Online Consumer Protection: Theories of Human Relativism (Premier Reference Source)

Online Consumer Protection:

Theories of Human Relativism Kuanchin Chen Western Michigan University, USA Adam Fadlalla Cleveland State University, USA

InformatIon scIence reference Hershey • New York

Director of Editorial Content: Senior Managing Editor: Managing Editor: Managing Development Editor: Assistant Managing Editor: Typesetter: Editorial Assistant: Copy Editor Cover Design: Printed at:

Kristin Klinger Jennifer Neidig Jamie Snavely Kristin M. Roth Carole Coulson Chris Hrobak Rebecca Beistline Joy Langel Lisa Tosheff Yurchak Printing Inc.

Published in the United States of America by Information Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global) 701 E. Chocolate Avenue, Suite 200 Hershey PA 17033 Tel: 717-533-8845 Fax: 717-533-8661 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: http://www.igi-global.com and in the United Kingdom by Information Science Reference (an imprint of IGI Global) 3 Henrietta Street Covent Garden London WC2E 8LU Tel: 44 20 7240 0856 Fax: 44 20 7379 0609 Web site: http://www.eurospanbookstore.com Copyright © 2009 by IGI Global. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or distributed in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission from the publisher. Product or company names used in this set are for identification purposes only. Inclusion of the names of the products or companies does not indicate a claim of ownership by IGI Global of the trademark or registered trademark. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Online consumer protection : theories of human relativism / Kuanchin Chen and Adam Fadlalla, editors. p. cm. Summary: "This book is designed to offer readers a comprehensive way to understand the nature of online threats, consumer concerns, and techniques for online privacy protection"--Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-60566-012-7 (hardcover) -- ISBN 978-1-60566-013-4 (ebook) 1. Consumer protection. 2. Ethical relativism. 3. Privacy, Right of. 4. Electronic commerce--Security measures. 5. Electronic information resources--Access control. 6. Disclosure of information. 7. Computer crimes. I. Chen, Kuanchin. II. Fadlalla, Adam. HC79.C63O54 2009 381.3'402854678--dc22 2008010313 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. All work contributed to this book set is original material. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors, but not necessarily of the publisher. If a library purchased a print copy of this publication, please go to http://www.igi-global.com/agreement for information on activating the library's complimentary electronic access to this publication.

Table of Contents

Preface ................................................................................................................................................ xiv Acknowledgment ................................................................................................................................ xx

Section I Background Chapter I Google: Technological Convenience vs. Technological Intrusion ......................................................... 1 Andrew Pauxtis, Quinnipiac University, USA Bruce White, Quinnipiac University, USA Chapter II A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation .............. 16 Angelena M. Secor, Western Michigan University, USA J. Michael Tarn, Western Michigan University, USA Chapter III Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats: A Manager’s Perspective............................................... 33 Hy Sockel, DIKW Management Group, USA Louis K. Falk, University of Texas at Brownsville, USA

Section II Frameworks and Models Chapter IV Practical Privacy Assessments .............................................................................................................. 57 Thejs Willem Jansen, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark Søren Peen, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark Christian Damsgaard Jensen, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark

Chapter V Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions .............................................................................................. 85 Leszek Lilien, Western Michigan University, USA Bharat Bhargava, Purdue University, USA Chapter VI Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia ...................................................... 123 Huong Ha, Monash University, Australia Ken Coghill, Monash University, Australia Elizabeth Ann Maharaj, Monash University, Australia Chapter VII Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior: Towards an Integrative Model ........................ 151 Anil Gurung, Neumann College, USA Anurag Jain, Salem State College, USA

Section III Empirical Assessments Chapter VIII Privacy Control and Assurance: Does Gender Influence Online Information Exchange? ................ 165 Alan Rea, Western Michigan University, USA Kuanchin Chen, Western Michigan University, USA Chapter IX A Profile of the Demographics, Psychological Predispositions, and Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders ...................................................................................... 190 Bernadette H. Schell, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada Thomas J. Holt, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA Chapter X Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet: Revisiting Privacy Toward a Situational Paradigm ............................................................................................................................................ 214 Chiung-wen (Julia) Hsu, National Cheng Chi University, Taiwan

Section IV Consumer Privacy in Business Chapter XI Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems ............................................... 240 Tom S. Chan, Southern New Hampshire University, USA J. Stephanie Collins, Southern New Hampshire University, USA Shahriar Movafaghi, Southern New Hampshire University, USA

Chapter XII Online Privacy and Marketing: Current Issues for Consumers and Marketers ................................. 256 Betty J. Parker, Western Michigan University, USA Chapter XIII An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies ................................................. 269 Suhong Li, Bryant University, USA Chen Zhang, Bryant University, USA Chapter XIV Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in The United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan ....... 284 Andy Chiou, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan Jeng-chung V. Chen, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan Craig Bisset, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan

Section V Policies, Techniques, and Laws for Protection Chapter XV Biometric Controls and Privacy ......................................................................................................... 300 Sean Lancaster, Miami University, USA David C. Yen, Miami University, USA Chapter XVI Government Stewardship of Online Information: FOIA Requirements and Other Considerations .................................................................................................................................... 310 G. Scott Erickson, Ithaca College, USA Chapter XVII The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe ............................................... 326 Charles O’Mahony, Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Ireland Philip Flaherty, Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Ireland Chapter XVIII Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States ......................................... 347 Karin Mika, Cleveland State University, USA Barbara J. Tyler, Cleveland State University, USA

Chapter XIX Online Privacy Protection in Japan: The Current Status and Practices ............................................. 370 J. Michael Tarn, Western Michigan University, USA Naoki Hamamoto, Western Michigan University, USA

Compilation of References .............................................................................................................. 388 About the Contributors ................................................................................................................... 429 Index ................................................................................................................................................ 436

Detailed Table of Contents

Preface ................................................................................................................................................ xiv Acknowledgment ................................................................................................................................ xx

Section I Background Chapter I Google: Technological Convenience vs. Technological Intrusion ......................................................... 1 Andrew Pauxtis, Quinnipiac University, USA Bruce White, Quinnipiac University, USA Search engines can log and stamp each search made by end-users and use that collected data for an assortment of business advantages. In a world where technology gives users many conveniences, one must weigh the benefits of those conveniences against the potential intrusions of personal privacy. With Google’s eyes on moving into radio, television, print, and other technologies, one must back up and examine the potential privacy risks associated with the technological conveniences being provided by Google. This chapter gives an overview of Google’s services and how they are related to personal privacy online Chapter II A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation .............. 16 Angelena M. Secor, Western Michigan University, USA J. Michael Tarn, Western Michigan University, USA This chapter offers a review of online privacy issues, particularly in the areas of consumer online privacy legislation and litigation, relationship among the privacy issues, legal protections, and risks for privacy violations. A survey into the privacy literature provides insights on privacy protection and privacy concern. Results show a need for a stronger intervention by the government and the business community. Consumers’ privacy awareness is also the key to a successful protection online. This chapter is concluded with a call for consumer privacy education to promote privacy awareness, and for government and businesses’ timely responses to privacy violations.

Chapter III Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats: A Manager’s Perspective............................................... 33 Hy Sockel, DIKW Management Group, USA Louis K. Falk, University of Texas at Brownsville, USA Victims of online threats are not necessarily just individual consumers anymore. Management must be ready to neutralize, reduce, and prevent these threats if the organization is going to maintain its viability in today’s business environment. This chapter is designed to give managers an overview needed to have a working knowledge of online privacy, vulnerabilities, and threats. The chapter also highlights techniques that are commonly used to impede attacks and protect the privacy of the organization, its customers, and employees.

Section II Frameworks and Models Chapter IV Practical Privacy Assessments .............................................................................................................. 57 Thejs Willem Jansen, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark Søren Peen, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark Christian Damsgaard Jensen, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark This chapter proposes a privacy assessment model called the operational privacy assessment model that includes organizational, operational, and technical factors for the protection of personal data stored in an IT system. The factors can be evaluated in a simple scale so that not only the resulting graphical depiction can be easily created for an IT system, but graphical comparisons across multiple IT systems are also possible. Examples of factors presented in a Kiviat graph are also presented. This assessment tool may be used to standardize privacy assessment criteria, making it less painful for the management to assess privacy risks on their systems Chapter V Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions .............................................................................................. 85 Leszek Lilien, Western Michigan University, USA Bharat Bhargava, Purdue University, USA Trust is an essential ingredient for a successful interaction or collaboration among different parties. Trust is also built upon the belief that the privacy of the involved parties is protected before, during, and after the interaction. This chapter presents different trust models, the interplay between trust and privacy, and the metrics for these two related concepts. In particular, it shows how one’s degree of privacy can be traded for a gain in the level of trust perceived by the interaction partner. The idea and mechanisms of trading privacy for trust are also explored.

Chapter VI Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia ...................................................... 123 Huong Ha, Monash University, Australia Ken Coghill, Monash University, Australia Elizabeth Ann Maharaj, Monash University, Australia Australia uses regulation/legislation, guidelines, codes of practice, and activities of consumer associations and the private sector to enhance protection of consumers’ privacy. This chapter is designed to report Australian’s experience in privacy protection. In particular, the four main areas of protection outlined above are analyzed to draw implications. Recommendations include areas in coverage of legislation, uniformity of regulations, relationships among guidelines and legislation, and consumer awareness Chapter VII Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior: Towards an Integrative Model ........................ 151 Anil Gurung, Neumann College, USA Anurag Jain, Salem State College, USA This chapter proposes an integrated framework to model online privacy protection behavior. Factors in this framework are drawn from recent Internet and online privacy studies. Although many possible factors can be included in the framework, the authors took a very conservative approach to include in their framework only those factors that were formally studied in the academic literature. This framework serves as the basis for future extensions or empirical assessments

Section III Empirical Assessments Chapter VIII Privacy Control and Assurance: Does Gender Influence Online Information Exchange? ................ 165 Alan Rea, Western Michigan University, USA Kuanchin Chen, Western Michigan University, USA One main reason that online users are wary of providing personal information is because they lack trust in e-businesses’ personal information policies and practices. As a result, they exercise several forms of privacy control as a way to protect their personal data online. This chapter presents survey results of how the two genders differ in their ways to control their private data on the Internet. Findings provide guidelines for e-businesses to adjust their privacy policies and practices to increase information and transactional exchanges

Chapter IX A Profile of the Demographics, Psychological Predispositions, and Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders ...................................................................................... 190 Bernadette H. Schell, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada Thomas J. Holt, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA Research about hackers is scarce, but the impact on privacy that hackers bring to the Internet world should not be underestimated. This chapter looks at the demographics, psychological predispositions, and social/ behavioral patterns of computer hacker to better understand the harms that can be caused. Results show that online breaches and online concerns regarding privacy, security, and trust will require much more complex solutions than currently exist. Teams of experts in fields such as psychology, criminology, law, and information technology security need to collaborate to bring about more effective solutions for the virtual world. Chapter X Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet: Revisiting Privacy Toward a Situational Paradigm ............................................................................................................................................ 214 Chiung-wen (Julia) Hsu, National Cheng Chi University, Taiwan This chapter introduces a situational paradigm to study online privacy. Online privacy concerns and practices are examined within two contexts: technology platforms and users’ motivations. Results show a distinctive “staging” phenomenon under the theory of uses and gratifications, and a priori theoretical framework. “Diffused audience” was concerned less about privacy but they did not disclose their personal information any more than the other groups. Users may act differently in diverse platforms or environments, implying that treating Internet users as a homogeneous group or considering them to act the same way across different environments is a problematic assumption.

Section IV Consumer Privacy in Business Chapter XI Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems ............................................... 240 Tom S. Chan, Southern New Hampshire University, USA J. Stephanie Collins, Southern New Hampshire University, USA Shahriar Movafaghi, Southern New Hampshire University, USA The business values of using the Internet for the delivery of soft media may be hampered when the owners risk losing control of their intellectual property. Any business that wishes to control access to and use of its intellectual property is a potential user of digital rights management (DRM) technologies. Managing, preserving, and distributing digital content through DRM is not without problems. This chapter offers a critical review of DRM and issues surrounding its use

Chapter XII Online Privacy and Marketing: Current Issues for Consumers and Marketers ................................. 256 Betty J. Parker, Western Michigan University, USA Certain marketing practices may sometimes cause privacy conflicts between businesses and consumers. This chapter offers insights into privacy concerns from today’s marketing practices on the Internet. Specifically, areas of focus include current privacy issues, the use of spyware and cookies, word-of-mouth marketing, online marketing to children, and the use of social networks. Related privacy practices, concerns, and recommendations are presented from the perspectives of Internet users, marketers, and government agencies. Chapter XIII An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies ................................................. 269 Suhong Li, Bryant University, USA Chen Zhang, Bryant University, USA This chapter examines the current status of online privacy policies of Fortune 100 companies. Results show that 94% of the surveyed companies have posted an online privacy policy and 82% collect personal information from consumers. Additionally, the majority of the companies only partially follow the four principles (notice, choice, access, and security) of fair information practices. Few organizations have obtained third-party privacy seals including TRUSTe, BBBOnline Privacy, and Safe Harbor Chapter XIV Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in The United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan ....... 284 Andy Chiou, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan Jeng-chung V. Chen, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan Craig Bisset, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan This chapter studies concerns of Internet privacy across multiple cultures. Students from several countries were recruited to participate in the focus group study in order to discover the differences of their privacy concerns. Collectivistic cultures appear to be less sensitive to the violation of personal privacy; while the individualistic cultures are found to be more proactive in privacy protection. Implications are provided.

Section V Policies, Techniques, and Laws for Protection Chapter XV Biometric Controls and Privacy ......................................................................................................... 300 Sean Lancaster, Miami University, USA David C. Yen, Miami University, USA

This chapter provides an overview of biometric controls to protect individual privacy. Although much of the discussion targets protection of physical privacy, some may also apply to online consumer privacy. Discussion is focused in four main areas, technological soundness, economic values, business applications, and legal/ethical concerns. Further insights are provided Chapter XVI Government Stewardship of Online Information: FOIA Requirements and Other Considerations .................................................................................................................................... 310 G. Scott Erickson, Ithaca College, USA This chapter focuses on the issues surrounding the federal Freedom of Information Act and associated state and local laws for their implications on personal privacy. Despite the good intentions of these laws to enable openness in government, confidential business information and private personal information may be vulnerable when data are in government hands. This chapter offers the readers a better understanding of the several trends regarding the statutes and their interpretations Chapter XVII The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe ............................................... 326 Charles O’Mahony, Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Ireland Philip Flaherty, Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Ireland This chapter discusses the legal framework and the law of the European Union (EU) for consumer and data protection. The creation of legal frameworks in Europe aims to secure the protection of consumers while simultaneously facilitating economic growth in the European Union. This chapter outlines the main sources of privacy protection law and critically analyzes the important provisions in these sources of law. Gaps and deficiencies in the legal structures for consumer and data protection are also discussed Chapter XVIII Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States ......................................... 347 Karin Mika, Cleveland State University, USA Barbara J. Tyler, Cleveland State University, USA This chapter provides an overview of law relating to Internet medical practice, data protection, and consumer information privacy. It provides a comprehensive overview of federal (HIPAA) and state privacy laws. Readers are given advice to the legal and data protection problems consumers will encounter in purchasing medical and health services on the Internet. Furthermore, actual case studies and expert advice are provided to offer a safer online experience. The authors also advocate that the United States must enact more federal protection for the consumer in order to deter privacy violations and punish criminal, negligent, and willful violations of personal consumer privacy.

Chapter XIX Online Privacy Protection in Japan: The Current Status and Practices ............................................. 370 J. Michael Tarn, Western Michigan University, USA Naoki Hamamoto, Western Michigan University, USA This chapter reports the current status and practices of online privacy protection in Japan. It offers a perspective of an eastern culture regarding the concept of privacy, its current practices, and how it is protected. Following the discussion of the Japanese privacy law called Act on the Protection of Personal Information, Japan’s privacy protection mechanisms to support and implement the new act are examined. The authors also offer a four-stage privacy protection solution model as well as two case studies to show readers the problems, dilemmas, and solutions for privacy protection from Japan’s experience.

Compilation of References .............................................................................................................. 388 About the Contributors ................................................................................................................... 429 Index ................................................................................................................................................ 436

xiv

Preface

Privacy, the right to be left alone, is a fundamental human right. Risks of the contrary—privacy invasion—have increased in significant proportions in a world increasingly turning online. In today’s networked world, a fast growing number of users are hopping on and off the Internet superhighways, multiple times everyday—more so than they hop on and off physical expressways. Internet users are also doing more diverse activities online, including browsing, shopping, communicating, chatting, gaming, and even working. With so much online presence, users find themselves, in many situations, divulging information that they would otherwise may not due to privacy concerns. Users may even be wary of getting online because of fear of possible privacy invasion from the many preying eyes on the Internet. The issue is not whether privacy should be protected or not, rather the issue is how it should be protected in the vast online world where information can be intercepted, stolen, quickly transported, shared unknowingly to the user, or even sold for profit. Compared to an offline environment, the Internet enables collection of more information from users cost effectively, sometimes even without their consent. Thus, the Internet poses greater privacy threat for users as their personal information is transmitted over the Internet if an organization does not have a good security mechanism in place. Furthermore, the connectivity of the Internet allows capturing, building, and linking of electronic profiles and behaviors of users. Online privacy is a multidimensional concept and thus has been addressed in research from a multiplicity of angles, albeit not equally thoroughly. Much research effort has focused on addressing privacy as a technological factor and hence proposed technical solutions to privacy protection. Although this is an important dimension of online privacy, there are equally, if not more, important dimensions, such as context, culture, perceptions, and legislation. Such softer (non-technological) aspects of privacy cannot be understood by only looking at the technological aspects of privacy. The human dimension is as complex and as important for getting a more complete understanding of privacy. At a micro level, not only that individuals have varying requirements for privacy, but the same individual’s requirements may change over time or between situational contexts. Response to privacy invasion may be very different between individuals and situational contexts. There may also be a gap between what individuals’ desired and actual behaviors in relation to their privacy concerns. Individuals may have more stringent privacy requirements than what their actual online practice reflects. Online privacy researchers offered less coverage to these human factors, but understanding these factors, and many more, is key to gaining a better understanding of online privacy—hence the human relativism. At a macro level, privacy requirements and response to privacy invasion may vary across cultures, societies, and business situations. Organizational practices of privacy policies and responses to incidents of privacy invasion affect people’s perceptions on the current state of privacy, and consequently affect their trust in the organization. People are generally concerned about how personal information is collected, used, and distributed beyond its original purpose and beyond the parties originally involved. Breaches to how their information is collected, used, or shared and response to such breaches directly

xv

impact their privacy concerns and their trust. There is still not sufficient empirical evidence to answer many privacy questions at these macro levels, and many human aspects of online privacy in some social and cultural settings have not yet received enough research attention. Consequently, our understanding of the relationships between online privacy and dimensions such as culture, user characteristics, business context, technology use, and education is still limited. The world is increasingly turning online and there will be no reversal of this trend. To protect the privacy of online users and to consequently achieve the full potential of transacting in an online world, the issue of online privacy needs to be understood from multiple facets. The challenge is to minimize constraints of online dealings without compromising users’ privacy. Such delicate balancing cannot be achieved without a broad understanding of online privacy. This book is an attempt to provide such understanding by offering a comprehensive and balanced coverage of the various dimensions of online privacy. Many previously published books either treat privacy as a sub-topic under a broader topic of end-user computing or information systems or focus primarily on technical issues or managerial strategies. Many others focus on end users and offer only introductory material or general guidelines to enhance personal online security and privacy. While this treatment of these important topics of privacy is appropriate for their intended use and audience, it does not allow for a broader and a more extensive examination of online privacy and how it guides practice. Furthermore, many gaps in privacy, threats, and fraud theories have not yet been filled. The most prominent such gaps include linking privacy theories to other established theories and frameworks in information technology or related disciplines. For example, culture, social, and behavioral issues in privacy have not received enough attention. Research on human aspects as well as empirical assessments of privacy issues are lacking. Research on linking privacy considerations to business practices, educational curriculum development/assessment, and legislative impacts are also scarce. Many studies have focused on technological advancements, such as security protection and cryptography to offer technical tools for privacy protection and for assessing risks of privacy invasion. Although such focus is a must to protect users from these risks, technology is not equivalent to protection. For a protection scheme to work well, both technical and human aspects have to work in harmony. A major goal of this book is to provide a view of privacy that integrates the technical, human, cultural, and legal aspects of online privacy protection as well as risks and threats to privacy invasion. The book aims for (a) promoting research and practice in various areas of online privacy, threats assessment, and privacy invasion prevention, (b) offering a better understanding on human issues in these areas, and (c) furthering the development of online privacy education and legislation. The book goes beyond introductory coverage and includes contemporary research on the various dimensions of online privacy. It aims to be a reference for professionals, academics, researchers, and practitioners interested in online privacy protection, threats, and prevention mechanisms. The book is the result of research efforts from content experts, and thus it is an essential reference for graduate courses and professional seminars. There are 19 great chapters in the book, grouped into five sections: (1) background, (2) frameworks and models, (3) empirical assessments, (4) consumer privacy in business, and (5) policies, techniques, and laws for protection. The background section provides an overview of privacy for those who prefer a short introduction to the subject. In Chapter I, Pauxtis and White point out the serious privacy implications of online searches. Search engines can log and stamp each search made by end-users and use that collected data for an assortment of business advantages. In a world where technology gives users many conveniences, one must weigh the benefits of those conveniences against the potential intrusions of personal privacy. Nevertheless, end-users will always use search engines. They will always “Google” something on their

xvi

mind. The authors conclude that while the vast majority of casual Internet users either do not know Google’s data collection policies, or simply do not care, at the end of the day it comes down to the simple fact that we as a society must put our trust into the technological innovations that have become commonplace conveniences. In Chapter II, Angelina and Tarn brought to the forefront the importance of legal protection and privacy awareness and presented a taxonomic view to explore the relationship of the issues, legal protections, and the remedies and risks for not complying with the legal requirements. The authors used two survey studies to reinforce the vital need for a stronger role by the government and business community as well as the privacy awareness from online consumers themselves. The chapter is concluded with a vital call for consumer privacy education and awareness, government and legislators’ attention, and timely responses with legislation that protects consumers against those who would misuse the technology. In Chapter III, Sockel and Falk highlighted the gravity of vulnerabilities to privacy in that it is not uncommon for employees to work offsite, at home, or out of a hotel room, often using less than secure Internet connections—dial-up, cable, Internet cafés, libraries, and wireless. The chapter highlights the relationship between vulnerability, threats, and action in what the authors termed “risk triangle.” It delves into techniques that are commonly used to thwart attacks and protect individuals’ privacy, and discussed how in the age of unrest and terrorism, privacy has grown even more important, as freedoms are compromised for security. The chapter provides an overview of the various vulnerabilities, threats, and actions to ameliorate them. Section II consists of four chapters that offer frameworks or models to study various privacy issues. In Chapter IV, Jansen, Peen, and Jensen turn the attention to the claim that “Most of the current work has focused on technical solutions to anonymous communications and pseudonymous interactions, but, in reality, the majority of privacy violations involve careless management of government IT-systems, inadequate procedures or insecure data storage.” The authors introduced a privacy assessment model, called the Operational Privacy Assessment Model that includes organizational, operational, and technical factors. The factors can be evaluated in a simple scale so that not only the resulting graphical depiction can be easily created for an IT system, but graphical comparisons across multiple IT systems are also possible. Although their method has been developed in the context of government IT-systems in Europe, they believe that it may also apply to other government systems, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and large private companies. In Chapter V, Lilien and Bhargava underline the strong relationship between privacy and trust. The authors contend that the role of trust and privacy is as fundamental in computing environments as it is in social systems. The chapter presents this role in online interactions, emphasizing the close relationship between trust and privacy, and shows how one’s degree of privacy can be traded for a gain in the level of trust perceived by one’s interaction partner. The chapter explores in detail the mechanisms of this core theme of trading privacy for trust. It also presents different trust models, the interplay between trust and privacy, and the metrics for these two related concepts. In Chapter VI, Ha, Coghill, and Maharaj offer an Australian perspective on measures to protect econsumers’ privacy, the current state of e-consumer privacy protection, and discuss policy implications for the protection of e-consumers’ privacy. The authors suggest that although privacy protection measures in the form of legislation, guidelines, and codes of practice are available, their effectiveness is limited in alleviating consumers’ privacy and security concerns. The authors contend that protection of consumers’ personal information also depends on how e-retailers exercise their corporate social responsibility to provide protection to e-consumers. In Chapter VII, Gurung and Jain review the existing literature and analyze the existing online privacy theories, frameworks, and models to understand the variables that are used in the context of online

xvii

privacy protection. The authors developed an integrative framework to encapsulate the antecedents to online privacy protection behavior. Section III includes research studies that report empirical findings on various privacy topics. One main reason that online users are wary of providing personal information is because they lack trust in e-businesses’ personal information policies and practices. As a result, they exercise several forms of privacy control as a way to protect their personal data online. In Chapter VIII, Rea and Chen report survey results of how the two genders differ in their ways to control their private data on the Internet. Findings provide guidelines for e-businesses to adjust their privacy policies and practices to increase information and transactional exchanges. Discussion on privacy is incomplete without a glimpse into hackers and crackers—the elite corps of computer designers and programmers, according to Schell and Holt in Chapter IX. Schell and Holt argue that it is vital that researchers understand the psychological and behavioral composition of network attackers and the social dynamics that they operate within. This understanding can improve our knowledge of cyber intruders and aid in the development of effective techniques and “best practices” to stop them in their tracks. Such techniques can minimize damage to consumer confidence, privacy, and security in e-commerce Web sites and general information-sharing within and across organizations. The authors discuss known demographic and behavioral profiles of hackers and crackers, psychological myths, and truths about those in the computer underground, and how present strategies for dealing with online privacy, security, and trust issues need to be improved. In Chapter X, Hsu adds a perspective from communications to the ongoing debate on online privacy. She examines why online privacy researchers failed to explain why users asserting to have higher privacy concerns still disclose sensitive information. The author argues that this is due to ignoring the social context (what the author terms situational paradigm) in the research on online privacy. The author tries to offer more support for the argument of the situational paradigm from the newly-emerging phenomenon of online photo album Web sites in Taiwan. Section IV focuses on consumer privacy in business and consists of four chapters. In Chapter XI, Chan, Collins, and Movafaghi tackle the issue of online consumer privacy and digital rights management (DRM) systems of protecting digitally stored content. This protection may be accomplished through different strategies or combinations of strategies including: identifying authorized users, identifying genuine content, verifying proof of ownership and purchase, uniquely identifying each copy of the content, preventing content copying, tracking content usage and distribution, and hiding content from unauthorized users. The authors argue that DRM systems may change the business model from a traditional buy-and-own to a pay-per-use, but caution that this may pose great risks to consumers and society as DRM technologies may weaken the rights to privacy, fair use, and threaten the freedom of expression. The chapter discusses the conflict between the rights of content owners and the privacy rights of content users, and explores several DRM techniques and how their use could affect consumer privacy. In Chapter XII, Parker offers views on online privacy from a marketing perspective in the context of consumer marketing. The chapter provides insights into the ways that online privacy has become a balancing act in which the needs of businesses are oftentimes balanced against the needs of consumers. A number of privacy issues that affect the marketing of products and services are presented, along with recommended best practices. The issues discussed include: (1) consumer, marketer, and government perspectives on data collection, ownership and dissemination; (2) online advertising and the use of cookies and spyware; (3) word-of-mouth marketing and the use of blogs, sponsored chat, and bulletin boards; (4) marketing online to children; and (5) privacy issues in social networks and online communities. The chapter represents one of the first analyses of online marketing practices and their associated privacy issues.

xviii

In Chapter XIII, Li and Zhang offer analysis of online privacy policies of Fortune 100 companies within the context of the four principles (notice, choice, access, and security) of fair information practices. The authors found that 94% of the surveyed companies posted an online privacy policy and 82% of them collect personal information from consumers. The majority of the companies only partially follow the four principles of fair information practices. In particular, organizations fall short in security requirements—only 19% mention that they have taken steps to provide security for information both during transmission and after their sites have received the information. The authors conclude that a well designed privacy policy by itself is not adequate to guarantee privacy protection, effective implementation is as important. Consumer education and awareness are also essential for privacy protection. In Chapter XIV, Chiou, Chen, and Bisset focus attention on the important question of online privacy across cultures by analyzing cultural perceptions on privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan. The authors point out clear differences between how personal information is viewed in the United States and Asia. For example, an American in Taiwan might feel suspicious if asked to provide his passport number by a community Web site, while a Taiwanese in the United States might be puzzled and alienated by the fierceness at which people guard their private lives. The authors argue that such differences should be considered in cross-culture online privacy research and legislation. Furthermore, due to the various cultural differences and backgrounds that form privacy perceptions, great care and sensitivity should be taken into consideration when conducting privacy studies across cultures. Section IV deals with policies, techniques, and laws for privacy protection. In Chapter XV, Lancaster and Yen focus on the important linkage between biometric controls and privacy. Biometrics is an application of technology to authenticate users’ identities through the measurement of physiological or behavioral patterns, and thus do not suffer from the shortcoming of external authentication techniques that rely on items that can be lost, forgotten, stolen, or duplicated. The authors conclude that, with adequate communication, users are likely to appreciate systems that allow them the ease of use and convenience that biometric systems offer, and hence their use will continue to grow in the future. In Chapter XVI, Erickson discusses the important issue of the tension between openness in government and personal privacy. The trend in the federal legislature has been to continually strengthen the FOIA and openness by reaffirming a presumption that government records should be released unless there is a compelling reason not to. Alternatively, the trend in agency practice and the courts has been toward more privacy, allowing use of certain exemptions in the FOIA to deny records to individuals or organizations seeking them. This balance has been clarified somewhat by legislation on electronic records, agency practice, and a number of court cases suggesting agencies can limit releases to central purpose activities and records not including individually identifiable information. The author also considers the status and vulnerability of confidential business information passed on to governments and the status and vulnerability of government databases concerning individual citizens. The main conclusion of the chapter is that matters remain in flux in the legal aspects of privacy, and regardless of which way the balance tips (openness vs. privacy), more certainty will help government, organizations, and individuals better plan how and when to share their own information resources. In Chapter XVII, O’Mahony and Flaherty discuss the legal framework for consumer and data protection in Europe which seeks to secure the protection of consumers while simultaneously facilitating economic growth in the European Union. The chapter outlines the main sources of law which protect consumers and their privacy, the important provisions in these sources of law and critically analyzes them, and points the gaps and deficiencies in the consumer and data protection legal structures. The authors argue that the creation of these legal rights and legal protections will only stem the misuse of personal data if people know about the law and their rights and know how to access legal protections. Thus, more needs to be done to ensure that citizens of the European Union are equipped with the nec-

xix

essary knowledge to ensure that their personal data is treated with respect and in accordance with law. The authors conclude that more focus needs to be put on ensuring greater compliance with the law, particularly from businesses who have benefited from the free flow of data. In Chapter XVIII, Mika and Tyler provide an overview of the law relating to cybermedicine and telemedicine in terms of data protection and other legal complications related to licensing and a conflict of state laws. The authors examine the laws applicable to Web sites where medical diagnosis or the purchase of medical services (including prescriptions) is available. They discuss how the new methodology of acquiring medical care is at odds with traditional notions of state regulation and how current laws, both federal and state, leave many gaps related to any consumer protections or potential causes of action when privacy is compromised. The authors posit some expert advice for consumers regarding using websites for medical purposes as well as protecting their own privacy. Lastly, the authors advocate a federal law more punitive that HIPAA; one that regulates and protects patient information, medical transactions, and interactions on the Internet and deters violations of patient privacy by mandating significant fines and imprisonment for negligent or criminal and willful violations of that privacy. In Chapter XIX, Tarn and Hamamoto emphasized trans-border differences in the concepts of privacy; namely, that the concept of privacy in Japan is different than that in the western countries. They explained how, after more and more privacy-related problems were revealed by the media, consumers began to pay attention to the protection of their private information, and, in response, the Japanese government enacted legislation to protect consumers and regulate companies’ business activities associated with customers’ private information. This exposed many weaknesses in companies’ privacy protection systems and revealed unethical uses of private data. We cannot claim perfection of this book on online privacy, a broad and multidimensional concept. Nevertheless, we believe it fills a major gap in the coverage of privacy by providing a comprehensive treatment of the topic. Thus, it provides a single integrated source of information on a multitude of privacy dimensions including technical, human, cultural, personal, and legal aspects. Research on privacy is still evolving and a varied and broad coverage as presented in this book is a valuable reference for researchers, practitioners, professionals, and students.

xx

Acknowledgment

We are grateful to numerous individuals whose assistance and contributions to the development of this scholarly book either made this book possible or helped to make it better. First, we would like to thank all chapter reviewers for their invaluable comments, which helped ensure the intellectual value of this book. We would also like to express gratitude to our chapter authors for their excellent contributions to this book. Special thanks are due to the publishing team at IGI Global, in particular to our Managing Development Editor, Ms. Kristin Roth, who allowed her staff to provide invaluable support to keep the project on schedule and in high quality, and to Dr. Mehdi Khosrow-Pour whose vision motivated the development of this pioneering project. This project would not have been successful without Ross Miller, Deborah Yahnke, and Rebecca Beistline, who tirelessly offered their professional assistance during the development of this project. Finally, we would like to give our heart-felt thanks to Kuanchin’s wife, Jiajiun, and Adam’s family for their understanding and encouragement during the development of this book. Kuanchin Chen and Adam Fadlalla

Section I

Background



Chapter I

Google:

Technological Convenience vs. Technological Intrusion Andrew Pauxtis Quinnipiac University, USA Bruce White Quinnipiac University, USA

AbstrAct What began as simple homepages that listed favorite Web sites in the early 1990’s have grown into some of the most sophisticated, enormous collections of searchable, organized data in history. These Web sites are search engines—the golden gateways to the Internet—and they are used by virtually everyone. Search engines, particularly Google, log and stamp each and every search made by end-users and use that collected data for their own purposes. The data is used for an assortment of business advantages, some which the general population is not privy too, and most of which the casual end-user is typically unfamiliar with. In a world where technology gives users many conveniences, one must weigh the benefits of those conveniences against the potential intrusions of personal privacy. Google’s main stream of revenue is their content-targeted “AdWords” program. AdWords—while not a direct instance of personal privacy breach—marks a growing trend in invading personal space in order to deliver personalized content. Gmail, Google’s free Web-based e-mail service, marked a new evolution in these procedures, scanning personal e-mail messages to deliver targeted advertisements. Google has an appetite for data, and their hundreds of millions of users deliver that every week. With their eyes on moving into radio, television, print, establishing an Internet service provider, furthering yet the technology of AdWords, as well as creating and furthering technology in many other ventures, one must back up and examine the potential privacy and intrusion risks associated with the technological conveniences being provided.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Google

IntroductIon: the World of seArch engInes Now more then ever, the casual consumer is letting their guard down on the Internet because of the level of comfort gained over the past decade. The Internet has become a norm of society and a staple of culture. Many end-users accept the potential risks of unveiling their credit card number online, even at the most respected of retailers. While having a credit card number compromised could certainly cause a headache, the future of privacy on the Internet does not have much to do with those 16 magic digits. Instead, privacy, or lack thereof, on the Internet has to do with something all Internet users employ in their daily lives: the search engine. Privacy and general consumer protection on the Internet is no longer exclusively limited to the safeguarding of personal financial information such as credit card numbers and bank accounts. Other personal information is being given out each and every day simply by using any major search engine. Google, for instance, logs much of what their users search for and then use that information to their advantage. With hundreds of millions of logged searches each day, a search engine like Google can analyze everything from cultural and economic trends right on down to what a given user is thinking or feeling based on their search queries. This collection of information is a smoking stockpile of marketing data that can then be utilized to build or better render other personalized, content-targeted services. Search engines provide the enormous service of indexing billions of pages of data so that the end-user can mine for a given query. To end-users, this indexing and search service is the ultimate convenience put out by the major search engine companies. It allows us to locate documents, images, videos, and more among billions of Web pages in a matter of milliseconds. An Internet without search engines would be an unorganized, uncharted, unmeasured wilderness of Web pages.



Rather than having to shuffle through a floor full of crumpled up, torn notebook pages, search engines put everything into finely labeled, organized notebooks—an invaluable service no end-user would ever sacrifice. Web sites are typically archived, or indexed, using advanced Web crawling “bots” or “spiders” that run off of servers and seek out new Web pages or recently updated pages. A search engine’s business is built entirely on the practice of collecting data—as much of it as possible. Search engines began as simple, small listings of useful Web sites in the 1990’s. One decade later, these simple listings have turned into one the most phenomenal collections of organized data in history. Google, for instance, claims to have over 10 billion pages of content indexed in their search engine, with millions of more pages being added each day. It is because of the search engine’s easy access to requested information that they have become second-nature to Web users. People flock to search engines without thinking twice. Google has become a part of everyday society and a verb in modern linguistics. When someone needs to find something online, they simply “Google” it. End-users enter names, addresses, phone numbers, interests, health ailments, questions, fantasies, and virtually anything imaginable into search boxes. Every search is logged and saved. Every user has a search engine “fingerprint trail.” The data that search engines such as Google amount from logging search queries is astronomical, and the uses for such data are endless. The value alone for such precise data to be sold to advertisers is priceless. Imagine an advertiser who obtained the search data—in its entirety—that Google has. They could immediately reconfigure their marketing efforts with pinpoint precision. Google’s data reservoir is the Holy Bible of the marketing universe. All the same, one could call these piles of data some of the most dangerous weapons in the world: identifying, damming, incriminating search queries are logged by the

Google

millions each and every day. Nevertheless, endusers will always use search engines. End-users will always “Google” something on their mind. Search engines are quick, convenient, and always yield a precise or near-precise result. Who would want to give that up?

gAteWAys to the Internet Google is no longer just a search engine—it is a portal to the Internet. Over the past several years an architecture shift within the search engine world has been occurring. Google, Yahoo!, and an army of others, are providing much more than just search results. Items like free e-mail and Web site hosting have always been among the traditional extensions of a search engine, but in more recent years the bigger search engines have launched impressive additions to their communities. Google, for instance, has recently launched a suite of Web applications which rivals Microsoft Office, complete with word processing and spreadsheets, all right on your Web browser—pair that with Google Maps, Google Talk, Google Calendar, Google News, Google Checkout, Google Notebook, Google Groups, YouTube, Google Earth, and Google Desktop, and one could argue never having to leave the Google domain for all your Internet needs! After all, the bigger the audience they can attract—and provide a technological convenience or solution to—the better. Why, exactly, does Google go through the hassle of launching new services? It is simple: search engines have the ultimate goal of finding new ways to provide conveniences to the enduser. The Google services listed—along with the dozens of others provided by Google—are just that: conveniences. The more services Google has to attract and retain their viewers the better off they will be. Search engines live and die by the amount of traffic that goes through their massive networks each day. This traffic is their audience, to which advertisements can be displayed, much

like commercials on television. Positioned on the top and sides of each and every traditional search engine result page, or SERP, are blocks of advertisements which directly correlate to the end-user’s search query. On Google, these aforementioned blocks of advertisements are called “AdWords.” AdWords is one of the main support beams of the Google business infrastructure, and is the company’s main stream of revenue. It allows end-users, from individuals to companies to international organizations, to purchase advertising space on the SERP’s as well as other areas of Google’s massive advertising network. Prices for an advertising campaign are determined solely on who searches for what queries, and how frequently a given query is searched for. Google is not alone in this advertising architecture—Yahoo! runs their own program, “Yahoo! Search Marketing” and MSN runs “Adcenter.” Google AdWords, however, has set the bar for this type of pay-per-click (PPC) advertising, with Yahoo! and MSN usually following suit with any major changes that Google makes to their program. AdWords—while not a direct instance of personal privacy breach—marks a growing trend in invading personal space in order to deliver personalized content. One must also see things as Google does. This is their company. When an end-user enters one of Google’s many Web sites, we are in essence walking though the door of their store. Much like any responsible store owner may observe his or her patrons or inventory logs to see what sells and what does not, Google is ultimately doing the same, but on much larger scale. Google is free of charge, and if they are not earning money through some sort of subscription-based other e-commerce model, then displaying advertisements is the only sustainable—and sensible—way to go. Google CEO, Eric Schmidt, on what it takes to run and improve the advertisements on Google: More computers, basically, and better algorithms. And more information about you. The more per-



Google

sonal information you’re willing to give us—and you have to choose to give it to us—the more we can target. The standard example is: When you say “hot dog,” are you referring to the food, or is your dog hot? So the more personalized the information, the better the targeting. We also have done extensive engineering work with Google Analytics to understand why people click on ads. That way we can actually look at the purchase and go back and see what buyers did to get there. That is the holy grail in advertising, because advertisers don’t advertise just to advertise, they advertise to sell something. Google CEO Eric Schmidt. (Fred Vogelstein, Wired Magazine, 4/9/2007)

the fIne lIne betWeen prIvAcy And publIc domAIn While Google may certainly be well within its rights to collect some degree of data from their users, one needs to determine where public domain ends and personal privacy begins. In order for a degree of privacy to exist on the World Wide Web, one first must chart its boundaries. Definitions of “Internet privacy” come on many different levels and in many different flavors. Ali Salehnia, author of Ethical Issues of Information Systems (2002), defines Internet privacy as: “the seclusion and freedom from unauthorized intrusion.” Salehnia goes on to emphasize the word “unauthorized,” explaining that the casual end-user understands that his or her personal information is constantly being collected by data centers around the world to some degree. The point of “unauthorized intrusion” occurs as soon as the end-user is no longer aware that this data collection is happening. Unauthorized intrusion comes on several levels. On the highest level, an unauthorized intrusion of personal information will occur when the perpetrator directly accesses a computer, stealing as much or as little information as possible. This could be achieved in a variety of ways, from the perpetrator physically breaching personal data



by sitting down and simply using a computer, or by slipping onto a system due to a lack of network security or other vulnerabilities. But most privacy breaches are a lot more subtle than that, and occur much more than Internet users would like to think. Putting Salehnia’s concept in a real-world example, a user who enters their credit card on Amazon.com typically understands that they are giving that merchant quite a bit of information about themselves—much the same as if that user were to walk into a Macy’s and make a similar purchase. On the other end of the spectrum, a casual end-user who utilizes Google several times a day may come to find out three years later that every search they have ever made was logged, time-stamped, and potentially used to Google’s own business benefit. The latter, of course, is an illustration “unauthorized intrusion” on the Internet—and it is happening millions of times a day.

A brIef hIstory of contemporAry seArch engInes End users were not always as comfortable with the Internet as they are today. Shopping on Amazon. com, running a Google search, and online banking are second-nature to most Americans—but back in the 1990’s, they were not. In a 1992 Equifax study, 79% of Americans noted that they were concerned about their personal privacy on the Internet. Moreover, 55% of Americans felt that privacy and the security of personal information would get worse in the new millennium (Salehnia, 2002). “A March 1999 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) survey of 361 Web sites revealed that 92.8% of the sites were collecting at least one type of identifying information…” explains Salehnia. Examining this statement more closely, nine out of every ten Web sites not only detected but stored a visitor’s name, address, IP, or something else that

Google

is both unique and identifying. This was 7 years ago. Technology has become much more precise and invasive, under the rationalization that some of these intrusions are necessary for convenience and the advancement of technology. It was in the mid 1990’s when several of the world’s most well-known search engines began appearing online. Yahoo! was one of the first “big” search engines. Debuting in 1995, Yahoo! was the result of Stanford University students David Filo and Jerry Yang creating a simple homepage that listed their own favorite Web sites. Next to each URL, they included the site’s full name and a short description. As they began manually indexing more sites, Yahoo! blasted off. It gained a large fan base, which in turn led to major funding. Also making their debut in the mid 1990’s were Excite, Lycos, and AltaVista—all three of which are still around presently. In 1996, two other Stanford University graduate students, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, launched “BackRub.” It was a system that organized Web sites using a proprietary algorithm designed by Page and Brin. This algorithm measured how many Web sites link to a given Web site. The more “backlinks” equals a higher page quality; the higher the quality equals how high up on the SERP’s a given page appears. Page and Brin opened shop in a garage, turned “BackRub” into “Googol” several months later, and ultimately ended up with “Google” thanks to a misspelling on their first check from a venture capitalist. Google is presently one of the most viewed, utilized Web site portals on the Internet, and is growing in virtually every way every single day. It is the big brother of the World Wide Web, and any change it makes effects virtually any Web site in existence. Google grows by the day, but not only in terms of features and pages indexed. Google’s data reservoir from its user’s searches is one of the largest collections of data in history.

survIvAl of the fIttest Companies—and Web sites in general—need search engines to survive. Search engines cannot be ignored or avoided. Professional Web sites are constructed in such ways so that they are search engine optimized (SEO), thereby improving their chances of a timely and deep indexing by the popular search engines. Typical search engine optimization trends are defined by the major search engines. Google, for instance, has largely done away with scanning HTML Meta tags, which used to define Web site keywords and details right in the HTML code, in favor of scanning a given Web site for concise keywords, themes, design style, inbound and outbound links, even a visible privacy policy. In the age of information, when Google hiccups, every major Web developer hears it. Search engines bring targeted traffic, which in turn convert to sales, which creates a client base. Many Web sites would flounder in the darkness of cyberspace without search engines. Lawrence M. Hinman (2006), director of the Values Institute at the University of San Diego explains the philosophy of the search engine best: “Search engines have become, in effect, the gatekeepers of knowledge. If you don’t show up in Google, you don’t exist —indeed, if you don’t show up on the first page of Google, you hardly exist.” Because of the reliance on search engines—on both personal and business levels—Internet users will not ever stray away from using them. Alexa. com, one of the Web’s most respected traffic pattern analysis companies, reports that the average Internet user visits google.com seven times a day. According to Alexa, google.com receives 75-100 million hits a day, and that is not to mention any visits to their foreign mirrors or other services. Search engines are here to stay, and a level of vigilance must be taken as to just how big they become and how they utilize the sheer amounts of data they collect.



Google

WhAt’s the hArm? What is the harm is having Google log 150 million searches a day? In Elinor Mill’s CNET news article Google Balances Privacy, Reach (2005), she explains some of the extreme, but plausible, scenarios that could arise: “The fear, of course, is that hackers, zealous government investigators, or even a Google insider who falls short of the company’s ethics standards could abuse [this] information. Google, some worry, is amassing a tempting record of personal information, and the onus is on the Mountain View, California, company to keep that information under wraps.” Furthermore, there is no way a user can delete their data from Google’s records, nor is there any sort of clear explanation what the information could potentially be used for in the future. According to GoogleWatch, a non-profit organization that has as one of its goal the spreading of awareness of search engine privacy, there are several important main points in regards to the potential privacy exploits and other harm Google could wreak. The first point it brings up is Google’s mysterious 30 year cookie. Google places a cookie with an expiration date of January 17, 2038, 2:14:05 PM on the hard drive of any user that makes a search or visits a website containing Adsense advertisements (Google’s publisher network). The cookie contains a uniquely identifying serial number which can be used to correlate with other searches. In essence, it is another IP address—a second layer of identification Google can use to string together a user’s search queries or site viewing trends. The second breach of privacy, GoogleWatch argues, is the increasing reliance on IP addresses. As seen in the server log, Google includes a user’s IP address among other things in each stored search query. IP addresses reveal much more than a number, but a location as well. This is called “IP delivery based on geolocation” and can serve several purposes. For one, when a user searches Google, the engine knows your country,



state, and town. Advertisements are then tailored to these settings. Finally, GoogleWatch alludes to some of Google’s “side projects.” A notable project is the Google Toolbar which was released in March 2002, and continues to stir a great deal of controversy in regards to what Google captures and logs. Google captures a user’s IP and sends a cookie when their search engine is used or when the user lands on a page with Adsense ads. The Google Toolbar, on the other hand, logs, records, and beams back to Google every site a user visits, regardless of whether or not that site is in any way affiliated with Google. The Google Toolbar is just another example in modern conveniences. The convenience of the end-user having the most powerful search tool in the world in front of them at all times outweighs the possible privacy invasions it may pose. According to PC Magazine writer Cade Metz, “One of the advanced Toolbar features is a service called PageRank. With this activated, when you visit a Web site, a small PageRank icon in the toolbar gives you a rough indication of how popular the site is. If the site is particularly popular, you’ll see a long green line. If not, you’ll see a short green line. When this service is turned on, Google keeps a complete record of every Web site you visit.” The Google Toolbar comes set with the page-tracking feature set to on. The Google Toolbar privacy policy explains that “by knowing which web page you are viewing, the PageRank feature of Google Toolbar can show you Google’s ranking of that web page.” PageRank is part of the search algorithm patent developed by Sergey Brim and Larry Page that decides which pages appear higher than others in the SERP’s. Many users simply leave the feature turned on, while those in Web-production or similar fields choose to leave it on as a convenient resource. This resource allows Web developers and Web aficionados to view in live-time which Web sites have high PageRank, and which do not. It is an invaluable resource to those in the field. The price

Google

paid, of course, is privacy. As a side note, out of the billions of Web pages out there, not many rank as the coveted PageRank 10. A few examples are: Google.com, Adobe.com, NASA.gov, Real.com, MIT.edu, and NSF.gov (November 2006). Another clash of convenience and privacy within the Google realm comes under their Google Earth application. Google’s popular driving directions and maps Web site launched one of the company’s most controversial and privacy-threatening features to date in June of 2007. Dubbed “Street View,” it is a feature that allows end-users to view 360 degree panoramic and zoom-able images from street level. While the images are not live, they still captured people in action during a certain point in time. Some of the images are clear enough to easily identity individuals. Google was bombarded with complaints by privacy advocates, and has since instituted a policy of blacking out images of people upon request. The “Street View” feature took loss of privacy on the World Wide Web to a new, much more tangible level.

seArch engIne loggIng Google certainly was not the first search engine, but it is the one that has made the largest impact on Internet. Any change made by Google is felt not only by the Webmasters of the Internet, but by virtually the entire World Wide Web. Google’s reach is far and strong. Google engineers are constantly improving indexing technologies, to make search results more accurate. This in turn brings in more users, which brings more traffic, which equals more data to be collected and utilized. The more traffic, of course, also means a higher flow of clicks on Google’s advertising network. The more clicks, the higher the likelihood of Google selling a user their advertiser’ products via AdWords. Google tracks it all: every search, every query, right down to each and every letter and punctua-

tion mark. Google stores upwards of 150 million queries a day from all over the world. What exactly does this data look like? In its most primitive form, a search for “colleges” would yield the following piece of data in Google’s logs: ...89 - /Nov/00 0::9 - http://www.google. com/search?q=colleges - Firefox .0.; Windows XP SP – 08kd0e9

Clearly marked in this simple string of information is the end-user’s Internet protocol address, date and time of access, the URL complete with keywords (search?q=colleges), browser and browser version, operating system, and unique user-identifying cookie. Google generates and stores over one billion of these strings a week, which equals approximately fifty billion a year. If Google has not deleted one of these queries since they began logging, then one could estimate that they currently store upwards of half a trillion of these strings within their servers. Google provides a rather by-the-book explanation in regards to the reason why they log every search. In a CNET news article by Elinor Mills, she asked Google executive Nicole Wong the need for such a collection of data. The answer: “Google uses the log information to analyze traffic in order to prevent people from rigging search results, for blocking denial-of-service attacks and to improve search services.” This data is then stored on many servers, for an unknown period of time. According to David F. Carr of Baseline Magazine, Google is believed have anywhere from 150,000 to 450,000 servers around the world—with the majority being in the United States. Google’s privacy policy, which clearly outlines all of their data collection practices, is a mere two clicks away from any site on their entire network. Their search engine policy is divided up into nine clear, simple, easy to understand sections that span no more than two screens and clocks in at approximately 980 words. The policy makes it clear that no personally identifiable information



Google

is ever released without court warrant. However, anything typed into a search box is certainly “free-game” and very much becomes the property of Google. Google’s privacy policy clearly states that “Google may share information about you with advertisers, business partners, sponsors, and other third parties.” According to their own policy, Google shares statistical data regarding search trends with groups of advertisers and affiliates. With information like this, an advertiser could potentially know how to best optimize their own Web sites to increase traffic from Google or to appear significantly higher in the SERP’s. Obviously, the more traffic a given site receives the more probability of a conversion, sale or lead.

google knoWs It All Users type in what they need to find. Typically, this has much to do with what they are thinking, planning on doing, or is just something that is a part of their life. For instance, Google may log IP 123.45.67.89 as having 17 out of 20 searches on a given day having to do with high blood pressure and treatments. Clearly, Google now knows that IP 123.45.67.89 has a user who either has this ailment or is researching it on behalf of a friend or relative that does. Kevin Bankston, staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, one of the Internet’s biggest privacy advocates explains that data like this “is practically a printout of what’s going on in your brain: What you are thinking of buying, who you talk to, what you talk about.” Taking the example about high blood pressure one step further, Google now is able to potentially make money from user 123.45.67.89. First, Google will make money through their AdWords program. Google uses the search term to show advertisements that are as close to the search query as possible on the top and right sides of each SERP. While in no means is this a direct breach of privacy, the notion of scanning what an end-user enters to

8

deliver targeted content is beginning to evolve. Take Gmail, for instance. Gmail does not scan a search query—it scans private email messages. The process is automated, of course. That is to say there is not a Google employee sitting in a cubicle somewhere reading personal e-mails of Gmail users. Messages are scanned by a “bot.” Gmail took content-targeted, personalized ad delivery to a whole new level—a level which is simply the precursor for even more invasive advertising yet to come.

AdWords The value of the sheer amounts of data Google has amassed is priceless. It is data that can prove trends, display top ranking search queries, illustrate what region searches for what item more—the list is long, but not as long as the list of marketing groups or advertisers that would do anything to have such data. Should the data Google has amassed ever be released, the damage could be devastating. In the summer of 2006, AOL released the search queries of 528,000 of its users that used AOL’s generic search engine. While not nearly as detrimental as could have been if it was Google releasing data, the damage was already done. People were openly identified by their search terms—several even being convicted of crimes and sentenced to prison, as their search queries either supported evidence of their wrongdoings, or put the person in the spotlight and exposed them for committing a crime. Google uses much of their data to sculpt their pride and joy: AdWords. AdWords accounts for nearly $3.5 billion in yearly revenue, and is the main stream of Google’s income. Google utilizes their users’ search queries to aggressively and competitively price keywords. Advertisers then bid on these keywords for positions on the top and right side of the SERP’s. The more relevant the ad, the more likelihood a targeted searcher will click on it. While this is hardly an invasion

Google

of end-user privacy, the concept of AdWords utilizing search trends and scanning text given by the end-user is the precursor to more invasive and privacy-exploiting advertising practices.

gmAIl: AdWords evolve Gmail, Google’s free Web-based e-mail service, gives users who sign up their own Google e-mail and nearly three gigabytes (and counting) worth of storage. It has a lightning-fast interface, and some of the most advanced features ever seen in Web-based e-mail. But all of the flashy features are there for a reason: to once again drive people in. Once more, Google is freely handing out convenience for the small price of highly-personalized, content-targeted advertising. This time around, Google is scanning e-mail messages for certain keywords. For instance, if Google sees the word “ice cream” in a private e-mail, advertisements for ice cream will appear on the right side of their e-mail application. According to the Gmail privacy policy: “Google maintains and processes your Gmail account and its contents to provide the Gmail service to you and to improve our services. The Gmail service includes relevant advertising and related links based on the IP address, content of messages and other information related to your use of Gmail.” Elinor Mills of PC Magazine explains the other unsettling fact about Gmail—that Google takes its time to erase “trashed” messages from their servers. According to Mills, “Gmail users can delete messages, but the process isn’t intuitive. Deletion takes multiple steps to accomplish and it takes an undetermined period of time to delete the messages from all the Google servers that may have a copy of it…” Since Gmail launched in 2004, their automated scanning of private e-mail messages has stirred a bit of controversy. The GoogleWatch organization

argues the possibility of Gmail compiling a database of what email addresses use which keywords. What further complicates Gmail’s e-mail privacy is the fact that people who do not even subscribe to the Gmail service are having their e-mails scanned as well. If a Gmail user receives an email from a Comcast e-mail address, the person with the Comcast e-mail is having their message scanned for advertising opportunities by Google. The sender does not agree to Google’s invasive scanning, nor do they agree to have their e-mail infiltrated with ads pertaining to what they wrote in private. Gmail furthers the notion of invasive and targeted advertising, and merely builds some framework to the forms of advertising Google may be capable of in the future.

the future of the seArch engIne Industry Predicting the future trends of search engines is like predicting the future trends of any other industry: it’s purely hypothetical. Search engines are businesses. From time to time, like any other business, they drop hints of their future plans. Newspapers carry the latest headlines and trade journals chart their latest strategic business moves. The best we can do is to connect the dots using this information. Things such as acquisitions, however, may give the best glimpse into the future of a particular search engine. Take for instance, Google’s acquisition of YouTube. When Google acquired YouTube in October of 2006 for $1.65 billion, it sent ripples through the industry. Google, worth almost $170 billion in stock, swallowed YouTube whole. After all, in the grand scheme of things, YouTube is to media what Google is to information. Aside from being one the largest technology acquisitions ever, this showcased Google’s might. But above all,

9

Google

this acquisition dropped a hint of where Google is going. From Google’s Press Release: The acquisition combines one of the largest and fastest growing online video entertainment communities with Google’s expertise in organizing information and creating new models for advertising on the Internet. The combined companies will focus on providing a better, more comprehensive experience for users interested in uploading, watching and sharing videos, and will offer new opportunities for professional content owners to distribute their work to reach a vast new audience.(source: Google press release, October 9, 2006) One of the main motivations behind Google’s acquisition of YouTube is laid out right in their press release: “creating new models for advertising on the Internet.” The past few years have given birth to a new hybrid form of Internet-based advertising: viral marketing. Although viral marketing has been around for a decade, it was never a household term or fully-utilized marketing method until recently. Viral marketing encompasses any advertising effort that quickly spreads (typically over the Internet) through social networks and becomes the “talk of the town.” Viral videos and multimedia usually depict highly unique, comical, or risqué materials that have exceedingly unusual appeal to certain niche audiences. A successfully executed viral campaign costs nothing, but can create the same results as paid print or media advertising. What makes the opportunity of viral marketing so enticing to Google? With millions of hosted videos, and upwards of 70,000 new videos added per day, YouTube controls a large portion of the Web’s video-viewing audience. Combined with Google’s analytical and marketing arms, the Google/YouTube combo makes for a serious advertising podium. If a popular viral niche is found by Google, they can ride that niche by inserting

0

their own advertising campaign or that of one of their advertisers via AdWords. As viral videos spread like the plague through social networks, Google may be able to control what messages or advertisements those videos hold. Viral marketing aside, imagine for a moment just running a basic search for a particular car model. Instead of Google just returning the usual search results and accompanying AdWords, the search engine can now return streaming commercials targeted precisely for the make and model. Similar to how logs of how many searches a particular user makes, logs of which commercials play more often can also be made and utilized in a similar capacity. But above all, when an enduser watches one of these advertisements they have actively sought it out, rather than passively watching a random commercial on the TV. These Internet searchers are more targeted consumers than the passive coach-potato. Google acquiring YouTube is only one of the dozens of major ventures either recently completed or in the works by major search engines. Search engines are exploding their presence online as well as off-line. The future of search engines may be somewhat of a rather ironic thing. During the dot com bubble of 1990’s, businesses were doing everything possible to get online and to expand their presence there. Now, we see well-established online entities wanting to move off-line. For the online powerhouses, the off-line world is an uncharted wilderness of opportunity and new audiences. Take Google, who has paved the way for Internet advertising, now researching something foreign to them but commonplace to traditional marketers: radio and television. Google AdWords makes it extremely simple for a marketing novice to launch an advertising campaign online. Through their simple interface, all one must do is create an ad, choose a target audience, and pay using a credit card. Google uses its stockpile of end-user search query data to run the advertisements as precisely as possible, which in turn gives the advertiser sales or conversions.

Google

This degree of simplicity is something that never existed for marketers wishing to easily advertise on the TV or radio. To advertise on one of these mediums, one must traditionally go through the complicated steps of calling the cable company, creating an advertisement with a third-party media company, and working with another third-party marketer to properly target the ads. If Google can properly take the complexity out of running advertisements on the radio and television for the average person (especially in the age of Webcams and YouTube), it could potentially reshape the landscape of the TV and radio advertising industry. Why does the future of search engines—especially if their main focus is the off-line world— matter? Simply put: because the data they begin collecting off-line will be migrated into the online world. If search engines can one day record the shows we watch, the songs we listen to, the advertisements we actively (as opposed to passively) watch, there will be no stop in sight for the types of overly-invasive advertising methods used.

the future of google AdvertIsIng Today, the vast majority of our revenue is in text ads correlated with searches. In the last couple of years, we have developed what are called display ad products, including banner ads, video ads, click-to-call ads, and things like that. And I’ve also said that we are pursuing the possibility of television advertising. By that I mean traditional television advertising. And we bought dMarc Broadcasting to do radio ads. So let’s rank the probability of them being affected by targeted ads. There’s search: That’s 100 percent affected. What about radio? Is it possible to get a targeted ad right to your car right now? Not yet because we can’t target the individual receiver in your car. If two cars are next to each other,

the same radio station cannot have two different ads. However, if it’s at a regional level we can do it to the zip code level. So let’s call that partial targeting. Now, let’s look at television. Every one of the next generation of cable set-top boxes is going to get upgraded to an IP-addressable set-top box. So all of a sudden, that set-top box is a computer that we can talk to. We can’t tell whether it’s the daughter or the son or the husband or the wife in a household. All we know is we’re just talking to the television. But that’s pretty targetable because family buying patterns are pretty predictable, and you can see what programs they’re watching. And if you’re watching a YouTube video, we know you’re watching that video. My point of going through this little treatise is to say, if the total available market is ($600 billion to $800 billion, we won’t be able to target all $800 billion. It will not be a 100 percent perfectly targetable, straight into your brain, but we should be able to offer a material improvement (in response rates) to many businesses. Eric Schmidt, Google CEO (Fred Vogelstein, Wired Magazine, 4/9/2007). AdWords is not only migrating into other services in Google’s network, but it is evolving technologically as well. During the summer of 2006, Google launched two new services which further enhanced AdWords. First, they launched their own payment processor dubbed “Google Checkout.” Advertisers that elect to use Google Checkout have a small shopping cart icon next to their advertisement. Google Checkout brings AdWords even closer to “1-click-purchasing.” A Google search engine user that makes a purchase through Google Checkout surrenders their name, address, and credit card number to Google to make that purchase. While financial information is no doubt safe, Google now has the ability to connect a user’s searches to their buying account—if



Google

they elect too, of course. Also launched in the summer of 2006 was AdWords “Click-to-Talk.” With the click of button, a user may now talk to a salesman or representative on the other side of the advertisement. A second advancement in Google’s technology came with the 2005 launch of “Google Desktop,” and has only been seeing stable releases as of late 2006. Google Desktop took Google’s indexing of files one step further. Like the Google Toolbar, this service was a downloadable software package. Essentially, Google Desktop records a user’s e-mail, photos, music, and all other files so that they are easily searchable. Once more, Google drew in a fan-base for this product, as the search capability they engineered has been proven far more powerful than the built-in Windows search. Google Desktop lets Google have full-access to a computer and other computers that system may be networked with unless a particular setting in the program configuration is set off. In February of 2006, the Electronic Frontier Foundation distributed a press release expressing their outrage against Google’s latest venture. The release stated: “Google …announced a new “feature” of its Google Desktop software that greatly increases the risk to consumer privacy. If a consumer chooses to use it, the new “Search Across Computers” feature will store copies of the user’s Word documents, PDFs, spreadsheets, and other text-based documents on Google’s own servers, to enable searching from any one of the user’s computers.” The release of and technology driving Google Desktop is yet another precursor to the potential future plans Google has in store for data collection and targeted, intrusive advertising. As if Google’s reach was not far and impressive enough, the next stop for Google might be in the airwaves. Google has been known for some time to be toying with the idea of becoming a full-blown Internet service provider, in the form of a massive WiMax or Wi-Fi network. This would give them more leverage to further deliver targeted advert-



ing and appeal to an even larger base. The notion came about early in 2005, when the city of San Francisco sent out a request for information about a free city-wide high-speed wireless network. Google originally showed much interest. PC World Magazine describes Google’s pitch to San Francisco as a system that would deliver both free access, and the ability to “upgrade” to faster access. PC World writer Stephen Lawson explains that: “Google proposed to build an IEEE 802.11b/g Wi-Fi mesh network that delivers more than 1 megabit per second of capacity throughout the city. Anyone in the city could get access free at speeds as high as 300 kilobits per second, and Google or third parties could sell access at higher speeds, possibly as high as 3mbps.” By entering the world of Wi-Fi and WiMax, Google secures itself a new stream of potential income, while showing off its might to other media conglomerates. By having a free WiMax network, Google also can get into more homes and places that otherwise may not have ever been able to afford Internet. The keyword, of course, is “free.” Jeff Chester, writer for The Nation Magazine explains that “…the costs of operating the “free” service would be offset by Google’s plans to use the network to promote its interactive advertising services.” In other words, Google generates even more—free—traffic, that in turn uses its services, generates more data, and makes Google more money. Google is currently up against other big providers such as EarthLink, who also wants to develop a massive Wi-Fi network in San Francisco. Along with the potential implementation of city-wide wireless networks comes the ability for mobile phones to use these networks instead of the traditional cellular networks. Imagine, for a moment, placing a phone call with a friend some years down the road in the future. The mobile phone is any one of your typical brand name phones, but it is not one that belongs exclusively to any network like Verizon, Sprint, or Cingular. Instead, it uses voice over IP technology over a

Google

nationwide, ubiquitous Google Wi-Fi network. The phone call is going over the Internet, much the same as it can today. Presently, VoIP-based phones must be attached to a computer or used wirelessly within close proximity of an access point. The ability to freely roam does not exist. In the future, the phone in the mentioned example making this phone call may be getting used at the beach, in a restaurant, or in a department store—much like an ordinary cell phone. With high-speed WiMax and city-wide Wi-Fi on the horizon, cell phones that rely on VoIP have the potential to become a popular commodity. Now imagine for a moment a conversation taking place over this network. The conversation has to do with getting an ice-cream cake for a friend’s upcoming birthday. If the Wi-Fi network or VoIP network the phone is hooked into is run by Google, for instance, they may have similar technology to scan verbal words in the same fashion as typedwords on Gmail. As soon as “ice cream” is said in the conversation, a small tone beeps, lighting up the phone’s screen. On the screen is the nearest location for an ice cream parlor. If Google can scan what user’s type in their personal e-mails, why not move into audible conversations? By offering such telecommunications services for free (or significantly cheaper than the cellular alternative), Google again increases their customer base and exposes more users to their network of advertisements. The sacrifice of privacy for convenience will evolve with the technology.

In google We trust In a world where technology keeps creating conveniences, we must sometimes hit the brakes so we can make sure nothing is getting missed. Google is amassing one of the largest collections of search data in history. It remains to be seen whose hands this data will end up in, or how Google will use it to their maximum advantage. Services like AdWords and Gmail are slowly pushing the notions

of invasive and extremely targeted advertising, and future innovations are sure to bring even more invasive advertising. While the vast majority of casual Internet users either do not know Google’s data collection policies, or simply do not care, at the end of the day it comes down to the simple fact that we as a society must put our trust into the technological innovations that have become commonplace conveniences. We live in an interesting time. Wires are disappearing and high-speed Internet will be in the air all around us. Media conglomerates will go up against each other for control of the wireless Internet airwaves. Online giants will migrate off-line, and more off-line entities will move online. Privacy will always be a question, but smart surfing and awareness can help to reduce unwanted intrusion. Stephen O’Grady, the blogger behind the Tecosystems blog, was quoted by PC Magazine writer Cade Metz: “Google is nearing a crossroads in determining its future path. They can take the Microsoft fork—and face the same scrutiny Microsoft does, or they can learn what the folks from Redmond have: Trust is hard to earn, easy to lose and nearly impossible to win back.”

references Bankston, K. (2006, February 9). Press releases: February, 2006 | electronic frontier foundation. Retrieved November 11, 2006, from http://www. eff.org/news/archives/2006_02.php Brandt, D. (n.d.). Google as big brother. Retrieved November 11, 2006, from http://www.googlewatch.org Carr, D. (2006, July 6). How Google works. Retrieved November 17, 2006, from http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,1397,1985040,00.asp Chester, J. (2006, March 26). Google’s wi-fi privacy ploy. Retrieved November 14, 2006, from www.thenation.com/doc/20060410/chester



Google

Gage, D. (2005, March 7). Shadowcrew: Web mobs—timeline: Cybercrime. Retrieved November 1, 2006, from http://www.baselinemag. com/article2/0,1397,1774786,00.asp Garfinkel, S. (2002). Web security, privacy & commerce (2nd ed.). Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly & Associates. Google corporate information: Google milestones. (n.d.). Retrieved November 25, 2006, from http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html Google privacy center: Privacy policy. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2006, from http://www. google.com/privacy.html Google’s advertising footprint. (2007, June 14). Retrieved July 21, 2007, from http://www.eweek.com/ slideshow/0,1206,pg=0&s=26782&a=209549,00. asp Hinman, L. (2006, March 16). Why Google matters. Retrieved November 7, 2006, from http:// www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060316/ news_lz1e16hinman.html Internet usage world stats—Internet and population. (n.d.). Retrieved November 12, 2006, from http://www.Internetworldstats.com Lawson, S. (2006, Nov. 29). Google describes its wi-fi pitch. Retrieved December 1, 2006, from ://www.pcworld.com/article/id,123157-page,1/ article.html Metz, C. (2003, February 27). Is Google invading your privacy? Retrieved December 2, 2006, from http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,4149,904096,00.asp Mills, E. (2005, July 14). CNET.com. Retrieved November 7, 2006, from news.com.com/ Google+balances+privacy,+reach/2100-1032_3Report to Congressional Requestors. (2005). Information security emerging cybersecurity issues threaten federal information systems. Retrieved



December 12, 2006, from http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d05231.pdf Salehnia, A. (2002). Ethical issues of information systems. Hershey, PA: Idea Group Incorporated. Thompson, B. (2003, February 21). Is Google too powerful? Retrieved December 12, 2006, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2786761. stm Traffic details for Google.com. (n.d.). Retrieved November 11, 2006, from http://www.alexa. com/data/details/traffic_details?q=www.google. com&url=google.com Vogelstein, F. (2007, April 9). Text of wired’s interview with Google CEO Eric Schmidt. Retrieved July 15, 2007, from http://www. wired.com/techbiz/people/news/2007/04/mag_ schmidt_trans?curren

AddItIonAl reAdIng Battelle, J. (2005). The search: How google and its rivals rewrote the rules of business and transformed our culture. (Portfolio Hardcover ISBN 1-59184-088-0). Brin, S., Motwani, R., Page, L., & Winograd, T. (1999). The PageRank citation ranking: Bringing order to the Web. Retrieved from http://dbpubs. stanford.edu:8090/pub/showDoc.Fulltext?lang=e n&doc=1999-66&format=pdf&compression= Brin, S., & Page, L. (1998). The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search engine. Retrieved from http://dbpubs.stanford.edu:8090/ pub/1998-8 Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF): http://www. eff.org/issues/privacy Google PageRank Patent: http://patft.uspto.gov/ netacgi/nph-Parser?patentnumber=7058628

Google

Google Privacy Policy: http://www.google.com/ privacy.html

Search Engine Land Blog: http://searchengineland.com/

Google-Watch.org: http://www.google-watch. org

Search Engine Watch: http://searchenginewatch. com/

Malseed, M., & Vise, D. (2005). The Google story. Delacorte Press.

World Privacy Forum: Search Engine Tips: http:// www.worldprivacyforum.org/searchengineprivacytips.html





Chapter II

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation Angelena M. Secor Western Michigan University, USA J. Michael Tarn Western Michigan University, USA

AbstrAct In this chapter, consumer online privacy legal issues are identified and discussed. Followed by the literature review in consumer online privacy legislation and litigation, a relational model is presented to explore the relationship of the issues, legal protections, and the remedies and risks for not complying with the legal requirements. Two survey studies are used to reinforce the vital need for a stronger role by the government and business community as well as the privacy awareness from online consumers themselves. This chapter is concluded with a vital call for consumer privacy education and awareness and government and legislators’ attention and timely responses with legislation that protects consumers against those who would misuse the technology.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

IntroductIon Information privacy is defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves (Richards, 2006). As the Internet becomes more popular and more people are using it as a daily means of communication, information sharing, entertainment, and commerce, there are more opportunities for breaches of privacy and malicious intent attacks. There have been numerous bills introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate in recent years attempting to legislate protections for consumers regarding online privacy. Many of these attempts at legislation fail to become laws. This study aims to examine consumer online privacy legal issues, recent litigation topics, and the present active legislation. The topic will be of interest because some of the legislation does not provide more consumer protection but is instead taking away consumer privacy such as the USA Patriot Act and the Homeland Security Act enacted after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These laws give government more access to private information instead of providing consumers with increased protections. Some relevant privacy issues are underage consumer protections, health information privacy, lack of consumer control over information stored in databases, information security breaches, and identity theft. Recent litigation in the United States in the information security area has been over the lack of protection over the information gathered and stored by companies from consumers. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has initiated lawsuits against companies not providing the level of information protection they should. The FTC charged Petco with Web site security flaws that allowed a structured query language (SQL) injection attacker to gain consumer credit card information (FTC File No. 032 3221, 2004). The FTC also charged BJ’s Wholesale Club with failing to secure credit card magnetic stripe information appropriately (FTC v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc, 2005). There was also a class action suit filed on

behalf of Banknorth, N.A. (Visa and Mastercard) charging BJ’s Wholesale Club that “hackers” gained access to credit card information of cardholders and used the information fraudulently (FTC v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc, 2005). These instances are examples of companies failing to take proper measures to secure consumer information. The stolen personal information could have been gathered through an online interaction or a personal visit to the company. These examples show that it does not matter how a consumer interacts with a company, either on the Web, in person, or on the phone, the company stores the information they gather in databases on their systems and all of the information is a target. Current laws relating to consumer online privacy and protections are the U.S. Safe Web Act of 2006, the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Homeland Security Act: Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2001, the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, the Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act of 2000, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. The points pertaining to consumer privacy and protection will be included. Not all parts of the laws may be applicable to the subject of this chapter. In the following section, consumer online privacy legal issues are identified and discussed. Followed by the literature review in consumer online privacy legislation and litigation, the authors present a relational model to explore the relationship of the issues, legal protections, and the remedies and risks for not complying with the legal requirements. Two survey studies are used to reinforce the vital need for a stronger role by the government and business community as well as the privacy awareness from online consumers themselves. This chapter is concluded with a vital call for consumer privacy education and awareness and government and legislators’ attention and timely responses with legislation that protects consumers against those who would misuse the technology.



A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

Table 1. Research in consumer online privacy legal issues Year

Author

2006

Swartz, Nikki

Health Information Privacy

Issue

• “A survey of 1,117 hospitals and health systems that was conducted in January by the American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA) found that compliance with the three-year-old federal rules governing the privacy of patients’ medical records declined in the past year.” --“The survey results also suggest that patients are becoming more concerned about the privacy of their medical records. According to 30% of respondents, more patients are asking questions.”

Contribution

2006

Vasek, S.

Information Privacy

• “Sensitive, confidential information found in court and probate records, deeds, mortgages, death certificates, and other civic records is posted online” --“The information is available because the records containing it are, by law, public records filed according to provisions of state statutes and maintained at taxpayer expense. In many instances these records contain health information, social security and medicare numbers, birth dates, bank account information, prescription numbers, and information that could be used to steal individuals’ identity.”

2004

Milne et al.

Information Security Breaches

• “Directly hacking into company databases and stealing personal or financial data, such as consumer credit card or social security information”

2004

Milne et al.

Identity Theft

• Using “techniques such as IP spoofing and page jacking” • Using “e-mail and a bogus Web page to gain access to individuals’ credit card data and steal thousands of dollars from consumers” • “Cyber-thieves who were able to access tens of thousands of personal credit reports online”

2004

Milne et al.

Spyware, Malware, Viruses & SPAM

• “The installation of spyware distributed as viruses attached to e-mail makes it possible for third parties to view the content of a consumer’s hard drive and track movement through the Internet.” • “Cookies that allow others to track clickstream history”

2003

Bagner et al.

Underage Consumer Protection

• “The lack of super-vision while online exacerbates a child’s vulnerability to online violations of privacy. A 1998 survey revealed that 36% of parents admitted that they never supervised their child’s use of or access to the Internet.”

consumer onlIne prIvAcy legAl Issues Table 1 summaries the major research studies in consumer online privacy issues which contain the following six categories: information security breaches, information privacy breaches, identity theft and pre-texting, health information privacy, underage consumer protection, and spyware, malware, viruses, cookies, and SPAM. The following subsections discuss these six categories.

Information security breaches Information security breaches include events such as hacker or SQL injection attacks on business or institutional networks resulting in stolen personal, financial, or medical information, interceptions of

8

e-mail by unauthorized parties, and any breach of security not withstood by current security practices. Each of these security breaches can be disastrous for consumers. In the instance of the FTC v. Petco, an unauthorized person outside the company was able to successfully break into the Petco information system through their Web site using structured query language (SQL) attacks and gained access to customer personal and credit card information that was being stored on the system in an unencrypted format (FTC File No. 032 3221, 2004). This security breach resulted in the compromise of customer information in the custody of the business that was not reasonably and appropriately protected against external threats. Besides information being threatened by external entities, it can be threatened by internal

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

entities as well. Security breaches by employees or agents of companies retaining consumer information occur all too often. Although there are not good statistics to quantify the amount of loss, this is still a threat to information security. Businesses need to studiously monitor employee access to sensitive information and have enforceable privacy policies in effect. Policies should include what information access is necessary for job positions, how the information is handled and disposed of if necessary (shredded), and removal of access immediately upon employee dismissal. Policies may also include minimum password security measures. Also included in information security breaches is the interception of e-mail or unencrypted files. According to AnonIC.org e-mail “can be intercepted at each step along the way. (The) E-mail message is stored on two servers on its way at least: on sender ISP mail server and on recipient ISP mail server. When traveling through the MX hosts, message is stored on each of MX hosts” (Email Security and Anonymity, 2004). Depending on where the e-mail message is going, it could be stored on many servers along the way. There is opportunity at many points for an experienced attacker to gain access to email messages and files attached to the email messages.

Information privacy breaches Information privacy breaches include any release of information by a business or institution that is not compliant with privacy practices defined by law or within the business privacy statement. Such occurrences could be purely accidental, but the occurrence just highlights the need for business and institution policies to pay careful attention to the laws and to make sure harm to consumers is not a result of their actions. An example of an information privacy breach would be the selling of customer information to third-party vendors without notification to the consumer through a privacy statement that such

a release of information could occur. In 2003 the FTC brought changes against CartManager, Inc., a Web-based shopping cart software company, for “selling to third parties the personal information of nearly one million consumers.” “The FTC asserted that consumers reasonably expected that the merchants’ privacy policies, rather than CartManager’s, covered information consumers provided on the shopping cart and check out page of the merchants’ Web sites” (Ambrose & Gelb, 2006).

Identity theft and pre-texting Identity theft is when someone uses another’s personally identifying information, like names, social security numbers, or credit card numbers, without permission, to commit fraud or other crimes (ftc.gov, 2006). Online consumer privacy issues such as identity theft can occur through many channels. One example is phishing, where consumers receive unsolicited e-mails requesting information, and they unwittingly provide private information, which is then used maliciously. The theft can also occur when a company does not secure electronic information appropriately or when employees steal the information. Identity theft can also occur in an off-line situation where documents containing personal information are not disposed of properly by either a business or consumer themselves. Many businesses have policies regarding disposal of confidential or sensitive information, specifying that the documents must be shredded, but there are many instances in the recent past where businesses have been caught not complying with their policies and documents containing personal information were not shredded. Consumers themselves must take steps to prevent identity theft (see suggestions on FTC.gov Web site). In addition to common ways thieves steal identities, there is an activity called pretexting. According to the FTC (FTC.gov, 2006), pre-texting is the practice of getting your personal

9

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

information under false pretenses, which uses a variety of tactics to obtain personal information. “For example, a pre-texter may call, claim he is from a research firm, and ask you for your name, address, birth date, and social security number. When the pre-texter has the information he wants, he uses it to call your financial institution. He pretends to be you or someone with authorized access to your account. He might claim that he has forgotten his checkbook and needs information about his account. In this way, the pre-texter may be able to obtain other personal information about you such as your bank and credit card account numbers, information in your credit report, and the existence and size of your savings and investment portfolios” (FTC.gov, 2006).

health Information privacy Health information privacy is of great concern to many consumers. HIPPA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, legislation requires healthcare providers to adopt standards designed to facilitate the development of a uniform, computer-based healthcare information system, while protecting the security of the information and the privacy of its subjects (Michael, 2001). The concern comes in having personal health information available in a computer-based healthcare information system. If the information is housed in a computer network, then there are concerns over security of the information. The legislation demands security of the information, but even with great security, information can still be misused, stored improperly, accessed inappropriately, and disposed of incorrectly as with any electronic information. According to OCR (2005), the Privacy Rule protects all individually identifiable health information held or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associate, in any form or media, whether electronic, paper, or oral. The Privacy Rule calls this information “protected health information” (PHI). HIPPA also provides

0

provisions of the law-standards for electronic transactions and standards for the privacy of individually identifiable health information (Michael, 2001). The HIPPA legislation demands providers use electronic transactions in addition to using computer-based information systems which essentially covers all facets of healthcare interactions within their organization and with external entities. In addition, HIPPA regulates the use and disclosure of personally identifiable information and demands patients be given a privacy statement detailing how the provider or institution will use their information.

underage consumer protection The growth of computer use in school systems is educating children in the use of computers and the Internet. Children then have knowledge of how to browse the Internet and interact with online entities. In addition, many children have access to computers at home and can use the Internet from there as well. School computers have content blocking software installed where the school can filter the content returned for online searches and block access from Web sites known to contain inappropriate content for the safety of the children, but the same content filtering software may not be installed on every computer accessible by children. In addition to access concerns, there are concerns over how the online entities with which children interact behave. According to FTC (FTC.gov, 2007), “Congress enacted COPPA (Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act) in 1998 to address privacy and security risks created when children under 13 years of age are online. COPPA imposes requirements on operators of Web sites and online services directed to children, as well as other operators with actual knowledge that they have collected personal information from children.” “The primary goal of COPPA and the Rule is to place parents in control over what information is collected from their young children online. The

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

Rule was designed to protect children under age 13 while accounting for the dynamic nature of the Internet.” “The Rule applies to operators of commercial websites and online services directed to children under 13 that collect, use, or disclose personal information from children, and operators of general audience Web sites or online services with actual knowledge that they are collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children under 13” (FTC.gov, 2007). In addition, the Rule prohibits operators from conditioning a child’s participation in an online activity on the child’s providing more information than is reasonably necessary to participate in that activity (FTC.gov, 2007).

•

spyware, malware, viruses, cookies, phishing, and spAm Spyware is software installed on a computer without the owner’s consent, which monitors or controls the owner’s computer use to send pop-up ads, redirect the computer to Web sites, monitor Internet surfing, or record the keystrokes, which, in turn, could lead to identity theft (FTC.gov Spyware, 2007). There are several ways for a computer to get infected with spyware. Some of the most frequent are: “downloading free software that contain the spyware, unauthorized downloads that occur without consumer knowledge when Internet security is set to less than medium, links within pop-up ads can contain spyware, and opening a spam e-mail or attachment can download the spyware” (FTC.gov Spyware, 2007). Malware includes adware, hijackers, toolbars, and dialers. Baratz and McLaughlin (2004) define malware as follows: •

Adware is the class of programs that place advertisements on a computer screen. These may be in the form of pop-ups, pop-unders, advertisements embedded in programs, advertisements placed on top of ads in Web sites, or any other way the authors can think

•

•

of showing the victim an ad. The pop-ups generally will not be stopped by pop-up stoppers, and often are not dependent on the victim having Internet Explorer open. They may show up when the victim is playing a game, writing a document, listening to music, or anything else. Should the victim be surfing, the advertisements will often be related to the Web page he or she is viewing. Hijackers take control of various parts of victims’ Web browsers, including their home page, search pages, and search bar. A hijacker may also redirect a victim to certain sites should the victim mistype an address or prevent him or her from going to a Web site the hijacker would rather the victim not, such as sites that combat malware. Some will even redirect a victim to a hijacker’s own search engine when the victim attempts a search. Toolbars plug into Internet Explorer and provide additional functionality such as search forms or pop-up blockers. The Google and Yahoo! toolbars are probably the most common legitimate examples, and malware toolbars often attempt to emulate their functionality and look. Malware toolbars almost always include characteristics of the other malware categories. Any toolbar that is installed through underhanded means falls into the category of malware. Dialers are programs that set up a victim’s modem connection to connect to a 1-900 number. This provides the number's owner with revenue while leaving the victim with a large phone bill. Most dialers are installed quietly and attempt to do their dirty work without being detected.

As defined by the National Consumers League (NCL), phishing is using the Internet to fraudulently gather personal data about a consumer (Fraud.org). According to a report published by



A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

the NCL, “the bait is an e-mail claiming to be from a trusted organization, such as a bank or an online retailer. The e-mail often claims that the consumer must urgently take action, or else a bad thing will occur such as closure of the account. Once the phisher sends spam with bait the next step is that the e-mail provider delivers bait to consumer. Next, the user reads bait. A user might respond directly to the e-mail, shown as user enters info. More often, the user clicks on spoofed link. The link is typically to a Web site controlled by the phisher. The Web site is designed to seem like the site of the trusted company. The consumer then enters personal information, such as account number, password, or social security number. When the user enters info on spoofed site the phishing attack has succeeded at its first goal, to gather personal information fraudulently. Next the personal information is used to harm the consumer, when the bad guy selects victims and attempts fraud. Important examples of fraud are if the phisher commits bank fraud, such as by hijacking the consumer’s account, or credit card fraud, by using the personal information to purchase goods fraudulently” (Fraud.org). cookie —when a consumer visits a site, a notation may be fed to a file known as a “cookie” in his or her computer for future reference. If the person revisits the site, the cookie file allows the Web site to identify him or her as a return guest and offers him or her products tailored to his or her interests or tastes. The consumer can set his or her online preferences to limit or let him or her know about cookies that a Web site places on his or her computer (FTC.gov Spyware, 2007). Marketers want to customize a consumers experience at their Internet store so they collect personal information from the consumers computer “cookies” when a consumer enterers their Web space. They use this information to target their marketing specifically to the individual. The companies collect this information store it in their database and can even sell the information to other companies.



Spam is the receipt of unsolicited e-mail. “The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act) establishes requirements for those who send commercial e-mail, spells out penalties for spammers and companies whose products are advertised in spam if they violate the law, and gives consumers the right to ask e-mailers to stop spamming them. The law, which became effective January 1, 2004, covers e-mail whose primary purpose is advertising or promoting a commercial product or service, including content on a Web site. A transactional or relationship message—e-mail that facilitates an agreed-upon transaction or updates a customer in an existing business relationship—may not contain false or misleading routing information, but otherwise is exempt from most provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act” (FTC.gov, 2004).

consumer onlIne prIvAcy Issues, legIslAtIon, lItIgAtIon & theIr Inter-relAtIonshIps As the six legal categories in consumer online privacy were examined, the solutions to these issues are further investigated in terms of legislation and litigation. According to the literature review, the results were summarized in Table 2 and Table 3. Based on the literature research in the legal issues, legislation and litigation of consumer online privacy, the relational model of consumer online privacy as shown in Figure 2 is developed, which exhibits the relationship between the issues consumers have with online privacy and how those issues are addressed with protections provided by legislation and then the remedies for consumers and risks to companies for not complying with the legal requirements. Some of the legislative works provide coverage for more than one consumer online privacy categories. For instance, the Federal Privacy Act and Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions could be used to

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

Table 2. Consumer online privacy legislation Year

Law

Applications

Contribution

2006

U.S. Safe Web Act

“Undertaking Spam, Spyware, And Fraud Enforcement With Enforcers Beyond Borders Act of 2005 or the U.S. SAFE WEB Act of 2005”

Includes but not limited to: • “Amends the Federal Trade Commission Act to include within the definition of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” those acts or practices involving foreign commerce” • “Authorizes the FTC to disclose certain privileged or confidential information to foreign law enforcement agencies”

2003

Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act

“To amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act, to prevent identity theft, improve resolution of consumer disputes, improve the accuracy of consumer records, make improvements in the use of, and consumer access to, credit information”

Includes but not limited to: • “Identity theft prevention” • “Protection and restoration of identity theft victim credit history” • Improvements in use of and consumer access to credit information” • “Enhancing the accuracy of credit information” • “Limiting the use and sharing of medical information in the financial system” • “Financial literacy and education improvement funds”

2003

CAN-SPAM Act

“Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act”

Includes but not limited to: • “Bans false or misleading header information” • “Prohibits deceptive subject lines” • “Requires the e-mail provide an opt-out method” • “Requires that commercial e-mail be identified as an advertisement and include the sender’s valid physical mailing address”

2002

Federal Information Security Management Act

“bolster computer and network security within the Federal Government and affiliated parties (such as government contractors) by mandating yearly audits”

Includes but not limited to: “FISMA imposes a mandatory set of processes that must be followed for all information systems used or operated by a U.S. government government federal agency or by a contractor or other organization on behalf of a U.S. government agency. These processes must follow a combination of federal information processing standards (FIPS) documents, the special publications SP-800 series issued by NIST”

2001

USA Patriot Act

“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”

Includes but not limited to: • “Expands the scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications to include the length and types of service utilized, temporarily assigned network addresses, and the means and source of payment (including any credit card or bank account number).” • “Permits electronic communication and remote computing service providers to make emergency disclosures to a governmental entity of customer electronic communications to protect life and limb.” • “Makes it lawful to intercept the wire or electronic communication of a computer trespasser in certain circumstances.” • “Provides for nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence.”

2001

Homeland Security Act, Cyber Security Enhancement Act

Enhanced Cyber Security and Protections for Companies Assisting in Investigations

Includes but not limited to: • “Directs the Attorney General to establish and maintain a National Infrastructure Protection Center to serve as a national focal point for threat assessment, warning, investigation, and response to attacks on the Nation’s critical infrastructure, both physical and cyber.” • “Prohibits the distribution of advertisements of illegal interception devices through the Internet as well as by other, specified media.” • “Broadens the offense of and increases the penalties for illegally intercepting cell-phone conversations or invading the privacy of another person’s stored communications. States that a law enforcement officer need not be present for a warrant to be served or executed under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.”

continued on following page



A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

Table 2. continued Year

Law

Applications

Contribution

2000

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act

“Specifically protects the privacy of children under the age of 13 by requesting parental consent for the collection or use of any personal information of the users”

Includes but not limited to: • “Incorporation of a detailed privacy policy that describes the information collected from its users.” • “Acquisition of a verifiable parental consent prior to collection of personal information from a child under the age of 13.” • “Disclosure to parents of any information collected on their children by the Web site.” • “A right to revoke consent and have information deleted.” • “Limited collection of personal information when a child participates in online games and contests.” • “A general requirement to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of any personal information that is collected online from children.”

1996

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

“Establishes, for the first time, a set of national standards for the protection of certain health information”

Includes but not limited to: “The Privacy Rule protects all individually identifiable health information held or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associate, in any form or media, whether electronic, paper, or oral. The Privacy Rule calls this information protected health information (PHI). Individually identifiable health information is information, including demographic data, that relates to: • “The individual’s past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition, • “The provision of health care to the individual, or • “the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the individual, and that identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe can be used to identify the individual. Individually identifiable health information includes many common identifiers (e.g., name, address, birth date, social security number).”

1974

Federal Privacy Act

“Created in response to concerns about how the creation and use of computerized databases might impact individuals’ privacy rights”

Includes but not limited to: • “Safeguards privacy through creating four procedural and substantive rights in personal data.” • “It requires government agencies to show an individual any records kept on him or her.” • “It requires agencies to follow certain principles, called fair information practices, when gathering and handling personal data.” • “It places restrictions on how agencies can share an individual’s data with other people and agencies.” • “It lets individuals sue the government for violating its provisions”

Table 3. Consumer online privacy litigation Year

Case

Issues

2007

FTC v. Albert

• Spyware: “the code interfered with the functioning of the computer, and was difficult for consumers to uninstall or remove. In addition, the code tracked consumers’ Internet activity, changed their home page settings, inserted new toolbars onto their browsers, inserted a large side “frame”or “window” onto browser windows that in turn displayed ads, and displayed pop-up ads, even when consumers’ Internet browsers were not activated”

Contribution • “Permanently bars him from interfering with consumers’ computer use, including distributing software code that tracks consumers’ Internet activity or collects other personal information, changes their preferred homepage or other browser settings, inserts new toolbars onto their browsers, installs dialer programs, inserts advertising hyperlinks into third-party Web pages, or installs other advertising software. It also prohibits him from making false or misleading representations; prohibits him from distributing advertising software and spyware; and requires he perform substantial due diligence and monitoring if he is to participate in any affiliate program”

continued on following page



A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

Table 3. continued Year

Case

Issues

Contribution

2006

FTC v. Petco

“Web site security flaws allowed SQL injection attacks to gain consumer credit card information”

• “Must construct a system-wide security plan that will adequately protect consumers from security breaches via the company’s Web site” • “Will be subject to a biennial security audit from a third party auditor to validate their effectiveness” • “Prevents Petco from misrepresenting its security system to consumers in the future and mandates record keeping provisions to permit the FTC to monitor compliance”

2006

FTC v. BJ’s Wholesale Club

“Collection of magnetic stripe information from consumers and failing to secure the information appropriately”

• “Must implement and maintain an information security program that is reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected from consumers” • “Program must assess internal and external threats to security and design reasonable safeguards to control the risk identified” • “Must obtain independent assessment and report of security program within 180 days of the order and biennially for 20 years”

2006

Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club

“Unauthorized parties, “hackers,” gained access to credit card information of cardholders and used the information fraudulently”

• “Establish and implement, and thereafter maintain, a comprehensive information security program that is reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected from or about consumers” • “Obtain an assessment and report (an “Assessment”) from a qualified, objective, independent third-party professional, using procedures and standards generally accepted in the profession, within one hundred and eighty (180) days after service of the order, and biennially hereafter for twenty (20) years after service” • “Maintain, and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission for inspection and copying, a print or electronic copy of each document relating to compliance”

2005

FTC v. Cartmanager International

• “Engaged in unfair trade practices by selling to third parties the personal information of nearly one million customers” • “Web pages collect consumer name, billing and shipping address, phone number, e-mail address, and credit card information” • “Violated merchants’ privacy policies which provided that the personal information collected through their Web sites would not be sold, traded, or rented to third-parties”

• “Cannot sell, rent, or disclose to any third party for marketing purposes any personally identifiable information collected from consumers…prior to the date of order” • “Can sell, rent, or disclose such information after date or order provided there is a clear and conspicuous written notice of and they obtain a written certification that merchant privacy policy allows the sale, rental, or disclosure, OR prior to collecting personal data the merchant discloses the consumer is leaving the merchant’s Web site and subject to Cartmanager’s privacy policy”

litigate a breach in information security along with the Federal Information Security Management Act. In addition, many of the privacy categories are closely related or resultive of each other. An attacker could use spyware to gain information about a consumer that may lead to identity theft, or identity theft could be a result of an attacker gaining access to consumer information through

an information security breach event on a business. Identity theft could be a result from most of the categories, but could also occur without any interaction with an online entity through non-shredding of personal documents therefore, it is a category in and of itself. The model illustrates a top-down view of the consumer online privacy protection flow.



 health Information privacy— p ers on ally id entifiab le inform ation b ein g releas ed

fair & Accurate credit transactions Act— id entity th eft preven tion an d c redit res toration f or vic tim s health Insurance portability and Accountability Act— es tab lis h ed n ation al s tan d ards for c ollection an d releas e of p ers on al h ealth inf orm ation

legislation – government provided protections

Identity theft & pretexting— p ers on al inf orm ation or c redit c ard inf orm ation b ein g s tolen to im p ers on ate c ons um er

children’s online privacy protection Act— req uirin g p aren tal c ons ent for c ollec tion or us e of p ers on al inf orm ation f or th os e u nd er 13 yrs . of ag e

underage consumer— p ers on al inf orm ation b ein g releas ed b y you th

ftc v. petco 2006— S Q L injec tion attac ks g ain ed c ons u m er c red it c ard nu m b ers

Register complaint at ftc.gov

ftc v. bJ’s Wholesale club 2006— f ailin g to s ec ure c us tom er m ag n etic c redit c ard inf orm ation

Register complaint at ftc.gov

felony hIppA violation— w om an c on vic ted on f elon y c h arg es f or H IP P A violation of s ellin g p atient inf orm ation to dru g d ealers

Notify law enforcement and register a complaint at ftc.gov

Notify law enforcement and Health and Human Services

consumer Actions Available

ftc v. bJ’s Wholesale club 2006— h ac k ers g ain ed ac c es s to c red it c ard inf orm ation an d us ed it frau du lentl y

Register complaint at ftc.gov

ftc v. Xanga.com— c ollec ted and d is c los ed un d erag e p ers on al inf orm ation w ith ou t p arental c ons en t

litigation – risks for companies and remedies for consumers

federal privacy Act— privac y s af eg u ards f or inf orm ation s tored in c om p uteriz ed d atab as es

federal Info security mgmt Act— b ols ter g overn m ent an d affiliates c om p uter an d n etw ork s ec urity

homeland security Act – en h anc e c yb er s ec urity protec tions f or c om p anies as s is tin g in in ves tig ations

Information privacy— s ens itiv e or c onfid ential inf orm ation releas ed in a p p ro p riatel y

Information security breaches— h ac king , s tealin g p ers on al inf orm ation, or Intern et or e-m ail interc eptions

C onsum er O nline P rivacy C ategories

Register complaint at ftc.gov

ftc v. Albert 2007— c od e trac k ed ac tivity, c h an g ed s ettings , an d w as u nrem o vab le

cAn-spAm Act— c ontrollin g n on-s olic ited em ail ag ains t b ein g m is lead in g or d ec e p tive

us safe Web Act— en h anc in g fraud enf orc em ent ag ains t s p y w are an d s p am

spyware, malware, viruses, cookies, & spAm — to trac k c lic ks , h is tory, or ins tall m alic ious program s

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

Figure 1. Consumer online privacy relational model

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

The following two survey studies examine consumer online behaviors and privacy concerns, reinforcing the vital need for a stronger role by the government and business community as well as the privacy awareness from online consumers themselves.

survey studIes survey study I: consumers’ protection of online privacy and Identity The study by Milne, Rohm, and Bahl (2004) examined results from three consumer surveys wherein attitudinal, behavioral, and demographic antecedents that predict the tendency to protect one’s privacy and identity online were explored. The research looks at online behaviors increasing or reducing risk of online identity theft and indicates the propensity to protect oneself form online identity theft varies by population. The survey findings are summarized as follows: •

•

• • •

There was a positive significant relationship between privacy concern and active resistance. Those who had bought online, provided e-mail, and registered for a Web-site had “higher rates of protection and higher number of hours on the Web.” Males were more likely to protect their information online than females. Protection behavior increased with years of schooling. Younger online adults were more vigilant than older adults in protecting information online.

Overall, the study found that consumers are not protecting themselves adequately, and therefore there is a need for a stronger role by the government and business community to combat identity

theft. The researchers suggest the government enact “new laws…to more effectively monitor business practices” (Milne et al., 2004) and businesses “take responsibility for security of sensitive customer information in the off-line as well as online context” (Milne et al., 2004) and implement “technological solutions including digital certificates and signatures, biometrics, and other authentication approaches” (Milne et al., 2004). In addition, they call for the public sector to expand educational programs for consumers. Furthermore, the study covers areas such as identity theft, online privacy statements, and discusses about updating virus protection often and clearing cookies and computer cache after browsing on the Internet, as would be expected because these were surveys completed by various online users. There are also other privacy concerns for consumers besides those covered in the survey such as security breaches from hacking and SQL injection attacks on their information stored within business networks, unscrupulous online Web sites collecting information from those underage online users, and inappropriate release of information not related to online transactions by businesses or their agents.

survey study II: user privacy concerns and control techniques Chen and Rea (2004) examine the relationship between two types of user privacy concerns and how users control personal information. The two types of privacy concerns addressed are control of personal information and trust of online businesses. The three privacy control factors include: •

Falsification of private information, which includes altering one’s personal information and removing browser cookies to obtain access to online resources that require some form of registration.



A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

• •

Passive reaction, which includes ignoring or deleting the unwanted presence. Identity modification, which includes changing one’s personal identity, gender-neutral IDs, and multiple identities.

The study found that consumers do try to protect themselves, but there is much yet to be studied regarding online privacy. The fact is that many consumers do not demonstrate sufficient awareness of their online privacy, which require better privacy controls.

Analysis and Implications Consumers enjoy their surfing on the Internet to learn everything, to buy anything, and to communicate with anyone with a computer connected to the Internet. But how many net visitors are concerned with their personal information that may drift on the Internet when they are online and are concerned about who may be looking at their personal information? The study by Milne et al. (2004) suggests that consumers are more aware of the dangers in providing sensitive information online. They are, however, not taking adequate technical protection and are often unable to differentiate between a safe site and an unsafe site. Carefree online buying behavior and ignorance about protection tools provided by the browser, by the operating system, and by the open source community are some reasons, among others, behind lack of online consumer privacy protection. Chen and Rea (2004) state that consumers appear to use three types of privacy controls; that is, falsification, passive reaction, and identity modification when (a) there is a possibility that others might observe and use the information (unauthorized secondary use) and (b) concerns about giving out personal information. The study also discusses privacy protections such as encryption and anonymity. In many cases, these tools are either not available or simply infeasible for users.

8

The results of these two survey studies point out that online consumers need to be educated and encouraged to follow protective measures in three areas; technical, educational, and behavioral. However, there are responsibilities for the governments and the businesses as well. What is required is a concurrent effort among all stakeholders to protect privacy of all entities involved. The surveys point out that the online privacy issue is global rather than local. The researchers suggest the government enact new laws to effectively monitor business practices and businesses take responsibility for the protection of online consumers. Along with laws and standards, available technological solutions including digital certificates/signatures, biometrics, and other authentication approaches can be used. Online privacy concerns started with the inception of the Internet. These concerns are amplified tremendously with powerful computing ability to gather and process vast amount of data which is coupled with the Internet’s capacity for dispensing information instantly around the globe. In short, success or failure of tackling this problem depends on the willingness and joint effort of all parties involved.

future trends The growth of the online community does not seem to be slowing. There are new and inventive ways to use the Internet and the degree to which consumers can interact online is also growing. There are now ways to collaborate online that did not exist just a few short years ago. This new interaction online allows anyone to voice opinions or work together. The success of the auction Web site Ebay has been mostly due to the ability of consumers to voice their opinion by rating their online transactions. The rating system allows positive, negative, or neutral comments to be posted regarding specific transactions. The rating and comments are viewable by anyone and are used

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

to build trust with the online entity. These rating systems are used by many other online entities as a way for consumers to give other consumers their opinions. This trend in allowing consumers to rate their interactions seems to be a successful model and will continue to grow in popularity. Consumers are now demanding more control over their online interactions and the rating systems give a controlled venue for opinions. Consumers are now relying on other consumers to determine trust in an online business instead of relying solely on the business.

Legislators need to be aware of what is happening within the technology area and respond with legislation that protects consumers against those who would misuse the technology. Each year many proposals are introduced to further define consumer privacy and protections, but most do not become enacted into laws. Consumer groups need to remain vigilant in their education of legislators on what misuses of information are occurring and why it is imperative they act.

future reseArch dIrectIons conclusIon Online privacy concerns are present in everyday life for most consumers in the United States. Each day there are millions of interactions with businesses that store and use our personal information. Each day businesses are trying to find new ways to interact with consumers and get ahead in their business. Each day there are unsavory and unethical people trying to steal consumers’ personal information. The balance between convenience and safety in interacting with an online entity is a struggle. Consumers want to provide information to the online entity to conveniently interact for their own purposes, but want to control how the entity then uses, stores, recycles, and disposes of the information as well. The government is there enacting legislation to try to define those gray areas, but there are still so many instances where businesses are not complying with the laws. Consumers are left with the consequences when a business fails to properly handle their personal information. The call for more consumer education is a necessary step in trying to battle the privacy issues. Consumers need to be aware of how a business is using their information and be able to exert pressures on a business to conform to the required standards of society in an information age.

Consumer online privacy is an important subject and will remain an important subject as long as there are businesses collecting consumer information, online transactions, and hackers trying to gain access to that information. Future investigation could include the following: •

•

•

How can consumers protect their information? Finding ways to make opt-in and optout easier and giving consumers options on how a business stores and handles their information. Should consumers be able to more specifically control the storage time and be informed exactly what information is being stored? Investigating a new model for personal information online: creating a secure personal profile with your information and when interacting with online businesses, you provide an encrypted transaction number that authenticates to your profile and allows a transaction to be created and stored under your profile. You are identified by the transaction number and not a name to the online business. While the business is still storing the transaction, their records do not include personally identifiable information. Gaps in legislative protections for consumers: recommendations for legislative actions

9

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

•

on how to fill the gaps in the current legislations to bring them up to current business model expectations. HIPAA was created before offshore outsourcing began an upswing in healthcare. There are currently no provisions in the rules for sending consumer information beyond our borders. Investigation within different age groups on specific concerns about online privacy. Younger generations have concerns, but still interact online because it is part of their culture. Other generations choose to not interact online for a couple of reasons. They may lack understanding of the technology and/or their judgments are usually based more on personal interactions to create trust. How can they trust an online entity when there is no personal interaction? What would it take for other generations to trust online transactions?

references Ambrose, S., & Gelb, J. (2006). Consumer privacy litigation and enforcement actions in the United States. The Business Lawyer, 61, 2. Ashworth, L., & Free, C. (2006). Marketing dataveillance and digital privacy: Using theories of justice to understand consumers’ online privacy concerns. Journal of Business Ethics, 67, 07-123. Baratz, A., & McLaughlin, C. (2004). Malware: what it is and how to prevent it. Retrieved November 11, from http://arstechnica.com/articles/ paedia/malware.ars BJ’s Wholesale Club settles FTC charges. (2005). Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/ bjswholesale.htm Brooke, J., & Robbins, C. (2007). Programmer gives up all the money he made distributing

0

spyware. Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/ opa/2007/02/enternet.htm Chen, K., & Rea, A. (2004). Protecting personal information online: A survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. The Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85-93. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. (2000). Enacted April 22, 2000. Retrieved from http:// www.epic.org/privacy/kids/ Congress Passes Safe Web Act 2006. (2007). Retrieved January 31, 2007, from http://www. epic.org COPPA protects children but challenges lie ahead. (2007). Retrieved from http://www.ftc. gov/opa/2007/02/copparpt.htm COPPA FAQs. (n.d.) Retrieved from http://www. ftc.gov/privacy/coppafaqs.htm Email Security and Anonymity. (2004). Retrieved from http://www.anonic.org/email-security. html Federal Privacy Act of 1974. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.usdoj.gov/foia/privstat.htm Federal Security Information Act of 2002. (2002). Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Federal_Information_Security_Management_Act_of_2002 Fraud.org. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www. fraud.org/tips/internet/phishing.htm, http://www. phishinginfo.org/ FTC v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. (2005). Filing ordered May 17, 2005. Retrieved from http://www. ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/050616agree0423160. pdf FTC.gov. (2006). Retrieved from http://www.ftc. gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/aboutidentity-theft.html#Whatisidentitytheft

A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

FTC File No. 032 3221. (2004). Petco settles FTC charges. Retrieved from http://www.ftc. gov/opa/2004/11/petco.htm

The CAN-SPAM Act: Requirements for Commercial Emailers. (2004). Retrieved from http://www. ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/canspam.htm

FTC File No. 062-3073. (2006). Xanga.com to pay $1 million for violating children’s online privacy protection rule. Retrieved from http://www.ftc. gov/opa/2006/09/xanga.htm

Top Ten Ways to Protect Online Privacy. (2003). Retrieved from http://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/ basic/topten.html

FTC.gov Spyware. (2007). Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/spywarealrt.htm Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996—HIPPA (Kennedy-Kassebaum Act). (n.d.). Retrieved from http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191.htm Homeland Security Act, Cyber Security Enhancement Act enacted December 13, 2001. (2002). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ bill.xpd?bill=h107-3482 Medlaw.com. (2006). Retrieved from http://www. medlaw.com/healthlaw/Medical_Records/8_4/ woman-pleads-guilty-to-se.shtml Michael, P., & Pritchett, E. (2001). The impact of HIPPA electronic transmissions and health information privacy standards. American Dietetic Association. Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 101(5), 524-528. Milne, G., Rohm, A., & Bahl, S. (2004). Consumers’ protection of online privacy and identity. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), 217-233. Richards, N. M. (2006). Reviewing the digital person: Privacy and technology in the information age by Daniel J. Solove. Georgetown Law Journal, 94, 4. Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rules by HIPPA Compliance Assistance. (2005). Health & Human Services, May. Swartz, N. (2006). HIPPA compliance declines, survey says. Information Management Journal, 40(4), 16.

USA Patriot Act of 2001 enacted October 23, 2001. (2001). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack. us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h107-3162 US Safe Web Act of 2006 enacted by 109th Congress March 16, 2006. (2006). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?tab= summary&bill=s109-1608 Vasek, S. (2006). When the right to know and right to privacy collide. Information Management Journal, 40(5), 76-81.

AddItIonAl reAdIngs 37 States give consumers the right to freeze credit files to prevent identity theft; consumers union offers online guide on how to take advantage of new state security freeze laws. (2007). PR Newswire, July 16. Anthony, B. D. (2007). Protecting consumer information. Document Processing Technology, 15(4), 7. Carlson, C. Poll reveals data safety fears. eWeek, 22(50), 29. Chellappa, R., & Sin, R. (2005). Personalization versus privacy: An empirical examination of the online consumer’s dilemma. Information Technology and Management 6(2-3), 181-202. de Kervenoael, R., Soopramanien, D., Hallsworth, A., & Elms, J. Personal privacy as a positive experience of shopping: An illustration through the case of online grocery shopping. International



A Taxonomic View of Consumer Online Privacy Legal Issues, Legislation, and Litigation

Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 35(7), 583.

trust through privacy practices. International Journal of Information Security, 6(5), 323.

DeMarco, D. A. (2006). Understanding consumer information privacy in the realm of Internet commerce: Personhood and pragmatism, pop-tarts and six-packs. Texas Law Review, 84(4), 1013-1064.

New trend micro internet security products strengthen personal information protection and deliver enhanced performance. (2007). Al Bawaba.

Erickson, K., & Howard, P. N. (2007). A case of mistaken identity? News accounts of hacker, consumer, and organizational responsibility for compromised digital records. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12(4), 1229–1247.

Online privacy policies: An empirical perspective on self-regulatory practices. (2005). Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 3, 61-74.

Kelly, E. P., & Erickson, G. S. (2004). Legal and privacy issues surrounding customer databases and e-merchant bankruptcies: reflections on Toysmart.com. Industrial Management+Data Systems, 104(3/4), 209. Kobsa, A. (2007). Privacy-enhanced personalization. Communications of the ACM, 50(8), 24. Lauer, T. W., & Deng, X. (2007). Building online



Pan, Y., & Zinkhan, G. M. (2006). Exploring the impact of online privacy disclosures on consumer trust. Journal of Retailing, 82(4), 331-338. Roman, S. (2007). The ethics of online retailing: A scale development and validation from the consumers’ perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 72(2), 131. Smith, A. D. (2004). Cybercriminal impacts on online business and consumer confidence. Online Information Review, 28(3), 224-234.



Chapter III

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats: A Manager’s Perspective Hy Sockel DIKW Management Group, USA Louis K. Falk University of Texas at Brownsville, USA

AbstrAct There are many potential threats that come with conducting business in an online environment. Management must find a way to neutralize or at least reduce these threats if the organization is going to maintain viability. This chapter is designed to give managers an understanding, as well as the vocabulary needed to have a working knowledge of online privacy, vulnerabilities, and threats. The chapter also highlights techniques that are commonly used to impede attacks and protect the privacy of the organization, its customers, and employees. With the advancements in computing technology, any and all conceivable steps should be taken to protect an organization’s data from outside and inside threats.

IntroductIon The Internet provides organizations unparalleled opportunities to perform research and conduct business beyond their physical borders. It has proven to be a vital medium for worldwide commerce. Even small organizations now rely on

Internet connectivity to communicate with their customers, suppliers, and partners. Today, employees routinely work from areas beyond their office’s physical area. They regularly transport sensitive information on notebook computers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), smartphones, and a variety of storage media: thumb drives, CDs,

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

DVDs, and even on floppies. It is not uncommon for employees to work offsite, at home, or out of a hotel room. Outside the office, they often use less than secure Internet connections—dial-up, cable, Internet cafés, libraries, and wireless. Organizations often employ portals to share information with their stakeholders, however; these portals are not always secure from would be attackers. In order to protect the organization from vicious and malicious attacks, management needs to understand what they are up against. Even if the organization does not conduct any business on the Internet, they are still not out of harms way. Viruses, Trojans, and spyware can come from multiple sources; floppy discs, CDs, thumb drives, and even from mobile phones. To complicate the matter even more, the information technology (IT) environment at many organizations has become obscure—partially due to new regulations and industry standards. The standard has changed, it is no longer enough to be secure and protect the businesses assets, organizations need to be able demonstrate that they are compliant and that security is an ongoing concern; failure to do so could leave them facing stiff penalties (Forescout, 2007). The purpose of this chapter is to address some of the potential threats that come with conducting business in an online environment. The chapter highlights the relationship between privacy and vulnerability and threats. It delves into techniques that are commonly used to thwart attacks and protect individuals’ privacy. In the age of unrest and terrorism, privacy has grown even more important, as freedoms are compromised for security. The news is loaded with stories about security breaches. For example: In May of 2007, the news of the TJ Maxx security breach shook up the banking and retail industry. At first it was estimated that hackers had downloaded at least 45.7 million credit- and debit-card numbers; however, court filings indicated that



number was closer to 96 million. Estimates for damage range from $216 million to $4.5 billion. The breach was blamed on extensive cyber thief activity within TJ Maxx’s network from 2003 through June 2004 and then again from mid-May 2006 through mid-December 2006 (Schuman, 2007). However, others blame the breach on weak wireless security—Ou (2007) revealed that the “retailer’s wireless network had less security than many people have on their home networks.” Another example is: In April 5, 2002 hackers exploited vulnerabilities in a server holding a database of personnel information on California’s 265,000 state employees. The state responded, and the world listened. California is one of the largest economies in the world, bigger than most countries. The attack included in its victims, the then Governor Grey Davis and 120 state legislators. The breach compromised names, social security numbers, and payroll information. In response, the state legislature enacted a security breach notification law Senate Bill (SB) 1386. To put this in perspective, if online privacy is described in terms of a risk “triangle,” the three corners are vulnerabilities, threats, and actions. Where actions represent anything the organization can (and should) do to mitigate attacks. Applications, like ships, are not designed and built to sit in a safe harbor, they were meant to be used in churning chaotic waters. It is important to understand threats and vulnerabilities enough to have a good idea to of what to expect, so that strategies and tools can be put in place to mitigate the consequences (Bumgarner & Borg, 2007).

vulnerAbIlIty Software vulnerabilities are not going away, in fact they are increasing. According to the Coor-

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

dination Center at Carnegie Mellon University (CERT, 2007) there was an average of over 10 vulnerabilities discovered every day in 2003 (3,784 in total). This number has jumped to over 5500 in the first nine months of 2007. Software flaws have become the vulnerabilities of choice for attackers. Flaws cut across the entire enterprise application stack—including Web and application servers, databases, and operating systems. Dr. (Rear Admiral) Grace Hopper (1906-1992), a highly respected and accomplished computer scientist indicated that all software has problems and that it is impossible to have a “perfect” system. She articulated this point using the following example…if the probability of an individual module having an error in the code was just one in a hundred (1%), and that the system had several hundred modules; then the net probability of an error for that system would be 100%. This observation is particularly relevant in that most commercial software developers use complex computer software program development toolkits (SDK) to improve their productivity and effectiveness. Qualsys (2006), a security vendor, studied over 40 months of data scans (September 8, 2002 to January 31, 2006) and identified nearly 1600 unique critical vulnerabilities from a total infestation of more than 45 million vulnerabilities. The data scan showed more than 60% of critical vulnerabilities were in client applications such as Web browsers, backup software, media players, antivirus, and flash. The Third Brigade found that vulnerabilities generally fall into one of the following categories (Aberdeen Group, 2005): • • •

Vulnerabilities caused by incorrect configured systems Failure to turn off factory defaults, guest accounts, outdated software Failure to maintain anti-virus and spam updates

• • • •

Failure to change default values leaving holes Well-know bugs in system utilities Poor or ignorant policy decisions Unapplied vendor security systems patch; Aberdeen states that 95% of attacks are against known vulnerabilities for which patches are available.

Vulnerabilities do not have to be broken program code; Norman (1983) indicated that errors in system designs, which provoke erroneous entries by users can also be considered as vulnerabilities that can be intentionally exploited by attackers. Individually and collectively vulnerabilities can create major risks for organizations. Weak policies and protection can result in the release of personal private information (PII). The release of PII is not the only the problem. Another issue is that hackers can obtain important data and modify it. Suddenly, there are additional names on the preferred lists, payroll, and accounts payable; and outsiders could be given authority or consideration that they are not entitled to. An organization’s strategic plans could be compromised. Additionally, the release of PII can weaken the public’s confidence in the organization, subject the organization to litigation, large fines/reparation costs, and to rigorous investigations, as well as oversight.

threAts Threats are not the same as vulnerabilities; threats are things that take can advantage of vulnerabilities. Security threats, broadly, can directly or indirectly lead to system vulnerabilities (Im & Baskerville, 2005). An analogy might be an army fort surrounded by the enemy where someone accidently left the fort’s front gate wide open. The open gate is a “vulnerability” and the threat is the “opposing force.” Translating this analogy to datainformation, the vulnerability would be a “poorly



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

protected” system, and the threat is the criminal hacker community. In this case, poorly protected could be construed to be any of a number of things including absolutely no protection, software that is not updated, inappropriately defined security rules, and weak passwords. In general, it is important to ensure that sensitive information and systems are protected from all threats, both internal and external. Typically, this is done by separating the systems from the networks. However, this is not always possible; with the advent of e-business there is a need for organizations to share information. For example: an organization gives its partners (A) and (B) permission to look at its online schedule (instead of calling a clerk as they had in the past). This can create the opportunity for partner A to look at (or modify) partner B’s data. If the data is of a personal type, say medical, several laws could easily be violated. If it is indicated in the privacy policy that data/information is not shared, the individual whose data is released may have rightful cause to institute litigation. Clearswift, a leading provider of content security products, has categorized five major message traffic threat types as: asset theft, disruption, repudiation, content abuse, and denial of service. Asset theft happens via spoofing or social engineering; when an outsider pretends to be an authorized user and requests information not available to an unauthorized user. However, more commonly, it is the sending of sensitive information inadvertently or by disaffected “insiders.” Disruption is a common threat, which includes anything that keep users (and services, i.e., e-mail, fax …) from doing what they are suppose to do. Other workplace disruption can include dissemination of personal, pornographic, or “non-business” information. Repudiation (denial) is concerned with either party (sender or receiver) being able to declare



that an event did not happen. Techniques like Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange permit digital signatures, which provide assurance that the message was actually sent and/or received by the intended parties. Digital signatures are accepted as evidence in a court of law. This is critical because oftentimes parties involved in transactions do not know each other. Content abuse is similar in scope of repudiation, but is focused on the content of the message and not whether it was sent or received. It deals with issues between the sending and receiving parties over what was sent and what was received. Denial of service (DoS) and distributed DoS (DDoS) results when a party is bombarded with more messages than it can handle, causing the system to use all its resources to handle non-legitimate traffic. This can happen by bombarding the victim’s machine with thousands to millions of messages so that it cannot respond to legitimate requests or responds so slowly that it is effectively unavailable. DOS attacks are considered violations of the Internet Architecture Board’s (IAB) Internet proper use policy concerning Internet ethics passed January 1989 (often referred to as RFC 1087; see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1087). In the U.S. (and many countries), DoS is a serious federal crime under the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 with penalties that can include fines and imprisonment.

socIAl engIneerIng It is not always a technical issue—a perpetrator can use chicanery and/or persuasion to manipulate unsuspecting people into either revealing sensitive information (such as logon and password) or compromise perimeter defenses by installing inappropriate software or portable storage devices (that are seeded with malware) on computer networks. For example, an approach of phishing is to ask a user to fill out a simple fake online form. The form itself asks almost no personal informa-

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

Figure 1. Ploy to capture personal information

tion; instead, it pre-fills the form with some of the info that the sender already knows about the victim. It asks for a person to make up a login name and a password. The criminal hackers know that most people suffer from password overload and tend to reuse the same passwords over and over again. Figure 1—ploy to capture personal information—is a representative sample (taken off the net November 4, 2007):

the formula (see Equation 1—risk dollar value) is straight forward, coming up with the values and probabilities is not. The important issue is not the devised dollar value, but what does the asset really mean to the organization and how are they going to use it? Equation 1—risk dollar value Risk $ = Asset value * Threat * Vulnerability * Impact * Likelihood * Uncertainty

rIsk Risk is involved in everything, every process, and every system. Operational risk is often defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events. Risk is one of those things that no one can escape and is hard to define. In general, risk is the probability of a negative outcome because some form of threat will be able to exploit vulnerabilities against an asset. Many define the value of a risk attack as: the value of an asset times the probability of a threat times the probability of an undiscovered vulnerability times some “impact factor (representing reparations) times the possibility of the event. While

Elimination of risk is categorically impossible; the best that can be hoped for to get it under control. Even if it were possible, the cost and scalability issues of risk avoidance have to be weighed against the cost of the probable losses resulting from having accepted rather than having eliminated risk (Pai & Basu, 2007). Qualys, Inc. (2006) analyzed a global data pool of more than 40 million IP scans with their product QualysGuard. Data analysis revealed the six axioms of vulnerabilities. These axioms are important because they help management understand the nature of possible attacks and why and how their data could be at risk of being compromised. Qualys Inc. (2006) believes that



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

“Understanding the behavior of vulnerabilities is essential to setting effective security strategy and proactively implement security solutions.”

of the outbreak. Automated attacks pose a special hazard to network security because they inflict damage swiftly with little time for reaction.

The axioms of Qualys’s Research: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

8

Half-life: Is the average time it takes an organization to patch (or apply a fix) to half of the most dangerous vulnerabilities. The 2006 findings indicate a decrease in the half life to 19 days (down from 30 in 2003) on external systems. They found that the exposure of unpatched systems continues during the significantly long period of halflife dissipation and increases as the severity decreases. Prevalence: Prevalence is the degree to which the vulnerability poses a significant threat. They found that half of the most prevalent critical vulnerabilities are replaced by new vulnerabilities each year. This means there is ongoing change to the most important threats to our networks and systems. Persistence: The life spans of some vulnerabilities are unlimited as soon as the current infection is addressed, a variant may appear. In one day Sophos found over 300 variants of the “Stranton” virus. The risk of re-infection can happen during deployment of machines with a faulty unpatched operating system Focus: The 2006 study data revealed that 90% of vulnerability exposure is caused by 10% of critical vulnerabilities. Exposure: The time-to-exploit cycle is shrinking faster than the remediation cycle. Eighty percent of critical vulnerability exploits are available within the first half-life after their appearance. Since the duration of vulnerability announcement-to-exploitavailability is dramatically shrinking, organizations must eliminate vulnerabilities faster. Exploitation: Nearly all damage from automated attacks is during the first 15 days

Cannon and Kessler (2007) believe that the rapid increase in breaches and incidents can be directly related to technology. They indicate that the increase in 1) computer processing power and data storage capacity and in 2) higher data transmission bandwidth have acerbated the problem. This in conjunction with the massive connectivity of information systems afforded by the Internet and World Wide Web allow for the mass collection and misuse of sensitive personal data.

electronIc rIsk mAnAgement There is a large group of people that believe that in the final analysis of security breaches, that most problems should not be blamed on hackers or malicious employees, instead the instances should be blamed on lack of common sense. To them, the vast majority of breaches can be classified under the title of carelessness. As in people not paying attention to what they are doing, such as putting a letter in the wrong envelope, adding a copy to an e-mail, or losing equipment or hardware, the real culprit is a lack of following procedures (Padilla, 2007). However, regardless of how breaches are caused: by ignorance, carelessness, inside users, or criminal hackers, there are a lot of them. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2007); indicates that more than 48 million records containing sensitive personal information have been involved in some form of a security breach in just January 2007 alone. Cannon and Kessler (2007) define “A data breach as the unauthorized access to and acquisition of data in any form or format containing sensitive information that compromises the security of confidentiality of such information and creates a reasonable risk of its misuse.”

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

IDC indicates that strong corporate governance is the foundation of successful protection of corporate assets from a wide variety of threats (CNET, 2004). To that end, organizations need to establish, educate, and enforce their policies to effectively ensure the protection they need. 1.

2.

3.

Establish: Establish clearly written policies and procedures for all employee communications. The rules must deal with acceptable and unacceptable behavior for the Internet, P2P (peer-to-peer), e-mail, IM (instant messaging), and blogging. Educate: Educate and support written rules and policies with company wide training. The employees need to understand that the policy is a living document (it will mutate as new threats and issues arise) but compliance is mandatory. This can be a critical issue for an organization because misuse (whether deliberate or accidental) can result in the organization being held responsible by the legal principle of vicarious liability. Enforcement of written rules and policies Enforce policies: With a combination of disciplinary action and software. If there is any doubt about employee willingness to adhere to the organization’s usage and content rules, consider applying a technological solution to the people problem. Tools can help the installation of hardware, software, and/or appliances, and enforce established policies. The organization can block access to inappropriate sites and stay on top of employees’ online activity. Failure to discipline employees for e-mail-related misconduct may encourage other employees to abuse the system and could create liability concerns for the organization. It is important to communicate the policies and to adhere to them. The American Management Association (2005) Electronic Monitoring & Surveillance Survey found that most companies monitor employee Web site

usage (76%) and use filters to block access to inappropriate Web sites (65%). Slightly more than a quarter (26%) of responding organizations indicated they went further admonishing individuals, they terminated them for misuse of e-mail or the Internet. The World Bank indicates that to reduce the e-security risk, day to day augmentation of e-security internal monitoring and processes are needed. They indicate that proper “Risk management is achieved through a comprehensive checklist per the cyber-risks that affect the network as a whole.” They have refined a “technology risk checklist” based upon standards set by ISO 17799 (Glaessner, Kellermann, & McNevin, 2004).

mAlWAre The term malware (malicious software) is typically used as a catch-all to refer to a variety of forms of hostile, intrusive, or annoying software designed to infiltrate or interrupt services from a single computer, server, or computer network without the owner’s informed consent. The term malware includes all types of trouble makers: such as: viruses, worms, kiddy scripts, Trojan horses, and macro (script–context) viruses. Malware seeks to exploit existing vulnerabilities on systems. Malware can utilize communication tools to spread and oftentimes it goes unnoticed. McAfee Avert Labs (Bernard, 2006) has recorded more than 225,000 unique computer/network threats. In just 10 months between January and November of 2006, they found 50,000 new threats. Google researchers (as part of the Ghost in the Browser research) warned that one in 10 Web pages is hiding embedded malware (Provos, McNamee, Mavrommatis, Wang, & Modadugu, 2007). The term malware is often associated with the characteristic attributes of a virus; self-replicating, something that embeds itself into other programs, which in turn can infect other programs. The no-

9

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

tion of a self-replicating program is not new, it dates back to John von Neumann’s 1949 lectures. Neumann postulated the theory that a program could reproduce itself. Nearly 35 years later, November 1983, Professor Fred Cohen substantiated Neumann’s work by creating and demonstrating the first computer virus in a computer security seminar. The name “virus” was provided by Len Adleman (the A in RSA); (http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Malware) and (http://all.net/books/virus/part5.html). In 1989, John McAfee (of McAfee Avert Labs) defined a virus as a computer program created to infect other programs with copies of itself. It is a program that has the ability to clone itself—so that it can multiply and constantly seek new host environments (McAfee & Haynes, 1989). Today, not all computer viruses inject themselves into their victims, nor is cloning considered mandatory. Researchers now make distinction between different malware varieties based on whether it is considered viral or non-viral malware (Cafarchio, 2004): •

•

•

0

Viral malware typically replicates rapidly and fairly indiscriminately, its behavior has a very visible impact. Viral infections might be used as part of distributed denial of service attack; worms like Code Red are able to spread worldwide in a matter of hours. Non-viral malicious software does not replicate. It is planted by hackers, or unknowingly downloaded by unsuspecting users, or foisted on systems as part of a software package to track the user’s behavior and/or software usage. Non-viral malicious software is designed to be “inconspicuous and stealthy.” These types of infections can go undetected for long periods of time. There are some virus types of malware that are design merely to harass the users and not to intentionally damage files or the operating systems. Malware like the Bearded Trojan are of this style. The Bearded Trojan displays

•

a nude female and while it is potentially offensive or embarrassing, it often makes people realize that they are vulnerable and could have been infected with a virus that acts as a key logger, or a Web bot (Harley, Slade, & Gattiker, 2001). Another example of a non-viral virus is the “ANSI bombs;” thankfully, they are not common and they do not reproduce. An ANSI bomb is a sequence of characters that is meant to redefine key(s) on a keyboard. Thus, when the user presses a key the normally assigned characters for that key are not sent to the terminal or computer, but rather the redefined string. This string may contain any ASCII characters, including and multiple commands. A function key or even the space bar could be assigned a string that invokes a program to do something the user does not want to happen—copy, delete, or send material (Harley et al., 2001).

Adware/spyware A particular annoying and dangerous form of malware is adware/spyware. The terms are communally used as interchangeably. The goal of this technology is to gather information without the target person’s knowledge or permission. This type of software is used to watch and record which Web sites and items on the Internet the user visits in hopes of developing a behavioral profile of the user that can later be exploited. The slight difference between the two terms is the intent of the software agent. Adware has an advertising aspect in the information it collects, while spyware tracks and record user behavior (in the traditional sense of the word “spy”). The problem with spyware is that users typically store all sorts of sensitive and personal information in their machines that should not be made public. Some information is protected by law, trade secrets, and financial data. The loss of personnel and customer information could wreak

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

havoc for the organization. Additionally, the theft of stored information such as: bank account numbers, credit card numbers, social security numbers, and pictures could also devastate the individual. Another thing that makes adware/spyware so pernicious is that anti-viruses & firewalls are not very effective against them. While a good anti-virus program (AV) is an absolutely essential for any machine, even those that do not connect to a network (especially if the machine accepts removable media), it is not enough. AV software will not protect user machines from spyware. Viruses and spyware have different properties; because spyware does not propagate itself like other forms of malware, it is not likely to be detected by traditional AV methods.

botnets Vent Cerf, one of the “founding fathers” of the Internet, believes that one in four computers (approximately 150 million out of 600 million) connected to the Internet are compromised and likely to be unwilling members of a botnet (Fielding, 2007). These machines are often used as proxies for illegal activities like spamming and credit card fraud. Botnets have been a growing problem on the Internet since at least 2002. A bot (short for robot) is a software agent released onto a computer connected to the Internet. The bot can download malicious binary code that compromises the host turning it into a zombie machine. The collection of zombies is called a botnet. The servers hosting the bot binaries are usually located in countries unfriendly to the United States. The bots are transparent and run in the background. Bots can open a channel to a “bot controller” machine, which is the device used by the perpetrator (the bot herder) to issue commands to the bots (Baylor & Brown, 2006). Bot herders typically use “bot controllers” to harvest user accounts via screen-capture, packet-

sniffers, and key-logging techniques. They are routinely used for phishing (some estimate that over 70% Internet spam is due to them), click fraud, and malware. Botnets can be used for attacking various Web sites by unleashing a barrage of requests against the site, so that the victim site spends more time processing the requests coming at it, than it does doing the job it was intended for. These attacks employ a technique known as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The idea behind the DDoS is to flood a machine, server, or cluster faster than the server can respond to them. DDoS chew-up bandwidth and resources, effectively shutting down the attacked network. In this manner a large botnet can wield an amazing amount of power. If several large botnets are allowed to join together, they could literally threaten the national infrastructure of most countries. On April 27, 2007, a series of DDoS attacks crippled the financial and academic Web sites in Estonia (Kirk, 2007). “Botnets are no longer just annoying, spampumping factories—they are big business for criminals. This shift has awakened large businesses, which historically have either looked the other way or been in denial about bots infiltrating their organizations” (Higgins, 2007). The Anatomy of a Typical Botnet Attack •

•

•

Step 1: The bot herder loads remote exploit code onto an “attack machine” that might be dedicated to this purpose or an already compromised machine. Many bots use filesharing and remote process control (RPC) ports to spread. Step 2: Attack machines scan for unpatched (not current with updates) victim machines to launch attacks against. Steps 3 & 4: The victim machine is ordered to download files (binaries) from another server (frequently a compromised web or FTP server).



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

•

•

•

Step 5: These binaries are run on the victim machine and convert it to a bot. The victim machine connects to the bot controller and “reports for duty.” Step 6: The bot controller issues commands to the victim to down load new modules, steal account details, install spyware, attack other machines, and relay spam. Step 7: The bot herder controls all bots by issuing commands via the bot controller(s).

uses an IRC approach, it does not scale very well and is unlikely to rival reach Storm’s size. Rbot’s underlying malware uses a backdoor to gain control of the infected machine, installing keyloggers, viruses, and even stealing files from the infected machine, as well as the usual spam and DDoS attacks. The real scary part is that Rbot [malware] is readily available to anyone who wants try to apply some kind of criminal activity in the bot arena (Higgins, 2007).

World’s biggest botnets

Whose fault Is It?

Storm

The answer to this question depends on who you ask. It can easily be argued that it is the users’ fault. If the user keeps their antivirus up-to-date and stays away from traditional types of sites that harbor malware (celebrity), the problem should be lessened. However, variants of viruses have been tracked in the hundreds per day; it is hard to keep current on protection when there is a whole industry working against you. Since it may not necessarily be the user then it must be the developers, or the publisher for not creating a product that cannot be usurped. Unfortunately, there are highly skilled, university trained hackers that strive to develop the right code. After all, there is really only one reason for botnets: and that is to make money. Some people blame law enforcement or government for not quick prompt and decisive action. However, many of the bot herders are in countries in which the U.S. does not have jurisdiction. Politicians can pass laws, but never be in the position to have them enforced. To that end, in 2007, Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Delaware) introduced the Cybercrime Act to update existing laws and close what they say are loopholes that online criminals can exploit. The bill takes a multifaceted attack. It lowers the threshold of evidence, it address not only damaged computers but also to individuals. It prohibits the creation

There is a new threat, that of the super botnet. While few agree on the actual size of these botnets, they are huge; where the number of active members per 24 hour period (not just attached zombies) of the net can be in the hundreds of thousands. Currently, the largest of the new breed of botnets is “Storm.” Storm broke away from the mode and uses a decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) communication, instead of the traditional centralized Internet relay chat (IRC) model. The P2P makes it tough to track and tougher to kill; you cannot render it mute by disabling one or two central control machines. Storm uses a complex combination of malware, which includes worms, rootkits, spam relays, and Trojans. It propagates via a worm or when a user visits an infected site or clicks on a link to one. It is very stealthy, it employs a balance “use” approach and a “fast-flux.” The purpose of fast-flux is to circumvent the IP-based black list technique (see black list). It does this by rapidly rotating DNS records to prevent discovery (Higgins, 2007).

Rbot Rbot is generally considered the second largest botnet. It employs an old-style communication structure using Internet relay chat. Because it



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

of botnets that could be used in online attacks. It makes the threat of revealing (extortion) confidential information illegally obtained from computers a crime (Savage, 2007).

botnets—fbI operation bot roast In the second week of November 2007, John Schiefer of Los Angeles, California agreed to plead guilty to felony charges for building and using a botnet as large as 250,000 nodes to steal personal identifying information (PII). The botnet was used to invade individuals’ privacy by intercepting electronic communications being sent over the Internet from the zombie computers to PayPal and other Web sites. Later, data mining techniques were used to garner PII such as username and passwords. With the usernames and passwords, they accessed bank accounts to make purchases without the consent of the true owners. The botnet was also used to defraud a Dutch advertising company. This was the first U.S. prosecution under the U.S. federal wiretap statute for conduct related to botnets (Wilson, 2007). The FBI and Department of Justice in an antibotnet sweep label as “Operation Bot Roast” has arrested three individuals for assembling botnets. They are charged with felonies. One of the three arrested is alleged to have used a large botnet network to send tens of millions of unsolicited email messages. Another is charged with infecting more than 10,000 computers worldwide, including two Chicago hospitals. “The ‘bots’ caused the infected computers to, among other things, repeatedly freeze or reboot, causing significant delays in the provision of medical services.” It took the hospitals more than 1,000 man-hours to clean up after the infections (Keizer, 2007; Albanesius, 2007). The government is working in conjunction with industry partners to uncover these schemes. These include the CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University as well as Microsoft,

and The Botnet Task Force, (a low-profile organization initiated by Microsoft in 2004 that acts as a means of building awareness and providing training for law enforcement). In the process, the FBI has identified more than 1 million hijacked personal computers. The majority of victims are not aware that their computers have been compromised or their personal information exploited. The FBI said because of the widely distributed abilities of botnets they not only harm individuals but are now considered a threat to national security, as well as the information infrastructure and the economy.

seArch engInes A problem with most search engines is that they are ambivalent to content permissions. Certain individuals (such as the head of payroll) may have permission to view all of the company’s information. While other individuals (such as the head of personnel) are limited in the type of data are allowed to see. An employee may be given permission to see their own information but not that of the person working next to them. There may also be certain individuals that are not allowed to see any information at all. Because search engines typically can not take data ownership and coordinate it with user permissions, problems can arise when responding to a request. “When implemented carelessly, search engines have the potential to uncover flaws in existing security frameworks and can expose either restricted content itself or verify the existence of hidden information to unauthorized users” (Vivisimo, 2006). In this regard, poorly implemented search engines could release large amount of personal identification information. Imagine typing the name of the CEO in a search engine and receiving a page that lists his personal phone number, salary, and home address.



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

WIreless medIA Organizations may think their mobile workers are safe with their new wireless notebooks, but recent WLAN tracking at the RSA security conference showed a multitude of vulnerabilities. Some common faults were that many users were using hotspots, but had no idea who was sponsoring the ports. In some cases, it was discovered that the users were actually talking to other local computers that also had their connections active (Shaw & Rushing, 2007). Wireless devices often remember the “last good” site they were connected to and attempt to use them first. Which means that if the user did not shutdown the port (disconnect from a hot spot correctly), the computer will look for that spot first, even if there is a more secure connection available. Another issue is that the port will continue to actively search for a signal. A critical situation can arise if the user forgets to disable the wireless card, and then plugs his/her device into a wired network. A couple of things could happen—the network will see the other port and might adjust its routing information to accommodate it, in the process it could bypass firewalls and border security. Another thing that may happen is the device might also connect to another device via the wireless port, again bypassing some security, but elevating the permissions and authority of the newly connected user to that of the legitimate user. In either case, the result is a huge hole in security (Shaw & Rushing, 2007). Organizations are paying a very high price for wireless management. The Aberdeen Group estimates that it costs nearly 10 times more to manage wireless services and devices compared to wired-lines (Basili, 2007). In spite of that, Aberdeen found that 80% of respondents were planning increases in mobile wireless access. The RSA Conference is an event that draws thousands of computer users. Many of them bring their wireless laptops (and other devices). AirDefense (2005), a wireless security company,



credited by many as the founder of the wireless security industry, found that more than half of the 347 wireless devices it monitored during conference were susceptible to attack. What is truly amazing is not that it happened once, but just 2 years later it happened again at another RSA conference. AirDefense once again found that more than half of the wireless devices at the conference network were themselves unsecured and were vulnerable to attacks; thus leading to the conclusion that the people responsible for protecting enterprise data were not doing a very good job of protecting their own assets (Cox, 2007).

telephones Wireless telephones with computer-enabled features (such as e-mail and Internet access) have been compromised; Trend Micro Inc. announced it had found security flaws on MS Windows Mobile, a popular operating system used in the smartphone. Many individuals that used these devices are executives who routinely access sensitive information. In this case, the main risk is not malware, but the risk of lost devices.

mobile encryption The news regularly repots that laptops with thousands of sensitive records on customers or employees are lost or stolen each month. Organizations know the risks and the threats. These threats are easy to understand but most organizations do not allocate the resources necessary to protect themselves. Encryption is an effective safe guard for most mobile devices, and one that will relieve some of the legislative pressures. However, it is far from being fully adopted; a survey by Credant (see McGillicuddy, 2006) asked respondents to list reasons why their companies had not adopted encryption for mobile devices. •

56% indicated it was due to a lack of funding;

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

• •

51% said encryption was not a priority; and 50% said there were limited IT resources; in other words: “No one wants to pay for it.”

Mobile devices are often seen as low-powered, low-capacity corporate tools. To which there is considerable fear that encryption will add little, but in the end will slow them down. Critics cite that the idea behind mobile devices is to make the user more productive by added convenience. Anything that slows down the devices would ultimately detract from the user’s productivity. Additionally, encrypted devices are harder to diagnose, repair, and recover. However, these concerns are more applicable to older less powerful devices (McGillicuddy, 2006).

dAtA Organizations accumulate a wide breath of data, that if stolen could potentially hurt the enterprise. Loss or theft of confidential information: such as blueprints and engineering plans, tenders, budgets, client lists, e-mails and pricelists, credit card and other financial information, medical or other confidential personally identifiable records, classified, restricted or personal information, scripts, storyboards, source code, database schemas, or proprietary trade secrets can severely impact the integrity and profitability of a corporation. “This risk is amplified by the prevalence of portable computing devices as a part of normal business activities and by the increasing levels of online transactions that occur routinely” (GFI-2, 2007). Fundamentally, there are two types of security. The first type is concerned with the integrity of the data. In this case the modification of the records is strictly controlled. The second type of security is the protection of the information content from inappropriate visibility. Names, addresses, phone numbers, and credit card details are good examples

of this type of data. Unlike the protection from updates, this type of security requires that access to the information content is controlled in every environment. The Internet makes it easy for organizations to collect personal identifying information, such as: names, addresses, social security numbers, credit card numbers, or other identifiers (Shimeall, 2001). If this information were disclosed inappropriately, it would put these individuals at risk for identity theft (Wang, Lee, & Wang, 1998). To guard against such an outcome, laws worldwide have been passed to aid in data protection.

the threat from Within Within the U.S., the Gartner Group estimates that 70% of all unauthorized access to information systems is committed by employees. The CSI/FBI survey found that 68% of respondents claimed losses due to security breaches originating from insiders (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Richardson, 2006). Of course, the magnitude of insider malfeasances depends somewhat on how one slices and dices the numbers. The U.K. Scotland Yard Computer Crime Research Center, (2005) found that 98% of all crimes committed against companies in the U.K. had an insider connection. In the USA, surveys conducted by the U.S. Secret Service and CERT coordination center concluded that: “Respondents identified current or former employees and contractors as the second greatest cyber security threat, preceded only by hackers” (Keeney, Kowalski, Cappelli, Moore, Shimeall, & Rogers, 2005).

endpoInt (perImeter-bAsed) securIty The term endpoint, as its name implies, is any place that a device can interact with another device. Generally speaking, an endpoint is an individual computer system or device that acts as a network



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

client and serves as a workstation or personal computing device. Endpoints are often mobile and intermittently connected and in the mobile society, they are becoming indistinguishable (Forescout, 2007; Endpointsecurity, 2004). Laptops have become so popular they have almost caught up with desk top machines, as office use goes (40% to 45%—CSI/FBI survey, 2006). Because laptops are not tethered to the desk, they are routinely out of the protection of the organization’s network. Additionally, if removable media (floppy’s, CDs, DVD’s, flash drives) are used on laptops or office machines, they are an easy entry point for malware. A further security concern is the construct of engineering devices for easy maintenance. These easy maintenance devices can allow a person to literally remove the internal hard drive from a laptop in less than a minute and make off with all of the private data that is in the machine. Endpoint security is the total measures taken to implement security sending and receiving data. These measures include assessing the risk to the clients’ antivirus and personal firewalls, as well as protecting the network from themselves. Endpoint security logically extends to the management and administration of these security measures. It also deals with risk, reporting, and knowledge management of the state and results of these measures (Positive Networks—Endpoint security).

endpoint components Firewalls In general terms, a firewall is software or a hardware device that controls the flow of traffic between two networks or entities. A packet filter firewall works by inspecting the contents of each network packet header and determining whether it is allowed to traverse the network. There are basically three types of firewalls: packet filter, “stateful” inspection, and application proxy.



In the case of a personal firewall, it controls the network traffic between a computer on one side, and the Internet or corporate network on the other side. A firewall is a network (hardware & software) node that isolates a private network from a public network. The firewalls’ job is to keep unwelcome traffic from the Internet out of the computer, and also to keep in the traffic that you do not want leaving the computer. To that end, organizations may have several firewalls to create barriers around different layers of their infrastructure. Firewalls are often compared to a “bouncer” at a nightclub: they are located at the point of entry; they enforce rules to determine who gets in (and out); and they inspect all that passes through the doors they are guarding. With a layer approach, it is possible that a firewall can insure that even if a password is compromised an intruder will only have restricted access to the network. However, firewalls are neither the first nor the last word in endpoint components. Hardware and software firewalls have a serious flaw in that they typically do not look at the contents of a packet; they only look at its headers. As written earlier, antivirus software is not very effective against spyware, the same is true with a firewall.

preventIve meAsures The open nature of PCs in most organizations has resulted in users installing a wide variety of applications that they use to get through their day, and several that they should not. Some IT managers attempt to prohibit the use of unauthorized peripherals (removable media) and applications with the hope that this process will shut out malware. The usage of portable devices at work could impact corporate network security through the intentional or unintentional introduction of viruses, malware, or crimeware that can bring down the corporate network and or disrupt business activity.

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

Even with the tightest security net, it is possible for a destructive breach to occur. Failure to implement a security audit process to meet government regulatory requirements can result in significant fines, in addition to the possibility of imprisonment. The risks are real and affecting businesses on a daily basis (Juniper Research, 2006). Further, not only are devices a threat to data and machine integrity, but also to worker productivity. An employee can use company hardware and software to enhance digital photos, play computer games, or work on freelance projects. The control of USB (universal serial port) ports can limit unauthorized use and prevent intentional or accidental attacks against a company’s network (Muscat, 2007). Control of the USB ports can be made either programmatically or by physically locking & blocking them (PC Guardian). Additionally, there are emerging technologies that monitor the movement of data and enforce actions on the data based on company policies. These products from vendors such as Orchestria and Vericept work at the network and desktop levels, and can monitor movement, as well as prevent data from being copied from the originating application to external sources, such as USB drives. Another approach relies on detecting the departure of an authorized user. A wireless USB PC Lock will lock and unlock a PC based on a user’s proximity to the machine. A small transmitter is carried by the user, if s/he is more than two meters away, the machine’s screen will be programmatically locked, once the user returns in range the screen is unlocked.

caveat is that this list is not for corporate users, it is for the home user. For the home user, the advice is simple: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Get a good antivirus package and keep it up to date. Let your system download system updates (patches) from a trusted site. Deactivate Active X components. Do not install items from unknown sources. Do not open e-mails from people or organizations that you do not know. Never click on an embedded e-mail link; copy it or use a book mark. Be extremely careful about what sites you visit. Strangers that send you mail, want something! You will not win something if you did not enter.

In an organizational environment, the mentioned still applies. However, the user is usually burdened by user names and passwords. The number one suggestion is pick a strong password and do not share it with anyone for any reason. If you need to have multiple sign-ons, tailor the passwords for each application. For example your password for accounts payable may begin with AP. The easiest way to pick strong passwords is to create an acronym out of your favorite song lyrics. Take the first letter of each of the first 12 words, your application code and some important number, like the middle digits of your first home address.

the end user the human in the equation While the chapter is aimed at management, we would be amiss if we did not describe some things that the end user can do. This list is far from complete and some may argue about the order of which items are presented. They might also point that import suggestions have been admitted. The

According to CompTIA’s IT security survey, human error, either alone or in combination with a technical malfunction, was blamed for 74% of the IT security breaches (Cochetti, 2007). Human involvement in systems is not limited to making



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

errors; during the day users often take breaks to surf the Web, e-mail, or IM their friends. However, Web surfing can do more than relieve stress and waste time; it can expose users and organizations to dangerous Web sites, data leakage, and e-mails with inappropriate or dangerous content. Further, it can lead to installation of non-authorized software, which besides prompting civil and criminal investigations, can introduce piracy robbing malware. This type of publicity has a negative impact on the bottom line. To protect themselves, organizations should abide by a strong user access policy (Shinder, 2007). Instant messaging (IM) has begun to be embraced by organizations because it provides a cost effective means to electronically communicate both synchronously and nearly instantaneously. IM presence awareness and permission-based lists give the perception of a low risk of receiving spam or other unwanted messages. The rapid adoption of public IM services (such as AOL, MSN, and Yahoo) has raised serious concerns about security risks and compliance with regulatory requirements. IM and e-mail can be used as a tool for deliberately disseminating private information; or it may provide a channel that could inadvertently admit spyware, worms, or viruses. Since instant messaging involves free electronic communication with internal employees and anyone designated as a “trusted” colleague, unauthorized information dissemination may proliferate via unmonitored (Webex, 2006). Roger J. Cochetti, group director—CompTIA U.S. Public Policy states “… security assurance continues to depend on human actions and knowledge as much, if not more so, than it does on technological advances.” He indicates that failure to follow security procedures (human error) was blamed by more than 55% of the organizations as the factor that contributed the most to security breaches (Cochetti, 2007).

8

lIstIng—WhIte, blAck, And grAy Listing is a response to malware’s continuous mutation of their signatures, which results in a continuous flow of zero-day attacks. The basic idea is to restrict execution of programs based on a list. Listing comes in three distinct styles: white, black, and gray. White listing basically consists of allowing users/workstations to run only software that has been pre-approved by the organization. Implementing this approach requires conducting exhaustive inventory of all applications in use as well as their version. Once the inventory is completed, each application must be reviewed to ensure it is required. After the review, the software implementations and versions need to be made consistent across the “protected” network segments. Black listing is the opposite of white listing. Workstations are prevented from running applications or visiting Web site that are specifically listed. Thus, sites that are found to be perpetrators of malware and spam are “banned” from user activity. While this may seem to be a viable approach for the business managers, it is weak, and can be very risky, if not supported by additional controls. A missed module can be disastrous. Further, new malicious or highly vulnerable applications are created or identified faster than they can be placed on a blacklist. Gray listing is a conditional blacklist, and has a high risk of false positives, blacklisting someone by mistake. Hybrid listing is a combination of features that combine the features of white, black, and gray listing. It is designed so that management can approve some software and ban other software that is not needed or wanted, thus preventing the first execution of any new unknown software. Because the hybrid approach prevents the first execution, not the installation, the approval/authorization process can be centrally managed in real time.

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

Figure 2.

Browser-based listing relies on a modern browser to check that the site a user is going to is not a forgery. One option downloads a list of known Web forgeries (see Figure 1—ploy to capture personal information): but this technique only offers real protection for a few moments after it is downloaded. Another technique would be to have the browser check with an authority (such as Google) each time a URL or site is entered. Mozilla indicates that users can protect themselves from Web forgeries by: •

•

•

That instead of following links from a e-mail to banks or online commerce sites, always either type the Web page address in manually or rely on a bookmark; They also recommend using a Password Manager to remember passwords instead of entering them manually; and They recommend using an e-mail product that will detect and alert the user about suspect web sites.

least privilege Authority In an organizational environment, the information systems/information technology group struggles to give users the access they need and want, while

attempting to ensure that security is not sacrificed. Programs that perform useful functions of work are known as applications. Applications need certain capabilities to create, read, update, and delete data—these privileges often go by the acronym CRUD. Applications need access to certain services that are only granted access through the operating system or the system administrators: such as scheduling new tasks, sending information across applications, and verifying passwords. In order for that to work the application/user needs to be at a high enough level of trust (permissions/privileges/authority) so that they know what they are doing. With the principle of least privilege, the goal is to give users only the minimal access and privileges they need to complete the task at hand. In most cases this will be for the entire logon session, from the time they logon in the morning till they leave for the night. The concept of principle of least privilege is a prophylactic—kind of a safety belt; if the machine is not attacked by malware, it is not necessary and does no harm; but if it is, it’s an extra layer of protection. Therefore, the construct of least privilege is becoming a common phrase as organizations scramble to protect network assets and resources.

9

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

vulnerability management The process of patch management can be complex, difficult, and is often sacrificed when an organization is in a “crisis” mode. If shortcuts are taken, they will almost always comes back to haunt the organization. Patching in the programming has long been defined as “trading an error that is known for one that is unknown.” It is not the thing to rush through. Vendors spend considerable time researching vulnerabilities and devising repairs or work-arounds. Many of the repairs are dependent on updates being already applied. Failure to stay current on updates is one of the main reasons that enterprises struggle with bot infections (Symantec). Patching is a trade off between the time required to repair a problem responsibly and completely versus the hacker’s window of opportunity to exploit a specific vulnerability. Vulnerability management has become a critical aspect in managing application security. Patching vulnerabilities (depending on the severity) can be a time consuming job. To do it safely, the patches should be applied and tested in an isolated environment against a copy of the system. •

•

0

New components of distributed architectures: Standardization and plug-and-play are not always positive, they come with a price. Standardize code makes it easier for all involved the developer and the criminal hacker. Each module represents a unique addressable attack point—a target at which criminal hackers can aim their exploits. Multiplying network access points can act similar to an open wound, if one is not careful, it will allow in all sorts of viruses and the like. With organizations opening their networks to suppliers, clients, customers, employees, and contractors, security has become a mandate. Multiple entry points have raised the importance of controlling the traffic that comes and goes through the

•

•

network. Within this regards, firewalls and antivirus products are important parts of an effective security program. Wireless network access points bring their own set of issues. With wireless, the perimeter (endpoint) security is critical. It is important to have IDS (intrusion detection system) and to monitor all traffic. Simply relying upon firewalls and antivirus is not an effective strategy. Understanding the network and understanding its weaknesses (vulnerabilities) can provide insight on how to manage and protect critical data.

conclusIon No matter how hardened a network perimeter is, there are a number of weaknesses that can allow breaches to occur. It is usually recommended that a layer defense approach be adopted to strengthen protection. However, care needs to be taken that additional layers actually add protection instead of just protecting against the exact same vulnerabilities or threats. Reckless implementation or selection of software may not produce the desired outcome. A layered approach may be more like buying overlapping warranty coverage. The harm is that businesses may confuse this approach for real security. Ultimately, they could end up spending more money and resources on implementing the wrong security mechanisms without gaining complete security (Ou, 2007). Remember the organization is responsible for maintaining the privacy of the stakeholder’s consumer while also preserving a harassment-free, discrimination-free, crime free, and civil business environment. The development, implementation, and enforcement of a comprehensive Internet policy can help in that goal. Whether employees intentionally violate Internet policy or accidentally surf to an objectionable Web site, under the legal principle known as vicarious liability, the

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

employer can be held responsible for the misconduct of the organization’s employees—even if the employer is completely unaware that there is a problem. Simply following security best practice by limiting access rights may be a good first step, but it is just a step. No single approach is going to be totally viable against all malware and protect privacy. The best protection comes from using a layer approach. In addition to using technology it is important to: • • • • •

Create and enforce policies and procedures Educate and train Monitor the network and the systems Require Penetration testing Ban inappropriate sites and prohibit wasted resources and productivity

Aberdeen Group’s (2005) research shows that technology, by itself is not the primary indicator for success—this was true despite differences in technology usage, loss rates, or firm sizes. They also found that organizations performing as best in class leaders focus on managing four areas to maximize results for the money being spent on security: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Sharing of data and knowledge to improve results Processes in place for executing against objectives Organizational structure and strategy to manage to results A security technology maturity that influences results

Of the four, they indicate that the most important focus area is the managing of data and knowledge to improve results. This chapter presented an overview of the concerns that organizations must address while working within the Internet community. It was meant to inform management of the potential

threats and pitfalls that must be addressed to be a viable player within the Internet realm. While there are many technical areas that need to be attended to, nothing is more important than ensuring maintaining the users’ confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity (CIA). Hackers and con-artists are devising clever and inventive techniques to violate a user’s privacy for the purpose of committing illegal activities. If left unchecked, these issues threaten the viability e-commerce and e-business.

future reseArch dIrectIons This chapter lays out some of the issues that must be concentrated on. With the most emphasis being placed upon a strong organizational Internet privacy and security policy, followed by education and training of users and stakeholders. Future research should focus on how large and small organizations create, maintain, and monitor privacy and security policies. Because organizations are of differing sizes and have different resources available, research should investigate how large and small organizations vary on their approaches and implementation. Future research should also focus on how existing protections can be expanded to protect tomorrow’s technology. Finally, research needs to be conducted on how protecting portable storage devices from misuse, as this type of media is bound to proliferate.

references Aberdeen Group. (2005). Third brigade—business value research series—most important security action: Limiting access to corporate and customer data. Whitepaper. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.thirdbrigade.com/uploadedFiles/ Company/Resources/Aberdeen%20White%20P aper%20--%20Limiting%20Access%20to%20 Data.pdf



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

Air Defense Press Release. (2005, February 17). AirDefense monitors wireless airwaves at RSA 2005 conference. Retrieved October 2007, from http://airdefense.net/newsandpress/02_07_ 05.shtm American Management Association. (2005). Electronic monitoring & surveillance survey. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.amanet. org/research/pdfs/EMS_summary05.pdf Basili, J., Sahir, A., Baroudi, C., & Bartolini, A. (2007, January). The real cost of enterprise wireless mobility (Abridged ed.). The Aberdeen Group. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www. aberdeen.com/summary/report/benchmark/Mobility_Management_JB_3822.asp Baylor, K. (2006, October 26). Killing botnets McAfee. Retrieved March 2007, from http://blogs. techrepublic.com.com/networking/?cat=2 Bernard, A. (2006). McAfee’s top ten security threats for 2007. Retrieved October, from http:// www.cioupdate.com/print.php/3646826 Bumgarner, J., & Borg, S. (2007). The US-CCU cyber security check list. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.usccu.us/documents/USCCU%20Cyber-Security%20Check%20List% 202007.pdf Cafarchio, P. (2004). The challenge of non-viral malware! TISC Insight Newsletter, 4(12). Retrieved October 2007, from www.pestpatrol. com/Whitepapers/NonViralMalware0902.asp Cannon, D. M., & Kessler, L. (2007). Danger—corporate data breach! Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 18(5), 41-49. CERT. (2007). Vulnerability remediation statistics. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www. CERT. org/stats/vulnerability _remediation. html Clearswift. (2006 October). Simplifying content security—ensuring best-practice e-mail and



web use. The need for advanced, certified email protection. Retrieved October 2007, from http:// whitepapers.zdnet.com/whitepaper.aspx?&scid= 280&docid=271750 CNET Staff. (2004, September). Spam volume keeps rising. Retrieved September 2007, from http://news.com.com/2114-1032-5339257.html Cochetti, R. J. (2007, June). Testimony of the computing technology industry association (CompTIA), before the house small business committee subcommittee on finance and tax, sata security: Small business perspectives. Retrieved October 2007, from www.house.gov/SMBiz/hearings/ hearing-06-06-07-sub-data/testimony-06-0607-compTIA.pdf Computing Technology Industry Association. (2004). Annual study. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.joiningdots.net/library/Research/statistics.html Cox, J. (2007, February 9). RSA: attendees drop ball on wi-fi security—many IT security experts at conference used unsecured devices. Network World. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www. networkworld.com/news/2007/020907-rsa-wifisecurity.html Endpointsecurity. (2004). What is endpoint security? Retrieved October 2007, from http://www. endpointsecurity.org/Documents/What_is_endpointsecurity.pdf Fielding, J. (2007, January 28). 25% of all computers on Botnets. Retrieved http://blogs.techrepublic. com.com/networking/?cat=2 Flynn, N. (2005). E-policy best practices a business guide to compliant & secure internet, instant messaging (IM), peer-to-peer (P2P) and email communications. The ePolicy Institute; Executive Director, St. Bernard Software. Retrieved http:// www.securitytechnet.com/resource/security/application/iPrism_ePolicy_Handbook.pdf

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

Forescout. (2007). NAC enforcement and the role of the client. Infonetics Research, Inc. Retrieved July 2007, from www.Forescout.com/downloads/ whitepapers/Infonetics-NAC-Enforcement-andthe-Role-of-the-Client.pdf GFI. (2007). The threats posed by portable storage devices. Whitepaper. Retrieved July 2007, from http://www.gfi.com/whitepapers/threat-posedby-portable-storage-devices.pdf Glaessner, T. C., Kellermann, T., & McNevin, V. (2004). Electronic safety and soundness securing finance in a new age (World Bank Working Paper No. 26). Washington DC Retrieved http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/abstracts_current_studies_2004.pdf Gordon, L. A., Loeb M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2006). CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey. Computer Security Institute. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.cse. msu.edu/~cse429/readings06/FBI2006.pdf Harley, D., Slade, R., & Gattiker, U. (2001). Viruses revealed: Understanding and counter malicious software. New York: McGraw-Hill/Osborne. Higgins, K. (2007, November 9). The world’s biggest botnets. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.darkreading.com/document. asp?doc_id=138610 Im, G. P., & Baskerville, R. L. (2005, Fall). A longitudinal study of information system threat categories: The enduring problem of human error. ACM The DATA BASE for Advances in Information Systems, 36(4), 68-79. Juniper Research. (2006, February). Security information & event management. Retrieved http://www.juniper.net/solutions/literature/solutionbriefs/351178.pdf Keeney, M., Kowalski, E., Cappelli, D., Moore, A., Shimeall, T., & Rogers S. (2005). Insider threat study: Computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors. U.S Secret Service and CERT

Coordination Center/SEI. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.CERT. org/archive/pdf/ insidercross051105.pdf Kirk, J. (2007, May 17). Estonia recovers from massive denial-of-service attack. InfoWorld, IDG News Service. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/05/17/estonia-denial-of-service-attack_1.html McAfee, J., & Haynes, C. (1989). Computer viruses, worms, data diddlers, killer programs, and other threats to your system. New York: St. Martin’s Press. McGillicuddy, S. (2006, November 1). Encrypting mobile devices: A best practice no one uses SearchSMB.com http://searchSMB. techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid44_ gci1227295,0 0.ht m l?a s r c =SS _C L A _ 300336&psrc=CLT_44 Muscat, A. (2007, January 17). Perils of portable storage. Computer Reseller News. Retrieved http:// www.gfi.com/documents/32686_crn_eprint.pdf Norman, D. (1983). Design rules based on analysis of human error. Communications of the ACM, 26(4), 254-258. Osterman Research Inc. (2003). The impact of regulations on email archiving requirements. ORI white paper sponsored by Information Management Research. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.Ostermanresearch.com/whitepapers/or_imr01.pdf Ou, G. (2007) Wireless LAN security myths that will not die. ZDNet. Retrieved July 2007, from http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=454 Padilla, R. (2007). Root out data breach dangers by first implementing common sense. TechRepublic. Retrieved July 2007, from http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/tech-manager/?p=312 Pai, A. K., & Basu, S. (2007). Offshore technology outsourcing: overview of management and legal



Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

issues. Business Process Management Journal, 13(1), 21-46.

org/congressional_testimony/Shimeall_testimony_Aug23.html

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2007). A chronology of data breaches. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm

Shinder, D. (2007, February 9). How SMBs can enforce user access policies. Retrieved April 2007, from http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/51001009_11-6157054.html?tag=nl.e101

Provos, N., McNamee, D., Mavrommatis, P., Wang, K., & Modadugu, N. (2007). The ghost in the browser analysis of web-based malware. Google, Inc. Retrieved http://www.usenix.org/ events/hotbots07/tech/full_papers/Provos/Provos.pdf

Symantec. (2006, September 19). Symantec finds firms recognize importance of application security, yet lack commitment in development process. News release. http://www.symantec.com/about/ news/release/article.jsp?prid=20060919_01

Qualys. (2006). The laws of vulnerabilities: Six axioms for understanding risk. Retrieved October 2007, from http://developertutorials-whitepapers. tradepub.com/free/w_qa02/pf/w_qa02.pdf Savage, M. (2007, October 23). Proposed legislation would strengthen cybercrime laws. Retrieved November 2007, from http://searchsecurity. techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_ gci1278341,00.html?track=sy160 Schuman, E. (2007, November 14). TJMaxx’s projected breach costs increase to $216M. eWEEK. Retrieved November 2007, from http://fe42.news. sp1.yahoo.com/s/zd/20071114/tc_zd/219495 Shaw, K., & Rushing, R. (2007). Podcast, Keith Shaw (NetWorkWorld) talks with Richard Rushing chief security officer at ... data, listen to this podcast. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.networkingsmallbusiness.com/podcasts/panorama/2007/022807pan-airdefense. html?zb&rc=wireless_sec Shimeall, T. (2001, August 23). Internet fraud, Testimony of Timothy J. Shimeall, Ph.D. CERT®, Analysis Center Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA; Before the Pennsylvania House Committee on Commerce and Economic Development, Subcommittee on Economic Development, retrieved October 2007, available http://www.CERT.



Vivisimo. (2006). Restricted access: Is your enterprise search solution revealing too much? Retrieved October 2007, from via http://Vivisimo.com/ or http://www.webbuyersguide.com/bguide/whitepaper/wpDetails.asp_Q_wpId_E_NzYyMQ Wang, H., Lee, M., & Wang, C. (1998, March). Consumer privacy concerns about internet marketing. CACM 41(3), 63-70. Webex.(2006). On-demand vs. On-premise instant messaging. Webex Communications, Ease of Communications—On Demand EIM Solutions. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.webbuyersguide.com/bguide/Whitepaper/WpDetails. asp?wpId=Nzc4MQ&hidrestypeid=1&categor y= Wilson, T. (2007, November 12). ID thief admits using botnets to steal data. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=138856 Yank, G. C. (2004 December 21). Canning spam: Consumer protection or a lid on free speech? Retrieved October 2007 from http://www.law.duke. edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0016.html

AddItIonAl reAdIng Bächer, P., Holz, T., Kötter, M., & Wicherski, G. (2005). Know your enemy: tracking botnets;

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities, and Threats

using honeynets to learn more about bots. The Honeynet Project & Research Alliance. http:// www.honeynet.org Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.honeynet.org/papers/bots/

Henry, P. A. (2007, June). Did you GET the memo? Getting you from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 security. (In Today’s Risky Web 2.0 World, Are You Protected?). Secure Computing Corporation.

Cohen, F. (1984). Experiments with computer viruses. Fred Cohen & Associates. Retrieved October 2007, from http://all.net/books/virus/ part5.html

King, S. T., Chen, P. M., Wang, Y., Verbowski, C., Wang, H., & Lorch, J. R. (2006). SubVirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.eecs. umich.edu/virtual/papers/king06.pdf

Commission of the European Communities. (2000). Proposal for a directive of the European parliament and of the council concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. Retrieved October 2007, from http://europa. eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/new_rf/documents/com2000-385en.pdf Computer Crime Research Center. (2005). Security issues: find the enemy within. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.crime-research. org/analytics/security-insider/ Endicott -Popovsky, B., & Frincke, D. (2006). Adding the fourth “R”: A systems approach to solving the hacker’s arms race. In Proceedings of the 2006 Symposium 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.itl.nist.gov/iaui/vvrg/ hicss39/4_r_s_rev_3_HICSS_2006.doc European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. (2003). Annex 11 computerised systems, Labcompliance. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.labcompliance.com/documents/ europe/h-213-eu-gmp-annex11.pdf Federal Trade Commission. (1999). Gramm-Leach bliley act. Retrieved October 2007, from http:// www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/glbact. html Federal Trade Commission. (2006). ChoicePoint settles data security breach charges; to pay $10 million in civil penalties, $5 million for consumer redress. Retrieved October 2007, from http:// www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.htm

MessagesLabs. (2007). Effectively securing small businesses from online threats. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.messagelabs. com/white_papers/secure_smb SANS Institute. (1999, May). Management errors. In Proceedings of the Federal Computer Security Conferences held in Baltimore. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.sans.org/resources/errors. php Sarbanes-Oxley. (2002). Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002. Retrieved October 2005, from http://www. sarbanes-oxley.com/section.php?level=1&pub_ id=Sarbanes-Oxley Shinder, D. (2002). Scene of the cybercrime (Computer Forensics Handbook). Rockland, MA: Syngress Publishing. United Kingdom Parliament. (2000). Freedom of information act 2000. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/ acts2000/20000036.htm U.S.A. Department of Health & Human Services. (1996). Health insurance portability and accountability act of 1996. Retrieved October 2007, from http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191.htm U.S.A. Federal Trade Commission. (2002). How to comply with the privacy of consumer financial information rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act. Retrieved July 2002, from http://www.ftc. gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/glblong.shtm



Section II

Frameworks and Models



Chapter IV

Practical Privacy Assessments Thejs Willem Jansen Technical University of Denmark, Denmark Søren Peen Technical University of Denmark, Denmark Christian Damsgaard Jensen Technical University of Denmark, Denmark

AbstrAct Governments and large companies are increasingly relying on information technology to provide enhanced services to the citizens and customers and reduce their operational costs. This means that an increasing amount of information about ordinary citizens is collected in a growing number of databases. As the amount of collected information grows and the ability to correlate information from many different databases increases, the risk that some or all of this information is disclosed to unauthorised third parties grows as well. Although most people appear unaware or unconcerned about this risk, both governments and large companies have started to worry about the dangers of privacy violations on a major scale. In this chapter, we present a new method of assessing the privacy protection offered by a specific IT system. The operational privacy assessment model, presented here, is based on an evaluation of all the organisational, operational and technical factors that are relevant to the protection of personal data stored and managed in an IT system. The different factors are measured on a simple scale and the results presented in a simple graphical form, which makes it easy to compare two systems to each other or to identify the factors that benefit most from improved privacy enhancing technologies.A standardised assessment of the privacy protection offered by a particular IT system; serve to help system owners understand the privacy risks in their IT system as well as help individuals, whose data is being processed, to understand their personal privacy situation. This will facilitate the development and procurement of IT systems with acceptable privacy levels, but the simple standard assessment result may also provide the basis for a certification scheme, which may help raise the confidence in the IT system’s ability to protect the privacy of the data stored and processed in the system.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Practical Privacy Assessments

IntroductIon Existing research into privacy enhancing technology (PET) has provided few answers to many of the real questions that governments and large companies are facing when they try to protect the privacy of their citizens or customers. Most of the current work has focused on technical solutions to anonymous communications and pseudonymous interactions, but, in reality, the majority of privacy violations involve careless management of government it-systems, inadequate procedures or insecure data storage. In this chapter, we introduce a method that helps system developers and managers to assess the level of privacy protection offered by their system and to identify areas where privacy should be improved. The method has been developed in the context of government IT systems in Europe, which has relatively strict privacy legislation, but we believe that the method may also apply to other government systems, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and large private companies. With the privatisation of many state monopolies, such as telecommunications and railroads, in many countries and the increasing number of public/private partnerships, the distinction between the public and private sector has grown increasingly fuzzy.1 For the purpose of clarity in our discussions, however, we have decided to use the vocabulary from government systems, so we discuss the relationships between governments and citizens instead of companies and customers. Governments are increasingly relying on information technology to provide enhanced services to the citizens and reduce the costs of the public sector. This means that an increasing amount of information about ordinary citizens is collected in an increasing number of government databases. As the amount of collected information grows and the ability to correlate information from many different databases increases, the risk that some or all of this information is disclosed to unauthorised third parties grows as well. Although most

8

citizens appear unaware or unconcerned about this risk, governments have started to worry about the dangers of privacy violations on a major scale. If the government is not seen to be able to treat information about its citizens securely, these citizens will be reluctant to provide timely and accurate information to the government in the future. Many of the same factors are relevant in the relationship between companies and their customers, so both governments and large companies have realised that protecting the privacy of their citizens and customers is necessary if they are to reap the benefits of the information society in the future. The benefits of collecting and storing information about citizens in electronic databases is an increasing level of efficiency in administrative systems and convenience for the citizens, because it provides government agencies with faster and easier access to relevant data and improves their ability to combine sets of personal data from different systems. This allows improved services at reduced costs, for example, the Inland Revenue Service in Denmark has reduced the number of employees from around 14,000 to around 9,000 in the past decade, while the amount of information that is being processed about each citizen has increased. The sheer volume of data collected by different government IT systems, however, makes it increasingly difficult for anyone to obtain an accurate picture of all the personal information that may be available in government databases. Moreover, it also makes it difficult to determine which persons, institutions or private companies that have access to the data. There have been an increasing number of incidents, where personal information has been released to unauthorised third parties, either through carelessness or through negligent administrative procedures. Financial News reports that JPMorgan Chase recently lost a container with a backup tape that includes the account information and social security numbers of some 47,000 of their Chicago-area clients according to Financial

Practical Privacy Assessments

News Online U.S. (2007). In another high profile press story, personal information including birth dates and social security numbers of 26.5million U.S. veterans was recently compromised when a laptop containing the information was stolen from the house of an employee, who had taken home the information on his laptop without authorisation, according to Sandoval (2006). Similar examples of employees who loose sensitive personal data of clients and customers have become commonplace, which lead Smith (2006) to declare 2006 “The year of the stolen laptop” and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2007) has compiled “a chronology of data breaches,” which includes a total of almost 155 million number of records containing sensitive personal information involved in security breaches from January 2005 until May 2007. These examples illustrate that privacy enhancing technologies alone cannot protect the privacy of citizens, effective enforcement of security and privacy policies and awareness among the users and mangers of IT systems are also necessary. The many press reports about privacy violations and the increasing risks associated with identity thefts, mean that privacy is becoming a major factor for both system architects and end-users. Such concerns lead to analysis and discussions with varying results depending on the parties’ individual privacy concerns and the type of system involved. Privacy enhancing initiatives are often focused on technical solutions to anonymous communications and pseudonymous interactions thus forgetting that privacy is not exclusively a technical issue. The resulting ad-hoc approach to privacy protection means that there are varying degrees of privacy protection in government IT systems. For the individual citizen, this means that there is very little insight into the amount of private data being handled in the government sector as well as the how, why, and which officials may be given access to this information. Asking the citizen’s permission every time personal data is collected ensures that the citizen knows what data has been collected, but it does not ensure that

the citizen remembers what data has been collected and what information can be inferred from the data. Informed consent, where the individual citizen agrees to the collection of private data for a specific purpose, is one of the most important instruments in data protection legislation, but it is not a realistic solution to this problem. Moreover, informed consent only addresses the collection and authorised use of private information, it does little to inform the citizens about the way that their data is stored and what procedures are in place to keep this data safe. In this chapter we present an operational privacy model that helps focus the privacy discussions on areas with the most significant privacy risks. The model defines a method that can be used to analyse the privacy properties of IT systems, which are different in their design, functionality, and the data that they process. The method helps identify privacy risks in such systems, so that they may be the subject of further analysis and discussion. Moreover, the method helps assess the magnitude of different privacy problems, so that developers may decide which problem to address first and citizens may decide whether they wish to trust the system with their personal data. While the method may be used to suggest areas of possible privacy enhancements, it does not seek to provide specific solutions to privacy problems, but leaves it to the owners of the system to develop specific solutions for the individual system. In other words, the goal of the model is to identify possible privacy risks and provide the basis for valuable privacy improvements. The assessment of privacy plays an important role in online systems because a standard privacy assessment scheme may provide the basis for a certification program that will allow individuals to decide whether they wish to interact with a particular service provider. The operational privacy assessment model proposed in this chapter is based on factual answers to a few simple questions, which makes it ideally suited for a certification scheme. The results of a privacy assessment are presented

9

Practical Privacy Assessments

in a simple graphical form, which allows a layman to determine the overall privacy protection in the examined system and identify areas with particularly high privacy risks.

prIvAcy In government It-systems There have been a number of proposals for a definition of privacy, but although some have been widely used, none have been able to meet the demands of new technologies and variations in cultures. This is why the concept today is somewhat diffuse and the definition depends highly on the context in which it is used. Generally, privacy can be described as a form of “knowledge about our existence” which we may wish to control as it is something others potentially can use against us. This knowledge can be further divided into three categories: “knowledge about our person,” “knowledge about our relationships,” and “knowledge about our behavior.” In this classification, “knowledge about our person” covers information regarding physical factors, such as information about our health, financial situation, consumer profile, current location, and recent movements. For practical reasons, it is common for individuals to share chosen parts of information from this category with selected persons or institutions. For example, health information is often shared with doctors and the health insurance agency, but this does not automatically confer a wish to share this information with friends or co-workers. The category “knowledge about our relationships” covers information about relationships with other persons or institutions. Examples of such relationships could be political and religious convictions as well as family, sexual, work related, and other relationships with friends. Even though most of these relationships involve at least one other party, the knowledge about their existence can still be sensitive and private for the individual. 0

The final category “knowledge about our behavior” covers information about us, which is not necessarily based on something physical. This can be information about our interests, habits, priorities, life-plans, and general preferences. While this information is not directly measurable, it can often be deducted from the actions of the individual, such as shopping profiles, library visits,2 and social circles. These three categories cover most aspects that define the identity of a person: the relation of this person to others and the actions of the person in this world, which allows a complete compilation of information about an individual; information that the person is likely to want to exercise some control over. Another reason why privacy is such a diffuse and widely discussed term is that it covers a large area. In order to work with the term without risking that it becomes too vague, it has to be narrowed down to what is relevant for the context of the specific task. The information which government systems requires and uses, is usually information about different physical entities or attributes, this is different from the private sector which also uses behavioral information to compile customer profiles and promote sales. The government systems manage a lot of information which falls under the category “knowledge about our person.” Even though the amount of information is extensive, it is still only a subset of the total amount of data covered by this category. By limiting the definition of privacy for the specific task of evaluating the privacy risks in a government IT system, we only consider privacy issues that are relevant in the context of administrative IT systems, so important privacy issues, such as physical surveillance through CCTV, are not addressed in this chapter. The government sector uses the personal information about an individual for identification and interaction purposes, for example, name, date of birth, location of birth, current address,

Practical Privacy Assessments

and so forth. For this reason, these data are extremely sensitive. The consequences of a breach in the security of these data can be negative for both the individual and for the government institutions that are responsible for the data. Since these data serve as the basis of identification of an individual, a breach can in worst case, lead to extensive problems with identity theft. Common for personal data stored in government systems is that they are gathered for a specific purpose. Whether this purpose is fair or is in itself a breach of privacy is a completely different discussion concerning the merits of the specific system versus the limitations to the privacy of the individual. This chapter does not enter this discussion beyond looking at whether a system has a given purpose for collecting private data or not. The goal must be to limit access, use, and processing of personal data as much as possible, while still acknowledging the purpose for which the data has been gathered. With this focus on personal data in government systems, we can finally make a task-specific definition of privacy. This definition is only applicable for use in the model described in this chapter and as such is not an attempt to make a complete and general definition of privacy. Privacy is the influence on and knowledge about the existence and use of personal data in government digital records. The requirement of knowledge about the information that is stored about the individual, gives the individual an important tool to know exactly what personal information the government has registered as well as the purpose of this registration. The requirement of influence addresses the important goal of being able to control who gets access to personal data. We use the term influence, instead of the stronger term “control,” because government systems usually

have a purpose that rarely allows the individual to completely opt-out. This chapter does not aim to propose solutions or recommendations of technical tools for protecting privacy in specific systems or generally. Instead, we define a method for evaluating systems from a privacy point of view, the result of which can be used to focus further work on improving privacy in a given system.

prIvAcy protectIon With the growth of online systems and the digitalisation of administrative procedures, the interest in the topic of user privacy is rapidly increasing. Much of the work being done in securing privacy is being focused on defining and developing technical tools and standards for the protection of private information according to Pfitzmann and Köhntopp (2000) and the European Parliament (1995). These tools seek to maximise privacy in systems by minimising the amount of and restricting the access to personally identifiable data as well as the amount of information that can be gathered from the interactions between private parties and services. However, these methods are often hampered or outright prevented by the functional requirements of the systems they seek to secure. For example, many financial systems require the real name of its users in order to meet accountability requirements, so these requirements prevent the system from implementing privacy through anonymity or pseudonymity.3 When the requirements of the individual systems prevent the implementation of technical privacy, other means are needed to ensure the best possible level of privacy protection. While the technical privacy enhancing technologies may be readily available, their full effect on the privacy of a system is often hard to measure, especially in the cases where these tools cannot be used to their full effect.



Practical Privacy Assessments

technical privacy Issues According to Pfitzmann and Köhntopp (2000), contemporary privacy research, tools, and general public interest is largely focused on the technical issues of anonymity, pseudonymity, unobservability, and unlinkability. These four concepts also define the privacy class of the common criteria security evaluation described by International Organization for Standardization (1999). The four concepts define different levels of anonymity, from pseudonymity, which provides some level of accountability at the risk of allowing profiling, to unlinkability, where two transactions issued by the same anonymous user cannot be linked to each other. The technical tools for protecting privacy are very efficient, but they often impose serious restrictions on the applications and generally introduce a considerable performance penalty. This means that there is often a direct conflict between privacy concerns and the desired functionality of a given system.

operational privacy Issues In cases where functional requirements limit the applicability of privacy enhancing technologies, there should be other safeguards in place to ensure the best possible level of privacy protection. Usually, such safeguards consist of legislation and operational procedures that ensure that data is handled with care. Legislation and operational procedures cannot directly enforce privacy policies, so they cannot guarantee that privacy risks are eliminated. The work presented in this chapter addresses systems where technical tools alone cannot secure privacy. Working with practical privacy protection starts in the systems design phase where the required amount and structure of personal data is determined and where input from laws and interest groups are essential. The legislation must be considered to ensure that the system conforms to the law; both with respect to



what information should be collected and with respect to what information must not be collected. External interest groups often have useful perspectives on the scope of information that should be collected and the necessary procedures for auditing the use of data. Once the system is up and running, it is still possible to improve privacy by ensuring that only properly trained personnel have access to personal identifying data, as well as improving the amount and quality of information available to the registered individuals. Properly defined operational procedures are therefore an important element in the protection of privacy, because they instruct personnel what data should be collected and how that data should be handled so that legislation is followed.

Influence on Privacy The level of privacy protection that is required for a specific system depends on the type of system and the type of personal identifiable information that is managed in the system. There are three primary categories that influence privacy by defining demands that the system must meet.

Actors Actors are individuals and institutions, such as political parties, interest groups, and industry lobbyists, whose work directly or indirectly influence the public opinion about privacy. Their mutual interests and conflicts can often influence the level of privacy protection implemented in a government IT system. Actors that influence privacy rarely aim to violate privacy directly. Often, it is the negative side effects of suggestions to change other parts of the system, which end up influencing privacy in a negative way, for example, proposals to increase surveillance as part of anti-terror legislations are meant to save innocent lives, but they are obviously detrimental to privacy. Privacy activists, on the other hand,

Practical Privacy Assessments

often work directly with privacy with the aim to protect the private sphere. There are three main types of actors: •

•

•

Government actors are identified by owning or controlling one or more public systems. The actor’s relationship with personal data is often a wish to reduce the workload through use of IT systems, which often includes processing of personal data. Commercial actors are identified by being driven by a commercial interest. An actor can be an industry association or a private company. The operation of a government IT system can sometimes be outsourced to a commercial actor. Many commercial actors have interest in the data they collect, which may be used for marketing purposes. Non government organisations (NGO) are a large group of different organisations. These are identified by being motivated by the members’ political or social goals. NGOs are not motivated by commercial or government interests.4

General for all actors is that their willingness to work for a solution to a specific problem depends on how important the problem is within the scope of the actor. Another factor is how controversial a given system is, because actors often want to set their “mark” on high profile cases.

legislation Although laws are the result of the work of politicians, they are still a decisive factor in government systems, because they are more consistent and stable than the mind of politicians and other actors. An example of such legislations is the “Data Protection Directive” from the European Parliament (1995), which is defined to protect personal data. The goal of this directive is to harmonise

the privacy laws in the individual member states. All member states of the EU have to follow the directive, so there is a relatively high level of privacy protection in the European Union and the directive ensures that privacy is protected when new legislation is introduced in any member state of EU. This legislation protects personal information in both commercial and government systems. The legislation also prevents data form inside the EU from being transferred to countries outside the EU, unless the country guarantees the same level of privacy protection as countries in the EU. It protects individuals, giving them some basic rights, for example, to access data, to know the origin of the data, and to withhold permission to the use of data in some cases. The advantage of defining privacy rights in legislation is that public institutions not always have an obvious interest in the protection of privacy, but they always have an interest in following the law. Without legislation, the developers will design the systems according to their own ideas, but the law ensures some basic rules for privacy protection.

culture Culture is an important factor in the perception of privacy, and it often decides when privacy issues are of interest. Cultures with a relaxed attitude towards the protection of privacy are also less likely to protest against the development of systems to process personal data. Even within the EU, there are large variations between the citizens’ privacy concerns in the different countries. According to a privacy poll performed by the European Opinion Research Group (2003), countries such as Denmark, Spain, and Portugal have populations where only 13% are very concerned about their privacy, but the populations of countries such as Greece and Sweden are much more concerned about privacy with 58% and 54% of their respective populations stating that they are very concerned



Practical Privacy Assessments

about their privacy. It is interesting to note that these large differences occur in spite of similar data protection laws within the European Union, which suggest to us that the culture of the individual country may play an important role in the privacy concerns of its citizens. The result of this variation is that systems, which in some countries would be faced with severe public concern, might be more easily introduced in other, less privacy concerned, countries. There is a huge difference in how the three categories, actors, legislation, and culture influence privacy in government systems. There are actors, who drive new initiatives. Legislation, on the other hand limits the development of systems. Culture is also an important factor, since it influences the values that can limit the use and development of new systems.

•

though this is conflicting with legislation. Political change can change the foundation for new privacy legislation. Even though the change might not be introduced to limit privacy, optimisation or detection of benefit fraud can introduce circumstances where privacy is violated beyond the people committing the fraud. In this case, both technology and previous legislation help identify risks of the change.

These examples all show that both technology and legislation in different ways influence the development of privacy, and protect the individual from harm of future change.

prIvAcy enhAncIng technologIes

privacy maintenance Privacy is not clearly defined and the composition of the three categories of actors in the privacy field tends to change over time, so the privacy risks also change over time. This is important to keep in mind when designing new systems or legislation, because both will have to be updated at regular intervals. There are two main areas that serve to maintain the privacy of citizens, “the legislation based protection” and “the technology based protection.” The risk of placing protection in legislation is that it can be changed. What is legal today might not be legal next year. Therefore, there are different factors that have to be considered: •

•



The development of technology can open for new ways to use data. In this case the legislation could limit the influence of this factor. The environment of the system (the world around the system), a good example of this is the anti-terror legislation. Privacy may here be protected by technology protection, even

Privacy enhancing technologies (PET) are the technical tools used to protect privacy. The term does not cover all privacy enhancing methods as there are many means to protect privacy that do not involve technology. This means that for a given system, which processes personal data, there is a whole range of elements that influence privacy. Again, these elements are not limited to technical aspect of data security, but also concerns practical aspects such as the privacy awareness of the system builder, the system operators, and the individual user. Another aspect is the availability of contact points for the registered individual. As such, interaction between government and private persons present a range of potential privacy-risk areas; communications, data-storage, and dataprocessing: •

Communication: This privacy risk area concerns the risk of someone eaves dropping when private information is sent or received across any communications channel. This could be a person sending an online request to the local library or someone filling in

Practical Privacy Assessments

•

•

their tax return online. This area concerns using encryption schemes such as public key encryption described by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (1978) and the International Organization for Standardization (2006), but also hiding the sender and receiver of the messages as developed by Chaum (1988). Data-storage: This concerns the risks associated with storing private data electronically for later use. Later use could be report production or data-mining. Stored data could be the loan records stored in the library systems or the tax returns. Stanton (2004) describes how both physical and cryptographic mechanisms exist to prevent intruders from accessing stored data either remotely or through common theft of the storage media. Data-processing: This covers the risks that arise when personal information is somehow used to make decisions. This concerns both human processing where a person evaluates the data, and automated processing where a computer makes the evaluation. An example of a process like this could be a librarian registering the return of a book or a tax auditor examining a tax return. The area covers employee’s access, such as role-based access control described by Ferraiolo and Kuhn (1992) and interaction with data as well as the registered individuals control (Blaze, Feigenbaum, & Lacy, 1996) and information procedures.

These three terms cover the spectrum of privacy risks in government systems, but they are far too generic to base an exact evaluation on. Therefore these three areas are decomposed into their privacy relevant components.

into hiding the very fact that a communication is going on, since the fact that you are talking to someone may be private information. For example, an employer that monitors outgoing telephone calls may discover that an employee has called a recruitment agency, which breaks the privacy of the employee, although the contents of the conversations are unknown. There are many technical tools that protect the communication channels, such as SSL5 and Pretty Good Privacy created by Zimmermann (1995). Pfitzmann and Köhntopp (2000) found that there are many issues that have to be addressed in secure communications, but most of these can be generalized into three main areas: •

•

•

Anonymity: Defined as being unable to identify sender and receiver within a space of possible senders and receivers Unlinkability: Defined as being unable to relate separate message even with knowledge of the channels being used. This ensures that a third party cannot link repeated communications with the same or different resources, back to a user.6 Unobservability: Defined as not being able to distinguish messages sent between two points, they will look like any other message or random noise.

Pseudonymity is defined by Pfitzmann and Köhntopp (2000) as the use of pseudonym IDs; this is worth mentioning here, because it is often the best solution in systems where total anonymity is impossible or impractical. While pseudonymity is an improvement over directly identifiable information, it cannot match the privacy of anonymization of data as long as it is reversible.

data-storage communication Privacy in communication is very much a matter of securing the transmissions. But it also extends

Storing data securely is also a task that relates to IT security. The task here is that data must be protected against both theft and loss through



Practical Privacy Assessments

negligence. While a locked vault can guarantee protection against theft from outsiders, it does not protect against employees losing their laptop with copies of private data on it. This means that not only must the physical protection be considered, but also whether the data itself is protected, for example encrypted, on disk using something like an encrypted file system as described by Zadok, Badulescu, and Shender (1998). In the context of privacy, the sensitivity of data being stored is also important, that is, the more sensitive the data being stored is, the larger the risks and consequences of theft will be. Therefore, it is important to assess the degree of sensitivity of the data stored in the system and the possible consequences of a privacy violation (e.g., caused by a security breach). This highlights the importance of storing as little sensitive data as is possible. Data-storage also concerns providing access to the stored data to authorised personnel. This raises the problems of who should be authorised to see the information and how much information an individual employee should be allowed to see. The answers to these questions differ a lot from system to system but also within a single system, as there can be large variations in the level of access required depending on the person’s function. For a government system, it is possible to identify five separate interest groups relating to a system’s data. The first group is management who has an interest in the proper treatment of data, but who is also interested in increasing efficiency thus reducing costs. The second group is the employees who, idle curiosity aside, primarily are concerned with getting the data they need to do their job. The third group is the society at large, which has an interest in the data’s use in statistical reports and scientific research but also that current laws and regulations are upheld. The fourth group consists of commercial interest groups that may have interests in using private data for targeted marketing and product development; generally this interest extends to getting access to as much data as pos-



sible. Finally, the registered users themselves have an obvious interest in their private data, that it is treated responsibly and well protected. With the large variation in the protection of stored data, it is important to also look at the privacy issues in access control, because it is important to restrict the access to only those who really need it, and only when they need it. In a report published by the European Parliament (2006) it is found that many security breaches today are made by employees or others with legitimate access to data and it is important to consider this problem as well when protecting privacy

data-processing A very privacy sensitive person may argue that privacy is broken whenever personal data is being processed. However, in government systems there is often a reason for the processing of personal information, which just has to be accepted. The discussion of whether the purpose of a specific system in itself is a breach of privacy, such as the current transfer of airline passenger data between European Union and United Stats of America (2007), is another discussion. Here we focus on the three components of data-processing that are important in a privacy evaluation. •

•

Confidentiality is important when private data is processed. Any persons with access must know and follow the requirements of confidentiality. Furthermore, it is important that only the data directly relevant to the process is made available, so that peripheral information does not affect the results of the process. Completeness means that the data used in the process must be both complete and correct to ensure that faulty decisions are not made based on the data. Erroneous processing could also lead to further breaches of privacy.

Practical Privacy Assessments

•

Insight is important for the people whose personal data is being processed. Insight means access to information about what data has been used in what processes and what the conclusions are as well as who did the processing. This allows citizens to either accept the use of personal data or to raise objections if they feel that their privacy is being violated.

A further development of ensuring confidentiality, completeness and insight, would be to allow a person lesser or greater control over data-processing involving his or her personal data. While this quickly becomes complicated when considering large systems, it is still desirable from a privacy point of view.

frameworks for privacy evaluation There have been some initial efforts to define a common framework for discourse about privacy. Lederer, Mankoff, and Dey (2003) have done similar work on dividing the different privacy problems into more general categories in order to improve the clarity of discussions. Their work aims to improve discourse on the subject of privacy in regards to different technical tools and protocols. Their work is, however, not immediately applicable when evaluating a single system which may include several privacy enhancing technologies. Their work allows for comparisons on the effects of different privacy enhancing tools but does not extend to comparing systems. Yu and Cysneiros (2002) have presented a framework to help design systems while satisfying, the sometimes contradicting, demands of privacy, usability, and functionality. Their work establishes a method for engineers to evaluate the effects that different design decisions have on the privacy and general usability of the system. The framework is, however, very detailed and does not naturally extend into non-technical

privacy improvements, which limits its use for non-engineers.

operAtIonAl prIvAcy Assessment model In the following, we present a method to assess the level of privacy protection offered by government IT systems that contain sensitive data. The model defines a method to identify and highlight privacy issues either during the development of the system or as an evaluation of an existing system. The method gives a standardised evaluation of privacy, which is not influenced by the current state of technology or current moral standards. This evaluation can then be used to apply more focused solutions for upgrading privacy, solutions which are tailored to the design of the specific system and its functional requirements. Applying the model to a system in its design phase allows the system designer to evaluate the privacy issues of the current design and the effects that different design choices may have on privacy. Focusing on these issues already, before implementation, makes it significantly easier to ensure minimal privacy risks in the final system. The method does not prescribe or recommend specific solutions to these privacy issues, but only highlight areas that could benefit from additional privacy protection. The method also produces results in a simple graphical form that can be used to compare two possible design alternatives for the current system or two systems with similar functionality, which can be useful when having to choose between systems.

Identifying privacy factors The model divides the factors that influence privacy into different categories, where each category describes an element of privacy protection. Using the component breakdown in the fourth section,



Practical Privacy Assessments

we have defined a range of privacy factors, which are divided into seven main categories that are explained below. The division into categories helps keep the model simple to work with. Each category has its distinct privacy focus, which decides the elements it contains. It is important that the factors cover all the categories of privacy identified in the second section as well as the problem areas described in the fourth section, to ensure that the result of the model gives a complete image of the privacy situation. Each category may be further divided into subcategories that cover more specific fields of privacy, but are still within the scope of the main category. The different categories and subcategories do not only focus on technical solutions, but also on practical aspects relating to the operation of the system, such as “how is data stored?,” “who has access to the data?,” and “what personal data is recorded?” The categories are defined as follows: Data protection: This category covers the risks concerning data being leaked or stolen. This is the area of privacy that prevents an outsider from gaining direct access to the private data, either where it is stored or in transit over the network. The category is to a high degree based on traditional IT security tools. The major areas of concern are:

The focus of this category is very technical and is considered a traditional topic in IT security. Encryption and physical security are well known and widely used security mechanisms and though they are not designed as specific privacy tools, the effects they achieve amounts to the same. A system failing to get a decent score in this category not only has problems with privacy, but problems with the general security of the system as well. Sensitivity: This category covers the sensitivity of data stored and managed by the system. The sensitivity is an expression of the amount of damage a privacy breach could do. The category identifies privacy risks in a given system, so it must include the techniques that are used to protect data, in case it is leaked or stolen, such as separation of sensitive data, from less sensitive data. This means that the category works to accomplish a measurement of the sensitivity of the data, as well as whether this sensitivity has been lowered by separating identifiable information from the rest of the data. The focus areas of this category are:

•

•

•

8

Storage of private data. For private data, both the physical security of the storage media is important, but also that the data is encrypted should a theft occur. Communication of private data. This covers the security of communication channels carrying private data between users of a system. In order to ensure privacy, it is important to consider both the security of the data packets and the identity of the communicating parties, that is, hiding the identities of the sender and the receiver to prevent traffic analysis.

•

Risk profile which is a measure of the sensitivity of the data in a system. The measure ranges from items of low sensitivity, for example, phone numbers, to items of high sensitivity such as medical records. ID-separation is a measure of the degree in which identification data has been separated from the operational data in a system. The use of pseudonyms, instead of real names, would provide a low separation, while use of completely anonymized data would provide a high degree of separation.

The possible score of this category is highly dependant on the context and the function of the system, for example, medical journaling system for an emergency room will probably never be able to get a perfect score.

Practical Privacy Assessments

Environment: This category covers the entire environment that surrounds the system. The environment includes all aspects relating to privacy, from the ability of interested parties to comment on and influence the development process, to the production environment of the system. The category seeks to assess the work that has been done to ensure that the system has been subjected to examination and comments have been received by special interest groups and the like. It also examines whether the system is seen to conform to applicable laws and to what degree parts or the whole of the system is outsourced to other companies with different interests or to other nations with different cultures. The major areas of concern for this category are: •

•

•

Influence concerns whether the concerns and comments of public interest groups have been sought and whether they have come to a common understanding. Law and regulation must be followed and it is important to note whether there has been a professional to check the systems compliance. Outsourcing can lead to problems arising from differences in culture and interests. Outsourcing covers not only outsourcing to other countries but also outsourcing from government agencies to private companies.

This category is mostly important during the development phase of the system. Its purpose is to prevent closed and secretive development of systems handling private data by emphasising the values of open and publicly scrutinised systems. Surveillance: This category covers the surveillance capabilities that the system provides to the operators of the system. This includes who has interest in the data, and how easy it is to link data from this system to other datasets. The category establishes to what degree the system limits its

gathering of data, as well as how much it uses of common identifiers that can easily be linked to other datasets. The focus areas are: •

•

Limiting data is about ensuring that only the necessary data are collected and processed in a system. In order to minimize privacy issues a system should resist the lure to collect more data than needed, that is, the system should not collect data which is nice-to-have, but should limit itself to only collect data that it needs-to-have. Common identifiers concern the use of identifiers which are used in other databases and therefore allows for data to be joined from one or more separate databases. Identifiers such as social security numbers are especially dangerous in this regard.

While data-mining may solve a number of important problems for governments and large organisations, it is a very large threat to an individual’s privacy. While data contained in individual databases may not present a serious privacy threat in itself, the combination of data from many databases may provide the ability to infer large amounts of private information about an individual. Ordinary use: This category covers how data is processed when it is used on a daily basis. The category examines how risks of data leaks are handled, and what is done to reduce individual users’ access to sensitive data. This important category establishes how the operators of the system are trained to handle such data and to what degree they are restricted in their data access. Finally, the category examines the operators’ ability to remove the private data from its security framework by, for instance, printing the data. The category focuses on the following areas: •

Education covers the training received by the personnel, such as case workers, that are actively working with people’s private data

9

Practical Privacy Assessments

•

•

on a daily basis. Basically, this establishes whether the employees have been informed or educated about privacy and the data they have access to. Access control concerns to what degree the systems restrict individual employee’s access to data. Generally, tighter restrictions on data access are better for privacy. User storage is generally about the ability of the system’s user to remove private data from the security framework, for example, by taking data home on their laptop or by printing cases.

Often within IT security, the greatest threats to a systems comes from the employees. This is no different for privacy where it may be much more common as something as casual curiosity can be difficult to detect or prevent. Transparency: This category covers the level of information that the system provides to its users about privacy risks in the system. For example if the system is able to tell the user why and for what purpose the data is collected. The category also examines to what degree the users are able to influence the way that data is processed in the system. More specifically, the category examines how well the system manages to inform the registered people about the purpose of the registration and the system, contact points, the registered persons’ rights, and exactly what data are processed. The major areas of concern in this category are: •

•

0

Purpose concerns whether the system has a well defined purpose, which motivates the collection of private data and whether the registered individuals are informed about this purpose. Contacts concerns how easy it is for individuals to get in touch with representatives of the system, making it possible to get information or make complaints about it.

•

•

Information of rights covers to what degree a system informs registered individuals of their rights, if any, relating to the processing of their private data. Information of data covers the amount of information that registered individuals receive from a system about what data has been collected. This also extends to any extra information the individuals receive about the processing of their data. For example, the names of case workers and such.

This category of privacy is less about preventing privacy breaches and more about ensuring that every person whose private data is collected and processed is informed of this and given the necessary knowledge and opportunity to ask questions and raise objections. Control: This category covers the controls that the system implements to check the use and storage of the data. This includes both the user’s control of data correctness and external audits of the system. The category examines the user’s own level of control with data in the system, but also the level of outside impartial controls to ensure that the system is only doing what it is supposed to do. Finally, the category examines the system’s own functions to ensure that data is correct and coherent. The major focus areas of the category are: •

•

Registered individual’s control concerns the level of control an individual is given in the processing of his or her data. Such controls could include the ability to decide who gets access to the data and who should be denied access to the data. Data correctness concerns the quality of the private data. This examines whether a system double-checks data with other data sources and/or whether individuals are encouraged to check and correct errors.

Practical Privacy Assessments

•

Audit covers the controls of the system and its functions. A higher score is given for audits performed by independent sources but even internal audits are better than no control.

The category examines the controls that ensure a running system is performing according to its purpose. With private information being held in the system, the registered individuals have an interest in being able to check that this information is not being misused. This also helps to build trust between the system and the users. Audits may be introduced to ensure that the system performs correctly, even when the users are failing to check the system or when they do not know how to check the system. Finally, auditors may also be allowed to check parts of the system that are not visible to the users.

Privacy and Privacy Factors The privacy factors are derived from a compilation of several sources. The model emphasises the need to cover not only the traditional privacy protection in the form of classic IT security and related technical tools, but also the practical handling of privacy data. The traditional security factors are according to Jansen and Peen (2007) partly identified by the common criteria security evaluation scheme which has a category covering privacy. This set is further expanded on by the focus areas of privacy enhancing technologies as described in the fourth section. A state-of-the-art analysis into current privacy enhancing technologies is used to identify the possibilities in privacy protection. It is this set of possible privacy tools that define the technical factors in the privacy model and the score of each factor (as each factors’ score is based on how well privacy is protected in relation to how well privacy can be protected). The rest of the factors concern the more practical privacy protection or risk reduction. These factors are the ones focusing more on the operational privacy

issues covered in the third section. These factors are defined so that they cover the privacy risks arising from the different interests and motivations of the actors in a system. These factors also cover legislation and cultural issues. Combined, this aims to cover the definition of privacy in context as defined in the second section. Some overlap does exist between the technical and the practical factors as a result of similarities in the cause of the specific privacy risk. In these cases, the factors have been kept separate to assess the technical and practical solutions separately, as they are not mutually exclusive.

Measuring Privacy Factors The results of the evaluation of each category will finally be used to sum up a final result. To produce a result set which can be compared to other sets, it is important that the results are treated uniformly. The operational privacy assessment model defines a series of questions designed to determine the level of privacy protection that the system provides within each category. The specific questions each address one of the issues covered by the category. The questions are designed to result in a percentage score ranging from 0% in cases of the highest privacy risk, to 100% in cases of the lowest possible privacy risk. Each possible answer to a question, results in a score that reflects the possible steps taken (or lack of steps taken) to reduce the privacy risks. Note that the score goes towards 100% as you approach the steps taken to ensure privacy which are practically possible, and not just theoretically possible. These questions are compiled into a questionnaire that should be answered by someone who knows about the design and operation of the system within the different areas covered by the questionnaire. Typically, the head of IT services will be able to answer most of these questions, but she may delegate some questions to someone who are more familiar with a particular topic. The answers to the questions within each sub-category are aggregated into



Practical Privacy Assessments

a single score for each of the seven categories, which may then be plotted on a chart that shows seven percentage values, one for each category. The score for each sub-category is calculated by simply reading of the recorded answer to each question, which is always a percentage value. If there are several valid answers to a particular question, the assessment method selects the one that gives the lowest score. This enforces the policy that no chain is stronger than the weakest link. The result of each category is then calculated as the average of the questions in each sub-category. The averaging produces seven discrete results, one for each of the above categories. Example: Consider a system that contains sensitive personal data. An evaluation of the category “Sensitivity” requires an evaluation of two subcategories: ID-Separation and Risk Profile, which may receive the following scores: “ID-Separation = 0%” because “the person is completely identified” (i.e., the highest possible privacy risk) and “Risk Profile = 50%” because “the sensitivity of personal data is medium” (i.e., the medium of possible privacy risk). With these results, the final result is calculated as a simple average, which gives 25%. This category score is then used as one of the seven scores in the final result.

Privacy Assessment Questionnaire As previously mentioned, the practical assessment of privacy is based on a series of questions answered by a person who is familiar with the system that is being evaluated. These questions are presented in the form of a questionnaire, where each question has a few standard answers that are associated with a numerical value. The scale of these values is equidistant, which means that there is no way to differentiate between systems that offer the same type of protection with different degrees of security, that is, there is no difference in the value of a server that is locked in a normal server room and a server locked in a highly se-



cured area, such as a bunker. This is done because precise weights on this type of issues depends on too many factors that differs from system to system, so we have decided on a unified scale, so the differences in security is only made evident by a combination of questions. The underlying categories for each question are identified in the section on identifying privacy factors and the way we associate numerical values with each answer is presented in the section on measuring privacy factors. The first page of a standard questionnaire is presented in Figure 1. In the following, we present the questions for each category and the numerical values associated with each of the possible standard answers that we have identified. Data protection: This category considers the protection of data that are being stored in the system as well as data being transmitted between components in the system. The data protection classes are shown in Table 1. Sensitivity: This category describes the sensitivity of the data managed in the system. This includes a risk profile based on the inherent sensitivity of the data and id-separation, which describes how easy it is to link data to a physical (real world) identity. The sensitivity classes are shown in Table 2: Environment: The questions pertaining to the environment focus primarily on factors relating to the development of the system. Questions include whether relevant external organisations have been consulted in the development process, whether competent advice has been sought regarding the legal aspects, and whether parts of the development has been outsourced to another country, where the privacy legislation or culture of community living may be different. The standard environment classes are shown in Table 3. Surveillance: This category addresses the surveillance capabilities that the system offers to the operators of the system. These capabilities are normally controlled by limiting the amount of data collected and preventing linkability through

Practical Privacy Assessments

Table 1. Standard data protection classes

Table 2. Standard sensitivity classes Risk profile

Storage 1.

No protection

0%

1.

Highly sensitive data

0%

2.

Protected against physical theft or encrypted

50%

2.

Sensitive data

50%

3.

Protected against physical theft and encrypted

100%

3.

Normal public accessible data

100%

ID-separation

Communication 1.

No protection

0%

2.

Protected against wire tapping but not against identification

50%

3.

Protected against wire tapping and identification

100%

the use of common identifiers. The standard surveillance classes are shown in Table 4. Ordinary use: This category focus on problems relating to the day to day operation of the system. This includes the education of staff with respect to privacy issues, the implementation of the necessary access controls to enforce the need-to-know principle, and the ability to make off-line copies of data that are not subject to the controls implemented by the system. The standard ordinary use classes are shown in Table 5. Transparency: This category focus on the registered person’s ability to ascertain the purpose

1.

No protection—identification is possible

0%

2.

Responsible pseudonyms

33%

3.

Pseudonyms data

66%

4.

Full protection—anonymised data

100%

for registering personal information, contact the agents who operate the system, find out what rights they have with respect to the registered data, and the actual right that registered people have with respect to the private date managed in the system. The standard transparency classes are shown in Table 6. Control: The final category addresses the external controls imposed on the system by the registered users and auditors. These controls include the procedures put in place to ensure the correctness of data managed by the system. The standard control classes are shown in Table 7.

Table 3. Standard environment classes Influence 1.

Developed without from external organizations help or users

0%

2.

Developed with a few external organizations or users

33%

3.

Developed with external organizations and/or users

66%

4.

Developed with many external organization and users, with high public attention

100%

Law and regulation 1.

Developed without legal advice

0%

2.

Developed legal advice

50%

3.

Approved by the authorities

100%

Outsourcing 1.

Developed with all development outsourced to a foreign country

0%

2.

Developed with some/all of the development outsourced to a company that is covered by the same laws

50%

3.

Not outsourced

100%



Practical Privacy Assessments

prIvAcy Assessment

Table 4. Standard surveillance classes Limiting data 1.

Collection all possible data, for possible later data processing

0%

2.

Collection of some extra data

50%

3.

Limited data collection

100%

Common identifiers 1.

Social security numbers used for identification

0%

2.

Some system depended identifiers and social security numbers

50%

3.

System depended identifiers and no social security numbers

100%

To present an intuitive overview of the operational privacy assessment results calculated by our method, and to enable a comparison of the different results of the categories, we suggest displaying the results using a Kiviat graph defined by Kolence and Kiviat (1973), where each category is represented by an axis. The chart displays the strength and weaknesses of the system tested. High privacy protection is placed at the edge of the chart and low privacy protection is placed close Table 6. Standard transparency classes

The assessed systems score with respect to these different classes is determined through a questionnaire, which is completed by a person who is familiar with the different aspects of the development and operation of the system. An example of the first page of a questionnaire is shown in Figure 1.

Table 5. Standard ordinary use classes

Purpose 1.

There is not given information about purpose of system

0%

2.

There is not given information about purpose of system. But there is access to some part of the data.

25%

3.

There is not given information about purpose of system. But there is access to all of the data.

50%

4.

There is given information about purpose of system. And there is access to some part of the data.

75%

5.

There is given information about purpose of system. And there is access to all of the data.

100%

Education 1.

No information about privacy issues

0%

2.

Warning about system containing sensitive data

33%

3.

Informed about how to handle sensitive data

66%

4.

Educated in handling sensitive data

100%

Access control

Contacts 1.

No official way to contact system owner

0%

2.

It is possible to contact system owner, but this is not public knowledge

50%

3.

Official and public known ways to contact system owner

100%

Information of rights

1.

Open system full access to data

0%

2.

Closed systems were some users have access to all data

33%

3.

Some segregation of duties, where access is granted depending on job description

66%

4.

Full segregation of duties, including geographical segregation

100%

1.

No information about information rights

0%

2.

The simple rights are available

50%

3.

The rights are available and explained in a decent manner

100%

Information of data 1.

It is not possible to see registered data or know how it is processed

0%

User storage



1.

Extraction data is possible without requirement for encryption

0%

2.

It is possible to see registered data, but not to know how it is processed

33%

2.

Extraction data is possible with requirement for encryption

50%

3.

It is possible to see registered data, and know some about how it is processed

66%

3.

No extraction of data is possible

100%

4.

It is possible to see registered data, and know how it is processed

100%

Practical Privacy Assessments

Figure 1. First page in a privacy assessment questionnaire



Practical Privacy Assessments

Figure 2. Example of a Kiviat graph from a fictitious system

Table 7. Standard control classes Registered individual’s control 1.

No control of the data

0%

2.

The process is described but no control

33%

3.

Parts of the process are controllable

66%

4.

All parts of the process are controllable

100%

Data correctness 1.

Not possible to check

0%

2.

Only some administrators can see and correct the data

33%

3.

All administrators can see and correct the data

66%

4.

Individuals can see and correct the data

100%

1.

No audit

0%

2.

Occasional audit

33%

3.

Internal audit by official schedule

66%

4.

Independent audit by official schedule

100%

Audit

to the centre of the chart. When the scores are connected a heptagon is formed, and the area of the graph depends on the total score with a small area showing high privacy risk and a larger area showing lesser privacy risks. Figure 2 shows a fictional government IT system. It shows that the privacy protection of the system is strong in the categories environment, ordinary use, and control; the system has average scores in surveillance and data protection; and the areas sensitivity and transparency have weak privacy protection. These final two areas would possibly benefit from further work to improve their privacy level.

prIvAcy Assessment evAluAtIon When the privacy protection instruments of a given system is evaluated, it is important to examine both the quality of the privacy enhancing technologies employed in the system and the



operational environment of the system, which includes privacy legislation, system operation, and education of the managers and end-users of the system. The privacy assessment method presented in this paper includes all of these factors.

prIvAcy Assessment methodology Producing the assessment result using the model means that for each of the seven categories in the model, the components must be assigned a percentage value as described in the fifth section. The specific values are found by establishing the amount of work done to protect privacy in a scale between no work and all that is possible. Such values can be found through setting a number of possible levels of work and assigning each level a value. For example, to determine the amount of work done to protect privacy through audits, in the category control, four possible levels can be used (see Box 1). When determining which level is achieved by the system, the lowest denominator has precedence, for example, an occasional independent audit will only score 33%. Completing these evaluations for all categories and their components produces the values required to calculate the cat-

Practical Privacy Assessments

Box 1. Privacy through audit 1. 2. 3. 4.

No audits Occasional audit Internal audits by official schedule Independent audits by official schedule

egory scores and the Kiviat graph as described in the fifth section. Realizing the full benefit of a completed evaluation is an important two-step process, where the first step identifies the areas of potential privacy improvements and the second step further analyzes privacy risks and identifies more specific privacy improvements. Initially, an evaluation using the model will result in a Kiviat graph visualising privacy protection in a given system as illustrated by Figure 2. In this visualization, the dimensions with the lowest scores are the most immediately interesting as they represent the largest risks and therefore the largest potential areas for improvements. It is unlikely that all privacy risk areas can be improved, because the system’s functional requirements may prevent some privacy improvements. For example, a system requiring large amounts of very sensitive data will receive a low score in sensitivity, representing the high risk associated, and will be unable to improve on that score. The discovery of such areas is in itself valuable information that allows the system owners to counter this risk using other precautions and/or raising the demands in other areas. The results of the privacy assessment must therefore be interpreted in the context of the functional requirements of the system and the limits these requirements impose. The model does not seek to conclude on the question of whether the systems benefits are sufficient for the associated privacy risks to be accepted, it merely seeks to determine and clarify these privacy risks. Once the overall assessment has been completed, more specific improvements can be found by looking at the individual dimensions.

0% 33% 66% 100%

The dimensions with the lowest scores represent the greatest areas of privacy threats, which are often the most efficient areas to start with, but are not necessarily the easiest which is why the overall assessment in step one is important. For each dimension, the specific issues that cause the low score can be easily identified. It is for these specific issues that the system owners and developers should try to identify and implement possible improvements. While the evaluation presents the specific privacy issues in a system, it does not provide the specific solutions. The method of improving the individual solutions is highly dependant on the type and structure of the specific system. Any solution must therefore be tailored to the specific system using industry approved methods and tools. This means that there is a certain amount of work to be done finding an optimal solution for each of the specific privacy issues. Once all the issues of a dimension have been examined, and improved if possible, the work can continue to the next dimension having a low score. This continues as long as time or budgets allows or until all dimensions have been adequately analyzed.

prIvAcy Assessment scenArIos In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed privacy assessment model, we have defined two application scenarios, which illustrate how our model may be used to assess the privacy properties of these scenarios. In each scenario, we provide a description of the setting and the immediate results of an assessment for each category



Practical Privacy Assessments

of the model. Also, the resulting Kiviat graph is presented. After the two scenarios we discuss a comparison of the results.

scenario 1 The first scenario defines a simple medical journaling system used by doctors and small clinics. The data stored in the system is personal medical information, which is by nature very sensitive. The journaling system is integrated with the doctor or small clinic’s existing IT system, which also stores the data. The system does not encrypt data but the door to the office is locked after opening hours. The system is developed by a small development company and is only used by a handful of doctors and clinics. The system uses social security numbers to identify patients and stores any personal data that the doctors find relevant. The clerks at the medical clinic have no special training regarding management of personal information and they have the same access to the system as the doctor. The system allows doctors to print individual patient’s journals so that they can bring them on a house call or take them home. Patients’ data are entered into the system the first time they visit the clinic and updated at subsequent visits. The data in the system does not expire and there is no external audit of the system. The patients can, upon request, receive a copy of their data but they are not otherwise informed about the contents or functions of the system and the patient has no direct control of the stored data. Assessment Results: Using our model, we get a specific result for each category which indicates the level of privacy risks in each category. Data protection: While the overall score in this category is relatively high, the model shows an evident opportunity for improvement by encrypting the stored private data. The system scores 25%. Sensitivity: The category notes some very large risks inherent in a system with this sort of

8

data. Also, the system is too small to properly separate the identification data from the rest of the set. A low score in the category warns that extra care should be taken. The system scores 12%. Environment: As a result of the closed development, the system is unable to achieve a top score in this category. The system scores 33%. Surveillance: The system scores low in this category as a result of the unrestricted amount of personal data, the high sensitivity of the data, as well as the use of common identifiers such as social security numbers. The system scores 0%. Ordinary use: A bottom score in this category reveals a lot of room for improvement. The clerk has no training in handling personal data and there are no levels of access to differentiate between what data the different users can access. Also, any security in the system is lost when the data is printed or otherwise copied out of the system. The system scores 8%. Transparency: While the system is not a secret, it does little to actively inform the registered persons. This makes it harder for the registered person and thus lowers the score of the category. The system scores 46%. Control: A lack of system revision as well as the registered individual having very little to say in how and why the data is processed. The system scores 22%.

scenario 2 This scenario is similar to Scenario 1, but with a different system. The journaling system in this scenario is developed by the IT branch of a large medical company which also hosts and serves the data from its central server farms. These server farms securely stores the data and communicates with the clinics using encrypted channels. The system is able to share data with hospitals and provides online access for the patients to their data. The system uses social security numbers to identify patients and stores any personal data the doctors find relevant. The clerks and doctors

Practical Privacy Assessments

Figure 3. Privacy assessment of Scenario 1

using the system attend an introductory course which gives information about management of personal data. The system has different levels of access for the doctors and the clerks. The system synchronises items such as addresses and phone numbers with government databases. Through the online access, patients are able to browse their personal data and contact the system owners. Also, the system is regularly audited by government auditors. Assessment results: Using our model, we get a specific result for each category which indicates the level of privacy risks in each category. Data protection: The system has protection of data both during storage and transport. While this serves to reduce privacy risks, the model does present options for additional improvements. The system scores 50%. Sensitivity: Due to the sensitive nature of the data, there are significant privacy risks involved in the system. The score of this category reflects this fact. The system scores 16%. Environment: This system has been developed with more input from external interest groups as well as having been checked for compliance with current law. However, the possible conflicts of interest from the private firm hosting the data subtracts from the final score. The system scores 44%.

Surveillance: As with the system described in Scenario 1, the risks that stem from the amounts of data and the common identifiers are considerable. The system scores 0%. Ordinary use: The extra educational effort combined with the role based access limits goes a long way to reduce the risks in this category. However, the possibility for removing data from the security of the system still exists. The system scores 58%. Transparency: The system allows registered people to access their data and contact their doctor or the system owner if something is wrong. This gives the individual better information about his or her privacy situation with respect to this system and the data that it contains. The system scores 75%. Control: While the registered persons have no control of the processing of their personal data, the system still improves on privacy by ensuring correctness of data as well as submitting to regular official audits. The system scores 66%.

prIvAcy Assessment results The privacy assessments of the two scenarios allow us to compare the privacy properties of the two systems, by plotting the scores in a Kiviat graph. Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows the plotted results of the privacy evaluation. The interpretation of the Kiviat graph is presented in the fifth section. While the sensitivity, which is inherent in medical systems, is a large factor in the large overall level of privacy risks, there are important differences between the two systems. The categories of sensitivity and surveillance can be difficult to improve directly, which explains the similar scores, but it is not impossible and it is worth considering for both systems. The system in Scenario 2 is somewhat more professional in design and operation. The extra effort results in a considerably improved privacy protection compared to Scenario 1, in the catego-

9

Practical Privacy Assessments

Figure 4. Privacy assessment of Scenario 2

ries of “data protection,” “control,” “transparency,” and “ordinary use.” While some of these improvements are technical solutions, such as encryption and role based access control, many are the result of improved policies, practises and awareness. This includes improved training, regular audits, and the effort to inform the registered individuals of what is going on. While these improvements can be more difficult to assess than technical solutions, such as the use of role based access control, they may prove equally efficient and help to significantly reduce privacy risks when technical solutions are not possible. The comparison reveals that scenario two is in most areas superior to scenario one from a privacy perspective. While some of this is based on technical solutions that may not be easily adaptable for scenario one, many of the more practical are. Transparency, ordinary use, and control are areas where scenario one could benefit by learning from scenario two. While the system describe in scenario one is likely to be cheaper, it comes with an extra cost of poor privacy protection.

future trends Most people are, in one way or another, concerned about their privacy, this is especially true amongst

80

Internet users as indicated by Reips (2007). This concern, however, is not easily translated into specific demands for privacy protection until after mayor privacy breaches become known. Therefore, we do not see demands of privacy coming from the users of government systems, but from politicians and companies that feel a need to avoid scandals caused by the loss of personal data. The reason for this is probably that most people do not see the risks, because they lack understanding of the privacy issues and their risks. Most people only know about privacy risks and loss of personal data from the newspapers, but once data breaches are known, demands for privacy enhancing technologies emerge. The threats against privacy are also likely to increase. This is probably best illustrated by the latest anti-terror legislation by The Congress of the United States (2001) and The English Parliament (2006). The fear of terror has also prompted legislators to introduce new biometric passports and to require passenger information, including credit card details, for all passengers in commercial airlines. Finally, the European Parliament has published a report by Walton (2006) “on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system),” which also increase surveillance and thereby the threats against privacy. Not all new privacy enhancing technologies are easily implemented in government systems, but the method defined by our operational privacy assessment model gives an overview of the current privacy risks and security level. This can be used to highlight the issues relating to privacy in the future development of government systems, which may help to make them more privacy friendly. Furthermore, it may form the foundation for further research into what privacy risks are common and should be the focus for further privacy research.

Practical Privacy Assessments

conclusIon Privacy is a subjective concept, so its definition and importance will vary from person to person. The model presented in this chapter helps to standardise the work of securing privacy in electronic systems. The model contains seven categories that together cover all aspects of privacy. Each category clarifies a range of questions concerning privacy and the model produces a simple objective result in the form of a score system. The score system makes it possible to assess the overall privacy level in a system and to compare the system to other similar systems. The score in each category indicates the level of privacy risk within that category, which helps the developers and administrators of government IT systems to identify the privacy factors that should be addressed first. The score relates to the current state of privacy in the system, but it may also help determine how well the system tested may address future privacy problems, for example, if the system has a low score in sensitivity because the information that it manages is highly sensitive, there is little hope for a better score in the future. The standardisation and the overview of privacy risks provided by the model, serve to help system owners understand the privacy risks in their systems as well as help the individuals, whose private data is being processed, to understand their personal privacy situation. Furthermore, the model addresses all the technical and operational aspects which influence privacy in a system. The model has been evaluated in a few real systems by Jansen and Peen (2007), but we would like to analyse a whole sector within a government administration, in order to demonstrate the general applicability of our model. This analysis would also provide valuable information about the general state of privacy in the government sector. The proposed model focuses on government IT systems, which are governed by privacy legislation and there are few direct motives for civil servants to ignore privacy laws. The privacy

issues in the private sector are slightly different because private companies have financial interests in the personal data that they collect, so further studies are needed to determine whether it is possible to include this aspect into the model without compromising its usability.

future reseArch dIrectIons The privacy model described in this chapter defines a basis for a systematic approach to working with privacy. The current definition of the model is very general and it may not capture all aspects of privacy in a given application. However, working with the model in practice and, in particular, performing assessments of existing government IT systems will help refine the model so that it may serve as the basis of a privacy certification scheme. Ideally, we would hope for a single general scheme, but we believe that it is more likely that a number of schemes may emerge, which would be limited to certain genres of systems, such as e-commerce. The narrower the genre of system examined with the model, the easier it may be to find an appropriate definition of privacy in that context. An interesting idea would be to attempt to extend common criteria certifications with elements of the model described in this chapter. As the current model is already based on the structure of the common criteria, this would be an obvious and valuable extension of the work presented in this chapter. The advantage of certification is that systems with the label “privacy friendly” would help focus the public’s attention on privacy. A more general problem that needs to be addressed is that privacy has different meanings for different people. Moreover, the definition of privacy seems to change when people are forced to consider the issues involved, so the meaning of privacy may actually change when observed. It would therefore be interesting to solve this problem and come up with a generally acceptable definition of the privacy concept. Questionnaires

8

Practical Privacy Assessments

and interviews might help determine the value that people intuitively put on privacy and how this value changes when they are asked to think about problems relating to privacy. This approach could also be used to determine the ability and willingness of people to manage their own privacy, which determines whether an approach based on informed consent, is actually useful. This study would also help develop new tools that allow people to control the keys to their own data in a non-intrusive and intuitive way. There are a lot of questions to answer in this area, which is typical when it comes to working with privacy, but it could be interesting to see if these questions could lead to people defining their own ideas of privacy and to define a framework for building IT systems that incorporate these personal definitions of privacy when choosing how to work with private data.

references Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., & Lacy, J. (1996). Decentralized trust management. In Proceedings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (pp. 164-173). Chaum, D. (1988). The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. Journal of Cryptology, 1(1), 65-75. Congress of the United States. (2001). USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001. Retrieved July 16, 2007, from http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107: H.R.3162

24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. European Parliament. (2001). Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI)). European Union and United Stats of America. (2007). Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security. Ferraiolo, D., & Kuhn, R. (1992). Role-based access controls. In Proceedings of the 15th NISTNCSC National Computer Security Conference (pp. 554-563). Financial News Online U.S. (2007). JPMorgan client data loss. Story attributed to the Wall Street Journal, reported on Financial News Online U.S. on May 1, 2007. International Organization for Standardization. (1999). Common criteria for information technology security evaluation (ISO IS 15408). Retrieved on July 12, 2007, from http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ International Organization for Standardization. (2006). Information technology—security techniques—encryption algorithms—part 2: Asymmetric ciphers (ISO/IEC 18033-2).

English Parliament. (2006). Terrorism Act 2006, Queen’s Printer of Acts of Parliament, UK.

Jansen, T. W., & Peen, S. (2007). Privacy i offentlige systemer. Master’s thesis, Informatics and Mathematical Modelling, Technical University of Denmark (in Danish).

European Opinion Research Group. (2003). Data Protection, Special Euro barometer 196, Wave 60.0.

Kolence, K. W., & Kiviat, P. J. (1973). Software unit profiles & Kiviat figures. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 1973(2), 2-12.

European Parliament. (1995). Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of

Lederer S., Mankoff, J., & Dey, A. (2003). Towards a deconstruction of the privacy space. In

8

Practical Privacy Assessments

Proceedings of the Ubicomp communities: privacy as boundary negotiation Workshop on Privacy at Ubicomp’2003. Pfitzmann, A., & Köhntopp, M. (2000). Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudonymity—a proposal for terminology. In H. Federrath (Ed.), Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability. Springer Verlag. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2007). A chronology of data breaches. Retrieved on May 14, 2007, from http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm Reips, U.-D. (2007). Internet users’ perceptions of ‘privacy concerns’ and ‘privacy actions’. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65(6), 526-536. Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. A. (1978). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21(2), 120-126. Sandoval, G. (2006). Veterans’ data swiped in theft. CNET News.com. Story last modified Mon May 22 16:55:51 PDT 2006. Smith, R. E. (2006). Laptop hall of shame. Forbes. com. Commentary on Forbes.com September 7, 2006. Stanton, P. (2004). Securing data in storage: A review of current research. CoRR, cs.OS/0409034. Walton, R. (2006). Balancing the insider and outsider threat. Computer Fraud and Security 2006(11), 8-11. Yu, E., & Cysneiros, L. (2002). Designing for privacy and other competing requirements. In Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information Security (SREIS-02).

system (Technical Report CUCS-021-98). Columbia University: Computer Science Department. Zimmermann, P. R. (1995). The official pgp user’s guide., Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Additional Reading American Civil Liberties Union—ACLU. (2007). Privacy section of their web site. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://www.aclu.org/privacy Anderson, R. (1996). The eternity service. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Theory, Applications of Cryptology, PRAGOCRYPT’96. Brands, S. (2000). Rethinking public key infrastructures and digital certificates. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Chaum, D. (1981). Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2), 84-88. Chaum, D. (1985). Security without identification: Transaction systems to make big brother obsolete. Communications of the ACM, 28(10), 1030-1044. Chaum, D., Fiat, A., & Naor, M. (1990). Untraceable electronic cash. In S. Goldwasser (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’88 (pp. 319-327). Springer Verlag. Clarke, I., Sandberg, O., Wiley, B., & Hong, T. W. (2000). Freenet: A distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system. In H. Federrath (Ed.), Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability (pp. 46–66). Springer Verlag. Dingledine, R., Freedman, M. J., & Molnar, D. (2000). The free haven project: Distributed anonymous storage service. In H. Federrath (Ed.), Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability (pp. 67–95). Springer Verlag.

Zadok, E., Badulescu, I., & Shender, A. (1998). Cryptfs: A stackable vnode level encryption file

8

Practical Privacy Assessments

Electronic Frontier Foundation. (2007). Privacy section of their web site. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://www.eff.org/Privacy Electronic Privacy Information Center—EPIC (2007). Privacy web site. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://epic.org European Union. (2006). Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. Goldberg, I. (2000). A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet. Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley. Goldberg, I. (2003). Privacy-enhancing technologies for the Internet, II:Five years later. In G. Goos, J. Hartmanis, & J. van Leeuwen (Eds.), Second InternationalWorkshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2002) (pp. 209-213). Springer Verlag. Goldberg, I., Wagner, D., & Brewer, E. (1997). Privacy-enhancing technologies for the Internet. In Proceedings of IEEE COMPCON’97 (pp. 103110). IEEE Computer Society Press.

Hiding Workshop 1999 (pp. 434-447). Springer Verlag. Waldman, M., Rubin, A., & Cranor, L. F. (2000). Publius: a robust, tamper-evident, censorshipresistant and source-anonymous web publishing system. In Proceedings of the 9th UsenixSecurity Symposium (pp. 59–72).

endnotes 1

2

3

4

Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (2000). The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. Reiter, M., & Rubin, A. (1999). Anonymous web transactions with crowds. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 32-48. Stajano, F., & Anderson, R. (1999). The cocaine auction protocol: On the power of anonymous broadcast. In A. Pfitzmann (Ed.), Information

8

5 6

Healthcare is an example of a service which has primarily been offered by the public sector, but where the private sector is playing an increasing role in many European countries. It is interesting to note that library records of ordinary citizens are among the types of data monitored in the hope to identify and apprehend potential terrorists before they commit any terrorism. A numbered Swiss bank account is an example of a pseudonymous financial service, but most governments wish to limit the availability of such services because they can be used by criminals to hide the proceeds from their crime. Examples of NGOs that are active in the field of privacy are: The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), and Privacy International. Secure Sockets Layer, RFC 2246 Definition from Common Criteria issued by International Organization for Standardization (1999).

8

Chapter V

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions Leszek Lilien Western Michigan University, USA Bharat Bhargava Purdue University, USA

AbstrAct Any interaction—from a simple transaction to a complex collaboration—requires an adequate level of trust between interacting parties. Trust includes a conviction that one’s privacy is protected by the other partner. This is as true in online transactions as in social systems. The recognition of the importance of privacy is growing since privacy guarantees are absolutely essential for realizing the goal of pervasive computing. This chapter presents the role of trust and privacy in interactions, emphasizing their interplay. In particular, it shows how one’s degree of privacy can be traded for a gain in the level of trust perceived by the interaction partner. After a brief overview of related research, the idea and mechanisms of trading privacy for trust are explored. Conclusions and future trends in dealing with privacy and trust problems complement the chapter.

IntroductIon Any interaction—from a simple transaction to a complex collaboration—can be successful only if an adequate level of trust exists between interacting entities. One of the more important

components of trust of an entity in its interaction partner is its reliance that the partner is both willing and able to protect entity’s privacy. This is as true in the cyberspace as in social systems. The need for privacy is broadly recognized by individuals, businesses, the government, the

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

computer industry, and academic researchers. Examples are shown in Table 1. The growing recognition of the importance of privacy is motivated not only by users’ sensitivity about their personal data. Other factors include business losses due to privacy violations, and enactments of federal and state privacy laws. Even more important, the quest for the promised land of pervasive computing will fail if adequate privacy guarantees are not provided. The role of trust and privacy is fundamental in social systems as well as in computing environments. The objective of this chapter is presenting this role in online interactions, emphasizing the close relationship between trust and privacy. In particular, we show how one’s degree of privacy can be traded for a gain in the level of trust perceived by one’s interaction partner. We begin with a brief overview in the next section, presenting the background for research on

trust, privacy, and related issues. First, we define trust and privacy, and then discuss their fundamental characteristics. Selecting the most relevant aspects of trust and privacy to be employed in a given application and computing environment is in and by itself a significant challenge. The reason is that both trust and privacy are very complex, multifaceted concepts. Privacy and trust in computing environments are as closely related and as interesting in various aspects of their interplay as they are in social systems (Bhargava, Lilien, Rosenthal, & Winslett, 2004). On the one hand, a high level of trust can be very advantageous. For example, an online seller might reward a highly trusted customer with special benefits, such as discounted prices and better quality of services. To gain trust, a customer can reveal private digital credentials—certificates, recommendations, or past interaction histories. On the other hand, a mere

Table 1. Recognition of the need for privacy by different entities Recognition of the need for privacy by individuals (Cranor, Reagle, & Ackerman, 1999) • 99% unwilling to reveal their SSN • 18% unwilling to reveal their favorite TV show Recognition of the need for privacy by businesses • Online consumers worrying about revealing personal data held back $15 billion in online revenue in 2001 (Kelley, 2001) Recognition of the need for privacy by the federal government • Privacy Act of 1974 for federal agencies (Privacy Act, 2004) • Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (Summary HIPAA, 2003; Mercuri, 2004) Recognition of the need for privacy by computer industry research (examples) • IBM—incl. Privacy Research Institute (IBM Privacy, 2007) • Topics include: pseudonymity for e-commerce, EPA, and EPAL—enterprise privacy architecture and language, RFID privacy, privacy-preserving video surveillance, federated identity management (for enterprise federations), privacy-preserving data mining and privacy-preserving mining of association rules, hippocratic (privacy-preserving) databases, online privacy monitoring • Microsoft Research—including Trustworthy Computing Initiative (Trustworthy Computing, 2003) • The biggest research challenges: reliability/security/privacy/business Integrity • Topics include: DRM—digital rights management (incl. watermarking surviving photo editing attacks), software rights protection, intellectual property and content protection, database privacy and privacy-preserving data mining, anonymous e-cash, anti-spyware Recognition of the need for privacy by academic researchers (examples) • Trust negotiation with controlled release of private credentials, privacy-trust tradeoff • Trust negotiation languages • Privacy metrics • Anonymity and k-anonymity • Privacy-preserving data mining and privacy-preserving database testing • Privacy-preserving data dissemination • Preserving location privacy in pervasive computing, and privacy-preserving location-based routing and services in networks • Trust negotiation with controlled release of private credentials • Genomic privacy

8

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

perception of a privacy threat from a collaborator may result in a substantial lowering of trust. In particular, any sharing of an entity’s private information depends on satisfactory limits on its further dissemination, such as a partner’s solid privacy policies. Just a privacy threat can impede sharing of sensitive data among the interacting entities, which results in reduced effectiveness of the interaction and, in the extreme cases, even in termination of the interaction. For instance, a user who learns that an Internet service provider (ISP) has carelessly revealed any customer’s e-mail will look for another ISP. The idea and mechanisms of trading privacy for trust, the main topic of this chapter, are explored in the following section. It categorizes types of privacy-for-trust tradeoff, and shows how to exchange one’s privacy for trust in an optimal way. The remaining sections, in turn, present our view of future trends in research on privacy and trust; include conclusions; present future research directions for privacy and trust in computing; include references; and suggest additional reading material that can supplement the topics of this chapter.

bAckground: trust, prIvAcy, And relAted Work The notions of trust and privacy require an indepth discussion of their background, including their interplay. It is provided in this section.

trust and Its characteristics Definition of Trust We define trust as “reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing” (The American, 2000). Use of trust is often implicit. Frequently, it is gained offline (Bhargava et al., 2004). A user, who downloads a file from an unfamiliar Web site, trusts it implicitly by not even considering

trust in a conscious way. A user who decides to buy an Internet service from an Internet service provider may build her trust offline by asking her friends for recommendations. Each entity E should have a good reason to expect that its interaction partner is both willing and able to protect E’s privacy. This indicates that dimensions of trust include integrity and competence of a trusted party. That is, the integrity dimension of trust is a belief by a “truster” that a “trustee” is honest and acts in favor of the truster, and the competence dimension of trust is a belief in a trustee’s ability or expertise to perform certain tasks in a specific situation. Predictability can be attached as a secondary measure to both an integrity belief and a competence belief (Zhong, Lu, Bhargava, & Lilien, 2006).

Implicit and Explicit Trust Trust is a powerful paradigm, truly ubiquitous and beneficial in social systems, that enables smooth operation of such systems, also under conditions of uncertainty or incomplete information. Trust has been comprehensively used and well tested. The need for trust exists in all interactions, irrespective of the fact whether the parties involve individuals, institutions, or artifacts. For example, trust is constantly—if often unconsciously—applied in interactions between people and animals (e.g., a guide dog), or people and artifacts (e.g., “Can I rely on my car for this long trip?”). Trust has to be approached differently in closed and open systems. In the former, trustworthiness of an interaction partner is known to the initiator of an interaction before the interaction starts, and in the latter it is not known. An example of a closed social system is a small village where people know each other (or at least know each other’s reputations). Trust is used implicitly since each villager has a rather good clue what to expect of everybody else. In short, X “feels” how much to trust Y. An example of an open social system is a large city where trust must be used explicitly to

8

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

avoid unpleasant surprises (such as being harmed by a dishonest or incompetent car mechanic or dentist). A city dweller needs to ask around to find a trusted entity she needs, inquiring friends, office mates, and so forth. She can also inquire professional “reputation databases,” such as the Better Business Bureau (BBB), or the AAA’s Approved Auto Repair Network. Trust has proven its usefulness in social systems. We need similarly ubiquitous, efficient, and effective trust mechanisms in the cyberspace. We have both closed computing systems—such as a LAN serving a research lab—and opened computing environments—such as the World Wide Web or WiFi hot spots. Only the latter include users who are not known in advance to the system. For example, an access control subsystem for a WiFi hot spot must determine the permitted actions for each user, also a new and completely unknown user. We believe that many users or computer systems err by not considering trust issue at all. They do not assume trust implicitly. They simply ignore the issue of trust. Without even knowing it, they trust blindly, without any evidence, justification, or verification. Such a mistake is made also by any operating system that trusts all application programs, allowing any program—including malware—to run. As another example, too many users do not even know that they show a naïve trust by accessing unknown Web site, which can harm them or their computers. Still, closed computing environments systems—analogous to a small village—have been working well without applying the notion of trust, at least explicitly. However, it becomes more and more difficult to handle open computing systems—analogous to a big city—without the assistance from the powerful trust paradigm. In the security area, for example, the confidentialityintegrity-availability (CIA) paradigm has served sufficiently well in closed systems but it has to be replaced or augmented with trust-based solutions in open environments. Using the trust paradigm

88

can simplify security problems by reducing complexity of interactions among system components, both human and artificial ones.

Selected Trust Characteristics Trust is a very complex and multifaceted notion. A researcher wishing to use trust in computing systems must cope with the challenging choice of the optimal subset of trust characteristics. A vast variety of different trust-based systems can result from selecting different subsets. Only some of the choices will make systems based on them effective and efficient. Some of the choices for trust characteristics include the following: 1.

2.

3.

Symmetric vs. asymmetric trust: Symmetric trust assumes that “X trusts Y” implies “Y trusts X,” which is not true in general. Asymmetric trust does not assume such implication and is, therefore, more general. Symmetric trust can be viewed as its special case, which can be chosen only in very special circumstances or applications. Gradual vs. binary trust: The former allows for degrees of trust, and can be defined on a multilevel or a continuous scale. The latter is an all-or-nothing proposition, which forces to specify a single trust threshold above which full trust can be assumed. Binary trust, as a special case of gradual trust, is insufficient in general. It can be assumed only for very special and limited settings. Explicit vs. implicit trust: Implicit trust is used by either ignorant or naïve interaction parties. For instance, a user, who downloads a file from an unfamiliar Web site, trusts it implicitly by not even considering trust in a conscious way. The consequences might include penetration by malware. Explicit trust allows for its clear specification, assuring that trust considerations are not ignored. Given X’s need for determin-

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

4.

5.

ing trustworthiness of Y, only explicit trust allows for determination of the party that vouches for trustworthiness of Y, and assumes risks when this trust is breached. It could, but does not have to be the case, that Y vouches for its own trustworthiness (e.g., via its behavior in earlier interactions with X). Explicit trust might be gained offline. For instance, a person who decides to buy an Internet service from an Internet service provider (ISP) may build her trust offline by asking her friends for trustworthy ISPs. Direct vs. indirect trust: Direct trust between X and Y, when “X trusts Y,” is limited to cases when X has gained a degree of trust in Y from previous interactions. (This may, but does not have to, mean that Y gained any degree of trust in X). It is obvious that the domain of trust can be significantly extended by relying not only on direct trust but also on indirect trust. For indirect trust, X does not need to trust Y to be willing to interact with it. It is sufficient that X finds an intermediary Z such that X has a sufficient degree of trust in Z and Z trusts Y. (To be more precise, in this case X needs to trust to a sufficient degree in Z’s recommendations about trustworthiness of Y). Z becomes a trusted third party (TTP). A TTP can be any entity accepted by X, in particular, it can be an institution set up to provide indirect trust, also on a commercial basis. Examples of such institutions are certification bodies of all kinds, including providers of digital certificates. Type of trusted entities: Should trust be lavished only on humans? We believe that the answer should be “no.” We trust our cars, refrigerators, cellphones, PDAs, or RFID tags in stores. As is the case with humans, this trust can be breached if the devices are

6.

7.

disloyal, or loyal to other parties than their owners or primary users. Loyalty decides who the entrusted party works for. For example, sensors and recorders in a car can work not for the driver but for an insurer, a browser can work for a commercial advertiser, and a sensor network in one’s house can be hijacked by a nosy neighbor or—in the worst case—by the Big Brother. Number of trusted entities: The most critical distinction is between trusting somebody or trusting nobody. The latter leads to paranoid behaviors, with extremely negative consequences on system performance, including exorbitant costs. We believe that “You cannot trust everybody but you have to trust somebody.” Trusting more partners improves performance as long as trust is not abused. Any breach of trust causes some performance penalties. An optimal number of trusted entities should be determined. Responsibility for a breach of trust: If no TTP is involved, is the truster or the trustee responsible for deciding on the degree of trust required to offer or accept a service? As a consequence, is the truster or the trustee ultimately responsible for bearing consequences of possible breaches of trust? In commercial relationships, most often a buyer determines whether the seller is trustworthy enough and then—at least once the warranty period is over—bears the possible costs of broken trust. There are, however, cases when it is the seller who pays for abuses by the buyer (as in the case when terrorists are not prevented from boarding a plane). If a TTP is involved in a trust relationship, it may be held responsible to the extent allowed by its legal obligations.

89

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Caveats

Selected Privacy Characteristics

A few words of caution are in order (Bhargava et al., 2004). First, using a trust model too complex for an application domain (i.e., including superfluous trust aspects) hurts flexibility or performance. Second, excessive demands for evidence or credentials result in laborious and uncomfortable trust-based interactions, while insufficient requirements make them too lax. (In the latter case, who wants to befriend someone who befriends crooks and thieves?). Third, exaggerating the need for explicit trust relationships hurts performance. For example, modules in a well-integrated (hence, closed) system should rely on implicit trust, just as villagers do. Also, in a crowd of entities, only some communicate directly, so only they need to use trust—but even not all of them need to use trust explicitly.

Privacy has three dimensions: (a) personal privacy of an entity—demanding protecting an entity against undue interference (such as physical searches) and information that violates moral sense of the entity; (b) territorial privacy—calling for protection of the area surrounding the entity, such as laws on trespassing; and (c) informational privacy—requiring protection of gathering, compilation and dissemination of information (Fischer-Hübner, 2001). Any interaction involves exchange of data. It is hard to find any data that (at least in conjunction with other data, also offline data) does not carry any private information on its sender. Hence, informational privacy is endangered by each interaction involving release or dissemination of data. The release of sensitive data can be controlled in various degrees: from none to full control. It can also be categorized as voluntary, “pseudo-voluntary,” or mandatory (incl. the case of information release as required by law). The pseudo-voluntary data dissemination is particularly deceitful since it appears to give a user a freedom to decline sharing his private information—but only at the cost of denying the user an access to a desirable service. As a simple example, a person who refuses for privacy reasons (including fears of receiving more spam) to enter the e-mail address on a Web site can be denied the site’s services. Quite often, in the name of a real need or just a convenience the user is forced or pressured to provide private data. (This is a tradeoff between privacy and convenience that should be studied). The amount of privacy lost by disclosing a piece of information is affected by the identity of the recipients of this information, possible uses of this information, and related private information disclosed in the past. First, the recipients of private information include not only direct but also all indirect recipients, who receive some of this private information from entities other than the

privacy and Its characteristics Definition of Privacy We define privacy as “the right of an entity (normally a person), acting in its own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing to share information about itself with others” (Internet Security, 2007). We fully embrace the possibility—indicated by the words “an entity (normally a person)”—to extend the scope of the notion of privacy from a person to an entity. The latter may be an organization, an artifact (software in particular), and so forth. The extension is consistent with the use of the notion of “trust” also in relationship to artifacts (The American, 2000), and with the common practice of antropomorphization of intelligent system components (such as objects and agents) in computer science. The extension is useful for discussion of privacy not only for humans but also for artificial entities (acting, more or less directly, on behalf of humans).

90

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

user. For example, a doctor, the direct recipient of private patient’s information, passes some of this information to an insurer, an indirect recipient. Any indirect recipient can disseminate information further. In our example, the insurer can pass some information to user’s employer. Second, possible uses of information vary from completely benevolent to the most malicious ones, with the latter including the most painful case of identity theft. Third, related private information disclosed in the past has a life of its own, like a genie let out of the bottle. At best, it is limited only by the controls that its owner was able to impose on its dissemination, for example, asking a company not to sell to or share it with other businesses. At worst, it can be retrieved and combined with all pieces of information about the owner, destroying much of owner’s privacy.

Threats to Privacy

forwarder, or receiver; (ii) threats to anonymity of service provider; and (iii) threats to privacy of communication (e.g., via monitoring, logging, and storage of transactional data). In the third category, threats to privacy at the system level are due to attacks on the system in order to gain access to its data. For example, attacks on access controls can allow the attacker breaking into confidential databases. Finally, in the fourth category, threats to privacy in audit trails are due to the wealth of information included in system logs and audit trails. A special attention should be directed to consider logs and trails that gained an independent life, away from the system from which they were derived. Another view of threats to privacy (FischerHübner, 2003) categorizes the threats as: 1. 2. 3.

Threats to privacy can be classified into four categories (Fischer-Hübner, 2003): 1. 2. 3. 4.

Threats to privacy at the application level Threats to privacy at the communication level Threats to privacy at the system level Threats to privacy in audit trails

In the first category, threats to privacy at the application level are due to collection and transmission of large quantities of sensitive data. Prominent examples of these types of threats are large projects for the information highway, including large peer-to-peer systems (Can, 2007) or implementations of applications for public administration networks, health networks, research networks, electronic commerce, teleworking, distance learning, and so forth. In the second category, threats to privacy at the communication level include risks to anonymity of communication, such as: (i) threats to anonymity of sender,

4.

5.

6.

Threats to aggregation and data mining Threats due to poor system security Government-related threats. They arise in part because the government has a lot of people’s most private data (incl. data on taxes, homeland security, etc.) and it is difficult to strike the right balance between people’s privacy on the one hand and homeland security concerns on the other hand. Threats due to use of Internet, for example, intercepting of unencrypted e-mail, recording of visited Web sites, and attacks via Internet Threats due to corporate rights and business practices. For instance, companies in the United States may collect data that even the federal government is not allowed to gather. Threats due to many traps of “privacy for sale,” that is, temptations to sell out one’s privacy. Too often online offers that seem to be “free” are not really free since they require providing the “benefactor” with one’s private data. An example is providing one’s data for a “free” frequent-buyer card.

9

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Escalation of Threats to Privacy in Pervasive Computing Pervasive computing exacerbates the privacy problem (Bhargava et al., 2004). People will be submerged in an ocean of zillions of computing devices of all kinds, sizes, and aptitudes (Sensor Nation, 2004). Most of them will have limited or even rudimentary capabilities and will be quite small, such as RFID tags and smart dust. Most will be embedded in artifacts for everyday use, or even within human bodies, with possibilities for both beneficial and apocalyptic consequences. Unless privacy is adequately protected, the progress of pervasive computing will be slowed down or derailed altogether. Pervasive devices with inherent communication capabilities might even self-organize into huge, opportunistic sensor networks (Lilien, Kamal, Bhuse, & Gupta, 2006; Lilien, Gupta, & Yang, 2007) able to spy anywhere, anytime, on everybody and everything within their midst. Without proper means of detection and neutralization, no one will be able to tell which and how many snoops are active, what data they collect, and who they are loyal to. Questions such as “Can I trust my refrigerator?” will not be jokes—the refrigerator will be able to snitch on its owner’s dietary misbehavior to the owner’s doctor. We might ask these serious questions, notwithstanding their humorous appearance. Will pervasive computing force us to abandon all hope for privacy? Will a cyberfly, with high-resolution camera eyes and supersensitive microphone ears, end privacy as we know it?1 Should a cyberfly be too clever to end up in the soup, the only hope might be to develop cyberspiders. But cyberbirds might eat those up. So, we will build a cybercat. And so on and so forth. Radically changed reality demands new approaches to computer security and privacy. We believe that we should talk about a new privacy category—namely, privacy of artificial entities. We think that socially-based paradigms, such

9

as trust-based approaches, will play a big role in pervasive computing. As in social settings, solutions will vary from heavyweight ones for entities of high intelligence and capabilities—such as humans and intelligent systems—interacting in complex and important matters, to lightweight ones for less intelligent and less capable entities interacting in simpler matters of lesser consequence.

Interplay of privacy and trust Privacy and trust can be in a symbiotic or in an adversarial relationship. We concentrate here on the latter, when users in interactions with businesses and institutions face tradeoffs between a loss of their privacy and the corresponding gain of trust by their partners. An example of a symbiotic relationship is the situation when a better privacy provided by a commercial Web site results in its customers’ higher degree of trust. Users entering an online interaction want to gain a certain level of trust with the least loss of their privacy. This is the level of trust that is required by an interaction partner, for example, a Web site, to provide a needed service, for example, an online purchase of a gift. The interaction partner will ask a user for sensitive information such as certain credentials, for example, the user’s credit card number and other cardholder information. These credentials, when provided online, are indeed digital credentials—despite the fact that non-digital credentials, such as a plastic credit card, are their basis. This simple scenario shows how privacy and trust are intertwined. The digital credentials are used to build trust, while providing the credentials reduces the degree of privacy of their owner. It should be noted that in a closed environment a user could receive certain service while revealing much less private information. For example, a student can order free educational software just by logging into a password-protected account, without any need for providing his credit card information.

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Obviously, entering only one’s login and password reveals less sensitive data than providing one’s credit card information. We can not expect that privacy and trust are provided for free or traded for free—under any cost measures. Only in an ideal world we would never loose our privacy in any interaction, would be fully trusted at the same time, and would be provided these benefits at no cost. In reality, we can only approach this optimum by providing minimal privacy disclosures—ones that are absolutely necessary to gain a level of trust required by the interaction partners. The mechanisms providing minimal privacy disclosures and trust carry costs, including costs of computation, communication, storage, and so forth. It is obvious that gaining a higher level of trust may require a larger loss of privacy. It should also be obvious that revealing more sensitive information beyond certain point will produce no more trust gains, or at least, no more useful trust gains. For example, a student wishing to enter a tavern must show a proof of his age, exchanging a loss of privacy for a trust gain. Showing his driver license is entirely sufficient, and showing his passport and birth certificate produces no more trust gains. It should also be obvious that for each required level of trust we can determine (at least in theory) the minimal loss of privacy required to produce this level of trust. This means that users can (and usually want) to build a certain level of trust with this minimal loss of privacy. We want to automate the process of finding this optimal privacy-fortrust tradeoff, including automatic evaluation of a privacy loss and a trust gain. To this end, we must first provide appropriate measures of privacy and trust, and then quantify the tradeoff between privacy and trust. This quantification will assist a user in deciding whether or not to trade her privacy for the potential benefits gained from trust establishment. A number of questions, including the following, must be answered. How much privacy is lost by disclosing a specific

piece of information? How much trust is gained by disclosing given data? How much does a user benefit by having a given trust gain? How much privacy a user is willing to sacrifice for a certain amount of trust gain? Only after answering these questions, we can design algorithms and mechanisms that will assist users in making rational privacy-for-trust decisions. Proper mechanisms can empower a user’s decision making process, or even automate it based on policies or preferences predefined by the user.

related Work Related Work on Privacy Many conferences and journals, not only in the area of computer science or other technical disciplines, focus on privacy. We can mention only a few publications that affected our search for a privacy-for-trade solution presented in this chapter. Reiter and Rubin (1999) use the size of the anonymity set to measure the degree of anonymity for senders or receivers. The anonymity set contains all the potential subjects that might have sent or received data. The size of the anonymity set does not capture the fact that not all senders in the set have an equal probability of sending a message. This may help the attacker in reducing the size of the set of potential senders. Therefore, the size of the anonymity set may be a misleading measure, showing a higher degree of privacy than it really is. Another approach (Diaz, Seys, Claessens, & Preneel, 2003; Serjantov & Danezis, 2003) uses entropy to measure the level of privacy that a system achieves. Differential entropy is used by Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001) to quantify the closeness of an attribute value, as estimated by an attacker, to its original value. These papers assume a static model of an attacker, in the sense that the attacker does not accumulate information by watching the system over the time.

9

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

The Scrub system (Sweeney, 1996) can be used to de-identify personal patient’s information. Privacy is ensured by filtering identifying information out of data exchanged between applications. The system searches through prescriptions, physician letters, and notes written by clinicians to replace with generic data information identifying patients—such as their names, phone numbers, and addresses. A database of personally-identifying information—such as first and last names, addresses, phones, social security numbers, employers, and birth dates—is used to detect the occurrences of such information. In addition, the system constructs templates for different information formats, for example, different formats for phone numbers and dates. These templates are used to detect variants of personal information. Collecting pieces of information from different sources and putting them together to reveal personal information is termed data fusion (Sweeney, 2001a). Data fusion is more and more invasive due to the tremendous growth of information on individuals being electronically gathered (Sweeney, 2001b). The Scrub system does not provide a sufficient protection against data fusion, that is, it does not assure complete anonymity. The Datafly system (Sweeney, 1998; Sweeney, 2002b) maintains anonymity even if data are linked with other information sources. While maintaining a practical use of data, Datafly automatically aggregates, substitutes, and removes information to maintain data privacy. Datafly achieves data privacy by employing the k-anonymity algorithm (Sweeney, 2002b), which provides a formal guarantee that an individual can not be distinguished from at least k - 1 other individuals. Platform for privacy preferences (P3P) is the best-known protocol and tool suite for specifying privacy policies of a Web site and preferences of Web users (Cranor , 2003). P3P is not intended to be a comprehensive privacy “solution” that would address all principles of Fair Information Practices (Trade Commission, 1998). AT&T Privacy Bird

9

is a prominent implementation of P3P (Privacy Bird, 2004). It is a tool that can be added to a Web browser to keep its users aware of privacy policies of the visited Web sites. We do not discuss here general security solutions which contribute to privacy protection. Examples include protecting software, mobile objects, or agents from many types of attacks by either: (i) running them only on dedicated and tamper-resistant platforms—for example, on secure coprocessors (Tygar & Yee, 1994); or (ii) by providing security on commodity hardware—for example, partitioning a single hardware platform into many isolated virtual machines or “closed boxes” (Garfinkel, 2003). Examples include also protection of a software client (code) from a malicious host by obfuscating, tamperproofing, or watermarking the code (Collberg & Thomborson, 2000).

Related Work on Trust The problem of establishing and maintaining trust in dynamic settings has attracted many researchers. One of the first formalized models of trust in computer science (Marsh, 1994) introduced the concepts widely used by other researchers, such as context and situational trust. A comprehensive social trust model, based on surveying more than 60 papers across a wide range of disciplines, has been proposed by McKnight and Chervany (2001). It has been validated via an empirical experimental study (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002). The model defines five conceptual trust elements: trusting behavior, trusting intention, trusting belief, institution-based trust, and disposition to trust (cf. Cofta, 2006). First, trusting behavior is an action that increases a truster’s risk or makes the truster vulnerable to the trustee. Second, trusting intention indicates that a truster is willing to engage in trusting behaviors with the trustee. A trusting intention implies a trust decision and leads to trusting behaviors. Two subtypes of trusting intention are: (i) willingness

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

to depend, that is, the volitional preparedness to make oneself vulnerable to the trustee; and (ii) subjective probability of depending, that is, the likelihood that a truster will depend on a trustee. Third, trusting belief is a truster’s subjective belief in the fact that a trustee has attributes beneficial to the truster. The followings are the four attributes used most often: (i) competence: a trustee has the ability or expertness to perform certain tasks; (ii) benevolence: a trustee cares about a truster’s interests; (iii) integrity: a trustee is honest and keeps commitments; and (iv) predictability: a trustee’s actions are sufficiently consistent—so future action can be predicated based on the knowledge of previous behavior. Fourth, institution-based trust is the belief that proper structural conditions are in place to enhance the probability of achieving a successful outcome. Two subtypes of institution-based trust are: (i) structural assurance: the belief that deployed structures promote positive outcomes, where structures include guarantees, regulations, promises and so forth; and (ii) situational normality: the belief that the properly ordered environments facilitate successful outcomes. Fifth, disposition to trust characterizes a truster’s general propensity to depend on others across a broad spectrum of situations. Two subtypes of disposition to trust are: (i) faith in humanity: the general assumptions about trustees’ integrity, competence, and benevolence—that is, a priori trusting beliefs; and (ii) trusting stance: a preference for the default trust-based strategy in relationships. Zacharia and Maes (2000) proposed two reputation systems, SPORAS and HISTOS. Reputations in SPORAS are global, that is, a principal’s reputation is the same from the perspective of any querier. HISTOS has the notion of personalized reputation, that is, different queriers may get different reputation values about the same principal. In addition to the reputation value, a reputation deviation is provided to measure the reliability of the value. Discarding a notorious identity, used in many systems by dishonest parties to shed

their unfavorable reputations, is unprofitable in SPORAS and HISTOS, because a newcomer starts with the lowest reputation value. Carbo, Molina, and Davila (2003) propose a trust management approach using fuzzy reputation. The basic idea is similar to that of SPORAS. A distributed personalized reputation management approach for e-commerce is proposed by Yu and Singh (2002a, 2002b). The authors adopt the ideas from the Dampster-Shafer theory of evidence to represent and evaluate reputation. If two principals a and b have direct interactions, b evaluates a’s reputation based on the ratings of these interactions. This reputation is called a local belief. Otherwise, b queries a so called TrustNet for other principals’ local beliefs about a. The reputation of a is computed based on the gathered local beliefs using the Dampster-Shafer theory. How to build and maintain the TrustNet is not mentioned in the papers. Aberer and Despotovic (2001) simplify this model and apply it to manage trust in a P2P system. Sabater and Sierra (2002) propose a reputation model for gregarious societies called a Regret system. The authors assume that a principal owns a set of sociograms describing the social relations in the environment. The Regret system structure has three dimensions. The individual dimension models the direct experience between two principals. The social dimension models the information coming from other principals. The ontology dimension models how to combine reputations on different aspects. Different reputations are defined: witness reputation, neighborhood reputation, and system reputation. The performance of this approach highly depends on the underlying sociograms. The paper does not discuss how to build sociograms. Bayesian analysis approach to model reputation and trust is used by Mui (2002) and Mui, Mohtashemi, and Halberstadt (2002). Many reputation models and security mechanisms assume the existence of a social network (Barnes & Cerrito, 1998). Pujol, Sangesa, and Delgado (2002)

9

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

propose an approach to extract reputation from the social network topology that encodes reputation information. Morinaga, Yamanishi, Tateishi, and Fukushima (2002) propose an approach to mining product reputations on the Web.

Related Work on Privacy-Trust Optimization Yu, Winslett, and Seamons (2003) investigated automated trust negotiation (ATN) considering the issues of iteratively exchanging credentials between two entities to incrementally establish trust. This approach considers the tradeoff between the length of the negotiation, the amount of information disclosed, and the computation effort. The major difference between ATN and the proposed research is that we focus on the tradeoff between privacy and trust. Our research leads to a method for estimating the privacy loss due to disclosing a piece of information, and ways for making rational decisions. Wagealla, Carbone, English, Terzis, Lowe, and Nixon (2003) present a formal model for trustbased decision making. An approach is provided to manage trust lifecycle with considerations of both trust and risk assessments. This approach and our research on trust and evidence formalization (Bhargava & Zhong, 2002; Zhong, 2005), can be extended to use trustworthiness of an information receiver to decide whether or not to disclose private information to him. Seigneur and Jensen (2004) propose an approach to trade minimal privacy for the required trust. Privacy is based on a multiple-to-one linkability of pieces of evidence to a pseudonym, and is measured by nymity (Goldberg, 2000). The authors assume the presence of a partial order of nymity levels for the measurement of privacy. Our research approach employs multiple-to-multiple relationships between pieces of evidence and private attributes.

trAdIng prIvAcy for trust problems in trading privacy for trust To gain trust, a user must reveal private digital credentials—certificates, recommendations, or past interaction histories. She is faced with a number of tough questions: •

•

•

• •

How much privacy is lost by disclosing a specific credential? To make the answer even more difficult, the amount of privacy loss is affected by credentials and information disclosed in the past. How many credentials should a user reveal? If alternative credentials are available (e.g., both a driver license and a passport indicate birth data), which one or ones should be revealed? What is the trust gain obtained by disclosing a given credential? Also, what is the minimal degree of privacy that must be sacrificed to obtain a required trust gain? Which credentials should be presented to satisfy this minimum requirement? How much does a user benefit by having a given trust gain? How much privacy is a user willing to sacrifice for a certain amount of trust gain?

These questions alone show how complex and difficult is optimization of the privacy-for-trust exchange. Obtaining an optimal solution without a technical support is practically impossible. There is only a small chance that intuitive approaches to this process would result in outcomes close to the optimal results.

A solution for trading privacy for trust This section presents our proposed solution facilitating privacy-for-trust trading and enabling

9

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

optimal outcomes of this process. It discusses proposed approaches for building and verifying trust, protecting privacy, and trading privacy for trust.

Building and Verifying Trust We focus on methods of building trust in opened and dynamic computing environments, which are more challenging than the closed and static settings. Digital credentials are common means of building trust in open environments. Credentials include certificates, recommendations, or past transaction histories (Farrell & Housley, 2002; Fujimura & Nishihara, 2003). Since credentials contain private information, presenting them in hopes of gaining trust means privacy losses. We need to consider problems with credentials, including their imperfect and non-uniform trustworthiness. Since no credentials are perfect, means to verify trust gained by showing them are necessary. We present basic ways of verifying trust.

A. Trust Metrics Trust cannot be built or verified without having measures of trust or trust gain. We propose a three-step method for defining a trust gain metric. In the first step, we determine multilevel trust metrics with n trust levels, measured on a numeric scale from 1 to n, where n could be an arbitrarily large number. Such metric is generic, applicable to a broad range of applications, with the value of n determined for a particular application or a set of applications. The case of n = 2 reduces multilevel trust to the simplistic case of binary trust (it might still be useful in simple trust-based applications), with trust levels named, perhaps, full_service and no_service. Selecting, for example, n = 5 results in having five trust levels that could be named: no_service, minimal_service, limited_service, full_service, and privileged_service going from the lowest to the highest level.

Trust levels could be defined by a service provider, the owner of a Web site on which it resides (who might be the same or different from the service provider), or any other entity that is an intermediary between the service provider and the customer. The number of levels n could be increased when the site outgrows its old trust metric, or when the user becomes more sophisticated and needs or wants to use more trust levels. In the second step, a trust benefit function B(ti), associated with each trust level ti, needs be defined. The default trust benefit function for a service can be defined by the same party that defined trust levels in the preceding step. An optional trust benefit function, overriding the default one, can also be defined by an individual customer, allowing for a more user-specific benefit metric. In the third step, trust gain, denoted by G(t2, t1), can be calculated based on the benefit function. G(t2, t1) indicates how much a user gains if the user’s trust level, as seen by the user’s interaction partner, increases from t1 to t2. The following simple formula is used to compute the trust gain: trust_gain = G(new_trust_level, old_trust_level) = B(new_trust_level) - B(old_trust_level)

B. Methods for Building Trust Some of many generic means of building trust are listed in Table 2. They include familiarity with the entity to be trusted or its affiliation with a familiar entity, as well as building trust by firsthand experience or second-hand reputation. Rather than looking at ways of building trust in general, we differentiate them depending on the relative strengths of the interacting parties. The strength of a party P1 participating in an interaction with another party, P2, is defined by P1’s capability to demand private information from P2, and P1’s means available in case when P2 refuses to comply. As a simple example,

9

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Table 2. Basic means of building trust among partners Building trust by familiarity with X • Person: face, voice, handwriting, and so forth. • Institution: company name, image, good will, and so forth. • Artifact: Manufacturer name, perceived quality, and so forth. Building trust by affiliation of X with person/institution/artifact Y • Trust or distrust towards Y rubs off on X Building trust by first-hand experience with X’s activities/performance • Good or bad experience (trust or distrust grows) Building trust by second-hand reputation of X determined by evidence or credentials • Reputation databases (e.g., BBB, industry organizations, etc.) with ”good” evidence or a lack of ”bad” evidence • Credentials: driver license, library card, credit card

a bank is stronger than a customer requesting a mortgage loan. As another example, two small businesses negotiating a contract are, in most cases, equally strong. We concentrate on different-strength trust relationships, in which one party is stronger and another weaker, for example, trust relationships between individuals and institutions, or between small businesses and large businesses. We ignore trust relationships with same-strength partners, such as individual-to-individual interactions and most B2B interactions. We will interchangeably use the terms: “a weaker partner” and “a customer,” as well as “a stronger partner” and “a company.” Example means of building trust by a company in a customer include receiving a cash payment for a service provided, or checking partner’s records in the e-Bay reputation databases. Example means of building trust by a customer in a company include asking friends about company’s reputation, or checking its reputation in Better Business Bureau databases. Multiple means of building trust by a stronger partner in the weaker partner are shown in Table 3. They can assist a company in a fight against fraud attempts by its dishonest customer. All these means can be divided into means preserving privacy of the weaker partner, and the means not preserving privacy. Only the first item listed in

98

Table 3 (“Ask partner for an anonymous payment for goods or services”) belongs to the privacypreserving means—by the virtue of preserving customer’s anonymity. All others compromise customer’s privacy and result in disclosing private information. This indicates that, much more often than not, successful interactions with a stronger party require that a weaker party trades its privacy loss for a trust gain required by this stronger principal. There are also multiple means of building trust by a weaker partner in the stronger partner, with some of them shown in Table 4. All these means can assist a customer in a fight against fraud attempts by a company. It is clear that customer’s major weapon is information about the company and its reputation.

C. Methods for Verifying Trust Since no credentials are perfect, means to verify trust are necessary. This is as true in computing as in social life.2 The basic ways of verifying trust are shown in Table 5. Verification must be careful, not based on mere appearances of trustworthiness, which could be easily exploited by fraudsters. The cyberspace can facilitate more careful verification than is the case in the offline world, in which such verification might be too costly or too inconvenient. Quite

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Table 3. Means of building trust by a stronger partner in her weaker partner Ask partner for an anonymous payment for goods or services • Cash / digital cash / other ---------- above– privacy-preserving, below – privacy-revealing ---------Ask partner for a non-anonymous payment for goods or services • Credit card / traveler’s checks / other Ask partner for specific private information Check partner’s credit history Computer authorization subsystem observes partner’s behavior • Trustworthy or not, stable or not, … • Problem: Needs time for a fair judgment Computerized trading system checks partner’s records in reputation databases • e-Bay, PayPal, … Computer system verifies partner’s digital credentials • Passwords, magnetic and chip cards, biometrics, … Business protects itself against partner’s misbehavior • Trusted third party, security deposit, prepayment, buying insurance, …

often a business order sent from Company A to Company B is processed without verification. The reasons, in addition to costs and convenience, include the following factors: (i) implicit trust prevails in business; (ii) risk of fraud is low among reputable businesses; and (iii) Company B might be “insured” against being cheated by its business partners, that is, a trusted third-party intermediary might assume transaction risk (for example a buyer’s bank could guarantee a transaction).

protecting privacy Protecting privacy requires defining privacy metrics as a prerequisite. Privacy measures are discussed first, and methods for protecting privacy, relying on metrics, are presented next.

A. Privacy Metrics We cannot protect privacy if we do not know how to measure it. This indicates the importance of privacy metrics. More specifically, we need a privacy metric to determine what degree of data and communication privacy is provided by given protection methods. The metric has to work

in any existing or future combination of users, techniques, and systems. It has to support or deny claims made by any such combination that a certain level of privacy will be maintained by it. This gives rise to at least two heterogeneityrelated challenges. First, different privacy-preserving techniques or systems claim different degrees of data privacy. These claims are usually verified using ad hoc methods customized for each technique and system. While this approach can indicate the privacy level for each technique or system, it does not allow comparisons of diverse techniques or systems. Second, privacy metrics themselves are usually ad hoc and customized for a user model and for a specific technique or system. Requirements for good privacy metrics call for unified and comprehensive privacy measures to provide quantitative assessments of degrees of privacy achieved by a broad range of privacypreserving techniques. A good privacy metric has to compare different techniques/systems confidently. It also has to account for: (i) operation of a broad range of privacy-preserving techniques; (ii) dynamics of legitimate users—such as how users interact with the system and awareness that

99

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Table 4. Means of building trust by a weaker partner in his stronger partner Ask around • Family, friends, co-workers, … Check partner’s history and stated philosophy • Accomplishments, failures and associated recoveries, … • Mission, goals, policies (incl. privacy policies), … Observe partner’s behavior • Trustworthy or not, stable or not, … • Problem: Needs time for a fair judgment Check reputation databases • Better Business Bureau, consumer advocacy groups, … Verify partner’s credentials • Certificates and awards, memberships in trust-building organizations (e.g., BBB), … Protect yourself against partner’s misbehavior • Trusted third party, security deposit, prepayment, buying insurance, …

repeated patterns of data access can leak information to a violator; (iii) dynamics of violators—such as how much information a violator may gain by watching the system for some time; and (iv) costs associated with a metric implementation—such as injected traffic, delays, CPU cycles, and storage use. We proposed two metrics for assessing the privacy achieved by a given system: an anonymity set size metric and an information-theoretic metric also known as an entropy-based metric. The first metric can provide a quick estimate of privacy, while the second gives a more detailed insight into the privacy aspects of the system it measures.

Table 5. Basic ways of verifying trust toward entity X Verify own experience with X • Check own notes about X’s activities / performance Verify reputation evidence / credentials for X • Call back to verify phone number • Check online user feedback about quality of an artifact • Check reputation database (e.g., consumer reports, BBB) Verify affiliation of X • Check with employer if X still employed • Check reputation of Y with which X is affiliated

00

A.1. Effective Anonymity Set Size Metric: Since anonymity is defined as the state of being indistinguishable within a set of subjects (Pfitzmann & Köhntopp, 2000), we can use the size of the anonymity set as a privacy metric. The basic idea is that of “hiding in a crowd.” As illustrated in Figure 1, hiding among n entities provides more privacy than hiding among 4 entities (for n >> 4). Clearly, the larger the set of indistinguishable entities, the lower probability of identifying any particular one. This approach can be generalized to anonymize not only identities of entities but also the values of their attributes: a selected attribute value is hidden within the domain of its all possible values. We need to present this metric in more detail. The set of subjects, or values, known as the anonymity set, is denoted by A. Using the size of the anonymity set directly may indicate a stronger privacy than what it really is. The probability distribution that the violator can assign to individual subjects of the set should be considered. To illustrate this problem, consider a system claiming that a subject receiving data cannot be distinguished from |A| other subjects belonging to the anonymity set A. Suppose that a violator

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Figure 1. “Hiding in a crowd” underlies the metrics based on the anonymity set size in a crowd” “Hiding“Hiding in a crowd”

“Less” anonymous (1/4) “More” anonymous (1/n)

has noticed that a half of the nodes in A rarely receive messages. Then, he assigns to these nodes a very low probability of receiving a data item. The violator has effectively reduced the anonymity set size to |A|/2. To counter this problem, we define the anonymity set as: A = {(s1, p1), (s2, p2), …, (sn, pn)}, where pi represents the probability assigned to Subject si. Thus, we can determine the effective anonymity set size as: | A|

L = | A | ∑ min( pi , 1/ | A |)

(1)

with the maximum possible entropy value, we can learn how much information the attacker has gained about the system. Therefore, the privacy of a system can be measure based on how much of its private information was revealed. a.) Entropy calculation example: Privacy loss D(A, t) at time t, when a subset of attribute values A might have been disclosed, is given by: D(A,t) = H* (A) – H(A,t)

i

Note that the maximum value for L is |A|. L equals |A| when all entities in A are equally likely to access data, that is, pi = 1/|A|, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Equation (1) captures the fact that the anonymity set size is effectively reduced when the probability distribution is skewed, that is, when some entities have a higher probability of accessing data than the others.

where H*(A) is the maximum entropy (computed when probability distribution of pi’s is uniform), and H(A, t) is entropy at time t given by:

A.2 Information-theoretic (entropy-based) metric: Entropy measures the randomness in a system, and therefore, it measures the uncertainty that one has about that system (Cover & Thomas, 1991). Building on this notion, we propose to use entropy to measure the level of privacy that a system achieves at a given moment. The idea is that when an attacker gains more information about the system, the uncertainty about subjects that send or receive data, and thus their entropy, is decreased. By comparing a current entropy value

Consider a private phone number: (a1 a2 a3) a4 a5 a6 – a7 a8 a9 a10, where the first three digits constitute the area code. Assume that each digit is stored as a value of a separate attribute. Assume further that the range of values for each attribute is [0—9], and that all attributes are equally important, that is, for each j ∈ [1-10], wj = 1. The maximum entropy exists when an attacker has no information about the probability distribution of the values of the attributes. In such a case, the attacker must assign a uniform

| A|   (2) H ( A, t ) = ∑ w j  ∑ (− pi log 2 ( pi )) j =1  ∀i  with wj denoting weights that capture relative privacy “value” of the attributes.

0

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

probability distribution to the attribute values. Thus, aj = i with pi = 0.1 for each j and for each i, and we get: 9  10  H * ( A) = ∑  w j ∑ (−0.1 log 2 (0.1)) = 33.3 j =0  i =1 

Suppose that after time t, the attacker can figure out the state in which the phone number is located. This may allow the attacker to learn the three leftmost digits (at least for states with a single area code). Entropy at time t is given by: 10  9  H ( A, t ) = 0 + ∑ w j  ∑ (−0.1 log 2 (0.1)) = 23.3 j =4  i =0 

Note that attributes a1, a2, and a3 contribute 0 to the entropy value because the attacker knows their correct values. Information loss at time t is: D(A,t) = H * (A) – H(A,t) = 10.0 b.) Decrease of system entropy with attribute disclosures: Decrease of system entropy with attribute disclosures is illustrated in Figure 2. The lighter circles indicate the size of the attribute set for private data under consideration, the smaller darker circles within them indicate the sizes of subsets of disclosed attributes, the vertical lines to the left of the lighter circles indicate the maximum entropy H*, and vertical bars to the left of the lighter circles (superimposed on the “H* lines”) indicate the current entropy level. Let us first consider cases (a) – (c) in which we assume a fixed size of private data. This fixed size of private data explains why the lighter circles in these three cases have the same size. When entropy of data reaches a certain higher threshold value H2, as shown in case (b), a controlled data distortion method, increasing entropy of these data, must be invoked to protect their privacy. Examples of distortion mechanisms include generalization and suppression (Sweeney, 2002a) or data evaporation (Lilien & Bhargava, 2006). When entropy of data drops below a certain lower threshold level H1, as shown in case (c), data destruction must

0

be triggered to destroy all private data. Data destruction is the ultimate way of preventing their disclosure. Let us add a bit more detail to this example. Consider private data that consists of three attributes: a name, a social security number, and a zip code. Each attribute has a domain of values. The owner of private data first computes the maximum entropy H* for all three attributes. The owner also determines two values for entropy mentioned above: the higher value H2 (the threshold for triggering controlled data distortions), and the lower value H1 (the threshold for triggering data destruction). Each time when private data is shared or transferred from one entity to another, the new value of entropy, Hnew, is calculated using Equation (2). If Hnew stays above H2, no privacypreserving actions are needed. If Hnew drops below H2 but stays above H1 (H2 > Hnew > H1), a controlled data distortions method is invoked to increases data entropy. Finally, if Hnew drops below H1 (H1 > Hnew), data destruction must be invoked to protect data privacy. The example assumed that the size of the private data attribute set is fixed. The entropy metric can be extended to cases when the private data attribute set is allowed to grow or shrink. Case (d) in Figure 2, when compared with case (c), illustrates the situation in which private data attribute set grew. This growth is indicated by the larger diameter of the lighter circle, indicating a larger attribute set for sensitive data. The sizes of subsets of disclosed attributes, indicated by the darker circles, are identical in cases (d) and (c); do not be fooled by the optical illusion that the darker circle in (d) is smaller than the darker circle in (c). As a result, entropy for case (d) is higher than for case (c), as indicated by a higher vertical bar for case (d). This utilizes the principle of “hiding in the (larger) crowd.” Entropy can be increased not only by increasing the size of the private data attribute set, as just demonstrated, but also by making its subset of disclosed attributes less valuable. For example,

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Figure 2. Dynamics of entropy

suppose that a bank releases the current account balance of a customer to an insurer. This balance is valid for a specific period of time. After this period, the value of knowing this private piece of information decreases, because the customer could have changed her balance. In computing the new value of entropy, the balance is assumed to be private again. This leads to a gradual increase in entropy. In another example, a bank can increase entropy rapidly: to make stolen credit card numbers useless, it quickly changes credit card numbers for all compromised accounts.

B. Methods for Protecting Privacy Privacy controls for sensitive data are necessary. Without them, many interaction opportunities are lost. Examples are patients’ symptoms hidden from doctors, given up business transactions, lost research collaborations, and rejected social contacts Privacy can be supported by technical or legal controls. Examples of legal controls are the EPA privacy act (Privacy Act, 2004), and HIPAA Privacy Rule (Summary HIPAA, 2003; Mercuri, 2004) intended to protect privacy of individuals. Yet, there are many examples of privacy violations even by federal agencies. The sharing of travelers’ data by JetBlue Airways with the federal government was one such incident (Privacy Act, 2004). Technical controls for facilitating or enabling privacy controls must complement legal controls.

Such privacy protection mechanisms should empower users (peers, nodes, etc.) to protect user identity, privacy of user location and movement, as well as privacy in collaborations, data warehousing, and data dissemination. Each party that obtained other party’s sensitive data through an interaction must protect privacy of these data. Forwarding them without proper privacy guarantees to other entities could endanger partner’s privacy. Both stronger and weaker party should be assisted with technical solutions. On the one hand, the responsibility of the stronger partner for protecting privacy is larger. The reason is that the stronger partner obtains more sensitive data of her counterpart then a weaker partner. In many cases, the stronger partner might be the only party that obtains private data. On the other hand, the weaker partner should not rely entirely on the integrity of the stronger counterpart. He needs mechanisms to protect sensitive data released by him even—or especially—when they are out of his hands. This means that at least the following two kinds of mechanisms are needed. The first one must assist in minimizing the amount of private information that is disclosed. A system for privacy-for-trust exchange, presented in this chapter, is an example of a mechanism of this kind. Mechanisms of the second kind provide protection for further dissemination of sensitive data that are already disclosed, setting clear and well-defined limits for such dissemination. They

0

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

assure that data disclosed to a stronger party are not freely disseminated by her to other entities. For example, a mechanism of this kind assures that only some of data revealed by a patient to his doctor are forwarded by the doctor to an insurer or a nurse, and most sensitive data are never forwarded to anybody.3 An example of this kind is the solution named P2D2 (privacy-preserving data dissemination) (Lilien & Bhargava, 2006), which enables control of further dissemination of sensitive data by integrating privacy protection mechanisms with the data they guard. P2D2 relies on the ideas of: (i) bundling sensitive data with metadata specifying privacy preferences and policies; (ii) an apoptosis—that is, a clean self-destruction (Tschudin, 1999)—of endangered bundles; and (iii) an adaptive evaporation of bundles in suspect environments. B.1. Technical privacy controls: Technical privacy controls, also known as privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), can be categorized into the following categories (Fischer-Hübner, 2001): • • •

Protecting user identities Protecting usee identities Protecting confidentiality and integrity of personal data

We take a look at these categories of technologies in turn. a. Protecting user identities (Fischer-Hübner, 2001): User identities can be protected via anonymity, unobservability, unlinkability, and pseudonymity of users. First, anonymity ensures that a user may use a resource or service without disclosing the user´s identity (Class FPR, 1999). The special cases of anonymity are: sender and receiver anonymity, ensuring that a user is anonymous in the role of a sender or a receiver, respectively, of a message. We can define the following six degrees of sender anonymity—from the one fully protect-

0

ing the sender, to the one exposing the sender (Fischer-Hübner, 2001): (i) absolute privacy, when the sender enjoys full privacy with respect to being considered as the sender of a message; (ii) beyond suspicion, when the sender appears to be no more likely to be the originator of a message than any other potential sender in the system; (iii) probable innocence, when the sender appears to be no more likely to be the originator of a message than not to be its originator; (iv) possible innocence, when there is a nontrivial probability that the real sender is someone else; (v) exposed, when the sender is highly likely to be the originator of a message; and (vi) provably exposed, when the sender is identified beyond any doubt as the originator of a message. Second, unobservability ensures that a user may use a resource or service without others being able to observe that the resource or service is being used (Class FPR, 1999). Third, unlinkability ensures that a user may make use of resources and services without others being able to link these uses together (ibid). Its special case is unlinkability of a sender and a recipient, when a sender and a recipient cannot be identified as communicating with each other. Fourth, pseudonymity ensures that a user acting under a pseudonym may use a resource or service without disclosing his identity (ibid). b. Protecting usee identities (Fischer-Hübner, 2001): In this case, the protected entity is the usee, that is, the subject described by data. Usee identities can be protected, for example, via depersonalisation, providing anonymity or pseudonymity of data subjects. Depersonalisation (anonymization) of data subjects can be classified as a perfect depersonalization, when data are rendered anonymous in such a way that the usee (data subject) is no longer identifiable, and a practical depersonalization, when a modification of personal data is such that information concerning personal or material circumstances can either no longer be attributed to

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

an identified or identifiable individual, or can be so attributed only with a disproportionate amount of time, expense and labor. Attackers attempt to circumvent depersonalization by reidentification attacks. c. Protecting confidentiality and integrity of personal data (Fischer-Hübner, 2001): Confidentiality and integrity of personal data can be protected by a number of methods and technologies, including privacy-enhanced identity management, access controls, using enterprise privacy policies, making data inaccessible with cryptography or steganography (e.g., hiding a message in an image), and utilizing specific tools (such as platform for privacy preferences or P3P; Marchiori, 2002). B.2 Legal privacy controls: For completeness of our presentation, we will take a look, albeit a quick one, at legal privacy controls. Despite the fact that definitions of privacy vary according to context and environment, the belief that privacy is a fundamental human right, even one of the most important rights of the modern age, is internationally recognized .At a minimum, individual countries protect inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications (Green, 2003). There are two types of privacy laws in various countries (ibid): comprehensive laws and sectoral laws. Comprehensive laws are general laws that govern the collection, use and dissemination of personal information by public and private sectors. They are enforced by commissioners or independent enforcement bodies. The disadvantages of this approach include lack of resources for oversight and enforcement agencies, as well as the governmental control over the agencies. Comprehensive privacy laws are used in Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. Sectoral laws focus on specific sectors and avoid general laws. They benefit from being

able to use a variety of specialized enforcement mechanisms, selecting the ones best suited for the sector they apply to. Their disadvantage is the need for a new legislation for each new sectoral technology. Sectoral privacy laws are used in the United States. Disparate national privacy laws require international agreements to bridge different privacy approaches. An example is the Safe Harbor Agreement, reached in July 2000, between the United States and the European Union (Welcome Safe, 2007). It has been criticized by privacy advocates and consumer groups in both the United States and European Union for inadequate enforcement, and relying too much on mere promises of participating companies.

Trading Privacy for Trust An interacting entity can choose to trade its privacy for a corresponding gain in its partner’s trust in it (Zhong & Bhargava, 2004). We believe that the scope of a privacy disclosure should be proportional to the benefit expected by the entity that discloses its private information. For example, a customer applying for a mortgage must—and is willing to—reveal much more personal data than a customer buying a book. Having measures of trust and privacy defined above allows for precise observation of these two quantities, and precise answers to questions such as: (i) What degree of privacy is lost by disclosing given data? (ii) How much trust is gained by disclosing given data? and (iii) What degree of privacy must be sacrificed to obtain a certain amount of trust gain?

A. Same-Strength and Different-Strength Trust As defined earlier, the strength of a party participating in the relationship is defined by the party’s capability to demand private information from the other party, and the means available in

0

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

case when the other party refuses to comply. As a simple example, a bank is stronger than a customer requesting a mortgage loan. As mentioned, trust relationships can be divided into same-strength or different-strength.

B. Same-Strength and Different-Strength Privacy-for-Trust Negotiations To realize a privacy-for-trust tradeoff, two interacting parties, P1 and P2, must negotiate how much privacy needs be reveled for trust. We categorize such negotiations as either: (1) same-strength—when both parties are of similar strength; or (2) different-strength—when one party’s position is stronger vis-à-vis the others. In turn, same-strength privacy-for-trust negotiations can be either: (1a) privacy-revealing negotiations, in which parties disclose their certificates or policies; or (1b) privacy-preserving negotiations, in which parties preserve privacy of their certificates and policies. We compare all three kinds of privacy-for-trust negotiations—that is, (1a), (1b), and (2)—in terms of their behavior during the negotiations. This behavior includes defining trust level necessary to enter negotiations, growth of trust level during negotiations, and the final trust level sufficient for getting a service. Same-strength negotiations are very popular in the research literature. Different-strength negotiations, to the best of our knowledge have been defined explicitly by us. B.1. Trust growth in same-strength trust negotiations: Same-strength trust negotiations involve partners of similar strength. a. Trust growth in privacy-revealing samestrength trust negotiations: Negotiations of this type can start only if an initial degree of trust exists between the parties. They must trust each other enough to reveal to each other some certifi-

0

cates and policies right away. From this point on, their mutual trust grows in a stepwise manner as more private information is revealed by each party. Negotiations succeed when a “sufficient” mutual trust is established by the time when the negotiation ends—it is “sufficient” for the requestor to obtain the desired service. This procedure is summarized in Table 6. b. Trust growth in privacy-preserving samestrength trust negotiations: In contrast to privacy-revealing same-strength trust negotiations, negotiations of this type can start without any initial trust, since they involve no risk related to revealing one’s privacy. There are no intermediate degrees of trust established during the negotiations. They continue without mutual trust up to the moment when they succeed or fail. They succeed when a sufficient mutual trust is established by the time when the negotiation ends. This procedure is summarized in Table 7. B.2. Trust growth in different-strength trust negotiations: Negotiations of this type can start only if at their start the weaker partner has a sufficient trust in the stronger partner. This trust is “sufficient” when the weaker party is ready for revealing private information required to start gaining stronger party’s trust necessary for obtaining its service. As negotiations continue, the weaker partner trades a degree of privacy loss for a trust gain as perceived by the stronger

Table 6. Trust growth in privacy-revealing samestrength trust negotiations An initial degree of trust necessary • Must trust enough to reveal (some) certificates / policies right away Stepwise trust growth in each other as more (possibly private) information about each other revealed • Proportional to the number of certificates revealed to each other Succeed if sufficient mutual trust established when negotiations completed • ”Sufficient” for the task at hand

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Table 7. Trust growth in privacy-preserving samestrength trust negotiations Initial distrust • No one wants to reveal any information to the partner No intermediate degrees of trust established • ”From distrust to trust” Succeed if sufficient mutual trust established when negotiations completed • ”Sufficient” for the task at hand

partner. It should be clear that the former looses a next degree of privacy when revealing the next private certificate to the latter. (The only exception to privacy loss is the “no privacy loss” case in the anonymity-preserving example in “stronger building trust in weaker,” shown in Table 3). Negotiations succeed when, by the time when the different-strength trust negotiations end, the stronger party gains a sufficient trust in the weaker party to provide it the requested service. This procedure is summarized in Table 8.

Table 8. Trust growth in privacy-preserving different-strength trust negotiations Initially, Weaker has a “sufficient” trust in Stronger • Weaker must trust Stronger sufficiently to start revealing private information required to gain Stronger’s sufficient trust Weaker trades a degree of privacy loss for a trust gain as perceived by Stronger • A next degree of privacy “lost” when a next certificate revealed to Stronger “Sufficient” trust of Stronger in Weaker established when negotiations completed • “Sufficient” for the task at hand

Table 9. Summary of trust growth in samestrength Trust growth in same-strength “disclosing” trust negotiations • Initial degree of trust / stepwise trust growth / establishing mutual “full” trust • Trades information for trust (information is private or not) Trust growth in same-strength “preserving” trust negotiations (from distrust to trust) • Initial distrust / no stepwise trust growth / establishes mutual ”full” trust • No trading of information for trust (information is private or not)

B.3. Summary of privacy-for-trust trading in same-strength and different-strength Trust Negotiations: Table 9 summarizes trust growth in same-strength and different-strength trust negotiations and different-strength trust negotiations

C. Privacy-for-Trust Optimization in Different-Strength Trust Negotiations The optimization procedure for trading privacy for trust in different-strength trust negotiations presented, follows our approach (Zhong & Bhargava, 2004; Zhong, 2005). It includes four steps: 1. 2. 3.

Formalizing the privacy-trust tradeoff problem Measuring privacy loss due to disclosing a private credential set Measuring trust gain obtained by disclosing a private credential set

Trust growth in different-strength trust negotiations • Initial “full” trust of Weaker in Stronger and no trust of Stronger in Weaker / stepwise trust growth / establishes “full” trust of Stronger in Weaker • Trades private information for trust

4.

Developing a system that minimizes privacy loss for a required trust gain

We distinguish two forms of privacy-for-trust optimization. The first one minimizes the loss of privacy by the weaker partner necessary for obtaining, in the eyes of the stronger partner, a certain trust level required to get a service. This is the form discussed in more detail below. The second form of optimization finds the degree of privacy disclosure by the weaker partner necessary for maximizing the trust level obtained from the stronger partner. We do not discuss this form,

0

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

just noticing that it is needed in situations when the weaker partner’s benefits obtained from the stronger partner are proportional to the trust level attained in the eyes of the stronger partner. We assume that a user has multiple choices in selecting sensitive information for disclosure. For example, in response to an age query, a user can show a driver license, a passport, or a birth certificate. C.1. Formulating the tradeoff problem: Suppose that the private attributes we want to conceal are a1, a2, …, am. A user has a set of credentials {c1, c2, …, cn}. A credential set can be partitioned by a service provider into revealed and unrevealed credential subsets, denoted as R(s) and U(s), respectively, where s is the identity of a service provider. The tradeoff problem can now be formulated as follows: choose from U(s) the next credential nc to be revealed in a way that minimizes privacy loss while satisfying trust requirements. More formally, this can be expressed as: min {PrivacyLoss(nc ∪ R(s)) – PrivacyLoss(R(s)) | nc satisfies trust requirements} This problem can be investigated in two scenarios: 1.

2.

08

Service providers never collude to discover customer’s private information. An individual version R(s) is maintained for each service provider and privacy loss is computed based on it. Some service providers collude to discover customer’s private information. A global version Rg that consists of all credentials disclosed to any colluding service provider is maintained. Since the difference between R(s) and Rg is transparent to the procedure for evaluation of privacy loss and trust gain, they both are denoted as R in further considerations.

The tradeoff problem changes to a multivariate problem if multiple attributes are taken into consideration. It is possible that selecting nc1 is better than nc2 for a1 but worse for a2. We assume the existence of an m-dimensional weight vector [w1, w2, …, wm] associated with these private attributes. The vector determines the protection priority for the private attributes a1, a2, …, am, respectively. We can minimize either: (a) the weighted sum of privacy losses for all attributes or (b) the privacy loss of the attribute with the highest protection weight. Another factor affecting the tradeoff decision is the purpose of data collection. It can be specified in the service provider’s privacy policy statement, for instance, by using P3P (Marchiori, 2002). Pseudonymous analysis and individual decision are two data collection purposes defined in P3P. The former states that collected information will not be used in any attempts to identify specific individuals. The latter tells that information may be used to determine the habits, interests, or other characteristics of individuals. A user could make different negotiation decisions based on the stated purpose of data collection. Furthermore, the service provider’s trustworthiness to fulfill the declared privacy commitment can be taken into consideration. C.2. Estimating privacy loss: We distinguish two types of privacy losses: the query-dependent and query-independent ones. Query-dependent privacy loss for a credential nc is defined as the amount of information that nc provides in answering a specific query. The following example illustrates a query-dependent privacy loss for a credential. Suppose that a user’s age is a private attribute. The first query asks: “Are you older than 15?” The second query tests the condition for joining a silver insurance plan, and asks: “Are you older than 50?” If the user has already presented a valid driver license, we are 100% sure that the answer to the first query is “yes” but the probability of answering “yes” to the second

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

query by a person with a driver license is, say, 40%. Privacy loss for a revealed driver license is here query-dependent since it varies for different queries: it is a full privacy loss (100%) for the first query, and only a partial (“probabilistic”) privacy loss (40%) for the second query. This example also makes it clear that the value of revealed information (such as a driver license) can vary for different queries. Let us consider now an example illustrating a query-independent privacy loss for a credential. Suppose that a user has already presented her driver license, which implies that she is older than 16. If she uses her Purdue undergraduate student ID as the next piece of evidence, a high query-independent privacy loss ensues—since this credential greatly reduces the probable range of her age. Let us consider the third query asking: “Are you an elementary school student?” The student’s ID is redundant as a credential for this query because the revealed driver license has already excluded this possibility. This shows that a credential having a high query-independent privacy loss may not necessarily be useful to answer a specific query (a large privacy loss with no trust gain). Two types of methods can be used to measure a privacy loss: probabilistic methods and the predefined lattice method. a. Probabilistic methods for estimating privacy losses: There are two probabilistic methods: one for evaluating query-dependent privacy losses, and another for evaluating query-independent privacy losses. More specifically, the first probabilistic method evaluates the query-independent privacy loss for disclosing a credential ci with respect to one attribute aj that has a finite domain { v1, v2, …, vk }. The probability of aj = vi before disclosing the credential is Prob(aj = vi | R). The probability of aj = vi with a given credential ci disclosed is Prob(aj = vi | R ∪ ci). The privacy loss is measured as the difference between entropy values (Young, 1971):

k

k

i =1

i =1

Pr ivacyLossa j (ci | R) = ∑ − Pi log 2 ( Pi ) − ∑ − Pi* log 2 ( Pi* )

where Pi = Prob(aj = vi | R) and Pi* = Prob(aj = vi | R ∪ ci). The second probabilistic method evaluates the query-dependent privacy loss based on the knowledge of a complete set of potential queries. Let q1, q2, …, qn denote n queries. Let pri be the probability that qi is asked, and wi be the corresponding weight indicating the protection priority for this query. We can now evaluate the privacy loss for disclosing a credential ci in response to a query qk. Suppose that there are r possible answers to the query. The domain of an attribute aj is divided into r subsets { qv1j , qv2j , ..., qvrj } based on the query answer set. The privacy loss with respect to attribute aj and query qk is computed as: where Pi = Prob(aj ∈ qvik | R) and Pi* = Prob(aj ∈ qvik | R ∪ ci). The query-dependent privacy loss with respect to attribute aj is evaluated by the following formula: n

Pr ivacyLossa j (ci | R) = ∑ (Pr ivacyLossa j ,q k * prk * wk ) k =1

Bayes networks (Jensen, 1996) and kernel density estimation can be used for conditional probability estimations. b. The predefined lattice method for estimating privacy losses: The second type of methods that can be used for measuring a privacy loss is represented by the predefined lattice method. This method assumes that each credential is associated with a tag indicating its privacy level with respect to attribute aj. The tag set is organized as a lattice (Donnellan, 1968) in advance. Tags are assigned to each subset of credentials as follows. Suppose that TB and TA are two tags and TB ≤ TA. TA and TB are assigned to credentials cA and cB,

09

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

respectively, if the information inferred from cA is more precise than what can be inferred from cB. cA determines a possible value set VA for aj, and cB determines another set VB. The formula to compute the privacy loss is: (see Box 1.) where lub is the least upper bound operator (ibid). C.3. Estimating trust gain: We have already shown in the section on Trust Metrics the way to compute a trust gain. It requires defining a trust benefit function B(ti) associated with each trust level ti. Then, the trust gain G is calculated as follows: trust_gain = G(new_trust_level, old_trust_level) = B(new_trust_level) - B(old_trust_level) C.4. PRETTY—a system minimizing privacy loss for a required trust gain: A prototype system named PRETTY (private and trusted systems) was developed in the Raid Laboratory at Purdue University (Zhong & Bhargava, 2004). PRETTY, shown in Figure 3, utilizes the server/client architecture. It uses as one of its components the existing TERA (trust-enhanced role assignment) prototype, which also was developed in the Raid Lab (Zhong, Lu, & Bhargava, 2004). TERA evaluates the trust level of a user based on the user’s behavior. It decides whether the user is authorized for an operation based on the policies, the credentials, and the level of trust. The user’s trust value is dynamically updated when more data on the user’s behavior become available. The server component consists of the server application, the TERA server, the privacy negotiator, the set of privacy policies, the database,

and the data disseminator. The client component of PRETTY consists of the user application, the credential manager, the evaluator of trust gain and privacy loss, the privacy negotiator, and a set of privacy policies. The evaluator of trust gain and privacy loss implements the mechanisms presented in this paper. It prompts a user to enter the utility function for the ongoing interaction. The evaluator either automatically makes the tradeoff decision, or provides the user with the evaluation results for privacy loss and trust gain. A typical interaction is illustrated in Figure 3 with numbered arrows. An arrow number (1 – 4, some with letter suffixes) corresponds to an item number in the interaction description. A number in parentheses in the figure denotes an unconditional path (e.g., “(1)”), that is, a path followed by all interactions. A number in brackets denotes a conditional path (e.g., “[2a]”), that is, a path followed only by some interactions. An interaction takes place as follows: 1. 2.

The user application sends a query to the server application. The server application sends user information to the TERA server for trust evaluation and role assignment. (Examples of roles are student role and faculty role, the latter granting its “actor” broader access rights.) 2a. If a higher trust level is required for query, the TERA server sends a request for more user’s credentials to the local privacy negotiator. 2b. Based on the server’s privacy policies and credential requirements, the server’s privacy negotiator interacts with the client’s privacy negotiator to build a higher level of trust.

Box 1. Pr ivacyLossa j (ci | ∅) = Tag (ci ) Pr ivacyLossa j (ci | R) = lub( PrivacyLossa j (ci | ∅), Pr ivacyLossa j ( R | ∅) )

0

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Figure 3. Architecture of PRETTY

3.

4.

2c. The trust gain and privacy loss evaluator of the client selects credentials that will increase trust to the required level with the minimal privacy loss. The calculations consider credential requirements and credentials disclosed in previous interactions. (This item includes two actions: [2c1] and [2c2]). 2d. According to client’s privacy policies and the calculated privacy loss, the client’s privacy negotiator decides whether or not to supply credentials to the server. Once the achieved trust level meets the minimum requirements, the appropriate roles are assigned to the user for execution of the user’s query. Based on the query results, the user’s trust level and privacy policies, the data disseminator determines: (i) whether to distort data for protecting its privacy and, if so, to what degree; and (ii) what privacy enforcement metadata (e.g., policies) should be associated with it.

future trends In prIvAcy- And trust-relAted solutIons Technical privacy-related and trust-related solutions will continue their strong impact on online consumer protection. The future trends related to privacy will be determined, among others, by the following challenges (Bhargava, Farkas, Lilien, & Makedon, 2003; Bhargava, 2006): 1.

2.

Defining and measuring privacy and privacy policies: How to define privacy? How to define privacy metrics? How to best define privacy policies? How to best perform privacy requirement analysis and stakeholder analysis? How to analyze, and manage privacy policies? Determining technologies that endanger privacy in computing environments: What technologies or system components endanger privacy in computing environments, and how to prevent this? As an example, how to prevent pervasive computing from illegitimate monitoring and controlling people? How to assure anonymity in pervasive computing environments? How to balance



Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

3.

anonymity with accountability under these circumstances? Finding new privacy-enhancing technologies

What technologies can be utilized or exploited to provide privacy, and how to use them to this end? What are the best ways of privacy-preserving data mining and querying? How to monitor Web privacy and prevent privacy invasions by undesirable inferences? How to address the issue of “monitoring the monitor,” including identification and prevention of situations when incorrect monitor data result in a personal harm? The future trends related to trust will be determined among others, by the following challenges (Bhargava et al., 2003):

4.

What is the impact of trust solutions on system performance and economics? How to guarantee performance and economy of trust solutions? How and what economic incentives and penalties can be used for trust solutions? Engineering trust-based applications and systems: How to experiment with and implement trust-based applications and systems for e-government, e-commerce, and other applications? How to enhance system performance, security, economics, and so forth, with trust-based ideas (such as enhancing role-based access control with trust-based mappings)?

conclusIon 1.

2.

3.



Improving initiation and building of trust:How to create formal models of trust, addressing the issues of different types of trust (e.g., trust towards data subjects, or data users)? How to define trust metrics able to compare different trust models? How should trust models assist in selecting and accommodating trust characteristics? How should the models of trust handle both direct evidence and second-hand recommendations? How TTPs can be used to initiate and build trust? How timeliness, precision, and accuracy affect the process of trust building? Maintaining and evaluating trust: How to collect and maintain trust data (e.g., credentials, recommendations)? How and when to evaluate trust data? How to discover betrayal of trust, and how to enforce accountability for damaging trust? How to prevent trust abuse, for example, by preventive revocation of access rights? How to motivate users to be good citizens and to contribute to trust maintenance? Constructing practical trust solutions: How to scale up trust models and solutions?

Providing tools for privacy-for-trust exchange is critical to further developments of online interactions. Without privacy guarantees, there can be no trust, and without at least some trust no interactions can even commence—unless a party is totally oblivious to the dangers of privacy loss, up to the point of identity theft. Normally, people will avoid any negotiations if their privacy is threatened by a prospective negotiation partner. Without trust-building negotiations, no trust can be established. The stakes are becoming higher since privacy guarantees are becoming absolutely essential as we progress towards pervasive computing. More pervasive devices have the higher potential for violating privacy. Unless adequate technical privacy controls and privacy-for-trust support is provided, possibilities of huge privacy losses will scare people off, crippling the promise of pervasive computing. The objective of this chapter was presentation of an approach and a tool for protecting privacy in privacy-for-trust exchanges. We presented the notions of privacy and trust, their characteristics, and their role in online interactions, emphasizing the

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

tradeoff between these two phenomena. An overview of problems facing a person wishing to trade privacy for trust was followed by a description of our proposed solution. It started with a look at trust metrics and means for building and verifying trust, and continued with a presentation of two privacy metrics: an effective anonymity set size and an entropy-based metric. We then discussed technical means for protecting privacy. We categorized the processes of trading privacy for trust into same-strength privacy-fortrust negotiations and different-strength privacyfor-trust negotiations, dividing the former into privacy-revealing and privacy-preserving subcategories. The described privacy-for-trust solution is intended for optimization in different-strength trust negotiations. It involves four steps: formulating the tradeoff problem, estimating privacy loss, estimating trust gain, and minimizing privacy loss for a required trust gain. We provided a brief description of PRETTY, a system minimizing privacy loss for a required trust gain.

2.

3.

future reseArch dIrectIons for prIvAcy And trust reseArch We have shown that privacy and trust enable and facilitate collaboration and communication. We indicated their growing role in open and dynamic environments. To increase the benefits of privacy-related and trust-related solutions, a number of research directions should be pursued (Bhargava et al., 2003). For privacy-related solutions, the following research problems should be addressed (ibid): 4. 1.

Privacy metrics: Issues of privacy of users or applications, on the one hand, and privacy (secrecy, confidentiality) of data, on the other hand, intertwine. Metrics for personal and confidential data usage should be developed to measures that accesses data, what data

are accessed, and how they are accessed. Metrics and methods for measurements of privacy-related aspects of data quality should be provided. Accuracy in information extraction should be measured since inaccurate information can obstruct accountability or harm privacy (e.g., in a case of a wrongly identified individual). Privacy policy monitoring and validation: We need to better understand how to monitor and validate privacy policies, and develop technologies that ensure correct enforcement of privacy policies. Researchers should address monitoring and validating privacy aspects of data integration, separation, warehousing, and aggregation. An interesting issue is licensing of personal data for specific uses by their owners (an example is Ms. Smith agreeing to receive house-for-sale advertising by licensing her e-mail rights to a real estate advertiser). Information hiding, obfuscation, anonymity, and accountability: Researchers should address different ways of assuring anonymity via information hiding and obfuscation, ranging from steganography through location security and hiding message source and destination from intermediate nodes to approaches used for digital elections. At the same time, for accountability, we need to investigate how to prevent illegitimate or improper information hiding. We need models that support accountable anonymity without depending on a trusted third party. As an example, accountability suffers when data provenance obfuscation or user anonymity hinder intruder identification. New privacy-enabling and privacydisabling technologies: The impact of emerging technologies on privacy should be investigated. In particular, broad research on privacy for pervasive computing is an urgent necessity. Unless proper access control is provided, less restricted data. Another



Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

5.

important issue is privacy-preserving data mining on massive datasets. Interdisciplinary privacy research: Interdisciplinary research should propose comprehensive and rich privacy models based on social and ethical privacy paradigms. Another direction is considering public acceptance of privacy requirements and rules, and their enforcement.

In turn, for trust-related solutions, the following research problems should be addressed (ibid): 1.

2.

3.



A better utilization of the social paradigm of trust: Utilization of the powerful social paradigm of trust, based on the analogies to uses of the notion of trust in social systems, should be explored in many ways. Finding out what makes trust work in existing social systems, and transferring this to a computing world is a big challenge. This work calls for a strong cooperation with social scientists. Liability of trust: We need to provide methods, algorithms, and tools to identify which components and processes of the system depend on trust. We also need to find out to which extent and how security of a system may be compromised if any of these trust-dependent components fails. As an example, the role of data provenance explanations in trust-based systems needs be investigated. Scalable and adaptable trust infrastructure: A high priority should be given to building scalable and adaptable trust infrastructures, including support for trust management and trust-based negotiations. In particular, support should be made available for gaining insight from different applications, for exploring the issue of dynamic trust, for building interoperable tools for the trust infrastructure, for developing flexible and extensible standards, and for investigating trust-based negotiations.

4.

5.

Benchmarks, testbeds, and development of trust-based applications: We need benchmarks and testbeds for experimenting with diverse roles of trust in computing systems. The experiments should form a strong basis for the development of diverse prototype trust-based applications. Trust-based solutions for new and emerging technologies should be studied. An example is ensuring data integrity and privacy in sensor networks deployed in trustless environments. Interdisciplinary trust research: There is a strong need for trust-related interdisciplinary research outside of the realm of computer science and engineering. In addition to already-mentioned interdisciplinary work on the social paradigm of trust, it should include research on ethical, social, and legal issues, both human-centered and system-centered. Another important direction is work on economic incentives for building trust, and disincentives and penalties for committing fraud.

Trust and privacy are strongly related to security. Therefore, in addition to the separate research directions for privacy and trust specified, we can also indicate threads of research common not only to them, but also to security. This means research on intersecting aspects of trust, privacy, and security (TPS) (Bhargava et al., 2003). The first common thread includes the tradeoffs, including not only the tradeoff between privacy and trust, but also performance vs. TPS, cost and functionality vs. TPS, and data monitoring and mining vs. TPS. The second common thread contains policies, regulations, and technologies for TPS. This includes creation of flexible TPS policies, appropriate TPS data management (including collection, usage, dissemination, and sharing of TPS data), and development of domain- and application-specific TPS approaches (such as TPS solutions for commercial, government, medical, and e-commerce fields). The third and the fourth

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

threads are a development of economic models for TPS, and investigation of legal and social TPS aspects.

AcknoWledgment This research was supported in part by the NSF Grants IIS-0242840, IIS-0209059, ANI-0219110, and NCCR-0001788. The authors thank Dr. Yuhui Zhong and Dr. Yi Lu for contributing input for the subsections on Related Work, Trust Metrics, Privacy Metrics, and Privacy-for-trust Optimization in Different-strength Trust Negotiations; as well as Dr. Mohamed Hefeeda for contributing Figure 2. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendation expressed in the chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies or institutions with which the authors are affiliated.

references Aberer, K., & Despotovic, Z. (2001). Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system. In Proceedings of the 2001 ACM CIKM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, Atlanta, Georgia (pp. 310-317). New York: ACM. Agrawal, D., & Aggarwal, C. (2001). On the design and quantification of privacy preserving data mining algorithms. In Proceedings of the Twentieth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, PODS’01, Santa Barbara, California (pp. 247-255). New York: ACM. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.). (2000). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Barnes, G. R., Cerrito, P. B., & Levi, I. (1998). A mathematical model for interpersonal relation-

ships in social networks. Social Networks, 20(2), 179-196. Bhargava, B. (2006, September). Innovative ideas in privacy research (Keynote talk). In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications DEXA’06, Kraków, Poland (pp. 677-681). Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society. Bhargava, B., Farkas, C., Lilien, L., & Makedon, F. (2003, September 14-16). Trust, privacy, and security: summary of a workshop breakout session at the national science foundation information and data management (IDM) workshop held in Seattle, Washington (Tech. Rep. No. 2003-34). West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS). Bhargava, B., Lilien, L., Rosenthal, A., & Winslett, M. (2004). Pervasive trust. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 19(5), 74-77. Bhargava, B., & Zhong, Y. (2002). Authorization based on evidence and trust. In Y. Kambayashi, W. Winiwarter, & M. Arikawa (Eds.), Proceedings of 4th International Conference on Data Warehousing and Knowledge Discovery (DaWaK 2002) Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2454, pp. 94-103). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Can, A. B. (2007). Trust and anonymity in peerto-peer systems. Ph.D. thesis, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University. Carbo, J., Molina, J., & Davila, J. (2003). Trust management through fuzzy reputation. International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems, 12(1), 135–155. Class FPR: Privacy. (1999). Common criteria for information technology security evaluation. Part 2: Security functional requirements. Version 2.1. (Report CCIMB-99-032) (pp.109-118). Ft. Meade, MD: National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP). Retrieved June 5, 2007, from



Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

http://www.niap-ccevs.org/cc-scheme/cc_docs/ cc_v21_part2.pdf Collberg, C., & Thomborson, C. (2002). Watermarking, tamper-proofing, and obfuscation-tools for software protection. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 28(8), 735-746. Cofta, P. (2006). Impact of convergence on trust in ecommerce. BT Technology Journal, 24(2), 214-218. Cover, T., & Thomas, J. (1991). Elements of information theory. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Cranor, L. F. (2003). P3P: making privacy policies more useful. IEEE Security and Privacy, 1(6), 50–55. Cranor, L. F., Reagle, J., & Ackerman, M. S. (1999). Beyond concern: Understanding net users’ attitudes about online privacy (Tech. Rep. No. TR 99.4.3). Middletown, NJ: AT&T Labs-Research. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://citeseer.ist. psu.edu/cranor99beyond.html Diaz, C., Seys, S., Claessens, J., & Preneel, B. (2003, April). Towards measuring anonymity. In R. Dingledine & P. F. Syverson, (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies PET 2002, San Francisco, CA. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2482, pp. 184-188). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Donnellan, T. (1968). Lattice theory. Oxford, NY: Pergamon Press. Farrell, S., & Housley, R. (2002). RFC3281: An Internet attribute certificate profile for authorization. The Internet Society. Network Working Group. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www. ietf.org/rfc/rfc3281.txt Fischer-Hübner, S. (2001). IT-security and privacydesign and use of privacy-enhancing security mechanisms. Lecture Notes on Computer Science, 1958. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.



Fischer-Hübner, S. (2003). Privacy enhancing technologies. Session 1 and 2, Ph.D. course, Winter/Spring 2003. Karlstad, Sweden: Karlstad University. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http:// www.cs.kau.se/~simone/kau-phd-course.htm Fujimura, K., & Nishihara, T. (2003). Reputation rating system based on past behavior of evaluators. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, San Diego, CA, USA (pp. 246-247). New York: ACM Press. Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., & Boneh, D. (2003). Terra: A virtual machinebased platform for trusted computing. In Proceedings of 19th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP 2003, Bolton Landing, New York (pp. 193-206). New York: ACM Press. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://citeseer.ist. psu.edu/667929.html Goldberg, I. (2000). A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the Internet. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Berkeley. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley. edu/ iang/thesis-final.pdf Green, A. M. (2003). International privacy laws. Sensitive information in a wired world (Tech. Rep. No. CS 457). New Haven, CT: Yale University. IBM Privacy Research Institute. (2007). Armonk, NY: IBM. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http:// www.research.ibm.com/privacy/ Internet Security Glossary. (2007). The Internet Society. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from www.faqs. org/rfcs/rfc2828.html Jensen, F.V. (1996). An introduction to Bayesian networks. London: UCL Press. Kelley, C. M., Denton, A., & Broadbent, R. (2001). Privacy concerns cost ecommerce $15 billion. Cambridge, MA: Forrester Research. Lilien, L., & Bhargava, B. (2006). A scheme for privacy-preserving data dissemination. IEEE

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, 36(3), 503-506. Lilien, L., Gupta, A., & Yang, Z. (2007). Opportunistic networks for emergency applications and their standard implementation framework. In Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Next Generation Networks for First Responders and Critical Infrastructure, NetCri07, New Orleans, LA (pp. 588-593). Lilien, L., Kamal, Z. H., Bhuse, V., & Gupta, A. (2006). Opportunistic networks: The concept and research challenges in privacy and security. In P. Reiher, K. Makki, & S. Makki (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Workshop on Research Challenges in Security and Privacy for Mobile and Wireless Networks (WSPWN06), Miami, FL (pp. 134-147). Marchiori, M. (2002). The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) specification. W3C recommendation. W3C. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/ Marsh, S. (1994). Formalizing trust as a computational concept. Ph.D. thesis, University of Stirling, U.K. McKnight, D. H., & Chervany, N. L. (2001). Conceptualizing trust: A typology and e-commerce customer relationships model. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, HICSS-34, Island of Maui, Hawaii (Volume 7, 10 pages). Washington, D.C.: IEEE Computer Society. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2001/0981/07/09817022.pdf McKnight, D., Choudhury, V., & Kacmar, C. (2002). Developing and validating trust measures for e-commerce: An integrative topology. Information Systems Research, 13(3), 334-359. Mercuri, R. T. (2004). The HIPAA-potamus in health care data security. Communications of the ACM, 47(7), 25-28.

Morinaga, S., Yamanishi, K., Tateishi, K., & T. Fukushima, T. (2002). Mining product reputations on the Web. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (pp. 341–349). New York: ACM Press. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from citeseer.ist.psu.edu/morinaga02mining.html Mui, L. (2002). Computational models of trust and reputation: Agents, evolutionary games, and social networks. Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mui, L., Mohtashemi, M., & Halberstadt, A. (2002). A computational model of trust and reputation for e-businesses. In Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, HICSS’02, Track 7, Island of Hawaii, Hawaii (9 pages). Washington, D.C.: IEEE Computer Society. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2002/1435/07/14350188.pdf Pfitzmann, A., & Köhntopp, M. (2000). Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudonymity—a proposal for terminology. In H. Federrath (Ed.), Designing privacy enhancing technologies, Proceedings of the Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Observability, Berkeley, California. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2009, pp. 1-9). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Privacy Act. (2004). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.epa.gov/privacy/ Privacy Bird Tour. (2007). Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.privacybird.org/tour/1_3_beta/ tour.html Privacy online: A report to congress. (1998). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Pujol, J. M., Sangesa, R., & Delgado, J. (2002). Extracting reputation in multi agent systems by means of social network topology. In Proceed-



Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

ings of the First International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS ‘02, Bologna, Italy (pp. 467-474). New York: ACM Press. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from citeseer.ist.psu.edu/pujol02extracting.html Reiter, M., & Rubin, A. (1999). Crowds: Anonymity for Web transactions. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 32-48. Ross, R. (2007, July 19). Robotic insect takes off. Researchers have created a robotic fly for covert surveillance. Technology Review, July 19. Retrieved July 20, 2007, from http://www. technologyreview.com/Infotech/19068/ Sabater, J., & Sierra, C. (2002). Social ReGreT, a reputation model based on social relations. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 3(1), 44-56. Seigneur, J.-M., & Jensen, C. D. (2004). Trading privacy for trust. In T. Dimitrakos (Ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Trust Management, iTrust 2004, Oxford, UK. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2995, pp. 93-107). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Sensor Nation. (2004). [Special Report]. IEEE Spectrum, 41(7). Serjantov, A., & Danezis, G. (2003). Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity. In R. Dingledine & P. F. Syverson. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PET 2002, San Francisco, California. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2482, pp. 259-263). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. (2003). Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Sweeney, L. (1996). Replacing personally-identifying information in medical records, the Scrub system. In J. J. Cimino (Ed.), Proceedings of the American Medical Informatics Association (pp. 333-337). Washington, D.C.: Hanley & Belfus.

8

Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://privacy.cs.cmu. edu/people/sweeney/scrubAMIA1.pdf Sweeney, L. (1998). Datafly: A system for providing anonymity in medical data. In T. Y. Lin & S. Qian (Eds.), Database security XI: Status and prospects. IFIP TC11 WG11.3 Eleventh International Conference on Database Security, Lake Tahoe, California (pp. 356-381). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science. Sweeney, L. (2001a). Computational disclosure control: A primer on data privacy protection. Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Sweeney, L. (2001b). Information explosion. In L. Zayatz, P. Doyle, J. Theeuwes, & J. Lane (Eds.), Confidentiality, disclosure, and data access: Theory and practical applications for statistical agencies (26 pages). Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://privacy. cs.cmu.edu/people/sweeney/explosion2.pdf Sweeney, L. (2002a). Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using generalization and suppression. International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10(5), 571-588. Sweeney, L. (2002b). k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy. International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10(5), 557–570. Trustworthy Computing White Paper. (2003). Redmond, Washington: Microsoft. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.microsoft.com/ mscorp/twc/twc_whitepaper.mspx Tschudin, C. (1999). Apoptosis—the programmed death of distributed services. In J. Vitek & C. D. Jensen (Eds.), Secure Internet programming. Security issues for mobile and distributed objects. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 1603, pp. 253-260). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Tygar, J. D., & Yee, B. (1994). Dyad: A system for using physically secure coprocessors. In Proceedings of the Joint Harvard-MIT Workshop Technological Strategies for Protecting Intellectual Property in the Networked Multimedia Environment. Annapolis, MD: Interactive Multimedia Association. Retrieved July 20, 2007, from http://www.cni.org/docs/ima.ip-workshop/Tygar. Yee.html Wagealla, W., Carbone, M., English, C., Terzis, S., Lowe, H. & Nixon, P. (2003, September). A formal model for trust lifecycle management. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust, FAST 2003, Pisa, Italy, (pp. 181-192). Retrieved July 20, 2007, from http://www.iit.cnr.it/FAST2003/fastproc-final.pdf Welcome to the Safe Harbor. (2007). Trade Information Center. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ Young, J. F. (1971). Information theory. New York: Wiley Interscience. Yu, B., & Singh, M. P. (2002a). Distributed reputation management for electronic commerce. Computational Intelligence, 18(4), 535-549. Yu, B., & Singh, M. P. (2002b). An evidential model of distributed reputation management. In Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS ‘02, Bologna, Italy, (pp. 294–301). New York: ACM Press. Yu, T., Winslett, M., & Seamons, K. E. (2003). Supporting structured credentials and sensitive policies through interoperable strategies for automated trust negotiation. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 6(1), 1-42. Zacharia, G., & Maes, P. (2000). Trust management through reputation mechanisms. Applied Artificial Intelligence, 14, 881-907.

Zhong, Y. (2005). Formalization of trust. Ph.D. thesis, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University. Zhong, Y., & Bhargava, B. (2004, September). Using entropy to trade privacy for trust. In Proceedings of the NSF/NSA/AFRL Conference on Secure Knowledge Management, SKM 2004, Amherst, NY (6 pages). Zhong, Y., Lu, Y., & Bhargava, B. (2004). TERA: An authorization framework based on uncertain evidence and dynamic trust (Tech. Rep. No. CSD-TR 04-009). West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University. Zhong, Y., Lu, Y., Bhargava, B., & Lilien, L. (2006). A computational dynamic trust model for user authorization (Working Paper). West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University.

AddItIonAl reAdIng In prIvAcy And trust Antoniou, G., Wilson, C., & Geneiatakis, D. (2006, October). PPINA—a forensic investigation protocol for privacy enhancing technologies. In H. Leitold & E. Leitold (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th IFIP International Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security, CMS 2006, Heraklion, Crete, Greece. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 4237, pp. 185-195). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Bauer, K., McCoy, D., Grunwald, D., Kohno, T., & Sicker D. (2007). Low-resource routing attacks against anonymous systems (Tech. Rep. No. CU-CS-1025-07). Boulder, CT: University of Colorado at Boulder. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.cs.colorado.edu/department/publications/reports/docs/CU-CS-1025-07.pdf Bearly, T., & Kumar, V. (2004). Expanding trust beyond reputation in peer-to-peer systems. In Proceedings of the 15th International Database

9

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

and Expert Systems Applications, DEXA’04, Zaragoza, Spain (pp. 966-970). Bouguettaya, A. R. A., & Eltoweissy, M. Y. (2003). Privacy on the Web: facts, challenges, and solutions. IEEE Security and Privacy, 1(6), 40-49. Cahill, V., Gray, E., Seigneur, J.-M., Jensen, C.D., Chen, Y., English, C., et al. (2003). Using trust for secure collaboration in uncertain environments. IEEE Pervasive Computing, 2(3), 52-61. Capra, L. (2004, November). Engineering human trust in mobile system collaborations. In Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering, SIGSOFT 2004, Newport Beach, California, (pp. 107-116). Washington, D.C.: IEEE Computer Society. Chaum, D. (1981). Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2), 84-90. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://world.std.com/~franl/ crypto/chaum-acm-1981.html Frosch-Wilke, D. (2001, June). Are e-privacy and e-commerce a contradiction in terms? An economic examination. In Proceedings of Informing Science Challenges to Informing Clients: A Transdisciplinary Approach, Krakow, Poland, (pp. 191197). Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www. informingscience.org/proceedings/IS2001Proceedings/pdf/FroschWilkeEBKAreEP.pdf Grandison, T., & Sloman, M. (2000). A survey of trust in Internet applications. IEEE Communications Surveys, 3(4), 2-16. Hubaux, J.-P., Capkun, S., & Luo, J. (2004). The security and privacy of smart vehicles. IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, 2(3), 49-55. Kagal, L., Finin, T., & Joshi, A. (2001). Trust-based security in pervasive computing environments. IEEE Computer, 34(12), 154-157. Kesdogan, D., Agrawal, D., & Penz, S. (2002). Limits of anonymity in open environments. In

0

F. A. P. Petitcolas (Ed.), Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding (IH 2002), Noordwijkerhout, The Netherlands. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2578, pp. 53-69). Heidelberg: Germany: Springer. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www-i4.informatik. rwth-aachen.de/sap/publications/15.pdf Köpsell, S., Wendolsky, R., & Federrath, H. (2006). Revocable anonymity. In Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security, ETRICS, Freiburg, Germany. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 3995, pp. 206-220). Heidelberg: Germany: Springer Kuntze, N., & Schmidt, A. U . (2006). Transitive trust in mobile scenarios. In Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security, ETRICS, Freiburg, Germany, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 3995, pp. 73-85). Heidelberg: Germany: Springer. Lam, S. K., Frankowski, D., & Riedl, J. (2006, June). Do you trust your recommendations? An exploration of security and privacy issues in recommender systems. In Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security, ETRICS, Freiburg, Germany, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 3995, pp. 14-29). Heidelberg: Germany: Springer. Langheinrich, M. (2001). Privacy by design— principles for privacy-aware ubiquitous systems. In G. D. Abowd, B. Brumitt, & S. Shafer (Eds.), Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing, UbiComp 2001, Atlanta, Georgia, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2201, pp. 273-291). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Lu, Y., Wang, W., Bhargava, B., & Xu, D. (2006). Trust-based privacy preservation for peer-to-peer data sharing. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A, 36(3), 498-502.

Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Manchala, D. W. (2000). E-commerce trust metrics and models. IEEE Internet Computing, 4(2), 36-44. Martin, D. M., Jr., Smith, R. M., Brittain, M., Fetch, I., & Wu, H. (2001). The privacy practices of Web browser extensions. Communications of the ACM, 44(2), 45-50. Nielson, S. Crosby, S., & Wallach, D. (2005). A taxonomy of rational attacks. In M. Castro & R. Renesse (Eds.), Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, IPTPS ‘05, Ithaca, New York, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Vol. 3640, pp. 36-46). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Resnick, P., Kuwabara, K., Zeckhauser, R. & Friedman, E. (2000). Reputation systems. Communications of the ACM, 43(12), 45-48. Richardson, M., Agrawal, R., & Domingos, P. (2003). Trust management for the Semantic Web. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Semantic Web Conference. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Vol. 2870, pp. 351–368). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.

Theodorakopoulos, G., & Baras, J. S. (2006). On trust models and trust evaluation metrics for ad hoc networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 24(2), 318-328. Thuraisingham, B. (2007, June). Confidentiality, privacy and trust policy enforcement for the Semantic Web. In Proceedings of the Eighth IEEE International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, POLICY’07, Bologna, Italy, (pp. 8-11). Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society. Virendra M., Jadliwala, M., Chandrasekaran, M., & Upadhyaya, S. (2005, April). Quantifying trust in mobile ad-hoc networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems, KIMAS 2005, Boston, MA, (pp. 65-70). Washington, D.C.: IEEE Computer Society. Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and freedom. New York: Atheneum. Westin, A. (2003). Social and political dimensions of privacy. Journal of Social Issues, 59(2), 431-453.

Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academic Management Review, 23(3), 393-404.

Xiao, L., Xu, Z., & Zhang, X. (2003). Low-cost and reliable mutual anonymity protocols in peer-topeer networks. IEEE Transactions on Distributed Systems, 14(9), 829-840.

Sandberg, C. K. (2002). Privacy and customer relationship management: can they peacefully co-exist. William Mitchell Law Review, 28(3), 1147-1162.

Yao, D., Frikken, K., Atallah, M., & Tamassia, R. (2006, December). Point-based trust: Define how much privacy is worth. In Q. Ning & Li (Eds.), Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS ‘06, Raleigh, North Carolina, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Vol. 4307, pp. 190-209). New York: ACM Press.

Skogsrud, H., Benatallah, B., & Casati, F. (2003). Model-driven trust negotiation for Web services. IEEE Internet Computing, 7(6), 45-52. Squicciarini, A. C., Bertino, E., Ferrari, E., & Ray, I. (2006). Achieving privacy in trust negotiations with an ontology-based approach. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 3(1), 13-30.

Zhang, N., & Todd, C. (2006, October). A privacy agent in context-aware ubiquitous computing environments. In H. Leitold & E. Leitold (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th IFIP International Conference on Communications and Multimedia



Privacy and Trust in Online Interactions

Security, CMS 2006, Heraklion, Crete, Greece, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Vol. 4327, pp. 196-205). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Zhu, H., Bao, F., & Liu, J. (2006). Computing of trust in ad-hoc networks. In H. Leitold & E. Leitold (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th IFIP International Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security, CMS 2006, Heraklion, Crete, Greece, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Vol. 4237, pp. 1-11). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.

endnotes 1

2

3



A successful construction of a cyberfly or “the first robot to achieve liftoff that's modeled on a fly and built on such a small scale” was just reported (Ross, 2007). This includes politics. A Russian proverb “Trust but verify” was made famous in the mid 1980’s by President Reagan, at the start of the historic negotiations with General Secretary Gorbachev. A special case of protection of this kind is preventing any forwarding of disseminated data by any party that received it directly from their original source.



Chapter VI

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia Huong Ha Monash University, Australia Ken Coghill Monash University, Australia Elizabeth Ann Maharaj Monash University, Australia

AbstrAct The current measures to protect e-consumers’ privacy in Australia include (i) regulation/legislation, (ii) guidelines, (iii) codes of practice, and (iv) activities of consumer associations and the private sector. However, information about the outcomes of such measures has not been sufficiently reported, whereas privacy incidents have increased. Some policy implications for e-consumer protection are drawn from the analysis. Firstly, national privacy legislation should widen its coverage. Secondly, uniform regulations and guidelines could contribute to providing equal protection to e-consumers. Thirdly, guidelines and codes of practice need to be supported by legislation and a proper compliance regime. Corporate social responsibility by e-retailers is also required for effective adoption of self-regulatory measures. Fourthly, consumer education is important to enhance consumer awareness of online privacy risks and their ability to deal with such incidents. Finally, a combination of legal frameworks, technological, and human-behaviour related measures is more likely to address online privacy issues effectively.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

IntroductIon E-retailing has generated many benefits to both e-retailers and e-consumers. At the same time, it has also raised serious problems for the operation of the online market, especially consumer protection. Among several problems with online shopping, privacy concerns are key factors which discourage consumers from shopping online (Stoney & Stoney, 2003). These concerns have been addressed by a number of measures at both the international and national levels. However, insufficient information about these measures and the outcomes of such measures has been reported. This chapter examines the current measures to protect consumers’ privacy in the online market, using Australia as a case study; examines the current state of e-consumer protection regarding privacy; and discusses policy implications for the protection of e-consumers’ privacy. This chapter consists of four main sections. The first section introduces three main privacy issues, namely data security, spam/spim, and spyware. The second section examines several measures implemented at the international and national levels to address privacy issues. In Australia, these measures include (i) legislation, (ii) guidelines, (iii) codes of practice, (iv) initiatives by the private sector, and (v) activities by consumer associations. The effectiveness of the current measures to address privacy concerns has been examined in the third section by analysing the current state of e-consumer protection in terms of privacy. This section also discusses a case study, using Dell as a subject of investigation. The final section discusses the policy implications. The findings suggest that although legislation, guidelines, and codes of practice are available, the effectiveness of these measures is limited. Consumers are not confident to shop online due to privacy and security concerns. Also, the protection of consumers’ personal information depends on how e-retailers exercise their corpo-



rate social responsibility to provide protection to e-consumers. The chapter aims to contribute to the development of theoretical understanding relating to regulations, guidelines, industry codes of conduct, and initiatives by the private sector to protect econsumers’ privacy. Its also provides an insight into measures addressing privacy concerns and how these measures could be improved to enhance consumer confidence in the online market.

bAckground This section first discusses three sub-issues of concern in the protection of e-consumers’ privacy. It then introduces the concept of consumer rights, and discusses justification for e-consumer protection. It also analyses the current framework for e-consumer protection regarding privacy.

privacy Issues Privacy is one of the key issues in e-consumer protection (Stoney & Stoney, 2003; Consumers International, 2001; Jackson, 2003; Kehoe, Pitkow, Sutton, Aggarwal, & Rogers, 1999). Internet users are very concerned about how their personal and financial data and medical history are collected, used and disseminated (Consumers International, 2001; Jackson, 2003; Kehoe, Pitkow, Sutton, Aggarwal, & Rogers, 1999; Moghe, 2003). Many consumers are very reluctant to reveal their particulars because they do not want e-retailers to misuse their personal information. However, by adopting advanced technology, e-retailers can easily collect personal and financial details of e-consumers (Lynch, 1997). In addition, many Web sites request e-shoppers to “register or accept” cookies which can help in tracking their Internet itinerary (Yianakos, 2002). Privacy risks can become a greater danger when e-retailers share common databases (Egger, 2002). To make things worse, many e-retailers have not published

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

privacy policies on their Web sites (Consumer Affairs Victoria, 2003; Consumer Affairs Victoria, 2004). For example, only 28% of the Web sites, investigated in the Internet Sweep Day 2001, had privacy policies (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2003). This chapter focuses on three sub-issues, namely data security, spam/spim, and spyware, affecting privacy due to their relevance to e-consumer protection. Firstly, data security refers to the security of personal and financial information during the collection, usage, transmission, and retention stages of e-transactions. Personal identity includes name, residential and postal address, driving license, date of birth, social security number, health card number, passport number, birth certificate, contact number, contact and place of employment, mother’s maiden name, employee or student identification number, and e-mail address of the workplace (Lawson & Lawford, 2003; Milne, 2003). Identity can also be “username, password, …, cryptographic keys, physical devices such as dongles, swipe cards, or even biometric recognition” (Marshall & Tompsett, 2005). Financial information includes bank account number, credit card number, password, personal identification number (PIN), and tax file number (Lawson & Lawford, 2003; Milne, 2003). Identity theft occurs when a customer’s financial and personal information is illegally collected and used by unscrupulous retailers or unauthorised person in order to impersonate another for personal gain or committing a fraud (Grabosky, Smith, & Dempsey, 2001; Lawson & Lawford, 2003; Marshall & Tompsett, 2005; Milne, Rohm, & Bahl, 2004; Smith, 2004). It has been noted that more cases of identity theft have been committed via electronic means (Grabosky, Smith, & Dempsey, 2001; Ha, 2005; Metz, 2005). Information can be unlawfully obtained during the transmission process. Employees, independent hackers, criminal individuals, and organised crime rings, business competitors, saboteurs, and cyber terrorists are possible intruders (Crime

and Misconduct Commission Queensland, 2004; Ha, 2005; Ha, 2006). Information can also be attained from a dishonest e-retailer or an online bank officer who illegally share customers’ information with others (Egger, 2002). For instance, the Financial Institution Online Fraud Survey in 2004 reported that 40% of bank officers shared passwords (Cyota, 2005). Information can also be illegally acquired during the retention stage, especially when the storage of data is connected to the Internet (Milloy, Fink, & Morris, 2002). Other ways to unlawfully obtain information online are the use of computer viruses/worms, spyware, phreaking, smurfing, and account harvesting. Phreaking refers to the hacking of “a telecommunication system” to obtain free phone services (U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 1986). Hacking refers to the “illegal breaking into a computer system for various malicious purposes” (Krone, 2005). Smurfing refers to the use of “smurf program to use internet protocol and Internet control message protocol to send a request using a packet Internet gopher to an Internet host to test its response” (Krone, 2005). Account harvesting refers to the collection of “e-mail accounts from information in the public domain or by using spybots to search for e-mail addresses stored locally on a computer” (Krone, 2005). However, this chapter does not examine these heavily technical forms of computer offences (Ha, 2007, unpublished). Secondly, spam occurs as a result of personal e-mail addresses being divulged, and is thus a subset of privacy concerns. In this case, users’ e-mail addresses are either stolen randomly from the Internet or are provided to other parties by eretailers or authorised persons in their companies, then used for “unsolicited commercial e-mails (“UCE”) or unsolicited bulk e-mails (“UBE”)” (Quo, 2004). Spam usually promotes prohibited or undesirable content which involves scams, hoaxes, deception and advertisements of financial products, sexual sites, and unaccredited educational



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

programs (Cheng, 2004; James & Murray, 2003; OECD, 2006). Spam takes a lot of computer resource (i.e., memory), and thus reduces productivity and annoys Internet users with unsolicited e-mails and pop-up advertisements. Spam spreads computer viruses and worms and wastes users’ time to filter and delete junk messages (Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA), 2005; Cheng, 2004), causing a huge financial and productivity losses to industry (Ha, 2007; MacRae, 2003). A new version of spam, called spim, targets “instant messaging (IM) services” and spreads undesirable content such as pornography (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2006). Finally, spyware refers to software that is used to steal information related to identification, password, and PIN numbers during a transaction process (Australian Federal Police (AFP), 2007). It can monitor and gather sensitive financial or medical information from Internet users. It can also change users’ browser settings or home pages which may direct users to other Web sites (Majoras, Swindle, Leary, Harbour, & Leibowitz, 2005). However, many consumers do not have adequate knowledge about it (Zhang, 2005). Only 45.6% of respondents in a survey by Zhang (2005) in 2005 were aware that their PCs could be infected by spyware. Therefore, there is an urgent need to raise e-consumers’ awareness of spyware, and how to deal with the online privacy risks and “for societies and groups to establish and define new norms of behaviour” (Kaufman, Edlund, Ford, & Powers, 2005). Overall, e-consumers are not confident of e-retailers’ practices regarding privacy protection. A survey by Roy Morgan Research (2004) reported that 81% of the respondents believed that “customer details” of a business are often transferred or sold to another business. Consumers only want to shop online and provide their personal and information to e-retailers when they trust such e-retailers (Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002; Kim, Williams, & Lee, 2003; Mansoorian, 2006; Saarenpää & Tiainen, 2003; Walczuch, Seelen,



& Lundgren, 2001). Hence, e-retailers need to keep customers’ information confidential and they are, by law, not allowed to use customers’ personal information for other promotion activities without customers’ prior consent (Ha, 2007, unpublished). The analysis shows that privacy is a problem of both technology and human behaviour (Yianakos, 2002). Thus, the priority task is to find the “best set of motivators and inducements” to deal with “simple challenges” which are made more complicated by the “networked world” (Yianakos, 2002).

consumer rights and consumer protection The four basic consumer rights, introduced in 1962 by the then USA President John Kennedy, aim to empower consumers in commercial, social, and economic activities (Akenji, 2004; Consumers International, 2006). They are the rights to (i) safety, (ii) information, (iii) choice, and (iv) representation (Akenji, 2004; Consumers International, 2006). These rights were adopted by international consumer organisations and another four rights were added as a result of the development of consumer movement led by Consumers International (USA) (Consumers International, 2006). The United Nations adopted the eight basic consumer rights in 1985, including the right to: (i) safety, (ii) be informed, (iii) choose, (iv) be heard, (v) satisfaction of basic needs, (vi) redress, (vii) consumer education, and (viii) a healthy environment (Akenji, 2004; Choice, 2006; Consumers International, 2006; Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs (Australia), 1993; Huffmann, 2004; Mansor, 2003; NSW Office of Fair Trading, 2003; Singh, 2002). These rights have been the basic foundation for countries to establish their own principles for consumer protection. However, these rights apply to consumers in both the online and off-line market without distinction for e-consumers. Ac-

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

cording to these rights, e-consumers consumers are entitled to be “further protected against unsolicited communication …. invasion of privacy” (Huffmann, 2004). Therefore, consumer protection aims to “protect the interest(s) of consumers in trade and commerce” (Quirk & Forder, 2003). Consumer protection is one of the tools to implement the eight universal basic consumer rights. It refers to activities which police “the market against acts and practices that distort the manner in which consumers make decisions in the marketplace” (Muris, 2002). The development of the online global marketplace has entailed “a number of consumer protection issues in Australia which have been uniquely e-related”, that is, some issues only occur in the online market (Round & Tustin, 2004). Consumer protection is important in eretailing for a number of reasons. Firstly, there has been “a lack of respect for [consumer] rights and their safety online” and many e-consumers do not know what kind of protection they have been entitled to receive, how and by whom they have been protected (Scottish Consumer Council, 2001). It means the first consumer right to safety may not be met. Secondly, e-consumers seem to be disadvantaged in commercial transactions in terms of “lack of choice” in contracts and lack of understanding of terms and conditions, and lack of knowledge about alternative choice in an e-contract (Petty & Hamilton, 2004). The second and third consumer rights to receive information and to choose may be violated if these above issues are not properly addressed. Consumers have to accept all terms and conditions, known as “bundle consent” which usually includes the option for receiving further marketing information, if they want to proceed with an online purchase (Ha, 2007, unpublished). Thirdly, consumers have to take more risks when conducting online transactions because customers cannot contact e-retailers

physically before making decisions to buy online. They also have to pay in advance and provide their personal and financial information (Huffmann, 2004). Nevertheless, they could not be assured that their privacy is sufficiently protected. Consumer rights to receive adequate protection in terms of privacy are not respected in practice.

the current measures to protect e-consumers’ privacy Currently, privacy issues associated with consumer protection in e-retailing have been addressed by a mixture of measures at the international and national levels. This section briefly discusses legislation and guidelines introduced by national and supra-national organisations to protect consumers’ privacy. It also analyses other measures which are employed by different organisations in both the public and private sectors to address privacy issues in e-retailing.

Table 1. Summary of international and national guidelines and legislation for consumer protection in terms of privacy (based on information in Harland, 1987; North American Consumer Project on Electronic Commerce, 2006) Organisation

Guidelines and Legislation

UN

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 Guidelines for Consumer Protection 1985 (expanded in 1999)

OECD

Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data 1980 Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce 1999

EU APEC

Data Protection Directive (EU) (95/46/EC) APEC Voluntary Online Consumer Protection Guidelines 2002

Sources: summarised from North American Consumer Project on Electronic Commerce (NACPEC). (2006). Internet Consumer Protection Policy Issues. Geneva: The Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Harland, D. (1987). The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection Journal of Consumer Policy 10(2), 245-266.



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

International level The following section discusses legislation and guidelines relating to consumer protection by the UN, the OECD, the EU, and APEC (Table 1).

The United Nations (UN) According to Article 12 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, everyone has the right to be protected against interference with his privacy (Australian Privacy Foundation Inc, 2006; United Nations, 1948). This document acknowledges the universal right of human beings regarding privacy. The UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection 1985, adopted on April 9, 1985 (Harland, 1987), are an extension of the UN basic consumer rights (see Appendix 1). These provide guidance for governments of member countries to develop, strengthen, and modify (if necessary) the legal framework and policies related to consumer protection in their countries. However, provision for privacy protection is not mentioned in this set of guidelines.

The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) The OECD introduced the Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-border Flows of Personal Data in September 1980. This set of guidelines provides a foundation for member countries to review their privacy legislation. The OECD guidelines include five parts and 22 provisions which provide directions to stakeholders regarding the collection, use, transmission, and retention of individual information (OECD, 2001b). The OECD guidelines also seek strong support among all stakeholders within and among countries to adopt these guidelines, and promote

8

international co-operation. This aims to develop a healthy online market which can facilitate the production and distribution of goods and services globally, whereas individuals’ privacy can still be protected. OECD member countries are encouraged to employ a wide range of measures to deal with privacy incidents such as using (i) market-based incentives and punishment (e.g., trust-marks and privacy seals) to encourage compliance with standards, (ii) technical measures, (iii) self-regulatory approach (e.g., online privacy policies), and (iv) online privacy-related dispute resolution (OECD, 2003). The OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce was approved by member countries in 1999. This document covers many areas such as information disclosure, confirmation process, and conclusion of contracts, security, privacy, dispute resolution, and redress as shown in Appendix 1 (OECD, 2000; Smith, 2004). The seventh OECD guidelines for e-consumer protection aim to protect e-consumers’ privacy in accordance with the OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Data (1980). This document also advises member countries to improve measures to protect e-consumers regarding privacy and other aspects, taking into consideration the cross-border flow of information (OECD, 2000). Similarly to the UN guidelines, both of these OECD guidelines encourage private sector initiatives and call for strong and fruitful co-operation among all stakeholders to achieve the common objectives (OECD, 2000). These documents emphasise consumer protection in general, and privacy protection is only a sub-set of consumer protection.

The European Union (EU) The key legislation regarding e-consumer protection regarding privacy in the European Union (EU) is the Data Protection Directive (Huffmann,

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

2004). This directive and self-regulatory privacy protection schemes aim to deal with spam and other privacy incidents (Cheng, 2004). The EU also acknowledged that sufficient consumer protection in terms of privacy constitutes “a fundamental right” to consumers, and “new areas of protection” had to be addressed so that the full potential of e-retailing could be realised, and both e-consumers and e-retailers could take full advantage of the benefits which e-retailers could offer (Buning, Hondius, Prins, & Vries, 2001). However, Appendix 1 shows that EU Principles of Consumer Protection do not cover the protection of privacy.

Asia Pacific Economic Co-Operation (APEC) APEC introduced APEC Voluntary Online Consumer Protection Guidelines in 2002 (APEC Electronic Commerce Steering Group, 2004). These guidelines state that consumers must receive the same level of protection no matter which forms of commerce they engage in. The APEC guidelines include ten provisions relating to international cooperation, education and awareness, private sector leadership, online advertising and marketing, online information disclosure to consumers, confirmation process, resolution of consumer disputes, privacy, security, and choice of law and jurisdiction as summarised in Appendix 1 (APEC Electronic Commerce Steering Group, 2004; Consumer Protection Commission, n.d.). The content of these guidelines is similar to the UN and the OECD guidelines, and generally consistent with the eight basic consumer rights. In brief, a number of guidelines and legislation have been introduced by the UN, the OECD, the EU, and APEC to create a favourable online environment, and to protect consumers in general, and their privacy in particular. Yet, these guidelines have not been compulsory, and there have been no clear powers or mechanisms to enforce them. These guidelines aim to comple-

ment existing national legal frameworks for e-consumer protection rather than overriding or replacing them (Ha, 2006). Although the level of compliance may vary among individuals and organisations, depending on what roles they play, the ultimate objective of these documents is to create a safe and secure online environment for all players. At the international level, there has been no measure to deal with member countries which have not complied with these guidelines for whatever reasons. Non-uniform regulations and standards in different countries have made the protection of e-consumers’ privacy more difficult and challenging due to ambiguous jurisdictional applications and difficulties in enforcement. Thus, different countries can adopt these guidelines to review and develop their current privacy policy on e-consumer protection (Harland, 1999).

Australia In Australia, privacy issues had already been a concern of the public and relevant authorities even before the introduction of e-retailing. Privacy concerns have been tackled by several measures, including (i) legislation, (ii) guidelines, (iii) codes of practice, (iv) initiatives by the private sector, and (v) activities by consumer associations as summarised in Table 2. Source: Ha, H. (2007). Governance to Address Consumer Protection in E-retailing (unpublished thesis). Department of Management, Monash University. This section discusses the current policy framework for protecting e-consumers’ privacy and the institutional arrangement in Australia.

Legislation Privacy protection is based on two main mechanisms: (i) general laws that regulate “the collection, use, and dissemination of personal data both by the public and private sector” and (ii) different acts (Moulinos, Iliadis, & Tsoumas, 2004).

9

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

Table 2. The current regulatory framework to address privacy concerns in Australia (based on information in Ha, 2007, unpublished thesis) Policy framework

Activities

Legislation

Privacy Act 1988 (Public sector) (Cth) (Commonwealth) Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) (Commonwealth) Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (Commonwealth) Spam Act 2003 (Cth) (Commonwealth)

Guidelines

Scams and Spam booklet and fact-sheets published by the ACCC and the CAV, respectively

Industry codes of practice

Codes by Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA) and Australian Internet Industry Association (IIA)

Initiatives by the private sector

Using privacy, digital seals, trust marks provided by TRUSTe, WebTrust, BBBOnline, BetterWeb Using the Platform for Privacy Preferences

Activities by consumer associations

Activities by Australian Consumers’ Associations (ACA) and Australia Privacy Foundation (AFP)

Table 2 shows that there are three main acts regarding privacy: Privacy Act, Telecommunications Act, and Spam Act. Firstly, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is applicable to the public sector regarding handling personal information (Curtis, 2005b; Jackson, 2003). This Act requires government agencies to gather personal information in a legitimate and proper way. These agencies must transparently disclose to the recipients about what will be collected and how the information will be used (Jackson, 2003; Vasiu, Warren, & Mackay, 2002). Government bodies must ensure that personal information is recorded accurately and stored securely. They have to explain to individuals about the “nature of the information” and why the information has been collected as well as allow individuals to make changes if the information is not correct (Jackson, 2003). However, this Act has been criticised by the EU on four main grounds. Firstly, it excludes many organisations such as the private sector from the coverage of the Act. Secondly, it introduces an “opt out” scheme which permits organisations to use personal data for direct marketing without obtaining the prior consent of the recipient. Thirdly, it only covers data collected and used for other purposes rather than the primary purpose. An organisation collects and uses personal data for the primary purpose “for which it was col-

0

lected” is not regulated under this Act (Vasiu, Warren, & Mackay, 2002). Finally, the Act only protects the privacy of information collected from Australian citizens or permanent residents, not from foreigners even if they are residing in Australia at the time of the offence (Vasiu, Warren, & Mackay, 2002). The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), amended in 2000, became the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) (Expert Group on Electronic Commerce (Australia), 2003). This amended Act extended to the private sector and “privatised government corporations” (Jackson, 2003). Schedule 3 in the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) includes the ten National Principles for the Fair Handling of Personal Information (NPPs) which do not apply to sub-national public sector or government business enterprises (GBE’s) that “perform substantially core government functions” (Information Law Branch, n.d.). The 10 national privacy principles are: (i) collection, (ii) use and disclosure, (iii) data quality, (iv) data security, (v) openness, (vi) access and correction, (vii) identifiers, (viii) anonymity, (ix) transborder data flows, and (x) sensitive information (Privacy Commissioner (Australia), 2000). At the minimum level, businesses must adhere to these 10 NPPs (Jackson, 2003; Moghe, 2003; Privacy Commissioner (Australia), 2000). Paradoxically, the rights

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

of individuals to privacy is said to obstruct the investigation of activities of cyber criminals such as hackers, money launderers, drug traffickers, terrorists, and fraudsters, and thus also hinder law enforcement (Armstrong & Forde, 2003). Nevertheless, the amended Act is not applicable to small businesses with annual revenue less than $3 million, the media industry or “political parties and representatives” (Jackson, 2003). These organisations can choose to adopt a privacy code established by an industry which must be approved by the privacy commissioner (Moghe, 2003). Small firms are not covered by the Act, and thus many e-retailers may avoid liability for the misuse of personal information or the abuse of customers’ particulars. Neither do these national privacy acts regulate sub-national agencies, with an exception for the Australian Capital Territory (Clark, 1989; Privacy Commissioner (Australia), 2003; Privacy Commissioner (Australia), 2003, n.d.). The current legislation may not be effective in tackling privacy concerns due to legal loopholes. The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the Privacy Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) are not applicable to overseas spammers and international e-retailers that do not buy and sell personal information. An e-mail address without an individual’s name may not be regarded as personal information under the Privacy Act. If a spammer gives the receivers a chance to opt out or “to comply with such request,” he/she is not under any legal liability (National Office for the Information Economy (Australia), 2003). Furthermore, it is not easy to track the senders due to the anonymous and global nature of electronic messages. Although national legislation is in place, these acts do not cover all individuals and groups. This allows some e-retailers to avoid protection of their customers’ privacy. Given the loophole in the current privacy legislation. Regarding institutional arrangements, the Federal Office of Privacy Commissioner administers the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). Each sub-national jurisdiction also has an office of the Privacy Commissioner. For example, the office of the

Victorian privacy commissioner (Privacy Victoria or OVPC), established in 2001 by the Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic), performs various functions including advising the attorney-general and relevant agencies “on the privacy implications” of proposals for policy and legislation, revising the Guidelines to the information privacy principles (IPPs), investigating and enforcing breaches of the IPPs (Privacy Commissioner (Australia), 2006a). The second relevant Australian Act is the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), amended in 2006, which specifies the responsibilities of Internet service providers in terms of the usage and disclosure of customers’ information. This Act encourages relevant industries to develop codes of practice and other internal schemes in order to address consumer protection regarding privacy (Moghe, 2003). Another act is the Australian Spam Act 2003 (Cth) which prohibits the sending of “unsolicited commercial electronic messages” which have an Australian link and the use of “address-harvesting software” (Quo, 2004). It is unlawful to send any spam, either by mobile phones or by e-mail, from Australia and/or to an Australian address from overseas (Williams, 2004). This act “extends to every external territory” and also applies to matters outside Australia if there is no “contrary intention” (see Spam Act 2003 (Cth) ss). Yet, messages from government agencies, registered political parties, charities, and religious organisations are exempted from this act. There are two conditions of the exemption: (i) messages can be sent in mass but these messages must communicate the information about goods or services and (ii) the senders must be the providers of such products (Ha, 2007, unpublished). Messages with merely factual content and with no commercial content are also exempted, but these messages must contain precise identifying information (Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2005). Also, messages sent by e-retailers to consumers who they have existing relationships will not



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

be classified as spam (Cheng, 2004). This Act introduces an “opt in” principle which allows the consent to be implicit or explicit (Vaile, 2004). This Act does not cover “non-electronic messages” and, therefore, it has a “narrower application” than legislation by the UK (Cheng, 2004). On the other hand, The Spam Act 2003 (Cth) has a wider application than the EU Privacy Direct and the US Can-Spam Act 2003 (US) because this Act is applicable to spam originating from outside Australia (Cheng, 2004).

Guidelines The Treasury (Australia) published the Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce (AGEC) in March 2006, which has become one of the most important documents promoting best practice in e-retailing (The Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce (AGEC) 2006 replaces the Australian Best Practice Model (BPM) introduced in 2000). The AGEC consists of 14 main provisions (see Table 3).

Table 3. The Australian guidelines for electronic commerce 2006 (AGEC) (based on information in Treasury (Australia), 2006) No.

Guidelines

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Fair business practices Accessibility Disability access Advertising and marketing Engaging with minors Information—identification of the business Information—contractual Conclusion of contract Privacy Payment Security and authentication Internal complaint-handling External dispute resolution Applicable law and forum

Source: Summarised from Treasury (Australia) (2006) The Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce (March 2006). Canberra: Treasury (Australia).



Guideline 9, Items 37 and 38 of the AGEC indicate that consumers’ privacy must be respected and protected. The AGEC encourages small businesses, which are not under the scope of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), to comply with privacy legislation so that they can enhance consumer trust and confidence (Treasury (Australia), 2006). Nevertheless, some e-retailers do not want to adopt government guidelines (Ha, 2007). In 2004, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission published a Scams and Spam booklet and other educational material to inform consumers about the types and the adverse effect of scams and spam, and how to avoid scams and spam (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2004). National enforcement of consumer protection laws is undertaken by the ACCC. Established in 1995, it acts independently of ministerial direction as a national statutory body to administer the implementation of the TPA. The main function of the ACCC is to advance the interest of Australian consumers by promoting fair, dynamic and lawful competition among all kinds of businesses. The ACCC has continuously advocated consumer rights and has conciliated many complaints related to online purchase (Graeme, 2005; OECD, 2001a). Other countries, such as the USA, have enacted a number of pieces of legislation to deal with privacy issues in general. For example, the U.S. Can-Spam Act deals with offences relating to spam e-mails (Cheng, 2004; OECD, 2003). The state of California (U.S.) has enacted “the AntiPhishing Act of 2005 (Business and Professions Code sections 22948-22948.3)” and “Computer Spyware 2004 (Business and Professions Code section 22947)” legislation (2004) which prohibit “phishing” activities and illegal installation or provision of software that can collect personal information of the recipients without their knowledge and/or consent (State of California, 2007). The “Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (Business and Professions Code sections 2257522579),” which came into effect in July 2004,

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

requires e-retailers to post “a privacy policy on the site and to comply with its policy” (State of California, 2007). However, only a few countries such as Canada have designed principles especially for consumer protection in e-retailing. Canada introduced eight principles of e-consumer protection in August 1999 (Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers (Canada), 1999) as shown in Appendix 2. Principles 3, 4, and 7 require e-retailers to respect customers’ privacy and ensure that e-transactions are secure. E-retailers should not send commercial e-mails to consumers without consumers’ prior consent. This principle aims to address the first basic consumer right to safety. In 2004, Canada developed the Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce, based on the eight principles of consumer protection. The Code has been warmly welcomed by other stakeholders (Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers (Canada), 2004).

Industry Codes of Practice Consumers’ privacy is also protected by industry codes of practice. The two best known industry associations in Australia are the Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA) (a non-profit organisation), and the Australian Internet Industry Association (IIA) (a national industry organisation) (Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA), 2005; Coonan, 2005; Quo, 2004). Both devote their activities to advance the interests of their members and the community as well as to reinforce consumer confidence (Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA), 2005; Internet Industry Association (Australian), 2006). These two organisations have established codes regarding privacy and spam, standards, and mechanisms to ensure their members to comply with the laws regarding consumer protection (Clarke, 1998; Privacy Commissioner (Australia), 2006b).

Firstly, the ADMA has developed a code of practice which established a self-regulatory mechanism for it members to comply with privacy policies and to avoid spam, after consultation with the relevant authorities, the ACCC and consumer and business groups (Quo, 2004; Scott, 2004). The ADMA has also appointed an independent code authority to monitor the compliance of its members with the Code of Practice. The code authority has the authority to sanction offenders and the penalty may be the termination of membership. The second set of code of practice (2000), introduced by the Australian Internet Industry Association (IIA), discourages its members and code subscribers from using spam as one of marketing tools “with exception in the case of pre-existing relationships (acquaintance spam)” (Quo, 2004). Both sets of code of practices mainly apply to their members and code subscribers, but non-member organisations are welcome to adopt these codes. Different from many countries which have not had ‘government-endorsed codes of conduct,” some industry associations in Australia have lodged codes of practice to the relevant authorities for approval (Chan, 2003; OECD, 2003). For instance, the ADMA received conditional authorisation of its direct marketing code of practice from the ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 1999), whereas the IIA Content Regulation Code of Practice (Version 10.4) has been registered with and administered by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (Forder, 1999; Internet Industry Association (Australia), 2006). Yet, insufficient information about how these codes improve the protection of consumer’s privacy has been reported.

Initiatives from the Private Sector The private sector has adopted a self-regulatory approach to address the protection of consumers’ privacy by engaging other firms providing services related to audits of privacy policies and privacy



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

seals which could assure that the participant companies adhere to their policy (Egger, 2002). Some examples of such services are TRUSTe or WebTrust, BBBOnline Privacy Program, and BetterWeb (Egger, 2002; Milloy, Fink, & Morris, 2002; Moulinos et al., 2004). The use of security locks, security and privacy statements, and certificates can increase e-consumer confidence which can, in turn, increase their purchase intention (Milloy, Fink, & Morris, 2002). However, Moulinos et al. (2004) argued that there have been many factors affecting the efficiency and acceptability of digital seals used by companies. These factors include the technology related to security, the brand name of the companies issuing the digital seal, and the legal framework surrounding online privacy. Yet, these privacy seals do not offer any legal protection because they only measure the extent to which e-retailers conform to their promises. In addition, some seals are recognised in one country but not in other countries, others may not have any value in the same country (Egger, 2002). In many cases, consumers place their trust more in “a seal of their local Consumers’ Association” than a seal endorsed by other organisations (Egger, 2002). Nevertheless, less than half of respondents in a survey conducted by Moores (2005) could recognise a privacy seal, and even those who could recognise a private seal might not know how to identify whether a seal was genuine or counterfeit. New technologies developed by the private sector also offer alternative solutions. The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) allows users “to compare a Web site’s privacy policies” with their own preferences (Yianakos, 2002). This enables users to select the websites which match their expectation and thus they should only do business with such Web sites. The P3P is supplementary to legislative and self-regulatory mechanisms to



help in the review and enforcement of Web site policies (Moghe, 2003). Other means to counter privacy incidents include the use of digital cash (cyber cash or Internet cash which does not require users to reveal their personal and financial information), authentication, filters, and anti-phishing and anti-pharming systems (Milloy, Fink, & Morris, 2002; OECD, 2006).

Activities by Consumer Associations The Australian Privacy Foundation (APF), established in 1987, is a non-government voluntary organisation (Australian Privacy Foundation, 2006). The APF claims that its main objective is to protect privacy rights of Australians via different means such as provision of education to increase public awareness, and advocacy of new legislation and codes of practice regarding privacy (Australian Privacy Foundation, 2005). One of the main activities of the APF is to organise campaigns against privacy threats caused by the adoption of the ID card scheme (Davies, 2004). The Australian Consumers’ Association (ACA) is a non-profit and key consumer association (Brown, 1996). It advocates consumer rights in both the online and offline markets. It provides the public with advice on different kinds of goods and services and represents consumers (Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs (Australia), 1995). The ACA has also advocated a review of privacy legislation and other legislations regarding consumer protection (Australian Consumers’ Association, 2004). Overall, although several measures described above have been used to address e-consumer protection regarding privacy, insufficient information about formal evaluation of such measures has been published. The following section provides statistics relating to privacy

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

mAIn thrust: the current stAte of e-consumer protectIon regArdIng prIvAcy privacy Incidents International Level About 62 billion spam e-mails are sent everyday worldwide (Sullivan, 2007). Spam accounted for 93% of all e-mail traffic which was monitored by Postini, an Internet security firm, in February 2007 (Haymarket Media, 2007). A study by Teo (2002) in 2002 reported that 43.9% of Singaporean respondents showed concerns about privacy when they shopped online, whereas Udo’s study (2001) reported 55.1% of U.S. respondents ranked privacy concerns number one. According to PC Magazine (2005), 20% of the respondents in a recent survey were victims of identity theft, and 64% of U.S. consumers would not buy online because of “concern over personal information.” Consumers International and the Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) conducted an international online survey in 2004 in which 21,000 people from more than 36 countries were asked about spam. Forty two percent of them replied that spam e-mails accounted for more than 50% of their e-mails, whereas 84% of respondents welcomed the prohibition of all unsolicited e-mails (Consumers International, 2004).

National Level In Australia, 62% of Australian respondents in a survey conducted by Roy Morgan Research in 2004, worried about privacy concerns (Roy Morgan Research, 2004). Australia loses more than $1.1 billion per year for identity fraud (The Age, 2006). The National Australia Bank loses $1 million per month due to Internet fraud, and

this amount is expected to reach $30 million per year by 2008 (Lekakis, 2005). The findings from surveys conducted by Coalition against Unsolicited Bulk E-mail (Australia) (2002) revealed that the average number of spam per e-mail address was 118 and 140 in 1999 and 2001 respectively, an increase of 18.6% in Australia. Spam costs Australia about $2 billion a year (Quo, 2004). The highest number of computer-related offences reported to Victoria Police was in 19981999 and the number of offences decreased from 2000-2001 to 2002-2003. The most common offences reported to Victoria Police related to illegal access to computer systems which can be classified as security and/or privacy incidents. Official statistics might not include all the cases occurring because the police could only deal with matters that were reported to them (Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee (Parliament of Victoria), 2004). In addition, many consumers did not bother to complain as the cost of redress might outweigh the claim value (Donahey, 2003; Patel & Lindley, 2001). Most e-consumers have been very reluctant to report their problems. This is evident by “a low rate of reporting attacks on computers to police” since up to 65% of victims of e-attacks did not report to law enforcement in Australia in 2005 (Krone, 2006). Generally, the statistics about complaints are fragmented. Some e-consumers have lodged a complaint with the ACCC or Consumer Affairs Victoria, whereas others might report their cases to the police. However, these figures can provide an overview picture of the current state of e-consumer protection regarding privacy in Australia, and worldwide, that is, the number of complaints relating to online shopping has increased.

consumers’ Attitudes towards online privacy Issues A recent study by Ha (2007, unpublished) provides an insight into the current state of e-consumer



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

protection regrading privacy. According to this study, the majority of the respondents (80%) were aware of different devices and means used on the Internet, such as cookies, computer bugs, viruses, spyware, and adware, which could reveal their personal data. Nearly three-quarters of them (73%) were worried about the amount of spam they received. This is consistent with a survey conducted by the NOIE in 2000 which reported that 77% of the respondents would not shop online because of privacy concerns (Consumer Affairs Victoria, 2004). The Australian National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE) was replaced by the Australian Government Information Management Office (AGIMO) in 2004 (Williams, 2004). Only 49% of these respondents showed an agreement on the sufficiency, accuracy, and ease of locating information about privacy on commercial Web sites. As discussed previously, the current Privacy Act (Australia) does not apply to small businesses with the annual revenue less than A$3 million (Privacy Commissioner (Australia), n.d.). Thus, small companies are not required to post any information about privacy. Most of e-retailers are “small and new, with limited security skills and budget” (Centeno, 2002), and thus this may explain for the low percentage of the respondents who agreed on the adequacy and precise of information about privacy. In this case, lack of regulation relating to privacy applied to small businesses is one of the weaknesses of the current policy framework for consumer protection in e-retailing. Finally, only 54% of the respondents agreed that they knew how to handle issues relating to privacy. This means nearly half of them might not know how to deal with online privacy incidents (Ha, 2007, unpublished).

how does a Well-known e-retailer protect the privacy of Its customers? This section illustrates how a well-known eretailer provides protection to its customers by 

discussing and evaluating Dell’s policies and practices regarding privacy. Dell has been chosen because of its unique direct e-business model and its success as a computer e-retailer operating in many countries, including Australia (Bangeman, 2006).

Policies and Practices Dell has posted privacy policy on its website, as required by the privacy legislation in Australia. Dell has also employed several self-regulatory measures to protect the privacy of its customers. One of Dell’s activities is the launch of an “online essential” portal which aims to educate consumers to protect their own privacy. This portal has been developed by Dell in conjunction with the National Consumers League (National Consumers League (USA), n.d.). Dell has also worked with other organisations to launch several campaigns to enhance public awareness of issues associated with online shopping. For instance, Dell and the Internet Education Foundation (www.neted.org) jointly launched the “consumer spyware initiative (CSI) public awareness campaign” in 2004 (Claburn, 2004). Dell’s Web site provides information about what types of personal information will be collected, and how customers’ particulars will be used and stored (Dell Inc. Australia, 2004). Dell’s privacy policy assures customers that their personal data will not be revealed to third parties without their prior written consent (Dell Inc. Australia, 2005). According to Dell’s policy, customers have the right to opt out from the marketing list. Dell also requests its employees to protect the confidentiality of information about the relationship between Dell and its customers and other stakeholders. Consumers can update or correct their personal information online or by contacting Dell (Dell Inc. Australia, 2004). Customers can find a physical address and an online feedback platform on Dell’s Web site, and they can make queries to Dell about privacy issues.

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

Dell is a member of the U.S.-based Word of Mouth Marketing Association (WOMMA), and was the first corporate subscriber to have publicly committed itself to the code of ethics introduced by WOMMA in 2006 (Word of Mouth Marketing Association, 2006). In addition, Dell is a member of the Australian Internet Industry Association (IIA), the Electronic Industry Code of Conduct (USA), and the BBB OnLine Privacy Program (BBB Online, 2003). Dell’s employees must provide accurate and sufficient information to its customers, and protect the privacy of both internal and external customers. Dell’s employees who do not act in accordance with Dell’s policy are liable to discipline and/or civil and/or criminal penalties (Dell Inc. Australia, 2007).

Evaluation Dell does not fully comply with the regulation in that Dell does not provide sufficient information regarding identifiers, anonymity, cross-border data flows, and sensitive information as required by the NPPs (see the second section). This implies that Dell has not fully respected consumers’ safety (the first basic consumer right) regarding privacy (see the second section). Also, the contact number and the physical address which consumers can communicate any privacy concern to Dell are in Singapore, and no name of any individual in charge of privacy at Dell is indicated. This shows that Dell fails to meet the accepted standard of information disclosure (Clayton, 2000, Ha, 2007, unpublished). Finally, there has been insufficient formal evaluation of how Dell’s codes of conduct improve the level of privacy protection. Also, most of Dell’s collaboration with industry and consumer associations has taken place in the USA, not in Australia. Furthermore, insufficient information about how Dell has worked with industry and consumer associations in Australia has been reported. Generally, companies registered in Australia, except for small businesses, have to comply

with the current privacy legislation. In addition, guidelines and industry codes of practice are only advisory, not compulsory, whilst the activities of industry and consumer associations are limited. Thus, the protection of consumers’ privacy depends much on the willingness and ability of companies to practice social corporate responsibility (CSR) and adopt self-regulatory measures to protect their customers’ privacy. The mentioned data demonstrate that the current measures to address privacy issues associated with online shopping may not be effective without the willingness and ability of e-retailers to protect consumers’ personal data. The case study also shows that even a well-known e-retailer does not fully comply with the prevailing privacy legislation to protect its customers’ privacy much less voluntarily go beyond the minimum requirements of the laws.

polIcy ImplIcAtIons for e-consumer protectIon In terms of prIvAcy There are a number of policy implications for the protection of e-consumers regarding privacy. The first implication refers to the coverage of the current national legislation regarding small businesses. Most e-retailers are small and they do not post sufficient information about privacy on their Web sites. The failure to provide sufficient information regarding privacy is difficult to reconcile with good standards of consumer protection. Thus, the current privacy legislation will be reviewed in order to widen its coverage and ensure all e-retailers receive equal treatment in terms of compliance with privacy legislation (Ruddock, 2006). The second implication refers to the harmonisation of regulations, standards, and guidelines. Most international guidelines call for voluntary adoption of good business practice by e-retailers to protect e-consumers’ privacy given the special



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

nature of the online market (Curtis, 2005a; Dudley, 2002; Gilliams, 2003; Lahey, 2005). However, econsumers perceive that self-regulation means “no standards,” that is, e-consumers will receive different levels of protection by different e-retailers. Also, different laws and standards across jurisdictions regarding privacy may adversely affect the compliance of e-retailers and the effectiveness of law enforcement. Thus, uniform regulations, guidelines, and CSR can contribute to addressing jurisdiction concerns and enabling consumers to receive equal level of privacy protection. The third implication refers to the review of enforcement mechanisms of both legislation and guidelines regarding privacy. The AGEC and industry code of practice are only advisory, not mandatory. Such guidelines and codes could not be effective unless backed by legislation and a compliance regime; there is little incentive for e-retailers to voluntarily comply with guidelines and/or codes of conduct (Ha, 2007, unpublished; Mayer, 2002). The fourth implication refers to consumer education. Given the lack of awareness of consumers regarding identity theft and spyware, educational programs provided by government agencies, industry and consumer associations would increase the awareness of e-consumers of the importance of keeping personal information confidential. Such education programs could aim to equip the public with knowledge about how to recognise online threats and risks as well as how to avoid online privacy incidents. In addition, some e-retailers are willing to comply with regulations and guidelines, but they do not have sufficient means to do so (Ha, 2007, unpublished). Such eretailers may not know what information should be posted, and how much information would be sufficient. Thus, e-retailer education would be helpful to such e-retailers. Industry associations could be the most appropriate candidates to provide education to e-retailers. Another implication refers to the use of a combination of legal, human, and technical mea-

8

sures to address privacy issues more effectively, as Yianakos (2002) comments that privacy is a problem of both technology and behaviour. Thus, a combination of legal framework (e.g., legislation, guidelines, and codes of practice), technological measures (e.g., digital seal and certificate), and human behaviour related measures (e.g., education) is desirable to improve the protection of consumers’ privacy in the online market. The final implication refers to the effect of acts enacted by other countries which have great impacts on global business and privacy protection. For example, the U.S. “Fair Information Practice Principles” lays the foundation for the formulation of privacy laws by supra-national organisations and many countries (State of California, 2007). The “Safe Harbor” Privacy Framework, which was approved by the EU in 2000, facilitates the compliance of U.S. companies with the European Directive on Data Protection (1998) and other relevant European privacy laws. Some other countries which have “low benchmark for “adequacy” of privacy policy may have to improve their standards regarding privacy to meet the EU’s standards in order to prevent any interruptions in commercial transactions when Australian companies do business in EU countries (Allens Arthur Robinson, 2007; Greenleaf, 2000b, p. 1). However, the Attorney General (Australia) argued that Australian privacy legislation has gone “significantly further than the US Safe Harbor Agreement” (Allens Arthur Robinson, 2007), although there have still been loopholes in the amended privacy act (Greenleaf, 2000a). The impacts of privacy acts enacted by supra-national organisations and other countries on international trade should be a subject of further research.

conclusIon This chapter has examined privacy issues associated with consumer protection in the online market, including data security, spam/spim, and

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

spyware, and the policy framework for addressing online privacy incidents at both international and national levels. Although international and national policies to address privacy issues are in place, the effectiveness of the current policy framework has not been formally evaluated. However, the number of online privacy incidents has steadily increased, and most consumers do not know how to deal with such incidents. The findings reveal that a single organisation or a single measure is not adequate to address the complicated and challenging issues associated with online privacy. A joint effort of all stakeholders and adoption of a combination of different measures would be desirable to protect e-consumer’s privacy more effectively. Given the lack of studies on online consumer protection in terms of privacy, further research on online privacy will certainly contribute to the development of a theoretical framework and practical approaches to solving stagnant problems with e-consumer protection regarding privacy.

The exposure of loopholes in the current privacy legislation has led the Australian government to review it (Ruddock, 2006). This confirms the potential for more research on the extent to which new legislation could deter undesirable behaviour relating to privacy. The cross-border and transient nature of e-retailing justifies more research on how legislation and guidelines could be adopted at a supra-national level to more effectively prevent the abuse of or illegal use of e-customers’ particulars. In addition, the limited formal evaluation of privacy protection measures in e-retailing suggests they should be further investigated. Finally, security and privacy issues are interrelated because lack of security measures may lead to the unwanted disclosure of customers’ personal and financial information. Addressing any one of these issues separately is insufficient to ensure consumers’ interests to be fully protected. Thus, they must be investigated as an integrated problem and addressed simultaneously.

future reseArch dIrectIons

references

Further research could usefully focus on the motivations and behaviour of consumers in protecting themselves against privacy incidents in the online marketplace and on technical measures which can contribute to addressing online privacy concerns. Privacy issues associated with e-retailing are caused by a combination of legality, technology, and human behaviour which require different measures by different groups of stakeholders to address them effectively. Thus, future research could also focus on whether cooperation among all stakeholders at all levels (international, national, and sub-national levels) could address privacy online incidents more effectively and on whether greater consumer vigilance and self-help efforts could contribute to addressing privacy concerns.

Akenji, L. (2004). The eight basic consumer rights. Retrieved November 8, 2006, from http://www. tudatosvasarlo.hu/english/article/print/254 Allens Arthur Robinson. (2007). International data flow. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from www. aar.com.au/privacy/over/data.htm APEC Electronic Commerce Steering Group. (2004). APEC voluntary online consumer protection guidelines. Retrieved March 1, 2005, from http://www.export.gov/apececommerce/cp/guidelines.htm Armstrong, H. L., & Forde, P. G. (2003). Internet anonymity practices in computer crime. Information Management & Computer Security, 11(5), 209-215.

9

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

Australian Communications and Media Authority. (2005). Consumer information. Anti spam—fighting spam in Australia: Consumer information. Retrieved July 22, 2005, from http://www.acma.gov.au/ACMAINTER.2163012:STANDARD:848603301:pc=PC_ 1965#anti%20spam%20law Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (1999). ACCC conditionally authorises ADMA code of practice. Retrieved March 27, 2007, from http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index. phtml/itemId/322914/fromItemId/621589 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (2003). Review of building consumer sovereignty in electronic commerce (best practice model). Retrieved November 11, 2006, from http:// www.ecommerce.treasury.gov.au/bpmreview/ content/_download/submissions/accc.rtf Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (2004). Annual report 2003-2004—fostering competitive, efficient, fair and informed Australian markets. Canberra, ACT: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Australian Consumers’ Association. (2004). Submission to the review of the private sector provisions of the privacy act 1988 (Cth) (the privacy act) Sydney, NSW: Office of the Privacy Commissioner (Australia). Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA). (2005). ADMA profile. Retrieved August 17, 2005, from http://www.adma.com. au/asp/index.asp?pgid=2026 Australian Federal Police (AFP). (2007). Internet fraud. Retrieved March 16, 2007, from http://www. afp.gov.au/national/e-crime/internet_scams Australian Institute of Criminology. (2006). More Malware—adware, spyware, spam and spim. High Tech Crime Brief, 1(2006), 1-2. Australian Privacy Foundation. (2005). Rule 3—objectives and purposes. Retrieved April 2,

0

2007, from http://www.privacy.org.au/About/Objectives.html Australian Privacy Foundation. (2006a). Identity checks for pre-paid mobile phones. Retrieved April 2, 2007, from http://www.acma.gov.au/ webwr/_assets/main/lib100696/apf.pdf Australian Privacy Foundation. (2006b). International instruments relating to privacy law. Retrieved February 23, 2007, from http://www. privacy.org.au/Resources/PLawsIntl.html Bangeman, E. (2006). Dell growth rate slips behind market. Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/200604206640.html BBB Online. (2003). Dispute resolution. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from http://www.bbbonline.org/ privacy/dr.asp Brown, J. (1996). Australia and the modern consumer movement. A History of the Australian Consumer Movement (pp. 1-6). Braddon, ACT: Consumers’ Federation of Australia. Buning, M. D. C., Hondius, E., Prins, C., & Vries, M. D. (2001). [email protected]. An analysis of European consumer legislation information society. Journal of Consumer Policy, 24(3/4), 287-338. Centeno, C. (2002). Building security and consumer trust in internet payments: The potential of “soft” measure. Seville, Spain: Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. Chan, P. (2003, September). The practical effect of privacy laws on the global business and global consumer. Paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Sydney, NSW. Cheng, T. S. L. (2004). Spam regulation: Recent international attempts to can spam. Computer Law & Security Report, 20(6), 472-479.

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

Choice. (2006). The eight basic consumer rights. Retrieved November 5, 2006, from http://www. choice.com.au/viewArticle.aspx?id=100736&cat Id=100528&tid=100008&p=1&title=The+eight+ basic+consumer+rights

Consumer Protection Commission, E. Y. T. (undated). E-commerce: APEC voluntary online consumer protection guidelines. Retrieved April 3, 2007, from http://www.cpc.gov.tw/en/index. asp?pagenumber=25

Claburn, T. (2004). Dell believes education is best way to fight spyware. InformationWeek, October 20. Retrieved September 30, from http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle. jhtml;jsessionid=GHVMAU4IX1LXGQSNDLO SKHSCJUNN2JVN?articleID=50900097&quer yText=Dell+Believes+Education+Is+Best+Way+ To+Fight+Spyware

Consumers International. (2001). Should I buy? Shopping online 2001: An international comparative study of electronic commerce. London: Consumers International.

Clark, R. (1989). The Australian privacy act 1988 as an implementation of the OECD data protection guidelines. Retrieved March 27, 2007, from http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/ PActOECD.html Clarke, R. (1998). Direct marketing and privacy. Retrieved March 24, 2007, from http://www.anu. edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/DirectMkting. html Clayton, G. (2000). Privacy evaluation: Dell. Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://www.informationweek.com/privacy/dell.htm Coalition Against Unsolicited Bulk Email (Australia). (2002). Spam volume statistics. Retrieved June 2, 2007, from http://www.caube.org.au/spamstats.html Consumer Affairs Victoria. (2003). Commonwealth website guidelines ignored. Retrieved November 16, 2006, from http://www.consumer. vic.gov.au/CA256F2B00231FE5/Print/C3DCD CFFC3DBD8EECA256F54000412C4?OpenD ocument Consumer Affairs Victoria. (2004). Online shopping and consumer protection. Discussion paper, Melbourne, Victoria: Standing Committee of Officials of Consumer Affairs—E-commerce Working Party, Consumer Affairs Victoria.

Consumers International. (2004). Annual report 2004. London: Consumers International. Consumers International. (2006). World consumer rights day. Retrieved November 7, 2006, from http://www.consumersinternational.org/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeID=95043&int1stParent NodeID=89651&int2ndParentNodeID=90145 Coonan, H. (2005, February). 10 years on. 10 years strong. The internet in Australia. Paper presented at the 2005 Internet Industry Association Annual Dinner, Sydney, NSW. Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland. (2004). Cyber traps—an overview of crime, misconduct and security risks in the cyber environment. Queensland: Crime and Misconduct Commission. Curtis, K. (2005a, September). The importance of self-regulation in the implementation of data protection principles: the Australian private sector experience. Paper presented at the 27th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Montreux, Switzerland. Curtis, K. (2005b, March). Privacy in practice. Paper presented at the Centre for Continuing Legal Education, University of NSW, Sydney. Cyota. (2005). Cyota online fraud survey. Retrieved April 7, 2006, from http://www.cyota. com/press-releases.asp?id=78 Davies, S. (2004, February). The loose cannon: An overview of campaigns of opposition to national



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

identity card proposals. Paper presented at the Unisys seminar: “e-ID: Securing the mobility of citizens and commerce in a Greater Europe,” Nice. Dell Inc. Australia. (2004). Dell’s privacy policy. Retrieved March 2, 2006, from http://www1. ap.dell.com/content/topics/topic.aspx/ap/policy/ en/privacy?c=au&l=en&s=gen Dell Inc. Australia. (2005). Dell’s online policies. Retrieved March 28, 2006, from http://www1. ap.dell.com/content/topics/topic.aspx/ap/policy/ en/au/termsau?c=au&l=en&s=gen Dell Inc. Australia. (2007). Online communication policy. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www. dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/corp/governance/en/online_comm?c=us&l=en&s=corp Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN). (2003). United nations guidelines for consumer protection (as expanded in 1999). New York: United Nations. Donahey, M. S. (2003). The UDRP model applied to online consumer transactions. Journal of International Arbitration, 20(5), 475-491. Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee (Parliament of Victoria). (2004). Inquiry into fraud and electronic commerce—final report. Melbourne, Victoria: Parliament of Victoria. Egger, F. N. (2002). Consumer trust in e-commerce: From psychology to interaction design. In J. E. J. Prins, P. M. A. Ribbers, H. C. A. van Tilborg, A. F. L. Veth, & J. G. L. van der Wees (Eds.), Trust in electronic commerce. The role of trust forms a legal, an organizational and a technical point of view (pp. 11-43). The Hagues/London/New York: Kluwer Law International. European Commission. (2005). Consumer protection in the European Union: Ten basic principles. Brussels: European Commission.



Expert Group on Electronic Commerce (Australia). (2003). Review of building consumer sovereignty in electronic commerce: A best practice model for business. Canberra, ACT: Treasury (Australia). Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs (Australia). (1993). Your consumer rights. In K. Healey (Ed.), Consumer rights (Vol. 38). Balmain NSW: The Spinney Press. Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs (Australia). (1995). Your consumer rights. In K. Healey (Ed.), Consumer rights (Vol. 38). Balmain NSW: The Spinney Press. Forder, J. (1999). The IIA code of practice: “Coregulation” of the internet starts here. Retrieved March 31, 2007, from http://epublications.bond. edu.au/law pubs/38 Fraud costing Australia $1.1b a Year. (2006, April 7). The Age. Gilliams, H. (2003, October). Self regulation by liberal professions and the competition rules. Paper presented at the Regulation of Professional Services Conference organized by the European Commission, Brussels. Grabner-Kraeuter, S. (2002). The role of consumers’ trust in online-shopping. Journal of Business Ethics, 39(1-2), 43-50. Grabosky, P., Smith, R. G., & Dempsey, G. (2001). Electronic theft: Unlawful acquisition in cyberspace. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Graeme, S. (2005). 30 years of protecting consumers and promoting competition. Keeping Good Companies, 57(1 (Feb)), 38041. Greenleaf, G. (2000a). Private sector bill amendments ignore EU problems. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ PLPR/2000/30.html

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

Greenleaf, G. (2000b). Safe harbor’s low benchmark for “adequacy”: EU sells out privacy for U.S.$. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from www. austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/2000/32.html Ha, H. (2005, October). Consumer protection in business-to-consumer e-commerce in Victoria, Australia. Paper presented at the CACS 2005 Oceania Conference, Perth, WA. Ha, H. (2006, September-October). Security issues and consumer protection in business-to-consumer e-commerce in Australia. Paper presented at the 2nd Australasian Business and Behavioural Sciences Association International Conference: Industry, Market, and Regions, Adelaide. Ha, H. (2007). Governance to address consumer protection in e-retailing. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria. Harland, D. (1987). The United Nations guidelines for consumer protection. Journal of Consumer Policy, 10(2), 245-266. Harland, D. (1999). The consumer in the globalised information society—the impact of the international organisations. Australian Competition and Consumer Law Journal, 7(1999), 23. Haymarket Media. (2007). Spam hits records levels in February. Retrieved March 20, 2007, from http://www.crn.com.au/story. aspx?CIID=75798&r=rss Huffmann, H. (2004). Consumer protection in e-commerce. University of Cape Town, Cape Town. Information Law Branch. (undated). Information paper on the introduction of the privacy amendment (private sector) bill 2000. Barton, ACT: Attorney General’s Department (Australia). Internet Industry Association (Australia). (2006a). Content code. Retrieved March 31, 2007, from http://www.iia.net.au/index.php?option=com_c

ontent&task=category§ionid=3&id=19&It emid=33 Internet Industry Association (Australian). (2006b). About the IIA. Retrieved March 24, 2007, from http://www.iia.net.au/index. php?option=com_content&task=section&id=7 &Itemid=38 Jackson, M. (2003). Internet privacy. Telecommunications Journal of Australia, 53(2), 21-31. James, M. L., & Murray, B. E. (2003). Computer crime and compromised commerce (Research Note No. 6). Canberra, ACT: Department of the Parliamentary Library. Kaufman, J. H., Edlund, S., Ford, D. A., & Powers, C. (2005). The social contract core. Electronic Commerce Research, 5(1), 141-165. Kehoe, C., Pitkow, J., Sutton, K., Aggarwal, G., & Rogers, J. D. (1999). Results of GVU’s tenth world wide web user survey. Retrieved November 16, 2006, from http://www.gvu.gatech.edu/user_surveys/survey-1998-10/tenthreport.html Kim, S., Williams, R., & Lee, Y. (2003). Attitude toward online shopping and retail website quality: A comparison of US and Korean consumers. Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 16(1), 89-111. Krone, T. (2005). Concepts and terms. Canberra: The Australian High Tech Crime Centre. Krone, T. (2006). Gaps in cyberspace can leave us vulnerable. Platypus Magazine, 90 (March 2006), 31-36. Lahey, K. (2005, August 30). Red tape on a roll... and it must stop. The Age, 8. Lawson, P., & Lawford, J. (2003). Identity theft: The need for better consumer protection. Ottawa: The Public Interest Advocacy Centre. Lekakis, G. (2005). Computer crime: The Australian facts and figures. Retrieved April



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

7, 2007, from http://www.crime-research.org/ news/19.07.2005/1373/ Lynch, E. (1997). Protecting consumers in the cybermarket. OECD Observer, 208(Oct/Nov), 11-15. MacRae, P. (2003). Avoiding eternal spamnation. Chatswood, NSW: Australian Telecommunications Users Group Limited (ATUG). Majoras, D. P., Swindle, O., Leary, T. B., Harbour, P. J., & Leibowitz, J. (2005). The US SAFE WEB Act: Protecting consumers from spam, spyware, and fraud. A legislative recommendation to congress. Washington D.C.: Federal Trade Commission (US). Mansoorian, A. (2006). Measuring factors for increasing trust of people in e-transactions. Lulea, Sweden: Lulea University of Technology. Mansor, P. (2003, April-May). Consumer interests in global standards. Paper presented at the Global Standards Collaboration (GSC) 8—User Working Group Session, Ottawa. Marshall, A. M., & Tompsett, B. C. (2005). Identity theft in an online world. Computer Law & Security Report, 21, 128-137. Mayer, R. N. (2002). Shopping from a list: International studies of consumer online experiences. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 36(1), 115-126. Metz, C. (2005, August 23). Identity theft is out of control. PC Magazine, 87-88. Milloy, M., Fink, D., & Morris, R. (2002, June). Modelling online security and privacy to increase consumer purchasing intent. Paper presented at the Informing Science + IT Education Conference, Ireland. Milne, G. R. (2003). How well do consumer protect themselves from identity theft? The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 37(2), 388-402.



Milne, G. R., Rohm, A. J., & Bahl, S. (2004). Consumers’ protection of online privacy and identity. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), -232217. Moghe, V. (2003). Privacy management—a new era in the Australian business environment. Information Management & Computer Security, 11(2), 60-66. Moores, T. (2005). Do consumers understand the role of privacy seals in e-commerce? Communication of the ACM, 48(3), 86-91. Moulinos, K., Iliadis, J., & Tsoumas, V. (2004). Towards secure sealing of privacy policies. Information Management & Computer Security, 12(4), 350-361. Muris, T. J. M. (2002, October). The interface of competition and consumer protection. Paper presented at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York. National Consumers League (USA). (n.d.). Essentials for online privacy. Retrieved June 25, 2007, from http://www.nclnet.org/technology/essentials/privacy.html National Office for the Information Economy (Australia). (2003). Spam—final report of the NOIE review of the spam problem and how it can be countered. Canberra, ACT: Department of Communication, Information Technology and the Arts. North American Consumer Project on Electronic Commerce (NACPEC). (2006). Internet consumer protection policy issues. Geneva: The Internet Governance Forum (IGF). NSW Office of Fair Trading. (2003). International consumer rights: The world view on international consumer rights. Retrieved November 15, 2006, from http://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/shopping/shoppingtips/internationalconsumerrights. html

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

OECD. (2000). OECD Guidelines for consumer protection in the context of electronic commerce. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2001a). Australia—annual report on consumer policy development 2001. Retrieved March 11, 2005, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/45/1955404.pdf OECD. (2001b). OECD guidelines on the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2003). Report on compliance with, and enforcement of, privacy protection online. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2006). Protecting consumers from cyberfraud. Paris: OECD. Patel, A., & Lindley, A. (2001). Resolving online disputes: Not worth the bother? Consumer Policy Review, 11(1 (Jan/Feb)), 2-5. PC Magazine. (2005). The perils of online shopping. PC Magazine, 24(14), 23. Petty, R. D., & Hamilton, J. (2004). Seeking a single policy for contractual fairness to consumers: A comparison of U.S. and E.U efforts. The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(1), 146-166. Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (2000). National privacy principles (extracted from the privacy amendment (private sector) act 2000). Retrieved July 19, 2006, from http://www.privacy. gov.au/publications/npps01.html Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (2003). National privacy principle 7—identifiers in the health sector. Sydney: Privacy Commissioner, Office of (Australia). Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (2006a). Annual report 2005-2006. Melbourne, Victoria: Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner. Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (2006b). Industry standard for the making of telemarket-

ing calls. Sydney, NSW: Office of the Privacy Commissioner (Australia). Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (n.d.). State & territory privacy laws. Retrieved August 2, 2005, from http://www.privacy.gov.au/privacy_rights/laws/index.html#2 Quirk, P., & Forder, J. (2003). Electronic commerce and the law (2nd ed.). Queensland: John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. Quo, S. (2004). Spam: Private and legislative responses to unsolicited electronic mail in Australia and the United States. ELaw—Murchdoch University, 11(1). Round, D. K., & Tustin, J. (2004, September). Consumers as international traders: Some potential information issues for consumer protection regulators. Paper presented at the International Trade Law Conference, Attorney-General’s Department, Canberra, ACT. Roy Morgan Research. (2004). Community attitudes towards privacy 2004. Sydney, NSW: The Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner (Australia). Ruddock, P. (2006). Australian law reform commission to review privacy act. Retrieved June 7, 2007, from hhttp://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/ MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2006_First_Quarter_31_January_2006__Australian_Law_Reform_Commission_to_review_Privacy_Act_-_0062006# Saarenpää, T., & Tiainen, T. (2003). Consumers and e-commerce in information system studies. In M. Hannula, A-M. Järvelin, & M. Seppä (Eds.), Frontiers of e-business research: 2003 (pp. 62-76). Tampere: Tampere University of Technology and University of Tampere. Scott, C. (2004). Regulatory innovation and the online consumer. Law & Policy, 26(3-4), 477506.



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

Scottish Consumer Council. (2001). E-commerce and consumer protection: Consumers—real needs in a virtual world. Glasgow: Scottish Consumer Council. Singh, B. (2002). Consumer education on consumer rights and responsibilities, code of conduct for ethical business, importance of product labelling. Kualar Lumpur: Consumers International. Smith, L. (2004). Global online shopping: How well protected is the Australian consumer? Australian Competition and Consumer Law Journal, 12(2), 163-190. State of California. (2007). Privacy laws. Retrieved September 26, 2007, from http://www. privacy.ca.gov/lawenforcement/laws.htm Stoney, M. A. S., & Stoney, S. (2003). The problems of jurisdiction to e-commerce—some suggested strategies. Logistics Information Management, 16(1), 74-80. Sullivan, B. (2007). Spam is back, and worse than ever. Retrieved March 20, 2007, from http://redtape.msnbc.com/2007/01/spam_is_ back_an.html Teo, T. S. H. (2002). Attitudes toward online shopping and the internet. Behaviour & Information Technology, 21(4), 259-271. Treasury (Australia). (2006). The Australian guidelines for electronic commerce (March 2006). Canberra, ACT: Treasury (Australia) Udo, G. J. (2001). Privacy and security concerns as major barriers for e-commerce: A survey study. Information Management & Computer Security, 9(4), 165-174. United Nations. (1948). Universal declaration of human rights. New York: United Nations. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. (1986). Security in cyberspace. Retrieved April 3, 2007, from http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960605t.htm



Vaile, D. (2004). Spam canned—new laws for Australia. Internet Law Bulletin, 6(9), 113-115. Vasiu, L., Warren, M., & Mackay, D. (2002, December). Personal information privacy issues in B2C e-commerce: a theoretical framework. Paper presented at the 7th Annual CollECTeR Conference on Electronic Commerce (CollECTeR’02), Melbourne, Victoria Walczuch, R., Seelen, J., & Lundgren, H. (2001, September). Psychological determinants for consumer trust in e-retailing. Paper presented at the Eight Research Symposium on Emerging Electronic Markets (RSEEM01), Maastricht, The Netherlands. Williams, D. (2004, 27 Feb). Business guides to combat spam. Retrieved August 2, 2005, from http://www.agimo.gov.au/media/2004/02/12070. html Williams, D. (2004, 10 March). Maximising the benefits of the information economy. Retrieved August 2, 2005, from http://www.agimo.gov. au/media/2004/03/21377.html Word of Mouth Marketing Association. (2006, 13 Nov). Dell makes public commitment to word of mouth ethics. Retrieved January 5, 2007, from http://www.womma.org/womnibus/007895.php Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers (Canada). (1999). Principles of consumer protection for electronic commerce—a Canadian framework. Ottawa: Canada Bankers Association. Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers (Canada). (2004). Canadian code of practice for consumer protection in electronic commerce. Ottawa: Office of Consumer Affairs, Industry Canada. Yianakos, C. (2002). Nameless in cyberspace— protecting online privacy. B+FS, 116(6), 48-49.

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

Zhang, X. (2005). What do consumers really know? Communications of the ACM, 48(8), 4448.

Acts Anti-Phishing Act 2005 (California) Can-Sapm Act 2002 (USA) Computer Spyware Act 2004 (California) Online Privacy Protection Act 2003 (California) Privacy Act 1988 (Public sector) (Cth) Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) sch 3 Spam Act 2003 (Cth) Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth)

AddItIonAl reAdIng Al Iannnuzzir, J. (2002). Industry self-regulation and voluntary environmental compliance. Boca Raton: Lewis Publishers. Ang, P. H. (2001). The role of self-regulation of privacy and the internet. Journal of Interactive Advertising, 1(2), 1-11. Australian Privacy Foundation. (2006). Identity checks for pre-paid mobile phones. Retrieved April 2, 2007, from http://www.acma.gov.au/ webwr/_assets/main/lib100696/apf.pdf Business for Social Responsibility. (2005, April 2005). Privacy (consumer and employee). Retrieved December 8, 2006, from http:// www.bsr.org/CSRResources/IssueBriefDetail. cfm?DocumentID=50970 Chung, W. C., & Paynter, J. (2002, January). Privacy issues on the internet. Paper presented at The 35th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii.

Clayton, G. (2000). Privacy evaluation: Dell. Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://www.informationweek.com/privacy/dell.htm Coonan, H. (2005, November). Self-regulation and the challenge of new technologies. Paper presented at the AMTA Annual general Meeting Luncheon, Sheraton on the Park, Sydney, NSW. Drake, W. J. (2004). ICT global governance and the public interest: Transactions and content issues. Geneva, Switzerland: Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. Drezner, D. W. (2004). The global governance of the internet: Bringing the state back in. Political Science Quarterly, 119(3), 477-498. Gunningham, N., & Rees, J. (1997). Industry self-regulation: An institutional perspective. Law & Policy, 19(4), 363-414. Ha, H. (2006). Regulation. In Encyclopedia of World Poverty, 2, 903-906). Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications. Lacey, D., & Cuganesan, S. (2004). The role of organizations in identity theft response: The organization-individual victim dynamic. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), 244-261. Linnhoff, S., & Kangenderfer, J. (2004). Identity theft legislation: The fair and accurate credit transactions act of 2003 and the road not taken. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), 204-216. Marshall, A. M., & Tompsett, B. C. (2005). Identity theft in an online world. Computer Law & Security Report, 21, 128-137. OECD. (2001). OECD guidelines on the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2006). Report on the implementation of the 2003 OECD guidelines for protecting consumers from fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices across borders. Paris: OECD.



Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

Office of Communications (UK). (2006). Online protection: A survey of consumer, industry and regulatory mechanisms and systems. London: Office of Communications (UK). O’Neill, B. (2001). Online shopping: Consumer protection and regulation. Consumer Interests Annual, 47, 1-5. Price, M. E., & Verhulst, S. G. (2004). Self regulation and the internet. Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. Schwarts, P. M. (1999). Privacy and democracy in cyberspace. Vanderbilt Law Review, 52, 16091702. Simpson, S., & Wilkinson, R. (2003, September 2003). Governing e-commerce: Prospects and problems. Paper presented at the 31st Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, “Communication, Information and Internet Policy,”

8

National Centre for Technology and Law, George Mason University, School of Law, Arlington, VA. Stafford, M. R. (2004). Identity theft: Laws, crimes, and victims. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), 201-203. Sylvan, L. (2002, September). Self-regulation— who’s in charge here? Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference on “Current Issues in Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance,” Melbourne, Victoria. Sylvan, L. (2004, September). Issues for consumers in global trading. Paper presented at the 26th International Trade Law Conference, Rydges Lakeside, Canberra, ACT.

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

AppendIX A Principles and Guidelines of Consumer Protection by the United Nations (UN), Organisation Economic Corporation Development (OECD), European Union (EU), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (based on information in Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN), 2003; OECD, 2000; European Commission, 2005; Consumer Protection Commission, E. Y. T., n.d.) Table 1A. No.

UN(a)

OECD (b)

EU (c)

APEC (d)

1

Physical safety

Transparent and effective protection

Buy what you want, where you want

International cooperation

2

Promotion and protection of consumers’ economic interests

Fair business, advertising, and marketing practices

If it does not work, send it back

Education and awareness

3

Standards for the safety and quality of consumers goods and services

Online disclosures information about the business, the goods or services, the transaction

High safety standards for food and other consumer goods

Private sector leadership

4

Distribution facilities for essential consumer goods and services

Confirmation process

Know what you are eating

Online advertising and marketing

5

Measures enabling consumers to obtain redress

Payment

Contracts should be fair to consumers

Online information disclosure to consumers

6

Education and information programs

Dispute resolution and redress

Sometimes consumers can change their mind

Confirmation process

7

Promotion of sustainable consumption

Privacy

Making it easier to compare prices

Resolution of consumer disputes

8

Measures relating to specific areas

Education and awareness

Consumer should not be misled

Privacy

9

Protection while you are on holiday

Security

10

Effective redress for cross-border disputes

Choice of law and jurisdiction

Sources: (a) Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN). (2003). United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection (as expanded in 1999). New York: United Nations. (b) OECD. (2000). Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce. Paris: OECD. (c) European Commission. (2005). Consumer Protection in the European Union: Ten Basic Principles. Brussels: European Commission. (d) Consumer Protection Commission, E. Y. T. (undated). E-Commerce: APEC Voluntary Online Consumer Protection Guidelines. Consumer Protection Commission, Executive Yuan (Taiwan). Retrieved April 3, 2007, from http://www.cpc.gov.tw/en/index. asp?Pagenumber=25

9

Current Measures to Protect E-Consumers’ Privacy in Australia

AppendIX b Summary of Eight Principles of Consumer Protection in Canada (based on information in Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers (Canada), 1999) Table 2B. No.

Principles

1

Information provision

2

Contract formation

3

Privacy

4

Security of payment and personal information

5

Redress

6

Liability

7

Unsolicited commercial e-mail

8

Consumer awareness

Sources: Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers (Canada). (1999). Principles of Consumer Protection for Electronic Commerce—A Canadian Framework. Ottawa: Canada Bankers Association.

0



Chapter VII

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior: Towards an Integrative Model Anil Gurung Neumann College, USA Anurag Jain Salem State College, USA

AbstrAct Individuals are generally concerned about their privacy and may withhold from disclosing their personal information while interacting with online vendors. Withholding personal information can prevent online vendors from developing profiles to match needs and wants. Through a literature review of research on online privacy, we develop an integrative framework of online privacy protection.

IntroductIon The latest report on e-commerce by the U.S. Census Bureau (2007) shows that although there has been an increase in online purchasing by individuals, the portion of consumer e-commerce or “online” to total retail sales is far less than the

portion of electronic business-to-business sales to the total business-to-business sales. One of the factors that may be influencing this online consumer behavior is the privacy concerns that consumers have regarding the personal data collection procedures used by online companies. An individual’s trust in online companies and

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

their data collection procedures has been the major factor hindering the growth of electronic commerce (Belanger, Hiller, & Smith, 2002; Liu, Marchewka, Lu, & Yu, 2004). Companies use the consumer data to study consumer preferences so that they can build effective strategies to expand their customer base. Emergent technologies and organizational practices in gathering data raise privacy concerns. Such technologies include the use of cookies, authentication programs, spyware, and adware. The growth of technologies to collect information about consumers may only lead to fueling the consumer’s privacy concerns. Companies have realized that protecting consumers’ private information is an essential component in winning the trust of the consumers and is a must in facilitating business transactions (Belanger et al., 2002; McKnight & Chervany, 2001). Privacy policies that inform the consumer about how the collected information will be used are usually posted on the websites. However, there is not enough evidence to prove whether or not these policies are effective in alleviating the consumers’ privacy concerns. In the absence of any strong mechanisms, technologies or policies that ensure information privacy, the consumer adopts different strategies for their privacy protection. Such strategies may include, for instance, abstaining from purchasing, falsifying information, and adjusting security and privacy settings in the Web browsers (Chen & Rea, 2004). In this chapter, we review the existing literature and analyze the existing online privacy theories, frameworks, and models. Through the analysis of the literature, we aim to understand existing privacy frameworks and variables that are used in the context of online privacy protection. Finally, based on the review, we develop an integrative framework to encapsulate the antecedents to online privacy protection behavior. The motivation for this study is to understand the factors that are related to online privacy protection. Although this topic has been studied



in other disciplines, such as marketing, (e.g., Sheehan, & Hoy, 1999), the literature review shows that research on privacy is fragmented. The proposed integrative framework aims to integrate these fragmented yet related constructs under one overarching concept. This will help us in expanding our understanding of the various issues involved in online privacy. Specifically, we focus on what has been done in privacy protection and how future studies in this area can proceed forward.

bAckground Research has shown that privacy concerns act as a hindrance to the growth of electronic commerce (Hoffman, Novak, & Peralta, 1999; Miyazaki & Fernandez, 2001). In countering privacy concerns, the Federal Trade Commission has primarily relied upon fair information practices to guide privacy regulation in the United States (Milne, 2000). Fair information practices include the following: notice of the firm’s information practices regarding what personal information will be collected and how the collected information will be used; choice or consent regarding the secondary use of the information; accessibility of users to view their own data collected by companies; security of the collected data; and enforcement to ensure that companies comply with fair information practices. Research shows that fair information practices have not been effective in alleviating the privacy concerns of consumers (Culnan, 2000). In the absence of stricter laws to ensure privacy, consumers adopt differing strategies to protect their identity online, for instance, falsification, passive reaction, and identity modification (e.g., Sheehan & Hoy, 1999). For the purpose of this chapter, the strategies adopted by consumers to protect their identity are defined under the general term of “privacy protection behavior” in an online environment.

Main Research Questions

How do information privacy concerns affect the growth and development of consumer-oriented commercial activity on the internet?

What actions are taken by online consumers in response to their privacy concerns?

What is the extent of online retailer disclosures of various privacy and security related practices?

What is the extent to which consumer-oriented commercial Web sites post disclosures that describe their information practices and whether these disclosures reflect fair information practices?

Develop a privacy research framework that highlights key dimensions of the information interaction between marketers and consumers.

What are the underlying factors of online privacy concerns?

Authors & Year

(Hoffman et al., 1999)

(Sheehan & Hoy, 1999)

(Miyazaki & Fernandez, 2000)

(Culnan, 2000)

(Milne, 2000)

(Sheehan & Hoy, 2000) Survey

Conceptual

Survey

Survey

889

361

128

Awareness of collection, information usage, sensitivity of information, familiarity, and compensation

Marketer information strategy

Personal identifying information

Privacy related statements, security-related statements, consumer perceptions

Privacy concerns, situational contexts

889

Survey

IV

Information privacy, environmental control, and secondary use of information control

N

Conceptual

Method

Consumer information behavior

Information practices

Online disclosures and information practices

Fair information practices

Online disclosures

Purchase likelihood

Information practice and privacy policy disclosures

There is some correlation between privacy concerns and consumer complaining behavior such as flaming, complaining, or abstaining from participating in online activities. The most frequently adopted complaining behavior was providing incomplete information when registering for Web sites.

Consumer complaining behavior

Consumer behavior (i.e., falsifying information, reading unsolicited e-mail

Three important factors are: control over collection and usage of information; short-term transactional relationship; and established long term relationship.

The main types of interactions are information requests/disclosures, information provision, information capturing without consent, and information practices.

The most of the Web sites surveyed notified about their information practices but did not fully disclose fair information practices. Not having a fully-agreed definition for fair information practices pose challenges in assessing online disclosures.

A positive relationship exists between the percentage of privacy and security related statements on Web sites for particular online shopping categories and consumers’ online purchase likelihoods.

The opt-in, informed consent policies are beneficial for online businesses. The most effective way for commercial Web providers to develop profitable exchange relationships is gaining consumer trust.

Relationship exchange

Policy, Protection

Findings

Theoretical Framework

DV

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

Table 1. A review of online information privacy literature

continued on following page





What are the important features of business to consumer Web sites?

What are the differences in privacy concerns of online users?

What is the impact of customer perceptions of security control on ecommerce acceptance?

(Ranganathan & Ganapathy, 2002)

(Sheehan, 2002)

(Suh & Han, 2003) Survey

Survey

Survey

502

889

214

100

Authentication, nonrepudiation, confidentiality, privacy protection, data integrity, trust, attitude, behavioral intention

Awareness, usage, sensitivity, familiarity, and compensation

Information content, design, security, and privacy

Choice, access, security, and notice

Study the content of online privacy notices to inform public policy

(Milne & Culnan, 2002)

Survey

Trustworthiness, site quality, privacy, and security features

Experiment

What is the importance of third party privacy seals, privacy statements, third party security seals, and security features on purchasing behavior of consumers? What role does trustworthiness play in consumer behavior?

(Belanger et al., 2002)

140

Disposition to trust, institution-based trust, trusting beliefs, trusting intentions, and Web vendor interventions (i.e., third party seals, privacy policy)

Conceptual

What are different typologies of trust and how do they relate with e-commerce consumer behavior?

Internet experience, purchasing method, risk concerns

(McKnight & Chervany, 2001)

160

Survey

How do risk perceptions vary with Internet experience? What is the effect of risk perceptions on online shopping activity?

(Miyazaki & Fernandez, 2001)

Actual use

Purchase intent

Information disclosure

Technology acceptance model

Information practices

Information practices

Fair information practices

Information practices

Customer perceived strength of nonrepudiation, privacy protection, and data integrity was important for determining e-commerce acceptance.

The privacy concerns of consumers vary depending upon the situation. The contextual nature of online privacy makes it difficult to predict how online users will react to specific online situations.

Security is the best predictor of online purchase intent followed by privacy, design and information content.

Effective privacy notice is the first step towards privacy protection. The amount of Web sites that posted privacy notice grew from 1998 to 2001.

Security features are more important than privacy and security seals. Trustworthiness of Web merchants is important.

A trust model is presented which helps to study consumer trust at levels of personal, institutional, and interpersonal.

Theory of reasoned action

Trust related Internet behavior

Intention to purchase

This study indicates that higher levels of Internet experience may lead to lower risk perceptions regarding online shopping and fewer specific concerns regarding system security and online retailer fraud, yet more privacy concerns.

Information practices

Online purchasing rate

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

Table 1.continued

continued on following page

23

Interview

What is the perception of Internet users regarding privacy? What are the implications of gathering information by offering financial benefits?

What is the relationship between privacy risk beliefs and confidence and enticement beliefs that influence the intention to disclose information?

Do consumers value privacy statements and privacy seals? If so, do these statements and seals affect consumer disclosure of personal information?

Do information transparency features, which provide knowledge of information and procedures, affect willingness for information disclosure?

(Olivero & Lunt, 2004)

(Dinev & Hart, 2006)

(Hui, Teo, & Lee, 2007)

(Awad & Krishnan, 2006) Survey

Experiment

Survey

293 & 449

Survey and experiment

What is the nature and dimensions of Internet users’ information privacy concerns?

(Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004)

401

109

369

212

Experiment

Do privacy seals ease privacy concerns of online customers?

(Liu et al., 2004)

102

Survey

What types of privacy control techniques are used in an online context?

(Chen & Rea, 2004)

Information transparency, privacy concern, privacy policy, and previous privacy invasion

Privacy statement, privacy seal, monetary incentive, sensitivity of information

Privacy concerns, trust, privacy risk, personal interest

Attitude toward privacy, control, perceived risk, and awareness of information collection

Collection, control, awareness, type of information, trust beliefs, risk beliefs

Notice, access, choice, security, and trust

Concerns of unauthorized use Concerns of giving out personal information

Willingness to be profiled

Information disclosure

Willingness to disclose information

Information practices

Contemporary choice theory

Privacy calculus

Online disclosures

Social contract theory

Behavioral intention

Willingness to disclose information

Theory of reasoned action

Information practices

Behavioral intention to purchase

Privacy controls

Customers who desire greater information transparency are less willing to be profiled.

The existence of privacy statement was effective for information disclosure while that of privacy seal was not. Monetary incentive was positive influence on disclosure. Information request had a negative influence on disclosure.

Privacy concerns inhibit e-commerce transactions. Trust and personal interest outweigh privacy risk perceptions while deciding on personal information disclosure.

Perceived risk and awareness of information collection are related with a shift in concerns from trust issues to control issues. Risk awareness reduced the level of trust and increased the demand for control.

The second order Internet users’ information privacy concerns scale is developed with dimensions of collection, control, and awareness. Privacy concerns will have negative influence the willingness to have relationships with online companies.

Privacy concerns have strong influence on whether an individual will trust an electronic commerce business. Trust will influence the behavioral intention to purchase online.

Passive control was related to the concern of unauthorized use of personal information and identity modification was related to the concern of giving out personal information.

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

Table 1.continued



Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

revIeW of fIndIngs The methodology followed for this chapter was a literature review. In this conceptual study, the existing privacy and related literature was analyzed to identify existing frameworks and variables related to online privacy. In the review of the literature, we retained the studies where privacy was in the context of “online,” and the unit of analysis was either individual and/or online consumers. The results of the literature review are presented in Table 1. The research articles that were considered for the review were published from 1999 onwards. This was necessary, since the popular media has been ripe with news coverage on heightened privacy concerns of consumers since that time. Most of the research studies included in the review used a survey methodology, while experiments were the second most frequently used methodology. Our review of the literature on privacy revealed that most of the research studied the consumers’ willingness to disclose information in light of their privacy concerns (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Hui et al., 2007; Malhotra et al., 2004; Milne & Culnan, 2002; Olivero & Lunt, 2004). There were other group of literature that studied the consumers’ willingness to purchase in light of privacy concerns (Belanger et al., 2002; Miyazaki & Fernandez, 2001; Suh & Han, 2003). There were very few studies that actually studied privacy protection behavior (Chen & Rea, 2004). The review of current research shows that privacy concerns affect the disclosure of information or purchase intent of consumers (Belanger et al., 2002; Malhotra et al., 2004). The reviewed literature gives us insights into how the privacy construct is used with other related constructs from different perspective. Therefore, we feel it is necessary that an integrative framework of privacy be proposed. This framework would be helpful to study in more completeness, the impact of privacy on consumer behavior. As outlined in the beginning, the proposed framework will



attempt to explain the antecedents that lead to privacy protection behavior. Since only one study specifically examined the privacy protection behavior, we feel that a discussion on how privacy concerns will affect consumer behavior is relevant before outlining a framework on privacy protection behavior. Therefore, we first proceed to discuss the existing typologies of privacy concerns. These typologies explain both the states and types of privacy concerns in an individual. A mixed typology is put forth that combines both the states and types of privacy concerns.

typology of privacy concerns Several privacy typologies have been suggested, such as privacy aware, privacy active, and privacy suspicious (Drennan, Mort, & Previte, 2006). Privacy aware refers to being knowledgeable and sensitive about risks associated with sharing personal information online. The privacy aware factor consists of selectivity about information provision, awareness of sensitivity of mother’s maiden name, and perceptions that online companies require an excessive amount of personal information. The privacy active factor refers to active behaviors adopted by consumers in regards to their privacy concerns. This factor consists of seeking detailed information about online purchasing, requesting that companies do not share collected personal information, and regularly changing passwords to protect one’s privacy. The privacy suspicious factor refers to concerns about company behavior regarding privacy practices. This factor consists of awareness of companies’ plans to share collected personal information, belief that company privacy policies are hard to find in their Web sites and checking to make sure that e-mail and phone numbers are provided online before transactions. In summation, these typologies seem to be related to “state” or degree of privacy concerns that exist in individuals. In addition to the privacy typologies described, other typologies have also been suggested in lit-

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

Table 2. Mixed typology of privacy concerns Fundamentalists & privacy aware

Fundamentalists & privacy active

Fundamentalists & privacy suspicious

Unconcerned & privacy aware

Unconcerned only

Unconcerned only

Pragmatists & privacy aware

Pragmatists & privacy active

Pragmatists & privacy suspicious

erature. For instance, as it appears in the report by Federal Trade Commission (1996), categorizes consumers into groups such as fundamentalists, unconcerned, and pragmatists as suggested by Westin (1967). Fundamentalist individuals prefer privacy controls over consumer benefits and comprise one fourth of the population. They are unlikely to partake in any activities that will compromise their privacy. The unconcerned individuals fall in the other extreme and also comprise one fourth of the population. They are willing to forego their privacy if they can enjoy any consumer benefits. Such individuals are most likely to join reward programs and are more willing to divulge their personal information in order to get discounts. The other half of the population is comprised of pragmatists who weigh the advantages of various consumer benefits against the degree of personal information sought by companies. Building upon Westin’s typology, Sheehan (2002) suggested unconcerned, circumspect, wary, and alarmed as privacy typologies. The unconcerned users have the most minimal privacy concern. They are willing to provide accurate information to online companies. The circumspect have minimal privacy concerns, however, they are more likely than unconcerned to provide incomplete information to online companies during registration. The wary have a moderate privacy concern and are likely to provide incomplete information during registration. The alarmed users are highly concerned. Even if they register for Web sites, they are more likely to provide incomplete or inaccurate information. In our analysis, Westin’s and Sheehan’s privacy typology relates to the “state” or degree of privacy concerns. Some are too concerned while some are not concerned at all, with the rest of the popula-

tion falling somewhere between the extremes. On the other hand, the typology suggested by Drennan et al.(2006) is behavior-centric as they refer to behavior in response to privacy concerns. Rather than being mutually exclusive, these two suggested typologies are related. This relatedness is illustrated in the three-by-three matrix in Table 2. In the second row of the table, the second and third cells have only “unconcerned.” We believe that if consumers are unconcerned about their privacy, they are less likely to be privacy active or privacy suspicious, although they may be aware of privacy issues. For our “degree of privacy concern” typology, we have followed Westin’s (1967) typology instead of Sheehan’s, for its conciseness. Moreover, in order to form a mixed typology, we combined Westin’s typology with the typology suggested by Drennan et al. (2006).

privacy protection Approaches taken by individuals to protect their personal information online may be passive or active. Passive protection may involve depending upon external entities such as government or private institutions and not adopting any privacy protection by oneself. As the name suggests, active protection involves using different measures for privacy protections. Some of the privacy protection strategies are as follows: use personal firewalls, withhold information to a Web site, remove name and address from mailing lists, inform Web sites not to share information, avoid using a Web site, disable cookies, use anti-spyware tools, and provide false or incomplete information when registering on a Web site. Privacy protections can be viewed from three perspectives: preroga-



Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

tive, objective, and subjective (Yao, 2005). The prerogative privacy is enforced at such a broad level by the government that it is hard to link it to beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals. The objective privacy focuses on the effectiveness of privacy protection strategies such as the ones set by the Federal Trade Commission. The subjective privacy can be addressed by specific human efforts taken to protect privacy online. Table 3 shows the different perspectives on privacy protection. Since there are no means to help users determine for themselves what information to share and with whom to share and control the dissemination of information, the consumers have resorted to other methods in order to protect their personal information and still receive goods and services from online vendors (Chen & Rea, 2004). Described as “privacy controls,” Chen & Rea (2004) developed three factors that relate to different behaviors adopted by consumers to protect their personal information online. The three factors are falsification of private information, passive reaction, and identity modification. Privacy controls are defined as consumers’ ability to hold control over an unwanted presence in the environment (Goodwin, 1991).

findings to provide insight into the phenomenon of online privacy protection behavior.

Dependent Variable Several differing factors that contribute to the overall behavior of an individual to protect their privacy’s have been discussed in literature (Chen & Rea, 2004). The first factor, falsification, refers to altering one’s personal information and removing browser cookies when registering for online Web sites. The second factor, passive reaction, refers to just ignoring or deleting the intrusion of others. The third factor, identity modification, refers to changing one’s personal identity by using gender-neural identities or multiple identities when registering for online services.

Independent Variables Our literature analysis showed that a wide range of variables have been used to predict online privacy protection behavior. These predictor variables can be classified as privacy concerns, Internet experience, demographics, and awareness of privacy issues as shown in Figure 1.

Privacy Concerns frAmeWork In this section, we propose an integrative framework for online privacy protection behavior. The proposed framework, as shown in Figure 1, builds upon prior research and integrates research

Privacy concerns arise from the fear that the faith that consumers put in online companies will be violated. When companies gather personal information from consumers, there is an implied social contract that companies will act upon the collected information as they have agreed (Phelps, Nowak,

Table 3. Perspectives on online privacy protection

8

Prerogative

Objective

Subjective

• political or legal issue that can be addressed by philosophical, political, or legal debates

• can be addressed by measuring effectiveness of privacy protection strategies

• • • • •

can be addressed by focusing on factors that determine the adoption of specific privacy protection strategies

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

& Ferrell, 2000). The implied social contract is violated if information is collected without consumers’ awareness, if the collected information is used for purposes other than those of which the consumer has been informed, or if the collected information is shared with third parties without consumers’ consent (Phelps, D’Souza, & Nowak, 2001; Smith, Milburg, & Burke, 1996; Smith, 1996). Because of privacy concerns, consumers are unwilling to disclose personal information to online companies. The consumers’ unwillingness to disclose can be attributed to perceived lack of environmental control and information control (Goodwin, 1991). The perceived lack of information control is related to privacy concerns and is central to the issue of this chapter, while environmental control is related to security concerns (Gurung, 2006). One of the few studies that examined the relationship between online privacy concerns and online behavior found some significant correlations (Sheehan & Hoy, 1999). As privacy concerns increased consumers were less likely to register for Web sites, more likely to provide incomplete information to Web sites, more likely to report spam, more likely to request removal from mailing lists, and more likely to send highly negative messages or “flames” to those sending unsolicited e-mail (Sheehan & Hoy, 1999). Privacy concerns regarding unauthorized use and concerns of giving out personal information were found to be significant with privacy protection behavior (Chen & Rea, 2004).

Internet Experience As consumers become more experienced in using the Internet, they are likely to become familiar with privacy protection strategies. The relationship between Internet experience of an individual and their adoption of privacy protection strategies has been suggested in literature, since the Internet experience helps to increase behavioral control which is considered significant in the prediction

of privacy protection behavior (Yao, 2005). Internet experience has been linked to use of privacy protection in literature (Yao, 2005). Such past behavior only helps to reinforce the behavioral control that one has over the privacy protection behavior, and thus acts as a predictor of future privacy protection behavior.

Demographics Among demographic variables of age, gender, and race, Chen and Rea (2004) found that gender and race are significant factors in privacy protection behavior. Their findings suggest that male consumers are more likely to falsify personal information than are female users. Their results further implied that data quality of personal information collected online may vary among racial groups. Phelps et.al (2000) found that among demographic variables such as gender, marital status, age, education, employment status, and income, only the education was significant with privacy concerns. They reported that respondents who had vocational or some college education were associated with highest levels of privacy concern. This further supports the contention that demographic variable may be related to the privacy protection behavior.

Awareness Consumers may be more likely to adopt privacy protection behavior if they are aware of the malpractices of online companies and the extent and the severity of privacy violations that could occur. In their research about anti-spyware tools, Hu and Dinev (2005) found that awareness was a key predictor to anti-spyware adoption behavior. Users were likely to run anti-spyware tools only when they became aware that their personal computers were infected with spyware and when they were aware of the negative consequences posed by spyware. The concept of awareness has been defined as the initial stage in the innovation dif-

9

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

Figure 1. Framework for the antecedents of online privacy protection behavior Privacy concerns Internet experience Demographics

Online privacy protection behavior

Awareness

fusion process model (Rogers, 1995). Dinev and Hu (2007) suggest that awareness may be related to situational awareness and problem solving process which includes identifying the problem, raising consciousness, and resolving the problem. In their research on protective information technologies, Dinev and Hu (2007) found that awareness is a significant predictor for the adoption of anti-spyware tools. Therefore, the prior research findings suggest that awareness may be related to the online privacy protection behavior.

dIscussIon The proposed framework provides a comprehensive approach for studying online privacy protection behavior of consumers. There has been much literature assessing the consumers’ concerns about privacy. We all know that consumers are concerned about their privacy in general. What we need to understand is how consumers are dealing with these concerns. The framework proposes that apart from privacy concerns, Internet experience, demographics, and awareness are also important antecedents to the prediction of online privacy protection behavior. Only those variables that have been researched in the past

0

have been included, and these variables should not be looked as the exhaustive list of variables that are important predictors for protection behavior. There may be other important factors that could further contribute to the prediction of online privacy protection behavior. One such variable is self-efficacy. The developed framework in this study can be used to formulate and test various hypotheses related to the adoption of privacy protection behavior. The defined variables in the framework may also be applicable to the development of research models of e-commerce adoption and information disclosures. Identification of factors that are related to consumers’ privacy behavior would help companies to formulate policies and strategies that could influence consumer satisfaction and thereby increase their confidence. Consumers disclose information based on their personal assessment of the risks and the benefits. Having a better idea of the privacy-related variables will help companies to focus on significant areas where they can foster their relationship with consumers. By understanding the mechanisms used by consumers for privacy protection, the companies can develop policies to raise consumer confidence and to increase the probability of disclosure of their personal information.

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

possIble future reseArch dIrectIons Future research can be undertaken to empirically validate the proposed framework. Either surveys or experiments can be conducted to collect the empirical data to test the model. One can also expand the model by adding other relevant variables such as self-efficacy, previous privacy violation, and personality traits. Privacy concerns of consumers may vary based on their culture. The cultural differences regarding privacy concerns and how this will affect privacy protection behavior can be another avenue used to further this research.

conclusIon This research was undertaken with the objective of investigating how online privacy has been studied. A framework for online privacy protection behavior was proposed based on the literature review. The proposed framework provides us with a roadmap to further analyze and understand the privacy concerns of consumers and consequent strategies taken by consumers to protect their privacy online. Implications for research and practice were discussed. Further, we hope that the proposed research directions will help to encourage more research in this exciting area.

references Awad, N. F., & Krishnan, M. S. (2006). The personalization privacy paradox: An empirical evaluation of information transparency and the willingness to be profiled online for personalization. MIS Quarterly, 30(1), 13-28. Belanger, F., Hiller, J. S., & Smith, W. J. (2002). Trustworthiness in electronic commerce: The role of privacy, security, and site attributes. Journal

of Strategic Information Systems, 11(3-4), 245270. Chen, K., & Rea, A. I. J. (2004). Protecting personal information online: A survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85-92. Culnan, M. (2000). Protecting privacy online: Is self-regulation working? Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 20-26. Dinev, T., & Hart, P. (2006). An extended privacy calculus model for e-commerce transactions. Information Systems Research, 17(1), 61-80. Dinev, T., & Hu, Q. (2007). The centrality of awareness in the formation of user behavioral intention toward protective information technologies. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 8(7), 386-408. Drennan, J., Mort, G. S., & Previte, J. (2006). Privacy, risk perception, and expert online behavior: An exploratory study of household end users. Journal of Organizational and End User Computing, 18(1), 1-22. Federal Trade Commission. (1996). Consumer information privacy hearings. Goodwin, C. (1991). Privacy: Recognition of a consumer right. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 10(1), 149-166. Gurung, A. (2006). Empirical investigation of the relationship of privacy, security and trust with behavioral intention to transact in e-commerce. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington. Hoffman, D. L., Novak, T. P., & Peralta, M. A. (1999). Information privacy in the marketspace: Implications for the commercial uses of anonymity on the web. The Information Society, 15(4), 129-139. Hu, Q., & Dinev, T. (2005). Is spyware an internet nuisance or public menace? Communications of the ACM, 48(8), 61-66. 

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

Hui, K.-L., Teo, H. H., & Lee, S.-Y. T. (2007). The value of privacy assurance: An exploratory field experiment. MIS Quarterly, 31(1), 19-33. Liu, C., Marchewka, J., Lu, J., & Yu, C. (2004). Beyond concern: A privacy-trust-behavioral intention model of electronic commerce. Information & Management, 42(1), 127-142. Malhotra, N. K., Kim, S. S., & Agarwal, J. (2004). Internet users’ information privacy concerns (IUIPC): The construct, the scale, and a causal model. Information Systems Research, 15(4), 336-355. McKnight, D. H., & Chervany, N. L. (2001). What trust means in e-commerce customer relationships: An interdisciplinary conceptual typology. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 6(2), 35-59. Milne, G. R. (2000). Privacy and ethical issues in database/interactive marketing and public policy: A research framework and overview of the special issue. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 1-6. Milne, G. R., & Culnan, M. J. (2002). Using the content of online privacy notices to inform public policy: A longitudinal analysis of the 1998-2001 U.S. web surveys. The Information Society, 18(5), 345-359. Miyazaki, A. D., & Fernandez, A. (2000). Internet privacy and security: An examination of online retailer disclosures. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 54-61. Miyazaki, A. D., & Fernandez, A. (2001). Consumer perceptions of privacy and security risks for online shopping. The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 35(1), 27-44. Olivero, N., & Lunt, P. (2004). Privacy versus willingness to disclose in e-commerce exchanges: The effect of risk awareness on the relative role of trust and control. Journal of Economic Psychology, 25(2), 243-262.



Phelps, J. E., D’Souza, G., & Nowak, G. J. (2001). Antecedents and consequences of consumer privacy concerns: An empirical investigation. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 15(4), 2-17. Phelps, J. E., Nowak, G. J., & Ferrell, E. (2000). Privacy concerns and consumer willingness to provide personal information. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 27-41. Ranganathan, C., & Ganapathy, S. (2002). Key dimensions of business-to-consumer web sites. 39(6), 457-465. Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of innovations (4th ed.). New York: Free Press. Sheehan, K. B. (2002). Toward a typology of internet users and online privacy concerns. The Information Society, 18(1), 21-32. Sheehan, K. B., & Hoy, M. G. (1999). Flaming, complaining, abstaining: How online users respond to privacy concerns. Journal of Advertising, 28(3), 37-51. Sheehan, K. B., & Hoy, M. G. (2000). Dimensions of privacy concern among online consumers. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 62-73. Smith, H. J. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, 20(2), 167-196. Smith, H., Milburg, S., & Burke, S. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, 20(2), 167-196. Suh, B., & Han, I. (2003). The impact of customer trust and perception of security control on the acceptance of electronic commerce. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 7(3), 135-161. U.S. Census Bureau. (2007). The census bureau of the department of commerce report on retail e-commerce sales.

Antecedents of Online Privacy Protection Behavior

Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and freedom. New York: Atheneum. Yao, M. Z. (2005). Predicting the adoption of self-protections of online privacy: A test of an expanded theory of planned behavior model. Unpublished dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara.

AddItIonAl reAdIng Culnan, M. J. (1993). How did they get my name—an exploratory investigation of consumer attitudes toward secondary information use. MIS Quarterly, 17(3), 341-361. Culnan, M., & Armstrong, P. (1999). Information privacy concerns, procedural fairness, and impersonal trust: An empirical investigation. Organization Science, 10(1), 104-115. Greenaway, K. E., & Chan, Y. E. (2005). Theoretical explanations for firms’ information privacy behaviors. Journal of Association for Information Systems, 6(6), 171-198.

Luo, X. (2002). Trust production and privacy concerns on the internet: A framework based on relationship marketing and social exchange theory. Industrial Marketing Management, 31(2), 111-118. Milne, G. R., & Culnan, M. J. (2002). Using the content of online privacy notices to inform public policy: A longitudinal analysis of the 1998-2001 U.S. web surveys. The Information Society, 18(5), 345-359. Stewart, K. A., & Segars, A. H. (2002). An empirical examination of the concern for information privacy instrument. Information Systems Research, 13(1), 36-49. Udo, G. J. (2001). Privacy and security concerns as major barriers for e-commerce: A survey study. Information Management & Computer Security, 9(4), 165-174. Wang, H., Lee, M. K., & Wang, C. (1998). Consumer privacy concerns about internet marketing. Communications of the ACM, 41(3), 63-70. Warren, S. D., & Brandeis, L. D. (1890). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review, 4(5), 193-220.

Henderson, S. C., & Snyder, C. A. (1999). Personal information privacy: Implications for mis managers. 36(4), 213-220.



Section III

Empirical Assessments



Chapter VIII

Privacy Control and Assurance:

Does Gender Influence Online Information Exchange? Alan Rea Western Michigan University, USA Kuanchin Chen Western Michigan University, USA

AbstrAct Protecting personal information while Web surfing has become a struggle. This is especially the case when transactions require a modicum of trust to be successfully completed. E-businesses argue that they need personal information so they can create viable data to tailor user interactions and provide targeted marketing. However, users are wary of providing personal information because they lack trust in e-businesses’ personal information policies and practices. E-businesses have attempted to mitigate user apprehension and build a relationship base in B2C transactions to facilitate the sharing of personal information. Some efforts have been successful. This chapter presents survey results that suggest a relationship between gender and how users control personal information. The findings suggest that e-businesses should modify information and privacy policies to increase information and transactional exchanges.

IntroductIon In the past few years we have witnessed the competing interests of technological convenience,

personal privacy, and e-business needs. Consumers are finding that e-businesses are asking for—or taking—more personal information than they may be willing to give in order to utilize goods and

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Privacy Control and Assurance

services. E-businesses counter that they only take necessary information to complete transactions and perform effective marketing and customization of their products and services. Consumers want to actively control how much personal information they disclose depending on the level of trust inherent in each e-business relationship. A consumer using a familiar Web site with privacy policies she trusts will be more willing to divulge crucial information an e-business needs, such as demographic data and shopping preferences. E-businesses want to create an atmosphere that will foster this trust and information sharing. However, there is a palpable tension between consumers and e-businesses at the start of a partnership. This tension exists because of a lack of trust between users and e-businesses. This mistrust is not unfounded. E-businesses have a poor record when it comes to protecting consumers’ privacy online.

privacy and the consumer The popular Apple iTunes software is no stranger to privacy indiscretions. In early 2006, Apple released iTunes version 6.0.2 which included a new feature called the MiniStore (Borland, 2006). The MiniStore enabled iTunes to offer customized user recommendations based on past browsing and purchases. Granted, this customizable feature offered a means to enable users to find more personalized selections. However, computer experts found that in addition to the song selection, unique data about each user was sent back to Apple via the MiniStore (McElhearn, 2006). Once this information was found, the software’s user agreement was analyzed by experts who found no mention of this particular MiniStore functionality (Borland, 2006). Apple soon recanted and explained to users how to turn off this feature. In all new versions of iTunes, MiniStore functionality must be enabled by users (Apple, 2007).



However, Apple’s iTunes is once again in the privacy spotlight. In 2007, researchers discovered that all DRM-free music purchased via iTunes embeds each user’s personal information in the file (Fisher, 2007). Additional research found that all iTunes purchases include this information with no explanation from Apple. Apple is not the only organization tracking users’ information without their knowledge. Microsoft Windows Media Player stores data about all users’ media files that they watch either online or on DVDs. The Media player encodes all selections with a “Windows Media Player ID number” specific to each user (Festa, 2002; Smith, 2002a). This information is then sent to an online Microsoft database. These “SuperCookies” can be used to track user viewing habits, Web surfing preferences, and other personal information. While Microsoft denies any plans to use this data and provides instructions on how to disable this feature on its support pages (Smith, 2002b), the feature is on by default until a user completes a series of steps hidden within a detailed privacy statement (Microsoft, 2003). Other companies have also amassed consumers’ data without their knowledge. In 1999, researchers learned that Comet Cursor was tracking the clickstreams of over 16 million people who downloaded the free software (Oakes, 1999). Other companies that have tracked, or are tracking, online user movements include RealNetworks, DoubleClick, HitBox, and X10. Some companies, such as DoubleClick, had discontinued tracking in favor of consumer privacy because of lawsuits and user complaints (Krill, 2002). However, Google’s pending acquisition of DoubleClick raises new concerns (EPIC, 2007). Ultimately, while many of these e-businesses have either changed data collection practices or written the procedures into privacy policies, users still are not always aware of the privacy implications. Moreover, much amassing of data is conducted without users’ awareness. Companies such as WebTrends specialize in offering e-busi-

Privacy Control and Assurance

nesses detailed user data and Web site usage in order to analyze what users do at the e-business site (WebTrends, 2007). Users are not usually made aware of the clickstream tracking, page views, or other data being collected about them with each click and view of a Web page within a site.

lack of Implemented privacy techniques As early as 1997, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) released a study noting that Web users (a.k.a. surfers) needed to be aware of Web site usage and privacy policies (EPIC, 1997). Our proffered examples illustrate that even if users should be aware of privacy policies if they exist, e-businesses can use technology to take personal information without asking, or at least without intentionally informing consumers. However, many e-businesses are working to simultaneously acquire necessary information and protect consumers’ personal privacy. In early 2000, some e-businesses began implementing P3P (platform for privacy preferences) into their Web sites. P3P is an XML scripting language that enables e-businesses to code their Web privacy statements with standardized markup syntax (W3C, 2007). Using this technology would allow all Web browsers to find and read the e-businesses’ privacy policies. Consumers would then be able to set acceptable personal privacy criteria and would be notified by their Web browsers if a Web site meets these criteria (Levy & Gutwin, 2005). P3P promised much to consumers because it would allow them to decide not only if they wanted to share personal information with a Web site but also what information to share (Radcliff, 2001). Unfortunately, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) suspended work on the P3P platform in late 2006 because of a lack of support from Web browser developers (W3C, 2006). Interestingly enough, the W3C P3P group notes that the standard is ready for implementation even though Web browsers currently do not support it. Perhaps future Web browser versions will.

Because there are no massively-deployed technologies to assist users who want to protect personal data, most use passive and active measures during online transactions. Consumers may not give out information (passive) or supply false information (active) in order to complete a transaction. As a result, e-businesses suffer from lost or incomplete transactions, or partial or incorrect data. Without assurances about Web site security—factoring in privacy and trust considerations—consumers are unwilling to supply the necessary personal information in order to complete an online purchase. A recent Gartner study estimates that over 2 billion dollars were lost in 2006 due to consumers’ security fears over e-business transactions (Schuman, 2006).

tension between desire to use and desire to share Consumers using active and passive measures underscore the tension between their desire to use technology and online services, and the level of information they are willing to provide. Invasive technology, such as the Media Player and Comet Cursor, “take” personal data without a user’s permission and not only cause user concern but also hinder trust between a user and an e-business. On the other hand, P3P and related technologies offer the control users need to decide whether or not to share personal information. In other words, the more control users have over their personal information, the more trust invoked between the entities and the less user concern. P3P offers users the chance to negotiate with each e-business as to how much personal information they want to share (W3C, 2007). In order to understand how e-businesses can foster better relationships with consumers, we studied the correlation matrix among the criteria of trust, concern, and control as it relates to consumers’ online privacy. In our research, we have found a significant difference in gender tendencies and privacy concerns (Chen & Rea, 2004).



Privacy Control and Assurance

This discussion supports and extends the factor of gender as crucial to relationship negotiation between consumer and e-business. Using this information, we can suggest when consumers might more readily share personal information with an e-business. We also delve into the relationships between gender and two categories of privacy constructs: the ability to control—actively or passively—the unwanted presence of others and Internet privacy concerns. Finally, we look at how we came to these findings, and explore the implications for future research in this area.

bAckground Negotiating trust is especially important in this study because all online interactions require some level of trust between the consumer and the e-business. From a simple hyperlink click to a complex e-commerce purchase, trust must be negotiated before users are willing to share personal data in exchange for goods, services, or information. E-businesses must understand how to establish and maintain this trust in order to be successful. A crucial enabling component for trust is privacy.

privacy Privacy takes many forms. Some researchers view it as a moral, legal, or consumer right (Goodwin, 1991; Papazafeiropoulou & Pouloudi, 2001; Han & Maclaurin, 2002). Others view it within the context of a social power struggle (Campbell & Carlson, 2002), economic theory (Hemphill, 2002), or commitment-trust theory (Mukherjee & Nath, 2007). Some view it as simply a need to sustain personal space (Gumpert & Drucker, 1998; Clarke, 1999) or a necessary psychological condition (Yao, Rice, & Wallis, 2007). This study does not address the privacy needs of personal space in terms of biometrics, video monitoring, or workplace surveillance. Instead,

8

we measure the consumer’s need for online privacy, or information privacy: Information privacy refers to the claims of individuals that data about themselves should generally not be available to other individuals and organizations, and that, where data is possessed by another party, the individual must be able to exercise a substantial degree of control over that data and its use. (Clarke, 1999) Key components can be extracted from this definition. First we see users’ concerns that personal data should not be taken without their knowledge. Consumers raged at Apple’s iTunes, Windows Media Player, Comet Cursor, and DoubleClick for acquiring information without active consent. Consumer concern over the uninformed harvest of personal information is high. This concern quickly correlates to a lack of trust between users and e-businesses since consumers experience lack of control over what information the Web sites have collected about them (Hoffman, Novak, & Peralta, 1999). Numerous studies discuss the importance of consumers’ control over personal information as the basis of establishing online trust (Wang, Lee, & Wang, 1998; Tavani & Moor, 2001; Han & Macclaurin, 2002; Hemphill, 2002; Roussos & Moussouri, 2004; Ashrafi & Kuilboer, 2005; Metzger, 2006) and promoting consumer privacy. While e-businesses argue that the collected data will not be used without consent, acquiring the data without explicitly asking does not sit well with users and privacy advocates (Yousafzai, Pallister, & Foxall, 2003; Duffy, 2005; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006; Pan & Zinkhan, 2006). Conversely, asking for users’ consent can be regarded as a shift of information control to the users (Eastlick, Lotz, & Warrington, 2006; Van Dyke, Midha, & Nemati, 2007). Many e-businesses are concerned this control shift will limit their access to crucial information and are wary of acceding this power to users.

Privacy Control and Assurance

It follows then that one of the best means of addressing users’ concerns and building trust is for e-businesses to allow users to control their personal information. However, it is not always feasible in a business context to permit complete control; therefore, e-businesses should inform users via online privacy policies how the collected information will be used. This allows for informed users to decide whether they should provide personal information in exchange for goods and services (Han & Maclaurin, 2002; Ashrafi & Kuilboer, 2005; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006; Pan & Zinkhan, 2006; Shalhoub, 2006; Lauer & Deng, 2007). Researchers note that companies that inform users how their information will be used begin to build online relationships crucial for success: In some respects, the lack of other means in cyberspace of establishing customer relationships and trust based on reputation and personal contact demands that firms reveal their policies on information disclosure, informed consent, and handling disputes. (Schoder & Yin, 2000) It would seem that a key measurement of how much personal information users are willing to share hinges on the trust level in the relationship between users and e-businesses (Roman, 2007).

trust Before users choose to enter into a relationship with a business, they must first be convinced that it is in their best interest. Consumers look at discounts, reputation, and other factors before they decide they will enter a physical store to conduct business (So & Sculli, 2002; Duffy, 2005; Eastlick et al., 2006; Chen & Barnes, 2007; Roman, 2007). There must also be some factor of initial trust before a user will enter into an e-business transaction:

The initial trust model, which assumes that parties barely know each other, also seems appropriate for the distant, impersonal relationships that characterize most Web vendor/customer relationships. (McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2000) Many studies have looked at methods through which e-businesses can gain users’ trust (Hoffman et al., 1999; McKnight et al., 2000; Phelps, Nowak, & Ferrell, 2000; Schoder & Yin, 2000; Riegelsberger, Sasse, & McCarthy, 2003; Aiken & Boush, 2006; Hui, Tan, & Goh, 2006; Pan & Zinkhan, 2006). Without the means to establish the trust relationship, there can be no viable interaction. Initial trust becomes the challenge for e-businesses as each Web site occupies a single clickspace for users. Current studies look at various factors e-business can use to foster this initial trust, such as third-party trustmarks (Noteberg, Christiaanse, & Wallage, 2003; Hu, Lin, & Zhang, 2003; Kim, Steinfield, & Lai, 2004; Patton & Josang, 2004; Moores, 2005; Aiken & Boush, 2006), privacy policy statements (Han & Maclaurin, 2002; Ashrafi & Kuilboer, 2005; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006; Pan & Zinkhan, 2006), brand reputation (So & Sculli, 2002; Yousafzai et al., 2003; Duffy, 2005; Aiken & Boush, 2006; Eastlick et al., 2006; Metzger, 2006; Roman, 2007), and Web site design and content (Janda, Trocchia, & Gwinner, 2002; Chen & Barnes, 2007). However, it is still ultimately the trust factor or “lack of faith” noted almost 10 years ago by Hoffman, Novak, and Peralta (1999) that plays one of the most crucial roles in e-business/consumer relational success. Without trust, users will not enter into relationships with e-businesses, and they will not provide any personal information to e-business sites: “Almost 95% of Web users have declined to provide personal information to Web sites at one time or another when asked” (Hoffman et al., 1999). More recent studies share statistics similar to Hoffman et al. (1999), suggesting that

9

Privacy Control and Assurance

not much has changed in terms of the consumer/ e-business trust relationship (Moores, 2005; Pan & Zinkhan, 2006). Trust must be established and maintained in order to foster and encourage a relationship in the e-business sphere. Trust is a construct that must be negotiated between a user and an e-business. What makes trust difficult is that this negotiation factor differs not only by the type of e-business or user but also by each relationship. Studies have looked at users’ “disposition to trust” (McKnight et al., 2000), “relationship exchanges” (Hoffman et al., 1999), and “consumer perceptions regarding the ethics of online retailers (CPEO)” (Roman, 2007) to explain how these relationship negotiations can be accomplished. Another factor that must be considered in this trust negotiation is gender. Researchers have found significant differences in gender tendencies toward Internet usage (Teo & Lim, 1997; Allen, 2000; Nachimias, Mioduser, & Shelma, 2001; Roach, 2001; Sexton, Johnson, & Hignite, 2002; Ono & Zavodny, 2005; Chesley, 2006; Kang & Yang, 2006; Fraser & Henry, 2007), e-business (Papazafeiropoulou & Pouloudi, 2001; Sexton et al., 2002; Garbarino & Strahilevitz, 2004; Ha & Stoel, 2004; Fraser & Henry, 2007), and exploratory work concerning privacy (Hupfer & Detlor, 2007; Yao et al., 2007). Our study supports and extends the factor of gender as crucial to the relationship negotiation and users’ attitudes as to when—or if— they will share personal information with an e-business.

mAIn thrust of the chApter Concerns about giving out personal information in the e-commerce environment cause low user involvement in online transactions (Miyazaki & Fernandez, 2001; Aiken & Boush, 2006). Users almost always find it unacceptable for marketers to use their personal information for purposes other than current, and sometimes future, transactions

0

that require personal information whether it occurs within traditional marketing methods (Goodwin, 1991; Nowak & Phelps, 1992; Wang & Petrison, 1993) or online (Tavani & Moor, 2001; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006; Roman, 2007). Both shoppers and non-shoppers worry about issues of acquisition and dissemination of consumer data (Rohm & Milne, 1998; Tavani, 1999; Berendt, Günther, & Spiekermann, 2005; Mukerjee & Nath, 2007). These concerns are usually triggered by more than one catalyst, such as age (Han & Maclaurin, 2002) or education (Ono & Zavodny, 2005; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006). However, in many cases, a major catalyst is linked to gender (Sexton et al., 2002; Garbarion & Strahilevitz, 2004; Ha & Stoel, 2004; Chesley, 2006; Fraser & Henry, 2007).

gender-linked privacy Questions Male users have been reported to use the Internet more frequently and for a greater number of tasks than female users (Teo & Lim, 1997; Teo, Lim, & Lai, 1999; Papazafeiropoulou & Pouloudi, 2001; Nachimias et al., 2001; Sexton et al., 2002; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006). Although Internet usage patterns are shifting toward a more equal gender balance (Roach, 2001; Ono & Zavodny, 2003; Ono & Zavodny, 2005), e-business transactions remain a male-dominated realm (Garbarino & Strahilevitz, 2004; Ha & Stoel, 2004; Fraser & Henry, 2007). The increased level of Internet experience and utilization of online tasks has been negatively related to concerns about online privacy (Hoffman et al., 1999; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006). However, other studies indicate that online privacy concerns are more readily attributed to educational level (Phelps et al., 2000; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006), or other demographic characteristics, such as marital status (Chesley, 2006), age (Han & Maclaurin, 2002), or employment (Ono & Zavodny, 2005). Ultimately, there is a strong indication that gender is a major factor relative to privacy concerns. Statistics from an early study show that

Privacy Control and Assurance

87% of female Internet users were very concerned about threats to their personal privacy while only 76% of male Internet users were very concerned. Furthermore, women registered higher levels of concern on every privacy-related issue about which they were questioned (Ackerman & Lorrie, 1999). More recently, Friedman, Kahn, Hagman, Severson, and Gill (2006) report in a study, “The Watcher and the Watched,” that females were more concerned than males about all aspects of privacy. In this study, researchers recorded more than 900 people passing through a public space. Afterward, those filmed were asked their reactions to whether these images should be publically viewed in real-time at the location, in real-time at another location (anywhere in the world), or saved and distributed online. Both males and females had some concerns over one of the three options. However, in almost all cases, females expressed privacy concerns over displaying the video and images no matter what the situational context or if they were in the role of the watcher or the watched. Ultimately, females were more aware of the implications of private information within public spaces (Friedman et al., 2006). This awareness can be linked to how women communicate on the basis of network-oriented and collaborative tasks while men, on the other hand, communicate to elevate their social hierarchy (Kilbourne & Weeks, 1997; Teo & Lim, 1997). Female users consider e-mail to have a higher social presence (Gefen & Straub, 1997), and tend to focus more on messaging and community formation (Teo & Lim, 1997). Men’s use of electronic media involves exchanging messages to disseminate information (Brunner, 1991). Men also focus more on searching, downloading, and purchasing (Teo & Lim, 1997; Ha & Stoel, 2004). Women’s use of electronic media for collaborative purposes may involve exchanging messages that contain personal information, views, and other information not meant for public disclosures. Moreover, studies have shown most women rely on recommendations from social

networks to make purchasing decisions (Garbarino & Strahilevitz, 2004). Studies of women in female-only discussion groups show women to be more focused on self-disclosure and individual opinions; women respond directly to others in the discussion groups. Conversely, men in maleonly discussion groups do not self-disclose, and instead argue to win discussions (Savicki, Kelley, & Lingenfelter, 1996). Because the content of communication messages largely affects the participant’s willingness to share the messages with others, it is likely that women would prefer more privacy protection than men. Therefore, we conjecture the following hypothesis: H1: Female users are more concerned with online privacy practices than male users. Consumers can be very uncomfortable sharing their personal data with others because they are sensitive to disclosing such data (Phelps et al., 2000; Han & Maclaurin, 2002; So & Sculli, 2002; Duffy, 2005; Aiken & Boush, 2006; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006). The term “information sensitivity” refers to “the level of privacy concern an individual feels for a type of data in a specific situation” (Weible, 1993). Despite concerns about online privacy, consumers do realize that personal information is important to online marketers. Consequently, they are willing to provide such information when Web sites provide privacy statements explaining how the collected information would be used (Hoffman et al., 1999; Han & Maclaurin, 2002; Ashrafi & Kuilboer, 2005; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006; Pan & Zinkhan, 2006). The disclosure of such privacy statements and similar constructs, such as trustmarks, is related to higher levels of involvement in e-commerce (Miyazaki & Fernandez, 2000; Noteberg et al., 2003; Hu et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2004; Patton & Josang, 2004; Moores, 2005; Aiken & Boush, 2006). Thus, online privacy issues are also related to (1) an individual’s willingness to share personal



Privacy Control and Assurance

data and (2) the privacy disclosure statements of online vendors. Although some exploratory studies (Garbarino & Strahilevitz, 2004; Ha & Stoel, 2004; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006; Fraser & Henry, 2007) indicate a relationship between gender and privacy issues, they have not demonstrated a direct relationship between gender and these two types of privacy issues (willingness and disclosure). Nonetheless, women have been found to process information in more detail and thus are more aware of, and sensitive to, changes in their environments (Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1991). Women are more likely to be irritated than men by ambient factors (e.g., background conditions), store design factors (e.g., aesthetic and functional aspects), and social factors (e.g., customers in the same environment) (D’Astous, 2000; Garbarino & Strahilevitz, 2004; Ha & Stoel, 2004). Even though most of the indicated studies focused on women’s sensitivity to changes in their physical environments, it is likely this sensitivity would continue in the “virtual” environment. Because of these reasons, we hypothesize that gender difference may be significant in the context of online privacy: H2: Female users are less likely to share their personal data with online vendors. H3: Female users are more concerned with the disclosure of privacy statements on Web sites. Consumers’ ability to control their interactions within Web sites affects their perceptions of online security and privacy practices (Hoffman et al., 1999; Han & Maclaurin, 2002; Nam, Song, Lee, & Park, 2005; Pan & Zinkhan, 2006). Goodwin (1991) defines this type of control as “control over unwanted presence in the environment.” However, in some environments, such as the Internet, users cannot easily control the unwanted presence of others. For example, users can delete unsolicited



e-mail thus controlling the unwanted presence in a passive way. Alternatively, users can configure their e-mail software to filter out unwanted future e-mail, respond to the sender to opt out of mailing lists, or report the offense to a third party service, thereby branding the senders as spammers. In instant messaging, users can block others from their friend lists or simply ignore them. Therefore, even though intrusion into users’ environments due to publicly accessible nature of the Internet is unavoidable, users’ reactions to such intrusions can be of two types: active control (block) and passive control (ignore). While women consider electronic communications useful, it is men who are more comfortable actively using software tools for such Internet activities (Arbaugh, 2000; Sexton et al., 2002). Existing studies report that the literature discussing the relationship between computer anxiety and gender is relatively inconclusive (Chua, Chen, & Wong, 1999; King, Bond, & Blandford, 2002). However, in terms of online shopping, women have reported difficulty locating Internet merchandise and navigating through modern Web interfaces (Fram & Grady, 1997; Garbarino & Strahilevitz, 2004; Ha & Stoel, 2004). Compounded with fewer interests in computer-related activities, female users are less likely to have a favorable attitude toward computer usage (Qutami & Abu-Jaber, 1997; Nachimias et al., 2001). In studying gender differences in Web searching, researchers found that men are more active online and explored more hyperlinks than women (Teo & Lim, 1997; Large, Beheshti, & Rahman, 2002). Male online users also take control of the bandwidth by sending longer messages (Herring, 1992) and tend to use the computer more hours per week than women (Sexton et al., 2002). Thus, it is likely that women will be engaged in passive controls to block the unwanted presence of others. Conversely, men, with their strong computer interests and skills, are more likely to take active control over any unwanted presence:

Privacy Control and Assurance

H4: Female users are likely to be engaged in passive control over unwanted presence of others. H5: Male users are more likely to actively control unwanted presence of others.

2004) and Table 4 shows only the survey questions related to the current study. Each privacy-related question was measured with a seven-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (7).

survey procedure study procedures The authors developed a survey (Table 4) based on existing privacy literature. To our best knowledge, there is no existing study that empirically covers online privacy issues focusing on users’ preferences to control the unwanted presence of others (either actively or passively), and concerns on privacy disclosure, revealing personal data, and online privacy practices. Specifying the domain of individual privacy concerns and their ability to control, the authors used the literature review (detailed in a previous section) as the starting point for this instrument. Questions for three types of privacy concerns (revealing personal data, privacy practice, and disclosure of privacy policy) were modified from Smith, Milberg, and Burke (1996) and others, to suit the context of the current study. The user controls over others’ presence were derived from Goodwin (1991) and others. The survey instrument was internally distributed to faculty members who specialize in e-commerce and online privacy to ensure its content validity. A pilot study followed and the instrument was further fine-tuned before implementation.

survey structure The survey begins with a series of questions that assess the respondent’s concerns over various privacy issues and his or her ability to control personal data and the presence of others. To avoid the likelihood of associating each participant’s personal demographic data with real individuals, questions regarding identifiable information were separated from the main part of the survey. This survey is part of a larger study (Chen & Rea,

The survey was administered to undergraduate students taking a Web site architecture/design course. Several prerequisite courses had prepared participants for basic computer literacy, such as computer software, hardware, and the Internet, before they were eligible for this junior-senior level course. Participants were awarded extra points in class for completing the survey. To encourage involvement, the participants were promised anonymity and that their responses would be used solely for research purposes. As other studies note, a study sample of more advanced users from a younger demographic is useful because it functions as an indicator of Internet and e-business usage among more Websavvy individuals (Nachimias et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2004; Moores, 2005; Aiken & Boush, 2006). With the increase of Web usage in almost all countries, the study group offers a glimpse into the future of online consumption. However, an application of the study to a larger, more general Web-using population would also prove useful for measuring our study of controls, and also indicate shifts in approaches as more users partake in online commerce and general Web usage. Other studies have demonstrated that even with a larger demographic, gender tends to play a role in Internet usage (Teo & Lim, 1997; Roach, 2001; Sexton et al., 2002; Ono & Zavodny, 2003; Ono & Zavodny, 2005); in some cases, gender may also be a factor in e-business participation (Garbarino & Strahilevitz, 2004; Ha & Stoel, 2004; Chesley, 2006; Fraser & Henry, 2007). Out of a possible 160 students, 107 elected to participate in the survey, of which 105 valid responses were returned. Of the 105 valid responses,



Privacy Control and Assurance

Table 1. Factor analysis Factor Loading Variable

1

2

3

4

5

Factor 1: Concern about privacy practice (A)

.86

(B)

.83

(C)

.83

(D)

.82

(E)

.82

(F)

.67

.39

Factor 2: Concern about privacy disclosure (G)

.90

(H)

.88

(I)

.85

(J)

.85

(K)

.82

(L)

.73

Factor 3: Concern about giving out personal data (M)

.84

(N)

.74

(O)

.74

(P)

.70

Factor 4: Active control (Q)

.86

(R)

.84

(S)

.60

(T)

.58

Factor 5: Passive control (U)

.78

(V)

.77

(W)

.56

(X)

.49

Variance explained Cronbach’s alpha



24.07%

17.89%

10.02%

7.85%

6.90%

.90

.92

.84

.70

.62

Privacy Control and Assurance

eight did not indicate gender in the demographics section and have been removed for the purposes of this study. The 97 remaining responses were entered in the database for further analyses, and are the basis for this study and ensuing discussion. The response rate was 66.88%.

Analysis and results Of the 97 responses, 71 participants were male (73.2%) and 26 participants were female (26.8%). Most respondents were between the ages of 16 and 24. Of them, 55.2% were whites, 21.9% were Asians, 6.7% were African-Americans, and 4.8% were Hispanics. Furthermore, 53.3% of the participants were full-time students, 38.1% were employed, and 1% was retired. Questions regarding privacy concerns and the user’s ability to control the environment were factor analyzed with principal component extraction. The exploratory factor analysis with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation yielded factors with multiple loadings. With eigenvalues of 1.0 and scree plots as the criteria, we found a presence of five factors. Items with factor loadings less than 3.0 were excluded from further analyses. The results of the factor analysis are shown in Table 1. Factors one and three were split from a larger section of questions in which respondents were asked how concerned they were about (1) current privacy practice on the Internet and (2) giving out personal information. The results of factor analysis show two separate factors: “concern about privacy practice” (variance explained: 24.07%; Cronbach’s alpha: .90) and “concern about giving out personal data” (variance explained: 10.02%; Cronbach’s alpha: .84). The second factor reflects the respondents’ feelings about giving their personal data when e-commerce sites are supplemented with privacy components, such as privacy statements, privacy logos, and privacy endorsements from third parties. Therefore, the factor is named “concern about privacy disclosure.” This factor explains 17.89% of the variance and its Cronbach’s alpha is .92.

The fourth factor is comprised of items such as deleting browser cookies, abandoning spammed e-mail accounts, and faking personal information for online registration. Although these items are related to dealing with the unwanted presence of others, they exhibit the users’ intention to be actively involved in preventing intrusion into personal online privacy. Users combat such intrusion with active actions, such as information falsification and multiple identities. Thus, the factor is named “active control.” This factor explains 7.85% of the variance and its Cronbach’s alpha is .70. Four items loaded on the last factor clearly represent users’ reactions to the unwanted presence of others. In public accessible media, such as e-mail and chat rooms, it is difficult for users to prevent others from contacting them or automatically collecting personal information. One good strategy of blocking such an unwanted presence is to just ignore it. This factor is named “passive control” because items clustered into it were related to users’ control in a passive way. This factor explains 6.90% of the variance. Cronbach’s alpha for this factor is .62. Traditionally, an instrument is considered sufficiently reliable when its Cronbach’s alpha is .70 or above. However, Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998) indicate that Cronbach’s alpha may decrease to .60 in exploratory studies. Because of the exploratory nature of the current study, this factor is considered valid for further analysis. Factor loadings of these five factors were saved for later analyses. ANOVA was conducted to examine the differences between the two genders in their reactions to the five privacy factors. The results in Table 3 show that two variables (concern about privacy disclosure and active control) were significantly related to the gender variable. Both Table 2 and Table 3 indicate that male users were more concerned about active control of the unwanted presence of others, while female users were more concerned about privacy disclosure. Gender differences were not found in the rest of variables:



Privacy Control and Assurance

Table 2. Means and S.D.—five privacy factors N

(1) Concern about privacy practice

(2) Concern about privacy disclosure

(3) Concern about giving out personal data

(4) Active control

(5) Passive control

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error

95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Min.

Max.

Female

26

-.08

1.20

.24

-.57

.40

-4.22

1.30

Male

71

.02

.93

.11

-.20

.24

-3.56

1.11

Total

97

-.05

1.00

.10

-.21

.20

-4.23

1.30

Female

26

.38

.75

.15

.08

.69

-1.30

1.36

Male

71

-.15

1.05

.12

-.40

.10

-2.22

1.48

Total

97

-.08

1.00

.10

-.21

.19

-2.22

1.48

Female

26

-.21

1.11

.22

-.66

.24

-2.64

1.31

Male

71

.07

.96

.11

-.16

.30

-2.60

1.65

Total

97

-.05

1.00

.10

-.21

.20

-2.64

1.65

Female

26

-.33

.96

.19

-.72

.05

-1.82

1.51

Male

71

.14

.99

.12

-.09

.37

-2.15

1.90

Total

97

.01

.99

.10

-.19

.21

-2.15

1.90

Female

26

.25

.77

.15

-.06

.56

-1.48

1.50

Male

71

-.06

1.03

.12

-.31

.18

-3.91

1.81

Total

97

.02

.98

.1

-.18

.22

-3.91

1.81

Table 3. ANOVA—five privacy factors

(1) Concern about privacy practice

(2) Concern about privacy disclosure

(3) Concern about giving out personal data

(4) Active control

(5) Passive control



Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Between groups

.221

1

.22

.22

.64

Within groups

96.55

95

1.02

Total

96.77

96

Between groups

5.45

1

5.45

5.69

.02

Within groups

90.91

95

.96

Total

96.36

96 1.47

.23

4.45

.04

1.952

.17

Between groups

1.47

1

1.47

Within groups

95.28

95

1.00

Total

96.75

96

Between groups

4.28

1

4.28

Within groups

91.30

95

.96

Total

95.58

96

Between groups

1.86

1

1.86

Within groups

90.59

95

.95

Total

92.45

96

Privacy Control and Assurance

passive control, concern about giving personal data, and concern about privacy practice.

discussion and recommendations The first hypothesis predicts that females are more concerned about privacy practice online (Factor 1). With a p-value greater than .05, this is not supported in the current study (p = .64). The second hypothesis conjectures that females are less likely to share their personal data with online vendors (Factor 3). The result of ANOVA suggests this hypothesis should also be rejected (p = .23). There was no statistical difference between the two gender groups in their concerns about giving out personal data. However, the means of variables clustered into the same factor range from 5.59 to 6.19 for females, and from 5.73 to 6.41 for males, indicating that both gender groups were very concerned about giving out their personal data on the Internet. E-businesses should take this concern into account and work toward alleviating this condition through privacy assurances. Concerns about disclosure of privacy procedures (Factor 2) were conjectured in the third hypothesis. The results from Table 3 support this hypothesis (p = .02). Females appear to be more concerned about whether e-businesses disclose their privacy procedures. As the results suggest, females pay more attention to online privacy than males. The “Watched” study also found similar gender-related privacy concerns (Friedman et al., 2006). E-businesses that disclose their privacy practices in various modes, such as showing a privacy statement, displaying a third-party privacy logo, and creating alliances with other well-known sites (Hu et al., 2003; Noteberg et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2004; Aiken & Boush, 2005), are very likely to draw attention from female users. It is likely that privacy issues and practices are beginning to emerge as a strong “influencer” of e-commerce success. Privacy is an important measure by those who are sensitive to their physical or virtual environments. Females are known to possess a

high environmental sensitivity (Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1991) and will be the first to spot the importance of privacy practices within their virtual environments. Trust in e-privacy practices has been cited as one cause of low consumer involvement in business-to-consumer electronic commerce (Hoffman et al., 1999; Phelps et al., 2000; Eastlick et al., 2006; Roman, 2007). Our present study supports this assertion because female users are most likely to be influenced by various privacy procedure disclosures. Therefore, to foster trust and enhance consumer perception of privacy protection, ebusinesses are advised to make their privacy procedures visible and understandable. Hypotheses four and five predict that females are more likely to adopt passive control mechanisms (Factor 5) to block the unwanted presence of others, while males are more likely to take a proactive approach (Factor 4) to prevent such a presence. Hypothesis four was not supported (p = .17), but hypothesis five was (p = .04). As evident in existing literature, males are likely to exercise control over messages and the communication medium. Unsolicited marketing e-mail and Web user tracking components, such as cookies and Web bugs, can be ineffective because male users will control and filter out these unwanted messages. As a result, business intelligence resulting from mining the data collected from such user-tracking software can be biased and distort online marketing decisions. E-businesses should be cautioned to carefully interpret the mined data, which may be subverted by male users’ online behavior.

limitations of the study Our study empirically assessed an Internet user’s ability to control his or her private information and its relationship with the five types of privacy assurance techniques. However, due to its early assessment of privacy controls and its empirical nature, this study is subject to limitations.



8

E-businesses should never share personal information with other companies without proper authorization.

E-businesses should never sell the personal information in their computer database to other companies.

E-businesses should take more steps to make sure that unauthorized people cannot access personal information in their computers.

E-businesses should devote more time and effort to preventing unauthorized access to personal information.

When people give personal information to an e-business for some reason, the e-business should never use the information for any other reason.

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

(M)

It usually bothers me when e-businesses ask me for personal information.

Factor 3: Concern about giving out personal data

I feel more comfortable submitting personal information to sites that have a brick-and-mortar counterpart that I can shop in.

I feel more comfortable submitting personal information to sites that have a statement that guarantees protection of personal information.

(J)

(L)

I feel more comfortable submitting personal information to sites that have a privacy logo endorsed by another site.

(I)

I feel more comfortable submitting personal information to sites that have a privacy statement.

I feel more comfortable submitting personal information to sites that have established themselves with other well-known companies.

(H)

(K)

I feel more comfortable submitting personal information to sites that have established themselves as good e-commerce sites.

(G)

Factor 2: Concern about privacy disclosure

Computer databases that contain personal information should be protected from unauthorized access.

(A)

Factor 1: Concern about privacy practice

Variable

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Strongly disagree

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Somewhat disagree

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

Disagree

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

Neutral

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

Agree

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

Somewhat agree

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

Strongly agree

Privacy Control and Assurance

Table 4. Survey instrument

continued on following page

It bothers me to give personal information to so many e-businesses.

I am concerned that e-businesses are collecting too much personal information about me.

(O)

(P)

When visiting a Web page that requires registration, I fake my personal information to obtain access.

I use several email accounts for privacy reasons.

I know how to delete cookies from my computer.

(R)

(S)

(T)

I do not answer to unsolicited telemarketing calls.

I do not respond to unsolicited email.

I block Web browsers from receiving cookies.

I ignore chat requests from people that I don’t know.

(U)

(V)

(W)

(X)

Factor 5: Passive control

When downloading software from a Web site that requires registration, I fake my personal information to obtain the software.

(Q)

Factor 4: Active control

When e-businesses ask me for personal information, I sometimes think twice before providing it.

(N)

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

Privacy Control and Assurance

Table 4. continued

9

Privacy Control and Assurance

As noted previously, the current study sample may not be entirely representative since students were recruited to participate in the survey. However, the responses of these Web-savvy users may indicate that much needs to be done to facilitate effective e-business transactions. The sampling issue may also influence the generalizability of the findings. However, the differences found in the relationship between privacy controls and user concerns from this somewhat homogeneous group of respondents may suggest that more dramatic differences could be expected from a broader sample involving randomly selected participants. Finally, this study does not address psychological and attitudinal factors, which may be avenues for future exploration within the online privacy context. Even with these constraints, the current study nonetheless provides preliminary, yet useful, insights to the body of privacy research. Moreover, it can be situated with fellow researchers from diverse disciplines who are currently examining various factors in other exploratory studies (Garbarino & Strahilevitz, 2004; Royal, 2005; Chesley, 2006; Kang & Yang, 2006; Fraser & Henry, 2007; Hupfer & Detlor, 2007; Yao et al., 2007).

future trends The ongoing tension between the e-business need for personal information and user willingness to provide personal information in exchange for goods and services will increasingly demand our attention. As more information becomes available online for individual use, more information is collected by those offering the services. Consider Internet behemoths, such as Google, that offer a powerful search engine, e-mail, map searches (including actual street views), word processing software, and various other tools (Google, 2007a), all online for free access and use by anyone. However, these features may come at a price of which most users are unaware: privacy. Whether

80

a user remains logged into her Google account or keeps her Google Toolbar activated in her Web browser (Google, 2007b), information is collected at granular levels and saved for months or years on Google’s systems (O’Brien & Crampton, 2007). Subverting this process requires extensive technical knowledge and will limit many of the proffered Google features. Here we have the crux of the issue: features versus privacy. To compound the issue, experts have labeled Google as the worst offender in terms of its privacy practices (CNN, 2007). Coupled with a pending acquisition of DoubleClick by Google, we could see serious privacy infringements via the amount and type of personal information collected online (EPIC, 2007). Google is not the only e-business in this scenario of services versus privacy, but it is one of the most prevalent. As more commodities are offered online, more will be asked of users. Both e-businesses and consumers must work together to find the middle ground between how much information can be collected, retained, and used, and what users are willing to provide in exchange for the goods and services. One avenue towards this middle ground may already be available to e-businesses: a rebirth and reintegration of the W3C’s P3P specification. Although P3P is currently suspended, it would take little effort to incorporate this specification into current Web browsers via plug-in technology. Additional initiatives based on P3P are already in the works, such as the Policy Aware Web (2006) and Prime (2007). No matter what the solution, without a dialogue about these issues, users will continue to find both active and passive means to subvert data collection techniques. As a result, e-businesses will continue to work to find new ways to collect data, sometimes without users’ consent. We suggest the resources and time necessary for an acceptable compromise would be better spent looking for solutions together rather than fighting for control of information.

Privacy Control and Assurance

conclusIon Our study suggests that both female and male users implement controls when utilizing online services in the current e-business environment. Males use multiple identities and techniques to actively thwart data collection, whereas females passively ignore information requests or altogether forgo participation. Whatever the case, if e-businesses want to collect viable data in order to improve online offerings and remain competitive, they must (1) implement an accessible and easy-to-read privacy statement and (2) obtain endorsement from well-known privacy groups such as the BBBOnLine (BBBOnLine, 2007) and TRUSTe (TRUSTe, 2007), as well as prominently display the resulting certification logo. These two items are the foundation upon which an e-business can begin to form the initial trusting relationship between itself and users. Without trust between e-business and consumer, there can be no productive relationship (Duffy, 2005; Flavián & Guinalíu, 2006; Roman, 2007). Consumers will share the required information if they understand and agree with the privacy policies, as well as trust that an e-business will only use their personal data to better the available personalized offerings. In the information age, most consumers are bombarded with useless information on a daily basis; customized offerings are a most welcome change. However, if the trust is breeched, an e-business will experience an uphill battle to regain relationships with existing customers and acquire new consumers.

future reseArch dIrectIons Our study linking gender to attitudes toward online privacy is promising. E-businesses should take note that female users tend to build relationships with organizations that disclose their privacy policies (hypothesis three). E-businesses, particularly those seeking to maximize their female customer

base, should consider meeting the requirements of privacy and business organizations, such as TRUSTe (TRUSTe, 2007) and the BBBonline (BBBOnLine, 2007), thereby enabling the display of the third-party trustmark logo on their Web sites. Future research should look to help e-businesses determine the correct course of action to maximize initial relationship formations. Male users taking an active approach to privacy protection (hypothesis five) suggests another track of research. E-businesses that rely solely on Web bugs, cookies, banner ads, and click streams are losing valuable data because of the active control of information male users employ during their Web surfing forays. As a result, mined data might be skewed in directions unfavorable to effective marketing applications. In recent years, Internet computing has experienced a major interaction shift with the influx of social computing applications, such as social networking sites like Facebook (Facebook, 2007) and MySpace (MySpace, 2007), and the influx of Web 2.0 services, such as Google Docs (Google, 2007c). Current calls for cross-disciplinary research (Parameswaran & Whinston, 2007) must be heeded as we look to the changing social dynamics within online social networks (Jenkins & Boyd, 2006) and how they affect gender-related perceptions of privacy. For example, recent selfdocumented Facebook incidents (Chang, 2006, Leitzey, 2006, Stapleton-Paff, 2007; Stokes, 2007) of collegiate underage drinking and criminal mischief are no longer uncommon. Both male and female students share more of what used to be considered personal within these public spaces. Researchers must examine if this shift translates into changing attitudes (gender-related or otherwise) toward all forms of control of personal information, especially within the e-business realm. Our current study is designed to focus on gender differences in several privacy issues. It is likely that further insights can be discovered when other user characteristics, such as computer

8

Privacy Control and Assurance

and Internet experience, culture, learning styles and other types of online preferences, and demographic data, such as age, job type, and education, are included. When these other factors are taken into consideration, gender may or may not be the sole factor that explains user privacy concerns. Ultimately, our study suggests there are rich veins of research yet to be mined. Online privacy issues are in their infancy. As technology advances and more people use the Internet, demographical studies concerning users’ view of online privacy and how e-business can remain effective, yet maintain trusting relationships, are essential.

BBBOnLine. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.bbbonline.org/

references

Campbell, J., & Carlson, M. (2002). Panopticon. com: Online surveillance and the commodification of privacy. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 46(4), 586-606.

Ackerman, M. S., & Lorrie F. C. (1999). Privacy critics: UI components to safeguard users’ privacy. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI’99) (pp. 258-259). Pittsburgh, PA. Aiken, K., & Boush, D. (2006). Trustmarks, objective-source ratings, and implied investments in advertising: Investigating online trust and the context-specific nature of internet signals. Academy of Marketing Science Journal, 34(3), 308-323. Allen, A. (2000). Gender and privacy in cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 52(5), 1175-1200. Apple. (2007). iTunes [software]. Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.apple.com/ itunes/ Arbaugh, J. B. (2000). An exploratory study of effects of gender on student learning and class participation in an internet-based MBA course. Management Learning, 31(4), 503-519. Ashrafi, N., & Kuilboer, J. (2005). Online privacy policies: An empirical perspective on self-regulatory practices. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 3(4), 61-74.

8

Berendt, B., Günther, O., & Spiekermann, S. (2005). Privacy in e-commerce: Stated preferences vs. actual behavior. Communications of the ACM, 48(4), 101-106. Borland, J. (2006). Apple’s iTunes raises privacy concerns. CNet News. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://news.com.com/Apples+iTunes+raises+priv acy+concerns/2100-1029_3-6026542.html Brunner, C. (1991). Gender and distance learning. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 133-145.

Chang, J. (2006). Is Facebook private? Northwestern Chronicle. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from http://www.chron.org/tools/viewart. php?artid=1346 Chen, K., & Rea, A. (2004). Protecting personal information online: A survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85-92. Chen, Y., & Barnes, S. (2007). Initial trust and online buyer behaviour. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 107(1), 21-36. Chesley, N. (2006). Families in a high-tech age: Technology usage patterns, work and family correlates, and gender. Journal of Family Issues, 27(5), 587-608. Chua, S. L., Chen, D.T., & Wong, A. F. L. (1999). Computer anxiety and its correlates: A metaanalysis. Computers in Human Behaviors, 15, 609-623. Clarke, R. (1999). Internet privacy concerns confirm the case for intervention. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 60-67.

Privacy Control and Assurance

CNN. (2007). Google privacy “Worst on the Web.” CNN.com. Retrieved July 10, 2007, from http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/internet/06/11/ google.privacy.ap/ D’Astous, A. (2000). Irritating aspects of the shopping environment. Journal of Business Research, 49, 149-156. Duffy, D. (2005). The evolution of customer loyalty strategy. The Journal of Consumer Marketing, 22(4/5), 284-286. Eastlick, M., Lotz, S., & Warrington, P. (2006). Understanding online B-to-C relationships: An integrated model of privacy concerns, trust, and commitment. Journal of Business Research, 59(8), 877-886. Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (1997). Surfer beware: Personal privacy and the internet. Washington, D.C.: Electronic Privacy Information Center. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.html Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (2007). Proposed Google/DoubleClick deal. Washington, D.C.: Electronic Privacy Information Center. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www. epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ Facebook. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.facebook.com/ Festa, P. (2002). Windows media aware of DVDs watched. CNet News. Retrieved May 28, 2007, from http://news.com.com/2100-1023-841766. html Fischer, K. (2007). Apple hides account info in DRM-free music, too. Ars Technica. Retrieved July 8, 2007, from http://arstechnica.com/news. ars/post/20070530-apple-hides-account-info-indrm-free-music-too.html Flavián, C., & Guinalíu, M. (2006). Consumer trust, perceived security and privacy policy: Three

basic elements of loyalty to a web site. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 106(5), 601-620. Fram, E. H., & Grady, D. B. (1997). Internet shoppers: Is there a surfer gender gap? Direct Marketing, January, 46-50. Fraser, S., & Henry, L. (2007). An exploratory study of residential internet shopping in Barbados. Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, 32(1), 1-20, 93. Friedman, B., Kahn, P., Hagman, J., Severson, R., & Gill, B. (2006). The watcher and the watched: Social judgments about privacy in a public place. Human-Computer Interaction, 21(2), 235-272. Garbarino, E., & Strahilevitz, M. (2004). Gender differences in the perceived risk of buying online and the effects of receiving a site recommendation. Journal of Business Research, 57(7), 768-775. Gefen, D., & Straub, D. W. (1997). Gender differences in the perception and use of e-mail: An extension to the technology acceptance model. MIS Quarterly, 21(4), 389-400. Goodwin, C. (1991). Privacy: Recognition of a consumer right. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 10(1), 149-166. Google. (2007a). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.google.com/ Google. (2007b). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://toolbar.google.com/ Google. (2007c). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://documents.google.com/ Gumpert, G., & Drucker, S. (1998). The demise of privacy in a private world: From front porches to chat rooms. Communication Theory, 8(4), 408-425. Ha, Y., & Stoel, L. (2004). Internet apparel shopping behaviors: The influence of general innovativeness. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 32(8/9), 377-385.

8

Privacy Control and Assurance

Hair, J. F., Jr., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1998). Multivariate data analysis (5th ed.). UpperSaddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Han, P., & Maclaurin, A. (2002). Do consumers really care about online privacy? Marketing Management, 11(1), 35-38. Hemphill, T. (2002). Electronic commerce and consumer privacy: Establishing online trust in the U.S. digital economy. Business and Society Review, 107(2), 221-239. Herring, S. C. (1992). Gender and participation in computer-mediated linguistic discourse. Washington, DC: ERIC Clearinghouse on Languages and Linguistics, Document no. ED 345552. Hoffman, D. L., Novak, T. P., & Peralta, M. (1999). Building consumer trust online. Communications of the ACM, 42(4), 80-85. Hu, X., Lin, Z., & Zhang, H. (2003). Trust promoting seals in electronic markets: An exploratory study of their effectiveness for online sales promotion. Journal of Promotion Management, 9(1/2), 163-180. Hui, K. L., Tan, B., & Goh, C. Y. (2006). Online information disclosure: Motivators and measurements. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 6(4), 415-441. Hupfer, M., & Detlor, B. (2007). Beyond gender differences: Self-concept orientation and relationship-building applications on the internet. Journal of Business Research, 60(6), 613-619. Janda, S., Trocchia, P., & Gwinner, K. (2002). Consumer perceptions of internet retail service quality. International Journal of Service Industry Management, 13(5), 412-431. Jenkins, H., & Boyd, D. (2006). MySpace and deleting online predators act (DOPA). MIT Tech Talk. Retrieved October 12, 2007, from http://web. mit.edu/cms/People/henry3/MySpace.pdf

8

Kang, H., & Yang, H. (2006). The visual characteristics of avatars in computer-mediated communication: Comparison of internet relay chat and instant messenger as of 2003. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 64(12), 1173-1183. Kilbourne, W., & Weeks, S. (1997). A socio-economic perspective on gender bias in technology. Journal of Socio-Economics, 26(1), 243-260. Kim, D. J., Steinfield, C., & Lai, Y. (2004). Revisiting the role of web assurance seals in consumer trust. In M. Janssen, H. G. Sol, & R. W. Wagenaar (Eds.), Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC ‘04, 60) (pp. 280-287). Delft, The Netherlands: ACM Press. King, J., Bond, T., & Blandford, S. (2002). An investigation of computer anxiety by gender and grade. Computers in Human Behavior, 18, 69-84. Krill, P. (2002). DoubleClick discontinues web tracking service. ComputerWorld. Retrieved February 24, 2002, from http://www.computerworld. com/storyba/0,4125,NAV47_STO67262,00.html Large, A., Beheshti, J., & Rahman, T. (2002). Gender differences in collaborative web searching behavior: An elementary school study. Information Processing & Management, 38, 427-443. Lauer, T., & Deng, X. (2007). Building online trust through privacy practices. International Journal of Information Security, 6(5), 323-331. Leitzsey, M. (2006). Facebook can cause problems for students. Online PacerTimes. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from http://media.www.pacertimes. com/media/storage/paper795/news/2006/01/31/ News/Facebook.Can.Cause.Problems.For.Students-1545539.shtml Levy, S., & Gutwin, C. (2005). Security through the eyes of users. In Proceedings of the 14th In-

Privacy Control and Assurance

ternational Conference on the World Wide Web (pp. 480-488). Chiba, Japan. McElhearn, K. (2006). iSpy: More on the iTunes MiniStore and privacy. Kirkville. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.mcelhearn.com/article. php?story=20060112175208864

Nachimias, R., Mioduser, D., & Shelma, A. (2001). Information and communication technologies usage by students in an Israeli high school: Equity, gender, and inside/outside school learning issues. Education and Information Technologies, 6(1), 43-53.

McKnight, D. H., Choudhury, V., & Kacmar, C. (2000). Trust in e-commerce vendors: A two-stage model. In Proceedings of the Association for Information Systems (pp. 532-536). Atlanta, GA.

Nam, C., Song, C., Lee, E., & Park, C. (2005). Consumers’ privacy concerns and willingness to provide marketing-related personal information online. Advances in Consumer Research, 33, 212-217.

Metzger, M. (2006). Effects of site, vendor, and consumer characteristics on web site trust and disclosure. Communication Research, 33(3), 155-179.

Noteberg, A., Christiaanse, E., & Wallage, P. (2003). Consumer trust in electronic channels. E-Service Journal, 2(2), 46-67.

Meyers-Levy, J. & Maheswaran, D. (1991). Exploring differences in males’ and females’ processing strategies. Journal of Consumer Research, 18(June), 63-70. Microsoft. (2003). Windows media player 9 series privacy settings. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/player/9series/privacy.aspx Miyazaki, A. D., & Fernandez, A. (2000). Internet privacy and security: An examination of online retailer disclosures. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(Spring), 54-61.

Nowak, G. J., & Phelps, J. (1992). Understanding privacy concerns: An assessment of consumers’ information related knowledge and beliefs. Journal of Direct Marketing, 6(Autumn), 28-39. O’Brien, K., & Crampton, T. (2007). EU asks Google to explain data retention policies. International HeraldTribune. Retrieved July 10, 2007, from http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/25/ business/google.php Oakes, C. (1999). Mouse pointer records clicks. Wired News. Retrieved June 28, 2006, from http:// www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,32788,00. html

Miyazaki, A. D., & Fernandez, A. (2001). Consumer perceptions of privacy and security risks for online shopping. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 35(1), 27-44.

Ono, H., & Zavodny, M. (2003). Gender and the internet. Social Science Quarterly, 84(1), 111-121.

Moores, T. (2005). Do consumers understand the role of privacy seals in e-commerce? Communications of the ACM, 48(3), 86-91.

Ono, H., & Zavodny, M. (2005). Gender differences in information technology usage: A U.S.Japan comparison. Sociological Perspectives, 48(1), 105-133.

Mukherjee, A., & Nath, P. (2007). Role of electronic trust in online retailing: A re-examination of the commitment-trust theory. European Journal of Marketing, 41(9/10), 1173-1202.

Pan, Y., & Zinkhan, G. (2006). Exploring the impact of online privacy disclosures on consumer trust. Journal of Retailing, 82(4), 331-338.

MySpace. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.myspace.com/

Papazafeiropoulou, A., & Pouloudi, A. (2001). Social issues in electronic commerce: Implica-

8

Privacy Control and Assurance

tions for policy makers. Information Resources Management Journal, 14(4), 24-32. Parameswaran, M., & Whinston, A. (2007). Research issues in social computing. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 8(6), 336-350. Patton, M., & Josang, A. (2004). Technologies for trust in electronic commerce. Electronic Commerce Research, 4(1-2), 9-21. Phelps, J., Nowak, G., & Ferrell, E. (2000). Privacy concerns and consumer willingness to provide personal information. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 27-41. Policy Aware Web. (2006). Retrieved July 10, 2007, from http://www.policyawareweb.org/ Privacy and Identity Management for Europe. (Prime). (2007). Retrieved July 10, 2007, from https://www.prime-project.eu/

In A. Andreasen, A. Simonson, & N. C. Smith (Eds.), Proceedings of Marketing and Public Policy (Vol. 8, pp. 73-79).Chicago: American Marketing Association. Roman, S. (2007). The ethics of online retailing: A scale development and validation from the consumers’ perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 72(2), 131-148. Roussous, G., & Moussouri, T. (2004). Consumer perceptions of privacy, security and trust in ubiquitous commerce. Pers Ubiquit Comput, 8, 416-429. Royal, C. (2005). A meta-analysis of journal articles intersecting issues of internet and gender. Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, 35(4), 403-429. Savicki, V., Kelley, M., & Lingenfelter, D. (1996). Gender and small task group activity using computer-mediated communication. Computers in Human Behavior, 12, 209-224.

Qutami, Y., & Abu-Jaber, M. (1997). Students’ self-efficacy in computer skills as a function of gender and cognitive learning style at Sultan Qaboos University. International Journal of Instructional Media, 24(1), 63-74.

Schoder, D., & Yin, P. (2000). Building firm trust online. Communications of the ACM, 43(12), 73-79.

Radcliff, D. (2001). Giving users back their privacy. ComputerWorld. Retrieved February 28, 2002, from http://www.computerworld.com/ storyba/0,4125,NAV47_STO61981,00.html

Schuman, E. (2006). Gartner: $2 billion in ecommerce sales lost because of security fears. eWeek.com, November 27. Retrieved October 15, 2007, from http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2063979,00.asp

Riegelsberger, J., Sasse, M., & McCarthy, J. (2003). Shiny happy people building trust?: Photos on e-commerce websites and consumer trust. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 121-128). Ft. Lauderdale, FL. Roach, R. (2001). Internet usage reflects gender breakdown. Black Issues in Higher Education, 18(11), 119. Rohm, A. J., & Milne, G. R. (1998). Emerging marketing and policy issues in electronic commerce: Attitudes and beliefs of internet users.

8

Sexton, R., Johnson, R., & Hignite, M. (2002). Predicting internet/e-commerce use. Internet Research, 12(5), 402-410. Shalhoub, Z. (2006). Trust, privacy, and security in electronic business: The case of the GCC countries. Information Management & Computer Security, 14(3), 270-283. Smith, H. J., Milberg, S. J., & Burke, S. J. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, June, 167-196.

Privacy Control and Assurance

Smith, R. (2002a). Serious privacy problems in windows media player for Windows XP. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.computerbytesman. com/privacy/wmp8dvd.htm Smith, R. (2002b). Microsoft response to the windows media player 8 privacy advisory. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.computerbytesman. com/privacy/wmp8response.htm So, M., & Sculli, D. (2002). The role of trust, quality, value and risk in conducting e-business. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 102(8/9), 503-512. Stapleton-Paff, K. (2007). Facebook poses privacy issues for students. The Daily of the University of Washington. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from http://www.thedaily.washington. edu/article/2007/4/25/facebookPosesPrivacyIssuesForStudents Stokes, M. (2007). Police charge three female students for sign stealing. Western Herald. Retrieved October 22, 2007 from http://media.www. westernherald.com/media/storage/paper881/ news/2007/10/22/News/Police.Charge.Three.Female.Students.For.Sign.Stealing-3046592.shtml Tavani, H. (1999). Privacy online. Computers and Society, 29(4), 11-19. Tavani, H., & Moor, J. (2001). Privacy protection, control of information, and privacy-enhancing technologies. Computers and Society, 31(1), 611.

TRUSTe. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.truste.org/ Van Dyke, T., Midha, V., & Nemati, H. (2007). The effect of consumer privacy empowerment on trust and privacy concerns in e-commerce. Electronic Markets, 17(1), 68-81. Wang, H., Lee, M., & Wang, C. (1998). Consumer privacy concerns about internet marketing. Communications of the ACM, 41(3), 63-70. Wang, P., & Petrison, L. A. (1993). Direct marketing activities and personal privacy. Journal of Direct Marketing, 7(Winter), 7-19. WebTrends. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.webtrends.com/ Weible, R. J. (1993). Privacy and data: An empirical study of the influence and types and data and situational context upon privacy perceptions. (Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Business Administration, Mississippi State University). Dissertation Abstracts International, 54(06). World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). (2006). The platform for privacy preferences 1.1 (P3P1.1) specification. World Wide Web Consortium. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/ TR/P3P11/ World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). (2007). The platform for privacy preferences (P3P) project. World Wide Web Consortium. Retrieved July 5, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/P3P/

Teo, T., & Lim, V. (1997). Usage patterns and perceptions of the internet: The gender gap. Equal Opportunities International, 16(6/7), 1-8.

Yao, M., Rice, R., & Wallis, K. (2007). Predicting user concerns about online privacy. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 58(5), 710-722.

Teo, T. S. H., Lim, V. K. G., & Lai, R. Y. C. (1999). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in internet usage. OMEGA: International Journal of Management Science, 27, 25-37.

Yousafzai, S., Pallister, J., & Foxall, G. (2003). A proposed model of e-trust for electronic banking. Technovation, 23(11), 847-860.

8

Privacy Control and Assurance

AddItIonAl reAdIng Antón, A., Bertino, E., Li, N., & Yu, T. (2007). A roadmap for online privacy policy management. Communications of the ACM, 50(7), 109-116. Bonini, S., McKillop, K., & Mendonca, L. (2007). The trust gap between consumers and corporations. The McKinsey Quarterly, 2, 7-10. Boyens, C., Günther, O., & Teltzrow, M. (2002). Privacy conflicts in CRM services for online shops: A case study. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Privacy, Security, and Data Mining Maebashi City, Japan, (Vol. 14, pp. 27-35). Curtin, M. (2002). Developing trust: Online privacy and security. New York: Springer-Verlag. Cvrcek, D., Kumpost, M., Matyas, V., & Danezis, G. (2006). A study on the value of location privacy. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Privacy in Electronic Society (pp. 109-118). Alexandria, VA. Drennan, J., Sullivan, G., & Previte, J. (2006). Privacy, risk perception, and expert online behavior: An exploratory study of household end users. Journal of Organizational and End User Computing, 18(1), 1-22. Earp, J., & Baumer, D. (2003). Innovative web use to learn about consumer behavior and online privacy. Communications of the ACM, 46(4), 81-83. Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). (2007). Privacy issues. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.eff.org/Privacy/ Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (2007). EPIC online guide to practical privacy tools. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www. epic.org/privacy/tools.html Frackman, A., Ray, C, & Martin, R. (2002). Internet and online privacy: A legal and business guide. New York: ALM Publishing. 88

Freeman, L., & Peace, A. (Eds.). (2005). Information ethics: Privacy and intellectual property. Hershey, PA: Information Science Publishing. Golle, P. (2006). Revisiting the uniqueness of simple demographics in the U.S. population. In Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society: Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (pp. 77-80). Alexandria, VA. Gross, R., Acquisti, A., & Heinz, H. (2005). Information revelation and privacy in online social networks. In Workshop on Privacy in The Electronic Society: Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (pp. 71-80). Alexandria, VA. Kauppinen, K., Kivimäki, A., Era, T., & Robinson, M. (1998). Producing identity in collaborative virtual environments. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Virtual Reality Software and Technology (pp. 35-42). Taipei, Taiwan. Khalil, A., & Connelly, K. (2006). Context-aware telephony: Privacy preferences and sharing patterns. In Proceedings of the 2006 20th Anniversary Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (pp. 469-478). Banff, Alberta, Canada. Landesberg, M., Levin, T., Curtain G, & Lev, O. (1998). Privacy online: A report to congress. Federal Trade Commission. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/ toc.shtm Lumsden, J., & MacKay, L. (2006). How does personality affect trust in B2C e-commerce? In ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, Vol. 156: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Electronic Commerce: The New E-Commerce: Innovations for Conquering Current Barriers, Obstacles and Limitations to Conducting Successful Business on the Internet. (pp. 471-481). Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada.

Privacy Control and Assurance

McCloskey, D. W. (2006). The importance of ease of use, usefulness, and trust to online consumers: An examination of the technology acceptance model with older customers. Journal of Organizational and End User Computing, 18(3), 47-65. Novak, J., Raghavan, P., & Tomkins, A. (2004). Anti-aliasing on the web. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on World Wide Web (pp. 30-39). New York. Peters, T. (1999). Computerized monitoring and online privacy. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.

Reagle, J., & Cranor, L. F. (1999). The platform for privacy preferences. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 48-55 Tan, F. B., & Sutherland, P. (2004). Online consumer trust: A multi-dimensional model. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 2(3), 40-58. Walters, G. J. (2001). Privacy and security: An ethical analysis. SIGCAS Computer Soc., 31(2), 8-23. Yee, G. (2006). Privacy protection for e-services. Hershey, PA: IGI Publishing.

Ratnasingam, P. (2003). Inter-organizational trust for business to business e-commerce. Hershey, PA: IRM Press.

89

90

Chapter IX

A Profile of the Demographics, Psychological Predispositions, and Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders Bernadette H. Schell University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Canada Thomas J. Holt The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA

AbstrAct This chapter looks at the literature—myths and realities—surrounding the demographics, psychological predispositions, and social/behavioral patterns of computer hackers, to better understand the harms that can be caused to targeted persons and property by online breaches. The authors suggest that a number of prevailing theories regarding those in the computer underground (CU)—such as those espoused by the psychosexual theorists—may be less accurate than theories based on gender role socialization, given recent empirical studies designed to better understand those in the CU and why they engage in hacking and cracking activities. The authors conclude the chapter by maintaining that online breaches and online concerns regarding privacy, security, and trust will require much more complex solutions than currently exist, and that teams of experts in psychology, criminology, law, and information technology security need to collaborate to bring about more effective real-world solutions for the virtual world.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

IntroductIon Hackers are the elite corps of computer designers and programmers. They like to see themselves as the wizards and warriors of tech. Designing software and inventing algorithms can involve bravura intellection, and tinkering with them is as much fun as fiddling with engines. Hackers have their own culture, their own language. And in the off-hours, they can turn their ingenuity to sparring with enemies on the Net, or to the midnight stroll through systems you should not be able to enter, were you not so very clever. Dark-side hackers, or crackers, slip into systems for the smash-and-grab, but most hackers are in it for the virtuoso ingress. It is a high-stress life, but it can be amazing fun. Imagine being paid—well paid—to play forever with the toys you love. Imagine. –St. Jude, Mondo 2000: User’s Guide to the New Edge Since its appearance in the United States in the second part of the twentieth century, the Internet has been the topic of arduous study from a number of academic disciplines, including the social sciences and criminology, business, law, computer science, and political science. In recent decades, as the Internet has expanded at unprecedented rates, and with different socio-economic interests becoming increasingly involved, the Internet’s impact on global citizens’ daily lives has been profound. The Internet has become one of the most important ways of communicating internationally in real time (such as is the case with online activism—known in the information technology field as hacktivism). Also, the complex infrastructure of the Internet has on the positive side facilitated a number of common activities—such as e-commerce, Internet banking, online gaming, and online voting—and has provided a more level political and economic “playing field” for citizens residing in both developed and developing nations, particularly in China, India, Russia, and Pakistan.

Moreover, in recent years in developed nations, professionals have been able to broaden their returns to society by adopting Internet-related technologies. For example, using hand-held devices, doctors have been able to access patients’ health histories and diagnostic records over the Internet without having to rely on “snail mail” courier services, and high-tech billionaires such as those who started the Google search engine (with a November, 2005, market cap of US$120 billion) have pushed the online entrepreneurial envelope to a whole new higher and societalbeneficial plane (Schell, 2007). However, with the growth of and diversity in Internet traffic, a dark side has surfaced, particularly since the late 1980s as more and more citizens have become able to afford personal computers (PCs) and online accounts. Thus, techsavvy criminals have increasingly made use of the Internet to perpetrate online crimes—causing an increase in incidences of online child exploitation, identity theft, intellectual property theft, worm and virus infestations of business and home computers, and online fraud involving its many presentations—e-commerce, voting, and gaming. Consequently, Internet-connected citizens worldwide have become increasingly fearful that their privacy—including personal health histories, banking transactions, social security numbers, and online voting preferences—would be vulnerable to destruction or alteration by mal-inclined computer hackers (known as “crackers”). Too, business leaders have become concerned that not only will their computer networks be tampered by tech-savvy outsiders but also by insider employees determined to destroy critical business data when, say, they leave the firm under less than happy circumstances (Schell, 2007). In the last decade, in particular, with the growth of the Internet and electronic or e-commerce, the amount of personal information that can potentially be collected about individuals by corporations, financial and medical institutions, and governments has also increased. Such data

9

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

collection, along with usage tracking and the sharing of data with third parties—especially in light of the reality that such actions can easily be accomplished through high-speed links and highcapacity storage devices without the consumers’ expressed knowledge or consent—has raised a multitude of issues among Internet users about privacy (by definition, the state of being free from unauthorized access), security (by definition, being protected from adversaries, particularly from those who would do harm, even unintentionally, to property or to a person or persons), and trust (by definition, the element present in business relationships when one partner willingly depends on an exchanging partner in whom one has confidence—including online business exchanges) (Grami & Schell, 2004). Computer systems are regularly attacked to do harm or for personal gain in today’s wired and wireless world (see Taylor, Caeti, Loper, Fritsch, & Liederback, 2006). Such mal-inclined attacks are often referred to as “hacks” but in the computer underground (CU), they are known as “cracks.” Both the positively-motivated, authorized “hackers” and the negatively-motivated, non-authorized “crackers” have a profound interest in computers and technology, and they like to use their knowledge to access computer systems (Schell, Dodge, & Moutsatsos, 2002). Many in the general public identify hackers as a primary threat to computer security, and there is significant media attention given to dramatic computer crimes attributed to them (Furnell, 2002). From a technical perspective, privacy issues in the security sense regarding cracks of computer systems include digital rights management, spam deterrence, anonymity maintenance, and disclosure rule adequacy. Over the past few years, a number of recorded cyber intruders into companies’ and institutions’ computer networks have violated the privacy rights of employees and online registrants. In 2005, for example, the media publicized evidence suggesting that the Internet information brokerage industry

9

is poorly regulated, for on or about March 10, cyber criminals stole passwords from legitimate online users of as many 32,000 Americans in a data-base owned by the renowned LexisNexis Group. Similar computer network breaches occurred at about that time at ChoicePoint, Inc., and at the Bank of America, prompting calls for the U.S. federal government oversight through the General Services Administration to investigate the matter. Recommendations were to follow about providing adequate protection for the safety of federal employees’ information, and fears of identity theft surfaced on a broad scale. In short, the present-day reality is that regardless of how well intentioned management is about protecting employee’s privacy rights as they navigate online, valuable personal information can be collected by hidden online tools such as cookies (small bits of data transmitted from a Web server to a Web browser that personalize a Web site for users) and Web bugs—and then that information can be shared with third parties for marketing purposes or surveillance. Moreover, with the increased usage in recent years of cellular phones and hand-held computers, users have become vulnerable to security breaches, for wireless communications rely on open and public transmission media (over the air). Thus, the mobile security challenges relate to the user’s mobile device, the wireless access network, the wired-line backbone network, and mobile commerce software applications. All of these challenges must be addressed by the companies releasing such products into the marketplace, including providing fixes for software vulnerabilities. Moreover, unlike wire-line networks, the uniqueness of wireless networks poses a number of complex challenges for security experts, such as vulnerability of the air interface, an open peerto-peer (P2P) network architecture (in mobile and ad hoc networks), a shared wireless medium, the limited computing power of mobile devices, a highly dynamic network topology, and the low data rates and frequent “disconnects” of wireless

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

communications. The media have often reported that coping with these wireless devices vulnerabilities costs companies considerable money; for example, the chargeback rate for credit card transactions using wireless devices is about 15 times higher than that for in-store point-of-sale credit card transactions (Grami & Schell, 2004). Mobile services, in general, are prone to two types of risks as a result of security vulnerabilities: subscription fraud (more commonly known as “identity theft”) and device theft (i.e., stolen devices). In 2003, the notion of the vulnerability of wireless computer systems came to the forefront in an interesting case involving a U.S. computer security analyst named Stefan Puffer. After he determined that the Harris County district clerk’s wireless computer network was vulnerable to crack attacks, he warned the clerk’s office that anyone with a wireless network card could gain access to their sensitive data. Though Puffer was charged by police for cracking the network, he was later acquitted by a Texas jury. Moreover, on September 8, 2003, while many students were returning to school, the media reported that a young hacker from Massachusetts pleaded guilty to cracking Paris Hilton’s T-Mobile cellular phone and dumped personal information of hers on the Internet for millions around the world to see. He also admitted to cracking other computer systems a year earlier and to stealing personal information without authorization. But his exploits did not stop there; the youth said he also sent bomb threats through the Internet to high schools in Florida and Massachusetts. The authorities estimated that the harm created to persons and to property for these exploits cost an estimated US$1 million, and like other juveniles who have cracked systems, he was sentenced to eleven months in a detention center (Schell, 2007). Finally, the essence of any business transaction—online, in industry, or in retail outlets—depends on trust, commonly expressed in laws, contracts, regulations, policies, and personal

reputations. Recent evidence has indicated that though consumers would tend not to initially trust someone knocking on a house door trying to sell expensive goods, many consumers using the Internet to purchase goods or to communicate with others seem to be overly trusting. Numerous consumers fall victim to spammers (those taking advantage of users’ e-mail accounts by swamping them with unwanted advertising using false but legitimate-looking headers), download virus-infected software, or engage in online chat rooms with strangers—sometimes sharing personal information which can later cause them or their loved ones harm. Though many efforts in the United States have been made to eradicate spam, including the creation of filters to stop it from getting through the network and the passage of laws like the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, to date, these remedies have proven not to be fully effective. For example, on April 8, 2005, a landmark legal case concluded that spammer Jeremy Jaynes of Raleigh, North Carolina, who went by the name “Gaven Stubberfield,” was guilty of massive spamming and was sentenced to nine years in U.S. prison in violation of the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act. Described by prosecutors as being among the top 10 spammers in the world, this case is considered to be important because it was the United States’ first successful felony prosecution for transmitting spam over the Internet. Jaynes apparently transmitted 10 million e-mails a day using 16 high-speed lines. For these mal-inclined exploits and breaches of trust, he allegedly earned as much as $750,000 a month on his spamming operation (Schell & Martin, 2006). Another interesting cyber case of breach of online trust occurred in March, 2005, when the Harvard Business School administration said that because of unauthorized intrusions, they decided to reject almost 120 applicants who had followed a hacker’s instructions on how to break into the university’s admission Internet Web site to learn if they had been admitted to this prestigious

9

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

university. The administrators argued that these intrusions were unethical and that the actions of the potential students breached trust. Other universities took similar punitive approaches to similar cracking incidents, including Carnegie Mellon University’s School of Business. The common thread involved in these breaches was the use of the Apply Yourself online application and notification software (Associated Press, 2005). Breaking into a computer typically involves discovering vulnerabilities and then creating an exploit (a program or set of instructions to be followed) to take advantage of the vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, as well as their related exploit programs, if released into the public domain, can be used by many other individuals, regardless of their inclinations (Rescorla, 2005). For example, system administrators tend to use them to test their systems, and good-natured computer hackers maintain that they capitalize on the vulnerabilities “just to have a good time.” There are also the malicious crackers who scan systems to determine which have vulnerabilities and then plan an attack. Crackers typically aim to get revenge on some perceived enemy or to make a profit from the cyber attack. It is not uncommon, in fact, for crackers to verify the success of their attacks, for it brings them considerable pleasure (Meinel, 2006). While detailing how hackers break into computers is out of the scope of this chapter, readers can refer to “Appendix A: How Do Hackers Break into Computers?” by Carolyn Meinel to get a better idea of how exploits are completed, as cited in this work (Schell & Martin, 2006). Considering the significant amount of valuable information contained in business, government, and personal computers worldwide, it is necessary to consider the risks and prevalence of attacks against computer networks. According to recent estimates, the costs to victims of malicious computer attacks have totaled more than $10 billion since 2000, including recent cellular phone exploits (IBM Research, 2006).

9

The CSI/FBI (Computer Security Institute/ Federal Bureau of Investigation) Computer Crime and Security Survey has annually attempted to assess the costs of computer attacks to industry, medical and educational institutions, and government agencies for the past 12 years by asking those involved in the IT security role to respond to the questions posed. The most recent 2007 version is simply known as the CSI, designed solely by the Computer Security Institute. The 2007 survey findings revealed that the average annual loss reported in this past year rose to $350,424 from $168,000 the previous year. Not since the 2004 report have the average losses been this high. Moreover, about one-fifth of the IT security respondents said that their firms tended to suffer a “targeted attack,” meaning that the mal-ware attack was aimed exclusively at their organization or those within a given subset. Also, financial fraud in 2007 overtook virus attacks as the major source of financial loss in 2006. Another significant cause of loss was system intrusion by outsiders. Insider abuse of network access or e-mail (including trafficking in child exploitation pornography or software pirating) also edged-out virus incidents as the most prevalent form of security problem—with 59% and 52% of the respondents, respectively, reporting these (Richardson, 2007). The 2006 CSI/FBI survey findings further revealed that most IT respondents perceived that their organization’s major cyber losses resulted from system breaches by outsiders (i.e., those not employed by the company). However, about 33% of the respondents believed that insider threats accounted for at least one-third of their sizable network abuse problems (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Richardson, 2006). The 2006 survey results suggested that within the enterprise security perimeter, the news is good, for the survey respondents maintained that they are keeping their cyber crime losses lower. At the same time, in the developed and developing world, our economic reliance on computers

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

and technology is growing, and so are criminal threats. Because criminal threats are becoming more sophisticated, IT security experts around the globe should not overestimate these recent gains (Cincu & Richardson, 2006). It is vital that researchers in a number of fields better understand the psychological and behavioral composition of network attackers and the social dynamics that they operate within. Knowledge of the personalities, behaviors, and communication patterns of computer attackers can help security researchers and practitioners to prepare for future exploits and to reduce costs due to electronic intrusion, alteration, and theft. Better preparation can also minimize damage to consumer confidence, privacy, and security in e-commerce Web sites and general information-sharing within and across companies (Cincu & Richardson, 2006).

•

•

•

•

Background: A briefing on basic hacking/cracking vocabulary, the coincidence of the four critical elements constituting a cyber crime, and the common types of “unauthorized use” Issue and controversy #1: Known demographic and behavioral profiles of hackers and crackers—behavioral misfits or seemingly normals? Issue and controversy #2: Psychological myths and truths about those in the computer underground (CU)—do they tend to be disease-prone or self-healer types? Future trends: How present strategies for dealing with online privacy, security, and trust issues need to be improved

bAckground purpose of thIs chApter The purpose of this chapter is to summarize what is known in the literature about the demographic, psychological, and social/behavioral patterns of computer hackers and crackers. This information can improve our knowledge of cyber intruders and aid in the development of effective techniques and “best practices” to stop them in their tracks. There is little question among IT security experts that when it comes to privacy issues, hackers and crackers are often ignored. As a matter of fact, if crackers do attack an international database containing high degrees of personal and/or homeland security information (with the 2005 LexisNexis database exploit serving as a smaller-scale case in point), this large-scale exploit could cause massive disasters affecting citizens across multitudes of jurisdictions, including a critical infrastructure failure. This chapter intends to assist in shedding light on what is known about how hackers and crackers generally tend to think and behave. Specific topics covered in this chapter include:

As noted, though the words hacker and cracker are regularly used interchangeably by the media and the public, these two terms have distinct meanings within the CU (Furnell, 2002; Holt, 2007). The word hacker typically refers to a person who enjoys learning the details of computer systems and how to stretch their capabilities (Furnell, 2002). Crackers tend to be malicious meddlers trying to discover information by deception or illegal means, often with the intent to do harm to another person or to another’s property for revenge or personal gain (Furnell, 2002). There are also variations of hackers within the CU, based on their motives and actions while hacking (Holt, 2007). For example, “White Hat hackers” are individuals who use their skills to benefit or protect computer systems. The term “Black Hat hacker” often refers to those hackers who maliciously damage or harm networks. In this context, a hack to gain knowledge or serve as a warning to security personnel in a company that a computer system is not properly protected may be defined by members of the CU as “good” and positively motivated. However, if the hacking

9

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

event occurs because of a perpetrator’s need for revenge, sabotage, blackmail, or greed, this action may be labeled as wrong, and possibly criminal in nature (Schell et al., 2002). While the public and the media suggest that the bulk of computer “crack attacks,” or “exploits,” are completed by sophisticated hackers with a detailed knowledge of computer systems and how they work, the reality is somewhat different. Evidence suggests that most perpetrators who attack networks are younger than age 30, are bored, and, often, are in need of peer recognition and acceptance (Schell et al., 2002). In fact, most industrial and government computer system invaders are not sophisticated hackers; they are often teenagers out to be challenged and to be recognized for their exploits by their peers. The less skilled individuals who engage in these sorts of attacks are typically referred to as “script kiddies” (Furnell, 2002; Schell et al., 2002; Holt, 2007). This term is often used derisively within the CU, as it recognizes a person’s dependence on pre-made scripts that facilitate hacks. Using a program to hack suggests that the individual does not have significant computer knowledge and is not truly a hacker (Furnell, 2002; Schell et al., 2002; Holt, 2007). There are several other terms used to describe hackers and computer attackers, particularly those interested in politically-motivated cyber attacks. For example, the term “cyber terrorist” refers to individuals who use hacking techniques to attack networks, systems, or data under the motivation of a particular social or political agenda (Furnell, 2002), and “hacktivists” are those who break into computer systems to promote an activist agenda, often defacing Web sites to express an opinion (Furnell, 2002). While this list is by no means an exhaustive one of the different labels applied to those in the CU or their activities, it, nonetheless, demonstrates the remarkable variation present in motives, thinking, and behavior within the CU.

9

Cyber Crime Defined The growth and spread of the Internet across the world over the last two decades has fostered the growth of a variety of online crimes as well as laws aimed at curbing these behaviors. In fact, a unique debate has developed concerning the definition of online crimes, using both cyber crime and computer crime. Cyber crimes typically occur because the individual uses special knowledge of cyberspace, while computer crimes involve special knowledge of computer technology. The interrelated nature of these behaviors complicates this definition process, and many individuals use the terms interchangeably. As a consequence, the term “cyber crime” will be used in this chapter to refer to any crime completed either on or with a computer (Furnell, 2002). Cyber crime generally includes electronic commerce (e-commerce) theft, intellectual property rights (IPR) or copyright infringement, privacy rights infringement, and identity theft. Also, cyber crime involves such activities as child exploitation and pornography; credit card fraud; cyberstalking; defaming or threatening another user online; gaining unauthorized access to computer networks; ignoring or abusing copyright, software licensing, and trademark protection; overriding encryption to make illegal copies of software; software piracy; and stealing another’s identity to conduct criminal acts. Although variations on the parameters constituting these unlawful acts, as well as the penalties corresponding to the infringements, may vary from one jurisdiction to another worldwide, this list is relevant and pertinent (Schell & Martin, 2006). Taken from a broad perspective, cyber crime is not all that different from the more conventional real-world crime. In fact, one of the most well known cyber crime typology classifies behavior along similar lines of traditional crime, including trespass, theft, obscenity, and violence (Wall, 2001). While this framework identifies multiple forms of potentially criminal cyber behaviors,

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

the criminal acts of trespass (defined as entering unlawfully into an area to commit an offense) and theft (an act occurring when someone takes, or exercises illegal control over, the property of another to deprive that owner of the asset) tend to garner the lion’s share of attention from the media (Furnell, 2002). Types of cyber trespass and theft commonly include but are not limited to (Schell & Martin, 2004): •

•

•

•

•

Flooding—a form of cyberspace vandalism resulting in denial of service (DoS) to authorized users of a Web site or computer system; Virus and worm production and release—a form of cyberspace vandalism causing corruption and, possibly, the erasing of data; Spoofing—the cyberspace appropriation of an authentic user’s identity by non-authentic users, causing fraud or attempted fraud and commonly known as identity theft; Phreaking—a form of cyberspace theft and/ or fraud consisting of the use of technology to make free telephone calls; and Infringing intellectual property rights (IPR) and copyright—a form of cyberspace theft involving the copying of a target’s information or software without getting their consent.

the four critical elements of cyber crimes Harm resulting from cyber crimes, as in conventional crimes, can be to property, to persons, or to both. As in the conventional world, in the cyber world, there are politically-motivated cyber crimes, controversial crimes, and technical nonoffenses. For a cyber crime and a conventional crime to exist in U.S. jurisdictions, four elements must be present (Brenner, 2001):

•

• • •

Actus reus (the prohibited act or failing to act when one is supposed to be under duty to do so) Mens rea (a culpable mental state) Attendant circumstances (the presence of certain necessary conditions) Harm (to either persons or property, or both)

Here is an example illustrating the four elements for a property cyber crime involving criminal trespass, whereby the perpetrator intends to steal information from another. A cyber perpetrator gains entry into a computer and unlawfully takes control of the property, the information of another user (actus reus). He or she enters with the intent to commit an offense by law and acts with the intent of depriving the lawful owner of data (mens rea). By society’s norms, the perpetrator has no legal right to enter the computer network (i.e., is not authorized to do so) or to gain control of the targeted software (attendant circumstances). Consequently, the cyber perpetrator is liable for his or her unlawful acts, for he or she unlawfully entered the computer (that is, criminal trespass) to commit an offense once access was gained (i.e., theft). In the end, the targeted user was not able to access data, resulting in harm to the target (Schell & Martin, 2004).

the changing nature of cyber crime and the need for emerging legislation As the nature of cyber crime has evolved, so have the legal structures to prosecute and punish these behaviors. Most newsworthy cyber crime cases have been prosecuted in the United States under the computer crime statute 18 U.S.C. subsection 1030. The primary federal statute criminalizing cracking was originally the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which was modified in 1996 by the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act and codified at 18 U.S.C. subsection

9

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

1030, Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers. If caught in the United States, crackers are often charged with intentionally causing damage without authorization to a protected computer. A first offender typically faces up to 5 years in prison and fines up to $250,000 per count, or twice the loss suffered by the targets. The U.S. federal sentencing guidelines for cracking have been expanded in recent years to provide longer sentences from 20 years behind bars to life sentences if exploits lead to injury or death of online citizens (Krebs, 2003). The targets of cyber crimes can also seek civil penalties (Evans & McKenna, 2000). It should be noted that while finding a cracker may not be an easy task for law enforcement because of the rather anonymous nature of the cyber environment, successfully prosecuting a cracker can be even tougher, for enforcement ability falls to any jurisdiction that has suffered the effects of the crack. If, for example, the corporate targets of the attack are in the United States, then U.S. laws would apply. Practically speaking, only those jurisdictions with the cracker physically in their locale will be able to enforce their laws. Therefore, though the United States or Canada may attempt to apply their country’s laws to any given cracking incident, the perpetrator needs to be physically in their jurisdiction to enforce the law (Walton, 2000). After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the U.S. government became increasingly concerned about terrorist attacks of various natures and homeland security protection. To this end, the U.S. passed a series of laws aimed at halting computer criminals, including the 2002 Homeland Security Act, with section 225 known as the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002. In 2003, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools against the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act) was passed to assist law enforcement agents in their efforts to track and identify pedophiles using the Internet for child exploitation purposes. Also in 2003, the Can Spam Act was passed by the United States 98

Senate, aimed at decreasing the issues raised by commercial e-mailers and spammers. Its longer title was the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, a title accurately reflecting its purpose. Other countries have enacted similar antiintrusion legislation. For example, section 342.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code is aimed at a number of potential harms, including theft of computer services, invasion of privacy, trading in computer passwords, or cracking encryption systems. Charges for violations are made according to the sections of the Criminal Code dealing with theft, fraud, computer abuse, data abuse, and the interception of communications (Schell & Martin, 2004). In fact, the Global Cyber Law Survey of 50 countries around the world found that 70 % of countries had legislation against unauthorized computer access, as well as data tampering, sabotage, mal-ware or malicious software usage, and fraud.

Issue And controversy #1: knoWn demogrAphIc And behAvIorAl profIles of hAckers And crAckers—behAvorIAl mIsfIts or seemIngly normAls? In light of the significant agreement on the potential harm caused by unauthorized computer intrusions and malicious cracks, it is necessary to consider the demographic, behavioral, and social composition of the CU. In short, who is likely to be responsible for these exploits, and are they really all that different from individuals in mainstream society? While the clothes that hackers wear seem to have shifted a bit from the 1960s (when long hair and sandals were the norm) through the present (where backpacks and black t-shirts are the norm), hackers and crackers in the experimental phase still seem to be predominately males under age 30 (Gilboa, 1996; Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Schell et al., 2002). But why is this?

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

theoretical framework From its very beginning as an all-male Tech Model Railroad Club in the 1960s at MIT, where the geeks had an insatiable curiosity about how things—and particularly how a slow-moving hunk of metal called the PDP-1 worked—the CU has attracted to this day predominantly men to its fold. Back then, because of the PDP-1’s turtle-like pace, the smarter computer programmers at MIT created what they called “hacks,” or programming shortcuts, to complete their computing tasks more efficiently. In fact, the club’s adoption of the term “hacker” to describe themselves as well as their acts indicated a creative individual who could “push the envelope” around what computers were designed to do. The club’s talented hackers became the seed of MIT’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) Lab, the world’s prime center of AI research. In 1969, the AI lab’s fame and influence spread fast, the year in which the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, or ARPANET, was formed, the first transcontinental, high-speed computer network created by the U.S. Defense Department as an experiment in digital communications (Schell et al., 2002) It is interesting to note that the positive, creative reputation associated with those in the CU has over the years taken on a negative connotation. Since the 1980s, the media seem to have focused on the darker side, frequently reporting the costs due to property and personal harm as a result of computer exploits by those in the CU. Moreover, this rather less than positive picture has also been painted by theorists trying to understand this rather unique population. One school of thought posited by psychosexual theorists argues that hacking can be viewed as a way for young men to fulfill their erotic desires through electronic means (Taylor, 2003). This notion is generated, in part, by stereotypical conceptions of hackers as introverted, socially inept, or awkward males who have difficulty relating to others (Furnell, 2002; Taylor et al., 2006). Certain

technologically-gifted young males’ inability to connect in meaningful ways with other people, especially women, these psychosexual theorists argue, drive them to spend more their time with computers and technology (Taylor, 2003). Through very focused and solitary involvement with their computers, young men in the CU become intimately connected with technology and with hacking. The shouting and swearing in arcades, the fixation on war and sports games, the focus on speed, and the presence of primarily men on software packages and computer games are all characteristics of this broader-based computer culture that is stereotypically male (Cohoon & Aspray, 2006). These psychosexual theorists further maintain that the knowledge base young hackers and crackers develop allows them to take out their sexual frustrations through their computer hardware and software. The effort taken to “bend” a computer system to an individual’s will can provide a sense of physical gratification that directly mirrors physical masturbation (Keller, 1988; Ullman, 1997). The destructive or vandalism-based hacks of young male script kiddies, in particular, are similar to masturbation in that they usually have no necessary objective or goal aside from the pleasure of the act itself (Taylor, 2003). These activities may, however, have little appeal for women, especially when coupled with their difficulty of communicating with self-focused male hackers (Jordan & Taylor, 2004). A second and more inclusive explanation of the male stereotype of those in the CU relates to gender role socialization on-line and off-line (Jordan & Taylor, 2004; Taylor, 2003). Wajcman (1991) suggests that gender and technology influence and shape one another, such that technology is a source of and consequence of gender relationships. For example, there are gender differences in the way that humans interact with and approach technology (Turkle, 1984). Males tend to use “hard mastery” techniques involving a distinct and decisive plan to impose their will

99

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

over the device, whereas women tend to practice “soft mastery” techniques based on interaction with the device and responding to its processes (Turkle, 1984). Moreover, these theorists argue, over recent decades, gender role socialization has resulted in an ongoing interest by males in technology—to the near exclusion of females. The creators of early computers, it is posited, were mostly men who used analytical and rational thinking to develop technology, especially the command-line interfaces of the early systems (Levy, 1984). These traits are in direct contrast to the prevalent role-specific traits purported to exist in females (nurturing, caring, and protecting). The gender role socialization theorists argue that given this societal bias, since the 1960s, young females have not been steered by male mentors to become enamored with technology, primarily because it runs counter to females’ supposed “natural” personality traits and softer approaches to technology.

present-day myths and reality If asked to describe the demographic, behavioral, and social composition of those in the CU, most people in mainstream society would probably suggest that hackers have a low tolerance for business suits and business attire—preferring to wear clothes optimizing comfort, function, and minimal maintenance. Onlookers would also likely add that hackers are obviously “connected” to their computers, perhaps even addicted to them. Also, mainstream citizens would likely suggest that besides their computers, hackers as a group would seem to like music, chess, war games, and intellectual games of all kinds. Moreover, assert onlookers in the mainstream, if hackers were to engage in sports, they would probably choose those that are self-competitive rather than team-oriented—as afforded by the martial arts, bicycling, auto racing, hiking, rock climbing, aviation, and juggling. In terms of religion and self-control, most mainstream onlookers might

00

suggest that hackers would probably describe themselves as agnostics, atheists, or followers of Zen Buddhim or Taoism, and they would probably tend to avoid substances that would make them become cognitively stupid (such as alcohol), but they would tend to ingest high-caffeine drinks as an aid to staying awake long hours so that they could hack. And when communicating with one another online, many mainstream onlookers would probably add that hackers would tend to use monikers (like Mafiaboy) rather than their own names. It is interesting to note that given these rather superficial attributes commonly assigned to hackers by mainstream citizens, many of the hackers, when asked, would tend to concur with these observations. As a matter of fact, this is a subset of descriptors for hackers appearing from 1996 through 2002 at the popular hacking Web site http://project.cyberpunk.ru/links.html. Aside from these appearance descriptors, little else but myths about those in the CU existed until just a few years ago. Contrary to some commonly-held beliefs among the public and the media that hackers are behavioral misfits with odd sexual relationships (whereby bi-sexual and trans-sexual relationships outnumber those in the adult population), are largely unemployed, and have strange sleeping patterns (with a propensity to hack through the night), a comprehensive behavioral and psychological assessment study by Schell et al. (2002) on 210 hacker attendees of the Hackers on Planet Earth (HOPE) 2000 gathering in New York City and of the DefCon gathering in Las Vegas in July, 2000, found that these three behavioral myths about those in the CU—and other myths—were generally unfounded. Of the respondents in this Schell et al. (2002) hacker study, 91% were males, 9% were females—representative, the authors argued, of the predominance of males in the CU population. The mean age of respondents was 25 years, with the youngest respondent being 14 years and with the eldest being 61 years.

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

Regarding sexual relationship propensity, a significant 79% of the hacker survey respondents (males and females) claimed to be monogamous heterosexual, and those approaching or exceeding age 30 were likely to be gainfully employed—with the mean salary for males placing at about $57,000 (n = 190) and with the mean salary for females placing at about $50,000 (n = 18). The largest reported income was $700,000. So from a sexual proclivity and employment standpoint, males and females in the CU seem to be quite similar to those in mainstream society and are generally sound contributors to the economic wealth of society. Moreover, from a financial angle, a t-test on the findings revealed that female hackers seem to be as financially rewarded as their male peers. The hacker study authors also affirmed that there were some statistically significant findings of demographic and behavioral mean score differences between the White Hats and the Black Hats in the study. The White Hats were designated as those who reported being motivated primarily by achievement or by societal/organizational gains (such as advancing networks or software and computer capabilities and hacking to expose weaknesses in organizations’ computer systems or in their products—but for the overall good of society), whereas the Black Hats were designated as those who reported being motivated by narcissistic needs such as hacking for personal financial gain without regard to the personal and property costs to others or for enhancing their reputation within the hacker community/world without regard to the costs to others. Using these definitions, Schell et al. (2002) classified 12 of the respondents as Black Hats. Demographically, these individuals were, on average, 27 years old (1 year younger, on average, than their White Hat counterparts), male (but not exclusively), and American. The Black Hats earned significantly more than their White Hat counterparts—almost double. In fact, the Black Hats (male and female) earned, on average, $98,000 annually, while the White Hats (male

and female) earned, on average, $54,000. Moreover, the Black Hat and White Hat males tended to work in large companies (with an average of 5,673 employees) and were generally not charged with hacking-related crimes (but not exclusively), whereas the females (White Hat and Black Hat) tended to prefer working in smaller companies with an average of about 1,400 employees. Interestingly and consistent with previous study findings and with the myth about hackers that they value information and activities that make them “smarter,” both the Black Hat and the White Hat hackers in the Schell et al. (2002) study tended to be self- and other-taught (like the founding hackers at MIT) and were quite well educated, with at least a community college education. The female White Hats and Black Hats, consistent with the gender role socialization theory, admitted to generally learning their computer skills later in life at college or university, largely because they were not steered in the technology direction by parents, teachers, or career counselors. Also, consistent with Meyer’s (1989) earlier study suggesting that neophyte hackers are drawn to computers from an early age and “tinker” with them on their own time, the most frequent response (39%, n = 83) to the item asking the hackers (male and female) how they learned their computer skills was that they were self-taught. The next largest pocket (7% of the respondents) said that they were self-taught, completed formal courses and courses on the job, and learned from friends and relatives. Regarding the myth in the public domain about odd sleeping patterns of hackers in the CU, a significant 79% of the hacker respondents (males and females) said that they sleep sometime during the night from 12 midnight through 8 A.M.—similar to individuals’ sleeping patterns in mainstream culture. Thus, Schell et al. (2002) noted that this myth about odd sleeping patterns was unfounded by their study findings. Regarding prevailing culture within the CU, Thomas (2002) has suggested, as earlier noted, that those in the CU operate within a predominately

0

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

competitive culture centered on demonstrations of mastery, wherein talented individuals show their ability to dominate their social and physical environment using their computers and their brains. Those in the CU taunt and challenge the ability of others while online, with the ultimate goal of gaining complete control of another individual’s computer system, often referred to as “taking root” or “0wning a box.” Sometimes this taunting can get out-of-hand, moving into the adverse impact areas of cyber harassment and cyber stalking. According to popular myth and consistent with the assertions of Thomas (2002), the Schell et al. (2002) study findings revealed that the male and female hackers adopt online monikers to protect their anonymity and privacy while online and to decrease the chances of being cyber harassed. The majority—63% of the respondents—said that they typically use a net handle or moniker to identify themselves online, with only 10% of the respondents admitting to use their birth name alone, and with 27% claiming that they use a combination of their birth names and net handles while online. Out in the real world, the hacker respondents affirmed that they tended to use their birth names only, indicating that when they are operating in mainstream society, they take on a rather mainstream persona. Again, a significant 56% of the respondents said that they used their net handles specifically for hacking activities. In this 2002 study, as suggested more recently by Holt (2007), the female hackers confirmed that they may adopt male monikers or handles to obfuscate their gender, to increase the likelihood that they are accepted by others in the CU, and to reduce the fear that they may be exposed to high levels of harassment via flaming (the situation where individuals direct online obscene or abusive messages to another online user to upset that individual and to provoke distress). Finally, contrary to the stereotypical communication patterns posited by the psychosexual theorists regarding the stereotypical conceptions of hackers as introverted, socially inept, or awk-

0

ward males who have difficulty relating to others (Furnell, 2002; Taylor et al., 2006), the Schell et al. (2002) study findings paint a somewhat different picture. While the psychosexual theorists tend to agree with the prevailing myth about hackers that they communicate only with their computers and not with other people and that they are loners, the just-cited 2002 study found that, as Meyer’s earlier 1989 study reported, hackers spend considerable time during the week communicating with their colleagues—about 25%. Moreover, while 57% of the respondents said they like to hack solo, the remaining 43% of the respondents (male and female) said that they prefer to collaborate with others when hacking. In summary, the literature seems to suggest that as more becomes known about those in the CU, the picture that emerges is quite different from the dark-side palette that prevails in the minds of the public, the media, and the psychosexual theorists. More support appears to be accumulating that paints a clearer picture of the positive sides of those in the hacker community, debunks a number of demographic and behavioral myths prevailing about individuals in the CU, and points to the accuracy of the gender role socialization theory. Considering the concern of industry and society about cyber crimes—and the huge costs to society regarding breaches of privacy, security, and trust—are there some psychological indicators that may point to a proclivity to cause harm to property and persons by those in the computer underground?

Issue And controversy #2: psychologIcAl myths And truths About those In the computer underground (cu)—do they tend to be dIseAse-prone or self-heAler types? In light of the significant agreement on the potential harm caused by unauthorized computer intru-

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

sions and malicious cracks by law enforcement agents, the public, industry, and those in the CU, it is necessary to consider the psychological makeup of those operating daily in the CU. In short, who is likely to be responsible for these exploits, and are these hackers really all that different from individuals in mainstream society?

theoretical framework At the start of this chapter, we addressed a number of concerns that industry and the general public have about privacy, security, and trust. However, in recent months, even those in the CU have expressed concerns about harmful episodes that have jeopardized their psychological safety and could interfere over the longer term with their personal safety. For example, in March, 2007, anonymous online death threats were levied against Kathy Sierra, a popular Web developer within the information technology community, author, and blogger who encourages companies to consider human behavior when designing their technological products. While many bloggers rallied to her support—online and off-line, a number of women and men got online to talk about their incidents of online bullying, harassment, and stalking (Fost, 2007). By definition, online bullying entails verbally abusing targets by threatening to cause harm to one’s reputation; cyber harassment uses cyber space to harass a targeted individual; and cyber stalking occurs when individuals repeatedly deliver online unwanted, threatening, and offensive e-mail or other personal communications to targeted individuals, including death threats (Schell & Martin, 2006). All of these threats are intended to cause psychological damage to others, and some of these exploits may actually result in death to the targets. One of the most well known cyber stalking cases reported in the popular media involved a young cracker named Eric Burns (a.k.a. Zyklon). Eric Burns’ claim to fame is that he attacked the

Web pages of about 80 businesses and government offices whose pages were hosted by Laser. Net in Fairfax, Virginia. Burns, a creative individual, designed a program called “Web bandit” to identify computers on the Internet that were vulnerable to attack. He then used the vulnerable systems to advertise his proclamations of love for a young classmate named Crystal. These computer exploits by Burns became his way of advertising worldwide his unrelenting “love” [or, more accurately, to get the attention of and then to take control of or to “take root” of] Crystal. He hoped that by proclaiming his love in the cyber world, he would, hopefully, get her attention, if not her long-term commitment. This real-world case ended with the 19-year-old male pleading guilty to attacking the Web pages for NATO and Vice President Al Gore. In November, 1999, the judge hearing the case ruled that Burns should serve 15 months in federal prison for his cracking exploits, pay $36,240 in restitution, and not be allowed to touch a computer for 3 years after his release. The irony in this case is that the young woman named Crystal attended the same high school as Eric but hardly knew him. In the end, she assisted the authorities in his capture, but Eric Burns, in his role as cyber stalker, did not make the media headlines, just the fact that he cracked Web sites (Reuters, 1999). Mental health experts who assessed Eric Burns declared that he likely felt more comfortable communicating online than in person, he had difficulty overcoming his fear of rejection by people in the real world, he lacked the social skills to repair relationships, and he was mocking authority by saying something like “I can put my favorite girl’s name on your Web site for everyone to see, but you can’t get me.” In short, Eric Burns had a number of pre-existing mental health issues that he “acted out” online (Schell et al., 2002). The case of Eric Burns is symbolic on a number of planes, including that most of what the literature reports about the psychological profiles of those in the CU has been gleaned from legal

0

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

documents following convicted crackers’ arrests, both insiders and outsiders. Moreover, Eric Burns as a cyber stalker is likely not too different from real-world stalkers who have been charged and convicted. Stalking experts tend to agree that those who commit these crimes in the virtual world are likely not much different psychologically from those who commit such crimes in the mainstream (Schell & Lanteigne, 2000). So when these crackers are caught, convicted, and analyzed by mental health experts, how are they classified? In general, mental health experts tend to describe the overall profile of working adults as being predominantly “self-healing” in nature (i.e., they recover well from stressful life episodes, and they are generally psychologically and physically well individuals over the longer term) and predominantly “disease-prone” (i.e., they tend not to recover well from stressful life episodes, they often suffer from bouts of depression in the short-term, and in the longer term, they often suffer from diseases such as premature cardiovascular disease or cancer) (Schell, 1997). As noted, Eric Burns would likely be placed in the category of disease-proneness. Consistent with some earlier reported “offender” profile findings developed on computer science students and information systems (IS) employees, Shaw, Post, and Ruby in 1999 said that “insider” computer criminals, in particular, tend to have eight traits that are more “disease-prone” than “self-healing.” In particular, insider crackers who cause damage to company computers and/or to individuals within these organizations are: (1) introverted; (2) they have a history of significant family problems in early childhood, leaving them with negative attitudes toward authority; (3) they have an online computer dependency that significantly interferes with or replaces direct social interactions in adulthood; (4) they have an ethical flexibility that allows them to justify their violations, even if they get caught; (5) they have a stronger loyalty to their computer specialty than to their employers; (6) they have a “sense of

0

entitlement,” thinking that they are “special” and are thus owed the corresponding recognition; (7) they tend to have a lack of empathy, preferring to disregard the adverse impact of their actions on others; and (8) because of their introverted natures, they are less likely to seek direct assistance from their supervisors or from their company’s employee assistance program (EAP) when they are distressed. Earlier in 1997, Ehud Avner constructed what he called “a personality analysis” he completed in several countries for mal-inclined information systems employees. His results found that the prototypical “insider” IT criminal rarely gets caught, because he or she tends to be a manager or a highranking clerk without a criminal record, he or she commits the crack in the course of normal and legal system operations, and he or she seems on the surface to be a bright, thorough, highly-motivated, diligent and a trustworthy employee—until caught. When caught, he or she tends to say that he or she did not intend to hurt anyone, that banks steal more than he or she did, or that he or she only tried to prove to their employers that it is possible to crack the vulnerable system. It is important to remember that the probable reason for their not getting caught earlier is that these cyber criminals frequently have a considerable number of White Hat traits—as well as Black Hat ones—which generally keep them out of investigators’ eyes (Schell et al., 2002). Considering this growth in knowledge about insider and outsider convicted crackers, noted Schell et al. in 2002, what was still sorely missing from the literature on those in the CU as of 2000 was a psychological profile of the White Hat hackers in the CU. What were they like psychologically, and did they differ substantially from the Black Hats or those charged and convicted of cyber crimes?

present-day myths and reality While a number of researchers have increasingly reported that disease-prone types and self-healing

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

types likely exist in the CU, few have been able to describe the relative proportion of each. Accepting this observation, researchers have become curious about the supposed lack of bias and “fair play” in the CU, as in recent times, anecdotal evidence (such as that of Sierra in March, 2007) seems to indicate that some degree of rejection or adverse attention-seeking by online peers is a real concern and needs to be addressed as a major online privacy, security, and trust issue within the CU (Gilboa, 1996; Holt, 2006; Jordan & Taylor, 1998, Sagan, 2000; Schell, 2007). As noted in the demographic section, the media have focused on the disease-prone side of those in the CU. Myths surfacing in the headlines since the 1980s, some founded and some not, include the notion that hackers seem to have troubled childhoods, marked by a history of alcoholic parents, abandonment by one or more parents, and parental discord (Shaw et al., 1999)—and that this could be a primary reason for their apparent need to rebel against authority figures. The Canadian cracker known as Mafiaboy, who in 2000 raised concerns when he cracked Internet servers and used them as launching pads for denial of service (DoS) attacks on the Web sites of Amazon, eBay, and Yahoo, is a poster boy for a cracker with a troubled childhood. Another prevailing myth about hackers is that because they have the predisposition and the capability to be multi-tasked (Meyer, 1989) and appear to be computer addicted (Young, 1996), they are likely stressed-out in the short-term and are likely to be cardiovascular-prone at early ages (i.e, disease-prone Type A) over the longer term. Thus, argues those who cite this myth, label hackers in the CU as “predominantly disease-prone.” Finally, if there is a bright light to shine in terms of prevailing hacker myths, it is that hackers are generally perceived by the public and the media to be creative individuals—a definite self-healing trait. As noted, the Schell et al. 2002 study presents the most comprehensive picture, to date, of those

inhabiting the CU, including their psychological make-up. Regarding the first myth about childhood trauma for those in the CU, while 28% of the hacker convention respondents in this 2002 study said that they had experienced childhood trauma or significant personal losses, the majority of hacker respondents did not make such claims. However, supportive of this myth, of those hackers who reported having a troubled childhood, the majority—61%—said that they knew that these events had a long-term adverse impact on their thoughts and behaviors. Moreover, a t-test analysis on the findings revealed that female hackers were more likely to admit experiencing childhood trauma than their male counterparts, but there was no significant difference in the reporting of childhood trauma for those charged and not charged of crimes, or for those hackers under ago 30 and those over age 30 (Schell et al., 2002). Though many mental health experts would seem to suggest those in the CU are predominantly task-obsessed and perfectionist “Type A” individuals who are cardiovascular “self-destructors,” Schell et al. (2002) reported that those individuals attending hacker conventions actually tend to be more moderated, self-healing “Type B” individuals in nature. Moreover, a current study being undertaken by the authors of this chapter seems to indicate that those attending hacker conventions may actually possess relatively high degrees of the Asperger’s Syndrome, or the Nerd Syndrome, and that this constellation of traits may, in fact, protect hackers in the CU from becoming too stressed-out by the highly competitive and, at times, very aggressive nature of this virtual environment (Fitzgerald & Corvin, 2001). The ability to screen out distractions is a geeky trait that can be extremely useful to computer programmers, in particular, and many of these traits in milder forms seem to be descriptive of computer hackers (Nash, 2002). Regarding the third “bright light” myth, Schell et al. (2002) corroborated with their study findings

0

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

that those in the CU are creative individuals who report using predominantly complex analytical and conceptual styles of problem-solving and decision-making. These researchers reported that on the 20-item Creative Personality Test of Dubrin, for example, the majority of hacker respondents—62%—had scores meeting or exceeding the critical “creative” level score of 15, thus supporting this myth. Further analysis revealed no significant differences in the creativity mean scores for the males and the females, for those charged and not charged of crimes in the CU, and for those under age 30 and over age 30. Moreover, using the 20-item Decision Style Inventory III of Rowe and colleagues, these researchers found that the highest mean scores for decision-making and problem-solving styles of hackers placed in the analytic and conceptual styles, supporting the myth that those in the CU are cognitively complex and creative in their thinking predispositions. In closing, in an effort to try to determine who might have high degrees of disease-proneness and the propensity to cause harm to persons and to property in the CU, Schell et al. (2002) completed a number of analyses on the Black Hat segment that admitted to being motivated to take revenge on targets. The traits for these individuals were that they tended to be under age 30, they had less formal education than their White Hat peers, they reported significantly higher hostility and anger stress symptoms in the short term than their White Hat peers, they reported higher depression stress symptoms and more longer-lasting (and addictive) hacking sessions than their comparative group, and they had higher psychopathic and highly narcissistic personality predispositions than their self-healing counterparts. Thus, the researchers concluded that that the group of hackers in the CU most at risk for committing self- and otherdestructive acts appeared to be under age 30, narcissistic, angry, obsessive individuals suffering from repeat bouts of depression. The authors suggested that the percentage of high-risk hackers

0

ready to cause harm to persons, in particular, may be as high as 7%.

future trends: hoW present strAtegIes for deAlIng WIth onlIne prIvAcy, securIty And trust Issues need to be Improved This chapter has discussed, at length, about how evolving cyber crime legislation and an increased knowledge of the demographic, psychological, and social/behavioral propensities of those in the CU may, combined, lead to better methods of not only curbing cyber crime but of better understanding who may commit it, how, and why. However, other solutions developed to deal with the privacy, security, and trust issues in cyber space have been developed and need to be discussed.

solutions for online privacy Recent public surveys have shown that a number of consumers are still afraid to buy goods and services online, because they fear that their personal information (particularly credit card and social security numbers) will be used by someone else. Moreover, despite assurances from credit card companies that they will not hold consumers accountable for any false charges, in recent times trust seals and increased government regulation have become two main ways of promoting improved privacy disclosures on the Internet. Trust seals nowadays appear on e-business Web sites—including green Truste images, the BBBOnLine (Better Business Bureau OnLine) padlocks, and a host of other privacy and security seals. In fact, some companies are paying up to $13,000 annually to display these logos on their Web sites in the hopes of having consumers relate positively to their efforts to provide online privacy.

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

In fact, almost half of the Fortune 100 companies display such logos, and of the fourteen information technology Web sites in the Fortune 100 companies, 10 have such seals (Cline, 2003). The question, however, remains about whether trust seals really work. Although they are intended to advance privacy for consumers through legislation—primarily through business self-regulation—critics often suggest that these trust seals are more of a privacy advocate for corporations than for consumers. But those supporting the usefulness of trust seals note that if companies display them on their Web sites, they need to follow the trust standards, provide online clients with a means of opting out of direct marketing and having their personal information sold to third parties, and give consumers a way to access the company’s information and file complaints. Also on the positive side, ScanAlert, an emerging security seal provider, argues that Internet sales are reported to increase by 10% to 30% if the trust seals are displayed (Cline, 2003). From consumers’ submissions, a study conducted by Flinn and Lumsden (2005) indicated that 42% of the consumers surveyed in their study said that they were more likely to trust a Web site that displays a trust mark than those not having the display, and 49% of the respondents said that they are likely to trust a Web site only if they are able to recognize the trust mark program. Furthermore, while government regulations in North America are increasing to advance the privacy of citizens—by passing laws like the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) and the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, citizens are commonly uneasy with such pieces of legislation, for consumers dislike having their telecommunications traffic monitored by government agents. As a result of these privacy concerns, the field of information ethics (IE) has emerged to deal with issues arising from connecting technology with concepts such as privacy, intellectual property

rights (IPR) information access, and intellectual freedom. Although IE issues have been raised as early as 1980, nowadays the field is more complex—spurred on by the concerns of a number of academic disciplines regarding Internet abuses. According to IE, information itself, in some form or role, is recognized to have intrinsic moral value. Thus, theoreticians have formulated a number of complex mathematical solutions for providing better information protection over the Internet. This is a field that is sure to bring more comprehensive solutions to online privacy concerns in future years.

solutions for online security Generally, businesses and government agencies take two kinds of approaches to prevent security breaches: proactive approaches—such as preventing crackers from launching attacks in the first place (typically through various cryptographic techniques) and reactive approaches—by detecting security threats “after the fact” and applying appropriate fixes. The two combined allow for comprehensive network solutions. In technical circles, securing Web sites generally refers to the use of SSL (secure sockets layer) technology for encrypting and authenticating HTTP (hypertext transfer protocol) connections (Flinn & Lumsden, 2005). Moreover, because network security is a chain, it is only as secure as its weakest link. Although enhanced network security features are desirable, they cost money—a key consideration factor for companies and institutions, especially the smaller ones that are often reluctant to apply an enhanced security solution because of prohibitive costs. These costs are associated with, for example, additional overhead (such as increased bandwidth), increased complexity (requiring specialized security personnel), and information processing delays such as degraded performance, which can, in turn, degrade network performance (Grami & Schell, 2004). Thus, if smaller companies in the

0

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

chain cannot afford appropriate security features, the whole chain is vulnerable to attack. Also, industry has come forward in recent years with some innovative commercial tools to assist network administrators in preventing network intrusions. One such tool, designed by Dan Farmer and Wieste Venema in 1995, is known as SATAN (security administrator tool for analyzing networks). This tool works by procuring as much data as possible about system and network services, and upon discovering vulnerabilities, it gives rather limited data to network administrators to assist them in fixing the problem. Its successor, SAINT, is also on the market to assist in this regard. Other improvements are on the way to help improve online security. From a standard perspective, the emerging IEEE 802.11i standards will improve wireless security issues, in particular, and turn wireless networking into a more trusted medium for all users, including the prevention of DoS problems caused when the entire network is jammed. (The attack could be against the client’s wireless device or against the network’s access point). Jamming has, to date, been difficult to stop, largely because most wireless local area networking technologies use unlicensed frequencies and are subject to interference from a variety of sources (Grami & Schell, 2004)

solutions for online trust As noted earlier in this chapter, a major barrier to the success of online commerce has been the fundamental lack of faith between business and consumer partners. This lack of trust by consumers is largely caused by their having to provide detailed personal and confidential information to companies on request. Also, consumers fear that their credit card number could be used for purposes other than that for which permission was given. From the business partner’s trust vantage point, the company is not sure if the credit card number the consumer gives is genuine, is in good credit

08

standing, and actually belongs to the consumer trying to complete the transaction. In short, communicating with unknowns through the Internet elicits two crucial sets of questions that require reflection: One, what is the real identity of other person(s) on the Internet and can their identities be authenticated? Two, how reliable are other persons on the Internet, and is it safe to interact with them? (Jonczy & Haenni, 2005). Consumer and business trust online is based on such authentication issues, and in recent years, a number of products have been developed to assist in the authentication process, including the following (Schell, 2007): •

•

•

•

Biometrics, which assess users’ signatures, facial features, and other biological identifiers; Smart cards, which have microprocessor chips that run cryptographic algorithms and store a private key; Digital certificates, which contain public or private keys—the value needed to encrypt or decrypt a message; and SecureID, a commercial product using a key and the current time to generate a random number stream that is verifiable by a server, thus ensuring that a potential user puts in a verifiable number on the card within a set amount of time (typically 5 or 10 seconds).

Experts agree that trusted authentication management in a distributed network like the Internet—which is the importance of the second question—is not easy, for in a decentralized authority, every user is also a potential issuer of credentials. Furthermore, a given set of credentials, perhaps issued by many different users, forms a credential network. Therefore, a “web of trust” model and solution was introduced by pretty good privacy (PGP), a popular application for e-mail authentication. Without getting too technical,

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

PGP organizes public keys and corresponding certificates in local key rings. The owner of the key ring gets a “web of trust” by assigning trust values to issuers. This “web of trust” thus acts as the basis for a qualitative evaluation of the authenticity of the public keys involved. In PGP, the evaluation of a “web of trust” is founded on three rules and on the production of two outcomes: valid or invalid (Jonczy & Haenni, 2005). Unfortunately, to date, authentication systems like PGP have failed to gain large acceptance and to solve real-world trust problems such as spam, primarily because they suffer from a number of deployment usability issues, as well as trust management issues. For example, in “web of trust” style systems, Internet users must validate keys out-of-band, which is a laborious task. Better solutions need to be developed which minimize these shortcomings. Finally, it is important to recognize that in recent years there has been some effort by experts to set standards and indicators for a more systematic and coordinated fashion to capture the trustworthiness state of a particular information technology infrastructure, including the Internet. Such indicators would reflect the “assurance” of the IT infrastructure to reliably transfer information (including security, quality of service, and availability of service)—thus increasing consumers’ trust in the network. These indicators could then be used to identify areas of the infrastructure requiring attention and be utilized by an IT organization to assess the return on investment (ROI) for improved IT infrastructure equipment purchase. Unfortunately, despite the existing work in progress, there is still no standard or widelyaccepted method of assessing assurance levels associated with IT infrastructures, including end-hosts, servers, applications, routers, firewalls, and the network permitting the subsystems to communicate. Clearly, this is an area where academics and security experts need to focus to find more effective trust solutions (Schell, 2007; Seddigh, Pieda, Matrawy, Nandy, Lombadaris, & Hatfield, 2004).

closIng This chapter has discussed a number of privacy, security, and trust issues affecting online consumers. Clearly, understanding these issues and finding solutions for them—legislative, technological, sociological, or psychological—is a complex chore requiring experts in multiple fields, including law, information technology, security, business, and the social sciences. Likely the only way forward in finding more comprehensive solutions is to adopt a team approach for finding hybrid solutions that are outside any one silo of expertise.

references Associated Press. (2005). Business schools: Harvard to bar 119 applicants who hacked admissions site. The Globe and Mail, March 9, B12. Brenner, S. (2001). Is there such a thing as “virtual crime?” Retrieved February 1, 2006,from http:// www.crime-research.org/library/Susan.htm Cincu, J., & Richardson, R. (2006). Virus attacks named leading culprit of financial lossby U.S. companies in 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey. Retrieved July 13, 2006, from http://www.gocsi.com/press/20060712.jhtml Cline, J. (2003). The ROI of privacy seals. Retrieved October 12, 2007, fromhttp://www. computerworld.com/developmentopics/websitemgmt/story/0,10801,81633,00.html Cohoon, J. M., & Aspray, W. (2006). A critical review of the research on women’s participation in postsecondary computing education. In J. M. Cohoon and W. Aspray (Ed.), Women and information technology: Research on underrepresentation (pp. 137-180). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Evans, M., & McKenna, B. (2000). Dragnet targets Internet vandals. The Globe and Mail, February 10, A1, A10. 09

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

Fitzgerald, M., & Corvin, A. (2001). Diagnosis and differential diagnosis of Asperger syndrome. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 7(4), 310-318. Flinn, S., & Lumsden, J. (2005). User perceptions of privacy and security on the web. Retrieved 12 October, 2007, from http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/ PST/2005/pdf/flinn.pdf

Jonczy, J., & Haenni, R. (2005). Credential networks: A general model for distributed trust and authenticity management. Retrieved on October 10, 2007, from http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/ PST/2005/pdf/jonczy.pdf Jordan, T., & Taylor, P. (1998). A sociology of hackers. The Sociological Review, 46(4),757-780.

Fost, D. (2007). The technology chronicles: the attack on Kathy Sierra. Retrieved March 27, 2007, from http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/ detail?blogid=19¢ury_id=14783

Keller, L. S. (1988, July). Machismo and the hacker mentality: some personal observations and speculations. Paper presented to the WiC (Women inComputing) Conference.

Furnell, S. (2002). Cybercrime: Vandalizing the information society. Boston, MA: AddisonWesley.

Krebs, B. (2003). Hackers to face tougher sentences. Washington Post. Retrieved Feburary 4, 2004, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/ wp-dyn/A35261-2003Oct2?language=printer

Gilboa, W. (1996). Elites, lamers, narcs, and whores: Exploring the computer underground. In. L. Cherny & E. R. Weise (Eds.), Wired women: Gender and new realities in cyberspace (pp. 98113). Seattle, WA: Seal Press. Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2007). 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime survey. Retrieved March 3, 2007, from http://www.GoCSI.com Grami, A., & Schell, B. (2004). Future trends in mobile commerce: Service offerings, technological advances, and security challenges. Retrieved October 13, 2004, from http://dev.hil. unb.ca/Texts/PST/pdf/grami.pdf Holt, T.J. (2006, June). Gender and hacking. Paper presented at the CarolinaCon ’06 Convention, Raleigh, NC. Holt, Thomas J. (2007). Subcultural evolution? Examining the influence of on- and off-line experiences on deviant subcultures. Deviant behavior, 28(2), 171-198. IBM Research. (2006). Global security analysis lab: Fact sheet. IBM Research. Retrieved January 16, 2006, from http://domino.research.ibm.com/ comm/pr.nsf/pages/rsc.gsal.html

0

Levy, S. (1984). Hackers: Heroes of the computer revolution. New York: Dell. Meinel, C. (2006). Appendix A: How do hackers break into computers? In B. Schell & C. Martin (Ed.), Webster’s new world hacker dictionary (pp. 373-380). Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, Inc. Meyer, G. R. (1989). The social organization of the computer underworld. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://bak.spc.org/dms/archive/ hackorg.html Nash, J. M. (2002). The geek syndrome. Retrieved July 5, 2007, from http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020506/scaspergers.html Rescorla, E. (2005). Is finding security holes a good idea? IEE Security and Privacy, 3(1), 14-19. Reuters. (1999). Teen pleads guilty to government hacks. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://scout.wisc.edu/Projects/PastProjects/netnews/99-11/99-11- 23/0007.html Richardson, R. (2007). 2007 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey. Retrieved October 12, 2007, from http://www.GoCSI.com

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

Sagan, S. (2000). Hacker women are few but strong. Retrieved August 5, 2004, from http:// abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/hackerwomen000602.html#top Schell, B.H. (2007). Contemporary world issues: The internet and society. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Schell, Bernadette H. (1997). A self-diagnostic approach to understanding organizational and personal stressors: The C-O-P-E model for stress reduction. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Schell, B. H., Dodge, J. L., & Moutsatos, S. S. (2002). The hacking of America: Who’s doing it, why, and how. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Schell, B. H., & Lanteigne, N. (2000). Stalking, harassment, and murder in the workplace: Guidelines for protection and prevention. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Schell, B. H., & Martin, C. (2006). Webster’s new world hacker dictionary. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, Inc. Schell, Bernadette H.. & Martin, Clemens. (2004). Contemporary world issues: Cybercrime. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC- CLIO. Seddigh, N., Pieda, P., Matrawy, A., Nandy, B., Lombadaris, J., & Hatfield, A. (2004). Current trends and advances in information assurance metrics. Retrieved October 10, 2007, from http:// dev.hil.unb.ca/Texts/PST/pdf/seddigh.pdf Shaw, E., Post, J., & Ruby, K. (1999). Inside the mind of the insider. Security Management, 43(12), 34-44. Taylor, P. A. (2003). Maestros or misogynists? Gender and the social construction of hacking. In Y. Jewkes (Ed.), Dot.cons: Crime, deviance and identity on the Internet (pp. 125-145). Portland, OR: Willan Publishing.

digital terrorism. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Thomas, D. (2002). Hacker culture. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Turkle, S. (1984). The second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York:Simon and Schuster. Ullman, E. (1997). Close to the machine: Technophilia and its discontents. San Francisco: City Lights Books. Wajcman, J. (1991). Feminism confronts technology. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Wall, D. S. (2001). Cybercrimes and the Internet. In D.S. Wall (Ed.), Crime and the Internet (pp. 1-17). New York: Routledge. Walton, D. (2000). Hackers tough to prosecute, FBI says. The Globe and Mail, February 10, B5. Young, K. S. (1996). Psychology of computer use: XL. Addictive use of the Internet: A case that breaks the stereotype. Psychological Reports, 79(3), 899-902.

AddItIonAl reAdIngs The Cybercrime Blackmarket. (2007). Retrieved July 11, 2007, from http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/cybercrime/index_page5.html Florio, E. (2005). When malware meets rootkits. Retrieved July 11, 2007, from http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/when.malware. meets.rootkits.pdf Grabowski, P., & Smith, R. (2001). Telecommunications fraud in the digital age: The convergence of technologies. In D. S. Wall (Ed.), Crime and the Internet (pp. 29-43). New York: Routledge.

Taylor, R. W., Caeti, T. J., Loper, D. K., Fritsch, E. J., & Liederback, J. (2006). Digital crime and



Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

Herring, S. C. (2004). Computer-mediated discourse analysis: An approach to researching online behavior. In S. A. Barab, R. Kling, J. H. Gray (Eds.), Designing for virtual communities in the service of learning (pp. 338-376). New York: Cambridge University Press. Holt, T. J. (2003). Examining a transnational problem: An analysis of computer crime victimization in eight countries from 1999 to 2001. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 27(2), 199-220. Holt, T. J., & Graves, D. C. (2007). A qualitative analysis of advanced fee fraud schemes. The International Journal of Cyber-Criminology, 1(1), 137-154. The Honeynet Project. (2001). Know your enemy: Learning about security threats. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley. James, L. (2006). Trojans & botnets & malware, oh my! Presentation at ShmooCon 2006. Retrieved July 11, 2007, from http://www.shmoocon. org/2006/presentations.html Kleen, L. J. (2001). Malicious hackers: A framework for analysis and case study. Master’s Thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology. Retrieved January 3, 2004, from http://www.iwar.org.uk/ iwar/resources/usaf/maxwell/students/2001/afitgor-ens-01m-09.pdf Littman, J. (1997). The watchman: The twisted life and crimes of serial hacker Kevin Poulsen. New York: Little Brown. Mann, D., & Sutton, M. (1998). Netcrime: More change in the organization of thieving. British Journal of Criminology, 38(2), 201-229. Noblett, M. G., Pollitt, M. M., & Presley, L. A. (2000). Recovering and examining computer forensic evidence. Forensic Science Communications 2(4). Retrieved February 4, 2005, from http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/oct2000/ computer.htm



Norman, P. (2001). Policing “high tech” crime within the global context: The role of transnational policy networks. In D. S. Wall (Ed.), Crime and the Internet (pp. 184-194). New York: Routledge. Ollmann, G. (2004). The phishing guide: understanding and preventing phishing attacks. Retrieved July 11, 2007, from http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/NISRWP-Phishing.pdf Parizo, E. B. (2005). Busted: The inside story of operation firewall. Retrieved July 9, 2007, from http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/ originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci1146949,00. html Savona, E. U., & Mignone, M. (2004). The fox and the hunters: How IC technologies change the crime race. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1), 3-26. Schell, B. H. (2007). Contemporary world issues: The internet and society. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Sterling, B. (1992). The hacker crackdown: Law and disorder on the electronic frontier. New York: Bantam. Taylor, P. A. (1999). Hackers: Crime in the digital sublime. London: Routledge. Taylor, P. A. (2003). Maestros or misogynists? Gender and the social construction of hacking. In Y. Jewkes (Ed.), Dot.cons: Crime, deviance and identity on the Internet (pp. 125-145). Portland, OR: Willan Publishing. Taylor, R. W., Caeti, T. J., Loper, D. K., Fritsch, E. J., & Liederback, J. (2006). Digital crime and digital terrorism. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Thomas, D., & Loader, B. D. (2000). Introduction—cybercrime: law enforcement, security, and surveillance in the information age. In D. Thomas& B. D. Loader (Ed), Cybercrime: Law

Social/Behavioral Patterns of Computer Hacker Insiders and Outsiders

enforcement, security and surveillance in the information age (pp. 1-14). New York: Routledge.

P. Francis (Eds.), Invisible crimes. London: Macmillan.

Thomas, R., & Martin, J. (2006). The underground economy: Priceless. Login, 31(6), 7-6.

Wuest, C. (2005). Phishing in the middle of the stream--today’s threats to on-line banking. Retrieved July 11, 2007, from http://www.symantec. com/avcenter/reference/phishing.in.the.middle. of.the.stream.pdf

Wall, D. S. (1999). Cybercrimes: New wine, no bottles? In P. Davies, V. Jupp, &





Chapter X

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet: Revisiting Privacy Toward a Situational Paradigm Chiung-wen (Julia) Hsu National Cheng Chi University, Taiwan

AbstrAct This chapter introduces a situational paradigm as a means of studying online privacy. It argues that data subjects are not always opponent to data users. They judge contexts before disclosing information. This chapter proves it by examining online privacy concerns and practices with two contexts: technology platforms and users’ motivations. It explores gratifications of online photo album users in Taiwan, and finds the distinctive “staging” phenomenon under the theory of uses and gratifications, and a priori theoretical framework, the spectacle/performance paradigm. The users with “diffused audience” gratifications are concerned less about privacy but not disclose more of their information. Furthermore, it finds that users act differently in diverse platforms, implying that studying Internet as a whole is problematic. The author proposes that studying online privacy through the use of a situational paradigm will help better research designs for studying privacy, and assist in understanding of users’ behaviors among technology platforms.

IntroductIon The common assumptions of the online privacy concerns literature claim that net users who have

higher privacy concerns disclose less information and that data subjects are always adversarial to data users. Thus, researchers with these assumptions ignore online environments, take privacy

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

concerns as privacy practices, and follow the off-line literature reviews to study what kind of persons (demographical variables) are concerned more about their privacy. This is called the adversarial paradigm, which does not take social contexts into account (Hine & Eve, 1998; Hsu, 2006; Raab & Bennett, 1998). What does go wrong for online privacy research with an adversarial paradigm? Researchers fail to explain why users asserting to have higher privacy concerns still disclose sensitive information and fail to verify why some claim that those belonging to particular demographical variables are concerned more about privacy, which is not always the case in other research studies. Thus, researchers instead have to find more social contexts which are essential to users’ privacy concerns and practices on the Internet as well as study what makes users disclose more of their information—the so-called situational paradigm (Hsu, 2006; Raab & Bennett, 1998). In this study, the author tries to find more proofs for the main argument of the situational paradigm, in which assumption is human relativism—a new approach for examining online privacy especially for the newly-emergence phenomena. What are the newly-emerging phenomena on the Internet? The author raises an example of online photo Web sites. Online photo album Web sites were originally started for sharing digital memories with friends and relatives. This trend is encouraged by commercial online photo album Web sites which provide “free or fee” spaces. In Taiwan, online photo albums (usually with additional blog functions) are also popular among Internet users. As a communication scholar, the author alleges that communication is a post-disciplinary “in which the rigid walls of disciplinarity are replaced with bridges (Streeter, 1995).” Online privacy is such an interdisciplinary topic, whereby communication could contribute with others. Given that the Internet is a mass media (Morris & Ogan, 1996), the author assumes that uses and gratification theory may pave the way for a

situational paradigm in online privacy research. The study suggests that media use is motivated by needs and goals that are defined by audiences themselves, and that active participation in the communication process may assist, limit, or influence the gratifications associated with exposure. Thus, different goals lead to diverse participation and gratification. Current online privacy research seldom takes users’ motivations of Internet behaviors into account. How do these different uses, motivations, and gratification influence their online privacy concerns and privacy practices? This is necessary subject to investigate. In addition to normal usage of online photo albums, there is a distinct “staging” or “performing” phenomenon in Taiwan. For example, I-Ren Wang, a now-famous celebrity, was recruited as an anchor by TVBS, a cable news network, due to her incredible popularity on the largest online photo album, Wretch (Jhu & Yung, 2006). Other girls, such as “Cutiecherry” and “Fing,” were invited to participate in noted TV programs and turned into commercial stars. For the majority of Internet users who have not yet become celebrity, they may enjoy having a reputation among users, getting on a popular list, or being discussed on the online chat system and BBS. It also seems that online photo album Web sites have developed into a “stage” for those who want to become stars and celebrities. This implies that the motivations for some online photo album (a new media use context) users are quite different from net users in previous studies. Online photo album users are more like diffused audiences, the concept from the spectacle/ performance paradigm (SPP) (Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998). Adopting the diffused audience cycle into the online photo album context, some users are drenched with mediascapes, integrate what they learned from the mediascapes into everyday life, and perform them for users’ own visibility. Others are drenched with mediascapes that facilitate discussions and help to attach themselves to some idols. No matter what purpose users hold,



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

after they achieve a certain level of narcissism, they turn their attention to getting further media drenching and performance. Performing or staging on the Internet means users usually disclose a large amount of their personal information. Are those users aware of possibly losing privacy and being transparent on the Internet? Are those staging users concerned less about their privacy or have they no idea of the consequences of their behavior? There are two possible results: one is that the staging users do care about their privacy. Two is that they do not care about privacy. The first outcome is parallel to the situational arguments. The users concerns do not reflect directly on their behaviors. The second result is even more interesting, because it is so different from previous studies that claim that concerns over privacy protection on the Internet or Web sites might become an obstacle to the diffusion of the Internet and the future growth of e-commerce (Culnan, 1999a, 1999b; Federal Trade Commission, 1998, 1999, 2000; Milne, Culnan, & Greene, 2006). Why do they ignore their privacy? What are their bottom lines and their disclosing strategies? What are the implications for the privacy studies and online business? Online photo album Web sites have a very special characteristic in that visual anonymity does not exist as with other Internet technology platforms, because they provide more visual cues, making visual anonymity impossible. This is another context worth studying. How does a visual function on the Internet influence users’ privacy concerns and practices? An investigation into this question will help us better understand how users perceive privacy while using a visual function and how different users’ motivations for using a visual function influence their privacy. The staging phenomenon (observed by uses and gratifications and the SPP theories) and the Internet technology platform (online photo album websites) are the two contexts developed in this study to validate the situational paradigm. This



study attempts to prove that these two contexts do influence users’ privacy concerns and practices which also verify that human relativism is the proper approach to study online privacy.

bAckground studying privacy with the situational paradigm The major flaw of the current definition of privacy is that it assumes that people are vulnerable without considering situations. Therefore, privacy risks are always deemed to be dangerous (Raab & Bennett, 1998). According to the previous discussion, studying the nature of privacy, privacy risks, and privacy protection with the adversarial paradigm means one is always coping with new privacy infringement. As Moor (1997) puts it, the privacy concept has been developed chronologically. In the current computer age, privacy has become very “informationally enriched.” As such, there should be an updated approach studying privacy. Moor, Raab, and Bennett separately study the nature of privacy, privacy risks, and privacy protection from an adversarial paradigm toward a situational paradigm, especially for Internet settings. However, little research is aware that privacy concerns studies are still trapped on the adversarial paradigm. Nowadays, online privacy concerns studies mostly adopt the off-line literature review and try to find what kind of Internet users care more about their privacy by means of using demographics as independent variables (Hoffman, Novak, & Peralta, 1999; Kate, 1998; Milne & Rohm, 2000; O’Neil, 2001; Sheehan, 2002). Nevertheless, the findings of the privacy concerns literature focusing on demographics usually are in conflict with each other. It implies that privacy concerns are not static, but vary with contexts.

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

Contexts are not a breakthrough idea. Most research studies are aware that understanding data subjects’ demographic variables is not enough to explain and predict data subjects. Contexts also determine subjects’ privacy practices and concerns. Hine and Eve (1998) raise the idea of situated privacy concerns by examining different situations qualitatively. They find that there is no particular kind of information that is always privacy sensitive in all kinds of contexts. Unlike the adversarial paradigm, researching privacy concerns with the situational paradigm needs to take two things into consideration. One is the context of privacy risks and data subjects. The other is a fundamental problem with studying privacy concerns, whereby it is necessary to distinguish privacy concerns and privacy practices. When researchers ask about net users’ online privacy concerns, people tend to think back to serious privacy infringements that they have experienced or heard, and thus rate their privacy concerns higher than what they actually practice on the Internet. However, when researchers ask about net users’ Internet usage regarding online privacy, users’ daily practices show that they might not be concerned about privacy as seriously as they report (GVU, 1998; Culnan & Armstrong, 1999). This study will examine privacy concerns and privacy practices with the contexts of data subjects separately. Contexts might be technology (Sixsmith & Murray, 2001), Web sites’ performance (Hsu, 2002; Culnan & Armstrong, 1999), privacy regulations (Bennett, 1992), political system (Plichtova & Brozmanova, 1997), culture/country (In the adversarial paradigm, the country/culture variable is usually taken to be demographics. Privacy concern/practice research studies under a situational paradigm revise the culture context of subjects as a social context along with social group), and so on. As mentioned earlier, online photo album Web sites are the new technology platform which should be taken as a context. How do users have differ-

ent privacy concerns under different technology platforms? In the early age of the Internet, there were several technology platforms: MUD, BBS, newsgroups, mailing lists, World Wide Web, e-mail, instant messaging (IM), and so forth. In e-mail posts and archives, Sixsmith and Murray (2001) point out that due to the absence of visual, aural, and other elements of face-to-face communication (i.e., list serves, bulletin board discussion groups, and chat rooms), those e-mail posts and archive users are less aware of their audience and believe they are interacting with only a limited circulation of subscribed, interested members. If researchers analyzing their message content or outsiders used the same words, they would feel their privacy had been invaded. When people use e-mail posts and archives, they might not care about their online contact information which is already listed on the list serve or discussion board. However, they might be concerned more about the message contents they have been posting. Online photo albums and blogs are so popular nowadays among users (Spector, 2003; Trammell, Williams, Postelinicu & Landreville, 2006). The unprecedented services provide opportunities for users to show their own personal information, pictures, and visual clips on the Internet. It means users make visual cues of themselves or their acquaintances public on the Internet, which might be identified by other users. Visual cues are very much related to privacy. Some research studies have done some anonymous investigation into CMC (computer-mediated communication) to find out the differences between visual and discursive anonymity (Barreto & Ellemers, 2002; Lea, Spears, & de Groot, 2001; Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001). Visual anonymity refers to the lack of any visual presentation of users like pictures or video clips. Discursive anonymity is a bit more complex. Users’ posting might reveal, to a certain degree of information, about the message source. Anonymity may be viewed as fostering a sense of deindividuation, which sequentially contributes to



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

self-disclosure (McKenna & Bargh, 2000).Visual function, by contrast, may be viewed as fostering a sense of individuation, which in turn contributes to privacy concerns. However, this seems to be a different situation for Taiwanese online photo album users’ staging behaviors. Under said circumstances, it is necessary to examine if a visual function facilitates users’ privacy concerns on the Internet and if different motivations of using a visual function would influence users’ privacy concerns. In order to know their motivation, this study first adopts the uses and gratifications approach.

Internet Uses and Gratifications As people integrate new technology into their lives, they often do not view it as just an update of the fixed function, but assign it special values. The cell phone enhances the fixed-line telephone as a means of social connectedness (Wei & Lo, 2006). The media literature has the same token. Ever since the Internet has turned out to be so popular, a number of researchers have taken it as a mass medium (Morris & Ogan, 1996) and also have started to find its users’ gratifications, but its special values are often ignored, which will be articulated later. The uses and gratifications approach provides an ample structure for studying new technology. The approach basically assumes that individual differences lead to each user seeking out diverse medium and employing the media in a different way. It is a user-centered perspective and implies that users are active in three ways: utility, intentionality, and selectivity (Katz, Gurevitch, & Hass, 1973; Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1974; Palmgreen, Wenner, & Rosengren, 1985). Some studies research the Internet as a whole, while some explore specific forms of Internet technology, such as homepages, search engines, and BBS. They try to find users’ motivations and identify new factors when new forms come out. In summary, net users attempt to fulfill their

8

needs such as information seeking, interaction, social avoidance, socialization, economic, entertainment, hobbies, relationship maintenance, coolness, life convenience, and so on (Charney & Greenberg, 2002; Hoffman & Novak, 1996; Korgaonkar & Wolin, 1999; LaRose, Mastro, & Eastin, 2001; Parker & Plank, 2000). The motivations for using both conventional media and the Internet are essentially the same, but they are not absolutely identical. Song, Larose, Eastin, and Lin (2004) identify a new gratification only for Internet settings—virtual community—which suggests a new self-image and social life on the Internet that has improved on real life. In addition, self-image, self-identity, and self-presentation are further recognized as unique to the Internet by researchers (Döring, 2002). Net users have become information producers instead of consumers only while creating their own personal homepages or blogs to disseminate and control individual information. Net users establish a new self-image through the Internet, which might be totally different from their true ego (Dominick, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2000; Papacharissi, 2002). The motivation of using online photo albums accounts for most of the mentioned cases. However, in the case of Taiwan, the uses and gratifications approach is not sufficient for explaining online photo album users’ “staging” behaviors. First, the traditional uses and gratifications approach is for media usage, which is so different from Internet users’ behaviors today. As Song et al. (2004) claim, an over-reliance on the set developed from television studies leads to a failure to depict new gratifications. Second, net users actively shape their presentation to interact and communicate with others adequately in everyday life in order for themselves to perform in this “performative society” (Kershaw, 1994), which has not been elaborated, such as “staging or performing.” This is the special value that technology users often assign, but researchers ignore when studying technology only with the users and gratifications approach.

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

As a result, this study suggests that studying net users’ motivations must consider that users are not only “the audience of the uses and gratifications approach,” but also the diffused audience of the spectacle performance paradigm. This part will be used to construct a questionnaire to identify new factors.

diffused Audiences As Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) argue, audience research has to take account of the changing nature of audience and social processes, which current research ignores. The common uses and gratifications approach (and effects literature) is categorized as a behavioral paradigm. According to Hall (1980), there are a number of problems with this paradigm, such as its lack of attention to power relations, the textual nature of media message, and understanding of social life. Hall’s critical approach to the study of the media is categorized as the incorporation/resistance paradigm (IRP), as in how social structuring and social location influence decoding of media texts. The key argument is the extent to which audiences resist or are incorporated by media texts in ideological terms. However, overemphasizing the coherence of the response to different texts is problematic. Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998) argue that the spectacle/performance paradigm (SPP) is much better in understanding the changing audience and conceptualizations of the audience and in recognizing the audience’s identity formation and reformation in everyday life. They propose that there are three different types of audiences: simple, mass, and diffused. All of them co-exist. The simple audience involves direct communication from performers to audience. The mass audience reflects the more mediated forms of communication. The diffused audience implies that everyone becomes an audience all the time, which entails people spending increasing amounts of time in media consumption. Thus, the audience interacts with the form of mediascapes, rather than

media messages or texts per se. Being a member of an audience is a part of everyday life under two social processes. First, the social world is more of a spectacle nowadays. Second, the individual is more narcissistic. Furthermore, the nature of audience is changing and not static. In terms of skills, audience could be identified as a continuum, from the consumer, fan, cultist, enthusiast, to the petty producer, in ascending order. Those who try to make money by means of their online photo album are more like petty producers. Abercrombie and Longhurst offer a cycle to explain the interaction of media and the diffused audience. They take football as an instance. Four processes form the kind of cycle. First, media drenching: The audience increases football consumption in various mediums. Second, everyday life: Media drenching facilitates interaction and discussion, as well as emotions engaged. Third, performance: The audience has more knowledge about football, increases attachment to the favorite team, and is identified as a football fan/follower. Fourth, spectacle/narcissism: The audience desires for increased visibility/knowledge as a basis for performance and is also constructed by football, and the display of logos, photos, and clothing. To obtain more knowledge, the audience is drenched in a massive amount of mediascapes again. The SPP is proved adequate in empirical research. Longhurst, Bagnall, and Savage (2004) use it to analyze the museum audience to “connect the ordinariness of museums as part of the audience processes of everyday life to wider themes of spectacle and performance.” Museum visiting is proven to be a salient part of the identity of the parent. Online photo album users are not a typical simple or mass audience. They are simultaneously information consumers and producers. They continually get information from fused communication and a huge amount of mediascapes. They could be also categorized as consumers, fans, cultists, enthusiasts, and petty producers. Without considering the assumptions of the diffused

9

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

audience and exploration under the SPP, online photo album users are simply taken as the mass audience. Their different behaviors are deemed only as another gratification. However, the role of information producer, the phenomenon of being noted, and the constitutive of everyday life are left unexplained.

mAIn thrust of the chApter — Issues, controversIes, problems research Questions and hypotheses Based on the review of privacy, major gratifications of the Internet, and diffused audiences from the SPP, we find that privacy concerns and privacy practices are situated, which cannot be examined without considering the contexts. In this study, the contexts are users’ gratifications and visual cues. Research questions and hypotheses are listed below. RQ1: What is the relationship between privacy concerns and practices? H1a: The more they disclose their information, the less privacy concerns they hold. H1b: The more they disclose their visual cues, the less privacy concerns they hold. H1c: The more they disclose their visual cues (post more pictures), the more information they disclose. RQ2: What is the difference on privacy concerns between online photo album haves and have-nots? H2: Those who have online photo albums are concerned less about their privacy. RQ3: What is the difference on privacy practices between online photo album haves and have-nots? H3: Those who have online photo albums disclose more information.

0

RQ4: What are online photo album users’ gratifications? RQ5: What is the relationship between gratifications and privacy concerns? H4: Those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences are concerned less about privacy. RQ6: What is the relationship between gratifications and posting pictures? H5: Those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences post more pictures on the Internet. RQ7: What is the relationship between gratifications and privacy practices? H6: Those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences disclose more of their information.

data collection The survey sample is drawn from volunteers, who were recruited from the biggest online photo album Web site in Taiwan: Wretch (http://www.wretch. cc). The advertisement for recruiting volunteers was put on the homepage with a hyperlink to a Web survey interface. A sample of 893 users participated in this Web survey. The sample consisted of 91.3% users (815) who have at least one online photo album and 8.6% users who do not have any (77). The average number of hours on the Internet per week was reported to be 5.64 hours. The most frequent visiting album types are relatives (56.2%), gorgeous persons (48.0%), celebrities (19.4%), and others.

Instrument construction This study draws on motives identified in previous studies on uses and gratifications from mass media and the Internet, adds the “virtual community” factor found by Song and his colleagues, and develops new items based upon Abercrombie and Longhurst’s diffused audience cycle. The diffused audience questions are developed by

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

conducting an in-depth interview with 10 users. Different levels of users are chosen in terms of the audience skills. The wordings were slightly changed to fit the online photo album context. After a pilot study, this study uses a list of 49 gratification items with Likert scales from 1 to 5. This study revises the privacy concerns questionnaire adopted from previous research (Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996). This study also would like to see online photo album users’ privacy practices, which is how often they disclose their information and pictures. There are two questions about pictures: “clear picture of you” and “clear picture of friends and relatives.” The scopes of personal information in this study are revised from the most frequently asked information lists done by GVU (1998) and sensitive information which are emphasized by privacy advocates, including demographic information, contact information (address, telephone numbers), online contact information (email address), other family members’ information, and details of everyday life, such as where to go, where to diet, and so forth.

data Analysis The results are listed, followed by the orders of research questions and hypotheses. All analyses were done using the SPSS 14.0 statistical program. Principal component solution and varimax rotation were adopted to find gratification groupings. This chapter selects items with a major loading at 0.5 or higher and a secondary loading no less than 0.40. Each factor is extracted with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and minimum reliability more than 0.60. All hypotheses were tested by Pearson product-moment correlations. A regression analysis was employed to evaluate the relationship between privacy concerns (dependent variable) and Internet gratifications (independent variables).

results RQ1: What is the relationship between privacy concerns and practices? H1a: The more they disclose their information, the less privacy concerns they hold. H1b: The more they disclose their visual cues, the less privacy concerns they hold. H1c: The more they disclose their visual cues (post more pictures), the more information they disclose. It seems that the respondents are not concerned a lot about privacy as the means are all fewer than 2 (see Table 1). However, the respondents’ concern about their privacy is very different as the standard deviations are all higher than .600, especially questions 1, 5, 7, and 12, in which their standard deviations are over .800. In order to know the details, all 12 questions added as general privacy concerns, are further analyzed with gratifications and other variables. The correlation of frequency of information disclosing and general privacy concerns shows some critical points. First, the privacy practices are not parallel with their privacy concerns. The coefficients are quite weak and contradictory (see Table 2). Those who post more clear pictures of themselves (-.130**) or clear pictures of their friends or relatives (-.124**) hold less privacy concerns. Second, users who usually disclose visual cues on the Internet are concerned less about privacy. However, despite other family members’ information, contact information, and demographic information being somehow more sensitive than everyday life and online contact information, respondents with higher privacy concerns unexpectedly disclose more of the sensitive types of information. In order to make clear the contradiction, it is necessary to see the differences between users who have online photo albums and those who do not.



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

Table 1. Descriptives statistics of privacy concerns Privacy Concerns

SD

1.

It usually bothers me when a Web site asks me for personal information.

1.85

.887

2.

When a Web site asks me for personal information, I sometimes think twice before providing it.

1.77

.789

3.

Web sites should take more steps to make sure that unauthorized people cannot access personal information in their computers.

1.48

.687

4.

When people give personal information to a Web site for some reason, the Web site should never use the information for any other reason.

1.34

.637

5.

Web sites should have better procedures to correct errors in personal information.

1.69

.815

6.

Computer databases that contain personal information should be protected from unauthorized access, no matter how much it costs.

1.35

.638

7.

Some Web sites ask me to register or submit personal information before using them. It bothers me to give my personal information to so many websites.

1.82

.910

8.

Web sites should ever sell the personal information in their databases to other companies.

1.26

.605

9.

Web sites should never share personal information with other Web sites unless it has been authorized by the individual who provided the information.

1.31

.627

10.

I am concerned that Web sites are collecting too much personal information about me.

1.60

.799

11.

The best way to protect personal privacy on the Internet would be through strong laws.

1.50

.781

12.

The best way to protect personal privacy on the Internet would be through corporate policies, which the corporations develop themselves.

1.63

.908

RQ2: What is the difference on privacy concerns between online photo album haves and have-nots? H2: Those who have online photo albums are concerned less about their privacy. RQ3: What is the difference on privacy practices between online photo album haves and have-nots? Table 2. Correlations of privacy practices and general privacy concerns General Privacy Concerns Clear pictures of you

-.130**

Clear pictures of your friends or relatives

-.124**

Demographic information

.126**

Contact information

.183***

Online contact information Other family members’ information Everyday life

.080* .199*** .028

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).



M

H3: Those who have online photo albums disclose more information. In order to answer Hypotheses 2 and 3, the t test is employed to see if users with online photo albums have less privacy concerns and more privacy practices (see Table 3). Those who have online photo albums perceive less privacy concerns than the have-nots. This parallels with Hypothesis 2. As for privacy practices, those who have online photo albums do disclose more clear pictures of themselves and clear pictures of their friends or relatives than the have-nots, which is not surprising. What is unexpected is those who have no online photo albums disclose more sensitive information, such as demographic information, contact information, and other family members’ information, than those who have online photo albums. The findings show that privacy concerns do not always reflect upon users’ practices. Taking the contexts into consideration, online photo album users post many pictures online, but they might

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

Table 3. Effect of having online photo album or not on privacy concerns and information disclosure Online photo album

n

Mean

SD

t

Mean difference

General privacy concerns

YES

702

1.53

.463

-4.544a

-.31

NO

63

1.84

.873

Clear pictures of you

YES

746

3.72

1.253

4.526a

1.724

(PCU)

NO

11

2.00

1.342

Clear pictures of your friends or relatives

YES

744

3.63

1.256

3.549a

1.360

-2.109c

-.786

-4.445a

-1.309

-.093

-.040

-4.475a

-1.210

.916

.330

(PFR)

NO

11

2.27

1.618

Demographic information

YES

734

2.21

1.159

(DEM)

NO

10

3.00

1.886

Contact information

YES

741

1.49

.912

(CON)

NO

10

2.80

1.687

Online contact information

YES

741

2.66

1.348

(OCO)

NO

10

2.70

1.767

Other family members’ information

YES

743

1.49

.832

(FAM)

NO

10

2.70

1.767

Everyday life

YES

743

3.53

1.124

(LIF)

NO

10

3.20

1.687

a Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). b Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). c Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

hold back the very sensitive information to prevent cyber stalking and other consequences. That is why insensitive information, such as online contact information and everyday life, does not show any significant differences between the haves and have-nots. Apparently, there is no harm to know the visual cues and insensitive information. The results show that the first context—the technology platforms—proves that privacy practices and concerns are situated. RQ4: What are online photo album users’ gratifications? This research extracts 10 factors with eigenvalues above 1.0 accounting for 67.39% of total variance from the original set of Internet

gratifications. The first gratification, named as information-seeking, contains seven items (α = 0.89), including learning about local community events, getting useful information, finding bargains, and getting up to date with new technology (see Table 4). Factor two is characterized as media drenching (α = 0.88). This factor indicates that respondents increase their usages of online photo albums and get updates from some of their favorite albums. The third gratification, named as diversion (α = 0.85), results from the pleasurable experience of content. The fourth and fifth gratifications, named respectively as performance and narcissism, are unprecedented in prior research. The factor performance (α = 0.83) refers to users’ media drenching facilitating a discussion to



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

particular persons or things. Users then perform their identity of fans/followers and also show their attachment and knowledge. The factor narcissism (α = 0.82) points out that users desire for increased visibility/knowledge as a basis for performance and show their special identities, not only on the Internet, but also outside the Internet. The sixth and seventh gratifications are relationship maintenance (α = 0.90) and aesthetic experience (α = 0.88). Those findings are comparable to those of Song et al. Unlike virtual community, the factor relationship maintenance focuses on existing acquaintances, not new friends on the Internet. Aesthetic experience fits the needs of aesthetic pleasure. The eighth gratification is virtual community (α = 0.82), which is similar to the finding of Song et al. Users try to establish a new social life online. The ninth and tenth gratifications are named as function (α = 0.60) and reference (α = 0.82). These two are unprecedented. Saving files and finding albums that are easy to navigate are goaloriented examples. Users take album owners’

released information as a reference and plan to do the same thing. They do not pursue pleasurable experiences only, but put what they learn into practice in the real world. Which gratifications are more like ones that diffused audiences may have? According to Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998), narcissism, performance and media drenching undoubtedly could be categorized as “diffused audiences’ gratifications.” Virtual community in name only, seems to have no connection with a diffused audience. If we look into the meaning, we find out that the purpose of virtual community is in finding companionship and meeting new friends and the way of finding companionship is through establishing special identities to appeal to new friends (Papacharissi, 2004; Song et al., 2004). This is quite like the argument of the SPP, whereby audiences form their identities to perform and to be narcissistic. Respondents show 10 gratifications while using online photo albums in this study. How do the gratifications influence users’ privacy con-

Table 4. Online photo album gratification factor loadings Loading Eigenvalue Variance

α

Factor 1: Information seeking (IS) Learn about local community events

.547

Get fashion information

.738

Get travel information

.851

Get gourmet food information

.860

Get useful information about products or services

.837

Find bargains on product and services

.513

Get up to date with new technology

.587

5.31

10.83

0.89

4.03

8.232

0.88

Factor 2: Media drenching (MD) Spend lots of time checking online photo albums without awareness

.730

Checking albums is a part of my life

.757

Have my favorite albums

.787

Check if those albums are updated regularly

.794

Expect new photos from people I like

.705

Factor 3: Diversion (DV) Have fun

.575

continued on following page



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

Table 4. continued Feel excited

.520

Feel entertained

.754

Feel relaxed

.738

Kill time

.655

3.57

7.292

0.85

3.52

7.190

0.83

3.52

7.179

0.82

3.47

7.088

0.90

3.21

6.559

.88

3.01

6.153

.82

1.75

3.565

.59

1.62

3.301

.82

Factor 4: Performance (PF) Download favorite persons’ pictures

.568

Discuss particular persons from albums with friends

.576

Discuss particular persons from albums in BBS

.711

Find relative information of particular persons from albums

.644

Let others know I am a fan of particular persons, from albums

.686

Enjoy browsing online photo album

.608

Factor 5: Narcissism (NA) Develop a romantic relationship

.574

Get people to think I am “cool”

.641

Improve my standing in the world

.700

Feel like I belong to a group

.507

Find ways to make more money

.545

Get noted

.610

Factor 6: Relationship maintenance (RM) Get in touch with people I know

.744

Keep posted about relatives and friends

.879

Want to see relatives and friends’ recent pictures

.885

Want to see relatives and friends’ social life

.798

Factor 7: Aesthetic experience (AE) Find cool new albums

.645

See albums with pleasing designs

.659

Find some gorgeous persons’ pictures

.636

Find attractive graphics

.660

See albums with pleasing color schemes

.568

Factor 8: Virtual community (VC) Find more interesting people than in real life

.637

Meet someone in person who I met on Internet

.535

Find companionship

.755

Meet new friends

.674

Factor 9: Function (FN) Save picture files

.777

Find albums that are easy to navigate

.519

Factor 10: Reference (RE) Check where particular persons from albums have been

.600

Go to the same place where particular persons from albums went

.719

Total variance explained = 67.39%



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

cerns and practices? Do the “diffused audiences’ gratifications” make any differences from other gratifications? Do respondents with “diffused audiences’ gratifications” care less about privacy and disclose more information or anything else? This is articulated in next section. RQ5: What is the relationship between gratifications and privacy concerns? H4: Those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences, are concerned less about privacy. A correlation coefficient may be difficult to assess just by examining the coefficient itself. In this research, the correlation between factors, privacy concerns, and general privacy concerns is considered low (see Table 5). Nevertheless, the researcher should consider the situation when interpreting correlation coefficient sizes. Jaeger points out (1990, cited from Reinard, 2006): “whether a correlation coefficient is large or small, you have to know what is typical.” Thus, the study pays more attention to a comparison of correlation coefficients between factors and privacy concerns in order to see how different gratifications influence respondents’ privacy concerns. The descending order of correlation coefficients between gratifications and general privacy concerns is diversion, relationship maintenance, aesthetic experience, reference, media drenching, function, information seeking, virtual community, performance, and narcissism. All are significant, but if we look at each question deeply, users with different gratifications do have diverse aspects of privacy concerns. There are six gratifications which do not correlate with Q1 significantly. The coefficients of media drenching, diversion, relationship maintenance, and reference are significant. Among 12 questions, Q1 and Q7 (Q7 will be discussed later) seem not to irritate users’ privacy concerns as much as others. Why do some respondents not feel bothersome when a website asks them for



personal information? This context should be considered. The respondents with information seeking, performance, narcissism, aesthetic experience, virtual community, and function have no choices, but register sites do provide information in order to use services. Therefore, these six correlation coefficients are insignificant. As for Q2, respondents with performance, narcissism, and virtual community gratifications seem not to think twice before providing personal information—“when a Web site asks me for it.” Unlike with Q2, virtual community gratification has a significant correlation with Q3. Why do respondents with virtual community gratification think that Web sites should take more steps to make sure that unauthorized people cannot access personal information in their computers? Net users usually have several identities on several communities. Without preventing unauthorized access, users would be easier recognized by cross-referencing. Performance, narcissism, and function have an insignificant correlation with Q3. Users with these gratifications do care less about unauthorized people access information. Information seeking, performance, narcissism, virtual community, and function do not correlate with Q4. Those with these gratifications do not worry about their personal information being used for any other reason by the Web sites which they give information. In addition, all gratifications correlate to Q5, which means the respondents all care about data error. As for Q6, only respondents with performance, narcissism, and virtual community care less about the database being protected from unauthorized access—no matter how much it costs (no significant correlation). Comparing Q3 and Q6, it seems that users with virtual community only care about unauthorized people accessing information and do not care about protecting databases in a broad sense. The correlation of Question 7 and gratifications is worth deliberating. Only four gratifications, diversion, relationship maintenance, aesthetic experience and reference, have a significant

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

usually have a higher correlation coefficient. It might be the reason that users with these two gratifications, to some extent, have to count on the Web sites’ services to fulfill the tasks. By the same token, information seeking and function do not correlate with Q1, Q4, Q7, and Q9 significantly. Although all gratifications significantly correlate with Q10, users with relationship maintenance, function, reference, and division worry more about information being collected. On the other hand, respondents with narcissism, virtual community, and performance gratifications are willing to expose themselves to the Internet. Correspondingly, they are not concerned that websites are collecting too much personal information about them. As for Q11 (protecting online privacy through strong laws), performance and narcissism do not have a significant correlation with it, but 10 gratifications all significantly correlate with Q12 (through corporate policies). In general, respondents who have privacy concerns in descending order usually use online photo albums with diver-

correlation with Q7. Taking research situations into consideration, when users use online photo albums for diversion, aesthetic experience, and reference, they usually do the activities alone and do not prepare to have any interaction with others online. That is why they feel particularly bothersome when websites ask them to register or submit personal information before using them. As for relationship maintenance, this gratification could be seen as an in-group need. Users tend to have interaction with their acquaintances online. Following Taylor, Franke, and Maynard’s (2000) argument, people with more in-group privacy are more sensitive to differentiating between people “inside” and “outside” their “private world.” Q8—data transferring seems not a big deal for respondents with narcissism, performance, and virtual community, and this makes sense under the SPP paradigm. Those who are more interested in being identified and noted are not concerned about data transferring, which ironically might satisfy their needs to catch more people’s eyes. Interestingly, Q9 does not correlate significantly with information seeking and function, which

Table 5. Correlation between factors and privacy concerns IS

MD c

DV

PF

NA

.127

a

.031

RM

AE

VC

FN

RE

.003

b

.096

.061

-.030

.021

.080c

1.

-.001

.082

2.

.116b

.127a

.137a

.066

.049

.142a

.136a

.061

.071c

.123a

3.

.093b

.131a

.205a

.060

.049

.170a

.173a

.097b

.063

.154a

4.

.050

.137

a

.204

a

.037

.009

a

.203

.138

a

.036

.063

.102b

5.

.139a

.218a

.223a

.177a

.124b

.164a

.229a

.172a

.201a

.200a

6.

.089

c

.141

a

.169

a

.050

.008

a

.179

.169

a

.060

c

.088

.128a

7.

.039

.054

.160a

.040

.037

.089c

.103b

-.013

.057

.084c

8.

.093b

.153a

.198a

.056

.016

.214a

.166a

.064

.089c

.126a

9.

.019

.115

b

.164

a

.040

-.027

a

.186

.144

a

.016

.064

.079c

10.

.119b

.147a

.153a

.093b

.108b

.177a

.145a

.108b

.167c

.164a

11.

.132a

.168a

.158a

.029

.053

.170a

.168a

.071c

.186a

.165a

12.

.169

a

a

a

b

a

a

a

a

a

Gen.

.127b

.163

.177

.101

.139

.147

.163

.130

.180

.157a

.195a

.247a

.107b

.083c

.236a

.219b

.109b

.156a

.206a

a Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). b Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).c Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

variables. The 10 gratifications account for 12.0% of the variance in privacy concerns. The regression analysis with the stepwise method demonstrates more details of these three significant gratifications (see Table 7). The strongest variable is relationship maintenance, and then diversion and reference. The three gratifications account for 10.4% of the variance in privacy concerns. It explains that uses and gratifications should be an important predictor for privacy concerns, which is unprecedented.

sion, relation maintenance, aesthetic experience, reference, media drenching, function, information seeking, virtual community, performance, and narcissism gratifications. Hypothesis H4 is sustained. Those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences (performance, narcissism, and virtual community) are concerned less about privacy. However, media drenching seems to be not a gratification which can be categorized into the diffused audiences’ gratifications with performance, narcissism, and virtual community. It only has an insignificant correlation with Q7. How much do those surveyed gratifications influence privacy concerns? The regression analysis with the enter method (see Table 6) illustrates that information seeking, performance, narcissism, and virtual community are all negative and insignificant predictors of privacy concerns, which corresponds with the SPP argument of this study. Media drenching, aesthetic experience, and function are positive, but not significant predictors. Diversion, relationship maintenance, and reference are all positive and significant independent

RQ6: What is the relationship between gratifications and posting pictures? H5: Those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences post more pictures on the Internet. RQ7: What is the relationship between gratifications and privacy practices? H6: Those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences disclose more of their information.

Table 6. Regressoion analysis with the enter Table 7. Regressoion analysis with the stepwise method method Model 1

Beta

-1.621

.064

1.247

.192

3.464

b

Performance

-.072

-1.419

Narcissism

-.050

-.934

Diversion

.134

3.097b

Aesthetic Experience

.094

1.701

Virtual Community

-.032

-.581

Reference

8

Model

8.886a

.120

1

Beta (Constant) Relationship Maintenance

2

Relationship Maintenance

Function

R2

t

F

22.850

46.303

a

a

R2

10.707 -.085

Media Drenching

F a

(Constant) Information Seeking

t

.256

(Constant)

.066 .066

6.805 a 14.341 a

3

Relationship Maintenance

.191

4.799 a

Diversion

.180

4.527 a

(Constant)

34.086

.104

.151

3.584 a a

.661

Diversion

.159

3.952

.119

c

Reference

.114

2.760 a

.028

.010

a

Relationship Maintenance

.094

a

12.263

.029

2.535

R2 change

25.492 a

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

In order to inspect RQ6, RQ7, H5, and H6, this research adopts the Pearson correlation analysis (see Table 8). For those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences, including performance, narcissism, and virtual community, there is no significant correlation between these three gratifications and posting clear pictures of themselves on the Internet. For those whose gratifications are media drenching, diversion, relationship maintenance, and reference, there is a significant negative correlation, which means they tend not to post clear pictures of themselves. Those four gratifications are so private that users will usually lurk and not be known. There is also no significant correlation between these three gratifications (performance, narcissism, and virtual community) and posting clear pictures of friends and relatives on the Internet. In addition, there is a significant negative correlation between these three gratifications (media drenching, relationship maintenance, and reference) and posting clear pictures of friends and relatives on the Internet. This study cannot directly prove that those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences will post more pictures on the Internet. However, it does find out that those whose gratifications are more private disclose fewer pictures of themselves, friends, and relatives. Thus, H5 is rejected and should be revised as those whose gratifications are more private post fewer pictures on the Internet. Privacy practices, interestingly enough, have a significant correlation with diffused audience gratifications, but conflicting with Hypothesis 6, those who have performance, narcissism, and virtual community gratifications do not disclose more. On the contrary, narcissism gratification has a significant negative correlation with disclosing contact information, online contact information, other family members’ information, and everyday life. Performance gratification has a significant negative correlation with online contact information, other family members’ information, and

everyday life. Virtual community gratification has a significant negative correlation with disclosing contact information, online contact information, and other family members’ information. If we look more into the contexts, it makes senses again. There is a difference between performance and narcissism, although they are grouped as diffused audience gratifications. Those who have performance gratification are cultists, enthusiasts, or petty producers for some particular themes or persons. They are willing to disclose information to others who are not as professional as they are. They even enjoy being a pro in the field. People who have narcissism gratification are not crazy for a particular theme or person. Their performance subjects are themselves. Thus, they already post a lot of information and hesitate to give away contact information, online contact information, and other family members’ information, which might ruin their identities created online. For performance, they see online contact information as being more sensitive than contact information. This is so different from previous research. Although people with performance gratification are willing to be famous due to their professions, do they really feel no harm at being reached in the real word? Why do they hold back their online contact information instead of contact information? The reason might be homepages, blogs, and those self-disclosure tools on the Internet are categorized into online contact information, which might reveal more about themselves. Additionally, users are known to some extent as having either performance or narcissism gratifications. Thus, they reserve other family members’ information and everyday life. As for virtual community, those who want to meet people online hold back their information in real life. Therefore, they do not want to disclose their contact information, online contact information, and other family members’ information, which would be traced back to their attribution. As long as they remain anonymous in their real life,

9

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

it would be fine for them to give away information about their everyday life. This study cannot directly prove that those whose gratifications are more like diffused audiences disclose more on the Internet. Thus, H6 is rejected, but there is more worth examining. In contrast, this study finds that users with performance, narcissism, and virtual community have some particular consideration due to their disclosing many pictures. As for correlation of other gratifications and privacy practices, information seeking, diversion, aesthetic experience, and function have a significant negative correlation with online contact information. Nevertheless, there is no significant correlation of any gratification with contact information. Why does the insensitive type of information have a significant correlation with more private gratifications? The reason might be that those with more private gratifications take securing sensitive information online for granted and have never thought about giving it away, which makes the statistic results irrelevant. However, they do think twice about the consequences of giving away the insensitive information. Take relationship maintenance as an example. Demography and everyday life have a significant negative correlation. Why not other information types? If we consider the in-group privacy characteristics of relationship maintenance, the answer is obvious. In-group members do not want to share information about this group to others. Media drenching gratification only has a sig-

nificant negative correlation with everyday life. We do not have a clear idea why media drenching has no correlation with others. It is logical to presume that media drenching users love to show their expertise about some celebrities or things, but they may not love to be known about how s/he did it. Everyday life is somehow sensitive for media drenching users. Indeed, the simple statistics cannot tell more about the relationship between them, but they reveal that contexts do play very important roles on users’ privacy practices.

solutions and recommendations Each of the significant relationships is provocative and invites further thinking and research on the associations of privacy and contexts which the adversarial paradigm neglects. Although users who have online photo albums are concerned less about privacy than the have-nots in general, it does not always mean the haves will disclose any information more than the have-nots. This might come about because of two important contexts. The first context is the common operations of online photo albums. Online photo album users post many pictures online, and they might hold back the very sensitive information to prevent cyber stalking and other consequences. The second context is from patrons’ gratifications. Based upon the interpretation, we have seen how users’ gratifications of using a technology platform impact their privacy concerns

Table 8. Correlation between factors and privacy practices IS

DV a

-.076

PCU

.024

-.198

PFR

.050

-.153 a

DEM

.033

-.051

PF c

NA

RM

AE

VC

FN

RE

a

-.045

.061

-.065

-.179 a

-.062

-.126 b

-.031

-.065

-.023

-.022

-.314

.007

-.018

-.004

-.272 a

.006

.090

-.004

-.062

.001

-.082 c

-.004

.007

b

c

CON

-.045

.058

-.005

-.024

-.112

.072

.004

-.078

-.038

.001

OCO

-.086 c

-.015

-.143 a

-.103 b

-.151 a

-.020

-.104 b

-.179 a

-.075 c

-.024

FAM

-.079 c

-.020

.011

-.083 c

-.156 a

.057

.020

-.101b

-.033

-.006

c

c

-.046

-.062

-.028

-.163 a

LIF

0

MD

-.019

-.164

a

-.088

c

-.075

-.077

-.178

a

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

and practices. H5 is rejected. It instead finds out that those whose gratifications are more private disclose fewer pictures of themselves, friends, and relatives. H6 is also rejected. For those who already post many pictures, or are more diffused audience-oriented, might think about possible consequences and hold back information. As for the relationships between privacy concerns and gratifications, the descending order of correlation coefficients between gratifications and privacy concerns is diversion, relationship maintenance, aesthetic experience, reference, media drenching, function, information seeking, virtual community, performance, and narcissism. From the standpoint of uses and gratifications and the SPP, this study’s findings highlight the idea that the gratifications are categorized as three groups. The first group includes performance, narcissism, and virtual community. Respondents who use online photo albums with these three gratifications like expose themselves to the Internet world in order to meet people and even become noted. The second group consists of information seeking, function, and media drenching. Respondents with these three gratifications are goal-oriented. They adopt online photo albums for some purposes, such as seeking information, storing files, and checking their favorite albums. They do not like to meet people or become famous. The third group comprises diversion, relation maintenance, aesthetic experience, and reference, or four gratifications. They are not as goal-oriented as respondents with the second group’s gratifications. Their purposes are more like seeking personal pleasure which is usually kept secret or sharing with some in-group persons only. Media drenching originally categorized as diffused audiences’ gratifications is an interesting one. Users with this one do not like to put clear picture of themselves, relatives, and friends on the Internet. However, it only has a significant negative correlation with everyday life (privacy practices) and a non-significant correlation with

Q7 (privacy concerns). By looking at the questions composing the factor, the context influences are revealed. Media drenching users enjoy being a pro on their favorite field and make efforts to maintain their expertise, but they do want to reveal their efforts and resources. Therefore, media drenching instead is categorized into the second group, which often does things secretly. The diverse aspects of privacy concerns caused by different gratifications do show up in this study’s findings. For example: Information seeking does not have a significant correlation with Q1, Q4, Q7, and Q9. Those questions relate to collection and unauthorized secondary use (Smith et al., 1996). This study finds that users with information seeking are not concerned more about information being used by other Web sites, but are concerned about their information being used by unauthorized individuals. The message here is that users who want to use Web site services to seek information should scarify their privacy in some sense, but it does not mean that being accessed by unauthorized individuals is endurable. Function does not have a significant correlation with Q1, Q3, Q4, Q7, and Q9 either. Those questions relate to the improper use of information and collection which Hsu’s (2006) study defines. As long as Web sites protect data well, users with the function gratification do not worry about collection and secondary use. They need the safe spaces for file storage more than have privacy. The more diffused audience gratifications, including performance, narcissism, and virtual community, only have a significant correlation with Q5, Q10, and Q12. It reveals that users with these three gratifications only care about data error, collecting too much personal information about them, and protecting privacy through corporate policies. They do not care about Web sites’ registration collection, secondary uses, or unauthorized access (except virtual community). Users with virtual communication have two more aspect of privacy concerns—unauthorized access



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

and protecting privacy through strong laws. Accordingly, it is quite reasonable that users manage pure online relationships with special cautions of being cheated or their identity in the real world being divulged. This in turn begs the question: What gratification might entail users to care more about their privacy? By looking at both correlation and regression analyses, relation maintenance, diversion, and reference gratifications predict privacy concerns with a 10.4% variance. Three gratifications are gained from using online photo albums secretly or sharing with some in-group persons. Thus, they care about collection, data error, unauthorized access, and secondary uses, and hope that privacy can be protected by both strong laws and corporate policy. As for other gratifications, they are not significant predictors at all. Moreover, relation maintenance raises the interesting challenge to understanding the international/intercultural differences of privacy (Taylor et al., 2000). Does the in-group privacy phenomenon only happen in Taiwan or Asian countries? Could it be applied to other countries and cultures? By doing this research, the author tries to prove that current online privacy theories, frameworks, and models are not thoughtful. The situational paradigm could seem to be a solution for online privacy research. Speaking of the situational paradigm, two common questions are brought up most. First, when it comes to contexts, there are no concrete answers to questions. It is not possible to depict privacy, because it depends on the contexts. Second, how can we account for any kind of contexts? The situational paradigm does not mean contexts or situations are omnipotent. We need to keep in mind that users’ behavior patterns and environment risks are not static, but dynamic, especially in Internet settings. Thus, it would be unguarded and arbitrary to conclude what types of persons care more about their privacy and disclose less information. The findings also give a positive answer to the main questions of this book: There are no absolute truths on



online consumer protection, but instead theories of human relativism. This study sheds new light of how users’ gratifications influence their privacy concerns and practices. This is unprecedented. Internet users’ uses and gratification are not static either. Testing with an a priori theoretical framework, the SPP shows that the current Internet gratifications studies are not sufficient to account for album users’ behaviors. This study upholds that future online privacy research should not take the Internet as a whole, but rather differentiate technology platforms first. Moreover, when studying a new technology platform, the researchers have to find social contexts which are essential to users’ privacy concerns and practices and accordingly study what makes users disclose and hold back their information. This study also gives hints to policy-making and the information gathering, storage, and retrieval of Web sites. At the macro level, policy makers have to recognize the differences between technology platforms and users’ needs. As this book’s theme suggests, theories of human relativism matter for online consumer protection. The minimum protection of personal data protection, including notice/awareness, choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security, and enforcement/redress, should be implemented by legislation. After fulfilling the basic fair information principles, the next part takes contexts into consideration to compose somehow comprehensive principles. Self-regulation is a more proper mechanism to focus on the details of compliance, standardization, and consequence based upon context differences. Self-regulation quickly adjusts the changing technology and provides prompt and detailed guidelines for data users with adequate levels of standardization and non-compliance penalties. Web sites could follow users’ purposes to tailor privacy statements and provide useful services which can obtain valuable information good for marketing (Hsu, 2006).

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

At the micro level, this study introduces Moor’s (1997) “zones of privacy” for solutions of possible privacy infringements caused by reckless net users. A zone of privacy is a set of privacy situations in which people become aware of aspects of their personal information that may be damaged if made public. In the Internet setting, with different zones of privacy, individuals can judge what type and how much information to keep private and which to make public by their uses and gratifications and other needs. Following this logic, a combination of privacy and technology education is suggested to assure privacy protection for net users. Privacy education should be taught not only in schools, but also in the community and society by means of media and reports. With basic know-how of online privacy, net users need to learn possible consequences and further take responsibility of their information disclosure.

future trends In previous studies, Web sites categories, regulation, culture/nation, demographics, physical environment, and technology contexts are all examined. There are many contexts left uncovered. It is crucial to find more contexts which are able to predict net users’ behaviors on the Internet. It additionally seems that the purposes of using varied forms of computer-mediated communication (CMC) influence Net users’ privacy concerns and practices. It is also essential to find their purposes of using CMC. Take this research as an example. The uses and gratifications approach and the SPP provide a glimpse of how users’ individual needs influence their privacy concerns and practices. Users who have more private gratifications act and are concerned are so differently from those who have more spectacular and performance gratifications. Researchers not only discover the predictive power of contexts, but also further examine their

interrelationship. The next step is to use structural equation models (SEM) such as LISREL, to confirm the relationship.

conclusIon This study explores gratifications of online photo album users in Taiwan and finds the distinctive “staging” phenomenon with media gratifications and a priori theoretical framework—the spectacle/ performance paradigm (SPP). Media drenching, performance, function, and reference are “new” gratifications, which no prior research has found. Performance, narcissism, and virtual community gratifications are consistent with the argument of the “diffused audience” on the Internet. This research then examines online privacy concerns and practices with two contexts: technology platforms (online photo album websites) and users’ gratifications (staging phenomenon) under the situational paradigm. It finds that users’ gratifications influence users’ privacy concerns and practices accordingly. Users with more diffused audience gratifications are concerned less about privacy, but do not necessarily disclose more of their information. They judge the contexts first before disclosing information. Studying online privacy therefore needs to adopt the situational paradigm instead of the adversarial paradigm. The findings provide implications to policy-making in that online privacy protection should not be fixed, but rather should take human relativism into consideration.

future reseArch dIrectIons The uses and gratifications perspective is one of the precious few theories that the communication discipline can really call its own (Lin, 1996). Theoretically, gratifications can be categorized into two dimensions: “gratifications that result from the pleasurable experience of media content



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

and are realized during consumption (i.e., process gratifications) and gratifications that result from learning information from media content and subsequently put it to use in practical affairs (i.e., content gratification). How do both types of gratification influence privacy concerns and practices? The process-content distinction may simply not be an applicable one in Internet settings since distinctions between the real world and the mediated world are vanishing, which is also the main argument of the SPP paradigm. Online photo album users’ consumption is gradually more woven into the fabric of everyday life. Societies have become more performative with an increasing spectacularisation of the social world and narcissistic individuals. Given that, is there no difference between these two types of gratification on privacy concerns and practices? It is certainly worth examining. Communication scholars not only can employ their very own theory on privacy studying, but can also provide a more focused view on the communication interaction process than scholars from other fields, which will facilitate profound online privacy theories, frameworks, and models. Thus, building an interdisciplinary privacy research community should be the future research trajectory.

references Abercrombie, N., & Longhurst, B. (1998). Audiences: A sociological theory of performance and imagination. CA: Sage Publication. Barreto, M., & Ellemers, N. (2002). The impact of anonymity and group identification on progroup behavior in computer-mediated groups. Small Group Research, 33, 590-610. Bennett, C. J. (1992). Regulating privacy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.



Charney R., & Greenberg, B. S. (2002). Uses and gratifications of the Internet. In C. Lin & D. Atkin (Eds.), Communication, technology and society: New media adoption and uses. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Cho, H., & LaRose, R. (1999). Privacy issues in Internet surveys. Social Science Computer Review, 17(4), 421-434. Chou, C., & Hsiao M. C. (2000). Internet addiction, usage, gratification, and pleasure experience: the Taiwan college students’ case. Computers & Education,35, 65-80. Culnan, M. (1999a). Georgetown Internet privacy policy survey: Report to the federal trade commission. Retrieved December 10, 2000, from http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/gippshome. html Culnan, M. (1999b). Privacy and the top 100 web sites: Report to the federal trade commission. Retrieved Dec 10, 2000, from http://www.msb. edu/faculty/culnanm/gippshome.html Culnan, M., & Armstrong, P. (1999), Information privacy concerns, procedural fairness, and impersonal trust: An empirical evidence. Organization Science, 10(1), 104-115. Dominick, J. (1999). Who do you think you are? Personal home pages and self-presentation on the world wide web. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 76, 646-658. Döring, N. (2002). Personal home pages on the web: A review of research. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 7(3). Retrieved December 26, 2003, from http://jcmc.indiana. edu/vol7/issue3/doering.html Federal Trade Commission. (1998, June). Privacy online: A report to congress. Retrieved January 2, 2001, from http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3 Federal Trade Commission. (1999, July). Selfregulation and privacy online: A federal trade

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

commission report to congress. Retrieved January 2, 2001, from http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/ index.htm#13 Federal Trade Commission. (2000, May). Privacy online: Fair information practices in the electronic marketplace: A federal trade commission report to congress. Retrieved January 2, 2001, from http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/index. htm#22 Ferguson, D. A., & Perse, E.M. (2000). The world wide web as a functional alternative to television. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 44, 155-174. Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/decoding. In S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe, & P. Willis (Eds.), Culture, media, language: Working papers in cultural studies. London: Hutchinson. Hine, C., & Eve, J. (1998). Privacy in the marketplace. Information Society, 14(4), 253-262. Hoffman, D. L., & Novak, T. P. (1996). Marketing in hypermedia computer-mediated environments: conceptual foundations. Journal of Marketing, 60(3), 50-68. Hoffman, D. L., Novak, T. P. & Peralta, M. A. (1999, April-June). Information privacy in the marketspace: Implications for the commercial uses of anonymity on the web. Information Society, 15(2), 129-139.

Retrieved March 26, 2006, from http://www. ettoday.com/2006/02/17/10845-1906739.htm Kate, N. (1998, January). Women want privacy. American Demographics, 20(1), 37. Katz, E., Blumler, J., & Gurevitch, M. (1974). Utilization of mass communication by the individual. In J. G. Blumler & E. Katz (Eds.), The uses of mass communication: Current perspectives on gratifications research (pp. 19-34). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Katz, E., Gurevitch, M., & Hass, S. (1973). On the use of mass media for important things. American Sociological Review, 38,164-181. Kaye, B. K. (1998). Uses and gratifications of the world wide web: From couch potato to web potato. The New Jersey Journal of Communication, 6, 21-40. Keith, W. B. (2005). Internet addition: A review of current assessment techniques and potential assessment questions. Cyberpsychology & Behavior, 8(1), 7-14. Kershaw, B. (1994). Framing the audience for theater. In R. Keat, N. Whiteley, & N. Abercrombie (Eds.), The authority of the consumer. London: Routledge. Korgaonkar, P. K., & Wolin, L. D. (1999). A multivariate analysis of web usage. Journal of Advertising Research, 39(2), 53-68.

Hsu, C. W. (2002). Online privacy issues: Comparison between net users’ concerns and web sites’ privacy statements. Paper presented to the 52nd Annual Conference of International Communication Association, Seoul, Korea.

LaRose, R., Mastro, D. A., & Eastin, M. S. (2001). Understanding internet usage: A social cognitive approach to uses and gratifications. Social Computer Review, 19, 395-413.

Hsu, C. W. (2006). Privacy concerns/privacy practices: Toward a situational paradigm. Online Information Review, 30(5), 569-586.

Lea, M., Spears, R., & de Groot, D. (2001). Knowing me, knowing you: Anonymity effects on social identity processes within groups. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 526-537.

Jhu, C. H., & Yung, H. C. (2006, February 17). The hit beauty in online photo album becomes a TV anchor and a celebrity in showbiz. Ettoday.

Lelia, G. (2001). Treating internet users as “audiences”: Suggesting some research directions.



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

Australian Journal of Communication, 28(1), 33-42. Lin, C. A. (1996). Looking back: The contribution of Blumler and Katz’s uses of mass communication to communication research. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 40(4), 574-581. Livingstone, S. (2004). The challenge of changing audiences: Or, what is the audience researcher to do in the age of the Internet? European Journal of Communication, 19(1), 75-86. Longhurst, B., Bagnall, G., & Savage, M. (2004). Audiences, museums and the English middle class. Museum and Society, 2(2), 104-124. McKenna, K. Y. A., & Bargh, J. A. (2000). Plan 9 from cyberspace: The implications of the internet for personality and social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 57-75. Milne, G. R., Culnan, M. J., & Greene, H. (2006). A longitudinal assessment of online privacy notice readability. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(2), 238-249. Milne, G. R., & Rohm, A. J. (2000). Consumer privacy and name removal across direct marketing channels: Exploring opt-in and opt-out alternative. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(2), 238-249. Moor, J. H. (1997). Towards a theory of privacy in the information age. Computers and Society, 27(3), 27-32. Morris, M., & Ogan, C. (1996). The internet as a mass medium. Journal of Communication, 46(1), 39-50. O’Neil, D. (2001). Analysis of internet users’ level of online privacy concerns. Social Science Computer Review, 19(1), 17-31. O’Sullivan, P. B. (2000). What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Impression management functions of communication channels in relationships. Human Communication Research, 26(3), 403-431.



Palmgreen, P., Wenner, L. A., & Rosengren, K. E. (1985). Uses and gratifications research: The past ten years. In K. E. Rosengren, L. A. Wenner, & P. Palmgreen (Eds.), Media gratifications research: Current perspective (pp. 11-37). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Papacharissi, Z. (2002). The self online: The utility of personal home pages. Journal of Broadcasting &Electronic Media, 46(3), 346-368. Papacharissi, Z. (2004, May). The blogger revolution? Audiences as media producers. Paper presented at the annual convention of the International Communication Association, New Orleans, LA. Parker, B. J., & Plank, R. E. (2000). A use and gratifications perspective on the internet as a new information source. American Business Review, 18(2), 43-49. Plichtova, J., & Brozmanova, E. (1997). Social representations of the individual and the community well-being: Comparison of the empirical data from 1993 and 1995. Sociologia, 29(4), 375-404. Postmes, T., Spears, R., Sakhel, K., & de Groot, D. (2001). Social influence in computer-mediated communication: The effects of anonymity on group behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1243-1254. Raab, C. D., & Bennett, C. J. (1998). The distribution of privacy risks: Who needs protection? The Information Society, 14, 263-274. Reinard, J. C. (2006). Communication research statistics. CA: Sage. Sheehan, K. B. (2002). Toward a typology of Internet users and online privacy concerns. The Information Society, 18, 21-32. Sixsmith, J., & Murray, C. D. (2001). Ethical issues in the documentary data analysis of internet posts and archives. Qualitative Health Research, 11(3), 423-432.

Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

Smith, H. J., Milburg, S. J. & Burke, S. J. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, 20(2), 167-196. Song, I., LaRose, R., Eastin, M. S., & Lin, C. A. (2004). Internet gratifications and internet addiction: On the uses and abuses of new media. CyberPsychology &Behavior, 7(4), 384-394. Spector, L. (2003, December 26). Guide to online photo album sites: Here’s how to post and share digital memories of your holidays. PC World. Retrieved April 14, 2004, from http://www.pcworld. com/news/article/0,aid,114040,00.asp

Young, K. S. (1998). Internet addiction: the emergence of a new clinical disorder. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 1(3), 237-244.

AddItIonAl reAdIng Bennett, C., & Raab, C. (2006). The governance of privacy policy instruments in global perspective (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press Bird, S. E. (2003). The audience in everyday life: Living in a media world. N.Y. and London: Routledge.

Swanson, D. L. (1992). Understanding audiences: Continuing contributions of gratifications research. Poetics, 21, 305-328.

Blumler, J. G., & Katz, E. (1974). The uses of mass communications: Current perspectives on gratifications research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Taylor, C. R., Franke, G. R., & Marynard, M. L. (2000). Attitudes toward direct marketing and its regulation: A comparison of the United States and Japan. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(2), 228-237.

Detrk, D., Bos, A. E. R., & Grumbkow, J. (2007, January). Emoticons and social interaction on the internet: the importance of social context. Computers in Human Behavior, 23(1), 842-849.

Timothy, R. (1999). The construction of the world wide web audience. Media, Culture & Society, 21(5), 673-684. Trammell, K. D., Williams, A. P., Postelincu, M., & Landreville, K. D. (2006). Evolution of online campaigning: Increasing interactivity in candidate web sites and blogs through text and technical features. Mass Communication & Society, 9(1), 21-44. Turow, J., & Hennessy, M. (2007). Internet privacy and institutional trust: Insights from a national survey. New Media & Society, 9(2), 300-318. Webster, J. G., & Lin, S. (2002). The internet audience: Web use as mass behavior. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 46, 1-12. Wei, R., & Lo, V. H. (2006). Staying connected while on the move: Cell phone use and social connectedness. New Media & Society, 8(1), 53-72.

Earp, J. B., & Baumer, D. (2003). Innovative web use to learn about consumer behavior and online privacy. Communication of the ACM, 46(4), 81-83. Hine, C., & Eve, J. (1998). Privacy in the marketplace. Information Society, 14(4), 253-262. Howard, P. N., & Jones, S. (Eds.). (2004). Society Online: The Internet in Context. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Hsu, C. W. (2003). A cross-country examination of online privacy issues: From an adversarial paradigm toward a situational paradigm--A comparison of regulations, net users’ concerns and practices, and web sites’ privacy statements in China, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and the United States. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo. Hsu, C. W. (2007). Staging on the internet: Research on online photo album users in Taiwan



Privacy or Performance Matters on the Internet

with the spectacle/performance paradigm (SPP). CyberPsychology & Behavior, 10(4), 596-600. Katz, J. E. & Rice, R. E. (2002). Social consequences of internet use: Access, involvement and interaction. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Lally, L. (1996). Privacy versus accessibility: The impact of situationally conditioned belief. Journal of Business Ethics, 15, 1221-1226. Lin, C. A. (1999). Online-service adoption likelihood. Journal of advertising research, 39 (2), 79-89. Lin, C. A., & Atkin, D. J. (Jan, 2002). Communication technology and society: Audience adoption and uses. The Hampton Press. Milberg, S. J., Smith, H. J., & Burke, S. J. (2000). Information privacy: Corporate management and national regulation. Organization Science, 11(1), 35-57.

8

Morris, M., Ogan, C. (1996). The internet as mass medium. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 1(4). Ribak, R., & Turow, J. (2003). Internet power and social context: A globalization approach to web privacy concerns. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 47(3), 328-349. Streeter, T. (1995, May). No respect! Disciplinarity and media studies in communication-- Introduction: For the study of communication and against the discipline of communication. Communication Theory, 5(2), 130-143. Tavani, H. T. (1999). Privacy online. Computers and Society, 29(4), 11-19. Yun, G. W., & Trumbo, C. W. (2000). Comparative response to a survey executed by post, e-mail, & web form. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, 6(1).

Section IV

Consumer Privacy in Business

0

Chapter XI

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems Tom S. Chan Southern New Hampshire University, USA J. Stephanie Collins Southern New Hampshire University, USA Shahriar Movafaghi Southern New Hampshire University, USA

AbstrAct While delivering content via the Internet can be efficient and economical, content owners risk losing control of their intellectual property. Any business that wishes to control access to and use of its intellectual property is a potential user of digital rights management (DRM) technologies. DRM control content delivery and distribution but it may affect users’ privacy rights. Exactly how it should be preserved is a matter of controversy; and the main industry solution is the W3C platform for privacy preferences (P3P) initiative. But, the issue remains unresolved, and industries and consumers are confronted with several incompatible standards.

IntroductIon The Internet has made an unprecedented impact in daily life. Broadband subscriptions in the U.S.

are projected to jump from 24 million in 2003 to nearly 50 million in 2008 (Cravens, 2004). The proliferation of digital technologies in homes, workplaces, and public places will enable a rap-

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

idly growing number of people to have access to the information superhighway. The e-commerce paradigm is both an opportunity and challenge to business. It also has implications for content owners and content users/consumers. While delivering content via the Internet can be efficient and economical, content owners risk losing control of their intellectual property. Use of software to control this delivery and distribution of digital content may also affect users’ privacy rights. A digital method of controlling access to and use of digital content must be developed, and used in combination with policies put in place in order to protect the rights of content owners without infringing on the rights of users. Any business that wishes to control access to and use of its intellectual property is a potential user of digital rights management (DRM) technologies. DRM technologies are any of various computer-based methods of protecting digitally stored content, usually applied to creative media. These include various ways of enforcing access control to authorized users only. This may be done through different strategies or combinations of strategies that may include: a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

Identifying authorized users; Identifying genuine content; Verifying proof of ownership and purchase; Uniquely identifying each copy of the content; Preventing content copying; Tracking content usage and distribution; and Hiding content from unauthorized users.

The entertainment industry is leading the charge for DRM adoption as a means to preserve their copyrights. Because the online distribution of digital content is different from physical distribution of content incorporated on media (downloading music vs. buying a CD), many digital content providers are actively reevaluating

their business models. They are opting to move from a traditional buy-and-own to a pay-per-use model with the incorporation of DRM technologies (ClickZ, 2003). However, this trend poses great risks to consumers and society. DRM technologies weaken the rights to privacy, fair use, and threaten the freedom of expression (EPIC, 2002). Naturally, everyone is in favor of privacy. Exactly how it should be preserved is a matter of controversy; and the main industry initiative facilitating online privacy is the W3C platform for privacy preferences initiative. At the moment, consumers are faced with several incompatible standards, and thus may face different kinds of threats to privacy as a result. When no standard exists, each content distributor’s DRM system must be treated individually. Content distributors continue the struggle with technology companies over which form of DRM should be included in the next generation of products and services. Some providers even made contents available without DRM protection at all (EMI, 2007). At stake is the future of consumer interactions with, and uses of, copyrighted digital media. The conflict is between the rights of content owners and the privacy rights of content users. This chapter will discuss several DRM techniques and how their use could affect consumer privacy.

producers’ rights: legal framework for copyrights A copyright is the legal right granted to an author, composer, playwright, publisher, or distributor to exclusive publication, production, sale, or distribution of a literary, musical, dramatic, or artistic work. It provides content creators with the legal right to be paid for, and to control the use of their creations. The foundation for copyright is based on the U.S. Constitution which gives congress the power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries” (LII, 2007a).



Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

The copyright law grants copyright holders the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display subject to limitations, qualifications, or exemptions (LII, 2007b). Copyright law is created to uphold a balance, and it is never absolute. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that copyright monopoly is established primarily to benefit the public interest. For example, exceptions have repeatedly been invoked to prevent copyright owners from misusing their copyrights in order to stifle legitimate marketplace competition. Copyright law allows for certain uses of content without violating the law as long as the copy is for personal non-profit use, and not commercial purposes. The generally accepted “fair use” exceptions are the following: a) the private copying exception allows users to make a back-up copy; b) copy for friends and family; c) the educational use exception allows teachers and researchers to copy for research or study, and as illustration to students; d) the citation exception allows quotes from content to express criticism or review; and e) the parody exception allows quotes from content for the purpose of caricature or parody. As with any societal creation, copyright is affected by the development of new technology. History has repeatedly proven this point, from the advent of the printing press, television broadcasting, and now to our brave new digital age. The last decade has seen tremendous growth and advancement in new information technologies. Some argue that the spread of these technologies marks the end of copyright. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted to counter the rapid growth of technology. The act criminalized the development or use of hardware or software that cracks digital copy-protection schemes (USG, 1998). Such actions facilitate others to access materials that are copyright protected, and thus break the copyright law. The creation and distribution of DRM circumvention tools is illegal. But DMCA favors owners’ rights



over users’ rights, because it infringes on fair use. For example, even when a user copies legitimately under the fair use exceptions and circumvents the copyright protection, he or she may be violating DMCA, a federal statute.

users’ rights: legal framework for privacy The term “privacy” is used frequently in ordinary language as well as in philosophical, political, and legal discussions, yet there is no single definition of the term. The concept of privacy is a central tenet of post-enlightenment thought. It affirms the inviolability of each individual’s rights over her/his own person. The U.S. Supreme Court has been explicit in ruling that privacy is a central reason for the Fourth Amendment (LII, 2007c). Surveillance, eavesdropping, and appropriation of one’s communication are forms of illegal search and seizure. They threaten rights of personal integrity and self-definition in subtle but powerful ways. In 1986, privacy protection was extended to cover electronic communications of the modern era with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (LII, 2007d). In general, it is illegal to acquire and process personal data unless the persons involved have agreed with the acquisition and processing of their personal data and the personal data is required for the execution of whatever process it is used in. It is also illegal to keep personal data longer than necessary. But, personal privacy is now threatened even more in the digital information age. There are massive databases with financial and credit histories, medical records, daily purchases, and contacts, that are all accessible via the Internet. The capability exists for others to mine and link the databases, but there are few controls over how the information can be used and distributed. The predicament makes individual control over one’s privacy next to impossible. In the context of digital content management, apart from the protection of personal information,

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

privacy can also be characterized by access and the right to be left alone within one’s personal physical and virtual space. For example, a person’s home is a place of retreat from the eyes of the outside world, where one may shed the situational personae adopted in public, and freely to express oneself unobserved and unobstructed. Respect for personal private space is as crucial as liberty and autonomy. That and selfhood are the hallmarks of a free society. Thus the concept of privacy can also be understood as the freedom to dictate the circumstances, that is, the time, place, method, duration, and frequency of one’s own intellectual consumption, such as listening to a digital music download, unobserved and unimpeded by others (Cohen, 2003). Such freedom is absent in public places, but rights to privacy afford individuals the unfettered ability for intellectual consumption without restrictions in one’s private spaces. Privacy would thus apply to the right to read digital content without being observed, and without having the instances of reading tracked and recorded for later retrieval by anyone. When a physical object with content is sold by the originator, he or she may never know how or when it will eventually be used by the buyer, or even if it will ever be used. The book may not be read, and the music may never be heard. With digital content, under some DRM systems, the originator or seller could have the capability to know when the content is used, how it is used, and when the content is passed on to someone else. No longer is consumption of intellectual content a private event.

dIgItAl rIghts mAnAgement technologIes The earliest forms of DRM in the Internet age can be traced back to the click-wrap license. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA, 2002) was passed in 2001 to facilitate e-commerce. Basically, it is traditional commer-

cial law with a digital twist. Software distributors can use click-wrap licenses as a convenient way to license software to end users on the Internet. The statements can be in unformatted text or in metadata with the rights holder’s name and claims over the work provided to users. When a user agrees to the end user license agreement (EULA), that user is legally bound by its terms. There is no easy way to enforce the EULA except by counting on the user’s good faith. The success of the DRM relies upon a high volume and low cost principle. By making contents affordable, users can easily acquire the product legally, making illicit activities less appealing. Furthermore, egregious infringements can be brought under control using the legal system. Measures such as registration make illegal copying inconvenient and burdensome. With the mainstreaming of personal computers and the Internet into society, content owners look upon “copy-protection technologies” to enclose and protect their copyrighted digital content. Digital rights management refers to protecting the copyright of digital content by monitoring content usage and restricting what actions an authorized recipient may take with regard to that content. While some view these technologies as playing “Big Brother” and behavior control, DRM is a necessary mechanism in a free market system. By preserving property rights, it encourages people to innovate because they can be more certain of eventual rewards. DRM gives owners the ability to securely distribute their valued content and to control the use of this content, preventing it from unauthorized distribution (Russ, 2001). Whether the content is periodicals, books, photographs, music, or video, DRM can be used to identify content and manage access, typically using steganographic and encryption techniques. While encryption allows only authorized users to access the message, cryptographic algorithms generate messages that are easily recognizable as encrypted. Although the content remains illegible and protected, encrypted messages attract



Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

attention; thus their use is undesirable in some circumstances. Steganography, on the other hand, embeds a secret message into another message that serves as a carrier. The goal is to modify the carrier in an imperceptible way that reveals neither the embedding of a message, nor the embedded message itself. Together, steganography and cryptography are two essential ingredients in making copyrighted digital contents secure.

digital Watermarking Steganography is the art and science of hiding a message in a medium, such as a digital image, audio, or video file, that can defy detection. Application of steganography can be traced back to antiquity. In the story of “The 300 Spartans,” Demeratus needed to warn the Spartans that Xerxes, King of Persia, was about to invade Greece. To send the message without detection, Demeratus removed the wax from a writing tablet, wrote his message on the wood underneath, and then covered the message with wax, making the tablet look like a blank one. While these kinds of methods worked in times past, they were replaced in the modern era by more sophisticated techniques such as invisible inks and microdots. In the computer age, digital images, as well as audio and video files, offer a rich medium for hiding an almost unlimited amount of data. The rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks has been an inevitable outgrowth with the rise of the Internet. Unfortunately, P2P networks have grown from helpful tools in information sharing to havens for unauthorized copies of copyrighted materials. Digital content identification or steganography is crucial in setting up controlled distribution systems and provide efficient means for copyright protection. Steganographic techniques can be divided into two categories: digital watermarking and digital fingerprinting. While watermarking is an arrangement of digital bits hidden in the content of the carrier, fingerprinting is the deriving of a unique identifier based upon the charac-



teristics of the content itself. Watermarking and fingerprinting are complementary technologies. While a digital fingerprint is generated from the digital good itself and perceptible to humans, a watermark is embedded into the content and designed to be imperceptible. Digital fingerprints can only identify content ownership, and are specific to the content itself. Watermarks can hold other embedded information, for example, usage entitlement or usage expiration date. Though both techniques are in their infancy, they are robust enough to survive duplication and conversion of digital files which will certainly be attempted by the copyright infringers. When used on paper, a watermark is an image that appears on valuable documents to prove their authenticity and prevent counterfeiting. The watermark is designed to appear only when the paper is held at a particular angle, or against a black background. Standard paper usually does not include a watermark, as watermarking the paper incurs an added cost. Currency is an example of the use of a watermark. By holding a piece of currency to the light and turning it to change the viewing angle, a faint image appears. Prior to the digital age, it was quite complicated to produce a counterfeit that looked like the original. This is not the case in the digital world, where it is extremely easy to duplicate original digital content without the slightest loss of quality. Similar to an artist artistically signing their paintings with a brush to claim their copyright, the concept can be applied to digital products by embedding a digital watermark in the content to identify its ownership. In the digital world, a watermark is inserted into the content itself. Digital watermarks are so named because they serve the same purpose as watermark on papers. Since all software files have predefined formats that are deterministic, they can be modeled mathematically and used as a basis for comparison. Steganography programs alter the subtle characteristics, such as color, frequency, tone, noise, and distortion, of a file to generate

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

small variances in the digital fingerprint of the content. Naturally, they can also take advantage of unused bits within the file structure to hide information. Take the least significant bit (LSB) watermarking technique as illustration. In this technique, the watermark is stored in the lower order bits of selected pixels in an image file. The original 8 bit gray scale image data is compressed to 7 bits by adaptive histogram manipulation. If this process is followed by a compensating mapping to restore the dynamic range, the resulting image is practically indistinguishable from the original. The process enables the LSB of the content file to carry the watermark information, and the watermark can be decoded by comparing the LSB bit pattern with a stored counterpart. Because “regular” software that creates the files would never produce these variances, the watermark can be detected and recovered. Watermarks can be embedded in a number of domains. Embedding is the process of manipulating coefficients in a particular domain in such as way that the manipulation can be detected later in that or another domain. For example, the embedding domain can be spatial where the coefficients are the pixel values; or frequency, where a watermark is encoded in the frequency coefficients. Still image watermarking techniques can be extended to video signals as video can be considered as a sequence of still images. For audio signals, the main constraint is that the watermark must be inaudible to listeners. One technique is to add a faint sound as background noise. As digital audio and video are generally stored and distributed in compressed format, compression is the greatest challenge to digital watermarking. Compression algorithms invariably throw away some of the data, including parts that belong to the watermark. Like the numerous compression techniques themselves, there is neither a perfect nor absolute watermarking technique. A high compression rate algorithm reduces the size of a digital file, but it is likely unable to recover all the original information when the file is decoded.

There is no perfect lossless compression. Watermarking techniques face a similar trade off. The stronger the embedded watermarking signal, the easier it will be to detect, but it is also likely to affect the quality of the reproduced content (Cox, Miller, & Bloom, 2002).

digital fingerprinting A digital fingerprint is a unique pattern that describes the content for identification purpose. Digital fingerprinting cannot resist illegal copying, but it enables the copyright owners or content distributors to track the recipients who leak or redistribute the fingerprinted content. Unlike watermarks, a fingerprint is not added into, but is extracted from the existing characteristics of the digital content. While the watermark for a recorded song may be a faint background sound, the fingerprint would be derived from the song’s tempo, rhythms, the length of verses or movements, the mix of instruments used, or other features. Fingerprinting identification works by matching a small sample of digital content to the original content against a database of fingerprints. Since digital fingerprinting does not add data to the content, it can be applied to contents that are already published. On the other hand, as the fingerprint is derived from the content, it cannot be used to store information about the content like a watermark does. Furthermore, taking the fingerprint of existing content does require added work and equipment. Once the fingerprint is created and stored in a database, it could then perform similar functions as a digital watermark, acting as a unique identifier for each piece of content. In any case, to be persistent, a watermark or fingerprint must be able to survive any of the digital duplication and transformations that the copyright infringer will likely to attempt on the content. Rather than preventing illegal copying, steganography is used to detect copying after the fact. An example of the application is trai-



Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

tor tracing (Chor, Fiat, Naor, & Pinkas, 2000). Copyrighted materials are secured, and a person who wishes to access the material is required to submit identification to the DRM system. The system generates a digital fingerprint according to the user identity. The fingerprint is then embedded back into the material as a digital watermark. If leakage of the contents occurs, the offender could be traced from the fingerprint on the leaked material. Apart from traitor tracing, steganography can be indispensable in the pursuit and location of illegal copyrighted material online. For example, a piece of watermarked digital music allows the owner to create a search engine that can find the marked clip on the Internet. The owner can then determine its legality and seek remedy. Under U.S. copyright law, to have an allegedly infringing material removed from a service provider’s network, or to have access to the material disabled, the owner must provide notice to the provider. Once the notice is given, or in circumstances where the provider discovers the infringing material itself, the service provider network is required to expeditiously remove, or disable access to, the material. The mentioned process is called “notice and takedown.” Though the process provides some protection to copyrighted materials, notice and takedown is a reactive approach. The process takes place after the infringing material is uploaded on the network and the damage is presumably already done. A more proactive technique is fingerprint filtering. The technology examines a content file and determines its identity by looking up digital fingerprints in a database. A service provider can either forbid the use of a file with an identified fingerprint, or allow it only under specified conditions. Several P2P sites are adapting the technology to verify contents uploaded by users in order to reduce the problem of copyright infringement. If the content is in the fingerprint database, upload is automatically blocked. Apart from the accurate monitoring of file transfers, the technology can also can be vital in systems that



account for and determine appropriate royalties to artists, music publishers, and record companies (Kellan, 2001).

encryption and the “buy and own” model Encryption is the process involved in the science of cryptography, which takes a message in plain text and performs some kind of transformation on it so it cannot be understood except by someone possessing the decryption key, which could be a number, a character, or a set of characters. Modern DRM technologies use cryptography to ensure that the permissions made available by the content owner are not breached. A media file is encrypted using a key specific for a user. Individual keys for viewing or listening to the content are provided to a user who has purchased the content, but the usage right can include limitations on copying, printing, and redistribution. When the user opens a content file, the DRM software checks the user’s identity and contacts the owner’s Web site. If permission is granted, the file is decrypted and assigned a key for future access. This type of systems can have a wide range of sophistication. In the simplest form, contents are encrypted using a single master key. But, such an approach is fragile, as compromising one key can compromise the entire system. The system can be strengthened using a “multiple keys-multiple encryptions” approach similar to the public key infrastructure (PKI) system. A PKI is an arrangement that binds public keys with respective user identities by means of a certificate authority (CA). The user identity must be unique for each CA. This is carried out by software at a CA, possibly under human supervision, together with other coordinated software at distributed locations. For each user, the user identity, the public key, their binding, validity conditions, and other attributes are made un-forgeable in public key certificates issued by the CA. In the latter approach, the loss of a single key only means the compromising of a

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

single piece of content, and not the entire system (Wikipedia, 2007). This method locks content except to the authorized users. This methodology can also be used to track users’ access times, and specific access sections of content. In more complex systems, keys are unique not only for the content but for the function and device as well. The content owner can configure access in many ways. For example, a document might be viewable but not printable. The content owner may specify that the document may only be used on a single device or only for a limited time. By tying access rights directly to physical devices, such as CPUs, hard drives, or other devices, content owners not only control who is accessing the information but also protect against illegal copying or sharing. When copyrighted content is bound to a physical disk, the user can loan, destroy, or give the disk away, but when the content is copied, it would not be viewable or playable. This is a source management approach where only a simple consumption right, from owners to users, is allowed. The limitations of this approach can disadvantage the user. For example, the user may want to contribute to the content, and the relationship has to be bidirectional for that capability to exist. The system can easily become useless if contents are to be edited, or multiple sources combined to form a new value added product (Godwin, 2006). While most modern DRM technologies use encryption system such as PKI to control user access to digital content, some distributors opt for a strategy of distributing digital content with embedded DRM software. In this way, copyright protection would not rely solely upon a user’s good faith. Once the content is downloaded onto a user’s computer, there is no further contact with the distributor. Users access the digital content under restrictions. If one attempts a function not authorized under the EULA, the embedded DRM software downloaded and installed with the content will stop the computer’s operating system from executing the requested task.

On a positive note, this approach does not affect user privacy in terms of personal information gathering and the actual use of digital content can take place in total privacy, even off-line, free of obstructions. However, apart from the obvious security risks, such an approach constitutes a more serious invasion of privacy by installing software onto a user’s computer, which is personal property, without their full knowledge. Even if the user consented to the EULA, one could argue such agreement is based on unconscionable licensing terms. Distributors must be extremely careful with their embedded DRM software, especially after the SonyBMG episode of creating “rootkit” security vulnerabilities in millions of users’ computers (EFF, 2005). Embedded DRM technology should always be subject to an independent and vigorous security review. Even with such review, the strategy may not be worthwhile given the legal liability and negative publicity that could result. DRM with encryption is less intrusive as it does not involve installing software on a user’s computer. Encryption keys are used to set and automatically enforce limits on user behavior. Different keys can have different privileges, and the keys can even be tied to a particular device or set of devices. Under this approach, the user would submit the serial numbers of the devices where content will be used. The encryption keys can be generated using the submitted numbers as a factor. This is a more complicated and persistent approach, and it requires ongoing and periodic contact between user and distributor. Users would want to be able to continue using the content when they are replacing an old device with new one. While information collected under this scenario will be minimal and less sensitive, it does build up a device ownership database where information can be mined. User’s privacy rights can be affected, since the results of the data mining could be sold to others. While DRM encryption does not raise privacy issues in itself, the functional restrictions



Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

in place intrude upon the private space and the autonomy to determine the circumstances of use for individual private property. Technologies that constrain user behavior narrow the zone of freedom traditionally enjoyed for activities in private spaces. In so doing, they decrease the level of autonomy that users enjoy with respect to the terms of use and enjoyment of intellectual goods. It restricts the freedom of expression. DRM technologies can also restrict legitimate fair use. Without the Fair Use doctrine, copyrights would intrude into everyday life in innumerable and intolerable ways (Lohmann, 2002). Under fair use, a creative person can make some use of another’s work that one believes to be fair. If the rights holder agrees, use continues. Otherwise, the case can be resolved in the courts. If, however, such a fair use attempt is prevented from the outset by DRM technologies, there will be no experimentation, no product innovations, and no evolution of new consumer markets. The Internet Age and “pay per use” model: a new model of content distribution from a legal perspective, buying or acquiring a license for digital content has very different implications. Sales involve the complete transfer of ownership rights in the copy. Copyright law explicitly anticipates the sale of copyrighted products and, by the “first sale rule,” constrains a copyright holder’s rights in copies of the work that have been sold. For example, if one purchases a music CD, after paying for the product, one owns the product as personal property. One is regulated by property and copyright law: one can sell the CD, lend, or resell it to someone else. Licensing, however, constitutes a limited transfer of rights to use an item on stated terms and conditions. Licenses are governed by contract law and, as such, are essentially a private agreement between two parties. In the case of contents acquired under licensing, apart from copyright laws, the conditions of use are specified in the license. The contractual agreement can involve a wide range of terms and conditions, and need not incorporate any public

8

policy considerations, beyond basic limits on what constitutes an enforceable contract. A new medium is often introduced for its value in altering the access to and distribution of existing materials. However, the long term success of the new medium lies within its ability to expand the horizon of effective communication, enabling presentation of existing materials in innovative ways that were not previously possible. Illustrating the point, when motion pictures were invented around 1890, early filmmakers saw them primarily as a means of distributing existing material, for example, stage performances. It took a long time before movies were recognized as able to extend expressive possibilities far beyond what is attainable in a stage performance. The maturity and potency of a new medium is reflected by the extent to which the market has taken advantage of the expanded horizons for communicating ideas using the new medium which cannot be reproduced under the older medium (Fraser, 1999). Early digital content found on the Internet was merely repurposed forms of the analog products in digital format. As content distributors needed to find ways to overcome the liabilities of screen reading and to improve consumer experiences, they slowly added interactive features for user control or user-centric contenting. The Internet is a powerful medium for communication and has the potential to be much greater than just merely a new distribution channel. Content owners look beyond their own Web sites by sending content to places where they may have more uses or find more audiences. Syndication refers to the process by which a website shares content with other Web sites to ensure the widest possible audience and more overall traffic. For example, a restaurant reviewer can syndicate its content to travel Web sites, a mutually beneficial arrangement for both the Web site and reviewer. The approach is similar to syndicated television shows that are produced by studios and sold to independent stations in order to reach a broader audience. Several vendors have tools for

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

automating syndication relationships, and there is an open standard protocol for site interoperability. Taking one step further, and looking beyond content syndication, the syndication model can be expanded for content distribution to multiple and arbitrary parties. Under this model, controls over usage based on contractual agreements are mandatory as the trustworthiness of the other parties is unknown. Under the new “pay-per-use” model, authentication is required whenever and wherever the digital content is used. After downloading the content from the distributor, users may have the right to use the work on any device at any time, but one has to prove one’s legitimacy each time the content is used. The amount of user-tracking under this approach is much greater, and it is qualitatively more threatening to consumer privacy than under the buy-and-own model. Potentially collected information about a user includes collecting a complete listening, reading, and viewing history. It could also be credit card and financial information which occurs in conjunction with a pay-per-use arrangement for access to the content. Not much different from the problem with spyware, information garnered by DRM systems in our highly networked society can be used to build a dossier of a user’s preferences and usage patterns. Such information can in turn be sold to online marketers or even obtained by the government to keep a tight watch on its citizens. Privacy control in DRM is a complicated matter because there are legitimate reasons for distributors to collect data about users and their activities. For example, the collected data can be used for traffic modeling, infrastructure planning, quality of service (QoS), and risk management. Data mining of aggregated, depersonalized data can be used for trend spotting, untargeted marketing, and advertising. Yet, data collected for legitimate reasons can also be used illegitimately, and by parties who are unknown at the time when the data is gathered. These parties may be any of the following: future business partners that the

data gatherer acquires, buyers of aggregated data, and any number of data brokers. While consumers may consent for data to be gathered by company X, the same data may end up being used by others of whom the consumer will never be aware (Estes, 2007). In today’s dynamic business environment, the mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies, and other changes over the life cycle of a corporation can radically change who has access to what information and how that information may be used and cross referenced. The conflict between information gathering and consumer privacy is not new to e-commerce. If a company is not able to gather information about its customers, the company will not be able to serve its market efficiently, potentially leading to higher prices. If data collection is inevitable, but a company has an established privacy policy and actually adheres to the policy, customers will also be more comfortable doing business with the company. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2000 issued a report identifying five principles of fair information practices: notice, choice, access, security, and enforcement. The operating principle entails a notice to consumers about the collection, use, and disclosure of information. It recommended that businesses give a clear and conspicuous notice of their information practices. If companies adhere to these principles, they will not be subject to sanctions (FTC, 2000). It is not clear, however, whether users have a good understanding of their rights with respect to data about themselves. A campaign to publicize these rights, and inform users may be necessary in order to allow users to make informed decisions.

A possIble solutIon: p3p And onlIne prIvAcy The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) recently approved a technology called the platform for privacy preferences (P3P) as a standard that would help consumers choose how much of their

9

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

personal information to divulge online. It allows Internet users to choose the type of information they will give to websites and if the Web sites can pass that information on to a third party. With the P3P specification, a site can prepare computer-readable policy statements, using extensible markup language (XML) files, to describe how the organization intends to use personal data during and after a user’s session. Consumers would receive alerts if they went to a site whose P3P policy does not match up with their preferences. The P3P specification is capable of handling the privacy notification requirement within a DRM system. The browser downloads the list of policies from the provider’s Web site with the digital content. It then performs logical inferences to determine if the policies comply with the user’s privacy settings. Unfortunately, such a scenario does require a certain technological sophistication on the consumer’s part in setting the correct privacy settings on the browser. P3P has already been incorporated into many software products, including Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 6. But, the capabilities implemented currently are quite rudimentary. They are limited to the automated processing of cookies and display of summary privacy policies upon request from users.

deploying p3p P3P implementation on a Web site involves both business and technical issues; and it does require a wide range of knowledge and input; from legal, technical, and marketing perspectives. While it can be done by a single individual in the case of a small organization, it is more appropriately conducted in a team approach involving members with diverse backgrounds and resources. The first team assignment is to review the current information practices of the organization; followed by an in-depth discussion of long term business plans for the use of consumer information. The entire organization should be involved in deciding exactly what the privacy policy should be,

0

not just a top down order of implementation. The review should examine the amount, and types of information that are collected, the place where information is collected, the information handling and processing practices, and the level of sharing and integration with third parties. The outcome of the review process will be an accurate human readable privacy policy that all parts of the organization that interact with consumer information can agree upon. Although most Web sites currently post human readable privacy policies, the level of detail reflected in those policies and adherence to the policies vary widely. Gaining an accurate and detailed understanding of the consumer information flowing in and out of the organization is crucial for P3P implementations. After developing the organization’s privacy policy, the P3P team should conduct a thorough policy audit. The audit should examine what information is collected, where it goes once it is collected, what it is used for, who uses it, and most importantly, if consumers are clearly notified of and agree to the stated information practices. In most organizations, it is likely that inadequacies in the policies and discrepancies will be uncovered between the published policy and actual practice through the use of the audit. Any problem or question must be addressed and resolved immediately. If the information policy is incomplete, or the organization does not comply with its published policy, or the policy does not accurately and fully disclose all the information to consumers, it could have serious legal ramifications (W3C, 2002a). As the focus here is not on P3P syntax, the remaining exploration will be on the P3P deployment issue instead. For requirement and implementation details, developers can consult the P3P specification from W3C P3P Working Group (W3C, 2002b). Most likely, developers will be using a P3P editor to create the P3P files; and a P3P validator to verify the file contents. For proper deployment, the site developer needs to create three separate files: an XHTML description of privacy policies (policy.

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

html), a P3P reference file (p3p.xml), and a P3P policy file (policy.xml). These files must be written in correct syntax in accordance with the P3P specification. In that regard, a P3P editor will be tremendously helpful in constructing the policy syntax and descriptions correctly. After the files are created, they should be stored in a directory named “/w3c” off the site’s domain root directory. In addition, to help the browser to locate the P3P files, the link tag, “” should be added to every document on the Web site. When a P3P-enabled browser visits the site with a defined P3P policy, it automatically locates, reads, and compares the policy with that of the privacy preferences set on the browser. The browser then displays an alert message or blocks transmission of certain data, if the site’s policy differs from the consumer’s preference.

future trends DRM systems can have many variations in implementation details, but they generally conform to a common structure (Rosenblatt, Trippe, & Mooney, 2001). Consumers download the digital content from a Web site. The digital content contains encrypted content and a key, along with a license that stipulates the usage right. A software or hardware controller interprets the licensing agreement. If authentication and authorization are successful, the controller allows the consumer to perform what is intended, such as playing, viewing, or copying of the digital content. However, within the general framework, there are several important implementation specific issues that must be addressed. These issues are: a.

p3p and privacy policy b. While P3P provides a way for sites to make their privacy policies available in an automated and structured manner, it does not and cannot enforce privacy practices. However, consumers should be aware of a site’s stated policy as they have been warned of what information will be collected, and how that information will be used. Additionally, a site’s policy is legally binding. The site’s operator is liable for violation of any stated policies. If an organization states that it is going to do one thing and does something else, there is no technological process to prevent that at present. However, deception and illegality are more appropriately resolved in the arena of public policy, legislation, and the courts. While P3P is useful for informing consumers about an organization’s privacy policies, it does not directly improve privacy protections. Nonetheless, P3P implementation does increase transparency, which is definitely a positive step forward for both businesses and consumers (Mulligan & Schwartz, 2000).

c. d. e. f.

g.

How does the system authenticate users? The options are to use passwords, smart tokens, another server, or the device itself. Are the controllers open source or proprietary? There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. How is the licensing bundled: buy-and-own, pay-per-use, or per site? How much fine-grained control does the content owner have? Are consumers required to be connected to the network when using the content? What consumer information will be required and collected, and how will the information be used? How do royalties and payments integrate with the DRM system?

In reaction to the advent of the Internet and e-commerce, organizations have been experimenting with DRM technologies to implement new business models for digital content, as this is the kind of information that is most suitable for online distribution. However, there is only modest success. Getting consumers comfortable with the new ways of consuming digital content is a



Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

major reason. Ingrained in consumers’ attitudes is a strong feeling that people should be allowed to do what they wish with the property they pay for and own, without restriction and fear of being controlled or monitored. Thus, it is important that DRM technologies can support such usage expectations. At a minimum, consumers should be able to use the digital content in any format on any device they own, and it should also include fair use rights such as copying for research or personal non-commercial purposes. The technology must also be lightweight, seamless, and user friendly. The system should be deployable on mass market legacy platforms such as PCs, preferably without adding new hardware or tedious software installation on the consumer’s part. It should provide unbreakable security and without adverse effects to the consumer’s platform. Finally, the system should support multiple content types such as audio, video, text, and software; multiple platforms and DRM vendors, and allow content migration between them. Furthermore, all operations should be as transparent as possible. Technology developers and content providers hoping to profit from the mass e-commerce market must agree on a common framework of interoperability requirements in order that key technology standards and compatibility can be resolved. Multiple and incompatible DRM standards as exist right now will only impede the development of the digital content market. Broad adoption of media sharing devices will be delayed as long as content owners disagree between themselves on how they wish to benefit from DRM technologies. Technology providers, in turn, cannot develop a horizontal market for connected devices until major content providers have agreed on a common framework of DRM interoperability.

conclusIon Information goods are characterized by negligible marginal costs, and therefore arguments in favor of 

subscription or pay-per-use are stronger for them than for physical goods. DRM technologies are an indispensable part of the pay-per-use business model. While media companies perennially lobby for pro-DRM legislation, government mandates must be fashioned with the greatest care because they limit the ability of innovators to introduce new technologies as well as the ability of consumers to purchase goods on the free market. Furthermore, mandating a technically unwise standard would not be in anyone’s best interest. DRM technologies can be a threat to consumer privacy through the disclosure of consumer data or the erosion of fair-use rights. Although these threats are real, DRM technologies can have a positive impact on consumer privacy. Electronic transactions are potentially more conducive to user privacy than older paper distribution channels. DRM systems can be designed to support anonymous e-payment tokens, allowing usage tracking without user tracking. Through DRM technologies, consumers could be enabled to assign copyright control for their personal data as owners of that information. Such upstream copyright licensing would empower consumers to prevent entities from misusing or reselling their information.

future reseArch dIrectIons E-commerce of digital content is a rapidly expanding market due to an abundant supply of digital content and the growing practicality of conducting transactions over the Internet. Delivering content directly to consumers online not only eliminates physical costs such as paper, printing, and storage, it allows for highly customizable products and opens up numerous business opportunities. There are many types of DRM system, and each supports a different business model. Some interesting topics for exploration include:

Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

1. 2.

What are the benefits and challenges of different systems and business models? What are the current trends in the digital content distribution and delivery market?

E-learning technology is rapidly changing the landscape for education products and services. Publishers, the traditional undisputed leaders in the educational content market who based their business process on the production of textbooks, must now seriously rethink their role and business model. The digital educational content market has arrived. The focus is now shifted from the distribution and sale of tangible products to the distribution and licensing of intangible products, from products to the services, and perhaps phasing out the paper product all together. While e-books have not experienced mass-market success, digital technology does provide ample opportunity for content marketers if one can find the right strategy and develop an effective business model. For education purposes, digital content availability and usefulness may seem to be incompatible with DRM, as its restrictions undermine the educational mission of promoting access, scholarship, and learning. Academics, teachers, and learners will expect to be able to reuse and repurpose digital content directly, to be able to edit digital content, and to be able to easily combine digital content. Historically, DRM has been focused on security and enforcement. A DRM system for an educational institute must also satisfy regulatory requirements, most prominently, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the Gramm Leach Bliley (GLB) Act. Furthermore, apart from fair-use, copyright laws governing an educational institute also include library exceptions and the TEACH Act. Given all these, a useful DRM system for educational content will indeed be a complex and challenging undertaking.

references American Heritage. (2006). American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.). Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://dictionary. reference.com/browse/copyright Chor, B., Fiat, A., Naor, M., & Pinkas, B. (2000). Tracing traitors. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 44(3), 893-910. ClickZ. (2003). Users still resistant to paid content. Jupitermedia, April 11. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.ecommerce-guide.com/news/ news/print.php/2189551 Cohen, J. (2003). DRM and privacy. Communications of the ACM, 46(4), 47-49. Cox, I., Miller, M., & Bloom, J. (2002). Digital watermarking: Principles & practice. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Cravens, A. (2004), Speeding ticket: The U.S. residential broadband market by segment and technology. In-Stat/MDR. EFF. (2005). Sony BMG Litigation Info, Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/ EMI. (2007, April 2). EMI music launches DRMfree superior sound quality downloads across its entire digital repertoire. EMI Group, Press Release. EPIC. (2002, June 5). Letter to house judiciary subcommittee on the courts, the internet, and intellectual property. The Electronic Privacy Information Center and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.epic. org/privacy/drm/hjdrmltr6.5.02.html Estes, A. (2007, May 6). Bill would ban lenders’ alerts to homebuyers. Boston Globe, p. B3. Fraser, A. (1999, August 8). Chronicle of Higher Education, 48, p. B8.



Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

FTC. (2000). Privacy online: Fair information practices in the electronic marketplace. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission. Godwin, M. (2006). Digital rights management: A guide for librarians. Office for Information Technology Policy, American Library Association. Kellan, A. (2001). Whiz kid has ‘fingerprints’ all over New Napster. CNN Technology News, July 5. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://edition. cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/07/05/napster. fingerprint/index.html LII. (2007a). United States Constitution Article I Section 8, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. LII. (2007b). US Code Collection, Title 17, Copyrights, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. LII. (2007c). The Bill Of Rights: U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. LII. (2007d). U.S. Code Collection, Title 18, S 2510, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. Lohmann, F. (2002). Fair Use and Digital rights management, Computers, Freedom & Privacy, Electronic Frontier Foundation. Mulligan, D., & Schwartz, A. (2000). P3P and privacy: An update for the privacy community. Center for Democracy & Technology. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.cdt.org/privacy/ pet/p3pprivacy.shtml

http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/ basics/434.php UCITA. (2002). Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. USG. (1998). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S. Copyright Office, Pub. 05-304, 112 Stat. 2860. W3C. (2002a). How to create and publish your company’s P3P policy in 6 easy steps. W3C P3P Working Group. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/P3P/details.html W3C (2002b). The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) specification. W3C P3P Working Group. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/ Wikipedia (2007). Retrieved October 1, 2007, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_infrastructure

AddItIonAl reAdIng Ahrens, F. (2005). Hard news, daily papers face unprecedented competition. Washington Post Sunday, February 20, p. F01 BEUC. (2007). Consumers digital rights initiative, European consumers’ organization. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www.consumersdigitalrights.org Boiko, B. (2002). Content management bible. New York: Wiley Publishing Inc.

Rosenblatt, B., Trippe, B., & Mooney, S. (2002). Digital rights management: Business and technology. New York: M&T Books.

Brands, S. (2000). Rethinking public key infrastructures and digital certificates; building in privacy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Russ, A. (2001). Digital rights management overview. SANS Information Security Reading Room, July 26. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from

Collier, G., Piccariello, H., & Robson, R. (2004). Digital rights management: An ecosystem model and scenarios for higher education. Educause Center.



Online Consumer Privacy and Digital Rights Management Systems

Duncan, C., Barker, E., Douglas, P., Morrey, M. & Waelde, C. (2004). JISC DRM study. Intrallect Ltd. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www. intrallect.com/drm-study/DRMFinalReport.pdf EFF. (2005). Dangerous terms, a user’s guide to EULA. Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www.eff.org/wp/eula. php

Hasebrook, J. (2002). International e-learning business: Strategies & opportunities. In Proceedings of the World Conference on E-Learning in Corp., Govt., Health & Higher Ed. (Vol. 1, pp. 404-411). LII. (2007). U.S. Code 20.31.3.4.1232g, FERPA. Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School.

EFF. (2007). A user’s guide to DRM in online music. Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved 6/22/07 from http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/guide/

Mazzucchi, P. (2005). Business models and rights management for e-learning in Europe. INDICARE Monitor, 2(7), 25-29.

EPIC. (2000). Pretty poor privacy: An assessment of P3P and internet privacy. Electronic Privacy Information Center. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www.epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html.

Morris, R., & Thompson, K. (1979). Password security: A case history. Communication of the ACM, 22(11).

FTC. (2007). Public Law 106-102, GLB. Federal Trade Commission. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/glbshort.htm Green, K. (2004). The 2004 national survey of information technology in U.S. higher education, the campus computing project. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www.campuscomputing.net/ Guibault, L., & Helberger, N. (2005). Copyright law and consumer protection. European Consumer Law Group. ECLG/035/05 Gunter, C., Weeks, S., & Wright, A. (2001). Models and languages for digital rights. Technical Report STAR-TR-01-04, InterTrust STAR Lab. HHS. (2007). Public Law 104-191, HIPAA. Department of Health & Human Services. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191.htm

National Research Council Panel on Intellectual Property. (2000). The digital dilemma: Intellectual property in the information age. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 2000. Prince, B. (2007). IBM shields online personal data. eWeek News & Analysis. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,2095275,00.asp Schaub, M. (2006). A breakdown of consumer protection law in the light of digital products. Indicare Monitor, 2(5). Schwartz, J. (2004). In survey, fewer are sharing files (or admitting it). The New York Times, Jan. 5, Section C, p. 1. Shapiro, C., & Varian, H. (1999). Information rules: A strategic guide to the network economy. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. UDDI. (2007). FAQs for UDDI Initiative and Standard, OASIS Standards Consortium. Retrieved June 22, 2007, from http://www.uddi. org/faqs.html





Chapter XII

Online Privacy and Marketing: Current Issues for Consumers and Marketers Betty J. Parker Western Michigan University, USA

AbstrAct Marketing practices have always presented challenges for consumers seeking to protect their privacy. This chapter discusses the ways in which the Internet as a marketing medium introduces additional privacy concerns. Current privacy issues include the use of spyware and cookies, word-of-mouth marketing, online marketing to children, and the use of social networks. Related privacy practices, concerns, and recommendations are presented from the perspectives of Internet users, marketers, and government agencies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ways in which consumers’ privacy concerns, as they apply to Internet marketing, would benefit from additional research..

IntroductIon Privacy has once again become the price computer users pay for their use of the information technology infrastructure — Mathias Klang, 2004 The Internet is a marketer’s dream come true. No other medium comes close to providing the

two-way communication, vast global reach, cost effectiveness, and tracking capabilities of the Internet. The Internet may well be on its way to becoming the medium of choice for advertising and promotion of both consumer and B2B (business to business) products and services. But all media have advantages and disadvantages and despite the efficiencies and effectiveness of Internet

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Online Privacy and Marketing

marketing, privacy and security concerns continue to dominate use of the Internet for marketing purposes (Hoffman, Novak, & Peralta, 1999). The marketing industry has long raised many issues for privacy advocates, even before the emergence of the Internet as a marketing medium (Ashworth & Free, 2006; Culnan, 1995; Jones, 1991). Today, the ease with which marketers can track users’ preferences and behaviors to serve them personalized advertisements represents a brave new world of privacy issues. The magnitude of data collection on the Internet is enormous and the FTC has estimated that up to 92% of Web sites collect personal information (FTC, 1998). Privacy issues as they apply to the marketing arena are especially challenging: What could be more personal and potentially damaging to consumers than the unauthorized sharing of credit or debit card numbers or public knowledge about one’s medical information or purchases, for example? The focus of this chapter is Internet privacy in the context of consumer marketing. The chapter will provide insights into the ways that online privacy has become a balancing act in which the needs of businesses are oftentimes balanced against the needs of consumers. A number of privacy issues that affect the marketing of products and services will be presented, along with recommended best practices. The marketing/privacy issues to be discussed in this chapter are: (1) consumer, marketer, and government perspectives on data collection, ownership, and dissemination; (2) online advertising and the use of cookies and spyware; (3) word-of-mouth marketing and the use of blogs, sponsored chat, and bulletin boards; (4) marketing online to children; and (5) privacy issues in social networks and online communities. There is currently a gap in the literature regarding specific online marketing techniques and privacy issues that impact marketers and consumers alike. Much of the marketing literature to date has focused on regulations, public policy, and consumer attitudes toward privacy. This chapter represents one of the first analyses

of online marketing practices and their associated privacy issues. Managerial issues and suggested marketing best practices are also provided.

three perspectIves on onlIne prIvAcy, dAtA collectIon, And dAtA oWnershIp There is consensus about the importance of online privacy among Internet users, marketers, and government agencies. Online privacy was a concern of 81% of Internet users and 79% of consumers who buy products on the Internet, according to a tracking study by the U.S. Department of Commerce (Oberndorf, 1998). Marketers’ privacy concerns are reflected in the fact that approximately 77% of Fortune 500 companies posted a privacy statement on their Web site (Schwaig, Kane, & Storey, 2005). In addition, government agencies play an important role in the regulation of the medium, and lawmakers continue to pass laws to increase online protection. Background information about key U.S. laws regulating privacy in marketing can be found in Table 1. Nevertheless, consumers, marketers, and the government can present different, and sometimes competing, perspectives on Internet privacy issues such as data collection, ownership, and dissemination. For example, the consumer hopes

Table 1. Online privacy legislation affecting marketing on the internet Act

Year

Description

Privacy Act

1974

Forbids government from gathering or maintaining secret information about people without a lawful purpose.

Communications Decency Act

1996

Regulates indecency and obscenity on the Internet.

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act

1998

Provides rules and guidelines for online information collected from children.

CAN-SPAM Act

2003

Establishes standards for commercial email use.



Online Privacy and Marketing

to provide little or no information, the marketer hopes to collect as much consumer information as possible, and the government seeks to protect the interests of both while maintaining an open and fair environment. Historically, marketing activity has been viewed as an exchange (Bagozzi, 1975). On the Internet, the user provides personal data in exchange for what he or she considers useful information or access to information. But research has revealed that consumers anticipate risks when providing personal data. Wang, Lee, and Wang (1998) documented consumers’ attitudes and privacy concerns regarding Internet marketing activities including consumers’ inability to opt-out of data collection and third-party distribution of information. An international survey of consumers revealed that nearly 20% of Web users felt that magazines have the right to sell subscribers’ data to other firms, but only 12% felt that online marketers had the same right (Hoffman et al., 1999). Because the Internet represents two-way communication between the consumer and marketer, consumers have a unique and easy opportunity to provide positive or negative feedback to marketers related to privacy issues. One study reported that as consumers’ privacy concerns increased, they were more likely to react in the following ways: provide incomplete information, notify ISPs about spam, request removal from mailing lists, and send a “flame” to spammers. They were also less likely to register on the Web site (Sheehan & Hoy, 1999). Marketers seek and utilize demographic and behavioral information from consumers for a variety of reasons, including targeting purposes. Ownership of valuable consumer data can be one of the most important assets of a company and the collection and reselling of marketing data can be a profit center for companies. The American Marketing Association’s Internet Marketing Code of Ethics states that “information collected from customers should be confidential and used only

8

for expressed purposes.” However, as is also true of off-line marketing practices, the ideal is not always the practice. One reason, suggested by Caudill and Murphy (2000), is that traditional marketing activities usually require the consumer’s knowledgeable participation, while online information collection (and marketing) does not. Radin, Calkins, and Predmore (2007) attributed the problem to some firms that do not treat collected information “respectfully and responsibly.” A good example of ethical concerns in data collection, ownership and dissemination can be found by examining consumer data practices of ETour.com, an Internet marketer of personalized virtual Web site tours. Looking to raise capital, ETour, which had a privacy policy against the provision of customer data to third parties, sold registration information from 4.5 million users and 2.2 million e-mail subscribers to the search engine Ask Jeeves in 2001, following the dotcom crash. EPIC, a public advocacy group, filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices. EPIC claimed that a precedent had been set one year earlier when Toysmart.com, an online toy retailer, was blocked by the FTC from auctioning its customer lists to pay creditors (Krebs, 2001; Montana, 2001). The Federal Trade Commission plays an important role in government policy creation and enforcement. The FTC has identified several norms (fair information practices principles) governing ethical use of consumer information: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Notice: The site will provide notice. Consent: Users should be allowed to choose to participate or not. Access: Users should have the ability to access their data. Security: Policies should be in place that will ensure the integrity of data and the prevention of misuse.

Online Privacy and Marketing

5.

Enforcement: Users should have means to challenge data collectors who are not following their policies.

Marketers have traditionally preferred selfregulation to government regulation. Self regulation efforts by business, such as the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), represent industry’s efforts to protect privacy without the aid of the federal government. The NAI, which was formed in 1999 in response to the controversial use by DoubleClick of click stream data combined with personal information, represented a historical moment for privacy protection in marketing. Two other industry groups, the U.S. Better Business Bureau and TrustE, now provide downloadable templates for businesses to provide accurate privacy policies quickly and easily to corporate web sites. Companies have also taken a stand for self regulation. In 1999 IBM announced that it would cancel its Internet advertisements from any Web site that did not provide clear privacy policies (Auerbach, 1999). Nevertheless, an effective and comprehensive self-regulatory policy for online consumer privacy has not yet emerged (Culnan, 2000). There are a number of recommended best practices to be applied to the issue of data collection, ownership, and dissemination. In addition to providing clearly labeled privacy policies and prominent data collection warnings, marketers will find it beneficial to practice good public and customer relationships in order to generate online registrations and information from consumers. Building relationships with consumers before making unsolicited contact or asking them to register or provide information has been recommended as an important strategy for marketers (Milne, 1997; Sheehan & Hoy, 1999). There is also a highly positive relationship between a company’s positive reputation and consumers’ decisions to provide accurate personal information to the Web site (Xie, Teo, & Wan, 2006).

Internet AdvertIsIng prActIces: the use of cookIes And spyWAre The advertising model, in which free or low cost media content is exchanged for advertising placements, has been a standard business model in the off-line world. It appears that the Internet has embraced a similar advertising-for-content model, although there are examples of subscription-based content providers (The Wall Street Journal, for example) and other models of online exchange. Unlike traditional media such as television, magazines, or newspapers, the Internet can deliver metrics such as advertising impressions, click-through rates, and page views on a daily or hourly basis. Despite the advantages that Internet advertising provides, this new medium has also created a new list of privacy issues for consumers and marketers alike. The most basic and vital tools in the marketer’s toolbox are segmentation of the market and targeting of users, and the Internet helps marketers to segment and target with great accuracy. Marketers are rapidly shifting mass media dollars to the Internet, which has grown from .7% of total ad dollars spent in 1998 to an estimated 3% in 2006, which translates to $8.7 billion (Media Week Marketer’s Guide to Media, 2006). Behavioral targeting/marketing is online advertising that serves ads to individuals who are most likely interested in them based on previous online activity (Shimp, 2007). Behavioral targeting can be an improvement on traditional segmentation and targeting because the marketer has a strong indication that the individual being targeted has exhibited a behavior that indicates potential interest in the product. Behavioral marketing takes as its premise that past behavior—such as site visits or page views—is the best predictor of future behavior. The information technology forming the basis of behavioral marketing is the cookie.

9

Online Privacy and Marketing

Cookies, small packets of data placed on a user’s hard drive through instructions generated from a Web page visited by the user, continue to occupy an important place in discussions of online marketing and privacy. Cookies are ubiquitous applications able to function without a user’s knowledge or control (Strauss, El-Ansary, & Frost, 2006). Online marketers cite many advantages to their use: the site owner can measure visitor traffic, the advertiser can better target their ads, and the site or e-mail can be tailored to the visitors’ preferences, and so forth (Dobosz, Green, & Sisler, 2006). Cookies have enabled marketers to take unique actions online. For example, cookies have enabled marketers to utilize dynamic pricing techniques, defined as offering different prices to different online consumers (Strauss et al., 2006). Even though dynamic pricing has been used (and defended) by marketers such as airline carriers for decades, the practice has tended to raise eyebrows among online consumers and watchdog groups. When Amazon was discovered to have charged customers different prices for the same CDs, the company was accused of price discrimination based on demographics. Amazon defended the practice as part of a randomized test (Daub, 2001). The utilization of cookies by marketers has many positive aspects for consumers. For example, cookies allow users to return to sites without having to log in or register each time. Most consumers are either unaware of cookies or unconcerned by their placement, because their identity remains anonymous to the marketer. The DoubleClick controversy of 2000, in which the interactive advertising agency DoubleClick combined demographic database information with online activity, illustrated that marketers have the capability, if not the intention, to do more than just monitor anonymous activity with cookies (Strauss et al., 2006). Many users attribute data mining capabilities to cookies that marketers say are impossible: provision of actual names and addresses, e-mailing capabilities, and so forth.

0

More likely, they are referring to spyware (also called adware). Spyware technology is similar to that of cookies, but it has a different, sometimes malevolent, purpose. The spyware program creates a unique user identifier and collects user data which can be sent to the collector of the information and can be installed unintentionally when the user installs another piece of software (Klang, 2004). Spyware can generate pop-up ads, send spam to an e-mail inbox, and crash a computer (Strauss et al., 2006). Technologies such as spyware, Web bugs, transactional database software, and chat-room analysis tools can monitor e-mail and keystrokes in order to serve ads to consumers even when they are not online (Turow, 2003). The use of cookies and adware by marketers may continue to serve as the primary technology tool enabling behavioral marketing. It may also be a first-generation marketing phenomenon that will not last. Because of the potential for (and numerous cases of) privacy intrusion, it is possible that legislation to limit the use of cookies and spyware will be enacted. To some degree, consumers have been addressing the issue themselves, because cookie rejection rates continue to increase. A survey by Jupiter Research reported that 58% of Web users have deleted cookies, with 39% of respondents reporting monthly deletions of cookies (Savvas, 2005). As Chen and Rea (2004) point out, there is a tension between technologies that take information from consumers (cookies, for example) and those that allow consumers the opportunity to share information or not (P3P technologies, for example). Because opt-in and opt-out choices are often “buried” in privacy notices that many consumers do not read, consumers do not always realize the privacy implications of their online activity. An important step in the protection of online privacy is the inclusion of prominent, easy to read and understand opt-in and opt-out choices for the consumer.

Online Privacy and Marketing

prIvAcy And Word-of-mouth mArketIng: blogs, sponsored chAt rooms, And bulletIn boArds Marketing often consists of “push” techniques, where sales or marketing information is sent to consumers and/or the distribution channel in the form of advertisements, coupons, and press releases, for example. The Internet provides a unique opportunity for marketers to utilize “pull” marketing techniques whereby the consumer requests or seeks out information about products or services via blogs, bulletin boards, and sponsored chat rooms. Pull marketing can be an effective marketing strategy because the consumer is actively involved in seeking information about desired products or services. It has been reported that Generation Y, consumers born between 1979 and 1994, exhibit a deep mistrust of advertising and prefer to rely on product information provided by their friends for their purchases (Belch & Belch, 2004). Previous studies have also found that young people are significantly more likely to shop online (Joines, Scherer, & Scheufele, 2003). These preferences have spurred the growth of marketing communication techniques referred to as “stealth,” “buzz,” or “word-of-mouth” marketing. To create buzz about their products, companies, such as Proctor & Gamble, have been quietly recruiting paid “product fans” to indirectly market their products through word-of-mouth marketing techniques such as personal endorsements and providing favorable product reviews or information on bulletin boards and in chat rooms (Berner, 2006). Much has been made recently of the use of blogs for corporate marketing and public relations purposes. Major corporations such as Boeing, Walt Disney, and McDonald’s are utilizing blogs on their Web sites to share information with the public and to monitor public opinion (Holmes, 2006). Some companies are finding that the role that journalists used to play in the publicity of

new products and other announcements is now being offered to bloggers to build support for their products. In 2005, General Electric executives met with environmental bloggers prior to making and announcing investments in energy-efficient technology. Microsoft contacted bloggers to promote their Xbox game system. Wal-Mart has utilized blogs since 2005 to promote positive news about itself and to repair its image (Barbaro, 2006). Companies are finding that bloggers are often more accessible and interested in doing more than just reporting the news. Oftentimes, bloggers are just as interested in shaping public opinion and they can be eager to provide a critical assessment of the company’s products or marketing activities. Privacy issues related to communication forums such as blogs, chat rooms, and bulletin boards are many and are as likely to affect the marketer as the consumer. For example, what happens to the product or company’s reputation if or when it is discovered that the person(s) providing the favorable information has been paid or provided with cash or free products? Is it possible that a company might encounter a backlash if their marketing technique becomes widely known to the general public? The privacy that many feel when they adopt a username and chat anonymously—they believe—can reduce inhibitions. But what happens when the identity of the chatter is revealed? The recent case of John Mackey, CEO of Whole Foods, illustrates the risky nature of blogs and online chat. For 8 years, Mackey posted comments on Yahoo Finance stock forums under a pseudonym. His comments included positive statements about his company and disparaging comments about a competitor, Wild Oats, which would become an acquisition target for Whole Foods in 2007. Mackey’s comments came to light only after the FTC made the comments public in its antitrust lawsuit to block the sale (Kesmodel & Wilke, 2007). The data ownership and dissemination issues discussed earlier can be troubling for the millions



Online Privacy and Marketing

of consumers who join online communities. In 1999, GeoCities, a virtual community Web site, sold personal information provided by its members to third parties. The FTC’s director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection called the case “a message to all Internet marketers that statements about their information collection practices must be accurate and complete.” He added that monitoring and enforcement would be forthcoming (Beltramini, 2003).

onlIne mArketIng to chIldren Data Monitor estimated that over 65 million children in the U.S. and Europe had access to the Internet at home (Bennett, 2006). Marketing to children, who comprise a significant proportion of online users, represents both an opportunity and a dilemma for marketers. On one hand, children and teenagers comprise an attractive target market for many products including clothing, entertainment, and food (Day, 1999). One study reported that U.S. companies spent an estimated $15 billion just to advertise and market to children age 12 and under (Munoz, 2003). But the opportunities for marketing to children can be overshadowed by government policies put in place to protect children, who represent a vulnerable population requiring oversight and protection (Shimp, 2007). In addition to ongoing government regulation, corporate policies have been enacted in response to negative publicity and to avoid future regulation. In 2007, for instance, Kellogg’s Corporation announced that it would stop advertising products that did not meet specific nutritional guidelines to children under age 12, because of concerns about the impact of food products on childhood obesity (Martin, 2007). It has been estimated that about 75% of 14 to 17 year-olds and 65% of 10 to 13 year olds used the Internet in 2001 (Cooper & Victory, 2002) and would spend $1.3 billion online in 2002 (Day, 1999). The ubiquity of home and school



computers and the emphasis on computer usage in education makes children and teenagers skilled users of computers and prime targets for online marketing of goods and services. Two academic studies of children and teenagers illustrate that privacy issues for children are often age dependent and that older children (teenagers) are more aware of the risks and more likely to manage online risks than children. A content analysis by Cai and Gantz (2000) found that a majority of Web sites analyzed (n=163) collected information from children without disclosure or parental involvement. In contrast, Youn’s (2005) study of 326 high school students’ online behaviors found that teenagers who exhibited a higher level of perceived risk for information disclosure were less willing to provide information. They also utilized risk-reducing strategies such as providing false or incomplete information. These studies point to the need to continue to monitor behaviors and provide legislation protections for our youngest consumers, especially compliance that includes parental consent and involvement. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998 required Web sites that target children to comply with a number of privacy protections, including requiring online users under the age of 13 to submit verifiable parental consent before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information (Federal Trade Commission, 1999). Others have called for private intervention, including more education and information in the form of privacy awareness programs (Lewandowski, 2002).

prIvAcy Issues And socIAl netWorks Marketing via social networks is a fast growing technique available to marketers hoping to reach a particular demographic group. Some social networks, such as LinkedIn, are targeted toward working professionals. Others, such as FaceBook

Online Privacy and Marketing

and MySpace, have been designed for young people and students. Marketers who want to reach the highly sought-after 18-24 demographic have become the medium’s biggest fans. Mainstream marketers such as Honda and Adidas are purchasing banner ads, sponsoring content and marketing directly to the tens of millions of registered social network members. Marketing on social networks provides many advantages to the marketer. The social network contains a large target market that has self-identified by age, educational status, sex, and so forth. The cost of Internet promotions can be less expensive than those using mainstream media. Mediarestricted or regulated products such as tobacco and alcohol can find a welcome audience. Nevertheless, there have been many well-publicized examples of privacy issues associated with popular social networks: minors meeting sexual predators online, the public dissemination of the names of sex offenders registered on My Space, and countless stories about the publication of tasteless photographs and content by social network members who thought that their information was “private,” despite its posting on a global medium. In spite of the negative publicity about social networks, marketing on social networking sites makes good sense for those marketers seeking to make contact with large groups of consumers. Even though operators of social networking sites are immune from liability for content posted by their users, there is an element of potential risk for marketers. Public support for safety measures such as age verification procedures to protect the under-age population is growing (Christ, Berges, & Trevino, 2007). Because of the rapidly changing environments for technology-driven marketing opportunities such as social networks, it is recommended that mainstream marketers frequently evaluate whether this is an arena they wish to operate in and whether privacy issues will help or hinder them in their efforts to market to the young. Just as sites targeted at children have incorporated information for parents into their content,

it is recommended that social networks aimed at minors take the lead in creating and promoting a safe online environment and communicating that information to parents, educators, and other authority figures.

conclusIons And recommendAtIons for further reseArch This chapter has provided an overview of some of the key issues related to privacy in marketing contexts and recommendations for the future. While it is not an exhaustive review of all marketing-related issues, it is a comprehensive discussion of several timely and important online marketing privacy issues affecting marketers and consumers. But there will be many more marketing issues to analyze and critique, particularly when one considers the dynamic nature of both marketing and the Internet medium. The marketing issues presented in this chapter provide fertile research opportunities because many of the marketing technologies and techniques discussed here are relatively new and changing rapidly. Privacy policy disclosure and clarity is one area where we can expect to see activity in the future. Much of the literature about marketing and online privacy recommends the inclusion of clearly written, prominently displayed privacy policies. The thinking by many of those who study this issue is that information is powerful and that awareness is the first step towards compliance. Much needs to be done, because only 5% of Fortune 500 companies were found to fully comply with the guidelines for provision of privacy policy notices on their Web sites (Hong, McLaughlin, Pryor, Beaudoin, & Grabowicz, 2005). It may be that the provision of privacy policies could become a Web-based requirement for e-commerce, similar to the financial disclosures consumers must receive prior to investing in a mutual fund. Turow (2003) recommends that



Online Privacy and Marketing

the federal government require P3P protocols on all Web sites. Future research could be focused on monitoring government and private sector proposals and actions to discover whether selfregulation or government regulation of marketing privacy activities ultimately leads to more and better information for consumers. The growth of Web 2.0 applications also represents an intriguing area of research into online privacy. Interesting research could be conducted about the growing use of public blogs for marketing purposes, for example. Boeing’s eventual positive experiences with blogs did not begin well because reader comments were not allowed initially (Holmes, 2006). Content analysis could be performed that analyzes blog structure and design and the quantity or variety of public commentary among blogging companies, non profits, or other institutions. Analysis of monitoring policies for the use of blogs and chat rooms by corporations and other public entities is another recommended area of research that would be helpful to managers planning communication strategies. Privacy issues in e-mail marketing are also worthy of research, especially because privacy issues in electronic mail are an unsettled aspect of online interaction (Strauss et al., 2006). An international survey of consumers revealed that nearly 21% of respondents like to receive direct postal mail, but only 6% of them like to receive commercial e-mail (Hoffman et al., 1999).Much of the dislike can probably be attributed to the massive and continued use of commercial SPAM and concerns about viruses in attachments, topics ripe for further study. An interesting e-mail privacy issue would entail understanding users’ perceptions of privacy related to Google’s Gmail, which trades server space for monitoring of users’ words to match them with product ads (Dobosz et al., 2006). The current state of e-mail marketing practices in light of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 would also be beneficial to study.



Mobile computing offers new opportunities to marketers. Mainstream marketers such as Coca-Cola and McDonald’s continue to utilize commercial text messaging and other mobile promotions (Sultan & Rohm, 2005). The ability to send effective promotional messages to cells phones is currently limited by factors such as the size of the screen and the risk of consumer irritation. Mobile advertising also requires different techniques for monitoring advertising effectiveness (Strauss et al., 2006). Future research will undoubtedly consider not only the feasibility of this high potential medium but also the associated privacy issues, including the identity, ownership, and use of consumers’ phone records. Countries such as India are betting heavily on a mobile (cell phone) computing technology platform in the future. Their experiences with mobile computing will provide fertile territory for mobile privacy research as the world moves to the adoption of a mobile personal computing platform that is likely to include other advertising and privacy issues. Marketing to children and young people will continue to be an area fraught with privacy concerns both online and off. Some of the same media strategies that have been used for alcohol and tobacco awareness could be utilized with these groups. An interesting experiment could be conducted that tested children’s awareness of privacy issues and safe behaviors before and after an advertising treatment and served to students in a school lab or library setting. Privacy and security issues will continue to dominate the online marketing landscape and there will be numerous opportunities to learn from others’ online marketing successes and mistakes. Efforts by industry, the government, and watchdog groups to monitor practices and propose improvements for protecting the privacy of all users will be ongoing.

Online Privacy and Marketing

references Ashworth, L., & Free, C. (2006). Marketing dataveillance and digital privacy: Using theories of justice to understand consumers’ online privacy concerns. Journal of Business Ethics, 67, 107-123. Auerbach, J. G. (1999, March 31). To get IBM ad, sites must post privacy policies. The Wall Street Journal, pp. B1, B4.

Christ, R. E., Berges, J. S., & Trevino, S. C. (2007). Social networking sites: To monitor or not to monitor users and their content? Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 19(7), 13-17. Cooper, K. B., & Victory, N. J. (2002, February). A nation online: How Americans are expanding their use of the internet. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.

Bagozzi, R. (1975). Marketing as exchange. Journal of Marketing, 39(4), 32-39.

Culnan, M. J. (1995). Consumer awareness of name removal procedures: Implications for direct marketing. Journal of Direct Marketing, 7, 10-19.

Barbaro, M. (2006, March 7). Wal-Mart enlist bloggers in P.R. campaign. The New York Times.

Culnan, M. J. (2000). Protecting privacy online: Is self-regulation working? Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 20-26.

Belch, G. E., & Belch, M. A. (2004). Advertising and promotion: An integrated marketing communications perspective (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

Daub, T. R. (2001). Surfing the net safely and smoothly: A new standard for protecting personal information from harmful and discriminatory waves. Washington University Law Quarterly, 79, 913-949.

Beltramini, R. F. (2003). Application of the unfairness doctrine to marketing communications on the Internet. Journal of Business Ethics, 42(4), 393-400. Bennett, C. (2006). Keeping up with the kids. Young Consumers, Quarter 2, 28-32. Berner, R. (2006, May 29). I sold it through the grapevine. Business Week, pp. 32-33. Cai, X., & Gantz, W. (2000). Online privacy issues associated with web sites for children. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 44(2), 197-214. Caudill, E. M., & Murphy, P. E. (2000). Consumer online privacy: Legal and ethical issues. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 7-19. Chen, K., & Rea, A. (2004). Protecting personal information online: A survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85-92.

Day, J. (1999, February 22). Report: Teen online spending increases. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/366. html Dobosz, B., Green, K., & Sisler, G. (2006). Behavioral marketing: Security and privacy issues. Journal of Information Privacy & Security, 2(4), 45-59. Federal Trade Commission. (1998). Privacy online: A report to congress. Retrieved July 14, 2007, from http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/ index.shtm Federal Trade Commission. (1999). Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, Federal Register, 64, 212. (November 3), 59888-59915. Hoffman, D., Novak, T. P., & Peralta, M. (1999). Building consumer trust online. Association for Computing Machinery. Communications of the ACM, 42(4), 80-85.



Online Privacy and Marketing

Holmes, S. (2006, May 22). Into the wild blog yonder. Business Week, pp. 84-86. Hong, T., McLaughlin, M. L., Pryor, L., Beaudoin, C., & Grabowicz, P. (2005). Internet privacy practices of news media and implications for online journalism. Journalism Studies, 6(2), 15-28. Joines, J. L., Scherer, C. W., & Scheufele, D. A. (2003). Exploring motivations for consumer web use and their implications for e-commerce. The Journal of Consumer Marketing, 20(2/3), 90-108. Jones, M. (1991). Privacy: A significant marketing issue for the 1990s. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 10(spring), 133-148. Kesmodel, D., & Wilkie, J. R. (2007). Whole foods is hot, wild oats a dud—so said “Rahodeb.” The Wall Street Journal, 250(9), A1. Klang, M. (2004). Spyware-the ethics of covert software. Ethics and Information Technology, 6, 193-202. Krebs, B. (2001). Etour.com data sales violate policy. Newsbytes News Network. Retrieved July 13, 2007, from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NEW/ is_2001_May_29/ai_75139832 Lewandowski, J. (2002). Stepping off the sidewalk: An examination of the data collection techniques of web sites visited by children. Doctoral dissertation, Purdue University, W. Lafayette, IN.

Montana, J. C. (2001). Data mining: A slippery slope. Information Management Journal, 35(4), 50-52. Munoz, S. (2003, November 11). Nagging issue: Pitching junk to kids. The Wall Street Journal Online. Retrieved July 14, 2007, from http://online.wsj.com Oberndorf, S. (1998). Users remain wary. Multichannel Merchant. Retrieved July 14, 2007, from http://multichannelmerchant.com/news/marketing_users_remain_wary/ Radin, T. J., Calkins, M., & Predmore, C. (2007). New challenges to old problems: Building trust in e-marketing. Business and Society Review, 112(1), 73-98. Savvas, A. (2005, March 22). Monitoring made harder by cookie security fears, Computer Weekly. Retrieved July 14, 2007, from http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/Article.aspx?liArticleID=208948&PrinterFriendl y=true Schwaig, K. S., Kane, G. C., & Storey, V. C. (2005). Privacy, fair information practices, and the Fortune 500: the virtual reality of compliance. The DATA BASE for Advances in Information Systems, 36(1). Sheehan, K. B. & Hoy, M. G. (1999). Flaming, complaining, abstaining: How online users respond to privacy concerns. Journal of Advertising, 28(3), 37-51.

Martin, A. (2007, June 14). Kellogg to phase out some food ads to children. The New York Times. Retrieved July 11, 2007, from www.nytimes. com/2007/06/14/business/14kellogg.html?ex=11 83953600&en=8f34f9be3c1620f7&ei=5070

Shimp, T. (2007). Advertising, promotion, and other aspects of integrated marketing communications (7th ed.). Mason, OH: Thomson SouthWestern.

Media Week marketer’s guide to media (Vol. 29). (2006). New York: VNU Business Publications.

Strauss, J., El-Ansary, A., & Frost, R. (2006). E-marketing (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Milne, G.R. (1997). Consumer participation in mailing lists: A field experiment. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 16, 298-309. 

Sultan, F., & Rohm, A. (2005). The coming era of “brand in the hand” marketing. MIT Sloan Management Review, 47(1), 82-90.

Online Privacy and Marketing

Turow, J. (2003). Americans & online privacy: The system is broken. Report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, June. Wang, H., Lee, M. K. O., & Wang, C. (1998). Consumer privacy concerns about internet marketing. Association for Computing Machinery. Communications of the ACM, 41(3), 63-68. Xie, E., Teo, H-H, & Wan, W. (2006). Volunteering personal information on the internet: Effects of reputation, privacy notices, and rewards on online consumer behavior. Marketing Letters, 17, 61-74. Youn, S. (2005). Teenagers’ perceptions of online privacy and coping behaviors: A risk-benefit appraisal approach. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 49(1), 86-110.

AddItIonAl reAdIngs Cantos, L., Fine, L., Porcell, N., & Selby, S. E. (2001). FTC approves first COPPA “safe harbor” application. Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 13(4), 24. Caudill, E. M., & Murphy, P. E. (2000). Consumer online privacy: Legal and ethical issues. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 7-19. Dobrow, L. (2006). Privacy issues loom for marketers. Advertising Age, 77(11), S6. Dommeyer, C., & Gross, B. L. (2003). What consumers know and what they do: An investigation of consumer knowledge, awareness, and use of privacy protection strategies. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 17(2), 34-51. Eastlick, M. A., Lotz, S. L., & Warrington, P. (2006). Understanding online B-to-C relationships: An integrated model of privacy concerns, trust, and commitment. Journal of Business Research, 59, 877-886.

George, J. F. (2004). The theory of planned behavior and Internet purchasing. Internet Research, 14(3), 198-212. Han, P., & Maclaurin, A. (2002). Do consumers really care about online privacy? Marketing Management, 11(1), 35-38. Hann, I., Hui, K., Lee, T., & Png, I (2002). Online information privacy: Measuring the cost-benefit trade-off. In Proceedings of the Twenty-third International Conference on Information Systems. Heckman, J. (1999). E-marketers have three childprivacy options. Marketing News, 33(16), 5-6. Klang, M. Y., Raghu, T. S., & Shang, K. H-M (2000). Marketing on the Internet—who can benefit from an online marketing approach? Decision Support Systems, 27(4), 383-393. Langenderfer, J., & Cook, D. L. (2004). Oh, what a tangled web we weave: The state of privacy protection in the information economy and recommendations for governance. Journal of Business Research, 57, 734-747. Luo, X. (2002). Trust production and privacy concerns on the Internet: A framework based on relationship marketing and social exchange theory. Industrial Marketing Management, 31, 111-118. Metzger, M. J., & Docter, S. (2003). Public opinion and policy initiatives for online privacy protection. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 47(3), 350-374. Milne, G. R., & Culnan, M. J. (2004). Strategies for reducing online privacy risks: Why consumers read (or don’t read) online privacy notices. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 18(3), 15-29. Miyazaki, A. D. & Fernandez, A. (2001). Consumer perceptions of privacy and security risks for online shopping. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 35(1), 27-44.



Online Privacy and Marketing

Morrison, K. L. (2003). Children reading commercial messages on the Internet: Web sites that merge education, information, entertainment, and advertising. Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. Palmer, D. E. (2005). Pop-ups, cookies, and spam: Toward a deeper analysis of the ethical significance of Internet marketing practices. Journal of Business Ethics, 58, 271-280. Pan, Y., & Zinkhan, G. M. (2006). Exploring the impact of online privacy disclosures on consumer trust. Journal of Retailing, 82(4), 331-338. Roman, S. (2007). The ethics of online retailing: A scale development and validation from the consumers’ perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 72, 131-148. Schwartz, G. (2003). Mobile marketing 101. Marketing Magazine, 108(26), 21. Sheehan, K. B. (2002). Toward a typology of Internet users and online privacy concerns. The Information Society, 18(1), 21-32.

8

Sheehan, K. B., & Hoy, M. G. (2000). Dimensions of privacy concern among online consumers. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 62-73. Stewart, D., & Zhao, Q. (2000). Internet marketing: Business models and public policy. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(2), 287-296. Vascellaro, J. (2007, April 30). Virtual worlds now cater to kids, but are they safe? The Wall Street Journal, p. B.1. Wijnholds, H., & Little, M. W. (2001). Regulatory issues for global e-tailers: Marketing implications. Academy of Marketing Science Review, 2001, 1-12. Yang, S., Hung, W., Sung, K., & Farn, C. (2006). Investigating initial trust toward e-tailers from the elaboration likelihood model perspective. Psychology & Marketing, 23(5), 429.

9

Chapter XIII

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies Suhong Li Bryant University, USA Chen Zhang Bryant University, USA

AbstrAct The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the current status of online privacy policies of Fortune 100 Companies. It was found that 94% of the surveyed companies have posted an online privacy policy and 82% of them collect personal information from consumers. The majority of the companies only partially follow the four principles (notice, choice, access, and security) of fair information practices. For example, most of the organizations give consumers some notice and choice in term of the collection and use of their personal information. However, organizations fall short in security requirements. Only 19% of organizations mention that they have taken steps to provide security for information both during transmission and after their sites have received the information. The results also reveal that a few organizations have obtained third-party privacy seals including TRUSTe, BBBOnline Privacy, and Safe Harbor.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

IntroductIon Privacy is defined as “the right to be let alone” which is part of the basic human rights to enjoy life (Warren, 1890). As an extension of privacy in the information age, information privacy is the legitimate collection, use, and disclosure of personal information, or “the claims of individuals that data about themselves should generally not be available to other individuals and organizations, and that, where data is possessed by another party, the individual must be able to exercise a substantial degree of control over that data and its use” (Clarke, 1999). One type of information privacy is online privacy, which is defined as “consumer concerns about what data is being collected by an online vendor about the customer and how it will be used” (Nyshadham, 2000). Compared to an off-line environment, the Internet enables organizations to collect more information from consumers cost effectively, sometimes even without the consent of consumers. The Internet poses greater security threats for consumers as their personal information is transmitted over the Internet if an organization does not have a good security mechanism in place. Furthermore, the connectivity of the Internet allows organizations to capture and build electronic profiles of consumers and potential consumers. Therefore, consumers today are facing a high level of privacy threat/invasion. One way to show an organization’s commitment to protect consumers’ online privacy is to post an online privacy policy and follow the policy truthfully. Online privacy has been viewed as a significant factor contributing to consumer trust and therefore an imperative for business success (Privacy & American Business, 2002). However, its provision is often at odds with organizational goals—such as the maximization of personal information value obtained from disclosure to third parties (often for commercial gain) and the retention of customer loyalty via enhanced personalized services (Lichtenstein, Swatman, & Babu, 2003).

0

The confrontation of individual versus organizational privacy prospective has started to drawn social and governmental attention. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has brought a number of principles to enforce the promises in organization’s privacy statements (FTC, 1998; FTC, 2005). The FTC suggests a set of principles regarding collection, use, and dissemination of information which will ensure fair information practices. These principles include four core principles called notice, choice, access, and security. The implementations of these principles are as follows: first, organizations should tell consumers what information they collect and how it will be used (notice); second, consumers should be offered a choice about having their personal information used for other unrelated purposes or shared with third parties (choice); third, consumers should be able to review their personal information and have errors corrected (access); finally, organizations should protect the personal information they collect (security). If an organization follows all these principles, it can then be said to follow fair information practices (Nyshadham, 2000). Fair information practices have been used as a standard to evaluate the online privacy policy of organizations in several studies (Nyshadham, 2000). Although online privacy issues have drawn social and governmental attention, the legislation of online privacy protection has not been fully implemented within the increasingly globalized e-commerce world. The European Union Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (EU Directive 2002/58/EC) has been adopted by EU. However, implementation of the EU directive by the member states has been slow because of resistance such as “considerable increase of the interest in the use (and retention) of traffic data by law enforcement authorities” (EDRI, 2004). Although the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 1998) has published a guideline to enforce the promises in organization’s privacy statements (FTC, 2005) and many bills related to consumer

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

privacy are currently reviewed by the congress (CDT, 2005), the U.S. Online Privacy Protection Act is still in a proposal (Baumer, Earp, & Poindexter, 2004). As a result, the current online privacy protection legislations taken effect vary by industries and states. Among these, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) have already taken effect (Desai, Richards, & Desai, 2003). The privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) requires disclosure of a financial institution’s privacy policy to consumers and requires that the institution provide the consumer an opportunity to opt out of any disclosures of non-public personal information to non-affiliated third parties (Wolf, 2004). The California Online Privacy Protect Act (COPPA) passed on July 1, 2004 requires the Web sites to post the online privacy policy (OPP) conspicuously with effective dates, in addition to other requirements similar to the FTC guideline and applies to any operator of a Web site or online service that collects personally identifiable information from consumers residing in California (Englund, 2004). Meanwhile, private organizations have been working on regulating online privacy protection for many years. Several third party privacy seals along with consulting service are available currently. These include TRUSTe, BBB (Better Business Bureau) Online, CPA Web Trust, and ESRB (Entertainment Software Rating Board) Privacy Online. Both TRUSTe and BBBOnline were founded in 1997. The European Commission’s directive on data protection went into effect in October of 1998 and prohibits the transfer of personal data to non-European Union nations that do not meet the European “adequacy” standard for privacy protection (BBBOnline, 2005). Therefore, non European Union companies who need to transfer the customer information transAtlantic must comply with the European Union’s safe harbor framework— approved by the EU in July of 2000. These four types of privacy

certificate programs reflect the self-regulation of the industry. Surveys have shown that consumers are concerned about the collection and use of their personal information when using e-commerce Web sites and will stay away from the electronic marketplace until they are confident their personal information is protected and used properly (FTC, 1998). As a result, more and more companies have posted an online privacy policy in order to provide customers with a sense of security regarding the protection of their personal data. In addition, organizations have begun to obtain some third-party privacy seals of trust. Several studies have focused on the investigation of the online privacy policy of organizations (Culnan, 1999; Nyshadham, 2000; Desai et al., 2003; Lichtenstein et al. 2002; McRobb & Rogerson, 2004). Those studies indicated that significant differences exist among the length, language, and content of privacy policies of organizations. The purpose of this study is to perform an up-to-date survey of online privacy policies of Fortune 100 companies with the goals of increasing our understanding of current online privacy practices, identifying the common deficiencies, and providing suggestions for future improvement of online privacy policies.

bAckground An online privacy policy (OPP) is a key organizational measure for assuring online privacy for Web site users (Lichtenstein et al., 2003). Serving as the high level guideline of the information privacy of an organization, the promises made in OPPs varied from each other, reflecting the difference in the organizational recognition of the online privacy issues and the privacy practices. Several studies have focused on the investigation of OPPs using survey methodology (Culnan, 1999; Nyshadham, 2000; Desai et al., 2003; Lichtenstein et al., 2002; McRobb & Rogerson, 2004).



An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

The purposes of these studies are to understand the current practices, compare the differences, identify the deficiencies, and offer suggestions for future improvement of online privacy policies. These studies suggest the research design and methodologies for conducting privacy policy survey and thus provide a good starting point for our research. We will discuss those studies briefly in the following paragraphs. Culnan’s report to the FTC (Culnan, 1999) studied 300 dot-com Web sites to investigate the self regulation status of these companies in compliance with the FTC guidelines. The report found that although the majority of these dotcom Web sites (79.7%) posted privacy policies, their compliance with the FTC’s guidelines was poor: only 22% provide consumers with notice regarding collection of personal information. On the important issue of providing individuals with the capacity to control the use and disclosure of personal information, the survey found that 39.5% say that consumers can make some decision about whether they are re-contacted for marketing purposes and fewer still, 25%, say they provide consumers with some control over the disclosure of data to third parties. Nyshadham (2000) studied the online privacy policies of 23 airlines, focusing on the fair information practices suggested by the FTC (FTC, 1998). His research indicates that significant differences exist among majors, nationals and intermediaries in the privacy practices. The air travel industry seemed to fall behind other industries in implementing fair information practices. According to his research, all the surveyed firms collect customer information and 90% of them collect both personal identifying information and demographic information. The result showed 100% of online air travel intermediaries (agents) posted privacy policies. While in contrast, 30% of major airlines and 92% of national airlines collected customer information without providing a privacy policy in 2000. The results also showed that no privacy policy statement followed all four principles and



again the ordering from best to worst practice is online intermediaries, major airlines, and then national airlines. In addition, a few firms (one intermediary, one major, and no national) used some type of privacy seals of trust. Lichtenstein et al. (2002) analyzed the OPPs of 10 companies in various industries in America and Australia. The authors focused on identifying the deficiencies in OPPs. Instead of using statistical methods, the authors performed a qualitative analysis and in-depth case studies. Trends, patterns, and differences are captured in the categories of: awareness, data quality, security, information movement, user identification, accountability, user access, assurance, contact, choice, change management, children’s privacy, sensitive information, and exceptions. The authors then provided detail guidelines for improvements in each category. Desai et al. (2003) researched the OPPs of over 40 e-commerce companies. The OPPs were evaluated based on the five privacy policy categories: privacy, returns, shipping, warranty, and security using a scale of 0 to 5. Their study also performed longitudinal comparisons from 1999 to 2001 and showed that e-commerce companies have improved communications of these policies with their customers significantly over the years. McRobb and Rogerson (2004) performed an empirical survey of 113 OPPs belonging to different industries and countries. They suggested that a five point scale is too simple to produce useful insights for the complex content of many privacy policies. The authors used statistical and subjective methods to evaluate the OPPs in terms of personal information collection, disclosure to third parties, customer consent, contact information, check/amend procedure, data protection, cookies, children’s issues, trust seal, and further privacy advice. The study performed a regional comparison of EU and North America and concluded that EU polices are more prominent but are less informative. The study also conducted industrial sector comparisons and showed that

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

retail and Internet services performed better than the average, while travel/tourism and public utilities performed worse than the average. It can be seen that previous studies on online privacy policies all use the four principles suggested by the FTC to evaluate the quality of online privacy policies. However, some studies focus on a specific industry such as airlines (Nyshadham, 2000), some just focus on e-commerce companies (Culnan, 1999; Desai et al., 2003); some include less than 50 samples in their studies (Nyshadham, 2000; Desai et al., 2003; Lichtenstein et al., 2002). No study could be found which has investigated the online privacy policies of Fortune 100 companies. The purpose of this chapter is to fill this gap by providing the current status of online privacy policies of the Fortune 100 companies which represent the largest companies in various industries in the U.S. and thus will enhance our understanding of privacy policy practices for the largest companies in the U.S.

mAIn thrust of the chApter research methodology and data collection The Fortune 100 companies are chosen as the target sample in our study (see Appendix). Four questions will be investigated: (1) How many Web sites surveyed have posted a privacy policy?; (2) What personal information is collected by the Web site from consumers?; (3) Do those privacy disclosures follow fair information practices?; and (4) How many Web sites use third-party seals (such as Truste and BBBOnline) to provide privacy assurances? The set of questions for measuring fair information practices were adopted from Nyshadham (2000) (see Table 2), with additional questions regarding privacy seals and more recent data (collected in February, 2005). This instrument has also been used in several privacy studies, including the privacy study conducted by the FTC

(FTC, 1998), the Culnan report to the FTC (Culnan, 1999), and Online Privacy Alliance (OPA, 2005). The data collection process was as follows: First, the Web site of each Fortune 100 company was visited by the authors. Second, the online privacy policy of each Web site, if available, was reviewed and evaluated carefully by the authors based on the four groups of questions described. To guarantee the validity and consistency of data collected, the authors first developed and agreed on the way of interpreting the information and one author would double check with the other if any discrepancies arose during data collection. The same method was used in most studies of online privacy policies.

data Analysis The Number of Web Sites Having Privacy Policy It was found that out of 100 Web sites, six do not post a privacy policy, since these companies usually do not have direct contact with consumers. For the 94 companies having an online privacy policy, five of them indicate that their Web sites are only for the purpose of displaying information. In sum, 89 companies have online privacy policy and also collect consumer information online. Those companies will be used in the later analysis.

Type of Information Collected Table 1 shows that 82% of companies indicate that they will collect personal information from the consumers. Out of this group, some organizations also indicate the type of information they collect. For example, almost half of the organizations will collect name, e-mail address, and postal address from the consumers. In addition, the types of information the companies collect also include phone number, credit card number, age/date of birth, family information, gender, education, income, preferences, and occupation.



An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

It was also found that 79% of the companies use cookies to collect non-personal information. A cookie is a small data file that a Web site or e-mail may send to a user’s browser, which may then be stored on the user’s hard drive. The cookies allow a Web site to recognize a user when he/she returns to the same site to provide the user with a customized experience. Most of the companies indicate that they do not store personal information in the cookies. In addition, 28% of the companies use Web beacons, also known as clear gifs, or Web bugs, which allow a company to collect certain information automatically. The collected information may include a user’ Internet protocol (IP) address, computer’s operating system, browser type, the address of a referring Web site, and any search terms a user may have entered on the site, among other information. Companies may include Web

Table 1. Type of information collected by Web sites Number

Percentage

Personal information

73

82.0%

Name

53

59.6%

E-mail address

50

56.2%

Postal address

41

46.1%

Personal Information

Phone number

34

38.2%

Credit card number

18

20.2%

Social security number

5

5.6%

Age/date of birth

11

12.4%

Family information

3

3.4%

Gender

4

4.5%

Education

2

2.2%

Income

3

3.4%

Preferences/interests

8

9.0%

Occupation

7

7.9%

Cookies/tracers

70

78.7%

Clear Gifs/Web beacons/Web bugs

25

28.1%

Non-Personal Information



beacons in promotional e-mail messages or newsletters in order to determine whether messages have been opened and acted upon.

Fair Information Practices Table 2 shows the status of fair information practices for the Fortune 100 companies. It can be seen that in general, Fortune 100 companies have not followed all four core principles of fair information practices fully. In relation to the notice requirements, about 70% of the sites have indicated what information will be collected from consumers, how it collects information from consumers, and how the information it collected from consumers will be used. Regarding the choice requirements, 69% of the sites indicate that they will use information the site has collected to contact consumers for marketing or other purposes. At the same time, about half (52%) indicate that they will give consumers the choice of whether they want to be contacted by this organization for marketing or other purposes. About 60% of the companies say that information they collect from consumers may be disclosed to outside third parties (e. g., advertisers, business partners, or affiliates), however, only 23% of the Web sites indicate that they will give consumers the choice of opting out of the disclosure to outside third parties. In addition, a small percentage of the companies (12%) indicate that they will only disclose the information in aggregate form to the third parties. Regarding the access requirements, more than half (56%) of the companies provide consumers some way to review and modify their personal information, in most cases, through access to an online account. However, only one third of the companies (33%) mention how inaccuracies in personal information collected are handled. Compared to notice, choice, and access requirements of fair information practices, security requirements receive the least attention from the companies. Only 19% of the companies indicate

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

Table 2. Fair information practices for Fortune 100 companies Survey Question

Number

Percentage

Does the site say anything about what information it collects from consumers?

63

70.8%

Does the site say anything about how it collects information from consumers?

62

69.7%

Does the site say how the information it collected from consumers will be used?

56

62.9%

Does the site say that this organization may use information the site has collected to contact consumers for marketing or other purposes?

61

68.5%

Does the site say that it gives consumers choice about whether they want to be contacted by this organization for marketing or other purposes?

46

51.7%

Does the site say that the information collected from consumers may be disclosed to outside third parties (e.g., advertisers, business partners, or affiliates)?

53

59.6%

Does the site say it only discloses this information to outside third parties in aggregate form?

11

12.4%

Does the site say it gives consumers choice about having collected information disclosed to outside third parties?

20

22.5%

Does the site say that it allows consumers to review or modify the information that the site has collected?

50

56.2%

Does the site say how inaccuracies with the personal information the site has collected are handled?

30

33.7%

Does the site say anything about the steps it takes to provide security for information during transmission?

14

15.7%

Does the site say anything about the steps it takes to provide security for information after the site has received the information? (not during transmission, but after collection)

18

20.2%

Mentioned both

17

19.1%

SSL

26

29.2%

Contact Information

25

28.1%

Does the site say how to submit a question about privacy? (e.g., provide contact information)

44

49.4%

Does the site say how to complain to the company or another organization about privacy? (e.g., provide contact information)

16

18.0%

Notice

Choice

Access

Security

Security Seal Verisign

that they have taken steps to provide the security for the information both during the transmission and after the site has received the information. Another 16% mention they have taken steps to provide security for the information during the transmission but do not mention how they handle the security of the information after they receive

it, and another 20% of them indicate that they have taken steps to provide the security after receiving the information but without mentioning the security of the information during the transmission. Almost half of the companies do not mention the security of the information in their online privacy policy at all. In terms of security standards and



An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

certificates, 29% indicate that they have used secure socket layer (SSL) for the security of the information and 5% indicate that they have used VeriSign digital certificate during the transmission of the information. The results also show that about 50% of the companies provide information to consumers on how to contact them about the privacy questions. However, only 18% provide a way for consumers to complain about privacy violations/concerns. In sum, it can be seen that in general, Fortune 100 companies have partially followed the four principles of fair information practices (notice, choice, access, and security). They have given consumer notice about the information they collect, the way they collect the information, and how the information is used. They also give consumers the choice of receiving marketing information from them and allow customers to review and modify the information they collect. However, the majority of them do not give consumers the choice of information disclosure to outside third parties, and do not provide customers a way to address the inaccuracies in personal information. Moreover, most of them fall short in security requirements.

Privacy Seals Table 3 shows that a few firms have begun to use third party privacy seals (19%), including TRUSTe (9%), BBBOnline Privacy (8%), and Safe Harbor (2%). These third-party firms survey an applying company’s online privacy practices and certify it. A certified company can display the graphic seal on its Web site. This is a form of self-regulation that a company can abide. In addition, four companies have support for the platform for privacy preferences (P3P) standard (W3C, 2002), which can be used by Web browsers to automatically shield users from sites that do not provide the level of privacy protection they desire. Using the P3P standard, a Web site can publish a summary of the privacy practices



Table 3. Third-party privacy seals for the surveyed sites Privacy Standard and Seal

Number

Percentage

TRUSTe

8

9.0%

BBBOnLine Privacy (better business bureau online privacy)

7

7.9%

Safe Harbor

2

2.2%

P3P

4

4.5%

of a Web site in machine-readable form. This summary is interpreted by browsers equipped to read P3P summaries. These browsers may then display alerts or block transmission of information to users if the Web sites privacy practices conflict with the preferences of users.

Additional Observations of Online Privacy Policy Even though most companies post privacy policies, the length, language, and contents of the online privacy policies vary from one to another. On one hand, organizations want to give consumers the choice of how their personal information can be used; on the other hand, organizations try to maximize the use of personal information for marketing and other purposes. This dilemma has been reflected in the privacy policy statements of some companies. For example, the online privacy policy of State Farm says “You may contact your State Farm agent if you prefer that we not share this information within State Farm. … Your choice does not limit State Farm from sharing certain information about your transactions with us (such as your name, address, and payment history) or your experiences with us (such as your State Farm claim activity). This choice does not apply to our efforts to market products and services to you—you may receive information about State Farm products that we believe may suit your needs.”

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

The following sentences are quoted directly from the privacy policy of Chase: “Even if you do tell us not to share, we may share other types of information within our family. For example, we may share name and address, information about transactions or balances with us, as well as survey results. ” The third example is the privacy policy of Microsoft, showing “Microsoft.com may send out periodic e-mails informing you of technical service or security issues related to a product or service you requested, or confirming you requested a product or service. In some services offered by Microsoft.com, contact with the customer is an intrinsic part of the service. You will not be able to choose to unsubscribe to these mailings, as they are considered an essential part of the service(s) you have chosen.”

future trends As the Internet and e-commerce become an integrated part of doing business in today’s digital economy, and as companies are collecting more personal information from consumers and using the information for understanding consumers’ needs and marketing their products, consumers will be demanding a stricter protection of their privacy which in turn forces companies to implement a high level standard in privacy protection. For example, compared to the survey conducted by Culnan in 1999, our research shows that more companies have posted an online privacy policy which implies the rise of privacy protection awareness from 1999 to 2005.

conclusIon This chapter investigates the current status of online privacy policies of Fortune 100 companies. It is found that 94% of the surveyed companies have posted an online privacy policy and 82% of them

notify consumers of the collection of information from them. The majority of the companies still only partially follow the four principles (notice, choice, access, and security) of fair information practices. For example, most of the organizations give consumers some notice and choice in terms of the collection and use of their personal information. However, organizations fall short in security requirements. Only 19% of organizations mention that they have taken steps to provide security for information both during transmission and after receiving the information. The results also reveal that a few organizations have obtained third-party privacy seals including TRUSTe, BBBOnline Privacy, and Safe Harbor. The findings show that almost all the Fortune 100 companies have posted their online privacy policy. However, room exists to improve their online privacy practices. As increasing number of consumers become concerned about how their personal information is used in the electronic marketplace, a well designed and implemented privacy policy is needed to build consumers’ trust and thus increase online sales. Especially, companies need to implement effective security measurement to protect the information of consumers both during the transmission and after the site has received the information, which is lacking currently for most of the surveyed companies. Consumers need to be educated of the possible privacy and security threats when submitting personal information online and to take a more active role in protecting their online privacy. According to Forrester Research, less than 1% of the visitors to six major online travel sites during April 2001 actually read privacy policies (Regan, 2001). This may explain why companies are not taking online privacy policies seriously, since the impacts of such policies on consumers’ online purchasing are very limited. To enforce the implementation of a good online privacy policy by organizations, consumers at least need to read online privacy policies before submitting personal information online, and may report the violation of a privacy policy to the company or a higher authority. 

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

Currently, the legislation of Internet privacy protection has not been fully implemented. This may explain partially why some of companies are not following the fair information practices fully. This has shown the limitations of industrial selfregulation in online privacy protection. Our study has also shown the limitation of the third party privacy seals. They are not widely accepted (19%) and research shows that these private seals of trust programs either fail to be recognized and trusted by the online consumers (Moores, 2005), or are only effective on inexperienced consumers (Kimery, 2002). And these private seals of trust programs suffer from the lack of resources for monitoring the member organizations’ compliance of the seal requirements (Miyazaki, 2002). Therefore, although there is a potential to improve consumers’ trust and organizations’ privacy protection practice, third-party private seals of trust may still be in their trial-and-error period (Zhang, 2005). In addition, technical privacy enhancement such as P3P try to automate the privacy preference-policy compliance checking is limited by its acceptance (4.5%). Other online privacy gadgets, such as anonymous surfing tools (thefreecountry. com, 2007), may be effective against tracking cookies. However, when a consumer needs to conduct an online transaction, he/she must submit personal identifiable information. Hence, these anonymity gadgets also have significant limitations. Therefore, more mature and complete future legislation for online privacy protection still seems to be the only alternative in enforcing meaningful and effective online privacy policies. For the time being, consumers should be aware of the potential risk and therefore use caution (such as reading the OPP) before compromising online privacy for convenience.

8

future reseArch dIrectIons Future research should be conducted to study the impact of contextual factors, such as firm size and type of industry on the quality of online privacy policy. It is anticipated that large firms or specific industrial sectors may require a stronger privacy policy. In addition, future research can be extended to study the practice of online privacy policies in other countries and to see how they are different from the U.S. Another direction for future research may focus on consumers’ perceptions and attitudes toward online privacy policies, which have not received enough attention in the literature. The following questions can be investigated such as: do consumers realize the existence of the online privacy policy? Do consumers read the online privacy policy of a company before purchasing from it? Do consumers believe that a company will follow its online privacy policy faithfully? In addition, it will be of interest to study the effect of online privacy policies on consumers. For example, how does the quality of an online privacy policy impact a consumers’ online trust, which in turn, influences their intent to purchase online? Besides online privacy, what are other factors necessary in building online trust? Another question may be how to increase consumers’ awareness of online privacy policy and online privacy protection as the study of Forrester Research shows that few consumers read online privacy policies (Regan, 2001).

references Baumer, D. L., Earp, J. B., & Poindexter, J. C. (2004). Internet privacy law: a comparison between the United States and the European Union. Journal of Computers & Security, 23(5), 400-412.

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

BBBOnline. (2005). European Union/US safe harbor compliance. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/eu.asp CDT. (2005). Center for democracy and technology. Legislation Center. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://cdt.org/legislation/ Clarke, R. (1999). Internet privacy concerns confirm the case for intervention. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 60-67. Culnan, M. J. (1999). The Georgetown Internet privacy policy survey: Report to the Federal Trade Commission. Retrieved April 15, 2005, from http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/gipps/ gipps1.pdf Desai, M. S., Richards, T. C., & Desai, K. J. (2003). E-commerce policies and customer privacy. Information Manage & Computer Security, 11(1), 19-27. EDRI. (2004). EU report: member states lazy to protect data. Retrieved August 20, 2007, from http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number2.24/report Englund, S., & Firestone, R. (2004). California law regulates web site privacy policies. The Computer & Internet Lawyer, 21(8), 22-23. FTC. (1998). Privacy online: A report to congress. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://www.ftc. gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf FTC. (2005). Federal trade commission privacy initiatives. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http:// www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html Kimery, K. M., & McCord, M. (2002). Thirdparty assurances: mapping the road to trust in e-retailing. Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application, 4(2), 63-82. Lichtenstein, S., Swatman, P., & Babu, K. (2003). Adding value to online privacy for consumers: remedying deficiencies in online privacy policies with a holistic approach. In Proceedings of the

36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. McRobb, S., & Rogerson S. (2004). Are they really listening? An investigation into published online privacy policies at the beginning of the third millennium. Information Technology & People, 17(4), 442-461. Miyazaki, A., & Krishnamurthy, S. (2002). Internet seals of approval: effects on online privacy policies and consumer perceptions. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 36(1), 28-49. Moores, T. (2005). Do consumers understand the role of privacy seals in e-commerce? Communications of the ACM, 48(3), 86-91. Nyshadham, E. A. (2000). Privacy policy of air travel web sites: a survey and analysis. Journal of Air Transport Management, 6(3), 143-152. OPA. (2005). Online privacy alliance: guidelines for online privacy policies. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines.shtml Privacy & American Business. (2002). Privacy on and off the internet: what consumers want.Privacy & American Business. Hackensack, NJ. Regan, K. (2001). Does anyone read online privacy policies? Ecommerce Times. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.ecommercetimes.com/ perl/story/11303.htmlthefreecountry.com (2007). Free anonymous surfing. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from http://www.thefreecountry.com/security/anonymous.shtml W3C. (2002). The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) specification. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/ Warren, S., & Brandeis, L. (1890). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review, 4(5), 193-220. Wolf, C. (2004). California’s new online privacy policy law has nationwide implications. Journal of Internet Law, 7(7), 3-8.

9

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

Zhang, H. (2005). Trust-promoting seals in electronic markets: impact on online shopping. Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application, 6(4), 29.

AddItIonAl reAdIngs Antón, A. I., Bertino, E., Li, N., & Yu, T. (2007). A roadmap for comprehensive online privacy policy management. Communications of the ACM, 50(7), 109-116. Anton, A. I., Earp, J. B., He, Q. F., Stufflebeam, W., Bolchini, D., & Jensen, C. (2004). Financial privacy policies and the need for standardization. IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(2), 36-45. Ashrafi, N., & Kuilboer, J. (2005). Online privacy policies: an empirical perspective on self-regulatory practices. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 3(4), 61. Brown, D. H., & Blevins, J. L. (2002). The safeharbor agreement between the United States and Europe: A missed opportunity to balance the interests of e-commerce and privacy online? Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 46(4), 565. Chen, K., & Rea, A. L., Jr. (2004). Protecting personal information online: a survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85. Cockcroft, S. (2002). Gaps between policy and practice in the protection of data privacy. Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application, 4(3), 1. Cranor, L., Guduru, P., & Arjula, M. (2006). User interfaces for privacy agents. ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, 13(2), 135-178. Liu, C., Marchewka, J. T., & Ku, C. (2004). American and Taiwanese perceptions concerning

80

privacy trust and behavioral intentions in electronic commerce. Journal of Global Information Management, 12(1), 18. Malhotra, N. K., Kim, S. S., & Agarwal, J. (2004). Internet users’ information privacy concerns (IUIPC): the construct, the scale, and a causal model. Information Systems Research, 15(4), 336–355. Mascarenhas, O. A., Kesavan, R., & Bernacchi, M. (2003). Co-managing online privacy: a call for joint ownership. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 20(7), 686. Meinert, D., Peterson, D., Criswell, J., & Crossland, M. (2006). Privacy policy statements and consumer willingness to provide personal information. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 4(1), 1. Metzger, M., & Docter, S. (2003). Public opinion and policy initiatives for online privacy protection. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 47(3), 350. Milne, G., & Culnan, M. (2002). Information society, using the content of online privacy notices to inform public policy: a longitudinal analysis of the 1998–2001 U.S. Web Surveys, 18(5), 345-359. Milne, G., Rohm, A., & Bahl, S. (2004). Consumers’ protection of online privacy and identity. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), 217. Pan, Y., & Zinkhan, G. (2006). Exploring the impact of online privacy disclosures on consumer trust. Journal of Retailing, 82(4), 331-338. Papacharissi, Z., & Fernback, J. (2005).Online privacy and consumer protection: an analysis of portal privacy statements. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 49(3), 259. Peslak, A. (2006). Internet privacy policies of the largest international companies. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 4(3), 46-62.

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

Pollach, I. (2005). A typology of communicative strategies in online privacy policies: ethics, power and informed consent. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 221-235.

Rowland, D. (2003). Privacy, freedom of expression and cyberslapps; fostering anonymity on the internet? International Review of Law Computers & Technology, 17(3), 303-312.

Pollach, I. (2006). Privacy statements as a means of uncertainty reduction in www interactions. Journal of Organizational & End User Computing, 18(1), 23-49.

Schuele, K. (2005). Privacy policy statements on municipal websites. Journal of Government Financial Management, 54(2), 20.

Pollach, I. (2007). What’s wrong with online privacy policies? Communications of the ACM, 50(7), 103-108. Roussos, G., & Theano, M. (2004). Consumer perceptions of privacy, security and trust in ubiquitous commerce. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 8(6), 416.

Shah, J., White, G., & Cook, J. (2007). Privacy protection overseas as perceived by USA-based IT professionals. Journal of Global Information Management, 15(1), 68-81. Wolf, C. (2004). California’s new online privacy policy law has nationwide implications. Journal of Internet Law, 7(7), 3-8.

8

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

AppendIX Fortune 100 Companies (Accessed in February 2005) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

8

Wal-Mart Stores Exxon Mobil General Motors Ford Motor General Electric ChevronTexaco ConocoPhillips Citigroup Intl. Business Machines American Intl. Group Hewlett-Packard Verizon Communications Home Depot Berkshire Hathaway Altria Group McKesson Cardinal Health State Farm Insurance Cos Kroger Fannie Mae Boeing AmerisourceBergen Target Bank of America Corp. Pfizer J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Time Warner Procter & Gamble Costco Wholesale Johnson & Johnson Dell Sears Roebuck SBC Communications Valero Energy Marathon Oil MetLife Safeway Albertson’s Morgan Stanley AT&T

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

Medco Health Solutions United Parcel Service J.C. Penney Dow Chemical Walgreen Microsoft Allstate Lockheed Martin Wells Fargo Lowe’s United Technologies Archer Daniels Midland Intel UnitedHealth Group Northrop Grumman Delphi Prudential Financial Merrill Lynch DuPont Walt Disney Motorola PepsiCo CVS Viacom Sprint Sysco Kmart Holding TIAA-CREF American Express New York Life Insurance International Paper Tyson Foods Wachovia Corp. Goldman Sachs Group Duke Energy Honeywell Intl. Caterpillar Best Buy Johnson Controls BellSouth

An Analysis of Online Privacy Policies of Fortune 100 Companies

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

Ingram Micro FedEx Merck ConAgra Foods HCA Alcoa Electronic Data Systems Bank One Corp. Comcast Mass. Mutual Life Ins.

91. Coca-Cola 92. Bristol-Myers Squibb 93. WellPoint Health Networks 94. Georgia-Pacific 95. Weyerhaeuser 96. Abbott Laboratories 97. AutoNation 98. Williams 99. Supervalu 100. Cisco Systems

8

8

Chapter XIV

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan Andy Chiou National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan Jeng-chung V. Chen National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan Craig Bisset National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan

AbstrAct In this chapter, the authors will briefly discuss some cross cultural concerns regarding Internet privacy. The authors believe that due to the cross cultural nature of the Internet itself, different cultures will tend to result in different concerns regarding Internet privacy. As such, there is no single system of protecting Internet privacy that may be suitable for all cultures. The authors also utilize focus groups from various countries spanning Asia and the United States to discover the differences between cultures. Hopefully an understanding of such differences will aid in future research on Internet privacy to take a more culture sensitive approach.

IntroductIon As the world’s population becomes increasingly plugged into the Internet, many of the new and

wondrous capabilities that the Internet has come to offer have come under serious scrutiny and debate as double-edged swords. File sharing, addiction, freedom of speech, and online gaming

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

are just a handful of topics that have spurned heated discussions. More often than not, one side of the debate invariably comes to involve underlying privacy issues. One example is the popularity of blogs. Hailed by many as a means of transforming journalism and disseminating information (Dietrich, 2006), blogs have also been scrutinized by companies and organizations as things that must be tightly controlled as a means of corporate strategy (Hanson, 2006). However, the question that then arises is: How private are personal blogs? Should an employee’s personal blog also be restricted in content? Should an individual be held publicly accountable for an offside comment in a personal blog? As organizations are trending towards restricting employee blogs and in severe cases firing employees for personal blogs (Horwedel, 2006), the debate has moved onto free speech and privacy concerns. As complicated as the debate is, the issue of blogs is but a small slice of privacy concerns that plague the Internet. One subject that looms on the horizon, and yet has not been seriously challenged, is the question of Internet privacy across cultures. The views and laws governing Internet privacy in the United States differ from those in the European Union, which in turn differ from those in many Asian countries. The cross-borders nature of the Internet means consideration must be taken on different cultural perceptions on this matter. This chapter will briefly discuss some of the concerns in approaching privacy on the Internet, in particular how different cultures view and handle privacy.

bAckground Just as the Internet has allowed for the instant transmission of much needed information, it has also become a channel for some unsavory elements. Organizations and individuals can now collect information on individuals with speed, ease, and relative accuracy. Masses of unwanted solicitation e-mails, commonly known as “spam,”

have been identified by many as a “scourge” upon the Internet (Herbert, 2006). Also of concern are various scams that are precipitated over the Internet, the most famous probably being the 419 scam, more commonly known as the “Nigerian” scam, where the e-mail recipient is asked to provide private information in exchange for large amounts of cash money. While at first glance this scourge may simply be an annoyance for ISPs and e-mail inboxes, privacy is also an underlying concern here. Most companies who participate in spam and scams usually obtain e-mail lists that are available for purchase commercially. E-mails on such lists may be harvested manually, or more commonly, simply obtained when Internet users carelessly disclose their e-mail addresses. However, while arguments rage over various sides of the privacy issues, be it debates over the blurring of public and private space and ethical responsibilities (Tavani & Grodzinsky, 2002), the legal and ethical battle between right to know and right to privacy (Sitton, 2006), or clashes on whether Internet service providers (ISPs) are required to disclose user information to the Record Industry Association of America (RIAA), little attention has been paid to how different countries react to the issue of Internet privacy. In the United States, several years of unsolicited telephone calls and spam e-mail have resulted in the National Do Not Call (DNC) Registry, the CAN-SPAM act, and the Spy Act of 2007 (H.R. 964), and Verizon, a United States cellular telephone service provider, has recently won a court case against cell phone spammers. While the intentions and effectiveness of acts such as CAN-SPAM and H.R. 964 are fiercely debated, it is important to recognize that for better or for ill, legal measures have been taken in an attempt to curb or at least control matters involving privacy and spam. In Asia however, measures such as DNC and CAN-SPAM are nowhere to be seen. Many residents of Taiwan complain privately about receiving telephone calls from scammers, and spam e-mail is as prevalent as ever. However, no attempt

8

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

has been made to legislate unsolicited phone calls and e-mails, as Americans have. While most Taiwanese citizens view of such spam as nuisances, little thought is spent on how personal mobile phone numbers, e-mail, and family information is obtained by spammers and scammers in the first place. This is very different from American attitudes, where thoughts of spam and scams bring to mind fears that personal information is being freely peddled on the open market. At present, no in depth empirical research has yet been done on these differences. Capurro, in his 2005 study of intercultural views on privacy, provided a brief philosophical glimpse at the possible reasons behind differences in Japanese and German views on privacy, focusing on how these two different cultures viewed the concept of private space. Dinev, Bellotto, Hart, Russo, Serra, & Coluatti (2006) also looked into the differences in privacy concerns between Italy and the United States, utilizing a more empirical approach by comparing cultural differences and privacy concerns via questionnaires. Most comparative studies done thus far have used the cultural model developed by Hofstede’s (1980) IBM study for comparison.

Issues And controversIes Millions of Internet users today post photos of themselves and their family on the Internet, or release important information of themselves by shopping online, essentially disregarding their anonymity when using the Internet (Hsu, 2006). Has privacy become less important in the age where information is readily available at the click of the mouse? Privacy is the ability to control the conditions under which your personal information is collected. It is the right of an individual to protect himself from intrusion into his personal life. To say that the Internet has created new problems for individual privacy is to state the obvious. Personal information that was previously

8

inaccessible now is, and in large quantities with, a high level of detail. In the post September 11th world, the right to privacy is no longer the issue as the spotlight has been cast upon the right to information. The right to privacy clashes with security and people are more inclined to give up personal information to feel more secure (Hsu, 2006). Legal action to protect individual privacy is scarce, not to say that action has not been taken, but has been limited. As of this writing, no single standard global privacy policy has yet to emerge. Each country has a different perspective on how to deal with the issue of privacy, with some ignoring it completely. This has led to a broad divergence in approaches. In the United States, the creation of the National Do Not Call Registry (DNC), the CAN-SPAM Act, the Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2007, and also various court decisions have all established precedence for protection of privacy. Direction is clear, but whether it is enough is debatable.

national do not call (dnc) registry The National DNC was created to give individuals a choice on whether they were willing to receive telemarketing calls at home. After a phone number has been registered with the DNC for 31 days, telemarketers may not make unsolicited calls to the registered number. If the registered does receive an unsolicited phone call, complaints may be filed at the DNC Web site. The complaint is then handled by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Registered numbers will be protected for up to 5 years after which they will have to be registered again (National Do Not Call Registry, 2003). However, the National DNC has several limitations, first and foremost being that the DNC is limited to commercial entities. Nonprofit and survey organizations are still able to make unsolicited calls. While some decry this has a loophole in the DNC, others view this as an essential protection of free speech. Thus far, the National DNC Registry has elicited fairly positive responses from the general U.S. public.

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

cAn-spAm Act The CAN-SPAM Act went into effect in January, 2004. It covers e-mails that have a primary purpose of advertising. This act establishes requirements for companies sending out commercial e-mail and explains clearly the punishments for spammers and companies who do not comply with regulations set in the act. These regulations include: banning of misleading header information, statement of originating domain name and e-mail address, and banning of deceptive subject lines. The act also gives consumers the right to ask advertisement companies to stop sending advertising in the form of spam to them. Every spammer or company must have an opt-out option for consumers to choose. Lastly, it requires that the e-mail be identified as an advertisement and include the sender’s postal address (CAN-SPAM Act, 2003). However, one severe limitation to the CAN-SPAM Act is that it is not able to effectively stop spam, which is what most Internet users would wish for. Instead, the CAN-SPAM Act grants spam a legitimacy that was previously lacking. Spammers are now merely required to openly state the purpose of their e-mails, sending out e-mails entitled “Advertisement: BUY VIAGRA NOW” instead of thinly veiled e-mails. In doing so, spammers become law abiding citizens, albeit something of a nuisance. The second limitation of the CAN-SPAM Act is that the act is not enforceable outside of the United States, where most spam originates.

spy-Act of 2007 In the past few years, anti-spyware efforts have gained momentum. The Spy Act bans the more obvious forms of spyware such as the ones that hijack a person’s computer or log keystrokes. Keystroke logging software records all the text typed onto the keyboard and runs completely hidden without the person knowing it. However, there are issues with the Spy Act. Many people point

to the limitations of the act to find the problems associated with it. The limitations essentially give hardware, software, and network vendors carte blanche to use spyware, even some of the more blatant ones, the right to monitor their customer’s use of their products and services. Most see the Spy Act as merely an extension of the CAN-SPAM Act in that it merely gave the real perpetrators of spam and spyware a legal mandate. Whether or not this was the original intention is debatable, however, it is true that CAN-SPAM and the Spy Act contain loopholes that can be exploited by various parties. Therefore, the act has come under a lot of criticism and for good reason (Internet Spyware Prevention Act, 2007). The legislations stated none withstanding, nowhere has Internet privacy been debated more heatedly, and used most often as a means of defense in court, than cases involving file sharing. The ease at which digital copies can be created has made the prevention of copyright violation increasingly difficult. As a result, copyright holders such as the Recording Industry Association of American (RIAA), Motion Picture Association of American (MPAA) in the United States, and their global counterpart, the IFPI, have shifted their focus from large scale organizations to individuals who make copyrighted works available over the Internet. Copyright holders now often locate, investigate, and sue individuals who make copyrighted works available over the Internet. There have been court proceedings by copyright holders around the world, in an attempt to stop file sharers from putting copyright works on the Internet to share. However, in order to do so, the IP address of the file sharer must be identified and subsequently linked to a specific address before search and seizure can be conducted. At this point is where the privacy debate usually comes in. Copyright holders state that ISPs must disclose all information when requested, while defendants argue that for ISPs to do so would be in violation of user privacy. Listed is a sampling of influential court decisions in the United States.

8

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

verizon vs. recording Industry Association of America In July of 2002, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) issued a subpoena to Verizon Online requesting the phone company to reveal the identities of customers who the RIAA believed were in possession of copyrighted material. Verizon refused to corporate with the subpoena on the grounds that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act states that copyrighted material must actually reside on Verizon Online’s system or network in order for Verizon to have to comply by law. By simply being an ISP, Verizon Online was not accountable for the actions of its users. Therefore, since the material that was allegedly in violation of copyright laws according to the RIAA existed on customers’ computers, Verizon did not have to comply with the subpoena. In response, the RIAA sued Verizon and obtained the court’s agreement that Verizon had to comply with the RIAA’s subpoena. Verizon immediately appealed in the U.S. Court of Appeals on the grounds that the RIAA’s single overarching subpoena for all users was in violation of the Constitution. In order for the RIAA’s request to have been within Constitution limits, the RIAA would be required to file a subpoena for every user infraction it had evidence for. The Court of Appeals agreed with Verizon’s argument and struck the case down. Verizon’s appeal lay down important groundwork. Had Verizon not won the appeal, the door would have been open for anyone who suspected a user of copyright violation to obtain privacy information without specifying exactly what or who was under suspicion (Recording Industry Association of America v. Verizon Internet Services).

capitol vs. does 1-16 In the latest series of RIAA court cases against file sharers, the ruling issued by Judge Lorenzo F. Garcia in the U.S. District Court of Mexico shows that Verizon v. RIAA was not an isolated

88

event in the U.S. Judge Lorenzo ruled that the RIAA’s tactic, identical to that used in Verizon v. RIAA, could not guarantee an individual’s due process rights. That is to say that the RIAA’s tactic could not guarantee that an individual charged in a single overarching subpoena issued against an entire group of people could be aware of the subpoena issued against him, and would therefore not have a chance to challenge the subpoena in court for self protection (Capitol v. Does 1-16). This further extends the legal precedence in protection of online individual privacy. Organizations or entities could not issue overarching subpoenas in order to embark on a “fishing expedition” in individual user information.

comparative Analysis of u.s. and eu Workplace privacy laws One of the fundamental differences between U.S. and EU privacy laws is in the approach taken by regulators in the two jurisdictions. The EU takes a data protection approach where as the U.S. has more of a civil rights approach to privacy (King, Pillay, & Lasprogata 2006). Generic information in the workplace is treated as a civil rights issue in the United States. Legislation is then designed to address misuses of genetic information since it is considered workplace discrimination. Acquiring and using employees’ genetic information for making employment decisions is a form of discrimination. In contrast, the EU, following a data protection approach, recognizes that individuals have a right to control their personal data and requires employers to justify any processing of that data based on legitimate business needs (King et al., 2006). It closely mirrors a privacy approach by recognizing that individuals have legitimate interests in controlling their personal data and therefore allows individuals to make decisions on the use of their data and whether it is being used for appropriate means. The employer can however justify use of the personal data for legitimate business needs.

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

It is important to look at the weaknesses with both approaches. The most disconcerting weakness of the data protection approach by the EU is when genetic information is used unfairly by EU employers. Legislation does not directly address this issue. If an employer justifies its collection and use of employees’ personal data within the framework of the designed legislation of data protection, then the privacy directive will not regulate unfair uses of genetic information. People would argue that if employers cannot obtain personal data of their employees then they cannot use the data inappropriately. However, others would point out that since exceptions are made to justify using employees’ personal data, the inappropriate use of it will not be protected (King et al., 2006). The most disconcerting weakness of the civil rights approach taken by the United States would be that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not protect employees from discriminatory use of their genetic information since only disabled employees are protected by the scope of the this law (King et al., 2006). Another major problem with the ADA is that once an employer uses personal data of an employee inappropriately, there are not any clear avenues for employees to take after the fact. If an employer fails to maintain the confidentiality of an employee’s records, therefore releasing genetic information, the breach of ADA’s confidentiality rules is not accompanied by employment action. For example, if an employer discloses an HIV-positive status of an employee and that employee’s co-workers learn of the positive status. Whether the disclosure was deliberate or not, the employee could suffer emotional distress because private medical information was released. However, if there was no harassment involved or other detrimental employment action, then it is argued that no employment discrimination has occurred. While the United States has implemented the DNC, the CAN-SPAM Act, and the Spy Act of 2007 with some amount of controversy, there has

been a movement in the direction to protect an individual’s information. The European Union also has in theory very stringent laws protecting their citizens’ privacy as well. In contrast, Asian countries have yet to take an in depth look at privacy issues. Privacy laws protecting citizens from spam, unsolicited phone calls, and spyware are non-existent. Universities and ISPs have also willingly provided information to record industries in Asia, a marked contrast to the behavior of Verizon who fought the RIAA nearly to the very top of the U.S. court system. While such technologies as RFID tags and the proposed national ID card in the United States have elicited concerns regarding violation of privacy, Asian nations have been among the first to adapt wireless credit cards and subway passes, while the idea of a national ID card hardly merits a bat of the eyelashes. Perhaps cultural differences are the key to why privacy laws are not yet at the forefront in Asian countries.

solutIons And recommendAtIons Since its inception in the late 1980s, the Internet has created more questions than it answers about how people from different cultural backgrounds view privacy. It is a complex issue that wrestles with many theoretical norms in regards to how best to frame it, if at all. Hsu (2006) investigated differences in privacy and cultural attitudes by comparing two Eastern cultures, China and Taiwan, with two Western nations, United States and Holland. Findings discovered that individuals in each of the four countries possessed significant differences not only in terms of reaction towards different types of information gathering Web sites, but also in terms of privacy concerns and privacy practices. Users in the United States were more likely to disclose information to non-profit and commercial Web sites, and less likely to government and health Web sites. Furthermore,

89

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

users in the United States demonstrated a willingness to provide demographics information, but unwilling to provide any sort of contact information or official ID identification, regardless of the type of Web site. Users in Taiwan and China were more likely to disclose contact information and official ID identification to government and community Web sites, while unwilling to provide the same information to health and non-profit Web sites. Many academics in the field of cross cultural studies acknowledge that the major difference is the noticeable bias of Western cultures toward individualistic ideas on privacy, while Asian cultures move to a more collectivist view (Capurro, 2005). Hofstede (1997) provided one of the most widely accepted frameworks for assessing national cultural norms. By Hofstede’s definition, there are five dimensions that describe these cultural norms, they are viewed as providing a stable means to look at values and given behavioral patterns. Hofstede is not without his critics, who view his ideas as generalist in nature and lacking in detail as to the specifics of national and regional cultures. His stance of seeking out common themes has the effect of simplifying cultural values at a macro level. Most critics claim of a lack of complexity, and the complete ignorance of situational factors that influence people, and in turn are influenced by those around them (McSweeney, 2002). This line of argument calls for more detail, which allows the specific context of the situation and life’s dynamic nature to intervene. This is a somewhat naive view, as general themes need to drawn to make cross cultural studies useful to academics and decision makers. Governments and businesses need clear ideas on cultural differences so quality decisions can be made. Milberg (2000) incorporated four of Hofstede’s dimensions into an index to measure privacy. The index used masculinity, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and individualism. Issues with privacy showed some interesting findings. Uncertainty avoidance was found to be negatively

90

correlated with privacy issues, while masculinity, power distance, and individualism were found to be positively correlated (Milberg, 2000). Low individualism cultures were found to have greater acceptance of privacy invasion than more individualistic cultures. Cultures with low uncertainty avoidance tend to regard rules and structure for privacy as unnecessary while the opposite can be said for high uncertainty avoidance cultures, which gravitate towards more rules and laws. Low masculinity societies place more emphasis on personal relationships over using personal information for economic gain. Power distance shows that countries with lower power distance scores have more trust in powerful interest groups, such as businesses (Bellman, Johnson, Kobrin, & Lohse, 2004). Privacy in itself is not a new issue. The rise of the Internet accompanied by the ensuing technological stream of devices and communication possibilities has instead contributed to the issue of privacy. The ease at which it is possible to disseminate information in our times, while remaining anonymous, has add to people’s general awareness about how others may access to their personal information is creating much interest in how this should be dealt with. This relatively new technological innovation is affecting how people communicate and how they view their own culture. The Internet has brought together people who could not have done so in the past. It is also creating glaring differences amongst people, while changing the vary nature of how we communicate. Cultures are always changing, abet at a slow pace, but the Internet is potentially doing this at an even greater rate. Perception is a subjective thing, when a post modernist view of the world is taken. The point of view one takes decides how you approach a given topic. Situational effects as outlined in the conclusion of Hsu’s paper are the current stumbling block to drawing up a more well rounded and explanatory theory of the balance of influence between national cultural dimensions and individual situational events

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

Cultural ties are something we are born into, a given time place and circumstances produces a person with very specific qualities. No two people are ever the same even if born into the same family in the same place (Hofstede, 1997). Of course, personality and the complex issues of human development should not be underestimated. But how does this all affect privacy and cultural influences on it? Hsu has pointed out this issue with glaring clarity and we need to differentiate between national cultural differences and situational effects by using a study of the various representational systems and measurable unconscious frameworks (Bandler, 2000). Bandler discovered the universality of people’s communication systems and the fact that they do not vary from culture to culture. In light of the various areas covered, we would like to propose a basic framework in approaching research on cross cultural privacy concerns. We argue that instead of a universal set of privacy laws, which would indeed be an ideal end-state given the cross-borders nature of the Internet, a cultural sensitive approach must be taken. In order to do this, we propose a socio-political approach to this discussion. First and foremost, the very concept of privacy in different cultures must first be defined. As per Hofstede’s (1997) conceptualization, the United States ranks as one of the highest countries in terms of individualism, while also ranking low in power distance, and relatively low in uncertainty avoidance. This is clearly reflected in the general history of the United States. The very core idea of the United States has been the idea of the individual, the underdog, being able to overcome the environment, competition, and even superior powers, to beat “The Man” and succeed in his own right. Historically, Americans have been distrustful of a central government. Even in the post-9/11 world with the ever expanding powers of the federal government citizen groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Unions (ACLU), have been clamoring for more oversight over powers

regarding terrorism. Recent court decisions have also made attempts in limiting the original broad powers of the Patriot Act. Many universities have also stated their intention to protect student privacy in the event of RIAA lawsuits. On the other side of the world, Taiwanese culture is categorized as being collectivist, relatively high in power distance scoring, and also relatively high in uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1997). This is reflected in Chinese tradition as individuals tend to be more trusting of their government and superiors. However, this also means the government and superiors are expected to care for their citizens and subordinates, much like how a parent would for a child. The political structure also reflects this as oversight of government or even corporate powers is not as powerful as it might be in the United States. This can be seen in cases where individual privacy might be an issue, such as a high profile case in 2001 when 14 students in a large public university in southern Taiwan were prosecuted for copyright violation. Students were not notified of incoming prosecutor raids nor of their legal status, and most would not find out until discovering their computers to have disappeared while they were away at class. Although some students did express dissatisfaction in regards to their privacy status and various protests sprung up in campuses around the island, public discussion quickly turned to condemning copyright violation and reminders to other students to be law abiding citizens. Hsu’s (2006) study has already indicated that individuals from different cultures react differently towards various types of Web sites, and also display varying willingness in terms of the type of information they provide on the various Web sites. Dinev et al. (2006) utilized Hofstede’s (1997) dimensions in order to discover whether differences among cultures led to different perceptions on privacy, government intrusion, and government surveillance in the post-9/11 world. This study is also interesting in that it compares the differences in regulatory style between

9

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

the United States and Italy, a European Union member nation. Per Hofstede’s dimensions, Italy is, relative to the United States, a more collectivist culture, while also being relatively higher in power distance. Results from Dinev et al. indicate that Italy possessed lower Internet privacy concerns. Respondents in the United States possessed higher Internet privacy concerns, which in turn were strongly related to government intrusion concerns. However, at the same time, U.S. respondents were not strongly concerned about government intrusion in and of itself. Dinev et al. explained this as being a possible side effect of the post-9/11 world, in which U.S. citizens are willing to allow for greater government surveillance powers in exchange for greater security. However, we would like to note that it is also possible the results were caused by a sampling bias, as the U.S. sampling obtained by Dinev et al. was from the southeastern region of the United States, which, being notably Republican “Red” states, would not have been as critical and suspicious of the, at the time of this writing, Republican federal government as other regions might be. A sampling from the northeast or from the west coast of the United States dominated by Democratic “Blue” states might have generated drastically different results. However, the results from Dinev et al. are still valid in that they point to cultural differences leading to not only differences in privacy perception, but also differences in perceptions towards government actions regarding individual privacy. We would therefore like to propose the following research questions:

same time a lack of similar moves in Asia despite the same problems serve to illustrate this. Milberg, Smith, and Burke’s (2000) study discovered a tentative, albeit marginal, relationship between culture and regulatory approaches taken towards privacy; specifically a negative relationship between power distance, and individualism and regulatory approaches. A country with high individualism would have less laws governing privacy. However, this is not congruent with actual events, as the United States, despite high individualism, also has a comparatively high amount of legislative protection for privacy. While many may point to the patchwork approach of the United States’ privacy protection as being proof of less government intervention, one should note the political system in the United States is essentially 50 separate systems governed by a federal government. Legally, the federal government may legislate matters involving interstate commerce; however, each state may also have its own laws that only apply within state borders. The recent rejection of the national ID program in many states, via state legislature due to privacy concerns, would be such a scenario. In comparison, more collectivist cultures such as China and Taiwan have done very little in ways of protecting individual privacy. We would therefore like to propose the following research questions: •

Research Question 2: The more collectivist the culture, the less legal protection for individual privacy.

exploration via focus groups •

Research Question 1: The more collectivist the culture, the less concern for individual privacy.

The culture of a nation is also influential in the forming of the legal environment of a nation. The United States with its myriad of legislation in an effort to protect individual privacy, the European Union also with its stringent directives, while at the

9

In order to tentatively explore whether our research questions are valid, a limited exploration was done via focus groups. A convenience sampling of students from the Institute of International Management (IIM) at a large public university in southern Taiwan was used. The IIM is the largest of its kind in southern Taiwan, calling upon a faculty with experience and training from

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

the United Kingdom, the United States, Taiwan, India, and Hong Kong. Students are drawn from various countries, with over half of the student population from South East Asia. The remaining half is composed of various students from the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom, Africa, and Taiwan. A sampling from this student population was done primarily to obtain the widest possible range of cultures amongst participants. As a result of this convenience sampling, education levels, age, and socioeconomic status were also controlled. Participants were all between 22 to 26 years of age, single, have at least obtained a college level degree in their native country, and currently pursuing a graduate degree in the institute. Other than one group of participants from the United States, English was a common second language amongst the remaining participants. Four culturally homogenous focus groups of four individuals each were used, these being: Vietnamese, Indonesian, Taiwanese, and United States of American. Students were asked to volunteer in a public announcement at the student research rooms. Upon deciding upon group compositions, each group was invited to meet in an empty research room at different dates. Moderators utilized a more structured approach by asking questions regarding attitudes towards online privacy, spam, and government regulation towards online privacy. Discussions were limited to 1 hour for each group. Before initiating the official discussion topics, moderators engaged the focus groups in casual conversation regarding exposure to computers and the Internet. All individuals in the focus groups were familiar with using computers for e-mail and daily school work research and preparation, and all individuals have engaged in shopping behavior on the Internet, with most of the individuals having actually made purchases on the Internet. Almost all individuals were registered on some sort of social network site, with Facebook and Friendster being the predominant sites.

Attitudes Towards Individual Privacy and Spam All participants in all the cultural groups indicated that they have received spam e-mail, and most participants believed that e-mail information was obtained from various forms filled out either online or on paper. One participant in the Indonesian group also stated that she felt a gym she had joined had sold her contact information to an advertising company. Discussion in the American group briefly turned to a recent incident in the university in which personal information, including student ID numbers, home telephone numbers, and home addresses were included on a student contact booklet and placed in the office in plain sight. Individuals in the American group unanimously expressed extreme discomfort over the matter and had attempted to communicate their feelings with the office staff. The office responded that it was normal for contact information to be included in a student contact booklet in order to facilitate student socialization and the communication of alumni in the future, and assured students that the booklet would not be distributed to non-university personnel. However, the American students still felt the university should be held responsible for failing to protect individual privacy. This issue was not raised in the other cultural groups. When questioned by moderators, most participants from non-American groups felt it was reasonable for a student contact list to include such information, as classroom interactions did not allow for a full range of social interaction. Participants in the Taiwanese group also stated that it would have been better if the university had tighter control over distribution of the student contact list, but likewise felt it was reasonable for such a contact list to include personal contact information, otherwise there was no way to know some of their classmates better. It is interesting that while the American group panned the concept of the student contact booklet, most were enthusiastic about the alumni group that existed on Facebook.

9

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

The non-American groups felt that while Facebook was a novel idea, a contact booklet made more sense as contact via phone or letters were more intimate in situations that allowed for it. Participants in the American group further felt that personal privacy was not respected in their host country, Taiwan. One individual related incidents in which he was questioned regarding his personal income and marital status. Other participants also related similar experiences. Most American participants expressed discomfort regarding these questions; however, some felt that this was part of the socialization process and how Taiwanese people became familiar with each other, commenting that it might be a characteristic of Asian culture. This issue was not raised by participants in the Vietnamese and Indonesian groups, and when asked by moderators, participants in both groups felt it was a good way to know people and did not differ much from their own culture. The Taiwanese group commented that the ability to discuss about matters such as income and marital status was a signal of trust amongst people, and the ability to do so would indicate a good and intimate relationship with the other person, or a willingness to know the other person on better terms. Furthermore, some participants in the Taiwanese group felt that for foreigners to be asked such questions indicated that the Taiwanese that had asked these questions were trying very hard to “be a friendly host.”

Government Regulation The Vietnamese group indicated that they felt no great need for government regulation on online private information, as did the Indonesian group. Participants in both groups stated that while spam was a nuisance, they were content with merely deleting the offending e-mail. The Taiwanese group, while expressing opinions that the government should “do something about it,” also exhibited distrust in the telecommunications industry and believed that it was the ISPs that were

9

selling e-mail lists to spammers. Participants in the Taiwanese group also agreed that any attempts by the government to regulate, would not be effective as it was not an important enough matter for the legislature to devote attention to. When asked, no participants in the Vietnamese, Indonesian, or Taiwanese groups were aware of specific laws that protected their privacy, online or off-line. Participants in the American group felt that spam was problematic enough to warrant government intervention. Compared with the Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Taiwanese groups, a more intense discussion was elicited from the American group. Many participants in the American group felt that spammers were breaking laws and in serious violation of personal privacy. Some expressed the wish to sue spammers or parties who made personal information available. Some Americans were aware of laws such as the National DNC Registry in the United States and had taken steps to register phone numbers when in their home country. All individuals who were aware of the DNC also expressed wishes that such laws should be passed in Taiwan as well. Most Americans were aware of laws that protected their personal privacy in the form of search and seizure laws, although comments were made regarding the ambiguous status of such laws in the post-9/11 world.

Summary of Findings Although our focus group discussions were not in depth, the brief discussions conducted indicated that it is possible that more collectivistic Asian cultures tended to be less sensitive to violations of personal privacy in the same way individualistic Western cultures may be. American participants also tended to lean towards a more legislative solution to the problem of personal privacy. Vietnamese and Indonesian participants did not actively express desires for personal privacy to be legislated. However, Taiwanese participants did express opinions that personal privacy

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

should be legislated, albeit most did not expect such an outcome. It is possible that Taiwan, due to being more westernized over the course of the past 30 years, may also possess certain reactions seen in Western cultures. However, Taiwanese participants were generally less sensitive on matters regarding personal privacy than Americans. Despite this, attention should be paid here to how different cultures define privacy. As seen by American reactions towards Taiwanese questions regarding personal status, drastic differences may exist.

combat terrorism in the post-9/11 world. As citizens claim a need to protection from unwanted intrusion, arguments are also made that the same protection afforded private citizens could also shield terrorists from investigations. There is no easy solution to this problem, and it remains to be seen if governments are capable of restraining themselves in the crusade against terrorism, or failing that, if citizens are capable of restraining their own governments.

conclusIon future trends At present, there is still no universal standard in terms of Internet privacy protection, and no light is yet visible at the end of the tunnel. The United States alone will still be required to wrangle on its own internal standard of privacy protection and obtain a consensus from all 50 states. The European Union, while possessing theoretically sound protection of personal data, has yet to vigorously test its own laws. Difference in opinion between European and American standards on privacy protection has also yet to settle. Asian countries face an even greater challenge as their populations become increasingly wired into the Internet, while possessing no historically strong legal or cultural basis for privacy protection. However, as individual citizens become increasingly aware of the pains of spam and inadequate privacy protection, it is possible that nations will eventually step up to the task of legislating privacy protection in an acceptable manner. A series of high profile murders of “spam kings” in Russia at the time of this writing would also indicate possible interactions with the criminal world that will eventually force law enforcement agencies to see spam as a serious problem. The trend of increasing awareness of privacy protection is counterbalanced by the need to

Although the research of privacy has certainly garnered much attention, it is important to keep in mind that not all cultures’ perceptions of privacy are the same, resulting in different concerns regarding privacy. An American in Taiwan might feel suspicious if asked to provide his passport number by a community Web site, while a Taiwanese in the United States might be puzzled and alienated by the fierceness at which people guard their private lives. While Hofstede’s (1997) cultural dimensions may give us some glimpse into the values of each culture, it does little to prepare us for how each culture deals with personal privacy. Hsu’s (2006) study indicated that different cultures do have different perceptions towards privacy, in particular, what kinds of information are deemed public enough to share on various different types of Web sites. The matter of Internet privacy only adds to the mix, but is not in and of itself a new “Internet” based phenomenon. Investigations into the laws and cases that form the basis of legal protection for privacy should also be handled with care. While the United States is touted as a self-governing system, does this hold true when investigation is done at the state level? As much of the United States legal system is based upon precedence and previous court cases, would this system not count as a very tight legal control? Taiwan may have laws ensuring individual

9

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

freedoms and rights. However, in the case of the 14 students whose rooms were searched and computers seized in 2001, while many students decried the trampling of individual privacy and lack of due process, this aspect was given very little consideration in the legal proceedings or even long term attention in public press. Would a researcher then argue Taiwan has plenty of protection for individual privacy, as a collectivist culture would per the study of Milberg et al. (2000), or an apparent lack of such protection, as witnessed by legal proceedings and lack of attempt to legislate spam mail and phone calls? Due to the various differences and backgrounds that form privacy perceptions, great care and sensitivity should be taken when conducting privacy studies across cultures.

How Asian nations continue to evolve and view online privacy is also worth reviewing. While the Great Firewall of China currently maintains some semblance of segregating China’s network from the rest of the world, online privacy is increasingly a worldwide problem. Lacking even the strong historical legal precedence available in the United States, the Asian countries must develop their own system on protecting privacy while at the same time combating further encroachments. However, these proposed research directions merely scratch the surface of how to look at privacy protection. It remains up to individual researchers to determine how best to analyze the myriad of issues in depth. At the current stage of research, any addition to the field would contribute to the overall understanding.

future reseArch dIrectIons

references

As continuing research is being done on the topic of privacy protection, many issues remain to be examined in depth. Of particular interest would be how the United States faces this problem. While many scholars choose to view the United States as a single country, the fact that various states in the United States have chosen to reject the national ID program proposed by the federal government on the grounds of privacy concerns indicates that the United States is far from a singular entity. This is further enhanced by the United States being affected most directly by the events of 9/11. What has been done to protection citizen privacy is as important a topic as what has been done to combat terrorism, perhaps even more so. Of equal concern is how governing bodies in the United States balance the needs of commercial entities and privacy citizens. The latest developments at the time of this writing in October 2007 in California have the governor of California vetoing a proposal for one of the most stringent data protection acts in the United States, citing concern for increasing costs for compliance.

Bandler, R. (2000). Persuasion engineering. Capitola, CA: Meta Publications.

9

Bellman, S., Johnson, J. J., Kobrin, S. J., & Lohse, L. L. (2004). International differences in information privacy concerns: A global survey of consumers. The Information Society, 20, 313324. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, Volume Number 858, (2005). CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, S.877, 108th Congress, (2003). Capitol v. Does 1-16, 07-485, WJ/LFG. Capurro, R. (2005). Privacy. An intercultural perspective. Ethics and Information Technology, 7, 37-47. Dietrich, W. (2006). Are journalists the 21st century’s buggy whip makers? Nieman Reports, 60(4), 31-33. Dinev, T., Bellotto, M., Hart, P., Russo, V., Serra, I.., & Coluatti, C. (2006). Internet users’

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

privacy concerns and beliefs about government surveillance: An exploratory study of differences between Italy and the United States. Journal of Global Information Management, 14(4), 57-93. Hanson, K. (2006). Should the boss be blogging? Strategic Communication Management, 10(2), 6-7. Herbert, N. (2006). Conquering spam in concert: Anti-spam legislative efforts in the Asia Pacific region. Law Technology, 39(2), 1-12. Hofstede, G. (1997). Culture and organizations. New York: McGraw Hill. Horwedel, D. M. (2006). Blogging rights. Diverse Issues in Higher Education, 23(2), 28-31. Hsu, C.-W. (2006). Privacy concerns, privacy practices and web site categories. Online Information Review, 30(5), 569-586. Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1525, 110th Congress, 1st Session, (2007). King, N. J., Pillay, S., Lasprogata, G. A. (Spring 2006). Workplace privacy and discrimination issues related to genetic data: A comparative law study of the European Union and the United States. American Business Law Journal, 43. Retrieved June 4, 2007, from https://ezproxy.royalroads.ca McSweeney, B. (2002). Hofstede’s model of national cultural differences and their consequences: A triumph of faith-A failure of analysis. Human Relations, 55(1), 89-118. Milberg, S. J., Smith, H. J., & Burke, S. J. (2000). Information privacy: Corporate management and national regulation. Organizational Science, 11(1), 35-57. National Do Not Call Registry of 2003, H.R. 395, 108th Congress, (2003). Recording Industry Association of America Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., Volume Number 03-7015, (2003).

Sitton, J. V. (2006). When the right to know and the right to privacy collide. Information Management Journal, 40(5), 76-80. Smith, H. J., Milberg, S. J., & Burke, S. J. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, 167-195. Stone, E. F., Gardner, D. G., Gueutal, H. G., & McClure, S. (1983). A field experiment comparing information-privacy values, beliefs, and attitudes across several types of organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 68(3), 459-468. Tavani, H. T., & Grodzinsky, F. S. (2002). Cyberstalking, personal privacy, and moral responsibility. Ethics and Information Technology, 4(2), 123-133.

AddItIonAl reAdIng Harper, J. (2006). Identity crisis: How identification is overused and misunderstood. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute. Milberg, S. J., Burke, S. J., Smith, H. J., & Kallman, E. A. (1995). Values, personal information privacy, and regulatory approaches. Communications of the ACM, 38(12), 65-74. REAL ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418, (2005). Rotenberg, M. (2006). Real id, real trouble? Communications of the ACM, 49(3), 128. State of Arkansas. (86th General Assembly, 2007). To urge Congress and the United States Department of Homeland Security to add critical privacy and civil liberty safeguards to the REAL ID Act of 2005 and to fully fund or suspend implementation of the REAL ID Act, SCR 22. Available at http://www.realnightmare.org/images/File/AR%20SCR22.pdf

9

Cross Cultural Perceptions on Privacy in the United States, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan

State of California. (2007). AB 779. Available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ ab_0751-0800/ab_779_cfa_20070522_154229_ asm_comm.html State of Maine. (123rd Legislature, 2007). An Act to prohibit Maine from participating in the Federal REAL ID Act of 2005, LD 1138, item 2. Available at http://janus.state.me.us/legis/LawMakerWeb/summary.asp?ID=280023863 State of Minnesota. (Legislative Session 85, 2007). HF 1438. Available at http://ros.leg. mn/revisor/pages/search_status/status_detail. php?b=House&f=HF1438&ssn=0&y=2007 State of Missouri. (Special Committee on General Laws, 2007). HB 868. Available at http://www. house.mo.gov/bills071/bills/hb868.htm State of Montana. (60th Legislature, 2007). HB 287. Available at http://data.opi.state.mt.us/ bills/2007/BillHtml/HB0287.htm

98

State of New Hampshire. (2007 Session), HB 685. Available at http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2007/hb0685.html State of Oklahoma. (51st Legislature, 1st sess., 2007), SB 464. Available at http://webserver1.lsb. state.ok.us/2007-08SB/SB464_int.rtf State of Washington. (60th Legislature, 2007), SB 5087. Available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo/ summary.aspx?bill=5087 Stewart, K. A., & Segars, A. H. (2002). An empirical examination of the concern for information privacy instrument. Information Systems Research, 13(1), 36-49. Trompenaars, F., & Hampden-Turner, C. (1994). Riding the waves of culture. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.

Section V

Policies, Techniques, and Laws for Protection

00

Chapter XV

Biometric Controls and Privacy Sean Lancaster Miami University, USA David C. Yen Miami University, USA

AbstrAct Biometrics is an application of technology to authenticate users’ identities through the measurement of physiological or behavioral patterns. The verification system offers greater security to the use of passwords or smart cards. Biometric characteristics cannot be lost or forgotten. As biometric characteristics are concerned with the very makeup of who we are, there are also security, privacy, and ethical concerns in their adoption.Fingerprint, iris, voice, hand geometry, face, and signature are all considered biometric characteristics and used in the authentication process. Examples of everyday biometric applications include thumbprint locks on laptop computers, fingerprint scanners to enter a locked door on a house, and facial recognition scans for forensic use. While there are several examples of biometrics currently in use, it is still an emerging technology. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a descriptive discussion of the current and future state of biometrics.

IntroductIon The world is growing increasingly digital as information systems and networks span the globe. As individuals, customers, employees, and

employers, we can often connect to the Internet, and to our information systems, from anytime and anywhere. The freedom and flexibility that technology provides is truly astounding when compared to the limits placed on society just a few years ago.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Biometric Controls and Privacy

Furthermore, data is recognized as a valuable resource. The information and knowledge that is created with this data is vital to business, trade, and the increased convenience of common day-to-day activities. We use this data to answer a variety of questions. Companies collect and aggregate data on their customers, products, and competitors. Individuals save confidential files on their hard and soft drives. How is this data secured? How are the physical and digital systems that store this data secured? How can we, as citizens of a digital society, protect ourselves from the theft of this private data? If you do not trust the information you are working with, you will not trust the decisions made with that data’s analysis. Biometrics is becoming more and more common as an answer to those questions. Biometric devices are a means of authenticating user identity or identifying someone from a list of possible matches. This chapter will cover why biometrics is needed, how they are used, important issues in their adoption, and future trends in their evolution. Learning Objectives: •

Learn the significance of privacy and the risk of identity theft

•

Better understand the need for biometrics in modern society Comprehend the technical, economic, business, and ethical issues related to biometrics

•

the need for bIometrIcs Imagine the most typical of e-commerce transactions, purchasing an item from an online Web site. You select the merchandise and begin to check out by filling in your personal information to complete the order. Now, also imagine someone standing over your shoulder watching and recording the data that you submit. Even worse, once you are finished, this person uses that data to impersonate you, accessing and using your credit. Fraud and identity theft are common examples of cybercrime. The United States’ Federal Trade Commission reported nearly 700,000 cases, with losses totaling nearly $700 million, of identity theft and online fraud during 2005 (Consumer Fraud, 2006). The same report from the FTC listed the most common methods consumer information was misused. A summary of that list can be found in Figure 1.

Figure 1. figure A: how victim's Information is misused 26%

25% 17%

15%

12%

10%

9%

6%

5%

governm ent docum ents/benefits fraud

em ploym ent related fraud

checking/savings account fraud

credit c ard fraud

0%

phone/utilities fraud

5%

attem pted identity theft

18%

20%

other identity theft

25%

loan fraud

30%

0

Biometric Controls and Privacy

A key aspect of both fraud and identity theft is the ability of the cybercriminal to impersonate the victim while convincing others of the fraudulent identity. This is especially true for systems that require only passwords, user logins, or simple ID swipe cards. For each of these, cybercriminals are able to obtain the password, login, or card through techniques that range from human engineering to user carelessness to sophisticated software programs. Once the cybercriminal has obtained the password or ID card, there is little to stop them from impersonating the victim. The password and card provide access to the prey’s physical and digital systems and assets. Examples include access to bank accounts, to credit, to government services, and through physical entryways. In this light, biometric security measures would be particularly useful because their use of unique human characteristics makes it far less likely that a cybercriminal would be successful impersonating the victim. While a cyberthief may steal a password it becomes harder to steal the pattern of veins in a retina and more difficult to forge someone else’s fingerprints. Online privacy is not the only activity supporting the use of biometrics which can be used for any information system that requires the identity of a user to be confirmed. Biometrics is an application of technology to authenticate users’ identities through the measurement of physiological or behavioral patterns. Fingerprint, iris, voice, hand geometry, face, and signature are all considered biometric characteristics and used in the authentication process. Examples of possible uses include access to buildings, airport security, access to computers and laptops, and access to ATM and financial systems (Jain, Ross, & Prabhakar, 2004).

overvIeW And evolutIon While computer security is a more modern phenomenon due to its dependence on technology,

0

biometrics dates back centuries. The use of fingerprint by law enforcement agencies to identify individuals suspected of committing a crime dates back to the late 19th century (Jain, Ross, & Prabhakar, 2003). Going back to earlier centuries, artists in East Asia were known for leaving fingerprints on their work and traders in Egypt were commonly identified by physical characteristics like height, hair, and eye color. Citizens and societies have commonly used unique human characteristics to identify individuals. Biometric tools are not a new addition to authenticating identity, but rather the modern technology has allowed for new methods of conducting biometrics. The Theory of Human Identification believes that there are three methods of “associating data with a particular human being” (Clark, 1994). Knowledge-based identification is when an individual possesses knowledge that only that person would know. For example, passwords, birthdates, and social security numbers represent forms of knowledge-based identification. Token-based identification recognizes a person’s possession of an item. Examples include a driver’s license, a passport, or an ID card. The third method is biometric identification, using unique and personal physiological characteristics to recognize an individual’s identity. Using human characteristics is seen as a reliable method of confirming one’s identity or matching an unknown identity to a list of possibilities. For example, a user may be granted access by a biometric device, thus authenticating his/her identity as a legitimate user. Biometrics can also be used to search for human characteristics of an unknown identity, seeking out possible matches. An example of this second use of biometrics can be found in detective work, matching the fingerprints of an unknown suspect to a database of known offenders. Knowledge and token-based identification are the traditional methods used to authenticate user identity. Confirming identity was based on some-

Biometric Controls and Privacy

thing the user had or was given like passwords, security badges, clearance codes, and so forth. For example, Web sites provide, or allow users to create passwords. Government offices ask to see your driver’s license or ID card to verify you are who you say you are. The downfall of these methods is that they rely on items that can be lost, forgotten, stolen, or duplicated (Matyas & Riha, 2003). Biometrics and its reliance on an individual’s characteristics do not face this pitfall. Biometric characteristics are human traits that one is born with. In addition, the ideal human traits used are those that are unique. Indeed, some biometric traits, like fingerprints and retinas are unique even among siblings and identical twins. As technology has progressed, so has the ability to find unique biometric patterns. Centuries ago, the emphasis was on obvious physical traits like hair and eye color. Over time, it evolved to more subtle characteristics like fingerprints. Today, it is not uncommon to see the use of retina or iris scans. In the future, it is likely that this evolution will continue to evolve to use DNA and other sophisticated human traits and patterns. The two purposes of biometrics in authenticating user identity are verification and identification. Verification is answering the question “am I who I claim I am?” It is confirming or denying an individual’s claimed identity. Verification is commonly used to authenticate a user’s identity before entering a secure room or before allowing access to a secure system. Identification answers the question or “who am I?” It establishes an unknown individual’s identity. Identification is commonly used in law enforcement to recognize and confirm suspects in an investigation.

eXAmples of bIometrIc ApplIcAtIons While the standard example of a biometric human characteristic is the fingerprint, there are many others in use as well. Common biometric characteristics are profiled. Figure 2 compares the biometric characteristics on ease of use and accuracy (Liu & Silverman, 2001). Fingerprint recognition focuses on the ridges on the skin of the fingers. An existing fingerprint can be queried across a database of prints to find a match to the user’s identity. A small number of people are unable to use fingerprint recognition systems due to excessive wear, dryness, or exposure to corrosive chemicals (Rosenzweig, Kochems, & Schwartz, 2004). Fingerprint recognition is presently the most common form of biometric device in use today and can be found in a variety of devices from simple USB plug-ins to wireless phone and PDA protection to entry door locks. Facial recognition is the ability to match facial patterns with those in a database to determine identity. Facial characteristics measured can include the location and shape of eyes, eyebrows, nose, and lips. Due to the complexity of the patterns, facial recognition is regarded as being the most expensive of biometric options. However, biometric devices using this facial detection are being used by industries to scan large areas to recognize suspected persons. Examples include airport systems screening for known terrorists and casinos screening against prohibited players. Hand recognition measures the shape and distance of key features like finger length, finger

Figure 2. Comparison of common biometrics fingerprint

facial recognition

hand recognition

retina

iris

Ease of use

high

medium

high

low

medium

Accuracy

high

high

high

very high

very high

0

Biometric Controls and Privacy

location, and finger size. Patterns can be found using 96 different measurements of the hand. Hand recognition has been used by a variety of industries for over 30 years, and is commonly used to protect entry points (Rosenzweig et al., 2004). For example, U.S. nuclear power plants use hand recognition devices to verify legitimate use. Hand recognition is also used by businesses for time clocks for hourly workers. In fact, simple hand punch systems can be found at office supply stores. Retina scanning examines the pattern of the veins found just below the surface of the retina. Additionally, iris scanning can also be used to match the patterns found in the colored part of the eye, surrounded by the white of the eye. Irises have 266 distinctive characteristics that can be used in biometric patterns (Jain, Hong, & Pankanti, 2000). Retina and iris scanning can be harder to use as the performance of these scanners are negatively impacted by some contacts and corrective lenses. Additionally, eyeglasses may make the scanning process uncomfortable. While both of these biometric measures are not as common as those profiled earlier, their accuracy is very high and thus their adoption is likely to grow in the future. In addition to these physiological characteristics, biometrics also includes more behavioral measurements. Examples in this category include signature verification and keystroke patterns. Signature verification is how a person signs their name and unique characteristics may include how hard an individual presses on certain characters, how quickly the letters were created, and the overall

appearance of the signature. Keystroke patterns are an individual’s tendencies and patterns when typing (Harris & Yen, 2002).

performAnce Issues Important terminology in the field of biometrics includes false rejection rates (FRR) and false acceptance rates (FAR). It must be noted that biometric devices look to match the user’s characteristics against a database of patterns of characteristics. It is unlikely, due to environmental and physical factors, that the database will return an exact match. Therefore, biometric measures look to find a probable, or likely match, leaving open the possibility of false positives and negatives. Figure 3 summarizes the activities of a typical biometric device. These activities do assume that the user has been enrolled into the system. Enrollment is simply the process of registering new users into the biometric system. The first step is the actual use of the biometric device by the user. Once the user is scanned, the system will create a biometric template. The template is simply a mathematical representation of the user’s characteristics. The third step is to search for potential matches to the biometric template. The system looks for matches compared to users who have been enrolled into the system. These results are analyzed, and scored, for probability of identity. Finally, the system will return the results of its processes, and positively or negatively acknowledge the identity of the user (Liu & Silverman, 2001).

Figure 3. Five steps of biometrics Step

0

1

2

3

4

5

Activity

user scan

template creation

query database

analyze results

return action

Description

user scans hand, finger, or eye using biometric reader

user scan is turned into a biometric template

biometric database is searched for similar results

algorithms are used to determine possible positive matches

system, negatively or positively acknowledges user identity

Biometric Controls and Privacy

False rejection rates, false negatives, measure the probability that an acceptable measurement is rejected. As an example, FRR is when a legitimate user is rejected, or not identified as legitimate, by the security device. This rate is also known as a type I error. Successful biometric devices will have a low FRR and thus have few type I errors. False acceptance rates, false positives, measure the likelihood that an invalid identity is confused with a legitimate user. In this case, the user is not genuine but is allowed access by the security device. This rate is also known as a type II error. Type II errors are significant because they open the possibility of security breach.

key Issues There are a number of important considerations that must be considered when analyzing biometrics in use today. This section will profile the technological, economic, business, and legal/ethical issues.

technological Before biometric measures can be properly implemented, users must be aware of the technologies needed to support. Every biometric device will need to store a database of positive patterns. For example, a retina scanner will need to be linked to a database of acceptable retina scans, used to confirm or reject the identities of users. The biometric industry has been fortunate to create several open standards that support the interoperability of devices. BioAPI and the common biometric exchange file format are examples of these standards (Liu & Silverman, 2001). BioAPI is a joint effort of more than 120 different organizations. The BioAPI group created a joint, open standard application programming interface (API) in 2000. This standard allowed biometric software applications to communicate with different biometric technologies. BioAPI is

widely used by the majority of industry vendors. In the future, the BioAPI Consortium would like to make it possible that biometric devices become plug and play. For more information visit the BioAPI Consortium Web site at http://www. bioapi.org/. The common biometric exchange file format (CBEFF) was coordinated in 1999 by a combination of end users and biometric organizations including several future members of the BioAPI consortium. CBEFF created common, agreed upon, data formats for biometric applications. It allows for biometric information to be passed between components and the system. The data described by CBEFF includes security and encryption, processing information, and biometric data. It can be used in conjunction with BioAPI to create seamless integration between devices. Additionally, it must be recognized that this electronic record storage is no different from other electronic records. As any computer device that uses binary to operate, someone looking to breach a biometric security measure need only to recreate the series of 1’s and 0’s that make a positive pattern in the database. While popular media portrays biometrics as being broken into by recreating fingerprints and other human characteristics, a more likely method of breaking through a biometric security device is to find the acceptable binary code. This electronic record storage must be properly secured, as any tampering would open the possibility of type II errors. For this reason, most biometric systems encrypt the templates that are created. Without rigid security measures, biometrics lose their value as a protective device. As with all procedures that store binary code, there is a need for adequate storage space. The biometric databases will need to be efficient to query to find probable matches to user requests. As an example, users will find biometric entry systems slow and frustrating if the system takes several minutes to respond to their initial scan. Aside from efficient storage, there must also be

0

Biometric Controls and Privacy

adequate network linkage between the biometric scanner and database. Again, the design should be to encourage the use of the biometric device through proper planning of technical considerations.

economic One of the largest drawbacks of biometrics to this point is the physical cost associated with their adoption. If an organization implements a biometric security system to guard their entryways, the system will be needed at all accessible points to be reliable. In addition to the physical costs, firms will need to acquire the expertise needed to setup, maintain, and audit these systems. Finally, compatibility issues with other information systems will need to be explored in order to prevent against mismatched programs and reports. A comprehensive biometric solution can range in cost from a few hundred dollars to the hundreds of thousands depending on the scope and level of complexity needed. There are more indirect costs to biometric systems as well. Users may be initially resistant to change, especially if the need for the new system is not properly communicated. Users may also be hesitant to provide data for the system, as they may question the need to scan personal and unique human characteristics. A perfect example of this reluctance may be found in fingerprint scanning systems. Due to their use in criminal justice applications, some may be suspicious of a biometric database. Still, there are numerous benefits to biometric systems. Secure points of entry into physical and digital assets. Rigorous authentication and identity confirmation can be an asset for those looking to better protect their systems. Biometric systems do away with the need to remember passwords and ID cards. While there is a cost associated with these systems, that cost may be more easily taken to prevent a cybercrime attack than in response to one.

0

business There are a number of business considerations for biometrics. From an end user standpoint, employees may appreciate the benefits of biometric systems. First, these devices offer increased security, which alone may make them worthwhile for highly secretive firms and industries. Second, biometric measures do offer greater convenience because they cannot be forgotten or left behind. Users will not have to remember a number of passwords or worry about bringing the ID card. However, users must be trained on the proper use of the new systems. This is especially true as the positioning of the eye for a retina or iris scanning device is critical to the operation. From an operational standpoint, firms will need to evaluate vendors in this industry to find a successful fit with their individual needs. Depending on the technical skill and savvy, the firm may be able to manage the system in house or be reliant on outside suppliers and consultants. Any successful supplier relationship will require adequate planning and communication. It must be noted that biometrics will be only one component of a comprehensive security plan. Organizations will use biometrics in conjunction with other security devices and checkpoints. Businesses must have multiple layers of security. For example, a firm may choose to increase the security of an entryway by using a biometric fingerprint scanner in conjunction with a swipeable ID card and a password keypad. Furthermore, the firm’s methods of guarding its entryways must be integrated with its overall security strategy. The sharing of data and intelligence about who is accessing these systems and what they are using the systems for is invaluable. Likewise, it would be smart to share data on when someone was not granted access to a system and compared to other company systems. Viewing security in a holistic manner can help identify attempted breaches before a crime can actually occur.

Biometric Controls and Privacy

In addition, multiple instances of biometric measures may be combined to form a multimodal biometric system. For example, the use of a fingerprint scanner with an iris reader would provide two biometric security measures for a greater level of security assurance. Again, a multimodal system must be recognized as a just single layer of security. One final business consideration is the maintenance of the biometric system. The scanning devices will need to be kept clean and hygienic. The back end hardware must also be kept in good operation. Data cleanup will be valuable to ensure that the system relies on accurate enrollment and template records.

legal/ethical Biometrics, by their very nature, touch on a host of legal and ethical issue. Any device that requires the capture, storage, and analysis of unique human characteristics must be managed with discretion. Users must be made aware of the need for biometrics and provide their consent for use. Due to the sensitive nature of these devices, they would be impacted by a number of privacy laws that have been created in the United States. For example, a medical institution using biometrics would need to verify that their processes comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Furthermore, any loss of data or breach in the system would need to recognized and dealt with immediately (Down & Sands, 2004). An additional legal concern for biometric systems is the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, passed by the United States Congress in1998. This law protects against the transfer of material that can be used for identity theft. The act explicitly includes biometric data in its list of materials that can be used as a “means of identification” (Hemphill, 2001).

The probability of type I and type II errors must be examined before biometrics can be implemented. Confirmation is needed that the biometric device will protect, to the needed level, against false positives and negatives. In this light, biometrics must also be examined for the impact on civil liberties. There will be, and are, concerns that devices that monitor unique human characteristics will be used for more than verifying and recognizing identity. Biometric solutions should be implemented overtly, with the consent of the user base, to avoid being confused with a “Big Brother” environment. The social impact of these systems will need to be continuously monitored (Johnson, 2004). Another ethical issue that should be considered is the ability of users to remove themselves from the system. How long are human traits kept in the biometric database? For example, if an employee retires, should his/her biometric data be kept in, or removed from, the database? Finally, the use of biometrics must be carefully weighed due to the permanence of the human characteristics that they use. Unlike passwords, there is no weak or strong biometric. The characteristics that these systems use are permanent. There is a simple remedy for a user losing their password; simply issue or create a new password. This procedure can also be followed if the password is compromised. However, if a biometric system is compromised, their permanence makes it hard to recover. You cannot reissue a user’s fingerprint or iris. Even more worrisome is what risks that user faces once their biometrics are no longer unique and personal (Schneier, 1999).

future of bIometrIcs Biometrics will continue to evolve. In the future, possible biometric traits to be incorporated into pattern matching systems include body odor, ear shape, facial thermography, and DNA matching (Rosenzweig et al., 2004). It is expected that

0

Biometric Controls and Privacy

the cost of implementation and use of biometric devices will continue to drop, making it economically feasible for their adoption in new environments and industries. The wireless and financial industries both show great potential for future biometric use. As wireless devices, cell phones, PDAs, and laptops, become increasingly more common, their security will grow in importance. In addition, the wireless devices are being used for more business critical applications and need to have appropriate levels of protection. Finance and credit institutions have always placed a high degree of importance on security and user identity authentication. Biometrics offer great potential when used with a credit/debit card to very the cardholders identity. It is also likely that the underlying algorithms that used to match characteristics with the biometric database will continue to improve. As the effectiveness of the queries grow, the probability of false positives and false negatives will decrease making these systems even more reliable. There is no question biometrics will continue to be used in law enforcement and criminal justice. The ability to match an unknown suspect’s identity can help to find lawbreakers and protect society. In addition, with concern to terrorism, states and government agencies will use biometrics to identify and protect against a list of known offenders (Zureik, 2004). For example, in the United States, the Department of State began issuing passports that included biometric passports in 2006. Perhaps the biggest question for biometrics is if they will be accepted on a large scale. While users certainly understand and respect their use in high security environments, it remains to be seen if society as a whole will be willing to use them for everyday tasks. The decrease in cost and the increase in effectiveness make these systems potential solutions for a host of daily activities, even as a possible replacement for everyday passwords. However, before biometrics can reach that point, citizens will need to be assured that there is little risk to their privacy and civil liberties.

08

conclusIon Today, personal and digital privacy have become mainstream issues as a result of the growth of cybercriminal activity and the severity of identity theft. While individuals must take greater precaution with their own private data, biometrics can assist in securing against fraudulent access to information systems and the impersonation of identity. Biometric devices offer another layer of security for physical and digital systems and assets. Their adoption, given proper planning, can be a valuable method to authenticate users and identify unknown persons. Modern technology is improving the techniques biometric systems use and lowering their cost of adoption. The designers and creators of biometric systems must be wary of the legal and ethical questions that their devices are likely to create. Indeed, biometric devices affect privacy on two fronts. First, they can help protect user privacy by legitimately authenticating identity. Their use can protect against cybercrime and identity theft. Second, due to their use and storage of personal and unique characteristics, biometrics opens a host of questions on their impact on civil liberties. However, with adequate communication, users are likely to appreciate systems that allow them the ease of use and convenience that biometric systems offer. Biometrics offer increased security levels when used properly and in conjunction with a well thought security plan. For this reason, we should expect their use to continue to grow in the future.

references Clark, R. (1994). Human identification in information dystems: Management challenges and public policy issues. Information Technology and People, 7(4), 6-37.

Biometric Controls and Privacy

Consumer fraud and identity theft complaint data, January-December 2005. (2006). Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/downloads/clearinghouse_2005.pdf Down, M., & Sands, R. (2004). Biometrics: An overview of the technology, challenges andcontrol considerations. Information Systems Control Journal, 4, 53. Harris, A. J., & Yen, D. C. (2002). Biometric authentication: Assuring access to information. Information Management and Computer Security, 10(1), 12-19. Hemphill, T. (2001). Identity theft: A cost of business? Business and Society Review, 106(1), 51-63.

Matyas, V., Jr., & Riha, Z. (2003). Toward reliable user authentication through biometircs. Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, 1(3), 45-49. Rosenzweig, P., Kochems, A., & Schwartz, A. (2004). Biometric technologies: Security, legal, and policy implications. NASSP Legal Memorandum, 12, 1-10. Schneier, B. (1999). Biometrics: Uses and abuses. Communications of the ACM, 42(8), 136. Zureik, E. (2004) Governance, security and technology: The case of biometrics. Studies in Political Economy, 73, 113.

AddItIonAl reAdIng

Jain, A. K., Hong, L., & Pankanti, S. (2000). Biometric identification. Communications of the ACM, 43(2), 90-98.

Ashbourn, J. (2000) Biometrics: Advanced identity verification. Springer-Verlag.

Jain, A. K., Ross, A., & Prabhakar, S. (2003). Biometric recognition: Security and privacy concerns. Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, 1(2), 33-42.

Kittler, J., & Maltoni, D. (2007). Introduction to the special issue on biometrics: Progress and directions. IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., 29(4), 513-516.

Jain, A. K., Ross, A., & Prabhakar, S. (2004). An introduction to biometric recognition. Circuits and systems for video technology. IEEE Transactions, 14(1), 4-20.

Pons, A. P. (2006). Biometric marketing: targeting the online consumer. Communicatiojns of the ACM, 49(8), 60-66.

Johnson, M. L. (2004). Biometrics and the threat to civil liberties. Computer, 37(4), 90- 92.

Ratha, N. K., Connell, J. H., & Bolle, R. M. (2003). Biometrics break-ins and band-aids. Pattern Recognition Letters, 24(13), 2105-2113.

Liu, S., & Silverman, M. (2001). A practical guide to biometric security technology. IT Professional, IEEE, 3(1), 27-32.

09

0

Chapter XVI

Government Stewardship of Online Information: FOIA Requirements and Other Considerations G. Scott Erickson Ithaca College, USA

AbstrAct This chapter focuses on the specific issue of the federal Freedom of Information Act and associated state and local freedom of information laws. While full of good intentions regarding openness in government, the statutes have increasingly been applied to circumstances when individuals or organizations seek government records for legal or business purposes. As such, confidential business information and private personal information are both vulnerable when data are in government hands. Given the maze of exemptions and agency interpretations regarding freedom of information requests, the circumstances are both highly variable and unpredictable. Better understanding of the statutes and their interpretations will help individuals and organizations make better decisions regarding data interactions with various levels of government.

IntroductIon In an age with ever increasing amounts of personal data held in commercial and government databases, many individuals view the government

as the champion of their personal right to privacy. While this is true to some extent, it is also true that various levels of government are great generators, collectors, and suppliers of personal data. Some is published as a matter of course, some is sold.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Government Stewardship of Online Information

But a substantial amount of information flows out of the federal, state, and local governments every day as a result of freedom of information requests. Indeed, it is quite possible that information you did not even realize the government holds is being turned over to a private concern right now, whether the government agency involved really wants to do so or not. In this chapter, we will look at general trends in data collection and processing and how they relate to statute, execution, and court precedent concerning the federal Freedom of Information Act and related state laws. We will cover the laws in some detail, including common exemptions from requests and changes in the law over time. Agency practices related to the act and key court decisions will also be covered. With that background, we will consider the status and vulnerability of confidential business information passed on to governments. Because such information increasingly includes personal details about individuals (chiefly customers), government-held business information impacts our privacy discussion. We will then move on to consider the status and vulnerability of government databases concerning individual citizens. The main point of the chapter is that matters remain in flux in this area. Government openness is fairly well-defined but privacy rights are not entirely clear, especially related to freedom of information requests. Regardless of which way the balance tips (openness vs. privacy), more certainty will help government, organizations, and individuals better plan how and when to share their own information resources.

bAckgound freedom of Information The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Apfelroth, 2006; Uhl, 2003; Halstuk & Davis, 2002; Perritt, 1998; Perritt, 1995) was enacted in the U.S.

in 1966 with the aim of opening up government to more public review, thus increasing accountability. The federal law applies to U.S. executive agencies (not judicial or legislative bodies), while all 50 states and the District of Columbia have also enacted freedom of information laws (FOIL), generally in line with the FOIA, covering their state and local government agencies. We will discuss these separately, where appropriate. The FOIA requires governmental agencies to proactively disclose or publish records as a matter of course. It also requires them to answer requests for disclosure of other, unpublished records. The law applies only to existing records (agencies do not need to create new ones to respond to a request) and requests can be made by any individual or group, theoretically without explaining why they want or need the records. There are nine exemptions in the act that agencies can use, but are not required to use, to deny an FOIA request. These exemptions cover requests for information relating to: • • • • • • • • •

National security or foreign policy Internal personnel policies and practices Personal privacy when exempted by law Trade secrets or other confidential business information Deliberative privilege Personnel or medical files Law enforcement Financial institution assessments Geological and geophysical information and data

A tenth exemption was added concerning critical infrastructure in the wake of 9/11 (Uhl, 2003). One of the key things the FOIA did was change the presumption in terms of turning over information. Where requesters previously had to make the case in terms of needing the records, the burden shifted to the agencies with the passage of this act. The government entities were expected



Government Stewardship of Online Information

to turn over requested information unless they could justify not doing so because of one of the exemptions. So the presumption was that records would be published or turned over when requested. Only in rare circumstances would agencies resort to one of the exemptions. And, again, note that the exemptions permitted the agencies to decline to reveal information, nothing requires them to decline. When exemptions might apply, it is up to the agencies whether to resort to them or not. The act has amended over the years, but the change most relevant to our discussion is found in the electronic FOIA amendments (EFOIA) of 1996 (Halstuk & Davis, 2002; Perritt, 1998; Leahy, 1998). The EFOIA made explicit what was already general practice, namely that “records” specified in the original FOIA included electronic media. Further, any records should be made available to requesters in whatever format they desired (again, including electronic). Finally, the EFOIA reiterated that the balance between openness and privacy, where government information was concerned, should fall firmly on the side of openness. Indeed, an important court decision, Reporters Committee, we will discuss later in this chapter, had raised some issues as to what agency records were subject to FOIA, suggesting that some might not be because of privacy concerns. As Leahy (1998), one of the EFOIA’s senate supporters put it, “FOIA is no longer limited to a ‘core purpose’ of making agency records and information available to the public only in cases where such material would shed light on the activities and operations of government.” In short, all information is subject to FOIA requests, not just certain information. Congress reiterated the presumption that records should be released, not held secret, with passage of the EFOIA. As this discussion suggests, and as we all know, the real key to the impact of legislation is found not only in the statue itself but also in its practice and its interpretation by the courts. The intention of the statute was to open up government to the scrutiny of concerned citizens and the press.



Interest proved to be much more extensive than anticipated. According to one source, 1,965,919 FOI requests were made to federal agencies in fiscal 1999 (Uhl, 2003). This figure does not include, of course, state and local requests. More detailed data from the FDA in 2004 showed 18,540 requests costing the agency $12.8 million to process. Sixty-seven point six percent of the requests were fully granted and 31.9% were not granted because no records existed or the requests were withdrawn. Forty-five requests were only partially granted (some information withheld) and 39 were denied, chiefly due to exemptions pertaining to confidential commercial information or ongoing investigations (Lurie & Zieve, 2006). As might be deduced from the data, the FOIA has become a source of commercial insights and litigation support. “Indeed, the vast majority of requests under the Act seek no information about the activities of the government, but rather information about business competitors, opposing parties in litigation, and the activities of other nongovernmental entities” (O’Reilly, 1982). Some general aspects of agency behavior and court decisions reflect this explosion in the number of requests and the cost of fulfilling them, as well as growing concerns about proprietary commercial information and individual privacy. We will discuss all in more detail, but it is important to recognize broad trends. Initially, as noted previously, the EFOIA in 1996 not only firmed up access rights for electronic records but also reiterated the presumption on the side of openness. This has generally been true of legislation, which seems to regularly reassert congress’ intention to push openness, even at the expense of sometimes revealing proprietary or private information. Practice at agencies varies widely (as it does between states and localities), but the trends in agency practice have been more in the direction of privacy, not openness, and have been further reinforced by court decisions. On one hand, there has long been a distinction and protection of “confidential business information” (Kilgore,

Government Stewardship of Online Information

2004). As long as an agency recognizes that the information provided is confidential (e.g., documentation of a drug production process filed with the FDA), this type of record clearly falls under Exemption 4 of the FOIA. The onus is on firms to identify and ask for such protection, but it is often available and has been supported, as we will discuss later. So even though FOIA requests are used for competitive intelligence purposes, agencies are not always giving away the store. Similarly, privacy concerns have resulted in some limitations in practice. Once again, there are specific exemptions concerning privacy though some are, on their face, more relevant to government employees than to the general public. In spite of that aspect, there is a general attitude toward balancing openness and privacy, even though the law’s presumption tends to favor openness. But a number of agencies have developed a standard policy toward FOIA requests, delivering records of a general or statistical nature while seeking to exempt requests focusing on individually identifiable information. This approach was legitimized in the case referred to as Reporters Committee in the literature (Halstock & Davis, 2002; Cate, Fields, & McBane, 1994). In Reporters, the U.S. Supreme Court essentially ruled that personal privacy should not be violated by release under FOIA unless the information had to deal with the “central purpose” of the agency’s operations. The decision goes back to the intentions of the original legislation—to monitor what the agency is doing—while limiting access to data it might have accumulated which is tangential to its actual operations. A wave of lower court decisions have followed and supported Reporters Committee. So although openness advocates frown upon it, the case is now well-established as a precedent. More recent activity includes a trend toward more national security exemption denials of FOIA requests in the wake of 9/11 (especially those made to the Department of Homeland Security) and a potentially far-reaching U.S. Supreme Court decision in National Archives and Records

Administration v. Favish in 2004. In a number of ways, it is probably too early to discern the full impact of either event but they are of import and will enter into our later discussion. In the former case, the increasing scrutiny of FOIA requests is a matter of Bush administration policy, changes in agency behavior, and aggressive support from the Department of Justice when challenged (Uhl, 2003). As memory of 9/11 fades and/or as administrations change (Uhl specifically contrasts the very different tendencies toward requests between the Clinton and Bush administrations), agencies’ attitudes and behaviors may very well change, too. And, of course, the courts will likely have something to say as well when challenges to denials move through the system. In the latter case, Favish was an attorney who sought death scene and autopsy photos under FOIA after Vince Foster’s 1993 suicide. The top court’s decision in favor of denial firmly established privacy rights for survivors and “the family’s privacy interests outweighed the public interest in disclosure” (Halstuk, 2005). But probably even more importantly for our purposes, the court created a “sufficient reason” test, requiring the FOIA requester to demonstrate a public interest that would be aided by disclosure. Without a sufficient reason to overcome a “presumption of legitimacy” that agencies are acting appropriately (Halstuk, 2005), this has the potential to be an extremely important change in philosophy if the presumption effectively passes from the agency to the requester. For 40 years, the burden has been on the agency to prove why an FOIA request should not be honored. Conceivably, this case transfers that burden to the submitter, to establish why the request should be. But only decided in 2004, it is far too early to try to assess the full impact of the case and whether it will hold up as a new precedent. The federal FOIA and state/local FOILs have always posed an issue of balancing openness in government with privacy rights, though



Government Stewardship of Online Information

those rights were often to do with the privacy of government employees, criminals, or corporations rather than the general public. Though a generalization, there has been a tension between legislatures pushing openness and agencies and courts moving more toward privacy. Freedom of information is a concept and policy still in flux but it has the potential to have substantial implications for businesses and individuals as we move ever further into the digital age.

privacy Although a lot of discussion about privacy rights takes place in the U.S., the actual legal standing of the concept is not as straightforward as it might seem. Indeed, in the previous section, we used the term rather frequently, but extensions to individuals who might have information concerning them within government databases can be problematic. The right to privacy generally derives from the fourth amendment, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” As should be clear from the context, this text tends to refer to government rather than private individuals or organizations (Brenner & Clark, 2006). So the U.S. constitution deals with privacy from the government, but not necessarily from Google. The right to privacy as we generally perceive it comes more from court rulings over time (Dalal, 2006), particularly Olmstead wherein Brandeis coined the term “the right to be left alone.” A later case, Katz, formalized the concept, establishing the criteria or whether an individual expected privacy and whether the expectation was reasonable; if so, their privacy should not be invaded (Brenner, 2005). This decision also extended Olmstead in that it made clear privacy applied to people, not just places (the home). How does privacy apply to records, particularly electronic ones? There are existing laws,



but they tend to be a hodge-podge, covering only very specific circumstances. At the federal level, statutes protect privacy in areas including electronic communications, health care records, financial data, video rental data, Internet data regarding children, and cable subscriber data (Solove, 2005; Levary, Thompson, Kot, Brothers, 2005; Eden, 2005). There has been some action on data gathered through radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, in particular, that we will discuss in more detail later. Even there, however, government action has been sparse with legislation passed in only a single state (Wisconsin) while potential regulators at the federal level, such as the Federal Trade Commission, have recommended only voluntary standards related to privacy (Hildner, 2006). In summary, although “right to privacy” is bandied about as if the term were a carefully defined legal concept enshrined in the constitution, its actual status and application is fairly loose. It has been defined more in practice by organizations and the government. As such, any protections are less entrenched than they might seem to be.

mAIn thrust contemporary databases and the Internet In an age of an ever-increasing number of electronic and online databases that contain an everincreasing depth of information, the issue of privacy has become of considerable concern to both individuals and organizations. The past 10 years have seen an explosion of spending in information systems that tie parts of firms, collaborator firms, and customers together. These extended networks of data exchange are now a critical part of doing business, transferring information between individuals and organizations on an ongoing and increasing level on a daily basis.

Government Stewardship of Online Information

Enterprise resource planning, supply chain management, and customer relationship management systems have all multiplied over the past decade (Rothberg & Erickson, 2005). All are typically done over the Web, of course, today. But the basic point is that a great deal of information is constantly flowing around the Internet and firms are using the information to build massive, valuable, proprietary databases concerning operations, supply chain partners, and customers (both consumers and organizations). The most recent extensions of these trends have been data collection methods on the Internet and through radio frequency identification technology, both serving to firmly establish the point to be made concerning the nature and ubiquity of contemporary corporate databases. The Internet has long been seen as a superior way to gather information on how consumers shop: what attracts them to a site, what options they consider, what communications and promotions move them (or not), and other such data. With cookies and other data-gathering mechanisms, such information could be collected on an individual basis for a vast number of consumers, with the vast majority unaware of the process. Similarly, RFID is not only a way to more efficiently manage supply chains and operations, but also as a mechanism to better record what goes on with consumers in retail environments and in service operations. RFID tags act in some ways like bar codes, but can be linked to much more information and can report data through long-distance readers rather than the close-at-hand scanners one sees at the supermarket. When joined with loyalty card or credit card data, RFID systems can gather extensive individual information on purchases, usage, response to communications, and so forth. One of the most high-profile applications of RFID, for example, is in casinos, where gaming choices, betting patterns, cash levels, responses to price levels, promotional choices (free room, free show, betting allowances, etc.) and other such individual data can be gathered and stored—later used to

craft appeals to specific customers to get them back into the casino more quickly. The main point is that extensive commercial databases are being constructed by organizations. And with good reason, as better knowledge concerning individuals allows better-crafted offerings that better address needs and wants. But modern technology, as in the case of the Internet or RFID, allows this data to be collected without individuals necessarily knowing it. This raises immediate issues for groups concerned with privacy. With RFID, for example, one interest group objects to the technology and its use with consumer products because: • • • • •

There is information disclosure, without consumer control; There is tracking, point-to-point, point-toindividual, or individual-to-individual; Collection is essentially invisible (readers are unobtrusive) Data are joined, without consumer awareness; and Tags and readers are ubiquitous and distributed (Mulligan 2004).

All of this becomes important in that governments, at all levels, are also capable of building these types of databases (indeed, one of the initial adopters of RFID technology was the U.S. Department of Defense, mandating tagging for all major suppliers). Further, corporations submit vast amounts of information from their proprietary databases in regulatory filings, including all sorts of operational and marketing data down to the individual consumer. “The federal government is the largest single producer and collector of information in the United States” (Leahy, 1998). And, finally, governments purchase marketing and other databases, combining them with other, existing databases in some cases. We will discuss some specific examples in the following sections. The fact that all of this activity is occurring in an age of ever-increasing transfer and publication



Government Stewardship of Online Information

of information over the Internet just exacerbates the problem. Much of the discussion has implicitly referred to how online activity affects the FOI issue. But it does not hurt to explicitly note the challenges in one place. As just noted, the Internet allows easy and unobtrusive data collection on individuals. It also allows easy collection and categorization of such data, as it is collected on a digital system and fed instantly into digital storage. The Internet provides a ready mechanism to instantly transfer copious amounts of data from one entity to another, whether that is business-to-business, business-togovernment, or government-to-business. Consequently, joining databases is also much simpler given internet technology and connections. And data mining capabilities also make a difference, as organizations can easily review and analyze data from a variety of sources. Essentially, the Internet has sharply increased the ability of firms to access and use databases, creating greater interest in what information various levels of government might hold. Hence, there is the potential for ever more FOIA requests at all levels. On a different level, online connections have also made the process of requesting records and delivering records simpler. Firing off requests for records at multiple agencies at all levels of government is much easier given internet technology. At the other end, those fulfilling such requests (and considering whether to fight them or not by claiming an exemption) should find it much simpler to just honor the request by pushing a few buttons rather than try to establish and perhaps get involved in a dispute over whether exemptions apply. Indeed, the logical solution for many agencies receiving multiple requests for the same data would be to simply publish it to the net where anyone can access it at will. The ease of use aspect is unlikely to enhance privacy as it makes increased openness so effortless. But the main issue is that extensive organizational and consumer data is held in federal, state, and local databases. If one is concerned with the



security of proprietary or personal information, how secure is it? Especially in light of what we have been discussing concerning FOIA activity? And especially in light of the explosive growth of the Internet over the past decade?

foIA and commercial data Given the regulatory function performed by government at all levels, it is no surprise that a wealth of proprietary commercial data is gathered and held by agencies. Further, other government activities generating information may also create interesting databases—with records and submissions from court proceedings, for example. And even though courts are theoretically not covered by FOIA, if the Justice Department or another agency is involved in a court case, the records can be subject to the law. As noted earlier in this chapter, this vast trove of data has generated quite a bit of interest in terms of FOIA requests. And the attention has not come from the press or other open government advocates, it has tended to come from business (chiefly competitors), litigants, and others seeking advantage from the records. O’Reilly (1982) notes examples such as Suzuki’s established program to harvest all Toyota filings with the federal government since 1981 (for data not available in Japan), the openness of records on anyone seeking to contract with the government, foreign government subsidized searches by bearing and aircraft manufacturers, and a food processor’s innovative filtration system retrieved from a regional EPA office. Indeed, EPA filings are a well-known source of detailed information on proprietary processes, as analysts can discern the types of machines employed, anticipated production volumes, and so forth,. from emission and other projections (Rice, 2000). Also noted earlier was Exemption 4 in the FOIA for trade secrets or other confidential business information (CBI). What constitutes CBI is fairly well established by precedent, with the case

Government Stewardship of Online Information

National Parks v. Morton instituting the language “commercial or financial matter is ‘confidential’ for purposes of the exemption if disclosure of the information is likely…to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained” (Kilgore, 2004). But as may be gathered from the high level of commercially motivated FOIA requests, the actual workings of the exemption are not perceived as a strong protection mechanism. Indeed, several issues exist. Establishing whether a disclosure would cause “substantial harm to the competitive position” is tricky and is generally left up to agency personnel. While a number of firms designate records as proprietary, confidential, sensitive, or otherwise when submitting, it is really up to agency personnel (and, perhaps, outside evaluators brought in to assess) whether a record is truly CBI. Further, if a firm believes that it would be harmed by disclosure, it must establish that the commercial harm is immediate, essentially that revealing the records would result in instant marketplace results (O’Reilly, 1982). That, of course, is extremely difficult, especially with innovative practices, products, customer insights, and such. Further, the exemptions are not mandatory. Agencies are allowed to deny FOIA requests but are not required to do so. The decision really is up to agency personnel. Not surprisingly, procedures vary widely by agency (Kilgore, 2004). The FAA and several other agencies have separate public and non-public files for CBI records. The NHTSA will inform a submitter whether CBI is honored or not, but if not allowed, the agency will then publish the record without allowing withdrawal. The Department of Labor requires each sheet be labeled “confidential” and then has a Director of the Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance determine whether the CBI exemption applies or not. In short, some agencies have established predictable procedures while others appear to be totally ad hoc (Kilgore, 2004; O’Reilly, 1982).

A further complication is the changing nature of what might be considered CBI. Standard intellectual property such as patents, copyrights, and such have always had some sense of protection—all are revealed anyway, though additional information covering how patented technology works best, and so forth, might not be. Intellectual property clearly has some commercial value but also has specific and generally effective protection, even when revealed. Trade secrets and more loosely defined or protected information are a more sticky issue. Trade secrets, by definition, are secret and must be kept so in order to have value. One interesting development in recent years has been the firming up of trade secret law in the U.S., as the Economic Espionage Act more explicitly established what a trade secret is (basically, any business information of value) and what must be done to keep it so (strong attempts to maintain its secrecy) (Carr, Erickson, & Rothberg, 2004). The EEA and its interpretation create a couple of interesting issues regarding commercial information and the FOIA. Initially, what might be considered CBI or a trade secret is wider than what had been standard practice in the past. In the enforcement of the EEA, quite a number of prosecutions have centered on marketing data, including customer lists and consumer information. We discussed casinos and their mountains of customer data earlier in the chapter. Harrah’s customer database, the state of the art in this industry, can undoubtedly now be classified as a trade secret. It might not have been a few years ago. Secondly, the onus is really on the holder of the trade secret to keep it secret. Sloppy protection mechanisms, loose internal and external security, and other such actions can invalidate trade secret status. The holder must have proper procedures to keep the information hidden. After objecting to some new product information being posted by bloggers, Apple, for example, was basically told “tough luck” by the courts, at least in part because it showed loose controls when the information got out in the first place (O’Grady, 2006).



Government Stewardship of Online Information

So it is quite possible that records turned over to a government agency end up being released, invalidating trade secret protection because the information is no longer secret and/or revealing it to the government may be seen as an indicator of lack of controls. Further, there is no guarantee right now that any particular agency will recognize information as CBI or a trade secret, that it will handle it carefully, or that it will choose to utilize an exemption to the benefit of the submitter. And, finally, in terms of consumer privacy, what of individuals who might have personal information stored within such records and/or others the government has accumulated? They obviously bear some risk here, too, and so we turn to that topic.

foIA And IndIvIduAls Federal, state, and local governments hold a great deal of data concerning individuals, including some coming from commercial enterprises. While issues of technological or operational trade secrets are less in this arena, deep knowledge of individual consumers is a growing source of competitive advantage and is unique, valuable, proprietary information for organizations. And this can pop up in government databases as financial information, medical records, demographic information, and the like are gathered and held at various levels. There is great interest in accessing this sort of information. Certain government databases can be valuable in and of themselves (e.g., census data) or can become valuable when combined with other databases (e.g., housing purchases, financial data, and tax data). But balancing that interest are obvious concerns about personal privacy (Gomez-Velez, 2005). While the government has a right and, perhaps a duty, to provide and/or sell some data (Leahy, 1998; Perritt, 1995), these personal privacy issues are also important. As discussed earlier in this chapter, privacy rights may be somewhat nebulously defined, but

8

there are a substantial number of individuals and organizations who value them and are nervous about their own rights in the age of the internet (Gomez-Velez, 2005). So there is information in government databases, some from commercial sources, concerning individuals. And there are privacy issues. How do these records pertain to FOIA? Initially, note that any privacy promises made by corporations before passing along data are worth very little. Once the Internet boom collapsed in the early part of this decade, one of the few remaining assets of bankrupt technology companies was their customer database. And even though promises had been made to individuals not to release their personal information to others, the rights of debtholders seeking to sell off such assets appeared to take precedence in at least one case (Kelly & Erickson, 2004). Although this toysmart.com case was never fully adjudicated, the direction was clear—personal privacy promises made by organizations had very little clout in court when balanced against other interests. Thus, if such data ends up held by the government, the privacy promises of the submitter likely have very little bearing on whether it will be shared or not. In terms of FOIA itself, there are again specific exemptions relating to personal records and privacy. Exemption 3 concerns personal privacy when exempted by law while Exemption 6 has to do with personnel and medical records. Both have been used repeatedly over the years. In fact, agencies developed something of a standard approach, reviewing the “balance” between openness and personal privacy in making FOIA decisions. Essentially, if the records held details of identifiable individuals, agencies often declined to honor FOIA requests and were supported by the courts (Cate et al., 1994). Indeed, in specific cases involving law enforcement (release full investigative records or withhold those with individually identifiable information), medicine (performance records of individual doctors), and medical records (several cases), courts affirmed that the individually iden-

Government Stewardship of Online Information

tifiable perspective trumped the public’s need to know (Prime, 1996; Sharrott, 1992; Harvard, 2007). Most of this is credited to the Reporters Committee decision discussed earlier in this chapter. The court decision, through the “central purpose” concept, lessened the weight of the public’s right to know. If the records are not central to the agency’s purpose and operation, the need for openness diminishes. Reporters also strengthened privacy considerations, establishing individually identifiable data as having a legitimate privacy interest and extending the personnel and medical record exemption to all personal information (Cate et al., 1994). Openness in government advocates objected strenuously, and the EFOIA amendments in 1996 were seen as something of an answer to Reporters, reestablishing the primacy of openness in the balance (Halstuk & Davis, 2002; Perritt, 1998), but the case still acts as the basis for a lot of agency decisions to decline FOIA requests on the basis of personal privacy. Also a help, at least to privacy advocates, was the Privacy Act of 1974. The law gave individuals more power over their personal records held by the government and ostensibly required agencies to deny FOIA requests for individually identifiable information. In large part, the law helped. But there is a bit of circularity to it (not release unless required by law) so that an official giving more credence to FOIA (the very law requiring release) might still choose to honor the request. In other words, do not release unless required by law, but since FOIA is a law, privacy might not be respected. Again, the act supported privacy but has not proved to be the final answer (Susman, 1988; Johnston, 1983). So is there, then, a privacy concern about FOIA and individual citizens? There are still issues to be worked out, on a number of fronts. Initially, as with proprietary commercial data, FOIA exemptions related to personal privacy are allowed, not required. So whether to be concerned about individually identifiable records is totally up to an individual agency. Some have processes for

review and standards for determining this balance between openness and privacy. Others still remain less concerned and review requests based on such concerns in an ad hoc manner, if at all. As long as different agencies have different attitudes, approaches, and eventual decisions, individuals will need to remain concerned about their personal privacy. And as we discussed relating to Internetgathered data and RFID data, information can be gathered unobtrusively, without individuals even knowing they have became part of a file, perhaps held by a government agency that routinely honors FOIA requests. Further, the joining of data is a major part of the problem, as both firms and government entities build ever bigger databases by combining holdings. What could very well happen is government data without individually identifiable features might be released under FOIA and then combined with a database with extensive personal details. With modern technology, it would not be that great a chore to match up some details in each database and add the government data on a person-by-person basis. So the original government database would have no call to be withheld for reasons of personal privacy, but would be personally identifiable when combined with other data. Finally, and somewhat adding to this general issue, FOIA is supported by 51 FOIL statutes in the states and District of Columbia. While very similar in many respects, the state laws do not precisely mirror the federal statute. Indeed, they tend to vary considerably by state (Tesler, 2000; Westin, 1996; Vaughn, 1984) and, of course, in their actual administration and specific judicial guidance. State and local agencies are likely to have far less guidance in terms of how to process and evaluate FOIL requests, and, of course, are far less likely to have established procedures, openness or privacy officials, or any other such systems. Bloom (2006) discusses at length the case of Greenwich, CT, recently decided in Connecticut Supreme Court. The court required the

9

Government Stewardship of Online Information

city to hand over voter registration records, a geographic information system (GIS) database, and a recreation management database to a computer consultant, the GIS records being subject to a denied FOIA request. As Bloom puts it, “the court almost blindly supports the most far-reaching interpretation of the FOIA without giving adequate weight to the countervailing legal and policy considerations.” As long as decisions are made on an agency by agency, state by state, municipality by municipality, and/or court by court basis, the exact balance between openness and privacy will tend to vary widely. Individual citizens will never quite know how their personal information stored in government databases will be treated. To summarize, the U.S. still has agencies at all levels holding and practicing some discretion over whether to use FOIA exemptions (or not) and widely varying procedures for making such determinations. Advances in database technology mean that records not individually identifiable in one database may be easily identified person by person in another. And state and local laws, agency procedures, and court decisions also vary widely in terms of the openness/privacy tradeoff. The vast amounts of personal information held by various levels of government on U.S. citizens are not protected from privacy concerns. In some ways, matters have gotten better from a privacy standpoint, but in a number of ways they have gotten worse. Firms and individuals cannot act with surety regarding valuable proprietary or personal information in government hands, so there is still considerable room for improvement.

ment. If it is not to be released, they will likely submit much more information and do so more willingly. It is the certainty that is the issue. For individuals, there also needs to be more clarity. What information is held, who holds it, and is it subject to release to others? Is it personally identifiable or not, or could it be made identifiable in combination with other records? As noted throughout this chapter, the presumption of the federal legislature has always been that government openness was the priority, with privacy a secondary concern. With modern databases, the wealth of information held by either governments or private organizations, and the possibilities of joining records; privacy is a much greater concern than was the case forty years ago when the FOIA was enacted. This has been reflected in some agency behaviors and some court decisions, but a more sweeping and clear privacy statute would help everyone know what is fair game for FOIA requests and what should be kept private. The European Union, for example, has a situation opposite that in the U.S. The U.S. case, as we have discussed, includes fairly well-defined open government statutes and court decisions but fuzzy definitions of privacy and privacy rights. In the EU, privacy rights are well-defined while open government varies by country and a full-fledged FOI statute only became a concern with the advent of the Maastricht treaty in the 1990’s (Perritt & Lhulier, 1997). Consequently, the EU is seen as having stronger privacy protection for its citizens and considerably less uncertainty for individuals, firms, and government. The EU Data Protection Directive includes, among other things:

recommendations

•

The situation calls for more clarity at all levels. For business, the situation is not so much whether proprietary information might be released or not. If it is to be released, for sure, then individual firms can at least establish their own policies in terms of what records will be transferred to the govern-

• • • •

0

Requirements of data quality (accuracy and timeliness) Prohibitions on processing sensitive data Required notification of the data subject Limitations on disclosures to others Rights of the data subject to object to certain processing

Government Stewardship of Online Information

•

Requirements of levels of security (Maxeiner, 1995)

This is not to say there is anything magic about the EU approach, but it does provide individuals with more knowledge of the data held concerning them and what is done with it. And, because the directive applies to both government and private entities, the problems of joining are lessened as well. Regardless of the specific approach, it is the certainty of the definitions and policies that would help everyone more than the current uncertainty at all levels.

future trends & conclusIon This chapter has focused on several trends, so they should already be clear. But let us reiterate. A tension between openness in government and personal privacy exists in the U.S. because of the federal Freedom of Information Act and universal state Freedom of Information Laws. The trend in the federal legislature has been to continually strengthen the FOIA and openness by reaffirming a presumption that government records should be released unless there is a compelling reason not to. Alternatively, the trend in agency practice and the courts has been toward more privacy, allowing use of certain exemptions in the FOIA to deny records to individuals or organizations seeking them. This balance has been clarified somewhat by legislation on electronic records, agency practice, and a number of court cases suggesting agencies can limit releases to central purpose activities and records not including individually identifiable information. Prominent trends have surfaced over the last 10 years, in terms of the databases and privacy. In the former case, the range, depth, processing and joining capabilities found in contemporary electronic databases can be mind-boggling. This fact has contributed to a growing interest in personal privacy, as individuals and organizations

begin to realize exactly how much information is out there concerning them and how it might be used. Because of the interest in privacy and a corresponding weakness in defining the field and individual rights, the topic is an important one vis a vis FOIA. Governments hold tremendous amounts of their own records, as well as those obtained from corporations, and those that could be created from further joining or analysis. As such, the status of proprietary commercial information and other personal information held by various levels of government is a concern. As databases and their capabilities continue to grow, these concerns will only grow without more clarification of privacy rights. One group of commentators favors strong FOIA statutes, practice, and court support. Another favors weaker FOIA but stronger privacy considerations. Which way the balance goes is less of a concern than establishing certainty so that organizations and individuals know what steps to take regarding their proprietary or personal information. Knowing how the data will be used and protected can influence organizations deciding whether to do business with various levels of government. Similarly, such knowledge can help individuals decide whether to pursue some sorts of licenses, invest in property, or even register to vote. More certainty will help individual decision making and, by extension, the government’s ability to serve the needs of its constituents.

future reseArch As reiterated often in this chapter, this is a constantly changing field with new decisions made on FOIA and FOIL applications on a daily basis at all levels of government. There are new statutes and new court decisions constantly flowing from various legislatures and courts. With each major change, opportunities for new research are created.



Government Stewardship of Online Information

In terms of immediately relevant and predictable research directions, however, we have the obvious differences in FOIA/FOIL practice that we have discussed. Initially, at the federal level, different agencies can have dramatically different procedures and responses to FOIA requests. Some have officers or groups in charge of processing and determining whether exemptions apply. Millions of dollars are spent at the federal level answering hundreds of thousands of annual requests. Analysis of differences in agency approach and process could be fruitful research directions and help our understanding of the benefits and burdens of the FOIA. Similarly, at the state level, laws, agency behavior, and processes differ markedly. There is some research on differences in statute and court decisions, but the field is again ripe for more detailed examinations of specific agencies, approaches, staffing, and so forth. In line with that theme, as freedom of information concerns become more formalized in Europe and elsewhere, similar research directions could prove fruitful.

references Apfelroth, J. (2006). The open government act: A proposed bill to ensure the efficient implementation of the freedom of information act. Administrative Law Review, 58(1), 219. Bloom, I. (2006). Freedom of information law in the digital age: The death knell of informational privacy. Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, 12(Spring), 9. Brenner, S. W. (2005). The search and seizure of computers and electronic evidence: The fourth amendment in an era of ubiquitous technology. Mississippi Law Journal, 75(Fall), 1. Brenner, S. W., & Clark, L. L. (2006). Fourth amendment protection for shared privacy rights in stored transactional data. Journal of Law and Policy, 14, 211.



Carr, C. A., Erickson, G. S., & Rothberg, H. N. (2004). Intellectual capital, competitive intelligence and the economic espionage act. International Journal of Learning and Intellectual Capital, 1(4), 460-482. Cate, F. H., Fields, D. A., & McBain, J. K. (1994). The right to privacy and the public’s right to know: The “central purpose” of the freedom of information act. Administrative Law Review, 46(Winter), 41-74. Dalal, R. S. (2006). Chipping away at the constitution: The increasing use of RFID chips could lead to an erosion of privacy rights. Boston University Law Review, 86(April), 485. Eden, J. M. (2005). When big brother privatizes: Commercial surveillance, the privacy act of 1974 and the future of RFID. Duke Law & Technology Review, 20. Gomez-Velez, N. (2005). Internet access to court records—balancing public access and privacy. Loyola Law Review, 51, 365-438. Halstuk, M. E. (2005). When is an invasion of privacy unwarranted under FOIA? An analysis of the supreme court’s “sufficient reason” and “presumption of legitimacy” standards. University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy, 16(3), 361-400. Halstuk, M. E., & Davis, C. N. (2002). The public interest be damned: Lower court treatment of the reporters committee “central purpose” reformulation. Administrative Law Review, 54(3), 983-1024. Harvard Law Review. (2007). Developments in the law of media. 120(4), 990. Hildner, L. (2006). Defusing the threat of RFID: Protecting consumer privacy through technology-specific legislation at the state level. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 41(Winter), 133.

Government Stewardship of Online Information

Johnston, C. A. (1983). Greentree v. united states customs service: A misinterpretation of the relationship between FOIA exemption 3 and the privacy act. Boston University Law Review, 63, 509-531. Kelly, E. P., & Erickson, G. S. (2004). Legal and privacy issues surrounding customer databases and e-merchant bankruptcies: Reflections on toysmart.com. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 104(3), 209-217. Kilgore, H. E. (2004). Signed, sealed, protected: Solutions to agency handling of confidential business information in informal rulemaking. Administrative Law Review, 56(2), 519-534. Leahy, P. (1998). The electronic FOIA amendments of 1996: Reformatting the FOIA for online access. Administrative Law Review, 50(2), 339-344. Levary, R., Thompson, D., Kot, K., & Brothers, J. (2005). Radio frequency identification: Legal aspects. Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, 12(Fall), 6. Lurie, P., & Zieve, A. (2006). Sometimes the silence can be like thunder: Access to pharmaceutical data at the FDA. Law and Contemporary Problems, 69(Summer), 85-97. Maxeiner, J. R. (1995). Freedom of information and the EU data protection directive. Federal Communications Law Journal, 48(December), 93-104. Mulligan, D. (2004). Privacy and information goods. FTC RFID Workshop, June 21. www.ftc. gov/bcp/worshops/rfid O’Grady, et. al. v. Superior Court (2006), 139 Cal. App. 4Th 1423. O’Reilly, J. T. (1982). Regaining a confidence: Protection of business confidential data through reform of the freedom of information act. Administrative Law Review, 34, 263-313.

Perritt, Jr., H. H. (1995). Sources of rights to access public information. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 4(Summer), 179-221. Perritt, Jr., H. H. (1998). Electronic freedom of information. Administrative Law Review, 50(2), 391-419. Perritt, Jr., H. H., & Lhulier, C. J. (1997). Information access rights based on international human rights law. Buffalo Law Review, 45(Fall), 899-929. Prime, J. S. (1996). A double-barrelled assault: How technology and judicial interpretations threaten public access to law enforcement records. Federal Communications Law Journal, 48(March), 341-369. Rice, S. (2000). Public environmental records—a treasure chest of competitive information. Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 3(3), 13-19. Rothberg, H. N., & Erickson, G. S. (2005). From knowledge to intelligence: Creating competitive advantage in the next economy. Woburn, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann. Sawyer, S., & Tapia, A. (2005). The sociotechnical nature of mobile computing work: Evidence from a study of policing in the United States. International Journal of Technology and Human Interaction, 1(3), 1-14. Sharrott, D. (1992). Provider-specific qualityof-care data: A proposal for limited mandatory disclosure. Brooklyn Law Review, 58(Spring), 85-153. Solove, D. J. (2005). The coexistence of privacy and security: Fourth amendment codification and professor kerr’s misguided call for judicial deference. Fordham Law Review, 74(November), 747. Susman, T. M. (1988). The privacy act and the freedom of information act: Conflict and resolution. John Marshall Law Review, 21, 703-733.



Government Stewardship of Online Information

Tesler, W. (2000). Gould debunked: The prohibition against using New York’s freedom of information law as a criminal discovery tool. New York Law School Law Review, 44, 71-129. Uhl, K. E. (2003). The freedom of information act post-9/11: Balancing the public’s right to know, critical infrastructure protection, and homeland security. American University Law Review, 53(October), 261-311. Vaughn, R. G. (1984). Administrative alternatives and the federal freedom of information act. Ohio State Law Journal, 45(Winter), 185-214. Westin, M. (1996). The Minnesota government data practices act: A practitioner’s guide and observations on access to government information. William Mitchell Law Review, 22, 839-902.

AddItIonAl reAdIng Andrussier, S. E. (1991). The freedom of information act in 1990: More freedom for the government, less freedom for the people. Duke Law Journal, 41(June), 753. Beall, C. P. (1996). The exaltation of privacy doctrines over public information law. Duke Law Journal, 45, 1249. Bunker, M. D., Splichal, S. L., Chamberlin, B. F., & Perry, L. M. (1993). Access to government-held information in the computer age: Applying legal doctrine to emerging technology. Florida State University Law Review, 20(Winter), 543. Davis, C. N., & Splichal, S.L. (Eds.). (2000). Access denied: Freedom of information in the information age. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press. Grunewald, M. H. (1988). Freedom of information act dispute resolution. Administrative Law Review, 46, 1.



Halstuk, M. E. (2002). The threat to freedom of information. Columbia Journalism Review, 40(5), 8. Heinrich, C. (2005). RFID and beyond: Growing your business through real world awareness. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley. Hildebrand, M. J., & Klosek, J. (2005). Recent security breaches highlight the important role of data security in privacy compliance programs. Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 17, 20. Hostetter, D. Z. (2005). When small technology is a big deal: Legal issues arising from business use of RFID. Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology, 2, 102. Kelly, E. P., & Erickson, G. S. (2005). Radio frequency identification tags: Commercial applications vs. privacy rights. Industrial Management and Data Systems, 105(5/6), 703-713. Kobelev, O. (2005). Big brother on a tiny chip: Ushering in the age of global surveillance through the use of radio frequency identification technology and the need for legislative response. North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology, 6, 325. McDonald, D. (1997). The electronic freedom of information act amendments: A minor upgrade to public access law. Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal, 23, 357. Milne, G. R., Rohm, A. J., & Bahl, S. (2004). Consumers’ protection of online privacy and identity. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), 217-232. Norian, P. (2003). The struggle to keep personal data personal: Attempts to reform online privacy and how congress should respond. Catholic University Law Review, 52, 803-806. Nowadzky, R. A. (1996). A comparative analysis of public records statutes. Urban Law, 28, 65.

Government Stewardship of Online Information

O’Reilly, J. T. (1998). Expanding the purpose of federal records access: New private entitlement or new threat to privacy? Administrative Law Review, 50, 371. Pandozzi, N. R. (2001). Beware of banks bearing gifts: Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the constitutionality of federal financial privacy legislation. University of Miami Law Review, 55, 163. Perritt, Jr., H. H. (1990). Federal electronic information policy. Temple Law Review, 63, 201. Siris, M. J. (1997). New York’s freedom from information law: Dislosure of public costs of a New York state senator’s “public interest” mailings. Albany Law Review, 60, 1273-1294. Smith, L. (2006). RFID and other embedded technologies: Who owns the data? Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal, 22, 695.

Solove, D. J. (2001). Privacy and power: Computer databases and metaphors for information privacy. Stanford Law Review, 53, 1393-1402. Solove, D. J. (2002). Access and aggregation: Public records, privacy and the constitution. Minnesota Law Review, 86, 1137. Terwilliger, G. (2006). EU data protection laws. National Law Journal, 28(37), 18. Wald, P. M. (1984). The freedom of information act: A short case study in the perils and paybacks of legislating democratic values. Emory Law Journal, 33, 649. Wichmann III, C. J. (1998). Ridding FOIA of those “unanticipated consequences”: Repaving a necessary road to freedom. Duke Law Journal, 47, 1213-1256.





Chapter XVII

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe Charles O’Mahony Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Ireland Philip Flaherty Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Ireland

AbstrAct This chapter will discuss the legal framework for consumer and data protection in Europe. Central to this discussion will be the law of the European Union (EU) on data and consumer protection.3 Recent years have seen the creation of legal frameworks in Europe which seek to secure the protection of consumers while simultaneously facilitating economic growth in the European Union. This chapter will outline the main sources of law which protect consumers and their privacy. This chapter will outline the important provisions in these sources of law and critically analyse them. The chapter will also point up the gaps and deficiencies in the consumer and data protection legal structures.

consumer protectIon There is a need for commercial law to respond to the challenges posed by technology and the means

by which technology has affected commerce. There is a specific need for law to respond to the challenges posed by e-commerce. The proliferation of the Internet and the expansion in the use

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

of e-mail has become increasingly important for business in terms of the sale of goods and services and also in terms of marketing. It is well recognised that e-commerce has the possibility of bringing major benefits to consumers. In particular, e-commerce has the potential to promote competition among suppliers of goods and services. It also has the possibility of permitting businesses to build up new mutually beneficial relationships with consumers. From a European perspective, there is a possibility for consumers and service providers to benefit from an internal market and cross border business transactions. Despite these beneficial possibilities, new challenges and risks for consumer exist. In particular, there is a concern with protecting consumers who are increasingly engaged in cross-border business transactions. The law must endeavour to adapt to a medium which is not limited by frontiers. This throws up many problems such as the choice of jurisdiction in the case of an online consumer contract between two countries. Another challenge identified by the European Commission for e-commerce is that there is a trust issue faced in achieving brand recognition by consumers and a problem for businesses becoming commercially viable and sustainable.4 The onward march of globalisation and new markets has left political and legal systems both at a national and international level struggling to adapt their laws to them. The new regulatory framework established by the EU for e-commerce is an important step at a regional level to ensure that the law keeps apace with these developments (Wahab, 2004).

the europeAn unIon And legIslAtIve InItIAtIve The European Union (EU) has become the driving force for the initiation of policy development in many diverse areas for its member states. Data and consumer protection are cogent examples of this. The concept of European Union can be con-

fusing, therefore it is perhaps best at this point to describe the method by which the EU can direct this change. The EU was created as recently as 1993 by the Treaty on European Union. The EU is an overarching entity which contains three-pillars, the pre-existing European community (EC) pillar, the justice and home affairs pillar and the common foreign policy and security policy pillar.5 The concept of a common market is a fundamental aim of the European Union and its policies have been heavily influenced by this. Under Article 211 EC, the European Commission has been given extensive powers such as its right of legislative initiative to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market. There are three modes of community lawmaking employed by the commission: regulations, directives, and decisions for a more lengthy discussion on community law-making (Craig & de Búrca, 2003). Regulations are binding upon and are directly applicable in all member states. Directives may not be applicable to all member states and are binding only on the end to be achieved and leave flexibility with the member states on the mode by which this “end” is achieved. Decisions are binding in their entirety on those to whom they are addressed under Article 249 (ex Article 189) EC. The European Union has provided a legal framework for e-commerce. The creation of this framework through a series of directives tied in with the goal of creating a European single market (Directive 2000/31/EC [2000] O.J. L178/1 and Directive 1999/93/EC [1999] O.J. L13/12). The rationale of the European Commission in bringing forward these directives was to inspire confidence in e-commerce. These directives were introduced to facilitate the development and expansion of e-commerce and the content of these directives do not limit or restrict e-commerce (Keller & Murray, 1999; Anassutzi, 2002). These directives primarily dealt with the following issues:



The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

• • •

The legal status of electronic contracts and digital signatures The legal liability of intermediary service providers The freedom to provide services

Essentially, the E-commerce Directive 2000/31/EC sought to establish a structure in which providers of e-services would be free to provide such services throughout the European community. The 1998 directives provide that a service provider will not be legally liable. The E-commerce directive under Article 9 requires member states to ensure that their domestic laws permit contracts to be completed online. As a result of this, contracts can be concluded electronically and will have legal effect in all member states of the European Union. The directives from the EU aimed also at promoting confidence in e-commerce. Measures specifically aimed at promoting confidence include a requirement on service providers to formally acknowledge a consumer’s order under this provision is contained under Articles 5 and 6 of the E-commerce Directive. The directive requires that the service provider acknowledgement be electronic and requires that it must be issued without delay. These measures complement consumer protections set out in the 1997 Distance Selling Directive and other EC regulations on commercial law. The European framework for e-commerce is still developing in Europe and as such there are still fundamental questions that need to be answered.

e-commerce And the europeAn unIon The European Union has had a policy of promoting and developing e-commerce. The rationale for this policy has been to make the European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. 8

The European Commission produced Directive 2000/31/EC in 2000, which established the basic legal framework for electronic commerce in the internal market. This directive removed obstacles to cross border online services in the European Union. Importantly, the directive also provided legal certainty to business and citizens of the European Union. The European Commission introduced the directive with a view to creating a legal framework that ensures: •

•

•

•

•

That the information society services benefit from internal market principles of free movement of services and freedom of establishment in an enlarged European Union; Monitoring and following up of Directive 2000/31/EC (including regular reports on its application); The correct implementation of the directive by new and existing member states and application of the legal framework for electronic commerce as provided by Directive 2000/31/EC; Appropriate following up of complaints concerning information society services; and General monitoring of legal, technical, and economic developments of electronic commerce and the Internet.

The EU has also recognised that there is a need for dispute resolution for what effectively is a new means of commerce. As Rule (2002) notes, alternative dispute resolution or online dispute resolution has been viewed as a more cost effective means to deal with Internet disputes similar to endeavours of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Emphasising the need to build consumer confidence in e-commerce, the EU Commission has worked on developing European extra-judicial network (EEJ-Net), an umbrella group linking all pre-existing ADR systems in individual member states. The advantages of ADR based solution

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

for online contracts were also recognised by the OECD.

e-commerce dIrectIve It was recognised in the mid 1990s that the Internet, which was once only accessible to a privileged few, was becoming increasingly popular as a means of communication and of doing business. The challenge for the EU was to design a regulatory framework which would protect parties doing business online but also to enable EU citizens to take advantage of new markets making the EU a true knowledge-based economy. See European Commission, Directorate General Press and Communication (2002) “Towards a knowledge-based Europe.” The need for a regulatory framework for ecommerce was first officially recognised in 1997 when the commission adopted its communication “A European initiative on electronic commerce” by the IP/97/313 (16/04/1997). Single market principles were recognised as being central to the continued growth and regulation of the sector, to ensure maximum efficiency and certainty. The commission identified four key areas where action should be taken. Firstly it was recognised that there would need to be standardised systems and upgraded technological infrastructure within the EU. Secondly, perhaps most importantly, single market principles were found to be integral to any future regulatory framework in the area. Thus the fundamental freedoms such as the free movement of goods, services, people, capital, and the freedom of established would guide any future developments in the area. Therefore, it was made clear that single market principles would be “grafted” on to the emerging Internet market and would govern the variety of important issues such as: distance selling, data protection, electronic signatures, and electronic payments. Importantly, it was also stated that the need for an analogous

international regulatory framework would need to be explored, in a way that would reflect the needs of EU member states. To this end, the Electronic Commerce Directive which was adopted in 2001 established an internal market framework for electronic commerce.6 The directive established harmonised rules on issues such as the transparency and information requirements for online service providers, commercial communications, electronic contracts, and limitations of liability of intermediary service providers.

the InternAl mArket And the ‘country of orIgIn’ prIncIple Article 3 (2) of the E-commerce Directive ensures that the freedom to provide service extends to the provision of information society services: “Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide information society services from another member state.” The E-commerce Directive establishes a country of origin rule for regulation of the provision of online services within the EU. These services have been defined as “information society services,” which covers a wide variety of economic services: “any service normally provided for remuneration at a distance by electronic means at a distance and at the individual request of a recipient of services” (Article 2 of the directive refers to the definitions in Article 1(2) of the earlier directives 98/34/EC and 98/84/EC). Article 3 elaborates on the country of origin rule for the regulation of the provision of information society services: “Each member state shall ensure that the information society services provided by a service provider established on its territory comply with the national provisions applicable in the member state in question which fall within the coordinated field.” Essentially, it means that the providers of such services will

9

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

only be subject to the rules applicable in their own home country. This has important practical effects as it avoids the inevitable confusion which could ensue if providers of these services had to be wary of the applicability of diverse laws and compliance with different standards. Importantly, the “country of origin” principle is not a fundamental principle of EU law, it is not present in primary or secondary sources of law and was first enumerated in the in the Television without Frontiers Directive, 1989 (89/552/EEC) was limited to certain areas of TV advertising. The term “coordinated field” is an important one, essentially meaning the requirements an information service provider must comply within its specific area of expertise such as: “qualifications, authorisation, or notification,” in addition to other requirements such as the behaviour of the service provider and stipulations as to quality or content (Article 2(h)(i)). This principle has the important effect that if service providers are bound only to the regulations applicable in their home state, there is a greater incentive to harmonise such regulations within the internal market. Hornle (2005) elaborates that the principle may lead to greater “coherence” of the internal market as it requires cross-border cooperation in enforcement as the home country must cooperate with the country of destination. It should be noted that, as in many areas of EU law and policy, member states may derogate from the prohibition on restricting the freedom to provide information services from another member state and may take measures to derogate if certain conditions are fulfilled under Article 3(4). Such derogations cover diverse concerns such as public policy and public health, it must be noted that in keeping with European Court of Justice case-law, the directive requires that these measures must be proportionate to their objective under Article 3(4)(a)(i). Importantly, the protection of consumers, including investors is recognised as an objective which could lead to such derogation. Thus, if it is

0

believed by the country of destination that it has a higher standard of protection regarding online gambling than that of another member state, then a derogation may be permitted (if deemed proportionate) in the protection of consumers. Others believe that ultimately the directive is a political compromise and may be difficult for lawyers to work with in reality. The exception of online consumer contracts from the directive means that a maze of pre-existing rules covers the choice of jurisdiction in this area. It became clear that greater simplification was needed with the increase in e-contracts; this led to the promulgation of the Jurisdiction Regulation in 2000.

the JurIsdIctIon regulAtIon And the ‘country of destInAtIon’ prIncIple The E-commerce Directive laid down a framework for future regulation and thus may be termed public law as it does not cover private law issues such as consumer contracts. To this end, the EU approved the Jurisdiction Regulation in December 2000. The regulation replaces and expands on the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Foreign Judgments. This convention had as its aim to ensure that nationals of member states could ensure that the rules guaranteeing the enforcement of judgments of awards would be simplified. This was important to strengthening the internal market by ensuring greater uniformity jurisdiction rules including consumer contracts. • Article 15 of the regulation essentially provides that the consumer may avail of the laws of his member state and consequently may be sued in that member state. Article 15(3) extends this to contracts conducted through the Internet. • Article 16(1) of the regulation importantly provides that the consumer may avail of the laws of the member state in which he is

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

domiciled or the member state in which the other party is domiciled. • Article 17 provides that these provisions may be departed from by an agreement of both parties. This agreement can be entered into after the dispute has arisen, or if both parties are domiciled/habitually resident in the same member state, jurisdiction may be conferred on the courts of that member state. Gillies (2001) pointed out that the EU has upheld the traditional view that consumers are the weaker party by allowing them to avail of the laws of their own jurisdiction. This concern is echoed in recital 13 of the regulation: In relation to insurance, consumer contracts and employment, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules provide for. Correspondingly, the regulation places an obligation on businesses who conduct their commercial activities online within the EU to comply with the laws of all member states. Business organisations claimed during the intensive discussions prior to the approval of the regulation that this was effectively placing a huge administrative burden on small-medium sized businesses to ensure that they were conducting their affairs in accordance with the laws of 15 different member states (Wallis, 1999). However, as Oren (2003) notes, any individual conducting commercial cross-border transactions must take account of the differing laws in other states and there is no compelling reason why e-commerce should be any different. Critics of the regulation, such as Motion (2001) claim that the “country of origin” and “country of destination” principles are conflicting in the special case of consumer contracts, meaning that businesses must be aware of the risks in doing business with nationals of other member states.

The complexity which currently exists between the Jurisdiction Regulation and the E-commerce Directive highlight the differences between personal and state cyberspace jurisdiction (Zekios, 2007). Cyberspace is a complex net of individuals and communities which transcend boundaries and affects territorial, state, and individual autonomy. The tension between state and personal jurisdiction is clear from the tangle of rules concerning jurisdiction in relation to e-contracts in the EU.

busIness conducted vIA A Web sIte The E-commerce Directive lays down important rules governing the information to be provided by the seller to the consumer on a website prior to purchase: • The various steps the consumer must take in order to place an order and when a contract is completed; • How the terms and conditions of the supplier can be accepted and retained by the consumer; • How the consumer can identify and rectify any technical errors; and • A receipt must be sent to the consumer on completion of the contract.

electronIc sIgnAtures dIrectIve The Electronic Signatures Directive 1999/93/E.C., a community framework for electronic signatures, addresses the problems associated with the legal status of electronic signatures by permitting certification service providers to establish without advance authorisation and to act as a third party in certifying the authenticity of a digital signature under Article 3 of the directive.



The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

The stated aim of the directive is to “promote the proper functioning of the internal market.” The recognition of electronic signature has important legal, technical, and commercial dimensions and any legislation required careful consideration. As Walden (2001) suggests, the directive forms an important addition to the EU’s e-regulation architecture, ensuring legal certainty which is integral to the development of e-commerce in any jurisdiction. As a result of Article 5 of the directive, the domestic law of the different member states of the European Union has been harmonised to ensure equivalence between hand written and digital signatures and Article 5 permits the use of these digital signatures based on certifications as evidence in legal proceedings. Member States are required to ensure the following under the directive: • The provision of certification services does not require prior authorisation, but remains subject to supervision by a relevant body; • The secure signature creation devices comply with and conform to the requirements set out in the directive and to be controlled by appropriate public or private bodies in each member state; • Equivalent legal status between electronic and hand-written signatures; • The admissibility of electronic signatures as evidence in legal proceedings; • Certification service providers are liable for damage caused to any entity, legal, or natural person who relies on such certificate; and • Certification service providers must comply with all data protection laws.

future chAllenges To become binding within individual member states, the directives must be transposed into



national law. The nature of a directive leaves flexibility to individual member states to transpose the contents of a directive into law in a matter which suits its traditions and legal system best. In Ireland, the Electronic Commerce Act 2000 (No. 27 of 2000) implemented the Electronic Signatures Directive and a number of provisions contained in the E-Commerce Directive. The greater bulk of the provisions of the E-Commerce Directive were transposed into law by the European Communities (Directive 2000/31/EC) Regulations 2003. These regulations are enforced by the data protection commissioner and director of consumer affairs in Ireland. The Irish approach is a “lightregulatory approach” and this is regarded by the government as the best method to regulation in Ireland (Colgan, 2003). The 10 new member states began transposition prior to their accession into the EU. Poland, for example, passed an act on July 18, 2002 relating to the provision of services by electronic means. The transposition of directive into the law of all the member states of a larger EU is an important development for the future growth of e-commerce in the EU. This harmonisation ensures a large and efficient “e-market” in the EU. However, it has been recognised that the same perceived flaws remain in the legislation as were identified with the directive as the transposing law, though flexibility must remain faithful to the directive’s provisions (Kryczka, 2004). Therefore, if there are problems with the E-commerce Directive, at least they are uniform and therefore can be addressed by a review if it is thought it is required in the future. It is clear from the legal framework that has been constructed for e-commerce in the EU that the focus has been to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, competitiveness, and economic growth in Europe. While this is important, there needs to be a greater emphasis placed on consumers and the protection that they are afforded.

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

sub conclusIon The directives discussed here constitute an important contribution to the overall e-regulation architecture. The transposition of the directives into the national laws of member states enhances the harmonisation of the rules governing e-commerce in Europe. This is vital to the European economy of both the more established member states and the new accession member states. There is considerable unease that common law principles are being squeezed out in favour of civil law principles in this new application of law to e-commerce. Roebuck contends that a greater notice should be taken of common law approaches as they are always more trade friendly than their civil law counterparts (Roebuck, 2002). Flexibility remains important and it is feared that heightened legislative activity may inhibit this. A strong regulatory scheme which is flexible is important for consumer confidence. However, certain commentators have found that the exception of consumer contracts from the “country of origin” principle difficult to justify (Moerel, 2001). However, as is so often the case with resolutions adopted between states, a certain amount of political compromise is needed which lawyers may find difficult to work in practice. Ultimately, e-commerce is of a global nature and the success of the EU venture points to the greater need for a global answer to a global regulatory problem.

dAtA protectIon Consumers traditionally have been able to shop anonymously with little or no intrusion into their private lives. However, shopping online requires consumers to divulge much more personal information than was required in the past. Even where consumers are merely enquiring about goods and services, they may be required to provide

personal data. While this requirement to divulge information is normally justifiable, there are situations where consumers reveal information unnecessarily. Legislation aimed at protecting the personal data of citizens in Europe has emerged as a response to concerns with how commercial and governmental agencies use personal data. The law relating to data protection is often extremely technical and overly complicated.7 Understanding the law in relation to data protection presents challenges for consumers, businesses, and government agencies. Despite the presence of a number of key harmonising directives from the European Commission, the law still remains confusing.8 The law on data protection in Europe is particularly puzzling, due to the distinctive nature of European Union law and fast paced developments.9 This chapter is going to discuss the main sources of law relating to data protection in Europe the most important of which is the Data Protection Directive 1995.10

the councIl of europe The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 and is a separate organisation to the European Union. The council seeks to develop in Europe common and democratic principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights and texts on the protection of individuals.11 The Council of Europe has played an important role in protecting the personal data Europeans. The Council of Europe’s European Convention of Human Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data have been influential in developing the law on data protection in Europe.



The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

the rIght to prIvAcy: ArtIcle 8 of the europeAn conventIon on humAn rIghts And fundAmentAl freedoms (echr) Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) established that “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence.”12 This right under Article 8 of the ECHR can only be restricted by a public authority in accordance with domestic law of a country and only in so far as it is necessary for the defence of a legitimate objective.13 The protection for privacy provided for under Article 8 is an important source of law in relation to data protection, particularly as all European states are signed up to the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights has given a usefully broad interpretation to Article 8 of the convention and this has been an important factor in influencing states to ensure an adequate level of protection of privacy in their national laws.14

councIl of europe conventIon for the protectIon of IndIvIduAls WIth regArd to AutomAtIc processIng of personAl dAtA 198115 This convention drew inspiration from the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, the convention was inspired by Article 8. The Council of Europe, through these guidelines established a structure of precise principles and norms which were aimed at preventing the unjust compilation and processing of personal data. This work culminated in the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data. This



convention required contracting states to make changes in the domestic law of their country so as to give effect in law to the principles relating to personal data. The principles contained within the convention relate mainly to: • Promoting fair and lawful collection and automatic processing of data; • Storage of data for specified legitimate purposes and not for ends incompatible with those purposes; • The retention of data for no longer than is necessary; • The confidentiality of sensitive data; and • The right of access and rectification of information. This convention, drafted in 1981, has been overtaken to some degree by technological developments. Technological developments have generally resulted in benefits for consumers and members of society in their ability to become as the Council of Europe phrases it “active agent(s) of the information society.”16 However, these developments have created new concerns particularly in relation to privacy and the greater interference by the “information systems of numerous public and private services—banks, credit services, social security, social assistance, insurance, police, and medical care.” The convention, while not legally enforceable, established a number of principles, which have been influential in the development of data protection law in Europe. However, as these principles are not legally binding, variation resulted in the laws on data privacy through out Europe. In addition, the challenges posed by technological developments have necessitated a more systematic system for ensuring privacy in Europe. The Council of Europe has noted since the 1960s that “rapid progress in the field of electronic data processing and the first appearance of main frames allowed public administrations and big

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

enterprises to set up extensive data banks and to improve and increase the collection, processing and interlinking of personal data.” The Council of Europe has not amended the convention or created many new protocols to deal with technological developments. Rather, the council has opted to produce recommendations to deal with new challenges. This approach is preferred by the council as these recommendations are easier to draft and to adopt. While these recommendations are not legally binding on member states, they do however, set down standards of reference for all member states, whether they are parties to the convention or not. The recommendations from the Council of Europe in data protection are useful in that they request a state to consider the possibility of expanding and implementing domestic law in compliance with internationally agreed interpretation of the principles set down in the convention. This is an effective means of promoting better regulation in Europe ensuring that gaps and deficiencies in data protection laws are remedied.

oecd guIdelInes on the protectIon of prIvAcy And trAnsborder floWs of personAl dAtA 1980 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established in 1961 is composed of governments who are committed to democracy and the market economy. Among the aims of the OECD are supporting sustainable economic growth, assisting countries in economic development, and contributing to world trade. The OECD published Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data in (OECD, 1980). These guidelines represented and continue to represent intercontinental consensus on regulation relating to the compilation and administration of personal information. The OECD guidelines have been

important and continue to be important in assisting European governments, businesses, and consumer agencies in protecting the privacy of personal data. The guidelines are also important in preventing needless restrictions to transborder data flows, both online and off-line. The guidelines were aimed at addressing unnecessary restrictions on data flows by providing a means of harmonising the laws of different countries. The OECD guidelines have been influential not only in the development of privacy protection in Europe and but also throughout the world.

dAtA protectIon dIrectIve 95/46/ec The Data Protection Directive was introduced in 1995 with the aim of harmonising the data protection laws within the European Union. (Member states of the European Union were given 3 years in which to implement the provisions of the directive into their national law). Essentially, the directive facilitates the movement of data throughout the EU, while simultaneously affording EU citizens a higher standard of protection in the domestic law of the EU state that they were resident in. The Data Protection Directive 1995 relates only to computerised files containing personal data. Under the directive, data which is not processed automatically still come under the scope of the directive as long as the data forms part of a filing system. It is important to note that the directive does not apply to activities, which are outside the remit of EU law. All member states of the European Union including the newer member states have enacted data protection laws in their domestic law, which give effect to the provisions of the 1995 directive. The 1995 directive has been complemented by Directive 2002/58/EC, which is known as the directive on privacy and electronic communications. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has interpreted the scope of the Data Protection Directive widely



The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

in its case law, see for example, the Lindqvist decision, C-101/01 [2003] ECR I- 6041]. The Data Protection Directive increased regulation with respect to the processing of data and the transferring of data outside the EU. The Data Protection Directives set out clear and readily understandable principles about how personal data ought to be handled. The most significant result of this directive is that it has given people rights to challenge mishandling of their data. The directive has removed obstacles to the flow of data through out the European Union. For example, businesses no longer face the difficulties previously encountered in transferring data relating to employees from one member state to another member state. The European Data Protection Directive 1995 contains general provisions aimed at ensuring that “data subjects” are informed of their rights regarding data protection. The following are some of the more relevant articles of the directive: • Article 6(1)(a) requires that personal data be processed “fairly and lawfully;” • Article 7 sets out a number of conditions that need to be complied with before personal data can be legally processed;17 • Article 8 prohibits the processing of data which reveals a data subjects ethnicity, religious beliefs, political beliefs, membership of a trade union, criminal record, health, and sex life (unless exemptions exist); • Article 10 outlines the minimum information that must be provided to the data subject in cases when the data is collected directly from him or her; • Article 11 outlines the minimum information that must be provided to the data subject in cases when data about him or her is collected from a third party; and • Article 14 requires that data subjects are informed before personal data is disclosed to third parties.18



InternAtIonAl dAtA trAnsfers The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC introduced the principle that member states should transfer data outside of the EU to a non member states only where adequate protection is provided. The European Commission plays a particularly important role in terms of international data transfers. The commission decides whether a country outside the EU offers an adequate level of data protection and approves the contracts for data transfers. Article 25 of the directive empowers member states and the commission to determine the level of legal protection in another state. Importantly, Article 25 of the directive also sets out clearly the criteria for assessing the adequacy of protection in a country outside the EU.19 Under Article 25 of the directive it is necessary to make a decision in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation. Article 25(2) requires particular consideration to be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation, and the country of origin and country of final destination. The rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that country are also required to be considered under Article 25(2). When the directive was first published there were concerns that the restrictions on the flow of data to countries outside of the European Union would restrict the development of an “information superhighway.” However, it is now generally accepted that the safeguards on data flows outside of the EU have not restricted unnecessarily data flows. Indeed, the transposition of the directive into the laws of the member states of the EU has encouraged countries outside of the European Union to adopt best data protection practice and to ensure the operation of adequate data protection laws in their country.

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

Nevertheless, there still is much criticism of the European Data Protection Directive by businesses, suggesting that the directive does not facilitate business and the needs of e-commerce. In the Lindqvist decision, the ECJ took a restrictive view of what constituted a transfer of data outside the EU. The ECJ held in that case that the placing of an item on a Web site did not amount to a transfer, even though anybody could access the Web site internationally. This decision has been the focus of much criticism.

ImplementAtIon of the dAtA protectIon dIrectIve 95/46/ec As already discussed, it is the responsibility of member states to give legal effect to the Data Protection Directive 1995. The significant provisions of the directives are, however, contained in the law of the individual EU member states. Problems have inevitably arisen in the transposition of the Data Protection Directive into the domestic law of the different member states of the European Union.20 A further difficulty arises in that many aspects of data protection laws are derived from administrative practices and informal customs which are not in written form (Kuner, 2007). This is the case with the implementation of the Data Protection Directive. In particular, the different enforcement practices in different member states have given rise to confusion and legal uncertainty from one EU member state to another.21 The European Commission published a report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive 1995. This report also sets out a work programme for the better implementation of the Data Protection Directive. It is clear from this report that levels of effective enforcement vary widely in the EU, particularly in the some of the newer member states. The most recent Flash Eurobarometer 2003 Survey of company practices indicated clearly that compliance with the current information requirements is problematic. The

survey demonstrated that there is not constant compliance with data protection legislation. For example, the survey reported that companies do not provide individuals with the information to which they are legally entitled. Research has demonstrated that only 37% of companies reported that they systematically provided data subjects with the identity of the data controller and only 46% said they always informed data subjects of the purposes for which the data would be used (see Article 29, Working Party Opinion). However, the Eurobarometer Survey indicated that larger companies were more likely to provide the required information than smaller businesses. The main thrust of the most recent European Commission report on the implementation of the Data Protection Directive demonstrates that EU law is achieving its main aims. In particular, the report suggested that the 1995 Data Protection Directive has broadly achieved the aim of ensuring strong protection for privacy while making it easier for personal data to be moved around the EU. The report did point up the late implementation by member states of the directive. The report was critical also of differences in the ways the directive is applied at national level. The European Commission suggested that this restricted the European economy from benefiting fully from the directive.

dAtA protectIon AgencIes In europe Most countries in the European Union have created an office charged with ensuring compliance with data protection laws. For example, the information commissioner’s office is the data protection body for the United Kingdom, while the data protection commissioner’s office is the relevant body in Ireland.22 Complaints, problems, and queries in relation to data protection are increasingly being directed to these bodies. As the Council of Europe has noted, these bodies play an “integral part of



The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

the control system in a democratic society.” Complaints to these data protection agencies will result in an investigation into the complaint and action by the agency to address the complaint. These data protection agencies maintain a register which provides general information about data handling practices of many important data controllers. Organisations such as government departments, financial institutions, and organisations who maintain sensitive types of personal data are included on this register. These data protection agencies have an important role in protecting consumers from excessive collection of personal data. For example, the Irish data protection commissioner publishes case studies of where his office takes action against different institutions, including financial institutions for collection of excessive amounts of personal data. These case studies are illustrative and easily understandable and are a good source of information for people who have concerns. As already mentioned, Article 29 the Data Protection Directive 1995 established a working party. Under Article 29(2) the membership of the working party is made up of the data protection commissioners from the different European Union member states along with a representative of the European Commission. The involvement of these data protection agencies in the working party means that problems encountered by these agencies in monitoring the application and operation of the data protection laws are formally filtered back to the European Commission. The working party advises the European Commission on the levels of data protection measures in place in countries outside the European Union. The European Commission benefits from the advice of these European data protection agencies. This is beneficial as these bodies often deal with complaints regarding the processing of personal information outside of the European Union. These data protection agencies have demonstrated their ability to ensure compliance with the law. Recent examples of this include a raid by

8

the Irish data protection commissioner’s office on businesses involved in the cell phone marketing sector. The commissioner took action following a large amount of complaints from members of the public. The data protection commissioner seized large volumes of documents from these companies with a view to prosecution of companies that sent unsolicited communications to subscribers and who failed to comply with their obligations regarding privacy. The information commissioner in the United Kingdom has been also proactive according to its annual report and is increasingly taking legal action against businesses who fail to comply with consumer and data protection legislation. Section 55 of the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 makes it an offence to obtain, disclose, or procure the disclosure of personal information knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the organisation holding the information. Under the Data Protection Act 1998, a conviction under Section 55 of the Act can result in a fine of up to £5000 in the magistrates court and an unlimited fine in the crown court. The information commissioner in 2006 recommended that the penalty for prosecution of the offence under Section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 be amended. The amendment proposed by the commissioner would see the introduction of a prison sentence on indictment of up to a maximum of 2 years or a fine, or both. A conviction or a prison sentence of up to 6 months or a fine, or both for a summary conviction was also recommended by the commissioner.23 Such a change in the law would be welcome and would provide the UK information commissioner with real teeth in terms of pursuing persons and organisations who fail to comply with the United Kingdom data protection laws. Moreover, the down to business approach of the UK commissioner in seeking stronger legal penalties for breach of the data protection laws demonstrates a tenacity in the approach of the commissioner’s office in promoting a culture of respect and legal compliance with the processing of personal data.

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

It is clear from the reports from the data protection agencies that there is a significant illegal trade in confidential personal information. As the UK information commissioner suggests, this demonstrates the need for a strong deterrent and greater attentiveness to the law control by organisations. The action taken by the Irish and UK data protection bodies sends a strong signal to businesses that violate the data protection laws. The call by the UK information commissioner also demonstrates the need for European Union member states to review their laws to ensure that the criminal sanctions for breach of the data protection law are sufficient to deter commercial entities (and other data controllers) for illegally processing personal data.

prIvAcy notIces Privacy statements inform online consumers how their personal information will be used by the company from which they purchase goods and services and it thus an important source of protection.24 However, there has been much criticism about the effectiveness of these privacy notices, particularly as these notices are presented in a convoluted way, using language which is unnecessarily technical and legal. This issue has been raised by Consumers International in a study published in 2007. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (which was set up under Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive. The working party is an independent EU advisory body, whose remit is in the area of data protection and privacy) issued direction on corporate privacy notices in 2004. This concept of multi layered privacy notices is important as such notices can effect improvements in the quality of information received by consumers on data protection. It does this, as the working party pointed out, by focusing on the information that the individual needs to understand their position and to make decisions. The working party called for layered and easily readable privacy statements

on Web sites. While this direction is not legally binding upon businesses, it has resulted in many businesses in Europe adopting the best practice suggested by the working party. Among the principles set out by the working party include the suggestion that information provided to data subjects should use language and layout that is easy to understand. The concept of comprehension is important because as the working party point out as it will allow a data subject to make informed decisions and have the knowledge and understanding to influence the practices of data controllers and processors. The working party also pointed out that it was important to ensure that the information is also given in an appropriate manner, so that it meets the needs of children for example. There is no obligation on any member states of the European Union to realise these standards in their domestic laws. The guidance on privacy notices set out by the working party if set in law certainly could play a role in better informing consumers about how their personal data will be used.

consumer protectIons As Fielder (2002) pointed out, despite the creation of data protection laws throughout the EU through the Data Protection Directive 1995, research demonstrates that there is still “widespread neglect of good privacy practice and lack of compliance with data protection legislation.” This has obvious and serious implications for consumers, and is particularly concerning due to the continuing growth and availability of more sophisticated data collection technology. In 2004 the European Commission published a report entitled “Commission Staff Working Document, Consumer Confidence in E-Commerce: lessons learned from the e-confidence initiative Brussels” which examined consumer confidence in e-commerce. The report identified that com-

9

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

petitiveness within the European economy is a key priority for the European Union and that consumer protection helps to ensure competitiveness in the European economy. This is important from a consumer protection point of view as the creation of good consumer protection rules and systems have been given attention by the European Commission, which aims to “strengthen consumer confidence in the functioning of the market” (Report, European Commission, 2004). Consumers who lack confidence in the workings of the market and who lack confidence in how they are protected in their member state will be unwilling to make significant purchases in other EU states. As e-commerce is particularly affected by lack of confidence, there is a need for national governments and the European Commission to promote consumer confidence by ensuring that the current laws on data protection are effective and by responding to emerging challenges posed by technological innovation. The Council of Europe created “Data Protection Day” on the January 28, which has been supported by the European Commission. The date for “Data Protection Day” was chosen to mark the date of signature of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. This event will be held on a European wide basis with the aim of informing people about their personal data rights. This is an important type of initiative, which can play an important role in empowering citizens of the European Union and informing them as to their rights regarding the use of their personal data. As the vice-president of the European Commission noted, it is of paramount importance that EU citizens are aware of their rights as every time they surf the Internet, make travel arrangements, use their credit card, and receive medical treatment they supply personal information which if misused could result in a serious invasion of privacy (Frattini, 2007).

0

future developments It is clear that data protection agencies have an important role to play in ensuring that the data protection legislation achieves its goals. In this regard, the publication of research which highlights international difficulties with data protection is paramount. Of course this will be contingent upon adequate funding which will permit these agencies to produce this work. Consumer literacy in terms of data protection will also form a key component in realising the data protection principles set out in the Data Protection Directive 1995. An important component of ensuring the protection of personal data is the availability of adequate training for businesses and data holders. It is essential that businesses know the law and are provided with incentives for protecting personal data and processing the data in accordance with the law. It is important also that businesses are provided with model privacy policies. Policies which are concise and readily understandable could be effective tools in promoting a culture of respect and further compliance with the data protection laws through out Europe. Significant also will be the increased availability of fast and effective redress for consumers and data subjects where there is infringement of their rights under the data protection laws. These issues require consideration and action by the European Commission and national European governments.

sub conclusIon Recent years have seen a rise in concern with how personal data is handled. These concerns have resulted in the introduction of data protection laws which aim at guaranteeing that personal data is handled appropriately. However, the creation of these legal rights and legal protections will only

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

stem the misuse of personal data if people know about the law and their rights and know how to access legal protections. The European Commission has been somewhat proactive in promoting knowledge about data protection and the rights of data users. However, it is clear that more needs to be done to ensure that citizens of the European Union are equipped with the necessary knowledge to ensure that their personal data is treated with respect and in accordance with law. The free flow of personal information throughout the European Union is crucial to almost all forms of economic activity in the European Union. The challenge for the European Commission, national governments, consumer agencies, and national data protection agencies is to keep the law and technological innovations under review and respond to threats to the privacy of consumers. To a large extent the European Commission’s proactive approach has been successful in monitoring the EU legislation and engaging with consumers and interest groups. However, as research has demonstrated, there is still the hugely important issue of compliance with the directive, which requires much work from some EU states. The Data Protection Directive has been successful in promoting the easier flow of information within the European Union. However, the focus now needs to be on ensuring greater compliance with the law, particularly from businesses who have benefited from the free flow of data.

conclusIon The legal frameworks that have been constructed to protect consumers and their privacy are not perfect, many gaps, deficiencies, and short comings still exist. However, the legal framework constructed does provide the foundation for the development of laws in Europe, which will be responsive and effective in protecting consumers from unethical processing and use of their personal data and from exploitative business

practices. The European Commission and European governments need to keep the law under review to ensure that it responds and evolves to protect consumers. Consumer rights agencies and data protection agencies will increasingly have a role to play in ensuring that consumers and data subjects are aware of their legal rights and are empowered to assert them.

references Anassutzi, M. (2002). E-commerce directive 00/31. International Company and Commercial Law Review, 13(9), 337-342. Brazell, L. (2004). Electronic signatures law and regulation (1st ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell. Colgan, N. (2003) Ireland: Electronic commerce directive—implementation into Irish law. International Trade Law and Regulation, 9(2). Corbett, R. (1993). The treaty of Maastricht. London: Longman. Craig, P., & de Búrca, G. (2007) EU law text cases & materials (4th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Ellis, H. (2004). Modern Irish commercial and consumer law. London: Jordan Publishing. Fielder, A. (2002). Better compliance: guidance, enforcement & self-regulation. Paper presented at the Data Protection Conference and Report on the implementation of Directive 95/46/EC, 2002. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://ec.europa. eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/lawreport/ fielder_en.pdf Gillies, L. (2001). A review of the new jurisdiction rules for electronic consumer contracts within the European Union. Journal of Information Law and Technology (1). Hornle, J. (2005). Country of origin regulation in cross-border media: one step beyond the freedom



The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

to provide services? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 54, 89-126. Johnson, D., & Post, D. (1996). Law and borders—the rise of law in cyberspace. 48 Stanford Law Review, 1367. Keller & Murray, (1999). IT law in the European Union. London: Sweet and Maxwell. Kryczka, K. (2004). Ready to join the EU information society? Implementation of e-commerce directive 2000/31/EC in the EU acceding countries—the example of Poland. International Journal of Law & Information Technology, 12, 55. Kuner, C. (2007). European data protection law: Corporate regulation and compliance. USA: Oxford University Press. Moerel, L. (2001). The ‘country of origin’ principle in the e-commerce directive: the expected one stop shop. Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 7(7), 184-190. Motion, P. (2001). The Brussels regulation and e-commerce a premature solution to a fictional problem. Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 7(8), 209-215. Mowbray, A. (2007). Cases and materials on the European convention on human rights (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. Oren, J. S. T. (2003). International jurisdiction over consumer contracts in e-Europe. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52, 665. Roebuck, W. (2002). Jurisdiction and e-commerce. Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 8(2), 29-32. Rule, C. (2002). Online dispute resolution for business. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Schellekens, M. H. M. (2004). Privacy and electronic signatures: are they compatible? Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 10(7), 182-186.



Wahab, M. (2004). Globalisation and ODR: dynamics of change in e-commerce dispute settlement. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 12(1), 123-152. Walden, I. (2001). Regulating e-commerce: Europe in the global e-conomy. European Law Review, 26(6), 529-547. Wallis, D. (1999) Report on the proposal for a council regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters. Committee on Legal Affairs in the Internal Market. COM (1999) 348 - C5-0169/1999 - 1999/0154 (CNS). White, R. C. A., & Ovey, C. (2006). Jacobs and White: The European convention on human rights (4th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Winn, J. K., & Wright, B. (2001). The law of electronic commerce. Aspen Publishers. Zekios, Dr., G. I. (2007). State cyberspace and personal cyberspace jurisdiction. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 15, 1-37.

press releAses And publIcAtIons Commission Staff Working Document, Consumer Confidence in E-Commerce: lessons learned from the e-confidence initiative Brussels, 8.11.2004, SEC (2004) 1390. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/ecommerce/e-conf_working_doc.pdf Consumers International, Credibility on the web: An international study of the credibility of consumer information on the internet. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www. consumersinternational.org/Shared_ASP_Files/ UploadedFiles/205F49EB-D048-43B0-A2B09596B2287BA5_Doc320.pdf

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

The Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968, OJ L299/32 1968. Retrieved 13 October, 2007, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:41968A0927(01):EN:HTML “Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 Dec 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.” Also known as the “Brussels 1 Regulation.” Retrieved October, 13 2007, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=CELEX:32001R0044:EN:HTML Directive 2000/31/EC. Retrieved October 11, 2007, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:EN:NOT Directives 98/34/EC and 98/84/EC. European Commission, Directorate General Press and Communication (2002). “Towards a knowledge-based Europe—the European Union and the information society.” Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://ec.europa.eu/publications/ booklets/move/36/en.pdf European Commission, The Special Eurobarometer Survey on Data Protection. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_196_en.pdf “First Report on the Implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC),” COM(2003) 265 final (Brussels, May 15, 2003). Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0265en01. pdf IP/97/313Date:16/04/1997. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/97/format=HTML&age d=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en “OECD Conference to Examine Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for On-Line Commerce.” The Hague, 11-12 December 2000.

Press Release “Data Protection Commissioner conducts “raids” on the Mobile Phone Text Marketing Sector”. Retrieved August 20, 2007, from http://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/press/ PR200707.doc “Statement from Vice-President Frattini, on behalf of the European Commission, on the occasion of Data Protection Day (28 January).” Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/format=HT ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (TVWF) Directive (89/552/EEC). “What Price Privacy Now” 2006, Information Commissioner’s Office. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/research_and_reports/ ico-wppnow-0602.pdf

sources of lAW Data Protection Act 1998 (UK). Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Directive 2002/58/EC Electronic Commerce Act, Number 27 of 2000 (Ireland). European Communities (Directive 2000/31/EC) Regulations 2003 S.I. No. 68 of 2003 (Ireland). European Convention on Human Rights and Additional Protocols is available from the Council of Europe’s Web site. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ EnglishAnglais.pdf OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www.oecd.org/ document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_ 1_1_1_1,00.html



The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

AddItIonAl reAdIng

endnotes

Börner, F., & Spindler, G. (2002). E-commerce law in Europe and the USA. Europe: Springer.

1

Bygrave, L. (2002). Data protection law—approaching its rationale, logic and Limits. Springer. Carey, P. (2007). Data protection: A practical guide to UK and EU law. Oxford University Press.

2

3

Chissick, M., & Kelman, A. (2002). Electronic commerce: Law and practice. Sweet & Maxwell. Delta, G. B., & Matsuura, J. H. (2001). Law of the internet. USA: Aspen Publishers Online. Doukidis, G. I., Mylonopoulos, N., & Pouloudi, N. (2004). Social and economic transformation in the digital era. Idea Group Inc (IGI). Lawrence, A. (2003). The law of e-commerce. LexisNexis. Nugter, A. (1990) Transborder flow of personal data within the EC. Springer. Plotkin, M. E., Wimmer, K. A., & Wells, B. (2003). E-commerce law & business. USA: Aspen Publishers Online. Reed, C., Angel, J. (2007). Computer law the law and regulation of information technology (6th ed.). Oxford University Press.

4

5

6

Schultz, A. (2006). Legal aspects of an e-commerce transaction. In Proceedings of the International Conference in Europe. Sellier: European Law Publishers. Singleton, S. (2003). E-commerce: A practical guide to the law. UK: Gower. Stein, S. D., (2003). Law on the web: A guide for students and practitioners. USA: Pearson Education.



7

*

Charles O’ Mahony B.A, LL.B (NUI), LL.M (Lond), LL.M (NUI) is a legal researcher for the Law Reform Commission of Ireland and is a senior tutor in law at University College Dublin. * Philip Flaherty BCL, LL.M (NUI), Diop sa Gh (NUI), is a legal researcher for the Law Reform Commission of Ireland. The European Union is a body of democratic European countries that work together. The European Union is a very unique organisation in that it is not a state or an organisation. The member states of the EU have common institutions to which the member states delegate some of their sovereignty. This is done to facilitate decisions on specific issues can be made. At the moment, the EU embraces 27 countries and 490 million people. More information about the organisation and structure of the EU can be obtained from http://www.europa.eu. For additional information see the European Commission’s Web site at: http://ec.europa. eu/consumers/cons_int/e-commerce/index_en.htm. For more information on the evolution of the European Union see Corbett, R. (1993). The treaty of Maastricht. London: Longman. The ambit of this directive is significant it includes online information services such as online newspapers, online selling of products and services (books, financial services and travel services), online advertising, professional services (lawyers, doctors, estate agents), entertainment services, and basic intermediary services (access to the Internet and transmission and hosting of information). For a general overview of the law on data protection see Kuner, C. (2007). European data protection law: Corporate regulation and compliance. USA: Oxford University Press.

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

8

9

10

11

The European Commission has a crucial role in terns of data protection in Europe. The commission is the only institution within the EU that proposes legislation (often in the form of directives) and the commission is also the institution that is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the data protection directives. Importantly, the commission also takes action against member states when they fail to properly transpose directives such as the Data Protection Directive 1995 into the domestic law of their country. This chapter is not going to consider the differences between the United States and Europe in their approach to data protection. It is sufficient to say here that there the U.S. and the EU have adopted different approaches to data protection. The United States has adopted a type of sectoral approach to data protection, insofar as a mixture of legislation and self regulation govern the area of data protection. This approach contrasts with the EU approach embodied in the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, which is a comprehensive piece of legislation aimed at protecting privacy of personal data. 95/46/EC. This chapter is not going to deal with the Directive on Data Retention, EC/2002/58, which was introduced in response to concerns with terrorism. Many commentators have been extremely critical of the directive, which was ultimately a rushed piece of law making. In terms of its contribution to data protection laws in the European Union, the directive has served to add more confusion. In particular, the 2002 Directive adds complexity to difficult issues such as jurisdiction and the applicability of the law. This is a pan European organisation with 47 different member countries; there are “5 observer countries” which include the Holy See, the United States, Canada, Japan, and

12

13

14

15

16

17

Mexico. More information on the Council of Europe is available from the council’s Web site at: www.coe.int. This text of the European Convention on Human Rights and Additional Protocols is available from the Council of Europe’s Web site. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/ rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B4575C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf Article 10 of the ECHR provides for the fundamental right to freedom of expression. This right includes explicitly the “freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” This freedom to receive information under Article 10 is considered to imply freedom in seeking information. Articles 8 and 10 of the convention complement each other in protecting the privacy of Europeans but also their freedom of expression. For a general discussion on the European Court of Human Rights and Article 8 see: Mowbray, A. (2nd.ed., 2007). Cases and materials on The European convention on human rights, Oxford University Press. White, R. C. A., & Ovey, C. (4th ed., 2006). Jacobs and White: The European convention on human rights, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. The text of the convention is available from the Council of Europe’s Web site. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://conventions. coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm See the Web site of the Council of Europe. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://www. coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/ data_protection/background/1Background. asp#TopOfPage.%20%20Retrieved%2020/ 08/2007 The conditions include: • Where the data subject has unambiguously given his or her consent for the processing; 

The Legal Framework for Data and Consumer Protection in Europe

•

18

19



Where the processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; • Where the processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation; • Where the processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; • Where the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest; and • Where the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed (with the exception of where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject). Importantly, Article 14 of the directive specifically requires member states to take the necessary measures in the domestic law of their country to ensure that data subjects are aware of the existence of the right. This is a positive obligation on states that requires them to make consumers aware of their rights with regards to the direct marketing provision. It is important to note that exceptions are contained under Article 26 of the directive,

20

21

22

23

24

where for example, a data subject gives consent for the transfer. Problems have arisen as different member states have their own language and separate legal tradition. This gives rise to problems in transposing the Directive into the national laws of the member states of the EU. The combination of civil, administrative, and criminal punishments and the differences in the importance of administrative bodies and private enforcement of the law, in particular further this confusion and uncertainty. Independent data protection authorities now function in 27 member states of the newly enlarged European Union. See for example, the United Kingdom information commissioner’s office Web site at www. ico.gov.uk and the Irish data protection commissioner’s Web site at www.dataprotection.ie (Retrieved October 13, 2007). In England and Wales summary convictions are less serious offences and are triable in the magistrate’s courts. More serious offences are triable only on indictment in the crown court. For example, information as to whether personal information will be sold to third parties is contained in these privacy notices.



Chapter XVIII

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States Karin Mika Cleveland State University, USA Barbara J. Tyler Cleveland State University, USA

AbstrAct This chapter provides an overview of law relating to online and Internet medical practice, data protection, and consumer information privacy. It provides a comprehensive overview of federal (HIPAA) and state privacy laws, concluding that both those legal resources leave gaps in consumer protection and provide no real penalties for violating the laws. The authors educate the readers to the legal and data protection problems consumers will encounter in purchasing medical and health services on the Internet. Furthermore, the authors recount some actual case studies and follow those with expert advice for those Internet consumers who wish to be not merely informed, but also safe. The authors not only educate the readers to the lack of protection afforded to them but also advocate throughout the chapter that the United States must enact more federal protection for the consumer in order to deter privacy violations and punish criminal, negligent, and wilful violations of personal consumer privacy.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

IntroductIon The practice of medicine is not immune from the information age. The use of the Internet, including e-mail, in medical practice is altering the traditional method of delivering medical care. Millions of Americans now rely upon the Internet as a primary source of medical information or education about their own symptoms, conditions, diagnoses, and treatments. The practice of telemedicine, consulting with another physician by using technology, is constantly evolving and expanding into areas never before imagined. Physicians are establishing their own Web sites and some few are now practicing medicine on the Internet. The progression of the traditional practice of medicine in cyberspace has brought with it many issues related to privacy and online data protection. No longer is the physician-patient relationship limited to an in-person office consultation that carries with it the legal protections of doctor-patient privilege. Rather, the practice of medicine has evolved to include interactions that might not have ordinarily been considered a physician-patient relationship, and these contacts may stretch across both real and virtual boundaries. In fact, the interactions are, at times, both real and virtual, and the consumer-patient is now in a situation where it is difficult to identify exactly who is the party on the other end. This chapter will provide an overview of the law relating to cybermedicine, medicine practiced without traditional in-person contact, and telemedicine, in terms of data protection and other legal complications related to licensing and a conflict of state laws. The chapter will examine the laws applicable to Web sites where medical diagnosis or the purchase of medical services (including prescriptions) is available. The chapter will discuss how the new methodology of acquiring medical care is at odds with traditional notions of state regulation and how current laws, both federal and state, leave many gaps related to

8

any consumer protections or potential causes of action when privacy is compromised. This chapter will proceed with an overview of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), an act promulgated to ensure privacy of health information as well as access to health care. It will review HIPAA’s application to medical practice conducted on the Internet. It will, in brief, discuss the plethora of sites available over which American citizens may purchase prescription drugs without a prescription from a licensed United States physician or merely through an overseas Web site with no physician to monitor the transaction. We then will examine current federal laws which are not set up to regulate these international transactions. The chapter will explore potential legal complications with personal data and privacy issues related to purchasing medical treatment or services on the Internet and describe what, if any legal recourse consumers might have when the outcome of an Internet medical transaction turns out to be undesirable. The chapter will posit some expert advice for consumers regarding using websites for medical purposes as well as protecting their own privacy. Lastly, this chapter advocates a federal law more punitive that HIPAA; one that regulates and protects patient information, medical transactions, and interactions on the Internet and deters violations of patient privacy by mandating significant fines and imprisonment for negligent or criminal and willful violations of that privacy.

the trAdItIonAl prActIce of medIcIne In the unIted stAtes physician’s state licensure The study and practice of medicine is core to mankind’s need to extend and preserve life. The evolution of medical practice over the centuries from prehistoric times has involved the study

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

of the human body and its mechanisms, disease processes, surgery, and natural herbal and manufactured drugs, to the present time, with its focus on modern genetic testing and techniques. While modern medicine and medical education had its genesis in the 19th century, the 20th century has made incomparable strides in clinical practice, immunology, and pharmacology. Practicing medicine is not regarded by the law as an inherent right of an individual. Rather, it is regarded as a privilege that is granted by the people in a state acting through their elected representatives. Because it is considered a privilege to practice medicine, each state protects health care consumers by licensing and regulating physicians. As a report to Congress stated, “The purpose of licensing health care professionals is to protect the public from incompetent or impaired practitioners” (Telemedical Report to Congress, 1996). Licensure authority defines who has the legal responsibility to grant health professionals the permission to practice their profession. Physicians, dentists, registered nurses, and pharmacists are subject to mandatory licensing in all 50 states. Many other types of health care professionals are also licensed in most states. The federal government licenses some individual health care providers, for example, those professionals who manufacture, distribute, prescribe, and dispense controlled substances must be registered with the Drug Enforcement Administration (Miller, 2006). Historically, under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, states have the authority to regulate activities that affect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens within their borders, including the practice of medicine. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that states have a “compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries” (Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 1975). In response to this amendment, each state has created a Medical Practice Act that defines the proper practice of medicine and mandates

the duties of the state medical board to regulate medical practice. Every state and United States territory has a medical board. The primary means through which the state medical boards promote sound medical practice and keep consumers safe is through licensing and regulating of physicians. The federal government plays little role in setting standards for the medical field except to the extent that the Food and Drug Administration is responsible for determining what prescription drugs are available, and setting safety standards for drugs and packaging. Retail pharmacies are highly regulated. All states require pharmacies have a license. Some states regulate hospital pharmacies through hospital licensing, exempting those pharmacies from the pharmacy licensing system. Pharmacy regulations often require staffing requirements as well that limit the hiring of those who are unlicensed. Standards of practice can be found in many places such as state statutes, agency regulations, and county or municipal ordinances. Pharmacists fall into the category of coverage by state law as well. All states require licensing of pharmacists. The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) is the independent group that assists member boards and jurisdictions in developing, implementing, and enforcing uniform standards. This group provides an Electronic Licensure Transfer Program (ELTP) listing all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands and the requirements for licensed pharmacists to transfer an existing license from one state or jurisdiction to another, as well as the fee for processing the preliminary application (NABP Web site, 2007). The federal government, under the Drug Enforcement Administration, licenses professionals who manufacture, prescribe, dispense, or distribute controlled substances.

Board Certification Traditional medical licensing has changed in recent years to require more education for those

9

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

physicians or specialists who wish to acquire board certification beyond the traditional state medical license. A seachange has occurred in the medical sciences as a direct result of exponential advances in electronics, chemistry, physics, computer sciences, engineering, and clinical medicine. Medical practice today requires so much knowledge, it is virtually impossible for any physician to become an expert in every field. Thus, many current clinical practices require advanced, specifically focused knowledge and extra years of training and education in specific fields of study. According to the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), there are more than 130 medical specialties and subspecialties. There are 24 member boards listed as members of the ABMS. If a physician is board certified it means that the physician has not merely completed medical school and holds a valid state license but has also completed an appropriate residency from 3 to 7 years and been examined using the criteria informing the physician’s specific field. As medicine and its practice become infinitely more complicated to practice, the licensure system within the United States discourages interstate practice (Johnson, 2006). There are some exceptions to requiring an actual physician’s state license in each state: one such exception is the consulting exception. Physicians may practice medicine in another state by acting in consultation with a state-licensed referring physician. Even this exception varies from state to state and this exception preceded the advent of the practice of telemedicine. To remedy this discouraging of interstate practice, specialists who complete residencies should be considered for federal licensing. This licensing would allow the best and brightest to practice within the United States in all jurisdictions, regardless of state boundaries and not be hindered by local restrictions on consulting and practice.

0

establishing the physician-patient relationship Whether express or implied, the traditional physician-patient relationship is contractual in nature and grounded in the premise that the physician is a learned individual, skilled and experienced in subjects about which the patient knows little or nothing but things that are of vital interest to the patient since they determine his health (Miller, 2006; Kohlman, 2006). This relationship is a fiduciary one, requiring the highest ethical obligation from the treating physician. Generally, the relationship may be created from an express or implied agreement. It is an express agreement when actual written forms are signed, the patient agreeing to pay for services in exchange for the performance of a specific service from the physician. In most cases, however, the agreement is implied. The patient finds a physician or is referred, makes an appointment, and travels to the physician’s office. When the physician accepts the patient or undertakes to treat him, and the patient accepts the services, the relationship is created. Generally, a physician or other independent practitioner has the right to accept or decline to establish a professional relationship with any person (Miller, 2006). Even though the existence of a physician-patient relationship usually depends upon whether a physician has examined, diagnosed, and treated a patient, the relationship must first be consensual for the purposes of doctor-patient privity. The relationship is considered consensual when the patient knowingly seeks the services of the physician and the physician knowingly accepts treatment of the patient (Kohlman, 2006). Certainly, such a relationship exists when a patient makes an appointment with and sees a practitioner in her office. In addition, physicians and surgeons on a hospital staff enter into a physician-patient relationship with every patient that they treat in the hospital, whether the patient has been admitted

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

for emergency treatment or is even conscious or able to consent. Once the relationship is established, it is a fiduciary relationship in which mutual trust and confidence are absolutely essential. The practitioner incurs a duty of due care to the patient that is always measured by a professional standard for rendering professional services—one that is usually monitored by the state in which the physician is licensed (Johnson, 2006).

Informed consent In general, consent for most treatment must be an informed consent. This type of consent means that the treating provider is required to give the patient or decision maker several elements of information before the decision on treatment is made. As the American Medical Association states so eloquently on its Web site: “Informed consent is more than simply getting a patient to sign a written consent form. It is a process of communication between a patient and physician that results in the patient’s authorization or agreement to undergo a specific medical intervention” (AMA, 2007). To establish a cause of action based upon lack of informed consent, the patient must prove that a practitioner failed to disclose to the patient the various alternatives and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved which a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed (AMA, 2007). The ethical obligation to communicate certain information to the patient exists in statutes and case law all 50 states. In 2007, Medicare and Medicaid circulated new interpretive guidelines contained in the Code of the Federal Regulations that significantly expanded the scope and documentation of informed consent that must be obtained by hospitals prior to performing surgical procedures. For example, the new Medicare/Medicaid guidelines require that patients be informed if a practitioner, other than the primary surgeon, would perform important parts of the procedure, even when the

person is performing under the supervision of the primary surgeon. Additionally, where surgery is concerned, the consent form must specify the “specific significant surgical tasks” that would be conducted by surgeons other than the primary surgeon (42 C.F.R. § 482.51). This requirement gives more transparency to the long-held ability of an experienced surgeon to allow a resident who is learning to gain experience in doing surgical procedures by requiring the patient be informed of that fact in advance.

liability-battery and negligence Because of the way in which the traditional medical relationship is established, the liability imposed for breaches of duty can be contractual in nature or based on tort law. Tort liability is civil in nature, not criminal, and is imposed by the common law and some statutes for injuries caused by breaches of duty not based on the contract. Tort liability is almost always based on fault, whether the fault be intentional, reckless, or negligent. The most frequent type of liability for health care professionals and institutions is the negligent tort. The five elements required to establish negligence or malpractice are the following: (1) a duty, that means what should have been done; (2) a breach of duty, or a deviation from the required standards of care; (3) injury to a party; (4) causation, that means an injury directly and legally caused by the deviation from what should have been done. To determine negligence, it is foremost important to be informed regarding the duty required by the practitioner in the jurisdiction. Once the existence of a duty is established, the scope of the duty must be determined. This scope is often referred to as the standard of care. The standard of care for individual health care professionals is what a reasonably prudent health care professional engaged in a similar practice would have done under the circumstances (Miller, 2006). Thus, the standard of care may differ for one who is an internist, a pediatrician, an obstetrician, or



Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

a thoracic surgeon based upon each physician’s special education and training. Board certified and trained specialists would owe a higher duty of care because of their advanced education, training and skill. When there is no informed consent or authorization for a procedure, the physician or other practitioner can be liable for battery even if the procedure is properly performed, beneficial, and has no negative consequences for the patient. The touching of the patient alone leads to the liability (Fox v. Smith, 1992; Bommardy v. Superior Court, 1990). Early court cases provided that giving the patient incorrect or incomplete information about a procedure or treatment could invalidate the consent and make the practitioner liable for a battery (Bang v. Miller, 1958; Moser v. Stallings, 1986). The majority of jurisdictions now rule that failure to disclose or to fully inform the patient is a separate cause of action from a battery.

Jurisdiction, Venue, and Conflict of laws In the practice of traditional medicine, there has been little question as to where a particular cause of action might be brought against a medical practitioner or when that action might be brought. The traditional patient/physician privilege has existed on a personal level with a patient physically seeing a physician. That physician may not practice medicine unless licensed in that particular state. Thus, were there to be a cause of action brought against the physician, the action would be brought in the state where the relationship existed, and the laws of that state regarding proving a cause of action would be applied. The state would necessarily provide a statute of limitations for bringing a malpractice or other legal action against the physician. There would be exceptions, however, if the individual seeking medical attention was not from a particular state but sought expertise medical help or particularized treatment. Nonetheless, in



a traditional physician-patient relationship in which each party is physically present during the treatment phase, the theory of where the lawsuit is brought and what laws are applied remains essentially the same. If a patient seeks treatment in a state in which she is not domiciled, that patient is still seeking treatment from a physician who must adhere to the licensing requirements and standards of the second state. Thus, it would be those laws that would apply should the patient be injured in the course of medical treatment or determine to bring a cause of action at a later date. No federal laws would apply, except to the extent that a patient might possibly be bringing an action based on an inappropriate action taken by the FDA related to a controlled substance or other type of drug (McGrath, 2005).

the IntegrAtIon of federAl lAW Into the trAdItIonAl prActIce of medIcIne: hIpAA The landscape of state domination of the medical profession changed somewhat with the enactment, in 1996, of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act commonly referred to as “HIPAA.” The enactment of HIPAA has also had implications concerning the burgeoning business of providing medical advice and treatment electronically. HIPAA was originally enacted to provide for the “portability” of health care coverage for workers who had lost jobs or were changing jobs (Metz, 2004). Ideally, HIPAA sought to implement a more unified system of medical information storage such that medical information could be easily transmitted electronically (Chiang & Starren, 2002). Because HIPAA contemplated the use of a unified electronic storage system, there was a demand that there be provisions enacted that would ensure the privacy of electronically transmitted material. Thus, included within HIPAA are protections

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

covering the privacy of an individual’s medical records. The privacy provisions of HIPAA are intended to allow a patient to limit who will have access to medical records and further provides a limitation on the internal use of sharing information for purposes of diagnosis in that it restricts the disclosure of health information to the “minimum amount necessary” required for the intended purpose (Schmidt, 2000). HIPAA specifically covers health information “oral or recorded in any form or element that: a) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearing house; and b) relates to the past, present, or future, physical or mental health condition of an individual; the provision of health care towards an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual. (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996) HIPAA essentially applies to three specific health entities: health care providers (such as doctors and hospitals), health care plans, and health care clearing houses, which include such entities as third party billing services that may be hired to “code” certain medical procedures for insurance companies (Public Welfare. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102). HIPAA also applies to “employers, insurance companies, and public agencies that deliver social security or welfare benefits” to the extent that they work with or necessarily disseminate information related to an employee’s medical records (§§ 160,164). HIPAA applies to all individual health information that is “maintained or transmitted” and includes “health claims, health plan eligibility, enrollment and disenrollment, payments for care and health plan premiums, claim status, first injury reports, coordination of benefits, and related transactions” (Metz, 20004). Thus, the purpose

of HIPAA, to provide health care portability for the patient while protecting privacy concerns, has broad and far-reaching consequences and regulations affecting the practitioner, the health care institution, and the insuring entity. In addition to HIPAA, federal privacy law also has been enacted to protect the confidentiality of information concerning patients who are referred or treated for alcoholism and drug abuse (42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2). The rules apply to any specialized programs to treat substance abuse in any facility that receives federal funds, including Medicare and Medicaid.

state law and hIpAA The United States Constitution provides that federal law is the “supreme law of the land.” Ordinarily, that clause would be interpreted to mean that when the federal legislature has passed a law on a particular issue, that federal law would take precedence over state laws on similar issues. Indeed, the enactment of HIPAA “mandated” that all state-licensed medical entities and professionals be “HIPAA compliant” within a certain period of time regardless of any state laws on the issue (Privacy Rights Clearing House, 2003). However, the Supreme Court has determined that when there are both federal laws and state laws covering the same issues, federal laws will not supersede a state law if the state law provides more “protections” than the federal law. It is said that a federal law may provide a “floor” for the rights of an individual while a state may provide a “ceiling” (Kramer, 2007). As applied to HIPAA, an individual is certain to enjoy the privacy protections set out in the federal statute, but may enjoy more privacy protections if his/her home state has enacted additional privacy requirements for medical practitioners. Examples of state laws that provide greater privacy protection than HIPAA are those state laws regulating the release of a patient’s mental health information and HIV/AIDS test results (Miller, 2006). In cases in which the



Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

state protections are greater, the state law trumps any federal law.

civil liability for violations of hIpAA Currently, HIPAA has no civil liability provisions for any violations of the statute. Thus, an individual who has been harmed in some way by a practitioner or entity that fails to protect them has no legal recourse for damages under the federal law. The law does provide criminal consequences in the form of fines and jail time. HIPAA provides that a “person who knowingly…uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier [e.g., names, addresses, social security numbers], . . .obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an individual,” or “discloses individually identifiable health information to another person” may: 1. 2.

3.

Be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; If the offense is committed under false pretenses, be fined not more than $100,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and If the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm, be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. (45 C.F.R. § 160.102)

HIPAA appears to specifically limit enforcement actions may be brought by only the respective states or the secretary of health and human services (42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a); O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 2001). Thus, reporting a HIPAA violation might be the best that an individual harmed by the release of data can do. However, some plaintiffs have attempted to bring indirect causes of action for a HIPAA violation by bringing a common law invasion of



privacy action against the offending party. In fact, HIPAA does not always pre-empt state litigation practices (Beck & Hermann, 2007). Moreover, some states specifically allow causes of action for the dissemination of private medical information (Pettus v. Cole, 1996).

telemedIcIne, cybermedIcIne, And InformAtIonAl Web sItes the basics When determining the complications related to medical practice and privacy on the Internet, it is important to understand the distinction between the types of medical Web sites that one might encounter, and the medical interactions that one might have. Like the traditional “in person” patient/physician relationship, some “virtual” interactions between patients and physicians are between known individuals who might actually “see” each other, although far removed from each other geographically (Harrington, 1999). In other interactions, however, the person logging into a website might have no idea who is on the other end, or even if the person on the other end is a physician. Thus, these relationships make the definitions of “patient” and “physician” hazy when attempting to discern the application of any existing privacy laws to Internet or telemedical transactions (Lewis, 2004).

telemedicine Telemedicine is defined as the “use of telecommunications technology to provide health care services to patients who are distant from a physician or other health care provider” (Granade & Sanders, 1996). Generally, a consultant is used to medically diagnose a patient’s condition via two-way interactive television, remote sensing equipment, and computers. Such medical practice has advantages, not only for improving access

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

to medical specialties, but for primary care for patients and cost reduction (Johnson, 2006). For example, in rural Arkansas, a pregnant patient with a family history of spina bifida, a congenital abnormality of the spine, living in a rural area whose obstetrician has just performed a prenatal ultrasound, can have her test transmitted to a specialist in maternal-fetal medicine in a large medical center who can review the test and opine the fetus is developing normally and immediately reassure the patient (Johnson, 2006). The benefits of using technology of the rich to diagnose and treat the poor has substantially increased the opportunities of those who would not otherwise receive health care and allowed them to receive specialized treatment (Tyler, 1998). Moreover, the availability of telemedicine has enabled the sharing of both information and expertise which has enhanced the development of the medical profession in general.

cybermedicine A. Patient Treatment An offspring of the information and technology revolution, cybermedicine is the embodiment of a discipline that applies the Internet to medicine. The field uses global networking technologies to educate, innovate and communicate in ways that enhance and promote medical practice, rapidly transforming medicine into a different discipline. In many respects, cybermedicine is broadly defined as the practice of medicine without the necessity of any physical in-person consultation or examination (Scott, 2001). Cybermedicine is a relatively new phenomenon that has been around for less than 15 years. On Friday, October 4, 1996, the news announced the first virtual real live doctor’s office on the World-Wide-Web had opened (Cyberdocs Today, 1996). On this site, for a reasonable fee of $65, a patient could enter her name and vital statistics, her medical problem, send the service her symptoms,

provide credit card information, and within a few minutes—without ever being examined—receive treatment and possibly a prescription. This first site located in Massachusetts, required that the patients either be physically in the state of Massachusetts or traveling abroad in a foreign country. These two location safeguards, allowed the site creators to circumvent the problem of state licensing laws for liability purposes (Tyler, 1998). If the patient was traveling in a foreign country, the patient who needed a medication refill could have one sent by fax machine to a local overseas pharmacy within a few hours. The reach of cybermedicine has since extended beyond the boundaries of a home state.

B. Prescription Drug Purchasing An “offshoot” of the cybermedicine industry is a new generation of Web sites that provide prescription drug delivery to consumers. Estimates of the number of Internet pharmacies operating in the United States have reached as high as 1400 (Gregg, 2007). In 1 year, one article estimates that 135% more Web sites have offered controlled substances such as Xanax, Vicodin, and Ritalin. Investigators found 394 Web sites advertising controlled prescription drugs and 7% of the sites, or about 187, offered to sell the controlled drugs. The vast majority of those Web sites offered to sell the drugs without a prescription (DeNoon, 2007). While most Internet pharmacies are legitimate businesses that offer customers an attractive and convenient option to purchase affordable medicine in accordance with state and federal law, these new online pharmacies present many problems for drug companies, consumers, and physicians. Consumers find it very attractive to order from the privacy of their own homes and find that such pharmacies offer privacy and convenience for them based upon medical consultation with a physician.



Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

In some instances, the “privacy” aspects making many sites attractive are problematic in and of themselves. Individuals can often order drugs by a brief description of symptoms—symptoms that they may or may not have (FDA FAQ’s, 2007). In addition, because the Internet guarantees near anonymity, there is no way for the “Web site” to tell that the person ordering on line is the person actually on the other end of the transaction. Although this type of scenario raises the specter of fraud, it raises other issues related to privacy. The truth is that anyone who owns a credit card and a computer can order controlled substances or any other drugs online. Pharmacies that do not require a faxed or mailed prescription from a licensed physician present serious concerns for not only privacy but life itself. Drugs offering help for erectile dysfunction, Viagra, Cialis, and Levitra, rank among the top 10 drugs bought online. Other drugs in the top 10 sought after online are Propecia, for baldness, as well as drugs for acid reflux, cholesterol, and bone density (Lade, 2007). Anonymity seems to be the deciding factor in ordering such drugs online. Legitimate pharmacies functioning online can be problematic for privacy concerns. An FDA advisory was issued in spring 2007 after examining foreign drug purchases and finding drugs with potentially dangerous side effects were easily ordered online, without a prescription. Two deadly examples of resulting problems with online ordering of drugs follow.

McKay used does not require a faxed or mailed prescription from a licensed physician. Instead, the prescription site asks only that the patients fill out an online questionnaire about their health history. McKay noted on his application that he had moderate depression, had taken the drug before, and was not suicidal. The doctor who wrote the prescription had a restricted medical license and was not allowed to prescribe drugs. Less than 7 weeks after ordering Prozac, John McKay killed himself. He was 19 years old. Articles reveal that neither the web prescribing doctor nor the online pharmacy accepted any responsibility for McKay’s death (Ostrov, 2007; Lade, 2007). California law requires that prescriptions must be written by a licensed California physician after a physical examination of the patient (Ostrov). Prozac and similar antidepressants carry the FDA’s strongest warning that notes the link between taking the drug and suicide in children and adolescents. The warning urges physicians to closely monitor young patients on these drugs especially at the start of treatments.

Expert Advice in Light of McKay • • •

C. A Suicide Case • In what is believed to be the first lawsuit of its kind, the parents of John McKay have sued an Internet site, a Colorado physician, and a pharmacy in Mississippi in federal court in California for wrongful death and negligence in the suicide of their son (Ostrov, 2007). John McKay was a Stanford University freshman and debating champion who used a credit card to order 90 tablets of the anti-depressant Prozac (generically called fluoxetine) from an online pharmacy. The pharmacy



Parents must monitor the Internet use of children and young adults. Parents should check the family mail for suspicious packages. Parents should keep credit cards and any documents with credit card numbers away from children. Parents should make certain young people who are treated for depression are consistently monitored by a physician.

D. An Overdose Case Christopher Smith made over $24 million dollars selling prescription painkillers illegally through his Internet pharmacy before he was indicted (Unze, 2007). Minneapolis court documents show that Smith sold prescription painkillers to

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

Justin Pearson at least 12 times in 2004-05. Justin accidentally overdosed on Christmas Day, 2006. Two other individuals listed in the government’s filing bought drugs from Smith and committed suicide or died of medical complications from prolonged controlled substance abuse within 18 months of purchasing drugs on the Web site. Smith was convicted of conspiracy to sell drugs illegally, misbranding drugs, and money laundering. He was sentenced to 30 years in federal prison August 1, 2007 (Unze). Pearson’s family members petitioned the state legislature to change the law on Internet pharmacies. Minnesota law now prohibits doctors from writing prescriptions for Minnesota clients based solely upon an online questionnaire.

Expert Advice for Finding Safe Internet Pharmacies Online • • •

•

•

• •

Use a pharmacy in the United States, not Canada or Europe. A safe pharmacy has a phone number and address listed. A safe pharmacy is one that is licensed by a government agency or certified by a reliable organization. (The National Board of Pharmacy has a Web site verifying U.S. pharmacies have met state and federal regulations. See www.vipps.info). A safe pharmacy has a clear privacy policy. Read it. Make certain it is easy to understand and explicitly states it will not share your personal information with others unless you agree. Always have a prescription from a physician or health care professional who has examined you. Make certain a licensed pharmacist is available to answer any questions you have. Price comparisons can be found at Pharmacy Checker, a company that certifies online pharmacies. See www.pharmacychecker. com.

InformAtIonAl And self-help sItes A third category of electronically available medical Web sites are those that are purely for information, or provide forums for discussing medical problems. Web sites proliferate that are available for educating the public about everything imaginable in health care from routine procedures to rare diseases. Because of the availability of these sites, patients can now read excellent articles and research dealing with a rare disease that they, or a family member, may suffer from. There are many stories regarding individuals who diagnosed their own or others’ illnesses by using the Internet. Hospitals as prestigious as the Mayo and Cleveland Clinic also routinely set up Web sites that not only provide information about the hospital, but provide information on disease processes and give health care consumers preoperative and postoperative instructions. In addition, these Web sites often provide links to articles about particular diseases, or even have informational charts concerning drug interactions. Sites such as WebMD allow individuals to look up symptoms or ask medical questions of certain practitioners in an effort to get feedback on a particular ailment. Finally, listservs and chatrooms provide individuals the opportunity to share information about particular medical ailments or seek advice or support from others dealing with the same problems. As an example, ACOR.org provides those afflicted with various cancers to share information with an international contingency about their conditions.

prIvAcy concerns relAted to electronIc sItes In generAl Since the inception of the Internet and the ability to enter personal information into a Web site, there have been problems with ensuring that personal data remains secure. Today, there are burgeon-



Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

ing problems with credit card fraud and identity theft in the best of circumstances. Connecting to a virtual site in which information must travel along millions of shared lines compounds the problem, even in situations where an individual believes she is entering into a transaction onto a trusted site. Even if a company takes the opportunity to employ encryption methodology (such as Verisign), the opportunity for data stealing remains in situations where hackers lurk. It is impossible to say with certainty that any electronic transaction will remain completely private (Mencik, 1999). Unfortunately or fortunately, depending upon personal point of view, there is no overarching regulation of the Internet. The Internet is not a place, nor is it contained within a certain jurisdictional boundary. Those setting up Web sites do not have to sign up with a central authority or conform to certain rules and regulations. There is no central place to register domain names and no periodic reporting that must be done to maintain a Web site. Some regulation of business on the Internet has begun. There are some laws that govern some types of Internet business and/or transactions; however, most of these laws draw upon principles that are more appropriately applied to land-based businesses and not cyberspace entities. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission is charged with enforcing various consumer protection laws such as preventing false advertising and deceptive trade practices (Granfield, 2000). Both state and federal law enforcement agencies are charged with preventing fraud occurring over the Internet, and there are various statutes, both state and federal, that deal with preventing the dissemination of spam (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003). Nonetheless, no law now in existence is able to prevent the stealing of personal data, and few laws can protect individuals whose personal data is used unknowingly by a Web site for uses such as targeted advertising. The only way for individuals to protect themselves to the highest

8

degree possible is to be aware of the privacy policies of the Web site with which they are dealing. Financial data should be logged only into trusted Web sites that have encryption methodology in place, and personal data (such as names and addresses) should be shared only on websites that have a similar encryption data or on those that have privacies policies with which the individual agrees. Most consumers should be aware that the Internet makes it very easy to share data with other businesses, and that most businesses would prefer to engage in quick, targeted advertising. Any registration with any type of Web site may make the consumer part of a larger database that will not only result in unwanted email solicitations, but will make the consumer more susceptible to scam advertising. Consumers should be aware that Web sites, even those related directly to the medical profession, have different types of privacy policies. Some highlights from these privacy policies are included in Table 1. When accessing any Web site where personal information is disclosed, consumers who have any privacy concerns at all should be aware of the privacy policies related to the Websites. As the examples indicate, not all information that might be thought to be private or even protected by HIPAA is necessarily private. For instance, there are many pharmaceutical Web sites that are not United States Web sites and not subject to United States laws. Although many of these websites have “American” sounding names, the consumer should be aware that when logging in, entering data, and ordering, that information entered might not be as private as the consumer thought. In addition, many Web sites contain somewhat of a “caveat emptor” proviso indicating to the consumer that if there are any links accessed from the first website, the consumer should understand that the privacy policies of the first Web site do not apply. Further, various Web sites disclose that private data may be accessed by a company doing

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

Table 1. Web Md

There is a lengthy privacy policy that includes information about what cookies are collected. The policy also provides that personally identifiable information will not be disclosed except 1) to meet legal requirements and 2) when there is a threat requiring disclosure. The site informs the consumer that the consumer will be informed of “material changes” to the policy and provides that complaints may be lodged with TRUSTe privacy watchdog

American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP)

A shorter privacy policy discloses use of cookies and states that member information may be provided to “constituent” chapters. The policy also provides that some information may be disclosed for purposes of targeted sales. There is a disclaimer providing that some information may be disclosed when legally required. The site also “forewarns” the consumer that it cannot be held responsible for the actions of third parties whom have links within the site.

Merck.com

Merck provides that consumers may elect a level of privacy protection. The policy states that, “Personal information about you will be accessible to Merck, including its subsidiaries, divisions, and groups worldwide, and to individuals and organizations that use personal information solely for and at the direction of Merck,” and further provides that information will be disclosed only to those “working on its behalf.”

American Heart Association

Policy gives consumer ability to “opt out” of disclosure, but also provides that “aggregate information” is sometimes disclosed for research purposes. There may be disclosure as “required by law.”

Revolutionhealth

Policy provides that the information provided by the consumer may be used to acquire information about other people in your demographic area for targeted advertising. The policy states that information may be disclosed for legal reasons, or when a “threat” is involved (e.g., national security). The site has a disclaimer that if third party sites are accessed, the privacy policies of the third party sites should be reviewed. Consumers have an opportunity to “opt out” of particular disclosures.

MedRx-One (No prescription necessary site)

Non U.S. company; one line privacy policy: “medrx-one pledges that the information you enter will not be shared with any parties not directly involved with the ordering or delivery process without your expressed consent (except for fraud cases) and that any e-mails you receive from medrx-one will be related to your order.” The terms of use indicate that “local laws” (i.e., country of origin) will apply to any legal issues.

CVS

Provides state specific privacy policies in addition to an extensive privacy policies that mirrors the HIPAA regulations. Provides that information may be disclosed to “business associates” provided an appropriate contract exists that safeguards privacy. Sets out that information may be disclosed in some instances to an individual (friend or family member) involved in your care, “if we can reasonably infer that you agree.”

Walmart

Walmart’s privacy policy provides, “We may use or disclose your PHI for prescription refill reminders, to tell you about health-related products or services, or to recommend possible treatment alternatives that may be of interest to you,” and, “We may disclose your PHI to a family member or friend who is involved in your medical care or payment for your care, provided you agree to this disclosure, or we give you an opportunity to object to the disclosure. If you are unavailable or are unable to object, we will use our best judgment to decide whether this disclosure is in your best interests.”

business with the first party and that the company is required by federal law to enter into contracts ensuring the privacy of data. However, most Web sites are vague about what data is protected and do not provide the consumer access to the actual contract and listing of data that is being disclosed and how it will be protected.

Finally, various Web sites provide for the disclosure of data in certain instances—such as, in numerous pharmacy sites, disclosure to a friend or family member who is the caretaker of the individual seeking a prescription. Although this proviso may make it more convenient for a caretaker to access information about meds for an

9

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

individual unable to access the data herself, there is also a potential for abuse. In many situations, an individual has sought out the Internet for purposes of enhanced privacy for the very reason that she does not want family members to be aware of certain health information. Without any verification procedures in place, many individuals may have their medical privacy compromised even though a website is legitimate, well-respected, and has various privacy protection procedures in place that a consumer believes are absolute. Although there is sometimes recourse when there has been an alleged breach of privacy occurring by way of an Internet transaction, this recourse may be limited in scope. As previously discussed, various federal entities are responsible for ensuring the enforcement of some laws; however, the Internet provides opportunities for businesses to both form and disappear overnight making it not only impossible to find the target of the investigation, but to determine what would be the appropriate jurisdiction to handle any complaint. Furthermore, although there are various actions that might be brought against Web site companies that do business in the United States and technically exist in the United States, there is virtually no recourse available against website companies that exist outside the boundaries of the United States. These sites may not have even minimal privacy protections for consumers. Certainly, the speed with which Web sites may be formed and disbanded will serve to hinder any sanctions or penalties that may be geared toward the enforcement of privacy rights. Finally, the varying privacy policies in place on Web sites make it difficult for consumers to even know what their rights are, or what rights were violated. Although most legitimate companies dealing with medical data have privacy safeguards in place, there are various “loopholes” that consumers must be aware of whenever transacting business on the Internet. These include releases for targeted marketing in some instances, disclosure to third party companies with which the original

0

company does business, disclosure to caretakers, and disclosures for law enforcement purposes (and when “threats” are involved).

concerns relAted to the dIsclosure of medIcAl InformAtIon A. patient rights and state remedies Medical information is often the most private and intimate information about an individual. Health information privacy is based upon two principles: 1) the patient should be entitled to know what is contained in her own record; and 2) the patient should be able to control who has access to that information. States, individually, have long been the principle regulators of health information. While physicians have always been obliged under their ethical obligations and the Hippocratic Oath to protect health care information, other secondary users in the health chain such as insurers, the government, and employers have, in the past, not always had the obligation to keep information confidential when storing or transmitting it. Only recently, the federal government has promulgated, through HIPAA, the Federal Health Privacy Rule to even out and establish a floor of privacy protection to all citizens. While all states have constitutions that may give rise to a right of privacy, explicit guarantees of privacy in state constitutions are rare. Applying privacy protections to health information has occurred in piecemeal fashion with little consistency from entity to entity and state to state. Thus, the right of privacy in state law provisions is a patchwork varying from legislative protection to only common law provisions. While every state has a statute restricting the use and disclosure of medical information, few states have taken a broad or uniform approach. Rather, the protection afforded to the information

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

tends either to be specific to a certain condition or fails to cover much of the information collected. Most states have some type of statutory providerpatient privilege that affords to the consumer limited protection of one’s health information. But states vary widely in the scope of the provisions that are enacted restricting the use of medical information (Pritts, 2002). Most states allow health care providers to use and disclose patient identifying information for treatment, payment, peer review, and research purposes. For any use or disclosure of information, not specified by state statute, the patient’s written permission is required. Patients should be informed regarding the information divulging practices of their health care providers. They are entitled to receive and review their medical records. In addition, the security of their medical information should be protected from unauthorized use or disclosure. To be effective, the state privacy statutes must provide remedies and penalties for violating them. Thus, if personal health care records are not provided to a patient, there must be a sanction for failure to do so. In addition, if health care providers can divulge information with impunity, there is no real benefit to consumers. States run the gamut in the remedies in their statutory provisions to protect the health consumer. Some states have expressly granted rights to patients to bring suit for equitable relief and attorney fees. Other states hold a violator liable for actual and punitive damages (Pritts, 2002). If a person can show the privacy violation was made with knowledge or was made intentionally, many states allow for criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment.

b. need for remedies & uniformity The problem remains that there is no uniform comprehensive state approach to violations of health care consumer privacy. Most states have allowed only some elements of fair and uniform

disclosure into their codes. Many have no remedy for violations. California has crafted some of the most privacy-oriented consumer protection laws in the nation (Cal. Civ. Code 56-56.37). California’s code affords patients by law rights to most of the major holders of health information. And the code restricts disclosures by health care providers, HMOs, and even employers. The California code also gives patients the right sue to enforce their rights. Yet, even California’s law is lacking because there is no provision to require notice of the health care providers’ practices and policies to patients. Individual states have a long way to go to offer real solutions to the problem of privacy.

federAl prIvAcy protectIons Applicability of hIpAA to cybermedicine and telemedicine With the recent issuance of federal government regulations governing the use and disclosure of health information by the Department of Health and Human Services, the role and importance of state government remedies has changed. While HIPAA is the first federal health privacy law, it does not pre-empt stronger state laws. So state law can offer greater protection than HIPAA provides especially with remedies for abuse (Pritts, 2002). Unlike many laws that do not contemplate the incorporation of technology into every day life, HIPAA was originally enacted for the specific purpose of integrating the use of computer technology in the dissemination of information. Thus, after the enactment of HIPAA, traditional forms of communication were added to coverage so that there would be no loopholes regarding the dissemination of information through such avenues of communication as oral and written communications. As a result, the application of HIPAA appears to be broad-based covering traditional forms and both cyber and telemedicine, at least in large measure (Wachter, 2001). 

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

For example, HIPAA’s “Privacy Rule” is broad-based in its application and protects individualized medical information transmitted “in any form or medium.” It extends to all patients whose information is collected. The Rule imposes responsibilities on all employees and volunteers and requires health care institutions to receive contractual assurances that business associates that will be handling individualized medical information will keep that data private (pp. 1-4). Also required, HIPAA mandates that those dealing with providing health care provide a Notice of Privacy Practices that will set out how the organization will protect health-related information and specify a patient’s rights including:

for the dissemination of this type of information. There are, however, some types of medical information that are not considered completely private. This information may be disclosed in limited circumstances without there being a HIPAA release. These categories include: • • • • •

• •

• • •

• •

How to gain access to the patient’s health records. How to request corrections to errors in a patient’s health records (or voice a disagreement with a medical conclusion). How to determine where medical information has been disclosed. How to request additional confidentiality for particular health information. How to keep information confidential by providing alternate contact numbers such that information will not be given to members of a household. How to complain about a breach of privacy protocol. How to contact the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to follow up about a complaint regarding a breach of privacy protocol (University of Miami School of Medicine, 2005).

Additionally, the Privacy Rule requires supplemental authorization if a health care provider intends to disseminate any private information for the purpose of research, some types of marketing, or fundraising. Information related to psychotherapy is also considered overly sensitive, and HIPAA requires supplemental authorization



Information related to public health issues. Information related to abuse or domestic violence situations. Information related to law enforcement, or some judicial proceedings. Information that might prevent an imminent threat to public safety. Specialized information as required by particular state or federal statutes.

In addition, not all forms of communication of medical information fall into the category of marketing. For instance, it is not considered marketing for a covered entity to use personal information to tailor a health-related communication to that individual, when the communication is: •

•

Part of a provider’s treatment of the patient and for the purpose of furthering that treatment, such as the recommendation of a particular medication. Made in the course of managing the treatment, such as reminders of appointments (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse).

In many instances, individual state laws will govern what must be disclosed regardless of the fact that HIPAA is a federal statute. And one author has argued that states should not rely solely on the Federal Health and Privacy Rule to protect citizens, but that they should “at a bare minimum . . . mirror the federal protections, thereby allowing enforcement to occur at the state level” (Pritts, 2002). Thus, states are encouraged to enact legislation spelling out health consumers’ rights and remedies. In addition, those states

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

that have already enacted comprehensive health privacy rules should reevaluate their statutes so they fill in gaps that may exist. For example, use of health information for marketing purposes is often ignored in state laws, while some states have enacted more stringent standards than the federal law (Boyer, 2004). Whereas HIPAA’s Privacy Rule protects against the disclosure of certain information, HIPAA’s Security Rule sets out regulations related to the electronic transmission of data and thus imposes security requirements on the electronic systems themselves. Moreover, the Rule imposes these restrictions on the “covered entities” of health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses. Neither in-person nor hand-written communications are covered by the Security Rule, but do fall under the Privacy Rule which covers “any mode” of communication (University of Miami Medical School; 45 C.F.R § 164.302, 45 CFR § 164.306). Given that telemedicine stems from a traditional doctor-patient relationship in which consultations are theoretically done remotely, technically, the criteria related to HIPAA would apply to those practicing telemedicine. However, there would be some complications related to HIPAA and privacy in general depending on what type of telemedicine relationship is established. In a situation where a patient sees her own physician and there is a consultation that is done while her physician is in the room, there is the opportunity for the original physician to ensure that the consultant is bound, in writing, by the prescriptions of HIPAA and that the patient is informed of her rights under HIPAA should there be such a consultation. If, however, there is a remote consultation being done without the involvement of an initial more primary care physician, there is less of an opportunity to verify privacy rights, especially if there is some immediacy to the teleconference. Although it is unlikely, and currently uncommon for an individual to log on to a Web site and visually present an injury for diagnosis, it is likely

that this type of doctor/patient interaction will increase in the future. With such an immediate relationship, there might be little opportunity for the patient to be told of the website’s privacy practices, and there would unlikely be any opportunity to review and sign appropriate forms. Thus, although any type of telemedicine practitioner would be bound by HIPAA, the patients would be well-advised to know the policies of the particular practitioner before going ahead with a consultation. In the case where a primary care physician would be involved in a telemedicine conference, the patient would be well-advised to know what privacy policies have been established between the two entities. The practice of cybermedicine is similar to telemedicine and, for the most part, those who practice cybermedicine are bound by HIPAA as are those involved with telemedicine. However, cybermedicine may present more opportunities for compromising privacy because there are various forms of what might be considered the practice of cybermedicine that are not subject to the HIPAA regulations (Lewis, 2004). Cybermedicine is often associated with prescription drugs, and, true enough, pharmacists and pharmacies are subject to the regulations of HIPAA as are the parent companies that might be engaged in the pharmaceutical business (such as Rite Aid or CVS). However, cybermedicine is also associated with such Web sites as “Ask a Physician,” “Self-Help,” or “General Advice” Web sites. Even in the case of “Asking a Physician,” one might not establish a doctor/patient relationship necessary to bind the doctor in question to HIPAA as a health care provider. Although many individuals might ordinarily believe that information is confidential because there is a person’s medical condition being discussed, that is not the case (Nath, 2006). Many people routinely log into Web sites to find out information concerning symptoms, or request information about a particular drug. Some sites require information such that a response might



Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

go to an email address, or may even require information such as an address. Because these sites are not health care providers, there is no prohibition that would prevent continuous emailings, or postal mailings that a person may not want about a condition that a person may not want others to know about. Because there is no health care provider relationship, there is nothing prohibiting any of these sites from selling information to other entities. There are numerous privacy concerns that may develop by virtue of the fact that lines blur as the electronic trail becomes more extensive. In an ordinary situation, a health care provider deals with secretaries who may deal with insurance companies, who may deal with other insurance companies, who may deal with outsourcing of billing and/or data processing, who may ultimately deal with collection agencies for unpaid bills. Although each of these entities would technically be bound to keep data private under an initial business entity and employee agreement, the more people involved, the more difficult it is to control who has what data. Where telemedicine and cybermedicine are concerned, the trail goes out even farther. In telemedicine situations, there may be staff in a room unseen by a patient having nothing to do with the procedure or medical consultation (such janitors, computer technicians, or camera operators). For both telemedicine and cybermedicine, there are Web designers and engineers who may have access to information in databases within the Web site. None of these ancillary workers are generally bound to keep health information private. When the Web site itself is set up to work as a place where health care is provided, there is a good argument that these technical employees are bound by HIPAA as employees dealing with health treatment information; however, that characterization is debatable if dealing with a third party Web administrator (i.e., an independent contractor), or when the Web administrators are part of a larger conglomerate, such as when a



retailer (e.g., Walmart) has a site where prescriptions may be filled. There is also some uncertainty as to what is the status of a third-party owner of a website when that owner is not in the health care field but rather has purchased the website for investment purposes, or even when the Web site itself is a subsidiary of a health care company (Nath, 2006). In all instances involving use of the Internet for medical care, the consumer must not assume that whatever personal data is being handled will be kept confidential. If the consumer is attempting to protect private data, that consumer must be aware of the policies of the entity from wherever any type of medical information is shared.

problems with privacy liability While HIPAA pre-empts any state law that provides less protection than it does, state laws that provide greater or equal protections than HIPAA remain in effect. Certainly, HIPAA privacy rules allow providers to share private information as long as it is used for allowable purposes such as billing and treatment. Most states have placed significantly more limitations on the scope of courts to order release of personal health information. Several areas of personal medical information, including mental health and HIV/AIDS cases also are protected by state statutes that restrict disclosure of such information. There is a common law cause of action that consumers may have based upon the physicianpatient relationship and privacy (Miller, 2006). Two examples of such actions include: 1.

2.

A New York court legally enjoined a psychoanalyst from circulation a book in which detailed information concerning a patient was written (Doe v. Roe, 1977). The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that a physician was liable for revealing his patient’s identity to the patient’s natural child who had been adopted (Humphers v. Inter. Bank,

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

1985). This breach was held to be a breach of professional responsibility. Thus, state law may statutorily and at common law offer greater privacy protection than does HIPAA privacy rules.

prIvAcy concerns for the future The future of medicine and healthcare necessarily must contain a prediction for the increased utilization of computer information and the Internet. Any such discussion will contain the exponential increase in the use of national and international markets with more chances for individual privacy to be compromised. There is an increasing focus on computerized medical records. The Veterans Administration has adopted computerized record keeping (Schmidt v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 2003). An executive order in 2004 established the Office of Health Information Technology. Thus, the federal government is moving forward in its efforts to use technology in health record keeping. The advantages for such record keeping systems are better patient care information and fewer iatrogenic illnesses, drug interactions, and prescribing mistakes. The disadvantage is the security risk. Each day, the newspaper contains stories of computer records being stolen or compromised. The HIPAA privacy rules do pertain to all computerized records and e-mail. Records and communications of this sort must be protected with encryption and other security steps. Computerized records have been accidentally posted on the Internet (Pillar, 2001). E-mail communications should be handled with the same discretion that other methods of communication are treated. E-mails can be requested in discovery and may be used in civil and criminal actions: e-mails tend to exist in cyberspace forever. Stories abound regarding health

care information emails that have accidentally been sent to hundreds of the wrong recipients (Salganik, 2000). The law relating to computers, e-mails, and the Internet is still developing. Individuals deserve privacy in their dealings with physicians, health maintenance organizations, billing agencies, pharmacies, and other entities. The remedies, both civil and criminal, offered to consumers for breaches of privacy are piecemeal at this time and consist largely of common law actions or those statutorily provided by each state. The federal HIPAA law articulates the minimum protection that may be afforded to individuals. There is no uniform consistent statutory scheme to protect individual privacy of medical information nationally. Each state is free to create its own legislation. It is important to minimize the accidental release of private information. The law is continually developing in the area of privacy, the Internet, e-mails, and computer-stored information. New legal issues emerge each day that need attention in this ever expanding area. Federal law must be enacted to deal with Internet privacy violations uniformly and provide deterrents for violating the law with significant fines and criminal penalties for the full range of patients’ privacy violations from merely negligent to that purposeful criminal violation of patients’ privacy. Web sites that provide drugs to all comers with no physician oversight should be illegal.

references 42 C.F.R. § 482.51 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006). American Board of Medical Specialties. (2007). Retrieved June 1, 2007 from http://www.abms. org



Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

American Medial Association. (2007). Informed consent. Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http://www. ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4608.html Bang v. Miller, 88 N.W. 186 (Minn. 1958). Retrieved June 1, 2007, from LexisNexis, Cases, Law School database. Beck, J., & Herrmann, M. (2007). Drug and device law: HIPAA does not preempt state litigation practice. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http:// druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2007/02/hipaadoes-not-preempt-state-litigation.html Bogozza, D. (2006). WHO and partners accelerate fight against counterfeit medicines. PR Newswire US. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from LexisNexis News

Cyberdocs today announced the rirst virtual doctors [sic] office on the world wide web (1996). Westlaw M2 Presswire. Retrieved June 1, 2007 from 1996 WL 11276562 Denoon, D. J. (2007). Internet drug pushing up again. More websites advertising, selling controlled prescription drugs. Health News. Retrieved June 21, 2007, from WebMD, http:// www.webmd. com/news/200770518/interent-drug-pushing-upagain Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977). Food and Drug Administration, FAQ’s. Retrieved September 26, 2007, from http://www.fda.gov/oc/ buyonline/faqs.html

Bommareddy v. Superior Court, 222 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Cal. Ct. App.1990). Retrieved from LexisNexis Cases, Law School database.

Fox v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 596 (Miss. 1992). Retrieved June 1, 2007, from LexisNexis Cases, Law School database.

Boyer, M. C. (2004). Texas administrative agencies tackle compliance with the health insurance portability and accountability act’s privacy rule. Texas Tech Journal of Administrative Law, 5, 100-111.

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).

Cal. Civ. Code 56-56.37 (LexisNexis 2007).

Granfield, A. (2000). FTC’s bite out of internet fraud lacks teeth. Forbes.com. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://www.forbes.com/2000/03/27/ mu2.html

Can Google diagnose illness better than doctors? (Nov. 6, 2006). The Daily Mail (London). Retrieved June 4, 2007, from http://www.seroundtable.com/archives /006667.html Chamness, J. N. Liability of physicians for communicating over the internet. Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http://www.Cornelius-collins.com/ CM/What’s New/asp Chiang, M., & Starren, J. (2002). Telemedicine and HIPAA: Data confidentiality and HIPAA. Retrieved May 23, 2007, from http://www.ideatel. org/syllabus/hipaa.html Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7706.



Granade, P. F., & Sanders, J. H. (1996). Implementing telemedicine nationwide: Analyzing the legal issues. 63 Defense Counsel, 67.

Gregg, J. (2007). Senator Gregg introduces bill to increase safety for Americans buying on-line prescription drugs. States News Service. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from LexisNexis News library. Harrington, K. (1999). Legal implications of the practice of medicine over the internet, telemedicine and cybermedicine. Cyberlaw. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://www.gase.com/cyberlaw/toppage11.htm Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d).

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985). Iredale, W., & Swinford, S. (2007, February 25). Web supplies prescription drug addicts. Sunday Times (London). Retrieved June 3, 2007, from LexisNexis News file. Johnson, A. (June 2006). Digital doctors. National Conference of State Legislatures Magazine. Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http://www.ncsl. org/programs/pubs/slmag/2006/org Kohlman, R. J. (2006). Existence of physician patient relationship. 46 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts 2d 373. §§ 1, 2, 3, 8. Kramer, D. (2007). American jurisprudence: Supremacy of constitutions; supreme laws (2nd ed.). Minneapolis: The West Publishing Company. Lade, D (2007, July 15). Getting medication in privacy is part of internet appeal, but there are risks. Sun Sentinel. Retrieved September 17, 2007, from LexisNexis current News file. Lewis, C. A. (2004). Cybermedicine: Do you need to know or see your physician, or is it safe to practice medicine in cyberspace? Retrieved March 28, 2007, from http://gsulaw.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/fa04/lewis/doc/htm Lisse, J. (2007). Bechet disease. Retrieved June 3, 2007, from http://www. emedicine.com/med. topic218.htm Mack, A. (2000, January 3). Op-Ed Re: Sometimes the patient knows best. New York Times. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from LexisNexis News service. McGrath, R. (2005). Only a matter of time: Lessons unlearned at the food and drug administration keep Americans at risk. Food and Drug Law Journal, 60, 603-624. MedicineNet. (2007). Orphan disease definition. Retrieved June 4, 2007, from http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=11418

Mencik, S. (1999). Are secure internet transactions really secure? Retrieved June 6, 2007, from http://www.jsweb.net/paper.htm Metz, J. (2004). Practical insights to HIPAA: Overview and general background regarding HIPAA. Retrieved May 21, 2007, from http://www. dilworthlaw.com/pdf/hipaa.pdf Miller, R. D. (2006). Health care law. Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones Bartlett Publishers. Moser v. Stallings, 387 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1986). Retrieved June 1, 2007 from LexisNexis law School database. Nath, S. W. (2006). Relief for the e-patient? Legislative and judicial remedies to fill HIPAA’s privacy gaps. George Washington Law Review, 74, 532-540. O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179-80 (D. Wyo. 2001). Office of Health Information Technology (2004). Retrieved June 21, 2001 from http://www.Whitehouse.gov/omb/egov/gtob/health_informatics. htm Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2743.43 (A)-(D) (LexisNexis 2007) Expert testimony on liability issues. Retrieved June 1, 2007, from LexisNexis Ohio Cases. Ostrov, B. (2007, March 14). Menlo Park teen’s suicide shines light on shadowy market. The Mercury News. Retrieved September 18, 2007, from LexisNexis News library. Patients Rights Conditions of Participation (Revised 2007). 42 C.F. R. 482.13, 482.24 and 482.51. Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Pillar, C. (2001, November 7). Web mishap: Kid’s psychological files posted. L.A. Times, Nov., A1.



Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

Pritts, J. L. (2002). Altered states: State health privacy laws and the impact of the federal health privacy rule. Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics, 2, 334-340.

Tyler, B. J. (1998). Cyberdoctors: The virtual housecall—the actual practice of medicine on the internet is here; is it a telemedical accident waiting to happen? Indiana Law Review, 13, 259-290.

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2006). HIPAA basics: Medical privacy in the electronic age. Retrieved May 23, 2007, from http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs8a-hipaa.htm

University of Miami Miller School of Medicine Privacy/Data Protection Project. (2005). Privacy Standard/Rule (HIPAA). Retrieved May 22, 2007, from http://privacy.med.miami.edu/glossary/ xd_privacy_stds_applicability.htm

Public Welfare. 45 C.F.R. § 160 et seq. The Safe Internet Pharmacy Act of 2007, S.596, 110th Congress, 1st Session (Fall 2007) Retrieved June 5, 2007, from LexisNexisCongrssional database. Salganik, M. W. (2000, August 10). Health data on 858 patients mistakenly emailed to others; medical information was among messages sent out by Kaiser Health Care. Baltimore Sun, Aug., 1C. Schmidt, C. W. (2000). Patient health information goes electronic. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v03/ i09/html/rules.html Schmidt v. Dep’t of Veteran’s Affairs, 218 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Wis. 2003). Scott, R. (2001). Health care symposium: Ehealth: The medical grontier: Cybermedicine and virtual pharmacies. West Virginia Law Review, 103, 412-413. Shah, R., & Piper, M. H. (2007). Wilson disease. Retrieved June 4, 2007, from eMedicine-Http:// www.emedicne.com/med/topic2413.htm Symptoms of Cushing Syndrome. (2007). WrongDiagnosis.com. Retrieved June 3, 2007, from http://www.wrongdiagnosis.com/c/cushings_syndrome/symptoms.htm th

Telemedical Report to Congress, 104 Cong., 2d Session (1996).

8

Unze, D. (2007, August 3). Internet operation puts man in prison. St. Cloud Times. Retrieved September 17, 2007, from LexisNexis Current news file. Wachter, G. W. (2001). Law and policy in telemedicine: HIPAA’s privacy rule summarized—what does it mean for telemedicine? Retrieved May 30, 2007, from http://tie.telemed.org/articles/article. asp?path=legal&article=hipaaSummary_gw_ tie01.xml

suggested reAdIngs Beaver, K., & Herold, R. (2003). Practical guide to HIPAA privacy and security compliance. New York: CRC Press. Hall, G. (2006). Privacy crisis: Identity theft prevention plan and guide to anonymous living. United States: James Clark King, LLC. HIPAA—Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d). Sanbar, S. S., Fiscina, S., & Firestone, M. H. (2007). Legal medicine (6th ed.). Philadelphia: Elsevier Health Sciences. Slack, W. V., & Nader, R. (2001).Cybermedicine: How computing empowers doctors and patients for better health care. United States: Jossey-Bass Inc.

Cybermedicine, Telemedicine, and Data Protection in the United States

Web sItes Data Privacy Lab. (2007). The laboratory at Carnegie Mellon seeks balanced integrated solutions that weave technology and policy together. Retrieved, November 4, 2007, from http// www. cs.cmu.edu

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2007). HIPAA basics: Medical privacy in the electronic age. Retrieved November 5, 2007, from http://www. Privacyrights.org/inquiryform.html

9

0

Chapter XIX

Online Privacy Protection in Japan: The Current Status and Practices J. Michael Tarn Western Michigan University, USA Naoki Hamamoto Western Michigan University, USA

AbstrAct This chapter explores the current status and practices of online privacy protection in Japan. Since the concept of privacy in Japan is different from that in western countries, the background of online privacy concepts and control mechanisms are discussed. The chapter then introduces Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information along with the privacy protection system in Japan. Following the discussion of the privacy law, Japan’s privacy protection mechanisms to support and implement the new act are examined. To help companies make smooth adjustments and transitions, a four-stage privacy protection solution model is presented. Further, this chapter discusses two case studies to exemplify the problems and dilemmas encountered by two Japanese enterprises. The cases are analyzed and their implications are discussed. The chapter is concluded with future trends and research directions.

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

IntroductIon In the past, privacy protection was not considered as necessary for business in Japan. Instead, the market determined how companies were to deal with consumer private information. However, information technology (IT) has advanced rapidly and all business standards were changed to use electric files. Companies began to store tremendous amounts of information to a database rather than using paper-based file cabinets. IT has changed business structure but it has also exacerbated privacy problems, private data leaks, unauthorized data collection, and the loss of private data. After more and more privacy-related problems were revealed by the media, consumers began to pay attention to the protection of their private information. As a result, the Japanese government established the Act on the Protection of Personal Information in 2005 to protect consumers and regulate companies’ business activities associated with customers’ private information (Yamazaki, 2005). After this law was launched, many companies exposed their weaknesses in their privacy protection system and unethical private data use. The role of privacy had begun to shift to the consumer side. When consumers decided to purchase or do business transactions online, they assumed that there would be a reliable system and trustworthy privacy protection (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005). The organization of this chapter can be overviewed as follows. In the next section, the background of online privacy concepts and control mechanisms are discussed. The chapter then explores Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information along with the privacy protection system in Japan. Following the discussion of the privacy law, Japan’s privacy protection mechanisms to support and implement the new act are discussed. To help companies make smooth adjustments and transitions, the authors present a four-stage privacy protection solution

model. Further, this chapter discusses two case studies to exemplify the problems and dilemmas encountered by two Japanese enterprises. The cases are analyzed and their implications are discussed. The chapter is concluded with future trends and research directions.

bAckground The concept of privacy in Japan is different from that in western countries. Japan is a country with a very high density of population. People are living right next to each other, and it seems like there are no boundaries and there is no privacy. However, these are the characteristics of the Japanese people who indeed understand and respect privacy (Makoto et al., 2005). Even though there is only a thin wall between rooms, people can have privacy with “as if” behavior. For example, even though one person knows another’s secret, he or she will act as if they do not know the secret (Mizutani, Dorsey, & Moor, 2004). It describes how Japanese people respect each other’s boundaries and help keep secrets. It is also important to understand that the Japanese culture is group-based. Within the group, people respect each other and try to think and move in the same direction. Although they have their own minds and thoughts, they always consider how other people in the group think first, and then decide what to do, heavily depending on the group’s opinions. Often people do not use eye or body contact as frequently as western people do because of the different perception of privacy they have in mind (Makoto et al., 2005). However, the Internet has created a new environment for privacy. People can obtain, access, and manage enormous amounts of information without actual face-to-face interaction. People can express their opinions anonymously and they can act any way they like on the Internet. Anonymity has a major impact on the Japanese conception of privacy because people no longer have to depend on the group mind, since on the



Online Privacy Protection in Japan

Internet information can be easily reached and individual thinking is promoted and encouraged. In other words, before the Internet was introduced, the group-based society had bound most people’s behavior. However, after the Internet became everyone’s platform, limitations from the group society were diminishing, which, on the other hand, advanced the concept of privacy protection in Japan (Mizutani et al., 2004). Since information technology has been growing up rapidly and companies can manage and collect massive amount of private information, this traditional privacy protection has not been working as strongly as it once did. According to the Ecom Journal (Japanese), the online market in Japan was $100 million in business-to-business (B2B) and $13 million in business to customer (B2C) in 2005, which is almost 20% growth as compared to 2004 (Goto, 2006). As a result of this rapid growth, consumers gave up private information that was then used by business companies without their permission. The private information that was collected in an illegal way had been shared, sold on online, used for unethical ways, and leaked outside of the company. There were many law suits from consumers, which gradually drew the media and consumers’ attention to privacy. The unethical business practices had occurred more often because there had not been any related privacy laws for confining commercial companies’ practices until 2005. Consumers were educated to select reliable companies with their awareness of their privacy and security when they released their private information to companies (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005).

Definition of Online Privacy in Japan Private information is defined in Japan as any information which a living individual can be identified with, such as name, address, birth date, and phone number. If information can connect a person with another source of information, such



as an employee ID within an employee database, it is also considered private information. The purpose of Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information (2005) is to protect the rights and interests of individuals to control collection and usage of private information.

privacy control mechanisms Platform for Privacy Preferences (PP) Platform for privacy preferences (P3P) is technology, built into a Web browser, such as IE, that helps consumers when they visit a company’s Web site. P3P was developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). P3P automatically matches up a company’s privacy policy on the Web site and consumers’ privacy preferences and lets consumers know what privacy policies match (Analysis of Japanese privacy protection technology, 2005). Consumers can set up their preferences by choosing a privacy level, which decides how much private information they want to share with others. P3P protocol is built on HTTP to communicate between consumers’ Web browsers and e-commerce Web sites. Once P3P is set by the consumer, it begins to match up all websites that he or she visits and returns the result automatically. Privacy policies are changing all the time and since most of them are very long and complicated, consumers need to take more time to understand them. The advantage of using P3P technology is that consumers do not have to keep updating themselves to understand a privacy policy. In other words, no matter how privacy policies are changing, P3P will give consumers the results of matchup and consumers can choose whether they would accept or not. Not only can companies post their privacy policies on their Web sites, but they can also enable P3P functions that consumers can easily recognize. It is important to attain trust from consumers in order to establish a good relationship. P3P can help companies distinguish themselves as trustworthy companies (Cranor, 2001).

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

Private Information for Third-Party Use

Opt-In

In order to prevent companies from letting a third party use private information without any permission from the individuals involved, two policies have been introduced to take care of private information from consumers for third-party use: opt-in and opt-out. As a response, many laws and guidelines have been applied with these policies for many countries (Bouckaert et al., 2006). The basic standard of these policies is that a company must show its privacy policy on their Web site. However, consumers’ private information is taken care of by different processes depending on which one of them the company selects.

As opposed to opt-out, opt-in policy requires a company to obtain a consumers’ explicit consent for third party use before consumers input their private information. The company must post their privacy policy and give consumers the opportunity to choose options such as whether they agree with the company’s privacy policy and third party use and whether they want to get direct advertising e-mails from the company (Bouckaert et al., 2006). The opt-in policy puts more weight on the consumer’s side, instead of the company’s. It creates more limitations than the opt-out policy because consumers can choose before they send private information to the company. However, it can get more consumer satisfaction for the company.

Opt-Out In opt-out, a company must guarantee the right of individuals to opt out their private information. It requires companies to post their privacy policy, including the subjects about opt-out policy, on their Web site so consumers can access to understand before they actually send their private information to company. Companies also have to provide the opportunity for consumers to request that their private information not be used for third party use whenever they want to do so (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005). Once a company collects private information according to the opt-out policy, it can use private information for third party use until consumers ask to stop doing it. It is considered as an agreement for third-party use between consumers and company when consumers send them out to the company. Under the opt-out policy, a company is willing to share private information with a thirdparty, such as direct phone marketing and direct e-mail advertisement. Most consumers are not aware of this policy and in most cases companies can take advantage of consumers to make their business easier.

Online Privacy Seals The third-party assurance (TPA) seal program provided by a third party helps consumers distinguish websites that got certified from those who are not yet certified. The third party assesses websites that want to get certification from the seal program and if it qualifies, the company can get certified and put the trust mark on their Web site. Companies can show that they have strong privacy security policies and practices to consumers. There are third-party assurance seal programs available. TrustE and BBBonline in the U.S. are the two major seal programs organizations in privacy assurance (Kimery & McCord, 2006). TrustE was established in 1997 as an independent non-profit organization to protect consumers’ privacy rights and promote a safer Internet marketplace. Its main purpose is to build consumer confidence in e-commerce. To accomplish its goal, TrustE is using the seal program, a certification program for Internet consumer privacy. If a company wants to get a certificate from TrustE, they need to apply and get accessed



Online Privacy Protection in Japan

by the organization. There are a few requirements that must be met in order to get compliance, which are 1) a participating merchant must prominently display a privacy policy statement on its Web site, 2) consumers must be allowed to choose whether or not their personal information is subject to secondary use by the merchant, 3) consumers must have access to information collected about them, and 4) reasonable security measures must be employed to maintain the privacy of personal information (Benassi, 1999). Once the company obtains a certificate, it can put the TrustE trust mark on its Web site. The company can show its reliability related to privacy policies and practices to consumers using this certificate.

onlIne prIvAcy protectIon In JApAn The development of Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information (thereafter the Act) began in 1980. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) first released guidelines for privacy in 1980. As a response, legislation for the protection of private information possessed by the government was established in Japan. In 1995, EU established the EU Privacy Protection Act. This law limited the transfer of private data from EU to other countries if there was no privacy law which was as good as what EU had in the other country. During that period of time, there was no law enforcement or protection for the personal information of commercial companies in Japan, and the Japanese government basically relied on the market to decide how to manage private information. After the EU privacy act, the Japanese government began to shift bases from market control to law control for private information protection (Okamura, 2004).

the Act Until 2005, there was no law enforcement for privacy protection in Japan but only guidelines. 

Japanese companies did not pay attention to privacy protection because consumers could not see how their private information was handled. As a result, there have been many privacy violations, especially in the case of personal private information leaking. For example, in 2003, there were 560,000 reported incidents of leaked private information according to an investigation by Lawson, one of the biggest convenience store companies in Japan. According to the report, Lawson was outsourcing the maintenance of its customer database to another company. The private information was leaked from the outsourced company, while, ironically, Lawson did not even have an access account to its own customer database. Lawson responded to the incident poorly, sending a gift card of merely five dollars to all customers whose information had been leaked. The mentioned example was just one of many violation cases in which the private information of consumers was poorly protected.

contents of the Act In 2005, the Japanese government enforced the Act on the Protection of Personal Information, which consists of six sections. Its purpose is to protect the right of all individuals to know how their private information is taken care of. It is also meant to protect their right to request that companies not release their private information (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005). The six sections of the Act include: (a) general provision, (b) responsibilities of the state and local public bodies, (c) measures for the protection of personal information, (d) duties of entities handling personal information, (e) miscellaneous provisions, and (f) penal provisions. The first three sections are for government and local public bodies. The fourth section targets commercial companies. There are three regulatory codes and five obligations in this section. This law prohibits companies to sell, transfer, and use any private information without receiv-

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

ing permission from the involved individual. When the information is collected, the company has to inform its consumers of how their private information will be used. The company is also responsible for protecting and managing the collected private information under a secure and safe environment. If a data leak happens, it will be the company’s fault. The three regulatory codes are listed (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005): •

• •

A company is not allowed to use private information beyond its original intended purpose. A company is not allowed to attain private information via illegal methods. A company is not allowed to give private information to a third party without receiving permission from the individual to whom the information belongs.

Moreover, the five obligations are detailed as follows (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005): • •

•

•

•

A company must specify its reason for using private information. A company must inform consumers its purpose of using private information when the company collects their information. A company must protect and manage private information under a secure and safe environment. A company must manage and observe all employees and its relevant outsourced companies which use private information. A company must release correct private information and stop using it when consumers want to do so.

scope of the Act The Act defines the scope of its application based on the amount of the company’s private data (more than 5000), the method for storing private

information (organized database), and the period that is observed (past 6 months). According to the Act, private information is based on a person, not on a segment defined by the company. For example, even though a company has three segments of private information for one person (name, address, and driver’s license number), it is counted as one. It includes not only consumers’ personal information but also any other private information, such as employees’ and potential new employees’ private information, and other related private information owned by each employee, such as customers and co-workers’ information on employees’ laptop computers. Organized private data means that the company has a database to manage private information. The database created by the company makes searching and retrieving consumer private data more easy and efficient. A 6 month period in the Act means that a company will have more than 5000 consumers’ private data more than once at any point during the past 6 months. Even if a company has less than 5000 right now, it might be in the scope of the Act if its amount of private data exceeded the defined 5000 records during the past 6 months. In short, if a company stored more than 5,000 private records on its database more than once during the past 6 months, it would be regulated by the Act.

Classification of Private Information Once a company is in the scope of the Act, it must ensure each type of private information. There are three types of private information defined in the Act, which each requires different obligations from the company (Arai, 2005). The three types include personal private information, personal private data, and retained personal private data. •

Personal private information: This type of information is about the living individual, such as name, address, birth date, and any



Online Privacy Protection in Japan

•

•

other information that can be used to identify the individual. However, this information is not organized and not in a database. Personal private data: If personal private information has been organized and put in a database to allow fast and easy search, this information is categorized as personal private data. The assumption is that personal private data will be deleted in 6 months and the company does not have any authority to release and correct the data. For example, if a company is contracted to create a database for another company as a part of its outsourced task, then the database will be deleted in 6 months and the company does not have the right to change any data after that. Retained personal private data: If personal private data will be kept for more than 6 months and the company has the authority to release, correct, stop usage, and delete data, then the data is categorized as retained personal private data.

Obligations Defined for Each Type of private Information All three types of personal information are required to uphold the following obligations (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005):

•

Releasing, correction, addition, deletion, and stop using of private data

Since the definition of information can be broad and vague, this classification can help company understand the boundaries of private information. Each category has its own definitions of private information and obligation. In summary, personal private information is unorganized private information, such as paper based information, which has not been sorted by index and cannot be retrieved easily. In other words, it is raw information before the company has a database to organize and manage it. However, this type of information must be deleted in a 6 month period, and private data cannot be published or modified. For example, if a small company organizes private information to create a customer database for another company as an outsourcing task, the private information will be deleted after the job is completed. In this case, the private information is considered as personal private data. Lastly, retained personal private data is similar to personal private data in the form of organized private information which is stored in a database. However, in this case, the company has full authority and is allowed to release, correct, stop using, and delete data. It can also use the information for its business and keep the information for more than 6 months.

limitations • • • •

• • • •



Specify the purpose of usage of private information Legal private information collection Inform of privacy policy Customer claim support Personal private data and retained personal private data: Maintain safety and secure environment for storing private data Observation of employees’ business practice Observation of outsourced company Limit data transfer Retained personal private data:

Data Collection The Act does not define any subjects as prohibited to collect private data from consumers. In the U.S., it is prohibited to collect sensitive data, such as political, religion, racial, and ethical view, medical history, sexual orientation, and criminal record. In addition, there is the Children Privacy Act to protect young people under the age of 13. However, no such types of protection laws exist in Japan and companies can collect any kind of data from anyone (Yamazaki, 2005).

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

Data Transfer

Private Data After Used

Data transfer is not prohibited by law in Japan. A company can transfer private data to other countries that do not have privacy laws comparable with Japan’s. This means that violation of privacy laws could easily occur in third countries. Even though a company located in Japan meets Japanese privacy laws, its customer data easily be leaked by an outsourced company in a third country that does not have any privacy policies or laws. Nevertheless, the global standard of the privacy protection act prohibits this type of activity to secure consumers’ data, especially in Europe (Yamazaki, 2005).

Private data that is used based on company privacy policies and indicates what kind of purpose the company is using the consumer’s private information for can be kept in the company’s database even though the company cannot use them for some other purpose. The Act does not address private data after they are used. After its task is completed, the company does not have to delete all private data that have already been used. If a company is acquired by another company, private information is transferred to the acquiring company and can be used for marketing or other purposes (Yamazaki, 2005).

Obligation of Informing Data Leak There is no obligation found in the Act that states that companies must inform consumers when a privacy violation occurs. Many states in the U.S. already have legislation that protects consumer privacy; that is, the company is required to inform the customers involved in consumer privacy breaches so that the customers can prevent further unknown activities involving their information (Yamazaki, 2005).

Right to Control Private Information Consumers give up most of their right to control from the moment they send their private information to a company. Consumers can request to update private information from the company’s database if they find it incorrect. In this case, the company is required, by law, to correct or delete wrong information from its database. However, it does not have to delete correct private information from its database even if consumers ask to delete it. The company simply does not have any obligations to remove customers’ private information under the Act (Yamazaki, 2005).

onlIne prIvAcy protectIon mechAnIsms In JApAn The three types of privacy protection mechanisms in Japan (Opt-out, P3P, and the privacy seal program) were discussed earlier. Opt-Out is the way companies collect private data from consumers. P3P is the technology used to communicate between a company’s privacy policy and consumer’s preference. P3P can help consumers understand the difference between them. It is useful under the situation where privacy policy is changed too often. Thirdly, the privacy seal program is for licensing a program to own a privacy mark on the company’s Web site. The company has to be certified for its privacy protection system based on JIS Q 15001 standard to join the privacy mark owner. Privacy mark represents how reliable the company is online.

opt-out policy for third-party use in Japan The Act forbids a company to pass private information to a third party without receiving the individual’s permission. The company must have



Online Privacy Protection in Japan

permission to give private information for the third party’s use. As a result, the company must use the opt-in or out policies to deal with this situation (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005). In Japan, most companies use the opt-out system, which shows the company’s privacy policy on its Web site. If consumers release their private data to the company, it is assumed that consumers agree with the privacy policy of the company as well as that of the third party. The Act requires companies to include four specific articles for the opt-out policy in their privacy policies, which include (1) the private information for third party use, (2) list of private information for third party use, (3) the way that company gives private information to a third party, and (4) when consumers request the company to disallow the third party to use their information, the company must accept the request. As long as a company posts sufficient privacy policies on its Web site, it can use an opt-out system in Japan (Syukunan, 2007). However, consumers might not realize that they agreed with a company’s privacy opt-out policy until they receive unknown e-mail ads. In other words, there is no option for consumers to choose no matter whether they agree or disagree to allow a third part to use their information. In the U.S. the opt-in system is used, which is opposite to the opt-out system. Both show their privacy policy on their Web site and collect consumers’ private data. However, the main difference is that in the opt-in system, consumers have the right to choose their options before their private information is used (Bouckaert et al., 2006). The global trend is shifting to opt-in systems because when more choices are offered to consumers, it has shown to increase their satisfaction. Many Japanese companies are following this trend to adopt opt-in systems, but still many companies remain using opt-out systems because of their convenience.

8

p3p system The new media development association in Japan decided to adopt the platform for privacy preferences (P3P) for privacy protection. However, the adjustments based on the Japanese law and customs are required to use P3P in Japan because the P3P was mainly developed in Europe and the U.S. According to a survey done by the new media development association (2006), 11% of companies used P3P on their Web site in 2005. Comparing the surveys from 2004 and 2005, the use of P3P decreased by 7% because of the following issues: • • • • •

P3P cannot cover Japanese privacy policy. There is no manual to install P3P. No browser is fully capable of using P3P. Translation is not native so consumers hardly understand it. Familiarity of P3P is low in Japan.

In order to promote P3P as a standard technology in Japan, it is important to clear these issues. The history of privacy protection in Japan is not long and consumers’ attention remains low. Consumers’ involvement is key to the popularity of protection mechanisms and will help these mechanisms become used by more and more companies in Japan.

privacy seals In Japan, there is a privacy seal system called privacy mark. They have a cross relationship with TrustE and BBBonline in the U.S., privacy mark uses JIS Q 15001, a privacy protection management standard, to observe candidates. If candidates are qualified, they can use privacy mark on their Web site and join other privacy-marked companies (Okamura, 2004). The privacy mark system started in 1998. At that time there was no law to protect private information. As a response, Japan Private Information Development Asso-

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

ciation initiated a licensing system for privacy protection (Purpose of Privacy Mark System, 2007). The privacy mark license would last for 2 years, and the company must be certified again to use the privacy mark. In 2007, more than 8000 companies used privacy mark. Since the Act was activated in 2005, the privacy mark system has received far more attention than before. Privacy mark is one of the key elements to obtain businesses from large companies. As mentioned previously, there are many outsourcing tasks available, such as data entry and delivery. However, a company must have a good privacy protection system installed in the company as required by the Act. As a result, companies use privacy marks as a rate of privacy protection when they outsource tasks in Japan. If a company has privacy mark, it will have a significant advantage when obtaining outsourcing jobs (Tahara & Yokohari, 2005).

because of carelessness and a lack of attention on the Act. In order to get all employees involved in this stage, top executives should have all departments submit detailed lists of private information and create a master list of private information, including how private information is kept. The master list of private information should include the following items: • • • • • • • • • •

four-stAge prIvAcy protectIon solutIon model Privacy protection has become a major issue in Japan since the Act was in effect. Companies have been trying to integrate their systems and receive their customers’ confidence. In this section, the guidelines to establish a privacy protection system are presented. Adapted from Tahara and Yokohari (2005) and Yamazaki (2005), a four-stage model is proposed as follows.

stage 1: check all personal private Information in the company There is large amount private information in the company. What the company needs to do first is to check and control all private information. If any unknown private information exists in the company, it is impossible to protect it. According to the consumer claim service center in Japan, most violations of private information occurred

Purpose of usage of private information How private information was collected Number of private information Contents of private information Whether private information is edited and added or not Store location and how they are stored Name of the users of private information Whether private information are shared or not Whether private information are transferred or not When and how private information will be deleted

stage 2: Analyze Whether there are any violations of the Act After the master list of private information is completed, the company should analyze its private information and compare it with the Act. This stage helps the company realize what problems it has so far and brings more attention to privacy protection. Most violations of privacy protection, such as a hacker’s attack, are internal cases rather than external cases. As a result, educating employees is one of the most important elements in privacy protection. In order to implement a protection system, the company has to be aware of the current situation regarding private information. The following is a checklist that can be used to analyze the company’s current situation: •

Specify how the private information will be used

9

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

• • • • • • •

The scope of usage of private information is not violated The way the private information was collected is legal Consumers are informed of the purpose of the usage of the private information An incident plan is prepared in the case of a leak or loss of private information Education for private information is implemented Guidelines for outsourcing private information are prepared Agreement of outsourcing private information has been received from consumers

stage 3: establish privacy policy and make It public for All consumers and employees Since the Act requires informing consumers of the purpose of the usage of private information when it is collected, a company must have privacy policy to let consumers know. Privacy policy should include all legal obligations as defined by the Act and future plan of the company. The subjects which companies must include in the privacy policy are as follows.

Privacy Policy Subjects • • • • •

Purpose of usage of private information Policy of data transfer to outsourced company Policy of sharing private information Policy of retained private data Contact information of claim or advise

Once the company has a detailed privacy policy done, it must be published on the Web site. Not only is this process for satisfying requirements of the Act and making the privacy policy public and located at a place where consumers can be easily access it, but it also allows consumers to know the company’s privacy policy before their actual business with the company. 80

It is important that the company implements the three plans—physical, internal, and external—to maintain their privacy policy in effect. In the physical plan, the company should secure all information by access control, security control, and removal control. First, it is vital to designate who can access what kind of information in the company and to keep updating the password and access lists so the company can control access to private information to prevent private data leaks. For example, most Japanese companies are giving access authorities for private information to all employees to make business run smoothly. However, it increases the risk of a data leak. The company must restrict access authority to protect private information. The second regards security control. Physical theft is always a serious concern for protecting private information. The inventory management of the equipment, especially for portable ones, such as laptop computers and USB flash drives, is also important. The company should restrict or prevent private information from being copied to devices that could be taken outside of the company. The last note is the removal of private information. There are many cases that are related to improper removal of private information that was stolen and spread out via the Internet. The company should establish a policy for removing and storing private information. The internal plan requires companies to have an effective organizational system to educate employees and establish employee working rules to deal with private information. An effective organizational system is for designating authority and responsibility and having effective communication between executive managers and employees so that top executives can observe how private information is handled by each department and employee. Education for employees is to make all employees aware of the Act in daily business practices. It is important to educate employees, because once a violation of privacy protection occurs, the company needs to show how much employees have been educated about

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

the Act. As listed, there are four steps to educate employees.

cAse studIes case I: yahoo! bb’s data leak

• • • •

Make all employees take classes about the Act Answer and solve all privacy-related inquires in daily business activities Test all employees’ knowledge on the Act Establish a working manual and distribute it to all employees

The establishment of working rules will help to increase employees’ awareness of the risks associated with violation of the Act. It should include rewards and punishments for violating a rule to motivate and involve all employees to create secure environment for private information. The external plan is for contracting with outsourced companies. In the Act, it requires the company to monitor outsourced companies. If a contracted company violates the Act, it will be the company’s responsibility. When a company outsources its data entry or delivery task to another company, it is required to have a specific and strict policy for selecting a reliable contracted company. It is a common business practice for a large firm to outsource its non-core or minor tasks to smaller companies. However, violations of the Act have occurred in situations like this frequently.

stage 4: establish guidelines if an violation of the Act occurs Companies need to make good decisions and take action to minimize the damage associated with a violation of the Act. In order to make a correct decision, the company should establish appropriate guidelines for an incident response of the violation of privacy laws. The first response from the company’s stakeholders is typically the most critical in this case because they would perceive how the company is reacting. The company must make sure they know exactly what happened and how much the damage could cost before minimizing the secondary damage for consumers.

Yahoo! BB, a DSL service owned by Soft Bank, Co. in Japan, had the private data of 4.5 million people leaked because it was illegally accessed from outside of the company in 2004. Yahoo! BB is a one of the largest DSL Internet providers in Japan. Its service began in 2001. Since its service was less expensive and broader than other competitors’, it gained more than one million customers in 3 years (Sasahara, 2005a). However, the massive privacy violation disaster occurred because Yahoo! BB could not update their system more quickly as the company grew, and it did not take care of private information as an asset of the company that was more prioritized than the company’s growth. Yahoo! BB’s private information was stored in an internal database. This database was connected to the company’s network so employees could access it from outside of the company if they had a remote access account and database access account. According to Yahoo! BB’s investigation (Suzuki, 2004), there were 100 people who had a remote or database access account, and 18 had both remote and database access accounts. Yahoo! BB had two types of account for each access, group and personal. The data leak was started by a person who had both accounts. This person retired and his Yahoo! BB personal account was terminated. However, the group account for both remote and database access was not updated. As a result, he could easily access the database, which stored more than 4.5 million customers’ private data, from outside of the company with his group account. This data leak was not caused by this person but another person who got the account information from him. The group account mentioned in this case had not been changed since 2002 and was finally deleted in 2005 (Suzuki, 2004). The group account did not necessarily need to be created, but was convenient when

8

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

conducting daily business activities. The loss of managing access control was the critical catalyst that triggered what became one of the largest private data leaks in the world. Yahoo! BB decided to physically separate the customer database with private data from any network and composed 684 security examinations, such as finger print activation and strict access control, to prevent more private data leaks. After all investigations were completed, Yahoo! BB mailed gift cards worth $5 to all customers whose private information had been leaked (Suzuki, 2004).

case II: michinoku bank’s customer data loss Michinoku Bank, located in Aomori, Japan lost its 1.28 million customers’ private data and all bank information in 2005. For security purposes, the bank created backup CDs for all customers’ private information, which were lost due to an unknown reason. According to Michinoku’s press release, these CDs may have been accidentally thrown away with other trash, and it is possible that the customers’ information will not fall into someone’s hands (Imaio, 2005). However, the conjecture could not be proved because no one would be able to know the location of the CDs. After this news was released, Michinoku Bank received a correction warning and business improvement order from the financial sector of Japanese government. The reputation of the bank completely collapsed and its stock price dropped more than 30% and they lost $300 million (Imaio, 2005). This case was only the tip of the iceberg. Since the private information protection law was activated in 2005, similar problems were reported to the government and 6.78 million people’s private data was lost from 287 companies (Sasahara, 2005b). According to the survey, 75% decided to provide security education on handling private data for all employees. Sixty-seven percent

8

reengineered business flow and 65% established customer support centers. It has been generally observed that increasing employees’ security awareness and education on the Act has become the most common practice. Even though the online security of the financial business has been more reliable, companies could not prevent human related flaws because of poor security education for their employees.

Analysis and Implication Case I: The Yahoo! BB case describes how important a company’s access control and organizational reporting system are. As addressed in the previous section, a company must establish its own privacy policy. In order to implement its policy, Yahoo! BB must conduct physical and internal controls for all employees, including establishing access control, restructuring its organizational system, offering security training and education, and establishing employee working rules. These controls were obviously absent in Yahoo! BB’s case. The following are the root causes of this case. •

•

•

Access control: Yahoo! BB had little access control over its private data. There was no employee access authority list, and the access logs were too small to record all unauthorized accesses. Restructuring organizational system: Yahoo! BB did not have an efficient organizational system to control each department and contracted company. There was no effective communication between top executives and employees. As a result, top executives did not even know the existence of group accounts until they were identified by the major investigation, and the group accounts had not been updated for more than 3 years. Security training and education: The employees did not have any training or education on the Act. They were not aware of the risks of violating privacy protection.

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

•

Employee working rules: The working environment was almost unrestricted. There was no rule for dealing with customers’ files. Employees could copy any files to a personal device if they could access the database.

Yahoo! BB’s main focus was getting more customers and more business to meet their fast growing goal but along the way they sacrificed their customers’ privacy protections. As a result, the company’s reputation significantly degraded after the incident. The company should have created a privacy policy not only for customers but also all employees. The core information should not be able to be easily obtained by anyone. Security training and education should be provided and employees should fully understand the Act and their working rules. In this case, there was no need to provide so many group accounts for employees, since they had not been changed for three years. Such accounts should be restricted and updated periodically (Kai, 2004). Case II: The Michinoku Bank case pointed out how important education for employees and physical security control are. Since the Act was put into effect in 2005, employees were not familiar with the law and they did not perceive the impact of privacy breaches. In order to reduce this security concern in daily business activities, the company should provide quality security training and education for all employees so they can work more safely under the law. It is also important to implement security control. As addressed in the previous section, physical security control is part of privacy protection. The Michinoku Bank had high security protection against attacking from outside. However, the privacy violation occurred from inside of the company. This is why it is critical to create an employee privacy policy. The Michinoku Bank did not have an organized physical security control. The most valuable information was lost because of a human error. The root causes are summarized.

•

•

Lack of security control: The bank did not have any inventory control of private data. They need to create a department to control and restrict corporate physical inventory. More than a million people’s private data can easily be saved on a couple of CDs. The company must pay more attention to handling private data. Lack of security training and education: Lack of employee security training and education resulted in less attention on valuable corporate assets, private data CDs, and so forth. Even though the company has a good security control policy, the security training and education for all employees needs to be provided.

In summary, two major privacy breaches occurred internally instead of externally. Both cases exhibit major problems in the stage of establishing privacy policy, which resulted from lack of access control, physical security control, and security training and education. The companies were not fully compliant with the Act because it was the first privacy law for commercial companies. However, their weak privacy protection had degraded their business’s reputation. The companies were required to report their privacy incidents to the government according to the Act. Both companies need to review their privacy protection system and reorganize their system to prevent similar incidents from happening again.

future trends The year of 2005 was a major turning point for all businesses in Japan. The first law on the protection of personal information for commercial companies was launched. Companies were trying to adapt to the new law. The Act on the Protection of Personal Information has brought new perspective of privacy to all Japanese companies and consumers. The stage of privacy protection in

8

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

Japan remains early. A learning curve to a mature privacy system in Japan is expected.

conclusIon For Japanese companies and consumers, it is important to understand the details of their new privacy law and make adjustments from the traditional privacy protection system to the new one. The Act also helps reveal many privacy breaches and violations. Many suits related to privacy are expected. However, companies cannot escape from the required changes since online privacy has become a priority problem for consumers in Japan. Consumer online privacy is receiving more and more attention because consumers are being educated to know the importance of private information protection and the impact of privacy breaches. For companies, protecting consumers’ privacy has become a primary issue since it will help gain their customers’ trust and business. However, companies should take the responsibility to not only enhance their online privacy protection systems but also educate their employees and customers and incorporate the privacy concept into Japanese culture toward a new stage. In e-commerce, online privacy can be protected by means of the online privacy protection mechanisms such as opt-in, privacy mark, and P3P. A privacy mark seal program can help a company provide more information in privacy policy for consumers. P3P allows consumers to choose their privacy level by themselves rather than let the company determine the level of privacy that they will have. The opt-in policy will allow consumers to select how their private information is used online. Weakness of privacy protection could cost companies even more than what was exhibited in the Yahoo! BB and Michinoku Bank cases. When implementing a privacy protection system, companies need to ensure the compliance of the regulatory codes and legal obligations.

8

future reseArch dIrectIons The Japanese privacy protection system has not yet matured since the Act on the Protection of Personal Information was launched in 2005. Many adjustments and changes are expected. It is suggested that future research pursue the following directions. •

•

•

How does a company in Japan make adjustment in compliance with the new Act on the protection of personal information? How are consumers’ attentions shifting to the new Act, which somewhat contradicts Japanese culture? Japanese people respect privacy in their culture but the new law will stimulate their thinking and need for privacy. The longitudinal change of the Act should be observed and analyzed. There is a lot of room for the Act to be corrected or adjusted as time goes on. Research can help establish new models for the future privacy protection system.

references Act on the protection of personal information. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2005). http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/kojin/foreign/act. pdf Analysis of Japanese privacy protection technology (2005). Retrieved from New Media Develpment Association: http://www.nmda.or.jp/enc/privacy/pr_rep_2006.pdf Analysis of new technology for privacy protection system (2006, March). Retrieved from New Media Develpment Association: http://www.nmda. or.jp/enc/privacy/pr_rep_2006.pdf Arai, T. (2005). Outline of personal informtion protection act. Information Management, 2-15.

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

Benassi, P. (1999). TRUSTe: An online privacy seal program. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 56-59.

Okamura, H. (2004). Privacy protection and rights to use privacy information in secure environment. Japan: Foundation Internet Association.

Bouckaert, J., & Degryse, H. (2005). Opt in versus opt out: A free-entry analysis of privacy policies. http://weis2006.econinfosec.org/docs/34.pdf

Purpose of Privacy mark system. (2007, April 9). Retrieved from Privacy Mark: http://privacymark. jp/privacy_mark/about/outline_and_purpose. html

Cranor, L. F. (2001). Introduction to P3P. In L. F. Cranor (Ed.), Web privacy with P3P. O’reylly. Goto, T. (2006, March). B to B, C to C, C to B, C to C. Retrieved from Next Generation Electronic Commerce Promotion Council of Japan: http://www.ecom.jp/journal/2007/ECOM_Journal_2007.pdf Goto, T. (2007, March). B to B, C to C, C to B, C to C. Retrieved from Next Generation Electronic Commerce Promotion Council of Japan: http://www.ecom.jp/journal/2006/ECOMJournal2006.pdf

Sasahara, E. (2005a, June 29). Security hole of privacy information database. Retrieved from IT pro: http://itpro.nikkeibp.co.jp/free/smbit/ smbit/20050629/163612/?ST=smb Sasahara, E. (2005b, Sept. 29). Privacy data lost in financial business. Retrieved from IT pro: http://itpro.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/SMBIT/ 20050928/221820/?ST=management Suzuki, T. (2004, May 31). Overview of Yahoo! BB data leak. Retrieved from IT pro, http://itpro.nikkeibp.co.jp/free/NC/NEWS/20040531/145132/

Imaio, K. (2005). Michinoku bank privacy data lost. Retrieved from IT pro: http://itpro.nikkeibp.co.jp/ free/NIP/NIPCOLUMN/20050616/162853/

Syukunan, T. (2007). Analysis for efficiency of anti-spam ware. Media Communications (Japanese), 57, 2-10.

Investigation result of data leak from Lawson. (2003). Retrieved from CNET Japan: h t t p: //ja p a n .c n e t .c o m / n e w s / m e d i a /s t o ry/0,2000056023,20060378,00.htm

Tahara, M., & Yokohari, K. (2005). Warning of usage of privacy information. Tokyo: Asa.

Kai, H. (2004). Comment from President of Softbank Co. Retrieved from Internet Watch: http://internet.watch.impress.co.jp/cda/ news/2004/02/27/2257.html Kimery, K., & McCord, M. (2006). Signals of trustworthiness in e-commerce: Consumer understanding of third-party assurance seals. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 4(4), 52-74. Mizutani, M., Dorsey, J., & Moor, J. (2004). The internet and Japanese conception of privacy. Ethics and Information Technology, 6(2), 121-128. Nakada, M., & Tamura, T. (2005). Japanese conceptions of privacy: An intercultural perspective. Ethics and Information Technology, 7(1), 27-36.

Yamazaki, F. (2005). Privacy protection law. Nikkei BP.

AddItIonAl reAdIngs Ackerman, M. (2004). Privacy in pervasive environment: next generation labeling protocols. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 8(6), 430-439. Agrawal, R., Kiernan, J., Srikant, R., & Xu, Y. (2003). An XPath-based preference language for P3P. In Proceedings of the Twelfth International World Wide Web conference (WWW2003) (pp. 629-639).

8

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

Andrade, E., Kaltcheva, V., & Weitz, B. (2002). Self-disclosure on the web: The impact of privacy policy, reward, and company reputation. Advances in Consumer Research, 29, 350-353. Antón, A., & Earp, J. (2004). A requirements taxonomy to reduce website privacy vulnerabilities. Requirements Engineering Journal, 9(3), 169-185. Antón, A., He, Q., & Baumer, D. (2004). The complexity underlying JetBlue’s privacy policy violations. IEEE Security & Privacy, 2(6), 12-18. Ashrafi, N., & Kuilboer, J. (2005). Online privacy policies: An empirical perspective on self-regulatory practices. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 3(4), 61-74. Belanger, F., Hiller, J., & Smith, W. (2002) Trustworthiness in electronic commerce: The role of privacy, security, and site attributes. Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 11(3/4), 245270.

cryptography over noisy channels. Physics Review Letters, 77(13), 2818-2821. Eldin, A. A., & Wagenaar, R. (2004). Towards users driven privacy control. IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 5, 4673-4679. Faja, S. (2005). Privacy in e-commerce: Understanding user trade-offs. Issues in Information Systems, 6(2), 83-89. Fitzpatrick, A., Evansburg, A., Fiore, M., Watson, V., & Welch, K. (2003). Japanese Parliament passes legislation governing use of personal information. Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 15(8), 18. Floridi, L. (2002). On the intrinsic value of information objects and the infosphere. Ethics & Information Technology, 4(4), 287-304. Gritzalis, D. (2004). Embedding privacy in IT applications development. Information Management and Computer Security, 12(1), 8-16.

Brown, M., & Muchira, R. (2004). Investigating the relationship between Internet privacy concerns and online purchase behavior. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, 5(1), 62-70.

Kawai, M. (2004). Anzen sinwa houkai no paradokkus (Paradox of the Collapse of Belief in Safety in Japan). Iwanami, Tokyo.

Capurro, R. (2005). Privacy. An intercultural perspective. Ethics and Information Technology, 7(1), 37-47.

Kudo, M., Araki, Y., Nomiyama, H., Saito, S., & Sohda, Y. (2007). Best practices and tools for personal information compliance management. IBM Systems Journal, 46(2), 235-254.

Cassidy, C., & Chae, M. (2006). Consumer information use and misuse in electronic business: An alternative to privacy regulation. Information Systems Management, 23(3), 75-87.

Milne, G., Rohm, A., & Bahl, S. (2004). Consumers’ protection of online privacy and identity. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), 217-232.

Davison, R., Clarke, R., Smith, J., Langford, D., & Kuo, B. (2003). Information privacy in a globally networked society: Implications for IS research. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 12, 341-365. Deutsch, D., Ekert, A., Jozsa, R., Macchiavello, C., Popescu, S., & Sanpera, A. (1996). Quantum privacy amplification and the security of quantum

8

Mizutani, M., Dorsey, J., & Moor, J. (2004). The Internet and Japanese Conception of Privacy. Ethics and Information Technology, 6, 121–128. Nakada, M., & Tamura, T. (2005). Japanese conceptions of privacy: An intercultural perspective. Ethics and Information Technology, 7(1), 27. Pavlou, P., & Fygenson, M. (2006). Understanding and predicting electronic commerce adoption: An

Online Privacy Protection in Japan

extension of the theory of planned behavior. MIS Quarterly, 30(1), 115-143. Peslak, A. (2006). Internet privacy policies of the largest international companies. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 4(3), 46-62. Reichheld, F., & Schefter, P. (2000), E-loyalty: Your secret weapon on the web. Harvard Business Review, 78(A), 105-113. Rifkin, J. (2000). The age of access. New York: Putnam. Skinner, G., & Chang, E. (2006a). A conceptual framework for information privacy and security in collaborative environments. International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, 6(2B), 166-172.

Skinner, G., & Chang, E. (2006b). A projection of the future effects of quantum computation on information privacy and information security. International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, 6(8B), 189-194. Yasu, K., Akahane, Y., Ozaki, M., Semoto, K., & Sasaki, R. (2005). Evaluation of check system for improper sending of personal information in encrypted mail system. PSJ (Information Processing Society of Japan) Journal, 46(8), 1976-1983. Zhang, X., Sakaguchi, T., & Kennedy, M. (2007). A cross-cultural analysis of privacy notices of the global 2000. Journal of Information Privacy & Security, 3(2), 18-37.

8

88

Compilation of References

42 C.F.R. § 482.51 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006). Abercrombie, N., & Longhurst, B. (1998). Audiences: A sociological theory of performance and imagination. CA: Sage Publication. Aberdeen Group. (2005). Third brigade—business value research series—most important security action: Limiting access to corporate and customer data. Whitepaper. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www. thirdbrigade.com/uploadedFiles/Company/Resources/ Aberdeen%20White%20Paper%20--%20Limiting%20 Access%20to%20Data.pdf Aberer, K., & Despotovic, Z. (2001). Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system. In Proceedings of the 2001 ACM CIKM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, Atlanta, Georgia (pp. 310-317). New York: ACM. Act on the protection of personal information. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2005). http://www5.cao. go.jp/seikatsu/kojin/foreign/act.pdf Agrawal, D., & Aggarwal, C. (2001). On the design and quantification of privacy preserving data mining algorithms. In Proceedings of the Twentieth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, PODS’01, Santa Barbara, California (pp. 247-255). New York: ACM. Aiken, K., & Boush, D. (2006). Trustmarks, objectivesource ratings, and implied investments in advertising: Investigating online trust and the context-specific nature of internet signals. Academy of Marketing Science Journal, 34(3), 308-323.

Air Defense Press Release. (2005, February 17). AirDefense monitors wireless airwaves at RSA 2005 conference. Retrieved October 2007, from http://airdefense. net/newsandpress/02_07_05.shtm Akenji, L. (2004). The eight basic consumer rights. Retrieved November 8, 2006, from http://www.tudatosvasarlo.hu/english/article/print/254 Allen, A. (2000). Gender and privacy in cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 52(5), 1175-1200. Allens Arthur Robinson. (2007). International data flow. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from www.aar.com. au/privacy/over/data.htm Ambrose, S., & Gelb, J. (2006). Consumer privacy litigation and enforcement actions in the United States. The Business Lawyer, 61, 2. American Board of Medical Specialties. (2007). Retrieved June 1, 2007 from http://www.abms.org American Civil Liberties Union—ACLU. (2007). Privacy section of their web site. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://www.aclu.org/privacy American Heritage. (2006). American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.). Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ copyright American Management Association. (2005). Electronic monitoring & surveillance survey. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/ EMS_summary05.pdf

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Compilation of References

American Medial Association. (2007). Informed consent. Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http://www.ama-assn. org/ama/pub/category/4608.html Analysis of Japanese privacy protection technology (2005). Retrieved from New Media Develpment Association: http://www.nmda.or.jp/enc/privacy/pr_rep_2006. pdf Analysis of new technology for privacy protection system (2006, March). Retrieved from New Media Develpment Association: http://www.nmda.or.jp/enc/privacy/ pr_rep_2006.pdf Anassutzi, M. (2002). E-commerce directive 00/31. International Company and Commercial Law Review, 13(9), 337-342. Anderson, R. (1996). The eternity service. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on the Theory, Applications of Cryptology, PRAGOCRYPT’96. APEC Electronic Commerce Steering Group. (2004). APEC voluntary online consumer protection guidelines. Retrieved March 1, 2005, from http://www.export.gov/ apececommerce/cp/guidelines.htm Apfelroth, J. (2006). The open government act: A proposed bill to ensure the efficient implementation of the freedom of information act. Administrative Law Review, 58(1), 219. Apple. (2007). iTunes [software]. Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.apple.com/itunes/ Arai, T. (2005). Outline of personal informtion protection act. Information Management, 2-15. Arbaugh, J. B. (2000). An exploratory study of effects of gender on student learning and class participation in an internet-based MBA course. Management Learning, 31(4), 503-519. Armstrong, H. L., & Forde, P. G. (2003). Internet anonymity practices in computer crime. Information Management & Computer Security, 11(5), 209-215. Ashrafi, N., & Kuilboer, J. (2005). Online privacy policies: An empirical perspective on self-regulatory practices.

Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 3(4), 61-74. Ashworth, L., & Free, C. (2006). Marketing dataveillance and digital privacy: Using theories of justice to understand consumers’ online privacy concerns. Journal of Business Ethics, 67, 07-123. Ashworth, L., & Free, C. (2006). Marketing dataveillance and digital privacy: Using theories of justice to understand consumers’ online privacy concerns. Journal of Business Ethics, 67, 107-123. Associated Press. (2005). Business schools: Harvard to bar 119 applicants who hacked admissions site. The Globe and Mail, March 9, B12. Auerbach, J. G. (1999, March 31). To get IBM ad, sites must post privacy policies. The Wall Street Journal, pp. B1, B4. Australian Communications and Media Authority. (2005). Consumer information. Anti spam—fighting spam in Australia: Consumer information. Retrieved July 22, 2005, from http://www.acma.gov.au/ACMAINTER.2163012:STANDARD:848603301:pc=PC_ 1965#anti%20spam%20law Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (1999). ACCC conditionally authorises ADMA code of practice. Retrieved March 27, 2007, from http:// www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/322914/ fromItemId/621589 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (2003). Review of building consumer sovereignty in electronic commerce (best practice model). Retrieved November 11, 2006, from http://www.ecommerce. treasury.gov.au/bpmreview/content/_download/submissions/accc.rtf Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. (2004). Annual report 2003-2004—fostering competitive, efficient, fair and informed Australian markets. Canberra, ACT: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Australian Consumers’ Association. (2004). Submission to the review of the private sector provisions of the privacy

89

Compilation of References

act 1988 (Cth) (the privacy act) Sydney, NSW: Office of the Privacy Commissioner (Australia).

November 11, 2006, from http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2006_02.php

Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA). (2005). ADMA profile. Retrieved August 17, 2005, from http://www.adma.com.au/asp/index.asp?pgid=2026

Baratz, A., & McLaughlin, C. (2004). Malware: what it is and how to prevent it. Retrieved November 11, from http://arstechnica.com/articles/paedia/malware.ars

Australian Federal Police (AFP). (2007). Internet fraud. Retrieved March 16, 2007, from http://www.afp.gov. au/national/e-crime/internet_scams

Barbaro, M. (2006, March 7). Wal-Mart enlist bloggers in P.R. campaign. The New York Times.

Australian Institute of Criminology. (2006). More Malware—adware, spyware, spam and spim. High Tech Crime Brief, 1(2006), 1-2. Australian Privacy Foundation. (2005). Rule 3—objectives and purposes. Retrieved April 2, 2007, from http://www.privacy.org.au/About/Objectives.html Australian Privacy Foundation. (2006). Identity checks for pre-paid mobile phones. Retrieved April 2, 2007, from http://www.acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/ lib100696/apf.pdf Australian Privacy Foundation. (2006). International instruments relating to privacy law. Retrieved February 23, 2007, from http://www.privacy.org.au/Resources/ PLawsIntl.html Awad, N. F., & Krishnan, M. S. (2006). The personalization privacy paradox: An empirical evaluation of information transparency and the willingness to be profiled online for personalization. MIS Quarterly, 30(1), 13-28.

Barnes, G. R., Cerrito, P. B., & Levi, I. (1998). A mathematical model for interpersonal relationships in social networks. Social Networks, 20(2), 179-196. Barreto, M., & Ellemers, N. (2002). The impact of anonymity and group identification on progroup behavior in computer-mediated groups. Small Group Research, 33, 590-610. Basili, J., Sahir, A., Baroudi, C., & Bartolini, A. (2007, January). The real cost of enterprise wireless mobility (Abridged ed.). The Aberdeen Group. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.aberdeen.com/summary/report/ benchmark/Mobility_Management_JB_3822.asp Baumer, D. L., Earp, J. B., & Poindexter, J. C. (2004). Internet privacy law: a comparison between the United States and the European Union. Journal of Computers & Security, 23(5), 400-412. Baylor, K. (2006, October 26). Killing botnets McAfee. Retrieved March 2007, from http://blogs.techrepublic. com.com/networking/?cat=2

Bagozzi, R. (1975). Marketing as exchange. Journal of Marketing, 39(4), 32-39.

BBBOnline. (2003). Dispute resolution. Retrieved July 19, 2006, from http://www.bbbonline.org/privacy/dr.asp

Bandler, R. (2000). Persuasion engineering. Capitola, CA: Meta Publications.

BBBOnline. (2005). European Union/US safe harbor compliance. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://www. bbbonline.org/privacy/eu.asp

Bang v. Miller, 88 N.W. 186 (Minn. 1958). Retrieved June 1, 2007, from LexisNexis, Cases, Law School database. Bangeman, E. (2006). Dell growth rate slips behind market. Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://arstechnica. com/news.ars/post/20060420-6640.html Bankston, K. (2006, February 9). Press releases: February, 2006 | electronic frontier foundation. Retrieved

90

BBBOnLine. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.bbbonline.org/ Beck, J., & Herrmann, M. (2007). Drug and device law: HIPAA does not preempt state litigation practice. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://druganddevicelaw. blogspot.com/2007/02/hipaa-does-not-preempt-statelitigation.html

Compilation of References

Belanger, F., Hiller, J. S., & Smith, W. J. (2002). Trustworthiness in electronic commerce: The role of privacy, security, and site attributes. Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 11(3-4), 245-270. Belch, G. E., & Belch, M. A. (2004). Advertising and promotion: An integrated marketing communications perspective (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. Bellman, S., Johnson, J. J., Kobrin, S. J., & Lohse, L. L. (2004). International differences in information privacy concerns: A global survey of consumers. The Information Society, 20, 313-324. Beltramini, R. F. (2003). Application of the unfairness doctrine to marketing communications on the Internet. Journal of Business Ethics, 42(4), 393-400. Benassi, P. (1999). TRUSTe: An online privacy seal program. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 56-59. Bennett, C. (2006). Keeping up with the kids. Young Consumers, Quarter 2, 28-32. Bennett, C. J. (1992). Regulating privacy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Berendt, B., Günther, O., & Spiekermann, S. (2005). Privacy in e-commerce: Stated preferences vs. actual behavior. Communications of the ACM, 48(4), 101-106. Bernard, A. (2006). McAfee’s top ten security threats for 2007. Retrieved October, from http://www.cioupdate. com/print.php/3646826 Berner, R. (2006, May 29). I sold it through the grapevine. Business Week, pp. 32-33. Bhargava, B. (2006, September). Innovative ideas in privacy research (Keynote talk). In Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems Applications DEXA’06, Kraków, Poland (pp. 677-681). Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society. Bhargava, B., & Zhong, Y. (2002). Authorization based on evidence and trust. In Y. Kambayashi, W. Winiwarter, & M. Arikawa (Eds.), Proceedings of 4th International Conference on Data Warehousing and Knowledge

Discovery (DaWaK 2002) Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2454, pp. 94-103). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Bhargava, B., Farkas, C., Lilien, L., & Makedon, F. (2003, September 14-16). Trust, privacy, and security: summary of a workshop breakout session at the national science foundation information and data management (IDM) workshop held in Seattle, Washington (Tech. Rep. No. 2003-34). West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS). Bhargava, B., Lilien, L., Rosenthal, A., & Winslett, M. (2004). Pervasive trust. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 19(5), 74-77. BJ’s Wholesale Club settles FTC charges. (2005). Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/bjswholesale.htm Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., & Lacy, J. (1996). Decentralized trust management. In Proceedings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (pp. 164-173). Bloom, I. (2006). Freedom of information law in the digital age: The death knell of informational privacy. Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, 12(Spring), 9. BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, Volume Number 858, (2005). Bogozza, D. (2006). WHO and partners accelerate fight against counterfeit medicines. PR Newswire US. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from LexisNexis News Bommareddy v. Superior Court, 222 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Cal. Ct. App.1990). Retrieved from LexisNexis Cases, Law School database. Borland, J. (2006). Apple’s iTunes raises privacy concerns. CNet News. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://news.com. com/Apples+iTunes+raises+privacy+concerns/21001029_3-6026542.html Bouckaert, J., & Degryse, H. (2005). Opt in versus opt out: A free-entry analysis of privacy policies. http://weis2006. econinfosec.org/docs/34.pdf

9

Compilation of References

Boyer, M. C. (2004). Texas administrative agencies tackle compliance with the health insurance portability and accountability act’s privacy rule. Texas Tech Journal of Administrative Law, 5, 100-111. Brands, S. (2000). Rethinking public key infrastructures and digital certificates. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Brandt, D. (n.d.). Google as big brother. Retrieved November 11, 2006, from http://www.google-watch.org Brazell, L. (2004). Electronic signatures law and regulation (1st ed.). London: Sweet & Maxwell. Brenner, S. (2001). Is there such a thing as “virtual crime?” Retrieved February 1, 2006,from http://www. crime-research.org/library/Susan.htm Brenner, S. W. (2005). The search and seizure of computers and electronic evidence: The fourth amendment in an era of ubiquitous technology. Mississippi Law Journal, 75(Fall), 1. Brenner, S. W., & Clark, L. L. (2006). Fourth amendment protection for shared privacy rights in stored transactional data. Journal of Law and Policy, 14, 211. Brooke, J., & Robbins, C. (2007). Programmer gives up all the money he made distributing spyware. Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/enternet.htm Brown, J. (1996). Australia and the modern consumer movement. A History of the Australian Consumer Movement (pp. 1-6). Braddon, ACT: Consumers’ Federation of Australia. Brunner, C. (1991). Gender and distance learning. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 133-145.

European consumer legislation information society. Journal of Consumer Policy, 24(3/4), 287-338. C. Martin (Ed.), Webster’s new world hacker dictionary (pp. 373-380). Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, Inc. Cafarchio, P. (2004). The challenge of non-viral malware! TISC Insight Newsletter, 4(12). Retrieved October 2007, from www.pestpatrol.com/Whitepapers/NonViralMalware0902.asp Cai, X., & Gantz, W. (2000). Online privacy issues associated with web sites for children. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 44(2), 197-214. Cal. Civ. Code 56-56.37 (LexisNexis 2007). Campbell, J., & Carlson, M. (2002). Panopticon.com: Online surveillance and the commodification of privacy. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 46(4), 586-606. Can Google diagnose illness better than doctors? (Nov. 6, 2006). The Daily Mail (London). Retrieved June 4, 2007, from http://www.seroundtable.com/archives /006667.html Can, A. B. (2007). Trust and anonymity in peer-to-peer systems. Ph.D. thesis, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University. Cannon, D. M., & Kessler, L. (2007). Danger—corporate data breach! Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance, 18(5), 41-49. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, S.877, 108th Congress, (2003). Capitol v. Does 1-16, 07-485, WJ/LFG. Capurro, R. (2005). Privacy. An intercultural perspective. Ethics and Information Technology, 7, 37-47.

Bumgarner, J., & Borg, S. (2007). The US-CCU cyber security check list. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.usccu.us/documents/US-CCU%20CyberSecurity%20Check%20List%202007.pdf

Carbo, J., Molina, J., & Davila, J. (2003). Trust management through fuzzy reputation. International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems, 12(1), 135–155.

Buning, M. D. C., Hondius, E., Prins, C., & Vries, M. D. (2001). [email protected]. An analysis of

Carr, C. A., Erickson, G. S., & Rothberg, H. N. (2004), Intellectual capital, competitive intelligence and the eco-

9

Compilation of References

nomic espionage act. International Journal of Learning and Intellectual Capital, 1(4), 460-482. Carr, D. (2006, July 6). How Google works. Retrieved November 17, 2006, from http://www.baselinemag. com/article2/0,1397,1985040,00.asp Cate, F. H., Fields, D. A., & McBain, J. K. (1994). The right to privacy and the public’s right to know: The “central purpose” of the freedom of information act. Administrative Law Review, 46(Winter), 41-74. Caudill, E. M., & Murphy, P. E. (2000). Consumer online privacy: Legal and ethical issues. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 7-19. CDT. (2005). Center for democracy and technology. Legislation Center. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://cdt.org/legislation/ Centeno, C. (2002). Building security and consumer trust in internet payments: The potential of “soft” measure. Seville, Spain: Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. CERT. (2007). Vulnerability remediation statistics. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.CERT. org/stats/vulnerability_remediation.html Chamness, J. N. Liability of physicians for communicating over the internet. Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http:// www.Cornelius-collins.com/CM/What’s New/asp Chan, P. (2003, September). The practical effect of privacy laws on the global business and global consumer. Paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Sydney, NSW. Chang, J. (2006). Is Facebook private? Northwestern Chronicle. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from http://www. chron.org/tools/viewart.php?artid=1346 Charney R., & Greenberg, B. S. (2002). Uses and gratifications of the Internet. In C. Lin & D. Atkin (Eds.), Communication, technology and society: New media adoption and uses. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Chaum, D. (1981). Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2), 84-88.

Chaum, D. (1985). Security without identification: Transaction systems to make big brother obsolete. Communications of the ACM, 28(10), 1030-1044. Chaum, D. (1988). The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. Journal of Cryptology, 1(1), 65-75. Chaum, D., Fiat, A., & Naor, M. (1990). Untraceable electronic cash. In S. Goldwasser (Ed.), Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’88 (pp. 319-327). Springer Verlag. Chen, K., & Rea, A. (2004). Protecting personal information online: A survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. The Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85-93. Chen, K., & Rea, A. (2004). Protecting personal information online: A survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85-92. Chen, K., & Rea, A. (2004). Protecting personal information online: A survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85-92. Chen, K., & Rea, A. I. J. (2004). Protecting personal information online: A survey of user privacy concerns and control techniques. Journal of Computer Information Systems, 44(4), 85-92. Chen, Y., & Barnes, S. (2007). Initial trust and online buyer behaviour. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 107(1), 21-36. Cheng, T. S. L. (2004). Spam regulation: Recent international attempts to can spam. Computer Law & Security Report, 20(6), 472-479. Chesley, N. (2006). Families in a high-tech age: Technology usage patterns, work and family correlates, and gender. Journal of Family Issues, 27(5), 587-608. Chester, J. (2006, March 26). Google’s wi-fi privacy ploy. Retrieved November 14, 2006, from www.thenation. com/doc/20060410/chester Chiang, M., & Starren, J. (2002). Telemedicine and HIPAA: Data confidentiality and HIPAA. Retrieved May

9

Compilation of References

23, 2007, from http://www.ideatel.org/syllabus/hipaa. html

Retrieved March 27, 2007, from http://www.anu.edu. au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/PActOECD.html

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. (2000). Enacted April 22, 2000. Retrieved from http://www.epic. org/privacy/kids/

Clark, R. (1994). Human identification in information dystems: Management challenges and public policy issues. Information Technology and People, 7(4), 6-37.

Cho, H., & LaRose, R. (1999). Privacy issues in Internet surveys. Social Science Computer Review, 17(4), 421-434.

Clarke, I., Sandberg, O., Wiley, B., & Hong, T. W. (2000). Freenet: A distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system. In H. Federrath (Ed.), Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability (pp. 46–66). Springer Verlag.

Choice. (2006). The eight basic consumer rights. Retrieved November 5, 2006, from http://www.choice.com. au/viewArticle.aspx?id=100736&catId=100528&tid=100 008&p=1&title=The+eight+basic+consumer+rights Chor, B., Fiat, A., Naor, M., & Pinkas, B. (2000). Tracing traitors. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 44(3), 893-910. Chou, C., & Hsiao M. C. (2000). Internet addiction, usage, gratification, and pleasure experience: the Taiwan college students’ case. Computers & Education,35, 65-80. Christ, R. E., Berges, J. S., & Trevino, S. C. (2007). Social networking sites: To monitor or not to monitor users and their content? Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, 19(7), 13-17. Chua, S. L., Chen, D.T., & Wong, A. F. L. (1999). Computer anxiety and its correlates: A meta-analysis. Computers in Human Behaviors, 15, 609-623. Cincu, J., & Richardson, R. (2006). Virus attacks named leading culprit of financial lossby U.S. companies in 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey. Retrieved July 13, 2006, from http://www.gocsi.com/ press/20060712.jhtml Claburn, T. (2004). Dell believes education is best way to fight spyware. InformationWeek, October 20. Retrieved September 30, from http://www.informationweek.com/ showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=GHVMAU4IX1LXGQS NDLOSKHSCJUNN2JVN?articleID=50900097&que ryText=Dell+Believes+Education+Is+Best+Way+To+F ight+Spyware Clark, R. (1989). The Australian privacy act 1988 as an implementation of the OECD data protection guidelines.

9

Clarke, R. (1998). Direct marketing and privacy. Retrieved March 24, 2007, from http://www.anu.edu. au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/DirectMkting.html Clarke, R. (1999). Internet privacy concerns confirm the case for intervention. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 60-67. Clarke, R. (1999). Internet privacy concerns confirm the case for intervention. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 60-67. Class FPR: Privacy. (1999). Common criteria for information technology security evaluation. Part 2: Security functional requirements. Version 2.1. (Report CCIMB-99-032) (pp.109-118). Ft. Meade, MD: National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP). Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.niap-ccevs.org/cc-scheme/ cc_docs/cc_v21_part2.pdf Clayton, G. (2000). Privacy evaluation: Dell. Retrieved July 20, 2006, from http://www.informationweek.com/ privacy/dell.htm Clearswift. (2006 October). Simplifying content security—ensuring best-practice e-mail and web use. The need for advanced, certified email protection. Retrieved October 2007, from http://whitepapers.zdnet.com/whitepaper.aspx?&scid=280&docid=271750 ClickZ. (2003). Users still resistant to paid content. Jupitermedia, April 11. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.ecommerce-guide.com/news/news/print. php/2189551

Compilation of References

Cline, J. (2003). The ROI of privacy seals. Retrieved October 12, 2007, fromhttp://www.computerworld.com/ developmentopics/websitemgmt/story/0,10801,81633,00. html CNET Staff. (2004, September). Spam volume keeps rising. Retrieved September 2007, from http://news.com. com/2114-1032-5339257.html CNN. (2007). Google privacy “Worst on the Web.” CNN. com. Retrieved July 10, 2007, from http://www.cnn. com/2007/TECH/internet/06/11/google.privacy.ap/ Coalition Against Unsolicited Bulk Email (Australia). (2002). Spam volume statistics. Retrieved June 2, 2007, from http://www.caube.org.au/spamstats.html Cochetti, R. J. (2007, June). Testimony of the computing technology industry association (CompTIA), before the house small business committee subcommittee on finance and tax, sata security: Small business perspectives. Retrieved October 2007, from www.house.gov/SMBiz/ hearings/hearing-06-06-07-sub-data/testimony-06-0607-compTIA.pdf Cofta, P. (2006). Impact of convergence on trust in ecommerce. BT Technology Journal, 24(2), 214-218. Cohen, J. (2003). DRM and privacy. Communications of the ACM, 46(4), 47-49. Cohoon, J. M., & Aspray, W. (2006). A critical review of the research on women’s Colgan, N. (2003) Ireland: Electronic commerce directive—implementation into Irish law. International Trade Law and Regulation, 9(2). Collberg, C., & Thomborson, C. (2002). Watermarking, tamper-proofing, and obfuscation-tools for software protection. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 28(8), 735-746. Computing Technology Industry Association. (2004). Annual study. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www. joiningdots.net/library/Research/statistics.html Congress of the United States. (2001). USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001. Retrieved July 16, 2007, from http://thomas. loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:H.R.3162

Congress Passes Safe Web Act 2006. (2007). Retrieved January 31, 2007, from http://www.epic.org Consumer Affairs Victoria. (2003). Commonwealth website guidelines ignored. Retrieved November 16, 2006, from http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/ CA256F2B00231FE5/Print/C3DCDCFFC3DBD8EEC A256F54000412C4?OpenDocument Consumer Affairs Victoria. (2004). Online shopping and consumer protection. Discussion paper, Melbourne, Victoria: Standing Committee of Officials of Consumer Affairs—E-commerce Working Party, Consumer Affairs Victoria. Consumer fraud and identity theft complaint data, January-December 2005. (2006). Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/downloads/clearinghouse_2005.pdf Consumer Protection Commission, E. Y. T. (undated). Ecommerce: APEC voluntary online consumer protection guidelines. Retrieved April 3, 2007, from http://www. cpc.gov.tw/en/index.asp?pagenumber=25 Consumers International. (2001). Should I buy? Shopping online 2001: An international comparative study of electronic commerce. London: Consumers International. Consumers International. (2004). Annual report 2004. London: Consumers International. Consumers International. (2006). World consumer rights day. Retrieved November 7, 2006, from http:// www.consumersinternational.org/Templates/Internal. asp?NodeID=95043&int1stParentNodeID=89651&int 2ndParentNodeID=90145 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7706. Coonan, H. (2005, February). 10 years on. 10 years strong. The internet in Australia. Paper presented at the 2005 Internet Industry Association Annual Dinner, Sydney, NSW. Cooper, K. B., & Victory, N. J. (2002, February). A nation online: How Americans are expanding their use of the internet. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce. 9

Compilation of References

COPPA FAQs. (n.d.) Retrieved from http://www.ftc. gov/privacy/coppafaqs.htm

December 10, 2000, from http://www.msb.edu/faculty/ culnanm/gippshome.html

COPPA protects children but challenges lie ahead. (2007). Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/copparpt.htm

Culnan, M. (1999). Privacy and the top 100 web sites: Report to the federal trade commission. Retrieved Dec 10, 2000, from http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/ gippshome.html

Corbett, R. (1993). The treaty of Maastricht. London: Longman. Cover, T., & Thomas, J. (1991). Elements of information theory. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Cox, I., Miller, M., & Bloom, J. (2002). Digital watermarking: Principles & practice. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Cox, J. (2007, February 9). RSA: attendees drop ball on wi-fi security—many IT security experts at conference used unsecured devices. Network World. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.networkworld.com/ news/2007/020907-rsa-wifi-security.html Craig, P., & de Búrca, G. (2007) EU law text cases & materials (4th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Cranor, L. F. (2001). Introduction to P3P. In L. F. Cranor (Ed.), Web privacy with P3P. O’reylly. Cranor, L. F. (2003). P3P: making privacy policies more useful. IEEE Security and Privacy, 1(6), 50–55.

Culnan, M. (2000). Protecting privacy online: Is selfregulation working? Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 20-26. Culnan, M. J. (1995). Consumer awareness of name removal procedures: Implications for direct marketing. Journal of Direct Marketing, 7, 10-19. Culnan, M. J. (1999). The Georgetown Internet privacy policy survey: Report to the Federal Trade Commission. Retrieved April 15, 2005, from http://www.msb. edu/faculty/culnanm/gipps/gipps1.pdf Culnan, M. J. (2000). Protecting privacy online: Is self-regulation working? Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 20-26. Culnan, M., & Armstrong, P. (1999), Information privacy concerns, procedural fairness, and impersonal trust: An empirical evidence. Organization Science, 10(1), 104-115.

Cranor, L. F., Reagle, J., & Ackerman, M. S. (1999). Beyond concern: Understanding net users’ attitudes about online privacy (Tech. Rep. No. TR 99.4.3). Middletown, NJ: AT&T Labs-Research. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cranor99beyond.html

Curtis, K. (2005, September). The importance of selfregulation in the implementation of data protection principles: the Australian private sector experience. Paper presented at the 27th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Montreux, Switzerland.

Cravens, A. (2004), Speeding ticket: The U.S. residential broadband market by segment and technology. In-Stat/MDR.

Curtis, K. (2005, March). Privacy in practice. Paper presented at the Centre for Continuing Legal Education, University of NSW, Sydney.

Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland. (2004). Cyber traps—an overview of crime, misconduct and security risks in the cyber environment. Queensland: Crime and Misconduct Commission.

Cyberdocs today announced the rirst virtual doctors [sic] office on the world wide web (1996). Westlaw M2 Presswire. Retrieved June 1, 2007 from 1996 WL 11276562

Culnan, M. (1999). Georgetown Internet privacy policy survey: Report to the federal trade commission. Retrieved

Cyota. (2005). Cyota online fraud survey. Retrieved April 7, 2006, from http://www.cyota.com/press-releases. asp?id=78

9

Compilation of References

D’Astous, A. (2000). Irritating aspects of the shopping environment. Journal of Business Research, 49, 149-156. Dalal, R. S. (2006). Chipping away at the constitution: The increasing use of RFID chips could lead to an erosion of privacy rights. Boston University Law Review, 86(April), 485. Daub, T. R. (2001). Surfing the net safely and smoothly: A new standard for protecting personal information from harmful and discriminatory waves. Washington University Law Quarterly, 79, 913-949. Davies, S. (2004, February). The loose cannon: An overview of campaigns of opposition to national identity card proposals. Paper presented at the Unisys seminar: “e-ID: Securing the mobility of citizens and commerce in a Greater Europe,” Nice. Day, J. (1999, February 22). Report: Teen online spending increases. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://www. ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/366.html Dell Inc. Australia. (2004). Dell’s privacy policy. Retrieved March 2, 2006, from http://www1. ap.dell.com/content/topics/topic.aspx/ap/policy/en/ privacy?c=au&l=en&s=gen Dell Inc. Australia. (2005). Dell’s online policies. Retrieved March 28, 2006, from http://www1. ap.dell.com/content/topics/topic.aspx/ap/policy/en/au/ termsau?c=au&l=en&s=gen Dell Inc. Australia. (2007). Online communication policy. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.dell. com/content/topics/global.aspx/corp/governance/en/online_comm?c=us&l=en&s=corp Denoon, D. J. (2007). Internet drug pushing up again. More websites advertising, selling controlled prescription drugs. Health News. Retrieved June 21, 2007, from WebMD, http:// www.webmd.com/news/200770518/interent-drug-pushing-up-again Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN). (2003). United nations guidelines for consumer protection (as expanded in 1999). New York: United Nations.

Desai, M. S., Richards, T. C., & Desai, K. J. (2003). Ecommerce policies and customer privacy. Information Manage & Computer Security, 11(1), 19-27. Diaz, C., Seys, S., Claessens, J., & Preneel, B. (2003, April). Towards measuring anonymity. In R. Dingledine & P. F. Syverson, (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies PET 2002, San Francisco, CA. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2482, pp. 184-188). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Dietrich, W. (2006). Are journalists the 21st century’s buggy whip makers? Nieman Reports, 60(4), 31-33. Dinev, T., & Hart, P. (2006). An extended privacy calculus model for e-commerce transactions. Information Systems Research, 17(1), 61-80. Dinev, T., & Hu, Q. (2007). The centrality of awareness in the formation of user behavioral intention toward protective information technologies. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 8(7), 386-408. Dinev, T., Bellotto, M., Hart, P., Russo, V., Serra, I.., & Coluatti, C. (2006). Internet users’ privacy concerns and beliefs about government surveillance: An exploratory study of differences between Italy and the United States. Journal of Global Information Management, 14(4), 57-93. Dingledine, R., Freedman, M. J., & Molnar, D. (2000). The free haven project: Distributed anonymous storage service. In H. Federrath (Ed.), Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability (pp. 67–95). Springer Verlag. Dobosz, B., Green, K., & Sisler, G. (2006). Behavioral marketing: Security and privacy issues. Journal of Information Privacy & Security, 2(4), 45-59. Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977). Dominick, J. (1999). Who do you think you are? Personal home pages and self-presentation on the world wide web. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 76, 646-658.

9

Compilation of References

Donahey, M. S. (2003). The UDRP model applied to online consumer transactions. Journal of International Arbitration, 20(5), 475-491. Donnellan, T. (1968). Lattice theory. Oxford, NY: Pergamon Press. Döring, N. (2002). Personal home pages on the web: A review of research. Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 7(3). Retrieved December 26, 2003, from http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol7/issue3/doering.html Down, M., & Sands, R. (2004). Biometrics: An overview of the technology, challenges and control considerations. Information Systems Control Journal, 4, 53. Drennan, J., Mort, G. S., & Previte, J. (2006). Privacy, risk perception, and expert online behavior: An exploratory study of household end users. Journal of Organizational and End User Computing, 18(1), 1-22. Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee (Parliament of Victoria). (2004). Inquiry into fraud and electronic commerce—final report. Melbourne, Victoria: Parliament of Victoria. Duffy, D. (2005). The evolution of customer loyalty strategy. The Journal of Consumer Marketing, 22(4/5), 284-286. Eastlick, M., Lotz, S., & Warrington, P. (2006). Understanding online B-to-C relationships: An integrated model of privacy concerns, trust, and commitment. Journal of Business Research, 59(8), 877-886.

A. Ribbers, H. C. A. van Tilborg, A. F. L. Veth, & J. G. L. van der Wees (Eds.), Trust in electronic commerce. The role of trust forms a legal, an organizational and a technical point of view (pp. 11-43). The Hagues/London/New York: Kluwer Law International. Electronic Frontier Foundation. (2007). Privacy section of their web site. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://www. eff.org/Privacy Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (1997). Surfer beware: Personal privacy and the internet. Washington, D.C.: Electronic Privacy Information Center. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.html Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (2007). Proposed Google/DoubleClick deal. Washington, D.C.: Electronic Privacy Information Center. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/ Electronic Privacy Information Center—EPIC (2007). Privacy web site. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http:// epic.org Ellis, H. (2004). Modern Irish commercial and consumer law. London: Jordan Publishing. Email Security and Anonymity. (2004). Retrieved from http://www.anonic.org/email-security.html EMI. (2007, April 2). EMI music launches DRM-free superior sound quality downloads across its entire digital repertoire. EMI Group, Press Release.

Eden, J. M. (2005). When big brother privatizes: Commercial surveillance, the privacy act of 1974 and the future of RFID. Duke Law & Technology Review, 20.

Endpointsecurity. (2004). What is endpoint security? Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.endpointsecurity. org/Documents/What_is_endpointsecurity.pdf

EDRI. (2004). EU report: member states lazy to protect data. Retrieved August 20, 2007, from http://www.edri. org/edrigram/number2.24/report

English Parliament. (2006). Terrorism Act 2006, Queen’s Printer of Acts of Parliament, UK.

EFF. (2005). Sony BMG Litigation Info, Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/ Egger, F. N. (2002). Consumer trust in e-commerce: From psychology to interaction design. In J. E. J. Prins, P. M.

98

Englund, S., & Firestone, R. (2004). California law regulates web site privacy policies. The Computer & Internet Lawyer, 21(8), 22-23. EPIC. (2002, June 5). Letter to house judiciary subcommittee on the courts, the internet, and intellectual property. The Electronic Privacy Information Center

Compilation of References

and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.epic.org/privacy/drm/hjdrmltr6.5.02.html Estes, A. (2007, May 6). Bill would ban lenders’ alerts to homebuyers. Boston Globe, p. B3. European Commission. (2005). Consumer protection in the European Union: Ten basic principles. Brussels: European Commission. European Opinion Research Group. (2003). Data Protection, Special Euro barometer 196, Wave 60.0. European Parliament. (1995). Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. European Parliament. (2001). Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI)). European Union and United Stats of America. (2007). Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security. European Union. (2006). Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. Evans, M., & McKenna, B. (2000). Dragnet targets Internet vandals. The Globe and Mail, February 10, A1, A10. Expert Group on Electronic Commerce (Australia). (2003). Review of building consumer sovereignty in electronic commerce: A best practice model for business. Canberra, ACT: Treasury (Australia). Facebook. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.facebook.com/

Farrell, S., & Housley, R. (2002). RFC3281: An internet attribute certificate profile for authorization. The Internet Society. Network Working Group. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3281.txt Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs (Australia). (1993). Your consumer rights. In K. Healey (Ed.), Consumer rights (Vol. 38). Balmain NSW: The Spinney Press. Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs (Australia). (1995). Your consumer rights. In K. Healey (Ed.), Consumer rights (Vol. 38). Balmain NSW: The Spinney Press. Federal Privacy Act of 1974. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.usdoj.gov/foia/privstat.htm Federal Security Information Act of 2002. (2002). Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Information_Security_Management_Act_of_2002 Federal Trade Commission. (1996). Consumer information privacy hearings. Federal Trade Commission. (1998). Privacy online: A report to congress. Retrieved July 14, 2007, from http:// www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/index.shtm Federal Trade Commission. (1998, June). Privacy online: A report to congress. Retrieved January 2, 2001, from http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3 Federal Trade Commission. (1999). Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, Federal Register, 64, 212. (November 3), 59888-59915. Federal Trade Commission. (1999, July). Self-regulation and privacy online: A federal trade commission report to congress. Retrieved January 2, 2001, from http://www. ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/index.htm#13 Federal Trade Commission. (2000, May). Privacy online: Fair information practices in the electronic marketplace: A federal trade commission report to congress. Retrieved January 2, 2001, from http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/ index.htm#22 Ferguson, D. A., & Perse, E.M. (2000). The world wide web as a functional alternative to television. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 44, 155-174.

99

Compilation of References

Ferraiolo, D., & Kuhn, R. (1992). Role-based access controls. In Proceedings of the 15th NIST-NCSC National Computer Security Conference (pp. 554-563). Festa, P. (2002). Windows media aware of DVDs watched. CNet News. Retrieved May 28, 2007, from http://news. com.com/2100-1023-841766.html Fielder, A. (2002). Better compliance: guidance, enforcement & self-regulation. Paper presented at the Data Protection Conference and Report on the implementation of Directive 95/46/EC, 2002. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/ lawreport/fielder_en.pdf Fielding, J. (2007, January 28). 25% of all computers on Botnets. Retrieved http://blogs.techrepublic.com. com/networking/?cat=2 Financial News Online U.S. (2007). JPMorgan client data loss. Story attributed to the Wall Street Journal, reported on Financial News Online U.S. on May 1, 2007. Fischer, K. (2007). Apple hides account info in DRM-free music, too. Ars Technica. Retrieved July 8, 2007, from http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070530-applehides-account-info-in-drm-free-music-too.html Fischer-Hübner, S. (2001). IT-security and privacy-design and use of privacy-enhancing security mechanisms. Lecture Notes on Computer Science, 1958. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Fischer-Hübner, S. (2003). Privacy enhancing technologies. Session 1 and 2, Ph.D. course, Winter/Spring 2003. Karlstad, Sweden: Karlstad University. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.cs.kau.se/~simone/kau-phdcourse.htm Fitzgerald, M., & Corvin, A. (2001). Diagnosis and differential diagnosis of Asperger syndrome. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 7(4), 310-318. Flavián, C., & Guinalíu, M. (2006). Consumer trust, perceived security and privacy policy: Three basic elements of loyalty to a web site. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 106(5), 601-620.

00

Flinn, S., & Lumsden, J. (2005). User perceptions of privacy and security on the web. Retrieved 12 October, 2007, from http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/PST/2005/pdf/ flinn.pdf Flynn, N. (2005). E-policy best practices a business guide to compliant & secure internet, instant messaging (IM), peer-to-peer (P2P) and email communications. The ePolicy Institute; Executive Director, St. Bernard Software. Retrieved http://www.securitytechnet.com/resource/security/application/iPrism_ePolicy_Handbook. pdf Food and Drug Administration, FAQ’s. Retrieved September 26, 2007, from http://www.fda.gov/oc/buyonline/faqs.html Forder, J. (1999). The IIA code of practice: “Co-regulation” of the internet starts here. Retrieved March 31, 2007, from http://epublications.bond.edu.au/law pubs/38 Forescout. (2007). NAC enforcement and the role of the client. Infonetics Research, Inc. Retrieved July 2007, from www.Forescout.com/downloads/whitepapers/Infonetics-NAC-Enforcement-and-the-Role-of-the-Client.pdf Fost, D. (2007). The technology chronicles: the attack on Kathy Sierra. Retrieved March 27, 2007, from http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/ detail?blogid=19¢ury_id=14783 Fox v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 596 (Miss. 1992). Retrieved June 1, 2007, from LexisNexis Cases, Law School database. Fram, E. H., & Grady, D. B. (1997). Internet shoppers: Is there a surfer gender gap? Direct Marketing, January, 46-50. Fraser, A. (1999, August 8). Chronicle of Higher Education, 48, p. B8. Fraser, S., & Henry, L. (2007). An exploratory study of residential internet shopping in Barbados. Journal of Eastern Caribbean Studies, 32(1), 1-20, 93. Fraud costing Australia $1.1b a Year. (2006, April 7). The Age.

Compilation of References

Fraud.org. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.fraud. org/tips/internet/phishing.htm, http://www.phishinginfo. org/ Friedman, B., Kahn, P., Hagman, J., Severson, R., & Gill, B. (2006). The watcher and the watched: Social judgments about privacy in a public place. Human-Computer Interaction, 21(2), 235-272. FTC File No. 032 3221. (2004). Petco settles FTC charges. Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/11/petco. htm FTC File No. 062-3073. (2006). Xanga.com to pay $1 million for violating children’s online privacy protection rule. Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/09/ xanga.htm FTC v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. (2005). Filing ordered May 17, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/os/ caselist/0423160/050616agree0423160.pdf FTC. (1998). Privacy online: A report to congress. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf FTC. (2000). Privacy online: Fair information practices in the electronic marketplace. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission. FTC. (2005). Federal trade commission privacy initiatives. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://www.ftc. gov/privacy/index.html FTC.gov Spyware. (2007). Retrieved from http://www. ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/spywarealrt.htm FTC.gov. (2006). Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-theft. html#Whatisidentitytheft Fujimura, K., & Nishihara, T. (2003). Reputation rating system based on past behavior of evaluators. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, San Diego, CA, USA (pp. 246-247). New York: ACM Press. Furnell, S. (2002). Cybercrime: Vandalizing the information society. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Gage, D. (2005, March 7). Shadowcrew: Web mobs—timeline: Cybercrime. Retrieved November 1, 2006, from http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,1397,1774786,00.asp Garbarino, E., & Strahilevitz, M. (2004). Gender differences in the perceived risk of buying online and the effects of receiving a site recommendation. Journal of Business Research, 57(7), 768-775. Garfinkel, S. (2002). Web security, privacy & commerce (2nd ed.). Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly & Associates. Garfinkel, T., Pfaff, B., Chow, J., Rosenblum, M., & Boneh, D. (2003). Terra: A virtual machine-based platform for trusted computing. In Proceedings of 19th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP 2003, Bolton Landing, New York (pp. 193-206). New York: ACM Press. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/667929.html Gefen, D., & Straub, D. W. (1997). Gender differences in the perception and use of e-mail: An rxtension to the yechnology acceptance model. MIS Quarterly, 21(4), 389-400. GFI. (2007). The threats posed by portable storage devices. Whitepaper. Retrieved July 2007, from http:// www.gfi.com/whitepapers/threat-posed-by-portablestorage-devices.pdf Gilboa, W. (1996). Elites, lamers, narcs, and whores: Exploring the computer underground. In. L. Cherny & E. R. Weise (Eds.), Wired women: Gender and new realities in cyberspace (pp. 98-113). Seattle, WA: Seal Press. Gilliams, H. (2003, October). Self regulation by liberal professions and the competition rules. Paper presented at the Regulation of Professional Services Conference organized by the European Commission, Brussels. Gillies, L. (2001). A review of the new jurisdiction rules for electronic consumer contracts within the European Union. Journal of Information Law and Technology (1). Glaessner, T. C., Kellermann, T., & McNevin, V. (2004). Electronic safety and soundness securing finance in a new

0

Compilation of References

age (World Bank Working Paper No. 26). Washington DC Retrieved http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/ Resources/abstracts_current_studies_2004.pdf Godwin, M. (2006). Digital rights management: A guide for librarians. Office for Information Technology Policy, American Library Association. Goldberg, I. (2000). A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet. Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley. Goldberg, I. (2000). A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Berkeley. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/ iang/thesis-final.pdf Goldberg, I. (2003). Privacy-enhancing technologies for the Internet, II:Five years later. In G. Goos, J. Hartmanis, & J. van Leeuwen (Eds.), Second InternationalWorkshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2002) (pp. 209-213). Springer Verlag. Goldberg, I., Wagner, D., & Brewer, E. (1997). Privacyenhancing technologies for the Internet. In Proceedings of IEEE COMPCON’97 (pp. 103-110). IEEE Computer Society Press. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). Gomez-Velez, N. (2005). Internet access to court records—balancing public access and privacy. Loyola Law Review, 51, 365-438. Goodwin, C. (1991). Privacy: Recognition of a consumer right. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 10(1), 149-166. Goodwin, C. (1991). Privacy: Recognition of a consumer right. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 10(1), 149-166. Google corporate information: Google milestones. (n.d.). Retrieved November 25, 2006, from http://www.google. com/corporate/history.html Google privacy center: Privacy policy. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2006, from http://www.google.com/privacy.html

0

Google. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.google.com/ Google. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://toolbar.google.com/ Google. (2007c). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://documents.google.com/ Google’s advertising footprint. (2007, June 14). Retrieved July 21, 2007, from http://www.eweek.com/slideshow/ 0,1206,pg=0&s=26782&a=209549,00.asp Gordon, L. A., Loeb M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2006). CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey. Computer Security Institute. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.cse.msu.edu/~cse429/readings06/ FBI2006.pdf Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2007). 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime survey. Retrieved March 3, 2007, from http://www.GoCSI.com Goto, T. (2006, March). B to B, C to C, C to B, C to C. Retrieved from Next Generation Electronic Commerce Promotion Council of Japan: http://www.ecom.jp/journal/2007/ECOM_Journal_2007.pdf Goto, T. (2007, March). B to B, C to C, C to B, C to C. Retrieved from Next Generation Electronic Commerce Promotion Council of Japan: http://www.ecom.jp/journal/2006/ECOMJournal2006.pdf Grabner-Kraeuter, S. (2002). The role of consumers’ trust in online-shopping. Journal of Business Ethics, 39(1-2), 43-50. Grabosky, P., Smith, R. G., & Dempsey, G. (2001). Electronic theft: Unlawful acquisition in cyberspace. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Graeme, S. (2005). 30 years of protecting consumers and promoting competition. Keeping Good Companies, 57(1 (Feb)), 38041. Grami, A., & Schell, B. (2004). Future trends in mobile commerce: Service offerings, technological advances, and security challenges. Retrieved October 13, 2004, from http://dev.hil.unb.ca/Texts/PST/pdf/grami.pdf

Compilation of References

Granade, P. F., & Sanders, J. H. (1996). Implementing telemedicine nationwide: Analyzing the legal issues. 63 Defense Counsel, 67. Granfield, A. (2000). FTC’s bite out of internet fraud lacks teeth. Forbes.com. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://www.forbes.com/2000/03/27/mu2.html Green, A. M. (2003). International privacy laws. Sensitive information in a wired world (Tech. Rep. No. CS 457). New Haven, CT: Yale University. Greenleaf, G. (2000). Private sector bill amendments ignore EU problems. Retrieved October 2007, from http:// www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/PLPR/2000/30.html Greenleaf, G. (2000). Safe harbor’s low benchmark for “adequacy”: EU sells out privacy for U.S.$. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ PLPR/2000/32.html Gregg, J. (2007). Senator Gregg introduces bill to increase safety for Americans buying on-line prescription drugs. States News Service. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from LexisNexis News library. Gumpert, G., & Drucker, S. (1998). The demise of privacy in a private world: From front porches to chat rooms. Communication Theory, 8(4), 408-425. Gurung, A. (2006). Empirical investigation of the relationship of privacy, security and trust with behavioral intention to transact in e-commerce. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington. Ha, H. (2005, October). Consumer protection in business-to-consumer e-commerce in Victoria, Australia. Paper presented at the CACS 2005 Oceania Conference, Perth, WA. Ha, H. (2006, September-October). Security issues and consumer protection in business-to-consumer e-commerce in Australia. Paper presented at the 2nd Australasian Business and Behavioural Sciences Association International Conference: Industry, Market, and Regions, Adelaide. Ha, H. (2007). Governance to address consumer protection in e-retailing. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria.

Ha, Y., & Stoel, L. (2004). Internet apparel shopping behaviors: The influence of general innovativeness. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 32(8/9), 377-385. Hair, J. F., Jr., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, th W. C. (1998). Multivariate data analysis (5 ed.). UpperSaddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/decoding. In S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe, & P. Willis (Eds.), Culture, media, language: Working papers in cultural studies. London: Hutchinson. Halstuk, M. E. (2005). When is an invasion of privacy unwarranted under FOIA? An analysis of the supreme court’s “sufficient reason” and “presumption of legitimacy” standards. University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy, 16(3), 361-400. Halstuk, M. E., & Davis, C. N. (2002). The public interest be damned: Lower court treatment of the reporters committee “central purpose” reformulation. Administrative Law Review, 54(3), 983-1024. Han, P., & Maclaurin, A. (2002). Do consumers really care about online privacy? Marketing Management, 11(1), 35-38. Hanson, K. (2006). Should the boss be blogging? Strategic Communication Management, 10(2), 6-7. Harland, D. (1987). The United Nations guidelines for consumer protection. Journal of Consumer Policy, 10(2), 245-266. Harland, D. (1999). The consumer in the globalised information society—the impact of the international organisations. Australian Competition and Consumer Law Journal, 7(1999), 23. Harley, D., Slade, R., & Gattiker, U. (2001). Viruses revealed: Understanding and counter malicious software. New York: McGraw-Hill/Osborne. Harrington, K. (1999). Legal implications of the practice of medicine over the internet, telemedicine and cybermedicine. Cyberlaw. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://www.gase.com/cyberlaw/toppage11.htm

0

Compilation of References

Harris, A. J., & Yen, D. C. (2002). Biometric authentication: Assuring access to information. Information Management and Computer Security, 10(1), 12-19. Harvard Law Review. (2007). Developments in the law of media. 120(4), 990. Haymarket Media. (2007). Spam hits records levels in February. Retrieved March 20, 2007, from http://www. crn.com.au/story.aspx?CIID=75798&r=rss Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d). Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996—HIPPA (Kennedy-Kassebaum Act). (n.d.). Retrieved from http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191. htm Hemphill, T. (2001). Identity theft: A cost of business? Business and Society Review, 106(1), 51-63. Hemphill, T. (2002). Electronic commerce and consumer privacy: Establishing online trust in the U.S. digital economy. Business and Society Review, 107(2), 221-239. Herbert, N. (2006). Conquering spam in concert: Antispam legislative efforts in the Asia Pacific region. Law Technology, 39(2), 1-12. Herring, S. C. (1992). Gender and participation in computer-mediated linguistic discourse. Washington, DC: ERIC Clearinghouse on Languages and Linguistics, Document no. ED 345552.

sandiego.com/uniontrib/20060316/news_lz1e16hinman. html Hoffman, D. L., & Novak, T. P. (1996). Marketing in hypermedia computer-mediated environments: conceptual foundations. Journal of Marketing, 60(3), 50-68. Hoffman, D. L., Novak, T. P. & Peralta, M. A. (1999, April-June). Information privacy in the marketspace: Implications for the commercial uses of anonymity on the web. Information Society, 15(2), 129-139. Hoffman, D. L., Novak, T. P., & Peralta, M. (1999). Building consumer trust online. Communications of the ACM, 42(4), 80-85. Hoffman, D. L., Novak, T. P., & Peralta, M. A. (1999). Information privacy in the marketspace: Implications for the commercial uses of anonymity on the web. The Information Society, 15(4), 129-139. Hoffman, D., Novak, T. P., & Peralta, M. (1999). Building consumer trust online. Association for Computing Machinery. Communications of the ACM, 42(4), 80-85. Hofstede, G. (1997). Culture and organizations. New York: McGraw Hill. Holmes, S. (2006, May 22). Into the wild blog yonder. Business Week, pp. 84-86. Holt, T.J. (2006, June). Gender and hacking. Paper presented at the CarolinaCon ’06 Convention, Raleigh, NC.

Higgins, K. (2007, November 9). The world’s biggest botnets. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www. darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=138610

Homeland Security Act, Cyber Security Enhancement Act enacted December 13, 2001. (2002). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1073482

Hildner, L. (2006). Defusing the threat of RFID: Protecting consumer privacy through technology-specific legislation at the state level. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 41(Winter), 133.

Hong, T., McLaughlin, M. L., Pryor, L., Beaudoin, C., & Grabowicz, P. (2005). Internet privacy practices of news media and implications for online journalism. Journalism Studies, 6(2), 15-28.

Hine, C., & Eve, J. (1998). Privacy in the marketplace. Information Society, 14(4), 253-262.

Hornle, J. (2005). Country of origin regulation in crossborder media: one step beyond the freedom to provide services? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 54, 89-126.

Hinman, L. (2006, March 16). Why Google matters. Retrieved November 7, 2006, from http://www.signon-

0

Compilation of References

Horwedel, D. M. (2006). Blogging rights. Diverse Issues in Higher Education, 23(2), 28-31. Hsu, C. W. (2002). Online privacy issues: Comparison between net users’ concerns and web sites’ privacy statements. Paper presented to the 52nd Annual Conference of International Communication Association, Seoul, Korea. Hsu, C. W. (2006). Privacy concerns/privacy practices: Toward a situational paradigm. Online Information Review, 30(5), 569-586. Hsu, C.-W. (2006). Privacy concerns, privacy practices and web site categories. Online Information Review, 30(5), 569-586. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NEW/is_2001_ May_29/ai_75139832 http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/Article. aspx?liArticleID=208948&PrinterFriendly=true Hu, Q., & Dinev, T. (2005). Is spyware an internet nuisance or public menace? Communications of the ACM, 48(8), 61-66. Hu, X., Lin, Z., & Zhang, H. (2003). Trust promoting seals in electronic markets: An exploratory study of their effectiveness for online sales promotion. Journal of Promotion Management, 9(1/2), 163-180. Huffmann, H. (2004). Consumer protection in e-commerce. University of Cape Town, Cape Town. Hui, K. L., Tan, B., & Goh, C. Y. (2006). Online information disclosure: Motivators and measurements. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 6(4), 415-441. Hui, K.-L., Teo, H. H., & Lee, S.-Y. T. (2007). The value of privacy assurance: An exploratory field experiment. MIS Quarterly, 31(1), 19-33. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985). Hupfer, M., & Detlor, B. (2007). Beyond gender differences: Self-concept orientation and relationship-building applications on the internet. Journal of Business Research, 60(6), 613-619.

IBM Privacy Research Institute. (2007). Armonk, NY: IBM. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.research. ibm.com/privacy/ IBM Research. (2006). Global security analysis lab: Fact sheet. IBM Research. Retrieved January 16, 2006, from http://domino.research.ibm.com/comm/pr.nsf/ pages/rsc.gsal.html Im, G. P., & Baskerville, R. L. (2005, Fall). A longitudinal study of information system threat categories: The enduring problem of human error. ACM The DATA BASE for Advances in Information Systems, 36(4), 68-79. Imaio, K. (2005). Michinoku bank privacy data lost. Retrieved from IT pro: http://itpro.nikkeibp.co.jp/free/ NIP/NIPCOLUMN/20050616/162853/ Information Law Branch. (undated). Information paper on the introduction of the privacy amendment (private sector) bill 2000. Barton, ACT: Attorney General’s Department (Australia). International Organization for Standardization. (1999). Common criteria for information technology security evaluation (ISO IS 15408). Retrieved on July 12, 2007, from http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ International Organization for Standardization. (2006). Information technology—security techniques—encryption algorithms—part 2: Asymmetric ciphers (ISO/IEC 18033-2). Internet Industry Association (Australia). (2006a). Content code. Retrieved March 31, 2007, from http://www. iia.net.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=categ ory§ionid=3&id=19&Itemid=33 Internet Industry Association (Australian). (2006b). About the IIA. Retrieved March 24, 2007, from http:// www.iia.net.au/index.php?option=com_content&task= section&id=7&Itemid=38 Internet Security Glossary. (2007). The internet society. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2828. html Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1525, 110th Congress, 1st Session, (2007).

0

Compilation of References

Internet usage world stats—Internet and population. (n.d.). Retrieved November 12, 2006, from http://www. Internetworldstats.com Investigation result of data leak from Lawson. (2003). Retrieved from CNET Japan: http://japan.cnet.com/news/ media/story/0,2000056023,20060378,00.htm Iredale, W., & Swinford, S. (2007, February 25). Web supplies prescription drug addicts. Sunday Times (London). Retrieved June 3, 2007, from LexisNexis News file. Jackson, M. (2003). Internet privacy. Telecommunications Journal of Australia, 53(2), 21-31. Jain, A. K., Hong, L., & Pankanti, S. (2000). Biometric identification. Communications of the ACM, 43(2), 90-98. Jain, A. K., Ross, A., & Prabhakar, S. (2003). Biometric recognition: Security and privacy concerns. Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, 1(2), 33-42. Jain, A. K., Ross, A., & Prabhakar, S. (2004). An introduction to biometric recognition. Circuits and systems for video technology. IEEE Transactions, 14(1), 4-20. James, M. L., & Murray, B. E. (2003). Computer crime and compromised commerce (Research Note No. 6). Canberra, ACT: Department of the Parliamentary Library. Janda, S., Trocchia, P., & Gwinner, K. (2002). Consumer perceptions of internet retail service quality. International Journal of Service Industry Management, 13(5), 412-431. Jansen, T. W., & Peen, S. (2007). Privacy i offentlige systemer. Master’s thesis, Informatics and Mathematical Modelling, Technical University of Denmark (in Danish). Jenkins, H., & Boyd, D. (2006). MySpace and deleting online predators act (DOPA). MIT Tech Talk. Retrieved October 12, 2007, from http://web.mit.edu/cms/People/ henry3/MySpace.pdf Jensen, F.V. (1996). An introduction to Bayesian networks. London: UCL Press.

0

Jhu, C. H., & Yung, H. C. (2006, February 17). The hit beauty in online photo album becomes a TV anchor and a celebrity in showbiz. Ettoday. Retrieved March 26, 2006, from http://www.ettoday.com/2006/02/17/108451906739.htm Johnson, A. (June 2006). Digital doctors. National Conference of State Legislatures Magazine. Retrieved June 1, 2007, from http://www.ncsl.org/programs/pubs/ slmag/2006/org Johnson, D., & Post, D. (1996). Law and borders—the rise of law in cyberspace. 48 Stanford Law Review, 1367. Johnson, M. L. (2004). Biometrics and the threat to civil liberties. Computer, 37(4), 9092. Johnston, C. A. (1983). Greentree v. united states customs service: A misinterpretation of the relationship between FOIA exemption 3 and the privacy act. Boston University Law Review, 63, 509-531. Joines, J. L., Scherer, C. W., & Scheufele, D. A. (2003). Exploring motivations for consumer web use and their implications for e-commerce. The Journal of Consumer Marketing, 20(2/3), 90-108. Jonczy, J., & Haenni, R. (2005). Credential networks: A general model for distributed trust and authenticity management. Retrieved on October 10, 2007, from http:// www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/PST/2005/pdf/jonczy.pdf Jones, M. (1991). Privacy: A significant marketing issue for the 1990s. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 10(spring), 133-148. Jordan, T., & Taylor, P. (1998). A sociology of hackers. The Sociological Review, 46(4),757-780. Juniper Research. (2006, February). Security information & event management. Retrieved http://www.juniper. net/solutions/literature/solutionbriefs/351178.pdf Kai, H. (2004). Comment from President of Softbank Co. Retrieved from Internet Watch: http://internet.watch. impress.co.jp/cda/news/2004/02/27/2257.html Kang, H., & Yang, H. (2006). The visual characteristics of avatars in computer-mediated communication: Com-

Compilation of References

parison of internet relay chat and instant messenger as of 2003. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 64(12), 1173-1183. Kate, N. (1998, January). Women want privacy. American Demographics, 20(1), 37. Katz, E., Blumler, J., & Gurevitch, M. (1974). Utilization of mass communication by the individual. In J. G. Blumler & E. Katz (Eds.), The uses of mass communication: Current perspectives on gratifications research (pp. 19-34). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Katz, E., Gurevitch, M., & Hass, S. (1973). On the use of mass media for important things. American Sociological Review, 38,164-181. Kaufman, J. H., Edlund, S., Ford, D. A., & Powers, C. (2005). The social contract core. Electronic Commerce Research, 5(1), 141-165. Kaye, B. K. (1998). Uses and gratifications of the world wide web: From couch potato to web potato. The New Jersey Journal of Communication, 6, 21-40. Keeney, M., Kowalski, E., Cappelli, D., Moore, A., Shimeall, T., & Rogers S. (2005). Insider threat study: Computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors. U.S Secret Service and CERT Coordination Center/SEI. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www. CERT. org/archive/pdf/insidercross051105.pdf Kehoe, C., Pitkow, J., Sutton, K., Aggarwal, G., & Rogers, J. D. (1999). Results of GVU’s tenth world wide web user survey. Retrieved November 16, 2006, from http://www.gvu.gatech.edu/user_surveys/survey-199810/tenthreport.html Keith, W. B. (2005). Internet addition: A review of current assessment techniques and potential assessment questions. Cyberpsychology & Behavior, 8(1), 7-14. Kellan, A. (2001). Whiz kid has ‘fingerprints’ all over New Napster. CNN Technology News, July 5. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://edition.cnn.com/2001/TECH/ internet/07/05/napster.fingerprint/index.html Keller & Murray, (1999). IT law in the European Union. London: Sweet and Maxwell.

Keller, L. S. (1988, July). Machismo and the hacker mentality: some personal observations and speculations. Paper presented to the WiC (Women inComputing) Conference. Kelley, C. M., Denton, A., & Broadbent, R. (2001). Privacy concerns cost ecommerce $15 billion. Cambridge, MA: Forrester Research. Kelly, E. P., & Erickson, G. S. (2004). Legal and privacy issues surrounding customer databases and e-merchant bankruptcies: Reflections on toysmart.com. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 104(3), 209-217. Kershaw, B. (1994). Framing the audience for theater. In R. Keat, N. Whiteley, & N. Abercrombie (Eds.), The authority of the consumer. London: Routledge. Kesmodel, D., & Wilkie, J. R. (2007). Whole foods is hot, wild oats a dud—so said “Rahodeb.” The Wall Street Journal, 250(9), A1. Kilbourne, W., & Weeks, S. (1997). A socio-economic perspective on gender bias in technology. Journal of Socio-Economics, 26(1), 243-260. Kilgore, H. E. (2004). Signed, sealed, protected: Solutions to agency handling of confidential business information in informal rulemaking. Administrative Law Review, 56(2), 519-534. Kim, D. J., Steinfield, C., & Lai, Y. (2004). Revisiting the role of web assurance seals in consumer trust. In M. Janssen, H. G. Sol, & R. W. Wagenaar (Eds.), Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC ‘04, 60) (pp. 280-287). Delft, The Netherlands: ACM Press. Kim, S., Williams, R., & Lee, Y. (2003). Attitude toward online shopping and retail website quality: A comparison of US and Korean consumers. Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 16(1), 89-111. Kimery, K. M., & McCord, M. (2002). Third-party assurances: mapping the road to trust in e-retailing. Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application, 4(2), 63-82.

0

Compilation of References

Kimery, K., & McCord, M. (2006). Signals of trustworthiness in e-commerce: Consumer understanding of third-party assurance seals. Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations, 4(4), 52-74.

Krill, P. (2002). DoubleClick discontinues web tracking service. ComputerWorld. Retrieved February 24, 2002, from http://www.computerworld.com/storyba/ 0,4125,NAV47_STO67262,00.html

King, J., Bond, T., & Blandford, S. (2002). An investigation of computer anxiety by gender and grade. Computers in Human Behavior, 18, 69-84.

Krone, T. (2005). Concepts and terms. Canberra: The Australian High Tech Crime Centre.

King, N. J., Pillay, S., Lasprogata, G. A. (Spring 2006). Workplace privacy and discrimination issues related to genetic data: A comparative law study of the European Union and the United States. American Business Law Journal, 43. Retrieved June 4, 2007, from https://ezproxy. royalroads.ca Kirk, J. (2007, May 17). Estonia recovers from massive denial-of-service attack. InfoWorld, IDG News Service. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.infoworld. com/article/07/05/17/estonia-denial-of-service-attack_1.html Klang, M. (2004). Spyware-the ethics of covert software. Ethics and Information Technology, 6, 193-202.

Krone, T. (2006). Gaps in cyberspace can leave us vulnerable. Platypus Magazine, 90 (March 2006), 31-36. Kryczka, K. (2004). Ready to join the EU information society? Implementation of e-commerce directive 2000/31/EC in the EU acceding countries—the example of Poland. International Journal of Law & Information Technology, 12, 55. Kuner, C. (2007). European data protection law: Corporate regulation and compliance. USA: Oxford University Press. Lade, D (2007, July 15). Getting medication in privacy is part of internet appeal, but there are risks. Sun Sentinel. Retrieved September 17, 2007, from LexisNexis current News file.

Kohlman, R. J. (2006). Existence of physician patient relationship. 46 Am. Jur., Proof of Facts 2d 373. §§ 1, 2, 3, 8.

Lahey, K. (2005, August 30). Red tape on a roll...and it must stop. The Age, 8.

Kolence, K. W., & Kiviat, P. J. (1973). Software unit profiles & Kiviat figures. ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, 1973(2), 2-12.

Large, A., Beheshti, J., & Rahman, T. (2002). Gender differences in collaborative web searching behavior: An elementary school study. Information Processing & Management, 38, 427-443.

Korgaonkar, P. K., & Wolin, L. D. (1999). A multivariate analysis of web usage. Journal of Advertising Research, 39(2), 53-68. Kramer, D. (2007). American jurisprudence: Supremacy of constitutions; supreme laws (2nd ed.). Minneapolis: The West Publishing Company. Krebs, B. (2001). Etour.com data sales violate policy. Newsbytes News Network. Retrieved July 13, 2007, from Krebs, B. (2003). Hackers to face tougher sentences. Washington Post. Retrieved Feburary 4, 2004, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A352612003Oct2?language=printer

08

LaRose, R., Mastro, D. A., & Eastin, M. S. (2001). Understanding internet usage: A social cognitive approach to uses and gratifications. Social Computer Review, 19, 395-413. Lauer, T., & Deng, X. (2007). Building online trust through privacy practices. International Journal of Information Security, 6(5), 323-331. Lawson, P., & Lawford, J. (2003). Identity theft: The need for better consumer protection. Ottawa: The Public Interest Advocacy Centre. Lawson, S. (2006, Nov. 29). Google describes its wi-fi pitch. Retrieved December 1, 2006, from ://www.pcworld. com/article/id,123157-page,1/article.html

Compilation of References

Lea, M., Spears, R., & de Groot, D. (2001). Knowing me, knowing you: Anonymity effects on social identity processes within groups. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 526-537. Leahy, P. (1998). The electronic FOIA amendments of 1996: Reformatting the FOIA for on-line access. Administrative Law Review, 50(2), 339-344. Lederer S., Mankoff, J., & Dey, A. (2003). Towards a deconstruction of the privacy space. In Proceedings of the Ubicomp communities: privacy as boundary negotiation Workshop on Privacy at Ubicomp’2003. Leitzsey, M. (2006). Facebook can cause problems for students. Online PacerTimes. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from http://media.www.pacertimes.com/media/storage/ paper795/news/2006/01/31/News/Facebook.Can.Cause. Problems.For.Students-1545539.shtml Lekakis, G. (2005). Computer crime: The Australian facts and figures. Retrieved April 7, 2007, from http://www. crime-research.org/news/19.07.2005/1373/ Lelia, G. (2001). Treating internet users as “audiences”: Suggesting some research directions. Australian Journal of Communication, 28(1), 33-42. Levary, R., Thompson, D., Kot, K., & Brothers, J. (2005). Radio frequency identification: Legal aspects. Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, 12(Fall), 6. Levy, S. (1984). Hackers: Heroes of the computer revolution. New York: Dell. Levy, S., & Gutwin, C. (2005). Security through the th eyes of users. In Proceedings of the 14 International Conference on the World Wide Web (pp. 480-488). Chiba, Japan. Lewandowski, J. (2002). Stepping off the sidewalk: An examination of the data collection techniques of web sites visited by children. Doctoral dissertation, Purdue University, W. Lafayette, IN. Lewis, C. A. (2004). Cybermedicine: Do you need to know or see your physician, or is it safe to practice medicine in cyberspace? Retrieved March 28, 2007, from http:// gsulaw.gsu.edu/lawand/papers/fa04/lewis/doc/htm

Lichtenstein, S., Swatman, P., & Babu, K. (2003). Adding value to online privacy for consumers: remedying deficiencies in online privacy policies with a holistic approach. In Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. LII. (2007). US Code Collection, Title 17, Copyrights, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. LII. (2007). U.S. Code Collection, Title 18, S 2510, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. LII. (2007). United States Constitution Article I Section 8, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. LII. (2007c). The Bill Of Rights: U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV, Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. Lilien, L., & Bhargava, B. (2006). A scheme for privacypreserving data dissemination. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, 36(3), 503-506. Lilien, L., Gupta, A., & Yang, Z. (2007). Opportunistic networks for emergency applications and their standard implementation framework. In Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Next Generation Networks for First Responders and Critical Infrastructure, NetCri07, New Orleans, LA (pp. 588-593). Lilien, L., Kamal, Z. H., Bhuse, V., & Gupta, A. (2006). Opportunistic networks: The concept and research challenges in privacy and security. In P. Reiher, K. Makki, & S. Makki (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Workshop on Research Challenges in Security and Privacy for Mobile and Wireless Networks (WSPWN06), Miami, FL (pp. 134-147). Lin, C. A. (1996). Looking back: The contribution of Blumler and Katz’s uses of mass communication to communication research. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 40(4), 574-581. Lisse, J. (2007). Bechet disease. Retrieved June 3, 2007, from http://www. emedicine.com/med.topic218.htm

09

Compilation of References

Liu, C., Marchewka, J., Lu, J., & Yu, C. (2004). Beyond concern: A privacy-trust-behavioral intention model of electronic commerce. Information & Management, 42(1), 127-142.

Mansoorian, A. (2006). Measuring factors for increasing trust of people in e-transactions. Lulea, Sweden: Lulea University of Technology.

Liu, S., & Silverman, M. (2001). A practical guide to biometric security technology. IT Professional, IEEE, 3(1), 27-32.

Mansor, P. (2003, April-May). Consumer interests in global standards. Paper presented at the Global Standards Collaboration (GSC) 8—User Working Group Session, Ottawa.

Livingstone, S. (2004). The challenge of changing audiences: Or, what is the audience researcher to do in the age of the Internet? European Journal of Communication, 19(1), 75-86.

Marchiori, M. (2002). The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) specification. W3C recommendation. W3C. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www. w3.org/TR/P3P/

Lohmann, F. (2002). Fair Use and Digital rights management, Computers, Freedom & Privacy, Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Marsh, S. (1994). Formalizing trust as a computational concept. Ph.D. thesis, University of Stirling, U.K.

Longhurst, B., Bagnall, G., & Savage, M. (2004). Audiences, museums and the English middle class. Museum and Society, 2(2), 104-124. Lurie, P., & Zieve, A. (2006). Sometimes the silence can be like thunder: Access to pharmaceutical data at the FDA. Law and Contemporary Problems, 69(Summer), 85-97. Lynch, E. (1997). Protecting consumers in the cybermarket. OECD Observer, 208(Oct/Nov), 11-15. Mack, A. (2000, January 3). Op-Ed Re: Sometimes the patient knows best. New York Times. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from LexisNexis News service. MacRae, P. (2003). Avoiding eternal spamnation. Chatswood, NSW: Australian Telecommunications Users Group Limited (ATUG). Majoras, D. P., Swindle, O., Leary, T. B., Harbour, P. J., & Leibowitz, J. (2005). The US SAFE WEB Act: Protecting consumers from spam, spyware, and fraud. A legislative recommendation to congress. Washington D.C.: Federal Trade Commission (US). Malhotra, N. K., Kim, S. S., & Agarwal, J. (2004). Internet users’ information privacy concerns (IUIPC): The construct, the scale, and a causal model. Information Systems Research, 15(4), 336-355.

0

Marshall, A. M., & Tompsett, B. C. (2005). Identity theft in an online world. Computer Law & Security Report, 21, 128-137. Martin, A. (2007, June 14). Kellogg to phase out some food ads to children. The New York Times. Retrieved July 11, 2007, from www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/ business/14kellogg.html?ex=1183953600&en=8f34f9b e3c1620f7&ei=5070 Matyas, V., Jr., & Riha, Z. (2003). Toward reliable user authentication through biometircs. Security & Privacy Magazine, IEEE, 1(3), 45-49. Maxeiner, J. R. (1995). Freedom of information and the EU data protection directive. Federal Communications Law Journal, 48(December), 93-104. Mayer, R. N. (2002). Shopping from a list: International studies of consumer online experiences. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 36(1), 115-126. McAfee, J., & Haynes, C. (1989). Computer viruses, worms, data diddlers, killer programs, and other threats to your system. New York: St. Martin’s Press. McElhearn, K. (2006). iSpy: More on the iTunes MiniStore and privacy. Kirkville. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.mcelhearn.com/article.php?story=20060112 175208864 McGillicuddy, S. (2006, November 1). Encrypting mo-

Compilation of References

bile devices: A best practice no one uses SearchSMB. com http://searchSMB.techtarget.com/originalContent/ 0,289142,sid44_gci1227295,00.html?asrc=SS_CLA_ 300336&psrc=CLT_44 McGrath, R. (2005). Only a matter of time: Lessons unlearned at the food and drug administration keep Americans at risk. Food and Drug Law Journal, 60, 603-624. McKenna, K. Y. A., & Bargh, J. A. (2000). Plan 9 from cyberspace: The implications of the internet for personality and social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 57-75. McKnight, D., Choudhury, V., & Kacmar, C. (2002). Developing and validating trust measures for e-commerce: An integrative topology. Information Systems Research, 13(3), 334-359. McKnight, D. H., & Chervany, N. L. (2001). Conceptualizing trust: A typology and e-commerce customer relationships model. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, HICSS-34, Island of Maui, Hawaii (Volume 7, 10 pages). Washington, D.C.: IEEE Computer Society. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/hicss/2001/0981/07/09817022.pdf McKnight, D. H., & Chervany, N. L. (2001). What trust means in e-commerce customer relationships: An interdisciplinary conceptual typology. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 6(2), 35-59. McKnight, D. H., Choudhury, V., & Kacmar, C. (2000). Trust in e-commerce vendors: A two-stage model. In Proceedings of the Association for Information Systems (pp. 532-536). Atlanta, GA. McRobb, S., & Rogerson S. (2004). Are they really listening? An investigation into published online privacy policies at the beginning of the third millennium. Information Technology & People, 17(4), 442-461. McSweeney, B. (2002). Hofstede’s model of national cultural differences and their consequences: A triumph of faith-A failure of analysis. Human Relations, 55(1), 89-118.

Media Week marketer’s guide to media (Vol. 29). (2006). New York: VNU Business Publications. MedicineNet. (2007). Orphan disease definition. Retrieved June 4, 2007, from http://www.medterms. com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=11418 Medlaw.com. (2006). Retrieved from http://www. medlaw.com/healthlaw/Medical_Records/8_4/womanpleads-guilty-to-se.shtml Meinel, C. (2006). Appendix A: How do hackers break into computers? In B. Schell & Mencik, S. (1999). Are secure internet transactions really secure? Retrieved June 6, 2007, from http://www. jsweb.net/paper.htm Mercuri, R. T. (2004). The HIPAA-potamus in health care data security. Communications of the ACM, 47(7), 25-28. Metz, C. (2003, February 27). Is Google invading your privacy? Retrieved December 2, 2006, from http://www. pcmag.com/article2/0,4149,904096,00.asp Metz, C. (2005, August 23). Identity theft is out of control. PC Magazine, 87-88. Metz, J. (2004). Practical insights to HIPAA: Overview and general background regarding HIPAA. Retrieved May 21, 2007, from http://www.dilworthlaw.com/pdf/ hipaa.pdf Metzger, M. (2006). Effects of site, vendor, and consumer characteristics on web site trust and disclosure. Communication Research, 33(3), 155-179. Meyer, G. R. (1989). The social organization of the computer underworld. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://bak.spc.org/dms/archive/hackorg.html Meyers-Levy, J. & Maheswaran, D. (1991). Exploring differences in males’ and females’ processing strategies. Journal of Consumer Research, 18(June), 63-70. Michael, P., & Pritchett, E. (2001). The impact of HIPPA electronic transmissions and health information privacy standards. American Dietetic Association. Journal of the American Dietetic Association, 101(5), 524-528.



Compilation of References

Microsoft. (2003). Windows media player 9 series privacy settings. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www. microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/player/9series/ privacy.aspx Milberg, S. J., Smith, H. J., & Burke, S. J. (2000). Information privacy: Corporate management and national regulation. Organizational Science, 11(1), 35-57. Miller, R. D. (2006). Health care law. Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones Bartlett Publishers. Milloy, M., Fink, D., & Morris, R. (2002, June). Modelling online security and privacy to increase consumer purchasing intent. Paper presented at the Informing Science + IT Education Conference, Ireland. M i l ls , E . (20 05, Ju ly 14). CN ET.c om. Re trieved November 7, 2006, from news.com.com/ Google+balances+privacy,+reach/2100-1032_3Milne, G. R. (2000). Privacy and ethical issues in database/interactive marketing and public policy: A research framework and overview of the special issue. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 1-6. Milne, G. R. (2003). How well do consumer protect themselves from identity theft? The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 37(2), 388-402. Milne, G. R., & Culnan, M. J. (2002). Using the content of online privacy notices to inform public policy: A longitudinal analysis of the 1998-2001 U.S. web surveys. The Information Society, 18(5), 345-359. Milne, G. R., Culnan, M. J., & Greene, H. (2006). A longitudinal assessment of online privacy notice readability. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(2), 238-249. Milne, G. R., & Rohm, A. J. (2000). Consumer privacy and name removal across direct marketing channels: Exploring opt-in and opt-out alternative. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(2), 238-249. Milne, G. R., Rohm, A. J., & Bahl, S. (2004). Consumers’ protection of online privacy and identity. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), -232217.



Milne, G., Rohm, A., & Bahl, S. (2004). Consumers’ protection of online privacy and identity. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(2), 217-233. Milne, G.R. (1997). Consumer participation in mailing lists: A field experiment. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 16, 298-309. Miyazaki, A. D., & Fernandez, A. (2000). Internet privacy and security: An examination of online retailer disclosures. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 54-61. Miyazaki, A. D., & Fernandez, A. (2000). Internet privacy and security: An examination of online retailer disclosures. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(Spring), 54-61. Miyazaki, A. D., & Fernandez, A. (2001). Consumer perceptions of privacy and security risks for online shopping. The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 35(1), 27-44. Miyazaki, A. D., & Fernandez, A. (2001). Consumer perceptions of privacy and security risks for online shopping. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 35(1), 27-44. Miyazaki, A., & Krishnamurthy, S. (2002). Internet seals of approval: effects on online privacy policies and consumer perceptions. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 36(1), 28-49. Mizutani, M., Dorsey, J., & Moor, J. (2004). The internet and Japanese conception of privacy. Ethics and Information Technology, 6(2), 121-128. Moerel, L. (2001). The ‘country of origin’ principle in the e-commerce directive: the expected one stop shop. Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 7(7), 184-190. Moghe, V. (2003). Privacy management—a new era in the Australian business environment. Information Management & Computer Security, 11(2), 60-66. Montana, J. C. (2001). Data mining: A slippery slope. Information Management Journal, 35(4), 50-52. Moor, J. H. (1997). Towards a theory of privacy in the information age. Computers and Society, 27(3), 27-32.

Compilation of References

Moores, T. (2005). Do consumers understand the role of privacy seals in e-commerce? Communication of the ACM, 48(3), 86-91.

from http://csdl2.computer.org/comp/proceedings/ hicss/2002/1435/07/14350188.pdf

Moores, T. (2005). Do consumers understand the role of privacy seals in e-commerce? Communications of the ACM, 48(3), 86-91.

Mukherjee, A., & Nath, P. (2007). Role of electronic trust in online retailing: A re-examination of the commitment-trust theory. European Journal of Marketing, 41(9/10), 1173-1202.

Moores, T. (2005). Do consumers understand the role of privacy seals in e-commerce? Communications of the ACM, 48(3), 86-91.

Mulligan, D. (2004). Privacy and information goods. FTC RFID Workshop, June 21. www.ftc.gov/bcp/worshops/rfid

Morinaga, S., Yamanishi, K., Tateishi, K., & T. Fukushima, T. (2002). Mining product reputations on the web. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (pp. 341–349). New York: ACM Press. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from citeseer.ist.psu.edu/morinaga02mining. html

Mulligan, D., & Schwartz, A. (2000). P3P and privacy: An update for the privacy community. Center for Democracy & Technology. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.cdt.org/privacy/pet/p3pprivacy.shtml

Morris, M., & Ogan, C. (1996). The internet as a mass medium. Journal of Communication, 46(1), 39-50. Moser v. Stallings, 387 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1986). Retrieved June 1, 2007 from LexisNexis law School database. Motion, P. (2001). The Brussels regulation and e-commerce a premature solution to a fictional problem. Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 7(8), 209-215. Moulinos, K., Iliadis, J., & Tsoumas, V. (2004). Towards secure sealing of privacy policies. Information Management & Computer Security, 12(4), 350-361. Mowbray, A. (2007). Cases and materials on the European convention on human rights (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. Mui, L. (2002). Computational models of trust and reputation: Agents, evolutionary games, and social networks. Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Mui, L., Mohtashemi, M., & Halberstadt, A. (2002). A computational model of trust and reputation for ebusinesses. In Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, HICSS’02, Track 7, Island of Hawaii, Hawaii (9 pages). Washington, D.C.: IEEE Computer Society. Retrieved June 5, 2007,

Munoz, S. (2003, November 11). Nagging issue: Pitching junk to kids. The Wall Street Journal Online. Retrieved July 14, 2007, from http://online.wsj.com Muris, T. J. M. (2002, October). The interface of competition and consumer protection. Paper presented at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute’s Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York. Muscat, A. (2007, January 17). Perils of portable storage. Computer Reseller News. Retrieved http://www.gfi. com/documents/32686_crn_eprint.pdf MySpace. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.myspace.com/ Nachimias, R., Mioduser, D., & Shelma, A. (2001). Information and communication technologies usage by students in an Israeli high school: Equity, gender, and inside/outside school learning issues. Education and Information Technologies, 6(1), 43-53. Nakada, M., & Tamura, T. (2005). Japanese conceptions of privacy: An intercultural perspective. Ethics and Information Technology, 7(1), 27-36. Nam, C., Song, C., Lee, E., & Park, C. (2005). Consumers’ privacy concerns and willingness to provide marketing-related personal information online. Advances in Consumer Research, 33, 212-217.



Compilation of References

Nash, J. M. (2002). The geek syndrome. Retrieved July 5, 2007, from http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020506/scaspergers.html Nath, S. W. (2006). Relief for the e-patient? Legislative and judicial remedies to fill HIPAA’s privacy gaps. George Washington Law Review, 74, 532-540. National Consumers League (USA). (n.d.). E-ssentials for online privacy. Retrieved June 25, 2007, from http://www. nclnet.org/technology/essentials/privacy.html National Do Not Call Registry of 2003, H.R. 395, 108th Congress, (2003). National Office for the Information Economy (Australia). (2003). Spam—final report of the NOIE review of the spam problem and how it can be countered. Canberra, ACT: Department of Communication, Information Technology and the Arts. Norman, D. (1983). Design rules based on analysis of human error. Communications of the ACM, 26(4), 254-258. North American Consumer Project on Electronic Commerce (NACPEC). (2006). Internet consumer protection policy issues. Geneva: The Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Noteberg, A., Christiaanse, E., & Wallage, P. (2003). Consumer trust in electronic channels. E-Service Journal, 2(2), 46-67. Nowak, G. J., & Phelps, J. (1992). Understanding privacy concerns: An assessment of consumers’ information related knowledge and beliefs. Journal of Direct Marketing, 6(Autumn), 28-39. NSW Office of Fair Trading. (2003). International consumer rights: The world view on international consumer rights. Retrieved November 15, 2006, from http://www. fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/shopping/shoppingtips/internationalconsumerrights.html Nyshadham, E. A. (2000). Privacy policy of air travel web sites: a survey and analysis. Journal of Air Transport Management, 6(3), 143-152.



O’Brien, K., & Crampton, T. (2007). EU asks Google to explain data retention policies. International HeraldTribune. Retrieved July 10, 2007, from http://www.iht. com/articles/2007/05/25/business/google.php O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1179-80 (D. Wyo. 2001). O’Grady, et. al. v. Superior Court (2006), 139 Cal. App. 4Th 1423. O’Neil, D. (2001). Analysis of internet users’ level of online privacy concerns. Social Science Computer Review, 19(1), 17-31. O’Reilly, J. T. (1982). Regaining a confidence: Protection of business confidential data through reform of the freedom of information act. Administrative Law Review, 34, 263-313. O’Sullivan, P. B. (2000). What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Impression management functions of communication channels in relationships. Human Communication Research, 26(3), 403-431. Oakes, C. (1999). Mouse pointer records clicks. Wired News. Retrieved June 28, 2006, from http://www.wired. com/news/print/0,1294,32788,00.html Oberndorf, S. (1998). Users remain wary. Multichannel Merchant. Retrieved July 14, 2007, from http://multichannelmerchant.com/news/marketing_users_remain_wary/ OECD. (2000). OECD Guidelines for consumer protection in the context of electronic commerce. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2001). Australia—annual report on consumer policy development 2001. Retrieved March 11, 2005, from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/45/1955404.pdf OECD. (2001). OECD guidelines on the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2003). Report on compliance with, and enforcement of, privacy protection online. Paris: OECD.

Compilation of References

OECD. (2006). Protecting consumers from cyberfraud. Paris: OECD. Office of Health Information Technology (2004). Retrieved June 21, 2001 from http://www.Whitehouse. gov/omb/egov/gtob/health_informatics.htm Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2743.43 (A)-(D) (LexisNexis 2007) Expert testimony on liability issues. Retrieved June 1, 2007, from LexisNexis Ohio Cases. Okamura, H. (2004). Privacy protection and rights to use privacy information in secure environment. Japan: Foundation Internet Association. Olivero, N., & Lunt, P. (2004). Privacy versus willingness to disclose in e-commerce exchanges: The effect of risk awareness on the relative role of trust and control. Journal of Economic Psychology, 25(2), 243-262. Ono, H., & Zavodny, M. (2003). Gender and the internet. Social Science Quarterly, 84(1), 111-121. Ono, H., & Zavodny, M. (2005). Gender differences in information technology usage: A U.S.-Japan comparison. Sociological Perspectives, 48(1), 105-133. OPA. (2005). Online privacy alliance: guidelines for online privacy policies. Retrieved March 25, 2005, from http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines. shtml Oren, J. S. T. (2003). International jurisdiction over consumer contracts in e-Europe. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52, 665. Osterman Research Inc. (2003). The impact of regulations on email archiving requirements. ORI white paper sponsored by Information Management Research. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.Ostermanresearch. com/whitepapers/or_imr01.pdf Ostrov, B. (2007, March 14). Menlo Park teen’s suicide shines light on shadowy market. The Mercury News. Retrieved September 18, 2007, from LexisNexis News library. Ou, G. (2007) Wireless LAN security myths that will not die. ZDNet. Retrieved July 2007, from http://blogs. zdnet.com/Ou/?p=454

Padilla, R. (2007). Root out data breach dangers by first implementing common sense. TechRepublic. Retrieved July 2007, from http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/techmanager/?p=312 Pai, A. K., & Basu, S. (2007). Offshore technology outsourcing: overview of management and legal issues. Business Process Management Journal, 13(1), 21-46. Palmgreen, P., Wenner, L. A., & Rosengren, K. E. (1985). Uses and gratifications research: The past ten years. In K. E. Rosengren, L. A. Wenner, & P. Palmgreen (Eds.), Media gratifications research: Current perspective (pp. 11-37). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Pan, Y., & Zinkhan, G. (2006). Exploring the impact of online privacy disclosures on consumer trust. Journal of Retailing, 82(4), 331-338. Papacharissi, Z. (2004, May). The blogger revolution? Audiences as media producers. Paper presented at the annual convention of the International Communication Association, New Orleans, LA. Papacharissi, Z. (2002). The self online: The utility of personal home pages. Journal of Broadcasting &Electronic Media, 46(3), 346-368. Papazafeiropoulou, A., & Pouloudi, A. (2001). Social issues in electronic commerce: Implications for policy makers. Information Resources Management Journal, 14(4), 24-32. Parameswaran, M., & Whinston, A. (2007). Research issues in social computing. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 8(6), 336-350. Parker, B. J., & Plank, R. E. (2000). A use and gratifications perspective on the internet as a new information source. American Business Review, 18(2), 43-49. Patel, A., & Lindley, A. (2001). Resolving online disputes: Not worth the bother? Consumer Policy Review, 11(1 (Jan/Feb)), 2-5. Patients Rights Conditions of Participation (Revised 2007). 42 C.F. R. 482.13, 482.24 and 482.51.



Compilation of References

Patton, M., & Josang, A. (2004). Technologies for trust in electronic commerce. Electronic Commerce Research, 4(1-2), 9-21. PC Magazine. (2005). The perils of online shopping. PC Magazine, 24(14), 23. Perritt, Jr., H. H. (1995). Sources of rights to access public information. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 4(Summer), 179-221. Perritt, Jr., H. H. (1998). Electronic freedom of information. Administrative Law Review, 50(2), 391-419. Perritt, Jr., H. H., & Lhulier, C. J. (1997). Information access rights based on international human rights law. Buffalo Law Review, 45(Fall), 899-929. Pettus v. Cole, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Petty, R. D., & Hamilton, J. (2004). Seeking a single policy for contractual fairness to consumers: A comparison of U.S. and E.U efforts. The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 38(1), 146-166. Pfitzmann, A., & Köhntopp, M. (2000). Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudonymity—a proposal for terminology. In H. Federrath (Ed.), Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability. Springer Verlag. Pfitzmann, A., & Köhntopp, M. (2000). Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudonymity—a proposal for terminology. In H. Federrath (Ed.), Designing privacy enhancing technologies, Proceedings of the Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Observability, Berkeley, California. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2009, pp. 1-9). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Phelps, J. E., D’Souza, G., & Nowak, G. J. (2001). Antecedents and consequences of consumer privacy concerns: An empirical investigation. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 15(4), 2-17. Phelps, J. E., Nowak, G. J., & Ferrell, E. (2000). Privacy concerns and consumer willingness to provide personal information. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 27-41.



Phelps, J., Nowak, G., & Ferrell, E. (2000). Privacy concerns and consumer willingness to provide personal information. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 27-41. Pillar, C. (2001, November 7). Web mishap: Kid’s psychological files posted. L.A. Times, Nov., A1. Plichtova, J., & Brozmanova, E. (1997). Social representations of the individual and the community well-being: Comparison of the empirical data from 1993 and 1995. Sociologia, 29(4), 375-404. Policy Aware Web. (2006). Retrieved July 10, 2007, from http://www.policyawareweb.org/ Postmes, T., Spears, R., Sakhel, K., & de Groot, D. (2001). Social influence in computer-mediated communication: The effects of anonymity on group behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1243-1254. Prime, J. S. (1996). A double-barrelled assault: How technology and judicial interpretations threaten public access to law enforcement records. Federal Communications Law Journal, 48(March), 341-369. Pritts, J. L. (2002). Altered states: State health privacy laws and the impact of the federal health privacy rule. Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics, 2, 334-340. Privacy & American Business. (2002). Privacy on and off the internet: what consumers want.Privacy & American Business. Hackensack, NJ. Privacy Act. (2004). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.epa.gov/privacy/ Privacy and Identity Management for Europe. (Prime). (2007). Retrieved July 10, 2007, from https://www. prime-project.eu/ Privacy Bird Tour. (2007). Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.privacybird.org/tour/1_3_beta/tour.html Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (2000). National privacy principles (extracted from the privacy amendment (private sector) act 2000). Retrieved July 19, 2006, from http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/npps01. html

Compilation of References

Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (2003). National privacy principle 7—identifiers in the health sector. Sydney: Privacy Commissioner, Office of (Australia). Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (2006a). Annual report 2005-2006. Melbourne, Victoria: Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner. Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (2006b). Industry standard for the making of telemarketing calls. Sydney, NSW: Office of the Privacy Commissioner (Australia). Privacy Commissioner (Australia), O. o. (n.d.). State & territory privacy laws. Retrieved August 2, 2005, from http://www.privacy.gov.au/privacy_rights/laws/index. html#2 Privacy Commissioner of Canada. (2000). The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. Privacy online: A report to congress. (1998). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2006). HIPAA basics: Medical privacy in the electronic age. Retrieved May 23, 2007, from http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs8ahipaa.htm Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2007). A chronology of data breaches. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www. privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2007). A chronology of data breaches. Retrieved on May 14, 2007, from http:// www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm Provos, N., McNamee, D., Mavrommatis, P., Wang, K., & Modadugu, N. (2007). The ghost in the browser analysis of web-based malware. Google, Inc. Retrieved http://www.usenix.org/events/hotbots07/tech/full_papers/Provos/Provos.pdf Public Welfare. 45 C.F.R. § 160 et seq. Pujol, J. M., Sangesa, R., & Delgado, J. (2002). Extracting reputation in multi agent systems by means of social network topology. In Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS ‘02, Bologna, Italy (pp. 467-474). New

York: ACM Press. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from citeseer. ist.psu.edu/pujol02extracting.html Purpose of Privacy mark system. (2007, April 9). Retrieved from Privacy Mark: http://privacymark.jp/privacy_mark/about/outline_and_purpose.html Qualys. (2006). The laws of vulnerabilities: Six axioms for understanding risk. Retrieved October 2007, from http://developertutorials-whitepapers.tradepub.com/ free/w_qa02/pf/w_qa02.pdf Quirk, P., & Forder, J. (2003). Electronic commerce and the law (2nd ed.). Queensland: John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd. Quo, S. (2004). Spam: Private and legislative responses to unsolicited electronic mail in Australia and the United States. ELaw—Murchdoch University, 11(1). Qutami, Y., & Abu-Jaber, M. (1997). Students’ self-efficacy in computer skills as a function of gender and cognitive learning style at Sultan Qaboos University. International Journal of Instructional Media, 24(1), 63-74. Raab, C. D., & Bennett, C. J. (1998). The distribution of privacy risks: Who needs protection? The Information Society, 14, 263-274. Radcliff, D. (2001). Giving users back their privacy. ComputerWorld. Retrieved February 28, 2002, from http://www.computerworld.com/storyba/0,4125,NAV47_ STO61981,00.html Radin, T. J., Calkins, M., & Predmore, C. (2007). New challenges to old problems: Building trust in e-marketing. Business and Society Review, 112(1), 73-98. Ranganathan, C., & Ganapathy, S. (2002). Key dimensions of business-to-consumer web sites. 39(6), 457-465. Recording Industry Association of America Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., Volume Number 037015, (2003). Regan, K. (2001). Does anyone read online privacy policies? Ecommerce Times. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/11303.



Compilation of References

htmlthefreecountry.com (2007). Free anonymous surfing. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from http://www. thefreecountry.com/security/anonymous.shtml Reinard, J. C. (2006). Communication research statistics. CA: Sage. Reips, U.-D. (2007). Internet users’ perceptions of ‘privacy concerns’ and ‘privacy actions’. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65(6), 526-536. Reiter, M., & Rubin, A. (1999). Anonymous web transactions with crowds. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 32-48. Reiter, M., & Rubin, A. (1999). Crowds: Anonymity for web transactions. Communications of the ACM, 42(2), 32-48. Report to Congressional Requestors. (2005). Information security emerging cybersecurity issues threaten federal information systems. Retrieved December 12, 2006, from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05231.pdf Rescorla, E. (2005). Is finding security holes a good idea? IEE Security and Privacy, 3(1), 14-19. Reuters. (1999). Teen pleads guilty to government hacks. Retrieved October 13, 2007, from http://scout. wisc.edu/Projects/PastProjects/net-news/99-11/99-1123/0007.html Rice, S. (2000). Public environmental records—a treasure chest of competitive information. Competitive Intelligence Magazine, 3(3), 13-19. Richards, N. M. (2006). Reviewing the digital person: Privacy and technology in the information age by Daniel J. Solove. Georgetown Law Journal, 94, 4. Richardson, R. (2007). 2007 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey. Retrieved October 12, 2007, from http://www.GoCSI.com Riegelsberger, J., Sasse, M., & McCarthy, J. (2003). Shiny happy people building trust?: Photos on e-commerce websites and consumer trust. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 121-128). Ft. Lauderdale, FL.

8

Rivest, R. L., Shamir, A., & Adleman, L. A. (1978). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, 21(2), 120-126. Roach, R. (2001). Internet usage reflects gender breakdown. Black Issues in Higher Education, 18(11), 119. Roebuck, W. (2002). Jurisdiction and e-commerce. Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 8(2), 29-32. Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of innovations (4th ed.). New York: Free Press. Rohm, A. J., & Milne, G. R. (1998). Emerging marketing and policy issues in electronic commerce: Attitudes and beliefs of internet users. In A. Andreasen, A. Simonson, & N. C. Smith (Eds.), Proceedings of Marketing and Public Policy (Vol. 8, pp. 73-79).Chicago: American Marketing Association. Roman, S. (2007). The ethics of online retailing: A scale development and validation from the consumers’ perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 72(2), 131-148. Rosenblatt, B., Trippe, B., & Mooney, S. (2002). Digital rights management: Business and technology. New York: M&T Books. Rosenzweig, P., Kochems, A., & Schwartz, A. (2004). Biometric technologies: Security, legal, and policy implications. NASSP Legal Memorandum, 12, 1-10. Ross, R. (2007). Robotic insect takes off. Researchers have created a robotic fly for covert surveillance. Technology Review, July 19. Retrieved July 20, 2007, from http://www.technologyreview.com/Infotech/19068/ Rothberg, H. N., & Erickson, G. S. (2005). From knowledge to intelligence: Creating competitive advantage in the next economy. Woburn, MA: Elsevier ButterworthHeinemann. Round, D. K., & Tustin, J. (2004, September). Consumers as international traders: Some potential information issues for consumer protection regulators. Paper presented at the International Trade Law Conference, AttorneyGeneral’s Department, Canberra, ACT.

Compilation of References

Roussous, G., & Moussouri, T. (2004). Consumer perceptions of privacy, security and trust in ubiquitous commerce. Pers Ubiquit Comput, 8, 416-429.

Sandoval, G. (2006). Veterans’ data swiped in theft. CNET News.com. Story last modified Mon May 22 16:55:51 PDT 2006.

Roy Morgan Research. (2004). Community attitudes towards privacy 2004. Sydney, NSW: The Office of the Federal Privacy Commissioner (Australia).

Sasahara, E. (2005, Sept. 29). Privacy data lost in financial business. Retrieved from IT pro: http://itpro.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/SMBIT/20050928/221820/ ?ST=management

Royal, C. (2005). A meta-analysis of journal articles intersecting issues of internet and gender. Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, 35(4), 403-429. Ruddock, P. (2006). Australian law reform commission to review privacy act. Retrieved June 7, 2007, from hhttp:// www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/MinisterRuddockHome. nsf/Page/Media_Releases_2006_First_Quarter_31_ January_2006_-_Australian_Law_Reform_Commission_to_review_Privacy_Act_-_0062006# Rule, C. (2002). Online dispute resolution for business. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Russ, A. (2001). Digital rights management overview. SANS Information Security Reading Room, July 26. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/basics/434.php Saarenpää, T., & Tiainen, T. (2003). Consumers and ecommerce in information system studies. In M. Hannula, A-M. Järvelin, & M. Seppä (Eds.), Frontiers of e-business research: 2003 (pp. 62-76). Tampere: Tampere University of Technology and University of Tampere. Sabater, J., & Sierra, C. (2002). Social ReGreT, a reputation model based on social relations. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 3(1), 44-56. Sagan, S. (2000). Hacker women are few but strong. Retrieved August 5, 2004, from http://abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/hackerwomen000602.html#top Salehnia, A. (2002). Ethical issues of information systems. Hershey, PA: Idea Group Incorporated. Salganik, M. W. (2000, August 10). Health data on 858 patients mistakenly emailed to others; medical information was among messages sent out by Kaiser Health Care. Baltimore Sun, Aug., 1C.

Sasahara, E. (2005, June 29). Security hole of privacy information database. Retrieved from IT pro: http://itpro.nikkeibp.co.jp/free/smbit/smbit/20050629/163612/ ?ST=smb Savage, M. (2007, October 23). Proposed legislation would strengthen cybercrime laws. Retrieved November 2007, from http://searchsecurity.techtarget. com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci1278341,00. html?track=sy160 Savicki, V., Kelley, M., & Lingenfelter, D. (1996). Gender and small task group activity using computer-mediated communication. Computers in Human Behavior, 12, 209-224. Savvas, A. (2005, March 22). Monitoring made harder by cookie security fears, Computer Weekly. Retrieved July 14, 2007, from Sawyer, S., & Tapia, A. (2005). The sociotechnical nature of mobile computing work: Evidence from a study of policing in the United States. International Journal of Technology and Human Interaction, 1(3), 1-14. Schell, B. H., & Lanteigne, N. (2000). Stalking, harassment, and murder in the workplace: Guidelines for protection and prevention. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Schell, B. H., & Martin, C. (2006). Webster’s new world hacker dictionary. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, Inc. Schell, B. H., Dodge, J. L., & Moutsatos, S. S. (2002). The hacking of America: Who’s doing it, why, and how. Westport, CT: Quorum Books. Schell, B.H. (2007). Contemporary world issues: The internet and society. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.

9

Compilation of References

Schellekens, M. H. M. (2004). Privacy and electronic signatures: are they compatible? Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 10(7), 182-186. Schmidt v. Dep’t of Veteran’s Affairs, 218 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Wis. 2003). Schmidt, C. W. (2000). Patient health information goes electronic. Retrieved July 2, 2007, from http://pubs.acs. org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v03/i09/html/rules.html Schneier, B. (1999). Biometrics: Uses and abuses. Communications of the ACM, 42(8), 136. Schoder, D., & Yin, P. (2000). Building firm trust online. Communications of the ACM, 43(12), 73-79. Schuman, E. (2006). Gartner: $2 billion in e-commerce sales lost because of security fears. eWeek.com, November 27. Retrieved October 15, 2007, from http://www.eweek. com/article2/0,1895,2063979,00.asp Schuman, E. (2007, November 14). TJMaxx’s projected breach costs increase to $216M. eWEEK. Retrieved November 2007, from http://fe42.news.sp1.yahoo.com/ s/zd/20071114/tc_zd/219495

Seigneur, J.-M., & Jensen, C. D. (2004). Trading privacy for trust. In T. Dimitrakos (Ed.), Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Trust Management, iTrust 2004, Oxford, United Kingdom. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2995, pp. 93-107). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Sensor Nation. (2004). [Special Report]. IEEE Spectrum, 41(7). Serjantov, A., & Danezis, G. (2003). Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity. In R. Dingledine & P. F. Syverson. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PET 2002, San Francisco, California. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2482, pp. 259-263). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Sexton, R., Johnson, R., & Hignite, M. (2002). Predicting internet/e-commerce use. Internet Research, 12(5), 402-410. Shah, R., & Piper, M. H. (2007). Wilson disease. Retrieved June 4, 2007, from eMedicine-Http://www.emedicne. com/med/topic2413.htm

Schwaig, K. S., Kane, G. C., & Storey, V. C. (2005). Privacy, fair information practices, and the Fortune 500: the virtual reality of compliance. The DATA BASE for Advances in Information Systems, 36(1).

Shalhoub, Z. (2006). Trust, privacy, and security in electronic business: The case of the GCC countries. Information Management & Computer Security, 14(3), 270-283.

Scott, C. (2004). Regulatory innovation and the online consumer. Law & Policy, 26(3-4), 477-506.

Sharrott, D. (1992). Provider-specific quality-of-care data: A proposal for limited mandatory disclosure. Brooklyn Law Review, 58(Spring), 85-153.

Scott, R. (2001). Health care symposium: E-health: The medical grontier: Cybermedicine and virtual pharmacies. West Virginia Law Review, 103, 412-413. Scottish Consumer Council. (2001). E-commerce and consumer protection: Consumers—real needs in a virtual world. Glasgow: Scottish Consumer Council. Seddigh, N., Pieda, P., Matrawy, A., Nandy, B., Lombadaris, J., & Hatfield, A. (2004). Current trends and advances in information assurance metrics. Retrieved October 10, 2007, from http://dev.hil.unb.ca/Texts/PST/ pdf/seddigh.pdf

0

Shaw, E., Post, J., & Ruby, K. (1999). Inside the mind of the insider. Security Management, 43(12), 34-44. Shaw, K., & Rushing, R. (2007). Podcast, Keith Shaw (NetWorkWorld) talks with Richard Rushing chief security officer at ... data, listen to this podcast. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.networkingsmallbusiness. com/podcasts/panorama/2007/022807pan-airdefense. html?zb&rc=wireless_sec Sheehan, K. B. & Hoy, M. G. (1999). Flaming, complaining, abstaining: How online users respond to privacy concerns. Journal of Advertising, 28(3), 37-51.

Compilation of References

Sheehan, K. B. (2002). Toward a typology of internet users and online privacy concerns. The Information Society, 18(1), 21-32.

Smith, H. J. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, 20(2), 167-196.

Sheehan, K. B. (2002). Toward a typology of Internet users and online privacy concerns. The Information Society, 18, 21-32.

Smith, H. J., Milberg, S. J., & Burke, S. J. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, June, 167-196.

Sheehan, K. B., & Hoy, M. G. (1999). Flaming, complaining, abstaining: How online users respond to privacy concerns. Journal of Advertising, 28(3), 37-51. Sheehan, K. B., & Hoy, M. G. (2000). Dimensions of privacy concern among online consumers. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(1), 62-73. Shimeall, T. (2001, August 23). Internet fraud, Testimony of Timothy J. Shimeall, Ph.D. CERT®, Analysis Center Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA; Before the Pennsylvania House Committee on Commerce and Economic Development, Subcommittee on Economic Development, retrieved October 2007, available http://www.CERT. org/congressional_testimony/Shimeall_testimony_Aug23.html Shimp, T. (2007). Advertising, promotion, and other aspects of integrated marketing communications (7th ed.). Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western. Shinder, D. (2007, February 9). How SMBs can enforce user access policies. Retrieved April 2007, from http:// articles.techrepublic.com.com/5100-1009_11-6157054. html?tag=nl.e101 Singh, B. (2002). Consumer education on consumer rights and responsibilities, code of conduct for ethical business, importance of product labelling. Kualar Lumpur: Consumers International. Sitton, J. V. (2006). When the right to know and the right to privacy collide. Information Management Journal, 40(5), 76-80. Sixsmith, J., & Murray, C. D. (2001). Ethical issues in the documentary data analysis of internet posts and archives. Qualitative Health Research, 11(3), 423-432. Smith, H., Milburg, S., & Burke, S. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, 20(2), 167-196.

Smith, H. J., Milberg, S. J., & Burke, S. J. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, 167195. Smith, H. J., Milburg, S. J. & Burke, S. J. (1996). Information privacy: Measuring individuals’ concerns about organizational practices. MIS Quarterly, 20(2), 167-196. Smith, L. (2004). Global online shopping: How well protected is the Australian consumer? Australian Competition and Consumer Law Journal, 12(2), 163-190. Smith, R. (2002). Microsoft response to the windows media player 8 privacy advisory. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.computerbytesman.com/privacy/wmp8response.htm Smith, R. (2002). Serious privacy problems in windows media player for Windows XP. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.computerbytesman.com/privacy/wmp8dvd.htm Smith, R. E. (2006). Laptop hall of shame. Forbes.com. Commentary on Forbes.com September 7, 2006. So, M., & Sculli, D. (2002). The role of trust, quality, value and risk in conducting e-business. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 102(8/9), 503-512. Solove, D. J. (2005). The coexistence of privacy and security: Fourth amendment codification and professor kerr’s misguided call for judicial deference. Fordham Law Review, 74(November), 747. Song, I., LaRose, R., Eastin, M. S., & Lin, C. A. (2004). Internet gratifications and internet addiction: On the uses and abuses of new media. CyberPsychology &Behavior, 7(4), 384-394.



Compilation of References

Spector, L. (2003, December 26). Guide to online photo album sites: Here’s how to post and share digital memories of your holidays. PC World. Retrieved April 14, 2004, from http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/ 0,aid,114040,00.asp Stajano, F., & Anderson, R. (1999). The cocaine auction protocol: On the power of anonymous broadcast. In A. Pfitzmann (Ed.), Information Hiding Workshop 1999 (pp. 434-447). Springer Verlag. Stanton, P. (2004). Securing data in storage: A review of current research. CoRR, cs.OS/0409034. Stapleton-Paff, K. (2007). Facebook poses privacy issues for students. The Daily of the University of Washington. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from http://www.thedaily. washington.edu/article/2007/4/25/facebookPosesPrivacyIssuesForStudents State of California. (2007). Privacy laws. Retrieved September 26, 2007, from http://www.privacy.ca.gov/ lawenforcement/laws.htm Stokes, M. (2007). Police charge three female students for sign stealing. Western Herald. Retrieved October 22, 2007 from http://media.www.westernherald.com/media/ storage/paper881/news/2007/10/22/News/Police.Charge. Three.Female.Students.For.Sign.Stealing-3046592. shtml Stone, E. F., Gardner, D. G., Gueutal, H. G., & McClure, S. (1983). A field experiment comparing informationprivacy values, beliefs, and attitudes across several types of organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 68(3), 459-468. Stoney, M. A. S., & Stoney, S. (2003). The problems of jurisdiction to e-commerce—some suggested strategies. Logistics Information Management, 16(1), 74-80. Strauss, J., El-Ansary, A., & Frost, R. (2006). E-marketing (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Suh, B., & Han, I. (2003). The impact of customer trust and perception of security control on the acceptance of electronic commerce. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 7(3), 135-161.



Sullivan, B. (2007). Spam is back, and worse than ever. Retrieved March 20, 2007, from http://redtape.msnbc. com/2007/01/spam_is_back_an.html Sultan, F., & Rohm, A. (2005). The coming era of “brand in the hand” marketing. MIT Sloan Management Review, 47(1), 82-90. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. (2003). Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rules by HIPPA Compliance Assistance. (2005). Health & Human Services, May. Susman, T. M. (1988). The privacy act and the freedom of information act: Conflict and resolution. John Marshall Law Review, 21, 703-733. Suzuki, T. (2004, May 31). Overview of Yahoo! BB data leak. Retrieved from IT pro, http://itpro.nikkeibp. co.jp/free/NC/NEWS/20040531/145132/ Swanson, D. L. (1992). Understanding audiences: Continuing contributions of gratifications research. Poetics, 21, 305-328. Swartz, N. (2006). HIPPA compliance declines, survey says. Information Management Journal, 40(4), 16. Sweeney, L. (2002). Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using generalization and suppression. International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10(5), 571-588. Sweeney, L. (2001). Computational disclosure control: A primer on data privacy protection. Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Sweeney, L. (1998). Datafly: A system for providing anonymity in medical data. In T. Y. Lin & S. Qian (Eds.), Database security XI: Status and prospects. IFIP TC11 WG11.3 Eleventh International Conference on Database Security, Lake Tahoe, California (pp. 356-381). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science. Sweeney, L. (2001). Information explosion. In L. Zayatz, P. Doyle, J. Theeuwes, & J. Lane (Eds.), Confidentiality,

Compilation of References

disclosure, and data access: Theory and practical applications for statistical agencies (26 pages). Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http:// privacy.cs.cmu.edu/people/sweeney/explosion2.pdf

Taylor, P. A. (2003). Maestros or misogynists? Gender and the social construction of hacking. In Y. Jewkes (Ed.), Dot.cons: Crime, deviance and identity on the Internet (pp. 125-145). Portland, OR: Willan Publishing.

Sweeney, L. (2002). K-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy. International Journal on Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10(5), 557–570.

Taylor, R. W., Caeti, T. J., Loper, D. K., Fritsch, E. J., & Liederback, J. (2006). Digital crime and digital terrorism. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. Telemedical Report to Congress, 104th Cong., 2d Session (1996).

Sweeney, L. (1996). Replacing personally-identifying information in medical records, the scrub system. In J. J. Cimino (Ed.), Proceedings of the American Medical Informatics Association (pp. 333-337). Washington, D.C.: Hanley & Belfus. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/people/sweeney/scrubAMIA1.pdf Symantec. (2006, September 19). Symantec finds firms recognize importance of application security, yet lack commitment in development process. News release. http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article. jsp?prid=20060919_01 Symptoms of Cushing Syndrome. (2007). WrongDiagnosis.com. Retrieved June 3, 2007, from http://www. wrongdiagnosis.com/c/cushings_syndrome/symptoms. htm Syukunan, T. (2007). Analysis for efficiency of anti-spam ware. Media Communications (Japanese), 57, 2-10. Tahara, M., & Yokohari, K. (2005). Warning of usage of privacy information. Tokyo: Asa.

Teo, T. S. H. (2002). Attitudes toward online shopping and the internet. Behaviour & Information Technology, 21(4), 259-271. Teo, T. S. H., Lim, V. K. G., & Lai, R. Y. C. (1999). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in internet usage. OMEGA: International Journal of Management Science, 27, 25-37. Teo, T., & Lim, V. (1997). Usage patterns and perceptions of the internet: The gender gap. Equal Opportunities International, 16(6/7), 1-8. Tesler, W. (2000). Gould debunked: The prohibition against using New York’s freedom of information law as a criminal discovery tool. New York Law School Law Review, 44, 71-129. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.). (2000). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Tavani, H. (1999). Privacy online. Computers and Society, 29(4), 11-19.

The CAN-SPAM Act: Requirements for Commercial Emailers. (2004). Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/ bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/canspam.htm

Tavani, H. T., & Grodzinsky, F. S. (2002). Cyberstalking, personal privacy, and moral responsibility. Ethics and Information Technology, 4(2), 123-133.

The Safe Internet Pharmacy Act of 2007, S.596, 110th Congress, 1st Session (Fall 2007) Retrieved June 5, 2007, from LexisNexisCongrssional database.

Tavani, H., & Moor, J. (2001). Privacy protection, control of information, and privacy-enhancing technologies. Computers and Society, 31(1), 6-11.

Thomas, D. (2002). Hacker culture. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Taylor, C. R., Franke, G. R., & Marynard, M. L. (2000). Attitudes toward direct marketing and its regulation: A comparison of the United States and Japan. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 19(2), 228-237.

Thompson, B. (2003, February 21). Is Google too powerful? Retrieved December 12, 2006, from http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2786761.stm Timothy, R. (1999). The construction of the world wide web audience. Media, Culture & Society, 21(5), 673684.



Compilation of References

Top Ten Ways to Protect Online Privacy. (2003). Retrieved from http://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/basic/topten. html

Multimedia Association. Retrieved July 20, 2007, from http://www.cni.org/docs/ima.ip-workshop/Tygar.Yee. html

Traffic details for Google.com. (n.d.). Retrieved November 11, 2006, from http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details?q=www.google.com&url=google.com

Tyler, B. J. (1998). Cyberdoctors: The virtual housecall—the actual practice of medicine on the internet is here; is it a telemedical accident waiting to happen? Indiana Law Review, 13, 259-290.

Trammell, K. D., Williams, A. P., Postelincu, M., & Landreville, K. D. (2006). Evolution of online campaigning: Increasing interactivity in candidate web sites and blogs through text and technical features. Mass Communication & Society, 9(1), 21-44. Treasury (Australia). (2006). The Australian guidelines for electronic commerce (March 2006). Canberra, ACT: Treasury (Australia) TRUSTe. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.truste.org/ Trustworthy Computing White Paper. (2003). Redmond, Washington: Microsoft. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/twc_whitepaper. mspx Tschudin, C. (1999). Apoptosis—the programmed death of distributed services. In J. Vitek & C. D. Jensen (Eds.), Secure internet programming. Security issues for mobile and distributed objects. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 1603, pp. 253-260). Heidelberg, Germany: Springer. Turkle, S. (1984). The second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York:Simon and Schuster. Turow, J. (2003). Americans & online privacy: The system is broken. Report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, June. Turow, J., & Hennessy, M. (2007). Internet privacy and institutional trust: Insights from a national survey. New Media & Society, 9(2), 300-318. Tygar, J. D., & Yee, B. (1994). Dyad: A system for using physically secure coprocessors. In Proceedings of the Joint Harvard-MIT Workshop Technological Strategies for Protecting Intellectual Property in the Networked Multimedia Environment. Annapolis, MD: Interactive



U.S. Census Bureau. (2007). The census bureau of the department of commerce report on retail e-commerce sales. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. (1986). Security in cyberspace. Retrieved April 3, 2007, from http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s960605t. htm UCITA. (2002). Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Udo, G. J. (2001). Privacy and security concerns as major barriers for e-commerce: A survey study. Information Management & Computer Security, 9(4), 165-174. Uhl, K. E. (2003). The freedom of information act post9/11: Balancing the public’s right to know, critical infrastructure protection, and homeland security. American University Law Review, 53(October), 261-311. Ullman, E. (1997). Close to the machine: Technophilia and its discontents. San Francisco: City Lights Books. United Nations. (1948). Universal declaration of human rights. New York: United Nations. University of Miami Miller School of Medicine Privacy/ Data Protection Project. (2005). Privacy Standard/Rule (HIPAA). Retrieved May 22, 2007, from http://privacy. med.miami.edu/glossary/xd_privacy_stds_applicability.htm Unze, D. (2007, August 3). Internet operation puts man in prison. St. Cloud Times. Retrieved September 17, 2007, from LexisNexis Current news file. US Safe Web Act of 2006 enacted by 109th Congress March 16, 2006. (2006). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.

Compilation of References

us/congress/bill.xpd?tab=summary&bill=s109-1608 USA Patriot Act of 2001 enacted October 23, 2001. (2001). Retrieved from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill. xpd?bill=h107-3162 USG. (1998). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S. Copyright Office, Pub. 05-304, 112 Stat. 2860. Vaile, D. (2004). Spam canned—new laws for Australia. Internet Law Bulletin, 6(9), 113-115. Van Dyke, T., Midha, V., & Nemati, H. (2007). The effect of consumer privacy empowerment on trust and privacy concerns in e-commerce. Electronic Markets, 17(1), 68-81. Vasek, S. (2006). When the right to know and right to privacy collide. Information Management Journal, 40(5), 76-81. Vasiu, L., Warren, M., & Mackay, D. (2002, December). Personal information privacy issues in B2C e-commerce: a theoretical framework. Paper presented at the 7th Annual CollECTeR Conference on Electronic Commerce (CollECTeR’02), Melbourne, Victoria Vaughn, R. G. (1984). Administrative alternatives and the federal freedom of information act. Ohio State Law Journal, 45(Winter), 185-214. Vivisimo. (2006). Restricted access: Is your enterprise search solution revealing too much? Retrieved October 2007, from via http://Vivisimo.com/ or http://www.webbuyersguide.com/bguide/whitepaper/ wpDetails.asp_Q_wpId_E_NzYyMQ Vogelstein, F. (2007, April 9). Text of wired’s interview with Google CEO Eric Schmidt. Retrieved July 15, 2007, from http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/ news/2007/04/mag_schmidt_trans?curren W3C (2002b). The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) specification. W3C P3P Working Group. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/TR/ P3P/ W3C. (2002). The platform for privacy preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) specification. Retrieved October 25, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/

W3C. (2002a). How to create and publish your company’s P3P policy in 6 easy steps. W3C P3P Working Group. Retrieved April 16, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/P3P/ details.html Wachter, G. W. (2001). Law and policy in telemedicine: HIPAA’s privacy rule summarized—what does it mean for telemedicine? Retrieved May 30, 2007, from http://tie. telemed.org/articles/article.asp?path=legal&article=hip aaSummary_gw_tie01.xml Wagealla, W., Carbone, M., English, C., Terzis, S., Lowe, H. & Nixon, P. (2003, September). A formal model for trust lifecycle management. In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Formal Aspects of Security and Trust, FAST 2003, Pisa, Italy, (pp. 181-192). Retrieved July 20, 2007, from http://www.iit.cnr.it/FAST2003/fastproc-final.pdf Wahab, M. (2004). Globalisation and ODR: dynamics of change in e-commerce dispute settlement. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 12(1), 123-152. Wajcman, J. (1991). Feminism confronts technology. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Walczuch, R., Seelen, J., & Lundgren, H. (2001, September). Psychological determinants for consumer trust in e-retailing. Paper presented at the Eight Research Symposium on Emerging Electronic Markets (RSEEM01), Maastricht, The Netherlands. Walden, I. (2001). Regulating e-commerce: Europe in the global e-conomy. European Law Review, 26(6), 529-547. Waldman, M., Rubin, A., & Cranor, L. F. (2000). Publius: a robust, tamper-evident, censorship-resistant and sourceanonymous web publishing system. In Proceedings of the 9th UsenixSecurity Symposium (pp. 59–72). Wall, D. S. (2001). Cybercrimes and the Internet. In D.S. Wall (Ed.), Crime and the Internet (pp. 1-17). New York: Routledge. Wallis, D. (1999) Report on the proposal for a council regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and en-



Compilation of References

forcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters. Committee on Legal Affairs in the Internal Market. COM (1999) 348 - C5-0169/1999 - 1999/0154 (CNS). Walton, D. (2000). Hackers tough to prosecute, FBI says. The Globe and Mail, February 10, B5. Walton, R. (2006). Balancing the insider and outsider threat. Computer Fraud and Security 2006(11), 8-11. Wang, H., Lee, M. K. O., & Wang, C. (1998). Consumer privacy concerns about internet marketing. Association for Computing Machinery. Communications of the ACM, 41(3), 63-68. Wang, H., Lee, M., & Wang, C. (1998). Consumer privacy concerns about internet marketing. Communications of the ACM, 41(3), 63-70. Wang, H., Lee, M., & Wang, C. (1998, March). Consumer privacy concerns about internet marketing. CACM 41(3), 63-70. Wang, P., & Petrison, L. A. (1993). Direct marketing activities and personal privacy. Journal of Direct Marketing, 7(Winter), 7-19. Warren, S., & Brandeis, L. (1890). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review, 4(5), 193-220. Webex.(2006). On-demand vs. On-premise instant messaging. Webex Communications, Ease of Communications—On Demand EIM Solutions. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.webbuyersguide.com/bguide/ Whitepaper/WpDetails.asp?wpId=Nzc4MQ&hidresty peid=1&category= Webster, J. G., & Lin, S. (2002). The internet audience: Web use as mass behavior. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 46, 1-12. WebTrends. (2007). Retrieved December 9, 2007, from http://www.webtrends.com/ Wei, R., & Lo, V. H. (2006). Staying connected while on the move: Cell phone use and social connectedness. New Media & Society, 8(1), 53-72. Weible, R. J. (1993). Privacy and data: An empirical study of the influence and types and data and situ-



ational context upon privacy perceptions. (Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Business Administration, Mississippi State University). Dissertation Abstracts International, 54(06). Welcome to the Safe Harbor. (2007). Trade Information Center. Retrieved June 5, 2007, from http://www.export. gov/safeharbor/ Westin, A. (1967). Privacy and freedom. New York: Atheneum. Westin, M. (1996). The Minnesota government data practices act: A practitioner’s guide and observations on access to government information. William Mitchell Law Review, 22, 839-902. White, R. C. A., & Ovey, C. (2006). Jacobs and White: The European convention on human rights (4th ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Wikipedia (2007). Retrieved October 1, 2007, from http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_infrastructure Williams, D. (2004, 10 March). Maximising the benefits of the information economy. Retrieved August 2, 2005, from http://www.agimo.gov.au/media/2004/03/21377.html Williams, D. (2004, 27 Feb). Business guides to combat spam. Retrieved August 2, 2005, from http://www.agimo. gov.au/media/2004/02/12070.html Wilson, T. (2007, November 12). ID thief admits using botnets to steal data. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_ id=138856 Winn, J. K., & Wright, B. (2001). The law of electronic commerce. Aspen Publishers. Wolf, C. (2004). California’s new online privacy policy law has nationwide implications. Journal of Internet Law, 7(7), 3-8. Word of Mouth Marketing Association. (2006, 13 Nov). Dell makes public commitment to word of mouth ethics. Retrieved January 5, 2007, from http://www.womma. org/womnibus/007895.php

Compilation of References

Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers (Canada). (1999). Principles of consumer protection for electronic commerce—a Canadian framework. Ottawa: Canada Bankers Association.

Youn, S. (2005). Teenagers’ perceptions of online privacy and coping behaviors: A risk-benefit appraisal approach. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 49(1), 86-110.

Working Group on Electronic Commerce and Consumers (Canada). (2004). Canadian code of practice for consumer protection in electronic commerce. Ottawa: Office of Consumer Affairs, Industry Canada.

Young, J. F. (1971). Information theory. New York: Wiley Interscience.

World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). (2006). The platform for privacy preferences 1.1 (P3P1.1) specification. World Wide Web Consortium. Retrieved July 7, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11/ World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). (2007). The platform for privacy preferences (P3P) project. World Wide Web Consortium. Retrieved July 5, 2007, from http://www.w3.org/P3P/ Xie, E., Teo, H-H, & Wan, W. (2006). Volunteering personal information on the internet: Effects of reputation, privacy notices, and rewards on online consumer behavior. Marketing Letters, 17, 61-74. Yamazaki, F. (2005). Privacy protection law. Nikkei BP. Yank, G. C. (2004 December 21). Canning spam: Consumer protection or a lid on free speech? Retrieved October 2007 from http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/ dltr/articles/2004dltr0016.html Yao, M. Z. (2005). Predicting the adoption of self-protections of online privacy: A test of an expanded theory of planned behavior model. Unpublished dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara. Ackerman, M. S., & Lorrie F. C. (1999). Privacy critics: UI components to safeguard users’ privacy. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI’99) (pp. 258-259). Pittsburgh, PA. Yao, M., Rice, R., & Wallis, K. (2007). Predicting user concerns about online privacy. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 58(5), 710-722. Yianakos, C. (2002). Nameless in cyberspace—protecting online privacy. B+FS, 116(6), 48-49.

Young, K. S. (1996). Psychology of computer use: XL. Addictive use of the Internet: A case that breaks the stereotype. Psychological Reports, 79(3), 899-902. Young, K. S. (1998). Internet addiction: the emergence of a new clinical disorder. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 1(3), 237-244. Yousafzai, S., Pallister, J., & Foxall, G. (2003). A proposed model of e-trust for electronic banking. Technovation, 23(11), 847-860. Yu, B., & Singh, M. P. (2002). Distributed reputation management for electronic commerce. Computational Intelligence, 18(4), 535-549. Yu, B., & Singh, M. P. (2002). An evidential model of distributed reputation management. In Proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS ‘02, Bologna, Italy, (pp. 294–301). New York: ACM Press. Yu, E., & Cysneiros, L. (2002). Designing for privacy and other competing requirements. In Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information Security (SREIS-02). Yu, T., Winslett, M., & Seamons, K. E. (2003). Supporting structured credentials and sensitive policies through interoperable strategies for automated trust negotiation. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 6(1), 1-42. Zacharia, G., & Maes, P. (2000). Trust management through reputation mechanisms. Applied Artificial Intelligence, 14, 881-907. Zadok, E., Badulescu, I., & Shender, A. (1998). Cryptfs: A stackable vnode level encryption file system (Technical Report CUCS-021-98). Columbia University: Computer Science Department.



Compilation of References

Zekios, Dr., G. I. (2007). State cyberspace and personal cyberspace jurisdiction. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 15, 1-37. Zhang, H. (2005). Trust-promoting seals in electronic markets: impact on online shopping. Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application, 6(4), 29. Zhang, X. (2005). What do consumers really know? Communications of the ACM, 48(8), 44-48. Zhong, Y. (2005). Formalization of trust. Ph.D. thesis, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University. Zhong, Y., & Bhargava, B. (2004, September). Using entropy to trade privacy for trust. In Proceedings of the NSF/NSA/AFRL Conference on Secure Knowledge Management, SKM 2004, Amherst, NY (6 pages).

8

Zhong, Y., Lu, Y., & Bhargava, B. (2004). TERA: An authorization framework based on uncertain evidence and dynamic trust (Tech. Rep. No. CSD-TR 04-009). West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University. Zhong, Y., Lu, Y., Bhargava, B., & Lilien, L. (2006). A computational dynamic trust model for user authorization (Working Paper). West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University. Zimmermann, P. R. (1995). The official pgp user’s guide., Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Zureik, E. (2004) Governance, security and technology: The case of biometrics. Studies in Political Economy, 73, 113.

9

About the Contributors

Kuanchin Chen is an associate professor of computer information systems at Western Michigan University. He received his DBA in information system from Cleveland State University and his MS in information systems from University of Colorado. His research interests include electronic business, online privacy & security, issues in online user environment, Internet technologies, and data mining techniques. Dr. Chen serves on the editorial advisory boards of several academic journals and business magazines. He received grants ranging from universities to federal government. He has been promoting online interactivity, privacy, and security through research studies and grants. Dr. Chen’s research has appeared in such journals as Information & Management, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Communications of the Association for Information Systems (AIS), IEEE Transactions on Education, Journal of Computer Information Systems, and many others. He is the director of Web technology of the Informing Science Institute. Adam Fadlalla is a professor, Computer and Information Science at Cleveland State University. He holds an MBA in finance and decision sciences from Miami of Ohio, a MSc in computer science, and a PhD in computer information systems from the University of Cincinnati. His current research interests include decision support systems, artificial intelligence applications, knowledge discovery in databases, information systems security and privacy issues, enterprise integration systems, and medical informatics. In addition, Dr. Fadlalla has developed interest in issues of global and cross-cultural information technology as a result of being a Fulbright fellow twice. His published research covers a broad spectrum of information systems issues. *** Bharat Bhargava is a professor of computer science with a courtesy appointment in the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Purdue. He conducts research in security and privacy issues in distributed systems. He received best paper award at the IEEE Data Engineering conference. He was awarded the IEEE Technical Achievement Award for contributions to foundations of adaptability in distributed systems and the IEEE Computer Society Golden Core service recognition. He was inducted in the Purdue’s Book of Great Teachers. He serves on seven journal editorial boards and on Technical Achievement Award and Fellow committees of the IEEE Computer Society. He founded of the IEEE Symposium on Reliable and Distributed Systems, IEEE Conference on Digital Libraries, and the ACM Conference on Information and Knowledge Management. He is an IEEE and IETE fellow. Craig Bisset is a former student of the University of Auckland. He graduated with a BA majoring in geography and political science. At present, he is completing his MBA at National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan. His current areas of research interest are Chinese consumer behavior and e-commerce. Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

About the Contributors

Tom S. Chan is an associate professor at the Information Department, Southern New Hampshire University at Manchester, New Hampshire, USA. He holds an EdD from Texas Tech University and a MSCS from the University of Southern California. Prior to SNHU, he was an assistant professor at Marist College, and as project manager and software designer, specialized in data communication at Citibank. He has published works in the area of instructional design, distance learning, technology adaptation, information security, and Web design. Jengchung V. Chen is assistant professor in telecommunications management at National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan. He has published articles dealing with privacy issues in journals like International Journal of Organizational Analysis, Labor Law Journal, and Information, Communication, and Society. He holds a PhD in communication and information sciences from the University of Hawaii and a master’s in policy and management from SUY-Stony Brook and computer science from Polytechnic University. Andy Chiou is an alumnus of New York University with a BA in sociology and economics, and is, as of time of this writing, currently completing his MBA at National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan. Upon completion of his MBA, Andy plans to continue pursuing a doctorate degree in the United States. His current areas of interest are general management and cross cultural issues. Ken Coghill was born in Australia (1944), has been a veterinarian, a public servant and elected to Wodonga Council, and as a member and speaker of parliament. He joined Monash University in 1996, where he teaches Governance and Business & Government in master’s programs and supervises PhD research students studying diverse aspects of governance. Assoc. Professor Coghill is a co-director, Monash Governance Research Unit, where he directs and undertakes research on integrated governance, that is, the dynamic, evolving inter-relationships of the public, corporate and civil society sectors as they affect the governance of nation-states. J. Stephanie Collins earned a PhD in management information systems in 1990 from the University of Wisconsin. She has taught in the field since 1988 and has published papers in various journals, and presented at conferences. She has published papers on Information Technology Outsourcing and Technology Applications for Economic Development, IT Education, and on technical issues. She has also worked as an IT consultant, and has developed several systems. Her current research is focused on how the uses of internet technologies change the environment for business and for education. G. Scott Erickson is associate professor and chair of the Marketing/Law Department in the School of Business at Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY. He holds a PhD from Lehigh University and masters’ degrees from Thunderbird and SMU. He has published widely on intellectual property, intellectual capital, competitive intelligence, and a number of other related topics. His book with Helen Rothberg, From Knowledge to Intelligence, was published by Elsevier in 2005. His consulting work began over 20 years ago with the Alexander Proudfoot Company and continues today. Louis K. Falk received his doctorate in mass communication from the University of Southern Mississippi where he graduated with an emphasis in advertising and public relations. Dr. Falk is an associate professor in the Department of English & Communication, University of Texas At Brownsville. His research interests include the impact of new technologies on marketing, advertising, and public relations. Dr. Falk has recently been published in a variety of journals to include: The Journal of Website Promotion, Journal of E-Business, and the Journal of Promotion Management. Dr. Falk is also an elected board

0

About the Contributors

member and Webmaster of the International Academy of Business Disciplines. His Web site address is http://www.louisfalk.org/ Philip Flaherty was awarded a Bachelor of Civil Law (BCL) from NUI, Galway in 2005; he was awarded a diploma in legal Irish in 2004. He holds a LLM in public law from NUI, Galway. He co-authored a consultation paper on statute law restatement for the Law Reform Commission in 2007 and conducted research on the commission’s e-conveyancing road map project. He is currently researching the Settled Land Acts and will produce a consultation paper on this area of law for the commission in 2008. Philip will join the Dublin law firm McCann FitzGerald in 2008. Philip is a regular contributor to legal conferences and legal journals. Anil Gurung is an assistant professor of business and information management at Neumann College. He received his PhD from the University of Texas at Arlington. Current research interests are in the areas of IT adoption, information security and privacy, ecommerce, and cultural and social aspects of business computing. He has published in various journals and conference proceedings. Huong Ha is currently holding the position of deputy course director at TMC Business School, TMC Academy, Singapore and a PhD candidate at Monash University, Australia. She holds a master’s degree in public policy from the National University of Singapore. She has many book chapters, journal articles, reviewed conference papers, and encyclopedia articles published. She has been awarded a research grant by Consumer Affairs Victoria (Australia), a distinguished paper award (Turkey and the USA) and many international travel grants. Naoki Hamamoto received his MBA in computer information systems from Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan. He was involved several major research projects during his graduate study. He is currently an information professional in internal system auditing. Mr. Hamamoto’s research interests include global information security management, Web 2.0 social networking and community, and business process management. Thomas J. Holt is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He has a doctorate in criminology and criminal justice from the University of Missouri—Saint Louis. His research focuses on computer crime, cyber crime, and the role that technology and the Internet play in facilitating all manner of crime and deviance. Dr. Holt has authored several papers on the topics of hacking, cyber crime, and deviance that have appeared in journals such as Deviant Behavior and the International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice. He is also a member of the editorial board of the International Journal of Cyber Criminology. Chiung-wen (Julia) Hsu received her PhD in communication from SUNY Buffalo in 2003. She is now an assistant professor of Department of Radio & Television at National Cheng Chi University, Taiwan. Julia’s research interests include communication technology, journalism, mass communication, and Internet research, especially online privacy issues. She is interested in the users’ behavioral differences between online and offline worlds, and in different Internet platforms. She developed a situational model and has conducted several empirical studies. Julia’s research has been published in journals such as the Asian Journal of Communication, Telematics & Informatics, Online Information Review, and Cyberpsychology & Behavior.



About the Contributors

Anurag Jain is an assistant professor at the Bertolon School of Business, Salem State College, MA. He has over 12 years of industry experience including: strategic brand management, financial planning, global bilateral business promotion, and IT services. His research has appeared in the proceedings for several leading conferences that include Americas Conference on Information Systems and Decision Sciences Institute, and Southwest Decision Science Institute, and the Northeast Decision Sciences. His research interests at present are towards IT capabilities, value, and the management of IT resources; knowledge management, adaptive and sustainable competitive enterprise; business intelligence and activity monitoring; and influence of information technology on organizations and society. He holds a PhD from the University of Texas-Arlington. He holds a master of science degree from The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; a post graduate diploma in business management from Sydenham Institute of Management; and a bachelor of commerce degree from The University of Bombay. Thejs Willem Jansen holds a master of science (computer science engineering) from the Technical University of Denmark. He co-authored his MSc thesis entitled “Privacy in Government IT-Systems” with Søren Peen, which developed the model presented in this chapter and resulted in a paper published at the Sustaining Privacy in Autonomous Collaborative Environments 2007 workshop. Thejs Jansen currently holds a position as an IT auditor at PricewaterhouseCoopers, where he reviews IT security procedures by identifying issues, developing criteria, reviewing and documenting client processes and procedures. His work includes working with Sarbanes-Oxley clients. Christian Damsgaard Jensen holds a master of science (computer science) from the University of Copenhagen (Denmark) and a PhD (computer science) from Université Joseph Fourier (Grenoble, France). Dr. Jensen currently holds a position as associate professor at the Technical University of Denmark, where he supervised the MSc thesis project of Thejs Willem Jansen and Søren Peen. Dr. Jensen works in the areas of system security and distributed systems, with a particular focus on pervasive computing systems. Dr. Jensen has published more than 50 papers in international peer-reviewed journals, conferences, symposia, and workshops. Sean Lancaster is a lecturer with the Department of Decision Sciences and Management Information Systems at Miami University. He teaches undergraduate courses on information systems & business strategy, Web design, VisualBasic.NET, database design, and e-commerce. Sean earned his MBA from Miami University in 2002. Suhong Li is an associate professor of computer information systems at Bryant University. She earned her PhD from the University of Toledo in 2002. She is a member of Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals, Decision Science Institute, and International Association for Computer Information Systems. She has published in academic journals including Journal of Operations Management, OMEGA: the International Journal of Management Science, Decision Support Systems, Journal of Computer Information Systems, Journal of Managerial Issues, and International Journal of Integrated Supply Management. Her research interests include supply chain management, electronic commerce, and adoption and implementation of IT innovation. Leszek Lilien’s research focuses on opportunistic networks or oppnets (a specialized kind of ad hoc networks); and trust, privacy, and security in open computing systems. He serves on the editorial boards of the International Journal of Communication Networks and Distributed Systems, The Open Cybernetics &



About the Contributors

Systemics Journal, and Recent Patents on Computer Science. He was the main organizer and chair of the International Workshop on Specialized Ad Hoc Networks and Systems (SAHNS 2007), held in conjunction with the 27th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS 2007). He is a senior member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Elizabeth Ann Maharaj is statistician and a senior lecturer in the Department of Econometrics and Business Statistics at the Caulfield Campus of Monash University. She teaches subjects on business data analysis, business forecasting, and survey data analysis. Her main research interests are in time series classification and forecasting. She has presented several papers on time series classification at international conferences and much of it has been published in international journals. Elizabeth has also been involved in research projects in climatology, environmental science, labour markets, human mobility, and finance, and she has also published in journals in some of these fields. Karin Mika has been associated with the first-year legal writing program at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law since 1988. She has also worked as an adjunct professor of English at Cuyahoga Community College and is a research consultant for various firms and businesses in the Cleveland area. In addition, Professor Mika was faculty advisor for the law school’s moot court program and currently judges at various national moot court competitions. She has lectured on essay writing technique for several bar review courses and has written bar exam essay questions for both the California and Minnesota bar examiners. Professor Mika’s areas of scholarly research are varied and she has published in the areas of Native American law, Internet law, and health care. Administrative and teaching responsibilities: legal writing, research, and advocacy program. Shahriar Movafaghi received a PhD in computer science from Northwestern University, with over 20 years of hands on technical experience. Dr. Movafaghi has published numerous papers in areas of digital rights, data warehousing, databases, system architecture, software engineering, object-oriented technology, application development, and teaching techniques for IT. He has architected and led many software system projects in the financial, apparel, publishing, and computer hardware/software industries as well as directed government-funded research and development projects. He has taught courses at various universities including SNHU, UNH, BU, and UMASS Lowell. Charles O’Mahony is a legal researcher with the Law Reform Commission of Ireland. He was awarded a BA in 2003 and a LLB in 2004 from NUI, Galway. He holds a master’s in law (LLM) from University College London and a LLM in public law from NUI, Galway. He was the principal legal researcher for the Commission’s Third Programme of Law Reform and authored a report on the Third Programme. He is currently preparing a consultation paper on reform of the jury system in Ireland, which is due for publication in 2008. He is a senior tutor in law at University College Dublin, where he has tutored courses on legal systems and methods, tort law, and constitutional frameworks. Betty J. Parker is associate professor of marketing & advertising at Western Michigan University, where she teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in Internet marketing, media research, and advertising. She has published papers about the Internet as a communication tool and the public policy aspects of marketing alcohol, food, and prescription drugs. She holds a PhD from the University of Missouri, an MBA from the University of Illinois-Chicago, and a BA from Purdue University.



About the Contributors

Andrew Pauxtis is currently a graduate student in the information systems management master’s program at Quinnipiac University in Hamden, CT. His areas of interest in regards to information technology include Web development and design technologies, search engine technologies, search engine optimization, Internet marketing, and Web 2.0. He graduated from Quinnipiac University in 2007 with a BA in mass communications. Søren Peen holds a master of science (computer science engineering) from the Technical University of Denmark. He co-authored his MSc thesis entitled “Privacy in Government IT-Systems” with Thejs Jansen, which developed the model presented in this chapter and resulted in a paper published at the Sustaining Privacy in Autonomous Collaborative Environments 2007 workshop. Since his graduation, Søren Peen has completed his national service in the Danish Defence Forces and is currently employed as an IT-specialist at IBM’s Copenhagen Crypto Competence Center. Alan Rea earned his BA at The Pennsylvania State University, an MA at Youngstown State University, an MS at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, and his PhD at Bowling Green State University. Alan is an associate professor of business information systems at Western Michigan University. Since 1997 Alan has taught courses in Web development and design, system administration, and various objectoriented language programming courses. Alan researches topics in artificial intelligence, hacker culture, security, and virtual reality. He has published articles in these fields, as well as authored several textbooks on an assortment of information technology topics. Bernadette H. Schell, the founding dean of the Faculty of Business and Information Technology at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology in Canada, has authored four books on the topic of hacking: The Hacking of America: Who’s Doing It, Why, and How (2002); Contemporary World Issues: Cybercrime (2004); Webster’s New World Hacker Dictionary (2006); and Contemporary World Issues: The Internet and Society (2007). She has also written numerous journal articles on topics related to violence in society and is the author of three books dealing with stress-coping in the workplace (1997), the stress and emotional dysfunction of corporate leaders (1999), and stalking, harassment, and murder in the workplace (2000). Angelena M. Secor received her MBA in computer information systems from Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan. She is currently an IT consultant in the healthcare field. Mr. Secor’s research interests include information security, information privacy, and offshore outsourcing of healthcare services. Hy Sockel received his doctorate in management information systems from Cleveland State University. Dr. Sockel is a visiting professor in the management information systems area at Indiana University South Bend. His research interests include the impact of technology on the organization and its employees, electronic commerce, database technologies, and application systems. Dr. Sockel has recently been published in a variety of journals including: Journal of Management Systems, The Journal of Website Promotion, and the International Journal of Web Engineering and Technology. J. Michael Tarn is a professor of business information systems at Western Michigan University. He holds a PhD and an MS in information systems from Virginia Commonwealth University. Dr. Tarn specializes in multidisciplinary research, involving ICT, EC, and strategic management. He has published various articles in professional journals, book chapters, and refereed conference proceedings. Professor



About the Contributors

Tarn coauthored the first scholarly book in ES education, Enterprise Systems Education in the 21st Century. He is managing editor of International Journal of Management Theory and Practices. His areas of expertise are information security management, data communications management, Internet research, international MIS, and critical systems management. Barbara J. Tyler is a registered nurse and attorney who taught legal writing and drafting for 16 years, as well as directing the Legal Writing Department for 6 years. She serves as a consultant to practitioners and firms on medical malpractice claims, risk management, and writing and drafting. She was most rewarded in her teaching career to serve as faculty-advisor to the Cleveland-Marshall Journal of Law and Health for 6 years, as well as advisor for 4 years to the Delta Theta Phi Law fraternity. Professor Tyler was honored with the Wilson Stapleton law alumni award for teaching excellence in 2005, as well as the International Delta Theta Phi law fraternity most outstanding teacher of the year 2005-06. She is active in many legal and community organizations. Her research and writing interests are varied, and she has published in the areas of medicine and law, Internet law, insurance law, and art law, as well as learning theory. Bruce A. White is the chair of information systems management at Quinnipiac University in Hamden, CT. He is also on the Educational Foundation for the Institute for Certification of Computer Professionals, on the editorial review board for the Journal of Information Systems Education and the Global Journal of Information Management. He has chaired the ISECON conference four times. His current research is on Web 2.0 technologies, assessment processes, health information systems, and outsourcing. David C. Yen is currently Jennifer J. Petters chair in Asian business and professors of MIS of the Department of Decision Sciences and Management Information Systems at Miami University. He assumed Raymond E. Glos professor in business from 2005-2007 and was a department chair from 1995-2005. After receiving his PhD in MIS and MS in computer sciences in 1985, Professor Yen is active in research. He has published books and articles which have appeared in Communications of the ACM, Decision Support Systems, Information & Management, Information Sciences, Computer Standards and Interfaces, Information Society, Omega, International Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, and Communications of AIS, among others. Professor Yen’s research interests include data communications, electronic/mobile commerce, and systems analysis and design. Chen Zhang is an assistant professor of computer information systems at Bryant University. He received his MS and PhD in computer science from the University of Alabama in 2000 and 2002, and a BS from Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Dr. Zhang’s primary research interests fall into the areas of computer networks and distributed systems. He is a professional member of ACM and IEEE.





Index

A

C

Adobe.com 7 AdWords 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 aesthetic experience 224, 225 AltaVista 5 Amazon 4, 205, 260 anonymity 19, 30, 65, 83, 86, 100, 117, 118, 217, 235, 356, 371, 394, 397, 398, 409, 416, 418 anonymity set 93, 100, 101, 113 anonymous surfing tools 278 ANSI bombs 40 Asia Pacific Economic Co-Operation (APEC) 129 asset theft 36 attack machine 41 Australian Consumers’ Association (ACA) 134 Australian Guidelines for Electronic Commerce (AGEC) 132 automated trust negotiation (ATN) 96 Automatic Processing of Personal Data 333, 340

CartManager 19 casual consumer 2 Children’s Online Privacy and Protection Act 17 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) 262, 271 civil liberties 307, 308, 309, 406 click streams 181 Coca-Cola 264, 283 code of ethics 137 common biometric exchange file format (CBEFF) 305 common identifiers 69, 74 computer-mediated communication (CMC) 233 computer cache 27 computer underground (CU) 190, 192, 195 confidential business information (CBI) 316 confidentiality 66, 105, 118, 121, 422 confidentiality-integrity-availability (CIA) 88 consumer protection 2, 17, 18, 111, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 232, 255, 280, 326, 327, 340, 347, 358, 361, 389, 395, 397, 403, 408, 413, 414, 418, 420, 427 consumer rights 126 content abuse 36 cookie 6, 7, 22, 259, 260, 266, 274, 419 Council of Europe’s European Convention of Human Rights 333 CPA Web Trust 271 CPU cycles 100 Crackers 194, 195 credit card data 18, 315 cyber crime 196 Cybercrime Act 42 cyberfly 92, 122 cybermedicine 347, 355, 361, 363, 367, 368, 409, 420

B banner ads 11, 181, 263 BBBOnline Privacy 134, 269, 276, 277 Better Business Bureau (BBB) 88 BioAPI 305 biometric characteristics 300, 303 black listing 48 blogs 52, 53, 210, 217, 218, 229, 237, 257, 261, 264, 285, 390, 400, 415, 424 Boeing 261, 264, 282 bot 8, 40, 41, 42, 50 bot herder 41, 42 botnet 41, 42, 43 Botnet Task Force 43 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Foreign Judgments 330 business-to-business (B2B) 372 business to customer (B2C) 372

Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.

Index

Cyber Security Enhancement Act 17, 23, 31, 198, 404 cyber stalking 202, 203, 223, 230

D data-processing 65 data-storage 65, 66 Data Protection Directive 63, 127, 128, 320, 333, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 345 denial of service (DoS) 36 Department of Justice 43, 313 diffused audiences 219 digital fingerprint 244, 245, 246 digital rights management (DRM) 240, 241 disposition to trust 94, 95, 170 disruption 36 distributed DoS (DDoS) 36 Do Not Call (DNC) Registry 285, 286

E e-commerce xvii, 3, 51, 81, 86, 95, 112, 114, 117, 120, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 151, 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 168, 170, 171, 173, 175, 177, 178, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 195, 196, 216, 241, 243, 249, 251, 252, 263, 266, 270, 271, 272, 273, 277, 279, 280, 301, 326, 327, 328, 329, 331, 332, 333, 337, 339, 340, 342, 344, 372, 373, 384, 385, 386, 391, 397, 398, 403, 405, 406, 408, 411, 412, 413, 415, 418, 419, 420, 422, 424, 425 e-retailer 136 Electronic Commerce Directive 329 Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 84, 167, 183, 188, 398 electronic risk management 38 encryption system 247 end user 47 Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB) 271 European Court of Human Rights 334, 345 European extra-judicial network (EEJ-Net) 328 European Parliament 55, 61, 63, 66, 80, 82, 84, 399 European Union (EU) 128, 149, 326, 327 Excite 5 exposure 38

F Facebook 181, 182, 183, 184, 187, 293, 294, 393, 399, 409, 422 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 22, 23 falsification of private information 27

FBI 43, 45, 46, 53, 194, 209, 210, 211, 394, 402, 426 Federal Information Security Management Act 23, 25 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 4, 17, 249, 258, 270, 286 file-sharing 41 firewalls 46 flooding 197 focus 38, 292 Fortune 100 207, 269, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 282 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA 311 FTC v. Petco 18, 25

G gender-neutral IDs 28 Gmail 1, 8, 9, 13, 264 Google 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1, 9, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 39, 49, 54, 166, 180, 181, 183, 185, 191, 264, 314, 366, 392, 393, 395, 398, 402, 404, 408, 411, 412, 414, 417, 423, 424, 425 Google Calendar 3 Google Checkout 3, 11 Google Desktop 3, 12 Google Earth 3, 7 Google Groups 3 Google Maps 3 Google News 3 Google Notebook 3 Google Talk 3 gray listing 48

H half-life 38 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) 17, 20, 24, 31, 86, 207, 253, 271, 307, 348, 352, 353, 366, 368, 404 Homeland Security Act 17, 23, 31, 198, 404 House of Representatives 17 hybrid listing 48

I identity theft 18, 19, 307 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 307 IIA Content Regulation Code of Practice 133 informational privacy 90, 322, 391 information technology (IT) 34, 371 Institute of International Management (IIM) 292



Index

integrity 24, 25, 45, 47, 51, 87, 88, 95, 103, 104, 105, 114, 154, 232, 242, 258 intellectual property rights (IPR) 196, 197, 207 Internet cafés 34 Internet itinerary 124 Internet protocol (IP) 274 Internet relay chat (IRC) 42 Internet service providers (ISPs) 285 IP-based black list technique 42 IP delivery 6 iTunes 166, 168, 182, 185, 389, 391, 410

obfuscating 94 Olmstead 314 online privacy policy (OPP) 271 online privacy protection behavior xvii, 152, 158, 160, 161 online trust 208 Operation Bot Roast 43 opt-out system 378 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 128 outsourcing 69, 73

J

P

Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information 370, 371, 372, 374

PageRank feature 6 patient rights 360 PayPal 43, 99 PC Magazine 6, 9, 13, 135, 144, 145, 411, 416 persistence 38 personal computers (PCs) 191 personal digital assistants (PDAs) 33 personal privacy xv, xviii, 1, 3, 4, 57, 81, 90, 165, 167, 171, 187, 222, 242, 294, 295, 297, 313, 318, 319, 321, 423, 426 phishing 21, 132, 147, 212, 213 phreaking 125, 197 Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 134, 372 prevalence 38 Privacy Act 1988 130, 131, 132, 147 privacy enhancing technology (PET) 58 privacy evaluation 67 privacy protection behavior xvii, 152, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 38, 54, 59, 83, 362, 368, 369, 417 pseudo-voluntary data dissemination 90 public key infrastructure (PKI) 246

K keyloggers 42

L LAN 53, 88, 415 legal privacy controls 105 limiting data 69, 74 Lycos 5

M malware 18, 21, 30, 39, 40, 140, 390 McDonald’s 261 media drenching gratification 230 Medicaid 351, 353 Medicare 351, 353 Michinoku Bank 382, 383, 384 MiniStore 166, 185, 410 MIT.edu 7 mobile encryption 44 multiple identities 28, 158, 175, 181 MX hosts 19

N NASA.gov 7 National Principles for the Fair Handling of Personal Information (NPPs) 130 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) xvi, 58 NSF.gov 7 NSW Office of Fair Trading 126, 144, 414

O O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo. 354, 367, 414 8

Q questionnaires 81

R Rbot 42 Real.com 7 Record Industry Association of America (RIAA) 285 remote process control (RPC) 41 repudiation 36 reputation deviation 95

Index

S

U

Safe Harbor 105, 119, 138, 269, 276, 277, 426 Safe Internet Pharmacy Act 368, 423 search engine logging 7 search engine optimized (SEO) 5 security administrator tool for analyzing networks (SATAN) 208 sensitivity 68, 72, 78, 79 situational paradigm 214, 216 smartphones 33 social engineering 36 social paradigm of trust 114 sociograms 95 Soft Bank, Co. 381 SPAM 18, 21, 22, 23, 31, 193, 257, 264, 285, 286, 287, 289, 296, 392, 423 Spam Act 2003 130, 131, 132, 147 spoofing 197 Spyware 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 40, 132, 141, 147, 260, 266, 286, 287, 297, 394, 401, 405, 408 SQL injection attacks 18, 25, 27 State Farm 276, 282 steganography 105, 113, 244, 245, 246 Storm 42 structural equation models (SEM) 233 surveillance 39, 69, 72, 78, 79, 242 syndication 248

U.K. Scotland Yard Computer Crime Research Center 45 U.S. Can-Spam Act 132 U.S. Court of Appeals 288 U.S. Safe Web Act 17, 23 underage consumer protection 18, 20 United Nations (UN) 128, 149 unlinkability 65 unobservability 65, 83, 394, 397, 416 USA Patriot Act 17, 23, 31, 425

T

X

tamper-proofing 94, 116, 395 Television without Frontiers Directive 330 territorial privacy 90 terrorism 34, 84, 211, 212, 291, 295, 296, 308, 345, 423 The Electronic Signatures Directive 331 Theory of Human Identification 302 transparency 70, 73, 78, 79, 80 trust 13, 27, 29, 30, 32, 49, 59, 71, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100–195, 202–210, 234, 237, 265, 266, 267, 268, 270–294, 301, 327, 351, 372–398, 400–428 trust-enhanced role assignment (TERA) 110 TRUSTe 130, 134, 181, 187, 269, 271, 276, 277, 359, 385, 391, 424 trustee 87, 89, 94, 95 truster 87, 89, 94, 95 trust gains 93

XML scripting language 167

V verifying trust 97, 98 vulnerability management 50

W Walt Disney 261, 282 watermarking 86, 94, 244, 245, 253, 396 Web bugs 177, 181, 192, 260, 274 WebTrends 166, 167, 187, 426 white listing 48 WiFi 88 Wired Magazine 4, 11 World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 167, 187, 249, 372, 427

Y Yahoo! 3, 5, 21, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 422 YouTube 3, 9, 10, 11

Z zombie machine 41

9