Moral Emotions and Intuitions

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Moral Emotions and Intuitions

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Sabine Roeser Delft University of Technology and University of Twente, The Netherlands



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© Sabine Roeser 2011

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–23267–9 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne


All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

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For Jeff, my love

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Abbreviations

ix

Acknowledgements

x

Preface Part I 1

xii Intuitions

1

Ethical Intuitionism 1 Introduction 2 What is intuitionism? 3 Cognitivism 4 Foundationalism 5 Realism 6 Conclusion

3 3 4 6 12 28 43

2 Different Forms of Intuitionism 1 Introduction 2 Examples of basic moral beliefs 3 Monism versus pluralism 4 Consequentialism versus nonconsequentialism 5 Skepticism versus commonsense 6 General versus particular moral beliefs 7 Conclusion

45 45 46 55 61 70 77 78

3 Typical Objections against Intuitionism 1 Introduction 2 Intuitionism is dogmatic 3 Intuitionism is simplistic and naive 4 Intuitionism presupposes an obscure moral faculty 5 Conclusion

79 79 79 81 100 106

Part II Emotions

109

4 Particular Intuitions and Emotions 1 Introduction 2 The importance of particular moral judgments 3 Dancy’s particularism

111 111 111 116


Contents

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Contents

4 A particularist epistemology: intuitions and emotions 5 Conclusion

124 136

5 Affectual Intuitionism 1 Introduction 2 Reid on moral emotions 3 Affectual intuitionism: intuitions as emotions 4 ‘Neuroethical’ challenges to affectual intuitionism 5 Affectual intuitionism and motivation 6 Conclusion

138 138 139 149 158 167 179

Epilogue: New Perspectives in Moral Philosophy

180

Notes

183

Works Cited

191

Index

199


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IP:

Reid, Thomas (1969a) [1785], Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Introduction by Baruch Brody, Cambridge, MA, and London: The MIT Press.

AP: Reid, Thomas (1969b) [1788], Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Introduction by Baruch Brody, Cambridge, MA, and London, England: The MIT Press. ME: Sidgwick, Henry (1901) [1874], The Methods of Ethics, London and New York: Macmillan. PE:

Moore, G.E. (1988) [1903], Principia Ethica, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.

RG: Ross, W.D. (1967) [1930], The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press. FE:

Ross, W.D. (1968) [1939], Foundations of Ethics. The Gifford Lectures, Oxford: Clarendon Press.


Abbreviations

ix

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This book has grown out of work I have done over the past 12 years. The basis for this lies in my PhD thesis. I wish to thank René van Woudenberg of the VU University, Amsterdam, for his fantastic support, feedback, and inspiration during the work for my PhD thesis (1998–2002). Terence Cuneo was a postdoc at our department, and I am very grateful for the invaluable feedback he gave me on my work, including his suggestion to call my approach ‘affectual intuitionism’. I also wish to thank my other former colleagues at the VU for their comments, most notably Martijn Blauw, Ron Rood, and Mariëtte Willemsen. The basis for Chapter 4 was written during a stay as a visiting graduate student (with a British Chevening Scholarship) at the University of Reading during the Fall term 2000, where I had the honor to be supervised by Jonathan Dancy. I am very much indebted to Jonathan for his fascinating ideas and the detailed feedback he has given me on my work. While finalizing my PhD research, I started to work at the philosophy department of TU Delft in 2001. I was partially funded (2005–2009) through a scholarship by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for my new research on risk and emotion, using my approach of affectual intuitionism as a theoretical framework. Besides my work on risk and emotion, I published several papers that were based on my PhD thesis, but that also included major revisions and new developments. I presented these papers at various conferences; too many to list here. I wish to thank the audiences of these conferences and the referees and editors of the various journals for their comments. This book incorporates these papers and parts of my PhD thesis, but I rewrote the initial texts substantially and added new passages. I was able to write up this book while I was a Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS) during the academic year 2009–2010. I cannot express my gratitude to the staff at NIAS for providing me with the most ideal working conditions, including four-course lunches every day. I enjoyed the interaction with the other Fellows. Specifically, I wish to thank the rector of NIAS at that time, Wim Blockmans, for creating such an inspiring and stimulating working environment. I also wish to thank my colleagues at the philosophy department of TU Delft for allowing me the sabbatical, especially Peter Kroes and Jeroen van den Hoven. I am aware that it is a special luxury to have a sabbatical to


Acknowledgements

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bridge the gap between two major research fellowships. Special thanks is due to Joanna Bouma who edited the manuscript and made meticulous revisions and comments. I would also like to thank Pri Gibbons and Melanie Blair at Palgrave Macmillan for their feedback and support, and the team at Newgen for their marvelous copyediting. Special thanks to Tony Hooper for turning my 1994-paintings (from my studies at the Academy of Fine Arts in Maastricht) into a beautiful cover. This book incorporates reworked passages from the following papers or chapters that I have previously published: ‘Introduction: Thomas Reid’s Moral Philosophy’, in Sabine Roeser (ed.) (2010), Reid on Ethics, Series: Philosophers in Depth, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–22 (passages included in Chapters 1 and 2); ‘Intuitionism, Moral Truth, and Tolerance’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 39 (2005), 75-87 (passages included in Chapters 1 and 3); ‘Defending Moral Intuition’, in René van Woudenberg, Sabine Roeser, and Ron Rood (eds.) (2005), Basic Belief and Basic Knowledge: Papers in Epistemology, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 231–50 (passages included in Chapters 1 and 3); ‘A Particularist Epistemology: “Affectual Intuitionism” ’, Acta Analytica, 21, no. 1 (2006), 33–44 (passages included in Chapter 4, Section 4); ‘Reid and Moral Emotions’, Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 7 (2009), 177–192 (passages included in Chapter 5, Section 2); ‘Emotional Reflection about Risks’, in S. Roeser (ed.) (2010), Emotions and Risky Technologies, New York: Springer (passages included in Chapter 5, Section 3); ‘Intuitions, Emotions and Gut Feelings in Decisions about Risks: Towards a Different Interpretation of “Neuroethics”,’ The Journal of Risk Research, 13 (2010), 175–90 (passages included in Chapter 5, Section 4). I would like to thank the respective publishers and journals for allowing me to reprint passages from these publications in this book. This book is about emotions, and the last acknowledgements are mainly emotional. Jeff, thank you so much for your love and camaraderie during all these years. You have seen me start my career in philosophy and have always supported me in my dreams: mentally, by encouraging me and discussing my plans and ideas with me, but also very practically, by commenting on my texts and sharing the more mundane parts of life. Your sense of humor and direct understanding of complicated issues has always helped me to keep my feet on the ground. Our lives have taken on a totally different dimension since the arrival of our two truly wonderful children, Parker and Mae. I am so happy that we can make all our dreams true together. I owe you so much.


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1 Aims of this study How do we know what is morally right or wrong, good or bad? There have been innumerable answers to this question in the history of philosophy. Most of these answers can be grouped under two major positions. Either moral experience is emotional, but then it must be subjective (sentimentalism); or it is objective, but then it must be rational (rationalism). This division is based on the dichotomy between reason and emotion. However, this dichotomy has long been rejected by many emotion scholars. They believe that we need emotions in order to be practically rational. In this book I develop a moral epistemology that is based on this idea of emotions. I will argue that we need emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge. In order to develop this account, I start out from what I take to be the most sophisticated rationalistic metaethical theory, that is, ethical intuitionism. This will come as a surprise for many professional philosophers, as many of them take intuitionism to be a very problematic theory, to say the least. Instead, I will argue that intuitionism is a very plausible theory. However, I will argue that intuitionism has to be supplemented with an epistemological role for emotions. I call this new metaethical theory ‘affectual intuitionism’. Affectual intuitionism is a combination of ethical intuitionism and a cognitive theory of emotions which understands emotions as cognitive and affective at the same time. According to affectual intuitionism, paradigmatically, moral intuitions are emotions. Classical ethical intuitionists such as Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, and W.D. Ross did not allow emotions an epistemological role; emotions at most had a motivational role. In contrast, cognitive theories of emotions such as developed by, for example, Robert C. Roberts, Robert Solomon, and Martha Nussbaum, understand emotions as a source of ethical wisdom. By integrating features of sentimentalism with intuitionism, affectual intuitionism is able to combine the most important features of two rival metaethical traditions. It insists on the importance of emotions in moral experience as emphasized by Humeans and other sentimentalists, while at the same time maintaining that ethics is objective, as emphasized by intuitionists and Kantians. In doing so,


Preface

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xiii

it does more justice to the phenomenology of moral experience than its subjectivist or rationalist alternatives. This possible combination of emotions and objectivity has largely escaped moral philosophers in the past, since most of them saw emotions as subjective feelings. In this book I will argue that a cognitive theory of emotions and ethical intuitionism actually fit together very smoothly. Most intuitionists emphasize the importance of particular, context-sensitive ethical judgments. Emotions are better suited to such judgments than reason, since reason is the predestined source of general judgments. I will show that affectual intuitionism provides for a plausible metaethical theory that helps us shed new light on long-debated philosophical issues; in addition, affectual intuitionism fits well with recent developments in empirical psychology, but it can also shed new light on these developments, by offering a different understanding of moral emotions and intuitions. While many empirical scholars identify moral emotions and intuitions with irrational gut reactions, affectual intuitionism argues that we need moral emotions and intuitions in order to be practically rational. In addition, this book broadens the debate by including other intuitionist philosophers than the ‘usual suspects,’ Ross and H.A. Prichard. It also focuses on Sidgwick, Moore, and, most prominently, Thomas Reid. Reid has been ignored by the recent wave of philosophers who have developed contemporary intuitionist positions, such as Jonathan Dancy, Robert Audi, Michael Huemer, and Phillip Stratton-Lake. However, Reid’s ideas about self-evidence, the relationship between particular and general moral beliefs, and the role of emotions have a lot of interesting insights to offer contemporary metaethics. Hence, this book will serve as an introduction to ethical intuitionism in a broader sense than is usually the case, and in addition, it will defend a new metaethical position. By rehabilitating intuitionism, paying more attention to Reid’s moral epistemology and reconciling intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions (‘affectual intuitionism’), I hope to shed some new light on current debates in metaethics.

2 Outline of this study


Preface

This study is structured as follows. Part I, which is devoted to intuitions, is a defense of ethical intuitionism as such. Part I consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1 I review the essential features of intuitionism. I first give a general introduction to intuitionism (Section 2) followed by a

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discussion of the three features that are common to all intuitionist approaches: cognitivism (Section 3), foundationalism (Section 4), and nonreductive moral realism (Section 5). I call this the ‘core theory’ of intuitionism. I have distilled this core theory out of the works of many of those philosophers who either identify themselves as intuitionists or who have generally been identified as such. In Chapter 1, I refer to alternative theories to make the position of the intuitionists clearer by contrasting it with these other positions. A thorough discussion of objections against intuitionism will have to wait until Chapter 3. In this chapter I focus mainly on Reid, Sidgwick, Moore, and Ross as intuitionists who explicitly defend the three features of the core theory. Other intuitionists that I also mention are Butler, Prichard, Broad, and Ewing and some contemporary defenders of intuitionism such as Dancy and Audi. In Chapter 2 I argue that there are as many types of intuitionism as there are intuitionists. Although all intuitionists fulfill the criteria that define the core theory (cognitivism, foundationalism, and nonreductive moral realism), they have different views on the following issues: what kind of beliefs are basic (Section 2), monism versus pluralism (Section 3), consequentialism versus nonconsequentialism (Section 4), skepticism versus commonsense (Section 5), and general versus particular moral beliefs (Section 6). It will turn out that although intuitionism might be naturally connected to pluralism, Sidgwick defends a monist theory. Although intuitionism is a theory that is nicely compatible with some form of nonconsequentialism, both Sidgwick and Moore defend consequentialist positions. And although intuitionism allows for a moral epistemology that can take our commonsense beliefs very seriously, Sidgwick and Moore are rather skeptical about our prospects of having moral knowledge. Another issue that I introduce in Section 6 but discuss in much more detail in Chapter 4 is how intuitionists see the relationship between particular and general beliefs. As the bottom-up pluralist Ross is currently taken as the paradigm intuitionist, it might easily be ignored that there are also intuitionists who defend top-down and monist positions. The main lesson of this chapter is that although there is reason to connect intuitionism to nonconsequentialism, pluralism, confidence in moral beliefs, and bottom-up generalism, there is no necessary connection between intuitionism and these positions. Answers to these issues are underdetermined by the core theory. However, I also argue that certain views fit more naturally into the intuitionist picture than others.


xiv Preface

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In Chapter 3, I discuss the major objections that have been raised against ethical intuitionism. Only recently has intuitionism experienced a revival. Throughout the 20th century, intuitionism has undergone much criticism. At a certain stage, intuitionism became so unpopular that many philosophers took every opportunity to declare that they were not intuitionists. In this chapter I discuss objections that can be subsumed under the following headings: Intuitionism Is Dogmatic (Section 2), Intuitionism Is Simplistic and Naive (Section 3), and Intuitionism Presupposes an Obscure Faculty of Intuition (Section 4). I argue that many of these objections are based on misunderstandings of intuitionism. None of the standard objections forms a serious threat to intuitionism. However, I conclude by stating that ethical intuitionism can be made more plausible by allowing a role for moral emotions. This idea will be developed in more detail in the second part of this monograph. Part II of this study is primarily devoted to emotions. It articulates and defends my own version of intuitionism, what I call ‘affectual intuitionism’. Affectual intuitionism is the idea that ethical intuitions are paradigmatically cognitive moral emotions. Chapter 4 is concerned with the relationship between particular and general moral judgments. In Section 2 I argue why a top-down approach is not satisfying. In Section 3 I discuss Jonathan Dancy’s particularist ontology and his arguments against generalist accounts of moral knowledge. My conclusion is that I find Dancy’s arguments against generalism in normative metaphysics very attractive and that I agree that particular moral judgments can be justified in themselves and not only in so far as they refer to general judgments. However, in Section 4 I argue that Dancy’s particularism has to be supplemented with a theory of intuitions and emotions. I argue that particular moral judgments should be understood as noninferential judgments or intuitions. In addition, I emphasize the importance of emotions for contextsensitive ethical judgments. Based on that insight, in Chapter 5 I develop a new version of ethical intuitionism, by combining it with a cognitive theory of emotions, according to which emotions are cognitive and affective at the same time. I call this approach ‘affectual intuitionism’. In Section 2, I discuss Reid’s theory of the moral emotions. I argue that the role of the affective states is still too limited in Reid’s approach. He takes affective states to have a merely motivational function, namely, to help reason to control the passions and motivate to action where reason is too weak. He believes that in making moral judgments we do not need to have


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Preface

feelings; feelings are at most a result of a judgment. In contrast to this view, I argue that affective states play a much greater role in practical reasoning than Reid seems to acknowledge. Emotions are cognitive and affective at the same time. They are a source of ethical insight. In Section 3 I argue that ethical intuitions are paradigmatically moral emotions. I show that this approach can combine the most important features of the sentimentalist tradition (emphasis on emotions) and the rationalist tradition (objectivity): According to affectual intuitionism, moral emotions are a source of objective moral knowledge. This approach allows for a more plausible account of intuitions than that of rationalist intuitionists. In Section 4, I examine possible objections against affectual intuitionism, based on recent work in empirical psychology or what one could call ‘neuroethics’. This very influential and widely discussed work by Joshua Greene, Jonathan Haidt, and others claims to show that our moral judgments are based on supposedly irrational intuitions, emotions, and gut reactions. I argue that neuroethical developments are not a threat for affectual intuitionism. Rather, affectual intuitionism can provide for a more plausible interpretation of neuroethical findings than sentimentalist or rationalist approaches. Intuitions and emotions should not be equated with irrational gut reactions. Intuitions and emotions are not the result of a deductive argument, but they are nevertheless forms of reflection and rational insight. In Section 5, I argue that affectual intuitionism can provide for a very convincing theory of motivation, by discussing Michael Smith’s famous ‘moral problem’. According to Smith, moral judgments are either objective or motivational; they cannot be both at the same time. Because affectual intuitionism does not understand moral emotions as purely subjective feeling states but as a source of moral knowledge, there is no moral problem: Our emotional moral judgments are objective and motivational at the same time. This provides for a simple and elegant solution to the ‘moral problem’. What makes my approach of ‘affectual intuitionism’ unique is that it unites insights from two rival schools of ethical thinking, that is, rationalism (which includes Kantianism but also intuitionism) and sentimentalism (Humeanism). Affectual intuitionism acknowledges that while both schools have plausible features, they also have highly problematic features. Rationalism can account for objectivity in ethics, but it ignores the emotions. Sentimentalism acknowledges the importance of emotions in our moral lives, but it struggles with subjectivism and relativism. The dichotomy between rationalism and sentimentalism reflects the dichotomy between reason and emotion that is endorsed


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by most metaethicists.1 However, this strict dichotomy between reason and emotion is seriously questioned by many philosophers and psychologists who study emotions. Emotions are a form of cognition and insight, especially when it comes to evaluative judgments (Scherer 1984, Frijda 1987, Solomon 1993, Stocker 1996, Nussbaum 2001, Roberts 2003). Emotions allow us to be practically rational (Damasio 1994). This insight allows us to combine the plausible aspects of rationalism (objectivity) and sentimentalism (emotions) without their implausible implications. I would like to suggest to metaethicists to engage themselves more with these developments in emotion research. These developments can shed new light on problems that moral philosophers have dealt with for a long time. Empirical research makes room for the idea that our moral intuitions are paradigmatically emotions and that they are a source of objective moral knowledge.


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Part I

When men’s faculties are ripe, the first principles of morals, into which all moral reasoning may be resolved, are perceived intuitively, and in a manner more analogous to the perception of sense than to the conclusions of demonstrative reasoning. (IP 727) The first part of this study will elucidate and defend ethical intuitionism, and is based on a close reading of the writings of ethical intuitionists, specifically Thomas Reid, Henry Sidgwick, W.D. Ross, and G.E. Moore. I understand intuitionism as a combination of cognitivism, foundationalism, and nonreductive moral realism. This is what I call the ‘core theory’ of intuitionism. The early intuitionists in the 18th century (e.g., Reid and Butler) developed an account of a ‘moral faculty’ of direct cognition of moral truths.1 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Sidgwick and Moore emphasized the direct cognition of moral principles or truths in general. Recently, intuitionism has been associated with the direct cognition of a plurality of prima facie duties (Ross). Common to all the different intuitionist approaches is the aspect of direct cognition. Direct cognition can be captured by a foundationalist account of justification. However, all intuitionists also defend cognitivism and nonreductive moral realism. So it is the combination of the three features – cognitivism, foundationalism, and nonreductive moral realism – which I claim, constitute an intuitionist account.2 It is interesting to note that Jonathan Dancy, who calls himself an intuitionist, rejects foundationalism. So, by my definition he does not qualify as an intuitionist. Dancy believes that the defining criteria of intuitionism are realism, cognitivism, and pluralism. While most


Intuitions

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intuitionists fulfill Dancy’s criteria, Sidgwick does not. Furthermore, with the exception of Dancy, all intuitionists are foundationalists, so to define the core theory as I do is legitimate. Still, I will often discuss Dancy’s views since he takes a very interesting and challenging position on intuitionism that is similar to how I define it. I will discuss his position in Chapter 4, where I will also consider whether his rejection of foundationalism is convincing. In Chapter 1, I discuss the features of the core theory. I will discuss how the different intuitionist theories vary along other lines in Chapter 2. In these first two chapters, I will argue that much of the standard criticism will disappear once intuitionism is examined carefully. The explication of intuitionism in the first two chapters will also serve to distinguish serious objections against intuitionism from less serious ones. Chapter 3 will then discuss the well-known, mainly contemporary, objections against the core theory. I will argue that intuitionism can be defended against all these objections. However, in Part II of this study I will argue that intuitionism can be made even more plausible by connecting it to a cognitive theory of emotions.


2


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1

1 Introduction In this first chapter I will review the essential features of intuitionism. My analysis will enable us to do away with objections that are based on misrepresentations of intuitionism. These misrepresentations are not so much incorrect readings of the works of intuitionists; rather they are the result of a stereotypical conception of intuitionism. This stereotype has been used rhetorically and has reduced the incentive to study the intuitionists themselves. The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce intuitionism to philosophers who have never felt the need to read the work of the intuitionists seriously. This chapter shows that studying the intuitionists can be very fruitful indeed. In this chapter I will first give a general introduction to intuitionism (Section 2) followed by a discussion of the features that are common to all intuitionist approaches: cognitivism (Section 3), foundationalism (Section 4), and nonreductive moral realism (Section 5).1 I call this the ‘core theory’ of intuitionism. I have distilled this core theory from the works of many philosophers who either identify themselves as intuitionists or who are generally identified as such. In this chapter I will refer to alternative theories to make the position of the intuitionists clearer by comparing it to other positions. A thorough discussion of objections against intuitionism will be deferred to Chapter 3. Here in Chapter 1, I focus mainly on Reid, Sidgwick, Moore, and Ross as intuitionists who explicitly defend the three features of the core theory. Other intuitionists that I will also mention are Butler, Prichard, and Ewing and some contemporary defenders of intuitionism such as Dancy and Audi.


Ethical Intuitionism

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2


What is intuitionism?

Before going into technical details, I will sketch out what intuitionism is. Intuitionism as I define it here is a moral epistemology and ontology. It is currently one of the more controversial theories in moral philosophy. It combines features that have been under attack for some time, namely, cognitivism, foundationalism, and nonreductive moral realism. These attacks have been especially severe since the rise of logical positivism that denied that moral statements could be meaningful. From the 1930s until recently, Humeans have dominated the agenda in analytical moral epistemology. The main representatives of Humean approaches include the logical-positivist and noncognitivist A.J. Ayer (1954); the emotivist Charles L. Stevenson (1944, 1963); the prescriptivist R.M. Hare (1952; who also incorporates Kantian elements); the errortheorist J.L. Mackie (1977); the subjectivist Bernard Williams (1981); and the quasi-realist Simon Blackburn (1993). However, because many philosophers found Humean approaches unsatisfying, some philosophers from the 1970s onwards, such as John Rawls (1971) and, more recently, Christine Korsgaard (1996a) and Barbara Herman, started showing a renewed interest in Kant. They put rationalism and constructivism high on the agenda of metaethics. Only from the 1980s have Aristotelians been coming to the forefront of the metaethical debate again. One branch of neo-Aristotelians mainly emphasizes the role of culturally embedded practices. This branch includes Alasdair MacIntyre and philosophers working in feminist ethics (e.g., MacIntyre 1966, 1997; Ruddick 1984; Tronto 1993; Bowden 1997; Walker 1997). In addition, another neo-Aristotelian branch defends substantive realism and includes naturalist Cornell-realists (e.g., Boyd 1988, Sturgeon 1988, Brink 1989). However, more and more philosophers, such as John McDowell (1988) and David Wiggins (1987), defend an account of nonreductive moral realism, combined with an account of moral perception. It is in this latter tradition that intuitionists can most easily be placed, and where the new self-declared defenders of intuitionism can be found. Most of these are British philosophers, such as Jonathan Dancy (1993, 2004a), David McNaughton (1988), and Philip Stratton-Lake (2002). Britain is of course the home of ethical intuitionism, although Robert Audi (1997, 2003) and Michael Huemer (2005) in the United States are also contemporary defenders of an intuitionist moral epistemology. Ethical intuitionists defend a commonsense approach to moral epistemology. It is a theory that takes our ordinary moral beliefs at face value.


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Whereas Humeans declare that moral beliefs are not real judgments but rather subjective attitudes or statements about those attitudes, and Kantians claim that moral truths are constituted by our rationality, intuitionists assert that our moral beliefs are not very different from our ordinary perceptual or rational judgments. In short, moral beliefs are judgments about the moral aspect of reality that is independent of anybody’s judgments and attitudes. Moral judgments are about propositions that are true or false depending on what ‘moral reality’ is. Moral reality cannot be reduced to anything else. It cannot be reduced to the psychological state of the person who is making judgments, nor to evolution or any natural feature, nor to moral codes in a given culture, nor to our rationality. Rather, morality is a domain of reality that cannot be replaced by anything else. According to intuitionists, our prephilosophical moral judgments carry exactly that claim with them: if I believe that killing an innocent person is wrong, I believe it is really wrong because it is wrong, full stop. No further explanation necessary. This is what the term intuition means. An intuition is a belief that is not based on or justified by any other belief. Intuition is the analog in ethics to what sense perception is in general epistemology, at least on a naïve realist account. If I believe that there is a red ball in front of my eyes, this is all the evidence I have for this belief. The content or the occurrence of the belief is the only justification for the belief itself. If somebody asks me, ‘but how do you know that there really is a red ball in front of your eyes?’ my only reply may be: ‘because I see it! Can you not see it then?’ If the other person challenges me: ‘prove that there really is a red ball in front of your eyes,’ I might start to feel desperate and believe that this person is asking unanswerable questions. For this reason some philosophers take perceptual beliefs to be ‘basic’: they are not based on one’s other beliefs and are hence not justifiable by any other beliefs. Some philosophers believe that the same holds with respect to rational beliefs concerning mathematical or logical axioms. According to ethical intuitionists, some of our moral beliefs function like axiomatic beliefs and complicated ethical issues can eventually be traced back to these moral ‘axioms’. If, for example, we discuss whether euthanasia is morally legitimate, we have to form a derived belief because the question is so complex that we might not have any basic beliefs. In this case we try to trace our moral judgments back to the more basic beliefs that we take as premises for moral reasoning. We might end up with beliefs about respect for autonomy and respect for life and conclude that an answer to the issue of euthanasia consists of a balance




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between these two ideas. But if somebody asks us, ‘why should one respect autonomy?’ or ‘why should one respect life?’, we may not be able to give further answers. These concepts might be what we take to be fundamental human values that cannot be explained by reference to anything else. This is how the three elements of the core theory are connected. Our moral beliefs have truth-values (cognitivism). They are about an irreducible moral reality that exists independently of the content of our moral beliefs (nonreductive moral realism). Furthermore, some of those moral beliefs resemble perceptual beliefs about material reality or rational beliefs such as those concerned with axioms in mathematics or logic. They cannot be justified by reference to other beliefs but are ‘basic beliefs’ (foundationalism). In the remainder of this chapter I will examine the more technical details of what I call the core theory of intuitionism.

3 Cognitivism Cognitivism is the metaethical position according to which moral discourse expresses moral beliefs that can be either true or false. Ethical intuitionists endorse what I call cognitivism in the nonreductive moral realist sense, that is, the view that moral beliefs are about independently existing moral truths. This approach has been dismissed throughout much of the 20th century, and only recently have analytic philosophers begun to defend this form of cognitivism again. In this section, I will first sketch out the major alternatives to cognitivism in the nonreductive moral realist sense, namely, subjectivism and noncognitivism. I will then discuss the sense in which intuitionists are cognitivists and their arguments for this. Subjectivism David Hume is generally seen as the classical defender of a subjectivist account.2 This is how Hume states his position: The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary. (Hume 1975, 289)


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Hume believes that moral judgments are merely statements about subjective feelings. If people have different moral opinions, this means


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that they have different feelings and desires, and that is all that can be said in such a case. Hume puts it like this: ‘Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment’ (Hume 1975, 165). Reason only plays an instrumental role in that it is used to discern what the best means to achieve one’s ends is. It can tell nothing about which ends are best to achieve (Hume 1975, 293). The subjectivist is a cognitivist in the sense that the statement ‘I feel pain’ is a statement about one’s own emotional state and can be true or false. However, the subjectivist is not a cognitivist in the nonreductive moral realist sense because moral statements are not taken to be about supposed moral facts but about facts concerning the psychological makeup of the speaker. I will come back to the issue of realism in Section 5 of this chapter, and to cognitivism in the realist sense further on in this section. Noncognitivism or emotivism According to noncognitivists, moral discourse is nonassertoric. The 20thcentury noncognitivist par excellence, A.J. Ayer, says the following: in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. And the man who is ostensibly contradicting me is merely expressing his moral sentiments. So that there is plainly no sense in asking which of us is in the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine proposition. (Ayer 1952, 107, 108) By saying that moral expressions are not even statements about one’s own state of mind, Ayer is also rejecting subjectivism. Instead, he embraces emotivism according to which moral expressions mean no more than ‘hoorah x’ or ‘boo y’; they merely serve to express our attitude and to motivate others (cf. Stevenson 1944). According to Ayer, moral expressions are nonpropositional whereas subjectivist statements refer to propositions concerning one’s feelings. Cognitivism in the nonreductive moral realist sense



Intuitionism is a form of cognitivism in the nonreductive moral realist sense. This means that the truth-value of moral propositions does not, for example, depend on the psychological state of the speaker as in subjectivism. Moral truth is irreducible to any other kind of truth. This is


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how this form of cognitivism is distinguished from naturalism. There are also naturalist realists, but they are reductivists. They claim that moral facts can be reduced to natural facts. In contrast, the nonnaturalist believes that there are irreducible moral facts and that moral statements are attempts to describe these moral facts. Furthermore, intuitionism is nonskeptical, which is in contrast to Mackie’s errortheory. According to Mackie, moral discourse is assertoric, but there is nothing to which it refers. I will come back to Mackie’s and Ayer’s positions in Chapter 3, and I will expand on realism in Section 5 of this chapter. Against subjectivism and emotivism Sidgwick rejects Hume’s position by arguing that (1) ethical notions such as ‘right’ and ‘ought’ are different from notions concerning psychological facts and can hence not be reduced to them (see also Section 5) and that (2) although moral judgments involve emotions, that does not mean that moral judgments are only an expression of subjective feelings. Moral judgments are judgments about something that is independent of our cognitions. Moral judgments are cognitions of something other than our own psychological state, although they are often accompanied by emotions that help to motivate the agent to act according to the judgment (ME 25). Moore believes that subjectivism has implausible implications: It follows, therefore, from any view of this type, that, whenever any man has (or has not) some particular feeling towards an action, the action is right; and also that, whenever any man has (or has not) some particular feeling towards an action, the action is wrong. And now, if we take into account a second fact [that people sometimes have different feelings towards an action, SR], it seems plainly to follow that, if this be so, one and the same action must quite often be both right and wrong. (Moore 1912, 39) Since noncognitivism, according to Moore, has such implausible implications, it cannot be a tenable theory. Ross emphasizes that a noncognitivist view cannot make sense of an argument about our moral convictions (FE 41). Reid rejects Hume’s position for similar reasons as do Sidgwick, Moore, and Ross. He too believes that moral beliefs are real judgments (AP 468). Reid explains the difference between judging and feeling by the following example: compare the sentences (1) ‘Action x is good’ and (2) ‘Action x gives me


8


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a good feeling.’ Sentence (1) is an opinion about a certain action and not about the speaker, while sentence (2) is a statement about a fact concerning the speaker. And whereas sentence (1) can be contradicted, sentence (2) cannot be contradicted without insulting the speaker on the grounds that everybody knows his own feelings (cf. AP 465). According to Reid, moral judgments are expressions of opinions about the moral value of (possibly other) persons or actions. In contrast, what one feels is a matter of fact concerning one’s physical or psychological state. Both Reid and Hume understand moral perception as analogous to sense perception. However, this implies that Hume applies his general noncognitivist epistemology to moral knowledge, so that he denies that we make judgments in moral perception (AP 458, 468). Reid instead insists that we always make judgments in moral perception as much as we do in sense perception (cf. IP 536). For example, if I hear a noise I immediately judge whether it is a loud or soft noise, and whether the sounds are in harmony with each other. This is also the case with moral perception: there is always a judgment involved (AP 232). However, the most important reason for intuitionists to reject subjectivism or emotivism is that these approaches are inadequate to capture the essence of morality. Moral convictions are judgments that can be true or false; they are not merely subjective attitudes. If we make a moral judgment, we believe that something really is right or wrong. We believe that people can be mistaken in their moral judgments, not in the sense that they made a wrong introspective judgment (as the subjectivist can at most acknowledge) but because they got something wrong concerning an objective matter of fact. If somebody says, ‘slavery is good,’ ‘women should not have equal rights as men’ or ‘Milosevic was a good man,’ we do not just shrug our shoulders saying: ‘whatever you think, who am I to judge.’ No, we believe this person is fundamentally mistaken. Someone who believes that we can indeed only shrug our shoulders about moral disagreement is a relativist. Most philosophers try to avoid relativism. Emotivists and subjectivists might say that somebody has a ‘wrong’ or inappropriate feeling. But then the question is, inappropriate according to what standard? An objective standard is invoked after all. Intuitionists believe that relativism can only be avoided by cognitivism in the nonreductive realist sense. In Section 5 I will discuss realism as an ontological thesis, and there I will also argue why nonrealist forms of cognitivism are either incoherent or collapse into relativism.




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What are moral judgments?

I understand by it that operation of the mind, by which we determine, concerning any thing that may be expressed by a proposition, whether it be true or false. Every proposition is either true or false: so is every judgment. A proposition may be simply conceived without judging of it. But when there is not only a conception of the proposition, but a mental affirmation or negation, an assent or a dissent of the understanding, whether weak or strong, that is judgment. (IP 570) In this passage, Reid claims that judgments differ from conceptions in that judgments involve a mental activity of affirming or rejecting a conceived proposition. But this passage also shows ambiguity in the term ‘judgment’, since it can also refer to the product of a mental activity such as a belief concerning a proposition, and both the judgment (or belief) and the proposition itself can either be true or false. A moral proposition can take the form: ‘action f of agent x is right/ wrong/indifferent’ or ‘agent x ought to do f’ (these are deontological propositions). Moore emphasizes that moral judgments can concern the intrinsic value of things: ‘object x is good/bad/indifferent’ (this is an evaluative proposition).3 In general we can say that the notions good, bad, ought, right, and wrong refer to certain actions or persons or states of affairs. Truth and falsehood refer to a proposition or to the statement that expresses it. To reiterate, Reid claims that our ability to make moral judgments is analogous to the working of our external senses. We, as it were, ‘perceive certain things to be right, and others to be wrong’ (AP 231). As in sense perception, moral perception always involves a judgment. Reid argues that moral perception differs from sense perception in the following respect: in sense perception, an impression is made on the organ of sense, which gives rise to a sensation that leads to a judgment, whereas in moral perception, the feeling follows the judgment or belief (AP 462).4 Many intuitionists not only hold that we can see the truth of general moral propositions but also that we can judge particular cases to be morally right or wrong (or indifferent):


By judgment, Reid means the following:

the abstract notion of moral good and ill would be of no use to direct our life, if we had not the power of applying it to particular


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We will see in Chapter 2, Section 6 and in more detail in Chapter 4 that intuitionists disagree about the relationship between particular and general judgments in terms of whether one is epistemologically more basic than the other. Thus far we can state that both kinds of judgments are possible. The moral faculty Reid says the following about our acquisition of moral knowledge: That by an original power of the mind, which we call conscience, or the moral faculty, we have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation, and our other moral conceptions; and that, by the same faculty, we perceive some things in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty; and that we have some reason to rely upon those dictates, as upon the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural faculties. (AP 237) Many of the 18th-century intuitionists assume that we have a cognitive faculty by which we obtain moral knowledge. They refer to this faculty as the moral sense, the sense of justice, the sense of duty or conscience. The notion ‘moral faculty’ is one of the controversial concepts that has lead philosophers to reject intuitionism, which they mistakenly believed to imply some mysterious faculty such as a sense organ in addition to eyes and ears by which we would be able to intuit obscure moral facts. However, if we look at what the intuitionists mean by this notion, it turns out that it is much less suspect than many philosophers believe. By the moral faculty, Reid, for example, means those parts of our reason and emotion that are concerned with moral judgments (see AP 227, 228, 464, 471, 472; I will come back to Reid’s account of the relationship between reason and emotion at length in Chapter 5). This is not that controversial; many philosophers suppose that we acquire moral beliefs through reason or emotion or both. The moral faculty should not be understood as a yet-to-be-discovered sense organ. The moral faculty does not mean anything esoteric; it is simply the ability to make moral judgments. It is noteworthy that contrary to what is written in


actions, and determining what is morally good, and what is morally ill. (AP 231)


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many ethics textbooks, almost no intuitionist, with the exception of the 18th-century intuitionists, uses the notion of a moral faculty. This is one of the many examples of how intuitionists have functioned as strawmen in the philosophical literature. Philosophers often reason as follows: ‘Intuitionism is ridiculous because it claims that we have an obscure faculty of intuition.’ According to Reid, the moral faculty enables us to see the truth of abstract, general moral principles, and also the moral value of a concrete situation. At the same time, the moral faculty is not only what he calls an ‘intellectual power’, that is, a cognitive faculty, but is also an ‘active power’: conscience directs our actions. Joseph Butler describes the moral faculty as such: That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions; so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert. That we have this moral approving and disapproving faculty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other. (Butler 1896, 397) Butler’s views initially do not differ from a Kantian or Aristotelian approach to practical reason. However, Kantians are typically constructivists.5 They postulate that not only do we understand moral principles by our reflective nature, but that the moral law itself is constituted by our reflective nature or is a transcendental precondition for our moral nature. Intuitionists fit better into the Aristotelian than into the Kantian picture because they defend a recognitional view, that is, the view that moral properties are real properties (see Section 5) that are not constituted by our cognitive faculties. Only rational beings with a moral faculty can recognize moral properties.


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4 Foundationalism Foundationalism has an even worse reputation in moral philosophy than cognitivism. It is often associated with dogmatism and naivety and even with fundamentalism. In this section I will shed more light


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on this aspect of intuitionism and argue that it is a plausible approach, if properly understood. Before doing so, I will briefly sketch out foundationalism in general and its major contesters.

I take foundationalism as a theory of justification of beliefs. Foundationalists distinguish two classes of beliefs: basic beliefs, and nonbasic beliefs. Basic beliefs are ‘not accepted on the evidential basis of other beliefs’ (Plantinga 1993a, 177). Rather, a person is justified in believing a basic belief by the content of the belief itself (if the belief is ‘self-evident’; I will come back to this later) or because it is a belief about how one is ‘appeared to’ (this is Roderick Chisholm’s (1989) terminology for sensory experiences), whether one is in pain, and so on. A nonbasic belief is justified in so far as one has propositional evidence for such a belief from other beliefs one has and they evidentially support the belief at stake. Propositional evidence can be deductive, inductive, and abductive (Plantinga 1993a, 177, 178). Perceptual beliefs are often taken to be basic, as are rational beliefs, for example, mathematical beliefs (insight in axioms) or other forms of a priori knowledge. The standard motivation behind foundationalism is that basic beliefs function as ‘regress stoppers’. If all beliefs would be nonbasic, it would mean that the justification in terms of derived beliefs would go on ad infinitum or it would be circular. Some beliefs are justified by being derived from other beliefs, but to avoid an infinite regress or circularity, there has to be a class of nonderived beliefs. It is this latter point that is denied by coherentists. Coherentism Coherentists deny that there are beliefs that are basic. Instead, all beliefs are justified entirely by virtue of standing in certain evidential relations to one’s other beliefs. Beliefs mutually support each other. Most prominently, John Rawls and David Brink are defenders of coherentism in moral justification. I will discuss Brink’s objections to foundationalism in Chapter 3. Contextualism


What is foundationalism?

Contextualism is sometimes presented as an alternative to coherentism while at other times it is taken as a specific form of coherentism. Contextualists contend that beliefs are justified depending on the context in which they are held (Timmons 1998). For example, there are social contexts in which certain beliefs are agreed upon and are taken


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to be basic and hence no further justification is required. However, in another social context one might have to argue further until one reaches a point of agreement. Contextualist criteria are often understood as pragmatic criteria.

Intuitionists hold that there are basic moral beliefs that are noninferentially justified. According to Reid, each epistemic justification is based on first principles or, to use contemporary terminology, basic beliefs.6 This holds in moral reasoning, as in all other kinds. There must therefore be in morals, as in all other sciences, first or self-evident principles, on which all moral reasoning is grounded, and on which it ultimately rests. From such self-evident principles, conclusions may be drawn synthetically with regard to the moral conduct of life; and particular duties or virtues may be traced back to such principles, analytically. But, without such principles, we can no more establish any conclusion in morals, than we can build a castle in the air, without any foundation. (AP 234) So, basic beliefs are (1) a necessary foundation of our reasoning, and (2.) self-evident, which means that they are not justifiably based on other beliefs. ‘One of the most important distinctions of our judgments is that some of them are intuitive, others grounded on argument’ (IP 593). We know basic beliefs by intuition, and all other beliefs are based on those. Says Sidgwick: I have tried to show how in the principles of Justice, Prudence, and Rational Benevolence7 as commonly recognized there is at least a self-evident element, immediately cognizable by abstract intuition ... I regard the apprehension, with more or less distinctness, of these abstract truths, as the permanent basis of the common conviction that the fundamental precepts of morality are essentially reasonable. (ME 383)


Intuitionism as a Form of Foundationalism

As in general foundationalism, intuitionists argue that if there were no basic moral beliefs that we are justified in holding in themselves, that would mean that all beliefs are derived from other beliefs. This would then lead to an infinite regress or to circular reasoning. However, if this


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in ethics we have certain crystal-clear intuitions from which we build up all that we can know about ... the nature of duty. ... In the course of our thinking we come to know more, but we shall never come to know more if we did not know what we start with. (FE 144, 145) This quote shows that Ross believes that (1) ethical knowledge is based on intuition, (2) thinking generates knowledge but (3) that without intuition or basic beliefs we would not be able to increase our knowledge. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, the fact that we can have basic moral beliefs does not imply that moral intuitions come to us out of the blue. To the contrary, to be able to form justified moral beliefs we have to make empirical observations. However, the moral judgment is not a logical deduction of these observations since it involves a step from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. Intuitive beliefs typically cannot be justified by argument A central feature of foundationalism in intuitionism is that basic moral beliefs are rarely based on argument. Says Reid: It is a first principle in morals, that we ought not to do to another, what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances. If a man is not capable of perceiving this in his cool moments, when he reflects seriously, he is not a moral agent, nor is he capable of being convinced of it by reasoning. (AP 234, 235) Moore says that basic beliefs are the kinds of beliefs that are ‘incapable of proof or disproof’ (PE x). Basic beliefs are self-evident: The expression ‘self-evident’ means properly that the proposition so called is evident or true, by itself alone; that it is not an inference from some proposition other than itself. (PE 143)


were the case, then it would be impossible to tell which system of beliefs would be justified, since any circular system would be as justified as any other, incompatible, system. Intuitionists believe that basic beliefs are directly related to basic moral truths. Says Ross:

All intuitionists agree that basic moral beliefs are not like theorems that can be proven by reasoning or deduction; rather, they are themselves


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all must rest in the end upon some proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected, which cannot be logically deduced from any other proposition. (PE 143) There are propositions that we can apprehend without judging them to be true or false. Self-evident propositions, though, as it were, force a judgment upon us. We cannot but consider them self-evidently true or false. These are what Reid calls axioms or principles. Truth has an affinity with the human understanding, which error has not. And right principles of conduct have an affinity with a candid mind, which wrong principles have not. When they are set before it in a just light, a well disposed mind recognizes this affinity, feels their authority, and perceives them to be genuine. (AP 260, 251) Other beliefs can be derived from intuitions, but intuitions are not derived from other beliefs. The self-evident moral intuitions serve as the basis for all moral reasoning. Secondary beliefs can be derived from those basic beliefs by reasoning. According to Reid, if compared with mathematical beliefs, basic moral beliefs resemble mathematical axioms more than theorems. Sidgwick also believes that basic moral beliefs are like mathematical axioms: the propositions, ‘I ought not to prefer a present lesser good to a future greater good,’ and ‘I ought not to prefer my own lesser good to a future greater good of another,’ do present themselves as selfevident; as much (e.g.) as the mathematical axiom that ‘if equals be added to equals the wholes are equal.’ (ME 383) Reid says in a similar vein that just as mathematical axioms cannot be proven, neither can basic moral beliefs (IP 721, 722, 727). I call these first principles, because they appear to me to have in themselves an intuitive evidence which I cannot resist. I find I can express them in words. I can illustrate them by examples and authorities, and perhaps can deduce one of them from another; but I am not able to deduce them from other principles that are more evident. (AP 369)


the basis for reasoning or deduction. According to Moore, these derived beliefs:


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if, as is almost universally the case, by Moral Philosophy is meant the knowledge which would satisfy this demand [of provability, SR], there is no such knowledge, and all attempts to attain it are doomed to failure because they rest on a mistake, the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking. (Prichard 1912, 36, 37) According to Reid, a ‘clear and intuitive judgment, resulting from the constitution of human nature, is sufficient to overbalance a train of subtle reasoning on the other side’ (AP 409). This means that, according to the intuitionists, basic beliefs are not inferior to reasoning and argumentation. Instead, moral intuitions are a separate source of evidence that can be even stronger and more convincing than a complex argument. The fact that self-evident beliefs cannot be proven means that if somebody does not accept a basic belief after having had relevant experiences (I will come back to this in the following), we cannot convince him of this belief by deductive reasoning. We can at most try to make him see a situation in a certain light. It is impossible to convince him of that belief by an argument based on more fundamental premises because there simply are no beliefs or premises that are more basic. Somebody who is unable to see the truth of some basic moral beliefs is in the end not a moral agent, as his moral faculty does not function properly (e.g., a sociopath). On the other hand, Reid allows for the possibility that somebody who is unable to make real moral judgments can be motivated to behave morally out of egoism. We see that the assumption of egoism can lead to the adoption of certain moral norms in Hobbesian theories and in rational-choice theory. Intuitionists would say that, although this can be helpful to convince otherwise morally blind people to behave morally, such convictions are not genuine moral judgments. Compare this to colorblind people who can discern colors by the shades of gray they perceive. Although these people are able to make the appropriate color distinctions, we would hold that they do not perceive colors in the genuine sense.8


Or as Prichard puts it:

Reason involves two capacities Reid emphasizes that our faculties of sense perception and conscience are sources of basic beliefs that are as reliable as our capacity to generate


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We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reason. (IP 567) It might be helpful to give names to the different capacities of reason to avoid confusion. The first capacity of reason, according to Reid, is to make basic perceptual judgments or to intuit self-evident axioms. I will call this the intuitive capacity. The second capacity of reason is that by which we derive theorems from axioms, by which we develop or understand complex theoretical proofs and by which we understand the relationship between the different beliefs we hold. I will call this the reasoning capacity. Reason comprises these two capacities. Reid acknowledges that animals have ‘opinions’ and will, but believes that only human beings are rational beings. We can say that we share elements of rational capacities with animals, such as judging in perception,9 which involves the intuitive capacity, and interpreting signs that point to facts that we cannot observe directly, which involves the reasoning capacity. Other capacities are most probably uniquely human, such as making moral judgments and understanding mathematical axioms, both of which involve the intuitive capacity. Another probably uniquely human capacity is the ability to understand theoretical proofs and complex arguments, which involve the reasoning capacity. We can also intuit nonbasic propositions One might believe that self-evident principles cannot by definition be proven or supported by arguments. However, Robert Audi argues that different moral principles that are understandable by themselves and are in that sense self-evident might be derived from an even more fundamental moral principle, namely, the Kantian categorical imperative which demands respect for persons who ought to be regarded as ends


derived beliefs. Recall that Reid believes that judgment is always involved in sense perception, memory, and so on, and being able to judge is a capacity of reason. It is with another capacity of our reason that we deduce derived beliefs from primary principles or that we demonstrate mathematical theorems.


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It is a first principle in morals, that we ought not to do to another, what we should think wrong to be done to us in like circumstances. If a man is not capable of perceiving this in his cool moments, when he reflects seriously, he is not a moral agent, nor is he capable of being convinced of it by reasoning. (AP 234, 235)10 Some derived beliefs are justificationwise overdetermined, meaning that they are self-evident and also derivable from more basic beliefs. Indeed, according to Reid, intuition serves not only to cognize axioms but also theorems. Reid argues that the ‘system of morals’ is not so much like mathematics but rather like botany and mineralogy: where the subsequent parts depend not for their evidence upon the preceding, and the arrangement is made to facilitate apprehension and memory, and not to give evidence. (AP 376) In his discussion of Reid’s moral philosophy, Keith Lehrer puts this as follows: In such a system, there would be no epistemic priority of theorems to axioms. The system would be a collection of propositions, a taxonomy of moral propositions, which, though they stand in various logical relations to each other, and are not independent, do not obtain their evidence from deduction. They posses it immediately. (Lehrer 1989, 238) Hence, although moral principles are connected by logical relationships, theorems can be as much intuited as axioms. Even if it is in principle possible to derive some moral beliefs from basic moral beliefs by deduction or reasoning, we can also see the truth of derivable beliefs or theorems directly. According to Reid, this is apparent from the fact that the ability to reason is no guarantee for being virtuous. Reasoning can also be abused to further one’s own interest instead of following one’s duty. Furthermore, somebody who is not good at reasoning can still be virtuous. Hence, moral knowledge does


and never merely as means (Audi 1997, 47, 48; Audi 2004). One could say that this is the most basic principle and that it cannot be supported by argument, echoing Reid’s claims quoted before:


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If the rules of virtue were left to be discovered by demonstrative reasoning, or by reasoning of any kind, sad would be the condition of the far greater part of men, who have not the means of cultivating the power of reasoning. As virtue is the business of all men, the first principles of it are written in their hearts, in characters so legible, that no man can pretend ignorance of them, or of his obligation to practice them. (IP 726) According to Reid all human beings can in principle make moral judgments without complicated arguments and deductions. Does foundationalism imply infallibilism? Let me here try to remove one typical misunderstanding concerning foundationalism; namely, the idea that foundationalism implies infallibilism and that because of this a foundationalist is naive or even dogmatic. In fact, foundationalism does not necessarily imply infallibilism. Instead, whether a foundationalist adopts infallibilism or fallibilism is open (cf. Pollock 1986, 58). The infallibilist claims that there is a certain foundation: basic beliefs are taken to be infallible, incorrigible or indubitable (Descartes). In contrast, the fallibilist says that we do not always have external evidence for immediate beliefs except for the content of the beliefs themselves. The latter is a rather modest claim. In such a sense, foundationalism is just a position that says that not all of our beliefs can be justified by other beliefs. Says Moore: The expression ‘self-evident’ means properly that the proposition so called is evident or true, by itself alone; that it is not an inference from some proposition other than itself. The expression does not mean that the proposition is true, because it is evident to you or me or all mankind, because in other words it appears to us to be true. (PE 143)


not always depend on reasoning but is more analogous to perception (IP 727).

Self-evidence does not imply an easy process of insight; rather it means that a belief is not derived from another belief. A basic belief is immediate, but not understood as immediate in time. Indeed, acquiring self-evident beliefs can take time, just as understanding mathematical


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in every way in which it is possible to cognise a true proposition, it is also possible to cognise a false one. (PE x) Intuiting is just a way to cognize a proposition; it does not guarantee that one will acquire a true belief. The result is that our intuitions can be fallible (cf. Ewing 1929, 191). So it is possible to be a foundationalist and a fallibilist at the same time. Indeed, none of the intuitionists are infallibilists. Infallibilism concerns epistemology, that is, our human capacities. None of the intuitionists I discuss here believes that our human capacities are infallible. What might give rise to the idea that intuitionists are infallibilists is that many of them defend the position that moral principles are necessarily true or that they have axiomatic status. However, these statements do not concern our epistemic access to moral propositions but concern the status of the propositions themselves. As I will show in more detail in what follows, all intuitionists believe that although moral propositions are objectively true independently of our cognizing them, we can always err in our beliefs. Intuitionists differ about how sure we can be concerning our moral beliefs, something I will come back to in Chapter 2, Section 5. All intuitionists, though, allow for the possibility that people make wrong moral judgments. External versus internal justification Some foundationalists have claimed that some basic beliefs such as about one’s own state of mind or sensory experiences are indubitable and that a person can only have knowledge if she or he is aware of her or his beliefs being indubitable. This is the classic form of foundationalism as developed by, for example, Descartes. However, as said before, the intuitionists we are studying here do not claim that we have to be able to prove that our basic beliefs are indubitable. On the contrary, Reid’s epistemological project was meant as a criticism of a Cartesian foundationalism that required a cognizer to be able to prove the validity of his or her basic beliefs. According to the intuitionists, basic beliefs are characterized by the fact that they, for the most part, cannot be proven or argued. However, the fact that they cannot be proven or argued does not undermine their being justified. It is helpful here to use the


axioms and moral principles can take time. That something is a basic belief does not mean that we cannot be mistaken about it, as Moore emphasizes:


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The most generally accepted account of this distinction is that a theory of justification is internalist if and only if it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief to be epistemically justified for a given person be cognitively accessible to that person, internal to his cognitive perspective; and externalist, if it allows that at least some of the justifying factors need not be thus accessible, so that they can be external to the believer’s cognitive perspective, beyond his ken. (Bonjour 1992, 132) Reid and the other intuitionists fit into an externalist position. Presentday Reidians like William Alston and Alvin Plantinga are also mainly found in the externalist camp. Externalism is the position that says that to have knowledge we do not need to know that we know, that is, we do not need to have an internal awareness of our belief being knowledge (Alston 1989b). Therefore, some externalists reject the notion of justification, as this seems to suggest that an internal access to our beliefs is needed.11 Alston, for example, suggests instead that knowledge should be analyzed as true belief that is produced by a reliable belief-forming operation. He talks of ‘epistemization’ instead of justification (Alston 1989c, 1989d, 1993). Plantinga argues that knowledge is true belief acquired through a properly functioning belief generating mechanism. He prefers the notion ‘warrant’ to justification (Plantinga 1993b). One major argument Alston makes against internalism is that from an internalist perspective, in order to be justified in believing p, I have to know that I am justified in believing that p. According to Alston, this leads to an infinite regress (cf. also Prichard 1912, 34, 35). However, from a foundationalist perspective, this infinite regress could be avoided by proposing that there might be a basic belief like ‘I am justified in believing that there is a red ball in front of my eyes because this is self-evident.’ Against such a reply Alston would launch an additional argument, which is that we are not always able to articulate claims about the self-evidence of our beliefs. However, it seems common sense to hold that, in such a case, we would still be justified in our belief that, for example, there is a red ball in front of us. According to Alston, internalism would restrict that what we think to be knowledge to an incredibly small number of beliefs for which we really have (potential) internal justification. We have to distinguish


distinction between external and internal epistemic justification. This is how Laurence Bonjour states these positions:


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between having justification (requiring internalistic criteria) and being justified (externalistic). We can find both Plantinga’s and Alston’s externalist approaches in Reid. Reid insists on the impossibility of proving many of our beliefs directly and, instead, says that they are knowledge if they come from a reliable, properly functioning faculty of knowledge. Indeed, Plantinga says that his externalist epistemology is mainly Reidian (Plantinga 1993b, x). Reid and the other intuitionists argue that having self-evident beliefs is a state of being justified, even though one need not be aware of having this justification. Reid’s attack against philosophies in which we have to prove each of our beliefs can also be understood as follows: the kind of evidence (namely, internally accessible, propositional evidence) these philosophers want to accept is much too limited. According to Reid, there is evidence for our basic beliefs, that is, the content of these beliefs themselves in the case of a priori beliefs, and the reliable formation of beliefs in the case of empirical beliefs (‘evidence of the senses’). Reid and the other intuitionists advocate that nonpropositional kinds of evidence such as self-evidence and evidence of the senses, or the fact that a belief is reliably formed, or the content of a belief, have to be taken seriously as kinds of evidence or justification. Even if we are not aware of the fact that these are forms of evidence, they can give us justification. However, we should be careful to distinguish between different classes of beliefs here. Earlier we saw that Reid makes a distinction between intuitive or commonsense beliefs or basic beliefs on the one hand, and derived beliefs based on reasoning, on the other hand. Reid applies externalism to basic beliefs only, on the grounds that basic beliefs, by their very nature, do not allow for direct proof. To the skeptic, he replies that this does not mean that those beliefs are prone to doubt. If basic beliefs are generated by a reliable, properly functioning faculty, they are warranted as knowledge. With regard to derived beliefs though, they involve reasoning from premises to conclusion, so Reid could say that internal justification should be possible in these cases. There is yet another distinction concerning justification of beliefs, namely, that between evaluation and deontology. On an evaluative account, whether our beliefs are warranted or not depends on whether they are based on adequate grounds and whether we lack sufficient overriding reasons. Deontology instead means that we have certain epistemic duties. An evaluative account is most directly connected to externalism, while deontology fits better into




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internalism. Indeed Plantinga states: ‘deontology implies internalism’ (Plantinga 1993a, 15). Combined with internalism, deontology means that we can, as it were, influence and control our beliefs to some degree (Alston 1989d). This combination of internalism and deontology is the Cartesian and Kantian approach, and among the 20th century’s analytical epistemologists, Roderick Chisholm is a typical defender of an internalist-deontological account of justification. According to Chisholm, we are accountable for some of our beliefs and there are norms that govern our belief-policies (Chisholm 1989, especially pp. 58–60). Reid seems to embrace such a deontological account: Reason therefore is allowed to be the principle by which our belief and opinions ought to be regulated. (AP 201) Reid emphasizes that we have to do our best to make good moral judgments (AP 361). The proper functioning of our cognitive faculties is a constitutive and necessary condition for knowledge, but it might not always be sufficient. We also have to have the intention to find out what is right or wrong. The man who neglects the means of improvement in the knowledge of his duty, may do very bad things, while he follows the light of his mind. And though he be not culpable for acting according to his judgment, he may be very culpable for not using the means of having his judgment better informed. (AP 249) Reid says that somebody may not think that he may safely rely upon the suggestions of his mind, or upon opinions he has got, he knows not how. (AP 248; italics mine) So Reid believes that we have to do our best to inform ourselves of the ways in which we form our beliefs, to make sure they are formed by a reliable source of knowledge. In conclusion, we may say that Reid is an externalist concerning basic beliefs and what I call the intuitive capacity. But we can say that he is an internalist-deontologist concerning derived beliefs and what I call the reasoning capacity in terms of the preconditions that we create to obtain (basic) beliefs, and in terms of the intention to find out what is right or wrong.


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Our moral faculty needs to be developed

because man has the natural power of discerning what is right, and what is wrong, that he has no need of instruction; that this power has no need of cultivation and improvement; that he may safely rely upon the suggestions of his mind, or upon opinions he has got, he knows not how. (AP 248) Reid believes that conscience needs to be developed through exercise and instruction: I am far from thinking instruction in morals unnecessary. Men may, to the end of life, be ignorant of self-evident truths. They may, to the end of life, entertain gross absurdities. Experience shows that this happens often in matters that are indifferent. Much more may it happen in matters where interest, passion, prejudice, and fashion, are so apt to pervert the judgment. The most obvious truths are not perceived without some ripeness of judgment. For we see, that children may be made to believe any thing, though ever so absurd. Our judgment of things is ripened, not by time only, but chiefly by being exercised about things of the same, or of a similar kind. (AP 371) According to Reid, all of our cognitive faculties need to be developed to be able to generate beliefs reliably. Reid believes that while, for example, vision and hearing develop at an early age, our conscience is the most sophisticated of all our cognitive faculties and hence needs the most time to develop. All our cognitive faculties are innate faculties, which only means that we have the potential to use them. To activate conscience, exercise and education are needed (AP 246–50, 369–73). By this Reid does not mean merely intellectual education, but moral education that can be provided by virtuous people in all social groups. This is a very Aristotelian position. It may be observed, that there are truths, both speculative and moral, which a man left to himself would not discover; yet, when they are fairly laid before him, he owns and adopts them, not barely upon the authority of his teacher, but upon their own intrinsic evidence, and perhaps wonders that he could be so blind as not to see them before. (AP 249)


Reid emphasizes that we must not think that


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How can we know that basic moral beliefs are true? According to Reid, if there is a disagreement about derived beliefs, we try to find out which basic belief we have with respect to the issue in question, and which derived beliefs follow from this basic belief. Of course, in the case of basic beliefs, this procedure cannot be applied. Intuitionists hold that verification of our properly basic beliefs is not possible.12 Still, Reid believes that we have other ways to find out whether a supposed basic belief is true or false. Whereas other errors are merely false, an opinion contradicting a basic belief will appear ridiculous to us. Furthermore, Reid believes that one should check whether the supposed basic belief is consistent with one’s other beliefs13 and that one should consider what people around the world throughout time and from all levels of education have thought about this basic belief (IP 608).14 Ross says the following: The fact that in many individual cases the people whose judgement we have learned most to respect in ethical matters will pronounce the same judgement on acts is some guarantee that objectivity has been attained. (FE 191) Note that Ross says that consensus is some guarantee for objectivity, but can never be an ultimate guarantee. There is always the possibility that people err concerning the facts: In many such situations, equally good men would form different judgements as to what their duty is. They cannot all be right, but it is often impossible to say which is right; each person must judge according to his own individual sense of the comparative strength of various claims. (FE 189)


Consequently, although Reid believes that a proper education is a necessary condition to understand moral truths, he does not believe that morality is just a matter of conditioning. Reid is a moral realist and not a constructivist. Moral education influences our cognitive development, but not the moral facts we can learn to understand.

This means that after we have done our best to examine our basic moral beliefs by, for example, exchanging thoughts and discussing with others, we have to judge for ourselves whether what we believe is morally right or wrong.


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Ross argues that situations have both objective and subjective elements. The objective element consists of the facts concerning the persons and things that are involved in a situation. They determine which action would be the best fulfillment of the agent’s different prima facie duties.15 The subjective element is constituted by the beliefs an agent has concerning the situation. According to Ross, these subjective elements are as much a part of the situation as the objective facts. An action is morally suitable if it is an action that (1) the agent can indeed do, and (2) that the agent believes that she or he should do to fulfill her or his duties. However, in order for an action to be completely right, it has to fit the agent’s subjective thoughts as much as it has to fit the situation’s objective facts (FE 146). Sidgwick puts it as follows: no act can be absolutely right, whatever its external aspect and relations, which is believed by the agent to be wrong. Such an act we may call ‘subjectively’ wrong, even though ‘objectively’ right. (ME 207) This raises the question as to which aspect is morally more relevant: what we subjectively believe to be right or what objectively is right. All intuitionists are moral realists; they believe that there is an objective moral truth. This might lead one to think that they would defend the objective position. However, intuitionists are also fallibilists. Ross emphasizes that especially regarding our particular moral judgments we never know for sure whether what we believe to be true really is true. Still, this limited perspective is all we have; this is what we have to work with. Moral judgments are formed by human beings who can always get it wrong, either because we simply make a wrong estimation of the case or because we have to take into account future events. This means that we are often unsure of the consequences of a certain action. Ross argues that the most important thing is that we get ourselves to do what we believe is best, even if it turns out in the end that we had it wrong (FE 160). Intuitionists are often taken to be dogmatic or that they hold that intuitions just pop up mysteriously. However, the preceding discussion shows that intuitionists have very nuanced ideas about the complex relationship between objective moral truths and the limited, fallible cognitive abilities with which we try to grasp these truths.




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The third defining criterion of intuitionism is moral realism. For many philosophers, realism has been at least as controversial as cognitivism and foundationalism.16 In the following section, I will show in which respects and why the intuitionist philosophers were moral realists and how they can be contrasted with their opponents. Moral realism in contrast with other positions Realism here is taken as an ontological position, whereas cognitivism and foundationalism are epistemological positions; in addition, cognitivism is a semantic position. In contemporary literature, cognitivism is not taken to necessarily imply realism.17 Constructivists and cultural relativists can be cognitivists without being realists. Cultural relativists may say that moral beliefs have a truth-value with respect to a certain cultural background. Truth-values are then taken to be locally indexed instead of objectively valid. Constructivists may say that moral principles are the result of a procedure such as bargaining (as in contractarianism). The truth-value of moral judgments will then depend on which principles are agreed upon in the contract. A Kantian constructivist such as Korsgaard says that moral principles have universal truth-values but that moral principles are constructed by a rational procedure of some sort. In that sense, a Kantian constructivist is not a realist. This is how David Brink characterizes moral constructivism in contrast with moral realism: (1) There are moral facts or truths, and (2) these facts or truths are constituted by the evidence for them. (Brink 1989, 20) Contrary to such a constructivist account, moral realists say that moral propositions are not the result of a rational procedure such as a bargaining process or of a discourse. They also deny that the truth-value of all moral propositions are locally indexed. It may be the case that in different cultures different beliefs are taken to be true, but this does not mean that there cannot be a truth that transcends cultures and bargaining processes. A realist believes that the fact that we can find moral values in a certain culture wrong, or that we can criticize the outcomes of a bargaining process, indicates that we believe in an objective moral reality. A realist also denies that we constitute the moral law. Idealists claim that truth is an epistemic notion, so the truth or falsehood of a belief


5 Realism


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depends in some sense on somebody holding that belief. Instead, intuitionists combine their cognitivism and realism in a correspondence theory of truth. A defender of a realist correspondence theory claims that the truth or falsehood of a proposition is independent of anybody’s beliefs. The intuitionist-moral realist argues that this is also the case with moral beliefs. So, as said in Section 3, intuitionists are cognitivists in the nonreductive moral realist sense of truth. Against relativism Moral realism asserts that the truth of a moral proposition depends on the way the world is and not on the way we believe the world to be. This means that, just as in general realism, the objects of our knowledge irreducibly exist. This is how Brink defines moral realism: (1) There are moral facts or truths, and (2) these facts or truths are independent of the evidence for them. (Brink 1989, 17) The main motivation behind moral realism is the following: if there were no moral facts, there would be no objective standard against which to evaluate a situation. If, for example, morality were constituted by conventionality or ‘ways of life’ as some philosophers argue by invoking Wittgenstein, it is hard to see how we can say that one way of life can be better than another. Our moral intuitions, however, can tell us that some moral practices are wrong. Consider, for example, racist or sexist practices. Our intuitions are that these practices are really, that is, objectively, wrong. However, if morality were merely constituted by practices, it would follow, by definition, that no practice could be morally better or worse than another. But the whole point of morality seems to be exactly the opposite: moral judgments are about what kinds of actions are good or bad. Antirealists have a hard time avoiding relativism. I will come back to this point shortly. I already discussed relativism in the context of subjectivism in Section 3, and intuitionists would argue in the same way against all other forms of relativism. There are many reasons which make relativism an unacceptable theory. To state a few:



1. Relativism as a normative theory is inconsistent. ‘We should not judge other people’ is itself a supposed moral norm and as such is inconsistent with relativism which states that there are no moral norms.


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2. It is unclear whether the relativist can really live up to her or his own standards. The following example might show that relativism can be hard to realize in practice. Think about a nondemocratic country in which innocent people, dissidents, for example, are tortured. The leaders in that country say that the universal declaration of human rights is just a Western invention. They appeal to the right of noninterference with their culture and tell people in the West not to comment on their antidemocratic practices. The relativist faces a difficult dilemma. If she or he accepts the nondemocratic values that are held in that country she or he is disregarding the values of the dissidents. It seems that the relativist will have to make a choice, by either accepting the claims of the leaders or those of the dissidents. Making such a choice would mean that the relativist cannot live up to her or his skeptical position in practice. Refraining from making a choice, though, will most likely keep the situation as it is, which practically implies that the claims of the leaders are accepted. 3. Relativism has difficulty in dealing with resistance in a culture. The moral views in a culture are not as coherent as relativists presuppose. A relativist could insist that resistance movements are merely the result of counterpropaganda. But this is an arrogant position, as it denies people from making up their own minds on moral matters. Another explanation is that people can make genuine moral judgments and disagree about moral issues. On such an account, moral norms are not merely cultural conventions. 4. What are the limits of a culture or group? Can I found my own culture with its own moral norms? How long does a culture need to exist before we can speak of its own moral norms? It seems that a cruel culture does not become more or less cruel by existing longer or shorter. The Hindu caste system, slavery, Nazism, and the suppression of women by the Taliban are condemnable practices, no matter how long they have been in existence. 5. Ethical relativism goes against our phenomenology of moral experience: if we judge something to be wrong we believe that it is really wrong, not because we have been conditioned in a certain way. In conclusion, relativism is a bad theory for many reasons (cf. Wellman 1963, Rachels 1999, Moser and Carson 2001).


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Problems with nonrealist forms of cognitivism Most moral philosophers agree that relativism is problematic. Many different moral epistemologies and ontologies have been proposed which


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supposedly avoid relativism. However, intuitionists believe that realism is the only way to avoid relativism. I take relativism to mean the following:

The denial of relativism implies objectivism: 2. Antirelativism ↔ there is at least one objective standard It seems to me that we have to choose between (1) and (2). Obviously, realism is a form of antirelativism since it explicitly states that objective standards exist. But in the past decades, other theories have been developed that are claimed to be nonrelativistic and nevertheless not supposed to be forms of realism. I will briefly discuss the most well-known examples of these theories. First, there is John Rawls’s constructivism, which claims to provide for constructivist instead of objective standards. Second, there are neo-Humean accounts of which I will discuss Shaun Nichols’ sentimental rules-account, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, and Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism, which are all supposed to avoid relativism without any account of external standards. Third, there are accounts that refer to the analogy with secondary qualities. I do not believe that these accounts work. Since these theories were developed after the heydays of intuitionism, I will extrapolate how intuitionists would respond to these positions. The first alternative to realism and relativism I will discuss is Rawls’s approach. Rawls has set out his position in A Theory of Justice (1971), by providing a combination of contractarianism with Kantianism. In his book, Rawls develops an account of procedural justice in which we should imagine the makers of a social contract existing behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, meaning that they are stripped of knowledge of their social position, their gender, race, religion, and so on. This is what Rawls calls the ‘Original Position’ (OP). The account is supposed to portray an unbiased situation in which people decide what is the most just form of society. Every participant in the contract decides on the basis of selfinterest, but from the OP, the sum of everyone’s self-interest leads to a just outcome since no one knows whether they are or will be in a fortunate or unfortunate position. According to Rawls, the result will be an equal distribution of basic goods. I will not consider here whether this thought experiment would actually yield the results Rawls contends; rather, for the sake of argument, I grant Rawls his conclusions. However,


1. Relativism ↔ there are no objective standards


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Since in justice as fairness the principles of justice are not thought of as self-evident, but have their justification in the fact that they would be chosen, we may find in the grounds for their acceptance some guidance or limitation as to how they are to be balanced. (Rawls 1971, 42) My objection to this view is that either normativity is presupposed or it is not, but in the latter case, how are we to derive normativity from the bold fact that something would be chosen? Or are we to derive normativity from the fact that something is chosen in the OP? But the concept of the OP is already normatively loaded because it assumes that people are stripped of personal interests or the knowledge thereof, which is what provides for equality. However, equality is of course a normative notion. The real issue is how the conditions in the OP are justified. Rawls does not provide for such a justification. An intuitionist would have a way out here: she or he would argue that the proposition that equality has to be the basis of a fair contract is self-evident – but such a move is not available for Rawls since he explicitly rejects the idea of self-evident principles. As soon as we say that all human beings ought to be part of the OP, we have already made a normative claim that is not further justified. Again, such a move is only available for an intuitionist, who can appeal to self-evident or basic beliefs. This is how Rawls characterizes the OP: The original position is defined in such a way that it is a status quo in which any agreements reached are fair. It is a state of affairs in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces. Thus justice as fairness is able to use the idea of pure procedural justice from the beginning. (Rawls 1971, 120; italics mine)


although his thought experiment is interesting and might be useful in political theory, I do not believe that it can do the work it is supposed to do in metaethics, namely, to provide a constructivist account that can create normativity out of the blue. Let us look at what Rawls says:

It is no coincidence that the latter sentence holds, given how normatively loaded the conditions of the OP are. Again, it might be that a Rawlsian account of justice as fairness is a good account of how to make a fair social contract, but it fails as an account of the foundation of morality since it already presupposes a minimal morality.


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Let us next consider alternative approaches to realism and relativism that have been developed by Humeans. These are the approaches by Nichols, Gibbard, and Blackburn. Shaun Nichols’ (2004) sentimental rules-account is based on the idea that moral norms are defined by what we are emotional about. From Nichols’ account it should follow that whatever we get emotional about is morally significant. This precludes the possibility that our emotions might be inappropriate. However, how can we distinguish between the pleasure of a sadist and that of a benevolent person? Humeans generally answer that certain emotional responses are more common (cf. Nichols 2004, p. 156). However, that is an entirely contingent matter and is as such a much too weak basis for moral norms. In different historical periods and in other cultures, practices are accepted and do not give rise to strong emotional responses there that we would judge to be wrong. How should we understand moral disagreement on such an account, and how should we deal with it? Relativism becomes unavoidable and critique impossible. Hence, Nichols cannot avoid Hume’s problems. Nichols tries to take away worries about possible moral skepticism as a result of his view by referring to experiments that he has conducted with college students. Even those who were declared nonobjectivists turned out to think that moral violations are more serious and less authority contingent than violations of mere conventions. Nonobjectivists ‘responded in ways that could not be distinguished from objectivists’ (Nichols 2004, 195). However, rather than taking away worries about Nichols’ theory this should give rise to additional worries about the mutual consistency of the metaethical and normative ethical views of college students. Indeed Nichols addresses exactly this objection: Now then, is it inconsistent for moral nonobjectivists to make differential responses to moral and conventional violations? Are nonobjectivists unjustified in giving the normal responses to the moral/conventional task? It is hard to see why. It seems presumptuous to say that giving up objectivity means that I should not judge harmful violations to be more serious, that I should not judge the wrongfulness of hitting another as independent of the teacher’s authority, or that I should not think that the actions are wrong because they are harmful. As philosophical sentimentalists have long maintained, you do not have to believe an action is objectively wrong to have a deep and abiding opposition to such actions (Nichols 2004, 196).




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Nichols mainly discusses the psychological issue whether it is possible to be a nonobjectivist without endorsing nihilism or relativism. But in philosophy we are not so much worried about our psychology in holding inconsistent beliefs. Rather, we try to build a consistent theory, and consistency forces us to either reject objectivism and endorse relativism, or to reject relativism and endorse objectivism. The objectivist states that our strong intuitions that conventions can be criticized can best be explained by the hypothesis that, apparently, in our moral experience we perceive something of a profoundly more serious nature than mere contingent conventions. Nichols tries to supply us with an empirical argument about a normative issue. One might say that this is just consistent with his Humean, naturalist theory, but one could also call it question-begging and committing the naturalistic fallacy. Nichols’ account is unsatisfying because it fails as a normative theory and it cannot do full justice to our intuitions about the critical force of ethics. Allan Gibbard’s norm expressivism (Gibbard 1990) might offer the promise of a more normative Humeanism. According to Gibbard, moral judgments are about the appropriateness of moral emotions such as shame and guilt. Gibbard claims that in this way he can endorse an expressivist account of moral emotions and still allow for the idea that we can criticize our moral emotions. However, I believe that this is an implausible approach. First, it is unclear how we could judge a moral emotion to be appropriate or not. We need standards for appropriateness and inappropriateness in order to do so, but it is not clear what the nature of such standards should be in Gibbard’s antirealist view. Gibbard says: ‘what a person does is morally wrong if and only if it is rational for him to feel guilty for doing it, and for others to resent him for doing it’ (Gibbard 1990, 42). Interestingly, as Gibbard explains in a footnote (Gibbard 1990, 42, n. 6), he bases this claim on an analysis of the intuitionist A.C. Ewing for a specific sense of ‘ought’. But where Ewing, as a nonreductive realist, had firm ground to stand on as to what is rational, Gibbard as an antirealist has no such recourse to an objective standard. The crucial question is how on Gibbard’s account we should determine what is rational. Gibbard calls his view ‘normexpressivism’: our moral emotions express norms that we endorse. However, where do these norms come from? Either they are objective or they are relative, for example, subjective, or socially or biologically construed. In the first version, Gibbard’s theory is not able to avoid a form of moral realism; in the second version, it is not able to avoid the pitfall of relativism. Second, Gibbard’s approach is implausible in that it is a


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conflation of first-order and second-order moral judgments. Of course some of our moral judgments are about our moral emotions or those of others, but it seems odd to claim that this holds for all our moral judgments. Moral judgments are paradigmatically not about our emotions but about the values of actions, situations, and persons. Let me emphasize that I appreciate Gibbard’s attempts to allow for a rational evaluation of our emotions. As I will show in Chapter 5, I follow him in this endeavor. However, I believe that a Humean account such as the one Gibbard proposes fails in providing the ground for a rational evaluation of emotions. Let us next consider Simon Blackburn’s Humean account of quasirealism. Blackburn agrees with antirealists that there are no objective moral facts, but he still believes that our moral judgments are truth-apt: for quasi-realism, an ethic is the propositional reflection of the dispositions and attitudes, policies and stances, of people. The virtues of a system of ethics are simply (and exactly) the virtues of people who live it. (Blackburn 1998, 310) Blackburn believes that there are moral truths and, hence, that his position is not a form of relativism. However, it is unclear how a judgment can be true or false if there is nothing it refers to. In the passage quoted previously, Blackburn says explicitly that ‘the virtues of a system of ethics’ are identical to the virtues of the people who live it. This makes a descriptive and a normative reading ambiguous. Either Blackburn means that whatever people find virtuous is morally good (descriptive reading), which entails relativism, or he means that there is an independent standard by which we can assess a system of ethics and the people who live it (normative reading), which entails realism. It is unclear which view Blackburn defends. None of the Humean accounts, whether they are noncognitivist, expressivist, or anti- or quasi-realist, can avoid collapsing into a form of relativism, by replacing the normative, critical discipline of ethics by an empirical, contingent approach. Or, if they do invoke an objective standard, they are after all a form of realism. A third alternative approach to realism and relativism concerns the idea that moral properties are analogous to secondary qualities such as colors, odors, and sounds (McDowell 1988). On a noncognitivist or antirealist account of secondary qualities, these qualities are not real properties of objects that exist independently of a cognizer but are constituted




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in the process of cognition. However, that would mean that if nobody finds an action wrong, it is not wrong. For example, if somebody is knocked unconscious on the street by a vicious person who runs away, and nobody sees the victim, nobody judges the action to be wrong, and the action is, therefore, not wrong. This is of course blatantly counterintuitive. Some philosophers invoke ideal observers whose hypothetical moral beliefs are authoritative (Brandt 1959). But then again they have invoked an objective standard. An ideal observer might be a nice metaphor but cannot serve as a foundation of morality. In short, even if philosophers claim that they are not realists, they assume that there is a minimum standard that a moral position has to fulfill, for example, consensus, intersubjectively agreed values, and so on. But if, hypothetically, this minimum standard is itself not objective, then it can by definition only be a relative standard. Alternatively, if the minimum standard itself is taken to be objective, then the position either collapses into realism after all, or it is a form of reductionism. This is the case with nonmoral objective standards, which again have difficulty in avoiding relativism. Furthermore, reductionism faces the problem of what Moore calls the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, about which more in a moment. Antirealists often tend to downplay the importance of the metaphysical void entailed in their approach. However, if values would be mere projections or constructions, then ethics would be an inherently contingent and arbitrary matter. Our moral norms would be dictated by evolution, cultural processes or subjective preferences, and that would be all that we could ever say about ethics. However, the deep intuition remains that many established practices are morally wrong. Ethics as a normative discipline is inherently critical, something that cannot be understood and would actually be lost on a constructivist or projectivist account. In short, by paraphrasing Robert Brandom (who in turn paraphrases Fred Dretske): one cannot bake a normative cake without normative ingredients (Brandom 1994, 41). This is something intuitionists always take head on with their insistence on the irreducibility of the normative. I will discuss this in the next subsection. Against reductionism


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Moore determined the debate in 20th-century analytic metaethics by introducing what he calls the ‘naturalistic fallacy’. His account points out that attempts to reduce normativity to anything else are wrongheaded. Moore says that ‘good’ (and its complement ‘bad’) is ‘the only


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my answer ... may seem a very disappointing one. If I am asked ‘What is good?’ my answer is that good is good and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked ‘How is good to be defined?’ my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it. (PE 6) According to Moore, ‘good’ is unanalyzable, just as for example the notion ‘yellow’ is unanalyzable. Moore believes that there is a difference between ‘the good’, which is a natural object, such as a situation, and ‘good’, which is a moral property supervening on natural properties. In contrast, many philosophers define ‘good’ in terms of those natural properties. They believe that these properties, in fact, were simply not ‘other’, but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the ‘naturalistic fallacy’. (PE 10) Moore does not mean to reserve the term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ for naturalistic theories only; psychological, sociological or metaphysical reductions of ‘good’ to something else are also attacked under the heading ‘naturalistic fallacy’. We can conclude that Moore would criticize any kind of reductionist view in ethics. Examples of the naturalistic fallacy are when somebody believes that ‘good’ is the object of desire or that ‘good’ is pleasure (PE 11). Philosophers who defend these theories believe that there is only one kind of fact that has any value at all and that by this kind of fact they can define ‘good’. Such philosophers, though, have simply mixed up what is ‘the good’ and what is ‘good’. In the metaethical position of naturalism, ‘good’ is reduced to a property of a nonmoral object or to a collection of nonmoral objects, which means that ethics is as a matter of fact replaced by one of the empirical sciences. Mill, for example, identified ethics with psychology, while other philosophers identify ethics with sociology or physics (PE 40; this is also the view of the more recent Cornell realists). Moore makes the following objection: if, for example, it is said that ‘good’ is a feeling (as


simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics’ (PE 5). This is why it is important that this notion be clearly defined (PE 5). But then Moore makes a surprising statement, the consequences of which run as a red thread through PE and for which Moore and the PE have become so well known:


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good does not, by definition, mean anything that is natural; and it is therefore always an open question whether anything that is natural is good. (PE 44). That this is an open question is because ‘[w]hat the highest good is Nature cannot determine’ (PE 45). Another typical example of the naturalistic fallacy is evolutionary ethics. Spencer, for example, sees ‘more developed’ as equivalent to ‘higher’ (PE 47). According to him, we should move in the direction of evolution, as that is by definition ‘good’ (PE 56). But Moore argues that this is not at all implied by Darwin’s theory (PE 47): The survival of the fittest does not mean, as one might suppose, the survival of what is fittest to fulfill a good purpose – best adapted to a good end: at the least, it means merely the survival of the fittest to survive; and the value of the scientific theory, and it is a theory of great value, just consists in showing what are the causes which produce certain biological effects. Whether these effects are good or bad, it cannot pretend to judge. (PE 48) If ‘x’ is judged to be good, the relationship between the two notions ‘x’ and ‘good’ can be seen in two ways: 1. Reductionist: philosophers who commit the naturalistic fallacy defend that moral qualities are reducible to nonmoral ones or that they do not even exist at all, or 2. Nonreductionist: Moore’s point is that it is always possible to ask: ‘OK, x is judged to be good – but is x identical with good?’ According to Moore, this question can be asked concerning any ‘x’. And the fact that it makes intuitive sense to ask such a question indicates that there is a gap between the notions ‘x’ and ‘good’.18 This is why Moore holds that moral properties are irreducible facts of the world, although they are only observable for beings with the appropriate cognitive faculties.


is done in a psychologistic approach such as Hume’s), then the question can still be asked if that feeling is morally good. It thus follows that a feeling and ‘good’ can never be the same (PE 41). This is a version of Moore’s famous ‘open question argument’. Another version runs as follows:


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According to Moore, the naturalistic fallacy rests on a, mistaken, equivocation of two different ontological categories. This equivocation also has consequences on the semantic and epistemological levels, as naturalists believe that they can replace the question ‘what is good?’ by another question, namely, ‘what things are good in themselves, what things have the property “good”?’ Reid too believes that we cannot reduce moral properties to anything nonmoral: Upon the whole, I humbly apprehend, that true grandeur is such a degree of excellence as is fit to raise an enthusiastical admiration; that this grandeur is found originally and properly in qualities of the mind; that it is discerned in objects of sense only by reflection, as is the light we perceive in the moon and the planets is truly the light of the sun; and that those who look for grandeur in mere matter, seek the living among the dead. (IP 778) We find the idea that basic moral notions are indefinable among many intuitionists. Contrary to Moore’s nonreductivism of the evaluative, though, most of them believe that deontological notions such as ‘ought’, ‘right’ or ‘obligation’ are indefinable, which are properties of actions instead of states of affairs (e.g., Reid AP 229 and Ross RG 12). Even Sidgwick holds this view (cf. ME 32), although he is a consequentialist. According to Sidgwick, moral judgments are not about the present or future existence of human feelings or any facts of the sensible world; the fundamental notion represented by the words ‘ought’ or ‘right’, which such judgments contain expressly or by implication, being essentially different from all notions representing facts of physical or psychical experience. (ME 25) I will discuss these differences between the intuitionists in more detail in Chapter 2. Moral ontology



Note that while both Hume and Moore emphasize that we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, they draw opposing conclusions. Hume believes that moral statements are not factual. Moore and the other intuitionists instead believe that moral statements are about different kinds of facts than descriptive statements.


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According to intuitionists, moral properties are as much facts as empirical properties. A nonreductive moral realist says that empirical properties and moral properties are not the same; rather they are two kinds of facts. The most common terminology that is consistent with this position is to talk about descriptive versus normative properties, qualities, beliefs, and so on. The notion ‘descriptive’ refers to ‘is’-statements, the notion ‘normative’ to ‘ought’-statements and value-judgments and corresponding facts, properties, and propositions. This terminology might be misleading since it may be thought that if there are moral facts, they must be characterized as descriptive. However, since nonreductive moral realists believe that ‘ought’ cannot be reduced to or derived from ‘is’, it is important to have a clear conceptual distinction between moral and nonmoral notions. Supervenience Nonreductive moral realists believe that moral properties ‘supervene’ on nonmoral properties or, in other words, that moral properties are resultant properties that accompany a certain nonmoral or ‘base’ property.19 This is how Audi characterizes moral supervenience: first, no two things, whether acts or persons, can share all their natural properties and differ in their moral ones (if they have any); and second, any entity having moral properties possesses those properties in virtue of its natural properties (or certain of them), where ‘in virtue of’ expresses an asymmetric relation of dependence and is usually held to imply an explanatory connection as well, such that a thing’s possession of a moral property is explainable, at least in part, by appeal to its possession of one or more of the natural properties on which it supervenes. (Audi 1997, 113) Says Sidgwick: We cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong for B, unless we can find in the natures or circumstances of the two some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference in their duties. If therefore I judge any action to be right for myself, I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in some important respects. (ME 209)


40

According to realists, differing in ‘important respects’ does not include what we believe to be the case.20 All intuitionists are realists of the


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Now it is clear that it is in virtue of my thinking the act to have some other character that I think I ought to do it. Rightness is always a resultant attribute, an attribute that an act has because it has another attribute. ... it is only by knowing or thinking my act to have a particular character, out of the many that it in fact has, that I know or think it to be right. (FE 168) By this, Ross implies that one needs to understand an action to be of a certain kind, and this enables a person to judge it to be right or wrong. In general, intuitionists believe that we can directly perceive real existing moral properties, for example, of actions, states of affairs or persons. According to them, we can do so through conscience, intuition or an act of moral thinking, to give examples of notions that intuitionists use. We observe a nonmoral property by, for example, sight or hearing, but only through moral intuition do we perceive moral properties. Beings without a moral faculty or a capacity of moral thinking might witness the same descriptive base properties (e.g., somebody getting beaten up by somebody else), but they would not be able to comprehend the resultant moral properties (that beating somebody is morally wrong). A supervenience-account of moral properties is an Aristotelian form of moral realism, a form of nonreductive naturalism. An alternative view is Platonism, according to which moral properties are instantiations of ideal norms that exist independently of the natural world. This view is often ascribed to Moore. However, I believe that is incorrect. I read Moore as defending a nonreductive supervenience-account; according to him, ‘good’ is a nonnatural property of natural objects.21 This fits with an Aristotelian account, which is also the case with Reid, Sidgwick, Ross, Prichard, Dancy, and Audi, who explicitly state their indebtedness to Aristotle.


nonreductivist sort, meaning that they believe that although the moral value of a situation is constituted by the situation’s nonmoral elements, this constitution-relation is not a reductive relation. Ross puts it as follows:

A realist account of secondary qualities The question might still remain as to what is a moral property. Note that contemporary moral philosophers talk mainly in terms of moral reasons instead of moral properties. This might avoid some of the controversy


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that the metaphysical aspects of intuitionism have often aroused. In the rest of this study, I will use both terms without going into the issue whether one kind of terminology might be preferable to the other. Here I will give short overview of what intuitionists say about moral properties, based on a realist understanding of secondary properties. Intuitionists believe that our perception of moral properties differs from the perception of nonmoral, for example, empirical properties. It is possible to give a realist account of secondary qualities that can also be applied to moral properties. This is what Reid says: our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves: but of the secondary qualities, our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion. They inform us only, that they are qualities that affect us in a certain manner, that is, produce in us a certain sensation; but as to what they are in themselves, our senses leave us in the dark. (IP 252, 253) So, according to Reid, the main difference between primary and secondary qualities is that in the former we can identify what the qualities really are, whereas in the latter we can only derive their existence from the sensations they cause within us, although we are not able to say exactly what the qualities consist of. Reid emphasizes that we should distinguish between the sensation we feel and the quality in the object which occasions it, a distinction the antirealist about secondary qualities does not make (IP 754). Says Reid: It depends no doubt on our constitution, whether we do, or do not perceive excellence where it really is: but the object has its excellence from its own constitution, and not from ours. (IP 770) Moral qualities and the qualities of the characters of persons are secondary qualities in the sense that they are perceivable although, strictly speaking, they are invisible: Thus the beauties of mind, though invisible in themselves, are perceived in the objects of sense, on which their image is impressed. (IP 794)


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However, according to Reid, moral properties are in fact properties of intentional agents: Some figures of speech are so natural and so common in all languages, that we are led to think them literal and proper expressions.


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Thus an action is called brave, virtuous, generous; but it is evident, that valour, virtue, generosity, are the attributes of persons only, and not of actions. In the action considered abstractly, there is neither valour, nor virtue, nor generosity. The same action done from a different motive may deserve none of these epithets. The change in this case is not in the action, but in the agent; yet, in all languages, generosity and other moral properties are ascribed to actions. By a figure, we assign to the effect the quality which is inherent only in the cause. (IP 773)22 Reid believes that we only assign moral properties to actions by analogy, that moral properties are properties of the mind of the agent.23 Moore takes it that the most basic morally relevant properties are the goodness of friendship and the experience of beauty. Sidgwick believes that a feeling of happiness or pleasure is the most fundamental moral category, while for Ross it is intentional actions of agents. These differences have already been hinted at in Section 3, and they lead us well into Chapter 2, where I will discuss the ways in which intuitionists differ in their positions.

6 Conclusion In this first chapter, I sketched out the main ideas that are common to all intuitionist accounts, that is, cognitivism in the realist sense, foundationalism, and nonreductive moral realism. Each of these three ideas is necessary, and their conjunction is sufficient for a position to qualify as intuitionist. This is what I call the ‘core theory’ of intuitionism. My strategy was to let the intuitionists, as it were, speak for themselves, by quoting their original texts, analyzing these quotes, and putting them in the broader context of moral epistemology and ontology. The idea behind this approach is to correct many of the misrepresentations of intuitionism in the philosophical literature. Philosophers refer to intuitionism as if it is well understood. However, given the manner in which intuitionism is often represented, it is clear that intuitionists should be studied better before their achievements are judged. It is, for example, striking how intuitionism has been recently identified with a Rossian pluralism of duties. I will discuss this position in the next chapter in the context of the issues about which intuitionists differ. Pluralism of duties is, at least historically, not a common characteristic of all intuitionist approaches, but an issue about which intuitionists have different ideas. Another example of a common misunderstanding of intuitionism concerns the widespread




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prejudice that its commitment to foundationalism implies infallibilism and fundamentalism. I hope to have shown in the preceding sections that foundationalism does not imply infallibilism and is indeed rejected by intuitionists. Another typical cliché concerning intuitionism is that, with its realist commitment, it is forced to embrace a Platonist account of values. But the supervenience-account described above fits much better into an Aristotelian picture in which moral properties are part of the actual world and are not mysterious entities. Moral properties are always connected to natural properties, but only moral agents are able to make moral judgments. I hope this discussion of the most typical intuitionist concepts and ideas has shed some light on intuitionism. The next chapter will dig deeper into the different intuitionist approaches and show the different possible metaethical and normative-ethical ideas that are reconcilable with intuitionism. This should help to show that attacks on intuitionism that do not concern the core theory do not undermine intuitionism as such. In Chapter 3, I will discuss objections that are really directed at the core theory of intuitionism. My conclusion will be that it can be largely defended against these objections. However, in Part II, I will suggest how intuitionism can be improved by a different account about the relationship between reason and emotion.


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2

1 Introduction In the preceding chapter I defended what I call the core theory of intuitionism, namely, a combination of cognitivism, foundationalism, and nonreductive moral realism. I hope that I have paved the way for a better understanding of the essential features of intuitionism. In Chapter 3, I will discuss the best-known objections to intuitionism, but before doing so, I wish to show that many common objections concern issues that are not part of core intuitionism. In this chapter I will argue that there are as many types of intuitionism as there are intuitionists. Hence, objections to specific forms of intuitionism are not necessarily objections against core intuitionism. Although all intuitionists fulfill the criteria that define the core theory (cognitivism, foundationalism, and nonreductive moral realism), they have different views on the following issues: what are candidates for basic beliefs (Section 2), monism versus pluralism (Section 3), consequentialism versus nonconsequentialism (Section 4), the reliability of our moral belief forming processes (Section 5), and the relationship between general and particular beliefs (Section 6). We will see that although intuitionism might naturally be connected to a pluralism of principles, properties, or duties, Sidgwick defends a monist theory. Similarly, although intuitionism is a theory that is well compatible with some form of nonconsequentialism, both Sidgwick and Moore defend consequentialist positions. And although intuitionism allows for a moral epistemology that takes our commonsense beliefs very seriously, we will see that Sidgwick and Moore are skeptical about our prospects for moral knowledge. Another issue that I will introduce in Section 6 but that


Different Forms of Intuitionism

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I will discuss in much more detail in Chapter 4, is how intuitionists see the relationship between particular and general beliefs. As the bottom-up generalist Ross is currently taken as the paradigm intuitionist, a top-down generalist position among other intuitionists might easily be ignored. The main lesson of this chapter will be that although there is reason to connect intuitionism to nonconsequentialism, pluralism, confidence in moral beliefs, and bottom-up generalism, a connection between intuitionism and these positions is not necessary. Answers to these issues are underdetermined by the core theory. However, I will also argue that certain views fit more naturally into the intuitionist picture than others.

2

Examples of basic moral beliefs

In this section I will give an overview of the beliefs that each of the major noncontemporary intuitionists, such as Reid, Sidgwick, Moore, and Ross, believe are basic. This will help us to appreciate the diversity of the views defended by different intuitionists. Reid According to Reid, we can know several kinds of first moral principles by intuition. He gives examples of first moral principles, without claiming that this list is exhaustive (AP 361). Hereby he distinguishes between three classes of first moral principles. The first class of moral principles is related to virtues in general. The first principle of this class reads as follows: 1. There are some things in human conduct, that merit approbation and praise, others that merit blame and punishment; and different degrees either of approbation or of blame, are due to different actions. (AP 361) This is a rather trivial principle, but the following principles are philosophically more contentious, namely:


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2. What is in no degree voluntary, can neither deserve moral approbation nor blame (AP 361); and 3. ‘What is done from unavoidable necessity’ deserves neither. (AP 361)


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4. Men may be highly culpable in omitting what they ought to have done, as well as in doing what they ought not. (AP 361) 5. We ought to use the best means we can to be well informed of our duty. (AP 361) 6. It ought to be our most serious concern to do our duty as far as we know it, and to fortify our minds against every temptation to deviate from it. (AP 362) With these latter principles, Reid claims that not only are we obliged to do what is morally right but also to create the circumstances in which we are as well informed as possible as to what we ought to do. Reid says that the second class of first moral principles concerns principles that are more specific. In current terminology, we might say that the first class of principles concerns issues in moral ontology, whereas the second class concerns normative ethics. The first principle is that 1. We ought to prefer a greater good, though more distant, to a less; and a less evil to a greater. (AP 262) The other principles run as follows: 2. As far as the intention of nature appears in the constitution of man, we ought to comply with that intention, and to act agreeably to it. (AP 364) According to Reid, the intention of nature can be seen in the various active principles of man,1 in the desires of power, of knowledge, and of esteem, in the affection to children, to near relations and to the communities to which we belong, in gratitude, in compassion, and even in resentment and emulation. (AP 365)


So in principles 2 and 3 Reid defends the incompatibility of determinism and responsibility. He argues for this and his agent causation account in much more detail in AP, Essay IV, chapters VI–XI (cf. Van Woudenberg 2000, Yaffe 2005, and Roeser 2010, part III). Principles 4, 5, and 6 are as follows:


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3. ‘No man is born for himself only,’ that is why we should consider ourselves as part of humanity and social groups and do as much good as we can (AP 365). 4. In every case, we ought to act that part toward another, which we would judge to be right in him to act toward us, if we were in his circumstances and he in ours; or more generally, what we approve in others, that we ought to practise in like circumstances, and what we condemn in others we ought not to do. (AP 365, 366) This latter principle is of course the Golden Rule. The third class of first moral principles that Reid discusses is about the hierarchy that holds between different virtues. 2 According to Reid, different virtues can never be in conflict in the person who has them; instead, they form a harmonious and consistent system. Still, between particular external actions, which different virtues would lead to, there may be an opposition. Thus, the same man may be in his heart, generous, grateful, and just. These dispositions strengthen, but never can weaken one another. Yet it may happen, that an external action which generosity or gratitude solicits, justice may forbid. (AP 368) By ‘external actions’, Reid means what we really do as opposed to aspects of our character. Virtues can conflict when leading to real actions, but that means that one kind of action simply overrules another according to a self-evident hierarchy: That in all such cases, unmerited generosity should yield to gratitude, and both to justice, is self-evident. Nor is it less so, that unmerited beneficence to those who are at ease should yield to compassion to the miserable, and external acts of piety to works of mercy, because God loves mercy more than sacrifice. At the same time, we perceive, that those acts of virtue which ought to yield in the case of a competition, have most intrinsic worth when there is no competition. Thus, it is evident that there is more worth in pure and unmerited benevolence than in gratitude, and more in gratitude than in justice. (AP 368)


48 Moral Emotions and Intuitions


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We might understand what Reid says in the second part of this passage as a distinction between just acts and supererogatory acts. Just acts are, as it were, a minimum standard of morality, whereas supererogatory acts go beyond what can be demanded of normal human agents. In that sense acts of justice are more important. On the other hand, somebody who is merely just is less impressive as a moral agent than somebody who sacrifices a lot to help others. The ranking that Reid suggests in the above passage might be understood as based on degrees of minimal morality rising to supererogatory acts or attitudes. If different kinds of virtues lead to acts where one excludes the other, the morally more basic act is to be preferred. So in the case where justice might forbid an act of generosity (see the earlier quote from Reid), it might be better to do an ungenerous but just action rather than a generous but unjust action. An example could be someone in an official position carrying out the generous and unjust action of favoring a friend as opposed to a stranger in the distribution of goods. It is noticeable that Reid’s principles are very general. Reid does not mention the typical duties, say, that one ought not lie, steal, and so on. The most likely explanation for this generality is that Reid believes that the typical moral duties follow from the principles he mentions; more specifically they might follow from the Golden Rule.3 It is also noteworthy that Reid does not believe that there is a possibility of conflict of duties or even of moral dilemmas, something we will encounter explicitly when discussing Ross in what follows. Reid believes that all the first moral principles he mentions from all three classes, and the relationships between the different virtues are self-evident. Still, we should keep in mind that Reid says that we not only intuit general principles through conscience but that we can also perceive the moral value of individual and concrete situations. These particular beliefs can also be basic beliefs. In this respect Reid’s view is closer to Ross’s and further away from Sidgwick’s (cf. Section 3 and Chapter 4). Sidgwick Sidgwick distinguishes between the ends of actions and the means to achieve those ends. Sidgwick believes that the ultimate ends4 of action are



1. Happiness or pleasure, meaning an ‘ultimately desired or desirable kind of Feeling’ (ME 78; this end can be understood egoistically and universally).


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There are three means or ‘methods’ to achieve these ends, and every method can be connected to each end. The three methods are intuitionism, Epicurean or egoistic hedonism, 5 and Benthemian or universal hedonism – the latter of which Sidgwick calls utilitarianism (ME 84). Sidgwick claims that these three methods are all equally intuitive. In that sense they can be considered as possible content of basic beliefs. According to him, each method can in principle serve to achieve each end (happiness and perfection). However, Sidgwick is less concerned about the ends of our actions than about the methods that are means to achieve them and how they are related (hence the title The Methods of Ethics). He argues that intuitionism and utilitarianism are much easier to bring together than each is to bring together with egoism (ME 85). 6 I will focus my attention here on intuitionism and utilitarianism because these are where basic beliefs play an important role according to Sidgwick.7 Intuitionism Sidgwick believes that a moral belief can only be philosophically interesting if it concerns an axiom. Sidgwick formulates the following criteria by which a proposition can qualify as an axiom: (a) It has to be stated in clear and exact terms, (b) it has to be self-evident, (c) it may not contradict any other truth, and (d) there has to be an adequate consensus of experts that it is true (ME 338–42). Sidgwick believes that there are a few intuitionist principles that are candidates for moral axioms, namely, the principles of justice (‘Similar cases ought to be treated similarly,’ ME 386, 387), prudence (‘I ought not to prefer a present lesser good to a future greater good,’ ME 383), and benevolence (‘I ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater good of another,’ ME 383). 8 These principles constitute what Sidgwick calls ‘philosophical intuitionism’ (see the following). All these principles fulfill his criteria for axioms. In contrast to, for example, ‘I have to tell the truth’ or ‘I have to keep my promises,’ these principles are self-evident (criterion b). They are also in accordance with Kant’s and Clarke’s views (criterion d). Furthermore, these principles do not only fit into the intuitionist method but also into


2. Perfection, which is the ideal of human development, including duties (acting according to unconditional rules) and moral perfection. (ME 78, cf. also ME 6–10)


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the method of rational egoism (this is the case with the axiom of prudence) and of utilitarianism (justice and rational benevolence; ME 386; this means that criterion c above is fulfilled). All three principles are directed toward the good: Prudence is the insight into the good and into the measures to achieve it, benevolence is shown in actions with which we do ‘the good’, and justice is the impartial distribution of good (and bad) according to the right rules (ME 393). Axioms are propositions about which we can have basic beliefs, so the three principles of philosophical intuitionism can be the content of basic beliefs. Utilitarianism Utilitarianism can be separated into a method and an end. The utilitarian end is ‘universal happiness’, and according to Sidgwick the method to achieve it is empirical hedonism. Mill tried to deduce the utilitarian method or principle from the fact that everybody strives for their own happiness. Hence, Mill claimed that happiness was the good and that the general good would be the sum of everybody’s happiness (ME 387, 388). But Sidgwick points out that this is an incomplete proof. The sum of everybody’s desire for their own individual happiness does not constitute the desire for, let alone the desirability of, general happiness, meaning the happiness of everybody. Whether everybody’s happiness is desired is a contingent empirical fact that is logically independent of everybody’s desire for his or her own happiness. Whether everybody’s happiness is desirable is a normative claim which cannot be derived from any empirical claim. What Mill needs is a principle that states that everybody’s happiness ought to be desired or aimed at. Only an intuition of rational benevolence can fill this gap.9 This moral principle states that one not only has to strive for the good for oneself but also for everybody else. Consequently, the utilitarian principle needs an intuitionist foundation.10 However, to make this step logically complete, one has to prove that the universal (ultimate, general – Sidgwick seems to use these expressions interchangeably) good can be understood as universal happiness (ME 388). What exactly is the ultimate good? According to Darwinian scientists, the good is a tendency toward self-preservation or the preservation of one’s own species. Sidgwick believes that this is not enough because life can be bad and hence may not be an end in itself. The preservation of life is only meaningful if it is accompanied by a ‘Desirable




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(1) nothing is desirable except desirable feelings, and (2) that the desirability of each feeling is only directly cognisable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it, and that therefore this particular judgement of the sentient individual must be final on the question how far each element of feeling has the quality of Ultimate Good. (ME 398) Although pleasure is the ultimate end, one does not always need to strive for it consciously because ‘many important pleasures can only be felt on condition of our experiencing desires for other things than pleasure’ (ME 403). Sidgwick claims that the ends and means he formulates are selfevident or can be understood by reference to intuitions. In this sense we can take them to be the content of ‘basic beliefs’. Moore According to Moore, self-evident propositions concern things that are good in themselves, those which constitute ‘the good’. They need no other explanation of their moral value than what they are in themselves. Moore suggests that to determine whether something is good in itself we should imagine it existing alone and without a possible perceiver. This is often called the ‘isolation method’ or ‘isolation case’. The good is understood as something that has intrinsic value, such as a beautiful landscape or piece of music. But Moore argues that a beautiful object that is perceived to be beautiful has more value than a beautiful object in isolation of a perceiver. Beauty is valuable in itself (PE 85), but beauty plus the awareness of beauty is even more valuable (PE 189). This is also the case if perceiving as such is of little value. Thus, the whole can have more value than the sum of the parts. This is what Moore calls an ‘organic whole’ (cf. PE 191).11 Using the isolation method, Moore concludes that there are two sorts of things that have the most intrinsic value, namely, friendship and the admiration of beauty in art and nature (PE 188).


Consciousness’ (ME 397), a feeling of happiness. The ultimate good is happiness or pleasure, implying that

This simple truth may, indeed, be said to be universally recognized. What has not been recognized is that it is the ultimate and fundamental truth of Moral Philosophy. (PE 189)


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raison d’être of virtue; that is they – these complex wholes themselves, and not any constituent or characteristic of them – that form the rational ultimate end of human action and the sole criterion of social progress: these appear to be truths which have been generally overlooked. (PE 189). Personal affections and aesthetic enjoyment are, according to Moore, the greatest goods that we can imagine (PE 189). With the isolation method Moore also tries to determine which things are bad in themselves, such as pain and things that are ugly (PE 208–13). He believes that evil is the love for what is bad and ugly, or the hatred for what is good and beautiful, or the suffering of pain (PE 225). In order to illustrate the nature of evils of this class [of greatest evil, SR], I may take two instances – cruelty and lasciviousness. That these are great intrinsic evils, we may, I think, easily assure ourselves, by imagining the state of a man, whose mind is solely occupied by either of these passions, in their worst form. If we then consider what judgment we should pass upon a universe which consisted solely of minds thus occupied, without the smallest hope that there would ever exist in it the smallest consciousness of any object other than those proper to these passions, or any feeling directed to any such object, I think we cannot avoid the conclusion that the existence of such a universe would be a far worse evil than the existence of none at all. But, if this be so, it follows that these two vicious states are not only, as is commonly admitted, bad as means, but also bad in themselves. (PE 209) As said before, the isolation method can serve to discern whether something is good or bad in itself. According to Moore, all judgments about intrinsic (dis)values are intuitions, hence, basic beliefs.


Moore believes that every virtue, every duty, and every action is there to serve the realization of friendship and the admiration of beauty. They are the


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Ross

1. Duties that rest on acts that I have done, such as a. promises that I have made (‘duties of fidelity’), or b. wrong things that I have done (‘duties of reparation’). 2. Duties that rest on acts that others have done, for example, if somebody has done me a favor (‘duties of gratitude’). 3. Duties that rest on the prevention of an undeserved distribution of pleasure or happiness (‘duties of justice’). 4. Duties that rest on the fact that we can improve the condition of other beings in the world concerning virtue, intelligence or pleasure (‘duties of beneficence’). 5. Duties that rest on the fact that we can improve ourselves concerning virtue or intelligence (‘duties of self-improvement’). 6. Duties of nonmaleficence (‘not injuring duties’, RG 21). Ross does not intend this list of what he calls prima facie duties’12 to be complete or systematic: And if these convictions are, as I would claim that they are, of the nature of knowledge, and if I have not misstated them, the list will be a list of authentic conditional duties, correct as far as it goes though not necessarily complete. (RG 23) His list is rather a first attempt to list the duties that we see by reflecting on our moral convictions. Conclusion I hope that this section has shed some light on the diversity in the ideas of intuitionists as to what are basic or self-evident moral beliefs. Ross writes mainly in terms of duties, Sidgwick adds the principles of egoistic and universal hedonism, Reid also mentions virtues, whereas Moore believes that basic moral beliefs only concern the intrinsic value of objects or states of affairs. In the next sections I will analyze in more detail the considerations behind each of these positions.


According to Ross, we can have self-evident beliefs concerning duties. He lists what he takes to be moral duties.


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Monism versus pluralism

Is there one basic moral principle (monism) or are there several, irreconcilable basic moral principles or morally relevant properties (pluralism)? While Sidgwick defends the former position, Reid, Ross, and Moore defend the latter. In this section, I will discuss these two positions while focusing on Sidgwick and Ross. Reid and Moore are also pluralists, but Ross offers the most insightful arguments for this position. Monism Sidgwick discusses a complex variety of generally held basic moral beliefs and as we saw in Section 2; he also formulates several moral axioms. However, Sidgwick argues that all of these beliefs can be replaced by an even more basic principle, namely, that of utilitarianism. In this section, I will analyze Sidgwick’s argument for this view. With the notion intuitionism, Sidgwick initially refers to the normative-ethical position that actions have to conform to certain unconditional rules or imperatives (ME 96). He claims that according to intuitionists, ‘we have the power of seeing clearly that certain kinds of actions are right and reasonable in themselves, apart from their consequences’ (ME 200). Sidgwick does not deny that intuitionism takes direct results of actions into account as well, but he believes that intuitionists do not consider further consequences in a specific context. Sidgwick believes that according to intuitionism, we are supposed to have a direct intuition of unconditional duties from which we may not depart under any circumstances (ME 97, 98). Clearly, Sidgwick identifies intuitionism with a deontological position, and his following argumentation depends on this. Let me point out that it is possible to defend a nonconsequentialist position that is less rigid than the one that Sidgwick characterizes. I will come back to this later when I discuss Reid’s and Ross’s nonconsequentialist approaches. When I discuss Sidgwick’s criticism of intuitionism in this subsection, I will use the term ‘intuitionism’ in the same way as he does, namely, to refer to an epistemological theory according to which we have intuitions of duties (and nothing else). Sidgwick claims that we can distinguish between three forms or methods of intuitionism which can also be considered as different phases or


3

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stages in the development of intuitionism. He calls them respectively perceptual, dogmatic, and philosophic intuitionism (ME 102). Sidgwick acknowledges that these three phases are not distinguished in our daily moral thought. This, though, is exactly the task of the philosopher: to explicate the different sorts of methods and order them systematically (ME 103, 104). Sidgwick also refers to the first form of intuitionism, perceptual intuitionism, as ‘ultraintuitionism’ (ME 100). This theory states that we can rely on our conscience and thus, by intuition, obtain direct moral knowledge in concrete situations. In the most extreme form we do not reason from abstract principles to individual cases, but our conscience directly dictates our duty (ME 99; this is what Reid and Ross defend). According to Sidgwick, though, most people find this unsatisfying because (a) particular intuitions are not always experienced as indubitable or convincing, (b) there are moral questions to which our particular intuitions give no answer, (c) in comparable situations the same person often makes different judgments, and (d) different people who are equally competent also often judge the same case differently (ME 100). In contrast, the second intuitionist method emphasizes general rules that we follow in concrete situations (ME 101). These fundamental rules are presupposed in everybody’s thinking. The task of the philosopher is to explicate those rules and to bring them together in a coherent and consistent system (ME 101). The first moral principles that we know intuitively according to what Sidgwick calls commonsense philosophers, are, for example, the duties of benevolence, justice, truth, and courage. These so-called commonsense principles are taken to be unconditionally valid. However, after discussing each of these principles, Sidgwick concludes that one can always think of exceptions. Courage for example is often seen as a virtue. However, in an extremely dangerous situation in which it is likely that a principally courageous action will fail, we judge it as foolish. This calculation is done on a utilitarian consideration, namely, weighing the possibly achievable happiness against the risk of pain (ME 332–4). That we should tell the truth can also not be an absolute or unconditional duty. For if telling the truth would put us in danger probably few people would demand that we do tell the truth (ME 315). Again, for Sidgwick this is a utilitarian consideration, namely, with what kind of conduct we achieve the greatest possible happiness. Apparently, the deontological commonsense principles are not always sufficient to make moral judgments. Hence, Sidgwick’s


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criticism of the commonsense philosophers is that while they succeeded in identifying the principles that are considered to be selfevident by the majority of morally developed people, they did not further analyze how these principles are related or when they can be applied. Sidgwick calls this ‘dogmatic intuitionism’. But even if the commonsense principles would be sufficient to make moral judgments, Sidgwick still believes that it is more satisfying to know why these judgments are true. He believes that there must be more fundamental principles than those of the commonsense philosophers. On the basis of these principles, one should be able to make all moral judgments and it should be determined once and for all which principle is valid in which situation. This is the third form of intuitionism which, while accepting the morality of common sense as in the main sound, still attempts to find for it a philosophic basis which it does not itself offer: to get one or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident, from which the current rules might be deduced, either just as they are commonly received or with slight modifications and rectifications. (ME 102) This leads to the third stage of intuitionism, philosophical intuitionism, in which only axiomatic moral principles are taken to be fundamental. These are the principles of justice, prudence, and benevolence (see Section 2). This third stage of intuitionism provides for an answer to Sidgwick’s question as to why our commonsense moral judgments are valid to a certain degree, namely, in so far as they can be derived from these axioms. However, according to Sidgwick, even the axioms of philosophical intuitionism are insufficient to justify all moral judgments. Sidgwick says that, in making moral judgments, we unconsciously fall back on a more fundamental principle. This is the utilitarian principle of avoiding pain and maximizing universal happiness and pleasure. According to Sidgwick, this is the regulative principle that underlies all our moral judgments. Moral axioms are not always sufficient to make moral judgments, and in these cases, utilitarianism helps us. Mere deontological principles are not enough, there are situations in which only consequentialist reasoning helps us out. But not only that, Sidgwick believes that the utilitarian principle is more fundamental than the intuitionist principles, and we could in fact make all our moral judgments on utilitarian grounds.




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Sidgwick uses the following example to illustrate that in cases where other moral principles conflict we need to fall back on the utilitarian principle: The principle of justice states that ‘it cannot be right to treat two persons differently if their cases are similar in all material circumstances’ (ME 441, 442).13 However, Sidgwick believes that this is just a negative criterion with which we cannot yet determine what we really ought to do. We consider some inequalities as justified, but we can only understand this by utilitarian considerations. Sidgwick says that, for example, freedom of action is an important source of happiness that is also socially useful. He concludes that the unequal distribution of welfare by private individuals can be legitimate. Sidgwick claims that the utilitarian principle is the last ground on which such judgments are based (ME 442). It is remarkable that Sidgwick only gives this and some other rather weak examples to establish his claim. As I will point out in what follows, when discussing Reid and Ross, that we sometimes need to make utilitarian considerations does not as yet prove that we always need to do so. To make this point, Sidgwick would need to provide a more compelling argument. In any case, according to Sidgwick, we are always unconsciously relying on the utilitarian principle. This is what he calls ‘Unconscious Utilitarianism’. Sidgwick believes that with this thesis of ‘Unconscious Utilitarianism’ he has found an explanation for the fact that in different times and cultures, different duties have been taken to be more or less important. He argues that this is because of how different moral codes create universal happiness in different contexts (ME 455). All of humanity has in fact always been utilitarian, and all virtues and moral principles are merely concrete articulations of unconscious utilitarianism. The more rational and benevolent humanity gets in its historical development, the closer it comes to a ‘perfectly enlightened Utilitarianism’ (ME 455). This expresses once more that Sidgwick sees utilitarianism as the final and ultimate ground of moral judgments. Sidgwick argues that there is no opposition between intuitionism and utilitarianism as has been assumed in discussions on moral philosophy in the 19th century. There was a mutual misunderstanding underlying the discussion between intuitionist and utilitarian philosophers. Intuitionists often thought that utilitarianism presupposes egoism. Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick have shown that this is not necessarily the case. The earlier utilitarians instead accused intuitionists of randomly choosing their moral principles that were furthermore


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said to be insufficient to make moral judgments. Instead, Sidgwick believes that neither intuitionism nor utilitarianism can exist separately from each other. He tries to bridge the gap between these two schools by arguing that utilitarianism itself needs an intuitionist foundation and that the utilitarian principle can be used to determine which intuitionist principle is valid in a certain situation. According to Sidgwick, the utilitarian principle can only be justified on intuitionist grounds, namely, through the intuition of rational benevolence. In making concrete moral judgments, though, the utilitarian principle is the one that is the most fundamental. Pluralism Ross distinguishes two sorts of duties: ‘prima facie duties’ and ‘duties proper’ (or ‘actual duties’). A prima facie, or conditional, duty is a characteristic that a possible act has by being of a certain kind, for example, the keeping of a promise (RG 19). If it also has other morally relevant properties it does not qualify as a duty proper. Whether an act is a duty proper (Ross also calls this an actual duty) depends on all morally relevant sorts of acts of which it is an instantiation (RG 19, 20). Ross calls a duty proper, a ‘toti-resultant attribute’ of an action (RG 28). A prima facie duty instead has the tendency to be our duty and is also called a ‘parti-resultant attribute’: It refers to some attributes of an act (RG 28). Robert Audi explains prima facie duties as ‘ineradicable but overridable’ (Audi 1997, 34, 35). In a concrete situation, one prima facie duty can be overridden by another prima facie duty, but that does not mean that the grounds for the first duty no longer exist.14 According to Ross, there is no a priori way to determine what the right thing to do is in a particular case in which different duties tend to conflict: The different prima facie duties cannot be systematized in a hierarchy, nor can they be reduced to each other. Instead, there is a plurality of duties and the particular situation determines which is a duty proper. Ross says that it is only by knowing or thinking my act to have a particular character, out of the many it in fact has, that I know or think it to be right. (FE 168)



Ross considers the possible criticism that a utilitarian might have against his pluralism, namely, that there is no foremost fundamental principle


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Why should two sets of circumstances, or one set of circumstances, not possess different characteristics, any one of which makes a certain act our prima facie duty? When I ask what it is that makes me in a certain case sure that I have a prima facie duty to do so and so, I find that it lies in the fact that I have made a promise; when I ask the same question in another case, I find the answer lies in the fact that I have done a wrong. And if on reflection I find (as I think I do) that neither of these reasons is reducible to the other, I must not on any a priori ground assume that such a reduction is possible. (RG 24) Besides this, Ross believes that a similar problem confronts utilitarianism. If we have to choose between bringing about two different kinds of good things, for example, knowledge or pleasure, then utilitarianism also has to rely on a judgment for which no further justification can be given. Furthermore, our actions have an infinite variety of effects concerning pleasure; hence, it is an illusion to believe that utilitarianism could provide a single clear answer (RG 23, 24). The only sound method to get knowledge of moral principles is a direct reflection on what we really think (RG 23). Loyalty to the facts is worth more than a symmetrical architectonic or a hastily reached simplicity. If further reflection discovers a perfect logical basis for this or a better classification, so much the better. (RG 23) Ross believes that so far no such logical basis or classification has been established beyond doubt. Furthermore, he believes that monistic theories cannot account for the complexity of our moral existence:15 It ignores the fact that in many situations there is more than one claim upon our action, that these claims often conflict, and that while we can see with certainty that the claims exist, it becomes a matter of individual and fallible judgment to say which claim is in the circumstances the overriding one. In many such situations, equally good men would form different judgments as to what their duty is. They cannot all be right, but it is often impossible to


which determines which duty prevails in a given situation. Against this he argues:


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say which is right; each person must judge according to his own individual sense of the comparative strength of various claims. (FE 189)

The discussion in this section shows that intuitionists can be monists as well as pluralists. Whereas Sidgwick argues that we can reduce the commonsense moral principles to means to achieve universal happiness, Ross believes that these are self-evident prima facie duties that cannot be derived from any other principle. Sidgwick believes that intuitionism needs a fundamental principle with which all moral issues can be determined, whereas Ross believes that moral issues are often characterized by having several irreconcilable features. According to Ross, it would be misleading to believe that there could be a moral theory that could solve these problems. Intuitionism is a theory that can allow for a plurality of duties or moral properties, but, as is clear from the example of Sidgwick, there is no necessary connection between the core theory of intuitionism and pluralism.

4

Consequentialism versus nonconsequentialism

In this section I will discuss intuitionists who defend a consequentialist view (hedonism, utilitarianism: Sidgwick; and ‘ideal utilitarianism’: Moore) and those who defend a nonconsequentialist view (Reid and Ross).16 Consequentialists in general say that right actions are right in so far as they maximize good results (the end justifies the means), whereas nonconsequentialists say that the rightness of actions is (at least partially) independent of its results. Universal hedonism: Sidgwick As we saw in Section 3, Sidgwick believes that the utilitarian principle serves to make intuitionism practically complete. However, he also believes that we have to understand the relationship between the good and the right in a different way than the intuitionists before him did. ‘Right’ refers to actions themselves, whereas ‘good’ refers to ends of actions, states of affairs. Sidgwick says that in ethics, one of the notions right and good is always taken to be more important. We can understand him here as distinguishing between deontology (the right determines what is good) and consequentialism (the good determines


Conclusion


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what is right). According to Sidgwick, while others believe that the ‘good’ is the result of the ‘right’, he believes he has proven that

The ultimate good can only mean ‘Desirable Consciousness’ (ME 398) though not in an egoistic way (ME 392). It is pure universal hedonism in the altruistic sense (ME 407; cf. Section 2). Sidgwick believes that purely deontological principles are not sufficient. Instead it is necessary to presuppose a consequentialist framework. The utilitarian method of maximizing pleasure and avoiding pain turns out to be practically necessary in making moral judgments. Still, Sidgwick does not mean that we have to break with commonsense morality. These generally accepted principles are not opposed to utilitarianism, but can be considered as ‘middle axioms’, whereas utilitarian or hedonistic calculations can be applied where deontological principles are not sufficient (ME 459). However, the utilitarian method of empirical hedonism is not just another moral principle next to the intuitionist principles. According to Sidgwick, universal hedonism is the ultimate ground on which moral judgments are made (ME 474). The other, intuitionist, principles, just have a ‘dependent and subordinate validity’ (ME 421). From this it follows that the only intuitionist axioms which Sidgwick acknowledges (prudence, benevolence, and justice) are seen as means to achieve the ends of the good for oneself and for others. Hence, the intuitionist axioms are subordinate to the utilitarian principle. Problems with hedonism: Moore With hedonism (or utilitarianism), Moore means the position that nothing is good except for pleasure (PE 59). The naturalistic fallacy17 is only committed in the theory that defines ‘good’ completely in terms of pleasure: ‘The doctrine that pleasure, among other things, is good as an end, is not Hedonism; and I shall not dispute its truth’ (PE 62). The latter is a legitimate position, an answer to Moore’s question as to what things are good in themselves, namely, amongst other things, pleasure. However, as soon as anybody says that only pleasure is ‘good’, they try to answer the question, ‘what is good?’, and that is an illegitimate step, believes Moore. According to the


the practical determination of Right Conduct depends on the determination of Ultimate Good. (ME 391)


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hedonists who take this step, things that are not pleasure are only good in as far as they are a means to feel pleasure. Pleasure is then taken to be the ultimate end; knowledge, the virtues, nature, and beauty are only ‘good’ in as far as they maximize pleasure. Defenders of such a view are Epicurus, Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick (PE 63). Moore argues that utilitarianism is wrong in two respects: 1. The class of things that is ‘good’ is restricted to one sort of best possible results, namely, results of useful actions that are a means to pleasure. 2. The fact that utilitarians see everything as a means to pleasure implies that they cannot acknowledge that some things that are good as means are also good as ends in themselves ( PE 106). Moore believes that this last point has the absurd consequence that what is here and now, never has any value in itself, but is only to be judged by its consequences; which again, of course, when they are realized, would have no value in themselves, but would be mere means to a still further future, and so on ad infinitum. (PE 106) Moore believes that utilitarianism is right in as far as it is a consequentialist theory: In thus insisting that what is right must mean what produces the best possible results Utilitarianism is fully justified. (PE 106) Indeed, Moore himself defends consequentialism. But then the good is not only understood as pleasure; it is mainly understood as signifying friendship and the admiration of beauty. What we ought to do is determined by the amount of friendship and beauty our actions might realize.



All moral laws, I whish to shew, are merely statements that certain kinds of actions will have good effects. (PE 146)


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whence it follows that the end will always justify the means, and that no action which is not justified by its results can be right. (PE 147) Moore reasons as follows: An action can only be our duty and be of value if it results in the world as a whole becoming better than if an alternative action had been done. Whether an action fulfills this criterion is hence not just a matter of the intrinsic value of the action, since any action produces results. If the effects of an action have intrinsic value, this is just as relevant for the goodness of the universe as the intrinsic value of the action itself. But that means that it is possible that the quantity of ‘good’ in the universe is increased by an action that is in itself worse than an alternative action, but whose effects are relatively better (PE 147). Our ‘duty’, therefore, can only be defined as that action, which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative. ... When, therefore, Ethics presumes to assert that certain ways of acting are ‘duties’ it presumes to assert that to act in those ways will always produce the greatest possible sum of good. If we are told that to ‘do no murder’ is a duty, we are told that the action, whatever it may be, which is called murder, will under no circumstances cause so much good to exist in the Universe as its avoidance. (PE 148) Note that, as a matter of fact, Moore only argues that we should also consider the consequences of an action, while he claims to show that we only need to consider the consequences. As we will see, nonconsequentialists can hold that the first claim is true, but the latter not. Problems with consequentialism: Ross and Reid Ross believes that utilitarians have never made an effort to show in an inductive way that the maximization of, for example, pleasure or happiness is always the basis for a right action – utilitarians have just presupposed this to be self-evident. According to Ross, though, this is far from self-evident (FE 69).


Moore believes that ‘right’ means the same as ‘useful’. An action is right if it causes a good result,


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From a consequentialist view, whether an action is right depends only on the value of the result of that action. According to Moore’s ‘ideal utilitarianism’18 we have to increase the total amount of goodness in the universe. However, that would justify giving a morally bad person 1,001 units of ‘good’ instead of 1,000 units to a morally good person. Ross believes that this goes against our ideas of justice (RG 35). This is related to a fundamental problem of utilitarianism: The essential defect of the ‘ideal utilitarianist’ theory is that it ignores, or at least does not do full justice to, the highly personal character of duty. If the only duty is to produce the maximum of good, the question who is to have the good – whether it is myself, or my benefactor, or a person to whom I have made a promise to confer that good on him, or a mere fellow man to whom I stand in no such special relation – should make no difference to my duty to produce that good. But we are all in fact sure that it makes a vast difference. (RG 22) This personal character of duties is also referred to by the notion of agent relativity. Consequentialist theories cannot give an account of agent relativity, whereas deontological theories emphasize this concept. Ross raises a further objection against consequentialism. We understand that it is prima facie right to keep our promises, but it is far from obvious whether it is generally ‘optimific’ (maximizing the good) to keep our promises (RG 36). We can think of cases in which we can be certain that nobody would find out that we did not keep our promise. One example is if somebody to whom we made a promise dies. According to utilitarianism, we do not need to fulfill our promise anymore since nobody will be advantaged by it. Instead, Ross believes that we would still feel obliged to do so (FE 104, 105). Other examples show how utilitarianism generates counterintuitive results. If we reach equally good results by punishing an innocent person as by punishing a criminal, this would be justified according to the consequentialist principle that the end justifies the means (FE 102). Think of the following example: A murderer has disappeared, but a large group of people feels so outraged that they want revenge. According to utilitarianism it would be legitimate to convict an innocent person who is probably an outsider anyway, to fulfill the desire




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of collective revenge. However, this will undoubtedly strike us as unfair. Some of Ross’s counterexamples might only be a threat to actutilitarianism – that states that we should maximize outcomes based on individual actions – but not to rule-utilitarianism – according to which we should maximize outcomes based on generalized rules. For example, the institutions of promise keeping, rewarding, or punishing, would lose their credibility if people would regularly abuse them. However, some of Ross’s objections are also effective against ruleutilitarianism. Consider for example the following counterargument that Ross adopts from C.D. Broad: One could try to increase the number of people in a society to maximize the total amount of happiness, although the consequence might be that every individual would be less happy than before. This seems counterintuitive, and such a society seems less desirable than a smaller society with a lower total amount of happiness but where each individual would be happier (FE 70). Furthermore, utilitarianism cannot provide for a principle of equal distribution. This means that a better society would be one in which a few people are very happy and all others are not happy compared to a society with a lower total amount of happiness but with a more egalitarian distribution. In the latter society, every individual has more happiness than the unhappy individuals in the first society.19 Of course, one could think of a kind of utilitarianism in which a just distribution would play a role. But then we would need an extra principle besides pure utilitarianism, a principle that would not be motivated on utilitarian grounds. This further shows that the right cannot be reduced to maximizing utility. Reid also believes that the value of an action does not only depend on its good or bad consequences. Reid points out that people abhor certain actions because these are bad in themselves, and they feel a duty to carry out other actions because these are good in themselves (AP 224). However, the material action has to be distinguished from the intention of the agent: The opinion of the agent in doing the action gives it its moral obligation. If he does a materially good action, without any belief of its being good, but from some other principle, it is no good action in him. And if he does it with the belief of its being ill, it is ill in him. (AP 230)


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1. We can mean the action in abstraction of the intention of the agent. By this we indicate whether it is the action which is inherently good, ‘that it is an action which ought to be done by those who have the power and opportunity, and the capacity of perceiving their obligation to do it’ (AP 395). 2. We can mean the agents themselves and judge their intentions: A good action in man is that in which he applied his intellectual powers properly, in order to judge what he ought to do, and acted according to his best judgement. This is all that can be required of a moral agent; and in this his moral goodness, in any good action, consists. (AP 394, 395; cf. Chapter 1, Section 4) Reid gives the example of a person who wants to kill somebody by giving him poison, but instead of killing him, the poison cures him. Of course we would call this attempted murder and not a good deed. The person has acted with bad intentions, and these have to be distinguished from possible, unintended positive effects. The same distinction applies in the opposite case where a person acts with the intention of doing something good, but he or she judges the situation wrongly, thereby causing a bad effect. In such a situation, we judge the agent differently than if he or she would have intended the bad effect. We examine whether he or she did her best to inform him or herself about the possible effects of his or her action. If that turns out to be the case, we would judge the bad consequences as an accident. Reid believes that we would at most give this person a symbolic fine, but we would not morally condemn him or her. Many philosophers, among whom William Whewell, the intuitionist against whom Sidgwick’s criticism was mainly directed,20 have pointed out that utility calculations are too vague and too complex to be applicable (Donagan 1977, 459). Or as Reid puts it, ‘Pain and pleasure admit of various degrees, but who can pretend to measure them?’ (Reid 1967, 715). While Sidgwick acknowledges this problem, he still believes that we cannot avoid the method of ‘empirical hedonism’ (ME 195). However, the nonconsequentialist can say that these problems are so severe that it is not clear why a consequentialist principle should be better suited to make moral judgments than nonconsequentialist


According to Reid we use the expression ‘morally good’ in two ways:


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considerations. For example, when is it morally justified that a person or a group of people have to suffer in order to maximize universal happiness? How are we to weigh the happiness of one group as opposed to that of another? Can the end really justify the means? Would we judge this to be morally good?21 Consider the following absurd consequences that follow from Moore’s ideal utilitarianism: Moore believes that the end justifies the means. Virtues and duties are only valuable in so far as they serve to increase the good. According to Moore the highest ends of our actions are friendship and aesthetic enjoyment. However, this implies that we should not kill anybody simply because they would then not be able to admire beauty and to have friendships anymore. The life of an individual is only valuable to the extent that it serves to maximize the amount of good in the universe. This implies a very instrumentalist view of human beings. There are people who have little chance to admire sublime beauty, but of course we should think that their life is still valuable in itself. Do we try to stop the wars in the world only because we want to enable people to go to the museum? More probably we think that war is bad in itself and that it destroys intrinsically valuable human life. It was the supposed insufficiency of deontology that motivated Sidgwick to add the utilitarian principle to the intuitionist duties. And as we saw, he did not only add it, but he stated that in the end all moral judgments have to be, and are in fact, made on utilitarian grounds. But if consequentialism is so problematic itself, is it not then a bad deal to trade in the intuitionist principles for utilitarianism as the most fundamental principle? Ross’s The Right and the Good and The Foundations of Ethics have a certain parallel with Moore’s Principia Ethica. In this book, Moore defends the independence and irreducibility of ‘good’, and Ross uses a comparable strategy to defend the independence of the notion ‘right’. The bridge between the two authors is H.A. Prichard, Ross’s mentor. In his seminal paper, ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?’ (1912), Prichard criticizes the philosophical tradition which asks how we know whether a certain moral belief concerning what is our duty is true, which ultimately leads to reductivist accounts of moral rightness. In the case of Moore, for example, we see that he reduces the ‘right’ to means to reach good results. According to Prichard, though, this reduction of ‘right’ rests on a similar mistake as the reduction of ‘good’ that Moore attacked. Prichard believes that we cannot


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An act is not right because it, being one thing, produces good results different from itself; it is right because it is itself the production of a certain state of affairs. Such production is right in itself, apart from any consequence. (RG 46, 47) Nonconsequentialism is not the same as deontology Moore believes that only the intrinsic value of results of actions counts. Virtues and duties are just means to reach ‘the good’. Nonconsequentialists can surely consider good what Moore believes is good, but besides that they also think that certain duties and actions are valuable in themselves; they are answers to the question ‘what ought we to do.’ A conscientious nonconsequentialist has to consider consequences in a certain way, as a purely deontological position might lead to the following paradox: The fact that I now follow a duty might result in certain duties not being realized anymore in the long run. It is possible that one considers in how far duty-bound actions cause consequences that are opposed to these or other duties. Here duties do not have a utilitarian value although they do fit into a teleological framework. Still, on such an account it would not be right to say that the end justifies the means. Rather, the moral value of an action needs to be balanced with the (nonutilitarian) moral value of its outcomes. For example, by telling the truth about an act of resistance against a dictatorship now, somebody who has been fighting for justice might be killed the next moment. Although this is a kind of reasoning that involves consideration of consequences, it is not consequentialist in the sense of Sidgwick (the avoidance of pain and the maximization of pleasure), nor in the sense of Moore (the increasing of friendship or beauty, or the avoidance of ugliness and of hatred of friendship and beauty). It is not concerned with maximizing good results as such, but with balancing the value of results of actions with the intrinsic value of the actions. For example, murder is wrong in itself, and it is also wrong because human life has intrinsic value. Furthermore, to avoid


prove that something is our duty other than by considering the action itself in a given situation. 22 Ross picks up this stance. He believes that it is the intended action itself rather than its results which determines its moral value. The ‘right’ cannot be reduced to anything else.


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murder it may be necessary to tell a lie. Ross says explicitly that one duty can sometimes be overruled by another duty, and this is based on contextual information. Consequentialist reasoning is often inevitable, but so is deontological reasoning. It is probably a good idea to state that both methods have to exist together.23 Purely deontological principles, in which consequences are not taken into account, are often not sufficient to determine how to achieve the best results. On the other hand, consequentialism is often insufficient in striving for a virtuous life, justice, and human perfection. In striving for these things, the intention of the agent to do the right actions, agent-relativity, an equal distribution of goods, and other considerations than merely maximizing good results are important.

Conclusion The fact that Sidgwick and Moore defend forms of consequentialism shows that intuitionism is reconcilable with consequentialism, so there is not necessarily a link between the intuitionist core theory and nonconsequentialism. However, nonconsequentialist intuitionism can offer a valuable alternative to consequentialism, which might seem desirable considering the problems with pure consequentialism. Furthermore, intuitionism is a theory that can very well explain how we get to know what kinds of actions are right in themselves.

5

Skepticism versus commonsense

In Chapter 1, Section 4, I said that none of the intuitionists believe that our moral beliefs are infallible, but that some intuitionists are more skeptical than others. As we will see below, Sidgwick and Moore are rather skeptical, whereas Reid and Ross have more trust in commonsense. Skepticism about our moral beliefs: Sidgwick and Moore As we saw before (sections 2 and 3), Sidgwick believes that our spontaneous moral judgments (what he calls ‘ultraintuitionism’ or perceptual intuitionism) are not very trustworthy and that knowledge of commonsense principles, and even of moral axioms, is not sufficient to make moral judgments. According to Sidgwick, we should not rely on commonsense but instead on the utilitarian principle. So


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while he believes that moral knowledge is possible, he suggests that it is not the ordinary person’s beliefs themselves that are true, but the person’s unconscious beliefs that Sidgwick claims to reveal with his theory of ‘unconscious utilitarianism’. Reid and Ross instead believe that the moral beliefs we are aware of can by themselves be justified beliefs. Moore is even more skeptical about the possibility of moral knowledge than Sidgwick. Moore believes that our moral beliefs are extremely fallible: First, there are moral beliefs that concern propositions about what things are good in themselves. These propositions can only be known intuitively, but having intuitive beliefs is no guarantee at all for having true beliefs (cf. Chapter 1, Section 4). The value of an object and our judgment do not always need to coincide. The perceiver can find something beautiful that is not beautiful at all, or he can find something ugly that in fact is beautiful. Second, there are other moral propositions, namely, those which concern what is right. We have seen that Moore believes that duties are just means that help to produce the greatest amount of ‘good’ (PE 148). Hence, moral laws or duties are not self-evident, as the earlier intuitionists thought, but they are ‘capable of being confirmed or refuted by an investigation of causes and effects’ (PE 148, 149). This involves two sorts of evidence: 1. ‘Ethical truths’ from the class of self-evident propositions, that is, referring to what is good in itself (PE ix). In one’s consideration of what one should do, it is important to know which things have intrinsic value, as intrinsically valuable things are the ends of our actions. But as said above, these are fallible intuitions. 2. The other sort of evidence are ‘causal truths’ (PE ix). Here, Moore seems to mean contextual aspects that influence an action and its outcomes. For example, if we want to know what we ought to do, we have to know whether an action is possible at all given the circumstances. Furthermore, we have to know all causal relationships and we have to determine how the action, together with all other things in the universe, influences the value of the universe as an ‘organic whole’. However, our knowledge of such causal relationships will always be deficient, which means that



we never have any reason to suppose an action is our duty: we can never be sure that any action will produce the greatest value possible. (PE 149)


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Concerning propositions referring to what we ought to do, there are so many relevant considerations that it is impossible to determine a definite answer (PE viii). Practical ethics can at most tell us which action will be most likely to produce the greatest amount of good (PE 149). This means that we can only find out what generally has the best results, but we can never claim that we could even find a hypothetical universal law in ethics (PE 154, 155). In no two cases will all the effects of any kind of action be precisely the same because in each case the circumstances will differ; and although the effects, that are important for good and evil, may be generally the same, it is extremely unlikely that they will always be so. (PE 155) Our only guideline is which actions generally lead to good results. This is the case with all ‘commonsense’ principles, for example, that murder is wrong, and that respect of property, industry, temperance, and the keeping of promises are right (PE 156, 157). 24 According to Moore, all these rules have the following characteristics: (1) They seem all to be such that, in any known state of society, a general observance of them would be good as a means. ... And (2) these rules ... can be defended independently of the correct views upon the primary ethical question of what is good in itself. On any view commonly taken, it seems certain that the preservation of civilised society, which these rules are necessary to effect, is necessary for the existence, in any great degree, of anything which may be held to be good in itself. (PE 157, 158) Confidence in our moral beliefs: Reid and Ross Reid and Ross are rather confident in our knowledge of general moral principles. Still, they consider concrete moral judgments to be more problematic since contextual information is needed. People might often judge a situation wrongly, simply because they do not get all the information needed. But in general, human beings are able to acquire moral knowledge. Ross says that


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it seems as self-evident as anything could be, that to make a promise, for instance, is to create a moral claim on us in someone else. Many readers will perhaps say that they do not know this to be true. If so, I


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certainly cannot prove it to them; I can only ask them to reflect again, in the hope that they will ultimately agree that they also know it to be true. The main moral convictions of the plain man seem to me to be, not opinions which it is for philosophy to prove or disprove, but knowledge from the start; and in my own case I seem to find little difficulty in distinguishing these essential convictions from other moral convictions which I also have, which are merely fallible opinions based on an imperfect study of the working for good or evil of certain institutions or types of action. (RG 20, 21, n. 1) Moore is well known for his commonsense position in general epistemology and metaphysics, and he also chooses a certain commonsense position in moral epistemology. Sidgwick consults commonsense to come to the conclusion that people are always ‘unconsciously utilitarian’. Reid and Ross, though, are the most explicit defenders of commonsense in moral epistemology. They do not claim to show the unconscious assumptions of others, but take the moral judgments of the common person for what they are, namely, as genuine judgments. Reid says, in a similar vein as Ross, that the task of philosophy is not to doubt our commonsense judgments but to use them as a starting point. Without commonsense, philosophy would be impossible. 25 This does not mean that we should hold on to our naive prejudices in the face of other evidence but that our commonsense judgments are, as it were, innocent until proven guilty. That means that we can hold on to our initial beliefs until we have good reasons to doubt them. Of course people should always examine their beliefs to see whether they are tenable or not. However, we cannot start from scratch; commonsense knowledge has to be the starting point. Says Reid: In matters beyond the reach of common understanding, the many are led by the few, and willingly yield to their authority. But, in matters of common sense, the few must yield to the many, when local and temporary prejudices are removed. (IP 605) Hence, Reid does not think that the beliefs of the common person should be the guiding line on all matters. He definitely believes that certain fields of knowledge are the prerogative of philosophers and scientists, for example, those concerning knowledge of abstract and necessary propositions, and complex reasoning. However, in regard to




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the data we obtain by our sensory organs, philosophers – ‘the few’ – have no right to tell the common people that their cognitive faculties are mistaken. Instead, the philosopher should consult them on these matters. As ancient skepticism died away because it was in contradiction to commonsense, so will Hume’s skepticism die away, according to Reid: The modern skepticism is very different from the ancient, otherwise it would not have been allowed a hearing; and, when it has lost the grace of novelty, it will die away also, though it should never be refuted. (IP 605) To refute skepticism, in the sense that the radical skeptic could be convinced that we have knowledge, is impossible according to Reid. This is because skepticism starts out by asking unanswerable questions, namely, how we can justify our commonsense beliefs. These demands on knowledge, though, are too high. The general idea behind Reid’s commonsense epistemology is the following: The skeptical project is an impossible project. First, to demand a justification of our commonsense beliefs implies either that we assume that we have certain cognitive faculties, for example, reason, which are infallible and through which we can judge our other faculties. But this is an arbitrary, unjustified assumption. Or, second, we prove the reliability of some of our faculties by the fact that they have been successful in a lot of cases. However, this is a circular way of reasoning because, in order to judge that, we presuppose the reliability of some of our cognitive faculties. Otherwise, we would not be able to state that some judgments are reliably formed.26 Or third, we conclude that we cannot prove the infallibility of our cognitive faculties and hence become skeptics. However, this leads to a pragmatic paradox, as we rely on our faculties in everyday life. These three arguments indicate, according to Reid, that the skeptical project is a pragmatically impossible project. The faculties which nature has given us, are the only engines we can use to find out the truth. We cannot indeed prove that those faculties are not fallacious, unless God should give us new faculties to sit in judgment upon the old. But we are born under a necessity of trusting them. (AP 237)


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We should be careful to understand exactly how Reid’s commonsense argument runs. Intuitionists and commonsense philosophers are often criticized for being naive and dogmatic. However, Reid’s rejection of skepticism can hardly be called dogmatic; to the contrary, its upshot is very liberal. Concerning commonsense, the few have no right to tell the many what to believe, but the many instead can tell the few that they are wrong. Recall that with the few, Reid refers to the skeptical philosophers, who are the target of the ironic polemic that accompanies all his philosophical works. 27 Reid is here obviously not thinking of ideological mass movements that can be a form of repression themselves. These movements do not encourage people to think for themselves, so they do not fit in the commonsense picture. Believing that every human being has in principle an equal right to judge is at the heart of Reid’s commonsense philosophy. This is one of the aspects that makes Reid a typical enlightenment philosopher. Says Reid: The judgments grounded upon the evidence of sense, of memory, and of consciousness, put all men upon a level. (IP 540) As to the supposed naivety of a commonsense approach, Reid would say that, compared to the enormous demands that skeptics have on knowledge, commonsense philosophy might appear naive. Still our commonsense is the only source of knowledge we have concerning certain domains of knowledge. Thus, when it comes to practical matters, even the skeptical philosopher will have to rely upon his ‘naive’ commonsense beliefs. We are born under a necessity of trusting to our reasoning and judging powers; and a real belief of their being fallacious cannot be maintained for any considerable time by the greatest skeptic, because it is doing violence to our constitution. It is like a man’s walking upon his hands, a feat which some men upon occasion can exhibit; but no man ever made a long journey in this manner. Cease to admire his dexterity, and he will, like other men, betake himself to his legs. (IP 632)



It is probably impossible to determine how often our moral judgments are true. We do not have neutral standards by which we can judge that one of our cognitive faculties is more reliable than our


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other faculties. It is impossible to judge our faculties from the outside. The only way we might proceed is to ask ourselves how often in our daily lives we experience that our moral judgments were wrong, for example, that somebody feels mistreated although we thought we were doing our best. However, it might still turn out that our initial judgment was right after all. It is as speculative to say that our moral judgments are more fallible than we think as to assume that they are infallible. Our experience might indicate that sometimes we get it pretty right, other times we err. Reid says the following about how we can make sure that we make as good moral judgments as possible: by serious attention to moral instruction; by observing what we approve, and what we disapprove, in other men, whether our acquaintance, or those whose actions are recorded in history; by reflecting often, in a calm and dispassionate hour, on our own past conduct, that we may discern what was wrong, what was right, and what might have been better; by deliberating coolly and impartially upon our future conduct, as far as we can foresee the opportunities we may have of doing good, or the temptations to do wrong; and by having this principle deeply fixed in our minds, that as moral excellence is the true worth and glory of a man, so the knowledge of our duty is to every man, in every station of life, the most important of all knowledge. (AP 261)28 Hence, Reid believes that we can check our moral judgments by calm reflection and by comparing them to certain points of reference. In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Ross believes that in making our moral judgments we are not only left to ourselves with our subjective opinions or stuck to our tradition. Rather, by interacting with others and being open to other points of view, we are able to examine our judgments and to develop them further. This can never be an ultimate guarantee that we make the right judgments, but it is a more promising route than just relying on our own initial judgments; or on the moral beliefs of our own tradition (as Moore suggests); or to trying to find an ultimate principle (as Sidgwick tries).


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Conclusion In this section I hope to have shown that not only are intuitionists far from being infallibilists (which I pointed out in the first chapter) but also that there are intuitionists who are rather skeptical about our


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ability to have moral knowledge (Sidgwick and Moore). Even Reid and Ross, who are more optimistic about our ability to have moral knowledge, are far from believing that people can never err. That means that intuitionism leaves room for all degrees of skepticism or commonsense views. Nevertheless, a philosopher with commonsense inclinations might find intuitionism one of the few promising moral epistemologies, whereas skeptic philosophers have a much broader range to choose from.

6

General versus particular moral beliefs

The last issue in this chapter is whether we have initial knowledge of general principles from which we derive and justify our particular moral judgments (top-down) or whether we initially form particular judgments on which we base and justify our insight in general principles (bottom-up). Particularists, such as Dancy, can even deny that there is any need for general principles. I will discuss the issue of bottom-up and top-down generalism and particularism in detail in Chapter 4. For now I just want to state that this issue is as underdetermined by the intuitionist core theory as all the other issues discussed in this chapter. The point is that one should not reject intuitionism because one believes that it must entail a bottom-up approach or particularism. It is striking to see that Robert Audi’s view, interactionist intuitionism, borrows on the Rawlsian method of reflective equilibrium, whereas John Rawls thought that his method was an alternative to intuitionism. This, though, can be explained from the fact that Rawls identified intuitionism with a Rossian bottom-up view. Says Rawls: Intuitionist theories, then, have two features: first, they consist of a variety of first principles, ... second, they include no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing these principles against each other. ... Or if there are priority rules, these are thought to be more or less trivial and of no substantial assistance in reaching a judgment. (Rawls 1971, 34) This is correct in so far as we think of Ross as the paradigm intuitionist. However, as pointed out before, Reid believes that there is a hierarchy between virtuous acts, Sidgwick defends a monist theory, and Audi defends that intuitionism is compatible with a Rawlsian account of reflective equilibrium. So Rawls can only claim to attack a certain version of intuitionism but not intuitionism as such.




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My discussion of the different forms of intuitionism in this chapter already indicates that I sympathize with pluralism, nonconsequentialism, and a commonsense approach. These issues will come back in my more detailed discussion of generalism versus particularism in Chapter 4. However, at this stage my point is merely to show that no answer to these issues is essential to intuitionism and is hence not grounds for rejecting intuitionism. Intuitionism is a moral epistemology and ontology that is compatible with many different metaethical and normative ethical positions. Still, it is worthwhile emphasizing that intuitionism can be especially attractive for certain positions that are harder to be understood by nonintuitionist theories. So maybe, pace Sidgwick, utilitarianism can fare well without intuitionism, but nonconsequentialism might be best understood from an intuitionist point of view. Or while monists can find their retreat in a Kantian approach, pluralists are most naturally intuitionists. There are many skeptical ethical theories, for instance, those that claim that what we believe to be good moral judgments are only illusions (Sidgwick’s unconscious utilitarianism as much as emotivism, error theory, etc.). A philosopher with commonsense inclinations might find that intuitionism offers a perspective that seriously considers the moral beliefs of ordinary people. And whereas top-down generalists can choose from among quite a few moral epistemologies, particularists or those who at least allow for particular moral beliefs to play an important role, such as bottom-up generalists, might find intuitionism the most plausible framework. Again, though, I wish to point out that, strictly speaking, intuitionism is underdetermined concerning these issues, as the diversity of intuitionisms indicates.


7 Conclusion


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Typical Objections against Intuitionism

1 Introduction In the last two chapters I have given an account of the core theory of intuitionism (Chapter 1) and of different theories that are compatible with the core theory (Chapter 2). In doing so, I have shown that many common objections do not threaten the core theory of intuitionism, either because they are based on a wrong idea of what intuitionism is or because they are directed against specific versions of intuitionism and not against the core theory. In this chapter, I will return to the core theory as explained in Chapter 1 and discuss and reject the major objections that have been raised against it. These objections can be subsumed under the following headings. Intuitionism is dogmatic (section 2), it is simplistic and naive (section 3), and it presupposes an obscure faculty of intuition (section 4). I will consider these objections in detail. Many objections are based on a rejection of the most basic assumptions of intuitionism, and my reply will often be to argue that given its assumptions, intuitionism is a consistent theory, and furthermore, that its assumptions are plausible. What I wish to show in this chapter is that intuitionism is neither a bizarre theory nor one that does not answer any questions, as many critics have claimed. In fact, I argue that none of the standard objections forms a serious threat to intuitionism.

2


3

Intuitionism is dogmatic

Let me start with an often heard objection against intuitionism, which is rarely made in print, namely, that intuitionism is dogmatic. First I need to clarify what somebody might mean by the term ‘dogmatic’ 79


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here. According to the Pocket Oxford Dictionary, a ‘dogma’ is an ‘arrogant declaration of opinion’, and ‘dogmatic’ is explained as ‘arrogant, intolerantly authoritative’ (Allen 1984, 217). In what sense might one think that intuitionism is dogmatic? Somebody might argue that because moral intuitionism is a form of foundationalism, it has to be a form of infallibilism. And a moral epistemology that entails infallibilism must be dogmatic: If people were to believe that they cannot be mistaken in their moral beliefs, such people would surely be arrogant about their opinions and, as such, good examples of dogmatists. However, as I showed in Chapters 1 and 2, intuitionists are not infallibilists; they believe that all our cognitive faculties are fallible, including the faculty with which we make moral judgments. This even holds for philosophers such as Ross and Reid who rely more heavily on commonsense than Sidgwick and Moore. Another reason why intuitionists are accused of being dogmatic is because they are moral realists. According to this argument, realists presuppose an ‘absolute reality’ of which they supposedly have knowledge, and they should know better than others what moral reality is like. The argument concludes that this is an unacceptably dogmatic and intolerant attitude. Against this I wish to defend intuitionism as follows: If we believe that morality is not relative, being neither reducible to subjective feelings nor to intersubjective constructions, then hypothesizing that there must be moral facts is reasonable. Believing this, though, by no means entails that it is necessary that anyone knows these facts, whether it be the philosopher who makes this realist claim, or anybody else. Similarly, those defending moral realism do not necessarily need to be able to point out who would know these facts or that these facts be known in an infallible way. It even leaves open the possibility that at a certain point in time, we could all agree on the supposed facts and, nevertheless, still be mistaken. It is even possible that nobody might ever know the moral facts. As said in Chapter 1, realism is an ontological thesis which can be combined with more or less skeptical epistemologies. By claiming that there must be moral facts, we have not yet established what these facts might be. However, even if we claim that a moral belief is indeed objectively true, the extent to which it really is a dogmatic belief, or the extent to which someone is dogmatic in being convinced of the truth of that belief, will depend on the content of that belief. For example, one claim could be that a good candidate for a moral fact is that we should be


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Typical Objections against Intuitionism 81

What [the moral realist] denies is that we need to see tolerance, where it is appropriate, as springing from a belief that there are no right answers in such cases. Tolerance is better seen as itself the morally right reaction in some cases – a recognition of the other’s autonomy, of his right to run his own life. Realism and tolerance are not incompatible. (McNaughton 1988, 40) I hope this helps to illustrate that intuitionists need not be dogmatic. First, because they believe that all human beings are fallible cognizers, neither foundationalism nor realism gives anyone privileged access to moral truths. Second, even if intuitionists suggest candidates for supposed moral facts or necessary moral truths, the content of these facts and truths will determine whether they are dogmatic. For example, to believe that we really should be tolerant can hardly qualify as dogmatic (cf. Roeser 2005).

3

Intuitionism is simplistic and naive

Other typical arguments against intuitionism can be subsumed under the heading of simplistic and naive. In more detail, complaints have been made that intuitionism ignores the fact that it can be difficult to make moral judgments; it ignores the diversity of moral beliefs among different people, is uninformative, does not address the issue of normativity sufficiently, is circular, confirms our prejudices, makes moral beliefs unverifiable, and cannot explain how our moral beliefs relate to reality. I will discuss these objections one by one. Intuitionism ignores the fact that it can be difficult to make moral judgments An often heard objection against intuitionism is that it ignores the fact that it can be difficult to make moral judgments. Mackie raises the following point against intuitionism:


tolerant. David McNaughton puts the issue of tolerance and realism as follows:

the suggestion that moral judgements are made or moral problems solved by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking. (Mackie 1977, 38)


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By this Mackie suggests that intuitionists claim that moral intuitions come out of the blue, without any effort. But no intuitionist makes such a claim. Ross, Ewing, and Prichard have explicitly stated that we have to gather as much potentially relevant descriptive information about a situation or action as possible in order to form a moral judgment. However, that moral judgment itself is not inferred from the descriptive information as that would involve an illegitimate step from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. The descriptive information alone is not sufficient to make a moral judgment; this requires, as Prichard puts it, ‘an act of moral thinking’, or, in other words, an intuition.1 Intuitionism ignores the diversity of moral beliefs amongst different people Mackie raises another argument against intuitionism, namely, his famous ‘argument from relativity’, which runs as follows: the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values. (Mackie 1977, 37) I take Mackie to mean by ‘ways of life’ the social practices in which we participate. Mackie defends a form of cultural relativism. According to him, the most plausible way to account for divergent moral beliefs is that they reflect different social practices rather than fallible beliefs concerning one objective reality. Let me cite a few arguments which intuitionists have launched against such a position. As Ross puts it, To find a difference of opinion between ourselves and others, or between our own ages and previous ages, should weaken perhaps our confidence in our own opinions, but not weaken our confidence that there is some opinion that would be true. (FE 19)



Reid points out that a lack of understanding does not change the truth (AP 481). Says Reid: It would be extremely absurd, from the errors and ignorance of mankind, to conclude that there is no such thing as truth; or that


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Intuitionists believe that certain phenomena in our moral life are best understood by assuming that there is an objective morality. Ross gives the example of Wilberforce who condemned slavery at a time when the majority of the English population was pro-slavery. That means that Wilberforce did exactly the opposite of complying with the social conventions of his time (FE 25). This already shows that the cultural relativist has to have a more sophisticated account of how we form and adopt moral norms. Mackie replies to such a line of thought as follows: Of course there have been and are moral heretics and moral reformers, people who have turned against the established rules and practices of their own communities for moral reasons, and often for moral reasons that we would endorse. But this can usually be understood as the extension, in ways which, though new and unconventional, seemed to them to be required for consistency, of rules to which they already adhered as arising out of an existing way of life. (Mackie 1977, 36, 37) This position is of course very conservative: We only change particular moral beliefs in case they conflict with our more established moral beliefs. This ignores the possibility of formative experiences, that is, experiences that radically change our established views.2 In any case, Mackie believes it is more likely that relativism rather than realism holds: The causal connection seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy. (Mackie 1977, 36)


man has not a natural faculty of discerning it, and distinguishing it from error. (AP 248)

So Mackie says that it is not that we act according to our convictions but that we form our convictions in accordance with our behavior, which in turn is shaped by our environment. All our moral convictions can be explained by our cultural background. This drives


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Mackie to endorse an error theory. Moral judgments express propositions, and moral judgments have truth-values (pace Ayer), but they are all false because, since there is no moral reality, they have nothing to refer to. However, intuitionism can give another plausible explanation of divergent moral beliefs that avoids relativism, something which Mackie’s explanation cannot do. Mackie’s position holds concerning mores (conventions concerning etiquette such as how to greet somebody, what to do with your hands during eating, and which clothes to wear), but it does not hold for morality. While mores are indeed a matter of social practices, morality cannot be that alone, because that would entail moral relativism, which I have already rejected (cf. Chapter 1). If intuitionism can explain the divergence of moral beliefs just as well as cultural relativism, but avoid the problematic implications of such an account, intuitionism is the better theory, or so I will argue. How then can intuitionism account for the diversity of moral beliefs? As I said before, Reid and the other intuitionists believe that our ability to make moral judgments has to be developed in appropriate circumstances. Says Reid about our intellectual faculties (also concerning conscience): In their gradual progress, they may be greatly assisted or retarded, improved or corrupted, by education, instruction, example, exercise, and by the society and conversation of men, which, like soil and culture in plants, may produce great changes to the better or to the worse. (AP 247) Perhaps the cultural relativist is right that when considering moral beliefs we are confronted with more disagreement among people around the world and in different times than many intuitionists might have dreamed of. So I will grant the cultural relativist, at least for the sake of the argument, that he or she has a point in emphasizing moral disagreement. But that there is moral disagreement does not imply that the intuitionists’ stance does not make sense or even that we should become skeptical about the possibility of moral knowledge. It only means that we have to be more critical of our intuitive beliefs, without the implication that we could do without them. We often do not have anything else but our intuitions. A realist can say that there are not only clear-cut objective moral imperatives but also limits to a whole range of actions that we are


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allowed to do. This means that sometimes different actions in comparable situations might be equally justified, but contrary to relativism, there can be other actions in such a situation that are nevertheless objectively wrong. A moral realist can also account for divergent moral beliefs as follows: In the end, most people hold the same moral convictions, but since circumstances vary in different environments, a different balance in moral considerations is needed. This results in a great divergence of moral norms at the outset. However, while this answer might account for some divergence in moral attitudes, it does not suffice, since some practices are morally unacceptable in certain circumstances, and a morally better way of acting could be possible. So the moral realist must give a further explanation of moral divergence. I think the best way to account for this is to stress that our moral beliefs are attempts to grasp moral reality but that it can often be difficult to form correct moral beliefs. The cultural relativist has a point in emphasizing that we primarily get to know the world through a specific perspective. Things that appear self-evident to us may be disputed in another culture. Through our culture we have a certain point of view of reality. A realist easily accepts these ideas. However, despite all the differences among points of view, the realist will say that they are all frames of interpretation of one and the same reality. Of course we cannot pretend to have a view of the world from ‘nowhere’. We have to be aware of the fact that our cognitive faculties are fallible. However, that does not mean that we are caught once and for all in the perspective that we once learned. Neither does it mean that there is not a possibility to form a correct belief. So while I grant the cultural relativist, at least for the sake of the argument, that there is substantial moral disagreement, I conclude that this point is not a threat for moral realism. Historically we can see that there is both agreement and disagreement concerning morality. In all cultures, the Golden Rule has probably always been taken to be correct, but there has been disagreement and development concerning to whom it applies. This last point has been the goal of various emancipation movements. To conclude, I have shown that the diversity of moral beliefs can be well accounted for by intuitionism. Furthermore, there is not only moral disagreement but also moral agreement and convergence toward a broad application of the Golden Rule. Hence,




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Mackie’s argument from relativity does not show that intuitionism is mistaken.

Other philosophers believe that intuitionism is not so much wrong as simply uninformative. G.J. Warnock raises the following complaint against intuitionism: What – to save time by begging one or two questions – was really wrong with Intuitionism as a theory of morals? Not, I think, that much of what its proponents maintained was untrue: indeed, when allowance is made for certain eccentricities of expressions they often delineated the surface of the subject with commendable accuracy. It is rather that the theory, appraised as a contribution to philosophy, seems deliberately, almost perversely, to answer no questions, to throw no light on any problem. One might almost say that the doctrine actually consists in a protracted denial that there is anything of the slightest interest to be said. The effect of this is worse than unhelpful: it is positively misleading. (Warnock 1967, 13) Is it really the case that intuitionists refuse to answer any questions? Do they really throw no light on any problem? The issues I discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 show that intuitionists do answer questions but that they believe that certain questions are unanswerable, and hence, illegitimate. However, that is surely not the case with all possible questions. For example, intuitionists answer the question how we recognize moral facts: through intuition, conscience, reason, or an act of moral thinking. Intuitionists explain how moral facts are related to other features in the world: Moral facts nonreductively supervene on nonmoral facts. The kind of questions intuitionists think of as unanswerable are questions such as follows: How can we prove a basic belief to be true? How can we analyze a notion that is best thought of as unanalyzable? How can we explain ethics through empirical science? Or, how can we found morality on an ultimate principle (something Sidgwick does, but most other intuitionists do not)? Every theory has to take something as a starting point for discussion; intuitionists claim that, in ethics, these starting points are the most fundamental ethical notions. According to intuitionists, replacing these fundamental notions by others would be a futile and misguided attempt, which


Intuitionism is uninformative


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might make for a complex theory, but would only bring us farther from the truth. Warnock also says that intuitionists overstate the difference between moral and nonmoral properties, which makes it unclear how moral properties are related to other properties. At the same time, he continues, intuitionists understate the difference between moral judgments and other kinds of judgments. Warnock asserts that while we all know how to perceive a material object, it is unclear how we perceive a moral quality (Warnock 1967, 14, 15). Let us start with the point of supposed overstating of the difference between moral and nonmoral properties. According to Ross, moral properties are resultant properties; they supervene on nonmoral properties. Warnock finds this unsatisfying since it is merely an assertion that is itself not explained. This is a problem for all kinds of supervenience relationships. As soon as we explain in further detail how a certain property supervenes on another property, reductionism lures, which defenders of supervenience accounts so anxiously avoid. Of course, this is not yet an argument for a supervenience account, and more can be said about the relationship between moral and nonmoral properties. In Chapter 1, I argued against a reductivist account, and in Chapter 4 I will argue in more detail how moral properties result from nonmoral properties. Let us now turn to the point of supposed understating of the difference between moral and nonmoral judgments. Here the commonsense approach that is central to most intuitionists comes to the foreground. Intuitionists believe that the perception of material objects has a different phenomenology than moral perception, but all moral beings are acquainted with moral experience. For example, when we are confronted with injustice, we form a judgment that something is wrong. Saying that this is not an ordinary way of perceiving or judging is to beg the question as to what is ordinary. Maybe Warnock means that we should be given an explanation of how such perception works. I have addressed this partially in Chapter 1, and I will come back to this at the end of this chapter and in the second part of this study. Furthermore, Warnock says that intuitionism fails to explain how the perception of moral facts can bear any relevance on our conduct (Warnock 1967, 14, 16). However, intuitionists say that moral facts are important for our conduct as moral facts are moral imperatives. For example, I should help him because he is in pain; I should give back




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the book because I borrowed it; I should go to see her because I promised to; you should protect him because he depends on you, and so on. Moral facts are imperatives, and our perceiving them paradigmatically triggers us to act accordingly. While Warnock appears to presuppose a Humean theory of motivation according to which beliefs are motivationally inert, this thesis is rejected by most intuitionists. In Chapter 5 I will give a more detailed account of the relationship between moral cognition and motivation. Warnock also says the following against intuitionism: Intuitionism seems, in retrospect, so strange a phenomenon – a body of writing so acute and at the same time so totally unilluminating – that one may wonder how to explain it, what its genesis was. The idea that there is a vast corpus of moral facts about the world – known, but we cannot say how: related to other features of the world, but we cannot explain in what way: overwhelmingly important for our conduct, but we cannot say why – what does this really astonishing idea reflect? One may be tempted to say: the absence of curiosity. And what the absence of curiosity reflects may be the absence of doubt. (Warnock 1967, 16) I do not agree that intuitionism is unilluminating. To the contrary, it makes some very substantial claims, for example, that we should take certain moral beliefs as prima facie self-evidently justified. I agree that intuitionism does not supply us with a sophisticated theory that gives us a deeper explanation of our moral beliefs. This is because, as said before, intuitionists believe that to explain something basic by something else would be a misguided approach, as it would mean committing the naturalistic fallacy. Alternative theories may attempt to give deeper accounts of these phenomena, but are these accounts more plausible or correct? In the end this must be the most important criterion for theory choice. It is intuitionists who take ethics and commonsense moral beliefs more at face value than defenders of any other theory. This should not be considered a weakness if we believe that morality is a nonreducible domain of reality. Intuitionism insufficiently addresses the issue of normativity


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As we have seen, Warnock finds intuitionism uninformative. Christine Korsgaard also believes that intuitionism is uninformative in a certain respect. She claims that intuitionists, by being substantive realists,


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refuse to answer what she calls the ‘normative question’ as something that cannot and need not be done (Korsgaard 1996b, 39). With the ‘normative question’, she means the question as to whether we are justified in according morality the importance that we give it, namely, as taking it to be action-guiding, as providing imperatives (Korsgaard 1996b, 32). Prichard has indeed argued that such a question is misguided. This is how Korsgaard summarizes Prichard’s position: If we try to answer the question, ‘Why should I be moral?,’ the answer is either circular, for example, ‘It is your duty’ which is itself a moral answer, or the answer is irrelevant, for example, ‘It will make you happy,’ which is a selfinterested reason and can as such not answer why one should be moral. This is how Prichard puts his criticism of a reduction of morality to self-interest: The answer is, of course, not an answer, for it fails to convince us that we ought to keep our engagements; even if successful on its own lines, it only makes us want to keep them. (Prichard 1912, 23) Now Korsgaard argues that Prichard commits the following mistake: The question ‘Is this action really obligatory?’ can be understood as the question about whether moral concepts have been applied correctly in this case – whether, for instance, the requirement can really be derived from the categorical imperative or the principle of utility or some other moral principle. And that is a different question from the question how this obligation or any obligation can be normative. Prichard’s way of approaching the matter therefore leads us to confuse the question of correct application with the question of normativity. And this actually happened to Prichard himself. For it led him to think that once we have settled the question of correct application, there can be nothing more to say about the normative question. (Korsgaard 1996b, 39) If I understand Korsgaard correctly, her reasoning is that Prichard argues that we cannot ask why we have to do a certain action and that this leads him, wrongly, to deny that we can ask why we should be moral at all. I think that this is an incorrect reading of Prichard. I take Prichard to argue the following: We cannot satisfactorily answer the normative question, as this amounts either to circular reasoning or to a category mistake, by giving us the wrong kinds of reasons.




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And it is simply because of this that in a concrete situation it makes no sense to demand proof that a certain action really is obligatory. So it is not as Korsgaard suggests – that Prichard believes we cannot give a proof of a particular obligation and that he then wrongly concludes that we cannot answer the normative question – it is rather the other way around: Since we cannot answer the normative question, a proof of a particular obligation will be equally misguided. According to Prichard, [t]he sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness of, an action of a particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate. The rightness of an action consists in its being the origination of something of a certain kind A in a situation of a certain kind, a situation consisting in a certain relation B of the agent to others or to his own nature. (Prichard 1912, 27) Of course we will have to know whether we really can originate result A by our action, for example, returning a book we borrowed, and we will have to know in which relation B we stand to another person, for example, to whom we made a promise. This factual information is needed to make a moral judgment and is what Prichard calls preliminaries. However, these preliminaries are not premises in a deductive argument. Once we have all the relevant factual information, we need what Prichard calls ‘an act of moral thinking’, which cannot be replaced by a nonmoral proof or a nonmoral argument. Says Prichard: The plausibility of the view that obligations are not self-evident but need proof lies in the fact that an act which is referred to as an obligation may be incompletely stated, what I have called the preliminaries to appreciating the obligation being incomplete. If, e.g., we refer to the act of repaying X by a present merely as giving X a present, it appears, and indeed is, necessary to give a reason. In other words, wherever a moral act is regarded in this incomplete way the question, ‘Why should I do it?’ is perfectly legitimate. This fact suggests, but suggests wrongly, that even if the nature of the act is completely stated, it is still necessary to give a reason, or, in other words, to supply a proof. (Prichard 1912, 28)


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He says further on:

If we start to doubt whether our moral judgment is correct, the only thing we can do is to get the descriptive information clear before our eyes once more and form a moral judgment again. Just as in mathematics, if we start to doubt a sum we did the day before: ‘Plainly, the only remedy is to do the sum again’ (Prichard 1912). I will come back to Prichard’s account of intuition in Chapter 4 in more detail. Up to this point I merely want to make clear Prichard’s reason for refusing to answer what Korsgaard calls the ‘normative question’. Korsgaard also accuses Moore of confusing the normative question with another kind of question: Moore argued that no matter what analysis we give of ‘good’, it is an open question whether the objects picked out by that analysis are good. And he concluded that ‘good’ must therefore be unanalyzable, and further that therefore we can only know which things are good through intuition. But the force of the open question argument clearly comes from the pressure of the normative question. That is, when the concept of the good is applied to a natural object, such as pleasure, we can still always ask whether we should really choose or pursue it. This should not lead us to conclude that the concept of the good, or any other normative concept, cannot be defined in a way that guides its application. Conflation of the normative question with other questions is what drives Moore and others to the view that moral concepts must be simple and indefinable, and as a result to intuitionism. (Korsgaard 1996b, 43) I think this argument rests on a misunderstanding of Moore. Moore believes that we can give an account of normative concepts that can guide their application. He believes that there are certain things which are intrinsically good, such as happiness, friendship, and the admiration of beauty. To Moore the rightness of an action is exactly


The negative side of all this is, of course, that we do not come to appreciate an obligation by an argument, i.e. by a process of nonmoral thinking. (Prichard 1912, 29)


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determined by how far it will contribute to reaching good results. However, he denies that things that are intrinsically good, what he calls ‘the good’, can provide a definition of the notion ‘goodness’ (cf. Chapters 1 and 2). Goodness is a normative concept that can itself not be reduced to anything nonnormative. According to Moore, the open question is exactly not, as Korsgaard seems to understand it, whether we should pursue something to which we applied the concept of goodness. The open question argument means that we can always ask whether something is really good. Goodness is a property of things which is itself not identical to these things, as naturalist or reductivist theories tend to claim. In short, I do not see where Moore conflates the normative question with any other question. Rather, he says that morality is determined by the pursuing of intrinsically good states of affairs. So, actually, Moore does answer the normative question and, in doing so, becomes a target of Prichard’s argument. In a passage in which Korsgaard claims to tell us what is ‘really wrong’ with substantive realism as predominantly defended by intuitionists, she becomes plainly rhetorical, and I cannot really make sense of what she is saying: What is really wrong with substantive realism is its view about the source of normativity. Why do we use normative concepts like good, right, reason, and obligation? According to the substantive realist it is because we grasp that there are things that have normative properties. Some things appear normative, and there is no reason to doubt that they are what they seem. We have normative concepts because we’ve spotted some normative entities, as it were wafting by. According to substantive realism, then, ethics is really a theoretical or epistemological subject. When we ask ethical questions, or practical normative questions more generally, there is something about the world that we are trying to find out. The world contains a realm of inherently normative entities or truths, whose existence we have noticed, and the business of ethics, or of practical philosophy more generally, is to investigate them further, to learn about them in a more systematic way. But isn’t ethics supposed to be a practical subject, a guide to action? Well, the realist will grant that the eventual point is to apply all this knowledge in practice. According to the substantive realist, then, the moral


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She goes on in a footnote: In fact that is what realism takes action itself to be: a form of technology. Aristotle firmly distinguishes praxis or action from techneˉ or production (see Nichomachean Ethics VI.4), but a substantive realist has no way to make this distinction. (Korsgaard 1996b, 44) This is an absurd complaint. There could not be a more incorrect characterization of the views of intuitionists on human beings and normativity than this. Consider Prichard, who says that the remedy to finding out what an actual obligation is lies only ‘in imagining ourselves in that situation, and then letting our moral capacities of thinking do their work’ (Prichard 1912, 37). Intuitionists explicitly deny that philosophers are predestined to tell us what moral norms hold and how to apply moral theories. To the contrary, they emphasize that all moral beings have the ability to discern what is morally right or wrong. According to Korsgaard, ‘autonomy is the source of obligation’ (Korsgaard 1996b, 91). Instead, intuitionists argue that it is our autonomy and our reflective nature that enable us to be aware of moral obligations and that hold us accountable for our actions. Moral realism does not deny the possibility that a moral agent can question whether he really has moral obligations. But whereas Korsgaard believes that we have to travel this route to get to the foundations of normativity, the realist says that while on this route we will never be able to understand why we have certain obligations. Once we transcend the moral point of view, morality is out of reach. Only by being in the grasp of the moral claims that rest on us will we be able to experience them as such. This implies, contrary to what Korsgaard claims, that the intuitionist emphasizes the unique and practical character of moral experience that cannot be substituted by any kind of abstract theorizing. Consequently, I believe Korsgaard’s criticism against intuitionism is based on misinterpretations that do not hit the mark.


life is the most sublime feat of technical engineering, the application of theoretical knowledge to the solution of human problems. And in general human life and action consist in the application of theories, theories about what is right or good. (Korsgaard 1996b, 44)


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Intuitionism just confirms our prejudices

Prichard’s outstanding characteristic, and one which he shares with Moore as well as with other intuitionists, is the treatment of good, right, duty, obligatory, and the rest of the moral vocabulary as though it was a coinage of permanently fixed values and simple scrutiny. It is doubtless because of this that the proportion of assertion to argument is so high in Prichard. In other intuitionist writers, such as Sir David Ross, who holds that we have independent intuitions of ‘rightness’ and ‘goodness’, the standards of argument are much higher. But all intuitionist writers suffer from one difficulty: they are, on their own, telling us only about what we all know already. That they sometimes disagree about what it is that we all know already makes them less boring at the cost of making them even less convincing. (MacIntyre 1966, 254) I take MacIntyre here to be making the following claims: 1. Intuitionists treat moral notions – mistakenly – as if they had a fixed meaning rather than being context dependent. 2. Intuitionists merely confirm what we all already know. 3. This is made even more obscure by the fact that intuitionists disagree about what we are supposed to all already know. Let me discuss these arguments one by one. 1. Let me tackle MacIntyre’s first claim, which is that intuitionists ignore that moral notions are context dependent rather than fixed. Given his terminology, I think his claim concerns three aspects: (a) epistemology (‘know’), (b) semantics (‘vocabulary’), and (c) ontology (‘values’). (a) In terms of epistemology, intuitionists do indeed take notions such as ‘right’ and ‘good’ to be basic notions which we all implicitly must understand if we use them. Disagreement as to which things have the attributes right and good is on a different level. Intuitionists can easily accommodate disagreement


Similar to the other critics of intuitionism that I discussed before, Alasdair MacIntyre believes that intuitionism is misguided by merely telling us about what we all supposedly ‘know already’. This is MacIntyre’s argument against intuitionism:


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in beliefs since they are all fallibilists. Therefore, the fact that intuitionists are realists and foundationalists does not commit them to infallibilism, as I pointed out ad nauseam in Chapters 1 and 2. (b) Perhaps MacIntyre’s claim concerns the semantic aspect, that is, that these notions themselves have no fixed meaning. This raises the problem of whether we can ever have a fruitful discussion on any ethical issue if we are unable to assume that there is some consensus on the meaning of the most basic terms involved. On the one hand, intuitionists are rather optimistic in assuming that we are more or less in agreement about what we are referring to when we talk about goodness and rightness. On the other hand, they make the effort to sort out claims about the meaning of terms that they believe are not correct, in order to single out the meanings of terms they believe are correct. So they do not actually take a consensus on these issues for granted. However, intuitionists do believe that analyzing the meaning of basic moral notions is impossible. (c) Maybe MacIntyre’s concern is neither epistemological nor semantical, but is ontological. His concern might be that moral realism is misguided since it does not acknowledge how values change through time and space. Here, though, the intuitionist might reply in a similar vein as Reid (cf. the passage I referred to when I discussed Mackie’s argument from relativity before): Changes in opinion do not establish changes in facts. Furthermore, while intuitionists can hold that mores are culturally relative, in order to avoid ethical relativism there must be certain moral norms that are objectively true. However, the realist does not need to claim that moral properties cannot be context dependent, as will become clear in my discussion of particularism as a form of realism in Chapter 4. Let me say so far that a particularist differs from a cultural relativist in two main respects. First, to the particularist, a different culture is not sufficient to make a difference in moral values. Moral values must be accessible from another person’s point of view. Hence, saying ‘You just cannot understand the way we do this in my culture’ is a poor argument. Second, morality cannot be reduced to practices, even though certain circumstances in a moral practice can be morally relevant. We have to distinguish between epistemological and ontological contexts. Differences in




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Consequently, no matter how we understand MacIntyre’s first claim, intuitionists can defend themselves. In terms of the epistemological and semantic aspects, intuitionists assume that we understand moral notions because otherwise we would not be able to communicate. At the same time, they can incorporate variations of moral beliefs by their fallibilist epistemology. In particular, they do not further analyze the semantic aspects of moral notions since they believe that basic moral notions are indefinable. In terms of the ontological aspect, the more traditional intuitionists claim that moral properties indeed invariably supervene on certain nonmoral properties. However, more recent developments in intuitionism tend to defend a particularist account according to which normative relations are context dependent, albeit in a very different sense than the cultural relativist claims as I already mentioned. This is further expanded upon in Chapter 4. 2. Let me now address MacIntyre’s second claim, that intuitionists merely confirm what we all already know. First, most intuitionists are commonsense philosophers, in that they take the beliefs of morally developed3 persons seriously. In order to have moral knowledge, we have to start with commonsense. Their normative claims are always checked by our commonsense intuitions. However, many of the intuitionists’ claims are on a metaethical level, as can be seen in questions such as what kind of knowledge is constituted by our moral beliefs. Of course intuitionists do not claim that everybody is an equally good judge of morals. People need an adequately developed capacity of moral thinking, and only the beliefs of those with this capacity are considered relevant. Similarly, as often reiterated, all intuitionists are fallibilists who believe that we can never be guaranteed the truth of our commonsense beliefs but that these beliefs are simply the best we have (cf. Chapters 1 and 2). Paradoxically, the intuitionists’ insistence on commonsense is a philosophically controversial position. They do not intend revealing anything more than what we know through commonsense unless there is good reason for it. This is exactly where intuitionism’s contribution to philosophy lies.


epistemological perspectives are ultimately not normatively legitimate (they can function as explanation, but not as justification), whereas differences in ontological circumstances can make a moral difference.


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3. Let me now turn to MacIntyre’s third charge against intuitionism, that intuitionists disagree about supposedly self-evident beliefs. This can again be explained by the fact that we can never expect certainty with regard to our moral beliefs. Nevertheless, our starting point is moral beliefs so that we can inquire which view is ultimately the most convincing. Part of the discussion among intuitionists is to which of our beliefs we correctly ascribe the status of basicality. That there is a debate about this does not undermine a foundationalist account. The idea that there must be basic beliefs does not as yet determine which beliefs are the best candidates for basic beliefs. In short, none of MacIntyre’s critical remarks pose serious threats to intuitionism. Intuitionism is circular David Brink’s discussion of intuitionism is a pleasant exception compared to the more rhetorical arguments launched by many antiintuitionists. Indeed, he discusses intuitionist foundationalist epistemology very conscientiously. Nevertheless, he believes that foundationalism in intuitionism and elsewhere is wrong. He argues that although foundationalists reject coherentism because of its supposed unavoidable circularity or infinite regress, foundationalism (in both intuitionism and generally) itself is circular in that it presupposes self-justifying beliefs. Says Brink: But can there be such beliefs? Justification is justification in believing true. In order to be justified in holding one’s belief p, one must have reason to hold p true. But p is a first-order belief that such and such is the case and, as such, cannot contain the reason for thinking p is true. Indeed, self-justification can be regarded as the limiting case of circular reasoning – that is, self-justification is the smallest justificatory circle imaginable. And everyone – even the coherentist – regards such small circles of justification as nonexplanatory and, hence, as nonjustifying. (Brink 1989, 116) Brink’s main objection against intuitionism is that it is circular, a circularity with an even more vicious form than that of coherentism. I take Brink to claim the following: Premise 1: Foundationalism presupposes justifying beliefs.

the

existence

of



self-


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Are premises 1 and 2 true? The way I defined foundationalism in Chapter 1 was to say that self-evident beliefs can be justified through nonpropositional evidence, for example, a sensation on which a belief is based or the occurrence of a belief. In addition, self-evident beliefs can be justified through propositional evidence. This could be the content of a belief or external evidence such as a belief that is formed through a reliable belief-forming mechanism in favorable circumstances (cf. Chapter 1, section 4). This means that the notion of ‘self-justifying beliefs’ is misleading. A belief does not literally justify itself; justification is formed by its content, its occurrence, or that on which it is based. Hence, premise 1 is false, making premise 2 irrelevant, giving no foundation for the drawing of the conclusion. Brink (1989, 118, 119) demands that we justify our first-order beliefs by second-order beliefs (internalism). However, as argued in Chapter 1, this leads to an infinite regress by invoking higher-order beliefs. In addition, internalism restricts that what we think of as knowledge to an incredibly small number of beliefs which we can justify internally. In conclusion, Brink’s attack against intuitionism does not hold since intuitionism does not involve circular justification and the demand for second order beliefs leads to an infinite regress and unduly reduces our knowledge. Intuitions are unreliable More recently, Walter Sinnot-Armstrong (2006) has rejected ethical intuitionism based on empirical findings from psychology that show that our ethical intuitions are highly unreliable. His argument rests on five principles that state the conditions under which ethical intuitions are unreliable and under which we need inferential confirmation of moral beliefs. These conditions are (1) we are partial; (2) others disagree with us, and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgment to theirs; (3) we are emotional in a way that clouds our judgment; (4) the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (5) the source of our moral beliefs is unreliable or disreputable. Sinnot-Armstrong argues that empirical research shows that these criteria apply to our ethical


Premise 2: Self-justifying beliefs are a case of circular justification. ———————————— Conclusion: Foundationalism is committed to circular justification (and so is intuitionism, as being a form of foundationalism).


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intuitions; hence, we need inferential checks and confirmations of our ethical beliefs. Before going into the details of Sinnot-Armstrong’s argument, let me start by noting a curious feature of his methodology that threatens to undermine his approach from the start. Sinnot-Armstrong formulates his principles in exactly the same way as intuitionists: by reflecting on our armchair intuitions. Granted, Sinnot-Armstrong’s are epistemic principles and not moral principles, but the borderlines between epistemic and moral norms are vague. Sinnot-Armstrong’s methodology confirms a point that intuitionists endorse at heart: The point of departure for every reasoning is intuitive beliefs. It is curious that somebody adopts the exact same approach that he is trying to undermine. For the sake of the argument, let me leave this methodological curiosity aside and turn to Sinnot-Armstrong’s more substantial argument. Sinnot-Armstrong presents us with empirical material that shows how biased our moral beliefs can be, and he takes this to be a refutation of intuitionism. However, the reader of this book will not be too surprised by these principles. As a matter of fact, we have seen that Reid and others have thought about these problematic features of moral intuitions all along. Recall that Reid said more than 200 years ago: Men may, to the end of life, be ignorant of self-evident truths. They may, to the end of life, entertain gross absurdities. Experience shows that this happens often in matters that are indifferent. Much more may it happen in matters where interest, passion, prejudice, and fashion, are so apt to pervert the judgment. (AP 371) It is remarkable that Reid mentions exactly the same distorting factors as Sinnot-Armstrong: interest (principle 1), passion (principle 3), prejudice (principle 4), and fashion (Sinnot-Armstrong alludes to this in his discussion of principle 5). Recall that all intuitionists are aware that there can be disagreement (principle 2) on moral matters. But as I have argued on several occasions throughout this book, while intuitionists believe that these distorting factors show the potential fallibility of intuitions, they do not believe that these factors undermine our trust in intuitions. In a detailed discussion of Sinnot-Armstrong’s paper, Jonathan Smith (2010) argues in a similar vein. He explains that while Sinnot-Armstrong’s examples show that moral intuitions can be mistaken, they by no means show that




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moral intuitions are always mistaken or are mistaken most of the time. We cannot avoid invoking our moral intuitions; they can often serve as a good source of ethical insight, but we have to stay critical and open to the possibility that we err. Recall that in Chapter 2 I said that some intuitionists have more confidence in commonsense, whereas others are more skeptical. Hence, for intuitionists, SinnotArmstrong’s criticism hardly comes as a shock. At most, by referring to recent empirical evidence he shows us in more detail how wickedly misled we can be about our moral judgments. However, similar studies show the fallibility of sense perception and the fallibility of our computational rationality (work on heuristics and biases that show that people have huge difficulties in logical and statistical thinking; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Gilovich et al. 2002). By the same token, we would then have to reject sense perception and rational thinking – being left empty-handed. A more reasonable approach is to be aware of the shortcomings of all our cognitive abilities and building in checks and balances. That our cognitive abilities are fallible does not need to lead us to skepticism; epistemic modesty is a much more reasonable alternative and one that all intuitionists endorse explicitly.

4 Intuitionism presupposes an obscure moral faculty A very common objection against intuitionism is that it presupposes an obscure faculty of moral intuition through which we are supposedly aware of equally obscure moral facts. Mackie’s famous ‘argument from queerness’ goes as follows: This [argument] has two parts, one metaphysical, the other epistemological. If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else. (Mackie 1977, 38)


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Let us start with the metaphysical part of Mackie’s argument. Of course everything depends on our idea of what is ordinary. If all values are objective, this would also include epistemic values, aesthetic values, and so on, and they would hence not be so dissimilar to everything


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else we know. Indeed, we often know norms and values better than, for example, facts that are stated by sophisticated scientific theories. For example, we know that stealing is wrong better than we know what the speed of light is. People often believe that nonreductive moral realism is committed to a form of Platonism, but as I have shown in Chapter 1, that need not be the case. In fact, most intuitionists are inspired by Aristotle. They believe that moral properties are part of the world and supervene on natural facts. However, moral properties cannot be reduced to natural facts as that would mean committing the naturalistic fallacy. Let us now look at the epistemological part of Mackie’s argument from queerness. Mackie’s objection against a faculty of moral intuition is that it is utterly different from any other way of knowing. However, as I explained in Chapter 1, intuitionists only used the notion of the moral faculty up to Reid. Nevertheless, while no recent intuitionist has defended the notion of the moral faculty, an aversion to it is one of the most common Pavlovian reactions to intuitionism. In addition, the philosophers who did use the notion of the moral faculty applied it to reason, emotion, or both. Reason and emotion are faculties or abilities whose existence is acknowledged by most or all philosophers.4 While the term ‘intuition’ has the unfortunate connotation of some mysterious telepathic ability, intuitionists simply mean a capacity to form a noninferential belief. In ordinary perception, noninferential beliefs are beliefs based on sensation; in a moral sense theory, they might be sentiments. Rationalist intuitionists call such a source of basic beliefs ‘intuition’ (in Chapter 4, I will further elucidate on the notion ‘intuition’). Intuitionism makes moral beliefs unverifiable A.J. Ayer believes that intuitionism is a useless moral epistemology. He believes that the main problem with intuitionism is that it makes statements of value unverifiable. For it is notorious that what seems intuitively certain to one person may seem doubtful, or even false, to another. So that unless it is possible to provide some criterion by which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a proposition’s validity. (Ayer 1952, 106)



Ayer here says that (a) moral intuitions are not verifiable, and (b) intuitionism cannot provide a criterion for deciding which of two conflicting


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intuitions is true. These two reasons make intuitionism a useless and wrong theory. Let me first address the claim that moral intuitions are not verifiable. This is supported by Ayer’s logical-positivist theory. According to Ayer, a belief is only verifiable if it concerns a meaningful proposition. According to logical positivism, a proposition can only be meaningful if it concerns analytical truths or empirical facts. Moral, aesthetic and religious beliefs are pseudobeliefs because they refer to nothing and do not have a truth-value. However, if we do not accept logical positivism, we do not need to take any of these claims seriously. Indeed I offered several arguments in Chapter 1 why intuitionists do not subscribe to logical positivism. The first problem with logical positivism is, of course, that it is self-referentially inconsistent: The central claims of logical positivism are neither empirical nor analytical (tautological). Rather, they are substantial metaphysical claims about what there is and is not in the world. The second problem is that logical positivism begs questions by claiming which kinds of assertions (semantics), convictions (epistemology), and things (ontology) we should take seriously. Everything rests on the assumption that only sense perception and logical rationality provide knowledge. But as pointed out before, Alston and Reid have argued that this assumption is itself unwarranted, circular, or begs questions. However, even if Ayer’s first point is not convincing, his second point, namely, that intuitionism cannot help us decide between conflicting intuitions, could still be a reason to reject intuitionism as a useless theory. Indeed, this is a very common criticism of intuitionism. To this the intuitionist would reply that in this respect, ethical beliefs are not so different from other kinds of beliefs. In (fallibilist) foundationalist fashion, the intuitionist would say that, as with many beliefs, if we are confronted with somebody who believes the contrary to ourselves, it can be impossible to establish beyond doubt who is right. Remember that Reid says that this is simply a consequence of the fact that we have no new senses with which we can ‘sit in judgment upon the old’ (AP 237). We have to take the deliveries of our senses as starting points:


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Nature has doomed us to believe the testimony of our senses, whether we can give a good reason for doing so or not. (AP 462) This is also the case with our moral beliefs. Nevertheless, through discussion, evaluation, and reflection we can reconsider our beliefs. This


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is even more so with moral judgments which are formed not just by a simple impression on our senses, but by evaluating many aspects relevant to the situation. To wrap up, concerning the difficulty of deciding between conflicting beliefs, intuitionists believe that moral knowledge is similar to other forms of knowledge. Because of this, Ayer’s complaint might lead one to universal skepticism rather than only to a rejection of intuitionism. The consequence of Ayer’s account is that it might backfire. There are no objective criteria to evaluate our moral judgments A similar objection as Ayer’s has been brought forward by Shaun Nichols (2004). Nichols states that moral objectivism is wrong, because our moral judgments are based on arbitrary emotions. There are no moral norms ‘out there’, independent of our emotional responses. Nichols argues that certain moral norms are salient for us because they elicit strong emotional responses. This is what he calls the ‘Sentimental Rules’ account: In brief, moral judgment depends on certain emotions, and these emotions themselves are rationally arbitrary, so moral judgment, as we know it, is not objective. No action is wrong simpliciter. At best, an action is only wrong relative to a population – the population of individuals that share a certain emotional repertoire. A more careful way to frame the Humean conclusion here is that the commonsense commitment to objectivity is unwarranted. Given the emotional basis of moral judgment, we are not justified in our belief that morality is objective. (Nichols 2004, 185) I have already argued in Chapter 1 that Nichols’ account gives rise to the same problems with relativism as other Humean accounts. Here I focus on Nichols’ argument against objectivism. I wish to show that the conclusion to the relativity of ethics does not follow from the arguments that Nichols provides. Look at the following argument that Nichols gives for the passage quoted above:



1. Rational creatures who lack certain emotions would not make the moral judgments that we do. 2. There is no principled basis for maintaining that these certain emotions (on which our moral judgments depend) are the right emotions. That is, there is no externally privileged basis for


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Even if we agree with these premises, it does not follow that ethics is just a matter of projection. We can make the same claim for sense perception: 1*. Rational creatures who lack certain sensations would not make the perceptual judgments that we do. 2*. There is no principled basis for maintaining that these certain sensations (on which our perceptual judgments depend) are the right sensations. That is, there is no externally privileged basis for maintaining that all rational creatures should have the sensations. With the emphasis on ‘there is no externally privileged basis,’ premises 2 and 2* are true for emotions and for sensations, respectively. Premise 2 can be applied to all kinds of knowledge, without making them suspect, as has been argued for by reliabilists and externalists in epistemology (cf. Chapter 1, section 4). Even if we accept the Humean claim that moral experience is essentially emotional, this does not need to mean that moral objectivism cannot be true. Emotions might be (fallible) perceptions of moral truths. This view of the role of emotions is more plausible because it can account for different grounds of our moral emotions. For example, Nichols says that ‘norms that prohibit actions that are likely to elicit negative affect are more likely to succeed’ (Nichols 2004, 161). As said before, Nichols believes that it is completely arbitrary which violations should give rise to negative emotions. However, why do we get emotional about certain actions which makes us see them as violations of moral norms, and not about others? This requires a difference in the situation or action itself. Hence, an alternative explanation would be that we get emotional because we see that a norm is violated. This is the view I will defend in Chapter 5. Intuitionism cannot explain how our moral beliefs relate to reality


maintaining that all rational creatures should have the emotions. (Nichols 2004, 185)

Gilbert Harman believes that it is irrelevant to talk about moral facts and perception thereof to make sense of our moral judgments: Indeed, an assumption about moral facts would seem to be totally irrelevant to the explanation of your making the judgment you


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make. It would seem that all we need assume is that you have certain more or less well articulated moral principles that are reflected in the judgments you make, based on your moral sensibility. It seems to be completely irrelevant to your explanation whether your intuitive immediate judgment is true or false. (Harman 1988, 122; italics mine) So Harman believes that we do not even need the notions of truth and falsehood; in order to account for our moral judgments, we need only our moral sensibility. However, how do we develop our moral sensibility if we do not learn from what is around us? According to Harman our sensibility is simply due to our upbringing, but this rings a behaviorist tone. The question is whether one can avoid conventionalism and relativism on such an account. I have argued against relativism in Chapter 1. A better explanation of moral education would be in Aristotelian fashion, namely, that a good education is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to develop moral sensibility – another precondition is experience with moral reality. Furthermore, if moral judgments do not refer to anything and cannot be true or false, it is hard to see how we could evaluate them (cf. the discussion of realism in Chapter 1). Harman argues against accounts of moral perception as follows: While a change among the empirical facts makes a difference to our perceptual apparatus, there does not seem to be any way in which the actual rightness or wrongness of a given situation can have any effect on your perceptual apparatus. In this respect, ethics seems to differ from science. (Harman 1988, 122) Harman claims that moral beliefs are much different from scientific beliefs. Moral beliefs are not observational, in contrast with scientific beliefs, and it does not make a difference to our ‘perceptual apparatus’ whether an action is right or wrong. However, everything hinges on what Harman allows to be part of our perceptual apparatus. Ethics is a different domain than science and requires different modes of discovery. One could say that moral perception is part of our perceptual apparatus, and it definitely makes a difference to our moral perception whether an action is morally right or wrong. I will give a more detailed account of how I think moral perception works in Chapters 4 and 5.




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Perhaps Harman’s point is that the moral value of a situation does not have a material or causal effect on the perceptual apparatus. However, I would like to refer to an account of Reid’s moral perception by Terence Cuneo (2003) which draws on Nick Wolterstorff’s interpretation of Reid’s general epistemology. According to Wolterstorff (2001), Reid defends a ‘narrow’ and a ‘broad’ schema of perception: In the narrow schema, impressions are the input of perception, while in the broad schema, the input consists of signs that give rise to impressions. Signs can refer to things that do not interact directly with our bodies – for example, other minds – while impressions are material effects on our perceptual apparatus. This is a quote by Reid that Cuneo cites to illustrate this point: Other minds we perceive only through the medium of material objects, on which their signatures are impressed. It is through this medium that we perceive life, activity, wisdom, and every moral and intellectual quality in other beings. The signs of those qualities are immediately perceived by the senses; by them the qualities themselves are reflected to our understanding; and we are very apt to attribute the sign, the beauty or the grandeur, which is properly and originally in the things signified. (IP 793) Cuneo extends this definition of the broad schema and says that Reid takes moral facts to be perceived in such a way. For example, witnessing somebody being beaten is a sign that gives rise to my belief that this is morally condemnable. This example illustrates how we can perceive a moral property without it interacting materially with our body. It might comfort the skeptic that something analogous is common in other kinds of cognition as well.5 There is another possible account of how moral facts have a material or causal affect on our perceptual apparatus, namely, that of the neuropsychologist Antonio Damasio. According to Damasio (1994), emotions serve as somatic markers through which we form moral beliefs. His theory entails that we cannot have moral knowledge without emotions. I already hinted at this view in my discussion of Nichols in the previous subsection. I will defend this thesis in part 2 of this study.


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5 Conclusion In this chapter I have discussed the best-known objections raised against intuitionism, and I have concluded that intuitionism can be


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successfully defended against all these objections. Intuitionism uses a commonsense approach that fits well with the phenomenology of moral experience. Intuitionists refuse to extend philosophical theorizing further than is legitimate. Instead of explaining normativity and intuitions away with a supposed further account, intuitionists claim that these are basic phenomena, just as there are other basic phenomena which we cannot account for meaningfully. Although our moral beliefs may be fallible, we can have moral knowledge, and we can even make certain universal claims without being dogmatic. We can have basic moral beliefs about real, existing, nonnatural properties. However, there is one issue that I find of major concern, namely, that rationalistic accounts of moral cognition cannot explain certain features of our moral experience. I will address this issue in the second part of this study.




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Part II

Our moral judgments are not, like those we form in speculative matters, dry and unaffecting, but from their nature, are necessarily accompanied with affections and feelings. (AP 238) In the first part of this study, I defended what I call the core theory of intuitionism. In Chapter 2, I discussed different approaches within intuitionism that are not essential to it. I chose sides in that chapter by making it clear that I found the arguments for pluralism, nonconsequentialism, and a commonsense approach more convincing than the arguments for monism, consequentialism, and skepticism. In the following chapters, I will develop my own intuitionist approach. I initially follow Jonathan Dancy by emphasizing the importance of context-sensitive, particular moral judgments. My own innovative contribution will be to integrate intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions. I will argue that we can get a more convincing form of ethical intuitionism if we reconcile the core theory of intuitionism with an account of moral emotions. I will pick up the discussion in favor of pluralism, nonconsequentialism, and a commonsense approach in Chapter 4 and will argue that moral knowledge is formed in a particularist rather than in a generalist fashion. This argument will eventually lead me to the claim that particular intuitions are paradigmatically moral emotions. In Chapter 5, I will develop this account in more detail by combining intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions. I will call this approach ‘affectual intuitionism’. I will show that affectual intuitionism can give us a more plausible understanding of moral intuitions than conventional, rationalist approaches of intuitionism. In addition, affectual intuitionism can also help to shed new light on the theory of motivation.


Emotions

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Affectual intuitionism rejects the dichotomy between reason and emotion that is still endorsed by most metaethicists. Most philosophers presuppose a Humean psychology in which desires and feelings can only motivate, and only beliefs can have cognitive content. Humeans or sentimentalists believe that moral convictions are grounded in feelings, which supposedly renders these convictions subjective. In contrast, Kantians or rationalists believe that there are universal moral truths which we can only know through reason. However, developments in emotion research (both from philosophy and psychology) cast doubt on the Humean dichotomy between reason and emotion. There are several contemporary moral philosophers who believe that moral emotions are a source of moral knowledge Cf. for example, Zagzebski (1999), Nussbaum (1994), Nussbaum (2001), Blum (1994), Greenspan (1995), and Little (1995). Their roots lie in the work of Aristotle. This is also the case with the intuitionists. Still, intuitionists are rationalists, and most philosophers who endorse a cognitive theory of moral emotions are not explicitly intuitionists. In the following chapters I will argue that both theories should be united. This will lead to a moral epistemology that combines the most plausible aspects of objectivism (realism) and sentimentalism (emphasis on emotions). At the same time, it avoids their unattractive features, which is a phenomenologically implausible rationalism in the case of objectivism and a morally dubious relativism in the case of sentimentalism. Affectual intuitionism states that through moral emotions, we can get direct insight into irreducible moral truths. This possibility has largely escaped metaethicists because of the dominant traditional dichotomy between reason and emotion. However, I believe it is exactly the kind of account we need in order to make sense of our moral experience.




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4

1 Introduction This chapter examines the relationship between particular and general moral judgments. In Section 2, I argue why a top-down approach is problematic. In Section 3, I discuss Jonathan Dancy’s particularist ontology and his arguments against generalist accounts of moral knowledge. My conclusion is that Dancy’s arguments against generalism in normative metaphysics are very attractive and that particular moral judgments can be justified in themselves and not only in so far as they refer to general judgments. However, in Section 4 I argue that Dancy’s particularism has to be supplemented with a theory of intuitions and emotions. Particular intuitions should be understood as noninferential judgments, and we need emotions in order to make context-sensitive ethical judgments.

2

The importance of particular moral judgments

In this section I will begin by sketching Sidgwick’s arguments for a topdown approach in moral epistemology. I will then consider the arguments against this offered by defenders of a bottom-up approach such as Ross, Prichard, Ewing, and Broad. Monism and top-down generalism: Sidgwick i


Particular Intuitions and Emotions

Top-down

Sidgwick believes that we need to appeal to general moral principles in moral epistemology. In Chapter 2 I mentioned that

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1. Particular intuitions are not always experienced as indubitable or convincing. 2. There are moral questions to which particular intuitions give no answer. 3. In comparable situations the same person often makes different judgments. 4. Different people who are equally competent also often judge differently (ME 100). Says Sidgwick: Only exceptionally confident persons find that they always seem to see clearly what ought to be done in any case that comes before them. Most of us, however unhesitatingly we may affirm rightness and wrongness in ordinary matters of conduct, yet not unfrequently meet with cases where our unreasoned judgment fails us; and where we could no more decide the moral issue raised without appealing to some more general formula, than we could decide a disputed legal claim without reference to the positive law that deals with the matter. (ME 214) Hence, according to Sidgwick, in complicated cases our unreflected intuitions might not suffice to make moral judgments. Only by finding a general principle that applies to the case before us can we determine what our moral judgment should be. Sidgwick believes that general rules have more validity or are more reliable than particular moral judgments because there is a certain level of consensus about which general moral principles are valid (ME 100). We should study commonsense and reflect on moral axioms to find out which principles should form the basis of our moral judgments (ME 214, 215). ii Monism


Sidgwick offers the following reasons against particular intuitions:

As said in Chapter 2, Sidgwick believes that such a study eventually reveals that we are always unconsciously utilitarian. This principle, Sidgwick believes, allows us to determine in each and every case the right thing to do.


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Pluralism and bottom-up generalism: Ross, Prichard, Ewing, and Broad Bottom-up

Are things really that promising for top-down generalism and monism as Sidgwick believes? Ross and other early 20th-century intuitionists do not think so. They suggest a bottom-up approach instead: It is through particular moral judgments that we can see general principles. In order to have reliable moral beliefs, we should start from particular cases. According to Ross, all moral judgments, even the general ones, are initially justified on the basis of particular judgments. The following passage from Prichard is the locus classicus of this view: if we do doubt whether there is really an obligation to originate A in a situation B, the remedy lies not in any process of general thinking, but in getting face to face with a particular instance of the situation B, and then directly appreciating the obligation to originate A in that situation. (Prichard 1912, 37) Prichard denies that we can justify particular judgments merely by reference to general principles, a view which Ross also defends. Ross rejects the idea that we understand that in a concrete situation it is right to help somebody in need, because it is an instantiation of the general principle that you have to help people in need (FE 170). He believes that it is the other way around. That is, someone learns a general moral principle after having made particular judgments. Ross believes that human beings are practical beings well before they are theoretical beings. Human beings are able to be social and to help others before they are able to engage in theoretical reflections about what is right. He refers to Aristotle who pointed out that animals are capable of social behavior (FE 169, 170). Ross speculates that certain morally right actions are probably done at a lower level of development without a consciousness of their rightness. At a more developed level, it is vaguely understood that the action fits the situation, and, at a still higher level, it can be seen that a situation demands a certain action. The judgment that the action is right is not derived from a general principle; rather, we derive the principle from particular moral judgments (FE 170). The procedure of generating a general principle that concerns a necessary truth from particular observations is called intuitive induction (FE 170; cf. also Dancy 1993, 94, 95, and 107, n. 4).


i


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Ross believes that even after having developed a general principle, we still start from particular judgments (cf. FE 171). He argues that there are only two cases in which we deduce particular judgments from general principles. The first case is that most human beings go through a phase in their moral development in which they accept a moral principle before they have judged it for themselves to be true. Some would say that we never get beyond this phase, but Ross counters this. He argues that if that would be true, we would end up in an infinite regress: Person A learned principle p from person B, B learned it from C, C from D, and so on. The only way to avoid such a regress is to allow for the possibility that somebody is able to see for him or herself that principle p is true. It might also be argued that the regress can be stopped because the principle has at a certain point been invented by somebody, for example, in order to achieve a well-ordered society or to oppress other people. This approach, though, rejects moral realism. In Chapter 1, I showed that intuitionists are realists and discussed arguments against antirealism there. The second case in which we form particular judgments from general principles is that although we may currently accept a certain principle, we have forgotten exactly how we proved it. An example would be if a general principle is not self-evident and its proof is very complicated. In such a case we might need to refer to a remembered principle to make a particular judgment. In the case of a basic, or self-evident, moral principle this is not necessary. Particular instantiations of the principle are seen as being right or wrong in themselves, without reference to the principle (FE 172, 173). Ross’s argument for bottom-up generalism is based on the phenomenology of moral experience. According to commonsense philosophy, our beliefs are justified if they are generated through a reliable belief-forming mechanism. In conclusion, if we acquire a belief in a reliable way, this is at the same time also its justification (cf. Chapter 1). ii

Pluralism

Ross, Prichard, Ewing, and Broad believe that particular moral judgments are very important for an additional reason because they believe that there is a plurality of morally relevant features. This can lead to cases in which one action excludes the other. For example, one prima facie duty tells us that we should keep our promises, another that we




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should protect people in need. We need particular moral judgments to determine which action we should perform. According to Ross and the others, there is no metaprinciple by which we could determine in advance what to do. They also deny that the different prima facie principles can be hierarchically ordered, since every situation is potentially unique. Rather, we have no choice but to look at the situation in question and determine which duty has priority. That involves looking not only at the intrinsic character of a possible act but also at the consequences and the state of affairs it produces. Whether an action fits a situation depends upon the concrete circumstances (FE 54). According to C.D. Broad it is very doubtful whether any general rules can be given for balancing one kind of fittingness against another [the fittingness or suitability of one possible action vs. another in a situation] or for balancing fittingness on the whole against utility on the whole. When it comes to estimating resulting fittingness from component fittingnesses and unfittingnesses, and to estimating total rightness from total fittingness and total utility, we are soon reduced to something analogous to those perceptual judgements of very complex situations which we have constantly to make in playing games of skill. (Broad 1951, 222, 223) The difficulty is to predict the results of an action correctly and to estimate the moral value of different outcomes (FE 173–5). We can only have secure knowledge of the moral value of aspects of situations (in so far as they are prima facie duties) and thus of general prima facie duties. Ross would agree with Sidgwick that particular judgments about complex situations, all things considered, are not a form of secure knowledge, but nevertheless, they are the best we can get. It would be self-deceiving and even fatal to try to find something more certain where certainty is not available. However, Sidgwick believes that we only have justified moral beliefs if we have a solid system of general moral principles with which we can solve all moral problems in advance. To this point, Broad would reply the following:



No doubt this is an unsatisfactory conclusion and it compares ill with the sweet simplicity of Utilitarianism. But if it is so, it is so. And perhaps we may say that Utilitarianism is at once too simple in


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According to the bottom-up intuitionists, Sidgwick’s utilitarianism and all other forms of monism and top-down generalism or strict systematization are too simplistic: Moral reality is much more complex and demands an insight into concrete situations. This does not mean that there cannot be any methodology in ethics. On the contrary, bottom-up theorists can emphasize that there is a plurality of methods, as Ewing points out: we appeal sometimes to consequences, sometimes to the character of the act proposed apart from its consequences, sometimes we argue by analogy with situations where we should be certain what it was right to do, sometimes we ask which of the alternative acts is nearest to a given ideal of conduct, or which is most in accord with the spirit of an ideal man, sometimes we simply have recourse to general laws. (Ewing 1929, 197) In short, bottom-up generalists believe that we have to start by assessing concrete moral situations. This leads us to understanding general moral principles through intuitive induction. Those general principles can help us discern morally relevant features in other situations. However, we will always have to consider the concrete case before us to make sure that we do not miss any relevant subtleties.

3

Dancy’s particularism

Jonathan Dancy has become well known for his defense of a particularist intuitionism. He goes even further than the bottom-up intuitionists: According to Dancy, there is no up level, or at least it is not of any vital importance. In this section I will discuss Dancy’s arguments against Ross’s view, with which he not only attacks Ross’s generalist epistemology but also his generalist ontology. I will also discuss Dancy’s alternative ontology and epistemology.1 Against generalism


theory and too difficult in practice to satisfy either the philosopher or the plain man for very long. (Broad 1951, 223)

The first question I wish to discuss is what the relationship is between the moral properties of particular acts and general moral rules. This question really concerns the ontology of moral properties or, as


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i A particularist ontology Dancy suggests that when talking about nonmoral properties that are the basis of moral properties, we should distinguish between contributing features and enabling conditions. Contributing features and enabling conditions are two ways in which something can be relevant to the normative status of an action. Contributing features are for example ‘right-makers’, that is, features that make an action right. Enabling conditions enable right-makers to make actions right. Dancy calls the basic normative relation ‘favoring’. This is the relationship between contributing features and an action. Right-making is one sort of counting in favor of an action; good-making and pleasantmaking might be further sorts. A right-making feature of the action of meeting my friend is that I promised to do so. The enabling relation plays a different role. If something is enabling, it means that its absence would prevent a contributing feature from favoring an action, but its absence does not itself disfavor doing the action. An enabling condition of the action of meeting my friend is that I have time to do so. A favoring feature would be that it would be fun to meet her. Dancy gives the following reason to account for this distinction: If we think that ought implies can, we think that if I cannot do it it is not true that I ought to do it. But my ability to do it need not for that reason be conceived as among the reasons why it is right for me to do it; it is merely a feature in the absence of which the things that make the proposed action right are unable to do so. (Dancy 2000c, 51) Morally relevant features can be divided into the following classes: On the one hand, there is the class of contributing features, which can be further divided into right-makers and wrong-makers; on the other hand, there is the class of enabling conditions which can be divided into those conditions that enable through absence and those that enable through presence.


Dancy prefers to call it, normative relations. I will begin with a short account of Dancy’s view on normative relations, that is, the relationship between rightness and right-makers (Subsection i). Based on this I will consider his objections against Ross’s form of generalism (Subsection ii).


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Broadly speaking, we can say that the enabling conditions are necessary but not sufficient conditions for an action to be right. Only the contributing features are part of what Dancy calls the ‘resultance base’: This is a subset of all descriptive features of the situation which includes only those properties that count directly in favor of the action (cf. Dancy 1993, Chapter 4). 2 The relationship between right-makers and rightness is not an entailment or (semi)logical relationship,3 since it would be much too indiscriminate: an action could have them without being made right thereby, and would do so if some enabling conditions were absent. (Dancy 2004b, 233) So we can say that only certain combinations of enabling conditions and contributing features constitute necessary and sufficient conditions4 for actions to be right. Dancy believes that if the right-making relation is successful then the action is made right. Something has the property of rightness because it has other features that make it right. This is what it means for an action to be right – no new metaphysical feature is created. Dancy emphasizes that it is not rightness itself that is a reason for an action, but the lower-level features that make it right. The question of whether an action is right can then be translated into ‘do the features below favor the action all things considered/overall?’ I find Dancy’s account convincing. It is a very detailed account of the relationship between base properties and resultant properties, and the other morally relevant properties and their roles. Dancy shows in more detail than the earlier intuitionists how we can reason in a particularist way. In the next subsection, I will discuss Dancy’s attack against what he takes to be the most sophisticated form of generalism, namely, that of Ross. It will become clear that Dancy’s particularist ontology raises serious problems for Rossian-style, bottom-up generalism. ii Against a prima facie account In this subsection I will focus on Dancy’s objections against Ross’s account of prima facie principles. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Ross distinguishes two kinds of duties: ‘prima facie duties’, and ‘duties proper’. A prima facie, or conditional, duty is a characteristic of a certain kind of act, for example, the keeping of a promise (RG 19).5 Such an act would be a duty proper if it did not have other properties that




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are morally relevant as well. Whether an act is a duty proper or an actual duty depends on all morally relevant sorts of acts of which it is an instantiation (RG 19, 20). If something really is our duty, Ross calls it a ‘toti-resultant attribute’ of an action (RG 28). A prima facie duty has the tendency to be our duty, so Ross calls it a ‘parti-resultant attribute’ in that it refers to a particular attribute of an act (RG 28). Ross says other important things about prima facie duties. In a concrete situation, a certain prima facie duty can be overridden by another prima facie duty, but that does not mean that the first duty does not continue to exist. In such a case we have a residual duty – to apologize, make amends – and we should have an appropriate feeling of remorse or compunction for not acting according to the first prima facie duty (RG 28).6 I have identified four arguments in Dancy’s criticism of Ross that I will discuss in turn. 1. Dancy’s first criticism of Ross’s view is that a prima facie account is too indiscriminate. To use Dancy’s terminology, on Ross’s account, all morally relevant features are part of the resultance base: rightmakers, detractors (defeated wrong-making features), defeaters (disablers), and enabling conditions. However, on Dancy’s account, only those features that count directly in favor of an action constitute the right-making base. According to Dancy, an action is made right by a combination of favoring features. It is not made right by reasons that count against it or make it less right. Dancy believes it would be strange if the wrong-making features were part of the resultance base of a right action. The resultance base is different from what makes an action right in itself because we then also take defeaters into account. 2. Dancy argues that a further problem with Ross’s account is that Ross does not offer a very illuminating account of what prima facie duties are supposed to be. Consider the following account that Ross offers: An action is a prima facie duty if it is of such a kind that it would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant. (RG 19)



According to Ross, an action is a duty proper by virtue of being of a certain type where it has no other relevant feature. But Dancy


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can we really explain the behaviour of different properties in the more normal case where there are several morally relevant properties by appeal to a case, which never exists, when there is only one? Why should a property which would decide the issue if it were the only one that mattered be one which I should care about when it is not the only one? (Dancy 1983, 540) 3. Although Ross defends a bottom-up epistemology, his ontology is generalistic in that a certain action is right because and in so far as it is an instantiation of a prima facie duty. Dancy’s objection to this is that it is very strange to have a generalistic ontology but a bottom-up epistemology. He argues that it makes more sense that an epistemology starts at the same level as the ontology that it is meant to suit. Dancy believes that Ross should reconsider his ontology rather than his epistemology. Ross’s sophisticated argument of why we should consider each case separately is that in a concrete case we never know in advance which reasons are trumped by the interplay with other reasons. According to Dancy, this indicates that the underlying ontology can best be understood in a particularist way. 4. Dancy discerns an even more important problem with Ross’s account, and that is his atomistic conception of reasons. The following is another account of what Ross takes to be a prima facie duty: An action is a prima facie duty if it is an action which tends to be a duty. (RG 28) For Ross, every reason has its own value which it brings to every situation in which it figures. However, as Dancy points out, the polarity of moral reasons (their rightness or wrongness) can not only be neutralized but also reversed by a complex interplay of morally relevant features at the overall level. This reversal cannot be captured by the notion of tendency, since tendencies seem to have irreversible polarities:


believes that this is problematic, since it cannot capture the value of something that depends on its setting. Says Dancy:

Ross fails here to show that if a property is relevant in one case, it must be relevant wherever it occurs. (Dancy 1983, 541)


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Instead, Dancy believes that reasons behave holistically: The value of a reason depends on the circumstances. Dancy has several examples to illustrate this, two of which I mention here. The first example is that you borrow a book from somebody, but then you find out that he actually stole that book from the library. On Ross’s account, not giving the book back to the person from whom you borrowed would be morally wrong, but since not returning it to the library would be even worse, you should bring it to the library. Dancy instead would say that under normal circumstances, you would be obliged to give the book back to the person you borrowed it from. However, in this specific situation you are not obliged to return it to him, but to the library instead. The second example is that somebody might have pleasure in a cruel action. On Ross’s account, the fact that somebody enjoys the action counts in its favor, but the fact that the action is cruel counts against it and trumps the fact that it gives pleasure to the agent. Dancy instead holds that although we normally think that the fact that we enjoy an action contributes to its rightness, in this case, the action is made even worse by the pleasure. It would be bad enough for somebody to do something cruel, but to feel pleasure in doing it makes it even more repulsive (Dancy 1993, 60, 61; cf. Zimmerman 1999). There are many other examples, such as a case in which you have to decide whether to tell the truth and hurt somebody, or to lie and not hurt somebody. The right choice depends on the circumstances. For example, if a not very good-looking person asks us whether we find him or her good looking, on Ross’s account, not telling the truth would be wrong but still better than hurting them. However, in this situation, it seems that not telling the truth is the right thing to do and not wrong in any respect. But in a case where we know that person A is being cheated by person B, we might have to tell A the truth and, in doing so, hurt him. However, the fact that we hurt him by telling the truth might not count against telling the truth at all, as the Rossian account would have it, again, depending on the circumstances. Or think of Kant’s classic example where a murderer asks you where his potential victim is hiding. Are you allowed to lie or not? According to Kant, lying is categorically wrong and hence you should tell the truth. Ross would instead say that although even in this case lying is wrong, protecting an innocent person is more important, and hence you are allowed to lie. Our commonsense intuition, though, says that in this case, lying is not wrong at all, but perfectly right. Dancy’s theory can account for this intuition.




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1. What is a reason in one case is the same reason in all. 2. Judgment is the attempt to determine the balance of reasons, so conceived. (Dancy 2000b, 131) Dancy calls this atomism. His own, holistic, account is instead 1. What is a reason in one situation may alter or lose its polarity in another. 2. The way in which reasons here present combine with each other is not necessarily determinable in any simple additive way. (Dancy 2000b, 132)7 Dancy says that even if there are moral reasons that invariably hold, they do so because of their specific content and not because of being reasons. Reasons can, in principle, always change polarity. While it might not happen often, it could happen to all but those few exceptions. Atomism is insensitive to context whereas a holistic approach emphasizes context sensitivity (Dancy 2000b). Dancy’s considerations about the ontology of reasons show that Ross’s bottom-up account needs revision. According to Ross, an action is right in so far as it is an instantiation of a general rule. Dancy argues that the problem with this view is that it cannot avoid atomism, and atomism can give no account of variant polarities of reasons. Thus, according to Dancy, it is not that we discover necessary (prima facie) principles through particular observations as Ross believes, it is rather that particular observations enable us to form contingent generalizations, which Dancy also calls default rules. Such an account is compatible with holism. Hence, Dancy admits that we can form generalizations and that they might be an aid in discovering salient features; he grants that the opposite claim would be against commonsense (Dancy 1993, 67). I think this aspect of his position is often neglected, and he probably does not emphasize it as much as he should to avoid objections that are supposedly directed against particularism and which in fact do not hit the mark. Dancy objects to the idea that the fact that something is an instantiation of a general principle is what makes it right.


Dancy summarizes Ross’s account of prima facie duties as follows (cf. my discussions of Ross’s ideas earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 2):


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He rejects a generalist ontology and the idea that explanations should be given in generalist terms. Consequently, if one wants to attack particularism, one should attack one or more of the claims I gave above when I cited Dancy’s holistic account. However, most generalists cite examples of supposed reasons that are invariant8 – but that there are these reasons is entirely consistent with particularism as stated before. Thus, most philosophers who argue against Dancy’s position are arguing against a straw man. For their part, generalists should show that all moral reasons are invariant, that is, all reasons that would be sufficient to cover the domain of morally relevant features (cf. Dancy 2000b). Dancy believes that such an approach is bound to fail. There is an infinite number of reasons that can be morally relevant or that can contribute to the value of an action, and since it is possible to give examples of reasons that change polarity, pure generalism is wrong. There are philosophers who accept that there are variant reasons and yet who believe that we need a core set of invariant reasons (Crisp 2000, McNaughton and Rawling 2000). Margaret Little (2000, 304) suggests that particularists are not so much against the possibility of principles than against the idea that moral reasons are codifiable. By referring to Wittgenstein’s ideas about rule-following (and I believe one should also think of his notion of family resemblance), Little argues that it is impossible to give a complete account of which nonmoral features can be the basis for which moral features (Little 2000, 283, 284). The first reaction many have when they hear the particularist’s banner cry is that it is surely exaggerated: surely some moral principles survive scrutiny. Seemingly clear-cut cases spring to mind: surely rape, for instance, is always cruel. But the case of rape is a good example of the point at issue here. If we really mean ‘rape’ to be a nonmoral concept (so that this principle is indeed a case of codifying relations at the tier between moral and nonmoral features), then it is something that is cruel or unjust only against a certain kind of context – one which, of course, obtains in our society all too widely. It is actually very difficult to cash out that kind of context – to define the act we mean to condemn – without helping ourselves to concepts that turn out, on reflection, to be irreducibly laden with the evaluative (think of trying to isolate the instantiation conditions of consent without help of moral




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Little defends particularism at the level of thick moral properties, that is, moral properties in which descriptive features are tied to specific normative features. According to her, universal statements about the connection between descriptive and normative properties are not subtle enough to capture the complexities of situations. Still, she says that once we are at the level of intramoral properties (e.g., the relationship between thick and thin – that is, purely normative – moral properties), we can make universal statements without great problems. Indeed, many authors who defend generalism point to such principles as ‘justice is always good’ and ‘fairness is always good’ (e.g., Hooker 2000). However, Dancy believes that even at the intramoral level there might not be invariant reasons. There can be situations in which it is better not to be fair or not to be just, for example, if we show pity toward somebody who did something morally wrong. But even if there might be a set of invariant reasons, Dancy denies that this is what makes our moral thought rational. He believes that the rationality or justification of our moral judgments does not in any significant way depend on a suitable provision of invariant reasons. In other words, even if there are universals, they are not what gives a particular a certain property. Moral explanation and justification do not need to be top-down even if there is a top-level.

4

A particularist epistemology: intuitions and emotions

Dancy has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not clear. In earlier publications, Dancy mentioned the idea of ‘narrative rationality’, but in his most recent book, Ethics without Principles, epistemology does not play an important role. Still, a metaphysical particularism needs a fitting epistemology. In this section I will sketch criteria for a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy’s particularist metaphysics. However, my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims made by Dancy. I will argue that 1. particular moral knowledge is based on intuitions, and 2. we need emotions in order to have particular moral knowledge. Dancy rejects both claims, but I will argue that his arguments against these claims are not convincing.


notions like fair, or of force at the level of physical mechanics). (Little 2000, 284)


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Dancy offers a particularist epistemology in some of his earlier writings, which reflects his metaphysical ideas. In his early work (Dancy 1981, 1983), Dancy rejects the idea that it is important to form general moral beliefs, and instead we should look at each particular case individually. He argues that we should focus on the case at hand to determine the right course of action. Our particular moral judgments can be justified and rational even if we cannot point to a general moral principle. This means that rationality is not limited to a generalist approach. Rationality is concerned with more than formulating or understanding arguments with general premises. Rationality, according to Dancy, is also involved in looking at the properties of a situation and being able to understand the situation. This is what he calls ‘narrative rationality’. To illustrate his account of narrative rationality, Dancy offers two analogies, namely, the analogy with aesthetic appreciation of a visual object such as a work of art or a building, and the analogy with a story. According to Dancy, in the case of appreciating the salient features of a building, [t]here is no thought that such features will be generally salient; they matter here and that is enough. (Dancy 1983, 546) As to the analogy with understanding stories, Dancy claims that we have to understand the ‘narrative aspects’ of the situation, namely, by imagining the situation as a story and thinking which action would be appropriate. Rationality here is not to be seen as essentially related to the ability to construct or respond to arguments. It is more like the ability to listen to and appreciate a story. (Dancy 1993, 114) Unfortunately, Dancy has not developed this idea of narrative rationality in much detail. His most recent book, Ethics without Principles is almost completely concerned with metaphysical issues. Chapter 8, ‘Knowing Reasons’, discusses the features that a particularist epistemology should and should not have. Furthermore, in this chapter Dancy rejects some possible accounts for a particularist epistemology, among which a moral sense and foundationalism. However, I will argue that these two possibilities actually fit the constraints that Dancy formulates for a particularist epistemology very well, and they help elucidate


Constraints on a particularist epistemology


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moral judgement is not conceived as a form of inference from premises to conclusions; to say, ‘that would be cruel, and so it would be wrong’ is to say, ‘that would be cruel, and would be wrong for that reason’. ... practical reasoning is not inference either; the movement of thought from ‘that would be cruel’ to ‘I shall not do it’ is a movement from a relevant consideration to a decision. (Dancy 2004a, 141) Hence, a major feature of a particularist epistemology is that moral judgment and practical reasoning are noninferential. Dancy also says the following: The holism of reasons dictates a non-atomistic approach to such basic normative knowledge. To recognize an instance of favouring, more is required than just gazing at it in a receptive frame of mind. We need to bear in mind the presence of enablers, the absence of possible disablers, the absence of disablers for the enablers, and so on. ... Given that the cycle of enablers and disablers may continue indefinitely, are we ever going to be in a position to determine how things actually are in the world of reasons? This sort of worry needs to be firmly put aside, on pain of driving us to overall moral (and other) skepticism. (Dancy 2004a, 142) Dancy goes on to say that we do not need to know everything that might or even does make a difference. He mentions the analogy with a chess player who is skilled enough to focus on those features of a game that are salient for her next move. This idea leads Dancy to believe that on a particularist account, moral experience is more like knowledge-how than knowledge-that. He bases his claim on equating knowledge-that with general knowledge. Dancy rejects this on particularist grounds. I think the idea is that on a holist account, particular knowledge-that is by definition not helpful if we try to apply it to a new case. Hence, if we still want to make sense of moral experience on a holist account it can only be knowledge-how. As Dancy formulates it: ‘[The competent judge] is a person who can tell a difference when she


the notion of ‘narrative rationality’. We need intuitions and emotions in order to make well-grounded particular moral judgments. These are some of the constraints that Dancy puts on a particularist epistemology:


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The first of these is the ability to discern which features are playing the favouring and disfavouring roles here; our knowledge of this sort seems to be propositional, to be true knowledge-that, though this does not make it any less practical. The second is the ability to put this first sort of knowledge to use in determining how the various contributors combine here to give an overall answer to the practical question what is the thing to do. Though there are two distinct skills here, both of which issue in knowledge-that, I would say that we have both or neither. (Dancy 2004a, 143) Here, Dancy offers a couple of constraints for a particularist epistemology: Particular moral judgments involve the ability to discern important contributing features and to make overall moral judgments based on this, but the overall judgment is not an inference. An experienced moral judge is not someone who applies his earlier judgments to new cases, but is someone who is able to discern saliences in new situations. In the following paragraphs I will show why intuitions and emotions are exactly the elements we need in order to design a moral epistemology that fulfills these constraints, and I will argue why Dancy is wrong to deny this. Particularism and intuitions Dancy works in the intuitionist tradition. As discussed in Part I, the older intuitionists were all foundationalists: They held that moral knowledge is grounded in basic moral beliefs or intuitions. Dancy rejects this aspect of intuitionism. He argues against foundationalism and its appeal to basic beliefs (Dancy 2004a, 148–50). However, I will argue that a holistic normative metaphysics requires intuitive judgments. I will propose that some of the ideas of the early 20thcentury intuitionists can be helpful in developing a particularist epistemology. According to foundationalism, we can have basic and nonbasic beliefs. Nonbasic beliefs can be justified by basic beliefs, basic beliefs cannot (or need not) be justified by any other beliefs as they are justified in


comes across it’ (Dancy 2004a, 143). This passage concerns the kinds of skills we need to bring to a new case as experienced moral judges. This is what Dancy says about the kinds of skills we need to determine a specific case (in contrast to the experience we bring with us):


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1. Basic moral beliefs (concerning basic moral facts9) are not epistemological atoms. 2. A basic belief can be confirmed or weakened by a nonbasic belief. 3. We can be aware of nonbasic facts before we become aware of the basic facts. 4. Basic knowledge requires concepts that concern nonbasic facts. 5. Basic moral beliefs do not stand alone but include the claim ‘that the action is (overall) right’. I do not believe that these are convincing arguments against foundationalism. Foundationalists do not need to say that basic moral beliefs ‘stand alone’ (points 1 and 5), they only say that we do not need other beliefs in order to be justified in holding basic moral beliefs. Concerning point 2, recall from my Chapter 1 that all intuitionists are fallibilists. Basic beliefs are not immune to refutation, be it through basic or nonbasic beliefs. Points 3 and 4 instead concern the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to have basic moral beliefs, but they do not concern the justification of basic moral beliefs. Furthermore, Reid argues that we can also intuit nonbasic moral beliefs directly (Reid 1969b, 376; cf. Chapter 1). Some moral beliefs can be justification-wise overdetermined. It is very important to pinpoint which kinds of moral beliefs one takes to be basic. Dancy seems to take beliefs concerning contributing features to be basic. I, however, believe that it makes sense to take overall moral judgments to be basic or intuitive. I will argue for this by consulting ideas by Ross and Ewing. Ross says that we should consider all the morally relevant aspects of a concrete case, and based on those we can form an overall moral judgment. Ross believes that we should make particular judgments by looking at the nonmoral properties of a situation, which enables us to make a judgment about the resulting moral properties. To be able to make a moral judgment we must first assess the relevant nonmoral base properties as thoroughly as possible, a procedure that requires normal empirical observation. Once we have assessed the base properties, we are able to make a moral judgment (cf. Ross 1927, 127; Ewing 1929, 185 ff.; Prichard 1912, 28). The moral judgment is not an inference from these observations, but it needs


themselves. The reasons Dancy gives to show how his account differs from foundationalism are (Dancy 2004a, 148 ff.):


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Schema 1: 1. is1 2. is2 3. is3 .... n. isn ~~~~ ought Or more explicitly as follows: Schema 1’: 1. Situation x is a. 2. Situation x is b. 3. Situation x is c. .... n. Situation x is z. ~~~~ In situation x, person p ought to f. Schemas 1 and 1’ can be seen as ways by which we form judgments concerning contributing features. By these schemas I try to capture the idea that by observing as many of the relevant descriptive facts of a situation as possible, we prepare ourselves to form a normative judgment. However, that judgment is not a logical inference from the descriptive judgments since we cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. Hence the ~~ line instead of a straight line in a logical inference. The descriptive judgments are not premises in an argument. Instead, they are preliminaries that enable us to form a moral judgment (cf. Prichard 1912). In the spirit of Dancy’s remarks that I discussed in Section 2 we can say that it requires experience and knowledge-how to pick out salient preliminaries. Ewing also says the following about these preliminaries: They are ‘the arguments and data that help us arriving at, but do not, as we have seen, prove the truth of, our intuition’ (Ewing 1929, 187, n. 1). By intuition Ewing means ‘knowledge otherwise than by mediate inference or by mere observation’ (Ewing 1929, 186). Ewing also says something similar concerning evaluative judgments of organic wholes. He believes that we first have to perceive the values


them as input. The procedure might be illustrated in the following schema:


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Schema 2: 1. is1 ~ ought1/value1 2. is2 ~ ought2/value2 3. is3 ~ ought3/value3 .... n. isn ~ oughtn/valuen ~~~~ oughtoverall/valueoverall Or to make this idea more suitable to Dancy’s terminology: Schema 2’: 1. contributing feature1 2. contributing feature 2 3. contributing feature 3 .... n. contributing feature n ~~~~ reasonoverall Schemas 2 and 2’ illustrate how we assess the overall value of something on a holistic account. Hence, there are two ways in which moral beliefs can be basic: (a) by bridging the is–ought gap (schemas 1 and 1’), and (b) by assessing the overall value of complex situations (given a holistic account; schemas 2 and 2’). According to Ewing, making an assessment in this way is not an additive process, and this is also emphasized by Dancy. Ewing argues that such an assessment can best be described as an intuition, that is, in the sense of a noninferential judgment. These schemas (especially 2’) illustrate exactly what Dancy says about particular moral judgments (cf. Section 2): We first have to asses the contributing features and then make an overall judgment, which is not an inference from these features. Dancy gives us a much more detailed and sophisticated account of the various roles that different contributing features can play than do Ross or Ewing, but the general idea is still the same. If we understand the notion intuition as Ewing does, namely,


of the parts to determine the value of the whole. However, since Ewing is a holist in terms of values, he also believes that this determination cannot be a direct inference but must be an intuition. We can illustrate this as follows:


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as noninferential (overall) normative judgment, then I see no reason why Dancy should reject this notion. So far I have discussed the notion ‘intuition’ as a formal notion, that is, in the sense of noninferential judgment. In the next section I will flesh out which capacities are involved in forming particular intuitions. Particularism and emotions Dancy rejects the possibility that particular moral judgments involve a moral sense, or what he calls our ‘sensitive abilities’ (Dancy 2004a, 143–6). He contrasts cognitive abilities with sensory and appetitive abilities (desires) and claims that overall moral judgments only involve our cognitive capacities (Dancy 2004a, 144). Instead, I will argue that we need more than purely cognitive abilities in making particular moral judgments. Let us first take a close look at Dancy’s arguments. One of his arguments is that we do not need a moral sense ‘since moral reasons are not relevantly different from other reasons’ (Dancy 2004a, 143). He goes on to wonder whether we might then need a ‘normative sense that renders us capable of discerning instances of normative relations such as the favouring relation’ (ibid). Dancy denies this possibility. He says that it is through judgment, not through sensibility that we recognize reasons. Before we go on, let us pause to examine what Dancy means by a ‘normative sense’. I think that there are three possibilities. 1. Those philosophers who defended the existence of a ‘moral sense’ used this notion metaphorically, in order to refer to our ability to feel sympathy.10 Our feelings of sympathy reveal moral insights that in a way are more closely related to sense perception than to purely rational knowledge. However, in fact, Dancy has stated in conversation11 that he is not concerned with emotions at all in this passage. By ‘moral’ or ‘normative’ sense he refers to sense perception as opposed to rational knowledge, and by ‘desires’ he does not mean to invoke talk of emotions either. It is unclear what Dancy might instead have in mind. I can conceive of two further possibilities, neither of which are convincing. 2. A normative or moral sense could be an additional sense organ. This view has been attributed to intuitionists by many of their critics. However, this is nothing more than a straw man. As argued before,




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most of the earlier intuitionists were rationalists. Those intuitionist who explicitly mentioned a moral sense either meant our ability to have moral insights, whatever they may be, or they referred to option 1, sympathy (cf. Hudson 1967). 3. A normative or moral sense could be a form of regular sense perception. Normative or moral perception would then be a form of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, or smelling. This possibility seems highly implausible. Even a reductionist would probably deny that moral insights are nothing more than seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling, or a combination of these. Equally, even if this position were possible, it would not suit a nonreductionist account such as Dancy’s. He could then reject it for those reasons and would not need to go into the kind of argument that he as a matter of fact provides for in this passage, and which I will discuss in more detail below. Given the fact that it is unclear what Dancy has in mind when discussing a normative sense, let me go on to discuss his argument using the following strategy: Consider a moral sense as a black box, only assuming that it is something that is not (purely) cognitive. I will argue that Dancy’s argument is not convincing even by this charitable reading. Nothing he says poses a serious threat to the first possibility of how to understand the moral sense, namely, our ability to feel sympathy. The other two possibilities are not serious options for different reasons, as outlined above. Dancy argues against an account of a moral sense as follows: Is this capacity to judge a purely cognitive capacity? The cognitive is contrasted with the sensory and the appetitive. We have decided that the capacity to judge is not sensory (whether we approve of some general distinction between cognitive and sensory or not). It may not be sensory, but that capacity might still be appetitive. ... There are, then, three apparently distinct things to be accommodated: desire, motivation, and the recognition of a reason. How are we to map these three elements relative to each other? (Dancy 2004a, 144)


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This is a complicated passage. First of all, who contrasts the cognitive with the sensory and the appetitive? This is highly controversial. Again, it is not clear what Dancy has in mind here when he talks about the sensory. A mental state can be cognitive while also being


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a state of sense perception, whether one has regular sense perception in mind (cf. Reid 1969a) or whether one thinks of sympathy as a source of moral understanding. There is no a priori reason to think that if there might be a moral sense in the spirit of option 2, a sensory state might not also be cognitive. Since I do not believe that options 2 and 3 are feasible for different reasons, let us focus on option 1, sympathy. Dancy’s argument would only be effective against noncognitivist versions of a moral sense as sympathy, but the idea of a moral sense does not entail noncognitivism. Admittedly, most moral philosophers assume a division of labor between cognitive, sensitive, and appetitive as Dancy sketches. However, this is a very contested view by contemporary philosophers and psychologists who study emotions. Defenders of cognitive theories of emotions do not agree with such a contrast between cognitive, conative, and affective states. I will come back to this further on. The next claim is controversial as well: ‘[w]e have decided that the capacity to judge is not sensory’. It is unclear on which argument that decision has been based. The preceding paragraph does not provide an argument for this view; rather, it presupposes that our sensory ability and our ability to judge are exclusive categories: My own view is that, though we can indeed discern reasons across the board, our ability to do it is not sensory; it is not sensibility that issues in the recognition of reasons (though sensibility may be required along the way). It is rather our capacity to judge that is at issue. (Dancy 2004a, 144) The remark between parenthesis which follows is also highly controversial: ‘whether we approve of some general distinction between cognitive and sensory or not’. Dancy seems to suggest that it is irrelevant for this issue whether one assumes such a distinction or not. However, I would think that it makes an important difference, since Dancy’s argument hinges on this distinction. If we do not accept it, Dancy’s argument becomes void, no matter which account of a moral sense one has in mind. In any case, a cognitive theory of emotions rejects such a distinction between cognitive and sensory states as exclusive categories. Dancy goes on to consider whether desires play a role in moral judgments. He eventually rejects this since there are degrees of motivation or desires, and even though there are also degrees of recognition they are not ‘degrees of the same thing’ (Dancy 2004a, 145). However, here




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again a cognitive theory of emotions can provide a solution. In terms of a cognitive theory of emotions, we do not need to say that the conative aspect has to be identical to the cognitive aspect of a moral judgment. While one aspect may vary, the other may remain constant, or vary in a different way (cf. Zagzebski 2003). I will come back to this in the next chapter. In any case, Dancy’s argument is as follows: It is not sensitivity that gives us normative insights, nor is it desires, so it must be cognition. However, this is philosophically controversial. There are states that comprise all these kinds of mental states, namely, emotions. The fact that Dancy presupposes a philosophy of mind in which all these states are neatly separated precludes a straightforward solution to the puzzle he has construed. I will argue that a cognitive theory of emotions provides for exactly the kind of epistemology that we need for particularism, given the constraints that Dancy formulates and which I discussed earlier on. A cognitive theory of emotions allows for the idea that emotions are states that have affective, conative, and cognitive aspects at the same time.12 Note that, for example, the psychologist Robert Zajonc – famous for his defense of the existence of pure feeling states in the predominantly cognitivist research environment of psychology of emotion – only claims that there are at least some affective states that are not cognitive (Zajonc 1984). Thus, rather than taking the radical division between cognitive and affective states as a starting point, as most moral philosophers do, many psychologists of emotion take a cognitive theory of emotions as the default. At most, they try to show that noncognitive affective states might also exist. The psychologist Klaus Scherer says the following: There now seems to be a growing consensus among emotion theorists that emotion is best treated as a psychological construct consisting of several aspects or components: a) the component of cognitive appraisal or evaluation of stimuli and situations, b) the physiological component of activation or arousal, c) the component of motor expression, d) the motivational component, including behavior intentions or behavioral readiness, and e) the component of subjective feeling state. (Scherer 1984, 294)


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On this account emotions are a form of cognition, which allows for the possibility that moral insight is based on sympathy while at the same


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time being a form of objective, nonreductive moral knowledge. I will explore this idea in more detail in Chapter 5. Here I will show how a cognitive theory of emotions fits exactly with the requirements Dancy formulates for a particularist epistemology. According to some cognitive theories of emotions in philosophy, emotions are judgments of value (Solomon 1993, Nussbaum 2001, Zagzebski 2003). Translated into Dancy’s terminology, emotions are necessary for judging the contributory level as well as the overall level. Emotions can be moral knowledge-how and moral knowledge-that. All this fits exactly with Dancy’s requirements. Concerning the contributory level, a typical feature of emotions is that they help us to focus on what is morally relevant in a concrete situation. They are perceptions of morally salient features (Blum 1994). Margaret Little gives a very illuminating example: Think of what is really involved in seeing what is morally relevant. Often it means noticing what is not present: noticing that a student is not in class; spotting in a busy crowd that a child, though surrounded with adults, is not accompanied by any of them. (Little 1995, 121) According to Little, we need affective states to pick out the salience or the Gestalt of a moral situation: The extent to which one actually cares about and is responsive to moral ends, then, has enormous impact on how accurately and reliably one sees the moral landscape, because what one is attentive to is deeply influenced by what one cares about. (Little 1995, 123) Hence, an experienced sympathetic moral judge knows how and on what to focus in a new case (knowing-how). Emotions also give us epistemic access to the overall level (knowingthat). In the words of Martha Nussbaum: most of the time emotions link us to items that we regard as important for our well being, but do not fully control. The emotion records that sense of vulnerability and imperfect control. (Nussbaum 2001, 43)




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When I grieve, I do not first of all coolly embrace the proposition, ‘My wonderful mother is dead,’ and then set about grieving. No, the real, full recognition of that terrible event (as many times as I recognize it) is the upheaval. It is ... like putting a nail into your stomach. ... Knowing can be violent, given the truths that are there to be known. (Nussbaum 2001, 45) Hence, emotions are states that are cognitive and affective at the same time, and they are noninferential, normative judgments. We can understand emotions as fulfilling the role of noninferential judgments or intuitions that I illustrated in the schemas earlier on. They bridge the is–ought gap and they let us make context-sensitive, holistic moral judgments. Paradigmatically, particular moral intuitions are emotions. On a purely rationalist account, sense can be made of a generalist top-down approach which states that through reason we see general moral principles and we then apply them to particular cases. However, it is hard to see how a rationalist moral epistemology would fit with a particularist account such as Dancy’s. Purely cognitive, rational states seem to be suited to the insight of necessary and general principles such as in mathematics. But a rationalist owes us an account of how purely rational states help to discern particular moral saliences. Cognitive accounts of emotions offer exactly that. So it seems that the burden of proof is with the rationalist. However, empirical research indicates that the rationalist will have a hard time to provide for such an account. The neuropsychologist Antonio Damasio has studied people who, due to certain brain defects, lack the ability to feel emotions. They appear perfectly rational and know general moral principles but are unable to make particular moral judgments and concrete practical decisions (Damasio 1994).

5 Conclusion


Nussbaum, in my eyes correctly, claims that the cognitive aspect of an emotion cannot be separated from the experience of the emotion:

In this chapter, I have reviewed and critically evaluated the main arguments in the discussion between top-down and bottom-up intuitionists. I have argued that Dancy’s particularism is a plausible and fruitful development of intuitionism. However, the discussion of particularism shows that the conventional, rationalist account of intuitions is not


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plausible. Particular intuitions are paradigmatically moral emotions that are cognitive and affective at the same time. A cognitive theory of emotions allows for the idea that moral experience is based on emotions without making ethics subjective. With properly functioning moral agents, moral experience initially takes place in particular situations and through sympathy. Our ability to feel sympathy can be understood as a ‘moral sense’ since it provides us with experiential moral knowledge. We imagine how it must be to be in the situation of another person and we try to imagine what he or she is feeling. Feeling angry about a certain action enables us to properly understand what is wrong with it. Without affective states we would not have cognitive access to the particular moral facts. These ideas fit nicely with Dancy’s notion of ‘narrative rationality’. Sympathy enables us to capture the meaning of events in people’s lives and to determine what would be appropriate to do to others in their concrete circumstances. In the next chapter I will develop these ideas in more detail.




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5

1 Introduction I ended the discussion in Chapter 4 with the claim that emotions are needed for moral knowledge, especially for particular moral knowledge. In this chapter I will discuss these ideas in more detail. I will argue that emotions are epistemological tools in our discovery of objective moral truths. This requires a different theory of emotions than the ones generally presupposed by Humeans and rationalists. This different theory of emotions rejects the dichotomy between reason and emotion that Humeans and rationalists take for granted. In this theory, we should understand emotions as states that comprise cognitive and affective aspects, or as ‘felt value judgments’. This theory of emotions can be combined with ethical intuitionism to form what I call ‘affectual intuitionism’. Affectual intuitionism allows for a plausible moral epistemology by emphasizing the importance of moral emotions, and nevertheless maintaining that there are moral truths. This approach combines the attractive features of intuitionism and Humeanism while avoiding the problematic subjectivism of the latter. At the same time, it can provide for a more plausible understanding of the notion ‘intuition’. In Section 2, I discuss Reid’s theory of the moral emotions which is a more sophisticated account of emotions than those of most other intuitionists.1 However, I argue that his ideas about the role of the affective states is still too limited. He takes affective states to have a merely motivational function, namely, that they help reason to control passions and to motivate to action where reason is too weak. Reid believes that in making moral judgments we do not need to have feelings; feelings are at most a result of moral judgments. In contrast with this view, I argue


Affectual Intuitionism

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that affective states play a much greater role in practical reasoning than Reid seems to acknowledge. Emotions are needed for moral knowledge. In Section 3, I argue that ethical intuitions are paradigmatically moral emotions. This approach combines the most important features of the sentimentalist tradition (emphasis on emotions) and the rationalist tradition (objectivity): According to affectual intuitionism, moral emotions are a source of objective moral knowledge. In Section 4, I will discuss hotly debated developments in empirical psychology that claim that moral judgments are based on supposedly irrational intuitions, emotions, and gut reactions. I will argue that affectual intuitionism can provide a more plausible interpretation of these empirical findings. Moral emotions and intuitions are a source of practical rationality. In Section 5, I argue that affectual intuitionism can provide a convincing theory of motivation, by discussing Michael Smith’s famous ‘moral problem’. According to Smith, moral judgments are either objective or motivational; they cannot be both at the same time. I will dispute that there is a ‘moral problem’. Affectual intuitionism does not understand moral emotions as purely subjective feeling states but as a source of moral knowledge. Thus, our (emotional) moral judgments are objective and motivational at the same time.

2

Reid on moral emotions

Like all intuitionists, Reid is a rationalist with regard to moral judgment. However, he also gives an account of how affective states are involved in our moral life. His view of the relationship between reason and emotion is more sophisticated than that of Humeans and rationalist intuitionists. I will follow Reid’s analysis of the affective states closely. I will then suggest an alternative view that fits more naturally with his general philosophy. However, in Section 3, I will suggest that the relationship between feeling and judging is yet different from both these views. The affective states To understand the way Reid classifies the different kinds of affective states, let us look at the way he distinguishes different kinds of ‘principles of action’.



1. There are the ‘mechanical’ principles of action which require ‘no attention, no deliberation, no will’ (AP 99), such as instincts and habits.


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2. There are ‘animal’ principles of action which we share with animals. These principles are characterized as blind desires; they require intention and will, but not judgment (AP 200). 3. There are ‘rational’ principles of action which only rational beings have. Since Reid mentions no specific class of affective states in connection with the first class of principles, I will not discuss it here. I will instead discuss the different morally relevant affective states – benevolence, and moral approbation and disapprobation – and whether Reid considers them to be animal or rational principles. i

Benevolence

Benevolence, according to Reid, is an ‘animal principle’. To him, benevolence concerns feelings that we have in common with animals, or, more importantly, feelings that do not presuppose judgment or reason. Reid believes that benevolent affections are an important part of our happiness: They give us an agreeable feeling (AP 142, 143), and a life without reciprocal affections would not be worth living (AP 142). Reid believes that they are primarily directed at the well-being of others (AP 141). This means that only altruistic or other-regarding feelings count as benevolent affections. Reid distinguishes the following particular benevolent affections: the affections between parents and children and other near relationships (‘natural affections’, AP 145), gratitude to benefactors, pity and compassion toward the distressed, esteem of the wise and the good,2 friendship, sexual love, and public spirit (AP 145–55). Reid also discusses how many of these principles are paralleled among animals, although different names might be more appropriate. He does not explicitly discuss the animal equivalent of ‘public spirit’, for example, but we can think of something like ‘social feelings’. 3 According to Reid, other affections that we share with animals are malevolent affections like anger, resentment, and envy. Furthermore, there are the passions. Passions, according to Reid, are very vehement affections that can be in accordance with what conscience or reason would determine (vehement benevolent affections), but they can also be contrary to reason (in which case they are vehement malevolent affections). ii


140

Moral approbation and disapprobation

According to Reid, if we have an agreeable feeling toward a man who does a morally good action, we do not merely experience a warm


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I am likewise conscious, that this agreeable feeling in me, and this esteem of him, depend entirely upon the judgment I form of his conduct. I judge that this conduct merits esteem; and, while I thus judge, I cannot but esteem him, and contemplate his conduct with pleasure. Persuade me that he was bribed, or that he acted from some mercenary or bad motive, immediately my esteem and my agreeable feeling vanish. (AP 463) Reid believes that through reason we can see that the ends of action are one, what is good for us upon the whole, and two, what appears to be our duty. These are the ‘rational principles of action’ (AP 222). Conscience or the moral faculty, by which we discern what is our duty, is a part of reason, but it also comprises feelings that are a result of rational judgments (AP 244). We saw in the previous section that Reid believes that the benevolent affections are animal principles of action; they do not involve a rational judgment. However, the affective states that are part of conscience count as rational principles of action. These are what Reid calls moral sentiments or moral approbation and disapprobation, which are complex states that comprise a judgment and a feeling (AP 469). In more contemporary terminology we could call these ‘cognitive emotions’. Most of Reid’s contemporaries took it for granted that feeling and cognition were categorically distinct operations of the mind. In contrast, many present-day researchers of emotion also emphasize the cognitive aspects of emotions. Just like Reid, they distinguish between noncognitive feelings and cognitive emotions (what Reid calls sentiments). Hence, Reid is an emotional cognitivist avant la lettre (cf. Ledwig 2010). Our moral judgments are not, like those we form in speculative matters, dry and unaffecting, but from their nature, are necessarily accompanied with affections and feelings. (AP 238)


feeling, which has no object, but we experience affection, love, and esteem, which have the man as object. This is the case with benevolent affections. Reid believes that there are even more complex feelings:

Reid even believes that we would be deprived if our moral judgments were not accompanied by feelings (AP 239). It seems that Reid


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1. Feelings4: These do not have an intentional content and occur independently of a judgment. 2. Affections5: These have intentional content, mainly concerning moral agents, and they occur independently of a judgment. 3. Sentiments: Those comprise (a) a moral judgment, and (b) feelings6 that are the result of the judgment and are influenced by that judgment. It is not clear whether Reid believes that feelings and affections that are the result of a judgment are the same as the kinds of feelings that occur independently of a judgment, such as the benevolent affections discussed before. This raises the question of whether Reid believes that all feelings are more or less the same, but are either independent of a judgment or the result of a judgment, or whether there are two distinct classes of affections and feelings. The fact that Reid uses the same terminology in both cases seems to indicate that feelings and affections can indeed occur in both conditions, independently, or as a result of a judgment. Moral approbation and disapprobation comprise a moral judgment, affection for the persons involved, and a feeling in ourselves: [W]e approve of good actions, and disapprove of bad; and this approbation and disapprobation, when we analyze it, appears to include, not only a moral judgment of the action, but some affection, favorable or unfavorable, toward the agent, and some feeling in ourselves. (AP 238) Based on this we can formulate the following analysis of what a cognitive moral emotion is according to Reid: CME 1: A cognitive moral emotion is a complex state that is constituted by a moral judgment, positive or negative affection for the persons who are the intentional object of that judgment and of an agreeable or disagreeable feeling in ourselves. The affection and the feeling are the result of the judgment.


distinguishes at least three different kinds of affective states:

By this account of cognitive moral emotions, feelings and approbation depend on a preceding judgment (cf. the formulation in AP 244: ‘in


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What role do the affective states play and why are they important? In this subsection I will go back to the different kinds of affective states introduced above and discuss what role they play according to Reid, and why they are important. i

Benevolence

According to Reid, the prerational benevolent affections help human beings to guide their actions: [Man] is a voluntary agent long before he has the use of reason. Reason and virtue, the prerogatives of man, are of the latest growth. They come to maturity by slow degrees, and are too weak, in the greater part of the species, to secure the preservation of individuals and of communities, and to produce that varied scene of human life, in which they are to be exercised and improved. Therefore the wise Author of our being has implanted in human nature many inferior principles of action, which, with little or no aid of reason or virtue, preserve the species, and produce the various exertions, and the various changes and revolutions which we observe upon the theatre of life. (AP 138) Reid believes that benevolent affections can let us do what conscience would determine to be good or right even before we employ our reasoning faculty. If reason were perfect we would always do what is right, but in general our reason is far from perfect. The affections then, as it were, take over reason’s task to direct us toward that which is good for the human race. Therefore, it is not through reason alone but through feelings that we are directed to the right amount of work, power, and knowledge. All of these feelings are good because they promote our happiness and have a high utility. However, we can be led to strive for these goals not only by an insight into their utility but simply by desiring them. And this is not only the case concerning our own well-being but also concerning the good of other persons (AP 139). Benevolent


consequence of that judgment’), whereas the judgment seems to be made without any affective states involved (cf. Broadie 2010). I will come back to this later when I question whether this is the most convincing account of cognitive moral emotions.


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The benevolent affections planted in human nature, appear therefore no less necessary for the preservation of the human species, than the appetites of hunger and thirst. (AP 144) As stated before, according to Reid, our affections can be so vehement that we call them passions (AP 177, 178). This can be problematic if they lead us to do something that is contrary to reason, but they can be very useful if they are in accordance with what reason would prescribe (AP 182, 183). When there is no impropriety in it, much more when it is our duty, passion aids reason, and gives additional force to its dictates. (AP 183) In these cases, the passions can even enable people to do things that are good for others, that they otherwise would not do: Sympathy with the distressed may bring them a charitable relief, when a calm sense of duty would be too weak to produce the effect. (AP 183) Furthermore, passions play a vital role in our ability to sympathize with the feelings of others; through them we are able to interpret the facial or bodily expressions of other persons ‘previous to all experience’ (AP 185). Thus, passions are a form of very basic communication. To summarize, affections that are calm in nature and in accordance with what is morally good are useful as they allow humans to behave in the right way without having to use their reasoning faculty. These are the benevolent affections. On the other hand, passions can either be good or bad. If they incline us to do something that we would judge to be morally wrong by our reason, then they are malevolent affections and can be very hurtful. But if the passions are strong feelings that push us to do something that reason would approve of, then they are even better able than reason in motivating, as much in the interpersonal realm as in the personal realm where we might strive for intellectual, artistic, or other forms of excellence.


affections help us to do things without which the human race would perish:


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Moral approbation and disapprobation

According to Reid, conscience is an ‘intellectual’ and ‘active’ power at the same time. Conscience not only gives us the knowledge of what is morally right or good but is also a rational principle of action. It tells us what our duty is and motivates us accordingly (AP 255). The moral sentiments, moral approbation and disapprobation, have the same role as benevolent affections: Being affective states, they have a much stronger force to motivate than the moral judgments of which they are a result. Reid believes that reason is often overruled by passion: Epicurus reasoned acutely and justly to show, that a regard to our present happiness should induce us to the practice of temperance, justice and humanity. But the bulk of mankind cannot follow long trains of reasoning. The loud voice of the passions drowns the calm and still voice of reasoning. Conscience commands and forbids with more authority, and, in the most common and most important points of conduct, without the labour of reasoning. Its voice is heard by every man, and cannot be disregarded with impunity. (AP 244, 245) Rational judgment, which is present in every perception of the moral faculty, can by itself not always prevail above our more egoistic passions (AP 248). Moral sentiments are more able to do so, and that is why they play such an important role in our conscience, namely, in supporting our moral judgment to direct our conduct. Good conduct in others makes us happy, but what makes us most happy is our own good conduct (AP 242). Bad conduct in others causes painful sympathy, but bad conduct in ourselves causes remorse (AP 242, 243). Reid even believes that life that is not in accordance with conscience is almost impossible to endure (AP 245). He believes that the fact that our happiness is so severely affected by our moral self-esteem supports us in trying to lead a good life. Reid’s view is too limited


ii

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Emotions do not have a high status for many philosophers: They are taken to be part of the ‘animalic instincts’ of human beings and should be controlled by reason, which is considered to be superior.7 Christine Korsgaard calls this psychological model the ‘combat model’, which


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means that reason and passion are in combat in a person, struggling for control (Korsgaard 1999, 1, 2). However, in Reid’s account, reason and affective states work together. Conscience is constituted by the ability to make moral judgments and by the different kinds of affective states that are the result of moral judgments. The judgmental role of conscience is part of reason, and the affective role of conscience is part of our affective nature. We saw above that Reid believes that affective states (feelings, affections, and emotions) can often be very helpful as they are better able than reason to motivate us to act. This is because although reason is an active power, it is not always able to prevail above the egoistic passions that are much stronger in their motivating force. Affective states can help to suppress egoistic feelings and to give us enough motivating force to direct us toward the good. Michael Pritchard discusses the different roles the passions play in Reid’s and in Hume’s work. He concludes that the advantage of Reid’s position is that in the case of both the self-regarding and the moral sentiments, reason and feeling are inseparable. It follows, therefore, that desires and emotions can be criticized and guided and are not merely blind driving forces (Pritchard 1978, 296). However, Reid does not allow for the affective states to work as, or to be of any help to, an intellectual power. He argues that although the affective states are superior in their motivating power, it is reason that is not only superior in making judgments, but is even the sole faculty in making judgments. In Reid’s view, reason seems to be able to make moral judgments independently of affective states. Reason is needed to discover principles of action ‘to which all our animal principles should subordinate’; these are the rational principles of action (AP 202). Reason is the ‘power of judging what we ought, and what we ought not to do’ (AP 461). In his general epistemology, Reid analyses perception as follows: First, there is a sensation (caused by an object acting in some way on our body), and following this we make a judgment. This judgment includes the belief that the sensed object exists, but more specifically, it will examine the object’s properties, such as its color, shape, texture, and so on. Perception thus comprises sensing and judging, but the causal relationship between the two is that sensation precedes judgment (cf. AP 462, 463). This leads Alexander Broadie to write that Reid’s account of the moral sense parallels, to a certain degree, that of the external senses: In both these perceptions the ingredients are conception, judging, and sensing (or feeling). However, in each perception the


146


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order between sensing and judging is different. In moral perception, according to Reid, judgment comes first and is more important than feeling. Feeling is important in moral perception as a motivation for acting. But in external senses, the function of judgment is to obtain reliable information about the world in which we live through seeing, hearing, and so on (Broadie 2010). Reid’s view comes close to what Korsgaard calls the ‘constitutional model’ (analogous to Plato’s idea of the person in the Republic), where each part of the person has different tasks but are unified in rational agents. This is the model Korsgaard favors in place of the combat model. She summarizes the constitutional model as follows: Appetite makes a proposal. Reason decides whether to act on it or not. Spirit carries reason’s decision out. (Korsgaard 1999, 7) In Reidian terms the ‘animal principles’ would be the appetite, where reason indeed decides what to do. The moral emotions (spirit) are there to motivate the agent to act accordingly. Margaret Little has a much more derogatory name for what Korsgaard calls the constitutional model: Little calls it the ‘bureaucratic model’. On that model, moral agency involves a clear division of labor; reason is responsible for coming to moral verdicts; it then passes its report on to the will, motivation, or emotion, which then does or does not issue the appropriate response. (Little 1995, 113) Little believes that this model is not a correct characterization of the relationship between reason and emotion. She argues for a less bifurcated account. In Reid’s approach indeed, the fight between the superior reason and stronger passions is still presupposed. 8 But the moral emotions are out there to bridge the gap between judging and motivation: On the one hand, they are based on rational judgments; on the other hand, they are affective states and hence better able to motivate our actions than reason. It is due to our moral emotions that our rational moral judgments are generally able to guide our actions. Reid’s acknowledgment that there are also affective states that involve judgments is an important achievement. However, it is still the case that he considers emotions as inferior to knowledge and reflection. The




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affective states are at most the result of a rational moral judgment; they are not a source of moral knowledge. As we saw above, to Reid the judgment comes first in moral perception, and the feeling merely follows (this is the CME 1 account). We also saw that Reid believes that certain feelings, such as the benevolent affections, can exist without judgment. It is surprising that he did not connect these different classes of affective states in the following way: The (prerational) affections evoke certain judgments, and the judgments reinforce the feelings or give rise to other kinds of feelings. An alternative elucidation of cognitive moral emotions could be the following: CME 2: A cognitive moral emotion is a complex state that is constituted by a moral judgment, positive or negative affection for the persons who are the intentional object of that judgment and of an agreeable or disagreeable feeling in ourselves. A feeling is the input that gives rise to the judgment which in turn gives rise to other feelings. On a CME 2 account, the feeling is not the result of the judgment (as on a CME 1 account), but the other way around: The judgment is the result of the feeling.9 Feelings enable us to make a judgment, and the judgment can reinforce these feelings or give rise to other feelings. Feeling and judging are then as it were embedded in each other and relate to each other. It is somewhat surprising that Reid did not adopt a CME 2 account himself. We can even say that it seems much stranger to suppose that the prerational and the rational affective states should not stand in a causal relationship at all. Rational beings can experience prerational affections, but these affections should naturally lead to a rational evaluation. Reid could easily have defended such an account himself. But, apparently, despite his high esteem of emotions in certain respects, he was still too ‘rationalistically prejudiced’ and too afraid of a Humean subjectivism to allow the emotions to play such an important role. Reid may have feared that basing moral judgments on feeling would undermine moral realism or give our moral knowledge too contingent a base (cf. Essay V, chapter VII in AP, especially AP 480). But why should our feelings be more contingent than our rational judgments? Why can we not perceive real existing moral qualities by feeling, just as we can perceive real existing natural


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qualities through sensing them? Reid could have adopted a version of moral sentimentalism combined with realism in which moral qualities would not depend on feelings. Instead, Reid thought that it is only by reason that we can obtain objective moral knowledge. In his general epistemology, Reid always emphasized that we cannot defend the greater reliability of one kind of knowledge above another. So we can actually say that consistency should have forced Reid to defend a CME 2 account.

3

Affectual intuitionism: intuitions as emotions

There is yet another possible account of cognitive moral emotions. CME 3: A cognitive moral emotion is a complex state that is constituted by a moral judgment, positive or negative affection for the persons (or acts or states of affairs) who are the intentional object of that judgment, and of an agreeable or disagreeable feeling in ourselves. Without the affective aspects we would not be able to fully appreciate the moral value of a situation. On a CME 3 account, feeling and judging cannot be separated; they are two sides of the same coin. On a CME 3 account, we can understand (moral) emotions as ‘felt value judgments’.10 This means that moral emotions are at the same time both value judgments and affective states.11 According to some cognitive theories of emotions, emotions can be defined solely by their cognitive aspect; on such a view, affect is not an essential feature of emotions (cf. Solomon 1993, Nussbaum 2001). However, affect does seem to be a central feature of emotions (cf. Pugmire 1998, Solomon 2003). A plausible theory of emotions should avoid pure sentimentalism as much as pure cognitivism. This approach would help to make more sense of intuitionism and of the importance of particular moral judgments as defended in Chapter 4. It would also allow for a better account of the relationship between cognition and motivation, as I will argue in Section 5. By understanding emotions as unities of affective and cognitive aspects, such an approach does justice to the emotional-cognitivist idea that emotions are value judgments, but it also incorporates the commonsensical insistence that emotions are affective states of some sort. This is the view that I endorse (e.g., Roeser 2009) and that I will develop in more detail in the remainder of this chapter.




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Emotions are intentional states that incorporate beliefs. Many philosophers of emotions have argued that we cannot make sense of emotions such as fear, joy, or love without reference to beliefs and intentional objects. Moral emotions are focused on moral aspects of situations. They let us see salient features of situations that purely rational states would easily overlook. Emotions help us to be practically rational. Emotions shape the way we see the world in an evaluative sense. An account of emotions as cognitive and affective states allows for the possibility that paradigmatically, moral emotions are normative, veridical, appropriate; emotions are states that track evaluative features of the world. We paradigmatically experience emotions such as anger, outrage, or sympathy when we make moral judgments. In paradigmatic moral emotions, we cannot separate the feeling aspect from the cognitive aspect. They are two sides of the same coin. An example is feeling ‘pangs of guilt’. Feeling the ‘pangs’ and judging that we did something wrong go hand in hand and cannot be separated. Together they constitute the emotion ‘guilt’. Feeling guilt without believing that one did something wrong is pathological and parasitic on paradigmatic guilt. Other examples of such states that have both affective and cognitive aspects are as follows: ‘It is horrible that the Taliban shun practically all human rights for women in Afghanistan,’ or, ‘She made such a racist comment against him, disgusting.’ These statements are judgments; they imply the claim to be true. Still, at the same time, these judgments express a feeling in which judgment and feeling cannot be separated. One’s opinion that the sexist practices of the Taliban are condemnable is formed by one’s sympathy for the women who are their victims and by imagining the suffering and humiliation they are experiencing. Hence, such an emotional condemnation has the character of a propositional attitude (‘X is morally wrong’), but it also involves affective states, such as abhorrence. To say that emotions are affective and cognitive at the same time does not deny that cognitive and affective states can exist separately. For example, moods are noncognitive affective states. However, paradigmatic moral emotions comprise both aspects. We should further distinguish between dispositional – momentarily not felt, but potentially feelable – emotions, such as the love for


Emotions as felt value judgments


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in order to ‘see’ the moral landscape clearly, in order to discern it fully and properly, one must have certain desires and emotions. Caring, being outraged, being motivated to act – all these are part of discerning moral features clearly. The ideal epistemic agent herself would have appropriate affect, for it is needed if one is to discern all that there is to see. (Little 1995, 127) Lawrence Blum (1994) emphasizes that the perception of morally salient features is mainly predeliberative and emotional: Two people can see the same facts, but they do not get the same information from them. Only somebody who cares about certain moral issues can be receptive to the relevant aspects of situations. As Martha Nussbaum puts it, there will be certain contexts in which the pursuit of intellectual reasoning apart from emotion will actually prevent a full rational judgment. (Nussbaum 1994, 41)

Ethical intuitions as emotions Let us now see how this approach can be integrated into ethical intuitionism. By understanding moral emotions as (potentially) felt value judgments, we can combine the Humean idea that emotions are crucial for our moral lives with the intuitionist idea that moral judgments are truth-apt. Moral emotions such as sympathy, empathy, compassion, shame, and guilt provide us with access to the moral value of a situation, action, or person. Moral emotions understood as (potentially) felt value judgments can play the role that intuitions and basic moral beliefs play for traditional intuitionists. If someone asks you, ‘How do you know that this object in front of your eyes is red?,’ we might only be able to say, ‘Because I can see it.’ Analogously, if somebody asks you, ‘How do you know that lying is wrong?,’ after a long discussion, all we might be able to say is, ‘Because it just feels so wrong to me.’


our partner, and occurrent emotions, which we do feel at a specific moment (cf. Wollheim 1999). To do justice to this distinction we could call emotions ‘(potentially) felt value judgments’. As Little points out, without feelings and emotions, we would not be able to see certain morally relevant features:


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I take moral emotions to be regress stoppers in a similar sense as basic beliefs in foundationalism (cf. Chapter 1, Section 4). The fact that moral emotions are seldom the result of a deductive argument is not a weakness. Moral emotions are fundamental moral experiences on which we can base further moral reasoning. We can understand moral emotions in the same way as intuitionists understand moral intuitions. However, the idea that moral intuitions are emotions can give us a much richer understanding of moral intuitions. As we have seen earlier, ethical intuitionism was an extremely contested moral epistemology during the second half of the 20th century. For example, J.L. Mackie called intuitionism a ‘travesty of our moral thinking’ and John McDowell referred to it as a ‘bogus epistemology’. When trying to elucidate ethical intuitions, Prichard uses the formulation ‘an act of moral thinking’. He contrasts it with an act of providing an argument, which he explicitly calls a ‘process of non-moral thinking’ (Prichard 1912, 29). Instead, an ‘act of moral thinking’ is an ‘immediate (or direct) apprehension’ of an obligation, for example (Prichard 1912, 28). The problem with these formulations is that they are not very illuminating, which might invite the suspicion that intuitionism is indeed a ‘bogus epistemology’. The idea of emotions as felt value judgments, as developed in the previous section, gives us a better understanding of the notion intuition. Moral emotions are well suited to particular moral judgments. As Zagzebski (2003) argues, moral knowledge starts from concrete, emotional experiences, from where we form more general moral judgments by ‘thinning’ out the initial, emotional judgment. General moral judgments are either less intensely felt, or not felt at all. As discussed in Chapter 4, most intuitionists emphasize a bottom-up approach to moral knowledge: We initially make particular moral judgments, based on which we can form more general moral judgments. However, as mentioned previously, intuitionists do not acknowledge the importance of affective states in this process. Just as rational intuitionists have argued about rational intuitions, moral emotions understood as felt value judgments cannot always be scrutinized by inferential argumentation. However, moral emotions as felt value judgments are open to other kinds of reflection such as our imagination and empathy in order to consider other perspectives. Emotions such as sympathy, empathy, and compassion let us share in the perspectives of others and let us care for their well-being. This is a more satisfying and illuminating account




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of nondeductive moral perception and reflection than rationalist accounts of intuitions. For example, emotions enable us to notice that somebody looks disappointed in a meeting in which not enough attention was paid to his ideas or that somebody seems a little more introvert than usual. Through our empathetic abilities we can try to interpret which emotions and thoughts are referred to by subtle signals in others. We can then try to approach the other people in a way that could provide an adequate reaction to their disposition. We could, for example, try to resolve a misunderstanding, or show our appreciation. This is how emotions, sympathy, and interpretation of the thoughts of others can play a role in our daily contact with others. These are also the capabilities that allow us to realize that something is either wrong, or, to the contrary, morally beautiful or valuable. If we hear or read horrible stories or see pictures of people who are the victims of injustice, we will often be overwhelmed by a feeling of sympathy, impotence, and anger. A good person12 will feel like helping the abused or disadvantaged person, consoling and protecting him or her, and stopping the perpetrator. Similarly, to take another example, witnessing a scene of forgiveness can touch us very deeply. Moral experience is initially based on sympathy, both in day-to-day situations as well as in great, tragic, or touching situations. We imagine what it must be like to be in the other person’s situation. We do not reason in an abstract, deductive fashion. Rather, our sympathy and imagination are invoked: We see the other person in front of our eyes and try to imagine what they are feeling. We can have access to the emotional state of the other person by feeling with them. For example, if we see somebody in a certain situation, we first have to understand that he or she is suffering before we can determine that he or she might be suffering unjustly. We see the other person making facial, bodily, or other expressions that we can, through empathizing, understand as being signs of suffering. Without feeling with the other person we might not be aware of his or her suffering. Indeed, some people are more receptive than others to the often subtle signals we can read from the faces and movements of others. However, emotions are also necessary in determining whether the suffering of another person is justified or not, and a missing emotion prevents a fully fledged judgment. Think of the following example: Peter has heard about the suppression of ethnic minorities but has never really cared much about this issue. One day he




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sees a documentary about Kurdish villages that are burnt down by Turkish troops. He feels outrage at the suffering and injustice done to the Kurdish people. From that time onwards he becomes sensitive to this kind of issue. Later, when he first hears about the war in former Yugoslavia, he understands that terrible things are going on. He might not experience the same feeling of outrage and pity every time he is confronted with a case of ethnic cleansing, but he would not have such a clear moral judgment if he had not had that initial formative experience in which he underwent the feelings that, as it were, opened his eyes.13 In addition, a perpetrator might be prevented from doing a rationally calculated evil by a strong feeling of compassion. The result is a moral epistemology that comes very close to the one proposed by Humeans and other sentimentalists. However, it makes much stronger metaphysical commitments by endorsing the nonreductive moral realism as advocated by intuitionists. Affectual intuitionism states that we need emotions in order to have access to objective moral truths. Moral emotions are not projections on a normatively blank world; rather, they are the ‘window on the world’ by which we are receptive to the evaluative aspects of the world. This account allows us to overcome the traditional dialectic between rational intuitionists and Humeans. Affectual intuitionism avoids a ‘bogus epistemology’ as much as it does relativism. Emotional reflection Shaun Nichols discusses and dismisses the approach that I suggest, calling it the ‘compatibilist thesis’ (Nichols 2004, 161, n. 9). Nichols says that we should only endorse this thesis if there are independent reasons to endorse moral realism, which is actually what I argued for in Chapter 1. Nichols also says the following: if moral judgment really does pivot on the emotions, then to defend objectivism, the objectivist needs to provide some principled reason to think that emotions that drive moral judgment are the right emotions to have. That is, the objectivist needs to show that all rational creatures should have such emotional responses (or perhaps some other responses that would lead those creatures to share our moral norms). The difficulty is that it is not at all clear how to argue for such a claim. The objectivist cannot simply help himself to a moral intuition that rational creatures should have these emotions, because


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This is question-begging. The compatibilist’s argument would only be circular if Humeanism would be true, but, by being objectivists, compatibilists deny exactly that. So it is actually Nichols who is making a circular argument. Furthermore, here he requires an internalist argument (in the sense of epistemological internalism) for the justification of our moral beliefs. In Chapter 1, I showed that intuitionists reject internalist requirements for our properly basic beliefs, in favor of a reliabalist, externalist account. An objectivist who endorses the importance of emotions in moral knowledge can say that it is impossible to provide internal justification. Based on inference to the best explanation, it is more plausible to assume that there are moral truths that we should try to detect than it is to state that our moral views are contingent projections. Only by presupposing that there has to be a correct answer does it make sense to critically evaluate our moral views. However, by pressing the issue of ‘right emotions’, Nichols implicitly raises an important point, namely, how to critically assess our moral emotions. Emotions are not infallible guides to knowledge, and this holds for all our cognitive faculties. Even a rationalist cannot claim that reason always gets it right. In this respect, all epistemologies are in the same boat. For example, our vision can betray us, either because our eyes do not function properly, which means that we need glasses or contact lenses to correct them, or because we are prone to perceptual illusions. In an analogous way, our emotional capacities too can mislead us by not working properly or by being misguided by stereotypical reactions. Emotions can let us zoom in and focus on moral saliences, but to follow this photographic metaphor, it can mean that other things get blurred. In my position, emotions themselves should play a role in the critical examination of our moral views. Emotions are necessary for moral knowledge, though they are no guarantee for success. We need to critically examine our emotions, and exploit their reflective and critical potential, which is given by their ability to shift points of view and to care for the well-being of others. Emotions are reflective. Emotions such as sympathy can correct our egoistic emotions; insecurity about our moral viewpoint might reflect that we have doubts


the Humean point is that our moral intuitions depend on the emotions we happen to have. It is manifestly circular to use these moral intuitions to underwrite the claim that rational creatures ‘should’ have the emotions we do. (Nichols 2004, 188)


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whether we are right; outrage at a violation of a moral norm might reflect that we are confident of that norm. But in the light of thorough disagreement, we might consider reassessing our emotional moral belief, by trying out different points of view through empathy and sympathy. Furthermore, some of our moral emotions might be more prone to doubt than others. Moral emotions are more fallible in dilemmatic or complex situations, which can be reflected by feeling desperate about whether we made the right judgment or by being torn between two different emotions. Emotions are not infallible, but they paradigmatically lead virtuous moral agents to see what is morally right, and they are generally better in doing so than purely rational judgments. We need emotional judgments to assess whether an emotion is correcting or corrupting our rational moral judgment. We might feel uncomfortable and that we are cheating if we give up a rational judgment based on an emotion, but we might also feel forced to reconsider that initial rational judgment and feel relieved once we align our judgment and our feeling about the case. While the initial feeling of discomfort might point to a corruptive emotion, the latter feeling of relief might point to a corrective emotion. The criteria for the correctness of moral judgments and emotions are given by nonreductive moral truths, but in order to have epistemic access to the moral ontology we need emotional judgments. However, emotions are often considered to be more notoriously misleading than other mental abilities. I believe that this is a mistaken view as, to the contrary, purely rational beings without emotions cannot make proper moral judgments. This is especially so when it comes to concrete moral judgments in particular situations, as shown by the famous studies by the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1994) that I mentioned before. Rationalists are wrong to believe that only purely rational moral beliefs can be justified and scrutinized reflectively. To the contrary, purely rational beliefs can also be misleading, and emotions can correct them. Nussbaum even believes that ‘emotions are not only not more unreliable than intellectual calculations, but frequently are more reliable, and less deceptively seductive’ (Nussbaum 1992, 40). What follows is an example of how a rational belief might trump our correct moral emotions and prevent us from doing something that is morally right. John cares about the environment and believes that he should fly by plane as little as possible. However, he might reason




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that his small contribution will not have much impact. This can still hold even if he is aware that if everybody thinks this way, this is what creates the whole problem. Rationally John might conclude that his decision to not fly will not in itself change other people’s decisions whether or not to fly. Hence, John abandons his environmentalist attitudes that were initiated by his care about the environment and adopts a so-called rationalist stance that convinces him that he is entitled to fly by plane. John’s case is an example where rationality can actually corrupt our appropriate moral emotions. Jane, on the other hand, finds her care about the environment more important than John’s rational argument, even though she sees its logic. Jane’s emotions are recalcitrant; they resist the force of this rational argumentation. These emotions are contrary to our rational judgment and will not cease, even though our rational judgment tells us that we should not have these emotions. A convinced rationalist will call these emotions irrational and claim that we should ignore them, but I believe that these emotions can help us see something that our purely rational judgments are unable to detect. Sympathetic emotions, for example, can help correct egoistic rational judgments. Emotions, by helping us to reverse our rational judgments, can enable us to make better moral judgments. This idea finds support in empirical work by the psychologist Paul Slovic. He conducted a study that showed that donations for starving children in Africa increase when compassion is invoked by the picture of one starving child but that donations decrease when the picture is accompanied by statistical information about the millions of needy children like her in Africa. As Slovic puts it, People don’t ignore mass killings because they lack compassion. Psychological research suggests it’s grim statistics themselves that paralyze us into inaction. (Slovic 2007) Slovic’s article has the telling title ‘numbed by numbers’. Rational information might overwhelm us with the idea that our efforts will be fruitless. Instead, coming face to face with the destiny of a single person can successfully evoke a direct sense of compassion.14 Emotions can provide justification for moral beliefs: A certain emotion will give me a correct sense of the moral status of a situation. There are conditions for appropriateness of emotions (cf. for example, Greenspan 1988, de Sousa 1987, 122). Emotions can be the




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right thing to feel given the circumstances and in that sense emotions can be true or false (Nussbaum 2001, 47). Emotions can help us to examine our moral beliefs. To do this we try to understand different perspectives, look at examples, and try to use our abilities to feel empathy and sympathy to get a better moral understanding of a situation. In good moral agents, emotions rebel against moral wrongdoings.

4

‘Neuroethical’ challenges to affectual intuitionism

Recently, there has been a lot of attention for moral emotions and intuitions in empirical psychology that has also been considered to be directly relevant for moral philosophy. According to the neuropsychologist and moral philosopher Joshua Greene, Understanding how we make moral judgments might help us to determine whether our judgments are perceptions of external truths or projections of internal attitudes. (Greene 2003, 849) Empirical research by Greene and by the psychologist Jonathan Haidt seems to support the idea that in moral decision making, people follow their initial, supposedly irrational intuitions and ‘gut feelings’. Rational judgments are at most rationalizations or afterthoughts. Greene and Haidt argue that since moral judgments are nothing more than intuitive gut reactions, they are not so much attempts to capture moral truths but rather reflections of evolutionarily and socially formed prejudices. They might be beneficial to our survival but reveal nothing about normativity. These findings might be seen as a direct challenge for my ‘affectual intuitionism’. Before I start to discuss Greene’s and Haidt’s views in more detail, let me point out that there is a terminological difficulty. As do many empirical psychologists, Greene and Haidt equate the notions intuition, gut feeling, affect, and emotion. However, recall that traditional intuitionists are rationalists; they do not see intuitions as affectively loaded. On my affectual intuitionism, though, intuitions are paradigmatically moral emotions. However, also on my view, intuitions or emotions are not the same as ‘gut feelings’. Gut feelings are instinctive, spontaneous responses. Instead, on affectual intuitionism, moral intuitions and emotions might be the result of a long process of reflection, but they are not inferentially or deductively based on the preliminary




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ingredients of reflection. I will come back to these distinctions further on, as they will prove to be not merely a verbal question but philosophically significant. Greene conducted experiments in which he made fMRI scans of people who were judging trolley problems.15 Trolley problems are always variations on the following theme: A trolley speeds down a runway. You see that further down the track, there are five people who will get killed if the trolley hits them. The only way to avoid this is for you to (a.) push a button which diverts the trolley to a different track that has one person on it who will be killed, but the five on the initial track will be saved, or (b.) push a large man down the track who is standing next to you on a footbridge to stop the trolley, also killing one person but saving five. Where most people tend to find version a. of the example morally acceptable, they find version b. of the example morally unacceptable. In impersonal cases (like version a.) we tend to be utilitarians (maximize aggregate goodness); in personal cases (like version b.) we tend to be Kantians (respect for persons: Don’t use another person merely as a means to achieve a good outcome).16 According to Greene, different regions in the brain are activated in assessments of different sorts of moral dilemmas. Greene’s fMRI studies have shown that in the impersonal cases (like version a.), cognitive regions in our brain are invoked. In the personal cases (like version b.), with people who judged them unacceptable (the vast majority), emotional regions are invoked (Greene et al. 2001, 2004; Greene and Haidt 2002). The few subjects who did find b.-like cases acceptable needed significantly longer to make their decisions, and cognitive regions were invoked instead of emotional regions. Greene concludes that utilitarian decisions are made by reason and deontological decisions by emotion. According to Greene this can be explained by an evolutionary perspective: In our evolutionary past, we mainly had to make personal moral decisions, and these were made by our early, emotional brain regions. The further we evolved, the more complex moral decisions we had to make since our actions were able to have more and more far-reaching consequences. These decisions are made by our more evolved, rational regions in the brain. Greene contends:



There is a growing consensus that moral judgments are based largely on intuition – ‘gut feelings’ about what is right or wrong in particular cases. (Greene 2003, 847)


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But maybe this pair of moral intuitions has nothing to do with ‘some good reason’ and everything to do with the way our brains happen to be built. [...] To make a long story short, we found that judgments in response to ‘personal’ moral dilemmas, compared with ‘impersonal’ ones, involved greater activity in brain areas that are associated with emotion and social cognition. [ ... ] Over the last four decades, it has become clear that natural selection can favour altruistic instincts under the right conditions, and many believe that this is how human altruism came to be. (Greene 2003, 848) This leads Greene to formulate the following hypothesis: we ignore the plight of the world’s poorest people not because we implicitly appreciate the nuanced structure of moral obligation, but because, the way our brains are wired up, needy people who are ‘up close and personal’ push our emotional buttons, whereas those who are out of sight languish out of mind. (Greene 2003, 849) However, being able to detect a neural substrate of a certain judgment does not entail that the judgment is no more than a projection of that neural substrate. Even if a judgment is a perception of an external truth, it has to be accompanied by a neural substrate. That a certain belief is evolutionarily hardwired does not mean that it cannot be true; to the contrary, it might be an adjustment to an insight that has proven to be appropriate. Greene compares our moral intuitions with other effortless cognitive processes, for example, to detect whether a face is male or female, or whether somebody is sexy. Based on the latter analogy, Greene claims to have found the ‘beginnings of a debunking explanation of moral realism’ (Greene 2003, 849). Moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology, just like the experience of sexiness has. But, says Greene, the experience of sexiness can be explained by survival mechanisms to find suitable mates. Baboons find other baboons much sexier than, for example, Tom Cruise, whereas human beings will not be sexually appealed by baboons. There is no universal, objective truth about


According to Greene, the fact that our moral judgments have a neural substrate indicates that they are not perceptions of external, objective truths:


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sexiness. Analogously, Greene concludes, we can explain the experience of morality by survival mechanisms, without needing to invoke moral truths. I wish to refrain from making any commitments as to the (non) objectivity of sexiness judgments. For the sake of the argument, let us grant Greene that he is right that sexiness is merely an evolutionary construct with no objective truth to the matter. However, from this nothing follows as to the (non)objectivity of ethics. Greene merely presents us with a possibility, but this is not a conclusive argument. His argumentative structure gets ad hoc when he considers the other example that he has invoked, namely, that of gender perception. About this example, he says in parenthesis: Note that according to this view moral judgment is importantly different from gender perception. Both involve efficient cognitive processes that give rise to a perceptual phenomenology, but in the case of gender perception the phenomenology is veridical: there really are mind-independent facts about who is male or female. (Greene 2003, 849) This is of course begging the question. Why should moral judgment not be compared with the objectivity of gender perception rather than with the supposedly evolutionarily construed perception of sexiness? Greene goes on to admit that more argument is needed, which I agree with. One possible objection he tackles is how he could defend increasing aid to the poor and reject moral realism at the same time. His ‘brief reply’ in parenthesis is, giving up on moral realism does not mean giving up on moral values. It is one thing to care about the plight of the poor, and another to think that one’s caring is objectively correct. (Greene 2003, 850) This is philosophically unsatisfying. Why should we care about the poor? Surely, that is a question moral philosophers should try to answer. Greene helps himself to a moral intuition without giving a coherent justification of it, which is problematic, since in his view, moral intuitions aren’t justified. Greene first states that as a matter of fact, people care more for those close by than those far away and that this can be explained by an evolutionary account (cf. the first




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quote from p. 849). Furthermore, Greene claims that our moral judgments are nothing more than the product of evolutionary processes (cf. the quote from p. 848). Greene owes us an account how then he can ‘care about the plight of the poor’ (cf. the quote from p. 850). He cannot claim that this is what our moral intuitions should be like (even though as a matter of fact they are not), as he has removed the possibility of moral critique from his account. Greene started his paper by saying that he does not believe that we can derive a ‘moral ought’ from a ‘neural is’, and he is completely right in this view. However, in the remainder of the paper he does exactly this, thereby taking away the ground on which our moral gut feelings could ever be criticized, presumably by more elaborate moral intuitions. Hence, Greene’s approach faces serious problems concerning metaethical issues, and it is far from obvious that his findings preclude a realist interpretation of moral intuitions. Some of our moral intuitions and emotions might be like gut reactions, but not all are. These categories overlap, but they do not coincide. Hence, the fact that a moral insight is based on or involves intuitions and emotions does not necessarily mean that it is a gut reaction, and accordingly, that it is arational or irrational. Jonathan Haidt has developed ideas that are related to Greene’s (cf. also Greene and Haidt 2002). In a groundbreaking article, Haidt (2001) has developed a so-called social-intuitionist model (SIM). His claim is that our moral judgments are formed by spontaneous, intuitive gut reactions, and our rationality at most works as a rationalization post hoc, being the ‘rational tail’ that is wagged by the ‘emotional dog’. Affect is what primarily steers us. However, in a response to Haidt’s work, Cordelia Fine (2006) discusses empirical research that shows that people invoke second-order judgments with which they keep their unfavorable initial judgments, such as racist or sexist prejudices, under control (a similar argument is made by Pizarro and Bloom 2003). According to Fine, this shows, in contrast to Haidt’s claims, that rational judgments do not necessarily follow gut feelings but that they can actually supersede them.17 In line with the common understanding of the relationship between spontaneous and reflected judgments, Fine interprets the initial judgments as intuitive gut reactions and the second-order judgments as rational, nonintuitive. However, based on the framework of affectual intuitionism, the second-order judgments can still be understood as intuitions and emotions. They can be basic moral beliefs in the sense of being


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noninferential. I think that maybe the best examples of a basic moral belief is ‘all human beings have equal worth.’ It seems impossible to find a non-question-begging argument for this. We can point to the nasty implications of racism and sexism, but these implications are only nasty in the light of the idea of equal worth. Alternatively, one can think of arguments such as that all human beings are equally talented, nice, smart, and so on, but these are empirically false. In addition, they don’t seem to be able to provide us with the reason why everybody has equal worth. However, an emotion such as sympathy can help us understand this principle. By feeling with and for another person, I understand that he or she has the same needs and rights as I do. Sympathy can broaden our perspective; we share a ‘circle of concern’ with another person, as Martha Nussbaum (2001, 319) calls it. Emotional moral judgments can help overcome our own prejudices, stereotypical beliefs, and gut reactions. Hence, Fine’s examples might be counterexamples to Haidt’s SIM, but not to affectual intuitionism. Let us now look at the more normative-ethical claims that Greene makes. Greene and, based on Greene’s work, Peter Singer, argue that utilitarian considerations are superior and that people are irrational and inconsistent in their respect-for-persons intuitions about personal dilemmas and rational in their utilitarian judgments about impersonal dilemmas. However, that is question-begging toward long-lasting philosophical debates between utilitarians and deontologists. The conclusions Singer and Greene draw based on Greene’s studies about trolley problems are not as straightforward as they suggest. There are huge debates about the doctrine of double effect (cf. McIntyre 2004), the doing–allowing distinction (cf. Howard-Snyder 2007) and trolley problems (cf. Kamm 2007), and of course even more so about utilitarianism versus deontology. Greene’s and Singer’s rejection of respect-for-persons considerations is question-begging, to say the least. The fact that there are numerous articles by philosophers giving reasons and arguments for nonutilitarian answers to trolleylike problems refutes Greene’s and Singer’s presupposition that such answers are irrational, unreflected gut reactions. Even if one does not agree with the nonutilitarian answers, one has to admit that there is more to them than just a gut reaction that cannot sustain deliberation. The key philosophical question is of course: Are these intuitions justified or are they incoherent and irrational? Greene and Singer reject our intuitions. Greene says explicitly, in line with Haidt’s views about rationality: ‘Deontology, then, is a kind of moral confabulation’ (Greene 2007a, 63).




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A surgeon walks into the hospital as a nurse rushes forward with the following case. ‘Doctor! An ambulance just pulled in with five people in critical condition. Two have a damaged kidney, one a crushed heart, one a collapsed lung, and one a completely ruptured liver. We don’t have time to search for possible organ donors, but a healthy young man just walked in to donate blood and is sitting in the lobby. We can save all five patients if we take the needed organs from this young man. Of course he won’t survive, but we will save all five patients.’ (Hauser 2006, 32) Maybe Singer and Greene find the utilitarian solution to the hospital case acceptable, but I guess many people will disagree. Greene and Singer both argue that we should rise above our evolutionarily determined intuitions and find a rational answer. But it is not obvious that the utilitarian answer is the rational answer in each and every case. Greene and Singer ignore the normative discussion in which intuitionists and utilitarians have been engaged for the past 300 years. To mention just a few objections of intuitionists against utilitarianism (cf. Chapter 2, Section 4), it allows for exploitation of minorities, ignores issues of fair distribution, ignores the motives from which actions are done, and ignores agent relativity (I made a promise to you, Harry borrowed the book from Susan, he’s my son, and so on). In contrast with Greene and Haidt, intuitionists don’t make a descriptive claim about intuitions, but a normative claim: Our ethical intuitions have to be taken seriously. Recall (Chapter 2, Section 3) that the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick emphasized that the utilitarian principle is based on an intuitive insight, that is, the principle of rational benevolence.18 Hence, utilitarians cannot avoid ethical intuitions either. Every ethical theory needs to invoke intuitions at some point. Since Greene sets up the normative-ethical spectrum as solely divided between consequentialists and deontologists, he fails to see a straightforward alternative theoretical explanation of our diverging intuitions, and that is pluralism as developed by ethical intuitionists.19 Greene says, ‘it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative ethical theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions’ (Greene 2007a, 72). It depends on what one means by rationally coherent. If Greene means by it a monist theory that can


Are Greene and Singer right in their rejection of our ethical intuitions? Look at the following example:


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subsume all judgments under one principle, then intuitionists would agree with him. Most intuitionists are pluralists and believe that we cannot find one overarching moral principle that covers all possible cases. However, we can give reasons for our diverging ethical intuitions in different cases. Maybe not everybody is equally skilled in articulating these differences, but people are nevertheless proficient in making these distinctions. Marc Hauser (2006) and John Mikhail (2007) draw the analogy with our capacity to use language. Many native speakers who are proficient in their language are not capable of explicating the rules of grammar that they are nevertheless perfectly capable of using. According to Hauser and Mikhail, the same might hold for our moral sense. Even though Hauser and Mikhail relate their work to John Rawls, in this respect they come as close to the intuitionist Reid as one can. As said before, Reid thought that virtuous people are justified in their moral beliefs, even if they cannot provide further going arguments for them. In addition, the examples that Greene has studied all involve dilemmas. Now it is a defining characteristic of dilemmas that there is not a clear-cut solution. Whatever horn of the dilemma we choose, we have failed in a sense by not going for the other horn. A situation with one obvious best solution is by definition not a dilemma. Nevertheless, Singer and Greene treat the various dilemmas as if they do have a clear solution, thereby always unquestioningly favoring a utilitarian above a deontological solution. That is question-begging toward deontologists, to say the least. Hence, the fact that utilitarian decisions invoke rational parts of our brains whereas deontological decisions invoke emotional parts of our brains does not prove anything regarding the superiority of one kind of decision above the other. Maybe Singer and Greene reason the other way around: The fact that utilitarian decisions are rational and deontological decisions are emotional shows that reason is superior to emotion. But again, that is question-begging toward old-school sentimentalists as much as to philosophers who defend that emotions reveal moral truths (e.g., Roberts 2003, Zagzebski 2003, and my own approach). This brings us from intuitions to emotions. I have already given an alternative explanation of Greene’s observations concerning diverging intuitions from the point of view of ethical intuitionism. Now I wish to add to this by also invoking affectual intuitionism. Greene poses a challenge to deontologists: How can our deontological intuitions be true if in fact they are based on emotions (Greene 2007a, 69)? Greene is absolutely right that this is a difficult point for rationalist




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deontologists. However, my affectual intuitionism does not have any problems with it: The fact that an insight is based on emotions does not preclude the possibility that it is truth-apt. On a cognitive theory of emotions, emotions can be a form of judgment and insight into objective moral truths. In his comment on Greene, Mark Timmons hints in a similar direction, referring to a ‘sentimentalist deontology’ (Timmons 2007). In reply to this point, Greene ends his rejoinder to Timmons with the following words: Kant was opposed to emotion-based morality because emotions are fickly and contingent in oh-so-many ways (Kant, 1959). About that, he was right. (Greene 2007b, 117) It is true that emotions are fallible. But that holds for all our sources of knowledge. Gut reactions may be especially notorious, but the moral emotions that I have discussed before are a reliable source of moral knowledge. They can be highly reflective and serve to correct our immediate responses. But they also correct our overly rational judgments, as these might bias us toward a cold and detached attitude that lets us become cynical and indifferent toward the well-being of others altogether. This becomes clear when we look at another set of moral dilemmas. In his fMRI studies, Greene also used an example from Peter Unger where, in the first case, somebody can help a person in front of him who is in need at a slight personal cost; in the second case, somebody can donate money to a charity. Most people think we should help the person close by, but we don’t need to make the donation (Greene 2003, 848). However, this means that in this case personal, emotional considerations are superior. The impersonal case is rational but morally questionable. In order to overcome our rational paralysis concerning people who are far away, our emotional-personal judgments should be extended to impersonal cases. Sympathy allows us to care for others who can even be far away. My approach allows for the following interpretation of Greene’s experiments: Emotions such as compassion give access to deontological considerations such as respect for persons. However, in real life people sometimes face genuine dilemmas in which a utilitarian decision is the least unacceptable. Such decisions might involve a detached calculus that can be provided by rationality. However, the fact that we have to sacrifice innocent people even though we have


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no choice means that we feel guilt and remorse. But there is nothing irrational about these feelings. They show us and remind us that we had to make a tragic choice, which can help us direct future actions. It would be much more irrational, albeit more pleasant, to not have these feelings. Now let me make matters more complicated once again. I wonder whether it is really true that utilitarian considerations are purely rational and not emotional. Maybe a utilitarian decision does not need to involve an occurrent emotion, but it could invoke a dispositional emotion (Greene actually makes a similar claim, using different terminology; cf. Greene 2007a, 64). That would explain why emotional brain regions are not highlighted during utilitarian decisions on Greene’s fMRI scans. Nevertheless, this is how dispositional emotions might play a role in utilitarianism: Our sympathy for others makes us see the relevance of the utilitarian principle, that is, that we should improve the well-being of as many people as possible. We do not need to feel sympathy at every instance in which we make a utilitarian judgment; nevertheless, I believe that sympathy provides for the underlying justification of the utilitarian principle. However, in concrete decision-making, the very same principle can require us to make a detached judgment, especially if it involves sacrificing the happiness, or even worse, the lives of other people. In such situations, we need to make a fine-grained balance between these kinds of considerations and respect-for-person considerations that, by being directed at concrete individuals, have a more direct appeal to occurrent emotions. A different understanding of intuitions and emotions allows for a different interpretation of neuroethics. Moral intuitions and emotions are not irrational gut reactions, but sources of insight into moral truths.

5 Affectual intuitionism and motivation On Reid’s account, moral emotions mainly serve a motivational purpose. In the previous sections, I argued that we also need moral emotions in order to have moral knowledge. Moral emotions can be justified (basic) moral beliefs and, at the same time, they can be intrinsically motivating. This, of course, gives rise to some questions: Does this mean that moral judgments are necessarily motivating? How can motivation be reduced or even not occur at all? In this section




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I will argue that affectual intuitionism can provide for more plausible answers to these questions than its rationalist and noncognitivist rivals.

There is an important distinction in the theory of motivation, namely, that between normative reasons and motivating reasons. 20 Normative reasons are good reasons; motivating reasons are reasons that set us to act. We can be internalists or externalists in terms of both normative and motivating reasons, and both are, at least initially, logically independent. Some philosophers, however, reduce one type of reasons to the other. Bernard Williams (1981) believes that a reason can only be a normative reason if it is part of or accessible from our ‘motivational set’, which includes all our motivational states such as desires. This position is called normative internalism. Other philosophers, mainly from a realist stance, have argued that this reduces morality to our contingent desires. They instead defend normative externalism: Whether something is a normative reason or not does not depend on our motivation. An internalist concerning motivating reasons claims that moral beliefs are or can be sufficient to set us to act in themselves. The formulation ‘are sufficient’ expresses the view that there is a necessary connection between belief and motivation, while the formulation ‘can be sufficient’ expresses that there is a connection that is causal but not necessary. These are respectively strong and weak internalism. In contrast, a motivational externalist believes that moral beliefs have to be accompanied by appropriate desires in order to set us to act. Most rationalists are (strong or weak) motivational internalists in that they believe that rational persons act in accordance with their moral beliefs. Many different externalist positions have been expressed. According to Humeanism, beliefs are motivationally inert in themselves; they need to be accompanied by desires in order to lead to action. Another position is, for example, that of Thomas Nagel (1970), according to whom a moral belief gives rise to a desire and together set us to act. Reid’s position falls somewhere between weak internalism and Nagel-style externalism: Moral beliefs are potentially able to set us to act in themselves, but in practice affective states are much better at doing so, and some affective states are based on our moral beliefs (cf. Section 2).


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According to Michael Smith, there are three dominant theories related to the question as to the relationship between moral judgments and motivation. Smith believes that these theories are in themselves intuitively appealing but inconsistent if taken together. This inconsistency is what he calls ‘The Moral Problem’. 21 Smith’s three intuitively appealing theories are: 1. Moral judgments of the form ‘It is right that I ϕ’ express a subject’s beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what is right for her to do. 2. If someone judges that it is right that she ϕs then, ceteris paribus, she is motivated to ϕ. 3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume’s terms, distinct existences. (Smith 1994, 12) This can also be summarized as the impossibility of the combination of 1. moral realism and cognitivism 2. motivational internalism, and 3. a Humean theory of motivation. Theory 1 (moral realism and cognitivism) is attractive for the reasons that I have given in Chapters 1 and 3. Theory 2 (motivational internalism) is attractive because it makes sense to think that moral convictions should be sufficient to set us to act. Theory 3, the Humean theory of motivation, based on the dichotomy between beliefs and desires, is presupposed by many philosophers. Michael Smith is one of the philosophers who presupposes such a Humean dichotomy and for whom it is hence problematic to explain how objective moral knowledge can influence our actions. Smith says that ‘the objectivity and the practicality of moral judgements pull in quite opposite directions from each other’ (Smith 1991, 402). According to Smith, from the three theories stated above it follows that there are only two possibilities: (a) moral judgments are beliefs about objective facts – but if this is true, they then cannot influence our actions, as our actions are directed by our desires. Thus,


The moral problem


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we keep intuitions 1 and 3 but give up 2. Alternatively, according to possibility (b) moral judgments influence our actions, but if this is true, they then must be desires. Thus, we keep intuitions 2 and 3 but give up 1. If one presupposes theory 3, the Humean dichotomy, it is a problem to explain how truth-apt moral beliefs can influence our actions. There has been a huge debate about Smith’s ‘moral problem’, and most philosophers have tried to abandon theory 1 or theory 2. But theory 3, the Humean theory of motivation, has been questioned less frequently. Some rationalists reject theory 3 because of its first part, namely, that we need desires to be motivated. But we can also reject theory 3 because of the idea that beliefs and desires are categorically distinct. In the previous section I argued that for epistemological and phenomenological reasons alone, we should reject the Humean dichotomy between reason and emotion or beliefs and desires. In the following subsections I will show that affectual intuitionism allows us to solve the ‘moral problem’. Moral emotions and degrees of motivation It is generally considered that emotions are intrinsically motivating states (cf. for example, Scherer 1984; Frijda 1986, 77; Ben-Ze’ev 2000a). In this subsection I will examine in more detail how we should understand this from the point of view of affectual intuitionism. For simplicity’s sake, I will switch back and forth between talking in terms of desires and talking in terms of emotions, although these notions are not the same. This switching is unavoidable since the debate in the theory of action with which this section engages is generally held in terms of beliefs and desires. The point of my argument, however, is that a better understanding of emotions forces us to reject a strict dichotomy between beliefs and desires. Emotions have aspects that are typical for beliefs (cognitive content) and aspects that are typical for desires (motivational force). But emotions also have additional aspects, such as motor expression, arousal, and subjective feeling. 22 I will focus here on the cognitive, feeling, and motivational aspects of emotions. Again, for simplicity’s sake, I will sometimes just talk about belief and desire or cognition and affect and will use desire and affect to cover the feeling aspect and the motivational aspect. We will see, though, that the feeling aspect and the motivational aspect do not always run parallel. In order to understand this I will need to explicitly distinguish these aspects (feeling and motivation) of emotions in the cases I cite.




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Let me briefly compare affectual intuitionism with Humeanism. According to Humeans, cognitive and affective, or feeling, states have opposite ‘directions of fit’. Cognitions (beliefs) are mind-world directed; they describe the world as it is. On the Humean picture, affective states (desires) are world-mind directed; they concern how we would like the world to be. In contrast, affectual intuitionism allows that emotions can have both directions of fit (cf. Nussbaum 2001, 48, 49). Emotions have a cognitive aspect and an affective aspect. Michael Smith argues that the idea of states having both directions of fit is incoherent, as the way the world is and the way we would like the world to be need not coincide. However, I think this is only incoherent in the Humean or naturalist understanding of belief which describes the world as it is empirically. However, nonreductive moral realists believe that moral beliefs describe the world in terms of objective, but nonreductive, nonempirical moral truths. In other words, where for Humeans, beliefs can only be about ‘is’ statements, for nonreductivists, beliefs can also be about ‘ought’ statements. With this understanding, it is not an incoherent idea that there could be states that have both directions of fit. We can believe and desire that the world should be in a certain way. To the contrary, paradigmatically, our desires should coincide with our moral beliefs, or our feelings should coincide with our cognitions, which is exactly the idea behind affectual intuitionism. Smith argues further against the idea of states that are both beliefs and desires at the same time when he discusses what he calls ‘besires’. He believes that besires cannot make sense of weakness of will and other ‘practical irrationalities ... that can break the connection between moral judgment and motivation’ (Smith 1994, 120). So it seems that either we have to embrace Humeanism with its belief– desire dichotomy, which in turn gives rise to the ‘moral problem’, or we opt for a besire-based account such as affectual intuitionism but abandon the possibility of weakness of will. However, I will argue that weakness of will is still possible in ‘besire’-like states. This argument is inspired by a paper by Linda Zagzebski (2003, especially 119–23). According to Zagzebski, emotions are unitary states that have a cognitive and an affective aspect (Zagzebski 2003, 109). In Zagzebski’s theory, cognition and affect can go together, but they need not necessarily do so. Zagzebski speaks of the possibility of the ‘thinning’ of moral judgments, which means that they can become less emotional,




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and hence, less motivating. She says that ‘ground-level moral judgments’ are the most basic moral experiences on which our more abstract moral judgments are based. A ground-level moral judgment is directed toward a concrete case here and now involving thick moral concepts. When we reflect upon a situation we abstract from a concrete experience, and the motivating emotion that was there in the initial judgment gets weaker. The most abstract and normally the least motivating moral judgments concern general moral principles or thin moral concepts. 23 Translated into my previous analysis of aspects of emotions, this means that if the feeling aspect of emotions gets less intense, the motivating aspect gets less intense as well. Zagzebski provides us with a plausible account. If we think of a moral principle, we consider concrete cases at most abstractly and perhaps see a possible situation in our imagination. It may not even be a situation which we saw with our own eyes and which deeply shocked or moved us. We will generally be less moved and motivated by an imagined case than by a case in which we directly experienced something ourselves. We see countless pictures of wars, famines, executions, humiliations, and abuses every day. We rush over newspaper headings that contain horrible messages, often with no feeling. But this generally changes when we are eyewitness to a scene where somebody is mistreated, humiliated, or beaten (cf. the discussion of Slovic’s empirical findings in the previous section). In concrete situations, it is very common that the numbness that takes hold of us because of the flood of human misery in the media immediately disappears, allowing for a strong emotional reaction. This emotional reaction is at the same time a sharp, spontaneous, and basic judgment. In paradigmatic cases, an emotional reaction will lead directly to a desire to intervene, a desire that usually does not occur in more abstract judgments, such as after having seen a headline in a newspaper. 24 Hence, Zagzebski’s account can explain why moral judgments are sometimes motivating and sometimes are not, or why moral judgments are not always motivating enough to result in action. This is how Zagzebski’s account explains akrasia, that is the case of the weak-willed person who makes correct judgments and who would even like to act upon them but does not do so. In this case, the motivational force of the moral judgment is either defeated by the motivating force of another desire (cf. McDowell 1998, 54, 55) or the moral judgment lacks sufficient affective strength.25 This approach can provide for a subtle account of various phenomena concerning motivation, including how motivation can become more or less


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intense and how there might not be any motivation at all even if we believe that we should perform a certain action. These phenomena are explained by the degree of affect involved in a moral judgment. This shows that an account of besires does not need to ignore akrasia, pace Smith. However, some objections might be raised against this approach. Consider the following argument by Michael Smith: what Humeans must deny and do deny is simply that agents who are in belief-like states and desire-like states are ever in a single, unitary, kind of state. This is the cash value of the Humean doctrine that belief and desire are distinct existences. And their argument for this claim is really quite simple. It is that it is always at least possible for agents who are in some particular belief-like state not to be in some particular desire-like state; that the two can always be pulled apart, at least modally. This, according to Humeans, is why they are distinct existences. (Smith 1994, 119; emphases in original) With this in mind, it might be argued that Zagzebski’s account is a form of Humeanism after all, since it allows belief and desire or cognition and affect to be pulled apart. It might be argued that Zagzebski’s account merely gives us a more subtle picture of the contingent relationship between cognition and affect than a Humean account. Humeans believe that either belief and desire go together or they do not. Zagzebski’s account shows us that not only can a desire go together with a belief or disappear but that it can also get weaker. Hence, to continue the objection, Zagzebski’s account is not so much a refutation of Humeanism as simply an improvement of it. Humeans could happily embrace this suggestion. In other words, a defender of besires may run into the following dilemma: Either besires are unitary, disentangable states, which cannot account for weakness of will, or (and this seems to be what Zagzebski proposes), besires can be resolved into their components and, thus, can account for weakness of will. In the latter case, they are by definition not unitary states and we are back into Humeanism. Does this dilemma really exhaust all possible options? Let me first state that I agree with Smith that we can immediately reject the first horn of the dilemma. A theory of motivation that cannot account for weakness of will is implausible from the start, since weakness of will is far too common a phenomenon to be denied existence. 26




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So let us look at the second horn of the dilemma. Does Zagzebski’s account collapse into Humeanism by definition? This would mean that we would return to the idea that emotions are subjective, irrational, or arational states. Humeans would be right after all, unless we would want to bite the bullet and say that weakness of will is impossible. However, affectual intuitionism rejects the second horn of the dilemma. According to affectual intuitionism and other cognitive theories of emotions, emotions cannot be resolved into their components.27 Greenspan (1988, 4, 5) defines an emotion as a truly different state; an emotion is the affective response to an intentional object. John McDowell argues that perceptions of saliences cannot be decomposed into pure awareness together with appetitive states (McDowell 1998, 71): It does not seem plausible that any purely natural fellow-feeling or benevolence, unmediated by the special ways of seeing situations that are characteristic of charity ... would issue in behaviour that exactly matched that of a charitable person; the objects of a purely natural benevolence could not be guaranteed to coincide in all cases with the good of others as a possessor of the virtue would perceive it. It seems still less plausible that virtuous behaviour in general could be duplicated by means of the outcomes of independently intelligible desires. (McDowell 1998, 84) In other words, on a Humean account, the relationship between belief and desire would be too contingent. In order for an affective state to be appropriate in a given situation, it has to be intelligible, and this means that it has to be inherently connected to judgment. According to affectual intuitionism and other besire accounts, the cognitive and affective aspects of emotions cannot be pulled apart. These aspects of emotions are not contingently connected but are inherently intertwined. This is the central idea of affectual intuitionism and other besire accounts, which distinguishes them from Humeanism. Against this line of argument, Smith brings up the fact that people can indeed make appropriate moral judgments without being motivated, for example, in the case of depression; hence, belief and desire can be pulled apart after all. Smith takes this to be a fatal objection against a besire account (Smith 1994, 123).


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However, the idea that emotions form unitary states does not exclude the possibility that the intensity of one or more aspects of emotions might vary. Properties such as the size, color, or shape of a physical object can change although these properties cannot be isolated. Analogously, we can think of the affective and cognitive aspects of emotions as having the ability to change without that implying that an emotion is merely a contingent amalgam of two separate states. Rather, affect and cognition are essential constituents of an emotion, even though they can vary, as we can see from Zagzebski’s account. In a virtuous person, paradigmatically moral beliefs also have an affective aspect, even though on occasions, the affective aspect might be weakened or overruled. It is interesting that empirical research shows that people who lack appropriate affect are not able to make appropriate moral judgments, pace Smith. This holds for sociopaths (Nichols 2004) and for people with defects to their amygdala (Damasio 1994), as much as for those with autism. Some of these people approximate a form of moral judgment through abstract reasoning. However, the capacity to form moral judgments is never at the same level as that of people who do not lack these emotional capacities (Nichols 2004). Hence, emotions are essential to virtuous moral decision making. However, there are some complexities which Zagzebski does not address sufficiently. We cannot simply support her idea that the more emotional a moral judgment, the more motivating it is. In some cases, the feeling aspect of an emotion can be so overwhelming that we are not able to act in the way that we would like, or we might get too confused to determine what to do. Not all emotions provide for positive motivation. There are emotions that can make one feel numb, such as depression, as mentioned by Smith above. In this case, the feeling aspect undermines motivation. Depression has an inhibiting effect on our willingness to act. One might be tempted to respond to this by saying that a depressive emotion is different from an emotion involved in a moral judgment, and Zagzebski’s account only concerns those latter emotions. However, even a moral judgment can involve a depressive emotion rather than a motivationally positive emotion, for example, in the case of the numbness resulting from the perception of an overload of misery. Still, in a healthy person, a feeling of depression can be corrected by other judgments and emotions. For example, a judgment and feeling of urgency, or the enthusiasm to achieve a certain goal, can help to conquer an occasional feeling of depression. People who have clinical depression might not be able to correct this




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emotion by themselves (cf. Zagzebski 2003, 123), but this is exactly why they need special treatment and do not fall under the scope of a theory of action that applies to healthy human beings who may occasionally suffer from akrasia. In addition, an extremely emotional state can enable us to be more rational and efficient than we would normally be. It can enable us to find solutions to hard problems and to be able to do things we would normally not be able to do. It depends on the kind of person and on the particular circumstances, as to whether extreme situations and their accompanying strong emotions make somebody feel overwhelmed and helpless or, as it were, hyperrational.28 Another potential problem concerns emotions that make people do the wrong thing, such as extreme jealousy. Let us consider a case in which a rational judgment prevents me from following my motivation by a ‘bad’ emotion. My rational judgment tells me that my emotion is inappropriate. It refutes my initial emotional judgment. This challenges the cognitive and affective (and hence motivational) aspects of the initial emotion. However, it might seem that allowing rational judgments to challenge emotions would drive us into rationalism and, hence, undermine affectual intuitionism. However, I do not believe that this follows. Affectual intuitionism does not entail that emotions are infallible or incorrigible. Affectual intuitionism can allow for reason to correct the sometimes overwhelming or misguiding force of emotions. Affectual intuitionism is compatible with the idea that sometimes reason is right, but it denies that reason is infallible or superior. It denies that in cases of conflict between reason and emotion, reason should always have the lead. Rather, reason and emotion have to critically interact. In any case, what all these considerations show us is that we cannot simply claim that the motivational force of moral judgments runs parallel to the intensity of the feeling aspect of these judgments. Still, based on affectual intuitionism, we can develop a theory of motivation that is not only able to tie the motivational force of moral judgments to the feeling aspect of moral judgments but is also able to allow for varying degrees of feeling and motivating intensity of moral judgments. Given these reflections, we can formulate some important features that a theory of motivation, based on affectual intuitionism, should have.


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1. Moral emotions are a subclass of moral judgments; that is, they are moral judgments that have both cognitive and affective aspects at the same time.


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2. Moral judgments derive their motivational force from the intensity of their initial feeling. 3. Paradigmatically, moral judgments are more or less motivating depending on the intensity of their strength of feeling.29 4. The motivational strength of a moral judgment can be defeated by emotions, for better (cf. by feeling sympathy and compassion with others, for example, in the case above of Jane and her care for the environment in Section 3) or worse (cf. the example of depression). 5. The motivational strength of a moral judgment can be defeated by a purely rational judgment, for better (cf. the example of a feeling of extreme jealousy) or worse (‘surely my small contribution will not make a difference’; cf. the case of John’s ‘rationalist stance’ toward flying, in Section 3). This list of features can serve to refine Zagzebski’s account of motivation. Admittedly, it does not offer clear-cut criteria. Some of these features leave room for exceptions and counterexamples. But this is inherent to a subject matter as complex as this which involves psychological states which do not behave in a law-like fashion.30 Solving the ‘moral problem’ In the previous subsections I have discussed features of a theory of moral motivation that is based on affectual intuitionism. In this subsection I will show how such an approach can help to solve Michael Smith’s ‘moral problem’. However, before going back to Smith’s ‘moral problem’, we have to make some adjustments to the way the debate in the theory of action is traditionally made up, since it is conceptualized in accordance with Humeanism. The formulations of motivational internalism and externalism already presuppose a Humean belief– desire dichotomy which affectual intuitionism rejects. We need to redefine motivational internalism to accommodate the rejection of the Humean belief–desire dichotomy. The following is the common reading of motivational internalism: Motivational internalism



A moral judgment can by itself be sufficient to set us to act.31 This formulation of motivational internalism is compatible with a rationalist understanding of the notion ‘judgment’ as well as with


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affectual intuitionism. Instead, the following formulation explicitly requires a non-Humean theory of motivation:

A moral judgment is paradigmatically sufficient to set us to act if it is a moral emotion; that is, it is affective and cognitive at the same time. With these two readings in mind, let us return to the three theories that, if taken together, create Smith’s ‘moral problem’. We can now replace theory 3, the Humean account of motivation, by the previously developed theory of motivation. We can also modify Smith’s definition of motivational internalism (theory 2) in the spirit of motivational internalism* in order to make it more explicit that motivational internalism can be reformulated in a way that does not presuppose a belief–desire dichotomy. Furthermore, we can modify theory 1 (moral realism) based on the ideas about the role of emotions in moral epistemology as discussed in Section 3. The three intuitively appealing theories that we started with can now be restated as follows: 1*. Emotional moral judgments of the form ‘It is right that I ϕ’ express a subject’s beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what is right for her to do. 2*. If someone emotionally judges that it is right that she ϕs then, ceteris paribus, she is motivated to ϕ. 3*. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate emotional moral judgment, consisting of cognitive, feeling, and motivating aspects, where the strength of the motivating aspect is paradigmatically closely linked to the intensity of the feeling aspect. The conjunction of these theories forms a coherent and consistent account. Furthermore, these theories fit better with the phenomenology of moral experience and with some of the dominant views in current emotions research than the initial theories. The reason for this is that the initial theories operate on the idea that reason and emotion are strictly separated and have opposite tasks. Each of the separate theories (1*, 2*, and 3*) is convincing in themselves without, when taken together, creating a ‘moral problem’.


Motivational internalism*


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In this chapter I have developed a novel form of ethical intuitionism, by combining ethical intuitionism with a theory of emotions that takes emotions to be cognitive and affective at the same time. Ethical intuitions are paradigmatically emotions. We need moral emotions to have moral knowledge. This means that the account of the moral faculty which has given so much trouble to intuitionism can be understood in the following way which takes away all its mystery: The moral faculty is our ability to have moral knowledge by feeling sympathy and compassion with others. If we combine intuitionism with a more extensive account of cognitive moral emotions, we can achieve a convincing moral epistemology that fits our phenomenology of moral experience very well. Affectual intuitionism can give a more plausible account of the findings in neuroethical experiments than its rationalist and sentimentalist rivals. Furthermore, it can explain the relationship between cognition and motivation better than any other moral epistemology.


6 Conclusion


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This book has presented a theoretical framework that challenges various broadly accepted dogmas in moral philosophy. These dogmas are (1) intuitionism is a nonstarter; (2) reason is the source of universal, objective moral truths, and emotion is a source of subjective projections; and (3) psychological research is relevant only for naturalists. Part I of this book has challenged the common prejudices against ethical intuitionism. Part II has challenged the common dichotomy between reason and emotion, and it has also shown that psychological research can be of relevance for nonnaturalist philosophers. 1. In Part I, I have shown how a lot of criticism against intuitionism is based on misconceptions. If one studies the writings of the intuitionists with an open mind, they make a lot of sense. The intuitionists were aware of possible problems of their framework and how to deal with them. I have emphasized that the hitherto largely neglected writings of Thomas Reid on moral philosophy can shed important new light on ethical intuitions. 2. Traditionally, most intuitionists and other moral cognitivists (whether from the realist or from the constructivist camp) are universalists, in that they defend the existence of necessary (prima facie) moral principles if there are to be moral truths. And since necessary principles are assumed to be discernable only through reason, just as in the model of mathematical knowledge, moral knowledge must be rational. There are two realist challenges to this view: The first is particularism, and the other is my own affectual intuitionism. The first challenge to the above picture is directed against its universalist component: Dancy defends a form of realism and



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cognitivism but denies that there are necessary moral principles. The second challenge to the traditional cognitivist picture is directed against its rationalist component. Although affectual intuitionism is a form of realism and cognitivism, it claims that we need emotions in order to acquire moral knowledge. Affectual intuitionism and Dancy’s particularism, whether in combination or taken separately,32 show that cognitivists do not need to be rationalists and/or universalists. There can be objective moral truths even if those truths are not necessary (particularism) and even if we discover them through emotions rather than reason (affectual intuitionism). Affectual intuitionism combined with particularism multiplies this challenge to the traditional cognitivist view. As I argued in the second part of this study, it is exactly the combination of both views that seems to me extremely promising. This combination means that through moral emotions we perceive contingent moral facts. This is in the spirit of Reid’s quote that was the motto of the first part of this study. However, as I have argued in the last two chapters, this account is more radical than Reid’s account, both in its epistemology (by adopting affectual intuitionism) and in its ontology (by allowing for contingent instead of necessary moral facts). 3. Another novel feature of my approach is that although it is a form of nonreductivism, affectual intuitionism is directly engaged with findings from empirical psychology. Often, nonreductive realists shrug off findings from empirical psychology as being supposedly normatively irrelevant: Realists emphasize the gap between is and ought, and empirical research supposedly has little relevance for philosophical ethics. However, it can be highly relevant to check one’s claims about, for example, moral epistemology with empirical studies about how normal people usually form their moral judgments. The philosophers who do show active interests in such studies are usually sentimentalists: Their philosophical outlook is generally based in a naturalist Humeanism, so they are almost by definition interested in empirical studies. While this is in itself a good thing, I believe Humeans are too easily impressed by empirical research and have too little confidence in the strength of philosophical approaches. While psychological research is extremely rich in its empirical methods and data, it is often rather crude in its theoretical assumptions. Indeed, psychologists often direct themselves toward philosophers for reflection on theoretical foundations.




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I propose the following approach: Rather than either ignoring psychological research about, for example, emotions and moral judgments such as rationalists often do, or uncritically adopting such research as sentimentalists tend to do, philosophers from all leanings should critically engage with psychologists and vice versa. This is the age of interdisciplinary research. Different disciplines can learn a lot from each other. Empirical scholars have the data – philosophers have the theoretical and conceptual tools. At the least, philosophers can point out to empirical scholars that in philosophy, things are never as obvious as they might seem. In all philosophical debates, one can find virtually all possible positions. By trying out a different theoretical framework, empirical data might appear in a completely different light, or it can be realized that one should test different hypotheses or that one should test the same hypotheses, but in a different way. I have used this approach in my development of affectual intuitionism. Affectual intuitionism connects extremely well with recent empirical findings about the importance of moral emotions and intuitions in moral judgments. However, where most empirical scholars understand these findings as a ‘debunking’ of our moral rationality, my account can demonstrate that, on a different philosophical understanding of intuitions and emotions, these studies show that we need moral emotions and intuitions in order to be practically rational. Interestingly, this kind of approach fits well with a Reidian commonsense approach: Reid emphasized that we should start out with the (fallible) views of the common person. But that by no means implies a reductivist view on ethics. Rather, it means that we need moral emotions and intuitions in order to have moral knowledge.


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Preface 1. For example, the special issue of Philosophical Explorations that is devoted to the discussion of the meaning of neurological findings for moral philosophy is set up within the dichotomy ‘sentimentalism’ versus ‘rationalism’ (cf. Gerrans and Kennett 2006).

Part I Intuitions 1. This they have in common with the earlier sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Price. W.D. Hudson includes them in his definition of intuitionism: ‘Ethical intuitionism is here taken to be the view that normal human beings have an immediate awareness of moral values,’ Hudson (1967, 1). I do not include the sentimentalists in my account since they do not fit into the core theory; that is, they are generally not taken to be nonreductive moral realists but subjectivists instead (with the exception of Shaftesbury, cf. Gill 2006). 2. There may be philosophers who are not characterized as intuitionists but who still fulfill the criteria. Strictly speaking, they could then be called intuitionists as well. The idea that intuitionism is more widely accepted than only by textbook-intuitionists is something Reid would be eager to acknowledge. He emphasizes throughout his work that he is saying nothing controversial but is defending a theory that is supposed to capture commonsense and that has been defended by many philosophers, in particular Aristotle.

1

Ethical intuitionism

1. David Brink (1989, 102) and Michael Huemer (2005) have a similar characterization of intuitionism. Brink refers mainly to the same authors as I do. 2. Whether this is a correct interpretation is a matter of debate among Hume scholars, but I will adopt this interpretation since this is how Hume is commonly understood in the recent meta-ethical literature. 3. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the different importance intuitionists assign to these propositions. 4. Cf. also Broadie (1998). For a criticism of Reid’s view on this point, see Chapter 5. 5. At least as they present themselves in recent analytical metaethics, such as Korsgaard and Rawls.


Notes

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Notes

6. I will mainly use the contemporary terminology of ‘basic belief’, but when I quote Reid the reader should realize that this is what he means by ‘first principle’; that is, for Reid a particular observation can also function as a ‘first principle’, namely, as a foundation for other beliefs. 7. Sidgwick takes these principles to be moral axioms. 8. This example can be found in different versions in the literature, for example, in AP 232, McNaughton (1988), and Little (1995). 9. In the case of animals, Reid calls this opinion and reserves the term judgment for rational beings only. 10. It may not be a coincidence that in that quote Reid takes the Golden Rule as an example, as this can be seen as more or less (extensionally) equivalent to the categorical imperative. 11. An example of an externalist who does speak in terms of justification is Alvin Goldman: ‘I do not even assume that when a belief is justified there is something “possessed” by the believer which can be called a “justification.” I do assume that a justified belief gets its status of being justified from some processes or properties that make it justified’ (Goldman 1992, 106). 12. This still allows for the possibility that theorems that we can intuit can also be verified, that is, in the case of improperly basic beliefs. But in the end such a verification will rely on basic beliefs concerning axioms (cf. the point about overdetermination before). 13. Moore says something similar, cf. PE 145. 14. In the case of moral beliefs this last criterion might invite more disagreement than consensus. I will discuss this point further in Chapter 3. 15. I will discuss this notion in Chapter 2. 16. However, recently, for example, Cuneo (2007) and Shafer-Landau (2003) have defended moral realism in book-length studies. 17. Cf. Sayre-McCord (1988b), especially the diagram on p. 15. I will argue further on in this section why I believe that an antirealist version of cognitivism is problematic. 18. There has been a huge debate about whether Moore’s open question argument indeed proves what it is supposed to, or whether it proves too much, for example, that water and H2O cannot be the same since we can always ask whether this is really true. I will not go into this debate here; instead, I try to capture the spirit of the open-question argument, which is that moral properties cannot be reduced to nonmoral properties as morality is an irreducible domain of reality (cf. Huemer 2005, 94, 95). 19. Dancy argues that ‘resultance’ and supervenience are strictly speaking not the same. Supervenience is more suited for a generalist account, whereas resultance is more suited for a particularist account. Cf. for example Dancy (1993) 73–8. I will come back to the issue of generalism and particularism in Chapter 4. 20. However, compare with what I said before and what I will say in Chapter 2, when I discuss that both Ross and Reid believe that we have to believe that what we do is right. But this does not mean that our beliefs can change the facts; it just means that we have to act from a good motive and with the right intentions.


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21. In his discussion of different ways to understand naturalist epistemology Jaegwon Kim defends that Moore is a (nonreductive) ethical naturalist, cf. Kim (1993, 233, 234). See also Kim’s quote of Moore on p. 233. 22. According to Reid, this same figurative way of assigning properties to objects that actually are properties of the mind of the object’s creator occurs with regards to works of art, science, and God’s creation and so on, cf. IP 773–5. 23. However, elsewhere Reid distinguishes between the inherent value of an action in abstraction of the intentions of an agent and the value of an action given the agent’s intentions (AP 394, 395; cf. my Chapter 2).

2

Different forms of intuitionism

1. By active principles of man, Reid means instincts, desires, and rationality; cf. Essay III of the AP. 2. Rawls (1971, 45) claims that his attempt to provide for a serial ordering of moral principles is a novelty, but Reid already did so 200 years before Rawls, and Sidgwick can be understood to attempt something similar, as will become clear below. 3. Cf. AP 431: ‘The simple rule, of not doing to his neighbour what he [a man] would think wrong to be done to himself, would lead him to the knowledge of every branch of justice.’ 4. Sidgwick calls these ‘Principles’ with a capital P, while principles with a small p refer to principles in the sense of ‘first principles’. 5. Hedonism here means the prevention of pain and the maximization of happiness. 6. Actually, Sidgwick claims that universal hedonism and egoistic hedonism are equally self-evident but lead to contrary results; this is what he calls the ‘paradox of practical reason’, an issue I will not discuss any further. 7. Concerning the end of happiness understood in an egoistic way, Sidgwick believes that the most reliable method is ‘empirical hedonism’. 8. J.B. Schneewind (1977, 291) emphasizes that Sidgwick reformulates these axioms several times throughout ME; these are the shortest versions, but probably not the most complete. 9. Cf. the discussion of nonreductionism in Chapter 1. 10. Hence Rawls misrepresents Sidgwick completely when he says that ‘[c]lassical utilitarianism tries, of course, to avoid the appeal to intuition altogether’ (Rawls 1971, 40, 41), where he refers to Sidgwick explicitly. This might be due to Rawls’s own disputable definition of intuition as particular basic moral belief, but this is a definition which is (at least concerning the intuitionists) historically incorrect and causes a misrepresentation of the intuitionists’ views. I will come back to this at the end of this chapter. 11. The theory of the ‘organic whole’ can in Moore’s words be summarized as this: ‘The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts’ (PE 28).


Notes 185


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Notes

12. Prima facie is meant as ‘as far as it goes’. I will explain this idea in more detail in Section 3. 13. This is a different formulation of the principle of justice than the one I quoted in Section 2. Note that the other formulation is in positive terms, but still Sidgwick would find that principle insufficient. 14. Note that in contemporary literature the notion ‘pro tanto reason’ (meaning ‘as far as it goes’, see Dancy 1993, 180) is sometimes used instead of prima facie duty, to avoid the misleading expression ‘prima facie’, which might suggest that it is immediately obvious what our duty is; indeed Ross was not happy with that expression (RG 20). 15. In this context, Ross only refers to Kant, but I think his point is valid against all kinds of monist theories, cf. McNaughton (1988) 198. Cf. also De Haan (2000), who argues that monist theories cannot acknowledge the possibility of moral dilemmas; according to him a Rossian-style pluralist intuitionism can give the most plausible account of what a moral dilemma is and why we experience it as such. 16. I try to avoid the term deontology, as it might be understood as referring to unconditional duties (as Sidgwick presents it). As I will argue in this section, Reid and Ross are well aware of the importance of considering consequences of actions, but not in the sense of maximizing outcomes. 17. Cf. Chapter 1, Section 5. 18. This is how Ross calls Moore’s consequentialist position. 19. Cf. FE 71, 72. Ross only talks about two individuals here, but the way I construed the example might be even more revealing. 20. Which was probably not justified, cf. Donagan (1977). 21. Zimmerman (1999) argues that it is wrong to say that pleasure as such has intrinsic value, as there can also be inappropriate or undeserved pleasure, that is, the pleasure in something morally bad (cf. especially p. 659). 22. Cf. Reid, who also says that we cannot define the notion of moral obligation: ‘Moral obligation is a relation of its own kind, which every man understands, but it is perhaps too simple to admit of logical definition’ (AP 229). 23. Several philosophers say this in their criticism of Sidgwick, for example, Broad (1951), cf. especially p. 221, and Raphael (1974). 24. Some have taken Moore to (implicitly) defend conservatism: We should rely on what is generally taken to be morally right instead of judging for ourselves; cf. Regan (1986). Regan himself does not agree with this interpretation of Moore. According to Regan, Moore was mainly defending a progressive theory, which should be evident from the fact that he was so influential on the far-from-conservative Bloomsbury’s group. This was because of Moore’s emphasis on aestheticism. Maybe we can say that Moore underestimated the possible implications of his skepticism and connected defense of traditional rules. 25. Reid (1997, 19). 26. On this point, Alston (1993) also offers an extensive argument; cf. my discussion in Chapter 1, Section 4. 27. For example Reid’s introduction to the Inquiry into the Human Mind (1997) [1764] is a humorous polemic against the skeptical philosopher in defense of the convictions of the common person.


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Notes 187 28. This is one of Reid’s first principles of morals, and although it refers mainly to our knowledge about our own duties, we can also extend it to our moral judgments in general.

Typical objections against intuitionism

1. For more about this point, see Chapter 4. 2. Cf. DePaul (1993) who writes about the importance of formative experiences. 3. Cf. Chapter 1, in which I discuss Reid’s view that conscience needs to be developed. 4. Note that recently, the biologist Marc Hauser (2006) has also developed an account of a ‘Moral Sense’ that is close to Reid’s. 5. For a general criticism of the causal requirement for knowledge such as most famously formulated by Benacerraf (1973), cf. Plantinga (1993b), 113–21.

4

Particular intuitions and emotions

1. In my discussion of Dancy’s ideas I will not always insert exact references since I extract Dancy’s position from his many publications on this matter and from conversation with him. 2. An analogous account holds for wrong-makers: If an action is overall wrong, it is made wrong by the ‘wrong-making base’, which is the resultance base that only includes those properties that count directly against the action. 3. Cf. my schemas 1 and 2 further on that are meant to illustrate the same point. 4. In a particularist sense: They are necessary in this case but need not be so in another case. The same holds for all other morally relevant features; they can be necessary and/or sufficient in this specific case without needing to be so everywhere or anywhere else. 5. For a list of what Ross takes to be prima facie duties, see Chapter 2. 6. In contemporary literature the notion ‘pro tanto reasons’ is sometimes used instead of prima facie duties, cf. Chapter 2, n. 14. 7. Dancy says something analogous about value (Dancy 2000b, 139). 8. Dancy points to this phenomenon as well, cf. Dancy (2000b). 9. It is not clear whether with basic moral facts Dancy refers to contributing features or to overall normative reasons. In what follows I will assume that he means contributing features. 10. In this view, it is still reasonable to speak of a moral sense instead of a normative sense, since it is implausible that we can understand other normative reasons, such as epistemic norms or logical norms, through sympathy. 11. At the Bled Conference on Particularism (June 13–18, 2005) during the discussion of a paper which I have presented there, and on which this section is based.


3


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188

Notes

12. There are also emotional cognitivists who claim that emotions can be solely defined as cognitive states. This is a controversial form of emotional cognitivism and not the one that I defend.

Affectual intuitionism

1. Ewing says in two passages that we need affective states in order to have moral knowledge (cf. Ewing 1929; 194, 215), but he does not defend this thesis in much detail. 2. Reid wonders whether this is an animal or rational principle. He concludes that it is a lower principle not because animals have it (although he admits that they might) but because it is also developed in people who are not virtuous or reasonable (AP 153). 3. Indeed, de Waal (1996) gives empirical evidence for the existence of social emotions in primates and other animals. 4. This is the meaning of the term feeling in the strict, technical sense. 5. Note that Reid sometimes also calls these ‘feelings’ (e.g., AP 469). 6. In the broad sense, comprising feelings in the technical sense and also affections, esteem, and so on. 7. However, Susan James (1997) argues that, for example, many 17th-century’s philosophers thought that passions and emotions were of vital importance to human existence. 8. This is also pointed out by Ben Ze’ev (2000b, 39). 9. Cf. Damasio (1994) and his famous ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis for a similar account. 10. I here use value judgment as a generic term, including evaluative judgments about good and bad, normative judgments about right and wrong, and judgments about virtues and vices. 11. According to Linda Zagzebski (2003) emotions are unitary states that have a cognitive and an affective aspect. Similarly, Robert C. Roberts (2003) analyzes emotions as ‘concern-based construals’. ‘Concern’ refers to the affective aspect of emotions, construal to the belief-like or cognition-like aspect of emotions, that is, the way we conceive of something. 12. Here is a clear link to virtue ethics. Indeed, just as traditional intuitionists work in the Aristotelian tradition, so do many emotional cognitivists. However, traditional intuitionism and affectual intuitionism go beyond Aristotelian virtue ethics by also emphasizing the importance of deontological and consequentialist considerations in ethics, next to virtue ethical considerations. 13. DePaul (1993) writes about the importance of formative experiences, but he does not emphasize the role affective states play in these kinds of experiences. 14. Indeed, Slovic and his colleagues conducted further studies which show that compassion starts to diminish if the number of victims is 2. 15. Trolley problems have become very popular in the philosophical and psychological literature on moral judgments. They were initially conceived of


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16.

17.

18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

by Philippa Foot (1967) and further developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976, 1985). There are many other cases that cover the terrain between these two possibilities a. and b. These alternative cases might help to give us a better understanding of what the crucial differences between our intuitions are (cf. Hauser 2006, 110–20; Kamm 2007). Haidt (2003) acknowledges this but says that this is the exception rather than the rule – an empirical claim that should be further investigated. ‘[T]hat each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as mush as his own’ (Sidgwick 1901, 380). This principle is roughly similar to the principle of equality that I mentioned before. Timmons (2007) raises the same point against Greene, explicitly referring to Ross and Prichard. For thorough discussions and overviews of the variety of possible positions in these debates, see among others Parfit (1997) and Dancy (2000a). The problem has initially been stated by McNaughton (1988, 23). Cf. Scherer (1984, 294). Note that Scherer uses the notion of component, whereas other emotional cognitivists prefer the notion of aspect, since component might wrongly suggest that emotions are contingent amalgams of other states. I will come back to this issue further on. Nevertheless, Zagzebski acknowledges the possibility that people have motivational responses to thin moral concepts without necessarily being emotional about them, cf. Zagzebski (2003, 122). Cf. Ben-Ze’ev (2000a), who writes about the fact that emotions are typically focused on what is close by. This is an option McDowell does not acknowledge; cf. Zagzebski (2003, 106, 107). Cf. Smith (1994, 120), who quotes Stocker about this. de Sousa (1987, 165) offers several arguments why emotions cannot be reduced to either belief or desire, nor to a simple combination of both. Cf. Frijda (1986, 110–14), for empirical evidence concerning the variability of the motivational force of emotions. Frijda (1986, 113–14) argues that so far there is no convincing empirical evidence that there is a consistent pattern between arousal and performance (or, in the terminology of this chapter, feeling intensity and motivation), despite the popularity of the socalled inverted U-curve or Yerkes–Dodson law, which claims that there is an optimal point up to which increasing arousal leads to increased performance and after which it is supposed to drop. Features 2 and 3 are meant to capture Zagzebski’s idea of ‘thinning’. Cf. Zagzebski (2003, 123): ‘In short, moral motivation is confusing because we cannot account for the connection between our motivating emotions and our judgments by one single mechanism. Nonetheless, our psychology is economical. There is an important class of cases in which the judgment itself is motivating because these judgments are expressions of emotion. Those moral judgments that are not expressions of emotion are the descendants to those that are, and while they require the development of a backup mechanism of moral motivation,


Notes 189


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190

Notes

Epilogue: new perspectives in moral philosophy 1. Affectual intuitionism is, for example, also compatible with Ross’s generalist ontology.


they are not wholly devoid of the motivating force of those judgments from which they derive.’ Roberts (2003) also gives various lists of paradigmatic features of emotions instead of necessary and sufficient conditions. 31. I here choose the formulation of weak internalism: ‘can be’ instead of ‘are’ in order to allow for akrasia.


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Wollheim, Richard (1999), On the Emotions. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press. Wolterstorff, Nicholas (2001), Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van Woudenberg, René (2000), ‘Moral Responsibility and Agent Causation. A Discussion of Thomas Reid’s Views’, in Ton van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 143–53. Yaffe, Gideon (2005), Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid’s Theory of Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zagzebski, L. (2003): ‘Emotion and Moral Judgment’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, 104–24. Zimmerman, Michael J. (1999), ‘Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LIX, 653–66.


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9780230_232679_09_ref.indd 198

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actual duties (duties proper), 59, 118–19 act-utilitarianism, 66 aesthetic enjoyment, 68, 125 intrinsic value, 52–3 affections, 142 affective states, 133, 134, 138–9 Little on need for, 135 Reid on, xv–xvi, 138, 139–43 Reid on role and importance, 143–5 Reid’s types, 142 affectual intuitionism, xiii, xv, 109–10, 138–9, 179, 180–1 empirical psychology and, 181 and Humeanism compared, 171 intuitions as emotions, 149–58 motivation and, 167–78 neuroethical challenges, 158–67 notion, xii particularism and, 181 agent intention, 66–7, 69 agent relativity, 65 akrasia, 172–3 Alston, William P., 24 epistemization, 22–3 animal principles of action, 140, 147 benevolence, 140 a priori beliefs, 23 Aristotelianism on acquisition of moral knowledge, 12 on moral supervenience, 41 Aristotle, 41, 101, 110, 113, 183n. 2 atomism, 120–2 Audi, Robert, xiii, 4, 77 on derived beliefs, 18–19 on moral supervenience, 40, 41 on prima facie duties, 59 axiomatic beliefs, 5, 6, 13, 16 Ayer, R.J., 4 noncognitive account of morality, 7

on unverifiability of intuitions, 101–3 basic beliefs, xiv, 13 coherentists’s rejection, 13 contextualists’s contention, 13–14 intuitionists’s diverse notions, 39, 43, 46–54 justification, 21–4 self-evident, 14–17, 20–1, 97, 98 verification, 26–7, 76 beliefs basic, see basic beliefs coherentists’ views, 13 contextualists’ views, 13–14, 94–6 desire-belief dichotomy, 169, 170–4 diversity of, intuitionism and, 82–6 nonbasic, 13, 14–16, 18–20, 23–4, 26, 127, 128 perceptual, 5, 6, 13 rational, 5, 6, 13, 16, 156–7 relationship between general and particular beliefs, xiv, 10–11, 77, 116–18 scientific, 105 self-justifying, 97–8 benevolence Reid on, 140 Reid on role of, 143–4 Sidgwick on, 50–1, 56, 164 Bentham, Jeremy, 58 Benthemian hedonism, see utilitarianism Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron, 170 besires, 171 weakness of will and, 171–3 Blackburn, Simon, 4 on quasi-realism, 31, 35 Bloom, P., 162 Blum, Lawrence A., 135, 151


Index

199

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Index

Bonjour, Laurence on external vs. internal epistemic justification, 22 bottom-up generalism, 77, 113–14 Dancy’s criticism, 118–24 pluralism and, 114–16 Bowden, Peta, 4 Boyd, Richard, 4 Brandom, Robert, 36 Brandt, Richard, 36 Brink, David, 4, 13 on circularity of intuitionism, 97–8 definition of moral realism, 28, 29 Broad, C.D., 66 on plurality of methods, 114, 115–16 Broadie, Alexander on Reid’s moral sense, 146–7 bureaucratic model, Little’s, 147 Butler, Joseph notion of moral faculty, 12 Carson, Thomas L., 30 categorical imperative, 18–19, 184n. 10 causal truths, 71 Chisholm, Roderick, 13 internalist-deontological account of justification, 24 circularity of intuitionism Brink’s criticism, 97–8 Clarke, Samuel, 50 cognitive emotions, see moral approbation and disapprobation cognitive moral emotions, 148, 149 Reid’s notion, 142–3 cognitive theories of emotions, 109, 133–5, 137 see also affectual intuitionism cognitivism, xiv, 1, 28, 43 acquisition of moral knowledge and, 11–12 direct, 1 moral judgments and, 10–11 moral realism and, 169, 178 in nonreductive moral realist sense, 6, 7–8

problems with nonrealist forms, 30–6 subjectivist and emotivist account, 6–7 subjectivist and emotivist account, criticism on, 8–9 coherentism, 13 combat model, Korsgaard’s, 145–6 commonsense, 18–20, 72, 96 Reid’s views, 72, 73–6 Ross’s views, 72–3, 114 Sidgwick’s criticism, 56–7, 61, 70 compatibilist thesis, 154–5 conduct moral perception and, 87–8 conscience affective and judgmental role, 146 development, 25 consequentialism, 70 Moore’s views, 63–4 Sidgwick’s views, 61–2, 68 constitutional model, Korsgaard’s, 147 constructivism, Rawls’s, 31–2 contextualism, 13–14, 94–6 contributing features, Dancy’s, 117–18, 187n. 9 Crisp, Roger, 123 cultural relativism diverse moral beliefs and, 82, 83–4, 85 particularism vs., 95 Cuneo, Terence account of Reid’s moral perception, 106 Damasio, Antonio, xvii, 136, 156, 175 on emotions and moral beliefs, 106 Dancy, Jonathan, xiii, xv, 4, 41, 77 on basic beliefs, 128 constraints on particularism, 125–7 intuitionism criteria, 1–2 on particularlism, 116–24, 180–1 rejection of foundationalism, 127–8


200


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Index 201

egalitarian distribution utilitarianism and, 66 egoistic hedonism, 50, 51, 185n. 6 emotivism, 7 criticism, 8–9 empirical beliefs, 23 enabling conditions, Dancy’s, 117–18 Epicurean hedonism, see egoistic hedonism Epicurus, 145 ethical intuitionism, see intuitionism ethical truths, 71 evaluative account of justification, 23–4 evolutionary ethics, 38 see also neuroethics externalism, 21–4 motivational, 168 normative, 168 notion, 22 Ewing, A.C., 21, 34, 82, 128

notion of intuition, 129–31 on plurality of methods, 114, 116 fallibilism, 20–1, 44, 71 feelings, 142, 148 gut feelings, 158–64 felt value judgments, 149, 150–1, 152 Fine, Cordelia on gut feelings and rational judgments, 162, 163 Foot, Philippa, 189n. 15 foundationalism, xiv, 1, 6, 12–13, 43 Brink’s criticism, 97–8 central feature, 15–17 coherentism, 13 contextualism, 13–14 Dancy’s rejection, 127–8 fallibilism/infallibilism, 20–1, 44 intuitionism as a form of, 14–15 notion, 13 friendship, 68 intrinsic value, 52–3 Frijda, Nico, xvii, 170, 189n. 28 generalism, xiv, 10–11, 77 bottom-up approach, 113–14 bottom-up approach, Dancy’s criticism, 118–24 top-down approach, 111–12, 136 Gibbard, Allan norm expressivism of, 31, 34–5 Gilovich, Thomas, 100 Golden Rule, Reid’s, 48, 49, 85 Goldman, Alvin, 184n. 11 Greene, Joshua D. empirical research in neuroethics, xvi, 158–62 on superiority of utilitarian considerations, 163–7 Greenspan, Patricia, 110, 157, 174 gut feelings, 158 moral judgments and, 158–64 Haidt, Jonathan on neuroethics, xvi, 158, 159, 162 happiness/pleasure, 186n. 21 Sidgwick’s account, 49–50, 51–2, 61–2 Hare, R.M., 4


deontology account of justification, 23–4 nonconsequentialism and, 69–70 utilitarianism vs., 159, 163–7 depression, 175–6 derived beliefs, 13, 18–20, 23–4, 127 verification, 26 Descartes, René on foundationalism, 20, 21 desires, 131, 170 belief-desire dichotomy, 169, 170–4 role in moral judgments, 133 De Sousa, Ronald, 157 direct cognition, 1 dispositional emotions, 150–1, 167 diversity of moral beliefs intuitionism and, 82–6 dogmatic intuitionism, 79–81 Sidgwick on, 56–7 Donagan, Alan, 67 Dretske, Fred, 36 duties duty proper, 59, 118–19 prima facie, 54, 59–60, 114–15, 118–24 residual, 119


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Index

Harman, Gilbert criticism on intuitionism, 104–6 Hauser, Marc D., 164 on moral sense, 165 hedonism, 185n. 5 egoistic, 50, 51, 185n. 6 problems with, 62–4 universal, see utilitarianism: Sidgwick’s account Herman, Barbara, 4 holism of reasons, 120–3, 126–7 Hooker, Brad, 124 Howard-Snyder, F., 163 Hudson, W.D., 132, 183n. 1 Huemer, Michael, xiii, 4 Humeanism, 4, 5, 168 and affectual intuitionism compared, 171 alternative approaches to realism and relativism, 31, 33–5 belief-desire dichotomy, 169, 170, 171 Hume, David, 39 on moral perception, 9 subjectivist account of morality, 6–7 subjectivist account of morality, Sidgwick’s criticism, 8 ideal utilitarianism, Moore’s, 62–4, 65 criticism, 68 infallibilism, 20–1, 44 intended action, 66–7, 69 internalism, 21–4, 98, 155 motivational, 168, 169, 177–8 normative, 168 intramoral properties, 124 intuitionism, xii, xiii–xiv, 45–6, 183n. 2 affectual, see affectual intuitionism consequentialism vs. nonconsequentialism, 61–70 ‘core theory’, xiv, 1–3, 6, 43 criticism, xiv, xv, 3, 43–4, 45, 79, 106–7, 180 criticism of being dogmatic, 79–8 criticism of naivety, 81–100

criticism of presupposing obscure moral faculty, 100–6 criticism of unreliability, 98–100 as emotions, 151–4 Ewing’s notion, 129–31 as a form of foundationalism, 14–15 Greene and Singer’s rejection, 163–4 monism vs. pluralism, 55–61 notion and definition, 4–6 particularism and, 127–31 Sidgwick’s notion, 50–1, 55–9, 61 skepticism vs. commonsense, 70–7 types, xiv, 45–6, 78 utilitarianism and, 58–9, 68 intuitive capacity, 18, 24 intuitive induction, 113 invariant reasons, 123 isolation method/case, 52–3 just acts, 48–9 justice Sidgwick’s views, 50–1, 56, 58 justification, 14, 184n. 11 circular justification, 97–8 emotions and, 157–8 evaluative vs. deontological, 23–4 external vs. internal, 21–4 Kahneman, Daniel, 100 Kamm, Francis, 163 Kantianism on acquisition of moral knowledge, 12 Kant, Immanuel, 4, 50, 166 categorical imperative of, 18–19, 184n. 10 on lying, 121 Korsgaard, Christine, 4, 28 combat model of, 145–6 constitutional model of, 147 on normative question, 88–93


202

Ledwig, Marion, 141 Lehrer, Keith on Reid’s moral philosophy, 19


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Little, Margaret Olivia, 110 bureaucratic model of, 147 defence of particularism, 123–4 on importance of feelings and emotions, 151 on need for affective states, 135 logical positivism, 102 McDowell, John, 4, 35, 152, 172 on cognitive and affective aspects of emotions, 174 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 4 on prejudices and intuitionism, 94–7 McIntyre, Alison, 163 Mackie, J.L., 4, 8 argument from queerness, 100–1 argument from relativity, 82, 83–4 criticism on intuitionism, 81–2, 152 McNaughton, David, 4, 123 on tolerance and realism, 81 mechanical principles of action, 139 Mikhail, John on moral sense, 165 Mill, John Stuart, 37, 58–9 on utilitarianism, 51 monism, 55–9, 112, 186n. 15 Ross’s criticism, 60–1 Moore, G.E., xii, xiii, xiv, 1, 43, 45 on commonsense epistemology, 73 on ideal utilitarianism, 62–4, 65, 68 on intrinsic value of objects/state of affairs, 52–3, 64, 69–70 on moral supervenience, 41 on naturalistic fallacy, 36–9, 62 notion of moral judgment, 10 open question argument, 38, 94, 184n. 18 open question argument, Korsgaard’s criticism, 91–2 rejection of subjectivism, 8 on self-evident beliefs, 15–16, 20 skeptic position, 71–2, 186n. 24 moral approbation and disapprobation (cognitive emotions), 140–3 role and importance, 145 moral constructivism, 28 moral education, 105

203

need, 25–6 moral emotions assessment, 155–6 degrees of motivation and, 170–7, 188n. 11, 189n. 23, 189n. 30 as felt value judgments, 149, 150–1, 152 Gibbard’s evaluation, 34–5 intuitions as, 151–4 particularism and, 131–6 rationality’s impact on, 156–7, 172 Reid’s theory, xv–xvi, 138–45 as source of moral knowledge, xvi, 139, 156–8, 166–7 moral epistemology commonsense approach, 4–6 emotion-reason dichotomy, xii–xiii, 110 Humean approach, 4, 5 moral faculty development, 25–6 Mackie’s criticism, 100–1 notion, 11–12 moral judgments difficulty in making, 81–2 ground-level, 172 motivation and, 169–77 neuroethics, xvi, 139, 158–67 nonmoral judgments and, 87 notion, 10–11 objectivism, 103–4 Reid’s views, 8–9, 19–20 Ross’s views, 128–9 Sidgwick’s views, 8, 56–9, 61–2 Zagzebski’s views, 171–7 moral obligations, 93, 186n. 22 moral ontology, 39–40 Dancy’s particularist ontology, 116–18 Reid’s views, 46–7 moral perception, 10, 132 Harman’s views, 105 Hume’s views, 9 Reid’s views, 146–7, 148 Reid’s views, readings on, 106 moral problem, Smith’s, xvi, 139, 169–70 solution, 177–8


Index


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moral properties, 12, 44, 101 as analogous with secondary qualities, 35–6 intuitionist notion, 41–3 nonmoral properties and, 87 nonreductive moral realist account, 36–40 supervenience, 40–1, 87 moral realism, 28, 80–1 alternative approaches to, 30–6 cognivitism and, 169, 178 definition, 28, 29 diversity of moral beliefs and, 85 as a form of antirelativism, 31 nonreductive, see nonreductive moral realism vs. other positions, 28–9 moral sense, 137, 187n. 10 Dancy’s arguments against, 131–3 moral supervenience, 40–1, 87, 184n. 19 Moser, Paul K., 30 motivating reasons, 168 motivation affective states and, 146 based on affectual intuitionism, 175–7 moral cognition and, 88 moral emotions and, 170–7 normative vs. motivating reasons, 168 motivational externalism, 168 motivational internalism, 168, 169, 177–8 Nagel, Thomas on externalism, 168 narrative rationality, 125–7, 137 naturalism cognitivism vs., 7–8 naturalistic fallacy, Moore’s, 36–9, 62 neuroethics, xvi affectual intuitionism and, 158–67 Nichols, Shaun, 31, 175 sentimental rules-account, 31, 33–4, 103–4, 154–5 nonbasic beliefs, 13, 18–20, 23–4, 26, 127 intuiting, 18–20, 128

noncognitivism, 7 nonconsequentialism, 67–8 deontology and, 69–70 Reid’s views, 66–7 Ross’s views, 64–6 nonreductive moral realism, xiv, 1, 36–9, 43, 101 on beliefs, 171 cognitivism in, 6, 7–8 nonrelativistic theories, 31–6 normative ethics, 35, 36 Greene’s views, 163–4 Reid’s views, 47 normative externalism, 168 normative internalism, 168 normative reasons, 168 normative relationships, 116–18 normative sense, 131–2, 187n. 10 normativity, 32, 36–7, 88–93 norm expressivism, 31, 34–5 Nussbaum, Martha, xii, xvii, 110, 149 on emotions, 135–6, 151, 156, 157–8, 171 on sympathy, 163 objectivism, 110 Nichol’s argument against, 103–4, 154–5 Smith’s views, 169 occurrent emotions, 151 open question argument, Moore’s, 38, 91–2, 94, 184n. 18 paradigmatic moral emotions, 109, 136–7, 139, 150, 158, 177, 179 particularism, xiv, 10–11, 77, 109, 136–7 affecutal intuitionism and, 181 cultural relativism vs., 95 Dancy’s, 116–24, 180–1 Dancy’s constraints, 125–7 emotions and, 131–6 importance, 111–16 intuitionism and, 127–31 Little’s defence, 123–4 Sidgwick’s criticism, 56, 111–12 passions, 144, 146 impact on reason, 145


204 Index


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perception Reid’s analysis, 146–7 perceptual beliefs, 5, 6, 13 perceptual intuitionism (ultraintuitionism), 56, 70–1 perfection Sidgwick’s views, 50 philosophical intuitionism, 57 Pizarro, D.A., 162 Plantinga, Alvin, 13 externalist epistemology, 22, 23, 24 Platonism account of moral properties, 41 pluralism of duties, 43–4, 59–61 bottom-up generalism and, 114–16 Pollock, John, 20 prejudices intuitionism and, 94–7 preliminaries, 90, 129 Prichard, H.A., xiii, 22, 41, 82, 114, 128 argument for bottom-up generalism, 113 MacIntyre’s criticism, 94 notion of intuitionism, 152 position on normative question, Korsgaard’s criticism on, 89–91 on preliminaries, 90, 129 on reduction of ‘right’, 68–9 on self-evident beliefs, 17 prima facie duties, 54, 59–60, 114–15, 118–19 Dancy’s criticism, 119–24 definition, 120 primary qualities, 42 principles of action, Reid’s, 139–40, 185n. 1 Pritchard, Michael, 146 pro tanto reasons, 186n. 14, 187n. 6 see also prima facie duties prudence Sidgwick’s views, 50–1 psychology affecutal intuitionism and, 181 need for philosophical engagement with, 181–2 Pugmire, David, 149 quasi-realism, 35

205

Rachels, James, 30 rationalism-sentimentalism dichotomy, xii, xvi–xvii, 110 rational principles of action, 140, 146 moral approbation and disapprobation, 141 Rawling, Piers, 123 Rawls, John, 4, 13, 165, 185n. 2 on constructivism, 31–2 identification of intuitionism with Rossian bottom-up view, 77 notion of intuition, 185n. 10 reason atomistic conception, 120–2 basic beliefs and, 15–17 capacities, 17–18 invariant reasons, 123 moral knowledge and, 19–20 motivating vs. normative reasons, 168 narrative rationality, 125–7, 137 passion’s impact on, 145 pro tanto reason, 186n. 14, 187n. 6 reasoning capacity, 18, 24 reductionism Moore’s account against, 36–9 Regan, Tom, 186n. 24 Reid, Thomas, 1, 39, 41, 95, 128, 133, 165, 168, 182, 185n. 1–2 on basic beliefs, 14, 15, 16–17, 19, 184n. 6 basic beliefs classification, 46–9 basic beliefs verification, 26, 76 beliefs classification, 23 on capacities of reason, 17–18 on commonsense epistemology, 72, 73–6 criticism on Cartesian foundationalism, 21 externalist position, 22, 23, 24 on intellectual faculties, 84 internalist-deontological position, 24 moral emotions theory, xv–xvi, 138–45 moral emotions theory, criticism on, 145–9 on moral faculty, 11, 25–6 on moral judgments, 8–9, 10


Index


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Index

Reid, Thomas – continued on moral obligations, 186n. 22 on moral perception, 146–7, 148 on moral perception, readings on, 106 on moral qualities, 42–3 nonconsequentialist view, 66–7 notion of axioms/principles, 16 on problematic features of intuitions, 99 on relationship between moral knowledge and reasoning, 19–20 on truth and lack of understanding, 82–3 relativism, 9, 31 alternative approaches to, 30–6 unacceptability, 29–30 residual duties, 119 resultance base, 118, 184n. 19 Roberts, Robert C., xii, xvii, 135, 165, 188n. 11 Roeser, Sabine, 47, 81, 149 Ross, W.D., xii, xiii, xiv, 1, 8, 39, 43, 49, 68, 77, 82 on basic beliefs relation to basic moral truths, 15 on basic beliefs verification, 26–7, 76 on bottom-up generalism, 113–14 on bottom-up generalism, Dancy’s criticism on, 119–24 on commonsense epistemology, 72–3 criticism on ideal utilitarianism, 65 on moral judgments, 128–9 on moral supervenience, 41 nonconsequentialist view, 64–6 on objective morality, 83 pluralist stance, 43, 59–61 on prima facie duties, 54, 59–60, 118–19 Ruddick, Sara, 4 rule-utilitarianism, 66 Scherer, Klaus R., xvii on emotions, 134, 170, 189n. 22 Schneewind, J.B., 185n. 8 scientific beliefs

moral beliefs vs., 105 secondary qualities moral properties analogous with, 31, 35–6 realist account, 41–3 self-evident beliefs, 14–17, 20–1, 97, 98 self-justifying beliefs, 97–8 sense perception, 9, 100, 104, 131, 132–3 moral perception vs., 10 as source of basic beliefs, 17–18 sensibility, 105 sensitive abilities, 131–3 sentiment(s), 142 sentimentalism-rationalism dichotomy, xii, xvi–xvii, 110 sentimentalist deontology, 166 sentimental rules-account, 31, 33–4, 103–4, 154–5 Sidgwick, Henry, xii, xiii, xiv, 1–2, 27, 39, 43, 45, 67, 73 on basic beliefs, 14 consequentialist view, 61–2, 68, 70 criticism on particularism, 56, 111–12 on means to achieve ultimate ends, 49–52 monist stance, 55–9, 61, 112 on moral supervenience, 40, 41 paradox of practical reason, 185n. 6 rejection of Hume’s subjectivism, 8 skeptical position, 70–1 on top-down generalism, 111–12 on utilitarianism, 50, 51–2, 58–9, 61–2, 68, 115–16, 164 SIM, see social-intuitionist model Singer, Peter on superiority of utilitarian considerations, 163–4, 165 Sinnot-Armstrong, Walter on unreliability of intuitionism, 98–100 skepticism, 70–2, 76–7 Reid’s rejection, 74–6 Slovic, Paul, 157, 172, 188n. 14 Smith, Jonathan, 99–100


206


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Smith, Michael on besire-like state, 171–4 on Humean belief-desire dichotomy, 173 on moral problem, xvi, 139, 169–70, 177–8 social-intuitionist model (SIM), Haidt’s, 162 Solomon, Robert, xii, xvii, 135, 149 Spencer, Herbert on evolutionary ethics, 38 Stevenson, Charles L., 4, 7 Stocker, Michael, xvii Stratton-Lake, Philip, xiii, 4 Sturgeon, Nicholas, 4 subjectivism, 6–7 criticism, 8–9 substantive realism Korsgaard’s criticism, 92–3 supererogatory acts, 48–9 sympathy, 131–3, 137, 152–3, 157, 163 passion’s role in, 144 relevance of utilitarian principle and, 167 theorems, 19, 184n. 12 Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 189n. 15 Timmons, Mark, 13 sentimentalist deontology, 166 top-down generalism, 77, 136 Sidgwick’s account, 111–12 trolley problems, 159, 189n. 15 Tronto, Joan, 4 Tversky, A., 100 ultraintuitionism, see perceptual intuitionism unconscious utilitarianism, 58, 73 Unger, Peter, 166 universal hedonism, see utilitarianism: Sidgwick’s account utilitarianism act-utilitarianism, 66

207

deontology vs., 159, 163–7 dispositional emotions’ role in, 167 Mill’s views, 51 Moore’s criticism, 62–4, 68 Ross’s criticism, 60 rule-utilitarianism, 66 Sidgwick’s views, 50, 51–2, 58–9, 61–2 Sidgwick’s views, criticism on, 115–16 unconscious utilitarianism, 58, 73 verification, 26–7, 76 Ayer’s criticism, 101–3 virtues, 48–9 Walker, Margaret Urban, 4 Warnock, G.J. criticism that intuitionism is uninformative, 86–8 Wellman, Carl, 30 Whewell, William, 67 Wiggins, David, 4 Wilberforce, William, 83 Williams, Bernard, 4 on normative reason, 168 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 123 Wollheim, Richard, 150–1 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 106 Van Woudenberg, René, 47 Yaffe, Gideon, 47 Zagzebski, Linda, 110, 134, 135, 152, 165 on variability of motivational force of emotions, 171–3, 188n. 11, 189n. 23, 189n. 30 on variability of motivational force of emotions, criticism on, 173–4, 175–6 Zajonc, Robert, 134 Zimmerman, Michael J., 121, 186n. 21


Index


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Moral Emotions and Intuitions

Moral Emotions and Intuitions

Illicit Intuitions

Illicit Intuitions

Illicit Intuitions

Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology

Social Motivation, Justice, And The Moral Emotions: An Attributional Approach

Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms

Social Motivation, Justice, And The Moral Emotions: An Attributional Approach

Existentialism and Human Emotions

Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Cognitive Equilibrium

Philosophical Intuitions and Scepticism about Judgment

Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgments

Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory

Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction

Existentialism and Human Emotions

Motivation, Emotions and Leadership

Emotions and Religious Ethics

Emotions, stress, and health

Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Moral Traditions)

Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium

Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry (Moral Traditions)

Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology

Rekindled Emotions

Forgotten Emotions

Sensing Emotions

Deadly Emotions

Uncommon Emotions

Acting Emotions

Deadly Emotions

Emotions, Values, and the Law

Moral Emotions and Intuitions