Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651

MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE BRITISH CIVIL WARS, 1642–1651 Despite the wealth of British Civil Wars studies, little work...

Author: Stanley D.M. Carpenter

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MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE BRITISH CIVIL WARS, 1642–1651

Despite the wealth of British Civil Wars studies, little work addresses the nature of military leadership effectiveness in terms of the eventual result – parliamentary victory. It is no longer sufficient to credit religion, economics, localism or constitutional concepts for the outcome without considering the role of effective military leadership. Leadership studies advocating inherent characteristics as the basis of successful command have been conducted since ancient civilizations organized military forces. This study synthesizes elements of leadership analysis into a proposed model comprised of consistency, moral authority, aggressiveness and martial superiority, as modified by behaviour, human dynamics and context. For the general military history reader, the work provides a concise strategic and operational narrative of the British Civil Wars of 1642–1651 in northern England and Scotland. For historians, it offers an additional causative explanation for ultimate parliamentary victory. As a study of effective military leadership, it proposes, through a case study analysis based on a framework of characteristics and behaviour of specific commanders from the wildly successful to the abysmal failure, a model of effective millitary leadership for present and successive generations of military, naval and air officers at all levels of command. Stanley D. M. Carpenter is a Professor of Strategy and Policy and the official Command Historian at the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and has served as a United States naval officer since 1979 in both active and naval reserve status. His major field of research is seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury British military and naval history.

CASS MILITARY STUDIES SERIES I N T E L L I G E N C E AC T I V I T I E S I N A N C I E N T RO M E Trust in the gods, but verify Rose Mary Sheldon C L AU S E W I T Z A N D A F R I C A N WA R Politics and strategy in Liberia and Somalia Isabelle Duyvesteyn S T R AT E G Y A N D P O L I T I C S I N T H E M I D D L E E A S T, 1 9 5 4 – 6 0 Defending the Northern Tier Michael Cohen T H E C U BA N I N T E RV E N T I O N I N A N G O L A , 1 9 6 5 – 1 9 9 1 From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale Edward George M I L I TA RY L E A D E R S H I P I N T H E B R I T I S H C I V I L WA R S , 1 6 42 – 1 6 5 1 ‘The Genius of this Age’ Stanley D. M. Carpenter I S R A E L’ S R E P R I S A L P O L I C Y, 1 9 5 3 – 1 9 5 6 The dynamics of military retaliation Ze’ev Drory B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G OV I NA I N T H E S E C O N D W O R L D WA R Enver Redzic LEADERS IN WAR West Point remembers the 1991 Gulf War Frederick Kagan and Christian Kubik (eds) B OY S O L D I E R The defence of Budapest, 1944–45 Erwin Galantay C O N S C R I P T I O N I N NA P O L E O N I C E U RO P E , 1 7 8 9 – 1 8 1 5 A revolution in military affairs Donald Stoker and Harold Blanton (eds) THE ARMY OF KHEDIVE ISMAIL John Dunn Y U G O S L AV M I L I TA RY I N D U S T RY, 1 9 1 8 – 1 9 9 1 Amadeo Watkins R A I LWAY S A N D T H E RU S S O – JA PA N E S E WA R Harold Shukman and Felix Patrikeeff C O R P O R A L H I T L E R A N D T H E G R E AT WA R , 1 9 1 4 – 1 9 1 8 The List Regiment John F. Williams B R I T I S H WA R P L A N S , 1 9 1 9 – 1 9 3 9 Steven Ross

MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN THE BRITISH CIVIL WARS, 1642–1651 ‘The Genius of this Age’

Stanley D. M. Carpenter

FRANK CASS LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2005 by Frank Cass 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Frank Cass 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Stanley D. M. Carpenter All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no reprsentation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracry of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Carpenter, Stanley D. M. Military leadership in the British civil wars, 1642–1651 : “the genius of this age” / Stanley D. M. Carpenter p. cm. Include bibliographical references (p. ) and index. 1. Great Britain–History–Civil War, 1642–1649. 2. Military art and science–Great Britain–History–17th century. 3. Great Britain–History, Military–1603–1714. I. Title. DA415.C313 2005 942.06´24–dc2 204014473 ISBN 0-203-50404-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-58244-6 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–714–65544–9 (Print Edition)

This work is dedicated to Professor Michael I. Handel, colleague, mentor and friend, who taught me how to think strategically and to Noble Wells, USMC, Gerald Wells, USMCR, Christopher Wallace, USAAF, and William Carpenter, USAAF, who fought the good fight.

CONTENTS

List of figures Abbreviations Acknowledgements

ix x xiv

Introduction: ‘The Minstrel Boy to the war is gone’

1

P A RT I

The minstrel boy 1

9

The art of command: concepts of military leadership

11

‘Great Man’: traits as the determinant of leadership effectiveness – the traditional view 12 The chaos of war and the human element 14 Characteristics of effective command 16 2

Politics, religion and war in early seventeenth-century Britain

28

‘So dangerous a season’: the contextual background of the Civil Wars 29 Conflict in Yorkshire and the coming of Civil War 37 Choosing sides and the motivation to fight 42 The Push of Pike: warfare in seventeenth-century Britain 46 Pre-Civil War military experience, training and literature 53 P A RT I I

Chariot of fire 3

57

‘Miserable Bloody Distempers’ : Civil War in the north Lord Fairfax and the Yorkshire Treaty 60 Lord Fairfax, Newcastle and the War in Yorkshire

62

59

CONTENTS

Raising forces: recruitment, discipline and equipping 66 War in the north 72 The Scottish alliance 78 ‘The Devouring Sword’: parliamentary counterattack 80 The Army of the Covenant 81 Parliamentary resurgence in the north 85 4

‘In the Ranks of Death’: Royalist defeat and the New Model Army, 1644–1647

90

Marston Moor and its aftermath: the making and breaking of reputations 91 The New Model Army 103 Lambert’s independent command in the north and the end of the First Civil War 110 5

‘Inexorable things’: Civil War in the north, 1648

119

‘Prodigious treason’: the outbreak of the Second Civil War 120 ‘The Gentleman is in the Briars’: Lambert and Langdale 127 ‘Very hard at fisticuffes’: the Scottish invasion 129 ‘There being so much of God’: the battle of Preston 134 6

‘My bow and arrows’: the Third Civil War, 1650–1651

144

‘Controversie by the sword’: the invasion of Scotland 145 ‘Signal mercy’: the battle of Dunbar 149 ‘A dark sad business’: the battle of Hamilton 154 ‘A very glorious mercy’: the battle of Inverkeithing 158 The Worcester campaign 160 Conclusion: military effectiveness: a relative assessment

165

Models of effective military leadership and the study of war 169 Appendix: Biographical sketches

170

Notes Select bibliography Index

189 214 223

viii

RU N N I N G H E A D

LIST OF FIGURES

0.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3

Civil War in England The conflict in Yorkshire, 1642–5 Marston Moor, 2 July 1644 Scottish invasion/Preston campaign, 1648 The Scottish campaign, 1650–1 Battle of Dunbar, 3 September 1650 The Battle of Worcester, 3 September 1651

ix

xvi 60 91 130 146 150 161

A B B R E V I AT I O N S

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbott

Ashton, Counter-Revolution

Baillie

Bell

Bodl., Tanner MSS Burnet, Hamilton

Carlton, Going to the Wars

Cary

CJ Clarendon

CSPD CSPI

Oliver Cromwell, The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 4 vols, ed. Wilbur Cortez Abbott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937–47). Robert Ashton, Counter-Revolution: The Second Civil War and Its Origins, 1646–8 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994). Robert Baillie, The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, 3 vols, ed. David Laing (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1841–2). Robert Bell (ed.) Memorials of the Civil War: Comprising the Correspondence of the Fairfax Family With the Most Distinguished Personages Engaged in That Memorable Contest, 2 vols (London: Richard Bentley, 1849). Tanner Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford. Gilbert Burnet, Memoires of the Lives and Actions of James and William Dukes of Hamilton and Castleherald (London, 1677). Charles Carlton, Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars, 1638–1651 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1992). Henry Cary, ed., Memorials of the Great Civil War in England from 1646 to 1652, 2 vols (London: Henry Colburn, 1842). Journals of the House of Commons. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England Begun in the Year 1641, ed. W. Dunn Macray, 6 vols (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series. Calendar of State Papers Relating to Ireland. x


CSPV Dawson

DNB EHR Fairfax

Fairfax, Short Memorial

Firth, CA

Firth, Regiments

Gardiner, CW

Gentles

Hamilton

HMC Hodgson, Memoirs

Hutton, Royalist War Effort Johnston, Diary

Calendar of State Papers … Venice. William H. Dawson, Cromwell’s Understudy: The Life and Times of General John Lambert and the Rise and Fall of the Protectorate (London: William Hodge, 1938). Dictionary of National Biography. English Historical Review. George W. Johnson (ed.) The Fairfax Correspondence: Memoirs of the Reign of Charles the First, 2 vols (London: Richard Bentley, 1848). Thomas, Third Lord Fairfax, ‘A Short Memorial of the Northern Actions; During the War There, From the Year 1642 Till the Year 1644’, in Stuart Tracts, 1603–1693, ed. C. H. Firth (New York: Cooper Square, 1964). C. H. Firth, Cromwell’s Army: A History of the English Soldier During the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, 4th edn. (London: Methuen, 1962). C. H. Firth, The Regimental History of Cromwell’s Army, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). Samuel R. Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, 1642–1649, 4 vols (London: Longmans, Green, 1898–1910). Ian Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland, and Scotland, 1645–1653 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992). Samuel R. Gardiner (ed.) The Hamilton Papers: Being Selections from Original Letters in the Possession of His Grace the Duke of Hamilton and Brandon, Relating to the Years 1638–1650, NS (London: Camden Society, 1880). Historical Manuscripts Commission, Reports. John Hodgson, Original Memoirs, Written During the Great Civil War; Being the Life of Sir Henry Slingsby, and Memoirs of Capt. Hodgson (Edinburgh: James Bannatyne, 1806). Ronald Hutton, The Royalist War Effort, 1642– 1646 (London: Longman, 1982). Archibald Johnston, Diary of Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston, 4 vols, ed. David H. Fleming (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1919). xi


Kenyon

John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (eds) The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 1638–1660 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Kishlansky Mark A. Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). LJ Journals of the House of Lords. Maseres, Select Tracts Francis Maseres (ed.) Select Tracts Relating to the Civil Wars in England, 2 vols (London, 1815). Newcastle Anon., The First Duke and Duchess of Newcastleupon-Tyne (London: Longmans, Green, 1910). Packets of Letters Packets of Letters … to Members of the House of Commons (London, 1648). PP Past and Present. PRO, SP Public Record Office, London, State Papers Domestic. Roots, Great Rebellion Ivan Roots, The Great Rebellion, 1642–1660 (London: B. T. Batsford, 1966). Rubinstein, Luckless Hilary L. Rubinstein, Captain Luckless: James, First Duke of Hamilton, 1606–1649 (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1976). Rushworth, part 3 John Rushworth, Historical Collections: Containing the Principal Matters Which Happened from the Meeting of the Parliament, November the 3d. 1640 to the End of the Year, 1644 (London, 1691). Rushworth, part 4 John Rushworth, Historical Collections: Containing the Principal Matters Which Happened from the Beginning of the Year 1645, to the Death of King Charles the First 1648 (London, 1701). Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva Joshua Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva, Englands Recovery (London, 1647). Stevenson, Counter-Revolution David Stevenson, Revolution and CounterRevolution in Scotland, 1644–1651 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1977). Stevenson, Revolution David Stevenson, The Scottish Revolution, 1637– 1644: The Triumph of the Covenanters (Newton Abbott: David & Charles, 1973). TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. Trease, Cavalier Geoffrey Trease, Portrait of a Cavalier: William Cavendish, First Duke of Newcastle (London: Macmillan, 1979).

xii


Turner, Memoirs Warwick, Memoirs

Whitelock, Diary

Whitelock, Memorials Whitelock, English Affairs

Wilson, Fairfax Woolrych, Battles Worc. Coll., Clarke MSS

Sir James Turner, Memoirs of his own Life and Times (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1829). Sir Philip Warwick, Memoirs of the Reign of King Charles the First (Edinburgh: John Bannatyne, 1813). Bulstrode Whitelock, The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke, 1605–1675, ed. Ruth Spalding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Bulstrode Whitelock, Memorials of the English Affairs (London, 1682). Bulstrode Whitelock, Memorials of the English Affairs, 4 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1853). John Wilson, Fairfax: A Life of Thomas, Lord Fairfax (London: John Murray, 1985). Austin Woolrych, Battles of the English Civil War (London: B. T. Batsford, 1961). Clarke Manuscripts, Worcester College, Oxford.

xiii

AC K N OW L E D G E M E N T S

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the late autumn of 1981 as a young naval officer, I became fascinated with the concept of what made for effective military leadership. Having served as a cruiser division officer for almost two years, I had a wonderful opportunity to observe different leadership styles ranging from the highly successful to the woefully abysmal. My interest in leadership actually dated back to Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island. My company met with the base senior chaplain, a Navy captain who had served as a junior officer onboard a destroyer in the Second World War. He addressed effective leadership and the qualities of a good officer and cited a most memorable anecdote. He told us of standing watch as officer of the deck one dark, quiet Pacific night and of asking the quartermaster of the watch, a very senior professional Navy man, what quality he most desired in a junior officer. Without a moment’s hesitation, the petty officer replied, ‘consistency’. That story struck a chord and two years later as I headed back to Norfolk from shore leave on a Sunday afternoon, I pondered what I thought constituted the most desired qualities of an effective officer. I fully intended to submit an entry to a Chief of Naval Operations leadership essay contest. As things would have it, I never did write the essay. But I remembered for years afterwards the six characteristics of an effective military leader as I thought them through on that cool, crisp November afternoon: ability to see the big picture as well as the little picture, flexibility, aggressiveness, integrity, and, of course, consistency. In twenty-five years of naval service, both active duty and reserve, my belief in those characteristics of effective military leadership has only strengthened. The reader of this study will see those characteristics reflected in the proposed model of effective military leadership. I am particularly grateful to a number of friends and colleagues who supported and encouraged me in this project. To the late Michael Handel, my colleague at the Naval War College, I wish fair winds and following seas. He taught me how to think strategically and I am most grateful for his friendship and mentoring. Several colleagues at the Naval War College graciously critiqued the manuscript and I thank them for their keen insight, suggestions and observations particularly Professors George Baer and Richard Megargee. I am also grateful to Dean Michael Pavkovic of Hawaii Pacific University, one of our non-resident Strategy and Policy xiv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

seminar professors, who also runs a highly regarded military and diplomatic studies programme at HPU, for his advice on writing and publishing. Additionally, my thanks go to Professor Charles Carlton of North Carolina State University, a giant in the field of British Civil War and Stuart Britain studies, who offered a critique from the perspective of not only academia, but having been a serving officer in the Welch Regiment and the Special Air Service. And I am particularly grateful to Professor Jeremy Black of Exeter University and one of the world’s leading military studies historian for his advice, encouragement and support. When this idea was just a dim light bulb in the mind, the late Professor Richard Greaves of Florida State University, who demanded nothing but the best in writing and research from his students, shepherded me through the topic as a doctoral dissertation now come fully to fruition. Professor Bruce Lenman of the University of St Andrews first taught me how to research and produce a solid historical piece and I am forever grateful. Also, thanks to Professor David Mock of Tallahassee Community College and an Army Reserve officer, who initially suggested a case study analysis of effective military leadership. I wish to thank former Naval War College Dean of Academics Charles Neimeyer, College of Distance Education Director Timothy Jackson and Deputy Director Walt Wildemann, and Strategy and Policy Division Head Douglas Smith for their support and encouragement, without which, this project would not have been possible. Many thanks go to Peter Harrington of the Anne S. K. Brown Collection at Brown University for assistance with portraits and period prints as well as Pat Rossoni of the Naval War College for the excellent maps. And, finally, to Stewart Cass and Andrew Humphrys of Frank Cass, Publishers, for their faith in my work. Stanley D. M. Carpenter Strategy and Policy Division College of Distance Education US Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island December 2004

xv

AC K N OW L E D G E M E N T S

Figure 0.1 Civil War in England

xvi

T H E M I N S T R E L B OY TO T H E WA R I S G O N E

INTRODUCTION ‘The Minstrel Boy to the war is gone’

The impact of effective military leadership in influencing the outcome of conflict represents one of the least analysed aspects of the British Civil War experience. Although the results and specific incidents of the military events are welldocumented, very little attention has been paid to the fundamental issue of how the martial characteristics and actions of specific commanders shaped the course of the conflict. Previous Civil War narrative military histories such as those of Samuel R. Gardiner, Austin Woolrych and Peter Young have done a superb job laying out the physical conditions, operational events and tactical aspects of the struggles, but they provide little analytical comment on contextual factors in determining the outcome.1 However, owing largely to the influence of Sir Michael Howard beginning in the 1960s and historians in the following decades, the societal context and the analysis of why and how people fight have become essential concerns for military historians.2 On the other hand, recent histories of the parliamentary and royalist forces concentrating on the contextual (social, economic, religious, constitutional, political and regional) aspects of the military experience generally fail to address the seminal role of leadership. Thousands of words have been penned asserting that parliamentary military victory resulted from factors such as Protestant religious zeal, defence of traditional privileges as guaranteed by the ‘ancient constitution’ against perceived arbitrary royal power or fear of a Catholic restoration. While these arguments convincingly establish individual or collective motivation to rebel and fight, they do not explain fully the ultimate military outcome. The early nineteenth-century Prussian theorist of war, General Carl von Clausewitz, asserts that the quality of the military instrument is fundamentally important in determining the outcome in war. Without an effective military instrument, no strategy or resultant operational plan can succeed (save for the rare occurrence of pure blind luck). Inherent in the quality of the instrument are such characteristics as ‘moral forces’ (e.g. motivation to fight based on religious, philosophical, nationalistic or cultural zeal and a willingness to sacrifice for the cause); technological advantage; training; discipline; and, tactical or doctrinal superiority. Assuming all other factors being equal, a situation typical in a Westernstyle civil war, the: 1

I N T RO D U C T I O N

only remaining factor that can produce marked superiority, aside from familiarity with war, consists of the talents of the commander-in-chief, which hardly bear a constant relationship to the cultural standards of the people and the army, and are, indeed, completely left to chance.3 It is all well and good to possess the raw materials – zeal, motivation, resources both material and human (i.e. the superior military instrument) – but without effective command to lead, guide, direct and inspire troops and manage resources, success is rarely achievable. It is ultimately at the ‘spear’s point’ of leadership that wars are won. Regardless of how powerful the combatants’ passions or skills, unless they can be shaped, focused and directed by effective leadership, failure is almost inevitable. The study of human conflict over the centuries has revealed a simple, immutable truth – the finest, most inspired, motivated, well-trained, disciplined, experienced and equipped force is quite like a modern cruise missile. Without effective guidance (leadership), it is no more than a collection of very expensive parts. Although works by noted historians such as Ian Gentles, Mark Kishlansky, P. R. Newman, Charles Carlton, Ronald Hutton, John Kenyon and Robert Ashton properly cite the contextual factors that influenced the course of the struggle or provided a basis for morale and individual motivation to fight, they do not fully evaluate the nature of effective military leadership.4 It is no longer sufficient to credit parliamentary battlefield victories to ‘better commanders’ and ‘more talented officers’ or religious motivation without critical analysis of the role of effective leadership in moulding and employing the military instrument. It is a tale still largely untold. While a great deal of research and analysis on effective military leadership has been published in the last three decades particularly on the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War and modern world wars, there is not yet a study dedicated to British Civil War leadership and its relationship to the eventual military outcome. This work directly addresses that missing link in the historiography of the British Civil Wars and the resultant seventeenth-century English Revolution.5 The central purpose of this work is to demonstrate the impact of effective military leadership in a conflict where the essential factors of technology, doctrine and organization as well as civil and societal culture are essentially identical. This work uses the case study method in examining six regional commanders in the north of England and southern Scotland from 1642 to 1651. Technically, four distinct civil wars roiled the British Isles in this period: the Anglo-Scottish Bishops’ Wars of 1639– 40; the First Civil War of 1641–6 (which includes the early years of revolt in Ireland); the Second Civil War of 1648; and the Third Civil War of 1649–60 (which includes the suppression of the Irish rebellion and the minor royalist uprisings in Scotland and England, but with all major fighting ending at Worcester in 1651). For reasons of economy, the civil strife in Scotland between 1644 and 1647 and the actions of the marquis of Montrose in this period are only addressed tangentially as only one of the case study subjects, David Leslie, played any significant military 2


role. Additionally, Leslie commanded the suppression of various rebellious clans in 1647, including the Macdonalds, Gordons and Huntlys. Similarly, nor are events in Ireland analysed as only Alexander Leslie, earl of Leven, had any direct military involvement.6 In terms of causality and outcomes, this work addresses a huge gap in the historiography of the Civil Wars and English Revolution period by supplying what is clearly the overlooked, undervalued or even completely missing element in explaining the ‘why’ of eventual parliamentary military success in the north. Thus, the overarching thesis of this work is that: 1) the case study subjects reflected a model of leadership and military effectiveness derived from theories of war dating from ancient societies to the present; and 2) there is a direct causal link between effective military leadership and ultimate parliamentary military success in the north of England and southern Scotland. In short, through a narration of selected campaigns between 1642 and 1651, this study emphasizes and highlights the importance of effective military leadership. As an additional feature, through a comprehensive campaign narrative, some lesser known events such as John Lambert’s victory over the Western Remonstrance forces at Hamilton (December 1650) and the Scots at Inverkeithing (July 1651) are given their due in shaping the ultimate destruction of royalist military hopes by 1651. It is not the purpose of this work to engage in the fierce historiographical debate over the root causes of the Civil Wars and English Revolution. Nor is it the intention to argue the relative role of radical religion as the motive force behind parliamentary success after 1645 as do Kishlansky, Gentles and others. Indeed, historians such as Anne Laurence and Barbara Donagan have questioned the notion that radical Protestant chaplains drove the New Model Army to great achievements on God’s behalf. Since religion did play a highly motivational role in areas of discipline and morale and is a fundamental contextual element of leadership, a brief analysis of radical religion’s role in the parliamentary forces is provided as part of the discussion of New Model Army dynamics in Chapter 4. The essential point is that, whatever motivational reasons brought men to the colours of one side or another or caused them to defend the king or to rebel as opposed to maintaining neutrality, it is ultimately a function of leadership as to how well the military instrument is wielded. An effective military leader will overcome inherent disadvantages and successfully employ his strengths. An ineffective leader will not, regardless of the initial quality of his instrument. Any evaluation of military leadership effectiveness must first establish an analytical model against which commanders can be judged. It must incorporate contextual aspects that modulate their decision-making and actions. Additionally, human dynamics such as morale, fear, confidence and the motivation to fight must be considered. Establishing an analytical model of military leadership effectiveness is difficult in that there is no consensus as to a precise definition. General George S. Patton stated that he did not know what leadership was, but whatever it was, he had it.7 In the same vein, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley advocated that leadership is an ‘intangible [that] no weapon or impersonal piece of machinery 3


ever designed’ can replace. Further, Bradley asserted that a commander’s value is determined by the achievements of the followers, which constitute the ultimate measure of military effectiveness.8 Both generals address two fundamental aspects of military leadership – no definitive definition of leadership exists, and effective command is the central determinant of success or failure. If effective leadership (at all levels of command, not just the overall force commander) can overcome the inherent chaos of war, conversely, ineffective leadership often undermines otherwise substantive manpower, motivational, contextual or material advantages. James McGregor Burns concludes that leadership is ‘one of the most observed and least understood phenomenon on earth’.9 The mammoth volume of literature on the subject illustrates the difficulty in defining the precise nature of military leadership. David D. van Fleet and Gary A. Yukl, specialists in organizational management, calculate that over 4,000 books, pamphlets, articles and training guides addressing military leadership had been published in the West by the mid1980s. Further, from 1960 to 1990, social and military scientists conducted over 3,000 leadership studies.10 Despite the inherent difficulty, a workable evaluative technique can be developed. This study advances a theoretical model of effective military leadership based on a combination of traditional concepts of martial qualities (trait theory) and the more recent emphasis on individual and group actions (behaviour theory). Leadership studies have been conducted since ancient civilizations organized military forces. There exists a substantial body of such work from the ancient world, notably from the Chinese, Greek and Roman traditions. Until the twentieth century, however, most leadership analyses credited inherent traits as the basis of successful military leadership. Clausewitz prescribed the qualities of the ‘military genius’ of which much more will be said. In the twentieth century, social science has influenced leadership studies with the result that it is now viewed as an amalgam of traits, individual and group behaviour, human dynamics and the societal context within which military leaders operate. This study synthesizes these elements of leadership analysis into a simple model comprised of four characteristics as a combination of inherent traits and resultant behaviours – consistency, moral authority, aggressiveness and martial superiority – as modulated by human dynamics and the societal context. These elements collectively form a martial synergy. At the sublevel, consistency is defined in terms of reliability, discipline, trustworthiness and mediation skill. Moral authority consists of personal honour (courage, character, credibility and integrity), willingness to share risk, ability to convey a common purpose and stoic sacrifice. Aggressiveness is a function of risk-taking, boldness and initiative all balanced by prudence. Finally, martial superiority derives primarily from traditional concepts of military talent and includes strategic vision, operational artistry, tactical acumen, battlefield management and intuition.11 Through this campaign narrative, reference will be made frequently to this model, illustrating how the various subjects demonstrated these leadership dynamics. Though this methodology may strike some readers as trite or repetitive, it is nevertheless a critical analytical tool. The technique is useful in 4


both the critique of their performance and is a standard process in the case study evaluation methodology; it is seminally important to the military studies aspect of this leadership study. Those reading from a purely historical narrative viewpoint are asked for indulgence as this work aims at two distinct, yet ultimately complementary, objectives – a leadership study and a campaign history. Human dynamics encompass what Clausewitz called the ‘moral forces’ and include fear, motivation, passion, the urge to flee, hate, loyalty and so on. A successful leader, through his inherent traits and behaviours, is able to overcome (or at least moderate) the negative aspects of human dynamics and conversely take advantage of the positive. In this regard, one can if not overcome, at least mitigate what Clausewitz popularized as the ‘fog and friction of war’. It allows him to better manage the inherent chaos and uncertainty of combat. The societal context plays a large part in a military leader’s success or failure. It often determines the quality of the instrument and certainly influences the depth of such human dynamics as motivation, passion, willingness to sacrifice and so forth. As with the human dynamics, it is how the commander, through his traits and behaviours, manages the societal context that will determine his effectiveness. For this reason, a good deal of discussion of the historical context within which the commanders operated is provided throughout the chronological narrative. Part I briefly summarizes the contextual nature of British society (i.e. politics, constitutionalism, economics, religion) leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. Second, it addresses military experience, training, individual motivation to take sides and the art and science of war in seventeenth-century Britain. These sections are essentially designed for the benefit of the reader interested in the phenomenon of leadership and resultant military effectiveness, but who may not be as familiar with the nature of Britain in the seventeenth century or the state of warfare in the early modern period. Third, a model of effective military leadership based on theories of leadership and the characteristics of effective commanders is proposed against which selected commanders will be evaluated. Part II provides a chronological campaign narrative of selected military events in the north of England and southern Scotland between 1642 and 1651 analysing the commanders using the model of effective military leadership. Compared to Civil War events in the rest of England, Ireland and Scotland, the conflict in the north with the exception of the battles at Marston Moor and Dunbar has not received due attention. Thus, Part II is also a detailed narrative campaign history. Additionally, some discussion is provided as appropriate, chronologically addressing the dynamics of raising, recruiting, equipping and disciplining forces; the parliamentary alliance with Scotland; and the nature of the Scottish Covenanter and the New Model Armies. The Appendix provides a brief biographical sketch of each case study subject. The reader may desire to delve into this section as each commander appears in the historical narrative. In the British Civil Wars, opposing forces rarely numbered more than 20,000 men, about the maximum number that could be logistically sustained through a combination of depots, magazines, supply trains or local foraging. Relatively small 5


forces, often only a few hundred men, fought most engagements. Thus, field commanders (quite frequently, the regional commander himself) played an intimate, highly visible role where his actions might be immediately buoyant or disastrous to morale and force cohesion. This case study analysis examines six officers who served as major regional commanders and thus played seminal roles in determining the strategic and operational imperatives within their areas of responsibility, and frequently the actual tactical employment of battlefield combatants. The case study approach illustrates how the leadership model played out in actual historical situations. Through this analytical framework, the careers of the parliamentary commanders Ferdinando Fairfax, Baron Cameron and Major-General John Lambert, the royalists William Cavendish, earl (and after October 1643, marquis) of Newcastle and James Hamilton, duke of Hamilton, and the Scots, Alexander Leslie, earl of Leven and David Leslie (who fought at various times for each side), are addressed. Through a chronological narrative of each officer’s participation in the Civil Wars, conclusions are drawn regarding the military effectiveness of each, particularly in terms of their impact on the outcomes. Notably absent are the more widely known commanders, including Oliver Cromwell, Sir Thomas Fairfax, the marquis of Montrose, Prince Rupert and the king. This omission is deliberate in an effort to consider less well known figures who, as major regional commanders, participated in the pivotal campaigns and thus exerted great influence on the military outcome. It should also be added that the model of effective military leadership is equally valid in a non-combat setting where the commander must deal with the everyday realities of military life and with the civil aspects of regional command. For this reason, some commentary is useful particularly the example of John Lambert as parliamentary commander in the north in 1647–8 in his dealings with a peacetime standing army and the often resentful civilian community. Another example of civil–military relations is that of David Leslie’s difficulties with the Scottish Kirk in 1650. Where these aspects of command are appropriate, they will be addressed in depth. Given that in the British Civil Wars no significant differences existed between the two sides in terms of weaponry, technology, tactics, strategic culture, military experience or societal context, an examination of leadership effectiveness as expressed by the key commanders is especially fruitful in explaining the eventual military outcome. Again, while religious zeal is a vitally important element in favour of the parliamentary forces relative to the motivation to fight, will to endure physical hardship and maintenance of military discipline, without effective leadership, particularly from the top–down, it is a wasted advantage. The British Civil Wars provide a wonderful laboratory for a study of military leadership effectiveness. In a civil conflict (or domestic insurrection, rebellion, revolt or call it as you will), a compare and contrast methodology works well. Without the cultural or technological variations inherent in much of human conflict (e.g. technologically advanced imperial powers versus native tribes), many intervening and quality of the instrument variables are neutral. In the broader military studies sense, this analysis provides a valuable tool for 6


understanding the nature of and reason for the outcomes of conflict. It is a step forward in developing a critical analytical methodology to explain how and why military forces can prevail in such a decisive fashion. Secondly, it proposes a methodology applicable to the study of any commander (as modified by his specific context). As a study of effective military leadership and the resultant outcomes, it provides through a case study analysis, models of leadership for present and successive generations of naval, air and military officers. An argument might be made that such leadership studies are no longer valid in the age of instantaneous satellite communications, network-centric command and control, precision-guided munitions and so forth where regional-level leadership is exercised from afar. Do the heroic values of personal and intimate leadership on the battlefield as exemplified by successful pre-Industrial Age commanders still count? Absolutely! If one judges leadership characteristics as indicators of effectiveness and resultant successful outcomes not at the highest levels of military authority, but at the field level of command on the modern battlefield (e.g. battalion, company or even platoon and squad level), then the ‘lessons learned’ from the ‘Heroic Age’ (as John Keegan styles it) are indeed still valid and worthy of study and emulation by modern military leaders. Effective military leadership is universal. It crosses boundaries and transcends time, space and culture. This model of effective military leadership can be applied as easily to the Napoleonic field-marshal as to the Special Air Service corporal leading his squad in flushing Taliban fighters out of Afghan mountain caves. For English Revolution historians, this study offers an additional causative explanation for parliamentary victory. The work thus adds value to the great body of texts on religious, constitutional, social and economic dimensions of the Civil Wars and revolutionary period. Through this case study analysis comparing and contrasting military leaders, and by examining their characteristics and actions within the context of their time (particularly the ‘passions of the people’ in the Clausewitzian analytical framework) and the impact of their leadership from the woefully inadequate to the level of the Clausewitzian ‘genius’, one can add much needed validity to the assertion that the parliamentary forces had ‘better officers’. Given the inadequacy of the previously purely contextual causative explanations, one comes closer to understanding the reasons for the ultimate parliamentary military success. A few words on the sources are useful. This work has mined well-known manuscript, printed, secondary and archival sources, particularly period newspapers and pamphlets, as well as letters, histories and memoirs penned by participants. There are no great new historical revelations here, rather, this work provides a fresh perspective on a period that has been dissected and analysed for centuries. This study views the events from an angle of approach not yet taken by either period or military historians. One must, of course, be wary of the printed sources (i.e. newspapers, pamphlets, political tracts, contemporary accounts) in that they are highly partisan. Most surviving material supports Parliament, but there are still a great number of royalist tracts available. Nonetheless, once one looks beyond 7


the obvious agenda, a pattern may be seen in terms of the military outcomes and the roles of the respective case study subjects. Some might question the use of the theorists of war, including Clausewitz, Sun Tzu or more modern analysts such as Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart. The value of the theorists is that they provide a framework for analysis of the dynamics of conflict. These great theorists of war all make observations on the universal nature of human conflict and organized violence. While the historical context may change, these universal dynamics are essential elements of the human condition. The observations of the great theorists of war are as applicable to the Stone Age clan chieftain leading his war party as they are to the twenty-first-century commander-in-chief engaged in global war. Leadership in any human endeavour encompasses: a complex mixture of psychological, motivational and behavioural factors; economic, political, constitutional, religious, social and cultural assumptions, beliefs and norms; and, strategic, operational and tactical thinking. It should be remembered that the ultimate goal of military action (in truth, the only real goal if war is conducted as a rational act) and thus all the levels of war from the strategic through the operational down to the tactical, is to establish the conditions whereby the political objectives can be achieved. The parliamentary forces established those conditions and the English Republic of 1649–53 and Protectorate of 1654–59 resulted. That these constitutional experiments ultimately failed does not diminish the success of parliamentary forces and the commanders between 1642 and 1651. For, as Clausewitz says, the results of war are never final – it is up to the political nation ultimately to sort it out. But, it is up to the military authority to create the necessary conditions. It is to that phenomenon that this work now turns.

8

T H E A RT O F C O M M A N D

Part I THE MINSTREL BOY

The Minstrel Boy to the war is gone, In the ranks of death you’ll find him; His father’s sword he has girded on, And his wild harp slung behind him. ‘Land of song!’ said the warrior-bard. ‘Though all the world betrays thee, One sword at least thy rights shall guard, One faithful harp shall praise thee!’ Thomas Moore, ‘The Minstrel Boy’

9

T H E M I N S T R E L B OY

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1 THE ART OF COMMAND Concepts of military leadership

In an authoritative analysis of military effectiveness, a case study of seven nations involved in both modern world wars, Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray concluded that an examination of individual military leadership is a valid way to assess effectiveness and a crucial element for understanding the broader political, strategic, operational and tactical issues. Further, these scholars propose that ‘one must include in the analysis non-quantifiable organizational attitudes, behaviors, and relationships that span a military organization’s full activities’ at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels.1 To this must be added the contextual variables such as socio-economic and religious factors that influence not only events but also the performance of men in combat. This combination of individual leadership characteristics (traits and behaviour) as modulated by the context of the period and culture and human dynamics thus provides a model for assessing the military performance of leading commanders in the Civil Wars and for judging their impact. Ian Gentles asserts that, given the high rate of desertion in the early months of the New Model Army’s existence, leadership was far more critical in maintaining operational effectiveness than has previously been acknowledged. In his summation of the reasons for the success of the new national army, he credits ‘excellent leadership free of interference by parliamentary committees’.2 Gentles further cites the value of effective leadership in terms of morale and willingness to endure hardship, saying of Oliver Cromwell that ‘the career of Cromwell illustrates the truth that a military leader makes a crucial contribution to the morale of his troops if he can bring them to feel that they are safe in his hands, that he will not be careless of their lives and welfare’.3 Similarly, Mark Kishlansky tangentially acknowledges the impact of leadership on the success of the New Model Army in the First Civil War, but never directly addresses its pivotal role in explaining the profound and thorough defeat of royalist forces in the months following Naseby. Kishlansky’s thesis that the New Model Army simply resulted from the final act of consensus parliamentary politics and constituted essentially an amalgamation of the three southern armies with little to distinguish it from the predecessors fails to explain why that army proved so overwhelmingly successful. If no substantial difference existed between the previous three armies and the New Model Army of January 1645 in terms of military and operational effectiveness, then what dynamic explains the sudden and dramatic 11


improvement in the war-winning capability of the parliamentary forces? Clearly, the dynamic of effective leadership must be considered. A more recent work on the human experience of the civil wars by Charles Carlton addresses the issue of leadership, albeit in a limited fashion. In a chapter entitled ‘Tradesmen of Killing … Managers of Violence’ dedicated to an analysis of military leadership, Carlton introduces several characteristics of effective officers, including moral authority, respect, courage, heroic leadership and energy. He analyses several officers from the king down to the company-grade level in light of these characteristics. His effort is the first by a primarily socio-economic historian to address the nature and impact of effective military leadership and to apply an analytic perspective to explain the success or failure of certain officers.4 To advance a viable analytical model for evaluating military effectiveness as a function of leadership, a workable definition must be established that incorporates traditional viewpoints (traits) as well as more current conventions on human motivation in terms of a leader’s actual actions (behaviour). Currently, over 350 definitions of leadership have been proposed in various academic studies and yet there is no consensus.5 Three examples illustrate the dilemma. In his 1948 survey of leadership literature, Ralph M. Stogdill identified six factors generally associated with leadership – capacity (mental ability), achievement (results), responsibility (dependability, initiative, persistence, aggressiveness, self-confidence and desire to excel), participation (sociability, adaptability, willingness to cooperate and sense of humour), status (rank) and situation (group characteristics and objectives).6 William E. Rosenbach and Robert L. Taylor characterize leaders and followers as ‘engaging in reciprocal influence to achieve a shared purpose’. Their concept of leadership is the ability to motivate and inspire followers to achieve a common goal.7 Illustrating the current trend in military professional education, Brigadier C. N. Barclay defines leadership as ‘invariably a combination of inherent and acquired qualities’. 8 While these descriptions do not provide a definitive definition, they all address fundamental aspects of leadership: traits, behaviour, human dynamics and context.

‘Great Man’: traits as the determinant of leadership effectiveness – the traditional view General J. F. C. Fuller, the highly influential military theorist of the early twentieth century, asserts that generalship consists of three pillars: courage, creative intelligence and physical fitness.9 This description illustrates the theory that credits native ability as the central determinant of leadership effectiveness, the dominant concept prior to the Second World War. In a broader sense, it exemplifies the ‘Great Man’ view of historical interpretation popularized in the nineteenth century by historians such as Thomas Carlyle. In this theory, a successful leader possesses unique or superior traits that not only set him apart from followers, but also catapult him beyond his peers. In recent years, the trait theory has come under increased attack because it cannot be supported by experience or research data. In spite of 12


efforts to derive a model for leadership effectiveness based solely on traits, researchers have achieved no consensus nor has much success been attained by the armed forces in terms of selecting and promoting officers based on a set of desired traits. Further, the traits required for success change with various contextual situations. Finally, the trait theory has failed to incorporate group or human behavioural dynamics.10 As a result of these weaknesses, many models since the 1950s have emphasized situational theory, which asserts that leadership results from the environment rather than the leader. Thus, most modern leadership analyses rely upon the behavioural model that examines the actions of leaders as modified by their inherent traits, organizational and situational context, experience and training.11 Despite these weaknesses of the trait analysis of military leadership, concepts of leaders as motivators and as the central, irreplaceable element in determining military effectiveness are universal and timeless. Ancient civilizations that exhibited highly developed military systems and theory considered traits the central ingredient of success. As illustrated not only by the military philosopher Sun Tzu, presumed author of the Art of War (500 BC), but by the analytical works on leadership known collectively as the Seven Military Classics, the ancient Chinese showed great concern for all aspects of command, leadership traits and military practices. Throughout these works, a central tenet is the fundamental role of the commander exhibiting specific native talents as the chief determinant of victory or defeat. Sun Tzu regarded the commander as the ‘supporting pillar of state’ whose talents must be all-encompassing or the state will wither. The Six Secret Teachings of T’ai Kung stresses that ‘military matters are not determined by the ruler’s commands; they all proceed from the commanding general’.12 Gerat Barry, an Irishman who served for thirty years in the Holy Roman Imperial forces and produced a manual on military discipline and tactics in 1634, laid out the leadership traits required from the rank of corporal to captain-general. His attributes of a commander included prudence, experience, valour, temperance, gravity, constancy, vigilance, care, liberality, courage and resolution. Moreover, Barry commented on the qualities sought by the Greeks and Romans in a commander, including skill in the art of war, courage and valour, projected authority and good fortune. Most importantly, he must possess a great depth of successful military experience.13 Other writers of the pre-Industrial period understood the role of effective leadership and the disastrous results of poor command. In multiple writings, they attributed success to the nature of the commander. Barnaby Rich, the most prolific Elizabethan military writer, adopted Cicero’s four traits of a successful commander: experience, valour, authority and felicity – and added the additional qualities of justice, fortitude, prudence and temperance to his definition of an effective military leader. Rich understood, as had military analysts for centuries, that ‘through the default of one ignorant captain a whole army may sometime[s] be overthrown’.14 Roger Boyle, major-general of Charles II’s forces in Ireland during the Restoration, observed that he ‘very seldom saw the English soldiers flinch if their officers were good’.15 Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, commented on the defeat of the English 13


forces against the Scottish Covenanter army in the First Bishops’ War in a scathing evaluation of the commander-in-chief, Thomas Howard, earl of Arundel, stating he exhibited ‘nothing martial about him but his presence and his looks’.16 Clausewitz asserts that leadership requires courage, discriminating judgement, rapid and accurate decision-making, determination, strength of character and a ‘thirst for fame and honour’.17 Finally, Napoleon’s dictum on leadership –‘in war it is not men but the man who counts’ – is the ultimate expression of the ‘Great Man’ theory.18 Technology and the evolution of mass national armies altered the role of the commander from the ‘heroic age’ where physical presence counted most. Concurrently, concepts of effective leadership also changed and incorporated dynamics such as human behaviour in combat and the social context of war. No longer are characteristics such as individual courage in the face of an enemy as highly valued in senior officers. Leadership studies through most of the nineteenth century, particularly expressed in biographies of successful commanders, taught how to conduct oneself not only in military affairs, but also in government and business. By the beginning of the twentieth century, military biographies all but disappeared. Military writers realized that no overall theory of leadership incorporated the ‘complexities of the leader, his subordinates, and the situation’, therefore the study of group dynamics, situational context and behaviour replaced the trait approach.19 Colonel Ardant du Picq in the 1860s, the first modern military theorist to examine the behaviour of men in battle, emphasized the role played by fear and morale in determining outcomes. Through his studies of conflict from the ancient Greco-Roman experiences to the American Civil War, he concluded that, while the circumstances of time, geography, culture and technology change, the ‘human element remains the same’.20 By the 1940s, a decided shift towards the behavioural approach to leadership studies occurred. Since no generally acceptable model of successful traits could be derived that suited the complex combination of people and situations encountered in both modern warfare and business, the behaviour of leaders operating within varying situations and group dynamics replaced the traditional study of traits. Additionally, the concept that not only is leadership inherent (a holdover from the trait approach), but that its principles can be taught, took hold. Modern military education and training reflects this concept. Thus, military history and studies have firmly embraced a combination of the trait, behavioural and situational approaches when addressing effective leadership.21 Modern studies of leadership assume that a leader’s behaviour will be a function of both the traits and the situational context, particularly group dynamics.22

The chaos of war and the human element Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, a philosophical godfather of modern military history and strategic analysis, categorized the three spheres of war as mental, moral and physical. The study of military leadership owes much to Liddell Hart. A veteran 14


of the trench combat in the First World War, he sought to analyse war and formulate techniques to restore the loss of mobility encountered in the first great world conflict of the industrial age. Two of his first significant works, Great Captains Unveiled (1927), which addressed the generalship of Gustophus Adolphus, the duke of Marlborough and James Wolfe, and Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon (1928), centred on successful commanders and heralded a number of examinations of effective military leadership during the last century. John Keegan, an advocate of studying human conflict through the prism of the human element, proposes the dynamics of the emotional, physical, religious, cultural, political and economic. In his analysis of Alexander the Great, Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolf Hitler in The Mask of Command, Keegan postulates several ‘imperatives’ that successful commanders must exhibit to succeed in war, including sanction, example, prescription, kinship and action.23 Inherent in both Liddell Hart and Keegan’s concept of the spheres of war are the human factors of fear, morale, inspiration, confidence, hope and dread. All must be manipulated, focused or controlled by the effective commander. Failure to do so will result in anarchy and defeat, two tributes to the chaos of war. Michael Roberts, who argues that European warfare in the seventeenth century underwent a profound military revolution based on the advance of weapon technology and tactical innovations such as those of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and Prince Maurice of Nassau, compared the early modern army to an ‘articulated organism of which each part responded to impulses from above’.24 Despite Roberts’s rather mechanistic likening of an army to a machine, the battlefield of any era is, as Keegan aptly describes, a ‘wildly unstable physical and emotional environment’.25 Given the potential for chaos, the one stabilizing element is effective leadership. It is the dynamic that prepares a force for combat and provides the guiding momentum for mobilizing and focusing all other elements. Leadership is the dynamic which, if effectively employed, overcomes the wrenching fear every combatant faces. It is the central influence that conquers chaos and ultimately determines victory or defeat. Major-General Frank Richardson, a Royal Army Medical Corps psychiatrist who devoted his retirement years to a study of psychological factors in war, concluded that leadership is the most important single factor in the preservation of high morale.26 Coming to a similar conclusion, Professors John Dollard and Donald Horton of the Yale University Institute of Human Relations published a study in 1944 of the dynamics of fear in combat and its effect on unit cohesion, morale and efficiency. In interviews with veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, a unit of American volunteers who fought for the republican government in the Spanish Civil War, the researchers found a constant among the respondents. Decisive and competent leadership controls fear in battle. Soldiers have more confidence when the leader is tested and proven and takes no unnecessary risks with their lives. Eighty-nine per cent of the respondents agreed that receiving frequent instructions and directions from leaders both reduced fear and made better soldiers. In Dollard’s succinct analysis, ‘leadership means reassurance’.27 15


In a study conducted on several United States Army divisions engaged in combat in Italy and the south-west Pacific in the spring of 1944, a team led by Samuel A. Stouffer examined the attitudes of soldiers on all manner of subjects, particularly the role of effective leadership in overcoming fear and instilling confidence. In response to the question: ‘Can you recall a case in your experience in which an officer did a particularly good job of helping his men to feel more confident in a tough or frightening situation’, 31 per cent cited leadership by example along with the display of personal courage and coolness. A further 26 per cent mentioned encouraging the men through pep talks, jokes and the dissemination of information, while 23 per cent cited the display of active concern for the men’s welfare and safety.28 These studies illustrate a central feature of leadership that has always been recognized by military theorists, but, unfortunately, tends to be missing from most British Civil War histories in terms of analysing the military outcome. In the chaos and terror of combat as men struggle to conquer fear and the urge to flee, especially when friends and comrades are killed or horribly wounded, soldiers hope their commanders possess the leadership skills that will see them safely through to victory or safety. Therefore, in any analytical model of effective military leadership, the ability to control or manage the human factors under the stresses of the chaos of combat must be considered.

Characteristics of effective command The leadership model for analysing the actions of the six regional commanders under examination incorporates the elements of traits and behaviour (characteristics), human dynamics, and the social, religious, economic and political context of seventeenth-century Britain. The model is an amalgam of the traditional trait theory and the more recent behavioural, situational and transformational approaches. But, ultimately command is an art. Effective military leadership is not a quantifiable formula, rather it is a combination of native talent honed and polished by education, training and experience as modified by the situational context. The remainder of this chapter proposes a model of effective military leadership, a function of both inherent traits and resultant behaviours. The four essential characteristics of this model are consistency, moral authority, aggressiveness and martial superiority. Considered collectively as martial synergy, these characteristics are always modulated by human dynamics and the context of war and society. This methodology is then employed in the following narrative chapters (presented as a campaign history) as an analytic framework for evaluating the relative military effectiveness of the six case study subjects providing historians with an additional tool for understanding the outcome of many of the military events in northern England and southern Scotland between 1642 and 1651 and students of military leadership with a study of a vitally important aspect of human conflict.

16


Consistency Consistency means reliability and predictability. A leader is predictable not in the sense of an opponent’s ability to guess his actions based on an historical pattern, but in that followers expect specific reactions to certain situations. In that sense, the leader is both predictable and reliable. Other elements of consistency are discipline, trustworthiness and mediation. In some respects, consistency is the most fundamental characteristic; without it, the trust of those commanded is quickly lost. Subordinates are reticent to make recommendations or honest appraisals when they fear chastisement or criticism from an inconsistent superior. On the battlefield, in the midst of destruction and confusion, the lack of a consistent manner on the part of commanders can lead to confusion and disaster, thus undercutting other positive attributes. The enforcement of strict discipline in accordance with the prevailing code of military conduct in a consistent manner is imperative. Discipline implies more than punishment for malefaction. It entails the manipulation of physical coercion, positive inducement and rewards to overcome fear and prevent anarchy. A commander’s willingness to discipline and punish, even if harshly, must be consistent and perceived as fair and just. Similarly, the treatment accorded to prisoners of war and civilians affected by the fighting must also be consistent. Failure to enforce the established rules adversely affects not only unit discipline, morale and cohesion, but often negatively hampers operational effectiveness. Desertion, rampant looting and the attendant inability to control troops in the vortex of combat are direct results of a commander’s inconsistent application of discipline. Captain Thomas Venn, a contemporary commentator, wrote that military discipline could only be achieved through exercise, order, reward, compulsion and example.29 Under a commander who understands the application and limits of discipline, order can be maintained. The experience of campaigning and intense combat in the early years of the First Civil War, as each army matured, tended to produce a relatively high state of discipline. Skilled officers capable of maintaining control over their men rose to positions of authority; ill-behaved troops disappeared gradually through cashierment, desertion or execution. William Bariffe, a veteran artillery expert who served as a major in the earl of Essex’s parliamentary army early in the war, commented on the value of experience in the maintenance of military discipline, asserting that ‘no man is born a Souldier, nor can [he] attaine to any excellency in the Art Military without practice’.30 The manner in which a leader administers discipline has a marked impact on all aspects of his effectiveness, particularly his ability to conduct dangerous operations or to motivate the men to carry out his orders. A commander perceived by his troops as weak or vacillating, despite other qualities of leadership, is inherently disadvantaged. Trustworthiness, based on an officer’s consistent adherence to agreements and principles, is a fundamental leadership trait at all levels of command. When senior officers are called upon to conduct negotiations with both allies and opponents, it has especially onerous connotations. An opponent’s willingness to surrender and 17


place his fate and that of his troops in the hands of a superior enemy to minimize further loss of life and property is based on the presumption of trust that agreements will be honoured. At a more basic level, the troops must first place their trust in their commander before they will carry out his orders. A loss of trust most often foretells disaster on the battlefield. Inherent in a leader’s consistency is the ability to mediate or conciliate. This characteristic incorporates the elements of reliability and trustworthiness. In the British Civil Wars, the most common arena for an officer to display his skills at mediation came with the negotiation of terms of surrender for a besieged castle or town. The parliamentary ordinances laid out three requirements under which a commander could justifiably surrender – a starving garrison, no likely relief or inevitable capture. The ordinances prescribed severe sanctions for the surrender of a fort, town or castle under any other conditions, including the death penalty for the commander. Should he be forced into a premature capitulation by the troops under his command, the regulations required the execution of the officer at fault. For all other ranks, a lottery determined every tenth man for hanging.31 Given the onerous consequences inherent in a surrender of a town or garrison, mediation skill on the part of the negotiators tended to be of critical concern. It should be noted that, typically, prisoners received rough treatment, as illustrated by the summary execution of a royalist officer at the surrender of Basing House in 1645. Major Thomas Harrison, the future parliamentary major-general and member of Cromwell’s first Protectorate Council of State, shot a royalist officer, exclaiming, ‘cursed be he that doeth the Lords work negligently!’32 Parliamentary prisoners received no better treatment. Those taken to Oxford typically had their outer clothing and hats confiscated before being forced to dig trenches or construct defensive fortifications. Despite the king’s prohibition against plundering prisoners, officers often tolerated or even encouraged such actions.33 Therefore, the commander who showed magnanimity and mercy towards prisoners might be seen as extraordinary, thus enhancing his reputation for conciliation. A second form of mediation entailed dealing with subordinates. Pre-modern forces had no clearly defined hierarchy of ranks based on a regularized promotion system, thus creating the possibility of squabbles over seniority between officers, a situation that could adversely affect an army’s tactical or operational deployment.34 Command relationships flowed down from the lord-general or commander-inchief through a series of immediate assistants normally designated lieutenant or major-generals, who headed the foot, horse and artillery, to regimental colonels. Designated colonels, typically the senior officer in that rank, filled the intermediate position as brigade commander between the major-generals and the regimental colonels. The ranks of major-general and lieutenant-general did not exist in the modern sense and represented temporary appointments based on an officer’s duties for a specific campaign. The issue of precedence and seniority and the manner in which a commanding officer handled such issues played a major role in his ability to manage his forces. A third form of mediation, which incorporates the issues of an officer’s reliability 18


and trustworthiness, entails relationships with opponents in negotiations other than surrender agreements, particularly common in the early stages of the First Civil War as local leaders attempted to contain the spread of violence in their regions. Agreements aimed at establishing temporary truces to contain internecine violence or restrict partisan activities directed at either opposing forces or to intimidate the civilian population. The attempt of several Yorkshire gentry to arrange a truce within the county in September 1642 following the king’s failure to capture Hull illustrates this phenomenon as will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2. Moral authority The effectiveness of any leader in combat is inextricably tied to the soldiers’ motivation to fight at the individual and collective level. It encompasses both the willingness to take up arms for a cause as well as action once combat commences. The single most important aspect of the will to fight is the perception of a leader’s moral authority. Confidence in one’s leader as an expression of the perception of their moral authority is paramount in motivating soldiers to suffer the deprivations, hardships and dangers of war. Moral authority is the hold a commander exerts over his subordinates independent of legal or hierarchical relationships. Orders and directions carry the weight of both legal and moral authority. Although most orders will be carried out, the enthusiasm of the subordinate frequently influences the translation of directions into the desired actions. A commander who has either lost or abrogated his moral authority quickly finds that there are limits to coercion or persuasion. Battles are frequently lost because troops are unwilling to exert themselves, commit acts of self-sacrifice or undertake individual initiative on behalf of a commander with little moral authority. Descriptions of the nature of moral authority are similar among historians and social scientists who study the dynamics of effective leadership. Moral authority to Keegan is the ‘heroic ethic’ that legitimizes military and political authority. Carlton espouses a similar perspective, defining moral authority as ‘heroic mystique’ or the perception of the leader as one who displays courage, takes risks alongside the men and provides for their safety.35 In the pre-modern age, personal presence mattered for moral authority. With the commander’s span of control limited to his actual physical location, the leader’s singular most important function changed once the engagement commenced. Prior to combat, battlefield preparation, positioning of troops, issuance of orders to subordinates and tactical decision-making functions set the stage, but once sword met shield, the essential role of the commander became direct leadership by the personal example of courage, honour, duty and steadfastness in harm’s way, which could only be demonstrated by personal presence. As Martin van Creveld points out in his study of the dynamics of command in war: Precisely because he [the commander] was always fully visible to his men, marching in their midst and fighting in their ranks, the motivating 19


functions he exercised were supremely important. The sacrifice, the review, and the speech held before the battle; the example set during it; the trophy erected after it – all these were morale-building factors…36 A commander’s presence, whether by modern communications media in the twentyfirst century or by personal presence and example on the pre-modern battlefield is a great determinant of the troops’ perception of a leader’s moral authority. This dynamic applies at all levels of command from the commander-in-chief to the corporal. This study addresses four fundamental elements against which the selected commanders’ moral authority will be evaluated – personal honour, shared risk, common purpose and stoic sacrifice – all of which are intrinsically tied to his personal example and physical presence. Personal honour includes such qualities as courage, character, credibility and integrity, and is perhaps the most fundamental element of moral authority. Keegan’s analysis of warfare in different epochs finds that honour is ‘paramount, and it was by establishing ones honourableness with ones fellows that leadership was exerted indirectly over the common soldiers’. Carlton again takes a similar view asserting that bravery is the ‘quality which soldiers value more than any other in their leaders’.37 Gentles cites the exemplary courage demonstrated at Naseby by Sir Thomas Fairfax as a central ingredient in the eventual victory.38 Thus, even to writers who do not specifically address the role of effective leadership as a primary thesis, the overwhelming importance of personal honour, particularly courage, as a key to a commander’s moral authority is acknowledged. It is important to note the fundamental difference between physical and moral courage. While the physical type is visible and clearly evident to the troops, the moral is internal and provides a leader with the will to make difficult decisions. Moral courage is the ability to stand firmly against adversity as well as to carry out a decision even in the face of dire consequences or overwhelming uncertainty. It is a central ingredient of character, and is additionally defined as possessing high ideals that the leader can be trusted to uphold regardless of the consequences. An important adjunct to the concept of personal honour is adherence to a code of conduct that regulates actions such as the treatment of prisoners and noncombatants in accordance with the standards of the period. The decline of the medieval code of chivalry during the wars of the sixteenth century, and the attendant barbarity particularly against civilians, gave rise to a need for new codes of military conduct. The Dutch political philosopher Hugo Grotius observed the end of the long-established restraints on soldiers’ behaviour at the end of the sixteenth century. He viewed religion, formerly a governor on military behaviour, as the ‘pretext for ferocity, rather than a check upon it’. In his work on conduct in war, De jure belli ac pacis libre tres, Grotius attempted to come to terms with the new moral paradigm and established behavioural conventions based on the reality of warfare in the early modern age. His limits included the legality of killing prisoners, slaughtering and terrorizing civilians and devastating land and property, values seemingly at odds with Reformation Christian concepts. Although most rational men avoided 20


these excesses as a matter of moral concern, the standards of Grotius’ era justified such actions. Incidents of cruelty and devastation in the Thirty Years’ War eventually turned European public opinion towards the rejection of these standards.39 Although isolated from the physical horrors of continental strife, a vibrant literary network kept the British relatively well-informed of the brutal nature of the struggle. The plight of the continental civilian population as viewed by the average Briton is captured in Nehemiah Wallington’s comment on starvation in Germany: ‘they did boil whole pots and kettles of frogs, and did eat them with the entrails’.40 Sir Thomas Fairfax sought to establish a philosophical basis for the conduct of Christian soldiers. In a letter written to Sir Ralph Hopton during the final stages of royalist collapse in Cornwall, Sir Thomas asserted that the actions of rational and moral Christians determined the laws of nations. Second, the customary and ancient laws of war predated the period of degeneration into barbarity since the end of the Middle Ages. Third, military law prescribed precise and strict disciplinary codes with attendant mechanisms for enforcement. All three aspects of the laws of war, nature and nations bounded soldiers’ actions.41 Ultimately the protection of civilians and non-combatants relied on the discipline and control maintained by commanders. Fairfax’s reflections illustrate the desire of Civil War participants to avoid the cruelties and savagery common to the age. Adherence to codes of conduct represented the main defence against lapses into barbarity and served as a fundamental measure of an officer’s personal honour.42 Shared risk embraces the characteristics of leadership by example and the willingness to endure physical danger with the common soldiers. A key ingredient in the perception of shared risk is a leader’s personal presence. However, risk must be moderated by the need to preserve the commander. Although a leader may show himself at the greatest moment of danger, the key to the successful application of this characteristic is to strike a balance between shared risk at the point of danger and maintaining an appropriate distance in order to control events and direct the course of battle. The Stouffer study found that the perception of an officer’s personal courage, coolness under fire and the sharing of hazards with the troops represented the single most important determinant of the soldiers’ willingness to fight. The survey found that the men’s attitudes towards their officers ‘had a real importance in determining whether [they] fought aggressively and stayed in the fight’. Conversely, when unfavourable attitudes towards an officer emerged, the soldiers appeared less likely to take extra risks. The soldiers viewed personal example and a disregard for his own safety as the most important of an officer’s leadership characteristics. Those men who expressed confidence in their leaders seemed most likely to fight, which gave them a greater certainty in their ability to carry on in trying and dangerous situations.43 A leader’s willingness to share risk can motivate and energize troops to great exertions on a commander’s behalf. Conversely, an unwillingness to endure the same hazards can result in the perception of cowardice. A willingness to share risk with the troops is critical to maintaining high morale and is a fundamental feature of a commander’s ‘conspicuousness’ in combat.44 The comments of Serjeant-Major 21


(field grade rank below lieutenant-colonel) Matthew Carter on the extraordinary actions of the New Model Army troops besieging Colchester in 1648 illustrate the motivational power of shared risk and individual courage: ‘The meanest of the Soldiers as yet held a conformable obedience to the commands of their Officers, undaunted in their courages, and couragious in their actions’.45 As an adjunct to shared risk, a commander must surround himself with subordinates able to garner the troops’ respect. A commander’s inability to project his sense of shared risk through key subordinates imparts a negative image to common soldiers. Commanders must be able to convey to the troops a sense of common purpose or unity that can be transmitted through words or actions. Few successful commanders lack the ability to communicate a sense of common purpose. The ability to do so establishes a personal bond between a leader and his subordinates. Common purpose promotes a solidarity that mitigates the human dynamics of fear and despair, particularly in seemingly hopeless situations and in the chaos of the battlefield.46 Unity inspires men to risk their lives for a greater end and to muster the courage to achieve it. Military commanders charged with motivating soldiers and directing their actions cannot be effective unless they are able to harness the feelings of unity towards the accomplishment of that shared purpose. In a larger sense, the international-relations historian Quincy Wright in one of the first interdisciplinary studies on conflict and the will to fight, found that group motivations to conduct war are frequently related to the perception of threats to collective or individual legal, constitutional or implied rights.47 In the Civil War experience, soldiers viewed common purpose as the defence of national or individual religious and constitutional liberties or a defence of traditional norms. A commander must be able to convey not only a common destiny, but also his tactical or strategic conception and directions. Troops who feel a mutual bond with their commander are more receptive to his orders if they believe that such directions will advance their common goal. Unity advances the soldiers’ sense of ‘pride and self respect … [which] evoke[s] devotion and cooperation’.48 Stoic sacrifice is a trait rarely addressed by historians. In essence, stoic sacrifice is a willingness or ability to suppress the normal physical and emotional responses to pain, fatigue, tragedy, horror or fear. A leader’s personal example in the emotional and irrational battlefield environment can calm and inspire troops and enhances his personal honour as well. Stoic sacrifice has many facets. It ranges from the simple imperative of ensuring that the troops are fed and billeted before himself or his officers, to refusing to allow injury or the loss of a loved one in combat to interfere with one’s command duties. For example, at Marston Moor, Charles Fairfax, brother of Sir Thomas, died of multiple wounds in the initial cavalry attack on the allied right. Despite the loss, Fairfax continued the fight and played a significant role in the eventual victory. Most often, stoic sacrifice in battle entails less dramatic events, but the effect of such actions creates a mutual bond with the troops. Typically, the refusal of a wounded officer to remove himself from the fray or to seek medical aid until after his troops are cared for accomplishes the same ends. Following the disaster at Adwalton Moor in July 1643, Sir Thomas led 22


a fighting retreat of the remnants of his horse in a desperate ride to the safety of Hull. In a rearguard action to protect the retreating parliamentary infantry under Lord Fairfax, Sir Thomas charged the enemy in the streets of Selby even though shot in the wrist ‘which made the bridle fall out of my hand: which, being among the nerves and veins, suddenly let out such a quantity of blood [that] I was ready to fall from my horse’. Ignoring the wound, Fairfax allowed a surgeon to wrap his hand to staunch the bleeding and continued the race to Hull. He remained in the saddle for a further twenty hours and led his men to safety.49 Aggressiveness Aggressiveness is composed of risk, boldness and initiative as modified by prudence. Military commentators since the ancient world stress the primacy of aggression for success on the battlefield. Sun Tzu advocates a swift strike against an erring enemy. If the opponent ‘presents an opportunity, [the aggressive commander must] speedily take advantage of it’.50 This concept of aggression advises caution and prudence while awaiting the ideal moment to strike. Clausewitz pointed out that ‘no military leader has ever become great without audacity’. He additionally characterizes aggressiveness as boldness and asserts that ‘a distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable’. Further, it ‘has its own prerogative … a genuinely creative force’.51 Napoleon most admired and credited boldness as the common denominator among great commanders.52 Colonel du Picq described aggressiveness as a moral force or the ‘moral impulse, that resolution to go to the end’, and called it the single most important element in combat.53 Most military commentators advocate audacity and risk-taking as paramount in a leader. The moral force of aggressiveness and risk gives one the ability to motivate men despite the human factors of fear and lack of confidence. Admiral John Paul Jones captured the essence of risk-taking in advice to the Russian Imperial Navy. He noted that ‘in human affairs … it seems to be a law inflexible and inexorable that he who will not risk cannot win’.54 But risk cannot be foolhardy. The element of prudence must moderate a commander’s actions lest he over-commit to an ill-advised act, leading to a tragic conclusion. An aggressive commander should not only exhibit appropriate daring and a willingness to engage the enemy, an offensive spirit that expresses great vitality, energy and swiftness of decision and action, but also practise prudence such as intelligence gathering prior to committing to action. In pre-modern warfare, the commander who endeavoured to understand the nature of the enemy, gather a realistic assessment of the spatial battlefield and its geography and process the information quickly and issue appropriate orders, enjoyed a distinct advantage. Thus, prudence implies both caution and the acquisition of knowledge of battlefield conditions and the state of the enemy forces prior to committing to combat and serves as a necessary moderator of uncontrolled aggressiveness.

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Martial superiority The final characteristics of effective command are the most often discussed in terms of military leadership. They are appropriately grouped together as martial superiority and include tactical acumen, operational artistry, strategic vision, battlefield management and intuition. Tactics is the art of fighting once the enemy is engaged. It is the actions of unit on unit once combat has commenced and ranges across all manners of formation from individual squads to army groups. Operational art is the employment of forces to attain strategic objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of campaigns. Military strategy represents the disposition of forces, direction of operations and organization of assets to establish the conditions for the achievement of the policy objectives of the state or political entity (e.g. a revolutionary movement). While tactical acumen, battlefield management and intuition are critical in determining the outcome of combat once initiated at the field level, without a high degree of all elements of martial superiority, a commander has little hope of ultimate success. Tactical acumen encompasses numerous qualities, the most important of which is the capability to employ one’s forces in a manner that destroys the enemy’s ability to wage war. Tactical methods include deception, movement and pursuit. Sun Tzu advocated that ‘all warfare is based on deception’. A successful commander will feign weakness and disorder, disguise his movements and entice the enemy to act imprudently. Once the deception is accomplished, he swiftly attacks at an unexpected weak point and, if tactical surprise is achieved, overwhelms the stunned opponent. Bevin Alexander, a modern analyst of the characteristics exhibited by successful commanders, advocates the tactical principle of ‘convergent assault’ whereby the successful commander divides his force into two or more bodies and attacks the enemy simultaneously while maintaining close coordination and control. Often, one force will hold the enemy in place and distract its attention while the second, through speed, mobility and manoeuvre, surprises and overwhelms the defence. Almost all victorious generals achieve their results by successful movements against an enemy’s flanks or rear. At the point of attack, they concentrate their forces at the most vulnerable and important position while employing deception to surprise, mislead and deceive the enemy. The key is to avoid a headlong charge against an organized and strong defensive position. Once the enemy is beaten, the failure to follow up with a vigorous pursuit often allows him to reform and re-engage at a later date. Therefore, the principle of pursuit is an essential element of tactical acumen. Alexander provides a useful summation of these elements of tactical acumen: 1) approach on a line of least resistance; 2) manoeuvre in the enemy’s rear; 3) occupy the central position; 4) employ a ‘plan with branches’; and, 5) deliver convergent blows.55 A successful commander must exhibit a strong sense of strategic vision or the ‘ability to discern the means for the attainment of the ultimate political objective’ through the use of military forces.56 According to Liddell Hart, this implies the skill to choose a line of least expectation and exploit the area of least resistance. He asserts that the primary strategic failure of both sides in the First Civil War lay 24


in the tendency to conduct a series of indecisive direct advances or a strategy of annihilation. The campaigns interspersed with local skirmishes, that merely drained resources and accomplished little towards destroying the will or ability to wage war, left the royalists temporarily checked by 1646, but capable of mounting a vigorous second and third effort in 1648 and 1650. For the pre-modern age, the distinction between operational artistry and strategic vision is not sharply defined. Even Clausewitz fuzzes the distinction between operations and strategy; what he typically terms ‘strategy’ is usually defined as the operational level of war in modern analysis. As Hart points out, the term ‘strategy’ only appeared in military literature in the early eighteenth century (taken from the Greek strategoi or roughly, the ‘art of the general’). 57 The limited ability to conduct war much beyond the visual limits of the immediate battlefield, coupled with the tendency of the ultimate political and strategic authority (e.g. Napoleon and other monarchs) to physically command field forces, essentially limited broad strategic planning. But, as van Creveld argues, the strategic level of war has always existed whether recognized as such or not. Once a war commenced, a commander charged with conducting operations in a large geographic area had to make strategic decisions such as going on the offensive or defensive or whether to conduct a strategy of annihilation (profoundly destroy the enemy’s capability to continue the war usually through battle) or a strategy of attrition (gradually wear down the opponent until he cannot physically continue or loses the will to carry on) often through small actions and harassment. In this regard, strategic vision, like leadership effectiveness itself, is universal and enduring. It is thus ‘eternal and has changed hardly at all from the Stone Age to our time’.58 As will be seen, the royalists in general exhibited little strategic thinking at any level. The theoretical focus of all royalist strategic planning, King Charles I and the court at Oxford, proved singularly incapable of coherent strategic planning. Parliamentary strategic planning took place essentially at the major commander level, particularly Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell at various stages of the conflict. While various parliamentary committees charged with overall direction of the war effort (e.g. Derby House, Committee of Both Kingdoms) established the rebellion’s political objectives, no national command authority then derived a coherent national military strategy beyond the rudimentary level, consequently, both operational and strategic planning fell to the regional commanders, who had a general notion of their role in establishing the conditions for achieving parliamentary policy objectives. The best that might be said of the strategic vision of the six commanders under consideration is that, in the absence of a well-defined and cohesive national strategy, they developed a strategic plan appropriate to their region and then conducted operations in support of that strategy. Thus, their strategic vision will be evaluated on that basis. Therefore, operational artistry and strategic vision in this study are looked at simultaneously and as symbiotically related within the broader context of martial synergy. This perspective essentially analyses the ability to manage the many branches of a complex campaign while discerning, 25


if not completely articulating, some sense of strategic coherence within a region in support of national policy objectives. At a higher level, the principles of grand strategy often influence the military effectiveness of field generals. Grand strategy can be characterized as military strategy for achieving national ends in cooperation with other non-military instruments of power. Grand strategy embraces more than the movement of forces or the geography of battle. Political, social, religious, moral, diplomatic and economic dynamics determine grand strategy to a far greater degree than the ‘logistical strategy (the combination in time and space, and force of the military pieces on the chessboard of war)’.59 A central ingredient in the ability to manage the battlefield is flexibility or the capacity to respond to changing dynamics or to recover from and surmount setbacks. Flexibility has a broad context. Carlton, in compiling statistics of the Civil Wars, found that 47 per cent of the casualties occurred in small-scale skirmishes, 24 per cent in extended sieges, and only 15 per cent in large-scale, set-piece engagements.60 The dynamics of combat change as the field of action becomes smaller. On the typical early modern battlefield, most troops fought either fully engaged or at least close enough for rapid deployment into the action. This dynamic increased the possibility for panic and rout when even a single unit lost its cohesion or broke and ran. While most historians who analyse the elements of effective command concentrate on large, set-piece engagements or entire campaigns, the ability to control battlefield events at any level of conflict and to alter the plan without an attendant loss of control is a mark of martial superiority. Given the nature of the fighting, a successful Civil War field commander had to possess broad tactical ability as well as the flexibility to manage the battlefield in a variety of diverse conditions and operational situations. Battlefield management is also an expression of other characteristics, particularly personal honour and shared risk. The ability to remain calm in the face of calamity while maintaining personal presence in the face of danger that inspires and steadies wavering troops, and the ability and energy to rally panicked or faltering men through personal honour and shared risk, are part of the battlefield management skills of successful leaders. Finally, the element of intuition must be addressed. Some amount of innate ability to know instinctively when to act and how is fundamental to effective military leadership. No amount of training or experience can compensate for its lack. Learned skills can partially mitigate the lack of intuition but they cannot compensate for the absence of this ability. It acts as a governor for the other martial superiority traits. Intuition encompasses the ability to be at the right place at the correct moment. It is not always blind luck and often is the result of a firm knowledge of events, terrain, the nature of the enemy and one’s own troops. Additionally, intuition is also the ability to know the precise moment to strike or commence a tactical movement based on an understanding of the situation and an inherent sense of good timing.

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Clausewitz views these abilities as inherent in the military ‘genius’, who possesses the quality of ‘coup d’oeil’, the ability to instantly grasp the broad situation and to strike decisively even in the absence of full intelligence or situational awareness. A military genius operates outside of and rises above all established rules. It is the ‘intuition of the military genius’ that allows him to devise the ‘complex interconnections in war’. Herein illustrates Clausewitz’s concept of the probabilistic nature of war replete with ‘fog, friction, and the realm of chance and probability’ and intervening intangible ‘moral factors’ of human nature and motivation where the commander’s creativity based on innate talent and genius overcomes obstacles or uses them to the enemy’s detriment.61 Although many theories and models to explain the phenomenon of leadership effectiveness have been advanced by military writers and social scientists, no consensus on a precise definition exists. Despite this disadvantage, the military effectiveness of the regional commanders in the British Civil Wars can be analysed using a model that synthesizes the various approaches, including trait, behavioural and contextual. The additional elements of human dynamics and the chaos of war are added to form the full analytical model characterized as martial synergy. This chapter proposes a series of four fundamental characteristics, namely, consistency, moral authority, aggressiveness and martial superiority, that will be used to judge the actions of the subjects. Using a chronological progression of selected campaigns in northern England and southern Scotland from 1642 through 1651, the behaviour and attendant outcome of each of the subject officer’s leadership decisions and actions will be analysed against the martial synergy model as a way of explaining the ultimate parliamentary military victory achieved by 1651.

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2 POLITICS, RELIGION AND WAR IN EARLY SEVENTEENTHCENTURY BRITAIN

The political, constitutional and religious context of mid-seventeenth-century Britain, as well as the nature of war and military experience in the early modern period, played a major role in the relative military effectiveness of the six regional commanders in the north of England and southern Scotland during the Civil Wars. These contextual dynamics affected not only the motivation to take up arms, but also the will to continue the struggle through hardship, deprivation and defeat. Events in Yorkshire between January and August 1642 directly precipitated open rebellion as well as influenced the motivation of locals to take up arms against the legitimate sovereign, therefore, it is useful to briefly examine the nature of those occurrences. A brief narrative of the early events in Yorkshire also establishes the contextual framework for understanding the campaign history of that region in the First Civil War. Additionally, pre-Civil War military experience and attitudes shaped both the character and the fighting qualities of each of the forces that eventually participated – parliamentary, royalist, Covenanter and Engager. The nature of war in the period as well as the skills and professionalism derived from pre-war military training, literature and experience, must also be considered. The context within which the six regional commanders operated partially accounted for their ultimate success or failure. As Hew Strachan, the noted military historian points out, the ‘development of war cannot be understood … simply as a continuum, independent, self-generating, unaffected by external phenomenon’.1 Context is a moderator that ultimately attenuates martial synergy and thus forms a key component in the analytical model of effective military leadership. Accordingly, this chapter sets the stage for the outbreak of civil war in Yorkshire in 1642. Areas to be addressed include the historical background of the road to civil war as well as the events immediately preceding the raising of the royal standard at Nottingham on 22 August 1642, the event that unambiguously heralded the start of formal hostilities. Additionally, some discussion of the constitutional crisis in Yorkshire in which the case study subjects – Lord Ferdinando Fairfax, John Lambert and the earl of Newcastle – played significant roles sets the contextual stage for the case study narrative. A brief look at the motivations to take up arms for either crown or Parliament provides some insight into the nature of the conflict given that motivation and will to fight (Clausewitz’s ‘moral forces’) directly 28

P O L I T I C S , R E L I G I O N A N D WA R

impacted the quality of the instrument with which the case study subjects found themselves helped or hindered. While the historian of the seventeenth-century period may find this discussion cursory, it is quite helpful to the military studies or general reader, who likely is not familiar with the historical context of Stuart Britain. Finally, an overview of the nature of period warfare, while perhaps more familiar to the military studies reader, provides the general reader and period historian with a guide to terminology, the art and science of war, command and control structures, tactics and methods of fighting and other military dynamics, so as to aid in their understanding. This chapter thus establishes the contextual framework for the subsequent examination of the selected military campaigns in the north and for evaluating the military effectiveness and leadership of the six case study subjects. One of the central arguments of this work is that, on the whole, little difference existed between the two sides in terms of military experience, weaponry, tactics and operational concepts. No vast technological, methodological, doctrinal or organizational differences marked the opposing forces, a situation typical of an internecine civil war. Some differences did emerge with the creation of the New Model Army in 1645 that gave parliamentary commanders a distinct advantage in terms of the quality of the instrument, a phenomenon addressed in Chapter 4. But it must be borne in mind that, without effective leadership, the advantage of quality is soon squandered.

‘So dangerous a season’: the contextual background of the Civil Wars The immediate causes of the Civil Wars lay in the events of Charles I’s Personal Rule from 1629 to 1640 (without a sitting Parliament). The religious reformation and constitutional questions over the relative authority of the monarchy vis-à-vis the representative assembly drove opposition to royal policies throughout the 1630s. Opponents of crown policy saw the seeming drift towards royal absolutism as innovative and in violation of the ‘ancient constitution’. The collection of ship money, distraint of knighthood and the exercise of the royal prerogative in raising revenue without parliamentary concurrence became touchstones of conflict, as did the perceived resurgence of Catholicism in the established church and the interference with Scottish religious practice. The Petition of Right in 1628 argued against the collection of taxes without parliamentary consent. That position formed the backbone of opposition to the exercise of royal prerogative in revenue collection throughout the 1630s. The collection of ship money (taxes) to provide for maritime defence and support for the navy traditionally from the coastal counties and towns, had been extended throughout the kingdom by 1634. Taxes for ship maintenance and upkeep in peacetime could not be collected without parliamentary consent; however, the law allowed the crown to conscript ships for a limited period (generally six months) in a national emergency whereby the citizens of a particular area hired existing 29


commercial hulls for national service and conversion to warships. A conscripted ship did not become crown property, rather, at the end of its service it reverted to the original owner. Through the declaration of a continuous national emergency and the implementation of the conscription laws, Charles collected money for naval upkeep every year beginning in 1634, when he extended it to the inland counties, generating substantial revenue. Opposition leaders in 1641 argued for the illegality of a general ship money tax without parliamentary consent even in time of national emergency. In essence, they charged that the king did not abuse an existing power, rather, he claimed one that he did not possess under the ‘ancient constitution’.2 The distraint of knighthood created controversy early in the reign of Charles. The creation of new knights from among subjects with sufficient landed income to support the military needs of the kingdom and to supply themselves with horses, weapons, arms and men-at-arms dated as far back as Henry III and had become a traditional function of each succeeding monarch at his coronation. Charles initially declined to carry on the practice in 1625, although the crown did order county sheriffs in 1626 to identify likely candidates. By 1627, however, with a pressing need for new revenue, the king ordered the imposition of fines on all those eligible subjects who had not appeared at the coronation to be knighted (not actually enforced until 1629). Not satisfied with the scope of the collections, the Privy Council appointed special county commissions in 1630 to identify delinquents and ensure payment of the fines. Although clearly within the scope of royal prerogative, the distraint of knighthood resulted in the further alienation of an important segment of society and led to the elimination of the ancient practice along with other feudal privileges in the constitutional reforms of 1641.3 Despite such controversial and ultimately profitable measures, the crown’s inability to support itself through the traditional ordinary income worsened. Inflation in the previous century had eroded the buying power of normal revenue sources – crown lands, customs, feudal dues and subsidies. The bureaucratic mechanism for collection proved inadequate and underpaid or unpaid officials typically skimmed proceeds or under-assessed their property. Such abuses fomented strident political opposition and resentment towards crown revenue policies by the 1630s and created the impression of a royal absolutism threatening the ‘ancient constitution’ and traditional property rights.4 In religion, many Britons viewed the seeming drift towards Catholicism as a threat to the Protestant Reformation and blamed the king, William Laud (archbishop of Canterbury) and ‘high church’ Arminianism. By the end of the 1620s, two opposite notions of religion polarized English society and roiled politics. A perceived Puritan attempt to undermine monarchy and an alleged Catholic plot to reverse the Reformation – each seen by contemporaries as an explanation for the political turbulence – disturbed the early years of Charles’s reign. Objections to the Arminian outlook included the seemingly Catholic form of worship, particularly the emphasis on traditional sacraments and high church ceremony as well as a relaxation on permissible Sabbath activities. The greater 30


respect for the clerical estate – intellectually, spiritually and economically – espoused by the Arminians carried onerous political connotations because of their court ties.5 Puritans, a body of ardent reformers who advocated a ‘more secure, morally reformed social order’ viewed the rise of Arminianism in the 1620s and 1630s, with its emphasis on ceremony, sacraments, clerical status and secular employment, as heralding a return to popery. Without a religious reformation based on Calvinist principles of certainty and election, Puritans believed that royal policies could inadvertently open the door to an unintended return of Roman Catholicism or at least a popish-style royal absolutism.6 By 1642, it appeared that the crown had proven not only incapable of stemming a resurgent Catholicism, but actually favoured popery. For many Protestants (not just Puritans and Calvinists), it seemed increasingly apparent that the Stuart monarchy could no longer be trusted to safeguard their religious and political values. As to the choosing of sides when military conflict finally did occur, religious sympathy provides one of the most reliable indicators of loyalty – Puritans, separatists and sectaries (dissenters from the established Church of England) supported Parliament while Catholics and Arminians chose the king.7 Events in Scotland sparked the long-smouldering bonfire of resentment towards perceived arbitrary rule. A royal proclamation of 20 December 1636 commanded the publication and compulsory use of the Service Book in every Scottish parish by Easter of 1637. Archbishop Laud played a leading collaborative role with the Scottish bishops in producing the Scottish Service Book based on the English Book of Common Prayer. Many Scots viewed the book as imposing religious observances so obviously Catholic that public demonstrations erupted, notably the riot in St Giles’s Cathedral, Edinburgh, on 23 July 1637. Within months, the Scottish National Covenant of February 1638 swept the northern kingdom. Nonconforming Presbyterians and members of radical conventicles formed the original basis of the Covenanting movement; however, it became widespread and popular as key nobles such as Archibald Campbell, earl of Argyle, formally embraced the cause. The movement represented a ‘fundamental ideological message: that opposition to the royal prerogative in defence of religious and civil liberty was divinely warranted’. Indeed, it also encompassed a nationalist reaction to the implementation of religious uniformity throughout the two kingdoms. Archibald Johnston of Wariston drew up the formal document called the National Covenant in February 1638 that asserted a special relationship between the Scots and God. Although the document did not explicitly pledge to support a Presbyterian ecclesiastical government, it clearly rejected any form of Catholicism and, by implication, challenged Charles’s religious policies. While religion may have been the catalyst, the Covenanting movement encompassed Scottish national resentment over the union with England as well as the constitutional issue of the royal prerogative’s extent.8 Although the Scottish Privy Council, which temporarily halted the implementation of the Service Book after the St Giles affair, advised Charles to exercise caution, the king prepared for military confrontation. In December 1638, a General 31


Assembly of the Kirk convened in Glasgow and abolished the Scottish episcopacy, asserted the primacy of Presbyterianism in Scotland and ordered every shire committee to raise, equip and maintain a regiment of foot and a troop of horse. Spurred to action by the affront to his authority, Charles resolved to punish the Covenanters by military action, thus precipitating the First Bishops’ War of 1639.9 Hindered by an uncoordinated and vacillating strategy, and facing experienced veterans of continental service such as Alexander Leslie, the royal army performed dismally in the First Bishops’ War of March to June 1639. Charles chose an offensive strategy that relied on a show of English force and a perceived Scottish reluctance to invade for fear of arousing English nationalism. However, the halfhearted preparations and lack of enthusiasm for his expedition, perhaps due to the reluctance of English Protestants to harm their Scottish brethren, doomed any chance of success. Charles concealed his preparations with as much secrecy as possible, given that the raising and equipping of the trained bands could not be disguised. The offensive strategy as conceived by Sir Jacob Astley, a veteran of the continental wars, called for a three-pronged attack on the Scottish Lowlands. With a force of 5,000 militia and pressed men raised in the Midlands, the duke of Hamilton would mount an amphibious landing in the Firth of Forth directed at Edinburgh in hopes of precipitating a Scottish civil war. The main English assault by the royal army of 20,000 troops under the earl of Holland would cross the border between Carlisle and Berwick, supported by an attack on western Scotland staged from Ireland by the earl of Antrim and Thomas Wentworth. Logistical and financial difficulties coupled with the refusal of key aristocrats to support the military preparations caused the royal strategy to collapse by March 1639. Hamilton’s amphibious landing degenerated into a series of tactical diversions and played no significant role in supporting the primary action along the border mainly due to his soldiers’ lack of training and the precarious supply line. The attempt to challenge the Scots in the west similarly failed. The main royal force suffered from the same difficulties as Hamilton’s prompting the king’s standard bearer, Sir Edmund Verney, to lament: ‘Our men are verry rawe, our armes of all sorts nawght, our vittle scarce, and provition for horses woarce; and now you maye judg what case wee are in, and all for want of monny’.10 Leslie’s defeat of Holland at Kelso on 4 June stunned the English and forced retreat that prompted truce negotiations at Berwick. Embarrassed, the king still refused to accept the legitimacy of the Glasgow Assembly, dismissed the commanders who had failed to win a battlefield victory and planned for a second war.11 Faced with the need for revenue to continue military action against the Scots, Charles issued writs for a new Parliament in March 1640. Many of the opposition leaders from the 1620s re-emerged primarily under the leadership of John Pym, a superb parliamentarian and organizer, who pressed Charles with grievances and a legislative agenda. After a short session of just three weeks, Charles dissolved the Short Parliament, based on the rumour of a petition opposing renewed war against the Covenanters. The privileges of Parliament emerged as a central point of 32


contention between the crown and the Short Parliament. On 4 May, Pym raised the issue of continuing the fight against Scotland. Faced with parliamentary intransigence, the king dissolved the assembly the following day. Interestingly, religious differences played only a minor role in the lack of harmony between the king and the parliamentary leadership despite having been the driving force behind Scottish actions. The Short Parliament brought to the surface tensions that had permeated English economic and political life throughout the Personal Rule and illustrated the growing rift between the crown and elements of the aristocracy over constitutional as well as religious issues.12 In June 1640, a Scottish Parliament met and declared that its votes created statutes even without the king’s approval. The issue crystallized. Scotland would have no bishops and the king demanded an episcopacy. Despite the lack of funds and the political opposition apparent in the Short Parliament, Charles resolved to chastise the Scots through military force. Accordingly, royal strategy in the summer of 1640 envisioned another three-pronged offensive; however, inadequate military preparations and the ineffectual implementation of the royal strategy exacerbated tensions and illustrated the king’s military deficiencies, further compounding his political troubles. The 1640 strategy mirrored that of the previous year; however, Charles had fewer resources both financial and manpower than in 1639. Emboldened by the perceived English weakness, the army of the Covenant crossed the Tweed on 20 August under Leslie and the marquis of Montrose. The invasion of England altered the political dimension. The English aristocracy could no longer refuse to support the king’s efforts to destroy the Covenanters. The Scots, however, had made a calculated gamble that they could disrupt English military preparations and thus forestall an invasion of the Scottish Lowlands. On the banks of the River Tyne at Newburn, the king lost the Second Bishops’ War. Leslie’s men forded the river on 28 August. Employing artillery fire that destroyed one royal fortification after another, combined with a devastating cavalry charge, the Covenanters drove back the English defenders. Newburn ended the Second Bishops’ War with a single English defeat. The loss had a direct correlation to an ill-conceived and inappropriate royal strategy. The crown possessed neither the manpower nor the resources to divide its forces into multi-pronged attacks.13 Ultimately, politics doomed the royal war effort. Without parliamentary finance, the king could not mount a sufficient war effort. Lacking a political consensus, the normal preparations for war in terms of supply, equipment and training proved deficient. Petitions called for a new Parliament but Charles agreed only to convene a council of lay and clerical notables that met at York in September and October 1640. The Treaty of Ripon, signed on 26 October, produced a truce but left the Scots in possession of Northumberland and Durham and guaranteed them a large subsidy. If the calling of a new English Parliament represented the ultimate Scottish policy aim, the victory at Newburn guaranteed that outcome. Charles reluctantly issued writs for a new Parliament that convened 3 November 1640 thus setting in motion the slide towards a general civil insurrection. 33


Challenges came swiftly in the new Parliament, particularly directed against the ‘evil counselors’ (Archbishop Laud and Thomas Wentworth, lord lieutenant of Ireland and recently created earl of Strafford), royal confidants blamed for the unpopular royal policies of the Personal Rule. Opposition leaders pushed a reform agenda to limit the royal prerogative, prevent the collection of customs duties without parliamentary consent, ensure triennial Parliaments, abolish the courts of High Commission, Star Chamber and the other prerogative tribunals, remove bishops from the House of Lords and revoke the liturgical and doctrinal innovations of the 1630s. Despite the formation of a king’s or royalist ‘party’ in both houses and the withdrawal of the Covenanter army on the conclusion of the Treaty of London in August 1641, Charles still faced potent political opposition.14 The 1641 Irish rebellion forced the king to continue to raise troops and revenue to suppress the revolt. Long-standing Irish resentment over English colonialism and heavy-handed royal policies imposed by the earl of Strafford (lord deputy of Ireland from 1632 to 1641) to extract more revenue for the crown, reform the Irish army, maintain a tighter control over the justice system and enforce Laudian changes in the Irish church fired the rebellion. As with the Covenanting movement and the constitutional debate over royal privileges, the Irish rebellion became inextricably mixed with religious concerns. Political and religious opponents of the king saw danger in allowing Charles to exercise control over a large force in Ireland, given their suspicions that he had had a hand in the fomenting of rebellion as a means of raising forces and imposing Catholicism.15 Strafford’s eventual execution for treason by a bill of attainder in May 1641 represented the increasing radicalization among the king’s more strident parliamentary opponents. The two army plots of 1641 further undermined the king’s credibility and highlighted the inherent danger in his control over military forces. The first plot of March to May 1641 grew out of soldiers’ frustration over the lack of pay and the seeming inability or unwillingness of Parliament to address these concerns. The plot, originally a series of unconnected conspiracies that eventually merged into a single, more coordinated plan, resulted from the notion that, by moving military forces near London, the army could intimidate Parliament into acting on material demands. The king’s involvement is not precisely known though certainly he would have benefited from a cowing of the assembly. The second army plot of July 1641 carried the prospect of a military coup d’état against Parliament rather than simple intimidation. Daniel O’Neill, a gentleman of the Privy Chamber Extraordinary and the king’s representative to the army, suggested that it might inject itself into the political debate by offering to provide physical security to his majesty as well as Parliament. The rumours of dissident elements in London, who threatened both the king and parliamentary members, added some impetus to O’Neill’s proposal, which actually aimed at the intimidation of Parliament though in a bolder fashion than the previous plot. Pym and his political allies realized the implications of the plan and countered by suggesting that the trained bands in England and Wales be mobilized to scotch any attempt to subvert or threaten Parliament, thus checking the second army plot. The two episodes further alienated 34


the king and the opposition leadership and led to a hardening of opinion over allowing the king unfettered control of the forces for the suppression of the Irish rebellion. On 6 April 1642, the Commons voted that the army and the trained bands could not be mobilized or marched without the king’s permission along with the consent of both houses of Parliament, thus establishing the precedent of parliamentary control of the military, a factor that weighed heavily in the outbreak of open hostilities in 1642. Additionally, the army plots gave impetus to a bill against the dissolution of Parliament. The episodes convinced many moderate members of Parliament that ‘true loyalty might take the form of taking authority, and especially military authority, out of the king’s hands’.16 In November 1641, the Commons debated the Grand Remonstrance, which criticized royal government since the beginning of Charles’s reign and accused the king of establishing arbitrary government and appealing to popish and malignant supporters. The Remonstrance generated vociferous debate and passed by only eleven votes in a near riotous House of Commons on 22 November. The power of the Grand Remonstrance in terms of public opinion is illustrated by the country’s reaction. Between December 1641 and the raising of the king’s standard at Nottingham the following August, thirty-eight out of forty counties sent similar petitions to London demanding religious reform or anti-Catholic legislation. Presented to Charles on 1 December, the Grand Remonstrance served mainly as a propaganda device to incite public opinion. The king’s reaction resulted in one of the seminal moments in the building momentum towards civil war – the Five Members’ Case. Angered by their role in the passage of the Grand Remonstrance and the impeachment of the bishops on 29 December for protesting against their inability to attend the Lords because of hostile crowds, the king ordered the arrest of five leading opponents in the House of Commons, as well as Edward Montague, Viscount Mandeville and future earl of Manchester, on 3 January 1642. The king charged the six with treason, including attempting to subvert the law, alienating the affections of his subjects, promoting army mutiny, encouraging the Scottish invasion and subverting the authority of Parliament. When both houses refused to turn over the accused members to the attorney general, the king arrived at Westminster accompanied by soldiers, but forewarned of the pending arrest, the group had escaped. Charles withdrew from Whitehall on 10 January to Windsor Castle largely due to a fear of violence in the City. The House objected to the issuance of the arrest warrants without formal charges and warned the king that reconciliation could be possible only if he declared as public enemies those ‘evil counselors’, who had advised him to act illegally. Events such as the Five Members’ Case further moved public opinion in Parliament’s favour and accelerated the breach between the crown and the representative.17 Although the king agreed to the bulk of the constitutional reforms of 1641, two issues remained divisive by early 1642: control of the military and the reformation of religion. Doctrinal and liturgical innovations embraced in the 1630s had been revoked, but despite the apparent rejection of Laudian innovations, religion 35


continued to cause divisiveness. To Puritans, the church had not been sufficiently purged of Catholic features, and the influence of the clergy in secular matters, despite the removal of the bishops from the House of Lords (13 February 1642), remained unacceptable. To royal supporters, the proposed reforms went too far. Religion, then, promoted the growing hostility as definitive sides formed in early 1642. Prior to 1640, there seemed to be little opposition to episcopacy per se even among Puritans; however, the association of a majority of the bishops with the increasingly controversial Laudian innovations and concerns over the secular power of the clergy drove the opposition. On 11 December 1640, the City of London delivered a petition to the Commons attacking the power of the clergy and demanding that the ‘government of archbishops and lord bishops, deans and archdeacons [should be dismantled] with all its dependencies, roots and branches’. The Root and Branch Petition bearing 15,000 signatures illustrated the fundamental shift in public opinion against the establishment of Laud and Charles. The petition set in motion a series of debates over the form of worship as well as the liturgy and ceremony. Although a bill based on the Root and Branch failed in the Commons, many of the features made their way into other bills, including a prohibition of sports on the Sabbath, ritual bowing and crucifixes or images of the Virgin Mary. Although the bill based on the original London petition of 1640 failed, it inspired a fundamental reform in the church by 1642. On the eve of the First Civil War, however, further religious reformation still provided a powerful motivation to take up arms for or against the king.18 The issue of the command and control of the military erupted again in October 1641 with renewed rebellion in Ireland. Strafford’s Irish army had been disbanded in May. With the Treaty of London personally negotiated by Charles in Scotland and the resultant withdrawal of the occupying Covenanter army, the first session of the Long Parliament concluded with the expectation of its dissolution, despite an earlier act requiring its consent (May 1641). Fears that the king would co-opt the Covenanters with concessions, thus providing him with a potent armed force, proved unfounded. However, the need to suppress the rebellion guaranteed a second session. Control of the army proved the thorniest issue. Pym pushed a bill that in essence usurped royal command and control of military forces, illustrating the fundamental mistrust of the king as commander of the armed forces. Beginning in January, the Commons debated a bill empowering that body to nominate lords lieutenant and to raise troops. The Militia Ordinance, which eventually passed in the Commons on 31 January and the Lords on 5 March 1642, attacked one of the most fundamental pillars of kingship: command and control of the armed forces. As each side claimed the right to embody, raise, command and control armed forces, the drift towards open war sharply accelerated.19 To heal the widening breach, Charles offered concessions and agreed to the exclusion of the bishops from secular employments as well as a possible compromise on the militia bill. He had previously appointed new members of the Council whom Parliament more readily accepted as a counter to the charge of evil counsel. Pym and the increasingly strident parliamentary leadership still refused to 36


compromise. While attempting to negotiate, the king plotted to make the arsenal cities of Hull and Portsmouth into strongholds and to send the queen to the continent not only for her personal safety but also to sell or pawn the crown jewels to finance a mercenary army in the Netherlands and Denmark. If Charles genuinely desired to prevent outright civil war in the winter of 1642, his actions seem nevertheless provocative and incendiary.20 While the unresolved issues of command and control of the military and religious reformation still created political controversy in early 1642, the rebellions in Scotland and Ireland precipitated a series of events that culminated in open conflict by the summer. The Covenanter rebellion demonstrated the military incompetence of Charles’s government and forced the calling of two parliaments, which provided opponents a forum for promoting constitutional and religious reforms and attacks on the royal prerogative. The Irish rebellion brought to a head the issue of command and control of the military, the loss of which Charles would not abide.

Conflict in Yorkshire and the coming of Civil War The king’s withdrawal from London and the queen’s flight to the continent shifted the focus of events to Yorkshire where Charles hoped to draw support. Subsequent events in the north ultimately sparked the explosion of civil war. Charles’s failure to win the enthusiastic support of the Yorkshire gentry through the spring and summer of 1642 exacerbated the continuing series of crises that soon centred on Hull and the arsenal for the northern counties. As both sides contended for support, Parliament struck first. On 12 January, both houses ordered a muster of the Yorkshire trained bands nearest to Hull, the issuance of two pounds of powder with match and ball and the establishment of a garrison under the command of Sir John Hotham with orders not to ‘deliver up the Town of Hull, or [the] Magazine there … without the King’s Authority, signified unto him by the Lords and Commons’.21 A further order the following day called out the Yorkshire trained bands and established a constabulary watch at Hull. Sir John Gower, sheriff of Yorkshire, immediately implemented the orders, despite some opposition in the East Riding. At a meeting on 28 January, Gower and the justices of the peace devised a plan for the defence of the county, specifying the setting of watches, the commencement of weekly drills and the issuance of arms and ammunition. Much of the gentry’s opposition to the precautionary actions stemmed from the cost of the preparations as well as their questionable legality. Further parliamentary action on 11 February made the lord lieutenant of each county responsible only to Parliament and also proposed a list of noblemen and gentlemen for appointment to these offices.22 In mid-February, Gower and the justices met again and decided to transfer the magazine to York where a sheriff’s guard would be posted. Additionally, three petitions of 15 February signed by 530 prominent Yorkshiremen declared their full concurrence with Parliament’s actions. The emerging parliamentary faction in Yorkshire understood the implications. Prior to signing, the petitioners agreed that, should the danger of violence increase, they would raise a force of 3,000 37


infantry and 300 cavalry for six weeks’ duty. The documents thanked the king for removing both the bishops and prelates from the House of Lords and the ‘evil councilors’, a euphemism which, despite protestations of loyalty, took direct aim at the king.23 Strafford’s execution had demonstrated to Charles the meaning of any demand to remove evil influences from the court. The embodiment of troops not sanctioned by the crown represented the most inflammatory of all the proposed actions. On 1 March, Parliament sent a message to the king justifying the actions of those ‘Parts of the Kingdom which have put themselves in a Posture of Defence’ according to the directions of both houses.24 Charles reacted swiftly. With a train of courtiers and a bodyguard, he entered York on the afternoon of 16 March. Despite his arrival with the crown and great seal as symbols of his authority, in vacating Whitehall, Charles in effect abdicated real authority to his parliamentary opponents who now controlled the machinery and revenue of government. The crowds in York seemed enthusiastic, which buoyed the king’s resolution. But in his welcoming address, the mayor admonished Charles to ‘forget not them that alwayes remember you: concurre with them in their sedulous consultations’.25 Despite his irritation at the mayor’s allusion to cooperation with Parliament, Charles did not lose his newly found confidence. On the journey north, the king had advised Parliament that the people ‘cannot be obliged to obey any Act, Order or Injunction to which his Majesty hath not given his consent’. If the king fired a shot across Parliament’s bow, his opponents responded with a full broadside. On the day of his arrival in York, Parliament declared that commissions issued to lords lieutenant under the great seal lacked legal sanction. Furthermore, anyone who attempted to execute power over the county militias without the consent of both houses would be regarded as a disturber of the peace. Parliament further declared that the supreme court of judicature should determine the law of the land. To question, contradict or controvert that authority constituted a violation of parliamentary privilege, an audacious and dramatic declaration. Despite attempts to defuse the growing constitutional crisis, the breach between Parliament and crown appeared irreparable. The slide into armed conflict accelerated.26 Not all residents of Yorkshire welcomed the February petitions. Opposition formed on the issues of billeting and the maintenance costs of the troops. Pym proposed that Parliament borrow money to reimburse county residents for billeting so as to dampen the ‘hot invectives against the Yorkshire Petition’. Although Parliament supplied funds for billeting and provided assurances of more to follow, the problem of pay and supply appeared early on in the struggle and remained a thorny, divisive issue. For the Yorkshire gentry, the conflict between the king and Parliament took on an added burden. The petitions and the raising of troops called on the gentry to provide quarters in ‘some most convenient places of the severall Ridings of our said County’. With the seat of discord firmly in their midst and with both sides moving towards outright civil war, few could remain neutral.27 Facing an increasingly likely prospect of outright rebellion, Charles resolved to secure the arsenal at Hull, which had not yet been moved to York. To check the 38


opposition’s growing military power, the earl of Newcastle, lord-general of the king’s forces in the north, issued a proclamation on 1 April demanding that all arms be surrendered to the magazine at York or Tynemouth Castle within twentyfour hours in the city of York and four days in other parts of the county. The weapons sought included corslets, pikes, carbines, muskets, and pistols not ‘employed in or about his Majesty’s public service’ or that could be used ‘through the disaffection of the owners … against his Majesty’. The earl offered a bounty for arms confiscated or captured from rebels by any means.28 In response, Thomas Stockdale proposed another petition calling for the king to return to London. At the York assizes on 5 April, several leading gentry signed this new petition and presented it to Charles. Although the king’s attitude appeared generally deferential, his subsequent actions revealed his true position. On the 8th, Charles announced a plan for raising a personal bodyguard from among loyalists in Cheshire and for a new campaign against the Irish rebels. Arms would be drawn from the magazine at Hull for the expedition. The proposal came as part of a broader attempt by Charles to win back the initiative on the command of forces. In an alternate militia bill proposed to the Lords on 19 April, Charles offered to allow parliamentary-approved officers to hold their commissions for a year with both houses in control of the army during the campaign in Ireland. However, neither compromise on the militia bill nor the sanctioning of a large, well-equipped royal force had any realistic chance of parliamentary acceptance by late April 1642.29 Henrietta Maria, though on the continent, played a significant role in the welling crisis. By letter, she persuaded Charles to move against Hull and challenge Hotham. On 23 April, Charles marched to Hull with 400 horse, justifying his action by citing a petition of the citizens of York who requested that he remove the magazine for his own safety.30 The timing of the petition seems somewhat staged as it arrived at court on 22 April barely a day before Charles commenced his march. Hotham refused to allow the king into the city thus inflicting a serious blow to royal prestige. He declared to Charles that he had received word of an assassination plot against himself should he admit the king. He further pleaded that he could not open the gates without direct authorization from Parliament, for to do so would constitute a violation of the trust placed in him as governor of Hull. Enraged, the king declared Hotham and his officers traitors and interdicted communications between Hull and London. Parliament promptly reacted to the siege of Hull that began on 23 April. On the 28th, it resolved that the king’s action violated parliamentary privilege. Further, it voted that Hotham had merely carried out the orders of both houses. In declaring Hotham and his officers traitors, the king violated the principles of due process, thereby infringing the ‘Liberty of the Subject and the Law of the Land’. In practical terms, Hotham’s refusal to allow entry to the king put into effect the militia ordnance, the most incendiary parliamentary challenge that eventually drove Charles to declare war on his own assembly. Indeed, to the increasingly anxious residents of Yorkshire, the fire and counter-fire between monarch and Parliament created for them and the kingdom as a whole ‘so dangerous a season’.31 39


A poignant letter from the citizens of Hull printed on 12 May 1642 pleaded with Parliament, the king and the royalist gentry of Yorkshire to ‘stanch the bleeding wounds of Ireland and distracted England’.32 Affairs in Yorkshire, however, had moved too far for compromise. Charles summoned the Yorkshire gentry in midMay to announce that he intended to have a royal guard to protect his person as well as the gentry, the laws and the ‘true Protestant Profession’, citing the denial of his entry into Hull and the raising of the militia without his consent.33 The people of Yorkshire had good reason to fear increased violence as each side continued to raise troops. On 14 May, Charles issued a warrant summoning the county horse to muster under arms at York. By late May, Sir Robert Strickland’s 600-man regiment of North Riding trained band soldiers had mustered at York along with Sir Francis Wortley’s troop of horse.34 For Parliament, the king’s growing military power had to be checked. A petition of 23 May seeking the disbanding of the king’s guard at York stated that Parliament deemed these forces ‘a cause of great jealousie, and danger to the whole Kingdome’.35 Despite the protestations, troops continued to pour into Yorkshire. In response, Parliament ordered the sheriffs to suppress the raising of men for the king without the explicit approval of both houses and for all officials to prevent the movement of arms and ammunition to York.36 The escalating conflict in Yorkshire and the apprehensions of its citizens are captured by comments from a news sheet that described the ‘great Preparations for warre[;] … the Country hereabouts is put in a great feare, if civill Warrs begin amongst us, that ruine and distruction will befall this [Kingdome], which God of his mercy prevent’.37 Convinced that Charles bluffed, Parliament responded. The Nineteen Propositions offered in late June as the basis of a peaceful settlement and made possible by the departure from London of many royalist peers and Members of Parliament further undermined royal sovereignty and called for radical changes in the government and liturgy of the Church of England. The proposals represented a sharp attack on traditional royal prerogatives such as the right to appoint crown officials, command military forces and control the judiciary. In addition, Parliament demanded the strict enforcement of laws against Jesuits and recusants. The terms of the Nineteen Propositions represented nothing less than a transfer of sovereignty from the crown to Parliament.38 Parliament reacted to the likelihood of civil war by raising money. Both houses declared that anyone who donated either cash or plate or furnished, equipped and maintained horse ‘for the preservation of the publick peace’ would provide great service to the Commonwealth. Cash donations would be repaid at 8 per cent interest while the full value of plate would be refunded. Those who raised troops would be compensated for their expenses and the troops paid at 6d. per diem for as long as they remained under arms. Parliament justified the raising of money and subscriptions as necessary to maintain the Protestant religion, assure the king’s authority and dignity, preserve the laws of the land and privileges of Parliament and guarantee the peace of the kingdom.39 By mid-summer 1642, many Yorkshire gentry simply wished for Charles to 40


leave the county in hopes that his departure would dampen the growing crisis. However, to secure their defence, they resisted royalist efforts to confiscate arms. By early July, the division into opposing and hostile factions prompted one Yorkshire observer to comment that ‘our Countie is halfe divided … [and] exceedingly distracted’.40 Recruitment efforts accelerated particularly in the hotbeds of parliamentary support around Bradford, Halifax and Leeds. Many landowners raised troops in the hope of deterring the other side. Royal recruitment throughout England brought in men as the ‘drums strike up all the day long here for Voluntiers upon the promise of large pay’.41 The royal commissions of array charged with raising troops and revenue for the crown and whom the Commons dubbed ‘esteemed disturbers of the peace of the kingdom and betrayers of the liberty of the subject’, nonetheless proved successful recruiters.42 Volunteers poured into Beverley where Charles established his military headquarters. By late July, the royalist gentry of Yorkshire showed in force. Sir John Goodrick brought in 250 horse; Sir Francis Wortley engaged to recruit two regiments of trained bands for the siege of Hull. The majority of the Yorkshire gentry remained loyal to the king and outnumbered the Parliamentarians by roughly four to one.43 The first formal skirmish of the civil war occurred at Manchester on 4 July. The royalist commander, Lord Strange, marched from York and attempted to enter the town. The citizens rebuffed him, precipitating a two-day musket duel. Although minor compared to later battles, the Manchester fight escalated the conflict into civil war. A London newsletter reported the skirmish: This is the beginning of the Civill Warre[;] … GOD knows when the ending will be … for no man knoweth the cruelty of war, not those that have felt and tryed it[,] for when that time commeth, many Child will be left Fatherlesse, and many a poore wife Husbandlesse’.44 Parliament responded to the ballooning crisis in the north when, on 12 July, it resolved to raise an army with Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, as captain-general. Essex, a notable aristocrat, is described by Austin Woolrych as a ‘mediocre general even by the amateurish standards of the civil war’.45 The centre of the conflict again shifted to Hull. Charles advanced on the town with a force of 400 horse and 700 foot. The residents raised 1,000 men in response and requested money to build new defensive works and a reinforcement of 300 troops. After some debate, Parliament agreed to send men and money for provisions and future pay as well as arrears for the existing garrison. The king’s forces commenced night attacks in mid-July using burning buildings to distract defenders while the infantry scaled the walls. By month’s end, no one in the kingdom could deny that civil war had begun. It needed only a formal declaration.46 In August, two issues especially troubled the Yorkshire gentry as they sought to quell the growing violence and restore the peace: the king’s interference with the trained bands and the outbreaks of pillaging and looting, especially by royalist troops. Early in the month, Charles replaced the Yorkshire trained band officers 41


with reliable loyalists. The new officers immediately forced the troops to muster under arms and compelled several men from each regiment to march to Hull to join the besieging forces, committing soldiers who refused to the stocks. But the unreliability of the Yorkshire militia at Hull demonstrated to Charles that he needed a national army capable of mobile operations thus prompting the general call to arms. He issued a proclamation on the 17th announcing that he intended to raise the royal standard at Nottingham on the 22nd. In the proclamation, he declared as traitors any who refused to obey the orders of the commissions of array and called on all loyal subjects to rendezvous at Nottingham. Accordingly, on the 18th, the king’s forces abandoned the camp at Beverley and the siege works surrounding Hull and marched towards Nottingham.47 By the end of August 1642, the trouble in Yorkshire thus came to be nationalized. Reacting to the raising of the standard and the formal inauguration of a royalist army, the Commons established a council of war. As the various forces coalesced in late August, the command structure that dominated the first years of the war emerged. In the north, the king appointed the earl of Newcastle as his commanderin-chief. To oppose him, Parliament designated Lord Ferdinando Fairfax as the commander of all parliamentary forces in the northern counties, namely Yorkshire, Cumberland, Northumberland, Lancashire, Westmorland and Durham.48 The outbreak of civil war occurred over constitutional issues of sovereign authority, most notably, command and control of the military forces as well as frustration over the progress of religious reformation. In short, the parliamentarians could not trust the king to forbear using organized military forces to punish opponents or refute the constitutional changes of 1641. Nor did they trust Charles to purge the church of perceived Catholic influences. The one-upmanship displayed in the raising of royal guards and, conversely, troops for county defence in Yorkshire through 1642, illustrates the singular lack of trust in the other side’s intentions. Ultimately, parliamentary leaders resolved to maintain the constitutional reforms of 1641 by armed force. In attempts to secure these reforms in the increasingly antagonistic climate, they claimed new sovereignty, notably the sole right to raise, command and control military forces. Attempts at settlement in 1641 and early 1642 failed for a number of reasons, including the mistrust of the king’s intentions, a growing reluctance by many in Parliament to provide adequate funding to the crown, and, finally, divisions over how to accomplish a religious reformation.49

Choosing sides and the motivation to fight The economic and religious context is important in explaining the choosing of sides as hostilities commenced in Yorkshire in the summer of 1642. The example of the West Riding of Yorkshire provides enlightenment on the motivation to chose a side for two reasons – first, the majority of the troops under Lord Fairfax in the first two years of the war hailed from the West Riding, and second, many of the contextual dynamics found in that region applied in other areas of the country where parliamentary recruiters found willing volunteers. Also, the motivation to 42


fight plays large in the human dynamics aspect of each commander’s martial synergy and is essential in forming an analysis of their military effectiveness. The majority of the early parliamentary recruits in the north came from Yorkshire woollen industry towns such as Leeds, Halifax and Bradford, as well as from south-eastern Lancashire and Birmingham. These independent craftsmen and artisans proved to be staunch parliamentary supporters. Fears of popery, depredations by royal troops, the interruption of trade, the hope that Parliament would address grievances and a desire for religious reformation drove these men into rebellion. Common interests based on economic concerns emerged especially among the artisans and merchants of the clothing towns. Popular enthusiasm for the parliamentary cause resulted in great recruiting success in the West Riding clothing towns amongst otherwise largely royalist northern rural areas. The Yorkshire woollen interests took an active part in the events leading to the outbreak of civil war, as indicated by a petition of the clothiers of Leeds to the king for redress of grievances in April 1642. The Yorkshire woollen market suffered a serious depression during the 1630s due to the inferior quality of their product as well as their inability to react to changes in consumer style and quality demands. Economic anxiety often is expressed in political terms and the parliamentary supporters of Yorkshire may have been caught up in a growing anti-crown sentiment driven by economic concerns.50 By the 1630s, many parishes in the West Riding had developed a common tradition of godly preaching. The rise of a godly ministry, especially prominent around Halifax, Leeds and Bradford, penetrated into parishes in Craven and Upper Wharfedale (home to John Lambert and the Fairfaxes), regions where parliamentary agents found fertile recruiting ground. Additionally, these districts had expressed strident opposition to Laudianism in the 1630s. Clarendon characterized the West Riding clothiers as generally Puritans who ‘wanted only conductors to carry them into rebellion’. The royalist chronicler clearly recognized the criticality of effective leadership in guiding and shaping the parliamentary war effort.51 As the crisis of summer 1642 increasingly dominated pulpit oratory in the West Riding, many ministers, while not advocating rebellion per se, ‘had armed their congregation with a clear view of where both right and responsibility lay’. To the ordinary parishioner, that meant the defence of Protestantism. The tradition of godly preaching represented a common factor in those areas dominated by Parliament. For example, a comment on the royalist prisoners captured at Gainsborough in October 1643 illustrates the importance of religion in the parliamentary forces. The writer observed that ‘most of the Cavaliers taken at Gainsborough [1643] had Cards in their pockets, whereas the Parliament Souldiers daily carry Psalme bookes (the leafe is turned downe at the Psalme of mercy)’.52 Catholics predominantly supported the royalist cause and accounted for a third of the Yorkshire and almost two-thirds of the Cheshire gentry royalists.53 The Catholic connection in the king’s forces must not be overstated. While parliamentary propagandists excelled at portraying the royal armies as rat’s nests of rabid papists willing to spill Protestant blood to restore Catholicism, the reality is 43


somewhat different. P. R. Newman demonstrates that the king’s arms did indeed welcome professed Catholics and that royalist forces exhibited a remarkable lack of religious bigotry. Given the broad encompassing nature of the established church, religion among the royalists took many forms including Catholicism, broad Anglicism and even some Puritanism. The central motivating ingredient for the royalists seems to be a conservative defence of the established order and tradition and not religion. In essence, what drew Protestants to the king also drew Catholics: defence of the established order and a fear of constitutional innovation that challenged the traditional polity and social norms. The ‘continuing identity of interest which tied them to their Protestant gentry neighbours’ motivated Catholic aristocrats to defend king and country. Perhaps as many as a third of the officers in the earl’s northern army in 1642 can be classified as Catholic. Newcastle, according to Lady Newcastle’s post-war commentary, exclaimed that ‘he did not examine their [Catholic officers] opinions on religion, but looked more upon their honesty and duty; for certainly there were honest men and loyal subjects amongst Roman Catholics, as well as Protestants’.54 Aristocratic sentiment played a central role in the decision of many to take up arms for either side. Deference to authority as well as the traditional military role of aristocrats that obligated them to raise recruits from their estates, represented pivotal factors in the formation of the armies. Family connections proved to be an important determinant for aristocrats. The high rate of heads of families and sons all serving demonstrates this phenomenon especially in the royalist forces. The Civil Wars saw a resurgence of the aristocratic ideal of military service. Thirteen peers and forty-two baronets and knights died as a result of combat.55 Indicative of the phenomenon of aristocratic participation, the royalist cavalry often suffered from a misalignment in the number of cavalry (horse) to infantry (foot) units. Often at a 1:1 ratio when prevailing concepts of force structure called for a 1:2 or even 1:3 ratio of horse to foot, the far more expensive to equip and maintain cavalry exacerbated the royal financial dilemma. But the sons of the aristocracy had to be accorded the status due them by their birth and that meant cavalry service.56 The phenomenon of lowly born officers in the parliamentary forces emerged late in the First Civil War and generated controversy. Initially, only aristocrats and gentlemen served as officers in the royalist and parliamentary regiments. Contemporary observers reacted to the dilution of social distinctions as the necessity to improve the efficiency of the parliamentary forces drove the promotion of nonaristocrats to high ranks. Sir James Turner, a veteran of the continental wars and one of the best of the Scottish commanders, commented on the removal of the aristocratic distinction of the cavalry resulting in ‘most of the Horsemen, as well as of the Foot, being composed of the very scum of the Commons’.57 Often, the ideal of loyal, courageous, knightly service transcended political or religious associations, as illustrated by Turner’s comments on foreign service: ‘so we serve our master honestly, it is no matter what master we serve’.58 Regardless of loyalties, for the sons of the aristocracy, likely well-read in military matters and perhaps seasoned by continental service, the Civil Wars provided an outlet for the 44


expression of their traditional social role as defenders of religion and the constitution. There is no evidence that either side initially attracted officers of greater talent, experience or will to fight. Distinctions in ability or success resulted from the inevitable sorting out caused by casualties and the need for the best men to rise to the top. Effective leadership in the Civil Wars eventually resulted from individual talent and resultant behaviour as modified by experience, situational and contextual factors. The role of adventurism in motivating men to take up arms cannot be overlooked. While complex factors such as religious zeal and economic self-interest drove many to one side or the other, the opportunity for adventure, profit and advancement induced many men to fight. For veterans of the continental wars, the need for experienced non-commissioned officers and junior officers to mould the green recruits into disciplined forces meant instant advancement opportunity. Senior officers seized the chance to obtain field commands. In the Scottish army that invaded England in 1644, fifty-three out of eighty-seven field grade officers (major, lieutenant-colonel, colonel) had experienced continental service. Of the regional or major field commanders, only the king, Cromwell, Manchester, Newcastle and Lambert had no continental experience. Despite initial qualms about their presence causing the war to become as savage and barbarian as had occurred in the German states, the former mercenaries professionalized the armies by teaching the latest tactical innovations and instilling efficiency, a process that required two or more years. The distinction between sides often mattered little, as illustrated by Turner’s comment that upon his leaving the Swedish army to return to Scotland in 1640, two ships lay in the harbour, one for royalists and one for Covenanters and that he did not care which he took. Colonel William Murray, rebuffed for a royalist regimental command, turned to Parliament where he had better luck due to fewer officers.59 Thus adventurism and the attendant lures of profit or excitement, along with the aristocratic ideal of military service, religion and economic self-interest, provided significant motivation to take up arms as the dispute between the king and Parliament devolved into open hostilities. Whatever master one served, whether it be king, gold or God, the motivation to fight formed a significant aspect of the context within which commanders operated in the north. While geography, training, troop numbers, quality and quantity of weapons and battlefield conditions all affected the contextual situation, motivational factors exerted an overwhelming influence on the human dynamics. A skilled leader blessed with a high degree of martial synergy who understands human motivation and can successfully channel the will to fight, can often minimize the chaos, ‘fog’ and ‘friction’ of war and use the situational context to his advantage. Thus, the understanding and successful manipulation of the human motivation to fight or ‘passions that are to be kindled in war [that] must already be inherent in the people’ as Clausewitz asserts, are critical elements in the effective military commander’s arsenal.60 The evolution of a royalist ‘party’ cannot be simplified into explanations of support for monarchy or a high church. Certainly many saw the possibility of 45


rewards or titles for their service. Traditional deference to authority cannot be overlooked. While some may have opposed particular royal policies, many viewed sweeping constitutional and religious changes as bringing out the possibility of social upheaval. Others may have been content with the constitutional reforms accomplished in 1641. As P. R. Newman asserts, the motivation for supporting the king cannot be tied simply to religion or self-interest. Rather, it exhibited a broader and ‘straight forward and relatively simple matter – that it arose from inclination, temperament and humours that will forever defy precise analysis … such men saw something profoundly worth fighting for, and fought for it accordingly’.61 Alternately, many who supported Parliament questioned the veracity of the king’s promise to maintain the new constitutional arrangement. Certainly his actions against the opposition leadership demonstrated his untrustworthiness and convinced many opponents that, unless Charles could be compelled by force, he would refute the legislation at the first opportunity. Within this contextual environment, the actions of the six regional commanders must be placed. Issues of politics, constitutionalism, religion and economics all influenced their ability to field forces and conduct operations. The traits and behaviour of commanders cannot be judged in a vacuum when assessing military leadership effectiveness. The national and regional context as well as human dynamics and motivation to take sides all modulated the actions of officers in the civil wars. Often, how a commander reacted to, shaped or overcame the context and human dynamics determined his success or failure in combat. Moreover, the admonition put forward in the Introduction must be remembered: no matter how keen a commander’s military instrument, without effective leadership, it is a dull spear. Clearly, the motivation to fight in 1642, whether driven by religious sentiment, constitutionalism, adventurism, deference to authority, desire to preserve a traditional order or what you will, existed equally on both sides. It is in how the individual commanders led those highly motivated forces that ultimately determined the military result and, subsequently, the political, constitutional, social and religious outcome of the English Revolution.

The Push of Pike: warfare in seventeenth-century Britain To set the stage for understanding the nature of warfare in the mid-seventeenth century, this brief synopsis addresses the weaponry, organization, functionality of troops and tactical doctrine common in Britain and the continent. This discussion both provides a background for the reader not generally familiar with early modern European warfare and further establishes the context within which each of the case study subjects operated. Moreover, the contention that both sides benefited more or less equally from a wealth of military knowledge is supported by the section following that discusses pre-war experience, education, training and literature.62 The pike, a wooden pole usually of ash and typically 15 to 18 feet in length tipped with an iron spear point, represented a common infantry weapon in 1642. 46


However, by the 1640s, many had been cut down to 11 feet for more agile handling. In the Civil Wars, the Scots used a crude variant with its end shaped into a point and the butt firmly planted in the turf to form a deadly hedgehog (shiltron) against charging cavalry. Expertly trained Spanish troops used a pike typically 18 feet in length dubbed La senora y reyna de las armas (the lady and queen of arms). In a ‘push of pike’, a massed body of pikemen advanced against an enemy formation in much the same fashion as the ancient Greek phalanx and by sheer manpower repulsed its foes. When in a defensive mode, the pikemen, protected by rudimentary body armour consisting of a helmet and breastplate (corslet, demi-cuirass or plastron) that covered the chest and back over a heavy leather coat, intermingled their formations among the musketeers to provide protection against charging cavalry. Typically, the tallest and strongest men in a regiment served as pikemen. The smooth-bore matchlock musket, a woefully inaccurate and cumbersome weapon, gradually emerged as the primary infantry weapon and, by the end of the First Civil War, dominated the battlefield. The general ratio of muskets to pikes stood at 2:1 by doctrine, but until late in the war, a shortage of muskets hampered both sides and most regiments fielded more pikemen than musketeers. The musket weighed over 10 pounds and typically had a barrel length of 32 to 48 inches, but a lighter, more manoeuvrable version developed by the Swedes proved popular by the 1650s. The shot, weighing approximately an ounce (but could be as much as two ounces) and carried loose in a pouch or in the musketeer’s mouth for ready access, had to be rammed down the barrel after the soldier first placed priming powder in the pan then poured an appropriate charge into the muzzle. The musketeer carried pre-measured prime and charge powder in twelve wooden or metal tubes (called ‘twelve apostles’) attached to a bandolier worn over the shoulder. Eventually, paper cartridges holding both powder and ball together and carried in a pouch or cartridge (cartouche) box improved the rate of fire. To fire, a soldier ignited the powder in the pan by pulling a trigger attached to a spring, which caused the link or linstock match (a slow-burning length of cord boiled in a flammable liquid such as wine or vinegar) to fall into the pan. Once the powder in the pan ignited, the flame shot through a touch hole drilled in the breech igniting the charge and expelling the ball. As the lead shot clattered down the barrel, it lost accuracy and muzzle velocity. The accurate range of smooth-bore muskets even as late as the mid-nineteenth century stood at hardly more than 100 yards in the best conditions. Weather also adversely effected musketry, particularly wet conditions. The misfire rate even in excellent weather could easily exceed 50 per cent. Each musketeer, balancing his barrel on a notched pole, fired in unison with his fellow soldiers, sending a volley of lead balls in the enemy’s general direction. While volley fire often proved ineffective even against densely packed infantry, it could devastate cavalry. The musket required over forty separate movements to prime the pan, load the charge and fire, thus, a rate of fire of one shot per minute represented an acceptable standard. Despite the slowness, inaccuracy and inefficiency of both pike and musketry, commanders skilled in the tactical deployment of infantry arms generally prevailed on the battlefield. 47


Gunpowder radically altered the battlefield primacy of heavy cavalry and rendered the armoured, mounted knight obsolete. Most forces abandoned the traditional weapon of a charging knight, the lance (except the Scots). Although at extreme range, body armour combined with a thickly padded lining could still impede a musket ball, once the cavalryman closed to his own weapons’ range, volley fire often devastated armoured warriors. In the early decades of the century, the German caracole tactic in which heavy cavalry approached the opponent’s foot at a medium trot, fired their brace (pair) of pistols at about twenty paces and slashed at the unprotected enemy soldiers with broadswords, constituted the common cavalry tactic. As the first rank of horse volleyed, it wheeled and rode to the rear to reload pistols as each subsequent rank discharged its pistols in turn. At the slow pace with which cavalry approached the opposing formation, well-drilled musketeers did dreadful damage; rarely did such efforts succeed in breaking the foot. By the mid-seventeenth century, tactically astute commanders abandoned this technique in favour of a headlong charge at a gallop directed at a key position or perceived weakness in the enemy line. Troopers rode at maximum speed in a tightly packed formation, stirrup to stirrup, with the objective of penetrating the enemy line and shattering the foe’s cohesion with pistols and swords. The sheer force of a successful cavalry charge usually disrupted an infantry formation and created panic among all but the best-trained soldiers. The inherent weakness of the cavalry charge lay in reforming the troop once the enemy formation broke. More often than not, the force of the charge carried the cavalry off the battlefield. In the civil wars, cavalry attacks all too often ended in a pell-mell charge through the enemy’s infantry formations and into the opponent’s camp where pillage and looting destroyed unit discipline and cohesion. Exceptional parliamentary cavalry commanders such as Sir Thomas Fairfax, Oliver Cromwell and Lambert could control their troopers, a key to their tactical effectiveness. While Lambert and Fairfax excelled in headlong, devastating charges, Cromwell maintained the closest control over his men and typically could mount multiple attacks in an engagement.63 With the alteration in tactical employment came a change in cavalry uniform and accoutrements. With few exceptions, a helmet called a ‘pot’ and a corselet breast and back plate worn over a thick, knee-length buff leather undercoat replaced full body armour. Shin and foot armour gave way to the heavy leather cavalry boot reaching well above the knee that proved remarkably effective against sword slashes. Some remnants of the heavily armoured cavalry remained in the form of cuirassiers such as Sir Arthur Hazelrig’s regiment of horse, derisively called ‘lobsters’. Dragoons, a new form of mounted infantry, emerged in the early modern army. These mounted musketeers rode to a position, dismounted and served as infantry. The horse provided rapid tactical mobility. When dismounted, every eleventh man in a troop tended the horses. Dragoons carried out duties such as scouting and reconnaissance, the securing of vital objectives ahead of the main force such as bridges and buildings, providing protection for the artillery and camp and manning picket posts. The organization of the dragoons paralleled the more glamorous 48


cavalry with a troop of either type generally composed of seventy to a hundred men commanded by a captain and formed into a regiment of three to five troops. While generally armed with the infantry matchlock musket, some dragoons carried pikes and broadswords. Although artillery had evolved from the iron-banded tube of the late Middle Ages, the slow and cumbersome guns often proved useless on a rapidly shifting battlefield particularly as an anti-personnel weapon. The ability to manufacture artillery, a goal of every major European state, rested essentially on two basic products – iron and gunpowder. England enjoyed the advantages of a vibrant iron founding industry particularly in Surrey, Sussex and Kent. A reliable local supply of timber aided in the industrial process. Other important iron centres included the West Midlands, South Wales and Gloucestershire. The Ordnance Office at the Tower controlled all gunpowder manufacturing (typically co-located with the gun foundries) as a royal monopoly. At the start of the First Civil War, the major arsenals at the Tower, Greenwich, Woolwich, Portsmouth and Hull housed the bulk of available guns and powder. With the London area controlled by Parliament by mid-1642, the king placed great importance on the capture of Hull and other regional arsenals. Siege warfare continued to be the primary role of artillery for battering castle and town walls and creating a breach through which infantry attacked. Guns also destroyed field fortifications such as breastworks, bastions and redoubts and in the open field could be used in the initial stages of battle to bombard enemy formations to cause casualties and break morale. Mounted in a fortified defensive post, they could inflict heavy casualties on attacking infantry; however, the slow rate of fire negated their usefulness against a well-disciplined force that reached the walls quickly. The largest guns, cannons or culverins weighing upwards of 6,000 pounds, proved useful only in extended sieges or in permanently mounted defensive positions and could be fired roughly eight times per hour. They required tremendous logistical support including a carriage pulled by eight or more draft horses as total weight of gun, carriage, powder and shot sufficient for twelve hours of firing could easily exceed 6 tons. Smaller field guns, such as the demiculvern, saker, minion and drake, could be handled and fired faster than siege guns (up to fifteen rounds per hour) and usefully employed on the battlefield against infantry and cavalry. The robinet, smallest of the artillery (more of a large calibre musket than an artillery piece) frequently caused grave damage to tightly packed cavalry. The mortar emerged as an excellent siege weapon. With a short barrel only a few inches long, it lacked range and accuracy but could launched a large calibre ball in a ballistic arc over walls and palisades causing immense damage to a defender’s inner works and buildings, particularly if using incendiary shot.64 Reconnaissance and field intelligence fell under the direction of the scoutmaster-general. These officers relied on local residents to provide geographical information, a system fraught with hazard. They also used dragoons riding in advance of the force to provide intelligence of enemy movements and 49


sources of food, quarters and animal fodder. Scoutmasters additionally relied on the ‘forlorn hope’, or advance body, for intelligence gathering. A nascent staff system developed in the early modern period, as exemplified by the armies of the Holy Roman Empire as well as that of the Protestant states. The British Civil Wars reflected those common organizational characteristics. In addition to the scoutmaster, talented officers would be assigned collateral duties (or perhaps even as a primary duty) as the provision master, wagon master (to keep the train in order), provost marshal and judge advocate (to maintain army discipline and civil order in occupied areas). The quartermaster, first referred to about 1600 and formalized throughout the century as the commissary-general, rode ahead of the force to select bivouac sites, lay out the castramentation plan (camp arrangement for individual units, headquarters and the artillery park) and direct the sutlers (civilian merchants who accompanied the army on the march and supplied soldiers’ material needs). By the eighteenth century, the quartermaster had gradually absorbed the duties of the scoutmaster, including intelligence gathering. A rudimentary depot system developed in the 1640s, which allowed an army to march and fight at a distance from its magazines, billets and sources of supply; this system fell under the commissary-general.65 The Spanish tercio, a formation of up to 3,000 soldiers (later reduced to 1,600) in a combination of musketeers and pikemen represented the dominant infantry formation at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The slow and lumbering tercio, used chiefly in a defensive role, also proved effective in an offensive mode against a broken or outnumbered opponent. The greatest disadvantage lay in the difficulty in tactical movement in that only a forward advance could be reasonably conducted. Gerat Barry described the standard tercio formations in his Discourse of Military Discipline. His diagrams show a tightly packed core of pikemen surrounded by multiple rows of musketeers for defensive fire.66 Tercios could be formed into an arrowhead pattern of one regiment in front and two flanking on an offset or in a four regiment diamond pattern. Typically, one regiment formed a complete component part of a tercio and had a frontage of approximately fifty men across with a depth of thirty. Although the tercio formations lacked mobility and flexibility, due to the massed firepower and weight of numbers combined with the generally skilled and well-trained Spanish troops, they performed competently against the smaller Dutch, French and English formations. Typically, sixteenth-century engagements ended inconclusively. Although severe casualties might be incurred, the tercios rarely broke and a decisive outcome (almost always the result of panic or flight) eluded even the most skilled and disciplined armies. Unlike the Imperial forces, by 1642, both the English and Scottish armies used a standard formation called the battalia (battalion) and linear tactics pioneered by the Dutch in the 1590s and the Swedes in the 1620s. Infantry regiments occupied the middle positions in the extended line, typically arranged in a draughtboard pattern so as to allow free movement of horse between the battalions. The horse took the flanks, with artillery placed at regular intervals to provide both offensive 50


and defensive support. Dragoons were deployed to protect the baggage and headquarters areas in the rear, around the less mobile artillery or in positions from which to snipe at the enemy. Buildings, hedges and ditches constituted the preferred locations for harassing fire. Battle generally commenced with a cavalry charge intended to dislodge the opponent’s infantry centre or to destroy his cohesion and morale. If the initial attack failed to unhinge the foe, the battle devolved to the ‘push of pike’ whereby the infantry closed to drive the opponent from the field. Musketeers concentrated volley fire on a designated section of the opposing line to break its cohesion, which then allowed the cavalry to exploit the breach and to charge into the enemy’s rear. Once an infantry formation broke, casualties inflicted by cavalry tended to be severe. Since a tight hedgehog of pikes or rapid volley fire from extended lines constituted the only real protection against charging cavalry, onerous consequences typically resulted from a broken formation. By the middle of the sixteenth century, the mercenary armies that Renaissance monarchs used to break the military power of their regional magnates and aristocratic vassals became prohibitively expensive. Efforts to alter the cycle of indecisive engagements between hired armies and static sieges set in motion a series of profound changes in warfare. Prince Maurice of Nassau initiated the process in the last quarter of the century. Inspired by the military writings of Vegetius and the model of the Roman imperial military system, Maurice sought to build forces based on the primacy of discipline and professionalism. He recruited widely; permanent Dutch employment characterized the fundamental difference between the new professional army and the mercenaries. He offered regular pay and advancement in exchange for obedience to his orders, which eliminated the three key weaknesses of the mercenary system: irregular pay leading to mutiny, looting and a lack of discipline. Drill became regular and systematic. Maurice developed a radically new tactical concept as a counter to the tercio. While he retained the caracole cavalry tactics, he reduced the size of infantry formations to 500 or 600 men (battalion) modelled after the Roman 550-man maniple, which brought tactical mobility to the field while sacrificing massed firepower. The Dutch system instituted linear formations built upon rapid movement and firing by ranks, whereby the front line discharged then countermarched to the rear of the file to reload while each successive rank fired in turn. Thus ten or fewer ranks maintained a rolling, continuous fire. If viewed two-dimensionally, one would see the ranks as the horizontal axis with the files as the vertical. A typical Dutch battalion would be fifty to sixty across (rank) and ten men deep (file). Organized into companies as the primary tactical unit of roughly eighty to a hundred men commanded by a captain, each foot regiment consisted of both pikemen and musketeers, which in theory amounted to 1,200 men divided into two battalions of 550 troops supported by non-combatant auxiliaries and headquarters staff. Lieutenants commanded the two subunits of each company (platoons) while serjeants, the principal non-commissioned officers, led squads of six to ten men each. The Dutch system allowed for the maximum employment of firepower with a clear field of fire and mobility to shift positions rapidly to reinforce a weak 51


section of the battle line. The Dutch victory over the Spanish at Nieuport on 2 July 1600 demonstrated the advantages of Maurice’s reforms and captured the attention of Europe.67 Maurice constructed formidable fortifications designed to prevent Spanish penetration into Holland and Zeeland, which employed new designs in fixed defences. The high, thin walls of the typical medieval castle or town proved especially vulnerable to siege artillery. Blowing a breach, either through constant artillery pounding, exploding a mine under the foundations or using an explosive petard (a barrel of powder held aloft by a wooden frame and placed against a door or gate, albeit with great risk to those tasked to place the device) constituted the normal tactic against such fortifications. Infantry then stormed through breached walls using the rubble as a ramp. Techniques to protect the besiegers from defensive fire evolved. Elaborate systems of entrenchments provided cover for the assaulting formations as they gradually advanced towards the target. Approach trenches zigzagged across the field to prevent fire directly into the trench. Responding to such tactics, military engineers developed deeper, more complex fortifications. A series of outworks consisting of redoubts, detached bastions and covered trenches provided obstacles in the path of the besieging forces. In the late fifteenth century, the trace italienne fortification emerged particularly in Italy and the Low Countries. Characterized by low, sloping earthen walls often covered with brick or sod to absorb the impact of round shot, these fortifications employed bastions that projected from the main works and provided multiple angles of fire. The sloped area in front of the walls (glacis) gave the defenders a long, open field of fire as the attackers struggled up hill. Once under the walls, assaulting troops encountered a deep ditch, often filled with water, which additionally served as a deterrent to mining.68 King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in the 1620s further refined the Maurician tactical innovations. While the Dutchman developed infantry tactics, Gustavus improved the efficiency of cavalry by altering the basic caracole manoeuvre based on his observations of the effectiveness of Polish cavalry shock tactics during the 1621–9 Polish War. Organized in five or six ranks (reduced to four or three by the 1630s), the horse charged the enemy at a gallop but only the first ranks fired their pistols. The rear ranks held their fire, ensuring the availability of loaded pistols for emergency use. Every rank struck the enemy line with broad-bladed sabres, aided by direct artillery fire and detached units of musketeers interspersed along the line of horse squadrons. Thus cavalry became a shock weapon designed to destroy the enemy’s cohesion and morale.69 Gustavus also implemented innovations in infantry doctrine and organized his battalions into 400-man units further subdivided into 100-man companies. In the centre of each battalion stood two companies of pikemen armed with a shorter, more offensively oriented weapon, with a company of musketeers on each flank. Employing the rolling volley-fire technique popularized by the Dutch, the Swedish foot formed in ranks six deep with two firing simultaneously, which became the normal tactical employment until the 1680s. The tactic required maximum 52


discipline and constant training in the firing drill. This improvement based on the ability of the well-drilled Swedish troops to prime and load their muskets quite rapidly, meant that a battalion could widen the front to seventy across and six deep. This widened front gave obvious advantages in that the battalion could maintain a continuous rolling volley fire while other battalions could outflank the more compact enemy. The remarkably efficient Swedish battalions fired while advancing on the enemy, allowing the pikemen to strike at an opponent already shaken and disorganized by constant musket volleys. Swedish linear tactics allowed for a far longer battle line, enhanced firepower, mobility and infilade fire from several directions into the front and flanks of the relatively immobile massed formations preferred by Imperial commanders. Gustavus successfully developed a tactical system that combined the advantages inherent in both types of infantry arms and changed the character of European warfare from a defensive to an aggressively offensive nature.70 The seventeenth century witnessed a tremendous transformation in the techniques of war. This work is not seeking to enter the debate over the ‘military revolution’ verses evolution, rather, it acknowledges that, in a time of dynamic transition in warfare, there is always a mix of the old and the new and this pattern held true in Britain. The comment of Sir William Constable regarding the actions of Lambert’s parliamentary horse against Colonel John Bellasis in Yorkshire in early 1644 illustrates that, as of late in the First Civil War, at least some units had not adopted the Swedish cavalry system: ‘[the parliamentarians] crept out of Hull with their Horse, making their Carrocols upon ye woulds’.71

Pre-Civil War military experience, training and literature Sir Thomas Fairfax and other senior officers of the New Model Army protested in June 1647 that their force did not represent a ‘mercinary Army, hired to serve any Arbitrary power’. The statement illustrated a profound shift in the English military tradition from the Tudor–Early Stuart period where professional mercenaries hired by the monarchs for specific and limited operations to augment the trained bands and local levies represented the normal pattern. The Declaration of the Army, issued at St Albans in June 1647 to counter a perceived attack on the New Model’s honour by the parliamentary Presbyterian opposition, insisted that the New Model Army had been raised only to defend the liberties of the people.72 Though the New Model represented the beginnings of a professional, standing force in England, the training, military education and practical experience of Britons serving on the continent from the 1580s through the 1630s provided the foundations of both the parliamentary and royalist forces in the civil wars. Additionally, the large number of publications dedicated to military science dating from the mid-Elizabethan period provided theoretical instruction (widely read by the men who accepted commissions in each force). Whether as experienced veterans of the continental wars such as Sir Thomas Fairfax, Leven or David Leslie or as talented amateurs such as Cromwell or Lambert, the officer corps that emerged in 1642 enjoyed both a wealth of practical 53


experience and a theoretical foundation in the art of command and military leadership. The practical experience gained in the English expeditions against the Spanish in the 1590s and the service of thousands of Britons in the Dutch forces provided a training ground in the newest military and administrative reforms and brought tactical innovations to England in the early seventeenth century. Under Sir Francis Vere, commander of English forces serving with the Dutch from 1590 to 1595, thousands of Britons received valuable practical experience. The Treaty of Greenwich (1596) ended their participation as separate forces and incorporated the English regiments (with the exception of garrison troops) directly into the Dutch army. Vere remained in command of the English units until 1603 under the overall charge of Maurice. Although James I withdrew England from the war with Spain in 1604, English troops served until the truce and subsequent demobilization of 1609. Their withdrawal as a standing force heralded a long decline in the military training of English officers, a point made particularly evident by Charles I’s inept 1625 Spanish expedition. Mercenary service in the Thirty Years’ War provided even non-career officers a measure of expertise and practical experience, including the gentleman volunteers – generally members of the lesser gentry, who combined a grand tour of the continent with military service.73 Often, families purchased commissions for wayward sons in the hope that military discipline would correct their deficiencies. Others, seeking a haven from legal proceedings at home, fled to the continent and supported themselves through mercenary service (e.g. George Monck, future champion of the 1660 Stuart Restoration). Career opportunity, regular pay, promotion, foreign estates and titles and a quest for honour, profit or adventure motivated men to join the continental armies. Between 6,000 and 8,000 Scots served in Gustavus Adolphus’s army. Some 10,000 to 15,000 Englishmen and up to 25,000 Scots fought in the Thirty Years’ War.74 Many experienced officers received field grade appointments as regimental serjeant-major (major) at the start of the civil wars so as to leaven inexperienced senior officers appointed for their political or familial connections rather than martial experience. Beginning in the 1570s, military writers published a large number of works in England dedicated to the art and science of warfare. Writers such as William Garrard, Humphrey Barwick and Sir Roger Williams in the late Elizabethan period served in the Spanish Army of Flanders and published observations on that force’s tactical and organizational character.75 The Dutch published a wide variety of works. Translated into English and widely read in Britain, these treatises included Jacob de Gheyn’s popular illustrated manual addressing drill techniques for the arquebus, musket and pike (1607). Popular English variants of Dutch works included Henry Hexham’s Principles of the Art Militarie based on his twenty-six years of Dutch service. Several seventeenth-century publications including The Art of War and Englands Traynings by Edward Davies and Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie by John Cruso reflected English experience in continental warfare, particularly tactics, discipline and military traditions.76 Vere’s own Commentaries, not published 54


until 1657, came too late for the 1642 officer cadre, but other early Stuart period works expressed the principles he laid down in the 1590s. Not only did military writers detail the latest thinking on drill, tactics and training, but they also expressed opinions on the art of leadership and the characteristics of successful commanders. Barry’s contention that commanders must know the geography of the field as well as gather intelligence on the enemy through spies, personal observation and officers ‘sente with comisiones in visitinge frontieres, fortificasiones, amunisiones magasenes’ is illustrative and reflects both Sun Tzu and Clausewitzian concepts of the characteristics of the successful commander.77 Two examples represent the popularity of military works among Civil War officers. When Dr Edward Dillingham collected the entire volume of existing military books for a general publication in 1657, he found many of the original editions in the libraries of the parliamentarian generals Sir Thomas Fairfax and Philip Skippon. On going into exile at the Restoration, Lambert took John Bingham’s Tactiks of Aelian: Or, Art of Embattailing an Army After ye Grecian Manner, originally published about 1616 and reissued in 1631.78 Widely read by the aristocracy as well as the middling sort and urban elite, works published in the 1620s and 1630s not only detailed military principles but conveyed the horror and destruction of the continental wars. Thus, there existed a vibrant literary tradition about military matters on the eve of the wars from which both experienced veterans and talented amateurs could draw as they prepared their troops for combat and themselves for command (sixty books published in England between 1600 and 1634 and a further thirty-five after 1642).79 In terms of practical military experience other than service on the continent, the trained bands dating from 1573 provided rudimentary training in drill, tactics, organization and leadership principles, despite their suspect military effectiveness. Anecdotal commentaries frequently refer to trained band companies mustering for roll call followed by the firing of a few practice rounds and a hasty adjournment to a local public house for refreshment. In the early stages of the First Civil War, only the London trained band regiments proved reliable, relatively well-drilled and disciplined, as shown by their steady performance against the royalist forces at the first battle of Edgehill in late 1642. But, commanders generally proved reluctant to utilize these units for their field armies due to their inherent localism. The king opted to raise a volunteer force after he failed to convince the Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, County Durham and Leicestershire trained bands to serve outside their home regions. Newcastle initially incorporated six Yorkshire trained band regiments and one from Northumberland into his field army, but three of these never marched with the earl. Commanders on both sides encountered similar difficulties in raising reliable forces from the trained bands as not only localism but also political fragmentation within the regiments themselves limited their reliability. Despite the relatively inconsequential role played by the trained bands in the conflict as compared with the volunteer regiments, the logistic infrastructure established in previous decades proved of great military value. Magazines with 55


up-to-date weapons and artillery ‘gardens’, such as those established at St Martin’s Field, London in 1610 and Westminster in 1635, provided ready stores of reliable weapons as each side formed its field forces. Outside London, similar sites at Colchester, Bury St Edmunds, Norwich, Bristol, Gloucester, Great Yarmouth, Derby, Coventry and Ipswich provided considerable resources. Finally, training and military indoctrination garnered by the officer cadre over a long period leading up to civil war, when combined with the experience of a great many continental veterans, provided a considerable level of military expertise for both sides.80 The New Model Army provided the bridge between the medieval and the modern professional standing army. The hiring of Swedish officers to instil strict discipline in the ranks and to inculcate the battlefield tactics and techniques perfected by the Protestant forces in the 1630s indicated growing professionalism by 1645. Fairfax employed German and French artillery and engineer officers to improve the efficiency of the train. By 1650, the pike all but disappeared in the New Model. Musketeers enjoyed greater mobility and speed of movement than did the ponderous phalanx of pikemen. Since musketeers wore no body armour, their ability to march rapidly increased dramatically; a force could cover 15 or more miles per day rather than the traditional 10 to 12. Cavalry underwent a dramatic alteration in both employment and equipment as commanders abandoned the caracole in favour of the headlong charge. The heavily armoured cuirassier gave way to the harquebusier, armed with a light, shorter-barrelled carbine, pistols and saber. The Dutch drill system manipulated by a simple set of command orders conveyed by beat of drum allowed rapid movement, deployment and response. The key to the success of these improvements lay in constant, repetitive drill of the kind not possible in the one day a year typical of the trained bands. The establishment of the standing, professional New Model made this drill regimen possible. The context of English society in the mid-seventeenth century modulated the martial synergy of each of the six regional commanders, most importantly, politics, religion and pre-war military experience, education and training. However, each officer encountered similar contextual dynamics, as is typical of a civil war. Therefore, the measure of their leadership effectiveness is in how each officer employed his characteristics to motivate men to fight or to accomplish the agenda given a similar contextual environment. The true measure of effective military leadership lies not only in pure military ‘genius’, but also in the successful manipulation of the societal context and human dynamic. The ability to do so derives from the innate characteristics of consistency, moral authority, aggressiveness and martial superiority. This text now turns to the case study analysis of the three civil wars between 1642 and 1651 as conducted in the north of England and Scotland, paying particular attention to the actions of the six regional commanders, using the model of effective military leadership as proposed in Chapter 1. The relative effectiveness of the subjects will be analysed with respect to the outcomes and their roles in shaping the eventual results.

56

‘M I S E R A B L E B L O O DY D I S T E M P E R S ’

Part II CHARIOT OF FIRE

And did those feet in ancient time Walk upon England’s mountains green? And was the holy Lamb of God On England’s pleasant pastures seen? And did the countenance divine Shine forth upon our clouded hills? And was Jerusalem builded here Among those dark satanic mills Bring me my bow of burning gold! Bring me my arrows of desire! Bring me my spear! O clouds, unfold! Bring me my chariot of fire! I will not cease from mental fight, Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand, Till we have built Jerusalem In England’s green and pleasant land. (William Blake, ‘Jerusalem’)

57

C H A R I OT O F F I R E

58


3 ‘MISERABLE BLOODY DISTEMPERS’ Civil War in the north

Though sporadic violence had occurred since late spring of 1642, the raising of the royal standard at Nottingham officially opened the Civil Wars. Although the king marched south with his newly embodied army, the parliamentary effort in the north stood in grave danger in the autumn of 1642. Heavily outnumbered, Lord Fairfax, the parliamentary commander, devised a strategy that aimed at preventing total royalist domination of the north. For the earl of Newcastle, soon to supersede the ineffectual earl of Cumberland as royalist commander at York, the physical destruction of the numerically inferior parliamentary forces and eventual conjunction with the larger main army in the south for operations against Essex stood as the essential strategic imperative. The military effectiveness of each officer can be judged on his relative success in carrying out the overarching strategic imperatives in the first two years of the war. By examining the critical military events as modulated by the contextual dynamics, particularly the political and religious sentiment of the northern counties on the eve of war, one can assess the military leadership effectiveness of both regional commanders. While each in turn demonstrated a fair degree of tactical acumen, battlefield management and operational artistry, it is clear that Lord Fairfax exhibited a far keener strategic vision than Newcastle. Faced with a significant numerical inferiority, he instituted a highly successful ‘Fabian’ strategy culminating in the decisive parliamentary victory at Marston Moor in July 1644, the event that irrevocably lost the north for the king. Conversely, Newcastle failed to use his advantage either to destroy Lord Fairfax before the arrival of the Scottish Covenanter army in early 1644 or to support a combined royalist advance on London, which if successful, might well have ended the war in the king’s favour. In conducting his campaigns, Lord Fairfax demonstrated a high degree of aggressiveness, boldness and risk-taking and the moral authority needed to replenish troop losses due to combat casualties or normal attrition despite the dominant royalist sentiment in the northern counties. Lord Fairfax proved so successful that his presence even with small troop numbers made Newcastle reticent to engage in bold operations outside the north. This chapter illustrates those characteristics of martial synergy of Lord Fairfax and Newcastle as demonstrated by their activities in several campaigns in northern 59


Figure 3.1 The conflict in Yorkshire, 1642–5

England from the raising of the royal standard to the summer of 1644. Of particular note for the model of martial synergy are the elements of aggressiveness and moral authority. Additionally, the rise of John Lambert as a commander of great reputation, heralding his phenomenally successful career after 1645, will also be chronicled.

Lord Fairfax and the Yorkshire Treaty Events in Yorkshire in the autumn of 1642 provided Lord Fairfax the opportunity to exercise his mediation skill, particularly in dealing with opponents as exemplified by the Yorkshire treaty negotiations. Following the raising of the royal standard at Nottingham in August, the situation in Yorkshire remained unsettled. Incidents of the destruction and confiscation of private property increased. Such depredations prompted a resolution to Parliament from several prominent Yorkshire gentry, calling for an order forbidding the plunder of private property by royalists as well as the reinforcement of parliamentary forces in the county.1 In this climate of growing tensions and violence between neighbours, Lord Fairfax, Sir Thomas Fairfax and other prominent Yorkshire parliamentarians resolved to mediate the dispute by concluding a treaty with the major royalist leaders to avoid any further conflict in the county.2 The attempt foundered as the momentum towards war overcame the good intentions of both sides. The initial prospects for a treaty seemed promising. Neither side enjoyed overwhelming support in Yorkshire where many 60


of the gentry refused to become embroiled in the growing antagonism. For example, a call for a general muster of the trained bands on Heworth Moor for 2 September by Henry Clifford, the earl of Cumberland, royalist commander of York and lord lieutenant of Yorkshire, resulted in only a 50 per cent turnout. Only half of the court of aldermen and the common council of York answered the summons of Cumberland and the lord mayor the previous day. In early August, only 200 members of the county trained bands showed up for a muster called by the king. A protestation of 29 August instigated by Lord Fairfax and several prominent West Riding gentry objected to the maintenance of royalist troops in the county contrary to the law. Vowing to resist by force if Cumberland continued to raise troops, eighteen of the county’s most prominent citizens signed the document. Acknowledging the shallowness of parliamentary support in Yorkshire, a London newspaper pointed out that less than a tenth of the county gentry signed the document.3 In mid-September, the hitherto passive parliamentary troops initiated offensive operations against royalist forces. Prompted by the depredations of a royalist Northumberland cavalry regiment passing through the county, Sir John Hotham marched out of Hull on the 12th with two troops of horse and 500 foot en route to York. Finding the gates closed and ordnance on the walls, the parliamentary forces entrenched. Cumberland, meeting at that moment with several Yorkshire gentry in the deanery, raged against the affront and ordered his troops to sally out and repel the rebels. In the resultant struggle, the royalists fled and the embarrassed earl departed the city disguised as a shepherd.4 Following the seizure of York, Lord Fairfax promptly set about organizing regional defence. West Riding forces under Sir Thomas Fairfax occupied Bradford, Sheffield and Rotherham. On the 19th, Lord Fairfax issued a summons to the gentry and freeholders of Yorkshire in response to royalist activities. At the meeting, Captain John Hotham, son of the governor of Hull, exhorted the participants to join Lord Fairfax to ‘cleanse the Country of the Cavaleers’. In response to Fairfax and Hotham’s pleas, the assembled gentry and freeholders unanimously pledged to raise a force of 5,000 men.5 By late September, an effort to derail the slide towards war among the less hotspurred gentry of Yorkshire emerged. Encouraged by Lord Fairfax, who continued to prepare for war but sought reconciliation, neutrality negotiations convened at Rothwell in the West Riding on the 29th. Hopes ran high, prompting one participant to exclaim that ‘with some Gentlemen of the County, of whose affection to peace and Unity (though differing in Opinion from us) we were most confident’. The negotiations produced a conditional agreement for restoring order to Yorkshire. The major provisions included the disbanding of all forces in the county, a suspension of recruitment and a general amnesty for previous military actions. The negotiators hoped to present the remonstrance to both Charles and Parliament as a model for the rest of the kingdom. A dozen influential representatives signed the Treaty of York but notable absences included both Hothams, Cumberland, and his deputy, Sir Thomas Glenham. The treaty carried neither the knowledge nor the consent of the major commanders, thus ensuring its ultimate failure.6 61


Responding to the agreement, Parliament declared that none of the parties had the authority to bind Yorkshire to neutrality. Only Parliament could take such action; private treaties endangered the security of the entire kingdom. Moreover, for private men to suspend the execution of the militia ordinance represented a threat to parliamentary authority. Accordingly, both houses ordered that neutrality not be observed in Yorkshire, for it would constitute a significant strategic advantage for the king, who had already raised substantial forces there. Parliamentary opponents argued that the king could use Yorkshire as a base of operations, particularly Newcastle with its excellent port for supply and reinforcement. In essence, Yorkshire would become his ‘Seat of the War’. From a logistical and strategic position, such a firm base of operations in the north constituted a significant and unacceptable royal advantage.7 In mid-October, the king issued warrants and commissions to the Yorkshire royalists, authorizing them to ‘plunder the estates, to kill and destroy all those that are well-affected to the King and Parliament, who will not joyne with them’. Lord Fairfax responded by renouncing the peace treaty and informing Parliament of his intention to commence operations against Cumberland. On the 23rd, Parliament formally granted him command of all its forces in the northern counties as well as authority to appoint officers and impose martial law.8 Despite their efforts to defuse the growing conflict in the north, Lord Fairfax and the treaty negotiators failed to check the tumble towards full-scale war. He prepared to fight with all the resources at his command. Lord Fairfax demonstrated a high degree of mediation ability throughout the episode, which enhanced his reputation for trustworthiness and reliability, skills much needed in the following two years as he attempted to prevent the domination of the north by the more numerous royalist forces and to maintain support among the outnumbered parliamentary supporters.

Lord Fairfax, Newcastle and the War in Yorkshire With the failure of the Yorkshire treaty, widespread hostilities commenced in the north. At Bradford, with only 300 men, Lord Fairfax successfully engaged a larger royalist force of 500 foot and 240 horse under Sir William Savill and Sir Thomas Glenham. By mid-November, the king, perhaps upset by the failures of Cumberland and eager to use his 2,000 troops in Yorkshire for offensive operations in the south, ordered the earl to rendezvous for a march on London. In response, the parliamentary forces in Yorkshire combined into a body of over 1,000 men under the command of Captain Hotham, who promptly engaged and dispersed the earl’s troops near Pontefract. Lord Fairfax subsequently established an operational base at Tadcaster with 2,000 men, from which he could interdict supplies and reinforcements destined for the royal garrison at York. Sir Thomas Fairfax ensconced himself at Wetherby with a force of 40 horse and 300 foot to cover the western approaches to Tadcaster.9 At the end of November, Newcastle crossed the River Tees into Yorkshire, 62


repulsed a desperate attempt to check him at Pierce Bridge on 1 December, disarmed the North Riding parliamentary forces and pushed on to York where he relieved the ineffective Cumberland.10 Newcastle’s force of Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland men, anchored by his own brigade of Whitecoats, while competent and motivated, suffered from ineffectual senior leadership. Noted for his style, fashion and poetic talents, Newcastle lacked the military capability and vigour of the Fairfaxes. Clarendon described Newcastle as a ‘very fine gentleman’, polished in the arts of riding, dancing and fencing, who liked the ‘pomp and absolute authority’ of his role as a commander, but the ‘substantial part, and fatigue of a general, he did not in any degree understand’. Clarendon characterized the hapless earl of Cumberland as ‘much decayed in the vigour of his body and his mind’.11 Newcastle’s commission actually included command of all royal forces in Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Rutlandshire and Lincolnshire; however, he confined his recruiting and operational activities to Yorkshire and points north except for a brief foray into the eastern counties that ended in disaster at Winceby in 1643. In effect, he held an independent command with the mission to hold the north for the crown and await the arrival of reinforcements brought from the continent by the queen in early 1643. In that regard, his range of strategic options remained limited; however, his failure to eliminate the much weaker parliamentary force between his arrival in November and that of the queen undercut his best chance to accomplish the first goal of the northern royal strategy. As lord-general, Newcastle held viceregal authority in that he could create knights thus illustrating the level of independence enjoyed by the earl. In truth, this independence proved to be his undoing as will be seen in the next chapter. It fostered a lack of royal strategic coherence. In effect, the royalists fought two separate wars in the first two years – in the north under Newcastle and in the south, Wales and Midlands under Charles and Prince Rupert of the Rhine, the king’s nephew. This bifurcation in command ultimately led to strategic incoherence and disaster. In the struggle for control of Yorkshire from late 1642 through the following eighteen months, Newcastle enjoyed superior troop strength. To compound the problem for Lord Fairfax, perhaps as many as 1,000 North Riding parliamentary men headed for home following the crossing of the River Tees.12 The disadvantage in troop numbers forced Lord Fairfax to prosecute a war of attrition by strategic defence characterized operationally by a series of attacks and retreats as opportunities occurred where he held a rough parity of forces on the field in hopes of small, incremental wins, eventually leading to a substantial, culminating victory. He lacked the manpower to maintain control over territory, towns and fortified strongholds, the standard of victory in early modern warfare and a factor in his strategic choice. Often styled a ‘Fabian’ strategy, the central elements require the weaker entity to: 1) exhaust the adversary first while avoiding annihilation in conventional battle where the opponent’s force of numbers or military power makes combat risky for the weaker force; 2) employ sanctuary (civilian support and sustenance), strategic depth (use of irregular forces such as friendly militia to enhance regular forces, interdict and disrupt supply and communications lines and harass the enemy) and 63


mobility (to avoid destruction in a large-scale engagement and to use speed and surprise in ‘pin-prick’ operations); 3) maintain close civil–military relations including avoiding pressure from the civil authority to go on the offensive too early that might risk complete defeat, as well as maintaining morale and civil support through small, incremental victories; and, 4) mount a culminating offensive blow that destroys the adversary militarily, convinces him to abandon the fight or undercuts his popular will and public support to continue the struggle. Clearly, the element of time is essential to the weaker entity. He must maintain troop morale, popular support and combat effectiveness through vital, though often relatively small, incremental victories, while concurrently wearing down the stronger opponent’s will or ability to continue the fight (or as in the case of Lord Fairfax, Newcastle’s decided numerical advantage). If successful in the first phase of a ‘Fabian’ strategy (attrition by strategic defensive), the weaker entity must at some point go over to the offensive against the enemy in search of the final, culminating blow. A successful ‘Fabian’ strategy requires patience, a willingness to absorb casualties without loss of morale or will to fight, avoidance of the temptation to commit to battle under disadvantageous circumstances and superior public and civil relations skills.13 In the broader strategic sense, by maintaining forces in the field and aggressively engaging the enemy whenever possible in pursuit of an incremental victory, Lord Fairfax prevented the consolidation of royalist armies in the south that might have given the king an opportunity for a decisive victory. Although Newcastle proved to be tactically competent as a field commander, his inability to destroy the weaker parliamentary forces prior to the Scottish invasion of January 1644 prolonged the war in the north. Had he destroyed Fairfax in Yorkshire and joined with the king, the royalists would have enjoyed a significant quantitative and qualitative advantage over Essex’s southern parliamentary army. Never able to concentrate his forces at the decisive point (one of Clausewitz’s measure of a military ‘genius’) and aggressively destroy the numerically inferior opponent, Newcastle squandered the royalists’ best opportunity to crush the rebellion thus giving the strategic initiative to Lord Fairfax. In fairness to Newcastle, the leadership effectiveness of Lord Fairfax, shown most brightly in his ability to rally defeated troops, rebuild his forces through vigorous recruitment, defeat royalist detachments in detail and, through superior tactical acumen, prevented Newcastle from earning a decisive victory. Within days after his crossing into Yorkshire, Newcastle attacked Lord Fairfax’s base at Tadcaster. On 5 December, Newcastle marched out of York and deployed his main force of 7,000 men against Tadcaster and 1,500 against Sir Thomas’s garrison at Wetherby. On the same day, Lord Fairfax recalled his son to prepare for the expected assault with their combined force of roughly 2,000 foot and six troops of horse. Newcastle opened his assault in mid-morning with musket fire on the unfinished breastworks at the eastern end of Tadcaster, while artillery bombarded the town to disrupt the parliamentary reserves. Newcastle’s initial infantry assault fared badly. Fearful of artillery counterfire, his soldiers sought 64


cover in the outbuildings after pushing the defenders out of the town. Another royalist attack on the Wharfe River Bridge to the south-east of Tadcaster also failed owing to stout resistance. By dusk, having sustained heavy casualties, Newcastle withdrew to York. Lord Fairfax’s force suffered light losses compared to the royalists. With most of the ammunition spent and unable to withstand a second assault, Lord Fairfax abandoned Tadcaster and retreated to Selby and Cawood Castle. Sir Thomas staged an abortive attempt on Leeds. Unable to dislodge the royalist garrison, he too returned to Selby.14 The battle at Tadcaster illustrated the weak and dangerous position of the parliamentary forces in the north during the early months of the conflict. Outnumbered and outgunned, the foot under the command of the younger Hotham and the horse under Sir Thomas Fairfax fought a hit-and-run campaign against Newcastle. In a broader sense, the military events of late 1642 revealed the potential for military disaster inherent in the division of parliamentary strength into loosely coordinated regional commands. A parliamentary decision in mid-September compounded the problems of command and control and undercut the development of a coherent strategy early in the war. Parliament ordered all established regiments of foot with at least 400 or more men and units of horse with at least 40 or more troopers to rendezvous with Essex within forty-eight hours.15 This action forced Lord Fairfax to confront the royalists with a woeful army consisting of a few hundred West Riding men. Even with the bulk of the parliamentary forces committed to Essex, the first large-scale action of the war at Edgehill resulted in a tactical draw, and the king’s advance on London, checked at Turnham Green in October, ensured a stalemate, at least in the short term. But, rather than a cohesive, coordinated strategy employing all the various parliamentary forces, the consolidation order in effect left strategic decision-making in regional commanders’ hands. Thus, little in the way of nationally coordinated strategic planning occurred. Although Parliament had the spatial (control of London) and economic (wealth of the City and south-eastern counties) advantages, the lack of a unified, coordinated strategy in the early months of the conflict undercut those advantages. Fortunately, in the north, Parliament had a regional commander both strategically and operationally competent. As the year ended, Lord Fairfax stood in a precarious situation. Although he managed to repel the larger royalist force at Tadcaster, the arrival of Newcastle in November dramatically altered the strategic balance in the north in the royalists’ favour. With a majority of the population either supporting the king or remaining neutral, Lord Fairfax and his subordinate commanders, Sir Thomas Fairfax and Captain Hotham, could not implement a strategy of either holding territory or defeating outright the earl’s numerically superior army. An option did present itself that the astute Lord Fairfax embraced; with his smaller but capable forces he could implement an attrition by strategic defence with the two objectives of avoiding total royalist territorial control in the north and preventing the juncture of Newcastle’s troops with the king’s southern army. An augmentation of the main royal force would likely have led to a successful attack on London and provided 65


the king with a sizeable numerical advantage against Essex, thus directly threatening the essential parliamentary centres of gravity, economic (City of London) and military (Essex’s main parliamentary army). Given the strategic situation at the end of the year as each force coalesced into effective fighting armies, it is useful to now turn to a brief description of the dynamics of raising, recruiting, disciplining and equipping forces before returning to the campaigns of 1643 in the north as the war took on the character of a national civil war.

Raising forces: recruitment, discipline and equipping The opposing armies in the north in the first three years of the conflict exhibited no sharp dividing lines in terms of the patterns of recruitment, training, equipment and organization.16 Military training and experience did not vary to any measurable degree. Many had previously served alongside each other in the two Bishops’ Wars. Differences in the individual soldiers, which emerged in the course of events, reflected the motivation or will to fight rather than the nature of the men or their initial military skills. Commanders, therefore, faced similar dynamics and difficulties in terms of organizing, equipping, training and employing their forces. The basis of English military experience in 1642 lay with both the veterans of continental service and the trained bands. The efficiency of the latter depended entirely on their officers’ energy and motivation. More often than not, drill consisted of exercising the pikes and muskets a few hours a year; individual soldiers might provide the weapons themselves or obtain them from a royal or county magazine. With the exception of the London trained bands, who performed well at the first battle of Edgehill and as part of Essex’s southern army, these militia units played a marginal role in recruitment. Chastened by his inability to attract the Yorkshire trained bands in the early summer of 1642, the king preferred to raise volunteer forces, a policy validated by his success in attracting men once he raised the royal standard at Nottingham.17 By the end of that year, the northern parliamentary commanders had also abandoned any hope of employing the local militia on a broad scale and opted to rely on volunteers who would march and fight where ordered to do so. Although militia did provide some excellent service at various stages in the war, they always acted as auxiliaries to the regular forces composed of volunteers, trained and commanded by reliable and dedicated officers.18 Wary of sending men and arms to a different region, local leaders tended to keep their forces at home for the defence of their property and families. Localism plagued both sides as troops often refused to fight outside their home areas. This proved particularly true of the Yorkshire royalists (both militia and regular regiments) despite the fact that Yorkshire provided more regiments for the king’s cause than any other single county. Thus, the unwillingness of local men to march beyond their immediate areas created strategic problems for commanders, who required the flexibility to range over their regions either to engage an enemy field force or to implement territorial control. This aspect of the militia relegated the bands to 66


the role of a home guard.19 As a rational solution, Parliament created three field armies built around regional associations. In addition to the northern forces under Lord Fairfax, Parliament formed a Western Association army raised mainly in the Bristol and Gloucester areas under the command of Sir William Waller and an Eastern Association force under the earl of Manchester in Essex, Norfolk, Huntingdonshire and Cambridgeshire. Financial and logistical management of separate field forces and the coordination of disparate local efforts loomed as a huge administrative problem. To manage regional military efforts, Parliament appointed gentry in each county to committees. These organizations, often criticized for exercising arbitrary power, nonetheless, allowed parliamentary commanders to conduct active and relatively coordinated field operations within their regions in the first months of the war, a significant advantage over the king, who continuously struggled owing to a lack of central command, control, supply and finance. Parliament regularized the system for raising and organizing troops and issued Instructions for the Lord Lieutenants, Deputy Lieutenants, and Other Officers and Commanders on 22 December 1642. These instructions authorized recruiting officials with the assistance of the county committees, to summon citizens to ascertain the availability of arms and troops in their region and to inspect the condition of available equipment. The instructions also allowed parliamentary officials to raise money, fine those unwilling to pay assessments, search homes, confiscate property and grant commissions to local officers to raise, command, and train new troops, construct defensive works and destroy infrastructure items such as bridges and private dwellings.20 The king’s army that mustered at Nottingham in August 1642, paltry compared to high initial expectations, amounted to 800 horse and 3,000 foot. Troops arrived in significant numbers throughout the early autumn and bolstered the royalist army to 2,800 horse and 10,500 foot by the battle of Edgehill (only a few hundred less than the force collected under Essex). Royalist landowners raised and equipped many troops at private expense in the traditional manner, but few had any formal military experience. Many continental veterans such as Major-General Jacob Astley, Sir Arthur Aston and the earl of Forth did provide a leavening of combat experience in the senior officer ranks.21 By 1643, the raising of forces for both sides exhibited a new pattern as opposed to the traditional manner of the feudal host in which a magnate raised his tenantry and dependants. On the grant of a warrant to raise a regiment, a colonel first appointed the junior officers, who then enlisted men at the company and platoon level in exchange for their commissions. Officers did not necessarily raise men from their own particular region and often sent recruiting parties into other counties. The raising of regiments in this manner established the pattern that prevailed in Britain until the mid-nineteenth century.22 The practice of issuing warrants and levy money to colonels created substantial problems for the royalists. Unlike the parliamentary practice of filling up the ranks of depleted regiments with drafts of men from overmanned or disbanded units, the king’s agents preferred to issue warrants to raise wholly new formations, 67


primarily as a device to mollify important aristocrats, who expected military appointments. The policy resulted in colonels commanding regiments of little more than one troop or company. Newcastle practised this system in the north, resulting in the considerable reduction in his operational efficiency at a time when he enjoyed a sizeable numerical advantage over Lord Fairfax.23 Additionally, the royalist forces suffered from the tendency to appoint high-ranking officers based on social standing rather than military ability. To be fair, this habit merely continued a long-standing pattern and early parliamentary forces appointed many senior officers in the same manner. The difference came in the creation of the New Model Army in 1645 and the concurrent Self-Denying Ordinance designed to exclude those who sat in Parliament from field command (as will be discussed in the following chapter). This act in practical terms eliminated many ineffective aristocrats from the parliamentary field armies as they moved towards a military meritocracy with attendant improvements in the performance and professionalism at all leadership levels. For Newcastle, however, the practice created a contextual dynamic that, given his limited martial synergy, could not be overcome. Commissions of array, royal appointees in each county whose purpose encompassed summoning the local militia, raising forces and collecting money, formed the central feature of early Civil War royal recruitment. Commissions of array dated from the early fourteenth century as monarchical tools to raise troops quickly to repel invasion, but had not been used in England since 1557. Commissioners relied on the cooperation of local gentry. Whereas commissions of array operated as an official organ of crown government, private contracts between the king and the appointed colonels resulted in the majority of the troops raised. However, in some unusual instances as in Worcestershire, Shropshire and Herefordshire, the king granted no colonelcies, yet a sizeable number of royalist troops enlisted from these counties.24 Initial royalist recruitment in Yorkshire and the East Midlands yielded five foot regiments and 500 horse, which joined the king and marched west on his departure from Nottingham on 13 September, thereby making these troops unavailable to Newcastle. However, the earl did receive considerable Catholic support in Yorkshire upon his arrival in December. In Lancashire, a large body of Catholics volunteered for military service under the earl of Derby, a subordinate of Newcastle.25 The north-west provided the most consistent support for Newcastle’s army until a Scottish offensive under Leven captured all of the royalist strongholds except Carlisle in September 1644. Only twenty-one Cumberland or Westmorland gentry families openly declared for Parliament.26 With little parliamentary activity in the far north, Newcastle raised and trained his force with no interference. He relied on experienced continental veterans to drill his recruits, which showed in the early clashes with the Hothams and Fairfaxes in Yorkshire. The earl’s administrative experience garnered during his tenure as lord-lieutenant in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire paid dividends as his army emerged as the best-armed and equipped force of either side in the early stages of the war. The quality of the horse raised and commanded by the talented and aggressive 68


Yorkshireman, Sir Marmaduke Langdale, gave Newcastle a significant operational advantage. In the early stages of the war, the northern royalist horse, largely composed of the gentry, sons of the more prosperous yeomen and their outdoor servants, enjoyed a qualitative advantage over Sir Thomas Fairfax’s horse. Langdale’s men generally brought more serviceable equipment, arms and superior horses. Although the bulk of the Northumberland, Durham, Westmorland and Cumberland gentry sympathized with the royalist efforts, they did little to aid the wider war effort. Had they been more engaged, the royalist advantage in cavalry would have been more substantial and might have led to a decisive victory in the north well before the unravelling of royalist fortunes beginning with Marston Moor. Newcastle did manage to persuade the northerners to garrison local strong points particularly in Durham and Northumberland.27 Many volunteers came forward in the first few months of the conflict, but by the summer of 1643 both sides relied on conscription to fill depleted ranks. Parliament passed an ordinance (10 August) authorizing local committees to impress men (2,000 men from London and a further 20,000 from the eastern counties).28 Desertion for lack of pay or for better prospects in other local forces depleted the armies of both sides, prompting General Edward Massey to conclude that the ‘desertion of our soldiers to seek new entertainment upon any new levies being heard of, is the true reason, I conceive, why our armies moulder away from great strengths to nothing’.29 Frequently, prisoners accepted employment in the opposing army either for better pay or to avoid the hardships of captivity, indicating the relative shallowness of ideological commitment among many of the initial recruits on both sides. At Oxford in February 1643, Charles reviewed the parliamentary prisoners and offered the option of royal service to the most ‘able and lusty fellows’. Following a night in the prisons, ‘some of the properest fellowes … were now apparelled and tooke into service for his majestie’.30 The ability and willingness to enforce discipline is a key characteristic of an effective commander. Without discipline he cannot consistently maintain order, ensure that his tactical or operational plan is implemented or prevent force attrition through desertion or a loss of public support caused by excessive pillage and other depredations against non-combatants. The establishment of discipline in the parliamentary forces did not fully come to fruition until after the professionalization of the New Model Army in the late 1640s. Troubling reports reached Parliament of pillage and the destruction of property, robbery and the abuse of suspected royalists, especially in the early months. Colonel John Hampden and five other regimental commanders wrote to Essex in September 1642 warning that, unless discipline improved, the army ‘will grow as odious to the country as the Cavaliers’. Parliament responded to the lack of discipline (9 November) by declaring that infractions of the ordinances would not be tolerated and that officers and troops could no longer expect leniency for legal violations.31 All three forces adopted stringent rules of conduct early in the conflict. The Lawes and Ordinances of Warre Established for the Better Conduct of the Army, issued by Essex in September 1642, provided a guide for parliamentary forces 69


similar to those of the royal and Scottish Covenanter armies. Arranged under eleven topical areas, the ordinances addressed not only infractions and penalties, but the actions expected of officers and other ranks. Subjects included duties to superiors and God in camp or garrisons, on the march, in action and in the administration of justice. Numerous infractions warranted the death penalty and included failure to repair to the colours on an alarm, fleeing in battle, throwing down a weapon or flinging away powder, leaving camp beyond a mile without authorization, straggling, desertion, unlawful assembly, uttering seditious words, sleeping on watch, quarrelling with an officer and spying. A soldier could receive capital punishment for killing an enemy attempting to surrender, destroying or pillaging property without proper orders, holding prisoners for ransom or as hostages and extortion of civilians.32 Essex did not ignore the spiritual and moral aspects of soldiering either. In the parliamentary forces, blasphemy resulted in boring the tongue with a red-hot iron, whereas cursing and missing religious services merited severe punishment at the commanding officer’s discretion. Rape, adultery, theft and murder incurred the death penalty; drunkenness resulted in whatever penalties deemed appropriate by a courts-martial.33 While all of the military codes employed by the forces to regulate soldiers’ conduct prescribed harsh penalties, the ultimate decisions on the severity of punishment lay with the commanding officer. Any alteration of the ordinances or regulations could have either the effect of undercutting discipline, which generally led to uncontrolled violations particularly against civilians and prisoners or to the perception of a just but humane commanding officer, therefore encouraging trust and admiration. In the first two years of the war, discipline proved problematic as each army evolved from gaggles of ill-trained recruits into disciplined forces. The king issued a similar set of ordinances (1643) entitled Military Orders and Articles Established by His Majestie for the Better Ordering and Government of His Majesties Army. The royal ordinances added an oath of loyalty required of every soldier and demanded harsh punishment for depredations against and plundering of civilians. Prior to the publication of formal regulations, the king issued two proclamations in August and November 1642 addressing discipline. The proclamations specifically prohibited plunder and the buying or receipt of any horses or arms belonging to the king’s forces. All of the codes had their origins in Swedish and Dutch models. Henry Hexham translated and printed the 1590 Dutch military regulations in 1642, which served as a model for the drafters of all three sets of regulations.34 The practice of providing troops for garrison duty at the expense of the main field armies severely reduced operational capability particularly among the king’s forces and had a detrimental effect on discipline as well. The maintenance of garrison forces strained royal finances, forcing local commanders to subsist off local resources, typically through free quarter and fixed monthly assessments. Chronically short of money to sustain the often unnecessary garrisons, commanders who resorted to such methods suffered breakdowns in discipline and engendered animosity among the inhabitants. Once the focus of the war shifted north in the 70


summer of 1644, Newcastle particularly suffered from the habit of unnecessary garrisoning and its by-products of ill-will and a wastage of troop strength as had other royalist commanders in the south previously.35 Supplying weapons for the large bodies of troops raised in 1642 proved to be one of the most difficult problems faced by the various parliamentary committees and royal commissions of array. Local militia proved understandably reluctant to part with their weapons; many of the early recruits, particularly northern royalists, brandished antiquated weapons, including long bows, brown bills and crossbows. Lord Fairfax and the northern parliamentarians initially enjoyed the advantage of the arms and ammunition stored at Hull while Charles resorted to the confiscation of weapons from opposition and neutral gentry. Typically better armed than royalist armies, parliamentary troops took advantage of the magazines at Hull, Newcastle, Plymouth and the Tower.36 To supplement their store of arms, royalists relied upon contributions from private individuals. For example, the Woods family of Oxford contributed ‘armour or furniture for one man, viz. a helmet, a back and breast piece, a pike, a musket and other appurtenances’. Affluent aristocrats provided substantial equipment. Captain Robert Millington, who commanded a company of foot at Edgehill, supplied most of the arms for his men by donating eighty muskets. The quality of arms reflected differences in the general social standing of the horse and foot. Captain Richard Atkyns raised a royalist troop of horse in 1643, almost all of whom came well-equipped. Atkyns’s memoirs illustrate the generally higher social standing of the horse in all three forces. Cavalry volunteers often arrived at musters with their own mounts, arms and accoutrements.37 Despite the donation of arms, the royal forces in particular, owing to the loss of the central magazines at Hull and in the London region (the Tower, Woolwich and Greenwich), often marched off to battle armed with little more than clubs, cudgels and farm implements. Conflict immediately occurred in efforts to capture stores of arms such as the royalist attack on Nottingham, successfully repulsed by Colonel John Hutchinson. To raise funds for the purchase of arms and other supplies, the crown encouraged the levying of voluntary local taxes from supporters for the maintenance of royalist forces within their county. Newcastle made such an arrangement with the Yorkshire royalist gentry in December 1642.38 No ill-equipped unit, regardless of its devotion to the cause or quality of leadership, can long stand up to a well-armed opponent, even an ill-disciplined one. By the third year of the conflict, both sides possessed large stores of arms. Parliamentary losses always yielded captured arms and ammunition for the victorious royalists and the draw down in military activity on the continent by 1648 created stores of surplus weapons and powder (although not always of the best quality). Musket factories in Oxford, Bristol and Worcestershire supplied royalist forces until their capture near the end of the war, a factor in the king’s eventual defeat.39 Despite some initial differences, the dynamics of recruiting, disciplining and equipping each side varied little between 1642 and 1646. Differences in the quality 71


of the military instrument cannot be credited with granting commanders a substantial advantage in the First Civil War. The key to achieving victory lay in the quality and effectiveness of the leadership and in how each officer employed their substantially similar military instruments (remembering that Lord Fairfax chronically suffered from a disparity in troop numbers). It is to that story that the remainder of this chapter now returns.

War in the north Following his successful defence at Tadcaster, Lord Fairfax went on the offensive in January 1643 despite the difficulty of a winter campaign. In so doing, he illustrated the qualities of boldness and aggressiveness that characterized his entire career. Chronically outmanned, he realized that the parliamentary army in Yorkshire could not conquer and hold territory but must remain constantly active and engage Newcastle at every opportunity to prevent the earl from solidifying a royalist hold on valuable sites. The tactic of continually striking at detached royalist forces under subordinate commanders where a relative superiority existed, remained viable only so long as the parliamentarians won (incremental, small victories over detached forces are essential in a successful ‘Fabian’ strategy). The essential weakness of his strategy lay in the inability to sustain a major battlefield loss given the disparity in manpower. In early January 1643, a force under Sir Thomas Fairfax augmented with new recruits, crossed the Aire River in a snowstorm and overwhelmed the royalist garrison at Leeds on the 23rd. Newcastle retreated from Pontefract to York, but the castle remained in royalist hands.40 Fairfax’s victory resulted from a combination of superior generalship and the concentration of forces to attain a numerical advantage at the point of attack. However, trouble brewed in the northern parliamentary high command. The Hothams, though competent commanders and of unquestioned personal courage, grew edgy and perhaps envious of the Fairfaxes’ success. Lord Fairfax had appointed Hotham the younger as his lieutenant-general of foot but clearly subordinate to the commander of horse, Sir Thomas. By late spring 1643, both Hothams corresponded with Newcastle and eventually switched sides, a move that would later cost them their lives.41 The war in Yorkshire altered dramatically in favour of the royalists in February. Queen Henrietta Maria, sent to the continent earlier to raise men, returned from Denmark with a large contingent of French and Walloon troops; they landed at Bridlington (Burlington) and arrived at York on 9 March.42 In addition to the mercenary troops, she brought a considerable store of arms, ammunition and money. The boon allowed Newcastle to mount a spring offensive against Lord Fairfax, which resulted in complete royalist control north of the Humber River and the institution of a siege of Hull in the summer. The queen’s presence heartened local royalists previously discouraged by the relative ease with which the Fairfaxes had prevailed in the winter campaign. Lord Fairfax abandoned his Tadcaster base and marched west to Leeds, severing the 72


important supply link with the coast and his chief base of support in the West Riding. Sir Thomas protected the right flank of his father’s army as it made its way across the county. To compound their difficulties, the Fairfaxes now faced George Goring, an officer of considerably more energy and military skill than his predecessors. Considered reckless, ambitious, immoral and famous for his debauchery, Goring nevertheless proved to be an outstanding cavalry commander, though his military effectiveness always suffered from his troops’ singular lack of discipline.43 On 30 March, Goring intercepted Sir Thomas’s covering force at the edge of Seacroft Moor near Leeds where he assaulted the flanks and rear. Sending his foot as rapidly as possible across Branham Moor, Sir Thomas counterattacked with only three troops of horse – a desperate move – but in keeping with his risk-taking nature. The attack disintegrated as the parliamentary horse broke and fled. Unhinged by the ferocity of the sudden charge on their rear and short of weapons, the parliamentary foot’s cohesion collapsed as Goring’s troopers slaughtered the exposed infantry. Sir Thomas made good his escape to Leeds, but most did not. The first defeat suffered by the commander of horse tarnished his reputation and caused him great anguish; however, it did accomplish the mission of protecting his father’s force as it safely marched into Leeds. Lambert, in his first independent command, could not assist Sir Thomas in averting the disaster at Branham Moor. Leading the vanguard, he attacked the royalist force covering Leeds and, taking it by surprise, captured considerable numbers of the enemy, including eleven colours, an action that ensured the safe passage of Lord Fairfax.44 For Lambert, the affair demonstrated his ability to command independent forces and accomplish a difficult task. As the war in the north continued, the heightening confidence placed in the youthful officer by the Fairfaxes increased his responsibility and resulted in his rapid promotion to colonel of a dragoon regiment by the end of 1643. By mid-April, Lord Fairfax, desperate for relief, appealed for supplies and money. He sought an additional 1,000 horse, a request not likely to be granted despite the assurance that with such reinforcement and money he would ‘carrie through the businesse of Yorkeshire, to the great content of Parliament, and [the] good of this Kingdome’. But he warned in a dark tone that, should the aid not be granted, the decision would eventually cost Parliament ‘ten times as much, which must be after spent, if he have not this supplie forthwith’.45 Clearly, the crisis demanded another bold stroke. With fresh troops and money, Lord Fairfax allowed his son the opportunity. On 21 May, Sir Thomas struck Goring at Wakefield with 1,500 men. The intelligence capability of the royalists far exceeded that of the Fairfaxes. In almost all the engagements of that spring, royalist movements remained unknown until the eve of battle; however, the royalists generally knew the parliamentary intentions well in advance. At Wakefield, Fairfax arrived early in the morning to find the breastworks and fortifications fully manned and musketeers stationed in the hedges along the approaches. In the case of Wakefield, two of Sir Thomas’s letters intercepted by royalist troops in early May revealed the parliamentary plan. Notwithstanding, he attacked the town and 73


captured 1,500 prisoners, including Goring. Despite routing the enemy, Sir Thomas retreated, wary of his ability to hold the post in the face of a determined counterattack. The substantial number of captured royalists especially high-ranking officers, allowed Lord Fairfax to exchange prisoners and recover most of those captured at Branham Moor. Sir Thomas deemed Wakefield to be ‘more a Miracle than a Victory’. 46 A coordinated royal military strategy seemingly emerged by the summer of 1643; however, the evidence comes solely in a letter from the Venetian secretary in London, who reported that the king intended to divide his forces into separate armies, north and south of the Thames and to order Newcastle to attack from the north-east to ‘scour the country’ and reduce London to starvation and revolt. More likely, the improvements in the royal military position in the north and west by the early summer of 1643 encouraged independent moves on London; however, the king’s armies lacked the strategic cohesion and a sense of common purpose necessary to implement such a plan. The Oxford Council of War papers make no mention of such a coordinated offensive.47 This three-pronged offensive, however derived, shows an understanding that London, as the centre of both parliamentary political power and economic support, represented the opponent’s centre of gravity or as Clausewitz described it: ‘the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends’.48 Whether by design or as a result of the recognition by individual army commanders of London’s vulnerability, the operation would encompass a threepronged movement against the capital. The western army under Sir Ralph Hopton and the earl of Hereford would march through the southern counties to attack London from the south. Newcastle, ignoring Lord Fairfax in Yorkshire, would strike the city’s northern works. From Oxford, the king’s main army would engage Essex to hold him in place, then strike eastward towards the capital as the opportunity presented itself. The summer of 1643 proved frustrating and deadly for Parliament’s northern forces. Despite the defeat of his subordinate at Wakefield, Newcastle determined to crush Lord Fairfax. He detached nearly 12,000 troops to assault Bradford. In command of a dilapidated force of barely 3,000 men, Lord Fairfax offered battle marching out of Bradford towards a long ridge leading to Adwalton Moor where he engaged Newcastle on 30 June. A rout ensued. The parliamentary force lost 500 men dead and over 1,400 captured. The costly defeat returned the strategic advantage in the north to Newcastle. Elevated to marquis for his victory at Adwalton Moor, the victory freed him to march southward. Pursued by the enemy force, Lord Fairfax abandoned Bradford and fled for the safety of Leeds and Selby, then on to Hull. The Adwalton disaster prompted a stoic remark from the humiliated Sir Thomas Fairfax. Referring to the generally good results of the hit-and-run operations of the previous six months undone by Adwalton Moor, he opined that ‘it pleased GOD to mix water with our wine’.49 Despite the overwhelming defeat, the incident demonstrated the aggressive nature of Lord Fairfax. Though outnumbered, the parliamentary commander boldly risked the destruction of the last substantial parliamentary field force in the north. 74


In keeping with his strategic objective of attacking Newcastle wherever possible to prevent the royalists from consolidating territorial control over Yorkshire, Lord Fairfax remained committed to his strategy and successfully continued to disrupt by simple presence any movement of Newcastle into the south in support of the other main royalist forces by simple presence. For his part, Newcastle, having successfully employed his numerical advantage, vigorously followed with a pursuit to prevent Lord Fairfax from regrouping. Newcastle’s action resulted in complete royal control north of the Humber, with the exception of Hull where the remnants of the northern parliamentary forces resisted a siege for several months. On the resiliency of the Fairfaxes, Clarendon conceded: it must be confessed, the enemy in those parts, with whom the earl of Newcastle was to contend [Fairfaxes], in courage, vigilance, and insuperable industry, was not inferior to any who disquieted his Majesty in any part of his dominions, and who pursued any advantage he got farther, and recovered any loss he underwent sooner, than any other in the kingdom. He remarked on their incredible activity reducing towns when they had an army and on their ability to rebuild defeated forces.50 The ability to replace their losses through vigorous recruitment provided testament to the moral authority and confidence in their abilities held by the parliamentary minority in Yorkshire. Statistics provided by P. R. Newman on royalist colonels from the various counties and municipalities illustrate the depth of the parliamentary recruitment challenge. In Yorkshire, twenty-five royalist colonels hailed from the West Riding, seventeen from the North Riding and ten from the East Riding. In total, fifty-two Yorkshire royalist colonels far eclipsed Somerset and Devonshire, the second leading counties with twenty-four colonels each.51 For Newcastle, the victory at Adwalton Moor proved to be the high water mark of his military career. Despite a superb tactical victory, he failed to follow up with a bold strategic pursuit that might have utterly destroyed the remnants of Lord Fairfax’s northern parliamentary army and thus have ended the conflict in the north with complete royalist victory. The battle at Marston Moor the following year need not have occurred, with its disastrous consequences for the king (see Chapter 4). Despite an enormous manpower and resource advantage after Adwalton Moor, by a lack of aggressiveness, Newcastle squandered his best opportunity to unhinge the Fairfaxes and eventually passed the strategic initiative back to the parliamentarians by early 1644. In this regard, his strategic vision proved remarkably short-sighted. Gentles remarks that the newly created marquis ‘was deficient in strategic consciousness’, a criticism that seems valid in all respects. While clearly Newcastle’s moral authority as an expression of the loyalty and high morale of his troops as demonstrated by his recruitment ability ran high, the severe weakness in his overall martial superiority eventually proved detrimental to the royal cause.52 75


In early August, Newcastle initiated the siege of Hull, an action that set in motion the eventual demise of the royalist war effort in the north. At the onset, the prospects of survival, much less ultimate victory, seemed distant for the beleaguered Lord Fairfax. He had been appointed governor of Hull on 22 July to replace the discredited Sir John Hotham; the latter had declared for the king and threatened to shut the gates in the Fairfaxes’s faces. With the bulk of his infantry, Lord Fairfax held the city and the magazine, while Sir Thomas with 2,000 foot and twenty-five troops of horse quartered around Beverley. Newcastle opened the siege on 2 September with a force of 15,000 men and several guns. But Newcastle, who saw the defenders of Hull as inconsequential, departed with much of his force in accordance with his orders to attack the Eastern Association army, leaving only the garrisons throughout Yorkshire and a small besieging force outside the city. Newcastle entered Lincolnshire where he captured Gainsborough and Lincoln and threatened the parliamentary garrison at Lynn. Although the marquis’s actions complied with the king’s orders, his departure before overwhelming the beleaguered city amounted to a massive strategic blunder. In splitting his force, he abrogated his significant numerical advantage. The more astute operational deployment for Newcastle would have been to crush Lord Fairfax’s tiny force with weight of numbers, consolidate his stranglehold on the north and then march south.53 Using every defensive scheme at their disposal, the Fairfaxes opened the sluices and flooded the surrounding countryside, making a direct assault impossible. Despite being surrounded on land, they controlled the seaward approaches and the Humber River. Supplies arrived by sea to maintain the garrison and the citizens. By late September, parliamentary horse from the Eastern Association army arrived under Oliver Cromwell. To relieve the pressure on Hull by drawing off royal forces, the combined horse of Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax rode south, joined the Eastern Association foot under the earl of Manchester and initiated a campaign against royal garrisons at Lynn and Bolinbroke Castle. Responding to the parliamentary movements, Newcastle detached his cavalry to intercept the enemy. On 11 October, Cromwell and Fairfax mauled the royalist horse at Winceby in Lincolnshire. Manchester’s foot took no part in the action. The combined horse then recaptured Lincoln and occupied Gainsborough on 20 December; there the commanders hoped to quarter the troops in the winter.54 In allowing the recovery of the Eastern Association by dividing his forces, Newcastle neither disposed of Lord Fairfax at Hull nor assisted in the move on London, either of which might have prevented the disaster of the following year. He might well have ended the rebellion in 1643 when the royalists enjoyed their greatest strength. Instead, he demonstrated his deficiency in strategic vision and operational artistry in the 1643 autumn campaigns, despite some excellent tactical victories earlier in the year, and showed serious weaknesses in his overall military judgement. Although Lambert took no part in the autumn campaign with Sir Thomas Fairfax in Lincolnshire, his presence at Hull paid great dividends. On 9 October, the enemy assaulted an outwork that protected the shipping anchorage. Although the royalists eventually retreated under a vigorous counterattack, the potential loss of this vital 76


fortification threatened the one advantage enjoyed by Lord Fairfax, namely, reliable supply by water. Accordingly, he convened a council of war, which resolved to repulse the royalists from the siege works closest to the town. On the same day as Winceby (11 October), the parliamentarians sallied out of Hull with 800 men, a force composed of foot supported by sailors from the parliamentary warships anchored in the harbour. Under the command of Lambert and Colonel Thomas Rainsborough, the parliamentarians surprised the unprepared enemy. As a diversionary action, the defenders manning the walls on the north side of town fired their matches. Newcastle had constructed a layered arrangement of siege works. Despite this strong defensive position, Lambert and Rainsborough’s men overran one fortification after another until royalist officers rallied their forces and repelled the attackers. The parliamentarians surged forward again after retiring inside the gates of Hull and reforming. In the second sally, the parliamentarians captured and turned the royalist guns against the fleeing soldiers. A three-hour fire-fight erupted as the parliamentary troops hauled the captured guns inside the walls. Royalist musketeers opened fire from the northern embankment, but a vigorous counterattack drove them off with such speed that most abandoned their muskets. Dispirited, Newcastle’s besieging force disintegrated. The following day, having suffered a loss of nearly half of his force in the parliamentary victories at Winceby and Hull as well as from disease and desertion, Newcastle called off the siege and retired to winter quarters near Beverley. In a report to Parliament, Sir John Meldrum commended Lambert and Rainsborough for having ‘carryed themselves very bravely’. While Sir Thomas’s reputation for military effectiveness had been secured earlier in the year, Lambert came to national attention in the autumn campaign.55 The two losses altered the strategic balance in the north. After October 1643, Newcastle failed to hold the territorial gains of the previous year as a reinvigorated Lord Fairfax went on the offensive against royalist strongholds. Having successfully employed a ‘Fabian’ strategy that relied on winning small, incremental victories over detached enemy forces, Lord Fairfax conducted a strategic reassessment that resulted in an offensive campaign. Thus, by late 1643, his position in the north transformed from one of survival in the face of superior numbers combined with the maintenance of viable field forces so as to impede a royalist concentration in the south, to one of annihilation or the total destruction of Newcastle’s forces throughout the north (attrition by strategic offensive). Despite plans to remain in winter quarters at Gainsborough, Sir Thomas Fairfax, on orders from Parliament, advanced into Cheshire to relieve the siege of Nantwich (held for Parliament by Sir William Brereton). The royalist commander, Lord Byron, reinforced by five regiments released from Irish service, had marched north to raise forces and recover Lancashire for the king before joining Newcastle to eliminate the Fairfaxes. From a force of 1,800 foot and 500 horse, including Lambert’s regiment, Fairfax augmented his strength to 3,000 foot, primarily with Lancashire and Cheshire recruits, and embarked on an ambitious operation in spite of poor weather and the difficulty of a winter campaign.56 77


The Scottish alliance Good reasons for optimism cheered the royalist camp by mid-1643. Essex’s army, hobbled by a severe disease outbreak and continuously harassed by Rupert’s cavalry, stood operationally immobile. In the west, Sir William Waller’s parliamentary forces suffered a crushing defeat at Roundaway Down in July, while Prince Maurice threatened Plymouth. The same month, Bristol surrendered to Rupert, a huge blow to parliamentary prestige. But, by August, the three-pronged movement on London disintegrated and the momentum gained in early 1643 shifted back to Parliament. Although the parliamentary situation appeared desperate in the north and west, several strongholds remained, notably Hull under Lord Fairfax and Gloucester under Colonel Edward Massey. The royalists squandered their best opportunity to destroy the parliamentarians in the pincer attack on London out of fear of those two garrisons. A bold commander might have used a covering force to hold the enemy in their positions while assaulting London. Instead, Charles directed his two main field forces against the garrisons and delayed the march on London. Stout defences by both garrisons cost Charles his opportunity to win the war in mid-1643.57 However, the impression of imminent success of royalist arms precipitated the creation of the odd alliance of convenience between the Scottish Covenanters and the English Parliament. Increasing disappointment with the king’s failure to embrace the Covenant and religious reformation seemingly assured by Leven’s victory at Newburn in 1640, coupled with the success of royalist arms in early 1643, created the possibility of Scottish intervention on Parliament’s behalf. This military and political cooperation represented the last instance of Scottish national and religious unity during the Civil Wars. The subsequent royalist defeat at Marston Moor, largely due to Scottish intervention, altered the strategic balance in favour of the allies and set in motion a series of royalist losses in all regions of Britain from Scotland to the west of England. Therefore, a brief discussion of the political context of the Scottish alliance is in order to set the stage for the second half of the First Civil War. The ‘war party’ in Parliament under Sir Henry Vane and Oliver St John supported more aggressive military operations rather than a negotiated settlement with the king and viewed a Scottish alliance as essential. Although wary of a presbyterian settlement, this group worked to mitigate the religious implications of any church reform resulting from such an alliance. Largely conservative on religious issues, the ‘peace party’ did not support toleration. They felt that its political goals had already been achieved by the Long Parliament and desired a negotiated settlement with the king. John Pym and his closest allies attempted to mediate. He never formed a party or interest, rather he attempted to steer a middle course between the war and peace parties, and in doing so attracted many members, who desired to preserve the constitution and supported monarchy, albeit with restrictions on the royal prerogative. The ‘middle group’ gained the upper hand by late summer as Essex advocated a renewed military campaign and the raising of a fresh army.58 78


With the spectre of imminent defeat in 1643, particularly after Adwalton Moor in the north and Roundaway Down in the west, the ‘war party’ leadership sought a military alliance with the Scottish Covenanters. In January 1643, a parliamentary agent in Edinburgh reported that the prospects for a military alliance with the Scots appeared good and that the ‘coals now want only blowing from England and this kingdom [Scotland] will be soon on fire’. In early August, Sir Henry Vane the Younger led a delegation to Edinburgh to conclude a treaty. The Scottish Convention of Estates and the General Assembly, meeting simultaneously in Edinburgh, established committees to negotiate with the English representatives. The Clerk of the General Assembly, Archibald Johnston of Wariston, advocated Scottish intervention on behalf of Parliament and convinced the Scottish leaders to accept an alliance. The English primarily sought to bring the Scottish army into the field in the hope of a result similar to Newburn. The Scots, urged on by Johnston, demanded a religious covenant that called for a reorganization of the Church of England along presbyterian lines. On 17 August, the Convention and Assembly approved the treaty, the Solemn League and Covenant, which called for the suppression of episcopacy, Catholicism and royalists as well as the preservation of both kingdoms’ political liberties.59 On 26 August, the Convention approved an additional treaty for sending troops into England, and on 1 September ordered the shire colonels and committees of war to raise and train a levy of 32,000 foot and 2,720 horse for the invasion of England. Many Members of Parliament expressed apprehension about the implications of the religious settlement. But, despite the qualms, the treaty passed both houses.60 As a result of the Covenant’s political ramifications and the Scottish demand for joint control of the war effort, a new executive agency emerged. Parliament established the Committee of Both Kingdoms composed of seven members from the House of Lords, fourteen from the Commons and four Scottish commissioners. Several leading military commanders, including the earls of Essex, Manchester and Warwick, as well as Cromwell, served as members, but their absence due to field service ensured that ‘war party’ civilians dominated the Committee. Ultimately, the Committee of Both Kingdoms restored the efficacy of the war effort, often implementing its decisions without parliamentary approval. Not only did the alliance alter the balance of power in Parliament’s favour, but it brought into the field two commanders of significant experience and talent, who contributed to the military victory over royalist forces in the north and Scotland, the earl of Leven and David Leslie.61 Despite autumn battlefield successes and high hopes for the Scottish alliance, 1643 ended as a desperate year for Parliament and its armies. The deprivations of the soldiers and the lack of shoes, clothing and equipage meant that morale-restoring victories would have to occur quickly lest the parliamentary war effort collapse. Recruitment had practically withered to nothing, particularly in the south, requiring impressment. Troop strength suffered as men refused to muster when called. This situation induced the committee for the London militia to issue a stringent declaration in October to the trained bands, hitherto some of the most reliable 79


parliamentary forces. Soldiers ordered to ‘repair to [their] Colours’ would be heavily fined if they failed to report, armed and ready for service, with penalties as severe as the deprivation of one’s trade or business.62 Two powerful factors remained in Parliament’s favour – the imminent Scottish invasion and the failure of the London operation. Under the earl of Leven, 21,000 Scots prepared to march south. In the north, the Fairfaxes and Cromwell had effectively removed Newcastle’s forces as a threat to the capital. The bold stroke by Lord Fairfax in breaking the siege of Hull placed Newcastle on the defensive and stripped him of the numerical advantage he had enjoyed for the entire year. His failure to capture the city as quickly as possible following the victory at Adwalton Moor contributed significantly to the demise of the royalist strategy. The failure of the London operation, more than any other factor, ensured that the war dragged on into 1644 when the Scottish alliance provided Lord Fairfax with the manpower to crush royalist power in the north. Nonetheless, as the year ended, the losses in the south and the near-destruction of Lord Fairfax in the north created the impression of overwhelming royalist domination. The victories, however, proved to be Pyrrhic. The king credited Providence for his ‘good fortune, as God hath wonderfully manifested His care of Us, and his defence of His, [and] Our most Just Cause’. In an understated observation, Charles characterized the events of the first full year of the struggle as ‘these miserable bloody Distempers [that] have disquieted this poor Kingdome’.63

‘The Devouring Sword’: parliamentary counterattack As Sir Thomas Fairfax dragged his exhausted, hungry army across the wintry countryside towards the besieged city of Nantwich in early January 1644, few could imagine the scope of parliamentary victory soon to unfold. The town, close to starvation and surrender, could not be lost if Parliament had any hope of retaking control in the north. The subsequent victory against Lord Byron’s royalists set the pattern for parliamentary and later allied victory that swept the royalist forces out of the north by the end of the year. In the months leading up to Marston Moor in July, the allies experienced a continual series of victories against royalist garrisons. Newcastle, unable to impede the advance of the Scottish army, allowed Leven to besiege and capture the city of Newcastle.64 Sir Thomas Fairfax continued his assault on royalist strongholds with a difficult siege against Lathom House, seat of the earl of Derby, while Lambert, in command of an independent detachment, recaptured several West Riding towns. By April, Newcastle had retired to York, an action that precipitated the arrival of Rupert in the north and the disaster at Marston Moor. While Sir Thomas marched out of Gainsborough, Byron demanded the surrender of Nantwich on 16 January to prevent a bloody siege; however, the defenders under Sir William Brereton refused to comply. A barrage of artillery followed over the next several days as the citizens held out for relief from Fairfax. Byron’s use of five regiments detached from service in Ireland proved to be highly 80


controversial and the taint of papists in the royal service inflamed public opinion. Nonetheless, with these veteran troops Byron defeated all parliamentary forces in Cheshire. On 12 January, Fairfax halted to refresh his men and collect additional reinforcements. With an augmented force of 2,500 foot and twenty-eight troops of horse, he commenced a rapid march towards Nantwich on the 21st. Byron threw up blocking forces at several points along the parliamentary line of march, but none of the royalist efforts impeded Fairfax’s progress. After a sharp engagement against substantial enemy forces at Acton Church outside Nantwich, Fairfax reformed his men for a general assault. About 1,000 of Brereton’s men sallied from the town and joined the developing fray.65 The battle initially developed into two separate engagements, one on each wing of the parliamentary force. Commanding one wing and reinforced by Brereton’s men, Lambert charged into the town at the head of his regiment of horse, drove out the enemy cavalry and routed the unsupported royalist infantry. As the engagement unfolded, the situation on Sir Thomas Fairfax’s wing became desperate until the horse under Sir William Fairfax charged through the town and disrupted the enemy. Despite the ineffectiveness of cavalry on an urban battlefield, Sir William’s boldness reinvigorated Sir Thomas’s flagging infantry. Within two hours, his foot pushed the royalists back to the open fields near Acton Church. There, both wings of Fairfax’s army pressed the disorganized enemy in a pincer movement between Lambert’s and Sir William’s cavalry. Although Sir Thomas credited the ensuing victory to Providence, the parliamentary horse under Lambert and Sir William Fairfax ensured the victory. Royalist fortunes suffered a severe setback when a flash flood collapsed the bridges over which only half the counter-attacking royalists had crossed, thus dividing their forces at a key juncture in the engagement and making reinforcement or retreat impossible. Sometimes in war, simple blind luck and happenstance cannot be disregarded in the outcome. Most of the royalist cavalry escaped to Chester; the foot did not. The parliamentarians killed 200 of Byron’s men and captured the bulk of the remainder, including a major-general, six colonels and 1,500 common soldiers. About half of the soldiers in the Irish regiments enlisted with the parliamentary army. Lambert’s actions prompted Sir Thomas Fairfax to comment in a dispatch to Essex that the colonel performed ‘very good Service’. Nantwich validated the youthful officer’s growing reputation as an effective commander. Based on his performance to date (and somewhat extraordinary given little more than a year of military experience), Lord Fairfax, and later Sir Thomas, accorded Lambert increasing operational responsibility including command of independent forces. He did not disappoint his patrons.66

The Army of the Covenant Commencing on 19 January 1644, 18,000 foot and 3,000 horse of the Scottish army under Leven’s command crossed the River Tweed into England.67 The dynamics of this extraordinary force need to be highlighted. Of all the Scottish 81


armies that participated in the Civil Wars, the Army of the Covenant represented the most potent, motivated and well-led, despite its inherent weaknesses particularly in training and experience. Its intervention gave Lord Fairfax and the bedraggled and decimated northern parliamentarians the military instrument they so desperately needed. Heavy winter snows hampered the Scottish advance, allowing Newcastle to reinforce the city of Newcastle before the siege began on 3 February. After a delay of six weeks owing to foul weather and a stout defence, Leven detached six regiments of foot to blockade Newcastle and marched south. The Scots consolidated their position around Sunderland and prepared to coordinate operations with Lord Fairfax at Hull while Newcastle fell back to his base at York. A lack of forage mitigated the huge cavalry advantage of the Scots as each side settled into winter quarters.68 The Scottish Army of the Covenant that crossed the border in the winter of 1644 differed substantially from its English parliamentarian allies most notably in the manner of recruitment. In the Scottish levy system, the government embodied roughly twenty recruiting regions and established strict manpower quotas by shire based on the highly successful Swedish model, one familiar to Leven and the other continental war veterans. Shire committees represented the central government and owed their allegiance to Edinburgh rather than to local aristocrats or landowners. The committees determined manpower quotas for each burgh and parish within their assigned shire, ordered troop quartering, and collected taxes for military expenses known as the ‘cess’. In the more rural areas, the Kirk proved fundamental to recruitment prospects. If the clergy supported the recruitment as they did in 1643–4, large numbers of men came forward voluntarily; however, in 1648 and 1650–1, clerical opposition had a deleterious impact on the quality and quantity of men raised (see Chapters 5 and 6).69 Candidates for conscription theoretically ranged from 16 to 60, including all able-bodied males. In the south and east, those with sufficient financial means frequently paid men to take their place in the levy and thus the typical Lowland regiment consisted of many landless youth, often unskilled in any trade, who saw military service in terms of the economic advantages of regular employment. In the Highlands and Islands of the north and west, an opposite notion prevailed. A Highland chieftain or his principal tacksmen (chief tenants) lined up the eligible men of each parish and, marching down the line, selected the best prospects. Often, as a sign of being chosen, the recruiting officer offered a pinch of snuff as a token of the honour. The Highland clan’s military ethic dictated that those not taken lacked character or military prowess. While Lowland regiments were often deployed undermanned, those from the mountain regions frequently turned men away.70 Initially, the force appeared capable and impressive if somewhat raw and inexperienced. The veteran officer Sir James Turner commented on the ‘armie of the Scots (of which Parliament so much boasted) … I found the bodies of the men lustie, well clothed and well moneyd, but raw, untrained and undisciplined: their officers for the most part young and unexperienced’.71 Despite the eventual 82


problems resulting from increasing ill-discipline, lack of experience and desertion, the injection of such a large force instantly provided Lord Fairfax with an overwhelming troop majority, and, despite the problems, on the whole the Scots preformed adequately. Leven’s 21,000-man army eventually withered under the stress of combat, desertion and disease. To replenish the decimated forces in early 1645, the Committee of Estates ordered a further levy of 17,500 men; however, only a small number resulted. Even threats to confiscate the income of the estates of landowners who did not supply the required number of men under arms failed due to the inability of the Estates to enforce its demands.72 Nevertheless, the Covenanter levy system eventually raised a remarkable number of troops – 24,000 by 1640 and 30,000 by 1644 – especially given the total population of Scotland.73 Landowners played the crucial role in bringing in their tenantry to fill the shire quotas. Officers tended to be members of their extended families and the Covenanter and later Engager armies reflected the Scottish tradition of military service as a fundamental role of aristocracy. With the normal political weakness of Scottish monarchs, regional magnates exerted both political and military hegemony over their estates. Although the crown legitimized military action and official violence, the aristocracy tightly held the means of conducting war through control of the parish levies and bands of dependent retainers with which private violence and territorial disputes had been waged for centuries. In the 1644–6 Covenanter Army, thirteen earls, five lords and three sons of peers served as regimental colonels (of a total of thirty-one). Although the nobility still dominated the senior officer ranks, a fundamental shift had occurred by 1644. Noble birth remained important, but with regiments raised and embodied for state rather than private service, many lesser-born men served as senior officers; nobility ceased to be the sole basis of authority.74 The extent of Scottish mercenary service in the continental wars provided a wealth of experience in both the officer and other ranks, a factor contributing to the generally good battlefield performance of 1644 to 1646. Between 1625 and 1642, the Scottish government had authorized the raising of over 47,000 men for foreign service, mainly in the Swedish army. Although the colonels tended to be peers, all of the Covenanter Army general officers, including Leslie and Leven, originally of lesser birth, obtained their titles and posts through considerable foreign service. Eleven of thirty-one colonels, twenty-four of twenty-nine lieutenantcolonels and twenty-three of twenty-nine majors had continental experience.75 At all levels, previous military experience provided a leavening for the newly raised Scottish levies. The Covenanter Army began the invasion of England with a relatively high state of discipline. Leven, as commander of the invasion force of 1640, had severely punished plunderers following the Scottish victory at Newburn and during the brief occupation of the north.76 As commander of the Covenanter Army of 1644 to 1646, he continued that pattern. In the force that crossed the River Tweed in January 1644, each regiment had a minister and several elders who conducted morning 83


and evening prayers as well as Sunday services. According to the Articles and Ordinances of Warre drawn up in 1643, every man had to swear to be faithful to the Solemn League and Covenant. Various articles mandated severe punishment for missing prayers and sermons, swearing, pillaging, rape, adultery and desertion. The stringent nature of the articles, while mirroring those typical of the day with regard to military offences such as desertion, shirking duty and failure to obey lawful orders, reflected the religious aspect of the Covenant and the raison d’être for the invasion: the maintenance and protection of the Kirk and Scottish Protestantism. A high moral purpose justified the invasion and the soldiers reflected that purpose.77 Action commenced soon after Leven’s crossing of the English border at Berwick on 19 January. Initially, the Covenanters encountered little royalist opposition, reaching the Tyne valley unchallenged. But, showing unusual strategic vision, Newcastle fortified the city of Newcastle with troops drawn from southern and eastern Yorkshire. From a strategic viewpoint, the reinforcement of Newcastle forced the Scots to divide their forces for fear of leaving a substantial garrison in their rear, which also allowed for royalist attacks on their communications and logistics train back to Scotland. But Leven had no choice. Either he must subdue Newcastle by a siege with all his forces, thus negating their value to Lord Fairfax, or he must divide them. The Scot took the later option. Detaching six foot regiments to remain north of the Tyne River to bottle up the Newcastle garrison, Leven marched across the river on 28 February with the remaining fifteen infantry and six cavalry regiments for coordinated operations with Lord Fairfax. The royalists took advantage of the opportunity to reduce the overwhelming Scottish numerical advantage and, at Corbridge on 19 February, royalist horse badly roughed up the Scottish cavalry. A further action at Boldon Hills near Sunderland occurred on 7– 8 March, but to no royalist advantage. Newcastle withdrew, thus allowing Leven to take the South Shields Fort at the mouth of the Tyne by the 20th. Finally, another indecisive skirmish occurred on 24–25 March at Hilton, also near Sunderland. Though the Scots did not take Newcastle, from a strategic viewpoint, they had gained the initiative, mainly through overwhelming troop strength rather than more effective leadership or a qualitative edge. In fairness, though Newcastle probably made the correct strategic decision to fortify Newcastle and prevent unimpeded Scottish operations further south in support of Lord Fairfax, the fact remains that nothing he could do would preserve his situation short of a woeful Scottish blunder. His stripping of the East Riding of royalist forces to both fortify the town and challenge the Scots allowed the Fairfaxes to run unchallenged and to recover territory lost the previous year and further resulted in the disastrous loss of John Bellasis’s royalist force at Selby. Exhibiting that keen operational artistry and tactical acumen so obvious in the two Bishops’ Wars, Leven checkmated Newcastle, repulsed royalist attempts to wear down his manpower superiority and marched south in force against the severely depleted royalists. Given the disparity of numbers and the skill of Leven and his Covenanter Army, Newcastle admitted defeat and fortified the pivotal city of York, there to await reinforcement from Oxford. 84


Parliamentary resurgence in the north While the Scots besieged Newcastle and established their military domination in the north, Sir Thomas Fairfax remained in Cheshire after his victory at Nantwich to secure the parliamentary position. He detached Lambert with his regiment of horse and Colonel John Bright’s foot to return to the West Riding to protect the wool market towns from the depredations of Lambert’s kinsman, Colonel John Bellasis (Belasyse), the royalist governor of York. This amounted to Lambert’s first independent command. Throughout the spring of 1644, he demonstrated that talent for military command, battlefield management and tactical acumen that marked his subsequent career. On 17 February, 150 royalists from Skipton surprised the parliamentary garrison at Heightley, raided the town and captured 100 prisoners. On their return, a party of parliamentary horse intercepted them, freed the prisoners and recovered their plunder. The skirmish illustrates the small-scale action typical of the First Civil War and the sort of royalist activity that Lambert resolved to suppress. To the citizenry, who suffered the deprivations of free quarter and armies marching across newly planted fields, tearing down barns and confiscating winter stores and farm animals, even parliamentary supporters must have heard the news of Lambert’s advance with trepidation. After a relatively quiet hiatus of several months, the war returned to Yorkshire in full force. One pessimistic London commentator summed up the apprehension: ‘The Genius of this age breathes nothing but War, and the nations of the earth make haste to obey it, as if they were in emulation who first should offer up their lives to satisfie the appetite of the devouring sword’.78 At the beginning of March, Bellasis’s royalists held Bradford and comprised the last remaining royalist force capable of contesting the rendezvous of the parliamentary and Scottish armies. Lambert marched out of Chester by way of Halifax towards Bradford with a sizeable number of Fairfax’s horse and Bright’s foot regiment. Hearing of the parliamentary approach, the garrison sent an urgent plea for assistance to York, whereupon Bellasis, leading a large contingent of horse and foot, set out to challenge Lambert. On 5 March, Lambert’s men encountered a larger royal force under Bellasis and Sir Charles Lucas near Bradford. The engagement quickly turned into an eight-hour musketry duel with little damage to either side. With his musketeers down to two rounds each, Lambert called a council of war to determine whether he should retire. Characteristically, he decided on a bold course and charged the enemy to break up their formation. The swiftness and effectiveness of the assault shattered the royal horse, leaving their foot vulnerable. Lambert committed Bright’s pikemen to a headlong push, which so disoriented the royalist foot that they collapsed in a disorderly retreat. The parliamentary musketeers then gave the enemy ‘such a salute with shot as made them run for it’. The victorious Lambert marched into Bradford and re-established a parliamentary garrison.79 Chastened but not beaten, Bellasis returned to Bradford with additional forces determined to overcome Lambert by sheer numbers. He assaulted the breastworks surrounding the town in an attempt to wear down the parliamentary defenders 85


after Lambert, convinced of his inability to withstand the enemy in the open field, had retired behind the earthworks. The parliamentary musketry proved so effective that the attackers retired in great disorder suffering heavy losses. Realizing the enemy’s vulnerability, Lambert ordered a general sally that unnerved the royalists, and on the first (or possibly second) counterattack, his troops ‘quite routed their whole body’. Lambert’s men captured 150 horse and 80 foot.80 Despite his characteristic risk-taking nature, Lambert exhibited a good deal of prudence at Bradford, which moderated foolhardy aggression. Once he realized the advantage gained over the larger royalist force by the superior parliamentary musketry, Lambert struck swiftly and boldly thus securing a decisive victory following an inauspicious beginning to the affair. A third engagement occurred at Kirklees near Huddersfield. By tempting a royalist cavalry brigade into an ambush, Lambert’s men broke up the enemy formation and captured over 300 officers and men as well as substantial material and personal possessions that had been pillaged from civilians.81 In this series of small-scale engagements, Lambert proved exceptionally talented as an independent commander detached from the main body of the army striking swiftly and decisively. Senior commanders recognized these characteristics in Lambert and used him to Parliament’s keen advantage. As a chronicler of his early career noted after the three West Riding victories, Lambert ‘grew more and more prosperous and victorious’. On 30 March, the Commons approved a monetary award for Lambert in recognition of his victories in the West Riding.82 As Lambert consolidated the parliamentary position in the West Riding, other actions occurred that favoured a parliamentary revival in the spring of 1644. Sir Thomas Fairfax marched about Cheshire and Lancashire capturing royalist strongholds while Sir Thomas Constable took Whitby. Operating out of Hull, Lord Fairfax seriously disrupted royalist activities in the East and North Ridings. In response, the king ordered Rupert to commence operations in the north where he relieved the siege of Newark. At the end of February, Sir Thomas Fairfax moved against the earl of Derby’s stronghold, Lathom House in Lancashire. Commanded by the resolute countess of Derby, the garrison held off the parliamentary siege and embarrassed Fairfax. Sir Thomas no doubt rejoiced in the arrival of orders on 21 March to join Lambert in operations against Newcastle. At Ferrybridge, their combined forces rendezvoused with the 4,000 men of Lord Fairfax, and, despite his orders to proceed north to operate in concert with the Scots, Sir Thomas delayed his march in order to assist his father against Selby.83 Bellasis occupied Selby with 6,500 men to fill the vacuum left by Newcastle’s abandonment of Yorkshire to garrison Newcastle. Seeing an opportunity to destroy the main royal army in Yorkshire, Lord Fairfax prepared to attack on 11 April. Bellasis sallied out of Selby in an attempt to surprise the encampment of what he mistook to be a small parliamentary force, but instead encountered the entire enemy army. Lord Fairfax counterattacked, but despite initial success in taking the outworks, royalist cavalry blocked further advance. Sir Thomas and Lambert’s cavalry charged into the town where they pushed the enemy towards the River 86


Ouse. Many of the royalist horse fled over a pontoon bridge after the first charge. Bellasis organized the more courageous of his men and delivered a counterattack that brought down Sir Thomas. In the forward surge to rescue their commander, the parliamentary horse wounded and captured Bellasis and drove the remnants of his cavalry out of Selby. The parliamentary foot easily surged through the remainder of the enemy fortifications and captured the town along with 3,000 prisoners, mainly Yorkshire foot regiments and veterans of the successful 1643 campaigns. A subsequent report referred to Lambert as ‘that valiant Gentleman, Colonell Lambert’, an indication of his increasing reputation.84 With the destruction of Bellasis’s force, the parliamentarians joined the Scots for a general assault. Selby, from a strategic viewpoint, proved fundamentally important to control of the north and in particular to the culmination of Lord Fairfax’s defensive attrition strategy. Not only did it accomplish the objective of small incremental victories leading up to the culminating, decisive victory at Marston Moor, but it removed the dangerous royalist threat in the parliamentary rear. Freed from concern over Bellasis, Lord Fairfax moved his forces north to initiate the eventual encirclement and siege of York. From Newcastle’s standpoint, with Lord Fairfax running free to the south, of necessity, he abandoned any effort to defeat the Covenanter Army. After consolidating his diminished forces, the marquis retreated to York, arriving on 19 April. On the 17th, the parliamentary army joined the Scots at Wetherby giving them a combined strength of 16,000 foot and 4,000 horse. Though diminished, Newcastle’s army remained far from helpless, for he still held the advantage in horse with an estimated 5,000 troopers. Additionally, he controlled the river crossings, allowing for the swift deployment of his cavalry on either bank. But, realizing that his horse provided little utility in a protracted siege, Newcastle detached them under Sir Charles Lucas on 22 April, leaving only some five troops in the city. He then made urgent appeals to the king for support. Manchester invested Lincoln on 3 May, but rainy weather and the advance of Goring with several thousand horse impeded his progress. Manchester finally joined the besieging army in early June. With Lord Fairfax covering the eastern approaches to the city and the Scots to the north and west, the arrival of Manchester’s troops in the south completed the encirclement of York.85 The coalescence of the three allied armies around York in June 1644 emphasized the profound change in the strategic picture in the north since the summer of 1643. The war had essentially started in Yorkshire in summer 1642 with the failure of the king to secure the magazine at Hull and the consequential raising of local forces. The breakdown of treaty negotiations in Yorkshire ensured that the war would become large-scale throughout the county. Accordingly, Lord Fairfax organized a defence against the rapidly forming local royalist forces in early autumn 1642. The arrival of the earl of Newcastle in November dramatically altered the picture forcing Fairfax to adopt attrition by strategic defensive or a ‘Fabian’ strategy. The strategy produced mixed results. Superior subordinate commanders such 87


as Sir Thomas Fairfax and John Lambert attacked isolated royalist garrisons and small field armies and prevented Newcastle from achieving his goal of territorial domination. However, the defeat of Lord Fairfax at Adwalton Moor nearly destroyed the parliamentary war effort in the north. Only the stout defence of Hull by Lord Fairfax assisted by Lambert prevented the total defeat of parliamentary arms in the north. The invasion of the earl of Leven’s Army of the Covenant in January 1644 again altered the strategic balance in favour of Parliament. Additionally, the focus of the war turned towards York, which became the linchpin of the royalist war effort as the encircling allied armies converged on the city. As major commanders, both Lord Fairfax and Newcastle demonstrated some degree of aptitude. Despite their relative lack of pre-war military experience, both competently handled their forces, but neither displayed more than a rudimentary understanding of the dynamics of battlefield management or a command of tactical movement, especially the indirect approach technique of attacking an opponent’s weak point. Combat between the two lords’ forces tended to be direct frontal assaults with the objective of bludgeoning the opponent into submission or flight. While both regional commanders lacked a high degree of tactical acumen, each had subordinate commanders of exceptional military talent. Lord Fairfax relied on Sir Thomas and his protégé Lambert for the battlefield management skills that he lacked; both performed exceptionally. Newcastle also benefited from the services of skilled subordinates, notably Goring, Bellasis and Langdale. Despite the predominant royalism in the north, Newcastle never leveraged his numerical superiority in both initial numbers of troops and potential replacements to defeat Lord Fairfax decisively. Setbacks such as Adwalton Moor may have temporarily hampered the parliamentary war effort; however, the rapidity with which the Fairfaxes replenished troop losses provided a testament to the endurance of the parliamentary cause in the north, especially in the West Riding wool districts and clothing towns. Additionally, the weapons from the former royal magazine at Hull provided the parliamentarians a distinct equipment advantage especially in the early months of the war, a factor that partially offset the royalist numerical advantage. In a strategic sense, the advantage went to Lord Fairfax. He understood that he would rarely outnumber Newcastle on the field and lacked the manpower resources to control significant territory. However, he showed a high level of strategic vision in the implementation of a successful ‘Fabian’ strategy. Newcastle, on the other hand, merely reacted to Fairfax’s movements rather than developing a comprehensive war-winning strategy that utilized his superior manpower and resources. As a tribute to Lord Fairfax’s extraordinary moral authority, he consistently raised new forces from the ashes of defeat, an ability that surprised and flummoxed the royalists. In this regard, though he controlled very little territory in the north by the spring of 1644, Lord Fairfax provided great service to the parliamentary cause. He maintained a viable presence until the arrival of the Scots under Leven, which altered the strategic balance in the north and shifted the focus to York in the early summer of 1644. The hoped for final blow against Newcastle, a requirement for a 88


successful ‘Fabian’ strategy, occurred at Marston Moor that July. The fury and violence of the summer storm that swept over the battlefield outside York as the armies faced each other provided a fitting setting for the deadliest engagement ever conducted on British soil and one that ultimately doomed the royalist cause, a story to be told in the next chapter. From a strategic viewpoint, Newcastle displayed a singular lack of vision by concurrently becoming embroiled in a fruitless siege of Hull that cost many casualties; in fact, he utterly nullified his value to the king. Ironically, his mere presence and occasional tactical victories such as Adwalton and Seacroft Moors terrified Parliament and thus stimulated the Scottish Alliance. Another complicating factor in Newcastle’s failure lay in his inability to integrate the Yorkshire royalists fully into his northern army. As indicated by P. R. Newman in his study of the geographic origins of royalist colonels, Yorkshire provided a great number of officers and thus troops. But the reluctance of the Yorkshire royalists to commit to action in support of Newcastle proved damaging. In truth, throughout the First Civil War, Yorkshire royalists, while substantial in number, generally declined to commit to operations outside the county so long as Lord Fairfax controlled Hull or remained active in the field. Despite his seeming high moral authority as northern royalist commander, Newcastle lacked the ability to rally the Yorkshiremen to great exertions beyond their home area. Clearly, a fundamental characteristic of successful military leadership is the ability to inspire and motivate troops to exertions above and beyond the defence of immediate home and hearth and to strive for the success of the greater cause despite difficulties, disadvantages and hardships. Newcastle proved incapable of so inspiring the Yorkshiremen to such sacrifices as he had done with the Northumberland and Cumberland royalists earlier in 1642. A further complication for Newcastle lay in the nature of his mission. Raised for the quite narrow purpose of controlling territory and suppressing the rebellion in Yorkshire, his highly capable force neither carried out any meaningful strategic coordination with the southern royal armies nor provided substantial reinforcements (again, the localism problem). By clinging to his northern base rather than supporting the war effort elsewhere, Newcastle became the engine of his own destruction. Finally, Newcastle’s lack of aggressiveness in supporting the advance on London or the war in the Midlands and his failure to follow up the destruction of Lord Fairfax’s forces at Adwalton Moor with a strike against London, illustrates Newcastle’s singular lack of strategic vision. By his narrow focus on the north, he abrogated the opportunity for royal victory. Conversely and ironically, by his periodic tactical successes, he ensured his own destruction. Newcastle ultimately provided very little support for the king’s cause through a lack of aggressiveness, strategic vision and decisiveness. His example illustrates the inherent danger of such failing at the highest levels of command, regardless of the quality of leadership at the operational or tactical levels. Few commanders have been so blessed with such initial advantages as Newcastle.

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4 ‘IN THE RANKS OF DEATH’ Royalist defeat and the New Model Army, 1644–1647

The battle of Marston Moor marked a watershed in the careers of Lord Fairfax, Leven, Leslie, Lambert and Newcastle. Although Lord Fairfax had succeeded in preventing royalist domination of the north, what should have been his triumphal moment – the defeat of Rupert and the destruction of Newcastle’s army – turned instead into personal embarrassment. His flight during the course of the battle left a permanent stain on his personal honour. Although Lord Fairfax remained in command in the north for a further nine months, both Sir Thomas and Lambert garnered increasingly demanding command responsibility and eclipsed him in prominence and reputation. Similarly, Leven’s reputation and personal honour never recovered from his flight from the battlefield. The Scottish cavalry commander, David Leslie, received credit for his actions in support of Cromwell’s horse at the battle and by 1645, emerged as the de facto commander of the Scottish army. Newcastle, who carried himself with great poise during the battle despite his replacement as overall commander at York by the impetuous Rupert, withdrew from the fray and exiled himself to Antwerp. In the remainder of the First Civil War, Lambert, Sir Thomas Fairfax and Cromwell emerged as the primary parliamentary commanders in the north. This chapter addresses the Marston Moor engagement in some detail for several reasons. First, it heralded the effective end of the careers of the two regional commanders in the north, Lord Fairfax and the marquis of Newcastle. And, through a seeming loss of personal honour, both Lord Fairfax and the earl of Leven’s contemporary and historiographical reputations suffered despite having won the battle. Second, the battle and the aftermath represented the firm establishment in reputation of the cavalry commanders Oliver Cromwell, Sir Thomas Fairfax, John Lambert and David Leslie, two of the case study subjects (despite the poor performance of Fairfax and Lambert’s inexperienced horse at Marston Moor). Having established the source of Lambert’s growing reputation, this chapter addresses his career during the remainder of the First Civil War and the interim period of 1646– 8 in which he served as parliamentary northern commander and demonstrated exceptional qualities of moral authority and consistency. Finally, a brief synopsis of the establishment and nature of the New Model Army in 1645 is useful in 90

‘ I N T H E R A N K S O F D E AT H ’

Figure 4.1 Marston Moor, 2 July 1644

understanding the quality of the instrument possessed by Parliament in the period 1646–51. That instrument gave Lambert and Cromwell a decisive edge over the duke of Hamilton’s Engager army in 1648 and Leslie’s Scottish royalists in 1650– 1. Subsequent chapters will analyse just how successful Lambert proved in using that keen military instrument through his extraordinary martial synergy.

Marston Moor and its aftermath: the making and breaking of reputations Newcastle’s retreat to York in the face of the combined allied forces and crippling losses at Nantwich, Selby and in the West Riding, directly precipitated the battle of Marston Moor (2 July 1644). As the allied forces prepared for a siege of the city, royalist operations shifted to supporting Newcastle and preventing the loss of Yorkshire. Should York fall, the hitherto fertile recruiting areas for the king in the north would be cut off, along with supplies from the northern counties to maintain royalist forces throughout the kingdom. As the spring campaign season opened, insufficient resources plagued royalist forces in the south, making the relief of York a necessity. Accordingly, Charles detached Rupert from Oxford (5 May) for operations against the combined parliamentary and Scottish forces in the north. The main focus of the war thus shifted to that region.1 The parliamentary assault against York commenced on 16 June.2 Given the unusual stoutness of the medieval walls, an artillery onslaught would probably not have made a breach through which the infantry could pass. The besiegers 91


developed a plan to dig two tunnels and ignite mines under the city’s main gate as well as one of the towers of St Mary’s manor. In a hasty attempt to breach the walls, Major-General Lawrence Crawford, Manchester’s infantry commander, prematurely exploded the powder under the tower without informing his superior officers and the subsequent infantry assault failed. The defenders, able to concentrate their fire, killed half of his attacking force. The failed assault effectively ended allied action for several days.3 On his departure from Oxford, Rupert moved rapidly to implement his northern operation. Passing through heavily royalist Lancashire, he raised numerous new recruits and captured Bolton, Wigan, Liverpool and Preston. On 14 June, Charles dispatched a letter to Rupert that in effect ordered him not only to relieve York but to defeat the enemy army in the field. The letter has generated substantial historical controversy as to its precise meaning. Charles extolled his nephew with the ominous message that ‘if York be lost I shall esteem my crown little less … wherefore I command and conjure you … that, all new enterprises laid aside, you immediately march, according to your first intention [an agreement concluded at Oxford], with all your force, to the relief of York’. To Rupert, the order meant march to York, relieve the siege and defeat the allied forces. Whether or not this represented the king’s intention, the headstrong prince resolved to meet the enemy on the field of battle, a highly controversial decision that resulted in the fight at Marston Moor.4 Rupert commenced his notorious ‘York March’ on 16 May from Shrewsbury with only 8,000 troops, far too few to break the siege. Along the route, he collected additional reinforcements and relieved the siege of Lathom House. The besiegers retreated to Bolton where Rupert met and crushed them on the 28th, killing 1,600 and accepting the surrender of only 700. This brutal action outraged the English, who generally treated prisoners leniently. Goring joined Rupert at Bury with the royal cavalry of Sir Charles Lucas, which provided experienced and battle-hardened soldiers to leaven Rupert’s fresh recruits. Liverpool held out for several days due to the reinforcement of its walls with wool sacks to absorb the force of artillery rounds, but the town soon fell and became the next victim of plunder and massacre. Rupert’s march, however, stimulated royalist recruitment in Lancashire. Rupert set out from Preston on 23 June, crossed the Pennines and arrived at Skipton where he paused to prepare his forces for the coming battle. By 30 June, he reached Knaresborough, less than 20 miles from York.5 Outside York, the option of fighting Rupert or awaiting additional reinforcements presented the allied commanders with a dilemma. Reinforcements from the Midlands would not arrive for several days. These additional troops provided the option of confronting Rupert while simultaneously maintaining the siege. The swiftness of Rupert’s advance, combined with faulty allied intelligence that overestimated his strength, complicated the tactical situation. In a council of war, the allied generals learned ‘that behinde us their Goliath [Rupert] had made his neare approach, with men not to be numbred; a vast body indeed it was’.6 As a result, Lord Fairfax, Leven and Manchester resolved to confront Rupert with maximum force as soon as possible so as to prevent a juncture with Newcastle. Marching out 92


to establish a blocking position between York and Knaresborough, the parliamentary troops abandoned siege guns and great stores of equipment and ammunition. They chose as their ground the huge heath north-west of York known as Marston Moor.7 The Rivers Ouse, Nidd and Wharfe, all running roughly from north-west to south-east, provided some protection for the allied forces. In a triangle formed by the Nidd in the north, the Ouse running east through York, and the Wharfe through Tadcaster to the south and west, the moor at Marston commanded the crossings at all points. To reach Marston, Rupert would have to cross the Ouse at Poppleton where Manchester’s dragoons guarded the pontoon bridge. Should Rupert take this route, the allied forces could swing back across the Ouse via this bridge and block his advance on York. Marston Moor provided the optimum use of favourable topography. Unless Rupert opted to take the long route around the north, he had to march across Marston Moor to reach York. A master of speed and manoeuvre, Rupert did the unexpected by taking the northern route and accomplishing the improbable in a single day. On a long march of 22 miles, he crossed the Ouse at Boroughbridge, then marched further north across the Swale at Thornton Bridge and finally down the east bank of the Ouse. His forces repulsed Manchester’s dragoons and captured the bridge at Poppleton before encamping for the night 3 miles north of York. Rupert’s march on 1 July 1644 remains one of the boldest, best-executed manoeuvres in the history of warfare. By that evening, he stood in a position to relieve York, join its defenders and then offer battle to the shocked allies lying 5 miles away at Marston. Rupert’s cavalry cleared the road into York and established pickets across the eastern edge of the Moor to maintain reconnaissance. Sending Goring into the city with orders for Newcastle to march to the moor early the next morning, Rupert stayed at his encampment for the night.8 The battle of Marston Moor ended the military career of Newcastle. A lack of mediation skills combined with a momentary breakdown in his control over the discipline of his troops played a significant role in the results of the engagement. At the root of his difficulty lay his inability to cooperate fully with Rupert at a time when the initiative had shifted definitively in their favour as a result of Rupert’s extraordinary achievement in outflanking the allied armies and effectively breaking the siege of York. Until the arrival of Rupert, Newcastle enjoyed unchallenged authority as the northern regional commander with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Northern Counties. The royalist command structure as created by Charles in April 1643 for the purpose of coordinating all war activities – financial, strategic, administrative and recruiting – relied on six regional commanders, five of whom were the ‘greatest Royalist magnates of the areas committed to their care’. By early 1644, with the exception of Newcastle, the system had failed. Charles then opted to appoint army commanders with wide-ranging geographic authority to replace the unsuccessful grandee system.9 Prince Rupert, as a major field commander, thus came to Yorkshire with implied authority over all royalist troops in the north, a situation likely to 93


create a crisis of command. The arrival of the strong-willed prince demonstrated a dangerous weakness in Newcastle’s leadership – his inability, or perhaps unwillingness, to develop and execute a coordinated plan in the absence a clearly defined chain of command. From Rupert’s camp, Goring carried orders to Newcastle to join Rupert as early as possible the next morning on Marston Moor for a combined assault on the allies. At this point, the royalist chain of command began to break down. Shortly after the arrival of the prince, Newcastle sent a warm letter, stating: ‘you are welcome, sir, so many several ways, as it is beyond my arithmetic to number, but this I know, you are the Redeemer of the North, and the Saviour of the Crown’.10 Since Rupert purported to have direct orders from the king, Newcastle considered resigning, but eventually, albeit reluctantly, answered that he stood ‘ready and willing … to obey [Rupert] no otherwise than if His Majesty were [there] in person’.11 On Marston Moor the allied forces spent a miserable night. The dry wells forced men and horses to drink from puddles and drainage ditches. Most of their provisions had been left behind in the entrenchments. The cavalry slept in the open air holding the reins of their horses. A council of war produced dissension as Manchester and the Fairfaxes advocated a battle the next day; the less bold Leven opposed the plan and argued in favour of awaiting reinforcements from the west under Sir John Meldrum and the earl of Denbigh expected by the 3rd. Rupert had performed a brilliant stroke in relieving the city, but the allied armies still held a considerable manpower advantage. The English participants argued that should Rupert be left unmolested, he could strike out for the undefended eastern counties or join with the king in the south. Under the prodding of the more aggressive Cromwell and Sir Thomas Fairfax, the council determined that Rupert must be cornered and prevented from escaping. Accordingly, the commanders ordered a general withdrawal to the south towards Cawood and Selby to block Rupert’s move in that direction.12 Early on the 2nd, the allied foot with the Scots marching in the van, moved south in accordance with the council of war’s decision to withdraw towards Cawood. About 3,000 cavalry and dragoons, including Lambert’s newly raised and unseasoned Yorkshire horse, remained on the moor as a covering force. What initially appeared to Lambert’s men to be a royalist cavalry patrol turned out to be 5,000 of Rupert’s veteran troopers, prompting an immediate appeal for the recall of the parliamentary infantry spread out over an 8-mile line of march. The recall order did not reach the Scottish regiments in the van until they had marched to within a mile of Tadcaster.13 For three hours, the horse of Sir Thomas Fairfax and Lambert faced the royalist cavalry expecting an imminent advance. None occurred. As his horse approached the enemy, Rupert expected to see Newcastle’s infantry marching into line of battle. Instead, he observed the marquis accompanied by his lifeguard riding towards his location. Ignoring the order to move into position for an attack, Newcastle’s foot had plundered the abandoned siege trenches. Most had not returned from their pillaging or simply refused to march out until paid their arrears. 94


The northern royalist army had a reputation for pillaging while occupying various garrisons throughout 1643 and Newcastle had been unwilling or unable to suppress their activity. While occupying the city of Newcastle in 1642, he had received orders from the king to suppress indiscriminate plundering, but could not discipline the troops. Not surprisingly, he failed to prevent the pillaging of abandoned allied siege works. Though justifiably confident that he could disperse the enemy horse without the foot, Rupert opted to await the arrival of his infantry, a decision that allowed the allied foot to reform. Advised by Newcastle that his troops would not arrive until late in the afternoon, Rupert formed a defensive front and stationed musketeers along a hedge-backed ditch.14 Newcastle, through his reluctance to cooperate fully with Rupert and the inability to maintain discipline among his troops, squandered a priceless opportunity to attack the enemy’s weak rear in force and assault the allied foot strung out along a long and vulnerable line of march. Despite a tardy though vigorous attempt by Newcastle to reform his forces, valuable time had been lost as Rupert awaited the infantry’s arrival at Marston. Although Newcastle had performed credible service for the royal cause for two years in the north, this singular act of unreliability – failure to enforce discipline and lack of mediation skill – contributed to the series of military setbacks that led to ultimate defeat in the north within two years. As the forces gathered throughout the afternoon, the two armies faced each other a thousand yards apart between the tiny hamlets of Tockwith and Long Marston. The allied forces occupied a huge rye field, the highest point of which gave them the advantage of better observation and a slight downhill slope. Rupert’s men formed behind a wide drainage ditch. Their position offered the advantages of excellent cover and an open field of fire. Behind them stretched the flat expanse of Marston Moor, which provided suitable ground for cavalry operations.15 By early afternoon, Newcastle’s foot finally arrived on Marston Moor. Rupert formed the combined armies into three lines with small units of horse interspersed among the foot to provide support against enemy cavalry. George Goring commanded the first line as well as the horse on the royalist left opposite Sir Thomas Fairfax and Lambert. On the allied side, the 26,000 troops formed into battalions in three lines. Although nearly equal in horse (8,000 allied to Rupert’s 6,500), the smaller and less capable Scottish mounts reduced the allied relative advantage. Under Cromwell, Manchester’s cavalry formed the front of the allied left supported by David Leslie’s Scottish horse. Sir Thomas Fairfax commanded the right of the line with 2,000 horse, predominantly untrained, newly raised Lancashire men. Lambert commanded the second line of cavalry to the immediate rear made up of equally inexperienced Yorkshire recruits. The reserve consisted of three regiments of Scottish horse, including one of lancers. At this point, Leven demonstrated the tactical acumen that had served him so well as a field-marshal in the Swedish service and as the victor in the Bishops’ Wars. He realized that the royalists did not expect action to commence that day and had stood down to prepare a meal and bivouac for the night. Sensing the psychological advantage at his command, Leven struck as thunderstorms rolled over the Moor. 95


As the battle commenced in the early evening, things went well for the allied forces. The initial assault drove back the forlorn hope of musketeers lining the ditch before Rupert’s lines. On the left, Cromwell’s Eastern horse (dubbed the Ironsides) charged headlong into the enemy horse and quickly dispersed the shattered royalist first line. A firm counterattack by Rupert’s second line threatened to repel Cromwell’s men until Leslie attacked the second line of horse in the flank. The action degenerated into a hand-to-hand melee with swords and pistols as each side ‘stood at Swords Point a pretty while hacking one another’. Rupert arrived in time to rally his own regiment and temporarily halted the Ironsides’ advance. The check proved fleeting and soon the entire right wing of the royal army fled. Cromwell’s troopers reformed in good order rather than chase the broken enemy.16 Newcastle raced to the disintegrating right wing where he managed momentarily to rally Byron’s broken royalist horse. However, panicked troops ‘betook themselves to their heels again, and killed even those of their own party that endeavoured to stop them’.17 Illustrative of Newcastle’s understanding of the importance of stoic sacrifice, his sons along with their tutor, rode close behind him, prompting Sir Charles Lucas to urge the marquis to order them off the field. Newcastle responded that the boys should ‘shew their Loyalty and Duty to His Majesty, in venturing their lives, as well as Himself’.18 In the centre, Manchester’s foot drove back the royalist infantry. In less than an hour of fighting, the entire right and centre of Rupert’s force had either fallen back or fled. However, a crisis developed on the allied right where Sir Thomas Fairfax and Lambert found themselves in considerable trouble. As the general advance commenced, both officers trotted out leading their two lines of horse, but fire from a battalion of royalist musketeers posted in a ditch at a range of between 70 and 100 yards from Atterwith Lane inflicted numerous casualties. The sight of comrades being shot out of the saddle had a shattering effect on the inexperienced troopers. The cohesion and discipline of the Lancashire and Yorkshire levies disintegrated as they pushed through the ditch and drove out the harassing musketeers. The ground beyond the ditch, covered in thick, prickly gorse and cut by a series of small ditches, further broke the momentum of the advance. But the carnage began well before the troopers could come to grips with the enemy horse beyond the ditch. To enter the Moor, Fairfax’s troopers had to pass along the Atterwith Lane and then through a narrow defile barely wide enough for four horses abreast. This constriction slowed the advance, thus providing excellent targets for the enemy musketeers lining the bordering hedges and the ditch. As Fairfax emerged from the ditch area, his 2,000-man command had been reduced to barely 400. Unable to reform stragglers because of continual fire from the musketeers, he resolved to charge immediately. In the fury of the assault, hand-tohand fighting erupted as broadswords chopped and slashed at helmets and breastplates. Pistols fired at close range penetrated body armour causing ghastly wounds. Fairfax’s men gradually prevailed and broke through Goring’s royalist front line but at a high cost including many officers. Lambert’s major, William Fairfax (not related to the general), and Sir Thomas’s brother Charles, deserted by 96


their men, lay dying together. Sir Thomas suffered a slash wound to his face and Lambert had his horse shot out from under him.19 Although the royalist first line broke, the second stood firm. Separated from each other with only a few men still mounted, Fairfax and Lambert rallied their troopers still struggling to clear the ditches and gorse. Meanwhile, Goring organized a counterattack that broke through Lambert’s wavering troopers, most of whom fled in panic. The momentum of the royalist attack carried it headlong into the third line of Scots, who initially stood firm but ultimately failed to stem the fury of the charging horse. The momentum carried Goring’s troopers over Marston Hill and into the parliamentary baggage train where all order and discipline broke down. Unlike the Ironsides on the opposite wing, the royalist cavalry lost all effectiveness as men dismounted to plunder and pillage. A few royalist troopers chased Lambert’s terrified refugees. Many of Fairfax and Lambert’s troopers rode over their own reserve infantry. The panic spread to the unengaged reserve foot. The entire right wing of the allied army collapsed with the exception of a few Scottish units and Manchester’s foot. As the rear formations crumbled, Lord Fairfax’s foot, still engaged across the ditch before the enemy’s first line, suffered a devastating counterattack from Newcastle’s Whitecoats and a brigade of horse under Sir William Blakiston. Accompanied by only his brother, Sir Charles Cavendish, two other officers and a page, Newcastle rallied a group of Yorkshire ‘gentlemen volunteers’, who then rode to the centre of the royalist line and joined Blakiston’s counterattack. Losing his sword in the melee, the marquis borrowed his page’s ‘half leaden’ sword and struck down three enemy pikemen.20 The ferocity of the royalist assault broke the parliamentary line and sent it into a panicky retreat. With the disintegration of the allied infantry in the centre, both Leven and Lord Fairfax, believing the battle to be lost and unable to rally their men, fled the field, either leading the flight or having been simply caught up in the flow of panicked soldiers. But in warfare, great cataclysmic events often turn on a single episode of random chance. Despite the ferocity of the royalist charge, the Scots in the second line under Sir James Lumsden held their ground and then moved forward to fill the gap created by the rout of the first line, thus stabilizing the situation, but not before the two generals had departed. The stoutheartedness of Lumsden’s inexperienced, poorly equipped and under-trained but extraordinarily well-led Scottish levies stabilized the allied front and checked royalist momentum while others fled around them. Had the second line broken after the two commanders fled, the battle would have been lost and, with it, any chance for ultimate parliamentary victory. Thus a few Scots, exceedingly well-commanded by a minor gentry laird, may well have preserved the English Revolution. 21 A pair of Scottish foot regiments in the centre planted their pike butts in the rain-sodden soil and fought off two separate royalist charges. The Scottish officers commanding the far right section of the centre organized the men still holding their ground and advanced into the enemy foot, driving them backwards and stabilizing the allied centre and right. In the haze of dusk made more difficult by 97


the clouds of acrid powder smoke from the discharge of thousands of muskets and pistols, the battle devolved into two separate engagements. Unaware of the plight of the men on the right, the allied left pressed on against the enemy foot. Seeking to restore order to the chaos on the allied right, Sir Thomas Fairfax sought Lambert, but realized that his second-in-command could not be reached for the mass of intervening enemy soldiers. Fairfax later stated that Lambert, ‘who should have seconded me; but could not get up to me’, charged the enemy at another spot. Individually, both officers rounded up stragglers and made their way to the opposite side of the battlefield in search of Manchester’s horse. Fairfax removed the white handkerchief in his hatband identifying him as an allied field commander, which allowed him to pass through the royalist horse unrecognized. Sir Thomas and Lambert, once clear of the melee on the right, gathered disorganized groups of horse including five or six troops of Scottish horse under Lord Balgonies and made their way to the safety of the allied left by riding around the royalist rear. While en route the two officers led a charge through the royalist line, which dispersed a regiment of enemy foot. As the refugees made their way to the opposite wing, the Scottish horse under the earl of Eglinton held their ground, gradually restoring order to the shattered allied right wing. Joining Cromwell’s command, which had circled the rear of the enemy and now came up on the royalist left, Fairfax and Lambert continued the fight and took part in the subsequent destruction of Newcastle’s Whitecoats, the last royalist unit to stand its ground. Curiously, Fairfax, in commentary of the battle, failed to mention his or Lambert’s involvement in the final stages of the battle, although other commentators remark on their success in rallying stragglers and leading the final assault on the rear of the Whitecoats.22 While the action in the centre and on the allied right unfolded, Cromwell and Leslie led their troopers behind the enemy line and engaged Goring’s horse, an action that ultimately determined the outcome. The allied cavalry engaged most of the royalist troopers just returning to the field after plundering the baggage. Caught between the cavalry coming at them from the rear and Scottish pikemen pressing them from the front, the royalist horse, facing stouter, better trained and more disciplined men than the panicky raw levies of Sir Thomas Fairfax and Lambert, broke and fled. Leslie’s horse ‘charged the enemies horse, (with whom L. Generall Cromwell was engaged) upon the flanke, and in a very short space the enemies whole Cavalry was routed’. Rupert had rallied some troops and counterattacked after Cromwell’s initial charge had dissipated and enjoyed some success. But Leslie, commanding the reserve horse to the Ironsides’ rear, broke the counterattack’s momentum. In the ensuing melee, Rupert, cut off from his lifeguard and swept along with his panicked and fleeing troops, played no further part in the engagement.23 In the centre, the brigade of Northumberland Whitecoats under Colonel William Lambton stood their ground, leading to their eventual slaughter as the horse under Cromwell and Leslie, aided by the refugees from the allied right under Fairfax and Lambert, attacked them in the flank and rear. These 4,000 royalists, forced 98


into a ditch and trapped in an enclosure as the enemy cavalry swirled around them, refused to surrender. Lambert organized a charge that penned them to the rear of the initial royalist position where they closed ranks into a battalion square. Out of ammunition, the Whitecoats planted their pikes and resisted all efforts by Lambert’s men to break through the wall of spear points. Allied dragoons came up to make a gap in their square to allow the horse to charge through, a tactic that eventually succeeded. The Whitecoats fought on, jabbing their pikes and swords at the underbellies of horses, refusing to surrender. Within an hour, the slaughter ended; only thirty of the Northumbrians remained standing. Three regimental colonels including Lambton perished. The actions of Newcastle following the allied counterattack are not precisely established and Lady Newcastle does not chronicle the action except to suggest that he remained somewhere in the vicinity of his own regiment of Whitecoats. She does credit him as the last royalist general officer remaining on the field in the final moments of the slaughter. He managed to escape to York.24 The heroic sacrifice of the Whitecoats, few if any sharing the radical Protestant beliefs of many parliamentarians, again calls into question the contention that radical religious zeal explains the military outcome of the civil wars. When effectively led by officers from the overall commander down through the brigade and regimental commanders to individual tactical level officers and non-commissioned officers, these men, largely Catholics, fought with the same degree of duty, honour, courage, sacrifice, devotion and loyalty as did radical parliamentarians. The single most critical constant in determining victory on the battlefield remains, as it always has in human conflict, the behaviour of the leaders – men such as Leslie, Sir Thomas Fairfax, Cromwell, Lambert, Lambton, the earl of Eglinton and Lumsden. It is the quality of leadership that ultimately makes or breaks the military instrument. So ended the largest and deadliest battle ever fought in Britain. After stripping the dead, the burial parties counted 4,150 deceased royalists. Amazingly, the allied army reportedly suffered only 300 dead, but with a considerable number of wounded, many of whom shortly died. Rupert lost 6,000 arms, all of his powder, baggage, ordnance, 100 regimental and individual colours as well as eighteen cannon, five drakes and forty wagons. Of the major commanders, only Manchester remained on the field. He rode about, attempting to encourage his exhausted troops, many of whom huddled in small groups praying and hoarsely singing psalms through blackened, powder-caked lips. Chastened, Rupert returned to York where he rallied some 6,000 survivors and retreated over the Pennines through Lancashire to the safety of Chester. Most of the royalist wounded remained on the battlefield to be cared for by the victors; however, of those who accompanied Rupert’s retreating army, many ‘were like to perish for want of Chyrurgeons [surgeons] instruments [and] salves to dresse their wounds’. The allies gave no chase. 25 While the action at Marston Moor contributed to the growing reputations for military effectiveness and leadership of Cromwell, Leslie, Sir Thomas Fairfax and Lambert, it essentially ended the careers of Leven, Lord Fairfax and Newcastle. Though still acknowledged as the leading royalist field commander, Rupert never 99


again enjoyed the acclaim accorded him for his previous successes. A sympathetic account described Leven endeavouring to rally his panicked men, shouting, ‘Although you run from your Enemies, yet leave not your Generall, though you flie from them, yet forsake not mee’.26 According to Lieutenant-Colonel James Somerville accompanying Leven as a staff officer, the general ‘seeing that the greater part of the army quite broken where he had placed himself’, acknowledged inevitable defeat and departed. Officers attached to the allied commander urged him to depart and he ‘never drew bridle until he came the length of Leeds’.27 From a different Scottish perspective, Sir James Turner, who disliked the earl, saw the incident as an act of cowardice and loss of personal honour: ‘Generalls Leven, Manchester and old Fairfaxe … shamefully left the field and fled; but Leven fled furthest, for he did not draw bridle till he was at Wedderbie [Wetherby], four and twentie miles from the place of battell’.28 In light of the fundamental importance of a commander’s direct presence in the ‘heroic age’, which requires him to remain on the field in the sight of his men exemplifying personal courage and sharing the risk of death with the troops, the actions of Leven and Lord Fairfax cannot be justified regardless of what subordinate officers may have advised. On learning the results of the engagement at Leeds the following day, Leven lamented, ‘I would to God I had Dyed upon that place’.29 Their flight amounted to the most egregious example of a loss of personal honour in the entire Civil Wars; their reputations never recovered. Lord Fairfax, despite his admirable service in preventing royalist domination in the north, resigned the following April in accordance with the SelfDenying Ordinance. Leslie, the cavalry general, who earned great praise for his actions in the flanking attack on Rupert’s right, soon eclipsed Leven. Simeon Ash described Leslie’s action in leading the three Scottish regiments on the allied left as having done ‘singular good service’. Although Leven served as titular head of the Scottish army through the Third Civil War, he held no actual field command. After Marston Moor, David Leslie assumed the mantle of the leading Scottish commander.30 Newcastle’s reputation emerged from the Marston Moor debacle in good order despite the devastating loss. His inability to control the near-mutiny of his troops might be due to the fact that the day of the battle fell on a regular pay day. As the troops mustered at two in the morning, a rumour spread that the men would be paid before the march to the Moor. When this did not occur, the incidents of rebellion and desertion erupted. Newcastle received little blame for the destruction of the royalist army at Marston Moor. His personal honour and reputation remained intact. Nonetheless, he fled to Hamburg and eventually settled in Antwerp, living in exile until the Restoration. Charles II rewarded him with the title duke of Newcastle in March 1665 for his services in the First Civil War. When confronted at York the day following the disaster by Rupert, who pressed for renewed action against the equally exhausted and battle-weary allies, Newcastle justified his departure by stating that he would not endure the court’s laughter.31 The reputations of Sir Thomas and Lambert soared despite their troubles on the allied right wing. Clearly, Lambert benefited from the excellent reputation of 100


his senior officer. Simeon Ash remarked of the two men’s actions: ‘Sir Thomas Fairfax, that undaunted Commander, with Colonell Lambert, and some other of his Officers, went on daringly through very difficult and dangerous adventures, though much of their strength did unhappily shrink from them’. Sir Thomas and other commentators, including Ash and William Stewart, blamed Fairfax and Lambert’s failure to execute a successful charge against Goring on the topography that reduced their front to four horses abreast and the inexperience of their Lancashire and Yorkshire troopers. In light of the strenuous efforts of both officers to rally their men and re-engage the enemy, this assessment seems fair. Had the ground and calibre of men been the same on their wing as on the opposite, they might have carried the day without the near-disastrous collapse of the allied right.32 In effect, the war ended in the north. A few royalist strongholds, such as Pontefract and Scarborough Castles along with Newcastle and Carlisle, held out for some time, but the royalists never again mounted a major offensive or raised significant troops north of the River Trent. Fighting shifted to the Midlands where the defeat at Naseby the following year irrevocably damaged the royalist war effort. The efforts of many Yorkshire royalists to make peace with Parliament illustrated the sea change in the north. Marston Moor set in motion the eventual demise of royalist fortunes throughout the kingdom. In July 1644, ultimate parliamentary victory seemed assured; however, the failure of the allied forces to pursue the beaten royalist troops after the second battle of Edgehill and Essex’s blunders in the west that resulted in the surrender of his foot at Lostwithiel, momentarily squandered the advantage gained at Marston Moor and ensured that the war would drag on for almost two years. Reticent to commit his troops to a campaign in the south for fear of royalist activity in Scotland, Leven played no role in that region where the Covenanter Army might have been the decisive factor. For example, Montrose’s victory at Auldern, near Inverness, on 9 May 1645, caused Leven to pull his main force back into Westmorland and poised to march back into Scotland, thus making it a hollow asset to the allied cause.33 As a result of frustration with the war effort, the Independents, led by Cromwell and the ‘war party’ in Parliament, secured the passage of the SelfDenying Ordinance and the creation of the New Model Army, legislation that eventually revolutionized the parliamentary forces and led to victory by the spring of 1646 and in the two subsequent civil wars. With royal forces in the north shattered by Marston Moor, the siege of York resumed. The allied forces remained on the field at Marston Moor and quartered in the small surrounding villages until the 4th when they reoccupied the abandoned siege works. When the resolute Sir Thomas Glenham refused the proposed articles of surrender, preparations for a general assault commenced. The Sunday following Marston Moor, allied troops outside the city walls held a public thanksgiving. The victory celebrations combined with the daily preparations for the imminent destruction of York’s defenders disheartened the latter and undermined Glenham’s resolve. Allied soldiers could be seen preparing scaling ladders and other storming equipment. Glenham sent word that he would entertain a treaty, and on 9 July 101


Lambert and Sir William Constable entered the city to negotiate. They returned later in the day having agreed that treaty commissioners would be sent in to conclude the arrangements.34 Two days after the initial negotiations, the allies dispatched commissioners to conclude the articles of surrender. The provisions guaranteed the preservation of civilian property and lives, particularly church buildings, the protection and care of wounded and sick soldiers and passes for the royal troops to rejoin Rupert’s army or to proceed home. The remarkably magnanimous articles expressed respect for the defenders’ pride and sacrifice. The treaty granted them the ‘honours of war’, which allowed the vanquished royalists to march out of the city ‘with their Armes, flying Colours, Drummes beating, Matches lighted on both ends, Bullet[s] in their mouth[es], with all their Bagge and Baggage, and that every Souldier shall have Twelve charges of Powder’. In the York negotiations, Lambert assumed a new role as a parliamentary spokesman. He proved to be quite effective earning a reputation as an honest mediator. This respectability, a source of power and prestige, magnified his growing military and political reputation.35 With York in hand, the allied armies split to pursue different objectives. The Scots moved into quarters at Leeds and Wakefield; Manchester occupied Doncaster to prepare for a move against the royalist stronghold of Newark. The remaining parliamentary troops in Yorkshire under Lord Fairfax, newly appointed governor of York, quartered throughout the city. Under subordinate commanders such as Sir Thomas Fairfax, Sir William Brereton, Sir William Fairfax and Lambert, these troops acted as independent strike forces during the remaining months of 1644 to remove the last vestiges of royal strength in the north. In accordance with this plan, Sir Thomas departed York with a thousand horse to take Scarborough. Upon hearing that the royalist commander, Sir Hugh Cholmly, intended to surrender the town and castle, Fairfax turned towards Helmsley Castle. However, none of the garrisons laid down their arms and Fairfax initiated sieges. While repulsing a sortie by the Helmsley Castle defenders on 29 August, Fairfax suffered another wound in the shoulder. Although surgeons removed the bullet, the injury forced him to return to York. Lambert took charge of the sieges during Sir Thomas’s convalescence. It is not certain when Lambert departed from Scarborough; however, the siege continued until the city surrendered in late November.36 Throughout October, Lambert operated in the West Riding to intercept raiding and foraging parties from the remaining enemy garrisons. On 12 November, he participated with Sir Thomas in the storming of Knaresborough and, in late December, at the siege of Pontefract Castle. Once again, an enemy musketeer found Fairfax. The new wound, his fourth in eighteen months, though not as serious as that suffered at Helmsley Castle, again forced his return to York. He left Lambert in command of the siege with an appointment as commissary-general. The extraordinarily talented officer had attained general officer rank at the remarkably young age of 25.37 The end of the year marked a turning point in parliamentary fortunes as well as for Lambert and Fairfax. As commissary-general of the northern forces, Lambert 102


exercised significant responsibility. Before joining the New Model Army in the west in the autumn of 1645, the young general eliminated the last vestiges of royalist strength in the north and continued to enhance his reputation for moral authority, consistency and martial superiority. The New Model Army would become the vehicle for his increasing military and political power in the following years. His actions at Marston Moor and in the campaign of the autumn of 1644 against royalist strongholds demonstrated his capabilities to senior commanders, resulting in the assignment of independent forces coincident to his growing reputation for military effectiveness.38

The New Model Army The creation of the New Model Army in 1645 eventually provided the superior military instrument by which commanders of extraordinarily high martial synergy, including Sir Thomas Fairfax, Oliver Cromwell and John Lambert, crushed the royalists in 1646, 1648 and 1651. But the New Model alone, despite its growing professionalism, individual motivation, efficiency and discipline, could not achieve victory on the battlefield without effective leadership to guide and focus this weapon. Not only did the army benefit from superior leadership in the senior positions, but it generally enjoyed excellent leadership throughout the officer and non-commissioned officer ranks. The New Model benefited from the Self-Denying Ordinance and eventually embraced the concept of military meritocracy; the results validated that practice. As a fundamentally important aspect of the contextual and human dynamics environment within which the case study subjects operated, the New Model Army requires some examination and commentary as to its role in determining the outcome of the struggle. The dynamics of the parliamentary forces gradually evolved following the creation of the New Model Army. C. H. Firth’s ground-breaking study of the New Model first established that the soldiers exhibited few differences from those of the three preceding southern forces – the Eastern Association army under the earl of Manchester, Sir William Waller’s southern army and the main field force under Essex. In its early form, the New Model simply reflected the dynamics of the earlier stages of the war. Parliament never intended the New Model to be anything more than an amalgam of three decimated and weak existing forces and not a radically new creation.39 The broader question is thus: did the dynamics of the New Model Army (more regular pay, stricter discipline, religious motivation, etc.) exert the deciding factor in ultimate parliamentary victory by 1646? Clearly, possession of the superior military instrument is fundamentally important, but is it the ultimate reason for superior operational effectiveness? What about the intervening variables and ‘moral forces’ that must be managed as Clausewitz asserts? How does one overcome the ‘fog’ and ‘friction’ inherent in all warfare (a factor regardless of how motivated or competent the force)? The traditional historical view asserts that the character of the New Model determined the war’s military (and thus political) outcome. 103


However, the fundamental flaw in that historical interpretation is that no matter how keen the military instrument, it still requires effective leadership to wield the weapon. Otherwise, the qualitative or quantitative advantage is lost. Without effective leadership, the keenest military instrument is a wasted asset. In short, Parliament won the war because of highly effective military leadership that formed, nurtured, trained, inspired and commanded this marvellously motivated, innovative and disciplined force – The New Model Army. Therefore, the institutional dynamics of this force and its role in the events following Marston Moor are worthy of some discussion. The Commons approved legislation to create the New Model Army on 27 January 1645. The ordinance passed the House of Lords despite debate over the authority of the commander-in-chief to commission and promote officers up to the rank of colonel. Sir Thomas Fairfax seemed an acceptable compromise candidate for command despite his relative youth. He had suffered setbacks at Adwalton Moor and Marston Moor, yet his dash and aggressiveness starkly contrasted with the plodding and cautious Essex and Manchester. A mildly religious presbyterian, Fairfax never associated himself with either the political Presbyterians or Independents in Parliament and refused to engage in the rancorous political debates in the winter of 1644–5. Accordingly, by a vote of 101 to 69, the Commons elected Fairfax to command the New Model Army and on 1 February 1645 ordered him to report to Parliament to receive his commission. Lambert, acting as Fairfax’s observer in London, informed the general of his appointment. Not until the end of March did the Lords approve his commission and then only by the margin of a single vote. To command the foot, Parliament appointed Major-General Philip Skippon, a professional soldier of great talent and breadth of experience.40 The selection of regimental colonels proved to be thorny. Hoping to avert Independent control over the army, the political Presbyterians in the Lords insisted that all subordinate officers be chosen by both houses and that all should take the Covenant. On 7 February, the Commons granted Fairfax the authority to nominate his subordinate officers selected from any of the existing forces. As to the Covenant, the Independents yielded on the issue and on the 13th mandated taking the oath. With the objections of each side partially assuaged, the New Model Army’s form finally emerged on 15 February. It took Fairfax only a week to submit his list of officers drawn primarily from the southern forces with which he had never served, and with many officers from the north noticeably absent, including Lambert. Contemporaries understood that the New Model initially represented simply one of several parliamentary field armies created for operations in the south. It took the Lords until 18 March to approve the list of senior officers, with some alterations to exclude radicals or Independents and replace them with moderates, political Presbyterians and relatives or associates of Essex. Nonetheless, Sir Thomas’s choices remained largely intact. The process of officer appointment despite tampering by opponents, generally weeded out the less effective and proven undesirable officers; it ensured a far higher level of military talent at all officer ranks than had been previously enjoyed by any royal or parliamentary force. Thus, 104


the natural process of more effective officers rising to command positions finally occurred after three years of conflict.41 Although Lambert did not initially receive a regiment in the New Model, as Fairfax’s commissary-general, Parliament ordered him to assume command of the northern forces and to clear out the last pockets of royalist resistance in that region. On 21 January the Commons instructed Lambert to ‘speed downe into the North … to command the Forces there’.42 Blessed with a natural genius for war, John Lambert, at age 26, had demonstrated the essential characteristics of effective military commanders without having had either previous military training or extensive experience. Lambert epitomized that exceedingly rare master of war who appears periodically in human conflict – a blending of a genius for war blessed with the opportunity to express it. Rather than depend on local committees for food, equipment and billeting, the New Model relied on a monthly assessment of £53,436 imposed on those counties under firm parliamentary control as stipulated in the ordinance of 15 February 1645, essentially the same scheme as had existed for Essex’s force. Regular pay in the first few months of the army’s existence contributed to high morale, but ultimately the scheme broke down. Initially, the guarantee of pay attracted recruits from Massey’s western force as well as former royalists. By late 1646, the New Model suffered from the same financial limitations as its predecessors and opponents – the lack of immediate cash for the purchase of supplies and equipment exacerbated by chronic pay problems (at least £3 million in arrears by early 1647), which forced commanders to implement the unpopular expedient of free quarter. In practice, then, the system of assessment, supply and pay of the early war years remained essentially intact and subject to the same limitations with two notable exceptions. After May 1645, direct control over the logistics and financial system transferred to the high command under Fairfax at the field level, and the combined assessments from all sources supported a national army, thus diminishing the authority of local committees in controlling military affairs in their regions except for their responsibility for collection.43 The work of shaping the New Model Army into an effective fighting force from the remnants of the three previous armies relied on military leadership at all levels, especially the senior and general officer ranks. Many of the most successful senior officers in the New Model between 1645 and 1651 rose through the ranks based on talent notwithstanding their humble social origins. This perceived lack of gentlemanly pedigree among the original New Model officers caused Denzil Holles to comment that ‘most of the Colonels and Officers [are] mean Tradesmen, Brewers, Taylors, Goldsmiths, Shoemakers, and the like; a notable Dunghil, if one would rake into it, to find out their several Pedigrees’. While many did came from humble origins, the majority of the officers belonged to the gentry. Of the original thirty-seven colonels and general officers, twenty-one derived from the gentry while nine came from noble backgrounds.44 However, within several months, many of the more conservative and higher born officers had resigned or been purged. By late 1647, only 49 per cent of New Model officers derived from the 105


nobility or gentry. According to statistics calculated by Gentles, 17 per cent came from the ranks of professional, state servants, merchants and others of what would today be deemed middle to upper middle class, 18 per cent came from a yeoman or husbandman background, and 16 per cent from the trades, either as a craftsman or labourer. Additionally, 17 per cent of New Model officers rose from the private or non-commissioned ranks.45 It is not accurate to credit the entire promotion system to meritocracy. Typically, one advanced when a senior officer retired, transferred, died or resigned due to illness or wounds. Seniority as a basis of promotion is not necessarily detrimental to military efficiency in that training and experience at the company officer level often provides a stable foundation upon which to build an effective unit. Promotion by merit becomes more important in the initial selection of an officer, who then begins to build his seniority. At the senior and general officer level, promotion based on merit becomes far more critical to military effectiveness. The earlier parliamentary and royalist forces tended to reflect the patterns of officer commissions inherited from the late medieval period in that senior officers derived from the upper aristocracy while company and platoon level commanders came from the gentry. Many of the other ranks came from the tenantry or local townsmen associated with the officers. The break in the pattern occurred with the army of the Eastern Association. John Hewson, a shoemaker, rose to regimental command in Manchester’s army on merit alone. Several other colonels came from the lesser gentry, thus fostering a nascent meritocracy that continued in the New Model.46 Essex had the authority to appoint and promote all officers and typically relied on seniority to fill vacancies. After 1645, seniority remained the primary avenue for promotion at the lower officer ranks, but merit governed Fairfax’s and Cromwell’s appointments to the higher and field command positions. While the senior captain within a regiment had a strong claim to a vacancy as major, an officer from a different unit could be appointed based on proven performance. Vacancies at the senior level remained low during the final stages of the First Civil War. In the horse regiments, only a single major had to be replaced due to death in action and this by promotion of the regiments’ senior captain. A total of six captains of horse died between Naseby and the end of the war, all replaced by their senior lieutenants. Only three captains of horse resigned in the same period. In the infantry, Colonels John Pickering and Walter Lloyd died in action and two others, Edward Montague and Ralph Weldon, resigned. Lambert replaced Montague upon the latter’s election to Parliament in October 1645. Weldon departed to become governor of Plymouth in December and Robert Lilburne assumed command of his regiment. Five lieutenant-colonels and a major of foot died in action in the western campaign, all replaced by the next senior officer. Fairfax insisted on promotion by seniority or merit in filling vacancies and even abandoned the practice of filling positions with officers from the Lord general’s Lifeguard, traditionally a preserve of the socially elite.47 The fact that the New Model relied on experienced officers drawn from previous parliamentary forces comes from Sir Thomas’s 106


statement that he called it a new army ‘not because any new officers are to be chosen, for there are only such … who are already in the service’.48 Parliamentary forces enjoyed several fundamental advantages over the royalists after 1645: command appointment not based on social status, promotion resulting from merit and seniority and a growing military professionalism. By the end of the First Civil War and increasingly through the 1640s, the trend towards nonaristocratic officers continued. At the conclusion of the first war, many aristocratic officers resigned their commissions and returned to their estates while many of lesser social standing remained in service. Despite the loss of a large number of senior officers through resignation by the spring of 1647, the army retained a sizeable body of talented and experienced men. The examples of the rise to prominence based on merit of senior officers such as Robert Lilburne, John Okey, John Hewson, Robert Overton, Thomas Harrison and John Desborough illustrate the depth of leadership talent and experience enjoyed by the New Model as it matured into a professional force after 1646. In this regard, the pattern of appointment to such positions in the post-1645 parliamentarian forces provided Lambert and other regional commanders with a seasoned and accomplished cadre of subordinate officers capable of executing operational plans in a timely and efficient manner. Additionally, merit promotions provided a pathway to social advancement heretofore not seen in British society. The basis of many lesser-born senior officers’ social position lay in their military rank thus providing a significant inducement to remain on active duty in the professional standing force.49 The New Model Army establishment of 22,000 men organized into eleven regiments of horse, one of dragoons and twelve of foot, along with an artillery train, could not initially be filled. The three southern armies supplied only half of the mandated troop strength, which prompted Parliament to establish recruiting quotas by county. The requirement for men from the south-eastern counties and London amounted to 8,460 men aged 18 to 65, only half of whom had reported for service by the time the army initiated active operations in May 1645. Exemptions included any man or his sons possessing £5 in goods or £3 in land, clergymen, scholars, university and law students, sons of gentlemen, members of Parliament, peers, mariners, watermen, fishermen and tax officials. To fill out the ranks, Parliament impressed 8,460 men, including many royalist prisoners. Desertions among the infantry ran high in the initial months, particularly by impressed soldiers who took the enlistment bounty and promptly fled. Parliament passed an ordinance (15 January 1645) authorizing officials and county committees to arrest, try and punish deserters by death or corporal punishment. In the first months, however, conscripting infantry seemed ‘like ladling water into a leaky bucket’. Massive desertions plagued the army after both Naseby and the capture of Bristol, but the winter recruiting campaign of 1646 again filled the ranks.50 Several highly disciplined and reliable units such as the Lincolnshire men of Charles Fleetwood and the Ironsides of Oliver Cromwell provided leavening. In general, horsemen exhibited better discipline and reliability in combat than infantry. 107


Eastern Association troopers, many of them devout Puritans, proved to be especially dependable. Fairfax took the fourteen troops of Cromwell’s horse and distributed them throughout the cavalry, with six troops forming the Commander-in-Chief’s Regiment to balance the new recruits.51 Once army manpower stabilized by the summer of 1646, no further impressment occurred until 1651 when the Commons ordered the raising of 10,000 additional troops for Irish service. The strict prohibition of free quarter, an indicator of regular pay as a high priority of both Parliament and the senior leaders, combined with an additional two weeks’ pay at the end of April 1645 for all fully recruited regiments, prompted many reluctant volunteers to come forward. As the New Model defeated one royalist force after another, the recruitment of prisoners increased. Following Naseby, 102 royalist prisoners took the Covenant and joined the New Model and a further 200 enlisted after the victory at Torrington. Four hundred of Sir Ralph Hopton’s royalist army joined in February 1646.52 Strict discipline emerged as a central feature of the New Model Army. Faced with large numbers of impressed men, many without previous military experience, as well as former royalists, the commanders sought to maintain discipline rather than purge offenders. Beginning in April 1645, Fairfax took measures to enforce strict standards of discipline, which included the immediate execution of deserters, mutineers and plunderers and the assignment of discipline to the field commanders rather than the headquarters. Responsibility for enforcement fell to commissioners appointed for each regiment, who determined the nature of punishment except for offences that required the death penalty. These cases could only be tried at the army commander’s headquarters. Rampant desertion by new recruits, particularly after they had received their uniforms, other clothing, accoutrements and bounties, diminished military effectiveness. Fairfax, and later Cromwell, enforced regulations far more stringently than had Essex and other southern commanders. More regular pay in the New Model decreased incidents of plundering, a crime that Essex could not reasonably control given the problem of constant arrears and the need for free quarter. Despite initial problems, the New Model Army gradually instilled strict adherence to the regulations. The good conduct of parliamentary forces exhibited in the Second and Third Civil Wars in marked contrast to that of royalist or Scottish forces, resulted more from a long cultivation by the senior leaders, the experience of warfare and the growing professionalism within the ranks than the ‘product of the character of those who composed the Army’.53 Although soldiers occasionally committed murder, rape and plunder, such incidents in the New Model occurred rarely enough to warrant mention in the national press. After desertion, blasphemy incurred the highest rate of punishment, an unusual statistic given the normally rapacious nature of pre-modern armies. The enforcement of strict discipline had an additional practical military effect. The human dynamics of war or ‘moral forces’ such as fear, panic, irrationality, disillusionment, mental disorders or the loss of hope and the subsequent will to fight, played less of a role in the New Model than in the earlier parliamentary or royalist forces. As Frank M. Richardson, the military psychologist observed, 108


military history has shown that ‘units with high standards of discipline and general efficiency were less liable to suffer psychiatric casualties’.54 Much traditional historiography credits the inexorable connection between radical religion and the military success of the New Model. This interpretation credits the emerging radical religious element with driving the army to victory. Religion certainly played a central unifying role in motivating religious minorities to take up arms and in forcing the provincial aristocratic leadership to choose sides as the controversies of the summer of 1642 evolved into open war. In the first two years of the conflict, Parliament made strenuous efforts to promote religious accommodation within the army as exemplified by the role of the Essex minister Stephen Marshall charged with maintaining spiritual unity. In a military sense, religious idealism produced high morale even in defeat or horrible physical conditions and led to a sense of self-discipline rarely seen in pre-modern forces. On the other hand, anti-Catholicism supplied a critical motive force behind religious unity. Religious zeal created a ruthlessness in prosecuting the war against royalists and Catholics characterized as tools of the Antichrist. Finally, sharing the risks of battle between officers and other ranks promoted religiously inspired egalitarianism and enthusiasm. The success of Cromwell’s Ironsides regiment raised in the heavily Puritan eastern counties does add credence to his assertion that a religious man makes a better soldier and will fight best. The practice of forming regiments into gathered churches composed of both officers and other ranks while in garrisons created a religious bond, which had a practical military purpose of encouraging a feeling of shared purpose and sense of sacrifice for the cause.55 But high morale driven by religious zeal alone will not result in military success. There must be effective leaders who shape, direct and manipulate the spiritual energy into military effectiveness, high morale, a will to fight and discipline. In the parliamentary and Covenanter forces, three types of leaders filled that role: official chaplains, officers and lay leaders. Officers often provided religious and inspirational leadership. At Turnham Green in 1642, Major-General Philip Skippon exhorted his men to ‘Come, my boys, my brave boys, let us pray heartily and fight heartily … and God will bless us’.56 Known for his Protestant religious zeal, Oliver Cromwell apparently carried on during the battle of Dunbar with sparkling eyes in a state of religious euphoria over God’s victory. He maintained the primacy of spirituality over military ability in determining the outcome of an engagement and believed that ‘he that prays and preaches best will fight best’.57 The activities of Colonel John Pickering, who openly evangelized before his entire regiment, antagonized the Presbyterian majority in the Commons, which led to the prohibition against preaching by non-ordained soldiers, an order routinely ignored. Senior officers periodically defied Parliament’s restrictions on lay preaching. When Captains Paul Hobson and Richard Beaumont received rough treatment for lay preaching at Newport Pagnell, Charles Fleetwood admonished the garrison commander, Sir Samuel Luke, for the mistreatment and warned him that ‘to disturb a saint Christ takes it as done to himself’. Lieutenant Edmund Chillenden of Whalley’s regiment justified the practice of lay preaching in a tract entitled 109


Preaching without Ordination, illustrating the open defiance of Parliament’s declaration.58 Contemporaries observed a clear relationship between a ‘godly army’, high morale and discipline. The Moderate Intelligencer commented that, unlike most soldiers who in their spare time gamble and drink, the soldiers of the New Model ‘pray, and discourse’.59 The exceptionally high morale exhibited by the New Model Army brought several distinguishable advantages, especially the ability to endure the physical discomforts of campaigning with a minimum of desertion and depredations on the civilian population, which coincided with an unusually high state of discipline. Religious zeal fostered an attitude of victory and feelings of invincibility backed by the surety of God’s blessing. But, as with any human organization, motivation requires effective leadership to inspire, direct and focus people towards accomplishment of a common goal. A military leader must be able to employ his moral authority to inculcate a sense of unity or common purpose and direct it to his advantage. All aspects of moral authority – personal honour, courage, stoic sacrifice, willingness to share risks and personal example – when effectively employed, are the tools with which he shapes the outcome. The fundamental goal of leadership is to cause followers to accomplish the objectives or support the agenda of the leader. Any analysis of the role of religion in the Civil Wars is incomplete if it does not incorporate the leadership aspect. Nor have those involved in the debate over the role of religion adequately addressed the spiritual motivations of royalist soldiers, with the exception of P. R. Newman’s various studies. While the royalist side did draw significant Catholic support, particularly Newcastle’s northern army, accusations by parliamentary propagandists that papists dominated the king’s forces are discredited by contemporary accounts and by modern studies of Catholic support at the local level.60 Additionally, thousands of conforming members of the Church of England served in the royalist armies. Without further scholarly analysis of the role of religion in motivating royalist soldiers to fight and sacrifice for their cause, the contention that spirituality and religious zeal drove the New Model to victory and provided the parliamentarians the decisive military advantage cannot be validated.

Lambert’s independent command in the north and the end of the First Civil War While Fairfax moulded the New Model Army, Lambert reduced the remaining royal garrisons in the north. By early February 1645, he assumed his new independent command and turned his attention to Skipton Castle. From that stronghold, royalist parties had pillaged for supplies. On 7 February, 150 horse of the Skipton garrison attacked the parliamentary quarters at Heightley, capturing a hundred prisoners and sixty horses. Lambert’s men ambushed the raiders on their return to the castle, freed the prisoners, killed a royalist officer and fifteen troopers and chased the enemy back to Skipton.61 110


In early March, Sir Marmaduke Langdale relieved Pontefract Castle with the remnants of Newcastle’s northern horse. The siege, begun the previous autumn by Sir Thomas Fairfax and carried on by Lambert until being struck by a debilitating illness, had languished throughout the winter.62 The action took a new direction in early February when the parliamentary besiegers placed gunpowder charges under the wall foundations and threatened to explode them if the garrison refused to submit. Langdale joined the royalist garrison at Newark on 3 March for a dash to relieve Pontefract. Despite standing orders to refrain from engaging Langdale without a significant numerical superiority, Lambert thrust aside prudence and attacked the superior enemy force, one of the few instances in his career where he failed to moderate his natural aggressiveness. His forces paid the price, losing 600 men captured (including fifty-seven officers), forty-seven barrels of powder and 1,600 muskets and pikes.63 The initial assault pushed back Langdale’s horse, but the parliamentary foot failed to exploit the advantage. Faced with the threat of an imminent and overwhelming counterattack, Lambert retreated. Although wounded, he rallied his dispirited force and led it out of harm’s way. Despite Lambert’s defeat, Langdale marched into Doncaster rather than chase the beaten parliamentarians. Once assured of a clear line of march, he proceeded to Pontefract where the defection of a regiment of horse allowed the royalists to slip through the siege lines and reinforce the garrison. His mission accomplished, Langdale rejoined Rupert in Cheshire much to the chagrin of the embarrassed, but no doubt wiser Lambert.64 In Langdale, Lambert faced a potent foe. Certainly one of the most talented of the royalist cavalry commanders (and worthy of a future biographical analysis), Sir Marmaduke led his forces by personal example and enforced a keen discipline on his men. So dangerous did the parliamentarians consider Langdale that upon his escape from Nottingham Castle in 1648, Sir Thomas Fairfax placed a £1,000 bounty on the Yorkshireman.65 Fearing the prospect of more active and energetic royalist forces operating out of Cheshire and Wales, on 20 June 1645 the Association of the Northern Counties established five new regiments of horse and seven of foot composed of 10,000 men (20 June 1645). Lambert received the colonelcy of a horse regiment, which remained in service throughout the Civil Wars and Interregnum (incorporated into the New Model Army early in 1646).66 With the creation of the new northern force intended strictly for regional defence, the older parliamentary military pattern repeated itself. The New Model Army took on the task of engaging the royalist main forces in the south as had Essex’s in the previous era. A truly national military strategy with command consolidated under and coordinated by a single lord general did not emerge until over a year after the royalist defeat in 1646. Under these conditions, Lambert, as commander in the north, exercised substantial operational independence. As the focus of the war shifted southward in the autumn of 1645, Lambert remained in the north to conclude his ongoing sieges. Pontefract Castle held out until 21 July. Scarborough surrendered four days later to Sir John Meldrum, but Skipton held out until 21 December. By the end of the year, Lambert’s forces had irrevocably shattered royalist strength and hopes in the north. 111


The events of the final campaign of the First Civil War, from the siege of Exeter to the capture and occupation of Oxford, provided Lambert with additional opportunities to demonstrate his mediation skills. In November 1645 he joined the New Model at the siege of Exeter where his newly raised regiment of horse took up quarters at Autre. The siege of Exeter dragged on into the cold, rainy winter. Disease, compounded by the lack of provisions and proper accommodations, killed more men than did the enemy. Rushworth described the conditions around Exeter thus: ‘The army is sickly; many die daily; the disease is infectious; the quarters bare; and truly, I fear, a great mortality will ensue for want of accommodation, to the foot especially’.67 The siege dragged on through the winter as Fairfax shifted the focus of his operations to other royalist strongholds with the intention of starving out the garrisons. He launched a combined land and sea attack on Dartmouth where a parliamentary naval squadron provided support for the storming in January 1646. With the city secured, Fairfax departed to visit his wife at Tiverton and left command of the Dartmouth area to Lambert ‘untill the Government and Governour be setled’.68 Fairfax left Sir Hardress Waller in command of a force covering Exeter in early February and turned his attention to Hopton and the remnants of the royalist army at Torrington. Fairfax initiated a dragoon assault at midnight on the 18th and despite stout resistance, his men quickly captured the town. Fairfax pressed into Cornwall on 21 February in pursuit of Hopton. To maintain friendly civilian relations, Fairfax ordered his field officers to ensure that the troops ‘do in no kinde offer any violence to the Cornish, nor do any prejudice unto them in their persons or goods’.69 On reaching Bodmin in early March, the campaign ground to a close. In response to an offer of an honourable surrender from Fairfax, Hopton, realizing the inevitability of his defeat, agreed to negotiations. Once again, Fairfax called on Lambert to treat with the enemy as he and Commissary-General Henry Ireton headed the team of parliamentary negotiators at Tresilian Bridge. In accordance with the treaty’s generous terms, Hopton’s force, the last royalist field army of any consequence, disbanded. Over 500 royalist soldiers, including a large number of officers, joined the New Model Army. The terms allowed officers to depart with their horses and side arms while private soldiers turned in their mounts and weapons and received 20s. each in recompense.70 Fairfax then turned his attention to the continuing siege of Exeter and demanded the city’s capitulation on 31 March. Faced with starvation and disease, Sir John Berkeley agreed to negotiate the following day. Lambert again served on the treaty commission. Negotiations continued day and night for five days, resulting in signed articles on 9 April. Berkeley received similar terms to those of Hopton. The last enemy citadel in the south-west had fallen.71 Only Oxford under the command of Sir Thomas Glenham remained as a bastion of royal power. Fairfax constructed siege works prior to the arrival of Lambert with reinforcements, and on 23 April the defenders ‘stood out [and] shott furiously att the Leaguer butt did little hurt to them’. Fairfax declined to return fire for fear of destroying the university, but he resolved to conduct a siege if the garrison refused to surrender.72 The arrival of 112


additional entrenching tools in early May allowed the completion of the siege works. Accordingly, on 11 May Fairfax offered honourable terms and assured Glenham that he ‘desired the preservation of that place (so famous for learning) from ruine’.73 A large delegation of parliamentary commissioners including Ireton and Lambert commenced negotiations on the 17th. The talks stalemated due to demands by the garrison, despite the king’s order of 15 June for all royalist garrisons to surrender. A further delay in the negotiations occurred when the defenders fired cannon into the parliamentary siege works for several hours, causing considerable damage and some casualties. Fairfax sent Lambert on the 26th to negotiate privately with Glenham. It is not known how much latitude Fairfax granted Lambert or whether he simply presented the lord general’s terms; however, his effort broke the log jam and Oxford surrendered on 20 June.74 Fairfax appointed Lambert governor of Oxford on 2 July. Adamant about preserving the university and its library, Fairfax immediately established a guard at the Bodleian to prevent looting and fire. As governor, Lambert took great care to preserve the town and university, particularly churches, the defacing of which had become commonplace. Lambert afforded protection to Catholics and their businesses, whose security the treaty guaranteed. When the commissioners of Goldsmith Hall challenged the treaty provisions regarding the safety of Catholics, he resolutely prohibited any acts of overt discrimination.75 Throughout the western campaign leading to the end of the First Civil War, parliamentary commanders increasingly called on Lambert to conduct surrender negotiations. He had garnered a reputation for fairness, honesty, consistency and mediation skills that resulted in moderate and dignified surrender terms. Royalist commanders such as Glenham, Berkeley and Hopton relied on the personal honour of Lambert for the safety of themselves and their soldiers. Supported by Fairfax, who believed in reasonable treatment of prisoners, Lambert enjoyed an increasing reputation and the attendant rise in the perception of his moral authority. As the military governor of captured cities, including Oxford and Dartmouth, he maintained order, protected property and prevented depredations against civilians as illustrated by his actions at Oxford. Often following a successful war termination, major military commanders are required to serve as the civil authority to administer occupied territory or during the transition to a reconstituted and stable government. Those characteristics, along with the ability to manage human dynamics and the contextual environment (notably consistency and moral authority), are fundamentally important to a military commander placed in such a role. While many highly successful military commanders fail miserably off the battlefield (George Patton’s problems with the press come to mind), certain traits and behaviours applicable to the battlefield bode well for the commander tasked to act as the civil authority. Such is the case of John Lambert in the immediate post-war period. Beginning in November 1646, events in the north demonstrated several aspects 113


of Lambert’s consistency: discipline, trustworthiness and mediation. In July 1647, Lambert relieved Sydenham Poyntz, the parliamentary commander in the north since the resignation of Lord Fairfax in the spring of 1645, whose autocratic and arbitrary manner resulted in mutiny. Charged with restoring order among the restive troops and re-establishing good relations with civilians, he arrived at Pontefract Castle on 3 August and began a series of speeches expressing his determination to resolve the grievances that had driven the soldiers to mutiny. At a rendezvous of over 5,000 troops at Peckham Moor the following day, he informed the soldiers that Fairfax had arranged for their pay and promised to rectify their material grievances, chiefly arrears and free quarter. He asked the troops to show some ‘token of their acceptance of him … [and] willingness to obey his commands’.76 Through tact, a conciliatory approach, a strict application of justice and attention to the complaints of both the soldiery and civilians, Lambert garnered a reputation for ‘Fairness, Civility and Moderation’ that not only restored discipline within the ranks but also eased bitter feelings between the troops and civilians.77 From his headquarters at Ripon, Lambert wrote on 1 October 1647 that the settlement of quarters, hearing and redressing complaints and grievances and suppression of the Scottish border bandits (mostly demobilized Covenanter Army cavalry known as ‘moss troopers’) constituted his greatest concerns. He addressed the problem of free quarter by regularizing the billeting system and by dispersing the troops over a wider area. The root of the free quarter problem lay in unreliable pay. Accordingly, Fairfax recommended to the Committee of the Army that one month’s pay for the northern troops be sent to Lambert out of the first money raised for army expenses. In a letter from his headquarters on 23 October, Lambert concluded that the ‘greatest Business is to study equality in quartering the Forces, that we may prevent Oppression as much as may be, and of a heavy Burthen make it as light as we can’.78 In December, he issued comprehensive orders for the regulation of billeting that decentralized and streamlined the hearing process and punished officers negligent in responding to just complaints. To ensure adequate food, he issued an order in early January 1648 that all soldiers be provided with ‘such dyet as those whom they quarter usually afford themselves and their families’.79 Always sensitive to the complaints of the citizenry regarding unruly or disorderly soldiers, Lambert established a process to deal with civilian charges, particularly assault, riot and physical threats. Punishment for infractions included confinement on bread and water, standing in the pillory, public whipping through the streets and execution. The articles of war had always called for such penalties for crimes against civilians; Lambert’s firm but just application of the laws won back local support that had badly eroded in the two years of the autocratic Poyntz regime. Lambert regularly proved more than willing to exercise the near-dictatorial power to discipline and punish malefactors, both military and civilian, inherent in his position. In defence of the troops’ actions, however, Lambert observed that their growing impoverishment brought on by months of little or no pay led to a rise in 114


the number and severity of incidents. As a solution to the problems of criminal behaviour, he ordered that those soldiers of ‘deboyst or dishonest conversation’ be disbanded as soon as possible.80 Despite the efforts to regularize quartering of troops and ease the burden on civilians, animosity towards the army flared up in the Swaledale region of Richmondshire in the North Riding in December 1647. When a large group of estate owners refused to quarter troops, Lambert dispatched a regiment of foot and another of horse to the Dales to intimidate the protesters, and, if necessary, resolve the problem by force. Armed protesters challenged the troops, who fled to a parish church from where they appealed to Lambert for assistance. The general marched into Richmondshire with a rescue party and arrested the ringleaders. After a warning from Lambert, he freed the protesters. To ease the tension, Lambert and several local gentry agreed to quarter 600 foot in the area. The generosity displayed towards the resisters prevented the spread of discontent outside Richmondshire. The diplomatic skills of Lambert prompted one commentator to remark that the free quarter protesters ‘have been so won by the Sweetness of the Major [general], that they are content not only to give Quarter, but to deliver up their arms unto him’.81 In the early winter of 1647, the thorny issue of disbandment of supernumerary troops emerged. Parliament and the army command deemed such a reduction in forces prudent and fiscally necessary. Fairfax ordered a general disbandment of excess troops in early January 1648. All soldiers enlisted since 6 August 1646 had to disband with the payment of two months’ arrears. Led by Denzil Holles in the Commons, Parliament sought the disbandment to reduce a force no longer needed (and, frankly, a potential threat), but ordered the disestablishment of units before settling pay arrears. The action led to an avalanche of soldiers’ petitions demanding payment of arrears, the end of conscription by impressments and a parliamentary act of indemnity for soldiers covering any actions carried out as a result of lawful orders. A firestorm ensued when Parliament essentially ignored the petitions, but the army command took notice as various regiments selected ‘agitators’ to represent their interests before the senior leaders. That the ‘agitator’ movement remained under control with little mutinous behaviour or violence in the northern forces is a testament to Lambert’s moral authority and ability to maintain order and discipline. In early February, Lambert disbanded three regiments of horse in accordance with a parliamentary ordinance requiring the demobilization of the Yorkshire militia, but prudently retained several companies and troops at Pontefract and a further six troops of horse on Fairfax’s recommendation. A letter from York dated 29 January 1648 illustrates the high hopes of the residents that disbandment would remove a troublesome burden: The soldiery here are now for the present in a very ill Condition, the Country complaining of them for lying on them still, and they on the Country for resisting to give them Quarters: but ’tis hoped, a sudden Disbanding and Payment will prevent both.82 115


Lambert ensured that soldiers paid the debts owed to local residents for past free quarter prior to discharge. But any military draw-down incurs risk to local residents despite the best efforts of the leadership to ease the transition. Reports from York indicated a rise in ‘desperate Robberies and Murthers in these Northern Countries’, coupled with fear of leaving one’s home.83 Despite such problems, Lambert’s command in the north restored discipline to the fractious army, produced more reliable pay, eliminated the troublesome burden of free quarter, restored the army to the good graces of the citizenry and successfully demobilized most of the excess troops with relatively little disturbance. The end of the First Civil War brought to a close the military careers of the two primary antagonists in the north. Lord Fairfax died the following year. Newcastle, in exile in Antwerp, did not return to England until the Restoration. In light of the strategic goals of each, Lord Fairfax must be judged the more effective commander. Though hampered by an initial numerical inferiority, he aggressively attacked Newcastle’s detached field and garrison forces and enjoyed a modicum of success through periodic incremental victories, a fundamental element of a successful ‘Fabian’ strategy of attrition by strategic defensive leading to a final culminating offensive victory. Despite some setbacks such as Adwalton Moor, he maintained a parliamentary military presence in the north that precluded total royalist domination and prevented the use of Newcastle’s veteran troops in the southern region where their presence might have proven decisive against a struggling Essex. Using talented subordinate commanders such as Sir Thomas Fairfax and Lambert, Lord Fairfax struck swiftly and aggressively. Despite his loss of personal honour at Marston Moor, Lord Fairfax must be judged an extremely effective military commander. Conversely, Newcastle must be judged less than effective. In spite of an often overwhelming numerical majority, he failed to accomplish his two strategic imperatives: the elimination of parliamentary forces in the north and juncture with the king’s forces for concerted efforts in the south against Essex and London. In particular battles such as Adwalton Moor, he competently commanded at the tactical level; however, it is wise to remember Clarendon’s description of the marquis as a man of refinement, intellect and grace, but not a warrior.84 His personal honour as a function of courage cannot be questioned. One need only look to his actions at Marston Moor. Additionally, his physical presence and willingness to share risk with his troops can be seen frequently, as at Adwalton Moor where he charged the enemy on foot carrying a pike. But personal honour without some degree of martial synergy is not enough. His lack of strategic vision is nowhere better illustrated than in his reluctance to commit his forces beyond the confines of the north and the wasteful siege of Hull. Ultimately, the intrinsic value of Newcastle to the royal cause lay in his prestige, reputation as an honourable man and extent of his landholdings, factors that aided in initial recruitment and enthusiasm. Unfortunately for Charles I, the initial advantages proved to be an empty vessel in the absence of the calibre of commander needed to employ those assets and resources to achieve battlefield victory through effective leadership. 116


Leven presents an analytical problem. Judged against his past record on the continent and in the Bishops’ Wars, he performed less than might have been expected. With fresh troops charged with religious zeal for the Covenant and Reformation, Leven could have overwhelmed the northern royalists following Marston Moor and subsequently exerted an impact in the south. He did neither. However, in fairness, concern over Montrose and the Scottish royalists limited his options and caused him to stay close to the Scottish border. In a tactical sense, at Marston Moor, he appeared overly cautious and reluctant to confront Rupert, who completely flummoxed both Leven and Lord Fairfax by his bold marches and growing aura of invincibility. While aggression must always be tempered by prudence, Leven’s caution might have cost the allies the resounding victory on the Moor. In his defence, Leven’s singular astuteness in discerning the absolutely correct moment to launch the allied army into action against the royalists settling in for the night illustrates the qualities of tactical acumen and boldness Leven had demonstrated in previous conflicts. Unfortunately for his reputation, the flight from the battlefield destroyed his mantle of moral authority. From the strategic perspective, he allowed himself to become bogged down in a drawn-out siege of Newcastle. However, given the limited goals Leven established for his army, he must be judged less harshly. The Scottish presence reversed the parliamentary numerical disadvantage in the north. Despite Leven’s flight, the actions of subordinate Scottish commanders, notably Leslie, Eglinton and Lumsden, saved the victory at Marston Moor by their stalwart stands when other allied units crumbled. In 1645–6, despite playing no role in the south and west, Leven did prevent any royalist resurgence in the north by the presence of the Covenanter Army as Fairfax and the New Model Army destroyed the remaining southern royalist forces. For Leven, then, the judgement is in relation to his limited strategic goals. In that regard, he must be judged as exhibiting a fair amount of military effectiveness. Lambert earned a justified reputation for effectiveness and considerable martial synergy as reflected in his activities after 1643, including his independent commands in Yorkshire in 1644 and 1645, assignment as commissary-general of Sir Thomas’s army in 1645 and his posting as parliamentary commander in the north in 1647–8. Under Fairfax’s tutelage, Lambert learned the art of command and at the end of the First Civil War stood poised to dominate the newly created professional army. As the First Civil War concluded, a new cadre of senior commanders emerged based on proven talent, effectiveness and martial synergy. Cromwell, Sir Thomas Fairfax, Lambert and Leslie clearly led among a group blessed also by a host of talented subordinate commanders such as Thomas Harrison, Charles Fleetwood, John Desborough, Robert Lilburne and Thomas Rainsborough. With the exception of Leslie, those northern commanders, who had initially received their commissions as regional or major subordinate commanders based on either substantial continental experience (Leven) or aristocratic position (Newcastle), had proven disappointing. Lord Fairfax, not a major aristocrat, though of a substantial West Riding family, had no consequential prior military experience; he owed his 117


appointment more to his parliamentary political connections. In essence, the talented amateurs emerged as the most successful, notably Lord Fairfax, Oliver Cromwell and Lambert. In that regard, their characteristics and behaviour, in combination with the successful manipulation of both human dynamics and the societal context propelled them to success. Conversely, Newcastle failed owing to his lack of key elements of martial synergy. Leslie displayed a high degree of potential coupled with previous experience; however, he did not serve as a regional commander with the exception of the brief campaign against Montrose in late 1645 and a final judgement of his performance must await the events of the Third Civil War of 1650–1. Based on the model proposed in Chapter 1, it can be concluded that Lambert, Lord Fairfax and Leslie rated highly in military effectiveness. Leven falls somewhat below, while Newcastle demonstrated a relatively low degree.

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‘I N E X O R A B L E T H I N G S ’

5 ‘INEXORABLE THINGS’ Civil War in the north, 1648

The royalist forces that precipitated the Second Civil War of 1648 comprised a loose coalition with similar interests. Disgruntled former parliamentarians such as Major-General Rowland Powell and Colonels John Poyer and Rice Powell in Wales came to view their interests as best satisfied by the royalists. In Kent and Essex, the scene of anti-Parliament disturbances, political Presbyterians, who despised the committees and the seemingly arbitrary drift of the Independentdominated Parliament, viewed the best hope for peace and a settlement as the constitutionally restrained monarchy of 1641. Former royalist commanders, such as Langdale, Goring, Byron, Lucas and Glenham, looked for an opportunity to overturn the military defeat of 1646. In Scotland, aristocrats known as the Engagers concluded a treaty with Charles for his restoration that drew upon Scottish anger and disillusionment with English failure to honour the terms of the 1643 Covenant treaty. In separate regions, each of these parties raised the royal standard and attempted to rally conservatives and moderates who opposed the Independents and the New Model Army. Cromwell called the Second Civil War, and the further blood-letting caused by the king’s plotting and the subsequent Scottish invasion, ‘a more prodigious Treason than any that had been perpetrated before’.1 The dynamics of the opposing forces in 1648 differed dramatically from those of 1642. The New Model Army exhibited a high state of expertise, combat effectiveness and competence in 1648, particularly in the senior officer ranks. Fairfax, Cromwell and Lambert emerged from the First Civil War as leaders of an increasingly professional force. Aided by not only their extraordinary martial talent but also the soldiers’ confidence, they benefited from a moral authority unmatched by any other senior officers in any of the forces during the Civil Wars. While Fairfax, Cromwell and Lambert entered the war with proven ability, supported by an experienced, well-trained and highly motivated force, the same cannot be said for their opponents. In 1648, the duke of Hamilton, led an ill-fated and poorly executed Scottish invasion of England. Handicapped by a badly prepared, poorly trained and underequipped force of levies and continually hampered by a lack of Scottish national unity as well as squabbling senior commanders, the duke proved unable to match the strategic, operational and tactical brilliance of his opponents. Had he enjoyed 119


the same degree of martial synergy as his enemies, the duke might well have overcome the disadvantages, beaten Cromwell and Lambert, taken London and restored the king. Charles could then have dictated a settlement to Parliament. Even though the terms of the Engagement of December 1647 between Charles and the Scots would have imposed the stringent Scottish conditions for religious reformation in England, the king agreed to the conditions in the hope that the Scots would alter the strategic balance in his favour. This gamble ultimately resulted in his execution. That the king’s hoped-for scenario did not occur owes much to a profound lack of any martial synergy on the part of Hamilton and his major subordinate commanders. Conversely, Lambert, acting as the parliamentary bulwark against royalist military activity in the north, overcame his deficiencies in men and materiel and prevented royalist resurgence. This chapter deals in depth with two of the case study subjects, Lambert and Hamilton, as well as presenting the story of the northern campaign and Scottish Engager invasion of 1648 that ended in royalist disaster at Preston. As parliamentary commander in the north, Lambert faced the Scottish invasion with limited resources. His subsequent actions provide a marvellous canvas upon which to paint a portrait of an officer blessed with an extraordinarily high degree of martial synergy. Conversely, Hamilton demonstrates how badly wrong a campaign can go when commanded by a leader of clearly limited martial synergy. The contrast is stark and provides the best illustration of the impact of effective military leadership on the outcome of events of the Civil War period. What follows is a substantial narrative of the Second Civil War in the north coupled with an analysis of the deteriorating political cohesion of Scotland, a contextual phenomenon that severely hampered Hamilton. Unable to overcome Scottish political disunity and handicapped by his leadership deficiencies, Hamilton led the Scottish Engager army to abject defeat at the hands of Lambert and Cromwell at Preston. With that disaster, the royalist cause in 1648 collapsed.

‘Prodigious treason’: the outbreak of the Second Civil War In the spring of 1648, several events in England, Wales and Scotland indicated growing public disenchantment with Parliament and the New Model Army as well as the lack of a political settlement with the king. In April, a mob of over 3,000 apprentices overran the trained band sentries guarding Whitehall. Cromwell broke up the demonstration with several troops of horse, but the rioters stormed Ludgate and Newgate and captured an artillery piece. Colonel John Barkstead’s foot finally dispersed the rioters. On 11 April, the Scots abruptly disavowed the treaty with England and demanded the disbandment of the New Model, the first step in implementing the Engagement treaty concluded with Charles the previous December. Throughout the spring, numerous petitions from counties near London called for the disbandment of the army and a personal treaty with the king. In February and March, Colonel John Poyer, a former parliamentarian, and his 120


mutinous troops occupied Pembroke and Tenby Castles in south Wales where they declared for the king and the Book of Common Prayer. Within weeks, the whole of south Wales openly revolted against Parliament.2 The emerging royalist strategy centred around simultaneous risings in divergent parts of the kingdom to disperse parliamentary forces and prevent a concentration of troops against a Scottish invasion led by Hamilton. With the support of the fleet, the prince of Wales could conduct an amphibious landing at any point from the Downs to Berwick. The plan exhibited far more strategic coherence and insight than any attempted by the king’s adherents in the previous struggle. It might have worked had all the components succeeded. The weakness lay in its fragility and lack of effective coordination. The actual execution appeared to be a series of ‘isolated and un-coordinated risings rather than … any unified strategic plan’.3 The operations relied heavily on a large outpouring of support from former royalists or neutrals disenchanted with the machinations of parliamentary Independents and the army. But, plagued by generally incompetent leadership and the failure of potential adherents to rise particularly in London, defeat inexorably followed. On 1 May, Fairfax detached Cromwell with a strong force to counter the Welsh risings. A council of war, which advocated the immediate suppression of all royalist activity, resolved to ‘call Charles Stuart, that man of bloud, to an account, for that bloud he had shed’.4 With Cromwell advancing westward to suppress the Welsh rebellion, Kentish royalists rose against Parliament on the 21st and mustered a force of 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Fairfax assembled all available troops on Hounslow Heath. The need to defend London from southern and eastern insurgents negated his original plan to march north to reinforce Lambert. Only Colonel Thomas Harrison’s regiment, detached on the 18th to oppose any royalist movement from Lancashire, stood ready for action in the north.5 In the Downs, the crews of seven warships mutinied, forcing the new admiral, Thomas Rainsborough, to flee by cockboat. In late June, a further dozen warships defected to the king, negating the parliamentary naval advantage enjoyed in the previous civil war. Controlling the Thames estuary, royalist warships blockaded London’s seaborne trade, impelling Fairfax to clear the south-east prior to any northward movement.6 In a series of quick assaults, Fairfax drove the royalists out of Kent. At Maidstone on 1 June he defeated a large force under the earl of Norwich. By mid-month, the retreating royalists occupied Colchester under the command of Sir Charles Lucas. Fairfax, though bogged down at Colchester in the mire caused by an unusually rainy summer and the resolute defence of the garrison under Sir Charles Lucas, Lord Capel and George Goring, bottled up the royalists in a protracted siege thus neutralizing the threat to London. Fairfax, however, played no role in the pivotal action unfolding in the north. Pembroke Castle surrendered on 11 July, freeing Cromwell’s considerable force for operations against the northern royalists and Scots.7 In Scotland, preparations for renewed fighting had been under way for some months prior to the Welsh and Kentish risings, including the assembly of 5,000 121


horse and foot in southern Scotland. In February, Sir Marmaduke Langdale received a commission from the prince of Wales to command all royalist troops in the north and travelled to Edinburgh to consult with the principal Scottish leaders notably the earl of Lanark. Lord Byron commanded considerable royalist forces in Cheshire, Lancashire, Shropshire and north Wales. The appointment of these two capable officers, coupled with the declaration of a large number of northern men that they would rise for the king if the Scots invaded, emphasized the imminent threat to Lambert’s forces. In an incident marked by audacity and intrigue, a troop of royalist horse under Captain Edward Wogan rode through Lancashire into Scotland carrying counterfeit papers. Fairfax sent orders to Lambert and various sheriffs to intercept Wogan and his men, but ‘Wogan’s Ride’ embarrassed Lambert and provided a morale boost to the gathering royalist forces. In response, Fairfax sent reinforcements to guard the main roads into Scotland. Derby House issued orders to the northern committees that no troops could march through their counties without the orders of Fairfax, Lambert, Sir Arthur Hazelrig (governor of Newcastle) or the committee.8 Langdale did not tarry. On 28 April he implemented the second of the regional risings by capturing Berwick in a surprise raid carried out by only 120 horse. The raiders broke down the bridge across the Tweed, severing the route across which Lambert would have to cross to retake the city. Concurrently, Sir Philip Musgrave and Sir Thomas Glenham captured Carlisle. Effective military control of Westmorland and Cumberland passed to the royalists. Langdale commissioned several colonels to raise additional troops and awaited the promised Scottish invasion. Despite ongoing military preparations, perceived Scottish procrastination caused many English royalists to question their allies’ sincerity and commitment. As early as April, one royalist writer proposed to Hamilton that ‘If your armie doe not march very suddenly into England, Scotland will loose her honour and reeward of restoring [the] King and his part, for your delayes hath made us all dispaire of receaueing any assistance from Scotland’.9 The rending of Scottish unity and the creation of opposing political movements based primarily on religion severely hampered Hamilton’s ability to raise an invasion army. The breakdown of Scottish unity after 1646 resulted from the personal treaty with Charles known as the Engagement, which required that the king subscribe to the Covenant and establish an English presbyterian church for three years, acts guaranteed by the threat of Scottish invasion of England. The origins of the agreement lay in the secret negotiations with Charles in December 1646 based on the 16 December vote of the Scottish Estates (Parliament), which resolved that the government of Scotland would be settled without the king unless he abided by the terms of the Newcastle Propositions. Further, the Scots informed the king that, unless he agreed to the propositions, he would not be allowed to come to Scotland nor would his countrymen aid him against any English attempt at deposition.10 Following the failure of the Scottish negotiations with Charles at Newcastle and the return of the Covenanter Army to Scotland, English parliamentary commissioners assumed custody of the king. However, negotiations 122


with Charles remained viable and Hamilton, the king’s most prominent Scottish supporter, continued to pursue that course of action. In December 1647, with the king under close parliamentary supervision at Carisbrooke Castle on the Isle of Wight to prevent either his plotting with royalists or escape to the continent, the Scots concluded an agreement with Charles. Led by the earls of Lanark (Hamilton’s younger brother), Loudon and Lauderdale, the Scots opened talks with the king in late October where they made clear that he must accept the Kirk’s demands on religion. Following his unsuccessful attempt to escape the country, Charles agreed to entertain further negotiations with the Scottish commissioners in late December. Parliament presented its own proposed settlement entitled the Four Bills – disagreeable to the king and the Scots alike in that they neither settled the religious issue, particularly the enforcement of the terms of the 1643 treaty and the Covenant, nor adequately addressed the nature of the union of the crown and the two kingdoms. Waiting in London until the English negotiators departed, the three earls travelled to the Isle of Wight on the pretext of formally protesting Parliament’s settlement terms. Parliament presented the Four Bills to Charles on Christmas Eve; on Boxing Day, he signed the Engagement and is reputed to have buried his copy in a jar in the castle gardens. The duplicitous act of the king in negotiating with both the Scots and the parliamentary commissioners set in motion the events leading to the Scottish invasion of England the following summer.11 For Engagement supporters, the concession to Charles proved inflammatory at home. To reach an agreement, they had abandoned the religious demands of the Newcastle Propositions and signed the accord without the knowledge or consent of the Kirk and the Estates. Nonetheless, the Engagers controlled the Committee of Estates by winning over a sufficient number of moderate Covenanters. A successful vote on 11 April 1648 sanctioned the raising of Scottish forces in accordance with the treaty terms. The basis of the remilitarization lay in the violation of the Solemn League and Covenant treaty of 1643 by the English, specifically, negotiations with the king without Scottish approval, a refusal to settle the religious issue in accordance with the treaty and failure to impose the terms of the agreement. On 4 May the Scottish Parliament finally approved the raising of an army for an invasion of England to enforce the terms of the Covenant and to honour those of the Engagement. Nonetheless, the lengthy political debate dangerously delayed the Scottish invasion, leaving the English royalist risings unsupported and easily suppressed in detail. Several prominent army commanders opposed the Engagement and circulated a petition signed by Leven, Leslie and Lieutenant-General James Holborne (commanding the foot). Generals John Middleton (horse) and Alexander Hamilton (artillery) refused to sign, further fracturing army unity. Middleton did persuade many opponents to sign the petition, with the addition of the stipulation that they would obey Parliament even though they opposed the Engagement. The anti-Engagers, however, suppressed the army petition. The Engager army, handicapped from its inception by the animosity of the anti-Engagers led by Argyle as well as the shattered 123


unity of Scotland, now faced a far superior, better trained, equipped and led New Model Army.12 Despite opposition, war preparations proceeded. In late April a grand committee of the Scottish Parliament ordered the raising of 30,000 foot, 10,000 horse and 5,000 dragoons and called for a general rendezvous on 31 May. A letter from Edinburgh on 24 May commented on the ‘great preparations, Drums, Bagge-Pipes, and Coulours, there are good store in readinesse, the Motto’s of divers Colours are, For Religion and the Covenant; some for King and Parliament’.13 In spite of the eventual issuance of warrants to raise levies, the delayed Scottish invasion in the summer of 1648 chilled royalists in Cumberland and Northumberland. Several prominent Engagers, including Lord Fraser, chaffed at the delay. He urged Hamilton to advance into England claiming that the parliamentary garrisons at Bristol, Weymouth, Plymouth and Exeter stood ready to declare for Charles and that Langdale had a ‘considerabell partie of Parll: horse redy to cume in to him upon your march to Ingland’.14 While the Scots delayed, the parliamentary commanders prepared to meet the anticipated invasion and check the activities of royalists in the north. At Newcastle, Sir Arthur Hazelrig complained of the tardiness in forming a resistance to the royalists and his lack of authority to commission officers. He requested that either Derby House (parliamentary committee charged with the conduct of the war) or Fairfax send blank commissions to counter the great numbers of ‘papists and Cavaliers [who] doe flock to Barwick’. In the interim, he pleaded with Lambert for support and requested money to raise troops for the defence of Newcastle. Despite Hazelrig’s concerns following the initial successes at Berwick and Carlisle, little progress had been made even in royalist-leaning Northumberland. However, by mid-May, Langdale had finally raised 8,000 foot and 6,000 horse and prepared to undertake offensive operations.15 The Commons voted on 5 May to place the seven northern counties in a ‘Posture of Defence’. Anticipating royalist offensive moves, Lambert established garrisons at Appleby in Westmorland, Raby Castle in Durham and Walton Hall in Yorkshire. By late May, Lambert held Barnard Castle with approximately 900 Yorkshire horse. As the parliamentary resistance organized, Langdale made recruiting forays into Yorkshire and other areas in search of arms and volunteers. With Lambert at Barnard Castle, Glenham invaded Craven and sent recruiting parties into County Durham, prompting a commentator to assert that ‘Lambert flyes, and will not abide him’.16 As the parliamentarians prepared to meet the anticipated Scottish invasion, unsettling letters from Edinburgh indicated that Hamilton, reluctant to lead or raise an army against either the English Parliament or the Kirk, had offered to lay down his commission and ignored desperate requests for troops from Langdale and Musgrave to defend Carlisle and Berwick. Whatever his reservations about the Engagement, ultimately, the duke did not resign and subscribed to the Acts of Parliament of 10 June, which established the authority and lawfulness of the Engager-dominated Parliament. The legislation demanded ‘obedience to, and observation of the Acts, and Constructions’ of Parliament, thus reassuring the English that the invasion would soon occur.17 124


Opposition to the enterprise came not only from political and religious leaders, but from Leven as well. As a Kirk supporter, he refused to become involved unless the Engagement fully guaranteed the religious terms of the Covenant. Although the Hamiltonian ‘party’ controlled the Scottish Parliament, potent clerical opposition made passage of the legislation authorizing the raising of an Engager Army exceedingly difficult. The Kirk ‘party’ demanded that the king establish Presbyterianism throughout the realm prior to receiving assistance from Scotland. As an indicator of the potential for schism in Scottish unity, Hamilton’s true interest, according to Clarendon, lay in the complete restoration of the king’s authority rather than any religious settlement as called for in both the Covenant and the Engagement. Thus the Scots worked at cross purposes from the beginning of the Second Civil War.18 Opposition to the Engagement came from all areas but particularly from Fife and most of the western shires. Led by Argyle, the anti-Engagers and many Kirk leaders obstructed efforts to levy troops. Granted a colonelcy by Hamilton, Argyle used his authority to raise anti-Engager troops in south-west Scotland, a region traditionally dominated by his family as chiefs of the Clan Campbell. In June, Argyle mustered 2,000 foot and 500 horse from Ayrshire at Mauchline Moor to protest the Engagement. The anti-Engagers even invited Lambert to join them. Engager forces under Middleton and the earl of Callander attacked and dispersed the anti-Engagers on 12 June, suffering few casualties.19 Popular disgust in Edinburgh led to attacks on Hamilton himself. While he was passing through the Cannongate district of the capital on the last day of May, a gaggle of women shouted obscenities at the duke, despite the fact that he rode in the company of over 300 troopers. On 1 June, as he approached the Parliament House, a woman hurled stones at him from a window of her home. The duke declined to prosecute the offenders; nonetheless, the incidents underscored popular dislike of the Engagement. Though he was reputed to have been a reasonable and popular landlord, so strong ran public opinion against the Engagement that Hamilton’s own tenants at Avendale and Lesmahago revolted against him. A letter from Edinburgh on 31 May commented that ‘the opposition is so great, that many of Duke Hamiltons own Tenants refuse to joyne with him, and therefore a party of Horse is appointed to force them’. In mid-June two regiments mutinied in Edinburgh and attempted to march towards Argyleshire. Hamilton suppressed the rebellious troops and shot a ringleader. In response, the city of Edinburgh declared that it would not support a war against the English Parliament and arrested three leading Engagement peers.20 Although both sides supported the return of Charles and the Covenant, the difference lay in degree. The Kirk ‘party’ opposed aiding the king until he agreed to subscribe to the Covenant and also refused to ally with non-Covenanting English royalists. The Engagers included a majority of the aristocracy, who mistrusted a powerful Kirk and saw it as a threat to their traditional position. Only a restoration of the king on their terms provided a hedge against the growing social and political influence of the Kirk. Demonstrating not only a lack of 125


mediation skills but an inability to rally public opinion under the banner of Scottish nationalism and the enforcement of the Covenant, Hamilton exacerbated rather than aided his projected invasion of England. He missed opportunities to conciliate major anti-Engagers in the weeks preceding the movement south. The issue of the marquis of Huntly, leader of the powerful Clan Gordon of the northeast, illustrates the duke’s lack of conciliatory skill. Argyle had been instrumental in the execution of two prominent Huntly lieutenants the previous November, Gordon of Newton and Patrick Leith of Harthill, and had kept the marquis in confinement in Edinburgh Castle. Hamilton refused to procure the release of Huntly, who out of gratitude or vengeance might have supported the Engagement. Despite the urging of Lanark and other leading Engagers, the duke also refused to arrest Argyle, thus leaving a powerful foe free to foment dissent in the army’s rear. The more strident Kirk partisans adamantly refused to cooperate with nonCovenanting royalists, which exacerbated recruitment and poisoned relations with English royalists. In late winter, as Langdale and Musgrave attempted to win Scottish support for royalist operations against Berwick and Carlisle, Argyle and the Kirk required that all of their men subscribe to the Covenant in exchange for Scottish assistance. Attempting to assuage the two Englishmen, Hamilton assured them that once operations commenced, there would be ‘no more talk of covenants’.21 Although the overwhelming majority of the aristocracy supported Hamilton, the anti-Engagement activities of the ministers from their pulpits had a deleterious effect on the levy. The ill-trained, poorly equipped army that eventually mustered at Annan probably numbered no more than a quarter of the 40,000 troops called for by the Scottish Parliament. Additionally, they lacked field guns and siege artillery. Few men had been trained in the rudiments of handling either the pike or the musket; the freshly raised horse demonstrated questionable riding skills. To add to the difficulties, two parliamentary warships shadowed the transports carrying General Robert Monro’s Ulster troops, forcing them to land in Galloway rather than Lancashire. On the march south through Dumfriesshire, ministers railed against them while the inhabitants refused to provide quarters. A French diplomat in Edinburgh noted the impact of Kirk opposition on war preparations as Hamilton gathered his forces in the west: ‘the clergy … continue their maledictions against all those who have any part in this war’.22 While Hamilton’s military prospects seemed dubious, his political situation grew perilous. Opponents in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland accused the duke of treason (12 July). Despite the efforts of Lauderdale to maintain support at home, the political tide ran against the Engager army. Once the troops crossed the border, the Kirk party became increasingly emboldened prompting Lanark to lament that ‘while we are tearing our selves in pieces through Factions and Self-interests … our King is forgot’.23 Sir James Turner, reflecting on the military implications of the duke’s failure to unify the Scots before relieving the beleaguered Langdale, commented: 126


to marche to his [Langdale’s] reliefe, were to leave the halfe of our forces in Scotland unleavied, and ane enemie behind our hand, ourselvs in a very bad condition, without money, meale, artillerie, or amunition; to suffer him [Hamilton] to perish was against honour, conscience, and the reason both of state and warre.24 Gordon Donaldson captures the desperate nature of the lack of Scottish unity on the eve of the invasion: ‘Scotland was a country divided as it had hardly been since Pinkie [1544]’.25 Command of the Engager army also proved problematic. Hamilton reluctantly assumed direct command of the army in place of the ageing Leven. Had Leven, a strong supporter of Argyle and the Kirk party, remained in charge, the invasion might not have occurred; however, by the spring of 1648 the Engagers controlled the Estates and thus appointed general officers. Despite this advantage, it proved a ‘hard thing’, opined Clarendon, to remove the old general Lashly [Leven], who had been hitherto in the head of their army in all their prosperous successes … but the man was grown old, and appeared in the actions of the last expedition into England very unequal to the command.26 The appeal to Leven to step down on the basis of his physical fitness eventually prevailed, resulting in Hamilton’s appointment as commander-in-chief. David Leslie resigned rather than command the horse and the post fell to the far less capable earl of Callander, who disliked and mistrusted the duke. Arguments among the commanders erupted over delays in raising the army. Lanark argued that all resistance to the Engagement must be suppressed prior to an invasion of England. Others, including the earl of Lauderdale, demanded an immediate crossing of the border in support of Langdale and the English royalists already fighting Lambert. Swayed by Lauderdale’s argument for immediate action, Hamilton ordered a general rendezvous for 4 July at Annan in Dumfriesshire from which the invasion force would set out for Carlisle and Cumberland. Unable to unite the Scots in support of the Engagement, lacking in ammunition, artillery and supplies, and facing potent religious and political opposition at home, Hamilton set out for England with distinct disadvantages. Although his force when joined with Langdale’s command outnumbered the combined English armies of Lambert and Cromwell, the military effectiveness of the duke as a function of his moral authority, particularly the ability to forge a bond for a common purpose and to maintain discipline, can only be characterized as dangerously flawed.

‘The Gentleman is in the Briars’: Lambert and Langdale By June, royalist morale and confidence stood high despite the tardiness of the Scottish invasion. With Lambert on the defensive and having few troops, Cromwell 127


embroiled in Wales and Fairfax besieging Colchester, the royalist military strategy of dividing the parliamentarian forces through multiple risings combined with a Scottish invasion appeared to be working. A party of a hundred men under Captain John Morris (Morrice) seduced the garrison of Pontefract Castle into betraying Parliament and thus gained the powerful fortress with little effort. Lambert immediately sent 800 horse and foot to recover the castle; however, the force proved insufficient to mount a siege. Despite royalist confidence, signs of a crumbling strategy appeared as early as 2 June when several troops of Cromwell’s horse appeared in Lancashire.27 The sparring between Lambert and Langdale ended in early June as each side collected sufficient troops to conduct a campaign. With close to 7,000 men, Lambert recaptured Skipton Castle. The opportunity for Lambert to assault Langdale directly came in the first week of June when the royalist commander advanced towards Barnard Castle. Initially, Lambert’s men retreated, but turned about and drew up on Gatesby Moor, (Gaterly-Moore) 5 miles from the castle, where the parliamentarians offered battle. Langdale uncharacteristically withdrew, which checked the hitherto royalist offensive momentum and shifted the advantage to Lambert. In the retreat, Lambert ambushed the royalist rearguard composed of a newly raised regiment. Officers and soldiers threw down their arms and ran. Langdale’s force finally collected itself at Carlisle. Along the route of the retreat, many of Langdale’s less stout-hearted volunteers, including many officers, surrendered to Lambert. Eager to capitalize on the defection of prominent royalists, Derby House ordered Lambert to issue an indemnity to all who deserted and joined the parliamentarians. With Langdale momentarily neutralized, Lambert recaptured Braugham Castle at Penrith and strengthened the garrison of Appleby.28 In late June, Lambert initiated a campaign against secondary royalist strongholds, retaking Greystock, Helmsley and Rose Castles, which hampered royalist foraging and recruiting. At Warwick Bridge, near Carlisle, Lambert attacked and captured a small enemy detachment, causing Langdale to withdraw his outlying garrisons. Relief appeared imminent for the beleaguered royalists when the Scottish Parliament declared war on England on 23 June and Hamilton’s army prepared to march south. Despite the imminent threat from the north, Lambert resolved to carry on: ‘we shall not refuse to fight, though they should be twice our Number’.29 A royalist newspaper mocked the major-general’s tenuous position and bold statement, claiming that Langdale had cleverly drawn Lambert to Carlisle where he would be crushed between two forces and exclaiming that ‘the Gentleman is in the Briars’.30 Major-General Thomas Harrison joined Lambert early in July and county militia arrived in significant numbers. Going on the offensive, Lambert marched to within a mile of Carlisle, around which Sir Marmaduke had constructed defensive positions. Although outnumbered nearly two to one and despite the disadvantages of restricted approaches to the town, Lambert appeared willing to fight; however, Langdale declined to order an assault. The reasons for his inaction are not clear, although one report asserts that Lanark ordered Langdale to avoid an engagement. 128


On the 15th, Langdale occupied a position on the Yorkshire border near Bowes. As Lambert advanced, the royalists unexpectedly retreated. The action degenerated into a chase over 12 miles across Westmorland as Langdale raced back towards Carlisle. The advance scouts fired only a few shots, much to Lambert’s consternation (the enemy being ‘utterly unwilling to engage, not so much as a party of Horse to Skirmish’). The following day, he again advanced only to have Langdale refuse to fight. Frustrated, Lambert retired to Penrith on the 16th for lack of forage and supplies and to await the arrival of reinforcements from Lancashire.31 Following an appeal for assistance from Hazelrig at Newcastle early in July, Lambert detached Colonels Robert Lilburne and Harrison to challenge the royalists threatening Northumberland. A victory near Berwick resulted in the capture of over 400 royalists, including many of the Northumberland gentry and part of Langdale’s horse, as well as a large store of arms. The action relieved the pressure on Newcastle, secured Lambert’s right flank and forced Hamilton to advance by way of Carlisle.32 Conditions in the north-west may have contributed to the lack of activity and the frustrating series of marches and countermarches. The weather, particularly troublesome in the summer of 1648, complicated the tactical movements and deployment of both forces. Hampered by unseasonably cold, stormy conditions, each side struggled to find forage and supplies. Muddy roads and swollen rivers in topography rugged in even the best of weather conditions, made movements difficult and exhausted the stoutest soldiers. Musketeers could not keep their matches lit in the damp air. Resupply became nightmarish as carts bogged down in the mud. Pervasive illness plagued both forces. From Penrith, Lambert, reportedly ‘not very well [and] hath beene long sickly’, described the conditions confronting his troops as ‘miserable Marches, and most pitiful Quarters, in this barren and undone Countrey’.33 A royalist newspaper complimented Langdale’s passive tactics, stating that ‘like a wise Commander [he] gathers strength, and by his civill deportment ingratiates himself into the Country’.34 But, in practical terms, Langdale had surrendered momentum to his opponent at a point where more aggressive operations might have led to royalist victory in the north before the arrival of Cromwell. As an aggressive and tactically astute commander, Lambert took advantage of Langdale’s passivity and placed the royalists on the defensive at the moment when the weight of numbers and the initiative lay with Langdale and the Scots.

‘Very hard at fisticuffes’: the Scottish invasion Despite anti-Engager opposition, Hamilton ordered an invasion by way of Carlisle in early July. Without artillery, chronically short of provisions, arms and ammunition and with deficient senior leadership, the Scottish effort had little chance of success. Throughout July, Lambert sparred with the Scots in an effort to impede their southward march while awaiting Cromwell. Demonstrating an abject lack of operational artistry, particularly concerning the need for haste, Hamilton slowly 129


Figure 5.1 Scottish invasion/Preston campaign, 1648

marched his force south, stopping repeatedly to rest his men and await the arrival of reinforcements and artillery.35 Even before the forming of the invasion force at Annan in early July, faulty decisions adversely affected the duke’s hopes. Langdale’s activities created problems in implementing a coherent strategy of raising multiple local risings in conjunction with a Scottish invasion aimed at London. The Yorkshireman’s premature capture of Berwick and Carlisle before he had the assurances of Scottish support forced the duke to launch the invasion prior to the completion of proper preparations. Once committed, Langdale faced only Lambert’s small force in Yorkshire, which might have been pushed aside by swift, aggressive operations. However, Lanark ordered Langdale to maintain a defensive posture while awaiting the Engagers’ arrival. The premature royalist actions in Cumberland and Northumberland proved decisive for two reasons. They induced Cromwell to complete the destruction of the Welsh rising and quickly move his forces north to reinforce Lambert, and they forced the Scots to march with a shortage of money, food, artillery, powder and shot. Lanark lamented the serious shortage of arms on the eve of the invasion: ‘if the arms and ammunition promised from France be not speedily sent they will be of no use’.36 Although outnumbered roughly three to two, the 14,000 English forces eventually arrayed against Hamilton’s combined Engager and English royalist army of 21,000 comprised a ‘fine, smart army … fit for action’ that easily outclassed the ill-prepared, badly equipped, poorly trained and, most critically, worse led Scottish levies.37 130


As the Scottish Engager army marched into England, the inadequacies of Hamilton’s military leadership became more apparent. In the central elements of consistency – discipline and mediation – he proved woefully inadequate. He could neither control the depredations of his troops against the civilian population nor prevent personal squabbles among his major officers, particularly over seniority issues. Without the strong hand of either Leslie or Leven in command, the future of the royalist cause in 1648 lay with an army wracked by dissension at home, fractious senior leadership and a commander of little skill who had ‘persuaded himself and convinced his master [Charles] that as a soldier[,] he was inferior to none’.38 Hamilton’s brief military career in the Swedish forces had already demonstrated his lack of mediation skills. As the commander of an Anglo-Scottish brigade in Gustavus Adolphus’s army, he consistently favoured his Scottish soldiers and antagonized the English troops. The royalist commentator Patrick Gordon, while extolling Hamilton’s virtues as a statesman and politician, admitted that ‘in this only he was defective, that he had never practised the airt militarie’. Given such a commander, the Engagers desperately needed strong subordinate leadership. Bowing to pressure from the Kirk, Leslie declined an appointment as second-incommand, a post that went instead to the inept earl of Callander – headstrong, arrogant and who continually opposed and obfuscated Hamilton’s orders. The inability to control Callander and to mediate disputes between senior officers cost the royalist cause dearly.39 After a week’s delay at Carlisle, the Scottish army finally marched south. Hamilton preferred to keep his troops in dry quarters in the city rather than bivouacking in the rain-soaked fields. While this concern for the men’s health showed compassion, it meant a further delay at a time when the Scots enjoyed their greatest numerical advantage and aggressive operations might have forced Lambert to retire. By his lack of initiative, Hamilton squandered his one advantage over the parliamentarians at the outset of the campaign. From Annan on 6 July, Hamilton wrote to Lambert that he intended to carry out the terms of the 1643 treaty particularly on religion and the restoration of harmony between the king and a free Parliament. The duke requested that parliamentary forces not oppose the ‘Pious, Loyall, and necessary Undertakings’. Lambert curtly reminded Hamilton of the parliamentary forces’ mission for the suppression of Langdale and his rebels and that the English Parliament ‘votes free, and no visible Force in this Kingdom acts any Thing but by their immediate command’. Lambert promised to oppose all forces raised within or brought into the kingdom except by authority of Parliament.40 The route of Hamilton’s army carried it across barren, rain-sodden Westmorland, country already stripped of forage and supplies. With an inadequate supply system and adamant opposition at home, the Scottish army had little hope of sustaining itself. The army remained at Carlisle for six days before moving to Penrith for a further three weeks. At Carlisle, Langdale’s 3,000 foot and several troops of horse joined Hamilton’s force for a combined move against Lambert. Langdale stripped 131


the royalist garrisons of Carlisle and Berwick to bolster the army. By the end of July, the combined royalist force numbered about 13,000 foot and 5,000 horse. Though desperately short of supplies and ammunition, Langdale’s experienced veterans leavened the untested levies. In response to the gathering of enemy forces, Colonel Robert Lilburne hurriedly rejoined Lambert. Derby House directed that troops from Gloucester and elsewhere throughout the kingdom abandon their garrisons and reinforce Lambert; it also directed the committee of Nottinghamshire to send 700 horse to relieve Lambert’s men besieging Pontefract Castle, enabling them to rejoin the main army.41 The duke’s inability to maintain discipline on the march south characterized by enormous depredations against the civilian population contrasted sharply with that of the parliamentarian forces on their subsequent invasions of Scotland in late 1648 and 1650. One contemporary commented on the destruction wrought by the Scots: ‘scarce, in the whole time of these wars, did any army exercise greater cruelty towards the poor inhabitants of England’.42 The Scots stole livestock for food and confiscated English horses, forcing their owners to drive the teams, owing to the lack of animals to pull wagons and artillery pieces. Although serving as a parliamentary propagandist, Bulstrode Whitelock captured the extent of the depredations, reporting that the Scottish troops took all ‘Moveables, Cows, Sheep, and all House-hold-stuff to the very Pot-hooks, that they [seized] children, and [made] their parents pay ransoms for them, and force[d] women before their friends faces’.43 A letter from Manchester described the Scots as ‘no respecters of persons, they plunder and ruine without distinction’.44 Turner added a measure of authenticity to the English perceptions of the lack of Engager discipline, complaining that the troops took advantage of the duke’s being ‘too spareing in taking lives’.45 Hamilton’s biographer characterizes the duke as a moral but not physical coward. He refused to enforce the draconian disciplinary code required of an invading army, particularly one so ill-prepared for its mission as the Engagers. In his attempts to resolve disputes between subordinates, he refused to exert the necessary leadership demanded of a commanding officer. In attempts to be pragmatic and diminish confrontation, he emerged as weak and vacillating. The nature of war allows no such compromises. Turner captured the spirit of Hamilton’s inability to mediate between senior officers or to enforce discipline, stating that, though of excellent character, courteous, affable and humane, the duke appeared ‘soe merciful that he was but a bad judiciary’.46 On 14 July, royalist cavalry engaged Lambert’s rearguard of horse near Penrith. With the Scottish infantry strung out for miles along the route of march and unable to support the attack, it accomplished little. By the 17th, the royalist forces formed into three large bodies on the hills within a mile of Lambert’s position at Appleby. As the major-general gathered his cavalry for an attack led by Harrison, the parliamentary troops enthusiastically shouted ‘a Field, a Field’. However, a full-scale assault failed to develop. After a few hours of skirmishing, Lambert retreated to Bowes. The royalist army then established camp at Kirkby Thore between Penrith and Appleby for the remainder of July. These early skirmishes demonstrated two 132


fundamental flaws in Hamilton’s tactical acumen and battlefield management: his inability to maintain a tight line of march thus preventing a concentration of forces, and his unwillingness to advance rapidly while he still enjoyed a numerical advantage.47 Lambert took up a position between Bowes and Barnard Castle with a forward defence in the pass at Stainmore. He anticipated an easterly royalist advance over the Pennines; however, his position allowed him to threaten the enemy flank should Hamilton continue a southerly march through Lancashire. He intended to allow the royalists to advance south while maintaining a flanking position in Yorkshire to prevent an attack on York or relief of Pontefract Castle. The next action occurred on the 26th when the royalists attacked Stainmore and drove the parliamentarians back to Barnard Castle. The victors failed to occupy the pass, allowing Lambert to regarrison it immediately. Indeed, the absence of tactical acumen on the part of Hamilton and his senior commanders is striking. Had they aggressively pursued Lambert, their weight of numbers might have made up for the deficiency in equipment and training. Faced with the inactivity of the Scots, Langdale’s command withered and few northern royalists turned out.48 Despite the enemy’s deteriorating condition, Lambert wrote several letters to the Commons requesting reinforcements and pointing out the precariousness of his situation. In a particularly pointed correspondence, he simply stated: ‘Haste, Haste, Post Haste!’49 The major-general advised the Commons on 20 July that his situation allowed the enemy forces to ‘recruit and grow greater every day’.50 Despite his success in maintaining close contact with the Scottish army throughout July, financial and administrative troubles threatened his viability. Derby House reported on 20 July that Lambert’s forces had received little pay or money for activities such as intelligence gathering. Additionally, he had no scoutmaster or quartermaster general, thus straining his ability to manage the army. Lacking an artillery train, he could not initiate a siege of Carlisle. In response, the Commons passed an ordinance to raise money from the excise for support of the northern forces.51 The Yorkshire horse, released from duty at Pontefract and other sites, arrived at Lambert’s camp at Bowes by the 25th, as did a thousand of Cromwell’s foot. Having accepted the surrender of Pembroke Castle, Cromwell had marched north on the 14th. A diversion through Leicester to obtain badly needed shoes slowed his advance; given the lack of motion on the part of the Scots, the delay proved inconsequential. Lambert reported on 25 July that there had been no action since the affair at Appleby; however, he had received substantial reinforcements, including the Yorkshire horse and about a thousand foot of Cromwell’s advance party. By the 28th, thirty troops of Cromwell’s horse had joined him, bolstering his forces to over 9,000 men. With a further 5,000 coming with Cromwell from Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Derbyshire, Lambert asserted that ‘his Army will bee very numerous, and more offensive then [sic] defensive’.52 As Lambert collected additional forces, the Engagers remained inactive for several days at Kirkby Thore. The only aggressive operations occurred on 28 July when Langdale captured Appleby Castle along with all of Lambert’s small artillery 133


train and about 500 muskets. The royalists allowed Lambert’s men to march out with colours flying and granted safe passage back to Barnard Castle in accordance with the honours of war. In response to the loss of Appleby Castle, Lambert retired to Skipton. Mercurius Melancholicus gleefully reported the loss of Appleby Castle and chided Lambert as the ‘Yorkshire Saint’. A sarcastic poem in Mercurius Elencticus opened with: ‘What! Lambert worsted in the North, and Fairfax stay here yet [at Colchester]? Surely those Saints are little worth, whom thus the States forget’. With his flank turned by Langdale, Lambert withdrew first to Skipton, Richmond, then Ripon and finally to Knaresborough where he arrived on 7 August. In losing contact with the enemy, Lambert surrendered the strategic initiative to Hamilton. Unfortunately for the duke, he never realized the momentous opportunity afforded by Lambert’s error and the Scots slowly moved to Kendal in a two-day march. Arriving on 2 August, the army remained inactive for a further week.53 A royalist newspaper described the fighting in July: ‘The Scots and Lambert are very hard at fisticuffes’.54 In retiring in the face of the enemy, Lambert committed the only major tactical blunder of the parliamentary campaign. He lost contact with the enemy for several days. Had Hamilton been more astute or willing to advance rapidly, he would have accomplished the goal of neutralizing the northern parliamentarian force prior to Cromwell’s arrival. With few casualties, Hamilton could have recaptured the strategic initiative. But, incapable of such bold action, the duke failed to seize the opportunity allowing Lambert to recover from his misstep.

‘There being so much of God’: the battle of Preston The battle of Preston ended the Second Civil War and ensured the viability of the nascent English Republic. The parliamentary forces that devastated the Engager army both at Preston and as it fled south in disarray enjoyed the advantages of superior generalship, supply, discipline and experience. The Scots, meanwhile, suffered from a breakdown of command, lack of food, arms and ammunition and a decreasing will to fight as the parliamentary forces finally engaged Hamilton following weeks of maintaining close contact and avoiding a general engagement. With the arrival of Monro’s veteran Ulster army of 2,100 foot and 1,200 horse in the Engager camp at Kendal, Hamilton finally had troops of the same calibre as Lambert and Cromwell’s. However, a squabble erupted between Callander and Monro over seniority, as each refused to serve under the other. Rather than take control of the deteriorating command situation and exert his authority, the duke ordered Monro and his force along with two of Langdale’s English regiments to hold a position at Kirkby Lonsdale and provide security for the anticipated artillery train. This ill-fated decision cost Hamilton the services of several thousand of his best troops as the Preston campaign unfolded. On 9 August Hamilton advanced to Hornby where the army encamped for five days. Lambert, unaware of the decision to leave Monro behind, urgently requested reinforcements to counter the arrival of the Ulster force. The Commons ordered 134


Cromwell to hasten to his relief. On 8 August, Cromwell reached Doncaster where he awaited the arrival of ammunition and replaced Lambert’s veterans still engaged in the siege of Pontefract Castle with his new levies from the Midlands. The parliamentary advance forces met between Leeds and Knaresborough on the 12th and Cromwell assumed command. To preclude any dissension over seniority, Derby House informed Cromwell that, based on the ‘regard of the place and quality you bear in the army, there will be none in the North who will pretend to a commandin-chief while you are there [;] … we have written to all the commanders of forces there to obey your orders’. Knowing of Lambert’s inclination for bold, aggressive actions, Cromwell ordered the major-general on 4 August to ‘forbear engaging before he [Cromwell] came up’.55 In contrast to parliamentary firmness, indecisiveness reigned in the royalist camp. Several senior officers favoured an invasion of Yorkshire while others argued for the Lancashire route. In hope of attracting the Lancashire royalists, Hamilton opted to continue south. The duke faced two options. If he marched east, he could engage and defeat Lambert prior to the arrival of Cromwell. A southerly march might rally the Lancashire royalists, giving him an even greater numerical advantage and the possibility of joining Byron’s still considerable and undefeated royalist force in northern Wales. Hamilton chose the southerly route over the objections of more competent officers such as Turner, who later lamented that the unfortunate decision to march through Lancashire instead of Yorkshire allowed Cromwell to intercept the Engagers with his more experienced army. In a telling remark on the duke’s lack of martial synergy, particularly aggressiveness, Turner commented that the arguments over the route of march produced the only instance of the duke being ‘tenacieous in any thing’. Accordingly, the army marched on the 14th for Preston on the River Ribble. Had Hamilton chosen the route east through York, he would have made Cromwell and Lambert’s task far more difficult. Although royal support in Lancashire ran high, the poor land promised little relief for the worsening supply situation. Yorkshire, described as ‘presbyterial’, offered both the possibility of some local support as well as the geographical advantages of broken, craggy terrain interspersed with moorland, which made cavalry operations difficult and undercut the parliamentary advantage in numbers and quality of horse.56 Hamilton’s willingness to divide his army in the face of a far stronger, more capable enemy, thus violating the maxim regarding the concentration of forces, provides a further indication of Hamilton’s lack of battlefield management skills. As the royalist army reached Preston, Hamilton allowed the horse under Callander and Middleton to ride ahead of the foot in search of better quarters. When the infantry finally reached Preston, the advance guard of horse lay at Wigan 16 miles to the south. The error further diminished Hamilton’s ability to concentrate his forces against Cromwell, who rapidly approached the royalist left flank from the north-east. Parliamentary patrols had already skirmished with the Scottish cavalry near Clitheroe, but Hamilton knew little of Cromwell’s movements. As the battle approached, Hamilton had lost all tactical control over the movement of his scattered forces.57 135


Cromwell convened a council of war at the Hodder River bridge just west of Clitheroe on the 16th. The council agreed that the army should cross the Ribble and engage north of Preston to cut off a royalist retreat towards Scotland. Reports reached the headquarters that Monro might be on the march to reinforce Hamilton, underlining the need for a speedy assault. The battle plan for Preston reflected the highly developed tactical acumen of both Lambert and Cromwell. The two officers rarely disagreed in their approach to war and, as a team supported by excellent, well-trained, motivated and disciplined troops with experienced and capable subordinates, the pair proved difficult to defeat. Although both tended to be cautious at the outset of an engagement, as the action commenced and when battlefield conditions met their criteria, they struck quickly, indicative of an aggressiveness moderated by prudence. Both officers advocated the concentration of large forces along a narrow front so as to deploy maximum force against the enemy’s weak points. Once in motion, they marched and counter-marched, retreated and advanced as rapidly as possible, while the royalists generally reacted slowly. The destruction of the enemy’s ability to wage war constituted the ultimate goal of both Lambert and Cromwell. In this regard, they espoused a modern definition of victory as opposed to the prevailing concept of controlling territory and holding the field at the end of the engagement.58 Throughout the weeks leading up to the engagement of 17 August, Lambert employed the indirect approach. In not confronting the Scottish main body and by maintaining a flanking position, he preserved his strength while the enemy withered. Only with local numerical superiority did Cromwell and Lambert strike.59 At Preston and throughout the campaigns of the Third Civil War of 1650–1, Cromwell routinely employed Lambert as the commander of an independent strike force to harass and draw the opponent into a decisive engagement with the main body or to defeat the enemy’s garrisons and detached forces. Lambert, then, became the hammer for Cromwell’s anvil. The two generals exemplified the tactical technique of find, fix and flank. Early on the morning of the 17th, a confident parliamentarian army broke camp and quickly marched towards Preston in hope of a lightning thrust at the Scots. Only Langdale’s outnumbered command stood between the two forces. A fundamental aspect of battlefield management and intuition is the ability to ascertain the enemy’s presence. As with his disposition of the line of march, Hamilton again proved inept. Well before the day of battle, Scottish patrols operating east of the main body reported encounters with parliamentary horse, but the duke either ignored the intelligence or believed them to be merely Lancashire militia. Clausewitz is wary of the accuracy and usefulness of battlefield intelligence, stating that: Intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that he should possess a standard of judgment, which he can only gain from a knowledge of men and affairs and from common sense.60 136


But clearly, Hamilton lacked that sense of intuition cited by Clausewitz as the standard of judgement and common sense that should have caused alarm and wariness in the Engager commander’s mind. The night before the battle, Cromwell encamped 9 miles from Preston at Stonyhurst Hall, barely 3 miles from Langdale’s main body on Ribbleton Moor. When Langdale realized the true nature of the parliamentarian force, he informed Lord Livingstone (Callander’s nephew) of the imminent threat. But, neither Hamilton nor Callander considered the report credible and took no action. The following morning, with no apparent reaction from his allies, Langdale rode to the commander-in-chief’s position to report the presence of a large force of parliamentarians. Again, Hamilton scoffed at the intelligence and insisted on continuing the march across the Ribble. The veracity of the Englishman’s report became all too clear thirty minutes later when parliamentary horse assaulted Langdale’s outlying posts.61 Langdale’s position straddled the lane into Preston across Ribbleton Moor. He prepared to make a determined stand. The sunken, muddy road surrounded by enclosures with numerous hedges and ditches provided an excellent field of fire for musketry and essentially nullified cavalry action. A skirmish ensued between Langdale’s main body and Cromwell’s ‘forlorn hope’. By four in the afternoon, the bulk of Cromwell’s foot arrived, allowing for a frontal assault on Langdale led by Lambert. The horse attacked down the lane and probed the royalist flank. The infantry slowly pushed back the enemy hedge by hedge. Dismounted and accompanying Bright’s regiment, Lambert realized that the main battle had emerged on the south of the road and ordered a Lancashire regiment previously held in reserve to attack Langdale’s right, whose front collapsed under the weight of numbers. With the enemy foot in retreat, the parliamentary cavalry charged through the narrow lane and rode down stragglers. The survivors of the hour-long engagement fled into the town in disorder. Despite being outnumbered two to one, the English royalists contested every hedge in a fighting retreat that lasted over four hours. Langdale again pleaded for assistance and reinforcements as his men streamed into Preston’s streets. Hamilton hurriedly sent 700 foot to save Langdale and ordered his horse to return from Wigan. Langdale later contended that he had been abandoned by the Scotsman and, had the duke sent an additional thousand foot, he ‘should have gained the day’.62 In actuality, Hamilton had no more resources to commit. In a woeful display of battlefield mismanagement, he allowed his force to be stretched out over an almost 50-mile line of march from Wigan back towards Carlisle. All of the cavalry except his own lifeguard lay south of the Ribble and much of the foot had crossed as well. Despite his initial plan to draw his available troops into battalions and contest Cromwell on Preston Moor, the duke allowed Callander to convince him to withdraw the entire Scottish force south and abandon Langdale’s men. From a tactical viewpoint, Callander might have been correct. Without horse, the Engager foot remained vulnerable to attack from parliamentary cavalry. Conversely, Middleton’s horse had already been turned around by Turner and headed north, 137


therefore a stout defence might have saved Langdale and allowed for the arrival of the Scottish horse at the necessary moment. While neither option seemed desirable from a tactical viewpoint, the mere fact that Hamilton found himself in the dilemma underscores his complete lack of tactical acumen and battlefield management ability. As the parliamentarians overwhelmed Langdale’s command, ‘Hamilton was bewildered [as] desperation and panic were mounting within him’.63 By early evening, Hamilton belatedly acknowledged that he faced more than local militia. Cromwell had succeeded in cutting off the Scots from a line of retreat towards Scotland. Clarendon later described Hamilton as ‘at his wits’ end’ once he realized the vulnerability of his position.64 At this point in the engagement, the duke displayed remarkable and conspicuous courage, particularly after he realized that Lambert’s men had already overwhelmed Langdale’s shattered command. As Langdale’s troops retreated further into the town pursued by Cromwell’s horse, Hamilton took Callander’s advice to retreat across the Ribble. Lieutenant-General William Baillie stationed two brigades of foot on the north end of the bridge to cover the retreat of the Scottish infantry. Hamilton ordered the rearguard cavalry to cut their way through the enemy to join Monro in Lancaster. With Callander and Baillie safely on the south bank with the bulk of the retreating foot, the duke, Sir James Turner, Langdale and a few men attempted to cross the river at a ford a mile east of Preston. The attempt failed owing to the high waters caused by the abundant rains and fire from parliamentary musketeers. Covering the flight of the refugees to a different crossing, the duke twice personally charged the enemy troops to rally his remaining panic-stricken soldiers. Shouting ‘charge once more for King Charles’, the duke exhibited such a display of courage that Turner later commented: ‘truelie he shew[ed] heere as much personall valour as any man could be capable of’. A third desperate charge led by Hamilton drove back the enemy musketeers long enough for the duke and his men to reach and swim across a safer ford where they rejoined Baillie.65 Cromwell noted the exemplary courage of the Scots and royalists in a letter to the speaker of the House of Commons, commending the resolution of both Langdale’s command and Baillie’s rearguard brigades. Referring to Hamilton, Langdale, Turner and Baillie, he added that ‘God was as much seen in the valour of the officers … as in any action that hath been performed’.66 Meanwhile, the battle for the Ribble Bridge intensified as the parliamentary foot repeatedly charged the Scots holding the crossing forcing them to give way after two hours of intense musketry and spirited pike charges. Across the bridge, Cromwell’s men chased the retreating Scots and just before dark captured the undefended baggage train. By day’s end, Cromwell’s force had taken nearly 4,000 prisoners and an equal number of arms. Each army settled down for the night in the rain-soaked fields.67 In Hamilton’s camp, a hurried council of war decided that the army should retreat southward to join the horse still making its way from Wigan. To escape without alerting the enemy, the Scots marched silently without drum beats. A slow-burning fuse meant to explode the abandoned barrels of powder three hours into the march failed; the parliamentarians captured the prize intact. Cromwell 138


realized the Scottish intention and dispatched three regiments of horse under Colonel Francis Thornhaugh in pursuit. The hapless Scots, though successful in retiring unheard, missed each other in the dark. As the foot slogged south along the westerly road to Wigan, Middleton’s horse moved north on the easterly route and arrived at the Darwen River, a tributary of the Ribble, only to encounter Thornhaugh’s troopers. Middleton realized the error and rode south along the route taken earlier by the Scottish foot. Throughout the night, Thornhaugh’s men pursued the Scottish horse and inflicted heavy casualties.68 The retreating Scots, exhausted and soaked from the night march, faced the parliamentary forces early the next morning. However, their flasks held nothing but useless, drenched powder and they turned south towards Wigan. Without ammunition and thoroughly exhausted, the Scots fell easy prey to the aggressive parliamentarians. Hamilton continued the retreat south to Warrington to place the Mersey River between his force and Cromwell’s and to join Byron in Wales. The Scots departed Wigan for another damp night march. A rearguard attempt turned into panic on the approach of parliamentary cavalry. Cromwell, however, halted his ‘very dirty and weary’ men and allowed them to rest. In the night, the Scottish force disintegrated. Hungry men broke into houses in search of food and lost all discipline. A few officers formed a defensive position in a lane north of Winwick. The position held for several hours, but crumbled when Lambert arrived with the main body and attacked the defences in the flank, leaving 1,000 Scottish dead. The survivors fled into the town where 2,000 surrendered.69 Though a failure as a soldier and combat commander, Hamilton displayed remarkable personal heroism at Preston. Had his military leadership ability been of the same calibre, the relatively easy parliamentary victory at Preston might not have occurred. But, as if to add to his complete breakdown, the duke soon lost the one asset that had not yet failed him, his personal honour. With the Scottish army in full, disjointed retreat following the collapse at Winwick, he allowed Callander to convince him to flee with the remainder of the horse in an effort to reach Byron. Rather than standing with his few remaining men, he abandoned Baillie and fled towards Warrington 10 miles further south. Once Baillie arrived at Warrington with 2,600 men, he barricaded a bridge. Their commander-in-chief had already departed. Without ammunition and having not slept in two days, the bedraggled soldiers had had enough and quickly surrendered.70 Cromwell detached Lambert with 2,000 horse and 1,400 foot to continue the chase despite the troops’ near exhaustion. Hamilton and the fleeing horse made for Chester. Harassed by attacks from local trained bands and depleted by desertions, the dwindling band decided to head for Scotland through Yorkshire and turned east, but got no further than Uttoxeter. Unwilling to retreat or fight further, the men mutinied and imprisoned Hamilton in his quarters. The duke again found his courage and opened negotiations for an honourable surrender with the governor of Stafford. Lambert, lying a few miles away, exerted his authority and sent three officers under Colonel Robert Lilburne, who reputedly offered Hamilton safe passage to Scotland in exchange for the surrender of Berwick and 139


Carlisle. Regaining the honour he had lost at Winwick, the duke refused to betray his king and became Lambert’s prisoner. The terms of surrender guaranteed the safety of the duke and his men, stipulating that they would be regarded as prisoners of war rather than traitors and accordingly would neither be pillaged nor ‘otherwise wronged, beaten, or abused, upon the delivering up of their Arms, or afterwards, and shall have civil Usage during the time of their Imprisonment’.71 As a final gesture of his utter defeat, Hamilton handed Lambert his sword that had been in the family for generations and implored the parliamentarian to take suitable care of it. Callander fled to London, then on to the Netherlands. Langdale escaped only to be captured at an alehouse near Nottingham while claiming to be one of Lambert’s men. When the Commons read Cromwell’s report of the campaign on 21 August, the members decreed 7 September as a day of thanksgiving. Cromwell refused to take credit for the victory stating that ‘there being so much of God, and I was not willing to say more, least there should seeme to be any thing of man’. Compared to the thousands of royalist casualties, the total parliamentary dead of barely 100 men seems stunning. A report from Preston placed Scottish losses in the initial stages of the campaign at 2,500 dead and 2,000 prisoners, with 300 officers either killed or captured.72 The pursuit of the Scots continued after Hamilton’s defeat. In late August, Fairfax ordered Cromwell and Lambert to give chase to the remnants of the Engager army. On 2 September, Lambert reached Pontefract and was in a position to intercept Monro. The Scotsman had no intention of fighting and crossed the border on the 15th. As the parliamentarians marched through the Northumberland countryside after the Scottish retreat, the devastation wrought by the invaders evoked a comment that the sight would ‘make a Heart of Flint to melt’. As Lambert and his horse joined Cromwell’s main body, a council of war resolved to assault Berwick where many of the fleeing troops took shelter.73 With the defeat of the Engager army, the Kirk party re-emerged as the predominant political force in Scotland and formally ended the Second Civil War following the English invasion of the early autumn. Cromwell returned to London and Lambert remained in the north to destroy the last royalist resistance at Pontefract Castle. In what came to be styled the ‘Whiggamore Raid’, several thousand anti-Engagers from the west of Scotland, led by Leven, Leslie and the earls of Loudon and Eglinton, marched on Edinburgh and drove the Engagement-dominated Committee of Estates into exile in Stirling. Through the month of September, as the anti-Engagers gathered strength, key members of the faction opened negotiations with Cromwell. In midmonth, Sir Andrew Ker and Major Archibald Strachan assured Cromwell that English interests would be preserved if the Kirk party came to power and asked that the parliamentary army be ready to march to their assistance. Cromwell replied that, with the garrison of Berwick not yet subdued and a strong Engager force at Stirling under Monro that could still resist, the English would march into Scotland in order that they ‘might be in a posture more ready to give you assistance’.74 On 21 September, Cromwell’s army crossed the border and took Berwick. Lambert initiated a series of fast marches in pursuit of the remnants of the Scottish 140


forces gathering at Stirling Bridge. The next day, Cromwell and Argyle met and established a political alliance whereby the English army became the tool to destroy the Engagers and secure the rule of the Kirk party. With agreement in hand, Lambert advanced on Edinburgh on the 26th and entered the city the following day with six regiments of horse and two troops of dragoons. Cromwell arrived several days later. With English troops occupying the capital, supporters of the Engagement summarily lost offices. Faced with the threat of total defeat, Monro disbanded his force in early October.75 Leaving behind a small force under Lambert consisting of Lambert’s and Lilburne’s horse, to ensure the stability of the new government, Cromwell departed on the 7th and marched into Yorkshire to clear out the final pockets of royalist resistance. Lambert stayed in Edinburgh until early November, apparently ‘well liked … by the honest Party in Scotland’. A letter from the new Committee of Estates to the English Parliament of 7 November thanked both generals for bringing peace to the kingdom.76 Reacting to a letter of 21 October from the committee of Yorkshire requesting that he march to Pontefract Castle and remove the royalists under Morris, Cromwell used substantial forces to neutralize the last remaining royalist stronghold. The siege had not progressed well. Sir Henry Cholmley, appointed commander at Pontefract by the Yorkshire militia committee, allowed repeated royalist excursions out of the castle for foraging. In one incident, raiders rounded up over 200 head of cattle and herded them to the castle, despite Cholmley’s assurances that he had the situation well in hand. He complained loudly to the Commons when Fairfax, angered by the lack of effectiveness, appointed Colonel Thomas Rainsborough as commander of the siege forces. On the night of 29 October, royalist raiders disguised as messengers from Cromwell stole out of the castle and assassinated Rainsborough in his quarters at an inn near Doncaster. Incensed by the outrageous act, Parliament ordered Cromwell to use whatever measures he deemed necessary to bring the garrison to submission. Cromwell, however, proceeded to London and turned the affair over to Lambert, who arrived from Scotland with his regiments on 17 November and instituted a siege to starve out the defenders, who surrendered in March 1649, the final act of the Second Civil War.77 It is easy to blame the hapless Hamilton for the disaster of the Preston campaign. He failed due to a number of critical errors. While he certainly displayed a woeful lack of all the essential characteristics of martial superiority – tactical acumen, operational artistry, strategic vision, battlefield management and intuition – he did enter England handicapped by a debilitating array of disadvantages. Ill-suited to command a field army, Hamilton neither understood the implications of speed of advance nor the tactical imperative of concentration of forces. The inability to discipline and control the depredations of the soldiers cost the Scots the support of the local royalist population. The duke’s unwillingness to exercise his authority over headstrong subordinates, notably Callander, cost him the services of Monro’s veterans and the bulk of the cavalry at Preston. He squandered the opportunity to 141


destroy Lambert when he had a sizeable numerical advantage. The delays at several points in the advance allowed parliamentary reinforcements to arrive. By allowing his forces to be divided and the inattention to maintaining a tight line of march, he lost the flexibility to concentrate his army rapidly in a defensive posture at Preston and the Ribble Bridge. In failing to react to a wealth of intelligence about the whereabouts of enemy forces, he gave the parliamentarians the advantage of surprise. Thus, Cromwell and Lambert attacked the Scots piecemeal and destroyed Langdale’s royalists, Baillie’s rearguard brigades and Middleton’s horse in a succession of nearly separate engagements. As the battle unfolded, his exhausted men, unable to fire their muskets due to wet powder and overcome by the human dynamics of fear and fatigue, lost the will to fight. Effective leadership might have alleviated some of the inherent problems facing the Scots; however, tactical blunders and the lack of effective battlefield management on Hamilton’s part as well as among key subordinates, doomed any chances the Engager army had for success or even survival. The Engager invasion disaster proved Hamilton to be: no general, nor of the stuff of which commanders are made[;] … despite a superficial grandness and a deceptive optimism he was neither confident nor assertive; lacking charisma and an authoritative personality he was not a leader of men, and, devoid of decision and foresight, he had no gift for military strategy.78 Although the probability of Scottish defeat had been determined well before the Engager army crossed the border in July, Hamilton believed that his leadership and the firmness of the cause would inspire the Scots to achieve the difficult task of restoring the king’s authority by force. In his final speech delivered just before his execution the following March, he denied ever having given Charles false advice or betraying his army: ‘it was so contrary to my Conscience, and so derogatory to my Honour’. His personal honour and physical courage seem to have been the only laudable aspects of his campaign so beset by blunders, a lack of national unity or sense of common purpose and a complete breakdown of the royalist unity of command. Perhaps owing to his heroic action at Preston and in spite of his failure to stand with his troops after Winwick, Hamilton appears as a tragic and sympathetic figure. His subsequent execution and the dignity he displayed in captivity added to his martyrdom. However, the perception is mixed even among Restoration commentators, making it difficult to judge contemporary public opinion of the duke’s actions and the perception of his personal honour. Clarendon, for example, criticized Hamilton for his actions during the retreat and the surrender to Lambert, virtually accusing the Scot of cowardice.79 The fate of the 1648 royalist insurgency rested with the ability of the Scottish Engager army and its northern royalist allies to defeat the New Model Army in the field, a difficult objective under the best of circumstances; however, the royalist forces and Engagers suffered from not only a lack of Scottish unity, but the failure 142


to operationally coordinate and execute a reasonably astute strategic plan. The various risings in Wales and Kent might have tied down Cromwell and Fairfax long enough for Hamilton to push aside Lambert and join Byron in a march towards London. In theory, separate risings in the north, east and Wales to split the New Model Army and prevent Fairfax from concentrating his forces combined with an Engager invasion represented a viable strategy. The naval revolt gave the royalists sea control, especially important in terms of supplies and troops from the continent. The fragility of the plan lay in the coordination and timing. Langdale captured Carlisle and Berwick before the Scots marched. The Welsh and Kentish risings also occurred prematurely and in no case did the various participants coordinate their actions with each other. Byron’s failure to impede Cromwell’s advance into Lancashire removed his forces from any meaningful participation in the north, which would have aided Hamilton and Langdale. The loss at Preston doomed the royalist cause and the Second Civil War ended, as had the first, in abject royalist defeat. Hamilton, like a man whose glory is written in the sand at low tide, held the keys to victory in his hands, but squandered the opportunity through a total lack of any martial synergy. Lambert demonstrated the full development of his martial synergy. With the exception of his losing contact with the enemy after the defeat at Appleby, which Hamilton failed to take advantage of, Lambert demonstrated the characteristics that had propelled his rapid rise as a parliamentary general. Throughout the Preston campaign, he successfully employed the indirect approach and the strategic pursuit. The former resulted in the attack on Langdale’s outnumbered royalists separated from the Scottish main force by the River Ribble. The latter prevented the exhausted refugees from forming an effective defence and resulted in Lambert’s capture of Hamilton and the surrender of thousands of Scottish troops. And, the combination of Cromwell as army commander with Lambert as deputy frequently charged with conducting rapid independent strike force missions that proved so effective against Hamilton would be equally powerful in the Third Civil War. The unsuccessful implementation of the royalist strategy granted the New Model Army overwhelming advantages. The parliamentarians benefited from the professionalism honed over three years of active field service, greater discipline and training, a generally skilled and experienced officer corps and, above all, exemplary senior commanders such as Cromwell and Lambert. A parliamentary supporter wrote of the New Model in admiration: ‘this poore despised army … scattered from North to South, from Wales to Dover, and from Barwick to the lands end; are used by God in handfuls to scatter the great enumerous bodies of these wicked ones’.80 The premature risings and the lack of coordination are captured in the lament of a royalist participant in September 1648: [the king’s supporters] caused the Countreys to grow warm too early, and in confidence of assistance from [London] … [rose] severally … to carry it on their own way … whereby the hopefullest Design that ever was contrived for his Majesty … is destroyed.81 143


6 ‘MY BOW AND ARROWS’ The Third Civil War, 1650–1651

The experience of defeat in 1648 did not heal the rifts among the Scots. The basic tensions between royalism and Presbyterianism remained. Chastised and forced to renounce the agreement with Charles I, the Engagers negotiated a treaty with Argyle that ensured the political domination of the Kirk party from September 1648 until the disaster at Dunbar two years later. Prominent Engagers, notably the second duke of Hamilton, recanted their agreement with Charles I and joined Argyle in a newly reformed Covenant ‘party’. The defeat and execution of Montrose by May 1650 and Charles II’s acceptance of the Covenant seemingly restored Scottish unity. Concurrently, the English invasion of July 1650 initially caused a unified Scottish reaction with the formation of a large defensive force and the mobilization of Scottish resources. But the new-found unity proved ephemeral.1 As the New Model Army crossed the Scottish border in 1650, the Scots had a reasonable chance of repulsing the invasion based on a sizeable numerical advantage and in defence of their own lands. The elderly Leven still served as titular lordgeneral of all the Scottish forces, though David Leslie, as the actual field commander, made strategic decisions and executed operations. Leslie had gained a well-deserved reputation for his actions at Marston Moor and the victory over Montrose at Philiphaugh in 1645. However, trouble with the Kirk over the issue of the English royalists within Leslie’s forces emerged early in the campaign. The basic tensions within Scottish society over religion that had played such a sizeable role in Hamilton’s defeat in 1648 remained. His inability to mediate or overcome the disunity among the Scottish political, military and religious leaders severely hampered Leslie’s efforts to repel the invaders. Leslie, like Hamilton, suffered the consequences of a divided nation. As the army marched south towards Berwick to intercept Cromwell and Lambert, Kirk supporters in Edinburgh argued that the royalists should not be included in the Scottish forces and must raise an army of their own in England. With the highly professional, well-trained and equipped New Model Army under the competent command of Cromwell and Lambert advancing on Edinburgh, such statements illustrated the abject lack of a Scottish common purpose as well as the fundamental handicap under which Leslie operated.2 The invasion of Scotland in the summer of 1650 again placed Lambert in the role of a major subordinate to Cromwell as the invading army’s commissary-general 144

‘ M Y B OW A N D A R ROW S ’

(and de facto second-in-command) with periodic assignments as an independent field commander. His actions at Hamilton destroyed the Western Association army of Gilbert Ker in December 1650. Lambert’s victory at Inverkeithing made possible the successful invasion of Fife in July 1651 to choke off Leslie’s supply line to Stirling. For Leslie, the Third Civil War proved to be a sad ending to an otherwise laudable military career. He allowed his strategic and operational decisions to be influenced by militarily inept civilian authorities, which led to the disaster at Dunbar. Forced out of his dominating defensive position at Torwood by Lambert’s successful Fife campaign, he agreed to the doomed invasion of England in August 1651, which led to the final defeat of the royalists at Worcester in September. This chapter examines the leadership effectiveness of John Lambert and David Leslie, former comrades in arms in the 1640s, as the central players in the story of the campaigns of the Third Civil War of 1650–1 in the north of England and southern Scotland, the final major royalist attempt to restore the Stuart dynasty to the English throne (which ultimately came to fruition with the Restoration of 1660 following a number of minor royalist insurrections and short-lived, failed rebellions). Both Leslie and Lambert benefited from a high degree of martial superiority, as demonstrated by their actions and successes in the first two Civil Wars; however, a critical flaw appeared in Leslie’s leadership in the third war: the inability to mediate (a function of consistency) and prevent undue civilian interference with his tactical, operational and strategic decision-making, This failing ultimately undercut his otherwise high degree of martial synergy. Lambert, on the other hand, benefited from a united England and little interference with his military operations, a fact that made an enormous difference in their relative failure or success.

‘Controversie by the sword’: the invasion of Scotland Following the proclamation of the prince of Wales as king in Edinburgh on 5 February 1649, Charles appointed Montrose as his lieutenant-governor and captain-general of the forces in Scotland. Taking advantage of the New Model Army’s preparations for the Irish campaign of 1649, Montrose organized a mercenary force of Danes and Germans that landed in the Orkneys in August, followed in March 1650 by additional troops. With a negligible body of 500 mercenaries, fifty royalist horse and 1,000 ill-trained Orcadians, he sent an advance party to the mainland and followed in mid-April. Montrose hoped to form a substantial Highland army around this nucleus having been promised considerable support from the Clans MacKenzie, Ross and Monroe. David Leslie, commanding the Covenanter Army, ordered Colonel Archibald Strachan, the military commander at Inverness, to intercept Montrose. At the Carron River on 27 April, Strachan induced Montrose to attack, but the Rosses and Monroes, who had sided with the Covenanters, ambushed the marquis and dispersed the little polyglot army.3 Relations between the two kingdoms had deteriorated since the victory of 1646 over issues such as the Scottish frustration with the tepid attempt to impose 145


Figure 6.1 The Scottish campaign, 1650–1

presbyterianism on England in accordance with the terms of the Covenant, the rise of religious and political radicalism in the New Model and Hamilton’s Engager invasion. The king’s execution in January 1649 destroyed the Covenanter– Independent alliance and caused a majority of the Kirk supporters to oppose the political alliance between Cromwell and Argyle established in the autumn of 1648, thus reviving the political fortunes of old Engagers such as the second duke of Hamilton, the former earl of Lanark. Owing to the failure of the royalists in Ireland in 1649 and 1650, coupled with the execution of Montrose in Edinburgh in May 1650, Charles II agreed to take the Covenant in order to assure broader Scottish support for renewed military action against the English Republic. He landed at Spey Mouth in Moray and arrived in Edinburgh in July. Few trusted his sincerity, a factor that hampered efforts to defeat the parliamentarians. In England, the new alliance of royalists and Covenanters induced the Rump Parliament to recall Cromwell from Ireland, activate a northern field army, raise new regiments and mobilize the northern militia. On 20 June, the Council of State ordered an invasion of Scotland as a pre-emptive measure against an anticipated Scottish invasion. Fairfax objected to the proposal. He preferred to confront the Scots once they invaded, which allowed for a general mobilization of local troops and veterans motivated to defend their counties. At a Whitehall conference on 25 June, Fairfax vigorously objected to the invasion plan and resigned his post to satisfy his conscience. Cromwell assumed command of the invasion army with 146


Lambert as commissary-general in charge of the cavalry. Lieutenant-General Charles Fleetwood, Cromwell’s son-in-law, served as the second-in-command, though effectively Lambert filled that role. George Monck commanded the foot. Major-General Thomas Harrison commanded a mobile reserve of four regiments stationed near the border. As the English forces collected for the march to Scotland, Cromwell issued a declaration justifying the invasion and assuring the Scottish people that the army had no intentions of committing the pillage and destruction against civilians typical of previous Anglo-Scottish conflicts. But, he warned the General Assembly of the Kirk that ‘God shall please to order the decision of this Controversie by the Sword’. Throughout the Highlands, the chiefs fired signal beacons to announce to their clansmen an invader’s advance.4 Statements of English unity as preparations advanced for the invasion of Scotland in the summer of 1650 provide a marked contrast to the divisions among the Scots. Cromwell’s declaration to the General Assembly clearly laid out the goal of the invasion as preventing the return of the Stuart monarchy made possible by the Scots having taken our grand Enemy into [their] Bosoms, and [their] engagement to Him … to restore Him to the possession of England and Ireland; and therefore we call Heaven and Earth to witnesse, Whether or no, we have not cause to defend our selves by hindring the present power of Scotland.5 The declaration served as a unifying statement of the New Model Army’s purpose from which it never deviated throughout the Third Civil War. A parliamentary declaration of 26 June 1650 justifying the invasion made clear the Republic’s unity in support of the army’s action: ‘the Son [Prince Charles] did tread in the Fathers steps, and pursue his Designes, destructive to Religion and Liberty’.6 As an expression of the army’s unity in support of the endeavour and its commander, a council of officers at York on 10 July ‘declared to live and dye with him [Cromwell]’.7 The sense of common purpose between the English political and military establishments contrasted markedly with the disarray among the Scots and provided the field commanders with a powerful tool in their endeavours to bring the royalists to heel. The reputation garnered by Lambert elevated him in the esteem of the parliamentary soldiery. An example of the practical results of his personal honour and reputation for fairness occurred on the march north in July 1650. Colonel John Bright resigned his regimental command at Newcastle in a dispute with Cromwell over the granting of an extended leave to return home to settle personal affairs. Faced with replacing such a skilled and experienced officer at the outset of a difficult campaign, Cromwell nominated George Monck. However, he consulted the men of Bright’s regiment before finalizing the appointment. Upon hearing of the nomination, the men objected to the former royalist officer on the grounds of untrustworthiness and dubious loyalty to the parliamentary cause. The following day, Cromwell proposed Lambert, a nomination received with enthusiasm by the 147


men, who shouted ‘a Lambert! a Lambert!’ and tossed their hats in the air. Captain John Hodgson, who served in Bright’s, then Lambert’s foot through the Second and Third Civil Wars, recorded that ‘the soldiers chose him unanimously’. The men of Bright’s foot had first-hand knowledge of Lambert; he had chosen that unit to march with in the assault against Langdale at Preston, evoking Hodgson’s description of Lambert as ‘always faithful and forward to promote the work’. To console the vilified Monck, the lord-general appointed him colonel of a newly raised foot regiment drawn from the Newcastle and Berwick garrisons.8 The nine regiments of foot (10,800 men) directly under Cromwell and eight of horse (5,000) commanded by Lambert concentrated at Berwick, crossed the border on 22 July without opposition and took up a position south of Edinburgh at Musselburgh. The Scottish army held a strong defensive position from Leith on the Firth of Forth to the eastern end of Edinburgh. Leslie employed a strategy of attrition, forcing the English to attack strongly fortified positions and exhaust supplies and resources in a series of costly assaults against the Scottish lines. The Scot acknowledged the distinct advantages enjoyed by the professional troops of the New Model Army in an open engagement, particularly in training, equipment and experience. He chose a plan to bleed the enemy with periodic quick assaults and rely on his internal lines of supply, the harsh Scottish climate and a numerical advantage to maintain his defensive position in the face of a clearly superior opponent. The strategy proved to be correct. When the Scots did choose to confront the parliamentarians in open battle, they lost at Dunbar, Hamilton, Inverkeithing and Worcester. When they remained behind stout fortifications, they frustrated the English bent on a strategy of offensive annihilation designed to destroy the Scottish forces in combat. Early fighting prior to Dunbar and in the following spring campaign against Leslie’s Torwood line near Stirling demonstrated the efficacy of this defensive attrition strategy and of Leslie’s keen strategic vision.9 On 29 July, Lambert’s cavalry drove back the Scottish outposts to within a mile of Edinburgh, but could not capitalize on the victory owing to soaking rain and exhaustion. Cromwell withdrew to the original camp at Musselburgh the following day with Lambert providing a rearguard. Lambert’s men drove the Scots back into their own trenches with a well-executed counterattack. In the melee, a Scottish lancer wounded Lambert in the arm and thigh, but troopers of Cromwell’s horse rescued the wounded and momentarily captured major-general. The English braced for and repulsed a general attack the following day.10 Despite withstanding two vigorous Scottish attacks, Cromwell’s position at Musselburgh remained tenuous. Faced with a supply shortage complicated by the inability to unload ships due to foul weather and continuous losses of men through casualties and desertion, Cromwell withdrew on the 6th to Dunbar and a more logistically sustainable position. Despite a qualitative superiority, the opponent’s skill and the physical conditions of the battlefield (weather and terrain) complicated Cromwell’s offensive annihilation strategy. Throughout August, Leslie demonstrated a striking tactical acumen that continually frustrated English efforts to advance on Edinburgh. A slowly developing attempt to outflank the Scots at South 148


Queensferry failed when Leslie detected the movement and placed guns in the line of march. In a series of moves and countermoves aimed at dislodging the Scots and outflanking the Edinburgh defensive positions, Cromwell advanced and captured outposts at Braid Hill and Redhall. However, with every move, Leslie either sidestepped the English or threatened their flank so that Cromwell could neither initiate a general engagement nor move between Leslie and the city. By the 1st of September, Cromwell and his ‘poor, shattered, hungry, discouraged’ army returned to Dunbar.11

‘Signal mercy’: the battle of Dunbar Two events altered the strategic balance in Cromwell’s favour by the end of August and led to English victory at the battle of Dunbar; the mistrust of Charles and his royalist followers precipitated a purge of Leslie’s army, and interference in military decisions by civilian Kirk representatives induced the general to commit a woeful tactical error. Two instances of a lapse in Leslie’s mediation skills with a resultant diminution of command authority occurred just prior to the battle of Dunbar. Prince Charles arrived at Leith on 2 August hoping to enhance his standing with the army but this possibility alarmed the Kirk, still doubtful of his recent conversion to the Covenant. The Committee of Estates and major Kirk leaders feared the prince’s presence would bring in many old royalists, thus polluting the godly purpose of the army and diminishing the soldiers’ will to resist the invaders. Archibald Johnston of Wariston argued that the prince’s involvement would ‘breed carnal confidence’ and that the ‘Lord would so disrupt the English that only a few godly Scots would destroy them’. Urged on by Johnston, the more radical ministers demanded a purge of Leslie’s force. Prominent officers such as Colonels Archibald Strachan and Gilbert Ker advocated the Kirk position; Leslie faced a potent opposition. He did win some support for moderation from Argyle and some of the less radical Kirk ministers. Leslie countered that the privilege to fight for the cause of Scottish religion meant that the bar should not be set too high. He lost the argument. Beginning on 16 August, the Commissioners for Purges cashiered eighty officers and 3,000 soldiers, many of them skilled veterans whom the commissioners accused of being ‘malignants’.12 To justify the actions of the purgers and interference with Leslie’s army, Johnston commented in early August that the Scottish forces stood ‘all in confusion; no counsel amongst us’. The interference with the army resulted from Johnston’s proposal in late July that a committee from the Kirk be appointed to meet with senior officers to determine how best to employ the army. Though unable to prevent the establishment of the committee, Leslie nonetheless vigorously opposed the suggestion. This strange turn of events and subsequent interference by civilians in military decisions, particularly in the face of a capable and seasoned opponent, cost Leslie dearly in the unfolding struggle.13 Despite the loss of the purged troops, Leslie retained a nearly two-to-one numerical advantage. Maintaining close contact with the retreating English, he 149


Figure 6.2 Battle of Dunbar, 3 September 1650

occupied the Lammermuir Hills rising south of Dunbar dominated by Doon Hill. From this position, the Scots controlled all land communications with England. Even without a successful engagement, Leslie could force the English to evacuate by sea. However, pressure from the Kirk ministers and members of the Estates accompanying the army induced Leslie to commit a woeful tactical blunder. Acquiescing to the ministers, who argued that God had ordained a Scottish victory, he agreed to move the army from the high ground to the valley of the Broxburn River and attack the English seemingly at his mercy. In addition, the loading of sick and wounded parliamentary soldiers aboard transport ships gave Leslie the impression of a pending English evacuation. An aggressive attack by the Scots would catch Cromwell at a vulnerable moment.14 However, at this point, Leslie suffered an inexplicable loss of tactical astuteness. Convinced that the English intended to evacuate by sea, he failed to employ sufficient scouts for battlefield reconnaissance. This simple tactical and common-sense expedient would have indicated that the enemy did not intend to evacuate immediately. In fact, adequate reconnaissance might have revealed Lambert’s movement of artillery into position for an assault, not a retreat. While his mediation skills in preventing the Kirk’s interference failed initially, he compounded his dilemma by not moderating his normal aggressiveness and boldness by prudence in ignoring a basic tenet of warfare: the posting of scouts. Leslie additionally suffered from an astounding loss of moral authority the 150


night before the battle through his inattention to the troops’ physical well-being. Perhaps distracted by the Kirk’s interference, he violated a basic maxim of effective leadership and allowed his troops to suffer hunger and deprivation leading up to and including the night of the battle, first on the windswept and desolate Doon Hill and then in the valley beneath. As the Scottish army waited through the raindrenched night for the morning and the chance to push the invaders into the North Sea, Leslie allowed his officers to seek warmer, drier quarters rather than persevere with their men. By morning, the suffering, hungry, shivering troops had largely lost the will and strength to fight even though they defended their own home and hearth. Leslie, in effect, ignored the human context of war and subsequently paid heavy dues for his inattention. The incident represented a woeful loss of moral authority and stoic sacrifice at all levels of command. But the ultimate responsibility for this devastating lack of good judgement must rest with Leslie. Leslie bowed to the pressure of civilian authorities when the decision to relinquish the high ground and initiate a general action should have been a purely military one and only his to make. The loss of his command authority to civilian interlopers due to his lack of astute mediation proved decisive. Against lesser commanders than Cromwell and Lambert, the numerical advantage might have proven sufficient. Effective mediation of the purge dispute with the civilian commissioners might have resulted in a compromise whereby the accused troops could have been detached under a reliable Kirk party commander for service in a less sensitive region. In this fashion, ill will between the royalists and the Kirk could have been reduced and the Scots would have retained the service of some of their most experienced and motivated forces.15 From the English perspective, Leslie’s mistakes presented a wonderful opportunity. On the morning of 2 September, Lambert and Cromwell stood in the garden of Broxmouth House observing the Scottish forces moving down from Doon Hill. Both officers realized Leslie’s critical error. In the open country where Leslie’s right wing took up position, the New Model cavalry enjoyed a distinct tactical advantage in quality and quantity. At a council of war that evening, many officers argued for a retreat whereby the foot would embark on the supply ships while the cavalry attempted to force its way out of the trap. Lambert strenuously opposed the plan and argued that insufficient darkness remained to embark the foot before daylight, making them vulnerable to a morning assault. He pointed out that the ground favoured a swift English attack using the advantage in artillery and horse and that the enemy had allowed gaps to form between his formations, allowing the free movement of cavalry and preventing the Scots from wheeling about to protect their flanks. Impressed with Lambert’s assessment of the tactical picture and keen sense of situational awareness, one colonel requested that Lambert command the attack. Though Cromwell cannot have been pleased with the implications regarding his leadership of the campaign, he agreed.16 Debate has always surrounded the battle of Dunbar as to the source of the tactical plan. Advocates for Cromwell as the initiator of the plan to engage Leslie once he had moved down from Doon Hill rely on Cromwell’s report to Speaker of 151


the House Lenthall of 4 September 1650, in which the lord-general relates that, in the early evening of the 2nd, the Major-General [Lambert] and myself coming to the Earl Roxburgh’s House, and observing this posture, I told him I thought it did give us an opportunity and advantage to attempt upon the enemy, to which he immediately replied, that he thought to have said the same thing to me. Cromwell acknowledged that both officers mutually concurred on the plan of action and that Monck, when called in, also agreed.17 The event illustrates the remarkable synergy of the two officers and their tactical theories. Military protocol dictates that Lambert, as second-in-command, withhold his opinion until the commanding officer has expressed his view of the situation unless specifically asked to so state before the senior officer announces his intentions. At that point, it would have been appropriate for Lambert either to agree or to suggest an alternate plan. The plan’s actual author is not germane since both concurred in all respects. The more important aspect is that both officers then executed the plan with considerable efficiency and success. Throughout the night, Lambert arranged the forces, paying particular attention to the artillery placement. Although a cavalry officer, Lambert understood the employment of artillery as part of the overall tactical plan. Hodgson comments that Lambert placed the artillery so that ‘our guns might have fair play at their left wing, while we were fighting their right’. Lambert so skilfully placed the parliamentary artillery during the initial stages of the battle that when he led the flanking attack on the pass over the Berwick road, Leslie could not engage his left to repulse the assault and prevent the collapse of the Scottish right wing. Lambert massed the horse and much of Monck’s infantry in the centre for the main assault, with Colonel Thomas Pride’s four regiments of foot and horse assigned the task of turning the exposed Scottish right flank. The major-general’s efforts resulted in such success that Cromwell deployed the bulk of his forces against Leslie’s right and thus defeated an army twice the size.18 As day broke with Lambert still engaged in positioning the artillery, Cromwell grew impatient; however, Lambert soon arrived and ordered Pride’s flanking body to march. Cromwell accompanied Pride’s men throughout the battle. Riding to the head of the horse on the far left of the English line composed of Lambert’s, Whalley’s and Lilburnes’s horse and supported by two regiments of foot, Lambert initiated a movement across the low ground between the Scottish right and the sea to secure the pass over the Berwick road in preparation for a general assault. Lambert’s brigade encountered a party of Scots under Colonel Strachan headed up the road for a surprise attack on the English line and an hour-long melee ensued before Lambert secured the pass. Counterattacking Scottish cavalry armed with formidable lances constructed of pikes with iron pegs on either side failed to dislodge Lambert from the pass. Supported by Cromwell’s horse, Lambert delivered a devastating blow against the Scottish right. The advance turned into a furious charge into the Scottish line. 152


Though initially checked by the enemy reserve, a second charge by Lambert shattered the Scottish horse while Monck’s infantry drove through the wavering enemy foot. Cromwell ordered a shift of the line leftward to disentangle his troops and provide a wider front for the pikemen to engage the Scottish infantry. Only two foot regiments stood their ground against the advancing English pikemen. Confident that the English intended to evacuate, most Scottish foot regiments had not even lit their matches, despite the close proximity of the enemy. In a steady, pelting rain, the Scottish musketeers stood little chance of resisting the English pike onslaught. Many soldiers, some still asleep in their tents and completely surprised when Lambert launched the audacious and unexpected attack, quickly threw down their useless muskets and surrendered or took flight. The aggressive action resulted in the collapse of the Scottish horse, which galloped in panic through the foot on the opposite flank. Observing the disintegration of the best of the Scottish foot before the furious charge of Pride and Cromwell’s men, the Scottish artillerymen abandoned their guns and fled. Despite being unengaged, Leslie’s foot on the left of his line also threw down their weapons and scattered, completing the rout within an hour. Although Leslie escaped to Stirling with 4,000 men, which formed the nucleus of the Scottish army that held Cromwell at bay for almost another year, he lost 10,000 men captured, 3,000 dead and all of his guns. In contrast, Cromwell’s dead amounted to only twenty troops, all slain in Lambert’s attack on the Berwick road pass. He reported that not a single Englishmen died in the general assault, an extraordinary statistic if somewhat dubious. In his letter to Parliament on 4 September, Cromwell credited the victory to the hand of Providence that granted ‘one of the most signal mercies God hath done for England and His people, [in] this war’.19 The decision by Lambert and Cromwell to attack the far more numerous Scots with little opportunity for a hasty retreat should events go badly illustrates their characteristic boldness, aggressiveness and risk-taking nature, attributes that weighed heavily in the resulting stunning English victory. Following Dunbar, Lambert advanced with nine regiments of horse to seize Edinburgh before the shattered Scottish forces could mount a defence. Although a body of roughly 1,000 horse had collected near the city, it did not impede Lambert’s dash. The heavily fortified line running from the capital to Leith proved useless as Leslie collected the remnants of his army and retreated to Stirling. Cromwell arrived on 7 September with the main body and occupied Edinburgh. For the remainder of the autumn, the war devolved into a series of raids and skirmishes and the successful siege of Edinburgh Castle, which held out until mid-December. Both sides replaced casualties and prepared for a renewed campaign in the spring. Strategically, however, the English had gained the ascendancy through successful offensive annihilation made possible by Scottish blundering at Dunbar. Dunbar accelerated the fracturing of Scottish political and religious parties, further damaging Leslie’s ability to sustain a viable defence. The remnants of the old royalists, leaderless after the execution of Montrose, with no forces and ‘like a Serpent in the grass’, remained a dangerous threat to both the Covenanters and 153


Scottish unity. The ‘new Cavaliers’ aligned with Charles and, supported by the bulk of the former Engagers, ‘would shake hands with the Kings party upon any terms’. Headed by Leslie, this group controlled the army at Stirling, the only significant force militarily capable of resisting the English.20

‘A dark sad business’: the battle of Hamilton Although blamed for the loss at Dundee and Edinburgh, the Covenanters under Argyle remained a potent faction and still represented sizeable public opinion. Charles’s acceptance of the Covenant created an unstable but potentially powerful alliance, an important factor in Leslie’s efforts to rebuild his forces. The Covenanters still dominated the Committee of Estates sitting at Stirling and provided political legitimacy to Charles and Leslie. Disenchantment with both the royalists and the rigid religious intolerance of Presbyterianism stimulated a reaction based largely in the western Lowlands (called the Western Association) and led by Colonels Archibald Strachan and Gilbert Ker. Although pledged to repulse the English invaders, the new faction recognized the ascendancy of the Independents in England and pledged in a remonstrance to resist Charles until he reformed and abandoned the old royalists. The Remonstrants formed an independent army of the Western Association under Strachan and Ker, a dangerous political move that both created a new military force and alienated the aristocrats who considered themselves the natural military leaders of the kingdom. Cromwell attempted to negotiate with the Western Association leaders, an effort that proved fruitless and frustrating.21 The breakdown of negotiations with the Remonstrants led to the action at Hamilton in which Lambert again demonstrated his ability to rally panicky men and reverse the flow of the battle in his favour. As Scotland reeled from the defeat at Dunbar, orders for fresh levies went out from the new capital at Stirling. Forced into concessions, the Estates accepted the offer of the Western Association to raise larger than ordered levies on the condition that those troops would form an independent field force under the command of Colonels Ker, Strachan and Robert Halket. The appointment of non-aristocratic, radical Kirk party officers set in motion a renewed fracturing of Scottish unity. Many peers refused to support the Western Association, including the earl of Eglinton, who immediately ceased raising men from his estates. Despite the lack of noble support for the western army, religious enthusiasm fired its supporters, mostly lesser lairds, heritors, burgesses and small farmers.22 While the Western Association formed its forces and Leslie fortified Stirling with the remnants of his army, the royalists openly rejoiced at the disaster at Dunbar, believing that it would cause a general shift in support towards Charles and away from the religious extremists, who demanded even more purges. Charles, in particular, ‘was glad of it, as the greatest happiness that could befall him, in the loss of so strong a body of his enemies’. Despite royalist hopes of gaining from the disarray of the Kirk party, Charles accrued no apparent advantage from Dunbar and signed a compromise agreement with Leslie and the Kirk leaders on 4 154


November, which established the alliance that ended in defeat at Worcester the following September.23 Ignoring the accord between Charles, Leslie and the Kirk, the Western Association moved further into opposition. Cromwell opened negotiations with the westerners in hopes of applying pressure on Leslie’s near-impregnable position at Stirling. The western radicals further alienated themselves by conducting a meeting at Dumfries on 17 October at which the attendees signed a remonstrance criticizing the Kirk’s alliance with Charles without evidence of a change in his position on religion. They further declared that they would neither support the prince until he mended his ways nor accept an alliance with malignants. Negotiations with Cromwell soon broke down. The Kirk condemned the remonstrance and initiated action against its leaders. Robert Baillie accused Strachan of being the ‘chief author of all this mischieffe [and had] foullie betrayed his trust, and since is [gone] unto the enemy’. In a test to determine if the western force had any utility in the war against Cromwell, the Committee of Estates ordered Ker to relieve the siege of Borthwick Castle. The colonel demurred, claiming he had insufficient forces, but that he would obey Charles as long as the prince served the Lord. With the Western Association army obviously of no use under its radical leadership, the Committee dispatched Robert Montgomery to supersede Ker as commander. Prompted into action by the Committee’s move, Ker marched east to attack what he perceived to be the lightly held New Model post at Hamilton on the River Clyde.24 Growing weary of the inability to bring the main Scottish force to action as well as with the fruitless negotiations with the Western Association, Cromwell resolved to destroy Ker’s force. From Glasgow on the 22nd, Ker advanced against Whalley as he returned to Scotland after a brief foray to Carlisle. Reacting to Ker’s movements, Cromwell reached Hamilton, the only crossing of the Clyde, on the 28th with eight foot regiments to await Lambert, who had been previously detached westward towards Dumfries with 3,000 horse. On Lambert’s approach, Ker retired with his 2,000 troops to Dumfries and into the Stirling Hills beyond rather than confront the parliamentarians. When the cavalry failed to arrive owing to flooding on the south bank of the Clyde, Cromwell returned to Edinburgh; however, Lambert’s command arrived two days later, and on the night of 30 November crushed the army of the Western Association at the battle of Hamilton.25 The defenders of Bothwell Bridge across the Clyde at Hamilton fled northward as Lambert attacked them in the rear and captured both the crossing and the town. Cromwell’s departure induced Ker to leave the surrounding hills and launch a night attack against Lambert in near-blizzard conditions. The laird of Ralston led the Scottish vanguard into the town, found no sentries and immediately assaulted Lambert’s loosely formed men. A melee of street fighting and hand-to-hand combat erupted through homes and shops. The English troops broke and fled into buildings for safety. Lambert, captured briefly, managed to flee through the back door of an inn. Accompanied by Whalley, he rode about the snow-choked streets rallying troops in clumps of twenty or thirty. Ker awaited events on the outskirts of Hamilton and finally advanced early in the morning with the remainder of his command 155


only to find Lambert’s men reformed and order restored. Ker’s men crossed a deep trench in their front against the parliamentarians holding the east bank, but the move broke their cohesion. Seeing Ker’s demise, Lambert quickly outflanked him, forcing a disorderly retreat. In the confusion, the Scots fled in disarray. Lambert’s troopers chased the refugees as far as Paisley and Kilmarnock. Ker remained in the town to rally his survivors despite a wound to his right arm, described as hanging by a strip.26 With the defeat of the Western Association army and the capture of Ker, Strachan and a number of western lairds submitted to Lambert on 13 December and to Cromwell in Edinburgh six days later. The Hamilton action gave the English virtual control over the entire south of Scotland from Edinburgh to Glasgow and further isolated Charles’s forces in their defensive works around Stirling. Thomas Carlyle, citing an eyewitness account of the battle of Hamilton, described it as a ‘dark sad business, of an ancient Winter morning’.27 The destruction of the Western Association convinced the Kirk that all means possible must be employed to repel the invaders, including the employment of otherwise noxious malignants and former Engagers. The Estates ordered a new levy and required that all officers be reliable Kirk supporters. Despite the prohibition, the colonels included many royalists or former Engagers who had fought with Montrose and even some Highland clan chieftains not known for supporting the Covenant. The Scottish Parliament ended its session on 30 December with the resolution that Charles would be crowned at Scone.28 At the traditional coronation site at Scone, Charles Stuart became King Charles II of Scotland on New Year’s Day 1651. He appointed the duke of Hamilton as lieutenant-general and Leven as commander-in-chief of the Scottish forces. As senior officer of the force at Stirling, Leslie remained in charge of field operations. Hamilton summoned the young gentry of Scotland to ride with him on a recruiting tour to ‘animate the people to recruite his Forces’. Few seemed willing to commit any ‘further then they [were] constrained’. Nonetheless, the king secured enough men to replace the losses of the autumn campaigns.29 In early March, Hamilton gave a formal confession before a congregation of his ‘sin of the Engagement as unlawfull against the consents of the Kirke of Scotland’, thus solidifying wavering support for Charles.30 The new king immediately set about recruiting forces in anticipation of his ultimate aim, the invasion of England and the restoration of his monarchy. In support of the plan, he dispatched royalist agents to various sites in England, including Chester, Liverpool, Hull and Norwich to foment royalist uprisings. Owing to an effective counter-intelligence service, Parliament learned of the subversive intentions and prevented any royalist activities as well as raising an additional 4,000 troops for home defence. Derby House appointed Charles Fleetwood commander in London and gave Harrison responsibility for the defence of Lancashire and the north. The coronation represented the ascendancy of the royalists in Scotland. One by one, the Covenanter, Engager and Kirk parties had all collapsed. With the need to free Scotland from the New Model Army, national unity had finally been restored 156


for the first time since 1646. Argyle, the arch-presbyterian Kirk leader, placed the crown on Charles’s head, symbolizing the royalist victory, but it heralded an uneasy peace between the factions. Charles II represented the one unifying figure. Despite public protestations of unity by Kirk leaders, many parish ministers particularly in Stirling and Aberdeen, declined to support Charles. However, Leslie finally had the support of the principal political and religious leaders, the lack of which had cost him so dearly. It made possible the rapid replacement of his losses both in combat and in the natural attrition of garrison life caused by disease and desertion. Though the newly raised force would be no match for Cromwell and Lambert’s veterans, Leslie hoped to delay and frustrate the Englishmen from behind stout defensive positions long enough to bring his new army up to fighting condition by the spring of 1651.31 Two factors prevented aggressive English operations well into the spring of 1651: winter weather and Cromwell’s illness. In early February, seventeen regiments marched out of Edinburgh and crossed by easy marches into Fife to eliminate the main source of supplies for Stirling. On the march, Lambert’s troopers slept in the open, frosty air, which exacerbated the troops’ already sickly condition. The expedition, unchallenged by Leslie, came to naught owing to wintry weather and high water at the river fords. Much of the efforts until late spring consisted of reducing or capturing castles and fortified sites from which the Scots could stage raids. More importantly, Cromwell fell ill on the return to Edinburgh, suffering from exposure and dysentery. Although Lambert assumed command of the English forces, little activity resulted despite his normally aggressive, risk-taking nature. The morale of the troops suffered from lack of pay, foul weather and inactivity. By late March, Cromwell regained his health; however, English operations still lacked cohesion and aggressiveness. On 16 May Cromwell relapsed, suffering from five fits of ague in three days and possibly kidney stones. Despite orders to return to England, Cromwell remained in Edinburgh and recovered by the end of the month.32 The lack of English activity and the apparent drift in strategic initiative during the spring is a strange anomaly. Given Lambert’s inclination for aggressive, bold actions, the expectation would have been for rapid, decisive strokes either against Leslie directly or into Fife given the major-general’s penchant for the indirect approach. There is little evidence to explain Lambert’s lack of initiative. Perhaps he either awaited Cromwell’s recovery or death, or wished to allow sufficient time for the troops to recover from the rigours of the harsh winter. But with Cromwell’s eventual recovery, the army renewed active operations in June. In the interim, however, Leslie used the respite to recruit and train fresh forces and make his defensive position at Stirling far more formidable. The dilemma for Cromwell lay in how to engage Leslie without a costly siege of Stirling. A letter from English headquarters on 10 June captured the essence of the problem: ‘The beauty of the Summer is passing away very fast, and yet we are not upon any action. The enemy lieth so, that we cannot engage them; and unless they do com forth, we may yet be a long time in this posture’.33 157


‘A very glorious mercy’: the battle of Inverkeithing With the return to active operations, Cromwell initiated moves intended to fix the main Scottish force in place while assaulting the vulnerable flanks. On 28 June, Leslie, prompted by the king and reinforced by 15,000 new levies from north of Fife, marched out of Stirling and took up a position on a stout defensive line consisting of redoubts and trenches anchored on the woods of Torwood and Torwoodhead Castle south of Stirling near Falkirk. The only direct line of assault against the Torwood line lay across Larbert Bridge and was surrounded by swampy ground. When an English attempt to take the bridge in the first week of July failed, Cromwell retired to Falkirk. A direct assault on Leslie’s main position would prove costly and likely futile, therefore Cromwell resolved to starve out the enemy by interdicting the food supply coming from Fifeshire and the eastern ports. Accordingly, he detached Lambert with three regiments of horse to reconnoitre the fords across the River Forth on 8 July. The English discovered many undefended and unfortified sites; however, the difficulty lay in getting the carriages and wagons across to sustain an assault in any strength. Harrison’s arrival at Leith from northern England on 18 July allowed Cromwell to commit troops to the Fife campaign and simultaneously retain a strategic reserve to give chase should the Scots attempt to cross the border.34 On 17 July, Cromwell detached Colonel Robert Overton with 1,600 men to cross the Forth at Queensferry for a surprise strike. Overton successfully stormed the fortifications on the north bank just past daybreak with the loss of only six men. In hopes that the Scots would reinforce their position in Fife, Cromwell marched to Larbert Bridge only to find that Leslie’s main body remained in its defensive works. In reaction, Cromwell sent Lambert to support Overton while maintaining his main force near Torwood. Fearing that the small detachment on the north bank of the Forth risked annihilation, Lambert ordered two regiments of foot and two of horse to cross the river. The major-general personally directed the crossing of the Forth for a day and a night and assumed overall command on the 20th. Cromwell’s actions presented Leslie with a dilemma. He could either attack a weakened Cromwell or reinforce his crumbling eastern position in Fife. Showing an uncharacteristic lack of decisiveness, Leslie waited three days before responding to the probe and finally detached Sir John Brown with 4,500 men to repulse Lambert before he broke into the rich pastures and fields of Fife.35 Brown’s command appointment apparently did not rest on any demonstrated military skill; rather, the political authorities hoped that the threat to his own estates in southern Fife might induce him to perform in an exemplary manner. No record of the Scottish council of war’s deliberations remains; however, prudent battlefield management dictates that a subordinate given the task of confronting an opponent of Lambert’s skill must be equally adept. On his arrival, Brown ordered MajorGeneral James Holborne to use the hills to block the road leading north out of the Ferry Peninsula to prevent an English breakout into Fife. Early on the morning of 20 July, Cromwell withdrew from the covering position at Torwood, a dangerous manoeuvre that allowed for a massive Scottish reinforcement of Brown’s command, 158


thus threatening Lambert’s 4,000 men on the peninsula, who now stood surrounded on three sides by water and fronted by a long, sloping plateau broken by two low hills separated by a narrow valley. On the east side lay the village of Inverkeithing.36 Lambert’s original plan called for holding a defensive position around a breastwork constructed by Overton’s men while concealing the bulk of his foot on a hillside to ambush the advancing Scots. Seeing the English drawn up in battalions, Brown retreated to the hills north of Inverkeithing. For almost seven hours, Lambert waited for the Scots to move. Noticing the arrival of Scottish reinforcements, including a large body of the Clan MacLean of Duart, the major-general ordered an advance with a small party of horse to prompt a Scottish reaction. The ruse worked as Brown came down from the hills and deployed. Upon hearing of Cromwell’s retirement from Torwood, Lambert decided to attack the enemy before further Scottish reinforcements arrived. He placed the bulk of his troops on the right wing and commenced a general assault. As Lambert’s men charged up the hill, Holborne fled, which precipitated a panic in the reserve foot. Despite a desperate stand by 300 Highlanders under the marquis of Huntly and 800 of Clan Maclean under Sir Hector Maclean of Duart, Lambert’s men swept the field.37 Brown suffered a fatal wound. Though he was hit twice by musket balls, the heavily padded jerkin beneath the metal cuirass saved Lambert’s life. However, from the troops’ viewpoint, an apparently wounded commander who stays on the field directing the battle despite wounds demonstrates the highest moral authority, particularly stoic sacrifice, a behaviour that often drives soldiers to achieve overwhelming success in combat. In his report to Parliament, Cromwell noted the performance of Lambert: ‘The carriage of the Major-General, as in all other things so in this, is worthy of your taking notice of’.38 A letter from a parliamentary officer aptly described the Inverkeithing affair as a ‘very glorious mercy’.39 Reinforced further, Lambert swiftly blockaded all movement of supplies to Leslie out of Fife. To consolidate the victory, Cromwell captured Perth on 2 August only to learn that Leslie had abandoned the Torwood line and marched for Carlisle. In strategic terms, Inverkeithing returned the initiative to the English for the first time since the fight at Hamilton. The subsequent loss of Fife forced Leslie out of his secure defensive post at Torwood to avoid inevitable starvation, and led to the ill-conceived and poorly executed invasion of England. The events between September 1650 and August 1651 illustrate the fundamentally high degree of Lambert’s martial synergy. His actions at Dunbar demonstrated a keen tactical acumen. In attacking and holding the Berwick road pass, he divided the Scots. The enemy’s foot could not support the isolated cavalry on the Scottish right, allowing Cromwell and Pride to devastate the Scots horse with little difficulty. At Hamilton, Lambert demonstrated his ability to rally a disintegrating force by the power of his personal presence and as a function of his immense personal honour and moral authority such that a potential disaster turned into an overwhelming victory. At Inverkeithing, the perception of stoic sacrifice after he was wounded encouraged and inspired his troops. And his aggressive nature combined with his sense of intuition as to the nature of the battlefield and the flow 159


of events caused him to assault the enemy at the correct moment. The campaign in Scotland again proved Lambert’s worth to the English Republic. Leslie showed a great deal of martial superiority throughout the campaign. His holding of the high ground (Doon Hill) at Dunbar threatened to undermine all English operations in Scotland and force a withdrawal by sea. Following Dunbar, the establishment of the Stirling and Torwood defensive post frustrated the English. His attrition strategy of remaining on the defensive behind strong positions very nearly succeeded, especially given the traditional standard of a three to one troop superiority to defeat a well-entrenched enemy (troop numbers the English never had). But his lack of mediation skill undid his superb strategic plans. In allowing the civilian authority to force him into open battle at Dunbar and, as will be seen, in abandoning the Torwood position for an ill-advised march into England, Leslie abrogated all hope of winning the Third Civil War on behalf of Charles. Ultimately, his lack of mediation skill in defending his hitherto successful strategy resulted in the utter Scottish defeat at Worcester.

The Worcester campaign From a strategic perspective, an invasion of England appeared practical. With Lambert and the bulk of the best English troops in Fife, the opposition in northern England consisted of inexperienced recruits and local militia. Anticipating a possible Scottish invasion, Harrison raised the Lancashire militia in March. These troops had joined Cromwell for the operation in Fife, leaving the border essentially undefended. However, several advantages lay with the English. Charles ordered the invasion on the assumption that large numbers of northern royalists would flock to his standard. Accordingly, he sent the presbyterian General Edward Massey (now a royalist) ahead to rally English support. Unfortunately, the Committee of Ministers accompanying the army preached the harsh brand of presbyterianism that drove off many potential recruits. Unknown to the king, the ministers sent a declaration to Massey with orders for its publication; the declaration extolled the zeal of the king and the army for the Covenant and forbade the recruitment of any man who did not subscribe. Appalled by the act, Charles immediately ordered Massey to take any volunteer and not publish the paper. But the interference of the ministers resulted in few volunteers.40 A second advantage for the English lay in the nature of the Scottish force itself. Leslie had little confidence in its ability or willingness to fight. For months, he had pampered his troops by never placing them in risky situations. While they might fight well for home and hearth, their commander knew they had no heart for an invasion of England. As the Scots moved south, dysentery and desertions thinned the regiments. Hamilton admitted he could not tell ‘whether our hopes or fears are greatest; but we have one stout argument, despair’. In a more positive vein, he commented that all the ‘rogues had left them’. The planned risings in England fizzled with the arrest of royalist agents; few locals joined the doomed expedition.41 160


Figure 6.3 The Battle of Worcester, 3 September 1651

As Parliament accelerated raising troops to impede the invasion, Cromwell detached Lambert on 5 August with 3,000 horse and dragoons to chase the Scots. He ordered the major-general to harass the enemy but to avoid a general engagement. Leaving Monck at Perth, Cromwell followed Lambert with the slower foot and a light artillery train in a series of forced marches. By driving the Scots in a westerly direction, the English hoped to blunt any direct assault on London and allow time for a rendezvous of Cromwell’s forces. 42 Lambert led five regiments of horse by way of Jedburgh and Kelso. He ordered Harrison and the four regiments of horse already at Penrith to strike at and harass the enemy’s flank and rear. Meanwhile, militia forces marched north to join Lambert in Lancashire and Fleetwood at Northampton. Colonel Robert Lilburne patrolled Lancashire to impede the formation of royalist forces under the earl of Derby. Having departed Perth on 4 August, Lambert reached Settle (140 miles) in a week. Joining Harrison near Preston, he marched to Bolton arriving on 14 August. Militia from Lancashire, Cheshire and Staffordshire joined him at Warrington Bridge, giving the major-general over 13,000 combined foot and horse.43 161


An attempt to prevent the Scots from crossing the River Mersey at Warrington on 16 August failed. Many of the enemy had already passed over the partially destroyed bridge before Lambert’s arrival with reinforcements and the broken ground impeded cavalry manoeuvres. Charles personally led his men across the bridge and, despite a vigorous defence by the Cheshire foot, the hedges enclosing the pastures negated the English advantage in cavalry. Lambert retired to Warwick where he joined with Cromwell on the 24th, the same day Lilburne smashed Derby’s recruits at Wigan. Lambert’s men intercepted royalist letters giving an indication of both the intentions of the Scots and their desperate straits. In contrast to the unity of command exhibited by the parliamentarians in the Worcester campaign, Charles and Leslie suffered from a lack of cohesion at the senior level that hampered efforts to resist the advancing English. Clarendon noted that ‘alas! the [royalist] army was in amazement and confusion’. Leslie, who through his depth of experience and proven command ability might have acted as a unifying agent, ‘appeared dispirited and confounded’, frequently issuing, then revoking orders. There was ‘no good understanding between the officers of the army’.44 The Scots arrived at Worcester on the 23rd in pitiful condition. Hard-pressed and dejected by over three weeks of hard marches and reduced to barely 12,000 men against Cromwell’s 30,000, the troops could not continue. Charles decided to stay and fortify the town. Accordingly, he burned all out-buildings up to the newly reconstructed city walls and several bridges leading into Worcester. Cromwell arrived outside the city on the 28th and established his headquarters at Spetchley. Requiring control of both banks of the River Severn, he detached Lambert on the 28th to secure the crossing at Upton Bridge, which Massey defended. Sending his horse across the river under covering fire from the dragoons, Lambert drove off the 300 enemy horse holding the opposite bank and wounded Massey. Fleetwood’s infantry brigade secured the bridgehead.45 Rebuilding Upton Bridge, Cromwell moved his main body across the Severn and launched an assault on 3 September. Deployed about a mile south of Worcester where the River Teme meets the Severn, the Scots prepared to stand. Cromwell, leading a third of his main body in person, crossed the Severn and Teme near the junction on a bridge of boats and approached on the left bank of the Severn to link up with Fleetwood crossing from the south. Coming over the bridge, the lordgeneral arrived on the enemy bank and exhorted his men to action shouting ‘The Lord of Hosts’.46 Crossing the river and attacking at Powick Bridge with 11,000 troops, Fleetwood drove back the Scottish defenders. A third column under Lambert approached the city from the south-east. The king initially organized a successful resistance to Fleetwood’s attack at Powick Bridge, but when he returned to the main force attempting to hold off Cromwell and the remainder of Fleetwood’s men, he found his troops disorganized and near panic. Despite defeat on the west bank of the Severn, Charles took advantage of a respite while Cromwell and Fleetwood reorganized their troops and shifted his counterattack to the east bank at Perry Wood, south-east of the city. Leslie’s still fresh cavalry charged out of the city towards Red Hill where Lambert and Whalley waited with six regiments and 162


the militia. Despite initial success in breaking a regiment of foot and pushing back the parliamentary horse, reinforcements from Cromwell regained the advantage for Lambert, who broke the enemy horse in less than an hour. After three hours of continuous firing, the Scots retreated behind the city walls. 47 After dusk, Cromwell committed his entire force against the city. Taking Fort Royal, the Essex militia turned the guns on the Scots as the fighting inside the city devolved into hand-to-hand street brawling. Scottish resistance collapsed. Soldiers threw down their arms without firing a shot as cavalry rode pell-mell in panic. Only Middleton’s men stood firm before being overpowered. The king, observing that Cromwell had moved many of his troops from the east to the west bank, organized a force of reserves and stragglers and rode out in an attempt to reverse the English momentum. After some initial success, the king returned to Worcester when Cromwell reinforced his position. Spotting a formation of unengaged horse, he led it in a renewed attempt to break the New Model’s advance, but after only a short distance, he realized that only his servants still rode with him. After a hasty council of war, Charles fled with a guard of 600 horse, ending the battle by early evening. On this note the Third Civil War concluded with Parliament and the New Model Army triumphant.48 In his report to Parliament on 8 September, Cromwell declared Worcester a ‘most remarkable, seasonable and signal victory’.49 The New Model captured over 100 Scottish regimental colours at Worcester. At a cost of fewer than 200 slain, the English army killed between 2,000 and 3,000 Scots and captured 7,000 (many of the common soldiers later transported to Ireland or Bermuda). A report from Chester on the 13th described prisoners as ‘dispersed and stragling in every County on the North side Trent, and many of them for want of care and through too much husbandry, on our part, will get into Scotland againe’.50 Charles eventually made his way to the south coast with several followers and escaped to France. Cromwell arrived in London on the 12th to an extravagant welcome complete with adoring crowds and the salute of cannon and muskets as he entered Whitehall. Leslie remained in confinement lasting until the Restoration (the earl of Derby suffered execution). Parliament declared a day of thanksgiving (24 October) to commemorate the victory at Worcester and the end of the Third Civil War.51 The demise of royalist fortunes in September 1651 effectively ended the British Civil Wars. Sporadic royalist risings such as Glencairn’s in the Scottish Highlands in 1654, Penruddock’s the following year and Sir George Booth’s in 1659, drew only limited support. The New Model Army easily dealt with the occasional outbreaks of resistance to Cromwell’s Protectorate government. The military success of Cromwell and Lambert thrust them into the vortex of Interregnum politics. Many of the traits that catapulted them to success in the military environment carried over into the political world with mixed results. So long as they enjoyed the support of the army, opponents had little chance of successfully challenging the army’s dominance during the Protectorate. Once Lambert lost the perception of his moral authority and consequently the support of the soldiery 163


following the coup d’état against the Rump of 13 October 1659, he fell precipitously.52 The Third Civil War illustrated the profound advantages enjoyed by the senior parliamentary commanders. Against the poorly trained and ill-equipped Scottish levies, the New Model professional soldiers rarely lost on the battlefield. Morale, discipline and the concomitant will to fight stood in marked contrast to the swift collapse of the second Covenanter Army. These features of human dynamics markedly affected the ability of commanders to implement a strategic vision and to manage the battlefield. The religious and political context of the struggles played a pivotal role in the Third Civil War, particularly with regard to national unity. While the English armies enjoyed a sense of common purpose supported by the political establishment, the Scots suffered from a woeful lack of unity. Differing concepts of the nature of the desired religious reformation, an issue that had propelled Britain into civil war in the late 1630s, hampered the building of Scottish national unity and prevented effective military operations. Given the contextual differences which either aided or hindered the commanders, several dynamics of military effectiveness and leadership are clear from the experiences of 1650 and 1651. Lambert emerged from the Civil Wars as a commander of great repute perhaps worthy of Clausewitz’s title of ‘genius’. In the Dunbar and Worcester campaigns, he demonstrated exceptional martial superiority. Similarly, he proved his skill as a commander of an independent strike force tasked with destroying enemy field armies or reducing garrisons and strongholds. Lambert consistently displayed those characteristics of moral authority – the building of unity or common purpose and courage as an expression of personal honour, shared risk and stoic sacrifice – that motivated his troops and allowed him to direct his men as he desired and consequently accomplish the mission. Leslie lacked the advantages of Lambert. Unlike the youthful Yorkshireman, he struggled against internal dissent, interference from civilian authorities and the lack of a sense of common purpose. Still, Leslie is an anomaly. Based on his earlier career, the expectations for his performance in the Third Civil War should have been higher despite the profound disadvantages. An effective military leader overcomes adversity and the intangibles of war; a lesser one succumbs to them. Although he did demonstrate a keen strategic vision in the events prior to Dunbar and in the spring of 1651 as he held the defensive line at Torwood, he lacked the mediation skills needed to overcome the meddling of the Kirk and the absence of Scottish unity. Ultimately, these failings led to defeat and humiliation on the field of battle. To be fair, it is not known how Lambert might have fared in the same circumstances where the nation, torn by multiple competing political and religious interests, prevented any semblance of Scottish national unity and consequently undercut Leslie at every juncture. That aside, the fact remains that his inability to mediate competing interests overwhelmed his otherwise exceptional martial superiority to the detriment of Scotland and the future King Charles II.

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CONCLUSION Military effectiveness: a relative assessment

This case study analysis of military leadership effectiveness through a selected campaign history of the north of England and southern Scotland between 1642 and 1651 began with the caveat that there is no consensual definition of military leadership. Given this pre-condition, the most that can be accomplished is to analyse each subject’s actions and decisions. While leadership is not quantifiable, outcomes are. Battles are either won or lost and the results affect the entire contextual pattern of societies: religious, social, economic, constitutional and political. By evaluating the outcomes of military actions and commanders’ decisions, a measure of an officer’s military effectiveness is possible. Despite the long-standing debate over the primacy of trait, behavioural, situational or transformational factors as the primary determinant of effective leadership, it is possible to derive a model against which to evaluate leadership. In developing a model, this study incorporates longaccepted traits and behaviours of superior leadership reaching back to the ancient Chinese and Mediterranean civilizations and ranging to the most current theories. A workable model can be constructed (martial synergy) based on the most fundamental characteristics (traits and behaviours) exhibited by successful commanders: consistency, moral authority, aggressiveness and martial superiority. Inherent in these four characteristics are the traits and behaviours viewed through the ages as those of a successful military leader. Of critical importance to this model is the contextual basis of British society in the mid-Stuart era, most notably, religion, politics and constitutional concepts. Human dynamics such as fear, confidence and the motivation to fight modulate the traits, behaviour and context within this analytical framework. Therefore, it is possible to rate the military effectiveness of the regional commanders on the outcomes of their efforts based on this analytical model of effective military leadership. In this light, three relative military effectiveness judgements can be made and each officer placed into a category – highly effective, moderately effective or ineffective. John Lambert clearly emerges as the most effective. He exhibited an enormous military talent and rated highly in all four characteristics. In fairness, it must be pointed out that he benefited from the advantages inherent in the New Model Army. Those features included religious zeal, promotion and appointments based on experience and merit, superior training and discipline derived through long165

CONCLUSION

term service and a growing professionalism at all levels of leadership. While Lambert no doubt would have succeeded in any of the three forces that fought the Civil Wars, his association with the New Model Army gave him a decisive advantage over less fortunate adversaries such as Langdale, Leslie and Hamilton. It is wise to remember General Bradley’s observation on the measure of a commander’s leadership in light of the achievements of his followers. No other regional commander in this study went into combat blessed with the inherent advantages enjoyed by Lambert. Lord Fairfax’s reputation has been marred by the unfortunate flight at Marston Moor and the performance of Sir Thomas once the elder Fairfax had withdrawn from military affairs. He deserves a new appraisal. In light of the disadvantages he encountered, notably a chronic numerical inferiority versus Newcastle, he performed admirably. Representative of his moral authority that manifested itself in the consistent ability to regenerate forces despite the overwhelming royalist sentiment in most of the north, Lord Fairfax’s northern parliamentary army grew from a paltry 900 men in late 1642 to a sizeable 8,000-man force by early 1645 despite casualties, desertion and normal attrition.1 Lord Fairfax’s actions demonstrated a keen awareness of the strategic imperative of preventing complete royalist victory in the north and he implemented an appropriate ‘Fabian’ strategy. He exhibited a fundamental grasp of his mission and succeeded in his strategic objectives. It is interesting to note that the two most successful commanders – Lord Fairfax and Lambert – had little previous military experience. In view of the leadership debate, this feature adds credence to traditional arguments for the trait theory. Their talent derived from inherent characteristics, not any depth of experience or training. In short, his highly effective level of martial synergy provided valuable service to the parliamentary cause in the early years of the First Civil War. Newcastle, Leslie and Leven must be placed in the moderately effective category. While each enjoyed a modicum of success at various points in their military careers, each ultimately failed. Newcastle, true to Clarendon’s assessment, did perform better at the tactical level than might have been expected given his experience and personality, but in the strategic and most important sense, he proved lacking. Had he been able to destroy the northern parliamentary forces and join with the king, the war might well have ended in 1643 with a royalist victory. Although Newcastle’s military leadership from 1642 to 1644 demonstrated a moderate degree of tactical acumen, ultimately he failed to use his numerically superior forces to drive the parliamentarians out of the north. Success against Lord Fairfax would have secured the region for the king, bringing the benefits of a reliable source of supplies and recruits. Additionally, his substantial forces could have been operationally employed in the south against Essex or in the east where the Eastern Association enjoyed little royalist opposition. That he failed to accomplish either of these illustrated his lack of strategic vision and aggressiveness, qualities required of a successful commander particularly when opposed by generals of the calibre of the two Fairfaxes. 166


Leslie’s actions at Worcester in September 1651, along with the apparent torpor and indecisiveness he exhibited on the march into England leading up to that engagement, did not reflect his normally dynamic persona. Against Cromwell and Lambert’s professional, seasoned New Model Army, Leslie and his bedraggled Scots had no chance of victory and his attitude may have reflected that understanding. A report noted his ‘riding up and down … as one amazed or seeking to fly’ as the king’s failed charge ended the desperate battle.2 Despite his success as a subordinate commander, his performance as field commander at Dunbar and as Charles’s major-general of horse at Worcester appear singularly disappointing. Clarendon, though generally complimentary of Leslie, noted that he ‘performed not the office of a general or of any competent officer’ during the Worcester Campaign of 1651.3 When the royalist council of war hurriedly convened at sunset as the battle hung in the balance and Charles resolved to break out with the cavalry and to attack the parliamentarians on the heights east of the city, Leslie’s cavalry, stationed at Pitch Croft north of the city and, according to reports, ‘so confused that neither threats nor entreaty could persuade them to charge with His Majesty’, refused to join the assault and took no part in the battle.4 Leslie’s unwillingness or inability to motivate his men to action reflected badly on his moral authority and formed the basis of the later recriminations against him. Leslie had the opportunity to alter the course of the war in the Stuarts’ favour. Had he been more adept at mediation vis-à-vis Scottish civilian and religious leaders, he might have repelled Cromwell’s invasion in 1650. His lacklustre performance during the invasion in 1651 ensured the final royalist defeat in major campaigns. The best that can be said of Leslie is that while he clearly performed effectively as a subordinate commander or leading a small, independent strike force, as demonstrated at Marston Moor and Philiphaugh, he lacked the talent to succeed as commander of a national army. Leven is an anomaly. Clearly he possessed the capability of a lord-general as exhibited by his accomplishments as a commander on the continent and in the Bishops’ Wars. His mediocre performance as the Covenanter lord-general from 1644 to 1646 is inexplicable. When the circumstances demanded boldness, he remained overly cautious. He abrogated the fundamental advantage of quantitative and qualitative superiority over the northern royalists granted him by the first Covenanter Army, a force blessed with vast continental experience and charged with Scottish nationalism and religious zeal. Aggressiveness and boldness on his part and a willingness to march to the aid of the struggling parliamentary forces in the south and west under Essex and Waller despite the potential threat of Montrose and the Scottish royalists might have ended the war in 1644. At the bottom of the heap lies the hapless Hamilton. Few commanders in the history of human conflict have committed more egregious errors in judgement and exhibited a more abject lack of any military skills. Although he embarked on the invasion of 1648 without the sense of common purpose and Scottish national unity enjoyed by Leven in 1644, he compounded his troubles by failing to strike swiftly and aggressively when the conditions gave him a tremendous numerical 167

CONCLUSION

superiority that even Lambert could not have overcome. He failed to mediate disputes between senior subordinates and allowed his manpower advantage to dissipate by woeful battlefield management. Only his extraordinary personal courage as his army disintegrated under the hammer blows of Cromwell and Lambert distinguished the ‘luckless’ duke. His failure ensured that the royalist cause came to naught in 1648. The Duke of Hamilton paid for his lack of military effectiveness on the scaffold, a victim of his lack of any martial synergy. The Engager invasion proved Hamilton to be: no general, nor of the stuff of which commanders are made [;] … [he displayed] a superficial grandness and a deceptive optimism [but] he was neither confident nor assertive; lacking charisma and an authoritative personality [; Hamilton was] not a leader of men, and, devoid of decision and foresight, he had no gift for military strategy.5 In retrospect, it must be stated that, until the modern age, officers, particularly senior commanders, typically held their posts by right of birth, not merit or accomplishment. Did Hamilton do any worse than his peers over the ages who commanded simply by the rights of aristocracy? Perhaps not. However, the purpose of this study is to show the causal connection between effective military leadership and the resultant outcome – victory or defeat on the battlefield. Other studies have the task of demonstrating the relative effectiveness of leadership based on right of birth. Only Lambert enjoyed a post-Civil War political ascendancy. Based on the ‘rule of the sword’ rather than on any apparent political skill, his influence proved ephemeral. Once he lost the support of the army in late 1659, he fell precipitously. Lord Fairfax died from an unfortunate accident without enjoying the fruits of his success. Leven and Leslie endured humiliation and imprisonment, though both eventually received rewards at the end of their lives. Newcastle lost his estates and his country at a time when his position, wealth and influence should have been at their height (although he did recover somewhat in his last years). Hamilton, of course, lost his life. Curiously, each regional commander had the opportunity to achieve lasting greatness; each in his own turn failed. But where their talents, initiative, ambition and qualities of leadership mattered most for the evolution of the British constitution and the future nation – on the field of battle – some flew gloriously high and others crashed disastrously. In the end, what mattered most is that the dominance of military talent and effectiveness, as measured by definitive traits and resultant behaviours and the ability to modulate human dynamics and the societal context to their advantage, lay on the parliamentary side. Without battlefield victory, none of the political, social, religious and constitutional achievements of the English Revolution could have occurred. And, despite all the religious and constitutional zeal and motivation readily apparent on the parliamentary side, without effective leadership to guide, coordinate and inspire the marvellous military instrument, the advantage would have been irrevocably lost. 168


This study of effective military leadership as analysed through the prism of a campaign history supplies a fundamentally important and hitherto missing causative explanation for why the parliamentary forces so thoroughly prevailed on the battlefields of the north of England and Scotland between 1642 and 1651 (the exception being Montrose’s Scottish campaigns prior to Philiphaugh). Religious motivation alone cannot explain the outcome. Nor can the defence of the perceived constitution or ancient rights of the people complete the picture. No matter how keen the military instrument, without effective leadership, it is a dull spear.

Models of effective military leadership and the study of war Most traditional studies of military history focus on issues of capability and centre on quality or quantity of weaponry or use technological or methodological gaps in terms of equipment, doctrine or organization to explain success. This is a macrohistorical approach that is of limited value when looking at war within common cultural areas where essentially technology etc. is shared, a feature particularly true of civil conflicts in the Western world. In looking at such events, it is far more pertinent to focus on issues of leadership skill and capability. Work hitherto in this area has been essentially ad hoc; it has relied on empirical studies (e.g. was Robert E. Lee a better commander than Ulysses S. Grant and vice versa) without any general theoretical model within which to derive or draw conclusions and make comparisons. The innovative aspect of this study is the attempt to move towards an analytical approach to leadership and resultant outcomes. Creating such an approach is clearly a difficult endeavour and doubtless there will be criticisms of this study. But the crucial element that it offers is a new theoretical method that is of infinite capacity for use in understanding the dynamics of warfare. And, while it can comprehend historical differences between periods, it offers a way to make comparisons across historical epochs. It thus has a universal application for historical analysis. Leadership is a universal human activity. While cultural differences do change the nature of conflict and the milieu within which military leaders operate, they do not change the fact that the ability to lead or motivate people to raise arms against others and to organize and manage violence to achieve specific goals essentially requires similar leadership characteristics and the ability to modulate the societal context and human dynamics across all cultures and eras. For this reason, this model of effective military leadership is applicable at all levels of leadership in war from superpower commanders-in-chief to the New Model Army sergeant leading a file of musketeers to a Stone Age war chieftain exhorting his clan on to victory over a rival.

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APPENDIX Biographical sketches

This study of military effectiveness and leadership in the north of England and southern Scotland in the three Civil Wars between 1642 and 1651 addresses the six regional commanders of all three combatant forces: Lord Ferdinando Fairfax, parliamentary commander in the north from 1642 to 1645; the duke of Newcastle, northern royalist commander from 1642 to 1644; John Lambert, parliamentary major-general from 1647 to 1651; the duke of Hamilton, commander of the Scottish Engager army of 1648; the earl of Leven, lord-general of the Scottish army from 1639 to 1651; and David Leslie, field commander of the Scottish army from 1650 to 1651. The following brief biographical sketches address five topical areas relative to their backgrounds: pre-war social status, politics, military experience, religious orientation and post-Civil War career. Inherent in each of these sketches is an analysis of the motivation to support or oppose the king. Although such decisions are by nature complex, certain features provide clues as to why each made a particular choice based on socio-economic, constitutional or religious factors.

John Lambert, Lord of Calton (1619–1684) Lambert sprang from the country gentry of the West Riding of Yorkshire. Little is known about his early life; however, an account by an eighteenth-century Yorkshire biographer using local lore described him as ‘tall, manly and genteel … his eyes animated, quick and piercing, and the whole countenance, altogether artless and unaffected, appears strongly sensible, good-natured, generous and determined’.1 The rise of the Lamberts of Calton to prominent gentry status began with the major-general’s great-grandfather, John Lambert of Skipton, an ambitious and acquisitive attorney in the reign of Henry VIII. This Lambert acquired multiple offices in the last years of Henry’s reign. By the time of his death in 1566, Lambert had become a prosperous landed gentleman. In the 1530s, he established the family seat in the parish of Kirkby Malhamdale near Skipton with the purchase of the manors and halls of Airton and Calton. Within a few decades, the Lambert family owned all or most of every township within the parish of Kirkby Malhamdale, an area encompassing thirty-five square miles. 170

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By the 1630s, the family had declined owing to the lack of financial acumen of John Lambert’s father. At his death in 1632, Josias Lambert left an estate worth £300 p.a., with a debt of £1,200. As a minor heir, young John Lambert faced the judgement of the Court of Wards.2 It is not known who acted as his guardian, but he apparently survived with his inheritance intact; nonetheless, he must have been influenced by the prevailing anti-wardship sentiment. In terms of annual landed income, the family ranked high among the 128 parliamentarian families of Yorkshire at the outbreak of the Civil War.3 Josias Lambert exemplified what Hugh Trevor-Roper calls the ‘mere’ gentry, those who derived their income strictly from landed estates. Unlike his ancestor John Lambert, Josias held few lucrative royal offices. Trevor-Roper argues that the lack of office, whether by an individual or by a family over time, often heralded eventual economic decline and that the real difference between the ‘mere’ country gentry and the profitable office-holding ‘court’ or ‘rising’ gentry lay in office incumbency. The Lamberts of Calton clearly fell into the category of ‘mere’ gentry who throughout the late Tudor and early Stuart period found it increasingly difficult to maintain their economic and social status without benefit of income derived from office. Many of these men subsequently became radicals, embraced the Independent cause in the Long Parliament and provided a solid base of country support for the parliamentary side.4 An advantageous association with prominent aristocrats, either familial or otherwise, remained a constant throughout Lambert’s early career. He married Frances, daughter of Sir William Lister of Thornton, one of the most prosperous of the Yorkshire gentry.5 Sir Martin Lister, a brother of Frances, married a daughter of Sir William Fairfax of Steeton, thus establishing the Lambert–Lister–Fairfax connection.6 Little is known about Lambert’s early life. Since he left neither an autobiography nor memoirs, most comments regarding his upbringing and education can only be speculative. His letters, particularly military reports, exhibit a clarity and conciseness indicative of a rigorous formal education. Lambert’s writing style reflected a well-disciplined, highly trained intellect honed by substantial practice. He might have attended the school in Kirkby endowed by his grandfather, followed by boarding school at Giggleswick.7 The registry of Trinity College, Cambridge, shows a John Lambert admitted on 14 March 1636. There is no record of this John Lambert graduating. Puritan ideology remained vibrant though not dominant at Trinity in the first decades of the Stuart dynasty. The college retained its concept of reformed learning by ‘attempting to combine the humanist and protestant impulses’ into its curriculum, a legacy from a century earlier. Many Trinity dons and undergraduates favoured the king at the outbreak of war, with parliamentary support stronger in the town. If Lambert did indeed attend Trinity, he likely would have been exposed to Puritan ideology, but not necessarily overly influenced.8 In contrast to the ‘colossal, exuberant religious zeal’ of Cromwell and many other senior parliamentary officers, Lambert never expressed the same passion for spiritual matters as many of his contemporaries. Biographers including William 171

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Dawson and Maurice Ashley state that his religious views are unknown and therefore had no effect on his military and political actions. Dawson portrays Lambert as one who strove to accommodate the divergent religious feelings of the day without outwardly engaging in any sort of official persecution. Contemporaries seem to have been unsure of his spiritual concepts. As governor of Oxford in 1646, Lambert forbade the persecution of Catholics and encouraged formal theological debate. His strident defence of the Quaker John Nayler in 1656 raised the hopes of the sectaries that they had at last found a powerful patron. A nineteenth-century history of Northumberland identifies Lambert as a Catholic, based perhaps on no other evidence than popular legend.9 Archibald Johnston of Wariston accused Lambert of defending witches while in Scotland during the English occupation of 1651. The major-general’s separation of spiritual from military and political matters caused Johnston to comment that Lambert was ‘mor[e] untender, yea wicked, to al[l] this nation, and had not the principles of respect to the profession and professors of godlyness as the uther [Cromwell] had’.10 In no instance throughout his military or political career does Lambert’s religion appear to have been a primary motivating factor in determining his actions. He sought to prevent religious concerns from influencing military and political decisions. Lambert recognized that pluralism was a fact of religious life and that the ‘church’s coercive machinery was gone for good’.11 With a family background in the law, Lambert may have opted to study common law while at Cambridge, thereby necessitating his move to the Inns of Court. Referring to Lambert’s co-authorship with Henry Ireton of ‘The Heads of the Proposals’ in the summer of 1647, Bulstrode Whitelock, commenting on the legal orientation and clarity of the document, referred to Lambert as one ‘who had likewise studied in the Inns of Court, and was of a subtle and working brain’. The Middle Temple is the likely place owing to the Lambert family’s long association begun at least as far back as 1522.12 The young squire of Calton, who inherited ten contiguous manors and the political and legal expectations of the country gentry, understood and expected the status and responsibility due his place in the Great Chain of Being, which still dominated English hierarchical society. Probably educated in the classics at Giggleswick, in the law at an Inn of Court and at Cambridge, Lambert understood the constitutional, political and military responsibilities required of his socioeconomic position. And he inherited the landed gentry’s values of aristocratic demeanour, honour and a penchant for organized violence. Their code of honour required both personal as well as organized political violence for the benefit of the king and the good of the realm, concepts ‘woven into the life and training of upper-class males’.13 Reared in the ethos and imagery of honour, chivalry and military virtues, Lambert, predisposed by breeding and education, chose actively to participate in the conflict that engulfed the country.14 Charles’s proposal in April 1642 to raise a royal guard prompted a petition signed by seventy-eight ‘Gentlemen of note’, including Lord Fairfax, Sir Thomas Fairfax and Lambert, which questioned the king’s reasons for fearing Parliament. Whatever Lambert’s disposition towards the king or the constitutional and legal 172

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debates that dominated the late winter and spring of 1642, by mid-May, he clearly resided in the parliamentary camp.15 Because Lambert’s extant letters never address his reasons for joining the parliamentary opposition, any analysis of his motivations is speculative. However, three factors probably influenced his thinking as the conflict unfolded. As a West Riding landowner whose income depended on the local cloth industry, the attitudes expressed by the merchants and manufacturers of wool market towns such as Leeds, York, Hull and Bradford might have coloured Lambert’s perception of events. Familial associations likely influenced his decision to oppose Charles. His marriage to Frances Lister brought him into close contact with several leading parliamentarian families, most notably the Fairfaxes. His father-in-law, though not as strident an opponent of the king as his Fairfax relatives, sided early with the parliamentary faction. Although Lambert’s probable attendance at Cambridge and an Inn of Court should have given him a more cosmopolitan viewpoint, it is possible that he shared the provincial gentry’s general lack of understanding of royal policies, which put many in the country into opposition.16 But, as Wilfrid Prest argues, the Inns of Court and universities concentrated more on reading and powers of thinking or as finishing schools in real estate and property law than on constitutional issues.17 Therefore, attendance at these institutions provided no guarantee that Lambert possessed in 1642 the clear constitutional notions he advocated by the late 1640s and 1650s. In the early seventeenth century, there existed broad agreement that the king, while accountable only to God, must govern within the law and the constitution.18 Although the king’s power derived from God, this did not imply royal absolutism. Both divine law and the terms of the coronation oath bounded the royal prerogative. The concern over the violation of the oath emerged in the trial of Archbishop William Laud. The prosecution levied the charge that Laud had altered the meaning of the phrase ‘ancient customs of the realm’ and inserted language supportive of royal absolutism not found in any previous coronation oath.19 If this interpretation of royal prerogative and the oath as a widespread notion among the gentry prior to the Civil Wars is accurate, Lambert might have been a proponent and thus inclined to opposition on the basis of the king’s perceived violation of the constitution. What gives this speculation merit is the constitutionalism of Lambert as fully developed by the Commonwealth period. Strict compliance with the terms of the coronation oath, particularly the upholding of ancient customs and the exercise of royal prerogative within the confines of law, might have been paramount to Lambert as early as 1642, thus influencing his opposition to Charles. Whatever his motivation, Lambert accepted a cornet’s commission in Sir Thomas Fairfax’s regiment of horse in the autumn of 1642. Lambert emerged from the Civil Wars as a leading spokesman for the army and primary advocate of a constitutional arrangement based on the Heads of the Proposals drafted in June 1647 as the New Model Army’s proposed settlement. Lambert assisted commissary-general Henry Ireton in the drafting of the document that advocated a government based on the separation and balance of powers between king and Parliament. Although not accepted as the basis of the Commonwealth, 173

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Lambert adopted the Heads’ fundamental principles in the Instrument of Government, which formed the constitutional basis of the Protectorate from 1653 to 1659. Roger Hainsworth sees in Lambert a politician whose orientation ‘had always lain in a written constitution dominated by secular considerations which would ensure the security of the army … [and a man who] carefully drafted a constitution which he believed would achieve this’.20 After considerable debate, Commons accepted the Instrument as the constitution and, as such, it represents the only written English constitution ever in force.21 Lambert assumed a prominent role in the new government as a member of the Council of State and as de facto commander of the army. Although Cromwell retained the title of commander-in-chief, Lambert and a cadre of senior officers or ‘grandees’ exercised actual military command.22 Despite Cromwell’s occasional withdrawals from Council meetings or any political aspirations Lambert may have harboured as heir apparent, the ‘grandees’ and civilian council members always ‘recognized that through Oliver flowed the republic’s life blood’. Within the Protectorate government, only Lambert can be regarded as an ‘independent political figure in his own right, thanks both to his personality and to his following in the army’. As such, the major-general continued his role as deputy to Cromwell in political and military affairs, a pattern first established in the Second Civil War.23 Lambert and the army reacted to sporadic outbursts of royalist rebellion with force and vigour. The Penruddock rising of 1655 prompted Lambert to advocate martial law. The rule of the major-generals instituted the same year divided the country into military districts governed by an appointed major-general responsible for subduing royalist activity as well as maintaining order and security. By 1657, the major-generals had become a political liability to the Protectorate, resulting in their recall. Lambert came under increasing criticism for his leading role in what the public perceived as a military dictatorship.24 Although he regularly sat in Parliament after 1654, primarily acting as Cromwell’s representative, Lambert could not control the legislative process in an often obstreperous house. His martial synergy and military skills honed in the highly structured and hierarchical military environment did not translate to the contentious world of parliamentary politics, leaving Lambert unable to cope with the compromises and consensus-making nature of a democratically elected body. The Humble Petition and Advice of 1657 became the touchstone of Lambert’s fall from power. Initially, the petition proposed making Cromwell a monarch. Lambert ardently and publicly opposed the petition, prompting Cromwell to revoke his commissions in July 1657. Retiring to his estate in Wimbledon, Lambert awaited a change in his political fortunes. Cromwell’s death in September 1658 brought Lambert back into political favour. Many observers had seen Lambert as the heir to Oliver; however, Richard Cromwell succeeded his father as the second Lord Protector. Contentious relations between Richard and his Council of State forced his resignation in the spring of 1659. Lambert and the army grandees recalled the Rump Parliament, an action that stimulated a series of political and constitutional crises throughout the remainder of the year.25 174

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Despite the return to a republican form of government, relations between the army and the Rump Parliament deteriorated. By autumn, the Lambertonians had had enough and engineered a second dissolution by force on 13 October. They established a virtual military dictatorship under a committee of safety, an event that set in motion the return of the Stuart monarchy. In Scotland, General George Monck opposed the dissolution of Parliament and marched south with his own force in support of the Rump. Lambert attempted to oppose the march, but by December 1659 he no longer commanded the loyalty of the troops and his force withered to a pitiful body of fifty horsemen.26 By February 1660, Monck established control of London. While Lambert relied on his past standing with the troops in the dispute with Parliament, Monck engaged in an effective propaganda campaign that hammered at Lambert’s illegal usurpation and portrayed himself and his force as defenders of the constitution. Confined to the Tower in April, Lambert escaped and mounted a desperate rebellion. Cornered at Daventry, his captors returned him to London in disgrace.27 Tried and convicted of treason at the Restoration, Lambert escaped execution owing to his not having been a regicide in 1649. He pleaded that it had been his intention to restore the king but, considering the opposition, he had been unable to carry out his plan. His plea succeeded and ‘in consideration thereof [he] was reprieved during the pleasure of the King’. However, he spent the remainder of his life in confinement and exile in Plymouth and Guernsey. Despite continuing rumours of his escape and return to power, Lambert played no further role in political or military affairs after 1660.28 An interesting commentary on his popular image is cited by A. J. Hopper in that a Yorkshireman, Richard Smith of Northovram, suffered a trial for sedition by declaring: ‘the King is a bastard, and the sonne of a whore. I hope to see Lord Lambert Kinge’.29

Ferdinando Fairfax, Second Baron Fairfax of Cameron (1584–1648) By the beginning of the Stuart era, the Fairfax family had emerged as one of the leading gentry families of Yorkshire, with seats at Nun Appleton, Denton and Steeton in the West Riding. Lord Fairfax’s branch of the family held significant estates near Wharfdale and had been locally prominent since at least the midthirteenth century. Ferdinando’s father, Thomas Fairfax of Denton, purchased a Scottish peerage in 1627 for £1,500, becoming Baron Fairfax of Cameron. The marriage of Ferdinando to Mary, daughter of the third Lord Sheffield, president of the Council of the North, provides a further indication of the family’s rising status. Ferdinando succeeded to the title in May 1640; he had been previously knighted. There is no record of a formal education; however, his letters are articulate and precise, suggesting some degree of academic training. The first baron encouraged his son to take up the military profession and sent young Fairfax to the Netherlands for training, apparently with poor results. The elder Fairfax remarked of his son: ‘he makes a tolerable country justice, but is a mere coward at fighting’.30 175

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As a politician, Sir Ferdinando made more of an impression representing Boroughbridge in the last three parliaments of James I and the first four of Charles. He became a follower of John Pym in the Short and Long Parliaments and voted in the majority for the attainder of Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford in 1641, despite the family’s long association with Wentworth.31 That relationship had been strained by the reprimand given by Wentworth to Sir Ferdinando over his ruling in a 1632 case involving misappropriation of public money. Sir Ferdinando objected to the ‘unwarrantable encroachments of the Council of the North’ in the rulings of the local justices of the peace. The incident marked a milestone in Fairfax’s increasing objection to royal government’s interference in local affairs. Wentworth’s formerly cordial relations with the Fairfax family ‘began to turn noticeably cooler’.32 Along with other members of the Commons representing Yorkshire in the two Parliaments of 1640, including Henry Bellasis, Sir Hugh Cholmly and Sir John Hotham, Sir Ferdinando objected to the policy of ‘Thorough’ as implemented by Strafford first in the north and then in Ireland. He served on the committee that presented the Grand Remonstrance of November 1641.33 The attitude of both Lord Fairfax and Sir Thomas towards the king’s perceived arbitrary drift is captured in a comment by John Rushworth, stating that the Fairfaxes viewed Charles as ‘excessively in love with his darling prerogative’ and that they feared his establishment of a Spanish-style absolute monarchy.34 Lord Fairfax’s opposition to royal policy may have been based partially on concerns about a seeming drift towards Catholicism, probably influenced by the reports of the massacre of Irish Protestants.35 Clearly Protestant and probably Calvinist, the Fairfax family may have been Puritan.36 His attitude towards the Laudian innovations is captured in a comment made in 1635 expressing dismay that the country faced ‘nothing less than the subversion of the established religion’.37 Lord Fairfax’s religious sympathies apparently drove much of his opposition to the crown’s political and religious policies. Although he opposed any alteration in the liturgy, he advocated curtailing the episcopacy’s secular power. Another possible clue to the religious orientation of the Fairfax family is indicated by Sir Thomas’s attendance at St John’s College, Cambridge, where Puritan influence emerged in the 1560s and remained vibrant through the early Stuart era.38 In the First Bishops’ War of 1639, Sir Ferdinando commanded a regiment of the Yorkshire trained bands but does not appear to have taken part in the second war in 1640. His son Thomas commanded a troop of horse known as the Yorkshire Redcaps. The Fairfaxes’ troops served as defensive formations and occasionally skirmished with Scottish cavalry patrols but played no significant part in the main struggle along the border. As Charles established his court at York in April 1642, Lord Fairfax served as one of five commissioners to attend the king and represent Parliament’s interests. As the most prominent member, he became a focus of royal wrath against parliamentary military preparations. Sir Thomas commented on the resolution of his father to resist the king’s attempts at intimidation: 176

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My father being yet at his house at Denton … [and] though he had notice from his friends that it was resolved that he should be sent for, as a prisoner, to York: yet he resolved not to stir from his own house; not knowing anything in himself to deserve it. As the political and military situation deteriorated in Yorkshire, many were forced to come and intreat him [Lord Fairfax] to join with them in defence of themselves and country … and [he] was resolved, seeing his country [Yorkshire] in this great distress, to run the same hazard with them for the preservation of it.39 When the two sides formed in the summer of 1642, Lord Fairfax emerged as a leading member of the parliamentary opposition, prompting Clarendon to write later: ‘There were very few gentlemen, or men of any quality, in that large county who were actively or factiously disaffected to his majesty; and of those the Lord Fairfax, and his son, Sir Thomas Fairfax, were the chief’.40 As the political situation deteriorated and the king attempted to seize the magazine at Hull, Parliament appointed Lord Fairfax commander of its troops in the north, a position he held until his resignation in April 1645. The earl of Essex formally granted him a commission in December 1642. In viewing the decision of Lord Fairfax and other Yorkshire notables to rebel against the king, the observation of M. L. Bush on the attitudes of the early modern aristocracy vis-à-vis their social and political role in English society is helpful: ‘This tradition of revolt affected the aristocracy’s mentality, instilling the role of a responsible opposition to royal tyranny’.41 Lord Fairfax’s flight from the field early in the battle at Marston Moor damaged his hitherto excellent military reputation. Despite the eventual parliamentary capture of York and other royalist strongholds in the north by the end of 1645, he no longer enjoyed his previous stature. Apparently mercy and magnanimity characterized his governorship of York following Marston Moor, as indicated by the award of a ‘butt of sack and a tunn of French wine’ from the lord mayor and council ‘in regard [for] the great love and affection he hath shewed to the Citty’.42 The passage of the Self-Denying Ordinance in 1645 forced Lord Fairfax to resign his military command in April; Sydenham Poyntz succeeded him as parliamentary commander in the north. On his resignation from the army, Lord Fairfax travelled to London where he again took up his seat in Parliament, thus returning to his pre-war political career. He remained active in the north in a variety of political roles as a member of the parliamentary committee for Yorkshire, steward of Pontefract, head of the Commission of the Peace and chief ranger of the county. As the result of a riding accident, Lord Fairfax died at York on 13 March 1648. Sir Thomas (then also Baron Naseby) inherited not only the title of third Baron Cameron, but Ferdinando’s political offices as well.43 177

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William Cavendish, First Duke of Newcastle (1593–1676) Born to a prominent Nottinghamshire gentry family and son of Sir Charles Cavendish, the future duke became politically active in 1614 as Member of Parliament for East Retford. James I elevated Cavendish to the peerage as Viscount Mansfield and Baron Ogle of Bothal in 1620. Eventually, the dukes of Newcastle, Kingston and Devonshire all emerged from the Cavendish family, originally one of the most prominent northern gentry families. William spent his boyhood at Welbeck, a former abbey located in Sherwood Forest, and benefited from a formal education at St John’s College, Cambridge, where a Puritan influence remained from the Elizabethan era. The tutelage of Sir Henry Wotton, envoy to the duke of Savoy, gave him a broad, worldly experience.44 Charles I made him baron of Bolsover and earl of Newcastle in 1628. His early political career included two lord-lieutenancies in Derbyshire from 1628 to 1638 and Wiltshire from 1626 to 1642. Newcastle craved political office partly as a means of paying his huge personal debt incurred owing to his passion for lavish hospitality. For example, the entertainment of the king on his journey to Scotland in 1633 prompted Clarendon to state that the earl provided: at his own proper expense, in such a wonderful manner and in such an excess of feasting as had never before been known in England, [hospitality] would be still thought very prodigious if the same noble person had not within a year or two afterwards made the King and Queen a more stupendous entertainment … [that] no man ever imitated.45 By contrast, his professional efficiency exhibited as lord-lieutenant paid dividends with the appointment as governor of the prince of Wales and a member of the Privy Council in 1639. Given his predilection for lavish display, it is doubtful that the earl recouped much of his expenses from royal offices, relying primarily on landed income.46 Noted for his charming aristocratic manners and his skill at fencing, drama, writing and horsemanship, Newcastle published a large volume of poetic and dramatic works as well as two acclaimed books on riding. His second wife, a noted author in her own right, commented that his comedies ‘do sufficiently show his great observation and judgment; for they are composed of these three ingredients, viz. wit, humour, and satire’.47 As a courtier, Newcastle generally supported the policies and aspirations of Charles I except in religion. Despite his education at St John’s, Newcastle appears to have not been influenced by any of the Puritan beliefs popular at the college in the early part of the century. A papal agent at the court characterized the earl as indifferent to religion: ‘He hates the Puritans, he laughs at the Protestants, and he has little confidence in the Catholics’.48 As the prince of Wales’s governor, the earl cautioned the future king to exercise moderation in religious fervour lest he alienate his subjects as had his father. Having witnessed the kingdom’s religious anguish,

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Newcastle advocated that only the established church should be allowed. He believed in episcopal supervision of education, strict uniformity, press censorship, theological works written only in Latin and pre-printed sermons for all preachers. His views reflected a concern for order and stability influenced more by the political and social upheaval of the English Revolution rather than any strong doctrinal beliefs. With no previous military experience, the earl nonetheless raised a troop of 200 horse at his own expense for the First Bishops’ War, composed entirely of knights and gentlemen. Newcastle assumed the captaincy of the Prince of Wales’s Troop described by Clarendon as the ‘best gentlemen of the north’. The troop served with the main royal army along the border but took no part in the embarrassing retreat from Kelso.49 A dispute with the earls of Essex and Holland in May 1641, driven by the influence he exerted over the prince, led to Newcastle’s resignation from his royal offices and withdrawal from the court; however, he continued to serve Charles in the north. Appointed governor of Hull, Newcastle attempted to take control of the arsenal in February 1642, but the parliamentary garrison under Sir John Hotham foiled the effort.50 Sent to secure the city of Newcastle in June as commander of all royal forces in the four northern counties, the earl collected trained band forces primarily from Northumberland and took possession of the city with no opposition. His reputation in the north and ownership of multiple estates made recruiting for the royalist army easier and he soon raised several thousand volunteers. With no parliamentary forces in the area, Newcastle’s men trained without interference. He marched south in November and crossed the River Tees where he shoved aside a blocking force and advanced on York, thus initiating his participation in the Civil Wars. Clarendon remarked that Newcastle, though not a soldier by temperament or capability, nonetheless took up arms as an obligation to his king from a sense of duty, aristocratic honour and obligation.51 While Lambert and Lord Fairfax saw their higher duty to the nation as a whole as encompassed in a defence of the ‘ancient constitution’ and the perceived privileges of Parliament in opposition to royal absolutism, Newcastle viewed unqualified service and devotion to his sovereign as his highest priority. Newcastle’s military career ended at Marston Moor. Despite Rupert’s cheery assumption that the royalists could reassemble their scattered troops and mount another attack on the allied armies, Newcastle realized that the ‘royal army was not merely beaten, it was destroyed’.52 While the marquis exclaimed that he would ‘not endure the laughter of the Court … [and would] go to Holland’ Rupert retorted, ‘I will rally my men’. Newcastle settled into a self-imposed exile until the Restoration. Parliament excluded the marquis from a pardon in 1649 and confiscated his estates without compensation. But, like many regional magnates in the Restoration who drew on their past political influence, Newcastle recovered most of his property through a special act of Parliament.53

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Although appointed to Charles II’s Privy Council in 1650, he played only a limited role in politics or military affairs for the remainder of the Interregnum. During the parliamentary campaign in Scotland in 1651, rumours hinted of a royalist revolt in Kent supported by German mercenaries under the marquis’s command. A further report on royalist activity issued in March concerning regional risings throughout England claimed that Newcastle intended to command the northern royalists; he had no such intentions. However, as a member of the Privy Council in exile along with the duke of Buckingham and the earl of Derby, he counselled Charles to invade England by way of Carlisle in 1651.54 The recommendation further illustrated Newcastle’s lack of strategic vision. As long as the Scots remained on the defensive, they could checkmate Cromwell, providing they could find a way to break Lambert’s hold on Fifeshire. The marquis failed to grasp the strategic reality that once the Scots abandoned the Torwood line and entered England, they placed themselves between Cromwell and Lambert’s army to the north and east and the rapidly coalescing county militia and New Model Army forces to the south. With his property sequestered in 1649, Newcastle settled into a life of genteel poverty in Antwerp until the late 1650s when he received funds from the compounding of his estates through the efforts of his brother, Sir Charles Cavendish. While in exile, he published his first work on horsemanship. Despite his poverty, Newcastle gave a splendid ball for Charles II in Antwerp that harkened back to his previous tendency towards expensive entertainment. An editor of Lady Newcastle’s papers wryly commented that ‘the report of all this magnificence must have made Newcastle’s creditors feel a little anxious’.55 At the Restoration, the king partially compensated for Newcastle’s losses with political office and rewards including investment in the Order of the Garter (April 1661) and elevation to the earldom of Ogle and dukedom of Newcastle (March 1665). He played no further role in politics, preferring to restore his house at Welbeck and other estates. He did accept appointment as chief justice in Eyre, north of Trent, a post that delegated to him the authority to hear all pleas argued before a royal court. In his later years, the duke concentrated on riding and literature. He published his second volume on horsemanship in 1667. He produced four comedies as well as poetry and became a patron of several rising artists, including John Dryden. He died in 1676; burial in Westminster Abbey recognized his service to the Stuarts.56

James Hamilton, First Duke of Hamilton (1606–1649) James Hamilton, descended from an Anglo-Norman family that rose to prominence in the early fourteenth century, inherited the Scottish title marquis of Hamilton and the English earldom of Cambridge in 1625. Through a propitious marriage of the first Lord Hamilton to the daughter of James II in the fifteenth century, the marquis stood as the next heir to the thrones of Scotland and England should the Stuart line fail. Therefore, his political attachments to Charles I always generated 180

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suspicion, and in aristocratic circles especially in Scotland, the Hamiltons engendered substantial jealousy. Economically, the Hamiltons benefited from one of the greatest fortunes in the otherwise impoverished kingdom of Scotland. The estates stretched across the Lowlands from west of Edinburgh through Clydesdale to Galloway, some of the richest and most productive farmland in the country. The family owned five castles but made their seat at Hamilton Palace in Lanarkshire. Hamilton’s close ties and friendship with Charles I made him a prominent figure at court during the 1630s. The family’s intimate association with the court dated from James’s reign. After observing Hamilton’s father at work in the Scottish Privy Council in 1617 and impressed with his ‘apparent prudence and ability’, James made him earl of Cambridge, a title heretofore reserved for royal princes, and appointed him to the Council of State.57 The elevation of his father brought the young James to England where he spent his childhood and placed him directly in the Caroline orbit. The close association led to a succession of royal appointments in the 1630s, including master of the horse, gentleman of the bedchamber and member of the Privy Council. Hamilton played a significant role in English politics as a royal confidant from 1628 to 1642. Clarendon commented on the bond between Charles and the marquis during the military preparations for the First Bishops’ War, describing him as ‘the only person trusted by his majesty in that grand affair’.58 However, his closeness to the king, particularly as the sole royal adviser on Scottish affairs, engendered mistrust among his countrymen and the English aristocracy. Hamilton attended Exeter College, Oxford, an ‘attractive centre for Puritan gentlemen’ in the early Stuart period. The university experience apparently had little effect on Hamilton’s religious beliefs. Though consistently hostile to Catholicism, he showed no interest in any particular manner of religious worship. Raised as a Presbyterian, Hamilton nonetheless attended Church of England services as a matter of convenience. He described himself as ‘not of a rigid opinion [;] … differing in religion does not move me’. On the scaffold in 1649, though, he claimed to be a true Reformed Protestant in accordance with Scottish Presbyterianism.59 Hamilton offered his services to Gustavus Adolphus for the Swedish continental campaign of 1630. The king accepted on the condition that Hamilton supply 6,000 British mercenary troops. Charles granted permission to raise troops and supplied funds; however, Hamilton raised only a few hundred men in Scotland. He filled out his command with 6,000 pressed Englishmen, mostly older men or the ‘idle, the shiftless and the unemployed’ vagrants and arrived at the Oder River in August 1630.60 Hamilton’s assignment to guard the Oder fortresses and passes in Silesia and Pomerania while Gustavus campaigned against the Imperial army failed miserably. Plagued by disease, desertion and famine, his force dissipated. Poor relations with the king and dissension between the Scottish and English troops further hampered his operational effectiveness. By December, barely 100 of the original contingent remained. Hamilton’s mismanagement of the army caused the Swedish minister Axel Oxenstierna to comment that the Scotsman’s ‘want of knowledge … in military affairs, and of care to provide for [his troops]’ caused the destruction of the Anglo-Scottish force.61 Hamilton returned to England in 181

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October 1632. His military ineptness in the German states foreshadowed the tragedy of 1648. In June 1638, Charles sent Hamilton to Scotland as a royal commissioner to pacify the growing discontent over the imposition of a new prayer book. Despite Hamilton’s weak performance on the continent, the king appointed the marquis as commander of an amphibious operation in 1639 designed to land in the Forth region and incite a Scottish civil war to disrupt the Covenanter defence of the border and hamper any attempt to invade northern England. Faced with stout Scottish resistance near Leith against his badly prepared Midlands and East Anglia militia, the expedition degenerated into a series of ineffectual skirmishes and raids, providing little support to the main royal army on the border. In August 1640, Hamilton again commanded an English force; however, a mutiny in England over the appointment of Catholic officers precluded his active participation in the Second Bishops’ War. Hamilton raised a troop of horse for the king at the outbreak of the First Civil War, but primarily served as the king’s representative in Scotland through most of 1642 and 1643. His elevation to duke, along with the Covenanter earl of Argyle to marquis in April 1643, sought to prevent an alliance between the Scots and Parliament. Ever cognizant of his powerful position in Scotland and close royal ties, Hamilton continuously employed his wealth and prestige in support of Charles despite suspicions of his intentions on the part of other courtiers and rivals, notably Argyle and the marquis of Huntly. His efforts to mediate between the increasingly antagonistic Kirk ‘party’ and Charles’s government as the royal commissioner in Scotland, particularly the attempt to keep Scotland from allying with the English Parliament in 1643, earned him the enmity of the Covenanters and the handicap of being ‘suspected of all, [and] loved of none’.62 The mistrust made him singularly ineffective on the king’s behalf. Although Hamilton attempted to ally himself politically with Argyle as early as 1641, he failed to prevent the subsequent Solemn League and Covenant and earned the suspicion of the court. On his arrival at Oxford in December 1643, Charles imprisoned him at Pendennis Castle and St Michael’s Mount for the remainder of the war, indicative of the mistrust he engendered even on the part of the king whom he had endeavoured to assist. Following his surrender to Lambert after the Preston debacle, an army committee appointed in December 1648 determined the disposition of the duke along with several other leading royalist prisoners, including George Goring, Arthur Capel and the earl of Holland. Cromwell attempted to solicit information from Hamilton on royalist activities, but the Scotsman refused to betray his compatriots, thus ensuring his demise. Advised of the execution of the king, Hamilton escaped from Windsor Castle aided by a bribed jailer. He strolled out the front gates of the castle unchallenged dressed as a merchant just as the guards closed them for the night. He arrived in London while army patrols were searching the city for Langdale, who had also escaped. Queried and later arrested by soldiers who recognized him, he attempted to set fire to incriminating documents. The duke later responded that his capture reflected ‘God’s will’.63 182

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In March, a high court of justice tried Hamilton for treason. Despite his claim that as a Scot, the English court had no jurisdiction in his case, the court rendered a guilty verdict on 6 March and executed ‘Captain Luckless’ three days later at St James’s Palace along with Holland and Capel.64 Mistrusted and despised by Englishmen and Scots, his sole source of power had come from the close association with the royal family. Ultimately, failure marked Hamilton’s military and political career in almost every endeavour.

Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven (1580–1661) Likely the illegitimate son of George Leslie, the captain of Blair Castle in Athole and a daughter of the laird of Ballechin, Alexander Leslie grew up with dim future economic prospects, but his subsequent military career earned him not only a reputation for effective leadership but a large fortune as well. Little evidence exists of Leslie’s formal education. The only extant examples of his handwriting are a few signatures, indicating a lack of any academic credentials.65 Unlike their more prosperous English counterparts, the lesser Scottish gentry enjoyed few of the material advantages and luxuries made possible by landed income. In the region of Leslie’s origins at Coupar-Angus in Fifeshire, the quality of the land generated somewhat higher yields and incomes, therefore the Leslies of Balquhain probably enjoyed at least a moderate lifestyle. Owing to the limited income potential, many sons of the landed gentry opted for military service in hope of advancement and profits, thus establishing a tradition of Scottish military service particularly in foreign service.66 Following the traditional pattern, Leslie first volunteered in the Dutch service under Sir Horatio Vere in 1604. The following year, he joined the Swedish army where he served for over thirty years, rising to the rank of field-marshal. He fought under the Swedish kings Charles IX and Gustavus Adolphus in their campaigns against Russia, Poland, Denmark and the Holy Roman Empire. As a Swedish field commander in 1628, Leslie broke the siege of Stralsund and established himself as governor of the Baltic coastal cities until 1630, a position that greatly enhanced his personal estate. In May, he travelled to England to advise Hamilton on military matters relating to the formation of a combined Anglo-Scottish brigade for service with the Swedes. Leslie acted as sergeant-major-general of Hamilton’s unit, and though a subordinate, commanded the troops at several engagements along the Oder River. Following the king’s death at Lützen in 1632, Leslie commanded several Swedish expeditions, resulting in the award of two German titles with estates and promotion to field-marshal in 1636. He ended his long service to Sweden when religious dissent flared in Scotland over the king’s imposition of a new prayer book. Leslie not only subscribed to the National Covenant, but required many of his officers in the German states to follow his example. Though clearly a supporter of the Kirk and Scottish Presbyterianism, his biographer asserts that ‘Leslie’s religion was consistently placid, and therefore relatively unimpressive’. For example, following the victory at Newburn in the Second Bishops’ War, the general stated: 183

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‘It is the singular blessing of God that heth putt Newcastell in our hands’. No other reference to the role of providence appears in the account, which contrasts with the battle reports of other commanders of the period.67 Determined to support the Covenanters, Leslie retired from Swedish service and took his arrears in the form of two artillery pieces and a stand of 2,000 muskets. Avoiding English naval patrols, he arrived in Scotland with the arms in November 1638 and immediately set about organizing the Covenanter Army. In March, he seized Edinburgh Castle. Leslie took command of all Scottish forces as lord-general in May 1639. As the king’s main army approached the border, Leslie marched south with 30,000 men, but opted not to attack due to the troops’ lack of training and seasoning. The war ended ignominiously for the king at Kelso as his army fled south in the face of Leslie’s superior numbers. The First Bishops’ War ended with little fighting and a truce signed at Berwick in June 1639. Leslie resigned his commission, but with the prospect of renewed fighting, he again volunteered his services. Appointed lord-general in April 1640, his first action of the Second Bishops’ War resulted in an unsuccessful attack on Edinburgh Castle. Following this rebuff, Leslie massed his army along the border intending to capture Newcastle and the nearby coal mines. He crossed the Tweed in midAugust and reached the Tyne River at Newburn. On 28 August, through the successful employment of artillery and cavalry against a series of English fortifications, Leslie’s troops forced back the defenders. Newburn ended the Second Bishops’ War. Leslie occupied all of England north of the River Tees and remained at Newcastle for a year until the Treaty of Ripon formally ended the war the following August. The king travelled to Scotland in the late summer of 1641 to make peace with his northern kingdom. Accompanied by Leslie, Charles arrived in Edinburgh in late August. At the insistence of the Scottish Parliament, the king elevated Leslie to the peerage as the earl of Leven with precedence over all other earls. The newly created nobleman swore to the king that ‘he would not only never serve against him, but would do him any service he should command, right or wrong’.68 Additionally, the king appointed him captain of Edinburgh Castle and a member of the Privy Council. Although Leven resigned as lord-general of the field army, he remained as the titular commander-in-chief of the Scottish army, a post he held throughout the subsequent Civil Wars. Leven accepted the king’s offer to command a Scottish army for the suppression of the Irish rebellion in May 1642, but played little role in the fighting. Unable to suppress a mutiny among his officers, he returned to Scotland in late autumn having turned over command to General Robert Monro. Despite his oath of allegiance to Charles, Leven accepted command of the army raised in Scotland against the king in accordance with the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643. Leven justified his actions, stating that the oath was ‘with the expresse and necessar[y] condition, that Religion and [the] Countrey’s rights were not in hazard’.69 Unlike his English counterparts, Lambert and Lord Fairfax, Leven concerned himself primarily with the king’s intervention in Scottish religion and 184

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not with constitutional issues or the interference of monarchical government in local affairs. Religion, though, proved sufficient motivation to break his oath and take up arms against the king. Leven prepared the army for the march into England and crossed the Tweed in January 1644. He brought the experience of years of exceptional command performance, particularly at the highest levels of responsibility. Schooled in the intricacies of the new continental methods of warfare, especially Swedish tactical and organizational innovations, Leven instilled military proficiency in his army, which, combined with the religious enthusiasm and Scottish nationalism inherent in the Covenant, proved to be a decisive advantage over the northern royalists. Leven, though present at the battle of Dunbar in September 1650 as the Scottish lord-general, played no active part. He fled with the rest of Leslie’s defeated troops. The earl accepted full responsibility for the Dunbar debacle though he had not made the tactical decisions that led to Scottish defeat. At Stirling, Leven raised additional forces, but did not march with the army in the ill-fated invasion of England that ended in disaster at Worcester in September 1651. While he was attempting to raise troops for the relief of Dundee, parliamentary horse captured him on 28 August 1651. Monck, left in Scotland to maintain English control after the departure of Cromwell with the main army to chase Leslie and Charles into England, heard of the presence of Leven and several members of the commission of the Kirk and Committee of Estates along with several hundred soldiers at Alyth in Perthshire near Dundee. He sent a cavalry force, which surprised the Scots and captured nearly all of their party.70 The subsequent capture of Dundee on 1 September effectively ended the Third Civil War in Scotland. Cromwell ordered Leven and several other senior Scottish officers confined to the Tower, but with imprisonment made less harsh by their ‘liberty of the Tower’ and the use of servants. In October, the earl’s son-in-law, Ralph Delavall of Seaton Delavall, obtained his release on the payment of a £20,000 bond and the promise that Leven would stay within a 20-mile radius of the Delavall estate in Northumberland. On a visit to London in 1652 to recover his sequestered property, he again suffered imprisonment in the Tower until 1654. The eventual intervention of the queen of Sweden secured his release and the restoration of his estates as well as an exemption from the heavy fines imposed on many of the Scottish nobility. Following his release from the Tower in May 1654, Leven returned to his seat at Balgonie in Fifeshire where he died in 1661 having played no further role in the political or military events of the Interregnum.71

David Leslie, First Baron Newark (d. 1682) Though born a commoner, David Leslie claimed noble descent through his mother, a daughter of the earl of Orkney.72 As the fifth son of Sir Patrick Leslie of Pitcairly in Fifeshire, he began with minimal career or economic prospects. Little is known of his early life except his place of birth and that his father held a minor royal post. There is no indication that he had any formal education. 185

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Following in the tradition of the lesser gentry’s younger sons, he volunteered for military service in the Swedish army of Gustavus Adolphus sometime in the late 1620s or early 1630s and rose to the rank of colonel of horse. He did not return to Scotland for the two Bishops’ Wars and suffered a wound on active service in the Swedish forces in 1640; he remained in Sweden to convalesce.73 On his subsequent arrival in Scotland in November 1643, Leven appointed him majorgeneral of horse; he took part in the campaigns of the Covenanter Army in northern England from 1644 to 1646. There is little documentary evidence of his religious beliefs. A supposition can be made that he espoused presbyterian beliefs based on two factors. First, he believed strongly enough in the Covenanter cause to resign from Swedish service and return to Scotland following his convalescence. Second, from a purely economic and career perspective, remaining in Sweden likely would have resulted in greater advancement opportunities. The war on the continent had not yet ended, although the major Swedish campaigns of the 1630s had abated following Gustavus Adolphus’s death. The resignation of many Scottish officers meant the possibility of rapid promotion. Following this logic, it is presumed that, as with Leven, opposition to royal interference in Scottish religion motivated Leslie to take up arms against the king. Concern over the activities of the royalist marquis of Montrose in Scotland prevented the movement of Leven’s forces south for combined operations with the New Model Army under Sir Thomas Fairfax in 1645, although the earl reluctantly dispatched Leslie into Yorkshire with several thousand troops in March.74 When Leven finally moved further south in June following the defeat of the king’s army at Naseby, he left Leslie in command of the siege of Carlisle, which surrendered in June 1645. The mounting victories of Montrose, coupled with the suspicion that the king would attempt to join the marquis, caused Leven to order Leslie to the border with all of the Scottish horse.75 Throughout 1644 and 1645, Montrose defeated numerous Covenanter forces at Tippermuir, Inverlochy, Auldern and Kilsyth. In August 1645, the Committee of Estates in Edinburgh, exasperated by the royalist victories, ordered Leslie north to confront the marquis. With 6,000 horse, he crossed the border at Berwick and, by a series of rapid marches, surprised Montrose at Philiphaugh near Selkirk in the early morning of 13 September 1645. Leslie’s victory ended the royalist threat to Scotland. By 1647, only small pockets of opposition to the Covenanters remained, primarily in the Highlands. Appointed lieutenant-general, Leslie conducted a campaign in the north against the Gordons and MacDonalds that solidified all the kingdom under Covenanter rule.76 When the Scottish army collapsed into rout and panic following the Worcester disaster in September 1651, Leslie and General Middleton collected a large body of horse and struck out towards Yorkshire in a desperate flight for Scotland. Clarendon reported that Leslie joined the king with about 4,000 horse within two hours after the battle and that the general had ‘all his own equipage, as if he had not fled upon the sudden; so that good order and regularity and obedience might 186

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yet have made a hopeful retreat even into Scotland’.77 At some point in the night, the king departed with two servants and the refugees’ discipline disintegrated. In small clumps, many men, particularly English royalists, broke off and attempted to seek refuge from the local militia now alerted to their flight. As Leslie reached Yorkshire, his force dwindled to barely 1,500 troopers. Recriminations against his conduct in the campaign surfaced and many officers abandoned their commander. Despite accusations that Leslie had betrayed the king, Clarendon argues that, once the inquiry had been made, ‘there appeared no case to suspect that David Lashly [Leslie] had been unfaithful in his charge’. Parliamentary troops captured Leslie and Middleton at Rochdale near Manchester and on 17 September took them as prisoners to Chester.78 Committed to the Tower in October, Leslie remained in captivity until the Restoration. Although he was originally fined £11,000, Cromwell’s Act of Pardon and Oblivion of 24 February 1653 reduced the amount to £4,000. Leslie submitted a failed petition for his freedom in April 1653. Despite his imprisonment, he eventually received the liberty of the Tower, as did Leven and other senior Scottish officers. The king apparently never lost faith in Leslie’s devotion despite a report shortly after the battle that claimed Charles had left Leslie and Middleton fearing their possible treachery. Charles elevated Leslie to the peerage as Baron Newark in 1661 and granted him a pension of £500 p.a. Additionally, the king sent him a letter on 10 June 1667 that noted this confidence in the baron’s continued loyalty and fidelity. Leslie played no further role in the political and military events of the Restoration and died of apoplexy in 1682.79 Two general themes emerge from the backgrounds of the six regional commanders. First, with the exception of Leven and Leslie, religion seems to have played a relatively minor role in their motivation to fight. In the case of Lambert, Newcastle and Hamilton, it played no role in their decisions to support or rebel against the king. While religion certainly factored into Lord Fairfax’s dislike of crown policies, religious concerns formed part of a broader opposition based on his perception of royal absolutism and interference in local affairs. Additionally, attendance at Oxford and Cambridge colleges associated with Puritan influence, notably Trinity College, Cambridge, St John’s College, Cambridge and Exeter College, Oxford, had no bearing on religious orientation and therefore played little if any role in decisions to support or oppose the crown. Only in the case of the two Scots, Leven and Leslie, does opposition to royal innovation and interference in Scottish religion appear to have been a primary motivation to oppose the king. Even here, the element of Scottish nationalism as a contributory factor is an unknown variable in the absence of memoirs or first-hand comments by Leven and Leslie. Second, the cases of the six officers do not shed any light on the debate over the gentry and nobility. All of the men clearly seem to have been on the rise economically by 1640. Lord Fairfax and Newcastle benefited from an ancient and wealthy gentry lineage as well as the liberal policy of the early Stuart era in terms of elevation to the peerage. Hamilton, the scion of the most prominent Scottish 187

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family after the Stuarts, benefited from vast estates. There is no indication of any economic decline in the pre-Civil War period of any of the three, despite the obvious personal expenses incurred in their political or court activities. Lambert is the closest to the Trevor-Roper model of the ‘mere’ gentry in decline through the lack of royal offices, but by 1642 he had restored his family’s economic position through a propitious marriage and so it cannot be considered to have been in decline. Leven and Leslie sprang from a traditionally less prosperous but genteel rural aristocracy; however, unlike their English counterparts, the Scots used foreign military service on a far greater scale as a mechanism for assuring a living. Both officers, through their military talent, rose to high rank, prestige and economic standing. Therefore, they do not fit the pattern of declining ‘mere’ gentry. Since none of the six officers exemplify any strict model for determining why one chose a particular side in the conflict, the most that can be said is that, as a group, they reflected elements, to some degree, of several pivotal motivations to rebel or support the king in 1642. Those reasons included interference with or an attempt to impose religious innovations, constitutional debates on the proper role and relative powers of the crown and Parliament, opposition to royal absolutism and the crown’s interference in traditionally local matters.

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I N T RO D U C T I O N 1 Gardiner, CW; Peter Young and Richard Holmes, The English Civil War: A Military History of the Three Civil Wars, 1642–1651 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974); Peter Young, Edgehill, 1642: The Campaign and the Battle (Kineton: Roundwood Press, 1967) and Naseby, 1645: The Campaign and the Battle (London: Century, 1985). 2 David A. Charters, Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson (eds) Military History and the Military Profession (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), 44. Howard delivered a seminal paper at a 1961 meeting of the Royal United Services Institute in which he argued that military history must be studied in width (comparatively), in context (as a reflection of society) and in depth (primarysource research). The role of military historians, he argued, is to study warfare from the viewpoint of how societies perceive the activity and how they prepare for and conduct it. This viewpoint is also known as the ‘new military history.’ 3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 282. Book 5 (‘Military Forces’) essentially addresses the physical qualities of the military instrument with which a commander works. But to Clausewitz, the essential ingredient is the quality of leadership. With all other military factors being relatively equal, as in the First Civil War, clearly, effective leadership is the deciding factor in parliamentary military success. 4 Gentles; Kishlansky; Carlton, Going to the Wars; Hutton, Royalist War Effort; Ashton, CounterRevolution; J. P. Kenyon, The Civil Wars of England (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988). Professor Carlton does address the issue of officer leadership in one chapter; however, this topic is not the central thesis of his work. Additionally, a recent work by Kenyon also addresses the leadership qualities of several senior commanders, but as with Carlton, not as a central thesis. 5 It is not the objective of this study to argue whether the Civil Wars caused the revolution or vice versa. It is clear that there existed a symbiotic relationship and one could not have occurred without the other. 6 There are a number of excellent works available dealing with Montrose and the Civil Wars in Scotland. For Ireland, see Jane Ohlmeyer’s article in Kenyon and James Scott Wheeler’s The Irish and British Wars, 1637–1654: Triumph, Tragedy and Failure (London: Routledge 2002). 7 Martin Blumenson, ‘Leadership and the Art of Command: Together with Some Thoughts on George S. Patton, Jr’, in Henry S. Bausum (ed.) The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures in Military Leadership and Command, 1986 (Lexington, Va. : VMI Foundation, 1986), 15. The quote is from the Patton Papers in the possession of Professor Blumenson. 8 Omar N. Bradley, ‘On Leadership’, in Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown (eds) The Challenge of Military Leadership (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 3–4. 9 Quoted in Howard T. Prince, ‘Understanding Leadership’, in Contemporary Issues in Leadership, 3rd edn, ed. William E. Rosenbach and Robert L. Taylor (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 1.

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N OT E S 10 David D. van Fleet and Gary A. Yukl, in Military Leadership: An Organizational Behaviour Perspective (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1986), 1–15; Michael J. O’Keeffe, ‘The Effects of Leadership Style on the Perceived Effectiveness and Satisfaction of Selected Army Officers’ (Ed.D. diss., Temple University, 1989), 15. 11 While many modern leadership studies now focus on ‘transformational leadership’, ultimately all forms of leadership, whether driven by inherent characteristics, education or experience, result in certain behaviours that determine the outcome. It is not the intent of this study to inject a voice into the argument over the theories of effective leadership, rather it is to analyse the outcomes, which are essentially driven by traits and resultant behaviour in the time before modern officer training and education clearly came to be an instrument to steer officers and senior non-commissioned officers towards (hopefully improve) more effective behaviours.

1 T H E A RT O F C O M M A N D : C O N C E P T S O F M I L I TA RY LEADERSHIP 1 Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’, in Millett and Murray (eds) Military Effectiveness, 3 vols (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 1: 26–7. 2 Gentles, 118. 3 Gentles, ‘The Civil Wars in England’, in Kenyon, 119. 4 Carlton, Going to the Wars, 180. Carlton attributes the quote ‘Soldiers are the tradesmen of killing, but officers are the managers of violence’ to Harold D. Laswell. 5 Michael J. O’Keeffe, ‘The Effects of Leadership Style on the Perceived Effectiveness and Satisfaction of Selected Army Officers’ (Ed.D. diss., Temple University, 1989), 16. 6 Ralph M. Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1974), 35–62. Stogdill looked at leadership theory in general, not just military command. 7 William E. Rosenbach and Robert L. Taylor, ‘Understanding Leadership’, in Rosenbach and Taylor (eds) Contemporary Issues in Leadership, 3rd edn (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 1. 8 C. N. Barclay, ‘Military Leadership’, British Army Journal 54 (April 1974): 15–19. 9 J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1926), 48–54. 10 Wayne R. Wheeler and Louis S. Csoka (eds), ‘Leader Behaviour-Theory and Study’, in Office of Military Leadership, United States Military Academy, A Study of Organizational Leadership, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1976), 309; Stogdill, Handbook, 128. 11 Billy R. Cook, ‘Situational Leadership Styles of Air Force Commanding Officers’ (Ed.D. diss., University of La Verne, 1992), 24–5; Laurie A. Broedling, ‘The Psychology of Military Leadership’, in James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb (eds) Military Leadership, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping, vol. 10, ed. (London: Sage, 1981), 78– 9. 12 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 3, 17, as quoted in Ralph D. and M. Lee Sawyer (ed. and tr.), The Art of the Warrior: Leadership and Strategy from the Chinese Military Classics (Boston: Shambhala, 1996), 150. Sun Tzu is acknowledged as the greatest Chinese military philosopher, and the scope of the writings covers the Warring States period from several hundred years BC down through the Sung dynasty. The precise date of T’ai Kung’s work in not known; however, Sawyer believes that it preceded Sun Tzu’s by several centuries. 13 Gerat Barry, A Discourse of Military Discipline (Brussels, 1634), 165–6. 14 Henry J. Webb, Elizabethan Military Science: The Books and the Practice (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 36; Barnaby Rich, Allarme to England (London, 1578), sig. K3r; A Right Exelent and Pleasaunt Dialogue: Betwene Mercury and an English Souldier (London, 1574), 42 (quoted). 15 Roger Boyle, earl of Orrery, A Treatise of the Art of War: Dedicated to the Kings Most Excellent Majesty (London, 1677), 12.

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N OT E S 16 Clarendon, 1: 150. 17 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 101–12. The very best analysis of both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as military theorists is Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass, 2001). 18 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 251. 19 Wheeler and Csoka, ‘Leader Behaviour-Theory’, 319. 20 Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, tr. John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1958), p. vii. Colonel du Picq was killed by a Prussian shell while commanding his regiment in September 1870 in the Franco-Prussian War. 21 Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer, Nijhoff, 1982), 149–50. 22 Bruce T. Caine, ‘Role Making and the Assumption of Leadership’, in Office of Military Leadership, A Study of Organizational Leadership, 362–3; David D. van Fleet and Gary A. Yukl, Military Leadership: An Organizational Behaviour Perspective (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1986), 37–41; Chester A. Schriesheim and Steven Kerr, ‘Theories and Measures of Leadership: A Critical Appraisal of Current and Future Directions’, in James G. Hunt and Lars L. Larson (eds) Leadership, the Cutting Edge: A Symposium Held at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, October 27–28, 1976 (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 13–15; Robert J. House and Gary Dessler, ‘The Path-Goal Theory of Leadership: Some Post Hoc and a Priori Tests’, in James G. Hunt and Lars L. Larson (eds) Contingency Approaches to Leadership, (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1974), 29–55; Marshall Sashkin and William E. Rosenbach, ‘A New Leadership Paradigm’, in Rosenbach and Taylor (eds) Contemporary Issues in Leadership, 105–7; O’Keeffe, ‘Effects’, 37; Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown (eds), The Challenge of Military Leadership (Washington, DC: PergamonBrassey’s, 1989), p. xviii. Social scientists have attempted to define leadership as a combination of characteristics, behaviour and group dynamics. Gary A. Yukl developed a taxonomy of measurable leadership behaviour, which includes actions such as goal setting, inspiring subordinates, emphasizing performance, planning, administering discipline, etc. while incorporating modern military leadership objectives such as mission orientation, maintenance of morale and esprit de corps, discipline and job knowledge. The Path-Goal Theory, as advanced by Robert J. House and Gary Dessler, incorporates the motivational aspect in that the ability of a leader to cause followers to act is directly determined by the particular situation. Additionally, the Transformational Theory, as espoused by William Rosenbach and Marshall Sashkin views leadership as having passed from traits through behaviour and arrived at a ‘transformational’ model in which leaders articulate goals, create an image of them in the followers’ minds, demonstrate confidence and thus inspire motivation to accomplish the task. This theory relies heavily on personal charisma as the leader uses inspiration, communications and an understanding of human behaviour to prompt followers into achieving goals beyond normal expectations and into subordinating their interests to the leader’s agenda. For the purposes of this study, ‘behaviour’ is the rubric that incorporates various aspects of the Traits, Behaviour, Path-Goal, Situational and Transformational theories of leadership. 23 John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Penguin, 1987), 315–38. 24 Michael Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560–1660’, in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 14–15. 25 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 47. 26 Frank M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors in War (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), 79. 27 John Dollard and Donald Horton, Fear in Battle (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972), 44–5.

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N OT E S 28 Samuel A. Stouffer, The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath, 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 125. 29 Thomas Venn, Military Observation or the Tacticks Put Into Practice (London, 1672), 2. 30 William Bariffe, Militarie Discipline: or, the Young Artillery-man (London, 1639), 1. 31 ‘Of Duties in General, Articles 3, 4 and 5’, Lawes and Ordinances of Warre: Established for the Better Conduct of the Army (London, 1642). 32 Wilfred Emberton, ‘Love Loyalty’: The Close and Perilous Siege of Basing House, 1643–1645 (Basingstoke: W. J. Emberton, 1972), 88–9. 33 Anthony Wood, Wood’s Life and Times and Wood’s City of Oxford, ed. Andrew Clark (Oxford: Oxford Historical Society, 1891), 73. 34 J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985), 130–3. 35 Keegan, Mask of Command, 350–1; Carlton, Going to the Wars, 189. 36 Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 42. 37 Keegan, Face of Battle, 189; Carlton, Going to the Wars, 191. 38 Gentles, 60. 39 Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, quoted in Roberts, ‘Revolution’, 28–9. 40 Folger Shakespeare Library, Folger MSS V. a 436, fol. 26v. 41 Fairfax to Sir Ralph Hopton, 5 March 1646, Rushworth, part 4, 1: 105. 42 Barbara Donagan, ‘Codes and Conduct in the English Civil War’, PP 118 (February 1988): 73– 8. 43 Stouffer, American Soldier, 127, 130, table 8, 134. 44 John T. MacCurdy, The Structure of Morale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 66. 45 Matthew Carter, A Most True and Exact Relation of That … Unfortunate Expedition of Kent, Essex, and Colchester (London, 1650), 177. 46 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II’, Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (Summer 1948): 280–315. The authors found that group solidarity as a function of a shared purpose was the most important factor in motivating the German soldiers to fight even after the war was clearly lost. 47 Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), 2: 726–7. 48 Daniel T. Reeves, ‘Combat Motivation: The Human Dimension Correlates’ (Masters thesis, Carleton University, 1990), 19. 49 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 384–5. 50 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, tr. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 140. 51 Clausewitz, On War, 190–2. 52 Jay Luvaas, ‘Napoleon on the Art of Command’, in Matthews and Brown (eds) Challenge, 21. 53 Du Picq, Battle Studies, 85. 54 Admiral John Paul Jones to Vice-Admiral Kersaint, 1791, Warrior’s Words: A Quotation Book: From Sesostris III to Schwarzkopf, 1871 BC to AD 1991, ed. Peter G. Tsouras (London: Cassell, 1992), 378. 55 Bevin Alexander, How Great Generals Win (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 35–6, 300–5; Hart, Scipio, 255; Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. edn (New York: Praeger, 1967), 341– 8; Sun Tzu, Art of War, 66. The ‘plan with branches’ means conducting separate but coordinated operations against an enemy simultaneously to confuse him and to force wasted effort and resources in countering the ancillary blows prior to the primary attack. 56 Mitchell M. Zais, ‘Strategic Vision and Strength of Will: Imperatives for Theatre Command’, in Matthews and Brown (eds) Challenge, 85. 57 Basil H. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 94. 58 Van Creveld, Command, 18, 26–7. 59 Hart, Scipio, 256–7. 60 Carlton, Going to the Wars, 206–7. 61 Clausewitz, On War, 77, 36, 140, 184; Handel, Masters of War, 85.

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2 P O L I T I C S, R E L I G I O N A N D WA R I N E A R LY S E V E N T E E N T H - C E N T U RY B R I TA I N 1 Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 4. 2 Charles Carlton, Charles I: The Personal Monarch (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 193–4; Conrad Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments: English History, 1509–1660 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 321. 3 H. H. Leonard, ‘Distraint of Knighthood: The Last Phase, 1625–41’, History 63 (1978): 23–37. 4 Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621–1629 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 64–84. 5 Andrew Foster, ‘Church Policies of the 1630s’, in Cust and Hughes (eds) Conflict, 216–17; Peter Lake, ‘Anti-Popery: The Structure of a Prejudice’, ibid, 91. 6 John Morrill, ‘The Religious Context of the English Civil War’, TRHS, 5th ser. 34 (1984): 178. 7 A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, Setting Forth the Grounds and Reasons, that Necessitate Them at This Time to Take up Defensive Arms (London, 1642), 5; LJ 5: 257–8; Johann Sommerville, ‘Ideology, Property and the Constitution’, in Cust and Hughes, 47–71. 8 Johnston, Diary, 1: 205; Allan I. MacInnes, Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement, 1625–1641 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1991), 157–61 (quoted); Kevin Sharpe, ‘Archbishop Laud’, History Today 33 (August 1983): 26–30. 9 MacInnes, Charles I, 190–1. 10 Sir Edmund Verney to Ralph Verney, 9 May 1639, Letters and Papers of the Verney Family, ed. John Bruce, Camden Society, 56 (London, 1853), 233. 11 Mark Charles Fissel, The Bishops’ Wars: Charles I’s Campaigns Against Scotland, 1638–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3–39. 12 Russell, Crisis, 326–8; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 871–7. 13 Fissel, Bishops’ Wars, 52–60. 14 Mark Charles Fissel, ‘Scottish War and English Money: The Short Parliament of 1640’, in Fissel (ed.) War and Government in Britain, 1598–1650 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 193–223; Russell, Crisis, 330; Perez Zagorin, The Court and the Country: The Beginning of the English Revolution (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 265, 305–6. 15 Michael Hawkins, ‘The Government: Its Role and Its Aims’, in C. Russell (ed.) Origins of the English Civil War (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973), 49, 62–3; Sharpe, Personal Rule, 134–6, 142. 16 Caroline M. Hibbard, Charles I and the Popish Plot (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 168, 194–6, 212, 227–38; Ann Hughes, The Causes of the English Civil War (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991), 55–6, 168–70; PRO, SP 16/490/12, 491/21, 30; Russell, Crisis, 334; Conrad Russell, Unrevolutionary England, 1603–1642 (London: Hambledon Press, 1990), 281–302. 17 CJ 2: 367; Hughes, Causes, 94–5, 172–5; Russell, Crisis, 338–9. 18 Robert Ashton, The English Civil War: Conservatism and Revolution, 1603–1649, 2nd edn (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), 122; Samuel R. Gardiner, The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625–1660, 3rd rev. edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), 137, 142 (quoted). Hughes, Causes, 166–9; Roots, Great Rebellion, 38–42; Zagorin, Court, 241–4. 19 Hughes, Causes, 171, 174; Lois G. Schwoerer, ‘No Standing Armies!’: The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 49, 50; Zagorin, Court, 291–304. 20 Zagorin, Court, 214–15, 316–17; LJ 5: 5; PRO, SP 16/489/59; PRO, SP 16/490/21. Secretary of State Sir Edward Nicholas commanded Sir Henry Mildmay, Master of the Jewel House, to turn over the crown jewels ‘to be disposed of as his Majesty has directed’. 21 CJ 2: 372 (quoted); Fairfax, 2: 343–8; PRO, SP 16/488/55. Captain William Legg reported on 14 January 1642 that Hotham had received the order to secure and garrison Hull and that the

193

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22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30

31

32

33

34 35

36 37 38 39

40 41 42 43

crown representative, Sir Thomas Metham, could not act since he neither commanded trained band troops nor had the military authority of a deputy lieutenant. Thomas Stockdale to Lord Ferdinando Fairfax, 4 and 28 January 1642, Fairfax, 2: 254, 344, 348; CJ 2: 426. CJ 2: 433; Stockdale to Lord Fairfax, 12, 18 and 25 February 1642, Fairfax, 2: 362, 365, 367– 72, 375. LJ 4: 620–1 (quoted); Rushworth, part 3, 1: 526. The Kings Noble Entertainment at York with the Lord Maior of York his Worthy Speech to the King (London, 1642). Rushworth, part 3, 1: 533–4. Stockdale to Lord Fairfax, 25 March 1642, Fairfax, 2: 391 (quoted); Stockdale to Lord Fairfax, 1 April 1642, Fairfax, 2: 394; The Petition of the Knights, Gentlemen, Freeholders, and Others the Inhabitants of the County and City of York (London, 1642), 5 (quoted). Fairfax, 2: 409–11. The proclamation made the bounty 5s. for a musket or pistol, 18d. for a pike and 12d. for a sword. Fairfax, 2: 396; LJ 5: 5; PRO, SP 16/490/21; Rushworth, part 3, 1: 613. Henrietta Maria, Letters of Queen Henrietta Maria, Including her Private Correspondence with Charles the First, ed. Mary A. E. Green (London, 1857), 59, 316; The Humble Petition of the Gentry and Commons of the County of York, Presented to His Majestie at York, April 22, 1642 (London, 1642). CJ 2: 547 (quoted); The Declaration and Votes of Both Houses of Parliament Concerning the Magazine at Hull, and Sir John Hotham Governour Thereof (London, 1642), 3–6; Stockdale to Lord Fairfax, 11 March 1642, Fairfax, 2: 381; LJ 5: 26–7. A Letter Sent from the Inhabitants of Hull to the Right Worshipfull the High Sheriffe, and the Rest of the Gentry in the County of Yorke, Now Attending His Sacred Majesties Pleasure (London, 1642), 3. Charles I, His Majesties Speech to the Gentry of the County of York, Attending His Majesty at the City of Yorke, on Thursday the 12. of May, 1642 with their Humble Answer (London, 1642), 2–3 (quoted); Fairfax, 2: 402. Francis Newport to Sir Richard Leveson, London, 24 May 1642, HMC 4, Fifth Report, appendix, 148; PRO, SP 16/490/50. Charles I, His Maiesties Answer, to the Petition … Concerning the Disbanding of his Gaurd (London, 1642); Charles I, The Kings Declaration, and the Princes Honour, Made Captaine of the Troupe for the County of York (London, 1642) (quoted). Charles I, His Majesties Answer; LJ 5: 90; Two Orders: The One, to All High Sheriffes, Justices of the Peace, and Other Officers, within 150 Miles of the City of Yorke (London, 1642). A Speedy Post with More News from Hull, York, and Beverley (London, 1642), 4–6 (quoted). John Kenyon (ed.) The Stuart Constitution, 1603–1688: Documents and Commentary, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 244–7; Zagorin, Court, 318–19. Propositions and Orders by the Lords and Commons now Assembled in Parliament, for Bringing in of Money or Plate to Maintaine Horse, Horse Men, and Armes for the Preservation of the Publike Peace (London, 1642), 3–4. An Abstract from Yorke of Seven Dayes Passages (London, 1642), 8 (quoted); HMC 4, Fifth Report, appendix, 191; LJ 5: 41, 301–303. A True Relation of the Proceedings from York and Beverley (London, 1642), 4. PRO, SP 16/491/80. J. W. Clay, ‘The Gentry of Yorkshire at the Time of the Civil War’, Yorkshire Archaeological Journal 23 (1915): 350–90; P. R. Newman, The Old Service: Royalist Regimental Colonels and the Civil War, 1642–46 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 250–1; PRO, SP 16/ 491/21; A True Relation of Proceedings from York and Beverley, 2. The ratio of four to one in favour of the king is calculated from Clay’s listing of the Yorkshire gentry and his assessment of their association in late 1642. Additionally, P. R. Newman’s calculation of regimental colonels in the king’s service shows the depth of Yorkshire royalist sentiment. More than twice as many

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44 45 46

47

48 49 50

51

52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59

60 61 62

royalist colonels hailed from Yorkshire (52) as any other single county (24). By early June the king’s guard had already mustered 1,000 foot and 200 horse. Terrible Newes from the North (London, 1642). Woolrych, Battles, 19. CJ 2: 668; Horrible Newes from Hull (London, 1642); LJ 5: 217; The Parliaments Determination, Concerning the Levies of Horse, Armes, and Monies, Which is Now Rays’d for This Present Designe (London, 1642), 5–6; PRO, SP 16/491/65. Charles I, His Majesties Resolution Concerning the Setting up of his Standard (London, 1642), 1–6; An Extract of a Letter from Yorke. Dated on Friday Night, August 5, 1642 (London, 1642); A True and Exact Relation of the Manner of His Majesties Setting up of his Standard at Nottingham (London, 1642); LJ 5: 301–2. At the time of the wholesale replacement of officers, the Yorkshire trained bands consisted of about 12,000 horse and foot, a considerable, albeit illtrained, force. Clarendon, 2: 465. Russell, Origins, 1–31; Sommerville, ‘Ideology’, 66 Clarendon, 2: 464; Herbert Heaton, The Yorkshire Woolen and Worsted Industries: From the Earliest Times up to the Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 196–8, 203, 208; The Humble Petition of the Clothiers, Inhabiting in the Parish of Leeds (London, 1642); Brian Manning, The English People and the English Revolution, 1640–1649 (London: Heinemann, 1976), 210–15; David Underdown, Revel, Riot, and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England, 1603–1660 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 168–70. Clarendon, 2: 285 (quoted); William Sheils, ‘Provincial Preaching on the Eve of the Civil War: Some West Riding Fast Sermons’, in Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts (eds) Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 297; Underdown, Revel, 130. Mercurius Aulicus (31 December 1643), 766; Sheils, ‘Preaching’, 311 (quoted); Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 21–2. John Morrill, ‘Northern Gentry and the Great Rebellion’, in The Nature of the English Revolution (London: Longman, 1993), 204–8; Newman, Old Service, 14; Christopher Storrs and H. M. Scott, ‘The Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c. 1600–1800’, War in History 3 (1996): 22. Morrill concludes that the divisions were largely based on local concerns and longstanding struggles for political supremacy. Additionally, neutralism played a large role as many of the natural officer class refused to become engaged on either side. Newman, Old Service, 14–18, 242, 311. Ian Roy, ‘The Profession of Arms’, in Wilfrid R. Prest (ed.) The Professions in Early Modern England (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 193. Martyn Bennett, The English Civil War, 1640–1649 (London: Croom Helm, 1995), 49. Sir James Turner, Pallas Armata: Military Essayes of the Ancient Grecian, Roman, and Modern Art of War (London, 1683), 166. Turner, Memoirs, 14. Carlton, Going to the Wars, 20–2; Clarendon, 4: 175–6; Michael Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560–1660’, in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 23; Turner, Memoirs, 14. The same phenomenon occurred throughout the Thirty Years’ War as manpower needs coupled with casualties meant ample promotion opportunity and a guaranteed living for those who survived. With the continental struggle winding down, the Civil Wars recreated the dynamic. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89. Newman, Old Service, 313. See Robert A. Doughty and Ira D. Gruber (eds) Warfare in the Western World, vol. 1: Military Operations from 1600 to 1871 (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co, 1996), 3–35; and Brent

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63

64

65 66 67

68

69

70 71 72 73

74

75

76

77 78 79

80

Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics, 1689–1763 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990), 9–27, for an in-depth discussion of the dynamics of period warfare. Abbott, 1: 242; Austin Woolrych, ‘Cromwell as a Soldier’, in John Morrill (ed.) Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (London: Longman, 1990), 98, 101. Cromwell’s actions at the battles of Winceby (11 October 1643) and Marston Moor (2 July 1644) illustrated his ability to reform his troopers after a charge. Ian Roy (ed.) The Royalist Ordnance Papers, 1642–1646, Part 1 (Oxford: Oxfordshire Record Society, 1964), 7–16, 61. The cannon, the largest gun with a calibre of 7 inches, threw a 47 pound shot and weighed 7,000 pounds. The robinet, with a calibre of 1¼ inches, weighed 120 pounds and fired a 12 ounce ball. See Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 35–6 for a comprehensive analysis of the early modern military staff system. Gerat Barry, A Discourse of Military Discipline, ed. Len Deighton (Brussels, 1634), 128. See Plate 1. Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden (London: English Universities Press, 1973), 103; Martin Windrow and Francis K. Mason, A Concise Dictionary of Military Biography (London: Windrow & Greene, 1990), 191–2. Although common on the continent by the 1640s, the trace italienne pattern of defensive fortifications remained rare in Britain by 1642, a factor that explains the relatively short sieges of the early years. By the Second and Third Civil Wars, however, the adoption of such innovative defensive techniques caused sieges to be drawn out, costly affairs. This attempt to integrate infantry with the faster moving cavalry enjoyed limited success, but introduced the tactic of ‘combined arms’ to the early modern battlefield. The Swedes also developed a mobile 4-pounder artillery piece that provided support to both cavalry and infantry and could be handled by only two horses, thus providing mobility. Simon Goodenough, Tactical Genius in Battle, ed. Len Deighton (London: Phaidon, 1979), 71–3; Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, 103–4; Windrow and Mason, Military Biography, 121–4. Quoted in Newman, Old Service, 22. John Rushworth to Lord Ferdinando Fairfax, St Albans, 15 June 1647, Bell, 1: 355. James Cleland, The Institution of a Young Nobleman (Oxford, 1607), 251–69. A Declaration from Sir Thomas Fairfax and the Army under his Command (London, 1647), 5 (quoted); 72. Cleland provides a guide for the aristocrat while travelling on the continent as a gentleman volunteer. Charles Carlton, ‘The Face of Battle in the English Civil Wars’, in Mark Charles Fissel (ed.) War and Government in Britain, 1598–1650 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 229; Newman, Old Service, 8,10; Roy, ‘Profession of Arms’, 191–2. George Goring is an example of the ‘black sheep’ phenomenon. Geoffrey Parker, ‘The “Military Revolution, 1560–1660” – A Myth?’, in C. J. Rogers (ed.) The Military Revolution Debate (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 40; H. J. Webb, Elizabethan Military Science, 44–50. John Cruso, Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie (Cambridge, 1632); Edward Davies, The Art of War and Englands Traynings (London, 1619); Henry Hexham, Principles of the Art Militarie (London, 1642). Cruso’s work, reissued in 1644, came to be the primary textbook for cavalry tactics and operations in the Civil Wars. Barry, Discourse, 169–70. Dawson, plate 10: facsimile of holograph list of books taken by Lambert into captivity, facing 432. Carlton, Going to the Wars, 71–3; Barbara Donagan, ‘Halcyon Days and the Literature of War: England’s Military Education before 1642’, PP 147 (May 1995): 65–100, 79; Schwoerer, ‘No Standing Armies!’, 14–15. Ian F. W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558–1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 35–43.

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3 ‘ M IS E R A B L E B L O O DY D I S T E M P E R S ’ : C I V I L W A R I N T H E N O RT H 1 CJ 2: 734; A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, that Whatsoever Souldier or Souldiers Shall Breake Open, Pillage, or Ransacke Any Mans House (London, 1642), 1; An Abstract of Severall Letters from Hull, York and Beverley (London, 1642), 2. 2 A Treaty of Peace, Concluded the 29. of September, 1642 (London, 1642), 1–3; LJ 5: 385–6. 3 Henry Dickenson, The Last True Newes from Yorke, Nottingham, Coventry and Warwicke (London, 1642); An Extract of a Letter from Yorke (London, 1642), 1; Speciall Passages 5 (6– 13 September 1642): 34; Perfect Diurnall 14 (12–19 September 1642). 4 A True Relation of the Taking of the City of Yorke by Sir John Hotham for the King and Parliament (London, 1642), 1–8. Apparently, many of the citizens supported Cumberland and resented Hotham’s action as disturbing the peace of the county. 5 Perfect Diurnall 15 (19–26 September 1642): sig. Q1r. 6 Ferdinando Fairfax, The Good and Prosperous Successe of the Parliaments Forces in YorkShire Against the Earle of New-Castle and his Popish Adherents (London, 1642); Henry Clifford, earl of Cumberland, The Declaration of the Right Honourable Henry Earle of Cumberland Lord Lieutenant Generall of His Majesties Forces in York-shire (London, 1642), sig. A2r; The Declaration of Captain Hotham Sent to the Parliament, Wherein hee Sheweth the Reasons of his Marching into the County of York (London, 1642), 1–4 (quoted); A Treatie of Peace, Concluded the 29. of September, 1642 (London, 1642), 1–3. Cumberland rejected the Treaty of Yorkshire because the ‘gentlemen have wholly broken that agreement so solemnly concluded, and without rendring the least reason’ (by arming themselves for the defence of the county). 7 CJ 2: 794; LJ 5: 385–6; The Declaration and Votes of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament: Concerning the Late Treaty of Peace in York-Shire (London, 1642), sig. A3r (quoted); HMC 4, Fifth Report, 191. 8 The Kings Resolution Concerning his Coming from Banbury to London (London, 1642), 2–3 (quoted); Perfect Diurnall 25 (21–8 November 1642): sig. Z3r. 9 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 365–6; Speciall Passages 16 (22–9 November 1642): 135; Perfect Diurnall 23 (14–21 November 1642). 10 Rushworth, part 3, 2: 77–8; Fairfax, Short Memorials, 367–8. 11 Clarendon, 3: 381–2. 12 Bell, 25–30. 13 Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, vol. 1: Antiquity, tr. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr (London: Greenwood Press, 1975), 342–3, 352–7. I am indebted to the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, Dr. Alberto Coll, of the United States Naval War College, Newport, RI, who in his examination of how weaker entities successfully defeat more powerful foes, provides this excellent analysis of an ‘attrition by strategic defensive’ or ‘Fabian’ strategy, as illustrated by Delbrück’s analysis of the strategic dilemma facing Hannibal and Rome in the Second Punic War. 14 A Happy Victory Obtained by the Lord Fairefax and Captaine Hotham over the Earle of NewCastle and his Forces, in Yorkshire (London, 1642); Fairfax, 2: 420–2; Rushworth, part 3, 2: 91–2; Fairfax, Short Memorials, 368–9. 15 Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament: Shewing that All Regiments of Foote, and Troopes of Horse in London and All Parts of England Shall Within Fortie Eight Houres After Publication Hereof, March to his Excellence Robert Earle of Essex (London, 1642), sig. A3r. 16 Roots, Great Rebellion, 62. 17 HMC 4, Fifth Report, 142. 18 Woolrych, Battles, 169. For example, the Lancashire militia under Colonel Ralph Ashton fought as well at Preston as the New Model Army troops. 19 Christopher Hibbert, Cavaliers and Roundheads: The English Civil War, 1642–1649 (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1993), 168–9.

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N OT E S 20 A Declaration of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, for the Raising of Forces, Both Horse and Foot in Severall Parts of This Kingdom (London, 1642), 4–8; LJ 5: 466; PRO, SP 16/492/106; Rushworth, part 3, 2: 66–7. The original instructions, issued to Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Cambridge, the Isle of Ely, Hertford, and Norwich, are typical of the general authority granted throughout the kingdom as the war unfolded. 21 Clarendon, 2: 290–1; PRO, SP 16/492/14; Peter Young, Edgehill, 1642: The Campaign and the Battle (Kineton: Roundwood Press, 1967), 104–5; Hibbert, Cavaliers and Roundheads, 54. Astley was appointed major-general of foot and Aston colonel-general of dragoons. Both had served in the Swedish and Polish forces. Patrick Ruthven, the newly created earl of Forth, had served in the Swedish army and garnered a reputation for hard drinking and strategic skill. A report of 15 September 1642 states that the king marched from Nottingham with only 500 horse, five foot regiments and twelve pieces of artillery. 22 Hutton, Royalist War Effort, 22–3. 23 Firth, CA 25–6; Warwick, Memoirs, 236. 24 Hutton, Royalist War Effort, 23. 25 PRO, SP 16/492/13, 14, 107; Hutton, Royalist War Effort, 50. Though nominally under the command of Newcastle, Derby operated as an independent field commander and provided little assistance in operations against Lord Fairfax. 26 C. B. Phillips, ‘The Royalist North: The Cumberland and Westmorland Gentry, 1642–1660’, Northern History 14 (1978): 170–5. 27 Newcastle, 64–74. By Naseby, however, the dedication of Langdale’s troopers had come into question as many threatened to desert or disband rather than march south with the king. 28 CJ 3: 200. 29 Colonel Edward Massey to Derby House, 18 November 1644, CSPD, 1644–45, 131. 30 Anthony Wood, Woods Life and Times and Woods City of Oxford, ed. Andrew Clark (Oxford: Oxford Historical Society, 1891), 73. 31 Quoted in Firth, CA 278–9; LJ 5: 439. 32 Lawes and Ordinances of Warre Established for the Better Conduct of the Army (London, 1642); Firth, CA 280. With Essex’s name removed from the title, Fairfax adopted essentially the same ordinances for the New Model. Every colonel and captain received a copy and read the ordinances to the troops at specified times. Many of the regulations remained in force under Charles II and formed the basis of the subsequent British Army’s general regulations. 33 Lawes and Ordinances, articles 1–4, ‘Of Duties Morrall’. 34 PRO, SP 16/491/134; Military Orders, and Articles, Established by His Majestie for the Better Ordering and Governing of his Army (Oxford, 1643); Henry Hexham, Principles of the Art Militarie (London, 1642); Firth, CA 280–1. 35 Firth, CA 26–7. 36 George Nugent, Memorials of John Hampden, his Party and his Times, 5th edn (London: George Bell, 1889), 254; Hutton, Royalist War Effort, 29. 37 Clarendon, 2: 347; Wood, Woods Life, 53 (quoted); Richard Atkyns and John Gwyn, Military Memoirs of Richard Atkyns and John Gwyn: The Civil War, ed. Peter Young and Norman Tucker (London: Longmans, 1967), 7. 38 Clarendon, 2: 347; Lucy Hutchinson, Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, ed. James Sutherland (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 142–4; Firth, CA 28. 39 Hibbert, Cavaliers and Roundheads, 200. 40 Perfect Diurnal 34 (30 January–6 February 1643): sig. Ll2r; Thomas Crompton, A True and Plenary Relation of the Great Defeat Given by My Lord Fairfax Forces unto My Lord Newcastles Forces in Yorkshire (London, 1643), 1–8. 41 Clarendon, 3: 281–3. 42 Speciall Passages 29 (21–8 February 1643): 239. 43 Geoffrey Ridsdell Smith and Margaret Toynbee, Leaders of the Civil Wars, 1642–1648 (Kineton: Roundwood Press, 1977), 65–8. 44 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 375–7; Wilson, Fairfax, 30–1; Hodgson, Memoirs, 97.

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N OT E S 45 Speciall Passages 39 (2–9 May 1643), 320. Parliament responded with additional money. 46 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 378 (quoted); A Fuller Relation of That Miraculous Victory Which it Pleased God to Give unto the Parliaments Forces under the Command of the Right Honourable the Lord Fairfax, Against the Earle of New Castles Army at Wakefield in Yorkshire (London, 1643), 1–8; John Vicars, God in the Mount (London, 1643), 337; Lord Fairfax to Lenthall, 23 May 1643, Rushworth, part 3, 2: 268–70; A Miraculous Victory Obtained by the Right Honorable, Ferdinando Lord Fairfax, Against the Army under the Command of the Earl of New-Castle at Wakefield in York-shire (London, 1643), 1–8; Another Relation of a Famous Victory Obtained by the Lord Fairfax Neere Wakefield (London, 1643), sig. A5r; The Rider of the White Horse and his Army, their Late Good Successe in Yorke-shiere (London, 1643), 5–7. Goring spent the next nine months in the Tower awaiting an exchange of prisoners. 47 Martyn Bennett, The English Civil War, 1640–1649 (London: Longman, 1995), 44. 48 Gerolamo Agostini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 23 January 1643, CSPV, 1642–1643, 230–1 (quoted). Clausewitz, On War, 595–6 (quoted). 49 An Expresse Relation of the Passages and Proceedings of His Majesties Armie, under the Command of His Excellence the Earle of Newcastle (Oxford, 1643), 1–2; Fairfax, Short Memorial, 378–86 (quoted); Hodgson, Memoirs, 97; Warwick, Memoirs, 257–8. 50 Clarendon, 3: 135. 51 P. R. Newman, The Old Service: Royalist Regimental Colonels and the Civil War, 1642–46 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 214. 52 Gentles, ‘The Civil Wars in England’, Kenyon, 123. 53 Peter Young and Wilfred Emberton, Sieges of the Great Civil War, 1642–1646 (London: Bell & Hyman, 1978), 48–50; Fairfax, Short Memorial, 387; Letters of Henrietta Maria, Including her Private Correspondence with Charles the First, ed. M. A. E. Green (London, 1857), 219, 225; Warwick, Memoirs, 243; Clarendon, 3: 177. 54 A True Relation of the Late Fight betweene the Right Honourable the Earle of Manchesters Forces, and the Marquesse of Newcastles Forces (London, 1643), 1–8; Fairfax, Short Memorial, 388–90; Abbott, 1: 265–6. 55 A True and Exact Relation of the Great Victories Obtained by the Earl of Manchester, and the Lord Fairfax; Against the Earl of Newcastles Army in the North (London, 1643), 6–8 (quoted); Fairfax, Short Memorial, 388; Young and Emberton, Sieges, 49–50. 56 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 390. 57 Woolrych, Battles, 48–9; Young and Emberton, Sieges, 35–51. These were the first major sieges to be successfully withstood and reflected the implementation of some of the innovative techniques imported from the continent. The king’s siege of Hull in the summer of 1642 failed because the newly raised royalist force lacked the required guns, equipment and training. 58 David Underdown, Pride’s Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 45–75; John R. MacCormack, Revolutionary Politics in the Long Parliament (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 327–46; Roots, Great Rebellion, 80–1; Valerie Pearl, ‘Oliver St John and the Middle Group in the Long Parliament: August 1643–May 1644’, EHR 81 (1966): 490–519; Firth, CA 24. 59 Walter Makey, The Church of the Covenant, 1637–1651: Revolution and Social Change in Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1979), 67–70; Stevenson, Revolution, 276–98; HMC 21, Hamilton, 110; PRO, SP 16/497/105, 139; LJ 6: 139–40, 171, 288. 60 Baillie, 2: 45; Four Speeches Delivered at Guildhall (London, 1643); LJ 6: 364–6; PRO, SP 16/ 498/39, 63; Stevenson, Revolution, 287, 293. 61 Lawrence Kaplan, Politics and Revolution During the English Revolution: The Scots and the Long Parliament, 1643–1645 (New York: New York University Press, 1976), 157. 62 A Declaration of the Committee for the Militia: Concerning the Penalties that are to be Inflicted upon Those of the Trained-Bands that Exempt Themselves in This Present Expedition (London, 1643), 3–4. The declaration also called for all London parishes to set up tables in each church to record the names of every soldier who had previously volunteered for service.

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N OT E S 63 Charles I, His Majesties Declaration to All his Loving Subjects. After his Victories Over the Lord Fairfax in the North, Sir William Waller in the West, and the Taking of Bristol by His Majesties Forces (Oxford, 1643), 1. 64 Rushworth, part 3, 2: 614. 65 Magnalia Dei. A Relation of Some of the Many Remarkable Passages in Cheshire Before the Siege of Namptwich (London, 1644), 5–6; Fairfax, Short Memorial, 390–2; Rushworth, part 3, 2: 302–3; Thomas Carte (ed.) A Collection of Original Letters and Papers, Concerning the Affairs of England, from the Year 1641 to 1660, 2 vols (London, 1739), 1: 36–42 (Lord Byron’s account). 66 Sir Thomas Fairfax to Speaker Lenthall, Nantwich, 29 January 1643, Rushworth, part 3, 2: 302. The highest accolade a soldier could receive was to be mentioned in dispatches. 67 ‘A List of the Several Regiments and Chief Officers of the Scottish Army’, Rushworth, part 3, 2: 604–5. 68 Charles Sanford Terry, The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven (London: Longmans, Green, 1899), 181–91. 69 Edward Furgol, ‘The Civil Wars in Scotland’, Kenyon, 42. 70 S. D. M. Carpenter, ‘Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British Army, 1756 to 1815’ (M.Litt. thesis, University of St Andrews, 1978), 3–10. 71 Sir James Turner, Memoirs of his own Life and Times (Edinburgh, 1839), 30. 72 Rushworth, part 3, 2: 604–5; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 21, 28, 33. 73 Furgol, ‘Civil Wars in Scotland’, 43. 74 Keith M. Brown, ‘From Scottish Lords to British Officers: State Building, Elite Integration and the Army in the Seventeenth Century’, in Norman MacDougall (ed.) Scotland and War: AD 79–1918 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1991), 138–40. 75 Ibid., 141. 76 BL, De la Ware MSS, Harleian MSS 374, fol. 313v. 77 Articles and Ordinances of Warre, for the Present Expedition of the Army of the Kingdome of Scotland. By the Committee of Estates, and His Excellence, the Lord-general of the Army (Edinburgh, 1643). 78 Weekly Account 36 (29 February–6 March 1644): sig. A3v. 79 John Vicars, Gods Arke Overtopping the Worlds Waves, or the Third Part of the Parliamentarian Chronicle (London, 1646), 168–9; Hodgson, Memoirs, 103 (quoted). Captain Hodgson, an officer of Bright’s regiment of foot (which became Lambert’s in 1650), served throughout the wars and chronicled many of the engagements in which Lambert participated. 80 Weekly Account 32 (3–10 April 1644): sig. A3r. 81 Vicars, Gods Arke, 168, 170–1; Sir R. Burgoyne to Sir R. Verney, 4 April 1644, HMC 6, Seventh Report, 447. 82 Vicars, Gods Arke, 69 (quoted); CJ 3: 441–2. 83 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 392. 84 Mercurius Aulicus (21–7 April 1644), 959–60; A Letter Sent from the Right Honourable, the Lord Fairfax, to the Committee of Both Kingdoms: Concerning the Great Victory … at Selby (London, 1644), 1–6; Rushworth, part 3, 2: 618–19; Fairfax, Short Memorial, 392–3; A True Relation of the Great Victory it Hath Pleased God to Give the Lord Fairfax, and Sir Thomas Fairfax his Son … Over the Remnant of Newcastles Forces in Yorkshire (London, 1644) (quoted). 85 Intelligence from the Scottish Army (London, 1644), 1–5; Rushworth, part 3, 2: 620; Fairfax, Short Memorial, 393

4 ‘ I N T H E R A N K S O F D E AT H ’ : R OYA L I S T D E F E AT A N D T H E N E W M O D E L A R M Y, 1 6 4 4 – 1 6 4 7 1 Simeon Ash, A Continuation of True Intelligence from the Right Honourable, the Earl of Manchester’s Army since the Taking of Lincoln, no. 2 (London, 1644). Ash served as a chaplain in Manchester’s command.

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N OT E S 2 For details of the siege of York and the Battle of Marston Moor, see P. R. Newman, The Battle of Marston Moor, 1644 (Strettington, Chichester: Strettington House, 1981); Woolrych, Battles, 52–80; Peter Young, Marston Moor, 1644: The Campaign and the Battle (Kineton: Roundwood Press, 1970); H. C. B. Rogers, Battles and Generals of the Civil Wars, 1642–1651 (London: Seeley Service, 1968), 124–51; Peter Wenham, The Great and Close Siege of York, 1644 (Kineton: Roundwood Press, 1970). 3 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 394; Simeon Ash, A Continuation of True Intelligence from the English and Scottish Forces in the North … Now Beleaguring York, no. 5 (London, 1644). 4 Rushworth, part 3, 2: 632–7; quoted in Young, Marston Moor, 86–7. 5 C. V. Wedgwood, ‘Prince Rupert’s Campaign of 1644’, Geographical Magazine (July 1944) 136–8; Ash, Intelligence, no. 5; Sir Hugh Cholmley, ‘Memorials Touching the Battle of York’, EHR 5 (1890): 347. 6 A Relation of the Good Successe of the Parliaments Forces under the Command of Generall Lesly, the Earl of Manchester, and the Lord Fairfax (London, 1644), sig. A3v. 7 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 394–5. 8 C. H. Firth, ‘The Journal of Prince Rupert’s Marches 5 September 1642 to 4 July 1646’, EHR 13 (October 1898): 736–7; Hodgson, Memoirs, 112; Cholmley, ‘Memorials’, 347. 9 Gentles, ‘The Civil Wars in England’. Kenyon, 107–8; Hutton, Royalist War Effort, 50–1, 82–3, 130. The six ‘grandees’ were: earl of Newcastle (6 northern counties); earl of Derby (Lancashire); marquis of Hartford (Wiltshire, Hampshire and western England); Lord Herbert, son of the marquis of Worcester (south-east Wales and Marches of Monmouthshire, Breconshire, Glamorganshire and Radnorshire); earl of Carbery (southwest Wales); and Lord Capel (north Wales, Cheshire, Shropshire and Worcestershire). 10 Pythouse Papers, in C. V. Wedgwood, The King’s War, 1641–1647 (London: Collins, 1958), 334; Newcastle, 137–8 (quoted). 11 Newcastle, 142. 12 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 394. 13 Wilson, Fairfax, 48–9; C. H. Firth, ‘Marston Moor’, TRHS, NS 12 (1898): 73–4. See Thomas Stockdale’s narrative as printed in Firth. 14 Cholmley, ‘Memorials’, 347–8; PRO, SP 16/497/157; Orders and Institutions of War, Made and Ordained by His Majesty, and by him Delivered to … the Earle of Newcastle (London, 1642), 4; Woolrych, Battles, 69. 15 Young, Marston Moor, 93–108. See Young for the dispositions and order of battle of both armies at the start of Marston Moor. 16 Simeon Ash, A Continuation of True Intelligence from the Armies in the North, from the 10. Day, to the 27. of This Instant July, 1644, no. 6 (London, 1644); Rushworth, part 3, 2: 634 (quoted); Abbott, 1: 286. 17 Newcastle, 155–8; Young, Marston Moor, 125 (quoted). 18 Newcastle, 160 (quoted); Trease, Cavalier, 136. 19 Abbott, 1: 286; William Stewart, A Full Relation of the Late Victory Obtained (through GODS Providence) by the Forces under the Command of Generall Lesly, the Lord Fairfax, and the Earl of Manchester (London, 1644), 9; Fairfax, Short Memorials, 395; A Diary, or an Exact Journall 8 (11–19 July 1644); Firth, ‘Marston Moor’, 76. See Stockdale’s narrative. 20 Newcastle, 150. 21 A Relation of the Good Successe; Wilson, Fairfax, 52; Robert Douglas, ‘The Diary of Mr. Robert Douglas When with the Scottish Army in England 1644’, in Historical Fragments, Relative to Scottish Affairs from 1635 to 1664 (Edinburgh, 1833), 65. Leven fled to Leeds. Lord Fairfax retired to his house at Nun Appleton in the West Riding. 22 Fairfax, Short Memorial, 396 (quoted); Ash, Intelligence, no. 6.; Stewart, Full Relation, 9–12; Lionel Watson, A More Exact Relation of the Late Battell Neer York (London, 1644), 7. Captain Stewart served in Lesly’s regiment of horse and was subsequently sent to London carrying dispatches describing the allied victory. Watson was Manchester’s scoutmaster-general and commented that Sir Thomas ‘caried himself as bravely as … man could do’.

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N OT E S 23 Stewart, Full Relation, 9 (quoted); Firth, ‘Marston Moor’, 71–2; Young, Marston Moor, 130, 138, 144. See Ogden’s narrative as printed in Firth. 24 James Somerville, Memorie of the Somervilles, 2 vols, ed. Sir Walter Scott (Edinburgh, 1815), 2: 348; Newcastle, 160. 25 Perfect Occurrences 30 (12–19 July 1644) (quoted). 26 Ash, Intelligence, no. 5, 6. 27 Somerville, Somervilles, 2: 343–52. 28 Turner, Memoirs, 38. There is dispute over whether Manchester remained on the battlefield. Turner says he fled; other commentators credit him as remaining. 29 Somerville, Somervilles, 2: 351. 30 Ash, Intelligence, no. 5, 6 (quoted); Charles Sanford Terry, The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven (London: Longmans, Green, 1899), 447. 31 Newcastle, 137–61; Trease, Cavalier, 134, 141, 193. The duchess of Newcastle provided most of the details of her husband’s participation in the battle. Although she takes a partisan stand, her account does not differ in significant details from those of other, less-biased commentators. 32 Ash, Intelligence, no. 6, 2 (quoted); Stewart, Full Relation, 6–7; Fairfax, Short Memorial, 396–7. 33 The activities of Montrose and the Scottish royalists in 1644–5 culminating with their defeat at Philiphaugh in September 1645 at the hands of David Leslie are nicely covered in a number of Montrose biographies. While coverage of this aspect of the First Civil War, particularly on the leadership effectiveness of Leslie would be of great value, there must be boundaries and the story of the 1644–5 Scottish civil war is left to other works. Suffice it to say that the leadership qualities of Leslie as displayed at Marston Moor showed equally as brightly against Montrose. Leven did, however, move further south in the early summer of 1645 to besiege Hereford and later Newark, but only after detaching Leslie with a substantial force to return to Scotland to deal with Montrose. 34 Ash, Intelligence, no. 6, 3; Douglas, Diary, 65–6; Hodgson, Memoirs, 115. 35 Rushworth, part 3, 2: 638–40; A Copy of the Articles for the Surender of the City of Yorke. July the 16. 1644 (London, 1644), 4 (quoted); Douglas, Diary, 66–7; Dawson, 443–4. 36 Rushworth, part 3, 2: 641; Ash, Intelligence, no. 6; Douglas, Diary, 67; Perfect Occurrences, 4 (30 August–6 September 1644): sig. D2r; Fairfax, Short Memorial, 397; Wilson, Fairfax, 55. 37 Whitelock, Memorials, 103, 131; John Vicars, Gods Arke Overtopping the Waves (London, 1644), 44. 38 Whitelock, Memorials, 132. 39 Firth, CA 34–8; Kishlansky, 50–1; Gentles, 13–14; Rushworth, part 4, 1: 4–16. 40 CJ 4: 33, 39; Perfect Diurnall 79 (27 January–3 February 1645): 624, 629; Wilson, Fairfax, 57; LJ 7: 298. 41 An Ordinance of the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament, for Raising and Maintaining of Forces, for the Defence of the Kingdom, under the Command of Sir Thomas Fairfax, Knight (London, 1645); CJ 4: 50; LJ 7: 204; Ian Gentles, ‘The Choosing of Officers for the New Model Army’, Historical Research 67 (October 1994): 264–85. 42 CJ 4: 26; Perfect Diurnall 78 (20–27 January 1645): 617 (quoted). 43 LJ 7: 204–9; Ordinance for Raising and Maintaining of Forces, 5–6, 12–21. The ordinance also appointed county and city committees to execute its provisions. 44 Holles, Memoirs, 149 (quoted); Firth, CA 46–7. Thomas Pride had been a drayman; John Hewson was a cobbler and John Okey had been a stoker in a brewery. 45 Gentles, ‘The Civil War in England’, Kenyon, 110. 46 Clive Holmes, The Eastern Association in the English Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 175–7. 47 Firth, CA 49; Parliament Scout 83 (10–16 January 1645): 659. 48 London Post 27 (11 March 1645). 49 Worc. Coll., Clarke MSS, 67: 3r–27v; Firth, CA 40–1, 46–54.

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N OT E S 50 CSPD, 1644–1645, 358–59; LJ 7: 256–8; Gentles, 33 (quoted), 38–40; Lois G. Schwoerer, ‘No Standing Armies!’:The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 52–3. 51 Ian Roy, ‘The Profession of Arms’, in Wilfrid R. Prest (ed.) The Professions in Early Modern England (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 36–47. 52 Firth, CA 36–7; Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva, 192–6; LJ 8: 230; A More Full and Exact Relation of the Severall Treaties Between Sir Thomas Fairfax and Sir Ralph Hopton (London, 1646), 4–5. 53 Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva, 15; Moderate Intelligencer 12 (15–22 May 1645): 93; Kishlansky, 66 (quoted); Firth, CA 276–310; Wenham, Siege of York, 195–7; PRO, SP 16/497/157; Roger Howell, Jr, Newcastle Upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution: A Study of the Civil War in North England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 149–50. 54 Perfect Diurnall 50 (18–25 November 1650): 626; True Informer 32 (22 November 1645): 242; Perfect Diurnall 38 (26 August–2 September 1650): 450; Perfect Passages, 20 (22–29 November 1650): 123; Gentles, 107; Richardson, Fighting Spirit, 89–90 (quoted). For example, owing to the lack of a suitable tree, a serjeant of Coxe’s regiment was hanged on a gallows for ‘being present with some soldiers’ who plundered a house. The act violated the strict orders against robbery issued by Cromwell on 16 November 1650 from Edinburgh. Once the example had been made, he pardoned the three soldiers who committed the offence. 55 Barbara Donagan, ‘Did Ministers Matter? War and Religion in England, 1642–1649’, JBS 33 (April 1994): 120 (quoted); John Morrill, ‘The Religious Context of the English Civil War’, TRHS 34, 5th ser. (1984): 157; Lawrence Kaplan, ‘Presbyterians and Independents in 1643’, EHR 84 (April 1969): 249 (quoted); Gentles, 87–119; Abbott, 2: 378; Firth, Regiments, 1–41, 57–8, 209; Perfect Diurnall 105 (8–15 December 1651): 1506–8. 56 Whitelock, English Affairs, 1: 190–1. 57 Abbott, 2: 319, 378 (quoted); C. H. Firth, ‘The Battle of Dunbar’, TRHS, NS 14 (1900): 19–52. 58 CJ 4: 123; Moderate Intelligencer 39 (27 November–4 December 1645): 209; Sir Samuel Luke, The Letter Books of Sir Samuel Luke, 1644–45, ed. H. G. Tibbutt (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1963), 323, 328, 582–3 (quoted); Richard L. Greaves, Saints and Rebels: Seven Nonconformists in Stuart England (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1985), 137; Edmund Chillenden, Preaching Without Ordination (London, 1647); Richard L. Greaves, ‘The Ordination Controversy and the Spirit of Reform in Puritan England’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 21 (July 1970): 225–41. 59 Moderate Intelligencer 19 (3–10 July 1645): 147. 60 Ronald Hutton, ‘The Failure of the Lancashire Cavaliers’, Transactions of the Lancashire and Cheshire Historical Society 129 (1980): 47–69. The earl of Derby received considerable manpower and monetary support from Lancashire Catholics. 61 Perfect Diurnall 82 (17–24 February 1645): 648. 62 Quoted in Dawson, 37. The exact nature of the illness is unknown. In a letter of 21 January 1645 to Sir Thomas Fairfax, Lambert referred to the condition as his ‘indisposition’, but reported that he was well enough to return to York. 63 Nathan Drake, diarist of the Pontefract siege as quoted in Newman, Marston Moor, 141. 64 A Diary, or an Exact Journall 39: sig. Mmm1; Bell, 1: 182–3; Moderate Intelligencer 2 (6–13 March 1645): 12–13. 65 P. R. Newman, Royalist Officers in England and Wales, 1642–1660: A Biographical Dictionary (New York: Garland, 1981), 221–3; The Old Service: Royalist Regimental Colonels and the Civil War, 1642–46 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 222. 66 Firth, Regiments, 1: 253–63. 67 John Rushworth to Lord Fairfax, Autree, 3 December 1645, Bell, 1: 261. 68 Rushworth to Lord Fairfax, Totness, 16 January 1646, Bell, 1: 276–77; The True Informer 39 (24 January 1646): 310–12; Moderate Intelligencer 47 (22–29 January 1646): 276 (quoted). 69 Rushworth to Lenthall, Torrington, 22 February 1646, Two Letters Sent to the Hono[urable] William Lenthal … Concerning Sir Tho: Fairfax’s March into Cornwal (London, 1646), 8.

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N OT E S 70 Sprigge, Anglia Rediviva, 220–9; Moderate Intelligencer 54 (12–19 March 1646): 345–6; Sir Thomas Fairfax to Lenthall, Truro, 14 March 1646, Sir Thomas Fairfax’s Letter from Cornwall, Relating the Whole Businesse in the West (London, 1646); LJ 8: 227–30. 71 Rushworth, part 4, 1: 261–5; Bell, 1: 289–91; A True Copy of the Articles Agreed on at the Surrender of Exeter (London, 1646), 6. 72 Whitelock, Diary, 186. 73 Rushworth to Lenthal, Oxford, 9 May 1646, Cary, 1: 27; Sir Thomas Fairfax, Sir Thomas Fairfax his Summons Sent into Oxford, and the Governours Answer (London, 1646), 2 (quoted); Rushworth, part 4, 1: 278. 74 Moderate Intelligencer 63 (14–21 May 1646): 451; LJ 8: 374; Rushworth, part 4, 1: 280; Whitelock, English Affairs, 2: 23. 75 Moderate Intelligencer 70 (2–9 July 1646): 528; The Case of Colonel John Lambert, Prisoner in the Tower of London (London, 1661). In an appeal for clemency on behalf of Lambert prior to his 1661 trial for treason, a defender pointed out his civility towards the town and the university as well as his concern for preventing deliberate damage. 76 Thomas Margetts to Speaker of the House, quoted in Dawson, 58. 77 Letter to Speaker, Wakefield, 11 September 1647, Rushworth, part 4, 2: 808–9. The unknown writer comments on Lambert’s style of conciliation and persuasion, stating, ‘such Fairness, Civility and Moderation doth he use … to win and overcome by Love’. 78 Ibid. 853. 79 Against the Disorders of the Soldiers (London, 1647), 10–13; Declaration of the Northern Army under the Command of Major General Lambert (London, 1648), 8 (quoted). 80 John Lambert, A Proclamation Published through Every Regiment of Horse and Foot, and All the Garrisons of the North of England by Major Generall Lambert (London, 1647); John Lambert, The Proclamation of Major-General Lambert (London, 1648) (quoted). 81 Rushworth, part 4, 2: 824 (quoted), 832; A Fight in the North or the Dales of Richmondshire (London, 1647). 82 Rushworth, part 4, 2: 935, 946–7, 951, 981 (quoted); Lambert, Proclamation, 6. 83 Rushworth, part 4, 2: 996–7. 84 Clarendon, 3: 381.

5 ‘INEXORABLE THINGS’: CIVIL WAR IN T H E N O RT H , 1 648 1 2 3 4

5 6

7

8 9 10

Abbott, 1: 691. Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1051–2; Ashton, Counter-Revolution, 347. Ashton, Counter-Revolution, 424. William Allen, A Faithful Memorial (London, 1659), 5 (quoted); H. N. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution, ed. Christopher Hill (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961), 332. Hamilton, 204; Firth, Regiments, 181. Hamilton, 204; D. E. Kennedy, ‘The English Naval Revolt of 1648’, EHR 77 (1962): 247–56; J. R. Powell and E. K. Timings (eds), Documents Relating to the Civil War, 1642–1648 (London: Navy Records Society, 1963), 331–2, 335–6. Matthew Carter, A Most True and Exact Relation of That Honourable … Expedition of Kent, Essex, and Colchester (London, 1650); Colchesters Teares (London, 1648); Ashton, CounterRevolution, table 2, 424–9. The revolt in Wales was undercut by the parliamentary victory of Colonel Thomas Horton at St Fagans prior to the arrival of Cromwell with 6,500 troops. Rushworth, part 4, 2: 982; Hamilton, 162, 167; Perfect Diurnall 241 (6–13 March 1648): 1944; Perfect Diurnall, 242 (13–20 March 1648), 1946; Whitelock, Memorials, 295. Cary, 1: 396; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1099; Packets of Letters 7: 5, 8: 5; Hamilton, 177–8 (quoted). Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 77.

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N OT E S 11 Burnet, Hamilton, 323–4, 328, 333–4; LJ 9: 532, 582–4, 591–601, 605; Ashton, CounterRevolution, 33–9; Gardiner, CW 4: 38; Clarendon, 4: 296–302. The Four Bills ‘aimed mortal blows at the heart of the royal prerogative’. The first bill gave Parliament absolute control of the armed forces for twenty years with no automatic reversion to the crown. The second and third bills revoked all wartime anti-parliamentary declarations and voided titles or honours created since 20 May 1642. The fourth bill granted Parliament the sole right to set the time and place of its adjournment. 12 Baillie, 3: 45; Turner, Memoirs, 52–3; HMC 72, Laing, 1: 224; Jean de Montereul, The Diplomatic Correspondence of Jean de Montereul, 2 vols, ed. J. G. Fotheringham (Edinburgh: Constable, 1899), 2: 439, 455–6; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 101–5. 13 Mercurius Elencticus 26 (17–24 May 1648): 203; Packets of Letters 7: 4, 11: 2 (quoted). 14 Hamilton, 176. 15 Sir Arthur Hazelrig to the Speaker of the House, Newcastle, 6, 9 and 18 May 1648, Cary, 1: 411–20; Bodl., Tanner MSS 57, fols. 36r, 42r (quoted); Mercurius Pragmaticus 9 (23–30 May 1648). 16 CJ 5: 551; CSPD, 1648–1649, 58; Packets of Letters 8: 6; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1105–6; Mercurius Elencticus 27 (24–31 May 1648): 200 (quoted). 17 Clarendon, 4: 533–5; HMC 21, Hamilton, 125; Packets of Letters 14: 2, 15: 1–3 (quoted). 18 Baillie, 3: 40; Clarendon, 4: 326, 346. Clarendon claims that the argument of Leven’s age and physical condition convinced the earl to decline command of the Scottish field army. 19 Rubinstein, Luckless, 193–4, David Stevenson, ‘The Battle of Mauchline Moor, 1648’, in Ayrshire Collections 11 (1973): 1–24; Turner, Memoirs, 55–7; Burnet, Hamilton, 353. 20 Montereul to Brienne, Edinburgh, 4 June 1648, Montereul, Correspondence, 2: 503; Burnet, Hamilton, 413; Packets of Letters 12: 2 (quoted); The Declaration of the Citizens of Edenborough, Concerning, the Maintaining of a Warre for the King, Against the Parliament of England (London, 1648), 4–6. 21 Clarendon, 4: 349, 354–5. 22 Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1189–90; Gardiner, CW 4: 165; Montereul to Cardinal Mazarin, Edinburgh, 4 July 1648, Montereul 2: 524 (quoted). 23 Burnet, Hamilton, 342. 24 Turner, Memoirs, 57–8. 25 Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (New York: Praeger, 1966), 337. 26 Clarendon, 4: 346–47 (quoted). 27 Packets of Letters 12: 6; Hamilton, 208–9; A. M. to Sir Robert Strickland, 2 June 1648, HMC 21, Hamilton, 124. 28 Exceeding Good Newes from South-Wales … Also, Good Newes from the North, of the Compleat Condition of Major Generall Lambert (London, 1648), 5; Weekly Intelligencer 264 (6–13 June 1648): 976; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1148, 1157; Whitelock, Memorials, 309; Langdale to Lord Lanerick, Carlisle, 11 June 1648, HMC 21, Hamilton, 124; CSPD, 1648–1649, 102–4. 29 Packets of Letters 16: 2–3; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1184 (quoted). 30 Mercurius Pragmaticus 14 (27 June–4 July 1648). 31 Packets of Letters 13: 3–4; Whitelock, Memorials, 307; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1148, 1157, 1165; Hamilton, 210–11; HMC 21, Hamilton, 124; The Severall Fights Neere Colchester in Essex … Also Major Generall Lamberts Victories in the North (London, 1648), 1–3 (quoted); Declaration of the Citizens of Edenborough, 1–3. For example, on 8 June, the committee of Lancashire ordered four regiments of foot and two of horse under Colonel Ralph Ashton to join Lambert. 32 Sir Arthur Hazelrig to the House of Commons, Newcastle, 1 July 1648, Perfect Diurnall 264 (3–10 July 1648): 2076; A True and Perfect Relation of a Great Victory Obtained by the Parliaments Forces in Northumberland (London, 1648), 3–5. 33 Packets of Letters 14: 4; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1184. 34 Mercurius Melancholicus 45 (1–8 July 1648): 211. 35 Burnet, Hamilton, 355–6; Turner, Memoirs, 59.

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N OT E S 36 Cary, 1: 396; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1099; Clarendon, 4: 354; Turner, Memoirs, 57–8; HMC 21, Hamilton, 126 (quoted). 37 Hodgson, Memoirs, 114–15. 38 Rubinstein, Luckless, 40. 39 Ibid., 32–7; Patrick Gordon, A Short Abridgement of Britane’s Distemper (Aberdeen, 1844), 208 (quoted). 40 Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1194–5; LJ 10: 377–9 (quoted). 41 Bloody Newes [f]rom the Scottish Army (London, 1648), 1–3; A Declaration from Scotland Concerning the Advance of the Scots Army: Who are Come into England (London, 1648), 1–6; Mercurius Pragmaticus 17 (18–25 July 1648); Clarendon, 3: 319. 42 Thomas May, A Breviary of the History of the Parliament of England, in Maseres, Select Tracts, 1: 122. 43 Whitelock, Memorials, 324. 44 Packets of Letters 22: 5. 45 Turner, Memoirs, 70. 46 Rubinstein, Luckless, 212, 244–5; Turner, Memoirs, 84–5 (quoted). 47 Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1200–1, 1211; A True Relation of the Fight between Maior Gen. Lambert, and the Scots Army Neer Appleby (London, 1648), 1–3 (quoted); A Bloody Fight in the North on Munday Last July 17. 1648 (London, 1648), 1–6; Another Great and Bloudy Fight in the North (London, 1648), 4. Although the losses on each side were slight, Harrison received three wounds in a charge that failed to dislodge the enemy. 48 A Gracious Answer from the King … with an Exact Relation of Advance and Motion of the Scots Army (London, 1648), 1–3; Another Great and Bloudy Fight, 4; Andrew Cooper, Stratologia (London, 1662), 167. 49 Lambert to Lenthall, Barnard Castle, 20 July 1648, quoted in Dawson, 75; CJ 5: 646, 650. 50 HMC 29, Portland, 1: 488. 51 CJ 5: 644–46. 52 Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1205, 1208, 1211; Whitelock, Memorials, 319; CJ 5: 650; A Declaration, of the Besieged Soldiers in the City of Colchester … Together with a True Relation of the Proceedings Betwixt the Scots and Major Generall Lambert (London, 1648), 6 (quoted). 53 Mercurius Melancholicus 51 (7–14 August 1648): 306; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1219; Mercurius Melancholicus 49 (24–31 July 1648): 297 (quoted); Mercurius Elencticus 36 (26 July–2 August 1648): 277 (quoted); Clarendon, 4: 367. 54 Mercurius Melancholicus 52 (14–21 August 1648): 316. 55 Whitelock, Memorials, 320; Abbott, 1: 626 (quoted); Perfect Diurnall 269 (7–14 August 1648): 3013; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1218. 56 Turner, Memoirs, 62 (quoted), 78; Warwick, Memoirs, 354–5. Turner was actually a great admirer of Hamilton, a fact that lends additional weight to the indictment of his leadership skills. 57 Bell, 2: 63 (Langdale’s narrative); Sir Thomas Herbert, ‘Sir Thomas Herbert’s Narrative’, in Charles I in Captivity: From Contemporary Sources, ed. Gertrude Scott Stevenson (New York: Appleton, 1927), 104. 58 Abbott, 1: 634; H. W. Koch, The Rise of Modern Warfare, 1618–1815 (London: Hamlyn, 1981), 57. 59 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1967), 87. 60 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 117. 61 Abbott, 1: 631–42; Bell, 2: 61–3; Burnet, Hamilton, 358; Clarendon, 4: 368–9; Gardiner, CW 168–93; Herbert, ‘Herbert’s Narrative’, 104–7; Hodgson, Memoirs, 112–23; Perfect Diurnall 265 (21–28 August 1648): 2125–6 (Cromwell’s report to Commons dated 20 August 1648); Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1212–42; Woolrych, Battles, 152–82. This narrative of the Preston campaign is drawn primarily from these sources. Cromwell slept on a table at Stonyhurst Hall with sword in hand, expecting a royalist attack at any moment.

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N OT E S 62 An Impartial Relation of the Late Fight at Preston (London, 1648), 1–5; Abbott, 1: 632, 635; Bell, 2: 62–3; Clarendon, 4: 369 (quoted). 63 Abbott, 1: 635–6; Bell, 2: 60–3; Rubinstein, Luckless, 206–8 (quoted); Turner, Memoirs, 64; Perfect Diurnall 265 (21–28 August 1648): 2125. 64 Hodgson, Memoirs, 115; Abbott, 1: 632; Clarendon, 4: 368 (quoted). Clarendon based this observation on a remark made by Langdale after the Restoration. 65 Turner, Memoirs, 63–4. 66 Cromwell to the Speaker, 20 August 1648, Abbott, 1: 635. 67 Abbott, 1: 635–6. 68 Ibid., 1: 636; Turner, Memoirs, 66. 69 Abbott, 1: 636–37. 70 Burnet, Hamilton, 361; Abbott, 1: 637. 71 Perfect Diurnall 265 (21–8 August 1648): 2126; Burnet, Hamilton, 363–4 (quoted); Edmund Ludlow, Memoirs, 2 vols, ed. C. H. Firth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), 2: 202; HMC 21, Hamilton, 129. 72 Mercurius Pragmaticus 22 (22–9 August 1648); CJ 5: 676; Perfect Diurnall 265 (21–28 August 1648), 2125–6 (quoted); The Victory Against the Scotts: Neere Preston in Lancashire (London, 1648). 73 Packet of Letters 30: 4–6; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1273 (quoted); Moderate Intelligencer 183 (14–21 September 1648): 1550–1. 74 Abbott, 1: 649, 653–4 (quoted), 656–8; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 115–19, 206; Moderate Intelligencer 184 (21–8 September 1648): 1564; LJ 10: 516–18. 75 Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1273; Abbott, 1: 660–9. 76 Ibid., 1: 669, 671–5; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1296, 1329 (quoted). 77 Mercurius Militaris or the Armies Scout 2 (10–17 October 1648): 136; Mercurius Elencticus 48 (18–25 October 1648): 395; Rushworth, part 4, 2: 1310, 1315–16, 1319; Mercurius Elencticus, 50 (1–8 November 1648): 490; Clarendon, 4: 396–407; A Declaration of the Three Deputy-Governors … With a Letter from the House of Commons to Col. Generall Lambert, Now Commander in Chief at the Leaguer Before Pontefract (London, 1648), 7–8. 78 Rubinstein, Luckless, 212. 79 James Hamilton, duke of Hamilton, A True and Perfect Copie of a Speech Delivered by James, Duke of Hamilton in the Chamber at St. James on the 9 of March that Morning before he Suffered (The Hague, 1649), quoted in Burnet, Hamilton, 399; Clarendon, 4: 369. 80 The Scots Cabinett Opened (London, 1648), 9. 81 A Letter Sent from Newport to a Gentleman in London (London, 1648).

6 ‘ M Y B OW A N D A R ROW S ’ : T H E T H I R D C I V I L W A R , 1650–1651 1 Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 115–19, 123–79. 2 Ibid. 35–7; Severall Proceedings 41 (4–11 July 1650): 600. 3 A Brief Relation of Some Affairs and Transactions, Civil and Military 35 (16–22 April 1650): 501–3; 38 (7–14 May 1650): 555–9; 39 (14–21 May 1650): 561–2. 4 Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 170–2; Gentles, 385–6; Clarendon, 5: 145–6; Whitelock, Memorials, 444–6; William Oldys (ed.) The Harleian Miscellany 10 vols (London: White & Cochrane, 1808–13), 5: 260; A Declaration of the Army of England, upon their March into Scotland (London and Edinburgh, 1650), 10 (quoted); Perfect Passages 5 (26 July–2 August 1650): 34. 5 Declaration of the Army, 8. 6 Ibid. 5. 7 Severall Proceedings, 41 (4–11 July 1650), 602. 8 Hodgson, Memoirs, 110 (quoted), 127, 139–40; Firth, Regiments, 528; CJ 6: 454.

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N OT E S 9 H. C. B. Rogers, Battles and Generals of the Civil Wars, 1642–1651 (London: Seeley Service, 1968), 290–4; Gentles, 389–92; Abbott, 2: 305. 10 Mercurius Politicus 9 (1–8 August 1650): 142–3; James Heath, A Brief Chronicle of the Late Intestine War in the Three Kingdoms (London, 1676), 494–5; Brief Relation of Some Affairs and Transactions 55 (6–13 August 1650): 779–83; John Nicoll, A Diary of Public Transactions and Other Occurrences (Edinburgh: Constable, 1836), 20–2. 11 Hodgson, Memoirs, 143. 12 Johnston, Diary, 2: 5–9, 11, 19–20 (quoted); Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 174–5. 13 Johnston, Diary, 2: 5, 8 (quoted); Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 173–4. 14 Baillie, 3: 111; Mercurius Politicus 14 (5–12 September 1650): 217–19. 15 Baillie, 3: 111; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 178–9. 16 Hodgson, Memoirs, 144–6; Abbott, 2: 316–17, 323. 17 Abbott, 2: 323. 18 Hodgson, Memoirs, 145 (quoted); C. H. Firth, ‘The Battle of Dunbar’, TRHS, NS14 (1900): 36; Abbott, 2: 323. 19 Sources for the events at Dunbar include A Brief Narrative of the Great Victorie Which it Hath Pleased God to Give to the Armie of This Commonwealth Against the Scots Armie Near Dunbar in Scotland (London, 1650); Firth, ‘Dunbar’, 19–52; Whitelock, Memorials, 454–5; Hodgson, Memoirs, 147, 300; W. S. Douglas, Cromwell’s Scotch Campaigns: 1650–51 (London: Elliot Stock, 1898), 109; HMC 51, Leyborne-Popham, 75; Oliver Cromwell to the Speaker, Dunbar, 4 September 1650, Mercurius Politicus, 14 (5–12 September 1650): 217–22; Abbott, 2: 324 (quoted). 20 Perfect Passages 15 (25 October–1 November 1650): 107. 21 Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 180–6; Abbott, 2: 354–5; F. D. Dow, Cromwellian Scotland, 1651–1660 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1979), 9. 22 Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 180–1. 23 Clarendon, 5: 149 (quoted); David Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy in England, 1649–1660 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1971), 12, 42; HMC 5, Sixth Report, appendix, 613. 24 Abbott, 2: 352, 354–7; Baillie, 3: 107 (quoted), 122–3; Johnston, Diary, 2: 30. 25 Abbott, 2: 363–5; Nicoll, Diary, 36–7; James Somerville, Memorie of the Somervilles: Being a History of the Baronial House of Somerville, ed. Sir Walter Scott, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1815), 2: 42–50; Cromwell to the Speaker, Edinburgh, 4 December 1650, A True Relation of a Second Victorie Over the Scots at Hamilton, Commanded by Col. Kerr (London, 1650); Douglas, Cromwell, 175–86; Mercurius Politicus 26 (28 November–5 December 1650): 145, 152; Mercurius Politicus, 27 (5–12 December 1650): 450; Mercurius Politicus 28 (12–19 December 1650): 457–8, 467; Severall Proceedings 63 (5–12 December 1650): 951–4; Severall Proceedings 65 (19–26 December 1650): 976. 26 Mercurius Politicus 29 (19–26 December 1650): 483. 27 Oliver Cromwell, Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches, ed. Thomas Carlyle, 2 vols (London: Chapman & Hall, 1903), 1: 498. 28 Baillie, 3: 125–6; Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 194; Coronation of Charles II, King of Scotland, England, France, and Ireland, as it was Acted and Done at Scone (Aberdeen, 1651). 29 Severall Proceedings 77 (13–20 March 1651): 1167 (quoted); Severall Proceedings 79 (27 March–3 April 1651): 1203; Severall Proceedings 80 (3–10 April 1651): 1215. The earl of Sutherland raised 500 of his tenants but refused to join the main army due to a disagreement with Hamilton. 30 Severall Proceedings 76 (6–13 March 1651): 1162. 31 Cornet John Baynes to Captain Adam Baynes, Edinburgh, 18 January 1651, John Y. Akerman (ed.), Letters from Roundhead Officers Written from Scotland and Chiefly Addressed to Captain Adam Baynes (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1856), 6; Douglas, Cromwell, 200–5; Abbott, 2: 382–3.

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N OT E S 32 Douglas, Cromwell, 219–20; Perfect Passages 32 (14–21 February 1651): 224; Perfect Diurnall 68 (24–31 March 1651): 955; Faithful Scout (23–30 May 1651): 183; Severall Proceedings 88 (29 May–5 June 1651): 1345, 1353; Abbott, 2: 400, 403, 419. 33 Mercurius Politicus 54 (12–19 June 1651): 874–5. 34 Mercurius Politicus 59 (17–24 July 1651): 926; Abbott, 2: 427–8. 35 Abbott, 2: 428–31. 36 Sources for the battle of Inverkeithing include Douglas, Cromwell, 272–86; Severall Proceedings 97 (31 July–7 August 1651): 1485–6; Severall Proceedings 99 (24–31 July 1651): 1474–5, 1477–81, 1484; Oliver Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord General (London, 1651), 3–8; A Great Victory God Hath Vouchsafed by the Lord Generall Cromwels Forces Against the Scots (London, 1651), 1–6; Lambert’s letter from North Ferry, 22 July 1651, in Whitelock, Memorials, 472; Mercurius Politicus 60 (24–31 July 1651): 953–6; Perfect Diurnall 86 (28 July–4 August 1651): 1198, 1205–8; Abbott, 2: 427–9. 37 Mercurius Politicus 60 (24–31 July 1651): 955; Whitelock, Memorials, 472; A. Seneachie, An Historical and Genealogical Account of the Clan Maclean (London: Smith, Elder, 1838), 125. 38 Cromwell, A Letter from the Lord General (London, 1651), 7; Abbott, 2: 433 (quoted); Perfect Diurnall 86 (28 July–4 August 1651): 1198. 39 Severall Proceedings 97 (31 July–7 August 1651): 1485. 40 Turner, Memoirs, 95; Abbott, 2: 445–6. 41 Hamilton to Mr Crofts, Penrith, 8 August 1651, Abbott, 2: 446 (quoted); Cary, 2: 305, 308–9; Underdown, Royalist Conspiracy, 42–7. 42 Abbott, 2: 444–8; Perfect Diurnall 87 (5–12 August 1651): 1196; Mercurius Politicus 62 (7–14 August 1651): 996; Cary, 2: 295, 297–302; HMC 77, De L’Isle, 6: 603. Monck captured St Andrews on 30 August and Aberdeen on 10 September. 43 Bodl., Tanner MSS 54, fol. 136r–138v; Perfect Diurnall 88 (11–18 August 1651): 1220; Abbott, 2: 448. Harrison had 3,000 troops at Penrith. 44 Cary, 2: 296–8, 301; Mercurius Politicus 63 (14–21 August 1651): 1010–12; Arbitrary Government Display’d: in the Tyrannick Usurpation of the Rump Parliament, and Oliver Cromwell (London, 1683), 75; Severall Proceedings 101 (28 August–4 September 1651): 1550; Lilburne’s report on the battle at Wigan, Bodl., Tanner MSS 54, fols. 188r–89r; 55, fol. 15r; Perfect Diurnall 89 (18–25 August 1651): 1258–60; Clarendon, 5: 189 (quoted). Derby had mustered 1,500 men in Lancashire. 45 Bodl., Tanner MSS 55, fols. 50r–51v; Mercurius Politicus 65 (28 August–4 September 1651): 1041; Perfect Diurnall 91 (1–8 September 1651): 1253–9; Abbott, 2: 456; Whitelock, Memorials, 481–2; Severall Proceedings 101 (28 August–4 September 1651): 1558–9; Abbott, 2: 458–9. Massey had destroyed all but a footplank across the river. 46 Perfect Diurnall 92 (8–15 September 1651): 1293–5; Mercurius Politicus 66 (4–11 September 1651): 1047–8, 1052; Abbott, 2: 459 (quoted). 47 Abbott, 2: 460. 48 Ibid., 2: 462–3; Whitelock, Memorials, 482–5; Cromwell’s report on the battle of Worcester, Bodl., Tanner MSS 55, fol. 29r–v; Severall Proceedings 102 (4–11 September 1651): 1565–9; Perfect Diurnall 92 (8–15 September 1651): 1293–5. 49 Cromwell to the Speaker, Evesham, 8 September 1651, Bodl., Tanner MSS 55, fols. 46r–47v; Abbott, 2: 467 (quoted). 50 Perfect Diurnall 93 (15–23 September 1651): 1322. 51 Severall Proceedings 105 (25 September–2 October 1651): 1622. 52 Dawson extensively chronicles the political rise and fall of Lambert after the end of the Civil Wars; however a weakness of that study is the failure to relate the major-general’s martial characteristics to his political decision-making. His orientation was hierarchical and highly structured. Accustomed to the absolute obedience to orders required in the military system, Lambert, like many great military commanders, was not a political consensus builder or a compromiser. Therefore, he chronically chafed at the rough-and-tumble of parliamentary

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N OT E S politics. This military orientation ultimately precluded his exercising a political role based on compromise and mediation. Lambert’s politics always implied the power of ‘rule by the sword’.

CONCLUSION 1 2 3 4 5

Gentles, ‘The Civil Wars in England’, Kenyon, 105. Abbott, 2: 460. Clarendon, 5: 193. Abbott, 2: 460. Rubenstein, Luckless, 212 (quoted).

APPENDIX 1 Thomas Hurtley, A Concise Account of Some Natural Curiosities of Malham in Craven, Yorkshire (York, 1786), 35. 2 John William Morkill, The Parish of Kirkby Malhamdale in the West Riding of Yorkshire (Gloucester: John Bellows, 1933), 157. The court awarded Mrs Lambert a grant of £20 a. from the Calton estate during the minority of John Lambert. She died on 25 July 1643 and was buried at Kirkby, but lived long enough to see the restoration of the family fortune and the beginning of her son’s military career. 3 J. T. Cliffe, The Yorkshire Gentry: From the Reformation to the Civil War (London: Athlone Press, 1969), 352. Cliffe calculates that the 242 Yorkshire royalist gentry families were substantially better off than the parliamentarians, with seventy-six families above £500 a. 4 H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Gentry 1540–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953); G. E. Mingay, The Gentry: The Rise and Fall of a Ruling Class (London: Longman, 1976), 50–8. 5 Cliffe, Yorkshire Gentry, 374. 6 Edward Hailstone (ed.) Portraits of Yorkshire Worthies: Selected from the National Exhibition of Works of Art at Leeds, 1868 (London: Cundall & Fleming, 1869), 77–84; A. Gooder (ed.), The Parliamentary Representation of the County of York, 1258–1832, 1 (York: Yorkshire Archaeological Society, 1935): 68. Sir Martin Lister served in the Protectorate Parliament of 1654 and was the father of Dr Martin Lister, naturalist and physician-in-ordinary to Queen Anne. Sir William Fairfax of Steeton headed the family connected to the Fairfaxes of Denton, the branch of Lord Fairfax. Sir William, a prominent parliamentarian general, died of wounds from a skirmish at Montgomery Castle on 27 November 1644. 7 Dawson, 15. Dawson discovered a letter in the Public Record Office written by John Carlisle, Clerk of the Passage of Dover, to Sir Henry Bennet, Secretary of State, on 16 June 1662, which refers to the major-general as ‘my school fellow Lambert’. Since a Carlisle family appears in the parish registers of the township of Scosthrop and Skipton at the time of the major-general’s youth, this reference may refer to Lambert’s schooldays at Giggleswick. 8 John Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan Attitudes towards Reason, Learning, and Education, 1560–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 227 (quoted); George M. Trevelyan, Trinity College: An Historical Sketch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 31–5. 9 Gentles, 92–3; Dawson, 42, 167, 216–21, 243–4; Maurice Ashley, Cromwell’s Generals (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1955), 99; The Case of Colonel John Lambert, Prisoner in the Tower of London (London, 1661); Cadwallader J. Bates, The History of Northumberland (Morpeth: Sandhill Press, 1996), 45. 10 Johnston, Diary, 2: 52, 55. 11 John Spurr, The Restoration Church of England, 1646–1689 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), 382. 12 Whitelock, Memorials, 257 (quoted); Dawson, 18; Morkill, Kirkby Malhamdale, 160–1.

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N OT E S 13 Caroline Hibbard, ‘The Theatre of Dynasty’, in R. Malcolm Smuts (ed.) The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 159, 161–2 (quoted); Mervyn James, ‘English Politics and the Concept of Honour, 1485–1642’, in James (ed.) Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 309. James describes the concept of honour as giving legitimacy and a ‘moral reinforcement for … [the] politics of violence’. 14 J. S. A. Adamson, ‘Chivalry and Political Culture in Caroline England’, in Kevin Sharpe and Peter Lake (eds) Culture and Politics in Early Stuart England (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), 193. Adamson asserts that the language and imagery of chivalry played a significant role in political culture until the late 1640s. 15 Fairfax, 2: 402; Rushworth, part 3, 1: 616; A Relation of Divers Remarkable Proceedings Betwixt the Kings Majesty and His Loyall Subjects, Exprest in These Particulars Following (London, 1642); Ferdinando Fairfax, A Letter from the Right Honourable Ferdinando Lord Fairfax … [and the] Committees of the Commons House of Parliament, Residing at York (London, 1642). 16 John Morrill, The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630–1650 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), 21–2. Morrill sees among the country gentry an attitude that the innovations of the king and his chief advisers eroded local traditions and conventions, and produced many social tensions. 17 Wilfrid R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts, 1590–1640 (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1972), 152–3. 18 Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), 209. 19 PRO, SP 16/499/19. 20 Roger Hainsworth, The Swordsmen in Power: War and Politics Under the English Republic, 1649–1660 (Stroud: Sutton, 1997), 154–9. 21 Thomas Burton, Diary of Thomas Burton, Esq., Member in the Parliaments of Oliver and Richard Cromwell … Containing an Account of the Parliament of 1654 From the Journal of Guibon Goddard, ed. John Towill Rutt, 4 vols (London: Henry Colburn, 1828), 1: pp. i–cxxxvi. 22 Clarendon, 5: 346–8. 23 Derek Hirst, ‘The Lord Protector, 1653–1658’, in John Morrill (ed.) Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (London: Longman, 1990), 131, 139. 24 Clarendon, 6: 20; PRO, SP 18/100/42–3, 133. 25 Clarendon, 6: 22–30, 41, 101, 104–5; Hainsworth, Swordsmen, 234–6, 244–9; PRO, SP 18/ 155/121; Earl Malcolm Hause, Tumble-Down Dick: The Fall of the House of Cromwell (New York: Exposition Press, 1972), 359–400. 26 Clarendon, 6: 146–52, 158, 160–2; PRO, SP 18/205/5. 27 Hainsworth, Swordsmen, 252–8, 262, 264; Maurice Ashley, General Monck (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977), 180–91; Worcester College, Clarke MSS 32: 1r-254r; Edmund Ludlow, A Voice from the Watch Tower, part 5: 1660–1662, ed. Blair Worden (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 89, 101, 111–15; Clarendon, 6: 182–5. Hainsworth describes Monck as having ‘rowed towards his objectives on muffled oars’. 28 A. W. McIntosh, ‘The Numbers of the English Regicides’, History 67 (1982): 195–216; Ludlow, Watch Tower, 179–80, 183–4, 291–2, 310–12, 316 (quoted); The Case of Colonel John Lambert, Prisoner in the Tower (London, 1661); Richard L. Greaves, Deliver us from Evil: The Radical Underground in Britain, 1660–1663 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 33, 38, 71, 89, 100, 117, 181. Many of the radical plotters in the early 1660s had served in Lambert’s forces and had been involved with his rebellion in April 1660. The officers who were commissioners of the high court that tried and convicted Charles but were not regicides included Sir Thomas Fairfax, Philip Skippon, John Desborough, Robert Overton and Lambert. Fairfax refused to serve on the court while Lambert and Overton were active in the north. Lambert conducted the siege of Pontefract until March 1649 and Overton was governor of Hull. 29 A. J. Hopper, The Readiness of the People: The Formation and Emergence of the Army of the Fairfaxes, 1642–43, Borthwick Paper, 92 (York: Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, University of York, 1997): 18.

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N OT E S 30 Wilson, Fairfax, 4, 7; DNB, s.v. One ancestor held the post of high bailiff of York while Sir Guy Fairfax was a justice of King’s Bench in 1478. Sir William Fairfax, high sheriff of York in the reign of Henry VIII, married a local heiress, bringing the Denton property into the family. 31 Wilson, Fairfax, 15. As president of the Council of the North, Wentworth had invited the first baron Fairfax to become the vice-president in 1628. 32 Cliffe, Yorkshire Gentry, 299. 33 Rushworth, part 3, 2: 436. 34 Quoted in Wilson, Fairfax, 16. 35 Fairfax, 1: 367. 36 Cliffe, Yorkshire Gentry, 306 (quoted), 346; Wilson, Fairfax, 6, 10. 37 Cliffe, Yorkshire Gentry, 306. 38 Michael V. Alexander, The Growth of English Education, 1348–1648: A Social and Cultural History (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 161; Morgan, Godly Learning, 233. 39 Thomas, Third Lord Fairfax, ‘Short Memorials of Some Things to Be Cleared During My Command in the Army’, in C. H. Firth (ed.) Stuart Tracts, 1603–1693 (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964), 352–3. 40 Clarendon, 2: 287. 41 M. L. Bush, The English Aristocracy: A Comparative Synthesis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 112. 42 Rushworth, part 4, 1: 641; York Public Library, City of York House Books, B.36 (1637–50), fol. 102b; York Public Library, City of York Chamberlains’ Rolls, C. 23 (1640–5), fol. 58, quoted in Peter Wenham, The Great and Close Siege of York, 1644 (Kineton: Roundwood Press, 1970), 164, 177. The gift worth £47 was approved on 25 July 1644. 43 Wilson, Fairfax, 61, 129; DNB, s.v. 44 Trease, Cavalier, 14–15, 48; DNB, s.v. His uncle, however, paid £10,000 for the earldom of Devonshire. 45 Clarendon, 1: 104–5. 46 Bush, English Aristocracy, 68. 47 DNB, s.v. 48 Mark H. Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition, 1558–1642: An Essay on Changing Relations between the English Universities and English Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 195–6; Kenneth Charlton, Education in Renaissance England (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 60, 146; Quoted in Trease, Cavalier, 65. In 1566, 300 St John’s students and fellows abandoned the surplice in protest during the vestiarian controversy. Newcastle would have been exposed to these views even though he clearly rejected them. The college also had a strong humanist background. 49 Clarendon, 1: 164–5. 50 PRO, SP 16/488/55. 51 Clarendon, 3: 381. 52 Abbott, 1: 287. 53 Newcastle, 118, 162. 54 Abbott, 2: 387, 401, 441; Newcastle, 194. 55 Clarendon, 5: 269; Newcastle, 187–94, 206 (quoted); William Cavendish, La Methode et Invention Nouvelle de Dresser les Chevaux (Antwerp, 1657); PRO, SP 18/179/80. 56 Newcastle, 209–10, 215, 219, 226–48; Trease, Cavalier, 185–211; DNB, s.v. Newcastle’s second book was entitled A New Method and Extraordinary Invention to Dress Horses and Work Them, According to Nature. 57 Rubinstein, Luckless, 7, 9–10 (quoted); Warwick, Memoirs, 111. 58 Clarendon, 1: 100. 59 Rubinstein, Luckless, 11, 28, 55–6, 233. 60 Ibid., 31.

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N OT E S 61 Bulstrode Whitelock, A Journal of the Swedish Embassy in the Years 1653 and 1654, 2 vols (London, 1855), 1: 313. 62 Baillie, 2: 100. 63 Abbott, 1: 711–12; Burnet, Hamilton, 379, 487; Whitelock, English Affairs, 2: 516–17; Rubinstein, Luckless, 224–6. 64 Rubinstein, Luckless, 233–8; Abbott, 2: 26–8. 65 Charles Sanford Terry, The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven (London: Longmans, Green, 1899), p, 10; DNB, s.v. 66 S. D. M. Carpenter, ‘Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British Army, 1756–1815’ (M.Litt. thesis, University of St Andrews, 1978), 79. For example, 60 per cent of the officers of the British army in the eighteenth century were Scots. 67 Baillie, 1: 111; Terry, Leslie, 5 (quoted). 68 Clarendon, 1: 397. 69 Baillie, 2: 100. 70 Charles Sanford Terry, The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven (London: Longmans, Green, 1899), 447; Cary, 2: 351–2; John Nicoll, A Diary of Public Transactions and Other Occurrences, Chiefly in Scotland, ed. David Laing (Edinburgh: Constable, 1836), 56–7; Abbott, 2: 470. 71 Abbott, 2: 476; DNB, s.v.; PRO, SP 18/16/91. 72 The surname is seen in contemporary documents as Lesley, Lesly, Lashley and Leslie. 73 DNB, s.v. 74 LJ 7: 185; Terry, Leslie, 345–60. 75 Stevenson, Counter-Revolution, 18; Terry, Leslie, 362–75. 76 LJ 7: 581; HMC 29, Portland, 1: 267–68; Montrose Totally Routed at Tividale in Scotland by Lieutenant-general Lesley (London, 1645); Turner, Memoirs, 44–6; Baillie, 3: 6. 77 Clarendon, 5: 192. 78 Clarendon, 5: 189–95 (quoted); Abbott, 2: 464, 474; Perfect Diurnall 93 (15–23 September 1651): 1322. 79 CSPD, 1651–52, 273; Abbott, 2: 475, 515, 517, 631; DNB, s.v.; PRO, SP 18/16/84, 128.

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INDEX

Aberdeen 157 Act of Pardon and Oblivion (1653) 187 Acts of Parliament (1648) 124 Acton Church, battle at (1644) 81 Adwalton Moor, battle at (1643) 22, 74–5, 79–80, 88–9, 104, 116 ‘agitators’ 115 Aire, river 72 Airton 170 Alexander, Bevin 24 Alyth 185 ‘ancient constitution’ 1, 29, 30, 179 Anglo-Scottish Brigade 131, 181, 183 Annan 126–7, 130–1 Antrim, earl of 32 Antwerp 90, 100, 116, 180 Appleby, castle and battle at (1648) 124, 128, 132–4, 143 Argyleshire 125 Arminianism 30–1 army plots 34 Art of War and Englands Traynings, The 54 Articles and Ordinances of Warre 84 artillery 17–18, 33, 48–52, 56, 64, 80, 91–2, 107, 120, 123, 126–7, 129–30, 132–4, 150–3, 161, 184; cannon, guns 49, 76–7, 93, 99, 113, 125–6, 149, 152–3, 163 Ash, Simeon 100–1 Ashley, Maurice 172 Ashton, Robert 2 Association of the Northern Counties 111 Astley, Jacob, Major-General 32, 67 Aston, Sir Arthur 67 Athole 183 Atkyns, Richard, Captain 71 Atterwith Lane 96

attrition by strategic defensive (Fabian strategy) 64, 87, 116 Auldern, battle at (1645) 101, 186 Autre 112 Avendale 125 Ayrshire 125 Baillie, Robert 155 Baillie, William, Lieutenant-General 138–9, 142 Balgonie 185 Balgonies, Lord 98 Ballechin, laird of 183 Barclay, C.N., Brigadier 12 Bariffe, William 17 Barkstead, John, Colonel 120 Barnard Castle 124, 128, 133–4 Barry, Gerat 13, 50, 55 Barwick see Berwick Barwick, Humphrey 54 Basing House 18 battlefield management 4, 24, 26, 59, 85, 88, 135–6, 138, 141–2, 158, 168 Beaumont, Richard, Captain 109 Bellasis, Henry 176 Bellasis, John, Colonel 53, 84–5, 86–8 Berkeley, Sir John 112–13 Bermuda 163 Berwick, also Barwick, city and siege of (1648) 32, 84, 121–2, 124, 126, 129–30, 132, 139–40, 143–4, 148, 152–3, 159, 184, 186 Beverley 41, 42, 76, 77 Bingham, John 55 Birmingham 43 bishops 31, 33–6, 38 Bishops’ Wars, Anglo–Scottish, First and Second 2, 14, 32, 33, 66, 84, 95, 117, 167, 176, 179, 181–4, 186

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Blair Castle 183 Blakiston, Sir William 97 Bodleian Library, Oxford University 113 Bodmin 112 boldness 4, 23, 59, 72–3, 75, 78, 80–1, 85, 94, 117, 128, 134–5, 150, 153, 157, 167 Boldon Hills, battle at (1644) 84 Bolinbroke Castle 76 Bolton 92, 161 Book of Common Prayer 31, 121 Booth, Sir George 163 Boroughbridge 93, 176 Borthwick Castle 155 Bothwell Bridge 155 Bowes 129, 132–3 Boyle, Roger 13 Bradford 41, 43, 61–2, 74, 85–6, 173 Bradley, Omar N., General 3, 4, 166 Braid Hill 149 Branham Moor, battle at (1643) 73–4 Braugham Castle 128 Brereton, Sir William 77, 80–1, 102 Bridlington 72 Bright, John, Colonel, Bright’s Regiment 37, 85, 147–8 Bristol, city and siege of (1643) 56, 67, 71, 78, 107, 124 Britain (British) 4, 5, 16, 28–9, 46, 53–4, 67, 78, 99, 164 British Civil Wars (1639–60) 1–7, 11, 12, 16, 18, 21–2, 26–9, 38–9, 41, 44–8, 50, 53–6, 59, 68, 78, 82, 99–100, 110– 11, 119–20, 145, 163–4, 166, 168, 170–1, 173, 179, 184, 188 Brown, Sir John 158–9 Broxburn River 150 Broxmouth House 151 Buckingham, duke of 180 Burns, James McGregor 4 Bury 92 Bury St Edmunds 56 Bush, M. L. 177 Byron, Lord 77, 80–1, 96, 119, 122, 135, 139, 143 Callander, earl of, General 125, 127, 131, 134–5, 137–41 Calvinist 31, 176 Cambridge, University 171–3, 176, 178, 180, 187 Cambridgeshire 67

Campbell, Archibald, earl and marquis of Argyle 31, 124–7, 141, 144, 149, 154, 157, 182 Capel, Lord 121, 182–3 caracole 48, 51–3, 56 Carisbrooke Castle 123 Carlisle 32, 68, 101, 122, 124, 126–33, 137, 140, 143, 155, 159, 180, 186, Carlton, Charles 1, 2, 12, 19, 20, 26 Carlyle, Thomas 12, 156 Carron River, battle at (1649) 145 Carter, Matthew, Serjeant-Major 22 Catholic, Catholicism 1, 29–31, 34–6, 42–4, 68, 79, 99, 109–10, 113, 172, 176, 178, 181, 182 cavaliers, cavaleers 43, 61, 69, 124, 154 cavalry 22, 33, 38, 44, 47–9, 51–2, 56, 61, 69, 71, 73, 76, 78, 81–2, 84, 86–7, 90, 92–5, 97–100, 108, 111, 114, 121–2, 132, 135, 137–9, 141, 147–8, 151–2, 155, 159, 162–3, 167, 176, 184–5; horse 18, 23, 32, 39–41, 50, 53, 62, 64–5, 67–8, 72, 77, 79, 85, 96, 102, 106–7, 110, 112, 115, 120, 123–9, 131–42, 145, 148, 151–3, 155, 158–9, 161–3, 167, 173, 176, 179, 182, 185–6; cuirassier 56 Cavendish, Sir Charles 178, 180 Cavendish, William, earl, marquis, and duke of Newcastle, earl of and Baron Ogle, Baron Bolsover, LieutenantGeneral 6, 28, 39, 42, 45, 55, 59, 62–5, 68–9, 71–2, 74–7, 80, 82, 84, 86–95, 99–101, 110–11, 116–18, 166, 168, 170, 178–80, 187; Lady Newcastle 44, 99, 180 Cawood Castle 65, 94 character 4, 14, 20, 132 Charles I, 3, 6, 12, 18–19, 25, 29–46, 49, 54–5, 59, 61–71, 74–80, 86–7, 89, 91–5, 110, 113, 116, 119–26, 131, 138, 140, 142–6, 170–88 Charles II, 13, 100, 121–2, 145–7, 149, 154–8, 160, 162–7, 175, 178–80, 187 Charles IX, king of Sweden 183 Cheshire 39, 43, 77, 81, 85–6, 111, 122, 161–2 Chester 81, 85, 99, 139, 156, 163, 187 Chillenden, Edmund, Lieutenant 109 Chinese 4, 13, 165 Cholmley, Sir Henry 141 Cholmly, Sir Hugh 102, 176 Church of England 31, 40, 79, 110, 181

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Cicero 13 clans of Scotland: Campbell 125; Gordon 3, 126; Huntly 3; MacDonald 3, 186; MacKenzie 145; Maclean of Duart 159; Monroe 145; Ross 145 Clausewitz, Carl von, General 1, 4–5, 8, 25, 27–8, 55; on boldness 23; on ‘centre of gravity’ 66, 74; on ‘fog and friction’ 5, 27, 45, 103; on intelligence 136; on leadership 14; on military genius 4, 7, 27, 64, 137, 164; on ‘moral forces’ 4–5, 27–8, 103; on ‘Paradoxical Trinity’ 7, 27, 45 Clifford, Henry, earl of Cumberland 59, 61–3 Clitheroe 135–6 Clyde, river 155 Clydesdale 181 Colchester, city and siege of (1648) 38, 56, 121, 128, 134 Commander-in-Chief’s Regiment 108 Commentaries 54 Commission of the Peace 177 commissions of array 41–2, 68, 71 Commissioners for Purges 149 Committee of the Army 114 Committee of Both Kingdoms 25, 79 committees, county and shire 32, 79, 122, 132, 141, 177 Committee of Ministers 160 common purpose 4, 20, 22, 74, 110, 127, 142, 144, 147, 164, 167 Commons, House of 35–7, 41–2, 44, 79, 86, 104–5, 108–9, 115, 124, 133–4, 138, 140–1, 174, 176 Commonwealth 40, 173–4 Constable, Sir Thomas 86 Constable, Sir William 53, 102 Corbridge, battle at (1644) 84 Cornwall, Cornish 21, 112 Council of the North 175–6 Coupar-Angus 183 courage 4, 12–14, 16, 19–22, 72, 75, 99, 100, 110, 116, 138–9, 142, 164, 168 Court of Wards, wardship 171 Covenanter Army 5, 14, 28, 33–4, 36, 59, 70, 78, 82–4, 87–8, 101, 109, 114, 117, 122, 145, 164, 167, 182, 184, 186 Covenanters: Solemn League and Covenant (1643), National Covenant (1638) 5, 31–3, 36–7, 45, 78–9, 83–4, 104, 108, 117, 119, 122–6, 144–6, 149, 153–4, 156, 160, 182–6

Coventry 56 Craven 43, 124 Crawford, Lawrence, Major-General 92 credibility 4, 20, 34 Creveld, Martin van 19, 25 Cromwell, Oliver, Lord General 6, 11, 18, 25, 45, 48, 53, 76, 79–80, 90–1, 94–6, 98–9, 101, 103, 106–9, 117–21, 127–30, 133–44, 146–50, 152–63, 167–8, 171–2, 174, 180, 182, 185, 187 Cromwell, Richard 174 Cruso, John 54 Cumberland 42, 63, 68–9, 89, 122, 124, 127, 130 Darwen, river 139 Daventry 175 Davies, Edward 54 Dawson, William 172 Declaration of the Army (1647) 53 de Gheyn, Jacob 54 de jure belli ac pacis libre tres 20 Delavall, Ralph 185 Denbigh, earl of 94 Denmark, Danish, Danes 37, 72, 103, 145, 183 Denton 175, 177 Derby, countess of 86 Derby 56, 68 Derby, earl of, General 68, 80, 86, 161–3, 180 Derby House 25, 122, 124, 128, 132–3, 135, 156 Derbyshire 63, 68, 133, 178 Desborough, John, Colonel 107, 117 Devereux, Robert, earl of Essex, Lord General 17, 41, 59, 64–7, 69–70, 74, 78–9, 81, 101, 103–6, 108–9, 111, 116, 167, 177, 179 Devonshire 75, 178 Dillingham, Dr Edward 55 discipline 1, 3–4, 6, 13, 17, 21, 48, 50–1, 53–4, 56, 66, 69–70, 73, 83, 93, 95–7, 103, 107–11, 114–16, 127, 131–2, 134, 139, 141, 143, 164–5, 187 Discourse of Military Discipline 50 distraint of knighthood 29–30 Dollard, John 15 Donagan, Barbara, 3 Donaldson, Gordon 127 Doncaster 102, 111, 135, 141 Doon Hill 150–1, 160 Dover 143

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INDEX

Downs 121 dragoons 48–50, 73, 93–4, 99, 107, 112, 124, 141, 161–2 Dumfries 155 Dumfriesshire 126–7 Dunbar, city and battle of (1650) 5, 109, 144–5, 148–51, 153–4, 159–60, 164, 167, 185 Dundee 154, 185 du Picq, Ardent, Colonel 14 Durham 33, 42, 55, 69, 124 East Anglia 182 East Retford 178 Eastern Association 67, 76, 96, 103, 106, 108, 166 Edgehill, battles at (1642,1644) 55, 65–7, 71, 101 Edinburgh 31–2, 79, 82, 122, 124–6, 140– 1, 144–6, 148–9, 153–7, 181, 184, 186 Edinburgh Castle 126, 153, 184 Eglinton, earl of 98–9, 117, 140, 154 Elizabethan 13, 53–4, 178 Engagement (1647) 120, 122–7, 140–1, 156 Engager(s) 28, 83, 91, 120, 123–7, 129–32, 134, 137, 140, 142–3, 146, 168, 170 England (English) 1–5, 16, 27–8, 31, 33–4, 40–1, 45, 49, 53–7, 60, 68, 78–9, 81, 83, 116, 119–20, 122–4, 126–8, 131–2, 141, 144–7, 150, 153–4, 156–60, 165, 167, 169–70, 178, 180–6 English Privy Council 30, 178, 180–1 English Republic (1649–53) 8, 134, 146–7, 160, 174 English Revolution 2–3, 7, 46, 97, 168, 179 Essex 67, 119, 163 Estates, Scottish 79, 83, 122–3, 127, 140–1, 149–50, 154–6, 185, 186 Europe, European 15, 21, 46, 49, 52–3 Exeter, city and siege of (1646) 112, 124 Eyre 180 ‘Fabian strategy’ 59, 63–4, 72, 77, 87–9, 116, 166 Fairfax, Sir Charles 22, 96 Fairfax family 6, 173–7 Fairfax, Ferdinando, 2nd Baron Cameron, General 6, 23, 28, 42–3, 59–65, 67–8,

71–8, 80–4, 86–90, 92, 94, 97–100, 102, 114, 116–18, 166, 168, 170, 172–3, 175–7, 179, 184, 187 Fairfax, Sir Thomas, 3rd Baron Cameron, Baron Naseby, Lord General 6, 20–3, 25, 43, 48, 53, 55–6, 60–3, 65, 68–9, 72–7, 80–1, 84–6, 88, 90, 94–106, 108, 110–17, 119, 121–2, 124, 128, 134, 140–1, 143, 146, 166, 172–3, 176–7, 186 Fairfax, Sir Thomas of Denton 175 Fairfax, Sir William 81, 102 Fairfax, William, Major 96 Fairfax, Sir William of Steeton 171 Falkirk 158 Ferrybridge 86 Fife 125, 145, 157–60 Fifeshire 158, 180, 183, 185 First Civil War (1642–6) 2, 11, 17, 19, 25, 28, 36, 44, 47, 49, 53, 55, 72, 78, 85, 89–90, 100, 106–7, 110, 112–13, 116– 17, 119, 166, 182 Firth, C. H. 103 Firth of Forth 32, 148, 158, 182 Five Members Case 35 Fleetwood, Charles, Lieutenant-General 107, 109, 117, 147, 156, 161–2 Forth, earl of 67 Fort Royal 163 Four Bills 123 France, French 50, 56, 72, 126, 130, 163, 177 Fraser, Lord 124 Fuller, J.F.C., General 12 Gainsborough, battle at (1643) 43, 76–7, 80 Galloway 126, 181 Gardiner, Samuel R. 1 Garrard, William 54 Gatesby Moor 128 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 32, 79, 126, 147 Gentles, Ian 2–3, 11, 20, 75, 106 Germany, German 21, 45, 48, 56, 145, 180, 182–3 Giggleswick School 171–2 Glasgow 32, 155–6 Glencairn’s Rising (1654) 163 Glenham, Sir Thomas 61–2, 101, 112–13, 119, 122, 124 Gloucester 56, 67, 78, 132 Goldsmith Hall, Oxford 113

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INDEX

Goodrick, Sir John 41 Gordon of Newton 126 Gordon, Patrick 131 Goring, George, Colonel 73–4, 87–8, 92–8, 101, 119, 121, 182 Gower, Sir John 37 Graham, James, marquis of Montrose, General 2, 6, 33, 101, 117–18, 144–6, 153, 156, 167, 169, 186 Grand Remonstrance (1641) 35, 176 Great Captains Unveiled 15 Great Chain of Being 172 Great Man Theory 12, 14 Great Yarmouth 56 Greek, Greeks, Greco-Roman 4, 13, 25, 47 Greenwich 49, 71 Greenwich, Treaty of (1596) 54 Greystock Castle 128 Grotius, Hugo 20–1 Guernsey 175 Gustophus Adolphus 15, 52, 54, 131, 181, 183, 186 Hainsworth, Roger 174 Halifax 41, 43, 85 Halket, Robert, Colonel 154 Hamilton, town of and battle at (1650) 3, 145, 148, 154–6, 159 Hamilton, Alexander, General 123 Hamilton, James, duke of Hamilton, General 6, 32, 91, 119–44, 146, 166–8, 170, 180–3, 187 Hamilton Palace 181 Hamilton, William, earl of Lanark, 2nd duke of Hamilton 122–3, 126–8, 130, 146, 156, 160, 138 Hampden, John, Colonel 69 Harrison, Thomas, Major-General 18, 107, 117, 121, 128–9, 132, 147, 156, 158, 160–1 Hart, Sir Basil H. Liddell 8, 14–15, 24–5 Hazelrig, Sir Arthur 122, 124, 129 Heads of the Proposals, The (1647) 172–4 Heightley, battle at (1644) 85, 110 Helmsley Castle 102, 128 Henrietta Maria 37, 39, 63, 72, 178 Henry III 30 Henry VIII 170 Hereford, earl of 74 Herefordshire 68 Heworth Moor 61

Hewson, John, Colonel 106–7 Hexham, Henry 54, 70 High Commission 34 Highlands, Scotland 82, 145, 156 Hilton, battle at (1644) 84 Hobson, Paul, Captain 109 Hodder River 136 Hodgson, John, Captain 148, 152 Holborne, James, Lieutenant-General 123, 158–9 Holland, earl of 32, 179, 182–3 Holland, Netherlands, Dutch 20, 50–2, 54, 56, 70, 179, 183 Holles, Denzil 105, 115 Holy Roman Empire, Imperial 13, 50, 53, 181, 183 Hopton, Sir Ralph 21, 74, 108, 112–13 Hornby 134 Horton, Donald 15 Hotham, Sir John 37, 39, 61, 76, 176, 179 Hotham, John, Captain 61–2, 65, 72 Hounslow Heath 121 Howard, Sir Michael 1 Howard, Thomas, earl of Arundel 14 Huddersfield 86 Hull, city, sieges of (1642, 1643), magazine at 19, 23, 37–42, 49, 53, 61, 71–8, 80, 82, 86, 87–9, 116, 156, 173, 177, 179 human dynamics 3–5, 11–12, 16, 22, 27, 43, 45–6, 103, 108, 113, 118, 142, 164–5, 168–9 Humber, river 72, 76 Humble Petition and Advice, The (1657) 174 Huntingdonshire 67 Huntly, marquis of 126, 159, 182 Hutchinson, John, Colonel 71 Hutton, Ronald 1 Hyde, Edward, earl of Clarendon 13, 43, 63, 75, 116, 125, 127, 138, 142, 162, 166, 167, 177–9, 181, 186–7 Independents 101, 104, 119, 121, 154 infantry 23, 38, 41, 44, 46–53, 64, 73, 76, 81, 84, 91–2, 94–7, 106–7, 121, 132, 135, 137–8, 152–3, 162; foot 18, 32, 41, 44, 48, 51–2, 61–2, 64–5, 67–8, 71–3, 76–7, 79, 81–2, 84–7, 94–8, 101, 104, 106–7, 111–12, 115–16, 120–21, 123–5, 128, 131–5, 137–9, 147–8, 151–3, 155, 158, 159, 161–3 initiative 4, 12, 19, 23, 131, 157, 168

227

INDEX

Inns of Court 172–3 Instructions for the Lord Lieutenants (1642) 67 Instrument of Government (1653) 174 integrity 4, 20 Interregnum 111, 163, 180, 185 intuition 4, 24, 26–7, 136–7, 141, 160 Inverkeithing, town of and battle at (1651) 3, 145, 148, 158–9 Inverlochy, battle at (1645) 186 Inverness 101, 145 Ipswich 56 Ireland, Irish 2–3, 5, 13, 32, 34–7, 39– 40, 77, 80–1, 108, 145–7, 163, 176, 184 Ireton, Henry, Commissary-General 112–13, 172–3 Ironsides (Cromwell’s Regiment of Horse) 96–8, 107, 109 Isle of Wight 123 Italy, Italian 16, 52 James I 54, 176, 178 Jedburgh 161 Johnston, Archibald of Wariston 31, 79, 149, 172 Jones, John Paul, Admiral 23 Keegan, John 7, 15, 19–20 Kelso 32, 161, 179, 184 Kendal 134 Kent, Kentish 49, 119, 121, 143, 180 Ker, Sir Andrew 140 Ker, Gilbert, Colonel 145, 149, 154–6 Kilmarnock 156 Kilsyth, battle at (1645) 186 Kirk (Scotland) 6, 32, 82, 84, 123–7, 131, 140–1, 144, 146–7, 149–51, 154–7, 164, 182–3, 185 Kirkby Lonsdale 134 Kirkby Malhamdale 170–1 Kirkby Thore 132–3 Kirklees, battle at (1644) 86 Kishlansky, Mark 2–3, 11 Knaresborough, town and battle at (1644) 92–3, 102, 134–5 Lamberts of Calton 170–2 Lambert, John, Lord of Calton, MajorGeneral 3, 6, 28, 43, 45, 48, 53, 55, 60, 73, 76–7, 80–1, 85–8, 90–1, 94–107, 110–22, 124–5, 127–45, 147–8, 150–68, 170, 172–5, 179–80,

182, 184, 187–8; Francis, Lady Lambert 171, 173 Lambton, William, Colonel 98–9 Lammermuir Hills 150 Lanarkshire 181 Lancashire 42–3, 68, 77, 86, 92, 95–6, 99, 101, 121–2, 126, 128–9, 133, 135–7, 143, 156, 160–1 Langdale, Sir Marmaduke 69, 88, 111, 119, 121–2, 124, 126–34, 136–8, 140, 142–3, 148, 166, 182 Larbert Bridge 158 Lathom House 80, 86, 92 Laud, William, archbishop of Canterbury 30–1, 34, 36, 173 Lauderdale, earl of 123, 126–7 Laurence, Anne 3 Laws and Ordinances of Warre 69 Leeds, city and battles at (1642, 1643) 41, 43, 65, 72–4, 100, 102, 135, 173 Leicestershire 55, 133 Leith 148–9, 153, 158, 182 Leith, Patrick of Harthill 126 Lenthal, William, Speaker of the House of Commons 152 Leslie, Alexander, earl of Leven, Lord General 3, 6, 32–3, 53, 68, 78–84, 88, 90, 92, 94–5, 97, 99–101, 117–18, 123, 125, 127, 131, 140, 144, 156, 166–8, 170, 183–8 Leslie of Balquhain 183 Leslie, David, Baron Newark, General 2–3, 6, 53, 79, 83, 90, 95–6, 98–100, 117–18, 123, 127, 131, 140, 144–5, 148–60, 162–4, 166–8, 170, 185–8 Leslie, George 183 Leslie, Sir Patrick of Pitcairly 185 Lesmahago 125 Lilburne, Robert, Colonel 106–7, 117, 129, 132, 139, 141, 161–2 Lincoln 76, 87 Lincolnshire 55, 63, 76, 107 Lister, Sir Martin 171 Lister, Sir William of Thornton 171 Liverpool 92, 156 Livingstone, Lord 137 Lloyd, Walter, Colonel 106 localism 55, 66, 89 London 34–7, 39–41, 49, 55–6, 59, 61–2, 65–6, 69, 71, 74, 76, 78–80, 85, 89, 104, 107, 116, 120–1, 123, 130, 140–1, 143, 156, 161, 163, 175, 177, 182, 185

228

INDEX

London, Treaty of (1641) 34, 36 Long Marston 95 Long Parliament 36, 78, 171, 176 Lord General’s Lifeguard 106 Lords, House of 34–9, 79, 104 Lostwithiel, battle at (1644) 101 Loudon, earl of 123 Low Countries 52 Lowlands, Scotland 32–3, 154, 181 Lucas, Sir Charles 85, 87, 92, 96, 119, 121 Ludgate 120 Luke, Sir Samuel 109 Lumsden, Sir James 97, 99, 117 Lützen, battle at (1632) 183 Lynn 76 Maclean, Sir Hector of Duart 159 Maidstone 121 Manchester, city of and siege (1642) 41, 132, 187 Marshall, Stephen 109 Marston Moor, battle of (1644) 5, 22, 59, 69, 75, 78, 80, 87, 89–101, 103–4, 116–17, 144, 166–7, 177, 179 Massey, Edward, General 69, 78, 105, 160, 162 Mauchline Moor, battle at (1648) 125 Maurice, Prince 78 Maurice, prince of Nassau 15, 51–2, 54 mediation 4, 17–18, 60, 62, 93, 95, 112–14, 125, 131, 149–51, 160, 164, 167 Meldrum, Sir John 77, 94, 111 Mercurius Elencticus 134 Mercurius Melancholicus 134 Mersey, river 139, 162 Middle Ages 21, 49 Middleton, John, General 123, 125, 135, 137, 139, 142, 163, 186–7 Midlands 32, 63, 89, 92, 101, 135, 182; West Midlands 49; East Midlands 68 Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie 54 military leadership effectiveness 1–7, 11–17, 19–20, 22, 24–9, 43, 45–6, 56, 59, 64, 69, 72–3, 77, 81, 84, 99, 103–6, 108–10, 116–20, 127, 142, 145, 151, 164–6, 168–70, 183 Military Orders and Articles 70 militia 32, 36, 38–40, 42, 63, 66, 68, 71, 79, 115, 128, 136, 138, 141, 146, 160–1, 163, 180, 182, 187

militia ordinance 36, 62 Millett, Allan R. 11 Millington, Robert, Captain 71 model of effective military leadership 3–7, 11–14, 16, 27–8, 56, 60, 118, 165, 169; aggressiveness 4, 12, 16, 23, 27, 56, 59, 60, 72, 74–5, 89, 94, 104, 111, 116, 129–30, 133, 135–6, 139, 150, 153, 157, 159, 165–7; consistency 4, 16–18, 27, 56, 90, 103, 113–14, 131, 145, 165; martial superiority 4, 16, 24, 26–7, 56, 75, 103, 141, 145, 160, 164–5; martial synergy 4, 16, 25, 27–8, 43, 45, 56, 59, 60, 68, 91, 103, 116–18, 120, 135, 143, 145, 159, 165–6, 168, 174; moral authority 4, 12, 16, 19–20, 27, 56, 59–60, 75, 88–90, 103, 110, 113, 115, 117, 119, 127, 150–1, 159, 163–7 Moderate Intelligencer 110 Monck, George, General 54, 147–8, 152–3, 161, 175, 185 Monro, Robert, General 126, 134, 136, 138, 140–1, 184 Montague, Edward, Colonel 106 Montague, Edward, Viscount Mandeville and earl of Manchester, General 35, 45, 67, 76, 79, 87, 92–100, 102–4, 106 Montgomery, Robert, Colonel 155 Moray 146 Morris, John 128 ‘moss troopers’ 114 Murray, William, Colonel 45 Murray, Williamson 11 Musgrave, Sir Philip 122, 124, 126 musketeers 47–8, 50–2, 56, 73, 77, 85, 95–6, 102, 129, 138, 153, 169; arquebus 54; harquebusier 54, 56; musket 39, 41, 47–9, 53–4, 64, 66, 71, 77, 85–6, 98, 111, 126, 134, 137–8, 142, 153, 159, 163, 184 Musselburgh 148 Napoleon, Napoleonic Wars 2, 7, 14–15, 23, 25 Naseby, battle of (1645) 11, 20, 101, 106–8, 186 National Covenant see Covenanters Nantwich, town and battle at (1644) 77, 80–1, 85, 91 navy, naval 7, 29–30, 112, 121, 143, 184 Nayler, John 172; Quaker 172

229

INDEX

Newark 86, 102, 111 Newburn, battle at (1640) 33, 78–9, 83, 183–4 Newcastle, city and siege of (1644) 71, 82, 84–6, 122, 129, 147–8, 184 Newcastle Propositions 122–3 Newgate 120 Newman, P.R. 2, 44, 46, 75, 84, 110 New Model Army 3, 11, 22, 29, 53, 56, 68–9, 90, 103–12, 117, 119–20, 124, 142–8, 151, 155–6, 163–7, 169, 173, 180, 186 Newport Pagnall 109 Nidd, river 93 Nieuport 52 Nineteen Propositions 40 Northampton 161 Northumberland 33, 42, 55, 61, 63, 69, 89, 98, 124, 129–30, 140, 172, 179, 185 Norwich 56, 156 Norwich, earl of 121 Nottingham Castle 111 Nottinghamshire 63, 68, 132, 178 Nun Appleton 175 Oder, river 181, 183 Okey, John, Colonel 107 O’Neill Daniel 34 operational artistry 4, 24–5, 59, 76, 84, 129, 141 Order of the Garter 180 Orkney, earl of 185 Orkneys, Orcadians 145 Ouse, river 87, 93 Overton, Robert, Colonel 107, 158–9 Oxenstierna, Axel, Swedish minister 181 Oxford, city of and siege (1646) 18, 25, 69, 71, 74, 84, 91–2, 113, 172, 182, 112–13; University 181, 187 Oxford Council of War 74 Paisley 156 Parliament 7, 28–9, 31–43, 45–6, 49, 60–2, 65, 67–9, 73, 77–80, 82, 88, 90–1, 99, 101, 103–10, 115, 119–21, 123–5, 128, 131, 141, 153, 156, 159, 161, 163, 172, 174–9, 182, 188; committees 11, 25, 71, 79, 122–4, 177; members of and leadership 32–6, 40, 42, 118, 121; politics, laws and ordinances, legislation, finance 11, 18, 29–30, 33, 38, 67, 115, 174; support

of in opposition to king 33–5, 37–9, 41–3, 53, 60–2, 74–5, 85, 99, 143, 171, 173, 177 parliamentary forces and commanders 1–3, 5–8, 12, 17–18, 23, 27–9, 35, 39, 41–4, 48, 53, 55, 59–78, 80–2, 85–8, 90–1, 93–4, 97, 101–4, 106–14, 116–17, 119–21, 124, 126, 128, 131–40, 142–3, 146–8, 150, 152, 155–6, 159, 162–4, 166–7, 169–71, 177, 179, 185, 187 parliamentary strategy and policy, war effort 25, 43, 59, 65–6, 68, 73, 75, 77–80, 85–6, 88, 91, 101, 103, 105, 110–11, 116–17, 120, 132, 134, 147, 166, 168, 176–7, 180 Patton, George S., General 3, 113 Peckham Moor 114 Pembroke Castle 121, 133 Pendennis Castle 182 Pennines 92, 99, 133 Penrith 128–9, 131–2, 161 Penruddock’s Rising (1655) 163, 174 Perry Wood 162 personal honour 4, 14, 19–22, 26, 90, 100, 110, 113, 116, 139, 142, 147, 159, 164 Personal Rule 29, 33–4 Perth 159, 161 Perthshire 185 Petition of Right (1628) 29 Philiphaugh, battle at (1645) 144, 167, 169 Pickering, John, Colonel 106, 109 Pierce Bridge, battle at (1642) 63 Pinkie, battle at (1544) 127 Pitch Croft 167 Plymouth 71, 78, 106, 124, 175 Poland, Polish 52, 183 Pomerania 181 Pontefract Castle 62, 72, 101–2, 111, 114–15, 128, 132–3, 135, 140–1, 177 Poppleton, battle at (1644) 93 Portsmouth 37, 49 Powell, Rice, Colonel 119 Powell, Rowland, Colonel 119 Powick Bridge 162 Poyer, John, Colonel 119–20 Poyntz, Sydenham, Major-General 114, 177 Preaching Without Ordination 110 Presbyterian, Presbyterianism, political Presbyterians 3, 32, 53, 78–9, 104,

230

INDEX

109, 119, 122, 125, 144, 146, 154, 157, 160, 181, 183, 186 Prest, Wilfred 173 Preston, town and battle at (1648) 92, 120, 134–43, 148, 161, 182 Preston Moor 137 Pride, Thomas, Colonel 152–3, 159 Prince of Wales see Charles II Prince of Wales’s Troop 179 Principles of the Art Militaire 54 Protectorate (1654–59) 8, 18, 163, 174 Protectorate Council of State 18 Protestant 1, 3, 30–2, 40, 43–4, 50, 56, 84, 99, 109, 171, 176, 178, 181 Providence 80–1, 153, 184; God 3, 31, 40–1, 45, 57, 70, 74, 80, 100, 109–10, 134, 138, 140, 143, 147, 150, 153, 173, 182, 184 prudence 4, 13, 23, 86, 111, 117, 136, 150, 181 Puritan 30–1, 36, 43–4, 108–9, 171, 176, 178, 181, 187 Pym, John 32–4, 36, 38, 176 Queensferry 149, 158 Raby Castle 124 Rainsborough, Thomas, Colonel 77, 117, 121, 141 Ralston, laird of 155 Redhall 149 Red Hill 162 Reformation 117 reliability 4, 17–18, 55, 62, 107 Renaissance 51 Restoration 13, 55, 100, 116, 142, 145, 163, 175, 179–80, 187 Ribble, river 135–9, 142–3 Ribbleton Moor 137 Rich, Barnaby 13 Richardson, Frank M., Major-General 15, 108 Richmond 134 Richmondshire 115 Ripon 114, 134 Ripon, Treaty of (1640) 33, 184 risk-taking 23, 59, 73, 86, 153, 157 Roberts, Michael 15 Rochdale 187 Roman military system, Vegetius 4, 14, 51 Root and Branch Petition 36 Rose Castle 128 Rosenbach, William E. 12

Rotherham 61 Rothwell 61 Roundaway Down, battle at (1643) 78–9 Roxburgh, earl of 152 royal absolutism 29–31, 173, 179, 187–8 royal prerogatives 29–31, 34, 37, 40, 78, 173, 176 royalist forces and commanders 1, 11, 18, 28, 41–5, 53, 55, 59–62, 64–9, 71–7, 79–81, 84–103, 105–8, 110–13, 117, 119–20, 122–3, 126–36, 138, 140–5, 154, 160–2, 166–7, 177, 179–80, 182, 185, 187 royalists, royalism 2–3, 6–7, 34, 40–1, 43–5, 59, 67, 69, 71, 79, 85, 92, 101, 103, 109–10, 121–6, 128–9, 133–6, 138, 140–1, 143, 147–8, 153–4, 156–7, 167, 170, 186 royalist war effort 21, 25, 41, 59, 62–4, 67, 69, 72, 75–8, 80, 85, 87–90, 93, 100–1, 116, 120–1, 128–9, 131, 135, 142–3, 145–7, 154, 156, 160, 162–3, 166–8, 174, 180, 186 Rump Parliament 146, 174–5 Rupert, prince of the Rhine 6, 63, 78, 80, 86, 90–6, 98–100, 102, 111, 117, 179 Rushworth, John 112, 176 Russia 183 Russian Imperial Navy 23 Rutlandshire 63 St Albans 53 St Giles’ Cathedral 31 St James Palace 183 St John, Oliver 78 St Martin’s Field 56 St Mary’s Manor 92 St Michael’s Mount 182 Savill, Sir William 62 Scarborough 102, 111 Scarborough Castle, siege of (1644–5) 101 Scipio Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon 15 Scone 156 Scotland, Scots 2–3, 5–6, 16, 27–8, 31–3, 36–7, 45, 47–8, 54, 56, 78–80, 82–8, 94, 97, 101–2, 119–27, 129–34, 136, 138–44, 146–65, 167, 169, 170, 172, 175, 178, 180–8 Scottish Parliament 33, 122–6, 128, 156, 184 Scottish Privy Council 31, 181, 184

231

INDEX

Scottish Service Book 31 Seacroft Moor, battle at (1643) 73 Second Civil War (1648) 2, 108, 119–20, 125, 134, 140–1, 143, 148, 174 Selby, town and battle at (1644) 23, 65, 74, 84, 86–7, 91, 94 Self-Denying Ordinance (1645) 68, 100–1, 103, 177 Selkirk 186 Seven Military Classics 13 Severn River 162 shared risk 4, 20–2, 26, 100, 116, 164 Sheffield 61 Sheffield, Lord 175 Sherwood Forest 178 ship money 29–30 Short Parliament 32–3, 176 Shrewsbury 92 Shropshire 68, 122 Silesia 181 Six Secret Teachings of T’ai Kung 13 Skippon, Philip, Major-General 55, 104, 109 Skipton 85, 92, 110–11, 134, 170 Skipton Castle 110, 128 societal context 1, 4–6, 56, 118, 168–9 Solemn League and Covenant see Covenanters Somerset 75 Somerville, James, Lieutenant-Colonel 100 South Shields Fort, battle at (1644) 84 Spain, Spanish 47, 50, 52, 54, 176, Spetchley 162 Spey Mouth 146 Stafford 139 Staffordshire 161 Stainmore, pass at 133 Star Chamber 34 Strange, Lord 41 Steeton, 171, 175 Stewart, William 101 Stirling 140, 145, 148, 153–8, 160, 185 Stirling Bridge 141 Stockdale, Thomas 39 stoic sacrifice 4, 20, 22, 96, 110, 151, 159, 164 Stogdill, Ralph M. 12 Stonyhurst Hall 137 Stouffer, Samuel A. 16, 21 Strachan, Archibald, Colonel 140, 145, 149, 152, 154–6 Strachan, Hew 28

Stralsund, siege of (1628) 183 strategic vision 4, 24–5, 59, 75–6, 84, 88–9, 116, 141, 148, 164, 166, 180 strategy of offensive annihilation 148, 153 Strickland, Sir Robert 40 Stuart 29, 31, 55, 145, 147, 165, 167, 171, 175–6, 180, 187–8 Stuart, Charles see Charles I, Charles II Sunderland 82, 84 Sun Tzu 8, 13, 23–4, 55 Surrey 49 Sussex 49 Swale, river 93 Swaledale 115 Sweden, Swedish 15, 45, 52–3, 56, 70, 82–3, 95, 131, 181, 183–6 tactical acumen 4, 24, 59, 64, 84–5, 88, 95, 117, 133, 136, 138, 141, 148, 159, 166 Tactiks of Aelian 55 Tadcaster, town and battle at (1642) 62, 64–5, 72, 93–4 Taylor, Robert L. 12 Tees, river 62–3, 179, 184 Teme, river 162 Tenby Castle 121 tercio 50–1 Thames, river 74, 121 theories of leadership: behaviour 4–5, 8, 11–14, 16, 20, 27, 45–6, 99, 113, 115, 118, 159, 165, 168; situational 13–14, 16, 45, 165; trait 4–5, 11–14, 16, 26, 46, 113, 163, 165, 168; transformational 16, 165 Third Civil War (1650–51) 2, 100, 108, 118, 136, 143–5, 147–8, 160, 163–4, 185 Thirty Years’ War 21, 54 Thornhaugh, Francis, Colonel 139 Thornton Bridge 93 Tippermuir, battle at (1644) 186 Tockwith 95 Torrington, battle at (1646) 108, 112 Torwood, Torwoodhead Castle 145, 148, 158–60, 164, 180 Tower of London 49, 71, 175, 185, 187 trace italienne 52 trained bands 32, 34–5, 37, 40–1, 53, 55–6, 61, 66, 79, 120, 139, 176, 179 Trent, river 101, 163, 180 Tresilian Bridge 112

232

INDEX

Trevor-Roper, Hugh 171, 188 trustworthiness 4, 17–19, 46, 62, 114, 147 Tudor–Stuart 53, 171 Turner, Sir James 44–5, 82, 100, 126, 132, 135, 137–8 Turnham Green, battle at (1642) 65, 109 Tweed, river 33, 81, 83, 122, 184–5 Tynemouth Castle 39 Tyne, river 33, 84, 184 Ulster 126, 134 Upper Wharfedale 43 Upton Bridge 162 Uttoxeter 139 Vane, Sir Henry 78 Vane, Sir Henry the Younger 79 Van Fleet, David D. 4 Vegetius see Roman military system Venetian Secretary 74 Venn, Thomas, Captain 17 Vere, Sir Francis 54 Vere, Sir Horatio 183 Verney, Sir Edmund 32 Wakefield, town and battle at (1643) 73–4, 102 Wales, Welsh 34, 49, 63, 111, 119–22, 128, 130, 135, 139, 143, 145, 178 Waller, Sir Hardress 112 Waller, Sir William, General 67, 78, 103, 167 Wallington, Nehemiah 21 Walloons 72 Walton Hall 124 Warrington 139, 161–2 Warrington Bridge 161 Warwick 162 Warwick Bridge 128 Warwick, earl of 79 Welbeck 178 Weldon, Ralph, Colonel 106 Wentworth, Thomas, earl of Strafford, ‘Thorough’ 32, 34, 36, 38, 176 Western Association (England) 67 Western Association (Scotland) 145, 154–6 Western Remonstrance 3, 154–5

Westminster, Westminster Abbey 35, 56, 180 Westmorland 42, 63, 68–9, 101, 122, 124, 129, 131 Wetherby 62, 64, 87, 100 Weymouth 124 Whalley, Edward, Colonel, Whalley’s Regiment 109, 112, 155, 163 Wharfe, river 65, 93 ‘Whiggamore Raid’ 140 Whitby 86 Whitecoats (Newcastle’s Foot) 63, 97–9 Whitehall 35, 38, 120, 146, 163 Whitelocke, Bulstrode 132, 172 Wigan 92, 135, 138–9, 162 Williams, Sir Roger 54 Wiltshire 178 Wimbledon 174 Winceby, battle at (1643) 63, 76–7 Windsor Castle 35, 182 Winwick 140, 142 Wogan, Edward, Captain 122 Woolrych, Austin 1, 41 Woolwich Arsenal 49, 71 Worcester, city and battle at (1651) 2, 145, 148, 155, 160, 162–4, 167, 185–6 Worcestershire 68, 71 Wortley, Sir Francis 40–1 Wotton, Sir Henry 178 Wright, Quincy 22 York, city of and siege (1644) 33, 37–41, 59, 61–6, 72, 80, 82, 84–5, 87–93, 99–102, 115–17, 133, 135, 147, 173, 176–7, 179 Yorkshire 19, 28, 37–43, 53, 55, 60–4, 66, 68–9, 71–6, 84–7, 89, 91, 93–7, 101–2, 111, 115–17, 124, 129–30, 133–5, 139, 141, 164, 170–1, 175–7, 186–7; East Riding 37, 75, 84, 115; North Riding 40, 63, 75; West Riding 42–3, 61, 65, 73, 75, 80, 85–6, 88, 91, 102, 117, 170, 173, 175 Yorkshire Petition 38 Yorkshire Redcaps 176 York, Treaty of (1642) 60–2 Young, Peter, Brigadier 1 Yukl, Gary A. 4

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