Linguistics and Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, Series IV: Current Issues in Linguistic Theory)

LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY

AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE General Editor E.F. KONRAD KOERNER (University of Ottawa)

Series IV - CURRENT ISSUES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY

Advisory Editorial Board Henning Andersen (Copenhagen); Raimo Anttila (Los Angeles) Thomas V.Gamkrelidze (Tbilisi); Hans-Heinrich Lieb (Berlin) J.Peter Maher (Chicago); Ernst Pulgram (Ann Arbor, Mich.) E.Wyn Roberts (Vancouver, B.C.); Danny Steinberg (Tokyo)

Volume 42

Adam Makkai and Alan K. Melby (eds.) Linguistics and Philosophy Essays in honor of Rulon S. Wells

LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RULON S.WELLS

Edited by

ADAM MAKKAI University of Illinois at Chicago and ALAN K. MELBY Brigham Young University

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA 1985

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Linguistics and Philosophy. (Amsterdam studies in the theory and history of linguistic science. Series IV, Current issues in linguistic theory, ISSN 0304-0763; v. 42) Bibliography: p. 1. Linguistics -- Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Wells, Rulon. I. Makkai, Adam. II. Melby, Alan K. III. Wells, Rulon. IV. Series. P26.W45E8 1985 410 85-20099 ISBN 90-272-3536-8 (alk. paper) © Copyright 1985 - John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

Professor Rulon S. Wells

CONTENTS PREFACE

iii

WORKS OF RULON S. WELLS

vii

1. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND GENERAL THEORETICAL ISSUES I n n a t e Capacity, K n o w - H o w a n d Use in L a n g u a g e 3 Robert A. H a l l , J r Language, Cognition and Linguistics Raimo A n t t i l a 11 Kuhnian P a r a d i g m s as Systems o f M a r k e d n e s s Conventions James D. McCawley 23 H i e r a r c h y i n Conceptual Space John Robert Ross 45 I m p e r f e c t M o d e l s a n d T h e i r Uses F r e d J. Damerau 55 Rask's L e c t u r e on t h e Philosophy o f L a n g u a g e W i l l i a m M. C h r i s t i e , Jr 77 Contrast John F o u g h t 85 II. PHONOLOGY Phonolgoical " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n " Stratificational Theories David G. Lockwood

i n Classical and 99

I I I . SYNTAX AND BEYOND G r a m m a t i c a l Phrases a n d Lexical Phrases André M a r t i n e t On Grammars o f Science Zeitig H a r r i s C o n s t i t u e n c y , Dependency a n d A p p l i c a t i v e S t r u c t u r e Sebastian Shaumyan S t r u c t u r e a n d F u n c t i o n in Syntactic Analysis: Rulon Wells As a P a l e o - S y n t h e s i z e r o f E u r o p e a n and American Syntax William J. Sullivan Come on Up Eldon G. L y t i e

127 139 149

205 223

Why "Junction" Theory Jill E. Peterson-Boogaard Generalization and Prediction of Syntactic Patterns In Junction Grammar Alan K. Melby 'Activity-'Accomplishment'-'Achievement'-A Language That Can't Say 'I Burned It But It Didn't Burn' and One Than Can Yoshihiko Ikegami Positional Tendencies of English Relative Clauses As Evidence for Processing Strategies Gary D. Prideaux

241

253

265

305

IV. HISTORICAL AND TYPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS Knowledge of the Past C. F. Hockett Lexical Reconstruction and the Semantic History Hypothesis Isidore Dyen Hymonymy, Heteroclysis, and History in the Japanese Verb Roy Andrew Miller

317

343

.

393

V. ON DIACHRONIC AND SYNCHRONIC DERIVATION Some Characteristics of Back-Formation Henry M. Hoenigswald How to Become a Kwa Language Kay Williamson Where Do Exclamations Come From? Adam Makkai

ii

421 427 445

PREFACE BY THE EDITORS

Rulon S(eymour) Wells III was born in Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 30, 1919, the son of a Mormon family of pioneer stock. He was graduated f r o m the University of Utah with a B.A. degree in philosophy in 1939. After moving to the East Coast, he received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1942. His dissertation director was Willard van Orman Quine. His topic was "The Correspondence of Language to Fact". In 1945 Rulon m a r ­ ried the f o r m e r Miss Virginia Halcomb B e n n e t t ; they have two sons, Seymour and David. From 1942 to 1945 Rulon was employed at the University of Pennsylvania, first teaching Bengali for the Army Spe­ cialized Training Program (ASTP) and then Japanese for the Office of Strategic Services. In the summer of 1945 he accepted an invitation from Bernard Bloch, Chairman of Linguistics and editor of Language, to assist him in teaching Japanese for the ASTP at Yale, but this engagement t e r m i ­ nated not long a f t e r the end of the war with Japan. He had studied Sanskrit under W. Norman Brown at Pennsylva­ nia and continued at Yale under Franklin Edgerton; and the good offices of Professor Edgerton put him in touch with F. S. C Northrop and the Philosophy Department. He was appointed instructor in Philosophy in 1946, becoming assis­ t a n t professor in 1948. In 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 , when he was made t e n u r e d associate p r o ­ fessor, Philosophy also decided to share him with the L i n ­ guistics d e p a r t m e n t . In 1962, due to his already formidable international r e p u t a t i o n , he was made f u l l professor in both departments. He won the Bechtel Prize at Harvard University in 1940-41 and in 1941-42. In 1944-46 he was a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies. In 1951-52 he was a Guggenheim & Morse Fellow. He held the prestigious Mahlon Powell lecturership at Indiana University in 1967. He is a member of the American Philosophical Association, the L i n ­ guistic Society of America (President in 1976), and the L i n ­ guistic Association of Canada and the United States. We will not go into his publications here as a separate section is

reserved date.

in

order

to

present

his

total

So much for the external history subject of the present Festschrift.

publication

of

the

life

list

of

to

the

But as all e x t e r n a l histories, retrievable f r o m various Who's Who-type publications, this e x t e r n a l history must be greatly expanded by the internal history of Rulon, the m a n , teacher, scholar, instigator of ideas, and f r i e n d . Perhaps the most striking fact of his life is t h a t during the height of the Bloomfieldian structuralist period, when "meaning" was a highly suspicious, even a dangerous t e r m , Rulon pioneered semantically oriented research not only in his own work but encouraged it in the work of his students as w e l l . In t r u e peripatetic fashion, clad with his o m n i p r e ­ sent scarfs against the cold winds of New Haven, he would walk with students asking him questions from the Hall of Graduate Studies to his office in Davenport College, the York Restaurant, or George and H a r r / s . He would gladly accept the invitation of a graduate student and spend eight to t e n hours discussing some intriguing topic of a disserta­ tion in progress, even if it meant missing his dinner. When most graduate thesis supervisors at Yale w e r e more or less neatly categorizable within t h e i r pigeon holes of specializa­ t i o n , Rulon would always have a number of bibliography slips in various pockets (once somebody counted f o u r t e e n in one lecture) t h a t would lead the seeker towards Carnap and symbolic logic if t h a t was what was missing in the student's background, or towards Aristotle and Peirce if t h a t seemed more necessary. He taught linguists how to think philosophi­ cally and he pointed out to philosophers what linguistics had done for their discipline. He predicted in the early sixties t h a t the discipline of linguistics would move significantly in the direction of Transformational-Generative Grammar. His interest in syntax, we must r e m e m b e r , goes back to "Immediate Constituents" published in Language in 1947. His breadth of vision allowed him, nevertheless, not only to t o l e r a t e but to encourage the f i r s t stratificational dissertation to be w r i t t e n at Yale under his own supervision in 1964-65, the height of the TGG wave in the USA.

iv

When he t a u g h t Linguistics at Yale (to u n d e r g r a d u a t e s and graduate s t u d e n t s ) , Rulon inculcated in his students a desire to read in the field f r e e l y and with informed c r i t i ­ cism r a t h e r than being labeled early as a follower of "x", '"y", or "z". His academic a t t i t u d e , in short, was c h a r a c t e r ­ ized by humanism and tolerance in an age when these v i r ­ tues w e r e conspicuously lacking in too many others. We learned from him as early as 1960 t h a t semantics and syn­ tax could be studied both independently, and in conjunction w i t h one another. This book, which was originally conceived in 1979 when Rulon t u r n e d 6 0 , was long in the making and goes to press only shortly a f t e r his 66th birthday. Some contributors r e w ­ rote e a r l i e r versions in the desire to reach p e r f e c t i o n - clearly an unrealistic goal In anyone's l i f e t i m e , but the desire was t h e r e ail the way from Port Harcort, Nigeria to Provo, Utah and many points in b e t w e e n . The two of us, having worked with this book, r e p r e s e n t , in a sense, the two poles in the life and career of Rulon 5. Wells: one of us coming from Europe and having studied at Yale, the other a computational linguist i n t e r e s t e d in formal theory and the computer, coming f r o m the place of Rulon's youth, Salt Lake City, Utah. We wish him good health and many more productive years both as a teacher and scholar.

Adam Makkai University of Illinois at Chicago Alan K. Melby Brigham Young University, Provo

ν

Works of Rulon S. Wells

WORKS OF RULON S. WELLS

1.

'The Pitch (1945):27-39.

Phonemes

of

English'

in

Language

2.

Review English,

3.

'Immediate Constituents' in Language 23 (1947):81-117; r e p r i n t e d in M. Joos ( e d . ) , Readings in Linguistics (1957) and elsewhere.

4.

'De Saussure's System of Linguistics' in Word 3 ( 1 9 4 7 ) : 1 - 3 1 ; r e p r i n t e d in M. Joos (ed.)/ Readings in Lin­ guistics (1957) and elsewhere.

5.

Review of Alexander B. Johnson ( e d . David Rynin), A Treatise on Language, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9 (1948):164-7.

of Kenneth L. Pike, The Intonation in Language 23 (1947):255-73.

of

21

American

6. 'Automatic Alternation' in Language 25 (1949):99-116. 7.

Review of A. Rosetti, Le mot; B e r t r a n d Russell, Human Knowledge; and Paul A. Schilpp ( e d . ) , The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, in Language 25 (1949):319-25.

8.

Review of Clarence I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation: Review of Metaphysics 2 (1949):99-115.

9.

'The existence (1949):1-20.

10.

of

facts'

in

Review

Articles 'Empiricism,' 'Charles S. Crowell-Collier s Encyclopedia (1950).

of

Peirce,'

Metaphysics

and

'Proof'

3

in

Works of Rulon S. Wells 11.

The State and Prospects of Semantics (41 pp., privately distributed by the Rockefeller Foundation), (1950).

12.

Colloquium on General Semantics at Yale University (with B. Blanshard and A. Korzybski), General Semantics Bulletin Nos. 1 and 2 , 55-63 (1950).

13.

Comment on article by Paul Weiss, in Lyman Bryson et al. (eds.), Perspectives on a Troubled Decade (1950):529-30.

14.

'Predicting Slips of the Tongue' in Yale Scientific Magazine 25 (3):9 ff. (1951); reprinted in Victoria Fromkin ( e d . ) , Speech Errors as Linguistic Evidence (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).

15.

Review of Recherches (1951):554-70.

16.

'Frege's Ontology' in Review of Metaphysics 4 (1951):537-73; r e p r i n t e d in E. D. Klemke ( e d . ) , Essays on Frege (Urbana: U. of Illinois Press, 1968).

17.

'Comment on (1952):124.

18.

Review of article by Alonzo Logic 17 (1952):133-4.

19.

'Secondary Derivation 29 (1953):237-41.

20.

'Archiving and Language Typology' in of American Linguistics 20 (1954):101-7.

21.

'Meaning and Use' in Word 10 (1954):235-50; r e p r i n t e d in Sol Saporta ( e d . ) , Psycholinguistics. A book of Readings (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1961).

22.

Reviews of articles by Hilary P u t n a m , Alonzo Church, Wilfrid Sellars, Arthur Pap, and Rudolf Carnap, in Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1955):293-7.

Francis

structurales

Raab'

from

viii

in

1949,

in

Review

Church,

Sanskrit

of

Language

Metaphysics

27

6

Journal of Symbolic

/-stems'

in

Language

International Journal

Works of Rulon S. Wells 23.

'Acronymy/ in Morris Halle ( e d . ) , For Roman Jakobson, (1956):662-7 in Adrienne and Keith Lehrer ( e d . ) , Theory of Meaning (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970):113-35.

24.

'Leibniz Today' 3 3 - 4 9 , 502-24.

25.

Brief notice of Sir David Ross ( e d . ) , (a) Aristotelis de anima and (b) Aristotelis Parva naturalia in Review of Meta­ physics 10 (1957):534-5.

26.

Brief notice of I. M. Bochenski, (O.P.) Formale Logik, and of William and M a r t h a Kneale, The Development of Logic in Review of Metaphysics 1 1 . (1957):343.

27.

'A Mathematical Approach to Meaning' nand de Saussure 15 (1957):117-36.

28.

'Is a S t r u c t u r a l T r e a t m e n t of Meaning Possible?' in Proceeding of the Eighth International Congress of Linguists (Oslo, August 1957):654-66.

29.

'Non-phonological Factors in Linguistic Change. A spec­ ulative e s s a / in Diego Catalan ( e d . ) , Miscelanea homenaie a André Martinet 2.269-83 (1958).

30.

Philosophy Mid-Century, (1958).

31.

Review of articles by George Berry, Frederic Young, Max Fisch, Jackson Cope, and Daniel Haskell, in Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 ( 1 9 5 9 ) : 2 0 9 - 1 1 .

32.

(with Robert S. Brumbaugh) 'The Plato Microfilm Project,' Yale University Library Gazette 34 (1960):313-20.

33.

'Nominal and Verbal Style' in Thomas A. Sebeok ( e d . ) , Aspects of Style: 197-200 (1960); r e p r i n t e d in Donald C. Freeman ( e d . ) , Linguistics and Literary Style (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1970).

in

Review

of

Metaphysics

in

10

(1956-57)

Cahiers

Ferdi­

of Language 1949-55 in Philosophy in the A Survey, ( e d . Raymond Klibansky) 2.139-45

ix

Works of Rulon S. Wells 34.

Untitled comment 190-91 (1960).

on

Meter

35.

Review of Willard V. Quine, Metaphysics 14 (1961):695-703.

36.

'A measure of Subjective Information' in Roman Jakobson (ed.), Proceedings of the 12th Symposium in Applied Mathematics, 237-44 (1961).

37.

(with Samuel Jay Keyser) The Common-Feature Method, Office of Naval Research, Contract SAR/Nonr 609 ( 1 6 ) , Technical Report No. 12, November 1961.

38.

'What has Linguistics Done f o r Philosophy 59, (1962):697-708.

39.

'Some Neglected Opportunities in Descriptive tics' in Anthropological Linguistics 5 (1963):38.

40.

'Is Frege's Concept of Function Valid?' in Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963):719-30; r e p r i n t e d in E. D. Klemke ( e d . ) , Essays on Frege (Urbana: U. of Illinois Press, 1968).

41.

'The True Nature of Peirce's Evolutioni in Edward  Moore and Richard S. Robin (eds.)/ Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Second Series (Amherst, Mass.: U. of Massachusetts Press, 1964:304-22).

42.

'Charles S. Peirce as an American' in Richard J. B e r n ­ stein ( e d . ) , Perspectives on Peirce (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1 9 6 5 ) : 1 3 - 4 1 .

43.

'Distinctively Human Semiotic' 6 (December 1967):103-24.

44.

(with Robert S. Brumbaugh) The Plato Manuscripts. Index (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

45.

Synchronics and Function, 1968. (Unpublished; a bound copy of the typescript, 113 pp., was given to Sterling Memorial Library (Yale University) and is catalogued as CCL/B67/ + W46/1968.) x

and

Metrics,

Word and Object,

in

Philosophy?'

Social

op.

cit.,

Review of

in Journal of

Science

Linguis­

Information

A New

Works of Rulon S. Wells

46.

'Innate Knowledge' in Sidney Philosophy (New York: New 1969):99-119.

47.

'Comprehension and Expression' Studies in Thought and Language Arizona Press, 1970):35-63.

48.

'Uniformitarianism in Linguistics' in ( e d . ) , Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Scribner's, 1973):423-31.

49.

'Lexicostatistics in the Regency ( e d . ) , Lexicostatistics in Genetic Mouton, 1973):118-21.

50.

Review of William J. Samarin, Tongues Angels, Religious Studies 9 (1973):503-6.

51.

'Phonemics in the Nineteenth Century' in Dell Hymes ( e d . ) , Studies in the History of Linguistics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974):434-53.

52.

'The Indispensible Word "now"' in Knowledge and (ed.) Action, B o b b s - M e r r i l l , 1975):207-35.

53.

'Deciphering in Linguistics: A Nineteenth Century e p i ­ sode' in Linguistic and Literary Studies in Honor of Archibald A. Hill I A. Jazayery e t a l , (eds.) Lisse: De Ridder 1976):407-12.

54.

'Metonymy and Misunderstanding' in Roger W. Cole ( e d . ) , Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977):194-214.

55.

'Criteria for Semiosis' in Thomas Perfusion of Signs (Bloomington: Press, 1977):1-27.

56.

'Peirce's Notion (1977):197-208.

of

the

xi

Hook York

( e d . ) , Language and University Press,

in J. L. Cowan ( e d . ) , (Tucson: University of

Philip P. Wiener Vol. 4 (New York:

Period' in Isidore Dyen Linguistics (The Hague:

of

Men

and

Hector-Neri Castaneda, Reality (Indianapolis:

Symbol'

A. Sebeok (ed.) A Indiana University

in

Semiotica

10

Works of Rulon S. Wells 57.

'Semantics in a Linguistic Framework' in Wolfgang Wolck and Paul L. Garvin (eds.), The Fifth Lacus Forum (1978) (Columbia, South Carolina: Hornbeam Press, 1979):21-36.

58.

'Linguistics as a Science: The case of the comparative method' in Henry M. Hoenigswald ( e d . ) , The European Background of American Linguistics (Dordrecht, the N e t h ­ erlands: Foris Publications, 1979):23-61.

59.

'Thirdness and Linguistics' in Irmengard Rauch and Gerald Carr (eds.), The Signifying Animal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980):186-200.

60.

(with Robert S. Brumbaugh) 'Yale's Plato Project' to be published in E. Moutsopoulos ( e d . ) , Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the Philosophy of Greek Culture (Calamata, Greece, 20-25 September 1982).

61.

'Thought Without Language' in Kurt R. Jankowsky ( e d . ) , Scientific and Humanistic Dimensions of Language. Festschrift for Robert Lado on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday on May 31, 1985. (John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1985):387-396.

xii

I ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND GENERAL THEORETICAL ISSUES

INNATE CAPACITY, KNOW-HOW AND USE IN LANGUAGE

Robert A. Hall, Jr. Cornell University Ever since the publication of the "vulgata" of F e r d i ­ (1915), nand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale t h e r e has been continuing but unresolved debate over two of his k e y - t e r m s , LANGUE and PAROLE.' There seems to be general agreement t h a t this pair of words can be i n t e r ­ p r e t e d as r e f e r r i n g to one or both of two dichotomies: that of the social aspect of language versus the individual, and t h a t of the abstract system of a language versus its a c t u ­ alization in speech. 2 For us to take langue as r e f e r r i n g to some "system" existing outside of all the individuals in whose usage it is m a n i f e s t e d , we must assume t h a t t h e r e is such a thing as a "conscience collective", a "superorganic" of the type which Sapir (1917) demonstrated long ago t h a t t h e r e is no justification for hypothesizing. The only sense in which the langue/parole dichotomy can be of any use is that of the t o t a l system of linguistic p a t t e r n s existing in posse in any individual, as opposed to the partial manifestations t h e r e o f when the individual speaks or w r i t e s . 3 Equally confusing, and causing equally extensive and inconclusive debate, has been the pair of terms COMPETENCE and PERFORMANCE, introduced by A. N. Chomsky (1965 and later works). The similarity between this pair and the Saussurean langue/parole dichotomy has been repeatedly observed and commented o n , as well as the d i f f e r e n c e s . 4 Chomsky's insistence on competence as something intrinsic, belonging to "deep s t r u c t u r e " and innate' goes beyond Saussure's conception of langue as an abstraction. At the same t i m e , Chomskyan "competence" is a purely individual, in no wise social phenomenon, existing only in his "ideal speaker-listener".6

4

Hall: Innate Capacity, Know-How and Use

Both of these dichotomies seem to hint at certain valuable distinctions, and yet both are basically unsatisfac­ tory. This is because they are cast in the very w i d e - s p r e a d but essentially fallacious mold of binary oppositions, 7 and are based on the reification of abstractions. In this discus­ sion, I shall a t t e m p t a somewhat more extended distinction between t h r e e basic factors in human linguistic activity: ( i n n a t e ) capacity, " k n o w - h o w " , and use of language. Before coming to these t h r e e main points of the dis­ cussion, however, we must settle one m a t t e r which has stood in the way of a clear understanding of the whole problem of human language: the relation between its i n d i ­ vidual and its social aspects. On the one hand, language certainly is both an individual and a social phenomenon. On the other hand, neither Saussure's ascription of langue to a "conscience collective" nor Chomsk/s limitation of language to individual usage can be j u s t i f i e d . The paradox can be resolved by recognizing t h a t , as I have argued elsewhere at g r e a t e r length (Hall 1968a: ch. 2 ) , nothing collective (con­ scious, unconscious, activity, responsibility, g u i l t , etc.) exists outside of the individuals who compose a group. Yet no individual exists i n , by, or for h i m - or herself alone. Every human comes into the world as the product of two others, and the normal person lives in continual contact with many others, influenced by and influencing t h e m . (Turning John Donne's famous phrase a r o u n d , we can say "Every man is an island, appearing for a while out of the sea of time and then sinking back into it - but with many bridges leading to and f r o m other islands".) In language, the basic unit with which every human operates is his or her IDIOLECT. 8 The usage of every speech-community consists of what is common to its members' idiolects, its DIALECT, at which we arrive only by a process of abstraction based on observation of individuals* linguistic activity. That humans d i f f e r from other living beings especially in possessing the ability to learn and use language, and t h a t our species should t h e r e f o r e be t e r m e d not only homo sapiens, but especially homo loquens, is a commonplace. 9 This ability is one facet of our basic power of SYMBOLIZATION, of using one phenomenon (or r e f e r e n c e t h e r e t o ) to stand for another. It may not be exclusive to m a n k i n d , 1 0 but it is certainly most highly developed in humans. Its seat seems to

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

5

be in the b r a i n , but it is not certain in exactly which part or in which interconnections b e t w e e n parts; 1 1 nor is it known by which chromosomes it is t r a n s m i t t e d . Nevertheless, the capacity of learning and using a system of linguistic symbols seems to be d e f i n i t e l y h e r e d i t a r y and hence innate in normal humans. Only in this sense can Chomsky's insis­ tence on innateness be regarded as valid. Certainly, as linguists f o r over a century have not t i r e d of insisting, no particular linguistic structure is born into any human child. As the normal person grows up in a group of homines (and feminael ) loquentes, he or she exercises this innate capacity f o r learning languages, and builds up his or her idiolect by imitating others. This process involves not just random samples of imperfectly heard and understood speech, but (in many, probably most instances) also deliber­ a t e , intentional teaching on the p a r t of parents and o t h ers.12 Each speaker thereby internalizes in childhood at least one set of linguistic habits or b e h a v i o r - p a t t e r n s , his or her idiolect, and learns how to use it in communicating with others. This is his or her " k n o w - h o w " . No individual's idiolect is ever absolutely identical with any other's, but of course the members of any speech-community have extremely close similarity in t h e i r idiolects, which makes it possible f o r them to act "as if" they shared a langue which was common to the e n t i r e group. On the basis of naive abstraction, people build up in themselves a notion of what they and their f e l l o w - s p e a k e r s do or ought to do - w h a t I have elsewhere (Hall 1951) termed their "linguistic superego". That naive speakers should reify such an abstraction and consider "the language", "correct speech" and the like as having objective existence outside their own usage, is understandable. Not so excusable is the habit, w i d e - s p r e a d among linguists, of doing the same. An individual's idiolect has an objective existence, as a l a t e n t set of potentialities in his or her b r a i n . Every time he or she speaks or listens, some portion of this set of linguistic habits is called into play, e i t h e r actively (in speaking) or passively (in listening). This use of language corresponds, grosso modo, to Saussure's parole and Chomsky's performance, in the sense of individual language-activity. Observation of speakers' use of t h e i r linguistic resources is the only channel through which t h e i r p a t t e r n s can be s t u d ­ ied and their r e g u l a r i t i e s f o r m u l a t e d .

6

Hall: Innate Capacity, Know-How and Use

From this point of view, it is f u t i l e to deny, as some have done, the possibility of studying la parole or " p e r f o r m ­ ance" scientifically, or to insist t h a t only /a langue or "com­ petence" can be the object of linguistic analysis. It is only by observing the sounds people make when t a l k i n g , the combinations of those sounds (i.e. linguistic FORMS) which they use, and the correlations of these l a t t e r with r e a l - l i f e phenomena (i.e. the MEANING of the f o r m s ) , in individual instances of use, t h a t the linguist can obtain the primary data without which none of his work has any value. Phonet­ ics is t h e r e f o r e an essential part of linguistics, and the part most amenable to instrumental study and analysis. It is in the study of language-use t h a t techniques of linguistic f i e l d - w o r k and socio- and psycholinguistic observation are of course essential. Their place can be t a k e n only partially by t r a d i t i o n a l grammars, no m a t t e r how d e t a i l e d . For languages no longer spoken, we have to depend on philological analy­ ses, the more f i n e - g r a i n e d the b e t t e r ; but even these are best used when combined with a knowledge of humans' actual speech-behavior, 1 3 Further analysis of the p a t t e r n s of any dialect or l a n ­ guage must inevitably be based on abstractions derived from observation of actual speakers' linguistic activity in r e a l - l i f e situations. As long as we realize t h a t our abstractions and the systems we perceive in them are the results of our theoretical analysis, and as long as we abstain from reifying t h e m , well and good. 14 Linguistic analysis loses its value, however, when objective observation of human communicative activity is replaced by mere formal logic or mathematics. Logic has no relevance to the study of human language, and the only kinds of mathematics t h a t are applicable to linguistics are statistics and the calculation of probability. 1 5 Linguistic structure is to be deduced on the basis of p a t ­ t e r n s thus observed, not on t h a t of some a r b i t r a r i l y and aprioristically assumed "universais". As I have remarked elsewhere (Hall 1968b:203), the dichotomy of " s u r f a c e " v e r ­ sus "deep" structure is false. There exist only linguistic structure and the meanings (i.e. the correlations w i t h r e a l lite phenomena) associated t h e r e w i t h , of which " d e e p s t r u c ­ t u r e " is a clumsy pseudo-grammatical r e f o r m u l a t i o n . Such is the prestige of Saussure and Chomsky t h a t their misleading dichotomies of langue/parole and competence/

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

7

performance are likely to continue a f f l i c t i n g linguistics f o r a long time yet and to cause f u r t h e r waste of t i m e , e f f o r t , ink, and paper. The best way to avoid such waste is to stop talking about e i t h e r dichotomy; to look the facts of human linguistic activity in the f a c e ; and to recognize the exis­ tence of what I have t e r m e d INNATE CAPACITY, KNOW-HOW and USE of language - w h e t h e r under these or any other names.

ENDNOTES

1 For a discussion of the various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of these terms, see the references given in Koerner (1973:233-262), and especially Spence (1957). Later discus­ sions of the langue/parole dichotomy have added little or nothing useful. The t i t l e of Gray (1977) is misleading, since the article does not deal with the Saussurean problem.

2

Cf. Wells (1947:15-16).

3

I include the activity of w r i t i n g here because every time a person w r i t e s , he or she is putting down a graphic representation of i n t e r n a l , f r e q u e n t l y suppressed speech; cf. my discussion in Hall (1979:95). 4 Ct. Koerner (1973:253-254). For critiques of Chomskyan "competence", cf. von R a f f l e r - E n g e l ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Kates ( 1 9 7 6 / 7 7 ) , and other r e f e r e n c e s given in Hall (1977:88).

5For discussion and criticism of the ness"-hypothesis, cf. Putnam (1967) and other given in Hall (1977:88-89).

"innatereferences

6

Ct. the illuminating observation of Faust (1970:46): "Chomsky's ideal s p e a k e r - l i s t e n e r is not in a speech-com­ munity at a l l . He is a lone individual completely surrounded by p e r f e c t speech-mirrors". 7

that

The late Henry Lee Smith Jr. was fond of emphasizing the w i d e - s p r e a d modern European and American habit

8

Hall: Innate Capacity, Know-How and Use

of setting up " e i t h e r - o r " binary oppositions view of phenomena. Cf. also Mikus (1977). 8

Cf. most recently ström (1980). 9 The best (1973:101-102).

the

current

excellent

falsifies

discussion

discussion

is

of

our

Hammar­

in

Hockett

10

For experiments with chimpanzees and other types of primates, cf. Hockett (1973:117, 156-157) and Peng (ed.) (1978). 11

Cf. Whitaker

12

Cf.

(1970).

especially Vorster

13 As I have a t t e m p t e d propos of runic w r i t i n g .

(1976). to

point

out

in

Hall

(1982),

à

14

As I suggested in Hall (1962).

15

Exemplified, for Joos and G. Herdan.

instance,

in the

work

of

the

late

M.

REFERENCES CITED

Chomsky, Avram Noam. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gray, Bennison. 1977. "Is t h e r e a science of parole?" Studies in Language 1.233-236. Hall, Robert Α., Jr. 1951. Idiolect and linguistic s u p e r - e g o . Studia Linguistica 5.21-27. Reprinted in Hall 1978. Lan­ guage, Literature and Life, 3 3 - 3 7 . Lake B l u f f , III.: Jupiter Press. . 1962. "Fact and fiction in grammatical analysis." Foundations of Language 1.337-345. . 1968a. An Essay on Language. Philadelphia: Chilton Books. . 1968b. "Some recent developments in American l i n ­ guistics." Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 70.192-227. Reprinted

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

9

in Hall 1976. American Linguistics 1925-1969: 62-87 Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. . 1977. "Some critiques of Chomskyan theory." N e u philologische M i t t e i l u n g e n 78.86-95. . 1979. "Once more: what is l i t e r a t u r e ? " Modern Lan­ guage Journal 6 3 . 9 1 - 9 8 . . 1982. The Kensington Rune-stone is Genuine. Columbia, SC: Hornbeam Press. Hammarström, U. Göran E. 1980. "Idiolekt." Lexikon der ger­ manistischen Linguistik2, 4 2 8 - 4 3 8 . Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Hockett, Charles F. 1973. Man's Place in Nature. New York: McGraw-Hill. Kates, Carol Α. 1976/77. "A critique of Chomsky's theory of grammatical competence." Forum Linguisticum 1.15-24. Koerner, E. F. K. 1973. Ferdinand de Saussure: Origin and Development of His Linguistic Thought in Western Studies of Language. Braunschweig: Viehweg. Mikus, . F. 1977. "Le binarisme e s t - i l inhérent au l a n ­ gage?" Revue Beige de Philologie et d'Histoire 55.745-750. Putnam, Hilary. 1967. "The 'innateness' hypothesis and explanatory models in linguistics." Synthese 17.12-22. Peng, Fred .  ( e d . ) . 1978. Sign Language and Language Acquisition in Man and Ape: New Dimensions of Comparative Pedolinguistics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sapir, Edward. 1917. "Do we need a superorganic?" American Anthropologist NS.19.441-447. Spence, N.  W. 1957. "A hardy p e r e n n i a l : the distinction of la langue and la parole." Archivum Linguisticum 9 . 1 - 2 7 . von R a f f l e r - E n g e l , Walburga. 1970. "Competence, a t e r m in search of a concept." Linguistique contemporaine (Hommage à Eric Buyssens), 271-285 Bruxelles: Université Libre, Institut de Sociologie. Vorster, Jan. 1975. "Mommy linguist: the case f o r m o t h erese." Lingua 37.281-312. Wells, Rulon S. 1947. "De Saussure's system of linguistics." Word 3 . 1 - 3 1 . Whitaker, H. A. 1970. A Model for Neurolinguistics. Colchester, England: University of Essex Language Centre (Occa­ sional Papers, no. 10).

LANGUAGE, COGNITION, AND LINGUISTICS

Raimo Anttila University of California at Los Angeles THE PROBLEM. One of the c u r r e n t "technical" t e r m s f r e e l y bandied about is cognitive. This catch-word gets strong support from the rise of a cognitive science, r e p r e ­ sented through interdisciplinary workshops, programs, and c e n t e r s , and it seems to be a central concept in psychology, linguistics, and even artificial intelligence. The obvious fashion aspect of the word may quite well camouflage the same emptiness as is o f t e n in ' s t r u c t u r a l ' , 'generative', or ' n a t u r a l ' and the like. Fashion seems to be clearer in Ger­ man, where the old Erkenntnis is being replaced by Kognition (although here the adjective kognitivisch gives an edge over erkenntnistheoretisch). Usage is strongest where 'generative' predominated e a r l i e r , and this is why I will concentrate here tor some preliminary explication for the history of the concept in recent times. This particular step in " c u r r e n t progress" is poorly understood by the majority of linguists, and perhaps others as w e l l . F u r t h e r reason for starting the analysis comes from the steady rise of semiotic and h e r m e neutic issues also in American linguistics. These aspects are necessary, but they are presented as 'post-generative' achievements. The t u r n i n g point was around 1976-78. In my experience the issues t u r n e d around the concepts of (denial of) analogy and associationism, semiotics, hermeneutics, cognition, and gestalt psychology. In the following I will show t h a t the t u r n i n g point was a r e t u r n to a t r a d i t i o n t h a t had been repudiated by the very persons who made this new progress.

ASSOCIATIONISM. Criticism by "outsiders" of the t r a n s ­ f o r m a t i o n a l - g e n e r a t i v e rationalism was t a k e n as a defense

12

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and

Linguistics

of empiricism, similarity, and association. This was of course t r u e , but such a defense was simply not permissible, although Esper (1973) had shown t h a t a viable theory must be based on both empiricism and association. Personally, my big e r r o r was an emphasis on similarity, when the d o m i n a t ­ ing school knew that identity is the real thing. F u r t h e r m o r e , similarity could not be formalized. Embarrassingly, similarity "does not f i t into associational theories because it r e p r e ­ sents a r e a l , inner connection between elements which does not reduce to mere contiguity" (Helson 1925:355 cf. 3 5 3 - 5 ) . What is associationism? Matson (1966:1) answers t h a t it is "an a t t e m p t to t r a n s l a t e the postulates and methods of Newtonian mechanics, as precisely as possible, into psycho­ logical t e r m s " (31). We need not concern ourselves with the many valuable aspects in the output of the associationists (e.g. Locke, Hume, the Mills), because the ultimate f r a m e is inadequate for perception and concept f o r m a t i o n , and thus cognition. I, among others, had t a k e n an explicit stand against associationism and N e w t o n , but for association. Accepting the viable parts of British empiricism does not entail embracing associationism. The rationalistic stance was not willing to perceive any f i n e r distinctions. GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY. "Cog­ nitive psychology" was launched by James Ward (1843-1925) in 1886 expressly against associationism. "This had two points of g r e a t advantage over associationism. It emphasized the unity of human experience and behavior, as against discrete and isolated functions; it emphasized activity and adjustment, and found the evolutionary approach highly congenial" (Murphy 1950:172; read also f n . 46 for an excerpt from Brett's History of Psychology). This certainly sounds like a birth announcement of gestalt psychology (v. Ehrenfels' Ober Gestattqualitäten was four years away), and in f a c t , cognitive psychology is still o f t e n subdivided into g e s ­ t a l t and clinical psychology, or cognitive psychology is simply equated with gestalt psychology. These definitions are easily found in handbooks, and they make the disparagement of gestalt psychology by d e f e n d e r s of cognitive psychology a baffle. A criticism one sometimes finds in l i t e r a t u r e is t h a t the gestalt approach is good and solid, but "what is missing from gestalt psychology is an adequate t r e a t m e n t of com-

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

13

municative processes, especially language and other symbolic forms" ( B r i t t a n 1974:331-2). This is where "contemporary cognitive psychology has moved beyond these models by t a k ­ ing both culture and social structure into account in its discussion of internal structuring" (332). This is a hasty evaluation and does not cover the whole f i e l d ; it reminds one of the untrue statement that the gestaltists deal with vision only. Let us not f o r g e t t h a t v. Ehrenfels started with melody, and that Köhler was an accomplished acoustician. Köhler also studied value, not to speak of the word field investigators, who all brought the approach to language and meaning (the so-called "symbol f u n c t i o n " ) . As f o r recent times, Uhlan Slagle (e.g. 1974) has shown that meaning can be handled only in gestalt t e r m s , and this line of thinking is supported by Peter Maher (e.g. 1977) who adds the s i t u ­ ational or cultural aspect in a most explicit f o r m . 1 This line of a r g u m e n t is certainly most i m p o r t a n t , since it gives a direct link to semiotics and since it uses gestalt terminology f o r cognitive issues. Roback (1964) points out t h a t the propaganda against gestalt psychology is due to Boring (365). There is hardly psychology, any t r u t h in the r e p o r t e d death of gestalt because "to d a t e , t h e r e does not seem to be any other school to replace it ..." (366). Hanson (1958) lists "a f e w fundamental papers" in gestalt psychology and concludes: "Philosophy has no concern with f a c t , only with conceptual matters ...; but discussion of perception could not but be improved by the reading of these t w e n t y papers" (181). As for the question whether t h e r e still are competing schools of psychology, two positions are possible, if one just does not maintain t h a t t h e r e is a " m o d e r n " behavioristic psychol­ ogy reigning over the others: 1) " M o d e r n " psychology rests on a phenomenological-anthropological S t r u k t u r - and Ganzheits- psychologie, and the psychology without a soul is dead (W. E. Mühlmann, Homo creator 1962, quoted by Wellek 1970:239). 2) But if the behavioristic variety is not dead in t o t o , as it certainly is not in America, we get the following answer ( M e t z g e r 1973:837-838): There are essentially two such schools. One of them is American behaviorism and the Russian doctrine on the highest nervous activ­ ity which have much in common. The other is

14

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and Wertheimer's and Köhler's von Bertalanffy's theory which is largely in accord

Linguistics

Gestalt theory and of open systems with Gestalt theory

In the number of its advocates and followers, the second school is hardly more than a lost h a n d f u l , and one can hardly avoid the con­ formity pressure of the world-ruling first school. Nevertheless, everything goes f o r the second school, a n d , as in the search f o r t r u t h the principle of democratic majority does not hold, there is no doubt t h a t the f u t u r e will belong to it.

There are already distinct signs t h a t " m o d e r n " linguists are shifting t h a t way, generally as an extension of t r a n s ­ formational g r a m m a r , a gross historical injustice. Karlsson and Lehtonen (1977:2) acknowledge the revival of gestaltist notions in psycholinguistics, and r e f e r to the second chapter of Kess (1976) for more details. T h e r e , of course, one finds no help at a l l , just a similar r e f e r e n c e to Neisser (1967). So what does Neisser say? He takes gestalt psychology as analogous to s t r u c t u r a l linguistics, the highest f o r m of which would be Chomskyan transformational grammar! Although this line of passing the buck is typical, it is of course ridiculous. It is t r u e t h a t Chomsky is an " i n v e t e r a t e structuralist" (Lewis 1970:23), but u n f o r t u n a t e l y his whole system is aligned w i t h American behaviorism and American structural linguistics of a compatible kind (Itkonen 1978). This kind of structuralism does not provide a viable theory (see particularly M e r r e l l 1975). Remember t h a t the main t a r g e t s of Köhler's critiques w e r e behaviorism and i n t r o spectionism (not introspection!), which entails devising e l a b ­ orate techniques f o r excluding the environment from the observer. This way learning is cut o f f , and pure Dinge-ansich would appear (a direct parallel to underlying forms and innatism). 2 Viable structuralism must be linked with gestalt theory. The replacement of behaviorism by "cognitive psy­ chology" (Neisser 8 f f . ) is by no means so clear, particularly

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

15

as considerable machine-theory aspects remain in this modern substitute. Ward at least made his break under the auspices of Brentano's emphasis on experience, which was totally missing in transformational g r a m m a r , although it is being g r a f t e d into it now.

SEMIOTICS. The issue of cognition can be taken up f r o m a d i f f e r e n t angle, viz. Peirce's theory of signs. This is particulary important for linguistics, which is generally taken as a paragon of a sign system, whether followed through or not. Usually not. It remains a fact t h a t linguists t e n d to p r e f e r an anticognitive stance (whatever their t e r ­ minology seems to say). A handy introduction to Peirce's theory of cognition is achieved by combining Buchler (1939:3-23) and Buczyńska-Garewicz (1978). The gist of these is the following: Cognition and thought and knowledge are synonymous. Cognitions are d e t e r m i n e d by ( i n f e r r e d f r o m ) previous cognitions. Every cognition is judicative, i.e. even for every material quality of cognition t h e r e must be some possibility of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . There are rules of inference used in reasoning. The sign is a basic unit of cognition, and a theory of signs itself is a philosophical discipline which is able to explain and i n t e r p r e t the whole domain of human cognition, giving at the same time a viable methodology. Every thought is a sign, because every real sign must be i n t e r p r e t e d by another. This is how signs necessarily grow. The essential function of the sign is to i n t e r p r e t and to be i n t e r p r e t e d simultaneously, which makes i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a wave phenomenon in a "semantic" f i e l d , and a real creative power. As a sign, thought is by its n a t u r e an i n f e r e n c e , because it is dependent on some previous thought. Meaning is thus an ideal phenomenon as it must be formed by thought, not by subjective activity, and a p a r t from the e l e ­ ments of the natural empirical w o r l d . "The semiotical method is a kind of analytical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which explains the sense of accomplished cognition. However, it is a method of understanding r a t h e r than an a t t e m p t to rebuild knowledge f r o m the very beginning" (Buczynska-Garewicz 14).

16

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and Linguistics

But analysis is not the conceptually "higher" notion, because the plurality of signs is logically prior to a single sign. Totality (Ganzheit) is thus crucial behind the t e r m s , exactly as in gestalt psychology, cf. Buczynska-Garewicz (13):

The system of signs is logically prior to a single sign, and thought is a whole which determines its parts. This holistic view of cognition constitutes the principal aspect of semiotical epistemology. It contrasts with the idea of dissolving knowledge into simple data in order to reconstruct it f r o m such d a t a . All methodology of reconstruction ( t h e r e a r e d i f ­ f e r e n t types) takes f o r g r a n t e d the cognitive self-subsistence of simple ideas or impres­ sions. However, according to the theory of signs, t h e r e are no simple autonomous d a t a .

This should be enough to show t h a t much of the talk about cognitive issues by linguists who concentrate o n , or come f r o m , formalistic aspects is r a t h e r empty. Peirce's output was an elegant and convincing (if t h a t is ever pos­ sible) a r g u m e n t against Cartesian rationalism, and m e n t a l ism, both nurseries of current ( l a t e - c o m e r ) "cognitive" l i n ­ guistics. It is not noticed t h a t espousal of cognition totally r e f u t e s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar as a w i d e r theory. And another point should be singled out here: abstraction. It is an empty word in t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l and p o s t - t r a n s f o r m a ­ tional linguistics, because the primacy of perception in cog­ nition is not understood. Only a semiotic and gestalt approach can t r e a t it adequately. Both prescinding and hypostatic abstraction was b e t t e r understood in the t r a d i ­ tional philological and philosophical contexts of language, r a t h e r than in " m o d e r n " linguistics. In both kinds the c r u ­ cial momenta are the gestalt laws of p e r c e p t i o n , which a r e , f u r t h e r m o r e , much more adequate than the still occurring t e m p l a t e matchings of ( " m o d e r n " ) cognitive psychology. And finally, note how gestalt psychology and semiotics combine to give the f r a m e for supersign formation (Dörner 1977).

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

17

HERMENEUTICS. "The starting point f o r analysis is always some already existing knowledge and culture or already functioning language ..." (Buczyńska-Garewicz 4 ) . "First of a l l , continuity means t h a t there is no absolute starting point f o r cognition" ( 1 2 ) . "Every stopping place of thought is also a new starting point" (13). "We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we e n t e r upon the study of Philosophy' (5.Z56; 14). "The hypothesis we wish to propose is t h a t there are no epistemological u l t i mates" (Blackwell 1976:264). " I n giving an account of our knowledge, we should begin there in m i d - s t r e a m , carry out our analysis in various directions as best we can, and sus­ pend claims to epistemological ultimates. Let us designate this methodological rule as the 'Mid-Stream Principle"' (264). These quotations continue the i n t e r p r e t a n t corner of semiosis from the previous section, and add a plan f o r a proper philosophy of science against the static structuralism found w a n t i n g . This plan presents another strategy f o r h e r meneutics, and I give it for variety. Esa Itkonen has been explicating the issue in connection with metalinguistics and grammatical theory for years (e.g. 1978). The m a t t e r should be s e l f - e v i d e n t , i.e., linguistics is primarily a hermeneutic "science", in which agent's knowledge is more important than observer's knowledge. Note also t h a t this is the posi­ tion of modern physics: the observer is d r a w n into the observed. "Modern" linguistics, however, harks back to Newton, and fiercely indeed! This is the kind of structuralism Blackwell try to put to rest. This that Merrell and ("Newtonian") position is embarrassing to its holders (plain English might say incompetent). It seems to be the Greek t h a t is most objectionable, because the Latin translation of hermeneutics, interpretation, is much more acceptable. We are back among the i n t e r p r e t a n t s of the sign, p a r t of which is reaching understanding. This is the very essence of m e a n ­ ing, and expressly so phrased, e.g. by Kenneth Pike in America. You simply cannot have any meaning without i n t e r ­ p r e t a t i o n . Thus denial of hermeneutics denies linguistics itself, but this does not m a t t e r . One has one's job. I am of course back at my beginning. Also Matson ends up with hermeneutics having f i r s t emancipated from Newton

18

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and

Linguistics

and associationism. Hermeneutics combines gestalt psychology, e.g. Polanyi (1959:100-2).

naturally

with

MODERN COGNITIVE "PROGRESS". Apparently the majority of American linguists firmly believe in the P e t r i n e position, as Peter Maher has named it in this context: P e t e r had agreed at Antioch to require the converts to Christianity to "pass through the synagogue". T r u e to this principle only those who w e r e e a r l i e r Haeckeling linguistics are allowed to make advances in the cognitive domain. I.e., those who made a name for themselves through classical transformational grammar (the synagogue) are listened to by those who explicitly denied all cognitive issues prepounded by others against t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l - g e n e r a t i v e hegemony. This progress unit includes names like Ray Jackendoff, George Lakoff, Leonard Talmy, John Ross, and Paul Kiparsky. In 1976 Jackendoff defended a machine-theory idea t h a t a concept is a mental procedure like a computer p r o g r a m , within a f r a m e - w o r k of innatism, in which verbs (!) g e n e r ­ alized (!) t h e i r meanings across semantic fields; all this being allegedly d i f f e r e n t f r o m the classical metaphor. A positive aspect was the admission that n a t u r a l language cannot be completely f o r m a l i z e d , because t h e r e are no con­ ceptual primitives. This was indeed a nudge " t o w a r d v i a b i l ­ ity", but otherwise the a t t e m p t was a random defense of the old formalism. But in 1978 he makes another advance under the auspices of classical gestalt psychology, ostensive d e f i n i t i o n , and Wittgenstein's family resemblances, and s u g ­ gests t h a t non-verbal cognition should be sufficient to h a n ­ dle language as w e l l , and be the basis of conceptual s t r u c ­ t u r e . He concludes t h a t it remains to be seen if this program can be adapted to language, and caps it all with the statement that definitions are explications of uncon­ scious knowledge (UCLA guest lecture "Semantics and cogni­ t i o n " , Oct. 27. Apparently none in the audience realized the hermeneutic f i n a l e ; see also Jackendoff 1978). George Lakoff's "Linguistic gestalts" (1977) is another rediscovery of the gestalt t r a d i t i o n in which he is develop­ ing "a theory of gestalts on the basis of empirical e v i ­ dence" (247) (of course this is what was done right f r o m the beginning), but unlike Jackendoff, he expects to

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

19

generalize f r o m linguistic to nonlinguistic areas! He "would ultimately like to show (or see other people show) ... that thought, perception, the emotions, cognitive processing, motor activity, and language are ail organized in t e r m s of the same kind of structures ..." (246) which he calls ges­ talte. This has of course in principle been shown in the classical gestalt t r a d i t i o n , and in recent times particularly by Uhlan Slagle f o r linguistics. In short, we have another plea against reductionism and ultimate e l e m e n t s , and a plea f o r a holistic study of man. This is reinventing some more gunpowder. What is l e f t out is that this is a program of long-standing and w o r t h - w h i l e results. If you slip into the ditch (as transformational grammar knowingly d i d ) , the road is not your achievement, once you step back onto i t . 3 CONCLUSION. Already contained in Peirce's notion of the i n t e r p r e t a n t - f o r example, in the definition of an iconic sign as one which displays q u a l i ­ ties t h a t 'resemble those of [ i t s d e n o t a t u m ] and excite analogous sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness' t h e r e was a concession to the psychology of perception which points the way to t h a t synthesis of semiotics and gestalt psychology which is at present being under­ taken (White 1976:67). The year of the appearance of White's statement is the important one, but the synthesis was not a p p a r e n t t h e n , at least not in linguistics. The French structuralists, it is t r u e , had taken to gestaltist foundations, and a French school of semiotics did solidify in the 1960's, but this semiotics t u r n e d out to be r a t h e r specialized without general appeal. On the other hand, the recent rediscovery of gestalt theory has not included semiotic potentialities. In linguistics I have t r i e d to work t o w a r d the synthesis seen by White, but the response has not been particularly g r e a t by linguists. I am happy to n o t e , however, t h a t Dörner (1977) espouses a very similar combination from the psychological side. There are prospects for a g r e a t e r momentum now, but some of the ingredients are missing, or the combination is hastily put together under false history. Cognition is too important a t e r m to be emptied of meaning and historical justice.

20

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and

Linguistics

ENDNOTES

1

Other names one could add f r o m the t r a d i t i o n are Harald Weydt, Hans Hörmann, Dwight Bolinger; see Anttila 1977. My manifesto was thoroughly t a k e n up by Langhoff 1980, which is the most comprehensive modern gestalt t r e a t m e n t of a linguistic topic. 2 Thus gestalt theory is directly and strongly opposed to t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l - g e n e r a t i v e grammar. It cannot be given as a reasonable p a t c h - u p , it demolishes the p a t i e n t .

3

This group successfully avoids all the gestalt t r a d i t i o n s in linguistics, although occasional r e f e r e n c e s to Köhler and Koffka are included. The behaviorist-structuralist (including TG; see Itkonen 1978) way of thinking has also spread to in linguistics has Germany, where the gestalt t r a d i t i o n always been the strongest. But witness now (Forum . . . 1979:41): Man erkennt heute gerade in Deutschland nicht immer, dass die verschiedenen strukturalistischen Schulen auf der schmalen Basis der behavioristischen Psychologie b e r u h e n , d e r man im Interesse des For­ schungsgegenstandes Sprache die Erkenntnisse der Gestaltpsychologie entgegenhalten muss. Wenn sich diese Erkenntnis einmal allgemein durchsetzt, hat die Sprachwissenschaft in Deutschland wieder zu ihrer f r ü h e r e n Lehrmeistern zurückgefunden. I do not w a n t to document here f u r t h e r the history of this Sturmgruppe Fortschritt, but just note t h a t Kiparsky and Ross have refound analogy, and Lakoff also metaphor and experience. I have a t t e n d e d guest lectures by all during the t u r n i n g point years. But vocalized evidence for the P e t r i n e principle should be informative: After presenting a guest lecture at UCLA L. Talmy was told about Slagle's work in the a r e a . The response by the speaker: "Who does he think he is?" Clearly, Slagle had sinned in his own country without o f f i ­ cial authorization by the synagogue. He might not even know himself, not to speak of evading customs by importing f o r -

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells eign traditions. (For the Talmy 1977 and 1978.)

rough content

of

T a l m / s talk,

21 see

REFERENCES CITED

Anttila, Raimo. 1977. "Dynamic fields and linguistic s t r u c t u r e : a proposal f o r a Gestalt linguistics." Die Sprache 23. 1-10. Blackwell, Richard J. 1976. "A structuralist account of scien­ tific theories." IPQ 16.263-74. B r i t t a n , Arthur. 1974. "Systems, structures and conscious­ ness: the social psychology of meaning." The rules of the game (Teodor Shanin, e d . ) 3 2 2 - 4 6 . Tavistock Pub­ lishers. Buchler, Justus. 1939. Charles Peirce's Empiricism. London: Kegan Paul. Buczynska-Garewicz, Hanna. 1978. "Sign and continuity." Ars Semiotica 2.3-15. Dörner, Dietrich. 1977. "Superzeichen und kognitive Proz­ esse." Zeichenprozesse (Roland Posner and Hans-Peter Reinecke, eds.) 7 3 - 8 2 . Wiesbaden: Athenaion. Esper, Erwin A. 1973. Analogy and Association in Linguistics and Ppsychology. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press. Forum des Hochschulverbandes. "Die Kleinen Fächer." 2nd e d . Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. Vol. 1.173-6 (Heft 4 / 1 , April 1979), Vol. 2.37-42 ( H e f t 4 / 2 , Juli 1979). Bonn: Hochschulverband. Hanson, N.R. 1958. Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Univ. Press. Heison, Harry. 1925. "The psychology of Gestalt. " American Journal of Psychology 3 6 . 3 4 2 - 7 0 , 494-526; 37.25-62, 189-223 (1926). I t k o n e n , Esa. 1978. Grammatical theory and metascience." CILT 5. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Jackendoff, Ray. 1978. "An argument about the composition of conceptual s t r u c t u r e . " Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing 2.162-6. Univ. of Illinois at Urbana. Karlsson, Fred and Jaakko Lehtonen. 1977. Alkukahdennus. Pubi, of the Dept. of Finnish and General Linguistics of the Univ. of Turku 2.

22 Kess,

Anttila: Language, Cognition, and Linguistics

Joseph F. 1976. Psycholinguistics. New York: Academic Press. Lakoff, George. 1977. "Linguistic gestalts." Papers from the 13th regional meeting 2 3 6 - 8 7 . Chicago: CLS. Langhoff, Stephan. 1980. "Gestaltlinguistik." European Univer­ sity Studies. Reihe XXI Linguistik, Vol. 10. F r a n k f u r t / M ( B e r n , Cirencester UK): Lang. Lewis, Philip E. 1970. " M e r l e a u - P o n t y and the phenomenol­ ogy of language." Structuralism (J. Ehrmann, ed.), 9 - 3 1 . A 719. Garden City, NJ: Anchor Books. Maher, J. P e t e r . 1977. " P a p e r s on language theory and his­ tory I." CILT 3. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Matson, Floyd W. 1966. The Broken Image. A 506. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday. M e r r e l l , Floyd. 1975. "Structuralism and beyond: a critique of presuppositions." Diogenes 92.67-103. M e t z g e r , Wolfgang. 1973. "Do schools of psychology still exist? Unity through diversity." A Fs. for Ludwig von Berialanffy (William Gray and Nicholas D. Rizzo, eds.), Vol. 2. New York (London, Paris): Gordon Scientific Publishers. Murphy, Gardner. 1950. Historical Introduction to Modern Psychol­ ogy. Rev. e d . New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. Neisser, Ulric. 1967. Cognitive Psychology. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts. Polanyi, Michael. 1959. The Study of Man. Ρ 128. Chicago: University Press. Roback, A. A. 1964. A History of American Psychology. New rev. ed. CS 13. New York: Collier. Slagle, Uhlan Von. 1974. Language, Thought, and Perception: A Proposed Theory of Meaning. JL, Series maior 98. The Hague: Mouton. Talmy, Leonard. 1977. "Rubber-sheet cognition in language." Papers from the 13th regional meeting Chicago: CLS. . 1978. "The relation of grammar to cognition - a synopsis." Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing 2.14-24. Univ. of Illinois at Urbana. Wellek, Albert. 1970. Witz-Lyrik· Sprache. Munich and B e r n : Francke. White, John J. 1976. "The a r g u m e n t f o r a semiotic approach to shaped w r i t i n g : the case of Italian f u t u r i s t t y p o g ­ raphy." Visible Language 10.53-86.

KUHNIAN PARADIGMS AS SYSTEMS OF MARKEDNESS CONVENTIONS

James D. McCawley University of Chicago Thomas Kuhn's (1962) approach to scientific revolutions, normal science, and the other topics with which it deals is important because of the a t t e n t i o n t h a t it has given to the previously neglected fact t h a t science is carried out within communities and t h a t the paths along which science develops are heavily influenced by the ways in which those communi­ ties work. The principal failing of his work has been that his account of how the communities work has been grossly oversimplified. This paper takes the viewpoint that if one replaces simple oppositions like 'normal'/'deviant' by the richer system of distinctions t h a t becomes available if Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' is r e i n t e r p r e t e d in terms of m a r k e d ­ ness, Kuhn's ideas provide a more realistic account of the dynamics of scientific communities than they have generally been thought to provide. In the f i r s t half of this p a p e r , I will present this revisionist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kuhn's ideas in f a i r l y general t e r m s , and in the second half I will apply it to a case history in linguistics, namely the analyses of E n g ­ lish auxiliary verbs by t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammarians. I propose r e i n t e r p r e t i n g Kuhn's notion of the paradigm of a community as a specification of the respects in which behavior within t h a t community is perceived within the com­ munity as normal (= unmarked) or special (= marked). Membership in any kind of community, not just a scientific community, involves acceptance of the paradigm, in the sense of acceptance of the notion of markedness t h a t it defines. Note t h a t acceptance of those markedness conven­ tions does not carry with it a commitment to engaging in unmarked behavior and avoiding marked behavior. Just as, in linguistics, marked sounds, marked syntactic

24

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

constructions, etc. are not excluded but are merely 'more costly t h a n ' t h e i r unmarked c o u n t e r p a r t s , marked behavior in a community is not excluded but is available at a cost, whereas unmarked behavior is available without cost. For example, in most American communities, belief t h a t t h e r e is a god ( i n d e e d , belief t h a t t h e r e is a god of the sort t h a t listens to prayers, judges the souls of dead persons, etc.) is unmarked. This does not mean t h a t members of t h a t society all believe in a god or are kept from expressing beliefs to the contrary, but it does mean that members of that society t r e a t one another as believing in a god except when t h e r e is reason to impute a contrary belief to some­ one, and expressions of nonbelief in a god are expected to be accompanied by apologies and/or justifications. The same situation prevails in scientific communities. Within what I will call the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community, 1 the belief t h a t a language can be i d e n t i f i e d with a set of sentences is unmarked; members of t h a t community are not obliged to believe t h a t proposition (and indeed, a large proportion of them do not believe i t ) , but they are obliged to o f f e r j u s ­ tification (or at least exculpation) when they express a contrary view, while they are not expected to o f f e r any justification for asserting (which they r a r e l y do) or saying something t h a t presupposes (which they do much more o f t e n ) that proposition. By examining publications internal to a scientific community and noting what propositions are presented without justifications and what ones are p r e ­ sented with at least minimal justification (e.g. a r e f e r e n c e to an e a r l i e r work in which justifications are claimed to be given), one can thus identify the propositions whose accep­ tance is unmarked in the given community. 2 For example, the length to which Akmajian, S t e e l e , and Wasow (1979) go in arguing t h a t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s must be allowed to change constituent s t r u c t u r e without changing word order points to the marked status within the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community of acceptance of t h a t proposition. 3 The last paragraph should not mislead the reader into thinking t h a t a paradigm is merely a set of propositions whose acceptance is unmarked within a community. As Kuhn (1974) made abundantly clear, a paradigm has components of diverse types, not all of which r e l a t e to 'theories' or to acceptance of propositions. (Thus, it is a gross m i s r e p r e ­ sentation of Kuhn to identify a paradigm with a 'theory'.)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

25

Among the components of a paradigm are policies about what questions deserve a t t e n t i o n , what kinds of answers to them deserve to be given serious consideration, and what standards of accuracy and thoroughness ought to be observed. Kuhn has discussed at length another component t h a t he calls 'exemplars': prestigious problem solutions that neophyte scientists are encouraged to model their own work a f t e r . Yet another component of paradigms, one to which Kuhn devotes little a t t e n t i o n but which plays a profound role in the dynamics of communities, is the ranking of goals. Linguists who share goals but do no't impose the same ranking on them are destined to get into disputes in which each accuses the other of throwing out the baby and keeping the bathwater: a d i f f e r e n c e in the ranking of goals amounts to a d i f f e r e n c e regarding which goal will be sacri­ ficed when it is not possible to achieve all the goals simul­ taneously. A celebrated dispute in linguistics that f i t s this description is the dispute over the phonemic level in the early 1960's, in which the opposing factions w e r e in sub­ stantial a g r e e m e n t t h a t it was desirable f o r phenomena to be described in f u l l e s t g e n e r a l i t y , that it was desirable f o r phonological units to have invariant phonetic realizations, t h a t it was desirable to keep the number of phonological units to a minimum, etc., but they disagreed over which of these goals should be sacrificed when cases arose in which they could not ail be met. 4 Since the dimensions t h a t play a role in a paradigm are largely independent of one another, marked activity on one dimension need not be marked on any of the other d i m e n ­ sions, i.e. when activity within a scientific community is not pristine 'normal science' ( t h a t is, completely u n m a r k e d ) , it need not be particularly abnormal from the communit/s vantage point, and its oddity can be localized to particular dimensions. We are thus in a position to oppose pristine 'normal science' to two very d i f f e r e n t things: 'marked sci­ ence', which is carried out by persons who accept the com­ munity's markedness conventions and pay costs in t e r m s of extra work justifying propositions t h a t they wish to use, and 'deviant science', carried out in defiance of the obliga­ tions to pay those costs. Note t h a t the status of particular work as 'deviant science' r a t h e r than as 'marked science' is not simply a m a t t e r of how much the authors' beliefs d i f f e r f r o m those t h a t are common within the community: rejection

26

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

of points that are without substance 5 makes scientific activity deviant if the rejection is not accompanied by j u s t i ­ fications, while acceptance of quite bizarre propositions can still be in the realm of marked r a t h e r than deviant science if even weak justifications are o f f e r e d . I t u r n now to a case history t h a t I will discuss in t e r m s of the above revisionist r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm', namely the various analyses of English auxiliary verbs that transformational grammarians have o f f e r e d , and the relation between those analyses and the paradigms of the communities within which they were offered. Chomsky (1957) presented the well-known and highly influential account of English auxiliaries that posits an underlying constituent t h a t contains the various auxiliar­ ies and verbal a f f i x e s , whose underlying constituency is given by the rule ( 1 ) : (1) AUX → Tense (Modal) (have - e n ) (be - i n g ) . The bulk of the syntactic phenomena in which auxiliaries participate are described in t e r m s of an underlying constit­ uent o r d e r in which the various verbal affixes precede the words on which they appear in surface s t r u c t u r e , by means of transformations t h a t apply prior to the application of a transformation ('Affix-hopping') t h a t attaches a t e n s e , -en, or -ing to an immediately following verb. This analysis ( h e n c e f o r t h , the 'AUX analysis') is of importance in the his­ tory of linguistics principally because of its status as an exemplar (in the sense of Kuhn 1970) in the transformational community. Transformational grammarians regularly pre­ sented the AUX analysis as an example of good linguistics and encouraged t h e i r students to model their syntactic analyses a f t e r it. The following characteristics of the AUX analysis, in p a r t i c u l a r , w e r e widely copied in early t r a n s ­ formational analyses and can be regarded as part of the paradigm of the transformational community in the early 1960's: (2) a. Primacy of morpheme order over constituent structure i. Morpheme order was regarded as the principal respect in which deep structures d i f f e r e d f r o m surface structures.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Z7

ii. While constituent structure played an important role in the functioning of t r a n s ­ f o r m a t i o n s , higher priority was accorded to getting the morphemes in the right order in surface structure than to getting the constituent structure right, i.e. bizarre constituent structures were tolerated if they enabled one to get the morphemes in the right orders. iii. Transformations having the same e f f e c t on constituent order were assumed to be identical, e.g. there was a single 'affixhopping' transformation rather than, say, one rule for placement of tenses and a separate rule for placement of -en and -ing. iv. The e f f e c t of a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n on constit­ uent s t r u c t u r e was regarded as predictable f r o m its e f f e c t on morpheme order. v. Only continuous constituent structure was admitted; dependencies among non-contig­ uous items were expressed in terms of deep structures in which those items w e r e contiguous. 6 vi. Syntactic structures w e r e typically relatively 'flat', with a constituent typically having several immediate constituents and the o r d e r of the l a t t e r items serving to d i s t i n ­ guish t h e i r roles. b. Combinatoric restrictions were expressed only as rules f o r how elements combined in deep structure. c. Status of categories i The rules were formulated in terms of 'AUX'7 ad-hoc syntactic categories such as (which the linguist could create at will) and 'abbreviatory· devices such as paren­ theses and curly brackets. 8 ii. Categories had no internal structure and t h e i r names had no significance. d. While relative simplicity in the formulation of transformations was a d e s i d e r a t u m , highly com­ plex formulations of transformations were regarded as acceptable.

28

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

e. Morphology was assimilated to syntax: the same sorts of devices w e r e posited f o r getting the morphemes in the right order within the word as for g e t t i n g the words in the right order in the sentence. These characteristics of the 'AUX' analysis also charac­ terize virtually all the work done in transformational syntax until the mid 1960's. Only (d) and (cii) can be said to have lost t h e i r status as p a r t of the paradigm of the t r a n s f o r ­ mational community by the time of the w r i t i n g of the next work t h a t I will take u p , namely Ross (1969). From the completion of Rosenbaum ( 1 9 6 5 ) , a work whose importance in the history of transformational grammar is greatly u n d e r e s t i m a t e d , it became standard among transformational grammarians to develop analyses in which derivations g e n ­ erally involved a relatively large number of steps, but the formulations of the individual transformations w e r e g e n e r ­ ally f a i r l y simple, and transformations w e r e posited t h a t factored out of several syntactic constructions common f e a ­ t u r e s of the relationship b e t w e e n t h e i r deep and surface structures. Two other changes in the paradigm of the transformational community are also relevant to the discus­ sion of Ross (1969), namely the addition of a f a i r l y detailed conception of how derivational steps interact with one another and of the idea t h a t ' f e a t u r e s ' are desirable; 9 I have incorporated these observations into the following summary of points of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l paradigm of the late 1960's t h a t are relevant to the discussion of Ross's paper: (3) a - b . as in (2) c. i. as in ( 2 ) . ii. Category distinctions are drawn in p a r t in terms of binary features. The employment of f e a t u r e s in syntactic analysis is virtuous. d. Transformations are typically fairly simple, especially as regards the 'structural change'. There are many t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t h a t are a p p l i ­ cable in a broad range of cases r a t h e r than just in one syntactic construction. e. as in ( 2 ) . f. The application of transformations to any d o ­ main is in accordance with a fixed ordering of the transformations: the application of trans-

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

29

formations to different domains conforms to the 'cyclic principie': application of transforma­ tions to any domain is prior to application of transformations to domains containing that domain; the domains to which transformations apply are the S's of deep s t r u c t u r e . The f i r s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l analysis of English auxiliary verbs that d i f f e r e d in more than inconsequential details f r o m t h a t of Chomsky (1957) was t h a t of Ross ( 1 9 6 9 ) , in which each auxiliary verb was the main verb of a deep structure S t h a t had a sentential complement, tenses w e r e represented as f e a t u r e s on the verbs that bore t h e m , and the transformations t h a t in other derivations served to reduce embedded S's and VP's, namely Raising and E q u i - N P d e l e t i o n , w e r e also t r i g g e r e d by auxiliary verbs, so t h a t to a deep structure like (4a) was associated a surface s t r u c ­ t u r e like (4b):io

30

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

The only points in (3) from which Ross (1969) clearly deviated w e r e (aii) and ( c i ) . 1 1 Ross provided no account of the order in which auxiliary verbs occur or of t h e i r cooc­ currence with affixes but only argued t h a t the deep and surface constituent s t r u c t u r e s and the category assignments must be as in his analysis and not as in Chomsky's analysis, e.g. he pointed out t h a t the deletion and pronominalization of VP's works in t e r m s of the multiple VP's that his analysis recognizes, not the single VP t h a t Chomsky's analysis recog­ nizes. The types of structures and rules t h a t Ross posited w e r e exactly what was generally accepted among t r a n s f o r ­ mational grammarians, and almost all the arguments t h a t he gave for the constituent s t r u c t u r e and the categories t h a t f i g u r e d in his analysis w e r e of sorts t h a t transformational grammarians generally found a c c e p t a b l e , 1 2 but nonetheless his conclusions w e r e generally received with hostility among transformational grammarians. I conjecture t h a t the main reasons why this work t h a t in so many respects conformed to the standards of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community was regarded as highly deviant within t h a t community are the following: (i) it reversed the standard priorities by a t t e n d ­ ing to categorization and constituent s t r u c t u r e while ignor­ ing morpheme order save for a b r i e f mention of the p r o b ­ lem in the final paragraph of the p a p e r 1 3 (by contrast, it was considered acceptable to a t t e n d to morpheme order and ignore constituent structure and categorization, as Chomsky (1957) had), (ii) it spurned the standard policy of relying on phrase structure rules as the primary device for expressing combinatoric restrictions, and (iii) it posited underlying S's ( i n d e e d , a g r e a t profusion of underlying S's) in cases other than those in which the descriptive practice of transformational grammarians generally admitted them. The cases in which t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammarians w e r e w i l l ­ ing to derive non-sentential surface constituents from structures involving embedded S's w e r e those where e i t h e r a surface f o r m with a f u l l embedded S was also available (as in the analysis of a tall man as involving an underlying relative clause, where an a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m with a f u l l r e l a ­ tive clause exists: a man who is tall) or a n o n - s e n t e n t i a l constituent contained items t h a t could make up a f u l l s e n ­ tence with a r e l a t e d meaning (as in the derivation of n o m inalizations like the invention of dynamite by Nobel from a While structure containing the S Nobel invented dynamite). transformational syntactic theory of the late 1960's did not

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells restrict the derivation of non-sentential constituents to this class of cases, the practise of mational grammarians did so restrict it. 1 4

31 surface transfor­

Not all of the discrepancies between Ross's analysis and Chomsky's constituted deviations of Ross's approach from the paradigm of the transformational community. Ross's t r e a t ­ ment of tenses not as separate deep structure constituents but as f e a t u r e s of verbs provoked no adverse reaction f r o m orthodox transformational grammarians. That detail of Ross's analysis appears to have been subjected to criticism only by persons sympathetic to Ross's general approach such as myself, not by adherents of the AUX analysis, a state of a f f a i r s that I think resulted f r o m the fact that 'in t r a n s ­ formational grammar you can get away with anything if you f o r m u l a t e it in f e a t u r e notation' (McCawley 1980a: 9 1 9 ) . Transformational grammarians have consistently observed laxer standards in evaluating the employment of f e a t u r e s than in evaluating the employment of any other putative component of rules or structures. That detail was one of the principal d i f f e r e n c e s not only between Ross's analysis and Chomsky's but also between Ross's analysis and the revision of it that I proposed in McCawley ( 1 9 7 1 ) , according to which tenses are independent deep s t r u c t u r e constituents r a t h e r than f e a t u r e s of verbs but are taken to be p r e d i c a t e s 1 5 of deep structure S's r a t h e r than to have a sui generis deep structure position as in Chomsky's analysis. This revision contributes significantly to the solution of the problem of accounting f o r the order of auxiliary verbs within an approach t h a t (like Ross's) has to do without a phrase s t r u c t u r e rule like ( 1 ) . It in f a c t goes beyond the AUX analysis in accounting f o r the o r d e r of auxiliary verbs, in that it provides not a mere s t a t e m e n t of the order in which they occur but indeed an explanation of why they occur in that order and not some o t h e r . 1 6 This revised version of Ross's analysis, however, found even less favor within the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community than Ross's d i d , since f r o m the viewpoint of t h a t community it was even more deviant. I explicitly rejected much of ( 3 a , b, c, e) t h e r e . My explanation of why English allows the combina­ tions of auxiliary verbs t h a t it does involved a number of quite deviant points. For example, I accorded morphology an autonomy t h a t it did not have in orthodox transformational grammar when I argued t h a t it is f o r morphological rather

32

McCawley: Kuhnlan Paradigms and

Markedness

than syntactic reasons t h a t modal auxiliaries cannot follow other auxiliaries: modal auxiliaries in English (unlike Ger­ man) have only f i n i t e forms, and a modal t h a t was p r e ­ ceded by any other auxiliary verb would have to be put in a form ( i n f i n i t i v e , present participle, or past participle) that its morphology does not allow. Since this a t t r i b u t e s the impossibility of e.g. a sentence in which have is followed by must not to any restriction on how things may combine in deep structure but to the morphological demand imposed on must in virtue of its surface position, it involves also r e j e c ­ tion of (3b): a combinatorie restriction here is accounted for neither in t e r m s of deep structure nor by means of 'phrase structure rules'. In a d d i t i o n , my t r e a t m e n t involved an even g r e a t e r profusion of higher predicates and e x t r a S's than did Ross's original version. A full survey of analyses of English auxiliary verbs within the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l community would necessarily take up f a r more space than is available to me here. I will accordingly skip over such important works as Emonds (1970, 1976), Akmajian and Wasow (1975), Jackendoff (1977), Putlum and Wilson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , and Steele (1981) and comment briefly on Akmajian, S t e e l e , and Wasow ( 1 9 7 9 ) , a work t h a t presented an analysis of English auxiliaries t h a t d i f f e r e d radically f r o m the AUX analysis but whose authors w e r e engaging in only slightly marked science, not deviant sci­ ence. Akmajian, S t e e l e , and Wasow ( h e n c e f o r t h , ASW) adopt an analysis t h a t involves the surface constituent structure of Ross's analysis combined with a use of phrase structure rules to describe the cooccurrence possibilities of auxiliary verbs in a way t h a t has at least something in common with Chomsky's. They use a category label 'AUX', but do not mean the same by it as Chomsky meant by 'AUX': ASW's AUX con­ sists in deep structure of e i t h e r a modal auxiliary or a tense plus do, and a f t e r the application of their D o - r e ­ placement t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , which replaces do by any auxiliary verb t h a t immediately follows i t , consists of a tense and the f i r s t auxiliary verb (Chomsky's 'AUX' included all the auxiliary verbs, not just the f i r s t o n e ) . 1 7 They distinguish categories V3, V2, and V 1 , with V3 = (have) V2 and V1 = (be) V 1 , as in (5):

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

33

(5)

(deep s t r u c t u r e f o r Spanish, ASW, p. 22)

β/7/ could have been studying

Though ASW speak as if t h e i r V 3 , V 2 , V 1 conformed to the 'X-bar' conception of categories (with superscripts indicating the number of 'bars'), it does not f i t t h a t conception w e l l . As developed in Chomsky (1970) and Jackendoff (1977), the X-bar categories are supposed to exploit cross-categorial parallelisms (e.g. V 1 , N 1 , and A1 are to have parallel i n t e r ­ nal s t r u c t u r e , except t h a t the head is to be respectively a v e r b , a noun, or an adjective); however, t h e r e is nothing in the internal s t r u c t u r e of NP's whose role is remotely like that of the have or the be of ( 5 ) . Appearances to the con­ t r a r y , the 2 and 3 of ASW's analysis function not as bars in the X-bar category system but as a r b i t r a r y f e a t u r e s that distinguish t h r e e kinds of VP. Their analysis allows them to accept Ross's surface constituent structure (which has been widely rejected but never seriously disputed) while using p h r a s e - s t r u c t u r e rules to describe cooccurrence restrictions and at the same time avoiding multiple S's in the deep structures of 'simple' sentences. 1 8 As noted above, ASW o f f e r extensive arguments for their acceptance of a marked position on the issue of w h e t h e r transformations can a l t e r constituent s t r u c t u r e other than as a side e f f e c t of a change in constituent order. ASW's analysis seems to have been received favorably by those sympathetic to the AUX analysis and ASW portray t h e i r paper as a defense of Chomsky's general approach to auxiliaries, notwithstanding the quite substantial d i f f e r e n c e s between their analysis and Chomsky's.

34

McCawley:

Kuhnian

Paradigms and

Markedness

In this f r a g m e n t a r y and programmatic survey of how paradigms have influenced the f a t e of various proposed analyses of English auxiliary verbs, I have suggested t h a t the reception given to a l t e r n a t i v e s to a prestigious linguis­ tic analysis (one with the status of an exemplar) depends not so much on the e x t e n t to which it d i f f e r s f r o m t h a t analysis as on the e x t e n t to which the author pays costs that the community's paradigm assigns to the marked activ­ ity t h a t goes into the elaboration and justification of the a l t e r n a t i v e . identifying these costs and paying them is a simple m a t t e r where the marked activity is the acceptance of some proposition: the cost is acceptable arguments t h a t that proposition is t r u e , and one pays the cost by con­ structing such arguments. In cases where the marked activ­ ity consists in rejection of an accepted policy regarding goals or s t a n d a r d s , 1 9 t h e r e is generally no p r e d e t e r m i n e d price f o r the privilege of engaging in the activity. One can generally get away with a little bit of it by o f f e r i n g apolo­ gies of a sort (i.e. by begging an audience's indulgence for dealing with unconventional classes of data or reversing standard p r i o r i t i e s , e t c . ) , but one is in considerable danger of not receiving the audience's indulgence and being judged a crackpot by a t least p a r t of the audience. Paradoxically, while goals and standards are the parts of a paradigm f o r which a scientific community o f f e r s the most opposition to change, they are nonetheless highly changeable. Among the reasons for t h e i r changeability are (i) they are much more imperfectly learned by novices in the community than are theories and factual propositions and (ii) scientific communities normally have, and easily give rise t o , subcommunities t h a t have their own paradigms. Just as persons in general normally belong to several overlapping communities (e.g. a neighborhood, one's workmates, a church congregation, the clientele of a particular p u b ) , so too those engaged in research normally belong to several over­ lapping scientific communities. Being a member of, say, the Montague grammar community, in which relating syntactic structure to model-theoretic semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is a prime goal, does not prevent one from also being a member of a larger community of syntacticians in which such a goal either is not recognized at all or is accepted in a weakened form and assigned low priority. The institution t h a t contrib­ utes the most to the cohesiveness of large scientific com-

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

35

munities, namely open conferences, also contributes the most to the origination and growth of subcommunities of the larger community by enabling holders of unorthodox ideas to identify one another; and t h e r e are g u a r a n t e e d to be holders of unorthodox views on goals and standards in view of the i m p e r f e c t and haphazard way in which those parts of a paradigm are t r a n s m i t t e d . I have maintained (McCawley 1976) t h a t scientific revolutions most typically consist in the expansion of a subcommunity u n t i l , practically speaking, it coincides with the whole community. A more restricted kind of 'revolution' can also take place, in which a subcommunity remains recognizably a subcommunity but acquires the status of the source f o r expertise in a p a r t i c ­ ular subject a r e a , in which case those parts of the subcommunity's paradigm that relate specifically to t h a t area become parts of the larger community's paradigm. I will conclude with a b r i e f discussion of the point that goals, standards, and other non-propositional parts of a paradigm can never be chosen on a completely 'rational' basis. 2 0 The most t h a t one can say in support of a choice of goals, etc. f o r scientific activity is t h a t so far it has been productive enough to keep one satisfied. Such a j u d g e ­ ment rests on an inherently subjective evaluation (no m a t ­ t e r how impressive the results achieved by a scientific approach, the j u d g e m e n t t h a t they are sufficient grounds f o r satisfaction is subjective), carries no g u a r a n t e e that the claimed success will continue in the f u t u r e (scientists g e n ­ erally bet on approaches with what they judge to be good track records but have no grounds f o r certainty that the bet will pay o f f ) , and implies nothing about the possible achievements of a l t e r n a t i v e approaches (one has no reason to t r u s t anyone's guesses about the limitations of a l t e r n a ­ tive approaches t h a t have not in f a c t been developed very f a r ) . The diversity among subcommunities t h a t I see as an inevitable development within any large scientific community provides the larger community with a major asset: insurance t h a t the community will not march en masse down a blind alley. What I hope linguists will derive f r o m my discussion above of the relation of the various analyses to the t r a n s ­ formational community is an appreciation of the fact that the non-propositional components of paradigms influence profoundly how proposed analyses are received and t h a t an a t t e m p t to resolve disputes on a purely 'rational' basis is futile: the best that one can achieve is simply an

36

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

identification of the issues t h a t are implicated in the dis­ putes, which need not be the same issues t h a t the d i s p u ­ t a n t s see as i m p l i c a t e d . 2 1

ENDNOTES

1 By this t e r m , I r e f e r to the community of linguists that has evolved f r o m the group of transformational g r a m ­ marians who w e r e active at M.I.T. about 1960 (to cite the time and place at which any identifiable community of transformational grammarians can f i r s t be said to have existed), whose members typically trace t h e i r intellectual heritage to Chomsky's linguistic writings, read Linguistic Inquiry, regard the study of mathematical models as virtuous for a linguist (though not necessarily relevant to linguis­ tics), etc. Note t h a t the last sentence provides encyclopedic information about an existing community, not necessary or sufficient conditions f o r identifying members of t h a t com­ munity. Whether particular individuals belong to t h a t com­ munity is a question of sociology, not of linguistics. In p a r ­ ticular, acceptance of syntactic analyses that involve transformations is neither a necessary nor a sufficient con­ dition for membership in t h a t community. I use the word 'transformational' in the name as a makeshift, in the absence of any equally short but less misleading alternative name.

2

Note the restriction to publications internal to the com­ munity. Works t h a t are f o r e x t e r n a l consumption often present putative justifications of propositions t h a t would simply be t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d in works intended f o r con­ sumption within the community. 3

This proposition is one of several t h a t transformational grammarians commit themselves to by acceptance of the standard notations of transformational grammar: the s t a n ­ dard notation f o r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s expresses the 'structural change* as a change in word o r d e r , and thus if the notation expresses the e f f e c t of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n accurately, any change in constituent s t r u c t u r e must be a concomitant of a change in word order. The prevalence of such a belief is

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

37

probably the main reason why transformational grammarians have devoted remarkably little a t t e n t i o n to the study of 'derived constituent s t r u c t u r e ' . Reinhart (1976) appears to be the f i r s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l study t h a t seriously raised the possibility t h a t transformations having the same e f f e c t on word o r d e r might d i f f e r in their e f f e c t s on constituent s t r u c t u r e . The arguments by which Reinhart shows t h a t extraposition of complements (as in ( i ) ) but not that of relative clauses (as in ( i i ) ) moves the embedded S into the VP could have been given in the late 1960's, except that no one then thought of asking the question. i. ii.

It surprised me that John quit. A man e n t e r e d who was wearing a top hat.

4

Wells (1963: 45) cites another dispute over what is baby and what is b a t h w a t e r : 'This explains how the contro­ versy could go on as it did between the advocates of phonetic and the advocates of phonemic transcription: each transcription had an advantage, and its advocates prized t h a t advantage more than they prized the advantage of the opposite transcription'. It is interesting to note that Bloomf i e l d (1962: sec. 4.66) gave an exact analog to Halle's (1959) a r g u m e n t against the classical phonemic level, except that whereas Halle concluded t h a t a phonemic level should be r e j e c t e d , Bloomfield concluded t h a t a phonemic distinction should be recognized b e t w e e n segments that did not con­ t r a s t , so t h a t the a l t e r n a t i o n between them could be t r e a t e d as a single morphophonemic rule r a t h e r than split between a morphophonemic rule applying in one class of cases and an allophonic rule applying in a complementary class of cases. 5The fact t h a t a belief lacks empirical consequences does not imply t h a t holding it has no consequences tor empirical investigations t h a t one carries out. Such beliefs can have, f o r example, profound e f f e c t s on what one regards as meaningful questions or as potentially acceptable answers to one's questions, and thus indirectly on what facts one examines in a t t e m p t i n g to answer one's questions; this point is made in Collingwood (1939). 6

See McCawiey (1982a) f o r arguments t h a t several syn­ tactic constructions in English have properties t h a t require the recognition of discontinuous constituents.

38

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

7

'AUX' shares with 'Ms.' the distinction of looking like an abbreviation but not really being an abbreviation of any­ thing. Note in particular t h a t 'AUX' does not mean 'auxiliary' or 'auxiliary verb': a sequence of auxiliary verbs such as may have been is no more an auxiliary verb than a sequence of adverbs such as in El Paso last week with a chainsaw is an adverb. 8

For critical discussion of the notion of 'abbreviatory' devices in t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l g r a m m a r , see McCawley (1974). 9

See below for the reason r a t h e r ridiculous way in (3cii).

why

I

put

this

point

in

a

10

l have omitted f r o m (4) some details of Ross's t r e e s that have little bearing on the issues under discussion, e.g. Ross t r e a t e d complement S's as f i t t i n g not into an ΓNP S] configuration, as in (4a) but r a t h e r into a deep structure ΓNP it S] configuration. The only noteworthy characteristic of Ross's acceptance of those it's in the present context is that it illustrates Ross's general acceptance of 'standard' transformational analyses at t h a t t i m e , even in cases w h e r e , as h e r e , they had little to recommend t h e m . 11

In other work t h a t Ross had done at t h a t t i m e , he had also deviated from ( b ) , e.g. Ross (1967) gives arguments that phenomena such as the word order of VP constituents in English r e q u i r e an account involving 'surface constraints', that is, combinatoric rules f o r surface structure. Even t h e r e , though, Ross r e t a i n e d a modified version of ( b ) , namely a policy t h a t combinatoric rules r e l a t e d primarily to deep s t r u c t u r e , specifically, t h a t t h e r e was a completo sys­ tem of combinatorie rules for deep structure (the 'base rules') and possibly also a partial system of combinatorie rules for Surface structure (the 'surface constraints'), but t h a t surface. constraints wore to be admitted only where t h e r e was no satisfactory account that avoided them, 12

An exception must be made for two arguments in ld phenomena in other which Ross used facts about parae languages as evidence for his analysis of English. Despite the frequency with which transformational grammation since the mid 1960's have claimed language universais as part of their subject m a t t e r , it was not until the late

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

39

1970's that they showed much willingness to use cross-linguistic comparisons as a means of distinguishing the universal components of phenomena f r o m the l a n g u a g e - p a r ­ ticular components. 13

ROSS'S words h e r e , 'the problem of insuring t h a t the verbs in (1) are embedded into [sic] one another in the right order' indicate t h a t he took the combinatorics of a u x ­ iliary verbs to be basically a m a t t e r of deep s t r u c t u r e , as demanded by the weakened f o r m of (2b) that Ross retained (cf. note 11); that assumption is rejected in the account of the order of auxiliaries given in McCawley (1971). 14

ln an important respect, this restriction on the posi­ ting of deep s t r u c t u r e S's conflicted with the goal of orthodox transformational grammarians of developing a 'maximally restrictive theory*. The more t h a t distinctions are drawn in t e r m s of e x t r a levels of embedding, the more t h a t the cyclic principle determines the interactions of the r e l e ­ vant transformations and the less t h a t ordering of t r a n s ­ formations can be a d i f f e r e n c e among grammars. For e x a m ­ ple, orthodox t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammarians must order the passive transformation before 'Negative placement' to exclude derivations of sentences like / while allowing for derivations of sentences like ii: i. *John didn't be investigated by the FBI. ii. John wasn't investigated by the FBI. Under an analysis in which not and tenses are higher p r e d i ­ cates, t h a t interaction of the transformations follows from the cyclic principle and thus r e q u i r e s no special stipulation. 15

In my 1971 p a p e r , I said 'verb' r a t h e r than ' p r e d i ­ cate', in accordance with the conception of syntactic c a t ­ egory t h a t I accepted at t h a t time but have subsequently r e j e c t e d . See McCawley (1982b) for arguments against t h a t conception of category and f o r exposition of an a l t e r n a t i v e conception in which syntactic categories are merely summar­ ies of factors having potential influence on an item's syn­ tactic behavior, including its logical category and the p a r t of speech of its head. 16

While Ross (1969) ignored Chomsky's account of the order of auxiliary verbs, McCawley (1971) mounted a f r o n t a l

40

McCawley: Kuhnian Paradigms and

Markedness

attack on it. To my knowledge, the only mention of my paper in Chomsky's w r i t i n g s is a single sentence (Chomsky 1972: 160) t h a t cites 'McCawley's discussion of respects in which auxiliaries have a q u a n t i f i e r - l i k e structure' [sic] as support for the strained parallel that Chomsky draws between auxiliaries and d e t e r m i n e r s . 17While ASW do not t r e a t modal auxiliaries as verbs, they could do so by making quite minor changes in t h e i r rules. Pullum and Wilson (1977: 7 5 3 - 6 0 ) argue t h a t t h e r e is no n o n - a r b i t r a r y way of characterizing 'verb' t h a t will exclude modals while including all items t h a t are usually called verbs. 18 I strongly doubt the viability of ASW's mechanism for describing the distribution of auxiliary have and progressive be. ASW take contexts as d i f f e r i n g with regard to w h e t h e r a position is filled by S, by V3, by V 2 , or by V 1 ; for example, they account for the a p p a r e n t fact t h a t progressive be but not auxiliary have can head the complement of make by say­ ing that make t a k e s a V2 complement: i. We made Bill [V2 be working at 4 : 0 0 ] . iL *We made Bill [V2 have finished the job by 4:00]. However, t h e r e are contexts t h a t exclude have but r e q u i r e on other grounds t h a t a deep structure S be recognized, e.g. since the support f o r the existential there of /V is p r o ­ vided by be riots, an embedded S there are riots must be posited (with Raising breaking up the posited S): iii. *John sarted having e a t e n already by 6:00. iv. There s t a r t e d being riots. If one excludes have by saying t h a t start r e q u i r e s a V2 com­ plement, one prevents the complement f r o m being an S, and if one allows the complement to be an S, one must rely on something other than the category of the comple­ ment to exclude the have. Whatever device is used to exclude have from a sentential complement of start could presumably also be invoked to exclude it from a sentential complement of progressive be.

19

The point being made here applies equally well to deviant raising of standards as to deviant lowering of s t a n ­ dards. Note also t h a t lowering of standards may be a con­ comitant of a broadening of the class of data t h a t are considered. For example, Feyerabend (1975: 121-39) points

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

41

out t h a t , by the then c u r r e n t standards, Galileo's i n t r o d u c ­ tion of telescopic observations into the astronomical debate brought in data t h a t w e r e t a i n t e d by illusions and not open to the sources of correction t h a t w e r e available f o r other optical d a t a . 20 I disavow the common practise of using the t e r m ' r a ­ tional' the way t h a t racists use the t e r m 'white', t h a t is, of t r e a t i n g any activity as polluted if it is less than 100% r a t i o n a l . I r e g a r d it as dangerous self-deception for one to supply a supposed 'rational basis' f o r choices t h a t inherently involve n o n - r a t i o n a l components, such as the selections and ranking of goals.

21 Only a f t e r completing a d r a f t of this paper did I reread Rulon Wells' "Some neglected opportunities in descriptive linguistics", hazy memories of which popped into my mind while I was working on the paper. I am so struck with how much of "Some neglected opportunities" is r e l e ­ vant to points t h a t I make here t h a t I now wonder whether I unknowingly d r e w f r o m it several ideas t h a t I have d e v e l ­ oped in my work on linguistics and the history of linguistic ideas. For example, Prof. Wells' comments on the acceptance of the whole t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l 'package' because of the attractiveness of one component of it (Wells 1963: 49) are remarkably like what I said (McCawley 1982b) about the acceptance of Chomskyan 'extended standard theory' in the early 1970's. If it was f r o m "Some neglected opportunities" that I learned to judge linguistic ideas separately f r o m the packages t h a t they generally come as components o f , I owe Rulon Wells an expression of deep g r a t i t u d e , though I must hang my head in shame f o r having f a i l e d to learn it when I f i r s t read "Some neglected opportunities" in the mid 1960's.

REFERENCES CITED

Akmajian, Adrian, Susan S t e e l e , and Tom Wasow. 1979. "The category AUX in universal grammar." Linguistic Inquiry 10.1-64.

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Markedness

Akinajian, Adrian, and Tom Wasow. 1975. "The constituent structure of VP and AUX and the position of the verb b e . " Linguistic Analysis 1.205-45. Bloomfield, Leonard. 1962. The Menomini Language. New Maven: Yale University Press. Chomsky, Noam A. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: M o u ­ ton. 1970. "Remarks on nominalization." In R. Jacobs and P. Rosenbaum ( e d s . ) , Readings in English Transfor­ mational Grammar (Waltham: Ginn) 1 8 4 - 2 2 1 . 1972. "Some empirical issues in the theory of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar." In N. Chomsky, Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar 120-202. The Hague: Mouton. CoHingwood, R. J. 1939. Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Emonds, Joseph E. 1970. Root and Structure-preserving Transfor­ mations. MIT Ph.D. thesis. 1976. A Transformational Approach to English Syntax. New York: Academic Press. Feyerabend, Paul. 1975. Against Method. London: New Left Books. Halle, M o r r i s . 1959. The Sound Pattern of Russian. The Hague: Mouton. Jackendoff, Ray S. 1977. X-bar Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chi­ cago: University of Chicago Press. 1970. Postscript to 2nd Edition of Kuhn (1962). 1974. "Second thoughts on paradigms." In F. Suppe (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 459-82. Reprinted in T. Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 293-319. McCawley, James D. 1971. "Tense and time r e f e r e n c e in English." In  Fillmore and D. T. Langendoen (eds.) Studies in Linguistic Semantics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), 9 6 - 1 1 3 . 1974. "Review of Chomsky and Halle, The Sound Pattern of English." International Journal of American Lin­ guistics 4 0 . 5 5 - 8 8 . 1976. "¡Madison Avenue, si, Pennsylvania Avenue, no!" In P. Reich (ed.), The Second LACUS Forum (Columbia, SC: Hornbeam Press), 17-28.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

43

1980a. "Review of Newmeyer, Linguistic Theory in America. " Lin gaieties 18. 9 1 1 - 3 0 . 1980b. " l e t t e r . · · Linguistics 18.1099-1104. 1982a. " Parentheticals and discontinuous constitu­ e n t structure." Linguistic Inquiry 13.91-106. 1982b. "The nonexistence of syntactic categories." In J. McCawley, Thirty Million Theories of Grammar 176-203. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pullum, 6 e o f f r e y , and Deirdre Wilson. 1977. "Autonomous syntax and the analysis of auxiliaries." Language 53.741-88. Reinhart, Tanya. 1976. The Syntactic Domain of Anaphora. MIT Ph. D. thesis. Rosenbaum, Peter S. 1965. The Syntax of English Predicate Complement Constructions. MIT Ph. D. thesis. Ross, John Robert. 1967. Constraints on Variables in Syntax. MIT Ph. D. thesis. 1969. "Auxiliaries as main verbs." Journal of Philo­ sophical Linguistics 1.77-102. S t e e l e , Susan. 1981. An Encyclopedia of AUX. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wells, Rulon S. 1963. "Some neglected opportunities in descriptive linguistics." Anthropological Linguistics 6.38-49.

A HIERARCHY IN CONCEPTUAL SPACE

John Robert Ross, M.I.T. and the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft Institut f ü r Psycholinguistik George Lakoff and Mark Johnson show, in a recent book [ L a k o f f and Johnson ( 1 9 8 0 ) ] , how humans spatialize many concepts. That is, we speak of abstract things, such as health, quality, time and dominance, in terms of space. To talk of one thing in t e r m s of another is to make metaphor, to borrow a f r a m e . Lakoff and Johnson show how, f o r instance, emotions are r e l a t e d to the three-dimensional spatial f r a m e w o r k , in p a r t i c u l a r , to the most salient of the t h r e e dimensions, namely height. [An a r g u m e n t f o r the primacy of the vertical dimension is given in Cooper and Ross (1975)]. Four reflections of it are the fact that we say vertical and horizontal, not the reverse; the fact t h a t we say North, South, East and West [ t h a t is, the vertically relevant compass points must precede the horizontally oriented o n e s ] ; the fact t h a t we say the top right corner of the cube, not "the right top corner of the cube; and the fact t h a t we say high, wide and handsome, not *wide, high and handsome. To put it in the quasi-axio­ matic f o r m t h a t Lakoff and Johnson use, (1) a. b.

HAPPY IS UP Examples: His spirits rose/fell.

Alice is on Cloud 9/ down in the dumps. Tell Sam a joke - that'll give him a lift.

They suggest t h a t t h e r e is in this case, as in many others, a physical, experiential basis f o r ( 1 a ) , namely ( 2 ) :

46

Ross: Hierarchy in Conceptual Space

(2) When we are happy, we walk t a l l e r , stand more e r e c t , do not lower our gaze. When we are sad, we droop or slump. Three f u r t h e r examples of t h e i r s are in ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , and (5). (3) a. b.

c.

MORE IS UP Examples: The number of whooping cranes in Kazakhistan went up/down (rose/fell). There is an overabundance /undersupply of electric can openers. Experiential basis: the more in a pile, the higher up the top will be.

(4) a. b.

HEALTHY IS UP You are in top shape/at the peak of health. Sandy fell sick. I came down with a cold. That virus really felled me. c. Experiential basis: when we are sick, we lie down. When plants are sick, they droop. (5) a. b.

c.

GOOD IS UP Examples: The quality of disco music in Monaco is on the rise/declining. The value of a liberal education is at an all-time high/low. Experiential basis: if we are happy and healthy and have more, we judge that as good. Since HAPPY and HEALTHY and MORE are UP, GOOD must also be.

Lakoff and Johnson show how certain values in our culture are consequences of some of these metaphors, t h a t these values are coherent with the metaphors. They state (p. 22) "MORE IS BETTER is coherent with MORE IS UP and GOOD IS UP. LESS IS BETTER would not be coherent with them". Though they do not state a formal scheme f o r inferences, it is clear t h a t t h e r e is one implicit in system. We might suggest (6) as a f i r s t approximation. (6) a.

such their

If t h e r e is a metaphor A IS X and another m e t a ­ phor  IS X, then we can f o r m a new metaphor (or

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

b.

possibly value, if metaphors) A 15 B. Formally, A IS X  IS X

values

are

different

47 from

A IS  However, t h e r e is a problem t h a t Lakoff and Johnson do not address: why do we say MORE IS BETTER, not *BETTER IS MORE? The scheme in (6) is symmetrical, so both of these could be deduced. The purpose of this note is to suggest that we need a t h i r d premise to add to (6) to make the conclusion follow. We need to be able to mark A and  with respect to their basicness, or with respect to t h e i r conceptual distance f r o m X. if A is more basic than  (I will w r i t e 'A -+ B' f o r this) then we can replace (6b) with ( 7 a ) , with (7b) being an i n s t a n t i ­ ation of it. (7) a. i. ii. iii.

A IS X  IS X A →-  A IS 

b. iii. iii.

MORE IS UP GOOD IS UP MORE - GOOD MORE IS GOOD

The question t h a t immediately arises is: can we establish inequalities like (7b iii)? suggest a f e w ways.

on what basis Below, I will

Since the basic "X" in all of the metaphors of Lakoff and Johnson t h a t I have discussed thus f a r is the primary spatial dimension, namely UP, let us say t h a t (8) A is more basic than  if A is more directly linked to space in experience than B, whether this linkage is causal, or per­ ceptual, or has some other basis. Some examples:

48

Ross: Hierarchy in Conceptual Space

(9) a. HEALTHY → HAPPY b. Experiential basis: SICK causes DOWN more directly than SAD causes DOWN. That is, it is easier to p r e ­ t e n d to be happy, and walk e r e c t , than it is to p r e ­ t e n d to be healthy. Thus health happiness. (10) a. b.

is more

immediately

linked to space than

is

MORE → HEALTHY Experiential basis: LESS causes DOWN even more directly than SICK causes DOWN. While we (some­ times) can, with a g r e a t e f f o r t of w i l l , OVERcome our f l u and get UP, pretending h e a l t h , t h e r e is no way for a stack of 5 plates to p r e t e n d to be t a l l e r than a stack of 10 plates. In other words, while HEALTH is [to an e x t e n t t h a t is little r e a l ­ ized in our medicine] dependent on mental a t t i ­ tudes, the HEIGHT of a pile of non-sentient objects is not.

Summing up, archy in (11).

then,

we

can

construct

the

partial

hier­

(11) UP → MORE → HEALTHY → HAPPY So f a r , the linkage has always been a causal one, with terms to the right in (11) causing t e r m s to the l e f t . Thus MORE causes UP, and HEALTHY causes UP (slightly less d i r e c t l y ) , and HAPPY causes UP the least directly of all. But so f a r , we have only linked UP other terms in (11). What happens when we the causal connections between the other more congruent with our view of the w o r l d , (12) a. b.

HEALTHY causes HAPPY happiness. J HAPPY causes HEALTHY health.]

[(Good)

causally to the t r y to establish terms? Which is (12a) or (12b)?

health

[Happiness

causes/brings causes /??brings

It seems s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t (12a) is congruent with our view, while (12b) is not. Ours is a materialistic philosophy; we value t h a t which is tangible. There are a number of

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

49

uses of terms taken f r o m the realm of physical objects which have metaphorical uses f o r the realm of value j u d g e ­ ments: (13) a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.

That is a solid a r g u m e n t . That matters. I have objective proof. What you say is not material f o r the issue discussing. They gave some flimsy excuse. Cadwallader is a real intellectual light-weight. The weight of her arguments is considerable. Heavy !

we

are

Let us examine the experientially valid causal connec­ tions between two more t e r m s in ( 1 4 ) , MORE and HAPPY. (14) a. b.

MORE causes HAPPY HAPPY causes MORE

Here it is even more clear which of these implications our culture favors - - (14a) is almost an axiom of a society in which materialistic concerns p r e d o m i n a t e ; (14b) is c e r ­ tainly not what the person in the s t r e e t would subscribe to. Thus it seems t h a t we have a curious asymmetry in the hierarchy in ( 1 4 ) , which I will r e p r e s e n t somewhat more abstractly as in (15). (15) UP → A1 → A2 → A3 → An The asymmetry can be seen in (16c) below: (16) a. b. 

For all Α., A. causes UP. For all Α i , Aj, if i < j in ( 1 5 ) , then A. causes UP more directly than A. causes UP. However, if i < j , then Aj causes A. is more c o n ­ g r u e n t with cultural beliefs and world view than is Aj causes Α..

At p r e s e n t , I do not understand well enough w h a t the implications of such hierarchies as (11) and (15) are to be able to explain why (16c) should exhibit such a puzzling reversal, but I will assume t e n t a t i v e l y in what follows t h a t

50

Ross: Hierarchy in Conceptual Space

it is correct, and make use of it to expand (11) by blending in a f e w more t e r m s . Let

us f i r s t

consider

BIG. Comparing

the

implications

in

(17), (17) a. b.

BIG causes UP [Size causes height] UP causes BIG [Height causes size]

we see t h a t (17a) is the correct one. For example, birds can be high u p , but not big. It would seem, t h e n , t h a t UP is to be i n t e r p r e t e d simply as a location. Maybe the basis f o r UP is t h a t shown in (18). (18) A point in space is UP if it is located above e y e - l e v e l . Whether or not (18) is t r u e , (17) would suggest t h a t BIG must be less basic than UP. What t h e n is the relationship of BIG to the next t e r m in ( 1 9 ) , namely MORE? Here it is harder to make a decision, but possibly the following considerations are r e l e v a n t . First of a l l , it seems to me t h a t of the two implications in ( 1 9 ) , (19) a.

MORE causes BIG

b.

BIG causes MORE

[The number of piates on the pile causes its tallness. ] [?? The tallness of that pile of plates causes the number of plates in it. ]

it is clear that (19a) is the correct one. From number, we can i n f e r size, but obviously not the r e v e r s e , because there are tall things, like t r e e s and t o w e r s , which are units. F u r t h e r m o r e , if it is correct to link the concept of basicness t h a t is r e l a t e d to space as in (8) with the type of c e n t r a l i t y t h a t Cooper and I w e r e studying the e f f e c t s of (cf. Cooper and Ross ( 1 9 7 5 ) ) , t h e n the following ordering asymmetries also argue t h a t MORE → BIG. (20) a. b.

Please ladders ?? Please ladders

tell me the number and size t h a t you need. t e l l me the size and number t h a t you need.

of

the

of

the

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells Note t h a t on order blanks, q u a n t i t y description, which l a t t e r includes size.

is to

51 the

left

of

(21)

In t e r m s of prenominai ordering in noun phrases, which Cooper and I argued is relevant to c e n t r a l i t y , the facts are very clear: (22) a. b.

many big cars. * * b i g many cars.

Finally, another reflection of the causal connection between number and size is the ordinariness of ( 2 3 a ) , as opposed to the strangeness of (23b). (23) a. b.

The more, the t a l l e r . ? The t a l l e r , the more.

All of these considerations lead correct relationship of these t h r e e (24).

me to think t h a t the t e r m s is as shown in

(2A) UP → MORE → BIG Presumably, BIG should be to the l e f t of HEALTHY, because of the ordering asymmetries in (25) and (26): (25) a. b.

a big healthy colt. ??a healthy big colt.

(26) a.

Brutus' size and health excellent lumberjack. ? Brutus' health and size excellent lumberjack.

b.

will

make

him

an

will

make

him

an

52

Ross: Hierarchy in Conceptual Space

Finally, it is clear t h a t size is directly spatial, while health is only i n f e r e n t i a l l y so. Thus we can conclude t h a t the t e r m s mentioned so f a r should be a r r a n g e d as shown in (27). (27) UP

-

MORE → BIG → HEALTHY → HAPPY

Two f u r t h e r pieces of evidence f o r HEALTHY → HAPPY, in addition to the directness of the causal link to space that was cited in ( 9 b ) , follow f r o m the asymmetries in (28) and ( 2 9 ) . (28) a. b.

a healthy, happy t w o - y e a r old. ? a happy, healthy t w o - y e a r old.

(29) a. b.

Health and happiness! ?? Happiness and health!

Since the relation '→' is t r a n s i t i v e , HAPPY, a prediction borne out by the asymmetries: (30) a. b.

we expect BIG → following ordering

a big happy family ? * a happy big family

I am g r a t e f u l to Rulon Wells, my f i r s t teacher of semantics, for showing me how someone could be both a linguist and a philosopher. He was doing work on meaning at a time w h e n , as a German linguist once said to me, in 1960, Americans w e r e bedeutungsfeindlich [= meaning - hos­ tile]. In my own recent work, I have come to f e e l , increas­ ingly, the importance of the study of meaning, not only within linguistics, but also as a bridge b e t w e e n us and related fields. So, for your pioneering the legitimizing of semantics, which contributed to making this paper possible, I thank you, Rulon.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

53

REFERENCES CITED

Cooper, William E. and John Robert Ross. 1975. "World order" in Functionalism: Proceedings of the Parasession on Functionalism, edited by Grossman e t a l , Chicago Linguistic Society, University of Chicago, Chicago, I l l i ­ nois. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Uve By, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wells, Rulon. "Immediate constituents." Reprinted in M a r t i n Joos ( e d . ) , Readings in Linguistics.

IMPERFECT MODELS AND THEIR USES

Fred J. Damerau IBM Corporation Introduction A curious thing about linguistics over the last 25 years or so is the almost exclusive concentration of many of its leading practitioners on linguistic theory, to the exclusion of practically anything else. This certainly contrasts with the situation in most other areas of science, where a consider­ able amount of experimental work goes on along with t h e o ­ retical development. Moreover, linguistic theories go out of fashion with amazing speed, to the point where adherents of the leading schools of thought must have well-developed channels for monitoring ongoing research, since anything published in the normal journals is likely to be already obsolete. This, t o o , is in contrast to other fields of science, which seem, to the outsider at least, to change less rapidly (and less radically). In a d d i t i o n , theories in fields other than linguistics which are known to be wrong or incomplete in some respects are still in active use as models f o r r e a l ­ ity, so long as t h e i r defects a r e not p e r t i n e n t to the study at hand. As a somewhat extreme example, Euclidean plane geometry is still used as a world model by local surveyors, although it is well known to be a poor model of the cos­ mos. It appears to be less well known that linguistic models long since abandoned by theoreticians are still used by practically oriented researchers. Such uses, where known, t e n d to be dismissed as uninteresting or i r r e l e v a n t by a large body of linguists. While state of with how certainly

t h e r e are probably a number of reasons f o r this a f f a i r s , it appears t h a t the main one has to do linguists conceive the goals of their study. There has been a substantial shift over the years in

56

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

thinking as to the nature of such goals. In Syntactic Structures (Chomsky, 1957:52), we f i n d "The point of view adopted here is t h a t it is unreasonable to demand of a l i n ­ guistic theory t h a t it provide anything more than a practical evaluation procedure for g r a m m a r s " , as contrasted to the structuralist search f o r discovery procedures. A c u r r e n t view is given in Chomsky (1980:2): "The task for linguistic theory is to discover the t r u e n a t u r e of the biological endowment t h a t specifies the general structure of the language f a c ­ ulty." Naturally, not every linguist subscribes to such a m b i ­ tious goals, and some t h a t did no longer do - "These goals w e r e based on assumptions t h a t seemed reasonable then to many people (including m e ) , but which with the hindsight of t w e n t y years of linguistics research now seem g r a t u i t o u s , or implausible, or downright wrongheaded. Among them is the assumption t h a t phrase structure rules and transformations are the right kinds of devices f o r characterizing linguistic rules." (Lakoff, 1978:274). Clearly, if one is interested in the n a t u r e of the language faculty, or any such global con­ c e r n , devices and theories which can be shown to be insuf­ ficiently p o w e r f u l , o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , overly g e n e r a l , are of little theoretical interest. However, not everyone is so ambitious. Some are concerned w i t h devising a w r i t i n g sys­ tem for a language with no w r i t t e n t r a d i t i o n , or teaching someone a new language, or, as will be discussed below, incorporating a linguistic capability in some sort of mechan­ ical device. For such uses, it may well be t h a t a model known to be imperfect for very general reasons is still suitable f o r the task at hand. The remainder of this paper illustrates the kinds of practical use to which linguistic theories have been p u t , mostly but not always by non-linguists. I concentrate on syntactic models and t h e o r i e s , although in some cases the work to be discussed will have a semantic component as w e l l . In a d d i t i o n , I limit the discussion to work which a t t e m p t s to provide a n a t u r a l language capability f o r a computer-based system, in p a r t because the n a t u r e of com­ putation r e q u i r e s that models be specified completely and exactly. (It is of course t r u e t h a t any model for a given computer can be t r a n s f o r m e d into a f i n i t e state model, because of the limited memory available to any real com­ p u t e r system. However, memories for existing computers are already so large t h a t this is only a theoretical possibility.)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells Finite State

57

Models

A f i n i t e state model can be characterized by a machine with a defined set of internal states, a defined set of state-to-state transitions, and a d e f i n e d alphabet, one symbol of which is e m i t t e d at each state t r a n s i t i o n . If a probability measure is defined for the state transitions, we have a f i n i t e state Markov source. A Markov source for which the states are identified with the preceding  e m i t ­ ted symbols is a k-limited source, a n d , if the symbols are l e t t e r s or words of a language L, the source is said to g e n e r a t e  + 1 - o r d e r approximations of L ( M i l l e r and Chomsky, 1963:427). The f i r s t example of such a system was given by Shannon, a mathematician (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). It was discussed as a linguistic model (Hockett, 1955) and then more or less dismissed by linguists when the transformational movement began to take hold, following criticism by Chomsky and others ( M i l l e r and Chomsky, 1963, but see Damerau, 1971). The arguments adduced against the model had to do with the possibility of infinite center embedding, leading to unbounded dependencies, and with learnability by children of a model with many states. While counter arguments can be made, a more serious problem with the model has to do with its inability to characterize relationships which appear to be linguistic in character. That is, t h e r e is nothing intrinsic to the Markov model which explicates the relationship between actives and passives, for example. In g e n e r a l , it is hard to see how one would define a compact semantics on top of a syntax which provides as little structure as a Markov model. Although defining a formal semantics for a Markov model might be d i f f i c u l t , reflection reveals t h a t the states and transition probabilities of such a model are determined in part by semantic as well as syntactic restrictions. This f a c t , coupled with the reduction in the size of the state space which can be achieved by restricting the domain of discourse to some coherent domain, has made the Markov model one of the candidates for implementing computer systems which transcribe speech automatically. Two of the most successful speech recognition systems developed to date employ a Markov model as an integral part of the recognition system.

58

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

In the early 1970's, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense f u n d e d a number of contractors to develop a speech understanding system capable of recognizing continuous speech from a vocabulary of 1000 words from more than one speaker. One of the contractors, Carnegie-Mellon University, developed a system called HARPY which met the goals laid out initially. No other system was able to do t h a t by the time of project t e r m i n a t i o n , although others f e l t t h a t they would have been able to if the time had been e x t e n d e d . This should not be taken to mean that the problem of automatic speech ARPA understanding has been solved; HARPY met the r e q u i r e m e n t s by severely constraining the task domain and the complexity of the language it was able to recognize. The developers of HARPY built a large f i n i t e state network incorporating all legal pronunciations of all the permissible sentences in their restricted language, and then found a best match between the incoming acoustic signal and a path through the network. The language which HARPY recognized had to do with retrieving documents from a file of news stories, e.g., "How many articles on psychology are there?" ( L o w e r r e , 1976). Many criticisms of the HARPY system have been made, some focusing on the choice of a Markov model r a t h e r than something more p o w e r f u l . However, it would appear t h a t the developers of HARPY, knowing the l i m i t a ­ tions of the model they chose to work w i t h , understood what was necessary to achieve the goals set f o r t h by ARPA. A large e f f o r t in speech recognition has been underway for some years at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Labora­ tory. This project aims to develop a speech transcription device, i.e., an automated t y p e w r i t e r . This system has an acoustic processor, which produces a string of phonetic symbols, and a linguistic decoder, which r e q u i r e s a probabi­ listic model of the t e x t g e n e r a t o r , r e f e r r e d to as the l a n ­ guage model. To quote Jelinek et al. ( 1 9 8 0 ) , "Linguistics has not progressed to the point t h a t it can provide a use­ ful grammar for a sizable subset of English. In addition, the interest in linguistics has been in specifying the s e n ­ tences of a language but not t h e i r probabilities. Our approach has been to model the t e x t g e n e r a t o r as a Markov source, the p a r a m e t e r s of which are estimated from a large sample of text." The t e x t in this case is a corpus of about 1.5 million words in the domain of laser patents. The word error rate for the IBM system on the laser patent

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

5?

recognition task is just under 10 percent. An example of the results f r o m this system are given in Figure 1 , (Bahl, e t a l . , 1980, p. 874). The same system applied to the CMU task described previously has a word e r r o r r a t e of a p p r o x i -

Spoken: Suitable mounting means are a r t and are t h e r e f o r e not shown.

well

known

in

the

Decoded: Suitable mounting means are a r t and are t h e r e f o r e not shown.

well

known

in

the

Spoken: The above. Decoded: above.

The

maser

maser

action

that

results has been

explained

results as been

explained

action t h a t

Spoken: The particular reflective coatings on the mirrors may be silver or other suitable material f o r example dielectric coatings. Decoded: The particular reflective coatings on the mirrors may be silver ed or other suitable material for example by electric coating.

Examples of speech recognition using a Markov model (Trigram

approximation)

Figure 1

mately .1 percent. The d i f f e r e n c e in the e r r o r r a t e is accounted f o r by the inherently more d i f f i c u l t language used in the laser p a t e n t t e x t ; t h e r e are more possibilities as successors f o r each word in the laser p a t e n t t e x t than t h e r e are in the r e t r i e v a l language used in the CMU e x p e r ­ iment.

60

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

One cannot know if speech recognition systems, when they become widely available, will employ probabilistic M a r ­ kov models as their linguistic component. Still, a model which was dismissed as uninteresting and i r r e l e v a n t more than t w e n t y years previous is still in use as a component in a major area of research. It is possible t h a t f i n i t e state models may yet be revived as a m a t t e r of interest to theoretically inclined linguists. An MIT master's thesis (Church 1980) has proposed t h a t a f i n i t e state machine, while demonstrably deficient as a model of linguistic competence, might serve as a p e r s p i ­ cuous model of linguistic performance. Church has designed a parser t h a t "approximates" competence by severely l i m i t ­ ing short t e r m memory (thereby restricting the device to a f i n i t e state machine). The parser encodes a competence model resembling the lexicalist position of Bresnan and Kaplan, e.g. Bresnan (1980). The i n t e n t was to design a parser which would " f a i l precisely where the idealizations require unrealistic resources" (Church, 1980:135). "Although there are many unsolved problems . . . we have d e m o n ­ strated plausibility for the underlying design which incorpo­ rates both performance (FS and determinism) and compe­ tence (Bresnan-Kaplan's lexical framework)" (Church, 1980:139).

Context-free

Models

In the late f i f t i e s and early sixties, in the course of defending his conception of linguistic theory, Chomsky a t t e m p t e d to formalize the models with which linguists w e r e then working. His formalization of the immediate constituent model was called a phrase structure grammar, and came in two v a r i e t i e s , context free and context sensitive. Postal (1964) made the strong claim t h a t , f o r the most p a r t , work done on immediate constituent analysis and on syntax in general was in fact capable of being modeled by a c o n t e x t - f r e e grammar. A number of linguists objected to t h a t c h a r a c t e r i ­ zation, e.g., (Harman 1963), but it was widely accepted. In a sense, such a characterization was u n f a i r , in t h a t the structuralists working within the immediate constituent model probably did not expect as much from immediate constituent analysis of a sentence as the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l ­ ists did. Thus, in discussing the sentences

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

61

"John is easy to please" (3) "John is eager to please" (4) Chomsky (1964:66) says "To achieve the level of descriptive adequacy, however, a grammar would have to assign struc­ t u r a l descriptions indicating that John in (3) is the direct object of please . . . , while in (4) it is the logical subject of please . . . A theory which does not allow structural descriptions of this sort cannot achieve the level of descriptive adequacy." Similarly, Postal (1964:137) says "A grammar has thus two tasks: it must e n u m e r a t e each s e n ­ tence and no nonsentence, and it must associate with each sentence a grammatical analysis which can provide the kind of grammatical information needed to explain examples of the types j u s t i l l u s t r a t e d , as well as many others. A g r a m ­ mar which g e n e r a t e s sentences without providing them with structural descriptions is of no real linguistic interest". Certainly it was not very clear in an I model how the two sentences cited by Chomsky w e r e to be r e l a t e d , but it is doubtful that the immediate constituent model was ever intended to provide that kind of information (although one can argue t h a t it should have). It is a more serious m a t t e r f o r c o n t e x t - f r e e models to be shown incapable of g e n e r a t i n g the set of grammatical sentences of a language. Postal (1964) argued t h a t a CF model f o r Mohawk is impossible. His a r g u m e n t in t h a t paper is d e f i c i e n t , although Langendoen (1977) has given a valid proof, providing the Mohawk facts are as claimed. The f a c t s , however, have been challenged by Pullum and Gazdar (1981). Assuming Langendoen and Postal are r i g h t , contextf r e e models are insufficient as a model f o r human language even in terms of the weakest r e q u i r e m e n t which can be made of a model. Theoretically o r i e n t e d linguists f o r the most p a r t abandoned work based on models which could be shown to be equivalent to a c o n t e x t - f r e e model f o r a con­ siderable period, although they are now coming back in vogue (see below). Once a g a i n , however, computer scientists and others interested in language have found uses f o r con­ t e x t - f r e e models. It happens t h a t the parsing problem, i.e., determining the constituent structure of a sentence given a g r a m m a r , is a computationally much more tractable problem for context-free grammars than determining sentence structure with respect to a transformational grammar, f o r example. C o n t e x t - f r e e parsing algorithms are well u n d e r -

62

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

stood and known to have polynomial time complexity (in fact known to have a time complexity proportional to n-cubed, where η is the length of the input sentence). A g r e a t many experimental n a t u r a l language processing systems have been based on c o n t e x t - f r e e grammars. Three examples follow. Many feel t h a t computer-based systems should be of g r e a t assistance in certain kinds of teaching environments. One group of researchers ( B r o w n , et a l . , 1974) built a sys­ t e m called SOPHIE for teaching electronic troubleshooting by having a computer simulate a f a u l t e d circuit, r a t h e r than using expensive and fragile h a r d w a r e . To make this system easy to use, they a t t e m p t e d to provide a capability for s t u ­ dents to communicate with the machine by typing questions and comments in normal English. Because the domain of discourse was so r e s t r i c t e d , i.e., to the discussion of a s i n ­ gle circuit, they f e l t t h a t it would be possible to provide good coverage using a c o n t e x t - f r e e g r a m m a r , through the device of " . . . r e f i n i n g the usual syntactic categories such as noun phrase into relevant semantic/conceptual categories such as 'measurement'. . . . These and other considerations led us to build a highly e f f i c i e n t . . . c o n t e x t - f r e e parser which makes its predictions on the basis of semantic r a t h e r than syntactic categories." ( B r o w n , et a l . , 1974:24). "A point has now been reached in which (the system) handles nearly all sentences g e n e r a t e d by users who have had at least one prior session . . ." ( B r o w n , e t a l . 1974:26). The developers restricted the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of ambiguities which generally results from a large c o n t e x t - f r e e grammar by incorporating what amount to selectional restrictions into the names of the word classes. Staying within the confines of a contextf r e e grammar allowed them to use the e f f i c i e n t parsing techniques which have been developed f o r such grammars, and so limit t h e i r use of expensive computer t i m e . Examples of sentences understood by the system, i.e., sentences for which the system took appropriate action, are shown in Fig­ ure 2. The experiment as a whole was generally classed as successful. A very similar tack was t a k e n by another of the projects in speech recognition, this one called HEARSAY-!!. "Syntactic and semantic knowledge in SASS is supplied by a task-specific semantic t e m p l a t e g r a m m a r , which can be characterized as a c o n t e x t - f r e e grammar w i t h ambiguity and recursion p e r m i t t e d . The t e m p l a t e s (nonterminals) of the

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

63

What is the voltage across the base e m i t t e r junction of c u r r e n t limiting transistor?

the

What is the VBE of Q6? What is the voltage between node 1 and the positive t e r m i ­ nal of C6? In a working circuit what power r e f e r e n c e transistor?

is

the

output

voltage

of

the

T u r n up the voltage control. Suppose the BE junction of Q6 is shorted.

Examples of sentences which SOPHIE " u n d e r s t a n d s " , responds to appropriately.

i.e.,

Figure 2

grammar are sequences and categories representing sets of phrases in the task language. Although the grammar is a context-free grammar in f o r m , as are general English phrase structure grammars, there is an important d i f f e r ­ ence in the spirit in which this f o r m is used. A semantic template represents a set of semantically equivalent (or similar) phrases. In contrast, a nonterminal in a general phrase structure grammar represents a set of phrases which can have the same syntactic role (e.g. noun phrase) but are otherwise u n r e l a t e d . . . . Thus a semantic template g r a m ­ mar imposes considerably more constraint on the phrases it accepts." (Hayes-Roth, e t a l . , 1978:19). Since the problem addressed by this system was speech recognition, in which the correct sequence of words must be selected f r o m a large set of possibilities, it was particularly important to maximally limit the set of sequences to be recognized to those which w e r e reasonable within the domain. On the same task used f o r the HARPY system (see above) HEARSAY-II

64

Damerau: I m p e r f e c t Models and Their Uses

had an e r r o r task, 26%.

r a t e of 9%, and on a somewhat more

difficult

Because the c o n t e x t - f r e e parsing problem is very well understood, it is sometimes advantageous to restrict the problem domain, as above, or take some other action so as to be able to use these algorithms for sentence analysis in contexts t h a t might seem i n a p p r o p r i a t e . Hendrix et a l . , (1978) describe a system designed to let a decision maker, rather than a technician, query a data base by allowing the use of English instead of a s t r u c t u r e d query language. The data base had to do with naval m a t t e r s , and the system was to allow such queries as "What is the length of the Kennedy?". This is a larger domain than t h a t described e a r ­ lier for electronic trouble shooting, and r e q u i r e d more i n t e r p r e t i v e ability. The parser used is called LIFER. "LIFER application languages are specified by augmented c o n t e x t - f r e e grammars. Each rule in the grammar . . . includes a c o n t e x t - f r e e production, plus an arbitrarily complex response expression, which is the ' a u g m e n t a ­ tion'. Although a purely c o n t e x t - f r e e system would severely restrict the set of ( n o n f i n i t e ) languages that LIFER could accept, the use of augmentation gives LIFER the power of a Turing machine. . . . In other words, the class of languages for which LIFER was designed may be characterized as those allow­ ing much of t h e i r structure to be d e f i n e d by context-free rules but requiring occasional augmentation. It has been our experience t h a t much of the subset of English used f o r asking questions about a command and control data base falls in this class." (Hendrix et al. 1978:129). This strategy allows one to use a c o n t e x t - f r e e parser for most structure building, while allowing escape f r o m t h a t formalism for a d e f i n e d set of special cases. Such a s t r a t ­ egy is feasible largely because of the restricted domain of discourse. A portion of a user-machine dialogue is shown in Figure 3 , for an application language called LADDER. The grammar for this application has much of the flavor of the SOPHIE grammar, in t h a t the rules and categories are highly application specific. In the opinion of the authors, "... the evidence presented indicates clearly t h a t , for certain

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

65

<What is the c u r r e n t position of the Kennedy? >(position 6000n0300w date 7601171200) trying ellipsis: what is the c u r r e n t position of kitty hawk >(position 3700n01700e date 7601171200) l have 79 answers; do you w a n t to see them all? trying ellipsis: To what country does the fastest sub belong >(nat us ship Los Angeles mxspd 30.0)

Example dialogue (condensed) with the LADDER system

Figure 3

restricted applications, n a t u r a l language access to data bases has become a practical and practicable reality." ( H e n drix, e t a l . , 1978:142). The revival of theoretical interest in c o n t e x t - f r e e mod­ els in the last several years is indeed quite striking. A major proponent of this approach is Gerald Gazdar, in a series of largely unpublished papers (but see Gazdar (1980), Pullum and Gazdar (1981)). The basic idea of this approach is the notion of a meta-rule or rule schema, a device which allows one to express, in an economical way, a potentially unbounded set of c o n t e x t - f r e e rules. By use of such a device, it becomes possible to state the kinds of unbounded dependencies which cannot be stated in a simple contextf r e e g r a m m a r , and still have the resulting language con­ t e x t - f r e e . The advantages of such an approach are the general limitation on linguistic theory given by the r e s t r i c ­ tive formalism, and the possibility of parsing with contextf r e e parsing procedures. However, Gazdar's approach has not yet been thoroughly e x p l o r e d , and it is not clear how some of the problems of c o n t e x t - f r e e parsing, such as extensive

66

Damerau: I m p e r f e c t Models and Their Uses

structural ambiguity, will be avoided. Other linguists may not go quite so f a r as to restrict themselves e n t i r e l y t o a phrase structure formalism, but are assigning a much g r e a t e r role to t h a t portion of the g r a m m a r , e.g., Keenan (1980) and Bresnan (1980) as well as others.

Transformational

Grammar

Although there are many traditions of linguistic research being pursued in the United States and elsewhere, over the last t w e n t y years or so the dominant force in American linguistics has been t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar as inspired by Noam Chomsky. It is also obvious t h a t t r a n s f o r ­ mational grammar is not a unified discipline, but has many often incompatible schools. Chomsky's own position has changed sufficiently f r e q u e n t l y t h a t he is sometimes in competition with his e a r l i e r views as developed by his s t u ­ dents of the t i m e . Relatively f e w experimentally oriented research groups have worked directly within the t r a n s f o r ­ mational f r a m e w o r k , although a number have been i n f l u ­ enced by t h a t work. The work of Chomsky's t e a c h e r , Zellig Harris, has inspired one of the longest running projects in computer based linguistic research, viz., the Linguistic String Project at New York University (Sager, 1981). This group has built a very large transformational grammar within the Harris f r a m e w o r k , and has developed parsing procedures to analyze English sentences with respect to t h a t , grammar. The system includes a large dictionary, a c o n t e x t - f r e e wellcomponent, a restriction component which makes formedness checks on subtrees, and a transformational component. The system is designed to analyze narrative t e x t , isolate items of information and place them in a defined f o r m a t , and then answer questions from the f o r ­ matted data records. The system has been tested mainly with medical records, although it is not in principle restricted to any special domain. A complete description of the system, including the g r a m m a r , is found in Sager (1981). An example of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l analysis it p r o ­ duces is given in Figure 4 (Sager, 1981: 207).

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

67

The force with which an isolated h e a r t beats depends on the concentration of Ca in the medium which surrounds it. sentence I center endmark I I asr I verb subj obj I I I depend t - d e f in I I nstg t-pwhs obj ρ nstgo I I I I I force asr nstgo on t - d e f I I I verb subj nstf t-vn-act I I I I beat t - i n d e f host asr I =force I I I nstg t-apos-ven verb subj obj I I I I I heart t-passive concentrate nstg pn I I I asr Ca Ρ nstgo I I I verb subj obj obj in t - d e f I I I I I isolate 0 host pn nstg t-whs-n = heart I I I P_nstgo medium asr I I I from 0 verb subj obj I I I surround host nstgo = medium I nstg I it

Transformational analysis in the NYU program Figure 4

68

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

One offshoot of Chomsky's version of transformational grammar was known as generative semantics. The essential theoretical idea was t h a t t h e r e was no level of deep s t r u c ­ t u r e distinct from semantic s t r u c t u r e . At the lowest level of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a sentence had a predicate with some n u m ­ ber of arguments defined f o r t h a t predicate. A l o n g - r u n ­ ning project at IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center, the Transformational Question Answering (TQA) system project, has constructed a very large transformational grammar within t h a t general t r a d i t i o n ( P l a t h , 1976). An example sentence with the underlying structure produced by this grammar is given in Figure 5. Along with a parsing procedure due to Petrick ( P e t r i c k , 1965) this grammar has been used to study the possibility of providing n a t u r a l l a n ­ guage query capabilities for relational data bases.

In one e x p e r i m e n t , the members of a city planning d e p a r t m e n t w e r e provided with such a system for accessing their basic land record files. This is a semantically richer domain than those mentioned above under context-free models. The range of constructions which can be parsed and provided with an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the TQA system is wide. The aim in designing the grammar was t h a t if a construc­ t i o n , such as "relative clause", could be handled in one context, it could be handled in all contexts. This means t h a t a user does not have to keep in mind a list of exceptions as well as an understanding of allowable constructions. In the main, this goal was r e a l i z e d , and users had relatively little d i f f i c u l t y in staying w i t h i n the English subset that the system understood. Some examples of questions correctly answered by the system are given in Figure 6. Detailed results of the planning d e p a r t m e n t experiment are available in Damerau, (1981); the general conclusion was t h a t it appeared feasible to provide such a capability for a q u i t e n a t u r a l subset of English, assuming the domain of discourse for any one system was restricted to one relatively unified field at a t i m e . It was mentioned above t h a t transformational grammar has changed very drastically since Chomsky's early work. In f a c t , in the most recently published work of Chomsky, t h e r e is only one major movement t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , move alpha,

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Where is Smythe's lot?

(BD LOCATED (THE ((LOT X5) (*BD OWN SMYTHE X5 BD*))) ((WH SOME) (PLACE X7)) BD) (S1 ( - PAST + WH + QUES + TOP) BD (V (+ ADJ + EN + LOC + TEMP + TW0AR6S) LOCATED) (NP (DET THE) (NOM (NOM (NOUN ( - HU + SG + PL + WBL) (V LOT) (INDEX ( - CONST + CINS) X5)) ) (Sl BD (V (+ OBJ + TEMP + POBJ) OWN) (NP (NOM (NOUN (+ HU + SG + UNKNOWN) (INDEX (+ CONST) SMYTHE))) ) (NP (+ OBJ) (NOM (NOUN ( - HU + SG + PL + WBL) (INDEX ( - CONST + CINS) X5))) ) BD ) ) ) (NP (+ AT + LOC) (NOM (V (+ ADJ + QUANT) WH SOME) (NOM (NOUN (+ SG - HU + PL) (V PLACE) (INDEX ( - CONST) X7)) ) ) ) BD)

Underlying ("deep")

structure in the TQA system.

Figure 5 where alpha ranges over phrasal categories. Constraints transformational application are provided by devices cal

69

70

Darnerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

What is the average assessed valuation houses in subplanning area 7.20?

of

the

two

family

How many nursing homes are t h e r e in Fisher Hill? What ft.?

parcels on

Greenacres Ave. have

more

than

10000

sq.

Who owns the vacant land in Hillair Circle? Where are the parcels than 3 dwelling units?

in the

Fisher

Hill assn. having

What is the average area of the parcels in the assn. in the R2 zone which have an LUC of 910? What is the parcel area of the f i r e

Battle

more

Hill

stations?

Examples of questions answered by the TQA system

Figure 6

filters, and semantic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is done on near surface structures. A parsing program f o r such a theory is described in Marcus (1980). Examples of sentences parsed by Marcus' program using a grammar f r a g m e n t w r i t t e n to exercise the parser and demonstrate its robustness are given in Figure 7. This program has a p p a r e n t l y not yet been used in an application like t e x t analysis or question answering.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

71

I told t h a t boy t h a t boys should do it. There seems to have been a meeting scheduled f o r

Friday.

The boy who you met scheduled the meeting. Who did Bob give the book? Who did you say t h a t Bill told? Who do you w a n t to give a book to tomorrow? Who did you promise to give the book to Sue tomorrow?

Sentences parsed by Marcus' parser

Figure 7

Conclusion The foregoing examples do not begin to cover the m u l ­ t i t u d e of n a t u r a l language processing systems which have been worked on over the last '25 years or so, nor do they cover any significant number of the linguistic theories and variants e x t a n t , although I believe the theoretical work described lies within the mainstream of linguistic theory. (For example, I have not discussed the extensive theoretical and computational l i t e r a t u r e on Augmented Transition N e t ­ works, ATNs). I simply w a n t e d to illustrate t h a t , depending on one's goals, it is possible to make good use of a theory and its constructs even though it is known to be deficient in some aspects. Moreover, old theories with attractive properties are seldom completely f o r g o t t e n . Sometimes a new insight can result in the rehabilitation of a theory which was thought to have a f a t a l e r r o r .

72

Damerau: Imperfect Models and Their Uses

lt can also be seen t h a t , as the projects described are ranked in increasing order of ambition, the complexity of the theory used to realize those ambitions rises also. T h e r e f o r e , these remarks should not be t a k e n to mean that one should not seek more comprehensive theories; on the contrary, c u r r e n t linguistic theory does not show us how to go about constructing the kind of n a t u r a l language u n d e r ­ standing capability that one would like computer systems to have. However, there are certain problems t h a t each of the models available to us can solve, and it is a mistake to dismiss a theory completely because it cannot explain all the phenomena one would like to explain. Solving an outstanding problem within the confines of an old theory might well be very useful to someone who has no compelling need to adopt a newer and probably more complicated model.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In preparing this p a p e r , I have b e n e f i t e d greatly from discussions with David Johnson, Stanley Petrick, Paul Postal and Warren Plath, all of whom made useful suggestions and clarifications. In a d d i t i o n , I owe a g r e a t deal to Rulon Wells, for his i n t e r e s t in computer models of linguistic theories at a time when such models w e r e not yet fashion­ able in d e p a r t m e n t s of linguistics.

ENDNOTE 1

Pullum (1984) indicates acceptance of t h a t Dutch, at least, is not a CF language.

an

argument

REFERENCES CITED

Bahl, L. R., R. Bakis, P. S. Cohen, A. 6. Cole, F., Jelinek, . L. Lewis, R. E. Mercer. " F u r t h e r Results on the Rec­ ognition of a Continuously Read Natural Corpus." in

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

73

Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, April 9 - 1 1 , Volume 3, IEEE, 1980, pp. 8 7 2 - 8 7 5 . Brown, John Seely and Richard R. B u r t o n . 1974. SOPHIE - "A pragmatic use of a r t i f i c i a l intelligence in CAI." in: Association for Computing Machinery. Annual Conference, 2 9 t h , San Diego, CA, November, 1974, Proceedings, Volume No. 2 , New York, NY: Association f o r Comput­ ing Machinery, 571-579. Bresnan, Joan 1980. "Polyadicity: p a r t I of a theory of lexi­ cal rules," in Lexical Grammar, Teun Hoekstra, Harry Van Der Hulst, and Michael Moorgat (eds.). Foris Publications, Dordrecht, 9 7 - 1 2 2 . Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic Structures. Mouton: The Hague. 1963. "Formal Properties of Grammars." In Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, II, R.D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter (eds.), New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3 2 3 - 4 1 8 . 1964. " C u r r e n t issues in linguistic theory." In The Structure of Language, Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964, pp. 5 0 - 1 1 8 . (1980). "On binding." Linguistic Inquiry 11:1 ( W i n t e r , 1980), 1-46. Church, Kenneth Ward 1980. "On memory limitations in n a t ­ ural language processing." Master of Science Thesis, MIT. Damerau, Fred J. 1971. Markov Models in Linguistic Theory. The Hague: Mouton. , Fred J. 1981. "Operating statistics f o r the t r a n s ­ formational question answering system." American Journal of Computational Linguistics 7:1 (January-March 1981). 3 0 - 4 2 . Gazdar, Gerald 1980. "A phrase s t r u c t u r e syntax f o r com­ Teun Hoekstra, parative clauses." In Lexical Grammar, Harry Van Der Huist, and Michael Moorgat (eds.). Dordrecht: Foris Publications. 9 7 - 1 2 2 . Harman, Gilbert H. 1963. "Generative grammars without transformational rules: a defense of phrase struc­ t u r e . " Language, 597-616. Hayes-Roth, Mostow, D. Jack, and Mark S. Fox. 1978. "Understanding speech in the HEARSAY-II system." in Speech Communication with Computers, Leonard Bloc ( e d . ) , Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 9 - 4 2 .

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Hendrix, Gary G.; Earl D. Sacerdoti, Daniel Sagalowicz, and Jonathan Slocum, 1978. "Developing a natural interface to complex data." ACM Transactions on Database Systems 3:2 (June 1978), 105-147. Hockett, Charles F. 1955. A Manual of Phonology. Memoir 11 of the International Journal of American linguistics, Baltimore, Maryland: Indiana University Publications in Anthropology and Linguistics. Jelinek, Fred, Robert L. Mercer, and Lalit R. Bahl, 1980. "Continuous speech recognition: statistical methods." In Handbook of Statistics, Volume 2, P. R. Krisnaiah (ed.), Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company (to appear). Keenan, Edward 1980. "Passive is phrasal not (sentential or lexical). In Lexical Grammar, Teun Hoekstra, Harry Van Der Hulst, and Michael Moorgat (eds.). Dordrecht: Foris Publications, Dordrecht, 181-213. Lakoff, George. 1978. "Some remarks on AI and linguistics." Cognitive Science 2:3 (July-September 1978), 267-275. Langendoen, D.T. 1977. "On the Inadequacy of Type-3 and Type-2 grammars for human languages." In Studies in Descriptive and Historical Unguistics: Festschrift for Winifred P. Lehmann. P.J. Hopper, ed., Amsterdam, Holland: Jogn Bennon 159-171. Lowerre, Bruce. 1976. "The HARPY speech recognition system." Ph.D. Dissertation, Dept. of Computer SCience, Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie-Mellon University. Marcus, Mitchell P. 1980. A Theory of SyntactiC Recognition for Natural Languages. Cambridge, Massachusetts: the MIT Press. Miller, George A. and Noam Chomsky. 1963. "Finitary models of language users." in Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, II, R.D. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter (eds.), New York, New York John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 419-422. Petrick, Stanley R. 1965. "A recognition procedure for transformational grammars." Ph.D. TheSiS, MIT. Plath, Warren J. 1976. "REQUEST: A natural language question-answering system:' IBM Journal of Research and Development, 20:4 (July, 1976), 326-335. Postal, Paul M. 1964. "Limitations of phrase structure grammars:· in The Structure of Language Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. 137-151.

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Pullum, G e o f f r e y K. 1984 Syntactic and Semantic Parsability in Proceedings of Coling84, 2-6 July 1984, Stanford University, California, 112-122. Pullam, Geoffrey K. and Gazdar, Gerald. 1981. " N a t u r a l l a n ­ guages and context f r e e languages." Stanford Cognitive Science Group Report, June, 1981. Sager, Naomi. 1981. Naturai Language information Processing - A Computer Grammar of English and Its Applications. Read­ ing, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Com­ pany, Inc. Shannon, Claude E. and Weaver, Warren. 1949. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

RASK'S LECTURE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

William M. Christie, Jr. University of Arizona One of the pleasures of studying the history of linguis­ tics with Rulon Wells was the opportunity to share in his delight in the discovery of minor and neglected episodes or sidelights on the main flow of the discipline. Receiving such mimeographed papers as his study of 'Lexicostatistics in the Regency Period' stimulated us to look f o r similar gems on our own and taught us t h a t the development of linguistics was f a r richer and f u l l e r than the usual histories would have us believe. In this spirit I would o f f e r here a little item t h a t shows a previously neglected side of Rasmus Rask. We all know, of course, t h a t Rask was strictly an historical and comparative linguist. Saussure was still not b o r n , and Whitney was still a child when Rask died. Even historical linguistics was still in its early s t a t e , not to reach its flowering until later in the century. Yet even at this early stage t h e r e w e r e some who w e r e thinking about more than the mechanical comparison of sounds, who w a n t e d to inves­ t i g a t e what was then called the philosophy of language. It was for such people t h a t Rask p r e p a r e d his notes f o r a lecture on this topic. The t e x t is to be found in Hjelmslev's edition of Rask's Udvalgte Afhandlinger, and it is immediately a p p a r e n t t h a t what we have is nothing more than an o u t ­ line sketch of what Rask w a n t e d to say. Recognizing this f a c t , his b r o t h e r , H.K. Rask, a t t e m p t e d to convert it into a finished product in his Samlede tildels forhen utrykte Afhandlinger (1836), but with less than happy results. I have r e t u r n e d here to the original t e x t , unfinished though it be. I have omitted the footnotes, which w e r e exclusively abbreviated reminders of illustrations Rask intended to use when he delivered the lecture. Otherwise I have l e f t the t e x t intact and t r a n s l a t e d it just as it stands. No date has been

78

Christie:

Rask on the Philosphy of

Language

d e t e r m i n e d for i t , and the t i t l e is provided by Hjelmslev. The text itself is quite clear, but a f e w comments are in o r d e r . In the f i r s t place it is r a t h e r odd t h a t Rask would be criticized for being too mechanical. He was, as Markey has noted in his introduction to the Old Norse Grammar1, essentially a g r a m m a r i a n , looking at systems and r e l a t i o n ­ ships. But it is very easy to mistake comparative linguistics for a mechanistic t r e a t m e n t . So much comparative work is based on phonologic correspondences t h a t it is easy to lose sight of the systems t h a t lie behind t h e m . Yet it is neces­ sary to keep those systems in view, for they, themselves, can be of considerable importance for historical reconstruc­ t i o n , as Saussure's Memoire makes plain. Rask did keep the system in view, and this lecture outlines his position on them. One point t h a t keeps appearing in the lecture and t h a t deserves a somewhat more extended comment is the m a t t e r of exposition. Clearly Rask believed t h a t one needed to do more than understand the phenomena and t h e i r relations. One must also find the 'correct (i.e. n a t u r a l ) form' for the exposition. This can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, one can see Rask saying here what Chomsky said a century and a q u a r t e r l a t e r , t h a t the proper goal of l i n ­ guistic theory is to provide an evaluation metric whereby one can decide which of two grammars is b e t t e r for a given corpus. On the other hand, something more seems to be involved here. He is concerned not just t h a t one must u n d e r s t a n d , comprehend, and distinguish (forstå, indse, dis­ tingvere); he is also concerned about the proper form for the s t a t e m e n t , the exposition (Fremsættelsen) of the g r a m ­ mar. One must not only choose the b e t t e r g r a m m a r , one must also present the grammar properly. This concern of Rask's finds a later echo in a comment t h a t Firth drops in the middle of his 'Synopsis of Linguistic Theory.'z 'Under otherwise equal circumstances one will p r e f e r that theory, which covers a larger field of phenomena, or which f r o m some points of view appears to be simpler' or as I should prefer clearer. This casually dropped comment, 'or as I should p r e f e r - - c l e a r e r , ' signals Firth's concern with the presentation of the g r a m m a r ; and Rask's concern with expo­ sition shows the same interest.

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79

The question now arises how one can d e t e r m i n e the correct f o r m f o r the exposition. The key word here is naturat. Clearly Rask believes not t h a t he is imposing a s t r u c ­ t u r e on language, but that he is discovering the natural system in a language. Those who remember the linguistic debates of the 50's will hear an echo of the old question whether structure is innate in speech or imposed by the linguist. For Rask, however, the m a t t e r goes f u r t h e r . A real philosophical linguistics, to be well grounded and correct, is based on a knowledge of all languages, or a t least the most important ones. And the highest achievement of philo­ sophical linguistics would be to discover the t r u e system in a language a n d , really more i m p o r t a n t , to know t h a t It is the t r u e one. Rask is searching here f o r some device, i n t u ­ itive or otherwise, that will tell one t h a t a particular a n a l ­ ysis is correct. And that device must be universally applica­ ble. We are moving here very close to a search for language universais, although Rask never quite takes that f i n a l step. My final comments concern the s t a t e m e n t of the object of the philosophy of language. When Rask says t h a t he wants to understand phenomena at the very deepest level, we are t e m p t e d to read our own terminology into the statement and view it as a precursor of deep s t r u c t u r e . These a r e , however, numerous ways of understanding phe­ nomena at deep levels. Deep structure is one possibility, but the deep grammar of systemics, to cite just one exam­ ple, is quite another. Rask does not make it clear just what he means by the very deepest level, but the fact that he has a separate statement f o r the relationships among the phenomena raises the distinct possibility t h a t his meaning is quite d i f f e r e n t from ours. However one may choose to express t h e m , relationships are what really define and Hjelmslev,  following describe linguistic phenomena, as Saussure, has made clear. Since relationships form the basis of what we know as synchronic linguistics, it becomes e n t i r e l y possible that by an understanding at the deepest level Rask meant primarily historical study. While t h e r e is certainly no necessity in adopting this position, its very possibility cautions us against reading too much 20th c e n ­ t u r y theory into a lecture t h a t , for all its striking moder­ nity, still must be understood in the context of its own age.

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Rask on the Philosphy of

Language

Text: A Lecture on the Philosophy of Language Rasmus Christian Rask Gentlemen: I must ask you to pardon a little digression today con­ cerning a m a t t e r which we ought to be clear about before we go deeper into the study of the old language, and almost before one independently begins any language study, namely what it is really t h a t one wants to study. I see in a piece in the Københavns Morgenpost t h a t , a f t e r some absurd praise, it is said t h a t I have only concerned myself with the mechanical in language and have never concerned myself with the philosophy of language. The mechanical in a language is the abc's, but not the investigation of the sound system. The system is much more the seed from which the whole vigorous t r e e has sprung up, and the investigation of it is the foundation of all t r u e linguistics. The mechanical in a language is the paradigms or e n d ­ ings, but by no means is it the investigation of the l a n ­ guage system and its exposition in the correct (i.e. n a t u r a l ) f o r m . This system is the organism in language, and the investigation of t h a t which is organic is the physiology of language or the philosophy of grammar. The mechanical is rules in syntax, f o r example t h a t when two substantives come t o g e t h e r and speak of d i f f e r e n t things, that one will always be put in the genitive which ends in - s in Danish and which owns or has the other. But it is not the investigation of the whole a r r a n g e m e n t of syntax in a language and the description of it in the cor­ rect o r d e r , which gives the r e a d e r a clear picture of the formation of sentences and the whole way of forming expressions in the language. Even less is it the theory of this investigation, or the investigation of the most correct form t o r its presentation. Likewise it is mechanical to mix colors and boil varnish, but not to paint a picture which in a thousand years will appeal to the viewer and delight him with its life and t r u t h .

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Likewise in metrics, the classification and names of the f e e t and the placement and n a t u r e of the rhyming l e t t e r s are mechanical. But the scholarly exposition of how one can at a glance take in the whole verse structure is philo­ sophic. (Likewise f o r rhetoric and poetics.) The mechanical is t h a t which one learns in school, but not the scholarly exposition of i t , still less the theory of the most correct f o r m f o r this exposition or the investiga­ tion of the t r u e organization of the language. On the con­ t r a r y , t h a t is the philosophy of language. And the object of this philosophy of language is to understand a t the very deepest level the phenomena that occur; to comprehend quite clearly the reciprocal relations in which these phenomena (endings, f o r m s , word combina­ tions, etc.) stand to each other and to know how to com­ bine this knowledge of various things so as to draw out new and yet certain results; to know how to distinguish d i f f e r e n t things that do not belong t o g e t h e r , and whose combination would lead to false conclusions. From this stand out etymology and criticism, which are correct and proper applications of linguistics. But all this application holds itself fixed to language, goes out f r o m it, t u r n s back to it, and receives f r o m it alone grasp and f i r m n e s s , use and w o r t h . For example, poetics presupposes metrics, which in t u r n presupposes f e e t and syllables. Rhet­ oric presupposes sentence composition (syntax), and the l a t ­ t e r presupposes morphology, which in t u r n presupposes pho­ nology. All this is built u p , one upon the other. This gives life and spirit to linguistics and is not mechanical, if knowledge of the f u n d a m e n t a l s is missing, the whole f o u n ­ dation is lacking and is not worth much more than a b r i l ­ liant soap bubble. If it goes outside language and e n t e r s the world of ideas, it is e i t h e r wild fantasy or an alien philosophical discipline. But this is what o f t e n happens to the linguistic speculations of those who lack f u n d a m e n t a l knowledge. Language is a natural object, and the science of l a n ­ guage resembles n a t u r a l history. It o f f e r s two objects for philosophical consideration: 1) the relations among the individual n a t u r a l items, i.e. the system; 2) the construction

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Language

of these items and what pertains to t h e m , i.e. physiology. That is not mechanical. On the contrary, the highest triumph of the application of philosophy in n a t u r e is when one can with its help discover the t r u e system in n a t u r e and know that it is the t r u e one. All other philosophy concerning n a t ­ ural history is either wild or u n f o u n d e d , or else a real philosophical branch of knowledge which lies outside n a t u r a l history, although the l a t t e r can be employed in it. T h e r e f o r e general or philosophical linguistics must also be drawn from real speech if it is not to become an empty figment of the imagination. And yet it is not w o r t h much because i t , to be well founded and correct, assumes t h a t one knows all languages, or at least most of t h e m , includ­ ing the most i m p o r t a n t , and t h a t the system in them was correctly s t a t e d . But t h a t is f a r f r o m being the case since the system is not t r u l y understood or properly described even in Greek or Latin or German. It can t h e r e f o r e scarcely become anything other than a patchwork; and since the individual materials do not hold, it becomes a mess. In addition to this manner of perceiving language structure and philosophizing over it as an object of e x p e r i ­ ence, t h e r e is another, apparently philosophical, which p r o ­ ceeds from the n a t u r e of the ideas which the language forms are made to express. Now since thoughts are every­ where the same, it appears t h a t this method must lead to a f i r m and immovable f o r m for the system in linguistics. But t h a t is by no means the case, and I would strongly w a r n the reader away from it. Thought is an infinitely f i n e , incorporeal, immaterial object, which is not easy to grasp, hold f i r m , and examine in such a way t h a t one can discover its absolutely correct f o r m . And in any case it is not thought and its forms but words, sounds, and their forms and relationships or combinations t h a t one should concern oneself with in linguistics.

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ENDNOTES

1

Rasmus Kristian Rask. 1976. A Grammar of the Icelandic or Old Norse Tongue, translated by Sir George Webb Dasent, new edition by T. L. Markey. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 2John Rupert Firth. 1951. "A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-1955," Studies in Linguistic Analysis (Special vol­ ume of the Philological Society). Oxford: Blackwell's, 1-31. 3

Louis Hjelmslev. 1961. Prolegomena to guage, t r a n s l a t e d by Francis J. Whitfield. sity of Wisconsin Press, 23.

a Theory Madison:

of Lan­ Univer­

CONTRAST1

John Fought University of Pennsylvania Contrast is the foundation of modern linguistics: the notion of structure in language rests on it. Despite its importance, however, d i f f e r e n c e s of terminology, d e f i n i t i o n , and practice remain in the scholarly l i t e r a t u r e , receiving only occasional and inconclusive examination. This paper presents an unrestricted contrast r e l a t i o n , analyzes it into its components, and shows how some other varieties of contrast can be derived f r o m it by the addition of restrictions in one or another component.

Paradigmatic Contrast and its Components Consider a number of discourses observed in the speech of some individual, each recorded as an a r r a n g e m e n t of discrete elements of sound and meaning - - components or f e a t u r e s of expression and of content. The correlation of a given expression with a given content is the Saussurean sign r e l a t i o n ; a discourse or portion of discourse is made up of one or more such signs, each having arrangements of f e a ­ t u r e s on both planes. Compared, the arrangements of expression or content f e a t u r e s of two such signs may be partly or wholly d i f f e r e n t from each o t h e r , or they may be alike. If they d i f f e r on one plane or the other, the f e a ­ t u r e s by which they d i f f e r are said to be in opposition. Thus, the sign relation holds between expression elements and content elements; opposition is a relation between expression elements or content elements.

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Fought: Contrast

Two signs d i f f e r e n t from each other in both expression and content f e a t u r e s are said to be in contrast. 2 Note t h a t the relation between such signs is one of dual d i f f e r e n c e : t h e r e are oppositions of expression f e a t u r e s and of content features. Hjelmslev (1935) introduced the t e r m commutation for another dual relation between two linguistic signs, carefully making it n e u t r a l between expression d i f f e r e n c e (seen as correlated with a content d i f f e r e n c e ) and content d i f f e r ­ ence (seen as correlated with an expression d i f f e r e n c e ) . The commutation test is a substitution of f e a t u r e s on either plane, content or expression; it tests whether t h e r e is a correlated change of f e a t u r e s on the other plane. The d i f ­ ference on either or both planes may be partial or com­ p l e t e ; the most convenient commutation tests for analytical and pedagogical uses are those in which the tested items d i f f e r by a single f e a t u r e on one or both planes. These are equivalent to minimal contrasts, the type traditionally used in books and classrooms to introduce the notion of contrast to students, by means of pairs of monosyllabic, monomorphemic, monolexemic utterances in isolation f r o m any larger context: [ p i n ] 'pin' / [ b i n ] 'bin'. In this f o r m , as FischerJørgensen noted in her admirable paper on the commutation test ( 1 9 5 6 ) , it is very old indeed; she cited an example from the t w e l f t h century. Figure 1 summarizes these relationships: the sign r e l a ­ tion links a given expression with a given content; opposi­ tion is a d i f f e r e n c e of expression or of content between signs; contrast is a d i f f e r e n c e of expression and of content between signs; and commutation is a relation between oppositions of content and of expression of signs.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Figure 1:

Sameness and

87

Terms and Relations

Identification

As Fischer-Jørgensen has r e p e a t e d l y emphasized, lin­ guistic elements having the same f e a t u r e s of substance are identified as the same; in some systems of linguistics, f e a ­ t u r e s of form are also adduced to establish i d e n t i t i e s , but substance, t h a t is, phonetic f e a t u r e s in the analysis of expression units, is the indispensable f o u n d a t i o n .  Accord­ ingly, the unrestricted contrast relation under construction here is based on elements identified as the same by virtue of having the same combination of properties. The salient relational p r o p e r t y of linguistic sameness t h e r e f o r e is reflexivity; the relation of the element to itself. Identification is the operation of asserting t h a t two distinct tokens are of the same type. Identification is perhaps most readily understood as the assignment of symbols for e l e ­ ments according to consistent principles. The same element (combination of relevant properties) is always assigned the same symbolic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and vice versa.

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Fought: Contrast

Linguistic sameness is generally considered an equiva­ lence r e l a t i o n , like numerical equality or logical identity. Equivalence relations are not only reflexive and symmetric, so that aRa, bRb, aRb, and bRa for all elements a and b in relation R; they are also transitive, so t h a t if aRb and bRc, then aRc, for any a, b, and  in R. That is, two elements equal to the same element are equal to each other. The assumption t h a t linguistic sameness is transitive causes no trouble so long as d i f f e r e n c e s among elements are either imperceptibly small or unmistakably l a r g e , but in a number of rather ordinary circumstances it is at odds with observation. A series of six or seven vowels ranging through the m i d - f r o n t unrounded zone, for example, may be such t h a t to the unaided ears of speakers and linguists alike any two neighboring vowels in the series are indistin­ guishable, whereas the f i r s t and the last are consistently d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by all. This kind of sameness is nontransitive; the relation so defined is technically not an equivalence r e l a t i o n , nor is it homogeneous. It belongs, in other words, with the indifference relations axiomatized over the years by utility theorists for dealing with p a t t e r n s of indifference or p r e f e r e n c e among alternatives. It is sobering to see how much more sophisticated is the study of such p a t t e r n s in economics and psychology than it is in linguistics. 4 To summarize, identification asserts t h a t two elements a r e , if not necessarily exactly identical, then at least indifferent as a l t e r n a t i v e s , and this relation is r e f l e x i v e , symmetric, and nontransitive. Opposition Sets and the Composition of Contrast Two linguistic forms partly d i f f e r e n t and partly alike in expression and content make up a minimum paradigm, the like portions on each plane forming a communis and each unique portion a propria, to use the widely accepted t e r m s introduced by Rulon Wells (1949). Minimally contrastive sets are a subclass of these paradigmatic contrasts in which each propria consists of a single f e a t u r e on one or both planes. The commutation test can be restated easily in these terms: substitute one propria f o r the other on either plane and t h e r e will be a change of propriae on the other.

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The operations of analysis and identification discussed so f a r , carried out on a corpus of discourses regarded as original d a t a , permit a condensed r e a r r a n g e m e n t of the corpus in the f o r m of a list of minimal opposition sets. Each set has an identifying communis, the environment of each member of the set of paradigmatically opposed propriae. To each pairing of the communis and a propria there corresponds a d i f f e r e n t a r r a n g e m e n t of elements on the other plane; in other words, each propria is abstracted f r o m a d i f f e r e n t sign. Each sign, and thus each propria abstracted f r o m one plane of i t , has a particular distribution describable in syn­ tactic, pragmatic, and sociolinguistic t e r m s . Each communis matched with a set of opposed propriae is d i f f e r e n t f r o m all the others in the list (and thus can serve as a convenient identifying label f o r the s e t ) ; some sets of opposed p r o p ­ riae may be the same as others in the list, but most will be d i f f e r e n t f r o m one another. Opposition is an i r r e f l e x i v e , symmetric, and transitive r e l a t i o n . No element is in opposition to itself. If one e l e ­ ment is in opposition to a second, then the second is in opposition to the f i r s t : if a/b then to/a. If one e l e m e n t is in opposition to a second, and that second to a t h i r d , then the f i r s t is in opposition to the t h i r d : if a/to and b/c, then a/c. Now consider lows: / _ət I / _əd /

two

fragments

p b t b

of

opposition

sets,

as

fol­

kg dk

From these two overlapping but incomplete opposition sets a complete set of stop oppositions can be built up by using identification and composition as indicated above. Two seg­ ments are common to both sets, and t h e r e f o r e may be i d e n t i f i e d , to = to, and  = . These identifications, and the generalizing power of composition fill in the gap: if b/t and b/d then t/d. Composition, t h e n , is the generalization of oppositions by transitivity, with the reflexive property bor­ rowed from identification (by substance) allowing a kind of summing process for filling the numerous 'accidental' gaps in particular opposition sets, as in the example just

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discussed. Of course, in this particular case, t h e r e are other opposition sets where the t/d opposition is shown directly, such as / tik / 'tick' and / dik / 'Dick'. But by using the reflexivity of i n d i f f e r e n c e and the transitivity of contrast together in this way, a complete inventory of e l e ­ ments in opposition can be constructed even though t h e r e may be no single opposition set t h a t contains them all. The same process of identification and composition could be used w i t h semantic elements t o o , given opposition sets to start with. Unrestricted paradigmatic contrast is thus defined by its component relations of signification and opposition, and these l a t t e r are used r e p e a t e d l y , with operations of i d e n t i ­ fication and composition, to build up the inventory of structural elements of a language, as r e p r e s e n t e d by some body of d a t a . Other v a r i e t i e s of contrast, as will be merely sketched h e r e , are derivable from the unrestricted relation by the addition of restrictions on identification or composition, or both. Restricted Varieties of Contrast A f e w examples of restricted contrast will be discussed b r i e f l y to suggest how others might also be compared within the system outlined here. In all of these, the restrictions are presented as f e a t u r e s of form to be added to the f e a ­ t u r e s of substance used in comparing elements f o r purposes of identification or d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . W. F. Twaddell (1935) proposed a system of phonology whose explicitness and consistency w e r e notably above the standard of the t i m e . The t r e a t m e n t of opposition given h e r e , in f a c t , owes much to t h a t monograph. Twaddell restricted the scope of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , however, mentioning Saussure as an a u t h o r i t y , allowing composition only among similarly ordered opposition sets, t h a t is, sets having exactly the same membership of opposed e l e m e n t s , which w e r e seg­ ments in his proposal. Each member segment of a given opposition set was called a microphoneme; each set of cor­ responding members of similarly ordered opposition sets

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71

made up what he called a macrophoneme. His aim in ending the process of composition with the macrophoneme was to establish a system based on opposition r a t h e r than on pho­ netic substance, respecting the Saussurean dictum that relations alone define linguistic elements. But like Saussure, Twaddell actually relied on both opposition relations and phonetic substance: the elements belonging to the opposi­ tion sets w e r e identified and ordered according to the d i f ­ f e r e n c e s among their phonetic properties. A look at Figure 2 will suggest how many macropnonemes are required by Twaddell's restrictions. The f i r s t t h r e e opposition sets are similarly o r d e r e d , thus each of the t h r e e / i / microphonemes may be assigned to the same macrophoneme. The last three lines are also similarly o r d e r e d , and those three / i / microphonemes also belong to a single macrophoneme. But the two / i / macrophonemes are d i f f e r e n t f r o m each o t h e r , and so it is f o r each of the other vowels found on all six lines of the Figure:

/ / / / / /

P_P P_k g_t b_t b_d t_t

/ / / / / /

e e e e e e

æ æ æ æ æ æ

   ə θ 

a a a a a a

  

Figure 2 Where identification is blocked in this system, neutralization is introduced: elements which would be r e g a r d e d as the same on the basis of substance alone, such as the six high f r o n t unrounded vowels above, are instead r e g a r d e d as d i f ­ f e r e n t because of their d i f f e r e n t relations to other e l e ­ ments, as are 7 in opposition to f o u r vowels' and 'i in opposition to five vowels', or in another f o r m u l a t i o n , 7 in opposition to ɔ' and 7 not in opposition to o'. The relational constraints implied by Twaddell's tion of the macrophoneme can be matched within the discussed here by requiring t h a t identification apply a o n e - t o - o n e basis, segment to segment, but r a t h e r a l l , opposition set to opposition set. That is, [ i ] is

defini­ system not on all-tonot to

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Fought: Contrast

be identified with [ i ] by reflexivity and substantive f e a t u r e s of this segment alone, but instead the set [ i / e æ ə a ɔ ] is to be identified with [ i '  æ ə a ɔ ] and not with [ i /  æ ə a ] , nor with any other combination of segments. Note also t h a t f e a t u r e s of phonetic substance play an appropriate role in this reconstruction, since the identification of the members of the opposition sets (the microphonemes) and t h e i r o r d e r ­ ing is based on them as it is in the original formulation of the system by Twaddell. Neutralization is doubtless most familiar in the f o r m given to it by Trubetzkoy ( 1 9 6 9 ) , where it is restricted to binary privative oppositions, t h a t is, to oppositions of two t e r m s (segments) whose phonetic d i f f e r e n c e is such t h a t one has a f e a t u r e the other lacks. In the position of n e u ­ t r a l i z a t i o n , it is the unmarked member of the pair, i.e., the one lacking the specified f e a t u r e , t h a t occurs, but this seg­ ment represents in such occurrences not ' i t s e l f but the pair of opposed segments. In this capacity, the unmarked segment represents an archiphoneme. To model this r e s t r i c ­ t i o n , and the notion of the archiphoneme, a specification of the position of neutralization must be added to the opposi­ tion sets, and the segments found in other sets in binary privative oppositions are matched pairwise in the positions of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , as with German stops, initial [ p / t / k / b / d / g ] but [pb / t d / k g ] . Trubetzkoy's type of neutralization is different from Twaddell's in several particulars: it is restricted to certain types of opposition ( d e f i n e d p h o n e t i ­ cally), and it is positional r a t h e r than universal in scope; this positional restriction is also definable phonetically at least in p a r t . But both systems have in common the r e s t r i c ­ tion of identification in certain instances where a compari­ son of f e a t u r e s of substance alone would support it. The relational conditions of Firthian polysystemic lin­ guistics, like the similar r e q u i r e m e n t s of Chomskyan g e n e r a ­ tive phonology, can be modelled in much the same way within this system of restrictions on contrast. 5 In dealing with the phonological elements of both Firthian and Chomskyan linguistics, the grammatical category membership of each propria in a phonological opposition set may (or must) be added to the information on phonetic substance. Thus, f o r a Firthian analysis of the vowel systems of, say, the verbs, nouns, and affixes of some language, the

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relevant f e a t u r e s supporting identification of phoneticallylike vowels, mid f r o n t u n r o u n d e d , f o r example, might have to be supplemented with the category of f o r m where the particular vowel occurs. Opposition, t h e n , is not between vowels as such, but b e t w e e n vowels in comparable f o r m s , and identification is not of [e] with [e], but of [e]-in-a-verb with [e]-in-a-verb, [e]-in a noun with [ e ] - i n - a - n o u n , and so on: [ e y ] = [ev] [ e N ] = [ e N ] . in Chomskyan phonology one is said to label the brackets around f o r m s , but this is no d i f f e r e n t f r o m labelling all the segments. A restriction of a d i f f e r e n t character f r o m the f o r e g o ­ ing can be traced from Bloomfield's system of structuralism (1926, 1933) through a number of works by followers of his distributionist approach. In b r i e f , the restriction applies only on the plane of c o n t e n t , where it amounts to rejecting all identification. In chapters 5 and 9 of Language (1933), Bloomfield clearly expressed the acceptance of the f u n d a ­ mental notion of s t r u c t u r a l linguistics, the idea of significant difference, in the analysis of sound, but rejected it in the analysis of meaning (cf. 1933.78, 1 4 4 - 5 ) . Though each f o r m had a constant and specific meaning in his system, t h a t meaning was nevertheless unanalyzable. Sound, on the other hand, though also varying subtly and continuously, was nev­ ertheless to be viewed as s t r u c t u r e d into discrete elements. Thus, Bloomfield's contrast relation is not equivalent to commutation, since t h e r e are strictly speaking no elements on the plane of content, and t h e r e f o r e no oppositions t h e r e , only d i f f e r e n c e or sameness. Conclusion The reconstruction of opposition and contrast provided here gives an unrestricted variety of the contrast relation against which others found in the l i t e r a t u r e may be meas­ u r e d . Those b r i e f l y examined here r e q u i r e e i t h e r more information in the characterization of specific contrasts than does the unrestricted v a r i e t y , or they embody, as did Bloomfield's position, some inconsistency in the t r e a t m e n t of linguistic elements. Judgments of worthiness are not the point h e r e , however. What is o f f e r e d is not a means of justifying restrictions on contrast but r a t h e r a means of

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Fought: Contrast

representing d i f f e r e n t contrast relations in a consistent comparable way within an explicit analytical f r a m e w o r k .

and

Endnotes

1 This study belongs to a genre to which Rulon Wells has made many distinguished contributions; many of his histori­ cal and critical w r i t i n g s , and many hours of his teaching and advice, have helped shape my thinking about language and scholarship. This is only the most recent opportunity to express my g r a t i t u d e .

For their assistance in bringing my thoughts on contrast to t h e i r c u r r e n t state I also thank Lee Ann Draud, Henry Hiz, Henry Hoenigswald, Patti Price, and Marcia Wesler. Responsibility for the content of the paper, and still more, for omissions, rests with me. 2 Bloomfield (1933.77) gave such a d e f i n i t i o n of " d i s ­ tinctive d i f f e r e n c e s or contrasts, capable of distinguishing one meaning from a n o t h e r " , agreeing with Hjelmslev (1935) also in accepting both potential and actual signs as con­ trastive instead of accepting only actual ones and some form of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n . Twaddell (1935, pt.2) collected many kinds of definition of contrast; many, like Bloomfield's, made no distinction between opposition and contrast. This is the f a t a l flaw of Postal's (1968) 'reconstruction' of the con­ trast relation. For a c r i t i q u e , see Hymes and Fought (1981:212-7) and Starke (1972).

3 Fischer-Jørgensen (1949, 1952) made this point with special clarity, speaking f o r herself and Hjelmslev; she also used the t e r m 'identification' in the sense continued here. Trubetzkoy (1969) and Twaddell (1935) likewise conceded the primacy of phonetic identity.

4 Arrow (1963) is lucid and accessible. Stigler (1950) is a good account of the history of utility theory; Skala (1975) shows how formal it can be. His f i r s t chapter gives a useful

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axiomatization of indifference and preference relations. Luce (1956) is more limited on these. Suppes (1957) gives an introduction to the properties of relations that is superior to those of most manuals. His emphasis on the empirical content of relations is especially h e l p f u l . The usual t r e a t m e n t s , however, concentrate on equivalence r e l a ­ tions (transitive, unlike indifference) and orderings (asymmetric, like preference, but unlike opposition). Abernathy (1961) is an unusually careful a t t e m p t to t r e a t equivalence as a linguistic r e l a t i o n , but it does not solve any of the problems. 5See (1968).

Firth

(1948),

Robins (1953), and

Chomsky and

Halle

REFERENCES CITED

Abernathy, Robert. 1961. "The Problem of Linguistic Equiva­ lence." In Roman Jakobson, e d . , The Structure of Lan­ guage and its Mathematical Aspects. Proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium in Applied Mathematics, 95-8, held in New York City April 1 4 - 1 5 , 1960. Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society. Arrow, Kenneth. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd e d . ) . New York: John Wiley and Sons. Bloomfield, Leonard. 1926. "A Set of Postulates f o r the Sci­ ence of Language." Language. 2.153-64. . 1933. Language. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win­ ston. Chomsky, Noam, and Morris Halle. 1968. The Sound Pattern of English. New York: Harper and Row. F i r t h , John. 1948. "Sounds and Prosodies." Transactions of the Philological Society, 127-52. Fischer-Jørgensen, Eli. 1949. "Remarques sur les principes de l'analyse phonémique." Travaux du Cercle linguistique de Copenhague 5.214-34. . 1952. "On the Definition of Phoneme Categories on a Distributional Basis." Acta Linguistica 7.8-39. . 1956. "The Commutation Test and its Application to Phonemic Analysis." For Roman Jakobson, 140-51, The Hague: Mouton.

96

Fought: Contrast

Hjelmslev, Louis. 1935. "On the Principles of Phonematics." Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Pho­ netic Sciences, 49-54. London. Hymes, Dell, and John Fought. 1981. American Structuralism. Janua Linguarum, Series Maior 102. The Hague: Mouton. Luce, R. Duncan. 1956. "Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination." Econometrica 2 4 . 1 7 8 - 9 1 . Postal, Paul. 1968. Aspects of Phonological Theory. New York: Harper and Row. Robins, R. H. 1953. "The Phonology of the Nasalized Verbal Forms in Sudanese." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 15.138-45. Sapir, Edward. 1925. "Sound P a t t e r n s in Language." Language 1.37-51. . 1933. "La Réalité psychologique des phonèmes." Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique 30.247-65. de Saussure, Ferdinand. 1922. Cours de linguistique generale (2nd e d . ) . Paris. Skala, H. J. 1975. Non-Archimedean Utility Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. S t a r k e , Paul. 1972. "On Characterizing Contrast." Language Sciences 22.17-20. Stigler, George. 1950. "The Development of Utility Theory." Journal of Political Economy 5 8 . 3 0 7 - 2 7 , 3 7 3 - 9 6 . Suppes, Patrick. 1957. Introduction to Logic. Princeton: Van Nostrand. T w a d d e l l , W. Freeman. 1935. On Defining the Phoneme. L a n ­ guage Monograph 16. Baltimore: Linguistic Society of America. Vache, Josef. 1966. The Linguistic School of Prague. loomington: Indiana University Press. Wells, Rulon. 1947. "De Saussure's system of Linguistics." Word 3 . 1 - 3 1 . . 1949. "Automatic Alternation." Language 25.99-116.

M PHONOLOGY

PHONOLOGICAL "NEUTRALIZATION" IN CLASSICAL AND STRATIFICATIONAL THEORIES*

David G. Lockwood Michigan State University

This paper distinguishes between the suspension--Praguian " n e u t r a l i z a t i o n " - - o f a contrast and the alternational discrepancy which has been t e r m e d "neutralization" by Lamb. The f o r m e r can be t r e a t e d within autonomous pho­ nology; the l a t t e r (which may be t e r m e d syncretization to dis­ tinguish it more clearly) involves the relation of autonomous phonology to a more abstract level. Two stratificational t r e a t m e n t s of suspension have been proposed. Lockwood showed in 1972 how it could be handled without the a r c h i phoneme (a concept so pejorated by Neo-Bloomfieldians); Sullivan proposed in 1975 a t r e a t m e n t substantially embrac­ ing the archiphoneme, though with some r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The l a t t e r approach is more economical than any direct translation of Praguian archiphonemic analysis into componential t e r m s , though the f o r m e r corresponds more exactly to one of several Praguian views. 1. 7ypes of Neutralization:

Suspension vs.

Syncretization.

The f i r s t point to note in a discussion of neutralization in phonology is t h a t the t e r m has been used by d i f f e r e n t linguists for distinct though o f t e n r e l a t e d phenomena. 1 In one sense, it r e f e r s to an environmentally conditioned absence of contrast 2 between otherwise contrasting units on a given level of abstraction in language s t r u c t u r e . The t e r m suspension may be proposed f o r this sort of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , since the contrast present in some environments may be seen as suspended elsewhere. 3

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In another sense, promoted particularly by Lamb in connection with stratificational theory, the t e r m n e u t r a l i z a ­ tion has r e f e r r e d to a kind of discrepant relation between the units of two distinct but adjacent linguistic levels or s t r a t a . Neutralization in this sense is said to obtain when two or more units of one level show, e i t h e r always or sometimes, the same realization on the level below (i.e. on the level which is one step closer to expression). The t e r m syncretization is suggested as a distinct t e r m for this type of neutralization.* 1.1 Suspension. Suspension is the type of neutralization which received primary a t t e n t i o n in the w r i t i n g s of Trubetzkoy and others of the Prague School. A full d e f i n i t i o n of the t e r m ' n e u ­ t r a l i z a t i o n ' does not seem to occur in T r u b e t z k o / s major works on the subject, but a f a i r l y clear discussion in t e r m s of neutralizable oppositions gives a good idea of what is meant by it: There are phonic oppositions which are phonologically relevant only in certain phonic positions, since both members of the opposi­ tion are found only in these positions, while in other positions only one or the other member of the opposition occurs ...We call such oppositions neutralizable...5 It would not be f a i r , however, to a t t e m p t to abstract a definition of neutralization directly f r o m this q u o t a t i o n , since such a d e f i n i t i o n would be too restrictive in requiring only one or the other member of the opposition to occur in the position of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n . T r u b e t z k o / s f u r t h e r discus­ sions of the phenomenon show t h a t the sound occurring at positions of neutralization may be (1) always identical to one member, (2) identical to one or the other member depending on f u r t h e r conditions, or (3) identical to neither though related to both more closely than to any other sound in the language. (Cf. Trubetzkoy 1969:77-83) Taking these f u r t h e r facts into account, and using the t e r m contrast as suggested above, we can give the following definition:

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells PHONOLOGICAL SUSPENSION: The situation which sounds in phonemic contrast in one of positions are not contrastive in another of positions, whatever the manifestation the suspended range may happen to be.

101 in set set of

Two examples of suspension will be cited: 1) In Russian, the voicing of obstruents is contrastive before a vowel or a resonant (including / v / and its p a l a t a l ­ ized c o u n t e r p a r t / v , / ) , but it is suspended in f i n a l position or before an obstruent. Examples will be cited f o r the p a r ­ ticular contrasts / p / : / b / and / t / : / d / f r o m among the several contrastive pairs in the language. Contrast [ p a l ] 'fell' vs. [ b a l ] 'ball, dance', and [ t o r n ] 'volume' vs. [ d o m ] 'house'. Suspension: [ r á p ] 'slave', [ j ú p k e ] 'skirt'; and [ k o t ] 'tomcat', [ k l , ἑ t k Ə ] 'cage'. 2) In standard T h a i , the voicing and aspiration of stops is contrastive such t h a t t h e r e are t h r e e possibilities in i n i ­ tial position f o r the labial and apical stops: / p / , / b / , / p / ; /t/, / d / , / t /. Both these contrasts are suspended in final position, however, so t h a t only u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d voiceless, normally unreleased, stops occur. Contrast: [ p à i ] 'go' vs. [ b ä i ] ' l e a f vs. [ p āi] 'danger' and [ t ī : ] 'hit' vs. [ d ï : ] 'good' vs. [ t ï : ] ' t i m e , instance'. Suspension: [ s a p ] 'vocabulary' and [ h è t ] 'mushroom'. 6 1.2

Syncretization.

In discussing 'the realization of elements of one s t r a ­ tum by those of the next lower s t r a t u m , Lamb defined the type of neutralization here t e r m e d syncretization as the s i t u ­ ation in which 'two or more units have the same realization' (1964:213). As it applies more specifically to phonology, syn­ cretization usually r e f e r s to the relationship between con­ trasting units on a morphophonemic level of some sort and various realizations they may have on phonemic (i.e. an autonomous phonemic) level. Thus we can o f f e r the more precise d e f i n i t i o n : PHONOLOGICAL SYNCRETIZATION: The situation in which distinct morphophonemic units, or distinct combinations of such units, have

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Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n " identical realizations on the at least some environments.

phonemic

level

in

Two examples of this phenomenon will be cited:

1) In Russian, such contrasting pairs of morphophonemes as / / p / / and / / b / / , / / t / / and / / d / / have distinct realizations before vowels or resonants, but finally and before o b s t r u ­ ents they have a realization which will be predictably voiced or voiceless according to context, regardless of which morphophoneme they realize. Examples: Contrastive realization of contrasting morphophonemes: / / p a p a / / ' p a p a ' - - / p á p a / vs. / / b a b a / / 'country w o m a n ' - - / b a b a / and / / p o t a / / 'of s w e a t ' - - / p o t a / vs. / / g o d a / / 'of a y e a r ' - - / g o d a / . Syncretized voiced realization of contrasting morphophonemes: //pap zet I 'papas indeed (acc.)'--[pábžə] vs. //bab že// 'country women indeed ( a c c . ) ' - - [ b á b ž ə ] and / / p o t ž e / / 'sweat i n d e e d ' - - [ p d ž ə ] vs. //god ž e / / 'a year i n d e e d ' - - [g d ž ə ] . Syncretized voiceless realization of contrasting morphophonemes: / / p a p / / 'papas (acc.)' - - [ p a p ] vs. ł/bab/ł 'country women (acc.) - - [ b a p ] and / / p o t / / 'sweat' - - [p t ] vs. / / g o d / / 'year' - - [g t ] 7 2) In Polish t h e r e are t h r e e contrasting morphopho­ nemes which may be symbolized as / / a / / , / / æ / / , and / / c e / / . In one set of environments, / / æ / / has a realization syncretized with t h a t of / / a / / , while in another set of environments it has a realization syncretized with t h a t of / / œ / / . The r e a l i ­ zation syncretizing / / æ / / and / / c e / / is / e / , and it occurs when the / / æ / / is followed ( a f t e r intervening consonantal morphophonemes) by a morphophoneme / / J / / , which itself o f t e n a f f e c t s the realization of preceding consonants. The realization syncretizing / / æ / / and / / a / / occurs in other posi­ tions. Examples: Syncretization of / / a e / / and / / a / / : / / v j æ r a / / 'faith' - - / v j a r a / and / / k a s a / / 'cashier's window' — /kasa/ (cf. / / ś œ s t r a / / 'sister' - - / s o s t r a / ) . Syncretization of / / a e / / and //œ//: //vjaerJe// 'to f a i t h ' - - / v j e ž e / and / / ś œ s t r J e / / 'to a sister' - - / s e s t š e / (cf. / / k a s J e / / 'to a cashier's window' - /kase/.)

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1.3 Distinguishing Suspension from Syncretization. By the definitions stated in the above subsections, sus­ pension and syncretization are two d i f f e r e n t phenomena. For suspension, we must f i n d that elements which contrast in one set of environments f a i l to contrast in some other set of environments on the same layer of s t r u c t u r e . For syncretization, we must f i n d distinct elements on one layer of structure which in at least some cases have the same realization on the structural layer below. Thus both suspen­ sion and syncretization involve lack of contrast, but when t h e r e is suspension this lack is opposed to contrasts which occur in other positions, and when t h e r e is syncretization, it is opposed to the occurrence of contrasting realizates on a higher level. The use of the same t e r m for both phenomena has been aided by the fact t h a t many concrete situations involving one of these phenomena t u r n out to involve the other as w e l l . To show t h a t they really are distinct, how­ e v e r , it is only necessary to show t h a t some examples illus­ t r a t i n g one phenomenon cannot be used to illustrate the other. As it t u r n s o u t , while many of the most f r e q u e n t l y cited examples involve both suspension and syncretization at the same t i m e , t h e r e are still f a i r l y f r e q u e n t examples in which suspension occurs without syncretization, and others where syncretization occurs without suspension. All t h r e e possibilities with respect to the occurrence of suspension and syncretization can be i l l u s t r a t e d , as it h a p ­ pens, with the examples already cited in sections 1.1 and 1.2. The Thai data illustrates suspension without syncretiza­ tion. Although the contrasts of voicing and aspiration are suspended in final position as illustrated above, t h e r e is no syncretization because t h e r e is no need to identify any final /p/'s or / t / ' s with aspirates or voiced consonants morphophonemically. We can most simply consider them to be r e a l i z a ­ tions of / / p / / and //t// and we could speak of a suspension on the morphophonemic level as well as on the phonemic, but t h e r e would be no syncretization.

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The Polish example, on the other hand, illustrates the occurrence of syncretization without suspension. There are no environments at all in which //æ// has a separate r e a l i ­ zation from both / / a / / and / / c e / / . The phonemes / a / and / e / which serve to realize / / æ / / can in general contrast in just about any environment; they are in no case subject to sus­ pension. 8 As to the Russian examples cited as illustrations of both phenomena, it should be clear t h a t they are indeed related in a way which very commonly occurs: syncretization and suspension occur in the same examples and under the same environmental conditions. The morphophonemes //t// and / / d / / , for instance, have a syncretized realization in p r e ­ cisely those environments--final and before an obstruent-where their more usual realizations /t/ and /d/ cannot con­ t r a s t phonologically because of suspension. The g r e a t frequency of situations parallel to that illus­ t r a t e d for Russian, t h e n , is a major reason why e a r l i e r writers have failed to make an adequate distinction between suspension and syncretization. The fact t h a t s i t u ­ ations like those illustrated by the Thai and Polish data can also occur, however, makes it clearly necessary to d i s t i n ­ guish the two phenomena in t e r m s of definition and nomenclature. 2. Interpretations of Suspension Phenomena. The main topic of this paper is the sort of n e u t r a l i z a ­ tion t e r m e d suspension r a t h e r than syncretization. This is appropriate in a discussion of autonomous phonology, since suspension can be discussed wholly in t e r m s of an a u t o n o ­ mous phonological level, without considering the relationship of this level to a more abstract level as is r e q u i r e d in dis­ cussions of phonological syncretization. 2.1 Interpretations in the Prague School. In the classic l i t e r a t u r e of the Prague School from the 1930's, t h r e e distinct i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of suspension phenom­ ena are found. All t h r e e of these agree on the occurrence of phonological suspension, but they disagree on the a p p r o ­ priate phonological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of sounds occurring in

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positions where a given contrast is suspended. These three approaches, which may be t e r m e d the archiphonemic approach, the unmarked member approach, and the phonetic identification approach, will be taken up in the following paragraphs. 2.11 The Archiphonemic Approach. The archiphonemic approach is doubtless the one most readily associated with the Prague School by phonologists of other persuasions, because it is the one set f o r t h in T r u ­ betzkoy 1939, the Prague School work most o f t e n r e a d , ( e i t h e r in the original Grman, the French translation by Cantineau [Trubetzkoy 1 9 4 9 ] , or the English translation by Baltaxe [Trubetzkoy 1 9 6 9 ] ) . Essentially the archiphonemic approach works as follows: given a sound occurring in a position where a contrast X/Y is suspended, and which is phonetically similar to both X and Y, this sound is identified with neither X nor Y, but with a third e n t i t y , Z, which represents the phonetic p r o p ­ e r t i e s held in common by X and Y and excludes r e f e r e n c e to the properties by which they would contrast. This third e n t i t y Z is an archiphoneme, and as such is a subordinated e n t i t y r a t h e r than a f u l l - f l e d g e d member of the phonemic inventory. Thus if a voiced/voiceless contrast such as / t / vs. / d / is suspended in particular positions in a given language, the most closely related sounds to these occurring in the position of suspension will be phonologically i d e n t i f i e d with an element usually symbolized / T / , which incorporates all properties / t / and / d / have in common (e.g. closure and apicality in a typical case), but is unspecified f o r the p r o p ­ e r t y d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g contrastive / t / from / d / (e.g. voiceless­ ness vs. voicing in a typical case). The archiphoneme /T/, and similar ones for any similarly suspendable voiceless/ voiced pairs, may seem to complicate the description when viewed from the point of view of inventories. If each pho­ neme or archiphoneme symbol is viewed as standing f o r a complex of distinctive properties (or f e a t u r e s ) , however, the archiphonemic approach can be seen as achieving a degree of economy, since voicelessness or voicing would have to be symbolized only in those positions where it can have dis­ tinctive value, and the phonetic voicing, voicelessness, or intermediate quality of sounds in the position of n e u t r a l i ­ zation could be l e f t as m a t t e r s of automatic predictability.

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2.12 The Unmarked-Member

Approach.

The approach here t e r m e d 'unmarked-member' identifies all putative archiphonemes with one or the other member of the contrast which has been suspended, namely t h a t member which is considered unmarked. Like the archiphonemic approach, this view is also found in the w r i t i n g s of T r u ­ betzkoy, but not in those which have received primary a t t e n t i o n as representing his point of view. Trubetzkoy 1931, f o r example, states: In those positions where the correlative p r o p ­ e r t y of a phoneme loses its phonological sig­ nificance, this phoneme is i d e n t i f i e d with the unmarked member of the c o r r e l a t i o n , even if it is objectively identical with the marked member of the correlation (p. 9 8 ) . 9

With this approach, t h e n , any sound i d e n t i f i e d with / T / in the archiphonemic approach would be i d e n t i f i e d with / t / if this is u n m a r k e d , or with / d / if this is u n m a r k e d . 1 0 In this way, we will have only two inventory units by any count, but when / t / is unmarked its presence will not nec­ essarily mean t h a t no voicing is p r e s e n t , merely t h a t no distinctive voicing is present. The presence of / d / under the same circumstances will mean not only t h a t voicing is p r e s ­ e n t , but t h a t the voicing is distinctive in being potentially opposable to its absence in the position where it occurs. Thus the phone [ d ] will be an allophone of / d / where its voicing is distinctive, but an allophone of / t / where such voicing is predictable. This approach has a major advantage of the archipho­ nemic view while lacking the major shortcoming of t h a t l a t ­ t e r view. Like the archiphonemic approach, the u n m a r k e d member approach does not require the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a property such as voicing in positions where its presence is predictable, even though such presence may not be predic­ table in other definable positions. But unlike the archipho­ nemic approach, this alternative does not r e q u i r e the p r o ­ l i f e r a t i o n of the inventory with subordinate units, which indicate the non-distinctiveness of given properties. In our present example / t / , / d / , and archiphoneme / T / , the inven­ tory is reduced from 3 to 2. In other more complicated

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cases, as in some Russian examples pointed out by M a r t i n e t (1936:48), the reduction would be more, because under the archiphonemic approach t h e r e would actually have to be more archiphonemes than phonemes in a given r a n g e , where more than one correlative constrast is subject to suspension under d i f f e r e n t circumstances. 1 1 This approach permits a degree of overlap in assigning phones as allophones of particular phonemes, in t h a t a [ d ] would be assigned to unmarked / t / wherever its voicing is not distinctive, and to marked / d / where its voicing is dis­ tinctive. Such overlapping, however, is completely without ambiguity: one could always t e l l which phoneme is being realized by noting the environment in which the phone occurs, so t h a t t h e r e would never be an ambiguous assign­ ment in a given environment. The same is also t r u e of the archiphonemic approach, which would assign distinctively voiced [ d ] to / d / , distinctively voiceless [t] to / t / , and a [ d ] or [ t ] which is predictably voiced or voiceless in its given environment to the archiphoneme / T / . A potential difficulty with the unmarked-member approach, however, is t h a t it r e q u i r e s one to make a clear decision about the marked or unmarked status of a phono­ logical property. The general applicability of this approach, t h a t is, would assume t h a t t h e r e will always be a way of deciding on the marked or unmarked status of the members of any suspendable contrast. The archiphonemic approach, on the other hand, does not r e q u i r e such a decision in order to be applicable. The general outlines of the kind of theory needed to deal with the problem of deciding on the marked or unmarked status of a property have already been laid down by Trubetzkoy. He has suggested, for example, t h a t we can in general establish a notion of phonetic markedness by viewing as unmarked the type of articulation "whose production r e q u i r e s the least deviation from normal b r e a t h ­ ing" (1969:146). Phonological markedness, f u r t h e r m o r e , would be assumed to correspond to phonetic markedness except in cases w h e r e evidence in the language points to a d i f f e r e n t conclusion. This approach would allow facts of the individual language to be taken into account where they clearly point one way or another, and would allow one to fall back upon universal considerations in the absence of clear functional evidence. The approach outlined here would of course have to be elaborated in more detail before it could be

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considered as d e f i n i t i v e . For the p r e s e n t , it will suffice to point out the necessity of careful a t t e n t i o n to the c r i t e r i a for establishing marked and unmarked status if the unmarked member approach is to be adopted. 2.13 The Phonetic Identification Approach. According to Vachek's history of the Prague School, most Prague linguists never adhered to e i t h e r of the views dis­ cussed in the previous sections. Rather they i d e n t i f i e d a sound in a position of suspension with one or the other contrastive phoneme according to its actual phonetics, while 'not ignoring, at the same t i m e , the fact t h a t the phonolo­ gical opposition ... is ... neutralized' (1966:62). Transcriptionally, this approach seems no d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of the Neo-Bloomfieldian phonologists who refused to admit any suspension at all. It seems to d i f f e r only in t h a t the fact of suspension is admitted in the general theory, but the transcriptional system seems to be out of phase with the general theory in not reflecting its occurrence. The only way t h a t such a transcription can be brought into coherence with the recognition of the suspension would seem to be by the use of subsidiary symbols f o r indicating the occurrence of the suspension. One might, f o r example, set up a series of diacritic symbols for the suspension of each suspendable contrast in a language, and use these together with the phonetically identified major symbols. If a circumflex is used for the suspension of voicing, for instance, we would w r i t e / t / for [ t ] in a position where voicing is suspended, and /d/ for a [ d ] in a similar posi­ t i o n . A system along these general lines, though d i f f e r i n g in d e t a i l , was in fact proposed in Prague Circle 1931 f o r ' d e ­ tailed phonological transcription' designed to distinguish 'the positions in which both correlative phonemes can occur f r o m the positions where only one of the two correlative pho­ nemes is admitted.' 1 2 Even though the phonetic approach may have been widely adopted in the Prague School, it must in the end be dismissed as the least tenable of the t h r e e Praguian posi­ tions in view of its essential inconsistency. It may be seen as an unsuccessful synthesis of two points of view t h a t cannot in fact by coherently synthesized in t e r m s of a s i n -

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gle level: one emphasizing the suspension of contrasts, and another focusing on phonetic identification. A single t r a n ­ scription which a t t e m p t s to r e f l e c t both these viewpoints at once results in the recording of more distinctions than would be necessary in a transcription r e f l e c t i n g e i t h e r i n d i ­ vidual point of view. 13 A f u r t h e r disadvantage of the phonetic identification approach is t h a t it fails to give us any solution at all to the problem presented when the sound occurring in a posi­ tion of suspension is phonetically i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n the otherwise contrasting sounds. Take, f o r example, the vowels of such words as tier, tear, tour, and tore in r - f u l l American dialects, which can be seen as a suspending tense  close vs. lax  open contrast seen before most other consonants, as in teal vs. till, tale vs. tell, pool vs. pull, and pole vs. Paul. Here the archiphonemic approach would have no i d e n t i f i c a ­ tion problems at a l l , and the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach would be faced only with the general question involving the decision as to which member is considered to be unmarked. 1 4 2.2 Suspension in Stratificational Phonology. 2.20 Historical Preliminaries. Initially, stratificational theory was an outgrowth of some of the more sophisticated Neo-Bloomfieldian work of the period centering around the 1950's. 15 In the course of the t h e o r / s development, however, it has been receptive to many ideas which originated in European schools of linguis­ tics, and has striven to develop a synthesis which incorpo­ r a t e s the best of several views while retaining a f u n d a ­ mental coherence of basic outlook. The most f u n d a m e n t a l of such ideas is undoubtedly the notion t h a t linguistic s t r u c ­ t u r e consists solely of relationships, which derives in p a r ­ ticular f r o m the glossematic theory of Louis Hjelmslev (1961) and can ultimately be traced back to Saussure's dictum t h a t 'in language t h e r e are only d i f f e r e n c e s ... without positive terms' (Saussure 1959:120). In phonology specifically, we find t h a t the s t r a t i f i c a ­ tional view has been receptive to the idea of suspension from the Prague School and the idea of prosodic analysis from the Firthian. The latter notion, of course, has

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Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

parallels in Neo-Bloomfieldian work especially in the long components of Harris (1944, 1951) and some aspects of the phonological I analysis proposed in Hockett 1955. Such t r e a t m e n t s , however, w e r e never accorded general accep­ tance by the Neo-Bloomfieldians except in t h e i r restricted application to classically suprasegmental phenomena such as stress, t o n e , and intonation. In accepting the suspendability of contrasts, s t r a t i f i c a tional phonology stands in particular contrast to the usual Neo-Bloomfieldian a t t i t u d e s , particularly those r e f l e c t e d in the classical papers of the 1940's. Hockett 1942, f o r e x a m ­ ple, f l a t l y states t h a t 'any talk of neutralization or cancel­ lation of archiphonemes confuses the facts without adding anything' ( 1 9 4 2 : 1 0 1 b - - i n Joos, 1 0 4 - 5 - - i n Makkai). 1 6 Similarly Harris (1944:2.2) criticizes the concepts of neutralization and the archiphoneme as 'not ... a productive method of description' on the grounds t h a t they handle only some of the positional limitations on the occurrence of phonemes and not others. The remainder of section 2.2 will be devoted to the presentation and comparison of two d i f f e r e n t approaches to the incorporation of suspension within stratificational pho­ nology. 2.21 Translations Approaches

of

the

Archiphonemic

and

Unmarked-Member

The f i r s t explicit discussion of suspension in connection with stratificational phonology is found in Lockwood 1972a, a paper originally p r e p a r e d in 1969 and cast in t e r m s of the model c u r r e n t at that t i m e . According to t h a t model, the autonomous phonemic level was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o n f i g u ­ rations of componential units t e r m e d hypophonemes, while the phonemes and phonons w e r e more abstract (cf. Lamb 1966). The major purpose of this 1972 paper was to show t h a t the suspension of contrasts could readily be r e p r e ­ sented in the stratificational system, and t h a t the s t r a t i f i ­ cational evaluation measure would p r e f e r solutions incorpo­ rating suspension to alternatives without it in the situations where the phenomenon was classically recognized. A f u r t h e r purpose of the paper was to point out t h a t the recognition of suspension provides one way out of the dilemma o r i g i -

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

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nally posed by Halle 1959 concerning the asymmetry of voicing alternations in Russian without the abandonment of the biuniqueness of autonomous phonology. 17 It further showed that stratificational phonology is most compatible with the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach to suspension, and showed a formalized application of this approach f o r a hypothetical but typical case of voicing suspension. Let us compare the approach to suspension discussed in Lockwood 1972a with their antecedents in the Prague School. To f a c i l i t a t e the comparison, the discussion will focus on the various levels of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and their realizational interrelationships, and it will f u r t h e r m o r e be confined to Russian / t / and / d / and the suspension of the voicing contrast between them. 1 8 It assumes the relevance of three levels within phonology in the broad sense: Morphophonemic, Phonemic, and Phonetic. Terminological d i f f e r e n c e s involving d i f f e r e n t names f o r one or more of these in v a r i ­ ous versions of stratificational theory will be ignored. In these t e r m s , t h e n , the basic facts are as follows. 1)

The morphophonemes //t// and //d// may be distinguished in ail positions. For example, the prefixes //ot// and //pod// occur before vowels as in / / o t u č i / / 'to break (of something)'; //pod u č i / / 'to instruct'; before resonants as in / / o t r u b , i / 'to chip off', //pod r u b , i / / 'to hew'; before voice­ less obstruents as in / / o t skoči// 'to j u m p aside', //pod skoči// 'to j u m p , run up'; and before voiced obstruents as in //ot 'to b,iraj// 'to take away 4 , //pod b , i r a j / / pick up'.

2)

Phonetically [ t ] and [ d ] are distinguished as the phonetic realizations of //t// and //d// only before a vowel or before a resonant, including a plain or palatalized [v] at the end of a cluster of phonetic obstruents. Cf. the infinitive forms of the above examples: [Atvčít,], [pədvčít,], [ A t r v b , í t , ] , and [ p ə d r v b , í t , ] . In other positions, one finds either only [ t ] or only [ d ] according to f u r t h e r con-

3)

112

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n " ditions: (a) finally or obstruent, only [t], [pətskač í t , ] ; (b) before e n t , only [ d ] [ a d b , l r á t , ] ,

before voiceless e.g. [atskačít,], a voiced o b s t r u ­ [pədb,lrát,].

Tables I and II summarize f o u r t r e a t m e n t s of this s i t u ­ ation using e i t h e r the archiphonemic or the u n m a r k e d - m e m ­ ber approach to suspension. Each table f u r t h e r presents two versions, the A version in terms of whole segments as in the Prague originals, and the  version using singulary Table I: The Archiphonemic Approach to Russian t / d . A. Segmental Approach: Prague

School

components as in stratificational

phonology.

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113

Table i l : The U n m a r k e d - M e m b e r Approach to Russian t/d A. Segmental Approach: Prague School

B. Componential Approach: Stratification

Interpretation

In the approach shown in Table I, the archiphoneme / T / of part A is identified with the simultaneous components / C 1 / 'closure' and /Ap/ 'apical' in part B. The full phonemes / t / and / d / of which / T / is the archiphoneme are d i f f e r e n t i ­ ated by the presence of an unvoicing component /Uv/ for / t / and a component /Vd/ 'voiced' in / d / . The postulation of two such mutually-exclusive components as /Uv/ and / V d / is the closest that stratificational theory can come to r e p r e s e n t a t ing the Praguian notion without the introduction of a d d i ­ tional theoretical apparatus such as would be needed f o r a fully binary (or even multinary) approach. The vertically a r r a n g e d suspension points in the phonetic representation show t h a t t h e r e may be other phonetic components present

114

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

which a r e irrelevant to the present discussion, e.g. a com­ ponent indicating the passive point of articulation such as [ D t ] 'dental' or [Al] 'alveolar'. The u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach shown in Table II d i f ­ f e r s from t h a t of Table I only in failing to make a distinc­ tion between / t / and / T / . Componentially this is accomplished by eliminating the distinction between /Uv/ (unvoiced) and its absence. In this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n an apical stop not marked for voicing will nevertheless contain phonetic voicing if it is next to a voiced obstruent; in all other cases it will contain no phonetic voicing. 1 9 2.22 A Reinterpretation of the Archiphonemic Approach. Another explicit discussion of suspension in the s t r a t i f i cational l i t e r a t u r e occurs in Sullivan 1975. The t r e a t m e n t of Russian voicing suspension presented in t h a t paper has c e r ­ tain points in common with the approaches dealt with in the previous section, but it d i f f e r s from them in other respects. Sullivan's t r e a t m e n t was originally incorporated into his dis­ sertation ( 1 9 6 9 ) , but its relation to archiphonemic principles was not recognized until later. Sullivan's a l t e r n a t e approach is summarized in Table I I I , which is organized along the same lines as the componential parts of Tables I and I I . The following aspects of this approach need to be pointed out:

1) It will be noted t h a t two distinct levels are shown in the area reserved for morphophonemic representations. The higher (more abstract) of these is the morphonic, the usual stratificational equivalent of t r a d i t i o n a l morphophonemics. The lower shows a breakdown into sequential elements / T / and /Y/, the f o r m e r realizing e i t h e r //t// alone or //d// without its voicing, and the l a t t e r being Sullivan's symbol for the voicing e l e m e n t . Since / T / represents what / t / and / d / have in common, it is i d e n t i f i e d with the archiphoneme by Sullivan, and parallel t r e a t m e n t s are proposed f o r simi­ larly r e l a t e d pairs of voiced/voiceless obstruents.

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Table I I I : Sullivan's Modified Approach to Russian t / d .

2) The phonemic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n retains the sequential approach found on the lower of the morphophonemic levels. So the combination: |CI | | Ap| is the realization of the "archiphoneme"

/T/.

3) The phonetic representations d i f f e r only in the way in which the voicing of clusters is r e p r e s e n t e d , since it t r e a t s voicing as a prosodic element extending over the whole of a cluster instead of having a separate occurrence for each segment within it. In order to indicate f u r t h e r t h a t the phonetic voicing which occurs will be the r e a l i z a ­ tion of an element from the end of the cluster we w r i t e it in italics, (Vd), with a bar to indicate the e x t e n t of the prosodic element involved. This element will be the r e a l i z a ­ tion of a /Y/ f r o m the end of the whole cluster. 4) It is f u r t h e r shown will have zero realization environments.

on in

the the

phonemic final or

level t h a t /Y/ pre-obstruent

116

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

Sullivan's basis for identifying the / T / of this t r e a t m e n t with the archiphoneme is primarily Trubetzkoy's d e f i n i t i o n (1969:79) 'the sum of distinctive properties t h a t two pho­ nemes have in common'. His /T/'s basically correspond to archiphonemes by this d e f i n i t i o n , though not by the other definition given elsewhere in the same book (1969:147) by which the archiphoneme function is filled by the unmarked member of the opposition in the position of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n . This d e f i n i t i o n can be met only in t e r m s of the lower level labeled 'PHONEMIC' in Table I I I , and for this reason Sullivan states t h a t the two Trubetzkoyan 'definitions should be understood as r e f e r r i n g to manifestations of the same p h e ­ nomenon on d i f f e r e n t levels of s t r u c t u r e ' (1975:481). One of these levels would be the lower Morphophonemic in the representation of Table I I I , and the other would be the Phonemic. It should thus be clear t h a t Sullivan's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the archiphoneme d i f f e r s from the more conventional one incorporated into Table I in t h a t an archiphoneme is taken to occur even in the absence of the suspension of contrast. Further comparison of these views is presented in the next section. 2.23 Comparison and Evaluation of the Stratification al Approaches. While this is not the place for a full technical discus­ sion of the detailed stratificational solutions involved, some remarks on the comparison and relative merits of the t h r e e solutions of Tables l ( B ) , ll(B) and III are in order. The g r e a t e r economy of the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach of Table ll(B) over the archiphonemic approach of Table l(B) should be f a i r l y obvious without lengthy discussion. The u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach is also more generally in line with the singulary approach to phonological componency generally found in stratificational practice. Although it speaks of archiphonemes, Sullivan's approach actually corresponds more closely to the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach than to the classical archiphonemic approach. It d i f f e r s f r o m the approach of Table l l ( B ) , in f a c t , in only two aspects:

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells 1) 2)

117

The prosodic treatment of phonetic voicing; The sequential treatment of the voicing element on the lower morphophonemic and phonemic levels (along with the r e c ­ ognition of the f o r m e r level for the p u r ­ pose of accounting for this d i f f e r e n c e ) .

With respect to the f i r s t point, the segmental t r e a t ­ ment of voice is by no means an essential characteristic of any of the views: the prosodic view could be incorporated in Table ll(B) (or l ( B ) , f o r t h a t m a t t e r ) without altering the rest of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and much the same can be said for the use of a nonprosodic view in connection with Sulli­ van's t r e a t m e n t of the higher levels. In many ways the p r o ­ sodie view is more realistic for the phonetic level, as was previously suggested in Lockwood 1976.20 The second point seems to be somewhat more objec­ tionable from the point of view of phonetic realism. It involves the use of sequential order in the analysis of a realízate in which no such order prevails in the realization. postulation of such abstract On the other hand, the sequences may be j u s t i f i e d if it significantly simplifies our account of the facts. Linguists commonly posit n o n - p a t e n t sequences, for example in morphophonemic t r e a t m e n t s of such allegro phrases as /míšœ ə/ 'miss you' or / k ə n f y ú w ž ə / 'confuse you' in English. And in autonomous phonemics we o f t e n find reasons to regard u n i t a r y phonetic segments as phonemic sequences when it makes our analysis of them simpler and more symmetrical, as when we t r e a t the nuclei of ['b d n ] as phonemic sequences i n / b ə d ə n / . In the present case all t h a t can be given is an interim r e p o r t : no simpler t r e a t m e n t of the facts of Russian obstruent voicing has been o f f e r e d than t h a t formalized by Sullivan (1975:482). In p a r t i c u l a r , any a t t e m p t at a parallel formalized solution of the same data based on the approach to the morphophonemics and phonemics found in Table ll(B) is a t best two points more complex than Sullivan's according to the usually accepted evaluation procedure for s t r a t i f i c a tional descriptions (Lockwood 1972b:58-59).

118

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

The interim n a t u r e of this conclusion results from two factors: 1) as in any such case of comparison, there remains a possibility that a b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e approach may e v e n t u ­ ally be discovered; 2) the stratificational evaluation meas­ u r e , though it is useful and has been quite durable and stable, is subject to revision, and such a revision might a f f e c t the comparison. For example, if the evaluation meas­ ure were revised so t h a t an ordered node counted more than the corresponding unordered one, the comparison might be a f f e c t e d . In the absence of such developments, however, we must conclude t h a t Sullivan's t r e a t m e n t is the most economical one k n o w n . 2 1

ENDNOTES *The original version of this paper was presented in the Symposium on Autonomous Phonemics at the Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America (Chicago, December 2 9 - 3 0 , 1977). It is o f f e r e d here in view of Rulon Wells's long interest in the history of phonemic theory, r e f l e c t e d , for example in Wells 1974. Thanks are due to Ralph Vanderslice f o r the numerous useful editorial sugges­ tions on an e a r l i e r d r a f t . 1

This basic point was made in Lockwood ( 1 9 7 2 a ) , section 1 , and also mentioned in Lockwood (1972b:193). The discus­ sion in the present paper a t t e m p t s to elaborate and clarify what was said in those works, as well as to o f f e r some a l t e r n a t e terminological suggestions. 2

The t e r m contrast will be used here in its American sense, as the equivalent of the Prague School t e r m opposi­ tion, 3

ln Lockwood (1972a) the term Ρ-neutralization (for P r a g u e - n e u t r a l i z a t i o n ) was used. The a l t e r n a t e t e r m sus­ pension was suggested in passing in Lockwood (1972b:193). 4 S-Neutralization was suggested in Lockwood (1972a) ( f o r stratificational neutralization parallel to P - n e u t r a l i z a t i o n ) . The present t e r m recalls the t r a d i t i o n a l t e r m syncre­ tism, used in t r a d i t i o n a l grammar f o r a situation in which

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

119

more abstract grammatical categories happened to have the same r e a l i z a t i o n . The generalization of the l a t t e r t e r m was suggested by Hjelmslev (1961:87-93). 3 In the original (Trubetzkoy (1936:187), 'Es gibt L a u t g e ­ g e n s ä t z e , die nur in bestimmten Lautstellungen phonologisch relevant sind, weil nur in diesen Stellungen sowohl das eine wie das andere Oppositionsglied zugelassen w e r d e n , w ä h r e n d in den ubrigen Stellungen e n t w e d e r nur das e i n e , oder nur das andere Oppositionsglied vorkommt. . .Solche Gegensätze nennen wir aufhebbar. . . . '

6

Examples are from Haas and Subhanka (1945). In a d d i ­ tion the voicing contrast, but not t h a t of aspiration, is sus­ pended in various initial clusters. The aspiration contrast also applies to dorsal and (phonetically a f f r i c a t e d ) palatal stops, but these never have voiced c o u n t e r p a r t s . 7

Since d i f f e r e n t linguists have had d i f f e r e n t opinions on the phonemic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the syncretized r e a l i z a ­ tions in such cases, the syncretized examples have been cited in phonetic r a t h e r than phonemic transcription. These problems of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n will be r e t u r n e d to in section 2. 5 From a diachronic viewpoint, of course, the syncretization results f r o m a double diachronic suspension of the type which Hoenigswald (1960:95) t e r m e d 'split through m e r g e r , without residue'.

9

l n the original: 'In den S t e l l u n g e n , wo die korrelative Eigenschaft eines Phonems sein phonologische Gültigkeit v e r l i e r t , wird dieses Phonem mit dem merkmallosen Korrela­ tionsglied i d e n t i f i z i e r t , selbst wenn es objectiv mit dem merkmalhaltigen Korrelationsglied identisch ist.' The above translation was originally published in Lockwood 1972a:667. 10 The voiceless member of a voiceless/voiced phoneme pair is perhaps most f r e q u e n t l y u n m a r k e d , but in some cases the voiced may be unmarked instead, particularly if it is f u r t h e r characterized by laxness or lack of aspiration. William J. Sullivan (personal communication) has claimed t h a t d i f f e r e n t varieties of standard Polish d i f f e r in whether voiced or voiceless is t r e a t e d as marked. Toby G r i f f e n (1975) has also found reasons f o r t r e a t i n g voicing as unmarked in

120

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

Welsh, where voiced resonants as well as opposed to aspirated voiceless c o u n t e r p a r t s .

obstruents

are

11

The example involves the f o u r Russian phonemes /χ/ (voiceless unpalatalized), (voiced unpalatalized), /t'/ (voiceless p a l a t a l i z e d ) , and / d ' / (voiced palatalized) ( M a r t i ­ net's symbols are used). In some positions, voicing contrasts are suspended but palatalization remains in f o r c e , and thus the voicing-neutral archiphonemes l\l and /TV are d i s t i n ­ guished. In other positions, palatalization contrasts a r e sus­ pended, but voicing is still distinctive, so we have the p a l a ­ t a l i z a t i o n - n e u t r a l archiphonemes / t / and / d / . Finally, in some positions both contrasts are n e u t r a l i z e d , resulting in the archiphoneme / T / , for which both voicing and palatalization are i r r e l e v a n t . 12 A S on page 324:'6 + Dans la transcription phonologique detaillée on distinguera les positions dans lesquelles des phonèmes c o r r é l a t i f s peuvent f i g u r e r l'un comme l'autre des positions ou n'est admissible que l'un des deux phonèmes corrélatifs'. See also M a r t i n e t 1936 f o r f u r t h e r discussion of the conflict between the archiphonemic approach as r e f l e c t e d in Trubetzkoy 1931 and the phonetic identification approach.

13

l f we w e r e to apply such a transcription to the Rus­ sian apical stops as discussed in footnote 1 1 , f o r example, one would have the potential of sixteen d i f f e r e n t units, taking into account the four phonetic items [ t ] , [ t ' ] , [ d ] , and [ d ' ] and t h e i r potential occurrence in positions with d i f f e r e n t numbers of voicing and palatalization contrasts: 1) both voicing and palatalization are distinctive; 2) voicing is distinctive, but palatalization is not; 3) palatalization is dis­ t i n c t i v e , but voicing is not; and 4) neither voicing nor p a l a ­ talization is distinctive. This compares with the four units needed in the u n m a r k e d - m e m b e r approach, and the nine ( f o u r f u l l phonemes and five archiphonemes) in the a r c h i ­ phonemic approach. 14

lt is interesting to note t h a t tagmemic theory, as set f o r t h in Pike 1967, speaks of an archiphoneme only when one finds 'a sound i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n the norms of two pho­ nemes, and within the same componential and congruent system as those norms but d i f f e r i n g only in the local e n v i -

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

121

ronment' (1967:300). Otherwise, this theory does not speak of the suspension or neutralization of phonemic contrasts, but r a t h e r 'a sound which is once seen to have the status of a phoneme at one place in the system is assumed to r e t a i n its phonemic status at other places in t h a t same sys­ t e m , even when in those places the contrastive c o u n t e r p a r t does not occur' (296). 15

See Lamb 1971 ( 1 5 - 1 7 ) for a b r i e f discussion of this background. Lamb has f r e q u e n t l y cited works by Hockett (e.g. 1947, 1954, 1955, 1958 and 1961) and T r a g e r (1955) as important Neo-Bloomfieldian influences on his own thought. The influence of transformational linguistics must also be recognized in the form of a general a g r e e m e n t about the linguistic relevance of what may, to give it a n e u t r a l des­ ignation, be t e r m e d non-patent structures in both phonologi­ cal and syntactic structures. (This t e r m was suggested in (Swadesh & Voegelin 1939) in r e f e r e n c e to morphophonemic abstractions.) Despite t h e i r f u n d a m e n t a l a g r e e m e n t on this point, stratificationalists generally disagree with t r a n s f o r ­ mationalists on other points concerning the relationships of p a t e n t and n o n - p a t e n t s t r u c t u r e s , including (1) the use of processes in relating the t w o , and (2) the importance of continued study of patternings on the p a t e n t levels of sur­ face syntax and autonomous phonology. The amount of over­ all disagreement today seems less than f o r m e r l y , however, as a result of gradual changes in the a t t i t u d e s of many transformationalists. 16

Hockett's later writings, however, reflect more sympathetic view of suspension. See, f o r Hockett 1951 and Hockett 1955, section 3232.

a much example,

17

Earlier discussion is in Lamb 1966, which proposed a d i f f e r e n t stratificational solution. Cf. Lamb and Vanderslice 1976 tor Lamb's later views. For a similar conclusion on the part of a transformational phonologist, see Johns 1969, and cf. the comment in Lockwood 1972a:651, n3. 18

Thus the f u r t h e r suspensions involving the palatalized counterparts of these phonemes and parallel phenomena involving obstruents ( a n d , for palatalization, resonants as w e l l ) will be l e f t aside.

122

Lockwood: Phonological

"Neutralization"

19

In all these approaches, it is taken f o r g r a n t e d t h a t voicelessness should be regarded phonetically as the absence of a p r o p e r t y , since voicelessness corresponds most directly to the state of the laryngeal mechanism in normal b r e a t h ­ ing. higher levels of the phonology, and t h a t a f o r m a t t e r m e d the 20There it was f u r t h e r suggested what prosodies are also relevant f o r higher levels of the phonology, and t h a t a f o r m a t t e r m e d the 'switch-matrix' may be the most a p p r o ­ priate one for phonetic representations in a stratificational model. 21

L a m b and Vanderslice 1976 present an analysis of the same Russian data equivalent to Sullivan's, though w i t h o u t explicit discussion of its relation to the archiphoneme.

REFERENCES CITED

G r i f f e n , Toby D. 1975. "On describing the cluster prosody." The First LACUS Forum, 140-147. Haas, Mary R. and H. R. Subhanka. 1945. Spoken Thai, vol. 1. New York: Holt. Halle, Morris. 1959. The Sound Pattern of Russian.The Hague: Mouton. Harris, Zellig S. 1944. "Simultaneous components in phonol­ ogy." Language 20.181-205. Reprinted in Joos 1957 (124-138) and in V. B. Makkai 1972 ( 1 1 5 - 1 3 5 ) . . 1951. Methods in Structural Linguistics. Chicago: U n i ­ versity of Chicago Press. (Paperback reissue under the t i t l e Structural Linguistics, Phoenix Books.) Hjelmslev, Louis. 1961. Prolegomena to a Theory of Language. Omkring Sprogteoriens Translated from the Danish Grundlægelse (Copenhagen, 1943) by Francis J. Whit­ f i e l d . 2nd Edition. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Hockett, Charles F. 1942. "A system of descriptive phonol­ ogy." Language 18.3-21. Reprinted in Joos 1957 ( 9 7 - 1 0 8 ) and in V. B. Makkai 1972 ( 9 9 - 1 1 2 ) . . 1947. "Problems of morphemic analysis." 23.321-343. Reprinted in Joos 1957 ( 2 2 9 - 2 4 2 ) .

Language

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

123

. 1951. "Review of Phonology as Functional Phonetics by Andre M a r t i n e t . " Language 27.333-342. Reprinted in V. B. Makkai 1972 ( 3 1 0 - 3 1 7 ) . . 1954. "Two models of grammatical description." Word 10.210-234. Reprinted in Joos 1957 ( 3 8 6 - 3 9 9 ) . . 1955. A Manual of Phonology. International Journal of American Linguistics, Memoir 1 1 . . 1958. A Course in Modern Linguistics. New York: Mac­ millan. .

1961. "Linguistic elements and their relations." Language 37.29-53. Hoenigswald, Henry M. 1960. Language Change and Linguistic Reconstruction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Johns, David A. 1969. "Phonemics and generative phonology." Papers from the Fifth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Lin­ guistic Society. 374-381. Reprinted in V. B. Makkai 1972. Joos, M a r t i n ( e d . ) . 1957. Readings in Linguistics. Washington, D. C.: American Council of Learned Societies. (Reis­ sued as Readings in Linguistics I, University of Chicago Press, 1966.) Lamb, Sydney M. 1964. "The sememic approach to structural semantics." American Anthropologist 66.3 (pt2) 57-58. Reprinted in Makkai and Lockwood 1973 ( 2 0 7 - 2 2 8 ) . . 1966. "Prolegomena to a theory of phonology." Lan­ guage 536-573. Reprinted in V. B. Makkai 1972 (606-633) and in Makkai and Lockwood ( 1 2 8 - 1 6 5 ) . . 1971. "The crooked path of progress in cognitive linguistics." Georgetown University Round Table ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 99-123. Reprinted in Makkai and Lockwood 1973 (12-33). Lamb, Sydney M. and Ralph Vanderslice. 1976. "On thrashing classical phonemics." The Second LACUS Forum, 154-163. Lockwood, David G. 1972a. " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n , biuniqueness, and stratificational phonology." In V. B. Makkai 1972 (646-669). . 1972b. Introduction to Stratificational Linguistics. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. . 1976. "Alternatives to matrix models in phonetics and phonology." The Second LACUS Forum, 141-153. M a k k a i , Adam and David G. Lockwood (eds.). 1973. Readings in Stratificational Linguistics. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

124

Lockwood: Phonological " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n "

Makkai, Valerie Becker. 1972. Phonological Theory: Evolution and Current Practice. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Win­ ston. M a r t i n e t , André. 1936. "Neutralisation et archiphonème." Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 6 . 4 6 - 5 7 . Pike, Kenneth L. 1967. Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior. The Hague: Mouton. Prague Circle. 1931. "Principes de transcription phonolo­ gique." Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 4.323-326. Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1959. Course in General Linguistics, translation by Wade Baskin (Cours de linguistique 1916). New York: Philosophical générale, Paris, Library. Sullivan, William J. 1969. "A stratificational description of the phonology and inflectional morphology of Rus­ sian." Unpublished Dissertation, Yale University. U n i ­ versity Microfilms I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order No. 7 0 - 1 6 , 5 6 6 . . " A l t e r n a t i o n , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , r e a l i z a t i o n , and s t r a t i ­ fication revisited." The First LACUS Forum, 472-522, 1975. Swadesh, Morris and C. F. Voegelin. 1939. "A problem in phonological a l t e r n a t i o n . " Language 15.1-10. Reprinted in Joos 1957 ( 8 8 - 9 2 ) . T r a g e r , George L. 1955. "French verb inflection." Language 31.511-529. Trubetzkoy, N. S. 1931. "Die phonologischen Systeme." Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 4.96-116. . 1936. "Die Aufhebung der phonologischen Gegen­ sätze." Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 6 , 2 9 - 4 5 . . 1939. "Grundzüge der Phonologie" (=Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague 7), 1939. . 1949. Principes de phonologie. Translation of T r u b e t z ­ koy 1939 by J. Cantineau. Paris: Librarie C. Klincksieck. . 1969. Principles of Phonology. Translation of T r u b e t z ­ koy 1939 by Christiane A. M. Baltaxe. Berkeley: U n i ­ versity of California Press. Vachek, Josef. 1966. The Linguistic School of Prague. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Wells, Rulon S. 1974. "Phonemics in the Nineteenth Century, 1876-1900." In Studies in the History of Linguistics: Tradi­ tions and Paradigms. (Dell Hymes, e d . ) , 4 3 4 - 5 3 . Bloom­ ington: Indiana University Press.

III SYNTAX AND BEYOND

GRAMMATICAL PHRASES AND LEXICAL PHRASES

by Andre M a r t i n e t Ecole pratique des hautes études Sorbonne, Paris There was a time when the exhaustive analysis of utterances into successive units, phonemes and morphemes, was deemed the first duty of the descriptivist. Is the current lack of interest in such problems due to the belief that they have received a totally satisfactory solution; or do people f e e l t h a t they have found a more satisfactory approach than the analytic one? It would seem t h a t the l a t t e r is the case, when we find t h a t the r e f e r e n c e to 'rules' is f a r more common than the mention of morphemes in c u r r e n t linguistic l i t e r a t u r e in America. One of the various reasons for this state of a f f a i r s may have been t h a t the post-Bloomfieldian conception of the morpheme blocked the road toward a satisfactory handling of the problems of syntax understood as the study of how significant units combine in order to convey i n f o r m a t i o n . If what is at issue is the identity of a relation such as the one which is r e f e r r e d to as 'genitive', it is perfectly imma­ t e r i a l whether it assumes the same form everywhere, or whether its form undergoes minor variations ( e . g . , Latin -is or -us) or major ones ( e . g . , Latin - i s , -us vs. -1). In Eng­ lish syntax, we want to operate with a single unit called 'plural' irrespective of the way plural is m a r k e d , by means of - s , - e n , or vowel mutation. It would seem t h a t , for many linguists, 'morpheme' implied a minimum of formal identity, that made the t e r m u n f i t for the designation of a u n i t , such as 'plural' or 'genitive', identified on the basis of its complementary distribution, but designated in r e f e r e n c e to its significant value. That is the reason why I rejected the t e r m and chose t h a t of 'monème' f o r the designation of

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the minimal significant unit irrespective of its formal avatars, even at the cost of its segmental n a t u r e as in French à + le > /  / , English deer + plural > deer. Unhampered by irrelevant formal considerations, the linguists who operate with monemes have proceeded, in m a t t e r s of linguistic description, without r e f e r e n c e e i t h e r to transformations or generation or to any 'deep structure'. It is t r u e t h a t they had, long b e f o r e , managed to d i s t i n ­ guish on all levels the linguistically relevant from the i r r e l ­ evant f e a t u r e s of speech events. They have established classes of monemes on the basis of like compatibilities, pointed out that a moneme can be t r a n s f e r r e d from one class to another, and t h a t some mutually compatible classes may e n t e r t a i n d i f f e r e n t relations, those which are t r a d i ­ tionally r e f e r r e d to as 'grammatical functions'. The marking of 'functions' is assumed either by the respective positions of the monemes involved, or by specific monemes, the connectives. The l a t t e r are identified as monemes whose appearance is conditioned by the presence of two units whose relation has to be specified. Distin­ guishing between connectives, w h e t h e r coordinators ( e . g . , and) or subordinators (e.g., with) and all other monemes is the f i r s t task of the descriptivist. Once minimal significant units have been identified by commutation, the question arises of whether and how they combine into larger units, w h e t h e r , for instance, we should r e t a i n such notions as 'word' and 'sentence'. Now, the most common reaction at this point is a conservative one, at least as f a r as 'word' is concerned. For most people involved, the question is not w h e t h e r , but how the notion of word can be vindicated. We are so used to conceiving of language as w r i t t e n t e x t s , with blanks between groups of l e t t e r s , that the very notion of operating with smaller sig­ nificant units is apt to make us dizzy and we cannot recover our balance unless our morphemes or monemes are d u t i f u l l y identified as segments of words. Yet it seems to be worth trying to investigate how minimal units actually combine in the flow of speech, when 'combining' does not r e f e r to formal accidents, but to the possibilities of moneme classes to coexist meaningfully.

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When faced with brushes, on the syntactic level, our task is no longer to f i n d a suitable formulation to account f o r the choice of / - i z / instead of / - z / , but to identify, by r e f e r e n c e to the context, / - i z / e i t h e r as the f o r m of a 'plural' moneme, compatible with a noun, or as the r e d u n ­ dant reminder of a so-called 'third person', compatible with a verb. If brushes is found just a f t e r the, it will be i d e n t i ­ f i e d as noun + 'plural'. Both 'definite article' and 'plural' will be ascribed to classes of nominal d e t e r m i n a n t s and placed on the same syntactic level, irrespective of the facts that the can be formally separated f r o m its head, as in the big brushes, whereas -es cannot and is t h e r e f o r e written immediately after brush without an intervening blank. Syntactically, it is perfectly i r r e l e v a n t whether we have two 'words', as in the brush, or one w o r d , as in brushes. Syntax is by no means the study of material com­ binations, but that of the compatibilities of moneme classes. This long preamble was indispensable before tackling the real subject of this paper, namely the two basically d i f f e r e n t types of phrases. In lay practice, the English word 'phrase' is very handy in r e f e r e n c e to - I am quoting Web­ ster - 'a sequence of two or more words a r r a n g e d in a grammatical construction and acting as a unit in the s e n ­ tence'. The lack of a suitable French equivalent probably induced Saussure to launch (or revive) the t e r m syntagme which he never really defined - it was not the fashion yet - but illustrated in several instances. Saussure's syntagmes correspond to phrases according to the definition given above, except that some of them are w r i t t e n without breaks between their significant components. In other t e r m s , some as relire, contremaître, indecoof Saussure's syntagmes, such rable are single 'words'. Moreover, some of Saussure's e x a m ­ ples are whole sentences, such as Dieu est bon. Thus Saussure, when he disregards word boundaries, goes beyond Webster's d e f i n i t i o n , a n d , if we refuse to dis­ tinguish, on the syntactic level, between the brush and brushes, we should probably not hesitate to call both of them 'phrases'. Yet, if we s t a r t f r o m Saussure's analysis, it will be preferable to use his t e r m and make bold to a n g l i ­ cize syntagme into syntagm.

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A possible definition of the Saussurian syntagm might be: 'a part of an utterance combining meaningful units t h a t are more closely r e l a t e d to each other than with the rest of the u t t e r a n c e , plus whatever connects it with t h a t rest? That would cover the Latin 'word' rosarum and its English equivalent 'of (the) roses', with the connectives, 'genitive' and of included, but also classroom and gold watch. It may not be superfluous to point out t h a t 'more closely', in the d e f i n i t i o n , does not r e f e r to any purely semantic r e l a t i o n , but to a syntactic one, implying f o r m and meaning, form consisting, in many cases, in contiguity, with or without supra-segmental additions. As an illustration we shall use the following sentence: He showed us a very beautiful picture by a famous Dutch master. If we are e n t i t l e d to consider it as part of a larger u t t e r ­ ance, the whole sentence may be called a syntagm; a very beautiful picture is one too, so is very beautiful a n d , also, a . . . picture where both very and a are more closely r e l a t e d to t h e i r respective heads, beautiful and picture, than to the rest. master, (by) a . . . Dutch Other syntagms are (by) a . . . master, (by) a famous Dutch master. It is worth pointing out t h a t not all the members of the syntagm need to be con­ tiguous, as shown by a . . . picture, (by) a .. . master. He showed us is not a syntagm since the syntactic r e l a ­ tions between he and showed, us and showed are no closer than t h a t between showed and picture, and the syntagm which includes both showed and picture is the whole sentence. In showed, the relation of 'past' to show d i f f e r s f r o m the one between show(ed) and its nominal or pronominal d e t e r ­ minations on two counts: 1 . 'past' is a n o n - d e t e r m i n a b l e d e t e r m i n a n t , 2. its relation to its head is a simple determination that does not entail the choice of a g r a m ­ matical function. Consequently, we may conceive of a syn­ t a g m , distinct from the sentence, combining the verbal head and its simple determinations such as tense or mood. Some readers may wonder why the connective should be included in the syntagm. What seems to call for this is not so much the desire not to split such Latin words as rosarum than the obvious fact t h a t t h e r e would be no need f o r a connective if t h e r e w e r e nothing to be connected with the rest of the sentence.

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So f a r , we have l e f t out two combinations of m e a n i n g ­ f u l units in which the units 'are more closely related to each other than with the rest', namely beautiful and famous, where each time the operation of commutation yields two units: beauti-ful

, since the f o r m e r is bracketless, and the l a t t e r involves the use of brackets, as is the case with any m a t h ­ ematical notation using infixes instead of prefixes. Besides, the arrow might involve conceptual ambiguity, since usually this symbol does not designate abstract objects.

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We can deduce the following two rules f r o m the Rule 0:

This rule reads: if the r e s u l t a n t of the application of expression X to expression  belongs to 0-category u and expression  belongs to 0-category v, then expression X belongs to category Ovu. Rule 01 is a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d consequence of Rule 0 and the proof is obvious: let X belong to 0-category z t h e n , according to Rule 0 , since  belongs to 0-category v and  belongs to 0-category u, z must be identical with - v u . Rule 01 defines the 0-category of an operator of 0-categories of its operand and r e s u l t a n t .

in

terms

The reverse of Rule 01 is this:

This rule reads: If expression  is the r e s u l t a n t of the application of operator X to its operand , and X belongs to category Ouv, then  belongs to 0 - c a t e g o r y u and  belongs to 0-category v. The proof of Rule 02 is no less obvious: If expression  is constructed by Rule 0 , and operator X belongs to 0-category Ouv, then  must belong to 0 - c a t e g o r y u and  must belong to 0-category v. Rule 02 defines the 0-categories of an operand and a resultant in t e r m s of the 0-category of t h e i r operator.

of

Let us now t u r n to our problem. By applying Rule 01 to the above set of definitions we can define p 1 , p2, p 3 in t e r m s of ultimate d e f i n i e n t i a t and s. This is done in t h r e e steps: f i r s t , we d e f i n e p1 as Ots, then we d e f i n e p2 as otots and finally we d e f i n e p 3 as ototos. As a r e s u l t , we get a new set of definitions: (1') sA Ξ OtsB tC

170

Shaumyan: Applicative (2') OtsBOtOtsB' (3') OtOtsB'

OtOWtsB"

Structure

tC' "

Reducing the definitions of aii 0-categories to their ultimate d e f i n i e n t i a makes it possible to clearly d e t e r m i n e to which O-categories given expressions must belong if they are to combine into categorially w e l l - f o r m e d expressions. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , Rule 0 formalizes the concept of catego­ rial w e l l - f o r m e d n e s s . I call an expression X categorially w e l l - f o r m e d constructed from expression Y 1 t . . . f Y by Rule 0.

if

it

is

η

We may construct applicative t r e e diagrams to r e p r e s e n t various categorial analyses of expressions. For example, a categorial analysis of the sentence Jim showed Nancy pictures may be r e p r e s e n t e d by the following applicative t r e e d i a ­ gram: OtOtOts OtOis Ots s

showed t Nancy (showed Nancy) t pictures ((showed Nancy) pictures) (((showed Nancy) pictures)

t Jim Jim)

Let us now apply the calculus of O-categories to other conceptual problems. We will be concerned with problems arising f r o m conceptual ambiguity and vagueness. It is obvi­ ous t h a t conceptual ambiguity and vagueness are highly disadvantageous for any science. The history of science abounds in examples where an increase in the conceptual clarity of a theory through careful clarifications and speci­ fications of meaning had significant influence on the p r o g ­ ress of science, as, f o r example, the emergence of the theory of special relativity depended on the recognition and subsequent reduction of conceptual ambiguity and vagueness within a particular domain. We will be able to construct precise definitions for syntactical concepts which e i t h e r are used undefined or whose definitions are of little avail because of t h e i r a m b i ­ guity and vagueness.

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I s t a r t with the d e f i n i t i o n of the syntactic system of Applicative Grammar. The syntactic system of Applicative Grammar is defined by six sorts of notions, as follows: (1) (2)

(3) (4) (5)

Primitive O-categories: t, s. Rules for constructing composite categories f r o m the primitives: (a) Primitive O-categories t, s are O-cate­ gories. (b) If χ and y are O-categories, then Oxy is an O-category. Expressions belonging to O-categories. Rules for constructing expressions: Rule 0, Rule 0 1 , Rule 02. Nine combinators (or combinatory operators): /, ,

(6)

 ,

W,

B,

L,

K,

Rules f o r applying combinators.

I will consider combinators below in Section 6.

and

rules f o r

applying

I introduce a f e w definitions. Definition 1. If expression  belongs to category θ, expression  belongs to category f and expression X belongs to category Ots, I call X a ONE-PLACE PREDICATE and call  a PRIMARY TERM. Definition 2. If expression  belongs to category Ots,  belongs to category t and expression expression X belongs to category OtOts, I call X a TWO-PLACE PREDICATE and call   SECONDARY TERM. Definition 3. If expression expression 

XY belongs to category OtOts, belongs to category f and

them

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Structure

expression X belongs to category OtOtOts, I call X a THREE-PLACE PREDICATE and call   TERTIARY TERM. The opposition of a primary and a secondary t e r m con­ stitutes the NUCLEUS of a sentence. These t e r m s I call NUCLEAR. It follows from the Definitions 1-2 t h a t primary t e r m s occur both in the opposition PRIMARY TERM : SECONDARY TERM (with two-place predicates) and outside with opposi­ tion (with one-place predicates). T h e r e f o r e , the position with one-place predicate must be r e g a r d e d as the point of neutralization of the opposition PRIMARY TERM : SECONDARY TERM which is r e p r e s e n t e d by the primary t e r m in this position. The primary term is the neutral-negative (unmarked) member and the secondary t e r m is the positive (marked) member of this opposition. Definition 4. Let AB be a w e l l - f o r m e d expression. It follows f r o m Rule 01 t h a t A belongs to 0-category Oxy, B, to 0-category x, and AB, to 0-category y. Either A or  can be considered the main constituent of this expression called its HEAD: if χ Ξ , the head is B, and if χ φ , the head is A. If  is the head, A is called a MODIFIER OF THE HEAD. If A is the head,  is called a COMPLEMENT OF THE HEAD. The word "dependent" denotes modifiers and comple­ ments together. Example: the expression Bill bought new books is sented by the t r e e diagram:

repre­

Books is the head of (new books) and new is its modi­ f i e r ; bought is the head of (bought (new books)) and (new books) is its complement; (bought (new books)) is the head of ((bought (new books)) Bill) and Bill is its complement.

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Definition 5. A categorial symbol is called ADJOINED if it is introduced into the syntactic system by a definition of the form: z -Oxy, where z denotes an adjoined categorial symbol and Oxy denotes an O-category where χ and y are e i t h e r other adjoined categorial symbols or t, or 5. It follows f r o m this d e f i n i t i o n t h a t we can introduce adjoined categorial symbols only by stages. At the f i r s t stage we can define only f o u r adjoined categorial symbols for which a r b i t r a r y l e t t e r s may be used: a-Oit,

m=Oss,

pi=0ts9

c=Ost.

By substituting these adjoined categorial symbols tor t h e i r d e f i n i e n t i a used as components of complex categories, we can introduce new adjoined categorial symbols, for example: P2-0tp19

α=ΟρλρΛ.

By substituting new adjoined categorial symbols for t h e i r d e f i n i e n t i a used as components in more complex c a t ­ egories we can introduce f u r t h e r adjoined categorial sym­ bols, and so on. It is obvious t h a t any adjoined categorial symbol i n t r o ­ duced a t later stages can be d e f i n e d in t e r m s of the u l t i ­ mate d e f i n i e n t i a t and s by a series of definitions. I call this series of definitions a definitional reduction. Example of definitional pz=0tp2=0t0tp,

reduction:

=OWtOis.

The concept of adjoined categorial symbols and t h e i r definitional reduction is important because by introducing adjoined categorial symbols we can present the categorial system in a compact f o r m .

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Here is a table of adjoined some basic syntactic categories.

Adjoined Categorial Symbols

Definitional

categorial

=Ots =0tp1=0t0ts =0tp 2 =Qt0t0ts =Ott =0p1pi=00ts0ts

d'

=Qp 2 p 2 =Q0tp,0tpi=0Qt0ts0t0ts

Pi*i

=up 1 0p 2 =u0tsutp 1 =00ts0t0ts

Pi-1

=0piS=00tS5

p2+ ι = 0 p 2 p 3 = 0 0 t p 1 0 t p 2 = 0 0 t 0 t s 0 t 0 t p 1 = 00 tO tsO tO tOts

=0p2p,=00tp,0ts=00t0ts0ts

symbols

denoting

Reduction

p, p2 p3 a d

"

Structure

One-place predicate Two-place predicate Three-place predicate Modifier of a t e r m Modifier of a o n e place predicate Modifier of a t w o place predicate Operator increasing the valence of a o n e place predicate Operator decreasing the valence of a o n e place predicate Operator increasing the valence of a t w o place predicate Operator decreasing the valence of a t w o place predicate

We can introduce as many adjoined symbols as we need. I will close this section by suggesting an method of constructing applicative t r e e diagrams.

alternative

The above examples presented the construction of t r e e diagrams in accordance with a convention t h a t an operator must be placed before its operand and t h a t the t r e e d i a ­ gram must be constructed f r o m top to b o t t o m , starting with the smallest units.

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Sometimes, however, it is convenient to construct a t r e e diagram f r o m bottom u p , starting with a sentence. We take a sentence and t r e a t is as the bottom node of a t r e e d i a g r a m ; then we draw a horizontal line over the node, extract the operator f r o m the sentence and w r i t e the operator at the l e f t and the operand a t the right above the horizontal line. The same procedure is r e p e a t e d over new nodes f r o m l e f t to right until we reach the ultimate con­ stituents of the sentence. To illustrate how this is done, let us take the sentence Bill bought new books in the above example. We will construct an applicative t r e e diagram in steps. Our f i r s t step is to take the sentence, draw a horizon­ t a l line over i t , extract the operator f r o m it and f o r m two new nodes over the horizontal line:

Our second step is to apply this procedure nodes f r o m l e f t to right. We get

By applying the same procedure complete the construction:

There diagram.

is no

need

to

use

to

brackets

the

to the

new

nodes

in this type

As another example of a t r e e diagram bottom up I present the following t r e e sentence Jim showed Nancy pictures:

of

new

we

tree

constructed f r o m diagram f o r the

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Structure

5. MORPHOLOGICAL REALIZATIONS OF SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES. Syntactic categories are classes of functional units. Functional units are formed by assigning to a word or a group of words certain syntactic functions. Every word t h a t belongs in one of the f o u r main word classes—a n o u n , a v e r b , an adjective, or an a d v e r b - - m a y have primary syntac­ tic functions and secondary syntactic functions. In t h e i r primary syntactic functions a noun is a t e r m , a verb is a p r e d i c a t e , an adjective is a modifier of a t e r m , an adverb is a modifier of a predicate. In t h e i r secondary syntactic functions a noun can be a p r e d i c a t e , a modifier of a t e r m or of a predicate; an adjective can be a t e r m , a predicate or a modifier of a predicate; a verb can be a t e r m , a modifier of a t e r m or of a p r e d i c a t e ; an adverb can be a modifier of a t e r m , a predicate or a t e r m . We may think of secondary syntactic functions of lexical classes as the transposition of one syntactic function into another: for example, we may think of the transposition of a predicate into a t e r m , into a modifier of a t e r m or of a predicate; we may think of the transposition of a modifier of a t e r m into a p r e d i c a t e , into a t e r m or into a modifier of a predicate. The syntactic system provides the means f o r transposing one syntactic function into another. For example, category OOitOts is a class of operators t h a t transpose a modifier of a t e r m into a one-place p r e d i c a t e , category OtOtt is a class of operators t h a t transpose a t e r m into a modifier of a t e r m . Sentences also can be transposed into d i f f e r e n t syn­ tactic functions: for example, category Ost is a class of operators t h a t transpose a sentence into a t e r m and so on. There are languages t h a t do not distinguish lexical classes, such as Chinese. We must abandon the t e r m s "verb" and " n o u n " when describing these languages. Still we can discover predicative and non-predicative functions in these languages just as in languages t h a t have lexical classes. They can be based on d i f f e r e n t modes of combinations of the expressions t h a t constitute one and the same lexical class.

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Functional units may be realized not only by single words t h a t belong in f o u r main lexical classes but by other morphological units, as w e l l : 1. A functional unit may be realized by a group of words: The weight of the snow on the roof caused the shed to coifapse. In this sentence the f i r s t t e r m is realized by the group the weight of the snow on the roof and the p r e d i c a t e , by the group caused to colt apse. 2. A functional unit may be realized by a morpheme t h a t constitutes a component of an incorporating complex. So, in Chukchee a lexical morpheme may be incorporated in a verb stem. This morpheme must be viewed as an optional affix which has a function of a t e r m denoting an object (Skorik, 1948). For example, such is the Chukchee lexical morpheme kora 'deer' incorporated in the verb kora-janratgat 'separated deer' in the sentence Jetynvyt korajanratgat 'The hosts separated the deer'. 3. A functional unit is realized by a morpheme which is a component of a verbal f o r m . There is no incorporation here because morphemes of this type are mandatory compo­ nents of verbal forms. For example, in Georgian the c o n j u ­ gation of transitive verbs involves the realization of a t e r m denoting a subject and a t e r m denoting an object: mo-kl-a 'he killed him', mo-kaf-i 'you killed him', mo-v-kai-i Ί killed him'. The realization of functional units by morphemes of incorporating complexes and morphemes constituting manda­ tory components of verbal forms is common in Paleoasiatic, Caucasian, Semitic, and Bantu languages. Functional units and morphological units which realize them constitute d i f f e r e n t levels of linguistic s t r u c t u r e which should strictly be distinguished f r o m each other. In accor­ dance w i t h this distinction we must distinguish two types of syntactic connections: 1) syntactic connections between functional units and 2) syntactic connections b e t w e e n units t h a t realize functional units. In c u r r e n t linguistic l i t e r a t u r e

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these two d i f f e r e n t types of connections are very o f t e n confounded with each other. Consider, f o r instance, such very common statements as: 1) The predicate agrees with the subject; 2) the predicate governs the object. In light of the foregoing, these statements are clearly incorrect. P r e d ­ icate, subject, object are functional units while a g r e e m e n t and government are formal connections between morpholo­ gical units. T h e r e f o r e , the correct statements will be, on the one hand: 1) the predicate has a subject relation with the t e r m , 2) the predicate has an object relation w i t h the t e r m ; a n d , on the other hand: 1) the verb agrees w i t h the noun, 2) the verb governs the noun. The syntactic connections between functional units are independent of the connections between the morphological units t h a t realize the functional units. The syntactic con­ nections between the functional units exist no m a t t e r how they are realized on the level of morphological units. The level of the functional units is universal, while the level of the morphological units t h a t realize the functional units is language-specific. The level of functional units I call the GENOTYPE LEVEL and the level of morphological units t h a t realize the functional units I call the PHENOTYPE LEVEL. In accordance with the distinction of these two levels we must distinguish two types of syntactic connections: genotype syn­ tactic connections and phenotype syntactic connections. Such notions as agreement and government clearly belong in the phenotype syntactic level. As was seid above, in some languages, tike Chinese, the distinction between functional units is based on the d i f f e r ­ ent modes of the combination of words. T h e r e f o r e , the rules of word order also belong in the phenotype syntactic level. The distinction of the genotype and phenotype levels is of paramount importance f o r linguistic theory because the universal rules of syntax are possible only in t e r m s of the genotype level, and without clear understanding of the u n i ­ versal rules we are unable to understand the languagespecific rules on the phenotype level.

are

The foregoing shows t h a t the minimal syntactic units functional units r a t h e r than morphemes or words. As a

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m a t t e r of f a c t , morphemes and words are morphological units r a t h e r than syntactic units. Constituency grammar and dependency grammar run into difficulties when they t r y to f o r m u l a t e universal rules of syntax, because it is the word t h a t they regard as a minimal syntactic unit. T r a n s f o r m a ­ tional Grammar has gone even f u r t h e r : it regards the mor­ pheme as a minimal syntactic unit. This is why in e a r l i e r transformational works morphology was eliminated alto­ gether. This approach was corrected in recent works on Transformational Grammar where the word is tacitly taken as a minimal syntactic unit r a t h e r than the morpheme. Still, the f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f i c u l t y remains: universal rules of syntax cannot be f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s of operations on words. In order to set out the crucial significance of f u n c ­ tional units f o r syntacic theory, we need some expressive terminological device. On the analogy of the morpheme as a minimal morphological u n i t , I suggest to call the functional unit the 5YNTAXEME as a minimal syntactic unit.

6. COMBINATORS IN APPLICATIVE GRAMMAR

Let us t u r n to abstract operators t h a t , following Curry, I call combinatory (Curry and Feys, 1958).

H. B.

Combinator / is called the identificator. Let X be an expression. The result of applying / to X is identical with X, which is expressed by the definition /X = X. Combinator / may be i n t e r p r e t e d as an operator d e r i v ­ ing a synonymous expression IX f r o m a given expression X. For instance, the application of / to bore in She bore a child results in She gave birth to a child: I bore Ξ gave birth Other examples: / I I I

shouted = gave a shout looked = gave a look jumped s gave a jump slept = was asleep

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Identificator / also facilitates ations, as will be seen below.

Structure

some

purely

formal

oper­

Combinator R is called the p e r m u t a t o r . If R is a t w o place r e l a t i o n , CR is the converse relation connected with R by the d e f i n i t i o n : CRXY s RYX. The notion of converse relation can be used to explain passive constructions. The predicate in a passive construc­ tion may be conceived of as the converse of the predicate in the respective active construction. The converse of the predicate involves the exchange of positions between the primary t e r m and the secondary t e r m . (By a position I mean a node in the applicative t r e e diagram.) For example, was bought in This book was bought by Peter yesterday is the con­ verse of bought in Peter bought this book yesterday. And was bought involves the exchange of positions b e t w e e n Peter and this book : now this book is in the position of Peter and Peter is in the position of this book. Having a set of active predicates and a set of respec­ tive passive predicates we can produce active and passive constructions independently f r o m one another. Very o f t e n the t e r m denoting an agent is o m i t t e d . We may say This book was bought yesterday and so omit the t e r m denoting the a g e n t , t h a t is the transposed primary t e r m . In this case we hypothesize t h a t the converse predicate is applied to a zero second t e r m denoting an unspecified agent. It should be noted that in some languages, such as Arabic, the omission of the t e r m denoting an agent in pas­ sive constructions is mandatory. There is also the impersonal use of the passive with intransitive verbs, f o r example, German Es wird heute abend getanzt, 'It will be this evening danced', t h a t is, 'There will be dancing this evening'; Latin ugnabatur, 'it was fought', that is, 'there was fighting'. The German construction may include the underlying subject: Es wird heute abend von uns getanzt, literally 'It will be danced by us this evening'. Passivization of intransitive verbs must be conceived of as an operation on verbs with fictitious secondary terms. On this view passive intransitive verbs are the converses of the respective active transitive verbs. The postulation of f i c t i -

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tious objects in explaining the passivization of intransitive verbs is j u s t i f i e d by the f a c t t h a t the passive constructions with intransitive verbs have a s t r u c t u r e similar to passive constructions with transitive verbs. The theory of passive constructions must be viewed as a p a r t of the theory of valence. Within the f r a m e w o r k of applicative grammar the theory of valence is concerned with the folowing operations: 1) r e l a t i v i z a t i o n ; 2) d e r e l a t i v i z a t i o n ; 3) t r a n s r e l a t i v i z a t i o n . Relativization is an increase in the number of the relations which a predicate contracts with its t e r m s , t h a t is, an increase of the valence of a predicate. Derelativization is a decrease in the number of the r e l a ­ tions which a predicate contracts w i t h its t e r m s , t h a t is, a decrease of the valence of a predicate. Transrelativization is a change in the relational n a t u r e of a p r e d i c a t e , that is, the operation of getting the converse of a predicate. To provide means f o r constructing a complete theory of valence, Applicative Grammar has generalized the operation of conversion so as to apply it to n-place predicates. Appli­ cative Grammar uses a generalized p e r m u t a t o r k, which is d e f i n e d as follows. If R is an n-place r e l a t i o n , connected w i t h  by the d e f i n i t i o n : n

is a converse

relation

Here are t e r m s of the relation R and its c o n v e r s e T h e superscript index  shows the n u m ­ ber of the t e r m which p e r m u t a t e s w i t h the following t e r m , p e r m u t a t e s with , We get all possible con­ t h a t is versions of n-place relation Generalized permutatorpermits to introduce the notion of generalized passive. Under the rules of g e n e r a l ­ ized passive, passivization involves not only the conversion b e t w e e n the primary and the secondary t e r m s , but also the conversion b e t w e e n the primary and the t e r t i a r y terms which occurs in many languages. Applicative Grammar also has a complete set of o p e r a ­ t o r s decreasing or increasing the valence of predicates. For

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Structure

example, o p e r a t o r i n c r e a s e s the valence of an intransitive v e r b , t h a t is, it changes an intransitive verb into a transitive v e r b ; o p e r a t o r d e c r e a s e s the valence of a transitive v e r b , t h a t is, it changes a transitive verb into a intransitive v e r b , etc. The theory of valence based on Applicative be presented elsewhere.

Grammar

will

Combinator w is called the duplicator. If  is a t w o place r e l a t i o n , WR is a one-place relation associated with the relation R by the d e f i n i t i o n The duplicator W can be i n t e r p r e t e d as the operator of c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y . Let the f o r m u l a be i n t e r p r e t e d as John shaves himself then the f o r m u l a WP2T must be i n t e r ­ p r e t e d as John shaves. The t e r m Π is not deleted (or c a n ­ celled); the duplicator W involves the fusion of the t e r m T1 with its c o r e f e r e n t i a l c o u n t e r p a r t , the t e r m Γ. As a p a r t of the formula WP2T the t e r m Τ must be i n t e r p r e t e d both as a subject and a direct object: in John shaves, John is both the subject and the direct object of the predicate shaves. The combinator W may be generalized as combinator If is an n-place r e l a t i o n , is a relation one of whose terms is a result of the fusion of its c o r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m . i s connected with R by the d e f i n i t i o n η

The t e r m in the l e f t p a r t of the formula is result of the fusion of the two c o r e f e r e n t i a l t e r m s shown in the right part of the f o r m u l a .

the

By using the combinator Applicative Grammar p r o ­ vides formal means f o r presenting the analysis of the decrease of the valence of predicates involved by processes resulting from coreference. The combinator S is called the compositor. some one-place o p e r a t o r , and let the operand of ator F be the resultant of some other one-place having X as its o p e r a n d , which can be w r i t t e n as

Let F be the o p e r ­ operator G F(GX).

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By means of the combinator  we can obtain instead of two operators F and Θ one complex operator BFG which can be applied to X. The operator BFG is related to the o p e r a ­ F(GX). t o r s F and G by the definition BFGX = The complex predicate BFG is obtained as follows: f i r s t  is applied to F, as a result of which we get the o p e r a t o r BF which has the operator G as its operand. Then we apply BF to G and get the operator BFG, which has X as its operand. When we apply BFG to X we get the combination BFGX, which is identical by definition to the combination F(GX). It should be noted t h a t t h e r e are f o u r initial compo­ nents in the f i r s t combination: B, Ft Gt X and only two in the second: F and (GX). If we reconstruct the parentheses in the f i r s t combination according to the notational rule of association to the l e f t , it will have the f o r m : (((BF)G)X)t or ( i f we do not restore the o u t e r parentheses): ((BF)G)X. The compositor  can have d i f f e r e n t important inter­ pretations on the empirical level. One possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is this: the compositor  may be thought of as an operator t h a t changes predicates with subordinate predicate clauses into the construction 'accusative+infinitive'. When we con­ sider the operation of the compositor, we must bear in mind t h a t subordinate object clauses can be formed not only by applying conjunctions ( f o r example, English that) to independent clauses and then applying predicates to the result of application, but also by directly applying p r e d i ­ cates to independent clauses (in which case the independent clause is considered to be one of the operands of the predicates). Following the first method f o r forming subordi­ nate object clauses we get in English, f o r example, s e n ­ tences with the conjunction that: I have known that he paints, and following the second method we get sentences without that (with the same meaning): / have known he paints. Let F be a two-place predicate P 2 which is i n t e r p r e t e d : have known. If we apply this predicate to the sentence P , T , we get (1)

2(1)

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Structure

to which the predicate have known he paints may correspond. If we apply (1) to T' we get

(2)  2(1)T to which the sentence / have known he paints corresponds. Using the identities:

compositor,

we

can

get

the

following

two

(3) (A) The l e f t - h a n d p a r t of (3) corresponds to have known him to paint, and its r i g h t - h a n d p a r t to the sentence / have known he paints.

the phrase corresponds

The l e f t - h a n d p a r t of (4) corresponds to the sentence / have known him to paint and its r i g h t - h a n d p a r t corresponds to the sentence / have known he paints. The t e r m Τ in the l e f t - h a n d parts of (3) and (4) which corresponds to the pronoun him in the English sentences must be i n t e r p r e t e d as the fusion of the subject and the direct object: it is the direct object of P 2 and the subject of P , . On the level of the empirical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , in I have known him to paint the pronoun him is the direct object of have known and the subject of to paint. The combinator L will be called confluentor. Let F be a t w o - p l a c e operator with X as its f i r s t operand and the r e s u l t a n t of the one-place operator G, which also has X as its o p e r a n d , as its second operand. This can be w r i t t e n : FX(GX). If we apply L to F and LF to G, we get the complex one-place operator LFG, which is connected to the o p e r a t o r by the identity : LFGX s

FX(GX).

We see t h a t when we introduce the o p e r a t o r LFG, a fusion into a single operand takes place between the two identical operands to which operators F and G are applied.

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The confluentor can be i n t e r p r e t e d on the level, f o r instance, as an operator t h a t changes constructions with subordinate object clauses into constructions with structure 'accusative+infinitive'.

empirical causative causative

Let F be a causative predicate of Ca, the application of which to the t e r m Γ and the application of its r e s u l t a n t to the sentence (Ρ1T1) gives the complex s t r u c t u r e : (1T) which can be i n t e r p r e t e d orders the boy that the boy take a walk. By using the identities: (1) LCaPT Ξ (2) LCaPTT'

confluentor

we

can

get

the

following

two

CaT(PT) CaT(PT)T'

The phrase orders the boy to take a walk corresponds to the l e f t - h a n d p a r t of ( 1 ) , and the phrase orders the boy that the boy take a walk corresponds to its r i g h t - h a n d p a r t . The phrase Mother orders the boy to take a walk c o r r e ­ sponds to the l e f t - h a n d p a r t of (2) and the phrase Mother orders the boy that the boy take a walk corresponds to its right-hand part. The t e r m Τ in the l e f t - h a n d parts of (1) and (2) which corresponds to the noun boy in the English sentences must be i n t e r p r e t e d as the fusion of the direct object and the subject: it is the direct object of Ca and the subject of P. On the level of empirical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in Mother orders the boy to take a walk the noun boy is the direct object of Ca and the subject of P. On the level of empirical i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion in Mother orders the boy to take a walk the noun boy is the direct object of orders and the subject of to take a walk. The combinator  introduces a pleonastic o p e r a n d . If G is an n-place o p e r a t o r , the KG is an ( n + 1 ) - p l a c e operator connected with G by the d e f i n i t i o n : KGX G. By using identity:

'2

the

Ρ2Γ'Τ2.

combinator

K,

we

can

get

the

following

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Structure

Let P 2 be a t w o - p l a c e predicate hate whose direct object is that man (T') and whose subject is / (Ύ 2 ). Let the application of the combinator  to P 2 be i n t e r p r e t e d as the introduction of the pleonastic object him (T) with the simultaneous stress on that man. Then we get That man, I hate him I hate that man. The combinator Cm makes an operator and an operand exchange t h e i r roles. Let F be a one-place operator with X as its operand. Then m F is an operator r e l a t e d to F by the d e f i n i t i o n Cm XF FX. Example: the redness of light

red light.

In the r i g h t - h a n d p a r t of this identity red (F) is an operator and light (X) is its operand. The application of the combinator m to X must be i n t e r p r e t e d in this case as a s t r u c t u r a l change which makes F and X exchange t h e i r roles: red becomes an operand (redness) and light becomes its operator (of light). The combinator by the indentity (1) C,

XY

Cm is connected

with

the

combinator



CIXY.

This identity is derived as follows: (2) , 

Y

l(YX)

I(I

YX)

I YX

C/ YX.

The identity (1) f a c i l i t a t e s the analysis of the exchange of roles b e t w e e n subjects and intransitive predicates. Con­ sider the sentence (1) PT and its possible

interpretation

(2) John works. The subject John and the predicate works cannot exchange t h e i r roles directly. But it can be done indirectly. Since Ρ IP we can change (1) into

(3) IPT.

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In (3) Ρ is an operand of /, which is the predicate of this sentence. Now Ρ must be i n t e r p r e t e d as a t e r m r a t h e r than a predicate, and / must be i n t e r p r e t e d as a copula which is the predicate of this sentence. We i n t e r p r e t (3) as (4) John does work. Applying  to / we get (5) / which must be i n t e r p r e t e d in our case as (6) Work is done by John. Thus we get the (7) John works There

are

identity

John does work two

combinators

Work is done by John. denoted

by

Greek

letters

and Let us consider Φ f i r s t . Let F be a two-place operator and let its f i r s t operand be the r e s u l t a n t of a one-place operator whose operand is X, and let its second operand be the resultant of a one-place operator whose operand is also X. This can be r e p r e s e n t e d by the formula (1) F(GX)

(H).

With the combinator Φ we g e t , instead of t h r e e o p e r ­ ators and X, a single complex operator ΦΡΘΗ, which can be applied directly to X. The operator FGH is connected with the operators F, G, H by the d e f i n i t i o n (2) ΦFGΗΧ

F(GX)

(HX).

The relationship between Φ and t w o - p l a c e operators the same as t h a t between 8 and one-place operators.

is

Let us now t u r n to the combinator Ψ. Let Ρ be a t w o - p l a c e operator with its f i r s t operand the r e s u l t a n t of a one-place operator D whose operand is X and with its sec­ ond operand the resultant of the same one-place operator

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D whose formula (3) F(DX)

operand

is

.

This

can

Structure be

represented

by

the

(DY).

With the combinator Ψ we get instead of the two operators F and D a single complex operator ΨΡΟ which is applied directly to X and . the operator ΨΡΟ is connected with the operators F and D by the definition (4) ΨΡΟΧΥ

F(DX)

(DY).

On the empirical level combinators Φ and Ψ may be i n t e r p r e t e d as operators used f o r the direct construction of conjoined structures w i t h o u t using the transformations of conjunction reduction. The identity (2) may be

interpreted

(5)John finished his work and went home work, and John went home F andt G  FGH combines operator.

finished his work, H these t h r e e operators

John finished his

went home, and into one complex

The identity (4) may be i n t e r p r e t e d as follows: (6)John and Peter like coffee likes coffee,

John likes coffee,

F-and, D-like coffee, X-John, Y-Peter, F and D into one complex operator.

and

FD

and Peter

combines

The combinators considered above constitute an open set which may be extended by adjoining new combinators if need be. 7. APPLICATIVE GRAMMAR AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF SUBJECTS The opposition primary term ; secondary term must be i n t e r p r e t e d as the opposition absolutive ; ergative in ergative languages and the opposition subject : direct object in accu­ sative languages (primary t e r m , as absolutive or subject, and secondary t e r m , as ergative or object).

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Applicative Grammar does not r e g a r d subject, direct object and indirect object as valid universal notions. The t r u l y universal notions are primary t e r m and secondary t e r m — t h e abstract concepts which are i n t e r p r e t e d as syn­ tactic functions 'absolutive' and 'ergative' in ergative l a n ­ guages and 'subject' and 'object' in accusative languages. (Syntactic functions 'absolutive' and 'ergative' must be dis­ tinguished f r o m the ergative and absolutive morphological case markers.) Space precludes a detailed substantiation of the claim t h a t subject and direct object are not universal notions and must be replaced on the universal level by the notions of the primary and the secondary t e r m . The detailed substan­ t i a t i o n is given in Shaumyan, 1982a and 1983b. In o r d e r to explain why this claim is j u s t i f i e d , here I consider solely the Keenan-Comrie Accessibility Heirarchy ( K e e n a n , Comrie, 1977). In an important study of relative clause formation strategy, Edward L. Keenan and Bernard Comrie established an Accessibility Hierarchy which characterizes the relative accessibility to relative clause formation of various members of a sentence. In t e r m s of the Accessibility Hierarchy they state universal constraints on relative clause formation. According to the Accessibility Hierarchy processes of relative clause formation are sensitive to the following hierarchy of grammatical relations: Subject > Direct object > indirect object > Oblique NP > > Possessor > Object of comparison w h e r e > means 'more accessible than'. The positions on the Accessibility Hierarchy are to be understood as specifying a set of possible relativizations t h a t a language may make: relativizations t h a t apply at some point of the hierarchy must apply at any higher point. The Accessibility Hierarchy predicts, f o r instance, t h a t t h e r e is no language which can relativize direct objects and not subjects or t h a t can relativize possessors and subjects, but not direct objects and oblique NPs. The Accessibility Hierarchy excludes the possibility of languages where subjects are less accessible to relativization

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Structure

than objects. Yet this is precisely the case with the Dyirbal and Mayan languages, if we identify ergatives with t r a n ­ sitive subjects and absolutives with intransitive subjects and direct objects, as is done in Relational Grammar (and Arc Pair Grammar). That is, these facts undermine the status of the Accessibility Hierarchy as a universal law. In his important study of ergativity gives this d e f i n i t i o n (Johnson, 1976: 2 ) :

David

E.

Johnson

A language is said to be absolutive/ergative (or simply, ergative) if some of its rules t r e a t <subjects of intransitive clauses (SUI)> and alike in some manner to the exclusion of <subjects of transitive clauses (SUT)>. In contrast, a language is said to be a nominative /accusative language if its rules identify <subjects of intransitive clauses> and <subjects of transitive clauses> as opposed to .

If we accept this d e f i n i t i o n of ergativity and apply it to Dyirbal and Mayan languages, we will see t h a t the data from these languages contravene the Accessibility Hierarchy. Dyirbal does not allow relativization on ergative sub­ jects; instead, the verb of the relative clause is intransitivized by adding the suffix - n a y , and the subject is put in the absolutive case (Dixon, 1972: 100). For instance, con­ sider the Dyirbal sentence (1) yabu ŋuma+ŋgu mother+ABS father+ERG 'Father saw mother'

buça+n see+PAST

In sentence (1) the ergative subject is marked by -ŋgu. In order to be embedded to another sentence as a relative clause, sentence (1) must be antipassivized and ergative ŋjuma+ŋgu replaced by absolutive ŋuma+ø We may get, for example, the sentence

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells (2)ŋuma+ father+ABS

[buçal+na+r)u+ see+ANTIPASS+REL+ABS

191

yabu+gu] mother+DAT

dur)gara+n y u see+PAST 'Father, who saw mother, was crying.'

The f e a t u r e s of Dyirbal under discussion here conform closely to those of Mayan grammar. So, in the languages of the Kanjobalan, Mamean and Quichean subgroups, ergative NPs may not as a rule be relativized (nor questioned or focused), while absolutive NPs can. In order for an ergative NP to undergo relativization, it must be converted into derived absolutive and the verb intransitivized through the addition of a special intransitivizing suffix. Here is an example of this process in Aguacatec (Larsen and Norman, 1979): (2) ja ø-ø-b'iy yaaj xan7n asp. 3sB-3sA-HIT MAN WOMAN 'the man hit the woman' (3)

a.

na7 m-ø-b'iy-oon xna7n WHO dep.asp.-3sB-HIT-suffix 'who hit the woman?'

WOMAN

b. ia ø-w-il yaaj ye m-ø-b'iy-oon xna7n asp. 3sB-1sA-SEE MAN THE dep.sap.-3sB-HIT-suffix WOMAN 'I saw the man who hit the woman' 

yaaj m-ø-b'iy-oon sna7n MAN dep.asp.-3sB-HIT-suffix WOMAN 'it was the man who hit the woman'

Here -oon is the intransitivizing suffix used to circum­ vent the constraints on extraction of ergatives (the t e r m extraction rules is a cover t e r m f o r relativization r u l e s , focus rules, WH-Question). We see t h a t the facts of Dyirbal and Mayan present strong evidence against the Accessibility

languages Hierarchy.

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Structure

Does it mean that the Accessibility Hierarchy must be abandoned as a universal law? I do not think so. The t r o u ­ ble with the Accessibility Hierarchy is that it is f o r m u l a t e d as a universal law in non-universal t e r m s , such as subject, direct object, etc. To solve this d i f f i c u l t y , it is necessary to abandon non-universal concepts, such as subject and direct object, and replace them by t r u l y universal concepts. The key to the solution of this d i f f i c u l t y is provided by Applica­ tive Grammar. We must replace Applicative Hierarchy:

the

Accessibility

Hierarchy

by

the

Primary term > Secondary Term > Tertiary Term . . . The Applicative Hierarchy may be i n t e r p r e t e d as 1 ) Subject > Direct object > Indirect object > . . . in accusative languages, and as 2) Absolutive > Ergative > Indirect object > . . . in ergative

languages.

We see t h a t the Accessibility Hierarchy viewed as a u n i ­ versal law must be considered a particular instance of the Applicative Hierarchy, established on independent grounds.

8. A COMPARISON GRAMMAR

OF APPLICATIVE

GRAMMAR

AND

MONTAGUE

A complete presentation of applicative grammar was given in my book Structural Linguistics (in Russian) published in 1965 (Shaumyan, 1965; English t r a n s l a t i o n : Shaumyan, 1971). Five years l a t e r , in 1970, Richard Montague presented his grammar which uses a formalism similar to the f o r m a l ­ ism of applicative grammar. Montague's grammar captured the imagination of many linguists in this country and came into vogue under the name MONTAGUE GRAMMAR.

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193

Although the formalism of Montague grammar is similar to the formalism of applicative g r a m m a r , its conceptual apparatus is very d i f f e r e n t . The d i f f e r e n c e is crucial. Montague grammar is not a linguistic theory; r a t h e r it is a logical theory. Just as in any logical theory, t r u t h is the central notion in Montague g r a m m a r , while this notion is peripheral to any linguistic theory. Characterizing his theory, Montague w r o t e : I regard the construction of a theory of t r u t h - - o r r a t h e r , of the more general notion of the t r u t h under an a r b i t r a r y interpreta­ t i o n — a s the basic goal of serious syntax and semantics; and the developments emanating f r o m the Massachusetts Institute of Technol­ ogy o f f e r little promise towards t h a t end. ( M o n t a g u e , 1974: 188). It is clear f r o m this passage t h a t Montague understands syntax and semantics not in the linguistic sense but r a t h e r in the sense of logical syntax and logical semantics in the t r a d i t i o n of Carnap, Reichenbach, Quine and other logicians who studied language f r o m a logical point of view. In Montague grammar the meaning of a sentence is its t r u t h value. But f r o m a linguistic point of view, the t r u t h - v a l u e is i r r e l e v a n t to linguistic analysis (with the exception of peripheral cases when it is expressed by linguistic means). Logic deals with thought proper, but linguistics is interested only in communicated thought. A distinction between thought proper and communicated thought is crucial. A witness may say: "I saw John in the store this morning." But this may be a l i e , not the t r u t h . Signs have t h e i r own meaning, and this meaning may conflict with the thought of the speaker who uses the signs. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , fiction w r i t i n g is possible only because signs are n e u t r a l to t r u t h . For the purposes of logical analysis of language Montague grammar uses a complicated logical formalism including the formalism of intensional logic which is i r r e l e ­ vant f r o m a linguistic point of view. There is nothing wrong in constructing a logical theory of n a t u r a l languages. On the contrary, the study of n a t u r a l

194

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Structure

languages from a logical point of view may provide new insights which can be of b e n e f i t to linguists. What is wrong with the logical grammar proposed by Montague is t h a t he regarded it as an a l t e r n a t i v e to linguistic theories proper, in p a r t i c u l a r , to g e n e r a t i v e - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar which Chomsky had been developing at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since about 1955. In what follows I will argue t h a t the claim of Montague and his followers t h a t t h e i r logical grammar as a linguistic theory is unjustified. The basic goal of any serious linguistic theory must be the discovery of language universais. Montague called his grammar universal, but he understood the t e r m 'universal grammar' in a quite d i f f e r e n t sense than this t e r m is used by linguists. Montague used the t e r m 'universal' as synony­ mous with the t e r m 'general'. Accordingly, Montague used the t e r m 'universal grammar* to denote simply a m a t h e m a t i ­ cal description of language, since a mathematical description of language is much more general than a usual linguistic description. In this connection I would like to quote R. Thomason, a w e l l - k n o w n exponent of Montague g r a m m a r , who w r i t e s the following about its relation to the study of linguistic u n i ­ versais: Such universais have no interest f o r Monta­ gue. They are mentioned nowhere in his paper, nor does he ever suggest t h a t his work should be applied to topics such as the psychology of language acquistition. Where the t e r m "universal" appears in his w r i t i n g s , as in "Universal Grammar", the t i t l e of chapter 7, it has r e f e r e n c e to the mathematician's n a t u r a l tendency to generalize. A theory t h a t is intuitive and mathematically e l e g a n t , and t h a t comprehends all special cases of a c e r ­ t a i n topic, can be t e r m e d a universal theory of t h a t topic. In this sense topology is a u n i ­ versal theory of geometry, and Montague's theory of universal grammar is a universal theory of grammar. (Thomason, 1974: 3 ) .

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195

As a m a t t e r of f a c t , Montague grammar cannot be used as a universal grammar in the sense of linguistics because its rules are stated in t e r m s of the linear o r d e r of consti­ tuents. As was shown above, a grammar t h a t states its rules in t e r m s of linear order of constituents fails to provide crosslinguistically valid notions for f o r m u l a t i n g linguistic univer­ sais because it makes it necessary to f o r m u l a t e distinct rules f o r languages with d i f f e r e n t word order for phenom­ ena which could be considered identical in t e r m s of r e l a ­ tional rules. The syntax of a language in Montague grammar is a simultaneous recursive d e f i n i t i o n of all of the syntactic c a t ­ egories of a language. The formalism used f o r the recursive definitions is similar to the formalism used for the r e c u r ­ sive definitions of syntactic categories in applicative g r a m ­ mar. But t h e r e is a crucial d i f f e r e n c e between the lists of syntactic categories in both grammars. Let us compare these lists. Montague confines his list to the sytactic categories ( M o n t a g u e , 1974: 249):

following

eleven

1) 2) 3)

e, or a category of e n t i t y expressions. t, or a category of t r u t h - v a l u e expressions. $ N, or the category of intransitive verb phrases. Symbol IV is an abbreviation for symbol e/t which in t e r m s of applicative grammar must be interpreted as a category of operators (Montague's t e r m 'func­ tion' corresponds to the t e r m 'operator' in applica­ tive grammar) which, when applied to their o p e r ­ ands of category e, for an expression of category t, like run, walk, etc.

4)

T, an abbreviation of X/N, or the category of terms that consists of operators which, when applied to intransitive verbs, f o r m an expression of category X, like John, Mary, ninety, he. Montague uses the label ' t e r m ' to denote proper nouns and similar expressions. TV, as abbreviation f o r N/J, or the category of operators which, when applied to terms, form intransitive verbs.

5)

196 6)

7)

8) 9) 10) 11)

Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

IAV, an abbreviation for N/N/, or the category of operators which, when applied to intransitive verbs, form intransitive verbs. CN, an abbreviation for t//e, or the category of operators which, when applied to expressions of category t, form expressions of category e, like man, park, fish, etc. t/t, the category of sentence-modifying adverbs, like necessarily, etc. IAV/T, the category of IAV- making prepositions, like about, etc. N//T, the category of sentence-taking verb phrases, like believe that, assert that, etc. N//N, the category of /V- taking verb phrases, like try to, wish to, etc.

Double slashes (//) in some of the above names of c a t ­ egories are used to distinguish two types of the same c a t ­ egory, as for example, to distinguish between two types of the same predicate: t/e, or intransitive verbs, and t//e, or common nouns. This list of syntactic categories oriented towards purely logical analysis of a sentence conflicts with some w e l l - j u s t i ­ fied principles of linguistics. First, Montague considers intransitive verbs and common nouns two types of the same category of predicate. This conforms to the t r e a t m e n t of common nouns in logic but contravenes the t r e a t m e n t of common nouns in any linguis­ tic theory. From a linguistic standpoint, common nouns, as any nouns in g e n e r a l , are not primarily predicates. They are opposed to predicates as the operands of predicates, or in another terminology as arguments of predicates. Nouns can be used as predicates, but this is their secondary f u n c t i o n . By contrast, the primary function of a verb is to be a predicate and its secondary function is to be a noun. The phenomena of nominalization and predicativization are based precisely on the basic opposition of nouns and verbs in t h e i r primary functions and t h e i r capacity f o r exchange of t h e i r functions. By t r e a t i n g common nouns and intransitive verbs as predicates alike, Montague Grammar precludes the description of the processes of nominalization and predica­ tivization in natural languages; these processes do not make sense in the framework of this grammar.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

197

Logic does not distinguish b e t w e e n nouns and i n t r a n s i ­ tive verbs and lumps them together under the label ' p r e d i ­ cate·. This approach is consistent with a principle of logic according to which only variables can be arguments of a p r e d i c a t e , never nouns which are constants. This is one of the points where a logical and linguistic analysis of the sentence cannot be reconciled. Second, Montague considers proper nouns and similar expressions to be secondary predicates whose arguments are primary predicates — intransitive verbs. This approach is consistent with the type of logical semantics espoused by Montague but has nothing whatsoever to do with linguistics. T h i r d , Montague introduces a mysterious syntactic c a t ­ egory denoted by the symbol e and called entity. This c a t ­ egory is empty, entity means nothing. By introducing this empty category, Montague had in mind two things: f i r s t to justify the t r e a t m e n t of common nouns as predicates; sec­ ond, to use this category f o r a certain purpose in the semantical p a r t of his grammar. The use of this category in semantics will be discussed below. Here I will explain the use of this category in syntax. Montague utilizes the categorial calculus whose rules r e q u i r e that any predicate must have at least one a r g u ­ ment. In an ordinary logic arguments of predicates are individual constants and variables. But since Montague espouses a type of logical syntax without individual con­ stants and variables as arguments of predicates, he runs into d i f f i c u l t y with his calculus. To solve this d i f f i c u l t y , he introduced the empty category e which is used as an empty a r g u m e n t of predicates. And, as we shall see, the empty category is also helpful in the semantical part of Montague's grammar. Montague Grammar has seventeen syntactic rules for the f r a g m e n t of the English grammar he describes. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , most of these rules are concrete instances of one syntactic rule: If oc is of category 1 and 0 is of category 2 , Γ is of category 3 , where γ = F (  , ß ) .

then

198

Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

One reason t h a t Montague does not use this g e n e r a l ­ ized syntactic rule is t h a t he w a n t s to specify word order. Since d i f f e r e n t functions may involve d i f f e r e n t word o r d e r , d i f f e r e n t syntactic rules involving the operation of concat­ enation are f o r m u l a t e d to r e p r e s e n t d i f f e r e n t word order. The semantic part of Montague grammar consists of the rules of the translation of syntactic structures into s e n ­ tences in a particular formalized language of intensional logic; this process is followed by laying down the conditions for t r u t h of a sentence with respect to a given language. There is one-one correspondence between syntactic and semantic rules. The semantic categories of the intensional logic are called types. The role of the category e in semantics is explained as follows. In standard logical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n this category must denote individuals. Montague w a n t s to establish semantic parallelism between proper names and q u a n t i f i e r phrases, for instance, between expressions like John and every man in (1) (2)

John walks. Every man walks.

To establish this parallelism, one may t r y to construe the q u a n t i f i e r phrase as an individual and assign both the q u a n t i f i e r phrase and the proper name to category e, but it is questionable w h e t h e r the q u a n t i f i e r phrases should be construed as individuals. The standard logic approach is to t r e a t q u a n t i f i e r phrases as a kind of second order p r e d i ­ cates whose arguments are f i r s t order predicates. Montague has chosen to elevate proper names from the category e to the category T, t h a t is to t r e a t proper names not as i n d i ­ viduals but as a set of properties which are used as second order predicates with respect to f i r s t order predicates. In ordinary logical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n the sentence (1) must be presented as (3)

Walks

(John).

But according to Montague's must be r e p r e s e n t e d as (4)

John

(walks).

interpretation,

this

sentence

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

199

As a result of the elevation of proper names f r o m c a t ­ egory e to category T, category e becomes empty in seman­ tics, as it was in syntax. Montague's t r e a t m e n t of proper names and q u a n t i f i e r phrases may seem ingenious f r o m a logical point of view, but one wonders whether this approach is j u s t i f i e d from a linguistic standpoint. A linguistic explanation of the p a r a l ­ lelism b e t w e e n proper names and q u a n t i f i e r phrases must be based on an analysis of the structural properties of the sentences r a t h e r than on a logical analysis. Montague's semantics has nothing whatsoever to do with linguistic analysis of meaning. The central notion in this theory is the notion of the intensional logic. The intension of a sentence is defined as a function f r o m possible worlds to t r u t h values: to each possible world the function assigns the t r u t h value of the sentence in t h a t w o r l d . The t e r m 'possible world' means 'situation' or 'case' in everyday l a n ­ guage. In t e r m s of the notion 'possible world' we can define the meaning of some predicates, f o r instance, (5)

possible certain

true in some possible world true in all possible worlds.

There is no doubt t h a t a translation of expressions of a n a t u r a l language into intensional logic may be interesting from a logical standpoint, but one wonders w h e t h e r this translation may be viewed as an a l t e r n a t i v e to a linguistic analysis of meaning. Since the formalism of Montague Grammar is roughly equivalent to the formalism of an immediate constituent g r a m m a r , Montague Grammar encounters all the difficulties encountered by an ordinary immediate constituent grammar. Partee recently suggested to extend T h e r e f o r e , Barbara Montague Grammar in the same way as Chomsky extended the immediate constituent g r a m m a r , t h a t is to enrich it by a system of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . Now an ordinary Montague Grammar is going to be replaced by a Transformational Montague Grammar ( P a r t e e , 1975).

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Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

I will not discuss Partee's contribution to Montague Grammar. Suffice it to say t h a t Partee suggests neither conceptual nor formal changes in it. What she provides is simply an addition of a f e w t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t a k e n from the standard version of G e n e r a t i v e - T r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l Grammar. Partee's version of Montague Grammar combines all the limitations of ordinary Montague Grammar with the l i m i t a ­ tions of Generative-Transformational Grammar. Montague Grammar cannot be an a l t e r n a t i v e e i t h e r to Generative-Transformational Grammar or to any other l i n ­ guistic theory simply because Montague Grammar is not a linguistic theory. The case of Montague Grammar is an interesting illus­ t r a t i o n of the crucial role of ideas and concepts in con­ structing linguistic theory. The same mathematical calculus may be combined with very d i f f e r e n t conceptual systems which may be opposed to each other. The ideas and con­ cepts constitute the essence of a theory, not mathematical calculus. A mathematical calculus must be combined with an appropriate system of ideas and concepts. Otherwise, a mathematical calculus is more than worthless: it may do harm as an instrument of the promotion of the products of immature thinking.

9. CONCLUSIONS The conclusion to which this paper has led is t h a t it is possible to construct an insightful non-transformational grammar which solves the difficulties inherent in c o n s t i t u ­ ency and dependency grammars and leads to a successful picture of linguistic reality. The proposed n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l grammar which I call Applicative Grammar i n t e g r a t e s Constituency Grammar and Dependency Grammar into a single system based on the relations of the type 'operator : operand'. Applicative Gram­ mar is associated with the hypothesis t h a t every language possesses applicative structure which is a network of o p e r a ­ tors and operands interconnected by p a r t - w h o l e and d e p e n ­ dency relations. The universal properties of this network constitute the linguistic genotype.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells The integrated system has the following advantages over constituency grammar and grammar:

201 significant dependency

1. Dependency Grammar applies the concepts 'head' and 'dependent' only to minimal constituents of a sentence, t h a t is, to words, and takes these concepts as primitives. Appli­ cative Grammar proposes generalized concepts 'head' and 'dependent' which may be applied to any constituent of a sentence and defines these concepts on the basis of the relation operator ; operand. 2. Constituency Grammar conflates p a r t - w h o l e relations with linear order. Applicative Grammar defines constituency as independent of linearity. 3. Neither Constituency Grammar, nor Dependency Gram­ mar can handle the phenomenon of transposition. U n d e r ­ standing the synchronic and diachronic implications of this phenomenon is of paramount importance for linguistic theory. Applicative Grammar provides the necessary concep­ t u a l and formal apparatus f o r the study of transpositions. 4. Applicative Grammar contributes to a d e e p e r study of word o r d e r by providing the generalized concepts 'head' and 'dependent' and distinguishing b e t w e e n two kinds of d e p e n ­ dents — modifiers and complements. 5. Neither constituency g r a m m a r , nor dependency g r a m ­ mar provide means f o r defining categories and syntactic functions. Applicative Grammar does provide these means. 6. The formalism of Applicative Grammar includes a sys­ tem of combinators which are essential f o r the study of universal syntactic relations. Since Applicative Grammar integrates constituency g r a m ­ mar and dependency grammar into a single system while preserving all t h e i r explanatory power, t h e r e is good reason to accept it as a replacement of these two separate models. Applicative structure is an autonomous e n t i t y i n d e p e n ­ d e n t of its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in linear sequences of e x p r e s ­ sion. In accordance with the autonomy of applicative s t r u c -

202

Shaumyan: Applicative

Structure

t u r e , Applicative Grammar consists of two parts: genotype grammar, which studies applicative structure in itself, i n d e ­ pendently of its linear r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and phenotype gram­ mar, which studies applicative structure in t e r m s of its l i n ­ ear representation. Statement of cross-linguistic generalizations in t e r m s of genotype grammar makes it possible to uncover identical structure underlying languageparticular constructions in d i f f e r e n t languages. In contrast to Dependency Grammar and Constituency Grammar (and Transformational Grammar) which regard the word (and sometimes, even the morpheme) as the minimal syntactic u n i t , the Applicative Grammar regards words, as well as morphemes, solely as morphological realizations of functional units. Functional units r a t h e r than words are t r u e minimal syntactic units. Linguistic theories which con­ sider the word to be the minimal syntactic unit run into difficulties when they t r y to f o r m u l a t e universal rules of syntax: these rules cannot be f o r m u l a t e d in t e r m s of o p e r ­ ations on words. Functional units belong in the genotype level and morphemes and words in the phenotype level in syntax. In order to set out the functional units as crucial notions f o r syntactic theory, I suggest to call them the SYNTAXEMES on the analogy of morphemes as minimal units of morphology. Cross-linguistic generalizations of terms of genotype grammar make it possible to come to grips with empirical problems other linguistic theories are unable to solve. Some of the most d i f f i c u l t problems arise f r o m the phenomenon of ergativity. Ergativity can be explained and understood properly only by relating the ergative system to a more abstract underlying system which is presented in Applicative Grammar. In p a r t i c u l a r , difficulties met by the Keenan-Comrie Accessibility Hierarchy are solved, which leads to a r e s t a t e m e n t of this important hypothesis in abstract t e r m s . Applicative Grammar calls for a serious overhaul of the c u r ­ r e n t views on language universais. In p a r t i c u l a r , subject, direct object, indirect object cannot be considered valid universal concepts and must be replaced by an abstract conceptual system, such as the system of primary, secondary and t e r t i a r y t e r m s . As a n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l linguistic theory, Applicative Grammar does not need e i t h e r the notion of deep structure or multiple levels of syntactic s t r u c t u r e .

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203

REFERENCES CITED

B a r - H i l l e l , Yehoshua (1964). Language and Information. Chapter 8 (with C. Gaifman and E. Shamir): "On Categorical and Phrase Structure Grammars". Jerusalem: Academic Press. Chomsky, Noam (1980). Rules and Representations, New York: Columbia University Press. Curry, Haskell B. and Robert Feyes (1958). Combinatory Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. Dixon, R. M. W. (1972). The Dyirbal Language of North Queens­ land, Cambridge: University Press. Hudson, Richard A. (1980). "Constituency and Dependency", Linguistics 18, pp. 179-198. Johnson, D. E. (1976). "Ergativity and Universal Grammar". To appear in Studies in Relational Grammar, e d . by D. M. Perlmutter. Keenan, E. L. and B. Comrie (1977). "Noun Phrase Accessi­ bility and Universal Grammar", Linguistic Inquiry 8, pp. 63-99. Larsen, T. W. and W. M. Norman (1979). "Correlates of Ergativity in Mayan Grammar". Ergativity: Towards a Theory of Grammatical Relations, e d . by F. Plank, London and New York: Academic Press. M o n t a g u e , Richard (1970a). "English as Formal Language". In Linguaggi nella societa e tecnica, . Visentini et al. (eds.), M i l a n . (Chapter 6 in M o n t a g u e , 1974). M o n t a g u e , Richard (1970b). "Universal Grammar". Theoria 36, pp. 3 7 3 - 3 9 8 . (Chapter 7 in M o n t a g u e , 1974.) M o n t a g u e , Richard (1974). Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague, R. Thomason ( e d . ) . New Haven, Con­ necticut: Yale University Press. P a r t e e , Barbara (1975). " M o n t a g u e Grammar and T r a n s f o r ­ mational Grammar". Linguistic Inquiry 6, pp. 2 0 3 - 3 0 0 . Shaumyan, S. K. (1977). Applicational Grammar as a Semantic Theory of Natural Language, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shaumyan, S. K. (1982a). "The Goals of Linguistic Theory and Applicative Grammar". The Eighth LACUS Forum 1981. Shaumyan, S. K. (1982b). "Ergativity and Universal Gram­ mar". To appear in Relational Typology e d . by F. Plank. Skorik, P. J. (1948). Očerki po sintaksisu čukotskogo jasyka: Inkorporacija, Leningrad.

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Structure

Thomason, Richmond H. (1974). " I n t r o d u c t i o n " . In M o n t a g u e , 1974. Wells, Rulon (1947). "Immediate Constituents". Language, vol. 23, pp. 8 1 - 1 1 7 .

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN SYNTACTIC ANALYSIS: RULON WELLS AS A PALEO-SYNTHESJZER OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN SYNTAX'

William J. Sullivan University of Florida 0. INTRODUCTION 0.1 The state of the art In 1979, the Linguistics Department of the University of Wisconsin a t Milwaukee sponsored a con­ ference on contemporary theories of syntax. Representatives of t h i r t e e n d i f f e r e n t models of syntax (or language) p r e ­ sented their approaches to describing a set of sentences distributed by the conference organizers. The result was little short of chaotic, in spite of heroic e f f o r t s by Edith Moravcsik and Jessica Wirth to i n - , a d - , and conduce us into some semblance of order. Their hope was to lead us to some kind of understanding of each o t h e r , perhaps even to a kind of rapprochement. Personally, I gained some u n d e r ­ standing of the state of the a r t in syntactic studies today. I now think I know just how deep the existing gulf between models is, not only in d i f f e r e n t people's understanding of others' theories, but even in t h e i r understanding of the goals of those theories. As might be expected, American structuralist theories of syntax w e r e numerically dominant, expecially in t e r m s of Neo-Chomskyan v a r i a n t s , which are legion. But t h e r e w e r e also representatives of Neo-Praguian and Neo-Firthian functionalism, and though no textlinguists w e r e present, t h e r e was a tagmemicist and a stratificationalist. More important than the theories themselves, from my point of view, was the response to the presentations: Chomskyites commented on the details of other (Neo-)Chomskyan theories and functionalists did the same f o r the functional theories. Tagmemics was, in e f f e c t , dismissed without comment, and only J. R. Ross commented on my p r e s e n t a t i o n , to point out

206

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an e r r o r on one structural diagram. Some understanding of others' approaches was shown, but no understanding of others' goals surfaced. Stockwell's presentation of the o f f i ­ cial comparison between theories focused on aspects of the d i f f e r e n t models. Theoretical goals and the success of each researcher w e r e never mentioned. It is almost as if a d i f ­ ference in goals was unimaginable. Worse, their a p p r o p r i ­ ateness and the success in attaining them seems to be thought irrelevant. Yet, d i f f e r e n c e s in goals exist and divide linguists. Still, the conference organizers looked upon our mass confusion as the natural state of a period in which an orthodoxy is breaking up. Their question was whether we would see a search for a new orthodoxy or remain in a state of general f r a g m e n t a t i o n . Either way, they held out hope. Either way, I foresee continued troubles, because t h e r e is a basic blindness on both sides, in such a case, i n t e l l e c ­ tuals are prone to assume t h a t the proper course of action lies somewhere between both courses. In f a c t , here the proper course is to take both paths simultaneously. 0.2 The simultaneous approach The need to take both structural and functional paths simultaneously is clearly not s e l f - e v i ­ dent. The purpose of this essay is to outline the reasons that make the need f o r both approaches clear and to i d e n ­ t i f y the developments which led European linguists down one path and American linguists down another. My s k e p t i ­ cism concerning a re-combination of these two approaches is based on two facts. First, t h e r e are two theories available today which can do the job; neither shows signs of con­ quering the linguistic world. Second, an indication of the necessity for following both paths has been available for nearly f o r t y years, in the w r i t i n g s of Rulon Wells. Almost everybody r e a d , but almost nobody listened t h e n . Indications are t h a t this situation continues today. Hence, my s k e p t i ­ cism. I conclude this essay with a more personal retrospective on Mr. Wells and an indication of the rays of hope I see.

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1. THE ARCHITECTURE OF LANGUAGE 1.1 Language as a semiotic Language is used f o r many things, but most of them include a measure of communication between individuals, usually via sound. Language can thus be visualized as some mechanism between meaning and

Figure 1 sound, as in f i g u r e 1. Without knowing anything concrete about the mechanism, we can suggest t h a t language must be able to transmit information f r o m the meaning store to the mouth of one individual (encoding a message) and f r o m the e a r to the meaning store of another individual (decod­ ing a message). Transmitting messages is the semiotic f u n c ­ tion of language. The automatic consequence of the ability to transmit messages is the need f o r paths interconnecting the meaning plane with the sound plane, paths along which messages can pass. Without such paths, the transmission of messages into sound (or the reverse) could not occur. These paths are the semiotic relationships in language, w h a t Saussure called the sign relations. Clearly, any description of language must include a provision for semiotic relationships. 1.2 Language as a structure Now semiotic relations could potentially be random in n a t u r e and i n f i n i t e in number. However, it this w e r e t r u e , it would not be possible for six-year-olds to command the language ability they do com­ mand. Even mature native speakers would show a lack of

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control over much of the native language, if it w e r e com­ posed of an i n f i n i t e number of r a n d o m l y - a r r a n g e d semiotic relations. Nor would it be possible to w r i t e meaningful grammars. In short, the semiotic relations alone cannot explain the way children acquire language so rapidly, the way adults can understand almost all things said to t h e m , vocabulary aside, and the way grammar rules can be induced from observations of native speakers' speech p a t t e r n s . All these things a r g u e , conclusively, to my mind, t h a t language is heavily p a t t e r n e d . These p a t t e r n s are called structural r e l a ­ tions of language. They are located within the boundaries of language. That is, they are neither meaning nor sound, but must be abstracted from meaning and sound. They are r e l a t e d to meaning and sound via the semiotic relations. Thus, t h e i r existence and n a t u r e must be induced from the n a t u r e and p a t t e r n i n g visible in meaning and sound during the communication process. My two claims, t h a t structural relations must be abstracted from sound and meaning and t h a t they are wholly within language, are neither original nor unique. Bloomfield believed t h a t all significant linguistic generalizations must (ultimately) be inductive in n a t u r e . Jakobson believed that t h e r e is no such thing as surface structure in any language, t h a t all structure is abstract; we might question the level or degree of abstractness, but talking about deep versus surface structure in any language is simply beside the point. I f i n d no f a u l t with e i t h e r belief. 1.3 Elements of language Before continuing the above discus­ sion, it will be useful to consider its implications with regard to individual linguistic elements. Imagine a linguistic e l e m e n t , somewhere within language, r e p r e s e n t e d by the dot in f i g u r e 2. It may have up to four types of relations, represented by the arrows. The relations in the vertical plane a r e the semiotic relations; those in the horizontal plane are the s t r u c t u r a l . The vertical-horizontal orientation is itself insignificant. It serves merely to distinguish the two types of relations diagrammatically. The particular o r i ­ e n t a t i o n was chosen to symbolize the fact t h a t structural relations are within language, semiotic relations connect with the meaning and sound planes of f i g u r e 2.

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MEANING

Figure 2

Traditionally, the semiotic relations are f u r t h e r d i s t i n ­ guished by their orientations. That is, relations t o ( w a r d ) meaning are called 'functional relations', because they r e l a t e the element to its (semantic) f u n c t i o n . Similarly, relations to(ward) sound are called 'formal relations', because they r e l a t e the element to its characteristic pho­ netic f o r m . The structural relations do not d i f f e r in name. However, the element in question can be related to both larger and smaller s t r u c t u r e s , or, more accurately, to structures of g r e a t e r or lesser scope. The discussion to this point has been couched in g e n ­ e r a l t e r m s , but it is easy enough to give a specific e x a m ­ ple. Let us assume t h a t the language in question is Russian and the element in question is r e l a t e d to morphemic s t r u c ­ t u r e . Consider the following facts. There is a class of nouns like zená 'wife' which is always accented on the ending in the singular but on the stem in the p l u r a l : ž ny ' w i f e , η.pl.' The majority of nouns have fixed accent, e i t h e r on the stem or on the e n d i n g , and no nouns of the -a declension have stem accent in the singular and ending accent in the p l u r a l . Thus the a p p a r e n t accent shift may be seen as a mark of plurality affixed to the s t e m , in addition to the plural case endings. The f o u r relations of the linguistic element in question can now be specified. 1)The f o r m a l relation or semiotic has the shape of word accent.

relation

to

sound

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2) The functional relation or semiotic relation to meaning specifies plurality. 3)The relation to smaller structures is to the stem; in logical n a t u r e it is a simultaneous or unordered AND r e l a t i o n . 4 ) T h e relation to larger structures is to word and morphemic phrase structures. This is what lingustics elements look like, and these are the types of things linguistic analysis must take into con­ sideration, if a complete and i n t e g r a t e d description is desired. 1.4 Language as a structured semiotic Language t h e r e f o r e con­ sists of an interlocking network of relations like those shown in f i g u r e 2. Not all elements of language need to have all f o u r relationships. Any combination of t h r e e r e l a ­ tionships (two semiotic, one structural or two s t r u c t u r a l , one semiotic) can be exemplified. But such explication is beyond the scope of this study. It is important only t h a t the f o u r types of relations specified are ultimately necessary. The total significance and indeed the d e f i n i t i o n of each element is given not by its f o r m or meaning but by the sum of relationships it contracts, including both semiotic and structural relations. In short, the need f o r both semiotic and structural relations in linguistic description is clear. What is not clear is how and why the analytical situation arrived a t the c u r ­ r e n t state of schism. An explanation of this schism is the next step. II. SYNTACTIC STUDIES IN EUROPE 11.1 The origins The founder of modern descriptive linguistics is, of course, Ferdinand de Saussure. That Saussure c r e d ­ ited many of his ideas to Jan Baudouin de Courtenay is unimportant f o r our purposes, as is the fact t h a t some ideas we credit to Saussure w e r e also advanced, a p p a r e n t l y independently, by other European linguists of his t i m e . Baudouin de Courtenay published little t h a t was accessible to students of linguistics outside of Imperial Russia, so his direct influence was severely limited. Saussure's w e s t e r n European contemporaries contributed ideas singly, sometimes almost randomly, in the context of particular articles or

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books. This is not to deprecate these contributions, but to point out their separated appearance. Saussure contributed his ideas in the context of an i n t e g r a t e d system he had developed t o r linguistic description, a system he was t e a c h ­ ing students in his introductory Cours ete linguistique générale. At t h a t t i m e , most linguists taught linguistics only in the context of teaching something else (Sanskrit, I n d o - E u r o p e a n , or the l i k e ) , and considered historical linguistics the f u n d a ­ mental goal of linguistic research. That is, they did not teach descriptive linguistics as such. Saussure d i d , and his influence on his students and their students was enormous, reaching down even to the present day. 11.2 The development Saussure defined the f u n d a m e n t a l l i n ­ guistic element as the sign relation of the linguistic sign. The linguistic sign has a phonetic f o r m and a semantic meaning. The sign relation connects them. A glance at f i g ­ ure 2 will show that both phonetic f o r m and semantic meaning are outside of language. The sign relation of Saussure is within language and is at least analogous to what I call semiotic relations above. Saussure did not intend all or even most sign relations to be simplex or o n e - t o - o n e . In f a c t , he envisioned a complex of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s among signs. The Prague school, Saussurean linguists a l l , produced descriptions in which the functional relations f i g u r e most prominently. An idea of their complexity can be gotten f r o m the Schenker monograph I discuss below. Though Saussure discussed the a r b i t r a r y n a t u r e of the linguistic sign, he did not mean t h a t linguistic signs w e r e randomly scattered throughout language. He clearly believed in the reality of structural p a t t e r n i n g . Moreover, his postu­ lation of the pharyngeals in Indo-European was prompted by a s t r u c t u r a l observation (the CVC- n a t u r e of most roots). An exegesis of his writings is beyond my present scope, but I need only point to the work of his intellectual ((great) grand) children to show that the sign relations are p a t ­ t e r n e d inter se (e.g. Jakobson 1958 and Schenker 1964). In f a c t , Schenker 1964 is a particularly clear and detailed example of such a work. It will be useful to take a closer look at i t , to understand exactly what the c u r r e n t practice is in some Neo-Saussurean q u a r t e r s .

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II.3 An example of Neo-Saussureanism Schenker's study (1964: 13-14) of the Polish noun inflection begins with a summary description of the meanings of the six cases of Polish,

NOM Directionality Quantification Marginality

ACC +

GEN

DAT +

+ +

LOC

INS

+ +

+

Figure 3

reproduced here as f i g u r e 3. The "meaning" of the cases is precisely the sum of the functional relations of each case, including the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n these functional r e l a ­ tions. His chapter 1 contains an outline structural j u s t i f i c a ­ tion of the inventory of cases, the categories singular and p l u r a l , and the genders and declensional types. The rest of the monograph gives a detailed description of the cases in each of the declensional types, concentrating on the pho­ nemic forms of the cases and the p a t t e r n of syncretisms, wherein two or more cases are r e l a t e d to the same pho­ nemic f o r m . This is, in other words, a description of the formal relations of the cases. Schenker's description of the p e r t i n e n t semiotic relations is f a i r l y complete. His descrip­ tion of t h e i r structural relations is sketchy, an outline only. As one of Schenker's students, I can t e s t i f y t h a t his system of description has g r e a t pedagogical value: using his approach, I was able to memorize the Old Church Slavic nominal inflection in approximately f i f t e e n minutes. It is also theoretically sound, though I believe the functional relations deserve elaboration. Even so, it is a more com­ plete description of the case system of Polish than can be found anywhere else. I was also in the audience when Schenker presented an oral version of his study to the language and linguistic f a c ­ ulties a t Yale. At t h a t t i m e , the linguists w e r e almost e n t i r e l y structuralists, with one notable exception. At the end of the p r e s e n t a t i o n , when the floor was opened for questions, the f i r s t questioner said something like, "Very

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nice, but what's it all for?" Now Schenker's description focuses almost e n t i r e l y on the semiotic relations. It does not ignore the structural relations of these morphemes, but they are d e f i n i t e l y secondary, completely subordinated to the semiotic relations. The structuralist questioner recog­ nized this a t t e n t i o n to n o n - s t r u c t u r a l detail and simply could not imagine its relevance. The loss is his. 11.4 The European situation Interestingly enough, Schenker, though a graduate of Yale, was heavily influenced by Jakobson (Schenker 1964: p r e f a c e ) , and t h e r e f o r e produced a study f a i r l y typical of the European approach. Semiotic relations are the main i n t e r e s t . There is a spectrum of types, of course. Some European researchers, e.g. M. A. K. Halliday and Simon Dik, are more i n t e r e s t e d in structural considerations than is Schenker's description. Others, e.g. the textlinguistic g r o u p , seem to be less interested in structural relations, if anything. Nonetheless, in all cases the semiotic relations are c e n t r a l , the structural relations are secondary. This does not imply European homogeneity: Chomskyan linguistics is now making inroads into European faculties. However, the European Chomskyans I know are not adding Chomskyan structuralism to European functionalism. They are simply adopting the Chomskyan model in its place. S t i l l , the European p r e f e r e n c e f o r functionalism stands. Given this, it is necessary to see how the American situation differs. 111 SYNTACTIC STUDIES IN AMERICA 111.1 The origins Concerted linguistic studies in America received t h e i r modern impetus f r o m Franz Boas, an a n t h r o ­ pologist, around the t u r n of the century, the magic date being 1 9 1 1 , when he published his 8 4 - p a g e introduction to Languages. the Smithsonian's Handbook of American indian Although this is f o r t y years a f t e r Saussure began his public career with the Memoire, Saussure's influence in general linguistics had not yet reached America in any substantive fashion. His theory was t r a n s m i t t e d through his students, and until a compilation was published from student notes in 1916, it was not even available in the United States. By the

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time it was generally available, the anthropological to the study of language was f i r m l y in place here.

approach

Anthropologists study human behavior and c u l t u r e , seek­ ing the underlying p a t t e r n s which the behavior(s) conform t o . With the exception of symbolic anthropologists, they do not w o r r y overmuch about the meaning of particular acts. For the most p a r t , this is reasonable. Most human action is e i t h e r t r a n s p a r e n t in its motivation (eating b r e a k f a s t ) , or its motivation can only be speculated on (your "choice" of f r i e n d s ) . Some acts (voting) range f r o m one extreme to the other. In any case, worrying about the meaning of acts is f r u i t l e s s , because the semiotic relations are e i t h e r trivial or incomprehensible. However, it is possible to induce the structural relations underlying acts from observing what acts are p e r f o r m e d , co-occurrence restrictions on combina­ tions of acts, sequencing of acts, dependency relations between acts, etc. Thus the anthropologist concentrates on the structural relations, assumes t h e r e are semiotic r e l a ­ tions, accepts the trivial ones and ignores the rest. Since anthropologists wish to avoid philosophical speculation and be as scientific in t h e i r work as possible, this approach is not only reasonable, but it may be the only approach they can t a k e . Of course, this outline contains oversimplifications, some of which I r e c t i f y below. But it accurately represents the approach of American anthropologists during t h a t period. III.2 The development At f i r s t glance, an anthropological approach to language might seem to be unfeasible. L a n ­ guage is, a f t e r a l l , stored in the b r a i n , and it is clearly inaccessible to direct observation in its operation. However, Bloomfield 1933 showed t h a t language is accessible to anthropological-style analysis in a perfectly regular fashion according to the t e n e t s of (Watsonian) behaviorist psychol­ ogy. Here everything begins with a t t e n t i o n to speech acts. Structures are induced. Trivial semiotic relations are i d e n t i ­ f i e d (e.g. f o r lexical meaning or f o r function w o r d s ) , and other semiotic relations are assigned to "grammatical m e a n ­ ing" or, more recently, to " t e x t semantics". But the struc­ t u r a l relations are central and the semiotic relations are peripheral (cf. Bloch 1946 f o r Japanese or Nida 1960 for English).

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1113 Current Neo-Boasianism The paramount importance of structures remains throughout the transformational era. Both Harris's and Chomsky's transformational rules r e l a t e two structures. Chomsky's rules combine the concept of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n with that of markedness in t h e i r u n i - d i r e c tional application. The supposedly trivial semiotic relations are placed in the lexicon, and the t e x t semantics is to be d e t e r m i n e d by the as yet unspecified semantic i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion. In f a c t , Chomskyan linguistics is so clearly s t r u c ­ t u r a l ( i s t ) in its conception and presuppositions t h a t I am t e m p t e d to say that the much-publicized "revolution" of 1957 was merely an exercise in notational variance. 111.4 The American situation Whether Chomskyan syntax or Montague " g r a m m a r , " w h e t h e r "surface" or " d e e p " seman­ tic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h e t h e r with or without a " t r a c e , " syn­ tactic studies in America remain predominantly structural in n a t u r e . There are individuals like Susumo Kuno, who i n t r o ­ duce functional considerations into t h e i r primarily structural descriptions f o r limited purposes. There are some followers of Hudson's generative but n o n - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l version of systemic grammar and some who adhere to Halliday's more traditional brand of Firthian linguistics, but these groups are relatively f e w in number and low in influence. There are also two other groups, somewhat more numerous but almost totally lacking in influence with the linguistic e s t a b ­ lishment. I r e t u r n to these two groups in section V. S t i l l , in spite of these f e w dissenters, American orthodoxy remains solidly s t r u c t u r a l in o r i e n t a t i o n . IV. THE ECUMENICAL

IMPULSE

IV.1 The overall situation It is clear, f r o m the discussion in sections II and I I I , t h a t linguistics in 1983 is in a state of radical schism. This schism between functionalist and s t r u c ­ t u r a l i s t lies mainly but not e n t i r e l y along a continental division. Both continents have heretics and dissenters f l o a t ­ ing a r o u n d , but each side seems to have excommunicated the other. Harsh words have been spoken, and worse. A t t i tudinally, the situation is not unlike t h a t of the religious w a r s in early s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Europe.

At

I do not wish to give a picture the Wisconsin conference, J. R.

of u n r e m i t t i n g Ross made an

gloom. almost

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impassioned plea t h a t it is long past the time when we should have started listening to each other and expressed the hope that our spirit of interaction would continue. The problem is that people w e r e listening in Milwaukee, but o f t e n they were not hearing. There w e r e no comments as blunt as the one aimed at Schenker, but many comments w e r e totally beside the p o i n t - - a n y point the speaker was trying to make. Not t h a t t h e r e seemed to be any malicious intent: the commenter was just not hearing what the speaker was saying. This is a sad situation and suggests yet again t h a t education will not necessarily cure social ills. Worse, since 1947, the situation has been completely unnecessary. IV.2 Wells's contribution In 1947, Rulon Wells published two papers: "De Saussure's System of Linguistics" appeared in Word and "Immediate Constituents" appeared in Lanugage. Language was t h e n , as it remains today, the organ of s t r u c ­ t u r a l linguistics, though the view of what is structuralist is somewhat n a r r o w e r today than it was t h e n . Word was the outlet for the functionalists, w h e t h e r renegade Americans or refugee Europeans like Jakobson. One ecumenical soul appeared in both places. Wells (1947a: 1) presented Saussurean linguistics as derived from a " c a r e f u l internal collation of the Cours itself," while assuming t h a t Saussure's "thought (was) a synchronic self-contained system." Wells's t r e a t m e n t , like the man himself, is g e n t l e , probing, critical though n o n - j u d g e ­ m e n t a l , and illuminating. It clearly illustrates Saussure's semiotic interests and his concentration on functional con­ siderations. Saussure's book, the Cours de linguistique generale, is o f t e n d i f f i c u l t , perhaps because he did not w r i t e it, comment on the t e x t , or edit the final d r a f t . But Wells 1947a makes clear how much we owe to it and to Saussure. Wells 1947b is simply described. In i t , Wells (1947b: 186) defines the theoretical and heuristic basis f o r structural analysis: "We aim ... to replace by a u n i f i e d , systematic theory the heterogeneous and incomplete methods hitherto o f f e r e d for determining immediate constituents ... by the famous concept of patterning, applied r e p e a t e d l y and in div­ ers forms (emphasis supplied-WJS)." As this quotation shows,

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the American structuralists of that era (Wells cites several, particularly Zeitig Harris and Bernard Bloch), w e r e indeed interested in methodology, but not to the exclusion of theory. It also shows a concern with the structural relations ( p a t t e r n i n g ) t h a t can be adduced f r o m the occurrence of d i f f e r e n t phonetic forms. Typically structural in its outlook, the f i n a l phrase of the quotation presupposes phonetic forms as a means f o r inducting p a t t e r n s of s t r u c t u r e . It does not go into any consideration of functional relations; it merely assumes the trivial ones. Thus in one year, 1947, Rulon Wells walked both sides of the s t r e e t . Rulon Wells made it possible to r e u n i t e the European and American branches of linguistics. Rulon Wells made it possible f o r anyone to produce f u l l y adequate l i n ­ guistic descriptions, which would include both structural and semiotic relations. In short, Rulon Wells provided the e c u ­ menical basis f o r ending the schism in linguistics. Though the schism still exists today, the f a u l t is clearly not his. V. TWO RAYS OF HOPE V.1 Tagemics One branch of American structuralism was forced to consider the consequences of semiotic relations, as linguists of this school w e r e i n t e r e s t e d in Bible t r a n s l a ­ t i o n . Pike, Longacre, and t h e i r colleagues and students at the Summer Institute of Linguistics w e r e moved by the need to make the Bible available to speakers of f o r g o t t e n or unknown languages. Now translation involves decoding a t e x t in one language and encoding it in another. It is the same amount of work as paraphrasing a t e x t within a particular language, but it r e q u i r e s linguistic competence in both l a n ­ guages. Translation involves, as mentioned above, both the encoding and decoding processes. Thus, it must use the semiotic pathways. However, since it is limited only by the scope of the t e x t , translation needs the structural relations to provide a mechanism of workable size. Thus the t a g m e micists have had to supply both types of descriptions for the languages they work on. They walk both paths a t once, and are not participants in the schism.

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In f a c t , contemporary anthropologists are no longer disinterested in meaning. 2 The credit f o r this is due to Pike's emic/etic distinction, which led anthropologists to believe t h a t t h e r e a r e , in addition to trivial semiotic r e l a ­ tions, semiotic relations which emerge f r o m the s t r u c t u r e . Some even believe t h a t all n o n - t r i v i a l semiotic relations derive from the structural relations, though this violates Pike's thinking. Still, it is a p a r t i a l advance in anthropolo­ gists' thinking and shows the duality and utility of Pike's approach. V.2 Stratificationalism The other branch of American linguistics which provides a ray of hope emerged from the confluence of two lines of thinking. One, pioneered by H. A. Gleason, Jr., was also partially motivated by a need f o r Bible t r a n s ­ lation. That is, Gleason's genesis paralleled Pike's, up to a point. The other line of t h i n k i n g , pioneered by Sydney Lamb, arose from a combination of the influence of M a r y Haas, a structuralist and student of Sapir's, with t h a t of Louis Hjelmslev, via his t r a n s l a t o r , Francis J. Whitfield. From the one came the emphasis on elaborated structural r e l a ­ tions; f r o m the other both the acceptance of structure and the emphasis on elaborated semiotic relations. Where Lamb and Gleason both d i f f e r f r o m Pike is in the p a t t e r n i n g and elaboration of semiotic relations. In the stratificational view, the structural p a t t e r n s , called tactic p a t t e r n s , are stacked vertically, and are i n t e r r e l a t e d by semiotic p a t t e r n s called realizational relations. This is a result of Lamb and Gleason essaying descriptions which did not assume t h a t the majority of semiotic relations w e r e t r i v i a l , o n e - t o - o n e relations or simply emerged directly (and hence, trivially) f r o m the s t r u c t u r e . Without this assumption, the realizational relations show up as interlocking p a t t e r n s , complex yet describable in a logically s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d f a s h ­ ion. Stratificationalism is a very demanding theoretical f r a m e w o r k . A stratificational description r e q u i r e s t h a t the researcher do it a l l , and it takes time and practice to mas­ t e r this approach. It cannot be taught to students in a five-week introductory course. Perhaps f o r this reason, t h e r e are very f e w stratificationalists around. Even so, we have our share of linguists in Europe, though they generally have no more influence t h e r e than we have here.

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Gleason sometimes agreed with and sometimes disagreed with guesses I made in my description in Sullivan 1980 (see Gleason 1980). Time may tell which, if e i t h e r , of us is right. However, he had one major criticism of my paper. He was dismayed t h a t I had presented stratificationalism as a structural theory, including only trivial semiotic/functional relations and finessing n o n - t r i v i a l ones. That was a calcu­ lated ploy on my p a r t , as I f e l t I could provide a b e t t e r description of the syntactic structure of English on one page than t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l - g e n e r a t i v e linguistics had provided in a q u a r t e r century. I could beat t h e m , so to speak, a t their (presumed) s t r e n g t h . And I believe I did. However, I also believe t h a t Gleason was correct, too. Stratificational theory is not only the structural theory par excellence, but the semiotic or functional theory par excel­ lence. As such, it realizes or provides the means to realize the best thinking that underlies both of Rulon Wells' 1947 articles. VI. MY DEBT TO RULON WELLS V M My academic debt At Yale in the fall of 1965, the i n t r o ­ ductory course in historical linguistics was begun by Bernard Bloch. A short while into the course, Bloch s u f f e r e d what was to be his final heart attack and was hospitalized. Rulon Wells stepped into the breach. During the rest of t h a t semester, a number of interchanges took place between the present w r i t e r ( S ) , then a f i r s t - t e r m g r a d u a t e student in the Slavic d e p a r t m e n t , and M r . Wells (W): S. Is this kind of change a split or a merger? W. Why or? Why not both? Later: S. What do you mean by saying such changes have a double e f f e c t on language? W. Well, t h e / r e changes in the sign (=semiotic, WJS) r e l a ­ tions, and they give rise to changes in the s t r u c t u r e . S. Isn't t h a t just two ways of saying the same thing? W. T h e / r e r e l a t e d , but t h e / r e certainly not the same.

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Sullivan: Structure and Function

Still

later:

S.

I don't know why  insists t h a t this must be the phoneme t. You can never establish a contrast in this environment. W. So what would you call it? S. It must be a morphophoneme. W. Don't you mean an archiphoneme? (See Sullivan 1974) Later yet: S. I don't understand why he comes to this conclusion. W. Instead of worrying about t h a t , r e - e x a m i n e the way he phrased his statement of the problem. S. (Re-examines it.) Oh, the conclusion is implicit in the hypothesis. W. Now ask why he stated the problem t h a t way. And so on. But you get the

picture.

VI.2 My personal debt In my two years of course-taking as a graduate student in the Slavic Department at Yale Univer­ sity, I managed to take only this one course from Rulon Wells. Scheduling conflicts and competing course r e q u i r e ­ ments severely limited the number of courses I was able to take f r o m the Linguistic Department offerings. Still, I accrued two personal debts to Mr. Wells in the course of this one semester. One personal debt I owe Rulon Wells is of a general order. He was one of two people (Alexander Schenker was the other) who urged me to enroll in Sydney Lamb's course in morphological analysis. This course was not r e q u i r e d of Slavic students, but the joint influence of Schenker and Wells made it imperative. Lamb's course showed me exactly how semiotic and structural relations could be catalogued, codified, i n t e g r a t e d , and reconciled with each other. About midway through this course, I became convinced t h a t Wells 1947a and b t o g e t h e r had a hook on the paths I should t a k e , and stratificationalism provided the instrument. The n a t u r e of my other personal debt to Rulon Wells is shown by the f i r s t and last interchanges r e p o r t e d in VI.1 Mr. Wells always insisted t h a t I look at the internal logic of

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

221

the question as well as a t the answer. Such a procedure is instructive in life in general and not just in linguistics. We are all used to people who do not know what the answer to a particular problem is. Wells' procedure makes it clear that many people who p r e t e n d to have the answer do not even know what the question is. Most instructive. In short, even when Rulon Wells did not have the answer to some problem, it was always clear that he understood the nature of the problem and had good ideas concerning that f o r m u l a t o n of the question which would point most directly toward the problem's resolution. Such clear vision is always to be envied and e m u l a t e d . For my p a r t , as one who took and takes advantage of his p e r c e p tiveness, I would like to thank Rulon Wells most sincerely f o r sharing it with me.

ENDNOTES 1

Obviously this p a p e r , like the book, is dedicated to Rulon Wells. However, I herewith acknowledge t h a t without Adam Makkai, it would not have been w r i t t e n . He issued the initial invitation to w r i t e it and kept a f t e r me until it was done. Most i m p o r t a n t , he it was who suggested the topic t h a t became my central thesis. 2 I am indebted to David Suggs and Kofi Akwabe-Ameyaw, graduate students in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Florida, f o r commenting on the section on anthropological methods and especially for pointing out this fact about Pike's contribution to anthropological research.

REFERENCES Bloch,

B e r n a r d . 1946. Syntax." In Joos 22.200-48.

"Studies in colloquial Japanese II: 1957, 154-85. Originally in Language

222

Sullivan: Structure and Function

Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. Language. New York: Holt, & Winston.

Rinehart

Gieason, H. Α., Jr. 1980. Comments on William J. Sullivan's "Syntax and linguistic semantics in stratificational theory." In Current Syntactic Theories: Discussion papers f r o m the 1979 Milwaukee Syntax Conference, Michael Kac ( e d . ) , 118-33. Bloomington, Indiana: lULC. Jakobson, Roman. 1958. "Morfologiceskie nabljudenija nad slavjanskim skloneniem (Sostav russkix padeznyx form)." In American Contributions to the Fourth Interna­ tional Congress of Slavicists, Moscow, September, 1958, 127-56. The Hague: Mouton. Joos, M a r t i n ( e d . ) . 1957. Readings in Linguistics. versity of Chicago Press. Nida,

Chicago: U n i ­

Eugene A. 1960. A Synopsis of English Syntax. Oklahoma: Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Schenker, Alexander Mouton.

M.

1964.

Polish Declension.

Norman,

The

Hague:

Sullivan, William J. 1974. "The archiphoneme in s t r a t i f i c a ­ tional description." In Proceedings of the Xlth Interna­ tional Congress of Linguists, Luigi Heilmann (ed.), 2 8 7 - 9 9 . Bologna, Italy: Casa Editrice il Mulino. . 1980. "Syntax and linguistic semantics in s t r a t i f i c a ­ tional theory." In Syntax and semantics, vol. 13, E. Moravcsik and J. Wirth (eds.), 3 0 1 - 2 7 . New York: Aca­ demic Press. Wells, Rulon. 1947a. "De Saussure's system of linguistics." Joos 1957, 1-18. Originally in Word 3 . 1 - 3 1 . . 1947b. "Immediate constituents." In 186-207. Originally in Language 23.81-117.

Joos

In

1957,

COME ON UP

I.

Eldon G. Lytie Linguistics I n t e r n a t i o n a l , Inc. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

In a paper read at the 1979 LACUS Forum, I asserted t h a t it was possible, using the recursive facilities of Junc­ tion Rules ( J - R u l e s ) , to give plausible representations for such horrors as COME ON UP FROM OUT OF DOWN IN UNDER THERE (BY THE STAIRS) WHERE ... ( L y t l e , 1979, pp. 3 0 5 - 3 4 3 ) . The purpose of the present w r i t i n g is to describe how this is done. The representation to be given will be based on Junc­ tion Rule (J-Rule) schemata utilized to describe the s t r u c ­ t u r e of pragmatic data. Pragmatic data is i n t e r m e d i a t e between the basic data of the general information net and the lexical data utilized as the basis f o r w r i t i n g or speak­ ing. A general outline and description of data types in Junction Grammar is given in Lytle, 1979. See the bibliogra­ phy for additional r e f e r e n c e s . The general outline of the paper is as follows: We f i r s t discuss two J - r u l e generalizations made in Junction Grammar (JG) which are germane to the analysis of constit­ uent s t r u c t u r e . Next, some analytical diagnostics are p r e ­ sented to provide guidance in the use of these g e n e r a l i z a ­ tions. And, lastly, we undertake a JG-style immediate constituent analysis of the problem d a t a . In so doing, we pay homage in our own way to the memorable t r a d i t i o n of Wells (Wells, 1947).

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Lytie: Come on Up

II. THE GENERALIZATIONS First, for adjunction (the junction type used to join objects to verbs and subjects to predicates), allowance is made to permit categories other than V (verb) to function as predicate nuclei. This has the consequence of making adjectival, adverbial, and prepositional modifiers structurally symmetrical with relative clauses. Thus, in JG one does not join adjectives, adverbs, and prepositional phrases directly to the element they modify. Rather, one f i r s t constructs an appropriate adjunction, i.e. a s t a t e m e n t t e m p l a t e , and then interjoins said t e m p l a t e to the head in the same fashion t h a t one would join a relative clause to its head. The r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t phrasal modifiers and clausal modifiers be structurally symmetrical is motiviated by semantic considera­ tions (See Lytle, 1 9 7 1 , pp. 1 0 2 - 1 2 2 ) . Generalizing adjunction to accommodate predicates of whatever nuclear category results in an expanded inventory of adjunctive node labels, as given in Figure 1.

STATEMENT LABELS PREDICATE LABELS PREDICATOR LABELS

Figure

SV PV V

SAj PAj Aj

SAv SP PAv PP Αν Ρ

1. Statements and predicates non-verbal nuclei

SN SN Ν

may

have

Node labels are abbreviated as follows: verb (V); adjective (Aj); adverb (Av); preposition ( P ) ; noun ( N ) ; predicate with verb nucleus (PV); predicate with adjective nucleus (PAj); predicate with adverb nucleus (PAv); predicate with p r e p o ­ sition nucleus ( P P ) ; predicate with noun nucleus ( P N ) ; statement with verb nucleus (SV); s t a t e m e n t with adjective nucleus (SAj); statement with adverb nucleus (SAv); s t a t e ­ ment w i t h preposition nucleus ( S P ) ; statement with noun nucleus (SN). These additional node labels e n t e r into other junction schemata f r e e l y , so t h a t , f o r example, adjectival and p r e p o ­ sitional statements may be introduced directly, without BE reduction, to account for expressions such as WHAT! ME SICK? or HOW FORTUNATE THAT THEY LEFT WHEN THEY DID!

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

225

The generalization of adjunction described above is paralleled by an equally important generalization f o r subj u n c t i o n . The generalization in question centers on the r e f e r m e n t , a structural template which defines among its constituents a set of grammatical relations as important to modification and subordination as subject, predicator, object, and predicate are to predication. The foregoing italicized terms, of course, are the functional names given to adjoined elements within a s t a t e m e n t . Please observe that each such constituent also has a fixed location relative to other elements in the s t a t e m e n t t e m p l a t e . Similarly, the constituents of which the r e f e r m e n t is composed have been given their own specific functional names and occupy fixed locations within the r e f e r m e n t t e m p l a t e . In an expression such as THE FIVE YOUNG MEN THAT WE MET, THE is at Nm as the modalizer, FIVE is a t Nq as the quantifier, MEN is at Nc as the classifier, YOUNG is the nucleus of an adjectival s t a t e m e n t (SAj) interjoined to M E N , and THAT WE MET is a verbal s t a t e m e n t (SV) interjoined to Na, the aggregate (See Figure 2 ) . With regard to these interjoined modifiers, it is important to understand also t h a t the point a t which s t a t e ­ ments interjoin to the r e f e r m e n t is not a r b i t r a r y . Specific modifiers interjoin to the a g g r e g a t e ; generic modifiers interjoin to the classifier. This corresponds to the definition of junction operations within the r e f e r m e n t , whereby j u n c ­ tions to the classifier result in a subset, while junctions to the aggregate result in e n u m e r a t i o n of specific elements. To recapitulate, modalizer, quantifier, classifier, and aggregate are functional names f o r constituents of fixed location within the r e f e r m e n t , and are considered to be as indispensable to the explication of the structure of simple phrases as subject, predicate, predicator, and object are to the explication of s t a t e m e n t (propositional) s t r u c t u r e .

226

Lytie: Come on Up

Figure

2. The pragmatic noun phrase

structure

of

a

typical

Notice t h a t there is a direct correlation between such nominal forms as a r t i c l e , cardinal number, common noun, relative pronoun, etc., and the nodes in the r e f e r m e n t . We assume t h a t just as the nominative/accusative noun f o r m contrast is reflective of noun position within the statement t e m p l a t e , other familiar contrasts in noun form are r e f l e c ­ tive of noun position within the r e f e r m e n t t e m p l a t e . Recall that in dealing with adjunction we generalized the statement t e m p l a t e to allow predicate nuclei of w h a t ­ ever category. We now wish to make a parallel g e n e r a l i z a ­ tion for subjunction. The basic r e f e r m e n t t e m p l a t e will be allowed to occur f o r all categories. The reason for this is that we observe a variety of contrasts within each category which appear to be r e f e r m e n t based. More specifically, it seems plausible to regard clausal markers such as THAT and IF as instances of SVm, i.e. as modalizers (articles) for clauses. Similarly, if modal contrasts for person are r e f l e c t e d by nominal articles, it seems reasonable to expect predicate articles at PVm expressing contrasts f o r t e m p o r a l ­ ity (WILL, SHALL, and WOULD, perhaps), and verbal articles expressing contrasts f o r aspect at Vm (the "auxiliaries" BE and HAVE r e q u i r e explication). Why not even expect, say, articles for prepositional phrases at PPm? Notice the sym­ metry between THIS BOOK THAT I BOUGHT and THERE ON THE TABLE WHERE I PUT IT ( t h i s . . . t h a t / t h e r e . . . w h e r e ) .

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

227

F u r t h e r m o r e , why should one assume that only nominals occur in connection with amounts? In an expression such as HE GREW SIX INCHES, f o r example, might not SIX INCHES be functioning at Vq ( q u a n t i f i e r of a verb)? And in an expres­ sion such as THEY CHEAT A LOT, might not A LOT be f u n c ­ tioning at PVq ( q u a n t i f i e r of a verbal predicate)? And in an expression such as HE IS TWENTY YEARS OLD, might not TWENTY YEARS be functioning at Ajq ( q u a n t i f i e r of an adjective)? We do not assume of course, that all the nodes in every r e f e r m e n t must be used in every case, any more than we assume t h a t every verb must have a direct object. potential We do postulate, however, that f u l l r e f e r m e n t does exist on every category, should the exigencies of dis­ course require it. Let us also assume t h a t r e f e r m e n t embedding is as essential to natural langauge recursion as statement embedding. In other words, let us assume t h a t r e f e r m e n t s may be embedded within other r e f e r m e n t s . For nominals, this will give us the facility to account f o r complex noun phrases such as WE THE PEOPLE, JOHN THE REVELATOR, and MY FRIEND THE HERMIT. For verbal predicates it will give us the facility for managing overlapping temporality such as we observe in THE PRESIDENT IS TO ARRIVE TOMORROW, or HE WILL HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. There a r e , of course, numerous possibilities for e m b e d ­ ding one r e f e r m e n t within a n o t h e r . . Since space will not permit elaboration on each embedding possibility and its syntacto-semantic correspondences, may it simply be stated for the purposes of this paper t h a t embeddings to the q u a n t i f i e r appear to involve complex amount specifications, e.g. ANOTHER TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND SACKS OF POTATOES; embeddings to the classifier appear to involve derivational processes, e.g. THE RAPID CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE BY WORKMEN; and embeddings to the aggregate appear to involve appositional/complementary processes, e.g. THE FACT THAT THEY SUCCEEDED, or WE THE PEOPLE. The expression we are laboring with in this paper appears to involve recursion via interjunction (relativization) and aggregate complementation, r a t h e r that recursive quantification or derivation.

228 III.

Lytie: Come on Up SOME DIAGNOSTICS

There are some useful diagnostics which may be brought to bear in sorting out adverbial/prepositional chains such as the one confronting us here. (D1) Appositives and/or complements are r e f erentially independent. Hence, the referment to which they are embedded can generally be removed without impairing t h e i r r e f e r e n c e . For example, THE FACT THAT THEY LEARNED SURPRISED can be shortened to THAT THEY LEARNED SURPRISED US.

US

(D2) Relativo modifiers, on the other hand, are more referentially dependent upon the r e f e r m e n t to which they are interjoined. Hence, the relative reading of THE FACT THAT THEY LEARNED SURPRISED US is lost when the expression is shortened: THAT THEY LEARNED SURPRISED US. Applying these diagnostics to the expressions BACK AT THE RANCH and AHEAD OF THE PACK, we note that AT THE RANCH can be isolated (THEY ARE AT THE RANCH), whereas OF THE PACK cannot be isolated (*THEY ARE OF THE PACK) without impairing the r e f e r e n c e of the prepositional phrase. Thus we conclude t h a t AT THE RANCH is a complement of BACK, Le. t h a t a PP r e f e r m e n t for AT THE RANCH is e m b e d ­ ded at the aggregate of the PAj r e f e r m e n t for BACK. See Figure 3.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Figure

3.

Prepositional phrase a locative adjective

229

complementing

OF THE PACK, on the other hand, corresponds to a prepositional s t a t e m e n t interjoined to AHEAD. See Figure 4.

Figure

4.

Relative phrase adjective

modifying

locative

Another useful diagnostic is the following: (D3) Complementary and/or appositional con­ stituents share the same grammatical relations v i s - à - v i s neighboring constituents. Thus, in the expression MY FRIEND THE HERMIT DWELLS IN A CAVE, MY FRIEND and THE HERMIT a r e both individually and jointly subjects of DWELLS IN A CAVE. B u t , in the e x p r e s ­ sion, THEY HAVE INHABITED A CAVE, where one might r e a ­ sonably expect t h a t HAVE simply embeds INHABITED as a complementary verb r e f e r m e n t , we observe t h a t while A CAVE is the direct object of INHABITED, it is not the direct

230

Lytie: Come on Up

object of HAVE. Hence, we conclude t h a t HAVE INHABITED does not involve embedded verb r e f e r m e n t s . On the other hand, both HAVE and INHABITED share the same subject, suggesting the possibility t h a t HAVE INHABITED may involve embedded PV r e f e r m e n t s . One final diagnostic relevant to our purpose is a corol­ lary to our d e f i n i t i o n of subjunction to the aggregate as the enumeration of a specific element: (D4) Complements do not occur in a r e s t r i c ­ tive series. This simply means t h a t complements are by n a t u r e r e f e r e n tially unique and are t h e r e f o r e not restricted by modifiers. IV.

THE ANALYSIS

Having attended to preliminaries, we now proceed directly to the analysis of the problem sequence. First, t h e r e appear to be some ellipses which must be taken into account. These are indicated by the a n g l e - b r a c k e t e d item inserted into the problem string at two locations as depicted in (S1). (S1) COME ON UP FROM OUT OF DOWN IN UNDER THERE WHERE ... Aside f r o m the intuition t h a t these nominals are understood, the presence of COME in conjunction with FROM (OUT OF) imposes a syntacto-semantic r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a prepositional object identifying point of origin. The point of origin is then pinpointed as being UNDER a second location, which is subsequently identified via the THERE WHERE sequence. Consider now the THERE WHERE substring. We have already pointed out the symmetry between (T)HERE and nominal demonstratives. The interesting fact about (T)HERE is t h a t in its locative reading it actually seems to qualify r e t e r e n t i a l l y as a prepositional phrase modalizer (PPm). Notice, for example, t h a t in an expression such as IN NEW YORK, WHERE I WAS BORN, the relative link WHERE takes as its antecedent IN NEW YORK r a t h e r than just NEW YORK. And, if I ask WHERE ARE YOU?, the answer will be something like AT THE STORE, i.e. a prepositional phrase. Observe f u r t h e r

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

231

that while demonstrative pronouns are followed optionally by a common noun, locative (T)HERE is followed optionally by a prepositional phrase. THAT (BOOK) THERE (ON THE PORCH)

WHICH HE HAS WHERE HE IS

Since the referential scope of both (T)HE'RE and WHERE is equivalent to that of prepositional phrases, we opt to view the former as a demonstrative at PPm (the TH-form) and the latter as a relative pro-PP marking an interjunction to the PP referment at the aggregate (the WH -form). See Figure 5. PP

/~

PPm

There

*

/ PPa

/ PPq

""" PP

on 5.

*

'* P

Figure

P'Z. "

/ PP where

/"'" +

N

the porch

Referment for PORCH) WHERE

THERE

(ON

THE

Consider now the expression FROM OUT OF . Notice that FROM has as its covert object (COME FROM "kutu-i- > *kutl - > kuti-, and DvN.: *kutu-i again similarly developing to the kuti- of the w r i t t e n pTg. records. Class 5: OJ wi- 'to be' (cognate with pA *-, bi- 'id.') needs little comment here: the developments w e r e the same as above ("wi-rl- > *wi-i- > wi- f o r Aor., *wi-i- > wi- f o r DvN.), and regular. 5.2.1.1 In understanding the course of developments sketched above, it is necessary to keep in mind two d i f f e r ­ ent sets of phonological change t h a t profoundly a f f e c t e d the course of preOJ. One of these sets is (again) proximate, i.e., it was solely a f e a t u r e of the i n t e r n a l history of Jap­ anese a f t e r the language had separated from the Tungusic branch of Altaic. This comprises the regular contraction of

400

Miller: H, H and H in the

Japanese Verb

vowel sequences so that preOJ a-i > OJ ë f and both ö and u+i > 7, thus clarifying ate < *ata-i, köri < * köro-i, and kuti < *kutu-it so long as we remember t h a t , just as e' and ě, kept separate following, e.g., -k-, w e r e neutralized to e following, e.g., -t-, so also w e r e 7 and Ί neutralized to / following, e.g., - r - and -t-, and specifically in the OJ examples just cited. The other set is one t h a t governs the loss of " -  - in all the Aor. developments sketched above; thus it is r e m o t e , not proximate, and of prime importance for the history of the language, particularly for clarifying its relationship to Altaic through Tungusic. 5.2.1.2 Central to the various developments sketched imme­ diately supra is the Lautgesetz t h a t Menges has dubbed 'der typisch süd-tungusische - r - Verschleiss' 2 2 . This governed the t r e a t m e n t of original pTg. intervocalic *-r- in the later l a n ­ guages of the southern Tungusic domain, where *VIV s u r ­ vived generally intact, but *VrV became - / in Negidal, Oroči, Olča, and Nanai and zero in Udi, a language t h a t represents a transitional i n t e r m e d i a r y between Northern and Southern Tungusic. The -r-Verschleiss mostly operated i n d e ­ pendently of the quality and q u a n t i t y of the vowels in question, but t h e r e is little question t h a t it is most f r e ­ quently, and regularly, attested when *-rwas followed in the same derivational morpheme by * - / ( - ) , as in the e x a m ­ ples above. There also can be little question that the o p e r ­ ation of this same, typically Southern Tungusic - r-Verschleiss in the prehistory of the OJ verb provides one of the most striking bodies of evidence arguing in favor of the genetic relationship of Japanese to the other Altaic languages, in particular for its close relationship to the Southern sub­ group of Tungusic. The relationship of Korean to Altaic is also bolstered by this same phenomenon of Altaic phonology; a p a r a l l e l , and probably r e l a t e d change may be established for Old Korean, in illustration of which OKor. *nali > 'MKor. 'naį-h 'river' is one of several f r e q u e n t l y - c i t e d examples. 2 3 MKor. and NKor. have a single liquid phoneme f o r which we w r i t e /. These changes in OKor. have been employed to argue f o r a contrast between *r and */ in the prehistory of the language (so that *r > zero, but */ survived); but in the light of Altaic comparisons they testify r a t h e r f o r original distinctive v o w e l - l e n g t h , so t h a t OKor. *nail > MKor. n a / - , etc. At any r a t e , the original, i n h e r i t e d , Southern Tungusic -r-Verschleiss rule in its canonical f o r m , i.e., when the " - r -

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

401

was before *-ī(-), was clearly operative in preOJ. For the class 5 verb meaning 'to b e / *a- plus e i t h e r -/ or *-r/ >ari(-), since the would equally have given ë - , but *ar-rirule did not operate a f t e r original C 1 C 2 , only intervocalically. And exactly p a r a l l e l , in formation and development, to the 0J forms are such developments as the Udì Nomen aoristi zèptêi < ǐ ä b - t ä r i , < j a b - 'eat*. 2 * And a closely asso­ ciated -g-Verschleiss (though t h a t t e r m seems not yet to have been employed in the l i t e r a t u r e ) also ruled occur­ rences of original *VgV, particularly when the second vowel was "-ǐ(-), with equally important consequences both f o r Tungusic generally and f o r the prehistory of 0J in p a r t i c u ­ lar, as we shall see infra, in 6. 5.2,2 Ind. homonymous with AdN. in classes 1 and 5. In order to understand how this particular and e n o r ­ mously significant area of homonymy arose, we must f i r s t establish, if only in broad o u t l i n e , the history of the forms that participate in i t , as a necessary preliminary step toward recovering the prehistory of the morphological f o r ­ mations that underlie this striking formal convergence of what have nevertheless remained semantically and syntacti­ cally distinct verb forms. 5.2.2.1 The Indicatives. In the syntax of the original Altaic linguistic unity, "Alle anderen V e r b a l f o r m e n , die in den verschiedenen altaischen Sprachen als prädikative Formen oder Tempusbildungen d i e n e n , d.h. die unseren Indikativ ausdrücken, sind geschichtlich und meistens auch begrifflich nur verschiedenartige verbale N o m i n a . " 2 5 Excepted f r o m this statement w e r e only the inherited Imps, and some optatives in * - s u . Otherwise, all Altaic verbs w e r e (and mostly still a r e ) nouns; and it is clear t h a t predication, in the original language, was almost exclusively n o m i n a l . 2 6 From Tungusic, OJ inherited a number of characteristic morphological f o r ­ mations by means of which DvNs., employed syntactically for this nominal predication, w e r e fashioned. In the most important of these formations, and the one t h a t underlies the Ind. category of the OJ v e r b , a DvN. was compounded with some f o r m of the reflex of pA and pTg. *b/- 'to be'. Apart from OJ, this formation is best preserved in the w e l l - k n o w n Manchu verbs in Ma. -m-bi, historically to be understood as DvNs. in *-n with suffixed b/- and assimilation * - n - b / - > -m-bi-.27 These provide the c i t a t i o n - f o r m s of the traditional Manchu dictionaries ( t e - ' t o sit' is e n t e r e d under

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Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb

tembi; gene- 'to go' under genembi; tuwa- to look ( a t ) ' under tuwambi, e t c . ) ; but the forms are also the imperfect indica­ tives of the most usual form of Manchu predication (thus, tembi 'sit, sits,' genembi 'go, goes,' tuwambi 'look, looks,' e t c . ) . This is the f o r m a t i o n - - e s s e n t i a l l y to be described as one of periphrasis, in which the indicative employed f o r predication consists of a compound of a verbal noun plus a form of the verb 'to b e ' - - t h a t was directly inherited by preOJ from its Tungusic heritage. But in the case of OJ, two important d i f f e r e n c e s separated it from the formation as otherwise and independently also inherited by Manchu. Unlike M a . , OJ did not use a verbal noun in *-n, and also (partially) unlike M a . , OJ did not use its direct reflex of pTg. *bi-, OJ wi-, in this f o r m a t i o n , but instead its reflex of the pA doubletform t h a t must also be reconstructed for this same v e r b , pA *bü-.28 It is not presently clear w h e t h e r * b ü - was originally some form of the verb in question possessing a specific morphological, semantic, resp. syntactic function or power, or whether it was merely a d o u b l e t - f o r m t h a t arose phonologically as the result of assimilation of the vowel of *bi- to the articulatory location of the initial. At any r a t e , both forms are extremely old, and both must be reckoned with in any account of subsequent developments in the later l a n ­ guages, including Japanese. OJ generally operated with wi< *bi-, but even so, a f e w r e l i c - f o r m s with OJ u < *wu < *bü- survived long enough to appear in early texts (where however they are OJ  because preOJ "w before  had already disappeared); an o f t e n - c i t e d (though hardly e d i f y ­ ing) example is OJ tukǐu '(she) impailed (her pudenda on a chopstick, to commit suicide)' where the formation is tukl, the DvN. in OJ -1 to OJ tuk- 'stab, impair plus  < *wu. 29 OJ tuk- is cognate with Ma. toko- 'to stab, to stick', but the Ma. form is thematic, < * tuk-u-, while the OJ is athematic. Nevertheless, the parallel in formations is striking: Ma. tokombi 'stab, stabs (imperf.)* is a verbal noun in "- plus bi- 'to be', while OJ tukǐu 'id.' is a verbal noun in "-/ plus "wu >  < *bü-. 3 0 Thus, for its inds., OJ inherited from preOJ the follow­ ing types of periphrastic, i.e., verbal n o u n - p l u s - ' t o be' f o r ­ mations in classes 1 , 2 , 3, 4, 6 , 8 , and 9: class 1: *kak+wu > kaku 'writes'; class 2: *ata+wu > atu 'strikes'; class 3: "körowu > köru 'learns from experience'; class 4: *kutu+wu > kutu 'rots'; class 6: *sin+wu > sinu 'dies'; class 8: *s(u)+wu > su 'does';

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class 9: *köwu > ku 'comes'. Since OJ t o l e r a t e d neither consonant sequences nor consonant+semi-vowel sequences nor multiple vowel-sequences (the tuklu f o r m cited above is, on this score, both a relic and an anomaly), all the phono­ logical assimilations and simplifications implied in the sketch j u s t given are readily understood as regular and automatic, and r e q u i r e no f u r t h e r discussion. This regular set of developments was i n t e r r u p t e d only in classes 5 and 7; but this will hardly be a surprise, when we recall the meanings of the verbs t h a t constitute these two classes, class 5, vw'to be', class 7 , ar- 'to be.' In both instances any periphras­ tic formation with " b ü - , or indeed with any other form of the original verb - 'to be', would have been semantically r e d u n d a n t , and hence was eschewed in the morphol­ ogy of the l a t e r , as also in the original languages. In class 7 t h e solution was an even simpler one: OJ ar- simply used as an indicative, its verbal noun in *-rī > OJ ari < *ar-rl predicative f o r m ; and indeed, this same form has remained intact in just t h a t shape and function in the subsequent history of the standard l i t e r a r y language. (The modern spo­ ken standard has analogically replaced it with the AdN. aru, but this is a very late shift.) In class 5, the solution was more complex. Here wī- f still properly eschewing a p e r i p h ­ rastic with itself, reached instead into the AdNs. for an analogic substitution, which it located t h e r e in the form of OJ wiru, to the history of which we must now t u r n . 5.2.2.2 The Adnominals. Meanwhile, in the syntax of the original Altaic linguistic unity, and in particular in t h a t portion of the same to which OJ was, in its t u r n , to be most closely r e l a t e d , a morphologically and at the same time a syntactically distinct f o r m a t i o n was employed for AdNs. One of the characteristic f e a t u r e s of the original language appears to have been its periphrastic employment, in syntax, of a secondary verb formation t h a t consisted of the root - 'to be' plus a suffixed morpheme *-ro. Lexically, this particular suffix marked the forms of the verb 'to be' with which it was employed as aorists; syntactically, these secondary formations * bi-ro, *bü-ro (and l a t e r , with v o w e l harmony, marked the verbal nouns to which they were in t u r n compounded as AdNs. The AdN. syntactic structures f o r m e d in this fashion had no category of voice in the original language, hence no distinctive categories of active or passive w e r e inherited anywhere in the later I a n -

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Japanese Verb

guages from this f e a t u r e , even though, when translating the descendant forms into an l.-E. language, one must generally introduce some such f e a t u r e . Thus, Ma. ¡etere niyalma 'the person who e a t s , a man who eats' is parallel to Ma. ¡etere saka 'fish, meat ( f i n e l y cut up, seasoned but r a w ) t h a t one e a t s , that is e a t e n ' . Both have the same AdN., įet'eat', cf. Ma. imp. jefu 'eat!', c i t a t i o n ere < *ǐeptere to *ǐäbf o r m įe-mbi; and both also are t r a n s l a t e d by, and etymologically parallel t o , 0J taburu Fito 'a manwho eats' and 0J taburu sakana 'fish t h a t is e a t e n , t h a t one eats' ( 0 J Fito 'man' sakana 'fish' (esp. as food)'). But in the original, as in the later languages, the collocation at issue was a simple voiceless aorist used in noun-head (as well as in other minor types of) modification; thus, in the examples above, the nouns niyalma and Fǐtö 'man' are modified by the AdN aorists jetere and taburu 'eat'. This characteristic construction of the original language appears to have been most elabo­ rately developed in Tungusic, particularly in the Southern Tungusic variety of t h a t branch of Altaic to which the 0J verb is most intimately r e l a t e d ; but while it is in So. Tgs. that the formation and its syntactic employment have l e f t their most striking traces, this does not mean t h a t e i t h e r the formal f e a t u r e or its syntactic function are by any means unknown to the rest of the Altaic domain. Indeed, it appears t h a t in the original language, o u t ­ side as well as inside the Tungusic sector, these inherited AdNs. had not only forms t h a t resulted from the suffixation of the morpheme *-ro just c i t e d , but also other forms with a r e l a t e d suffix *-ri t h a t also formed still other AdNs. These other AdNs. apparently had a d i f f e r e n c e in meaning f r o m those in *-ro, even though it is not presently possible to recover the details of this semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Tracing their development is r e n d e r e d especially d i f f i c u l t by the accident t h a t , early in t h e i r history, these *-ri AdNs. appear to have f a l l e n together with the originally d i f f e r e n t verbal nouns from the Participium aoristi in *-ri. Once this f a l l i n g together had appreciably advanced, any original d i f f e r e n t i a ­ tion in form and function between the two sets of forms was soon obscured. Meanwhile, and to complicate even f u r t h e r the history of this portion of the verb morphology, several d i f f e r e n t factors, operating independently within Tgs., fortuitously led

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to the simultaneous obscuring of much of the remainder of the evidence l e f t behind by this AdN. suffix *-ro. In the main, these factors w e r e , in their t u r n , largely the result of the gradually more and more rigorous extension of vow­ el-harmony restrictions between roots (resp., stems, themes) and suffixes in Tungusic. That the gradual advance of the assimilatory p a t t e r n s known under the general rubric of "vowel harmony" should, in this way, tend more and more toward the obliteration of the identifying shapes of e a r l i e r , inherited morphological distinctions is hardly to be wondered a t ; the only wonder is that any traces at ail of the original system survived in a f o r m sufficiently intact to p e r m i t later historical identification. But f o r t u n a t e l y , a f e w did. The original Tgs. Nomen aoristi in *-ra was inherited as such by all the languages. Each of the later languages, early in its prehistory, enforced certain assimilatory changes upon the consonant initial of this morpheme when it came together with the final consonant of a root, s t e m , or theme (some of these, as they appear in OJ, have already been > kaka-, etc., noted above, thus with - ' w r i t e / *kak-racf. 5.2.1. supra; parallel changes are readily documented f r o m a range of Tgs. l a n g u a g e s 3 1 ) . But with the extension of vowel-harmony r e q u i r e m e n t s , the vowel of this morpheme also f e l l a victim to assimilatory d e f o r m a t i o n . Initially, vow­ el-harmony split *-ra into two d i f f e r e n t allomorphs, as r e p ­ r e s e n t e d , e.g., by the Ev. and Lam. back- and f r o n t - v a r i ­ ants -ra / - r e . 3 2 But the process, once set into motion, did not stop t h e r e ; and in M a . , we see how it was f u r t h e r extended until it resulted in t h r e e allomorphs, - r a , - r e , and -ro, distributed automatically albeit according to a r a t h e r involved p a t t e r n of vowel-harmony r e q u i r e m e n t s . 3 3 But with this development, the Ma. inheritance of the AdN. *ro morpheme effectively f e l l together with (or one might say, was contaminated w i t h ) the Ma. inheritance of the pTg. aorist *-ra - - which we will recall had e a r l i e r been severed into two vowel-harmony v a r i a n t s , to appear as Ma. -ra and - r e . This now meant that AdN. forms such as Ma. ¡etere, cited above, had become formally indistinguishable f r o m the Ma. Participium imperfecta f o r m s , even though the f o r m e r continued *-ro, and the l a t e r continued *-ra· f o r Ma. ala' r e p o r t / gene- 'go', and tokto- 'fix, settle,' both the AdNs. and the Participium imperfecti w e r e now alara, genere, and toktoro. The shape of all these suffixes was now e n t i r e l y

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determined by vowel-harmony; only their syntactic employment preserved even a trace of t h e i r original dis­ t i n c t i o n , not only in syntactic employment but also in overt morpheme shape. Fortunately, even though mostly we must operate in the reconstruction of Altaic generally and in t h a t of Tungusic particularly without the support of early w r i t t e n - r e c o r d s , in the specific case of the morphologically and syntactically distinct periphrastic formations involving *bi- / "bü- 'to be' t h a t are at issue h e r e , we do for once enjoy the enormous luxury of being able to document our postulations through early t e x t u a l evidence, both in Tungusic and in certain varieties of 0 J . The language of the Jurchen (à la rigueur ü r č e n , h e r e a f t e r Jr.) was an early variety of Southern Tungusic, close to both later Nanai and Manchu, and known to us from bilingual texts with Chinese phonetic and semantic glosses as early as the mid-15th century; we may most simply, if not completely accurately, regard and c a t ­ egorize Jr. as 'Old M a . ' " In our Jr. sources we find a number of documentary examples of this periphrastic adno­ minal construction involving forms of the verb 'to be,' even though by the time of these Jr. t e x t s the formation appears already to have been well along the way to its decline, i.e., no longer fully productive. Thus, Jr. aiiburo is adnominal to Jr. alma 'man' (cf. Ma. niyalma 'id.') in the syntactic s t r u c ­ t u r e Jr. aiiburo ñalma 'a man who is a sage; a wise m a n ' " ; but here Jr. abituro is to be analyzed as an adnominal in Jr. -buro < "bü-ro to the Jr. reflex of pA " a č - ' t r e a t g r a ­ ciously, bless with grace and favor' (cf. Mo. ači i 'favor, grace, r e q u i t a l , r e w a r d ' , ahila' t r e a t with benevolence'; Nan. ačeuri- 'to bless,' Ma. - 'be in harmony,' NTk. aci'take pity on,' OJ atu. 'profound (of royal f a v o r , a f f e c t i o n , e s t e e m ) ' ) . And the identical construction is attested in Jr. aiiburo / 'gracious ( i . e . , imperial) decree,' where aiiburo is adnominal to Jr. ǐi borrowed f r o m Chin. '(imperial) w i l l , d e c r e e * , 3 6 and similarly in Jr. aiiburo ( i . e . , imperial) birthday', adnominal to Jr. Ma. hacin 'various auspicious days'. 37

hačeftin

'gracious ' f ē t e ' , cf.

Fortunate also is the circumstance t h a t , in precise p a r ­ allel to these Jr. survivals in f o r m , f o r m a t i o n , sense, and grammatical f u n c t i o n , we f u r t h e r have a significant number of non-standard 'Azuma', OJ adnominals well attested in 0J

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w r i t t e n - r e c o r d s that show the same inherited periphrastic formations, moreover t h a t show them before the phonologi­ cal alterations transpired that somewhat obscure their origin in standard 0 J . Thus we have such important Azuma forms showing the original, inherited shape of the *-ro f o r m a n t as Az, 0J arŏ to standard 0J aru, yukŏ to yuku, kòso to kŏsu ( ' f i l t e r , p u r i f y ' ) , aFo to aFu, Fǐkŏ to Fǐku, etc. 3 8 Similarly significant f o r the documentary support that they provide f o r the present hypothesis of periphrasis are a number of Japanese relic formations t h a t f o r t u n a t e l y also survive pas­ sim in our t e x t - c o r p u s , as e.g. 0J sökǐwon tömö 'even (tomó) (I) have been made to be away f r o m though ( y o u ) ' , 3 9 where we have p r e s e r v e d , due to the archaizing, change-inhibiting contextuality of the metrical passage in which the expression is f o u n d , a periphrastic structure with 0J wori < wor- 'to be (anim.)' with the 0J reflex of pTg. *-rl, onto OJ sök- 'put, be a t a distance' (cognate with Mo. sot- 'tie up the horses ( a t a distance) to let them cool o f f , Tk„ sor'f- 'cool off', e t c . 4 0 ) . Thus do these a t t e s t e d forms support us in our overall conclusion, to the e f f e c t that in this particular area of the Japanese verb and its history, remote homonymy arose as the result of two d i f f e r e n t sets of developments involving changes transpiring in verbs involved in periphrastic structures with *bi- / bü 'to be', the two d i f f e r e n t sets being phonologically d e t e r m i n e d along a two-dimensional axis of b i f u r c a t i o n , according to the o r i g i ­ nal configuration of the root in question. In other words, with athematic (consonant-final) roots, the pattern of development was along the lines 'kak-buro > *kak-buru > *kak ru > *kakww > -, i.e., kaku, with the Ind. 'writes' com­ pletely homonymous to the AdN. '(who, t h a t ) w r i t e s ' , while in the case of thematic ( v o w e l - f i n a l ) roots, the p a t t e r n was instead along the lines 'köröburo > 'köröburu > "ỏ uru > köruru, etc., where the I n d . , köru < *köröbu, was in the attested stages of the languages f i n a l l y distinguished f r o m the AdN., köruru, as sketched. But it is important to recog­ nize that the apocope as well as the -r-Verschleiss (thus, in the f o r m e r sequence, '-uru> *uw u) are in neither instance e i t h e r sporadic or ad hoc f o r m u l a t i o n s ; r a t h e r they w e r e regular applications to the developments within Old Japa­ nese of phonological constraints elsewhere a t t e s t e d in the r e l a t e d languages, constraints that w e r e f u r t h e r distin­ guished within 0J by being rigidly d e t e r m i n e d according to internal Japanese s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s , notably the dichotomy

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imposed by the athematic roots.

differentiation

between

thematic

and

5.2.3 DvN. homonymous with Ind. in class 7. Even though it is a unique member of its set, the sin­ gle OJ verb belonging to class 7 is in many ways one of the most important of all the words in the language when we a t t e m p t to reconstruct the history of the system as a whole. The verb in question is the one t h a t is to be a n a ­ lyzed, if we approach it solely in t e r m s of the internal OJ evidence, as OJ ar- 'to be (esp. of inaminates).' Surely no one would today question t h a t this word is genetically r e l a t e d to verbs of similar form and meaning in the other languages; but d i f f i c u l t and still largely unsolved problems r e m a i n , posed principally by the d i f f i c u l t and still largely unsolved questions involving the divergent vocalism of pMo. * å - 'id.' as against pTk. "är- 'id.' (which may however itself be secondary, < " ä - r - J . Comparing the Tkc. and OJ forms one would conclude t h a t we have here an original a t h e ­ matic, consonant-final root in inherited -r- (and either Mo. a or Tk. ä corresponds equally well with OJ a!); but the Mo. forms indicate instead an original v o w e l - r o o t with l a t e r secondary suffixation in the other languages. At the same t i m e , the vocalisations of the Mo. and Tkc. forms show t h a t the words in these languages can scarcely be directly cog­ nate with one another. For the p r e s e n t , suffice it to remark that Ramstedt long ago, with his customary combi­ nation of perception and almost instinctive insight, no doubt pointed in the right direction when he suggested t h a t , in all these words, we most likely must deal with the results of homonymy, culminating in a calamitous convergence of forms meaning 'to be' with words meaning 'not to b e / at an early stage in the history of all these languages, if not indeed in the original linguistic u n i t y . * 1 Not much has been done to follow up Ramstedf's suggestions along these lines in the years following; perhaps now it is time once more to t u r n to his early findings in the light of the evidence sub­ sequently uncovered, particularly from OJ. At any r a t e , and pending such f u r t h e r study, the OJ attested forms f o r this v e r b , with their stubborn resistance to the homonymy of Ind. and AdN. (OJ ari, Ind., but OJ aru, AdN.), are thrown into even more spectacular r e l i e f against the h i s t o r i c a l - l i n ­ guistic landscape by the f o r t u i t o u s homonymy of this verb's OJ DvN. ari < * ar-i, with its Ind., ari < *ar-rl.

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6. Space available f o r the present sketch precludes all but the merest introduction to one of the most potent sources f o r homonymy in the 0J v e r b , namely the regular loss of * - g - f r o m the inherited pTg. causative-reversal v e r b - s t e m derivative suffix *-giwhen t h a t suffix followed a vowel, thus * - a - g i - > *-ai> 0J  Even though such formations, distinct enough in pTg. and in p r e O J , tend to f a l l together with formations in inherited pTg. *rī in the language of the texts - - loss of *g f r o m *gi producing the same e n d - r e s u l t as loss of V f r o m *ri — it is sometimes possible to d i s t i n ­ guish one f r o m the o t h e r , e i t h e r on the basis of meaning, or f r o m evidence in the other languages, or, in a f e w lucky cases, by means of both. Thus, alongside the 0J class 1 "uruF-ra-, verb uruF- 'become w e t , damp,' with Aor. uruFa- < a word that precisely parallels and is cognate with Ev. ulap-, Lam. ufab- 'id.,' 0J also has a secondary derivative class 2 verb uruF- 'moisten, make w e t ' . At f i r s t glance the appearance of this eminently transitive verb in what is a f t e r alt the n o n - t r a n s i t i v e , medio-passive thematic class 2 of the 0J verb system might appear to be somewhat a n o ­ malous; but actually it is readily explained, since the class 2 verb has its Aor. as 0J uruF'ë- < *uruFa-i< *uruFagi-, with the pTg. causative-reversal morpheme *-gi-, a forma­ tion independently documented by Ev. ulap.kl 'moisten, make w e t / with Ev, -kias the regular reflex (with the velar unvoiced a f t e r the unvoiced stop of the stem) of pTg. m -gi-. 42 Similarly, 0J *ur- 'to ripen' appears only in the class 2 verb with its Aor. ỏ- < 'ỏ -gi-, a f o r m a t i o n with Olči. precise morphological parallels in Ma. uii-, Nan. uĭi-, ùli.iù-, Orok. ud'i-, Sol. irgi-, iggi-, Negd. Igi-, iggi-, Εν. irgi-, Lam. irge-, all meaning 'to raise, n u r t u r e , nourish;* but this unattested simplex 0J *ur- has its direct parallels in Ma. ỏ-, Nan. ỏ- 'get r i p e , be r i p e , be(come) done (of correspond 0J ỏ-, Ma. uii-, food).' 4 3 Thus to pTg. 'ürä.giNan. uĭi-, etc., while to pTg. ürä- would correspond 0J *r-, M a . ỏ-, Nan. ỏ-, etc. But without the happy c i r ­ cumstance of this variety of comparative evidence, we would be unable - - and this is t r u e of most other cases - - to be sure if a 0J f o r m of the type ỏ- r e s u l t e d , as does this one, f r o m *ura-gi-, or f r o m *ura-ri-, or simply f r o m *ura-i 7. Finally, some mention of the negatives in 0 J , in relation to the problems resulting f r o m homonymy, is called f o r , even if it must be even b r i e f e r . Menges has already called a t t e n t i o n to the existence of homonymous positive and n e g -

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ative verb forms in Nanai, as a result of sweeping apocope t h a t t r a n s p i r e d in the course of the history of Southern Tungusic, particularly damaging in its e f f e c t s upon verb formations t h a t , like the bulk of the OJ negatives, originally consisted of a head verb followed by various secondary derivatives of the inherited Verbum negativum, pTg. * ä - 'not to be.' 44 Menges has shown how, in these Nanai f o r m s , not only has the Verbum negativum found its place behind ( r a t h e r than b e f o r e ) the Nomen aoristi of the head v e r b , but the two have ended so closely fused together (eng ver­ schmilzt) that in more than one case we have as a result homonymy between negative and positive expressions: " e i n Form vom Typ [ N a n . ] oboaśi kann sowohl aus obo-r—e-śl 'nicht arbeitend' wie aus "· obo-ra-śī' 'wirklich, bestimmt, arbeitend' entstanden sein. Nur die syntaktischen Verhältniss geben h i e r - - a u s s e r dem Kontext—über die Bedeutung Auf­ schluss ... ,"45 Precisely the same Verschmelzung was respon­ sible, in OJ, for the generation of an apparently suppletive negative paradigm, in which - n - forms cross-over with - z forms most strangely, as the language w e n t about resolving conflict a f t e r conflict between suddenly homonymous n e g ­ a t i v e - and positive-verb structures. This it did along the following lines: (a) a p a r t from a f e w examples of the g e n ­ eral Tungusic, and Altaic, Verbum negativum followed by Head Verb formations, known from t e x t - r e l i c s such as OJ emisu-te 'did not see a n d , ' 4 6 the language mostly used instead (b) Head Verb followed by Verbum negativum f o r m a ­ tions, all involving the normal OJ inheritance of the pA, and pTg., Verbum negativum * ä - . In OJ as in Tungusic, any structure with this *a- always took its Head Verb in the Aor. But the forms t h a t resulted f r o m the implementation of this rule in Japanese led in t u r n to dangerous homo­ nymy; the form r e s u l t i n g , e.g., from a verb such as OJ aF'meet' was initially OJ aFasu < *aF-ra--as(Head Verb in Aor., plus the - s - stem of * a - ; , meaning 'not to m e e t / but soon easily confused with other non-negatives from this same verb involving o t h e r , non-negative - 5 - morphemes and t h e i r secondary derivatives. This intolerable homonymy was averted by f a v o r i n g , and eventually yielding paradigmatic monopoly t o , formations in which the Verbum negativum was not the simple - s - stem of " a - , but r a t h e r the p e r f e c t in -n of this same v e r b , a formation for which we have a b u n ­ dant documentation in the various languages, including e a r l y w r i t t e n - r e c o r d s of Jr. ešen, 47 < * ä - s ä - n . But in Japanese

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

411

these -η perfects were not added directly to the plain Aor., but r a t h e r to the -n present of the Aor. 48 This meant that OJ now had, rather than the potentially ambiguous, and dangerously homonomous, aFasu, the clearly negative and plainly unambiguous aFazu, a form t h a t was e i t h e r < •aF-ra-n—äsän or else < * a F - r a - - ä s ä n . We cannot choose between the two, since both sequences alike would, in the course of undergoing the Verschmelzung, eventually have resulted in the same OJ f o r m , with its plainly marked - z negative. Meanwhile, it was the -  - present of the Head Verb Aor. in apparent -ran, actually, as Menges has shown, *--, that in t u r n was abstracted to yield, eventually, not only the -  - members of the OJ suppletive -n-/-znegative paradigm, but also the n- initial f o r m s of the (historically, if not textually l a t e r ) nak- / nas- negative adjective p a r a ­ digm - - where the - s - forms still preserve vivid evidence f o r the - s - stem of the original pTg. * ä - Verbum n e g a t i vum. We have already mentioned Ramstedt's perspicacious t r e a t m e n t of the Altaic negatives in t e r m s of convergence, homonymy, and paradigmatic conflict and replacement; now t h a t we understand just how closely the otherwise puzzling OJ negative paradigm f i t s in with the circumstances that separately inclined Ramstedt toward these views, we are finally in a position to follow up his formulations in terms of the OJ evidence also, confident t h a t in so doing we will also be able f u r t h e r to clarify more of the prehistory of the other Altaic languages as well. The bulk of that impor­ t a n t work remains f o r the f u t u r e ; but one may hope that the present contribution has at least begun to clear away some of the undergrowth that until now has concealed even the approach toward a solution. If so, then it will not have been a wholly inappropriate way in which to honor the dis­ tinguished scholar, and f o r m e r colleague, to whom this v o l ­ ume is dedicated. 4 9

Abbreviations f o r Frequently Cited DTS-V. M. Nadeljaev et al., grad: 1969. DtS-J.

eds.

Literature

Drevnetjurkskij

slovar'.

Lenin­

Benzing. "Die tungusischen Sprachen. Versuch einer vergleichenden Grammatik," in Abhandlungen der geistesund sozial-wissenschaftlichen Klasse,

412

Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb Akademie der Wissenschaften Mainz 11 (1955): 9 4 9 - 1 0 9 9 .

und

EAS-G. J. Ramstedt, ed. Pentti Aalto. altaische Sprachwissenschaft, Vols. 1952-57.

der

Literatur,

Einführung in die I, I I , III. Helsinki:

TMS-V. I. Tsintsius, et a l . , eds. S r a v n i t e l ' n y j slovar' t u n g u ­ Materiały k ėtimologičesso-man čžurskix jazykov, komu slovarju. 2 vols. Leningrad: 1975-77. VEWT-Martti Räsänen. Versuch eines etymologischen buchs der Türksprachen. Helsinki: 1969. VG-N.

Wörter­

Poppe. Vergleichende Grammatik der altaischen S p r a ­ chen, Teil 1 , Vergleichende Lautlehre. Wiesbaden: 1960.

ENDNOTES 1

0 J is the language of texts from the seventh and eighth centuries, preserved through the medium of Chinese characters used as phonograms. The OJ consonants w e r e k, g, s, z, t, d, n, F, b, m, , ỏ, and w; the vowels w e r e o, ö, plus t h r e e archiphonemes of a, 1, 7, u, e, e, vocalic neutralization /, e f  (on which see note 10 infra). For an introduction to this language, and its phonology, see R. A. M i l l e r , The Japanese Language (Chicago: 1967), pp. 3 1 - 3 5 , 1 7 2 - 2 0 2 , and the author's Japanese and the Other Altaic Languages (Chicago: 1971), passim. The Altaicist u n f a ­ miliar with the conventional transcription of OJ must be w a r n e d t h a t the vowel w r i t t e n OJ ö is not "the same as 'Altaic' Ö, " etc., the diacritics selected to distinguish the members of the sets OJ ĭ, ï, ŏ, ö, and ě,  , being byand-large a r b i t r a r i l y chosen marks t h a t should be read without r e f e r e n c e to their customary significance in Altaic linguistics. 2 This is a still insufficiently studied - - but surely not a sporadic - - OJ morphological phenomenon where a mor­ pheme appears sometimes w i t h , sometimes w i t h o u t , initial s - , thus OJ am ~ same 'rain'. This ' s - movable' was surely no Japanese innovation; it is observed - - though for equally

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

413

obscure reasons - - in such etymologies as that connecting Ma. sain 'good' with the reflexes of pTg. *aja in virtually all the other languages (e.g., Ev. aja, so also Neg., Oroch, Ud., all ultimately cog­ and Ulč-.; Sol., Orok. a/, Lam., Nan. aj), nate with pA 'sag'i - 'good,' (VG, pp. 2 9 , 6 1 , 137), cf. OJ sakĭ ' f o r t u n a t e , l u c k / , Mo. sajín < 'sagln 'good, healthy,' OTk. say 'healthy'. 3

For an introduction to the history of the Japanese v e r b , including the essential bibliographical r e f e r e n c e s , see R. A. M i l l e r , "Altaic origins of the Japanese verb classes," pp. 845-880 in Y. L, Arbeitman and Allan R. Bomhard, eds., Bono Homini Donum: Essays in Historical Linguistics, in Memory of J. Alexander Kerns (Amsterdam: 1981) ( h e r e a f t e r : "Altaic origins . . . " ) . For the history of the Tungusic v e r b , intimately associated as it is with the history of the Japa­ nese v e r b , this account is, in t u r n , deeply in debt to . . Menges, "Die tungusischen Sprachen," pp. 21-256 in B. Spuler, e d . , Handbuch der Orientalistik, Erste Abteilung, der Nahe und der M i t t l e r e Osten, Fünfte Band, Altaistik, D r i t t e r Abschnitt, Tungusologie (Leiden/Köln: 1968) ( h e r e a f t e r : "Die t g n . Sprachen"). This important contribution w i l l , if con­ sulted along with "Altaic origins ...," a f f o r d the reader with the necessary background and bibliography for studying the problem t r e a t e d in the present contribution. The r e a d e r less interested in specific linguistic data may also be served by the more popularized account in R. A. M i l l e r , Origins of the Japanese Language, Lectures in Japan during the Aca­ demic Year 1977-78 ( S e a t t l e : 1981), passim, but esp. pp. 77-85. 4

For the Altaic Stammverkürzung, independently described in 1958 by both Murayama and Ramstedt, see "Altaic origins ...," p. 862. b b 5|.e., they are so believed by TMS, 2.52 , and 2.375 ; but the question is f a r from s e t t l e d , and should be r e s t u d ied, as is t r u e of many of the TMS imputations of b o r r o w ­ ing. 6

Available

in TMS

1.153  -154 a .

7VG, pp. 2 7 , 106; on the 0J - b - , as evidence for e i t h e r "ancient heteroclisis ... or suffix," . . Menges, "Problems of Tungus Linguistics," Anthropos 73 (1978):393.

414

Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb

8 See "Altaic origins ...," f o r the f i r s t a t t e m p t in the l i t e r a t u r e at a comprehensive account of the thematic vow­ els in OJ, particularly in comparison with the Tkc. reflexes of the same inherited Altaic morphological phenomenon.

9

l n OJ what is here called the 'adjective root' is a sub­ set of the noun, but one distinguished f r o m the bulk of the noun morphs in the language by participation in a number of verbal morphological situations. In the present c o n t r i b u ­ tion these adjective roots are distinguished by w r i t i n g . following the f o r m , e.g., taka. . 10 Each of the t h r e e sets of paired OJ vowels, (a) 1, 7 (b) ĕ,  () δ, ö was replaced by an archiphoneme of n e u t r a l i z a t i o n , here w r i t t e n , resp., for set ( a ) , /, f o r ( b ) , e, and for (  ) , o, following specific consonant inventories (including syllable-initial zero) for each set; but the i n v e n ­ tories w e r e slightly d i f f e r e n t f o r each set.

11

"Altaic origins ...," pp. 8 7 6 - 8 7 7 .

12

"Die

t g n . Sprachen," pp. 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 , 165.

13 0 n this *-i and its "ubiquitous role ... in morphology ... in all the languages, including Japanese," see "Altaic origins ...," pp. 8 6 4 - 8 6 5 .

14

B y these rules, original sequences of / followed by a w e r e regularly replaced by OJ ĕ, but original a followed by / was replaced by OJ  (the language did not t o l e r a t e sequences of two or more vowels). But then this OJ ĕ,  contrast was in its t u r n neutralized under certain circum­ stances, both being replaced by the archiphoneme OJ e f as explained in note 10 supra. 15

EAS,

16

2. 4 9 , p. 83.

K. H. Menges, "The Function and Origin of the T u n gus Tense in -ra," Language 19 (1943): Z 3 7 - Z 5 1 , is the classic t r e a t m e n t of this question; now almost four decades a f t e r its publication, this paper remains, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , a classic too o f t e n neglected.

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells 17

DtS,

415

135b' pp. 1076-1077; cf. 132, p. 1071, and pas­

sim. 18

DTS,

p. 6 5 b .

19

"Altaic origins ...," p. 8 5 9 , and the l i t e r a t u r e t h e r e , esp. DtS, 50a, p. 985, and VG, pp. 25, 106. a a 1.667 - 6 6 9 .

20

M a n y other Tungusic cognates in TMS,

21

iAgain, other Tungusic cognates in TMS, 1.441 b .

22

" D i e t g n . Sprachen," p. 157; and DtS, 59, p. 944 ff.

205;

cf.

cited

also,

ibid,

pp.

37,

23 Yj K i - m u n , Kogŏsa kaesŏl (Seoul: 1972), p. 70 ( t r a n s l a ­ tions in Fujimoto Yukio, Kankokugo no rekishi [Tokyo: 1 9 7 5 ] , p.85, and Bruno Lewin, Geschichte d e r koreanischen Sprache [Wiesbaden: 1 9 7 7 ] , p. 80. See also the discussion of these forms in L. R. Koncevič, "Priroda fonematičeskoj d l i t e l ' n o s t i glasnyx-monoftongov korejskogo jazyka, pp. 30-62 in Korejskij jazyk, Sbornik statej (Moscow: 1961), at p. 53.

24"

25

D i e t g n . Sprachen," p. 166; cf. ibid, p. 193.

EAS 2 , 5 2 , pp. 8 5 - 8 6 .

26

T h i s , of course, makes proper nonsense of the E n g ­ lish-General European-Translation based so-called "gram­ mars" that persist in t r e a t i n g Japanese and the other Altaic languages as representing "typical Subject-Object-Verb" syntactic systems, something t h a t they do not now and never d i d , for the simple reason t h a t , in a r e a l , and his­ torical sense, none of these languages really ever have or had any verbs. See R. A. M i l l e r , "Japanese, Altaic, and Indo-European," Journal of Indo-European Studies 7 (1979): 307-313. 27

K. H. Menges, Language 29 (1943):242: "Mandžu attaches to the 'present stem' (in Altaic terminology, to the nomen praesentis) in - the root  'existence, being' which may itself serve as the basis of an independent verb 'to exist, be'..." is the classic s t a t e m e n t , citing and building upon Bang's 1891 Etudes ouralo-alta'iques (cited ibid, p. 238, note 5 ) . Menges 1943 is cited in its t u r n by Benzing, DtS,

416

Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb

136, p. 1077, but apparently not completely understood (see K. H. Menges, The Turkic Languages and Peoples, An I n t r o ­ duction to Turkic Studies [Wiesbaden: 1 9 6 8 ] , p. 137, with note). 28

And the form is so reconstructed, though only as such, and not as here as one of a doublet, by, e.g., VG, p. 112. 29

T h e text for this remarkable passage, which includes the critical OJ form w r i t t e n in phonograms so t h a t t h e r e is no question of its phonological configuration, is to be found in the e i g h t h - c e n t u r y historical work Nihon Shoki, at S(h)ujin 10, p. 247 in the edition of Sakamoto Tarō et a l . , Nihon Koten Bungaku T a i k e i , vol. 6 7 , Tokyo: 1967. It was t r a n s ­ lated by Aston as follows: "Hereupon Yamato-toto-hime no Mikoto looked up and had remorse. She flopped down on a seat and with a chopstick stabbed herself in the pudenda so that she died. She was buried at Oho-chi. T h e r e f o r e the men of that time called her tomb the Hashi no haka, The Chopstick Tomb" (Nihongi, Chronicles of Japan from the earliest times to A.D. 697 [London: 1 8 9 6 ] , vol. 1 , p. 159). 30

Further on significantly r e l a t e d and parallel periphrastics in Menges, Turkic Languages and Peoples, p. 145 f f . , and "Die t g n . Sprachen, " p. 89 ff. 31

"Die t g n . Sprachen," passim, has many significant parallel examples, among which initially one will wish to note particularly such cases as Lam. aw-ra-rn 'ich wasche mich/ but Lam. *od-ra-m > od-dam 'ich mache f e r t i g , ' and similarly *tät-rä-m > tėt-tėm 'ich ziehe mich a n / * ǐ ä b - r ä - m > 3èp-tèm 'ich e s s e / all exactly in line with the OJ develop­ ments (ibid, p. 9 9 ) . 32

33

" D i e t g n . Sprachen," p. 49 ( f o r Ev.), p. 99 (for

E. Haenisch, Mandschu-Grammatik, und 23 T e x t t a f e l n (Leipzig: 1961), p. 53.

Mit

Lam.).

Lesestücken

34 P o r Jr., the only recent scientific work is the epitome by K. H. Menges in "Die t g n . Sprachen," pp. 2 4 6 - 2 5 5 ; o t h ­ e r w i s e , the state of the a r t remains exactly where it was left by W. Grube, Die Sprache und Schrift der Jučen

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells (Leipzig: 1956).

1896,

with

several

modern

reprints,

35

Grube,

No. 273; see also TMS,

1.59  .

36

G r u b e , No. 864; see also TMS,

1.59 b .

37

Grube,

1.59 b ,

No. 867; see also TMS,

417 e.g.,

Taipei:

1.465.a

38

F u k u d a Yoshizuke, Nara jidai Azumanokuni hŏgen no kenkyū (Tokyo: 1965), p. 3 9 7 , and also his Appendix VII, p. 4 9 7 f f . The various forms cited appear in Fukuda at pp. 503, 517, 5 2 0 - 5 2 1 , 523, and 526. 39

Poem No. 55 in the historical t e x t Kojiki; t r a n s l a t e d D. Philippi, This Wine of Peace, This Wine of Laughter (New York: 1968), p. 2 9 , as his No. 30. 40

V G , p. 6 1 ; VEWT, p. 425 ; on the morphology of the forms, G. J. Ramstedt, " Z u r Verbstammbildungslehre der mongolisch-türkischen Sprachen," Journal de la Société F i n no-ougrienne 28:3 (1912): 5 6 - 5 7 . 41 G . J. Ramstedt, "Die Verneinung in den altaischen Sprachen, Eine semasiologische Studie," Mémoires de la Société Finno-ougrienne 52 (1924): 196-215.

42

DtS,

130r, p. 1070.

43 T h e suffix r e q u i r e s f u r t h e r study; cf. "Die t g n . Sprachen," pp. 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 .

44

bid,

pp. 2 3 6 - 2 3 7 .

45

|bid,

pp. 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 .

46

in

the

meantime,

R. A. M i l l e r , 'The Footprints of the Buddha', An Eighth-Century Old Japanese Poetic Sequence (New Haven: 1975), p. 102, to poem 3.4; cf. Japanese and the Other Altaic Languages, 2 7 2 - 2 7 4 . Like all other t e x t - o c c u r r e n c e s of the potentially ambiguous 0J - s - negatives < * ä - s - , this passage has routinely been emended by t r a d i t i o n a l scholar­ ship to read emizute, thus making it an unambiguously marked negative, even though the phonogram orthography of

418

Miller: H, H and H in the Japanese Verb

the passage makes such emendation impossible. OJ e - in such relic forms goes back to *äni-, a f o r m a t i o n in - / on an - n - stem of the Verbum negativum " a - (also inherited in the OKor. form underlying NKor. ani 'not'); loss of the medial • -  - from this f o r m , so t h a t * ä - / - > OJ e - , is also seen in Jr. eyitḫei, glossing Chin, bù-zèng 'is not, was not; never', Grube Nr. 476. OJ ani 'not* is most likely a loan from a now lost OKor. original. Early in its history in preOJ, this preposed Verbum negativum became - contaminated through homonymy with a portion of the paradigm of the verb OJ u'be able'; the resulting semantic conflation, along w i t h the homonymy of overt f o r m s , hastened the r e t r e a t of this c o n ­ struction from the language. 47

G r u b e , Nos. again represents the Jr. remains identifying these

710, 7 3 8 , 739; "Die t g n . Sprachen," p. 254 one of the f e w advances in the study of since Grube, f o r the f i r s t time correctly important inherited negatives.

48

Menges's identification of the historical morphology of these forms unlocks the way for f u t u r e progress in the study of all the r e l a t e d forms, particularly of the OJ n e g ­ atives; see "Die t g n . Sprachen," pp. 2 2 3 - 2 3 4 , and Anthropos 73 (1978): 392, for details. 49

The statements of section 7 are now b e t t e r read in the light of the more detailed comparative-historical analysis of these formations available in my more recent paper 'Altaic Connections of the Old Japanese Negatives', to appear in Central Asiatic Journal (1985) (note added in proof, 15. X. 1984).

ν ON DIACHRONIC AND SYNCHRONIC DERIVATION

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF BACK-FORMATION

Henry M. Hoenigswald University of Pennsylvania 1. The speaker who produces a discourse does so 'on the analogy' of other discourses in the language, t h a t is, through its generative machinery, unless he or she repeats it from m e m o r y - - a proviso which can be neither verified nor falsified and which may t h e r e f o r e be ignored. According to the dictionaries readable occurs in the record more than two centuries before unreadable; but one wonders how meaningful such information is and whether readable does not emerge from unreadable unread read reading believable unbelievable--orf b e t t e r , from all the discourses containing these and other items connected with one another by r u l e s - - j u s t as readily as unreadable does from readable etc. Only in cases where this a l l - r o u n d symmetry can be shown to be chrono­ logically secondary can we distinguish additive constructions from back-formations. 2. Networks of paradigmatic rules may of course be summarily represented by the much-discussed proportional f o r m u l a . Thus we w r i t e piano : pianos :: radio : radios, and since it happens to be known which of the two inventions came f i r s t , it is tempting to i n t e r p r e t the above proportion as a b r i e f description of the event whereby the first speaker or the f i r s t speakers constructed the plural of radio. The proportion is built on the recognition of twc morpheme classes with two morphemes each. The morphs appear to be piano-, radio-, -s 'pi.', and perhaps -ø 'sg'. The construction is additive. 3. There is, however, no more reason to be certain that radios must be later than radio-ø (though both are later than piano-s piano-ø) than t h e r e is to believe that

422

Hoenigswałd: Back-Formation

unreadable is necessarily--and not just accidentally—more recent than readable. The additive formulation which is the customary one, and which may, incidentally, well be unavoi­ dable in the majority of cases, here begs the question. To keep the discussion open we may at least agree t h a t a converse, subtractive proportion could describe the r e l a t i o n ­ ship just as w e l l . On the face of it this would amount to a simple transposition, pianos : piano :: radios ; X, X = radio. Yet, what precisely are the morphemes involved, and where is the subtraction? Clearly we must w r i t e pianos-0 : pianos-

: : radios-ø : r a d i o s - . Only if this is done MINU MINU* shall we have t r u l y founded the singular on the plural. Let us also note t h a t this operation gives us only an a p p a r e n t , not a formally valid morph boundary before the s. 4. We are not always without guidance as to which a r r a n g e m e n t of the members of a proportion is appropriate rover-to history. Consider wandering : wanderer : : roving ; to pick one of the presumably equivalent a r r a n g e m e n t s at random. As a m a t t e r of f a c t , it seems t h a t rover was bor­ rowed f r o m Low German in the 14th century or e a r l i e r . This borrowing, so we must assume, immediately established rove- as a 'huckle(berry)' morpheme, due to the accident of -er having the existing suffix -er 'agent' to fall in w i t h . Unlike huckleberry with its very d i f f e r e n t history ' rov-er g e n e r a t e d rov-ing rov-es rov-ed and indeed rove-0 itself, all of later a t t e s t a t i o n . In d e f e r e n c e to the primacy of rover we

, er MINUS :: rover-ø : r o v e r - Μ Ι Ν U S er (for rover) a n d , with an obvious extension, wanderer-ø : wandererer ing :: rover-θ : . , MINUS PLUS rover

may choose to w r i t e ,

-MINUS

er

PLUSing

(for

say, wanderer-ø :

roving)

wanderer-

·

5. These are back-formations in the sense t h a t a subtractive operation is involved, e i t h e r exclusively or in com­ bination with an additive one. Also, they happen to be instances of mere analogic creation r a t h e r than of the more complex but also more c l e a r - c u t process know as analogic change. Only where an analogic creation replaces another morphic construction within a paradigm do we properly speak of analogic change. The historical replacement r e l a ­ tionship guarantees identity of meaning or syntactic f u n c ­ tion b e t w e e n the replaced and the replacing i t e m ; the exchange is one between allomorphs (wax-en 'changed to' wax-ed, 'on the analogy of', say, wan-ed or tax-ed, as -ed replaced its co-allomorph -en).

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

423

6. There are certain typical case-histories in which it is a back-formation that functions as a replacement. One such is that of the w e l l - k n o w n adder which is explained as a 'wrong' analysis, on the p a r t of the speaker, of a nadder, my nadder . . . as an adder , mine adder .. . , since e tymologically the word began with -. It would be a distinct a d v a n ­ tage to be able to formalize such 'recuttings' by f i t t i n g them into the formalism outlined e a r l i e r . This can be done as follows. We express the proportion an apple : apple ; ; (a nadder-->) an adder : adder subtractively as anapple-0 ; anapp-MINUS.an ::· anadder-θ : a n a d d e r - M Į I N U S , a n · The allomorphs the play of which constitutes the analogic change are, then, a (in nadder), and its replacement ,_ -MINUS -MINGO (in adder), paired much like their additive counterparts en and ed in waxen / waxed. It is a gain that the boundary shift or recutting no longer needs to be recognized as a s e p a r a t e , ad-hoc step, since, as we have seen ( 3 , e n d ) , there is no legitimate room in the f i r s t place f o r a morph boundary inside the minuend in a subtractive f o r m u l a t i o n . That there is an alternative formulation of the additive kind f o r each synchronic s t a t e , preceding and following the change, and that these two formulations may d i f f e r with regard to the location of the boundary is another m a t t e r , though of course not an irrelevant one. 7. It remains to generalize somewhat. Let t h e r e be a pair of co-allomorphs, phonologically conditioned in their complementation, exhibiting the phonemic shapes / c / and / c d / (e.g., E. a and an), where / c / and / d / are particular strings of phonemic e n t i t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , let there be paradigmatic material as follows: ( / e / , / f / , / g / = additional ø-/f/ (e.g., an apple, apple), /c/-/dg/, strings) / c d / - / f / , ø3-/dg/S '9 (a nest, nest), / c / - / d e / , ø - / d e / (a nadder, nad­ der). This configuration brings it about that in the sequences /cdf/, / c d g / , / c d e / the location of the morph boundary cannot be d e t e r m i n e d f r o m the mere knowledge t h a t the morpheme { / c / ~ / c d / } is present; it can be d e t e r m i n e d only from other constructs in the paradigm such as ø - / f / (hence /cdf/ is / c d / - / f / ) but ø - / d g / (/cdg/ = / c / - / d g / ) . If, in a given case, a new ø - / e / is produced by a n a ­ logic change instead of ø - / d e / (adder instead of nadder), this is best f o r m a l i z e d , in keeping with 4 above, as /cdf/-0 where

: MINUS

/cdf// c d / :: / c d e / - 0 : , , MINUS ,, / c d / replaces its co-allomorPh

/cde/MINUS

MINUS .

/cd/,

424

Hoenigswald: Back-Formation ENDNOTES

1

BIoomfield

2

indicated section 4.

(1933) 408. by

'-'

or,

when

necessary,

by '-

' as

in

3

'Addition' a n d , particularly, 'subtraction' are imperfectly defined in this n o n - a r i t h m e t i c a l use. It is sufficient to remember that 'subtraction' is vacuous unless the minuend encloses the subtrahend to begin w i t h . 4

There are two segments in pianoø, namely pianos and s (or, with its o p e r a t o r , s). Their point of contact is at MINUS the right e n d , a f t e r the s. - Conventional orthography is used except where it would be ambiguous. 5The data are more complex Oxford Dictionary etc. (1966) s.v. 6

Op. cit.

f

s. v.

7

The distinction has been 154, 1 6 5 - 6 , and passim. 8

Here, / c / = E. /  / , lût E. / ǽ p ə l / , / g / = E. / e s t / .

-

made

since

(?)

Oertel

(1902)

Ε. / η / , / e / = Ε, / ǽ d ə r / , / f /

=

'More generally, /h/-/f/, /h/-/dg/, /h/-/e/, /h/-/de/, respectively, where / h / stands for any p e r m i t t e d morph ( s e q u e n c e ) - - e . g . / s e m / in some apple, e t c . - - i n c l u d i n g ø (as in apple). - Also, see following note. 10

Subtrahends are made to follow minuends in order to let them appear in the familiar arithmetical place. Since / h / may be ≠ ø, the expression ' / c ( d ) / ' should really read: MINUS Section 4. 'MINUS/C(d)/PLUS/h/'; CP·

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

425

REFERENCES CITED

Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. Language. Holt. O e r t e l , Hanns. 1902. Lectures on the study of language. Yale. Oxford dictionary of English etymology ( e d . . . Onions et a l . ) . 1966 Oxford.

HOW TO BECOME A KWA LANGUAGE

Kay Williamson University of Port Harcourt,

Nigeria

1 Introduction

In Greenberg's 1963 classification of African languages, Kwa and Benue-Congo a r e co-ordinate branches of NigerCongo. To a g r e a t e x t e n t , Greenberg followed Westermann 1927 in listing the membership of the Kwa branch. In Westermann and Bryan 1952:90ff., the characteristics of Kwa languages a r e listed. The Eleme language, spoken to the south-east of Port Harcourt in the O k r i k a - T a i - E l e m e Local Government Area, conforms r a t h e r closely t o Westermann and Bryan's charac­ teristic phonological f e a t u r e s of a Kwa language, as seen in Table 1 .

Tabie 7. Phonological characteristics of Kwa languages compared with Eleme

Westermann and Bryan, 1.

1962

'In most of the Ianguages there appear to be seven vowel phonemes.' 'Vowel length is of secondary importance.'

Situation in Eteme /Ι e e

a

υ o /

Long vowels, Interpreted as / W / , relatively uncommon: /ètóó/ 'cocoyam'.

428

2. 3.

A.

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language 'Nasalized vowels are very common in sev­ eral languages.' 'In some languages ... vowel assimilation is so regular that one can speak of a t e n ­ dency to vowel h a r ­ mony.' 'Diphthongs are f r e ­ q u e n t , triphthongs also occur.' 'The labio-velars kp and gb are common.' 'Tone is of outstanding importance in all these languages.'

'Stress is of little importance...' 'Most Roots (Verb or Noun) are monosylla­ bic, consisting in CV.' 'Reduplication as a semantic and g r a m ­ matical element is common...'

5.

6.

'There are no t r u e Noun Classes. Rudimentary Noun Classes a r e , however, to be seen in many languages.' 'Nouns o f t e n have a vowel or nasal Prefix. This prefix is used to f o r m Nouns f r o m Verbs...'

/ e , o / do not normally occur in adjacent syllables to / ε / e i t h e r within roots or b e t w e e n prefix and root.

Vowel sequences are f a i r l y common: / gbaó/ 'dog', / m - b ĩ f 'nose'. Yes: / à k p u r ù / 'sack', / g b T / 'think'. High í/, low ì /, mid (unmarked) contrast: / n - s a / 'book', / - s a / ' f i r e ' , / -sï-sa/ 'mere/, / -sĩ-sa/ 'sand'. Yes. Monosyllabic CV roots com­ mon, though disyllabic ones also f a i r l y common: / d e / 'eat', / - k a n ĩ / 'firewood'. Reduplication common, though its s e m a n t i c / g r a m ­ matical function not clear: - t í - t ó 'work .', -n-ná 'earlier'. ò-bĩ 'native doctor', m-biè 'medicine'.

All nouns begin with V or N prefix: / è - b ó / 'head'. Nouns formed f r o m verbs by p r e f i x a t i o n : Je 'dance v.', è j e 'dance .'.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

429

Eleme thus conforms very closely to the characteristics of a Kwa language. Had it been found spoken in the west of Nigeria, isolated f r o m close relatives and adjacent to, say, Yoruba, there is little doubt it would immediately have been classified as Kwa. As a matter of f a c t , however, Eleme / è l é m e / has never been classified as Kwa. It was f i r s t r e p o r t e d by Wolff (1959), who noted its relationship to Khana / k a n à / and Gokana / g o k a n a / . Wolff (1964) classified them collectively as the Ogoni languages, forming part of the Benue-Congo branch of Niger-Congo, in line with Greenberg's 1963 classi­ fication of Ogoni (Kana) as part of the Cross River subbranch of Benue-Congo. The relationship of Eleme to Khana and Gokana is obvi­ ous and has never been questioned. Recent lexicostatistic counts by students of the University of Port Harcourt, checked by myself, show 57% relationship between Eleme and Khana, as opposed to 78% between Khana and Gokana. Khana and Gokana are very unlikely to be described as Kwa languages. While they have the same vowel inventory as Eleme, doubled vowels are f a r more common, particularly in Khana. Although monosyllabic roots are very common, many of them are of CVC s t r u c t u r e . Reduplication is hardly in evidence. Finally, nouns r a r e l y have p r e f i x e s , with the result that nouns and verbs o f t e n have the same structure and d i f f e r only in tone: Gokana zòb zob

Khana yèb yeb

Eleme Je e-je

dance v. dance n.

This example suggests t h a t the languages have d e v e ­ loped d i f f e r e n t phonological structures through two basic processes: 1. Loss of final consonants in Eleme Z. Loss of V or N prefixes in Khana and Gokana. 2. Loss of final consonants We detail,

shall with

now examine these additional data from

two processes in more Ogoi. Ogoi is spoken in

430

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language

Ban-Ogoi, consisting of the villages of Bala, Bontee, Kesari/T eegbaa, and Barabaa, and is not normally regarded as a separate language in the Ogoni group; the available data suggests, however, that it should be so regarded. Consonant phoneme are listed in Table 2.

inventories for the

Ogoni

languages

Table 2. Consonant phonemes of Ogon; languages

OGOI

ELEME

... IU

...

...

CI>

>I IU

IU IU

0 CI>

J:J :.0 Z .! .! /I)

fricative

-voice +voice stop -voice +voice sonorant -lateral +Iateral fricative-voice +voice stop -voice +voice sonorant

...

CI>

>

IU

f

IU

"0

... ... - ...... ~ .! J:J .2 IU

IU



> .!

s

(h) ?

r

IU

s z kp P t gb b d w m r(,?) y I

b) After nasalized vowel: Ogoi, Khana, Gokana

IN r '" n IN n? IN n n

g

>

IU

C7\

k g

?

ky k gy g y

?

s

GOKANA

KHANA

a;

...... .2

f

z kp P t gb b d ml v

kp p t k kw gb b d g gw w ml y

...

I

N

IU

...

CI>

CI>

y y y y l)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells ) Intervocalic, m o r p h e m e - i n t e r n a l : Khana, Gokana I →  Eleme appears to have an l/r contrast The situation in Ogoi is not clear. Gokana

b

→

431

in

this

position:

v

For the rest of the paper, a systematic phonetic t r a n s c r i p ­ tion showing the allophones listed above will be used. The only consonants and morpheme are:

which

occur

finally

in

the

syllable

Gokana [b I g m n η] Khana [b g m η] Eleme and Ogoi have only open syllables. The turn.

loss of

each

consonant

will

now

be

considered

in

Hyman (1983) regards the - i of Gokana as a m e a n i n g ­ less 'grade suffix'. It appears to take the underlying tone of the preceding root; thus it is H in 3 . 1 . In 3.2, when low tone would be expected, it is lost except in the f i r s t or second person singular of the simple habitual:  zovì 'you dance' (cf. 3.2.1 zòb).Khana this position but preserves the tone p a t t e r n :

has

lost

-i

in

 yeeb 'you dance' (cf. 3.2.1 yeb). Thus the tendency in Gokana and Khana is towards loss of final vowel, resulting in a CVC structure for verbs. In Ogoi *b weakens to [w] in 3.1.4, 3 . 2 . 1 , 3 . 4 . 1 ; this suggests that in the other cases it was e n t i r e l y lost i n t e r vocalically, a f t e r which V 2 assimilated completely to V1 Pos­ sibly, however, it was lost from final position with compen­ satory lengthening. In Eleme, the double vowel has been shortened in most (though not all) cases. The similarity of the nominals in 3.3 to the verbs gests t h a t they also originally ended in - i , while other vowels survive in 3.4.

sug­ final

432

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language

Tabte

3.

Reflexes

of *b as



2 Gokana

Khana

Ogoi

Eierne

3.1.1

roast, burn

3.1.2

tie

3.1.3

throw

3.1.4

fetch

3.1.5

gather

3.2.1

scatter

3.2.2

dance

3.2.3

dig, till

3.2.4

pin

3.2.5

steal

3.3.1

twenty

3.3.2

kernel

3.3.3

bundle

3.4.1

fish-hook

3.4.2

fern

(water)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

Table 4.

Gokana Khana

433

Reflexes of 'm as 

Ogoi

Eierne

4.1,1

pound

4.1.2

bite

4.2.1

know

4.2.2

extinguish

4.2.3

old, e a r l i e r

4.3.1

tongue

4.3.2

stone

4.3.3

workn.

4.3.4

husband

4.3.5

life

4.3.6

meat

4.3.7

ancestral spirit

4.3.8

a market day

4.3.9

viper

4.1 is parallel to 3 . 1 . 4.2 shows t h a t when V 2 is an open vowel it is r e t a i n e d , and t h a t * m is lost only in Eleme, f r o m intervocalic position. 4.3 shows noun examples parallel to 3.3; no cases with f i n a l open vowels among nouns have been observed.

434

W i l l i a m s o n : How t o become a Kwa L a n g u a g e

Table 5. Reflexes of *l as 2

Khana Ogoi Gokana Khana (citation) ( p e r f e c t )

Eterne

5.1.1

boil (of soup)

5.1,2 5.1,3

marry (of man) sing

5.1,4

call

5.2,1

buy

5.2,2

sweep

5.3.1

cook

5.3,2

cut

5.3,3

remove

5.4.1

mat

5.4,2

goat

5.4,3

song

5.4,4 5.4,5

call, invitation wine palm

5.4,6

forest

* l is lost in Khana in t h e c i t a t i o n f o r m b e f o r e t h e - i s u f f i x (which becomes -ɛ a f t e r o p e n v o w e l s : 5.2, 5.3,3) b u t r e t a i n e d as [ r ] b e f o r e the o p e n v o w e l - a of t h e p e r f e c t s u f f i x . As b e f o r e , - i is r e t a i n e d in Gokana a f t e r high tone v e r b s , lost a f t e r low. Ogoi a n d Eleme seem t o v a r y b e t w e e n f o r m s w i t h t h e s u f f i x , in w h i c h case [ r ] is r e t a i n e d (5.2.2)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

435

and forms without the s u f f i x , in which case [ r ] is lost (5.2.1). 5.4 suggests t h a t s t e m - f i n a l - i is lost in nouns in Gokana even when high. Table 6.

Gokana

6.1.1 6.1.2

Reflexes of *n as 2

Khana Khana (citation) ( p e r f e c t )

Ogoi

Eierne

pass by/thru break v.i. v.t.

6.2.2 6.2,3

refuse, reject give birth swallow

6.2.4

see

6.3.1

basket

6.3.2 6.3.3

person, corpse neck

6.3.4

child

6.3.5

town

6.3.6

voice

6.2.1

The reflexes of * n are exactly parallel to those of * 1 .

In Gokana, the - i suffix is r e t a i n e d in high and lost in low tone verbs, and in nouns, as with other consonants; *g is consistently r e t a i n e d . In Khana, f i n a l - i is lost in both verbs and nouns; * g is r e t a i n e d except in 7 . 3 . 1 , 7.3.4. *g is consistently r e t a i n e d in Ogoi and lost intervocalically in Eleme, while all f i n a l vowels are r e t a i n e d .

436

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language

Table 7. Reflexes of *g as  2 Gokana

Khana

Ogoi

Eierne

7.1.1

carve out

7.1.2

wash

7.1.3 7.2.1

announce, tell story mix

7.3.1

story

7.3,2

law

7.3,3

sibling

7.3.4

dog Table . Reflexes of *η as  Gokana

Khana

Ogoi

Eleme fry ant laugh economize, chop in pieces gather

From these tently retained vocalically.

examples, [ η ] appears to be most consis­ in Khana. When lost, it is always lost i n t e r -

3. Loss of noun prefixes All Eleme nouns begin with a prefix, which is a - , e - / ɛ - , Ò-/Ò-, or - (homorganic nasal). è - / ὲ - , ò-/ - are harmonic variants conditioned by the stem; è - / ò - are followed by i,

Essays in Honor of Rulon 5. Wells e, ο, υ, and ὲ-/ - by been recorded only with

e, -,

, à-,

a. Reduplicated or Ò-.

437 stems

have

The only noun prefix in Ogoi is Ń - , usually correspond­ ing to Ñ- in Eleme. Ogoi has reduplicated stems, normally corresponding to those in Eleme. The only noun prefix in Khana is é - / è - (tone same as that of s t e m ) , usually corresponding to a reduplicated stem in Ogoi and Eleme. Khana has no reduplicated stems. Gokana has no noun prefixes and no reduplicated stems. Table 9 shows non-reduplicated nouns with the various Eleme prefixes and their cognates in the other languages. Table 10 shows reduplicated stems. As neither Gokana nor Khana has reduplication, it appears to be a common innovation in Ogoi and Eleme. Two possible origins can be suggested for reduplication, perhaps re-inforcing each other: (a) That it is a plural f o r m a t i o n . The clearest evidence for this is the unique singular/plural pair: Ogoi

Eleme child children

Items such as 'breast', 'nail', 'fish-hook', and 'broom' (often conceived plurally in this area as 'broomstraws') can be e a s ­ ily explained this way, since t h e i r plural use is at least as common as t h e i r singular use. (b) That the reduplicated syllable d i - may be the old noun class prefix 5, Proto-Benue-Congo * l i - (De Wolf 1971), which has become f r o z e n to the stem and r e - i n t e r p r e t e d as r e d u ­ plication, whereupon a new prefix has been provided. This is likely for 'tongue' and 'rope', which are o f t e n found in this class. The e - of Khana would be a remnant of the same l i - prefix a f t e r loss of the consonant.

438

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language 7/ 9. Reflexes of noun prefixes Gokana

Khana

Ogoi

E leme

9 . 1 . *à 9.1.1

cooking pot

9.1.2

day

9.1.3

oil palm

9.1.4

eye

9.1.5

mother

9.1.6

name

9.1.7

tooth

9.2

*è-

9.2.1

t r e e , stick

9.2.2

(some)thing

9.2.3

cry(ing) (deverbal)

9.2.4

iron

9.2,5

louse

9.2,6

money

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells Gokana 9.3

Khana

Ogoi

439

E leme

*è-

9.3.1

bag

9.3.2

chief, king

9.3.3

crayfish

9.4

*ò-

94.1

faeces

9.4.2

egg

9.4.3

root

9.4.4

tail

9.4.5

antelope

9.5

*

9.5.1

hand, arm

9.5.2

ear

9.5.3

wife

9.5.4

glory, respect

9.5.5

matchet

9.5.6

fowl

9.5.7

God

440

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language

Gokana Khana

Ogoi

Eleme

9.6 *N9.6.1

ashes

9.6.Z

salt

9.6.3

water

9.6.4

wine

9.6.5

blood

9.6.6

elephant

9.6.7

food, yam

9.6.8

horn

9.6.9

oil

None of the Ogoni languages have i- or u - as a noun prefix. In Eleme, prefixes of loanwords with close vowels are changed to one of the possible prefixes of the l a n ­ guage; nouns which in the source language have no prefix are provided with è - / è - . In Khana, all prefix vowels are dropped from loanwords unless they can be i n t e r p r e t e d as e-, 4. Conclusion Gokana appears to be the most conservative of the Ogoni languages as regards final consonants; Eleme as regards noun prefixes. There is considerable evidence for C2 being lost i n t e r vocalically and some f o r it being lost when f i n a l . Hence in addition to stems of CV shape it is reasonable also to pos­ t u l a t e stems of CVCV shape as very common in the p r o t o language.

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells / 10. Gokana

Khana

441

Reduplicated noun stems Ogoi

Eierne

0.1.1

breast

10.1.2

broom

1O.1.3

fish-hook

10.1.4

e a r t h , sand

10.1.5

mercy, grace

10.2.1

tongue

10.2.2

lie n.

10.2.3

nail

10.3.1

rope

10.3.2

youngest palm-frond

Prefixes w e r e originally of V- or N- shape, and possibly also of CV- shape; i.e. they probably had not only the t y p i ­ cal Kwa shape but also perhaps the common Benue-Congo CV- shape. The loss of the prefixes was probably helped by the f a c t t h a t t h e r e is no tonal contrast on p r e f i x e s ; all are low. A language them to CV(V), stem s t r u c t u r e ; CVC shape, like

which starts with CVCV stems and reduces like Eleme and Ogoi, produces a Kwa-type while a language which reduces them to a Gokana, looks quite u n - K w a .

A language which maintains its V- or N- noun prefixes, like Eleme, looks Kwa; while a language which loses its prefixes e n t i r e l y , like Gokana, looks very u n - K w a .

can

As very simple sound changes of the kind illustrated make f a i r l y closely r e l a t e d languages look d i f f e r e n t in

442

Williamson: How to become a Kwa Language labte 11. Treatment of prefixes in loanwords Borrowing languages Khana

E leme

Source languages Igbo

Eastern 618 (English)

11.1.1

eagle

11.1.2

chair, table

11.1.3

box

11.1.4

African Star Apple

11.1.5

vulture

11.2.1

plate

11.2.2

mangrove

11.2.3

namesake

11.3.1

zinc

11.3.2

bottle

11.3.3

horse

11.4.1

(iron) nail

11.4.2

bucket

11.4.3

class

11.4.4

school

word structure, it is obvious that the characteristics of Kwa

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

443

languages cited by Westermann and Bryan are ·. quite superficial typological c r i t e r i a , which are not due to any common innovation and are t h e r e f o r e useless f o r genetic classification.

ENDNOTES * M y thanks to Mr. Nwinee B. Williamson for collecting the Ogoi data and checking Khana, and (partly) Gokana and Eleme d a t a ; M r . B. Anokari and Mr. S. N. Bakor (Gokana); Mr.  N. Kartay and Mr. I. 0. K. Eyi ( E l e m e ) ; Mr. John Wita (Ogoi); Nicholas Faraclas, for discussion and reading a d r a f t ; and to Larry Hyman f o r keeping me in touch with his Gokana work. 1

Khana monosyllabic verbs are basically p e r f e c t forms). Gokana monosyllabic verbs basically low or high. In both, verb tones verb f o r m . Ogoi and Eleme verbs are cited isolation. 2

Elements

of

compounds

are

separated

low or high (see are also cited as vary according to as they sound in

by

,

affixes

by

REFERENCES CITED DeWolf, P. P. 197. The Noun Class System of Proto-BenueCongo. The Hague: Mouton. Greenberg, J. H. 1963. Languages of Africa. The Hague: M o u ­ ton. Hyman, L. 1983. Distribution of Glottal Stop (GS) in Gokana. Preliminary version. Westermann, D. 1927. Die westlichen Sudansprachen. Berlin: De Gruyter. , and M. A. Bryan. 1952. Languages of West Africa. O.U.P. for International African I n s t i t u t e . Wolff, H. 1959. Niger Delta languages I: classification. Anthropological Linguistics 1:8.32-53. . 1964. Synopsis of the Ogoni languages. J' of African Languages 3 . 3 8 - 5 1 .

WHERE DO EXCLAMATIONS COME FROM?

Adam Makkai University of Illinois at Chicago 0. The Problem: Wow! Mankind has a universal habit which is, strangely, not much discussed in the l i t e r a t u r e . 1 It starts with every human being in early infancy and accompanies us through our lives. We all EXCLAIM. The occasion may be physical pain or sudden shock, like stubbing your toe in the door, or touching a hot iron. It may be f r u s t r a t i o n or anger: you forgot your car keys and have to hike back to the office to get them. It may be the sudden realization that you have been had. But it may be the overwhelming joy of a sudden recognition; the wave of pleasure at suddenly comprehend­ ing something that used to be a mystery. It can be the pleasure of seeing an old f r i e n d or a relative. It can be the mixture of joy and embarrassment: you understand something for the first t i m e , something that gives you g r e a t pleasure, yet at the same time you are mad at yourself because you think the recognition was long overdue. Why didn't I see this four or five years ago? A f r i e n d whom we like well enough but really consider not quite our equal in many ways, gets a sudden promotion, becomes famous, or wins the Irish sweepstakes: invariably we voice our feeling and pass a judgment on the situation. The u t t e r a n c e produced in most of these instances is not some sort of c e r e ­ bral peroration on the situation, but usually a spontaneous exclamation, phonologically well marked as such. To put it quite simply, the number of semantically, socially, and emotionally appropriate situations for me or the readers of these lines to exclaim is so g r e a t - - indeed we are in constant interaction - - that it is startling how

446

Makkai: Where do Exclamations Come From?

actually limited our reservoir of exclamations is. In this paper I will t r y to survey the most typical English exclama­ tions, compare them with others from languages I know, and then t r y to explain where these forms come f r o m . Since the t r e a t m e n t a t t e m p t e d here will be essentially a synchronic one, the phrase 'where do they come from?' is not to be i n t e r p r e t e d as a historical excursion which, no doubt about i t , must also be u n d e r t a k e n b u t , due to the immense size of the project, must remain a f u t u r e task. 1. One What

Word

Exclamations

from

the

Sublime

to

You

Know

The exclamations God!, Wow!, Zowiel, Bingol, Yeahl, 'Course!, etc., a f f i r m a t i v e and consentive semantically, s t a r t on the highest pitch level, say level 5, fall rapidly to a low level Z or 1 , and have a strongly f e l t a f f i r m a t i v e e f f e c t . Try exclaiming them with an interrogative intonation as God?, Zowie?, Wow?, Bingo?, Yeah?, and 'Course?, and the e f f o r t it takes to ask these as questions will clearly show t h a t they are all telescopic declarations. The point, of course, is, that one word exclamations can also be q u e s ­ tions, as in Me?, You?, Him?, Her?, Us?, Go?, Stay?, Pay?, Sleep? etc., all of which, whether personal pronouns or the overt predicates of sentences previously used in context and thus in memory between both hearer(s) and speaker(s) show surprise, indignation, unwillingness to believe what was heard and said or suggested, or a combination of them. The one word exclamation Why, being an interrogative normally spoken on a f a l l i n g , declarative intonation, can be exclaimed both with an interrogative and a declarative t e r m i n a l con­ t o u r , (Why? - - Why!) with the result t h a t they indicate d i f ­ f e r e n t semantic antecedents. Why??? which is angry, uptight, and argumentative (especially if elongated and loud) occurs in contexts where the speaker has been making or trying to make a point but has the feeling t h a t he isn't getting through, so he says why??? - - I'll tell you why! whereby he proceeds with his a r g u m e n t . The declaratively contoured Whyl(?) - - with an orthographic question mark but a pho­ nological falling exclamation mark - - does not r e f e r to information in memory or the subject just mentioned; qua exclamation it shows indignant curiosity or moral indignation plus disbelief. (Non-exclamatory why!(?) is, primarily, a non-biased, information-seeking speech act.)

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells

447

It thus seems that any personal name, lexeme for objects or actions which have been previously mentioned in context but which arouse the speaker's incredulity or indig­ n a t i o n , can occur as a one word interrogative exclamation, e.g., Car?, Gambling?, Arrested?, Drugs?, Escaped?, Psychic?, Already?, Gone?, Won?, Lost? - - the list is practically endless. Their grammatical description ('allocation' and 'provenience' in tandem) is best achieved by juxtaposition to their phonosemantically declarativeiy coded c o u n t e r p a r t s . We say Godi, Christi, Heavensl etc., as above, which are 'positive' on the surface, but can certainly be used on a whole scale of meanings ranging f r o m enthusiastic approval to forcefully disgusted condemnation -polar semantic opposites expressed by nothing 'grammatical' except the human voice, hence the t e r m PHONOSEMANTIC, and its inevitable correlate to be explained below, PHONOPSYCHOSEMANTIC. Any well t r a i n e d actor or actress can p e r f o r m the exclamations above so as to sound e c s t a t i ­ cally jubilant or lugubriously downcast, bored (accompanied by yawns into a telephone r e c e i v e r ) , resigned, pensive, or nervous and h u r r i e d . Next to these, however, we also use 'four l e t t e r words* in our exclaimings which, although all 'dirty' on the surface, can - - depending on the phonopsychosemantic interaction of the speaker and the hearer - be i n t e r p r e t e d as highly positive. Thus Shitl, Fuck!, Damn!, Helll - - the f o u r national favorites of post WW II America - - while ail almost certainly impossible as questions (*Shit?, *Fuck?, *Damn?, *Hell? - - except as THREATS against some­ one who j u s t u t t e r e d them whom we are about to scold very severely as if about 'to wash his mouth out with soap') and predominantly negative value-judgments in their semantics, can also function as exclamations of joyous s u r ­ prise, the congenial envy of a gambling or a drinking buddy mixed with admiration and tacit approval, etc. As outright anger and fully negative condemnations, these exclamations tend to be realized as shorter, f r o m highest to lowest falls on the loudest possible stress within the speaker's custom­ ary r a n g e ; as admixtures of solidarity, envy, and a d m i r a t i o n , as in the Army or around the poker t a b l e , they sound more elongated and the fall is not f r o m highest to lowest but f r o m mid to low. It is as if the speaker u t t e r i n g these forms is about to say a MITIGATING PHRASE a f t e r t h e m , such as you lucky devil, you lucky dog, you lucky sunovabitch, or you silver-tongued devil; perhaps, equally amiably, you crazy

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nut, you disgusting genius, etc. I personally overheard the following sentence offered as amazed and disbelieving praise from a graduate student of mathematics to a 13-year old: SHIllllÍT, why of COUrśe, you abso-LUTE-ly disGUSting. Miserable PROdigy! and the youngster couldn't have been more pleased. Maaaanl, the modern one word exclamation, is r a r e l y heard with an interrogative intonation, unless it is a CONVERSATION INITIATING ADDRESS between two previously unacquainted individuals. Thus Man? - - much shorter on the vowel than the declarative form -is heard when a stranger walks up to you at the bus stop asking for a light or a q u a r t e r ; it means something like 'I w a n t to talk to you' or 'may I engage you in conversation?'. The declarative, like most other declaratives, has the full phonopsychosemantic range of enthusiastic approval, acquiescence, a d m i r a t i o n , disgust, or ridicule, as the case may be; the most f r e q u e n t l y observed realization is a heavily breathed sigh of r e l i e f , or the emotive interjectional use quite simi­ lar to we//..., as in Maaan, I'm tellin' ya. . . (Cf. Well, I'm tellin' ya. . . ) where the vowels a r e , of course, quite d i f f e r e n t , but the o v e r - a l l structure is r a t h e r similar despite the appreciable nuances in phonopsychosemantics. (It goes w i t h ­ out saying t h a t the phonopsychosemantic nuances of these forms positively correlate with the sociolinguistic status of these forms. Thus Maaaan is f a r more intimate than welt or even wehhhhl; it is likelier to be heard from a younger Black male than from an older white male; if heard from a white f e m a l e , the odds are t h a t she is on the progressive and l e f t - f r o m - c e n t e r side of the political spectrum, e t c . 2 One word imperatives, such as Got, StayI, Sit!, Fetch!, Run!, Duck!, Eat!, etc., which, of course, can only be exclaimed interrogatively AS THREATS or ACTS OF VERBAL DEFIANCE, constitute a special class of exclamations whose n a t u r e qua exclamation is, by v i r t u e of our l o n g - s t a n d i n g acquaintance with imperatives, the least puzzling in the whole complex family. One intuitively - - and traditionally - expects a short, o n e - w o r d i m p e r a t i v e , to sound like an exclamation, though directors and actors r a r e l y miss an opportunity to exploit these f o r humor by having an actor 'say them nicely', as if 'begging' a dog to stay, sit, or f e t c h , as the case may be. If an extremely t i m i d , cowardly

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dog on a Walt Disney cartoorì should be commanded by his inept master beggingly Fehhhhhhtch , the dog could look back at him arid ask back: Fehhhhhtch???? meaning 'me, who can barely walk? You've gotta be kidding' - - in which case, because of the scenario's inner s t r u c t u r e , such an i n t e r r o ­ gatively coded o n e - w o r d imperative would not be e i t h e r a t h r e a t or an act of verbal d e f i a n c e , but an act of BEGGING FOR SYMPATHY. (The master has issued an obviously u n f u l fillable command and Snoopy Sr. appeals to him via the audience f o r a reprieve.) 2. No Kidding! Enter Syntax Complicated though o n e - w o r d exclamations are psychophonosemantically, they share a certain surface-simplicity. 2.1 Approval via Denial The most f r e q u e n t l y heard t w o - w o r d exclamation starts with the negative no and is thus predicated to a lexeme which is supposed to be negative, e.g., No shit!, No fooling!, No kidding! etc., where the forms shit, fooling, and kidding r e f e r to the 'undesirables' 'nonsense', 'double-talk', g e n e r ­ ally having to do with what I propose to call DISINFORMATION. Terms of intrinsically high esteem are nover heard n e g a t e d ; thus *No Christ!, *No God!, *No Heav­ ens/ simply don't occur e i t h e r in positively or negatively intended phonopsychosemantic coloring, whereas Godl, Christ! and Heavens!-without the no - - all occur both as short PRAYERS 'positive' coloring' or as short CURSES 'negative col­ oring'. This does not mean t h a t no and God, Christ, and Heavens never co-occur in construction; but if they do, the t h r e e ecclesiastical nouns are vocatives and the succeeding no negates a whole previously mentioned subject of w h a t ­ ever length from a short sentence to an e n t i r e discourse block or a novel. Thus we have God, no!, Christ, no! and Heavens, no! but these all function as f a i r l y specific denials of something t h a t has been said e i t h e r overtly, or suspected of the person u t t e r i n g t h e m . The likeliest situation to encounter this is listening to a person who is accused of a crime he did not commit. The likeliest statement to follow the vocative + negative structure would be something like How could you possibly think that I could do something like that? Less f r e q u e n t , but also possible is the emotional s u r f a c e -

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denial of bad news received over the telephone, such as the sudden illness or accident of a f r i e n d or relative: Christ, no! (I can't believe what you're saying... it can't POSSIBLY be true what you are saying. . . etc.) Obviously t h e n , one might think, we only deny ugly or harmful things, such as bodily refuse and the obfuscation of issues, whereas desirable entities - - as the above ecclesias­ tical t r i a d of nouns - - is never denied. The symmetry of the situation is distorted by the fact that no fooling!, no shit!, no kidding! can all function as enthusiastic exclamations of positive coloring as w e l l ; the expressions carry an admix­ t u r e of surprise in such instances. The slightly incredible news t h a t your spinster aunt Mathilda just won the Irish sweepstakes may be met with a variety of joyous and semiincredulous exclamations such as Wow!, Gosh!, Gee!,..... What about that?. . . . . etc., all the way to no kidding, no fool­ ing and no shit! - - depending, of course, on who you a r e , where you a r e , and who you are speaking to. A milder f o r m of these is the spreading no bull! which, like its fellows, can be used to encode a whole range of semantic a t t i t u d e s from scorn and disbelief to semi-incredulous admiration. This can never happen to no dice! however, which remains hermetically sealed in its tone of complote r e f u s a l . Try to praise or semi-credulously admiro someone by exclaiming no dice! at him! Your own eyes will throw the forbidding * to bar it from occurring. Z.Z Some Construction! The construction of exclamation some + N (riding the appropriate intonalional contour) is, once again, a constant challenge to the g r a m m a r i a n , playing h i d e - a n d - s e e k behind the phonopsychosemantic qualities of the human voice. Take the exclamation Some party! - - without f a i r l y specific stage instructions of what it is supposed to sound like, and tell what it means: I will contradict whatever you say until you have actually p e r f o r m e d it. Once I hear the exclamation on a high-fidelity tape recorder, chances are that 90 out of 100 others I should ask to listen and judge will agree with my finding. The human voice, like a most delicate musical instrument, can p e r f o r m the SIMULTANEOUS CODING of such semantically contradictory a t t i t u d e s as the highest degree of

Essays in Honor of Rulon S. Wells admiration, mild astonishment, thoughtfulness, mild scorn, sharp u t t e r disdain or disgust.

fear ameliorated sarcasm, all the way

451 by to

The productivity of this kind of exclamation is very g r e a t and will allow, besides Some Presidentl, Some doctor!, Some Peace Treaty!, Some red herring! etc., such forms as Some God!, Some Christ!, and Some Heavensl ~- all potentially sarcastic as well as a w e - s t r u c k , contrasting sharply with the nonoccurrence of no in f r o n t of these very nouns. 2.3 What a What! What President, what God, what Peace Treaty contrast with what a President, what a God and what a Peace Treaty in t h a t the first set without the indefinite article is very hard to perform with a r e v e r e n t a t t i t u d e ; scorn and condemnation, however, leap out vigorously in these forms. The wh form carries with it a pseudo-declarative falling intonation con t o u r , but only if a is absent: What President? What God? What Peace Treaty? with interrogative intonation, are not cxclama­ tions but SPECIFYING-REITERATIVE INTERROGATIVES: God, President, and Peace T r e a t y w e r e already mentioned or are in 'memory', and the wh - question seeks f u r t h e r specifica­ tion as to which one of those possible was meant. No g e n u ­ ino exclamation is thus possible without the indefinite a r t i ­ cle. With it, as in the second set, once again ambiguity sets in, since What a President! etc., can be exclaimed imparting the highest degree of praise and admiration OR the lowest degree of contempt; in b e t w e e n , the accomplished actor will be able to p e r f o r m a whole range of psychophonosemantic a t t i t u d e s including measured appraisal in musing reminis­ cence, or the bird's eye perspective of an eye-witness of long ago: Teddy Roosevelt---what a President he was! Why, i mei him in person in the African jungle. . . / 2.4 Adjective Noun! Good Lord!, Good Heavens!, Good grief! are normal exclamations in American English, but the adjective great sounds n a t u r a l only with Heavens; thus we have Great Heav­ ensl but seldom, if ever, "Great Lord, and certainly no mGreat grief, which is a pity, because with it we lose the a l l i t e r a ­ tion of the / g r - / cluster. Notice, incidentally, the u t t e r

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unlikeliness, not to say complete impossibility, of someone's coming out with an exclamation such as "good shitl, 'great shit I, "good bull!, "great bull!, "good cow!, "groat cow!, "good Moses!, great Moses!, "good mackerel!, "groat mackerel! or "good smoke! and "great smoke! We are obviously facing some sort of subtle restriction on productivity h e r e , the nature of which has escaped the a t t e n t i o n of most investigators. If we t r y the adjective holy in f r o n t of these barred forms (or most of t h e m ) , wo f i n d a whole class of ready-made and highly f r e q u e n t exclamations: holy cowl, holy Moses!, holy smoke!, holy Mackerel!, a n d , alas, contrapuntally desecrating the set, holy shit! It is strange t h a t holy Heavens!, holy God! are relatively rare in English, since the holiness of both God arid Heavens seems r a t h e r beyond dispute; f u r t h e r m o r e German has heiliger Gott! and heiliger Himmel! to bear out our intuition of the collocability of these forms. The German forms cited can be used as much in the a w e - s t r u c k , sin­ cerely religious mode as behind the smirk of a mundane disbeliever indulging himself in profanity: heiliger Gott/Him­ mel, meine gute Frau, glauben Sie, dass ich ganz verrückt bin? 'Holy smoke, my good woman, do you think I am completely crazy?' and not '*Good Lord/Heavens my good woman...' etc. (Heavens, my good woman, . . . sounds acceptable in a 19th century Dickensian s e t t i n g ; f u r t h e r m o r e a clever play­ wright can always create an acceptable context for almost anything. My observation here regarding German versus English is that English seems to take 'God' and 'Heavens' more seriously than does German; as exclamations of scold­ ing someone, these sound archaic in 1984 especially in the USA.) The corresponding French forms sacre Dieu! and sacre ciel! are considered vulgarisms and curses despite the s u r ­ vival of sacré as 'saint, holy, consecrated' as in sacre coeur the 'Holy Heart (of Jesus)' and are usually rendered euphemistically as sacre bleu, par bleu, etc. Since both French and German use t h e i r equivalent for 'holy' in exclamations, one might expect t h a t the nouns they carry might be interchanged, but we have no such luck. The English holy class seems to be a closed set, all its own; no language I know will accept as equivalent translations (the forms Ger.) "heilige Kuh!, "heiliger Rauch!, "heilige Makrele!, "heiliger Moses! and "heilige Scheisse!; French t o l e r a t e s no l i t ­ eral translation into "sacrée vache!, "sacrée fume!, "sacrée merde! etc. Forcing English holy cow! and holy smoke! morpho-

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logically into Russian yields the impossibilities *sviataja korovat and 'sviatoi dymi which sound just as impossible to Russians as would the Hungarian *szent tehénl and *szent fust! We must, f o r the sake of completeness, add holy Toledo! to the American English set which makes no sense a t all in any of the languages considered so f a r . 2.4.1 How About Generating These? Good Grief! The reader will bear with may seem that we are taking Barn just to f i n d that we have as Hockett has insisted more pseudo-progress, too, is a kind shows with as much specificity that actually makes a blind alley

me f o r a brief detour. It a walk around Robin Hood's stood still all the while; yet than once (1968a, 1968b) of progress inasmuch as it as possible just what it is blind.

Let us t u r n the clock back mentally and imagine that we are in 1960. R. B. Lees who had recently reviewed Chomsky's Syntactic Structurée (1957) (Lees 1957), has just finished his Grammar of English Nominalizations (1960). Two bold young f o r e i g n e r s , let us call them Günther von Nebelmacher and Gottfried von Schweinemund, respectively, bring to his a t t e n t i o n a serious shortcoming of the book before it goes to press. Whereas Lees had discussed adjective + N combi­ nations in many senses, touching even on idioms and how they defy g e n e r a t i n g (cf. Makkai 1972: 165 et passim), he paid no a t t e n t i o n to exclamations: a most serious defect! Lees is t i r e d of the project and commissions Nebelmacher and Schweinemund to w r i t e an appendix to the book so as to incorporate exclamations, as long as they do it in the spirit of generative grammar. How do our f r i e n d s proceed? Enthralled with Lees' example of red cap, 'The WH The The The

cap is lying on its side. ===> + the cap is r e d . ===> cap which is red is lying on its side. ===> cap red is lying on its side. ===> red cap is lying on its side. ===>

[ B u t not * t h e redcap is lying on its side, f o r while cap is an inanimate noun, the compound with red and cap as head (the redcap) is an animate noun' (Lees 1960, Ch. I V ) ] , they

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write a series exclamations. A 1 2 3 4 5 6 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 6g  6 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 6g

of

transformational

rules

that

generate

The Noun WH Noun Be Adj = = > The Noun is Adj = = > The Noun Adj = = > The Adj Noun = = > Adj Noun ==> Lexicalization: The cow WH Cow Be Holy ==> The cow is holy ===> The cow holy ===> The holy cow ===> Holy cow ===> Exclamation Transformation (contour added): Holy cow! Lexicalization The smoke WH smoke be holy ==> The smoke is holy ==> The smoke holy = = > The holy smoke ==> Holy smoke = = > Exclamation Transformation Holy smoke!

It takes them 13 steps to g e n e r a t e holy cowl - - where the crucial one is, of course, 6 f , the Exclamation T r a n s f o r ­ mation. Controversy arises, as some authorities near MIT don't quite see when and where the ET is to be added, but Nebelmacher and Schweinemund insist t h a t it is post-lexical and comes from the phonology. The same operation is p e r ­ formed as in sets A and  on a number of nouns and they thus successfully g e n e r a t e the e n t i r e holy set, including Moses, Toledo, mackerel, and shit. The trouble is t h a t they also derive all sorts of 'exclamations' which are not com­ monly recognized in the c u l t u r e . They g e t , in f a c t , any adjective and any noun a f t e r lexicalization and 6 f , with the right intonation contours a d d e d , yielding an 'exclamation', such as "yellow rose!, "blue sweaterI, "holy tablel, "holy potato!, "holy gasoline!, "holy cat!, "good elephant, etc, and t h e r e is literally nothing to block these forms f r o m occurring.

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Ten years have passed, and Nebelmacher and Schweinemund, now disillusioned with early TG, join the ranks of the generative semanticists. This gives them a chance to r e t u r n to some e a r l i e r work and they once again t u r n their a t t e n ­ tions to the perplexing problem of English exclamations. Nebelmacher, who used to minor in comparative theology at the University of Leipzig, comes up with a semantic restric­ tion rule regarding the holy set. His arguiment runs as f o l ­ lows: It is no accident that the holy set is as restricted as it is. The reason is that the world's major religions are represented in it. The mackerel, a fish, represents Chris­ tianity. Christ was born in the Piscean Age and ι χ θ ν σ 'fish' spells Ι η σ ο ν σ Χριστοο θβον Υ ɩ ο σ Σωτηρ 'Jesus Christ, Son of God, Savior'. Smoke, obviously must r e f e r to Judaism: remember the story of Cain and Abel? But since Judaism is ancient and strong, it has two r e f e r e n c e s in case 'smoke' does not do it f o r you: Holy Moses is the obvious f o r m . Holy cow takes us to India: Brahmanism and Buddhism. Toledo in medieval Spain gained its r e p u t a t i o n via Moorish culture: Islam e n t e r s the holy set via Spain, a country also very strong on Catholicism. Most of these associations have gone unconscious in the modern age, but in our collective uncon­ scious we are all products of one or the other of these g r e a t world religions, hence the closed holy set. Everyone is impressed, and Nebelmacher is credited f o r inventing the 'holyness raising' transformation which takes its proper place next to standard 'raising', 'pruning', 'sluicing', f e e d i n g ' , and 'bleeding'. Schweinemund, f o r e v e r the devil's advocate in all m a t t e r s linguistic, finds an ugly f l y in the ointment: the piece de résistance is the f o r m holy shitI which seems to destroy the 'naturalness conditions' of the closed n a t u r e of the holy set. Excited negotiations get under way at M.I.T. and, lo and behold, a simple solution is f o u n d : the more general rule of 'holiness raising' operates beside a minor e p i - r u l e , known as the 'decanonization transformation' or 'defrocking', f o r short. Defrocking applies postcyclically a f t e r lexicalization which, in t u r n , can only apply a f t e r holiness raising. In other words f i r s t you raise holiness to see that the semantic naturalness condition applies; without it c e r ­ tain lexical items become exclamations which must be disal­ lowed. Once the holy set is g e n e r a t e d , the naturalness con­ dition must be kept, and so the unwelcome occurrence of shit in such a noble ecumenically ecclesiastical setting must be explained. Schweinemund argues t h a t the least holy and

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most reprehensible thing we know is our own human refuse which reminds us of decay and death or 'ashes to ashes, dust to dust' as it says in the Bible. It is, t h e r e f o r e , p s e u ­ do-holy, or quasi-holy, as it w e r e , precisely because it is not holy at a i l , while appearing in its surface structure to belong to the same set. Hence the holiness raised e a r l i e r must be erased by the epi-rule of decanonization or defrocking. Prestigious journals carry the new global insight and the set is now g e n e r a t e d as follows: A 1 The Noun WH Noun Be Adj ==> 2 3 4 5 6 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 7 7a 7b 7c 7d 7e 8 8a 9 10

The Noun is Adj ==> The Noun Adj = = > The Adj Noun ==> Adj Noun ="> Holiness Raising Christianity insertion ==> (Piscean Age) Judaism! insertion ==> (Cain and Abel) Judaism 2 insertion = = > (Ten Commandments) Brahmanism and Buddhism insertion ==> ( v e g e ­ t a r i a n i s m , bovines) Islam insertion == > (The Moorish Conquest, Ibero-Arabic c u l t u r e ) Lexicalization Christianity = = > mackerel Judaism! = = > smoke Judaism 2 ==> Moses Brahmanism and Buddhism = = > cow Islam ==> Toledo Decanonization (defrocking) Disgust ==> shit Exclamation Transformation (contour added from phonology) Output: holy mackerelI, holy smoke I, holy Moses!, holy cowl, holy Toledo!, holy shitl

In 20 steps or so, on one basic generative cycle f o l ­ lowed by t h r e e epicycles, Nebelmacher and Schweinemund are thus able to account for the w e l l - f o r m e d output given in step 10. (They don't mention what blocks holy terror f r o m becoming an exclamation.) The w r i t e r is anxious to emphasize t h a t this is, of course, mere speculation, and t h a t resemblance to any real work done by any real linguist in the USA or elsewhere is pure coincidence as no one would ever, under any

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circumstances, have gone to the detailed research into com­ parative religion and the theory of the unconscious which, I claim, alone made these derivations possible. I r e g r e t it that I was unable to o f f e r Holiness Raising and Defrocking e a r l i e r ; much f u t i l e labor could have been saved and tighter naturalness conditions would have been introduced in a controversial and emotionally loaded compartment of l i n ­ guistics, the transformational study of exclamations. 2.4.2

Oh, no! Enter Sociolinguistics and All Hell Breaks Loose

We are now in the sociolinguistic e r a . Patients in doc­ tors offices in poverty stricken neighborhoods are inter­ viewed and their utterances recorded and transcribed; d e p a r t m e n t store a t t e n d a n t s are asked how they pronounce whatever they say, etc. Nebelmacher and Schweinemund are a l e r t e d to the fact that in the dialect of Robin, Batman's helper in the popular television series 'Batman and Robin', the young assistant can register his admiration and surprise at Batman's heroic exploits by naming almost any noun a f t e r holy - - thus in the Batman and Robin dialect of North American English it is w e l l - f o r m e d to exclaim holy chairI, holy table!, holy window!, holy rope!, and the like, especially if these objects are somehow tied to a clever escape a r r a n g e d by Batman f o r an innocent victim. The floodgates of analogy are thus inadvertently opened and the Holiness Raising Transformation must be r e w r i t t e n so as to accommodate the [+Batman and Robin - N o r m a l ] e p i - f e a t u r e . Thus they create rule 7 f , right a f t e r Islam I n s e r t i o n , known as Batmanization. (Some disgruntled voices accusing the fearless dynamic duo that this is batty are soon silenced f r o m headquarters near the Charles River.) The trouble lies elsewhere. Batmanization happens to be ANALOGICALLY PRODUCTIVE, and the phenom­ enon spreads into popular parlance when the speakers aren't even Batman-wise as to what and why they are exclaiming about. Holy kangaroo!t Holy Income Tax!, Holy Watergate!, Holy Pot!, e t c . , appear on the scene, each living its own linguistic incarnation f o r as long as the population finds it useful and e n t e r t a i n i n g . It appears t h a t the 'holy set' is expandable in yet another interesting way. (I owe this observation to Dwight Bolinger who is, of course, not responsible f o r any other statement made in this paper.) Bolinger points out ( p e r ­ sonal communication), t h a t as long as the NP following holy

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is long, ponderous and somehow quasi-biblical, the adjective f o r m holy seems all right. Thus if someone explains Holy pil­ lars of Jerusalem! with heavy stress on PILIars and Jerusalem, saying it slowly, as if a w e - s t r u c k , the phrase is quite acceptable. I have also been o f f e r e d Holy jumping ¡ackrabbitsl by Eldon 6. Lytie. I am struck by the fact t h a t both e x a m ­ ples have a noun t h a t starts with / j / (¡ackrabbits, Jerusalem) and this forces me to think t h a t the old phrase Holy jumping Jehosaphat, an obvious euphemism on Holy jumping Jesus is at play here in the 'collective unconscious'. It is thus possible to 'create' a number of quasi-ecclesiastic exclamations of the sort: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)

Holy Holy Holy Holy Holy Holy Holy Holy

walls of Jericho! jingle bells! Mormon Tabernacle! Black Stone of Mecca! Presidential jelly beans! Collected Poems of Chairman Mao! Watergate cover-up bullshit! Bridge of Chappaquiddick!

The reader is invited to create his/her own possible expansions of the 'holy'-set. Some will sound b e t t e r than others and if the r e a d e r has an interest in w r i t i n g a small dialog for two i n t e r a c t a n t s in a play, performing a scen­ ario, the 'holy'-set will make more sense or less sense in direct proportion to what has preceeded and what comes next. When I call the 'holy'set essentially closed, I n e v e r t h e ­ less state a fact about English which is well worth observ­ ing. The adi + n construction holy terror does not seem to yield itself to exclaiming despite the obvious presence of holy next to a word t h a t describes a mental-emotional state. Dennis the menace is a holy terror, Evil Knievel is a holy terror, John's old lady is hell on wheels on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays and in between she is a holy terror all accommodate holy terror as an idiomatic NP with the meaning Oppressive p e r ­ sonal presence' or something close to it. I have been unable as an exclamation from any native to get "holy terrori speaker, no m a t t e r what the narrative surrounding such a posited exclamation. It is simply not exclaimable; to cry holy shitl in a state of t e r r o r is much more likely than naming the t e r r o r itself. Maybe my imaginary character Schweine­ mund was onto something a f t e r all: it is certainly worth

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considering that the lexeme holy, realizing the sememe [holy, sacred] has some kind of a SEMANTIC COURT with expandable borders to accommodate new subjects who wish to immigrate into the kingdom. As all such 'immigrants', they must take certain eligibility tests ranging f r o m phonological criteria to the lexico-semantic and the morphosyntactic. 2.5 FAMOUS LAST WORDS! Enter longer Citations and Exit Syn­ tax We bid fond f a r e w e l l to Professors Nebelmacher and Schweinemund. They did t h e i r best; it wasn't really their f a u l t t h a t the paradigm they w e r e working in burst at the seams as soon as facts w e r e allowed to e n t e r ; in fact what happened was t h a t it t u r n e d out it was no paradigm at all! Having seen w h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s even the relatively simple Adj + N construction can land us i n , we would be well advised to give d i f f e r e n t accounts to the longer Adj + Adj ♦ N construction, as encountered in the famous famous last wordsl meaning something like 'watch out' what you said may t u r n out the opposite' f o r which, of course, English has a much older and b e t t e r established sememic idiom borrowed directly from Aesop, Don't count your chickens before they're hatched! These a r e , in a sense, paraphrases of one another, though of course not exact synonyms. We are confronted with the simple fact t h a t a longer c i t a t i o n , learned as one unit and f r e q u e n t l y not analyzed by speakers at a l l , can function as exclamations qua warnings, adages, proverbial summaries of folk wisdom, etc. In a small, politically troubled country in Eastern Europe such as Hungary, where I grew up, and where Shakespearian drama translation was a vigorous force in the development of the national language in the 19th century, quotations from a given Shakespeare play are o f t e n used as exclamations. 3 One of the most f r e q u e n t l y used ones is Something is rotten in the State of Denmark! meaning 'our gov­ e r n m e n t is up to no good again'. There is no available equivalent in American English; as a general approximation of the kind of exclamation t h a t this is, a kind of resigned humor of the gallows, one could cite the general O, oh! There we go again! which can, of course, be two separate exclamations or a double one used on the same occasion. At

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the end of A Midsummer Night's Dream when the artisans hold their performance for Oberon and Titania depicting the story of Pyarmus and Thisbe, a lion roars near a hedge to which Pyramus responds by saying Well roared, lion! In the classical translation of J. Arany, he gives Hungarian Helyes a bōgés, oroszlánl 'correct (is) the r o a r i n g , lion!' which has become a high frequency proverbial exclamation in Hungary. Everytime somebody silly says something pompous or unnec­ essary, the a t t e n d a n t grown-up or more knowledgeable person intones the Hungarian version of Well roared, lion! It is impossible to give the exact shade of meaning; I will call this kind of exclamation PHATIC CONDESCENSION in memory of Malinowski's t e r m 'phatic communion'. The above quote from Hamlet Something is rotten in the State of Denmark, by contrast, would be a case of PHATIC COMMISERATION. The exclamation which heads this section, Famous last words! is neither phatic condescension nor commiseration; it is a d i f f e r e n t kind of phatic act. It is a f r i e n d l y warning both to the interlocutor of the ego and to the ego's own self, comparable to the cultural phenomenon of 'knocking on wood' or as the British call it 'touching wood'. I will call it a PHATIC DISCLAIMER. 3. SOME THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS I think it should be reasonably clear a f t e r reading sec­ tions GOOD GRIEF! and OH NO! where our exclamations do NOT come f r o m . They do not come form nonexclamatory noun phrases, whether the 'underlying noun phrase' ( n o t h ­ ing, of course lies under anything else in linguistics, nor above or beside: things co-exist) was a single word or longer construction of the types discussed above. If, in order to say ouch! (cf. Hockett 1958: 201) I need a ' p e r f o r ­ mative deep structure' with a full NP and a full VP l a t e r to be deleted that says NP: I VP: Say onto you Dependent NP: OUCH! with everything deleted and only the ouch! r e t a i n e d , I will have spent more time on deriving the form than t h e r e was between my f i r s t shock of pain and my instantaneous exclamation of ouchl The performative deep structure analy­ sis is a red herring and should be held up to public r i d i ­ cule. Yet one cannot deny t h a t ouchl is something the speaking ego says to others or to himself. But we know this, as it is an intrinsic p a r t of our culture t h a t we

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address each other. We are not brainless robots constantly in need of reminding ourselves of what we do: I can say go( to my dog without saying to myself f i r s t "I am now saying to my dog 'GO'/" Our phatic behavior as humans, (in the sense of Malinowski) r e n d e r s it superfluous to 'derive' acts of a phatic n a t u r e , such as exclamations, f r o m f u l l sentences used elsewhere in the language. I would like to call the oucht type an AUTOPHATIC EXCLAMATION. It will be u t t e r e d , instantaneously and automatically, even if no one is around to overhear it. 3.1 EXCLAMATIONS AS A SPECIAL CASE OF IOIOMATICITY I believe t h a t exclamations, insofar as they a r e , to a very large e x t e n t , INSTITUTIONS IN A GIVEN CULTURE, are best viewed as a special case of idiomaticity. They qualify as such on several grounds. The meaning 'I am g r e a t l y s u r ­ prised with positive and/or negative overtones' is not logic­ ally deducible e i t h e r f r o m the holiness of cows, mackerels, Moses, smoke, or the blemish in the holy set; nor is the meaning 'beware of your bragging' f r o m Famous last wordsl This is not to deny t h a t these meanings are partly SUGGESTED by some subset of the semantic f e a t u r e s of the participant lexemes. More importantly, these exclamations are SET EXPRESSIONS which a person not f a m i l i a r with t h e m , even if he knows the grammar p e r f e c t l y , cannot make up at will. Problems arise, as we have seen, when such semantically opaque and closed sets suddenly become p r o ­ ductive, at least f o r awhile and at least in a certain sec­ tion of society, as we have seen in the case of Batman and Robin's rapidly expanding holy-set. There is, of course, no way to predict w h e t h e r this productivity will remain associ­ ated with h/y-words t h i r t y or f o r t y years f r o m now; the survival of the 'limited holy set', by contrast, seems r e l a ­ tively easy to f o r e s e e . But just by saying t h a t certain expressions are 'idio­ matic' we have not really accounted for their existence, t h e i r i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e , or t h e i r provenience. To explain the provenience of these forms could only be accomplished as a rigorous diachronic research project which would take years and is, painfully obviously, beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, certain t e n t a t i v e generalizations can be attempted:

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Mankind universally exclaims as part of its PHATIC BEHAVIOR. 2. Exclamations divide into basically two types: a. The ego identifies with the object of his phatic act ( p l e a s u r e , joy, etc.) b. The ego rejects the object of his phatic act ( p a i n , a n g e r , etc.) 3. This kind of phatic behavior antedates learned l e x i ­ cal and grammatical speech and starts in all human groups in the earliest infancy; it is co-ordinated with facial and bodily gestures (grimace and f r o w n , clenched fist for r e j e c t i o n , smile, cooing, etc., for joy and pleasure.) 4. The sensation of surprise, encountering the unex­ pected, factors out into the a. and the b. types (under 2) allowing a wide range of gradience between the two extremes. 5. The socially controlled logical lexico-grammatical speech which replaces the infant's arche-speech during and in the wake of primary socialization (roughly age 6), assigns certain previously used portions of the lexicon for the t r a d i t i o n a l encoding of both the identifying and the rejecting types of phatic acts. (The expression Holy Mary, mother of God has the same lexeme holy in it as does the exclam­ ation holy cow! which has the same lexeme cow in it as the sentence the farmer bought a new cow.) The selection of already existing lexical items for the tagging of positively or negatively colored exclama­ tions most probably proceeds along the lines of metaphorical extension (cf. Makkai 1975), but the 'rhyme or reason' of a particular choice seems a r b i t r a r y under synchronic investigation. 6.

7.

Thus the available lexico-grammatical apparatus is much too inadequate f o r the expressing of the flow of human emotions. This has a dual result: a. People create new exclamations by analogy. b. People mean more than one thing by the 'same' exclamation. 6b is regulated by PH0N0P5YCH0SEMANTICS.

4. PSYCHOPHONOSEMANTICS SPEECH

AND

MULTIPLE

CODING

IN

LIVE

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As the pioneering research of Iván Fónagy has convinc­ ingly shown (Fonagy 1976, 1983, and in press), the live human voice resists the tyranny of lexico-grammaticai c a t ­ egorizations and claims continual access to the symbolization process, as if every individual user of a language w e r e engaged in an ongoing battle to expand and modify the socially agreed upon meanings of the common lexeme stock. This tendency, of course, is more noticeable in the area of PSYCHOSEMEMES than in the areas of the COGNOSEMEMES and TECHNOSEMEMES (see Makkai 1983). Generally, psychosememes are the meanings of those lexemes which a child acquires during primary socialization, up to leaving the home f o r k i n d e r g a r t e n and/or the f i r s t g r a d e . Definitions of the lexeme stock are never verbal but ostensive, as no one ever needs a d e f i n i t i o n f o r daddy or mommy as 'male parent' and 'female parent'. They are hugged and they f e e d us, if things are normal; if n o t , they shout and hit us, etc. Thus the child acquires the meanings of these words uncon­ sciously; hence the t e r m psychosememes. Cognosememes are acquired in the grades through exposure to reading m a t e r i ­ als. Definitions are given verbally or by pictorial illustration. The names of animals, ranging f o r m ostrich to duck-billed platypus are such cognosememes, so are the terms anticipa­ tion, pledge, allegiance, etc., which must all be learned con­ sciously. Doggy and kitty cat in most homes are acquired psy­ chose memicaIIy: the c r e a t u r e s are simply members of the family. Technosememes are acquired as one acquires tools and their use; as t e r m s in the upper grades of high school, college, and g r a d u a t e school. The t e r m s phoneme, morphophoneme, syntax, and idiom are all technosememes. Psychophonosemantic multiple-coding primarily affects, t h e n , psychosememes, and the more emotionally colored lower ranges of our cognosememes, but doesn't seem to have much e f f e c t on medical discourse, the language of a well argued legal w r i t , a d e e d , or a technical treatise on formal linguistics. I have devoted a long essay (Makkai 1975b) to documenting how a theory of human language that fails to take multiple coding into account is bound to be a f a i l u r e . In t e r m s of the w r i t t e n language idioms, jokes, allusions, and t r a n s l a t i o n , ' l i t e r a t u r e ' , f o r short, c a n ­ not be accomplished if simultaneous multiple coding is not allowed. No known brand of Transformational Generative Grammar is capable of handling simulcoding to d a t e , hence its characterization as a f a i l u r e .

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The human voice, in p a r t i c u l a r , Fonagy argues, is as individual as our f i n g e r prints or our signature. Logical lexico-grammatical discourse about business, education, and politics, in short, civilization, has become possible because Homo sapiens accepted the necessity of an a r b i t r a r y code which is traditionally l e a r n e d . The ADULT and the PARENTAL ego state (comparable to the Freudian Ego and Superego, (cf. Makkai 1978) are particularly well suited to function via socially regulated lexicogrammatical norms. But the individu­ al's most c r e a t i v e , inner self, his CHILD (comparable to the Freudian Id) rebels against the lexicogrammatical norms and t r i e s to transcend them in every possible way. The socially most adjustable, even commercially successful, version of such rebellions may be t e r m e d POETRY. The poets e. e. cummings and Edgar Guest may have used a large number of identical lexemes and g r a m m a r , yet Edgar Guest remains a not very highly r e g a r d e d poet and e. e. cummings remains the century's linguistically most rebellious genius in modern American English. Their individual styles are unmistakable. T. S. Eliot and Ogden Nash may have used words and con­ structions t h a t w e r e common to both of them as speakers of English; yet Nash's charm and verbal playfulness is all his own and Eliot's greatness in the Four Quartets remains unparalleled and outdone perhaps only by Ezra Pound in the Cantos, In each case mentioned here an artist has used his CHILD, took his rebellious a t t i t u d e s , his playful inventive­ ness, and mapped t h a t into novel a r r a n g e m e n t s of the available lexicogrammatical patterns for consumption by other adults in the w r i t t e n medium. But not every one succeeds in translating his inner speech into socially valued a r t , whereas every human being appears to have this t r i p a r t i t i o n of the personality. The commonest manifestation of the inner child, t h e n , is through our voice and the meanings it adds to or subtracts from the socially accepted, standard average dictionary meanings of our lexicons. The human voice doesn't lie; just like preverbal children, it doesn't know how to tell a lie. Thus when the lexicogrammar forces it to say something it doesn't quite m e a n , the voice compensates f o r it by g r a f t ­ ing a private meaning onto the lexicogrammatically e x t a n t one at hand.

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Let us revisit, with this in mind, some of our examples discussed e a r l i e r in this paper. Let us take the example Good grief!, a popular exclamation in American English. Lexicogrammatically and logically, it is somewhat of a contra­ diction; grief has, usually, negative connotations such as 'sadness', 'sorrow', 'pain', 'loss', and 'mourning'; the lexeme good, on the other hand means 'not bad', 'joyous', ' f a v o r a ­ ble', 'advantageous f o r me', etc. Thus a grief that is good is hard to imagine and calls f o r some moral parable such as 'too much f u n is bad f o r you because you will become i r r e ­ sponsible; an occasional g r i e f , on the other hand, is good f o r you, because it will sober you and make you mature'. Obviously people when they exclaim Good grief! do not think about these m a t t e r s and j u s t use the ready-made phrase on t a p , since it is a convenient p r e - f a b , to use Bolinger's most f i t t i n g t e r m (1976). But this involves the ego in an e m o ­ tional contradiction: should he/she emphasize the 'good' part or the 'grief' p a r t of the exclamation? And so it happens that exclaiming Good grief! can be done both belly-achingly, self-pityingly, lugubriously, mournfully, pessimistically, d e f i ­ antly, and delightedly, happily, light-headedly, and optimis­ tically. (Due to Charlie Brown, whose favorite phrase it is, it is most o f t e n heard in a mood of crestfallenness and lack of self-confidence.) However it can be chuckled sarcas­ tically and unbelievingly, as if separating the syllables into GOO-OOD GRIE-IEF; or in mock-surprise upon seeing the very largest pumpkin on Halloween Day good GRIEFlll (eyes rolling in mock f e a r ) . The point of these quasi-descriptions and quasi-classifications here is t h a t private though the inner speech is, i t , too, comes in observable p a t t e r n s and these can be correlated with physically observable and recordable phonological contours. This is the essence of Ivan Fonagy's research into the functions of the live human voice. A highly t r a i n e d instrumental phonetician equally at home in E d i n ­ b u r g h , Ann Arbor, Stockholm, Vienna, Paris, and Budapest - c u r r e n t l y residing in Paris - ~ Fónagy, in his forthcoming book translated by myself, has succeeded in giving objec­ tively q u a n t i f i e d evaluations, 'emicizations of alios', in a way, of what major types of multiple coding there are in human languages. Most of his examples come from his native Hungarian but t h e r e are also many French, German, English and other examples as w e l l .

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The child, who thrives to r e t a i n the arche-language of itself developed prior to the acquisition of the lexicogrammatical norm of its family, survives under the diplomas of the grown up and in constant dialectical tension against the norm, creates new meanings by the thousands every day. We cannot dismiss this as the 'idiolect' of the individual since the idiolect itself is largely lexicogrammatical speech imbued and interwoven with the inflections of the inner voice. Thus the voice, a phonologically observable e v e n t , carries m e a n ­ ings into grammar and lexis, signalling directly unobservable but in e f f e c t clearly manifest psychological states. In other words the c a r r i e r is phonology, the content is semantics, and the source is the individual's emotional states. There is nothing mystical or 'mentalistic' about this; the average well t r a i n e d family physician knew it a hundred years ago and said to bewildered parents 'your son talks nicely but sounds and looks mean; have a word with him to see what's bothering him, and his head aches will go away.' Hence the t e r m PSYCHOPHONOSEMANTICS. Currently still unrecognized in America, the phenomena it promises to be able to t r e a t will encompass what is c u r r e n t l y relegated to the ill defined area of 'speech acts'. There is something Jakobsonian about it (amounting to his notion of Gesamtbe­ deutungen); the questions raised range from Saussure through Wells (1958) to HaUiday. American structuralists, by and large, tended to stay away from discussing inobserv­ ables and concentrated t h e i r energy on the careful display of overt d a t a . This was correct scientific behavior couched in modesty and i n t e g r i t y , but it also landed the profession in the turmoil of the Transformationalist-Generativist move­ ment which started in 1957. Transformationalists tend to call themselves 'mentalists', but have created some of the largest and most awkward taxonomies in the f i e l d — t a x o n o ­ mies of rules instead of taxonomies of facts. Section 2.4.1 of this paper o f f e r s a parody of t h e i r approach to the t r e a t m e n t of data. As the century progresses and previously incredible achievements of mankind, such as the manned lunar landing in July of 1969, become household conversa­ tion topics, we can e n t e r t a i n the vision of an objective c a t ­ aloguing of those facets of language which are not directly observable without falling pray to pseudo-mentalism which is, to use Talmy Givón's adroit phrase, 'structuralism w i t h a vengeance'. This paper is a modest a t t e m p t at answering Wells' question in 1958: Is a Structural Description of

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Semantics Possible? We have seen the pseudo results of the 25 years. Formal explicitness, although a v i r t u e , cannot account f o r n a t u r a l language use without a theory of con­ t e x t , t e n o r , and r e g i s t e r , as in Halliday (1978). The desired synthesis will be ecological linguistics, or EC0UNGU1STICS, f o r short. To understand and to practice EC0LIN6UISTIC5, one must approach the f i e l d with the peripathetic o p e n mindedness and tolerance I have experienced f o r the f i r s t time in my life at Yale University, when I f i r s t came into contact with Rulon S. Wells, to whom this paper and this e n t i r e volume is dedicated. Peripathetic open-mindedness is an a t t i t u d e that approaches all movements within linguistics with creative curiosity. As the f i r s t major American exponent of syntax through Immediate Constituents (Wells 1947), Wells has shown that a Harris-type structuralist approach to syn­ tax is certainly possible; f u r t h e r m o r e , it is reasonably clear t h a t the study of surface s t r u c t u r e will gain new recogni­ tion in all modes of theoretical linguistics. (Chomsky, f o r example, no longer seeks meaning e n t i r e l y in 'Deep Struc­ t u r e ' , much of meaning is now found in surface structure as well.) Since exclamations a r e , as we have seen, to a large e x t e n t idiomatic, we must recognize that live language is stored in chunks and units in memory beyond the size of the single word. Sometimes the meaning is t r a n s p a r e n t , sometimes it is opaque; in all cases t h e r e is something unpredictable e i t h e r about the semantics or about the con­ struction. We have learned from stratificational grammar (Makkai 1972) t h a t idioms are hard to g e n e r a t e and that the LEXEMIC and SEMEMIC STRATA of a n a t u r a l language o f f e r convenient places f o r the storage and retrieval of idioms. Yet it is clear t h a t idioms have both internal and external syntax; not to study t h a t in detail would be to ignore overt d a t a . Exclamation idioms in p a r t i c u l a r , however, ride on PHONOLOGICAL INTONATIONS which, invariably, CARRY MEANING. To understand exclamations, t h e n , we need all of the following: a)

Knowledge of the syntax of the u t t e r a n c e , both internal and e x t e r n a l . b) Knowledge of the morphologies involved. c) Knowledge of the appropriateness conditions for the exclamation; this involves

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d)

e) f)

g)

thorough familiarity with a theory of 'speech acts' or ii) a knowledge of the register and tenor of the explanation, and a iii) theory of context, which must be sociolinguistically and semiotically based. The meaning of the exclamation is of central importance, of course, both as a m a t t e r of lexicography (static v i e w ) , and syntactic operability (dynamic v i e w ) , but it rests on the phonological realization of the utterance - - see the role of intonation discussed above. Meaning through phonology is in its infancy in the United States, despite major advances made by scholars such as Dwight Bolinger; f u r t h e r m o r e , it involves the researcher in psycho-linguistics of the psychiatric-transactional type.

EC0LIN6UISTICS rests on these seven foundations. Fact, overt observation; introspection, study of context, syntax, semantics, morphology, and phonology are inextricably i n t e r ­ woven in the study of exclamations. Would Bloomfield have shied away from studying exclamations? It is u n f a i r to guess. He would have urged t h a t we needed much f a s t e r and b e t t e r access to much more and much b e t t e r classified information. But t h a t was in 1933, and this is half a c e n ­ t u r y later in 1984. Even the large capacity IBM computers of the '60-ies are outmoded; this is the age of the micro­ chip computer with the v i d e o - s c r e e n , easily available to all who need one. It is perhaps no accident that cognitive stratificational linguistics should be so closely tied with computer research through the work of Sydney M. Lamb: both Lamb and Halliday view human language as a large serniotic system in the last analysis. Wells' question of nearly 30 years ago, 'Is A S t r u c t u r a l T r e a t m e n t of Semantics Possible?' can now be answered with a more than t e n t a t i v e , cautious 'yes'. Oddly enough no single theoretical model can do the job; we need the synthesis of Tagmemics (with its -ernes and -alios, f i e l d , particle and wave modalities); Sys­ temic-Functional Grammar (Halliday's concept of Language as Social Serniotic)- Lamb's cognitive-stratificational theory via computer, and the classical theories of analogy, formation of neologisms, etc. Set theory and logic and t r a n s f o r m a ­ tional sentence derivation can also be shown to play a p a r t ,

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although a minor one, and o f t e n one that yields negative results. The systematization of all of these c u r r e n t s into a t r u l y viable ECOUNGUISTICS calls f o r rigor in logic and presupposes a philosopher thoroughly versed in all modes of modern linguistics. To put it briefly: it is a Wellsian task.

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1 For some historical insights see McDavid/Mancken 1963: 395, 6 2 9 , 6 7 7 , etc. The f o r m holy ¡umping Jesuel is cited as having vanished t o w a r d 1890. Bolinger (1975: 3 0 8 ) , one the best recent t e x t books on general linguistics, discusses exclamations in a chapter dealing with the origin of l a n ­ guage in connection with holophrasis. This is in essential agreement with Hockett's interesting but short t r e a t m e n t of exclamations in 1958: 201 where exclamations are t r e a t e d as 'minor types' of sentences, or 'fragments'. Hockett w r i t e s : 'Strong emotion, or its simulation, may produce exclamatory fragments: Ouchl Goodness graciousl The devil you say!' S t a n ­ dard discussions are available in various older traditionalist t r e a t m e n t s of English grammar. See also Wentworth and Flexner 1960: 264 under holy cow!, Boatner, Gates & Makkai 1975-77: 162 under the same e n t r y .

Several sources, especially McDavid/Mencken and Wentworth and Flexner t r e a t the holy set as euphemisms for Holy Jesus! This might have interesting consequences for section 2.4.1. Other, now extinct exclamations, perhaps still remembered by the older g e n e r e a t i o n such as ¡umpin' jimminie cricket! and ¡umpin' (holy] Jehosaphat! w e r e left unmentioned in this essentially synchronic t r e a t m e n t . 2 This situation may be changing as sentences such as Man, I'm telling you, I'm beat are more f r e q u e n t l y heard even among middle class white women in intellectual professions, such as teachers among themselves during coffee break, etc.

3

Hungary is by no means unique in having adopted Shakespeare as a national saint through l i t e r a t u r e . Shakes­ pearian proverbs have, of course, originated in British c u l ­ t u r e and w e r e exported with the dramatic output itself; many t r a n s l a t o r s knew what lines had become proverbial in the original English which a l e r t e d them to outdo themselves in t r a n s l a t i n g those particular lines. The same lines a r e , for those who read Shakespeare anyway, among the better known and more easily recognized ones. Generally speaking, however, in modern American English, unless one is in the company of l i t e r a t u r e majors or professors, one does not hear a g r e a t deal of Shakespearian quotation in commenting on instances of every day l i f e ; 'to be or not to be', and 'he

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shuffled off this mortal coil' have almost become forbidden as t r i t e . I have not once in 27 years in the USA encount e r e d a spontaneous comment f r o m any native American speaker about politics using 'something is r o t t e n in the State of Denmark' (not even during W a t e r g a t e ) , and I have never been able to observe 'well r o a r e d , lion!' f r o m an adult to an excessively vocal youngster. Accordingly, I t r y to use them myself in an a t t e m p t to f i n d out if they are at least recognized, which they f r e q u e n t l y a r e , though some­ times not. It is my understanding that even in Britain 'to exclaim in Shakespeare' is a generational phenomenon found more typical of older people and regarded as snobbery by most.

REFERENCES CITED Boatner, Maxine T u l l , John Edward Gates, and Adam Makkai (update e d i t o r ) . 1975. A Dictionary of American Idioms. Woodbury, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, second ed. 1977. Bolinger, Dwight. 1975. Aspects of Language. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton. Fónagy, Iván. 1976. A költō hangja: öregség. Dallamfejtés. (The Voice of the Poet: Old Age. Introduction to MelodySemantics.) Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó. English t r a n s ­ lation of the above by A. Makkai, Budapest: Akadém­ iai kiadó, in press. . 1983. La vive voix, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Halliday, M. A. K. 1978. Language as Social Semiotic, London: Edward Arnold. Hockett, Charles F. 1958. A Course in Modern Linguistics. New York: MacMillan. Lees, Robert B. 1957. "Review of Chomsky 1957." Language. 33:375-408. . 1960. Grammar of English Nominalizations. Publication of Indiana University Research Center in Anthropology, Folklore and Linguistics No. 12 (IJAL XXVI, No. 2, II.). McDavid, Raven I. ( e d i t o r ) . 1963. The American Language. Abridged e d i t i o n , original by H. L, Mencken. New York: Knopf.

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Makkai: Where do Exclamations Come From?

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