Legitimacy in International Society: Japan's Reaction to Global Wildlife Preservation

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Legitimacy in International Society Japan’s Reaction to Global Wildlife Preservation

Isao Miyaoka

St Antony’s Series General Editor: Richard Clogg (1999–), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Isao Miyaoka LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY Japan’s Reaction to Global Wildlife Preservation Neil J. Melvin SOVIET POWER AND THE COUNTRYSIDE Policy Innovation and Institutional Decay Juhana Aunesluoma BRITAIN, SWEDEN AND THE COLD WAR, 1945–54 Understanding Neutrality George Pagoulatos GREECE’S NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY State, Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU Tiffany A. Troxel PARLIAMENTARY POWER IN RUSSIA, 1994–2001 A New Era Elvira María Restrepo COLOMBIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS Fear and Distrust Julie M. Newton RUSSIA, FRANCE, AND THE IDEA OF EUROPE Ilaria Favretto THE LONG SEARCH FOR A THIRD WAY The British Labour Party and the Italian Left Since 1945 Lawrence Tal POLITICS, THE MILITARY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN JORDAN, 1955–1967 Louise Haagh and Camilla Helgø (editors) SOCIAL POLICY REFORM AND MARKET GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA Gayil Talshir THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF GREEN PARTIES From the Politics of Nature to Redefining the Nature of Politics E. K. Dosmukhamedov FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN Politico-Legal Aspects of Post-Communist Transition Felix Patrikeeff RUSSIAN POLITICS IN EXILE The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924–1931

He Ping CHINA’S SEARCH FOR MODERNITY Cultural Discourse in the Late 20th Century Mariana Llanos PRIVATIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA An Analysis of President–Congress Relations Michael Addison VIOLENT POLITICS Strategies of Internal Conflict Geoffrey Wiseman CONCEPTS OF NON-PROVOCATIVE DEFENCE Ideas and Practices in International Security Pilar Ortuño Anaya EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS AND SPAIN The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77 Renato Baumann (editor) BRAZIL IN THE 1990s An Economy in Transition Israel Getzler NIKOLAI SUKHANOV Chronicler of the Russian Revolution Arturo J. Cruz, Jr NICARAGUA’S CONSERVATIVE REPUBLIC, 1858–93 Pamela Lubell THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION The Case of the Sixty-One Renegades Mikael af Malmborg NEUTRALITY AND STATE-BUILDING IN SWEDEN

St Antony’s Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71109–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Legitimacy in International Society Japan’s Reaction to Global Wildlife Preservation Isao Miyaoka Associate Professor of International Politics, Osaka University of Foreign Studies, Japan

in association with St Antony’s College, Oxford

© Isao Miyaoka 2004 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied, or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–1780–9 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Miyaoka, Isao, 1965– Legitimacy in international society : Japan’s reaction to global wildlife preservation / Isao Miyaoka p. cm. — (St. Antony’s series) “In association with St. Antony’s college, Oxford.” Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 1–4039–1780–9 (cloth) 1. Wildlife conservation. 2. Japan—Foreign relations. 3. Legitimacy of governments. 4. International organization I. St. Antony’s College (University of Oxford) II. Title. III. St. Antony’s series (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm)) QL82.M58 2003 333.95′416′0952—dc21 10 13

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents

Figures and Tables

vii

Acknowledgments

viii

1 Introduction

1

2 The Legitimacy of International Norms

7

Norms and legitimacy Three forms of social influence Three sources of legitimacy Research methods

7 13 16 24

3 Wildlife Protection and Japan

27

Wildlife protection regimes The conservation principle Conclusion

27 37 48

4 Case One: Driftnet Fishing

49

Norm building Alternative explanations The legitimacy of the norm against driftnet fishing Conclusion

5 Case Two: Scientific Whaling Norm building Alternative explanations The legitimacy of the norm against scientific whaling Conclusion

50 56 63 72

74 74 76 84 96

6 Case Three: Ivory Trade

98

Norm building Alternative explanations

98 104 v

vi

Contents

The legitimacy of the norm against the ivory trade Conclusion

7 Conclusion Tentative conclusions Theoretical limitations and implications The future of elephants and whales

111 120

122 122 127 130

Notes

137

Bibliography

185

Index

202

Figures and Tables Figures 2.1 Legitimacy spectrum 2.2 A “legitimacy in context” approach

11 12

Tables 2.1 Three forms of social influence 4.1 Resolutions and documents on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing 5.1 Votes on Japan’s research whaling for IWC resolutions, 1987–92 6.1 Votes on the African elephant at the 1989 CITES conference 7.1 Votes on Japan’s research whaling for IWC resolutions, 1993–2001

vii

19 64 85 113 133

Acknowledgments

In the late 1980s, I, an undergraduate student, befriended some Americans who were staying in or near Tokyo as English teachers with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Programme. Many of them were environmentally more conscious than most Japanese people at that time and were often critical of Japanese practices such as whaling and the use of disposable wooden chopsticks. To me, their discourses were a kind of culture shock. I realized that our normal practices could look abnormal to people from abroad. Again I had a similar experience when I lived in New Zealand as a diplomat from 1992 to 1995. In that country, the killing of whales was considered an absolutely bad thing, although some tribes of the Maori, its native people, wanted to resume aboriginal whaling. Both of these experiences made me reconsider such Japanese practices, and made me wonder why Japan defied general ecological expectations in the United States and New Zealand. This book originates from my doctoral research at the University of Oxford during the period between October 1995 and March 1999. My sincere appreciation must go first and foremost to my supervisor, Professor J. A. A. Stockwin. His patient academic guidance and immeasurable assistance with administrative and financial applications were indispensable to the research of my thesis. I would also like to express my gratitude to the staff of St Antony’s College and the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies. At Oxford, Dr Yuen F. Khong, Dr Andrew Hurrell (Nuffield College), and the internal and external examiners of my thesis, Professors Rosemary Foot (St Antony’s) and Glenn Hook (University of Sheffield) also provided me with useful comments. In writing my thesis, I spent a year and half in Oxford and nearly two years in Tokyo. During my stay in Tokyo, affiliation with the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo, greatly contributed to my doctoral research. In this connection, I would like to thank the staff of the Institute at that time, especially Professors Wada Haruki, Hirowatari Seigo, Hiwatari Nobuhiro, Ishida Hiroshi, and Kase Kazutoshi as well as visiting research scholars including Mr Masuyama Mikitaka. My doctoral research was financially supported by a New Century Scholarship (1996–7), and travel grants from the Sasakawa Fund (Oriental Institute, December 1996 and June 1997), the Cha Fund and the Stahl Fund (St Antony’s, December 1996), viii

Acknowledgments

ix

and the General Board of the Faculties, the University of Oxford (June 1997). This book and my dissertation are not the same things, however. The former has developed from the extensive revision of the latter, mainly during my stay at Harvard University between August 1999 and February 2001. That time was an excellent opportunity to absorb the American literature on international relations. I am very grateful to Professors Susan Pharr, Andrew Gordon, and Dr Frank Schwartz for hosting me at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (the Program on US–Japan Relations) and the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies. This post-doctoral research was made possible by financial assistance from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. Since April 2001, the Osaka University of Foreign Studies has provided me with a comfortable environment in which to write up the revisions. With appreciation, I must also note assistance and useful comments from Professors Ian Gow (University of Sheffield), Tom Havens (Northeastern University), Alastair Johnston (Harvard University), Peter J. Katzenstein (Cornell University), Ôyane Satoshi (Doshisha University), Leonard Schoppa (University of Virginia), Miranda Schreurs (University of Maryland), and Mr Sakaguchi Isao (University of Tokyo). I would also like to express my gratitude to interviewees, librarians, reviewers, and proofreaders. A special mention must be reserved for Professor Tanaka Hiroshi (Keio University) and Mr Richard Kennaway (University of Canterbury), who were my unforgettable supervisors in undergraduate and master’s courses respectively. I regret that I am not able to inform Mr Kennaway of the publication of this book. He suddenly passed away last year. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Satoko for all her tolerance and support throughout my work, my son Kentarô for his inspiration, and my parents Miyaoka Satoshi and Akiko and Satoko’s parents Wakatsuki Masaaki and Hiroko for their support and encouragement. I dedicate this book to my family and Mr Kennaway.

1 Introduction

In the age of globalization, it is increasingly necessary to address the problem of political conflicts between international norms and domestic autonomy. International norms do not automatically spread through the world nor infiltrate into domestic societies. Although neorealists usually downplay the importance of international norms, even Robert Gilpin, a leading scholar of the school, admits that “After decades of unprecedented success, the postwar ‘compromise of embedded liberalism’ deteriorated and the clash between domestic autonomy and international norms reasserted itself in the major economies of the international system. The increasing interdependence of national economies in trade, finance, and macroeconomic policy conflicted more and more with domestic economic and social priorities.”1 This problem is not restricted to the economic issue area in an era of “ecological interdependence.” 2 In the latter half of the 1980s, global environmental problems such as deforestation, ozone depletion, global warming, and biological diversity started to attract international political attention. At their Paris Summit meeting in 1989, for example, the Group of Seven leaders devoted one-third of the Economic Declaration to the environment. 3 In June 1992, international political enthusiasm for the global environment peaked at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro. Amid the diffusion of global environmental norms, Japan was often denounced as “the world’s boldest ‘eco-outlaw’.”4 Most notably, Japan was pressured to end whaling for scientific purposes, the import of African elephant ivory, and driftnet fishing on the high seas. In 1987, Japan started scientific research on minke whales in the Antarctic Ocean, just after entering a moratorium on commercial whaling. From the beginning, this research was criticized as a disguise for commercial whaling, because Japan was allowed to kill a certain 1

2

Legitimacy in International Society

number of minke whales for research and then to sell the meat. Since 1987, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) has almost annually adopted a resolution against Japan’s research programs. On the other hand, Japan’s imports of raw ivory for seals soared in the 1970s and early 1980s, while its large-scale driftnet fishing on the high seas started in the late 1970s. In 1989, which Time magazine called “the year of the earth,” these practices suddenly drew much opposition overseas. In 1989, during the seventh conference of the parties of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the member states made a decision by vote to ban international trade in African elephants and their products. In the same year, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a ban on driftnet fishing in the South Pacific region by July 1991, with a view to reducing the incidental catches and death of nontarget species such as dolphins and turtles. In 1991, moreover, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a global ban by the end of 1992. Japan responded to these developments differently. Japan abstained from the CITES voting concerning the African elephant, but it accepted the decision within two weeks. Similarly, Japan resisted the adoption of the General Assembly resolutions against driftnet fishing, but each time joined the consensus voting in the end. Since January 1993, the Japanese government has never allowed its nationals to conduct driftnet fishing on the high seas. On the other hand, Japan has still ignored the IWC resolutions against scientific whaling. Moreover, it started a new research program in the North Pacific on minke whales in 1994 and another new program on Bryde’s whales and sperm whales in 2000. In short, Japan adopted prohibition norms against driftnet fishing and the ivory trade, but has continued to contest a norm against scientific whaling. This book not only gives a detailed description of those stories but also contributes to international relations theory through the case studies. Why do states adopt certain norms but not others? According to major theories of international relations, a state is likely to adopt, and comply with, an international norm under the following conditions: 1) when a great power materially coerces the state to comply with the norm (realism); 2) when the state finds it self-interested to maintain its reputation for credibility (neoliberalism); 3) when the norm empowers certain self-interested domestic actors within the state (liberalism); and 4) when state actors come to have a sense of moral obligation to follow the norm (constructivism). (These perspectives are elaborated in Chapter 2.)

Introduction

3

These theoretical perspectives, however, fail to explain the cases mentioned above. First, no states invoked or threatened to invoke military or economic sanctions against Japan. Second, Japan would not have lost its reputation for credibility even if it had not adopted the norms. It was because Japan had not made a commitment to do so. One can lose this type of reputation only when one breaks a promise. Third, the norms in question did not empower transnational and domestic environmental groups strongly enough to affect Japanese domestic politics. Finally, Japanese policymakers adopted the norms reluctantly only after they were supported by a large number of other states. They did not consider the norms morally right. Moreover, they did not perceive the norms as legally binding, either. Although the CITES conference made a legal decision to ban the ivory trade, Japan could lawfully have filed a reservation about the decision. On the other hand, the resolutions against high seas driftnet fishing and those against scientific whaling were not legally binding but merely recommendatory.5 Some legal scholars regard resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly as “soft law,” which “does express the element of strong expectation that states will gradually conform their conduct to its requirements, which may include that they enact binding national regulations to control particular activities.”6 Even such scholars do not recognize that soft law is legally binding, however. 7 Instead, I argue that Japan adopted prohibition norms against driftnet fishing and the ivory trade because they were collectively legitimized in international society, and that Japan ignored a norm against scientific whaling because it was not done so sufficiently. These cases offer an interesting opportunity to reconsider the legitimacy of international norms by focusing on the impact of collective legitimization on state behavior. More than three decades ago, Inis Claude defined the term “collective legitimization” as “politically significant approval and disapproval of the claims, policies, and actions of states.” 8 He emphasized “a political function [of collective legitimization], sought for political reasons, exercised by political organs through the operation of a political process, and productive of political results.”9 He also argued that it is “a crystallization of judgment that may be influenced but is unlikely to be wholly determined by legal norms and moral principles” and that “the problem of legitimacy has a political dimension that goes beyond its legal and moral aspects.” 10 In short, collective legitimization is the process of producing and reproducing the “political legitimacy” 11 of state claims, policies, and actions. Nevertheless, Claude did not directly address the concept of legitimacy itself. 12

4


In the international relations literature, the question of legitimacy has long been an unpopular topic for empirical research. There are four possible reasons for this. First, international relations scholars who endeavor to conduct scientific research may agree with Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba that “Many of the most important questions concerning political life – about such concepts as agency, obligation, legitimacy .. . are philosophical rather than empirical.”13 Second, even if we recognize that legitimacy is an empirical issue, the elusive “mine-field”14 concept of legitimacy cannot divorce itself from methodological difficulty.Third, some political scientists in international relations believe that normative force originates from law or morality, and thus want to disassociate themselves from legal study and ethics for the sake of developing their own discipline. For example, Hans Morgenthau argues that “political realism takes issue with the ‘legalistic-moralistic approach’ to international politics.”15 Finally, economic approaches such as neorealism and neoliberalism taken by the mainstream of the discipline have difficulty in dealing with the analysis of legitimacy, a social construct. 16 Despite these concerns and problems, it is still worth exploring the concept of legitimacy. First, it is possible to make a distinction between the making of normative claims and the empirical analysis of normative phenomena. Chris Brown similarly argues that “The usual meanings of normative revolve around the idea of standard setting and prescription, and the danger is that two different kinds of intellectual activity will be confused: the setting of standards, and the study of how (and what and by whom) standards are set.” 17 Second, I agree with Ian Hurd that “Methodological difficulties signal potentially interesting questions, which should attract scholarly attention, not discourage it.” 18 Third, since legitimacy contains a political dimension, legal and ethical studies are not sufficient for better understandings of the concept. As Claude rightly points out, “Politics is not merely a struggle for power but also a contest over legitimacy” and “Power and legitimacy are not antithetical, but complementary.” 19 Legitimacy is the worthy subject of the political study of international relations. Finally, sociological and sociopsychological approaches can offer useful insights about the concept of legitimacy. Explication of legitimacy in turn can contribute to constructivism in international relations, which often mentions the term “legitimacy” as one of its central concepts but rarely grapples with the elusive concept. This book addresses collective legitimization of emergent norms at multilateral meetings and its effect on state adoption of the norms. 20 In it, I discuss the international and domestic sources of legitimacy and

Introduction

5

basic conditions under which collective legitimization matters for norm adoption. I also outline three causal mechanisms of the impact of collective legitimization and several conditions under which a particular mechanism is likely to operate. For this theoretical inquiry, the case studies examine Japan’s responses to three prohibition norms against high seas driftnet fishing, scientific whaling, and the ivory trade. Special attention is paid to the period from 1987 to 1992 during which major relevant developments occurred internationally and domestically, although more past and recent developments are also discussed briefly. My main argument is that the consent given to an emerging norm by more than one-third of the total states in international society is likely to have an impact on state behavior, even without material coercion, self-interest, or moral obligation, due to social pressure or political obligation. In Chapter 2, I present a theoretical framework for the legitimacy of international norms, mainly drawing on constructivist insights in international relations and social psychology. (The general reader who is not interested in international relations theory may skip this chapter.) The purpose of this chapter is: first, to review the international relations literature on norms and legitimacy; second, to put forward theoretical propositions as to under what conditions collective legitimization matters for norm adoption; and finally to discuss several methodological issues. For the second purpose, I ask the following questions: Is a majority of states at a small multilateral conference large enough to make an impact on norm adoption? Do states adopt a collectively legitimized norm even when it contradicts existing legal rules, scientific views, and moral principles? How does interaction between norm promoters and target state actors affect the latter’s interpretation of the legitimacy of a collectively legitimized norm? Do states adopt a collectively legitimized norm even without coercion by powerful states or political pressures from societal actors? Moreover, I discuss three forms of social influence (normative, informational, and referent informational influence) to gain an insight into mechanisms through which social interaction such as collective legitimization affects legitimacy and thus state behavior. For better understandings of the case studies, Chapter 3 offers an overview of international regimes on high seas fishing, commercial whaling, and trade in endangered species as well as Japan’s wildlife protection policy. I also pay special attention to two irreconcilable principles for wildlife protection: conservation and preservation. I define the former as sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems along with the maintenance of genetic diversity, and the latter as the protection of

6


individual animals as holders of intrinsic or inherent value and the right to life. My main argument here is that conservation was the main principle of both international regimes and Japan’s policy on wildlife protection in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The next three chapters conduct case studies to probe the plausibility of the propositions discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 deal with Japan’s adoption of prohibition norms in the cases of driftnet fishing and the ivory trade respectively. Chapter 5 addresses the case of scientific whaling, where Japan remained in defiance of an emerging norm against the practice. Finally, Chapter 7 conducts a cross-case analysis and presents revised propositions. These revised propositions follow. States are likely to adopt a collectively legitimized norm under the following conditions: first, when the states that voted in favor of its legitimization constitute more than one-third of the total states in international society; second, even when the norm contradicts scientific views and moral principles but not legal rules; third, when state actors do not have an enmity relationship with the norm promoters; finally, even when the states are not coerced by powerful states or when they are not under political pressures from societal actors. These refined propositions come with cautions. I also discuss theoretical implications of these propositions for international society and Japanese foreign policy. Moreover, I briefly consider which mechanism of social influence was likely to operate in the cases of driftnet fishing and the ivory trade. Finally, I describe recent developments of the ivory trade and scientific whaling and make a few normative claims about the future of elephants and whales.

2 The Legitimacy of International Norms

A good understanding of collective norm legitimization requires a careful study of norm legitimacy. This chapter presents a theoretical framework to analyze the legitimacy of international norms, mainly drawing on constructivist approaches in international relations and social psychology. First, I review three major theories of international norms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism and then reconsider the concept of legitimacy. Second, I outline three forms of social influence (normative, informational, and referent informational influence) to gain an insight into mechanisms through which social interaction such as collective legitimization affects legitimacy and thus state behavior. Third, I discuss three sources of legitimacy: the formal consent to emergent norms expressed by states; ideational consistency between emerging norms and existing legal rules, moral principles, and scientific views; and intergroup relationship between norm promoters and target state actors. I also summarize the crude propositions offered by my theoretical framework. Finally, I briefly discuss methodological issues such as data sources and case selection.

Norms and legitimacy The study of norms focuses on three bases of compliance: coercion, selfinterest, and legitimacy.1 The first two are utilitarian bases. A distinction between self-interest and coercion is made in the sense that “self-interest involves self-restraint on the part of an actor (as does legitimacy), whereas coercion operates by external restraint [emphasis in original].”2 Similarly, Friedrich Kratochwil lists three classical theories on compliance: “The Hobbesian or realist position derives compliance with norms from force or the threat of force. A second class of theories explains compliance in 7

8


terms of the long-term utilitarian calculations of actors, a perspective perhaps best identified with Hume’s argument about the nature of conventions. Third is the idealist position of Durkheim, who conceptualizes norms and rules as ‘social facts’ existing objectively and constraining individual choices.” 3 Factors of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy have an affinity with three major theories of international relations: realism, liberalism, and constructivism respectively.4 Major theories of international norms Realism, liberalism, and constructivism view norms differently. Realism regards norms as patterns of behavior, which are material rather than ideational phenomena.5 It does not recognize the independent role of international norms in world politics. Similarly, liberalism uses the term “norm” as the normal. 6 For liberalism, however, norms are ideas, or “beliefs held by individuals.” 7 For example, Robert Keohane defines norms “simply as standards of behavior” and excludes from his definition the norms that are “justified on the basis of values extending beyond self-interest, and regarded as obligatory on moral grounds by governments.” 8 Liberalism recognizes the constraining and enabling roles of international norms. By contrast, constructivism views the concept of norms more broadly.9 First, constructivists regard norms as “the normative” rather than “the normal.”10 They define them as standards of appropriate behavior for states with a given identity.11 Second, for constructivists, norms are collectively or intersubjectively held ideas. Third, norms not only constrain state behavior but also construct state identities and interests. In other words, norms are not only regulative but also constitutive. Liberals treat norms as an intervening variable between pre-given interests and behavior, while constructivists regard them as an independent variable to explain the transformation of state identities and interests.12 Realism normally plays down the theoretical importance of norms because this perspective assumes that norms themselves possess no or little power to affect state behavior.13 Traditional realists consider international ethics, mores, and law, but attach less importance to them than to material power. For example, Hans Morgenthau argues that nationalism has destroyed much of international ethics, especially since the end of World War I, that world public opinion does not exist, and that international law reflects common interests of states and the distribution of power among them.14 Neorealists pay even less attention to international norms. Kenneth Waltz, a leading neorealist who advocates the most parsimonious structure of the international system, characterizes the

The Legitimacy of International Norms 9

structure simply as the principle of anarchy and as the distribution of material capabilities among states. 15 Even when neorealists admit the existence of norms in international life, they attribute the power of norms to the material capabilities of dominant states.16 For example, although Robert Gilpin recognizes regimes and prestige as components of the governance of an international system, he ultimately attributes the effectiveness of regimes and the hierarchy of prestige to the power of a dominant state. He states that “In every social system, the dominant actors assert their rights and impose rules on lesser members in order to advance their particular interests.” 17 Great powers use material sanctions or rewards to manipulate the cost–benefit calculations of other states. Neoliberals focus on the instrumental roles of international norms in serving as focal points and reducing transaction costs and uncertainty. 18 They also admit that states adopt norms of an international regime even when compliance is against their myopic or short-term interests.19 For example, even if one can think of a better regime, it is often too costly to construct it in place of the existing one that embodies sunk costs. States may also comply with norms because they value reciprocity out of their own self-interest. 20 Norm defiance may bring about retaliation by other states or set bad precedents. However, neither retaliation nor precedent is a strong cause for compliance, due to the problem of collective action. Thus, neoliberalism pays more attention to reputation for credibility. 21 If states defy rules that they had promised to keep, the defiance is likely to damage their reputation for credibility (or trustworthiness) in observing commitments. If states lose this type of reputation in wide networks of issues and/or regimes, they will more likely be disadvantaged in future negotiations.22 Nonetheless, reputation for credibility in adhering to one’s commitment matters only under certain limited conditions. 23 For neoliberals, moreover, as March and Olsen put it, “The only obligations recognized by individuals are those created through consent and contracts grounded in calculated consequential advantage.”24 Thus, neoliberalism cannot sufficiently explain why states reluctantly adopt norms to which they had not committed themselves. Liberals focus on the self-interest of various societal actors. State preferences emerge as a result of the aggregation of powerful non-state groups’ or individuals’ self-interest. 25 This approach, like constructivism, looks at the formation process of state interests but, unlike constructivism, assumes the self-interests of societal groups as given.26 For liberals, norms are functional for some domestic groups but not for others. According to this approach, states adopt an international norm when societal actors who benefit from the norm become more politically

10


powerful than those who suffer from the norm. Moreover, liberals would also argue that international norms empower certain societal groups in favor of the norm, who in turn put pressure on the government to accept it. 27 In a liberal view, it is also noteworthy that increasing interdependence and the easing of tensions between the West and the East have enabled nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to become more politically influential. 28 Indeed, transnational NGOs have played important roles in the issue area of the global environment.29 Traditional liberalism seems to be more promising for research on international politics of transnational issues such as the environment and human rights. Finally, constructivism claims that states follow international norms when they feel it legitimate to do so. From a constructivist perspective, actors are conceived as “role-players” rather than as “utility-maximizers.”30 James March and Johan Olsen summarize the logic of appropriateness that a role player follows as: “1) What kind of situation is this? 2) Who am I? 3) How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation? 4) Do what is most appropriate.”31 Role players adopt legitimate norms because the norms define the appropriateness of behavior. According to this logic, the appropriateness of a state’s action is more important than the expected consequences of that action. In other words, norm compliance derives from a sense of obligation rather than a cost–benefit calculation.32 For constructivism, legitimacy is a central concept. I argue, however, that a constructivist understanding of legitimacy is too narrow. Constructivism regards the concept as “an internal sense of moral obligation”33 as well as to habit.34 For constructivists, legitimacy is “a product of internalization.”35 The internalization of a norm occurs when individuals have accepted the norm privately. Constructivism, however, has simplified and failed to specify multiple microprocesses of socialization. 36 In this chapter, I discuss different forms of social influence and add two more bases of legitimacy: social pressure and political obligation. 37 Before doing this, I first reconsider the concept of legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy Legitimacy is a difficult concept to define. Dictionaries give its definition as reasonableness or lawfulness. In the former sense, constructivist Ian Hurd defines the term as “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”38 In the latter sense, international lawyer Thomas Franck defines it as “a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed


normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.”39 Hurd pays attention to substantive legitimacy, a subjective sense of obligation by an individual, while Franck to procedural legitimacy with an emphasis on the objective existence of obligation at the level of the international community. 40 On the other hand, Frank Schimmelfennig pays attention to the international legitimacy of states from a rationalist perspective. He assumes that “Rational political actors regard legitimacy as a resource that strengthens their political power, improves their access to positions of authority, enhances their capacity to govern and extends their period of rule.”41 Each of these definitions reflects a partial conception of legitimacy. For the theoretical framework of this book, I lay down a more comprehensive definition: the prescriptive quality of a norm, rule, or institution that makes people feel obliged or feel a sense of obligation to comply. (I later explain the difference between “feeling obliged” and “feeling a sense of obligation.”) Legitimate norms affect state behavior. In this case, legitimacy is a motive or reason for, and thus a likely cause of, norm adoption. 42 As Donald Davidson puts it, “A primary reason for an action is its cause.”43 Although socially causal relationships are not mechanically deterministic, the stronger legitimacy is, the more likely it is a cause of an action. 44 “Legitimacy is a matter of degree.”45 It scales along a spectrum and has both positive and negative dimensions. 46 One end of the spectrum is high positive legitimacy. Beyond this point, a base of norm adoption shifts from a sense of obligation to subconscious or unconscious habit.47 The spectrum also includes the negative side of legitimacy. Thus, the other end of the spectrum is high negative legitimacy (or illegitimacy). The middle point is the lack of both positive and negative legitimacy (see Figure 2.1). It is clear that legitimacy should be inferred independently of state adoption or defiance of norms. If it is inferred from adoption or defiance, the explanation of this causality becomes tautological. 48 Since legitimacy is related to a subjective sense, we can use the Weberian

Negative Legitimacy

Habit High

Figure 2.1

Legitimacy spectrum

Positive Legitimacy Low

0

Low

Habit High

12


method of Verstehen, the empathetic identification of subjective meanings. 49 It has an affinity with neoliberalism, which deals with ideas as beliefs held by individuals in a rationalist way.50 As Goldstein and Keohane rightly point out, however, “Unless the interpreter’s judgments are evaluated according to systematic standards for assessing the quality of inferences, they remain only the personal view of the observer. After all, we do not observe beliefs directly; we observe only claims about beliefs and actions presumably based on beliefs.”51 It is worth noting here political theorist David Beetham’s contrastive argument: rather than assessing people’s belief in legitimacy, social scientists should make a judgment about legitimacy against criteria that exist in a particular society at a particular time. 52 As Beetham admits,53 his argument is akin to the Winchian idea that “the order in the minds of the actors is to be traced by identifying the rules which guide their thoughts and actions.”54 Legitimacy, like emotion, derives from subjective experience that also has intersubjective or cultural components.55 Since this research focuses on the legitimacy perceived by state actors such as politicians and bureaucrats, its main aim is not to make my own judgments about norm legitimacy.56 A “legitimacy in context” approach, however, is still valid for this empirical study because state actors are embedded in a social context. Social science is “interpretive in a double sense”: the social scientist interprets “the self-interpretation of the human beings under study.”57 We can vicariously infer the legitimacy perceived by state actors, by analyzing a social context that enabled them to interpret the legitimacy in the first place. I seek to “understand” the legitimacy of international norms as perceived by state actors in order to “explain” the effect of the norms on state behavior. I take the position that “understanding” and “explanation” are compatible58 (see Figure 2.2).

A Social Context

Understanding

Norm Legitimacy Figure 2.2

Explaining

A “legitimacy in context” approach

State Behavior


Three forms of social influence A context consists of both structure and process. As Alexander Wendt reminds us, meanings “arise out of interaction.” 59 This point is important since legitimacy is the normative meaning of a norm. Interaction constructs a social context in which people make sense of the world, including legitimacy, and thus affects their behavior. Before explaining three sources of legitimacy, I here describe three causal mechanisms through which social interaction such as collective legitimization influences state behavior. Drawing upon the social psychology literature on conformity, I pay attention to three forms of social influence: normative, informational, and referent informational influence. 60 Social psychologists traditionally give attention to the first two forms, although various scholars use different terms.61 John Turner challenges the dichotomy and adds the third form of social influence, which contributes to the development of social identity theory. 62 Normative influence “is rooted in the individual’s need for social approval and acceptance.” 63 Under normative influence, people conform to expectations with a fear of social sanction. 64 Normative influence results in “public compliance” without “private acceptance,” or internalization. 65 The vehicle of normative influence is group pressure, which is a utilitarian base of compliance. Social punishments such as censure and rejection or social rewards such as praise enter into the cost–benefit calculus of cooperation. Under this type of influence, individuals are most likely to comply when their actions are kept under surveillance. Moreover, the strength of backpatting or opprobrium is usually proportional to the importance of the audience and to the number of those who applaud or criticize. 66 Most constructivists, who are interested in the state of internalization and the logic of appropriateness, fail to pay sufficient theoretical attention to normative influence.67 Action under group or social pressure is based on the logic of expected consequences. Jeffrey Checkel points out that some norms are “internalized first by individuals through a socialization and learning process,” while other norms are institutionalized “at a higher level of aggregation, through bureaucratic and legal processes that affect society as a whole.” 68 When legalization or bureaucratization precedes internalization, actors may comply with norms publicly but not necessarily accept them privately. 69 Moreover, the pace of internalization may vary across people. Suppose that a norm affects interests

14


and identities of the majority of group members but not of every member in a society. In this case, the minority of group members is under social pressure and they may comply with the norm without internalizing it. They are “rational actors operating in a normatively institutionalized international (and domestic) environment.” 70 To the minorities under social pressure, a norm takes on “public legitimacy,” which means the belief by an actor that people other than him or her believe that a norm ought to be obeyed. Social pressure presupposes the prescriptive quality of norms, or legitimacy. Of course, we cannot deny the possibility that some states may criticize the defiant states because they fear that they will be also criticized for not criticizing the defiant states. Ultimately, however, “some sanctions must be performed for motives other than the fear of being sanctioned” since sanctioning is constantly costly while the cost of being sanctioned for failing to sanction those who fail to sanction those who fail to sanction . . . is close to nil.71 As H. L. A. Hart puts it, “if a social rule is to exist some at least must look upon the behavior in question as a general standard to be followed by the group as a whole.”72 The second form of social influence is informational influence, which is based on the need to know what is “right” or to validate their beliefs, perceptions, judgments, and so on. People conform to informational influence because they believe that the information provided is of value to guide their thinking and behavior. Informational inference leads to true cognitive change (private acceptance). Those who feel uncertain about the validity of their perception on a situation try to ascertain it through “social comparisons” with other group members. Thus, “the precondition for effective informational influence is subjective uncertainty, or lack of confidence in the objective validity of one’s beliefs, opinions and so forth, which cannot be directly resolved by objective tests against physical reality.”73 This type of influence is a social learning process such as arguing and persuasion, which has recently drawn some constructivists’ attention. 74 People under informational influence act on the logic of arguing. In the words of Thomas Risse, “Arguing implies that actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action.”75 Norms validated in communicative action may affect interests of actors. A major difference between normative influence on the one hand and informational and referent informational influence on the other is the degree of externalism76 or whether actors feel obliged to


comply (external pressure) or feel an obligation to comply (internal conviction).77 The logic of arguing is built on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, which presupposes empathy, a “common lifeworld,” and equal partnership.78 In the process of truth seeking, norms take on a sense of moral obligation, or “substantive legitimacy.” The third form of social influence is referent informational influence, which originates from “the need of people to reach agreement with others . . . (psychological ingroup members in the given situation),” or “psychological group belongingness.”79 This is a core concept of the social identity approach, which contends that when individuals identify with a group, they tend to conform to group norms. Referent informational influence produces the private acceptance of group norms. In this process, first, individuals identify themselves with a certain social category (“self-categorization”) or assign themselves a social identity (“social identification”). Second, they recognize norms of that categorical group. Third, they clarify their membership in that category by following the norms. People are most likely to conform to referent informational influence when their group membership is salient. Although constructivism focuses on this logic of social action, it fails to consider political obligation: that is, obligation as members of the political community.80 People under this type of influence comply with norms by the logic of appropriateness. Norms invoke a sense of political obligation, or “communal legitimacy.” They affect interests and identities of actors. In international relations, the ultimate source of political obligation lies in international society. Of course, the current society of states is neither the world community of human beings nor even the global community of states in the strict sense that members of a community shares identity and culture.81 Nonetheless, international society in Hedley Bull’s sense exists: “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.”82 A communitarian logic of obligation can be found in the international society approach of the so-called “English School” or “classical constructivism” as Timothy Dunne calls it.83 Political obligation is also similar to what legal scholars Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Franck call “associative obligation” and “status-based obligation” respectively.84 Considering their state a member of the society, state actors hold a sense of procedural obligation when they believe that the norm “has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process” or what H. L. A. Hart calls

16


“secondary rules” of international society: rules about rules and rule making. 85 It is important to note here that a new rule that is in accordance with procedural rules is legitimate even to the states that did not commit themselves to the rule. 86 As Franck puts it, “obligation derives not from nations’ [own] consent but from their status as members of a community of rules.”87 It should be noted here that international society is qualitatively different from ordinary groups. States can make a relatively easy choice to join or leave ordinary groups such as small international organizations by calculating instrumentally. On the other hand, it is normally unthinkable to leave international society. As Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger claim, the long-term benefits accrued by belonging to international society are “interests of a very special kind” that go beyond a simple rationalist account. “The interest that states have in the international society, where a set of basic norms such as the respect for sovereignty and the binding nature of treaties are taken for granted, is a necessary one: for without an international society there would be no sovereign states.” 88 Similarly, Franck elaborates on status-based obligation as follows: “Though states’ compliance with the rules may be voluntary, states’ obligation to them is not. Nations, or those who govern them, recognize that the obligation to comply is owed by them to the community of states as the reciprocal of that community’s validation of their nations’ statehood [emphasis in original].” 89 For most states, international society is much more than a means to maximize their interests.

Three sources of legitimacy A social context includes the ideational structures of: social consent; existing principles, norms, and rules;and roles and social categories. 90 In this context, actors perceive the legitimacy of emergent norms. I pay special attention to three sources of legitimacy: the formal consent to emergent norms expressed by states; ideational consistency and inconsistency between emerging norms and existing legal rules, moral principles, and scientific views; and intergroup relationship between norm promoters and target state actors. Expressed consent The scale of expressed consent to an emerging norm at the time of collective legitimization affects the legitimacy of the norm.91 Inis Claude argues that the legitimacy of United Nations’ resolutions depends mainly on the size and composition of their supporters, the forcefulness


of their text, and the number of their repeated adoptions.92 For legitimacy, in particular, “the broadness of support is of paramount importance.” 93 I must admit here that it is difficult to determine “tipping or threshold points” for norm adoption in general and a priori. In this respect, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink make the interesting suggestion that state adoption of a new norm accelerates after “one-third of the total states in the system adopt the norm.”94 This “the more, the better” proposition contrasts well with a neoliberal argument, which holds that rule compliance is more likely to occur when the group sharing the rule is smaller.95 Based on game theory, neoliberals argue that a game played by a large number of players faces the difficulty of material sanctions. 96 This neoliberal argument is partial in that it does not take legitimacy into account. Collective legitimization exerts three forms of social influence on state behavior. First, consent expressed by a majority of states at an international conference may give rise to normative influence through setting standards of conduct for social approval and acceptance. It strengthens social pressure and thus public legitimacy even to those who do not believe privately that the norm ought to be obeyed. In this case, legitimized norms do not affect interests or identities of the actors who do not accept them privately. The actors, however, perceive legitimized norms to be prescriptive since the norms can justify social criticisms for deviant behaviors, which incur costs to the deviant individuals. Collective legitimization is likely to have a normative influence when norm defiance can be easily detected and when the audience is important and the number of those who backpat or shame is large. Second, expressed consent may also bring about informational influence. Collective legitimization often entails discursive communication of truth seeking. Even without verbal communication, however, the specific actions that publicly express consent have informational value to those who feel uncertainty about the validity of a norm. Individuals tend to become confident about the validity if many others agree with them. This process is called “consensual validation.” 97 Collective legitimization with a high degree of support may invoke a sense of moral obligation. In this case, expressed consent increases substantive legitimacy. Legitimized norms do affect interests of actors. Collective legitimization is likely to exert an informational influence when state actors are not sure about the legitimacy of a norm. Third, consent expressed by many states in international society may exert a referent informational influence. Through collective legitimization in accordance with procedural rules and with a wide range of support in

18


international society, an emergent norm becomes a norm of international society and provokes social identification as members of the society. In this case, expressed consent increases communal legitimacy. Legitimized norms do affect interests and identities of actors. The strength of communal legitimacy varies in accordance with the degree of support in international society. It is arguable that a norm has a high degree of legitimacy when collective legitimization reminds state actors of the existence of international society. From these perspectives of social influence (for a summary, see Table 2.1), the United Nations deserves special attention. It can have each form of social influence on state behavior. It can offer social approval, the validation of beliefs, and a sense of belonging to international society. Claude notes the special position of the United Nations in international society: the prominence of the United Nations in the pattern of international organization and its status as an institution approximating universality give it obvious advantages for playing the role of custodian of the scale of international approval and disapproval. While the voice of the United Nations may not be the authentic voice of mankind, it is clearly the best available facsimile thereof, and statesmen have by general consent treated the United Nations as the most impressive and authoritative, instrument for the expression of a global version of the general will.98 Moreover, the special position of the United Nations within the society of states depends not only on the large number of its members, but also on the United Nations Charter. The Charter constitutes important principles of international society and the United Nations’ roles in recognizing states and governments and conferring legitimacy on new international principles and norms, for example, by adopting resolutions at the General Assembly. 99 In short, it is conceivable that the adoption of a resolution by consensus (or an overwhelming majority)100 at the United Nations highly legitimizes the norms contained in the resolution. Ideational consistency State actors perceive an emerging international norm legitimate or illegitimate by interpreting it in reference to its consistency or inconsistency with existing legal rules, moral principles, and scientific views. 101 Franck focuses on “coherence” between a rule and the underlying rules of international society as an indicator of legitimacy.102 Some political

Social approval and acceptance Sanction Group pressure Public compliance Surveillance Expected consequences Public Social pressure None Standard-setting

Logic of social action Type of legitimacy Base of norm adoption Construction of agents

Collective legitimization

Normative influence

Three forms of social influence

Object of need Source of influence Vehicle of influence Reaction Precondition

Table 2.1

Consensual validation

Arguing Substantive Moral obligation Interests

Validation of beliefs Informational value Social comparisons Private acceptance Subjective uncertainty

Informational influence

Social identification

Appropriateness Communal Political obligation Interests and identities

Group belongingness Group norms Self-categorization Private acceptance Salient group membership

Referent informational influence

19

20


scientists take a similar view.103 Since a new norm is uncertain, state actors call upon analogies to judge the norm’s “ought-ness” by comparing it to existing prescriptive norms whose positive legitimacy the state actors have already acknowledged. From a cognitive psychological perspective, humans are “cognitive misers” and process new information through metal structures such as analogies and schemas.104 A new norm invokes a sense of obligation if it is linked to established legal rules and moral principles. Conversely, to the extent that a new norm contradicts existing principles, norms, and rules, it is considered illegitimate. In this case, the state actors interpret a new norm not by analogy but by contrast. In addition, if a causal logic has something to do with a norm, its legitimacy also derives from its consistency with non-normative, scientific views. Take, for example, a norm of reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide in order to alleviate the problem of global warming. The scientific legitimacy of the norm is low when no one believes that the emission of carbon dioxide causes global warming. As Beetham puts it, “Scientific theories are logically incapable of generating normative principles on their own yet the prestige of science in the modern world is such that it is often appealed to as an authoritative source for rules of social organization.” 105 It is important to note here that different states often perceive the legitimacy of a particular norm differently. This is because state actors interpret international norms in the context of domestic ideational structure as well. 106 Indirectly, domestic ideational structure affects the interpretation of the existing international ideational structure that state actors consciously or unconsciously use to evaluate an emerging international norm by analogy and by contrast. To borrow the phrase of Jeffrey Checkel, state actors feel a higher degree of legitimacy toward an international norm when “a cultural match” exists with the existing domestic ideational structure. Domestic norms and values constitute complex ideational structure. Checkel argues that “cultural matches vary across issue areas.” 107 More narrowly, Elizabeth Kier holds that “The culture of an organization shapes its members’ perceptions and affects what they notice and how they interpret it; it screens out some parts of ‘reality’ while magnifying others.” 108 I focus on the culture collectively held by state actors in a particular issue area. The culture of policymaking includes a set of basic assumptions, values, norms, and identities that shapes collective understandings. In short, international norms gain legitimacy or illegitimacy in relation to existing ideational structures both at the international and the domestic levels.


It is also conceivable that state actors cannot link an emerging norm to ideational structures and perceive its legitimacy to be ambiguous. In this case, it is easier for norm promoters to exercise an informational influence and to affect substantive legitimacy. As Finnemore and Sikkink put it, “the meanings of any particular norm and the linkage between existing norms and emergent norms are often not obvious and must be actively constructed by proponents of new norms.”109 Similarly, Richard Price argues that a new norm prohibiting antipersonnel land mines gained legitimacy because transnational NGOs successfully “graft” it onto the existing norms of noncombatant immunity (or discrimination) and of chemical weapons prohibition. 110 On the other hand, causal beliefs “derive authority form the shared consensus of recognized elites.” 111 Peter Haas and other scholars focus on a group of such recognized elites as an “epistemic community” – a network of specialists who share principled and causal beliefs as well as notions of validity and a common policy enterprise. 112 Since epistemic communities are often considered authoritative, their causal beliefs are often viewed as facts intersubjectively. Thus, epistemic communities can construct part of transnational ideational structure. 113 Intergroup relationship An intergroup relationship between norm promoters and target state actors affects the latter’s sense of the legitimacy of a promoted norm. In the process leading up to collective legitimization, state and non-state actors such as governments, NGOs, and international organizations promote a certain international norm in interaction with others. Such an interaction clarifies the intentions of norm promoters. Following the logic of constructivism, I argue that social interaction influences the legitimacy of a norm, through provoking a sense of type, role, and collective identities.114 First, interaction between actors sharing some characteristics may invoke a sense of type identities such as cultural identities. A norm promoted by culturally different states may remind actors of state identities that are inconvenient to the norm. For example, the imposition by Christians of a norm on the Muslims may invoke their Islamic identity, which in turn makes it more difficult for them to accept the Christian norm. Second, interaction may produce role identities such as friend and enemy. 115 In a friendship relation, state actors tend to see a promoted norm positively. In an enmity relation, on the other hand, state actors tend to see the norm negatively. Third, interaction may invoke a sense of collective identity, which builds on type and role identities. When people share some type identities and have internalized the role

22


of friend with others, they come to have a sense of collective identity with them. Similarly, social identity theory in the social psychology literature suggests that when actors identify with a group, they tend to conform to the norms of the group, but when actors “dis-identify” with a group, they tend to violate the norms of the group. 116 Categorization of “others” enhances stereotypes and prejudices. When tension exists between an in-group and an out-group, moreover, such social categorization increases a sense of enmity toward “others.” 117 Such a relationship increases the chance of norm defiance. In this case, it is difficult for norm promoters to exert an informational and a referent informational influence and to increase legitimacy. Stereotypes, prejudices, and enmity reduce receptivity to norm promoters’ arguments and prevent target state actors from having a sense of state identity as members of international society. In addition, three related points about intergroup relationship should be noted. First, identification and disidentification may be the selfreinforcing processes. Collective identification promotes a sense of trust toward “fellows.” As Adler and Barnett put it, moreover, “the development of trust can [in turn] strengthen mutual identification.”118 By contrast, an enmity relation can easily enter a vicious circle. Once the relationship of enmity is established, norm promoters and target state actors are expected to evaluate each other’s intentions more negatively, which leads to harsher interactions and consolidates enmity further. 119 Second, strategies for norm promotion may have the opposite effect to what was intended. Norm promoters often strategically isolate defiant states by labeling them as “villains” for two reasons. First, this strategy can create social pressure on the defiant states in international society. Norm promoters would categorize norm followers and non-followers as “good” and “evil.” Second, it can also increase solidarity among norm supporters by emphasizing difference between “us” and “them.” This strategy, however, may backfire by increasing enmity. A sense of enmity would arise in such a mirror image. Finally, the attempt to impose a “foreign” norm may give state actors an opportunity to construct the state’s “unique” national identity and culture so that they can justify their refusal of a “foreign” norm. If this is the case, states are less likely to adopt such “illegitimate” norms. Crude propositions To sum up, legitimacy is a social construct as well as a subjective sense of obligation. I focus on the social context in which state actors interpret


the legitimacy of international norms, drawing mainly on constructivist approaches in international relations and social psychology. Now I propose that states are likely to adopt a collectively legitimized norm under the following conditions: first, when the states that voted in favor of its legitimization constitute more than one-third of the total states in international society; second, when the norm is consistent with legal rules, scientific views, and moral principles; third, when the states have a cordial relationship with norm promoters. In addition, to understand the independent effect of legitimacy on state adoption, we need to examine the effect of other factors by utilizing the perspectives of realism and liberalism. From these perspectives, I also propose that states are likely to adopt a collectively legitimized norm when they are coerced by powerful states or when they are under strong political pressures from societal actors in favor of the norm.120 Three causal mechanisms through which collective legitimization influences state behavior may or may not operate together. It is important to separate them out because the separation “will help point to how durable pro-social conformity is over time and what kinds of institutional designs are most conductive to this durability,” as Alastair Johnston puts it.121 A critical question, then, is under what conditions collective legitimization is more likely to have a particular form of influence. It can be assumed that “different causal mechanisms may operate under different conditions.” 122 I pay attention to the perception by norm takers of legitimacy before collective legitimization in terms of ideational consistency and intergroup relationship. First, informational influence is the most likely mechanism in the case of ambiguity in ideational consistency and a cordial relationship with norm promoters. In this case, norm promoters can make a great impact on target state actors and the target state actors are not expected to show reluctance to accept a norm. Second, normative influence, which results in public compliance without private acceptance, is the most likely mechanism in the case of ideational inconsistency and a cordial relationship with norm promoters. Ideational inconsistency makes it hard for actors to internalize the emergent norm; a cordial relationship with the norm promoters increases the cost of social criticism since it is the norm promoters who tend to criticize defiance after collective legitimization. Under this type of influence, moreover, individuals are most likely to comply when their actions are kept observable to other people. Finally, referent informational influence is the most likely mechanism in the case of ideational consistency and a hostile relationship

24


with norm promoters. Ideational consistency promotes internalization; and criticisms from hostile actors do not incur much social cost, which reduces the possibility of normative influence. Furthermore, a strong sense of membership in international society is a precondition for referent informational influence. It is here worth noting March and Olsen’s argument that “When identities and their implications are clear but the implications of preferences or expected consequences are not, the logic of appropriateness tends to be more important.”123 In this case, a sense of obligation may be a more efficient substitute for complex calculations of social costs and economic benefits (for example, the protection of an industry by defying an international environmental norm).

Research methods Although I also use an interpretative approach for the analysis of legitimacy, I, like most rationalists and many constructivists, accept the possibility of gaining objective knowledge of the world and do not agree with relativist epistemology or anti-positivism. 124 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie argue that the “intersubjective” ontology of regimes and norms contradicts an “objective” positivist epistemology, and thus needs a more interpretive epistemological approach. They give a reason: “actor behavior has failed adequately to convey intersubjective meaning.” 125 They raise two methodological problems related to treating norms in a “scientific” positivist way. First, the effect of a norm on state action is not decisive. Second, behavioral violations of a norm alone do not necessarily mean that the norm was refuted or invalidated. The empirical works of Kratochwil and Ruggie, however, do not completely replace a behavioral cum positivist approach with a radical interpretivist one totally denying empiricism and behaviorism. 126 They contend that a positivist epistemology is not wrong, but that it is insufficient for studying norms.127 Similarly, this research “privilege[s] ontological concerns over epistemological problems.” 128 I observed social practices (including texts and verbal behavior but excluding the norm adoption or rejection to be explained) in order to infer the three structural elements of the social context that constitute the legitimacy of international norms. According to an interpretative approach, intersubjective meanings and social practices should be inferred from each other. The “hermeneutic circle,” however, is not tautological because the relationship between them is not causal but constitutive. 129


I relied on several data sources. First, I used the records of voting behavior at international organizations and the texts of resolutions and decisions. Second, I also referred to legal documents and scientific reports, although there was the possibility that the text might not exactly reflect legal and scientific collective understandings.130 I inferred moral principles from social discourse. Third, intergroup relationships were inferred from the exchange of words between norm promoters and target state actors. I attempted to make an analytical distinction between the subjective nature of personal perceptions inferred from intensive interviews as well as recorded reflections on one hand,131 and the “intersubjective” ontology of norms and legitimacy on the other. 132 In order to decide whether a subjective perception reflected intersubjective understandings and expectations, it was also necessary to determine from other sources whether the viewpoint had been collectively held or not. In addition, documentary sources were supplemented by a small number of intensive interviews with participants in the policymaking process and close observers to uncover factual information and to document their interpretations of expressed consent, ideational consistency, and intergroup relationship. The interviewees include government officials, representatives of trade associations and environmental NGOs, and academic and non-academic experts. In the interviews, anonymity was assured to encourage interviewees to speak unreservedly. This book employs a case study method that traces the processes by which wildlife preservationist norms terminated or failed to terminate three of Japan’s economic practices between 1987 and 1992. 133 More specifically, it deals with Japan’s responses to three emerging prohibition norms against driftnet fishing, scientific whaling, and international trade in African elephant ivory. This case selection has several merits. First, all of the norms were related to Japanese economic activities that drew harsh environmental criticisms from abroad. Although I basically employ a single-country research design centering on Japan,134 this case selection enables me to make comparative studies among similar contemporary cases that share the same type of explanatory variable for state behavior: the legitimacy of wildlife preservationist norms. Second, the focus on prohibition norms, rather than mere regulatory norms, facilitates explicit examination of the effect of norms on state behavior. 135 Third, this book takes up two cases of norm adoption and one case of norm defiance. Although Japan initially contested all three of the prohibition norms, it adopted the two norms against the ivory trade and driftnet fishing by the end of 1991. On the other hand, Japan has continued to kill minke

26


whales for scientific purposes. As Kowert and Legro put it, “in order to understand how norms work, studies must allow for more variation: the success or failure, existence or obsolescence of norms.”136 Comparison between similar cases contributes to literal replications, while comparison with contrastive cases leads to theoretical replications.137 Finally, the period under examination corresponds to a time of stable domestic politics, before the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) went out of power in 1993. The LDP’s 38-year dominance greatly influenced the Japanese political process.138 In the analyzed period, this important factor was largely invariable. A change of government was not the reason for the policy changes. Some readers might raise the question: What about other cases? 139 This book focuses on the rather narrow issue area of wildlife protection. As for this choice, the reader might feel that the study should involve more cases, at least from other global environmental issues. For example, environmentalists and some developed countries also denounced Japan for its alleged contribution to the destruction of the tropical rain forests and for the environmentally negative impact of its direct investment and official development assistance (ODA) activities abroad. 140 In addition, the stabilization of carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions as a way to alleviate global warming has attracted political and media attention as one of the most serious global environmental issues. Nevertheless, no prohibition norms emerged from these issues. On the other hand, a prohibition norm against the use of ozone depleting gases such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is a possible addition to this study since it emerged around the same period and has affected Japan’s production and consumption of the gases. This case is omitted, however, to focus on the conservationist–preservationist debate: whether people should conserve wildlife species for their continued use as resources or preserve every single animal due to its own intrinsic value. In any case, it is not my intention to derive valid generalizations about Japan’s global environmental policy. The intention is to contribute to theory generation, rather than theory testing, on the effect of collective legitimization on state behavior. The relatively small number of cases in the study can be justified by giving priority to detail over generalization. In other words, this book conducts “plausibility probes” and “heuristic case studies,” as categorized by Harry Eckstein. 141

3 Wildlife Protection and Japan

Before moving to the case studies of driftnet fishing, scientific whaling, and international trade in African elephant ivory with a focus on the period from 1987 to 1992, it is beneficial to look at the wider context of international wildlife protection and Japan’s action and inaction in this issue area. In this chapter, I first describe three international regimes on high seas fishing, commercial whaling, and trade in endangered species and Japan’s attitudes toward them. Then, I discuss the conservation principle of the wildlife protection regimes and explain the process by which Japan came to respect that principle.

Wildlife protection regimes After World War II, several international treaties emerged to deal with the loss of wildlife species. In 1946, for example, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) was adopted. The politicization of the environment at the interstate level from the 1970s onward spurred the development of wildlife protection regimes. The international conventions on wildlife protection adopted after 1970 include: the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat; the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals; the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears; the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals; the Convention on the 1980 Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources; and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity. In addition, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 27

28


includes sections regarding the conservation of living resources in the exclusive economic zones and the high seas. Among these conventions, the rest of this section pays special attention to UNCLOS, the ICRW, and CITES, especially the sections on high seas fishing, commercial whaling, and trade in endangered species.1 Out of these broader regulatory regimes, three prohibition norms on driftnet fishing, scientific whaling, and trade in African elephant ivory emerged in the late 1980s. International regime on high seas fishing The freedom of the high seas was long considered an international customary law, and was first codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.2 The 1958 Geneva Convention was absorbed into the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982 as a comprehensive convention on the law of the sea. UNCLOS provides for the freedom of the high seas in Article 87.1: “The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.” At the same time, however, UNCLOS restricted the concept of the high seas in terms of the degree of freedom and of the geographical areas to which this freedom applied. First, the freedom of the high seas was subject to the conditions of conserving living resources, of preventing pollution of the marine environment, and of restricting the development of the “Area”: the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (Article 1.1 (1)). The restriction of the freedom of the high seas reflected an increasing awareness of the need to protect the global environment and an ongoing change in the fundamental concept of the high seas. The earlier notion that the high seas belong to no one (res nullius) began to shift toward the idea that high seas belong to all human beings (res communis).3 Part 12 (especially Articles 192, 194.5, and 197) of the UNCLOS documentation deals with the “protection and preservation of the marine environment.” Although Article 87.1 (e) includes “freedom of fishing” on the high seas, this provision is “subject to the conditions laid down in section 2”: that is, “Conservation and Management of the Living Resources of the High Seas” (Articles 116 to 120). Section 2 starts with Article 116 on the right to fish on the high seas, which stipulates that “All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: (a) their treaty obligations; (b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, in articles 63.2, and articles 64 to 67; and (c) the provisions of this section.” The rest of the provisions of section 2 include Article 117 on the duty of States to

Wildlife Protection and Japan

29

adopt, with respect to their nationals, measures for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas; Article 118 on the cooperation of States in the conservation and management of living resources; Article 119 on the conservation of the living resources of the high seas; and Article 120 on marine mammals in the high seas. As regards treaty obligations (Article 116(a)), a number of agreements have been concluded bilaterally, regionally, and internationally to regulate high seas fishing for certain areas and/or for certain kinds of fish stocks. 4 In 1952, for example, the United States, Canada, and Japan concluded the International Convention on the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific, which resulted in the establishment of the North Pacific Fisheries Commission for the management of major commercial species of Northeast Pacific, such as salmon, bottom fish, and squid. Another example is the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) for fisheries stocks in the South Pacific and off Oceania, which was formed in 1979 by South Pacific Forum (SPF) members including Australia and New Zealand.5 According to Article 116(b), the freedom of fishing is also subject to the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States with regard to the stocks and species that live both within and beyond the exclusive economic zones of coastal States. The stocks and species in question are straddling stocks (Article 63.2); highly migratory species such as albacore tuna and whales (Article 64 and Annex I); marine mammals in the exclusive economic zones (Article 65); anadromous stocks such as salmon (Article 66); and catadromous species (Article 67). As soon as Japan agreed on a total ban on driftnet fishing on the high seas in November 1991, a new issue related to high seas fishing came to light at the United Nations: the management of straddling stocks and highly migratory species. This concern resulted in the Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 6 Second, the geographical area of the high seas became smaller due to the emergence of the exclusive fishery zone and later the exclusive economic zone. Global yields of fish in 1990, some l00 million tons, were five times as much as in 1950, but most of this increase in yield occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. Throughout the 1970s, the growth rate of catches slowed down, due to a combination of overfishing, pollution (water, soil, and air), high fuel costs, inadequate equipment and facilities, and a lack of integrated production and marketing policies.7 Some fishery resources that were once considered inexhaustible became depleted. In order to protect fishery resources in their surrounding waters, coastal States began to extend their fishery jurisdictions to

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an area beyond and adjacent to territorial seas. In l976, the United States unilaterally established a 200-mile exclusive fishery zone under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Subsequently, many countries followed suit. Japan established an exclusive fishing zone in 1977. The concept of the fishery zone was absorbed into the wider concept of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the 1982 UNCLOS. According to Article 56.1, the coastal State has rights and duties including “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living”; and “jurisdiction . . . with regard to (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment.” Although this convention did not take effect until November 1994, some provisions such as Article 56 were widely observed as international customary law, as exemplified by the widespread adoption of the EEZ between 1976 and 1981. In 1983, the United States changed its fishery conservation zone into an exclusive economic zone.8 In response to the emergence of the EEZ, Article 86 defines the high seas as “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”9 The establishment of a number of exclusive fishery or economic zones during the latter half of the 1970s was a major reason for the reduction in the Japanese distant-water catch from a maximum of about 4 million tons during the early 1970s to around 2 million tons in 1982.10 Article 62 of UNCLOS provides that “the coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone . . . Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.” Although the annual catch quota of the United States that went to Japanese fishing boats peaked at 1,424,000 tons in 1981, the allocation dramatically decreased every year (to zero in 1988) in the “Americanization” process of fisheries in the US EEZ.11 Accordingly, Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs) such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan shifted their fishing operations from foreign EEZs to the high seas. 12 Japan’s total catch from distant-water fisheries remained stable at around 2.2 million tons from 1978. Although its yield decreased in foreign 200-mile zones, it increased on the high seas. The Japanese fish catch on the high seas increased from 410,000 tons in 1978 to 1,630,000 tons in 1988. 13 This shift included the increase of DWFNs’ large-scale driftnet fishing on the


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high seas. In December 1991, however, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 46/215, which banned the use of large-scale driftnets on the high seas because of its negative impact on fish, sea birds, and marine mammals.14 International regime on commercial whaling The 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) is “a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry” (the Preamble). Under the ICRW, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was set up in Cambridge, England.15 Until the early 1970s, the IWC employed the so-called Blue Whale Unit (BWU) system that set the annual quota of whales for catch, irrespective of stocks or species. In this system, two fin whales (Balaenoptera physalus), 2.5 humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae), and six sei whales (Balaenoptera borealis) were respectively counted as one blue whale, or one unit. The IWC set the quotas on the high side and used the Olympic or the “first come, first served” method. This regulation policy resulted in over-investment in the whaling industries, and in the over-hunting of larger species because they could produce oil more efficiently. From 1959, the BWU system allocated a quota to each whaling nation.16 In the 1961–2 season, whaling activity peaked at a catch of nearly 66,090 whales. In the 1960s, whaling states such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway began to phase out their pelagic, coastal, or both types of whaling.17 In the early 1970s, the “Save the Whale” campaign caught the public’s attention in many industrialized countries. 18 The decline in commercial whaling and the increase in public attention on whales gradually transformed the character of the IWC from a whalers club to a protection-minded club. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, convened at Stockholm in 1972, accelerated this shift. The Stockholm Conference adopted Resolution 33 calling for a ten-year moratorium (temporary ban) on commercial whaling: “It is recommended that governments agree to strengthen the IWC, to increase international research efforts, and as a matter of urgency to call for an international agreement under the auspices of the IWC and involving all governments concerned for a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling.”19 Among 130 nations, 54 voted for the moratorium, while three nations including Japan voted against it.20 Immediately after the Stockholm Conference, the United States submitted a moratorium proposal to the IWC, but the organization did not approve it. Instead, the IWC abolished the BWU system and set catch quotas for

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species and ocean areas. During the following two years, the United States continued to submit a moratorium proposal, but without success. In 1974, Australia proposed a compromise New Management Procedure (NMP), which was implemented in 1975. This new procedure was a scientific management method based on the concept of “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY). The NMP created three categories: initial management stocks, sustained management stocks, and protected stocks. 21 The adoption of the NMP symbolized the change that the ICRW regime had become more conservation-oriented than commercial-oriented. M. J. Peterson argues that it was around this time that “the epistemic community of conservation-minded cetologists only briefly enjoyed predominant influence over policy.” 22 In 1982, the IWC introduced a moratorium on all commercial whaling by amending the Schedule 10 of the IWC convention, the ICRW. The amended Schedule 10(e) stipulates that “Notwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10, catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero.” In response, Japan, together with USSR, Norway, and Peru, lodged an objection to the Schedule amendment. According to Article 5.3 of the Convention, a government that presents an objection to an amendment of the Schedule is not bound by that amendment. Thus, by lodging an objection to the amendment, Japan was made exempt from the amendment’s regulations. Japan did not recognize the legitimacy of the commercial whaling moratorium. The moratorium was adopted in contradiction to the prevailing scientific view. In 1972, the IWC scientific committee “agreed that a blanket moratorium on whaling could not be justified scientifically since prudent management required regulation of the stocks individually” and unanimously rejected a United States proposal for a commercial whaling moratorium. 23 The committee indicated that there were approximately 260,000 minke whales in the Antarctic Ocean.24 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) also opposed to the moratorium.25 The 1982 introduction of the moratorium by the IWC was not based on the recommendation of the scientific committee, either. 26 Article 5.2 of the ICRW provides that any amendments of the Schedule “shall be based on scientific findings.” Japan did not accept the scientific legitimacy of the moratorium.27 Moreover, Japanese policymakers believed that political maneuvering by the United States and environmental NGOs played a key role in the IWC’s adoption of the moratorium.28 In 1979, the United States again started its efforts to realize a whaling moratorium at the IWC. 29


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Anti-whaling nations and NGOs needed a three-fourths majority of the ICRW members to amend provisions of the Schedule attached to the ICRW (Article 3.2). They recruited new members with ease because joining only requires “a notification in writing to the Government of the United States of America” (Article 10.2 of the ICRW). NGOs allegedly brought some small, non-whaling developing nations into the IWC by paying their membership fees, in order to get the majority necessary for the moratorium. 30 In 1981, ten nations joined the IWC: India, St Lucia, Dominica, Jamaica, Uruguay, St Vincent, Costa Rica, the Philippines, Egypt, and Kenya; and five more in 1982: Monaco, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belize, Senegal, and Antigua and Barbuda.31 The number of member states jumped from 16 in 1978 to 39 in 1982. 32 In 1982, consequently, the group in favor of the commercial whaling moratorium attained a three-fourths majority.It was adopted by a vote of 25 in favor, seven against, and five abstentions. 33 After the achievement of the goal, the IWC became less important for many countries. In 1984, only 19 nations among the 39 members of the IWC paid a share of the expenses.34 Some politicians, bureaucrats, and journalists in Japan believed that the United States used the issue of whaling at the 1972 Stockholm Conference to divert world attention from the environmental problems it had caused, such as the use of dioxin in the defoliant Agent Orange by the US military in the Vietnam War and the dumping by the Pentagon of nuclear wastes into the ocean.35 Japan’s acceptance of the moratorium came under the United States’ threat of economic sanctions. Since the IWC lacked any enforcement powers, the United States “acted as the whaling commission’s policeman.”36 In 1983, the United States reduced the fishing quota for Japanese fishermen within the US 200-mile EEZ by more than 100,000 tons in protest to Japan’s objection to the moratorium.37 In April 1984, Japan and the United States reached an executive agreement on whaling. Behind this agreement lay the American threat of evoking the 1979 Packwood–Magnuson Amendment (to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act) to withhold all fishing quotas for Japan within the US EEZ, unless Japan accepted the moratorium on all commercial whaling. The Packwood–Magnuson Amendment stipulates that “once the Secretary of Commerce certifies that a country is diminishing the effectiveness of the ICRW, the Secretary of State must impose a sanction against that country. The sanction is an immediate reduction, by not less than 50 percent, of the country’s fishing allocation in the United States’ 200 mile fishery conservation zone [emphasis in original].” 38 Japan’s acceptance of American pressure was based on the rational

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calculation of the possible cost of being driven out of the US fishing zone. The yield from the US fishing zone, worth 130 billion yen and the employment of 12,000 people, was much bigger than the prospective benefit of continuing the condemned practice, which was worth 11 billion yen and employed 1300 people.39 Parental companies of Japan’s whaling company, Taiyô Gyogyô, Nihon Suisan, and Kyokuyô, had also operated in the US EEZ. 40 Japan’s decision maximized Japan’s interests in its fishing industry. Due to the executive agreement, the US Secretary of Commerce withheld certification despite the claim by environmentalists that Japan’s catch of sperm whales was in violation of an IWC zero quota. 41 In July 1986, Japan withdrew its opposition to the moratorium.42 Under the Japan–US agreement, Japan was allowed to continue pelagic whaling in the Antarctica until April 1987 (for minke whales) and coastal whaling until March 1988 (for sperm, minke, and Bryde’s whales). In 1987, the USSR and the Republic of Korea also ceased their whaling operations. 43 Japan did not wholly give up on whaling, as the IWC had decided to review the moratorium by 1990. Together with Norway and Iceland, Japan insisted that the IWC should partially lift the moratorium on all commercial whaling. These pro-whaling nations believed that it was possible to resume commercial whaling of certain kinds of whales in certain areas. To prove that the minke whales were sufficiently abundant for commercial whaling, Japan started scientific whaling of the minke whales in the Antarctic Ocean. Nonetheless, it became clear that the attempt immediately to lift the commercial whaling moratorium was virtually hopeless since the IWC was dominated by anti-whaling nations. In 1990, the IWC scientific committee estimated that there were approximately 760,000 minke whales in the Antarctic Ocean with the number increasing, and calculated catch limits at 4853.44 During the 1990 annual meeting held at Noordwijk, The Netherlands, however, the IWC shelved a review of the moratorium. The following year, the scientific committee recommended the adoption of a Revised Management Procedure (RMP) for the resumption of commercial whaling, but the plenary session rejected a proposal submitted by Japan, Iceland, and Norway for the early adoption and implementation of the RMP. 45 In 1992, moreover, the IWC demanded further that the resumption of commercial whaling presuppose the completion of the Revised Management Scheme (RMS). The scheme was a more comprehensive program including a fully effective inspection and observation plan.46 Pro-whaling nations perceived this further requirement as a “foot-dragging” strategy. 47 In 1993, Chairman Philip Hammond of


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the IWC scientific committee resigned in protest over the commission’s inability to adopt the RMS.48 As of February 2001, the IWC has not adopted the RMS. 49 In the meantime, Japan, Iceland, and Norway increasingly became dissatisfied with the IWC. In 1992, Iceland withdrew from the IWC and Norway announced that it would resume its commercial whaling of minke whales the next year. 50 In that year, Norway and Iceland established the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), which further reduced the legitimacy of the IWC. In a long statement at the end of the 1992 IWC meeting, Japan’s IWC Commissioner Shima Kazuo was quoted as saying that Japan would prefer to remain inside the IWC but, unless the IWC changed its basic policies, pressure from the Diet and angry fishermen to pull out would be irresistible. 51 Although the situation in the IWC has been against Japan,the nation has remained in the international organization. Japan seems to believe that it is in its interest to remain a member in the regime.52 First, the major purpose of the ICRW is not the preservation of the whales but “the proper conservation of whale stocks” and “the orderly development of the whaling industry” (the Preamble). The government of Japan agrees with both aims. 53 Second, the IWC is practically the only international forum to discuss scientific arguments on large whales. The Japanese government “had spent a great deal of effort and finance to monitor the dynamics of the minke whales in relation to the entire ecosystem of the Southern Hemisphere” and did not want to waste these efforts by withdrawing from the IWC. 54 In short, the IWC is the only organization through which the Japanese government can argue for the legitimacy of sustainable whaling. International regime on trade in endangered species The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), better known as the Washington Convention in Japan, was adopted in 1973 to control international trade in endangered and near-endangered wildlife species and their products by issuing import, export, and re-export permits. In the late 1980s, international trade in wildlife products was valued at four to five billion dollars a year. Almost one-third of the trade was considered illicit.55 The wildlife species under the control of the convention are listed in three appendices. Appendix I bans commercial trade in “endangered” items. By requiring export permits, Appendix II regulates trade in the items that are deemed to be at the risk of becoming endangered. Appendix III restricts trade in species that individual parties designate as domestically endangered

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species. As of June 1992, Appendices I, II, and III listed 527 items, 262 items, and 246 species, respectively. About 35,000 species are under the control of this convention.56 At the same time, this convention allows a party to enter a reservation concerning the listing of a species in the appendices. Entering such a reservation means, in effect, that the nation is not bound by the regulations relating to that species. When Japan ratified CITES, it made nine reservations to Appendix I and added five more by 1985, which made Japan the party with the largest number of reservations. 57 In 1984, a CITES seminar of the Asian and Oceanian countries adopted a resolution denouncing Japan for not observing the convention. This resolution was immediately followed by a request by the Duke of Edinburgh (the President of WWF) to thenPrime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to change Japan’s CITES policy. These events took Japan by surprise, and led to the establishment of the liaison conference of seven CITES-related ministries, and to the strengthening of import controls on endangered species, including an amended Import Trade Control Order under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.58 Despite these changes, foreign criticism continued. In the sixth conference of the parties to CITES in Ottawa in July 1987, many developing countries again voiced a call for Japan to withdraw its reservations. They believed that Japanese reservations were promoting the poaching and smuggling of endangered species.59 Under this international pressure, Japan revised its CITES policy again in 1987. Most notably, it amended the Import Trade Control Order to enact a Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.60 It also withdrew four reservations regarding the giant desert lizard (sabaku ôtokage) and the green sea turtle (ao umigame) in 1987 and the musk deer (jakô jika) and the salt-water crocodile (irie wani) in 1989.61 After the withdrawal in 1987, Japan’s reservations were outnumbered by those of Switzerland.62 In general, Japan was perceived as an inactive participant in the CITES regime. It was not until 1980 that the nation ratified the 1973 convention; Japan did not enact a domestic law to regulate the domestic distribution of endangered species until 1987. Japan was repeatedly criticized for its poor record of protecting endangered species throughout the 1980s.63 The strongest criticism that Japan received in this regime was related to its import of African elephant ivory.64 In October 1989, the seventh CITES conference banned the worldwide trade in African elephant ivory.65In the 1990s, however, Japan became a more active participant in the CITES regime. In 1992, Japan hosted a CITES conference at Kyoto. It withdrew three more reservations on the bengal


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monitor (indo ôtokage), the yellow monitor (aka ôtokage), and the live ridley (hime umigame), and announced “a policy of banning the import of hawksbill turtles [taimai] after 1993, to be followed by a withdrawal of its special reservation by July 1994.”66 Now, Japan has withdrawn all the reservations that it once held except for those applying to six kinds of whales (the fin, the sei, the sperm, the minke, the Bryde’s, and the Baird’s beaked whales). 67 The 1992 conference was attended by more than 60 Japanese NGOs (including some 20 industrial groups) as observers, due partly to the geographical advantage of the conference site. The 1992 conference offered Japanese environmental NGOs the first opportunity to experience a significant international meeting and to meet and exchange views with other NGOs located at home and abroad. The 1992 CITES conference in Kyoto enhanced public awareness of wildlife conservation issues.68

The conservation principle Concept For an analysis of wildlife protection norms, it is necessary to distinguish the principle of conservation from that of preservation. The debate between these two principles in the United States dates back to the early twentieth century, when a dam construction project was planned in Yosemite National Park. In the 1970s and 1980s, the debate again attracted much attention in the literature of philosophy.69 John Passmore defines conservation as “the saving of natural resources for later consumption” and preservation as “the attempt to maintain in their present condition such areas of the earth’s surface as do not yet bear the obvious marks of man’s handiwork and to protect from the risk of extinction those species of living beings which man has not yet destroyed.” 70 For pro-conservation Passmore, the need for conservation and preservation is based on the “purely instrumental value” of wilderness and species for humans. For him, the instrumental value includes economic, scientific, moral, recreational, and aesthetic aspects. Passmore has theoretical doubts about the “intrinsic value” and the “right to exist” of wilderness and species because these concepts in turn depend on unjustifiable “mysticism, primitivism, [and] authoritarianism.”71 This humancentered view is in stark contrast to a nature-centered view that has two variants: holism and individualism. J. Callicott, who represents the holistic approach, acknowledges intrinsic value in ecology, drawing from

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the land ethic advocated by Aldo Leopold.72 On the other hand, animal liberators and rightists, such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, employ the individualistic approach. The latter approach is more relevant to the analysis of the norms under the examination of this book. Singer and Regan, however, fail to justify the moral standing of individual animals. Drawing upon Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian argument, Singer advocates “animal liberation” through the abolition of “speciesism,” which he describes as discrimination against nonhumans. His main argument is that all species with the capacity for suffering deserve equal moral consideration. If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering – insofar as rough comparisons can be made – of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. So the limit of sentience (using the term as a convenient if not strictly accurate shorthand for the capacity to suffer and/or experience enjoyment) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this boundary by some other characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary manner.73 According to Singer’s utilitarian argument, it is acceptable for humans to treat animals as resources and even to eat them if the action does not incur pain, or if the action increases the overall utility for all species with sentience. Regan addresses this utilitarian weakness from a different perspective.74 Instead of utilitarianism and perfectionism, Regan focuses on the equality of individuals based on their equal “inherent value.” Individuals have inherent value if they possess: “beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiental life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests.” 75 From these criteria, it is apparent that Regan considers animals in a much narrower sense than Singer does: only “normal mammalian animals, aged one or more.”76


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In short, Regan argues that all animals with inherent value have an equal “right to respectful treatment.”77 Nevertheless, his theoretical ground of inherent value is not persuasive enough for many scholars because he merely insists that “If we do not make this postulate . . . we will be unable to account for our considered beliefs (our reflective intuitions) about when it is wrong to harm either moral agents or moral patients.”78 In the literature, attempts to accord rights to nonhumans based on intrinsic or inherent value have come to a deadlock.79 In 1980, the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), with the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), issued an influential report on nature protection entitled World Conservation Strategy, with the aim of helping “advance the achievement of sustainable development through the conservation of living resources.”80 This report lists three objectives of living resource conservation: “to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems (such as soil regeneration and protection, the recycling of nutrients, and the cleansing of waters),” “to preserve genetic diversity (the range of genetic material found in the world’s organisms),” and “to ensure the sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems (notably fish and other wildlife, forests and grazing lands) [emphasis in original].”81 These objectives are again supported by its sequel published in 1991 Caring for the Earth.82 Using these reports’ language as a guideline, I define the conservation principle as the sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems along with the maintenance of genetic diversity. I also associate the principle of preservation with animal rights and refer to the principle as the protection of individual animals as holders of intrinsic or inherent value and the right to life. Practice Since the end of World War II, wildlife regimes have developed under the conservation principle, which allows for sustainable utilization of wildlife species.83 The regulatory regimes of commercial whaling, high seas fishing, and endangered species trade are not exceptions. While the ICRW and CITES are clearly based on the conservation principle, UNCLOS requires more explanation. On one hand, Article 65 of UNCLOS recognizes “the competence of an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part.” Thus, although Annex I categorizes cetaceans as highly migratory species as well, the whales are exempted from the “optimum utilization” requirement for the species (Article 64).

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On the other hand, UNCLOS does not reflect the pure preservation principle, either. Although some people argue that whaling is no longer permissible since the whales are the common heritage of mankind, UNCLOS uses the phrase only to refer to the Area (“the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”) and its resources (Article 136). In sum, although UNCLOS incorporates a more ecological perspective than the ICRW, it does not go so far as to recognize the preservation principle. Animal welfare groups have long stressed animal rights and a moral need for the protection of individual animals of any kind, but they could hardly affect the evolution of international regimes on wildlife protection. In the 1970s and especially 1980s, however, some ecological movements took advantage of the politicization of the global environmental problem and pushed the cause of animal rights. 84 Riding a wave of green politics, environmentalists successfully made dolphins, whales, and African elephants symbols of global environmental degradation in industrialized countries. For environmental NGOs, such “lovely” symbols were effective in attracting new members and financial contributions. 85 As Andrew Hurrell reminds us, citing Hume: “the origins of many moral sentiments depended in the first instance on pragmatic and self-interested calculation.”86 They socially constructed the “bad guys,” such as whalers, ivory importers, and driftnetters, while they publicly applauded the “good guys” who supported their campaigns financially and organizationally. Arne Kalland gives an example of the contrastive cases that do not attract the attention of environmentalists: There are only a few hundred monk seal left; this species is victim of massive environmental degradation due to military activities and high population concentration around the Mediterranean with millions of tourists flocking to its beaches every year. In the case of the monk seal, it is almost impossible to identify the seal’s “enemy” and the economic and political forces effecting monk seal depletion are powerful and influential. Furthermore, there is no “face-to-face” confrontation between the monk seal and the killer, no dramatic deaths and no blood.87 In exchange for donations and other types of support, environmentalists sold “green images” to people, companies, and the governments of nations that neither conducted large-scale driftnet fishing and whaling, nor imported significant amounts of elephant ivory.88 It was easier for


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the campaigners to attack foreign rare practices and customs such as the diet of whale meat and the use of high seas driftnets and ivory seals. The environmental NGOs that made their appeals on a moral basis formed a transnational industry with political leverage.89 In 1991, for example, Greenpeace collected 175 million US dollars from 4.8 million members worldwide.90 With abundant financial resources, environmental NGOs exercised political influence by providing donations to politicians. The profitability of such protest campaigns can be illustrated by the size of financial contributions made by one of the principal campaigners, the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW). During the 1992 national election campaign in Britain, IFAW contributed £68,000 (ca. $100,000) to the Conservative party election fund. To gauge just how large this contribution was in the U.K. context, the 30 leading British industrial corporations contributed an average of about £42,000 each to the Conservative party campaign. The IFAW also contributed £100,000 to the Labour party that year, and a further £20,000 to the Liberal Democrats. The IFAW contribution to the Liberal Democrats was twice as large as the contribution made to that party by the Marks and Spencer retailing giant. 91 Donations to political parties and persuading members to vote for particular parties enhanced campaign organizers’ ability to exert potential political influence. This preservationist sentiment spread among the public and moved politicians in industrialized countries, as reflected in the following statement by the then US Vice President Al Gore. “To be sure, the deaths of some of the larger and more spectacular animal species now under siege do occasionally capture our attention.” 92 For politicians, it was politically attractive to strengthen their green reputations by criticizing foreign economic activities such as logging, fishing, and whaling. Japan was frequently targeted by such environmental campaigns and, consequently, Japan often reacted to such international pressures. Nevertheless, the application of the preservation principle to a few charismatic animals did not hamper the development of the conservation principle for at least two reasons. First, the rapid loss of species led to the recognition of genetic diversity as an important issue. A 1991 report Signs of Hope, which reviewed progress in the implementation of the recommendations included in the 1987 report Our Common Future, described the “depressing” state of the loss of species: “5 to 15 percent of the world’s species could disappear in the next thirty years, primarily

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in the tropics. If there are roughly ten million species on the planet – and scientists cannot even confirm that number; some think it may be as high as thirty million – that means a loss of 50 to 150 species a day.”93 This unprecedented rate of extinction is largely attributable to human activities: the direct destruction of natural habitats, hunting, the introduction of mammalian predators and competitors, pollution, and overfishing.94 In particular, the loss of habitats by destruction of tropical forests and coral reefs was rapidly reducing the level of biodiversity, which includes the variety of differing wildlife species and the mixture and range of genes.95 It became increasingly important to protect wildlife species, not only because they could be resources for food, industrial, and medical products, but also because they could offer the genetic resources necessary for the development of plant breeding and biotechnology.96 In addition, more people came to believe in the “moral, ethical, cultural, aesthetic, and purely scientific” value of biodiversity, quite apart from its value for human economic activities. 97 Second, the conservation principle gained more legitimacy from the development of the sustainable development principle in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The report Our Common Future, published in 1987, popularized the concept, which had been advocated previously, and defined the concept as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 98 The principle of sustainable development is a compromise between environmentalism and developmentalism for the coexistence of ecology and human societies. This concept has come under criticism, especially by those who believe that it still places too much stress on the necessity of economic growth for environmental protection.99 Nevertheless, this compromise was inevitable. Environmentalism without an emphasis on sound economic and social development would exert an adverse influence on ecology since poverty causes environmental degradation.100 Sustainable development became the theme of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The UNCED strengthened the conservation principle. At the conference, 155 countries and the European Community signed the Convention on Biological Diversity. The United States also signed the convention in June 1993. The Biological Diversity Convention, one of the most important documents of UNCED, is aimed at conserving species rather than preserving individual animals. The objectives of this convention (Article 1) are: “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising


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out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies.” Together with the Rio Declaration (Principle 2), the convention reaffirms that “States have sovereign rights over their own biological resources.” Moreover, Paragraph 17.46 of Agenda 21, another significant document of UNCED, provides that “States commit themselves to the conservation and sustainable use of marine living resources on the high seas.” In the UNCED process, New Zealand, one of the keenest opponents of commercial whaling, proposed that UNCED should call for the perpetuation of the commercial whaling moratorium. New Zealand was, however, isolated in the international conference, whose main theme was sustainable development, and thus the proposal was not taken into Agenda 21. Instead, the conference adopted Paragraph 17.47 that calls for the “conservation, management and study” of cetaceans at “the appropriate international organizations.” New Zealand argued that Paragraph 17.47 of Agenda 21 would support the current moratorium by reaffirming the special status of marine mammals. Nonetheless, the paragraph, which is a mere repetition of Article 65 of UNCLOS on marine mammals, was “characterized as quite harmless” by pro-whaling nations.101 Although the IWC, a small organization consisting of approximately 40 nations, adopted a more preservationist proposal submitted by France to establish an Antarctic whaling sanctuary in 1994 (Schedule 7(b)),102 it is not preservation but conservation that has been the norm in international society, including both developed and developing countries. It is arguable that the principle of sustainable development was widely accepted by governments and international organizations and became intersubjective and constitutive of international ideational structure.103 Worth noting is that the emergence of the sustainable development principle changed the definition of the global environmental problem. The global environmental problem no longer focused on the unique practices of a few countries but on the wide range of economic activities of all the countries. The global warming issue well illustrates this point. Japan’s wildlife protection policy It is also true that until the end of the 1980s, Japan did not pay adequate attention to conservation, as described in the above section on the wildlife protection regimes. The core of Japan’s domestic environmental policy was not nature conservation, including the protection of wildlife and primeval forests.104 OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan (1994) pointed out that “there is a gap between Japan’s stated policy objectives and the general trends over the past two decades: a decrease

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in natural forest, alteration of lakes, watercourses and coastlines and endangerment of many animals and plants.”105 Arne Kalland and Pamela Asquith argue that “While Japanese interpretation of nature have, in many people’s opinion, produced visual and literary works of unparallelled beauty, this aesthetic bears little relationship to an attitude or behaviour towards nature as a whole.”106 Japan’s report to UNCED states that “The basic idea of the Nature Conservation Law is that the natural environment should be correctly conserved . . . because it is indispensable to human health and cultural life.” 107 Japan’s environmental policy focused on technological solutions for industrial pollution problems caused by rapid economic growth. The issue of nature conservation received less political attention.108 As regards wildlife conservation at home in Japan, the Wildlife Protection and Hunting Law enacted in 1918 is still in effect. This law not only controls hunting and “harmful wildlife,” but also bans the capture of mammals and birds (including eggs) except game species, and establishes special and non-special wildlife protection areas.109 The Wildlife Protection and Hunting Law, however, was not effective enough to protect endangered species, as the government of Japan admitted in 1991 that “Owing to development and industrial activities, much of the wildlife that used to be seen closely is disappearing and more than a few species are endangered or extinct . . . the number of species or subspecies supposedly extinct in Japan is 20; endangered species or subspecies number 238. If animals that are not vertebrates are added, the number of endangered species or subspecies comes to over 600.”110 The Japanese were less concerned about endangered wildlife species than people in other developed countries. In a 1988 opinion poll, for instance, only 26 percent of Japanese expressed great anxiety, while 42 percent of Europeans did so in a 1986 survey.111 It was not until 1992 that the government additionally enacted the Law for the Conservation of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, which covers the domestic endangered species as well that have nothing to do with international trade. 112 Similarly, conservation was not initially given a high priority in Japan’s global environmental policy. Moreover, insufficient ecological concern in the globalization of the Japanese economy aggravated “living resource friction” between Japan and other countries, notably in log import, wildlife import, and fishing activities. Japan was the second biggest economy in the world (GNP: $2920 billion in 1989) with 123.5 million people (1990)113 in resource-poor islands. A sharp appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985 increased Japan’s purchasing


45

power of foreign products and resources.114 Between 1986 and 1991, moreover, Japan enjoyed the second longest postwar economic boom, later known as the Heisei bubble economy. Japan increased its imports of living resources, and extended its fishing activities on the high seas. Newsweek of May 1, 1989 quoted Campbell Plowden of the environmental activist group Greenpeace as saying that “My impression is that they will do whatever it takes to secure what they need.”115 For example, Japan was the largest importer of tropical wood, accounting for about a quarter of the world’s import, and of wood in general, accounting for about one-fifth of the world total. 116 Hanns Maull argues that “Perhaps the most conspicuous example of Japan’s shadow ecology has been the Japanese role in destroying tropical forests in South-East Asia.”117 Japan was the destination of about 50 percent of the timber exported from Malaysia and Papua New Guinea, and about 30 percent of the plywood exported from Indonesia.118 Although there has been no effective international regime for forest protection, Japan was singled out as the destroyer of tropical forests by environmental NGOs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 119 With regard to wildlife, Japan was the world’s top importer (in terms of per capita volume) of ivory, tortoise shell, alligator skin, orchids, cactus, and tropical fish as pets or as raw material for ornaments or medicine.120 For example, Japan maintained the world’s largest demand for ivory, which environmentalists tied to the dwindling number of African elephants in the 1980s. Japan imported 322 tons of unprocessed ivory in 1985.121 In fact, Japan’s ivory imports accounted for 40 percent of the global total.122 In 1989, as stated above, Japan became the prime target for environmental groups in the drive toward a total ban on the ivory trade under CITES. Similarly, Japan, which was the world’s biggest market for whale meat, came under pressure to stop whaling in any form at the annual meetings of the International Whaling Commission (IWC). 123 In 1989, Japan was the world’s largest importing nation of fish products; fish imports were valued at US $10,548 million.124 Japan was also the biggest fishing country in the world, accounting for 13.8 percent of the global fish catch in 1988.125 Japan allegedly jeopardized some fish resources in several ocean areas, including areas around Japan.126 Ishi Hiroyuki argues that the exclusive economic zones would not have been established if Japan had not plundered fishery resources all over the world. 127 In the area of fishing on the high seas, in particular, Japan’s practice of using large-scale driftnets was severely criticized because it risked depleting fishery resources and allowed incidental catches of marine mammals. During the third UN Conference

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on the Law of the Sea in the early 1970s, Japan was the only nation opposed to the concept of the EEZ. In other words, Japan wanted to keep high seas fisheries as free as possible. Although Japan signed UNCLOS in 1983, it did not replace its 200-mile fisheries zone with an EEZ until 1997. Moreover, whaling (including whaling for scientific research from the 1987/88 season) became a key part of Japan’s image as an environmental wrongdoer. The turning point in Japan’s environmental attitudes came in the early 1990s. First, Japan came to realize that the conservation and management of marine living resources was becoming increasingly necessary. The annual world fish catch started to decline from a record 1989 level at 99.6 million tons. 128 World Resources 1992–93 reported that “in the late 1980s, catches began declining in several major fishing areas. In 1990, the total global fish catch declined for the first time in 13 years. This situation may reflect natural fluctuations in fish stocks and a decrease in fishing effort dictated by conservation efforts, but overfishing, coastal habitat destruction, and water pollution may also be the cause.”129 This international reality led Japan to modify its official stance in the early 1990s. Japan had been the world’s leading nation in fisheries for many years. The Japanese annual fisheries yield constantly exceeded 10 million tons from 1972, and was about 12.8 million tons, valued at 2.7 trillion yen, in 1988. In 1989, however, the yield of the Chinese fisheries exceeded that of Japan, with the result that Japan fell from first place as the world’s leading fisheries nation. Moreover, the Japanese annual fisheries yield continued to decline between 1988 and 1991. In particular, a sharp decrease in distant-water fishing stands out: from 2.2 million tons in 1988 to 1.2 million tons in 1991.130 Similarly, the Japanese high seas fishery decreased from a peak of 1.63 million tons in 1988 to 1 million tons in 1990. Furthermore, in 1991, Japan faced a ban on salmon and trout fishing on the North Pacific high seas (from the following year), reductions in the central Bering Sea trawl fishing, as well as a driftnet ban.131 The Japanese government realized that the Japanese fishing industry would be driven out of the high seas if it continued to advocate “the freedom of the high seas” without considering the impact on fish resources. Japan shifted its high seas fishing policy from free operations toward proper conservation and management based on scientific data and equitable use by the countries concerned through international frameworks.132 Second, in order to take countermeasures against the development of the preservation principle for more species, Japan began to emphasize the conservation principle. Since the end of World War II, wildlife protection regimes had been based on the conservation principle. In the 1980s,


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however, more people in industrialized democracies became interested in preserving symbolic wildlife animals because they were deemed “intelligent” or “magnificent,” not because they were endangered. Japan reluctantly accepted a commercial whaling moratorium under the ICRW regime and a ban on international trade in African elephant ivory under the CITES regime. Both regimes were originally built on the principle of the sustainable use of living resources. Japanese officials believed that some species of the whale and elephants in some African countries were so abundant that they could be utilized on a sustainable basis for human consumption. The Japanese policymakers became cautious about the increasing sentimental imposition of preservationist values on Japan’s autonomy and its right to use such living resources. They started to stress the conservation principle partly because it was instrumental in resisting the diffusion of the preservation principle. Japan’s report to UNCED argued: It is believed that there are also some who have taken extreme positions, advancing arguments that do not conform to the spirit of Agenda 21, as they are not compatible with the idea of legitimate utilization of oceanic resources and securing a stable supply of food for the growing population of the world as it approaches the twentyfirst century. Such arguments lead to countries being denied the right to utilize available resources, for example, in restrictions being imposed on high-seas fisheries on the basis of inadequate scientific data, to a total ban on catching marine mammals, and the establishment of protective zones on the basis of inconclusive scientific data.133 Japan gave emphasis to the sustainable use of living resources based on science. Another reason for Japan’s acceptance of the conservation principle is that the concept matches the sustainable development principle that Japan has promoted since the latter half of the 1980s. Japan contributed to the publication of Our Common Future, the core tenet of which is sustainable development. Under Japan’s proposal to set up a special environmental committee at the special meeting of the UNEP Management Council held in Nairobi in 1982, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was established in 1984. In 1987, Japan hosted the final meeting of the WCED in Tokyo, which led to the publication of Our Common Future.134 In September 1989, Japan, together with UNEP, hosted the Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and Human Response toward Sustainable Development, at which participants

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from all over the world discussed the issues of global warming, tropical forest protection, and the environmental problems of developing countries. 135 Japan also became more active in the preparation of the 1992 UNCED as a sub-chair nation. In the UNCED process, emphasis was placed on the concept of sustainable development. This emphasis enabled Japan to make a realistic contribution by positioning itself between the developed and the developing countries as a state with the experiences of late industrialization and pollution control. In fact, Japan was highly regarded, especially among developing countries, for pledging the largest amount of additional environmental aid to these countries. 136 With an emphasis on the principle of sustainable development, Japan also came to accept the conservation principle.

Conclusion This chapter described the wider contexts in which Japan responded to the international norms to ban driftnet fishing, scientific whaling, and the ivory trade. I first explained international regimes on high seas fishing, commercial whaling, and trade in endangered species and Japan’s attitudes toward them. Then, I made two claims. First, the wildlife protection regimes developed under the conservation principle, not the preservation one. Second, Japan initially neglected but eventually came to accept the conservation principle due in part to the realization of the need to conserve and manage marine living resources, to its instrumentality in taking countermeasures against the development of the preservation principle for more species, and to its close link to the principle of sustainable development, which it had advocated since the latter half of the 1980s. Thus, it is arguable that the preservationist norms against driftnet fishing, scientific whaling, and the ivory trade did not match Japan’s conservationist ideational structures, which reduced the legitimacy of the international norms in the eyes of Japanese policymakers.

4 Case One: Driftnet Fishing

It took only the three years between 1989 and 1991 for international campaigns against large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing to phase out the 100-year-old Japanese practice on the high seas. Driftnet fishing was conducted globally, with albacore fisheries in the North Pacific, the South Pacific, and the Indian Oceans; the squid and salmon fisheries in the North Pacific; and fisheries for swordfish in the Mediterranean. 1 The driftnet fishing issue became the first case in the history of the United Nations (UN) in which Japan and the United States introduced conflicting draft resolutions to a committee of the UN General Assembly. 2 Eventually, in November 1991, Japan decided not to conduct large-scale driftnet fishing on the high seas from January 1993.3 Driftnet fishing is defined in a United Nations General Assembly resolution as “a method of fishing with a net or a combination of nets intended to be held in a more or less vertical position by floats and weights, the purpose of which is to enmesh fish by drifting on the surface of or in the water.” 4 This resolution points out that “large-scale” pelagic driftnets “can reach or exceed 30 miles (48 kilometers) in total length.” It also admits the importance of “small-scale driftnet fishing traditionally conducted in coastal waters, especially by developing countries, which provides an important contribution to their subsistence and economic development.” The resolution, however, fails to clarify the boundary between “large-scale” and “small-scale” driftnets. The 1989 Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific defines a long driftnet as “a gillnet or other net or a combination of nets which is more than 2.5 kilometers in length the purpose of which is to enmesh, entrap or entangle fish by drifting on the surface of or in the water” (Article 1(b)).5 This length became a standard for individual countries to ban the use of driftnets within their waters and by their 49

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nationals on the high seas. Australia, Fiji, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the United States adopted this criterion, and so did the European Community on October 28, 1991 despite strong oppositions from France.6 Fishermen used large-scale driftnets because the density of fish in the high seas is low. High seas account for 90 percent of the total ocean, but fisheries resources in the high seas are 10 percent of the total resources. 7 This chapter first describes the development of a prohibition norm against the use of large-scale driftnets (hereafter referred to simply as driftnets) on the high seas. Then, it attempts realist and liberal explanations as to why Japan accepted the norm. Finally, I focus on the legitimacy of the international norm in terms of expressed consent, consistency with the existing ideational structure, and intergroup relationship between the norm promoters and the Japanese policymakers in charge.

Norm building Driftnet fishing has a long history in Japan, but the introduction of the practice to the high seas was relatively recent. Japan conducted large-mesh driftnet fishing in its waters for tuna and tuna-like species for more than 100 years.8 In the process of shifting operations from the newly established foreign exclusive economic zones (EEZs) to the high seas, the driftnet fishing of flying squid (Ommastrephes bartrami) started on the high seas of the North Pacific in 1979. In the South Pacific region, commercial driftnet fishing for albacore tuna (Thunnus alalunga) began in 1982.9 The Japanese government placed the North Pacific squid driftnet fishing under a limited entry licensing system in 1981. Throughout the 1980s, the number of Japanese squid driftnet vessels in the North Pacific slightly decreased from 534 in 1981 to 457 in 1991. 10 In the South Pacific, on the other hand, the number of driftnet fishing boats from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea suddenly increased from 29 in total in the 1987–88 summer season to 126–96 (Japan: 65, Taiwan: 60–130, and South Korea: 1) in the next season.11 This sudden change in the South Pacific is attributable to “diminished access opportunities in the North Pacific” and “an apparent desire to make driftnet operations more profitable through year-round fishing,” accelerated by an increase in the price of albacore tuna. 12 First, directed fishery allocations to Japanese fishermen within the US 200-mile EEZ were completely phased out in 1988 when the Japanese fishing fleets for salmon and trout were excluded from the zone. 13 One of the reasons for the exclusion of the Japanese fleets was the understanding that their

Case One: Driftnet Fishing 51

nets caught marine mammals such as fur seals. 14 On the high seas in the North Pacific as well, regulative measures were introduced for the fishing of such species as cod and salmon. For example, salmon became increasingly protected as anadromous stocks, which return to the rivers where they were born.15 Article 66 of UNCLOS stipulates that “States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest in and responsibility for such stocks”; “Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in waters landward of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones.” Second, the North Pacific squid driftnet fishing was limited to a designated area in the North Pacific from June 1 through December 31. The northern boundary of the area was established to restrict the fishing to warmer waters where the incidence of salmon was minimal. 16 In the South Pacific, on the other hand, the albacore tuna fishing season stretches from November to March. 17 These factors at least quadrupled the number of driftnet fishing vessels in the South Pacific in the 1988–89 season. Moreover, the driftnets used by Japanese vessels became increasingly longer. The driftnets used by a Japanese vessel per night in the 1989–90 season ranged from 35 to 80 kilometers long with a 12 to 15 meter width.18 A prohibition norm on driftnet fishing originated from concerns about its impact on fisheries resources, particularly off the West Coast of the United States and Canada and in the South Pacific. UN General Assembly Resolution 44/225 notes that “the serious concern, particularly among coastal States and States with fishing interests, that the overexploitation of living marine resources of the high seas adjacent to the exclusive economic zones of coastal States is likely to have an adverse impact on the same resources within such zones.” American and Canadian fishermen pushed for a driftnet ban, contending that Asian driftnet vessels were catching US- or Canada-origin salmon before the fish came back to their territorial waters. 19 This concern pushed politicians to take countermeasures. US Senator Murkowski of Alaska (Republican) and US Representative Jolene Unsoeld of Washington (Democrat) introduced a bill seeking a worldwide ban on driftnets on the high seas.20 Murkowski argued that Japanese squid driftnet fleets were catching Alaska-origin salmon and steelhead trout on the high seas.21 On September 29, 1989, the United States Senate passed a resolution calling for a total ban on the use of large driftnets on the high seas.22 On the other hand, South Pacific island countries were equally concerned. Fisheries resources supported their economies. The annual tuna harvest from the South Pacific, which accounted for 45 percent of the world’s total supply, was worth more than one billion dollars. Domestic tuna fishing operations

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produced half of the GNP of the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands and other countries in the region saw the abrupt increase in foreign driftnet operations as a great threat to their fisheries resources, or “the most important renewable resources of the South Pacific.”23 New Zealand, a strong supporter for a ban on driftnet fishing, expanded non-driftnet, albacore tuna fishing operations in the South Pacific, from 330 tons in 1988 to 5161 tons in 1989.24 The albacore tuna fishery was economically important to New Zealand, Australia, and South Pacific island countries.25 The United States also had a great interest in the conservation of albacore tuna in the South Pacific Ocean, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Department of State stated that “tuna is the most important distant water fishery which we have.” 26 On October 31, 1989, the committee on foreign affairs in the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution calling for an immediate moratorium on driftnet fishing of albacore tuna in the South Pacific Ocean. 27 In 1989, driftnet fishing became an international political issue in the South Pacific. As early as November 1988, the first consultation on South Pacific albacore fisheries management in Fiji recognized a threat from driftnet fishing to the sustainability of the South Pacific albacore resource.28 In the 1988–89 season, Japanese and Taiwanese driftnet vessels allegedly caught around 35,000 tons of tuna, more than twice the sustainable yield of the fish stock.29 In the summer of 1989, Japan had no intention of reducing the practice of driftnet fishing. In a consultation on South Pacific albacore fisheries management in Fiji in June 1989, Japan refused a request from representatives of South Pacific countries to reduce its driftnet fishing operations.30 On July 11, 1989, the South Pacific Forum (SPF) meeting unanimously adopted the Tarawa Declaration calling for “a regime for the management of albacore tuna in the South Pacific that would ban drift net fishing from the region” and “deeply regretting that Japan and Taiwan have failed to respond to the concerns of regional countries about this most serious issue.”31 The Tarawa Declaration was also supported by such observers as the United States, Canada, France, and Britain, which left Japan isolated in the post-Forum meeting for nonmember aid donor nations.32 This denunciation of Japan at the SPF was a sharp contrast with the SPF joint communiqués of the previous years. The 1988 SPF communiqué expressed its appreciation for the increase in Japan’s ODA to 3.8 times more than five years before. 33 Japan, however, opposed the Tarawa Declaration, and instead promised to place the South Pacific driftnet fishing under a notification system from August, and to freeze its driftnet catch at current levels, pending a scientific study of the practice. 34


On September 14, 1989, Japan announced its first major concession with regard to driftnet fishing in the South Pacific. Japanese officials stated that they would dispatch research and monitoring vessels to the South Pacific, and limit the number of driftnet vessels in the 1989–90 season to 20 or less, the level that Japan used to maintain in the 1980s before a sharp increase to 65 vessels in the 1988–89 season.35 This concession, however, could not stop the evolution of an international norm against the practice. In the fall of 1989, the issue of driftnet fishing started to draw attention in various international organizations and conferences. They include the joint Assembly of the African Caribbean and Pacific States and the European Economic Community (ACP/EEC) at Versailles, France; the Commonwealth Heads of Governments’ Meeting at Kuala Lumpur; the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Conference at Rome; the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.36 In October, the 29th meeting in Guam of the South Pacific Commission (SPC), also became a regional forum to condemn the use of driftnets, and adopted a resolution endorsing the Tarawa Declaration without any objection from its members including the United States and the United Kingdom.37 In the meantime, the United Nations General Assembly became the main international forum for the driftnet fishing issue. In early October 1989, Japan attempted to persuade the United States not to submit a draft resolution calling for a moratorium on driftnet fishing to the United Nations, but this effort failed.38 In the UN General Assembly, the United States introduced a proposal on driftnet fishing on the high seas, with 11 cosponsors including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.39 On October 25, 1989, US Ambassador Armacost and NZ Ambassador Gates received official protest letters to their governments from Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Kano. 40 On November 2, Japan and the United States separately introduced draft resolutions to the Second Committee on Economy and Finance of the UN General Assembly. This was the first submission of conflicting draft resolutions between the two countries in the history of the United Nations.41 The Japanese draft proposed to introduce additional measures such as a moratorium only if scientific research admitted the need to employ such measures. Japan and the United States simultaneously negotiated for a compromise resolution while separately maneuvering to gain support for their respective resolutions. 42 As of November 17, Japan had secured one cosponsoring nation (a Caribbean country) and a few supporting nations; on the other hand, the United States had 15 cosponsors and numerous supporters.43 Japan eventually withdrew its resolution and agreed on

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a joint resolution that favored the initial US position, but also incorporated Japanese demands. In Japan’s favor, the cessation of driftnet fishing in the South Pacific was postponed until July 1, 1991.44 This joint resolution reflected a political determination made by Japan, the European community (EC), and the United States(particularly, the state Department) to avoid a full US–Japan confrontation at the United Nations. On December 22, 1989, the United Nations General Assembly passed by consensus Resolution 44/225 “Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas.” This resolution contains three important points: 1) a ban on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing activities in the South Pacific region by July 1, 1991 (Operative Paragraph 4(b)); 2) a review by June 30, 1991 of the best available scientific data on the impact of large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing, and agreement upon further co-operative regulation and monitoring measures (Operative Paragraph 3); 3) the imposition of driftnet moratoria on a regional basis by June 30, 1992 if “effective conservation and management measures” were not taken in time for the deadline, “to prevent unacceptable impact of such fishing practices on that region and to ensure the conservation of the living marine resources of that region” (Operative Paragraph 4(a)). 45 On July 17, 1990, Japan announced that it would cease driftnet fishing in the South Pacific beginning with the next fishing season (between November 1990 and March 1991). 46 The Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations stated that Japan has made this decision taking into account, in particular, grave concerns that the South Pacific islands countries still have with drift-net fishing in the region, as these countries, whose economic base depends, to a large extent, on marine resources, have strong intentions to develop the albacore fishery for their own economic development in the future, through this decision. Japan wishes further to promote good relations with the South Pacific island countries.47 The South Pacific was one of the few attractive fishing grounds left for the Japanese pelagic fisheries in general.48 Moreover, Japan needed support from developing countries at the United Nations for the continuation of the squid driftnet fishing.49 It timed the cessation in the South Pacific one year in advance of the date set by Resolution 44/225, in a desperate attempt to continue driftnet fishing in the North Pacific.50 Nevertheless, international efforts to extend the regional driftnet moratorium to a global scale quickly followed the adoption of Resolution 44/225.


These efforts were partially accelerated by the fact that Taiwanese driftnet boats expanded into the Atlantic and Caribbean area in 1990.51 The IWC annual meeting held in 1990 adopted a consensus “resolution in support of the United Nations General Assembly initiative regarding large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing and its impact on the living marine resources of the world’s oceans and seas.” 52 The other international organizations and meetings involved in this development in 1990 alone included: an expert consultation convened by the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) at Rome in April; the Council of the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO) in June; the 21st South Pacific Forum meeting at Port Vila, Vanuatu in July and August; the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Nairobi in August; the International Conference on the Conservation and Management of the Living Resources of the High Seas at StJohn’s, Newfoundland, Canada in September; the 66th session of the Fisheries Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in September; and a symposium and workshops sponsored by UNEP and other agencies in October; and the annual meeting of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) at Perth, Australia in December.53 These international developments in 1990 culminated in the 45th session of the UN General Assembly that reconfirmed the 1989 resolution on December 21 by adopting new Resolution 45/197.54 The 1991 session of the UN General Assembly was to decide whether to impose a global moratorium on driftnet fishing by June 30, 1992. In July 1991, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution requiring the government to work to halt driftnet fishing. 55 After the collapse of bilateral high-level administrative negotiations on the use of driftnets in Washington DC, the United States and Japan again separately submitted conflicting draft resolutions to the second committee of the UN General Assembly on October 11, 1991. The United States, with seven other nations, submitted a draft resolution (A/C.2/46/L.7) in support of a total ban on driftnet fishing by the end of June 1992. Japan alone sponsored another draft resolution (A/C.2/46/L.9), arguing that the reconfirmation of the 1989 resolution would be enough to address international concerns.56 On November 25, 1991, however, Japan and the United States reached a compromise agreement: Japan would halve the fishing capacity of its driftnet fishing on the high seas by the June 30, 1992 deadline set by the 1989 UN resolution, and it would curtail the remaining half by the end of 1992 for a global ban. On November 26,

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the agreement was endorsed by the Japanese Cabinet and was announced at home and abroad. On December 20, 1991, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 46/215, which was based on the US– Japan agreement. 57

Alternative explanations Material power of the United States In the process leading to the cessation of high seas driftnet fishing in the South Pacific, New Zealand played an important role. In November 1989, New Zealand hosted a conference in Wellington for the establishment of a convention called for by the Tarawa Declaration in order to create a South Pacific zone free of driftnet fishing. On November 24, 1989, the conference finalized the text of the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, known as the Wellington Convention. New Zealand, which “devoted substantial diplomatic and political resource to stopping the practice,” 58 enhanced its “green” identity by emphasizing ecologically negative aspects of driftnet fishing. The driftnet fishing issue also gave New Zealand a chance to act as a good neighbor of the South Pacific island countries, thereby enhancing its South Pacific identity, and a chance to improve its relations with the United States, which had been damaged by New Zealand’s antinuclear policy.59 This convention did not prohibit the nonparties from using driftnets on the high seas. The countries that immediately signed the convention were only New Zealand and a few others. Since the convention provides for restriction of port access and port servicing facilities for driftnet fishing vessels (Article 3.2(d)), however, the increase in the number of signatories would have made it extremely difficult to conduct driftnet fishing activities in the South Pacific.60 This convention entered into force on May 17, 1991. In October 1990, the two Protocols to the Convention were adopted with the aim of establishing a mechanism by which states outside the Convention Area could accept legally binding obligations with respect to driftnet fishing activities. Nonetheless, the United States took the lead in ending high seas driftnet fishing worldwide. In 1987, the United States started to negotiate with Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea about monitoring and regulating the squid driftnet fleets operating in the North Pacific beyond the US 200-mile EEZ. This negotiation was based on the Driftnet Control Act (the Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987), which would


apply the Pelly Amendment if the United States and driftnet fishing countries failed to reach adequate agreements by June 29, 1989. 61 The Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act provides that “when the Secretary of Commerce determines that a country is diminish[ing] the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program,” he must certify that fact to the President. The President, in his discretion, can decide whether or not to prohibit the importation of fish products into the United States from the offending country.”62 In 1988, Japanese driftnet boats were blamed for a sharp decrease in the salmon catch in Alaska and the North Pacific. 63 Although Alaskan fishermen predicted a catch of 40 million pink salmon in 1988, they actually caught only 12 million. 64 In May 1989, Japan agreed under pressure to allow Japanese, US, and Canadian observers to monitor their squid driftnet fleets.65 In the next month, Japan and the US reached another agreement to strengthen the monitoring and enforcement set forth in the previous agreement.66 Under the American pressures, Japan made small concessions little by little. In the 1990s, the United States demanded more by threatening to apply trade sanctions against Japan’s driftnet fishing on the high seas. Since the albacore tuna taken by Japanese fishermen is mainly canned and exported, US politicians called for the boycott of Japanese albacore tuna cans.67 The call was responded to by “some of the world’s largest sellers of canned tuna.”68 In November 1990, the US Congress enacted the Dolphin Protection Consumers’ Information Act (DPCIA), which obliged driftnet-fishing nations to issue official documents certifying that their fish exports to the United States were not caught by driftnets. Under this Act, the Commerce Department announced that the US government had recognized Japan, the Koreas, Taiwan, and France as “high seas driftnet fishing nations” on September 18, 1991. This announcement meant that the United States would impose an embargo on the fish imports from these countries that were caught with driftnets from July 1992 (partially from December 1991 for tuna and its processed products).69 At that time, Japan’s annual exports of marine products caught with driftnets were worth more than 1.5 billion yen. Nevertheless, the sanction had the potential of affecting all fish exports to the United States (worth nearly 40 billion yen), because it was difficult to certify that products such as canned fish were not caught with driftnets.70 Meanwhile, on August 1, 1991, the Senate passed the “Driftnet Moratorium Enforcement Act” requiring the President to impose extra tariffs on fish and other products from nations that continued driftnet fishing beyond the end of June 1992. This bill was pushed through by

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three Republican Senators from the Pacific Northwest: Bob Packwood of Oregon, Slade Gorton of Washington, and Ted Stevens of Alaska. The fishing industry in these states believed that it was being threatened by Asian driftnet fishing.71 In reality, however, it was difficult to implement trade sanctions against foreign fishing activities on the high seas. First, threats of such sanctions by the United States were not credible since the fish import embargoes to attempt to control foreign fishing activities on the high seas were inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).72 In response to US pressure, Japan considered filing a complaint with GATT.73 In the meantime, the international legitimacy of unilateral trade sanctions came before GATT in the case of a US ban on the import of yellowfin tuna caught by Mexican boats. Since October 1990, the United States had imposed the embargo under a 1988 amendment to the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) because the Mexican fleet for yellowfin tuna had been killing dolphins on the high seas at a rate twice that of its American counterpart. The US Congress set the three-year by-catch quota of dolphins at 6039 in 1988. Since then, the US tuna industry had shifted some companies to Vanuatu, Mexico, and Puerto Rico to evade US regulation. 74 It should be noted here that the US government was reluctant to impose this embargo. Environmental NGOs filed a suit demanding implementation of the amended MMPA against the cautious US government. The government lost the case and thus had to impose an embargo on Panama’s yellowfin tuna in September 1990 and the Mexican one in October 1990. Although the embargoes were temporally lifted since the US government appealed to a higher court in November 1990, the government lost the case again and imposed embargoes on the import of yellowfin tuna from Mexico and Panama in February 1991, and from Venezuela and Vanuatu in March 1991.75 In September 1991, a GATT dispute-resolution panel concluded that the case was a violation of GATT Article 11.1. The panel ruled that GATT Article 20, which allows trade restrictions for human health or the conservation of animal or plant life, could not apply beyond US jurisdiction.76 Although the panel decision was not presented to the GATT Council due to Mexico’s higher priority efforts to conclude the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it became “a major factor in shaping the politics of trade and environment issues in subsequent years,” as Porter and Brown put it. 77 Second, the eroding legitimacy of unilateral trade sanctions was also reflected in, and promoted further by, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21


adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992. For example, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration provides that “Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided.”78 Third, it was also unrealistic for the United States to impose fish import embargoes on Japan because the United States would have suffered from Japan’s retaliation. In 1987, Japan’s four major opposition parties (Japan Socialist Party, Clean Government Party, Democratic Socialist Party, and Japan Communist Party) tabled a retaliation bill to restrict the import of fisheries products from the nations that regulated the operations of Japanese fishing vessels “inappropriately.”79 This move was backed by the All Japan Fishermen’s Union. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries warned the US side against taking sanctions by referring to this domestic trend. 80 In 1988, the United States relied on the Japanese fisheries market more than Japan relied on the US market. Japan’s imports from the United States were valued at approximately 285.3 billion yen, which was much larger than the US imports of fish from Japan: 39.1 billion yen. 81 In short, the material power of the United States was not sufficient to force Japan to ban driftnet fishing.

Political pressures from societal groups Transnational environmental NGOs played a critical role in spreading a driftnet fishing prohibition norm. The 1990 report of the UN SecretaryGeneral notes that “Non-governmental organizations have submitted information and comments to the Secretary-General that were taken into account in the preparation of the present report. It must be noted that a number of these organizations, such as Greenpeace and Earthtrust, have created awareness of the ecological problems arising from large-scale driftnet fishing.”82 Among them, Greenpeace deserves special attention. This transnational NGO contributed to forming the public image of the practice as “walls of death” fishing 83 or “strip mining on the high seas.”84 It dispatched a ship for research and protest in the South Pacific in early 1990. It was through Greenpeace that South Pacific Forum’s Fisheries Agency sent protesting messages to Japanese driftnet fishing boats. 85 In the summer of 1990, the Greenpeace vessel purposefully collided with a driftnet fishing boat.86 In September 1990, 40 Greenpeace members occupied part of the Japanese Embassy in Canberra, Australia.87 Greenpeace took advantage of the politicization of the driftnet fishing issue amid its campaign for the conservation of the marine environment.88 Indeed,

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driftnet fishing was an effective target because a small number of countries engaged in the practice on a large scale. Environmental NGOs, however, failed to affect Japanese policymaking. Around 1990, Greenpeace Japan focused one of its main campaigns on the driftnet issue.89 In March 1990, Greenpeace Japan with four other NGOs submitted protest letters relating to Japanese South Pacific driftnet fishing to Foreign Minister Nakayama, Fisheries Agency Director-General Kyôtani, and President of the Japan Fisheries Association Uchimura. 90 Although Greenpeace played an important role in the development of a prohibition norm of driftnet fishing at the international level, Greenpeace Japan seems to have had little direct policy impact on the government. The NGO was known to the Japanese government as a radical group. 91 It was not well accepted by the Japanese public, either. In 1993, the number of Greenpeace members in Japan was just 760 while in the United States, its members numbered 2.3 million.92 Moreover, domestic NGOs did not have much interest in the driftnet fishing issue. In September 1990, the 20th national conference on nature conservation could not pass a resolution calling for a driftnet moratorium due to strong opposition from people engaged in fishing.93 The authority of fisheries administration in the Japanese government lies in the Fisheries Agency, located within the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF).94 In the Fisheries Agency, the Offshore Fisheries Division of the Fisheries Promotion Department and the International Affairs Division of the Oceanic Fisheries Department dealt with the issue of high seas driftnet fishing. The trade association for the Japanese fishing industry as a whole is the Japan Fisheries Association (JFA: Dai Nippon Suisankai). As of 1991, members included 148 fishery associations, 152 major Japanese fishing companies, and other entities belonging to related industries such as marketing, processing, shipbuilding, and gear and net manufacturing.95 The JFA, established in 1882, supports various negotiations between the Japanese government and foreign nations, sponsors private delegations, and conducts international public relations and labor management. 96 The president of the Japan Fisheries Association, Uchimura Yoshihide, was a former Fisheries Agency DirectorGeneral and Administrative Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. 97 The tie between government and industry was solid, as was the case with whaling. For the Japanese fishing industry, it was more difficult to give up the North Pacific squid driftnet fishery than the South Pacific tuna driftnet fishery. The former was much more economically important than the latter. The Japanese squid driftnet fishery in the North Pacific produced


an annual yield of 141,263 tons, an output of 45.531 billion yen, in 1989, while the Japanese driftnet fishery in the South Pacific caught approximately 10,000 tons of albacore tuna, worth four billion yen, in the 1988–89 season.98 There were approximately 500 Japanese driftnet vessels in the North Pacific and only 21 at most (with the exception of the unusual 1988–89 season) in the South Pacific.99 Japan’s national report to the UNCED emphasized the importance of flying squid fishing, saying that: Squid is among the favorite seafood of the Japanese, but the volume of surumeika, a sort of squid particularly liked by the Japanese, available in the seas around the country, has been stagnating at a medium to low level in recent years. Consequently, akaika or red squid [flying squid] caught in the high seas of the North Pacific constitute valuable fishery resources for the Japanese. 100 Among fish products, squid accounted for the largest share of annual household consumption: annual household consumption of squid was 1657 grams per capita in 1989.101 The North Pacific driftnet fishing caught 145,342 tons of flying squid, which was equivalent to 25.7 percent of the Japanese total squid catch in 1990, 565,000 tons.102 Moreover, the South Pacific driftnet fishery was a “secondary crop” to the North Pacific driftnet fishery.103 In other words, the cessation of South Pacific driftnet fishing did not affect employment significantly. On the other hand, it was not easy for driftnet fishermen to move to other fisheries since there was little space for newcomers under the Japanese licensing system for commercial fish stocks.104 Finally, the fishing method of driftnets was regarded as most appropriate for flying squids since they do not migrate in schools and are too heavy and too fragile for the use of hooks. The North Pacific driftnet catch accounted for 93.8 percent of the Japanese total flying squid catch in 1990.105 In the autumn of 1991, the politicization of the driftnet issue at the international level brought the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) into the policymaking process.106 By the summer of 1991, MOFA seems to have just followed the position of the Fisheries Agency. In 1989, for instance, Araki Kiyoshi, director of the Oceania Division, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “To take a drastic measure like total banning of existing fishing operations we need very concrete data.” 107 As early as on September 27, 1991, however, MOFA admitted that it would be very difficult for Japan to continue driftnet fishing because Japan was isolated in international society in this regard, and because the US position in

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favor of the ban was firm. 108 MOFA urged preparation for a driftnet ban. 109 In contrast to MOFA, the Fisheries Agency emphasized the importance of devising effective driftnet methods for resource management in order to avoid a ban.110 In the Japanese report submitted to the UN in September 1991, the Fisheries Agency proposed five new policies with a view to continue driftnet fishing on the high seas: “a limit on the number of operating vessels; fishing area and season restrictions; establishment of appropriate levels of by-catch for main species; continued collection of statistically reliable data; the establishment of an effective enforcement regime.”111 This proposal did not reverse a global drive toward a driftnet ban. Driftnet fishing and the opening of the Japanese rice market were expected to be the major issues on the agenda of the US–Japan summit meeting scheduled in late November.112 On November 1, 1991, during the preparatory process in Washington DC, a MOFA official implied Japan’s acceptance of a driftnet ban before US President George Bush’s visit to Japan. 113 The President sought to ban driftnet fishing partly because he was emphasizing “environmental protection” in his presidential election campaign in 1992.114 Meanwhile, MOFA gave a high priority not only to the maintenance of the amicable relationship between the two nations over driftnet fishing, but also to Japan’s position in the United Nations.115 The MOFA stance, however, offended the Fishing Agency, which argued that concessions to “unscientific US argument” were not official government policy. 116 In the final stage of the driftnet debate, differences split the Japanese fishing industry as well. Squid driftnet fishermen strongly resisted the ban. In the latter half of October 1991, a delegation of the Squid Drift-net Fishery Association headed by President Imura Kôji visited Washington DC, and New York to appeal to US government officials and representatives to the United Nations for acceptance of driftnet fishing as a reasonable practice.117 Although the Japan Fisheries Association opposed a ban on high seas driftnet fishing on October 3 and 18, 1991, the industry itself was not united. 118 According to the Squid Drift-net Fishery Association, large fishing companies were not strongly opposed to the ban. 119 Some Japanese small- and medium-sized fishing companies using other fishing gears were against driftnet fishing as competitors.120 For example, the Kesennuma Distant-water Fisheries Cooperative, which was mainly engaged in the longline fishery, had opposed driftnet fishing as wasteful since the late 1970s.121 The squid driftnet fishery, consisting of small- and medium-sized companies, 122 had little political power. Squid caught with driftnets was still a very small section of the Japanese entire fishing industry: only 1.3 percent of the total yield, 11,051,735 tons. The fishery


produced a yield worth 43.906 billion yen in 1990, which accounted for 1.6 percent of the total fisheries, 2,724.328 billion yen.123 In 1991, 454 vessels and some 8000 people belonged to the Squid Drift-net Fishery Association. The driftnet fishing created 8000–10,000 jobs in the fishing industry and 50,000 in the fish processing industry, mainly in the Hokkaido and Tohoku regions.124 They amounted to 0.1 percent and 2.3 percent of the entire Japanese fishing industry respectively.125 On November 26, 1991, the government announced Japan’s acceptance of the driftnet ban, which reportedly took the industry by surprise. 126 On November 29, approximately 3000 people involved with driftnet fishing held a national rally. They unanimously adopted a Sendai Declaration to seek a way of continuing driftnet fishing and to request the government to secure their right to life.127 Opposition from this small fishery, however, was too weak to prevent the government from accepting the driftnet ban. In 1992, the Fisheries Agency and prefectural governments conducted research on alternative methods for fishing flying squid, but the new methods caught less than one fifth of the average driftnet catch.128 The poor results of this research led to the inclusion of a compensatory package for driftnet fishermen in a draft supplementary budget of FY 1992, worth 16.3 billion yen. The Fisheries Agency estimated that some 300 driftnet fishing vessels would be scrapped with the cessation of driftnet fishing on the high seas.129 To sum up, neither environmental NGOs nor the driftnet fishing industry played a critical role in the Japanese government’s decision to ban the use of driftnets on the high seas.

The legitimacy of the norm against driftnet fishing In this section, I analyze the legitimacy of the norm against driftnet fishing from the viewpoint of Japanese policymakers in terms of expressed consent, the norm’s consistency with the existing ideational structure, and intergroup relationship between the norm promoters and dissenters. Expressed consent A prohibition norm against driftnet fishing rapidly developed between 1989 and 1991. The United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution calling for a high seas driftnet moratorium for three years in a row from 1989. In the meantime, various international organizations expressed their support for the norm; for example, the South Pacific Forum, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, and the International Whaling Commission all came out in favor of the

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moratorium. In addition, the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific entered into force on May 17, 1991. It was, however, the 1991 General Assembly resolution that was critical for the global ban on driftnet fishing on the high seas. Through these multilateral processes (see Table 4.1), a prohibition norm against high seas driftnets became politically institutionalized in international society by late 1991. The United States chose the multilateral arena of the UN General Assembly, instead of simply imposing unilateral pressures in this case.

Table 4.1

Resolutions and documents on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing

Year/Month/Place

Main forum

Resolutions and documents

1989 July/Tarawa November/Wellington

South Pacific Forum South Pacific states

November/Castries December/New York

OECS* UN General Assembly

Tarawa Declaration Convention on the Prohibition of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Castries Declaration Resolution 44/225

1990 July/Noordwijk

IWC*

October/Noumea

South Pacific Conference

December/New York

UN General Assembly

Resolution in support of the United Nations General Assembly initiative Resolution against driftnet fishing Resolution 45/197

1991 December/New York

UN General Assembly

Resolution 46/215

1992 June/Rio de Janeiro

UNCED*

Agenda 21, which supports Resolution 46/215 in Paragraph 17.55

*OECS: Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; IWC: International Whaling Commission; UNCED: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Source: UN General Assembly, 44th Session, Official Records, Supplement 49, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Forty-Fourth Session: Volume I A/44/49 (1989), pp. 147–8; UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Official Records, Supplement 49A, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Forty-Fifth Session: Volume I A/45/49 (1990), pp. 123–4; UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Official Records, Supplement 49, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Forty-Sixth Session: Volume I A/46/49 (1991), pp. 147–8; International Whaling Commission, Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 46, 49–50.


This choice seems to be attributable to several factors. First, the Law of the Sea regime had evolved in the United Nations. Second, the United States realized that the legitimacy of unilateral trade sanctions had decreased. Third, the United States expected that international society would support a ban on high seas driftnet fishing. On November 12, 1991, US Assistant Secretary of State Zerich visited Director-General Tsuruoka of the Japanese Fisheries Agency to reconfirm the US position on a total ban, and stated that “If Japan does not change its position, international denunciation will drive it into a corner.” 130 It appears that the United States believed that Japan would adopt the norm once it was endorsed by international society. The Japanese government perceived that the adoption of the 1991 resolution with only one dissenting voice (Japan) would institutionalize a norm prohibiting driftnet fishing. At the Cabinet meeting of November 26, 1991, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Tanabu Masami stated that not a single country supported the Japanese argument that driftnet fishing was scientifically manageable in terms of the conservation of fisheries resources. He added that the government could not do anything but give consideration to Japan’s position in international society and accept the driftnet ban. Minister Tanabu also admitted that Japan had been forced to yield because of severe pressure from other countries. 131 On the next day, Sezaki Katsumi, acting permanent representative of Japan to the United Nations, made a statement at the second committee of the UN General Assembly: [The Japanese government] had set aside the issue of interpretation of the scientific analysis, and had decided to adopt that agreement in view, inter alia, of the concerns expressed by Member States and of the welfare of all those who depended on fisheries for their livelihood. [Japan’s] delegation remained convinced of the importance of scientific analysis and at the same time, attached great importance to the international cooperation promoted by the United Nations. Therefore, it would make every effort to abide by whatever agreement was reached.132 At the final stage of norm institutionalization, Japan realized that it would not be able to defy the norm as one of the “members of the international community” (Resolution 46/215). Thus, Japan quickly changed its policy with a view to obtaining a small concession: delaying the start of the full ban from June 30, 1992 to December 31, 1992. This is a good example of rational choice action under a normative constraint.

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Ideational consistency Legal rules The first UN General Assembly resolution with regard to high seas driftnet fishing, which was adopted in 1989, recalls “the relevant principles elaborated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” The convention marked the end of an era when freedom ruled the high seas. Douglas Johnston argues that the high seas fisheries provisions of UNCLOS are, rather than binding general or customary law, non-binding “soft law” principles: “(1) the duty to conserve; (2) the duty to cooperate; and (3) the duty to negotiate.”133 Articles 116(b) and 120 of UNCLOS provide that the freedom of fishing on the high seas is subject to “the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States” regarding the fishing of straddling stocks, highly migratory species (such as albacore tuna), marine mammals, anadromous stocks (such as salmon), and catadromous species. These species and stocks were commercially or incidentally caught by high seas driftnets. In UNCLOS, Article 119 is the most specific about the duty to conserve the living resources of the high seas. Article 119.1 provides that States shall: (a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence available to the States concerned, to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield . . . (b) take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened. According to Article 119.1, States have an obligation to “maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield” but have no obligation to regulate fishing with regard to “species associated with or dependent upon harvested species.” Following the strict interpretation of Article 119.1, it is questionable that the UNCLOS regime itself can legitimize the prohibition, rather than reduction, of the use of a specific kind of fishing gear. Although no international law clearly supported driftnet fishing, as international lawyer Ted McDorman puts it, “neither the UNCLOS Convention nor any other treaty explicitly prohibits high seas driftnet fishing.” 134


In the early 1990s, Japan had not ratified the convention yet. Although the Japanese government admitted that the fisheries provisions of UNCLOS had become customary international law, it perceived that the prohibition norm went well beyond the specific UNCLOS provisions.135 Legal legitimacy was not an issue for this case. Having accepted the duty to conserve, Japan engaged itself in scientific debates with the United States and other countries. Scientific views The initial international discourse on driftnet fishing was based on conservational concerns among fishermen about the impact of driftnet fishing on fisheries resources. At that time, however, scientific data on this issue were very limited. Operative Paragraph 3 of the 1989 UN General Assembly resolution recommends that “all interested members of the international community, particularly within regional organizations, continue to consider and, by 30 June 1991, review the best available scientific data on the impact of large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing and agree upon further co-operative regulation and monitoring measures, as needed.” In July 1990, the US Commerce Department issued a report of a sampling survey on incidental catches of nontarget species by the 4 percent of the Japanese squid driftnet-fishing boats in the North Pacific in the 1989 season. It reported the incidental catches of 59,060 albacore tunas, 79 salmons, 58,100 blue sharks, 22 sea turtles, 914 dolphins, 208 fur seals, and 539 albatrosses.136 Observers on board collected the data under the monitoring and enforcement framework set up by Japan, the United States, and Canada. This research program was expanded in the following year to cover the 10 percent of the Japanese driftnet fishing operations in the North Pacific. The result was by-catches of 1758 whales and dolphins, 30,464 seabirds, 81,956 blue sharks, 253,288 tunas, and more than three million pomfrets. 137 According to a Japanese survey, the Japanese North Pacific driftnet fishing not only caught 106 million squid, but also caught more than 41 million sea creatures in 1990, including 141,000 salmon, 700,000 sharks, 406 sea turtles, 26,000 marine mammals such as whales and dolphins, and 270,000 sea birds.138 According to Japanese fishery statistics, the Japanese North Pacific driftnet fishing in 1991 yielded not only 83,258 tons of flying squid but also 1557 tons of tuna, 103 tons of swordfish and spearfish, 957 tons of skipjacks, 156 tons of sharks, 220 tons of yellowtails, 4 tons of dorados, 4 tons of marine mammals, and 307 tons of other kinds of fish.139 In June 1991, scientists from Japan, the United States, Canada, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan reviewed “the best available scientific

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data” at Sidney, British Columbia, Canada. The Sidney meeting, however, failed to conclude that driftnet fishing had adverse impacts on the species incidentally caught and discarded. For example, the alleged negative impact on salmon of high seas driftnet fishing had spurred the politicization of the issue in the United States. In the Sidney meeting, however, “The estimated level[s] of by-catch of salmonids in 1989 of 1614 fish and in 1990 of 141,279 fish were considered by the group to have no known significant biological impact.”140 Another example is that scientists failed to conclude that the use of driftnets had adverse impacts on flying squid. The Sidney meeting recorded that “Although there was no adequate assessment of squid standing stocks, the abundance of squid as determined from catch statistics appeared to be relatively stable at present.”141 As UN General Assembly Resolution 46/215 notes, however, the United States, Canada, and Japan also “failed to conclude that this practice has no adverse impact which threatens the conservation and sustainable management of living marine resources.” Because of this scientific uncertainty, the UN General Assembly finally introduced the global ban on the high seas driftnet fishing in late 1991. Behind this international move, the United States insisted that the driftnet fishing should be terminated since it could not be proven scientifically that the practice had no adverse impact. The US permanent representative to the UN issued a letter saying that “there is no agreed scientific assessment with respect to the environmental impact posed by large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing which would justify continuation of this indiscriminate and wasteful high seas fishing method.” 142 The United States took a highly precautionary position. William Burke, Mark Freeberg, and Edward Miles argue that “If these notions are taken seriously for general application, few, if any, high seas fisheries (or even fisheries within national jurisdiction) could exist.”143 On the other hand, Japan did not accept this level of cautionary principle and conceded no scientific legitimacy to the driftnet ban. Both Japan and the United States recognized the June 1991 report of the Sidney scientific review meeting as the most authoritative at that point.144 Nevertheless, “there was a division of views with regard to the interpretation of that scientific analysis.”145 It is normally expected that the burden of proof lie with fishing nations. For Japan, however, there was not enough evidence to deny the US position. 146 Japan concluded that it could not be proven scientifically that the practice had an unacceptable level of adverse impact on living resources in the high seas. A 1991 report of the UN Secretary-General on driftnet fishing notes Japan’s less cautionary position: “126. Japan submitted that the results of the


Sidney meeting did not support any assertion that any level of high seas driftnet operation would have an unacceptable impact on stocks of marine species, and therefore Japan did not support the introduction of the moratorium.”147 As early as 1989, Japan criticized the draft resolution submitted by the United States, arguing that it lacked a scientific basis.148 Emphasizing the importance of science in the driftnet issue, Japan contested the moratorium until the last moment at the United Nations in late 1991. With regard to the US proposal, Japan maintained in its letter to the UN dated November 14: A threat is being posed to the consensus agreement [Resolution 44/225]. The scientific approach would be abandoned. The necessity of a moratorium has not been scientifically demonstrated. The by-catch of non-target species from driftnet fishing in the North Pacific is comparable to the by-catch from other fishing methods.149 Japan contested the scientific legitimacy of an evolving prohibition norm on high seas driftnet fishing. Japan perceived the US position as greatly politicized. For the US government, putting an end to the Japanese and other Asian driftnet fishing on the high seas was a rare chance to please both environmental NGOs and the US fishing industry at the same time. Burke, Freeberg, and Miles point out the politicization of the scientific debate: The U.S. attempt to characterize the high seas driftnet fisheries as taking an enormous and wasteful by-catch is not based on scientific assessment; it is purely political. The United States does not rely on the scientific review held in Sidney, British Columbia, because that review makes no mention of this alleged result, nor is the policy statement supported in the report by U.S. scientists who reviewed the Sidney Report. Neither group of scientists spoke about the quantity of the overall by-catch. Accordingly, it is not surprising that these terms evoke political, not scientific, assessment.150 The 1991 resolution is not accompanied by a mechanism to lift the moratorium if effective conservation and management measures are taken to prevent the unacceptable impact of driftnet fishing on living marine resources. The 1989 resolution had assumed such a mechanism.151 By 1991, the United States, together with other anti-driftnet

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nations and environmental NGOs, had successfully created a convincing image of driftnet fishing as massive “walls of death.” The negative intersubjective understanding of the practice had already been established before “the best available scientific data” were reviewed in June 1991. In 1990, Greenpeace estimated that 120,000 marine mammals and 800,000 sea birds became the victims of driftnet fishing annually.152 It is worth noting that the UN General Assembly itself is a political organ that is not suitable for discussing scientific data or fishery conservation and management. As Burke, Freeberg, and Miles put it, “the General Assembly hurriedly took action on the basis of a partial review and immediately recommended terminating all the high seas fisheries in the world ocean.”153 Scientific discourse was conducted in a political context. Because of scientific uncertainty regarding the driftnet issue, ethical beliefs, rather than scientific beliefs, affected and politicized the scientific discourse. Moral principles Behind the initial politicization of driftnet fishing lay concerns about the impact of driftnet fishing on fisheries resources among fishermen in the South Pacific and in the West Coast of the United States and Canada. As time passed, however, other concerns became increasingly salient in the discourse regarding this issue. For example, the SPF argued in its 1991 report to the UN Secretary-General that driftnet fishing: • is extremely non-selective with regard to the size and species of marine life they entangle; • wastes significant quantities of target and non-target fish species; • causes mortality to fish and wildlife which are entangled, but fall out or escape from the net during hauling; • can pose a threat to marine life when lost or discarded pieces of net continue to fish (“ghost fishing”); and • presents special risks to marine resources as the practice can provide an economically viable return even when target stocks have been significantly depleted. 154 Rather than the ecological impact of driftnets in the strict sense, the aspect of a “highly indiscriminate and wasteful fishing method” (Resolution 44/225) became emphasized in international discourse on the use of driftnets. The discourse strongly reflected a preservationist value against incidental catches of such nontarget species as turtles, sea birds, and marine


mammals, especially dolphins. 155 The impact of driftnet fishing on the flying squid was not an issue since the squid were biologically abundant and commercially did not interest the fishermen of anti-driftnet nations.156 Instead, mortality of incidental catches attracted international attention. In the conclusion of the Sidney meeting, the United States stated that “one of the most disturbing aspects of the large-scale pelagic driftnet fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean was the variety and magnitude of by-catch species mortality.”157 It threatened to invoke the 1990 Dolphin Protection Consumers’ Information Act to prohibit the use of driftnet fishing for the protection of dolphins. The International Whaling Commission (IWC) discussed the driftnet by-catch of dolphins in 1991.158 Like whales, dolphins were popular enough to become a symbol of ecological protection in some industrialized countries. Environmentalists had already criticized the Japanese fishermen for killing a large number of dolphins.159 On the basis of the conservation principle, Japan would have regulated its fishing activities as long as it was scientifically proven that they posed a threat to the survival of target and nontarget species. A 1991 report of the UN Secretary-General on driftnet fishing notes Japan’s conservationist position: 124. On the other hand, in its submission dated 23 September 1991, Japan, commenting on the Sidney meeting, stated that the claims for immediate prohibition of high seas driftnet fishing focused only on the numbers of incidental catch by this fishery. According to Japan, the point however was not the absolute number of the incidental catch, but the ratio of the incidental catch to the total stock size of the species incidentally taken. The ratio, it noted, not the number, was the accurate indicator of the impact of the incidental catch.160 Japan would also have agreed that the less incidental catches of nontarget species was the better. Many Japanese people seem to have disapproved of wasteful practices. According to a survey of Japanese people outside the fishing industry, conducted by Dr Kawai Tomoyasu in a fisheries research institute of the Fisheries Agency, 41.8 percent of people opposed the incidental catches of marine mammals and sea birds while 6.7 percent objected to the diet of whale meat.161 The government attempted to reduce the rate of incidental catches, for example by developing subsurface driftnets,162 but it was impossible to reduce the rate to zero. The United States required zero incidental taking of marine mammals in the use of driftnets on the high seas.163

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Japan was dissatisfied with the arbitrary application of the preservation principle only to high seas driftnet fishing. In the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the United States kept a global “dolphin kill” quota of 20,500 a year for its own tuna fishermen using fishing gear other than high seas driftnets.164 The actual number of killed dolphins in 1990 was estimated at 5083, less than half the 1989 total. 165 This estimate is more than the number of whales and dolphins killed by the Japanese squid driftnet fishing in the North Pacific during the 1990 season, which was estimated by a Japan–US–Canada research program.166 Japan argued that the discourse on the use of driftnets should not be limited to driftnets on the high seas, 167since it knew that “The United States had never sought to eliminate the use of driftnets, trawls, pots, seines, or longlines within its jurisdiction, even though they take larger bycatches than are taken in the North Pacific.” 168 In short, Japan did not accord any ethical legitimacy to the ban on driftnet fishing based on the preservationist principle. Intergroup relationship The discourse regarding the driftnet issue did not invoke much of a sense of identity or difference or a sense of friend or enemy between the norm promoters and dissenters. First, the international campaigns to criticize the use of driftnets lasted for only a few years. Second, the campaigns criticized not the Japanese food culture but the use of a specific fishing gear. Third, the campaigns reflected not only the preservation principle but also the conservation principle. Forth, driftnet fishing on the high seas had only a short history and did not constitute the Japanese culture. Finally, Japanese politicians did not take the opportunity to invoke a sense of nationalism against foreign pressures. The reverse of these points can be applied to the case of scientific whaling.

Conclusion The case study of driftnet fishing does not support the realist and the liberal propositions. The US threat of imposing trade sanctions became less credible, as symbolized by the 1991 conclusion of a GATT disputeresolution panel that found the US embargo against Mexican yellowfin tuna under the Marine Mammal Protection Act was in violation of GATT. In the meantime, transnational NGOs failed to affect the Japanese government’s decision to accept the driftnet ban, while the Japanese Squid Drift-net Fishery Association could not stop the acceptance, either.


I argue that the Japanese government decided to accept the driftnet ban because it considered the norm against the practice to be institutionalized in international society. After Japan increased its driftnet fishing operation in the South Pacific in the 1988–89 summer season, the United Nations General Assembly annually passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on driftnet fishing on the high seas for three years in a row. Japan recognized the political legitimacy of the international norm, although Japan contested the legitimacy scientifically and ethically. Japan opposed the application of a highly precautionary principle and the preservationist stance that called for the maximum protection of turtles, sea birds, and marine mammals. Finally, despite Japan’s scientific and ethical dissatisfaction about the ban, Japan did not have a sense of enmity toward the norm promoters.

5 Case Two: Scientific Whaling

On March 13, 1987, one day before Japanese whalers caught the last minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata) in the Antarctic for commercial purposes, Japan decided to begin scientific whaling. 1 Since then, Japan has annually conducted scientific whaling, despite continuous criticisms against the research. The term “scientific whaling,” which is also called “chôsa hogei” [research whaling] in Japanese, is defined here as “to kill, take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific research.” (Article 8.1 of the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)). This chapter first describes contestation over an international norm on scientific whaling. Then, it attempts realist and liberal explanations as to why Japan has not accepted the norm. Finally, I focus on the legitimacy of the international norm in terms of expressed consent, consistency with the existing ideational structure, and intergroup relationship between the norm promoters and the Japanese policymakers in charge. In order to compare this case with the two other items, I focus on the period between 1987 and 1992.

Norm building Under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), “any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national” to conduct scientific whaling “subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit” (Article 8.1). Between 1951 and 1993, ten whaling nations issued more than 170 special permits.2 Prior to 1982, various governments such as Canada, the United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa, and Japan freely issued more than 100 permits. 3 Japan had conducted scientific whaling 74

Case Two: Scientific Whaling

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of several hundred Bryde’s whales in the late 1970s.4 The member states of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) had the autonomy to conduct scientific whaling. After the introduction in 1982 of a moratorium on commercial whaling, the IWC started to regulate scientific whaling in order to prevent commercial whaling from being conducted under the guise of scientific research. Paragraph 30 of the Schedule provides that permit proposals should address the four sets of information: (a) “the objectives of the research,” (b) “the number and stock of the animals to be taken,” (c) the participation of “foreign scientists,” and (d) “the possible effect of the proposed catches on conservation of the stock.”5 In addition to the guidelines established by the scientific committee, two IWC resolutions in 1986 and 1987 introduced eight criteria for evaluating scientific whaling programs.6 The 1986 resolution set some conditions on scientific whaling; for example, it recommended that the meat “should be utilized primarily for local consumption.” Environmental groups in the United States denounced the 1986 resolution because they believed it would not be strict enough to regulate disguised commercial whaling. 7 The 1987 resolution conferred on the IWC the authority “to review, annually . . . the report of the Scientific Committee regarding special permits involving the killing of whales.” This resolution also recommended contracting governments to “refrain from issuing or revoking, permits to its nationals that the Commission, taking into account the comments of its Scientific Committee, considers do not satisfy each of the criteria.” This resolution, with Article 6 of the ICRW, enables the IWC to issue resolutions to recommend contracting governments to cancel their scientific whaling programs. 8 On June 26, 1987, the annual meeting of the IWC, held at Bournemouth, United Kingdom, adopted the first resolution to urge the government of Japan to refrain from issuing research permits until the scientific committee approved their research programs.9 The first resolution “RECOMMENDS the Government of Japan to refrain from issuing special permits . . .until such time as the Scientific Committee is able to resolve the serious uncertainties identified in its discussion as to the capability of the research methods proposed to contribute sufficiently reliable results needed for the Comprehensive Assessment or for other critically important research needs [emphasis in original].”10 Formally, this was a resolution for postponement, but it effectively meant the suspension of the research program in question.11 In reality, an anti-whaling majority of the IWC member states opposed any research programs involving the killing of whales. Indeed, the IWC did not endorse any programs of scientific

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whaling. Moreover, anti-whaling nations also attempted to institutionalize a norm against lethal scientific research in general. In 1990, for instance, the IWC adopted a “Resolution on Redirecting Research towards Non-lethal Methods” by a vote of 23 in favor, none against, and six abstentions.12 This emerging prohibition norm, however, was inconsistent with the official stance of the IWC: to endorse a program of scientific whaling if it met the criteria mentioned above. The norm against scientific whaling has been seriously contested since the mid 1980s. Iceland conducted a four-year scientific whaling program between 1986 and 1989, while Norway started a seven-year research program in 1988. 13 Japan was a primary contester. In late 1987, however, Japan started a research program (called JARPA) by hunting 273 minke whales in the Antarctic. 14 Despite the almost annual adoptions of similar IWC resolutions, Japan annually caught 300 or 400 (±10 percent) minke whales for scientific purposes. 15

Alternative explanations Material power of the United States Japan’s acceptance of a commercial whaling moratorium is a textbook case of the realist hypothesis that argues that states adopt international norms when they are coerced to do so by powerful states. The United States threatened to exclude all Japanese fishing boats from its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the 1979 Packwood–Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act unless Japan accepted the moratorium. This threat was the decisive factor for Japan’s decision in 1984 to accept the commercial whaling moratorium adopted by the IWC in 1982, as stated in Chapter 3. Japan’s long defiance of IWC resolutions against its scientific whaling is partially explained by the absence of material coercion by powerful states. In the summer of 1987, within a month after the IWC adopted the first resolution against Japan’s scientific whaling, the Japanese Fisheries Agency decided to ignore the resolution.16 IWC resolutions are not legally binding, but they could give the United States grounds for taking economic sanctions against nations that ignored the IWC resolution. 17 The US government also held that the commercial whaling moratorium gave legitimacy to economic sanctions against disguised “commercial whaling.”18 In September 1987, Fisheries Agency Director-General Satake Isoroku visited the United States to persuade the US government not to oppose Japan’s scientific whaling.19 In response, Acting Secretary Curtis


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Mack of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which is part of the Department of Commerce, expressed the United States’ intention of taking economic sanctions if Japan conducted scientific whaling.20 On January 20, 1988, US Secretary of Commerce Verity warned Minister Watanabe of the Japanese Embassy at Washington DC that the United States would invoke the Packwood–Magnuson Amendment unless Japan quit its research program. This threat, however, became no longer effective by early 1988. Due to a strong domestic call for limiting access to resources within the US 200-mile zone only to American fishermen, the amount of directed fishery allocations to Japanese fishermen, 1,158,000 tons in 1984, was radically reduced to 104,000 tons in 1987, despite Japan’s acceptance of the commercial whaling moratorium in April 1985.21 Although some 600 people still engaged in the northern-sea longline and gill net fishery (50,687 tons worth 12.8 billion yen) were entirely dependent on the US EEZ in 1987,22 the 1988 quota set for Japanese fisheries was expected to be zero, irrespective of Japan’s decision on scientific whaling.23 At that time, the Japanese government was in the midst of negotiating with its US counterpart for a fisheries quota for Japanese fishermen. According to the 1979 Packwood–Magnuson Amendment, a certification under the Amendment also serves as a certification for the 1971 Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act.24 The Pelly Amendment could have affected the Japanese fisheries industry more than the Packwood–Magnuson Amendment. Under the Pelly Amendment, Japan’s fishery-related exports to the United States, such as pearls and canned products, which were worth 76.6 billion yen in 1986, could have been banned with presidential authorization. Nevertheless, the Fisheries Agency expected that the US President would not formally invoke the Pelly Amendment for at least three reasons.25 First, the President had never authorized its invocation. In 1974, for example, the Secretary of Commerce certified to the President that Japan and the USSR violated the Pelly Amendment, but the President decided not to impose an embargo on their fisheries products. Although the Packwood–Magnuson Amendment had been applied to the USSR in 1985, the Pelly Amendment had never been invoked. Since 1975, the US Commerce Department and the State Department has been reluctant to invoke the Pelly Amendment over the whaling issue.26 Second, the invocation of the Amendment, a ban on all fish imports from a particular nation, was deemed to violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Fisheries Agency considered filing a complaint with GATT if the United States invoked the Pelly Agreement. The Agency took the view that even if the

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US government attempted to legitimize its action by referring to Article 20(g) of GATT allowing measures for the conservation of limited natural resources, the provision could empower the United States to ban only whale-related imports. Moreover, Japan believed that the possibility of Japan’s retaliation could prevent the United States from implementing trade sanctions. In the words of a spokesperson for the Japan Whaling Association, “Japan is America’s best customer for fish.”27 On January 23, 1988, the Fisheries Agency reconfirmed its policy on scientific whaling. 28 On February 10, 1988, the US Department of Commerce announced a decision to take sanctions against Japan under the Packwood–Magnuson Amendment. 29 Despite this formal announcement, after the cabinet meeting of February 12, Japanese Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Satô Takashi expressed the intention to continue Japan’s scientific whaling program.30 In April 1988, the United States rejected Japan’s request for 3000 tons of sea snails (shellfish) and 5000 tons of Pacific whiting (codfish) from the US EEZ, and made it a policy not to allow Japanese vessels in the zone in years to come. 31 In April 1988, however, US President Reagan announced that he would not restrict the import of marine products from Japan by invoking the Pelly Amendment, since the invocation of the Packwood–Magnuson Amendment in March would be enough to force Japan to comply with the IWC. It was not enough, however. In effect, the sanction was “a gesture to domestic environmental NGOs.”32 In short, the United States could not force Japan to stop scientific whaling because the Packwood–Magnuson Amendment had lost its power, and because the threat of trade sanctions under the Pelly amendment was not credible. Nonetheless, it remains unanswered why a powerful state such as the United States could not have forced Japan to give up scientific whaling and why the scientific whaling issue was unique and important enough for Japan to ignore repeated pressures by the United States. Political pressures from societal actors Behind the threat of economic sanctions by the US government lay political pressures from environmental, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). At a press conference of September 1, 1987, President William Reilly of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) USA stated that the WWF had asked US President Ronald Reagan to take economic sanctions against the Japanese fishing industry if Japan carried out its scientific research program. 33 NGOs continued the anti-whaling effort. On September 24,


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Greenpeace and 11 other environmental NGOs announced a decision to file a suit to ask the US Department of Commerce to implement sanctions against Japanese scientific whaling.34 On December 22, the Fisheries Agency of Japan formally decided to conduct scientific whaling. The next day, a Japanese whaling factory ship, Nisshin Maru No.3, left Yokohama Port for scientific whaling in the Antarctic Ocean.35 On that day, 16 US environmental NGOs protested Japan’s scientific whaling, 36 and the WWF sent US Commerce Secretary William Verity a letter calling for the application of the Packwood–Magnuson Amendment to Japanese scientific whaling.37 On January 13, 1988, 16 US environmental NGOs held a demonstration against Japan’s scientific whaling near the White House where a Japan–US summit meeting was being held, and filed “a lawsuit against the US Department of Commerce for violations of the bilateral agreement and the US government’s failure to sanction Japan for the whaling activities.”38 On February 1, 1988, during Prime Minister Takeshita’s visit, demonstrations against Japanese scientific whaling took place all over the United States. 39 Environmental NGOs’ pressures on the US government continued, and so did the US governmental pressure on its Japanese counterpart to quit its research program. In February 1989, for example, US Secretary of State Baker warned Japanese Foreign Minister Uno against its scientific whaling. 40 Unlike their counterparts in Japan, environmental NGOs had become political pressure groups influential with the US Congress and government.41 Transnational environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, successfully conducted campaigns against whaling not only in the United States but also in other “like-minded” nations such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand. 42 In the United Kingdom, for instance, Greenpeace denounced Japan’s scientific whaling in major newspapers on January 11, 1990, when Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visited the United Kingdom. It was reported that the British Prime Minister’s Office received some 100 phone calls just after the advertisement was published and that the Japanese Embassy in London also received 70 phone calls on the morning of January 12. A cross-party group of 150 members of the British Parliament sent Prime Minister Kaifu a letter calling for the cessation of whaling. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also mentioned the whaling issue at a summit talk with her Japanese counterpart.43 In late May 1990, the Japanese Embassies in London and The Hague received over 38,400 and 6000 protest postcards respectively from the Animal Welfare International Fund.44 In the meantime, NGOs did not adopt a boycott strategy against Japan. This strategy seems to have worked in relation to Iceland. In August 1989,

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Greenpeace lifted its three-year campaign for a worldwide boycott of Icelandic fish products, just after Iceland announced that it would not catch whales in 1990 for scientific or commercial purposes. 45 A norm against scientific whaling was spreading in industrialized countries. On the other hand, there were no strong supporters for the norm in Japanese domestic society. Japanese environmental NGOs were “muted in their opposition to whaling, which is perceived in the country as a traditional ritual.”46 Among transnational NGOs, Greenpeace was the most visible in Japan. In 1989, it established its Japanese branch “to get Japanese people involved in the ecology movement,” especially in the anti-whaling movement.47 In late 1989, two NGOs, Greenpeace Japan and Whale Issue Network, conducted a campaign against whaling in Sendai, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka.48 Holding a whale watch meeting in November 1990, Greenpeace Japan argued that since whaling destroyed the environment, whale watching should replace it. 49 Nevertheless, as stated in the previous chapter, even internationally powerful Greenpeace “lacked leverage with the Japanese government.” 50 Another large international NGO, WWF, was also ineffective. Although the chairman of WWF Japan was former Foreign Minister Ôkita Saburô, the NGO’s request of October 6, 1987 to Fisheries Agency Director-General Satake Isoroku to reconsider Japan’s scientific whaling had only a negligible impact on the scientific whaling policy. The NGO argued that the research program that caught many whales was not different from commercial whaling, and that the program would lead to severe international criticism and damage the reputation of Japan in international society. 51 The request from the WWF did not make a difference. The Japanese government did not face strong pro-whaling pressures from its domestic society, either. It is true that in 1987, the All Japan Seamen’s Union put pressure on the Fisheries Agency to conduct scientific whaling through the Democratic Socialist Party.52 Moreover, the major Japanese newspapers supported Japan’s scientific whaling.53 One exception is the editorial of Asahi shinbun of July 20, 1987, which argued that scientific whaling should not be conducted in consideration of strong international criticism. In the next month, however, Asahi shinbun printed a pro-scientific whaling article by one of its editors.54 In Japan, however, the meat had become “a minority taste.”55 Until the end of World War II, whale meat was consumed in local communities. After the war, consumption spread nationwide, as an ingredient in school lunches.56 In the first half of the 1960s, some 200,000 tons of whale meat annually came onto the wholesale markets all over Japan. Nevertheless, the annual supply of whale meat was on the decline due to the stricter catch quotas


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set by the IWC, well before the moratorium went into effect in Japan in 1987. For instance, the annual supply dropped to 24,000 tons in 1979 and 18,000 tons in 1986, and plunged to a level of 1000 tons in 1989, which was indeed a tiny portion of the total catch of Japan’s fisheries supply in that year: 13,341,000 tons. 57 According to a survey of 200 housewives in Tokyo and Osaka, fourfifths of them answered that they would not be in trouble if whale meat became unavailable.58 In addition, there was no strong public consensus against scientific whaling. According to a public opinion survey sponsored by a US cetacean protection association and conducted by the Japan Research Center in January 1991, the Japanese public was divided over “Japan’s scientific whaling, which was against the IWC’s recommendations.” In the survey, 53 percent of the respondents supported the whaling, while 43 percent opposed it.59 Therefore, public opinion did not create strong political pressure for or against the continuation of scientific whaling. 60 After the early 1960s when the Japanese whaling industry was at the height of its prosperity, whaling became economically less important for the Japanese fishing industry, even before Japan’s acceptance of the moratorium. 61 The number of people directly employed by the whaling industry fell below 1000 in the latter half of the 1980s. In 1987, 930 people were directly employed in the industry: 533 people in pelagic whaling, 303 in large-type coastal whaling, and 94 in small-type coastal whaling.62 In the same year, the Japanese whaling industry commercially hunted 2790 whales (317 Bryde’s whales, 188 sperm whales, 2245 minke whales, and 40 Baird’s beaked whales). In 1988, due to the commercial whaling moratorium, it hunted only 192 whales (57 Baird’s beaked whales, 128 pilot whales, and seven killer whales), which were not covered by the ICRW. 63 Accordingly, the annual yield dropped from 12.93 billion yen to 0.48 billion yen.64 By the late 1980s, the economic necessity of killing whales had already declined in Japan. The Far Seas Fisheries Division of the Oceanic Fisheries Department of the Fisheries Agency, located within the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), was in charge of whaling administration. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Fishery Division of the Economic Affairs Bureau, which was in charge of multilateral fisheries negotiations, follows the whaling issue. On the other hand, the Environment Agency was excluded from the policymaking process.65 In any case, DirectorGeneral Moriyama Mayumi of the Environment Agency and her successor Kitagawa Ishimatsu expressed their support for whaling as a tradition, in 1989 and 1990. 66

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While giving up large-type coastal whaling, the Fisheries Agency sought for the continuation of Japan’s pelagic whaling in the Antarctic and its small-type coastal whaling in the form of “scientific whaling” and “subsistence whaling” respectively, both of which could be allowed under the commercial whaling moratorium.67 This decision was based on a proposal from 14 experts that the Fisheries Agency Director-General received as early as in July 1984, three months after the decision by the Japanese government to accept the world commercial whaling moratorium.68 It seemed unrealistic, however, to obtain IWC approval for Japan’s small-type coastal whaling as a subsistence occupation, since it required the amendment of the Schedule of the ICRW. Given the anti-whaling mood of the IWC, it was difficult to attain a three-quarters majority of votes for Japan’s subsistence whaling of 210 whales. Fisheries Agency Director-General Satake admitted difficulty in starting small-type coastal whaling at the Committees on Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of the both Houses of the Diet in July 1987. 69 In 1987, indeed, Japan could not obtain IWC permission to continue its coastal whaling as subsistence whaling. Since then, Japan has failed to obtain permission for coastal whaling.70 In contrast, scientific whaling was more promising because Article 8.1 of the ICRW gives the contracting governments the authority to issue special permits for scientific whaling. The Institute of Cetacean Research has conducted Japanese research programs under government supervision since its inception in November 1987.71 The institute is a nonprofit foundation (zaidan hôjin) under the jurisdiction of MAFF, and it receives government grants. It entrusts whaling to a company called Kyôdô Senpaku. Judging from the history of Kyôdô Senpaku, the company is the core survivor of the Japanese whaling industry. Pelagic whaling had contributed to the rapid postwar development of major fisheries companies such as Taiyô Gyogyô (currently called Maruha), Nihon Suisan, and Kyokuyô. In 1976, Nihon Kyôdô Hogei (the Japan Joint Whaling Company) was established by integrating the whaling sections of the three major fishing companies and three smaller whaling companies: Hokuyô Hogei, Nihon Hogei, and Nittô Hogei. This merger was carried out under the direction of the MAFF Minister to prevent over-competition and potential failure. The company started with 1500 employees in 1976, but slowly downsized itself to 750 employees in 1978 and to 533 in 1987, due to the further reductions of whale quotas by the IWC.72 Partly to avoid the image of commercialism in the scientific whaling programs, Nihon Kyôdô Hogei was dissolved and reorganized as Kyôdô Senpaku, a smaller company with 320 employees, one factory ship, and three catch boats. 73 In 1988,


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the Japan Whaling Association was reestablished with the secretariat of seven people, which served primarily as a public relations department for Kyôdô Senpaku. 74 “The first president of the new company was the director-general of the Japan Whaling Association, a former director of the Fisheries Agency.”75 The parent companies remained linked to Kyôdô Senpaku by holding its shares.76 In the middle of the 1990s, the company had accumulated a debt worth 170 million yen, although it had made a profit from selling whale meat. Parent companies started turning their backs on the company during its time of need, as exemplified by the report that Maruha sold its shares of the company in the late 1990s.77 Nevertheless, the Japanese government demonstrated a high degree of autonomy against foreign pressures to stop its scientific whaling. The standing committee on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries of the Japanese House of Representatives and its counterpart in the House of Councillors unanimously adopted a resolution for the implementation of scientific whaling on July 29 and 30, 1987 respectively. The resolutions sought not only “to take a proper measure for the fishermen and others who are forced to cease their business, and to make special efforts to continue coastal whaling” but also “to make maximum efforts to conduct scientific whaling from this fishery season, while seeking understanding of relevant nations with a full resolve, and being prepared, if necessary, for withdrawing from the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.” 78 Numerous committee members criticized the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) for having been weak-kneed in international negotiations on whaling, especially with the United States. For example, Diet member Higashi Chikara stated that “the stance of the Fisheries Agency on whaling has been weak. A certain amount of friction with other nations in fisheries diplomacy should be tolerated.”79 The most active participants in the political process were the Diet members who belonged to the whaling policy group established in May 1985 by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 80 Since 1985, LDP Diet members had attended IWC annual meetings.81 In the 1987 IWC meeting, for example, three LDP Diet members were present: Tamazawa Tokuichirô, Kikuchi Fukujirô, and Higashi Chikara.82 Opposition parties were also in favor of whaling. In 1991, not only Higashi Chikara and Matsuura Akira, both LDP Diet members, but also Niimori Tatsuo, a Diet member from the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), attended the IWC meeting.83 In sum, Japan did not adopt the norm against scientific whaling because there were no strong supporters for the norm in its domestic society. Nonetheless, the Japanese government faced no strong societal

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pressures in favor of scientific whaling, either. This fact provides little explanation for the firm stance taken by the Japanese government to ignore a majority view of the IWC against scientific whaling. In the next section, I argue that this firm stance originated from a sense of illegitimacy among Japanese policymakers toward the norm against scientific whaling.

The legitimacy of the norm against scientific whaling In this section, I analyze the legitimacy of the norm against scientific whaling that Japanese policymakers held from 1987 in terms of expressed consent, the norm’s consistency with the existing ideational structure, and intergroup relationship between the norm promoters and dissenters. Expressed consent Between 1987 and 1991, the IWC annually adopted a resolution against Japan’s scientific whaling. Anti-whaling nations and NGOs argued that Japan was ignoring world opinion against scientific whaling.84 Had a prohibition norm on scientific whaling been institutionalized in international society? I argue that it is difficult to conclude so.85 First, none of the resolutions against Japan’s programs were adopted at the IWC by an overwhelming majority. For example, the 1987 resolution was adopted by a vote of 16 in favor, nine against, and six abstentions. The majority was smaller than that of votes for the 1982 moratorium, which was adopted by a vote of 25 in favor and seven against.86 The result was also less critical than those of Iceland’s research program (adopted by a vote of 16 in favor, six against, and nine abstentions) and of the Republic of Korea’s (19, 3, and 9). 87 Once the first Japanese research fleet left for Antarctica in December 1987, the United Kingdom proposed an urgent postal ballot of all IWC member nations regarding a resolution to recommend that the Japanese government refrain from issuing, or withdraw, the special permit for its feasibility study. In February 1988, the resolution was adopted by a simple majority of the mailed votes: 19 out of 27 eligible votes. The Japanese government, however, ignored the resolution, arguing that the adoption of the resolution was invalid since it did not reach a majority of all the member states of the IWC: 41.88 Another postal ballot to recommend that the Japanese government withdraw the issued permit failed to reach a majority of 32 valid votes by one vote in April 1989. 89 On the other hand, although pro-whaling nations accounted for less than a quarter of the IWC members since the early 1980s, the Japanese scientific whaling program was consistently


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supported by at least five other nations in the IWC. They included Norway, whose Prime Minister Gro Brundtland was renowned as one of the environmental world leaders.90 Iceland conducted a four-year scientific whaling program between 1986 and 1989, while Norway started a seven-year research program in 1988. Japan was not isolated in its decision to proceed with scientific whaling. Second, as time went by, IWC resolutions became increasingly less critical about Japan’s scientific whaling (see Table 5.1). The 1987 resolution “RECOMMENDS the Government of Japan to refrain from issuing special permits to its nationals [emphasis in original].”91 In comparison, the June 1989 IWC annual meeting at San Diego adopted a more weakly worded resolution that “INVITES the Government of Japan to reconsider its research program.” This resolution was more in favor of the Japanese government than any previous resolutions on the topic, since “the invitation of reconsideration” was a weaker expression than “the recommendation of refrainment.” Moreover, this resolution was adopted by a smaller majority: 13 votes in favor to six against, with eight abstentions. 92 Judging from these results, Japan’s IWC Commissioner Shima Table 5.1

Votes on Japan’s research whaling for IWC resolutions, 1987–92

Year

Programs*

Strength of wording**

Approval

Disapproval

Abstention

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

SH SH SH SH SH SH

Medium Unknown Weak Weak Weak Very weak

16 19 13 Consensus Consensus Consensus

9 6 6

6 2 8

*SH: Southern Hemisphere **The relative strength of wording in resolutions: • Very strong: The IWC “strongly urges” the Government of Japan to “refrain from issuing” a special permit or to “halt the lethal takes of minke whales.” • Strong: The IWC “requests” the Government of Japan to “refrain from issuing” a special permit. • Medium: The IWC “recommends the Government of Japan to refrain from issuing” a special permits. • Weak: The IWC “invites the Government of Japan to reconsider” its research. • Very weak: The IWC “invites the Government of Japan to continue to reconsider and improve” its research. Source: International Whaling Commission, Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1988–93); Nihon keizai shinbun (16 February 1988), p. 3; Yomiuri shinbun (4 April 1989), p. 1.

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maintained in a 1990 article that the scientific nature of Japan’s scientific whaling was steadily gaining better understanding in the IWC. 93 In the 1990 meeting held at Noordwijk, The Netherlands, the IWC shelved a review of the moratorium, although the Commission was supposed to undertake one by 1990 at the latest. Given the situation against whaling in general, it was the Japanese delegation that strongly called for a reconsideration resolution. This time, the resolution was adopted unanimously.94 A reconsideration resolution was again adopted by consensus at the 1991 IWC meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.95 In the 1992 IWC meeting in Glasgow, for the first time, the IWC unanimously adopted a resolution that “INVITES the Government of Japan to continue to reconsider and improve the proposed research under special permit in 1992/93.”96 The Japanese press reported this as acceptance of Japan’s scientific whaling program. 97 Third, the IWC was a relatively small, specialized organization, although its geographical scope was global. The number of the member nations in 1987 was just 41 among over 150 nations in the world, and only 32 nations attended the IWC annual meeting held in June 1987.98 Moreover, the number of the members dropped to 36 in 1991, and only 30 nations attended the IWC meeting in that year.99 Indeed, nations against Japan’s program numbered only 19 at most. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that a majority of the IWC did not constitute a majority opinion in international society. Finally, the IWC resolutions against Japan’s research programs did not deny the right itself to scientific whaling by contracting governments, as discussed in the following subsection. The resolutions addressed the “problems” of specific scientific whaling programs and concluded that the programs should be postponed until they were solved sufficiently. The 1990 “Resolution on Redirecting Research towards Non-lethal Methods” also cannot deny the right to scientific whaling itself. In short, Japan did not perceive the norm against scientific whaling in general to have been institutionalized in international society, despite some technical criticisms against Japan’s scientific whaling. Ideational consistency Legal rules The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) recognizes the right of the member states to conduct scientific whaling. Article 8.1 of the ICRW stipulates that “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national


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to kill, take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.” In the ICRW, scientific whaling under Article 8 is clearly distinguished from commercial whaling. Thus, scientific whaling does not contravene the commercial whaling moratorium adopted by the IWC in 1982 and accepted by Japan in 1985, nor the Southern Ocean Sanctuary declared by the IWC in 1994, to which Japan lodged an objection with regard to minke whales. Moreover, IWC resolutions under Article 6 of the ICRW calling for the cancellation of Japanese scientific whaling did not legally affect the right of contracting governments to conduct scientific whaling as stipulated under Article 8.100 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Minister Katô Mutsuki stated at the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of the House of Representatives on July 28, 1987 that Japan could not give up scientific whaling just because of a mere recommendation, since the Convention of the IWC stipulated that it was a right of member states to conduct scientific whaling.101 Hence, some Japanese Diet members argued emotionally that such resolutions violated the sovereignty of Japan.102 Japanese scientific whaling was often criticized as “commercial whaling in scientific disguise.” 103 Anti-whaling nations saw Japanese scientific whaling as the exploitation of a loophole in the 1982 moratorium on commercial whaling.104 In 1989, 450 tons of whale meat from the 1988–89 Japanese scientific whaling entered the market. It is apparent that scientific whaling supplied a significant share of all the whale meat in Japan.105 The former Prime Minister and Minister for the Environment of New Zealand, Geoffrey Palmer, stated his concern about Japan’s program in a book on New Zealand’s environmental policy: “The renewed interest in scientific whaling when commercial whaling has been banned New Zealand finds extremely suspicious and of great concern. We have said so. But isn’t it strange that hundreds of tons of whale meat from scientific catches are ending up in commercial markets and on restaurant tables?” 106 Article 8.2 of the ICRW, however, stipulates that whales taken in research should not be wasted: “Any whale taken under these special permits shall so far as practicable be processed and the proceeds shall be dealt with in accordance with directions issued by the Government by which the permit was granted.” The Japanese government maintained that it was dealing with the meat from research in

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accordance with the stipulation, and that the proceeds thus derived, which were far too small to be commercially profitable, were appropriated to research expenses.107 According to Executive Director Nagasaki Fukuzô of the Institute of Cetacean Research, the scientific whaling program in the 1987–88 season cost 1.7 billion yen, which was covered by the sale of meat (1.3 billion yen) as well as government subsidy (350 million yen) and public donations. 108 Japan conducted scientific whaling, not for immediate economic gains but for the maintenance of whaling skills and the accumulation of scientific data in the hope of resuming commercial whaling. As President Inagaki Motonobu of the Japan Whaling Association stated in the Diet, scientific whaling was conducted for not only further proof of sustainable commercial hunting of minke whales in the Antarctic, but also the succession of a body of whaling techniques until the moratorium was lifted.109 In short, Japan saw the norm against scientific whaling as legally illegitimate. Scientific views When the IWC adopted the moratorium in 1982 on the ground that there was “uncertainty” on the status of whale stocks, it also added that the moratorium “will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other catch limits” (Schedule 10 (e) of the ICRW). After 1982, the onus was placed on whaling nations to prove that whales were not endangered.110 The Japanese government had actively participated in the IWC sighting surveys on the minke whale in the Antarctic since 1978, known as the IDCR (International Decade of Cetacean Research) program, by providing researchers, a research vessel, and most of the funding. The Japanese commercial whaling fleet also conducted research from the whales hunted in the Antarctic Ocean, but the data were biased since commercial hunting targeted bigger mature whales in areas where the minke whale was abundant. Scientific whaling could improve this bias by employing a random sampling method.111 In December 1987, the Japanese government took the view that the Japanese research proposal was approved in the special meeting of the scientific committee, and sent the first research fleet to the Antarctic.112 In reality, however, no scientific consensus was reached regarding the Japanese scientific whaling programs at the meeting. 113 An IWC resolution adopted in 1989 also acknowledged that “the Scientific Committee was not unanimous in its view of the [Japanese] research programme.” 114


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The epistemic community of cetologists was divided over several issues.115 Most notably, some cetologists argued that non-lethal methods such as sighting research and skin sampling was enough for resource management and that lethal methods such as scientific whaling were not necessary.116 In response to such criticism, Executive Director of the Institute of Cetacean Researchand marine biologist Nagasaki Fukuzô explained the need for scientific whaling in the British science journal Nature: Undeniably, useful information can be obtained from nonlethal sampling, such as estimates of total abundance. But for assessing population dynamics, it is necessary to kill the animal. In the case of baleen whales such as the minke, the age can be determined by counting the annual rings in the ear plug, for example. Segregative distribution by age, sex and maturity can be determined only by lethal sampling, and this information is essential for the regulation of catches. 117 Scientific knowledge was necessary to resolve the “uncertainty” and to help the IWC in its review process of the commercial whaling moratorium. It seemed illogical to the Japanese government that those who stressed scientific uncertainty opposed Japan’s research programs to solve the uncertainty.118 Considering that anti-whaling scientists initially opposed even the non-lethal IDCR as unscientific, Japanese policymakers believed that the anti-whaling side preferred to avoid solving the uncertainty because they wanted to maintain the commercial whaling moratorium. 119 In short, Japan perceived the norm against scientific whaling as scientifically illegitimate. As Iceland’s IWC Commissioner Gudmundur Eiriksson put it, “We’re seeing the politicisation of scientific research.” 120 It was the plenary sessions of the IWC, not the scientific committee, that adopted resolutions on scientific whaling. Although the plenary sessions take into account reports from the scientific committee, there was much room for political considerations in the plenary sessions because the scientific committee was divided. Some member nations did not take the scientific committee seriously. In the 1987 IWC meeting, the Japanese government noted that among 16 nations consistently opposing scientific whaling, seven nations did not attend the scientific committee and another seven did not submit progress reports on research. 121 The politicization of science was also seen in the scientific committee as well, where so-called “migratory scientists,” mainly from the United States, attended IWC meetings as advisers to, or acting as representatives for, such nations

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as the Seychelles, St Lucia, and St Vincent. 122 Since almost all governments of the IWC non-whaling nations had moved in a preservationist direction, conservation-minded cetologists had lost policy influence. 123 As Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran put it, whaling “is to a large extent not an ecological, but a moral, issue.”124 British newspaper The Independent of June 1, 1991 agrees with this view, stating that: opponents of whaling within the commission have cloaked their ethical concerns in the language of science . . . Increasingly, however, some member nations of the commission are frustrated by its constitution, which prevents them from openly debating the true issues: the ethical concerns of those opposed to whaling as against the economic case put forward by the whaling nations. The scientific debates were strongly influenced by different moral principles. Moral principles James Scarff point outs three main ethical issues with regard to the management of whales and small cetaceans: “(a) the morality of risking or actually causing the extinction of species or smaller taxonomic units, (b) the humaneness of hunting techniques, and (c) the ethical propriety of killing cetaceans for human use.”125 The first point is related to the conservation of species while the rest are concerned with the welfare or rights of individual animals. In particular, the last ethical issue could lead to the preservation or complete protection of species. Initially, anti-whaling nations at the IWC stressed the first ethical issue: scientific uncertainty regarding the impact of whaling on whales.126 The Japanese government also accepted, or at least used, the conservation principle and repeatedly reminded anti-whaling nations of the conservation spirit of the ICRW, or “a convention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry” (the Preamble). This was why the Japanese government mainly targeted the abundant minke whale, not endangered whales, such as the 700 blue whales in the Antarctic Ocean.127 In the Special Meeting in December 1987 of the scientific committee, “Many members noted . . . that the take of 300 whales for one year would be unlikely to adversely affect the overall status and trends in the stock.”128 In 1987, the IWC scientific committee estimated the exploitable population of the southern hemisphere minke whale at 287,000.129 In 1990, the IWC scientific committee estimated that


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there were approximately 760,000 minke whales in the Antarctic Ocean with the number increasing, and calculated catch limits at 4853.130 The Economist argues that “human beings’ fuss about the whale is caused less by the threat of extinction than by the fact that it is an attractive fellow mammal . . . Now the argument is a straight question of animal rights.” 131 As a British scientist J. A. Gulland puts it, “The ‘whale war’ is, to a large extent, no longer concerned with conservation.” 132 Once it became scientifically proved that the minke whales were not endangered, however, anti-whaling nations started to stress the second ethical issue: the inhumane aspect of whaling.133 In 1991, the British government was reportedly considering a proposal to the IWC to allow for the resumption of commercial whaling, based on the latest scientific report on whales. In his letter to a group of members of the Parliament (MPs), British Agricultural Minister John Gummer mentioned that it was now “difficult to say that controlled and highly limited catches of whales would harm the stock,” 134 but he soon yielded to the pressures of anti-whaling NGOs. 135 In May 1991, he reassured members of Greenpeace and Wildlife Link that the British Government would not allow the resumption of commercial whaling.136 The Guardian reported that he “switched his argument to refusing to accept resumption of whaling until a humane way of killing them is found.”137 Since 1975, the IWC has discussed the humaneness of whaling methods, although the issue is not explicitly covered by the ICRW. 138 In 1981, the IWC adopted a ban on the use of non-explosive harpoons and in response, Japan introduced the explosive harpoon for the minke in 1984.139 The Japanese government took the view that since the time necessary for killing whales had been shortened from four to two minutes by introducing the penthrite harpoon, this ethical problem had been settled. 140 The largest concern among most anti-whaling supporters was the third ethical issue: the ethical propriety of killing cetaceans for human use. Most of them believed that humans should not kill whales even for scientific purposes, let alone consume the meat of whales because they were ethically distinguished from other species. Scarff illustrates this point as follows: “If all animals have the same rights, then a proponent of complete protection for whales would logically have to support complete protection of most or all other animals eaten as human food. To avoid this extreme position, whale protectionists generally argue that the rights of whales are greater than those of other animals.”141 For example, WWF President Kathryn Fuller made such a distinction in her 1995 statement: “To World Wildlife Fund, whales are for watching.

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We oppose commercial whaling because whales have an intrinsic value as mammals of great intelligence, whose behavior and language set them apart.”142 From the perspective of the special status of the whale, anti-whaling people believed that all humans should neither kill nor consume the meat of intelligent whales.143 Nonetheless, the third ethical issue, “the ethical propriety of killing cetaceans for human use,” does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ICRW. 144 In 1980, for example, a meeting on the behavior and intelligence of whales and on the ethics of whaling was held outside the IWC regime.145 Andrew Morgan of The Times pointed out that “To a large extent the whaling commission’s problems stem from its failure to decide if all killing of whales is unacceptable.”146 Indeed, the preservationist argument was not officially made in IWC meetings. It appears, however, that Japanese policymakers sensed a preservationist value at the bottom of opposition to Japan’s scientific whaling.147 Shima Kazuo, Japanese commissioner to the IWC, stated in 1993 that “It is really deplorable that the IWC has become an organization to protect the rights of whales.”148 Special treatment of whales was not accepted by Japan, which traditionally treated the whale as one type of fish. 149 A survey, designed by Freeman and Kellert and conducted by Gallupaffiliated organizations in six nations in 1992, shows that 64 percent of the Japanese respondents answered that “There is nothing wrong with whaling if it is properly regulated” while 24 percent opposed the “hunting of whales under any circumstances.”150 In essence, difference in views on “the ethical propriety of killing cetaceans for human use,” was the fundamental source of conflict between the pro- and the anti-whaling camps. Japan did not recognize the legitimacy of the norm against scientific whaling ethically.151 Japanese policymakers also feared that if the preservation principle was established in the whaling case, it could be applied to other species in the future as well. Whaling maintained importance politically rather than economically. 152 The Fisheries Agency stressed the legitimacy of sustainable use of living resources.153 Yonezawa Kunio, former Japanese representative to the IWC, argued that: For Japan to withdraw from the IWC might please extremists, but it would not necessarily help our concern for sustainable whaling or further our larger cause. The larger cause we stand for goes well beyond the immediate issue of whaling. It encompasses much broader questions, among which are the fundamental human right to use natural resources responsibly; mutual respect for


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divergent cultural and ethical values; and freedom from the tyranny of the majority.154 In this sense, the whale became a symbol of conservation in Japan, as a result of which the whaling issue became more politicized than expected from the economic size of the whaling industry. Intergroup relationship In the past, anti-whaling movements angered the Japanese government. In the 1978 IWC meeting, radical anti-whaling activists poured red ink over the Japanese representative, while screaming that “This is whale blood.” In the next year, environmentalists burnt the national flag of Japan in front of the meeting site.155 As stated in Chapter 3, moreover, although Japan withdrew its objection to the moratorium in 1985 for protecting Japanese fishing boats in the American zone, the United States excluded them in 1988 after all. Japan accepted the moratorium out of coercion, not legitimacy, and later felt betrayed by the United States. Anti-US feelings existed among Japanese Diet members, especially those who belonged to the Diet committees on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Niimori Tatsuo of the Japan Socialist Party said that the United States, which threatened to impose sanctions under domestic law on other member nations, was unreasonable.156 The International Herald Tribune of January 23, 1988 reported that “The official, Kenichi Unno, a division director in the Fisheries Agency, said ‘it was not proper’ for Washington to threaten to apply the amendment since Japan had gone through ‘all the necessary procedures’ requested by the United States last autumn.” Aboriginal whaling in the United States also seemed contradictory to the Japanese.157 The Japanese policymakers knew that the US government allowed the Inuit in Alaska to conduct subsistence whaling of bowhead whales, one of the most endangered whales.158 At the 1987 IWC meeting, the quota for the United States increased from 26 to 35. 159 In the “Save the Whale” movement, anti-whaling activists employed several campaign strategies that angered the Japanese policymakers. One strategy for publicity was direct action that was photographed or filmed for the viewing of its current and potential members. For example, Greenpeace repeatedly obstructed the activities of the Japanese scientific whaling fleet in the Antarctic Ocean.160 The Japanese Institute of Cetacean Research condemned the deeds of Greenpeace as “terrorism in the guise of protecting the environment.”161 In Japan, where its activities on whaling attracted the most attention, Greenpeace was perceived as a radical group. Journalists Michael Brown and John May attribute

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the unpopularity of Greenpeace in Japan to the harmony-oriented society where people perceived the organization’s “direct activities” as violence.162 Another strategy of anti-whaling activists was to call the campaign the “Whale War” and to highlight the difference between “us” (whales and whale-lovers) and “them” (whale-killers).163 Anti-whaling campaigners successfully personified whales and identified them as the mates of humans.164 Arne Kalland argues that since people know little about the whale, anti-whaling activists easily created the romanticized “super-whale myth” in which whales were described as “lovely,” “gentle,” “peaceful,” “graceful,” “magnificent,” “delightful,” “beautiful,” “playful,” “loyal,” and “innocent,” and that for those who believed the myth, “caring for whales became a metaphor for kindness, for being ‘good’.” Similarly, it was easy to depict whalers as “cruel,” “brutal,” “reckless,” “barbaric,” “insatiably greedy,” “butchers,” “savages,” and “sadists,” since the whalers were rare and unfamiliar to the public in anti-whaling nations.165 Japan’s former IWC Commissioner Shima Kazuo, who was also former Fisheries Agency Deputy Director-General, notes this identification strategy by environmentalists: The anti-whaling groups constructed their campaigns like a drama, with high emotional content to wring money from the public. They cast themselves as heroes seeking to protect the fair maiden (whales) from a villain (Japan). Their campaigns were designed to evoke fear (the alleged extinction of the world’s largest animals), love and hate. To Westerners, the Japanese were the perfect villains. All of the stereotypes of Pacific War propaganda were rolled out to depict Japanese as cruel, barbaric, and inhumane.166 Anti-whaling activists focused on the protection of symbolic animals and turned public attention away from more ecologically important issues such as mass consumption. 167 Meanwhile, whalers became “ideal scapegoats for environmental disasters and human cruelty.”168 With such an antagonistic relationship between anti-whaling NGOs and Japanese policymakers, the latter guarded itself against the former. 169 Moreover, the salience of identity-difference discourse in this issue is attributable to the fact that whaling has a cultural aspect. The Japanese whaling industry has a 400-year history. Some scholars maintain that whaling culture exists in Japan. A workshop regarding Japanese small-type coastal whaling held in April 1988 defined the concept of whaling culture as “the shared knowledge of whaling transmitted across generations”


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that was composed of “a number of different sociocultural inputs: a common heritage and world view, an understanding of ecological (including spiritual) and technological relations between human beings and whales, special distribution processes, and a food culture.”170 By extending this concept to Japanese large-type coastal and pelagic whaling as well, Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran, attendants at the workshop, argue that a Japanese whaling culture exists at two levels. 171 At the village level, local whaling cultures have been formed along with the development of local community identities consisting of religious rituals and beliefs about whaling and the diet and gift-giving of whale meat. As for rituals, whalers and their families went to shrines “to give thanks for good catches and for whalers’ protection at sea” and to temples “to pray for the souls of killed whales.” 172 At the national level, local cultures have been integrated into a national whaling culture by whaling companies’ recruitment of employees from all over the country and by linkages between whaling companies through mergers, acquisitions, and joint operations. A service for dead whales was also conducted annually for pelagic commercial whaling in the Antarctic at Zôjô Temple and others until Japan ceased whaling under the moratorium.173 With the decline in whale meat consumption, however, the whaling culture was on the verge of extinction as the scale of the industry dwindled to nearly zero. Kyôdô Senpaku, the only whaling company that has survived, no longer employs whalers from coastal whaling towns.174 In response to the anti-whaling movement, Japanese politicians attempted to promote public awareness about the cultural tradition of whaling and eating whale meat in Japan to legitimize continuation of whaling. For example, the government organized whale meat parties, held fund-raising meetings for research programs, and designated whaling boat events in Mie Prefecture as intangible national cultural assets.175 The government of Japan also emphasized a special need for whale meat of people with allergies to other kinds of meat such as beef. 176 Since the IWC accepted aboriginal subsistence whaling as a new noncommercial category for cultural reasons, the Japanese delegations stressed a cultural aspect in Japanese small-type coastal whaling so that it might be accepted as aboriginal whaling.177 The Japanese culture of whaling has partially been sustained by the government. It is ironic that anti-whaling campaigns consequently prolonged the life of the Japanese whaling industry. The perception that Japan’s whaling culture, especially the consumption of whale meat, was denied by foreigners promoted race identification and provoked a sense of national

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identity. As Kalland and Moeran put it, “since few other peoples eat whale meat, this habit also sets the Japanese apart from others.” 178 Japan’s then-IWC Commissioner Shima Kazuo said that “The issue of whaling is a confrontation between the meat-eating race and the fish-eating race.”179 Similarly, Diet member Niimori Tatsuo (Japan Socialist Party) stated that “To argue that it is cruel to kill whales and dolphins while it is not to eat beef and pork is to impose the value of the meat-eating race on the fish-eating race.”180 The Japanese policymakers perceived anti-whaling movements as cultural imperialism, which in turn fueled nationalism among the Japanese policymakers. 181 Some pro-whaling Japanese also believed that the issue of whaling reflected racist, anti-Japanese feelings in the West. 182 Anti-whaling nations – the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the United States – were enemies of Japan in World War II. Many prisoners of these nations suffered in Japanese camps in and around the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, some of these nations were suffering from trade imbalances with Japan. Some Japanese officials emphasize the difference between the Japanese and the “Anglo-Saxons” (the Americans, the British, the Australians, and the New Zealanders).183 Niimori Tatsuo called the first IWC resolution against Japan’s scientific whaling program “Japan Bashing.”184 Assistant Director Okamoto Junichirô of the Far Seas Fisheries Division of the Fisheries Agency said that “The more the whaling issue becomes a racial or moral one, the more the Japanese will be unwilling to accept it . . . It has become a matter of international pride.”185 It seems wrong, however, to argue that the anti-whaling campaign was “racist” since it “ignores the fact that if the movement is anti-Japanese, it must also be anti-Norwegian, anti-Icelandic and antiSoviet.” 186 Moreover, it should be noted that some Japanese politicians consciously used such terms as “cultural imperialism” and “racism” to provoke a nationalistic sentiment among the people for the protection of Japanese whaling. 187 Nonetheless, a sense of persecution among some Japanese people played a role in enhancing the legitimacy of whaling.

Conclusion Realist and liberal explanations are not sufficient to explain the case of scientific whaling. The absence of credible economic threats by the United States enabled Japan to continue scientific whaling, although it remains a puzzle to realists why the United States was constrained by the norm against unilateral sanctions generated by GATT and UNCED.


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On the other hand, the Japanese government was not under strong anti-whaling pressures from its domestic society. The whaling industry was also too small to pressure the government to continue scientific whaling. Without salient societal pressures, Japanese state actors were eager to continue scientific whaling, although a majority at the International Whaling Commission supported the norm against scientific whaling. I argue that the key to understanding Japan’s exceptional resistance to this norm is the illegitimacy of the norm in the eyes of Japanese policymakers. First, a norm against scientific whaling was not institutionalized in international society. Second, the norm presented striking contrasts to existing legal rules and moral principles, although scientists were divided about Japan’s research programs. On the surface, the whaling issue was located in the discourse of legality and science at the international or transnational level. Fundamentally, however, the issue is a political contestation of domestic values over the ethical question that humans can kill whales for food on a sustainable basis. Third, interaction over norms against commercial and scientific whaling produced an enmity relationship and invoked a sense of Japanese nationalism. Japanese state actors often argued that they could not accept the norm because they had “pride.” According to this argument, their defiance was based on the logic of appropriateness rather than expected consequences. In short, Japanese state actors perceived the prohibition norm as strongly illegitimate.

6 Case Three: Ivory Trade

International trade in African elephant ivory has been subject to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) since 1978. In that year, the African elephant was listed in the CITES Appendix II, which regulates trade in the items that are deemed to be at the risk of becoming endangered. The worldwide trade ban on African elephant ivory dates back to the seventh CITES conference in October 1989 when the African elephant was listed in the CITES Appendix I, which bans the commercial trade in endangered species and their products. During the process leading up to the conference, an ivory trade ban became the most politically important issue. Japan, the biggest importer of ivory, became a target of criticism by environmental NGOs, the mass media, and the public in North America and Western Europe. Eventually, in 1989, Japan agreed to list the African elephant in the CITES Appendix I. This chapter first describes the development of a prohibition norm against trade in African elephant ivory. Then, it attempts realist and liberal explanations as to why Japan accepted the norm. Finally, I focus on the legitimacy of the international norm in terms of expressed consent, consistency with the existing ideational structure, and intergroup relationship between the norm promoters and the Japanese policymakers in charge.

Norm building In the 1980s, the species that attracted the most attention at CITES conferences was the African elephant. In 1976, Ghana listed the African elephant in Appendix III.1 Although the African elephant was listed in Appendix II as well in 1978, international trade in ivory rose due to the 98

Case Three: Ivory Trade

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rise in the price from three to ten US dollars a pound in the 1960s to around 200 US dollars a pound in the 1980s.2 The issue of the ivory trade attracted special attention at the fourth CITES conference in Gaborone, Botswana. At the conference, a sectional meeting decided to form guidelines to control trade in processed ivory and reached the conclusion that it was urgent to regulate trade in raw ivory as well.3 In 1986, CITES introduced a quota system for raw ivory exports with a view to toughening control of the international trade.4 At first consideration, this quota system seems to have worked very well. The volume of the registered ivory trade declined dramatically from 711,534 kg in 1985 to 176,167 kg in 1988.5 The real effectiveness of the system was controversial, however, because the fall in trade was attributable to elephant population reductions and evasion of the ivory monitoring systems.6 The quota system had at least three major shortcomings. First, the quotas were set at the amount that each producer country assessed as sustainable. Second, ivory poaching within national boundaries was beyond the control of the system. Third, it was possible to legalize poached ivory by transferring it from one country to another in Africa. 7 The sixth CITES conference in 1987 concluded that the ivory trade was reducing the African elephant population but it did not take any measures to control the trade.8 “At the beginning of 1989, not one African country was in favor of a ban on ivory trading. Nor had a single Western country called for one.” 9 It is worth emphasizing here that environmental NGOs have played key roles in the CITES regime. As Thomas Princen puts it, “the endangered species trade regime is very much a product of non-governmental forces.”10 In particular, the World Conservation Union (IUCN), 11 the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), 12 and the Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce (TRAFFIC)13 were critical players. The IUCN advocates conservation of nature and natural resources. Its members range from states and governmental institutions to NGOs. It played an important part in establishing the CITES regime. 14 The WWF and TRAFFIC are independent of the IUCN. Nonetheless, the WWF, the world’s largest environmental NGO, is considered “the fund-raising arm” of the IUCN.15 WWF made contributions to elephant protection projects and attempted to raise public consciousness on the fate of the African elephant in ivory consuming countries. 16 In 1990, WWF spent more than 2.7 million dollars on elephant programs. 17 On the other hand, TRAFFIC, funded by local WWF organizations, is a network monitoring the wildlife trade for the IUCN. Sakaguchi Isao points out that the IUCN and TRAFFIC have formed a biological epistemic community and a trade management epistemic community respectively for CITES.18

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In early 1989, main conservation-oriented NGOs did not support any ivory trade ban, following the principle of sustainable utilization stipulated in the World Conservation Strategy, as discussed in Chapter 3. 19 By contrast, animal rights groups such as Friends of the Animals (FoA) had advocated an ivory trade ban throughout the decade.20 At the end of 1988, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), which was established by defectors from Greenpeace who criticized the NGO as too moderate,21 started a campaign for the boycott of ivory products by exposing the illegal ivory trade and appealing to public sentiment through television programs in the United Kingdom and the United States.22 At this stage, there was “a division within the NGO community” between conservationist NGOs and preservationist NGOs. 23 During the first half of 1989, preservation-oriented NGOs increasingly popularized a norm against the ivory trade. They intensified mass media campaigns, which successfully affected public opinion in North America and Western Europe.24 The African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) became the first major conservationist NGO to advocate a ban on ivory trading by announcing its policy on May 5, 1989. 25 In the meantime, the NGOs pushed governments to side with their stance: in February 1989, for example, 32 NGOs submitted a petition to the US Government. 26 Moreover, the EIA successfully persuaded Tanzania to support an ivory trade ban, with the result that the state proposed the Appendix I listing of the African elephant on May 10, 1989. 27 In the meantime, FoA was also successful in lobbying Kenya, Austria, Gambia, Somalia, and Hungary to submit a similar proposal; the United States also handed in another proposal for a trade ban.28 The increasing support by the Western public and African governments for an ivory trade ban could no longer be ignored by the WWF, especially the financial division of WWF US, which greatly depended on the financial support of its 600,000 members.29 The WWF was also under attack by animal rights groups. For example, FoA asked its members to protest against the WWF. One WWF member wrote that “WWF is feverishly lobbying to prevent the total ban on ivory products that even the world’s foremost experts on elephants say is needed to save the species and instead lobbying against a full ban . . . Much to my dismay, I am going to have to cancel my membership in your organization and will encourage all my friends to do the same.”30 Raymond Bonner points out the dilemma faced by the WWF, by referring to an internal document of WWF US: “Most of these members are more traditionally oriented towards species ‘preservation,’ and there is little understanding of the complexities of conservation in Africa in the 1980s, particularly where


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wildlife utilization programs are concerned.”31 According to Bonner, the WWF US took the initiative in aligning the WWF with other environmental and animal welfare groups.32 Finally, on June 1, 1989, the WWF, together with Wildlife Conservation International (WCI), a conservation division of the New York Zoological Society, announced its new stance to endorse the Appendix I listing of the African elephant. In addition, they asked all ivory importing countries to take immediate action to stop the commercial import of ivory so that the ivory trade would not rise in anticipation of a CITES ban in October.33 The WWF/WCI announcement immediately accelerated international developments toward a blanket ivory trade ban. 34 As Princen puts it, the “WWF’s support of the trade ban was arguably a key factor in building the momentum in 1989 to the October meeting.”35 Within ten days of the announcement, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom declared an immediate moratorium; within a month, Switzerland and the European Economic Community (EEC) followed these decisions.36 In the United States, the Bush administration allegedly had lost favor with the environmentalists due, for example, to its responses to the disastrous oil spill from the Exxon Valdez tanker off the coast of Alaska. Thus, it had been looking for a new environmental policy to please environmentalists on the occasion of World Environment Day on June 5, but without offending any domestic businesses. Worth noting here is a close working relationship between the WWF US and the US administration, especially the State Department. In most developed countries, governments were under public pressure to stop importing ivory. For these countries, an ivory trade ban was “a ‘low cost’ environmental action” 37 since they did not have significant ivory industries. The Economist of July 1, 1989 reported that “The momentum behind a ban has gathered pace at an astonishing rate in the past month.” 38 At the July meeting of the African Elephant Working Group (AEWG) of CITES, there was a heated confrontation between East African nations calling for a total ban and southern African nations opposing it. 39 Behind this conflict lay the fact that the change in elephant population varied in each country. East African nations such as Kenya and Tanzania saw a drastic decrease in their elephant populations in the 1980s, largely due to poaching.40 For Kenya, the elephant is one of its “big five” wildlife draws, along with lions, rhinos, cheetahs, and giraffes. Although Kenya outlawed the ivory trade in 1978, the elephant population diminished from 65,000 in 1981 to 18,000 in 1989, according to the African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group.41 In September 1988, the President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi, furthermore ordered that poachers be shot

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on sight. He also set light to an ivory pile worth some two million pounds as part of a campaign against poaching on July 18.42 The elephant population in Tanzania decreased from 203,900 in 1981 to 75,000 in 1989.43 Under such circumstances, East African nations contended that a global ban was necessary for the protection of their elephants, since ivory poached in their countries was being exported as southern African elephant ivory with forged export permits.44 On the other hand, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa successfully stabilized or increased their elephant populations with effective conservation management. 45 The elephant population increased in Botswana from 20,000 in 1981 to 58,000 in 1989; in South Africa from 8000 to 8200; in Zimbabwe from 47,000 to 49,000.46 These countries were comparatively untouched by poaching. In South Africa, for example, “The game scouts are well paid, well trained and well motivated.”47 In fact, South Africa and Zimbabwe needed to cull elephants every year. In addition, Malawi and Namibia also had a stable or increasing elephant population. However, this pro-trade group was a minority in Africa.48 Consequently, these countries objected to a worldwide ban on the ivory trade. They argued that profits from selling the ivory of culled elephants was necessary for their conservation programs49 and for compensation for the farmers whose lands were devastated by elephants. 50 Furthermore, they declared that they would submit official reservations if the October Conference adopted a worldwide ban.51 Following this development, the IUCN-WWF-TRAFFIC coalition reached a conclusion to propose “split listing,” in which the elephants in southern African countries would remain in the category of the CITES Appendix II on the condition of a two-year moratorium on the ivory trade. 52 At the seventh CITES meeting held at Lausanne, Switzerland, the ivory trade became a dominant issue. 53 Eight hundred representatives of 92 countries attended this meeting along with over 135 international organizations and NGOs; this was the largest number of participants for a CITES meeting at that time.54 Initially, the split-listing proposal looked promising, but some pro-preservation NGOs such as the EIA successfully convinced the IUCN-WWF-TRAFFIC coalition to support the so-called Somali amendment. Somalia proposed to list all the African elephants in Appendix I in exchange for the compromise to set up a special review process to admit the downgrading of certain sustainable elephant populations back to Appendix II at a future CITES conference.55 According to David Western, chairman of the African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group of the IUCN, “the United States, Europe and several African countries came with mandates to vote Appendix I, no compromise.” 56


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After more than a week of heated debate, the Somali amendment was adopted by a two-thirds majority in a major committee, and the decision was formally approved at the plenary session on October 17, 1989. 57 In the 1970s and early 1980s, Japan’s raw ivory imports were stable at a level of 300 tons a year, but in 1983 and 1984, they exceeded 450 tons. Under the CITES regulations, the re-export of specimens of Appendix II species requires the attachment of re-export certificates. Until April 1985, however, Japan imported ivory from intermediary countries without their re-export certificates if an export permit of a country of origin was attached to the ivory.58 Princen argues that approximately 80 percent of Japanese imports in 1984 were illegal. 59 In July 1984, international condemnation of Japan’s loose control on ivory import peaked at a special regional meeting for African parties to CITES in Brussels. As a result, in December 1984, the Japanese government and industry agreed to introduce an import policy documenting each ivory transaction and then to submit the documents to the CITES Secretariat for verification. This regulation, along with the introduction of a CITES export quota system in 1986, cut Japan’s imports of ivory from 475 tons in 1983 and 1984 to a level of 100 tons per year in the latter half of the 1980s. The demand for ivory products by the Japanese consumers dropped in proportion to the rise in price. In late 1988, moreover, Japan strengthened its import controls on worked ivory from intermediary countries.60 Nevertheless, Japan maintained the world’s largest demand for ivory, which environmentalists tied to the dwindling number of African elephants. In the face of foreign pressure in the spring of 1989, Japan attempted to secure the amount of ivory sufficient for the industry to survive. 61 In April 1989, Japan insisted upon the effectiveness of the CITES export quota system, at least with respect to Japan’s import of ivory, and opposed the Appendix I listing of the African elephant. Instead, it considered proposing the strengthening of the CITES export quota system, the elimination of illegal traders, the strengthening of regulations on processed ivory, and financial contributions by ivory traders to the CITES Secretariat. By April 1989, Japan had recognized the problems of ivory poaching and the illegal ivory trade and the need to eliminate them, but attempted to minimize regulations on Japan’s import of ivory.62 In 1989, there were three major changes in Japan’s policy on the import of African elephant ivory. First, on June 15, following the unilateral declaration of a moratorium on ivory import by the United States and European countries, Japan announced a ban, effective on June 19, on the import of all ivory except raw ivory directly exported from producer countries in Africa.63 This announcement meant a substantial cut in ivory

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imports because the raw ivory that Japan imported directly from states of origin between 1986 and 1988 accounted for only about 13.6 percent of its total imports of raw ivory. Second, on September 20, Japan started a provisional ban on ivory import by incorporating raw ivory from countries of origin into the import quota system and setting the quota at zero for the rest of the year. 64 Finally, on October 30, just after the CITES conference, Japan officially agreed to accept the ban.65 In other words, Japan decided to continue its provisional import ban on all ivory as long as the African elephant was listed in Appendix I.

Alternative explanations Material power of the United States The United States took the initiative in establishing the CITES regime. 66 At the 1989 CITES meeting, the United States maintained its firm stance for a total ban on ivory trading.67 There is some evidence suggesting that the United States implicitly pressured Japan to stop its ivory import. 68 In July 1989, Japanese Prime Minister Uno Sôsuke met United States President George Bush in Paris just before the G7 Summit meeting. It was reported that Prime Minister Uno expressed understanding of the United States’ policy of a total ivory ban and promised serious reconsideration of Japan’s policy on ivory import. 69 After the 1989 CITES conference, the State Department of the United States officially welcomed Japan’s decision not to file a reservation to the trade ban on ivory.70 The United States, however, did not threaten Japan with economic sanctions as it did Zimbabwe. The United States allegedly threatened to reduce its official development assistance (ODA) to Zimbabwe, a leading anti-ban country. According to Bonner, a US official told his Zimbabwe counterparts that “they should keep in mind the economic assistance that the United States provided to Zimbabwe.”71 The United States had the 1988 African Elephant Conservation Act that “gave the president the authority to ban the import of ivory from countries that were not complying with CITES or were dealing in illegal ivory.” 72 Nevertheless, it did not possess any legal measures to conduct economic sanctions against Japan’s import of ivory. In short, the material power of the United States was not a factor in Japan’s decision to accept an ivory trade ban. Political pressures from societal groups In the Japanese ivory industry, there were some 100 companies employing approximately 700 people for importing and processing ivory. 73


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The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) estimated the business to be worth some 20 billion yen at the wholesale level in 1988.74 According to TRAFFIC Japan, an NGO monitoring the wildlife trade, 64 percent of the raw ivory imported to Japan in 1988 was processed into personal seals (hanko) which are used in place of a signature on official documents in Japan, while the rest was used in musical instrument parts such as piano keys and shamisen plectrums (12 percent); sculptures and netsuke (traditional toggles on a kimono) (6 percent); jewelry (8 percent); and other accessories such as cigarette holders, chopsticks, and polished tusks (10 percent). 75 Many of the major ivory importers, manufacturers, and carvers were in Tokyo or Osaka, and belonged to the Tokyo Ivory Arts and Crafts Association (Tokyo zôge bijutsu kôgei kyôdô kumiai; 47 companies with 250 to 260 employees) or the Osaka Ivory Arts and Crafts Association (Osaka zôge bijutsu kôgei kyôdô kumiai; slightly fewer than 30 companies with 300 employees). The Japan Ivory Arts and Crafts Association (Nihon zôge bijutsu kôgei kyôdô kumiai) functioned as an agent of the two organizations. These associations were under the jurisdiction of MITI, which is Japan’s CITES management authority. The ivory industry was under the jurisdiction of the Recreation and Miscellaneous Goods Division of the Consumer Goods Industries Bureau of MITI. The Import Division of the International Trade Administration Bureau of MITI was in charge of ivory imports. In order to implement a new import policy in compliance with CITES regulations, MITI established the Japan Ivory Importers’ Association (JIIA) in late 1984 as the ivory unit of the Japan General Merchandise Importers Association (JGMIA) (Nihon keikôgyôhin yunyû kumiai), which had been under the jurisdiction of MITI. 76 On behalf of the Ministry, the JIIA implemented a pre-customs clearance check for its members with the Ivory Unit of the CITES Secretariat. The JIIA members were engaged in some 90 percent of Japan’s total imports of ivory. 77 Most of them had already been members of one of the Tokyo or Osaka associations.78 It appears that MITI took the initiative in creating the new ivory association so that it could enhance its influence and control over the activities of ivory importers (some 30 companies). The Japanese liaison conference of seven CITES-related ministries (Washington jôyaku kankei shôchô renraku kaigi) included the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), the Environment Agency, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). In the Japanese government, MAFF and the Environment Agency were the scientific authorities of CITES. MAFF was in a position to give advice on the fish and vegetation sections of the CITES appendices. The Environment Agency was in charge

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of mammals, birds, and amphibia.79 The Environment Agency also chaired the liaison conference of the CITES-related ministries. With regard to ivory, the Wildlife Protection Division of the Nature Conservation Bureau maintained close contacts with MITI and the ivory industry. The Environment Agency’s perception of the industry was positive. An Environment Agency official stated that “It is right to support the clean and transparent industry with good intentions toward the African elephants. Otherwise, the activities of the industry would go underground.” 80 On the other hand, MOFA had authority over international treaties including CITES.For example, MOFA was concerned about the consistency with GATT of Japan’s import restriction on ivory prior to the 1989 conference.81 Japan had several transgovernmental and transnational links in the CITES regime. First, Japanese organizations had close relations with the CITES Secretariat, which was run by 20 staff members with a budget of three million dollars a year. The Japanese government maintained a close tie with the Secretariat through a Japanese officer who worked there between 1985 and 1992, and then through an official seconded from the Environment Agency to the Secretariat between 1992 and 1995.82 The ivory industry donated financial contributions to the Secretariat. The JIIA members levied a 1.2 percent surcharge on the declared value of their ivory imports to establish a fund, from which they made annual contributions to the ivory unit of the CITES Secretariat.83 The mass media widely reported the industrial tie as a bribe, but the contributions were made in line with a resolution adopted by a CITES conference. 84 Second, the Environment Agency had been a member of the IUCN since 1978.85 Third, the WWF and TRAFFIC established their respective branch offices, WWF Japan and TRAFFIC Japan, in 1971 and in 1982.86 The WWF was more widely accepted in Japan than Greenpeace. The membership of WWF Japan comprised 39,020 individuals and 1419 companies.87 In 1989, WWF Japan worked with the Nature Conservation Society of Japan on the Red Data Book of Japanese Vascular Plants, which formed part of the Red Data Book of Japan published in 1991 by the Environment Agency. 88 On the other hand, TRAFFIC Japan, staffed with one director and three office workers in the late 1980s, kept a close eye on Japan’s import of ivory and investigated the Japanese ivory industry. The NGO worked in conjunction with the Japanese ivory industry and the Japanese government.89 For example, the Japan General Merchandise Importers Association provided TRAFFIC Japan with data on Japan’s imports of ivory. 90 A few times a year, TRAFFIC Japan submits to the


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Environment Agency and MITI a formal report to improve Japan’s ivory import system. The Environment Agency worked with the NGO, for example, to promote public awareness of the 1987 Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. 91 MITI largely depended on the NGO for information on the state of the ivory trade and the industry.92 Most notably, “TRAFFIC (Japan) played a leading role in working with the Japanese government and the ivory importers to establish an interim import policy, including a ban on all worked ivory imports and raw ivory imports from non-CITES and non-producing countries.”93 On May 30, 1989, just two days before the WWF and the WCI called for an immediate moratorium on the international ivory trade, TRAFFIC Japan held a meeting with representatives of the Japanese government and the industry to explain the press release and to persuade them to implement an import moratorium at least on all processed ivory. On June 7, TRAFFIC Japan proposed several policy options, such as a ban on ivory import by nonmembers of the Japan Ivory Importers’ Association (JIIA), an import ban on all processed and semi-processed ivory, or on all ivory products from non-CITES countries.94 At this stage, TRAFFIC Japan did not suggest an immediate import ban on all kinds of ivory, which was likely to face strong opposition from the government and the industry. In early June, many developed countries suddenly decided to stop importing ivory. Although the amount of Japan’s ivory imports was only a quarter of that in a peak year, Japan perceived the need to reduce further the amount of its ivory imports in order to avert a worldwide ban on the ivory trade.95 On June 9, 1989, along the line of TRAFFIC Japan’s suggestions, the liaison conference of seven CITES-related ministries decided to reduce the consumption of ivory, particularly worked ivory, and to call for the establishment of an international elephant conservation fund. Moreover, the government and the ivory trade association agreed to a total import ban on worked ivory, and to refrain from buying Hong Kong ivory. Japan imported an annual average of 25 tons of worked ivory.96 On June 15, MITI announced a total ban on the import not only of worked ivory, but also of raw ivory from any country other than African producer countries. The industry also announced a resolution on voluntary import controls by the four ivory associations. The resolution aimed for a substantial reduction in ivory imports and the elimination of poached or smuggled ivory.97 In this way, the Japanese government and the industry sought a way for the ivory industry to survive with raw ivory directly imported from African

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producer countries. 98 Although it fell short of a comprehensive ban, the WWF praised the Japanese decision.99 After June 15, 1989, MITI continued to put pressure on the trade associations to decrease the import of ivory.100 In September, however, MITI found that some members of the associations ignored their selfrestraint resolution. In secret, they imported 20 tons of ivory between June 15, when MITI announced the partial ban, and June 19, when the ban entered into force.101 Moreover, despite the import-cutting principle behind the resolution, ivory imports from June to August 1989 had reached as much as 60 percent of the total for 1988. By September, Japan’s importation of ivory had increased to a level of 100 tons, the amount imported in the previous year.102 The trade associations did not sufficiently control their members. Under such circumstances, MITI introduced a provisional ban on ivory import on September 20. 103 When the government decided to accept the ivory trade ban in October, it may have notified the industry of the decision in advance, but it did not fully consult the industry. This conclusion seems to be substantiated by the reported statement by the head of the Japan Ivory Arts and Crafts Association that “The decision came so suddenly that I was caught off balance. So long as our livelihood is concerned, it is not possible to accept the government policy.”104 MITI reportedly persuaded the ivory industry not to call for a reservation. 105 The ivory industry was politically so weak that it could not resist political developments toward a total ban. There are several reasons for this political weakness.106 First, the ivory industry consisted of an inconsequential number of small businesses. 107 For example, only two companies, who employed fewer than 15 people, were engaged in ivory piano key production in the entire country. 108 Reflecting the limited importance of the ivory industry, only a few officials in each of the two MITI divisions dealt directly with ivory-related affairs; these divisions as a whole were in charge of many industries and import items. 109 As Porter and Brown point out, the commercial value of the ivory business was not crucial to Japan’s national interest.110 Moreover, the four major ivory trade associations represented only 700 people in the Japanese ivory import and processing industries, and did not include the 30,000 people indirectly related to ivory, such as retailers and hallmark carvers. 111 In Yamanashi Prefecture, for example, some 5000 full-time and part-time workers carved hallmarks on name seals.112 Taking the size of the industry and its political representation into consideration, it appears that the industry could not exert substantial influence on MITI or politicians. 113


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Second, the industry covered different types of businesses such as importers, seal makers, sculpture and netsuke manufacturers, musical instrument-parts makers, and jewelers. This diversity made it difficult to establish a unified response to the proposed ban. Moreover, some of the processors relied not only on ivory but also on other materials. For example, although ivory seals accounted for nearly half of the total profits of the seal industry in the late 1980s, they accounted for less than 20 percent of all seals produced.114 For seal and jewel producers, ivory was a lucrative material, but was far from essential. Ivory was an indispensable import item only for traditional sculptures and musical instrument parts. The Tokyo and Osaka Ivory Arts and Crafts Associations did not defend the use of ivory for seals but promised to use other materials as much as possible for seals.115 In August 1989, moreover, two major Japanese piano makers, Yamaha and Kawai, stopped ivory import, and increasingly used artificial ivory for piano keys.116 Dependency on ivory increasingly varied from business to business. Third, the industry had only recently expanded with the growing popularity of ivory seals. Japan’s overall consumption of ivory soared as ivory seals gained popularity in the 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s. In other words, the largest element of Japan’s ivory consumption in the late 1980s was “rather uncommon in Japan” until the mid-1960s. 117 On the other hand, ivory carvings such as netsuke are a tradition stretching back more than 300 years,118 and by the late nineteenth century “a full-fledged domestic ivory industry” had emerged. 119 Nonetheless, such traditional businesses accounted for a small part of the industry and they were declining in the 1980s. It became difficult to attract apprentices to an ivory carving industry whose future was uncertain. 120 For this reason, the industry as a whole was not under the jurisdiction of the Traditional Craft Industry Division of MITI. 121 As for other societal pressures, the Japanese public did not demand a ban on the ivory trade, either. International developments over ivory did attract mass media attention in Japan. For instance, an editorial in the Yomiuri Shinbun of June 28, 1989 argued that the industry needed to reduce the waste of ivory and to speed up the development of ivory substitutes with the aim of stopping all use of ivory in the future. Nevertheless, the mass media did not exert much influence on public opinion in this case. In 1989, growing international concern over the fate of the African elephants failed to interest the Japanese public and local environmental NGOs.122 As a result, ivory demand remained high in Japan.123 WWF Japan joined the international movement to boycott ivory

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products that took off in Western Europe and North America in May 1989, but the attempt was in vain. 124 In Japan, the issue of African elephant ivory did not become as politicized as in other developed countries. The acceptance of a total ban on ivory import merely required an amendment to two cabinet orders (seirei) concerning the control of trade and the Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.125 This policy change, therefore, did not involve the Diet. Due to low public interest in the African elephant and the political weakness of the ivory industry, the policy process involved only a small number of politicians, including MITI Ministers and ministerial Directors-General of the Environment Agency.126 In the Japanese government, two Directors-General of the Environment Agency supported a ban on the ivory trade. One day after MITI announced a partial ban on June 15, 1989, Environment Agency Director-General Yamazaki Tatsuo stated that “the Environment Agency considers a total ban on ivory import unavoidable. It is not necessary to import ivory because ivory is not one of the necessities of life. I would be content with a total ban.”127 After the Uno Government fell in August, the new Environment Agency Director-General, Shiga Setsu, met with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki and MITI Minister Matsunaga Hikaru. He then proposed an immediate total ban on the ivory trade, rather than a moratorium through the end of 1989, with a view to avoiding increasing international criticism of Japan. Objecting to this proposal, the MITI Minister indicated that the present system would introduce an import quota on the following day, setting a zero quota for 1989 and insisted that it would be sufficient. The Environment Agency Director-General criticized this statement, saying that the present system was not working well.128 In early October, DirectorGeneral Shiga again stated that “I have no objection to a total ban if it is a worldwide trend. Japan should not jeopardize its national interests by being isolated internationally.”129 At the final stage of the conference, Shiga again expressed his view that Japan should not take a step toward isolation among developed countries by filing a reservation.130 It appears, however, that these Directors-General did nothing more than make such statements to try to establish the significance of the agency and their leadership to the public. Taking advantage of the foreign pressure, these Directors-General apparently insisted on nature conservation, which was under the jurisdiction of their agency. Despite their pro-ban statements, the Environment Agency had already reached an agreement on the ivory matter with MITI. 131 The above statement by Environment Agency Director-General Yamazaki confused MITI, which


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complained that “this import control has been adopted after fully consulting with the Environment Agency. It is incomprehensible why the Director-General made such a statement.” 132 In the process of preparing for the 1989 CITES conference, the Environment Agency supported split listing of the African elephants, based on the conclusion of a working group of specialists commissioned by the Nature Conservation Bureau of the Environment Agency. 133 The actual position of the Environment Agency was similar to that of MITI.134 To sum up, among the alternative explanations, the influence of TRAFFIC Japan on the Japanese government and the political weakness of the Japanese ivory industry are the most plausible factors affecting Japan’s decision to accept an ivory trade ban. These factors, however, are not sufficient to fully explain the decision. TRAFFIC Japan was a constructive player in the process leading up to Japan’s announcement of June 15, 1989, but it seems that the NGO did not make a significant impact on Japan’s final decision on a total ban in October. On the other hand, the Japanese ivory industry was politically too weak to resist the ivory trade ban, but the government did not receive political pressures in favor of the ban from societal actors, either. Additional factors must have facilitated Japan’s acceptance of the total ivory trade ban. First, MITI had already adopted a general policy of not adding to Japan’s reservations, since Japan had been criticized for its many reservations.135 Second, the CITES conference adopted a resolution to set up a special panel of experts that would examine a proposal to move back some groups of African elephants from Appendix I to II in 1992. 136 This left Japan with hopes of resuming the import of ivory from designated countries in two years. Third, as of late 1989, Japan had a stock of ivory with which the industry could continue its business for one or two years.137 The Recreation and Miscellaneous Goods Division of MITI admitted that a 100-ton stock of ivory would sustain the industry for at least a year.138 In reality, moreover, Japanese companies had much more stock of ivory because they concealed some ivory stock to evade taxation. 139 Such factors eased acceptance of the ban. I argue, however, that the fundamental reason for Japan’s acceptance of the ban was that Japanese policymakers felt the political legitimacy of the norm against the ivory trade at the end of the 1989 CITES conference.

The legitimacy of the norm against the ivory trade In this section, I analyze the legitimacy of the norm against the ivory trade from the perspective of Japanese policymakers in terms of expressed

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consent, the norm’s consistency with the existing ideational structure, and intergroup relationship between the norm promoters and dissenters. Expressed consent At the 1989 CITES conference, an ivory trade ban became a legal norm. At the end of the conference, a proposal to list all African elephants in Appendix I was rejected by a vote of 53 in favor, 36 against, and two abstentions. Instead, the conference adopted the Somali proposal with a vote of 76 in favor, 11 against, and four abstentions. The latter proposal was opposed by southern African countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. 140 The Somali proposal allowed for a special procedure to remove some African elephants from Appendix I in the future, but otherwise was similar to the former proposal. At the conference, two more proposals were voted down. The first one was the Zimbabwean proposal that kept the African elephants of South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, Angola, and Namibia in Appendix II. The second was a proposal that kept the African elephants of Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon in Appendix II (see Table 6.1). 141 In principle, the Appendices I and II listings are legally binding for all of the contracting parties. Although Article 23 of CITES provides that a party is allowed to enter a reservation concerning the listing of a species in the Appendices, such a reservation can only invalidate the legal effect of the decision in relation to the party, and cannot affect the social expectation for the other member states to act in accordance with the decision. As for the Somali proposal, the ivory exporting countries of Botswana, Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe immediately announced their intentions to file reservations. In the end, Botswana, China, Malawi, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Zambia, and Zimbabwe officially entered a reservation. 142 It is worthy to note that Zambia recorded a decrease in elephant population from 160,000 in 1981 to 45,000 in 1989, according to the African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group.143 At the CITES conference, Japan voted against the listing of all African elephants in Appendix I and abstained from the vote on the Somali proposal.144 This abstention was “widely criticized.”145 Japan abstained because it wanted to make its voting behavior and previous arguments consistent and to consider the position of anti-ban African nations and at the same time because it hoped to resume its ivory import under the Somali proposal. 146 Japan could have continued its import of ivory after the conference by filing a reservation regarding the listing of the

1. 2. 3. 4.* YNNN YNNN NNYY NNYY NNNY NNYY NNYY YNNY NNYY YYNN NNNY YYNN YYNN NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY YNNN NNNY YYNN NNYY NNYY

Afghanistan Argentina Australia Austria Bangladesh Belgium Belize Benin Bolivia Botswana Brazil Burundi Cameroon Canada Central African Rep Chad Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Denmark

Guinea Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran Israel Italy JAPAN Jordan Kenya Liberia Luxembourg Madagascar Malaysia Malta Mauritius Monaco Mozambique Nepal Netherlands New Zealand

Nations

Votes on the African elephant at the 1989 CITES conference

Nations

Table 6.1

NNNY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNNY NNNY NNYY NNYY YNNA NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY YNNY YYNN NNNY NNYY NNYY

1. 2. 3. 4. Portugal Rwanda Senegal Singapore Somalia South Africa Soviet Union Spain Sri Lanka St Lucia St Vincent Sudan Surinam Sweden Switzerland Tanzania Thailand Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia United States United Kingdom

Nations

NNYY NNYY NNYY YNNY NNYY YNNN NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY YNYY NNYY NNYY NNNY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNAY NNYY NNYY

1. 2. 3. 4.

113

NNNY NNYY NNNY NNNY NNYY YYNN NNYY NNNY NNNY

Dominica Ecuador Ethiopia Finland France Gabon Gambia Ghana Guatemala

Nicaragua Niger Norway Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines

Nations ANAY NNYY NNYY NNYY NNNA NNNY YNNA NNYY YNNY

1. 2. 3. 4. Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela West Germany Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe

Nations

YNNA NNYY NNNY NNYY NNNY YYNY YYNN

1. 2. 3. 4.

*The numbers “1,” “2,” “3,” and “4” in the table represent the Zimbabwean proposal, the Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon proposal, the normal Appendix I listing proposal, and the Somali proposal respectively. The letters “Y,” “N,” and “A” represent voting in favor, voting against, and abstention respectively. Source: TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 6, no. 2 (31 March 1990), p. 7.

1. 2. 3. 4.*

Continued

Nations

Table 6.1

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African elephants in Appendix I. After the adoption of the Somali proposal, the world’s attention focused on whether Japan, the biggest ivory consumer, would enter a reservation. As Porter and Brown put it, “By demanding a reservation on African ivory, Japan would have frustrated international efforts to ban the trade.” 147 Director Kikuchi Kunio of the Wildlife Protection Division of the Environment Agency revealed that at the conference, Japan was under fierce pressure from Western countries and NGOs not to file a reservation. 148 At the end of the conference, Director Higuchi Masaharu of the Import Division of MITI was at a loss, saying that “Japan has a right to enter into a reservation, but such an action would cause international criticism.”149 The Japanese delegation felt that circumstances would not allow Japan to file a reservation to the Appendix I listing of all the African elephants. At the same time, however, southern African nations strongly asked the Japanese delegation to enter a reservation.150 The delegation did not make an official decision at the conference. After coming back to Tokyo, the delegation reported the results of the conference to the government. 151 Considering the fact that the total ban was passed with a great majority, the Japanese Cabinet agreed not to file a reservation on October 20, 1989.152 On October 30, 1989, Japan accepted the ban without entering a reservation. The Japanese government reportedly stated that it was “respecting the overwhelming sentiment of the international community.”153 It appears that Japan recognized the ban as a social norm as well as a legal one, and thus accepted the ban from a sense of obligation as a member of international society. Ideational consistency Legal rules A prohibition norm on the ivory trade developed within the CITES framework. The purpose of the convention is to protect endangered and near-endangered wildlife species by controlling international trade. With regard to the endangered wildlife species listed in Appendix I and their products, CITES bans international commercial trade. According to Article 15.1(b) of CITES, amendments to Appendices I and II “shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of Parties present and voting.” With that mechanism, the CITES regime legally institutionalizes a prohibition norm on international trade in a certain species when the species is listed in Appendix I. At the 1989 CITES conference, the Somali proposal was adopted by meeting the procedural condition of a two-thirds majority. Indeed, Japan did not contest the legal legitimacy

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of the prohibition norm on the ivory trade that emerged within the CITES regime. Scientific views In the scientific discourse on the ivory trade, the Ivory Trade Review Group (ITRG), an ad hoc group of specialists, played a critical role in creating an impetus for the ivory trade ban. Raymond Bonner states that “Over and over again, when I asked conservationists who had been opposed to the ban why they had come to endorse it, they answered simply, ‘the Ivory Trade Review Group’, or ‘the ITRG report’.” 154 In 1988, the ITRG was established with the participation of the African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group (AERSG) of the IUCN, the TRAFFIC Network, the Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit (WTMU) of the World Conservation Monitoring Centre and the CITES Secretariat. The ITRG study was “carried out by some of the world’s foremost elephant scientists, trade specialists, and economists,”155 and there were no other comprehensive studies.156 This is not to say that the study was flawless, however. Data on elephant populations were contestable. The factor that herds of elephants move irrespective of national borders makes it difficult to estimate their populations. An ITRG report itself noted that “These predictions are based on data which are not perfect.”157 The Economist points out that “One problem for conservationists is that figures on the number and distribution of elephants are hard to see.” 158 Bonner also argues that “The population numbers being used were largely based on ‘guess work’.”159 Initially, this epistemic community was divided over a total ban on the ivory trade. Bonner points out a division in the ITRG: “Indeed, four days before the summary was released, a member of the group, David Pearce, sent a memorandum to the ITRG coordinator, Stephen Cobb, on behalf of the Review Group economists. The economists were opposed to an unconditional ban on all ivory trading.”160 By the end of May 1989, however, the ITRG managed to come to preliminary conclusions concerning the biological, economic, and trade management aspects of the ivory trade, and its effects on the future of the African elephant. The ITRG reached the conclusions for its interim report to the second meeting of the CITES African Elephant Working Group, held at Gaborone in July 1989.161 The issue of the preliminary report on June 1, 1989 was “politically motivated.” 162 The ITRG’s “Public Statement on the Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant” was released on the same day the WWF and the WCI announced their policy change: support for the Appendix I


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listing of the African elephant. Indeed, the ITRG study was mainly funded by WWF US and the WCI. 163 After the announcement of the ITRG’s preliminary conclusions and the support by the WWF and the WCI for a total ivory trade ban, the public and governments in North America and Western Europe came to support the ban. 164 Although the ITRG may have been politicized, its trade ban proposal had some scientific legitimacy in the CITES regime. According to the Berne criteria for listing or de-listing species in or from Appendices I and II, “to qualify for Appendix I, a species must be currently threatened with extinction.” In order to assess a threat of extinction, the Berne criteria require information on “population size, geographic range and potential causes of extinction.”165 The ITRG estimated that the African elephant population had dropped from 1.3 million in 1979 to 625,000 in 1989.166 The group emphasized the possible extinction of the African elephant, due largely to ivory poaching for export.167 The ITRG also argued that consumers’ demand for ivory in developed countries was facilitating ivory poaching in Africa, and consequently threatening the African elephants with extinction. Although admitting that “there are populations of elephants, in a small number of range states, that appear at present not to be threatened,” 168 the ITRG report concluded that the only way to eradicate poaching was a total ivory trade ban since “legal (i.e. government controlled) and illegal trades have become virtually indistinguishable.”169 This conclusion is consistent with the Berne criteria, which also provides that the whole genus should be listed in Appendix I “if most of their species are threatened with extinction and if identification of individual species within the genus is difficult.”170 TRAFFIC Japan used the ITRG report to deepen its understanding of the problems of ivory poaching, the illegal ivory trade, and Japan’s huge demand for ivory. It also used the report to link the problems to the proposal that Japan should strengthen its import policy on ivory.171 MITI used data from the ITRG preliminary report for its press release of June 15, 1989. TRAFFIC Japan also invited a special delegation of the ITRG to Japan, and arranged meetings of experts from June 21 to June 23, 1989.172 Japan valued the data in the ITRG report very highly.173 In a month, MITI decided to impose a quantitative restriction on annual raw ivory imports up to 50 tons beginning the next year.174 Japan accepted the biological conclusion of the ITRG report: some African elephant groups were in danger of extinction. The Japanese government came to support the Appendix I listing of endangered groups of the African elephant.175 Nevertheless, it objected to the trade management

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conclusion that non-endangered populations of elephants in Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa should also be listed in Appendix I. These three southern African nations had successfully stabilized or increased their African elephant populations. Moreover, some African nations conveyed to MITI their wishes to continue exporting ivory.176 At the Botswana meeting of the African Elephant Working Group (AEWG) of CITES in July 1989, Japan sided with the southern African nations that called for controlled trade rather than a total ban. Japan proposed a total ban on international trade in all processed ivory, a thorough review of the CITES export quota system, and import controls by countries of import. Japan supported the split listing of the African elephants with the hope of maintaining its ivory trade. 177 At the 1989 CITES conference, the Japanese government took a stance similar to that of the IUCN and TRAFFIC: the elephants in southern African countries would remain in the category of the CITES Appendix II on the condition of a voluntary moratorium on the ivory trade for two years.178 In short, a total ban on the ivory trade was scientifically unacceptable to Japan. Moral principles Throughout the 1980s, Japan, a contracting party of CITES since 1980, was repeatedly criticized for its poor record of protecting endangered species. In the latter half of the decade, however, Japan’s CITES policy improved, as exemplified by Japan’s policy changes in 1987. Japan amended the Import Trade Control Order, enacted the Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and withdrew two reservations regarding the Appendix I listing of the giant desert lizard and the green sea turtle. Gradually, as argued in Chapter 3, Japan accepted the conservation principle (sustainable wildlife utilization) to contest the wildlife preservation principle that prohibited the economic utilization of wildlife species, especially such “charismatic” large animals as elephants. By the late 1980s, the Japanese government appreciated the CITES regime because it stood for sustainable utilization. In fact, the CITES Secretariat favored regulated trade in ivory. In the run-up to the 1989 CITES conference, the Secretariat as well as Japan became the target of criticism by pro-ban groups and part of the mass media.179 It should be noted that the CITES conference adopted Resolution 7.9, which admitted that some groups of African elephants were not endangered but were still shifted to Appendix I together with the rest groups.180 Japan resisted the emerging norm against the ban on the ivory trade launched by preservationist groups.


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Intergroup relationship Japan attracted much attention as the largest final destination of ivory.181 Japan imported an annual average of nearly 270 tons of raw ivory between 1979 and 1988. The volume roughly corresponds to the deaths of 120,000 elephants and accounts for approximately 38 percent of the world’s total ivory consumption.182 According to the Japanese government, Japan was the final destination of 40 percent of all exported ivory; EC, 25 percent; US, 15 percent; other Asian countries, 10 percent; others, 10 percent. 183 Pro-ban groups often claimed that poaching would continue as long as Japan consumed ivory. 184 Environmentalists also claimed that Japan’s import of a huge amount of larger tusks had a significant impact on the African elephant population because large tusks tended to come from breeding, male elephants. Japanese ivory importers preferred larger and harder tusks.185 The concern about the huge demand for ivory among Japanese consumers was not confined to radical wildlife preservation NGOs. Tom Milliken, the then-Director of TRAFFIC Japan, stated that “It is up to the Japanese demand of ivory whether it is possible to control international trade in ivory effectively, and for African nations to protect and manage the elephants.”186 The ITRG also viewed the Japanese market for ivory as a problem. Its final October 1989 report argues: In the past two decades the Japanese Yen has emerged as an “international currency,” and it has thereby contributed to the pressure on the elephant . . . [T]he single most important factor contributing to the growth in ivory demand has been the unparalleled income growth occurring in Asia, and in Japan in particular.187 The Economist of July 1, 1989 (p. 19) similarly argues that “In particular, a big publicity campaign is needed to make the Japanese as embarrassed about buying ivory . . . Every bit as important as better conservation in Africa is the need for a change of attitude among rich Japanese ivorycollectors.” 188 On June 1, 1989, the WWF specifically mentioned Japan as well as Hong Kong, and stated that one of the targets of its campaign was to educate the governments and consumers of these countries. 189 Nevertheless, most environmental NGOs did not regard Japan or the Japanese people as an enemy or enemies of the animal lovers in their campaigns. Japanese did not directly kill elephants for ivory, nor did they eat elephant meat. It was also widely perceived that corruption in some African governments was a principal cause of poaching.190 The focus

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of many anti-ivory groups was the actual slaughter of the animals, not cultural or artistic uses of ivory. Their campaigns employed general slogans such as: “Only Elephants Should Wear Ivory,” “Ivory Kills,” “African Chainsaw Massacre,” “Murdered for Their Ivory,” and “Elephant Holocaust.” 191 Such “Save the Elephant” campaigns did not incite Japanese nationalism. Unlike the whaling issue, the African elephant ivory issue did not become an emotional touch point among Japanese policymakers. The Japanese government had good rapport with the IUCN and TRAFFIC for the protection of African elephants. Tom Milliken, the then-director of TRAFFIC Japan, emphasized “Japan’s exemplary record of cooperation with the CITES secretariat” in the latter half of the 1980s, saying that: Japan’s ivory trade was contentious through the early 1980s, but her unequivocal compliance with CITES requirements in mid-1985 and support of the CITES export quota system in 1986 ushered in a new era that has been commendable. Since that time, no other ivory industry in the world has operated with the same degree of transparency, and the volume of importation has subsequently dropped to approximately one-third of previous years.192 Akao Toshinobu, the Foreign Ministry’s senior official who chaired the 1992 CITES conference, regards the IUCN and TRAFFIC, major nongovernmental players in the CITES regime, as “objective, scientific, and sound environmental NGOs.” 193 The Japanese government trusted the IUCN and TRAFFIC as conservationist NGOs and identified them as partners. Thus, the government considered their advice seriously. By contrast, animal rights NGOs had no institutional links to the Japanese government. It is difficult to imagine that their demonstrations against Japan’s import of ivory in front of Japan’s embassies abroad, for example in Vienna in September 1989, could have made a direct impact on Japan’s policy.194

Conclusion The case study of the ivory trade does not support the realist and the liberal propositions. In this instance, the United States did not threaten to take economic sanctions against Japan. The Japanese ivory industry was politically too weak to resist the ivory trade ban, but the government did not receive strong political pressures in favor of the ban, either.


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TRAFFIC Japan was a constructive player in the process leading up to Japan’s announcement in June 1989 of a partial ban on its ivory import. It seems, however, that the NGO did not make a significant impact on Japan’s final decision on a total ban in October 1989, and that collective legitimation was a more decisive factor. My argument is that the CITES conference institutionalized the norm against the ivory trade not only legally but also politically. Legally, Japan could have filed a reservation in order to continue the import of ivory from the African countries that also filed reservations. Politically, however, Japan could not ignore the fact that 76 countries voted for the ban decision. At the same time, however, Japan doubted the scientific and ethical basis of the total ban, as some populations of African elephants in southern African nations were stable or growing. In the end, preservationist groups successfully pushed forward a complete ban on the ivory trade. Although Japan did not listen to such preservationist NGOs, Japan trusted the key conservationist NGOs under the CITES regime, especially the IUCN and TRAFFIC, which agreed to the blanket ban at the final stage of the 1989 conference.

7 Conclusion

The final chapter conducts a cross-case analysis and posits revised propositions on conditions under which collective legitimization matters for norm adoption. I also briefly consider which mechanism of social influence was likely to operate in the cases of driftnet fishing and the ivory trade. Then, I note two limitations to these tentative conclusions: generalizability and insufficient attention to country variance in adoption. I also discuss two theoretical implications for international society and Japanese foreign policy. Finally, I describe recent developments of international trade in African elephant ivory and scientific whaling and make a few normative claims about the future of elephants and whales.

Tentative conclusions Realist and liberal explanations I draw on realism and liberalism as alternative explanations for norm adoption and defiance. A realist perspective with a focus on the material power of the United States does not adequately explain Japan’s adoption of emerging prohibition norms against driftnet fishing and the ivory trade. It is true that Japan’s 1984 decision to accept a commercial whaling moratorium resulted from the threat by the United States to exclude Japanese fishing boats from its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A strategy of an exclusion threat, however, became unavailable in 1988, when the United States completely phased out fishery allocations for Japanese fishermen within the American zone. The increasing dependence of the United States on the Japanese fish market also reduced American capability to threaten and implement trade sanctions in fisheries under the 1971 Pelly Amendment. Apart from these changes, 122

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moreover, unilateral trade sanctions for wildlife protection abroad were multilaterally invalidated at a dispute-resolution panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in the early 1990s. In this international climate, it was increasingly difficult for the United States to implement unilateral economic sanctions on ecological grounds. Indeed, a threat of economic sanctions was not the main reason Japan stopped driftnet fishing and ivory import. Realism cannot explain why a powerful state such as the United States seriously took multilateral normative constraints against unilateral sanctions. In the case of scientific whaling, however, realists are partially right in the sense that the absence of credible threats enabled Japan to continue scientific whaling. Liberals are also right in their viewpoint that the lack of strong societal pressures in favor of driftnet fishing and ivory import made it easy for the Japanese government to accept the prohibition norms. The economic interests represented by the three industries considered in this study were not critical to Japan’s national interests. The Japanese squid driftnet fishery produced a yield worth some 40 billion yen and created about 10,000 jobs in the fishing industry and 50,000 jobs in the fish processing industry. In the ivory industry, some 100 companies directly employed approximately 600 to 700 people, while related businesses employed another 30,000 people. The entire ivory business was valued at some 20 billion yen at the wholesale level. On the other hand, scientific whaling was conducted on a non-commercial basis by just one company, Kyôdô Senpaku, with some 300 employees. From a liberal perspective, the Japanese politicians and bureaucrats’ determination to continue scientific whaling without strong industrial pressure is puzzling. The liberal view that transnational, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can play important roles in the issue area of the global environment is not satisfactory for explaining the Japanese cases, either. It is difficult to conclude that societal actors such as environmental NGOs effectively pushed the Japanese government to accept the prohibition norms. Studies of Japan’s global environmental policy share the claim that environmental NGOs had little influence on the formation of Japan’s international environmental policy.1 Thomas Risse-Kappen suggests that the building of transnational coalitions with domestic actors increases the policy impact of the transnational actors, particularly when their target nation has “corporatist domestic structures.” Risse-Kappen puts Japan in the category of corporatist nations.2 Although TRAFFIC had close relations with Japanese government departments and trade

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associations, however, most environmental NGOs failed to build transnational coalitions with such organizations. Moreover, there were no “green” political parties at the national level through which environmental NGOs could affect policymaking. It was not until the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), held at Kyoto in 1997, that domestic environmental groups attracted public attention in Japan. 3 It is true that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) included some politicians called kankyô zoku giin (politicians of the environmental policy tribe). Many of them belonged to the Special Committee on Global Environmental Affairs of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, they did not care much about wildlife protection. In short, Japan did not adopt the norms against driftnet fishing and the ivory trade because certain societal groups in favor of the norms became more influential in domestic politics. In sum, the factors of coercion and domestic politics are at best insufficient for explaining norm adoption or defiance in the cases under examination. The cases do not support the realist and liberal propositions presented in Chapter 2. I here present a revised proposition: states are likely to adopt a collectively legitimized norm even without material coercion by powerful states or without change in political pressures from societal actors. I argue that the legitimacy of international norms is a key to understanding the cases. Expressed consent According to the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, the first source of legitimacy is the formal consent to emergent norms expressed by states. In November 1991, when Japan found that a resolution calling for a moratorium on high seas driftnet fishing was about to be adopted by consensus at the United Nations General Assembly, Japan decided not to engage in high seas driftnet fishing after January 1993. Similarly, when the Somali proposal to ban the ivory trade conditionally was adopted by a vote of 76 in favor, 11 against, with four abstentions, Japanese state actors felt that a prohibition norm against the ivory trade became legally and politically institutionalized in the CITES regime. While Japan could have filed a reservation regarding the legal decision, it did not. On the other hand, a prohibition norm against scientific whaling was not globally legitimized despite criticisms in numerous industrial countries of Japan’s scientific whaling. The number of nations supporting the IWC resolutions was 19 at most, although the supporting group included the United States and major European countries. From

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these cases alone, it is difficult to establish the minimum number of states necessary for sufficient legitimization. Still, it is possible to support the original proposition that states are likely to adopt a collectively legitimized norm when the states that voted in favor of its legitimization constitute more than one-third of the total states in international society. Ideational consistency The second source of legitimacy is consistency with existing legal rules, scientific views, and moral principles. First, as for legal rules, Article 8 of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) provides that a contracting government may grant nationals special permits for scientific whaling. Thus, the article contradicted a prohibition norm against scientific whaling. By contrast, prohibition norms against driftnet fishing and against the ivory trade were consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Second, scientific views on whaling were so divided and politicized that Japanese actors did not trust the opinions in favor of the prohibition norms. The UN General Assembly hastily adopted resolutions calling for a global driftnet moratorium without much scientific evidence. Japan and some southern African nations questioned the scientific necessity of the global ban on the ivory trade because elephant populations in some countries were stable or growing. Third, the driving force for banning driftnet fishing, scientific whaling, and the ivory trade totally or partially originated from the selected application of the preservation principle to dolphins, whales, and elephants. Japan contested the principle from a conservationist point of view. Do states adopt a collectively legitimized norm even when it contradicts existing legal rules, scientific views, and moral principles? My cases do not support the relevant original proposition. I here present a revised proposition: states are likely to adopt collectively a legitimized norm even when the norm contradicts scientific views and moral principles but not legal rules. There are several plausible reasons for this proposition. First, international law is also a crucial element of international society in which collective legitimization is also embedded. Second, people in different countries tend to have different moral principles. Third, similarly, science cannot solve everything and leaves uncertainty and room for various interpretations. By definition, an epistemic community shares principled beliefs as well as causal beliefs. A scientific discourse may be dictated by the ethical beliefs of the epistemic community, which may also cause the politicization of science.4 Finally, collective legitimization

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is a political function to attempt to overcome conflict over scientific views and moral principles. As Inis Claude rightly points out, collective legitimization “can also give aid and comfort to a bad cause.” 5 Intergroup relationship The third source of legitimacy is intergroup relationship between norm supporters and target state actors. Despite the small economic size of the whaling industry, the Japanese government had a high level of autonomy vis-à-vis foreign pressure. This was partly because “Save the Whales” campaigns by environmental NGOs had produced a relationship of enmity between the pro-and the anti-whaling sides. In particular, a criticism against eating whale meat led to the identification of the Japanese as a distinctive people and fueled nationalism among Japanese state actors who perceived the discourse as cultural imperialism. By contrast, in the cases of driftnet fishing and the ivory trade, moral accusations against Japan were less explicit. Thus, Japan did not become emotionally resistant to the norms. In the latter case, moreover, Japan trusted major conservationist NGOs of the CITES regime. How does interaction between norm promoters and target state actors affect the latter’s interpretation of the legitimacy of a collectively legitimized norm? My cases support the original proposition that states are more likely to adopt a collectively legitimized norm when state actors do not have an enmity relationship with the norm promoters. Causal mechanisms In Chapter 2, I outline three forms of social influence to gain an insight into causal mechanisms of the impact of collective legitimization on state behavior. Which mechanism was likely to operate in the cases of driftnet fishing and the ivory trade? First, informational influence was the least likely mechanism in both cases since Japanese state actors had perceived the norms inconsistent with their moral principles and their scientific views before the time of collective legitimization. They had already felt certain about the illegitimacy of the norms. Second, normative influence was a probable mechanism in both cases. In other words, Japan reacted to foreign pressure. Japan had a relatively cordial relationship with norm promoters. Third, referent informational influence was also a likely mechanism in the case of driftnet fishing. This case does not perfectly meet two conditions for referent informational influence: ideational consistency and a hostile intergroup relationship. Nonetheless, a norm against driftnet fishing was legally consistent and Japan had a less cordial relationship with norm promoters in the fishery issue area

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than in the wildlife trade one. It is arguable, moreover, that the consensus adoption of a resolution calling for a moratorium on high seas driftnet fishing at the United Nations General Assembly reminded Japanese state actors of Japan’s membership in international society. Some scholars would argue that Japan adopted resolutions of the United Nations only because the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been interested in pursuing Japan’s candidature for permanent Security Council membership since the end of the 1980s. At the end of 1991, however, the Japanese government, including the Fisheries Agency, had not reached a consensus about this bid.6 Judging from the causal mechanisms in operation, it can be expected that Japan watched for a chance to resume ivory import even after collective legitimization of a norm against the ivory trade, while Japan did not attempt to restart driftnet fishing on the high seas. Normative influence alone results in public compliance without private acceptance. On the other hand, referent informational influence leads to private acceptance, or internalization. These expectations are right, as described in the final section of this chapter.

Theoretical limitations and implications These conclusions suffer two major limitations: generalizability and insufficient attention to state variance in norm adoption. First, for more valid generalization, we need to look at more cases involving other states or different issue areas and to conduct quantitative studies. My cases are far from “crucial cases” for testing the original propositions. 7 Although Japan was “less likely” to adopt wildlife preservationist norms, it was also “more likely” to yield to international pressure in general. The aim of this book is modest: to offer more plausible propositions about the effect of collective legitimization on norm adoption. I must admit that collective legitimization even at the United Nations does not always result in norm adoption, especially in security issues, and that the case of driftnet fishing is biased in the sense that the final, decisive resolution was adopted in the midst of the early post-Cold War optimism about the United Nations.8 In this respect, Miguel MarínBosch’s research on votes in the United Nations General Assembly is noteworthy. According to his data, one to three negative votes were cast in the 12 percent of the resolutions adopted from 1946 through September 1997. 9 This implies the proposition that a state is unlikely to vote against a General Assembly resolution when it finds no or only a few other countries will do so. This proposition is supported even more strongly

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when one excludes from the data the negative votes cast by the United States and Israel. Among the 2331 negative votes, the 715 votes from the United States accounted for 31 percent and the 489 votes from Israel for 21 percent. This trend peaked in the period between 1981 and 1990 when the former accounted for 47 percent and the latter for 28 percent of the negative votes; the votes from these two countries made up three-quarters of the total. It should be noted, however, that not all General Assembly resolutions contain norms, or general rules of conduct. Some resolutions are only administrative, and others are a mere accusation of a particular behavior by a particular state. Even if the proposition is right, moreover, the United Nations is not the panacea for international problems because it is difficult to reach an overwhelming majority in a politically critical issue in the first place. 10 Second, this book does not directly address the question of state variance in norm adoption, because it employs a single-country research design. According to Marín-Bosch’s data, during the period from 1946 through September 1997, the United States voted against 212 resolutions alone, 384 resolutions with another state, and 119 resolutions with two other states. For a recent example, the United States ignored resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly for nine years in a row that condemned the US embargo against Cuba for Cuban violations of human rights. In 2000, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 167 in favor, three (Israel, the Marshall Islands, and the United States) against, and four abstentions. 11 By contrast, for example, Japan cast no negative votes alone or with another state, and only one negative vote with two other states.12 Collective legitimization is likely to have a referent informational influence on states such as Japan when membership in international society is salient to them. An account of this variance across states requires further research from at least two perspectives. First, it is not clear how the lack of support from the United States affects the normative force of international norms. Paul Kowert and Jeffery Legro argue that “Norms backed by the United States are likely to become more widespread and effectual than otherwise similar norms originating in Luxembourg.” 13 As they suggest, the relationship between normative and material structures requires further exploration.Second, it is necessary to clarify the various role identities of states that go beyond “a member of international society” and their various views on international society. If I exaggerate a contrast between the United States as a leader and most other states as followers, I would argue that the former views international society instrumentally while most other states regard it as constitutive of themselves. For

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a majority of states, the United Nations is so important an institution as to be not just a means, but also an end itself.14 In the words of neoconservative Robert Kagan, who writes a monthly column for The Washing Post, “Most Americans are not principled multilateralists. They are instrumental multilateralists. Yes, they want to win international support. They like allies, and they like approval for their actions. But the core of the American multilateralist argument is pragmatic. As Baker puts it, ‘the costs will be much greater, as will the political risks, both domestic and international, if we end up going it alone.’ This would seem unarguable. But Baker’s multilateralism is a cost–benefit analysis, not a principled commitment to multilateral action as the cornerstone of world order.” 15 It is no wonder that most American political scientists favor rationalism over constructivism. Next, the tentative conclusions stated above offer theoretical implications for international society and Japanese foreign policy. First, my tentative conclusions suggest the incompleteness of rationalism such as neorealism and neoliberalism, which do not admit the existence of an international society. The current international system has no supranational government but it is not without governance. 16 Even realists such as Hans Morgenthau admit that the international system is not a Hobbesian state of nature.17 States often comply with international norms out of coercion, self-interest, or both. For effective governance, these utilitarian bases of behavior are important but not sufficient. 18 As Ian Hurd reminds us, effective governance also presupposes legitimacy. 19 On the other hand, most constructivists fail to recognize the compliance bases of social pressure and political obligation. Collectively legitimized norms can affect state behavior even without depending on material coercion, self-interest, or a sense of moral obligation, although their effect on state behavior is not always decisive. A mere claim on a standard of state behavior, once collectively legitimized in international society, becomes a norm of the society. State actors feel obliged or feel a sense of political obligation to adopt the norm because it is socially costly to ignore the norm or because they know that their state is a member of international society. At the domestic level, legitimacy also justifies the government’s acceptance of the norms in the eyes of the citizens who recognize their state as a society member. With this knowledge, the United States made every effort to establish prohibition norms by adopting resolutions at multilateral forums, rather than by threatening the kinds of unilateral economic sanctions whose effectiveness had already waned in the area of environmental diplomacy. In the words of Joseph Nye, the United States exercised “soft power.”20 Although the

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United States itself is an “instrumental multilateralist,” it assumes that other states are “principled multilateralists.” American state actors believe not only that international society exists, but also that the United States is exceptional there, as illustrated by its insistence upon the right to strike preemptively. 21 Second, my conclusions suggest that Japan has often reacted to foreign pressure (gaiatsu) partly because Japanese state actors have had a strong sense of membership in international society. Many scholars agree that foreign pressure has played a crucial role in policymaking in the “reactive state,” as Kent Calder calls Japan.22 The literature on Japanese politics emphasizes the utilitarian nature of external pressure such as material coercion and social pressure and neglects a non-utilitarian factor such as communal legitimacy, or a sense of political obligation. 23 It is true that Japan has often reacted to foreign pressure in order to avoid economic sanctions and social “marginalization among their peers.” 24 It is still possible, however, to argue that a sense of political obligation may sometimes be another important factor of Japan’s “reactive-ness.” Japan lost its sovereignty right after World War II for nearly seven years and it was not until 1956 that Japan became a member of the United Nations. It is not wrong to assume that Japan has had a desire to “occupy an honored place in international society” (the Preamble to the Constitution of Japan). In recent decades, moreover, Japan has groped for its appropriate international role as the second largest economy in the world. It is reasonable to infer that Japanese state actors have acted not only on the logic of expected consequences but also on that of appropriateness.

The future of elephants and whales Since January 1993, Japan has implemented the driftnet fishing moratorium on the high seas. A High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Bill passed the US Congress on October 4, 1992, and entered into force on November 2, 1992. This act provides that the United States place an embargo on the import of marine products and fishing gear from the countries that conduct high seas driftnet fishing after January 1, 1993. It also extends coverage from marine and wildlife products to all products for the countries that do not cease the practice under the initial sanction for six months. 25 It seems, however, that even without such legislation Japan would have no intention of allowing its nationals to use high seas driftnets again. It is arguable that Japanese state actors have internalized the norm against high seas driftnet fishing and that

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the norm has become customary international law.26 Now people do not need to worry about the death of dolphins, turtles, and sea birds incidentally caught by this fishery. On the other hand, a demand for ivory still exists in Japan, although it is on decline. Within a year of the ban’s implementation, demand for ivory started to fall in Japan, and prices of ivory goods also dropped gradually. According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the demand dropped in response to criticism of ivory use. Largely due to the results of the October 1989 conference, Japanese aversion to ivory seems to have risen. In early 1990, department stores in Tokyo, one after another, stopped selling ivory accessories. In the meantime, WWF Japan raised 16.6 million yen for the conservation of the African elephants. 27 Just before the 1992 CITES conference, five Japanese NGOs submitted a formal request to MITI with some 17,000 signatures opposing the resumption of trade in African elephant ivory and skin. 28 In the 1990s, moreover, Japan’s economic slowdown reduced its ivory consumption. Consequently, the stock of ivory has lasted until now. 29 Ivory seals are still on sale in Japan, despite the international trade ban on African elephant ivory. Japan has sought to resume the import of raw ivory from African countries since 1989. In June 1997, the tenth CITES conference agreed to transfer the African elephant populations of three southern African nations, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe from CITES Appendix I (a list of the most endangered species) to Appendix II (a list of species that are at the risk of becoming extinct) and to allow these nations experimentally to export their stock of ivory to Japan if certain conditions were met. The African nations were required: to improve ivory management systems as recommended by a special panel; to establish an international system to monitor the illegal ivory trade and poaching; to elicit support for international cooperation in law enforcement; and to establish and enhance an organization to use the profits of the ivory trade for the conservation of African elephants. 30 After these conditions were fulfilled, Japan imported 50 tons of ivory from the three African countries in 1999. 31 The eleventh CITES conference, held at Nairobi in 2000, decided to transfer the African elephant population of South Africa from CITES Appendix I to Appendix II. In November 2002, the twelfth CITES conference again conditionally allowed Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa to make one-off sales of 20, 10 and 30 tons,

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respectively, of ivory. In the meantime, CITES has established two monitoring systems to track illegal killing of elephants and illegal trade in ivory32. It seems that an international norm of a strictly controlled trade in ivory is now emerging under the conservation principle. As for scientific whaling, Japan has expanded its research program quantitatively and geographically. Japan increased the number of minke whale catches from 300 to 400 in the 1995–96 season in the research program in the Antarctic Ocean (the program called JARPA). In addition, Japan started a new research program (JARPN) on the minke whales in the Western North Pacific in 1994 and since then has annually caught approximately 100 minke whales in that area. In 2000, Japan began an enlarged Western North Pacific program (JARPN II) and caught 50 Bryde’s whales and ten sperm whales as well as 100 minke whales.33 Accordingly, since the mid-1990s, IWC resolutions have become increasingly more critical about Japan’s scientific whaling. Nonetheless, the number of states in favor of a critical resolution against Japan’s program is still 21 at most and the number of dissenting states is on the rise (see Table 7.1). In February 1988, December 1995, and September 2000, when Japan started a new research program, the United States Secretary of Commerce certified under the 1971 Pelly Amendment that Japan was diminishing the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program. The President, however, has never invoked the Amendment to prohibit the importation of fish products into the United States from Japan.34 As for the last research expansion, then-US Secretary of Commerce Norman Mineta contributed the article to The Washington Post entitled “Stop Japan’s Whale Killing.” He concluded that “It’s time for Japan to allow these magnificent creatures to recover after decades of killing.”35 Soon after the publication, he actually asked the President to consider invoking trade sanctions against Japan. On December 28, President William Clinton officially announced that his administration would leave a decision to its successor. This decision was allegedly a political tactic to help the “environmental” candidate Al Gore in the midst of the presidential campaign. Nonetheless, Secretary of State Colin Powell of the new George W. Bush administration also expressed concern about Japan’s scientific whaling in his first meeting with Japanese then-Foreign Minister Kôno Yôhei in Washington DC36 The current Bush administration has repeatedly emphasized the importance of Japan as a major ally in the Asia-Pacific region. Nonetheless, the scientific whaling issue is still on the agenda. Considering that scientific whaling is one of the few issues in which Japan has stood firm against American pressure for more

Conclusion Table 7.1

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Votes on Japan’s research whaling for IWC resolutions, 1993–2001

Year

Programs*

Strength of wording**

Approval

Disapproval

Abstention

1993 1994 1994 1996 1997 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001

SH SH NP SH & NP SH NP SH & NP SH & NP SH NP II SH NP II

Weak Weak Weak Strong Very Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Very Strong Very Strong Very Strong

9 Consensus Consensus 21 18 15 17 20 20 19 21 20

10

12

7 11 10 9 10 10 12 14 14

1 2 6 8 4 3 2 1 2

*SH: Southern Hemisphere; NP: North Pacific. **The relative strength of wording in resolutions • Very Strong: The IWC “strongly urges” the Government of Japan to “refrain from issuing” a special permit or to “halt the lethal takes of minke whales.” • Strong: The IWC “requests” the Government of Japan to “refrain from issuing” a special permit. • Medium: The IWC “recommends the Government of Japan to refrain from issuing” a special permits. • Weak: The IWC “invites the Government of Japan to reconsider” its research. • Very Weak: The IWC “invites the Government of Japan to continue to reconsider and improve” its research. Source: International Whaling Commission (IWC), Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1994–98); IWC, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1999–2002).

than a decade, the Japanese state actors’ sense of the illegitimacy of the norm seems to have been very high. At the end of this empirical book, I make a few normative claims. I feel it wrong to kill animals for fun or for no purpose. I believe that all animals are worthy of respect and, in particular, that endangered animals should be protected. Nevertheless, the ethics of killing whales and elephants that are not at the risk of becoming endangered should be examined from at least two perspectives: ethical distinction of these animals and the necessity of killing them for local people. 37 First, at this stage, there are no legitimate criteria to distinguish ethically whales and elephants from other animals. Environmentalists have expanded the definition of “humanity” and have applied the right to life to particular species such as whales and elephants. Those who

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fight for whales and elephants ethically distinguish them from other species. For example, many whale preservationists believe that humans should not kill whales because these creatures are “intelligent.” The intelligence of the whale has been controversial, however. As Milton Freeman points out, “there is no testable, nor even generally agreed upon definition of ‘intelligence’ so that it comes to mean almost anything the writer understands the term to mean.”38 Moreover, the argument that only intelligent creatures have the right to life sounds like the eugenics of the Nazis. Should mentally handicapped people have less human rights? Human rights are accorded to us not because we are intelligent but because we are fellow humans. There is also no global consensus as to which animals are “magnificent” for humans. Some people such as Hindus believe that cows are sacred animals, while others do not. I totally agree with an editorial of The Independent of May 3, 1990 that “It is possible to contend that killing any of these wonderful creatures [whales] is wrong. But until most of us become thorough-going vegetarians, it is hard to see why it is less ethical to kill whales than keep chickens in battery sheds or pigs in pens, afterwards consigning them to abattoirs – unless whales, unlike chickens or pigs, are still in danger of extinction.”39 Peter Stoett, even an “avid whale fan” political scientist, also reaches a similar conclusion.40 Second, I also feel it necessary to be sensitive to local economic needs and cultural diversity in the age of globalization. For example, the welfare of African people who live with African elephants poses an ethical issue. The animal rights groups “accorded rights to elephants, but ignored the rights of people.”41 Elephants damage farmlands and even kill people. Moreover, local people shoulder most of the burden for the conservation of elephants, which can be financed by selling ivory from culled elephants. According to David Pearce, a professor of economics in the Ivory Trade Review Group (ITRG), an ivory trade ban would require African governments to raise additional tax revenue of 50 million US dollars. Raymond Bonner also holds that the ITRG report did not reflect the interests and perspectives of African countries. He points out that, realizing this weakness, the ITRG hastily added the names of four Africans to the final report as contributors.42 Urs Kreuter and Randy Simmons stress the need to take local people into account for the protection of elephants: The ban was championed mainly by Western preservationists and animal rights activists to promote their own agendas, but they provided few resources to protect elephants from poachers . . . The

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evidence strongly suggests that the best sustainable conservation strategy for African elephants is to promote them as a valuable resource which provides direct personal benefits to the people who face the cost of co-existing with them.43 For elephant conservationists in southern African countries, it was necessary to continue sustainable ivory export for the maintenance of their effective conservation programs. Although preservationists called them “elephant killers,” Chryssee MacCasler, an independent conservationist, stated that “They say you’re killing elephants if you buy ivory. I say you’re killing elephants if you don’t buy ivory [emphasis in original].”44 Conservationists such as the IUCN-WWF-TRAFFIC coalition came to consider such local needs more seriously. At the beginning of the October 1989 conference, the coalition had decided to support the split-listing idea, as described in Chapter 6. On the other hand, I believe that it is not necessary to protect Japanese producers of ivory seals and jewels. Ivory is not an essential material for seals and jewels. At the time of introducing the ban, the industry paid more attention to artificial ivory substitutes, mammoth and walrus ivory, hippo teeth, bone, and palm “ivory.”45 A senior official of MITI publicly recognized the necessity of ivory substitutes on October 17, 1989. MITI granted subsidies and low-interest loans for the development of ivory substitutes.46 On December 27, 1989, MITI also announced a plan to dispatch a commission to Siberia in March 1990 to increase the use of tusks from prehistoric mammoths excavated in the region, although this attempt did not seem to come out well.47 It should be noted, however, that ivory was an indispensable import item for traditional sculptures and musical instrument parts in Japan. In the case of anti-whaling campaigns, few supporters would imagine that many former whalers in Japan have been in a predicament. The government paid 1.4 billion yen of compensation to those who had been engaged in large-type coastal whaling, which ended in March 1988. 48 The Financial Times of May 25, 1991 reported that “In Japan only 28 percent of those thrown out of work in large coastal whaling firms have found jobs since the moratorium; 18 percent have found part-time or temporary work.” Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran observe that the decline of whaling has made local whaling towns “more dependent on compensation paid by potentially polluting industries.”49 Mizuguchi Kenya also points out that many whaling towns are located near the actual or planned sites of nuclear power facilities.50 The whaling moratorium has also deprived them of their cultural sense of identity and pride.

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I believe that whalers, depicted as “bad guys” by anti-whaling campaigners, deserve our sympathy, at least as much as whales. From the perspective of local needs, the resumption of coastal whaling is crucial. If a review of the commercial whaling continues to be shelved, Japanese small-type coastal whaling should be accepted as aboriginal subsistence whaling, the IWC’s non-commercial category for cultural reasons. Currently, it is more important to realize the sustainable utilization of living resources, than to draw an arbitrary line between one group of animals and the other. We should also take care of the needs of local people. The key concept here is conservation, not preservation. It goes without saying that Japan should neither conduct scientific whaling for actual or presumed endangered species nor import ivory from the areas where African elephants are at the risk of becoming endangered. For the restricted resumption of commercial whaling and the ivory trade, the countries concerned, including Japan, should do their best to establish a Revised Management Scheme (RMS) for whales and to strengthen the existing monitoring systems for elephants. At the same time, Japan should do everything in its power to eliminate the illegal import of whale meat and ivory. In July 2001, a senior official of WWF, the world largest environmental NGO, stated that the limited resumption of commercial whaling was inevitable.51 Although the statement came under severe criticism, I believe that it was a courageous and significant step in the right direction toward a better state of conservation.

Notes Chapter 1 1. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 389. 2. Jim MacNeill, Pieter Winsemius, and Taizo Yakushiji, Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing of the World’s Economy and the Earth’s Ecology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 4. 3. Linda Starke, Signs of Hope: Working Towards Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 14. 4. Globe & Mail (30 January 1990) (quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Overseas Public Relations Division, Kankyô mondai hanron shokanshû [Collection of Protest Letters regarding Environmental Issues] (Tokyo, 1991), p. 68). 5. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Grotius, 1991), pp. 93–5. Certain resolutions, such as those regarding budgets (see Article 17 of the UN Charter), have a legal effect on the UN organizations and member states of the United Nations. 6. Patricia Birnie, “International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs,” p. 53, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 51–84. See also Kenneth W. Abbot and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization, vol. 54, no. 3 (2000), pp. 37–72. 7. Blaine Sloan, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Our Changing World (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1991); W. E. Butler, ed., International Law and the International System (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), especially Chapters 1–4. It is true that the so-called “solidarist” theorists argue that a norm supported by consensus in the international community carries an international legal obligation. This argument, however, is a minority view in the legal literature. Sloan, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Our Changing World, pp. 87–8; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 141–4. 8. Inis L. Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” p. 367, International Organization, vol. 20 (1966), pp. 367–79. 9. Ibid., p. 371. 10. Ibid., p. 369. 11. Ibid., pp. 367–70. Note that the term “political legitimacy” is often conceptualized as the domestic legitimacy of the government or the state. 12. For a brief account of the politics of international norms, see, for example, Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 135–9. 13. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 6. 137

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Notes

14. Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” p. 376, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40 (1996), pp. 363–89. 15. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn (New York: Alfred a Knopf, 1978), p. 12. 16. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” pp. 889–90, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 887–917. 17. Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 3. 18. Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” p. 392, International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999), pp. 379–408. 19. Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” p. 368. 20. This book does not directly address the legitimacy of governments and international organizations or that of an international order. As for state legitimacy, see, for example, Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (Basingstoke: Macmillan, now Palgrave, 1998). On a legitimate political order, see Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964); Markus Jachtenfuchs, Thomas Diez, and Sabine Jung, “Which Europe? Conflicting Models of a Legitimate European Political Order,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 4, no. 4 (1998), pp. 409–45.

Chapter 2 1. Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” pp. 383–9, International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999), pp. 379–408; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 268. 2. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” p. 386. 3. Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Force of Prescription,” p. 686, International Organization, vol. 38, no. 4 (1984), pp. 685–708. 4. Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chapter 1. 5. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 101. 6. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction,” p. 20, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1–32. 7. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” p. 3, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 3–30. 8. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 57–8. 9. John Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” p. 870, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 855–85.

Notes 139 10. Janice E. Thomson, “Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis,” p. 77, International Journal of Group Tensions, vol. 23, no. 1 (1993), pp. 67–83; Christopher Gelpi, “Crime and Punishment: The Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining,” p. 340, American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 2 (1997), pp. 339–60. See also Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” pp. 862–74. 11. Katzenstein, “Introduction,” p. 5; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 891, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 887–917. 12. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Chapter 1; Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1–21. 13. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Chapter 4; John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” p. 15, International Security, vol. 19, no. 3 (1995), pp. 5–49. 14. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn (New York: Alfred a Knopf, 1978), Chapters 15, 16, 17, and 18. 15. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 88–101. 16. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” p. 15. 17. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 36. 18. Keohane, After Hegemony, Chapter 6; Goldstein and Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy.” 19. Keohane defines the term “myopic self-interest” as “governments’ perception of the relative costs and benefits to them of alternative courses of action with regard to a particular issue, when that issue is considered in isolation from others [emphasis in original].” Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 99. 20. Oran R. Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 18–19. 21. Realism, on the other hand, pays attention to reputation for toughness or resolve. See, for example, Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Reputation for credibility should also be distinguished from a reputation for social approval, which is related to social pressure rather than self-interest. 22. Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 98–106. 23. Philip B. Heymann, “The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules,” pp. 822–3, Harvard Law Review, vol. 86 (March 1973), pp. 797–877. 24. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” p. 950, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 943–69. For a neoliberal approach to the prescriptive role of norms with a focus on this type of reputation, see Gelpi, “Crime and Punishment.” 25. Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” pp. 525–8, International Organization, vol. 51, no. 4 (1997), pp. 513–53. This reformulated liberalism, however, should not be regarded as a purely domestic theory since it assumes that the preferences of states are not only shaped by their respective domestic factors, but also are interdependent in the international system. Ibid., pp. 520–4.

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26. Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 143–8. 27. Amy Gurowitz, “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State,” World Politics, vol. 51 (April 1999), pp. 413–45. 28. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd edn. (Harper Collins, 1989), p. 26; Stanley Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 270. 29. Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics: Dilemmas in World Politics, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 16; Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, “The International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction,” p. 20, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 1–47; Oran R. Young, “Global Environmental Change and International Governance,” p. 14, in Ian Rowlands and Greene Malony, eds, Global Environmental Change and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, now Palgrave, 1991), pp. 6–18. 30. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 5 and p. 155. A role player “is not always a mechanical actor.” Roles are not completely deterministic; various expected behaviors for a role may be in conflict, and there may be conflict among different roles possessed by a person. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 156. 31. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 23. 32. In this case, state actors are value-rational in the sense that they behave out of a sense of obligation, rather than goal-rational in the sense that they choose the best option for a certain goal. For a distinction between value rationality and goal rationality, see Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Persons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 115–16. When I use the term “rational” without any adjectives, I mean goal-rational. 33. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” p. 387. 34. Hurd regards legitimacy as taken-for-grantedness or “cognitive” as well. For the term “cognitive legitimacy,” see Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” Academy of Management Review, vol. 20, no. 3 (1995), pp. 571–610. 35. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” p. 389. 36. Alastair Lain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” p. 495, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 4 (2001), pp. 487–515. 37. Note that Oran Young lists six bases of compliance: self-interest; enforcement and inducement (coercion); social pressure; obligation and habit or practice. Young, Compliance and Public Authority, pp. 18–25. 38. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” p. 381. 39. Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 24. 40. Christopher Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 14.

Notes 141 41. Frank Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment,” p. 117, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 6, no. 1 (2000), pp. 109–39. Note that Schimmelfennig uses the term “legitimacy” as international reputation of a state. For a similar view, see Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” pp. 903, 906. 42. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?” p. 869. Modern constructivists, unlike postmodernists, adopt the notion of social causality. Albert S. Yee, “The Causal Effect of Ideas on Policies,” International Organization, vol. 50, no. 1 (1996), pp. 69–108; Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 3, no. 3 (1997), pp. 319–63. 43. Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” p. 693, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60, no. 23 (1963), pp. 685–700. 44. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization, vol. 40, no. 4 (1986), pp. 753–75. 45. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, p. 43. 46. For a similar view, see David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke: Macmillan, now Palgrave 1991), pp. 15–20. 47. Young, Compliance and Public Authority, pp. 24–5. 48. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 892; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revising the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” p. 33, International Organization, vol. 51, no. 1 (1997), pp. 31–63. 49. Yee, “The Causal Effect of Ideas on Policies”; Mark Neufeld, “Interpretation and the ‘Science’ of International Relations,” Review of International Studies, vol. 19 (1993), pp. 39–61. Neufeld and Yee refer to this method as “meaningoriented behaviorism.” 50. For a rationalist approach to shared understandings, see James D. Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information,” International Organization, vol. 48, no. 3 (1994), pp. 387–423. 51. Goldstein and Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy,” p. 27. 52. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, pp. 13–14. 53. Ibid., p. 101. 54. Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, p. 87. This Winchian argument itself is based on Wittgenstein’s idea on the rule. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 35; Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), Chapter 1. 55. Neta C. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships,” p. 125, International Security, vol. 24, no. 4 (2000), pp. 116–56. 56. By Contrast, John Williams directly applies Beetham’s approach to consider the ethical legitimacy of Yugoslavia as a state at both the domestic and the international levels. John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (Basingstoke: Macmillan, now Palgrave, 1998).

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Notes

57. Neufeld, “Interpretation and the ‘Science’ of International Relations,” pp. 43–4. 58. On this topic, see Yee, “The Causal Effect of Ideas on Policies,” pp. 96–8; J. Donald Moon, “The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives,” pp. 186–91, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds, Political Science: Scope and Theory Vol. 1 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 131–228. 59. That is Wendt’s second principle of constructivism in his 1992 article. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” p. 403, International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 391–425. 60. Michael A. Hogg and John C. Turner, “Social Identity and Conformity: A Theory of Referent Information Influence,” Current Issues in European Social Psychology, vol. 2 (1987), pp. 139–82; Michael A. Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes (London: Routledge, 1988). 61. For the original terminology of normative and informational influence, see Morton Deutsch and Harold B. Gerard, “A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influence upon Individual Judgment,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, vol. 51 (1955), pp. 629–36. 62. John C. Turner, “Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group,” in Henri Tajfel, ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 63. Hogg and Turner, “Social Identity and Conformity,” p. 142. 64. Social psychology also includes material coercion as a base of normative influence. 65. Charles A. Kiesler and Sara B. Kiesler, Conformity (Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesley Pub. Co., 1969). 66. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” pp. 505–6. 67. Ibid., p. 495. Note that Johnston equates social influence with normative influence. See also Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” pp. 902–4; Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 166. 68. Jeffery T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory (A Review Essay),” p. 340, World Politics, vol. 50 (1998), pp. 324–48. 69. Ronald J. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” p. 54 n. 69, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 33–75; Felix E. Oppenheim, “The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification,” p. 322, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds, Political Science: Scope and Theory vol. 1 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 283–335. 70. Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe,” p. 116. 71. Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 120. Note that social sanctioning is usually less costly than material sanctioning. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” p. 511. 72. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 56.

Notes 143 73. Hogg and Turner, “Social Identity and Conformity,” p. 143. 74. See, for example, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization, vol. 54, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1–39; Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, International Organization, vol. 55, no. 3 (2001), pp. 553–88. 75. Risse, “‘Let’s argue!’,” p. 7. 76. The term “externalism” refers to “the view that the content of at least some mental states is constituted by factors external to the mind.” Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 173. 77. Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 82–91. 78. Risse, “‘Let’s argue!’,” pp. 10–11. Note that he argues that arguing affects both interests and identities of actors. 79. Hogg and Turner, “Social Identity and Conformity,” pp. 139, 150. 80. Some recent explanations of domestic political obligation also rely on the logic of obligation as members of the domestic community. John Horton, Political Obligation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, now Palgrave, 1992); John Charvet, “Political Obligation: Individualism and Communitarianism,” in Paul Harris, ed., On Political Obligation (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 65–88. For political obligation, see also A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 81. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” p. 31, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 29–65. 82. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 13. 83. Timothy Dunne, “The Social Construction of International Society,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 1, no. 3 (1995), pp. 367–89. See also Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, pp. 169–76; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 31; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” p. 45; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, pp. 17–19. 84. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, pp. 200–2; Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986), pp. 195–202. 85. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, p. 24. Judging from his definition of legitimacy, he places high priority on procedural legitimacy. Note that H. L. A. Hart does not recognize secondary rules in international society. Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 236. 86. Legal scholars used to think that the explicit or implicit consent of states was the only source of international law. Recently more scholars have come to challenge this traditional view. Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 224–6. 87. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, p. 190. 88. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p. 171. 89. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, p. 196. 90. Here I draw partially on Beetham’s “threefold structure of legitimacy as rule-derived validity, the justifiability of power rules, and expressed consent” and on Schoppa’s three elements of the social context that can make coercive international bargaining legitimate: the principle of hierarchy, procedural

144

91. 92.

93. 94. 95.

96.

97. 98. 99.

100.

101.

102.

Notes rules, and trust. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, p. 64; Leonard J. Schoppa, “The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining,” International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999), pp. 307–42. See Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, pp. 90–7. Inis L. Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” p. 375, International Organization, vol. 20 (1966), pp. 367–79. See also I. I. Lukashuk, “Recommendations of International Organizations in the International Normative System,” p. 40, in W. E. Butler, ed., International Law and the International System (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp. 31–45; Jerome Slater, “The Limits of Legitimization in International Organizations: The Organization of American States and the Dominican Crisis,” pp. 70–1, International Organization, vol. 23, no. 1 (1969), pp. 48–72. Lukashuk, “Recommendations of International Organizations in the International Normative System,” p. 37. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” pp. 901. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” pp. 511–2; Michael N. Barnett, “Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations,” p. 542, World Politics, vol. 49 (1997), pp. 526–51. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” pp. 234–8, in Kenneth A. Oye ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 226–54; Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” pp. 19–20, in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1–24. Leon Festinger, “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes,” Human Relations, vol. 7 (1954), pp. 117–40. Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” pp. 371–2. Barnett, “Bringing in the New World Order,” pp. 539–45; Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, “Introduction: The UN’s Roles in International Society since 1945,” pp. 19–22, in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 1–62. Consensus does not necessarily mean unanimity. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 352 n. 93. Blaine Sloan defines consensus as “procedure by which decisions were taken when there was no strong opposition.” Blaine Sloan, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Our Changing World (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1991), p. 87n. I use the terms “principles,” “norms,” “rules,” and “views” interchangeably. For a distinction among the first three terms, see Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences,” p. 2. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, Chapter 10. Note that Franck considers international rules social rather than legal in the domestic sense and thus that he covers non-legal international rules as well.

Notes 145

103.

104. 105. 106.

107.

108.

109. 110.

111. 112.

113. 114. 115.

116. 117. 118. 119.

He argues that domestic legal obligation is absolute while international social obligation is a matter of degree. Ibid., pp. 37–42. Andrew Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach,” in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 49–72; Paul Kowert and Jeffery Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 451–97. Yuen Foon Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, p. 73. Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr, “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” pp. 456–7, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40 (1996), pp. 451–78; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review, vol. 2, no. 1 (2000), pp. 65–87; Jeffery T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 43 (1999), pp. 83–114. Their argument does not pay attention to international ideational structure, however. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” p. 87. For similar arguments on the domestic impact of international norms, see, for example, Legro, “Which Norms Matter?” Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine before World War II,” p. 202, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 186–215. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 908. Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” pp. 628–9, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 3 (1998), pp. 613–44. Goldstein and Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy,” p. 10. Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” p. 3 in Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 1–35. Causal beliefs can be intersubjective as well as cognitive. Peter Katzenstein views them only as cognitive. Katzenstein, “Introduction,” p. 20 n. 63. I mention these kinds of identity, drawing on Wendt’s identity typology. See Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Chapter 5. Ibid., Chapter 6. Roles are structural while role identities are perceptional. Note that Wendt uses these role concepts limitedly as roles concerning the use of violence. Hogg and Abrams, Social Identifications, Chapter 8; Hogg and Turner, “Social Identity and Conformity.” Hogg and Abrams, Social Identifications, Chapter 4. Adler and Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” p. 45. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics,” pp. 134–5, 144, 154.

146

Notes

120. The relationship between non-rationalist factors such as legitimacy and rationalist factors such as coercion and self-interest remains an important question to constructivism. Kowert and Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits,” pp. 490–1; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” pp. 680–2, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 645–85. 121. Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” p. 496. 122. Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe,” p. 11. 123. March and Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” p. 952. 124. Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground,” p. 326. For positivism and postpositivism, see Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 125. Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization,” p. 764. See also Kratochwil, “The Force of Prescription,” especially, pp. 703–7; Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 132–3; Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, pp. 113–14. 126. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” pp. 67–8. 127. Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization,” pp. 764–8. For Kratochwil and Ruggie’s list of representative interpretivist works, see ibid., p. 771 n. 65. 128. Mark Hoffman, “Normative International Theory: Approaches and Issues,” p. 28, in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light, eds, Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory (London: Pinter, 1994), pp. 27–44. 129. Moon, “The Logic of Political Inquiry,” pp. 173–4. For a distinction between constitution and causation, see Alexander Wendt, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” Review of International Studies, vol. 19 (1998), pp. 321–47. 130. For the texts of relevant international conventions, I consulted the appendix entitled “Texts of Conventions” of Simon Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Cambridge: Grotius, 1985); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Law of the Sea Division, Kokuren kaiyôhô jôyaku: Eiwa taiyaku [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Japanese Translation with the Original in English] (Tokyo: Nihon Kaiyô Kyôkai, 1987). 131. A good example is a book written by Akao Toshinobu as incumbent Ambassador for the Global Environment. Akao Toshinobu, Chikyû wa uttaeru: Taikenteki chikyû kankyô gaikôron [An Agenda for Global Survival: An Ambassador Reflects on Environmental Protection] (Tokyo: Sekai no Ugokisha, 1993). 132. Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 32 n. 39. 133. For a process tracing method, see Alexander L. George and Timothy McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organization Decision Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2 (1985), pp. 21–58. 134. For single-country research, see James N. Rosenau, “Toward Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy: The Case of the USSR,” in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr, and James N. Rosenau, eds, New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 53–74.

Notes 147 135. For various examples of global prohibition norms, see Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society,” International Organization, vol. 44, no. 4 (1990), pp. 479–526. 136. Kowert and Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits,” p. 485. 137. For the replication logic, see Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd edn (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1994), pp. 45–50. 138. See, for example, J. A. A. Stockwin, “Dynamic and Immobilist Aspects of Japanese Politics,” p. 16, in J. A. A. Stockwin, Alan Rix, Aurelia George, James Horne, Daiichi Itô, and Martin Collick, eds, Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan (Basingstoke: Macmillan now Palgrave, 1988), pp. 1–21. 139. For selection bias, see, for example, Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 128–49. 140. Hanns W. Maull, “Japan’s Global Environmental Policies,” p. 354, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 354–72; Sharon Begley with Hedeko Takayama and Mary Hager, “The World’s Eco-Outlaw?” Newsweek (May 1, 1989), p. 54. 141. Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” pp. 104–13, in Fred I. Green and Nelson Polsby, eds, Handbook of Political Science Volume 7: Strategies of Inquiry (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79–137.

Chapter 3 1. These regimes are linked to each other. Pelagic commercial whaling is part of high seas fishing; trade in endangered fish and whale (meat) is covered by the CITES regime. 2. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Grotius, 1991), pp. 337–8. The convention entered into force in 1962, and Japan became a party to the convention by accession in 1968. 3. World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future: The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 261–2. 4. For various international fisheries commissions, see, for example, M. J. Peterson, “International Fisheries Management,” in Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, eds, Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), pp. 249–305. 5. New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade, The South Pacific Forum: 21 Years of Regional Cooperation (Wellington, December 1991), pp. 9–10. 6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Environment Agency, eds, Kokuren kankyô kaihatsu kaigi shiryôshû [Collection of Materials for UNCED] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau, 1993), pp. 190–4. 7. Andy Crump, Dictionary of Environment and Development: People, Places, Ideas and Organizations (London: Earthscan, 1991), pp. 100–1. 8. Shaw, International Law, pp. 339, 362–3; WCED, Our Common Future, p. 274; Peterson, “International Fisheries Management,” p. 250.

148 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

16.

17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

Notes For “archipelagic States,” see Part IV of UNCLOS. Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of Japan 1991 (Tokyo, 1991), p. 24. Ibid., p. 15. Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo [White Paper on Fisheries: Fiscal Year 1991] (Tokyo: Nôrin Tôkei Kyôkai, 1992), p. 21. Ibid., p. 16. However, the production value was declining from 1984 because Japan stopped catching lucrative fish in foreign EEZs. Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of Japan 1991, p. 2. UN General Assembly, 2nd Committee, 46th Session, Official Records, Summary Record of the 52nd Meeting A/C.2/46/SR. 52 (December 11, 1991), para. 61; UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 79th Meeting A/46/PV.79 (January 8, 1992), pp. 64–6; Nihon keizai shinbun (December 21, 1991, evening edition), p. 2. The IWC has lacked enforcement power. Melvyn Reader, “Profile: the International Whaling Commission (IWC),” pp. 82–3, Environmental Politics, vol. 2, no. 1 (1993), pp. 81–5. Sakuramoto Kazumi, “Kujirarui shigen no kanri to IWC” [Management of Whale Resources and the IWC], pp. 98, 100, in Kitahara Takeshi, ed., Kujira ni manabu [Learning from Whales] (Tokyo: Naruyamadô Shoten, 1996), pp. 98–122. Peter J. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), p. 157. M. J. Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” p. 149, in Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 147–86. Julian Gresser, Koichiro Fujikura, and Akio Morishima, Environmental Law in Japan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), p. 372. Katô Yoshinobu, “Hogei to nihonjin” [Whaling and the Japanese], p. 82, Dokkyô daigaku kyôyô shokagaku kenkyû, vol. 28, no. 1 (September 1993), pp. 82–98 Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, p. 58. Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” p. 182. IWC, Twenty-Fourth Meeting (London, 1972), pp. 5–6. Fukuzo Nagasaki, “The Case for Scientific Whaling,” p. 189, Nature, vol. 344 (March 15, 1990), pp. 189–90. Nakajima Keiichi, “Hogei mondai ni kansuru futatsu no sokumen” [Two Perspectives regarding the Whaling Issue], p. 20, Refarensu (May 1994), pp. 5–36; Kawashima Noboru, “Hogei saikai no michi kewashi” [A Long Way to Resumption of Whaling], p. 24, Zen’ei ( July 1993), pp. 24–6. House of Representatives, Secretariat, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku [Minutes of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, House of Representatives] (July 29, 1987), p. 6. Ibid., (July 28, 1987), p. 3; Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1989 [Fisheries Yearbook 1989] (Tokyo: Suisansha, 1989), p. 23. The IWC has granted observer status to a large number of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. Nakajima, “Hogei mondai ni kansuru futatsu no sokumen,” p. 32; Reader, “Profile,” p. 84.

Notes 149 29. Sakuramoto, “Kujirarui shigen no kanri to IWC,” pp. 98, 102–6. 30. Reader, “Profile,” pp. 82–3; The Independent ( July 2, 1990). On the other hand, Japan was allegedly also involved in political maneuvering. A Japanese Diet member Yamada Kôzaburô, who established the JapanSeychelles Association, quoted Seychelles’s Minister as saying that a Japanese ambassador conditioned its aid to Seychelles on taking the side of Japan in the IWC in the early 1980s. House of Councillors, Secretariat, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku [Minutes of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, House of Councillors] ( July 30, 1987), pp. 27–8. 31. House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 30, 1987), p. 7. See also House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 29, 1987), p. 7. 32. Doi Zenjirô, Saikin hogei hakusho [White Paper on Recent Whaling] (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1992), p. 28. 33. IWC, Thirty-Third Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge 1983), p. 21. 34. Komatsu Renpei, “Kujira to keizai masatsu” [Whales and Economic Friction], p. 93, Chuô kôron (April 1986), pp. 82–109. 35. House of Representatives, Secretariat, Shûgiin yosan iinkai kaigiroku [Minutes of the Standing Committee on Budget, House of Representatives] (February 20, 1992), p. 17; The Japan Times (8 November 1994); Komatsu, “Kujira to keizai masatsu,” pp. 97–8; Umezaki Yoshito, “Shigen hogo dewanaku jinshu sabetsu shisô da” [Not Resource Conservation but Racial Thought], p. 19, Sekai shûhô ( July 21, 1987), p. 18–21. 36. The Times (June 26, 1987). See also Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” pp. 172–3. 37. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, p. 87; Akao Toshinobu, Chikyû wa uttaeru: Taikenteki chikyû kankyô gaikôron [An Agenda for Global Survival: An Ambassador Reflects on Environmental Protection] (Tokyo: Sekai no Ugokisha, 1993), p. 157. 38. Christopher S. Gibson, “Narrow Grounds for a Complex Decision: The Supreme Court’s Review of an Agency’s Statutory Construction in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,” p. 486, Ecology Law Quarterly, vol. 14 (1987), pp. 485–516. 39. Komatsu, “Kujira to keizai masatsu,” pp. 89–90; Nakajima, “Hogei mondai ni kansuru futatsu no sokumen,” p. 20. 40. A former MOFA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 8, 1999). 41. Meanwhile, environmentalists filed suit against him, arguing that the Secretary of Commerce must certify Japan as a nation diminishing the effectiveness of the ICRW. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary had discretion in certification under the Pelly Amendment and the Packwood– Magnuson Amendment. For more details of this case, see Gibson, “Narrow Grounds for a Complex Decision.” 42. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 28, 1987), p. 3 and ( July 29, 1987), p. 6; Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1989, p. 22. 43. Nihon keizai shinbun (May 23, 1987, evening edition), p. 2; David Day, The Whale War, updated edn (London: Grafton, 1992), p. 125.

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Notes

44. IWC, Forty-First Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1991), Table 1, pp. 59, 62; Mainichi shinbun ( July 5, 1989), p. 3; The Financial Times (July 5, 1990). 45. IWC, Forty-Second Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1992), p. 25; Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo, pp. 19–20; Nihon keizai shinbun (May 28, 1991), p. 9; Mainichi shinbun (June 1, 1991), p. 3. 46. IWC, Forty-Third Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1993), p. 40. 47. Arne Kalland, “Whose Whale is That? Diverting the Commodity Path,” p. 168, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 159–86. 48. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, pp. 38, 131, 160. 49. IWC, “Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on the Revised Management Scheme” [cited August 20, 2001], available from http:/ /ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/iwcoffice/Monaco.htm. 50. The Financial Times (June 30, 1992); Asahi shinbun ( June 29, 1992, evening edition), p. 14. Although Japan, USSR, and Peru withdrew their opposition to the whaling moratorium in 1987, Norway did not do so. Thus, it was legal for Norway to resume commercial whaling. 51. The Guardian (July 4, 1992); Asahi shinbun ( July 4, 1992), p. 3. 52. Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo, p. 20. 53. Government of Japan, Environment and Development: Japan’s Experience and Achievement (Tokyo, December 1991), p. 13; Shima Kazuo, “Hogei mondai wo kangaeru” [Consideration of the Whaling Issue], p. 395, Sekai (August 1990), pp. 395–9. 54. IWC, Forty-First Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 15; Asahi shinbun (August 4, 1990), p. 4; Asahi shinbun (May 27, 1991), p. 22; Asahi shinbun ( July 4, 1992), p. 3. 55. Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics: Dilemmas in World Politics, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 81; The Financial Times (October 9, 1989). 56. Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, p. 171. 57. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics, p. 82; Nishimiya Hiroshi, “Washinton jôyaku niokeru yasei dôshokubutsu no hogo” [Protection of Wild Fauna and Flora in the Washington Convention], p. 8, Kankyô (January 1988), pp. 6–9. 58. Kobayashi Tôru, “Mizugiwa kisei no gaiyô” [Outline on the Shoreline Regulations], p. 11, Kankyô (January 1988), pp. 10–12; Kaneko Yoshio, “Washinton jôyaku: Shu no hogo to eizokuteki riyô” [The Washington Convention: Species Protection and Sustainable Utilization], p. 25, Kankyô (January 1988), pp. 23–7. The seven ministries were the Environment Agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and the Cabinet Councillors’ Office on Internal Affairs. 59. Nishimiya, “Washinton jôyaku niokeru yasei dôshokubutsu no hogo,” p. 8; Hirayama Yoshiyasu, “Dai 6 kai Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi ni shusseki shite” [After Attendance at the sixth Conference for the Parties of the Washington Convention], Kankyô (January 1988), pp. 61–2.

Notes 151 60. Government of Japan, Environment and Development, p. 77. For more information on this law, see “Kishô yasei dôshokubutsu no kokunai torihiki kisei hô” [Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora], Kankyô ( January 1988), pp. 6–27. 61. Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, p. 173. 62. Environment Agency, Kankyô hakusho: Shôwa 63 nenban [White Paper on the Environment: 1988] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau, 1988), p. 97. 63. For a recent account of Japan in the CITES regime, see Phyllis Mofson, “The Behavior of States in an International Wildlife Conservation Regime: Japan, Zimbabwe and CITES” (PhD dissertation, Faculty of the Graduate School, University of Maryland, 1996). 64. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, How Japan is Dealing with Global Environmental Issues (Tokyo, 1990), p. 12. 65. Asahi shinbun (October 18, 1989), p. 3; The Financial Times (October 18, 1989). 66. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Environmental Endeavors (Tokyo, 1992), p. 15. See also Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, pp. 172–3. 67. Environment Agency, Nature Conservation Bureau, Wildlife Protection Division, Wildlife Conservation in Japan (Tokyo, 1997), p. 11. 68. Nihon keizai shinbun (March 2, 1992, evening edition), p. 15; Osaka Yomiuri shinbun (March 12, 1992, evening edition), p. 2; The Japan Times (March 14, 1992). 69. Hiraishi Takatoshi, “Dôbutsu kaihô no riron” [A Theory of Animal Liberation], in Kamo Naoki and Tanimoto Mitsuo, eds, Kankyô shisô wo manabu hito no tameni [For Learners of Environmental Philosophy], 4th edn (Tokyo: Sekai Shisôsha, 1998), pp. 184–98. For the topic of environmental ethics, see, for example, Robert Elliot, ed., Environmental Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 70. John Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions, 2nd edn. (London: Duckworth, 1980), pp. 73, 101. 71. Ibid., pp. 3, 101, 125–6. See also John Passmore, “Attitude to Nature,” in Robert Elliot, ed., Environmental Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 129–41. 72. J. Baird Callicott, “Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair,” in Robert Elliot, ed., Environmental Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 29–59. 73. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, new revised edn. (New York: Avon, 1990), pp. 8–9. 74. Hiraishi, “Dôbutsu kaihô no riron,” p. 193. 75. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 243. Note that Regan differentiates the concept of inherent value from that of intrinsic value such as pleasure and pain. See ibid., pp. 235–9. 76. Ibid., p. 239. 77. Ibid., pp. 276–80. 78. Ibid., p. 264. For moral patients, see ibid., pp. 151–6. See also Hiraishi, “Dôbutsu kaihô no riron,” pp. 195–6. 79. Sudô Jiyûji, “Shizen hogo wa naniwo mezasunoka” [What is the Aim of Protecting Nature?], p. 159, in Katô Hisatake, ed., Kankyô to rinri: Shizen to ningen no kyôsei wo mezashite [Environment and Ethics: Toward Symbiosis between Nature and Humans] (Tokyo: Yûhikaku, 1998), pp. 149–67. 80. IUCN, UNEP, and WWF, World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development (Gland, Switzerland, 1980), p. iv.

152

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81. Ibid., Section 1. 82. The second report supports the continuation of the commercial whaling moratorium, but gives no reason for it. IUCN, UNEP, and WWF, Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living, trans. WWF Japan (Tokyo: Shôgakukan, 1992), Chapters 4 and 16. 83. Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, p. 141. 84. The concept of animal rights is as old as the late nineteenth century. In 1892, Henry Salt published a book on animal rights, which was reprinted a century later. Henry Salt, Animal’s Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress, new edn (Clark’s Summit, Pennsylvania: Society for Animal Rights, 1980). 85. On international environmental NGOs, see Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Chapter 4; Lasse Ringius, “Environmental NGOs and Regime Change: The Case of Ocean Dumping of Radioactive Waste,” European Journal of International Relations, vol. 3, no. 1 (1997), pp. 61–104. 86. Andrew Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach,” p. 66, in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 49–72. 87. Kalland, “Whose Whale is That?” p. 180. 88. A driftnet prohibition norm was also promoted by fishermen who were politically influential around the South Pacific Ocean and on the West Coast of the United States and Canada. 89. Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran, Japanese Whaling: End of an Era (London: Curzon Press, 1992), pp. 10–11. 90. Michael Brown and John May, The Greenpeace Story, 2nd edn, trans. Nakano Haruko (Tokyo: Yama-Kei Publishers, 1995), p. 331. 91. Milton M. R. Freeman, “Science and Trans-science in the Whaling Debate,” p. 145, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 143–57. 92. Al Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), p. 24. 93. Linda Starke, Signs of Hope: Working Towards Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 25. 94. New Zealand Ministry of Environment and Ministry of External Relations and Trade, New Zealand’s National Report to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Wellington, 1992), p. 53. 95. Crump, Dictionary of Environment and Development, pp. 32–3. 96. Fuji Research Institute, Kankyô yôran ‘92 [Handbook on the Environment, 1992] (Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1992), p. 31. 97. WCED, Our Common Future, p. 13 98. Ibid., p. 43. 99. See, for example, Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, The Earth Brokers: Power, Politics and World Development (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 13–29. 100. WCED, Our Common Future, pp. 29–31. 101. New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Report (Wellington, 1993), p. 43;

Notes 153

102.

103. 104.

105. 106.

107. 108.

109.

110. 111.

112. 113. 114.

115. 116. 117.

118.

New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade, International Whaling Commission Annual Meeting: Brief (Wellington, 1992), p. 55. See also Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, pp. 166–7; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Environment Agency, eds, Kokuren kankyô kaihatsu kaigi shiryôshû, pp. 192–4; New Zealand Ministry of External Relations and Trade, Environment Division, UNCED ’92 Information (Wellington, 1992). Sakuramoto, “Kujirarui shigen no kanri to IWC,” pp. 104–6; The Independent (May 28, 1991). Immediately, Japan filed an objection to the sanctuary under Article 5.3 of the Convention. Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 73. Brendan F. D. Barrett and Riki Therivel, Environmental Policy and Impact Assessment in Japan (London: Routledge, 1991), Chapter 5; Helmut Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective: Lessons for a Preventive Approach,” p. 494, in Shigeto Tsuru and Helmut Weidner, eds, Environmental Policy in Japan (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1989), pp. 479–552. See also Government of Japan, Environment and Development, pp. 56–9. OECD, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Japan (Paris, 1994), p. 187. Arne Kalland and Pamela J. Asquith, “Japanese Perceptions of Nature: Ideals and Illusions,” p. 31, in Pamela J. Asquith and Arne Kalland, eds, Japanese Images of Nature: Cultural Perspectives (Surrey: Curzon, 1997), pp. 1–35. Government of Japan, Environment and Development, p. 67. Isao Miyaoka, “Policy Legacies: Japan’s Responses to Domestic and International Environmental Problems,” Occasional Paper, Program on U.S.–Japan Relations, Harvard University (September 2000). Government of Japan, Environment and Development, p. 77. In 1972, the Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Special Birds was enacted to protect endangered birds in Japan and other countries. Ibid., p. 59. Prime Minister’s Office, Kankyô mondai ni kansuru chôsa [Survey on Environmental Issues] (1988) and European Community, The Europeans and Their Environment in 1986 (1986) (both quoted from Environment Agency, Kankyô hakusho: Shôwa 63 nenban [White Paper on the Environment, 1988] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau, 1988), p. 119). Environment Agency, Wildlife Conservation in Japan, pp. 2–4. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992–93: A Guide to the Global Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 237, 247. For an account of the impact of the agreement on Japanese economy, see, for example, Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1990), Chapter 6. In September 1985, the exchange rate was 230 yen to the US dollar; by January 1989, it was just 128 yen. Ibid., p. 71. Sharon Begley with Hedeko Takayama and Mary Hager, “The World’s Eco-Outlaw?” Newsweek (May 1, 1989), p. 54. Government of Japan, Environment and Development, p. 63. Hanns W. Maull, “Japan’s Global Environmental Policies,” p. 363, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 354–72. Government of Japan, Environment and Development, p. 63.

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Notes

119. Following calls for an international agreement on the world’s forests at the Houston Summit in July 1990, an agreement on non-legally binding forest principles was reached at UNCED. Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, p. 212. 120. Mototani Isao, Chikyû kankyô mondai dokuhon [Textbook on Global Environmental Problem] (Tokyo: Tôyô Shoten, 1992), p. 139. See also Yuko Inoue, “Japan: A Thriving Market for Endangered Species,” The Japan Economic Journal (July 15, 1989), p. 28. 121. Fuji Research Institute, Kankyô yôran ’92, p. 309. 122. Environment Agency, Global Environment and Economy Study Group, Chikyû kankyô no seiji keizaigaku [Political Economics on the Global Environment] (Tokyo: Daiyamondosha, 1990), p. 223. 123. Day, The Whale War, p. 143; The Guardian (May 27, 1991); The Times (June 26, 1987). In 1991, however, Japan stopped the import of whale meat. Officially, the whale meat regulated under the IWC has entered the Japanese market from three sources since 1992: scientific whaling, frozen stocks from the pre-moratorium era and bycatch of whales by Japanese fishermen. TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 11, no. 1 (November 8, 1995), pp. 8, 12; Nihon keizai ryûtsû shinbun (December 17, 1992), p. 13. 124. Although Japan was the world’s largest exporter of fish products at one time, in 1987 Japan’s exports accounted for only 5 percent of the world’s total trade in fish thereby ranking tenth behind Canada, the United States, Denmark, Korea, Norway, Thailand, Iceland, the Netherlands, and China. In 1989, its exports of fish were valued at US $1,354 million, US $282 million of which was exported to the United States. Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of Japan 1991, pp. 5–7. 125. OECD, OECD Environmental Indicators 1991 (Paris, 1991), p. 43. From 1984 to 1988, Japan maintained its annual marine catch (excluding fish farming) at about 11 million tons. Environment Agency, Kankyô hakusho: Heisei 4 nenban sôron, p. 90. 126. See Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo. 127. Ishi Hiroyuki, Okajima Shigeyuki, and Hara Tsuyoshi, Tettei tôron: Chikyû kankyô [Thorough Discussion: The Global Environment] (Tokyo: Fukutake Shoten, 1992), p. 173. 128. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992–93, p. 178. 129. Ibid., p. 175. 130. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, pp. 292, 293, 300, 303. 131. Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo, pp. 16–17, 24; Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, pp. 89–90; Yomiuri shinbun (April 17, 1992, evening edition), p. 2; The Japan Times (April 18, 1992); Asahi shinbun (May 12, 1992), p. 5. Some Japanese argued that these fishing regulations reflected “Japan bashing.” Yomiuri shinbun (December 19, 1991), p. 15. 132. Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo, pp. 122, 130–1; Nihon keizai shinbun (May 11, 1991), p. 3. Japan ratified the UNCLOS in June 1996, and then set up its EEZ. Asahi shinbun (February 25, 1996), p. 5; Asahi shinbun (December 15, 1996), p. 8. 133. Government of Japan, Environment and Development, pp. 12–13. See also Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo, p. 127. 134. Government of Japan, Environment and Development, p. 4.

Notes 155 135. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Environmental Endeavors, p. 4. 136. The Financial Times (June 15, 1992).

Chapter 4 1. UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas: Report of the Secretary-General A/45/663 (October 26, 1990), pp. 19–36. 2. Asahi shinbun (November 4, 1989), p. 3; Nihon keizai shinbun (November 4, 1989), p. 1; The International Herald Tribune (November 8, 1989). 3. Nihon keizai shinbun (November 26, 1989, evening edition), pp. 1, 19. 4. UN General Assembly Resolution 44/225: Large-scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, in UN General Assembly, 44th Session, Official Records, Supplement 49, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its FortyFourth Session: Volume I A/44/49 (1989), pp. 147–8. 5. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean – Issues and Impacts: The South Pacific Perspective (submitted to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, August 1991), pp. 43–50. 6. World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992–93: A Guide to the Global Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 181; The Guardian (September 27, 1991); The Daily Telegraph (October 5, 1991); Asahi shinbun (October 30, 1991), p. 11; The Financial Times (August 25, 1992). 7. Ono Seiichirô, “Kôkai shigen no gôriteki riyô eno teigen” [Suggestions toward Rational Utilization of High Seas Resources], p. 209, in Kitahara Takeshi, ed., Kujira ni manabu [Learning from Whales] (Tokyo: Naruyamadô Shoten, 1996), pp. 208–24. 8. The fishing that expanded onto the high seas was placed under a limited entry licensing system in 1990, which allowed more than 200 boats. At the beginning of 1992, a ban was introduced in this fishing as well. In 1990, approximately, 2000 fishermen on 150 vessels produced a yield of 30,000 tons. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fisheries Division, “Kôkai nagashiami gyogyô mondai” [High Seas Driftnet Fishing Issue], (Tokyo, June 18, 1992), p. 1; Yomiuri shinbun (November 26, 1991, evening edition), p. 2. 9. Japan Fisheries Association, “The High Seas Driftnet Issue: What is Known and What is Not Known” (Tokyo, March 1991). 10. Japan Fisheries Association, “The High Seas Driftnet Issue”; Asahi shinbun (October 16, 1990), p. 29. 11. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, p. 38. 12. Ibid., p. 5; Asahi shinbun (July 29, 1989), p. 4. 13. Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of Japan 1991 (Tokyo, 1991), p. 24. 14. Yomiuri shinbun (April 12, 1989), p. 13. 15. Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo [White Paper on Fisheries: Fiscal Year 1991] (Tokyo: Nôrin Tôkei Kyôkai, 1992), p. 23; The International Herald Tribune (November 27, 1991). 16. Japan Fisheries Association, “The High Seas Driftnet Issue.” 17. Yomiuri shinbun (August 4, 1989), p. 11. 18. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, p. 6.

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19. The Christian Science Monitor ( July 27, 1989). 20. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 29, 1989, evening edition), p. 2; The International Herald Tribune (September 25, 1989). 21. Asahi shinbun (April 15, 1989, evening edition), p. 2. 22. Mainichi shinbun (September 30, 1989, evening edition), p. 2. 23. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, p. 8. 24. The numbers are based on estimates made by the SPF Fisheries Agency. Asahi shinbun ( July 29, 1989), p. 4. 25. Kazuo Sumi, “International Legal Issues concerning the Use of Driftnets with Special Emphasis on Japanese Practices and Responses,” p. 53, in Ellen Hey, William T. Burke, Doris Ponzoni, and Kazuo Sumi, eds, The Regulation of Driftnet Fishing on the High Seas: Legal Issues (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1991), pp. 45–73. 26. Edward E. Wolfe, “U.S. Responsibilities in International Fisheries Matters,” a Statement in Washington DC on May 2, 1989 by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Current Policy No. 1172 (Washington DC: United States Department of State, 1989). 27. Asahi shinbun (November 1, 1989, evening edition), p. 2; Yomiuri shinbun (November 2, 1989, evening edition), p. 2. 28. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, p. 10. 29. The Economist (August 5, 1989), p. 68; The Christian Science Monitor ( July 27, 1989). 30. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, p. 11; Nihon keizai shinbun ( June 29, 1989), p. 8. 31. “Tarawa Declaration,” in South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, pp. 41–2; Geoffrey Palmer, Environmental Politics: A Greenprint for New Zealand (Dunedin, New Zealand: John McIndoe, 1990), p. 36; Yomiuri shinbun (July 12, 1989), p. 7; Yomiuri shinbun (August 4, 1989), p. 11; Asahi shinbun (July 29, 1989), p. 4. 32. At the meeting, South Korea was praised for having vowed to stop driftnet fishing by its fishing fleet. 33. In September, the conference of the members of the SPF Fisheries Agency again called for a ban on Japan’s driftnet fishing. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 28, 1989, evening edition), p. 2. 34. Nihon keizai shinbun ( July 15, 1989), p. 4; Asahi shinbun ( July 29, 1989), p. 4; Yomiuri shinbun (August 4, 1989), p. 11; The Economist (August 5, 1989), p. 68. 35. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1990 [Fisheries Yearbook 1990] (Tokyo: Suisansha, 1990), p. 90; Nihon keizai shinbun (September 15, 1989), p. 5; The International Herald Tribune (September 20, 1989). 36. UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, pp. 4–6. The Governing Council of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) discussed this issue in May 1989. 37. The Economist (October 21, 1989), p. 86; Asahi shinbun (October 14, 1989), p. 3. 38. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 29, 1989), p. 7; Nihon keizai shinbun (October 13, 1989), p. 7; Yomiuri shinbun (October 13, 1989, evening edition), p. 2. 39. Nihon keizai shinbun (December 24, 1989), p. 3. 40. Mainichi shinbun (October 26, 1989), p. 9; Nihon keizai shinbun (October 26, 1989), p. 5.

Notes 157 41. Asahi shinbun (November 4, 1989), p. 3; Nihon keizai shinbun (November 4, 1989), p. 1; The International Herald Tribune (November 8, 1989). 42. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1991, p. 90; Nihon keizai shinbun (November 7, 1989, evening edition), p. 2; Asahi shinbun (November 19, 1989), p. 9. 43. Asahi shinbun (November 19, 1989), p. 9. 44. Nihon keizai shinbun (December 12, 1989, evening edition), p. 2; Asahi shinbun (December 12, 1989, evening edition), p. 2; Mainichi shinbun (December 13, 1989), p. 9. 45. UN General Assembly Resolution 44/225. 46. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, p. 13. 47. UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Letter Dated 16 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General A/45/350 ( July 18, 1990), p. 2. 48. See, for instance, Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo, pp. 26, 201. 49. A then-Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 22, 1999). 50. Nihon keizai shinbun (July 18, 1990), p. 24; Asahi shinbun (July 21, 1990, evening edition), p. 13. 51. The International Herald Tribune (August 15, 1990). UN General Assembly Resolution 46/215 expressed “deep concern about reports of expansion of large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing activities on the high seas in contravention of Resolutions 44/225 and 45/197, including attempts to expand large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing in the high seas areas of the Indian Ocean [emphasis in original].” In August 1991, Taiwan, a UN nonmember, announced that it would cease its driftnet fishing operations by the end of July 1992. Nihon keizai shinbun (October 11, 1991, evening edition), p. 1. 52. International Whaling Commission, Forty-First Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 46, 49–50. 53. UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, pp. 4–7; Asahi shinbun (December 6, 1990), p. 30. 54. UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 71st Meeting A/45/PV.71 (January 11, 1991), pp. 21–2. For UN General Assembly Resolution 45/197: Large-scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, see UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Official Records, Supplement 49 A, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Forty-Fifth Session: Volume I A/45/49 (1990), pp. 123–4. For the process of adopting the resolution at the committee level, see UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Development and International Economic Co-operation: Report of the 2nd Committee, part 2 A/45/ 849/ADD.1 (December 18, 1990), pp. 15–18. 55. Nihon keizai shinbun (August 3, 1991, evening edition), p. 1. 56. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Report of the Second Committee (Part VII) A/46/645/Add.6 (December 16, 1991); Nihon keizai shinbun (October 11, 1991), p. 3; Nihon keizai shinbun (October 11, 1991, evening edition), p. 1; Nihon keizai shinbun (October 12, 1991), p. 5; Yomiuri shinbun (October 22, 1991, evening edition), p. 22. 57. UN General Assembly, 2nd Committee, 46th Session, Official Records, Summary Record of the 52nd Meeting A/C.2/46/SR. 52 (December 11, 1991),

158

58.

59. 60.

61.

62.

63. 64. 65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70. 71.

Notes para. 61; UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 79th Meeting A/46/PV.79 (January 8, 1992), pp. 64–6; Nihon keizai shinbun (December 21, 1991, evening edition), p. 2. For Resolution 46/215, see UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Official Records, Supplement 49, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Forty-Sixth Session: Volume I A/46/49 (1991), pp. 147–8. Palmer, Environmental Politics, p. 33. For New Zealand’s foreign policy in the late 1980s, see Richard Kennaway and John Henderson, eds, Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s (Auckland, New Zealand: Longman Paul, 1991). Asahi shinbun (February 5, 1990), p. 3; Palmer, Environmental Politics, p. 37. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, pp. 43–50; 29 I.L.M. 1449 (1990); Mainichi shinbun (November 22, 1989), p. 9; Nihon keizai shinbun (November 30, 1989), p. 7; Nihon keizai shinbun (December 2, 1989), p. 7. Ted L. McDorman, “The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles,” George Washinton Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 24, no. 3 (1991), pp. 477–525. Christopher S. Gibson, “Narrow Grounds for a Complex Decision: The Supreme Court’s Review of an Agency’s Statutory Construction in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,” p. 486, Ecology Law Quarterly, vol. 14 (1987), pp. 485–516. The International Herald Tribune (September 20, 1989). The International Herald Tribune (September 6, 1989). Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1990, p. 89; Wolfe, “U.S. Responsibilities in International Fisheries Matters,” p. 2; Asahi shinbun (August 12, 1987), p. 9; Yomiuri shinbun (October 3, 1987), p. 7; Asahi shinbun (May 3, 1989), p. 9. UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 91; Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1990, p. 90; Yomiuri shinbun ( June 24, 1989, evening edition), p. 3. Asahi shinbun (October 26, 1990, evening edition), p. 2; Yomiuri shinbun (October 27, 1989), p. 7; Yomiuri shinbun (August 4, 1989), p. 11; The Christian Science Monitor ( July 27, 1989). UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 25; Asahi shinbun (October 3, 1990, evening edition), p. 18. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Kôkai nagashiami gyogyô mondai,” p. 2; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fisheries Division, “Kankyô to gyogyô mondai” [Environment and Fishing Issue], (Tokyo, December 3, 1992), p. 5; Asahi shinbun (September 19, 1991, evening edition), p. 2; Nihon keizai shinbun (September 19, 1991, evening edition), p.1; Mainichi shinbun (September 20, 1991), p. 11; Yomiuri shinbun (September 21, 1991), p. 7. Asahi shinbun (September 22, 1991), p. 3. Asahi shinbun (August 3, 1991, evening edition), p. 2; Yomiuri shinbun (August 3, 1991, evening edition), p. 3; Nihon keizai shinbun (August 3, 1991, evening edition), p. 1; The Guardian (September 13 and 27, 1991); The

Notes 159

72. 73. 74.

75. 76.

77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

International Herald Tribune (November 29, 1991); Nihon keizai shinbun (August 3, 1991, evening edition), p. 1. McDorman, “The GATT consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles.” Yomiuri shinbun (September 20, 1991), p. 7; Nihon keizai shinbun (September 20, 1991, evening edition), p. 3. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1989, p. 25; Mizuguchi Kenya, “Umi to kujira eno kakawarikata no tayôsei to suisanshigen” [Variety in Relationship with Ocean and the Whale and Fisheries Resources], pp. 69–70, in Kitahara Takeshi, ed., Kujira ni manabu [Learning from Whales] (Tokyo: Naruyamadô Shoten, 1996), pp. 63–79. The Financial Times of January 30, 1992 reported, “Mexican tuna fishermen, unlike their US counterparts, fish in the eastern tropical Pacific, where for unknown reasons, schools of yellowfin tuna swim below dolphin herds. US tuna boats fish near New Guinea, where dolphins stay apart from the predominantly albacore and skipjack tuna.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Kankyô to gyogyô mondai,” p. 1. “GATT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,” 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991); World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992–93, p. 182; The Economist (May 4, 1991), p. 91. Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics: Dilemmas in World Politics, 2nd edn (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 133. See also Paragraph 2.22 of Agenda 21. The Fisheries Agency opposed it, pointing out that the bill could be in a violation of the GATT provisions. House of Representatives, Secretariat, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku [Minutes of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, House of Representatives] ( July 28, 1987), pp. 10, 16; House of Councillors, Secretariat, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku [Minutes of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, House of Councillors] (July 30, 1987), p. 19; Yomiuri shinbun (September 8, 1987), p. 7. Nihon keizai shinbun (December 5, 1988), p. 5. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, pp. 308–9. UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 24. Kakuta Naoko, “Shi no kabe to iu na no nagashiami ryôhô” [Fishing Method of Driftnets Called “Wall of Death”], The Komei, vol. 343 (August 1990), pp. 158–63. Yomiuri shinbun (September 15, 1989), p. 4. Mainichi shinbun (January 6, 1990, evening edition), p. 10; Asahi shinbun (January 6, 1990, evening edition), p. 12; Asahi shinbun (February 5, 1990), p. 3. Asahi shinbun (July 21, 1990, evening edition), p. 13; Asahi shinbun (October 16, 1990), p. 29; Asahi shinbun (August 16, 1990), p. 26. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 12, 1990, evening edition), p. 19. Kakuta, “Shi no kabe to iu na no nagashiami ryôhô,” p. 159. A then-Greenpeace Japan official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 21, 1999). Asahi shinbun (March 10, 1990), p. 3; Mainichi shinbun (March 10, 1990), p. 3. See, for example, Akao Toshinobu, Chikyû wa uttaeru: Taikenteki chikyû kankyô gaikôron [An Agenda for Global Survival: An Ambassador Reflects on Environmental Protection] (Tokyo: Sekai no Ugokisha, 1993), p. 38.

160

Notes

92. B. Gifford, “Inside the Environmental Groups,” p. 73, Outside (September 1990), pp. 69–84 (quoted in Arne Kalland, “Whose Whale is That? Diverting the Commodity Path,” p. 182, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 159–86); Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., Kankyôgaku ga wakaru [Leaning of Ecology] (Asahi Shinbunsha, 1994), p. 125. 93. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 25, 1990, evening edition), p. 18. 94. The Fisheries Agency is headed by a Director-General, who is not a Minister of State but a bureaucrat ranking lower than an Administrative Vice-Minister. The Fisheries Agency is virtually a bureau of MAFF. Management and Coordination Agency, Administrative Management Bureau, Organization of the Government of Japan 1993 (Tokyo: Institute of Administrative Management, 1993), pp. 118–20. 95. Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of Japan 1991, p. 32. 96. As of 1991, it had branch offices in Washington, DC, Seattle (the United States), Vancouver, Halifax (Canada), and Wellington (New Zealand), and Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea). 97. Nihon keizai shinbun (May 28, 1987), p. 9. 98. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, pp. 294, 300, 315; Asahi shinbun (July 29, 1989), p. 4. 99. Japan Fisheries Association, “The High Seas Driftnet Issue”; South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, p. 38. 100. Government of Japan, Environment and Development: Japan’s Experience and Achievement (Tokyo, December 1991), p. 47. 101. Japan Fisheries Association, Fisheries of Japan 1991, p. 15. 102. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, pp. 294, 305. 103. Nihon keizai shinbun ( July 18, 1990), p. 24. 104. Nihon keizai shinbun (November 26, 1991, evening edition), p. 19. 105. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, pp. 294, 297. 106. Yomiuri shinbun (November 5, 1991, evening edition), p. 2. 107. The Christian Science Monitor (July 27, 1989). 108. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 28, 1991), p. 5; Asahi shinbun (September 28, 1991), p. 3. 109. Asahi shinbun (September 28, 1991), p. 3. 110. Asahi shinbun (October 18, 1991), p. 11. 111. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 137. For the US reaction to this proposal, see ibid., para. 139. The term “bycatch” means “the unintended and unwanted part of the catch.” Milton M. R. Freeman, “Science and Trans-science in the Whaling Debate,” p. 152, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 143–57. 112. Yomiuri shinbun (October 30, 1991), p. 2. 113. Mainichi shinbun (November 2, 1991, evening edition), p. 2; Nihon keizai shinbun (November 2, 1991, evening edition), p. 2. The presidential visit was postponed indefinitely. Asahi shinbun (November 6, 1991, evening edition), p. 2; Yomiuri shinbun (November 7, 1991), p. 7. 114. Nihon keizai shinbun (November 5, 1990), p. 7.

Notes 161 115. A then-Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 22, 1999); a then-MOFA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 8, 1999). 116. Mainichi shinbun (November 2, 1991, evening edition), p. 2. 117. Yomiuri shinbun (October 22, 1991, evening edition), p. 22; Asahi shinbun (October 26, 1991), p. 2; Nihon keizai sangyô shinbun (October 26, 1991), p. 4. 118. Nihon keizai shinbun (October 4, 1991), p. 7; Asahi shinbun (October 19, 1991, evening edition), p. 2. 119. Nihon keizai shinbun (May 11, 1991), p. 3; Yomiuri shinbun (November 7, 1991), p. 6. 120. A then-Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 22, 1999); Sumi, “International Legal Issues concerning the Use of Driftnets with Special Emphasis on Japanese Practices and Responses,” p. 55. 121. Asahi shinbun (January 6, 1990, evening edition), p. 3. 122. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Statistics and Information Department, Gyogyô yôshokugyô seisan tôkei nenpô: Heisei 3 nen [Annual Statistics Report on Fishery and Aquaculture Output: 1991] (Tokyo: Nôrin Tôkei Kyôkai, 1993), pp. 60–7; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Statistics and Information Department, Gyogyô keizai chôsa hôkoku: Kigyôtai no bu, Heisei 3 nendo [Survey Report on Fisheries Economy: Part on Companies, Fiscal Year 1991] (Tokyo: Nôrin Tôkei Kyôkai, 1993), pp. 2–3, 86–8. 123. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, p. 300. 124. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Kôkai nagashiami gyogyô mondai,” p. 3; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Gyogyô yôshokugyô seisan tôkei nenpô: Heisei 3 nen, p. 71; The International Herald Tribune (November 27, 1991). 125. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, p. 321; Nihon keizai shinbun (November 26, 1991, evening edition), p. 19. A crew member could reportedly net an income of two to three million yen a season. Asahi shinbun (October 16, 1990), p. 29. 126. The Independent (November 27, 1991). 127. Mainichi shinbun (November 30, 1991), p. 3. 128. Nihon keizai shinbun (March 23, 1992, evening edition), p. 19. 129. Asahi shinbun (September 15, 1992), p. 5; Nihon keizai shinbun (October 8, 1992, evening edition), p. 2; Nihon keizai shinbun (October 29, 1992), p. 5. See also Fisheries Agency, Gyogyô hakusho: Heisei 3 nendo, p. 221. 130. Mainichi shinbun (November 13, 1991), p. 1. 131. Nihon keizai shinbun (November 26, 1991, evening edition), p. 1; Mainichi shinbun (November 26, 1991, evening edition), p. 1; Yomiuri shinbun (November 26, 1991, evening edition), p. 2; The International Herald Tribune (November 27, 1991); The Independent (November 27, 1991); The Financial Times (November 27, 1991). The editorial of Nihon keizai shinbun of November 27, 1991 (p. 2) supported the decision by the Japanese government, arguing that the decision was unavoidable for Japan, a nation that has to live in international society. 132. UN General Assembly, 2nd Committee, 46th Session, Official Records, Summary Record of the 52nd Meeting, para. 61. 133. Douglas M. Johnston, “The Driftnetting Problem in the Pacific Ocean: Legal Considerations and Diplomatic Options,” pp. 19–22, Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 21 (1990), pp. 5–39.

162

Notes

134. McDorman, “The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles,” p. 500. For further legal arguments on driftnet fishing, see Ellen Hey, William T. Burke, Doris Ponzoni, and Kazuo Sumi, The Regulation of Driftnet Fishing on the High Seas: Legal Issues (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1991). 135. A then-Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 22, 1999). 136. Nihon keizai shinbun ( July 11, 1990), p. 34. 137. UN General Assembly, 45th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 92; Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1991, p. 90; International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Final Report of 1990 Observations of the Japanese High Seas Squid Driftnet Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean” (Seattle: Alaska Fisheries Science Center, 1991), pp. 193–5 (quoted in World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992–93, p. 181). 138. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas: Report of the Secretary-General A/46/615 (November 8, 1991), para. 121. 139. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Gyogyô yôshokugyô seisan tôkei nenpô: Heisei 3 nen, pp. 46–59. 140. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 80. 141. Ibid., para. 83. See also ibid., para. 122. 142. UN General Assembly, 2nd Committee, 46th Session, Letter Dated 29 October 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General A/C.2/46/11 (November 8, 1991), p. 2. 143. William T. Burke, Mark Freeberg, and Edward L. Miles, “United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management,” p. 168, Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 25 (1994), pp. 127–86. For a precautionary principle, see Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 144. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, pp. 12, 24–9. 145. UN General Assembly, 2nd Committee, 46th Session, Official Records, Summary Record of the 52nd Meeting, para. 61. 146. A then-MOFA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 8, 1999). 147. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 126. 148. Yomiuri shinbun (November 5, 1989), p. 7. 149. UN General Assembly, 2nd Committee, 46th Session, Letter Dated 14 November 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General A/C.2/46/14 (November 20, 1991). For the US position related to its resolutions, see UN General Assembly, 2nd Committee, 46th Session, Letter Dated 29 October 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. 150. Burke, Freeberg, and Miles, “United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing,” p. 169.

Notes 163 151. Ibid., pp. 171–2. 152. Asahi shinbun ( July 21, 1990, evening edition), p. 13; Asahi shinbun (October 16, 1990), p. 29. “This estimate is nothing more than an exaggeration.” Sumi, “International Legal Issues concerning the Use of Driftnets with Special Emphasis on Japanese Practices and Responses,” p. 65. 153. Burke, Freeberg, and Miles, “United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing,” p. 171. 154. South Pacific Forum, Review of Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Ocean, pp. 15–16. For more details, see Ibid., pp. 16–28. 155. Sumi, “International Legal Issues concerning the Use of Driftnets with Special Emphasis on Japanese Practices and Responses,” p. 56. 156. Asahi shinbun (October 18, 1991), p. 11; Nihon keizai shinbun (March 23, 1992, evening edition), p. 19. It is possible to argue that squid deserve protection as food for fish. Komatsu Renpei, “Kujira to keizai masatsu” [Whales and Economic Friction], p. 109, Chuô kôron (April 1986), pp. 82–109. 157. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 121. 158. The Daily Telegraph (June 1, 1991). Although the IWC had no mandate to manage the small whales and the dolphins, there has been a movement to put them under the IWC jurisdiction in the 1990s. The Guardian (July 13, 1990). 159. See, for instance, The Times (November 10, 1990). 160. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 124. In the report, the Fisheries Agency added that the Japanese squid driftnet fishing was conducted in only 1.7 percent of the North Pacific, and that 90 percent of the sea turtles caught incidentally were thrown back alive. Asahi shinbun (September 28, 1991), p. 3; Mainichi shinbun (September 28, 1991), p. 9: Yomiuri shinbun (September 28, 1991), p. 7. 161. In the meantime, 44.5 percent of people supported the incidental catches of marine mammals and sea birds while 89.1 percent upheld the diet of whale meat. Kawai Tomoyasu, Nihon no gyogyô [Japan’s Fisheries] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1994), pp. 86–99. 162. UN General Assembly, 46th Session, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas, para. 132. 163. McDorman, “The GATT Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles,” p. 501. The United States also had a law called the 1989 Sea Turtles Amendment. Ibid, pp. 495–6. 164. The Economist (May 4, 1991), p. 91. 165. US Marine Mammal Commission, Annual Report of the Marine Mammal Commission, Calendar Year 1990 (Marine Mammal Commission, Washington, DC, 1991), p. 101 (quoted in World Resources Institute, World Resources 1992–93, p. 182). 166. International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, “Final Report of 1990 Observations of the Japanese High Seas Squid Driftnet Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean,” Table 24, pp. 193–5. 167. A then-Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 22, 1999). Sumi agrees with this view. Sumi, “International Legal Issues concerning

164

Notes

the Use of Driftnets with Special Emphasis on Japanese Practices and Responses,” pp. 57–8. 168. Burke, Freeberg, and Miles, “United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing,” p. 169.

Chapter 5 1. Nihon keizai shinbun (March 14, 1987), p. 30; Nihon keizai shinbun (March 15, 1987), p. 31. 2. Katô Yoshinobu, “Hogei to nihonjin” [Whaling and the Japanese], p. 83, Dokkyô daigaku kyôyô shokagaku kenkyû, vol. 28, no. 1 (September 1993), pp. 82–98. 3. International Whaling Commission (IWC), “Scientific Permits and Japan” [cited November 3, 2000], available from http:/ /ourworld.compuserve. com/homepages/iwcoffice/sciperms.htm. 4. Far Eastern Economic Review (May 28, 1987), p. 39. 5. IWC, Thirty-Ninth Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1989), p. 161. 6. For more details of the criteria, see IWC, Thirty-Seventh Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 11–12; IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 11–12. 7. For more details, see IWC, Thirty-Seventh Report of the International Whaling Commission, pp. 11–12; “Resolution on Special Permits for Scientific Research,” in ibid., p. 25. 8. IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, pp. 11–12; “Resolution on Scientific Research Programmes,” in ibid., pp. 27–8. 9. Nihon keizai shinbun (June 27, 1987), p. 7. 10. “Resolution on Japanese Proposal for Special Permits,” in IWC, ThirtyEighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 29. 11. House of Councillors, Secretariat, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku [Minutes of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, House of Councillors] (July 30, 1987), p. 9. 12. IWC, Forty-First Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 15, 49. The IWC adopted a similar resolution in 1999. Fisheries Agency, “Press Release” (May 29, 1999) [cited November 9, 2000], available from http://www.maff.go.jp/work/990601-2.pdf. 13. IWC, “Special Permit Catches” [cited November 22, 1998], available from http:/ /ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/iwcoffice/Catches.htm#Permit. 14. “Resolution on Japanese Proposal for Special Permits,” in IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 29; IWC, Thirty-Ninth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 1. 15. Institute of Cetacean Research, “Nihon ga nankyokukai de jisshi shitekita minku kujira no hokaku chôsa no gairyaku” [Outline of the Japanese Research Program on the Minke Whale in the Antarctic] [cited November 3, 2000], available from http:/ /www.icrwhale.org/03-A-a-05.htm. 16. Asahi shinbun ( July 27, 1987), p. 1; The Japan Times (August 19, 1987). In August 1987, Iceland also decided to continue scientific whaling. Nihon keizai shinbun (August 29, 1987), p. 7.

Notes 165 17. House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 30, 1987), p. 5; Yomiuri shinbun ( June 30, 1987), p. 9. 18. Arne Kalland, “Whose Whale is That? Diverting the Commodity Path,” p. 178, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 159–86. 19. Yomiuri shinbun (September 17, 1987), p. 7. 20. Mainichi shinbun (September 18, 1987, evening edition), p. 2. 21. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1992 [Fisheries Yearbook 1992] (Tokyo: Suisansha, 1992), p. 84. 22. House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 30, 1987), p. 14; Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, p. 293. 23. Akao Toshinobu, Chikyû wa uttaeru: Taikenteki chikyû kankyô gaikôron [An Agenda for Global Survival: An Ambassador Reflects on Environmental Protection] (Tokyo: Sekai no Ugokisha, 1993), pp. 160–1; Nihon keizai shinbun ( January 23, 1988, evening edition), p. 1; The International Herald Tribune (April 8, 1988). 24. Christopher S. Gibson, “Narrow Grounds for a Complex Decision: The Supreme Court’s Review of an Agency’s Statutory Construction in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society,” p. 491 n. 50, Ecology Law Quarterly, vol. 14 (1987), pp. 485–516. 25. Yomiuri shinbun (February 13, 1988), p. 7. 26. Julian Gresser, Koichiro Fujikura, and Akio Morishima, Environmental Law in Japan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 372–3. 27. The International Herald Tribune (February 12, 1988). 28. Asahi shinbun (January 24, 1988), p. 3. 29. The International Herald Tribune (February 17, 1988). 30. Nihon keizai shinbun (February 11, 1988), pp. 1, 3; Nihon keizai shinbun (February 12, 1988, evening edition), p. 1; Asahi shinbun (February 13, 1988), p. 11. 31. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1989, p. 23; Asahi shinbun (April 7, 1988), p. 2; The International Herald Tribune (April 8, 1988). 32. Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, p. 161; The International Herald Tribune (December 22, 1988). 33. William K. Reilly, “An Economic Harpoon Can Stop Japanese Whaling,” The International Herald Tribune (September 4, 1987); Mainichi shinbun (September 2, 1987, evening edition), p. 2. 34. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 24, 1987, evening edition), p. 19. 35. Nihon keizai shinbun (December 23, 1987), p. 5. 36. Nihon keizai shinbun (December 24, 1987, evening edition), p. 3. 37. Asahi shinbun (December 24, 1987, evening edition), p. 2. The New York Times supported this call for sanctions against Japan. The International Herald Tribune (January 4, 1988). 38. The Japan Times (December 23, 1987); Asahi shinbun ( January 14, 1988, evening edition), p. 22; Yomiuri shinbun ( January 14, 1988, evening edition), p. 2. 39. Asahi shinbun (February 2, 1989, evening edition), p. 2; Yomiuri shinbun (February 2, 1989, evening edition), p. 14. 40. Nihon keizai shinbun (February 10, 1989), p. 3. 41. M. J. Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” p. 173, in Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power,

166

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

62.

63. 64.

65. 66.

Notes and International Policy Coordination (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 147–86. Ibid., p. 155. Asahi shinbun (January 13, 1990), p. 3. Yomiuri shinbun ( June 1, 1990, evening edition), p. 14. The Daily Telegraph (August 2, 1989). The Daily Telegraph (June 22, 1987). The Japan Times (December 23, 1987). Mainichi shinbun (November 17, 1989), p. 26. Asahi shinbun (November 8, 1990). Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” p. 171. Similarly, Greenpeace was not very popular in Norway, another whaling nation. The number of its members in Norway, about 2000, was much smaller than those of non-whaling nations. For example, Norway’s neighbor, Sweden had 200,000 Greenpeace members. Asahi shinbun (March 27, 1992), p. 5. Yomiuri shinbun (October 7, 1987), p. 7. House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 30, 1987), p. 23. For example, see Nihon keizai shinbun (April 15, 1987), p. 2; Yomiuri shinbun (April 17, 1987), p. 3. Asahi shinbun (August 14, 1987), p. 4. The Independent ( July 6, 1992). Nakajima Keiichi, “Hogei mondai ni kansuru futatsu no sokumen” [Two Perspectives regarding the Whaling Issue], p. 27, Refarensu (May 1994), pp. 5–36. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, p. 317. These figures include fish imports. Nihon keizai shinbun (July 28, 1987, evening edition), p. 13. Mainichi shinbun (May 30, 1991), p. 3. A Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 23, 1999); a former Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 28, 1999). Yamamura Kazuo, “Hogei no rekishi” [History of Whaling], pp. 25–37, in Kitahara Takeshi, ed., Kujira ni manabu [Learning from Whales] (Tokyo: Naruyamadô Shoten, 1996), pp. 25–44. For a more detailed historical account of Japanese whaling, see Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran, Japanese Whaling: End of an Era (London: Curzon Press, 1992), Chapter 4; Yutaka Hirasawa, “The Whaling Industry in Japan’s Economy,” in John R. Schmidhauser and George O. Totten III, eds, The Whaling Issue in U.S.–Japan Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 82–114. House of Representatives, Secretariat, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku [Minutes of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, House of Representatives] (July 28, 1987), p. 4. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1993, pp. 298–9. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Statistics and Information Department, Gyogyô yôshokugyô seisan tôkei nenpô: Heisei 3 nen [Annual Statistics Report on Fishery and Aquaculture Output: 1991] (Tokyo: Nôrin Tôkei Kyôkai, 1993), pp. 3, 225. Gresser, Fujikura, and Morishima, Environmental Law in Japan, p. 372. The Japan Times (August 21, 1989); The Japan Times (March 9, 1990).

Notes 167 67. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 28, 1987), p. 20; Asahi shinbun (April 28, 1987, evening edition), p. 3. 68. Komatsu Renpei, “Kujira to keizai masatsu” [Whales and Economic Friction], pp. 89–90, Chuô kôron (April 1986), pp. 82–109. 69. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 28, 1987), p. 17; House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 30, 1987), p. 5. 70. IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, pp. 21–2; Peter J. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), p. 76; Asahi shinbun (October 24, 1997), p. 11. 71. Asahi shinbun (October 20, 1987), p. 9; Nihon keizai shinbun (November 18, 1987), p. 8. 72. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 28, 1987), p. 4; Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling, p. 93; Gresser, Fujikura, and Morishima, Environmental Law in Japan, p. 372. 73. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 28, 1987), p. 7; Komatsu, “Kujira to keizai masatsu,” p. 106. 74. Two Japan Whaling Association officials, interview by author (Tokyo, July 1, 1999). The Small-Type Whaling Association is a trade association for small-type coastal whaling. 75. Gresser, Fujikura, and Morishima, Environmental Law in Japan, p. 372. 76. A former MOFA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 8, 1999). 77. AERA (October 16, 2000), p. 13; a Japanese NGO official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 21, 1999). 78. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 29, 1987), p. 8; House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 30, 1987), p. 29. 79. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 28, 1987), p. 13. 80. Komatsu Renpei, “Kujira to keizai masatsu,” p. 108. The number of its current members is about 80. Two Japan Whaling Association officials, interview by author (Tokyo, July 1, 1999); a Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 23, 1999). 81. Komatsu Renpei, “Kujira to keizai masatsu,” p. 94. 82. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (28 July 1987), pp. 3, 12. 83. Asahi shinbun (May 25, 1991, evening edition), p. 18. 84. Asahi shinbun (November 1, 1988), p. 6. 85. Komatsu Masayuki, Kujira wa tabete ii [It is Right to Eat Whale Meat] (Tokyo: Takarajimasha, 2000); a Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 23, 1999). Komatsu Masayuki is a Fisheries Agency official who has been engaged in whaling issue since 1991. 86. IWC, Thirty-Third Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1983), p. 21. 87. IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 14. 88. IWC, Thirty-Ninth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 2; Nihon keizai shinbun (February 16, 1988), p. 3. 89. IWC, Fortieth Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1990), p. 2; Yomiuri shinbun (April 4, 1989), p. 1; Nihon keizai shinbun (April 5, 1989), p. 5.

168

Notes

90. The Guardian (May 2, 1990); The Times (May 14, 1990). 91. “Resolution on Japanese Proposal for Special Permits,” in IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 29. 92. IWC, Fortieth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 17; “Resolution on the Proposed Take by Japan of Whales in the Southern Hemisphere under Special Permit”, in ibid., p. 36. Similar resolutions on the Icelandic and the Norwegian proposals were also adopted. “Resolution on Icelandic Proposal for Special Permits,” and “Resolution on Norwegian Proposal for Special Permits,” in ibid., pp. 35–6. 93. Shima Kazuo, “Hogei mondai wo kangaeru” [Consideration of the Whaling Issue], p. 395, Sekai (August 1990), pp. 395–9. See also IWC, Fortieth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 17. 94. IWC, Forty-First Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 15; “Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan in the Southern Hemisphere,” in ibid., pp. 47–8. 95. IWC, Forty-Second Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1992), p. 14; “Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan in the Southern Hemisphere,” in ibid., p. 45. 96. IWC, Forty-Third Report of the International Whaling Commission (Cambridge, 1993), p. 29; “Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan in the Southern Hemisphere,” in ibid., p. 49. 97. Mainichi shinbun (July 4, 1992), p. 1. 98. House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 30, 1987), p. 9; Yomiuri shinbun ( June 30, 1987), p. 9. 99. The Independent ( June 1, 1991). 100. House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 30, 1987), p. 5. 101. Nihon keizai shinbun ( July 29, 1987), p. 5. 102. See House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987). 103. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, p. 133. 104. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future: The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 269. 105. Nihon keizai shinbun (July 26, 1989, evening edition), p. 16. Executive Director Allan Thornton of Greenpeace gave another reason to attack Japan’s scientific whaling: “As long as there is any trade in whale products they can always launder pirated whale meat onto the Japanese market, hidden as the product of scientific whaling.” The Guardian ( June 15, 1987). 106. Geoffrey Palmer, Environmental Politics: A Greenprint for New Zealand (Dunedin, New Zealand: John McIndoe, 1990), p. 43. 107. The Independent (May 30, 1990). 108. Fukuzo Nagasaki, “The Case for Scientific Whaling,” p. 189, Nature, vol. 344 (March 15, 1990), pp. 189–90. The wholesale prices (per kilogram) of whale meat from Japan’s scientific whaling in the 1987–88 and 1992–93 seasons were 1489 yen and 2059 yen respectively. TRAFFIC International, Whale Meat Trade in East Asia: Review of the Markets in 1997 (Cambridge, U.K., May 1997), p. 10. In 1989, the retail price for 100 grams was 500 to 700 yen. The most expensive tail part was sold at 2500 yen per 100 grams. Nihon keizai shinbun ( July 26, 1989, evening edition), p. 16; Asahi shinbun (May 27, 1991), p. 22; The Daily Telegraph (October 31, 1988).

Notes 169 109. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), p. 7. See also Nihon keizai shinbun (June 18, 1989), p. 13; The Daily Telegraph ( June 22, 1987). 110. The Times (April 29, 1991). 111. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), p. 5; IWC, Forty-Third Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 29. 112. Nihon keizai shinbun (February 16, 1988), p. 3. 113. “Report of the Special Meeting of the Scientific Committee to Consider the Japanese Research Permit (Feasibility Study),” in IWC, Thirty-Ninth Report of the International Whaling Commission, pp. 159–66. 114. “Resolution on the Proposed Take by Japan of Whales in the Southern Hemisphere under Special Permit,” in IWC, Fortieth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 36. 115. IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, pp. 13, 55–7; “Resolution on the Proposed Take by Japan of Whales in the Southern Hemisphere under Special Permit”, in IWC, Fortieth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 36. See also Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” p. 181; Fujiwara Eiji, “Kenshô nihon no chôsa hogei” [Inspection of Japan’s Scientific Whaling], pp. 310–1, Sekai (August 1990), pp. 307–19. 116. IWC, Forty-Third Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 29; The Guardian (November 24, 1990); The Daily Telegraph (April 12, 1991). 117. Nagasaki, “The Case for Scientific Whaling,” p. 190. 118. IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 14; Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” p. 169; Shima, “Hogei mondai wo kangaeru,” p. 399; Nakajima, “Hogei mondai ni kansuru futatsu no sokumen,” p. 22. 119. Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, p. 159; Shima, “Hogei mondai wo kangaeru,” p. 398; Suwa Yûzô, Amerika wa kankyô ni yasashiinoka [Is the United States Environment-friendly?] (Tokyo: Shinhyôron, 1996), p. 226. 120. The Independent (July 9, 1990). See also Milton M. R. Freeman, “Science and Trans-science in the Whaling Debate,” p. 146, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 143–57. 121. IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 14. 122. Komatsu, “Kujira to keizai masatsu,” p. 93. 123. Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” p. 186. 124. Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling, p. 3. 125. James E. Scarff, “Ethical Issues in Whale and Small Cetacean Management,” p. 243, Environmental Ethics, vol. 3 (Fall 1980), pp. 241–79. 126. Shima, “Hogei mondai wo kangaeru,” p. 397. 127. Akao, Chikyû wa uttaeru, p. 165. 128. IWC, Thirty-Ninth Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 164. 129. IWC, Thirty-Eighth Report of the International Whaling Commission, Table 3, p. 43. 130. IWC, Forty-First Report of the International Whaling Commission, Table 1, pp. 59, 62; Mainichi shinbun ( July 5, 1989), p. 3; The Financial Times ( July 5, 1990). 131. The Economist (June 27, 1992), p. 12.

170

Notes

132. 133. 134. 135.

J. A. Gulland, “Ban on Whaling,” The Times ( July 7, 1987). Asahi shinbun (May 14, 1991), p. 5; Asahi shinbun ( June 21, 1992), p. 3. The Times (April 29, 1991). The Times (April 15, 1991); Asahi shinbun (April 15, 1991), p. 2; Mainichi shinbun (May 20, 1991), p. 3. The Times (May 11, 1991); The Japan Times (May 15, 1991). The Guardian (May 27, 1991). A pro-whaling Norwegian lobby group contrasted Gummer’s argument on animal welfare with his recent support for fox hunting. The Guardian ( June 26, 1992). Scarff, “Ethical Issues in Whale and Small Cetacean Management,” p. 252. Nakajima, “Hogei mondai ni kansuru futatsu no sokumen,” p. 19. IWC, Forty-First Report of the International Whaling Commission, p. 15. Scarff, “Ethical Issues in Whale and Small Cetacean Management,” p. 263. WWF, Conservation Issues, vol. 2, no. 2 (Washington, DC, April 1995), p. 2. Kalland, “Whose Whale is That?” p. 178; Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling, p. 193. Scarff, “Ethical Issues in Whale and Small Cetacean Management,” p. 246. Nakajima, “Hogei mondai ni kansuru futatsu no sokumen,” p. 19. The Times (June 26, 1987). House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), pp. 11, 21. Globe and Mail (May 15, 1993) (quoted in Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, p. 61). Scarff, “Ethical Issues in Whale and Small Cetacean Management,” p. 258. Milton M. R. Freeman and Stephen R. Kellert, “International Attitudes to Whales, Whaling and the Use of Whale Products: A Six-Country Survey,” p. 295, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 293–300. Komatsu, Kujira wa tabete ii, pp. 155–61; a Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 23, 1999); a MOFA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 8, 1999). Nihon keizai sangyô shinbun (November 12, 1990), p. 16; a former Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 28, 1999). House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), p. 11; Asahi shinbun (May 14, 1991), p. 5; Asahi shinbun ( June 21, 1992), p. 3; a Fisheries Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 23, 1999). The Japan Times (November 9, 1994). House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), p. 24; Komatsu, “Kujira to keizai masatsu,” p. 94. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), p. 19. House of Councillors, Sangiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 30, 1987), p. 19; Itabashi Morikuni, “Akumu no nakano hogei kaigi” [The Whaling Meeting in Nightmare], p. 57, Ekonomisuto (July 21, 1987), pp. 54–7; The Economist (February 6, 1988), p. 88. See also Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, p. 143. Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” pp. 173–5; Yomiuri shinbun (May 30, 1991), p. 6.

136. 137.

138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150.

151.

152. 153.

154. 155. 156. 157.

158.

Notes 171 159. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), p. 10. 160. Asahi shinbun (February 9, 1989), p. 4; Mainichi shinbun (March 6, 1990), p. 9; Mainichi shinbun (December 24, 1990), p. 22. 161. The Guardian (February 10, 1989); The Guardian (March 17, 1989). It is interesting to note that an English verb “to whale” also means “to strike or hit vigorously.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edn., s.v. “whale.” In this sense, Greenpeace “whaled” Japanese whaling vessels in the Antarctic. 162. Michael Brown and John May, The Greenpeace Story, 2nd edn., trans. Nakano Haruko (Tokyo: Yama-Kei Publishers, 1995), p. 266. 163. A Japanese NGO official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 21, 1999). See, for instance, David Day, The Whale War, updated edn (London: Grafton, 1992). 164. Suwa, Amerika wa kankyô ni yasashiinoka, pp. 234–5. 165. Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling, pp. 6, 8; Kalland, “Whose Whale is That?” pp. 163–4. 166. Kazuo Shima, “Japan and Whaling,” pp. 4–5, Social Science Japan, vol. 16 (August 1999), pp. 3–6. For similar views, see Peterson, “Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of Whaling,” p. 155; Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, p. 113. 167. Suwa, Amerika wa kankyô ni yasashiinoka, p. 237. 168. Kalland, “Whose Whale is That?” p. 165. 169. Understanding this situation and feeling a little dissatisfied with Greenpeace’s international aggressive campaigns on whales, Greenpeace Japan instead directed its focus on the driftnet issue around 1990. A then-Greenpeace Japan official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 21, 1999). 170. T. Akimichi, et al., Small-Type Coastal Whaling in Japan, Occasional Paper, no. 27 (Edmonton: Boreal Institute for Northern Studies, 1988), p. 75 (quoted in Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling, p. 2). 171. Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling, Chapters 7 and 8. 172. Ibid., p. 188. 173. Nakajima, “Hogei mondai ni kansuru futatsu no sokumen,” p. 29. 174. Two Japan Whaling Association officials, interview by author (Tokyo, July 1, 1999). 175. Nihon keizai shinbun (May 18, 1988), p. 31; Yomiuri shinbun ( June 10, 1988), p. 25; Asahi shinbun ( January 28, 1989), p. 30. 176. TRAFFIC International, Whale Meat Trade in East Asia, p. 11. 177. Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling, p. 1. 178. Ibid., p. 194. 179. Asahi shinbun (June 21, 1992), p. 3. 180. Niimori Tatsuo, “Hogeikoku aisurando no ketsudan” [Decision by Iceland, a Whaling Nation], p. 108, Gekkan shakaitô (September 1991), pp. 104–13. For other examples, see House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku ( July 28, 1987), pp. 3, 4, 11, 14, 18, 22; The Japan Times (November 9, 1994). 181. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), pp. 11, 14; Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, p. 113; The Times (December 22, 1987). 182. Komatsu, “Kujira to keizai masatsu,” p. 109; Kalland and Moeran, Japanese Whaling, pp. 14, 94; Umezaki Yoshito, “Shigen hogo dewanaku jinshu sabetsu

172

183. 184. 185. 186. 187.

Notes shisô da” [Not Resource Conservation but Racial Thought], p. 21, Sekai shûhô (July 21, 1987), pp. 18–21. See, for example, Komatsu, Kujira wa tabete ii, pp. 185, 206, 213; The Economist (February 6, 1988), p. 88. House of Representatives, Shûgiin nôrinsuisan iinkai kaigiroku (July 28, 1987), p. 17; Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling, p. 105. The Guardian (March 17, 1989). See also Shima, “Japan and Whaling,” p. 5; The Guardian (May 27, 1991); The Daily Telegraph ( June 22, 1987). Day, The Whale War, p. 140. A former journalist, interview by author (Tokyo, June 28, 1999).

Chapter 6 1. Thomas Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban: NGOs and International Conservation,” p. 125, in Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 121–59. The Indian elephant had already been listed in Appendix I. Asahi shinbun (May 13, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. 2. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 122. 3. Tom Milliken, “Afurikazô no genshô to zôge no kokusai torihiki: Washinton jôyaku ni motozuku ketsudan no toki” [Decrease in African Elephant Populations and the International Ivory Trade: Time to Decide in Accordance with the Washington Convention], p. 7, TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 5, nos. 3–4 (November 30, 1989), pp. 2–24. 4. Ibid., pp. 7–9. The fifth CITES Conference in 1985 adopted the quota system. 5. Ivory Trade Review Group, The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Volume 1 Summary and Conclusions (October 1989), p. 17. In 1989, the market was estimated to be worth 50 to 60 million dollars. Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics: Dilemmas in World Politics, 2nd edn (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 81. 6. Ivory Trade Review Group, The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Volume 1 Summary and Conclusions, pp. 21–2. 7. Ibid., pp. 31–2; Milliken, “Afurikazô no genshô to zôge no kokusai torihiki,” pp. 8–9; Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” pp. 125–6. 8. Ivory Trade Review Group, The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Volume 1 Summary and Conclusions, p. 2. 9. Raymond Bonner, At the Hand of Man: Peril and Hope for Africa’s Wildlife (New York: Vintage, 1994), p. 114. 10. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 136. Princen also argues that this feature distinguishes it from the IWC regime, to say nothing of economic regimes such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Ibid., p. 142. 11. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources changed its name in 1988 to the World Conservation Union but kept the old acronym. Andy Crump, Dictionary of Environment and Development: People, Places, Ideas and Organizations (London: Earthscan, 1991), p. 267. 12. This organization changed its name from “World Wildlife Fund” in 1989. Ibid., p. 270.

Notes 173 13. For further details on this organization, see Tokunaga Hideomi, “Torafikku nettowaaku: Sono soshiki to katsudô” [TRAFFIC Network: Its Organization and Activities], Kankyô ( January 1988), pp. 28–30. 14. Nishimiya Hiroshi, “Washinton jôyaku niokeru yasei dôshokubutsu no hogo” [Protection of Wild Fauna and Flora in the Washington Convention], p. 7, Kankyô ( January 1988), pp. 6–9; Simon Lyster, International Wildlife Law (Cambridge: Grotius, 1985), p. 239. 15. Crump, Dictionary of Environment and Development, pp. 270–1. 16. WWF, Afurikazô no kyûsai [Relief of African Elephants] (Tokyo, 1990), pp. 21–2. 17. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 130. 18. Sakaguchi Isao, “Zôge torihiki kisei regiimu: Chishiki, gensetsu, rieki” [The Ivory Trade Regulation Regime: Knowledge, Discourse, and Interests], p. 175, Kokusai seiji, vol. 119 (October 1998), pp. 170–91. 19. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, pp. 112–13. 20. WWF, “WWF Policy Statement on African Elephants and the Ivory Trade” (agreed at the Directors’ Meeting in Hong Kong on December 2, 1988); Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 149. 21. A TRAFFIC Japan official, interview by author (Tokyo, March 28, 1997); a then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, March 30, 1997). 22. Allan Thornton and Dave Curry, Afurikazô wo sukue [Save the African Elephant], trans. Nakano Haruko (Tokyo: Sôshisha, 1993), pp. 106–18. 23. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 144. For two kinds of environmental transnational coalitions, see Thomas Princen, “Ivory, Conservation, and Environmental Transnational Coalitions,” pp. 230–1, in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 227–53. 24. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, pp. 117–19; Princen, “Ivory, Conservation, and Environmental Transnational Coalitions,” p. 231. 25. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 124. 26. Yomiuri shinbun (February 24, 1989, evening edition), p. 7. 27. Thornton and Curry, Afurikazô wo sukue, pp. 124, 140–7, 161–2, 169; Bonner, At the Hand of Man, pp. 128–9. 28. Sakaguchi Isao, “Yasei seibutsu torihiki kanri regiimu” [The Wildlife Trade Management Regime] (MA thesis, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, 1995), p. 144; Asahi shinbun (May 13, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. 29. A then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 30, 1997); WWF, “News Release: WWF Petition Spurs the United States to Halt Ivory Trade from Somalia” (Washington, DC, February 21, 1989). 30. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 112. 31. Ibid., p. 113. 32. Ibid., pp. 89, 139. 33. WWF and WCI, “News Release: WWF and WCI Call for Worldwide Ban on Ivory Trade, Findings in New Scientific Study Show Elephant Holocaust is Likely Unless Action is Taken” (Washington, DC, June 1, 1989). Milliken, “Afurikazô no genshô to zôge no kokusai torihiki,” p. 10; Nihon keizai shinbun

174

34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53.

54.

55. 56. 57.

Notes ( June 2, 1989), p. 34; Mainichi shinbun ( June 2, 1989), p. 26; Yomiuri shinbun ( June 2, 1989), p. 30; Asahi shinbun (June 2, 1989), p. 30. David Western, “Ivory Trade under Scrutiny,” pp. 35–6, Species, Newsletter of the Species Survival Commission, IUCN, nos. 13–14 ( July 1990), pp. 35–7. Princen, “Ivory, Conservation, and Environmental Transnational Coalitions,” p. 245. J. R. Caldwell, and R. A. Luxmoore in collaboration with the TRAFFIC Network, Recent Changes in World Ivory Trade (Cambridge: World Conservation Monitoring Centre, February 1990), pp. 2–3; Milliken, “Afurikazô no genshô to zôge no kokusai torihiki,” pp. 10–11; Asahi shinbun ( June 6, 1989), p. 30; Asahi shinbun (June 10, 1989), p. 30. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 140. See also Ibid., pp. 139–40, 154. The Economist (July 1, 1989), p. 18. Asahi shinbun ( July 10, 1989), p. 3; The Independent ( July 8, 1989); Western, “Ivory Trade under Scrutiny,” p. 37. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 122. The Economist (July 1, 1989), pp. 17–18. This group commissioned the study of the Ivory Trade Review Group (ITRG). Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 126. The Economist (April 15, 1989). The Financial Times (July 19, 1989); Asahi shinbun ( July 19, 1989, evening edition), p. 2. The Economist (July 1, 1989), p. 18. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 122. Ivory Trade Review Group, The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Volume 1 Summary and Conclusions, p. 29. The Economist (July 1, 1989), p. 18. Ibid., p. 19. The International Herald Tribune (October 12, 1989); The Economist (July 1, 1989), p. 17. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” pp. 122, 127–8. The Economist (October 14, 1989), p. 20. Sakaguchi, “Yasei seibutsu torihiki kanri regiimu,” p. 167. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, pp. 152–3; Thornton and Curry, Afurikazô wo Sukue, pp. 210, 213; Tom Milliken, Ginette Hemley, and Jon Barzdo, “Dai 7 kai Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi hôkoku: Afurikazô mondai ga kaigi no shôten ni” [The seventh CITES Conference of the Parties: African Elephant Takes Center Stage], pp. 3–5, TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 6, no. 2 (March 31, 1990), pp. 2–8. The proposal allowed the export from the region of elephant skin and meat as well. The Financial Times (October 9, 1989). Princen points out that “many other traded and threatened species were neglected for lack of time and money.” Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 151. Milliken, Hemley, and Barzdo, “Dai 7 kai Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi hôkoku,” p. 2. Princen cites the WWF, TRAFFIC, the Environment Investigation Agency (EIA), Greenpeace, the Humane Society, and Safari Club International as the most prominent NGOs at the 1989 meeting. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 158. Thornton and Curry, Afurikazô wo sukue, pp. 212–16. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 155. Asahi shinbun (October 18, 1989), p. 3; The Financial Times (October 18, 1989).

Notes 175 58. Tom Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade: Tradition, Cites and the Elusive Search for Sustainable Utilisation,” 3.8.7, in Ivory Trade Review Group, The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Volume 2 Technical Reports (October 1989). For more details on the rules governing international trade in specimens of species listed in the Appendices, see Lyster, International Wildlife Law, pp. 247–56. 59. Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 124. The Economist of October 14, 1989 (p. 20) argues that the world black market “already accounts for perhaps three-quarters of the total trade.” 60. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.7, 3.8.8, 3.8.3.1, 3.8.1, and 3.8.7. 61. Mainichi shinbun ( June 10, 1989), p. 26. 62. A then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999); an Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). In many cases, ivory from intermediary countries was illegal. A then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997); Mainichi shinbun (May 27, 1989), p. 27. 63. A then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999); Asahi shinbun ( June 16, 1989), p. 1; Nihon keizai shinbun (June 16, 1989), p. 34; Mainichi shinbun ( June 16, 1989), p. 27; Yomiuri shinbun (June 16, 1989), p. 30. 64. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.3.3; Yomiuri shinbun (September 19, 1989, evening edition), p. 18; Nihon keizai shinbun (September 24, 1989), p. 12. 65. Yomiuri shinbun (October 31, 1989), p. 2; Nihon keizai shinbun (October 31, 1989), p. 34; Asahi shinbun (October 31, 1989), p. 30. 66. Peter J. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), p. 85. 67. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, pp. 154–5; Thornton and Curry, Afurikazô wo sukue, p. 203. 68. Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 21. 69. Asahi shinbun (July 12, 1989), p. 1; Nihon keizai shinbun ( July 12, 1989), p. 5. According to a then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 30, 1997), the issue was brought up by the Japanese side without government coordination in advance. 70. Nihon keizai shinbun (November 2, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. 71. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 148. 72. Ibid., p. 140. 73. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.3.8 and 3.8.4; Tokyo Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association and Osaka Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association, “A Proposal for Reconciling the Japanese Need for Ivory with the Conservation of the African Elephant” (Tokyo, 1989); a then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999). For more information on the industry, see also Esmond B. Martin, The Japanese Ivory Industry (Tokyo: WWF Japan, 1981). 74. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.5.1; Asahi shinbun ( June 21, 1989), p. 6; Asahi shinbun ( July 12, 1989), p. 1. In January 2001, MITI was reorganized into the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). 75. These percentage figures include the scrap and waste generated in the manufacturing process. It should be noted that scrap from the production of seals and

176

76.

77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

84.

85. 86.

87. 88. 89.

90. 91.

92.

Notes musical instrument parts was recycled to make jewelry and other accessories home and abroad. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.4 and 3.8.4.1. Kaneko Yoshio, “Zôge torihiki zenmen kinshi niwa mondaiten” [Problems with a Total Trade Ban on Ivory], Asahi shinbun ( July 25, 1989), p. 5. Kaneko Yoshio was Head of Special Project Unit of the CITES Secretariat. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.3.8. The membership was not mandatory. Ibid., a then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997). The Japan Ivory Arts and Crafts Association was a member of the JIIA. Environment Agency, Nature Conservation Bureau, Nature Conservation in Japan, 4th edn. (Tokyo, 1995). In January 2001, the Environment Agency was upgraded to the status of a ministry. An Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). A then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999); a thenMOFA official, telephone interview by author (Tokyo, June 25, 1999). A then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 30, 1997); an Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.3.8. Lapointe, Secretary-General of the CITES Secretariat, said that Japan had been “performing perfectly.” The Financial Times (October 9, 1989). According to Yomiuri shinbun of October 9, 1989 (p. 30), 80 percent of the budget of the Ivory Unit was financed by donations from ivory industries. A then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 30, 1997). For more information on the relations between CITES and the industry, see Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.8. In June 1995, the Japanese government became a member of the IUCN. Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., Kankyôgaku ga wakaru [Leaning of Ecology] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1994), p. 122; Tokunaga, “Torafikku nettowaaku” p. 29. Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., Kankyôgaku ga wakaru, p. 122. Environment Agency, Nature Conservation Bureau, Wildlife Protection Division, Wildlife Conservation in Japan (Tokyo, 1997), pp. 5–6. Kaneko Yoshio, “Washinton jôyaku: Shu no hogo to eizokuteki riyô” [The Washington Convention: Species Protection and Sustainable Utilization], p. 26, Kankyô ( January 1988), pp. 23–7; an Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.2; Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 154. Tsuji Masami, “Kishô yasei dôshokubutsu no kokunai torihiki kiseihô no jisshi nitsuite” [Implementation of the Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora], p. 18, Kankyô ( January 1988), pp. 18–19. A TRAFFIC Japan official, interview by author (Tokyo, March 28, 1997); a then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999). TRAFFIC Japan had a closer contact with the Environment Agency than MITI. Its staff normally met directors of the Environment Agency and assistant directors of MITI. The NGO and WWF Japan were established under the approval of the Wildlife Protection Division of the Environment Agency. A then-Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 18, 1999).

Notes 177 93. TRAFFIC Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 1 (September 4, 1989), p. 18. 94. Sakaguchi, “Yasei seibutsu torihiki kanri regiimu,” pp. 156–7. 95. A then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999); Tokyo Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association and Osaka Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association, “A proposal for reconciling the Japanese need for ivory with the conservation of the African elephant.” 96. Mainichi shinbun (June 10, 1989), p. 26; Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.4.6. 97. Tokyo Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association and Osaka Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association, “A proposal for reconciling the Japanese need for ivory with the conservation of the African elephant”; Asahi shinbun ( June 16, 1989), p. 30; Mainichi shinbun ( June 16, 1989), p. 27; Yomiuri shinbun (June 16, 1989), p. 30; Nihon keizai shinbun (June 16, 1989), p. 34. 98. Yomiuri shinbun (June 28, 1989), p. 3. 99. Asahi shinbun (June 17, 1989, evening edition), p. 16. 100. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 14, 1989), p. 34. 101. Yomiuri shinbun (September 14, 1989), p. 2; Milliken, “Afurikazô no genshô to zôge no kokusai torihiki,” p. 22; TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 5, nos. 3–4 (November 30, 1989). 102. Asahi shinbun (September 19, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. 103. A then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997). 104. Nihon keizai shinbun (October 20, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. This statement was corroborated by a then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997). 105. Asahi shinbun (October 18, 1989), p. 8. 106. A then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997). 107. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 20, 1989), p. 10. 108. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.4.3. 109. Ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau, Shokuinroku [Government Directory] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau, 1990), pp. 1373, 1384. 110. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics, p. 81. 111. “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.4; Tokyo Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association and Osaka Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association, “A proposal for reconciling the Japanese need for ivory with the conservation of the African elephant”; a then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999). 112. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.4.1. They accounted for 50 percent to 60 percent of the national total number of hallmark carvers. 113. A then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, March 30, 1997); a then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997). 114. This is based on the estimation of Tom Milliken, the then-Director of TRAFFIC Japan. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.4.1. 115. Tokyo Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association and Osaka Ivory Art and Craft Co-operative Association, “A proposal for reconciling the Japanese need for ivory with the conservation of the African elephant.” 116. Asahi shinbun (August 16, 1989), p. 4; Yomiuri shinbun (August 24, 1989), p. 30; Nihon keizai shinbun (August 25, 1989), p. 10. 117. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.4.1 and 3.8.3.1; Martin, The Japanese Ivory Industry, p. 21; Nihon keizai shinbun ( June 27, 1989, evening edition), p. 18.

178

Notes

118. Asahi shinbun (June 16, 1989), p. 1. 119. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.1; Martin, The Japanese Ivory Industry, p. 16. Until the early twentieth century, Japan mainly imported the ivory of Asian elephants. 120. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.4. 121. A TRAFFIC Japan official, interview by author (Tokyo, March 28, 1997). 122. Ibid.; an Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). 123. A then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 30, 1997); a then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997); an Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). 124. A TRAFFFIC Japan official, interview by author (Tokyo, March 28, 1997); Yomiuri shinbun (May 22, 1989, evening edition), p. 1. 125. Nishiyama Yutaka, “Zetsumetsu no osorearu yasei dôshokubutsu no jôto no kiseitô nikansuru hôritsu nitsuite” [Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora], pp. 14–15, Kankyô, vol. 13, no. 1 ( January 1988), pp. 13–17; Environment Agency, Kankyô hakusho: Heisei 2 nenban sôsetsu [White Paper on the Environment: General Remarks, 1990] (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, Printing Bureau, 1990), pp. 210–11. 126. A then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 30, 1997); a then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997); an Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). 127. Asahi shinbun ( June 16, 1989, evening edition), p. 19; Mainichi shinbun ( June 16, 1989, evening edition), p. 12. 128. Asahi shinbun (September 19, 1989, evening edition), p. 18; Yomiuri shinbun (September 19, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. 129. Asahi shinbun (October 6, 1989, evening edition), p. 22; Yomiuri shinbun (October 6, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. 130. Yomiuri shinbun (October 17, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. 131. Kikuchi Kunio, “Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi ni shusseki shite” [After Attendance at a Conference of the Parties of the Washington Convention], p. 40, Kankyô (January 1990), pp. 38–41; a then-CITES Secretariat official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 30, 1997); an Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). 132. Mainichi shinbun (June 16, 1989, evening edition), p. 12. 133. An Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). 134. Kikuchi, “Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi ni shusseki shite,” p. 40. 135. Milliken, “Afurikazô no genshô to zôge no kokusai torihiki,” p. 23. 136. TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 6, no. 2 (March 31, 1990), p. 11. 137. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.9. 138. Nihon keizai shinbun (September 24, 1989), p. 12. 139. A then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997). 140. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics, p. 83. 141. TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 6, no. 2 (March 31, 1990), pp. 6–7. 142. Milliken, Hemley, and Barzdo, “Dai 7 kai Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi hôkoku,” pp. 7, 20. 143. The Economist (July 1, 1989), p. 18. 144. TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 6, no. 2 (March 31, 1990), p. 7.

Notes 179 145. The Times (October 21, 1989). 146. A then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999); a thenEnvironment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 18, 1999). In 1989, MITI, MOFA, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, and the Environment Agency participated in the conference. Milliken, Hemley, and Barzdo, “Dai 7 kai Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi hôkoku,” p. 2. 147. Porter and Brown, Global Environmental Politics, p. 84. 148. Kikuchi, “Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi ni shusseki shite,” p. 40. 149. Mainichi shinbun (October 17, 1989, evening edition), p. 10. 150. An Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, August 8, 1997). 151. Yomiuri shinbun (October 17, 1989, evening edition), p. 18. 152. A then-MOFA official, telephone interview by author (Tokyo, June 25, 1999); Asahi shinbun (October 20, 1989, evening edition), p. 22; Yomiuri shinbun (October 20, 1989, evening edition), p. 18; Mainichi shinbun (October 20, 1989, evening edition), p. 12; The Times (October 21, 1989). 153. Boston Globe (October 21, 1989), p. 6 (quoted in Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty, p. 312 n. 88). 154. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 141. 155. TRAFFIC USA, vol. 9, no. 2 ( June 1989), p. 1. 156. Thornton and Curry, Afurikazô wo sukue, p. 180; Iain and Oria DouglasHamilton, Zô notameno tatakai [Battle for the Elephants], trans. Itô Noriko and Ono Sayaka (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1995), p. 423. 157. Ivory Trade Review Group, “The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Executive Summary, Interim Report” (prepared for the Second Meeting of the CITES African Elephant Working Group, held at Gaborone, Botswana, on July 4–8, 1989), p. 5. 158. The Economist (July 1, 1989), p. 17. 159. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 143. 160. Ibid., p. 142. 161. Ivory Trade Review Group, “The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Executive Summary, Interim Report.” 162. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 139. Ivory Trade Review Group, “Zôge torihiki to afurikazô no shôrai nitsuiteno seimei” [Public Statement on the Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant], trans. TRAFFIC Japan (Tokyo, June 1, 1989). 163. Ivory Trade Review Group, “The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Executive Summary, Interim Report,” p. 1. 164. Sakaguchi, “Zôge torihiki kisei regiimu,” pp. 178–9. 165. Lyster, International Wildlife Law, p. 243. 166. Ivory Trade Review Group, “The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Executive Summary, Interim Report,” p. 3. 167. Ibid., p. 1 168. Ibid., p. 9. 169. Ibid., p. 4. See also ibid., p. 11; Western, “Ivory Trade under Scrutiny,” pp. 35–6. 170. Lyster, International Wildlife Law, p. 243. 171. Sakaguchi, “Yasei seibutsu torihiki kanri regiimu,” p. 158.

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172. A then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999); TRAFFIC Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 1 (September 4, 1989), p. 18; Asahi shinbun ( June 24, 1989), p. 3; Yomiuri shinbun ( June 24, 1989), p. 30. 173. Douglas-Hamilton, Zô notameno tatakai, p. 425. 174. Nihon keizai shinbun ( July 27, 1989, evening edition), p. 14. 175. A then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999). 176. Nihon keizai shinbun ( July 27, 1989, evening edition), p. 14. 177. TRAFFIC Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 1 (September 4, 1989), p. 1; The Times (July 4, 1989); Nihon keizai shinbun (July 7, 1989, evening edition), p. 18; Nihon Keizai shinbun ( July 9, 1989), p. 13. MITI was relieved to see the division of opinions on international trade in ivory. A then-JGMIA official, interview by author (Tokyo, July 31, 1997). 178. Kikuchi, “Washinton jôyaku teiyakukoku kaigi ni shusseki shite,” p. 40; Thornton and Curry, Afurikazô wo sukue, p. 210. 179. Kaneko, “Zôge torihiki zenmen kinshi niwa mondaiten”; Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban,” p. 128; Thornton and Curry, Afurikazô wo sukue, pp. 186–209; Douglas-Hamilton, Zô notameno tatakai, pp. 440–2; Asahi shinbun (October 8, 1989), p. 3; The Financial Times (October 9, 1989); The Times (October 12, 1989). At the 1989 CITES meeting, environmentalists pressured SecretaryGeneral Lapointe to resign. 180. TRAFFIC Japan Newsletter, vol. 6, no. 2 (March 31, 1990), p. 11. 181. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 134; Mainichi shinbun (May 27, 1989), p. 27; Kaneko, “Zôge torihiki zenmen kinshi niwa mondaiten.” 182. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.3.1 and 3.8.3.6. 183. A then-MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 16, 1999). Japan accounted for up to 70 percent of the entire ivory trade prior to 1987. WWF, “News Release: WWF Petition Spurs the United States to Halt Ivory Trade from Somalia.” 184. Asahi shinbun (July 12, 1989), p. 1; The Daily Telegraph (October 30, 1989). 185. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.3.4, 3.8.3.5, and 3.8.3.6; Martin, The Japanese Ivory Industry, p.19. 186. Milliken, “Afurikazô no genshô to zôge no kokusai torihiki,” p. 14. 187. Ivory Trade Review Group, The Ivory Trade and the Future of the African Elephant: Volume 1 Summary and Conclusions, pp. 18, 19. 188. The Economist (July 1, 1989), p. 19. 189. Mainichi shinbun (June 2, 1989), p. 26; Yomiuri shinbun (June 2, 1989), p. 30. Japan and Hong Kong imported 75 to 83 percent of the world import of raw ivory. Since Hong Kong, like the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, re-exported much of this ivory after processing it, Japan was the largest consumer of ivory. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.3.1, 3.8.3.7, and 3.8.4.7. On June 18, Hong Kong announced a ban on raw ivory import. Asahi shinbun (June 19, 1989), p. 3. 190. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, p. 135. 191. Ibid., pp. 108, 119. 192. Milliken, “The Japanese Ivory Trade,” 3.8.1. For the attitude of TRAFFIC Japan toward the industry, see also ibid., 3.8.8. 193. Akao Toshinobu, Chikyû wa uttaeru: Taikenteki chikyû kankyô gaikôron [An Agenda for Global Survival: An Ambassador Reflects on Environmental Protection] (Tokyo: Sekai no Ugokisha, 1993), p. 176. 194. Yomiuri shinbun (September 15, 1989), p. 30.

Notes 181

Chapter 7 1. Helmut Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective: Lessons for a Preventive Approach,” p. 522, in Shigeto Tsuru and Helmut Weidner, eds, Environmental Policy in Japan (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1989), pp. 479–552; Jonathan Holliman, “Environmentalism with a Global Scope,” p. 290, Japan Quarterly (July–September 1990), pp. 284–90; Alan S. Millar and Curtis Moore, Japan and the Global Environment (College Park: Center for Global Change, University of Maryland, 1991), pp. 18, 38; Hanns W. Maull, “Japan’s Global Environmental Policies,” pp. 366–8, 371, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 354–72; Miranda A. Schreurs, “Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?: Global Environmental Policy-Making Under the Liberal Democratic Party,” p. 31, The Journal of Pacific Asia, vol. 2 (1995), pp. 3–33. 2. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Structures of Governance and Transnational Relations: What Have We Learned?” p. 291, in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 280–313. See also Jeffery T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 43 (1999), pp. 83–114. 3. Kim D. Reimann, “Building Networks from the Outside In: International Movements, Japanese NGOs, and the Kyoto Climate Change Conference,” prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association (NPSA) and International Studies Association – Northeast (ISANE) (Philadelphia Crown Plaza Hotel, November 10–14, 1999). 4. See, for example, Karen T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 5. Inis L. Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” p. 379, International Organization, vol. 20 (1966), pp. 367–79. 6. Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, now Palgrave, 2000), pp. 120–1. In 1993, Japan officially started to seek permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council. Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: From Economic Super Power to What Power? (Basingstoke: Macmillan, now Palgrave, 1996), pp. 131–5. 7. For “crucial-case studies,” see Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Green and Nelson Polsby, eds, Handbook of Political Science Volume 7: Strategies of Inquiry (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79–137. 8. Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd edn. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), p. 1. 9. Miguel Marín-Bosch, Votes in the UN General Assembly (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 110, 183–5, 195–200. The resolutions without a vote account for 56 percent of the total, those without negative votes 17 percent, and those with four or more negative votes 15 percent. For a recent account of voting alignments in the General Assembly, see Soo Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, “The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly,” International Organization, vol. 50, no. 4 (1996), pp. 629–52.

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10. For problems with the United Nations’ standard setting, see Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, “Introduction: The UN’s Roles in International Society since 1945,” pp. 52–6, in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds, United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 1–62. 11. United Nations, “Press Release: For Ninth Successive Year, General Assembly Calls for End of United States Embargo against Cuba,” GA/9814 (November 9, 2000) [cited September 23, 2001], available from http://www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2000/20001109.ga9814.doc.html. 12. Japan has accepted decisions of the Security Council as well: for example, the decision to impose sanctions on North Korea in 1994. Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” p. 402, International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999), pp. 379–408. 13. Paul Kowert and Jeffery Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits,” p. 491, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 451–97. See also Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 901, International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 887–917. 14. For a similar argument, see Ingo Peters, “The OSCE and German Policy: A Study in How Institutions Matter,” in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 195–220. 15. The Washington Post (September 13, 2002), p. A39. 16. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds, Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 17. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn. (New York: Alfred a Knopf, 1978), p. 231. 18. Governance “refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain and compliance.” James N. Rosenau, “Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics,” p. 4, in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds, Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1–29. 19. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” pp. 383–9. See also Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 266–78; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 54, 134; Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Force of Prescription,” p. 686, International Organization, vol. 38, no. 4 (1984), pp. 685–708. 20. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 32. 21. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, September 2002). 22. Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation,” World Politics, vol. 40, no. 4 (July 1988), pp. 517–41. 23. Robert M. Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question (Washington, DC:

Notes 183

24. 25.

26.

27.

28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

33.

34.

35.

The AEI Press, 1992), pp. 111–13; Yumiko Mikanagi, Japan’s Trade Policy: Action or Reaction? (London: Routledge, 1996); Taniguchi Masaki, Nihon no taibei bôeki kôshô [The US–Japan Trade Relationship: Its Structure and Transfiguration] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1997); Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Amy Gurowitz, “Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State,” World Politics, vol. 51 (April 1999), pp. 413–45. Note that Leonard Schoppa focuses on the procedural legitimacy of coercive strategies. Leonard J. Schoppa, “The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining,” International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999), pp. 307–42. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fisheries Division, “Kôkai nagashiami gyogyô mondai” [High Seas Driftnet Fishing Issue], (Tokyo, June 18, 1992), p. 2; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fisheries Division, “Kankyô to gyogyô mondai” [Environment and Fishing Issue], (Tokyo, December 3, 1992), pp. 5, 8; Nihon keizai shinbun (November 4, 1992), p. 3. For a similar view, see Grant J. Hewison, “The Legally Binding Nature of the Moratorium on Large-Scale High Seas Driftnet Fishing,” Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, vol. 25, no. 4 (October 1994), pp. 557–79. Michael A. O’Connell and Michael Sutton in cooperation with TRAFFIC USA, The Effects of Trade Moratoria on International Commerce in African Elephant Ivory: A Preliminary Report (Washington, DC: WWF and the Conservation Foundation, June 1990), pp. ii, 8–10; Nihon keizai shinbun (April 2, 1991), p. 35; Yomiuri shinbun (March 8, 1990), p. 30; Yomiuri shinbun (January 16, 1990), p. 27; Yomiuri shinbun (April 12, 1990), p. 30. Yomiuri shinbun (February 28, 1992), p. 30. A MITI official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 18, 1999); a then-Environment Agency official, interview by author (Tokyo, June 18, 1999). Kiyono Hisako, “Washinton jôyaku dai 10 kai teiyakukoku kaigi hôkoku” [Report on the 10th CITES Conference of the Parties], WWF, vol. 27 (Tokyo, November 1997), pp. 1–6. Yomiuri shinbun ( July 17, 1999), pp. 1, 38. Tom Milliken, “African Elephants and the Twelfth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, TRAFFIC Briefing Document” (October 2002) [cited June 27, 2003], available from http://www.traffic.org/cop12/ Elephants_CoP12.pdf; CITES Secretariat, “Press Release:CITES Sets Strict Conditions for Any Possible Future Ivory Sales” (November, 12, 2002) [cited June 27, 2003], available from http://www.cites.org/eng/news/press/ 021112_ivory_update.shtml. International Whaling Commission (IWC), “Scientific Permits and Japan” [cited November 3, 2000], available from http://ourworld.compuserve.com/ homepages/iwcoffice/ sciperms.htm. Fisheries Agency, Far Seas Fisheries Division, “Hogei mondai no keii to genjô” [The Past and Current State of the Whaling Issue] (Tokyo, January 1999), pp. 4–5; Asahi shinbun (September 15, 2000), pp. 3, 9. The Washington Post (August 27, 2000), p. B7.

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36. Asahi shinbun (September 15, 2000), pp. 3, 15; Asahi shinbun (December 30, 2000); Asahi shinbun ( January 27, 2001, evening edition). 37. James E. Scarff, “Ethical Issues in Whale and Small Cetacean Management,” pp. 263–75, Environmental Ethics, vol. 3 (Fall 1980), pp. 241–79. 38. Milton M. R. Freeman, “Science and Trans-science in the Whaling Debate,” p. 144, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 143–57. 39. This editorial was supported in a letter to the editor from the Embassy of Japan in London. The Independent (May 30, 1990). For other similar editorials, see The Times (July 3, 1990) and The Times (May 29, 1991). 40. Peter J. Stoett, The International Politics of Whaling (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), p. 130. 41. Raymond Bonner, At the Hand of Man: Peril and Hope for Africa’s Wildlife (New York: Vintage, 1994), p. 110. 42. Ibid., pp. 142–3. 43. Urs P. Kreuter and Randy T. Simmons, “Economics, Politics and Controversy over African Elephant Conservation,” p. 53, in Milton M. R. Freeman and Urs P. Kreuter, eds, Elephants and Whales: Resources for Whom? (Basel, Switzerland: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1994), pp. 39–57. For a similar argument, see also Edward B. Barbier, Joanne C. Burgess, Timothy M. Swanson, and David W. Pearce, Elephants, Economics and Ivory (London: Earthscan, 1990). 44. Bonner, At the Hand of Man, pp. 111, 130. 45. Thomas Princen, “The Ivory Trade Ban: NGOs and International Conservation,” p. 130, in Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 121–59. 46. Asahi shinbun (October 18, 1989), p. 3; Yomiuri shinbun (October 19, 1989), p. 7; (October 31, 1989), p. 34. 47. Mainichi shinbun (December 27, 1989, evening edition), p. 1; Japan Times (December 29, 1989). 48. Suisan Nenkan Henshû Iinkai, ed., Suisan nenkan 1989 [Fisheries Yearbook 1989] (Tokyo: Suisansha, 1989), p. 23. 49. Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran, Japanese Whaling: End of an Era (London: Curzon Press, 1992), p. 41. 50. Mizuguchi Kenya, “Umi to kujira eno kakawarikata no tayôsei to suisanshigen” [Variety in Relationship with Ocean and the Whale and Fisheries Resources], pp. 73–4, in Kitahara Takeshi, ed., Kujira ni manabu [Learning from Whales] (Tokyo: Naruyamadô Shoten, 1996), pp. 63–79. 51. Asahi shinbun (July 28, 2001, evening edition), p. 10

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Index Adler, Emmanuel, 22 African Elephant Conservation Act (US, 1988), 104 African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), 100 Akao, Toshinobu (MOFA), 120, 146n131 All Japan Fishermen’s Union, 59 All Japan Seamen’s Union, 80 Angola, 112 animal rights, 39, 40, 133–4, 152n84 and ivory trade, 100, 120 and scientific whaling, 90, 91 see also preservation Animal Welfare International Fund, 79 appropriateness, logic of, 10, 13, 15, 19, 24, 97, 130 Araki, Kiyoshi (MOFA), 61 arguing, logic of, 14–15, 19 Armacost, Michael (US Ambassador to Japan), 53 Asahi shinbun, 80 Asquith, Pamela, 44 Australia, 29 and driftnet fishing, 50, 52, 53, 55, 59 and whaling, 32, 79, 96 Austria, 100 Baker, James (US Secretary of State), 79, 129 Barnett, Michael, 22 Beetham, David, 12, 20, 143n90 Bentham, Jeremy, 38 biodiversity, 1, 42 Blue Whale Unit (BWU) system, 31 Bonner, Raymond, 100–1, 104, 116, 134 Botswana, 99, 102, 112, 118, 131 Britain, see United Kingdom Brown, Chris, 4 Brown, Janet W., 58, 108, 115

Brown, Michael, 93 Brundtland, Gro (Norwegian Prime Minister), 85 Bull, Hedley, 15 Burke, Williams, 68, 69, 70 Burundi, 112 Bush, George H. W. (US President), 62, 101 Bush, George W. (US President), 132 Cabinet Councillors’ Office on Internal Affairs, 150n58 Calder, Kent, 130 Callicott, J., 37 Cameroon, 112 Canada, 29, 154n124 and driftnet fishing, 51, 52, 53, 55, 67–8, 70, 72, 152n88 and scientific whaling, 74 Caring for the Earth, 39 cautionary principle, 68 Checkel, Jeffrey, 13, 20 China, 112, 154n124 Claude, Inis, 3, 4, 16, 18, 126 Clean Government Party, 59 Clinton, William (US President), 132 Cobb, Stephen, 116 coercion, 5, 7–8, 76, 93, 124, 129, 130, 142n64, 146n120 cognitive psychology, 20 collective legitimization, 3, 4–5, 13, 16–18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 121, 122, 126 definition of, 3 political dimension of, 3, 125–6 at United Nations, 18, 127–8 Commerce Department (US), 57, 67, 77, 78, 79 Secretary of Commerce, 33, 34, 57, 77, 132, 149n41 commercial whaling coastal, 31, 34, 83 large-type coastal, 81, 82, 95, 135 202

Index pelagic, 31, 34, 81, 82, 95 regimes, 31–5, 147n1, 172n10 resumption of, 34, 91, 136 small-type coastal, 81, 82, 94, 95, 136 commercial whaling moratorium, 1, 31–5, 43, 75, 84, 87, 135 Japan’s acceptance of, 33–4, 47, 74, 76, 77, 81, 82, 93, 95, 122 Japan’s objection to, 31, 32–3, 150n50 legitimacy of, 32 political maneuvering for, 32–3, 149n30 Resolution, 31, 33 review of, 34, 86, 88, 89, 152n82 and United States, 31–4, 93 compliance, 7–10, 13, 16 sources of, see coercion; self-interest; legitimacy see also public compliance conformity, 13, 23 Congo, 112 Congress (US), 58, 79 consensual validation, 17, 19 consensus, 18, 21, 137n7, 144n100 consent, 5, 16–18, 124–5 data on, 25 and driftnet fishing, 63–5 and ivory trade, 112–15 and scientific whaling, 84–6 as a source of international law, 143n86 conservation, 26, 43–4, 46–8, 125, 131, 135, 136 concept of, 37–9 definitions of, 37, 39 and driftnet fishing, 66, 67, 71, 72 and ivory trade, 99, 100, 102, 118, 120 practice of, 39–43 and scientific whaling, 90–1, 93 see also sustainable use of living resources; wildlife protection constructivism, 4, 9, 13, 15, 21, 24, 129, 142n59, 146n120 on norms, 2, 8, 10 Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, 56, 63, 64

203

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 27, 35–6, 39 African Elephant Working Group (AEWG) of, 101, 116, 118 Appendices of, 35–6, 98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 112, 115, 116–18, 131, 172n1 and Berne criteria for listing or de-listing, 117 conference of the parties of: fourth (1983), 99; fifth (1985), 172n4; sixth (1987), 36, 99; seventh (1989), 2, 98, 102, 104, 111, 112–15, 118, 131, 180n179; eighth (1992), 36–7, 131; tenth (1997), 131; eleventh (2000), 131; twelfth (2002), 131 and ivory trade, 2, 45, 47, 98, 99, 104, 106, 115–16, 118, 125 and Japan, 36–7 and legal status of the decisions, 3, 112, 115 and quota system for raw ivory exports, 99, 103, 118, 120, 172n4 and reservations, 3, 36, 102, 104, 108, 110, 111, 112, 115, 118 Secretariat of, 103, 105, 106, 116, 118, 120, 176n83, 180n179 cultural imperialism, 96 cultural match, 20 culture, 22, 72 organizational, 20 of policymaking, 20 whaling, 94–5 Davidson, Donald, 11 deforestation, 1, 154n119 and Japan, 26, 45, 48 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), 59, 80 Denmark, 154n124 Diet, 82, 87, 88, 93, 110 Dolphin Protection Consumers’ Information Act (1990), 57, 71 dolphins, 2, 40, 67, 71, 72, 96, 131, 159n74, 163n158

204

Index

driftnet fishing, 1–2, 40, 130–1 and albacore tuna, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57, 60, 66 South Pacific ban on, 2, 52, 54 by-catches (incidental catches) in, 2, 45, 62, 66, 67–8, 69, 70–1, 160n111 definition of, 49 and flying squid, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 60–1, 62–3, 67, 68, 71, 72, 163n160 global ban on, 2, 31, 46, 51, 55–6, 63, 64, 65, 68 large mesh, 50, 155n8 large-scale, 49–50 North Pacific fishery and South Pacific fishery compared, 50–1, 60–1 and public opinion in Japan, 71, 163n161 Resolution 44/225 (1989), 51, 54, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70 Resolution 45/197 (1990), 55, 64 Resolution 46/215 (1991), 31, 56, 64, 65, 68, 69, 124, 157n51 see also norm against high seas driftnet fishing; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; United Nations General Assembly Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act (US, 1987), 56 Driftnet Moratorium Enforcement Act (US, 1991), 57 Duke of Edinburgh, 36 Dunne, Timothy, 15 Durkheim, Emile, 8 Dworkin, Ronald, 15 Earthtrust, 59 Eckstein, Harry, 26 Economist, The, 91, 101, 116, 119, 175n59 Eiriksson, Gudmundur (Iceland’s IWC Commissioner), 89 elephants African, 2, 40, 45, 47, 98, 101–2, 103, 117 future of, 133–6 Indian (or Asian), 172n1, 178n119

English School, 15 Environment Agency, 81, 150n58, 176n79 and ivory trade, 105–6, 107, 110–11, 176n92, 179n146 environmental groups, see nongovernmental organizations Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), 100, 102, 174n54 epistemic communities, 21, 32, 89, 99, 116, 125 European Community (EC), 42, 54 European Economic Community (EEC), 53, 101 exclusive economic zones (EEZ), 29–30, 33–4, 51, 56 Americanization of, 30, 50, 76, 77, 78, 93, 122 and Japan, 45–6, 50, 77, 148n13, 154n132 exclusive fishery zones, 29–30 expected consequences, logic of, 10, 13, 19, 24, 97, 130 externalism, 14, 143n76 Fiji, 50 Financial Times, The, 135 Finnemore, Martha, 17, 21 Fisheries Agency, 127 and driftnet fishing, 60, 61, 62, 63, 159n79, 160n94, 163n160 and whaling, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81–2, 83, 92 fishing industry in Japan, 34, 46, 60–1, 62–3, 78, 79, 81, 123 in United States, 58, 69 see also under individual associations fish products Japan’s exports of, 57, 59, 77, 154n124 Japan’s imports of, 45, 59 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 32, 53, 55 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (1949), 36 foreign pressures, 72, 83, 110, 126, 130 France, 43, 50, 52, 57, 101

Index Franck, Thomas, 10–11, 15, 16, 18, 143n85, 144–5n102 Freeberg, Mark, 68, 69, 70 Freeman, Milton, 92, 134 Friends of the Animals (FoA), 100 Fuller, Kathryn (WWF), 91 Gabon, 112 Gambia, 100 Gates, R. J. (NZ Ambassador to Japan), 53 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 58, 77–8, 106, 123, 159n79, 172n10 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 28, 147n2 Gilpin, Robert, 1, 9 global environmental problems, 1, 26, 43 see also under individual problems global warming, 1, 26, 43, 48, 124 Goldstein, Judith, 12 Gore, Al (US Vice President), 41, 132 Gorton, Slade (US Senator), 58 governance, 129, 182n18 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Greenpeace, 41, 45, 59, 60, 70, 79, 80, 91, 93, 100, 171n161, 174n54 in Japan, 60, 80, 93–4, 106, 171n169 Norway and Sweden compared, 166n50 in United States, 60, 79 group pressure, 13, 19 see also social pressure Guardian, The, 91 Gulland, J. A., 91 Gummer, John (UK Agricultural Minister), 91, 170n137 Haas, Peter, 21 habit, 10, 11 Hammond, Philip, 34 Hart, H. L. A., 14, 15, 143n85 Hasenclever, Andreas, 16 Higashi, Chikara (LDP), 83 high seas, definition of, 30 High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act (US, 1992), 130

205

high seas fishing, 50 and Japan, 30, 45, 46, 47, 147n2 regimes on, 28–31, 39, 65, 147n1 see also Geneva Convention on the High Seas; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Higuchi, Masaharu (MITI), 115 Hobbesian state of nature, 129 Hobbes, Thomas, 7 Hong Kong, 107, 119, 180n189 House of Councillors, 83 House of Representatives, 83, 87 see also Diet House of Representatives (US), 52, 55 Humane Society, 174n54 Hume, David, 8, 40 Hungary, 100 Hurd, Ian, 4, 10–11, 129, 140n34 Hurrell, Andrew, 40 Iceland, 34–5, 154n124 and scientific whaling, 76, 79–80, 84, 85, 86, 168n92 ideational consistency/inconsistency, 18, 20–1, 23–4, 125–6 data on, 25 and driftnet fishing, 66–72 and ivory trade, 115–18 and scientific whaling, 86–93 see also legal rules; moral principles; scientific views ideational structures, 48 international and domestic, 20, 145n106 identities, 8, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 38, 72, 94, 95, 96, 135, 143n78, 145n114 collective, 21–2 green, 56 as members of international society, 22, 65, 128, 130 role, 21–2, 128, 145n115 type, 21–2 see also constructivism; roles; social identity theory illegitimacy, 11, 20, 84, 97, 126, 132 see also legitimacy

206

Index

Import Trade Control Order, 36, 118 Imura, Kôji (Squid Drift-net Fishery Association), 62 Inagaki, Motonobu (Japan Whaling Association), 88 Independent, The, 90, 134, 184n39 Indonesia, 50 informational influence, 14–15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 126 see also social influence Institute of Cetacean Research, 82, 93 interaction, 13, 21 interests, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 143n78 intergroup relationship, 21–2, 23–4, 126 data on, 25 and driftnet fishing, 72 enmity (or hostile) relations, 21, 22, 23, 126 friendship (or cordial) relations, 21, 23 and ivory trade, 119–20 and scientific whaling, 93–6 see also identities internalization, 10, 13–14, 23, 24, 127 see also private acceptance international community, 67, 115, 137n7 see also international society International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), 27, 31–5, 39, 40, 47 and scientific whaling, 74, 75, 81, 82, 83, 86–7, 90, 92, 125 see also International Whaling Commission International Convention on the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific, 29 see also North Pacific Fisheries Commission International Decade of Cetacean Research (IDCR), 88, 89 International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), 41 International Herald Tribune, The, 93 international law, see legal rules

international norms, see norms international society, 3, 15–16, 17–18, 22, 23, 24, 125, 127, 128, 129–30, 143n85 and driftnet fishing, 61, 64, 65, 161n131 and ivory trade, 115 and United Nations, 18 and whaling, 43, 80, 84, 86 see also international community international system, 129 structure of, 8–9 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 39, 55, 172n11 African Elephant and Rhino Specialist Group (AERSG) of, 101, 102, 116, 174n41 and ivory trade, 99, 102, 106, 112, 118, 120, 135 International Whaling Commission (IWC), 2, 31–5, 43, 148n15, n28, 172n10 and driftnet fishing, 55, 63, 64, 71, 163n158 and Japan, 35 and legal status of the resolutions, 3, 76, 87 legitimacy of, 35 and scientific whaling, 75–6, 78, 82, 83, 84–6, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92 see also International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling interpretative approaches, 12, 24 intersubjectivity, 12, 24, 25, 70, 145n113 Ishi, Hiroyuki, 45 Israel, 128 ivory demand in Japan of, 103, 109, 117, 119, 131 Japan’s import of, 2, 36, 45, 98, 103–4, 105, 107–8, 119, 120, 178n119, 180n183, n189 poaching of, 99, 101–2, 103, 107, 117, 119, 131 substitutes of, 109, 135

Index ivory industry, 103, 104–5, 106, 107–9, 110, 111, 120, 123, 135, 176n83 different businesses in, 105, 109, 175–6n75, 177n112 see also under individual associations ivory seals, 2, 41, 105, 109, 131, 135 ivory trade, 1–2, 40, 99, 172n5 global ban on, 2, 36, 45, 47, 98, 100–3, 104, 108, 110, 115, 116, 117 illegal, 100, 103, 104, 117, 131, 136, 175n62 and public opinion in Japan, 109–10 and Resolution 7.9, 118 resumption of, 111, 112, 131, 136 and Somali amendment (proposal), 102–3, 111, 112, 114, 115, 124 and split listing, 102, 111, 118, 135, 174n52 see also Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; norm against trade in African elephant ivory Ivory Trade Review Group (ITRG), 116–17, 134, 174n41 Japanese bubble economy, 44–5 Japan Communist Party (JCP), 59 Japan Fisheries Association (JFA), 60, 62, 160n96 Japan General Merchandise Importers Association, 105, 106 Japan Ivory Arts and Crafts Association, 105, 108, 176n78 Japan Ivory Importers’ Association (JIIA), 105, 106, 107, 176n77, n78 Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 59 Japan Whaling Association, 78, 83 Johnston, Alastair, 23, 142n67 Johnston, Douglas, 66 Kagan, Robert, 129 Kaifu, Toshiki (Prime Minister), 79, 110 Kalland, Arne, 40, 44, 90, 94, 95, 96, 135

207

Kaneko, Yoshio (CITES Secretariat), 176n76 kankyô zoku giin, 124 Kano, Michihiko (MAFF Minister), 53 Katô, Mutsuki (MAFF Minister), 87 Kawai, Tomoyasu (Fisheries Agency), 71 Kellert, Stephen, 92 Kenya, 100, 101–2 Keohane, Robert, 4, 8, 12 Kier, Elizabeth, 20 Kikuchi, Fukujirô (LDP), 83 Kikuchi, Kunio (Environment Agency), 115 King, Gary, 4 Kitagawa, Ishimatsu (Environment Agency Director-General), 81 Komatsu, Masayuki (Fisheries Agency), 167n85 Kôno, Yôhei (Foreign Minister), 132 Kowert, Paul, 26, 128 Kratochwil, Friedrich, 7, 24 Kreuter, Urs, 134 Kyôdô Senpaku, 82–3, 95, 123 Kyokuyô, 34, 82 Kyôtani, Akio (Fisheries Agency), 60 Law for the Conservation of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1992), 44 Law for the Regulation of the Transfer of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1987), 36, 107, 110, 118 Law for the Regulation on the Transfer of Special Birds (1972), 153n109 legal rules, 3, 8, 20, 23, 125 data on, 25, 146n130 and driftnet fishing, 66–7 and ivory trade, 115–16 and scientific whaling, 86–8 see also ideational consistency legitimacy, 3, 7–8, 10–12, 13, 129, 138n20, 146n120 and the broadness of support, 17 cognitive, 140n34 communal, 15, 18, 19, 130 definitions of, 10–11 and empirical research, 4

208

Index

legitimacy – continued political, 3, 4, 137n11 positive and negative, 11 procedural, 11, 143n85 public, 14, 17, 19 and a social context, 12, 13, 16, 24, 143–4n90 sources of, 16–24, see also consent; ideational consistency; intergroup relationship substantive, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21 see also collective legitimization; illegitimacy Legro, Jeffery, 26, 128 Leopold, Aldo, 38 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 26, 83, 124 liberalism, 23, 72, 96, 120, 122, 123–4, 139n25 on norms, 2, 8, 9–10 see also neoliberalism MacCasler, Chryssee, 135 Mack, Curtis (US NOAA), 76–7 Malawi, 112 March, James, 9, 10, 24 Marín-Bosch, Miguel, 127–8 Marine Mammal Protection Act (US, 1972), 58 Matsunaga, Hikaru (MITI Minister), 110 Matsuura, Akira (LDP), 83 Maull, Hanns, 45 Mayer, Peter, 16 May, John, 93 McDorman, Ted, 66 Mexico, 58, 159n74 Miles, Edward, 68, 69, 70 Milliken, Tom (TRAFFIC), 119, 120, 177n114 Mineta, Norman (US Secretary of Commerce), 132 Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF), 150n58 and driftnet fishing, 59, 60, 160n94 and ivory trade, 105, 179n146 and scientific whaling, 81, 82, 83 see also Fisheries Agency

Ministry of Finance (MOF), 150n58, 179n146 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 61–2, 81, 83, 105–6, 127, 150n58 Ministry of Health and Welfare, 150n58, 179n146 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 150n58, 175n74 and ivory trade, 105, 106, 107–8, 109, 110–11, 117, 118, 131, 135, 176n92, 179n146, 180n177 Mizuguchi, Kenya, 135 Moeran, Brian, 90, 95, 96, 135 moral principles, 3, 8, 20, 23, 125 data on, 25 and driftnet fishing, 70–2 and ivory trade, 118 and scientific whaling, 90–3 see also ideational consistency Morgan, Andrew (The Times), 92 Morgenthau, Hans, 4, 8, 129 Moriyama, Mayumi (Environment Agency Director-General), 81 Mozambique, 112 Murkowski, Frank (US Senator), 51 Nagasaki, Fukuzô (Institute of Cetacean Research), 88, 89 Nakasone, Yasuhiro (Prime Minister), 36 Nakayama, Tarô (Foreign Minister), 60 Namibia, 112, 131 nationalism, 8, 72, 96, 120 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (US), 77 Nature Conservation Law (1972), 44 Nature Conservation Society of Japan, 106 neorealism, 1, 4, 129 on norms, 8–9 see also realism neoliberalism, 4, 12, 17, 129 on norms, 2, 9, 139n24 see also liberalism Netherlands, The, 154n124 and whaling, 31, 79, 86, 96 New Management Procedure (NMP), 32 see also commercial whaling

Index New York Times, The, 165n37 New Zealand, 29 and driftnet fishing, 50, 52, 53, 56 and whaling, 31, 43, 79, 96 Nihon keizai shinbun, 161n131 Nihon Kyôdô Hogei, 82 Nihon Suisan, 34, 82 Niimori, Tatsuo (JSP), 83, 93, 96 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 10, 21, 123–4, 126, 148n28 animal rights, 40, 100, 120 and commercial whaling moratorium, 32–3 and driftnet fishing, 58, 59–60, 63, 69, 70 environmental, 3, 10, 40–1, 45, 123–4, 126, 136 and ivory trade, 98, 99–101, 102, 115, 119, 174n54 Japanese, 37, 80, 109, 124, 131 and scientific whaling, 75, 78–80, 94 see also under individual names norm against high seas driftnet fishing, 2, 5, 25, 126–7, 130–1 emergence of, 50–6, 152n88 leading states for, 56–9, 122–3 legitimacy of, 3, 48, 63–72, 73, 124–6 societal groups on, 59–63, 123–4 see also driftnet fishing norm against scientific whaling, 2, 5, 25–6 emergence of, 74–6 leading states for, 76–8, 123 legitimacy of, 3, 48, 84–96, 97, 124–6 societal groups on, 78–84, 123 see also scientific whaling norm against trade in African elephant ivory, 2, 5, 25, 126 emergence of, 98–104 leading states for, 104, 122–3 legitimacy of, 3, 48, 111–20, 121, 124–6 societal groups on, 104–11, 123–4 see also ivory trade normative influence, 13–14, 17, 19, 23, 24, 126, 127, 142n67 see also social influence

209

norms, 4–5, 7–10, 12, 14, 15, 16–18, 20–4, 137n12 constitutive, 8 and constructivism, 2, 8, 10 definitions of, 8 and domestic autonomy, 1 “foreign,” 22 and liberalism, 2, 8, 9–10 and neoliberalism, 2, 9, 139n24 and neorealism, 8–9 the normal, 8 the normative, 8 and principles, rules, and procedures, 144n101 and realism, 2, 8–9 regulative, 8 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 58 North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), 35 North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 29 see also International Convention on the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Norway, 31, 32, 34–5, 150n50, 154n124, 166n50, 170n137 and scientific whaling, 76, 85, 168n92 Nye, Joseph, 129 obligation, 4, 9, 10, 11, 16, 20, 24, 115, 145n102 associative, 15 feeling obliged and feeling an obligation compared, 14–15 legal, 137n7 moral, 5, 10, 15, 17, 19, 129 political, 5, 15, 19, 129, 130, 143n80 procedural, 15 status-based, 15, 16 and value rationality, 140n32 OECD Environmental Performance Review, 43 official development assistance (ODA) of Japan, 26, 48, 52 of United States, 104 Okamoto, Junichirô (Fisheries Agency), 96 Ôkita, Saburô (WWF), 80 Olsen, Johan, 9, 10, 24

210

Index

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 55 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), 53, 64 Osaka Ivory Arts and Crafts Association, 105, 109 Our Common Future, 41, 42, 47 ozone depletion, 1, 26 Packwood, Bob (US Senator), 58 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment (US, 1979) and whaling, 33, 76–8, 79, 149n41 Palmer, Geoffrey (NZ Prime Minister), 87 Panama, 58 Passmore, John, 37 Pearce, David, 116, 134 Pelly Amendment (US, 1971) and driftnet fishing, 57 and whaling, 77–8, 122, 132, 149n41 Peru, 32, 150n50 Peterson, M. J., 32 Plowden, Campbell, 45 Porter, Gareth, 58, 108, 115 positivism, 24 Powell, Colin (US Secretary of State), 132 precedents, 9 preservation, 26, 37–9, 40, 41, 43, 46–8, 125, 133–5, 136 definitions of, 37, 39 and driftnet fishing, 70, 72 and ivory trade, 100, 102, 118 and scientific whaling, 90, 92 see also animal rights; wildlife protection prestige, 9 Princen, Thomas, 99, 101, 103, 172n10, 174n53, n54 Price, Richard, 21 private acceptance, 10, 13, 14, 15, 19, 23, 127 see also internalization; compare public compliance public compliance, 13, 19, 23, 127 see also compliance; compare private acceptance

rationalism, 11, 16, 24, 65, 129, 146n120 and goal rationality, 140n32 see also neoliberalism; neorealism reactive state, 130 Reagan, Ronald (US President), 78 realism, 23, 72, 76, 96, 120, 122–3, 124 on norms, 2, 8–9 see also neorealism referent informational influence, 14, 15–16, 17–18, 19, 22, 23–4, 126, 128 see also social influence Regan, Tom, 38–9 regimes, 9 on wildlife protection, 27–37, 39, 46 see also commercial whaling; high seas fishing; trade in endangered species Reilly, William (WWF), 78 Republic of Korea, 30, 34 and driftnet fishing, 50, 56, 57, 67, 154n124, 156n32 and scientific whaling, 84 reputation for credibility (or trustworthiness), 3, 9, 139n21 retaliation, 9 Revised Management Procedure (RMP), 34 see also commercial whaling Revised Management Scheme (RMS), 34–5, 136 see also commercial whaling Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 123 Risse Thomas, 14, 143n78 Rittberger, Volker, 16 roles, 140n30, 145n115 Ruggie, John, 24 Safari Club International, 174n54 Sakaguchi, Isao, 99 Salt, Henry, 152n84 sanctions, 14, 19, 33, 57–9, 76–9, 93, 104, 122–3, 129, 130, 142n71, 165n37 legitimacy of, 58–9, 65 material, 3, 9, 17 social, 13 Satake, Isoroku (Fisheries Agency), 76, 80, 82

Index Satô, Takashi (MAFF Minister), 78 Scarff, James, 90, 91 Schimmelfennig, Frank, 11, 141n41 Schoppa, Leonard, 143n90 scientific views, 20, 23, 125 on commercial whaling moratorium, 32 data on, 25 on driftnet fishing, 67–70 on ivory trade, 116–18 on scientific whaling, 88–90 see also ideational consistency scientific whaling, 1–2, 72, 132–3 and commercial whaling moratorium, 1–2, 34, 87, 88 and criteria for evaluation, 75 definition of, 74 as disguised commercial whaling, 1, 75, 87 and postal ballots about Japan’s program, 84 and public opinion in Japan, 81, 92 and research program in the Antarctic Ocean (JARPA), 1, 74, 76, 132 and research program in the Western North Pacific (JARPN), 2, 132 and resolutions against Japan’s programs, 2, 75, 76, 84–6, 88, 96, 132, 133 and resolutions against lethal research, 76, 86 special permits for, 74, 75, 82, 87 and whale meat, 2, 87–8, 168n105, n108 see also International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; International Whaling Commission; norm against scientific whaling Sea Turtles Amendment (US, 1989), 163n163 self-categorization, 15, 19 see also social identification self-interest, 5, 7–8, 9, 129, 139n21, 146n120 myopic, 139n19 Senate (US), 51, 57

211

Sendai Declaration, 63 Sezaki, Katsumi (Permanent Mission to UN), 65 Shiga, Setsu (Environment Agency Director-General), 110 Shima, Kazuo (Japanese IWC Commissioner), 35, 85, 92, 94, 96 Signs of Hope, 41 Sikkink, Kathryn, 17, 21 Simmons, Randy, 134 Singer, Peter, 38 Sloan, Blaine, 144n100 social comparisons, 14, 19 social identification, 15, 18, 19 see also self-categorization social identity theory, 13, 15, 22 social influence, 13–16, 17–18, 19, 23, 126–7, 142n67 forms of, see normative influence; informational influence; referent informational influence and United Nations, 18 socialization, 10 social pressure, 5, 13–14, 17, 19, 22, 129, 130, 139n21 see also group pressure social psychology, 13, 22, 142n64 soft law, 3, 66 soft power, 129 solidarist theorists, 137n7 Solomon Islands, 52 Somalia, 100 South Africa, 74, 102, 112, 118, 131 Southern Ocean Sanctuary, 43, 87 South Korea, see Republic of Korea South Pacific Commission (SPC), 53 South Pacific Forum (SPF), 29, 52, 55, 63, 64 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), 29, 59, 156n33 South Pacific island countries, 51–2, 54, 56, 64 see also under individual names Squid Drift-net Fishery Association, 62–3, 161n125 State Department (US), 54, 77, 101, 104 Secretary of State, 33

212

Index

Stevens, Ted (US Senator), 58 Stockholm Conference, see United Nations Conference on the Human Development Stoett, Peter, 134 Sumi, Kazuo, 163n167 Supreme Court (US), 149n41 sustainable development, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48 sustainable use of living resources, 42–3, 47, 136 and ivory trade, 100, 118 and scientific whaling, 92–3 see also conservation Switzerland, 36, 101, 102 Taiwan, 30 and driftnet fishing, 50, 52, 55, 56, 57, 67, 157n51 Taiyô Gyogyô (Maruha), 34, 82, 83 Takeshita, Noboru (Prime Minister), 79 Tamazawa, Tokuichirô (LDP), 83 Tanabu, Masami (MAFF Minister), 65 Tanzania, 100, 101–2 Tarawa Declaration, 52, 53, 56, 64 Thailand, 154n124 Thatcher, Margaret (UK Prime Minister), 79 Thornton, Allan (Greenpeace), 168n105 Tokyo Ivory Arts and Crafts Association, 105, 109 trade in endangered species and Japan, 36–7 regime on, 35–7, 39, 99, 104, 106, 117, 118, 147n1 see also Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce (TRAFFIC), 99, 102, 116, 120, 123, 135, 174n54 in Japan, 105, 106–7, 111, 117, 118, 176n92 Tsuruoka, Toshihiko (Fisheries Agency), 65 Turner, John, 13

Uchimura, Yoshihide (Japan Fisheries Association), 60 United Kingdom and driftnet fishing, 52, 53 and ivory trade, 100, 101, 112 and whaling, 31, 75, 79, 84, 91, 96 United Nations, 65, 129, 130 Charter of, 18 and collective legitimization, 18, 127–8 and international society, 18 and social influence, 18 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 1, 42–3, 44, 47, 48, 123 Agenda 21 of, 43, 58, 64 and driftnet fishing, 55, 59, 61, 64 Rio Declaration of, 43, 58–9 United Nations Conference on the Human Development, 31 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 45–6 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 27, 42–3 see also biodiversity United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 124 see also global warming United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 27, 39–40, 43 and anadromous stocks, 29, 51, 66 and catadromous species, 29, 66 and driftnet fishing, 66–7, 125 and freedom of the high seas, 28–30, 66 and highly migratory species, 29, 66 and Japan, 46, 67, 154n132 and marine mammals, 29, 43, 66 and straddling stocks, 29, 66 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), 39, 55 United Nations General Assembly, 2, 18 and driftnet fishing, 31, 49, 51, 53–4, 55, 63, 64, 65, 68, 70 historical record on votes in, 127–8, 181n9 and Japan, 128 and legal status of the resolutions, 3, 137n5

Index United States, 37, 122–3, 128, 129–30 and aboriginal whaling, 93 and commercial whaling moratorium, 31–4, 93 and Cuba, 128 and driftnet fishing, 50, 51, 52, 53–4, 55, 56–9, 64–5, 67–9, 70, 71, 72, 152n88 and fishing, 29, 93, 154n124, 159n74 and ivory trade, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 President of, 57, 77, 104, 132 and scientific whaling, 74, 76–8, 83, 89, 96 see also exclusive economic zones; fishing industry; official development assistance; sanctions Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 32, 34, 77, 150n50 Unno, Kenichi (Fisheries Agency), 93 Uno, Sôsuke (Prime Minister, Foreign Minister), 79, 104, 110 Unsoeld, Jolene, 51 Vanuatu, 55, 58 Venezuela, 58 Verba, Sidney, 4 Verity, C. William (US Secretary of Commerce), 77, 79 Verstehen, 12 Waltz, Kenneth, 8 Washington Convention, see Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Washington Post, The, 129, 132 Watanabe, Taizô (Japanese Embassy at Washington DC), 77 Wellington Convention, see Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific Wendt, Alexander, 13, 142n59, 145n114, n115 Western, David, 102 Whale Issue Network, 80

213

whale meat, 41, 91 and Japan, 2, 45, 80–1, 87–8, 95–6, 136, 154n123, 163n161, 168n105, n168 whales Baird’s beaked, 81 blue, 90 bowhead, 93 Bryde’s, 34, 75, 81, 132 future of, 133–6 killer, 81 minke, 1–2, 32, 34, 35, 74, 76, 81, 87, 88, 89, 90–1, 132 myth of, 94 pilot, 81 small, 163n158 sperm, 34, 81, 132 whaling, 40, 41, 46 aboriginal, 93, 95, 136 for commercial purposes, see commercial whaling for scientific purposes, see scientific whaling subsistence, 82, 93, 95, 136 see also International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling; International Whaling Commission whaling culture, 94–5 whaling industry, 35, 81, 82, 93, 95, 126 see also Japan Whaling Association; Kyôdô Senpaku; Nihon Kyôdô Hogei Wildlife Conservation International (WCI), 101, 107, 116, 117 Wildlife Link, 91 wildlife preservationist norms, 25, 37 see also norms against driftnet fishing, ivory trade, and scientific whaling wildlife protection, 26, 42, 123 Japan’s policy on, 43–8, 124 and public opinion in Japan, 44 regimes on, 27–37, 39, 46 see also conservation; preservation Wildlife Protection and Hunting Law (1918), 44 Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit (WTMU), 116

214

Index

Williams, John, 141n56 Winch, Peter, 12, 141n54 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 47 World Conservation Strategy, 39, 100 World Conservation Union, see International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources World Resources 1992–93, 46 Worldwide Fund for Nature, see World Wildlife Fund World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 39, 91, 99, 102, 107, 108, 116, 119, 135, 136, 172n12, 174n54 in Japan, 80, 106, 109, 131, 176n92 in United States, 78, 79, 100–1, 117

Yamada, Kôzaburô (Diet member), 149n30 Yamazaki, Tatsuo (Environment Agency Director-General), 110 Yomiuri shinbun, 109, 176n83 Yonezawa, Kunio (former Japanese IWC Commissioner), 92 Young, Oran, 140n37 Zambia, 112 Zerich (US State Department), 65 Zimbabwe, 102, 104, 112, 118, 131

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