Leeds International Classical Studies - Volume 1

LEEDS INTERNATIONAL CLASSICAL STUDIES 1.0 (2002) ISSN 1477-3643 (http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/) © Malcolm Heath

Editorial introduction MALCOLM HEATH (UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS) The Leeds International Latin Seminar sponsored five volumes of papers (PLLS 6-10) between 1990 and 1998. The inauguration of the Leeds International Classics Seminar in 2001 provided an incentive to reconsider our publication plans. Leeds International Classical Studies, an open access electronic journal, is the fruit of that reflection.1 This editorial introduction explains the thinking behind it, and outlines our—still tentative and evolving—plans for the future.

Open access publication Academics write articles. Then they give them, usually for nothing, to publishers. Publishers make them more expensive, and sell them back to the academics, and to the universities who employ them. The universities thus pay twice: first they employ academics to write articles, then they buy the articles back from the publishers. In fact, the universities pay three times: having bought the articles they have to pay for space to contain, and staff to maintain, the library collections. Not surprisingly, the convergent pressures of shrinking budgets and escalating costs mean that library holdings are more and more selective. So it is less and less likely that a copy of the particular article you want to read will be available locally. Document supply services have been developed to solve this problem, but these too can be expensive to run. Yet document supply need not any longer be expensive. If I put a document on the web, you can retrieve it and print it out in minutes at negligible cost. If we used the web as our publication medium, therefore, we could give our articles to each other, instead of giving them to publishers. With current technology, open access publication has become a feasible proposition.2 Electronic publication is not cost-free. The costs that have traditionally been loaded onto the user largely disappear; some of the saving is absorbed by infrastructure costs (networking, computers, printers), but the marginal cost of retrieving and printing a particular article is trivial. On the other hand, there are still costs associated with production, storage and distribution. Such costs are much lower than those incurred by printed publications; but in open access publications these costs are, by definition, no longer transferred to the user, and so have to be borne by the provider. An alternative to open access is to use subscription or access charges to recover the costs from readers. There are no doubt cases for which this model is appropriate (for example, a journal with a 1

PLLS will continue as Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar of the Department of Classics, The Florida State University, Tallahassee. 2 See, for example, the web-sites of the Budapest Open Access Initiative, the TEMPE Principles for Emerging Systems of Scholarly Publishing, SPARC (the Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition), and Create Change.

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MALCOLM HEATH, EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION very high volume of submissions might need subscription income to cover the cost of administrative support). But there are drawbacks. Charges reduce the provider’s incentive to be economical; they may limit the ease and breadth of the dissemination of the journal’s contents; and they raise questions about the control of rights, since republication by the author threatens the electronic publisher’s income. Moreover, even the simplest system for managing subscriptions and payment will add something to the total cost. Open access, therefore, even if it cannot be regarded as a universal norm might well serve as a benchmark against which the justification of access charges may be assessed and, perhaps, challenged. After all, if reciprocal open access were universally adopted, the costs incurred by each provider would be more than offset by the concurrent savings. We can surely think of better ways to spend the money that currently goes to support a complex and costly structure of intermediaries that technological change has made unnecessary.

Electronic publication From the point of view of the scholarly community wanting articles to read, open access electronic publication has obvious advantages. It provides easy access to new research without placing additional strain on (personal or institutional) library budgets. But there are advantages for authors, too, in electronic publication. The logistics of print publication impose many restrictions. Authors and editors have to work to production deadlines, but are also vulnerable to delays caused by tardy co-contributors or bottlenecks in the production process. Corrections are costly during production, and impossible afterwards. It may be difficult to find an outlet for very recondite or technical material, however good its scholarship. Economic considerations may dictate limits on length that conflict with the demands of the content. None of these rigidities need arise with an electronic journal. There is no need to wait for a complete volume-full of material, since contributions can be added to a web-site incrementally; this offers contributors the prospect of speedy publication, and—as a counterpart to that—frees them from the pressure to meet deadlines. Since the cost of publication is low there need be no arbitrary limits on length, and material with a limited potential readership need not be shunned. Contributions are also open-ended. When you see the published version of your work and realise with horror that you have written ‘o’ when you meant ‘Constantinopolitanus’, a simple remedy is available. ‘Forthcoming’ need no longer dangle for ever unresolved in bibliographies. To be sure, corrections to papers after publication must preserve stability of citation.3 Those who refer to your argument, for praise or blame, are entitled to be confident that readers who follow up the reference will be able to find the argument, and will find the same argument, that was cited. But more substantial additions or revisions to published 3

This stipulation applies to papers formally published in the regular series of LICS volumes. The LICS web-site will also host a less formal series of Discussion Papers, providing a facility by which work in progress can be made public in order to elicit feedback and debate. Discussion Papers may be withdrawn or revised without notice, and the contents of this section of the web-site should not be regarded as stable.

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MALCOLM HEATH, EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION work could be made in the form of dated appendices at any later stage. Where better to correct the blunder at AJP 119 (1998) 95 than in a note attached to the article itself?4 And it is not only the individual article that is open-ended. Whereas a printed collection is a fixed and frozen resource, an electronic collection of papers can grow and become more valuable.

Concerns Despite its apparent advantages, on-line publication raises a number of concerns. Are they well-founded? Quality is one recurrent issue. The web has notoriously given an easy outlet for vast quantities of drivel. So is it wise to abandon the mechanisms by which conventional publications maintain quality control? Obviously not. But quality is not inherent in the medium of publication. It is achieved, when it is achieved, by the combined efforts of authors, referees and editors. That collaboration provides no guarantee—spectacular failures of quality control can be found even in leading refereed periodicals. But the involvement of a printer in the production process offers no additional safeguard at all (except in the sense that the high cost of conventional publication has tended to deter the uncommitted). In reality, the concern about quality is more subtle. I know few people, if any, who admit to believing that work published electronically is inherently inferior; I know many more who are worried that other people may believe it. The problem, then, is less that electronic publication is perceived, however irrationally, as being qualitatively inferior, than that it is perceived as being perceived as inferior. Yet that is enough to create a reasonable concern on the part of potential contributors. Who would want to publish in an electronic journal if there is a risk that it will carry less weight in promotion decisions and research assessments than conventional publication? And this may, perversely, make a reality of the perception: for authors will then be reluctant to contribute their best work to electronic journals. The result is that academics who complain about the impact of budget cuts on periodical subscriptions, and about having to give away their copyright to commercial publishers, also fear that taking advantage of an obvious solution to both problems will work to their disadvantage in peer-review—in other words, that they will be penalised by other academics who suffer from the same problems. The individual’s concern is, of course, entirely rational; what is irrational is the collective tangle of superstition and mutual distrust that gives rise to it. Another concern that is often voiced is that electronic journals are less readerfriendly than print publications. Studying a long and complex article on screen is impossible; and material formatted for the web often looks terrible in print, to say nothing of the fact that everyone’s print-out will have different pagination. That was once true. But anyone who reads this editorial, on screen or in print, will (I 4

I overlooked the evidence in schol. Aesch. 3.258 (552 Dilts) for the occurrence of proswpopoi…a in Apsines On Figures; so the observation to which I then attached the proviso ‘for what it is worth’ was worth even less than I thought. But how is a reader of the original article going to become aware of a correction published here?

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MALCOLM HEATH, EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION hope) agree that such problems have now been overcome. Those who do not read it probably do not care whether or not it is readable. Or perhaps they would care, if they knew that the resource existed. Or perhaps the problem is that they find electronic publications inaccessible. This leads us to some further concerns. There are indeed obstacles to finding out about the existence and contents of electronic resources, but their days are surely numbered. The present transitional state is reflected in the seemingly paradoxical policy of TOCSIN, a valuable online bibliographical tool that does not index on-line publications, although it does give links to on-line versions of printed publications. Revues ouvertes en ligne has recently begun to fill the gap; but the divide between printed and electronic resources makes little sense, and what is really needed is the integration of both formats in our standard bibliographical tools. It is good to see that in volume 70 (1999) L’Année Philologique, the greatest of all bibliographies in our discipline and itself now available on-line, has indexed the on-line journal Histos back to its launch in 1997. The complaint that electronic publications are inaccessible sometimes arises from a reluctance to become familiar with the (very simple) technology involved. It is equally true that articles published in German are inaccessible to those who will not learn to read German. The solution is obvious in both cases. One can have more sympathy with those who have limited access to the necessary infrastructure. But if LICS were available only in printed form few individuals would buy it; readers would largely depend on access to institutional libraries. So if your institution’s library does not make it as easy for you to download and print out an article from an open access electronic journal as it is to photocopy an article from a conventional journal, you should point out to the librarians how much money they stand to save by encouraging this mode of publication. Conventional publication, in any case, does not guarantee ready access. Take a look at an issue of Bursians Jahresbericht from (say) the 1890s—if your library has it. How easy would it be to get copies of the publications listed there? From personal experience, I can assure you that in many cases it is not at all easy. An efficient inter-library loan service helps, but if and when the document arrives it may turn out to be irrelevant to your needs, or of very poor quality (despite having been published in print). Is it worth incurring the cost of conventional document supply speculatively? If it were an open-access electronic publication you could retrieve the item for evaluation quickly, and at no cost. It is not only older printed material that can pose this kind of problem. Last summer I decided that I needed to read some of the papers in L. Calboli Montefusco (ed.), Papers on Rhetoric III (Papers on rhetoric 5, Bologna: Cooperativa libraria universitaria editrice Bologna (CLUEB). Università degli studi di Bologna, Dipartimento di filologia classica e medioevale, 2000). My University’s library did not have a copy; no copy was listed in the British Library on-line catalogue or COPAC (the UK’s on-line union catalogue); nor, indeed, was it listed by the Library of Congress. When I requested this book by inter-library loan—and after I had dispelled the British Library’s not unreasonable suspicion that I was really asking for L. Calboli Montefusco (ed.), Papers on Rhetoric

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MALCOLM HEATH, EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION (Papers on rhetoric 3, Bologna: Cooperativa libraria universitaria editrice Bologna (CLUEB). Università degli studi di Bologna, Dipartimento di filologia classica e medioevale, 1993)—a long wait began. Seven months elapsed in total between my first requesting the book and its arrival. If the collection had been published as an open access electronic resource, I could have got hold of the articles much sooner myself with minimal effort and at no cost. Another concern is that electronic journals have tended to be ephemeral. This is not unique to electronic format: conventional journals sometimes fold, as well. It has been a good while since we last saw an issue of (say) Museum philologum londiniense. But the lower capital cost of launching an electronic journal has no doubt encouraged people to embark on such projects without sustainable commitment. And yet there is another, more positive, way of viewing this phenomenon. A new medium requires experiment: some of those experiments will fail, but if we waited until all the problems have been solved before we exploit the medium, we would never solve the problems. As for the future of LICS, needless to say we do not plan to be ephemeral. We hope that the association with an ongoing seminar will provide a stable platform for the new journal. In the longer term, we also aim to broaden the editorial base beyond Leeds, and to work collaboratively with colleagues at other universities; this, too, should help to ensure the project’s continuity in the future. A deeper concern than continuity of publication is the continuing availability of what has been published. If a conventional journal ceases publication its contents are still physically present in at least some libraries. A physical copy on a library shelf seems to have a more reliable future than a computer file that can be deleted from a disk, or simply not transferred to a new server when the system is upgraded. Moreover, the physical preservation of the file is of no use if the file format becomes obsolete; at some point, therefore, the file will need to be changed, and not just physically transferred. Electronic resources will require more active management than conventional publications if their continuing availability is to be ensured. This is a genuine concern, since the technical and organisational problems have not yet been solved. But there are considerations to be weighed on the other side. First, the tacit assumption that adding to paper archives will remain a viable strategy for ever is more than questionable: storage space is finite, and increasingly expensive. Secondly, there is the growing trend towards the digitisation of existing conventional collections: those who have created these resources will want to protect their investment, and thus have a stake in the establishment of international standards for the management of electronic archives. Finally, one might reflect on where we would be if our predecessors had taken the view that, though the book was a format with interesting possibilities, it was too risky to commit to it until the long-term archiving problem had been solved. Fortunately, people did not defer writing books until libraries had been established; libraries were established because there were books that people wanted to preserve. In the same way, the long-term solution to the problems of archiving electronic resources will be a consequence of the growth of electronic publishing, and should not be seen as its condition.

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Basic principles These considerations suggest a number of basic principles. First, quality is crucial. The onus here is, of course, in the first instance on authors. But it also means that there must be firm editorial control, supported where appropriate by consultation with referees. Secondly, the format must meet the needs of readers. It must be easy to produce a properly formatted printed version, with a stable pagination to facilitate citation; there must be no technical problems in displaying Greek and other special characters; any software required must be freely available and easy to install, and must not be restricted to a particular system. We believe that pdf (Adobe’s Portable Document Format) meets all these requirements. Thirdly, in order to maximise the collective advantage from the low cost of electronic publication, it should where possible be based on the open access model. We will be adopting this model for LICS—a fact that inevitably puts limits on the editorial resources available, and therefore on the quantity of material that we can realistically consider for publication. Fourthly, since open access publishers have no commercial interests to protect, authors should retain the maximum possible control over their work. LICS will require from contributors nothing more than the grant of a non-exclusive but irrevocable world-wide licence to publish and disseminate an article, for the full term of the copyright in it. Because the license is irrevocable, contributions cannot be withdrawn after publication—a necessary stipulation, since the long-term stability of the journal’s contents is crucial if it is to be cited. But authors retain all other rights in the content. In particular, because the license is non-exclusive, they are free to publish their work elsewhere in any format. Finally, the publishers must recognise that they have a responsibility to ensure that their output will remain accessible in the long term. LICS will initially be storing papers as MS Word documents, and distributing them using Adobe Acrobat; the chances of such widely used formats being left behind in the near future are reassuringly slim. Looking further ahead, we gain some confidence from the supportive institutional environment provided by the Scholarly Publication Forum at the University of Leeds, and by the University’s planned earchive.

Editorial policy Beyond these basic principles, the editorial policy of LICS will not be fixed rigidly from the start. We want to reserve for ourselves sufficient flexibility in our approach to enable us to take advantage of opportunities, and to meet scholarly publishing needs, that emerge over time. What follows is a summary of our starting-point. LICS will have a thematic structure. It will be organised around a growing number of thematic clusters, in principle covering any aspect of Greek and Roman antiquity and of the history of the classical tradition. Most of these clusters will be

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MALCOLM HEATH, EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION based on the themes of meetings of the Leeds International Classical Seminar (this is the case, for example, with the clusters on Lucretius and on Pastoral). However, LICS is not the proceedings of the Seminar, and its editorial process is separate from the organisation of Seminar meetings. The editors will assess all papers offered for publication, and will seek the advice of referees where appropriate. Hence contributors to the Seminar are under no obligation to offer their papers for publication in LICS, and papers given at the Seminar will not necessarily be accepted for publication in LICS. Because LICS is not the proceedings of the Seminar, the editors will be happy to consider for publication papers not given at Seminar meetings. First, existing thematic clusters are open to additional contributions. We cannot issue an open call for papers or undertake to consider unsolicited manuscripts: because we are operating on an open access basis our editorial resources are limited, and will vary from time to time for particular themes. But if you are interested in contributing a paper on an existing theme, you should feel free to contact the editors to explore the possibility. Secondly, additional thematic clusters may be added from time to time. Some of these will arise from other activities with which the School of Classics at Leeds is associated (for example, the projected cluster on Marriage arises from the Trans-Pennine Ancient History Seminar).5 Others will reflect the research interests of individual members of staff at Leeds (thus, for example, the cluster on Rhetoric). But we would also welcome the opportunity to host clusters edited or co-edited by colleagues from other universities (we aim, in any case, to broaden the editorial team beyond Leeds once we are established). Again, please contact us if you are interested in pursuing this possibility. Thirdly, because of its low cost and increasing technical flexibility, electronic publication offers an effective way to distribute material that might be difficult to publish in a conventional journal (for example, because of its length, its technical nature, or the complexity of its presentation). The editors of LICS would be happy to consider proposals of this nature as well.

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For earlier publications of the Trans-Pennine Ancient History Seminar see R. Brock & S. Hodkinson (ed.) Alternatives to the Democratic Polis (Oxford 2000) and G.J. Oliver, R. Brock, T.J. Cornell and S. Hodkinson (edd.) The Sea in Antiquity (BAR International Series 899, Oxford 2000).

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Web links L’Année Philologique http://www.annee-philologique.com/ Budapest Open Access Initiative http://www.soros.org/openaccess/ Create Change http://www.arl.org/create/home.html Histos http://www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/ Revues ouvertes en ligne http://agoraclass.fltr.ucl.ac.be/archives/ Scholarly Publication Forum http://www.leeds.ac.uk/library/scholpub/ SPARC http://www.arl.org/sparc/ TEMPE Principles http://www.arl.org/scomm/tempe.html TOCSIN http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/amphoras/tocs.html

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LEEDS INTERNATIONAL CLASSICAL STUDIES 1.1 (2002) ISSN 1477-3643 (http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/) © Leofranc Holford-Strevens

Horror vacui in Lucretian biography LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS ABSTRACT: The scrappy ancient notices for Lucretius’ life include a report by St Jerome that he committed suicide as a result of insanity brought on by a lovepotion, and that Cicero ‘emended’ his poem, to which much undue credence has been given, often with the added detail (wrongly attributed to Jerome) that the potion was administered by one Lucilia. Not content with these fictions, modern writers have contended that Lucretius was descended from a patrician house prominent in the early Republic, the Lucretii Tricipitini, or at the other extreme a Gaulish or Celtiberian freedman; others again have made him a poor Roman, or supposed that the lofty tone of the poem reflects exalted station and social equality with Memmius. These hypotheses are rebutted on historical, epigraphic, and literary grounds; a warning is given against a priori readiness to accept accounts conforming to congenial patterns, whether relating to social status or to relations, if any, with the philosophical community at Herculaneum.

Cicero, Ad Quintum fratrem 2.10.3 [before 12 Feb. 54 BC]: Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis; sed cum veneris. Virum te putabo si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris, hominem non putabo. haec a criticis immerito vexata esse luculente docet Shackleton Bailey

Vita Virgilii [sic] secundum Donatum 6: initium aetatis Cremonae egit usque ad virilem togam, quam XVII anno natali suo accepit isdem illis consulibus iterum, quibus erat natus, evenitque ut eo ipso die Lucretius poeta decederet.

Jerome, Chronica s.a.Abr. 1923 = Ol. 171.3 (94 BC): Titus Lucretius poeta nascitur. Qui postea amatorio poculo in furorem versus, cum aliquot libros per intervalla insaniae conscripsisset, quos postea Cicero emendavit, propria se manu interfecit anno aetatis XLIIII. codici A haec sub anno MDCCCCXXI vel MDCCCCXXII referenti non esse quod credamus monet Helm, praef. XXIV a. necnon Philol. supp. 21/2 (1929), 33

Clm 14429 (s. x), fo. 225: Titus lucretius poeta nascitur sub consulibus. ann(o) xx u:ii an(te) uirgilium xx u:ii] primum xxviii, deinde xxiii Usener

I have set out the above, not because I have anything to say about the confusion into which Lucretius’ and Vergil’s chronologies have been thrown by arithmetically incompetent authors and copyists, but in order to display the sum total of the purported evidence for Lucretius’ life available outside his poem. It is already suspicious that Lucretius should have been made to die on the same day as Vergil came of age; if the Florentine humanist Piero di Bartolomeo Del Riccio

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Baldi, better known as Petrus Crinitus, could declare: ‘Qua in re benignitas atque propensio visa est Romanae eruditionis patrocinium suscepisse, ne deessent in re latina qui Graecorum ingeniis atque disciplinis non minores haberentur’,1 others find in that very coincidence reason to doubt,2 though since two Presidents of the United States of America died on 4 July 1826 and the Union won Gettysburg and captured Vicksburg on that date in 1863, we should not dismiss it with quite so great an a priori distrust as we do Greek synchronisms that require the matching of different cities’ calendars. However, there is much else to concern us. Those who wish to know about poets’ lives—the common readers of antiquity and our own day—have been reluctant to give up such snippets of pretended information as have been passed down to us; witness the chatter about the lovepotion, the lucid intervals of madness, the suicide, Cicero’s editing, and even the acceptance of the manifestly fictitious Borgia life.3 Modern scholars have added or substituted their own Hirngespinste, which would be far more honestly presented in self-proclaimed works of fiction, as they are by Marcel Schwob, in whose Vies imaginaires Lucretius had grown up in the country with Memmius for childhood friend, or more recently by the translator turned novelist who represented the poet as that most un-Roman of phenomena, the acknowledged bastard with his father’s name.4

Lucretius and the love-potion The poet’s mental health has been debated with contradictory results,5 and largely by persons unacquainted with clinical lunacy; since I am of their number I shall desist, save to say that I do not suppose the question would even have been raised were it not for Jerome’s story. This has seemed plausible as conforming to a familiar pattern, for the fatal philtre had been a recognised hazard since Deinaeira poisoned Heracles; the Areopagus was reputed to have acquitted a woman who had inadvertently killed her husband diÒti oÙk ™k prono…aj.6 As a far less innocent lady observed, ¢mfib£llein e‡wqe t¦ f…ltra kaˆ ¢posk»ptein e„j 1

Pietro Crinito, De honesta disciplina 24.4, ed. Carlo Angeleri (Rome 1955) 453. He notes that some people referred eo ipso die to Vergil’s birth; Lambinus, alas, would be of their number. 2 See e.g. G. O. Hutchinson, ‘The date of De rerum natura’ CQ2 51 (2001) 150–62 at 156 with n.15. 3 On which see Renata Fabbri, ‘La «Vita Borgiana» di Lucrezio nel quadro delle biografie umanistiche’ Lettere italiane 36 (1984) 348–66. The wretched thing is lent credence by C. Bailey, ed. mai. (3 vols, 1947) 1.2 et alibi. 4 Luca Canali, Nei pleniluni sereni: autobiografia immaginaria di Tito Lucrezio Caro (Milan 1995), kindly brought to my attention by M.F. Smith; cf. R. Syme, ‘Bastards in the Roman aristocracy’ Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 104 (June 1960) 323–7 = Roman Papers ii, ed. E. Badian (Oxford 1979) 510–17. A slave-woman’s son would be a slave, though Republican law apparently permitted the master to adopt and thereby free him, at least in Cato’s time (J. 1.11.12; see Alan Watson The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford 1967) 96–8). Canali displays withal a disregard of chronology so thoroughgoing, nay positively Platonic, as to prove deliberate intention. 5 See G.D. Hadzsits, Lucretius and his Influence (New York 1935) 4–7. 6 [Arist.] MM 1.16.2, 1188b32–8, cf. EE 2 9.2, 1125b3–4. A more elaborate chain of events in the controversia at Quint. 7.8.2, Victor 378.11–12 Halm = 9.1–3 Giomini–Celentano.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Ôleqron.7 In addition, madness from so romantic a source is attractive to those who believe that The lunatic, the lover, and the poet Are of imagination all compact8

and that Great wits are sure to madness near allied, And thin partitions do their bounds divide.9

That is to say, it fits popular preconceptions about what we now call genius; it also pleases those who love dramatic deaths: Nolunt autem eum, aut sua sponte mortem obiisse, aut alicuius morbi vi, vt fit, consumtum esse, sed, vt eius obitum tragikèteron faciant, scribunt, eum sibi ipsum manus attulisse, alij tædio vitæ, quòd patriam suam ambitione, auaritia, luxuria, discordia, & similibus ciuitatum, quæ diu floruerunt, & iam senescunt, morbis æstuare, atque afflictari videret: alij ægritudine animi, quòd Memmij sui, qui in exilium pulsus erat, tristem casum æquo animo ferre non posset: alij furore percitum, in quem Lucilia siue vxor, siue amica, amatorio poculo porrecto, cum imprudens adegerat, cùm ab eo amari, non ei necem inferre, aut bonam mentem adimere, vellet.10

None of that alters the fact that the argument ends where it began, with Jerome. After recent demolitions of ancient poetical and philosophical biographies,11 the onus must rest on those who would have us believe such documents even in their entirety, let alone summarised extracts from them. For Lucretius, despite a suggestion that the tale is implied in Philodemus On Death,12 there are formidable obstacles to acceptance; indeed, the whole tale was torn to shreds by Konrat Ziegler, many of whose arguments reappear below only because they have not been heeded.13 First of all, not merely ought Vergil not to have called Lucretius felix nor Statius written so glibly of his furor arduus, but Ovid ought to have included his gruesome end, if not in Ars amatoria to support the warning at 2.106 that philtra nocent animis vimque furoris habent, then in his Ibis along with that

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Alciphron Ep. 4.10.5, in the name of the courtesan Myrrhine (¢posk»ptein Aldina, -yein codd., k¨n ¢posk»yeien Meineke). 8 Shakespeare A Midsummer Night’s Dream 5.1.7–8; and see the whole speech. 9 Dryden Absalom and Achitophel 1.163–4. 10 Lambinus (3rd edn Paris 1570) sigs. [d3]v-[d4]r. 11 Janet Fairweather, ‘Fictions in the biographies of ancient writers’ Ancient Society 5 (1974) 231– 75; ead. ‘Traditional narrative, inference and truth in the Lives of Greek poets’ PLLS 4 (1983) 315–69; Alice Riginos, Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Works of Plato (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 3, Leiden 1976); Mary Lefkowitz, The Lives of the Greek Poets (London 1981); ead. ‘Pindar’s Lives’ First-Person Fictions (Oxford 1991) 89–110; Nicholas Horsfall, ‘Virgil: his life and times’ in id. (ed.) A Companion to the Study of Virgil (Leiden 1995) 1–25. 12 Marcello Gigante, Ricerche filodemee2 (Naples 1983) 147; id. (tr. Dirk Obbink) Philodemus in Italy: The Books from Herculaneum (Ann Arbor 1995) 44. 13 Konrat Ziegler, ‘Der Tod des Lucretius’ Hermes 61 (1936) 421–40.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY of C. Helvius Cinna to wish upon his hapless enemy.14 Juvenal, too, might have exploited the story at 6.610–25. Nor is it hard to see how the story might have been concocted: on the one hand, given the traditional assumption that a poet finds his themes in personal experience, such an inference could easily be drawn from the ferocious polemic against emotional attachment in book 4 and from such phrases as furorem animi proprium at 3.828, even perhaps, however absurdly, from the reference to suicide at 3.79–82; on the other, a commonplace fault of copying, reading, or memory would confuse Lucretius with Lucullus, killed in just such a manner by his lovesick freedman Callisthenes.15 Another suggestion is that Serenus Sammonicus’ lines on female sterility (603–8) irrita coniugii sterilis si munera languent nec subolis spes est multos iam vana per annos (femineo fiat vitio res necne, silebo; hoc poterit magni quartus monstrare Lucreti)16 sed natura tamen medicamine victa potenti saepe dedit fetus studio curante paratos

followed by gruesome remedies involving a hare’s vulva, sheep’s saliva, and (to ease labour-pains) vulture’s dung, were carelessly read as implying that such things were inflicted on the poet by female fault.17 If Suetonius could transfer to Horace a tale told of Hostius Quadra (Vita Horati ~ Seneca Naturales Quaestiones 1.16.2), he could no doubt transfer one told of Lucullus to Lucretius; the motif itself is not foreign to him, for he reports that Gaius creditur potionatus a Caesonia uxore amatorio quidem medicamento, sed quod in furorem verterit (Caligula 50.2). However, if the story had been included in De poetis, one would have expected Lactantius, who abuses the poet with such incivilities as illius [sc. Epicuri] enim sunt omnia quae delirat Lucretius (De opificio Dei 6.1) and quid hunc putet habuisse cerebrum cum haec diceret nec videret sibi esse contrarium? (De ira Dei 10.17), both to insist that this insanity was a literal fact, and to dwell with no less relish on the miserable death of a blasphemer than he did on those of the persecutors. We are soonest out of the

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Vv. 539–40 conditor ut tardae laesus cognomine Myrrhae / urbis in innumeris inueniare locis, explained by A.E. Housman, JPh 12 (1883) 167 = Classical Papers ed. J. Diggle and F.R.D. Goodyear (3 vols, Cambridge 1972) 1.9. The minority reading urbis is distinctly preferable to the hyperbolical orbis: the fragments of Cinna’s corpse were discarded here and there in Rome by individual rioters as so much rubbish, not distributed throughout the Empire like the relics of a saint. 15 Nepos fr. 52 Marshall, cf. Pliny Naturalis Historia 25.25; see Julius Jessen, ‘Zu Lucrez’ Leben und Dichtung’ in Festgruß an die Kieler Gelehrten-Schule (Kiel 1869) 52–60 at 53–4 (made available to me through the kindness of M.F. Smith) and L.P. Wilkinson, ‘Lucretius and the lovephiltre’ CR 63 (1949) 47–8. Gifanius (edn. Antwerp 1566) sig. [**7]v, remarks that ‘Sæpè Lucilius, Lucretius & Lucullus, ut Cœlius ac Cecilius alius in alterius locum vitiosè subiecti sunt’ (see below, n.28), yet fails to suspect Jerome’s tale on that account. 16 The 9th-c. MS Zürich Stadtbibliothek W 78 and the Aldine read magni quartus, the B family and two early editions quartus magni, the first edition partus magni, whence, with assistance from Lucr. 4.1251–3, the assertion in the Borgia life that the poet was ‘matre natus diutius sterili’. 17 Raised in discussion at Leeds by Monica Gale, at the instance of the late D.P. Fowler.

12

LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY woods if the story originated either with Jerome himself or with a writer shortly before his time.18

Lucretius and Lucilia The assumption (not supported by Jerome) that the drug was administered by a woman is already found in the Borgia Life (improbae feminae poculo); Pomponius Laetus’ language in the parallel fiction that he records (or invents), ‘asserunt id ei accidisse ob amatum puerum: quem ob candorem et formam egregiam appellabat Asteri<s>con’,19 suggests that it was not the puer membris muliebribus who administered the drug, but rather a jealous rival, perhaps indeed a wife or mistress. The legend received canonical form in Joannes Baptista Pius’ edition of 1511: Constat amatorio versum in furorem ab uxore; sed quo nomine diceretur illa plurimum ambigitur. Sunt qui Luciliam velint, iis Hieronymi verbis adductis quae posita sunt in dissuasione contra Ruffinum. Liuia virum suum interfecit, quem nimis odit: Lucilia, quae nimis amavit. Illa sponte miscuit aconitum: Lucilia decepta furorem propinavit pro amoris poculo.20

The Dissuasio Valerii ad Ruffinum philosophum ne uxorem ducat, though long since incorporated into the collected works of St Jerome as blending the title of Adversus Rufinum with the misogyny of Adversus Iovinianum, was in fact composed in the twelfth century by Walter Map, dean of St Paul’s and archdeacon of Oxford;21 where Map got Lucilia from, no one knows, unless it were his own imagination. Nevertheless, it was to become the approved name for the lady down to Tennyson,22 for Pius’ paragraph, reworded but not credited, was frequently attached in editions of Lucretius to Crinitus’ life of the poet, which we shall discuss below; since Pius’ author Map was formerly believed to be the author of various goliardic poems, it is appropriate that his account was commonly taken to be Crinitus’ own work despite the dividing formula ‘Haec ille’.

18

Cf. Ziegler (n.13) 439: ‘eine erst nach der Mitte des vierten Jahrhunderts entstehende christliche Tendenzgeschichte über einen heidnischen Dichter.’ 19 See J. Woltjer, ‘De anno natali T. Lucretii poetae’ NJbb 129 (1884) 134–8 at 134 n.1, who adds: ‘unde id hausit Pomponius ipse paiderast…aj accusatus? ipsene finxit an alius? nomen Astericos nusquam inuenitur, ni fallor.’ For a fuller citation see id. ‘Studia Lucretiana’ Mnemosyne2 23 (1895) 221–33 at 224. 20 Edn. Bologna 1511, sig. A1r. 21 The Dissuasio had already circulated widely when it was incorporated in Map’s De nugis curialium, which did not circulate at all; see Walter Map, De nugis curialium: Courtiers’ Trifles ed. and tr. M.R. James, rev. C.N.L. Brooke and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford 1983) xxix, xlvii–xlix, 288– 312; the names Valerius and Rufinus, other influences apart (ibid. 388 n.2), recall the Diocletianic martyrs of Soissons culted on 14 June. For our passage see p.304: ‘Liuia uirum suum interfecit, quem nimis odit: Lucilia suum, quem nimis amauit. Illa sponte miscuit aconiton: hec decepta furorem propinauit pro amoris poculo.’ It was soon rewritten by Peter of Blois, ep. 69 (PL 207.244 C), ‘Liuia uirum suum interfecit, quem nimis habebat exosum: Lucilia suum, quem uehementissme diligebat: haec poculo amatorio, illa ueneno.’ 22 Whose ‘Lucretius’, cited below, was published in 1869. In Marcel Schwob’s Vies imaginaires she becomes ‘une femme africaine, belle, barbare et méchante’; Canali makes her the Flora of Philodemus’ famous epigram.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY

Lucretius edited by Cicero But what of quos postea Cicero emendavit? The conventional understanding is ‘di cui Cicerone dopo la sua morte (postea) curò la pubblicazione (emendavit)’.23 The verb emendare, in connection with books, has a wide range of meanings: Donatus, in his life of Vergil, uses it of authorial correction, impositurus Aeneidi summam manum statuit ... triennioque continuo nihil amplius quam emendare (Vita Donati 35), and editorial copy-editing, edidit autem auctore Augusto Varius, sed summatim emendata, ut qui versus etiam imperfectos sicut erant reliquerit (§41); but he also exhibits a pregnant use: heredes fecit ... ex reliqua [sc. parte] L. Varium et Plotium Tuccam, qui eius Aeneida post obitum iussu Caesaris emendaverunt (§37), that is to say ‘corrected and published’.24 And that is how Jerome himself uses it s.a.Abr. 2000: Varius et Tucca, Vergilii et Horatii contubernales, poetae habentur inlustres. qui Aeneidum postea libros emendarunt sub lege ea ut nihil adderent.

We shall therefore have no doubt that the verb has the same sense in quos postea Cicero emendavit, and does not, as Bailey was duped by the Borgia Life into supposing, denote improvements suggested to the poet ‘inter legendum’.25 That indeed makes nonsense of postea, albeit (as the last citation shows) Jerome uses the word with more frequency than care. So far as Lucretius is concerned, there is no telling whether the adverb means ‘postquam mortuus est’ or ‘postquam scribere desiit’, be it from the poetical death of madness, disgust with Memmius, or any other cause; however, failing such hypotheses we should expect a living poet to do his own emending. Sicco Polentonus of Padua, who writing in the early fifteenth century knew Jerome but not Lucretius, supposed that parts of the poem, not written during lucid intervals, were jumbled and disorganised, thus needing Cicero to put them in order: ‘emendavit preterea Cicero Lucrecii, Romani poetae libros, quod scripti cum insaniret ille interdum confuse ac minus composite viderentur.’26 That was the most rational hypothesis so long as the poem lay unread, but ‘scripti confuse ac minus composite’ is precisely the impression that the transmitted text has made on the many readers who have either sought to remedy it by transposition and deletion, or supposed, with or without recourse to the poet’s alleged insanity, that the work was left unfinished at his death. While Lucretius was read at Varro De Lingua Latina 5.17, Pius could write: ‘Vnus uir doctissimus undecumque Varro dubio procul ostendit plures edidisse libros. Sed qui fortassis incohati non perfecti

23

V.E. Alfieri, Lucrezio (Florence 1929) 7. Donatus’ other pupil Servius writes Aeneidem . . . nec emendavit nec edidit, but also Augustus vero, ne tantum opus periret, Tuccam et Varium hac lege iussit emendare, ut superflua demerent, nihil adderent tamen. 25 Bailey (n.3) 1.20–1. Pontanus, the real author of this romance, was in turn deceived by the attribution to Cicero of the Rhetorica ad Herennium. Canali has it both ways by making Lucretius take Cicero’s advice during composition and send the finished work off to him as if to a modern publisher. 26 Sicconis Polentoni Latinae linguae libri XVIII ed. B.L. Ullman (American Academy in Rome 1928), 445 ll.21–3, in bk.16. 24

14

LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY reiecti sunt a censore sollertissimo Marco Tullio’,27 but Gifanius’ correction to Lucilius28 leaves only Crinitus’ interpretation: ‘verisimile est: propter importunum obitum ab eo imperfectum atque inemendatum relictum.’29 It is inherently improbable that Cicero, long before Caesar’s victory and Tullia’s death had turned him into a philosophical author, would spend time and trouble editing (however superficially) a poem expounding a system he found absurd and repugnant, by a person to whom he lay under no obligation; if it were as a favour to Atticus, he might have occasionally quoted the odd phrase back at him, all the more so since, as Ziegler remarks, he would have employed his services for copying and distribution. Moreover, the believers’ proof-text, that letter of February 54 BC (Ad Quintum fratrem 2.10) in which Cicero concurs with his brother’s judgement of poemata (§3) by Lucretius, no more entails their maximalist interpretation, that he knew De rerum natura in its entirety, than the minimalist alternative that Quintus had quoted extracts, perhaps passed on by a friend of a friend.30 It does not prove that Lucretius was dead, however convenient that would be for saving Donatus’ credit and sparing Lucretius the knowledge of his patron’s spectacular disgrace in the summer’s consular elections. We may surmise that death explained (but would it?) why Cicero made no mention of the poet when urging Memmius to do the decent thing in respect of Epicurus’ house at Athens, but a surmise it remains to be weighed against four others: that Memmius had scorned Lucretius’ offering; that Cicero had forgotten about it; that the lines he had seen did not include the dedication;31 that the dedicatee was not the praetor of 58 BC, C. Memmius L. f., but the tribune of 54 BC, C. Memmius C. f.32 In any case, Cicero gives no more than a summary judgement like that on Sallustius’ Empedoclea, reading which will prove Quintus a he-man but not 27

Edn. (n.20) sig. A1v. See Gifanius loc. cit. (n.15), who observes: ‘Quid ergo? pro Lucretio, Lucilium olim scriptum fuisse existimo’; also Ausonius Popma, M. TerentI Varronis operum quae exstant noua editio (Leiden 1601) 518. M. Vertranius Maurus, M. Terentii Varronis pars librorum quattuor et viginti de lingua Latina (Lyon 1563) 221–2 had already dissociated this passage from the poet of De rerum natura; at p.309, on 7.94, he posited either another Lucretius or a corruption of Lucilium. Scaliger, having corrected the latter passage at Coniectanea in M. Terentium Varronem de lingua Latina (Paris 1565) 184, observed at In Sex. Pompei Festi de verborum significatione castigationes ([Heidelberg] 1575) cxvi, s.v. Oufentina, ‘Perperam Lucretius pro Lucillius [sic], vt apud Varronem’; this does not justify L. Spengel and his successors in crediting him with the correction of LL 5.17. 29 De poetis Latinis (Impressum Florentiæ per Philippum Iuntam. Kaleñ Februarii. M.D.V. = 1506 modern style; dedication dated ‘Kaleñ. Nouembris. M.D.V.’) sig. B3r. 30 F.H. Sandbach, ‘Lucreti poemata and the poet’s death’ CR 54 (1940) 72–7: esp. p.76: ‘It seems, then, that the exact meaning of Lucreti poemata is uncertain. It might be translated “the poetry of Lucretius”, “the passages of Lucretius”, or “the passage of Lucretius”.’ There is no need to suppose that Cicero knew more of Lucretius than his brother had sent him, or to defend the ‘complicated hypothesis’ rejected by Hutchinson (n.2) 153, ‘that Cicero and Quintus had both [sc. independently] read a particular group of extracts’. 31 If as Huchinson (n.2) argues the proem presupposes the outbreak of civil war, then since proems may be written last we have a terminus ante quem for other parts of the poem, but no compelling need to suppose that the poemata are unattested lost works (ibid. 154). 32 As suggested by Hutchinson (n.2) 158–9. The reader who finds merit in this proposal is invited to bear it in mind at future references to Memmius. 28

15

LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY human. Yet Cicero, having little else to say (§1), could reasonably have written at greater length had he any detailed comments to make, rather than await Quintus’ arrival (sed cum veneris); one derives the impression of a topic that only politeness bade him take up. Such allusions to De rerum natura as have been asserted for Cicero—most plausibly, in respect of deus ille fuit, deus, inclute Memmi (5.8) as underlying the sneer at Tusculanae Disputationes 1.48—would indicate knowledge only of the purple patches; indeed at primum erit hoc quasi prouincias atomis dare, quae recte, quae oblique ferantur (De finibus 1.20) he is contradicted by Lucretius 2.243–5 quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare necessest / corpora; nec plus quam minimum, ne fingere motus / obliquos uideamur et id res vera refutet. Or, if it be objected that Cicero might be casually denying a distinction he found artificial—to swerve is to move obliquely, and there’s an end on’t—the argument of De finibus 2.98 sin autem ad animum [sc. pertinentibus praeteritis gaudes], falsum est quod negas animi ullum esse gaudium quod non referatur ad corpus is refuted by Lucretius 3.145–6, concerning the entity variously known as consilium, mens, and animus: idque sibi solum per se sapit, id sibi gaudet, / cum neque res animam neque corpus commouet una.33 Perhaps it is too much to ask that a corrector should remember such details after nine or even five years in a poem whose style must have impressed him far more than its content; nevertheless, Cicero’s failure to notice Lucretius in his philosophical writings, when De rerum natura was in the public domain, must indicate either that he really had not read more than a few highlights, or that he preferred to ignore it. But if he had not read it, he had not edited it; and if he had edited it, the fact would have been too well known in the small literary world of Rome for him to wear the mask of ignorance. We should do better, then, to disbelieve the tale as a false inference from the letter to Quintus; if the poet had gone mad, someone else must have brought the poem to public attention; Cicero is the only contemporary in whose writings a reference is found; argal.34

Lucretius the aristocrat Belief in the philtre, the madness, and Cicero’s editing, however misguided, does at least rest on ancient assertion, though in other walks of life one would not call it evidence; there is another fantasy that rests on no ancient report whatever,

33

Since ună would yield the sense ‘when anima and body are each subject to more than one stimulus’, we need either to adopt the humanistic conjecture ulla, ‘when no single thing stirs either soul or body’ (Bailey’s translation, though his text reads una), or understand the adverb unā, ‘together with the animus’ (not with each other, as in Bailey’s commentary); this in turn entails understanding res either an unparalleled anticipation of rien (but why did the poet not write quidquam?), or as ea res quae animum mouet. 34 See Ziegler (n.13) 440; cf. D.E.W. Wormell, ‘The personal world of Lucretius’ in D.R. Dudley (ed.), Lucretius (London 1965) 35–67 at 37, who perhaps over-ingeniously finds polemic intent in the story: ‘It seemed appropriate to the opponents of Epicureanism that its chief poet should go mad and commit suicide, and that his poem should be given to the world by one whose philosophical leanings were in the direction of the New Academy and of Stoicism, and who had little use for Epicurus and his school.’

16

LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY the notion that Lucretius was of aristocratic birth. This is based variously on his name, his sentiments, and his style.

The honoured name Besides the well-known De honesta disciplina, Petrus Crinitus also wrote a five-book work of biography and criticism of the Latin poets; the first poet treated in book 2 is Lucretius, whose life begins with the words: ‘T. Lucretius Charus ex Lucretiorum familia natus creditur. quae Romae insignis: & peruetusta habita est.’35 The distinction and antiquity are obviously owed to the Lucretii Tricipitini, a great patrician house of the early Republic; according to tradition, indeed, the Republic itself was founded in revolutionary response to the outrage offered by the Crown Prince Sex. Tarquinius against one of that clan’s womenfolk. Thereafter the patrician Lucretii provided consuls and consular tribunes in every generation down to the Gaulish invasion; one of them, in the second year of the Republic, even bore the praenomen Titus.36 Unfortunately, the last we hear of them is in 381 BC; no bearer of the nomen is on record until the quaestor L. Lucretius is ambushed by Hannibal in 218 BC. Thereafter several Lucretii are known; but whereas in the middle and later Republic new stirpes of other patrician gentes make room for themselves, such as the Aemilii Scauri, the Cornelii Dolabellae, and most spectacularly the Iulii Caesares,37 these Lucretii are plebeian; if the by now rare praenomen Spurius borne by the praetors of 205 and 172 BC claims kinship with the patrician house, it is no less mendacious than the genealogies concocted in more recent times for persons desirous of boasting Norman blood. Not even in the antiquarian and phileupatrid reign of Augustus, when in successive years (if their pedigrees were genuine) the Furii Camilli and Sulpicii Camerini emerged from centuries of obscurity to reclaim the consulate over 300 years after they had last enjoyed it,38 did a patrician Lucretius trouble the chroniclers of public affairs. The patriciate, though still conscious of itself, was only one segment of that nobilitas which held the consulate polluted if a novus homo were elected.39 To this nobilitas the plebeian Lucretii did not belong, none having advanced beyond the praetorship. Even that was last achieved in 171 BC, about a century before our poet came of age, by the praetor C. Lucretius Gallus, whose career ended in the disgrace of a million-as fine (Livy 43.8.10); although Sp. Lucretius, the praetor of 35

De poetis Latinis (n.29) sig. B2v–3r; in subsequent editions this is ch. 19. The lady’s father, Sp. Lucretius, was squeezed into the fasti as suffect to L. Iunius Brutus in the first year of the Republic, by Varronian dating 509 BC; his brother (one supposes) T. Lucretius T. f. is recorded as consul in 508 and 504, and the latter’s son Lucius in 462. Hostus Lucretius was consul in 429, his son Publius served as consular tribune ten years later. The line ends with L. Lucretius Flavus Tricipitinus, consul suffectus in 393 and consular tribune in 391, 388, 383, and 381. 37 First known respectively from the consul of 115 (virtually a novus homo: Asconius 23C), the consul of 283, and the praetor of 208. 38 M. Furius P. f. Camillus, cos. AD 8, Q. Sulpicius Q. f. Camerinus, cos. AD 9; their families’ last consulates had been respectively 325 and 345 BC. 39 Sall. Cat. 23.6. On its composition see now D.R. Shackleton Bailey, ‘Nobiles and novi reconsidered’, AJP 107 (1986) 255–60. 36

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY 172 BC, continued in the public service, being last heard of on the mission to curb Seleucid power that ended in the assassination of Cn. Octavius, no subsequent Lucretius is known to have attained a curule magistracy in Republican times, unless (as has been suggested) the Q. Lucretius Afella put to death by Sulla for illegally aspiring to the consulate had held office during the Cinnanum tempus.40 Otherwise we must make do with the aedilis plebi of 133 BC, L. Lucretius, who earned the cognomen Vespillo by flinging Tiberius Gracchus’ corpse in the Tiber; his son Quintus, proscribed by Sulla; Quintus’ son, also Quintus, who was proscribed by the triumvirs, concealed by his wife Turia, and made consul in 19 BC; a tribune of 54 BC probably identical with the garrison commander who failed to hold Sulmo against Caesar;41 M. Lucretius, a senator manifestly sympathetic to Verres; and two moneyers, probably grandfather and grandson, with the cognomen Trio.42 Even if all these persons belonged to the same family,43 it had missed its chance of greatness; even if the poet was a member of it, he was not on a par with a Metellus or a Lentulus. Nor, in an age when many a nobilis with a distinctive cognomen promoted it in place of the nomen shared with persons of the lowest social status,44 is it conceivable that had the patrician Lucretii survived, even in reduced circumstances, they would have discarded the name Tricipitinus that alone marked them for what they were. Nevertheless, the ‘aristocratic’, even patrician, Lucretius continues to hold the imagination, partly at least for the sheer snobbish pleasure of studying an author out of the top social drawer: if scholars from the fifteenth to the twentieth century have sought Aulus Gellius’ kindred amongst the not particularly distinguished consuls of that name,45 how much more attractive an ancestry is a founding family of the Republic!

40

See G.V. Sumner, The Orators in Cicero’s Brutus: Prosopography and Chronology (Toronto 1973) 106–7. 41 Sometimes but implausibly also identified with the Vespillo last mentioned. 42 Cn. Lucretius Trio is dated to 136 BC by M.H. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage (2 vols, Cambridge 1970) 62, 269 no. 237, Lucius to 76 BC ibid. 404–5 no. 390. For their coins see vol. 2, pls. XXXVI and XLIX; H.A. Grueber, Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum (3 vols, London 1970) i. 132–3, 396–8. 43 Some relation between the Lucretii Vespillones and Afella is implied by Cic. Brut. 178; but why should the marine imagery used by L. Lucretius Trio be aimed at rehabilitating C. Lucretius Gallus, even if the moneyer had inherited the latter’s estate at Antium (Livy 43.4.6)? More attractive is Crawford’s suggestion that the boy on the dolphin is Palaemon son of Leucothea, metronymically recalling Lucretius. 44 See R. Syme, ‘Imperator Caesar: a study in nomenclature’ Historia 7 (1958) 172–88 at 172–3 = Roman Papers i, ed. E. Badian (Oxford 1979) 361–77 at 361–2. Gentes no longer counted for much; it is a joke, not a boast, when Cicero calls King Ser. Tullius his gentilis (Tusc. 1.38) despite the gratifying scene of Pro Sestio 123. 45 Sicco Polentonus (n.26), bk.8 (219.10–13 Ullman): ‘Romanus quippe iste ciuis Gelliorum e familia nobili et antiqua natus est’; cf. Luigi Rusca (ed.), Aulo Gellio: Notti attiche (2nd edn, Milan 1992) i. 70: ‘Gellio dovette essere romano come sembra indicare il fatto che la gens Gellia era romana già da lungo tempo.’ Other scholars, e.g. J.C.R. Rolfe (Loeb edn i, pp.xi–xii), have hedged their bets, listing prominent Gellii and then admitting that the miscellanist makes no claim of kinship.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Crinitus’ life, with its confident assertions that Lucretius was a little senior to Varro and Cicero,46 and that his dedicatee was the son of the man who had conquered Achaia,47 was reprinted with minor variations in Petrus Candidus’ Juntine of 1512/13; having been ignored in Andreas Naugerius’ Aldine of 1515 it was restored in Henricus Petrus’ Basle edition of 1531,48 with as we have seen an additional paragraph taken unacknowledged from Pius. The theme of false ascription continues, for the last item in Crinitus proper is a reference to the Lucretius comicus of Fulgentius Expositio sermonum antiquorum 62, commonly dismissed as a figment of that writer’s humour; though if any choose to believe in him,49 his profession would prove him no kinsman of the senatorial Lucretii in whose heyday he must have written. Obertus Gifanius, in the ‘Vita T. Lucretii’ preposed to his Antwerp edition of 1566, noted that the name of the Lucretii was most famous and ancient in Roman records; he had found ‘Tricipitinos, Cinnas,50 Vispillones, et Ofellas’,51 but declined to suggest what relationship there might have been between him and the Q. Lucretius of contemporary politics;52 it was enough to speculate that Lucretius wrote his poem and killed himself on observing Memmius’ disgrace and the ruin of the state.53 Lambinus, who in his first edition of 1563/4 had ignored biographical matters, and whose second or pocket edition of 1565 had reproduced the current expansion of Crinitus’ life, riposted in his third edition of 1570 with his own account of poet and poem asserting: ‘Porro autem gens Lucretia quam clara atque antiqua fuerit, argumento sunt Lucretii Tricipitini, Triones, Ofellae, Vespillones, Galli.’ He was inclined to see in the poet the non-political brother of a Vespillo or an ‘Ofella’ who bore a second cognomen ‘vel propter ingenii magnitudinem, et praestantiam, vel propter morum suauitatem, et comitatem, vel

46

Crinitus (n.29) sig. B2v: ‘paulo antiquior fuit Terentio Varrone & M. Tullio: ut quidam scripserunt: quod est obseruatum diligenter. quoniam in his Annalibus (quos a graecis habemus) complura falso exposita sunt: contraque rationem temporum peruerse signata.’ This plaudit for inverting the chronological sequence in Jerome’s chronicle excludes the charitable interpretation that Varro is Atacinus and not Reatinus. 47 Ibid. sig. B3r: ‘non me praeterit alios in hac re dissentire. Sed hi quidem dum parum diligenter temporum rationem obseruant. facile refelli possunt.’ To be sure Mummius was commonly corrupted to Memmius at that date. 48 T. Lucretii Cari poetae, nec minus philosopho vetustisimi, de rerum natura libri sex. Ad verorum exemplarium fidem accuratè castigati (Basle 1531) sigs. A1v–3r. 49 Ubaldo Pizzani, Fabio Planciade Fulgenzio: Definizione di parole antiche (Rome 1968) 210 does not entirely exclude genuineness: ‘Resta però sempre aperta la possibilità che Fulgenzio abbia qui riportato un frammento di un comico ignoto (magari con l’errata indicazione del nome) che potrebbe essere stato un pedissequo imitatore di Plauto; in tal caso nulla proverebbero i citati riscontri contro l’autenticità del frammento.’ 50 For this ghost cognomen, bestowed by Jerome s.a.Abr. 1998 or 1999 on the consul in whose year Vergil died, see CIL i2.89. 51 A false spelling for Afella based on Greek 'Ofšllaj, used till recently by persons who would never have corrupted Dolabella to conform with Dolobšllaj. 52 Sig. **5r. 53 Ibid. sigs. [**5]v–[**6]r.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY propter aliquid tale’.54 Subsequent editors, if they concerned themselves with the matter at all, were long content to transcribe Gifanius, Lambinus, or both, or in the case of Daniel Paré to present Gifanius’ conjectures, recast in the third person, as his own work;55 Giovanni Nardi, in his Florentine edition of 1647, combined his predecessor’s conjectures with his own amplificatio to produce a model of brief popular biography: Nascitur Romae Titus Lucretius Carus L. Licinio Crasso, & Q. Mutio Scæuola Conss:, anno ab V.C.IƆ LVIII Claris parentibus, prouidisque sublimis ingenij promotoribus, qui adolescentem Athenas tempestiuè erudiendum mittunt. Redux verò Lucretius, Epicuri se contulit ad Hortos; his verò tunc præerant Zeno, Phędrusque, vel Tullij testimonio, humanissimus. Locum frequentabant Atticus, Cassius, Pætus, Velleius, plurimique in R.P. præstantes Ciues: quibus noster Titus ob suauissimos mores, nitidamque eloquentiam Carus, Memmio verò, cui praesens dicauit opus, vel etiam percarus. Nihil obfuit grauissimo, atque disertissimo Scriptori inuidia, sed amor: qui zelotypæ Luciliæ, nostri Poëtæ vxori, vel amicæ, suasit, vt philtrum incauto propinaret. Exarsit ille confestim, & quæ prona est via ab amore in furorem, furit Lucretius: donec exsiccatis præ incendio iam medullis, arefactoque iecore, in cinerem concedit, anno ætatis suæ xxxxiij, ea ipsa die (vt ferunt) qua virilem togam sumpsit Virgilius.56

Romantic fiction about Lucretius has retained its hold on writers to this day. That the Tricipitini were patricians and the other Lucretii plebeians was apparently a distinction too subtle for the sixteenth century; they appear in both Gifanius and Lambinus as merely one stirps among many of the supposedly unitary gens Lucretia. By the early nineteenth century, even a literary Frenchman knew better, though in the manner of his kind he cited the fact with the loftiest disdain: Les fastes de Rome offrent un grand nombre de consuls et de sénateurs de ce nom; cependant, selon les recherches des savans avides de détails minutieux, l’illustre famille de Lucrèce devint plébeienne; que ce fait soit plus ou moins fondé, il ne peut inspirer aucun intérêt, lorsqu’il s’agit d’en faire l’application à un philosophe qui montra le mépris le plus absolu pour le préjugé de naissance.57

By contrast, Eichstädt and Forbiger, contemptible as they were in textual matters, dismissed the lives constructed for the poet by Gifanius and Lambinus as resting on pure conjecture;58 Lachmann left the poet’s social standing alone, and it was in his least scholarly book that Mommsen assigned Lucretius to the best circles of

54

Sigs. d1r–e1v: ‘T. Lucretii Cari patria, genus, vitae studium, ingenium, mortis genus et tempus, librorum ab eo scriptorum numerus, consilium poetae, argumentum et inscriptio operis, D. Lambino auctore’, at sig. d1v. 55 Edn. Frankfurt 1631, 10. 56 Edn. Florence 1647, 3. 57 Jean-Baptiste Sanson de Pongerville (trans.), Lucrèce, De la nature des choses (2 vols, Paris 1823) i, pp.xxxix–xl. 58 H.C.A. Eichstädt, edn. i (Leipzig 1801) lvi–lx; paraphrased by A. Forbiger, edn. (Leipzig 1828) xxx. Misled by the order in which Havercamp had cited the lives, edn. (Leiden 1725) i, sigs. m3v– n2r, they supposed that Lambinus wrote first.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Roman society, a usefully vague expression perhaps meaning no more that he might have been expected to seek and obtain political office: Es ist das Lehrgedicht des Titus Lucretius Carus (655–699 99–55) ›Vom Wesen der Dinge‹, dessen Verfasser, den besten Kreisen der römischen Gesellschaft angehörig, vom öffentlichen Leben aber, sei es durch Kränklichkeit, sei es durch Abneigung ferngehalten, kurz vor dem Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges im besten Mannesalter starb.59

Tennyson, with his poet’s privilege of shaping history to match his imagination, adopted Pius’ Lucilia, who ‘found her master cold’ and watchful, petulant, Dreaming some rival, sought and found a witch Who brew’d the philtre which had power, they said, To lead an errant passion home again,

but his raving poet does not expressly claim community of blood with the virtuous Lucretia, only of name and spirit: And what man, What Roman would be dragg’d in triumph thus? Not I; not he, who bears one name with her Whose death-blow struck the dateless doom of kings, When, brooking not the Tarquin in her veins, She made her blood in sight of Collatine And all his peers, flushing the guiltless air, Spout from the maiden fountain in her heart, And from it sprang the Commonwealth, which breaks As I am breaking now!60

If the poetic imagination needed defence, we might adduce the psychological effect in 44 BC on the plebeian M. Brutus of sharing a name with the patrician (and terminator of his own lineage) L. Iunius Brutus. By then, however, H.A.J. Munro, who was a scholar, not a poet, but was also the illegitimate son of a Scots laird, had declared in his edition, so justly admired in other respects, that Lucretius ‘may well have belonged to the high patrician gens of the Lucretii Tricipitini whose glories were chiefly linked with the early history of the commonwealth and were doubtless in great measure legendary, but not the less valued perhaps on that account’.61 His arguments are no more than that literary distinction in Lucretius’ day belonged almost entirely to the upper classes, and that it was not unknown for the cognomen to vary within the same family, as Licinius Macer was the father of Licinius Calvus; between premisses and conclusion there lies a vast and uncharted ocean, yet Munro’s assertion, which goes behind Gifanius and Lambinus to state explicitly what Crinitus had merely implied, has been adopted without even his residual reservation by more than one subsequent editor. Yet Cicero had said all that need be said against it when he included amongst the figments of Roman history transitions to the plebs, ut si ego 59

Th. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte (91904, rep. Munich 1976) v.259. 60 Tennyson: Poems and Plays ed. T. Herbert Warren, rev. Frederick Page (Oxford 1965) 150, 153. 61 T. Lucreti Cari de rerum natura libri sex 2nd edn (Cambridge 1866) 310.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY me a M’. Tullio esse dicerem, qui patricius cum Servio Sulpicio consul anno X post exactos reges fuit (Brutus 62). In fact, given the nature of Roman gentilicia there is no more reason to make the poet T. Lucretius Carus a relation of even the later Lucretii, let alone of semi-mythical personages from the early Republic, merely because he bears the same nomen, than the soldier M. Canuleius Carus attested at Rome in AD 70 a relation of the praetor L. Canuleius Dives, colleague of C. Lucretius Gallus in 171 BC, or of the more famous C. Canuleius who as tribune in 443 BC had forced the repeal of the Twelve Tables’ prohibition on intermarriage between the orders.62

The lordly tone No doubt one may, if so disposed, see in Lucretius’ explication of toiling Sisyphus as the perpetual candidate who can never wring political office from the voters a comment on personal or familial experience; but that is to argue on the same inferential basis on which T.P. Wiseman erected his humble jack-of-alltrades whose escape from manual labour to the clientage of Memmius proved less prudent a career move than it had seemed.63 Those who really care about such things, particularly when expectation of office is their birthright, express themselves in the manner of Sallust’s Catiline, non dignos homines honore honestatos videbam (35.3). It is this note, however, that certain scholars seem to hear in Lucretius’ poetry, whose lofty tone is said to prove a high aristocratic outlook itself proving a high aristocratic background and patrician status even though not bespoken by his name and rightly denied to the imperial Valerii, Maximus and Flaccus, who share both nomen and cognomen with patrician magistrates well known to Roman history. This lofty tone is sometimes said to be manifested in his contempt for the common herd: ‘le ton injurieux sur lequel il parle de la plèbe’;64 an allusion, I suppose, to his observation that one recovers from fever no sooner on embroideries and purple quam si plebeia ueste cubandum est (2.36), and that the latter is just as good as fine clothes for keeping out the cold (5.1426–9). The substantive plebes is absent from his poem; volgus is present, but the passages commonly cited as demonstrating disdain for the lower orders do no such thing. The volgus that shudders from Epicurean teaching (1.945) is not the faex urbis so disdained by Cicero the consular (In Pisonem 9), but the unenlightened majority from the principes civitatis downwards; the same viewpoint is assigned to the devotees of the Great Mother who bang their drums and blow their pipes and brandish their sickles to affright ingratos animos atque impia pectora volgi (2.622), that is to say the undevout. 62

For M. Canuleius Carus see Th. Mommsen, Inscriptiones regni Neapolitani Latinae (Leipzig 1852) 6769 iii 24. Though found by the arch of Septimius Severus, it was preserved in the Museo Borbonico at Naples, now called the Museo Nazionale Archeologico. 63 T.P. Wiseman, ‘The two worlds of Titus Lucretius’ Cinna the Poet and Other Roman Essays (Leicester 1974) 11–43. 64 A. Ernout, edn. (8Paris 1948) i, p.x; this enables him to conclude that ‘On peut sans trop d’invraisemblance conjecturer que Lucrèce appartenait à cette famille [the gens Lucretia], bien que le cognomen Carus n’ait été porté par aucun autre de ses membres, et sans doute aux Tricipitini.’

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Nor should we be seduced by such assertions as: Il tono disdegnoso e distaccato con cui egli guarda al resto dell’umanità, l’ebbrezza della solitudine spirituale, l’accento alto e profetico, il ripudio di toni bonari e umoristici che non siano sarcastici, tutto lo avvicina alla famiglia dei grandi spiriti aristocratici, come Pindaro e Dante, Alfieri e Byron, i quali riflettono nell’opera la nobiltà dell’origine e delle tradizioni.65

The lofty tone that Lucretius takes towards the generality of mankind in their ignorance and blindness is no proof of aristocracy, let alone of patrician rank; it is the mark of those who have found THE TRUTH, and are driven to share it with the rest of us who, like C. Memmius, have no particular desire to hear it. An aristocrat who scorned the masses would have no wish to save them; I have never yet encountered a street preacher whose bearing induced me to seek his kindred in the House of Lords. The exaltation in such persons’ tone comes from the conviction of knowing better than their betters. If, however, Lucretius was no Diogenes of Oenoanda, but wished only to win Memmius, so that the two together might continue to enjoy that greatest among pleasures, watching the benighted ways of others (2.7–13), that would not prove him an aristocrat of birth, only of temperament; the inutility of nobilitas asserted in 2.11, 38 proves nothing either way. Or, if Lucretius cared nothing for either Epicurus or the saving of Memmius, being rather a Roman Aratus or a Nicander, who had found or been told his topic and undertaken to render it in verse, then if his philosophical commitment was but borrowed plumage, why not his airs? And even if the despised volgus were the common masses, a lofty tone towards them is more easily arrogated than any refinement of etiquette by those whose de is not in the Almanach de Gotha. When Cicero the novus homo, the inquilinus civis urbis Romae, permits a scornful emphasis to fall on the names of M. Terpolius and C. Fidiculanius Falcula,66 not only their politics or their characters are at issue.67 In Wilhelmine Berlin, it was the middle-class Geheimrat Hermann Diels who stood bolt upright as if he had swallowed a poker, whereas Ulrich von WilamowitzMoellendorff would sit on the floor amidst his books.68 The fraudulent Sinologist Sir Edmund Backhouse declared that Mallarmé had ‘just a little touch of the bourgeois’; the Swiss professor to whom he made this remark naïvely took it as the tone of the English nobleman, but Hugh Trevor-Roper, as he was then, observed that ‘An Englishman is more likely to regard it as the remark of a poseur or a parvenu.’69

The noble verse Alternatively, by loftiness we may understand not hauteur but high style; that has even less to do with noble birth. Let us compare two contemporaries of 65

Luciano Perelli, Lucrezio poeta dell’angoscia (Florence 1969) 7. Pro Cornelio II, fr. 8 Crawford2 and Pro Caecina 28 respectively. 67 R. Syme, ‘Caesar, the Senate, and Italy’ BSR 14 (1938) 1–31 at 23 = Roman Papers i.88–119 at 111. 68 Reminiscences heard from Eduard Fraenkel. 69 H. Trevor-Roper (now Lord Dacre), Hermit of Peking: The Hidden Life of Sir Edmund Backhouse (rev. edn., Harmondsworth 1978) 341–2. 66

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Lucretius’ of whose respective social standing there is no doubt, Cicero and Caesar, writing on the same topic: tu quoque, qui solus lecto sermone, Terenti, conversum expressumque Latina uoce Menandrum in medium nobis sedatis †vocibus† effers, quiddam come loquens atque omnia dulcia dicens.70 tu quoque, tu in summis, o dimidiate Menander, poneris et merito, puri sermonis amator, lenibus atque utinam scriptis adiecta foret vis,71 comica ut aequato virtus polleret honore cum Graecis, neve hac despectus parte iaceres: unum hoc maceror ac doleo tibi desse, Terenti.72

The latter is the better criticism and also better poetry; but the style is no grander than Cicero’s. Indeed, the nobleman may be free of the urge to self-inflation that marks the man who would be more than he is, whether he seek to impress the electors or a Memmius. The fourteenth Earl of Derby, whose affability amongst his own kind was matched, as it was not in Caesar, by his aloofness towards the lower orders, translated the Iliad into English blank verse, a measure whose capacity for epic exaltation needs no proof after Milton; but compare his proem for loftiness with the rhymed couplets of the merchant’s son Pope. Of Peleus’ son, Achilles, sing, O Muse, The vengeance, deep and deadly; whence to Greece Unnumbered ills arose; which many a soul Of mighty warriors to the viewless shades Untimely sent; they on the battle plain Unburied lay, a prey to ravening dogs, And carrion birds; fulfilling thus the plan Devised of Jove, since first in wordy war, The mighty Agamemnon, King of men, Confronted stood by Peleus’ godlike son.73 Achilles’ wrath, to Greece the direful spring Of woes unnumber’d, heavenly goddess, sing! That wrath which hurl’d to Pluto’s gloomy reign The souls of mighty chiefs untimely slain: Whose limbs unburied on the naked shore, Devouring dogs and hungry vultures tore:

70

Cicero fr. 2 Morel–Büchner–Blänsdorf and Courtney. Enjambements, in pre-Vergilian hexameters, are not to be multiplied beyond necessity, least of all after the emphatic final monosyllable, set off as subject from the preceding predicate. Quite different is Lucr. 1.485–6 nulla potest uis / stinguere, where subject and predicate are interlaced, cf. 2.123–4, 5.104–5, 6.325–6; different again are such places as 2.95–6 nulla quies est / reddita, where the monosyllable is not emphatic. 72 Caesar fr. 1 Morel–Büchner–Blänsdorf and Courtney. 73 The Iliad of Homer, rendered into English blank verse. To which are appended Translations of Poems Ancient and Modern, by Edward Earl of Derby 2 vols (13London 1894) 1.1. 71

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Since great Achilles and Atrides strove, Such was the sovereign doom, and such the will of Jove.74

I do not ask which is better poetry, or the more faithful translation; I merely ask which more brings to mind a noble ancestry.

Lucretius the nobody If love of a lord is no sure principle for literary history, neither is the romantic prejudice that poets should be poor or humbly born. At the opposite social extreme to Lucretius the patrician is Lucretius the freedman, the brainchild of Friedrich Marx,75 who, noting that the chief nurseries of poets in Lucretius’ day were Gaul and Spain, declared that his cognomen Carus—not attested for our poet before the Oblongus and the Vienna leaves,76 but universally accepted77—was favoured in Celtic and Celtiberian territory and not attested during the Republic amongst persons of Roman or Latin birth; its bearer was always of low status, a slave, freedman, or foreigner. He cited the Celtiberian K£roj of Segeda (Appian Bellum Hispanum 45),78 and some inscriptions from the second and twelfth volumes of CIL, together with an imperial freedman from v.5291; he also observed that the T. Aebutius Carus of Livy 39.55.8 was at 42.4.4 given the cognomen Parrus by our only witness, the fifth-century Codex Vindobonensis Latinus 15. Modern editors agree with Bücheler in emending Carus to Parrus rather than vice versa with Pighius; this not only eliminates the cognomen Carus from the Republican senate, but leaves just one other known pre-imperial Carus, namely the Sex. Vibius Sex. f. Carus whose dedication to Hercules at Superaequum was found in the railway station at Molina Aterno.79 However, he was neither a freedman nor a Celt; his gentilicium is Italic, and a Paelignian 74

The Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, translated by Alexander Pope (Albion edn., London and New York [1895]) 1–2. 75 ‘Der Dichter Lucretius’ Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und deutsche Litteratur und für Pädagogik 2 (1899) 533–48 at 535; the article is reprinted in G. Maurach (ed.) Römische Philosophie (Darmstadt 1976) 12–36. 76 The recently revived identification with the marvellous Karos commemorated before the puzzled citizens of Oenoanda (Diog. Oen. fr. 122 ii 8–9) is refuted by M.F. Smith, ‘The chisel and the Muse: Diogenes of Oenoanda and Lucretius’ in K.A. Algra, M.H. Koenen, and P.H. Schrijvers (eds) Lucretius and his Intellectual Background (Amsterdam 1997) 67–78 at 68–72; it not only wields Ockham’s Razor in the spirit of Sweeney Todd, but falsely infers from our conviction that toà te qaumas…ou K£rou is a just tribute to De rerum natura that a contemporary Greek, in a Greek-speaking city, could or would have appraised a Latin poem—a pagan travesty of the Trecento notion that Diogenes’ fellow Greek-speaker Paul of Tarsus called Vergil poetarum maxime: Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, MS Sala del Prefetto 10.27, olim A 79 inf. (facs. ed. Io. [= G.] Galbiati, Francisci Petrarcae Vergilianus codex (Milan 1930) fo. iv. 77 We could not account for posthumous invention as we can for Richard de Fournival’s conferment on Propertius of the cognomen Nauta from navita (codd.: non ita Heinsius) at 2.24.38; see James L. Butrica, The Manuscript Tradition of Propertius (Toronto 1984) 25. 78 Adolf Schulten, Numantia: Die Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen 1905–1912 (4 vols, Munich 191431) i: Die Keltiberer und ihre Kriege mit Rom 335 n.10 takes it for granted that this war-leader K£roj is identical, not only with the political leader K£kuroj at D.S. 31.39, but with the Megaravicus of Florus 1.34, who fought the Romans twelve years after Karos’ death. 79 CIL i2. 1796 = 9.3302 = ILLRP 144 Sex. Vibius Sex. f. | Carus Her. d.d. | l.m.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY inscription, recording the construction of the temple, was found together with his dedication.80 Yet although there are Celtic names in Marx’s list, we do not find similar names in the Tres Galliae, and almost no Cari at all in Britain, despite the presence in all Celtic of other names beginning with Car- from kărā-, the stem of the Celtic verb meaning ‘to love’ (Irish caraim ‘I love’, Welsh caraf, infinitive caru).81 What relation K£roj of Segeda, paroxytone if only by happy accident, and the likes of C. Boduacius Karus (CIL xii.3205) bear to this root we need not here enquire; there is simply no evidence that our poet was a Gaulish or Celtiberian Kăros rather than a Latin Cārus like the L. Carenius Carus who made a dedication to the Nymphs at Vasio (CIL xii.1326) or Aemilia Kara, wife of the local worthy L. Cornelius C. f. Gal. Romanus at Tarraco (ii.4267).82 Marx’s onomastics, in short, utterly fail to establish his case; one might as well posit Thracian origin on the strength of Karos, father of the mercenary Darses who served in the troop that followed, and rebelled against, the son of Philadelphus.83 Both Merrill cursorily and Tenney Frank at greater length had refuted Marx even before the diligence of Iiro Kajanto established what should have been clear from the Onomasticon for the letter C in TLL, that the cognomen Carus was widespread in the Roman world; it was never characteristic of the upper class, but though not confined to the freeborn it is not especially servile.84 It therefore remains to be proved that the author of De rerum natura was either higher or lower in rank than Ovid’s friend who wrote a poem on Hercules and taught the sons of Germanicus.85 Yet however low the freedman socially, economically the poor man of free birth might well be beneath him. Such was the Lucretius envisaged by V.E. Alfieri, stretched out on his lectus lucubratorius at night, ‘in quel tablinum semplice e povero che noi ci immaginiamo senza sforzo’, composing those verses ‘in cui non so se sia lecito leggere la fierezza della povertà, ma il poeta ci fa sentire, nel suo orgoglioso fastidio, che è lui che giace in veste plebeia’ by a 80

R.S. Conway, The Italic Dialect Inscriptions Edited with a Grammar and Glossary (2 vols, Cambridge 1897) i.248, no. 239: a...... | t nounis | l alafis c | herec fesn | upsaseter | coisatens (‘... T. Nonius and L. Alfius C. f. saw to it that a temple should be built to Hercules’); on the syntax see F. Bücheler, RhM2 32 (1877) 60. 81 The lengthening in câr ‘loves’, câr ‘kinsman’ is secondary. Contrast the inherited long vowel of Latin cārus and its congeners Latvian kārs ‘greedy’, Gothic hōrs ‘adulterer’ ~ English ‘whore’. 82 There would still be none if, with Louise Adams Holland, Lucretius and the Transpadanes (Princeton 1979), we allowed him on grounds of style to be a Transpadane like Catullus and Vergil; but if relish of words for their sound be a mark of northern origin we must rewrite the life of Ennius with all due speed. 83 SEG 41 (1991) 663.4 = M. Büyükkolancı and H. Engelmann, ‘Inschriften aus Ephesos’ ZPE 86 (1991) 137–44 no. 7 (pp.140–2); cf. the Karos on a gem from Almus (now Lom) in Moesia, SEG 41 (1963) 963 = Aleksandra Dimitrova-Milčeva, Антични геми и камеи от Националния археологически музей в София (Sofia 1980) 94–5 no. 272 (who misreads the name). Both are cited by Smith (n.76) 70. 84 W.A. Merrill, edn. (New York 1907) 14; Tenney Frank, ‘On the name Lucretius Carus’ in Studies in Honor of Hermann Collitz (Baltimore 1930) 63–6; Iiro Kajanto, The Latin Cognomina (Helsinki 1965) 71–3, 294. 85 Ex Ponto 4.13.11–12, 47–8, cf. 4.16.7–8. For another poetical Carus see Martial 9.23–4.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY smoky lamp whose flame ‘accompagna il respiro dell’uomo e lo scorrere della penna che riempie di atramentum, di indelebile atramentum, le carte.’86 Indeed we imagine the room without difficulty, for we have seen it in La Bohème; placing Lucretius there is harder. Poor Lucretii there certainly were at Rome—we recall the M. Lucre part of whose remains were found by the Via Appia (ILLRP 877)— but such folk no more write six-book epics than Gaulish freedmen do. That is not simply because they know their place, as Merrill supposed: the austere sermon at the opening of the second book on the vanity of political ambition is evidence of a freedom of criticism and liberty of thought and expression which would hardly be found in a person of low social standing at the time.87

It was in Lucretius’ heyday that Helvius Mancia of Formiae, son of a freedman, not only prosecuted a future consul before the censors but answered Pompey’s insults with a devastating riposte that shocked Valerius Maximus in the more circumspect age of Tiberius (Val. Max. 6.2.8). Rather it is because they lack leisure,88 and (unless they have the elder Horace for a father) have not received the necessary education.89

Lucretius and Memmius: a study in friendship According to Munro’s contemporary W.Y. Sellar, by no means an exact scholar, The tone of the dedication to Memmius, a member of a noble plebeian house, and of the occasional addresses to him in the body of the poem, is not that of a client to a patron, but of an equal to an equal: Sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas Suavis amicitiae—90

‘Noble’ is loosely spoken, for the Memmii, like the plebeian Lucretii, were only of praetorian rank, but while the Lucretii were on the way down the Memmii, until the calamity of 54 BC, were on the way up: their first praetorship, in 172 BC, coincided with the last but one to be held by the Lucretii. Likewise Frank writes:

86

Alfieri (n.23) 11–12; the lectus lucubratorius owes its origin to Suet. Aug. 78.1. However, Lucrezio was the youthful work, written for badly needed money and later disowned, of a man whose academic prospects were blighted by the Fascist regime, but who became a respected headmaster in Milan (Franco Basso, pers. comm.). Despite community of name, he was no kin of either the great poet or the eminent soldier. 87 Merrill (n.84) 14. 88 When F. Giancotti, Tito Lucrezio Caro: La natura (Milan 1994) xxvii writes: ‘Lucrezio dovette godere d’un certo agio. Un indizio in questo senso si può forse desumere dallo scorcio di I 141142, specialmente da noctes vigilare serenas, e secondariamente da IV 969-970, ove semper sembra indicare la costanza di un impegno in cui non interferiscono preoccupazioni di altro genere’, the attempt to extract the literal from the literary is questionable, the inferences, even were they valid, would be incompatible; but the proposition they fail to prove is none the less correct. 89 A point made by Francis Cairns in discussion at Leeds. 90 W.Y. Sellar, The Roman Poets of the Republic (rev. edn., Oxford 1881) 282.

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Once we are rid of the prejudices created by the conjectures of Marx I think that no reader of Lucretius will fail to see that the poet speaks like a free citizen conscious of an honourable position in society and that he addresses Memmius as an equal.91

Is it really the tone of an equal to an equal that we hear in the famous lines 1.140–5? Sed tua me virtus tamen et sperata voluptas suavis amicitiae quemvis efferre laborem suadet, et inducit noctes vigilare serenas quaerentem dictis quibus et quo carmine demum clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti, res quibus occultas penitus convisere possis.

I do not think so; I hear it rather in the proem to Pope’s Essay on Man, addressed to his friend Viscount Bolingbroke and rivalling Lucretius himself in its assurance: Awake, my ST. JOHN! leave all meaner things To low ambition, and the pride of Kings. Let us (since Life can little more supply Than just to look about us and to die) Expatiate free o’er all this scene of Man; A mighty maze! but not without a plan; A Wild, where weeds and flow’rs promiscuous shoot, Or Garden, tempting with forbidden fruit. Together let us beat this ample field, Try what the open, what the covert yield; The latent tracts, the giddy heights explore Of all who blindly creep, or sightless soar; Eye Nature’s walks, shoot Folly as it flies, And catch the Manners living as they rise; Laugh as we must, be candid where we can; But vindicate the ways of God to Man.92

To be sure Pope had two advantages over Lucretius, that he was versifying Bolingbroke’s philosophy rather than his own, and that the intimacy to which Lucretius aspires had already been attained despite the difference of rank. The tone of personal address is very different from ‘quella impressione di subalternità che si ricava dal modo in cui Lucrezio si rivolge a Memmio’,93 that is to say, the language in which poets address those from whom they hope for favour. The favour is Memmius’ friendship, the polite word for patronage but not excluding personal intimacy; as Bailey well observes, ‘though the expression is not servile, it certainly might be used by a dependant’.94

91

Frank (n.84) 66. An Essay on Man: Epistle I, vv. 1–16. 93 L. Canfora, Vita di Lucrezio (Palermo 1993) 45. Quite different is the modesty topos, the profession of inadequacy used adroitly by Horace and Vergil to exalt the addressee as beyond their praises and ineptly by the panegyrist of Messalla (vv. 1–17). 94 Bailey (n.3) ii.623; contrast 1.7. 92

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Nor is the argument to be evaded by invoking the language of Epicurean friendship, which is plainly present but which the reader—even if he were Memmius—would not privilege over normal Latin usage. The tone suggests, not indeed a penniless nobody, but the social inferior of the great man, in the eighteenth-century sense of that expression, from whom he hopes to win favour, even as Catullus and Cinna had hoped to do from Memmius and his friends Veranius and Fabullus had from Piso; it was Catullus who, having failed to fatten himself on provincial pickings, both summed up the moral, and illustrated the type of amicitia at stake, in the words pete nobiles amicos!95 To be sure, since he affords no evidence of having sung Memmius’ praises (even if the odd political epigram was written in his interest), it was his own fault; Lucretius gave better value.96 Indeed, even though, before the fateful revelation, he need not have known any better than the shocked senators what a scoundrel Memmius was, what else but hope of advantage could persuade him to bestow on that politician above all other such extravagant praise as quem tu dea tempore in omni / omnibus ornatum voluisti excellere rebus (1.26–7) or lament that Memmi clara propago cannot desert the public weal at such a troublous time (1.41–3)? One no more expects Lucretius to believe it than one supposes James Thomson to have believed all the praises he bestowed on George Bubb Dodington: AND thou, my youthful Muse’s early Friend, In whom the Human Graces all unite: Pure Light of Mind, and Tenderness of Heart; Genius and Wisdom; the gay social Sense, By Decency chastis’d; Goodness and Wit, In seldom-meeting Harmony combin’d; Unblemish’d Honour, and an active Zeal, For BRITAIN’s Glory, Liberty, and Man: O DODINGTON! attend my rural Song, Stoop to my Theme, inspirit every Line, And teach me to deserve thy just Applause.97

Even if Dodington does not entirely deserve his reputation as a servile turncoat and opportunist,98 neither does he deserve such laudation; but he had every expectation of receiving it. He was a patron of letters, and rewarded Thomson generously; what Memmius did for Lucretius we have no way of knowing, but we cannot take it for granted that he disappointed the poet as he did the preacher.

Lucretius in Campania It was in monumental ignorance that Sellar declared:99

95

Piso was, and Memmius was not, a nobilis, but Catullus, like Sellar, is speaking loosely. I stand by my suggestion that Lucretius was the social as well as the poetical peer of Catullus: L.A. Holford-Strevens, Aulus Gellius (London 1988) 9 n.4. 97 James Thomson The Seasons: Summer 21–30, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford 1981) 60. 98 For a sustained defence see John Carswell, The Old Cause: Three Biographical Studies in Whiggism (London 1954) 129–265. 99 Sellar (n.92) 281. 96

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY The Gentile name Lucretius was one eminently Roman, nor is there ground for believing that, like the equally ancient and noble name borne by the other great poet of the age, it had become common in other parts of Italy.

Republican inscriptions exhibit Lucretii at Nemi (ILLRP 78), Teggiano (ILLRP 674), and Capua; at this last C. Lucretius C. l. Apulus was a magister in 106 BC (ILLRP 714)100 and C. Lucretius C. f. in the following year (ILLRP 712); two generations later Cassius the assassin may have had a friend there, unless the man in question was the Republican commander Q. Lucretius.101 However, the only other Lucretius Carus on record is the father of a sixteen-year-old boy called C. Lucretius Statilius whose tomb Mommsen found in the archiepiscopal palace at Benevento, but Carus, as he confesses, is even more doubtful a reading than the rest of this ill-written and ill-preserved inscription.102 If nevertheless it is correct, one might suppose that our poet came from a local family of Lucretii Cari, and even find support for Guido Della Valle’s notion that he was a smallholding relation of the Neapolitan, not the Roman, Lucretii, who attended Piso’s villa at Herculaneum;103 for all its author’s extravagances,104 this ‘romanzesca ricostruzione’, this ‘amorosa fantasia suggerita dall’amore di campanile’,105 seems to have the edge over the Transpadane hypothesis now that a text has been discovered in the Villa dei Papiri, but it remains a guess.106 Another guess makes him Umbrian,107 though no Umbrian instance of the nomen is adduced; Sabine origin is no less plausible.108 100

L. Lucretius L. f. Apulus was seventh in the list of pontifices at Sutrium (CIL xi.3254 i 7). Cicero ad Atticum 7.24.1, 25.1. 102 Mommsen (n.62) no. 1653: C. LVCRETIO STA|TILIO QVI VIXIT AN|NIS XVI // MENS V | LUCRETIVS CAR|VS PATER QVEM//|TO DECEPISTI INFI//|CITOCVM| INNOCENT (‘Descripsi, sed est male scripta et male habita’); in l. 4 ‘dubius fui num legerem GN CAR aut [sic] CAT’. 103 Guido Della Valle, ‘Tito Lucrezio Caro e l’epicurismo campano’ Atti della Accademia Pontaniana 62 = 2nd ser. 37 (1932) 185–496; id. ‘Dove nacque Tito Lucrezio Caro?’ Rivista indogreca-italiana di filologia — lingua — antichità 17/1–2 (1933) 1–16. Canali’s Lucretii have property, and a tomb, at Herculaneum (pp.8, 125). The second nomen Statilius might indicate Lucanian affinities; cf. R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford 1939) 237 n.4. 104 Such as his equation of the Campanian and Roman Epicureans respectively with the gn»sioi and sofista… of D.L. 10.26, opposing ‘ortodossi, genuini, sinceri’ intimates of Philodemus like Lucretius with ‘i giovani aristocratici dell’Urbe’, who merely dropped in on a Siro or a Philodemus to complete their education, and were soulmates of Memmius (‘Tito Lucrezio Caro e l’epicurismo campano’ 494–5); or his impossible emendation at Cic. Att. 4.16.6 Pompei Gallia, as if Gallia had not been long since corrected to gratia (‘Caio Memmio comandava il presidio di Pompeii?’ Rivista di studi pompeiani 1 (1934) 89–101 [non vidi], cit. Bailey (n.3) 1.7 n.4). The notion that Lucretius lived far from the bustle and corruption of Rome was sufficiently refuted by A. Traglia, Sulla formazione spirituale di Lucrezio (Rome 1948) 11–21. 105 So the northerner Perelli (n.65) 5. 106 K. Kleve, ‘Lucretius in Herculaneum’, CErc 19 (1989), 5–27, but note Giancotti’s warning (n.89) xxv n.32. For the Transpadane Lucretius see n.82. 107 A. Piganiol, La Conquête romaine (5th edn, Paris 1967) 607: ‘l’Ombrien Lucrèce’; for negative evidence see the index to CIL 11 (which by contrast shows the name well established in Etruria and not unknown in Aemilia). 108 R. Syme, Sallust (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1964) 7. The nomen is not unknown in Sabine territory (Conway (n.80) 2.368), but less favoured than in Campanian, Volscian, and Latin areas (ibid. 157, 265, 344). 101

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LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS, HORROR VACUI IN LUCRETIAN BIOGRAPHY Lucretius’ powers of description, his mastery of that technique called in Greek ™n£rgeia and in Latin sub oculis subiectio, have lead readers to suppose him intimately acquainted with town and country, with leisure and trade. Where observation ends and imagination begins, what is Ur- and what is Bildungserlebnis, no two critics will ever agree. Those not drawn by aprioristic principle to the thesis that texts, not their authors, should engage our concern may yet accept it in Lucretius’ case as a counsel, not of despair, but of reason. Even his links with the school at Herculaneum have been disputed: was it the man who went there, or only the book?109 Yet this is part of the larger question of Lucretius’ relation to the Epicureans of his day, and his degree of acquaintance with Epicurus’ writings, with those of later Epicureans, and those of other philosophers outside the Garden. As we have recently been assured, Now that the ‘psychological’ approach appears to have lost its appeal and the phantoms of the ‘mad poet’ and the ‘antilucrèce chez Lucrèce’ are no longer with us, Lucretian scholars are more and more trying to explain particular features of the De rerum natura by reference to the affiliations of doctrine and method between Lucretius and others (Epicurus, the Epicurean tradition, or other Greek and Roman philosophers and poets).110

Unfortunately, the answers to these questions have proved no less elusive; suffice it to recall the conflicting hypotheses presented at the very conference in Amsterdam to whose proceedings these words are prefaced.111 The Epicurean friend among friends and the brilliant loner are stereotypes perhaps no less attractive than the scornful aristocrat and the possessed starveling; if one moral can be drawn from the failure of Lucretian biography, it is that the fewer the facts, the easier they are to fit into a pattern. Let us beware of seeking pattern in reality: tanta stat praedita culpa.112

109

T. Dorandi, ‘Lucrèce et les Épicuriens de Campanie’, in Algra–Koenen–Schrijvers (n.76) 35–48 ends: ‘Le nom de Lucrèce ne paraît jamais en rapport ni avec celui de Philodème, ni avec celui de Siron ou d’autres épicuriens. Peut-être un jour, à notre grande surprise, lirons-nous le nom du poète sur un papyrus noirci d’Herculaneum. Pour le moment, nous devons nous contenter de reconstituer le background intellectuel des épicuriens de Campanie avec lesquels on peut seulement supposer que Lucrèce était en contact.’ The next contribution, K. Kleve ‘Lucretius and Philodemus’ (ibid. 49–66), begins: ‘The thesis of this paper is that Lucretius was a member of the Epicurean circle around Philodemus in the Papyrus Villa in Herculaneum.’ However, his attempt to read Lucretius’ name into Philodemus’ Rhetorica fails (F. Longo Auricchio, ex rel. David Blank, pers. comm.) 110 P.H. Schrijvers in Algra–Koenen–Schrijvers (n.76) vii. 111 See too other works by the same authors, and the contrasting viewpoints of P.H. Schrijvers, Lucrèce et les sciences de la vie (Leiden 1998) and David Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge 1998). 112 Previous versions of this paper were read to the Leeds Lucretius Workshop on 23 October 1999 and to the Oxford Philological Society on 18 February 2000. I am grateful to all who made comments on those occasions.

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LEEDS INTERNATIONAL CLASSICAL STUDIES 1.2 (2002) ISSN 1477-3643 (http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/) © Robert W. Sharples

Some problems in Lucretius’ account of vision1 ROBERT W. SHARPLES (UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON) ABSTRACT: Examination of three difficulties in Lucretius’ account of vision in book 4 helps to clarify exactly what is involved in the theory that vision takes place by means of a stream of images from the object seen to the eye. The three issues considered are: the apparent conflict in using similar arguments both for the continuity of the stream of visual images and for the rapidity of their travel; the problem of simultaneous awareness of the distance both of closer and more remote objects; and the explanation of why we can see into a lighted room from the dark but not in the reverse direction. It is argued that the difficulties can be resolved if we suppose that the images travel so rapidly that one arrives at our eye before its successor departs from the object we are seeing. The paper concludes with reflections on the implications of this for our general understanding of the atomic theory and for our assessment of Lucretius’ portrayal of it.

At 4.143-75 Lucretius argues for the constant flow of visual images (which is the translation I shall throughout use for e‡dwla/simulacra), and at 4.176-215 for their speed.2 At 4.155-8 he argues for the former point from the fact that images of objects appear in a mirror as soon as they are placed in front of it, and at 4.209-15 for the latter from the fact that the distant stars are immediately visible when water, serving as a mirror, is placed beneath the clear sky. But, as Lackenbacher 1910, 224 observed, the first argument negates the second; if images are constantly streaming down from the stars, the fact that the stars are reflected in the water as soon as it is placed there does not show that images travel quickly from the stars, for they will have been on their way already. Or so it might seem: in fact there is an answer, as we shall see. But first, another problem. At 4.244-53 Lucretius argues that we are aware of the distance of things because of the amount of air the image forces through our eye before it arrives there itself. There are various difficulties with this theory pointed out by ancient and modern critics alike: for example, the question how images which are fine enough to travel swiftly through the air can yet force before them columns of air which may be many miles long.3 (I will speak of ‘columns’ for convenience; these 1

This is a version of the paper given at the Leeds Lucretius colloquium on 5th May 2000, revised in the light of discussion there. I am particularly grateful for comments and suggestions to Francis Cairns, Hans Gottschalk, Elizabeth Pender, David Sedley and Katherina Volk. The responsibility for any misuse I have made of their suggestions of course remains my own. I am grateful to Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd. for permission to reproduce the translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima libri mantissa 136.11-24 from my version forthcoming in the Aristotelian Commentators series edited by Richard Sorabji. 2 Sedley 1998, 115-16 notes that whereas Epicurus On Nature 2 and following him Lucretius discuss first the speed of generation of the images and then the speed with which they travel, Epicurus Letter to Herodotus 46-48 reverses the order. 3 Alexander of Aphrodisias In De sensu 57.25; Mantissa 136.15; Bailey 1947, 3.1212; Godwin 1986, 108.

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION columns will be horizontal, at least if we are looking horizontally which we are more often than not.) Here however I want to concentrate on one specific question; how, on this view, do we continue to be aware how far away a thing is as we go on looking at it? This could perhaps be explained by our remembering the initial sensation of distance4—so long as the thing does not move. But if it does move, we can still see it; there is not an interruption in our vision of it while a fresh amount of air arrives to show us how far away it is now. Moreover, a similar difficulty can be derived from Lucretius’ own account at 4.269-88: Now come, grasp why the reflection is seen beyond the mirror; for assuredly it is seen removed deep within. In the same way as things which are seen in reality outside the doors, when the doorway provides an open passage for vision through itself, and causes many things to be seen from the house outside the doors. This seeing too comes about with duplicated air. For first at this time the air on this side of the doorposts is seen, then the doors themselves follow, the left and right-hand ones, then the outside light brushes through5 the eyes, and another [quantity of] air, and the things which are seen in reality outside the doors. Just so, when the image of the mirror [itself] first sends itself forth, while it is travelling to our sight it drives forward the air which is located between itself and our eyes, and makes us able to sense all this before the mirror [itself]. But when we have sensed the mirror itself too, straight away the image which is carried from us to [the mirror] arrives and, thrown back, returns to our eyes and drives on another [quantity of] air, rolling it before itself, and causes us to see this before itself, and so it seems to be separated from the mirror by so great a distance.

Lucretius is here explaining why it is that an image in a mirror seems to be beyond the mirror; and he compares this case with that of objects which we see through an open door. He describes how there arrive at our eyes, first the air between us and the door, then the two leaves of the door themselves—i.e. their 4

Disregarding the fact that a single image is not enough to generate sensation: cf. Lucretius 4.89, 105, 256-8, and Alexander Mantissa 136.17. Avotins 1980, 445; Rosenmeyer 1999, 26 n.6. (I am grateful to Michael Hendry for drawing my attention to Rosenmeyer’s discussion.) 5 perterget. I adopt, as does Godwin 1986, Bailey’s translation for this term, which appears first at 249, then at 252 and (here) at 277. Godwin 1986, 108 comments that ‘the idea of touching while passing through is prominent, rather than any idea of cleaning’, which the word does appear to have as a connotation in other authors. However, in a Mediterranean country the air outside the doors is likely to be considerably brighter than that inside the house; so one may wonder whether there might not be some anticipation here of purgat in the argument of 4.341 (below).

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION atomic images—then the air between the door and the objects outside them, and then the objects outside. Similarly with the mirror; and in each case the two bodies of air, that preceding the door or mirror and that following it, give us the awareness of distance. Once again, however, Lucretius’ account seems to fail to allow for the fact that we go on both seeing the door and the objects outside it and being aware of how far away they are. Nor, again, is it just a matter of memory; for suppose that the left-hand half of the door were subsequently closed but the right-hand half remained open, so that we could still see the object through it. We are aware of the left-hand half becoming closed; so at least at that point a new image of the door must come to us. Does it drive a fresh column of air before it? And how is it that, while this is happening, we continue to be aware of the objects outside? It might seem that if images are, as Lucretius has told us they are, constantly streaming off from every object, we have to suppose both that the sequence air this side of the door — door — air beyond the door — objects outside is preserved, and that every part of it is constantly arriving, or as near constantly as can be the case in an atomic theory. In other words, to speak—as Lucretius appears to do—of the air and the image of the things seen as two separate and successive stages in a sequence (or four, in the case of the door and the mirror) would be an oversimplification for the sake of exposition, not the full account of what is going on. However, the mechanics now become even more complicated. For if a stream of images is constantly arriving, say from an object six feet away from my eye, each image has to drive a six-foot column of air through my eye for me to be aware of the distance: a point which is made by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Next, if according to them the interval will be seen by the quantity of the air which flows off and impinges on the sight in advance of the image—[for] the [air] itself too impinges on the sight—,6 first, how will the sight receive so much air (for with each travelling of an image it will receive as much air as there is between it and the thing seen)? Next, what7 strength will the images that flow off have so as to be able to drive this [air] in front of them? (Alexander In De sensu 57.21-26)

and similarly To say that distance is apprehended by the quantity of air between the thing seen, from which the images come, and the eye (for this is pushed in front of it by the image and enters the pupil before the image) exceeds all absurdity.8 For how will 6

The Greek is difficult and, if it is taken in the way I have taken it here (similarly Towey 2000, 61), the parenthetical clause seems redundant. Avotins 1980, 433 translates ‘if according to them distance will be perceived by the amount of air which, too, enters the eye— belongs with the idol which emanates before [the air] and enters the eye—’, on the grounds (433 n.13) that only an image or idol, not air, can be said to ‘emanate’ (‘flow off’, ¢porre‹n). But this cannot be right; the explanation of our awareness of distance involves air which is pushed in front of the image, not air which follows it. 7 Reading t…na ›xei with Thurot (or ›xei t…na?) for ›xei tin¦. 8 The text in fact has not ‘exceeds all absurdity’ but ‘exceeds no absurdity’; a logical slip of a familiar sort, rather than an error in transmission of the text.

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION the image be able to push the air in front of it, if it is so easily affected? And how does the pupil admit this, and in addition frequently receive such an amount? For it is not by the entering of one single image that seeing occurs. So each of the (images) that enter in will send the same amount of air into the eye before it, unless indeed the images that travel from the thing seen do not travel when somebody looks, but are (already) adjacent to the eye. For it is not the case that, when the eye sees, (only) then do the images stream off. So how, if they are (already) adjacent, will they still push the intervening air in front of them? Moreover, if the images are not scattered by the winds because they are below the level of and finer and rarer in nature than the air which is carried by the winds, how at the same time will it be possible for them to push this air in front of them? (Alexander Mantissa 136.11-24).

This however means that I must be aware as a separate entity of the column of air which each image drives before it; for if the air were not divided into separate though overlapping six-foot portions, but merged into a continuous stream, all I would be aware of as far as the air is concerned is a single quantity the amount of which would be a function of the distance of the object multiplied by the length of time for which I had been looking at it. One could perhaps calculate distance on that basis, by discounting the length of time, of which one might be independently aware.9 The alternative, that I can distinguish the six feet of air impelled by image number x from the six feet impelled by image x+1 even when they overlap and portions of both are passing through my eye simultaneously, before the actual images that serve to individuate them arrive, certainly seems incredible. But even the view that we calculate the distance unconsciously from a continuous stream of air seems to involve complexities that take us uncomfortably far from Lucretius’ account. Something is clearly wrong with the interpretation so far. And I think that the difficulty points a general moral; the difficulty of taking full account of the smallness and rapidity of atomic movements generally and of the movement of images in particular, for all that Lucretius repeatedly emphasises it (and notably in the very context of the perception of distance, at 4.254-5 where he says that the passage of the air through our eye happens so quickly that we perceive the nature of the object and its distance both together). We must suppose that the movement of the images and the columns of air is discrete rather than overlapping; thus, from the object six feet away, image number x arrives, then the six feet of air impelled by image x+1, then image x+1, then the six feet of air impelled by image x+2, and so on, with the images arriving rapidly enough that we are not aware of any interruption in our vision of the distant image.10 In other words, image x + 2 does not set out, and so start driving air before it, until image x + 1 has arrived.

9

The first image, the one that is already present when I first look at the object because it has been on its way beforehand, would presumably have driven no air through my eye (because my eye was turned somewhere else). Those already in the pipeline, as it were—say the one that is three feet away when I start looking at the object—would presumably drive the last part of their column of air through my eye, the first part not; but perhaps my mind is used to discounting this as well. 10 This is a different point from the general one that, if space is divided into indivisible minima, the movement of the individual atoms of which the images and the air are made up must be in discrete

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION This will however have to apply not only to an object six feet away, but to every object whose distance we sense. True, it is questionable how far we have a direct sense of the true distance of very remote objects, either in fact or in Epicurean theory. David Sedley has pointed out to me that at Lucretius 5.564-91 the claim that the sun and moon are approximately the size they appear to be (whatever that means) is supported by the fact that the sun’s heat reaches us and that the moon’s outline is seen clearly, neither of which (we are told) would be the case if they were far enough away for their apparent size to be appreciably diminished by distance.11 This argument makes no appeal to any direct awareness of the distance of the heavenly bodies. Moreover, Lucretius at 4.404-13 refers to the optical illusion whereby the sun at sunrise seems closer than it actually is.12 This might suggest that the point at which we cease to have an accurate sense of the distance of remote objects is in fact determined by the distance at which the columns of air take so long to travel that they begin to overlap. Nevertheless, for objects closer at hand of whose relative distances we are simultaneously aware— such as doors and what is outside them—the notion that the images travel so rapidly that the first arrives before the next sets out resolves the difficulty we would otherwise have. At this point we need to return to the first difficulty, the use of the argument that we can see things as soon as we look at them, or in Lucretius’ version as soon as we place a mirror in the appropriate position, in two ways that seemed to negate each other: first to argue that there was a constant flow of images, and second to argue that the images travel very quickly. The conflict between the two arguments arises from the assumption of a continuous stream of images, such that at any given time one is already adjacent to my eye, another has travelled (say) nine-tenths of the distance, another four-fifths, and so on, for in that case it is not clear from this argument why the images should not travel slowly. (We could indeed argue for their speed rather from the fact that the whole landscape is illuminated rapidly at sunrise—a point made by Lucretius at 4.200-3—and that we are aware of this even when looking towards distant western regions, so that the passage of the light to them and back to our eyes of the images showing that they are illuminated does not take appreciably longer than for regions closer at hand.) Suppose instead that the images that move so fast that the second does not set out till the first has arrived. It may still seem that we cannot infer anything about the speed of travel of the images from the fact that the first image is already adjacent to our eye as soon as we look at the object. But the picture we now have, of images separated, in the case of an object six feet away, by six-foot columns of air, makes rather more pressing than did the previous one the question: why should we suppose that, at the moment we first look at the object, what is adjacent to our eye is an image rather than some portion of the column of air? (After all, the odds on it being part of the air, rather than an image, presumably correspond steps; the question is now concerned with the movement of compound bodies on a larger scale, the air and the images themselves. 11 Cf. Harry 1970, 58-63. 12 Cf. Sedley 1998, 90 nn.123 and 130.

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION to the proportion that a length of six feet has to the minute thickness of an image). So what is needed is not so much that an image should be present already as that, if one is not, one should at any rate arrive so quickly that we do not notice the delay. And for that we need both that there should be a continuous flow of images and that they should move very rapidly. The view that atomic images travel so quickly that the first one reaches us before the second sets out, at least in the case of objects up to a considerable distance away, thus agrees with what we need to suppose in order to solve the difficulty concerning the argument for speed as well as for constant flow, and itself solves the problem of our continued and simultaneous awareness of the distance of more and less remote objects. It does moreover give the most natural interpretation to 4.284-8: Straight away the image which is carried from us to [the mirror] arrives and, thrown back, returns to our eyes and drives on another [quantity of] air, rolling it before itself, and causes us to see this before itself, and so it seems to be separated from the mirror by so great a distance.

For these lines are more easily taken as suggesting that there are just two things we are aware of simultaneously, the air and the image driving it (repeated successively, indeed), rather than in terms of a stream of images overlapping successive columns of air which themselves overlap. It is perhaps ironical that Bailey (1947, 3.1212) comments, apparently as an objection to the explanation of awareness of distance in terms of the air driven through the eye, that ‘if the speed of all the ‘idols’ is almost absolute, there can be no sensible difference of time in the arrival of “idols” from near and distant objects’. Bailey’s observation is irrelevant as an objection; nothing in the text suggests that Lucretius’ explanation involves awareness of a difference in time. But Bailey is right to suggest the speed which I have argued is essential to understanding how the theory is meant to work. Bailey continues ‘Robin in an interesting note points out that it is really the number of the intermediate ‘idols’ of things between us and the object, and not the air lying between them, which gives us this sense of distance. But this is to correct rather than interpret.’ Rather it is to miss the point; it is essential, if the intervening air is to give us an awareness of distance, that at any given time there is one and only one image of an object between the object and us. I do not indeed want to suggest that this was formulated by Lucretius or even Epicurus as a conscious principle; only that we can interpret their arguments better if our notion of what their theory presupposes is in these terms rather than in terms of a stream of images of which at any given moment many are each at a different stage on their journey from the thing seen to the eye that sees it. There is one further complication to consider, before we come to the third problem in Lucretius’ text. Avotins and Asmis have argued that we do not in fact see the whole of the object with each image. For there is an obvious objection to this: how does the image from a table, say, become small enough to fit into my eye? Rather, each image represents only a small part of the object, and our

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION impression of the whole is built up from a succession of such partial images.13 The implication of this for our present discussion is simply to increase yet further, and to a very considerable extent, the number of images that will be needed to account for our vision of an object, and, if no image sets out till its predecessor has arrived, the speed of travel that will be required. But if this paper has a single overall moral it is that in interpreting ancient atomism one should not be afraid of interpretations that postulate very large numbers, quantities or ratios. The need for a succession of images to build up the object must be combined with the customary view that the succession is needed to explain continued vision. Avotins indeed argues otherwise (1980, 446), on the grounds that such a double theory is needlessly complex and that it is too much of a coincidence to suppose that Alexander, cited in n.13 above, preserves only one part of it, Lucretius (at 4.259-68) only the other. Nevertheless, the double theory is required. For our awareness of any change or movement in the object has to be explained by our reception of a new image or set of images; and it would be arbitrary to suppose that we receive a new image or set of images from the object only when it moves or changes. Now to the third problem. At 4.337-352 Lucretius uses the same principle, that what is closer arrivies at our eyes first, to explain why we can see from a dark region into a light one but not vice versa. (The problem, we may note, seems to have been a standard one in discussions of vision; it is used against the Stoic theory at Alexander Mantissa 10.131.30ff.) We see from the darkness things that are illuminated because, when the dark air of the gloom, which is nearer, enters our eyes first and occupies them, being open, hurriedly the bright and clear air follows and as it were cleans them14 and scatters the black shadows of the former air. For the latter is much more mobile and has smaller particles and more power. As soon as it fills the passages of our eyes with light and lays open those which the dark air had previously blockaded, straight away there follow the images of the things which are situated in the light, and they provoke us to see. On the other hand we cannot do this in darkness from the light, because the gloomy air, which is thicker, follows after [the illuminated air] and fills up all the apertures and blockades to the passages of the eyes, so that they cannot be roused by the images of any things impinging [on them]. Lucretius’ explanation is that when we are located in the dark and look at what is illuminated, the light follows (insequitur, 340) the darkness into our eye15 and drives it out, to be followed (sequuntur, 346) by the images of the objects seen in the light; whereas when we are situated in the light and look at what is in darkness the darkness comes second and blocks up the passages in our eyes, so 13

Cf. Alexander In De sensu 58.1-12; Mantissa 135.6-22; Galen De plac. Hippocratis et Platonis 7.7.8. Avotins 1980, 440; Asmis 1984, 128-137, and 1999, 169 n.12. Cf. also Rosenmeyer 1999, 27-28. 14 Cf., perhaps, above n.5. 15 Bailey 1947, 3.1223 suggests rather that, because shadows are outside our eyes, the passages (vias, 344) are not in our eyes but outside; this seems difficult to square with the text. The correct explanation at Godwin 1986, 113.

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION that the images of the actual objects cannot enter. But at first sight this seems to disregard the fact that, if we are in a lighted room and cannot see things outside in the darkness, we go on being able to see the lighted room; the darkness does not in fact follow the light in the sense that, as far as we are concerned, one finishes and the other starts, but rather—as with the simultaneous awareness of closer and more remote objects discussed above—we go on being aware of both at once. One possible answer might be that we are aware of the lighted objects in the room and of the darkness outside the door or window with different parts of our eyes; after all, in the reverse situation, when we are in the dark outside a lighted room, we are still aware that it is dark outside as well as that it is light within. But then the references to light driving darkness out of the passages and to darkness blocking them up seem problematic. The answer may again be that we should regard the processes involved as discrete in time rather than as overlapping. To return to the example of the object seen outside the door; we must suppose not only that the second image from the door does not start its travel towards our eyes before the first image from the door has reached our eye, but that the second image from the door does not start its travel until the first image from the object outside has reached our eye. For only so can the columns of air remain distinct. And similarly when we look out of the lighted room; the image we should have is not one simply of darkness replacing light, but of a rapid alternation, too fast for us to notice, as first the light within the room enters our eyes, then the darkness outside, and then the whole sequence repeats itself. Just as we receive images of the door and of the object outside alternately, just so we are affected by the light and the dark alternately. The light and the darkness do not, therefore, affect the other half of the cycle in each case; when Lucretius speaks of light driving out darkness and of darkness blocking the passages he is simply explaining why each half of the cycle is different from the one that has preceded it, and the explanation in fact reduces to the general point that we can see what is illuminated but not what is in darkness.16 There is however a problem. I have argued that, if we look at an object beyond a doorway, the image from the object must arrive, following the image of the doorway and driving the intervening air before it, before the next doorwayimage starts its journey driving its column of air into the eye. The easiest way to make sense of this, it seems to me, is to regard the process as governed as it were by the ticking of a clock:17 all my sensations—and we are here referring not just to the processes that take place within me, but those involved in the outside world 16

The interpretation requires that dark air is not illuminated when it enters a lighted room. But this must be presupposed on any interpretation of Lucretius’ argument. (I am grateful to Elizabeth Pender for raising this point.) 17 We are already aware of another metaphorical clock in the Epicurean universe ticking much faster: if space and time as well as body are divided into indivisible minima, and all atoms move at the same speed, every atom must move one indivisible minimum of space, in whatever direction, in one indivisible minimum of time. Ticks of the slower clock in the process of perception, which themselves happen so rapidly that we are unaware of them, will only happen when the faster clock has ticked enough times for a visual image—which as a compound presumably moves more slowly than an individual atom—to traverse each of the individual minima of space that together add up to the distance between myself and the furthest object of whose distance I am aware.

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION as well to bring this about—have to go through one cycle before the next cycle starts.18 And, since the ticking of this ‘clock’ must be independent of the images actually reaching my eyes—for otherwise some sort of feedback loop would be required, and it is difficult to see how this could be accommodated in Epicurean theory19—the ticking will need to be the same for all observers. The problem then is this. If the images from the open doorway are given off only infrequently enough for there to be space between them and their columns of air for the images from outside and their columns of air, what happens if we close the doorway completely? We can hardly suppose that the doorposts of a closed doorway give off images more frequently than those of an open one. There will therefore be gaps in the sequence reaching my eyes once the doorway has been closed: first will come the air between the doorway and my eyes, then the image of the doorway, and then, when I would have been receiving air and images from outside the doorway, no visual images, until the air driven before the next doorimage arrives.20 And this seems rather implausible.21 This might suggest a different interpretation from that advanced so far. The Epicurean explanation of awareness of distance is an attempt to capture our apprehension of the interval between us and the object seen.22 We might seek to combine this with the Epicurean notion of ™pibol», ‘application’, as ‘attending to’ or ‘focussing on’ a particular image at a given moment. Perhaps there are after all images of every part of the fourfold sequence air-doorway-air-external object present whenever we want to focus on any of them, and what is in fact going on is not so much a process of passive reception by our eyes of different stages in turn of the sequence, rather a process of active focussing on different stages of it; we look in turn (by focussing on the relevant image) at the indoors air, or rather each stage of it, the doorway, the outdoors air and the outdoors object in turn—or indeed the reverse, because if images are given off so frequently that we can focus on any part of the interval whenever we wish to, it does not much matter whether we scan if from near to far or the reverse. It will no longer then be necessary for the columns of air associated with each image to remain distinct; in effect we will be aware of the length of the column not by its passing through our eye but by focussing on different parts of it. Consequently there is now no need for there to be only (at most) one image of the doorway between it and our eye at any given time, and there is no longer the problem of the gap when the doorway is closed. There are however three problems with this view. First, to appeal to ™pibol» in this way may create problems for the distinction between sense-perception and opinion, for opinion may direct which images we focus on. If this is a problem, however, I suspect it is a more general one. Second, this interpretation of our 18

It might seem that the claim that images are given off in this way involves an un-Epicurean claim that things are organised for our benefit, so that we can apprehend them. (I am grateful to Katherina Volk for raising this point). But I do not think this need be the case; all that is required is that the world as a matter of fact is structured in such a way that we are able to apprehend it. 19 I am grateful to Hans Gottschalk for pointing this out. 20 I am grateful to Hans Gottschalk for pointing out that this must be the sequence. 21 I am grateful to Francis Cairns for emphasising this point. 22 I am grateful to David Sedley for this suggestion.

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION awareness of distance is harder to square with Lucretius’ (and indeed Alexander’s) text, which does attribute it to the air passing through our eyes. And that may be for a good reason: for, to move on to the third difficulty, to talk of focussing on different points in the interval between us and an object suggests that those points can themselves be seen. But in Epicurean terms that means that different parts of the air give off images of which we can be aware, and moreover that those images can be distinguished in terms of which part of the interval they come from. That either of these could be the case with visual images given off by air seems highly unlikely. Perhaps indeed we should rather imagine images apprehensible only by thought, or of some mental construction concerning the interval which does not involve the direct reception of images of the interval at all. But this takes us even further from the Lucretian text. It seems then that we should return to the view that images travel so rapidly that even in the case of (moderately) remote objects the first arrives before its successor starts its journey. In the case of the door that is first open and then closed, we do need to accept an interval in which no image arrives at all. And that is in fact only a special case of a more general point: in an atomist universe, as in any other, a body moving at a given speed will take a longer time to cover a greater distance, and consequently, if two objects emit visual images with the same frequency, and the more distant one does so in such a way that the second is not emitted till the first has reached us, in the case of the closer one there will actually be a delay between the arrival of the first image and the emission of the second. (Distance and closeness will be relative to individual observers.) However, if we suppose that even in the case of the more distant object the rate of emission of images and the speed of travel are such that we can see it as soon as we look at it and are not conscious of any interruption in our vision, our immediate and continued vision of the closer object will not be problematic. In general we should never, in interpreting ancient atomism, underestimate the extent to which the smallness and speed of atoms exceeds anything in our ordinary experience; ironically enough, even though Lucretius is himself at pains to emphasise this,23 the very vividness of his analogies from our own senseexperience may make it harder for us to realise the point. Here it is not irrelevant that, in striving to make the atomic system both comprehensible and vivid, Lucretius is doing something different from Epicurus, who emphasises the distance between the atomic level and that of our ordinary experience, both by his technical language and by explicitly stressing the limits of analogy (notably in Letter to Herodotus 62 and 47). The difficulty of imagining what Epicurus describes may not in itself be a criticism of Epicurean theory. Those of us trained in the humanities probably tend to imagine the entities and processes studied by contemporary science too as closer in scale to our ordinary experience than they actually are. But the apparent extravagance of Epicurus’ theories may also display something of a tendency to postulate one’s way out of difficulties which sets ancient natural philosophy apart from modern natural science. 23

E.g. 2.163, 4.159, 191, 254, 795; cf. Epicurus Letter to Herodotus 46.

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ROBERT W. SHARPLES, SOME PROBLEMS IN LUCRETIUS’ ACCOUNT OF VISION ROBERT W. SHARPLES UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON

References E. Asmis, Epicurus’ Scientific Method (Ithaca 1984) —— ‘Epicurean epistemology’ in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld and M. Schofield (eds.) Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge 1999) 260-94 I. Avotins, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on vision in the atomists’ CQ 30 (1980) 429-54 C. Bailey (ed.) Lucretius: De Rerum Natura (Oxford 1947) J. Godwin (ed.) Lucretius: De Rerum Natura IV (Warminster 1986) B. Harry, ‘Epicurus: some problems in physics and perception’ Greece and Rome 17 (1970) 58-63 H. Lackenbacher, ‘Zur Disposition und Quellenfrage von Lukrez 4.1-521’ Wiener Studien 32 (1910) 213-38 T.G. Rosenmeyer, ‘One strike will do: a Lucretian puzzle’ Scripta Classica Israelica 18 (1999) 25-44 D.N. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge 1998) J.A. Towey, Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle On Sensation (London 2000)

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LEEDS INTERNATIONAL CLASSICAL STUDIES 1.3 (2002) ISSN 1477-3643 (http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/) © Gordon Campbell

Lucretius 5.1011-27: the origins of justice and the Prisoner’s Dilemma GORDON CAMPBELL (NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND, MAYNOOTH) ABSTRACT: This paper considers two problems in Lucretius’ account of the origin of justice: its assumption of an apparently un-Epicurean absolute notion of fairness, and its unexplained assertion that the earliest humans were at risk of catastrophic extinction. It is argued that modern evolutionary theory and gametheoretic models help to solve these problems.

This paper looks at the Epicurean theory of justice from an evolutionary perspective, with a focus on the origins of justice as outlined by Lucretius in 5.1011-27. There has been a previous study of ancient theories of justice from the perspective of the Darwinian game known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma by Nicholas Denyer in 1983,1 but since then great advances have been made in Prisoner’s Dilemma and other so-called Darwinian game theories, especially since the mideighties and Robert Axelrod’s computer models.2 These advances have allowed a radically different view of the place of cooperation and altruism in evolution, and inevitably will affect our view of ancient theories and their relationship to Darwinian thinking. I begin with the passage of Lucretius (5.1011-27):3

1

N. Denyer, ‘The origins of justice’, in Suzetesis: studi sull’ epicureismo greco e romano, offerti a Marcello Gigante (Napoli 1983) 133-52. See also G. Herman, ‘Reciprocity, altruism, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: the special case of classical Athens’, in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite, and R. Seaford (eds), Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (Oxford 1998) 199-225. An earlier version of the present paper was given at the Leeds International Latin Seminar, 5 May 2000. 2 See pp.5-7 below. R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York 1984). See also the University of Michigan’s Centre for the Study of Complex Systems, online at http://www.pscs.umich.edu/CSCS/research/carReports.html; R. Axelrod, ‘On six advances in cooperation theory’, Analyse und Kritik, 22 (July 2000) 130-151, available online at http://www.pscs.umich.edu/pub/papers/OnSixAdvancesinCoopTheory.pdf. 3 For this passage in general see E. Asmis, ‘Lucretius on the growth of ideas’, in G. Giannantoni and M. Gigante (eds), Epicureismo greco e romano (Naples 1996) 763-78; K. Algra, ‘Lucretius and the Epicurean other’, in K.A. Algra, M.H. Koenen and P.H. Schrijvers (eds), Lucretius and his Intellectual Background (Amsterdam/Oxford 1997) 141-50, and G. Campbell, Lucretius on Creation and Evolution (Oxford, forthcoming) ad loc. Studies of Lucretius’ prehistory include E. Bertoli, Tempora rerum: modalità del progresso umano in Lucrezio (Verona 1980); D.R. Blickman, ‘Lucretius, Epicurus and prehistory’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 92 (1989) 157-91; P. Boyancé, Lucrèce et l’épicurisme (Paris 1963) 236-61, D.J. Furley, ‘Lucretius the Epicurean on the history of man’, in Fondation Hardt Entretiens 24 (Geneva 1978) 1-27; E.J. Kenney, ‘The historical imagination of Lucretius’, Greece and Rome, 19 (1972) 12-24; B. Manuwald, Der Aufbau der Lukrezischen Kulturentstehungslehre (Mainz 1980); L. Perelli, ‘La Storia dell’Umanità nel 5 libro di Lucrezio’, Atti della Academia delle Scienze di Torino 101 (1967) 117-285; A. Schiesaro, Simulacrum et imago (Pisa 1990) 91-168; P.H. Schrijvers, Lucrèce et les sciences de la vie (Mnemosyne Suppl. 186, Leiden 1999) 1-118. The main Epicurean sources

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA inde casas postquam ac pellis ignemque pararunt, et mulier coniuncta viro concessit in unum conubium,4 prolemque ex se videre creatam, tum genus humanum primum mollescere coepit. ignis enim curavit ut alsia corpora frigus non ita iam possent caeli sub tegmine ferre, et Venus imminuit viris puerique parentum blanditiis facile ingenium fregere superbum. tunc et amicitiem coeperunt iungere aventes finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari, et pueros commendarunt muliebreque saeclum, vocibus et gestu cum balbe significarent imbecillorum esse aequum misererier omnis. nec tamen omnimodis poterat concordia gigni, sed bona magnaque pars servabat foedera caste; aut genus humanum iam tum foret omne peremptum nec potuisset adhuc perducere saecla propago. Then, after they had got huts and skins and fire for themselves, and woman joined to man had retired into a single marriage, and they saw children created from them, then it was that the human race first began to soften. For fire saw to it that their now tender bodies were unable to bear the cold under the open sky as they had before, and Venus lessened their violence, and children with their winning ways easily broke the arrogant nature of their parents. And then eager neighbours began to form friendship pacts with one another neither to harm nor be harmed, and they entrusted children and the female race to each other’s care, signing with cries and halting gestures that it is right for all to pity the weak. It was not possible however for complete concord to arise, but a great part kept the pacts with integrity, or already at that time the human race would have been completely destroyed, nor would their offspring have been able to prolong the race to this day.

From 5.925 to 1010 Lucretius has described the lives of the first humans after they had sprung fully formed from the earth. They live a wandering ‘beast-like life’5 with no arts, technologies, laws, society or marriage, chasing wild animals with clubs and living in caves and forests. Their bodies are tough and hairy, and neither physically nor behaviourally are they clearly differentiated from the other animals. Their behaviour towards each other is described at 5.958-61: nec commune bonum poterant spectare neque ullis moribus inter se scibant nec legibus uti.

on the origins of society are conveniently collected in A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge 1987) ch. 22. 4 Post 1012 lacunam indicavit Marullus, 1013 conubium Lachmann: cognita sunt OQ 5 Cf. Eurip. Supp. 195-218, Orest. 1646; Critias Sisyphus TrGF 1.43 fr. 19; Hipp. De Vet. Med. 3.26; Isocrates Or. 3.6, 4.28, 4.39; Dicearchus fr. 49 Wehrli; Moschion TrGF 1.97 fr. 6; Polyb. 6.5.4; Diod. Sic. 1.8.1, 1.90.1; Cicero De Inv. 1.2, Rep. 1.25.40; Vitruvius De Arch. 2.1; Vergil A. 8.314; Horace Ars 391, Sat. 1.3.99; Tibull. 2.1.37; Ovid Am. 3.10.7, Ars. Am. 2.621, 2.289, 3.113; Manilius Astron. 1.66; Pliny NH 16.1; Plutarch Adv. Colotem 30, De Is. et Os. 13; Tacitus Ann. 3.26; Apuleius Apol. 23.

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA quod cuique obtulerat praedae fortuna, ferebat sponte sua sibi quisque valere et vivere doctus. Nor were they able to look to the common good, nor to use any customs or laws among themselves. What booty fortune had obtained for each person, each carried off at will for themselves, taught to live for himself and so to be strong.

Then the brief passage 1011-27 describes three things: the clear differentiation of humans from animals by a process of softening, domestication and socialisation; the formation of the first societies; and the origins of justice. All three are closely inter-linked: the first humans soften physically and psychologically by an evolutionary process in response to their new-found culture and environment of fire, clothes, houses, marriage, sex and child-care. This evolution into modern humans6 enables them to perceive the societal value of cooperation, so to form friendship pacts on the Epicurean model, and so to enable the formation of the first village societies. I shall not here go into all the details of the evolutionary process, or rehearse all the arguments around the Epicurean theory of justice as presented by Lucretius, but I shall look at two problems Lucretius’ account presents.7 First, in line 1023 we hear the first villagers explaining to each other that it is right for all to pity the weak. This, as Phillip Mitsis has said,8 assumes a preexisting absolute notion of fairness or rightness that, given Epicurus’ insistence that there never was an absolute justice,9 would seem to render it not truly Epicurean. Secondly, in 1025-7 we are told that had the first people not formed friendship pacts and kept them, the human race would have died out there and then. There is no obvious explanation for such a dramatic catastrophic extinction, given the only moderate level of violence between humans in the previous wild wandering phase of existence, and we are not given an explanation such as that of Plato’s Protagoras, who says that because the first people lacked the divine gift of political science the first gatherings exacerbated the level of violence between them.10

6

Lucretius regards the first people as human (cf. 5.925: genus humanum illud), but as a more bestial sub-species. His scheme of evolution in 1011-27, then, does not cross species boundaries (cf. his insistence on the fixity of species at 5.878-924). The problem of defining the origins of the genus Homo still remains in the present day, see B. Wood and M. Collard, ‘Is Homo defined by culture?’, in J. Coles et al. (eds), World Prehistory: Studies in Memory of Graham Clark (Oxford 1999) 11-24. 7 For a more detailed analysis see G. Campbell (n.3) ad loc, and id. ‘Zoogony and evolution in Timaeus, the Presocratics, Lucretius and Darwin’, in M.R. Wright (ed.), Reason and Necessity: Essays on Plato’s Timaeus (London/Swansea 2000) 145-80. 8 P. Mitsis, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability (Cornell 1988) 106 n.15c. 9 Cf. KD (Principal Sayings) 33. 10 Protagoras 320c-323a. Lucretius describes a similar descent of the first cities into violence and bloodshed (5.1105-60), but its cause, unlike in Protagoras, is not ignorance of political science but competition driven by the fear of death and the fear of the gods. Cf. DRN 3.59-93.

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA Some light may be thrown on these problems by viewing this passage of Lucretius from a modern evolutionary point of view. Since the publication of the anarchist Prince Peter Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution in 1902, classical Darwinian thinking has struggled to account for the origins of cooperative behaviour, altruism and justice.11 Kropotkin pointed out that nature and human society are characterised as much by cooperation as by competition, and that there is at least as much cooperation and altruism in nature as competition. Darwin himself had relied upon competition as the driving force of evolution in his theory of Natural Selection, but his followers, Huxley in particular, laid even heavier stress on competition than Darwin had. Darwin need not be held entirely responsible for the subsequent history of the idea of ‘survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence’12 as a positive evolutionary force, and its use to justify some of the most brutal economic and social policies of the last century, but the idea is at the heart of his thinking, and is still very strong in political and economic thinking and tends to colour our view of even ancient theories of the origins of justice.13 Various attempts have been made over the last century to explain the origins of altruism within the Darwinian framework of Natural Selection, all of them more or less unsuccessful, or at least only partly successful. The main difficulty faced by Darwinists has very often been expressed in terms of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this scenario two prisoners are charged with the same offence, and in order to extract a confession from them the police chief offers them both a deal: if they both keep silent (cooperate) they will both be convicted of a lesser offence, and each receive a year in jail; if, however, one confesses and gives evidence against the other (defects) he will be let off free, while the other gets ten years in jail. They are put in separate cells to think it over. Each one reasons thus: If I stay silent I will only get a year in jail, which is not too bad, but it is worth my while to confess and so get out free. In any case, I am not sure I trust my colleague to keep quiet for my sake, and so I had better confess before he does.

And so the one who cooperates and stays silent gets ten years in jail, the least desirable outcome, and the one who confesses (defects) gets out of jail free, the most desirable outcome. There are many ways in which the problem may be stated, but they all share one thing: that a rational approach to the problem leads to defection and to the best result for the defecting player. Accordingly, cooperation would seem to have negative value in evolutionary terms: Natural Selection would seem to favour defection, and so cooperation seems not to be an adaptive strategy, and thus cooperation in Nature is left unexplained.

11

For a general overview of the arguments see M. Ridley, The Origins of Virtue (London 1996). The phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ was coined by Herbert Spencer. It was urged on Darwin by Alfred Russel Wallace in preference to Darwin’s own ‘Natural Selection’ since the latter seems to imply some intelligent agency in the process. Darwin conceded: ‘I must be a very bad explainer. I suppose “natural selection” was a bad term’ (quoted from Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (London 1995) 73). 13 See Ridley (n.11) 247-65. 12

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA One attempt to get around this problem has been ‘Group Selection’, and this is one explanation that Darwin himself uses.14 In this a group of creatures more instinctively cooperative than other groups of the same species in food-gathering, hunting, child care and so on, would inevitably be more successful, and so outcompete others, and thus breed more prolifically and spread their cooperative behaviour genetically. But this model is vulnerable: critics point out that selection does not occur at the group level but at the level of the individual. What mechanism may operate to promote cooperation at the expense of competition between members of the same group is not clear: the Prisoner’s Dilemma would still seem to operate against selection for cooperation between members of the group. The other main strand of thought may be described by Richard Dawkins’ ‘Selfish Gene’ label.15 Here, cooperative and altruistic behaviour is explained at the genetic level. Put briefly, behaviour that may be directly disadvantageous to the individual organism may well be advantageous to its genes. This may be seen most clearly among social insects such as bees: it is directly disadvantageous to a worker bee to die defending the hive, but in doing so she promotes her genes in the form of the young of the hive, the females of which are at least her half-sisters and some her full sisters. She behaves selflessly, but this result is brought about because her genes behave selfishly. Again, this may be criticised in terms of the level selection works upon. Selection does not take place at the genetic level: genes are simply the carriers of information created by selection at the individual level. Another mechanism must be sought to allow individual and genetic advantage to coincide more neatly. Both of these mechanisms, Group Selection and Selfish Genes may well play a part in the evolution of cooperation, but they are only a part of the story. One problem with them is that both they and the classic model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma presuppose that altruism and self-interest are polar opposites, and that cooperative behaviour is directly disadvantageous to the individual, directly advantageous to the group (or the genes), and only indirectly advantageous to the individual. The work of Robert Axelrod, and many others since, has thrown doubt on the validity of this neat polarisation. Axelrod noticed that when the Prisoner’s Dilemma was played more than once between the same players (‘iterated’) in computer models, something remarkable happened. In a version called the Diner’s Dilemma16 three different types of player, Defector, Sucker and Tit-for-Tat, eat in the same restaurant repeatedly, dining with those adjacent to them. Each player gains points for the number of dinners bought for it, and thrives and reproduces 14

C. Darwin, The Descent of Man (1871), ch. 5, ‘On The Development of the Intellectual and Moral Faculties’: ‘A tribe including many members who ... were always ready to aid one another and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection.’ See P. Skelton (ed.), Evolution: A Biological and Palaeontological Approach (Wokingham 1993) 254-62. 15 R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (London 1976). 16 See C. Badcock, Psycho-Darwinism (London 1994) 38-58, and U. Gneezy, E. Haruvy and H. Yafe, ‘A laboratory versus field study of the Unscrupulous Diner’s Dilemma: are people that nice?’, online at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/uri.gneezy/vita/Restaurant jpe.pdf.

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA when successful or dies out if unsuccessful. Defector never buys anyone else dinner, and so is in the position of the confessing prisoner in the static game, and thus could be expected to be the most successful at getting free dinners. At first, as expected, the Defectors do well and the Suckers (who always cooperate) disastrously badly. But as the game progresses a strategy called Tit-for-Tat begins to thrive. Tit-for-Tat simply begins by cooperating (here buying dinner), and then does just what each player did to it last time. So it will always cooperate with Suckers and defect against Defectors. It holds no grudges though, and if a Defector were to change tactics and decided to cooperate, Tit-for-Tat would cooperate with it next time. After a while the Defectors use up most of the available Suckers and are left playing mainly against Tit-for-Tats, against which they can make no headway because Tit-for-Tats will not cooperate with them, or playing against other Defectors, which can bring them no advantage since they never buy dinner for anyone. Tit-for-Tat soon drives the Defectors nearly to extinction, and becomes the dominant player. Perhaps even more remarkably, Sucker, now that the Defectors are weak, begins to thrive by playing with Tit-forTat; both of them behave in exactly the same manner towards one another, buying each other dinner in turn. Finally, Sucker and Tit-for-Tat have almost equal numbers, and Defector struggles to survive, on the edges of electronic society. At least in the limited and artificial world of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, then, it can be seen that the former judgement was entirely wrong: competitive selfish behaviour does not give an adaptive advantage beyond the very early stages of the game. A modified and contingent cooperative strategy, Tit-for-Tat, is the most effective survival technique both directly for the individual organism, and for the group. Startlingly, an entirely unmodified and irrational seeming cooperative strategy, Sucker or always cooperate, is the second best individual survival strategy, thus giving an entirely different gloss to the maxim of W.C. Fields: ‘never give a sucker an even break.’ Axelrod was looking for a simple strategy that did not involve complicated thinking or any sentiment or emotion, and he predicted that Tit-for-Tat would be an evolutionarily stable strategy, by which he meant that it would win in any circumstances and conditions.17 Since the mid-eighties, other more efficient strategies than Tit-for-Tat have been derived, but they all have one thing in common: they are all more forgiving and cooperative than Tit-for-Tat. For example, a strategy called Tit-for-two-Tats outperforms the simple Tit-for-Tat by forgiving the first defection against it, and only responding in kind after a second defection. Nicholas Denyer’s analysis of the status of the Epicurean theory of justice in terms of the old static Prisoner’s Dilemma concluded that the Epicurean model of justice, the pragmatic contractarian friendship-pacts model, achieves the second 17

A strategy that did not depend upon family relationships, considerations of position within a social hierarchy or emotional attachments: Tit-for-Tat needs only to remember what each player did to it last time, which, in a small group at least, is not too difficult. Ridley (n. 11) 62-3 describes the process in colonies of vampire bats. For evolutionarily stable strategies see Dennett (n.12) 25166.

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA best result for the individual, but the best result for the group: a wise person will forego a direct individual advantage for the mutual benefit of the group, from which she will also, in turn benefit. This was a fair analysis at the time, but now we may view it differently. Using Axelrod’s reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma to analyze the Epicurean theory, the model would achieve the best result both for the individual and for the group: the individual gives up no direct advantage by sticking to the friendship / non-aggression / mutual aid pacts of the Epicurean theory, but receives a direct personal advantage by doing so. This may go some way in explaining the seemingly un-Epicurean absolute moral statement Lucretius has the first villagers make in 5.1024: ‘it is right that all pity the weak.’ In terms of the Prisoner’s Dilemma we could put it as: ‘it is right that all refrain from defecting against Suckers’, characterising the weak here as Suckers because, due to their position of weakness, they are unable to defect in the face of defection and so must always cooperate. This would be entirely correct from the point of view of Tit-for-Tat. Tit-for-Tat behaves from no sentimental motives, and does only what is advantageous to it. It refrains from taking advantage of the weak (defecting against Suckers), because it derives a direct personal benefit from cooperating with them. Tit-for-Tat does not simply protect Suckers from Defectors, it behaves exactly as a Sucker when dealing with Suckers, and thus gains as many points from them as it does in dealing with other Tit-for-Tats. So if Tit-for-Tat defected against Suckers, it would lose a large part of its livelihood. I said earlier that the statement ‘it is right that all pity the weak’, because it involves an appeal to a pre-existing notion of fairness, cannot be properly Epicurean if the Epicureans are absolute moral relativists and utilitarians. But if I now rephrase the statement from the point of view of Tit-for-Tat, it becomes: ‘it is a powerful individual and group survival strategy that all refrain from taking advantage of the weak.’ This gives us our pre-existing notion of fairness, but in a different form. It is not now an appeal to an absolute notion of fairness that exists somehow metaphysically independent of physical reality, but simply a statement of the true position, that this sort of behaviour will always outperform all others in producing beneficial results for all individuals involved: it is in fact an evolutionarily stable strategy. To put it another way, it is a prediction, based on empirical observation rather than abstract theorising, of the likely outcome of pitying the weak, and so the notion of fairness appealed to is established as a reference point upon which future decisions may be made. It does not exist independently of human action, but it may be said to pre-exist actions themselves because cooperative behaviour is an evolutionarily stable survival technique. The prehistoric and evolutionary setting of the Epicurean theory of justice parallels this temporal looseness: pragmatic cooperation saved the human race in the beginning, and so may reasonably be used as a model for future survival and success. In the first, wandering stage of humanity, people had learned that aggressive competition was the only survival technique, but now that the human race has evolved, they are able to make the conceptual leap from their previous conviction

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA learned in the ‘University of life’ and the ‘school of hard knocks’ that ‘every man for himself’ is the best way to survive and thrive, to ‘it is right that all pity the weak’. Both are seeming absolutes, but both are really predictions of outcome,18 or perhaps rules of thumb rather than carefully worked out rational strategies.19 The Diner’s Dilemma is of course very narrow and limited: the diners have no choice of which restaurant to go to, or of whom to dine with. In reality, if we find that someone is scrounging too many free dinners or drinks from us without reciprocating, we simply avoid dining with them, or go to a different restaurant or bar where we may meet more cooperative people. This is certainly what the Epicureans do in practice: withdrawing into the Garden to ensure they may interact only with other cooperative people, and so if they do play Tit-for-Tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma they seem to bend the rules. But this would also be a method of defecting against Defectors, and cooperating with cooperators. Epicurus in KD (Principal Sayings) 39 puts it: He who best knew how to meet external threats made into one family all the creatures he could; and those he could not, he at any rate did not treat as aliens; and where he found even this impossible, he avoided all dealings, and, so far as was advantageous, excluded them from his life. (Trans. Long and Sedley).

So the Epicurean will attempt to cooperate repeatedly even with Defectors, and to make friendship pacts with them. Only when she has satisfied herself that someone is incapable of changing their ways will she defect against them, and keep them at arm’s length. This could be perhaps described as ‘Tit-for-two-orthree-Tats’: she begins by cooperating, continues cooperating in the face of defection, and finally defects only when the Defector proves incapable of cooperating. In KD 32 Epicurus talks about an ability to make non-aggression pacts: Nothing is either just or unjust in relation to those creatures which were unable to make contracts over not harming one another and not being harmed; so too with all peoples which were unable or unwilling to make contracts over not harming and not being harmed. (Trans. Long and Sedley).

Hermarchus seems to take a tougher view, at least with respect to animals (fr. 34 Longo-Auricchio = Porphyry De Abstinentia 1.12):

18

In Epicurean terms a prolepsis (preconception). It may be objected that, while clearly the first humans were born with a prolepsis of the meaning of words (DRN 1028-90), they cannot have originally had a prolepsis of the value of cooperation. This may be answered by appealing to the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters (see below n.26): the early humans acquired a preconception of the value of cooperation and then passed this preconception on to their descendants, who were then born with such a preconception. Cf. Long and Sedley (n.3) 64. 19 Cf. Axelrod (n. 2, 2000) 134: ‘The rationality assumption of traditional game theory has been widely challenged ... Herbert Simon ... has emphasised that people have a limited knowledge of their situations, limited ability to process information, and limited time to make choices. People are therefore likely to use rules of thumb rather than detailed calculation, more likely to experiment than to determine an optimal response, and more likely to imitate someone who is doing well rather than rely completely on their own experience.’

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA If then it were possible to make a kind of contract with the other animals, as with men, over their not killing us or being killed by us indiscriminately, it would have been good to push justice up to this point; for it would have extended our security. But since it was impossible to associate creatures that lack reason with law, it was not possible to use such an instrument as the means of providing for utility in our security from other living beings any more than from lifeless things. All that can assure our security is the option, that we now have, of killing them. (Trans. Long and Sedley).

So the Epicurean will defect permanently from some creatures and some people who are incapable or unwilling to make contracts, and actually consider them outside justice. This seems harsher than the simple Tit-for-Tat, which never entirely gives up on a Defector. It keeps playing with any Defector in the hope that one day it may reform. This goes some way to explaining the closeting of the Epicurean school in the Garden. The Epicureans may seem, by withdrawing from the cut and thrust of normal society, to distrust the power of the friendship pacts to produce a just society, but their seclusion is actually part of their tactics in the game.20 This leads on to the second problem; the extinction of the human race had they not fortuitously hit upon the Epicurean theory of justice, and so survived. Clearly, Lucretius presents an outline of the Epicurean theory of justice: his nec laedere nec violari (5.1020) is a translation of Epicurus’ m¾ bl£ptein mhd
bl£ptesqai, the basis for the friendship pacts that underlie the Epicurean conception of justice.21 But the setting of it in prehistory gives it a much less theoretical feel than it otherwise might have.22 Lucretius is saying that far from being an ideal of justice, the Epicurean model is actually justice in its naturally occurring state: it is how justice came about before the rise of civilisation, and so before the imposition of restrictive legislation to curb human wrongdoing and to produce the limited amount of cooperative behaviour that now enables a civil society to exist. In Lucretius’ account at 5.1105-60 legislation is a late invention and arises only in a third stage of civilisation. First, powerful technocrats become kings and begin to found cities out of entirely selfish motives, then competition for power, wealth and position leads to revolution and the assassination of the kings, and a state of anarchy follows. Only then, tired of constant strife do people listen to certain individuals and accept the restrictions imposed on them by legislation for the common good. Legislation is presented as the salvation of civilisation, but it is not claimed that the human race would have become extinct had legislation not been invented. In Lucretius’ prehistory, the first humans are depicted behaving selfishly towards one another; they are unable to form any notion of the common good, but there is little explicit violence between them. They simply seem to wander alone with as little interaction as possible. When they see some food they snatch it for themselves rather than sharing it, but we do 20

Axelrod (n.2, 2000) 158 discusses a similar strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma called ‘Exit’ in which a player may refuse to play with uncooperative players. 21 Cf. KD 31, 32, 33, and 35. 22 From Epicurus’ use of the imperfect in KD 39 and 40 it seems likely that he too discussed the nature of justice in terms of its prehistoric origins.

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA not see them fighting over it, although we may imagine such things happening. All the explicit violence is between humans and animals, and we may, if we are looking for enough violence to cause the extinction of the human race, see the reference in 5.1025-7 as being towards the survival of the human race through collaboration in the face of wild animal depredations (much as in Protagoras 320c-323a, Diodorus Siculus 1.8, Cicero Republic 1.25.40, and in Porphyry’s report of the Epicurean Hermarchus). But the tone in 5.1011-27 is quite different. Lucretius speaks of the formation of human relations in terms of the ending of strife between humans and the beginnings of the protection of humans from other humans, of the weak by the strong. It may not be too fanciful to say that it was simply the inefficiency of their former survival strategy that would have led to the extinction of the human race. In terms of Darwinian game theory the selfish competitive behaviour exhibited by Lucretius’ first humans before the formation of the first societies is the least efficient survival technique, and in less theoretical evolutionary thinking the development of an ability to cooperate, especially in hunting large game and in the sharing of the meat surpluses this brought with it, is often thought to have been one of the evolutionary advantages that enabled modern humans to out-compete archaic humans and so drive them to extinction.23 I suggest Lucretius thinks in similar terms, for the following reasons. In 5.780-836 we are given a description of the origins of animals and humans. Humans arise by the same process as the other animals and at the same time. They are in fact one animal species, as we should expect in an anti-teleological account.24 In 855-78 we are told that all other animals had special characteristics that enabled them to survive: lions virtus, deer fuga, and foxes dolus. Without these, they would simply have become extinct. In addition, certain animals survived because of their utilitas to humans. Dogs, sheep, and oxen entered into a friendship pact with humans, and so they survived. This is clearly an anachronistic retrojection of the beginnings of animal domestication into Lucretius’ scheme of the origins of species, but the force is clear: all the animals that survived had special characteristics without which they would have died out. For some it was their ability to compete as individuals, and for others it was their cooperative ability that saved them. Dogs, sheep and oxen were saved by cooperating, but in the Epicurean theory the benefits of such cooperation are mutual. Since they cooperated with other animals, humans also received a direct benefit, and so the same mechanism also helped preserve the human race from extinction. We may compare Epicurus KD 32 where a similar picture is given, also associating the formation of the first societies with cooperative human / animal relationships.25 Clearly, animal domestication and herding cannot take place before the formation 23

Ridley (n.11) 105-24. The standard Presocratic, Atomist and Rationalist view: cf. Anaximander DK12 A30; Empedocles DK31 B71; Xenophanes DK21 B27, B29, B33; Archelaus DK60 A4; Anaxagoras DK59 A1; Pythagoras DK 58 C6; Democritus DK68 A139; Epicurus fr. 333 Us. (Censorinus De die nat. 4.9); Diodorus Siculus 1.7. See S. Blundell, The Origins of Civilization in Greek and Roman Thought (London 1986) 79. 25 See Long and Sedley (n.3) 1.135, and D.R. Blickman, ‘Lucretius, Epicurus and prehistory’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 92 (1989) 157-91, at 168. 24

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA of the first societies in 1011-27, and so there is a temporal shift in Lucretius’ account: 855-78 must refer to the period covered by 1011-27. Both passages, then, describe the same mechanism of extinction avoidance through cooperation, but only in the second passage is it stated that humans were saved by the process. The first passage refers to human / animal cooperation, and the second to human / human cooperation, but the import is the same in each case. The special characteristic that has enabled humans to survive is their ability to cooperate. Had they carried on mistakenly thinking that aggressive competition is the best strategy, they would have died out. Humans do not have the virtus of lions, the fuga of deer, or the dolus of foxes. Humans are the only animals described by Lucretius as evolving. All the others—we hear about deer, lions, dogs, foxes, sheep and oxen—seem to appear from the earth complete with their distinctive characteristics. The other creatures which did not have special characteristics have died out, leaving only those we see today. No other species has had to acquire the characteristics that enabled them to survive. This is not to say that the other animals could not evolve and acquire other characteristics in Lucretius’ scheme, but for the purposes of his argument, we are the only species that did so. The evolutionary change comes about by direct response to environment, and presumably involves the inheritance of acquired characteristics—standardly accepted in ancient biology, by the Hippocratics and Empedocles, and closely allied to the pangenetic theory of embryology that Lucretius shares.26 The physical and psychological softness27 acquired in response to fire, houses, sex and child-care would be passed on to offspring, and so become the new human nature. Lucretius speaks of a ‘breaking’ of the ingenium of the early humans: it is permanently altered. This mechanism of evolution is closer to that of Lamarck than of Darwin.28 In Lamarck’s system creatures evolve by passing on to their offspring characteristics they have acquired during their lifetimes by responding to environmental change. The giraffe has evolved its long neck by parent giraffes stretching up to eat high leaves, thus lengthening their necks slightly. They then pass on this acquired extra neck length to their offspring, who are born with slightly longer necks than their parents had been. They then repeat the process,

26

See DRN 4.1041-4 with R. Brown, Lucretius on Love and Sex (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, Leiden, 1987) ad loc.; cf. Epicurus fr. 161 Arr. For Empedocles cf. Aristotle Gen. an. 722b17-30; Aëtius 5.1.8; for the Hippocratics Nat. puer. 17 (7.496.19-20 Littré), Genit. 1 (7.470.1-21). 27 The process would seem also to be one of the feminisation of these early humans, especially given the context of Venus as the principle active in the change. For mollescere (5.1014) we may compare Latin etymologies of mollis: Isid. Orig. 10.179: mollis, quod vigorem sexus enerviati corpore dedecoret, et quasi mulier emolliatur; 11.2.18: mulier vero a mollitie, tamquam mollier, detracta littera vel mutata, apellata est mulier. Cf. also Velleius Paterculus 2.88.2. I owe this point to Matthew Leigh. 28 J.B. Lamarck, Philosophie zoologique (Paris 1809) and Histoire naturelle des animaux sans vertèbres (Paris 1835). See R.W. Burkhardt, The Spirit of System: Lamarck and Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, Mass. 1995).

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GORDON CAMPBELL, LUCRETIUS 5.1011-27: THE ORIGINS OF JUSTICE AND THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA and so on from generation to generation until we get the very long-necked giraffes of today.29 So the differentiation of humans from animals occurs by a Lamarckian evolutionary process at a late stage, and involves the gaining of reason, which leads to the formation of justice. Our cooperative ability is thus the feature that defines our humanity, and enables us to survive. Without it, we would have been simply one of the species preserved only as fossils, like those creatures Lucretius says did become extinct because they lacked special characteristics: the world, after all, does not exist for the sake of humans.30 As lions are defined by their strength, deer by their speed and foxes by their cunning, we are defined by our cooperative ability. Thus the destruction of the human race had the friendship pacts not been kept is explained. In Lucretius’ prehistory, the human race survived only because they evolved into proto-Epicureans.

29

Philosophie zoologique 1.256-7. This is no longer thought to be possible. However, neoLamarckism long provided an alternative mechanism to Darwinian natural selection, especially in the Soviet Union under Lysenko, with disastrous results for Soviet agriculture. See P.J. Bowler in E. Fox Keller and E.A Lloyd (eds) Keywords in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, Mass. 1992) 188-90. 30 DRN 5.156-234.

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Leeds International Classical Studies 1.4 (2002) ISSN 1477-3643 (http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/) © S.J. Harrison

Ennius and the prologue to Lucretius DRN 1 (1.1-148)1 S.J. HARRISON (CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD) ABSTRACT: This paper makes two interconnected claims about the prologue to the first book of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura. It is argued, first, that in this prologue Lucretius makes a more extensive and creative use of his great poetic predecessor Ennius than scholars have previously allowed; and, secondly, that this use of Ennius aids the reader in understanding the complex but logical structure of this extended opening to the De Rerum Natura.

1. Literary programme: emphasising Ennius Recent scholarly work on the prologue to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura 1 has placed considerable emphasis on the role of Empedocles.2 There is no doubt that Empedocles, as a poet writing in hexameters on the subject of the fundamental nature of the universe, is an extremely important literary predecessor for Lucretius, and it is clear from the praise given to Empedocles later in Book 1 that the Roman poet wanted openly to acknowledge his debt to the philosopher of Acragas (1.716-33). However, I would like to argue for the additional importance of Ennius as a major model in the prologue to Book 1. Scholars sometimes talk as if this is an either-or situation, in which we must acknowledge either Empedocles or Ennius as Lucretius’ primary model, but the two models need not be seen as in direct competition. In fact, they share a number of features. Both Ennius and Empedocles provide a poetic model of form in epic hexameters, but both also provide ideas with which Lucretius could strongly disagree: although, as already mentioned, Lucretius praises Empedocles later in Book 1 (716-33), that praise is immediately followed by a substantive refutation of his chief physical theories (1.734-81). Though we do not think of Ennius as a scientific poet propounding theories with which Lucretius might disagree,3 that is in fact how Lucretius chooses to present him in the prologue to Book 1, where he clearly picks up the famous opening of the Annales, in which Ennius seems to have claimed that he was a reincarnation of Homer who appeared to him in a dream. This advocacy of Pythagorean metempsychosis and of the existence of ghosts is directly opposed to the teachings of Epicurus as propounded by Lucretius, which emphasise the dissolution of a person’s identity after death and 1

I am most grateful to attenders at the Leeds seminar and to audiences at the Universities of London and Thessaloniki, for helpful and fruitful discussion of earlier versions of this paper; it is much the poorer for the death of Harry Jocelyn, whose comments (always vigorous and readily given) I was about to solicit and looked forward to. I should also like to record my thanks to the late Don Fowler for a stimulating introduction to the problems of the proem to DRN 1 more than twenty years ago. 2 Cf. Sedley (1998) 1-34. 3 Though, as Gale (1994) 77 points out, Ennius’ work does show scientific interests (e.g. in euhemerism).

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) exclude any notion of a continued existence in any form, and there is no doubt that Lucretius is concerned to deny the truth of these ideas. However, this need not prevent Lucretius from expressing admiration for Ennius as a poet rather than a philosopher, and what we find is a mixture of poetic homage and ideological refutation. This is in fact very close to Lucretius’ use of Empedocles as argued by David Sedley.4 With this in mind let us now look closely at the lines in which Lucretius recalls the lost opening of Ennius’ Annales (1.117-26): Ennius ut noster cecinit qui primus amoeno detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam. per gentis Italas hominum quae clara clueret; etsi praeterea tamen esse Acherusia templa Ennius aeternis exponit versibus edens, quo neque permaneant animae neque corpora nostra, sed quaedam simulacra modis pallentia miris; unde sibi exortam semper florentis Homeri commemorat speciem lacrimas effundere salsas coepisse et rerum naturam expandere dictis. As our own Ennius sang, who first bore down from pleasant Helicon the wreath of deathless leaves, to win bright fame among the tribes of Italian peoples. And yet despite this, Ennius sets forth in the discourse of his immortal verse that there is besides a realm of Acheron, where neither our souls nor bodies endure, but as it were images pale in wondrous wise; and thence he tells that the form of Homer, ever green and fresh, rose to him and began to shed salt tears, and in converse to reveal the nature of things. [tr. Bailey (1947)]

Here there seems to be a clear distinction between admiration for Ennius as a literary figure (note that he is presented as noster, our great Roman poet) and refutation of his wrong ideas about the afterlife: the words of praise in 117-9 are followed in 120 by a unique series5 of three adverbs, etsi praeterea tamen, an extraordinary verbal feature which expresses in the clearest possible way Lucretius’ strong objections to the old poet’s ideas: ‘and yet despite this’, as Bailey renders it. The passage throughout is suffused with detailed linguistic echoes of Ennian style; these are naturally intensively used here in a context which specifically invokes a famous episode in Ennius’ Annales, but it is also vital to realise that Ennius’ role as stylistic model for the De Rerum Natura is much more extensive than being the basis for this single passage. There can be no doubt that Ennius provides the clear stylistic model for the De Rerum Natura. The best confirmation of this is to look at other Roman poems of very similar date, for example Catullus’ epyllion of Peleus and Thetis (Catullus 64). This poem, normally thought to have been written at much the same time as the De Rerum Natura in the 50s BC,6 has a very different style: emotional, ornate and strongly influenced by Hellenistic poets such as Callimachus and Apollonius. The De Rerum Natura, on the other hand, maintains throughout the old-fashioned, 4

Loc.cit., n.2. The conjunction is unique on the PHI CD-ROM (as indeed is the conjunction etsi praeterea). 6 Cf. e.g. Jenkyns (1982) 130-32. 5

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) direct and rough Ennian style,7 which must have seemed very archaic in the 50s when compared to Catullus and the other neoteric poets, who were plainly the height of literary fashion in this period. Though there is no doubt that Lucretius had considerable knowledge of the Hellenistic poets,8 he chose to conceal it in his style. This must be connected with the missionary nature of his project as well as with his own stylistic and poetic preferences. The De Rerum Natura sets out to show traditional Roman aristocrats such as Memmius the benefits of the philosophy of Epicureanism. Its style is one of the chief ways in which it conveys its message: the potentially abstruse and alienating subject-matter of Greek microphysics is presented in a style with which every contemporary Roman reader of some education would be familiar, since it is clear from writers like Cicero that Ennius was a major school author in the first century BC.9 Thus Lucretius cleverly packages his potentially revolutionary subject-matter in the familiar and wellloved form of Ennian epic style. In 1.117-26 encomiastic elements clearly predominate over criticisms: even after the famous triple adverb expressing intense ideological opposition, the verses of Ennius can still be described in the following line as ‘everlasting’ (aeternis). The compliments made to Ennius are also notably reflected in Lucretius’ description of his own poetic task later in this same book (1.926-30). If these lines are juxtaposed with the opening of the passage already quoted, the similarities become very clear: Ennius ut noster cecinit qui primus amoeno detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam, per gentis Italas hominum quae clara clueret. As our own Ennius sang, who first bore down from pleasant Helicon the wreath of deathless leaves, to win bright fame among the tribes of Italian peoples. [tr. Bailey (1947)] avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante trita solo. Iuvat integros accedere fontis atque haurire, iuvatque novos decerpere flores insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam unde prius nulli velarunt tempora Musae. I traverse the distant haunts of the Pierides, never trodden before by the foot of man. ’Tis my joy to approach those untasted springs and drink my fill, ’tis my joy to pluck new flowers and gather a glorious coronal for my head from spots whence before the muses have never wreathed the forehead of any man. [tr. Bailey (1947)]

Both poets are claimed to be pioneers, Ennius as the great innovator (primus) in adapting Greek verse (presumably a reference to the hexameter) to Italian use, Lucretius as the first to venture into the unexplored poetic territory of a verseparaphrase of Epicurean physics (nullius ante / trita solo, novos, unde prius nulli). Both are connected with the Muses: Ennius is said to bring his poetic garland 7

Cf. Skutsch (1985) 155. Cf. especially Kenney (1970). 9 Cf. e.g. Bonner (1977) 213, 215, 223. 8

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) from Mount Helicon, the traditional home of the Muses, to Italy, while Lucretius presents himself as traversing the country of the Muses (Pieridum … loca) and as crowned by the Muses with a poetic garland. The poetic garland itself is another shared element: Ennius brings his to Italy, and Lucretius has ambitions to obtain a garland such as none has gained before. This looks like an obvious piece of rivalry with Ennius; and perhaps there was a lost part of the opening scene of Ennius’ Annales in which the poet was given a garland, perhaps by the ghost of Homer who appeared to him.10 What is really striking here is the suggestion that Ennius, through the ghost of Homer recounting its various transmigrations, produced an account of rerum natura, the nature of creation: 1.26 rerum naturam expandere dictis. This looks like nothing less than a claim that Ennius and Homer were poets who like Lucretius wrote de rerum natura. The claim that Homer gives a full account of the world in his poetry is a familiar one in antiquity,11 but the claim that Ennius did the same is striking. The suggestion is that Lucretius’ great poem and the great hexameter poem of Ennius are parallel in giving accounts of the universe. In a sense, this is a completely tendentious claim about the Annales, which was a partly mythographical, partly historical work about the history of Rome; but it is worth thinking for a moment about the analogy. Ennius’ Annales was for Lucretius and his contemporaries the literary work which contained the story of the origin of the Roman people, just as Vergil’s Aeneid fulfilled that function for later generations, going back to the origin of Aeneas in Troy and his descent from Venus. This aspect of the history of the Roman race is certainly echoed in the first line of Lucretius’ poem, Aeneadum genetrix (1.1). This allusion could suggest that what Lucretius is giving the reader is an alternative, more scientific version of Roman history: Rome does indeed go back to Venus, but in the sense of the Venus of De Rerum Natura 1.1.40, Venus as the generative principle which runs through the universe. This idea of the De Rerum Natura as an alternative history of Roman origins I shall return to shortly.

2. The tragic touch: the Ennian Iphigenia? Ennius was not only the first great Roman poet of hexameter epic. He was also a celebrated dramatist, writing at least twenty tragedies on Greek mythological subjects. One of the most famous of these was his Iphigenia, clearly an Iphigenia at Aulis from its few remaining fragments,12 amongst which is the well-known ‘Soldiers’ Chorus’ (fr.195-202 J.), in which some members of Agamemnon’s army claim that their waiting at Aulis is neither peace nor war but drifting somewhere in between.13 I would like to argue that the Iphigenia material in the prologue to the first book of Lucretius alludes to this Ennian play. The lines in question are 1.80-101: 10

Also perhaps suggested by Propertius 4.1.61 Ennius hirsuta cingat sua dicta corona, in another context of poetic initiation. 11 Cf. e.g. Hardie (1986) 6-32. 12 This helps to some degree in pointing to Ennius as a model for Lucretius here, since the only other known Latin play with the title ‘Iphigenia’, by Naevius, was an Iphigenia at Tauris. 13 See the treatment in Skutsch (1968) 157-65.

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) illud in his rebus vereor, ne forte rearis impia te rationis inire elementa viamque indugredi sceleris. quod contra saepius illa religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta. Aulide quo pacto Triviai virginis aram Iphianassai turparunt sanguine foede ductores Danaum delecti, prima virorum. cui simul infula virgineos circumdata comptus ex utraque pari malarum parte profusa est, et maestum simul ante aras adstare parentem sensit et hunc propter ferrum celare ministros aspectuque suos lacrimas effundere civis, muta metu terram genibus summissa petebat nec miserae prodesse in tali tempore quibat quod patrio princeps donarat nomine regem. nam sublata virum manibus tremibundaque ad aras deductast, non ut sollemni more sacrorum perfecto posset claro comitari Hymenaeo, sed casta inceste nubendi tempore in ipso hostia concideret mactatu maesta parentis, exitus ut classi felix faustusque daretur. tantum religio potuit suadere malorum. Herein I have one fear, lest perchance you think that you are starting on the principles of some unholy reasoning, and setting foot upon the path of sin. Nay, but on the other hand, again and again our foe, religion, has given birth to deeds sinful and unholy. Even as at Aulis the chosen chieftains of the Danai, the first of all the host, foully stained with the blood of Iphianassa the altar of the Virgin of the Cross-Roads. For as soon as the band braided about her virgin locks streamed from her either cheek in equal lengths, as soon as she saw her sorrowing sire stand at the altar’s side, and near him the attendants hiding their knives, and her countrymen shedding tears at the sight of her, tongue-tied with terror, sinking on her knees she fell to earth. Nor could it avail the luckless maid at such a time that she first had given the name of father to the king. For seized by men’s hands, all trembling was she led to the altars, not that, when the ancient rite of sacrifice was fulfilled, she might be escorted by the clear cry of ‘Hymen’, but in the very moment of marriage, a pure victim she might foully fall beneath a father’s slaughtering stroke in sorrow herself, that a happy and hallowed starting might be granted to the fleet. Such evils deeds could religion prompt. [tr. Bailey (1947)]

Only one scholar has so far suggested that this material might have come from Ennius’ lost Iphigenia.14 Perhaps one reason for this is that the passage contains some evident verbal echoes of extant Greek tragedies (84-5 ~ Aesch. Ag. 209-11; 93-4 ~ Eur. IA 1220), and scholars have been content to imagine that, like us, Lucretius and his contemporaries would first think of Aeschylus and Euripides. 14

Rychlewska (1957) 75-6, in very general terms. Lucretius is not mentioned as alluding to Ennius’ tragedies here by Jocelyn (1967); Prinzen (1998) 49-50 rejects the idea, and the idea that his Iphigenia is thematically relevant here is not found in the full lists of Ennian imitation in Lucretius by Pullig (1888), Wreschniok (1907) and Merrill (1918). See further Additional Note below.

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) But again we must put ourselves back into the position of an original reader in the 50s BC: for such readers the primary literary reference would be to Ennius’ Iphigenia given the contemporary fame of that lost play, which is quoted by Lucretius’ contemporaries Cicero and Varro and probably by the slightly earlier author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium.15 Furthermore, echoes of Greek tragedies do not prevent allusions to Ennius here, given that the remaining fragments of Ennius’ Iphigenia make it clear that the play was a loose adaptation of Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis which translated or imitated a number of lines from that play.16 The language of Lucretius’ lines gives us some strong indications of Ennian literary presence; though there are no exact verbal parallels between 1.80-101 and the few remaining fragments of Ennius’ play, the language of these lines is highly and markedly Ennian, especially at its beginning which sets the (Ennian) context. 82 indugredi uses a typically archaic Ennian form (cf. Ann. 78 induperator; 173 induvolo); the archaic genitive of 84 Triviai and 85 Iphianassai is much used by Ennius, especially in proper names (Skutsch (1985) 61, 191); and the form Iphianassa transliterates the Homeric form of Iphigenia’s name (Iliad 9.145), suitable for Ennius the alter Homerus (Horace Ep. 2.1.50), while Trivia (nom.) is found at Trag. 363 J. The theme and language of 84-5 aram … / turparunt sanguine foede also recall Trag. 93 J. Iovis aram sanguine turpari (of the death of Priam), while 86 ductores Danaum delecti picks up Ann. 331 duxit delectos and Trag. 212 J delecti viri, and 87 prima virorum uses a construction which may be an Ennian innovation (compare Ann. 84 infera noctis, with Skutsch’s commentary; Ann. 264 caeli vasta). Taken together, these details make a strong case for a particularly pronounced use of Ennius in these lines; though it is admittedly difficult to identify stilemes which are especially tragic rather than epic, allusion to Ennius’ Iphigenia seems not unlikely here given the subject-matter. If accepted, this clearly adds unity to the proem by echoing the use of Ennius’ Annales at 1.117-26, already discussed above. The issue of unity achieved through allusion to Ennius leads me to the second question I want to raise in this paper: the unity and structure of the whole prologue.

3. The structure of the proem (i) Order from chaos? The structure of the prologue of Book 1 of the De Rerum Natura was a celebrated topic of Lucretian scholarship in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.17 A key issue was how coherent and sequential the prologue was; many critics viewed it as rambling and relatively formless, and many of the suggestions made for achieving order and a clear sequence of thought involved transposition of lines on a large scale or other radical ideas. The proposal which I wish to adopt 15

Cf. Jocelyn (1967) 318-24. See Jocelyn’s discussions (Jocelyn (1967) 320-42) and Brooks (1981) 203-33. 17 Bailey provides a good guide to the various proposals and arguments made (Bailey (1947) 2.585-8). 16

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) is that of Jacoby.18 This avoids transposition and argues for an elaborate ‘Chinese box’ structure, in which elements which mirror each other are grouped concentrically around a central passage. Though Bailey criticised Jacoby’s proposal as being ‘an extremely artificial notion quite unlike Lucr.’s straightforward style’,19 it seems to me both typical of Lucretius and confirmed by contemporary evidence. Just as Lucretius’ text makes subtle allusions to Hellenistic poets but carefully disguises them, so it also presents complex and artificial structures which look rough and haphazard on the surface. As for contemporary evidence, we can look again to the work of Catullus. Catullus 68 seems to offer a parallel structure in contemporary Latin poetry: chiastic/ringcompositional architecture after an introduction,20 beginning and ending with a turn to the addressee, centering on a key theme of the poem. A comparison with Jacoby’s scheme for Lucretius DRN 1.1-148 indeed shows some detailed correspondences: Lucretius 1 proem (1-148)21 1-40 41-53 54-61 62-79 80-102 103-26 127-135 136-48

A: Hymn to Venus B: Address to, and link with, Memmius C: Summary 1: atoms (Books 1 and 2) D: Praise of Epicurus [using Ennius] E: Attack on religio (Ennius, Iphigenia) D′: Attack on dicta vatum / praise of Ennius C′: Summary 2: astronomy, history of earth, soul, dreams/perception (Books 3-6) B′: Address to, and link with, Memmius

Catullus 68 (OCT text)22 1-40 41-50 51-72 73-86 87-90 91-100 101-104 105-130 131-140 141-48

A: Letter to Manius B: Introduction to Allius C: Catullus’ ‘marriage’ to Lesbia D: Laodamia’s marriage to Protesilaus E: Troy F: Death of Brother E′: Troy D′: Laodamia’s marriage C′: Catullus’ ‘marriage’ B′: Conclusion to Allius

18

Jacoby (1921). Bailey (1947) 2.587. 20 For the structure of Catullus 68 cf. e.g. Kroll (1980) 219. 21 I assume here that lines 44-9 are to be retained in their transmitted location, and that there is a short lacuna in which an address of Memmius occurred: for a clear summary of the textual problems see Gale (1994) 215-7. 22 I assume here that Catullus 68.1-40 are part of the same poem as 41-148: for this vexed issue see e.g. Woodman (1983) and the bibliography gathered by Thomson (1997). 19

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) The parallels are striking, even down to general length and the length of individual sections. I am not suggesting a direct allusion by one passage to another, but rather a common technique of elaborate concentric composition.

(ii) Programmatic effects: Epicurus outdoes Ennius? If we adopt this proposed structure, the section which I wish to connect with Ennius’ Iphigenia becomes the centre of the prologue to De Rerum Natura 1. This is highly appropriate; the poem emphasises time and again the importance of correct belief about the gods and religion, and the key Epicurean view that the gods do not in any way intervene in this world of ours (cf. e.g. 1.44-9 = 2.646-51); for Epicureans like Lucretius the story of Iphigenia constitutes a powerful example of evil committed as a result of a false belief in the truth of divination and access to divine will. The Iphigenia section E is then flanked at the centre of the prologue by the praise of Epicurus at D and the attack on the dicta vatum at D′. This too is appropriate: the praise of Epicurus and the attack on dicta vatum balance each other as encomium and invective, though as we have already seen the attack on vates and their false view of the world is tempered with praise of Ennius as Lucretius’ great poetic predecessor. This introduces another balance: the praise of Ennius the poetic predecessor in D′ can then be seen to balance the praise of Epicurus the ideological predecessor in D. This balance is further confirmed by elements in the praise of Epicurus which link up with Ennius’ Annales: thus all three central sections of the prologue can be said to have an Ennian link. Let us take a closer look at section D, the praise of Epicurus (62-79): humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret in terris oppressa gravi sub religione quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contra est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra, quem neque fama deum nec fulmina nec minitanti murmure compressit caelum, sed eo magis acrem irritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret. ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra processit longe flammantia moenia mundi atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque, unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri, quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens. quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim obteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo. When the life of man lay foul to see and grovelling upon the earth, crushed by the weight of religion, which showed her face from the realms of heaven, lowering upon mortals with dreadful mien, ’twas a man of Greece who first dared to raise his mortal eyes to meet her, and first to stand forth to meet her: him neither the stories of the gods nor thunderbolts checked, nor the sky with its revengeful roar, but all the more spurred the eager daring of his mind to yearn to be the first to break through the close-set bolts upon the doors of nature. And so

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) it was that the lively force of his mind won its way, and he passed on far beyond the fiery walls of the world, and in mind and spirit traversed the boundless whole: whence in victory he brings us tidings what can come to be and what cannot, yea and in what way each thing has its power limited, and its deep-set boundary-stone. And so religion in revenge is cast beneath men’s feet and trampled, and victory raises us to heaven. [tr. Bailey (1947)]

The description of Epicurus himself as the Graius homo, ‘the man from Greece’ (1.66), is famously so vague that it has even been doubted whether Epicurus is unambiguously indicated,23 but that seems implausible. Not only is the praise of the anonymous Greek wholly suited to Epicurus and wholly consistent with Lucretius’ other encomia of his master; but, as Bailey points out in his commentary, the lack of naming is consistent with general Lucretian practice since Epicurus is directly named only once in the De Rerum Natura (3.1042). One might also speculate that naming Epicurus so openly early in the poem might actually put off those Roman readers who were acquainted with the image of Epicurus as an atheistic hedonist which was already common in the Hellenistic period. Another advantage conferred by the phrase Graius homo is that it is sanctioned by Ennian precedent: Graius homo is famously used of Pyrrhus at Ennius Annales 165 Sk., a passage which uses the archaic long final syllable homo, found for certain only here in Lucretius.24 The parallels which this allusion suggests between Epicurus and Pyrrhus of Epirus merit consideration. The two are in fact contemporaries: Epicurus lived from 341-270 BC, Pyrrhus from 319-272. Both can be represented as Greek invaders of Italy. This is literally true of Pyrrhus, who spent long periods occupying parts of the Italian peninsula in the 270s BC; it was said metaphorically of Epicurus, who could be said by Cicero to have invaded and (paradoxically given his views) disturbed the whole of Italy with his doctrines. At Fin. 2.49 Cicero refers to philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et Italia, sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, ‘that well-known philosopher, by whom not only Greece and Italy, but the whole barbarian world has been disturbed’; as in Lucretius, Epicurus is not named but is evidently meant. A more firmly military image is used at Tusc. 4.7 of the Epicurean popularisers of Cicero’s time whose writings have spread throughout Italy: Italiam totam occupaverunt, ‘they have seized the whole of Italy’. The idea of a cultural invasion from Greece was of course common in Roman thought; the most famous example is Horace Ep. 2.1.156: Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit, ‘Greece once captured in turn captured the fierce victor’. There is no doubt that the two invasions are to be regarded very differently: that of Pyrrhus constituted one of the greatest risks to the Roman Republic, while that of Epicurus paradoxically brought true peace and enlightenment to a previously crude and benighted culture. As scholars have pointed out,25 Lucretius’ account of Epicurus’ philosophical victory incorporates the imagery of triumph and conquest so dear to Roman culture and provides an alternative model of victory, psychological rather than imperial. It is also very 23

Furley (1970) 64 sees Empedocles as equally possible here. Cf. Skutsch’s note ad loc. 25 E.g. West (1969) 57-63, Kenney (1974). 24

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) likely that the military language here may owe something further to the great Ennian poem in which Pyrrhus appeared, since the Annales with its concentration on Rome’s victories naturally contained much detail about battles and triumphs. It is worth pursuing a little further the idea that in this praise of Epicurus and its echoes of Ennius, Lucretius is presenting an Epicurean version or even perversion of Roman history as so famously told in the Annales. It could be maintained that, just as later in the prologue at 117-26 Lucretius argues that Ennius was wrong about the afterlife, so here at 62-79 Lucretius may be arguing that Ennius was wrong about history: the truly important facts about Roman culture are not the wars and triumphs recounted in the Annales, but the greater triumph over the fear of death and the consequent attainment of mental peace represented in the philosophical achievements of Epicurus, a message which Lucretius himself is now seeking to spread amongst the Romans in his poem. There are some detailed echoes of Ennius in this passage which point the same way. At 1.70-71 Lucretius talks of the revolutionary effect of Epicurus’ throwing off of the fear of the gods, comparing it in a famous image to the throwing open of the gates of the universe, effringere ut arta / naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret, ‘to yearn to be the first to break through the close-set bolts upon the doors of nature’. This looks very like a philosophical version of the famous breaking open of the Gates of War in the First Punic War in Ennius Annales 7: cf. Annales 225-6 postquam Discordia taetra / Belli ferratos postes portasque refregit, ‘after foul Discord shattered the iron-bound door-posts of war and its gates’. The implication is that the bound-breaking achievement of Epicurus is far greater than that of the Punic Wars, since it led to peace of mind and not to the mindless destruction of war: bursting the bounds of the universe in order to provide peace of mind for all mankind is undoubtedly superior to bursting open the gates of war to inflict violence on the nations of the earth, even if the war in question settled big questions about the imperial future of Rome. It is worth noting that that Ennius’ Discordia and Epicurus are both boundary-bursting deities of a sort; Discordia is a minor deity like Euripides’ Lyssa or Vergil’s Allecto,26 while Epicurus is famously termed a god in the hyperbolic rhetoric of the proem to De Rerum Natura 5 (5.8, 19). The ultimate triumph achieved for Epicureans by Epicurus overcomes the ultimate triumph achieved for Romans as chronicled by Ennius. This fits well with other elements in the first prologue already suggested as offering a new Epicurean version of Roman history. The emphasis in the opening address to Venus (1.1-40) on the goddess as the bringer of peace and procreation, and on her peaceful quieting of Mars’ warlike instincts, looks again like a counter to the common claim that the Romans are a military people since descended from Mars through his son Romulus,27 a claim bolstered by the evident prominence of Mars as ancestor in the account of early Roman history given in Ennius’ Annales.28 In Lucretius’ picture of Venus and Mars (1.28-40), it is clear that the 26

Vergil’s Allecto famously imitates Ennius’ Discordia: cf. Norden (1915) 18-33. Cf. e.g. Livy praef. 7, Ovid Fasti 3.85-6 and (by implication) Vergil Aeneid 1.273-9. 28 Cf. Skutsch (1985) 193-5. 27

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) mother of Aeneas, representing peace, overcomes the father of Romulus, representing war. This could be seen as making a startling claim: if Venus is the key divine ancestor of the Roman race as mother of its founder Aeneas, adherence to the peace which she represents must in some sense invoke an ancestral quality of the warlike Romans which they need to regain. The Romans are the children of peace-loving Venus, not of war-loving Mars. This is a brilliantly paradoxical use of a type of argument which appealed intensely to the Romans: the argumentum a maioribus, according to which Romans should always resemble their ancestors.29 In the ideological choice between Venus and Mars as alternative divine parents, it is clear that Venus triumphs for Lucretius. I conclude by considering a further element which links together the three central sections of the prologue as analysed in the diagram, D, E and D′. We have already seen how the later part of section D′, the praise of Ennius, provides a connecting element with the Ennian material in D and E. But it may be possible to go further in seeing an Ennian connection in the attack on the terrifying predictions of vates which is found in lines 102-111: tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore vatum terriloquis victus dictis desciscere quaeres. quippe etenim quam multa tibi iam fingere possunt somnia quae vitae rationes vetere possint fortunasque tuas omnis turbare timore ! et merito: nam si certam finem esse viderent aerumnarum homines, aliqua ratione valerent religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum. You yourself sometime vanquished by the fearsome threats of the seer’s sayings, will seek to desert from us. Nay indeed, how many a dream they even now conjure up before you, which might avail to overthrow your schemes of life, and confound in fear all your fortunes. And justly so: for if men could see that there is a fixed limit to their sorrows, then with some reason they might have the strength to stand against the scruples of religion, and the threats of seers. [tr. Bailey (1947)]

What are the terriloqua dicta vatum, the ‘fearsome threats of the seer’s sayings’? It is logical to look back to the previous Iphigenia section (80-102). Here if anywhere is a story where the terrifying pronouncements of prophets played a key role: Agamemnon was forced to sacrifice Iphigenia by the forceful and fearsome prophecies of Calchas, famously described at some length in the parodos to Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (123-59). It is true that the account of the sacrifice of Iphigenia given here by Lucretius does not involve a specific reference to prophecy, but there is no doubt for Lucretius that religio towards the commands of gods is to blame, and that those commands were communicated to Agamemnon by prophecy, i.e. the words of Calchas. The problem for Agamemnon is that he was in the position of most of mankind according to Lucretius—unable to stand up to the threats of prophets (minis obsistere vatum, 1.111). Thus this passage can be closely connected with the story of Iphigenia.

29

Cf. e.g. Flower (1996) 220-1.

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4. Conclusion I hope in this paper to have shown two things: first, that the prologue to the first book of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura engages much more pointedly than previously thought with Ennius, his stylistic model and great predecessor as Latin hexameter poet; and, second, that these allusions to Ennius help to provide unity in this long and complex opening to Lucretius’ remarkable poem.

Bibliography S. Aretz, Die Öpferung der Iphigenia in Aulis (Stuttgart, 1999) C. Bailey, Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex (3 vols, Oxford 1947) S.D. Bonner, Roman Education (London 1977) R.A. Brooks, Ennius and Roman Tragedy (New York 1981) [reprint of Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 1949] H.I. Flower, Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture (Oxford 1996) D.J. Furley, ‘Variations on themes from Empedocles in Lucretius’s Proem’, BICS 17 (1970) 55-64 [reprinted in his Cosmic Problems (Cambridge 1989) 172-82] M. Gale, Myth and Poetry in Lucretius (Cambridge 1994) O. Gigon, ‘Lukrez und Ennius’ in id. (ed.), Lucrèce (Entretiens Hardt 24, Geneva 1978) 167-91 P.R. Hardie, Vergil’s Aeneid: Cosmos and Imperium (Oxford 1986) F. Jacoby, ‘Das Prooemium des Lucretius’, Hermes 56 (1921) 1-65 R. Jenkyns, Three Classical Poets (London 1982) H.D. Jocelyn, The Tragedies of Ennius (Cambridge 1967) E.J. Kenney, ‘Vivida vis: polemic and pathos in Lucretius 1.62-101’ in T. Woodman and D. West (eds), Quality and Pleasure in Latin Poetry (Cambridge 1974) 18-30 E.J. Kenney, ‘Doctus Lucretius’, Mnemosyne 23 (1970) 366-92 W. Kroll, Catull (ed. 6, Stuttgart 1980) [original 1922] K. Lennartz, Non verba sed vim : kritisch-exegetische Untersuchungen zu den Fragmenten archaïscher römischer Tragiker (Stuttgart 1994) W.A. Merrill, ‘Parallelisms and coincidences in Lucretius and Ennius’, University of California Publications in Classical Philology 3.4 (1918) 249-64 E. Norden, Ennius und Vergilius (Leipzig 1915) A. Perutelli, ‘Iphigenia in Lucrezio’, SCO 46 (1996) 193-207 H. Prinzen, Ennius im Urteil der Antike (Stuttgart 1998) H. Pullig, Ennio quid debuerit Lucretius (Halle 1888) L. Rychlewska, ‘De Ennii Iphigenia’, Eos 49 (1957) 71-81 D. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge 1998)

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S.J. HARRISON, ENNIUS AND THE PROLOGUE TO LUCRETIUS DRN 1 (1.1-148) O. Skutsch, Studia Enniana (London 1968) O. Skutsch, The Annals of Quintus Ennius (Oxford 1985) D.F.S. Thomson, Catullus (Phoenix Suppl. 34, Toronto 1997) D. West, The Imagery and Poetry of Lucretius (Edinburgh 1969) A.J. Woodman, ‘A reading of Catullus 68A’, PCPS 29 (1983) 100-06 R. Wreschniok, De Cicerone Lucretioque Ennii imitatoribus (Breslau 1907)

Additional note, July 2002 In the first version of this paper, posted in April 2002, I overlooked Rychlewska’s suggestion (n.14). I also did not deal sufficiently with the standard objection to imitation of Ennius’ Iphigenia in Lucretius 1.80-101, namely that it is clear that Ennius used the Euripidean Iphigenia in Aulis, closely imitated in several of the extant fragments, in which play Iphigenia is famously not sacrificed but escapes through the miraculous substitution of a hind by Artemis. This objection is considered decisive by many, most recently Perutelli (1996) 196 and Prinzen (1998) 49-50. But it is certain that Ennius’ play diverged in some important respects from the Euripidean play: the well-known Soldiers’ Chorus, the largest extant fragment of Ennius’ version, presents us with a chorus different from the female chorus of the IA and with words not closely paralleled there. This has led scholars to suggest that Ennius’ Iphigenia may have used more than one Greek tragedy in the kind of contaminatio familiar in Roman comedy (cf. Aretz (1999) 240-2; for the general likelihood of such contaminatio in Roman tragedy cf. Lennartz (1994) 116-26). Thus the likelihood that Lucretius 1.80-101 draws on Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (well argued by Perutelli 1996) need not militate against drawing on Ennius’ Iphigenia as well, since Ennius may also have used the Aeschylean ending.

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LEEDS INTERNATIONAL CLASSICAL STUDIES 1.5 (2002) ISSN 1477-3643 (http://www.leeds.ac.uk/classics/lics/) © Malcolm Heath

Porphyry’s rhetoric: texts and translation MALCOLM HEATH (UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS) ABSTRACT: This paper provides a working text and translation of the testimonia and fragments relevant to Porphyry’s contributions to rhetorical theory.

This paper collects, in Greek and in English translation, the testimonia and fragments relevant to Porphyry’s contributions to rhetorical theory. It may be viewed as a supplement to Smith’s edition of the fragments (1993), which is very selective in its coverage of the rhetorical fragments. It is also intended to complement the study of Porphyry’s rhetoric in Heath (2003a),1 which provides an introduction to and detailed commentary on the material assembled here, but which (for reasons of space) could not include a text or translation. The testimonia and fragments vary considerably in the directness of the evidence they provide for Porphyry’s work. In one case we have an extensive extract from Porphyry’s own theoretical writings (F7); in most others we have brief reports of or allusions to his theories in the words of others. In some cases there is doubt about the full extent of Porphyry’s contribution. It is impossible to determine how much of Porphyry there is in the multiply sourced F15, and the suspicion that he has contributed more to F9 than the author’s fleeting acknowledgement suggests cannot be proven. On the other hand, Porphyry is identified as a source of F2, which does not name him, by a convincing inference. This paper offers a working, rather than a properly critical, text. I have not undertaken any new work on the manuscripts; nor do I reproduce the information given in the apparatus to standard editions. In the case of extracts from volume 4 of Walz’s Rhetores Graeci I have selectively reported the collations of Py published by Kowalski (1940-6, 1947). Suggested improvements to the text in extracts from this and other volumes of Walz not otherwise attributed are (to the best of my knowledge) my own; but for reasons that will be obvious to anyone who has used them, I have not thought it feasible to try to cure all the problems posed by these badly transmitted and badly edited texts. Walz’s erratic punctuation has been subjected to extensive tacit revision. In F15 I have placed parallel passages from other sources in a separate column to the right of the Greek text, to facilitate close comparison; in each case the source (usually the Anonymus Seguerianus) is identified at the end of the relevant extract. The notes to the translation provide a very limited amount of explanatory comment on the content of the fragments. Readers should consult the article cited

1

Some addenda and corrigenda are given in the Additional Note at the end of the present paper. The research for this paper was completed with the support of a British Academy Research Readership.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION above for more detailed discussion of the rhetorical theory which they embody, and their place in Porphyry’s writings on rhetoric.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION

1. Texts Biographical and bibliographical evidence B1 Eunapius Lives of the Sophists (a) 4.1.1f. (6.11-13 Giangrande): tucën d
tÁj proshkoÚshj paide…aj, ¢n£ te œdrame tosoàton kaˆ ™pšdwken, æj Logg…nou m
n Ãn ¢kroat»j kaˆ ™kÒsmei tÕn did£skalon ™ntÕj Ñl…gou crÒnou ... (b) 4.1.1.4 (6.21-24): par' ™ke…nJ d¾ t¾n ¥kran ™paideÚeto paide…an, grammatikÁj te e„j ¥kron ¡p£shj, ésper ™ke‹noj, ¢fikÒmenoj kaˆ ·htorikÁj: pl¾n Óson oÙk ™p' ™ke…nhn œneuse, filosof…aj ge p©n edoj ™kmattÒmenoj ... (c) 4.2.2-3 (9.11-19): ... oÙd
n d
paide…aj edoj paraleloipèj. œsti goàn ¢porÁsai kaq' ˜autÕn kaˆ qaum£sai, t… ple‹Òn ™sti tîn ™spoudasmšnwn, pÒteron t¦ e„j Ûlhn ·htorik¾n te…nonta, À t¦ e„j grammatik¾n ¢kr…beian fšronta, À Ósa tîn ¢riqmîn ½rthtai, À Ósa neÚei prÕj gewmetr…an, À Ósa prÕj mousik¾n ·špei. t¦ d
e„j filosof…an, oÙd
t¦ perˆ lÒgouj katalhptÒn, oÜte tÕ ºqikÕn ™fiktÕn lÒgJ: tÕ d
fusikÕn kaˆ qeourgÕn teleta‹j ¢fe…sqw kaˆ musthr…oij: oÛtw pantomigšj ti prÕj ¤pasan ¢ret¾n Ð ¢n¾r aÙtÕj crÁm£ ti gšgonen. (d) 4.3 (10.11-13): kat¦ toÚtouj Ãsan toÝj crÒnouj kaˆ tîn ·htorikîn oƒ ™p' 'Aq»nhsi proestîtej PaàlÒj te kaˆ 'AndrÒmacoj ™k Sur…aj. B2 Eusebius Praep. Evang. 10.3 (Porphyry 408F Smith) Porfur…ou perˆ toà klšptaj enai toÝj “Ellhnaj, ¢pÕ toà prètou tÁj FilolÒgou 'Akro£sewj: t¦ Platèneia ˜stiîn ¹m©j Logg‹noj 'Aq»nhsi kšklhken ¥llouj te polloÝj kaˆ NikagÒran tÕn sofist¾n kaˆ Maora, 'ApollèniÒn te tÕn grammatikÕn kaˆ Dhm»trion tÕn gewmštrhn Pros»nhn te tÕn PeripathtikÕn kaˆ tÕn StwŽkÕn Kallišthn. meq' ïn ›bdomoj aÙtÕj katakline…j, toà de…pnou prokÒptontoj ka… tinoj zht»sewj perˆ 'EfÒrou ™n to‹j ¥lloij genomšnhj ... B3 Suda P2098 PorfÚrioj, Ð kat¦ Cristianîn gr£yaj, Öj kur…wj ™kale‹to BasileÚj: TÚrioj, filÒsofoj, maqht¾j 'Amel…ou toà Plwt…nou maqhtoà, did£skaloj d
'Iambl…cou, gegonëj ™pˆ tîn crÒnwn AÙrhlianoà kaˆ parate…naj ›wj Dioklhtianoà toà basilšwj. œgraye bibl…a p£mpleista, filÒsof£ te kaˆ ·htorik¦ kaˆ grammatik£. Ãn d
kaˆ Logg…nou toà kritikoà ¢kroas£menoj. Perˆ qe…wn Ñnom£twn a/, Perˆ ¢rcîn b/, Perˆ Ûlhj $/, Perˆ yucÁj prÕj BÒhqon e/, Perˆ ¢pocÁj ™myÚcwn d/, Perˆ toà Gnîqi sautÕn d/, Perˆ ¢swm£twn, Perˆ toà m…an enai t¾n Pl£twnoj kaˆ 'Aristotšlouj a†resin z/, E„j t¾n 'Ioulianoà toà Calda…ou filosÒfon ƒstor…an ™n bibl…oij d/, Kat¦ Cristianîn lÒgouj ie/, Perˆ tÁj `Om»rou filosof…aj, PrÕj 'Aristotšlhn toà enai t¾n yuc¾n ™ntelšceian, FilolÒgou ƒstor…aj

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION bibl…a e/, Perˆ gšnouj kaˆ e‡douj kaˆ diafor©j kaˆ „d…ou kaˆ sumbebhkÒtoj, Perˆ tîn kat¦ P…ndaron toà Ne…lou phgîn, Perˆ tÁj ™x `Om»rou çfele…aj tîn basilšwn bibl…a i/, Summ…ktwn zhthm£twn z/, E„j tÕ Qoukud…dou proo…mion, PrÕj 'Ariste…dhn z/, E„j t¾n Minoukianoà tšcnhn, kaˆ ¥lla ple‹sta, kaˆ m£lista ¢stronomoÚmena, ™n oŒj kaˆ E„sagwg¾n ¢stronomoumšnwn ™n bibl…oij tris…, kaˆ Grammatik¦j ¢por…aj. oátÒj ™stin Ð PorfÚrioj Ð t¾n kat¦ Cristianîn ™fÚbriston glîssan kin»saj.

Testimonia and fragments F1a Sopater RG 5.9.14-22 (Porphyry 415F Smith) Ð d
PorfÚrioj ¢pologoÚmenoj Øp
r toà Minoukianoà tÕ aÙtÕ œgklhma ™gkaloumšnou (kaˆ g¦r ™ke‹noj e„pën Óti Ð ·»twr ™re‹ p©n z»thma politikÒn, oÙ prosed…daxen oÜte t…j Ð ·»twr oÜte t…j ¹ ·htorik») taÚthn t¾n ¢polog…an prote…netai, ¼tij kaˆ Øp
r `Ermogšnouj ¡rmÒsei lšgesqai. fhsˆ g¦r Óti oÙ perˆ p£shj2 tÁj ·htorikÁj diel£mbanen, ¢ll¦ perˆ mÒnou toà dikanikoà kaˆ sumbouleutikoà. perittÕn oân mšrouj ™xštasin poioÚmenon perˆ p£shj lšgein tÁj tšcnhj.3 F1b ?Marcellinus PS 293.14-26 (Porphyry 415bF Smith) ™mšmyanto dš tinej tÕn `Ermogšnhn, di¦ t… tšcnhn ·htorik¾n mšllwn suggr£fein tÕn Óron aÙtÁj prÒ ge p£ntwn oÙk ¢podšdwken. ka… fhsi PorfÚrioj Óti triîn Ôntwn tîn tÁj ·htorikÁj e„dîn, sumbouleutikoà ka‹ dikanikoà ka‹ panhgurikoà, tÕ panhgurikÕn oÙc Øpop…ptei tù perˆ tîn st£sewn lÒgJ, ™peid¾ aƒ m
n st£seij ¢mfibol…an œcousin ¢mfisbhtoumšnwn pragm£twn, t¦ d' ™gkèmia Ðmologoumšnwn aÜxhsin ¢gaqîn. toà to…nun panhgurikoà Øpexairoumšnou e‡douj ¢tel
j ¨n e‡h tÕ t¾j ·htorikÁj: oƒ d
Óroi oÙ tîn ¢telîn ¢ll¦ tîn tele…wn e„sˆ pragm£twn. di¦ toutÒ, fhs…, ·htorikÁj oÙk ¢podšdwken Óron æj oÙ perˆ p£shj dialamb£nwn ™n taÚtV tÍ pragmate…v. F1c Athanasius PS 181.13-15 (Porphyry 415aF Smith) oÙ g¦r paradektšon t¾n Porfur…ou ¢polog…an Øp
r Minoukianoà kaˆ perˆ `Ermogšnouj. F2a Sopater RG 5.5.28-8.30 [5.28] dialabÒntaj oân ¹m©j perˆ toà Ðpo…a tšcnh ™st…n, ¢nagka‹on kaˆ ÐpÒqen ½rxato kaˆ Âken dialabe‹n. Ãn m
n ¥nwqen par¦ to‹j qeo‹j. toàtÒ fasin “Omhron ™nde…knusqai lšgonta, `oƒ d
qeoˆ p¦r Zhnˆ kaq»menoi ºgorÒwnto' [Iliad 4.1]. ½kmase d
™n to‹j ¼rwsi. kaˆ Ð m
n Pl£twn kaˆ toÜnoma aÙtÁj4 ™k toÚtou d…dwsi, par¦ tÕ e‡rein kaˆ lšgein: toÝj g¦r 2

taÚthj Walz. For the correction cf. 26f. (Óti perˆ p£shj tšcnhj dialamb£netai), PS 293.25 (F1b). 3 In the discussion that follows (9.22-14.17) there are references to Ð Porfur…ou lÒgoj at 5.9.27, 11.29, 14.17f. 4 aÙtîn?

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION ¼rwaj dialektikoÝj ode kaˆ ·htorikoÚj [Cratylus 398de]. fa…netai d
kaˆ Ð poiht¾j panto‹a e„dëj ·htorikÁj parade…gmata. tÕn m
n g¦r tacÝn kaˆ sÚntomon kaˆ ¢podeiktikÕn ·»tor£ fhsi lšgein `nif£dessin Ómoia' [Iliad 3.222], kaˆ tÕn puknÕn kaˆ sÚntomon, oÙd
n d
Âtton ¢podeiktikÒn, `paàra m
n, ¢ll¦ m£la ligšwj' [Iliad 3.214]: oden d
t¾n ¢tax…an tÁj dhmagwg…aj kaˆ toÝj ¢diakr…twj kaˆ ¢tšcnwj lšgontaj, Ðpo‹o… potš e„sin, ésper tÕn Qers…thn, `Ój ·' œpea fresˆn Îsin ¥kosm£ te poll£ te Édh' [Iliad 2.213]. [6.12]

kaˆ prîtÒn ge ¡p£ntwn genšsqai fasˆ par' 'Aqhna…oij lÒgon e„pe‹n kathgorikÒn, kathgoroànta Qhsša ™pˆ tù qan£tJ `IppolÚtou, metaxÝ d
sbesqÁnai. tîn g¦r turann…dwn ™n ta‹j pÒlesi genomšnwn ¢nagka…wj ¹ ·htorik¾ prÕj ™leuqer…an spoud£zousa kaˆ ™nant…a oâsa ta‹j turann…sin œgklhm£ te Ãn kaˆ ™pik…ndunon g…nesqai. ™n d
Sikel…v lšgetai F£larin dhmagwgikÕn lÒgon e„pe‹n kaˆ Øpagagšsqai tÕ plÁqoj piqanÒthti, éste kaˆ e„j turann…da ™lqe‹n. [6.20]

met¦ d
taàta KÒrax prîton ¡p£ntwn sunest»sato didaskal…an perˆ ·htorikÁj: oƒ g¦r prÕ aÙtoà ™pithdeÚontej t¾n tšcnhn æj ™mpeir…v tinˆ kaˆ ™pimele…v crèmenoi ™pet»deuon, kaˆ oÛtwj5 m
n oÙ met¦ lÒgou kaˆ a„t…aj, oÙd
tšcnhj tinÒj. toÚtou d
toà KÒrakoj Tis…aj gšgone maqht¾j, perˆ oá lšgetai toioàtÒn ti: Tis…an sunqšsqai tù KÒraki cil…aj dracm¦j ¹n…ka ¨n ™n dikasthr…J ¢gwnizÒmenoj t¾n prèthn n…khn nik»seien: Ôntoj d
presbutšrou toà KÒrakoj oÙ proÇei ™n dikasthr…J, ™pˆ tù tÍ teleutÍ toà KÒrakoj kerd©nai t¦j ™paggel…aj. ™gr£yato oân aÙtÕn Ð KÒrax cršoj, kaˆ toàto mÒnon epe to‹j dikasto‹j, Óti `™¦n ¹tthqÍ moi Tis…aj t¾n toà cršouj graf»n Ñfe…lei moi doànai t¦j cil…aj: t¾n g¦r prèthn d…khn nen…khke kat¦ t¾n sunq»khn.' Ð d
Tis…aj tÕ ™nant…on ¢pekr…nato lšgwn, Óti `e„ m
n ¹tt»qhn t¾n toà cršouj graf»n, oÙk Ñfe…lw doànai, nen…khka g¦r t¾n toà cršouj graf»n.'6 toioÚtwn g¦r ¢pokr…sewn ·hqeisîn e„j ¢por…an m
n Ãlqon oƒ dikasta…, ™bÒhsan d
`kakoà KÒrakoj kakÕn çÒn.' [7.9]

zÁloj oân e„j toÚtouj polÝj tÁj tšcnhj gšgone, kaˆ Gorg…aj Ð Leont‹noj kat¦ presbe…an ™lqën 'Aq»nhsi t¾n tšcnhn t¾n suggrafe‹san par' aÙtoà ™kÒmisen, kaˆ aÙtÕj ˜tšran prosšqhke: kaˆ met' aÙtÕn 'Antifîn Ð `RamnoÚsioj, Ð Qoukud…dou did£skaloj lšgetai tšcnhn gr£yai, met¦ taàta d
'Isokr£thj Ð ·»twr. kaˆ p©sai m
n aátai dhmagwgikaˆ tšcnai e„s…n, oÙd
n perˆ st£sewn œcousai kef£laion À toÚtwn tîn nàn ™pithdeuomšnwn, piqanÒthtoj dš tinoj, pîj de‹ dÁmon Øpagagšsqai. kaˆ Óti m
n crîntai lšgontej oƒ palaioˆ tšcnV, æmolÒghtai: fa…nontai g¦r t¦j aÙt¦j Øpoqšseij ™n diafÒroij lÒgoij kaˆ diafÒroij ·hto‹j ·»torej ¢eˆ Ðmo…wj meletîntej, kaˆ t¾n stocastik¾n ¢eˆ stocastikîj kaˆ to‹j aÙto‹j kefala…oij, kaˆ t¾n pragmatik¾n to‹j tÁj pragmatikÁj: dÁlon oân æj paradÒsei tinˆ taàta ™g…nwskon. aƒ m
n oân grafe‹sai perˆ toÚtwn oÙ diel£mbanon. Óti d
kaˆ dikanikaˆ tšcnai Ãsan gegrammšnai par' aÙtîn 5 6

oátoj Walz: corr. Radermacher (1951) 16. oátoi Gercke (1897) 345. For the problem in this passage see n.48 below.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION dhlo‹ 'Isokr£thj lšgwn: `loipÕn d
¹m‹n e„sin oƒ prÕ ¹mîn gegonÒtej kaˆ t¾n kaloumšnhn tšcnhn suggr£yai tolm»santej, oÞj oÙk ¢fetšon ¢nepitim»touj, o† tinej oÜte œscon tÕ7 dik£zesqai did£skein, ™klex£menoi tÕ dusceršsteron tîn nohm£twn' [13.19]. aátai mšntoi aƒ dikanikaˆ tšcnai oÙdamoà sèzontai. e‡te oân ™n aÙta‹j t¦ kef£laia taàta kaˆ aƒ st£seij ™peno»qhsan, e‡te kaˆ ¥llwj ™k didaskal…aj aÙt¦ paršlabon, dÁlon Óti aÙtoˆ tšcnV metÇesan, kaˆ dÁlÒn ™stin ¢f' ïn t¦j Øpoqšseij p£ntej Ðmo…wj melet»santej fa…nontai. [8.5]

½kmase d
kaq' Øperbol¾n ™n tÍ dhmagwg…v kat¦ tÕn Dhmosqšnouj kairÕn ¹ ·htorik». met¦ d
taàta ™pˆ tÁj 'Antip£trou basile…aj, ¹n…ka `Uper…dhj m
n ™glwssotom»qh, Dhmosqšnhj d
¢pšqanen, ™nen»konta d
kaˆ Ñktë lšgontai ™kdoqÁnai ™x 'Aqhnîn ·»torej, p£mpolloi d
¢pÕ p£shj tÁj `Ell£doj, foberÕn [d
] tÕ tÁj ·htorikÁj gšgonen, kaˆ ¹m£rthtai tîn Makedonikîn kakîn katecÒntwn t¾n `Ell£da. ¹n…ka d
¹ `Rwma…wn ½kmasen ¢rc¾ kaˆ polite…a sèfrwn katšsce t¦j pÒleij m£lista ™pˆ 'Adrianoà kaˆ 'Antwn…nou, ·htorikîn kaˆ filolÒgwn basilšwn, aâqij aƒ tšcnai sunet£qhsan. fa…netai m
n g¦r kaˆ Ð Kikšrwn kaˆ œti toÚtwn presbÚteroj ín taÚthn t¾n ·htorik¾n tšcnhn ™pist£menoj, ™x ïn dÁlon Óti ™sèzeto. [8.18] tîn d
nàn feromšnwn tecnikÕj prîtoj LollianÕj fa…netai ˜pt¦ mÒnaj st£seij e„pèn, kaˆ `ErmagÒraj met' aÙtÕn pšnte,8 met¦ toÚtouj Ð MinoukianÒj. lšgetai d
prîtoj Ð MinoukianÕj e„j t¦j dekatre‹j st£seij diele‹n, kaˆ ÑnÒmata ¢pÕ toà skopoà tÁj ¢polog…aj poi»sasqai. met¦ d
toàton `Ermogšnhj ™gšneto, gšnei m
n ™k Tarsoà tÁj Kilik…aj, uƒÕj Kall…ppou neèteroj, sfÒdra taÚthn t¾n tšcnhn sunqe…j: lšgetai g¦r Ñktwkaidekašthj proselqe‹n 'Adrianù tù basile‹ lšgwn, `¼kw soi basileà ·»twr paidagwgoÚmenoj, ·»twr ¹lik…aj deÒmenoj' [Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 2.7 (577-8)]. genÒmenoj d
e‡kosi pšnte ™tîn lšgetai pantelîj ™kstÁnai, éste kaˆ ¢gnoÁsai § aÙtÕj sunšqhken.

F2b Anon. PS 59.21-60.17 e„ ™k qeoà p©n ¢gaqÒn, ™k qeoà kaˆ ¹ ·htorik»: ¢gaqÕn g¦r oâsa ™k qeoà ™stin. e„ ™n qeo‹j ¹ ·htorik», fa…netai “Omhroj lšgwn, `oƒ d
qeoˆ p¦r Zhnˆ kaq»menoi ºgorÒwnto' [Iliad 4.1], Ó ™sti tÁj ·htorikÁj. e… ™n ¼rwsin, æj “Omhroj, `œpea nif£desin ™o…kota' [Iliad 3.222]. Óti ¢pÕ tîn ¹rèwn ™n Sikel…v eØršqh Fal£ridoj ™pask»santoj tÕ lšgein. eta KÒrax kaˆ Tis…aj, Ð maqht¾j aÙtoà. eta Gorg…aj Ð Leont‹noj e„j 'Aq»naj kaˆ 'Isokr£thj œgrayan tšcnaj kaˆ meg£loi ™gšnonto kaˆ ™p…shmon tÕ tÁj ·htorikÁj Ônoma ™po…hsan ™n tÍ `Ell£di. Óti kat¦ t¦ Makedonik¦ ™sbšsqh tÕ tîn ·htÒrwn Ônoma kaˆ feuktÕn kaˆ barÝ kaˆ Ðlok…ndunon ™dÒkei. 'Ant…patroj d
™x 'Aqhnîn ·»toraj ¢pškteine b kaˆ r ™k p£shj tÁj `Ell£doj. œpeita ¢kmas£ntwn tîn `RwmaŽkîn pragm£twn `ErmagÒraj 7

oÜte œscon tÕ: Isocrates’ text reads Øpšsconto. Comparison with RG 5.79.10-15 and PS 60.13-15 (F2b) shows that the two names have been accidentally transposed here. See Gloeckner (1901) 52f.

8

73

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION œgraye politik¾n tšcnhn kaˆ LollianÒj. `ErmagÒraj st£seij oden ˜pt£, LollianÕj d
pšnte. prîtoj d
MinoukianÕj ™xšqeto perˆ tîn ig/ st£sewn. œpeita genÒmenoj Ð `ErmÒgenhj toÚtou pollÁj ¢safe…a katšgnw, aÙtÕj d
met¦ ¢kr…beiaj ™xšqeto æj toà Minoukianoà prokr…nesqai. F3 Nicolaus Progymnasmata 55.18-20 Felten diÕ Øp' ™ke‹na t¦ par¦ tù KornoÚtJ ÑnomazÒmena kaˆ Porfur…J ¤panta cr¾ peir©sqai ¢n£gein t¦ pr£gmata.9 F4a Syrianus 2.14.9-14 (Porphyry 416F Smith) diÒper kalîj kaˆ Ð PorfÚrioj ™n tÍ perˆ tîn st£sewn tšcnV ™ke‹nÒ fhsin, ¹l…kon ¹ tîn nohm£twn eÛresij ™n lÒgJ dÚnatai mhnÚwn, `toà g¦r lÒgou yuc¾n dokoàntoj œcein kaˆ sîma ¹ m
n tîn nohm£twn eÛresij dika…wj ¨n yuc¾ toà lÒgou nom…zoito, ¹ d
˜rmhne…a sîma.' F4b Syrianus 1.93.9-13 (apparatus to Porphyry 416F Smith) Óqen kaˆ Ð filÒsofoj PorfÚrioj prÕj t¦ toiaàta kalîj ¢poblšyaj œfh l…an eâ ™cÒntwj, Óti d¾ toà lÒgou yuc¾n dokoàntoj œcein kaˆ sîma ¹ m
n tîn nohm£twn eÛresij dika…wj ¨n yuc¾ toà lÒgou nom…zoito, ¹ d
˜rmhne…a sîma. F4c Anon. RG 7.1086.12-7.1 Óqen kaˆ Ð filÒsofoj PorfÚrioj prÕj t¦ toiaàta kalîj ¢poblšyaj œfh l…an nounecÒntwj, Óti d¾ toà lÒgou yuc¾n dokoàntoj kaˆ sîma œcein, ¹ m
n tîn nohm£twn eÛresij dika…wj ¨n yuc¾ toà lÒgou nom…zoito, ¹ d
˜rmhne…a sîma: PorfÚrioj oân fhsi yuc¾n kaˆ sîma œcein tÕn lÒgon, kaˆ kalîj ¢pofa…netai. F5 Anon., Par. 3032 fol. 137r (Porphyry 417F Smith)10 Óti Ð PorfÚrioj ™n tÍ sunagwgÍ tïn ·htorikîn zhthm£twn fhs…n, Óti tr…a e„sˆn t¦ genikètata zht»mata: e„ ™stin, t… ™stin, Ðpo‹Òn ti ™stin. kaˆ tÕ m
n e„ ™stin ™stin ™n tù ÓrJ, tÕ d
Ðpo‹Òn ti ™stin ™n ta‹j ¥llaij. F6a Anon. RG 7.921.2-4 aÙt…ka goàn Ð filÒsofoj PorfÚrioj ™n tù perˆ tîn st£sewn tšcnV peristatik£ fhsin ˜pt£: prÒswpon, pr©gma, crÒnon, tÒpon, trÒpon, a„t…an, Ûlhn. F6b Maximus Planudes RG 5.466.18f. ... toÝj lšgontaj, ïn kaˆ PorfÚrioj Ð filÒsofÒj ™stin, ›bdomon peristatikÕn t¾n Ûlhn.

9

Cf. 54.23-5 (panhgurikÒn ... dikanikÕn kaˆ sumbouletikÒn), 3.20-4.5 etc. See also F1b. Rabe (1907) 561 n.2. I have added zhte‹tai to Rabe’s supplement.

10

74

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION F7 Porphyry RG 4.397.8-399.26 [397.8]

™peid¾ t¦ ¢p' ¢rcÁj ¥cri tšlouj shme‹a poioÚmenoj Ð kat»goroj doke‹ bi£zesqai tÕn dikast¾n kaˆ pe…qein æj toà ™gkaloumšnou ›neken taàta pepo…hken Ð feÚgwn, de‹ prÕj toàto ¢gwn…zesqai tÕn feÚgonta, kaˆ m¾ toà ™piferomšnou ¢dik»matoj ›neken f£skein pepoihkšnai À e„rhkšnai À tÕ p£qoj sumbebhkšnai. toàto g£r ™stin ¹ met£qesij tÁj a„t…aj, Ö crîma prosagoreÚousin oƒ `ErmagÒreioi. [397.15]

Øp£rcei d
lÚsij tîn ¢p' ¢rcÁj ¥cri tšlouj, lÚsij d
met¦ ¢ntiqšsewj: kaˆ œstai À ¢ntistatik¾ À metastatik¾ À ¢ntegklhmatik¾ À suggnwmonik». ¢ntistatik¾ m
n ™¦n ÔfelÒj ti probalèmeqa, oŒon `¢nalamb£nw toÝj ¢pokhrÚktouj, †na m¾ ¢poroàntej ™pˆ klop¾n À ™piboul¾n tr£pwntai.' k¢ke‹na d
Ðmo…wj ¢ntistatik£, Ótan Ópla œcwn kr…nhtai turann…doj ™piqšsewj: ™re‹ g¦r Óti `ful£ttw tÍ pÒlei e„j ¢nagka…an ™p…dosin.' <metastatik¾ d
... ¢ntegklhmatik¾ d
... > suggnwmonik¦ d
Ósa lamb£netai Øp' ¢gno…aj À mšqhj (oŒon ploÚsioj nšoj êmosen ™n sumpos…J turann»sein: lšxei g¦r Óti `™n eÙwc…v kaˆ mšqV oÙdeˆj ¢pÕ tîn legomšnwn polupragmone‹') kaˆ ¢pÕ tÁj ¹lik…aj (`nšwn ™stˆ tÕ kaˆ turann…daj ¢peile‹n kaˆ toiaàta ¢lazoneÚesqai'): kaˆ ¢pÕ ™lšou ™stˆ met£qesij, æj ™pˆ toà q£ptontoj tÕ neosfag
j sîma (Óti `™leîn œqapton'). ditt¾ d
tîn crwm£twn ¹ ¢nwt£tw diafor¦. t¦ m
n g¦r ™n11 tÍ Øpoqšsei ke…mena eØr…skomen, t¦ d
aÙtoˆ œxwqen eØr…skomen kaˆ porizÒmeqa. paršcei m
n oân aÙt¾ ¹ ØpÒqesij æj ™pˆ toà ¢llotr…v gunaikˆ t£lanton katalipÒntoj ™n diaq»kaij kaˆ e„pÒntoj `swfrosÚnhj ›neka katale…pw', eta krinomšnhj moice…aj. ™ntaàqa g¦r tÕ crîma ke‹tai ™n tù zht»mati, Óti di¦ swfrosÚnhn ¹ c£rij. œxwqen d
tÁj Øpoqšsewj, Ótan aÙtoˆ zhtoàntej tÕ crîma porizèmeqa, æj Ð ¢forîn e„j t¾n ¢krÒpolin ploÚsioj: f»sei g¦r ™lee‹n toÝj turannoumšnouj. [397.30]

[398.9]

perˆ d
posÒthtoj tîn crwm£twn, pÒteron ple…osi crhstšon À ˜nˆ kaˆ pÒteron peplanhmšnoij À sumfwnoàsin, e‡rhtai. [398.11] ™kb£llei d
tÕ crîma toà feÚgontoj Ð kat»goroj ™k tÁj toà ¢koloÚqou ¢nairšsewj À ¢pait»sewj. oŒon PeriklÁj par¦ Megareàsi kr…netai di¦ tÕ y»fisma ™ke‹se katenecqe…j. lšxei g¦r `Øp
r Ømîn pepo…hka: mellÒntwn g¦r 'Aqhna…wn strateÚein ™f' Øm©j œsthsa tù yhf…smati t¾n Ñrg»n.' Ð d
™nant…oj ™k tÁj toà ¢koloÚqou ¢pait»sewj ™kbale‹ lšgwn Óti `crÁn se toigaroàn Ûsteron làsai.' ¹ sunagwg¾ d
toÚtou ™k tÁj toà ¢koloÚqou ¢nairšsewj: `oÙ to…nun ™po…hsaj toàto: oÙk ¥ra Megareàsi carizÒmenoj œgrayaj.' ™n g¦r tÍ tîn ™x ¢kolouq…aj ¢pait»sei prot£ttetai m
n tÕ kat¦ qšsin, ›petai d
tÕ kat¦ ¢na…resin. †kat¦ ¢na…resin d
p£lin tÕn trÒpon† prot£ttontej di¦ tÁj qšsewj

11

™n Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 58); om. Walz (397.31).

75

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION kataskeu£zomen,12 oŒon: `Øp
r ¹mîn œprattej: oÙk œdei se ™pime‹nai tÍ toà pinak…ou grafÍ oÙd
Lakedaimon…oij ™nstÁnai13 ¢xioàsi tÕ y»fisma ¢nele‹n. ™po…hsaj d
taàta kaˆ ™nšsthj: oÙk ¥ra tÍ prÕj Megaršaj eÙno…v toàto œpraxaj.' Ðmo…wj d
kaˆ ™pˆ toà tršfontoj toÝj ¢pokhrÚktouj: ™re‹ m
n Ð tršfwn `Øp
r tÁj pÒlewj pepo…hka, †na m¾ sp£nei tîn ™pithde…wn ™pibouleÚswsi tÍ pÒlei', Ð d
lÚsei lšgwn `™n sp£nei tÁj pÒlewj oÜshj œdei filotime‹sqai s‹ton À deomšnV crhm£twn e„sfšrein: ¢ll¦ m¾n oÙk ™car…sw, oÙk ¥ra eÙno…v pepo…hkaj.' toàto p£lin ™x ¢koloÚqou ¢pait»sewj, eta ¢nairšsewj. À p£lin `¢ll' ™leîn œtrefon', Ð d
™kb£llei lšgwn `™crÁn toÝj o„ke…ouj toÝj gšnei pros»kontaj, toÝj ¢tucoàntaj tîn politîn, oÙcˆ toÝj ponhrot£touj', Ó ™stin ™k tÁj toà ¢koloÚqou ¢pait»sewj. kaˆ Dhmosqšnhj ™n tù parapresbe…aj lšgontoj A„sc…nou perˆ Fwkšwn Óti `ºpat»qhn', Óra pîj ™kbol¾n ™poi»sato toà crèmatoj: `œdei to…nun mise‹n tÕn ¢pat»santa14, ¢ll¦ m¾n oÙ mise‹j, oÙk ¥ra ºpat»qhj' [cf. 19.102-4]. ™k d
tÁj ¢nairšsewj oÛtwj: `oÙk ™crÁn toÝj o„ke…ouj perior©n, oÙd
perˆ toÝj loipoÝj Øbrist¾n enai kaˆ ¢gnèmona: kaˆ perˆ toÝj pol…taj d
Øp£rceij b…aioj kaˆ perˆ toÝj o„ke…ouj ¢gnèmwn: oÙk ¥ra oÜte khdemon…v tÁj pÒlewj, oÜte o‡ktJ toÚtouj tršfeij.' kaˆ Ð Dhmosqšnhj ™x ¢nairšsewj: `toÚtwn oÙdšna ¢koÚw tîn lÒgwn, oÙd
Øme‹j' [19.109]. [399.18] de‹ d
kaˆ ¢pÕ tîn prooim…wn ¢naire‹n t¦ crèmata, Ö d¾ kaˆ Dhmosqšnhj e‡wqe poie‹n ™pˆ tîn ¢ntiqšsewn, prolÚwn prÕ kairoà t¦j ¢ntiqšseij. [399.20]

œstin ™kbol¾ crwm£twn kaˆ ¹ tîn a„tiîn Øpexa…resij. proanairoàmen g¦r t¦ ¥lla p£nta †na e„j žn perikle…swmen tÕn ¢nt…dikon, oŒon æj ™pˆ tÁj krinomšnhj moice…aj ™peid¾ nÚktwr ™d£kruen: ™re‹ Ð kat»goroj `oÙ pat»r soi tšqnhken, oÙk ¢delfÕj, oÙ pa‹dej': ú kaˆ Dhmosqšnhj ™cr»sato lšgwn `™¦n de…xVj æj di' eÙ»qeian À ¥gnoian' [19.98]. F8 Sopater Division of Questions 35.20-2615 met¦ taàta q»seij paragrafikÒn, éj fhsi PorfÚrioj, ¢pÕ toà trÒpou. fhsˆ g¦r oÙk eÜlogon enai t¾n toà suneidÒtoj kathgor…an, m¾ ™n nom…mJ dikasthr…J kriqšntwn ™ke…nwn mhd
¡lÒntwn kat¦ toÝj nÒmouj, ¢ll' ØpopesÒntwn ™cqrîn kakohqe…v. tin
j m
n oân ™pˆ toÚtou toà zht»matoj kaˆ tîn toioÚtwn crîntai paragrafikù, tin
j d
oÜ.

12

The text here (398.23f.) is clearly corrupt. kat¦ ¢na…resin is assimilated to end of previous sentence. Possibly: kaˆ t¾n ¢na…resin d
p£lin tÕn trÒpon prot£ttontej di¦ tÁj qšsewj kataskeu£zomen. 13 ™kstÁnai Walz. 14 ¢pat»santa Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 77); ¢pat»sonta Walz (399.10f.). 15 Text: Innes and Winterbottom (1988) 39f.

76

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION F9 ‘Sopater and Marcellinus’ RG 4.520.20-522.26 ™x ïn d
t¦ ¢p' ¢rcÁj ¥cri tšlouj aÙx»somen, ™k tîn aÙtîn kaˆ t¾n phlikÒthta ™rgasÒmeqa. kaˆ œ<s>ti prîtoj m
n tÒpoj tîn aÙxhtikîn ™piceirhm£twn Ð ¢pÕ tÁj posÒthtoj: œ<s>ti d
oátoj toioàtoj, Ót' ¨n di' ˜nÕj toà pracqšntoj poll¦ œcwmen À t¦ kakourghqšnta À t¦ eÙergethqšnta deiknÚnai: deÚteron ¢pÕ toà poioà, oŒon t…ni diafšrei, pÒteron tÍ pÒlei À tù paqÒnti, kaˆ pÒteron dhmos…v t¾n pÒlin ºd…khsen À eÙhrgšthsen À „d…v Ð toàto poi»saj. [520.20]

[520.28]

kataskeu£somen d
taàta

¢pÕ tîn telikîn: - ¢pÕ toà ™ndÒxou16 e„ tÚcoi, Óti dÒxan poll¾n tÕ pracq
n proxene‹ tÍ pÒlei À ¢dox…an kaˆ Ûbrin. - ¢pÕ toà kaloà, Óti kalÕn tÕ pepragmšnon À p£lin a„scrÒn. ¢pÕ tîn parakolouqoÚntwn tÍ pr£xei: œsti d
taàta, æj poll£kij ded»lwtai, prÒswpon, tÒpoj, trÒpoj, crÒnoj, a„t…a, gnèmh, kat¦ d
PorfÚrion kaˆ kairÕj kaˆ Ûlh. kaˆ 17 „diÒthj, ¹lik…a, ¢x…a, ™pit»deusij, tÚch. tÕ e„kÕj toà kairoà, tÕ e„kÕj toà trÒpou, tÕ e„kÕj toà tÒpou, tÕ e„kÕj tÁj a„t…aj. [521.4] - ¢pÕ prosèpou, oŒon `Øme‹j g¦r, ð ¥ndrej 'Aqhna‹oi, Lakedaimon…wn gÁj kaˆ qal£tthj ¢rcÒntwn kaˆ t¦ kÚklJ tÁj 'AttikÁj katecÒntwn ¡rmosta‹j kaˆ froura‹j, T£nagran, EÜboian, t¾n Boiwt…an ¤pasan' [Dem. 18.96]. - ¢pÕ toà tÒpou: e„ g¦r oÙk ™n parabÚstJ ¢ll' ™n ™pifane…v gšgonen ¹ pr©xij, mšga tÕ ¢d…khma di¦ tÕ ™p…shmon toà cwr…ou. - ¢pÕ toà kairoà: e„ g¦r ™n cre…v Ônta ºd…khsen À eâ ™po…hse, mšga tÕ ¢d…khma À eÙergšthma. - ¢pÕ toà trÒpou, e„ ·vd…wj À calepîj, À peiqo‹ À b…v: ˜k£teron g¦r aÙx»seij, tÕ m
n Øperoc¾n shma…nein tÁj toà pepoihkÒtoj ¢ndre…aj, tÕ d
tšcnhj Øperbol¾n À sunšsewj. - ¢pÕ tÁj Ûlhj, <e„> œcoi ti qaumastÕn kat¦ t¦j ¢form¦j À par£doxon. - ¢pÕ tÁj a„t…aj: e„ g¦r di¦ prÒfasin gšgone sfÒdra ™painoumšnhn À yegomšnhn, mšga tÕ pracqšn, ésper ¹ kat£lusij tÁj turann…doj di' ™leuqer…an. - ¢pÕ tÁj gnèmhj, oŒon e„ eÙnoîn, À dÚsnouj ên.

¢pÕ posÒthtoj: - kat¦ prÒswpon, Óti e„j polloÝj ¢nqrèpouj À çfšleia, À bl£bh. - kat¦ crÒnon, Óti e„j polloÝj diate…nei crÒnouj, æj ™pˆ 16

toà

eÙdÒxou Walz. For the phrase cf. Hermogenes 44.8-10 (referring to the topics of encomium); but the supplement is, of course, very uncertain. 17

77

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION katalÚsantoj t¾n turann…da, Óti ¢dioj ¹ eÙerges…a: oÙdeˆj g¦r œti turann»sei, ˜kÒntoj toÚtou t¾n turann…da ¢porr…yantoj. - ¢pÕ posÒthtoj kat¦ t¦ ˜pÒmena, Óti meg£la t¦ ™pakolouqoànta kaˆ poll£: - ¢pÕ „diÒthtoj, Ótan lšgwmen Óti prîtoj À mÒnoj t¦ toiaàta ™tÒlmhsen, æj Ð Dhmosqšnhj ™n tù perˆ toà stef£nou: `kaˆ m¾n Óti polloÝj m
n ™stefanèkate ½dh tîn politeuomšnwn ¤pantej ‡ste: di' Óntina d
¥llon ¹ pÒlij ™stef£nwtai, sÚmboulon lšgw kaˆ ·»tora, pl¾n di' ™mš, oÙd' ¨n eŒj e„pe‹n œcoite' [Dem. 18.94]. - ¢pÕ tÁj ¹lik…aj, e„ nšoj ín À gšrwn, e„ qarralšoj À eÙlab»j. - ¢pÕ tÁj ¢x…aj, e„ „dièthj À ¥rcwn. - ¢pÕ tÁj ™pithdeÚsewj, e„ gewrgÕj À œmporoj. - ¢pÕ tÁj tÚchj, e„ pšnhj À ploÚsioj. - ¢pÕ toà gšnouj, e„ “Ellhn À b£rbaroj. - ¢pÕ fÚsewj, e„ ¢n¾r À gun». ¢pÕ toà e„kÒtoj: - e„ par¦18 tÕ e„kÕj toà tÒpou ¹ pr©xij pšpraktai, e„ Ópou mhdeˆj ¨n prosedÒkhsen. - e„ par¦ tÕ e„kÕj toà kairoà, Óte mhdeˆj ØpenÒhsen. - e„ par¦ tÕ e„kÕj toà trÒpou, Óti e„kÕj toiùde trÒpJ, Ó ™sti paradÒxJ trÒpJ: oŒon tšcnaij, mhcana‹j, lÒgoij, di' Ón tij oÙ prosedÒkhse trÒpon. - par¦ tÕ e„kÕj tÁj a„t…aj, Óti toi£de a„t…a. [522.12]

filot…mwj m
n oân ¹me‹j toÝj trÒpouj Øpex»lqomen, ¢rkšsousi d' aƒ ™piceir»seij tÍ phlikÒthti aƒ ¢pÕ toà ™somšnou, Ót' ¨n poll¦ kaˆ meg£la deiknÚein œcwmen t¦ ¢poba…nonta, oŒon: `deinÕn tÕ t¦ ƒer¦ ™pano…gein kaˆ t¦ ™n aÙto‹j klšptein, k¨n m¾ ƒer¦ tugc£nV: oÜte g¦r tÕ ¢sfal
j ›xousin aƒ tîn „diwtîn parakataqÁkai, kaˆ ™k toÚtwn ¢dikoàsin ™pˆ t¦ ¢naq»mata, katafronhq»setai t¦ ƒer£, Øperofq»setai ¹ eÙsšbeia, ¢pole‹tai t¦ par¦ tîn politîn keim»lia. e„ g¦r mhd
oƒ neë ¢xiÒpista fulakt»ria, t… perˆ tîn ™n ta‹j o„k…aij tamie…wn ØpolhyÒmeqa;' ™piceir»somen kaˆ ¢pÕ toà ™l£ttonoj: `Ópou g¦r, e„ kaˆ ¢nšJxe mÒnon, oÙk ¨n ™xšfuge t¾n tîn ƒerosÚlwn a„t…an, scolÍ ge nàn ÐpÒte prÕj tù ¢no‹xai kaˆ Øfe…leto'. [522.25]

aƒ m
n oân aÙx»seij ™k toÚtwn: aƒ d
meièseij ™k tîn ™nant…wn.

F10 Anon. RG 7.235.4-2119 kaˆ aØt¾ m
n ¹ diafor¦ œnqa p£qoj ti kaˆ ¥dikoj pr©xij ØpÒkeitai. œnqa d
m¾ toàto (æj ™n ™ke…nV tÍ ¢ntil»yei: Klšwnoj ™paggellomšnou t¦ perˆ PÚlou 'Alkibi£dhj ™gšla, kaˆ kr…netai Ûbrewj) ˜tšra diafor¦ ¹ kat¦ 18 19

perˆ Walz. Cf. Maximus Planudes RG 5.266.13-15.

78

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION PorfÚrion: ™n m
n g¦r tÍ ¢ntil»yei Ólon tÕ pr©gma sugkecèrhtai, ™n d
tÍ metal»yei oÙc Ólon (oŒon tÕ gel©n 'Alkibi£dhn kat¦ p£nta sugkecèrhtai kaˆ crÒnon kaˆ tÒpon: tÕ d
¢poktinnÚnai tÕn pšnhta kat£kriton Ônta oÙ sugkecèrhtai p£ntV) ... kat¦ Paàlon d
tÕn ¹mšteron ¢kribestšran diafor¦n prosqetšon, Óti ¹ m
n met£lhyij ¢pÕ nÒmou tinÕj ¢eˆ lamb£netai, ¹ d
¢ntil»yewj À ¢pÕ œqouj À ¢pÕ fÚsewj À ¢pÕ nÒmou. prÕj mšn oân tÕ ¢pÕ fÚsewj kaˆ œqouj oÙd
m…a ¨n gšnoito koinwn…a Ólwj, prÕj d
tÕ ¢pÕ nÒmou, œnqa koinwnoàsi mÒnon, ¢pÒcrh [oân] ¹ Porfur…ou. F11a Anon. RG 7.203.22-204.4 ¥meinon d
taÚthn paršntaj t¾n Porfur…ou diafor¦n paradšcesqai. œsti d
aÛth: e„ m
n e‡h tÕ ¢d…khma oŒon ™ndecÒmenon m¾ genšsqai ¢ll¦ qerape…aj tetuchkšnai tinÒj, met£stasij g…netai, oŒon nÒmoj tÕn presbeut¾n e‡sw l/ ¹merîn ™xišnai labÒnta par¦ toà tam…ou cil…aj dracm¦j e„j ™fÒdion, m¾ labèn tij kaˆ katame…naj kr…netai: toàto g¦r ™ndšchto m¾ genšsqai tÕ ¢d…khma, dunamšnou toà presbeutoà À dane…sasqai À o„ke‹a ™cÒnta ™fÒdia ™xelqe‹n. ™¦n d
Ï m¾ ™ndecÒmenon ˜tšrwj gegenÁsqai, suggnèmhn poie‹, oŒon ceimînoj ™pilabÒntoj oÙk ¢ne…lonto oƒ strathgoˆ t¦ sèmata tîn pesÒntwn ™n 'ArginoÚsaij kat¦ t¾n m£chn kaˆ kr…nontai: oÙ g¦r ºdÚnantÒ tina qerape…an pros£gein tù ™k ceimînoj kwlÚmati. F11b Christophorus fol. 101v-102r20 Ð d
PorfÚriÒj taÚthn lšgei diafor£n, Óti e„ m
n e‡h tÕ ¢d…khma oŒon ™ndecÒmenon m¾ gegenÁsqai ¢ll¦ qerape…aj tetuchkšnai tinÒj, met£stasij g…netai, oŒon æj ™pˆ toà presbeutoà: dunatÕn g¦r Ãn ¢llacÒqen aÙtÕn labÒnta ™fÒdia presbeàsai. ™¦n d
Ï m¾ ™ndecÒmenon ˜tšrwj gegenÁsqai ¢ll¦ p©sa ¢n£gkh pracqÁnai tÕ pracqšn, suggnèmhn poie‹, æj ™pˆ tîn m¾ ¢nelomšnwn dška strathgîn t¦ tîn pesÒntwn sèmata toà ceimînoj dialabÒntoj: oÙ g¦r Ân dunatÒn tina qerape…an prosagage‹n tù ™k ceimînoj kwlÚmati. taÚtV sunÇnesen EÙst£qioj. F11c Maximus Planudes RG 5.261.1-4 Ð d
PorfÚriÒj fhsin æj e„ m
n e‡h tÕ ¢d…khma oŒon ™ndecÒmenon m¾ gegenÁsqai ¢ll¦ qerape…aj tetuchkšnai tinÒj, met£stasij g…netai: ™¦n d
Ï m¾ ™ndecÒmenon ˜tšrwj gegenÁsqai, suggnèmhn œti zhtoàsi. F12a Anon. RG 7.596.14-2021 toàto d
œfhn ™pe… tinej kaˆ ›tera kef£laia tÁj pragmatikÁj pareil»fasin, ïn toÝj m
n ¢shmotšrouj parapšmyomai ™piceir»mat£ tina l…an eÙ»qwj e„j t¾n kefala…wn paralabÒntaj t£xin, Porfur…ou d


20 21

Rabe (1895) 247; Schilling (1903) 731. Cf. Maximus Planudes RG 5.346.20-22.

79

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION poi»somai mn»mhn, Öj ™n to‹j kefala…oij tÁj pragmatikÁj t»n te phlikÒthta kaˆ tÕ prÒj ti ¢phriqm»sato. F12b Georgius fol. 214v22 ¥lloi d
, ïn ™sti kaˆ Mhtrof£nhj te kaˆ PorfÚrioj, ™mp…ptein fasˆn ™n tÍ pragmatikÍ t¦ aÙxhtik¦ dÚo kef£laia, t¾n phlikÒtht£ tš fhmi kaˆ tÕ prÒj ti. F13a Marcellinus RG 4.268.16-269.1 de‹ t¦ dÚo ·ht¦ ™n ¢ntinom…v kekurwmšna enai. toàto d
epon ™peid¾ sumba…nei tÕ m
n žn p£lai kekurîsqai, tÕ d
žn nàn e„s£gesqai: toàto d
oÙ poie‹ ¢ntinom…an, ¢ll¦ pragmatik»n, éj fhsin Ð PorfÚrioj. oŒon nÒmoj ™kšleue ™n trisˆn ¹mšraij perˆ polšmou bouleÚesqai, 'El£teian kateilhfÒtoj Fil…ppou gr£fei Dhmosqšnhj aÙqhmerÕn ™xišnai, A„sc…nhj ¢ntilšgei. ™n toÚtJ g¦r Ð m
n nÒmoj kekÚrwtai, tÕ d
e„sferÒmenon y»fisma dokimasqÁnai de‹. œoike d
m©llon Ð PorfÚrioj ¢gnoe‹n t¾n diafor¦n pragmatikÁj tÁj kat¦ ¢ntinom…an kaˆ ¢ntinom…aj aÙtÁj: œsti g¦r Óte kaˆ ¹ pragmatik¾ kekurwmšnouj œcei toÝj dÚo nÒmouj, ¢ll' ™n m
n tÍ ¢ntinom…v ™pˆ ½dh parabebasmšnJ nÒmJ ¹ kr…sij, ™n d
tÍ pragmatikÍ boul» ™sti kaˆ skšyij t…na m
n de‹ parabÁnai tîn nÒmwn, po‹on d
™©sai kekurwmšnon. F13b Nilus fol. 170v23 kaˆ Ð PorfÚrioj œlegen Óti ¹ ¢ntinom…a ¢pÕ dÚo ·htîn kekurhmšnwn qšlei enai. F14 Sopater Division of Questions 381.29-382.2 eta ¹ phlikÒthj, Óti deinÕn ¹ plhg». kaˆ ™re‹j p£nta t¦ t¾n phlikÒthta kataskeu£zonta ™piceir»mata. taàta d
faner¦ ™k tîn Ðrikîn kaˆ tÁj Porfur…ou tšcnhj. F15 ‘Metrophanes, Athanasius, Porphyry, and Polemo’ RG 4.422.18-429.524 [422.18] tinšj fasin oÙk Ñrqîj ær…sqai toÝj ™pilÒgouj deuterolog…an [cf. Hermogenes 52.6f.], Ð m
n g¦r ™p…logoj œsti lÒgoj ™pˆ ta‹j ¢pode…xesi ta‹j

e„rhmšnaij ™pilegÒmenoj, ™n d
ta‹j deuterolog…aij eØr…sketai kaˆ ¥lla kef£laia kaˆ ™piceir»mata. [422.22]

`g…netai d
™n pant…' [Hermogenes 52.7]: ™peid¾ p£ntwn ™stˆ tîn lÒgwn ¹ koin¾ poiÒthj, oÙ mÒnon tîn stocastikîn, e„kÒtwj ™n tù stocasmù p©san aÙtÁj25 poie‹tai t¾n didaskal…an, †na k¢n ta‹j loipa‹j m¾

22

Schilling (1903) 751f. Gloeckner (1901) 77. 24 For the attribution see Rabe (1909) 588; Walz presents this section as part of the extract from Marcellinus beginning at 417.1. 25 aÙtÁj Py (Kowalski (1947) 123); aÙtoà Walz (422.24) 23

80

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION ¢gnoîmen. proãpšqeto26 g¦r ¹m‹n ¥nw, t¦ toà stocasmoà kef£laia kaˆ e„j t¦j ¥llaj st£seij suntele‹n. [422.27] ™p…logoj dš ™sti lÒgoj ™pˆ proeirhmšnaij ¢pode…xesin ™pilegÒmenoj, ¢qroismÕn pragm£twn kaˆ ºqîn kaˆ paqîn perišcwn

À ™p£nodoj e„rhmšnwn,27 À lÒgoj ™pirrwnnÚwn t¦ e„rhmšna.

™p…logÒj ™stin, æj m
n NeoklÁj, lÒgoj ™pˆ proeirhmšnaij ¢pode…xesin ™pilegÒmenoj, pragm£twn ¢qroismÕn kaˆ ºqîn kaˆ paqîn perišcwn. æj dš tinej, mšroj lÒgou Ûstaton ˜pÒmenon ¢pode…xesin. æj d
'Alšxandroj, lÒgoj ™pirrwnnÝj t¦ e„rhmšna. [Anon. Seg. 198-200]

[422.30]

kat¦ d
MinoukianÕn lÒgoj de…nwsin À me…wsin œcwn tîn pepragmšnwn, À lÒgoj gnîsin œcwn tîn pepragmšnwn, ™n ú kaˆ ¹ kaloumšnh diatÚpwsij À diaskeu¾ p£qoj kinoàsa kaˆ prÕj ™nargÁ tîn pepragmšnwn ™xštasin tÕn dikast¾n ¥gousa. œcousi d
oƒ ™p…logoi kaˆ parakl»seij kaˆ ¢nakefalaièseij kaˆ ™pidihg»seij. [423.3] œrgon

d
™pilÒgou kat¦ Pl£twna ™n Fa…drJ [267d]: ™n kefala…J lšgonta ØpomnÁsai ™pˆ teleutÍ toÝj ¢koÚontaj: 28

deÚteron tÕ ™paine‹n À yšgein: tr…ton, ¢namimn»skein t¦ e„rhmšna. [423.7] e„sfšrontai

d
`ØpÕ m
n tîn kathgÒrwn topikîj met¦ t¦j ¢pode…xeij katatrecÒntwn:

œrgon d
™pilÒgou Pl£twn m
n ™n Fa…drJ fhs…n [267d]: `™n kefala…J katalšgonta ØpomnÁsai ™piteleutikoÝj toÝj ¢koÚontaj tîn e„rhmšnwn.' œcetai d
tÁj aÙtÁj dÒxhj kaˆ CrÚsippoj: kaˆ g¦r aÙtÕj monomerÁ fhsi tÕn ™p…logon. 'Aristotšlhj d
™n ta‹j Qeodektika‹j tšcnaij fhs…n, Óti Ð ™p…logoj tÕ m
n kef£laion œcei protršyasqai toÝj ¢koÚontaj: protršyomen d
tricîj, e„j t¦ p£qh ¢n£gontej t¦ ˜k£stJ protreptik£. žn m
n oân œrgon ™pilÒgou tÕ t¦ p£qh diege‹rai, deÚteron tÕ ™paine‹n À yšgein: toÚtwn g¦r ™n ™pilÒgoij ¹ cèra: tr…ton d
tÕ ¢namimnÇskein t¦ e„rhmšna. [Anon. Seg. 207-8] `ØpÕ m
n tîn kathgÒrwn topikîj met¦ t¦j ¢pode…xeij katatrecÒntwn toà ™gkl»matoj, oŒon kat¦ tur£nnou À pÒrnou À Ó ti ¨n Ï tÕ œgklhma,

26

proãpšqeto Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 59); prout…qeto Walz (422.25). Cf. Aelius Aristides 4.21; Longinus Rhetoric 48.86 Patillon. [See Additional note, August 2005.] 28 ple…ona Walz: corr. Finckh. 27

81

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION

ØpÕ d
tîn feugÒntwn, ¢nakefalaioumšnwn m
n Ðmo…wj, oÙc Ðmo…wj d
crwmšnwn, ¢ll' ™leeinologoumšnwn kaˆ p£qh kinoÚntwn.'

kaˆ ™panakefalaioumšnwn ge ›kasta tîn ™pika…rwn, æj Ð Dhmosqšnhj, oŒon `sullog…sasqai d¾ boÚlomai t¦ kathgorhmšna: ¢pšdeixa mhd
n ¢lhq
j ¢phggelkÒta', kaˆ t¦ ˜xÁj [Dem. 19.177]: ØpÕ d
tîn feugÒntwn ¢nakefalaioumšnwn m
n kaˆ aÙtîn Ðmo…wj to‹j ¥lloij, oÙc Ðmo…wj d
crwmšnwn, ¢ll' ™leeinologoumšnwn te kaˆ p£qh kinoÚntwn.' [Hermogenes 52.8-17]

[423.10] Ñrqîj d
maqën Ð Pl£twn t¾n tîn ™lšwn kaˆ paqîn dio…khsin, di' ˜nÕj ÑnÒmatoj ™d»lwsen ™n tÍ ¢polog…v, t¦ ™leein¦ e„pën taàta dr£mata [Apology 35b]. œdoxe m
n g¦r ™k toà profanoàj cr»sasqai aÙto‹j, paraite‹sqai d
di¦ tÕ m¾ pršpein ¢ndrˆ filosÒfJ ™pˆ tosoàton ¢retÁj ¼konti di' ™lšou kaˆ o‡ktou por…zesqai t¾n swthr…an, scedÕn d
tù lÒgJ par»gage qaumastÍ kaˆ sfÒdra ·htorikÍ meqÒdJ crhs£menoj, di' Âj kaˆ tÕ ¢x…wma ™xÁre tÕ ˜autoà kaˆ t¾n ™k toà pr£gmatoj periginomšnhn çfšleian oÙ parVt»sato, ˜katšrJ tÕ ‡dion ¢pone…maj, filosof…v m
n tÕ semnÒn, ·htorikÍ d
tÕ tÁj ™pist»mhj o„ke‹on. æj ¢ganakt»santa g£r tina tîn dikazÒntwn Øpoqšmenoj di¦ t… Øperhfan…v kat' aÙtîn crèmenoj t¾n ™k toà ™lšou parVt»sato kr…sin, e„pèn: `t£ca ¥n tij Ømîn ¢ganakt»seien [cf. 34b], e„ m¾ met¦ pa…dwn kaˆ gunaikÕj kaˆ pollîn dakrÚwn ƒketeÚw, ™gë d
oÙd
n toÚtwn poiî: ¢ll' e„s… mo… fhsi kaˆ uƒe‹j [cf. 34d], ¢ll' oÙ sumfšrei prÕj dÒxan oÜte ™moˆ oÜte tÍ pÒlei toiaàta paqe‹n [cf. 34e]: oÙ g¦r de‹ tÕn ™n ¢xièmati ™leeinologe‹sqai'—æj oân taàta e„pën kat¦ ¢pÒkrisin ésper ™x ¢n£gkhj Øpšbale t¦ e„j œleon kinoànta toÝj dik£zontaj e„pèn: `t£ca ¥n tij Ømîn ¢ganakt»seien ¢namnhsqeˆj ˜autoà, e„ Ð m
n kaˆ ™l£ttw toÚtou toà ¢gînoj ™de»qh te kaˆ ƒkšteue toÝj dikast¦j met¦ pollîn dakrÚwn, paid…a te aÙtoà ¢nabibas£menoj †na Óti m£lista ™lehqe…h kaˆ ¥llouj f…louj kaˆ o„ke…ouj, ™gë d
oÙd
n ¥ra29 toÚtwn poi»sw, kaˆ taàta kinduneÚwn, æj ¨n dÒxaimi30, tÕn œscaton k…ndunon' kaˆ t¦ ˜xÁj [34bc]: eta ™p»gage tÕ ¢pÕ toà ¢xièmatoj tÍ meqÒdJ: `t… d¾ oân oÙd
n toÚtwn poi»sw; oÙk aÙqadiazÒmenoj, Óqen oÙd' Øm©j31 ¢tim£zwn' kaˆ t¦ loip£ [34d]. [424.9]

kaˆ toà m
n feÚgontoj tÕ ™leeinologe‹sqai ‡dion, tÕn d
kat»goron de‹ taàta ™kb£llein. poll£kij g¦r Ð œleoj tÁj kathgor…aj tÕ sfodrÕn ™klÚei. kaˆ Óti toàto meg…sthn œcei dÚnamin, ™nteàqen gno…hmen: Ð g¦r Kall…xenoj oÙk ¥llJ tinˆ œpeisen 'Aqhna…ouj katayhf…sasqai tîn strathgîn q£naton À tù toÝj o„ke…ouj tîn teteleuthkÒtwn 29

¥ra Py (Kowalski (1947) 130); «ra Walz (424.5). dÒxaimi Plato Ap. 34c. de…xaimi Py (Kowalski (1947) 140: ‘fort. deixa…mhn’); de…xai moi Walz (424.6). 31 oÙd' Øm©j Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 70); oÙdamîj Walz (424.9). 30

82

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION melaneimonoàntaj e„s£gein kaˆ dakrÚontaj kaˆ ƒkethr…aj œcontaj: oÛtw g¦r „scurÒn ™sti toàto tÕ kef£laion, éste kaˆ tÁj a„t…aj prod»lou oÜshj di' ¿n oÙk ¢ne…lonto t¦ sèmata, Ómwj oÙk ™fe…santo katayhf…sasqai tîn strathgîn oÛtw lampr¦n kaˆ meg…sthn naumac…an neninhkÒtwn. de‹ oân kaˆ tÁj ™kbolÁj „scur©j tù kathgÒrJ. t… oân poi»sei; ¢ntit£xei32 ta‹j ™leeinolog…aij t¦ telik¦ kef£laia. [424.23] œsti

d
koin¾ tîn dÚo prosèpwn ¹ koin¾ poiÒthj.

[424.24] e„dšnai mšntoi de‹, æj sumba…nei poll£kij ™pile‹yai tÕn ™p…logon, ™n…ote d
kaˆ tÕ proo…mion kaˆ t¾n di»ghsin, æj ™n ta‹j ¢pode…xesi mÒnon enai tÕ z»thma.

†na d
m¾ qaum£sV tij, e„ sumba…nei tÕ proo…mion kaˆ t¾n di»ghsin kaˆ tÕn ™p…logon parale…pesqai kaˆ ™n ¢pode…xesi mÒnaij enai tÕ z»thma, paraqhsÒmeq£ ti toioàton: fšre g¦r ™n stad…J drome‹j dÚo ¢mfisbhte‹n, tÕn m
n e„j toÝj Ûsplhgaj prÒteron e„spesÒnta, tÕn d
tÕ brabe‹on kekomismšnon: ™ntaàqa g¦r oÜte toà prooim…ou cre…a oÜte tÁj dihg»sewj oÜte ™pilÒgou, ¢ll¦ mÒnhj ¢pode…xewj. [Anon. Seg. 202]

[424.27] pronohtšon

pronohtšon d
™n to‹j ™pilÒgoij, Ópwj ™¦n kathgorîmen dÚsnoun tÕn ¢kroat¾n poi»swmen tù feÚgonti, ™¦n d
¢pologèmeqa eÜnoun ˜auto‹j tÕn ¢kroat¾n katale…ywmen. [Anon. Seg.

d
™n to‹j ™pilÒgoij, Ópwj ™¦n m
n kathgorîmen dusmenÁ tù feÚgonti tÕn ¢kroat¾n poi»swmen33, ™¦n d
¢pologèmeqa eÜnoun ˜auto‹j tÕn dikast¾n katast»swmen.

235] [424.30]

fhsˆ d
'Aristotšlhj [Rhetoric 1419b10-13] tšssara enai mšrh toà ™pilÒgou: prîton m
n tÕ e„j p£qoj ¥gein tÕn ¢kroat»n: œpeita tÕ poiÁsai to‹j m
n ™nant…oij ¢llotr…wj œcein, aÙto‹j d
o„ke…wj: kaˆ tÕ aÜxein kaˆ tapeinoàn: kaˆ teleuta‹on tÕ ¢namimn»skein. poll£kij d
oÙ p©si crhstšon ¢ll' ™n…oij.

[425.3]

di£foroi d
aƒ tîn ¢nakefalaièsewn mšqodoi par¦ to‹j ¢rca…oij. kaˆ g¦r - À ¢pÕ toà pl£smatoj kšcrhntai æj `Uper…dhj: boulÒmenoj g¦r t¦ lecqšnta ¢nakefalaièsasqai ™n pl£smati e„s»gagen. - À ¢pÕ tÁj a„t…aj, æj par¦ tù Pl£twni ™n Fa…drJ ™pˆ ta‹j prokeimšnaij a„t…aij di' §j eÙlÒgwj tîn e„rhmšnwn Øpomimn»skei. - À ¢pÕ tÁj ™paggel…aj, æj prÒteron ™paggeil£menoi ™n kefala…J t¦ ™paggelqšnta plhroàn ™qšlomen, æj œcomen ™n tù parapresbe…aj: 32 33

poi»sei; ¢ntit£xei Py (Kowalski 1940-6) 72; poi»seij; ¢ntit£xeij Walz (424.22f.). poi»swmen Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 53); om. Walz (424.29).

83

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION `sullog…sasqai d¾ boÚlomai t¦ kathgorhmšna ™x ¢rcÁj, †n' Ósa ØpescÒmhn ¢rcÒmenoj toà lÒgou de…xw pepoihkèj' [19.177]. - À ¢pÕ tÁj prÕj ›teron ¢ntexet£sewj, æj ™n tù aÙtù lÒgJ Dhmosqšnhj. prÕj ˜tšrouj g¦r ¢ntexet£zwn presbeut¦j [19.278] ¢nagka…an tÁj ¢nakefalaièsewj t¾n e„sagwg¾n ™poi»sato, æj ½dh e„r»kamen. - À kat' ™rèthsin, ¿n kaˆ daimon…an Ð ·»twr paršsceto ™n tù Øp
r toà stef£nou. boulhqeˆj g¦r p£nta ™n kefala…J diexelqe‹n t¦ ˜autoà ™gkèmia, ™peid¾ ™pacq
j Ãn34 toàto to‹j ¢koÚousi, t¾n tÁj ™rwt»sewj ™xeàre mšqodon, kaq' ¿n pompikîj ¤ma kaˆ met' ™rgas…aj ¥neu toà ™pacq
j œmelle t¾n ˜autù prosoàsan ¢ret¾n diexišnai kaˆ kat¦ ¢n£gkhn lšgwn fa…nesqai. æj ™rwtînta g¦r pepo…hke tÕn A„sc…nhn e„s£gwn oÛtwj: `eta m' ™rwt´j ¢ntˆ po…aj ¢retÁj ¢xiî tim©sqai; ™gë dš soi lšgw Óti tîn politeuomšnwn par¦ to‹j “Ellhsi diafqaršntwn ¢rxamšnwn ¢pÕ soà prètou, prÒteron m
n ØpÕ Fil…ppou, nàn d' ØpÕ 'Alex£ndrou, ™m
oÜte kairÕj oÜt' ¢ll' Ðtioàn œpeisen' [18.297f.]. - œsti kaˆ ¢pÕ sugcwr»sewj ™pˆ tù kat¦ diorismÕn sc»mati, Ótan toà ¢ntid…kou e„j ›teron meqist£ntoj, perˆ m
n toÚtou m¾ ¢kribologèmeqa, aÙtoˆ d
Ðrizèmeqa ™f' oŒj t¾n kathgor…an poioÚmeqa, æj ™n tù kat' A„sc…nou Dhmosqšnhj: A„sc…nou g¦r ¥gontoj ™pˆ C£rhta t¾n a„t…an tîn ™gklhm£twn æj strathgÒn, perˆ m
n toÚtou oÙd
n œfh diiscur…zesqai, e„ kaˆ Óti m£lista lelhqÒtwj ¢pologe‹tai Øp
r C£rhtoj, æj p£nta Øp
r tÁj pÒlewj pr£xantoj, ær…sato d
™f' oŒj A„sc…nou kathgore‹ e„pèn: `™gë g¦r oÙd
n A„sc…nhn a„tiîmai toÚtwn tîn ™n tù polšmJ pracqšntwn (toÚtwn g£r e„sin oƒ strathgoˆ ØpeÚqunoi), oÙd' Øp
r toà poi»sasqai t¾n pÒlin e„r»nhn, ¢ll' ¥cri toÚtou p£nta ¢f…hmi': eta diorismÒj: `t… oân lšgw kaˆ pÒqen ¥rcomai kathgore‹n' kaˆ t¦ ˜xÁj [19.333]. e„sˆ d
kaˆ ¥llai mšqodoi ¢nakefalaièsewn §j paraful£ttein cr¾ Ðrîntaj t¾n metace…rhsin kaq' ¿n ˜k£sth e„sÁktai, kaˆ t¦j m
n ™pika…rouj tîn metaceir»sewn dhloàntaj, t¦j d
¡plîj e„shgmšnaj paraite‹sqai. [426.17] crhstšon

d
tÍ ¢nakefalaièsei Ótan poll¦ t¦ e„rhmšna Ï, éste <m¾>35 memnÁsqai toÝj ¢koÚontaj: Ótan d
Ñl…ga Ï, parale…pomen.

Ótan m
n oân poll¦ Ï t¦ e„rhmšna, éste m¾ memnÁsqai toÝj ¢koÚontaj, tÍ ¢namn»sei crhsÒmeqa: Ótan d
Ñl…ga, parale…yomen t¾n ¢n£mnhsin. [Anon. Seg. 204]

[426.19]

eØr»somen d
diafÒrwj toÝj palaioÝj t¾n ¢nakefala…wsin poihsamšnouj.

[426.20] polloˆ m
n oân ™pˆ tšlouj ™cr»santo aÙtÍ, æj

34 35

œnioi m
n oân ™pˆ tšlouj e„sˆn aÙtÍ kecrhmšnoi, æj kaˆ ™n tÍ kathgor…v tÍ Dhm£dou

Ãn Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 52); om. Walz (425.20). Suppl. Graeven.

84

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION

™n tù kat¦ 'Aristokr£touj kaˆ ™n tù kat¦ Timokr£touj Ð Dhmosqšnhj, polloˆ d
kaˆ ™n tù mšsJ,

æj ™n tù parapresbe…aj. ™cr»santo d
aÙtÍ kaˆ metaxÝ tîn prohgoumšnwn kaˆ ¢nagka…wn p…stewn.

œsti d
kaˆ ¥lloj ¢nakefalaièsewj trÒpoj, ™pˆ ˜nˆ kefala…J genÒmenoj.

taÚtV d
diafšrousi aƒ ¢nakefalaièseij ¢ll»lwn, Óti ¹ m
n ™pˆ tšlouj toà lÒgou œkqesin œcei kefalaièdh,

¹ d
metaxÝ ¢n£mnhsin œcei36 tîn ¢nagka…wn p…stewn, ¹ d
™pˆ ˜nˆ kefala…J ginomšnh oÙkšti kefala…wn ¢n£mnhsin œcei, ¢ll¦ lhmm£twn di' ïn ¢pede…cqh tÕ proke…menon kef£laion. [426.31]

de‹ d
¢nakefalaioàsqai t¦ „scurÒtera,

36 37

™po…hsen Ð `Upere…dhj, kaˆ Ð Dhmosqšnhj ™n tù kat¦ 'Aristokr£touj kaˆ Timokr£touj. œnioi d
kaˆ kat¦ mšson toà lÒgou ™cr»santo tÍ ¢namn»sei, toutšsti tÍ ¢nakefalaièsei, æj ¢mšlei kaˆ aÙtÕj Ð Dhmosqšnhj ™n tù parapresbe…aj. ›teroi d
½dh metaxÝ tîn †proeirhmšnwn kaˆ tîn ¢nagka…wn p…stewn ¢nšmnhsan tîn prohgoumšnwn ¢pode…xewn kefalaiwdîj mšllontej perˆ tîn ¢nagka…wn dialšgesqai. œsti d
kaˆ ›teroj tÒpoj tÁj ¢namn»sewj ¹ gignÒmenoj ™pˆ ˜nˆ ¢podeicqšnti kefala…J, oŒon ... tre‹j oân œcei tÒpouj ¹ ¢n£mnhsij, toutšstin ¹ ¢nakefala…wsij, tÕn ™pˆ tšlei toà lÒgou, tÕn metaxÝ ginÒmenon tîn te ¢nagka…wn kaˆ tîn prohgoumšnwn ¢pode…xewn, kaˆ tÕn ginÒmenon ™pˆ ˜nˆ kefala…J ¢podedeigmšnJ. taÚtV d
diafšrousin ¢ll»lwn aƒ ¢namn»seij, Óti ¹ m
n ™pˆ tšlei ginomšnh toà lÒgou œkqesin œcei kefalaièdh tîn zhthm£twn ¡p£ntwn kaˆ ¢n£mnhsin tîn prohgoumšnwn ¢pode…xewn kefalaiwdîj kaˆ tîn ¢nagka…wn, ¹ d
metaxÝ gignomšnh ¢n£mnhsin perišcei tîn ¢nagka…wn p…stewn, ¹ d
™pˆ kefala…J ˜nˆ ¢podeicqšnti ginomšnh oÙk œti kefala…wn ¢n£mnhsij, ¢ll¦ tîn lhmm£twn di' ïn ¢pede…cqh tÕ proke…menon kef£laion. [‘Apsines’ 10.3.3-30 Patillon]37 ¢ll' oÙd
tîn e„rhmšnwn p£nta ¢nakefalaiwsÒmeqa, ¢ll' Ósa m
n „scurîj ™smen lelukÒtej, taàta ¢nakefalaièsasqai pros»kei,

œcei Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 53); om. Walz (426.28). The textual problems in this passage are discussed in Heath (2002) 662-67.

85

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION paralimp£nein d
t¦ saqrÒtera, æj œfamen, kaˆ tîn ™nant…wn t¢nagkaiÒtera Ðmo…wj parale…pein.

t¦ d
saqr¦ paralipe‹n. oÙ m¾n oÙd
t¦ ¢nagka‹a tîn ¢ntid…kwn kef£laia p£ntote ¢namn»somen, ¢ll' ™ke‹na, § t¾n ¢n£mnhsin ¢nagka…an œcei kaˆ ¹m‹n cr»simon. [Anon. Seg. 212]

[427.2]

eáre d
kaˆ ¥llhn Dhmosqšnhj kainotšran ¢nakefala…wsin, to‹j pršsbesin ¢ntit£xaj toÝj pršsbeaj, kaˆ gr£mmata gr£mmasin: `™peid¾ par¦ t¦ gr£mmat£, fhsin, ™pršsbeusan: oátoi d
oÙ par¦ t¦ gr£mmata;' [19.278]. [427.6]

tÒte d
de‹ cr»sasqai tÍ ™rgas…v toà koinoà tÒpou, Ótan ¹ toà tim»matoj ™xous…a perˆ toà t… cr¾ paqe‹n À38 ¢pot…sai to‹j dik£zousi katal…phtai. [427.8] poll£kij

d
tÕ paqhtikÕn

par»somen, Ótan m¾ œcV tÕ pr©gma p£qoj.

kaˆ tÕ paqhtikÕn d
mšroj æsaÚtwj: Ótan m
n g¦r perˆ tÕ pr©gma p£qoj e‡h, tÒte kin»somen: Ótan d
m¾ [e‡h], par»somen. ésper g¦r t¦ Ñl…ga kaˆ eÙmnhmÒneuta e„ p£lin ¢namn»somen, gelo‹on poi»somen, oÛtwj kaˆ t¦ m¾ œconta p£qoj ¨n paqa…nein peirasèmeqa, ¢por»santej toà toioÚtou gelo‹oi ™sÒmeqa. [Anon.Seg. 205]

[427.10]

`koin¦ d
¢mfo‹n t¦ telik¦ legÒmena kef£laia' [Hermogenes 52.19f.]: telik¦ d
e‡rhtai Óti ™pˆ tšlei tîn lÒgwn t…qetai æj kaˆ ™n tù koinù tÒpJ, À Óti žn ›kaston aÙtîn ™n ˜autù tÕ39 tšleion œcei, kaˆ oÙc ésper t¦ ¥lla ›teron ™x ˜tšrou kataskeu£zetai, ésper ¹ tîn ™lšgcwn ¢pa…thsij ™k tîn shme…wn: À Óti t¦ ¥lla p£nta kef£laia kaˆ ¡plîj e„pe‹n p£nta t¦ pr£gmata e„j taàta sunte…nei (À g¦r æj nÒmimÒn ti, À æj sumfšron, À æj d…kaion, À æj œndoxon, À éj ti toÚtwn proballÒmeqa). [427.20]

cr»setai d
toÚtoij Ð m
n feÚgwn lšgwn Óti `sumfšrei Øm‹n tÕ m¾ to‹j sukof£ntaij prosšcein kaˆ pe…qesqai: oátoi g£r e„sin oƒ t¦ koin¦ diafqe…rontej', kaˆ Óti `eÜorka paršxetai, e„ m¾ ¢d…kwj ™moà katayhfie‹sqe.' Ð d
kat»goroj ™k toà ™nant…ou, Ótan Ð feÚgwn e„s£gV40 pa‹daj kaˆ œleon, peir£setai taàta ¥kura poie‹n to‹j teliko‹j kefala…oij. [427.25] `¢f' ïnper kaˆ t¦ proo…mia' [Hermogenes 53.1f.]: dÒxei ¢ka…rwj Ð tecnikÕj ™ntaàqa prooim…wn memnÁsqai. ¢ll£ famen Óti perˆ ™pilÒgwn dialegÒmenoj, ™peid¾ poll¾n ede suggšneian ™pilÒgwn kaˆ prooim…wn (¢pÕ 38

À Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 54); om. Walz (427.8). tÕ Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 57); om. Walz (427.14) 40 e„s£gV Py (Kowalski (1940-6) 74); e„s£gei Walz (427.23). 39

86

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION g¦r tîn aÙtîn ¢mfÒtera kataskeu£zetai, kaˆ prÕj tÕ aÙtÕ ˜k£tera ™pig…netai41) ¢nagka…wj di¦ toàto mšmnhtai diafor©j, cwr…sai tÁj koinwn…aj boulÒmenoj: ¢mfÒtera g¦r À œleon À fqÒnon À p£qoj kine‹: ¢mšlei Dhmosqšnhj Ñrg¾n ™n ¢rcÍ toà prooim…ou kine‹ ™n tù kat¦ Meid…ou kathgorîn ¢sšlgeian Meid…ou [21.1]. toàto d
k¢n to‹j ™pilÒgoij poie‹ katadrom¦j topik¦j ™rgazÒmenoj. [428.4] di£foron

d
aÙtîn

tÕ scÁma kaˆ ¹ ˜rmhne…a toà lÒgou. t¦ m
n g¦r toà prooim…ou sc»mata mštria enai de‹ kaˆ ½pia kaˆ æj ¥n tij e‡poi tiqass£: ™peid¾ g¦r ™n ¢rcÍ n»fousi m©llon oƒ ¢kroataˆ, kaˆ oÜpw ¢nakek…nhtai aÙtîn tÕ p£qoj, Ðmoiopaqe‹n de‹ to‹j ¢koÚousi kaˆ ºršma probib£zein43 tÒ te ˜autîn kaˆ tÕ tîn ¢kroatîn p£qoj: œsti44 d
toàto ™¦n to‹j te sc»masi metr…oij kaˆ ta‹j lšxesi kaˆ ta‹j sunqšsesin, œti d
kaˆ ta‹j Øpokr…sesin metr…aij crèmeqa: Ð d
™p…logoj toÙnant…on kekinÁsqai to‹j sc»masin Ñfe…lei kaˆ poll¦j m
n ™kbo»seij œcein, polloÝj d
scetliasmoÚj:

kaˆ t¦ m
n proo…mia sustrof¾n œcei tÁj lšxewj, Ð d
™p…logoj lelumšnhn t¾n fr£sin.45 oÙ m¾n ¢ll¦ kaˆ Ølik» tij œsti diafor£. poll¦ g¦r tîn ™n tù prooim…J lecqšntwn oÙk ¢n£gkh lšgein ™n to‹j ™pilÒgoij, oŒon ØpopteÚeta… tij di¦ perierg…an À di¦ polupragmosÚnhn

diafšrei d
toà ™pilÒgou tÕ proo…mion, Óti ™n m
n tù prooim…J tÕ scÁma kaˆ t¾n ˜rmhne…an mštrion enai de‹ kaˆ 42 tiqassÕn æj ¨n e‡poi tij,

™n d' ™pilÒgoij tÕ scÁma sugkekinhmšnon kaˆ poll¦j m
n ™mbo»seij œcon, polloÝj d
scetliasmoÚj, t»n te ˜rmhne…an sugkeimšnhn ™k tropikÁj m©llon kaˆ shmeièdouj lšxewj, dunamšnhj mšntoi pese‹n e„j politikoÝj lÒgouj.

œti d
kaˆ toÚtJ diafšrei, Óti poll¦ tîn ™n to‹j prooim…oij oÙkšt' ™n ™pilÒgoij lektšon.

41

™pe…getai Py. ºp…an add. Anon. Seg. 237 (see below). 43 prosbib£zein RG 7.347.5. 44 œstai RG 7.347.5. 45 This section (from 428.6 ™peid¾ g¦r ™n ¢rcÍ to 428.16 lelumšnhn t¾n fr£sin) is also found in RG 7.347.2-12. 42

87

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION e„sercÒmenoj toÝj ¢gînaj: luqe…shj tÁj Øpoy…aj ™n tù prooim…J oÙk œti ¢n£gkh ™n to‹j ™pilÒgoij perˆ toÚtou lšgein. kaˆ ¥llai tinšj e„si prooimiakaˆ Ûlai, a†tinej Ótan diaperaiwqîsin ™n to‹j prooim…oij, perittÕn poioàsin ™n to‹j ™pilÒgoij tÕn perˆ ˜autîn lÒgon. e„sˆ d
kaˆ ™n to‹j ™pilÒgoij Ûlai tin
j aŒj ™n to‹j prooim…oij oÙ crèmeqa, oŒon perˆ tîn kefala…wn oÙk œcei kalîj tÕ t¦j Øpol»yeij ™n to‹j prooim…oij lamb£nein: ˜lkopoi»somen g¦r tÕ proo…mion. ™n d
to‹j ™pilÒgoij ¢n£gkh labe‹n ti aÙtîn e„j ™p…rrwsin. diafšrei oân,

Óti tÕ m
n p£qoj paraskeu£zei, Ð d
™p…logoj aÜxei. [428.30]

Ð d
feÚgwn kaˆ t¾n diabol»n ¢pode…xewn), ™n d
diarr»dhn ™kb£llein

oÙ mÒnon d
tîn prooim…wn e„s… tinej Ûlai, aŒj oÙ crèmeqa ™n ™pilÒgoij,

¢ll¦ kaˆ tîn ™pilÒgwn, ïn oÙk œstin ™n to‹j prooim…oij cre…a. poi»somen tÕ proo…mion, e„ tîn kefala…wn tîn ¢nagka…wn ™n toÚtoij t¦j Øpol»yeij lhyÒmeqa, ™n d
tù ™pilÒgJ ¢n£gkh p©sa ›n ti lamb£nein aÙtîn e„j ™p…rrwsin À para…thsin. [Anon. Seg. 19-20, cf. 237] diafšrei d
Ð ™p…logoj toà prooim…ou kaˆ kat¦ t¾n lšxin kaˆ kat¦ t¾n di£noian: kat¦ m
n t¾n lšxin, Óti ™n ™ke…nJ m
n metr…an enai de‹ kaˆ ºp…an, ™n toÚtJ d
sugkekinhmšnhn kaˆ poll¦j ™mbo»seij œcousan kaˆ scetliasmoÚj: kat¦ d
t¾n di£noian, Óti ™ke‹ m
n p£qoj ™mpoiÁsai de‹, ™ntaàqa d
proãpÕn aÙxÁsai kaˆ ™pirrîsai. [Anon. Seg. 237]

peir£setai ™n m
n to‹j prooim…oij meiîsai tÕ p£qoj (¥topon g¦r p£nth ¢naire‹n ™x ¢rcÁj prÕ tîn to‹j ™pilÒgoij met¦ t¾n ¢pÒdeixin ¢naire‹n kaˆ ™piceir»sei.

[429.3]

`æj ™n tù perˆ prooim…ou' [Hermogenes 53.13]: sÚggramm£ ™stin `Ermogšnouj perˆ prooim…ou, Ö eÛrhtai m
n ™n ta‹j ¢nagrafa‹j, oÙ fšretai dš. F16 Anon. RG 7.63.20-23 tÕn lÒgon perˆ prooim…wn poi»sasqai proeqšmeqa kaˆ oÙ perˆ tîn loipîn. ¢rkoÚntwj g¦r tù te `Ermogšnei kaˆ Porfur…J kaˆ ˜tšroij perˆ aÙtîn lšlektai.

88

MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION F17 Simplicius In Cat. 10.20-11.2 (Theophrastus fr. 683 Fortenbaugh) Ð d
PorfÚrioj skopÕn enai toà bibl…ou fhsˆn œn te tù prÕj Ged£leion kaˆ ™n tù kat¦ peàsin kaˆ ¢pÒkrisin perˆ tîn kathgoroumšnwn: aátai dš e„sin aƒ ¡pla‹ fwnaˆ aƒ shmantikaˆ tîn pragm£twn, kaqÕ shmantika… e„sin, ¢ll' oÙ kaqÕ lšxeij ¡plîj. kaqÕ m
n g¦r lšxeij, ¥llaj œcousi pragmate…aj, §j ™n tù Perˆ tîn toà lÒgou stoice…wn Ó te QeÒfrastoj ¢nakine‹ kaˆ oƒ perˆ aÙtÕn gegrafÒtej oŒon pÒteron Ônoma kaˆ ·Áma toà lÒgou stoice‹a À kaˆ ¥rqra kaˆ sÚndesmoi kaˆ ¥lla tin£ (lšxewj d
kaˆ taàta mšrh, lÒgou d
Ônoma kaˆ ·Áma), kaˆ t…j ¹ kur…a lšxij, t…j d
¹ metaforik», kaˆ t…na t¦ p£qh aÙtÁj, oŒon t… ¢pokop», t… ¢fa…resij, t…nej aƒ ¡pla‹, t…nej aƒ sÚnqetoi, t…nej aƒ ØposÚnqetoi kaˆ Ósa toiaàta, kaˆ Ósa perˆ „deîn e‡rhtai, t… tÕ saf
j ™n ta‹j lšxesin, t… tÕ megaloprepšj, t… tÕ ¹dÝ kaˆ piqanÒn.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION

2. Translation Biographical and bibliographical evidence B1 Eunapius Lives of the Sophists (a) 4.1.1f. (6.11-13 Giangrande): Porphyry had the standard education, and made such rapid progress and reached such a level of attainment that he was a pupil of Longinus and soon brought distinction to his teacher. (b) 4.1.4 (6.21-24): Under his tuition he achieved the very highest level of culture, and—like him—reached the highest level of attainment in literary studies and rhetoric; however, he was not strongly inclined to that subject, but absorbed every branch of philosophy ... (c) 4.2.2-3 (9.11-19): ... he did not omit any branch of culture. One might well be in doubt and wonder which of the things that he concerned himself with was primary—was it that which bears on rhetorical matters? or that which confers precision in literary scholarship? or that which is concerned with numbers? or that which is inclined to geometry? or that which bears on music? As for philosophy, his grasp of logic is beyond conceiving and his grasp of ethics beyond description; his grasp of physics and theurgy may be reserved for initiation rites and mysteries. To such an extent was this man a being infinitely adaptable to every excellence. (d) 4.3 (10.11-13): At this time the foremost rhetoricians in Athens were Paul and Andromachus from Syria. B2 Eusebius Praep. Evang. 10.3 (Porphyry 408F Smith) Porphyry on the Greeks being plagiarists, from Book 1 of the Literary Lectures: Giving a feast for us on Plato’s birthday in Athens, Longinus invited (among many others) the sophist Nicagoras, and Maior, Apollonius the grammarian, Demetrius the geometer, Prosenes the Peripatetic, and the Stoic Callietes. He himself was the seventh at the table with them, and as the meal progressed and a discussion about Ephorus arose among the others ... B3 Suda P2098 Porphyry, who wrote against the Christians. His proper name was Basileus; he was from Tyre, a philosopher, pupil of Amelius, Plotinus’ pupil, and teacher of Iamblichus. His floruit was in the time of Aurelian, and he survived until the emperor Diocletian. He wrote an extraordinary number of books, on philosophy, rhetoric and literary studies. He studied with Longinus the critic. On Divine Names (1 book); On First Principles (2 books); On Matter (6 books); On the Soul in reply to Boethus (5 books); On Abstinence from Animals (4 books); On ‘Know Yourself’ (4 books); On Incorporeals; On the Unity of the School of Plato and Aristotle (in 7 books); On Julian the Chaldaean’s Philosophical History (in 4 books); Against the Christians (15 books); On Homer’s Philosophy; Reply to Aristotle on the Soul being an Entelechy; Literary History (5 books); On Genus, Species, Differentia, and Proper and Accidental Properties; On the Sources of the

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION Nile according to Pindar; On the Usefulness of Homer to Kings (10 books); Miscellaneous Questions (7 books); On Thucydides’ Proem; In Reply to Aristides (7 books); On Minucianus’ Art; and many other works, especially on astronomy, including an Introduction to Astronomy in 3 books; and Grammatical Problems. This is the Porphyry who spoke in an offensively insolent way against the Christians.

Testimonia and fragments F1a Sopater RG 5.9.14-22 (Porphyry 415F Smith) Porphyry, defending Minucianus against the same criticism (since he, too, when he said that ‘the rhetor will speak on every political question’ did not go on to explain what is meant by ‘rhetor’ or ‘rhetoric’), advances this defence, which can also be appropriately spoken on Hermogenes’ behalf. He says that he was not dealing with the whole of rhetoric, but only with the judicial and deliberative branches; so it is superfluous, when examining a part, to discuss the art as a whole.46 F1b ?Marcellinus PS 293.14-26 (Porphyry 415bF Smith) Some have criticised Hermogenes: why, when he is going to write about the art of rhetoric, did he not first of all give its definition? Porphyry says that there are three kinds of rhetoric, deliberative, judicial and panegyric, and that panegyric does not fall under the doctrine of issues (since the issues involve a dispute about disputed facts, but encomia involve amplification of acknowledged goods); so then, with the removal of panegyric, rhetoric would be incomplete; but definitions are not of things that are incomplete, but of complete wholes. For this reason, he says, he did not give a definition of rhetoric, because he was not dealing with the whole of it in this treatise. F1c Athanasius PS 181.13-15 (Porphyry 415aF Smith) One should not accept Porphyry’s defence of Minucianus on behalf of Hermogenes as well. F2a Sopater RG 5.5.28-8.30 [5.28] Now that we have dealt with the nature of the art, it is necessary to deal with its origin and development as well. It existed initially among the gods. They say that Homer proves this when he says ‘the gods were sitting by Zeus’s side, gathered in assembly’ [Iliad 4.1]. It reached a peak among the heroes. In fact, Plato derives the name from this, from utterance and speaking, since he recognises the heroes as dialecticians and rhetoricians.47 The poet too is clearly familiar with examples of all kinds of rhetoric. He says that the rapid, concise and demonstrative rhetor is ‘like snowflakes’ [Iliad 3.222], and the dense and concise,

46

In the discussion that follows (9.22-14.17) there are references to ‘Porphyry’s argument’ at 5.9.27, 11.29, 14.17f. 47 See Cratylus 398de, where ‘hero’ is associated with eirein, a verb of speaking.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION but no less demonstrative, ‘at little length, but very clearly’ [Iliad 3.214]; he is also familiar with the indiscipline of demagogy, and the character of those who speak without judgement or skill, such as Thersites ‘whose head was full of vulgar abuse’ [Iliad 2.213]. [6.12] They say that the first prosecution speech was made in Athens, when Theseus was accused in connection with the death of Hippolytus. Then it went into decline. For when tyrannies arose in the cities, inevitably rhetoric, which is committed to freedom and opposed to tyranny, became a dangerous crime. It is said that in Sicily Phalaris made a demagogic speech and won over the masses by his persuasiveness, and so made himself tyrant.

Subsequently Corax was the first to establish a method of instruction in rhetoric. Those who practised the art before him did so on the basis of experience and hard work, and thus without an understanding of its rationale, or any art. But one of Corax’s pupils was Tisias, about whom this story is told. Tisias agreed to pay Corax 1000 drachmas when he won his first victory in a case in court; since Corax was rather old, he refrained from going to court, to get out of the promise by his death. So Corax sued him for the debt, and said just this to the jury: ‘If Tisias loses the case about the debt he has to pay me the 1000 drachmas, since he has won his first case in accordance with the agreement.’ Tisias replied by saying: ‘If I lose the case about the debt, I owe nothing, since I have won the case about the debt.’ This response reduced the jury to bewilderment, and they shouted ‘bad crow, bad egg’.48

[6.20]

So there came to be an intense rivalry with them with regard to the art. When Gorgias of Leontini came on an embassy to Athens he brought with him the Art which he had composed, and himself added another one. After him Antiphon of Rhamnous, the teacher of Thucydides, is said to have written another Art, and after him the rhetor Isocrates. These were all treatises on demagogic speaking, and did not contain any section on issues or the things that are now standard, but a certain kind persuasiveness needed for winning over the people. There is no dispute that the ancients did use art in their speeches, since the orators clearly declaimed the same subjects in different words and different forms speech but always in the same way—conjectural subject-matter always in the manner of conjecture and using the same heads, and practical subject-matter using the heads of the practical issue. So it is clear that they knew these things by some kind of tradition. So, then, the written treatises did not deal with these matters. That they also had written treatises on judicial oratory is clear from what Isocrates says: ‘It remains for us to consider those of our predecessors who had the audacity to write a so-called Art. They must not be let off without criticism, since they were not [7.9]

48

‘Crow’: korax. The jury might reasonably have been bewildered by exchange reported in this mangled version of the story. Corax should argue that if Tisias loses the case about the debt he has to pay (in accordance with the verdict), and if he wins the case he has to pay (under the terms of their agreement); Tisias should reply that if he wins the case about the debt he does not have to pay (in accordance with the verdict), and if he loses he does not have to pay in accordance (under the terms of their agreement). Since the confusion occurs twice in this passage it probably does not result from textual corruption.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION able49 to teach how to conduct legal cases, picking out the more captious sort of ideas’ [13.19]. However, these treatises on judicial oratory are not preserved. Whether it was in them that these heads and the issues were devised, or whether they were transmitted in some other way through instruction, it is clear that they proceeded by art; and this is evident from the fact that they all clearly declaimed subjects in similar ways. [8.5] Rhetoric reached a pinnacle in the demagogy of Demosthenes’ time. After that, in the reign of Antipater, when Hyperides’ tongue was cut out and Demosthenes died, and ninety eight rhetors from Athens are said to have been handed over, and very many from the whole of Greece, rhetoric became an object of fear, and came to nothing while the Macedonian troubles held Greece in their grip. But when the Roman empire reached its peak and a sound political order took control of the cities, especially under Hadrian and Antoninus, emperors given to rhetoric and literary scholarship, Arts were again composed. The fact that Cicero, who lived earlier than they did, also clearly knew this art of rhetoric, makes it evident that it did survive.

Of the technical writers currently in circulation, Lollianus was apparently the first. He said that there were seven issues, and after him Hermagoras said there were five.50 Minucianus was their successor. Minucianus is said to have been the first to make the division into the thirteen issues, naming them from the aim of the defence. Hermogenes came after him. He came from Tarsus in Cilicia, the son of the younger Callippus, and had a great talent in this art. He is said to have appeared before Hadrian at the age of 18, saying ‘I come before you, your majesty, a rhetor under a tutor, a rhetor in his minority.’51 At the age of 25 he is said to have gone completely insane, so that he did not even know his own compositions. [8.18]

F2b Anon. PS 59.21-60.17 If every good thing is from god, rhetoric too is from god: being a good thing, it is from god. As to the existence of rhetoric among the gods, Homer clearly says ‘the gods were sitting by Zeus’s side, gathered in assembly’ [Iliad 4.1], which belongs to rhetoric. As to the existence of rhetoric among the heroes, as Homer says ‘words like snowflakes’ [Iliad 3.222]. From the heroes it is found in Sicily, when Phalaris practised speaking. Then Corax and his pupil Tisias. Then Gorgias of Leontini, when he came to Athens, and Isocrates wrote Arts and achieved greatness, and made the name of rhetoric famous in Greece. Under Macedon the name of rhetoric was overshadowed, and was seen as something to avoid, troublesome and extremely dangerous. Antipater killed 102 rhetors from Athens from the whole of Greece. Then when Rome flourished Hermagoras wrote a Political Art, and Lollianus. Hermagoras recognised seven issues and Lollianus 49

Isocrates’ text has ‘they promised’. Our source has accidentally transposed the names of Lollianus and Hermagoras here: see n.8 above. 51 Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 2.7 (577-8). On the biographical traditions concerning Hermogenes see Heath (1998). 50

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION five. Minucianus was the first to set out the thirteen issues. Subsequently Hermogenes proved him guilty of considerable obscurity, and gave his own accurate exposition, with the result that he is preferred over Minucianus. F3 Nicolaus Progymnasmata 55.18-20 Felten So every subject-matter should be subsumed under the three named by Cornutus and Porphyry.52 F4a Syrianus 2.14.9-14 (Porphyry 416F Smith) For this reason Porphyry, in his treatise on the issues, put it well when, to indicate the full potential of the invention of thoughts in speech, he said: ‘Since speech is thought to have a soul and a body, one could justly regard the invention of thoughts as the soul of speech and expression as its body.’ F4b Syrianus 1.93.9-13 (apparatus to Porphyry 416F Smith) Hence the philosopher Porphyry, in considering these matters, said very well indeed that since speech is thought to have a soul and a body, one could justly regard the invention of thoughts as the soul of speech and expression as its body. F4c Anon. RG 7.1086.12-7.1 Hence the philosopher Porphyry, in considering these matters, said very intelligently that since speech is thought to have a soul and a body, one could justly regard the invention of thoughts as the soul of speech and expression as its body. So Porphyry says that speech has a soul and a body, and makes a good point. F5 Anon., Par. 3032 fol. 137r (Porphyry 417F Smith) Porphyry says in the Collection of Rhetorical Questions that there are three questions at the most general level: whether something exists, what it is, and what qualities it has. Whether something exists in definition, and what qualities it has in the other issues. F6a Anon. RG 7.921.2-4 The philosopher Porphyry, in his treatise on issues, says that there are seven elements of circumstance: person, act, time, place, manner, cause and material. F6b Maximus Planudes RG 5.466.18f. ... those who say (among whom the philosopher Porphyry is included) that matter is a seventh element of circumstance.

52

The reference is to the three classes of oratory: cf. 54.23-5 (‘panegyric ... judicial and deliberative’), 3.20-4.5 etc. See also F1b.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION F7 Porphyry RG 4.397.8-399.26 Since the prosecutor, in making the sequence of events into signs, seems to coerce the juror and persuade him that it was because of the crime of which he is accused that the defendant did these things, the defendant has to argue against this, and assert that it was not because of the alleged wrongdoing that he acted, spoke or experienced the emotion. This is the transposition of the cause, which the followers of Hermagoras call ‘gloss’. [397.8]

[397.15] It is a solution to the sequence of events, and a solution with a counterposition. It will take the form either of a counterstatement, or of a transference, or of a counteraccusation, or of a plea of mitigation. Counterstatement, if we put forward some benefit; e.g. ‘I take responsibility for the disinherited so that destitution will not make them turn to theft or conspiracy’. Likewise, it is also counterstatement when someone who has weapons is tried for conspiring to establish a tyranny; he will say ‘I am keeping them for the city for use in emergency’. Pleas of mitigation are those based on ignorance, drunkenness (e.g. the rich young man who swore at a party that he would be tyrant: he will say ‘no one takes any notice of things said in celebration and drink’); also on age (‘it is characteristic of young men to make threats about tyrannies and engage in that kind of empty bragging’); and there is a transposition based on pity, as in the case of the man burying the recently slain corpse (‘I buried him out of pity’).

The most general difference between glosses is twofold: some we find inherent in the subject, others we ourselves derive from other sources and furnish for ourselves. The subject itself provides one, as in the case of the man who left a talent in his will to another man’s wife, saying that he did so because of her chastity; she is then charged with adultery. Here the gloss is inherent in the question: i.e. that the gift was because of her chastity. From outside the hypothesis, when we ourselves seek out the gloss and furnish it for ourselves, as in the case of the rich man looking at the acropolis: he will say that he was feeling pity for the victims of tyranny. [397.30]

The question of the number of glosses—whether one should use many or one, and whether they should be speculative or concerted—has already been discussed. [398.9]

The prosecutor expels the defendant’s gloss by denying the consequent or demanding it. E.g.: Pericles is tried before the Megarians because of the decree, having been carried there.53 He will say: ‘I acted for your own good. When the Athenians were going to attack you I used the decree to put an end to their anger.’ The opponent will expel this by demanding the consequent, saying: ‘If that is the case, then you should have repealed it subsequently.’ The inference from this is reached by the denial of the consequent: ‘Well then, you did not do that: so it was not as a favour to the Megarians that you proposed it.’ For in the demand for the consequent the positive is put first, then the negation follows. Conversely, when [398.11]

53

I.e. by a storm or similar misadventure.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION we put the denial first we confirm it by the positive. E.g. ‘You acted for our good: then you should not have abided by what was inscribed in the public record, nor have resisted the Spartans when they asked you to revoke it. But you did this, and resisted. So it was not out of good will towards the Megarians that you did this.’ Likewise in the case of the man who looked after the disinherited; he will say: ‘I did this for the good of the city, to ensure that lack of necessities did not make them conspire against the city.’ The opponent will solve this by saying: ‘When the city was in shortage you should have sought honour by donations of grain or contributed when she needed money; but you did not do these favours, so it was not out of good will that you acted.’ This again is from the demand for the consequent, and then its denial. Or again: ‘But I looked after them out of pity.’ He will eject this by saying: ‘You should have done so to those who were your own people, those attached to you by kinship, or to citizens who suffered from misfortune—not to the most wicked.’ This is from the demand for the consequent. Demosthenes in the False Embassy, when Aeschines says with reference to Phocis that he was deceived, note how he made the ejection of the gloss: ‘Well then, you should hate the man who deceived you; but in fact you do not hate him—so you were not deceived’ [cf. 19.102-4]. And from denial thus: ‘It was not right to neglect your own people, nor to be aggressive and inconsiderate towards the rest; and you are violent towards the citizens and inconsiderate towards your own. So it is not through care for the city nor out of pity that you look after these people.’ Demosthenes too from denial: ‘I do not hear any of these words, nor do you’ [19.109]. One should eliminate the glosses right from the prologues; this was Demosthenes’ custom in the case of counterpositions—he prepared the solution to counterpositions in advance of their occurrence. [399.18]

The expulsion of glosses can also be achieved by the progressive elimination of causes. We begin by denying all the others in order to box our opponent into one, as in the case of the woman accused of adultery because she wept at night; the prosecutor will say: ‘Your father has not died, nor your brother, nor your children.’ Demosthenes made use of this when he said ‘if you show through naiveté or ignorance’ [19.98].

[399.20]

F8 Sopater Division of Questions 35.20-26 Next you will place an exception, according to Porphyry, based on manner. He says that the accusation of complicity is unreasonable, given that they have not been tried in a legally constituted court or found guilty in accordance with the laws, but have fallen victim to their enemies’ malice. So some use an exception in this and similar cases, but others do not. F9 ‘Sopater and Marcellinus’ RG 4.520.20-522.26 The resources which we will use to amplify the sequence of events are also the resources which we will use for the treatment of importance. The first topic of the amplificatory arguments is that from quantity. It is roughly as follows: when we are able to show from a single action performed that there have been [520.20]

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION wrongs done or benefits conferred. The second is from quality, e.g. who is affected, the city or the victim, and whether the person who did it wronged or benefited the city in a public or a private capacity. [520.28] We shall

confirm these things:

from the heads of purpose: from honour, perhaps (that what was done brings great honour to the city—or dishonour and outrage); from goodness: that the action was good, or on the contrary disgraceful. from the concomitants of the action: these are, as has often been indicated: person, place, manner, time, cause, attitude; and according to Porphyry also occasion and matter; and: individual character; age; status; occupation; fortune. the probability of the occasion; the probability of the manner; the probability of the place; the probability of the cause. - from person: e.g. ‘You, men of Athens, when the Spartans ruled by land and sea and the territory surrounding Attica was held by governors and garrisons, Tanagra, Euboea and the whole of Boeotia ...’ [Dem. 18.96]. - from place: if the action was not done in a corner but in open view, then the wrongdoing is great because of the conspicuousness of the place. - from occasion: if he wronged or benefited someone in a time of need, the wrong or benefit was great. - from manner: whether easily or with difficulty, by persuasion or force; you will amplify, indicating the exceptional degree of the agent’s courage, or his outstanding skill or intelligence. - from matter: if there is something remarkable or paradoxical about the resource used. - from cause: if it occurred for some particularly praiseworthy or blameworthy reason, the action is great, as in the dissolution of a tyranny on account of freedom. - from attitude: e.g. if he was well-disposed or ill-disposed. [521.4]

from quantity: - with respect to person: that there was benefit, or harm, to many people; - with respect to time: that it extends to a long period, as in the case of the man who puts an end to a tyranny, that the benefit is everlasting, since no one will be tyrant in future, now that this man has voluntarily laid the tyranny aside: - from quantity with respect to the consequences: that the results were many and great. - from individual character, when we say that he is the first or only person to dare such a thing, as Demosthenes does in On the Crown: ‘You all know that you have before now crowned many politicians: but none of you could name another man— I mean an adviser or orator—on whose account the city has been crowned, except

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION me’ [Dem. 18.94]. - from age: whether he is young or old, bold or cautious. - from status: whether a private individual or an official. - from occupation: whether a farmer or a merchant. - from fortune: whether poor or wealthy. - from nationality: whether Greek or non-Greek. - from nature: whether male or female. from probability, if the action was performed: - contrary to the probability of the place: where no one would have expected. - contrary to the probability of the time: when no one supposed. - contrary to the probability of the manner: that it was not likely in such a manner, i.e. in a paradoxical manner (e.g. using skill, trickery or speech, in a manner that no one expected). - contrary to the probability of the cause: that the cause was such-and-such. We have gone through all these modes out of competitive ambition. But sufficient arguments for importance are those from the future, when we can show that the outcomes are many and great; e.g.: ‘It is a terrible thing to break into temples and steal what is inside them, even if it is not sacred property: for private persons’ deposits will lose their security, and from this will come crimes against dedications, contempt for the sacred, disdain for piety, loss of valuables among the citizens—for if not even temples are trustworthy repositories, what are we to think of storerooms in houses?’ We will also argue from the less: ‘Since, even if he had only broken in, he would not have escaped the charge of temple-robbery, he can scarcely do so now that he has added theft to breaking in.’ [522.12]

[522.25] Amplifications

come from these sources; diminutions from their opposites.

F10 Anon. RG 7.235.4-21 This is the difference where there is some suffering and unjust action in the subject-matter. Where there is not (as in this counterplea: when Cleon made his promise about Pylos, Alcibiades laughed; he is charged with aggressive behaviour) there is another difference, that stated by Porphyry. In counterplea the act is permissible in its entirety, but in objection it is not permissible in its entirety (e.g. Alcibiades’ laughter is permissible in every respect, including time and place; but killing the poor man who has been condemned to death is not permissible without qualification) ... According to our teacher Paul, another difference should be added: that objection is always based on some law, while counterplea may be based on custom or nature or law. With regard to that based on nature or custom, there is nothing in common between them at all; with regard to that based on law, the only case in which they do have something in common, Porphyry’s distinction is satisfactory. F11a Anon. RG 7.203.22-204.4 It is better to set these aside and accept Porphyry’s distinction. It is as follows: if the wrongdoing is such that it could have been avoided, but allows of some extenuation, it is a case of transference (e.g. the law requires an ambassador to set

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION out within 30 days, having received his travelling expenses from the treasurer: someone does not receive his expenses, stays, and is prosecuted: here the wrongdoing could have been avoided, since the ambassador could have taken out a loan or paid the expenses from his own resources). But if it could not have happened otherwise, that makes it mitigation (e.g. because a storm blew up the generals did not recover the bodies of those who died at the battle of Arginusae, and they are prosecuted: they could do nothing about it because they were prevented by the storm). F11b Christophorus fol. 101v-102r Porphyry states this difference: if the wrongdoing is such that it could have been avoided, but allows of some extenuation, it is a case of transference (e.g. the ambassador: he could have got his travelling expenses from another source and gone on the embassy), but if it could not have happened otherwise, but there was a complete necessity for the act to be performed, that makes it mitigation (as in the case of the ten generals who do not recover the bodies of the fallen because a storm blows up: they could do nothing about it because they were prevented by the storm). Eustathius concurs with this. F11c Maximus Planudes RG 5.261.1-4 Porphyry says that if the wrongdoing is such that it could have been avoided, but allows of some extenuation, it is a case of transference, but if it could not have happened otherwise the question is one of mitigation. F12a Anon. RG 7.596.14-20 I have said this because there are those who assume other heads in the practical issues. I will pass over the people of no significance who have naively promoted certain ways of articulating an argument [epikheirêmata] to the rank of heads, but I will mention Porphyry, who counted importance and relative importance among the heads of the practical issue. F12b Georgius fol. 214v Others, including Metrophanes and Porphyry, say that the two amplificatory heads are relevant in the practical issue—I mean importance and relative importance. F13a Marcellinus RG 4.268.16-269.1 The two verbal instruments in conflict of law must be in force. I say this, since it may be that one is already in force, while the other is only now being introduced. This does not constitute conflict of law, but the practical issue, as Porphyry says. For example, the law requires three days of deliberation over a declaration of war; when Philip seizes Elateia Demosthenes proposes an immediate sortie; Aeschines opposes. In this case the law is in force, and the motion being proposed must be subjected to scrutiny. But in fact Porphyry seems to have overlooked the difference between the practical issue when it is based on a conflict of law and conflict of law as such: for sometimes the practical issue also has two laws, but in conflict of law the decision required concerns a previous violation of the law,

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION while in the practical issue there is deliberation and an enquiry as to which of the laws should be violated and which allowed to remain in force. F13b Nilus fol. 170v Porphyry said that conflict of law wants to be based on two verbal instruments that are in force. F14 Sopater Division of Questions 381.29-382.2 Then importance, that the blow is serious; and you will produce all the lines of argument [epikheirêmata] that confirm importance. These are clear from the discussion of definition and Porphyry’s Art. F15 ‘Metrophanes, Athanasius, Porphyry, and Polemo’ RG 4.422.18-429.5 Some have said that epilogues are a second speech,54 incorrectly: for an epilogue is speech uttered in addition to demonstrations that have already been spoken, but in second speeches other heads and arguments are found. [422.18]

‘It occurs in all’:55 since common quality is a feature of all speeches, and not just of conjectural ones, he has good reason to teach it in full in conjecture, to ensure that we are not ignorant of it in the other issues either. He has already established as a premise that the heads of conjecture contribute to the other issues as well. [422.22]

An epilogue is speech uttered in addition to demonstrations that have already been spoken, containing a collection of facts, characters and emotions; or a restatement of what has been said; or speech strengthening what has been said.56 [422.27]

Or according to Minucianus speech containing intensification or diminution of events, in which too there is the so-called ‘vivid description’ [diatupôsis] or ‘elaboration’ [diaskeuê] exciting emotion and leading the juror to a clear scrutiny of events. Epilogues also contain exhortations, recapitulations and supplementary narratives. [422.30]

The function of the epilogue according to Plato in the Phaedrus [267d] is by speaking in a summary to give the audience a reminder at the end; second, to praise or blame; third, to give a reminder of what has been said.57 [423.3]

They are introduced ‘by prosecutors running through the charge in the manner of a common topic, and by defendants recapitulating points in a similar way, but making a different use of them, appealing for pity and stirring up emotion.’58 [423.7]

54

Cf. Hermogenes 52.6f. Lemma from Hermogenes 52.7. 56 Cf. Anon. Seg. 198-200. 57 Cf. Anon. Seg. 207-8; the apparent duplication of the first and third functions results from the running together of a reference to Plato with a citation of Aristotle. 58 Abbreviated from Hermogenes 52.8-17. 55

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION Plato, who had a good knowledge of the management of pity and emotion, expressed it clearly in a single phrase in the Apology, when he speaks of ‘these pathetic dramas’.59 He gives the appearance of making overt use of them while setting them aside on the grounds that it is not fitting for a philosopher and a man who has reached such a level of virtue to secure his safety by making people pity and feel sorry for him, but was almost misleading in what he said, using a remarkable and very rhetorical technique, by means of which he raised his own dignity while at the same time not foregoing the advantage that arises from this matter, assigning what is appropriate to each—solemnity to philosophy and what belongs to that science to rhetoric. Positing one of the jury being annoyed about why he is treating them superciliously by rejecting a verdict based on pity, he says: ‘Perhaps one of you will be annoyed if I do not supplicate with my children and my wife and many tears, and I do none of this. I do have sons. But this kind of behaviour does not contribute to the good reputation either of myself or of the city; it is not right for someone of high dignity to resort to appeals to pity’—so saying this in the form of a reply, as if he were forced to, he insinuated the things that move the jury to pity, when he says: ‘Perhaps one of you will be annoyed, when he remembers his own experience, if in a lesser case than this he begged and supplicated the jury with many tears, presenting his children to extract the maximum pity, and his other relatives and friends, while I do none of these things, although I am exposed, as it may appear, to the ultimate danger’ (and so on). Then he added the argument from dignity to the technique: ‘Why, then, will I do none of these things? Not out of obstinacy, nor doing you any dishonour’ (and what follows). [423.10]

[424.9] Appeals to pity are characteristic of the defence, and the prosecutor must expel them. For pity often dissolves the intensity of the prosecution. That this has the greatest potency can be seen from this: Callixenus persuaded the Athenians to condemn the generals to death just by introducing into court the relatives of the fallen dressed in morning and weeping and bearing the suppliant’s olive-branch.60 This head is so powerful that, even though the reason for the failure to recover the bodies was patently obvious, they did not forbear from condemning generals who had won such a glorious and decisive victory. So the prosecutor needs a strong counter. So what will he do? He will deploy the heads of purpose against the appeals to pity. [424.23]

Common quality is common to the two parties.

One should realise that the epilogue is often omitted, and sometimes also the prologue and the narrative, so that the question resides in the demonstrations alone.61 [424.24]

One should take care in epilogues that if we are prosecuting we make the audience hostile to the defendant, and if we are offering a defence we make the juror well-disposed to ourselves.62

[424.27]

59

Apology 35b. The rest of the paragraph adapts material from 34b-e. Cf. Xenophon Hellenica 1.7.8; sch. Dem. 20.68 (157). 61 Cf. Anon. Seg. 202. 60

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION Aristotle says63 that there are four parts of the epilogue: first, moving the audience to emotion; secondly making them take a hostile attitude to our opponents and a favourable one to ourselves; also amplification and debasement: and finally giving a reminder. Often one should not use all of them, but only some.

[424.30]

The methods of recapitulation among the ancients are diverse. They use recapitulations based on: [425.3]

- fiction, as Hyperides does: when he wanted to recapitulate what had been said, he introduced it in a fiction.64 - cause, as in Plato’s Phaedrus, on the basis of the stated causes by means of which he reasonably gives a reminder of what has been said. - promise: that having previously made a promise we wish to fulfil what was promised in a summmary, as we find in the False Embassy: ‘I want to reckon up the charges from the beginning, to show that I have done everything I promised at the beginning of the speech’ [19.177]. - comparison with another, as Demosthenes does in the same speech: by comparing the ambassadors to others [19.278] he made the introduction of the recapitulation inevitable, as has already been said. - enquiry: the orator gave a splendid example in On the Crown: wanting to go through all the praises of himself in a summary, since this would be irritating to the audience, he devised the technique of enquiry, which enabled him simultaneously with pomp and elaboration but without giving offence to go through all his virtues while appearing to speak under compulsion. He represents Aeschines posing a question, introducing him thus: ‘Then you ask me for what virtue I think I should be honoured? I tell you that when all the politicians on the Greek side were corrupted—starting from you—first by Philip, then by Alexander, no occasion and nothing else whatsoever could win me over’ [18.297f.]. Another possibility is based on: - concession, using the figure of drawing a distinction, when the opponent tries to transfer the blame to another party, and we do not discuss that in detail, but define for our part the grounds on which we are making our accusation, as Demosthenes does in Against Aeschines: when Aeschines shifts the basis of the accusation to Chares, as general, he says that he does not insist on that (even if he does surreptiously defend Chares to the utmost, as acting entirely for the good of the city), but defines the grounds of his accusation against Aeschines, when he says: ‘I do not blame Aeschines for what was done in the war (it is the generals who are 62

Cf. Anon. Seg. 235. Rhetoric 1419b10-13. 64 The reference is to Hyperides’ Against Demades. Cf. Hyperides fr. 76 Jensen = ‘Apsines’ 10.9 Patillon, John Diaconus on pseudo-Hermogenes On Method, fol 481v (Rabe (1908) 144): Hyperides summarised his attack on a decree proposed by Demades in honour of Euthycrates by reading out a fictive decree telling the truth about the honorand. The extract from John Diaconus printed by Rabe introduces a fivefold classification of recapitulations, and then gives that based on fiction at greater length, with the example from Hyperides in detail; but Rabe does not reproduce the rest of the classification. 63

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION answerable for that), nor for the fact that the city made made peace—up to that point I leave everything to one side.’ Then the drawing of the distinction: ‘What, then, am I saying, and at what point does my accusation begin?’ (and so on) [19.333]. There are other techniques for recapitulation, as well, which one should pay careful attention to, observing the manner of treatment used to introduce each of them, and exhibiting those treatments that are opportune, but avoiding those that are introduced baldly. One should use recapitulation when many things have been said, with the result that the audience cannot remember them; when there only a few things, we omit it.65 [426.17]

We will find that the ancients used different kinds of recapitulation. Many used it at the end, as Demosthenes does in Against Aristocrates and Against Timocrates; many too in the middle, as in On the Embassy; and they used it also between the leading and necessary proofs. There is also another mode of recapitulation, occurring at the end of an individual head. These recapitulations differ from each other in that that at the end of the speech contains a summary exposition; that in between has a reminder of the necessary proofs; that occurring at the end of an individual head does not contain a reminder of the heads, but of the lemmata used to demonstrate the preceding head.66 [426.19]

One should recapitulate the stronger points but pass over the less sound ones, as we have said, and likewise omit the more forceful points of the opposition.67 [426.31]

Demosthenes invented another, innovative recapitulation, opposing ambassadors to ambassadors, mandate to mandate: ‘Since they conducted their embassy contrary to their mandate, he says: but didn’t these men act contrary to their mandate?’ [19.278]. [427.2]

[427.6] The development of the common topic should be used when the power to fix the penalty—what punishment or reparation should be imposed—resides with the jury. [427.8] Often we will pass over the emotive element, when the act does not have any emotion in it.68

‘The so-called heads of purpose are common to both sides’:69 they are called telika because they are placed at the end [epi telei] of speeches (as also in common topic); or because they are complete [teleion] in themselves, and unlike other heads are not confirmed one by another (as the demand for evidence is [427.10]

65

Cf. Anon. Seg. 204. Cf. ‘Apsines’ 10.3.3-30 Patillon; this passage, and the nature of ‘leading and necessary proofs’, is discussed in Heath (2002). 67 Cf. Anon. Seg. 212. 68 Cf. Anon. Seg. 205. 69 Lemma from Hermogenes 52.19f. ‘Heads of purpose’ translates telika kephalaia; the following discussion of this term turns on multiple sense of the Greek word telos (purpose, end, completion). 66

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION confirmed by the signs); or because all the other heads, and to put it simply everything else altogether, leads to these (for we put something forward as lawful, or as advantageous, or as just, or as honourable, or as one of these). The defendant will use these saying: ‘It is in your interest not to pay attention to malicious prosecutors or be persuaded by them: they are the people who undermine the public interest.’ And: ‘You will be faithful to your oath if you do not condemn me unjustly.’ The prosecutor, on the contrary, when the defendant introduces his children and pity, will try to nullify these using the heads of purpose. [427.20]

‘From the same topics as prologues’:70 the theorist may seem to have mentioned prologues here inopportunely. But we say that in discussing the epilogue, since he saw that there is a close affinity between the epilogue and the prologue (both are confirmed from the same things, and each exists with a view to the same thing), for this reason he necessarily mentions the difference between them, wishing to distinguish what they have in common: both excite pity, or resentment or emotion; for instance, Demosthenes excites anger at the beginning of the prologue in Against Meidias, accusing Meidias of ‘bullying’ [21.1]. He does this in the epilogue as well, launching attacks in the manner of a common topic. [427.25]

They differ in figuration and style of expression. In the prologue the figures should be moderate, mild and (so to speak) tamed; since the jury is more sober at the beginning and their emotion has not yet been stirred up, one should share the audience’s emotional state and advance one’s own and the audience’s emotion gently. This is the case if we are moderate in the use of figures, vocabulary and arrangement of words, and moderate too in delivery. The epilogue, by contrast, should be made vigorous by the use of figures, and should have many exclamations and many reproaches. Prologues are tightly expressed, while epilogue is free in its style. In addition, there is also a difference with regard to the material. Many of the things said in the prologue do not need to be said in the epilogue; for example, someone is suspect when he enters court because of his interfering and officious behaviour: since the suspicion has been resolved in the prologue it is not necessary to speak about it in the epilogue; and there are other kinds of prologue material which, once they have been thoroughly covered in the prologue, make it superfluous to mention them in the epilogue. There are also kinds of material in the epilogue which we do not use in the prologue (e.g. it is not a good idea to bring preconceptions concerning the heads of argument into the prologue: that will open up old wounds in the prologue), but in the epilogue it is necessary to include them to some extent to strengthen the case. The difference, then, is that the one prepares the emotion, while the epilogue amplifies it.71 [428.4]

The defendant will try in the prologue to minimise the emotion and the prejudice (it would be absurd to eliminate it entirely at the outset, before the demonstrations), but in the epilogue after the demonstration he will try to eliminate it and expel it altogether. [428.30]

70 71

Lemma from Hermogenes 53.1f. Cf. Anon. Seg. 19-20, 237.

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MALCOLM HEATH, PORPHYRY’S RHETORIC: TEXTS AND TRANSLATION ‘In my treatment of the prologue’:72 there is a treatise by Hermogenes on the prologue, which is found in the records, but is not extant. [429.3]

F16 Anon. RG 7.63.20-23 We have proposed to discuss prologues, and not the other parts, since there has been adequate discussion of these by Hermogenes, Porphyry and others. F17 Simplicius In Cat. 10.20-11.2 (Theophrastus fr. 683 Fortenbaugh) Porphyry says in To Gedalius and By Question and Answer that the book’s theme is concerned with predicates. These are simple vocalisations that signify things, in so far as they are significant, and not simply as verbal expressions. As verbal expressions they belong to other disciplines, to which Theophrastus gave the impetus in his On the Parts of Speech, and his associates, who have written on (e.g.) whether nouns and verbs are parts of speech, or also articles, conjunctions etc. (for these too are components of verbal expression, but nouns and verbs are parts of speech), and what is standard usage and what metaphorical, and what its modifications are (e.g. what apocope and aphaeresis are, which are simple, which compound and which derived from compounds, and suchlike); also what has been said about types of style [ideai]—what clarity is in verbal expression, what grandeur, what pleasantness, what persuasiveness.

72

Lemma from Hermogenes 53.13.

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Bibliography Gercke, A. (1897) ‘Die alte tšcnh ·htorik» und ihre Gegner’ Hermes 32 (1897) 341-81 Gloeckner, S. (1901) Abhandlungen 8.2)

Quaestiones

Rhetoricae

(Breslauer

Philologische

Graeven, J. (1891) Cornuti artis rhetoricae epitome (Berlin) Heath, M. (1998) ‘Hermogenes’ biographers’, Eranos 96, 44-54 — (2002) ‘Notes on pseudo-Apsines’, Mnemosyne 55, 657-68 — (2003a) ‘Porphyry’s rhetoric’, CQ 53, 144-66 — (2003b) ‘Metalepsis, paragraphe and the scholia to Hermogenes’, LICS 2.2, 191 — (2002/3) ‘Theon and the history of the progymnasmata’, GRBS 43, 129-60 Innes, D. and Winterbottom, M. (1988) Sopatros the Rhetor (BICS Supplement 48) Kowalski, G. (1940-6) ‘De commentarii in Hermogenis Status e tribus interpretibus confectis (Rh. Gr. IV Walz) in codice Par. Gr. 2923 obvia’, Eos 41, 46-80 — (1947) ‘De commentarii in Hermogenis Status e tribus interpretibus confectis (Rh. Gr. IV Walz) in codice Par. Gr. 2923 obvia’, Eos 42, 122-41 Rabe, H. (1895) ‘De Christophori commentario in Hermogenis librum’, RM 50, 241-9 — (1908) ‘Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften: 5. Des Diakonen und Logotheten Johannes Kommentar zu Hermogenes Perˆ meqÒdou deinÒthtoj’ RM 63, 127-51 — (1909) ‘Aus Rhetoren Handschriften: 11. Der Dreimänner Kommentar WIV’, RM 64, 578-89 — (1931) Prolegomenon Sylloge (Leipzig) Radermacher, L. (1951) Artium Scriptores. Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik (SB Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften Phil.-hist. Kl. 227.3,Vienna) Schilling, L. (1903) ‘Quaestiones rhetoricae selectae’, Jahrbuch für classische Philologie Suppl. 28, 663-778. Smith, A. (1993) Porphyrius. Fragmenta (Leipzig)

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Additional notes, March 2003 Subsequent research suggests the following corrections to the discussion of Porphyry’s rhetorical writings in Heath (2003a): 144: For reasons explained in Heath (2002/3), I now date Aelius Theon to the fifth century; on the title of Theon’s collection see ibid. n.45. To the list of attested collections of declamation themes add Anastasius ™n tÍ sunagwgÍ tîn problhm£twn, quoted by Georgius fol. 143r (Schilling (1903) 733-5). Anastasius of Ephesus is also cited in RG 6.253.22-5 as denying the authenticity of the Fourth Philippic. 146 n.18: John Ð shmeiogr£foj should be deleted from the list of commentators on Hermogenes. The rhetor cited as Ð shmeiogr£foj in Christophorus and Nilus is probably identical with the sophist John Ð shmeiogr£foj, who was teaching in Alexandria in the 480s, and with John of Alexandria who wrote a theoretical work on the characteristics of and differences between the issues. For more detail see Heath (2003b) 33. 157: I no longer think it adequate to describe the Sopater of RG 4 as a redacted version of Sopater in RG 5: instead we are dealing with two substantively different commentaries. The Sopater who wrote the commentary from which RG 5 derives worked (probably) in the late fourth century; the excerpts in RG 4 derive from commentary which incorporated material adapted from the earlier Sopater, but also from other sources, including at least one which is likely to date to the fifth century. The Sopater of RG 4, who is likely to be the Sopater who wrote the Progymnasmata cited by John of Sardis, can plausibly be identified with a sophist of that name who taught in Alexandria in the 480s. See Heath (2003b) 27-33, and (2002/3). 161: The distinction between the Sopater of RG 5 and the Sopater of RG 4 is also relevant here. I now suspect a change of source at RG 4.520.6; but since the Sopater of RG 4 combined (without always properly integrating) material from a number of sources, I would regard this as evidence of a change of source within Sopater, rather than as evidence of a change of source within the three-man commentary. 164 n.100: Analysis of their respective treatments of metalepsis provides further evidence against the identification of the Sopater of Division of Questions with the Sopater of the commentary on Hermogenes: see Heath (2003b) 11f. I should have included a reference to an intriguingly entitled work which mentioned Porphyry, probably as a technical writer on rhetoric, and presumably in an uncomplimentary way. See Suda A2180: 'Androkle…dhj, Ð toà Sunes…ou toà Ludoà toà Filadelfšwj uƒÒj. oátoj d
™pˆ Porfur…ou toà filosÒfou ™d…dasken, ™peid¾ mšmnhtai aÙtoà ™n tù Perˆ toà [tîn Portus] ™mpodën tecnolÒgwn.

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Additional note, August 2005 14 n.27: ™p£nodoj alludes to Plato Phaedrus 267d3-6. See also [Hermogenes] Meth. 427.22-428.6, Syrianus 2.89.17-25 Rabe.

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