Lebanon in the 1950s

STRUGGLE IN THE LEVANT Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s Caroline Attié I.B.Tauris Publishers • NEW YORK...

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STRUGGLE IN THE LEVANT

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s

Caroline Attié

I.B.Tauris Publishers • NEW YORK in association with Centre for Lebanese Studies LONDON

Published in 2004 by The Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford in association with I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, Bayswater, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY10010 Website: http://www.ibtauris.com In the United States and Canada distributed by St Martin’s Press 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © Caroline Attié and The Centre for Lebanese Studies, 2004 All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior witten permission of the publisher. ISBN 1 86064 467 8 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog card: available Typeset in BerkeleyOldstyle by Oxford Publishing Services Printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddels Ltd, Guildford and King’s Lynn

For Fares and Camille

Contents Note on Translation Acknowledgements Preface by Wm. Roger Louis Introduction 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

ix x xii 1

Lebanon: 1920–1952 French Interests in Lebanon The French Mandate The Second World War: Anglo-French Rivalry and Independence for Lebanon The National Pact

18 25

Domestic Politics, the Economy and Society in Lebanon: 1952–1956 Camille Chamoun Efforts at Reform Internal Opposition and Sectarian Tension

40 40 48 55

Lebanon: 1952–1956: Foreign Affairs Chamoun as Regional Mediator Chamoun’s Response to Anglo–American Policies in the Middle East

7 7 13

70 70 77

The Impact of Regional and International Politics in Lebanon: 1956–1957 The Suez Crisis and Nasser’s Populist Arabism The American Response: The Eisenhower Doctrine

98 98 108

The Parliamentary Elections of 1957 The Political Role of the Lebanese Press Foreign Interference in Domestic Elections The Parliamentary Elections of 1957

128 128 133 141

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Contents

viii 6.

From the Formation of the UAR to the Insurrection in Lebanon The Impact of the UAR on Lebanon The Issue of Chamoun’s Re-election The Outbreak of Rebellion: May 1958

154 154 160 170

7.

The Crisis in Lebanon The Rebellion American Military Intervention in Lebanon

185 185 197

8.

The Resolution of the Crisis Lebanon’s Case at the UN American–Egyptian Rapprochement

210 210 218

Conclusion Bibliography Index

228 234 247

Note on Translation All translations in the text are my own unless otherwise indicated and all references are to the Arabic and French original. When English translations are available these are noted in the first citation of the text. I have used the Anglicized versions of Arabic words when available. The ‘ayn and the hamza are represented by conventional symbols.

ix

Acknowledgements This study was completed with the assistance and support of a number of people whom it gives me great pleasure to thank. My research was facilitated by a travel grant from the Department of History at the University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to my dissertation committee members Professors Hafez Farmayan, Elizabeth Fernea, Clement Moore Henry, and Abraham Marcus for their advice, which is evident in the final product. I would like to thank the staff at the Public Records Office in London and at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, for their help in accessing archival material. I want to extend my gratitude to Abazar Sepehri, the Middle East librarian at the University of Texas at Austin, and to Linda Sadaka of the Jafet Library at the American University of Beirut for providing me with valuable research material. Renate Wise edited the manuscript and provided valuable stylistic suggestions. Special thanks to Nadim Shehadi, Director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies at Oxford, who encouraged me to publish this study and provided me with valuable references and research material at the Centre’s archives. I also thank Dr Najla Atiyah in Beirut for encouraging me over the years. Innumerable discussions with her aroused my interest in the subject of the modern history of Lebanon. This study would not have been completed without the support of my dissertation advisor Professor William Roger Louis to whom I will always be indebted. I thank him for his patient review of my work and valuable comments across the miles, which provided the needed guidance for writing the dissertation on which this book is based. His meticulous correspondence encouraged me to write while in a nonacademic environment. To my parents Camille and Sumaya Attié I owe a special debt of gratitude for many years of love and support and continuous encouragement for my academic work. Many thanks go to my brother Paul Attié for his support during my Austin years. Last but not least my husband, Yousef Abbas, lived with the subject for two years, patiently endured x

Acknowledgements

xi

discussions, read drafts, and formatted the dissertation. His unwavering support and encouragement were essential to the completion of this book. Thank you Yousef.

Preface by William Roger Louis In this carefully written and balanced book, Caroline Attié enquires into the nature of Lebanese politics in the 1950s. It can be read as a comprehensive work in its own right and also, more specifically, as the way in which Lebanon’s internal political alliances reflected shifting regional forces that impinged on the country’s security and indeed on its independent existence. Throughout the book it is useful to bear in mind certain questions that the author sets out to answer. How does the era of the 1950s fit into the larger history of Lebanon and the Middle East? How can the 1950s be viewed in relation to the period leading up to Lebanon’s independence in 1943 and the outbreak of all-out civil war in 1975? How can the crisis of 1958, when internal turmoil led to a climax of intervention by US military forces, be seen in relation to the high tide of Arab nationalism? It is difficult to recall from today’s vantage point the commercial prosperity and intellectual effervescence that characterized Lebanon in the 1950s. Beirut had become a principal financial centre in the region. The country had achieved a remarkable level of material prosperity, and Beirut was known as a thriving city where far-ranging debates took place not only on Lebanese politics but also on the future of the Middle East. A significant dimension of this discussion dealt with overt and covert intervention, intervention by the Western powers not only in such countries as Iran and Egypt, but also intervention in Lebanon by the regional powers. Since the time of the creation of the modern state of Lebanon in 1920, Lebanese politics had been determined by combinations or alliances that extended to France and Britain and regional powers as well as to the Lebanese religious and sectarian factions. The linchpin of the political system was the National Pact of 1943, which represented a compromise agreement between the Christian and Muslim communities. The National Pact symbolized democratic and religious co-existence as well as a reconciliation of the two faces of Lebanon, one side looking to the West, the other side to other Arab counties. xii

Preface by William Roger Louis

xiii

After the Second World War, the National Pact continued to hold, though sometimes precariously, in part because of the equilibrium in a parliament in which the Lebanese could contain their debates and disputes. But in the 1950s the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the appeal of radical Arab nationalism brought the system under severe strain. The Lebanese President during this era was Camille Chamoun, who provides a focus for many of these major themes. Chamoun, who viewed himself as both an Arab nationalist and a Lebanese patriot, attempted to reconcile Arab nationalism with the conflicting pressures from Britain and the United States. After the Suez crisis of 1956 and the decline of British power in the region, this balancing act became increasingly difficult. At this point the author’s principal concern becomes one of explaining the origins of the 1958 crisis. Lebanon, caught between East and West, appeared to be on the verge of dissolution. The last part of the book deals with the political polarization and insurrection of May 1958, the landing of some 15,000 US troops, and, after a three-month civil war, the advent of General Fuad Chehab as the saviour of his country. Chehab restored Lebanese national unity. The book concludes by comparing the 1958 civil conflict with the civil war of 1975 that lasted fifteen years and devastated the country. By contrast the era of the 1950s now appears as Lebanon’s golden age. This is a book informed by a close reading of archival and other sources in Arabic as well as in Western languages. It deals in a fairminded way with a critical episode in Middle Eastern history. The archival research confirms some conventional assumptions and indeed rumours while it dispels others that have long been held about the 1950s, particularly about Chamoun and the events of 1958. It also redeems the understated British role in Lebanese historiography. The book deserves to be widely read for its analysis of Lebanon in the 1950s, for its assessment of Arab nationalism, and for its balanced appraisal of the ascendancy of American influence in the Middle East. 1 July 2003

Introduction The early years of Chamoun’s presidency were often referred to as Lebanon’s golden age. As a commercial entrepôt for many of the countries of the Middle East, and in stark contrast to their repressive regimes, Lebanon with its lively press and vibrant intellectual activity was a haven for political exiles and often a base where revolts were plotted against Arab rulers. Despite the prosperity and promise of Chamoun’s presidency (1952–1958) as one of reform and reconciliation, the last two years were fraught with political strife that culminated in the crisis of 1958. Lebanon’s modern history has been one of constant overt and covert intervention by regional and international powers. Since the nineteenth century, cleavages in Lebanese society along religious and sectarian lines have facilitated the involvement of external powers in Lebanese politics. Foreign involvement has historically been most active in times of crises and ensuing settlements. The British and Americans were the two most active Western powers in Lebanon in the 1950s and their support for Chamoun significantly determined the course of events. The British role in Lebanon has been understated in Lebanese historiography contributing to the popular misconception that the 1958 intervention was solely an American affair. Although the Atlantic Alliance powers worked together to limit the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East, the cold war years of the 1950s were also years of Anglo–American rivalry in the area. The Suez crisis of 1956 marked the demise of British power and its gradual replacement by the USA as the dominant power in the Middle East. The Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 and the American military landing in Lebanon in 1958 were both manifestations of America’s new dominance. France was the postwar mandatory power in Lebanon and exercised effective control of the country for 25 years. Lebanon’s Maronite Christians had close educational ties and cultural affinity with Catholic France, their traditional protector. However despite this longstanding

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relationship, the French role will not be emphasized in this book. During the 1950s France was preoccupied with the Algerian war and as a result was less involved in Lebanon than Britain and the United States. At the regional level, the 1950s were years of revolution and change. In Egypt, the revolution of 1952 swept away the monarchy and inaugurated the leadership of a charismatic army officer who defiantly opposed Western influence in Egypt and thereby gained immense popularity across the Arab world. Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to extend his influence to other Arab countries. He promoted the ideology of pan-Arab unity as he directly addressed Arab peoples, often bypassing their leaders. The Suez crisis of 1956 marked the apogee of Nasser’s popularity among Arabs and constituted a watershed in Lebanon’s political development. Lebanon’s national consensus had been forged in an unwritten agreement between the Christian and Muslim leadership in 1932. Both parties, with divergent external loyalties, agreed to forego external alliances (the Christians with France, and the Muslims with the Arab world) and coexist within the framework of an independent Lebanese state. This national consensus was shaken by Chamoun’s overtures to the Western powers and by Nasser’s pan-Arab appeal to the majority of Lebanon’s Muslims. Their Christian compatriots rejected the notion of pan-Arab unity and sought to maintain the independence of Lebanon. The conflict of these ideologies culminated in the Lebanese crisis of 1958. In 1958, Camille Chamoun faced the predicament of balancing Western and Nasserist pressures and then reconciling the result with the requirements of the Lebanese National Pact. In the end, the resolution of the crisis in Lebanon depended substantially on the desire of both the United States and Nasser to reach an accommodation with each other. The external explanation does not deny the importance of the internal polarization of Lebanon’s ruling elite during Chamoun’s presidency, which rendered a large number of them receptive to external stimuli for rebellion. The external argument is reinforced by the quick conclusion of the rebellion and the return of both rebels and loyalists to participation in the traditional practices of Lebanese politics. Until the previous decade, the political history of Lebanon of the 1950s had received little scholarly attention, with only a few works

Introduction

3

written on the 1958 crisis. Both Qubain’s 1961 study entitled Crisis in Lebanon and Agwani’s 1965 work The Lebanese Crisis were written before access to the archives was available. The opening of the archives for the 1950s and 1960s has renewed interest in studies of that period and recent conferences have brought together diplomats of the 1950s and academics such as the conference on ‘Lebanon in the 1950s’ held at The 1 University of Texas at Austin in September 1992. Irene Gendzier’s exhaustive archival study Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958, published in 1997, emphasizes the primacy of US economic (mainly oil) and strategic interests in Lebanon and, within the regional context, the ties of US multinationals to US policymakers and in turn to the commercial and financial interests of Lebanon’s economic elite. While US diplomatic and other personnel in the field recognized the need for drastic political and economic reform in a Lebanon that was a ‘Minefield’ waiting to explode, Professor Gendzier concludes that US policymakers deliberately ignored these reports and went beyond that to stifle Lebanese reformists such as Kamal Jumblatt out of fear that his agenda would threaten American interests in Lebanon and the region. Another recent and valuable study of this period is Carolyn L. Gates’s economic history The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy (1998) that traces the development of Lebanon’s merchant republic as a deliberate policy of the country’s economic elite in the 1940s and carried through the 1950s with the concomitant absence of state-directed economic development benefiting the majority of the population. The overemphasis on tertiary economic activity rendered the economy more vulnerable to regional and international insatiability. Here I make extensive use of the recently declassified documents of the British Foreign Office as well as the Eisenhower Papers and the Central File Series of the US State Department and therefore provide documentary evidence for many of the events of the 1950s, particularly the crisis of 1958. The Lebanese Minutes of Parliament have been used as well as the Lebanese press, particularly the archives of the leading daily newspaper Al-Nahar. I have also used memoirs and other political literature by Lebanese politicians. Based on archival evidence, this work sheds light on commonly held misperceptions of the events of 1958. While it provides documentary evidence for widely held beliefs such as

4


Chamoun’s intent to seek re-election, it dispels assumptions about the decisive significance of the American marine landing to the resolution of the 1958 crisis. Just as the landing of the American marine forces in Beirut was prompted by events extraneous to Lebanon, so was the resolution of the crisis dependent on an American–Egyptian rapprochement. The archives attest to the high priority that Nasser attached to improving relations with the United States, one that superseded any potential gains to be had by extending his control over Lebanon. The introductory chapter presents the background to the Lebanon of the 1950s and reviews the important milestones in the political history of twentieth century Lebanon. These milestones are the establishment of the state in 1920, the proclamation of the constitution in 1926, and the deal brokered (the National Pact) on the eve of independence to effect the minimal consensus needed for the coexistence of the Lebanese communities within an independent state. The foundation of the modern state of Lebanon in 1920, as well as a discussion of the National Pact, is essential to understanding the history of Lebanon in the 1950s. Chamoun’s role in the events leading to independence and his early political career are also discussed. The second chapter is a study of Lebanon in the early years of the Chamoun presidency. Chamoun’s bid for election is examined and the new president’s reform efforts are evaluated. The chapter includes a discussion of the economy and society, particularly the sectarian tension that was prevalent in 1953 and 1954. Sectarian grievances were subdued by the economic boom of those years and by external events that distracted the public’s attention. The focus of the third chapter is Lebanon in both the regional and international setting. Lebanon’s mediator role in the pre-Suez years was an active one and enabled the country to avoid alignments in inter-Arab disputes. At the international level, the Lebanese president maintained close ties with the British and Americans, but with the Baghdad Pact and Czech arms deal of 1955 it became difficult for Lebanon to avoid formal commitments in an increasingly polarized Arab world. This chapter also reviews Anglo–American assessments of Lebanon and its president. The fourth chapter looks at the impact of regional and international politics in Lebanon in 1956 and 1957 through the Suez crisis and the ensuing Eisenhower Doctrine. Nasser’s populist appeal to many Arabs,

Introduction

5

including much of Lebanon’s Muslim population due to his message of Arab nationalism, and the reaction of a majority of Lebanon’s Christians to Nasser are central to understanding a major dimension of the 1958 crisis and the endemic Lebanese problem of divided loyalties. These events served to polarize the Lebanese population and the Lebanese governments acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine led to Muslim accusations of a breach of the National Pact. The fifth chapter addresses the parliamentary elections of 1957, which were a decisive event in influencing the outbreak of the rebellion the following year. The British, American, and Egyptian roles in the elections are discussed. The formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958 and the reaction of Lebanese Christians and Muslims to it are the subject of Chapter 6. This chapter also includes a discussion of the issue of Chamoun’s re-election, the outbreak of the rebellion, and the extent of British and American support for Chamoun. The question of re-election was a rallying point for the amorphous opposition to Chamoun. The declassified British and American documents provide sufficient information to confirm hitherto unsubstantiated rumours surrounding this issue. The seventh chapter continues the discussion of the rebellion from Chapter 6. Selected events in June and July are narrated in some detail to give a sense of what it was like to be in Lebanon at that time. Diplomatic activity at both the regional and international levels is discussed. This chapter then addresses the issue of American military intervention in Lebanon both before and in the wake of the Iraqi revolution and concludes that the crisis in Lebanon was heading towards resolution through compromise by mid-July. However, unforeseen events in Iraq prompted the landing of marines in Beirut. Just as the military intervention was prompted by motives extraneous to Lebanon, so was the resolution of tension at the regional and international levels between the UAR and the USA. That, together with the role of the UN during the crisis, is the subject of the eighth chapter. American–Egyptian rapprochement had been underway prior to the outbreak of the May rebellion in Lebanon and rendered Chamoun’s position with the Americans more tenuous. The diplomatic documents attest to the high priority that Nasser attached to improving relations

6


with the USA, one that superseded any potential gains to be had by extending his control over Lebanon. The revolution in Iraq and the increasing popularity of Arab nationalism brought about a reassessment of American foreign policy to the accommodation of, rather than opposition to, the new Arab ideology. Within the new policy outlook, the interest of Western policymakers in Lebanon was surpassed by more important concerns. The conclusion restates the findings of this research based on the documentary evidence now available and in doing so seeks to correct the misperceptions held about the crisis of 1958. ENDNOTE TO INTRODUCTION

1.

The conference was organized by the Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford and the University of Texas at Austin.

1 Lebanon: 1920–1952

FRENCH INTERESTS IN LEBANON

The state of Lebanon came into being at the end of the First World War as a consequence of the demise of the Ottoman Empire and ensuing rearrangement of its territory. A quasi-independent entity of Mount Lebanon existed in the nineteenth century under Ottoman supervision and with European guarantees, yet it was during the postwar peace negotiations that the modern state with its present boundaries was 1 formed. While the circumstances of the First World War led to the formation of ‘Greater Lebanon’, it was during the Second World War that the country attained its independence, again determined largely by external events. The theme of external intervention and internal wars is a recurrent one in the Lebanese Mountain and the Lebanese state and is 2 central to understanding both its history as well as recent events. In conjunction with this theme, French colonial interests in the postFirst World War period converged with those of the Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronite and Uniate communities. While the French sought to maintain a predominant position in the Levant in the face of the far superior British military forces, Lebanon’s Christians sought to enlarge the boundaries of the prewar Ottoman governorate (or mutasarrifiyya) of the Lebanese mountain. Their aim was to ensure the

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economic viability of a state that would be independent of Faysali or any other projects for Arab unity. Britain’s appointment of Sherif Husain’s son to head an Arab government in Damascus at the end of the war was in partial fulfilment of wartime pledges to the Hashemites. Britain’s alliance with the Arab nationalist Hashemites was superseded by con3 siderations for the Anglo–French wartime alliance and consequently the 4 British recognized France’s traditional interests in the Levant. The British manifested their recognition by acquiescing to France’s military control of the Levant, France’s defeat of Faisal, and the League of Nations’ appointment of France as mandatory power over Syria and 5 Lebanon, in the aftermath of the war. Clearly, external players had a central role in determining internal developments in Lebanon, a recurrent theme in the history of Lebanon. The National Pact, formulated in 1943 on the eve of independence is pivotal to understanding the post-independence history of Lebanon, particularly the events of the 1950s that culminated in the 1958 crisis. The Pact was a product of the relationship between internal Lebanese forces and external Arab and Western powers. This internal–external dialectic was and continues to be a dominant theme of Lebanon’s modern history and a potential source of instability. The National Pact agreement was not referred to popular referendum and was brokered in 6 the traditional style of the politics of the notables. The influence of the non-Lebanese actors was decisive and the consensus among Syria, Egypt, and Britain, together with fortuitous regional and international circumstances, ensured that an agreement was reached. The external component necessary for the success of the pact was also a clear source of its weakness, for the assumption was that the regional balance of 7 power would remain unchanged. The revolutions and wars in the Middle East in the 1950s swept away monarchies and installed army rule in more than one Arab state. The rise of Arab nationalism was the predominant ideology of the period and Gamal Abdel Nasser was its most visible proponent. These regional events brought much instability to Lebanon as they generated diametrically opposed reactions from Lebanese Christians and Muslims, which at times seemed to violate the spirit of the National Pact. The National Pact was a verbal agreement between leaders of the two major Lebanese Christian and Muslim communities, more

Lebanon: 1920–1952

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specifically the Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim sects). Bechara al-Khoury and Riyad al-Sulh agreed that while the Christians would forego any alliance with France and would pledge that Lebanon pursue a foreign policy aligned with that of the other Arab states, the Muslims would recognize the existence of Greater Lebanon as an independent political entity separate from Syria. Riyad al-Sulh spoke of the agreement as aiming to Arabize the Christians and Lebanize the Muslims. The Pact established the framework for their cooperation on the eve of Lebanon’s independence and fulfilled the need to present a unified front against colonial France that still held the post-First World War mandate for Lebanon. The agreement sought to reconcile the differing religious and political loyalties of the two communities and, while each pledged to forego their traditional allegiances, the Christians to France and the Muslims to Syria and the Arab world, each side held certain assumptions about the other that were not addressed and would constitute a major source of friction in the following decade. In return for accepting the French-sponsored state of Greater Lebanon as a separate political entity from Syria, the Muslims expected the Christians to espouse the ideology of Arab nationalism that eventually advocated full Arab unity. However the Christians’ concession to Arabism was based on a belief in the secular dimension of the ideology that fell short of actual Arab political unity.8 Regional political events in the 1950s overloaded the capacity of the National Pact and the unresolved problem of Lebanon’s identity re-emerged. The political relationship between Lebanon’s Christians and Muslims is pivotal to any study of Lebanon’s modern history. It permeates all levels of politics and society and, as Albert Hourani wrote, the different religious loyalties of the Lebanese people are ‘the fundamental reality in Lebanese society’.9 The centrality of this interaction between the two groups was succinctly described by Edward Atiyah in his 1946 biography. Born in 1903, Atiyah starts one of the chapters of his book with the following lines: Christians versus Moslems: this was my first notion of collective human relationships. To my mind at the age of five or six the world consisted entirely of Moslems and Christians in antagonism to one another — two natural inevitable groups, as natural and

10

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s inevitable as the world itself. … From my earliest days I was 10 hearing talk about ‘Christians and Moslems’.

The level of sectarian tension between these two groups fluctuated throughout the past century of Lebanon’s history and occasionally led to widespread civil strife. While some political alignments during the 1958 crisis cut across sectarian lines, the events of 1958 had heavy sectarian overtones and the majority of the population perceived the crisis in sectarian terms. This was clearly seen in the widespread denunciation of leaders who took positions opposed to the majority of their coreligionists. Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh and the Maronite patriarch were telling examples. While al-Sulh was denounced by the Muslim ‘ulema (religious leaders) as an apostate for his support of Chamoun, the Maronite patriarch was opposed by much of the Maronite clergy and community. In the 1940s, Riyad al-Sulh was among the Muslim politicians who became reconciled to an independent Lebanon that would eventually be part of a wider Arab union. The ideological framework for his position was provided by his cousin Kazim al-Sulh who in his newspaper al-Nida’ expressed the view that the existence of Lebanon as an independent state in its post-1920 borders did not contradict a commitment to Arab nationalism. Riyad al-Sulh became independent Lebanon’s first prime minister in 1943. Other prominent Muslim leaders such as Abdul Hamid Karami and Salim Ali Salam remained committed to immediate union with Syria and initially boycotted participation in the government of a 11 Lebanon separate from Syria. Karami finally accepted the premiership in January 1945 and declared his commitment to Lebanon’s independence within the post 1920 boundaries.12 The reference is relevant and interesting because the sons of Karami and Salam were the leaders of the 1958 insurrection against Chamoun and advocated closer relations with Nasser and the UAR after its formation in February 1958. On the other hand, the cousin of Riyad al-Sulh, Sami al-Sulh, closely worked with Camille Chamoun during his presidency and was his prime minister at a time when no other prominent Muslim agreed to cooperate with the president. Sulh’s association with Chamoun in 1958 lost him the support of his community and effectively ended his political career. An overview of the tenure of the first president of the independent

Lebanon: 1920–1952

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republic, Bechara al-Khoury, whose successor in 1952 was Camille Chamoun, is relevant because al-Khoury’s presidency ended in a crisis that had some similarity with the crisis of 1958 and the enduring characteristics of Lebanon’s political institutions of the presidency, government and parliament were formed in the 1930s and 1940s (when 13 al-Khoury’s role was prominent) and contributed to the 1958 crisis. The issue of Chamoun’s re-election in 1958 was a main source of opposition to the president, although he never publicly stated his intent to run for re-election. Diplomatic documents confirm popular belief at the time that Chamoun seriously considered re-election but backed down in the face of popular opposition, which culminated in the rebellion that broke out in May 1958. Al-Khoury succeeded (where Chamoun failed) in amending the constitution and renewing his mandate, but that brought about his downfall as Lebanese politicians of all political persuasions forced him to resign in a peaceful movement otherwise known as the ‘rosewater revolution’. These events are relevant in conveying the political climate of the times, particularly that Chamoun with his own presidential ambitions would lead the opposition movement that forced Khoury to resign in 1952. A review of French historical ties in the Levant is relevant for understanding the underlying basis of France’s claim to traditional interests in the area and the awarding to her of the mandate for Syria and Lebanon. This occurred despite the fact that it was British troops that actually occupied the Ottoman territories in 1917 and maintained a military presence there that was far superior to that of the French throughout the war. French interest in the Levant is centuries old and French historians claim that it dates back to the time of Charlemagne who negotiated with the Abbasid caliph Harun al-Rashid, for the custody of the Christian 14 Holy Places. The Holy Places were an obvious attraction to the Europeans and the minority Christian communities constituted the channel through which France established and extended her influence in the area 15 of present day Syria and Lebanon. The Ottoman sultan officially recognized French interests in 1535 when he granted Francis 1 the privileges defined by the capitulations agreement. French involvement in the area increased with the ‘Eastern Question’ and the post-1860 16 developments in Mount Lebanon. French influence in the Levant

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culminated in the acquisition of the mandate for Syria and Lebanon at the San Remo Conference in April 1920. The ongoing rivalry with Britain undoubtedly affected the scope and intensity of French influence and the British alliance with the Hashemites drove France to strengthen her connection with the Maronite community and create an expanded Lebanon in September 1920. French imperialist activity was enhanced by the lobbying role of colonial societies operating in Paris. Officials of the Foreign and Colonial 17 Ministries were often members of the colonial societies. Such was the case at the Quai d’Orsay where numerous officials responsible for Middle Eastern policy during the First World War were members of the Comité 18 de l’Asie Française. The colonial party could rally considerable public support for a venture by presenting a colonial issue as a matter of French 19 prestige. French economic involvement in Syria and particularly Lebanon increased from the mid-nineteenth century, and was concentrated in two major areas, the silk industry and public works to develop a basic infrastructure of roads, railways and ports. Sericulture in France had been destroyed by disease and hence silk factories were set up by firms from Lyons to produce thread for export to France. A number of French companies were set up in the late nineteenth century, to expand the ports and build railways, such as Tripoli’s Société Française des Tramways et Eclairage de Beyrouth and the Tramways et Eclairage d’Alep and many 20 others. French companies in the mid-nineteenth century built most of the railway lines in Syria and Lebanon as well as the Beirut Damascus road. French missionaries were as active as the politicians and businessmen particularly among the Catholic Maronite community. Educational institutions were set up by the different French Catholic missionary 21 orders, whether Lazarists, Franciscans, Capucins or Benedictine. The Jesuits were particularly active, and founded a university in 1878, partly in response to the American Presbyterian Mission’s establishment of the 22 Syrian Protestant College in 1866. By the turn of the century, French presence in Greater Syria, particularly in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, surpassed that of the other European powers. The French premier and foreign minister Raymond Poincaré sought and obtained from the British foreign secretary Edward

Lebanon: 1920–1952

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Grey and the cabinet, a denial of any potential British designs in an area recognized to be within the French sphere of influence. That was in 1912, two years before the outbreak of the First World War, and Poincaré declared in the Senate that ‘in the Lebanon and Syria we have 23 traditional interests, and we intend to see them respected.’ The theme of Anglo–French mistrust pervaded the relationship of these two wartime allies with respect to the Levant area. The French request for British assurances of disinterest in Syria and Lebanon would again be reiterated by the wartime leader Charles de Gaulle in 1941, and Churchill, like his predecessor, Edward Grey, would provide these verbal assurances. Like the crisis of 1860, the First World War brought about greater French involvement in Mount Lebanon. The war provided the opportunity for the creation of the Lebanese Republic and the ensuing French mandate over the newly created state. The mandate survived until the Second World War which again provided the Lebanese with an opportunity to alter their situation and this time declare their independence from foreign tutelage. An immediate cause for French intervention during the First World War was the famine that spread throughout Lebanon and some parts of Syria, and which Jemal Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army in Syria, did little to alleviate. In fact army requisitioning of animals and supplies worsened the situation, and Mount Lebanon, dependant on the hinterland for its food supply, lost at least 20 per cent of its population (80,000 people) during 24 the war. Moreover the allied blockade of the coast put an end to the remittances sent to Lebanon from the Lebanese émigré communities in the Americas and elsewhere, and on which the livelihood of many Lebanese families depended. In May 1916 the Maronite patriarch appealed for French assistance, and the various committees lobbying for French intervention in Paris presented the case of the Christians’ ‘suffering at the hands of their barbaric Turkish oppressors as the result 25 of their devotion to France’. THE FRENCH MANDATE

The secret wartime agreements between the Allied Powers, particularly Britain and France, effected a delineation of their respective areas of influence. The Sykes–Picot Agreement defined a blue zone encompassing

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the area of what became Greater Lebanon while the major Syrian towns 26 of Damascus, Homs, and Hama were excluded from this zone. An Arab state under Hashemite rule was set up in Syria, while Lebanon came under direct French rule. In effect this agreement constituted an informal separation of Lebanon from Syria, and due to the efforts of the Maronite patriarch and lobbying groups in Paris this separation became concrete with the French declaration announcing the establishment of the Lebanese state in September 1920. It was known as ‘Grand Liban’ (Greater Lebanon) due to the addition of territory to the pre-war autonomous sanjaq (administrative district) of Mount Lebanon. General Henri Gouraud’s decree number 318 of 31 August 1920 added the following towns and their respective hinterlands: Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, Rashaya, Hasbaya, and Baalbek. The new arrangement altered the sectarian composition of the population from what was previously a predominantly Christian-inhabited governorate (mutasarrifiyya) to a larger 27 entity comprising almost equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. The Maronite community with its longstanding political, economic, and cultural ties to France lobbied for and welcomed the French mandate while the majority of the Muslims opposed the French whom they 28 correctly perceived as favouring their Maronite clients. Moreover, Muslim and particularly Sunni aspirations aimed at retaining their membership in a larger Arab nation, which was advocated by the Hashemites and whose nucleus was perceived to be in Damascus with Faisal’s short-lived Arab government. Faisal’s exile from Syria in July 1920 and French occupation of the country only served to increase opposition by the Muslim majority of the 29 population to the mandates that were set up in Syria and Lebanon. The mandate authority was both a Christian and a foreign power and therefore lacked the legitimacy of the previous Ottoman ruler who as sultan and caliph represented the highest political and religious 30 authority in Sunni Islam. Moreover, French favouritism for the minority communities (constituting a counterweight to the predominantly urban Sunni majority) further exacerbated sectarian tension and was manifested in the territorial arrangements implemented by the first high commissioner General Henri Gouraud. An enlarged ‘Greater Lebanon’ was separated from Syria, which in turn was divided into four distinct 31 administrative units along ethnic and religious lines.

Lebanon: 1920–1952

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Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, an organization that was set up during the postwar peace talks, defined the mandate system as one of tutelage and advice by the mandatory power to the mandated territory to prepare it for self-rule. The mandatory power was required to submit an annual progress report on the political and socio32 economic development of its assigned territory. The French combined their policy of divide and rule with a highly 33 centralized administrative setup. The high commissioner had extensive powers and issued decrees without consulting the Syrian or French government. His second in command was the secretary general of the high commission. While the mandate administration included both indigenous and French officials, there were two categories of French officials: those appointed and paid by the high commissioner and those hired and paid by the local government on a contract basis. The latter basically duplicated the work of the high commissioner’s men who were appointed as delegates and advisers to the different administrative departments of the states. These officials had veto power over the local administrators, from the governor of a state to the local directors of departments such as finance, education, or public works. Such an arrangement resulted in an overlapping, redundant and costly administrative structure. The majority of the mandate personnel were drawn from the military, and many functionaries came to Syria and Lebanon from other parts of the overseas French empire. French policy in Syria and Lebanon was framed with North Africa in mind, in terms of 34 the repercussions that it could generate in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis. High commissioners tended to recruit officials from the locations in the colonial service with which they were familiar; Gouraud brought functionaries from Morocco, while his successors Ponsot and de Martel 35 relied on personnel from Indochina. The result was a high turnover in personnel with its predictable results. Moreover, Syria did not attract the best and the brightest, for French officials perceived it as a problematic post and one that was unlikely to promote the career of an ambitious civil servant. 36 In 1920 the French had an army of 70,000 in the Levant. The Armée du Levant was the central pillar of the mandate’s defence. Together with the Troupes Spéciales (Syrian Legion) they constituted the two most expensive institutions of the mandate structure. While the recruits of the

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Armée were from the foreign legion battalions of the French North and West African colonies, the Troupes Spéciales were recruited from the local population and half of their officers were Syrians and Lebanese, who were trained at the newly established Military Academy in Damascus. The French encouraged the minorities (particularly from the rural areas) to join, as a counterweight to the urban-based predominantly Sunni Muslims who often exhibited anti-French and nationalist sentiments. The rural-based minorities in turn used the army as a vehicle 37 for socio-economic advancement. The services spéciaux, an information service network of officers reporting to the high commissioner, were an additional instrument of public security. They were spread throughout the territory and effectively ‘exercised an almost unlimited influence over 38 the local administration and political life’. Financial policy was based on the premise of perpetuating French domination and safeguarding economic interests. The latter was visible in the preference given to French business concerns and violated the stipulations of the mandate for an open policy for all members of the League of Nations. Concessions were granted to French companies especially in the areas of public utilities and transport. The high commission manipulated the grain markets, and French-applied customs policies favoured French imports with inadequate protection for local products. A Syrian currency was issued by the Paris based Banque de Syrie et du Liban, but many people continued to use the more stable Turkish gold pound. Even the development of the basic infrastructure of roads, railways and communications was undertaken to facilitate troop movements and enhance French administrative control in the mandated territories although the mandated territories and their inhabitants were 39 beneficiaries of these projects. Thus, while the French developed the infrastructure of Syria and Lebanon especially in terms of roads, railways, and basic utilities, a disproportionate amount of the budget was nevertheless allocated for administration, defence and public security expenditures, with less emphasis on economic development. While France’s record as a mandatory power provides the observer with much to criticize, one must bear in mind the pre-existing conditions during Ottoman rule and the consequent very significant contributions of the French to the territories in the areas of administration, public works, education and the provision of equal rights to all indi-

Lebanon: 1920–1952

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viduals, particularly the minorities. In his contemporary account of the mandate period in Syria and Lebanon, Albert Hourani assessed France’s achievements as providing ‘some of the essential conditions which would 40 make possible the transition from a medieval to a modern society’. Among these were the establishment of law and order, and the rudiments of civil government. For the non-Muslim communities, the changes brought about by the French were monumental, for after enduring centuries of official second-class status, they were now treated by the government on an equal level with the majority Muslim population. Another legacy of the French was the promulgation of a constitution in 1926 that introduced a system of republican democracy. While maintaining the communal principle of the division of office, the electoral system established by the constitution laid down the principle that all the population would elect each deputy, regardless of his sectarian affiliation, and thus represent voters from all sectarian groups. Albert Hourani wrote that ‘this principle might indeed be regarded as the most important contribution made in the Mandatory period to the political life 41 of Lebanon’. Syrians and Lebanese held widely varying views of the French man42 date and its legacy. Some perceived it as a form of colonial rule going beyond its assigned task to advise and assist and one that had failed to fulfil the requirement to prepare the territories for indigenous rule (as stipulated in the mandate charter), while others, particularly among the religious minorities, favoured the French presence and worked closely 43 with the mandate authorities. With respect to the above-mentioned requirement, Lebanon had a head start over the other territories and, as had previously been the case, once again benefited from the troubled relationship between France and neighbouring Syria. The outbreak of the Syrian revolt in July 1925 increased the pressure on the French government to relent to requests by members of the Lebanese Representative Council that they participate in drafting a constitution. That request was 44 a requirement stipulated in the mandate charter. While scholars disagree about the extent of French influence in the drafting of the constitution, the importance of the document lay in its confirmation of the existence of a Lebanese entity separate from Syria and its consecration of 45 the existence of ‘Greater Lebanon’. To the Christian supporters of an independent Lebanon, this was more important than the issue of inde-

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pendence (which was postponed until 1943), while Arab nationalists who favoured the reattachment of the annexed areas to Syria simply 46 boycotted the proceedings of the constitutional committee. Myriad Syrian allegations against French rule and the perception that the French did not operate within the parameters of the terms of the mandate were augmented by regional developments such as the Anglo– Iraqi Treaty that terminated the British mandate and led to the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations in 1932. Tangible initiatives in a similar direction for Syria and Lebanon were not begun until 1936, when treaties between France and the two countries were initialled in Septem47 ber and November of that year. Both Syrian and Lebanese parliaments approved their respective treaty, which awaited ratification by the French parliament. The collapse of the Popular Front government in France (favourable to the treaties), its replacement by a right-wing government, and the impending advent of war led to the abandonment of the treaties by France. The increasing threat of war necessitated a strong French presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and in July 1939 the high commissioner Gabriel Puaux proceeded to dissolve the cabinet and parliament, to suspend the constitution, and to impose martial law in both Syria and Lebanon. General Maxime Weygand (the previous high commissioner) arrived from France to assume the command of the French forces in the Levant. THE SECOND WORLD WAR: ANGLO–FRENCH RIVALRY AND INDEPENDENCE FOR LEBANON

The events of the Second World War and wartime Anglo–French rivalry hastened the independence of Lebanon. The Lebanese of different political and religious persuasions were politically united over the issue of freeing themselves of French mandate rule. They were encouraged in these efforts by the British who sought to diminish France’s role in the Levant. On the eve of independence, the British were instrumental in brokering the National Pact between Lebanon’s Christians and Muslims. This verbal agreement was the basis for Christian–Muslim cooperation in independent Lebanon and was also called into question in times of crisis such as the events of 1956 until 1958 when each community accused the other of violating the National Pact. The capitulation of France in June 1940 and the emergence of both

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the collaborationist Vichy regime and the Free French movement led by a relatively unknown General Charles de Gaulle had a decisive impact on the future of the mandated territories. After the fall of France, Puaux declared loyalty to the Vichy government. The pro-Axis sympathies of the French authorities in the Levant were exemplified by the announcement of General Mittelhauser (Weygand’s successor) that the French forces in the Levant would abide by the French armistice. This announcement together with the access of Syrian air bases given to German aircraft during the Rashid ‘Ali revolt in Iraq in 1941 led the British to invade Syria and Lebanon in June 1941. The strategic importance of the Levant with respect to British interests in the Middle East was clear: ‘If the Germans were to gain control of the Levant States we would have inevitably lost the Suez Canal and Egypt, which was within 48 an hour’s flight of the Lebanese and Syrian landing grounds.’ French participation in the campaign was carried out by a contingent of de Gaulle’s Free French troops. The British launched their invasion of Syria and Lebanon on the 8 June 1941 and it took an unexpected five weeks to 49 defeat the Vichy forces. An armistice agreement was signed at Acre on 14 July. The British now had the upper hand in the previous French mandates both militarily and financially with respect to the Free French. To ensure indigenous support and enhance their position with the local population, the British pressured the French to issue a proclamation on the eve of the invasion, ending the mandate regime in Syria and Lebanon and proclaiming the independence and freedom of the two republics in June 1941. The British pledged to guarantee the French proclamation and would thereafter hold the French accountable and ensure that it was carried out to the letter. The implications of the British position were that they had now joined the French in the Levant; yet in the context of the wartime situation, they were the stronger partner. The British ambassador in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson, made a statement in the name of the British government guaranteeing the proclamation and ‘associating His Majesty’s Government with the assurance of independence given by General Catroux on behalf of General de Gaulle to Syria and Lebanon’. This pledge marked the beginning of a stormy relationship between the two wartime allies, with French accusations of British 50 ‘Fashodism’ and British denials, and local Syrian and Lebanese politicians capitalizing on the Anglo–French rivalry in order to wrest them-

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Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s 51

selves from mandatory tutelage. That they were able to do so was largely due to British assistance personified in Churchill’s personal envoy 52 and minister to the Levant, Major General Sir Edward Spears. Edward Spears (‘Spiers’ until 1918) was born of an English father of 53 German-Jewish ancestry and was brought up and educated in France. Spears was a war hero and personal friend of the British prime minister Winston Churchill, who brought him out of retirement and initially appointed him as his personal representative to a mission of liaison with 54 the leader of the Free French, Charles de Gaulle. In parliamentary circles, as a conservative MP, Spears was known to be a Francophile and 55 a supporter of the Free French. In February 1942, the prime minister appointed Spears as the first British minister to the republics of Syria and Lebanon following their recognition by Great Britain as independent republics. He would retain this position until Churchill recalled him in 1944. Despite the criticism of Spears’s conduct as being overtly antiFrench, his mission to simultaneously support the French position in the Levant and promote Syrian and Lebanese independence was irrecon56 cilable. The counterpart of Spears in the Levant was General Georges Catroux, whom de Gaulle had appointed as commander of the troops of the Levant, Delegate General and Plenipotentiary to Syria and Lebanon. The relationship between the two men was one of such intense rivalry that it led the French-appointed president of the Lebanese Republic, 57 Alfred Naccache, to complain to the US consul general that ‘the situation was reaching a point where the dignity of his own position was 58 being affected by the constant squabbles between the two allies.’ Anglo– French rivalry extended to the local scene and the presidential elections, 59 whereby each supported a contending faction for the presidency. The British supported the Destouri (Constitutionalist) bloc of Bechara al-Khoury and Riyad al-Sulh, which advocated closer relations with the 60 Arab world, while the staunchly French Emile Eddé led the Watani (National) Bloc and advocated maintaining a special relationship with France even after independence, a policy that coincided with that of the 61 French. In the 1920s, Eddé had opposed the Greater Lebanon project and favoured reconstituting a predominantly Christian-populated Mount 62 Lebanon under French protection from its Muslim Arab surroundings. He had defeated al-Khoury in the presidential elections of 1936 when

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French influence in the Levant was uncontested, but in 1943 it was the British candidate who would triumph. The Eddé–Khoury rivalry illustrates the predominance of personalities in Lebanese politics rather than political agendas and platforms. The rivalry of these two Maronite politicians dominated the political scene throughout the 1930s and 1940s and split their community. Eventually they both became president — solely the prerogative of the Maronite community — and while they held similar views of Lebanon’s political role at the outset of their careers they would change their views 63 for the political expedience of gaining office. After French support went to Eddé in the 1930s and was decisive in his election to the presidency in 1936, Khoury turned to the British and was their candidate in 1943 when they had the upper hand in Lebanon after their occupation of the country in 1941 and ousting of the Vichy forces. British influence was also decisive in the presidential elections of 1952. The British position in the Middle East remained uncontested until the mid-1950s when, in the context of the cold war, the Americans took over as the foremost power in the region facing the Soviet Union. Camille Chamoun was one of the founding members of the Destouri bloc and in his memoirs related the story of its emergence. After meeting at Bechara al-Khoury’s house, Camille Chamoun and two of his colleagues met the high commissioner and presented him with a memorandum of grievances requesting the restoration of constitutional life, termination of the mandate, the recognition of Lebanon’s sovereignty, and the conclusion of a treaty of friendship with France. Chamoun viewed that initiative in September 1934 as marking the birth of the 64 constitutional bloc. The small group rapidly attracted notables such as the Emir Majid Arslan, Hamid Frangieh, Sabri Hamade, Selim Tacla, and 65 Bechara al-Khoury who, according to Chamoun, joined six weeks later. The relationship between Khoury and the younger Chamoun would exhibit signs of latent rivalry that came out into the open in 1952. The memoirs of both men reveal the tension in their relationship that was also based on rivalry for the presidency. Khoury’s motivation for forming the Destouri bloc was in order to resume his presidential campaign, interrupted in 1932 when the high commissioner cancelled the presidential elections and suspended the constitution. Both the constitutional bloc and Eddé’s national bloc were not poli-

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tical parties in the formal sense of having a hierarchical organization and a formal political platform. They were loose formations of notables whose aims and interests coincided and whose members perceived that they had to align themselves with either presidential contender to participate in the political arena in which they took the form of parliamentary blocs. The mandate authorities encouraged this bipolar compe66 tition as it strengthened their position as ‘balancer’. Following the restoration of the constitution, presidential elections were held in 1936 and French-supported Emile Eddé defeated Bechara al-Khoury. The Eddé presidency resembled that of previous presidencies since 1926, whether appointed or elected, in that effective decision-making was in the hands of the French authorities. It was not until 1943 that a president was elected to an independent Lebanon and did not owe his position to the French. Nevertheless, foreign influence was instrumental in bringing about the 1943 parliamentary and presidential elections and in helping the Lebanese resist French attempts to reassert control that year. As already mentioned, Spears was Britain’s representative in Leba67 non and a central figure in determining the country’s political future. During the Second World War, Britain’s pan-Arab policy culminated in its sponsorship of the Arab League. Within the context of their pan-Arab policy, the British in Lebanon supported the demands of Lebanese Muslims for a more equitable division of parliamentary positions. Following an unfair distribution of parliamentary seats in June 1943, Spears intervened and alleviated Muslim grievances by allocating the community a greater percentage than hitherto given. Spears established the ratio of six Christians to five Muslims in parliament, which remained in effect until 1989 when the distribution was equalized and the legis68 lature enlarged. Consequently it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that Spears’s policy helped bring many Muslims into the folds of a political system that they had until then boycotted, particularly 69 during the early years of the mandate period. Amid French reluctance and British insistence, parliamentary elections were held on 5 September 1943 and al-Khoury’s faction won the day. Spears’s role was significant in ensuring that the elections were held and that the British supported al-Khoury’s nationalist bloc against that of Eddé. Although independence from French control would be declared two months later, none of the electoral platforms of either Muslim or

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Christian candidates focused on that issue. Lebanon’s independence had been formally proclaimed in Catroux’s statement of June 1941, yet the French were still effectively in control despite Spears’s efforts to chip away at their position. With al-Khoury’s election to the presidency on 21 September and his appointment of the pan-Arabist Riyad al-Sulh as prime minister, it was a matter of time before there would be a showdown with the French authorities. Bechara al-Khoury had the support of Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, as well as Britain whose policy in the Middle East veered towards supporting the then current trend of pan-Arabism in the interests of maintaining British influence in the area. As for the foreign representatives, both Spears and Catroux accused the other of interference in the parliamentary elections. While Spears maintained that his countermeasures were able effectively to block French pressure and intervention, Catroux in his memoirs acknowledged the effectiveness of the British effort: ‘The struggle for influence between the British and the French was superimposed on the antagonisms of clans, communities and individuals. The Spears mission and the French Delegation reproached the other for putting pressure on the electoral body. … The friends of France were defeated in north Lebanon, 70 in the south, and the Békaa region.’ The election of a nationalist parliament and president and the continued insistence of the French delegate to rule by decree set the two sides on an inevitable collision course. The irreconcilability of the two positions is illustrated in a somewhat trivial incident in October 1943, just prior to the November crisis. On 13 October, the French delegate Jean Helleu, who had replaced Catroux in June, published a decree declaring the end of summer savings time and the return to winter time. The Lebanese government’s response was the immediate publication of a similar decree. The incident elicited a witty remark from the American consul general George Wadsworth, who noted in a dispatch to the State Department that the action of the Lebanese government ‘permitted the Lebanese to observe their own rather than French promulgated law and deferred showdown on the vital 71 question of the hour’. However, a showdown was in the making, for on 25 October the Lebanese government sent Helleu a letter demanding independence and expressing the intent to modify the constitution to reflect that status. The government also requested that the French delegation be trans-

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formed into a diplomatic mission after transferring to the government all public services it retained during the mandate. Helleu left for Algiers for consultations with the French National Liberation Committee. In his absence the Lebanese government met on 7 November and proceeded to modify the constitution and legally terminate French authority in Lebanon by abolishing the prerogatives of the mandate. The government’s decisions were ratified by parliament the following day. The act was denounced by the French Committee in Algiers and a series of events culminated in the suspension of the constitution, the arrest of the president and cabinet members (with the exception of two) and their detention in the fortress of Rashaya in the 72 southeastern part of the country. The latter action was taken a few days after Helleu’s return to Beirut. Catroux has claimed that the decision was 73 Helleu’s alone and was not coordinated with the Committee in Algiers. As minister of the interior, Camille Chamoun was among those arrested in the early hours of 11 November, and his memoirs give a 74 detailed account of his arrest and 11-day incarceration at the fortress. Following the arrest of the president and cabinet members, Helleu appointed Emile Eddé by decree as president of the republic. These events generated an intense political reaction both at the popular and 75 diplomatic levels. Lebanese of all religious groups and parties united in denouncing French policy and held demonstrations calling for the 76 release of the imprisoned politicians. Many of the protesting delegations headed towards the residence of the British minister, because they perceived Edward Spears as their liberator. The ability of the nationalists to capitalize on the difficulties of the Anglo–French relationship was central to their success in achieving independence for ultimately it was British pressure that forced the French to back down and accede to the 77 wishes of the Lebanese government. The date the prisoners were released was thereafter celebrated as Lebanon’s independence day. British pressure was presented in the form of an ultimatum from the British minister of state in Cairo, R. G. Casey to Georges Catroux on 19 November. Catroux returned from Algiers, headquarters of de Gaulle’s Comité de Libération Nationale, to Beirut on 15 November to handle the crisis while Casey arrived in Beirut on 19 November. The ultimatum referred to the two demands the British government put forward on 13 November that the French had so far ignored. These were the replace-

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ment of Helleu and the release of the Lebanese politicians. The ultimatum gave the deadline of 10 a.m. on 22 November for acquiescence to these demands. Failure to do so by the French authorities would result in the British imposition of martial law and the forced release of the prisoners. To enhance the credibility of the ultimatum, two special regiments were brought in from Egypt in addition to the Ninth Army, which was ready to take control of the situation should the need arise. In his memoirs Catroux wrote that, at the time, he remarked to Casey that the spirit of the British document reminded him of the era of Fashodism: ‘Upon interpreting the spirit of this memorandum, I remarked 78 that it took me back to the era of Fashoda.’ Catroux had touched on the focal point of French accusations directed at the British in the Levant. The French accused the British of capitalizing on a situation where they had the upper hand to force concessions out of the French, undermine their position and eventually oust them from the area. British pressure on the French to free the president and other politicians was coupled with that of the Arab states that gradually 79 assumed a larger role in Lebanon’s internal politics. The position of the United States should also be considered, together with the prevailing 80 atmosphere engendered by the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. Anglo–French rivalry in the Levant was not novel to the Second 81 World War and can be traced back to the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. In the particular case of Lebanon, the multisectarian composition of the country’s population lent itself to the European powers’ patronage of the 82 different religious groups. Such historical circumstances rendered inevitable the underlying mistrust that characterized Anglo–French relations in the Levant from the outset of their joint venture in 1917. THE NATIONAL PACT

While the First World War had established France in the Levant, the Second World War accelerated the anti-imperialist process and terminated the French presence in Syria and Lebanon. As European intervention in the mid-nineteenth century had determined the future of the Lebanese mountain, so once again European involvement would affect major political developments in Lebanon. It was the British representative Edward Spears who brokered the Christian–Muslim agreement

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for the distribution of parliamentary seats, paving the way for the elections held in August 1943. In a larger sense this agreement provided the framework for the National Pact that constituted the basis for the coexistence of the two major religious groups in an independent Lebanese Republic. The National Pact was an unwritten agreement between the Maronite and Sunni notables, represented by Bechara al-Khoury and Riyad al-Sulh both having a stake in concluding an agreement to reconcile the differing Christian and Muslim conceptions of Lebanon so as to be able to govern. How did this agreement come about? The events of the Second World War highlighted the weakness of the French and together with British encouragement for independence provided fortuitous circumstances for an agreement among the Lebanese for a modus vivendi. The National Pact was a verbal agreement that aimed to establish a basis for cooperation between two communities with different political loyalties. In this sense, Riyad al-Sulh spoke of the agreement as aiming to Arabize the Christians and Lebanize the Muslims. While many Christians looked towards France as their traditional protector with whom they had religious and cultural affinity, many Muslims rejected Lebanon’s 1920 borders, yearned for Lebanon to become part of a greater Arab state and for many years refused to identify with it as their home83 land. By the agreement concluded between al-Khoury and al-Sulh in October–November 1943, each party undertook to modify its position whereby the Muslims would recognize the existence of an independent Lebanon, while the Christians would forego any alliance with France and would pledge Lebanon to pursue a foreign policy aligned with that of the other Arab states. The domestic component of the agreement was an extension of the confessional arrangement defined by Article 95 of the constitution of 1926, which provided for the proportional distribution of government employment among the confessional communities. According to the National Pact, the president would be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of parliament a Shi’ite Muslim, and parliamentary seats would be divided along the six to five ratio that had been agreed upon in August. This arrangement reinforced the sectarian principle as a pillar of the newly independent state. The National Pact may not have materialized had it not been for

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external involvement and encouragement for both Lebanese parties. A British-sponsored meeting held in Cairo in June 1942 was attended by Egyptian prime minister Nahhas Pasha, Syrian prime minister Jamil Mardam Bey, and Bechara al-Khoury, the leader of the pro-independence parliamentary Constitutionalist Bloc who would be elected president in September 1943. As alluded to in his memoirs, Bechara al-Khoury sought and received Syrian and Egyptian encouragement to pursue inde85 pendence for a pro-Arab Lebanon. Khoury’s election to the presidency in November 1943 was supported by Nahhas Pasha and Syria’s National Bloc politicians rather than by local Muslims, and his accommodation with the latter came only after he had ensured the backing of the 86 regional Arab states. Riyad al-Sulh, on the other hand, was one of the few prominent Muslim politicians to advocate cooperation with Lebanon’s Christians against the French and expressed support for an independent Lebanon in late 1943, a position that gradually evolved through the 1930s and was encouraged and publicized by his cousin Kazim al-Sulh in the daily alNida’ and the political party Hizb al-Nida’ al-Qawmi. He was the first to use the expression ‘Lebanon’s Arab face’ in acknowledging support for independence. Moreover, Syrian leaders of the National Bloc had deserted Lebanon’s Sunnis (their coreligionists) by accepting the French –Syrian treaty of 1936 and thereby recognizing Syrian independence within its post-1920 boundaries. Consequently, pragmatists such as 87 Riyad al-Sulh put aside any aspirations for pan-Arab unity. Regardless of the intentions of both parties, at that time of fast moving events, the National Pact was the most suitable arrangement to be made if independence was to be achieved. Notwithstanding the influence of the key players such as al-Khoury, al-Sulh, Eddé and Chiha, the pact was the final product of a long series of events that had begun in the 1930s and was shaped by regional and international political developments. While the pact provided a formula for political cooperation among Lebanon’s different confessional leaders, it was not an instrument of integration nor was it meant to foster a sense of national identity. In fact, it constituted a recognition of Lebanon’s pluralistic society, and reflected the influence of the political thinker and architect of the Lebanese constitution, Michel Chiha, who was the brother-in-law of Bechara alKhoury. Chiha proposed a political system that maintained the existing

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differences of Lebanon’s confessional communities within a unified political framework. Chiha’s Lebanon was a country of ‘associated confessional minorities’, which had undergone an unparalleled and unique 88 experience of pluralism. The ‘long experience of living communally’ engendered a sentiment of common destiny among the various groups who chose this communal destiny because it ensured tolerance and 89 liberty and was Lebanon’s raison d’être. He reiterated the theme that the situation of the Lebanese compelled them to choose between cooperation or death. The uniqueness of Lebanon as a refuge for persecuted minorities throughout history is a central theme of Chiha’s thought and the basis of his argument in favour of maintaining their particularisms: ‘Lebanon is a country of associated confessional minorities. All minorities must find their place there and obtain their rights. That is the raison 90 d’être for this country and is its uniqueness.’ The linchpin of the political system that would maintain Lebanon’s equilibrium was an assembly or parliament where the communities could contain their debates and disputes. Chiha repeatedly warned that transferring the debate outside the parliamentary forum — as would occur in 1958 — would have disastrous consequences for Lebanon. As if to underline its volatility, Albert Hourani wrote of the National Pact as an outcome of ‘changes of mood’ caused by events of the Second World War. In this sense the changing moods of the various communities with their differing religious loyalties and different conceptions of Lebanon would eventually (in 1958 and 1975) undermine the pact and threaten the structure of legitimate authority. Because the convergence of the Lebanese communities in 1943 was largely due to a certain regional balance of power, the country’s internal stability was closely tied to regional conditions and this rendered the National Pact a volatile agreement. As one scholar succinctly noted, the pact was based on the faulty assumption that ‘the balance of power in the region would remain unchanged in the sense that it will always reflect the value system of the 91 first generation of conservative pro-Western Arab nationalists.’ Riyad al-Sulh was of that generation and was Lebanon’s pre-eminent Muslim leader. He was known in the Arab world as a nationalist who had participated in the struggle against both the Ottomans and the French. His partnership with al-Khoury provided the consensus that kept sectarian animosity in Lebanon under control. As Bechara al-

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Khoury’s partner in the National Pact, he became his first prime minister in September 1943 and Camille Chamoun received the portfolio of the 92 Interior. It was largely due to his alliance with Riyad al-Sulh that Bechara alKhoury was able to remain in office and renew his term, despite the regional instability caused by events such as the Palestine war of 1948, the 1949 military coup in neighbouring Syria, as well as the attempted coup by the Parti Politique Syrienne (PPS) against al-Khoury in that 93 same year. Riyad al-Sulh was a well-known personality in the Arab world with many friendships among its leaders. As an Arab nationalist who had been exiled by the French, he was respected in the region. He helped the president weather several crises, with which the latter could 94 not have coped without a powerful Muslim partner. However, as the president’s relationship with al-Sulh deteriorated and his regime became increasingly tainted with corruption, al-Khoury’s broad base of support began to dwindle. Bechara al-Khoury was accused of influencing the parliamentary elections of 1947 and 1948 and, with the help of al-Sulh, he convinced the newly elected parliament to amend the constitution allowing for his 95 re-election. His mandate was due to expire in 1948. This move, together with increasing rumours of corruption surrounding the president and his family, served to mobilize opposition to the president from a broad and loose coalition of notables. These sentiments were manifested in the parliamentary elections of 1951 when politicians opposing the president allied themselves into a loose grouping known as the Socialist Front. Chamoun decided to join the ranks of the opposition at the end of May 1948, in the immediate aftermath of the constitutional amendment on 22 May that allowed for the renewal of al-Khoury’s mandate. Chamoun and Kamal Jumblatt were the leaders of the coalition that had formed with the objective of forcing the president out of office. The final blow came in the summer of 1951, when Riyad al-Sulh was assassinated by a member of the PPS seeking revenge for the execution of Antun Saadeh, the founder of the party, by the Sulh government in 1949. Deprived of the support that had been assured by his alliance with al-Sulh, the president had to face even greater opposition. Bechara al Khoury’s increased power after his re-election and that of his brother, nicknamed ‘Sultan’ Selim, alienated his former allies and threatened to

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upset the traditional balance of power among Lebanon’s notables. This hastened the president’s demise. The Deir al-Qamar opposition rally held in Chamoun’s home town on 17 August, hastened Bechara al-Khoury’s demise by rallying a broad spectrum of political figures and parties opposed to the president and calling for his resignation. On 16 September 1952, after increased attacks on his policy from all quarters, and the repeated resignations of three of his prime ministers within the month of September, the Socialist Front declared a general 96 strike and called for the president’s resignation. Bechara al-Khoury resigned on 18 September. On 22 September, parliament met and elected Camille Nimr Chamoun as the second president of the independent Republic of Lebanon. NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. For the circumstances in which modern Lebanon was formed in the years 1918–26, and in particular on how the Lebanese Christians both in France and Lebanon succeeded in persuading the French government to establish an independent Lebanese state with enlarged boundaries in 1920, see Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (London, 1985). See also Gérard D. Khoury, La France et L’Orient Arabe: Naissance du Liban Moderne 1914– 1920 (Paris, 1993). Khoury’s book is based on the papers of Robert de Caix, secretary general of Lebanon and Syria’s first high commissioner, Henri Gouraud. Khoury argues that the Sykes–Picot agreements were the work of the British and French governments and not of the negotiators as some historians have claimed. 2. For an examination of the historical record, see Marwan Buheiry, ‘External Interventions and Internal Wars in Lebanon: 1770–1982’, in Lawrence I. Conrad, ed. The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry (Princeton, 1989). 3. In October 1919, Faisal’s British allies, who had withdrawn their forces from Syria, told him that he must reach a settlement with France. ‘To make sure he did so, the British government cut his monthly subsidies by half, leaving the other half to be paid by the French.’ Faisal was later to remark to a British officer in Beirut that ‘he had been handed over tied by feet and hands to the French.’ Quoted in Christopher M. Andrew and A. S. KanyaForstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion (California, 1981), pp. 203–4. 4. For the origins of French involvement in Syria and Lebanon, see William I. Shorrock, French Imperialism in the Middle East: The Failure of Policy in

Lebanon: 1920–1952

5.

6.

7.

8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

31

Syria and Lebanon 1900–1914 (Madison, 1976). Shorrock approaches the subject from the three angles of religion, politics and economics and, unlike Zamir, maintains that the period from 1901 until 1914 rather than the wartime years was the crucial time during which France solidified her claim to Syria and Lebanon. As a result of British wartime pledges to the Hashemites (in the Hussein– McMahon Correspondence) to reward their revolt against the Turks, an independent Arab government headed by Faisal was installed in Damascus at the end of the war. It lasted from September 1918 until July 1920 when French forces occupied Damascus and forced Faisal into exile. An informative political history of Lebanon and its notables in establishing the distinctive character of the Lebanese polity in the 1940s is the subject of a recent study by Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (London, 2000). For a study of the National Pact, see Farid el-Khazen, ‘The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact’, October 1991, Papers on Lebanon, no. 12, Centre for Lebanese Studies (Oxford), p. 29. Ibid., pp. 16–17. Albert Hourani, ‘Lebanon: Development of a Political Society’, in The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (London, 1981), p. 141. Edward Atiyah, An Arab Tells His Story (London, 1946), p. 10. Najla W. Atiyah, ‘The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon’, unpublished D. Phil. thesis (University of London, 1973), pp. 131–2. Zisser, Lebanon, p. 116. Zisser reconstructs the political events of the Khoury presidency 1943–52 with major reliance on archival sources and assesses Khoury’s achievements and failings as well as his legacy to the Lebanese polity. Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London, 1946), p. 147. Hourani wrote that in 1649, a Maronite bishop went to the French court and asked for the protection of the king of France. The latter ‘issued letterspatent taking the whole Maronite community into his special protection’. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p. 147. Civil strife in the Lebanese mountain and Damascus in 1860 resulted in the massacre of a large number of Christians and prompted the French monarch, Napoleon III to send a French military expedition to Lebanon to prevent further bloodshed. In the aftermath of these events, French influence was central to effecting an agreement establishing a separate Ottoman

32

17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

22.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s governorship for the mountain and which was guaranteed by the European Powers. For a revisionist account (using the Ottoman archives) of the history of the Ottoman governorship set up in Mount Lebanon in 1860, see Engin Deniz Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920 (London, 1993). Akarli argues that French intervention in Ottoman Lebanon hampered rather than promoted the development of secular democracy. For an analytical narrative of the origins and outcome of the events of 1860 and the effect of regional and international power relationships on local developments in Syria and Lebanon, see Laila Fawaz’s An Occasion For War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (London, 1994). For more information on the colonial societies, see Andrew and KanyaForstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion. Robert de Caix who was the chief ideologist of this committee was a key figure in French Syrian policy during the peace settlement and a staunch advocate of the French acquisition of Syria. From 1919 to 1923 he held the position of secretary general to the first high commissioner in Syria and Lebanon, Henri Gouraud, and was an adviser to the Quai d’Orsay for many years and represented France on the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. This was concisely expressed in a conversation in 1918 between the two chief French and British negotiators on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. George Picot told Mark Sykes, ‘In our day to day political life the parti colonial remains in the background, but there are issues on which it truly represents the national will. When one of these issues, like that of Syria, arises, it suddenly comes to the fore, and has the whole country behind it.’ Picot to Sykes, 11 September 1918, FO 800/ 221, quoted in Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, ‘Centre and Periphery in the Making of the Second French Colonial Empire, 1815–1920’, Journal of Commonwealth and Imperial History, No. 198. Safiuddin Joarder, Syria Under the French Mandate, The Early Phase: 1920– 1927 (Dacca, 1977), p. 17. It has been estimated that 40,000 students were studying in French schools prior to the war, at an annual expenditure by the French government of one million francs in support of these institutions. See the article by one of the main proponents and defenders of the French Mandate, Robert de Caix, ‘L’Action de la France en Syrie’, La Revue Hebdomadaire, No. 8, 36 Anneé, 19 Février 1927 (Paris). See also Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 38–9. The growth of anti-clericalism was a significant force in France’s Third

Lebanon: 1920–1952

23.

24.

25. 26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

33

Republic, particularly after the separation of church from state in 1906. However, this made little difference in the French government’s policy towards promoting missionary work abroad, and hence the ironic situation whereby the Jesuits received funding from anti-clerical republican governments in France. Quoted in John P. Spagnolo, ‘French Influence in Syria Prior to World War I: The Functional Weakness of Imperialism’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 23, Winter 1969, p. 56. This figure was given in a 1918 report prepared by a commission of inquiry set up by the Turkish governor. For a contemporary description of the famine in Mount Lebanon, see Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen Orient, pp. 39– 40. Chamoun gives the figure of 150,000 who died as a result of famine and typhus fever, p. 59. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas, p. 107 and Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate (London, 1958), pp. 48–9. For a detailed discussion of the Sykes–Picot Agreement, see George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London, 1938), pp. 248–54. See also Gérard D. Khoury, La France et L’Orient Arabe, pp. 97–100. The 1911 figures for the governorate (mutasarrifiyya) of Mount Lebanon were 329,736 Christians to 85,232 Muslims. See Edmond Rabbath, La Formation Historique du Liban Politique et Constitutionnel (Beirut, 1973), p. 4. For a British perspective of the French mandate by a contemporary observer, see Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon. A more recent and the now standard work on the subject of the French mandate in Syria is Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945 (Princeton, 1987). See also the archival-based historical accounts of Lebanon’s political history in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s by Meir Zamir, Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926–1939 (London, 2000) and Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (London, 2000). For a contemporary account of Syrian grievances against French rule, see the following article by one of the leaders of the movement for an independent Syria, Chekib Arslan, ‘Syrian Opposition to French Rule’, Current History, Vol. XX, April–September 1924 (New York). The Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II resurrected the concept and title of the caliphate during the war in an effort to rally Sunni Muslims to defend the empire. These were the ‘Alawi state based in Latakia, the Druze state in Jebel alDruze, the sanjaq of Alexandretta and the fourth entity covered the remainder of Syria, which included the major cities of Damascus and Aleppo.

34


32. For a comprehensive account of the technical and legal stipulations of the mandate system as well as the complete text of Articles 22 and 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, see Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago, 1930). See also F. D. Lugard, ‘The Mandate System’, Edinburgh Review, Vol. 238 (1923). 33. For a detailed discussion of the organization of the French mandatory administration, see Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 71–94. 34. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p. 168. 35. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 72–4. 36. Joarder, Syria Under the French Mandate: The Early Phase 1920–1927, p. 89. 37. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 79–82. 38. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, p. 170. 39. According to Zamir, the improvement and expansion of the road, rail and general communications network was prompted by the Syrian revolt of 1925. Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926–1939, p. 18. 40. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 174–5. 41. Hourani, ‘Lebanon: Development of a Political Society’, The Emergence of the Modern Middle East, p. 138. 42. Meir Zamir’s political history in the 1920s and the 1930s emphasizes the significance of intra-sectarian rivalries and the primacy of personal interests as a driving force that shaped political developments in those years. Zamir, Lebanon’s Quest. 43. For a summary of the Syrian argument against French rule, see Chekib Arslan, ‘Syrian Opposition to French Rule’, Current History, Vol. 20, April– September 1924. 44. The Representative Council had developed out of the Administrative Council established by the acting high commissioner Robert de Caix on 8 March 1922. With 15 members appointed by the high commissioner, its function was purely consultative. In 1926 a 30-member council, whose members were elected for a four-year term with seats allocated among the various confessional communities, replaced it. For the text of the ordinance and the election proceedings, see Walter L. Browne, ed. The Political History of Lebanon (North Carolina, 1976). 45. The mechanics of the drafting process are recounted in Rabbath, La Formation Historique du Liban Politique et Constitutionnel, pp. 371–4, as well as in Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, pp. 202–15. 46. While Muslims were not unanimous in their opposition to the new state, neither were Christians in their support for it. Emile Eddé and Yusuf alSawda expressed the view of those supporting a smaller entity with a predominantly Christian majority.

Lebanon: 1920–1952

35

47. For the text of the treaties of 1936, see Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 200–4. 48. Sir Edward Spears, Fulfilment of a Mission (London, 1977). p. 118. 49. In his memoirs Spears relates a quip made by an ex-premier regarding the lengthy duration of the Syrian campaign that ‘Hitler would be in Moscow before the British were in Beirut.’ See Spears, Fulfilment, p. 116. 50. Martin L. Mickelsen, ‘Another Fashoda: The Anglo–Free French Conflict over the Levant, May–September, 1941’, Revue Française d’Histoire d’OutreMer, Vol. LXIII (Paris, 1976). 51. For a detailed account of Anglo–French wartime rivalry in the Levant based on an extensive use of British documents, see A. B. Gaunson, The Anglo– French Clash in Lebanon and Syria 1940–45 (New York, 1987). For a British perspective of the Damascus crisis of 1945 ‘as a concluding chapter in the history of Anglo–French rivalry in the Middle East’, see Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945–1951 (London, 1984), pp. 147– 72. Hourani’s Syria and Lebanon remains the classic account of the political history of the independence of the two states. The US attitude to Lebanon, Britain and the Free French is discussed by Edward Azar and Kate Shnayerson, ‘United States–Lebanese Relations: A Pocketful of Paradoxes’, in Edward Azar, ed. The Emergence of a New Lebanon (New York, 1984). 52. The central British role in bringing about Lebanon’s independence in 1943 has been understated in Lebanese historiography. 53. A vivid portrayal of Spears and his mission to Syria and Lebanon is the recent biography by Max Egremont, Under Two Flags: The Life of MajorGeneral Sir Edward Spears (London: 1997). 54. Circumstances had brought it about that de Gaulle’s narrow escape from the Germans in Bordeaux was assisted by taking one of the last allied aircraft to leave the city, which happened to be that of Spears. For Spears’s account of this event, see Edward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe, Vol. II (London, 1954). 55. Catroux refers to ‘la grande francophilie’ associated with Spears in British parliamentary circles. See Georges Catroux, Dans la Bataille De Méditerranée: Egypte–Levante–Afrique du Nord 1940–1944 (Paris, 1949), p. 191. 56. This much was clear to the American representative to Syria and Lebanon George Wadsworth, who was critical of the British position for keeping up the pretence of supporting the French. See W. R. Louis, The British Empire, p. 165. For a detailed and balanced account and assessment of the Spears mission, see A. B. Gaunson, The Anglo–French Clash in Lebanon and Syria 1940–1945 (London, 1987).

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57. Catroux appointed Naccache as president of the Lebanese Republic on 26 November 1941. 58. US Consul General (Engert) to Secretary of State, Strictly Confidential, Beirut, 15 April 1942, 890E.001/101 PS/EM. 59. The two leading Maronite figures during the Mandate were Bechara alKhoury and Emile Eddé. Both held official positions during the 1920s and 1930s. Eddé was president of the republic. However, prior to 1943, neither gained their parliamentary seat through election but was appointed by the French authorities. 60. The ideas of al-Khoury’s Constitutional Bloc were expressed in the daily Le Jour, founded in 1934 by his brother-in-law, the prominent banker and intellectual, Michel Chiha, who was one of the main architects of the Lebanese constitution. Chiha sought to reconcile those boycotting the Lebanese state by advocating a secular ideology that would accommodate communal pluralism. His books, some of which are collections of his editorial articles, include Essais (Beirut, 1950), Visage et Présence du Liban (Beirut, 1964), Politique Intérieur (Beirut, 1964) and Propos d’Economie Libanaise (Beirut, 1965). 61. The mouthpiece of Eddé’s Nationalist Bloc was L’Orient, edited by Georges Naccache. 62. Zamir, ‘Emile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon’, Middle Eastern Studies (May 1978), pp. 232–5. 63. After acquiring a law degree in Paris in 1912, Bechara al-Khoury returned to Beirut and began his legal training in Emile Eddé’s law office. For a biographical study of Khoury and his contributions and shortcomings, see Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (London, 2000). 64. Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen Orient, p. 88. 65. Ibid. 66. Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York, 1968), p. 137, draws attention to French encouragement of a two party system in that they shrewdly promoted Bechara al-Khoury into the Lebanese administration as a counterweight to their protegé Emile Eddé. 67. According to A. B. Gaunson, Spears pursued a policy that was not always in line with official British policy, and had this leeway because Churchill was preoccupied with the European and North African fronts during the war and paid little attention to the Levant. See A. B. Gaunson, The Anglo–French Clash in Lebanon and Syria, 1940–45, p. 116. 68. Egyptian and Iraqi prime ministers Mustafa Nahhas and Nuri al-Sa’id also intervened on behalf of Lebanon’s Muslims to ensure them a better quota of parliamentary seats. As Najla Atiyah succinctly concludes, ‘Henceforth the

Lebanon: 1920–1952

69.

70. 71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

37

Muslims benefited from the increasing support of the Arab-Muslim world to balance the now declining “external” support the Christians received from France.’ See Najla W. Atiyah, ‘The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon’, pp. 166–70. Perceiving the institutions of the newly established state as a French operation for the Maronites, most of the Sunni Muslim leadership boycotted participation in these institutions for a number of years, demanding union with Syria. However, the Muslim boycott of Greater Lebanon was by no means a unanimous one, and prominent Muslim notables were active participants in the political arena in the 1920s and 1930s, several being members of the Constitutional Committee which helped draft the constitution of 1926. These were ‘Umar Da’uq and Abboud ‘Abd al-Razzak (Sunnis), Yusuf al-Zein and Subhi Haidar (Shi’a) and Fuad Arslan (Druze). For an incisive account of the Sunni position, see Atiyah, ‘The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon’. Catroux, Dans La Bataille de Méditerranée, p. 402. Wadsworth to Secretary of State, 24 October 1943, 890E. 01/200, in Browne ed., The Political History of Lebanon, 1920–1950, Vols I and II (North Carolina Documentary Publications, 1977), p. 418. Although not a cabinet member at the time, Abdul Hamid Karami was among those sent to Rashaya. He was the uncontested leader of Tripoli and one of the more important political figures at the time. See Chamoun, Crise, p. 114. In his memoirs, Catroux related his reaction of disbelief at hearing of the arrests and his assumption that the reported news was the result of an error by the Reuters news agency: ‘This time Reuters has really overstepped the mark and I am not worried about the event because it appears to me to be unimaginable!’ See Catroux, Dans La Bataille De Méditerranée, p. 410. See Chamoun, Crise, pp. 111–17. For an account of the event of Rashaya and its aftermath, see also Munir Takieddin, Wiladat Istiqlal (The Birth of an Independence) (Beirut, 1953). In his memoirs, Catroux commented on the irony of the situation whereby in one night the French were able to bring about a unification of the Lebanese, which they had failed to detect throughout the past 20 years of their presence in Lebanon. Catroux, Dans La Bataille de Méditerranée, p. 418. However, this unity was very temporary and has often been exaggerated in contemporary Lebanese historiography. For a first-hand descriptive account of the events of November 1943, see Eugenie Abouchedid, Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria 1917–1947 (Beirut, 1948).

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77. The role of the Lebanese nationalists and their political skills in manipulating the situation to their advantage is underlined by A. B. Gaunson, The Anglo–French Clash in Lebanon and Syria, 1940–1945, pp. 185–9. 78. Catroux, Dans La Bataille de Méditerranée, p. 421. 79. For the help given by the Arab states during this crisis, see Bechara alKhoury, Haka’ik Lubnaniyya, Vol. 2 (Facts About Lebanese Politics) (Beirut, 1960), and Iskandar Riyachi, Kabl wa Ba’d (Before and After) (Beirut, 1953). See also Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 284–5. 80. Article III of the Atlantic Charter stipulated that all peoples should have the right to choose their own form of government. 81. For a relevant exposition of Anglo–French rivalry in this period, see John Marlowe’s Perfidious Albion: The Origins of Anglo–French Rivalry in the Levant (London, 1971). 82 The French traditionally supported the Maronites while the British supported the Druzes. 83. It was not until the 1980s that the Higher Sunni Council, which is a permanent body representing both the religious and secular Sunni leadership of the country, issued a document stating that Lebanon was the final homeland for members of the Sunni Muslim community. 84. Atiyah, ‘The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon’, pp. 176–81. 85. Al-Khoury, Haka’ik Lubnaniyya, Vol. 1 (Facts About Lebanese Politics) (Beirut, 1960), pp. 242–50. 86. Atiyah, ‘The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis’, p. 177. 87. As Najla Atiyah has pointed out, it is difficult to determine whether alSulh’s intentions were genuinely supportive of an independent Lebanon, or whether he was being expedient in attempting to gain the Christians’ confidence and ultimately ‘win them over to the cause of Arab unity’. See Atiyah, ‘The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis’, pp. 180–1. 88. Michel Chiha, Politique Intérieur (Beyrouth, 1964), p. 277. For a detailed analysis of the development of Chiha’s political thought as well as his ideas of Lebanon’s political pluralism, see Jean Salem, Introduction a la pensée politique de Michel Chiha (Beyrouth, 1970). See also Nadim Shehadi, The Idea of Lebanon: Economy and State in the Cénacle Libanais 1946–54, Centre for Lebanese Studies Paper No. 5, Oxford, 1987. 89. Chiha, Politique Intérieur, p. 287. 90. Ibid., p. 44, from the article ‘Continuité et Mouvement’, written on 30 November 1943, in the immediate aftermath of independence. 91. El-Khazen, ‘The Communal Pact of National Identities’, p. 29.

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92. These appointments preceded the aforementioned events of November, which brought about Lebanon’s effective independence. 93. The Parti Politique Syrienne (PPS), later known as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, was founded in 1932 and advocated a doctrine of Syrian nationalism whereby ‘natural Syria’ comprising the states of the Fertile Crescent should be reunited. On 4 July 1949, Antun Saadeh, founder of the party, declared a rebellion against the Lebanese government from Damascus. However, he was arrested by the Syrian authorities and turned over by Syrian strongman Husni al-Za’im to the Lebanese government, which executed him within 24 hours. 94. An example was the issue of the dissolution of the Syrian-Lebanese customs union established in 1944. Despite the opposition of the Syrian prime minister, al-Sulh took an unwavering position and his policy led to the economic independence of Lebanon from Syria in 1950. 95. Chamoun, Crise, pp. 232–3. 96. The cabinets formed in the last days of Bechara al-Khoury’s presidency were the following: Cabinet of Sami al-Sulh, February–9 September 1952; Cabinet of Nazim ‘Accari, 9–14 September 1952; Cabinet of Saeb Salam, 14–18 September 1952. Who’s Who in Lebanon, eighth edition (Beirut, 1983), pp. 122–3.

2 Domestic Politics, the Economy and Society in Lebanon: 1952–1956 CAMILLE CHAMOUN

An ex-prime minister used the words ‘We live in a state of enjoyable chaos’ to describe the situation in Lebanon in 1955. The conversation took place with the British chargé d’affaires Ian D. Scott who observed, ‘Fortunately there is at present such abounding prosperity on all sides (an indirect result of Middle East oil development) that the social strains of great and obvious inequality in the distribution of the resulting wealth 1 do not at present give rise to serious political problems.’ While the development of the oil industry in the Persian Gulf undoubtedly contributed to Lebanon’s economic prosperity, the country’s political climate of freedom was a main attraction in the Middle East of the 1950s when autocrats with socialist ideologies and expressions of xenophobia were replacing the kings who had been too amenable to the Western ‘imperialists’. The 1950s were years of growth and prosperity for the Lebanese economy, which benefited from the internal instability of other Arab countries. The events of 1948 in Palestine brought about the migration to Lebanon of professionals, unskilled labour as well as capital and the economic activity of companies such as the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), which moved its headquarters from Haifa to Tripoli. The port of 40

Domestic Politics, the Economy and Society in Lebanon: 1952–1956

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Beirut also increased its activity due to the diversion of Arab trade from the port of Haifa. Another oil-pipeline project, initially planned to have its terminus in Palestine, from the eastern Saudi oilfields to the southern Lebanese coast near Saida was completed in 1950. The Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company (Tapline) jointly owned the 1100-mile pipeline. In 1949 the first in a series of coup d’états occurred in Syria and inaugurated the intervention of the military in Syrian politics. That event was followed by a series of coups that would destabilize Syria over the following decade, a situation that encouraged capital flight by Syria’s business community to Lebanon. Anti-British rioting in Cairo on 26 2 January 1952 was another event that provided the Lebanese economy with opportunity for expansion as many foreign companies moved their 3 regional offices from Cairo to Beirut. The banking secrecy law passed in 4 1957 also stimulated capital flow to Lebanon’s banks from abroad. Towards the middle of the decade the effects of Middle East oil development began to be felt and Lebanon with an industrial head start benefited from an expanding export market in the neighbouring countries. As the British chargé d’affaires observed, the ensuing prosperity was so ‘abounding on all sides that the social strains of great and obvious inequality in the distribution of the resulting wealth, give rise to serious 5 political problems’. American State Department intelligence reports reflected a corresponding assessment that the existing prosperity of the 1950s rendered internal political disturbances as well as the threat of communism remote. In fact, the assumption was that the two main influences that shaped Lebanon and ensured the status quo were its 6 commercialism and confessionalism. The economic strategy pursued by preceding governments in the 1940s had directed the economy towards the ‘Merchant Republic’ 7 model. The merchant republic thrived in the 1950s with fortuitous regional and international circumstances marking that decade Lebanon’s ‘golden age’. The seeds of the merchant republic were sown in the nineteenth century by the emergence of an influential merchant class that in turn was a result of sociopolitical change, migration from the mountain 8 to the city and expanding trade relations with Europe. It was a small group of predominantly Christian Lebanese bankers and merchants who were close political allies, related by marriage to President Khoury and

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his entourage, who directed the development of the economy towards a deregulated service oriented laissez-faire economy that favoured trade and finance to the detriment of industry and that ensured the maintenance of a weak bureaucracy and administration. This system best preserved the political and economic interests of the elite but did not serve the best interests of the population at large in terms of job creation 9 priorities or development projects. The main ideologue of the mercantile-financial elite was Michel Chiha whose sister was married to the president and who in turn was married to the sister of Henri Pharaon, his partner in the influential Banque Pharaon & Chiha. Confessionalism was a religious-based political system that provided for the proportional distribution of government employment among the different religious communities. Membership in the legislature was also allocated on the same basis. The confessional system was a means of coping with pluralism in Lebanese society by maintaining communal differences yet enabling the communities to operate within a unified political framework. Lebanon’s commercial activity expanded in the 1950s with bilateral agreements signed with several countries in the Arab world, the Eastern bloc, as well as the West. Chamoun cultivated close ties with Arab neighbouring countries as their markets for Lebanese products increased with their growing oil revenues. In 1953, Chamoun signed a multilateral 10 trade agreement with Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. He began his presidential tenure with visits to Egypt and other Arab countries. Tourism became a major industry and was given special attention by President Chamoun and his Anglo-Lebanese wife, Zelpha, who encouraged the establishment of the annual international music festivals. These festivals inaugurated in 1953 were held at the site of the ancient Roman city of Baalbek and featured such celebrated attractions as the Bolshoi ballet, the 11 Old Vic as well as Lebanon’s popular singer Feirouz. However despite the prevalent economic prosperity, the endemic problems that had plagued Lebanese history would remain and resurface when given the necessary impetus. Among these problems were sec12 tarianism, parochialism, corruption, and disrespect for law and order. The impetus was provided by regional and international politics, which exerted a very heavy load on a fragile Lebanese system. External encouragement directed an amorphous opposition to conduct a full-scale


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insurrection against President Chamoun whose policies had alienated a number of traditional and influential leaders. Camille Nimr Chamoun was born in April 1900 in the town of Deir 13 al-Qamar. Located in southern Mount Lebanon in an area known as the Shuf, it had been an important town in the past, for it was the capital of the Mountain in Ottoman times. Nimr Chamoun was a respected civil servant who was exiled from Lebanon by the Ottomans in 1916 for expressing pro-French sympathies. The Chamoun family, together with a dozen other exiled Lebanese families, spent two and a half years in an Anatolian village outside Ankara and was allowed to return home only at 14 the end of the war. In 1923, Chamoun graduated with a law degree from the Jesuit university in Beirut. He trained at the law firm of Emile Eddé before 15 opening his own practice. During this time, Chamoun responded to the encouragement of Philippe Naccache, editor of the daily Le Reveil, to contribute to the paper. While this activity augmented his limited income at the time, Chamoun later attributed a much greater significance to it: ‘It was at that moment that I entered the political arena, 16 never to leave it.’ Both journalism and the practice of law were avenues for Chamoun’s rapid involvement in politics. He cultivated important clients and used the contacts of his father and maternal uncle Auguste Adib Pasha to advance his career in politics. Auguste Pasha was an influential figure in the early years of the republic and held the position of Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, the highest executive position for a Lebanese during the early years of the French mandate. He had also been a member of the constitutional commission and was appointed by the French as premier in 1926. Chamoun first sought public office in 1929 and from then on would represent the Shuf in parliament for most of his life with one interruption from 1964 to 1968. He held that seat from 1929 until his election as president in 1952, and then from 1968 until his death in 1987. His first political victory at the age of 29 in a country where most politicians came from old-established ruling families encouraged Chamoun to seek to realize his ambitions: ‘This success put me in direct contact with influential personalities, and the prestige it gave me, opened before me larger horizons. At that moment, I glimpsed greater possibilities for myself, and I began to prepare my electoral campaign for

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the next legislature.’ As a Maronite the presidency was the greatest prize and the temptation of retaining that office would afflict Chamoun as it did his predecessor. Chamoun’s popularity in the electoral district of Mount Lebanon was demonstrated in the parliamentary elections of 1943 when he was the only prominent Maronite to win in the first round. The two pre-eminent Maronite politicians Emile Eddé and 18 Bechara al-Khoury both won their seats in 1943 in runoff elections. In 1930, Chamoun married Zelpha Tabet, a beautiful and gracious woman whose family was wealthy and socially prominent. Zelpha’s mother was English, a fact that was frequently mentioned in the diplomatic documents and undoubtedly endeared the Chamouns to Spears. In his memoirs, Spears recalled the day that Zelpha Chamoun came to see him following the arrest of her husband with the other members of the government by the French authorities in November 1943: ‘Then tripped in the lovely Madame Chamoun, fair as a ripe wheat field in sunshine, 19 her immense light blue eyes ablaze.’ Spears strongly recommended the appointment of Chamoun as minister to London in 1944. The recommendation was made after an incident in Beirut that prompted Chamoun to accuse the French authorities of conspiracy and led to Premier Sulh’s decision (under French pressure) to remove Chamoun from the political 20 scene in Lebanon. Spears described the Chamouns in glowing terms and Zelpha as a diplomat’s wife to be an asset to her husband’s career. According to Spears’s account at the time, the ‘Chamouns returned from America on Boxing Day. They are installed in Norman’s House next door to 8 Little College Street. They are both very sweet; she is extremely 21 good with the Foreign Office.’ Chamoun’s first cabinet post was in 1938 and he held the portfolio of finance. He then became minister of the interior in 1943 before being appointed the following year as minister plenipotentiary in London. Chamoun whet his presidential ambitions in the campaign of 1943 when, as he later wrote, ‘for 48 hours, I remained the sole candidate to the presidency.’ How did this come about? Chamoun’s name was put forward as a compromise by one of the two main contenders, Emile Eddé. Eddé realized that he would lose the elections and in an attempt to prevent his rival’s success, he contacted Spears and suggested Chamoun’s name. Eddé’s rival Bechara al-Khoury accepted the offer and briefly withdrew his candidacy. In effect, al-Khoury used the threat of ‘Britain’s

Domestic Politics, the Economy and Society in Lebanon: 1952–1956 22

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man’ as president to goad French support for himself. The manoeuvre worked and the French who feared the election of Chamoun, and who erroneously begun to suspect Eddé of collusion with Spears, shifted their 23 support to Bechara al-Khoury. As a member of the newly elected president’s parliamentary bloc, Chamoun was appointed minister of interior in Riyad al-Sulh’s first cabinet. As mentioned in Chapter 1, as a cabinet member, Chamoun was at the centre of the events that occurred in November 1943 and led to Lebanon’s independence. That crisis dealt a final blow to French political 24 control in Lebanon. It was this post of minister of the interior that Chamoun left in 1944 in order to become Lebanon’s first ambassador to the Court of St James 25 with the rank of minister plenipotentiary. On his way to London, Chamoun stopped in Cairo and met with the British minister Lord Moyne. The need to reinforce Lebanon’s recently acquired independence was the topic of their discussion. Chamoun’s political career accompanied Lebanon’s transition from mandate status to independence and in London he undertook the important assignment of preserving his country’s newly won independence against French attempts — by de Gaulle who exerted pressure on the British government — to reassert French control. He spent three very active years in London and made the Lebanese Legation’s headquarters the centre where Arab delegates congregated to discuss the then unfolding events in Palestine. Chamoun’s prominence in Arab affairs led him to speak in the name of the Arabs at the United Nations sessions held in 1947 and 1948 to discuss the 26 situation in Palestine. Chamoun’s diplomatic efforts during his threeyear absence from Lebanon enhanced his reputation among nationalists at large and his presence abroad enabled him to distance himself from the corruption that became increasingly associated with the Khoury 27 regime and the president’s entourage. Chamoun returned to Lebanon in late 1946 and resumed his political activity at the local level. He was elected deputy for the Shuf in both the 1947 and 1951 elections despite the opposition he faced from the 28 political machine of the president’s, brother Selim al-Khoury. Upon his return to Lebanon, Chamoun held the ministerial portfolios of finance and of the interior and health, respectively, in the two successive cabinets of Riyad al-Sulh from December 1946 through July 1948. He

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soon joined the growing opposition to the Khoury regime, which crystallized into a loose coalition of parliamentarians known as the National Socialist Front. The opposition to al-Khoury gained momentum after the president managed to influence parliament to amend the constitution and to have himself re-elected for a second term in 1949. The major blow that undermined al-Khoury’s position further was the assassination of his long-time Muslim partner Riyad al-Sulh who was shot on 16 July 1951 while visiting Amman. His assassin was a member of the PPS who sought to avenge the death of the founder of the PPS, Antun Saadeh, who was executed in 1949 by a decision of President Bechara al-Khoury and Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh for conspiring to 29 overthrow the Lebanese government. The hasty execution of Saadeh and his denial of a fair trial was a shortsighted move by the Lebanese 30 government. With increasing scandals of corruption surrounding the president and his family, the assassination of al-Khoury’s reliable Muslim partner Riyad al-Sulh and deadlock in government, Bechara al-Khoury resigned in September 1952. Four days later Chamoun became president. With the fall of Bechara al-Khoury the obvious contenders for the presidency were Camille Chamoun and Hamid Frangieh, deputy from northern Lebanon and former Minister for Foreign Affairs. Chamoun had the support of the British and of the majority of the Muslim deputies while the French and many Christian deputies supported Frangieh. Personal considerations weighed heavily in these alliances; for example, the Beiruti Muslim leader Saeb Salam supported Chamoun because, as he put it, ‘Hamid Frangieh insisted on sticking to the al-Sulh family, Takyeddine and Kazim — cousins of Riyad al-Sulh — and we had grown tired of seeing Riyad al-Sulh as prime minister during Bechara al31 Khoury’s tenure.’ The Sulhs were the main competitors of Saeb Salam in Beirut for Sunni leadership and the premiership. Another prominent Muslim and former prime minister Abdallah al-Yafi, shared Salam’s views and they both supported Chamoun in order to end the predominance of the al-Sulh family as the representatives of the Sunni Muslims particularly in the post of prime minister. While both Salam and al-Yafi were former prime ministers, their tenures during the previous regime were short-lived compared with those they would hold during the Chamoun presidency. Prior to their joining the ranks of the opposition


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during the insurrection of 1958, Salam had been prime minister once while al-Yafi held the position four times. This was out of a total of 13 cabinets that were formed during the six years of Chamoun’s presidency, with an average life span of six to eight months per cabinet. 32 The other vital pillar of support for Chamoun was that of the British. In 1952, their position in Lebanon was still predominant and had not yet been undermined by the Americans. Suez was four years away and the consequent tenuousness of the British position in the Middle East from 1956 onwards could not be foreseen in 1952. The British ambassador Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews personally intervened with the deputies and influential persons such as Michel Chiha to induce them to shift their 33 support from Frangieh to Chamoun. According to deputy Pierre Eddé: ‘The British were always present in the person of Maroun ‘Arab — Oriental Secretary at the British embassy — both at the Parliament, and 34 at every meeting held among the deputies.’ The leadership in neighbouring states such as Syria also supported Chamoun. Syria’s strongman and president Adib al-Shishakli put pressure on the deputies of Tripoli and Beirut to vote for Chamoun. One week before the elections, Chamoun went to Syria ostensibly on a hunting trip but in 35 actuality to meet al-Shishakli. Iraq’s Nuri al-Sa’id also backed Britain’s candidate and during his presidency Chamoun cultivated close relations 36 with the Iraqi leadership and the Hashemite family in Jordan as well. In addition to Muslim and British support, a third asset that helped Chamoun win the election was his charismatic personality and perseverance. Former prime minister Takyeddine al-Sulh, who supported Chamoun’s opponent Hamid Frangieh, acknowledged the importance of these personal characteristics in the presidential campaign of 1952: 37 ‘Camille Chamoun did not sleep nor did he slow down.’ The British chargé d’affaires described Chamoun on the eve of his election as a candidate with much promise: ‘A former Minister in London, a lawyer of some distinction, a man of attractive presence, and the most consistent spokesman of the opposition over the past few years, and into the bargain universally acknowledged to be an honest man, he came to the 38 purple with a deep fund of goodwill on which to draw.’ These characteristics combined with his unbounded ambition and relentless activity throughout the campaign to enhance Chamoun’s chance of success.

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Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s EFFORTS AT REFORM

President Chamoun was elected with a mandate for reform. In his inaugural speech following his election on 22 September 1952, he made clear his determination to introduce reforms and rehabilitate a presidency that had been riddled with corruption by the former president and 39 40 his entourage. As a member of the opposition National Socialist Front Chamoun came to power indebted to the reformists and opposed by the traditionalist politicians, who were supporters of the former president 41 and opposed any reforms that would erode their power. Pierre Eddé related an incident that occurred on the eve of Chamoun’s election, which indicated that troubles lay ahead for the president who was determined to maintain his independence in decision making regardless of any previous commitments. Together with the other members of the National Socialist Front — the parliamentary bloc of which Chamoun had been a member — Eddé met the president to discuss the implementation of the Front’s reform programme. Chamoun’s response to Kamal Jumblatt’s assumption that his first cabinet would be drawn from the members of the Front — in order to implement a programme of social reform — was lukewarm. As they walked away from the meeting, in the courtyard of the historical palace of Beiteddin, Jumblatt confided in Eddé saying ominously, ‘People believe that we have just accomplished a revolution, while in fact the revolution is truly a white revolution. And I think that we will find ourselves 42 obliged to repeat this once again.’ The honeymoon between Chamoun and the scion of one of the oldest Lebanese ruling families was over. Moreover, Jumblatt later declined to participate in the government except on his own terms and in a meeting with the British ambassador he made it clear ‘that he feels that he, and those who think like him, should either have complete control of the Government or should stay outside and exert pressure upon the Govern43 ment in favour of the programme which they favour.’ As a deputy, Kamal Jumblatt would remain a critic of the Chamoun presidency in parliament until 1957 when his loss in the parliamentary elections drove him to open revolt. The ancestral home of the Jumblatts was the village of al-Mukhtara also in the Shuf and close to Chamoun’s home of Deir al-Qamar. Hence the rivalry between the two men began at a regional level. While


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Chamoun’s origins were middle class, Kamal Jumblatt’s family had in his own words played an active role in Lebanese politics during the reign of the Shehab princes 300 years ago. … During the Shehab era, our ancestors played an important role. In a way it was they who governed, through the Shehab Emirs, rather like Richelieu in France. That was enough for them; the title of Emir could only be borne by descendants of the line of Emirs who reigned in 44 Lebanon. Did Kamal Jumblatt aspire to govern in the manner of his ancestors? After all, he did believe that ‘the political system adopted for the Grand Liban opened the way for the unjustified dominance of the Maronites, 45 and it was a disaster.’ After the 1975–76 civil strife, he would conclude, ‘The French mandate handed the Maronites complete political power on a plate, a free gift that they did not deserve, as they themselves have 46 demonstrated.’ His opponents have often accused Jumblatt of presidential ambitions. As a Druze he could never become president of the republic unless he could effect a radical change in the accepted tradition of the sectarian allocation of the three highest offices (of president, prime minister and speaker of parliament). Jumblatt sought to do away with the political system that limited his political ambition at the national level. In his own words: Community sectarianism was a poison transfused by the Maronites into the body of the Grand-Liban from the moment it was born. This sickness may have been tolerable in the homogeneous Petit-Liban of 1864, but it became a festering sore in 1922. A State cannot be organized on the basis of such an inequitable division into castes, or around a religious spirit which is not shared by the other communities involved. A minority caste enjoyed the privil47 eges of a majority. While the extent of Jumblatt’s personal political ambition remains a matter for speculation, his opposition to the sectarian allocation of political office was a central tenet of his agenda for political reform. The following incident related by Pierre Eddé may be indicative of

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Jumblatt’s presidential ambitions. Two days prior to al-Khoury’s resignation, members of his Destouri party attempted to discredit the opposition National Socialist Front by circulating rumours that the Muslim members of the opposition wanted to revise the convention established by the National Pact — allocating the office of president of the republic to the Maronite community — and elect a Muslim as president. In order to quell these rumours Eddé drafted a statement of denial and had the former prime ministers al-Sulh, Salam, Yafi, and Karami sign it. Jumblatt who was present at the meeting of the opposition National Socialist Front approved of the statement but suggested adding the following qualification to the text: ‘The presidency is for the Maronite community this time.’ Those present rejected Jumblatt’s 48 suggestion and the statement was announced in its original form. Throughout his political career Kamal Jumblatt sought to rid Lebanon of what he perceived was the ‘unjustified dominance’ of the Maronites. He advocated a secular political system for Lebanon, where political confessionalism — that is, religious based politics — and consequently the privileged position of the Maronites be abolished. A new constitution would replace the existing one that he believed was imposed on the Lebanese, and a programme of radical social and 49 political reform would be introduced and implemented. However, despite these recurring themes the extent of his presidential ambition remains a matter of speculation. In the context of Chamoun’s election to the presidency, Kamal Jumblatt may have belatedly realized that because Chamoun was also from the Shuf, Chamoun’s becoming president shifted the leadership of 50 the Shuf from its traditional base — al-Mukhtara — to Deir al-Qamar. Some observers have concluded that, as he watched from the roof of alMukhtara palace the fireworks in the sky of Deir al-Qamar, Jumblatt may actually have had regrets when he realized that Chamoun was to be the 51 president of the republic for the coming six years. Kamal Jumblatt would be one of the main leaders of the insurrection in 1958. Chamoun, on the other hand, immediately began consultations with Muslim leaders in order to select the first cabinet of his presidency. He was unable to form a government of national union because of the polarization of positions of the progressive and traditional politicians, which included the insistence of Jumblatt on an immediate radical


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reform programme and the legal prosecution of the former president. With deadlock in place, Chamoun and Prime Minister Khaled Chehab formed a four-man cabinet of non-parliamentarians, which on the 9 October was voted decree-powers for six months by the Chamber of 52 Deputies. Chehab was a respected veteran politician who had held ministerial portfolios and the position of speaker of parliament during the mandate period. The president and government then initiated a series of reforms in various institutions of the state as well as those of the private sector. In the area of administrative reform, the government issued approximately ninety decrees to streamline an administration burdened with inefficiency and still operating according to the 1922 decrees of the French high commissioner. The reforms eliminated some deadwood with the firing of 600 bureaucrats. Civil service examinations were introduced in an attempt to reduce politically influenced appointments that permeated the administrative structure. The judicial system was reorganized, and a Higher Judicial Council was set up, which, according to Chamoun, gave 53 Lebanon a truly independent judiciary for the first time. The government introduced a liberal press law eliminating restrictions that had muzzled the press in the past. Suffrage was extended to women. With the aim of reducing the influence of feudal type landlords, the electoral law was modified reducing both the size of the electoral districts to single member constituencies and the number of deputies in parliament from 77 to 44. Chamoun later wrote that such reforms replaced quantity by quality. Yet with hindsight it is clear that the same notables continued to dominate the political scene during Chamoun’s tenure for several decades to come. Many of the attempts to reform the administration could not withstand sectarian political pressure and were consequently abandoned or simply ignored. A case in point is the above-mentioned competitive examinations for civil service appointments. Introduced by legislative decree in 1952, the exams were superseded by a January 1955 decree that stipulated that although applicants must still pass an examination, 54 the final selection would be subject to administrative choice. In addition to sectarian political pressure, such ineffectiveness of the reform efforts was due to the polarization of traditional and progressive politicians, many of whom, on both sides, had allowed their personal

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interests to take precedence over those of the public. Traditional politicians, whose interests were undermined by the proposed reforms, criticized such efforts while progressive politicians declared them inadequate. While government criticism was not confined to the halls of parliament, it was there that a lively debate took place. During several sessions in February 1953, deputies repeatedly criticized the government for failing to achieve the goals that it set. Ghassan Tueini and Emile Bustani rebuked the government for not fulfilling its mandate to clean up the corruption that caused the 1952 revolution. While they recognized the government’s accomplishments in the areas of administrative reform as well as the reorganization of the foreign service, they nevertheless outlined the government’s failures in judicial reform, and the law of accountability especially as it applied to high-ranking government 56 employees. The government’s record was again scrutinized and attacked two weeks later by deputies Bahige Takieddine and Kamal Jumblatt. Takieddine accused the four-month-old government of 57 ‘passing decrees but not governing’. However, despite these opinions the government won the vote of confidence taken at the end of that 58 session. As for economic reform, Chamoun’s record of economic reform did not fulfil the objectives he had outlined. In his memoirs, Chamoun discussed the two schools of thought that dominated the economic scene. One upheld the supremacy of commerce and banking as the natural direction for Lebanon’s economy in view of the country’s assets. The other promoted capital investment in industry, and the use of locally available raw materials. Merchants opposed the imposition of protective tariffs. While recognizing the importance of commerce in the Lebanese economy, Chamoun maintained that he was convinced of the need to develop industry and that he held this conviction until the end of his tenure: ‘I put a high priority on the development of industry, a source of revenue and above all a factor of energy and vitality. A country that does not produce is a country that is incapable of survival. That was my thesis 59 from the start and would remain so until the end of my mandate.’ While Chamoun outlined his concern for industrial development (and established the Institute of Industry in Beirut in 1954; the first of its kind in the Arab world), the record shows that little government support 60 materialized and the merchants and bankers continued to dominate the

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system to the detriment of industry. Industry in Lebanon had suffered the loss of the Syrian market with the dissolution of the Syrian–Lebanese 62 customs union in 1950. With the predominance of the laissez-faire philosophy, and increasing prosperity throughout the 1950s, planned government expenditure was only 11.4 per cent of the Gross National 63 Product in 1956 and 13.7 per cent in 1958. Government expenditure concentrated on development of the physical infrastructure with projects such as the expansion of the airport facilities, new roads and communications mainly in Beirut and close by rather than the periphery. Less priority was given to public development projects of immediate benefit to people such as healthcare, education and job creation. Lebanon’s economy in the mid-1950s was expanding and economic reports judged it to be sound. In the financial domain, the gold coverage of the Lebanese pound was expanded in 1954 from 61 per cent to 90 per cent. In 1952, it was 54 per cent. Commercial activity expanded significantly and port traffic at Beirut increased by 20 per cent (from the previous year) in 1954. This included the expansion of transit traffic through the free zone, which accounted for 27 per cent of the total volume of tonnage that was handled at the port of Beirut. The airport after the inauguration of the new complex witnessed an increase in activity with a total of 324,000 passengers using the Beirut International Airport that year. One-third of these were transit passengers. An economic report issued in 1954 by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry outlined three major areas of expanding economic activity in the country: the tourist industry, the initiation of large projects such as the construction of the Trans-Arabian (Tapline) refinery and the Litani water works project, and the expansion of commerce (especially the export of Lebanese agricultural goods) with Arab and foreign countries, which was enhanced by the many new commercial agreements 64 concluded with their governments. Tourism was assisted by government policies and the number of tourists visiting Lebanon grew from 216,000 in 1952 to 901,464 in 1955, with an increase of L.L.80 million 65 pounds in revenue. The fact that the Lebanese economy was dominated by sectors related to foreign clients such as financial services, tourism, transit and trade, rather than local industry and agriculture for import substitution purposes rendered it vulnerable to regional and international political pressure. The export market in the 1950s (especially

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the regional Middle East markets) far outweighed the domestic Lebanese 66 market for agricultural and industrial products. Assessments of Chamoun’s reforms have been unfavourable and the general consensus among experts in the field has been that ‘they pro67 duced more change than progress’. These assessments concur with observations made by British officials in Lebanon at the time. The annual political reports for 1954 and 1955 describe the governments as lacking a sense of direction, and public perception of Chamoun as a president 68 who was inclined ‘to let things drift’. The British ambassador Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews wrote of Chamoun after two years in office: He has completely failed to impose himself. Not that he is a bad influence — on the contrary, his path is paved with good intentions but he is vain and ineffectual. He was brought to power with popular acclaim only two years ago to effect reforms which are now a dead letter. All his interventions are half-hearted; none are pressed home. He has failed to complete his scheme of electoral reform; his laudable schemes for industrial and agricultural development are progressing all too slowly; during the year he has antagonised every member of the small Parliamentary Opposition 69 group that organised his predecessor’s downfall. While the reforms initiated by the president fell short of public expectations, it must be emphasized that, from 1953 onwards, Lebanese politicians were preoccupied with international issues starting with the Western-sponsored defence plans and culminating in the Suez debacle and its ensuing impact on Lebanon. Upon leaving his post in September 1955, the 52-year-old Arabicspeaking Chapman-Andrews re-evaluated the past four years and concluded that despite the ‘revolution in a teacup’ — namely the movement that forced Bechara al-Khoury out of office and that is known in Lebanon as the ‘rosewater revolution’ because of its non-violent nature — ‘the life of Lebanon has remained curiously unaffected … the structure of parliament, the courts and the civil administration are not 70 recognizably different now from when I came in 1951.’ More importantly, Chapman-Andrews grasped that the very ethos of Lebanon was based on the predominance of commerce: ‘Almost everything in this


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country of merchants, bankers, middlemen, interpreters, brokers, tradesmen and commercial adventurers, boils down in the end to economics. It permeates the life of the Lebanon as it must have done that of Phoenicia, 71 whose cities lay along these same coasts.’ INTERNAL OPPOSITION AND SECTARIAN TENSION

Another parting observation and one that had surprised ChapmanAndrews was ‘how deeply rooted religious communal differences and distinctions were in this country, which, in this respect, constantly 72 reminds one of a miniature Byzantine mosaic’. This observation was perhaps reinforced by the rising level of sectarian tension in the first years of the decade, and was marked by several overtly sectarian incidents. The most outstanding was the publication of a pamphlet by Mu’tamar al-Hay’at al-Islamiyya al-Da’im (The Permanent Conference of 73 the Muslim Commissions) in November 1953. This organization had only been established in January and brought together various Muslim popular associations and societies ranging from philanthropic societies 74 to the alumni association of the Makassed College. Reflecting the general mood of the community, the pamphlet entitled Moslem Lebanon Today was basically a list of Muslim grievances addressed to ‘the Christian dominated government’. It requested that its demands be met in the interest of establishing equality among the confessional groups in Lebanon. Based on a 13-point manifesto of the Islamic conference which was read by Sheikh Shafik Yamut, chief shari’a judge of Lebanon, from the pulpit of the Grand Mosque of ‘Omar in Beirut on 13 March 1953, the document was put forward as ‘the immediate goal of the conference’ and in order to combat ‘the efforts of the Maronite sect to impose its own characteristics on the entire country’. Of the 13 points, numbers four and thirteen address economic issues in very general terms, namely, the complete separation of state and religion with equal justice to all citizens, and a complete economic unity between Lebanon and Syria. The remainder of the manifesto deals with grievances such as the nationality law, inaccurate population census, distorted history textbooks, the Department of Tourism’s presentation of Lebanon to tourists as a Christian country, and the National Museum’s restriction of its exhibits to pre-Islamic, pagan and Christian objects and the exclusion of Moslem antiquities. The authorship of the

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pamphlet was not very clear, for although the names of those who signed the manifesto of March were listed, the Lebanese security officials believed the real sponsors to be Mohammed Jamil Beyhum, Abdul 75 Wahab Rifa’i, and Dr Mustapha Khalidy. The issuance of this pamphlet aroused confessional feelings and various personalities; both Christian and Muslim were quick to denounce sectarianism. Leading Muslim leaders like Abdallah al-Yafi, Sami al-Sulh, and Saeb Salam refused to commit themselves, alleging no 76 prior knowledge of the pamphlet’s existence. Prime Minister al-Yafi publicly disapproved it and ex-prime minister Saeb Salam issued a public 77 denial that he had any connection with the document. While discussing this pamphlet, it is important to bear in mind that this was not a spontaneous isolated incident but rather represented the crystallization of a general feeling of alienation held by the Muslim community (particularly the Sunni sect) towards the Lebanese Republic ever since its 78 inception. The subtitle of the pamphlet Moslem Lebanon Today explains the purpose of the document and summarizes the objectives of its authors, namely the abolition of state sectarianism and equality for its citizens: ‘A frank discussion of the struggle on the part of Lebanon’s nonChristian majority to secure a proportionate voice in the government in order to work effectively for the abolition of state sectarianism in the 79 interests of national unity and equality for all citizens.’ The pamphlet then describes the present conditions whereby the ‘non-Moslem factions control Lebanon today’ through French-instituted devices ranging from the Christian dominated administration to impartial rural development, rent laws, educational policy and government contracts. According to the pamphlet, strong partisanship is shown to Christian interests in all the above-mentioned areas and President Chamoun is a greater offender than his predecessor. The pamphlet cites 80 the American Point IV programme as a collaborator in such discrimination against the Muslims particularly in the areas of educational funding and government contracts, some of which are financed through Point IV 81 aid. In this vein, in November 1953, a British embassy report on the political situation from the Muslim perspective concluded that ‘President Chamoun has become the target of exactly the same criticisms and complaints directed at ex-president Bechara al-Khoury. All those


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Moslems whom I meet are of the opinion that things have not changed and that President Chamoun is following an anti-Islamic policy in the Lebanon. These complaints are no more secret as they are expressed 82 openly and everywhere.’ The specific complaints against Chamoun were the following: (1) the new electoral law, which was perceived as having been specially enacted in order to weaken Moslem leaderships; (2) the harsh sentence passed against deputy Suleiman al-Ali, accused of murdering his political opponent Mohammed al-Abboud. (Supporters of al-Ali in northern Lebanon accused the president of ingratitude, for they had hoped to see al-Ali appointed prime minister as a reward for his 83 political support for Chamoun); and (3) the closure of the Najjade house, the refusal of the authorities to carry out a census of Lebanese inhabitants, and the delay in an economic agreement being reached with Syria. The report concluded: ‘Many say that the President is interested in two things only: (a) finding ways and means to weaken Moslem 84 influence and (b) employing his followers in official departments.’ This report elicited an interesting and perceptive comment from Maroun ‘Arab, the Oriental secretary at the British embassy: All these grievances exist and sooner or later they might develop into something dangerous for the President. B. al-Khoury had Riad Solh [sic] to silence the Moslems; Chamoun has no such support. If one adds to this point the clumsiness and lack of method of the President, one is justified in expecting trouble at the 1st opportunity such as: Yafi going home; Sami Solh [sic] being ignored in the formation of the next Cabinet; or any major crisis. The report 85 does not give a too gloomy picture but a relatively correct one. Chamoun had been in office for one year when ‘Arab made this assessment, and four years later Chamoun would face serious trouble, which was only partially a result of his policies. Some of these grievances predated the Chamoun presidency and would outlast it to become, over the next 30 years, a stick with which to beat the Maronite establishment. Muslim grievances against the state must be viewed within the broader context of the community’s attitude of opposition towards the creation of the French sponsored Greater Lebanon. Apart from cultural alienation and the predominant position of the Christians, the newly

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delineated borders affected the economic well being of certain areas that had until then served the Syrian hinterland. The predominantly Muslim city of Tripoli was the most affected by its separation from Syria and its incorporation into the Lebanon in 1920. Its port had served the Syrian interior and it was a marketplace for Homs, Hama, and the ‘Alawi region. Although economic relations between Tripoli and Syria continued without serious hindrance, the city’s inhabitants demanded the re-attachment of Tripoli to Syria in a number of demonstrations and strikes that took place between 1920 and 1938. The next major blow came in June 1950 with the announcement of economic restrictions between Syria and Lebanon as a result of the dissolution of the customs union, which prompted the reappearance of the decentralization movement. Thus while the initial agitation for decentralization in the immediate aftermath of the creation of Greater Lebanon was mainly based on emotional ties to the hinterland, the second movement in 1950 was prompted by a very real cause of distress. Tripolitan grievances were furthermore aggravated by the French-styled centralization of the Lebanese bureaucracy and administration. Hence several meetings were held in 1952 at the homes of leading politicians and merchants bringing together the city’s notables (both Christian and Muslim) as reported to the British embassy. The embassy informant outlines the grievances of the Tripolitans: They want to get rid of the Beirut influence, which, according to them is incurring heavy losses on Tripoli. An inhabitant of Tripoli should come to Beirut to secure a judicial report if he wishes to apply for a post anywhere; economic permits should be produced from Beirut; etc. … etc. … all these formalities which should be done in Beirut and not in Tripoli are, also, the cause of dissatisfaction. These added to economic restriction which deprived the inhabitants of Tripoli of a fairly good income made them work for the decentralization of their town … I am reliably informed that once they achieve their aim, the inhabitants of Tripoli shall resume their activity for the attachment of their town and the Qaza of 86 ‘Akkar (Moslem) to Syria. Despite the economic hardship suffered by the people of Tripoli due to


59

its separation from its natural hinterland, the Tripolitans would by their own admission join the insurrection of 1958 primarily because of their 87 dissatisfaction with President Chamoun’s foreign policy. Muslim grievances were expressed often. An undisclosed source in a conversation with the American army attaché indicated his distress at the growing emphasis in the press on the subject of confessionalism and noted that the relationship between Muslims and Christians had been on the decline ever since the assassination of Riyad al-Sulh (in July 1951). He attributed this to the partiality shown by the government towards the Christians, illustrating his point with the case of the minimal funding allocated for the port of Tripoli compared with the extensive expenditure on the improvement of facilities at the port of Beirut: ‘Tripoli, which could well be the port of entrance for Northern Syria, has been allowed to deteriorate and the Syrians have spent large sums of money developing Latakia. The logical port for Homs and Hama, of course, is 88 Moslem Tripoli.’ The source did not believe that a ‘return to Syria’ movement was imminent, yet he maintained that unless some strong leader could control the country, the present trend would lead to a separatist movement. Sectarian tension continued to increase in the summer of 1954 and the Shakar incident led to a political crisis and to the resignation of the 89 government. George Ibrahim Shakar, a Christian of Zahle, published a book offensive to Muslims. He was arrested and brought to trial on 23 July and was reportedly acquitted. Muslim dissatisfaction with this outcome led to the abadai (strongmen and street toughs usually adhering to a certain political boss) marching and closing down shops through intimidation. Shakar’s book caused emotional outbursts and demonstrations that quickly got out of hand and became violent. The government then turned over internal security to the army. With the authority 90 of the al-Yafi government in question, it resigned six weeks later. Religious tension reached a pitch in the autumn with the religious 91 celebrations of the Day of the Cross and of the Prophet’s Birthday. That year also happened to mark the 100th anniversary of the pope’s proclamation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and Catholics throughout Lebanon celebrated the Marian Congress held on 20–24 October. The celebrations in Beirut were presided over by the patriarch of Venice and special papal envoy to the Congress, Cardinal Roncalli.

60


Special masses and processions were held in which ‘exceptionally large 92 crowds took part’. An American embassy report draws attention to the increased fervour of the religious celebrations: ‘The Moslem community of Beirut is celebrating the anniversary of the Prophet’s birthday this year on a greater scale than normal, in an attempt to offset the importance of the Christian celebration of the Marian Congress two weeks ago.’ The report relates the accident that marred the latter celebrations, and which was started by an oil fire from a torchbearer participating in a mass parade. Nine people died while 250 were ‘hospitalized with serious 93 burns’. Such incidents only exacerbated sectarian tension. External developments in the Arab world were another major source of division and instability for Lebanon. Historical divisions of political loyalty among Christian and Muslim communities resurfaced with the polarization between pro-Western and Arab nationalist regimes in the Arab world. Both at the popular and leadership levels of the Muslim community, the Lebanese government’s policy was criticized for its inadequate adherence to Arab nationalist ideals. The above-mentioned issues took precedence over economic grievances that were not a predominant factor in Muslim alienation in 1958 and were not cited by the opposition as the major cause of their discontent. Critics of the Chamoun presidency often cite a study carried out by the French survey mission, the Institut de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Dévéloppement (IRFED), to Lebanon in 1959– 1960, which concluded that 4 per cent of the ‘wealthy’ held 33 per cent of the national revenue while 50 per cent of the ‘poor’ held only 18 per 94 cent. However one cannot conclude from these figures that economic discontent contributed to creating a rebellion in 1958. The distribution of national income in Lebanon was comparable to that of other Middle Eastern states (for example Turkey, Iran and Iraq) as well as other developing countries outside the Middle East such as Latin America 95 (Colombia and Brazil). Moreover, while the 1953 pamphlet Moslem Lebanon Today refers to the government’s unequal distribution of aid such as that given through the American Point IV program and the government’s neglect of rural development in Muslim inhabited areas, these disparities were insufficient on their own in inciting a rebellion. The conclusions of the pamphlet itself focus on the issues of cultural identity and of Lebanon’s


61

place in the Arab world (rather than on economic issues) — issues that appear, according to the authors of the pamphlet, to be distorted by the Christians, particularly by the Maronite community: The Maronite sect of Lebanon and some of the other Christian groups in our country do not feel or sympathise with the Arab national spirit, but, to the contrary, are prepared to fight it in every possible way and to impose by force their own Christian civilisation on all of Lebanon and to violently separate Lebanon 96 from the rest of the Arab world. This document indicates that the petitions of protest by Muslim political and religious leaders express social and cultural alienation rather than socioeconomic deprivation. While perception of inequality ensured an agenda for the opposition despite the expanding economy and the ensuing economic prosperity in Lebanon in the 1950s, an increasingly favourable regional environment provided the impetus for action where revolutions proclaiming sweeping sociopolitical reforms were the hallmark of the 1950s in the Arab world. It was to Chamoun’s credit that he was able to maintain a democratic system in Lebanon with its concomitant liberties at a time when military regimes were taking over in neighbouring countries. However, Chamoun was unable to do away with some of the endemic weaknesses of Lebanese society and politics such as its sectarianism, parochialism, disrespect for law and order, and corruption. Some of his policies, particularly in the post-Suez period of his tenure, reinforced these weaknesses. While these problems were obscured by the unprecedented economic prosperity affecting Lebanon in the 1950s, they constituted a fragile Lebanon that was unable to withstand the pressures of regional politics that ultimately proved to be Chamoun’s undoing. NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Annual Report for 1955 on the Lebanon, Confidential, 1 January 1956, FO 371/121605. 2. On this day, known as Black Saturday, foreign particularly British establishments such as BOAC, Barclays Bank, and Thomas Cook were attacked. 3. E. J. W. Barnes to Eden, Confidential, 25 February 1953, FO 371/104486.

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4. Malek F. Chehab, ‘Leçon et conséquences de la crise de Novembre’, Economie Libanaise et Arabe, No. 7, January 1957, p.11. 5. Ian D. Scott to Selwyn Lloyd, Confidential, 1 January 1956, FO 371/ 121605. 6. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Report No. 7286 Secret, ‘Political Trends in Lebanon’, 5 July 1956. 7. For an incisive study of Lebanon’s political economy in the 1950s, see Carolyn L. Gates, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy (London, 1998). 8. This is Laila Fawaz’s thesis. She has written the history of the growth of Beirut in the nineteenth century and accounted for the growth of the town of 6000 to the political, economic cultural and educational centre of over 100,000 within the century and the socio-political effects these changes brought about, such as the rise of sectarian tension within the city, a legacy passed on to mandate Lebanon and beyond. See Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1983). 9. This interpretation is based upon Gates, The Merchant Republic, pp. 80–1. 10. Ibid., p. 95. 11. For a glowing description of Lebanon in the 1950s and the Chamouns see ‘Young–old Lebanon Lives by Trade’, in The National Geographic Magazine, April 1958, No. 4, pp. 479–523. 12. The issue of lawlessness was a recurrent theme in the sessions of parliament. See the following meetings: Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab (Minutes of Parliament) Meetings of 22 January 1953, pp. 128–32, 16 April 1953, pp. 732–4, 21 April 1953, pp. 753–4, 16 February 1954, pp. 112–13, 18 May 1954, pp. 812–15. The problem of corruption was another recurrent theme particularly in the following parliamentary debates: 29 January 1954, pp. 259–60, 5 February 1953, pp. 300–1, 5 March 1954, pp. 171–2. 13. For a biographical sketch of Camille Chamoun, see Elias al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is? (Who Makes the President?) (Beirut, 1982), pp. 303–5. See also Who’s Who in Lebanon, 9th edition (Beirut, 1986), p. 104. 14. For an account of his years in exile see Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen Orient, pp. 41–58. 15. The first president of independent Lebanon, Bechara al-Khoury, had also trained to practice law at Eddé’s firm. 16. Chamoun, Crise, p. 71. 17. Ibid., p. 79. 18. Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence, p. 48. 19. Spears, Fulfilment of a Mission, p. 230. 20. For a detailed account of the incident concerning the newly elected north-


21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36.

63

ern deputy Yusuf Karam, see Zisser, The Challenge of Independence, pp. 107–11. Spears Papers, Box 1, File 1, 15 December 1944. Quoted in Wade Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943–1976 (London, 1985), p. 37. Chamoun, Crise, pp. 106–8. According to Chamoun, it was he who advised Bechara al-Khoury to use his candidacy as a threat against the French, see p. 108. Elias al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is?, pp. 48–9. For a discussion of these events, see Chapter 1. For Chamoun’s personal account of those years, see Camille Chamoun, Marahil al-Istiqlal (Stages of Independence) (Beirut, 1949). Chamoun, Crise, p. 227. Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York, 1968), p. 274. The electoral law was modified in August 1950 to enlarge the chamber of deputies from 55 to 77 and reduce the size of the electoral districts. As minister of the interior, Chamoun had given the PPS a licence to operate as a legitimate political party in Lebanon in 1944. The PPS and its deputies supported Chamoun in 1958. Antun Saadeh was arrested on 6 July, given a 24-hour military trial and executed on 9 July 1949. Al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is?; Saeb Salam in an interview with al-Deiry, p. 51. The American chargé d’affaires referred to Chamoun’s British connection on the eve of his election to the presidency: ‘Whether true or not almost everyone in Lebanon believes Chamoun has British sponsorship.’ Lobenstine to the Department of State, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.11, 23 September 1952. FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, p. 1008. A banker by profession, Pierre Eddé was from a prominent landowning family and the son of the former president Emile Eddé. He would become minister of education in the Salam cabinet of April–August 1953, and thereafter minister of finance in the cabinets of al-Yafi (August 1953–March 1954), al-Sulh (July–September 1955) and al-Sulh (March–September 1958). He was a member of the opposition National Socialist Front formed against President Bechara al-Khoury. Al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is? Interview with al-Deiry, p. 57. Nicolas Nassif, ‘Akhir al-’Amaliqa’ (The Last of the Great Men) (Beirut, 1988), p. 55. Al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is? Moussa Moubarak in an interview with al-

64

37. 38. 39.

40.

41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s Deiry. Moubarak was a deputy in parliament and minister of foreign affairs in the first cabinet of the Chamoun presidency, pp. 50–1. Al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is?, p. 51. Annual Report on the Lebanon for 1952, Confidential, 25 February 1953, FO 371/104486. Among the accusations directed at President Bechara al-Khoury and his family in August 1951 were, reports of a £12 million discrepancy in presidential funds during his tenure; the import of 51 automobiles by his family during the same period; and rumours that the president’s brother nicknamed ‘Sultan Selim’ received £10 for every ton of cement produced at the Chekka plant. US Army Report, Beirut, To: Department of Army Washington DC, NR: 712, Confidential, 8 August 1951. Other members elected to the 1951 77-man parliament included Kamal Jumblatt, Pierre Eddé, Ghassan Tueini, Emile Bustani, Anwar al-Khatib, Abdallah al-Haj, and Dikran Tosbat. On the eve of the presidential elections, Britain’s representative in Lebanon reported to the Foreign Office that while the Sunni Muslim members of the opposition affirmed that they did not ‘wish to interfere with the tradition whereby the President of the Republic should be a Maronite. [However,] at the same time they remain genuinely determined on Constitutional and Electoral reform which will ensure that the President becomes more of a figurehead and that the real power shall lie with the Sunni Moslem Prime Minister’. Chapman-Andrews to A. D. M. Ross, Confidential, 19 September 1952, FO 371/98527. Al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is?, pp. 57–8. True to these words, Kamal Jumblatt would be one of the main leaders of the insurrection of 1958. Chapman-Andrews to Eden, Confidential, 9 October 1952, 371/98528. Kamal Joumblatt, I Speak for Lebanon (London, 1982), pp. 27–8. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 42. Al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is?, pp. 53–4. Pierre Eddé related this incident to the author. Kamal Jumblatt outlined the reform programme of his Progressive Socialist Party in parliament saying: ‘The people want radical reform and the government is responsible to achieve this if we want to build a modern state in Lebanon.’ See Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab, meeting of 12 May 1953, pp. 843–5. Two years later, Jumblatt (left out in the cold by Chamoun) would make the following statement in parliament accusing the president of encroach-


51. 52.

53. 54.

55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

65

ing on the prerogatives of parliament: ‘The present regime in the country is neither parliamentary, democratic nor legal, but is a Mutasarifiya regime, for the Mutasarif (governor) is simultaneously a qa’imaqam and a gendarme of the Shuf.’ Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab, meeting of 28 September 1954, pp. 1534–5. Al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Ra’is?, pp. 58–9, al-Deiry does not reveal his sources. In his memoirs Chamoun points out that in order to resolve the deadlock he chose a neutral government headed by a moderate politician and composed of high-ranking civil servants whose probity and experience presented ‘a maximal moral guarantee’. The cabinet formed by Khaled Chehab included Moussa Moubarak, Nazem Akkari, and Selim Haidar. See Chamoun, Crise, p. 246. Chamoun, Crise, p. 247. Halim F. Fayyad, The Effects of Sectarianism on Lebanese Administration, unpublished M.A. thesis, American University of Beirut (Beirut, 1956), p. 82. This polarization predated the Chamoun regime and was apparent during the last year of his predecessor’s tenure when feeble attempts at reform were made by the Yafi government of June 1951. An eyewitness report related that the incoming prime minister’s parliamentary speech in which he outlined that the government’s programme was: ‘followed by 6 hours of often heated but orderly debate during which deputies of the reform front criticized the program as not going far enough and disgruntled professional politicians viewed the program as a virtually impossible accomplishment’. From: USARMA Beirut, To: Washington DC, No: 692, Confidential, 22 June 1951, Department of the Army, Staff Communications Office. Malcolm Kerr succinctly analysed this deadlock in the system in his definition of the role of government in Lebanon as ‘an administrative, judicial body rather than a creator of public policy’. See ‘Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy’, in Leonard Binder ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York, 1966), p. 190. Minutes of Parliament, Vol. 1953, Seventh Legislative Session, Meeting of 3 February 1953, pp. 259–60. It is relevant to bear in mind that the average life span of cabinets during the Chamoun presidency as well as that of his predecessor was six months. Minutes of Parliament, Vol. 1953, Seventh Legislative Session, meeting of 19 February 1953, pp. 426–53. Chamoun, Crise, p. 250. While tax exemptions were given to a dozen industries, not all were above

66

61.

62.

63.

64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s suspicion of vested interest. A British embassy report noted that although both the president and the then minister of finance Muhieddin Nsouli were ‘both men of complete integrity’ yet ‘for the first time hints, if not specific charges of corruption have been uttered against the Chamoun regime’. See Chapman-Andrews to Shuckburgh, Personal and Confidential, 9 September 1955, FO 371/115725. See Roger Owen, ‘The Political Economy of Grand Liban 1920–1970’, in Roger Owen, ed., Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon (London, 1976), p. 28. Owen quotes figures from a preliminary study published by the Lebanese Ministry of Planning in the late 1950s to the effect that ‘between 1950 and 1957 the value of Lebanese commercial activity increased by 56.3 per cent and in 1957 itself contributed to nearly a third of GNP’ while ‘industry, on the other hand, continued to lag.’ For the political developments that led to the dissolution of the customs union and its effect on Lebanese industry, see Carolyn L. Gates, ‘Laissezfaire, outward orientation, and regional economic disintegration: a case study of the dissolution of the Syro-Lebanese customs union’, in Yousef Choueiri, ed. State and Society in Syria and Lebanon (Exeter, 1993). It is interesting to compare these figures with those for the presidency of Fuad Chehab where government expenditures by 1964 had almost doubled to 23.2 per cent of GNP. See Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 308, Table 25. Malik, F Chehab, ‘La Conjoncture Economique Libanaise en 1954’, Economie Libanaise et Arabe, No. 5, January 1955. Gates, The Merchant Republic, p. 118. Ibid., p.129. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 280. Hudson discusses the reformist pressures exerted on Chamoun and his response. For other evaluations of Chamoun’s reforms, see George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, Reformed Administration in Lebanon (Beirut, 1964), pp. 17–21, and Adnan Iskandar, Bureaucracy in Lebanon (Beirut, 1964). Ian D. Scott to Selwyn Lloyd, Confidential, 1 January 1956, FO 371/ 121605. Chapman-Andrews to Anthony Eden, Confidential, 7 January 1955, FO 371/115723. Chapman-Andrews to Selwyn Lloyd, Confidential, 16 February 1956, FO 371/121607. Ibid. Ibid. For the context within which this organization was set up, see Najla W.


74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79. 80.

67

Atiyah, The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon, p. 235, who maintains that ‘although al-Mu’tamar did not enjoy great popular following, yet like other popular organizations it represented the general mood of the community [and its formation] clearly indicated a decline in the Sunnis’ approval of the Independent Lebanese state’. The pamphlet mentions the following organizations as sponsoring and founding the conference: Moslem Young Men’s Union, ‘Amiliye Society, Moslem Neighborhood Society, Moslem Family Union, Moslem Bloc, National Committee (Al-Hay’at al-Wataniye), Worshippers of God Association, Young Men’s Moslem Association, Philanthropic Society, Morality Society, Orphan’s Committees, Committee of Village School Workers, Moslem Boy Scouts, The Pioneers (An-Najjada), Makassed College Alumni Association. FO 1018/93. A Foreign Service dispatch from the American embassy in Beirut identifies them as follows: ‘Mohammed Jamil Beyhum, prominent Beirut businessman, Abdul Wahab al-Rifa’i, secretary-general of the National Organization; Dr Mustapha Khalidy, a highly qualified gynaecologist who some years ago was removed from the staff of the American University of Beirut because of his excessive political machinations.’ The dispatch gives a grave assessment of the potentially destructive impact that such publications could have on the country: ‘Striking as it does at the very core of Lebanon’s existence, Moslem Lebanon Today is the most serious assault on Lebanon’s precarious religious equilibrium since the Moslem manifesto of last spring.’ American Embassy (Beirut) to Department of State, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 279, Restricted, Department of State, Central Files, 883A.413, 27 November 1953. US Army Military Intelligence. From: OARMA Beirut, Prepared By: Lt.Colonel T. J. Lawlor, Subject: Islamic Demands, Report Number: R–79–53, Restricted Security Information, 20 March 1953. Foreign Service Dispatch No. 279, American Embassy (Beirut) to Department of State, Restricted, Department of State, Central Files, 883A.413, 27 November 1953. For a succinct discussion of the perception of Greater Lebanon as a symbol of Sunni defeat, manifested in the press and writings of prominent Muslim personalities, see Najla W. Atiyah, The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon, pp. 76–8. FO 1018/93, cover page and p. 3. The Point IV program was set up in 1952 as a technical cooperation service, staffed by 48 technicians who worked closely with the relevant Lebanese ministries on various studies for development projects in areas

68

81. 82.

83.

84. 85. 86. 87.

88.

89.

90.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s such as water resources, agriculture, health, education, and industry. The Program Agreement of 26 June 1952 committed $3.1 million of funding for its activities for 1952 and 1953. Memorandum of conversation by the Country Director of Technical Cooperation Service, Lebanon, Restricted, Conference Files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156, 17 May 1953, No. 30, FRUS, Vol. IX, 1952–54, The Near and Middle East, pp. 85–6. FO 1018/93, pp. 7–12. ‘A General Review of the Political Situation’ by Wadih Malouf, a Lebanese employee of the British embassy, Confidential, 26 November 1953, 1018/93. The former minister and deputy Suleiman al-Ali and his brother Malek alAli, accused of complicity in the murder of former minister and deputy Mohammed al-Abboud, were sentenced to ten and twenty years imprisonment respectively by the Judicial Council appointed by President Chamoun to try the case. The assassin was hanged publicly on the morning of 3 December 1953. In a comment on the general state of affairs in Lebanon, the American ambassador Raymond A. Hare wrote: ‘The whole affair has been, in a sense, symptomatic of the general lack of public respect for law and order which prevails in Lebanon today. In this connection, the 73-year-old father of the victim, when he called on me recently, stated that internal security in the country had evidenced a steady deterioration since the departure of the French in 1943.’ Hare to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 299, Restricted, Department of State, Central Files, 883A.52, 4 December 1953. FO 1018/93. Minute by Maroun ’Arab’, Confidential, 12 December 1953, FO 1018/93. Report by Wadih Malouf to Maroun ’Arab, 30 June 1952, FO 1018/86. See the speech by Tripolitan deputy Sheikh Nadim al-Jisr delivered at a press conference at the Bristol Hotel in Beirut on 15 May 1958. Foreign Service Dispatch No. 232, American Embassy (Beirut) to Department of State, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 18 May 1958, Subject: ‘The Roots of the Lebanese Revolution: A Speech by Sheikh Nadim el-Jisr, Deputy from Tripoli’. US Army Military Intelligence from OARMA Beirut, Prepared By: Col. R. C. Works, Subject: Confessionalism Difficulties in Lebanon, Report No. R– 274–54, Confidential, 8 September 1954. Embassy (Beirut) to Department of State, Foreign Service Dispatch No: 67, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 883A.413, 30 July 1954. Shakar was later persuaded by the authorities to leave the country. For the debate of the Shakar incident in parliament, see Mahadir Majlis al-


91.

92.

93.

94.

95.

96.

69

Nuwwab, meeting of 30 July 1954, pp. 1411–13 and meeting of 31 July 1954, pp. 1505–7. ‘In the attempt by each sect to stamp Lebanon with its characteristics, the religious feasts were celebrated vociferously. The Christians celebrated ‘Id al-Salib (The Day of the Cross) on 14 September in this manner; the Muslims reacted by an even more vociferous celebration on the Prophet’s Birthday on 7 November. See the press of the period. This “duel” and its aftermath shook the country and brought it to the brink of civil war. See the discussion in parliament on 9 November 1954, Minutes of Parliament, Vol. 1954–55, pp. 1682–92.’ Quotation and reference in Atiyah, The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis, p. 239. American Embassy (Beirut) to Department of State, Foreign Service Dispatch, No: 272, Department of State, Central Files, 883A.413, 3 November 1954. The report also notes that efforts were made to include other religious groups in the celebrations and thus give them a national rather than a confessional colouring. Thus the sponsoring committee included prominent Muslims such as Sami al-Sulh, Saeb Salam, Abdallah al-Yafi, and Adel Osseiran. ‘Unfortunate accident marred celebration Prophet’s birthday in Beirut November 7 when oil fire started in midst torch bearer assembling for mass parade. Panic caused many participants to drop torches and individual oilcans in street, thereby adding to fire which quickly spread enveloping several persons who fell and were trampled on in resulting shuffle. According to Ministry of Health, nine persons have died, 250 were hospitalized with serious burns and some 300 others were less severely injured.’ Beirut to Secretary of State, No: 460, Department of State, Central Files, 883A.413, 8 November 1954. See Claude Dubar and Salim Nasr, Les Classes Sociales au Liban (Paris, 1976) who note that during the 1960s these inequalities were exacerbated mainly due to the effects of inflation and integration into the world market, p. 291. Caroline L. Gates made this analogy in an unpublished paper read at the ‘Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s’ at the University of Texas at Austin, September 1992. In her paper entitled, ‘Choice, Content and Performance of a Service-Oriented Open Economy Strategy: The Case of Lebanon, 1948– 1958’, Gates concluded that Lebanon’s economic model was not in itself a cause of the 1958 rebellion. Challenges to Lebanese society that year came from other sources such as internal divided loyalties, sectarianism, and foreign intervention. See pp. 37–40. FO 1018/93.

3 Lebanon 1952–1956: Foreign Affairs CHAMOUN AS REGIONAL MEDIATOR

In the cold war atmosphere of the 1950s, the major players in Lebanon were, in varying degrees at different times, the United States and the Soviet Union at the superpower level, followed by Britain and France with their corresponding historical legacies in the area. At the local level, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey were the countries to be taken into account. British and American policy-makers shared the common objective of stemming the growth of Soviet influence in the region and of maintaining their own against it. Their efforts to develop regional strategic alliances in the early 1950s had resulted in the formation of the Baghdad Pact, with Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Britain as 1 members. Gamal Abdel Nasser opposed the pact that disrupted his strategy of non-alignment and ‘positive neutralism’, a strategy that implied using Arab unity as leverage against the Western powers. Reacting against the Baghdad Pact of February 1955, Nasser announced the formation of the Arab Tripartite Pact with Saudi Arabia and Syria in May 1955. Against the backdrop of the cold war, both the British and the Americans recognized the potential threat of Arab nationalism to their predominance in the Middle East. Where did Camille Chamoun stand in the midst of these events? 70

Lebanon 1952–1956: Foreign Affairs

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What do the recently declassified documents of the British Foreign Office, the American State Department, and the Eisenhower papers reveal about his response to the Anglo–American overtures? Chamoun attempted to play the role of mediator in the Arab world while maintaining Lebanon’s traditional friendship with the Western powers. With an increasingly polarized Middle East and in the larger context of the cold war, Chamoun could no longer reconcile his role of regional mediator with friendly relations with the West. In fact, his difficulties stemmed from his attempt to be ‘all things to all men’, a 2 recurring theme in the Foreign Office documents. Chamoun’s difficult position was cogently summed up by Ian D. Scott, the British chargé d’affaires in Beirut, who wrote this report in January 1956 after the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia had further polarized the Arab world: There was an immediate awareness by thinking people (such as the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs) of the farreaching implications of this move; and underneath the popular acclaim with which Egypt’s decision was greeted there emerged a growing concern at the dangers latent in the situation. For some years previously the Lebanese had been playing their enforced role of trying to be all things to all men — friendly to the West, trading with the East, endlessly seeking to reconcile conflicting viewpoints among the Arab States and always anxious to appear not less Arab than the others where Israel was concerned. Now it was brought home to them that they were going to have to face up to 3 some difficult decisions. A polarized Arab world put much pressure on Lebanon, which with its multi-religious population with varying cultural and political loyalties could ill afford to take sides in regional and international disputes. Consequently, the external pressure of regional politics was a major destabilizing force in Lebanon especially from the mid-1950s. While internal discontent from 1953 onwards was certainly a factor in the mounting opposition to Chamoun, the driving force for this movement and the aggressive bent that it took was due to the presence of Gamal Abdel Nasser and his message of social justice and

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Arab nationalism. Bypassing local leaders in Lebanon and in other Arab countries, Nasser addressed the Arab masses directly, forcing the various Muslim leaders to outdo each other in espousing his message. In addition to Nasser’s stature, the Arab oil-producing countries were another source of strength for Lebanon’s Muslim (particularly Sunni) 4 community. Thus the external dimension of Lebanese politics was central to its development and to a large degree determined its course. Chamoun’s credentials as an Arab nationalist were firmly established by the time he was elected to the presidency, to the extent that he was popularly referred to as 'fata' al 'uruba al awwal' (the pre-eminent youth or champion of Arabism). He had acquired this reputation while serving as Lebanon’s first representative to the Court of St James, from 1944 until 1947, and particularly as an articulate spokesman for the Palestinian cause, whether meeting with United Nations’ delegates, British officials, or in public lectures at Chatham House and various other 5 associations. Furthermore, Chamoun was the main Arab spokesman at the critical 1947 United Nations session when the resolution partitioning 6 Palestine was passed. He maintained good relations with Arab leaders and began his presidential tenure by official visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 7 Iraq, and Jordan. As previously mentioned, Chamoun had Arab support in his bid for the presidency against the French-backed Hamid Frangieh. In his memoirs, he wrote of the favourable reception with which his election was received in Arab capitals whereas in western circles sentiments were 8 mixed. He perceived his role in the arena of Arab politics as one of leader and mediator, particularly between East and West, and adopted 9 this role from the time of his election until the Suez crisis of 1956. Among the initiatives he undertook were plans for regional defence, efforts at effecting an Iraqi–Saudi rapprochement, and various attempts to dissipate regional disagreements in favour of forming a united front 10 among the Arab countries. The period preceding the Suez crisis was one of relative peace among the Arab countries, for the ‘Arab Cold War’ that polarized the region had not yet begun, and consequently Lebanon was not in the difficult 11 position of having to choose sides. Anglo–American policymakers perceived Lebanon’s importance as being both its strategic location and


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the Western outlook of many Lebanese that afforded it a potentially 12 important role, namely to influence its Arab neighbors. While Anglo–American policy in the Middle East was mainly concerned with the issues of oil and the containment of Soviet expansion, the British were still very much a colonial power in the area, although they were losing ground in important countries such as Egypt 13 and Iran. The importance of maintaining the flow of oil to the West at all times and concurrently denying it to the Soviet Union was underscored by the agreement between the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff that ‘the Middle East in War is of importance second only to 14 Europe’. Anglo–American cooperation in the Middle East was still effective until a policy change occurred with the new Eisenhower administration in 1953. Prior to this shift, the Americans and British together with the French announced the Tripartite Declaration in May 1950. The aim of this agreement was to contain the Arab–Israeli conflict, maintain the status quo in the Middle East following the Arab–Israeli war of 1948, and ensure that all parties remained in a pro-Western alignment in the 15 context of the cold war. By 1953, American policymakers, particularly President Eisenhower’s 16 secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, wished to dissociate United States 17 policy from the colonial legacy of the British. Together with foreign aid administrator Harold Stassen, Dulles made a tour of the Middle East and South Asia in May 1953. In Lebanon he met President Chamoun, Prime Minister Saeb Salam, minister of foreign affairs George Hakim, prominent members of parliament, and American educators and oil industry 18 representatives, namely consultants for Tapline and ARAMCO. The consensus of these meetings was that the peoples of the area should assume responsibility for regional defence and that no collective defence plan could be imposed from without. This was despite the fact that Lebanese leaders, particularly the president ‘privately’ favoured a Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO). He ‘secretly’ tried to promote regional defence with the West in his numerous visits to Arab capitals, yet could not advocate this publicly. Moreover, Lebanon had signed necessary assurances to the United States enabling her to receive cash reimbursable 19 military aid. The Lebanese emphasized the need for American economic and military aid as well as the need for American efforts to resolve

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the two questions of Egypt and Palestine. While stressing the dangers of communism as the major international issue, Dulles pledged a more 20 even-handed American policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict. Following his first official visit to the Middle East, Dulles reported that the position of the West was being eroded and attributed this development to the bitterness and ill feeling engendered by British 21 imperialism. He therefore recommended that the colonial issue be removed from American relations with the Middle Eastern countries and that a new impartial approach be adopted in American policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict. The purpose of this policy would be to induce the Arab countries to join in collective security arrangements against 22 potential Soviet threats (the Northern Tier defence concept). The most pressing problem in the Middle East was the Anglo– Egyptian standoff regarding the British base in the Canal Zone. In keeping with his views of Britain’s imperial decline, Dulles’s trip to the area convinced him that the 80,000-man garrison must go. His assistant at the State Department, John Hanes cogently summed up Dulles’s view of the British: The Secretary was convinced that the British throughout the world were a rapidly declining power. He was convinced they no longer had any basic will to meet big international responsibilities. … It was not that Foster Dulles disliked Anthony Eden and the British, as some people were later to charge, but that he just thought neither Eden nor the country he represented 23 counted anymore. With mounting American pressure, the British conceded to withdraw 24 all troops from the Canal Zone by June 1956. The British foreign minister Anthony Eden faced considerable opposition over this concession to Egypt, from both Prime Minister Winston Churchill with his die-hard opposition to what he termed a policy of scuttle and from backbenchers within the Conservative Party. Eden believed that the Canal Base agreement would inaugurate a new era of good relations with Egypt and be a prelude for Egyptian participation in the antiSoviet regional defence alliances that were being formulated by the Western powers for the Middle East. The British ambassador to


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Lebanon, Edwin Chapman-Andrews, was under no such illusions as he wrote in a report to the foreign minister: ‘We cannot hope that a new era will dawn for our affairs in the Middle East merely by the withdrawal of our fighting troops and by showing a readiness for 25 friendship with Egypt.’ Chapman-Andrews went on to recommend constructive policies in the region that, while securing British national interests, also gave the Arabs ‘the satisfaction of military and economic security’. The success of such policies necessitated the full cooperation of the American government. Eden met with the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in Cairo in February 1955 to convince him that Egypt should join the newly formed Baghdad Pact. Nasser rejected Eden’s proposal as he had previously rejected American overtures in 1953 for the then proposed Middle East 26 Defence Organization. While his position in 1953 had been that Egypt’s 27 main problem was with the British rather than the Russians, Nasser now sought to prevent the reimposition of British domination through the Baghdad Pact. He therefore sought to unite the Arab countries to pursue a strategy of non-alignment and ‘positive neutralism’ in order to secure greater influence in international affairs. Nasser proposed to do this by reviving the Arab League Defence Pact signed in 1950. American president Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles came to view the Baghdad Pact primarily as ‘an instrument to serve British interests’ and it was therefore discredited in Middle Eastern eyes as a colonialist project. In effect the pact reinforced Britain’s position in Iraq, which had been subject to troubles within the framework of the bilateral relationship. The American policymakers had initially favoured a treaty between Pakistan and Turkey (the Northern Tier concept) without Iraqi participation but as Dulles put it: ‘The trouble was that the British have taken it over and run it as an instrument of British policy — that has 28 drawn upon it a tremendous amount of criticism.’ The British had appropriated the idea and consequently the Americans, who sought to distance themselves from colonialist association, refused to become full members of the Baghdad Pact. Prior to Eden’s visit and in the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi– Turkish communiqué of 12 January (declaring the intent of the two countries to conclude a mutual defence pact and inviting others in the area to join), Cairo was the centre of much political activity, for Nasser

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had invited all Arab prime ministers to a conference to discuss the implications of the communiqué. While Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria opposed the Baghdad Declaration, Lebanon and Jordan were unwilling to condemn Iraq’s action. Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh and 29 Foreign Minister Alfred Naccache represented Lebanon. Al-Sulh was chosen as chairman of a conference delegation sent to Baghdad to try and dissuade the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Sa’id, from proceeding 30 with his declared intent. The attempt failed and what became known 31 as the Baghdad Pact was signed a few weeks later on 24 February. Responding to Nasser’s arguments in favour of a purely Arab defence pact, Nuri is reported to have said, ‘Zero plus zero plus zero equals zero’, meaning that since the military effectiveness of the Arab states was zero, a major Western power was needed to give any defence pact 32 real military clout. Chamoun’s reaction to these events was to submit a memorandum to Nasser outlining his views on defence pacts and drawing Nasser’s attention to the benefits of joining a Western-supported alliance as well as to the costs of isolation. Lebanon’s ambassador to Egypt Nadim Dimechkié, submitted the document to Nasser on 12 February, and held two meetings with the Egyptian president. Nasser then sent Salah Salem to Beirut to discuss the matter with Chamoun, yet these talks only served to persuade the two leaders of the irreconcilability of their views. While Chamoun drew closer to the Western powers, Nasser continued to advocate a policy of nonalignment and neutralism. His attendance at the Bandung conference of Afro–Asian states in April 1955 in Indonesia, where he stood alongside Nehru and Tito and participated in the conference resolutions condemning imperialism and military 33 alliances, was a symbolic manifestation of his neutralist policy. The Czech arms deal concluded that same year on 27 September, pushed this concept much further for it ended the Western monopoly on arms sales to Egypt, while for the American president, it signified ‘the first evidence of Communist penetration’ in the area and posed a challenge to the 34 United States. From the Egyptian perspective, the much-needed arms (following the Israeli raid on Gaza in late February) were purchased from the Soviet bloc only after repeated attempts to obtain them from the Western powers had failed. Moreover, President Eisenhower had promised Nasser $27 million worth of arms in November 1954, yet he


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succumbed to Israeli and particularly British pressure and never 35 delivered. Egypt’s opposition to the Baghdad Pact was yet another stumbling block for the acquisition of arms from the West. Nasser correctly perceived that American willingness to provide Egypt with arms was contingent on its joining a Western-based regional defence pact, for this was precisely the strategy of the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles did not believe in non-alignment and held that countries not for the United States were against it. The Americans did not officially join the Baghdad Pact, yet supported it publicly, as it fulfilled the basic criteria of the ‘Northern Tier’ concept, which had replaced MEDO after 36 Nasser’s rejection of the latter. As Dulles explained to the British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia, he very much doubted that the United States would join the Baghdad Pact unless Saudi Arabia would join and 37 Israel would drop its lobbying against the Pact. Nevertheless the Americans did participate in the military committee and attended most other committee meetings as an observer. CHAMOUN’S RESPONSE TO ANGLO–AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 38

While the West courted Nasser until his decisive break in 1956, Chamoun offered Britain facilities and assurances that ‘as long as he was President, the Lebanon would be completely at the disposal of Her Majesty’s Government in the event of war.’ He made this pledge to the British ambassador in September 1952, just after his election as president. In return, Chamoun requested British training for the Lebanese military and easy terms for the purchase of matériel, which would be bought exclusively from Britain, as well as the supply of some equipment, free of charge. The Lebanese president repeated his offer to the British during a courtesy visit by the commander-in-chief of the British military forces in the Middle East, General Sir Brian Robertson, in mid39 November of that year. The British response to the Lebanese overtures was unsympathetic despite Chapman-Andrews’s recommendations. There was little interest in an exclusively Anglo–Lebanese Defence Agreement, and in time of war, British interest in Lebanon was confined to obtaining port and communications facilities, rather than building up 40 the Lebanese armed forces.

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Britain’s preoccupation in the Middle East in the early 1950s was with Egypt, primarily with negotiations concerning the status of the Sudan and negotiations for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty to supersede that of 1936 and settle the question of the British military presence in the Canal 41 Zone. In that context Chamoun was urged by the British to speak to the Egyptians in order to facilitate an Anglo–Egyptian agreement and in particular to ‘make clear the importance … of proper arrangements to safeguard the Canal base and, if evacuation took place, to re-deploy the 42 troops in the interests of regional defence’. Chamoun believed that three issues were central to Anglo–Egyptian talks in 1953. These were in order of precedence: the Canal Zone, 43 common defence, and Palestine. Three weeks earlier he had ‘very confidentially’ told the British chargé d’affaires at Beirut that in his discussions with the Iraqi leadership he had agreed that ‘Middle East 44 defence need not wait on a solution of the Palestine problem’. This was a significant gesture on Chamoun’s part towards the Western powers at a time when the question of Palestine was the predominant issue on the agenda of the nascent Arab nationalist movement. As previously mentioned, Chamoun saw himself as a mediator among the Arabs and between the Arabs and the West. British officials in Beirut feared that Chamoun would lean too far in the direction of the Arabs ‘in his desire to appear to lead them in their relations with the West’. These fears were augmented by the failure of the Lebanese parliament to ratify the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) agreement and indications of greater pan-Arab and anti-Western sentiment in 45 Lebanon. Another cause for British concern was a rumour that during Chamoun’s latest visit to Baghdad, ‘the possibility was discussed of asking Kuwait to join the Arab League and the Sheikh of Kuwait to withdraw his deposits at the Bank of England and to put them into some sort of Arab development bank.’ Chamoun’s reply to this 46 allegation was that he had ‘seen nothing official to that effect’. British embassy officials were concerned about ‘how far the Lebanese were consciously thinking in terms of lining up the Arabs in a solid bloc to 47 negotiate with the West’. All this led to some scepticism by British officials at the Eastern Department about the Lebanese president’s 48 intentions and they repeatedly commented on Chamoun’s efforts to ‘court popularity in Lebanon and abroad by advertising his support for


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Arab aspirations’. According to the British ambassador, Lebanon’s support for Egyptian aspirations was driven by fear of a vengeful Egypt, for in reality the Lebanese preferred to see a continued British presence in Egypt, ‘if only for the effective defence of the Lebanon in case of 50 war’. However, from the Lebanese point of view British troops in Jordan and Cyprus, in addition to a friendly Egypt provided for a more stable situation in the area. As previously mentioned, Chamoun’s credentials as an Arab nationalist were firmly established by the time he was elected president in 1952, yet he had also acquired a reputation of being an anglophile, to some even a ‘British agent’. Foreign Office documents do not sustain the latter charge, as the embassy’s Annual Report on Lebanon for 1952 shows: If any change in foreign policy can be detected as a result of the change in regime it is that President Chamoun (despite his inescapable reputation as a ‘British agent’, to which he is elaborately careful not to give any credence) is more arabisant than his predecessor. This attitude emerged not only in the declarations of his inaugural address but in the visits exchanged with other Arab Governments after his election, in the inordinate haste to walk into the Syrian parlour by way of economic negotiations, and even 51 in his unhelpful attitude to the ratification of the IPC Agreement. Another interesting assessment of Chamoun from the British point of view is in the file on leading personalities in Lebanon for the year 1957: ‘In matters of foreign policy, his British connections and superficial Anglicisms helped win him the reputation of being a British tool, though in fact his policy, while wholeheartedly supporting us in any conflict 52 with Communism, was basically Lebanese and pro-Arab.’ Chamoun’s pro-British reputation was undoubtedly enhanced by his personal admiration for British statesmen and institutions that did not, as he 53 himself contended, affect his policy-making. While maintaining that Chamoun was his own man, the British nevertheless acknowledged his importance in facilitating their dealings with Lebanese governments: Fortunately for us the President has very sensible views about cooperation with the West and about the dangers of the present Russian policy in the Middle East. He has been at all times as

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Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s helpful to us as he can reasonably be and this has greatly smoothed the course of our dealings with successive Governments. The substantial military assistance, which we are now 54 giving to Lebanon, is a just recognition of this fact.

British interests in Lebanon were ‘to keep the oil flowing through Tripoli’, the terminus of the IPC pipeline, air communications (where British interests were increased with BOAC’s purchase of shares in the 55 56 Lebanese airline), defence, and general trade. With respect to the Americans, the economic assistance provided through the Point IV program and American insistence on exclusive control of expenditures led to much friction with the Lebanese government. This was among the predominant issues facing the president in the aftermath of his election. Relations between Point IV and Lebanese officials — over the issue of the control of expenditures — deteriorated to the point where the Americans threatened to withdraw all Point IV 57 assistance by the end of 1952. Subsequent assessments of the Point IV 58 program have been negative particularly in terms of its effectiveness in improving the lot of the Lebanese at whom it was directed, such as the farmers in the rural areas since the major emphasis was on water resources development. In late 1952, the programme was in its early phase of preparing surveys for potential projects. The Litani River Survey was the largest project undertaken by Point IV staff. Najib Alamuddin, best known as president of Middle East Airlines, but who was previously a government appointee to the Economic Council of Lebanon in 1951, described the expectations generated 59 by the Point IV program as well as its results: The Point Four Program was introduced into Lebanon with a great fanfare. Soon afterwards, scores of American technicians arrived, and the Lebanese were asked to submit any project they believed beneficial to the country. Point Four officials also planned their own surveys. Great excitement was generated as the Lebanese put forward projects galore. Yet after all the surveys and studies, nothing much happened. The farmers received no real help and continued their tough hand-to-mouth existence. The Point Four Administration was then dismantled and the Americans returned


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home, after having spent substantial amounts of American tax60 payers’ money on themselves. The American ambassador to Lebanon Raymond Hare was also critical of the excessive publicity given to the American aid programmes by the Americans themselves, in that expectations were raised and relations with the Lebanese officials became strained. To ease this situation Hare introduced the following change: ‘We cut out the publicity with, the idea that you didn’t talk about things except things you had done, and you didn’t mention things you were going to do. People came, there was a 61 new agreement, but you didn’t ballyhoo it.’ At the time of his election, Chamoun was preparing for a Point IV leader-grant visit to the USA, although he had voted against the Point IV program as a member of the opposition in parliament. However, that was because he feared that it would help maintain President Khoury in power and not because of any inherent opposition to American assis62 tance and influence. Chamoun hoped to get both economic aid and arms from the United States. In requesting the latter, the president reassured the American chargé d’affaires of Lebanon’s alignment with the West in case of any war with the Soviets: ‘If it ever came to war with the Soviets, Lebanon would be 100 per cent on the side of the West, our harbours would be open to your ships, our airfields to your planes, whether or not we have any kind 63 of agreement in writing.’ While American cash and reimbursable military aid had been offered to Lebanon, Chamoun hoped for grant military assistance (as Iraq had received) as a step towards participation 64 in some form of regional defence arrangement. In acknowledging Chamoun’s assurances, American policymakers nevertheless recognized that Lebanon’s contribution to regional defence ‘would be limited to its 65 extensive airfield and to its ports’. Chamoun’s ability as a negotiator was recognized by the American ambassador, Raymond Hare, with whom discussions on US aid was the predominant subject at their meetings: Chamoun did his homework on aid. He went through these dossiers so that I had to be darn careful to be well briefed before I went, or I’d find I was at a disadvantage because he’d know a lot

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Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s more about what we were doing than we did. And also the foreign minister at that time was very able, a very good negotiator, perhaps not as interested in detail as President Shamoun [sic] was. 66 These were class A calibre men that I had to discuss things with.

The ambassador’s views were echoed by those of his chargé d’affaires, John K. Emmerson, who in a report to the state department in October 1955 observed that while most Lebanese tended to approach the Arab– Israeli issue with an unrealistic and emotional attitude, there were ‘at least two individuals who seem to have a sensible and realistic view of the existing situation. These are the President of the Republic and Dr Charles Malik, former ambassador to the United States’. Malik’s prescient views were privately yet frankly expressed to a group of visiting American congressmen; namely that some Lebanese were willing to live with a Jewish state in the area although the majority were not, and while a modification of the borders was necessary, it was unrealistic to talk of a 67 return to the frontiers of the 1947 UN Resolution. On the regional front the division of the Arab world into a proWestern and a Nasserist camp, led respectively by Iraq and Egypt, intensified in 1955 as each side sought to win new adherents. Both public as well as covert means were used in this ‘Arab Cold War’. A State Department intelligence report provides names as well as the sums of money involved in Egyptian and Saudi efforts to draw Lebanon to their anti-Baghdad Pact alignment: Saudi bribery and Egyptian propaganda are actively supporting elements opposed to Western-oriented President Shamoun [sic]. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Husayn al-Uwayni, apparently the chief Saudi paymaster, is said to be spending up to $16,000 each month to influence the press against the President and there are reports that the Saudi Government, unimpressed with the results, has ordered him to double this figure. Other reports indicate the Saudi Government is spending $150,000 monthly to subsidize newspapers and individuals in both Syria and Lebanon. This propaganda has been directed not only against the Lebanese President but 68 also against the US, the West, and the Baghdad Pact. Saudi and Egyptian pressure on Lebanon intensified after the signature


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of the Turco–Iraqi Pact — otherwise known as the Baghdad Pact — in February 1955. The British documents also reveal the use of Arab money in payoffs in Lebanon to the extent that Chamoun complained to the British foreign secretary Harold Macmillan about this when the latter passed through Beirut on 23 November 1955. Chamoun asked Macmillan for assistance to stop Saudi–Egyptian interference in Leba69 non’s affairs. In Lebanon, opposition to the president’s policies by rivals such as Kamal Jumblatt increased in 1955. Jumblatt was joined in his opposition to Chamoun by critics of the president’s foreign policy as the announcement of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955 polarized the situation in the Middle East. Egyptian, Syrian, and Saudi pressure on Lebanon to adhere to their camp was stepped up in late 1955 and led to the appointment of the pro-Egyptian Rashid Karami as prime minister. Karami had advocated a Syro–Lebanese military agreement and had opposed the president and some cabinet ministers on several issues. An example of his political inclinations was the incident concerning a demonstration called for by the Beiruti Sunni notable and well-funded ex-prime minister Hussein Oueini. Oueini’s National Congress of Parties decided to demonstrate on 14 January in support of the ‘Jordanian people’s struggle against foreign alliances and imperialist designs’. After the president conferred with security officials, the government announced that the demonstration would be banned, despite Karami’s protests, for he had argued in favour of permitting the demonstration to proceed. The National Congress of Parties backed down with a face-saving statement by the prime minister on his return from a visit to Damascus on 13 January, to the effect that Lebanon ‘would not join the Baghdad Pact or 70 any other foreign pact and that it supported the Arab Peoples struggle’. The charged atmosphere in the country was reflected by the replacement of the moderately pro-Western Sami al-Sulh with the Nasserist Rashid Karami and prompted words of encouragement for Chamoun from his British and American supporters. In view of the increased influence of anti-Western and pro-Nasserist politicians, American policymakers concluded that Chamoun’s continuation in office was clearly in the American interest and from that perspective the Chamoun– 71 Sulh combination formed the best team to govern Lebanon. In contrast with the anti-American Karami, the Americans regarded Sami al-Sulh as

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having ‘constructive views on foreign policy’, being pro-American and more importantly being able to take decisions because of his control of the Beirut mob. Sami al-Sulh’s political interests were focused on the domestic agenda and not on the regional and international, unlike his cousin Riyad’s. This lack of interest in politics outside Beirut, together with his personal weakness, were his strengths in that he did not threaten his Sunni rivals for the premiership even when he was in office and did not compete with 72 the president for the international limelight, at which Chamoun excelled. In view of the increasing opposition to Chamoun, the American ambassador was authorized to give the Lebanese president verbal assurances of American support for his policies and to express ‘great confidence in his judgement’ with the belief that his conception of the best interests of Lebanon and the Near East area coincide with those of 73 the USA. In Lebanon, opinion was divided over support for, or rejection of, the Baghdad Pact. The majority of Christians advocated an alliance with the West and opposed the policy of neutralism between East and West, while Kamal Jumblatt’s ‘National Conference of Lebanese Parties’ 74 opposed the Turco–Iraqi Pact. In this context Jumblatt stepped up his opposition campaign against Chamoun, addressing domestic issues such as nepotism and the president’s failure to carry out the reforms promised on the eve of his election in 1952. Mainly prompted by his exclusion from the regime, as well as his personal rivalry with Chamoun, Jumblatt’s opposition led him to sound out an American embassy official as to American reaction to a possible ouster of Chamoun. Jumblatt’s envoy, Nassim Majdalani, was told that contrary to any rumours the Americans were on good terms with the president, and ‘frowned upon a change of government which was not brought about by constitutional 75 means’. In keeping with the average life span of cabinets in those years, the Karami cabinet lasted for six months during which it failed to reach an agreement with the British-controlled IPC over fixing the oil transit dues. It eventually fell over the sectarian-charged issue of government subsidies to private schools, many of which were operated by religious institutions. Relations between the Lebanese government and the IPC had been


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regulated by an agreement reached in 1931. In 1953 the Lebanese government decided that in order to safeguard its interests it was necessary to revise the 1931 agreement. The government demanded the application of the ‘fifty-fifty’ principle to the profits gained from transport of oil by pipeline across Lebanese territory in comparison with the cost that the company would incur if the oil were shipped by tanker from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. The company refused to negotiate along these lines and little else was done until talks were restarted in 1955 when, in November, an accord was reached between the company and the Syrian government. The Syrian government would receive an annual payment of 65 million Syrian pounds in addition to 85 million pounds in retroactive indemnities for the years prior to 1955. The accord with the Syrian government encouraged the Lebanese to restart negotiations with the IPC in December 1955. The main cause of disagreement was that the Lebanese government wanted to divide the profits that the company made in transporting its oil by pipeline instead of by tanker, whereas the company wanted to calculate rental charges to the Lebanese government on the basis of the tonnage per mile of pipeline across Lebanese territory. Rashid Karami’s Lebanese government rejected that principle, which the Syrian government had accepted. The company offered the Lebanese government six million Lebanese pounds, while the Syrians had received 60 million. 76 According to Karami: ‘by our calculations, we deserved 28 million.’ The prevalent belief Lebanese officials held, including President Chamoun, was that the IPC had worked out the ton/mile basis with Syria after reaching an agreement on total payment. The two sides had compromised in that the Syrians had demanded 80 million Syrian pounds against the company’s initial offer of 50 million. They finally agreed on the sum of 65 million. The Lebanese believed that ‘the ton/ mile basis was then calculated from this figure, partly in order to provide a squeeze 77 on Lebanon when its turn came.’ With the ensuing deadlock, the prime minister decided to terminate the negotiations on 21 January 1956. Negotiations were restarted by Rashid Karami’s successor Abdallah al78 Yafi. and the minister of state in charge of oil affairs Saeb Salam. Salam, like Yafi, rode the Nasserist wave but more successfully and managed to establish himself as the pre-eminent Beiruti Sunni za’im (traditional leader) in the wake of the events of 1958. Not only did their attempts to

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reach an agreement with the IPC fail but relations with the company deteriorated to the extent that by September 1956 the company announced that, in the absence of an agreement with the Lebanese government, their new pipeline under construction would terminate at Baniyas (in Syria) instead of Tripoli, site of their current refinery and 79 pipeline. The Lebanese legislature had also passed a law withdrawing all tax concessions to foreign companies and imposing an income tax on them. With complete deadlock in the negotiations between the government and the IPC and the threat of a shutdown of the company’s activities in Lebanon, President Chamoun intervened in October 1956 and took over the conduct of oil negotiations. Karami’s replacement as prime minister was supported by the majority of the Christian population, by American embassy officials, and by Kamal Jumblatt, who despite his opposition to Chamoun was not 80 necessarily sympathetic to Nasserist influence. Jumblatt had recently informed the American ambassador that he had decided to abandon the policy of neutralism, and pledged to support Western policies (such as the Johnston Plan) ‘such as they are’ and fight communism and Soviet influence ‘with all his power’. Jumblatt attributed this reversal of policy to his fear for the existence of Lebanon as an independent state because 81 of the inroads made by communism on the Arab masses. Karami’s successor was Abdullah al-Yafi. The 55-year-old politician was a Paris trained lawyer and had held numerous ministerial portfolios over the past 20 years. He was prime minister four times prior to this latest appointment in 1956. Al-Yafi was also elected to the legislature as deputy for Beirut in 1932 and was re-elected for several terms. Because the new prime minister was sympathetic to Nasser’s appeal, Chamoun reassured the American ambassador that ‘the policy of Lebanon would continue to be that of impartial friendship with all Arab countries and abstention from lining up with the Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi bloc or with Iraq. If any government departed from this policy he would use his 82 presidential power to dismiss it.’ While offering assurances to the Americans, Chamoun also emphasized the encroaching Soviet influence in the area which would continue ‘unless something positive was done on the Israeli situation’. With the increasing involvement of the Soviets in the Middle East in the wake of the Egypt–Czech arms deal of September 1955, the


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Americans sought to contain these developments by attempting to break the Arab–Israeli deadlock by an American peace initiative. In January 1956, President Eisenhower sent Robert Anderson, former deputy secretary of defence and a close friend, as his personal envoy on a secret diplomatic mission to the Middle East with a plan for a comprehensive Arab–Israeli Agreement. He proposed that Nasser accept as permanent Israel’s boundaries and lead the Arab countries into a peace treaty with Israel. The charged atmosphere of the time was not conducive to the American plan, particularly with the recurrent violence along the Egyptian–Israeli and Syrian–Israeli borders. Anderson’s report to the president convinced Eisenhower that ‘Nasser had proved to be a complete stumbling block [and was] apparently 83 seeking to be acknowledged as the political leader of the Arab world.’ American concern over Nasser’s policy of neutralism was intensified with his rejection of the Anderson initiative. The American president’s response to Nasser’s rejection was to initiate a new direction for American policy in the Middle East: ‘to build up some other individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world’ in order to disrupt Nasser’s aggressive plans. Eisenhower suggested Saudi Arabia’s King Saud as a 84 prospective rival to Nasser. The reassessment and adjustment of American Middle East policy in March 1956 did not effect a major policy change towards Lebanon, which would be continued along previous lines and involve strengthening ‘pro-Western elements in Lebanon by immediately offering economic aid in the form of grants or loans for projects designed to create the 85 most favourable impact on public opinion’. While the National Security Council recommended increasing assistance to Lebanon to the tune of $11 million for 1956, in effect Lebanon only received $2 million, which was $2.8 million less than American assistance given the previous year in 86 1955. In both inter-Arab and Egyptian–American affairs 1955 was a watershed. The Baghdad Pact of February polarized the Arab world and Nasser’s Czech arms deal in September gave the Soviets a foothold in the area. While Iraq and Egypt, two of the larger and more important Arab countries, directed these pivotal events, the question that comes to mind is the importance of tiny Lebanon (with its 4000 square miles and population of 1.5 million) in the Middle East situation and with respect

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to the Western powers. The answer to this question was concisely outlined by the American chargé d’affaires in Beirut in October 1955: The nation’s assets from our point of view are greater than statistics of area and population would indicate. Among them are the strong Christian element which dilutes Moslem fanaticism, the outward Western outlook of the country’s people, and the strategic location of Lebanon. … One should consider whether Lebanon does not offer possibilities for the exercise of influence which might then extend elsewhere. Lebanon could be receptive to the 87 manifestation of United States policy. At a time of increased Soviet threat of penetration of a Middle East (specifically Egypt and Syria) that was increasingly hostile to American Middle East policy, British and American policymakers perceived Lebanon as a bridgehead for spreading their influence in the Arab world. The American viewpoint was echoed by the British whose departing ambassador, Chapman-Andrews, outlined Lebanon’s importance to the West: The Lebanon is a small country of just over one million people. The great majority are friendly to the West and could in certain circumstances be of great value to the West. As a bridgehead the Lebanon has strategic importance, its harbors are the best in the Eastern Littoral of the Mediterranean, its international airport is the best in the Middle East. … The Lebanon with its ring of mountains is a natural fortress. In its ports terminate oil pipelines coming from northern Iraq and Eastern Arabia. Hard businessmen and clever as the Lebanese may be, irritating as they so often are, my own view is that the Lebanese themselves and their country are potential assets to the West and of Great Britain in particular, assets which it is not only well worthwhile but in my opinion essential for us to reinsure, even though the premium in terms of 88 hard cash may seem a rather stiff one. Chapman-Andrews, like other ambassadors, tended to exaggerate the importance of the country in which he served and his assessments were indicative of that tendency. The Foreign Office on the other hand took a much more understated view.


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While Lebanon maintained its pro-Western orientation, the Suez war of 1956 and ensuing events over the next few years brought about a reevaluation of American policy and another major shift towards accommodation with Nasser and Arab nationalism. This decreased the strategic importance of Lebanon, which would once again — as it had been in its previous history — become the site of rivalry between the two river valleys of the Nile and the Tigris–Euphrates. NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. For a discussion of Western security concerns and the formation of various defence treaties in the 1950s, see Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945–1951 (Oxford, 1984). See also Robert W. Stookey, America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter (New York, 1975). 2. See p. 5 of the Annual Report on the Lebanon for 1952, Confidential, 25 February 1953, 371/104486 and p. 2 of the Annual Report on the Lebanon for 1955, Confidential, 1 January 1956, FO 371/121605. 3. Annual Report for 1955 on the Lebanon, Confidential, 1 January 1956, FO 371/121605. 4. Atiyah notes that the wealth of the Arab oil-producing countries led to a gradual dependence of both Muslim and Christian Lebanese on these countries. ‘Gradually the Muslims became aware of this factor and started using it in pressing for their demands.’ Atiyah, The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon, p. 240. 5. For Chamoun’s personal account of these years, see Camille Chamoun, Marahil al-Istiqlal (Steps Towards Independence) (Beirut, 1949). 6. Nadim Dimechkié, The United States Military Intervention in Lebanon, unpublished paper by the former Lebanese ambassador to the United States during the 1958 crisis. Dimechkié began his career as economic counsellor to the first Lebanese diplomatic mission abroad, in London, where Chamoun was ambassador in 1944. He also served as Lebanese ambassador to Cairo from 1952 until 1955 and met with Nasser on numerous occasions. 7. See Chamoun’s description of the visits and his meetings with Mohammed Neguib, King Abdul Aziz, the Regent ‘Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Sa’id, and the young King Hussein. Chamoun referred to his successful efforts at effecting a reconciliation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. He stressed his role as mediator among Arab countries and was able to undertake such a role until 1955 when the increasing polarization in the Arab world forced him to take sides. Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen Orient, pp. 254–7.

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8. Ibid., p. 253. 9. Chamoun viewed this assumption of a leading role for Lebanon in Arab politics as the natural extension of his previous policy as head of the Lebanese legation to London: ‘The prestige that the Lebanese Legation in London had acquired and the role played by the Lebanese delegation at the United Nations were conclusive experiences. Having become Head of State, it was logical and normal that I place emphasis on our diplomacy with the Arab leaders to the best interests of Lebanon and the region.’ Chamoun, Crise, p. 254. See also the British chargé d’affaires’ report following a meeting with Chamoun in March 1953: ‘After this morning’s talk with the President I am inclined rather to think that he genuinely sees himself as some kind of mediator between East and West.’ E. J. W. Barnes to Anthony Eden, Confidential, 31 March 1953, FO 371/104490. 10. Chamoun, Crise, p. 257. 11. Malcolm Kerr coined the term in his essay on Arab politics and ideology and Nasser’s career as a pan-Arab leader from the Suez crisis until his death in 1970. See Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (London, 1965). 12. Emmerson to Dulles, Secret, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 169, Subject: Lebanon and the Middle East, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 25 October 1955. 13. Wm. Roger Louis has pointed out that, although by 1951 the backbone of the British empire in the Middle East had begun to crack with the crises of the Persian oilfields and the Canal Zone, the British retained most of their naval and air bases in the area, and ‘appeared to be dug in more firmly than ever’. See Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945– 1951 (Oxford, 1984), pp. 746–7. 14. Quoted in a Staff Study on Psychological strategy Planning for the Middle East by the Psychological Strategy Board of the White House National Security Council, PSB D–22, Security Information, Top Secret, 18 March 1952, p. 4, Eisenhower Library, White House Office NSC Series 1948–62, Box No. 16. 15. For a study of the origins and purpose of the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, see S. Slonim, ‘Origins of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration of the Middle East’, Middle Eastern Studies, 23, No. 2 (1987), pp. 135–49. See also Louis, The British Empire, pp. 583–8. 16. For an informative biography of Dulles, see Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and their Family Network (London, 1978). 17. In a conversation with the Lebanese minister of foreign affairs, Dulles remarked that there were ‘many differences’ between the USA and her British and French allies, contrary to popular assumption in the Middle East that the


18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

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USA always sided with them. He furthermore noted that the United States was not a colonial power, citing the cases of American policy in Cuba and the Philippines as examples of that anti-colonialism. Memorandum of Conversation by the Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Lebanon (Meyer), Confidential, Conference Files, lot 59 D 95, CF156, 16 May 1953, FRUS, Vol. IX, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, pp. 72–5. The Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company was set up in 1945. The pipeline from the Saudi oilfields to the Mediterranean was built by Bechtel and completed in 1949. In 1952 Lebanon received $1.3 million in transit fees, as did Syria, while Jordan received a little less. The Lebanese were pressing for a renegotiation of their agreement with Tapline in the hope of augmenting their revenues. Memorandum of Conversation by William McMaster of the Petroleum Policy Staff, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553, 30 December 1952, FRUS, 1952–54, Vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, p. 636. As stated in a secretly classified state department paper prepared to brief Secretary Dulles prior to his trip to the Middle East and South Asia. Department of State Position Paper: ‘Lebanon’, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 611.80, 5 May 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, p. 1210. Memorandum of Conversation with President Chamoun, Confidential, Department of State, Conference Files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156, 16 May 1953; Memorandum of Conversation with Saeb Salam, Confidential, Department of State, Conference Files, lot 59 95, CF 156, 16 May 1953; Memorandum of Conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Hakim, Confidential, Department of State, Conference Files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156, 16 May 1953; Memorandum of Conversation with Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, No. 27, 17 May 1953, See FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, pp. 64–78. The British perception of American policymaking in Lebanon at this time of ‘rivalry’ between the two wartime allies was that the Americans were ‘advancing their country’s interests by taking advantage of our difficulties’. However, cooperation with the Americans was essential for the initiation of constructive policies in the region, and therefore a ‘halt must be called to that local American opportunism which constantly dogs our footsteps’. Chapman-Andrews to Eden, Secret, 14 October 1953. See the following two NSC documents: ‘United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Middle East’, NSC 155/1, 14 July 1953, White House Office for the Special Assistant for National Security Council Affairs: Near East (2), Box No. 5, and ‘Progress Report on NSC 155/1, United States

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23. 24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s Objectives and Policies with respect to the Near East’, 30 July 1954, Eisenhower Library, White House Office for the Special Assistant for National Security Council Affairs, Near East (1), Box No. 5. Mosley, Dulles, p. 353. The USA pledged economic and military assistance to Egypt to be effective upon Egyptian fulfilment of an Anglo–Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Base. ‘Progress Report on NSC 155/1, United States Objectives and Policies with respect to the Near East’, Top Secret, 30 July 1954, Eisenhower Library, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948–61, OCB Central File Series, Box No. 77. Nasser was to reject this offer later in November 1954 on the grounds that, although he was anxious to obtain US equipment, he endeavoured to ‘find means of obtaining it without an agreement’. Memorandum to OCB, from OCB working group on NSC 5428, Subject: US Grant Military Assistance to Egypt, Top Secret, 21 December 1954, Eisenhower Library, White House Office NSC Staff Papers 1948–61, OCB Central Files Series, Box No. 28. Chapman-Andrews to Eden, Secret, 14 October 1953, FO 371/104194. On the relationship between Nasser and the American president and his secretary of state, see Henry William Brands Jr, ‘What Eisenhower and Dulles saw in Nasser: Personalities and Interests in US–Egyptian Relations’, American Arab Affairs, No. 17, Summer 1986. Brands concludes that the basic incompatibility of the two countries’ interests was the major determinant of their relationship, and transcended any personality clashes, for ‘had Eisenhower and Dulles been on the best of terms personally with Nasser, these policy differences would have remained, and the countries the three men represented would still have been at odds.’ In rejecting American suggestions for Egyptian membership of the proposed Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO), Nasser told Dulles that Egypt’s main concern was the British rather than the Russians saying: ‘How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about somebody who is holding a knife 5000 miles away? … We’ve never had any trouble with the Soviet Union. They have never attacked us. They have never had a base here, but the British have been here for seventy years.’ See Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London, 1972), p. 51. Eisenhower telephone conversation with Foster Dulles, Telephone Calls, April 7, 1956, Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries Series, Box No. 15. Sami al-Sulh was Riyad al-Sulh’s father’s cousin and was married to Riyad’s sister. He had been parliamentary deputy for Beirut since 1943 and, unlike his brother-in-law who was a national leader with many political con-


30.

31.

32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

37.

38.

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nections in the Arab world, Sami al-Sulh was a local boss with a Beirut based political machine that he had built over the years through services rendered to constituents as a lawyer, judge and director of Al-Makassed Charitable Society (from 1934–39). For the history of the al-Sulh family, see Michael Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840–1985 (London, 1986), pp. 57–60. This account is based on the personal recollections of Ambassador Nadim Dimechkié of Lebanon, who was a participant in the above-mentioned events. Unpublished paper presented at the ‘Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s’ at the University of Texas at Austin, September 1992. Incidentally, Lebanon’s ambassador to Baghdad at the time was the prime minister’s cousin Kazim al-Sulh, who ‘was considered to have been partly responsible for the Baghdad Pact’. Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 60. Brian Lapping, End of Empire (New York, 1985), p. 259. In June 1956, Nasser attended the Brioni conference of leaders of nonaligned countries (the most prominent leaders were Nehru and Tito), where he declared that he would work against great power rivalries in the Middle East. See P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, fourth edition (Baltimore, 1991), p. 391. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, vol. 2: Waging Peace 1956– 61 (New York, 1965), p. 20. Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (New York, 1981), p. 71. American military and financial support was given to Baghdad Pact countries, such as the purchase of ten Mark VII Centurion tanks from Britain for Iraq under the grant military assistance programme. US participation in the pact activities was limited to comment on strategic military plans prepared by the pact military council. A progress report on Middle East policy, by the Operations Coordinating Board, drew the following parameters for US policy towards the Baghdad Pact: ‘The present US policy is not to adhere to the Pact chiefly because it would handicap our continuing efforts to influence events in the area and might also attract further Soviet designs and intrigues.’ Progress Report on the Near East (NSC 5428), Top Secret, 5 April 1956, Eisenhower Library, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948–61, OCB Central File Series, Box No. 78. Department of State, The Secretary, Memorandum of Conversation with Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador, at my residence. Personal and Private, Secret, 24 December 1956, Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers 1952–59, General Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Box No. 1. Despite the Czech arms deal, both Egypt and the United States attempted to work out a modus vivendi: the Egyptians by trying to obtain aid for the

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39.

40. 41.

42. 43.

44.

45. 46. 47. 48.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s Aswan dam project; the Americans by launching a top-secret diplomatic initiative for a comprehensive Arab–Israeli agreement. It was Nasser’s rejection of the Anderson peace plan that led the USA to withdraw the offer for financing the Aswan dam as well as the administration’s realization that Nasser was his own man and an unlikely client. See H. W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The US and the Emergence of the Third World 1947– 1960 (New York, 1989), pp. 267–72. Another scholar has attributed the American withdrawal of financing the dam to Egypt’s recognition of communist China. See Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago, 1985). Report on Anglo–Lebanese Relations, by Ross, Secret, 8 December 1952, 371/ 98536. The author of the report commented: ‘The Lebanese President repeated the assurance he had given in September that the Lebanon would always cooperate with the Western powers in the event of war. The President has since offered us what amounts to a military alliance in return for cheap or free arms.’ Report on Anglo–Lebanese Relations, Comment by Bowker, Secret, 12 December 1952, FO 371/98536. The agreement terminating the Anglo–Egyptian condominium over the Sudan and preparing the country for independence was signed in February 1953, and the agreement terminating British military presence in Egypt while maintaining British access to the Suez base in wartime was signed in October 1954 after 18 months of negotiations. For the historical context of these agreements, see Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, p. 389. Barnes to Eden, Confidential, 31 March 1953, FO 371/104490. Barnes to Ross, Confidential, 22 April 1953, FO 371/104490. Chamoun expressed these views in an interview with Elizabeth Monroe of The Economist, prior to his departure for Egypt. Barnes to Eden, Confidential, 31 March 1953, FO 371/104490. Chamoun reiterated this view publicly during his interview with Elizabeth Monroe on 22 April 1953. The negotiations between the Lebanese government and the Iraq Petroleum Company are discussed in detail later in the chapter. Barnes to Eden, Confidential, 31 March 1953, FO 371/104490. Barnes to Eden, Confidential, 31 March 1953, FO 371/104490. Minute by P. M. Rhodes commenting on a report of a conversation of the British chargé d’affaires with Chamoun about Lebanese relations with the Arab states and the Western powers, in which he wrote: ‘I am afraid that we cannot put much trust in President Chamoun’s good intentions towards the West whatever he may say.’ 16 April 1953, FO 371/104490.


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49. Minute by Ross commenting on a report of a conversation of British chargé d’affaires with Chamoun about Lebanese relations with the Arab states and with the Western powers. 26 April 1953, FO 371/104490. 50. Chapman-Andrews to Eden, Secret, 14 October 1953, FO 371/104194. 51. Barnes to Eden, Confidential, 25 February 1953, FO 371/104486. 52. Middleton to Lloyd, ‘Leading Personalities in the Lebanon’, 2 May 1958, FO 371/134115. 53. ‘If I personally had a certain admiration for the British people, their statesmen, the stability and power of their democratic institutions, my line of conduct remains as it has always been, profoundly Lebanese.’ Chamoun, Crise, p. 254. 54. Scott to Lloyd, Confidential, 1 January 1956, FO 371/121605. 55. For an insider’s account of British involvement in Lebanon’s commercial airline business, see Najib Alamuddin’s The Flying Sheikh (London, 1987). Alamuddin was general manager of Middle East Airlines in 1952, then chairman and president until his retirement in 1977, when he remained member of the board of directors. 56. Chapman-Andrews to Lloyd, Confidential, 7 January 1955, FO 371/ 115723. 57. Barnes to Eden, Confidential, 25 February 1953, FO 371/104486. 58. At a conference of the US chiefs of mission in the Near East area, held at Istanbul in May 1954, the American ambassador to Lebanon, Raymond Hare, recognized that the United States had still not succeeded in recovering the losses incurred ‘when we launched too large and too hasty a program in Lebanon and talked too much about it. The economic aid agreement was stymied over the clause involving the use of US commodities in the program. Sometimes it seemed that the United States insisted on putting a bitter coating on the bonbon rather than trying to sugar coat the pill.’ Summary Record of The Conference of US Chiefs of Mission in the NEA Area Held at Istanbul May 11–14, 1954, Top Secret, Eisenhower Library, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948–61, OCB Central File Series, Box No. 77. See also Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield (New York, 1997). 59. Alamuddin represented Lebanon at an agricultural conference in the USA in October 1951 and was in contact with American aid officials that year. See Alamuddin, The Flying Sheikh, pp. 31–4. 60. Ibid., p. 34. 61. Oral History Interview with Raymond Hare, by John Luter on 28 August 1972, p. 66, OH–189, Columbia University Oral History Project, Eisenhower Library.

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62. Chargé d’affaires in Lebanon (Lobenstine) to the Department of State, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.11, 23 September 1952, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, p. 1008. 63. US chargé d’affaires in Lebanon to the Department of State, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 2 October 1952, FRUS 1952– 1954, Vol. IX, The Near and Middle East, p. 1015. 64. President Eisenhower had, in 1953, declared Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia eligible for grant military assistance, and Egypt eligible for grant military assistance limited to training. ‘Progress Report on NSC 155/1, United States Objectives and Policies with respect to the Near East’, Top Secret, 30 July 1954, Eisenhower Library, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948–1961, OCB Central File Series, Box No. 77. 65. Annex to summary record of Conference of Chiefs of Mission in the Near East Area, Istanbul, 14 May 1954; Conference Conclusions on Regional Security in the Middle East, Top Secret, p. 3, Eisenhower Library, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948–1961, OCB Central Files, Box No. 77. 66. Oral History Interview with Raymond Hare, by John Luter on 28 August 1972, p. 67, OH–189, Columbia University Oral History Project, Eisenhower Library. 67. Emmerson to Dulles, Secret, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 169, Subject: Lebanon and the Middle East, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 25 October 1955. 68. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Report No. 7286, ‘Political Trends In Lebanon’, Secret, 5 July 1956. 69. Annual Report for 1955 on the Lebanon, Confidential, 1 January 1956, FO 371/ 121605. 70. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 791, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 January 1956. 71. Heath to Dulles, No. 442, Top Secret, 17 October 1955 and Dulles to Heath, No. 649, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 28 October 1955. 72. Zisser, Lebanon, p. 119; and Johnson, Class and Client in Beirut, p. 59. 73. Dulles to Heath, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 October 1955. 74. Heath to Dulles, Confidential, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 548, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 22 March 1955, Subject: Position of Christian Phalanges on Security Pacts. Ambassador Heath noted that Pierre Gemayel’s press statement attacking neutralism and advocating an alliance with the West was a fairly accurate reflection of the views of the majority of Lebanese Christians.


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75. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 98, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 23 August 1955. 76. For the viewpoint of Karami concerning the negotiations with the IPC, see Malik F. Chehab, ‘Le Conflit entre le Liban et l’IPC’, Economie Libanaise et Arabe, Number 6, March 1956. Chehab summarizes the prime minister’s views in a press conference he gave after his resignation from office, on 27 February 1956. 77. Chamoun conveyed this perception of events to the British chargé d’affaires Ian D. Scott on 29 December 1955. Scott to Rose, Restricted, 30 December 1955, FO 371/121607. 78. Salam defended his government’s position in its conflict with the IPC in a letter sent to the London Times on 10 October 1956. The letter specifically responded to the company’s communiqué that was distributed to the Lebanese press on 3 October 1956. For the text of both documents, see Malik F. Chehab, ‘Deux Documents sur le Conflit entre Le Liban et l’Iraq Petroleum Company’, Economie Libanaise et Arabe, No. 6, November 1956. 79. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 7 February 1957, Annual Report for 1956 on events in Lebanon, FO 371/127996. 80. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1069, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 9 March 1956. 81. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1077, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 9 March 1956. 82. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1216, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 5 April 1955. 83. Diary entry 13 March 1956, Secret, Conversation with Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr and Robert Anderson (afternoon of 12 March 1956), Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries Series, Box No. 9. 84. Diary Entry 28 March 1956, Top Secret, Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries Series, Box No. 9. 85. Memorandum for the President: Near Eastern Policies, Top Secret, 28 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, DDE Diary Series, Box No. 13. 86. In 1953 US assistance to Lebanon amounted to $1.1 million and in 1954 it was $2.5 million, 1955 $4.8 million, and 1956 $2 million. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948–61, Secret, OCB Central File Series, Box No. 78. 87. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 169, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 25 October 1955. 88. Chapman-Andrews to Lloyd, Confidential, 16 February 1956, FO 371/ 121607.

4 The Impact of Regional and International Politics in Lebanon: 1956–1957 THE SUEZ CRISIS AND NASSER’S POPULIST ARABISM

In view of the impact of the Suez crisis on Lebanese–Egyptian relations in which Suez constituted a watershed, it is relevant to examine Chamoun’s handling of the crisis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Lebanese president attempted to be all things to all men, maintained friendly relations with all regional and international parties and refused Iraqi and Turkish invitations to join the Baghdad Pact announced in February of 1955. However, Chamoun’s efforts to distance himself from the effects of polarization in the Middle East were unsuccessful, for in Lebanon Nasser’s policy advocating Arab unity was not welcomed by the majority of Lebanese Christians, while it struck a responsive chord among the Muslim community. The ensuing situation threatened to upset the delicate political balance agreed upon by the leaders of the two communities in the National Pact of 1943. Developments at the international and regional level also exacerbated sectarian tension in Lebanon. With the failure of the Anderson mission, Eisenhower and Dulles began to view Nasser as an impediment to US interests in the Middle

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Impact of Regional and International Politics in Lebanon: 1956–1957 1

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East. The situation in the region deteriorated that year to end with the Suez war of October 1956 and the tripartite (Anglo–French–Israeli) 2 aggression against Egypt. The impact of the Suez crisis surpassed Egypt and extended to all of the Middle East, influencing political developments there for the next decade. The crisis also led to a shift in the influence of the powers external to the region. The demise of the old colonial powers, the British and the French, was concomitant with the enhanced role of the Americans. With the impending events at Suez about to unfold in July of 1956, Chamoun had served a little more than half his presidential term and his record of success and failure was a mixed one. In terms of the reforms he had pledged to carry out on the eve of his election, his efforts had been stifled by the dualism of Lebanese politics, which coincided with the religious divide. Hence any issue, whether trivial or of utmost importance, took on a sectarian connotation and increased the level of communal tension in the country. In general terms, his economic policy upheld that of his predecessor in the support he gave to the dominant economic class, the commercial and financial elite, and the minimal support for human resource development projects or attention to the economic development of outlying areas beyond Beirut and its environs. The position of this economic class was further enhanced by Chamoun’s deliberate policy of weakening the power of the landlords and traditional zu’ama (plural of za’im) through changes in the electoral law. The Suez crisis was a turning point in Middle East politics on several levels, not least for Lebanon. Not only did it accelerate the dissolution of colonial influence in the region, but it also fundamentally transformed the nature of the Arab–Israeli conflict and in doing so, propelled Gamal Abdel Nasser to unprecedented influence and prestige in the Arab world. Until Suez, the Egyptian–Israeli border was relatively quiet and Nasser had restricted guerrilla activities against Israel. The Suez war ‘restated the Arab Israeli problem in a new form’ from one of the return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes to a struggle for the regional balance 3 of power. Henceforth Nasser would concentrate on foreign affairs and effect a greater Egyptian involvement in the politics of its Arab neighbours with adverse effects on stability in Lebanon. The polarization of the Arab world into pro-Western and pro-Nasser camps in 1955, with the formation of the Baghdad Pact and the

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Egyptian-led Arab Tripartite Pact, increased the pressure on Lebanon to take sides. Until then Lebanon had successfully maintained a neutral position in inter-Arab affairs and its president had even mediated interArab disputes. The effect of the Suez crisis on Lebanon and on the Middle East at large was considerable, for the event magnified Nasser’s stature both at the regional and international levels. In 1958 a threemonth-long insurgency, encouraged and aided by Nasser, broke out against the government in Lebanon, while in Iraq a military-led revolution toppled the monarchy and instituted a republican regime. The impact of Suez continued to reverberate in the Arab world for years after the event. Prior to Suez and specifically until the 1954 Egyptian–British treaty, the political priority of Egypt’s leaders was to complete their country’s effective independence by ridding it of British troops that had been on Egyptian soil since 1882. While Nasser had inherited from his predecessors two key political instruments (the Arab League Charter of 1945 and the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1950) both of which provided for Egyptian primacy over the remaining Arab states, his Arab policy did not emerge as a force to be reckoned with by both regional 4 and international players until 1954. That year, Cairo’s ‘Voice of the Arabs’ radio service was expanded from half an hour to four hours a day with the declaration that ‘Cairo must always remain in the service of the Arabs and of Arabism and Islam … the Voice of the Arabs speaks for the Arabs, struggles for them and 5 expresses their unity.’ With increasing British and American pressure to promote a regional defence alliance, Egypt’s Arab policy became more aggressive in opposing these plans and Arabism became synonymous with neutralism and non-alignment. Dulles’s Northern Tier strategy (based on Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) did not aggravate Nasser as much as the British sponsored and Arab-based Baghdad Pact, which enhanced Iraq’s regional importance. Iraq was Egypt’s historic rival and after the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone it acquired greater importance as Britain’s main Arab ally and host for British military bases. Nasser’s response to the Baghdad Pact of February 1955 was the Arab Tripartite Pact announced in May, which brought together Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in a strategic alliance. Egypt’s Arab policy entailed adherence to the Arab League’s Collec-

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tive Security Pact and the repudiation of all foreign military alliances. While the Baghdad Pact alliance was formed in 1955, the Anglo–French attack on Egypt the following year sounded the death knell for Arab regimes closely allied with these countries. Within twenty months of Suez, the staunchly pro-British Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in a violent revolution that instituted the rule of army strongmen and a three-month-long rebellion was underway in Lebanon. Nasser’s bold move in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company and standing up to the British and French, the two powers with a legacy of colonialism in the Middle East, enhanced his prestige in the eyes of his fellow Arabs, many of whom held the colonial powers to blame for the loss of Palestine and other grievances affecting the Arab world. Among these was the post-First World War division of the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire into many states rather than a unified Arab entity, which many believed would restore the greatness that existed at the time of the Islamic conquests. Arab nationalism took many forms, even in Lebanon, and the idea of an Arab nation had emerged in the twentieth century with the Arab revolt of 1916 and was expressed with renewed vigour in the struggle against the colonial presence in the post-Second World War period. With the advent of Nasser and his successful revolution in 1952, which rid Egypt of the monarchy, Arab nationalism acquired a revolutionary character. Cairo radio’s ‘Voice of the Arabs’ called upon Arab peoples from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf to overthrow their reactionary rulers. It was in the aftermath of Suez that Nasser with his enhanced credibility appealed to the Arab masses, bypassing their leaders and often inciting them to subversive activity. In the midst of the Suez crisis, the British ambassador George Middleton wrote of ‘the tremendous impetus which the Nasser bandwagon has now gained … pro-Nasser sentiments are the order of the day and undoubtedly popular. Portraits of the Egyptian dictator are beginning to appear in all the shops and I should think that nearly half the taxis in Beirut also have his portrait displayed in the rear window.’ However not all Lebanese supported Nasser, and Middleton expressed Chamoun’s views when he observed: ‘The Christian element especially feels that the very existence of Lebanon as an independent State is in danger since the dividing line between pan-

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Arabism and pan-Islam is a narrow one.’ The business community, both Christian and Muslim, was another group that feared Nasser’s increasing influence in Lebanon and this included Sunni Muslim politicians such as Saeb Salam who rode Nasser’s coattails to political prominence. Salam with industrial and commercial interests of his own and that of his family had no plans to do away with Lebanon’s laissez-faire liberal economic system and replace it with Nasser’s state-controlled socialism. In his memoirs, Chamoun accused Nasser of fomenting subversive activities in Lebanon since 1955 and described the effect of these activities in a very similar vein to that of the British ambassador: ‘Since 1955, the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut was a center of subversive activity. Portraits of Gamal Abdel Nasser, distributed by the embassy appeared in shop windows and taxis in certain quarters of Beirut, Saida and Tripoli; other urban centers responded to this provocation by displaying their Lebanese emblems. The unity of the country was being deliberately 7 endangered.’ Nasser’s subversive activity in Lebanon, of which there were a number of cases involving the staff of the Egyptian embassy, was a major factor in mobilizing opposition to President Chamoun. It was after the Suez affair that Nasser launched a major propaganda campaign against the Lebanese president. This was conducted in the Egyptian press and radio and Egyptian influence was implicated in several acts of violence that occurred in Beirut. Explosives were found in the car of the Egyptian commercial counsellor in November 1956 when, in the immediate aftermath of Suez, bombs were thrown at the British and French embassies as well as at establishments such as the Banque de Syrie et du Liban, the British Bank of the Middle East, the St George Club, the British run language school at Shemlan, and IPC. On 6 November 1956 the pipeline of the IPC was dynamited at a location that was close to the company refinery at Tripoli. The pipeline had already 8 been damaged in Syria. The Egyptian assistant military attaché was also implicated in the Beirut bombings when arms and explosives were found 9 in his car on 20 November. Two days later another cache of weapons and explosives was found in the quarters of six Egyptian schoolteachers 10 in Tyre. Another arms cache was found in the Palestinian refugee camp 11 of Burj al-Barajne on 26 November. With overwhelming evidence against the Egyptians, the Egyptian ambassador ‘charged up to the Presidential palace and threatened that if


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these two attachés were declared persona non grata, Egypt would break 12 relations with Lebanon’. The Lebanese government complied and 13 censored press reports of Egyptian complicity in the bombings. Nasser’s campaign against Chamoun peaked in 1958 when Cairo’s Voice of the Arabs called upon the Lebanese people to get rid of the president, and during the week of the Iraqi revolution in July, Egypt’s foremost paper Al-Ahram went so far as to advocate assassination: ‘Chamoun will have no better fate than that of Nuri al-Sa’id or any other 14 traitor who betrayed his country.’ The Egyptian ambassador supplemented Nasser’s propaganda by holding regular meetings with members of the opposition to support and encourage them in their policy against 15 the government, particularly with respect to its foreign policy. Despite his pro-Western inclinations, Chamoun refused to join the Baghdad Pact and turned down two invitations by Turkey in January and April 1955 to align Lebanon formally with Turkey and Iraq. The second invitation was made during a visit by Chamoun and Prime Minister Sami 16 al-Sulh to Turkey. The timing of the visit coincided with the Bandung conference of non-aligned nations and, while Nasser was in Indonesia, his envoy Major Salah Salem toured Arab capitals proposing a pact to unite the armies of the Arab countries under Egyptian leadership. Despite Chamoun’s refusal to join any Western-promoted pact, his visit to Turkey was interpreted by the pro-Egyptian politicians in Lebanon as 17 a drift towards the Western camp. In this increasingly polarized atmosphere Chamoun’s balancing act became more difficult to sustain. In trying to keep Lebanon on the sidelines of regional conflict, Chamoun exercised his mediation efforts for the last time, in the midst of Anglo–French–Israeli hostilities against Egypt, which began with the Israeli attack on 29 October 1956. On 30 October, Chamoun appealed to the Arab leaders to attend a summit conference in Beirut to discuss measures to take in support of Egypt. A few days later, the British and French fleets reached Egyptian shores and their troops disembarked on 6 November. Meanwhile, on 5 November, Nasser had sent his personal envoy, the well-known journalist Mustapha Amin to meet with Chamoun and ask for his intervention with the 18 Western powers to stop the hostilities. Nasser chose Chamoun to intervene with the Western governments because of the latter’s good relations with these powers. Moreover, while

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most Arab countries had severed diplomatic ties with both or one of these countries, Chamoun refused to do so for he believed that it was more advantageous for the Arabs to maintain direct relations with the West, particularly during a crisis, rather than have to resort to third 19 party mediators. Nasser never forgave and would later condemn Chamoun for maintaining diplomatic relations with Britain and France following their invasion of Egypt, ‘The rulers of Lebanon stabbed us in the back during our time of stress, at the time when Britain, France and 20 Israel were attacking us.’ This was despite Chamoun’s appeal (in response to a request by Nasser) to the British and French governments, made in the early hours of their attack, to cease hostilities. By the time the Arab summit conference convened on 13 November, a UN-sponsored cease-fire had been implemented both in the Canal Zone and in Sinai. The conference resolution was a moderate one and did not call for severing diplomatic relations with Britain or France, in keeping with the views of Chamoun and consequently reinforcing his stance. The conference participants unanimously agreed that the UN resolutions addressing the aggression against Egypt should be implemented and also undertook to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions against the aggressors, under the provisions of Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, should they refuse to withdraw from Egyptian 21 territory. In Lebanon, opinion was divided over the issue of maintaining diplomatic ties with the Western powers. The majority of Christians opposed a policy antagonistic to the Western powers, while many Muslims advocated full support for Egypt regardless of the consequences. Subjected to pressure from Egypt, Prime Minister Abdallah al-Yafi, and minister of state for oil affairs Saeb Salam submitted their resignations to Chamoun because he had refused to sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France. Their resignation at a time of increasing popularity for Nasser enabled them to pose as champions of Arab nationalism in the 22 eyes of their Muslim constituents. A more dangerous outcome of these resignations was that they transformed what was a tense situation between the majority of the Muslims and the majority of the Christians into a serious rupture on an official level between the two factions. The president, whose position in Lebanon had been strengthened by the Arab summit conference, accepted the resignations and Yafi and


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Salam became the leading Nasserist spokesmen of the opposition that formed against Chamoun in 1957. Following these resignations on 16 November, the Egyptian radio and press began to wage a campaign against Lebanon’s president, which persisted until the end of Chamoun’s tenure. Lebanese politics had become polarized and an insurrection would break out against the government before the political situation could return to normalcy. Nasserist pressure was not confined to Lebanon, but extended to other Arab countries, most notably Jordan and Syria. In Jordan, a general election had resulted in an Arab nationalist majority in parliament and the appointment of the pro-Egyptian and anti-British government of Suleiman al-Nabulsi. His government terminated the Anglo–Jordanian treaty and the British commander of the Arab Legion Glubb Pasha had been forced to leave the country in March 1956. The following year, in April, the government and some pro-Nasser military officers were dismissed by the king as they prepared for a coup against the monarchy with the aim of joining the Syrian–Egyptian union that had been declared two months earlier. In a show of support for the Jordanian monarch, President Eisenhower ordered the Sixth Fleet into the eastern Mediterranean. Subsequent assessments have indicated that the coup was a pre-emptive one instigated by the king (with American help) 23 against his enemies who were preparing to move against him. American undercover activity was also engaged in Syria, where the attack on Suez foiled an Anglo–American–Iraqi plot to instigate a coup against the pro-Nasserist government in Damascus. The failure of the plot strengthened the pro-Egyptian Ba’th faction in Syria, for the opposition was severely purged following the discovery of the attempted 24 coup. Syria’s drift towards Egypt culminated in the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958. Regardless of the pressing motives of the Syrian leaders for unity with Egypt, the new entity seemed to Arab nationalists to be the first step towards achieving the cherished dream of one Arab nation capable of maintaining genuine independence of great power influence (the idea of neutralism) and of 25 confronting Israel among other goals. In terms of economic development, the UAR was committed to a policy of socialism, land reform, and industrialization. Reaction in Lebanon to the formation of the UAR ranged from the

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delirious to the restrained and underlined sectarian animosities exploited by Lebanese politicians for political expediency. Nasser’s popularity among the majority of Lebanese Muslims was intense. It was publicly displayed with such fervour that it promoted Chamoun as the guardian of the Christians against Nasserist threats to incorporate Lebanon into an 26 Egyptian-dominated Arab union. Ultimately, the main concern of Chamoun as well as of British and American policymakers in 1958, was the extent to which Nasser would attempt to extend his influence over Lebanon, especially in the light of the recent Egyptian union with Syria and the continued harsh rhetoric directed at Chamoun by the Egyptian media. This question will be addressed in the following chapter. The resignation of Prime Minister Yafi and Minister Salam immediately following the Arab summit conference that convened in Beirut in November 1956 was evidence of the increased polarization of internal Lebanese politics. The level of tension in the country had already led the president to declare a state of emergency on 31 October (the day the Anglo–French ultimatum to Egypt expired) and to turn over internal security to the army. The formation of a new cabinet with predominantly pro-Western members was in itself a statement of policy by President Chamoun who asked the moderate (relative to other leading Sunni politicians many of whom were pro-Nasser) Sami al-Sulh to be prime minister, and the very pro-American Charles Malik to be the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Charles Malik was a distinguished academic educated in American institutions. After earning a Ph.D. at Harvard, Malik taught philosophy for eight years at the American University of Beirut (AUB). He participated in the drawing up of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 and was Lebanon’s first envoy to the United States from 1945 until 1955. After leaving his diplomatic post in Washington DC DC, Malik returned to the academic world as dean of the graduate school at the AUB. His pro-American views as well as his reputation as a ‘world-known intellectual’ led American officials to consider him for the presidency of the university in 1956. That was a few months before his appointment as foreign minister. The president of the American University of Beirut was and to this date is an American citizen, so the consideration of Malik for the post was an exception to the norm. Although Malik did not become president of the university, the reasons given for suggesting his can-


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didacy revealed the political nature of the appointment as well as an evaluation of Malik’s importance to American policymakers. Malik’s proposed selection as president of AUB was ‘to forestall neutralist and nationalistic trends in the area which might endanger the University’. The report continued that ‘since Malik is not a good administrator, much less an experienced educational administrator, it is suggested that an American Vice President who would have these qualifications would be selected to handle the University administration and the relationships with various faculties, while Malik acted as front man in Lebanon and in 27 the US.’ While these comments provide an insight into the official American opinion of Malik’s abilities, the recommendations did not materialize, and he returned to government service with his appointment as foreign minister of Lebanon in November 1956 in the wake of the Suez war. The appointment of the 50-year-old Charles Malik to the government in 1956 was the first (and sole) cabinet post that he would hold. He directed Lebanon’s foreign affairs at a critical time as Lebanon tried to absorb the impact of both international and regional events in the 1950s. Malik’s position as foreign minister was crucial during the events in Lebanon in 1958 and his impact on Lebanon’s adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine may have been considerable in view of his extreme antipathy towards communism and Arabism and his staunchly proAmerican views. He contributed to the further polarization of Lebanese politics because of his publicly known pro-American outlook. Elected to parliament in 1957, largely due to American pressure, Malik’s presence in the legislature was uncommon in terms of compatibility with his 28 fellow deputies. His academic background and philosophic bent and manner of speaking sharply contrasted with the personalities of the party bosses and landowners who traditionally occupied the Lebanese legislature. He was in parliament but not of it and, unlike the majority of Lebanese deputies, he served only one term in that office. Charles Malik was held in high esteem by both British and American policymakers for his ability to articulate the problems of the area ‘effectively’, according to George Middleton who made the following observation in December 1956, after Malik’s appointment to the Cabinet: ‘As far as I know Charles Malek is persona gratissima in Washington and can always count on a sympathetic hearing. I believe too that he may be

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able to put across to the State Department and others some of the realities of the present situation in the Middle East more effectively than 29 any other spokesman, either Eastern or Western.’ Middleton’s favourable assessment of Malik touched on the very points (particularly his closeness to the West) that were held against the foreign minister by his Arab nationalist critics. The extent of Malik’s influence on President Chamoun’s foreign policy continues to be debatable, particularly since 30 the Malik papers are still closed to researchers. However, American policymakers perceived him to be an asset to US policy in the Middle East at the time. In February 1957, before Lebanon had formally accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, the American ambassador to Lebanon Donald Heath urged Time magazine through the State Department to carry a cover story on Charles Malik and to emphasize Lebanon’s special position in the Arab world: Malik is especially newsworthy at this time as public figure in Middle East most vocally in favour of cooperation with America and the leading Arab proponent of President Eisenhower’s proposals. He also chief source attack on Nasser-type Arab nationalists and communists. Time is well distributed in Arab world and would help our cause if Malik were leading subject of 31 an early issue. Dulles responded to Heath’s suggestion by recommending a cover story on Chamoun or on both Chamoun and Malik, and stressed the timeliness of such a story in view of the forthcoming (June) Lebanese 32 parliamentary elections. Time did not respond to either suggestion. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE: THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

After Suez, the next watershed in intra-Lebanese and Lebanese–Egyptian relations was Lebanon’s formal acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in March 1957. President Eisenhower first presented the doctrine to the 33 public in a speech to Congress on 5 January 1957. Eisenhower cited the importance of the Middle East area to national interest, emphasized the communist menace, and asked Congress for the necessary funds (up to $200 million) to enable the USA to provide economic and military assistance to those Middle Eastern countries that were threatened by


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‘International Communism’. The purpose of American assistance was outlined in President Eisenhower’s statement of policy: ‘In order to preserve the integrity and independence of nations of the Middle East the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from 34 any country controlled by International Communism.’ To clarify the purpose and limitations of the president’s policy, Secretary of State Dulles testified to the Congressional House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the resolution ‘did not authorize armed intervention in cases of subversion. Dulles made it clear that the Eisenhower Doctrine’s only safeguards against internal Communist subversion were to aid a country against outside armed attack, to arm that country’s armed forces so as to put down subversion, and to provide it with a healthy life by economic 35 assistance.’ For America’s stature in the Middle East, this declaration symbolized her assertion as the dominant Western power in the region. George Middleton concisely summed up the change in a confidential dispatch to A. D. M. Ross, the Assistant Under-Secretary, who supervised Lebanon affairs: ‘What it boils down to is that we have become very much junior partners in the Western Alliance, and in the Middle East this fact sticks 36 out a mile.’ Eisenhower perceived an urgent need to fill the power vacuum that had been left by a discredited Britain in the aftermath of the Suez affair. The House Joint Resolution 117, to ‘Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East’, was adopted by Congress and signed by the president on 9 March 1957. In expressing his satisfaction Eisenhower reiterated the purpose of the policy: ‘We had effectively obtained the consent of the Congress in proclaiming the administration’s resolve to block the Soviet Union’s march to the Mediterranean, to the Suez Canal and the pipelines, and to the underground lakes of oil which fuel the 37 homes and factories of Western Europe.’ The general objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine, like that of the Truman Doctrine formulated ten years earlier, was the containment of Soviet expansion. The policy was prompted by the need to take over this task from Britain after Suez. Although the statement of policy made before Congress on 5 January 1957 became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, it lacked the clarity and precision of the Truman Doctrine. Primarily designed for USdomestic political consumption and in order to get congressional sup-

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port for funds for economic and military assistance, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a vaguely worded statement that lent itself to various interpretations. It did not define the terms of the doctrine such as ‘international Communism’ nor did it outline the conditions under which a country could be judged to be ‘controlled by International Communism’. The new policy essentially gave the president the latitude to intervene militarily in the Middle East in the event of a crisis without having to resort to Congress. In a conversation with Lebanon’s foreign minister Charles Malik, Eisenhower explained that the underlying reason for his new Middle East policy was ‘the threat of international Communism’ and indicated his preference that the policy not be described as the Eisenhower Doctrine ‘because he wanted it known as 38 American policy for the Middle East’. The declassified American diplomatic documents all refer to the doctrine as the ‘Middle East Resolution’. Secretary of State Dulles’s description of the doctrine as ‘an attitude, a state of mind, a point of view’ indicates that the vagueness of this policy may have been intentional on the part of the American administration and that the real purpose of the policy was to send a message to the 39 Soviets to deter them from indirect aggression in the Middle East. How real was the communist threat that prompted the new initiative? In Lebanon, communism made little headway, especially when compared with its relative success in neighbouring Syria. US intelligence estimates gave the figure of $210,000 for Soviet expenditure for propaganda in Lebanon in 1955. That sum included expenditure ($150,000) on a trip to the Eastern bloc for 60 Lebanese ‘loyal Communist Party members’. As for the Lebanese Communist Party, the small scale of its activities is apparent from expenditure figures of $2500 on publications 40 and $3000 on local politics. In Syria, on the other hand, American intelligence reports emphasized the spread of communism after the fall of the anti-communist Shishakli dictatorship in February 1954 and stressed the fact that despite its small size (10,000 members) ‘the Communist Party of Syria is nevertheless the largest, best organized and best led Communist Party of the Arab world.’ That year, Syria’s Communist Party leader, Khalid Baqdash, returned from self-imposed exile and was elected to the legislature. These developments were followed a few years later by accelerated Soviet arms shipments that were often observed being unloaded at the Syrian port of


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Latakia (particularly in January 1957). Although the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties, both functioned as underground organizations, had been merged in 1951, communism in Lebanon was less successful than in Syria in gaining adherents. American intelligence assessments in the mid-1950s warned of the communist infiltration of the Syrian army as well as of the danger of a Ba’th Party takeover, which would give the communists access to power. Despite this information there was a realization among American policymakers that the communist threat was exaggerated. In January 1956, a ‘Top Secret’ Department of Defence report entitled ‘Preparation of courses of action against Communism in Syria’ presented to the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) and concluded that it is of great importance that a clear distinction be made between those Syrians who favor Communism and the USSR and those whose first loyalties lie with the Arab cause and/or Syria, as they conceive of it. In a sense, therefore, it can be said that communism per se is not the main problem facing US foreign policy in the 42 area. For most Arab Muslims the atheism of the Communist Doctrine held little appeal and the popular interest in regional politics centred on the question of Palestine and Arab nationalism as expressed by Nasser. Consequently, the Eisenhower Doctrine’s call to combat ‘the threat of international Communism’ was not well received in Damascus. The Syrians, like the Egyptians, saw the new American initiative as yet another neo-imperialist scheme to intervene in Arab affairs. In Egypt, the Communist Party was banned despite the fact that Egypt maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, its major arms supplier. The majority of the Arab countries that had just condemned the Anglo–French–Israeli aggression at Suez considered that Israel rather than the Soviet Union, which had morally supported them in November 1956, constituted the main danger to their interests. As a result, most Arab countries, especially those promoting Arab nationalism, denounced the Eisenhower Doctrine as an imperialist instrument aimed at introducing American troops into the area in order to promote American policy that was at variance with the interests of the Arab world. Nasser

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rejected the ‘power vacuum’ explanation and perceived the policy as one aimed at containing Arab nationalism rather than Soviet communism. Arab condemnation of the doctrine was by no means unanimous. Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Saudi Arabia welcomed it. To facilitate acceptance of the doctrine, Eisenhower sent a special envoy, Ambassador James Richards, former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on a Middle East tour in January 1957, to explain the benefits of the new policy and report to Eisenhower on the most effective ways of 43 implementing it. Richards met with the Lebanese president on 14 March, and two days later a joint communiqué was published announcing Lebanon’s acceptance of the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Chamoun was convinced of the necessity of accepting American economic and military aid and security guarantees, even prior 44 to his meeting with Richards. Here it is relevant to recall that Lebanon was already involved in the American Point IV assistance program that had been established in 1949, preceding the Chamoun presidency. Richards negotiated economic assistance agreements under the terms of the resolution with a number of other countries in the area: Libya, 45 Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. However, Lebanon was the only Arab country to accept the doctrine formally. This declaration was made in the joint American–Lebanese statement issued at the end of the Richards mission 46 to Lebanon, on 16 March 1957. While Lebanon was receptive to the Eisenhower Doctrine, Arab nationalists both within the country and elsewhere were opposed to the American proposals. Led by Egypt’s Nasser, Arab nationalists saw the doctrine as yet another colonialist scheme to control the area. From the perspective of Arab nationalists, the Eisenhower Doctrine failed to address the main problems of the Middle East, which were the Arab– Israeli conflict and the repatriation of the Palestinians who had become refugees after the 1948 war. American policymakers continued to see the Middle East through the cold war lens and therefore seemed to the majority of the area’s inhabitants to be oblivious to their problems. Moreover, Nasser took a hostile attitude to the new American initiative, for he perceived it to be directed at isolating Egypt and other Arab nationalist states such as Syria and to be further promoting Egypt’s rival Iraq to a position of leadership in the Arab world. For Nasser the notion of a power vacuum in the Middle East was a neo-colonialist concept that


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took little account of the area’s inhabitants and that considered the 47 region to be merely an arena for superpower rivalry. In view of the limited Soviet presence in the Middle East in 1957 and the remote possibility of aggression by a communist-controlled country, the political significance of the new American policy statement, the Eisenhower Doctrine, was in the restraint that it tried to impose on Egypt and Syria in allowing the Soviets further entry into the area. The American president and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles hoped to isolate both Egypt and Syria in the area by extending aid and protection to other countries in the Middle East. The Soviets had supplied Egypt and Syria with arms in 1955 and 1956 and with the help of the Syrian leadership they attempted to extend their influence into 48 Lebanon. Thus, in November 1956, the Syrian president Shukry alKuwatly offered Chamoun ‘all of the arms that Lebanon wanted on fifteen years’ credit, or even no payment at all, and volunteered to make 49 the initial approach himself to Bulganin if Chamoun wished’. Kuwatly’s offer was the second Soviet overture to Chamoun within one month. On 17 October 1956, the Soviet ambassador in Beirut (Kiketev) offered the Lebanese president ‘new Russian arms at a token price and with payment 50 facilities over an extended period’. The American policy to isolate Nasser backfired, for he was able to rouse the Arab masses by denouncing an American imperialism that sought to stifle the Arab nationalist cause of which he was its foremost advocate and hero. Nasser appealed to the Arab masses directly and above the heads of their leaders and often incited them to revolt against their reactionary leaders. He did this through extensive use of Cairo Radio’s Voice of the Arabs. Founded by General Neguib in 1953, the importance of this instrument was emphasized by Nasser’s foreign minister Mahmoud Riad: The transistor radio was more important than guns. Nasser sent tens of thousands of radios to the Yemen. I saw illiterate tribesmen ask for ‘the radio with Nasser’s voice’, and they would only buy it if the set was turned to the appropriate station. It would be impossible to overestimate the impact of the radio, the Voice of 51 the Arabs, in the liberation struggle.

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Nasser’s adviser, the well-known journalist Muhammad Heikal, related an incident that underlined the importance of radio broadcasts for the Egyptian leader. When asked by the UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld to curb the propaganda war against Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, Nasser responded negatively, saying: How can I reach my forces? My forces are the Arab masses. I can only reach them through my position and my principles. Egyptian newspapers are banned from entering the Lebanon and Jordan. Our embassies are besieged. The only way I can reach my people is by radio. If you ask me for radio disarmament it means that you 52 are asking me for complete disarmament. Nasser’s effective appeal to the Arab peoples put their governments on the defensive and consequently they could not openly endorse the new American policy. Nasser’s hand was strengthened with the uncovering in August 1957 of an American plot to overthrow the Syrian government, which the American administration believed was falling under Soviet influence. Although the Syrian–American crisis was defused at the international level, Nasser capitalized on the situation by landing Egyptian troops on the Syrian coast in October, ostensibly to prevent an 53 American-backed Turkish invasion of Syria. Nasser’s involvement in Syria culminated with the Syrian–Egyptian union (the United Arab Republic) in February 1958, an event that contributed to Lebanon’s political instability. Prior to the formation of the UAR, another political development that was detrimental to Lebanon’s internal political stability was Chamoun’s public acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine and his insistence on the divisive and unnecessary procedure of having the Lebanese parliament discuss it and vote on it. This development signalled a decisive break from his previous foreign policy and provided his opponents in Lebanon and abroad with a stick with which to beat the president and government. The opposition now had a rallying point, although some of Chamoun’s opponents endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine. It is relevant to recall that after Suez and Nasser’s growing popularity in the Arab world and his increased attempts to influence the foreign policy of the Arab states, Chamoun perceived that it was no longer possible for


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Lebanon to remain on the sidelines with respect to its foreign policy orientation. His appointment of Charles Malik, who was known to have pro-Western sympathies, as foreign minister in November 1956, was in 54 itself ‘a declaration of policy’. In his memoirs, Chamoun defended his decision to accept the 55 Eisenhower Doctrine and answered his critics. He dismissed both the Tripartite Declaration and the UN organization as providing inadequate guarantees for Lebanon’s security. Considering alternative guarantees for Lebanon’s security that were claimed by his opponents to be sufficient, Chamoun held the following opinion of the Tripartite Declaration: At the time of its inception in 1950, the Nasserite regime and its ambitions to dominate the Arab world had not yet seen the light of day and Communism did not constitute a menace to any Arab country. In any case the Tripartite Declaration did not provide for indirect aggression, that which comes about through subversion 56 within the victimised country. Moreover, after the Suez affair the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 was defunct. Neither did the United Nations provide adequate guarantees, for its ability to take decisive action against an aggressor nation was often paralysed by the veto power at the Security Council. As for the criticism that Lebanon was the first Arab country to subscribe to the American policy, Chamoun noted that the recently concluded agreement between the Saudi monarch and the US government was in fact if not in name a 57 variant of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In order to lessen regional tension over the new American policy, Lebanon’s foreign minister, Charles Malik, went to Cairo in January 1957 and met with Nasser to try and bridge the widening gap in the 58 foreign polices of Egypt and Lebanon. He explained Lebanon’s attitude to the Eisenhower Doctrine and ‘realized from Nasser’s reply that outstanding questions between Egypt and the United States would have to be cleared up before Egypt could pronounce upon the Eisenhower 59 Plan’. Malik then visited Rome, Paris, London, New York and Washington DC and expressed the need for the normalization of relations between Europe and the Middle East. At the UN he joined the Arab delegates in demanding sanctions against Israel pending the withdrawal

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of its troops from Gaza and Aqaba, which it had occupied during the Suez war. Malik defended Lebanon’s decision to cooperate with the USA through the Eisenhower Plan. Among Malik’s conclusions about American policy and one of which he urged the Arabs to make use of was that ‘the present American Administration is the first which seeks genuine comprehension of Arab problems and justice for their legitimate demands. This attitude might not outlast the Administration’s three-year 60 term; advantage should therefore be taken of it.’ The fervently proAmerican Malik, whose hatred of communism echoed that of Dulles, defended Lebanon’s political cooperation with the United States on several occasions, both at press conferences and in the Lebanese parliament. In view of the controversial nature of such policies in the mid-1950s (largely due to opposition by Arab nationalists to Arab association with foreign defence pacts), Malik stressed Lebanon’s importance to the United States and outlined the extensive military and economic aid that it would receive. After all, the Lebanon–Richards joint communiqué, whereby Lebanon declared adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine, enumerated the economic and military benefits that Lebanon stood to gain by accepting the doctrine. Among the potential projects that ‘might be undertaken’ were ‘worker’s housing, rural electrification, village water supply, irrigation, flood control, highway construction, and airport development. … The US government shall provide the government of Lebanon certain equipment needed to strengthen the Lebanese armed 61 forces.’ While these provisions were couched in vague terms, Malik presented to the Lebanese public the details of US aid to Lebanon in such a way as to imply that Lebanon had received a carte blanche. In a speech to parliament on Lebanese–US relations on 26 November 1957, Malik said, ‘in general terms the aid that Lebanon will receive from the US government will be in principle unlimited with respect to what 62 Lebanon is capable of absorbing.’ The operative phrase was ‘what Lebanon is capable of absorbing’, which imposed considerable limitations on the types of arms that it received. Moreover, not all of Malik’s statements were so carefully worded and he sometimes made exaggerated claims. While some American aid was forthcoming, it did not include long-range 63 guided missiles as stated by the foreign minister in his speech. Another criticism that was increasingly voiced in parliament was the meagre amount of US aid to Lebanon compared with Soviet aid to Syria


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and Egypt. This issue was raised by the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee Philip Takla immediately following Malik’s announcement to parliament that the United States had agreed to waive the counterpart requirement for its foreign aid programme. Takla said that the $10 million that Lebanon received following the Richards visit was insignificant in the present circumstances as was the news of the US waiver, for the issue at stake was the necessity of increasing the amount of aid to 64 Lebanon. Other aspects of the government’s foreign policy were questioned and, in an earlier speech to parliament, Malik replied to criticism that the Lebanese–US (Richards) communiqué only referred to communist aggression and therefore failed to protect Lebanon against the threat of Israel. He said, ‘Within 48 hours he [Malik] could get US assurance to 65 come to the defence of Lebanon in the event of any aggression.’ Malik again assured parliament that ‘while the military provisions of the Lebanese–Richards communiqué were primarily directed at defending Lebanon against a Communist threat, the US, within the framework of its international policy would help Lebanon in the event of any other 66 aggression whether it were Communist or Israeli.’ As previously mentioned, the extent of Malik’s influence in determining the direction of Lebanon’s foreign policy in 1957 and 1958 remains ambiguous, as access to Malik’s personal papers remains unavailable. However, as a newcomer to political office and with no constituency of his own, Malik owed his appointment to Chamoun and that in itself limited the extent of his influence. Chamoun’s choice of Malik as foreign minister after Suez was a clear indicator of the president’s desire for closer ties with the USA. Wilbur Eveland, a CIA agent in close contact with Chamoun in 1957 and 1958, maintained in a first-hand account of events that while Chamoun ‘wasn’t initially enthusiastic’ about Lebanon being the first country to adhere to the Eisenhower Doctrine, ‘he accepted Malik’s assurances that we [the USA] would bolster Lebanon’s 67 poorly equipped armed forces and agreed to go along’. The effect of officially accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine was detrimental for Lebanon for it further polarized the divided loyalties of the population and worsened the already strained relations with Nasser. While other pro-Western Arab countries approved of the doctrine, they did not openly accept it. Lebanon was the only Arab country to accept it

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formally and discuss it in parliament. The other pro-Western Arab countries were restrained from such a step by the popular enthusiasm for Nasser among their peoples. Nasser condemned Western security pacts and labelled Arab leaders who adhered to them as lackeys of imperialism. Despite the knowledge that a large segment of the Lebanese public supported Nasser’s Arab nationalist ideology and the more dangerous fact that the majority of Nasser’s Lebanese supporters were Muslims, Chamoun’s adherence to the American policy statement was a step that further alienated the majority of Lebanon’s Muslim population. Moreover, by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine he was accused of violating Lebanon’s National Pact of 1943. As already mentioned, the National Pact was the agreement between the Christian president and Muslim prime minister on the eve of Lebanon’s independence that neither community would resort to external alliances with their traditional protectors, the West or the Arab world, respectively. Many Muslim politicians considered Lebanon’s acceptance of the American doctrine to be a breach of the National Pact, notwithstanding hostile Nasserist propaganda and subversive activity in Lebanon and in neighbouring Arab countries such as Jordan. On another front, in Jordan, King Hussein called for American sup69 port to put down a Nasserist instigated revolt in April 1957. In keeping with his anti-Nasserist position, the Lebanese president appealed to President Eisenhower in the midst of the Jordanian crisis, to ‘save Jordan’ from ‘international communism or its puppets’ and prevent ‘a chain reaction in our area whose sombre consequences cannot be foretold’. Chamoun reminded the American president that ‘the fate of western civilization and of all that is light and truth and liberty in these parts is 70 in your hands’ and urged him to take ‘swift and decisive action’. In Lebanon, the Egyptian ambassador’s disruptive activities increased and he now met with members of the opposition on a regular basis to encourage them in their opposition to the government’s foreign policy. That he did so in such an indiscreet manner was perceived by the American embassy to be advantageous to American policy in Lebanon: Actually it has been to benefit of American policy and prestige that Egyptian Ambassador and Egyptian Embassy have been so indis-


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creet and act so arrogant in their subversive action against President and Sami Solh [sic]’s Government. It will make Christian population more than ever set against Nasserism and embarrass those who were covertly or overtly promoting Egyptian policy and 71 designs in this country. The divisive effects of these developments served to increase the polarization among Lebanon’s religious communities. The Lebanese government feared the consequences of declaring the Egyptian ambassador persona non grata, but encouraged press criticism of Abdul Hamid Ghaleb, whereby he was referred to in the local press as the ‘High 72 Commissioner’. The alienation of the Muslim community was expressed in parliament on 5 April 1957 when a vote of confidence was taken on the government’s foreign policy. The government won the vote by 30 to 1, yet seven deputies (six of whom were Muslims and among the leading politicians in the country) resigned and walked out of parliament during 73 the six-hour-long debate. This step was taken in accordance with their previously announced intentions to do so if the government called for a 74 confidence vote at that time. As the resignations occurred two months prior to the upcoming parliamentary elections they appeared to political observers to be ‘gestures to strengthen candidacies in Muslim constituencies where the American doctrine was unpopular and pro75 Communists were active’. The government held its position towards the Eisenhower Doctrine and the new cabinet headed by Sami al-Sulh in August 1957 maintained this position, insisting on Lebanon’s right ‘to pursue an independent policy that was subject to the will of the Lebanese people alone, for [as the prime minister said in his ministerial statement to parliament] 76 Lebanon did not owe its existence to anyone’. Meanwhile the political opposition to Chamoun had split over the issue of Lebanon’s foreign policy. The split occurred within the loose coalition of the amorphous opposition groups known as the National Congress of Parties. It was headed by ex-prime minister Hussein Oueini and included Kamal Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), expresident Bechara al-Khoury’s Constitutional Union Party, the Muslim nationalist ‘National Organization’ and several small leftist groups. The

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majority of Druze and Christian members of the Congress as well as the pro-Saudi Muslim leaders such as Hussein Oueini refused to oppose the American doctrine. Kamal Jumblatt, one of the main leaders of the opposition to Chamoun, issued a statement to the press on 15 April on what became known as the Lebanese–Richards communiqué in which he endorsed Lebanon’s foreign policy. The Richards Mission–Saudi communiqué and the joint Lebanese–Saudi communiqué (that condemned communism) also endorsed American foreign policy in the Middle East. During an official visit to the United States in April 1957, King Saud renewed the lease for the American air base at Dhahran for another five years. Saudi Arabia had shifted its regional alignment from Egypt and Syria to the pro-Western camp and this shift was reflected in the abovementioned position taken by Lebanese members of the opposition that were close to Saudi Arabia (such as Oueini). Meanwhile, members of the opposition formed a new coalition on 1 April, known as the National Front. The purpose was to prepare for the parliamentary elections in June. The opposition agenda of the Front was mainly directed at Chamoun’s person as well as the foreign policy direction he had pursued for Lebanon. The purpose of the Front was made clear in a 12-point resolution published following a political rally on 12 May. The resolution attacked governmental pressure and the 77 president and did not mention socio-economic grievances. The Muslim National Organization (al-Hay’a al-Wataniyya) had sometimes put forward the latter issue as a major grievance against the Lebanese state and its ‘inequitable’ allocation of resources. Demands for socioeconomic justice would resurface in 1958 and throughout the years leading up to the 1975 civil war. The opposition was clearly split among pro-Nasserists who condemned Chamoun’s foreign policy and others whose agenda was confined to domestic issues. Jumblatt refused to sign a policy statement by the newly formed National Front on the grounds that he had not been 78 consulted regarding its formation. He and other members of the opposition continued to support Chamoun’s foreign policy until June 1957 when the results of the parliamentary elections hardened their position. Jumblatt’s unexpected loss in the Shuf, which was also Chamoun’s electoral district, marked a turning point in a hitherto tense relationship. Within several days of his electoral defeat, Jumblatt


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informed the US embassy that he would ‘join the Opposition and work actively through popular agitation for the dissolution of the new parliament … and against the re-election of President Chamoun’. Jumblatt added that ‘Chamoun had used the “umbrella” of the American 79 doctrine to eliminate all his rivals from the political scene.’ The elections of June 1957 crystallized opposition to Chamoun and marked a point of no return for the leading members of the opposition, most of whom (largely due to Chamoun’s efforts) lost their seats in those elections. The fact that Chamoun engineered the defeat of a number of traditional political leaders in the 1957 elections ensured their enmity, for he had broken the cardinal rule of Lebanese politics by consensus. However, despite the adverse effects of the election results on political stability in Lebanon, polarization among the Lebanese population had 80 already occurred along religious lines prior to June 1957. That most members of the opposition National Front were Muslims was indicative of these divisions, which intensified that year and led to the outbreak of the insurrection of 1958. ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The US and the emergence of the Third World 1947–1960, p. 270. 2. Among many works dealing with the Suez crisis, see Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London, 1957) and Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson (London, 1967). For the Egyptian viewpoint by a close confidant of Nasser, see Mohamed H. Haikal, Cutting The Lion’s Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes (London, 1986). The official British view is documented by Anthony Eden’s private secretary and later head of Middle Eastern Affairs at the Foreign Office Evelyn Shuckburgh in Descent to Suez: Foreign Office Diaries 1951–1956 (London, 1986). See also Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (Vermont, 1988); Keith Kyle, The Suez Conflict: Thirty Years After (London, 1990); and Scott A. Koch, ed., CIA Cold War Records: Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950–1959 (CIA History Staff: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington DC, 1993). A reassessment of the Suez crisis by participants of all parties to the conflict, and scholars (using recently accessible archives) is presented in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds, Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford, 1989). 3. Albert Hourani, ‘Conclusion’, in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds, Suez 1956, p. 407.

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4. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945– 1958 (London, 1965), p. 194. 5. Ibid., p. 196. 6. Middleton to Ross (Foreign Office), Secret, 20 August 1956, FO 371/121607. 7. Chamoun, Crise Au Moyen Orient, p. 282. 8. The brother of Adnan Hakim, founder and leader of the pro-Egyptian alNajjade party, was implicated in these incidents, as were 12 other persons. See Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 237, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 4 December 1956. In March 1957, 20 persons were convicted and imprisoned for complicity in the bomb incidents of November 1956. Mohamed Hakim was convicted of storing explosives in his house and was given a six-month sentence. See Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 428, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 21 March 1957. 9. US Army Beirut to Secretary of State, No. CX 158, Confidential, 22 November 1956. 10. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 1331, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 23 November 1956. 11. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 237, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 4 December 1956. 12. General Fuad Chehab related this incident to American ambassador Donald Heath. See Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1315, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 23 November 1956. 13. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1315, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 23 November 1956. 14. Time, July 1958, p. 21. 15. This activity occurred prior to the parliamentary elections of 1957. 16. In his memoirs, Chamoun affirms that he informed Nasser of the Turkish proposal of January 1955 and of his response. See Chamoun, Crise, p. 272. 17. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 283. 18. Chamoun, Crise, p. 300. 19. Ibid, p. 302. 20. Excerpt from a speech by President Nasser in Cairo, 16 May 1958, in M. S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis 1958: A Documentary Study (New York, 1965), p. 101. 21. The countries represented at the conference were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The Times, 16 November 1956.


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22. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1225, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 15 November 1956. 23. For this assessment of what the author called ‘the coup that never was’, see Said K. Aburish, The St George Hotel Bar (London, 1989), pp. 65–71. 24. For an account of the plot the CIA codenamed ‘Operation WAKEFUL’, see the first-hand account of CIA operative Wilbur C. Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle East (New York, 1980), pp. 180–227. For the impact of the failed plot on Syrian politics, see Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. 263–82. See also David W. Lesch, Syria and the United States: Eisenhower’s Cold War in the Middle East (Boulder, Co., 1992). 25. Ba’th–Communist rivalry and feuding within the Syrian officer corps led to the near ‘disintegration of Syria as an organized political community’. This situation prompted Syrian leaders to induce a reluctant Nasser to agree to the federation of the two countries. For a succinct account and analysis of the events leading up to the union with Egypt, see Seale, The Struggle For Syria, pp. 307–26. 26. Although no leading Muslim politician advocated union, many Christians were convinced that Nasser planned to annex Lebanon. See the Phalange Party newspaper, Al ‘Amal, 17 June 1958. 27. Memorandum for Mr Elmer B. Staats, Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board, Washington DC, Subject: Interesting Information– American University at Beirut, 19 June 1956, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948–61, OCB Central File Series, Box No. 78, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 28. For a detailed discussion of American pressure in Malik’s election, see Chapter 5. 29. Middleton to E. M. Rose, Confidential, 27 December 1956, FO 371/121618. 30. Mr Dory Chamoun, the son of the late president Camille Chamoun, told the author that Charles Malik’s influence on the president was minimal in terms of directing Lebanon’s foreign policy during the last few years of Chamoun’s tenure. Chamoun accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine in order to contain the Arab danger that he perceived. Interview with Dory Camille Chamoun on 24 January 1993 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Nadim Dimechkié, who was Lebanon’s ambassador to the United States in 1958, holds a contrary view. Ambassador Dimechkié is of the opinion that Malik’s influence was considerable in terms of the direction of Lebanon’s foreign policy during his tenure as foreign minister and recounts an incident that illustrates Malik’s pro-Western sympathies. In 1939, while he was accompanying Malik on a drive through the Bekaa’ valley (20 miles east of Beirut), Malik turned to Dimechkié and others present and said, ‘You know

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31. 32. 33.

34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s my friends, this is the furthest east I have penetrated in my travels.’ From an unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s at the University of Texas at Austin, September 1992. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1941, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 February 1957. Dulles to Heath, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3127, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 25 February 1957. For the complete text of the Eisenhower Doctrine, see The New York Times, 6 January 1957. On the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Vol. 2: Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (New York, 1965); John DeNovo, ‘The Eisenhower Doctrine’, in Alexander DeConde, ed., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas, Vol. 1 (New York, 1978); George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, 1990), pp. 52–64; Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (Oxford, 1981); and Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York, 1969), pp. 215–16. Congressman Reuss to President Eisenhower, 7 August 1958, Central Files, Official File of 116–SS Middle East Situation, Box No. 597, Eisenhower Library. Reuss to President, 7 August 1958, Central Files, Official File of 116–SS Middle East Situation, Box No. 597, Eisenhower Library. Middleton to Ross, Personal and Confidential, 20 December 1956, FO 371/121238. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House, pp. 182–3. Memorandum of Conversation, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 6 February 1957. DeNovo, ‘The Eisenhower Doctrine’, p. 292. USIS, Beirut to USIA, Washington, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 39, Confidential, 4 November 1955. The report entitled ‘Survey of Communist Propaganda Efforts: Lebanon’ was compiled by the USIS Acting Public Affairs Officer in Beirut, Thomas C. Sorensen. The US army attaché in Damascus reported the arrival of ‘at least 4 shipments of Soviet bloc arms to Syria during January 1957’ and that the port of Latakia was ‘jammed with military supplies’. Office Memorandum, US Government, 25 January 1957, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948–61, Box No. 55, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Operations Coordinating Board, Department of Defense Contribution, ‘Preparation of Courses of Action against Communism in Syria’, Top Secret, 26 January 1956, White House Office, NSC Staff Papers 1948–61, Box No. 55, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.


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43. Richards had been appointed as special assistant to the president on 7 January 1957. 44. Chamoun, Crise, p. 363. For the text of the joint communiqué see pp. 363– 4. 45. White House Report to Congress covering activities through 30 June 1957 in furtherance of the purposes of the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, 31 July 1957. Central Files, Official File of 116–LL, Box No. 594, Eisenhower Library. 46. For the text of the joint communiqué, see Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2225, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 16 March 1957. 47. Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir, Falsafat al-Thawra (The Philosophy of the Revolution) (Cairo, 1956). See also Khutub wa Tasrihat al-Ra’is Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir (Speeches of President Nasser) (Cairo, 1959). 48. American officials sometimes reported arms deliveries at the northern Syrian port of Latakia, for example, From ARMA Lebanon to Dulles, No. CX 159, 23 November 1956. 49. Middleton to Lloyd, Secret, 17 November 1956, FO 371/121618. 50. USARMA Beirut to Dulles, No. 109, Secret, 783A.00, 30 October 1956. 51. Quoted in Lapping, End of Empire, p. 259. 52. Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London, 1972), p. 164. 53. For an account of the crisis, see Lesch, Syria and the United States. 54. Kamal Salibi, ‘The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective’, The World Today (London, Chatham House), Vol. 14, No. 9, September 1958. 55. For literature on the American side relating to events in Lebanon during this period, see Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston, 1973); Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York, 1959); and Robert W. Stookey, America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter (New York, 1975). 56. Chamoun, Crise, p. 366. 57. Ibid., pp. 365–7. The Saudi monarch visited the USA on 30 January 1957 and, for continued US military and economic aid, agreed to a five-year renewal of the lease for the US air force base at Dhahran. In 1956 Saudi Arabia had received $10.2 million in reimbursable military aid from the USA. See Progress Report on the Near East NSC 5428, Operations Coordinating Board, 5 April 1956, Top Secret, White House Office NSC Staff Papers 1948–61, OCB Central File Series, Box No. 78. 58. For the Egyptian perspective, see Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London, 1972). 59. Middleton to Lloyd, 16 March 1957, FO 371/128003.

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60. Ibid. 61. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2225, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 16 March 1957. 62. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab (Minutes of Parliament), Meeting of 26 November 1957, p. 521. 63. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 28 November 1957, FO 371/128010. 64. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab Meeting of 30 December 1957, pp. 838–42. 65. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 120, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 5 September 1957. Malik had been asked this question in parliament repeatedly, in three separate sessions. See Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab, Meetings of 6 April 1957, 29 August 1957 (meeting of Foreign Affairs Committee), and 9 September 1957. 66. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab meeting of 26 November 1957, p. 523. For the complete text of Malik’s speech see pp. 519–27. 67. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 245. Eveland’s work is to be used with caution because his material lacks documentation. However, the work is valuable as a primary source. According to former US ambassador to Lebanon Richard Parker, Eveland’s book is among the more serious publications by former intelligence agents that were in the Middle East and is more reliable than that of Miles Copeland. 68. Ambassador Nadim Dimechkié noted that the discussion of the doctrine in parliament and the consequent publicity it received were unnecessary steps taken by the Lebanese government and were detrimental to both Lebanese and American interests. The official and public debate over the doctrine gave the false impression that America sought military alliances in the Middle East. Dimechkié added that, in his handling of discussions of Eisenhower’s policy statement, Chamoun intentionally made it appear as though he were contracting treaty arrangements with the USA. From an unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s at The University of Texas at Austin, September 1992. 69. See P. J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921–1957 (New York, 1967). 70. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2540, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 24 April 1957. For the correspondence between Chamoun and Eisenhower, see also Chamoun, Crise, pp. 377–9. 71. Message Unsigned to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2455, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 April 1957. 72. The reference is to the French high commissioner during the mandate period who effectively ruled the country. and the Lebanese president at the


73.

74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

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time was often his appointee. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 487, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 18 April 1957. For the texts of Ahmad al-As’ad and Hamid Frangieh’s parliamentary statements attacking the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Mahadir Majlis alNuwwab, Meeting of 4 April 1957, pp. 916–19 and Meeting of 5 April 1957, pp. 960–68. The deputies who resigned were former premiers Abdallah al-Yafi and Rashid Karami, deputies Ahmad al-As’ad, Kamel al-As’ad, Sabri Hamade, Abdallah al-Haj and Hamid Frangieh who ran against Chamoun for the presidency in 1952 and had presidential aspirations for the forthcoming elections of 1958. See Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2415, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 6 April 1957. American Embassy, Beirut to State Department, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 475, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 April 1957. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab, 29 August 1957, p. 38. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 547, Unclassified, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 16 May 1957. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 486, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 April 1957. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3115, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 21 June 1957. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 486, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 April 1957.

5 The Parliamentary Elections of 1957 THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE LEBANESE PRESS

The year 1957 was eventful in the Arab world in terms of attempted coups, political alignments and cold war rivalry. In Jordan and Syria, the authorities put down coup attempts, and in Lebanon the gendarmerie (internal security forces) prevented pre-election demonstrations from developing into a full-blown coup against the government. At the level of political alliances, the year began with the visit of King Saud to the United States and the concomitant shift of Saudi Arabia from the Egyptian–Syrian camp to the pro-Western and specifically American side. The Saudi shift was displayed in its support of Jordan during the April 1957 crisis when King Hussein, with American assistance, successfully crushed a coup attempt by pro-Nasserist officers against his monarchy. Syria’s drift towards the Soviet Union was manifested with the signing of a Syrian–Soviet economic agreement in the summer of 1957. That year the ‘sputnik’ satellite was successfully launched and the event enhanced Soviet prestige and stepped up Soviet–American rivalry. In Lebanon, many Lebanese Muslims perceived adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine to be in violation of the National Pact. Closer public identification with American policy was detrimental to political stability because many Muslims considered that as an infringement of the pact. Moreover, it brought little tangible benefit to Lebanon with the 128

The Parliamentary Elections of 1957

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exception of a slight increase in US aid. American policymakers themselves did not agree on the interpretation of the American statement of policy as it applied to countries of the Middle East. Notwithstanding international and regional pressure on Lebanese politics ever since the events of Suez, political developments within the country in 1957 were a major cause of the outbreak of armed insurrection in May 1958. The parliamentary elections of June 1957 and the ensuing issue of Chamoun’s re-election to the presidency hardened the positions of the government and opposition forces to a point that rendered armed conflict inevitable. Both events were subject to ongoing external interference and pressure, which, to a certain extent, determined their course. Chamoun and his adversaries sought and received funds from abroad, which they used for electioneering purposes. Chamoun would not have sought re-election without initial Anglo– American support. The 1957 elections clearly show the close interaction between domestic and foreign policy in Lebanon. Although the American ambassador reported the predominance of local clan and sectarian politics during the elections with little attention to international or inter-Arab affairs, the elections were seen as a referendum for the foreign policy of the Sulh 1 government. Press articles appeared pointing out that ‘some candidates would run on the basis of the Eisenhower Doctrine and others on the 2 basis of the Abdul–Nasser Doctrine.’ The impact of the Eisenhower Doctrine on local Lebanese politics was very significant and this was largely due to the public support government officials expressed for American policy, while Nasser attacked the Doctrine and the Lebanese president for accepting it. One month prior to the elections seven opposition leaders resigned from parliament in protest against the government’s adoption of the doctrine in order to strengthen their candidacies in their constituencies where America was unpopular and Nasser was considered a hero. The first of these deputies to resign was Rashid Karami. In his electoral campaign, he urged the voters to wage war against the government and to denounce the Eisenhower Doctrine. The opposition daily Al-Siyasah reported that after Karami gave a campaign speech in Tripoli on 11 June, the crowds followed him through the streets of the city chanting: ‘Down with the Eisenhower 3 Doctrine’.

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Before reviewing the parliamentary elections in detail, a discussion of the Lebanese press and its impact on events is necessary for a better 4 understanding of Lebanese politics in the 1950s. After all, the spark that ignited the insurrection on 9 May 1958 was the assassination of Nasib al-Matni, the editor of the leftist daily newspaper Al-Telegraph. Journalists in Lebanon played a central role in Lebanese politics and some politicians such as Abdallah al-Yafi (several times prime minister), Abdallah al-Mashnouk and Ghassan Tueini owned and operated the Beirut dailies Al-Siyasah, Beirut al-Massa and Al-Nahar respectively. With the highest literacy rate in the Arab world, Beirut published more newspapers and books than any other Arab country, including Egypt. Although its population numbered less than one-tenth of Egypt’s, freedom of expression in Lebanon encouraged the proliferation of newspapers expressing a wide range of political opinion. Press freedom in Lebanon contrasted with the suppression and censorship of the media in most of the Arab world. In Egypt, Nasser subjected the press to state control. He nationalized the media, including the foremost Arab daily Al-Ahram. The latter action prompted the Lebanese pro-government press to describe Cairo’s press as ‘having become 5 another Pravda or Izvestia’. In Lebanon, on the other hand, President Chamoun passed a new press law that lifted restrictions on the press imposed by former president Khoury in 1948. Chamoun was indebted to the press for playing a major role in discrediting his predecessor and facilitating his own election to the presidency. The ensuing increase in the number of newspapers in the early 1950s was so rapid that the press syndicate requested governmental action to limit the number of new papers. There were more than 50 dailies in Beirut and, while the majority were published in Arabic, several were in French (L’Orient, Le Jour and Le Reveil) and one in English (The Daily Star). The leading dailies in the 1950s were the independent and often pro-Western Al-Nahar and Lisan al-Hal, the pro-Saudi and anti-Nasserite al-Hayat, and the Arab nationalist often anti-Western Beirut al-Massa and Al-Siyasah. Among the political parties’ publications were the Christian right-wing Phalange Party’s Al-’Amal and the Muslim Arab nationalist Najjadah Party’s Sawt 6 al-’Urubah (Voice of Arabism). The latter was first published during the


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rebellion and was a by-product of a rebel radio station also called ‘Sawt 7 al-’Urubah’ and set up by the Najjadah Party. A large number of these papers were circulated both within and outside Lebanon and concomitantly were funded by foreign groups or governments. The Lebanese press reflected the diversity of the political spectrum in the country as well as of the Arab world at large, and all major political parties had their own daily publication. The necessity of maintaining a political balance among Lebanon’s multi-confessional groups sustained the freedom of the press and accounted for the government’s reluctance to exercise censorship. However, contrary to the established norm, the government interfered with the freedom of the press as political tension in the country increased during the last two years of Chamoun’s presidency. In 1957 and 1958 the government banned Egyptian and Syrian as well as local opposition papers. The ban, announced on 8 May 1957, was for an indefinite period and the timing of one month prior to the parliamentary elections was an attempt by the government to limit the influence of the increasingly aggressive Egyptian propaganda in the June elections. Following the elections, political tension in the country was reflected in the press both in a literal and physical sense. The editors of the leftist Al-Telegraph and the pro-communist Al-Sha’b were briefly arrested on 22 July 1957 for calling for an investigation of the parliamentary elections and for Chamoun’s impeachment if he were found to have violated the constitution and resorted to fraudulent practices during the elections. A more violent action against the press was the dynamiting of the offices of the conservative anti-Egyptian Al-Hayat and its sister publication the Daily Star, on the night of 15 September 1957. The event was attributed to elements protesting against Kamel Mroué’s anti-Nasserist attitude. Later, in 1966, a member of a Nasserist organization assassinated Mroué, who was both owner and editor of the papers. The ban on foreign publications expanded to include Lebanese opposition newspapers after the armed insurrection began in May 1958. Abdallah al-Mashnouk’s Beirut al-Massa, one of the main opposition papers that had accused Chamoun of being a British intelligence agent, was banned on 19 June 1958; but Mashnouk continued to publish and circulate his paper in rebel-held areas. Other anti-government news-

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papers banned during the insurrection were Yafi’s Al-Siyasah, Al-Kifah 8 (The Struggle) and the pro-Communist Al-Sharq (The East). While opposition papers such as Al-Telegraph, Al-Siyasah and Beirut al-Massa played a prominent role in mobilizing popular Muslim public opinion against Chamoun, other moderate and conservative publications such as Al-Jarida, L’Orient and Le Jour expressed concern over the totality of the government’s victory in the 1957 parliamentary elections and attempted to resolve the 1958 conflict in a conciliatory way. Georges Naccache, Ghassan Tueini, and Pierre Gemayel, publishers of L’Orient, Al-Nahar and Al-’Amal respectively, joined the coalition known as the Third Force, which expressed its opposition to the renewal of Chamoun’s mandate yet supported his foreign policy. The two issues that dominated the parliamentary elections were the forthcoming presidential elections (with rumours that Chamoun would seek renewal) and Lebanon’s pro-Western foreign policy. Chamoun resorted to both legal and extra-legal means to ensure favourable electoral results; these included the electoral law of April 1957, expanding the parliament from 44 to 66 members, and the use of American funds to buy votes. In the former area Chamoun was personally involved in defining the numbers and areas of the electoral districts. Britain’s ambassador George Middleton acknowledged Chamoun’s expertise at manipulating the electoral rearrangements and presciently noted the possibility that ‘the opposition will be frustrated by the shaping of the 9 number and area of the constituencies’. In his memoirs Chamoun defended the electoral law of 1957 and recalled that the rearrangement of the electoral districts was in accordance with the recommendations of a two-year-old project for that purpose, which the prime Minister at the time, Abdallah Yafi, had supervised. Yafi had since then become a 10 staunch member of the opposition to the president. Chamoun had basically rearranged the constituency boundaries in order to weaken the support base of each of the prominent opposition leaders and thereby ensure their defeat. Chamoun’s personal involvement in the elections extended beyond the technical aspects of the process. In order to maximize his scope for patronage prior to the elections, Chamoun personally took over (from the municipalities) the power to appoint and remove senior officials from the municipalities and also centralized control over the expenditure


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on roads, thus excluding local dignitaries from decisions affecting the 11 expenditure of these funds. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC ELECTIONS

The extra-legal means involved the use of American funds. In January 1957, Chamoun had expressed fears that ‘Syria and Egypt would 12 undoubtedly use money and influence to get their candidates elected.’ To counter their intervention, Lebanon’s foreign minister Charles Malik asked President Eisenhower for help in the elections. In February, while on an official visit to the United States, Malik agreed with Eisenhower on the need to combat the communist incursions into Syria and Egypt and expressed the following fears about Lebanon’s future: Syria and Egypt and even Saudi Arabia were intervening in Lebanese internal affairs. They were proving especially active at the present time because of the forthcoming Lebanese Parliamentary elections. If these elections went against those Lebanese representatives who favored the West, the future of Lebanon would be affected because the Parliament would later be called upon to select a new President. Dr Malik hoped we could find 13 some way of assisting Lebanon in preventing these developments. Malik’s request for American help in order to combat the communists that were ‘endeavoring to penetrate Arab nationalism’ was reiterated in a letter from Chamoun to Eisenhower on 24 April. Chamoun urged the American president to take ‘daring and decisive action’ against the ‘hotbeds’ of communism in this region. The American ambassador to Lebanon bolstered Lebanon’s requests. Donald Heath recommended to the State Department that ‘the US authorize the use of CIA funds to oppose anticipated Egyptian and Syrian intervention in Lebanon’s 14 forthcoming parliamentary elections’. Born in Topeka, Kansas, in 1894, Donald Heath attended college in the United States and the University of Montpellier in France where he studied law. His first diplomatic post was as vice consul at Bucharest from 1921 until 1923. A long serving member of the foreign service, Heath moved on to posts in Warsaw, Berne, Port au Prince, Berlin, and Santiago. His first ambassadorship was in Cambodia and Vietnam from

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1952 until 1955. He was then appointed to Beirut for a three-year term, customary for diplomatic posts in the foreign service. His tenure in Lebanon ended in January 1958, and his request for an extension was turned down as he was transferred to Saudi Arabia where he served as 15 ambassador until 1961. While he was involved in the 1957 elections and other significant events contributing to the crisis of 1958, he was not present during the crisis that would be handled on the American side by his flamboyant successor Robert McClintock. The theme of the impending communist threat to the area and the need to counter it by supporting pro-Western regimes was a recurring one, often emphasized by Chamoun and Malik particularly when they requested military equipment for Lebanon from American and British officials. In mid-November 1956, just after the Arab summit conference had met in Beirut, Chamoun told the American ambassador that Syria’s president Kuwatly had urged him to accept Soviet arms. Chamoun believed that ‘Russia was building up stocks of armaments in Syria that might be used by Soviet volunteers at some future date.’ Chamoun concluded that the USA should immediately supply Lebanon with the 16 armaments that he had requested to purchase a year ago. He repeated this message to the British ambassador and asked for the supply of arms, ‘a few tanks and a small number of modern aircraft’. Chamoun stressed the urgency of the situation and asked if Lebanon could obtain the 17 matériel from British stocks in nearby Cyprus. Chamoun’s critics accused him of exaggerating the communist threat in order to obtain Western support for his personal ambitions. How significant was communist influence in Lebanon? The credibility of the communist threat was dubious and had even been ques18 tioned in American intelligence assessments in the 1950s. Although the Lebanese Communist Party was one of the oldest political parties in the country, it was still a fledgling organization in terms of membership and political power in 1958. Founded in 1924, it was legalized in 1936 and then banned in 1948. The Communist Party operated clandestinely until 1970 when a ministerial order legalized all banned political parties in 19 Lebanon. The appeal of the communists in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab world was limited by the rise of the Ba’thists and Nasserists to power. Unlike the ‘godless’ communists whose political allegiances extended beyond the Arab world to the Soviet Union, the Ba’thists and


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Nasserists offered the Arab masses social justice within the framework of the appealing concept of Arab nationalism. Moreover, those communists that did not flee the rule of Nasser and the Ba’th were persecuted and 20 many lost their lives, particularly in the UAR. While the communist threat to Lebanon in the 1950s (which both Chamoun and Malik reiterated) was not significant, Nasser threatened the independence of the country . The formation of the UAR had struck a responsive chord among many Lebanese, some of whom advocated that Lebanon join the UAR. In that setting, the American administration responded to Chamoun’s appeal for help in 1957 and provided secret funds to Chamoun to assist him in ensuring a favourable outcome for pro-Western candidates in the 1957 parliamentary elections. Prime Minister, Sami al-Sulh also received American funds during the 21 elections. While evidence of the American role in the elections has been revealed in details in books by former intelligence operatives such as Wilbur Eveland and Miles Copeland, official documentation of American involvement is unlikely to appear except in subtle references in documents such as the ‘Top Secret’ internal memorandum of 17 January 1958, from the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria Affairs Edward L. Waggoner to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell. The subject was the ‘forthcoming Presidential election in Lebanon’ and as he wrote of the inevitability of an American role in the upcoming election, Waggoner noted, ‘We are closely associated in the Lebanese mind with the recent Lebanese parliamentary election in which 22 we played an active role.’ British assistance to Chamoun was also forthcoming during the elections, at the urging of the British ambassador who wrote that, in order to maintain Chamoun’s friendly attitude towards Britain, ‘we must bring our weight to bear in support of the President and his followers and do 23 what we can to frustrate the activities and influence of his opposition.’ While the extent of British monetary assistance is unknown, the comment by Sir William Hayter, the Deputy Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, that ‘we were quite active during the recent elections and may need to do no less during the Presidential election’ provides clear evidence of direct British involvement in the parliamentary elections as well as a commitment (at that date) to the support of a second term for 24 Chamoun. Syrian and Egyptian assistance funds given to the Lebanese

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opposition also played a part in the parliamentary elections and will be discussed below. Lebanon’s political system lent itself to foreign interference in domestic elections both at the parliamentary and presidential level. That 25 has been an endemic theme in Lebanon’s modern history. The agenda of the Lebanese crisis of 1958 was set by regional events, on which both Chamoun and the opposition tried to capitalize. Events in Lebanon that year quickly transcended local politics and were perceived to have repercussions in the Middle East at large. Chamoun’s bid for re-election was based on British and American support, which was forthcoming until the outbreak of the insurrection on 9 May 1958. British and American interests entailed maintaining a Western-oriented Lebanon, and Chamoun had proven to be a reliable client. Moreover, failure to support Chamoun would have a demoralizing effect on America’s friends 26 in the Middle East. On the other side, the opposition sought to channel popular adulation for Nasser in order to mobilize support against Chamoun. Nasser did not hesitate to exploit the grievances of the opposition in his attempt to extend his influence over Lebanon. As mentioned above, the American response to Chamoun’s request for help in the parliamentary elections was positive and CIA agent Wilbur Eveland was sent to Beirut to deliver the money to President Chamoun personally. In Eveland’s words: Throughout the elections I traveled regularly to the presidential palace with a briefcase full of Lebanese pounds, then returned late at night to the Embassy with an empty twin case I’d carried away for Harvey Armada’s CIA finance-office people to replenish. Soon my gold DeSoto with its stark white top was a common sight outside the palace, and I proposed to Chamoun that he use an intermediary and a more remote spot. When the president insisted that he handle each transaction by himself, I reconciled myself to the probability that anybody in Lebanon who really cared would 27 have no trouble guessing precisely what I was doing. According to Eveland it was the American ambassador Donald Heath 28 who decided how this money would be used. He was ‘the overall strategist, who hoped for a 99.9 per cent pure pro-US parliament’ and


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decided that ‘the seven deputies who had resigned in protest over Lebanon’s adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine were to be defeated as 29 punishment no matter what the cost’. In a telegram to Dulles, Heath actually wrote that the results of the Beirut elections ‘should serve as a 30 lesson to such fanatic Moslems as Abdallah Mashnouk and Saeb Salam’. Eveland added that Chamoun was opposed to this strategy of defeating these candidates of political stature and instead he recommended that the funds be used to support candidates in evenly divided districts ‘where winning a hotly contested election could be important in supporting the government’s policies and a victory would be less 31 vulnerable to accusations of Chamoun’s own intervention’. Eveland’s assertion that American ambassador Donald Heath was the ‘overall strategist’ of the elections is illustrated by his account of Heath convincing Foreign Minister Charles Malik to file his candidacy half an hour prior to the deadline, disregarding the opinion of 32 Chamoun and the instructions of John Foster Dulles. Malik’s election was a clear example of overkill and a blatant indication of presidential interference, for Chamoun had to induce the popular incumbent Fuad 33 Ghosn to withdraw his candidacy in order to ensure Malik’s victory. Charles Malik did not have a constituency for he was not in a strict sense a politician. Heath perceived Malik’s presence in parliament to be an asset to US policy, for, as a member of parliament, Malik would have permanent access to a forum in which to express his proAmerican views. Another initiative that Eveland attributed to the American ambassador was the delivery of US military equipment promised to Lebanon for adhering to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The first shipment consisting of ‘37 shiny new jeeps’ arrived on the first day of the elections to be followed by a second shipment three weeks 34 later. Although US military assistance to Lebanon received much publicity as in the above-mentioned instance, the overall amount of military aid was insubstantial and did not even meet the modest requirements of the Lebanese army. The army’s commander-in-chief was General Fuad Chehab scion of an old Maronite princely family that had ruled Lebanon from the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. He was very much a Francophile, educated in Jesuit schools and French run military institutions. His wife was French and when he became president of the republic in

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1958, he relied on French advisers, particularly Louis-Joseph Lebret, a Jesuit priest, and Jean Lay, an engineer and ex-colonel in the mandate 35 administration. Chehab often expressed distaste for civilian politicians, whom he disparagingly referred to as the ‘fromagistes’ (cheese-eaters), and during his presidency he undertook policies aimed at curbing their influence. Chehab’s role during the insurrection of 1958, especially in keeping the army out of the conflict, enhanced his reputation as a fair broker, especially among Lebanon’s Muslims and ensured his election to the presidency that year. On 15 March 1957, General Fuad Chehab met with Ambassador Richards, who was on a Middle East tour, and requested arms aid for Lebanon. Chehab expressed disappointment that his request for eight aircraft, 24 tanks and a patrol boat was turned down ‘for various technical reasons’. The sum total of US military grant aid agreed upon was $4.7 million and comprised military equipment of a non-offensive 36 capacity such as radar equipment and transport vehicles. The latter arrived in Beirut just as the elections were underway. Prior delivery of American military equipment was in February 1957 and comprised 25 recoilless rifles. At that time the UK had delivered 20 Charioteer tanks 37 while France had delivered 22 AMZ tanks and 18 155-mm howitzers. Clearly the scale of US military assistance to Lebanon was not as substantial as Foreign Minister Malik claimed, and was comparable to military aid received from Britain and France. The French gave Lebanon 38 a secret grant of $4 million for tanks and guns. With respect to the parliamentary elections of June 1957, Heath’s account of events differs considerably from that of Eveland and the American ambassador gives the reader the impression that Chamoun alone decided on electoral strategy, naturally omitting mention of American funds: It appears that President Chamoun’s desire to have the Parliament filled with loyal supporters — together with an exaggerated impression of his own strength deriving from firm United States support for Lebanon’s pro-Western policies — led him temporarily to lose sight of the fact that the future of Lebanon depends upon the cooperation of the Moslem population. In short, the lure of immediate political gains seems


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to have outweighed considerations which, if followed, might 39 have provided longer term stability. Heath’s gratification at the election results is somewhat guarded and, while he notes that the position of the government would be more solid if prominent leaders such as al-As’ad and Yafi had not lost their seats, he attributes the outcome to Chamoun’s ambitions. On the eve of the elections, the opposition, provoked by Chamoun’s blatant manipulation of the electoral process, called for the resignation of the Sulh cabinet and the appointment of a neutral government to oversee the elections. Demonstrations for this purpose on May 30 40 resulted in seven deaths and forty injuries. Saeb Salam was among the injured. The demonstrators threw up barricades in the predominantly Muslim areas of Beirut and, despite having announced that the demonstration would be a peaceful one, they proceeded to stone and fire on the gendarmes who were on duty. The army was then called in to restore order to the city. Strikes were also reported in Tripoli, Sidon and Nabatieh (southern Lebanon) and demonstrations took place in the Hermel (eastern Lebanon) region. The assessment of the British ambassador underscored the gravity of the situation; ‘it was an attempt at a coup d’état, which if it had succeeded would have produced serious consequences for the future working together of the Christians and 41 Moslems in this country.’ The Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Fuad Chehab, who called in members of the opposition to ‘warn them against any further acts of violence’, made a similar assessment to that of the British ambassador saying that ‘the present situation was not an internal affair but was due to the machinations of the unholy alliance of Syria, Egypt and the Communists who were trying to overthrow Chamoun and the 42 government and the policy of cooperation with the US.’ The opposition had brought in supporters to Beirut from outlying regions and they hoped to create enough disorder to force the Sulh government to resign. However, Chehab, who would reluctantly be Lebanon’s next president, also criticized the gendarmerie and government officials for ‘abusing their authority in favour of the President’s parliamentary candidates’ and he warned of the consequences of having a ‘Parliament composed almost 43 entirely of Presidential puppets’. At this time, Lebanese, British and

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American officials were putting forward Chehab’s name as the next president of the Republic. The elections were scheduled to take place in September, and Chehab continued to reject these overtures to present himself as a presidential candidate. In September, leaders of the opposition (such as Yafi, Salam, Frangieh, As’ad, and Mashnouk) and their supporters were indicted by the public prosecutor for having attempted to carry out an armed coup d’état on 30 May, for inciting confessional struggle and for the killing of members of the security forces. While the Lebanese government did not pursue the case and bring these politicians to trial, it sought to 44 demonstrate its capability to maintain internal security. The opposition defied the government ban on demonstrations and once again the sectarian nature of the conflict became apparent in the location of the violence (in the Muslim parts of the city while the Christian areas were unaffected by the events) and the statements of opposition members. In the aftermath of the violence of 30 May, one of the leading members of the opposition and former prime minister Rashid Karami said, ‘our religion bids us to be free and sovereign, commanding and not being commanded. … We do not wish to impose upon them (the Christians) a policy they cannot accept, but by the same token we (the Muslims) do not want a policy we cannot accept to be imposed 45 upon us.’ The statement revealed the predominance of sectarian sentiment among the population and a number of opposition leaders appealed to this sentiment in order to rally support. The presence of a number of leading Christian politicians as well as the Maronite patriarch in the ranks of the opposition provided a semblance of multi sectarian opposition to the president. Nevertheless the sectarian tilt of the opposition became so clear that Hamid Frangieh, a prominent Christian who was in the ranks of the opposition, had to issue a statement ‘dissociating himself from any attacks on Lebanese foreign policy and insisting that the Opposition’s differences with the Government concerned purely internal affairs and the arrangements for the carrying 46 out of the elections’. At the popular level the majority of Christians were supportive of Chamoun while the majority of Muslims supported the opposition and identified with Egypt’s Nasser. The issue of Egypt versus America was to an extent present and was illustrated by the report that ‘it would be dangerous to be overheard speaking English in Basta,


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the most Moslem district of Beirut.’ Basta would be the headquarters of the rebels during the insurrection of 1958. After the bloody events of 30 May and the ensuing impasse, a compromise was finally reached between government and opposition forces. The agreement was brokered by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Fuad Chehab and stipulated (1) two ‘neutral’ ministers of state to be appointed to the cabinet, namely Dr Yusuf Hitti, a well-known (Maronite) physician and brother of Princeton professor Philip Hitti, and Mohammad Ali Beyhum, a political moderate from a prominent Beiruti Sunni Muslim family; (2) security forces to be placed under the supervision of General Chehab for the duration of the elections; and (3) a ministerial committee to be set up to investigate complaints pertaining to the conduct of the elections. The nature of the agreement enabled the opposition to save face and they called off the general strike. General Chehab was able to bring about this compromise because of the personal prestige he had in the country, as well as his ongoing contacts with leaders of the opposition. It was Chehab and not Chamoun who ‘played 48 the leading role’ in these above-mentioned efforts. In his memoirs, Chamoun does not acknowledge Chehab’s role in the agreement and his only reference to the agreement is ‘the appointment of two non-political ministers to the cabinet to supervise the elections as a measure to 49 appease public opinion’. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1957

The elections were held on four successive Sundays in June 1957 at the following locations: 9 June, Beirut and Bekaa’; 16 June, Mount Lebanon; 23 June; North Lebanon; and 30 June, South Lebanon. To prevent interference with the voting, the government closed the Syrian–Lebanese border. The main themes of the electoral campaign were the foreign policy of the Sulh government and the forthcoming presidential elections of 1958. The political loyalties of the candidates were split between proWestern or pro-government and pro-Nasser sentiments and popular belief among both Lebanese officials and private individuals was that the opposition was receiving ‘considerable financial assistance from Syria 50 and Egypt’. In this vein, the British ambassador wrote the following report on the eve of the elections:

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There is no doubt at all that large quantities of money and arms have been supplied to the leaders of the opposition and their supporters by the Egyptian and Syrian authorities. I have direct evidence of the arrival of a consignment of arms at the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut, delivered by a Syrian military vehicle. … We know of the sum of half a million pounds (Syrian) distributed by the Egyptians to the Opposition and their supporters. And I am reliably informed that there is now little Lebanese currency left in 51 Syria; the Lebanese money has been bought for use in Lebanon. While Syrian and Egyptian assistance was blatant, that of the Western powers was far subtler and was a well-kept secret at the time. American funding to Chamoun’s campaign became public knowledge only in 1980 with the publication of Eveland’s book. On the other hand, Syrian and Egyptian assistance to the Lebanese opposition was documented in a publication that appeared in 1962, on the eve of the break-up of the UAR. Nuhad al-Ghadri, a journalist and radio broadcaster who was close to the ruling circles in Syria especially during the period when the UAR was formed, wrote Al-Kitab al-Aswad (The Black Book). Al-Ghadri documented the repressive nature of Nasserist rule in Syria as well as Nasser’s involvement in the Lebanese insurrection of 52 1958. The Syrian government encouraged the book after secession in September 1961 when Syrian relations with Nasser were at a nadir. According to the author of Al-Kitab al-Aswad, planning for the insurrection took place in March 1958 at a secret meeting in Damascus between Nasser, ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, and Saeb Salam. Born in Hama in 1925, al-Sarraj participated in the first military coup in Syria (and incidentally in the Arab world) led by Husni al-Za’im in 1949. He was on good terms with other members of the military such as Adib Shishakli, who was Syria’s strongman after al-Za’im was overthrown. Al-Sarraj survived Shishakli’s fall from power in 1954 and maintained good relations with leading officials of the Ba’th Party. In 1955 Colonel ‘Abd alHamid al-Sarraj was appointed chief of military intelligence and he was known to be opposed to the ‘reactionary and imperialist’ regime of Iraq and devoted to the cause of Arab unity with revolutionary regimes such as Nasser’s Egypt. His main activity from 1955 to 1958 was to foil Iraqi and Western conspiracies against the Syrian regime. His ability to weather the


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many changes in Syrian leadership during the 1950s was largely due to 53 ‘his care not to identify himself with any one faction or group’. According to al-Ghadri, at the Damascus meeting al-Sarraj arranged for the assassination of Nasib al-Matni, the Lebanese editor of the leftwing daily Al-Telegraf whose death ignited the rebellion against the government. The assassins of al-Matni were never found and al-Ghadri’s account could not be substantiated. As for the financial assistance provided to the rebels, the author of AlKitab al-Aswad provides two lists of payments made by al-Sarraj and by Abdul Hamid Ghaleb to Lebanese politicians and journalists in 1958. The source of the first list was a secret report that Sarraj sent in his own handwriting to Nasser and it gives the following information on payments to Lebanese politicians (in Syrian pounds): Saeb Salam, 23 million; Kamal Jumblatt, 6 million; Adnan al-Hakim, 5 million; Rashid Karami, 7 million; Shawkat Shuqair, 3 million; Ahmad al-As’ad, 2 million; Abdallah al-Yafi, 2 million; Rashid Shihab al-Din, 1 million; Shibli al-‘Aryan, 1 million; and Abdallah al-Mashnouk, 600,000. The total sum of these payments amounted to over 50 million pounds and did not include the money made by some of the opposition leaders who sold weapons sent to them free of 54 charge. The author of Al-Kitab al-Aswad provided another list of payments, this time to Lebanese journalists. His source was a secret report by Major Husni Abdel Mejid, the top ranking official responsible for the Egyptian intelligence apparatus in Syria who was also the assistant to Marshal Abdel Hakim ‘Amer in Damascus. The discrepancy between the figures of the British embassy and those of al-Ghadri is a large one and the ideological motive for the publication of Al-Kitab al-Aswad casts some doubt on the credibility of the figure of 50 million pounds that the author claims was paid to Lebanese politicians in 1958. However, Al-Kitab al-Aswad was widely circulated in Syria and Lebanon at the time of its publication and while it is difficult to substantiate the figures quoted by al-Ghadri, Syrian and Egyptian assistance to the Lebanese opposition is confirmed by different sources involved in the events of 1958. Another figure given by a more credible source, which was even higher than that of al-Ghadri’s, was by the Lebanese commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army, who succeeded Chamoun as president in September 1958. General Fuad Chehab, who maintained a neutral position throughout the 1958 crisis, told the British

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chargé d’affaires I. D. Scott in September 1958 (at the end of the rebellion) that according to his information Syria had spent about 80 million Syrian pounds (about 8 million pounds sterling) on the Lebanese 55 rebellion. Halfway through the elections in June 1957, the two ‘neutral’ ministers of state, Dr Yusuf Hitti and Mohammad Ali Beyhum, appointed to the cabinet to supervise the electoral process, resigned stating that ‘the general atmosphere prevailing during the elections’ did not encourage them to continue their mission. While they stated that ‘from an administrative point of view the elections in Mount Lebanon were carried out in a correct manner’ the consensus of general opinion was that Chamoun had used the ‘full force of the government’s administrative machinery’ and had gerrymandered the districts to defeat his 56 opponents who had traditionally held ‘safe’ seats. The British ambassador, whose government supported Chamoun’s candidates in the elections, also reached this conclusion. While George Middleton noted that ‘the extent of the government’s victory must be taken as an indication of general approval throughout the country for the present government’s policy’, the British ambassador acknowledged that ‘there is some truth in the opposition’s accusations that the elections were 57 manipulated in favour of government candidates.’ The results of the elections in Mount Lebanon were announced on 17 June, whereby Kamal Jumblatt and all candidates of his party were defeated. Even Chamoun was reportedly shocked at Jumblatt’s defeat in Baakline in the heartland of the Druze mountain. Elections in Beirut and southern Lebanon had yielded similar results and led to the exclusion of many politically prominent personalities from parliament. The outcome of the elections represented a personal victory for Chamoun, since many of his opponents were defeated and his friends, regardless of their political importance, were elected. The fact that elections in the Bekaa’, Zahle, and north Lebanon yielded mixed results weakened the opposition’s claim that the elections had been rigged by the government. In the Bekaa’ the opposition National Front won those elections when all four of their candidates were elected. In nearby Zahle, the prime minister’s son lost to his cousin and member of the opposition, Takyeddine Sulh. The elections in north Lebanon also had mixed results for the government with eight pro-government deputies elected


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against six for the opposition. The two main opposition leaders in north Lebanon were Hamid Frangieh and Rashid Karami and both retained their parliamentary seats. In a broad sense, candidates won by narrow margins and few polled more than 75 per cent of the votes in their district. In a conversation with an American embassy official, ‘a prominent member of an opposition group expressed the opinion that had the Lebanese Government refrained from intervening in the elections, only 58 about ten more opposition candidates would have been elected.’ Tension did not subside with the end of the elections and in fact increased, particularly in the Druze area of the Shuf, which included Kamal Jumblatt’s electoral district. Chamoun’s policy in the Shouf was criticized by several prominent politicians as unwise and apt to lead to an armed insurrection in the area. In a conversation, the American ambassador, deputy and former minister Pierre Eddé criticized Chamoun’s policy in the Shuf: ‘The President’s treatment of Kamal Jumblatt had been most unwise since Jumblatt was still the most prominent member of the Druzes, who have an almost religious veneration for him. The President was allowing his personal and devoted friend, Deputy Naim Moghabghab, to insult and terrorize Druze villages 59 and residents of the Chouf district.’ Naim Moghabghab was Chamoun’s protégé and commander of the gendarmerie forces that harassed and arrested some of Jumblatt’s followers. Another prescient assessment of the situation was that of Henri Pharaon, former foreign minister and an influential politician who had tried to mediate between the government and its opponents. Pharaon told a US embassy officer that ‘he has never seen Lebanon in a more precarious state of division than it is today’. He accused Chamoun of ‘permitting his personal feud with Jumblatt to drag the country to the point where in the Chouf an armed insurrection could break out at any moment’. Pharaon added that the government must withdraw the gendarmerie forces from the Shuf as their presence was 60 only provoking unrest. As previously mentioned, the rivalry between Chamoun and Jumblatt began at the regional level, in that they both came from the Shuf moun61 tains east of Beirut. They cooperated in ousting Bechara al-Khoury but then fell apart as President Chamoun did not accommodate Jumblatt’s ambitions for power sharing. The Jumblatts had ruled in Mount Lebanon in the eighteenth century and Jumblatt’s political lineage was among the

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oldest and most established of the Lebanese families. Because he was not a Maronite, Jumblatt was not eligible for the Lebanese presidency. In his political writings, Jumblatt considered himself to be the most qualified leader of the Shuf mountain, largely because of his ancestry. Therefore Chamoun’s attempt to weaken his power base in the Shuf in 1957 was intolerable. Unlike Jumblatt, whose political legitimacy was rooted in history, Chamoun’s claim to political leadership was, in Jumblatt’s view, weak for it was based on the artificially created entity of Greater 62 Lebanon. Jumblatt considered Greater Lebanon to be a French operation for the Maronites, whose dominance of the political system he regarded as unjust. Much of his political career was devoted to attempts to change that very system that gave him much political stature and influence but 63 also deprived him of assuming the highest office in the country. Among the leading Lebanese politicians, Kamal Jumblatt had the most reformist political agenda, which he promoted through his Progressive Socialist Party (PSP (PSP). Despite his disdain for the sectarian political system in Lebanon, Jumblatt held Chamoun’s actions to be the direct cause of the insurrection; in his words he was referring to ‘Chamoun’s use of the gendarmerie as a personal force, foul play in the parliamentary elections, 64 and his attempt to strike at the nationalist zu’ama.’ The rivalry between the two leaders extended to their memoirs and while Jumblatt is critical of Chamoun’s politics in the Shuf, Chamoun described Jumblatt as having a ‘double personality’. In his memoirs, Chamoun related that on her deathbed Jumblatt’s mother beseeched him 65 to treat her son with patience for he was not a ‘normal person’. Jumblatt was given to eccentric behaviour and after the break-up of his brief marriage he would spend months in an Indian ashram meditating with his yogi mentor. In the months following the parliamentary elections, the opposition to Chamoun began to increase and encompass a broader range of personalities that had hitherto been on the sidelines or even supportive of the government. As a number of the expanded or new (mainly Christian) opposition members were pro-Western, they took care to distinguish between opposing Chamoun’s internal policy and supporting his foreign 66 policy. Among the prominent personalities that published a statement on 3 October 1957 expressing these views were former deputies Gabriel


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Murr, Yusuf Salem and Ghassan Tueini (publisher of the largest Lebanese daily, Al-Nahar), Phalangist leader Pierre Gemayel, former minister of agriculture Bahige Takieddine, and Georges Naccache, publisher of the 67 French language daily L’Orient. The distinction between Chamoun’s foreign and domestic policies was an important one because it touched one of the core grievances of some opposition leaders who claimed that Chamoun’s pro-American policy, particularly his acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, was dictated primarily by domestic political considerations. Kamal Jumblatt believed that Chamoun’s purpose for seeking American support in the parliamentary elections was to ‘hand-pick deputies who could be counted 68 upon to re-elect him to the presidency in September 1958’. Jumblatt’s assumption had some merit since according to the American diplomatic correspondence Chamoun expressly told the American ambassador that he would seek re-election only if he had American support to do so. The US embassy recognized the blurring of lines between domestic and foreign policy as it did the ‘Lebanese tendency to equate support for a given policy with support for a specific individual … and the endorsement of all their acts whether on the domestic or external scene’. This tendency was the result of the endemic weakness of Lebanese institutions and the predominant role of the traditional leader or za’im. The term za’im was originally used for feudal dignitaries in the Ottoman Empire. Arnold Hottinger concisely defined the role of the contemporary za’im in Lebanon as: ‘a political leader who possesses the support of a locally circumscribed community and who retains this support by fostering or appearing to foster the interests of as many as 69 possible from among his clientele’. In order to provide patronage for his clients, the za’im must be in office as much as possible. He is the spokesman for his community and acts as the intermediary between them and the state. A prerequisite for the za’im is that he belongs to the same religion as his clients. His position is often passed on to his descendants and consequently the za’im usually belongs to a prominent and wealthy family. In this sense, Camille Chamoun could not be classified as the traditional za’im and, while he may have used some of the political methods of the za’im, he sought to break the power of these traditional leaders in both the 1953 and 1957 parliamentary elections. The electoral reform law of 1952 increased the number of electoral

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constituencies in the country from 9 to 33, thereby decreasing the potential influence of the local regional leaders. The number of seats was reduced from 77 to 44. Despite these measures, the outcome of the 1953 election demonstrated that the traditional leaders maintained their 70 political dominance. In the 1957 elections, Chamoun resorted to a more extreme method in attempting to break the power of the zu’ama (traditional leaders) when he engineered their loss in their traditionally solid constituencies by rearranging the boundaries of their electoral constituencies. However, the outcome of the events of 1958 once again illustrated the resilience of the za’im system. Most of the zu’ama, with the exception of Sami al-Sulh, continued to play a central role in Lebanese politics, and the political careers of some (such as Saeb Salam) were even bolstered by the events of 1958. The outcome of Lebanon’s parliamentary elections in June 1957 was the hardening of the opposition against Chamoun. The election results that constituted a victory for Chamoun’s candidates gave rise to the assumption that Chamoun intended to amend the constitution (with the two-thirds majority that he now had in parliament) and seek re-election the following year. That he had such ambitions is sustained by the diplomatic documents and will be discussed in the next chapter. Chamoun’s sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections, with British and American assistance, upset the balance between the different traditional political leaderships on which Lebanon’s political system was based. Deprived of a forum to express their politics, the zu’ama who lost their seats took their political campaign against Chamoun to the street and eventually led the insurrection against the president. It must also be said that a number of those who retained their seats such as Rashid Karami were leading insurrectionists as well. The defeat of prominent political leaders in the 1957 elections brought the otherwise amorphous opposition together and hardened their commitment actively to oppose Chamoun. NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2595, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 6 June 1957. 2. Quoted in Atiyah, The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon, p. 274.


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3. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3024, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 12 June 1957. 4. For more on Beirut’s press, see Zahi N. Khuri, ‘The Lebanese Press’, Middle East Forum, February 1962, pp. 11–15. See also Nabil Dajani, ‘The Press in Lebanon’, Gazette, International Journal of the Science of the Press, 17 (1971) 3, pp. 152–74. A more recent study with statistics on the Lebanese press in the 1970s is William A. Rugh, The Arab Press (New York, 1979), pp. 91– 101. 5. The right-wing Phalange Party newspaper, Al-’Amal, made the comment on 7 May 1957. 6. Rugh, The Arab Press, p. 96. 7. For an account of the rebellion from the opposition viewpoint, see Nadia and Nawaf Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah: Asbabuha, Tatawwuruha, Haqaiquha (The Events of the Lebanese Rebellion: Its Causes, Development and Realities) (Beirut, 1959), p. 228. According to them, ‘Sawt al-’Urubah’ was the most successful of the rebel radio stations and broadcast nine hours daily. The first broadcast was made on 26 June 1958. Other similar attempts that preceded ‘Sawt al-’Urubah’ were the short-lived ‘Mish’al’ (The Torch) radio broadcast in Beirut and ‘Radio Free Lebanon’ in northern Lebanon. 8. For a description, from the perspective of the opposition, of the government’s violation of the freedom of the press, see Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, pp. 257–8. 9. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 27 February 1957, FO 371/127999. 10. Chamoun, Crise, p. 380. 11. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 27 February 1957, FO 371/127999. 12. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 1716, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 15 January 1957. 13 Memorandum of Conversation, The Lebanese Foreign Minister’s call on the President, 6 February 1957, Central Files, Official File of 196–C, Box No. 880, Eisenhower Library. 14. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 248. 15. For a biographical summary of Donald Heath’s career, see Who’s Who in America, 37th edition, 1972–1973, Vol. 2 (Chicago, 1973), p. 1383. 16. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1281, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 19 November 1956. 17. Middleton to Lloyd, Secret, 17 November 1956, FO 371/121618. 18. See the discussion of this point in Chapter 4 19. The Lebanese Communist Party, Arab World File (Fiches du Monde Arabe), I–L 51 (Beirut, 1976). On the Communist Party in Lebanon, see also Sami

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20.

21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s Ayyub, Al-Hizb al-Shuyu’i fi Suriuyya wa Lubnan: 1922–1958 (The Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon: 1922–1958) (Beirut, 1959) and Michel Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon (New York, 1967). Farjallah Hilu, one of the leaders of the Syrian Communist Party, who stayed in the country after the declaration of the Egyptian–Syrian union died in a Syrian gaol. At the time, Nasser denied in a press conference any knowledge of his whereabouts. See Nuhad al-Ghadri, Al-Kitab al-Aswad (The Black Book) (Damascus, 1961), pp. 94–6; and Seale, The Struggle for Syria, p. 160. CIA agent Wilbur Crane Eveland was sent to Beirut as a special representative of CIA Director Allen Dulles and he saw the Lebanese president on a regular basis, bypassing the diplomatic channels of the American embassy. Eveland gave a detailed account of the use of American funds during the parliamentary elections in Ropes of Sand, pp. 250–2 and 256. Memorandum from the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria Affairs [Waggoner] to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs [Rockwell], Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 January 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XI, pp. 5–7. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 27 February 1957, FO 371/127999. Minute by Hayter, 20 December 1957, FO 371/128000. For an examination of the historical record related to this theme, see Marwan Buheiry, ‘External Interventions and Internal Wars in Lebanon: 1770–1982’, in Lawrence I. Conrad, ed. The Formation and Perception of The Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry (Princeton, 1989). McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3674, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 4 May 1958, FRUS, 1958– 1960, Vol. XI, pp. 28–30. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 252. According to Miles Copeland, also with the CIA, Eveland was sent to Beirut as ‘a special White House emissary to keep in touch with President Chamoun in following up the Eisenhower Doctrine agreement and according to an undisclosed source, to act as a sort of balance to Ambassador McClintock’. See Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York, 1969), pp. 230–1. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 250. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2988, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 10 June 1957. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 250.


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32. From Heath’s perspective, Malik’s candidacy was important enough to warrant a telegram to Dulles informing him of the last minute registration of the candidacy just before the deadline two weeks prior to the election in north Lebanon. See Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3054, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 15 June 1957. 33. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2917, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 3 June 1957. 34. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp. 252–3. 35. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 303. 36. Office of the Army Attaché, American Embassy, Beirut (Colonel Robert C. Works) to Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army A– 27–57, OARMA A/A, Secret, 18 March 1957, Military Grant Aid for Lebanon. 37. US Army Attaché, Beirut (Colonel Robert C. Works) to Department of the Army, Staff Communications Office, Washington DC, CX 10, Secret, 8 February 1957. 38. US Army, Beirut, to Department of Army, Staff Communications Office, Washington DC, CX 13, Confidential, 5 March 1957. 39. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 22, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 July 1957. 40. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2886, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 31 May 1957. 41. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 5 June 1957, FO 371/127999. 42. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2899, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 1 June 1957. 43. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2899, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 1 June 1957. 44. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 155, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 26 September 1957. 45. Atiyah, The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon, p. 272. 46. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 5 June 1957, FO 371/127999. 47. The secretary of the prime minister related this fact to the American ambassador. See Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2902, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 1 June 1957. 48. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 5 June 1957, FO 371/127999. 49. Chamoun, Crise, p. 383. 50. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 584, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 29 May 1957 and Heath to

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51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64.

65. 66.

67. 68.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 619, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 June 1957. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 5 June 1957, FO 371/127999. Al-Ghadri, Al-Kitab al-Aswad. On the events of 1958, see pp. 54–64. For a biographical summary of al-Sarraj’s career, see Seale, The Struggle For Syria, pp. 244–5. Al-Ghadri, Al-Kitab al-Aswad, pp. 59–61. Scott to Lloyd, Confidential, 2 September 1958, FO 371/134133. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 624, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 22 June 1957. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 31 June 1958, FO 371/127999. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 22, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 July 1957. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 129, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 12 September 1957. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 562, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 28 August 1957. For the above-mentioned discussion of the personal feud between Chamoun and Jumblatt, see Chapter 2. For an analysis of Kamal Jumblatt and aspects of his political career, see Farid al-Khazen, ‘Kamal Jumblatt, The Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1988, pp. 178–205. For Jumblatt’s views on the Lebanese state and the historic role of his family, see Joumblatt, I Speak for Lebanon, pp. 26–39. For Jumblatt’s account of the events leading up to the crisis of 1958 see Kamal Jumblatt, Haqiqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyya (The Truth about the Lebanese Revolution) (Beirut, 1959), p. 115. Chamoun, Crise, p. 392. According to Lebanon’s foremost historian, Kamal Salibi, who lived through the events of the 1950s, the Christian leaders of the opposition’s National Front ‘were not supported by their followers, who remained faithful to Chamoun. The overwhelming majority of Christians came to regard Chamoun, along with Sulh and Malik, as the mainstay of Lebanon’s independence, as did all other ‘Loyalists’, regardless of previous political colour. Kamal Salibi, ‘The Lebanese Crisis in Perspective’, The World Today, Vol. 14, No. 9, September 1958 (London, Chatham House), p. 378. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1009, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 4 October 1957. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 637, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 6 September 1957.


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69. Arnold Hottinger, ‘Zu’ama in Historical Perspective’, in Leonard Binder ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York, 1966), p. 85. 70. For a discussion of the 1953 parliamentary elections see Clyde G. Hess and Herbert L. Bodman, ‘Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, 1954.

6 From the Formation of the UAR to the Insurrection in Lebanon THE IMPACT OF THE UAR ON LEBANON

The union of Syria and Egypt, announced to the world on 1 February 1958 as the United Arab Republic (UAR), was the second regional event to polarize the Lebanese population in the 1950s and to widen the rift that had begun with Suez. While the internal causes of division have been previously mentioned (such as the elections of 1957), the formation of the UAR marked the peak of enthusiasm expressed by Lebanese Muslims towards Gamal Abdel Nasser as well as their concomitant alienation with the Christian-dominated state. For Nasser, the union constituted recognition of his predominance in the Arab world. Just as the Syrians had looked to Nasser for a solution to their internal troubles, so too would Lebanon’s Muslims, although they would 1 not go as far as their Syrian neighbours. The leaders of the insurrection closely identified with Nasser. The extent of Nasser’s influence in both encouraging and ending the rebellion in Lebanon is a central theme in any discussion of the Lebanese crisis of 1958. To what extent was the insurrection fomented from abroad? Were domestic grievances, particularly the issue of Chamoun’s re-election, sufficient to instigate the rebellion? Reaction in Lebanon to the formation of the UAR ranged from the 154

From the Formation of the UAR to the Insurrection in Lebanon

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delirious to the restrained and underscored sectarian animosities, which were exploited by Lebanese politicians. The Lebanese government extended de jure recognition to the UAR on 21 February 1958. Prior to that date popular reaction to the UAR was expressed in the streets of Beirut and other cities. Demonstrations took place in Beirut, Tyre, and Tripoli where pro-union slogans were accompanied by denunciations of 2 American policy. The mob clamoured for Lebanon to join the union immediately shouting: ‘Al-sha’b al-Lubnani al-tha’ir badduh al-wihdah ‘ajil ‘ajil’ (The Lebanese people in revolt want the union right away! Right 3 away!). Al-Makassed (the Muslim benevolent society, which operated a number of schools and orphanages) declared 1 February to be a national holiday and sent a cable of congratulations to the leaders of the UAR 4 expressing willingness to join the union: ‘Today is our small feast with the birth of the United Arab Republic. Tomorrow we will have the big feast when the overall union of the Arab nation is realized. … The students of al-Makased al-Islamiyya in Beirut … are soldiers ready to 5 serve this young republic.’ According to Desmond Stewart who was director of the English programme at the Al-Makassed in the late 1950s, ‘the mentality of the Maqassid teachers and their pupils was that of the new Arab nationalism. Every classroom had its portrait of Nasser, never 6 of Chamoun’. These sentiments were also voiced by Muslim leaders whose expressions of support for the UAR and aspirations to join were perceived by the majority of Lebanon’s Christians as expressions of disloyalty to Lebanon. Muslim leaders such as Salam, Yafi, and Karami visited Cairo and Damascus in the first week of February to extend their congratulations to Nasser and al-Kuwatly. For Lebanon’s Christians, the threat of being submerged in a larger predominantly Muslim entity seemed very real after the formation of the UAR and the jubilation expressed by Lebanon’s Muslims for the UAR. When Nasser came to Damascus on 24 February to visit the northern province of the UAR (which incidentally he had never seen before), tens of thousands of predominantly Muslim Lebanese as well as prominent opposition leaders streamed across the border to welcome him, chanting ‘to Damascus to Gamal!’ Lebanese security officials at the Lebanese– Syrian border estimated that 65,000 Lebanese crossed to Damascus during the first week of Nasser’s visit, compared with the regular border traffic of between 2000 and 4000. Arab nationalist papers reported a

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figure of hundreds of thousands. Nasser’s popularity among Lebanese Muslims was intense and publicly displayed with such fervour that Lebanon’s Christians feared Lebanon would become incorporated into the Egyptian-dominated UAR and they reacted by promoting Chamoun to the role of guardian of Lebanon’s independence. The speeches made in Damascus by leaders of the opposition heightened these fears. While no Muslim leader, with the exception of Adnan al-Hakim of the Najjade party publicly advocated adherence to the UAR, several leaders implied 8 that they would favour such an outcome in the future. On 9 February, the Syrian president Shukry al-Kuwatly invited Lebanon to join the UAR 9 ‘whenever she may so desire’. In a short balcony speech in the presence of Nasser, the speaker of parliament Adel Osseiran spoke of the Arab Union and said, ‘Sooner or later Lebanon will join the Arab caravan.’ Later, at a press conference in Beirut, Osseiran denied that he favoured Lebanon’s adherence to the 10 UAR and said that his remarks had been ‘misinterpreted’. Osseiran would again make similar pro-UAR statements while vacationing in Cairo in late April. There he was quoted by the Middle East News Agency as saying: ‘It is in Lebanon’s interests to join a union of Arab states. Lebanon wants even more than that. The day will come when everything will be fulfilled. The rise of the UAR was the aim of the Leb11 anese people.’ Osseiran’s unionist sympathies predated the formation of the UAR. In 1943, when discussions were held in Arab capitals for the establishment of the Arab League, Osseiran together with Abdul Hamid Karami (a prominent politician and the father of Rashid Karami) urged the then presidential contender Bechara al-Khoury to unify the Syrian and Lebanese flags, armies and diplomatic representation. Al-Khoury categorically refused but maintained his willingness to cooperate with 12 the Arab countries short of such measures for political unity. Former prime minister and one of the prominent leaders of the opposition, Rashid Karami publicly stated that Lebanon’s hesitation and reluctance to join the UAR was temporary. A more moderate statement made to Cairo’s Al-Ahram and reprinted by all Beirut’s newspapers was that of another former prime minister and opposition leader Saeb Salam who said that ‘in welcoming the union the Lebanese see in it a guarantee for the existence of Lebanon which all Arabs agree to regard as a national necessity’. As if to reassure Lebanon’s Christians, Salam added that he


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would not agree that others drag Lebanon into a union that was not 13 approved by all the Lebanese. Whatever grievances they held against the present political system, most opposition leaders realized that any prominence and recognition they had within the context of the Lebanese polity would be severely diluted in an Egyptian-dominated UAR. The benefits of union did not warrant the payment of such a heavy price as Syria’s unionist politicians 14 would soon find out. The secretary general of the Muslim National Organization, Abdul Wahab al-Rifa’i, expressed the views of mainstream Muslims, ‘While the United Arab Republic strongly appeals to their emotions … the majority of Lebanese Muslims recognize the advantages to be derived from cooperation with the Christian elements of the population and from maintenance of the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon.’ Rifa’i added that ‘most of the Muslim leaders including Yafi and Salam were not sincere in that their positions did not represent their personal convictions, and they used extremist support from whatever 15 source to further their personal ambitions.’ Lebanon’s pro-Nasser politicians faced the predicament of having to tow the line of their constituents who were ardent supporters of Nasser. In doing so, the Lebanese leaders abdicated their independence in decision-making, as they increasingly owed their popularity, among their constituents, to identification with Nasser. Consequently, the Egyptian leader’s influence among the Muslims of Lebanon — both at the popular and leadership 16 levels — grew by the day. As previously discussed, Nasser’s visit to Damascus on 24 February was celebrated by the majority of Lebanese Muslims both at the popular and leadership levels, with expressions of allegiance to both the UAR and Nasser. Britain’s ambassador to Lebanon Sir George Middleton reported on the tense atmosphere in the light of the formation of the UAR: The past month has seen many changes; above all it has brought Abdel-Nasser to within some fifty kilometers of Beirut, thus quickening the spirit of the Moslem population of the Lebanon, of whom probably eighty-five per cent must be counted as ardent supporters of the United Arab Republic … demonstrations have taken place in all the principal towns, with the crescent and the

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stars fluttering at the head of all the processions, and the cedar tree never in sight. The Damascus road teemed with bus and carloads of congratulatory delegations. … On the other side the supporters of M. Chamoun are beginning to demonstrate on their own account and to hang illuminated photographs of him across 17 the streets. Nasser’s popularity among the majority of Lebanese Muslims was intense, as witnessed by public displays of support for the Arab leader. During the months of February and March 1958, the level of tension steadily rose as pro-UAR and pro-Chamoun demonstrations became more frequent. In the southern city of Tyre, three pro-UAR demonstrators trampled the Lebanese flag and were sentenced to gaol. The incident generated a heated debate in parliament and further demonstrations protesting against the sentences. Elsewhere in Lebanon, particularly in the constituencies of the parliamentary candidates defeated in the 1957 elections, violence was commonplace. In Kamal Jumblatt’s fiefdom in the Shuf, pitched battles took place between Jumblatt’s men and those of the gendarmerie. In one of these clashes on 10 April, three persons were killed and 31 were arrested. The gendarmerie had closed in on an arms-smuggling operation by Jumblatt’s men at dawn and at the end of the day ‘28 rifles of Czech and Belgian make with Egyptian Army markings and explosives had 18 been seized’. Jumblatt protested to Chamoun about the arming of Christians in the Shuf by his protégé deputy Naim Moghabghab. Although no leading Muslim politician formally advocated that Lebanon join the UAR, many Christians were convinced that Nasser, with the cooperation of his Lebanese supporters, planned to annex 19 Lebanon. Such fears were probably exaggerated for, in the case of neighbouring Syria, Nasser did not initiate union but was persuaded by Syrian politicians for their own reasons. Nasser’s declared objective was 20 to bring about Arab solidarity rather than political union. This implied control of the foreign policies of Arab countries and not formal and direct control of their governments. Moreover, in a special message to the Maronite patriarch, who was opposed to Chamoun’s internal policies, Nasser gave assurances that ‘he did not wish to annex the 21 Lebanon to the UAR’.


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However, in view of the extent of enthusiasm in Lebanon for Nasser, Lebanese officials remained anxious about Nasser’s intentions towards their country. Foreign Minister Charles Malik expressed Lebanon’s concerns to the ambassadors of the USA, Britain and France and asked for their ‘formal assurances of intention to help Lebanon maintain its independence’. The Lebanese government feared that Nasser, who in a speech on 10 March had offered to come to the aid of Lebanon or Jordan if Israel attacked them, would fabricate a border incident and then proceed to occupy these countries on the pretext of ‘rescuing’ them from 22 Israeli ‘aggression’. In this context and as a means of safeguarding Lebanon’s independence, Foreign Minister Charles Malik suggested in a conversation with the American ambassador that Lebanon establish consular representation in the Syrian part of the UAR and that consulates be 23 set up at Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Latakia. Nothing came of Malik’s project and, as Lebanon and Syria did not have embassy representation, the Egyptian ambassador in Beirut became the chief UAR representative to Lebanon. Robert Mills McClintock had replaced Donald Heath in January 1958 as US ambassador to Lebanon. Heath had served the customary three-year tenure at his Lebanon post and was transferred to Saudi Arabia. Like his predecessor, McClintock was a foreign service officer. Born in 1909, he attended Stanford University and pursued higher degrees in Geneva, Switzerland. His diplomatic career included posts in Panama, Japan, Chile, Finland, Poland, Egypt, Cambodia, Lebanon, India, Argentina, Venezuela, as well as the United Nations. His first ambassadorship was to Cambodia from 1954 until 1956. He served as ambassador to Lebanon from 1958 until 1961 and was described by 24 colleagues as flamboyant, yet capable. Prior to his Lebanon assignment, McClintock had served in one Arab country that was Egypt 25 where he was Deputy Chief of Mission from 1952 until 1953. The revolution had just taken place in 1952 and the Free Officers were ruling the country. McClintock was therefore personally acquainted with Nasser from those days and knowledge of this fact made him suspect in the eyes of Chamoun, for Chamoun believed that 26 McClintock was sympathetic to Nasser. This belief was undoubtedly reinforced by the American policy decision to withdraw support for Chamoun’s re-election and to promote Chehab’s candidacy.

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Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s THE ISSUE OF CHAMOUN’S RE-ELECTION

The re-election issue was one of the main grievances of the amorphous opposition and in fact was an issue that brought together politicians that otherwise had very little in common. On 17 and 27 January 1958, the Third Force and the National Front respectively made statements opposing the renewal of Chamoun’s term of office. The declaration of Lebanon’s major opposition group was made in stronger language than that of the predominantly Christian Third Force that attempted to mediate between government and opposition. Former prime minister Yafi read the statement of the National Front that ‘asserted that the President had forced the Front to choose between Camille Chamoun and Lebanon and 27 that the Front’s natural choice was Lebanon’. Yafi did not announce the Front’s candidate, who remained unclear after the Front’s potential 28 candidate Hamid Frangieh had had a severe stroke in October 1957. Abdallah al-Yafi was a leading Beiruti politician and member of the opposition to Chamoun. Born in 1901 in Beirut, al-Yafi studied law at the Jesuit University and then at the Sorbonne in Paris. He was first elected deputy for Beirut in 1932 and his first of many tenures as prime minister was from 1938 until 1939. During the Chamoun presidency he was called to form the government on four separate occasions, all before the Suez crisis. Prime Minister al-Yafi resigned in November 1956 in protest at the president’s handling of the Suez crisis and what he perceived was insufficient support for Egypt at that time. Together with Saeb Salam and Rashid Karami, Abdallah al-Yafi was one of the main figures leading the opposition to President Chamoun in the period after 29 Suez and until the outbreak of rebellion in Lebanon in May 1958. On 27 March 1958 an expanded meeting of 80 Christian and Muslim personalities took place at the home of former foreign minister and leader of the Third Force Henri Pharaon. The meeting brought together members of the Third Force, the National Front, PSP president Kamal Jumblatt and other prominent Lebanese. At the end of the meeting all the attendees signed a resolution that supported the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and called for united efforts to oppose the renewal of Chamoun’s presidency. The extensive participation at the meeting was to show that parliament, which had a majority of proChamoun deputies, did not really represent the people. In order to be re-elected, Chamoun had to amend the constitution to


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remove the provision that the president may be re-elected only after an interval of six years. His predecessor Bechara al-Khoury had done so successfully and, although he was forced to resign halfway through his second term, he had shown that with a favourable parliament it could be done. The meeting held at Pharaon’s home was reminiscent of the meetings held in 1952 to unseat Bechara al-Khoury at which Chamoun had been one of the most active participants. While Chamoun never publicly stated that he sought re-election to the presidency, rumours of his intent to do so began to circulate in the wake of the 1957 parliamentary elections. The opposition claimed that Chamoun had influenced the outcome of the elections in order to ensure a two-thirds majority in parliament to enable him to amend the constitution. The election results secured that outcome and proChamoun deputies made statements to the fact that they carried enough votes to effect a constitutional amendment in parliament. Moreover, although Chamoun never declared his intention to seek the presidency again, he refused publicly to deny prevalent rumours that he indeed intended to seek re-election. He also made statements that ‘although he was, in principle, opposed to an amendment of the Constitution, he would reconsider his position if no candidate who he thought capable of 30 assuring the continuity of his policy emerged.’ In another move that reinforced rumours of re-election, the Sulh cabinet for no crucial reason resigned on 12 March, and the outgoing prime minister was asked to form a new cabinet. Popularly termed ‘the re-election cabinet’ and with 14 ministers, the new government was the largest formed during Chamoun’s tenure. It did not include any members of the opposition but broadened its parliamentary base by including deputies from the National Bloc (Pierre Eddé) and the Phalange Party (Joseph Chader). The latter move was important for ensuring a majority in parliament, should Chamoun decide to amend the constitution. On 25 March, the newly formed government presented its political platform in parliament as it submitted to a vote of confidence. The prime minister’s statement emphasized the importance of preserving Lebanon’s independence and preventing foreign interference in the country’s internal affairs. He also vowed to maintain internal stability and security and firmly deal with all troublemakers who sought to create chaos in the country. Sulh then outlined the various projects that his government

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planned to undertake. The statement did not mention the Eisenhower Doctrine or the United States and Sulh tried to project Lebanon as being 31 neutral in the context of the cold war alignments. In the wake of the formation of the UAR the government had avoided public statements referring to association with the United States. American policymakers were also concerned with these developments particularly with the growing unpopularity of Charles Malik and they feared a consequent 32 setback to American prestige and influence. The formation of the UAR had brought about expressions of anti-American sentiment with a corresponding desire on the part of many Muslims for closer ties with their Arab neighbours. In the debate that followed Sulh’s speech, the prime minister and foreign minister were criticized for failing to adopt a more friendly attitude towards the UAR. Malik was criticized for not having personally led the official congratulatory delegation to the newly formed republic. During the ongoing debate the following day, the issue of Chamoun’s renewal of office was brought up for the first time on the parliament floor. Rashid Karami raised the issue stating that re-election was the 33 underlying motive for the 14-man government. Sabri Hamade, a second prominent leader of the opposition, reiterated Karami’s statement, at 34 which point another deputy proposed that the debate be closed. A vote was taken and the government obtained the confidence of parliament with 38 votes in favour and 15 against. The month of March was one of rising internal tension, which eventually broke out into violence starting in areas outside Beirut such as Tripoli and Tyre. During the second week of March a number of proChamoun demonstrations took place in the predominantly Christian quarters of Beirut. Simultaneously, ‘icon like’ pictures of Chamoun 35 framed with light bulbs appeared on the streets of the city. These events elicited protests from Muslim political groups against what they called ‘provocative demonstrations’ and they demanded the removal of 36 Chamoun’s pictures. The minister of interior responded by banning all political demonstrations and ordering the removal of all pictures of politicians within 48 hours. However, both Christians and Muslims ignored the decree he issued to this effect; they held more demonstrations and, in Tripoli, on 18 March demonstrators clashed with gendarmes who were trying to remove posters of Nasser.


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Ten days later a clash occurred between security forces and demonstrators in Tyre and the army was brought in to control the escalating situation. The demonstrators were protesting against the gaol sentences of the persons who had trampled on the Lebanese flag during a pro-UAR rally in Tyre in February. In an escalation of violence in Tyre on 2 April, five demonstrators were killed and twelve were injured. The neighbouring city of Saida joined the ongoing strike in Tyre. Opposition leaders such as Karami and al-Yafi expressed support for the people of Tyre and criticized the authorities for their handling of the situation. Abdallah al-Yafi later confirmed to the American ambassador that the escalation of violence in Tyre was an attempt on the part of the opposition to ‘discredit the authorities and prove that the deputies 37 elected from Tyre in June 1957 do not truly represent the people’. Despite the above-mentioned political moves, which reinforced rumours that Chamoun sought re-election, the president never publicly stated any intent to renew his tenure. However, at the diplomatic level, the documents present a picture of a president who very much sought re-election and tapped all the possible channels in order to obtain the 38 support of the powers that mattered in order to ensure success. In December 1957, Chamoun sounded out the British and American 39 ambassadors as to whether they would support his bid for re-election. On 24 March 1958, Malik pressed McClintock to support Chamoun’s re-election and he outlined Chamoun’s re-election strategy to appease 40 the opposition. On 13 April, Chamoun told Iraq’s deputy prime 41 minister Taufiq Suwaidi that he intended to seek re-election. On 7 May 1958, American ambassador McClintock sent a Top Secret cable to Secretary of State Dulles in which he reported Chamoun’s intent to seek re-election and the American assurances of support that McClintock had conveyed to the Lebanese president: ‘Chamoun received me this morning. He said I was first man to whom he had communicated his decision to run again for presidency of Lebanon. He had appointment tomorrow with British Ambassador to whom he would give same word. He stressed special relationships he felt because of his policies between 42 himself, US and UK.’ Prior to McClintock’s meeting with Chamoun on 7 May, the American secretary of state and the British foreign secretary, who were both in Copenhagen for a NATO meeting, decided on 6 May to support Chamoun. Their decision was based on the recommendation

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of their ambassadors to Lebanon who had concluded on 4 May that the ‘optimum solution would be that Chamoun should hand over presidential office to General Chehab or to some other mutually agreed candidate’. However, since Chehab was reluctant to take office, that option was excluded: ‘We are therefore likely to be faced with stark alternative of supporting Chamoun or standing aloof. … We shall have 43 to support Chamoun despite known risks.’ According to the two ambassadors, the rationale for supporting Chamoun was that ‘his success or failure must be judged in much wider context than mere internal Lebanese politics. Once he has announced his intentions western failure to support him will have repercussions among all most moderate and responsible friends and allies of west in ME area. Chamoun has come to 44 symbolize to them forces of resistance to Nasser.’ This rationale became less relevant as the American rapprochement with Nasser gained momentum in May and June of 1958. Anglo–American support was forthcoming until mid-May when the insurrection in Lebanon, which had broken out on 9 May following the assassination of opposition newspaper editor Nasib Metni, intensified to 45 the point where it rendered Chamoun a liability. McClintock cabled Dulles on 13 May in the midst of anti-government rioting and calls by the opposition for a general strike: In my judgement it would be a capital political mistake to support Chamoun’s re-election if, in fact, we do forcefully intervene to maintain integrity and independence of Lebanon. By doing so we will be made to seem ranged against the Arab world in favor of a narrow Christian minority. We shall have achieved a military and 46 political beachhead comparable to the potential one in Israel. The events of that week undoubtedly influenced the withdrawal of American and British support for Chamoun’s re-election. The British ambassador’s defence of the earlier decision to support Chamoun illustrated the decisive impact of the events of May on Anglo–American policy in Lebanon: ‘In late April the Anglo–American decision to support Chamoun was undoubtedly the right one, for although the possibility of civil strife was a calculated risk we accepted, we had not foreseen an open rebellion conducted with vigour, persistence and massive external

From the Formation of the UAR to the Insurrection in Lebanon 47

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aid.’ Anglo–American interests entailed maintaining a Western-oriented Lebanon, and Chamoun had proven to be reliable. However, the violent events of the second week of May, including the burning of the USIA library in Tripoli and a total curfew imposed on Beirut from 8 p.m. to 6 am, and the overall intensity of opposition to the president led to a revaluation by the Western powers and a distinction between support for 48 a policy and support for an individual. The distinction was made clear in Dulles’s reply to McClintock given on the same day: ‘The US assumes that … President Chamoun recognizes that the crisis of Lebanon transcends the issue of Presidential election or the future of any particular person and that President Chamoun will not push his candidacy should this appear seriously to divide the support which should be counted upon to preserve the integrity and Western 49 orientation of Lebanon.’ The gravity of the situation had led Chamoun to enquire about the willingness of the American, British and French governments ‘to fulfil their guarantees to preserve the independence and 50 integrity of Lebanon’. While the response was affirmative, provided that Lebanon’s request for military assistance fulfilled a number of conditions, Dulles made it clear to Chamoun that the crisis in Lebanon transcended the issue of the presidential election and that he should not seek re-election if it were to jeopardize Lebanon’s pro-Western orientation. On 16 May, McClintock advised Chamoun to renounce any intentions of seeking re-election. Two weeks later, McClintock responded to British criticism and defended the consistency of US policy: ‘We have never indicated our support for Chamoun’s re-election except to him alone; and President and his Prime Minister have gone out of their way to stress no desire by Chamoun for renewal. Fact we are firmly insisting Chamoun finish his constitutional term in office is additional proof we 51 have not varied in support of President.’ However both the British and the Lebanese perceived American support for Chamoun to be wavering, particularly in view of the American rapprochement with Nasser that was underway and was being conducted by the American ambassador in Cairo, Raymond Hare. While McClintock and Dulles concluded by 13 May that Chamoun’s re-election was a liability, the British were reluctant to reach that conclusion and in the words of the British ambassador George Middleton,

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who wrote to the foreign secretary on 13 May: ‘It is being suggested in some quarters here that to avoid bloodshed President Chamoun should be sacrificed and a “political solution” found in this crisis. If this were 52 accepted the West will have suffered a resounding defeat.’ The British rationale for supporting Chamoun’s re-election was for lack of any ‘satisfactory alternative candidate’. Chamoun was referred to in a Foreign 53 Office minute in May 1958 as ‘our candidate’. Chamoun also symbolized ‘the forces of resistance to Nasser’. Hence, Western failure to support him would have ‘repercussions among all the most moderate 54 and responsible friends and allies of the West in the Middle East Area’. While the Americans indicated to Chamoun the withdrawal of their support for his re-election, the British continued to wait and observe Chamoun’s inclinations. On 12 May, Middleton reported, ‘Parliamentary steps for amendment of Constitution, which were to have been initiated 55 May 15th, have been postponed’. On 14 May, Middleton met with the Lebanese president and, although the issue of re-election was not discussed, Middleton concluded at the end of their conversation that ‘Chamoun implied that he was no longer thinking of seeking to renew 56 his mandate and would be content to retire in September.’ That day Chamoun told McClintock that ‘after September 23 [the day his mandate 57 ended] he intended to relax and go fishing’. The next day, on 15 May 1958, a Top Secret memorandum was sent from the Foreign Office to Washington enquiring of the Americans ‘where we are going about support for Chamoun’s re-election’. It took note of the withdrawal of American support for Chamoun’s re-election, yet recommended that the British maintain their position because At the present critical juncture I think we should be careful not to show any lack of confidence in him. We have told him we will support his re-election, and if we seem to be wobbling on this it may affect his nerves. A different situation would arise if Chamoun himself told us that he had decided not to stand again. There are indications in recent Beirut telegrams that his mind may be moving in this direction. But I do not think it would come well 58 from us to suggest this to him. The British maintained their previously held view that there was no


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alternative candidate to Chamoun who could stand up to Nasser and that ‘if the result of these disturbances is a decision by Chamoun to stand 59 down, Nasser will have gained a victory’. The British still viewed the Middle East from the perspective of Suez and believed that a Nasserist victory in Lebanon would be a substantial defeat for the West. However, by July the British had joined the Americans in urging Chamoun to help 60 find a successor. On 27 May, 11 days after McClintock had informed Chamoun of the withdrawal of US support for his re-election, Prime Minister Sami alSulh made a public declaration that his government did not intend to amend the constitution. Chamoun’s first public statement disclaiming his intent to seek re-election was not made until 20 June. As if to underline the importance of the external dimension of the Lebanese crisis, Chamoun chose to make his important statement to the American journalist Joseph Alsop of the New York Herald Tribune, rather than to a member of the Lebanese press. The centrality of the re-election issue to the crisis and the importance of initial Anglo–American support for Chamoun’s re-election begs the following question: what accounted for the divergence in British and American positions on the issue of re-election? The Americans were quick to shift their position while the British were reluctant to do so because a USA–Nasser rapprochement was underway. Charles Malik expressed his concern to Dulles in early May ‘over the impact on the Middle East of an ill-conceived rapprochement between the United 61 States and the UAR’. On 11 April at a press conference, Dulles stated that the Americans would consider unfreezing Egyptian funds in the USA, held since the Suez crisis, if Egypt agreed to compensation for the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company. Malik’s concern was matched by the unease reflected in some Christian papers in Lebanon that the USA was embarking on a new policy of rapprochement with Nasser and would consequently leave the Lebanese Christians without US pro62 tection. By mid-1958 US policy towards Nasser shifted from alienation to accommodation. The British could not seek reconciliation with Nasser so soon after the Suez debacle, and therefore held onto Chamoun as an asset a little longer than the Americans. In addition to the support of the Western powers, Chamoun sought and received the support of regional actors such as Iraq, Iran, Jordan,

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and Turkey. Iraq’s prime minister Nuri al-Sa’id and foreign minister Fadil al-Jamali both asked the British and Americans to support 63 Chamoun’s re-election. The British foreign secretary urged the Americans to help him ‘induce the Iraqis and Jordanians to exert maximum 64 influence on Lebanese Moslems in favour of Chamoun’. In assessing the importance of the re-election issue to the 1958 crisis, it is obvious that it was one of the issues that above all brought together politicians of very different views, both Christians and Muslims and all opposed to Chamoun’s re-election. That these political leaders had different agendas was seen clearly after 27 May. The fact that the rebellion continued after the prime minister’s statement indicated that re-election was not the sole issue that fuelled the rebellion. Chamoun’s bid for reelection had opened a Pandora’s box and jeopardized Lebanon’s traditional equilibrium. Middleton expressed the view of many who favoured the National Pact and felt that it was being challenged by the opposition: The opposition, so long as the question of renewal was kept in the foreground, was able to present itself as the champion of ‘legitimacy’. Now that pretext had been removed and they can be seen, even by the moderate opponents of President Chamoun, as openly aiming at the overthrow of the legal Government of the country … as the strike spread and was accompanied by civil disorder the opposition began to demand the immediate removal or resignation of President Chamoun. But in my view this was only a disguise for more far-reaching demands: new elections, a census (which was expected to reveal a Muslim majority) and finally a revision of the ‘Pact of 1943’. … For the Christians this would represent a direct challenge to the special position which they 65 have occupied since 1860. Middleton’s assessment brings up the question pertaining to the origins of the 1958 crisis and whether the impetus for the rebellion came from within or from without. Would the rebellion have been possible without external encouragement and support? Was there a genuine indigenous Lebanese movement in favour of joining the UAR? What were the aims of the rebels? Were they solely motivated by personal political rivalries, mainly to get rid of Chamoun, or was there a genuine programme for


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socio-political reform? While opposition leaders threatened to call for a constitutional convention and attempt to revise the constitution to provide for the constitutional eligibility of Muslims for the presidency, a preserve of Maronite Christians, the threat was not carried out when 66 Chamoun did not seek re-election. The quick resolution of the crisis, largely due to the American– Egyptian rapprochement, and the return of both rebels and progovernment politicians to participation in the traditional practice of Lebanese politics was indicative of the importance of the external dimension of the 1958 crisis. In fact, the internal polarization of both the Lebanese political leadership and society was a function of regional and international politics. Socio-economic grievances were not a major issue on the opposition’s agenda in 1958. This is clearly apparent upon reading Kamal Jumblatt’s book Haqiqat al-Thawra al-Lubnaniyah (The Truth About The Lebanese Revolution) written in 1959. Of all the opposition leaders, Kamal Jumblatt was the most vocal reformist. As founder of the Progressive Socialist Party, the Druze leader participated in the rebellion alongside traditional politicians such as Ahmad al-As’ad, Sabri Hamade, and Abdallah al-Yafi whose political agendas did not envisage the radical reform proposed by Jumblatt. While disdainful of the sectarian structure of the Lebanese political system, his main grievance was Chamoun’s internal policy that aimed at weakening 67 the zu’ama of all sects. According to Jumblatt, Chamoun’s motivation for accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine was re-election, for ‘he was willing to sign a pact with the devil if that would enable him to attain 68 that goal.’ Although Jumblatt saw corruption as an important underlying cause of the revolution, he believed the direct cause to be Chamoun’s attempts to consolidate his power at the expense of other 69 Lebanese leaders. Another text that represented the point of view of the opposition was a speech by Tripoli’s parliamentarian and religious notable Sheikh Nadim al-Jisr. Al-Jisr, close adviser to Tripoli’s pre-eminent politician Rashid Karami, and from a family of notables himself, presented Muslim grievances at a press conference on 17 May 1958. The timing was significant, for the rebellion had broken out a week earlier and Rashid Karami was one of the leaders of the opposition. While Sheikh al-Jisr outlined the economic hardship suffered by the people of Tripoli due to

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its separation from its natural hinterland (Syria), he emphasized that ‘the sufferings on the front of foreign policy are, however, greater.’ He spoke of the grave reaction of the people of Tripoli to the three-power aggression against Egypt, and of Nasser who ‘emerged to defend the Arab cause and become to all Arabs and Moslems an object of worship next to God. … Then came the announcement of the United Arab Republic. The attitude which the Lebanese state took towards the new Republic can best be described as lukewarm. This attitude implied a serious deviation towards Western imperialist policies.’ According to al-Jisr, the suffering of the people of Tripoli in particular and the Muslims in general could be alleviated as follows: ‘There was no hope for any improvement except in changing Lebanese foreign policy into one of truly positive neutrality, improving relations with the United Arab Republic and restoring the 70 economic relations with our neighbour and sister, Syria.’ These statements indicated that the main grievance of the Muslim community was the foreign policy of the government rather than economic deprivation. In the midst of the fighting and anti-government activity that occurred throughout the month of June, rumours circulated that the insurgents in Tripoli had formed a ‘Free Lebanese government’. Tripoli would be the capital and headquarters of the new political entity. On 10 June Sheikh Nadim al-Jisr publicly advocated a possible ‘geographic solution’ to the troubles in Lebanon. That implied the detachment of 71 Northern Lebanon and joining it to the UAR. Tripoli was the scene of heavy fighting as were areas north of Tripoli and the Bekaa’ valley contiguous to the Syrian border where much of the smuggled arms entered Lebanon. The divergence in the views of the opposition is clear in the case of the attitudes of Jumblatt and al-Jisr towards the government’s foreign policy. While al-Jisr condemned it, Kamal Jumblatt on the other hand supported Chamoun’s foreign policy until June 1957. The turning point was Jumblatt’s defeat in the parliamentary elections. Whatever the objectives of the opposition, they found a willing supporter in Nasser who provided them with substantial moral and material aid. THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION: MAY 1958

By directing their efforts at a personal rather than a political object, the


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opposition broadened its appeal and attracted Christians who were opposed to Chamoun’s re-election if not to his policies. The opposition of the Maronite patriarch to Chamoun was a major factor in muting the sectarian overtones of the conflict. In taking a position against Chamoun, Patriarch Paul Meouchi broke with the majority of the Maronite community as well as his own clergy. In February 1958, funeral bells were tolled in Deir al-Qamar, the hometown of the president, in protest to an alleged statement by the patriarch that ‘the Maronites were a drop in the sea of Muslims and must therefore support 72 Muslim Arab nationalism or pack up and leave.’ At the end of May the patriarch called upon Chamoun to take an extended vacation and leave the country until the end of his term of office in September. Despite the patriarch’s position, the appeal to sectarian allegiances was alive and well, especially in clerical circles. In April the Mufti of the Republic (the highest ranking Sunni Muslim religious figure) refused to accept the traditional congratulations offered by political personalities and members of the public on the day of celebration following the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. During Ramadan, on 19 April, the Higher Islamic Council gave the annual ‘Iftar’ banquet and contrary to tradition did not invite members of the government. The opposition leaders who attended turned the occasion into a major anti-government rally and passed a resolution declaring their opposition to the renewal of the presidential term and their refusal to accept the traditional ‘Id al-Fitr’ greetings in view of the mourning for the victims of the anti-government 73 demonstrations in Tyre. The foremost incident that illustrated the predominance of the confessional nature of the Lebanese crisis was the excommunication of the prime minister. On 5 June, the Grand Mufti of Lebanon together with 33 ‘ulema (religious leaders), including the president and most judges of the Muslim Shari’a court, issued a statement excommunicating Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh from the Sunni Muslim faith. They accused the prime minister of causing strife and declaring war on the people and ‘called on Muslims to disown and ostracize Sami al-Sulh for not following the path of believers’. The ‘ulema ended their statement by asking all Muslims ‘to remain steadfast to the community’s rights until God wills 74 us success and helps us achieve our goal’. As these members of the religious hierarchy were state employees, the government’s retribution

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was swift. On 7 June, the government issued a decree suspending all who had signed the statement of excommunication. The action taken by the Sunni religious hierarchy indicated to the rank and file of the community that the dispute with the government coincided with the religious divide of the country at large. Another incident that illustrated the sectarian nature of the conflict was the forcible eviction on 25 April of the sheikh leading the Friday prayers at Beirut’s Grand Mosque. The sheikh was turned out of the mosque by supporters of former Prime Minister Yafi when they protested against his sermon in which the sheikh praised Prime Minister Sami alSulh as a ‘good Muslim’ and a ‘benevolent man’. The sheikh was shouted down from the pulpit with cries of ‘Sami Sulh is not supported by the 75 Muslims!’ The ‘Sarajevo’ of the Lebanese crisis of 1958 was the assassination of the leftwing (Maronite) editor of the daily Al-Telegraph Nasib al-Matni in 76 the early hours of 8 May 1958. The opposition seized this opportunity to condemn the government and the next day, led by Karami, Salam and Yafi and with the acquiescence of the Third Force, led by Henri Pharaon, the opposition formulated a demand for the immediate resignation of President Chamoun, Prime Minister Sulh and Foreign Minister Malik. They were prepared to accept General Chehab as prime minister pending elections for a new president, and charged Raymond Eddé with 77 the task of conveying the message to the president. While he agreed to mediate between Chamoun and the opposition, Eddé made it clear that he supported Chamoun’s completion of his term of office. General Fuad Chehab was of the same opinion, namely that Chamoun should complete his legal term of office and, like Eddé, Chehab expressed his 78 opposition to Chamoun’s re-election. The president turned down the opposition’s demand and maintained his ambiguous position on whether or not he would seek re-election. Chehab rejected Eddé’s suggestion of the premiership. The fact that the opposition asked the Maronite army commander-in-chief to take over the premiership, a post that was the traditional preserve of the Sunni Muslim community, attested to the extent of confidence in and support for the general among the predominantly Muslim opposition. On 9 May 1958 rioting began in Tripoli and the following day the United States Information Service (ISIS) library was burned down in that


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city. The riots left 20 dead and 150 wounded. Opposition leaders were quick to condemn the attack on the American institution and met with the American ambassador to discuss the riot. Henri Pharaon of the Third Force offered some compensation for the library from his personal 79 funds. On 12 May the British ambassador reported that the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) pipeline had been broken and set on fire a 80 short distance inside the Lebanese border with Syria. That same day, Syria announced that northern Lebanon, led by Tripoli, had applied to 81 join the UAR. The American embassy in Damascus reported that the UAR flag had been raised over the gendarmerie post in Tripoli and the city was receiving military supplies from the Syrian side of the ‘wide 82 open borders’. The opposition effectively controlled the city as confirmed by parliament speaker Osseiran who added that ‘as of that moment the district of Tripoli could be considered as separate from 83 Lebanon’. The rebellion against the government had begun and fighting occurred on several fronts. Rioting spread to Beirut and the opposition set up barricades in the city, particularly in the constituencies of the 84 opposition leaders such as the Basta area where Saeb Salam lived. According to the British embassy an attempt by the gendarmerie to arrest 85 Salam was met by machine-gun fire from his house. A USIS library in the Basta area, a Muslim quarter of the capital where Salam lived, was burnt down. On 12 May the government imposed a curfew on Beirut with the timetable of 8 p.m. until 6 a.m. In the Shuf, Jumblatt’s forces attacked the summer presidential palace at Beiteddine but were repulsed by government forces. The government closed the borders but was unable to prevent continued infiltration of men and matériel from Syria. Although the situation was tense and fighting did occur, it was sporadic and drawn out. While the rebels barricaded their stronghold of Basta in Beirut, a mile or so away from the presidential palace, they were free to come and go and their communication lines were not cut by the 86 government, neither were their water or electricity supplies. There was a semblance of normality often interrupted by gunfire and explosions. An eyewitness account by Desmond Stewart, an Englishman who taught at Saeb Salam’s Al-Makassed Charitable Society, conveys the sense of life in Beirut during the early months of the rebellion. Stewart visited Salam in the Basta quarter on several occasions, often accompanied by Kim

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Philby who at the time was the Beirut correspondent for the Observer: On one of these visits on 19 May, Stewart wrote: ‘But it is not all strain — ordinary life goes on as well. From the little balcony behind Saeb’s study, I can see people sitting in their doorways, perhaps more watchful 88 than normal, but with the usual hubble-bubbles.’ Food was plentiful in the stores although prices were higher. A daily reminder of the ongoing crisis was the government-imposed curfew and the closed shops observing the strike called for by the opposition. On the diplomatic front, Malik met with the ambassadors of Britain, France and the USA and enumerated the instances of Syro–Egyptian interference that threatened Lebanon’s independence. Among these were: the apprehending of the Belgian consul-general to Syria Louis de San, who was caught at the border smuggling large quantities of arms 89 into Lebanon with written instructions to opposition leaders; an Egyptian boat from Gaza caught smuggling arms to the opposition; the arrest of several Syrian army personnel during demonstrations in Beirut; and the attack by 500 armed Syrians on a Lebanese frontier post on the 90 Damascus road. Malik then publicized these events at a news conference on 13 May and he charged the UAR with ‘conducting a concerted movement that has been going on for months … designed to undermine and ultimately to destroy Lebanon as a free, independent and sovereign state, and to bring about a radical modification in its fundamental 91 political orientation’. The above-mentioned events prompted Chamoun to ask the three ambassadors to enquire of their respective governments as to ‘what practical steps they would take to secure the integrity of Lebanon in the 92 event of further deterioration of the internal security situation’. How did the Western powers respond to Chamoun’s enquiry? The British urged the Americans to give an ‘affirmative answer’ to Chamoun’s appeal in order to avert a situation whereby Lebanon would ‘drift into Nasser’s camp and his forward march would become unstoppable’. The United Kingdom was ready, if requested by the legitimate government of Lebanon, to give military assistance to maintain law and order, but could only do so if the Americans ‘bore the major part of the burden’. The British hoped to make this operation a joint Anglo–American one and repeatedly urged the Americans to agree to the opening of military talks 93 to plan for the contingency.


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The American response, closely coordinated with the British, was that they would send forces to Lebanon only as a last resort and with the limited dual purpose of protecting American life and property and assisting the Lebanese government in preserving the integrity and independence of Lebanon, which is vital to the national interests of the 94 USA and to world peace. In addition to the above, Dulles specified that three conditions should be met by the Lebanese as a prerequisite for ‘the introduction of Western forces into Lebanon’: (1) a complaint by the Lebanese government to the UN Security Council alleging external interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs that threatened the country’s integrity and independence; (2) public support from some Arab states 95 for Lebanon’s appeals to the USA and the Security Council; and (3) recognition by President Chamoun that the crisis in Lebanon transcended the issue of presidential elections and that ‘President Chamoun will not push his candidacy should this appear seriously to divide the support which should be counted upon to preserve the 96 integrity and Western orientation of Lebanon.’ While these diplomatic exchanges continued, the security situation in Lebanon steadily deteriorated. Army troops remained in defensive positions in the outlying areas of the country such as Baalbek, northern Lebanon, and Tripoli and Sidon in the south. Rebel leaders in these areas gradually took control and called for the overthrow of the government. In Beirut, as bombs were set off (one at the tram killed ten persons while another exploded in the garden of the British ambassador’s residence), the government decided to arm volunteers supporting the security forces. Upon hearing that US gendarmerie equipment was being diverted to civilians, the American ambassador sent a message to Colonel Zouein, commander of the gendarmerie, that if this were true he would 97 recommend an ‘instant stoppage of military aid for Lebanon’. Chamoun had asked the Americans for the airlift of anti-riot equipment and 20 tanks whose supply to Lebanon was being discussed. Other military assistance came from Jordan whose king responded to Chamoun’s request for arms and sent them on 12 May, via the British air force base 98 at Habbaniya in Iraq. In Beirut, rebel leaders were treated in a privileged manner by the military, which induced the following comment by the American ambassador to the commander-in-chief of the army General Chehab:

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I showed General photographs in recent editions of New York Times and Herald Tribune of Saeb Salam and Rashid Karami holding councils of war in Saeb Salam’s headquarters in Beirut. I said this was first of my various revolutions and wars in which the enemy leaders were given passes to go out through a military curfew and were permitted to receive the foreign press as well as to have benefit of all the public utilities. I wondered why at least some cordon sanitaire should not surround insurrectionist 99 headquarters to cut them off from access to outside world. McClintock’s comment underscored the inability of non-indigenous observers to grasp the subtleties of the confessional nature of politics in Lebanon. A move by the army against the Muslim quarter of the Basta where Salam had erected barricades (and established his headquarters at his residence) would have jeopardized the unity of the multiconfessional army and marked it as one of the warring factions. By maintaining a neutral position General Chehab was able to remain above the conflicting parties and, with a majority consensus, become the next president of the republic. On the political front, Chamoun asked General Chehab on 21 May to form a government and bring about a ceasefire. The general’s efforts failed for the opposition would only accept the resignation of 100 Chamoun. Moreover, Chehab expressed his distrust of Chamoun when he noted that the president’s offer of the prime ministership ‘was not sincere and that from the first the President did his best to torpedo the 101 General’s efforts to achieve a political compromise’. Chehab’s personal antipathy towards Chamoun was public knowledge and was noted by Western diplomats in their assessments of the political situation in 102 Lebanon. The prime minister’s statement of 27 May, dispelling rumours that his government intended to amend the constitution, was another initiative that met with intransigence by some members of the opposition. Saeb Salam declared that no solution was possible short of Chamoun’s immediate resignation. The Beirut daily Beirut al-Massa, published by opposition figure Abdallah al-Mashnouk, rejected Sulh’s statement as inadequate and noted that the re-election issue was not the whole problem: ‘It was Chamoun’s deviationist policy that was responsible for


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103

leading Lebanon toward extinction.’ The opposition now insisted on immediate parliamentary elections, ostensibly to get back into power and to influence the election of the next president. Kamal Jumblatt called for a constitutional amendment that would permit the election of the president to be held four months before the expiry of Chamoun’s 104 mandate instead of the 30 to 60 days under the current provision. The more moderate leaders (such as Henri Pharaon, Philip Takla, and Charles Helou) of the predominantly Christian Third Force, who were also opposed to Chamoun’s re-election, did not adhere to the 105 opposition’s demands for early elections. The regular parliamentary session ended on 31 May and the legislature would reconvene in October. However, a special session to elect a president would be held not more than six days nor less than 30 days before 23 September, which marked the end of Chamoun’s tenure. As the month of May ended, there was a lull in the fighting. Although the issue of Chamoun’s re-election had been put to rest, the insurrection continued and gave rise to fears that the opposition’s real agenda extended beyond the issue of Chamoun’s re-election and aimed to alter the political status quo in the country. Diplomatic efforts were undertaken by Americans and Lebanese both in Cairo and at the UN in order to end the strife in Lebanon. Just as regional political forces had fanned the flames of sectarian strife in Lebanon, so too would they determine the end of the crisis. Lebanon’s endemic vulnerability to external pressure was perhaps best summed up in the parting words of the British ambassador George Middleton who judiciously concluded that: Christian and Moslem live in uneasy accord only so long as there is no obvious advantage to either side in seeking to change the balance or so long as one side has the clear mastery. So long as Islam and the West are not in conflict in the wider sphere of world politics, Lebanon manages to live quietly at home. But every outside change 106 stirs the smouldering religious feelings of the two main factions.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. For a concise account of the events in Syria that precipitated the union

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2. 3.

4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s with Egypt, see Patrick Seale, The Struggle For Syria (Oxford, 1965), pp. 307–26. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 429, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 7 February 1958. Kamal Salibi, ‘Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s’, unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s at the University of Texas at Austin, September 1992, p. 15. Muslim notables of Beirut founded Al-Makassed in the late nineteenth century to counter the increasing influence of Catholic and Protestant missionary activity in education. In early 1958, the president of the society was Saeb Salam’s elder brother Muhammad Salam. Muhammad passed away in early May 1959 and was replaced by Saeb as president of AlMakassed Charitable Society. Atiyah, The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon, p. 282. Desmond S. Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut (London, 1958), p. 14. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 498, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 7 March 1958. Adnan al-Hakim made a public statement at Beirut airport on 26 January 1958 that ‘he would do all he could to bring Lebanon into the Syro– Egyptian union’. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 413, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 29 January 1958. Al-Hakim also gave a written statement advocating that Lebanon join the UAR. According to the director-general of the Ministry of the Interior, the statement appeared in the 3 February issue of the weekly Al-Hawadeth. The article was removed before the issue was allowed to appear. See McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2628, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 3 February 1958. Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, 1961), p. 61. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 498, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 7 March 1958. US Army Beirut to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 73, Confidential, 25 April 1958. Bechara al-Khoury, Haqa’iq Lubnaniyya, Vol. 1, p. 258. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2628, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 3 February 1958. On Arab politics and ideology and Nasser’s career as a pan-Arab leader, see Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (London, 1965). Al-Rifa’i expressed these views in a conversation with a US embassy officer in Beirut on 25 March 1958. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service


16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

31. 32.

33.

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Dispatch No. 547, Department of State, Central Files, 784A.00, 27 March 1958. Atiyah, The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis, p. 280. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 13 March 1958, FO 371/134116. US Army Beirut to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 70, 18 April 1958. See the Phalange Party newspaper, Al-’Amal, 17 June 1958. Seale, The Struggle For Syria, pp. 321–2. Middleton to Lloyd, 31 May 1958, FO 371/134120. US Army Beirut, to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 45, Secret, 21 March 1958. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 498, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 7 March 1958. Oral History interview with Raymond Hare, No. 1 of 2 by John Luter on 16 June 1972, Columbia University Oral History Project, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. For a biographical summary of McClintock’s career, see Who Was Who in America with World Notables, Vol. VII, 1977–81 (Chicago, 1981). This was conveyed to me in an interview with the late president’s son, Dory Chamoun, on 24 January 1993 in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 413, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 29 January 1958. Frangieh suffered a cerebral hemorrhage four months after the event of the Miziara church massacre in which members of his family were involved in a shoot-out with rival clans from their hometown of Zghorta (north Lebanon) during a church service. For a biographical summary of al-Yafi’s career, see Who’s Who in Lebanon, eighth edition, 1982–83 (Beirut, 1983), p. 678. Chamoun made this statement on 31 December 1957 to a visiting delegation representing the Third Force. Heath to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 343, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 2 January 1958. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab (Minutes of Parliament), Meeting of 25 March 1958. For the complete text of the ministerial statement, see pp. 318–26. In a Top Secret Dispatch to Dulles, McClintock suggested: ‘Something must be done for Malik, the apostle of Americanism. In my judgment, he should go fairly soon as he is focusing anti-American opinion on himself.’ See McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2832, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 21 February 1958. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab, Meeting of 26 March 1958, p. 391.

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34. Ibid., p. 413. 35. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 512, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 14 March 1958. 36. US Army, Beirut to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 45, Secret, 21 March 1958. 37. US Army Beirut, to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 55, Secret, 5 April 1958. 38. A dispatch on 13 May 1958 from Beirut to the Levant Department of the Foreign Office classified as Top Secret read: ‘The President has informed us (and the Americans and French) confidentially that he intends to seek reelection. He has not yet made his intention public.’ FO 371/134117. 39. See Chapter 4. 40. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3181, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 25 March 1958. 41. Wright to Lloyd, No. 609, 13 April 1958, FO 371/134116. 42. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3709, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 7 May 1958. 43. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3674, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 4 May 1958. 44. Ibid. 45. Events of the rebellion will be discussed in the second part of this chapter and are referred to here only in the context of their relevance to the reelection issue. 46. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No.3832, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 13 May 1958. 47. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 11 June 1958, FO 371/134122. 48. By the end of the week the riots had left 60 dead and 250 injured. The Times, 16 May 1958. 49. Dulles to McClintock, No. 4271, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 13 May 1958. 50. Middleton to Lloyd, Top Secret, 13 May 1958, FO 371/134116. 51. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4346, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 30 May 1958. 52. Middleton to Lloyd, Emergency, Top Secret, 13 May 1958, FO 371/134116. 53. Minute by R. M. Hadow, 6 May 1958, FO 371/134116. The following comment was made in the context of concern about French indiscretion in publicizing British support for Chamoun: ‘This is very tiresome. It was the idea of the Ambassadors in Beirut to bring the French in, and I now wish we hadn’t agreed. Soon all the world will know that Chamoun is “our” candidate. But perhaps that was obvious from the start.’

From the Formation of the UAR to the Insurrection in Lebanon 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63.

64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

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Middleton to Lloyd, Secret, 5 May 1958, FO 371/134116. Ibid., 12 May 1958, FO 371/134116. Ibid., 14 May 1958, FO 371/134117. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3868, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 14 May 1958. Lloyd to Caccia, Top Secret, 15 May 1958, FO 371/134116. Ibid. For an account of the divergence of views between the British and American governments ‘on all out support of Chamoun to bitter end’, see McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4123, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 22 May 1958. Middleton to Lloyd, No. 890, Secret, 1 July 1958, FO 371/134128. Department of State, Central Files 611.80, 12 May 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1958–1960, Vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, p. 27. US Army Beirut, to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 77, Secret, 9 May 1958. Dr Jamali made this request to Britain’s ambassador to the Sudan, Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews. Andrews had been ambassador to Beirut until 1955 when George Middleton took over. See Chapman-Andrews to Lloyd, Secret, 1 May 1958, FO 371/134116. Jamali had just come from Beirut to Khartoum and he also made a similar request to the American ambassador. See Moose to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch 913, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 29 April 1958. Lloyd made this point to Dulles at the NATO meeting in Copenhagen. See Dulles to State Department No: Dulte 11, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 7 May 1958. Middleton to Lloyd, 11 June 1958, FO 371/134122. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3632, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 30 April 1958. Kamal Jumblatt, Haqiqat al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah (The Truth about the Lebanese Revolution) (Beirut, 1959), p. 115. Ibid., p. 78. Ibid., p. 91. As reported in McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4006, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 18 May 1958. US Army Beirut to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 153, Secret, 13 June 1958. The opposition press enthusiastically backed the patriarch’s statement. Meouchi, however, said that he had been misquoted. See McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 454, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 21 February 1958.

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73. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3495, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 18 April 1958. 74. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4525, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 7 June 1958. 75. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 623, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 30 April 1958. 76. For a detailed account of the events of the rebellion from an opposition viewpoint, see Nadia and Nawwaf Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah. Nawwaf Karami was one of Jumblatt’s lieutenants in the Shuf area. Another perspective, sympathetic to Chamoun, is the biographical account published a year after Chamoun’s death: Nicolas Nassif, Camille Chamoun: Akhir al ‘Amaliqa (Camille Chamoun: The Last of the Great Men) (Beirut, 1988). 77. Middleton to Lloyd, Secret, 12 May 1958, FO 371/134116. 78. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3779, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 May 1958. 79. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3766, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 10 May 1958. 80. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3804, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 12 May 1958. 81. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 3813, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 12 May 1958. 82. Hart to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2915, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 13 May 1958. 83. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3827, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 13 May 1958. 84. For an eyewitness account of the events in Lebanon during May and June of 1958, see Desmond Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut: A Personal Account (London, 1958). Stewart presents his material in the form of a diary and, although his perspective is biased in favour of the opposition (he was an employee of Al-Maqassid, an organization presided over by Saeb Salam), his account nevertheless gives the reader a sense of what it was like to be living in Beirut during those days. 85. Middleton to Lloyd, 12 May 1958, FO 371/134116. 86. Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut, p. 45. 87. Philby defected to Moscow from Beirut five years later, in 1963. 88. Stewart, Turmoil in Beirut, p. 39. 89. The text of the letter found on de San was released by the prime minister and published in the French language daily newspaper L’Orient of 14 May. The text is as follows and the identity of the writer and addressee are not


90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105.

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known: ‘Hamed, fire at police and gendarmes. Disarm agents even if you have to isolate them. Continue shooting all day. Blow up the following quarters; Souk Tawile, Rue Hamra, Rue Sadat and the Presidential Palace. Kill whenever necessary. Throw bombs from roofs and in streets: burn a few cars during night: this is indispensable. Barricade streets. … Only Beirut is left. All other areas have been occupied. Take Tripoli as example and do it. Signed: Saleh.’ See Middleton to Lloyd, 14 May 1958, FO 371/134117. Middleton to Lloyd, Top Secret, 12 May 1958, FO 371/134116. Middleton to Lloyd, 14 May 1958, FO 371/ 134117. Middleton to Lloyd, Top Secret, 12 May 1958, FO 371/134116. Lloyd to Caccia, Top Secret, 13 May 1958, FO 371/134116. Dulles to McClintock, No. 4271, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 13 May 1958. On 15 May, the British ambassadors to Iraq and Jordan were instructed to inform Nuri al-Sa’id and King Hussein respectively of the possibility that Chamoun and the Lebanese government might request Western military intervention. The British stressed the need to ensure public support by Arab governments for Lebanon’s appeal (should it occur) ‘in order to minimize charges that any action resulting therefrom is anti-Arab’. See Caccia to Lloyd, Top Secret, 15 May 1958, FO 371/134117. Nuri agreed to provide the public support if needed. See Wright to Lloyd, Top Secret, 15 May 1958, FO 371/134117. Two days later the king and crown prince also agreed to support British action within and outside the Security Council. See Wright to Lloyd, Top Secret, 18 May 1958, FO 371/134118. Dulles to McClintock, No. 4271, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 13 May 1958. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4166, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 21 May 1958. Johnston (Amman) to Lloyd, Secret, 12 May 1958, FO 371/134116. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4235, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 26 May 1958. Middleton to Lloyd, Top Secret, 22 May 1958, FO 371/134119. Ibid. Middleton to Lloyd, Top Secret, 19 November 1958, FO 371/128000. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4297, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 28 May 1958. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4428, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 3 June 1958. The three leaders relayed their view that there should be no general

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elections in Lebanon to the American ambassador. See McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4424, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 3 June 1958. 106. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 27 August 1958, FO 371/134133.

7 The Crisis in Lebanon THE REBELLION

June 1958 was a month of heightened tension in Lebanon. After fighting subsided towards the end of May, it flared up again and pitched battles were fought between security forces (the gendarmerie) and opposition insurgents in areas outside Beirut, such as the Bekaa’, Tripoli, and the Shuf. During the first week of June there was a lull in the fighting. In 1 Beirut, 60 to 70 per cent of the shops were open. Those in the areas outside government control continued the strike the opposition called for on 9 May, the day after Nassib Metni’s murder. Notwithstanding the lull in the fighting, both sides continued to arm in preparation for a military resolution of the conflict. The high points of the rebellion in June and July convey to the reader a sense of life in Lebanon at the time. In early June, opposition forces that controlled large areas of the country outside Beirut hoped for a military victory. On 6 June, government forces intercepted a rebel radio message that called on rebel forces under Sabri Hamade in the Bekaa’ to connect with Jumblatt’s Druzes in order to cut the lines of communication between Beirut and 2 the Bekaa’, with the ultimate objective of moving against Beirut. Simultaneously with these moves, rebels in the northern Lebanese region of ‘Akkar were ordered to make a diversionary offensive. That week the Shuf region, which included the hometown of Chamoun, fell to Jumblatt’s partisans. 185

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On 14 June, the situation in Beirut sharply deteriorated to the extent that fighting took place in the immediate vicinity of the presidential palace in the fashionable Kantari quarter in Beirut, less than a mile away from the rebel stronghold of Basta. The rebels’ orders were ‘to attack the 3 palace in Beirut and capture Camille Chamoun dead or alive’. The army repulsed the rebel attack against the palace. During the attack, Chamoun was seen ‘in a yellow sports shirt engaged in rifle fire from the roof of the 4 Palace’. Wilbur Eveland saw Chamoun on the roof with his hunting gun, waiting for someone to emerge from a gasoline-filled truck that had 5 been run towards the palace. As a result of these events, Chamoun considered requesting military intervention by the Western powers and 6 called an urgent cabinet meeting that evening. Although rebels also looted and burned the prime minister’s house to the ground, the fighting died down by the end of the day and Chamoun did not request American intervention. In retaliation for the attacks on the palace and the burning of the prime minister’s house, government forces shelled Saeb Salam’s 7 house in the Basta district and destroyed part of it. Throughout this period, the rebels continued to receive assistance from across the Syrian–Lebanese border. In Syria, especially in the southern parts of the country, discussions in the coffee houses centred on the enlistment of men for the Lebanese insurrection and the increased pay for enlisted men from 200 to 300 Syrian pounds per month due to 8 the long duration of the conflict. Other assistance was provided in the form of ammunition; in mid-June trucks under military escort were 9 observed leaving Aleppo towards the west. Officials close to opposition circles secretly acknowledged such assistance. The speaker of parliament Adel Osseiran explicitly told Ambassador McClintock that while Nasser had supplied Salam and Yafi with funds, ‘he was not originally responsible for the UAR intervention in Lebanon in terms of organizing partisans and sending clandestine shipments of arms.’ According to 10 Osseiran, those activities were ‘done independently by the Syrians’. By the end of June 1958, the money spent by the UAR on the opposition in Lebanon, according to Pierre Muqannas, director of the Banque de Syrie, 11 amounted to the sum of 70 million Syrian pounds. While the Lebanese army maintained a defensive position throughout the crisis, at times it engaged in limited warfare when the air force strafed the rebels to keep them at bay at several locations in the country.

The Crisis in Lebanon

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The need to use air power was an indication of the strength of the rebel forces. US military intelligence estimated the number of insurgents involved in the fighting to be around 5000 men while the gendarmerie 12 numbered 2100. Partisans of Chamoun together with members of the anti-Nasser Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) also fought against the rebels. The 5500-man army maintained a defensive position and did not openly engage the insurgents except when they threatened to close in on the pro-Chamoun forces. The opposition continued to demand the dissolution of parliament and the election of a new chamber of deputies prior to the upcoming presidential elections in late summer. Chamoun and Malik pressed US officials to respond to a potential request by the Lebanese government for immediate military assistance and were not encouraged to pursue that course. While American officials had prepared contingency plans, their concern was that military intervention be a measure of last resort and that allegations of foreign infiltration into Lebanon be substantiated 13 prior to foreign military assistance to the Lebanese government. The commander in chief of the Lebanese army, General Fuad Chehab, refused to put down the rebellion for fear that the army would disintegrate along sectarian lines, with large-scale desertion by its Muslim members if they had to open fire on co-religionists. In a conversation with the American ambassador, the general predicted a prolonged and indefinite struggle with neither side able to overpower the other. As previously mentioned, Chehab was the scion of a princely family that 14 had ruled Lebanon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Regardless of his lineage, the general was among the most respected public figures in the country. His aloofness from the day-to-day affairs of Lebanese politics and his disdain for politicians enhanced his credibility and reputation as an honest incorruptible official. Chehab’s refusal to put down the rebellion in 1958 by military force and his ability to maintain the army’s neutrality throughout the conflict earned him the reputation of a fair broker, particularly among Lebanon’s Muslim population. In view of the very limited military action by the Lebanese army throughout the crisis, Dulles reiterated that the Americans would intervene in response to a request by the Lebanese government ‘only under the most compelling necessity to meet a situation where [the] integrity of Lebanon is genuinely threatened and where its own forces do not

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suffice for protection’. He requested Ambassador McClintock to make clear to the Lebanese president that he should not count upon US forces to intervene ‘in circumstances where Lebanese forces are unwilling to 15 fight’. Despite his reservations concerning military intervention in Lebanon, Dulles responded to Chamoun’s request for a show of American force and ordered two destroyers to Beirut to cruise in view of the 16 city. While Dulles expressed reluctance to intervene openly in Lebanon with American troops, he nevertheless sanctioned covert American 17 assistance in order ‘to help the Lebanese government in its crisis’. CIA officer Wilbur Eveland was the main channel for covert assistance and was in constant touch with Chamoun. On 16 June, the situation in Beirut sharply deteriorated again and Chamoun sent for Eveland. He told Eveland that he expected an imminent attack on the palace and ‘handed him his wife’s jewels and discussed plans for the 18 safety of their grandson’. He also handed Eveland a ‘manuscript docu19 ment signed by members of the Cabinet authorizing Chamoun to call 20 for foreign military intervention to save Lebanon’. The following day, 21 on 17 June, Chamoun requested American assistance. Ambassador McClintock did not transmit the request to the secretary of state because Chamoun did not provide the necessary assurances that had been previously outlined by the Americans. However, as the situation in Lebanon deteriorated, Dulles approved Assistant Secretary of State Rountree’s recommendation to arrange for a departmental representative to establish contact with the military planners on Lebanon. The purpose of this action was to allow for closer coordination on the political aspects of the military plans. While Dulles reassured Chamoun of American support, he nevertheless repeatedly urged the Lebanese president to solve the crisis without recourse to foreign military intervention. The British shared this view with their American counterparts and both feared the fallout of such intervention in the region, particularly to the pro-Western regimes 22 of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. The British foreign minister, Selwyn Lloyd, underlined the importance of the regional political variable of the crisis in Lebanon in the following analogy he made to the British ambassador in Washington: ‘I believe that if the Lebanon falls to Nasser, it will be a more resounding defeat for the West, even than the with23 drawal of British and French forces from Port Said.’ While events in


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Lebanon were inextricably linked to developments in the rest of the Arab world and the outcome of the Lebanese crisis would significantly affect the political stability of Arab countries friendly to the West, Lloyd’s viewpoint may have been somewhat exaggerated. It was simplistic because as a distant observer he was unaware of the intricacies of the Lebanese situation, unlike the Western ambassadors in Lebanon. In Iraq, the leadership watched the events in Lebanon with ‘tense expectance and a somewhat brooding calm’. Their prevalent fear was that if Nasser scored any success in Lebanon ‘it was only a question of 24 time before Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait succumb to the same pressures’. This was the prevalent British view undoubtedly fostered by the British perspective (in the aftermath of Suez) of rivalry with Nasser in terms of a zero sum game. Each Nasserite victory, be it direct or through a proxy leadership, was a loss for the West and would only increase the chances of a similar spillover into another Arab country. Mediation efforts to resolve the crisis through political compromise were undertaken by the speaker of parliament Adel Osseiran, as well as by deputies Raymond Eddé and Fawzi al-Hoss. The latter (a Sunni Muslim) was a former staunch supporter of Chamoun and now believed that the president was manipulating the situation to bring about Western 25 military intervention. Al-Hoss resigned from parliament on 25 June after failed attempts to effect a compromise between the government and the opposition. Chamoun refused to propose a compromise political 26 solution because, as he put it, ‘the issue was not really domestic at all.’ The opposition, on the other hand, maintained their intransigence in calling for the president’s immediate resignation. Other efforts at compromise also failed, most notably those undertaken by the Third Force, a loose grouping of moderate Christian and Muslim politicians opposed to Chamoun’s re-election but supportive of some of his policies. Mediation efforts failed because of the extreme divergence of views between government and opposition concerning the domestic and international variables of the crisis. While the president maintained that the issue was purely one of external interference in internal Lebanese politics, the opposition held the view that the issue at stake was solely that of Chamoun’s attempt to get himself re-elected. Despite the stalemated situation in local Lebanese politics, there was a breakthrough at the regional level. After a series of meetings with the

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United Nations secretary general in the last week of June, Nasser gave the Syrian prime minister ‘categorical instructions that as of 24 June, no further supply of men or matériel should be made or permitted to be 27 given to the Lebanese rebels’. Nasser’s pledge to cease activities against 28 Lebanon was conveyed to Chamoun by Hammarskjöld. A concurrent development was a noticeable decrease in the hostility of Cairo radio broadcasts. A few days later, the impact of Nasser’s orders was felt by rebel leaders such as Kamal Jumblatt and Saeb Salam, who complained 29 to the UN officer Rajeshwar Dayal that they could no longer depend on 30 assistance from outside. Rumours circulated in diplomatic circles of an under-the-table deal between Nasser and Hammarskjöld whereby Nasser promised to stop sending aid to the Lebanese rebels in return for 31 Hammarskjöld’s pledge of a ‘watered down’ UNOGIL report. The first report issued on 3 July effectively maintained that there was no evidence of massive interference by the UAR in Lebanon, contrary to the claims of the Lebanese government. Notwithstanding Nasser’s curtailment of assistance to the rebels and despite the informal truce, American intelligence reports warned of an impending large-scale attack on the city of Beirut by the opposition 32 forces. A week earlier, the American embassy in Damascus reported in a dispatch to Washington that 20 civilian truckloads of small arms were sighted during the period of 19–22 June leaving Aleppo in a westerly direction. An unnamed source informed an embassy officer that the Lebanese opposition were uniting forces for a coordinated attack within 33 the coming few days. President Chamoun estimated rebel strength to be between 10,000 to 12,000 men, 25 per cent of whom were Syrian or 34 Egyptian. A member of the UN observation team reported a similar 35 figure. As for the casualty figures, the commander-in-chief of the Lebanese army reported that as of 22 June, 1400 persons had been killed as a result of the ongoing disturbances that had broken out in May. Of 36 this figure, 40 were army casualties. The anticipated large-scale offensive occurred during the last week of June following a brief period of calm while the UN secretary general visited Lebanon. Kamal Jumblatt’s forces led the offensive from their mountain stronghold east of Beirut and came within six miles of the airport but were unable to take control of it. While Jumblatt attacked Beirut, Rashid Karami activated the opposition front in Tripoli. On 29


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and 30 June, heavy fighting broke out in the two areas of Tripoli and the Shuf. In the Shuf, the army repelled Jumblatt’s forces from making 37 further advances towards the town of Shemlan. The British-operated Arabic language institute at Shemlan was evacuated under fire on the 38 morning of 30 June. The events of Tripoli illustrated the level of violence in the country. The second largest city in Lebanon (after Beirut) was partially controlled by insurgents led by Rashid Karami. The army based at the city’s port for several weeks had to withdraw from Tripoli harbour and relocate at the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) terminal five kilometres up the coast. A week later, it was able to reinstall units at the 39 port but only with the reinforcement of Sherman tanks. By 12 July, the port area of Tripoli lost its position as an opposition centre and the rebels simply gave up and left. IPC employees who had to evacuate their 40 homes at the beginning of the troubles in May returned. The military report for that week concluded, ‘During period 27–30 June Army used tanks, planes, and heavy weapons to repel what was believed to be an all out effort by opposition forces to gain complete control Tripoli and 41 vicinity.’ Army intelligence reports maintained that the rebels who controlled part of Tripoli tried to oust the Lebanese army in order to set up a rebel government. However, the Lebanese army was able to hold 42 onto its positions in the city. In Beirut, on 2 July, Saeb Salam announced to his followers over the loudspeaker system of the mosques in the Basta quarter ‘not to rise to arms until the arrival of Jumblatt’s Druzes, who would be at the gates of 43 Beirut shortly’. A week earlier Chamoun had requested the Americans 44 to intervene militarily. The Americans refused to respond to Chamoun’s request and Dulles repeatedly urged Chamoun to ‘do everything in his power to avoid situation in which request for intervention might be 45 required’. The opposition’s determination to seize power (even after the resolution of the re-election issue, with Prime Minister Sulh’s statement of 27 May) was explicitly discussed by Michel ‘Aflaq, a founder of the Ba’th Party, which had engineered the formation of the UAR. The Ba’th Party was founded in Damascus in the 1940s. Its ideological purpose was to work for Arab unity within a secular and socialist framework. On 2 June ‘Aflaq confirmed that Nasser had been informed of the opposition’s plans to take power. Furthermore, according to ‘Aflaq,

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Nasser had agreed to seek Soviet political and other support for the 46 Lebanese insurgents. That the opposition’s real aims were more radical than their stated ones was an opinion held by the British ambassador, an astute observer of the Lebanese scene. George Middleton believed that the real objective of the opposition was the ‘satellization’ or ‘Nasserization’ of Lebanon. The opposition sought to revise the National Pact of 1943 and thereby ‘challenge the position held by Lebanon’s Christians since 1860 when the European powers imposed on the Ottoman Empire a semi47 autonomous regime for Lebanon, with a Christian governor’. In expressing these views, Middleton echoed the beliefs and fears of many Lebanese. While few opposition leaders publicly expressed the desire that Lebanon join the UAR, the above-mentioned remarks by ‘Aflaq indicated that they were working for it. The month of July was busy with diplomatic activity and began with the three Western ambassadors urging Chamoun to take action against the rebels prior to any intervention by their respective countries. They also urged the Lebanese president to pursue the path of political compromise as the only way out of the conflict. American and British policymakers in particular, were quick to express their reservations about the first report of the UN observers, issued on 4 July, which failed to support the Lebanese government’s charge of massive UAR inter48 ference in Lebanon. Although American policymakers led by Dulles emphasized that ‘the only satisfactory solution of the Lebanese crisis was one brought about by the Lebanese themselves’ they reiterated that strife 49 in Lebanon may not have occurred without instigation from the UAR. Despite these statements, the overall impression in Lebanon was that the United States appeared to be backing down from its previous commitment to intervene militarily upon the request of the Lebanese government. At a news conference on 1 July, the secretary of state said that if American troops were sent to Lebanon, they would only be sent as ‘a sort 50 of measure of last resort’. Dulles’s statements dispelled the belief that the Americans were keen to intervene in Lebanon. Diplomatic activity at the regional level was stepped up in July, with support for the Lebanese government coming from leaders of Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Jordan who repeatedly urged the Western powers 51 to intervene militarily in Lebanon to ensure the defeat of the rebels.


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Furthermore, Turkey and Iraq encouraged Chamoun to enter into a defensive military alliance with the Arab Union, which comprised Iraq and Jordan and had been formed in March 1958 to counter the UAR (formed in February). Chamoun was not enthusiastic about joining the Arab Union and privately expressed his own misgivings as to the ability 52 of Arab armies and their unpredictability. The main motivation for the Arab leaders’ support for Chamoun was their fear that if Lebanon fell to the pro-Nasser rebels, a similar fate awaited them as their populations increasingly succumbed to the influence of the charismatic Egyptian leader. According to one of the leading opposition accounts of the 1958 crisis, Chamoun’s hesitancy to commit Lebanon to the Arab Union or Baghdad Pact alliance was his fear of the rebels making good on their threat to ‘call for volunteers from all the Arab countries and elsewhere, if Iraqi or Jordanian troops intervened in Lebanon on behalf of the Leba53 nese Government’. The opposition maintained that agreement was reached between Chamoun and the Arab Union leaders for concluding a joint defence agreement that would give legal sanction to Iraqi military 54 intervention in Lebanon. British and American documents do not sustain this account and, while the prospective defence treaty was preempted by the Iraqi revolution, no proposals for such a treaty were discussed in the Lebanese parliament. The second week of July marked a substantial decrease in military activity on the part of the rebels. Intelligence sources indicated a reduc55 tion in the flow of men and arms into Lebanon. These developments were accompanied by rumours of a split among the rebel leadership. Saeb Salam quickly discounted an Associated Press interview with Kamal Jumblatt during which Jumblatt admitted to a falling out between rebel 56 leaders. Throughout the Lebanese crisis, the rebels unsuccessfully tried to set up a unified command. Failure to do so was attributed to regional considerations. Jumblatt was in charge of the Shuf, Karami took charge in Tripoli, Hamade in the Bekaa’, while Salam, Hakim, and other Beirutis commanded the rebels in Beirut. Opposition accounts of the crisis acknowledged a divided rebel leadership and ascribed ‘the rebels failure 57 to deal Chamoun the final blow’ to these divisions among their leaders. The rebels’ lack of concerted action was also discussed in American embassy reports to Washington. Miles Copeland reported that the opposition leaders were out of touch with each other, particularly Kamal

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Jumblatt who was, in Copeland’s words, ‘freewheeling with no coordination with Saeb Salam or Rashid Karami’. Jumblatt confirmed that he was accepting aid from the UAR and spoke highly of UAR ambassador Abdul 58 Hamid Ghaleb. In the country at large, the ongoing crisis and its increasingly felt economic effects led the Executive Council of the Lebanese Industrial Association that represented the majority of leading industrialists in Lebanon to issue an ultimatum. On 9 July the council passed a resolution that called for closing all factories and discharging all employees if parliament failed to elect a new president at its upcoming session on 24 59 July. The industrial sector had lost $8 million in earnings for 1958 compared with the previous year. In order to alleviate the Lebanese government’s economic problems resulting from the ongoing rebellion, the US government announced its readiness to offer financial assistance 60 beyond the $10 million annual funds allocated to Lebanon. At the international level, events in Iraq in mid-July brought about an immediate shift in American policy, particularly regarding the willingness of the Eisenhower administration to land troops in Lebanon. Prior to the revolution in Iraq, the Baghdad Pact countries continued to urge Western support for Lebanon and were scheduled to meet in London on 28 July. Before the London meeting, the four Muslim members of the Pact (Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey) were to meet in Istanbul on 14 July reportedly to pressure the United States towards full membership of the Baghdad Pact. The purpose was to strengthen the organization and 61 the position of its members in the Middle East against Nasser’s UAR. According to an opposition account, the major purpose of the 14 July 62 meeting was to discuss the Lebanese situation. These meetings did not take place as planned, for on 14 July, the day the Iraqi king was due to leave Baghdad for Istanbul, a military-led revolution toppled the Iraqi monarchy, killed the king and proclaimed a republic in Iraq. The coup leaders’ sympathy for Nasser was demonstrated by their immediate decision to recognize the UAR. The previous regime had refused to extend diplomatic recognition and had joined Jordan in May in a federation to counter the UAR, which had been formed in February 1958. Meanwhile, in Lebanon quiet lobbying was underway to convince General Chehab to stand for the presidency on 24 July. Although


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Chamoun had clearly expressed his view that he would not seek reelection and privately indicated that he would support the candidacy of Chehab, opposition leaders such as Saeb Salam continued to call for the president’s immediate resignation from office, for the dissolution of parliament and for new parliamentary elections to precede the 63 presidential election. Salam’s views were echoed by another opposition leader, Abdallah al-Mashnouk, who published similar views in his suspended daily Beirut al-Massa. Despite the intransigence shown by some opposition leaders, the crisis in Lebanon was heading towards resolution by compromise by the second week of July. The speaker of parliament Adel Osseiran met with moderate opposition leader Hussein Oueini and obtained the 64 opposition’s support for the candidacy of Chehab. Osseiran confidently spoke of ‘the definite presidential elections to be held on July 24th with general agreement on a single candidate’. He dismissed the opposition’s demand to dissolve parliament and maintained that their contention that 65 the 1957 elections were rigged was ‘unsubstantiated’. While dwindling external material support for the rebels motivated them to seek compromise, the economic effects of the two-month-long rebellion took its toll on all economic sectors and parties. The government’s earnings were depleted and the treasury would have difficulty paying government 66 civil servants by September if the fiscal situation did not improve. Consequently, while American military and diplomatic intervention in July contributed to the resolution of the crisis and to an orderly transfer of power from Chamoun to Chehab, the process was more than likely already underway prior to the events in Iraq and to US military 67 intervention. The Iraqi revolution shockingly interrupted the Lebanese presidential campaign and, as the rebels hailed the coup and danced in the streets, President Chamoun immediately appealed to the USA, Britain and France to send troops to Lebanon to contain the fallout from the Iraqi situation. While the events in Iraq heartened the rebels in Lebanon, the Arab countries that maintained friendly ties with the West feared a spillover of the revolution in Iraq, which both they and Western leaders believed Nasser had instigated. The revolution had caught everyone by surprise and observers in the West expressed surprise and dismay on 14 July. One American reporter wrote: ‘The shadow of Nasserism fell across

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the Arab Middle East today. Washington awoke to it with surprise and 68 did not like it.’ Such commentary captured the prevalent mood in Washington as well as in London. The Iraqi revolution shocked the Western powers for it struck at the bastion of British influence in one of the largest oil-producing states in the Arab world and put what Western governments perceived at the time to be a pro-Nasserist government in control. The new rulers in Iraq set up a nationalist regime that had little direct links with Nasser. It was not until after the American and British military intervention in Lebanon and Jordan that the Western leadership paused to consider the possibility that Nasser may not have instigated 69 the Iraqi revolution. In a highly classified communication with the American secretary of state John Foster Dulles, British prime minister Harold Macmillan advised caution with regard to policy decisions about the new Iraqi regime, which, as he put it, ‘may turn out to be more nationalist than Nasserite and might even wish to stay in the Baghdad 70 Pact’. Although the former assessment was accurate the Iraqi revolutionaries withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which lost its founding member. Events in Iraq threatened to eliminate Western influence in the area as a whole. British and American fears were for the security of the oil-rich states 71 of the Persian Gulf. In Washington, Dulles expressed agreement with the British position in defining priorities to the British representative, namely that ‘the Gulf was the essential area, and that so long as we could 72 hold it and its oil resources, the loss of Iraq was not intolerable.’ The oil-producing states were alarmed at events in Iraq less than 24 hours after the revolution. Saudi Arabia’s king sent Eisenhower two messages demanding immediate action and warning that British and American failure to act would signal their end as powers in the Middle East. American intelligence assessments presented by CIA chief Allen Dulles to the president in the wake of the Iraqi revolution, concluded that 73 ‘Kuwait’s fate is presently in the balance.’ Fears of a coup in oil rich Kuwait on the south-eastern border of Iraq led Britain to move a battalion to Aden on 19 July and to ‘authorize the British Agent in Kuwait [Kuwait obtained its independence in 1961] to call for troops in 74 the event of disturbances’. The American president supported British redeployment of troops to strengthen its forces in the Persian Gulf and ordered the transfer of troops from the US base in Okinawa to the Gulf.


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Eisenhower’s concern for the security of the oilfields prompted him to charge the Middle Eastern Emergency Committee to draw up plans for an oil lift to Western Europe to offset any potential interruption in 75 Middle Eastern oil supplies. AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LEBANON

Fear generated by the Iraqi revolution accounted for the prompt British and American response to the appeals of Hussein of Jordan and Chamoun for military assistance. The situation of both leaders was judged to be precarious. Washington had ‘very reliable information’ that a coup d’état, similar to that of Iraq, ‘had been scheduled against King 76 Hussein of Jordan for July 17’. In early July, American intelligence sources alerted the King to the plot and he subsequently ordered the arrest of his chief aide, Colonel Radi Abdallah. American and Jordanian officials believed that Abdallah was conspiring with the Syrian minister of the interior, Colonel Abdul Hamid Sarraj, but there was no clear 77 evidence that Nasser was personally aware of the plot. On 16 July, two days after the Iraqi revolution and Lebanon’s consequent request for Western military intervention, King Hussein asked the British and American governments to fulfil previously given commitments to assist Jordan to maintain its independence. The king’s request for Anglo– American assistance was based on ‘the critical situation facing Jordan as a result of the Lebanese crisis, rebellion in Iraq and on the basis of information obtained from most reliable sources that a UAR inspired 78 coup d’état was scheduled to take place within 24 hours’. In Lebanon, six hours after the revolution occurred in Iraq, President Chamoun summoned the American ambassador and informed him that 79 ‘he wanted US military intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours’. Chamoun made similar appeals to Britain and France. He understood that French intervention would be ‘largely symbolic because of French 80 lack of means’. As of mid-June, the French admiralty had ordered the cruiser DeGrasse to remain within a 50-mile radius of the Lebanese coast and be ready for a possible evacuation of the 3000 French nationals 81 resident in Lebanon. France’s response to Chamoun’s appeal was a belated one, made on 16 July, when the French ambassador expressed support for the American intervention and France’s wish to send a cruiser to Beirut for a token visit in order to ensure the safety of French

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lives and property. In France, the press emphasized the importance of allied solidarity in the wake of the Iraqi revolution and there was a general awareness of the potential effects of a weakened Western 83 position in the Middle East for French interests in North Africa. In Washington, Eisenhower met with his advisers and members of Congress on 14 July. The president’s decisiveness to respond affirmatively to Chamoun’s request was apparent to his advisers. As Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs: ‘This was one meeting in which my mind was practically made up regarding the general line of action we should take, 84 even before we met.’ Although initial contingency plans envisaged a joint Anglo–American military landing in Lebanon, the Americans asked the British to ‘hold 85 back from the initial operation as planned’. While they sought and received British support, American leadership preferred to avoid public association with British military forces still tainted in the eyes of many Arabs with the Suez crisis. In a telephone conversation with British prime minister Harold Macmillan a few hours after learning of the Iraqi revolution, President Eisenhower asked him to hold in reserve for possible action in Jordan British forces previously earmarked for deployment in Lebanon. Macmillan then asked and received Eisen86 hower’s assurances that they were ‘in this together’. To obtain moral sanction for the Lebanon intervention, the Americans asked for a UN Security Council meeting for 15 July. The Security Council announced the intervention simultaneously with the landing of US troops on shore. American marines landed on the Beirut shores near the airport at 3 p.m. on 15 July and their first encounter with Lebanese was with beach goers and ice-cream vendors. After securing a beachhead at Khalde, south of Beirut, the marines were ordered to proceed to the city the next day. The reaction of the Lebanese people to the landings was as varied as the political factions in Lebanon and ranged from jubilation to lamentation. ‘In Beirut the Christians cele87 brated the American landings with the ringing of church bells.’ Progovernment newspapers, such as the Phalangist Party’s Al-’Amal, ran the headline ‘Lebanese citizens go out to shore to welcome US troops.’ For the opposition, the landings were the result of a Western conspiracy 88 against the independence of Lebanon. The opposition daily paper, AlTelegraph, described the landings as ‘flagrant aggression to Lebanon’s


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independence; this is an occupation in the full sense of the word’. A more judicious commentary was made by the moderately pro-Western and Harvard-educated deputy, and journalist, Ghassan Tueini who wrote, ‘the Government of Lebanon’s policy of looking to the West for protection is patterned after the worn out crusades whereas by landing troops, the West is simply protecting its vital interests. … Foreign troops 89 will not solve the Lebanese crisis.’ Tueni’s assessment of the situation was shared by a number of Christians in Lebanon. Fear of domination by Nasser drove the majority of the public to support Chamoun’s policy of alignment with the Western powers. The polarization between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon that ensued from their divided loyalties would be temporarily relaxed with the neutralist policy adopted by Chamoun’s successor, Fuad Chehab. The day after landing on the Lebanese shore, American marines began to move along the airport road towards Beirut. They soon ran into the Lebanese army garrison of Beirut lined up across the road with its tanks, barring the way into the city. American ambassador Robert McClintock and Lebanese commander-in-chief General Fuad Chehab drove out to the scene of the airport standoff where they met the American commander-in-chief Admiral Holloway accompanied by Rear Admiral H. A. Yaeger. The men defused the potentially explosive situation and agreed that joint Lebanese and American military patrols 90 would be conducted in Beirut. It was later ascertained that the deployment of the Lebanese forces in ‘this threatening attitude had been the insubordinate act of certain younger officers in the armor and artillery’ and was not an order by the army commander-in-chief who had never91 theless expressed reservations about American military intervention. Units of the 24th Airborne Brigade deployed from Germany later joined the marine forces. The total number of American forces deployed in Lebanon reached a peak of 14,300 of which 8500 were US Army and 5800 were marines. The military operation cost the American 92 government US $200 million. American military intervention was reinforced with a simultaneous diplomatic mission. On 16 July, the day following the first marine landings, President Eisenhower sent Robert Murphy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to Beirut to assist in brokering a settlement between the antagonists. Murphy met Chamoun on 18 July and ‘found a tired and

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worried man, who for 67 days had been a self-made prisoner’. Murphy observed that ‘apparently he [Chamoun] had not so much as looked out of a window during that time and this undoubtedly was wise as his 93 chances of assassination were excellent.’ Murphy met opposition leaders including Salam, Jumblatt, Karami, Yafi and Oueini and assured them that American intervention was not aimed at supporting Chamoun’s re-election. Contrary to the expectations of both Chamoun’s supporters and the opposition, the American troops did not engage in combat against the opposition forces and simply took positions at the airport and in Beirut and dug in. Subsequent to the event, opposition accounts claimed that the initial goal of US forces was to attack the rebel areas and subdue them militarily and that the American plan was foiled by General Chehab’s reaction at the airport and his insistence that US 94 troops enter Beirut escorted by Lebanese troops. The diplomatic documents do not substantiate these accounts and indicate the limited military mission of the American forces, which did not envisage an attack against the rebels in their Basta stronghold or elsewhere. While Murphy conducted diplomacy at the highest levels, the American administration tried to explain the US intervention to the Lebanese people. On 21 July American jets dropped one million leaflets all over Lebanon showing the picture of Eisenhower with the following message in Arabic addressed ‘to the citizens of Lebanon’: American troops have entered your country in response to a request by your constitutional government. They are there to help you maintain Lebanon’s independence in the face of threats by those who wish to interfere in your affairs and who have endangered the security of your country. American forces will leave your country as soon as the UN takes measures to guarantee Lebanon’s 95 independence. By mid-August United States deployment of forces peaked at 14,300 men and that day a phased withdrawal of the troops began. The last American soldier left on 25 October. On 31 July, the Lebanese parliament met and elected Fuad Chehab 96 as the next president of the republic. Murphy’s efforts had paid off and in his memoirs he admitted that through the difficult weeks that he


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spent in Beirut his esteem for the general had grown, ‘He was devoted to his Army career and I am sure he did not seek the presidency. Although political ambition sprouts rapidly in some individuals, Chehab had a vast amount of common sense and he accepted the office 97 only as a compromise essential to peace in Lebanon.’ Murphy’s assessment of Chehab was widely shared by many Lebanese and was a reason for the consensus by a number of political groups on Chehab as a compromise candidate. American motives for military intervention in Lebanon can be summarized in terms of credibility and resources and both were to be found outside Lebanon. Failure to respond to Lebanon’s appeal would undermine America’s credibility with its Arab allies, but, more impor98 tantly, the non-Arab members of the Baghdad Pact. The countries Turkey, Iran and Pakistan constituted the Northern Tier that faced the Soviet Union and were of vital interest for American strategic defence plans. The second and equally important motive for intervention was oil. The Western powers feared a spillover of the revolution in Iraq to other friendly oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf area. As seen above, Eisenhower’s main concern in the wake of the Iraqi revolution was the security of the oilfields. In a private conversation with Vice-President Nixon, Eisenhower attributed the Middle East crisis set off by the Iraqi revolution to ‘the struggle of Nasser to get control of the oil supplies’ in order ‘to get the income and power to destroy the Western world’. In his view, Nasser had violated a tenet of American foreign policy, which since 1945 had been ‘to maintain the opportunity to reach vitally needed petroleum supplies peaceably, without hindrance on the part of any 99 one’. Western policymakers feared a coup in Kuwait similar to that in Iraq. Dulles expressed his apprehension for the security of the Kuwaiti 100 and Saudi oilfields. At that time Western policymakers believed that the Iraqi revolutionaries were instigated by Nasser and consequently concluded that a military show of force in Lebanon would indicate the resolve of the West to defend the Gulf. The decisive effect of the Iraqi revolution on Western policy decisions in the Middle East and the relative unimportance of Lebanon in that context, was underlined by the British prime minister in a highly classified communication with the American president the day after the Iraqi revolution:

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I should like to feel that you agree with me that in the new situation the Lebanon cannot be looked at by itself. Indeed if these events had not happened in Iraq we would probably be carrying on the policy on which we were working together up till today; that is to hope for a political settlement in the Lebanon and a gradual questioning down of the situation. Now Lebanon is only 101 part of a much wider crisis. From both the Lebanese and Western perspectives, the Lebanese crisis was on its way to a peaceful political resolution on the eve of the Iraqi revolution. Prior to the revolution, the Western powers had pursued the course of diplomacy to try and resolve the crisis in Lebanon. They had no intentions of responding to Chamoun’s request for military assistance. Events in Iraq raised the stakes and rendered intervention in Lebanon unavoidable. NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 4572, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 9 June 1958. 2. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4472, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 6 June 1958. 3. Karami, Waqi al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, p. 231. 4. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4726, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 14 June 1958. 5. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 280. 6. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between William Rountree and Charles Malik, Secret, Washington, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 14 June 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XI, p. 115. 7. Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, p. 230. 8. Reported by a USIS senior employee to US embassy in Damascus. Hart to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3177, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 16 June 1958. 9. Hart to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3180, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 16 June 1958. See also Hart to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3224, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 22 June 1958. 10. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4861, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 18 June 1958.


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11. This information was conveyed to American embassy officials in Damascus by a pro-Western Syrian businessman who also opined that ‘the Lebanese opposition groups were no longer free agents but very heavily indebted to the authorities in the Syrian region of the UAR.’ Hart to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 6, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 1 July 1958. 12. US Army Beirut to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 153, Secret, 13 June 1958. The American ambassador gave a figure of ‘between five and seven thousand men on the insurgent side’. See Robert McClintock, ‘The American Landing in Lebanon’, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1962, Vol. 88, No. 10, pp. 65–79. 13. Dulles to McClintock, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4814, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 16 June 1958. 14. See Chapter 5 for a biographical summary of Chehab. 15. Dulles to McClintock, Foreign Service Dispatch No.4779, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 14 June 1958, FRUS, 1958– 1960, Vol. XI, p. 118. 16. Caccia to Lloyd, Top Secret, 15 June 1958, FO 371/134122. 17. At a White House meeting attended by the visiting British prime minister, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs William M. Rountree explicitly stated that: ‘as regards the immediate problem of help to the [Lebanese] government in its crisis we were progressing well on the covert side where greater flexibility is required in the use of money.’ The reference was to the amount of aid allocated to Lebanon. Memorandum of Conversation, White House, Top Secret, Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1022, 9 June 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XI, pp. 104–6. 18. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4795, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 June 1958. According to Eveland, it was Mrs Chamoun who handed him the family jewels and asked him to store them in the embassy’s safe. She charged Eveland with ensuring that ‘their boys receive the jewels in the event that she and the president were killed’. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 280. 19. The signatories to the Lebanese Cabinet resolution that empowered Chamoun ‘to ask for the fulfilment of guarantees given by friendly nations and intervention when he thinks it fit’ were Majid Arslan, Clovis el-Khazen, Sami al-Sulh, Joseph Skaff, Pierre Eddé, Joseph Chader, Albert Mokheiber, Kazim el-Khalil, and Farid Cozma. For the text of the resolution see McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4818, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files,

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20.

21.

22.

23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

Struggle in the Levant: Lebanon in the 1950s 783A.00, 17 June 1958. See also Middleton to Lloyd, Top Secret, 17 June 1958, FO 371/134123. Middleton to Lloyd, Top Secret, 17 June 1958, FO 371/134123. This Foreign Office document does not provide the name of the ‘American Intelligence Officer’ but the account of events is almost identical to that related by Eveland in his book Ropes of Sand and substantiates his account. American diplomatic documents relate these events but omit reference to the identity and nationality of the person sent for by Chamoun on the evening of 16 June 1958. See McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4795, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 June 1958, and Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp. 280–3. Telegram from the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (Holloway), Top Secret; Emergency, 17 June 1958. An account of events by Pierre Eddé, who held cabinet posts in the 1950s and was the son of former president Emile Eddé, also documented Chamoun’s official request (with the government’s sanction) for American intervention. See al-Deiry, Man Yasna’ al-Rais?, p. 63. See Memorandum of Conversation, Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 092 Lebanon TS Sensitive. Top Secret; Emergency, 18 June 1958; and also Dulles to McClintock, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4890, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 19 June 1958. For British concurrence, see Caccia to Lloyd, Immediate Top Secret, 19 June 1958, FO 371/134123. Lloyd to Caccia, Top Secret, 19 June 1958, FO 371/134123. The British ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Michael Wright, reported this Iraqi perspective of events. See Wright to Lloyd, Top Secret, 21 June 1958, FO 371/134124. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4928, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 20 June 1958. Quoted in Middleton to Lloyd, 25 June 1958, FO 371/134125. Memorandum from the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 26 June 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. XI, pp. 175–80. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 5103, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 25 June 1958. Dayal happened to be a personal friend of Jumblatt and had met the Lebanese leader during Jumblatt’s numerous trips to India where he stayed at an ashram and practiced yoga and meditation.


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30. Barco (USUN) to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1588, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 28 June 1958. 31. The first Secretary of the Greek embassy conveyed this information to the American embassy; he had heard it from the Lebanese ambassador to Turkey, Khalil Takieddine. See Warren (Ankara) to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 109, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 9 July 1958. 32. In his 26 June briefing of the National Security Council on world developments affecting US security, the director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, reported on preparations by the rebels for a ‘large-scale attack’ on Beirut. Memorandum of discussion at the 370th meeting of the National Security Council, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File NSC Records. See also FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XI, p. 181. 33. Hart to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 3235, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 24 June 1958. 34. Chamoun gave these figures at a press conference for foreign correspondents on 25 June 1958, Middleton to Lloyd, FO 371/134125. This was Chamoun’s second press conference since the beginning of the rebellion 46 days earlier on 9 May. 35. Memorandum of a Conversation between the Minister of the British Embassy (Lord Hood) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Rountree), Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 3 July 1958. 36. Middleton to Lloyd, 23 June 1958, FO 371/134123. 37. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No.14, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 1 July 1958. 38. See the article ‘Beirut Uses Jets to Check Rebels’, New York Times, 1 July 1958. 39. US Army Beirut to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 201, Secret, 26 June 1958. See also New York Times, 28 July and 29 July 1958. 40. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 49, 13 July 1958, Department of State, Central Files. For an account of the events in Tripoli from the perspective of the opposition, see Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah alLubnaniyah, pp. 238–56. 41. US Army Beirut to Department of Army Washington DC, No. CX 215, 3 July 1958. 42. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 16, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 1 July 1958. 43. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 77, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 3 July 1958.

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44. Based on reports from Indian members of the UNOGIL to the Indian Foreign Secretary. Office of the High Commissioner (New Delhi) to Commonwealth Relations Office (London), Confidential, 26 June 1958, FO 371/134127. 45. Caccia to Lloyd, Top Secret, 25 June 1958, FO 371/134125. 46. Hart (Damascus) to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3083, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 4 June 1958. 47. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 11 June 1958, FO 371/134122. Among the constitutional changes for which the opposition unsuccessfully campaigned was that the president of the republic be elected by popular vote instead of by parliament. See New York Times, 10 July 1958. 48. See the New York Times article, ‘Britain Repeats Lebanese Stand: Feels United Arab Republic Has Seriously Intervened’, 7 July 1958. 49. Department of State Circular, Sent to US Missions Worldwide, Official Use Only, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 4 July 1958. 50. New York Times, 2 July 1958. 51. A headline in the New York Times of 8 July 1958 read, ‘4 Baghdad Pact Countries said to Support Chamoun: Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey Reported to have Pledged Aid to President of Lebanon against Rebels.’ 52. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 206, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 8 July 1958. 53. Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, p. 268. 54. Ibid. 55. Department of State to American Embassy, Ankara, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 8 July 1958. 56. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 206, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 8 July 1958. 57. Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, pp. 230–2. 58. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 5235, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 30 June 1958. 59. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 228, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 9 July 1958. 60. New York Times, 13 July 1958. 61. ‘Baghdad Powers Eye Full US Tie’, New York Times, 13 July 1958. 62. Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, pp. 270–1. 63. Chamoun told the speaker of parliament Adel Osseiran that he would support Chehab for the presidency. Osseiran relayed this information to the American embassy. See McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 262, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 10 July 1958. 64. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 294, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 July 1958.


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65. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 285, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 July 1958. 66. As related to the American ambassador by the Lebanese Minister for Planning Joseph Chader. See McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 320, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 12 July 1958. 67. A contrary opinion is that of Robert McClintock who was US ambassador to Lebanon in 1958. In an article he wrote four years after the Lebanese crisis McClintock maintained that the crisis in Lebanon could not have been resolved without the stabilizing influence of the American forces in Lebanon. See Robert McClintock, ‘The American Landing in Lebanon’, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1962, Vol. 88, No. 10, p. 77. 68. ‘Nasserism’s March Dismays the Capital’ by Dana Adams Schmidt, New York Times, 15 July 1958. 69. At a cabinet meeting held on 24 July 1958 to review the latest developments in the Middle East, the British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd said that a report from the British ambassador at Baghdad indicated that many of the coup leaders ‘might be actuated more by a sincere desire for domestic reform in Iraq than by sympathy with the policies of the United Arab Republic’. Until the situation was clarified, Lloyd advised that Britain maintain a ‘non-committal attitude’ towards the new Iraqi regime. C.C. (58) 64, 24 July 1958, CAB 128/32. 70. Macmillan to Dulles, Top Secret, 19 July 1958, FO 371/133808. 71. Robert Divine’s thesis is that Eisenhower’s greatest concern in the wake of the Iraqi revolution was ‘the security of the Persian Gulf oilfields’ and not the possibility of a coup in Lebanon. In itself Lebanon was peripheral to American concerns, and its importance lay in its use as a test case for American credibility in the Middle East. See Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 101. 72. Lord Hood to Lloyd, Secret, 20 July 1958, FO 371/133823. 73. Memorandum of Conference with the President, White House, Washington, 14 July 1958, Top Secret, Whitman Files, Eisenhower Diaries, Eisenhower Library. 74. Intelligence Briefing Notes relating to the Mid-East Crisis — Reported to the president by Brigadier General, A. J. Goodpaster, Top Secret, 19 July 1958, White House Office, Office of Staff Security: Records of Goodpaster; Box No. 14, Eisenhower Library. 75. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 278. 76. Robert McClintock, ‘The American Landing in Lebanon’, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1962, p.69.

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77. For an account of the events of the Jordanian crisis of July 1958, see Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967 (Oxford, 1989), pp. 86–95. See also James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography (London, 1989) whose account is based on Hussein’s memoirs and on personal interviews. 78. Wright to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 132, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 16 July 1958. 79. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 358, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 14 July 1958. 80. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 358, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 14 July 1958. 81. London to Secretary of State, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 7304, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 17 June 1958. 82. Scott to Lloyd, Secret, 17 July 1958, FO 371/134131. 83. Jebb to Lloyd, Unclassified, 16 July 1958, FO 371/133784. 84. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961, p. 270. 85. Memorandum of Conversation, Dulles and Hood (the chargé d’affaires at the British embassy) at Dulles Residence, Top Secret, 14 July 1958, John Foster Dulles Papers 1951–59, JFD Chronological Series (July 1958), Box No. 16, Eisenhower Library. 86. Report of a Telephone Call between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan, 14 July 1958, DDE Diary Series (Ann Whitman File), Box No. 34, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 87. Scott to Lloyd, Confidential, 16 July 1958, FO 371/134130. 88. For the opposition view of the American landings, see Karami, Waqi’ alThawrah al-Lubnaniyah, pp. 278–302. 89. Al-Nahar, 16 July 1958. 90. For an account of the landing by the commander of the first contingent of American troops to land in Lebanon, see H. A. Hadd, ‘Orders Firm but Flexible’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1962, Vol. 88, No. 10, pp. 81–9. 91. This incident was described in detail by the American ambassador who was present at the scene and whose participation in his own words was that of ‘fulfilling the more humble office of interpreter’. Robert McClintock, ‘The American Landing in Lebanon’, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1962, p. 71. 92. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York, 1964), p. 409. 93. Ibid., p. 400. 94. Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, p. 287. 95. From an original leaflet kept at Jafet Library, American University of Beirut.


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96. The initial date for the presidential election was 24 July, but it had to be postponed until 31 July because Chehab, the only candidate acceptable to all parties, refused to stand for election. He subsequently agreed on 29 July and was elected as president of the republic on 31 July. 97. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 408. 98. In a telephone conversation with the president, Dulles emphasized the importance of US relations with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, saying that although ‘we always felt we would lose the Arab world … but did not want to lose the confidence of these countries’. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, 14 July 1958, White House Telephone Conversations, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library. 99. Memorandum of a Conversation between the President and the Vice President (Nixon), White House, Washington, 15 July 1958, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries, Staff Notes, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XI, pp. 244–5. 100. Hood to Lloyd, Top Secret, 18 July 1958, FO 371/133823. 101. Macmillan to Eisenhower, Top Secret, 15 July 1958, FO 371/134130.

8 The Resolution of the Crisis LEBANON’S CASE AT THE UN

The United Nations played an active role in Lebanon and a discussion of its role is essential to any study dealing with the events of 1958. We will therefore revert to early May in order to assess the role of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) as well as other diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. On 27 May, the Lebanese prime minister read an official statement over the radio that his government would not seek to amend the constitution, thereby putting to rest speculation about Chamoun’s reelection. For American policymakers, the resolution of the re-election issue was a major breakthrough in the Lebanese crisis. With this obstacle removed, they sought to eliminate other causes of friction by privately asking Nasser to use his influence with the Lebanese opposition ‘to dissuade them from continuing to demand the resignation of Chamoun 1 before his term expired’. Nasser had previously expressed to the American ambassador his ‘desire to use his influence with the Lebanese 2 opposition leaders in a helpful manner’. On 20 May, two days before Lebanon addressed a formal complaint to the UN Security Council charging the UAR with interference in its internal political affairs, Nasser had a two-hour meeting with the American ambassador and conveyed to him his proposals for the settlement of the crisis in Lebanon. Unlike the position held by the Lebanese oppo210

The Resolution of the Crisis

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sition, Nasser did not insist on Chamoun’s immediate resignation and said that the situation should be resolved in accordance with the constitution; Nasser agreed that Chamoun should complete his term and suggested Chehab as an appropriate successor. Ambassador Hare noted the more moderate approach that characterized this meeting, compared with his previous meetings with the Egyptian leader: Although I am still somewhat mystified by this sudden change of Nasser from the tendentious and querulous to thoughtful and reasonable (a change which was also reflected in his entire manner), I feel that we may have struck lead which can be profitably pursued. If so, it would surely be preferable do so rather than have case go to Security Council where it could hardly fail to degenerate into a propaganda battle between Lebanon backed by West and UAR backed by USSR. Perhaps this is Nasser’s worry since recurrent theme of conversation was his aversion being 3 linked with Soviets in connection Lebanon. Nasser’s relations with the Soviets had deteriorated and disenchantment with the Soviet Union gave the Egyptian leader greater incentive for 4 improving relations with the United States. Despite this knowledge by the Americans, Hare’s advice was unheeded and, on 22 May 1958, the Lebanese government, with much encouragement from the British, took its case to the UN Security Council where it charged the UAR with inter5 ference in Lebanon’s internal affairs. The British were sceptical of Nasser’s overtures and, while privy to the talks going on between Nasser and Hare, sought a resolution of the Lebanese crisis through other means such as the UN. However, despite some scepticism there seemed to be a consensus among British diplomats that Nasser genuinely wanted to disengage from the Lebanese situation. From Beirut, Middleton wrote that Nasser’s moderation implied that ‘the opposition and their patrons would like a truce’. Nasser’s insistence on a general amnesty for the rebels ‘may well indicate that they want to have their hands free to start all over again when the time seems 6 propitious’. In Washington, Caccia interpreted Nasser’s overtures as indicative of ‘his wish to disengage from the Lebanese operation’, which, according to the ambassador’s information, ‘was a new direction that

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seemed to be confirmed by the line being put out to the press in Cairo’. American diplomatic activity was stepped up between Washington and Cairo, and the Lebanese crisis was the pre-eminent topic of discussion between Hare and Nasser in May and June. However, American– Egyptian rapprochement was a gradual process and did not pre-empt Lebanon to take its case to the United Nations Security Council. At the local level in Lebanon, civil strife continued with intermittent spells of calm. The Lebanese government first took its case to the Arab League on 21 May and to the United Nations Security Council on 22 May 1958. Prior to submitting Lebanon’s complaint to the Security Council, Lebanon’s representative to the United Nations Karim Azkoul met members of the Canadian, French, American and British missions and asked for their advice on presenting Lebanon’s case. American and British positions on this issue were clearly divergent. The Americans preferred Lebanon to settle the problem without resorting to the Security Council and expressed more doubts than the British about the strength of Lebanon’s 8 case. Azkoul’s observations were confirmed by Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Pierson Dixon. Dixon observed that his American counterpart, Henry Cabot Lodge, felt pressed by the British towards Security Council action and intervention in Lebanon. The Briton assessed Lodge’s attitude towards Anglo–American intervention in Lebanon within the framework of recent events in the Middle East: ‘I suspect that with Suez still beclouding his judgment, basically he intensely dislikes the idea of the Americans being seen arm in arm with the British in opposition to the Egyptians who, in 1956, were the “victims” of Anglo–French intervention. This is too dramatic a change of the wheel of fortune for 9 Mr Lodge’s taste.’ American unease about overt intervention with the British was intensified by their perception that the British were eager to 10 ‘get their own back on Nasser’. This perception together with an impending American–Egyptian rapprochement diminished the probability of a joint Anglo–American operation in Lebanon. Indications of the USA–UAR rapprochement were apparent during the meeting between American and UAR representatives to the United Nations the same evening that Lebanon submitted its case to the Security Council. UAR representative Mahmoud Riad told Lodge that the UAR leadership frankly did not like Chamoun or Malik or their policies, and


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he observed that Chamoun had maintained diplomatic relations with Britain and France during the Suez crisis. Riad then attributed the present crisis in Lebanon to Chamoun’s desire for a second presidential term. The UAR did not want to take over Lebanon, ‘certainly not for the time being’. The UAR representative acknowledged that the Americans had discouraged Lebanon from bringing its case to the United Nations and hoped that the deliberations at the Security Council ‘would not deter 11 the process of improved relations now underway’ between them. The Americans did not urge the Lebanese government to appeal to the United Nations because they argued that any debate in the Security Council could aggravate the situation in Lebanon and may provoke UN action there, which would impede future Anglo–American freedom of action in Lebanon. The détente in American–Egyptian relations had an immediate impact on Nasser’s actions towards Lebanon. The president of the UAR postponed a scheduled trip to Damascus during the last week of May and pledged to use his influence with the Lebanese opposition to try 12 to end the fighting. In helping to relieve the pressure on Lebanon Nasser must have gauged the possibility of Western military intervention, if the strain on the Lebanese government became too great to with13 stand. That was the explanation given by Western policymakers, particularly Dulles, to Nasser’s conciliatory mood. His desire to improve relations with the Americans was reflected in the eased state of tension in Lebanon and dwindling UAR support for the insurrectionists. In this context it is relevant to note that Nasser had made overtures towards the Americans since 1957. On an official visit to the United States in January 1957, the Saudi king asked President Eisenhower to invite Nasser and the Syrian president to visit the United States. King Saud said that these two leaders ‘did not lean so much toward the Soviets’ as the Americans thought and ‘they would like to re-establish their ties with the West’. He further intimated that neither Nasser nor Kuwatly knew of his 14 suggestion. In the ongoing negotiations at the United Nations where Iraq was one of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, its foreign minister Fadel Jamali urged the Americans to support Lebanon and warned that ‘if Lebanon became subservient to Nasser’s policies, Jordan and Iraq would inevitably follow.’ Jamali viewed the Arab League as a ‘defunct organization which really existed as an element of the Egyptian

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foreign office’. In his assessment of the Arab League, Jamali echoed Malik’s views, for Malik expected little from Lebanon’s appeal to the League and looked to the Security Council for ‘substantial assistance’ in 16 solving Lebanon’s problems. Jordan and Iraq were also British concerns and coupled with Britain’s attitude towards Nasser made for the fundamental British–American policy difference over the Middle East. In the words of British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd: ‘Iraq is our key ally in the Middle East’; in the context of the Lebanese crisis Lloyd added: ‘Iraq is likely to be affected 17 by the danger to the pipelines.’ As previously mentioned, the British 18 favoured the Security Council discussion on Lebanon while the Ameri19 cans attempted to dissuade the Lebanese from pursuing that course. International support for Chamoun also came from Turkey as the Turkish foreign minister Zorlu told the American ambassador on 29 May that Chamoun was the indispensable man in the present Lebanese crisis 20 and that Sulh’s statement of 27 May was ‘extremely unwise’. Members of the opposition in Lebanon, such as Kamal Jumblatt, denounced Chamoun and Malik for submitting a complaint against the UAR to the UN. The Maronite patriarch — who before independent Lebanon in 1943 was the predominant leader of the Maronite community and spoke in its name — was opposed to Chamoun and believed that Lebanon’s complaint to the Security Council was unnecessary. Although some of the opposition’s arms may have come from Syria, the opposition was arming ‘its people’ as a reaction to the Lebanese government’s similar action. Patriarch Paul Ma’ushi assumed his position as head of the Maronite church in May 1955, following the death of Patriarch Anton ‘Arida. In contrast to his predecessor, the new head of the Maronite church adopted a policy that favoured cooperation with Lebanon’s Muslim neighbours. In March 1956, he visited the Muslim quarter al-Basta where he was enthusiastically greeted as the ‘Patriarch of 21 the Arabs’. Ma’ushi maintained good relations with Egyptian president Nasser and held the Lebanese government responsible for the violence that occurred during the demonstration held on 30 May 1957 in protest against Lebanon’s acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine. While the patriarch’s political activities that seemingly favoured Arab nationalism alarmed Christian right-wing leaders such as the Phalange Party’s Pierre Gemayel, Ma’ushi perceived Lebanon’s long-term interests to be closely


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tied to those of its Arab neighbours, rather than those of the more distant West. Although many of the members of the Maronite clergy supported Chamoun throughout the rebellion and the Maronite Council sent a 22 letter to Pope Pius XII to protest against Ma’ushi’s political activities, the patriarch’s opposition to Chamoun’s re-election helped mute the sectarian nature of the Lebanese conflict of 1958. As it sought recourse to the United Nations the Lebanese government simultaneously submitted its case against the UAR to the Council of the Arab League meeting in Khartoum. On 27 May at a special meeting of the Security Council, the Council members adopted the agenda to discuss Lebanon’s complaint in a special meeting and decided to reconvene on 3 June in order to give the Arab League a chance to address Lebanon’s complaint. After the Lebanese government rejected the resolutions of the Arab League, the Security Council met and Lebanon presented its appeal to the United Nations Security Council. In his presentation speech on 6 June, Malik spoke of the determination of his government to follow up its complaint ‘beyond the UN’ ostensibly alluding to the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was ironic in view of the fact that US policymakers were moving further away from resorting to the doctrine, especially as US relations with Nasser improved. Malik accused the UAR of aiding the rebels in providing arms and personnel, as well as waging a vicious propaganda campaign inciting the rebels to overthrow the Lebanese government. On 11 June, the Security Council passed a resolution proposed by the Swedish representative Dr Jarring, to send UN observers to Lebanon to ‘ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders’. The secretary general’s report on the above mentioned resolution presciently drew attention to the difficulty of the observer’s mission because the government forces controlled only a small part of the frontier (18 kilometres out of the 324kilometre Lebanese–Syrian boundary) and hence the UN observers had 23 limited access to the border area. The secretary general appointed three leaders of the UN group. They were ex-president Galo Plaza of Ecuador, Mr Rajeshwal Dayal of India and Major-General Odd Bull of Norway. The first UN observers arrived in Lebanon on 12 June. In Beirut, the Lebanese government nominated the minister of health Dr Albert Mokheiber as minister in charge of

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relations between the government and the United Nations group of observers. His task was to facilitate the work of the UN forces and inform them of all reports concerning illegal infiltration of arms and men 24 from across the Lebanese border. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld visited Lebanon on 19 June and met the president and prime minister. Amid speculation concerning the powers of the UN mission to Lebanon, a UN spokesman affirmed to the press on 21 June that the members of the mission were empowered to ‘observe’ and not ‘police’ the borders. The UN mission built up its force and facilities gradually so that by 25 June it numbered 90 to 100 observers with four aeroplanes, 75 vehicles and two helicopters delivered on 23 June. However, it was unable to meet its requirements due to the inaccessibility of the rebelcontrolled border, the inability to conduct night patrols — most of the infiltration and arms smuggling occurred at night — and the limited number of UN personnel assigned to the task. Moreover, the UN observers spoke no Arabic and, as they themselves admitted in private conversation, were ‘unable to distinguish between a Lebanese peasant 25 and a Syrian infiltrator’. These shortcomings affected the credibility of the UN reports in the eyes of the Lebanese government, particularly when they concluded in their first report on 3 July that there was no 26 evidence of Syrian infiltration. Prior to the publication of the first report Hammarskjöld had told Ralph J. Bunche, the undersecretary of the United Nations for special political affairs, that he ‘had no doubt that there was illegal traffic’ but that ‘authenticated evidence was, however, meagre because of the 27 confused situation’. He also reiterated these views to the British foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd and attributed the trouble in Lebanon to arms 28 smuggling and inflammatory broadcasts from the UAR. Notwithstanding his belief that there was infiltration across the Lebanese border, the secretary general maintained the opinion that the situation in Lebanon was essentially one of internal politics and that he was determined to ‘use all his influence against intervention [in Lebanon] by the United 29 States and the United Kingdom’. In assessing the Lebanese situation Hammarskjöld made the peculiar observation that the unity of the country was ‘of far greater importance than its independence’ and with reference to other parts of the world ‘Lebanon was of only slight


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importance when compared with events in Europe, and that the 30 execution of Nagy was of far greater importance’. The tense relations between Chamoun and Hammarskjöld undoubtedly contributed to the negative feelings held by many pro-government Lebanese towards the United Nations. The secretary general’s reputedly pro-Nasserist sympathies did little to improve relations and the tension between the two men was reflected in their press conferences. In a statement to the English Daily Mail, Chamoun accused the observers of 31 ‘acting as tourists’ and idling in cafés and nightclubs. Hammarskjöld took exception to these remarks and sent such a message to Chamoun about them. He also privately complained to the British UN representative Sir Pierson Dixon that the Lebanese government and ‘Chamoun and Malik in particular were attacking him and the United Nations on 32 every possible occasion’. That the United Nations should take sides in this conflict was a highly irregular situation. Britain’s ambassador to the UN noted the anomaly in his report to the Foreign Office: ‘This is the first time in my recollection that the UN has set out to help a country and seems to be ending up (through the mouthpiece of the Secretariat) by becoming highly critical of the constituted government.’ Dixon attributed the cause of this trouble to the fact that the UN observers had taken their cue from the secretary general and adopted a strictly neutral 33 attitude between the Lebanese president and the opposition. The necessary organization and equipment for UNOGIL to fulfil its task adequately was not available until 31 July, neither was access to the 34 opposition-held areas. When the UN observers were able to visit the rebel held areas, it was only with prior appointment and consent of the rebels, and hence the element of surprise necessary for their mission was 35 dispelled. By the time the UNOGIL was organized and sufficiently equipped to fulfil its mission, a new president of the republic had been elected and the crisis was by then to a large extent defused. The UNOGIL submitted four other reports between July and November 1958, none of which upheld the Lebanese government’s accusation of massive infiltration by the UAR but simply acknowledged some infiltration from across the border on a small scale. At the political level a quid pro quo had been reached between Nasser and the UN. After the Egyptians informed the UN secretary general that Nasser was calling off further supplies of men and matériel to the Lebanese insurgents, the UN

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report published on 3 July concluded that UAR infiltration was minimal. Evidence of infiltration of substantial amounts of men and matériel is now available from both Western diplomatic documents and from Lebanese opposition sources. One such document reports 50-truck envoys crossing the Syrian–Lebanese border and heading towards Tripoli on the 36 night of 6 July. Among the opposition accounts of the 1958 crisis is that of Nawwaf Karami who fought alongside Jumblatt. According to Karami, who was an eyewitness, among the reinforcements reaching the rebels from outside Lebanon was a 500-man force from Syria organized by the Syrian Druze leader Sultan Pasha al-Atrash that joined Jumblatt’s men in 37 his stronghold of the Shuf. A number of Syrian army officers fought with the rebels, among whom was the former chief of staff of the Syrian Army Shawkat Shuqair, a Syrian Druze, who commanded Jumblatt’s forces. AMERICAN–EGYPTIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

While accusations were traded between Lebanon and the UAR, the American ambassador to Egypt, Raymond Hare, warned that the increasing tension and US involvement in Lebanon could widen the conflict to one pitting the United States against the UAR. The ambassador then reminded American policymakers of the basic geopolitical fact that ‘Egypt (as Napoleon was reported to have remarked to the governor of St Helena) is the most important country.’ Hare urged that US support for Lebanon be undertaken ‘in a manner which would avoid open collision 38 with the UAR’. In mid-May Dulles informed the Egyptians that the USA had received information that Lebanese subversives were being ‘aided by elements and arms from UAR territory’ and that the USA would live up to its ‘commitment to assist Lebanon to maintain its independence and integrity’. Dulles then warned that with this knowledge the ‘UAR was now better able to evaluate the consequences of actions which may be carried on against the integrity of Lebanon from UAR territory’. He concluded his message with the acknowledgement of Nasser’s overture to the American ambassador on 25 April for improving relations with the US government but bluntly told Nasser that this would be contingent upon the termination of UAR subversive activity in Lebanon:


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We also have in mind assurances which Nasser gave US Ambassador April 25 that he desired good relations with USG. We desire UAR government to know that continuation of assistance from UAR territory to subversive efforts being directed against Lebanese Government would be very serious obstacle to betterment of relations between US and UAR which we, like President Nasser, 39 desire. Efforts at a rapprochement between Nasser and the Americans had been underway for a few months and, on 18 April, US secretary of state Dulles said at a press conference that the USA would consider unfreezing Egyptian funds (held during the Suez crisis) in his country if Egypt agreed on compensation for the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company. The next major move towards a USA–UAR rapprochement was Nasser’s proposal on 7 June that the two countries resolve the Lebanese crisis in a joint initiative. While the Americans rejected a joint approach, they nevertheless welcomed Nasser’s overture and passed on his proposals for a solution to the Lebanese crisis to President Chamoun. Nasser’s motives at this stage for his approach to the United States were twofold. His deteriorating relations with the Soviets increased the urgency to improve relations with the Americans. The second explanation for Nasser’s conciliatory mood, and one that was put forward by John Foster Dulles, was that he feared an American and British military intervention in Lebanon and hence wanted to defuse the situation there 40 so he called off the revolt. With a USA–Nasser rapprochement in process, Chamoun’s position from the American perspective became more tenuous. Nasser favoured Chehab as the next president of Lebanon and ultimately he would succeed Chamoun. The British on the other hand continued to support Chamoun’s re-election until Prime Minister Sulh made a statement on 27 May that his government would not seek to amend the constitution. The divergent views of British and American policymakers on support for Chamoun was noted by American ambassador McClintock on 22 May, ‘Middleton has explicit orders from Selwyn Lloyd to continue support for Chamoun unless some reliable alternative can be found. It looks as if there is a divergence of view between the British Government and possibly French and ourselves on all-out support of Chamoun to bitter

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end.’ The British urge to ensure American support for Chamoun was noted by Dulles who felt the need to ‘warn’ the British ambassador in Washington that American policymakers both in Washington and elsewhere ‘had the impression that they were being crowded by their 42 British colleagues into intervention in Lebanon’. While the British pressed for joint military discussions for a contingency plan to intervene in Lebanon, the Americans sought to distance themselves from a joint USA–UK military operation reminiscent of Suez. The two sides, however, agreed that French participation would be disastrous in view of France’s history as the mandatory power in Lebanon as well as her current involvement in Algeria, which made France very unpopular among Arabs at large. It is relevant to note that, despite the divergence in Anglo–American views, the Americans kept the British up to date on developments regarding USA–UAR rapprochement. This was done through highly classified diplomatic correspondence between 43 Washington and the Foreign Office. The political impasse in Lebanon continued throughout the month of May with a growing danger of the outbreak of sectarian strife. Minister of defence Rashid Beydoun resigned on 22 May over Lebanon’s complaint against the UAR at the UN. The next day communications minister Bashir Osman also resigned from the Sulh cabinet. Both men had been under considerable pressure from their Muslim community to resign and Osman’s house in his electoral district of ‘Akkar (north Lebanon) was burnt down the night before his resignation. The prime minister’s statement on 27 May that his government would not amend the constitution eased the political stalemate. It set in motion the process of presidential elections and on 6 June the speaker of parliament called on the deputies to meet on 24 July to elect the next president of the republic. Despite this announcement, clashes continued between insurgents and government forces and the opposition barricades did not come down. The deteriorating situation in Lebanon did not impede the USA– UAR rapprochement that was underway and the American ambassador in Cairo met again with Nasser on 7 June. Nasser stressed that he had no ambition either to incorporate Lebanon into the UAR or to install a Lebanese government that would be subservient to the UAR. He was very conciliatory and, as previously mentioned, feared that an escalation


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of the fighting in Lebanon would precipitate Western military intervention. Another incentive for Nasser to improve relations with the United States was the worsening state of relations with the Soviet Union. Nasser proposed to the American ambassador a joint USA–UAR approach to resolve the Lebanese crisis rather than have the USA 44 mediate between him and Chamoun. The Americans did not share this view and Dulles instructed McClintock to convey to Chamoun Nasser’s 45 terms for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Nasser had indicated his willingness to use his influence to end the dissidence in Lebanon in accordance with the following terms: (1) Chamoun would complete his term; (2) Chehab would become prime minister; and (3) the government would grant a general amnesty for the opposition. Throughout his talks with the Americans, Nasser denied UAR involvement in Lebanon and stated that his total budget for intelligence 46 was a meagre one million pounds. The ex-director of political affairs of the Syrian foreign ministry Ghalib Kayyali admitted to John Mecklin of Time magazine on 10 June that the Lebanese opposition was smuggling arms from Syria and small numbers of volunteers were crossing the 47 border into Lebanon. This was the first time that a UAR official had admitted to Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Another indication of Nasser’s involvement in Lebanon came from Michel ‘Aflaq, founder of the Ba’th Party. On 2 June, ‘Aflaq confirmed that Nasser had been informed of the opposition’s plan to seize power. Nasser had agreed to 48 seek Soviet political and other support for the Lebanese insurgents. Despite the above-mentioned information, Nasser’s persistence in wanting to resolve the Lebanese crisis became apparent the day after his meeting with Hare. The president of the UAR sent his confidant, the well-known journalist Mustafa Amin, to see Raymond Hare on 8 June, and stress the necessity of implementing the proposals that the two men had discussed the day before. This development led Hare to conclude: ‘For reasons not entirely clear and probably rather complex, Nasser would like to liquidate his commitments in Lebanon and bring the crisis 49 to an end.’ Chamoun rejected Nasser’s indirect overture and told McClintock that ‘it was a dangerous principle for Lebanon to admit that Nasser 50 should set out the terms for the settlement of its internal difficulties.’ Lebanon’s foreign minister Charles Malik who was in the USA for the

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UN meetings on Lebanon expressed his concern to Dulles about the change in the US attitude towards Nasser. The leaders of Iraq, Egypt’s historic and current rival for Arab leadership, were disturbed that the USA was courting Nasser. When Iraqi foreign minister Fadil Jamali voiced these concerns to Dulles, the American secretary of state reassured him that the USA ‘had no intention of reaching a deal with Nasser at the expense of their friends’. Dulles suggested that Iraqi rather than American and British troops intervene in Lebanon. One week later, Lebanon’s foreign minister Charles Malik indicated to Dulles that: ‘in the event external forces appeared to be the solution [to the crisis in Lebanon], it would be preferable for Jordan and Iraq alone to provide such forces, with the Western Powers giving full 51 support short of actual introduction of their own forces.’ Ironically, the battalion of troops that carried out the Iraqi coup of 14 July was ostensibly marching through Baghdad on its way to Lebanon. The issue of sending Iraqi troops instead of Western forces to Lebanon was discussed in Lebanon and Washington. On 10 June, Lebanese deputy Emile Bustani arrived in Baghdad and informed Nuri that Chamoun was ready to sign a treaty of defence with Iraq. In return, Chamoun wanted Iraqi troops to replace Lebanese ones along the Israeli 52 frontier with Lebanon. The subject of Iraqi troops was discussed at a Washington meeting between Malik, Jamali and Christian Herter, the undersecretary of state. Dr Jamali supported Malik’s viewpoint and noted that the participation of Iraqi troops would not ‘cause the Iraqi government any insurmountable security problems at home’. Jamali added that 53 the troops would have to be transported to Lebanon by the USA. The issue of sending Iraqi troops to Lebanon was also brought up by Iraq’s King Faisal in talks with the British ambassador Sir Michael 54 Wright. One month later, in early June, Cairo press reported on the Lebanese–Iraqi association and of an ‘Iraqi plot hatched by ‘Abd al-Ilah (the king’s uncle and former regent) in London’. The infamous broadcaster of Cairo’s ‘Voice of the Arabs’, Ahmad Sa’id, took up the story in his inflammatory daily broadcasts and spoke of the ‘new Iraqi conspiracy that was all because of the lust and power of one man (Chamoun), who 55 deserves being killed and his corpse dragged through the streets’. Six weeks later, on 14 July, the corpses of the Iraqi leaders would be dragged through the streets of Baghdad. It is relevant to bear in mind that Iraqi


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interest in the Lebanese crisis was not confined to maintaining Lebanon’s pro-Western political orientation but had its own agenda for the annexation of Syria or the Muslim areas of Lebanon in case they separated from Lebanon. Nuri contended that the inhabitants of these areas, which he called the Upper Euphrates Valley, preferred to be part of Iraq and were denied the opportunity to do so in the postwar territorial arrangements of the Middle East. If separation of these areas from their present countries became inevitable, the Iraqi prime minister proposed to the British that: ‘a United Nations mission ascertain by impartial vote the wishes of inhabitants in both the Lebanon and Syria and he would 56 look to ourselves and the Americans to support this’. Nuri’s ambition to annex Syria was recognized by American policymakers as his ‘main 57 reason for bringing his country into the Northern Tier system’. Nasser’s interest in seeking a rapprochement with the United States superseded any potential gains to be had by extending his control over Lebanon. The intensity of the diplomatic correspondence between Cairo and Washington during May and June 1958 attested to the high priority that Nasser attached to improving relations with the United States, as did his direct intervention to quell the insurgency in Lebanon. On 23 June, the UAR’s foreign minister Mahmoud Fawzi informed the UN secretarygeneral Dag Hammarskjöld that ‘Nasser had called the Prime Minister of Syria and given categorical instructions that as of Tuesday morning, June 24, no further supply of men or matériel should be made or permitted to 58 be given to the Lebanese rebels.’ On 29 April, the Egyptians agreed on compensation for the Suez Canal Company shareholders and a few weeks later the Americans released $26,000,000 in Egyptian funds frozen in American banks since July 1956 when Nasser nationalized the 59 company. By early July the political impasse in Lebanon appeared to be heading towards resolution. Chamoun had endorsed Chehab as his successor and parliament was scheduled to meet on 24 July to elect the new president. The revolution in Iraq caused an interruption in developments that would have followed the same route regardless of the US marine landing in Lebanon. The revolution in Iraq motivated the American administration to accommodate Arab nationalism, which seemed to be the ideology of change sweeping across the Middle East and destabilizing the old guard that had collaborated with the West. The new approach in US relations

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with the countries of the Middle East was spelled out in the statement of policy adopted by the National Security Council on 4 November 1958. Nasser and his ideology of pan-Arab nationalism would be accommodated rather than opposed. US interests were classified in order of importance, with oil being of ‘critical importance’ while ‘the military and commercial transit facilities of the Near East were less 60 essential’. The election of Fuad Chehab marked the end of the crisis in Lebanon. Camille Chamoun completed his presidential term and left office on 23 September 1958. The first cabinet of the Chehab presidency excluded Chamoun’s supporters and this prompted a month-long Christian-led counter-revolution manifested in strikes and protests that brought down Karami’s first cabinet and secured a four-man coalition cabinet (two Christians and two Muslims): Rashid Karami, Husein Oueini, Pierre Gemayel, and Raymond Eddé. Karami was the prime minister and as a militant member of the rebel forces his counterpart was Pierre Gemayel, whose Phalange Party was active in supporting the pro-government forces. The compromise cabinet sought to fulfil the political requirement of the post-crisis period, which was to foster national unity epitomized in the conciliatory slogan that referred to the outcome of the conflict as one of ‘No victor, and no vanquished’. NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. Dulles to Hare, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3223, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 27 May 1958. 2. Hare to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3029, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 20 May 1958. 3. Hare to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3029, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 20 May 1958. 4. See ‘Nasser Muffles Soviet Bloc Voice’, New York Times, 6 June 1958. 5. US ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge expressed misgivings about the practical advantages of Lebanon submitting its complaint to the Security Council. See McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4117, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 22 May 1958. 6. Middleton to Lloyd, Secret, 22 May 1958, FO 371/134118. 7. Caccia to Lloyd, Top Secret, 21 May 1958, FO 371/134118. 8. Dixon to Lloyd, Top Secret, 20 May 1958, FO 371/134118. 9. Dixon to Lloyd, Top Secret, 23 May 1958, FO 371/134119.


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10. In a conversation with the UN secretary general, Dixon denied such motives on the part of his government. See Dixon to Lloyd, Top Secret, 23 May 1958, FO 371/134119. 11. Lodge to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1365, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 22 May 1958. 12. Caccia to Lloyd, Top Secret, 11 June 1958, FO 371/134123. 13. Middleton to Lloyd, Top Secret, 26 May 1958, FO 371/134119. 14. Top Secret record of conversation between President Eisenhower and King Saud on Wednesday 30 January 1957, DDE Diaries (Ann Whitman File), Box No. 21, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 15. Lodge to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1407, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 29 May 1958. 16. Malik relayed these views to Lebanon’s ambassador to the US, Nadim Dimechkié, who was also a member of the Lebanese delegation that presented Lebanon’s complaint to the UNSC. The other members were foreign minister Charles Malik, Lebanon’s ambassador to the UN Karim Azkoul, Lebanon’s ambassador to Britain Ibrahim al-Ahdab, and director of the economic section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Najib Dahdah. See Memorandum of Conversation, at the Department of State, on the UN Handling of Lebanese Complaint, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 2 June 1958. 17. Lloyd to Caccia, Top Secret, 14 May 1958, FO 371/134117. 18. During the second week of May, Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Pierson Dixon, repeatedly stressed that short of outside help, ‘the best hope for holding the situation in the Lebanon would come from a discussion in the Security Council, which would arouse sympathy for the Lebanese and might restrain the UAR.’ See Dixon to Lloyd, Top Secret, 14 May 1958, FO 371/134117. 19. Lodge to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 1404, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 29 May 1958. 20. Warren (Ankara) to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2907, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 30 May 1958. 21. Matti Moosa, The Maronites in History (Syracuse, 1986), p. 293. 22. Ibid., p. 294. 23. Report by the Secretary General on the Implementation to date of the Resolution of the Security Council of 11 June 1958, on the Complaint by Lebanon (UN Doc.S/4029), 16 June 1958. 24. Letter of 15 June from the Prime Minister of Lebanon to Major-General Odd Bull, Annex I (UN Doc.S/4028). 25. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 3 July 1958, FO 371/134129.

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26. For the text of the UN report, see Dixon to Lloyd, 4 July 1958, FO 371/134128. 27. Dixon to Lloyd, Confidential, 21 June 1958, FO 371/134124. 28. Lloyd to Caccia, Top Secret, 25 June 1958, FO 371/134125. 29. Mason (Amman) to Lloyd, Top Secret, 21 June 1958, FO 371/134124. 30. UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld expressed these views in a conversation he had with the Indian resident representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board in Jordan who in turn conveyed them to British embassy officials in Amman. Mason to Lloyd, Top Secret, 21 June 1958, FO 371/134124. 31. Scott to Lloyd, 8 July 1958, FO 371/134129. 32. Dixon to Lloyd, Confidential, 8 July 1958, FO 371/134129. 33. Dixon to Hayter, Confidential, 9 July 1958, FO 371/134132. 34. Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington DC, 1961), p. 147. 35. Ibid., p. 147. 36. Scott to Lloyd, Confidential, 9 July 1958, FO 371/134127. 37. Karami, Waqi’ al-Thawrah al-Lubnaniyah, pp. 152–4. 38. Hare to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2968, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 15 May 1958. 39. Dulles to Hare, No. 3117, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 15 May 1958. 40. Caccia to Lloyd, Top Secret, 11 June 1958, FO 371/134123. 41. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4123, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 22 May 1958. 42. Memorandum of Conversation with the British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia, Top Secret, 21 May 1958. For the British perspective, see Caccia to Lloyd, Top Secret, 22 May 1958, FO 371/134119. 43. The State Department gave the British ambassador in Washington ‘the “most secret information” that they had directed their ambassador in Cairo to speak to Nasser about the situation in Lebanon’. See Caccia to Lloyd, Top Secret, 17 May 1958, FO 371/134118. 44. Hare to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch, No. 3241, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 7 June 1958. 45. Dulles to McClintock, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4710, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 June 1958. 46. Hare to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3029, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 20 May 1958. 47. Hart (Damascus) to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3137, Confidential, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 June 1958.


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48. Hart to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3083, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 4 June 1958. 49. Hare to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3244, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 8 June 1958. 50. McClintock to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 4629, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 June 1958. 51. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 15 June 1958. FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. XI, pp. 130– 2. 52. Gallman to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 2059, Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 11 June 1958. 53. Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, Washington, Top Secret, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 24 June 1958. 54. Wright to Lloyd, Top Secret, 17 May 1958, FO 371/134118. 55. Hare to Dulles, Foreign Service Dispatch No. 3252, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 9 June 1958. 56. Wright to Lloyd, Top Secret, 14 May 1958, FO 371/134117. 57. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Report No. 7074, ‘The Outlook for US Interests in the Middle East’, Secret, 14 November 1955, Department of State, Central Files. 58. Memorandum from Lodge to Dulles, Top Secret, FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XI, p. 176, Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00, 26 June 1958. 59. New York Times, 21 May 1958. 60. National Security Council, NSC 5820/1, 4 November 1958, Statement of US Policy Toward the Near East. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, 1980, 386B.

Conclusion In May 1958 a three-month-long civil war broke out in Lebanon and split the country into anti-government rebels and pro-government loyalists. The rebels called for the immediate resignation of President Camille Chamoun. The divisions were almost totally along sectarian lines as the majority of government opposition was among the Muslim community while most of Chamoun’s supporters were Christians. The opposition claimed that, by accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine, Chamoun had aligned Lebanon too closely with the West and had therefore violated the Lebanese National Pact. Chamoun’s viewpoint was that Nasser’s hostility in the wake of the Suez crisis and the threat he posed to the sovereignty of Lebanon prompted the Lebanese president to seek Western support in order to maintain Lebanon’s independence. The opposition of a number of prominent Christians to the president muted the sectarian nature of the conflict but nevertheless the sense of national unity among the Lebanese people was severely shaken with each confessional group accusing the other of violating the National Pact of 1943. The ensuing conflict between the two sides lasted from May until the end of July when General Fuad Chehab was elected president of the republic. Chamoun completed his term of office and left the presidential palace on 23 September 1958. Despite Chamoun’s close affiliation with American policy and a qualified American commitment to intervene militarily in Lebanon to support the government (communicated to Chamoun in mid-May, a week after the outbreak of the crisis) the American administration turned down his requests for intervention in June. When they did intervene with 15,000 troops in mid-July, it was in the wake of a revolution in Iraq on 14 July, which toppled the monarchy and instituted a republican regime. While American military intervention in Lebanon was in response to a hurried request by the Lebanese president and mainly prompted by fears of repercussions from the Iraqi revolution, it was also meant to be a demonstration of American

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credibility to support clients and maintain regional stability in the oilrich Middle East and warn against further Soviet encroachment in the region. The Lebanese conflict was practically resolved prior to American military intervention. The date for the election of a new president had been set and there was a nationwide consensus on the eligibility of General Chehab for the post. However, American diplomatic intervention was an important factor in helping to resolve the conflict, especially at the level of talks held with President Nasser whose incentive for improving relations with the United States outweighed any current ambitions he had in Lebanon. How does one evaluate the 1958 crisis in Lebanon? Was it an insurrection or a revolution? Did external non-Lebanese forces instigate it or was it an internal movement? Did Chamoun intend to amend the Lebanese constitution in order to seek re-election as the opposition claimed? While the truth about some of these issues remains ambiguous, the study of the diplomatic archives sheds light on many hitherto unanswered questions about the Lebanese crisis of 1958. The traditional viewpoints advanced by the parties to the conflict have been the following. The rebels maintained that their uprising was an indigenous revolution aimed at overthrowing the corrupt regime of Chamoun and correcting the foreign policy of Lebanon that had veered towards the West and away from Arab nationalism. The pro-government forces on the other hand held the view that the troubles of 1958 were an insurrection controlled by Nasser and Syria and aimed at undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon, especially in the wake of the formation of the UAR. How does the 1958 crisis fit into the history of Lebanon and what changes in Lebanese political life if any did it bring about? Intervention by regional and international powers in Lebanon has been an endemic feature of the country’s modern history and is accelerated at times of crises and their settlement. Therefore, Lebanon’s stability is closely related to that of the region. Shifting regional forces often upset the balance of power among Lebanon’s communities and political leaders. The crisis of 1958 manifests the above-mentioned features and both the regional and international players have had a significant impact on the local leaders. In the early 1950s Lebanon maintained peaceful

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relations within the Middle East and its leaders were involved in regional mediation efforts on several occasions. The rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser and the spread of his message of Arab nationalism and unity throughout the region threatened to do away with existing political frontiers and prompted Lebanese nationalists to seek Western support against Nasserist encroachment. The fact that a significant portion of Lebanon’s population was receptive to Nasser’s appeal underlined the divided loyalties of the Lebanese and polarized the country along pro and antiNasser lines. Nasser’s adulation by most Arabs, including a large number of Lebanon’s Muslim community, rendered that community’s leaders Nasserists in order to maintain their political power. The fact that these leaders were either feudal or urban wealthy landlords did not impede their acclamation of Nasser whose socialist reforms in Egypt and later Syria were not programmes with which politicians like Saeb Salam, Rashid Karami, Ahmad al-As’ad, or Sabri Hamade could identify. In fact, socioeconomic reform was not on their political agenda in 1958 and they were as much in favour of maintaining the status quo in Lebanon as were their Christian counterparts. 1 In this sense their revolt, referred to as the ‘revolt of the pashas’, against the government was prompted by personal rivalries with Chamoun, especially after the exclusion of a number of opposition leaders from parliament in the 1957 elections. They attributed their loss to Chamoun’s manipulation of the elections and justly feared that Chamoun intended to seek re-election. While he never declared this intent publicly, he did express it to Iraqi and Western policymakers, but was then forced to back down in the face of intense opposition. That the opposition agenda was focused on the person of Chamoun and was devoid of reformist themes is attested by the fact that the main opposition leaders resumed participation in the political system as soon as Chamoun’s presidential tenure was over. The receptiveness of the Lebanese to external political movements facilitated the incursion of these into Lebanon. The divided loyalties of the population roughly coincided with the religious divide whereby Christians traditionally looked towards the West as the guarantor of their independence in a predominantly Muslim Arab world, and Muslims held aspirations for closer ties with the Arab world, which sometimes

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were expressed in calls for unity within a larger Arab entity. The National Pact of 1943 had sought a compromise between these loyalties. At the regional level the appeal of Nasser’s message of Arab nationalism and unity and defiance of the West found much support in Lebanon and was a destabilizing factor in that it polarized the population along pro- and anti-Nasser lines. This polarization became clearly visible in the wake of the Suez invasion when Chamoun rejected the request of Prime Minister Yafi and Minister Salam to break diplomatic ties with Britain and France, and accepted the resignations of these two leading Muslim politicians. While Nasser never publicly stated any desire to bring Lebanon into the UAR, he launched a vociferous radio and press campaign against the Chamoun regime and the documents clearly show the involvement of the UAR in funding and arming the rebels. Despite the reports of the UN observers, infiltration of men and matériel across the Syrian–Lebanese borders is amply documented. At the international level, the crisis of 1958 marked the demise of British influence in Lebanon. While the presidential elections of 1943 and 1952 had been Anglo–French contests with the British having the upper hand, by 1958 the new presidential brokers were the Americans. In studying the documents one is aware of the divergence in British and American views regarding support for Chamoun, whom the Americans continued to perceive as pro-British and to whom they were consequently more reluctant than their British counterparts to lend support. Ultimately, the Americans did not support Chamoun and concentrated on improving their relations with his arch rival Nasser. They turned down several requests by Chamoun for intervention and finally only intervened as a result of the revolution in Iraq. By then the Lebanese crisis was on its way to a resolution and the outcome would not have changed had the marines not landed in Beirut on 15 July 1958. Camille Chamoun left the presidency at the end of his term at a peak of popularity predominantly among the Christian population. He was perceived as a hero who had withstood the assault of Nasser. His charismatic and strong personality had expanded the role of the presidency and that of Lebanon at the regional level, but his substantial political skill was unable to withstand the regional polarization that tore at the weak fabric of Lebanese society. His record of economic reform

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was more of continuity than of change and the economic prosperity of the 1950s in Beirut and Mount Lebanon overshadowed the need for planned economic development in the country at large, an issue that would be partly addressed by Chamoun’s successor. The changes brought about by the 1958 conflict were visible in the policies of the new president Fuad Chehab. The emphasis was on restoring national unity and reforming the administration with the aim of instilling a sense of professionalism in its various departments. Chehab’s attention to public works in hitherto neglected areas of the country and a more equitable allocation of government posts among the various Lebanese sects enhanced his reputation as a fair broker and helped restore national unity. The new president’s reliance on institutions, including the army, gave it unprecedented influence in the country. This was accompanied by a concomitant weakening of the politics of patronage favoured by the traditional politicians and Chehab sought to strengthen Lebanese state institutions as well as the sense of national unity in the country. These new policies marked a departure from the methods of previous Lebanese presidents and their long-term impact on the country is the subject of another book. Although the 1958 conflict in Lebanon had several important internal causes, the external variable of foreign interference was instrumental in intensifying the conflict and extending its duration. In this sense it can be compared with the civil war of 1975, although the latter was much more intense for it lasted 15 years and devastated the country. Unlike in 1975, when external intervention was the major catalyst for the civil war and its perpetuation, in 1958 external intervention was limited, for when Nasser withdrew support for the rebels in late June he significantly defused the crisis. The resolution of the 1958 conflict did not address the basic weakness of the Lebanese polity, namely the divided political loyalties of its multi-religious population. The Christians continued to have the upper hand in terms of political power, although Chehab sought to allocate political office among the different religious communities on a more equitable basis. When circumstances in the mid-1970s offered the prospect of changing the political balance of power, the opportunity was seized by the Sunni Muslim community and resulted in the 15-year civil war that ensued. In the 1990s the balance of power shifted in favour of

Conclusion

233

the Sunni and Shia Muslims, for the regional power brokers in Lebanon are Saudi Arabia and Syria. The demographic shift in favour of Lebanon’s Muslims who now comprise the majority of the population is undoubtedly a significant factor in bringing about this change. These developments were presciently outlined in 1958 by the departing British ambassador in Beirut, George Middleton, who in his valedictory dispatch in August of that year lamented the lack of moral fibre of the Christian ruling class, their want of patriotism and civic responsibility, and their preoccupation with retaining their wealth and wrote these prophetic words: The better Christian elements will increasingly tend to emigrate and those remaining will become more than ever Byzantine in their theological diversity. The Moslems will seek and win an increasing share of political responsibility and economic advantage. The speed of these processes cannot be forecast but I am inclined to think that they will be rapid and that my successor may well witness, on an infinitely smaller scale, something like the last 2 days of Constantinople. The events of 30 years later confirmed Middleton’s assessment of Lebanon’s future. NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

1. 2.

Tabitha Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon (New York, 1987), p. 50. Middleton to Lloyd, Confidential, 27 August 1958, FO 371/134133.

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Index

Abboud, Mohammed al-, 57, 68n83 Abdallah, Radi, 197 ‘Abd al-Ilah, 89n7, 222 ‘Accari, Nazim, 39n96 Acre, 19 Aden, 196 ‘Aflaq, Michel, 191, 192, 221 Agwani, M. S., 3 Ahdab, Ibrahim al-, 225n16 ‘Akkar, 58, 185, 220 Akkari, Nazem, 65n52 Al-Makassed Charitable Society, 93n29, 155, 173, 178n4, 182n84 al-Mukhtara, 48, 50 Alamuddin, Najib, 80, 95n55, 95n59 ‘Alawi region, 33n31, 58 Aleppo, 33n31, 159, 186, 190 Alexandretta, 33n31 Algeria, 15, 220 Algiers, 24 Ali, Malek al-, 68n83 Ali, Suleiman al-, 57, 68n83 Alsop, Joseph, 167 ‘Amer, Marshal Abdel Hakim, 143 American University of Beirut (AUB), 67n75, 106

Amin, Mustapha, 103, 221 Amman, 46 Anderson peace plan(n38), 94 Anderson, Robert, 87, 98 Anglo–Egyptian agreement, 92n24 Anglo–Iraqi Treaty, 18 Ankara, 43 Aqaba, 116 ‘Arab, Maroun, 47, 57 Arab Collective Security Pact, 100 Arab League, 22, 78, 100, 156, 212, 213, 215; Arab League Charter, 100; Arab League Defence Pact, 75 Arab Legion, 105 Arab Tripartite Pact, 70, 100 Arab Union, 156, 193 Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 41, 73 Argentina, 159 ‘Arida, Anton, 214 Armada, Harvey, 136 Arslan, Fuad, 37n69 Arslan, Majid, 21, 203n19 ‘Aryan, Shibli al-, 143 As’ad, Ahmad al-, 127n74, 139, 140, 143, 169, 230 As’ad, Kamel al-, 127n74

247

248 Aswan dam project, 94n38 Atiyah, Edward, 9 Atlantic Alliance, 1 Atlantic Charter, 25, 38n80 Atrash, Sultan Pasha al-, 218 Auguste Adib Pasha, 43 Aziz, King Abdul, 89n7 Azkoul, Karim, 212, 225n16 Ba’th Party, 105, 111, 123n25, 135, 142, 191, 221 Baakline, 144 Baalbek, 14, 42, 175 Baghdad Pact, 4, 70, 75–7, 82–4, 87, 93n31, 93n36, 98–101, 103, 193–4, 196, 201, 206n51 Bandung, 76, 103 Baniyas, 86 Bank of the Middle East, 102 Banque de Syrie, 16, 102, 186 Banque de Syrie et du Liban, 16, 102 Baqdash, Khalid, 110 Basta, 140, 173, 176, 186, 191, 200, 214 Beirut, 4–5, 12, 14, 24, 30n3, 36n63, 41, 43–4, 46–7, 52–3, 55, 58–9, 62n8, 69n93, 71, 76, 78, 83–4, 86, 88, 92n29, 99, 101–3, 106, 113, 123n30, 130, 134, 136–9, 141–2, 144–5, 150n21, 150n28, 155–7, 159–60, 162, 165–6, 172–6, 180n53, 181n63, 182n84, 183n89, 185–6, 188, 190–1, 193, 197–9, 201, 205n32, 211, 215, 231–3

Index Beiteddine, 173 Békaa, 23 Bekaa’ valley, 123n30, 141, 144, 170, 185, 193 Berlin, 133 Berne, 133 Bey, Jamil Mardam, 27 Beyhum, Mohammad Ali, 141, 144 Beyhum, Mohammed Jamil, 56, 67n75 Bordeaux, 35n54 Brazil, 60 Brioni conference, 93n33 Britain, 2, 8, 12, 13, 20, 22–3, 44, 47, 70, 74–5, 77–8, 88, 93n36, 100, 104, 109, 132, 135, 138, 157, 159, 174, 195–7, 212–14, 216–17, 231 Bucharest, 133 Bulganin, Nikolay Alexandrovich, 113 Bull, Odd, 215 Bunche, Ralph J., 216 Burj al-Barajne, 102 Bustani, Emile, 52, 64n40, 222 Caccia, Sir Harold, 77, 211 Cairo, 19, 24, 27, 41, 45, 75, 89n6, 100–1, 103, 113, 115, 130, 155–6, 165, 177, 190, 212, 220, 222–3, 226n43 Cambodia, 133, 159 Canal Zone, 74, 78, 90n13, 104 Casey, R. G., 24, 25 Catroux, General Georges, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 36n57, 37n73

Index Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 117, 133, 136, 150n21, 150n28, 188, 196 Chader, Joseph, 161, 203n19 Chamoun, Camille, 1–2, 4–5, 10–11, 21, 24, 29–30, 42–8, 50–2, 54, 56–7, 59–61, 63n22, 63n29, 63n32, 64n36, 64n50, 65n52, 65n55, 66n60, 68n83, 70–3, 76–9, 81–6, 89n6, 89n7, 94n48, 97n77, 98–9, 101–6, 108, 112–15, 117–21, 123n30, 127n74, 129–48, 150n28, 152n66, 154–6, 158–72, 174–7, 180n53, 183n95, 185–93, 195, 197–9, 202, 205n34, 206n51, 206n63, 210–12, 214, 217, 219, 221–4, 228–31 Chamoun, Dory, 123n30 Chamoun, Mrs, 203n18 Chamoun, Zelpha, 42, 44 Chapman-Andrews, Sir Edwin, 47, 54, 55, 75, 77, 88, 181n63 Charlemagne, 11 Chehab, Fuad, 66n63, 137–9, 141, 143, 159, 172, 175–6, 187, 194–5, 199–200, 206n63, 209n96, 211, 219, 221, 223–4, 228–9, 232 Chehab, Khaled, 51, 164 Chekka plant, 64n39 Chiha, Michel, 27, 36n60, 42, 47 Chile, 159 China, 94n38 Churchill, Winston, 13, 20, 36n67, 74

249

Collective Security Pact, 101 Colombia, 60 Comité de l’Asie Française, 12 Comité de Libération Nationale, 24 Constitutional Union Party, 119 Copeland, Miles, 126n67, 135, 150n28, 193 Copenhagen, 163 Covenant of the League of Nations, 15; see also League of Nations Cozma, Farid, 203n19 Cuba, 91n17 Cyprus, 79, 134 Czech arms deal, 4, 76, 86, 87, 93n38 Da’uq, ‘Umar, 37n69 Dahdah, Najib, 225n16 Damascus, 8, 12, 14, 16, 31n5, 31n16, 33n31, 35n51, 39n93, 83, 105, 111, 124n41, 142–3, 155, 157–9, 173–4, 190–1, 203n11, 213 Dayal, Rajeshwal, 204n29, 215 de Caix, Robert, 30n1, 32n18, 34n44 de Gaulle, Charles, 13, 19, 20, 24, 35n54, 45 de Martel, General, 15 de San, Louis, 174, 182n89 DeGrasse, 197 Deir al-Qamar, 30, 43, 48, 50, 171 Destouri bloc, 20–1, 50 Dhahran, 120, 125n57

250 Dimechkié, Nadim, 76, 89n6, 93n30, 123n30, 126n68, 225n16 Din, Rashid Shihab al-, 143 Dixon, Sir Pierson, 212, 217, 225n10, 225n18 Druze(s), 33n31, 37n69, 38n82, 49, 120, 144–5, 169, 185, 191, 218 Dulles, Allen, 150n21, 151n32, 205n32 Dulles, John Foster, 73, 74, 75, 77, 90n17, 92n26, 92n27, 98, 100, 108–10, 113, 116, 137, 163–5, 167, 175, 187–8, 191–2, 196, 201, 209n98, 213, 218–22 Ecuador, 215 Eddé, Emile, 20–2, 24, 27, 34n46, 36n59, 36n63, 36n66, 43–4, 62n15, 63n33 Eddé, Pierre, 47–9, 63n33, 64n40, 145, 161, 203n19 Eddé, Raymond, 172, 189, 224 Eden, Anthony, 74–5 Egypt, 2, 8, 19, 23, 25, 42, 70–9, 82, 86–8, 92n24, 92n27, 93n38, 94n41, 96n64, 99–101, 103–6, 111–13, 115, 117, 120, 122n21, 130, 133, 139–42, 154, 159–60, 167, 170, 218–19, 222, 230 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 3, 71, 73, 75, 76, 87, 92n26, 98, 105, 108, 109, 112, 118, 126n68, 133, 194, 196, 198–201, 213

Index Eisenhower Doctrine, 1, 4, 107–9, 111–19, 123n30, 128–9, 137, 147, 150n28, 162, 169, 214–15, 228 Emmerson, John K., 82 Euphrates, River, 89, 223 Eveland, Wilbur Crane, 117, 135–8, 142, 150n21, 150n28, 186, 188, 203n18, 204n20 Faisal, King, 8, 14, 30n3, 31n5, 222 Fawzi, Mahmoud, 223 Feirouz, 42 Finland, 159 First World War, 7, 9, 12, 13, 25, 101 France, 1–2, 8–9, 11–14, 16–18, 20–1, 23, 25–6, 30n1, 30n3, 31n4, 32n18, 32n22, 37n68, 49, 70, 104, 133, 138, 159, 174, 195, 197, 213, 220, 231 Francis 1, King, 11 Frangieh, Hamid, 21, 46–7, 72, 127n74, 140, 145, 160, 179n28 Free French, 19–20, 35n51 Free Officers, 159 French Mandate, 32n21 Gates, Carolyn L., 3 Gaza, 76, 116, 174 Gemayel, Pierre, 96n74, 132, 147, 214, 224 Gendzier, Irene L., 3 Geneva, 159 Germany, 199 Ghadri, Nuhad al-, 142–3

Index Ghaleb, Abdul Hamid, 119, 143, 194 Ghosn, Fuad, 137 Glubb Pasha, 105 Gouraud, General Henri, 14–15, 30n1, 32n18 Greater Lebanon, 7, 9, 14, 17, 20, 37n69, 57, 58, 146 Greater Syria, 12 Grey, Edward, 13 Habbaniya, 175 Haidar, Selim, 65n52 Haidar, Subhi, 37n69 Haifa, 40 Haj, Abdallah al-, 64n40, 127n74 Hakim, Adnan al-, 73, 122n8, 143, 156, 178n8, 193 Hakim, Mohamed, 122n8 Hama, 14, 58–9, 142 Hamade, Sabri, 21, 127n74, 162, 169, 185, 193, 230 Hamed, 183n89 Hamid II, Abdul, 33n30 Hammarskjöld, Dag, 114, 190, 216, 217, 223, 226n30 Hanes, John, 74 Hare, Raymond, 68n84, 81, 95n58, 165, 211, 218, 221 Harvard, 106, 199 Hasbaya, 14 Hashemites, 31n5 Hayter, Sir William, 135 Heath, Donald, 96n74, 108, 133, 136, 137, 138, 139, 151n32, 159

251

Heikal, Mohamed, 114 Helleu, Jean, 23, 24, 25 Helou, Charles, 177 Hermel, the, 139 Higher Islamic Council, 171 Hilu, Farjallah, 150n20 Hitti, Philip, 141 Hitti, Yusuf, 141, 144 Hizb al-Nida’ al-Qawmi, 27 Holloway, Admiral, 199 Homs, 14, 58–9, 159 Hoss, Fawzi al-, 189 Hottinger, Arnold, 147 Hourani, Albert, 9, 17, 28 Husain, Sherif, 8 Hussein, King, 89n7, 118, 128, 183n95, 197 India, 159, 204n29, 215 Indochina, 15 Indonesia, 76, 103 Institut de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Dévéloppement (IRFED), 60 Institute of Industry, 52 Iran, 60, 70, 73, 100, 167, 192, 194, 201, 206n51, 209n98 Iraq, 5–6, 18–19, 42, 47, 60, 70, 72, 75–6, 81–2, 86–8, 89n7, 93n36, 96n64, 100, 103, 112, 122n21, 142, 163, 167, 175, 183n95, 188–9, 192, 194–7, 201–2, 206n51, 207n69, 213–14, 222–3, 228, 231 Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), 40, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86, 97n78, 102, 173, 191

252 Israel, 71, 77, 87, 99, 104–5, 111, 115, 117, 159, 164 Istanbul, 95n58, 194 Jamali, Dr Fadil al-, 168, 181n63, 213, 222 Japan, 159 Jarring, Dr, 215 Jebel al-Druze, 33n31 Jemal Pasha, 13 Jesuit University, 160 Jisr, Nadim al-, 169, 170 Johnston Plan, 86 Jordan, 42, 47, 72, 76, 79, 91n18, 105, 114, 118, 122n21, 128, 159, 167, 175, 183n95, 188–9, 192, 194, 196–8, 213–14, 222, 226n30 Jumblatt, Kamal, 3, 29, 48, 49, 50, 52, 64n40, 64n42, 64n49, 64n50, 83, 84, 86, 119, 120, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 158, 160, 169, 170, 173, 177, 182n76, 185, 190, 191, 193, 200, 204n29, 214, 218 Kansas, 133 Kantari, 186 Karami, Abdul Hamid, 10, 37n72, 50, 156 Karami, Nawwaf, 182n76, 218 Karami, Rashid, 83–6, 127n74, 129, 140, 143, 145, 148, 155–6, 160, 162–3, 169, 172, 176, 190, 193, 200, 224, 230 Kayyali, Ghalib, 221

Index Khalde, 198 Khalidy, Dr Mustapha, 56, 67n75 Khalil, Kazim el-, 203n19 Khartoum, 181n63 Khatib, Anwar al-, 64 Khazen, Clovis el-, 203n19 Khoury, Bechara al-, 9, 11, 20–2, 26–30, 36, 36n59, 36n63, 39n96, 44, 46, 50, 54, 56–7, 62n15, 63n22, 63n33, 64n39, 119, 130, 145, 156, 161 Khoury, Selim al-, 45 Kiketev, Ambassador, 113 Kuwait, 78, 189, 196, 201 Kuwatly, Shukry al-, 113, 134, 155, 156, 213 Lampson, Sir Miles, 19 Latakia, 33n31, 59, 111, 124n41, 125n48, 159 Lay, Jean, 138 League of Nations, 8, 16, 18, 32n18; see also Covenant of the League of Nations Lebanese Communist Party, 110–11, 134 Lebanese Industrial Association, 194 Lebanese National Pact, 2, 228 Lebanese Republic, 13, 20, 26, 36n57, 56 Lebanese–Richards communiqué, 116–17, 120 Lebret, Louis-Joseph, 138 Levant, 7, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 35n51, 36n67

Index Libya, 112, 122n21 Litani, 53, 80 Lloyd, Selwyn, 188, 207n69, 214, 216, 219 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 212 London, 44–5, 47, 89n6 Lyons, 12, 115, 194, 196, 222 Ma’ushi, Paul, 214 McClintock, Robert Mills, 134, 150n28, 159, 163–7, 176, 186, 188, 199, 207n67, 219, 221 Macmillan, Harold, 83, 196, 198 Majdalani, Nassim, 84 Makassed College, 55 Malik, Dr Charles, 82, 106–8, 110, 115–17, 123n30, 126n65, 133–5, 137–8, 151n32, 152n66, 159, 162–3, 167, 172, 174, 179n32, 187, 212, 214–15, 217, 221–2, 225n16 Marian Congress, 59 Maronite(s), 1, 7, 9–10, 12,–14, 21, 26, 31n15, 36n59, 37n69, 38n82, 44, 50, 55, 57, 61, 64n41, 137, 140–1, 146, 158, 169, 171–2, 214 Mashnouk, Abdallah al-, 130–1, 137, 140, 143, 176, 195 Matni, Nasib al-, 130, 143, 172 Mediterranean, 18, 85, 88, 91n18, 105, 109 Mejid, Major Husni Abdel, 143 Meouchi, Paul, 171, 181n72 Metni, Nasib, 164, 185

253

Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO), 73, 75, 77, 92n27 Middleton, George, 101, 107–9, 132, 144, 157, 165–6, 168, 177, 181n63, 192, 211, 219, 233 Mittelhauser, General, 19 Miziara church massacre, 179n28 Moghabghab, Naim, 145, 158 Mokheiber, Albert, 203n19, 215 Montpellier, University of, 133 Morocco, 15 Moubarak, Moussa(n36), 64n36, 65n52 Mount Lebanon, 7, 11–14, 20, 32n16, 33n27, 43–4, 141, 144–5, 232 Moyne, Lord, 45 Mroué, Kamel, 131 Mu’tamar, al-, 67n73 Muqannas, Pierre, 186 Murphy, Robert, 199, 200 Murr, Gabriel, 147 mutasarrifiyya, 7, 14 Nabatieh, 139 Nabulsi, Suleiman al-, 105 Naccache, Alfred, 20, 36n57, 76 Naccache, Georges, 132, 147 Naccache, Philippe, 43 Nagy, Imre, 217 Nahhas Pasha, 27, 36n68 Najjadah Party, 130 Napoleon Bonaparte, 218 Napoleon III, 31n16 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 70–1, 75–7, 86–7, 89, 89n6, 92n24, 92n26, 92n27, 93n33,

254 94n38, 98–106, 108, 111–15, 117–18, 122n16, 123n25, 123n26, 129–30, 135–6, 140–3, 150n20, 154–9, 162, 164–7, 170, 174, 186–91, 193–5, 197, 199, 201, 210–15, 217–24, 226n43, 228–32 National Bloc, 27, 161 National Conference of Lebanese Parties, 84 National Congress of Parties, 83, 119 National Front, 120,–1, 144, 152n66, 160 National Organization, 119–20, 157 National Pact, 4–5, 8, 18, 26–9, 50, 98, 118, 128, 168, 192, 228, 231 National Socialist Front, 46, 48, 50, 63n33; see also Socialist Front Neguib, Mohammed, 89n7, 113 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 76, 93n33 New York, 115 Nile, River, 89 Nixon, Richard, 201 North Africa, 15, 198 Northern Tier, 74–5, 77, 100, 201, 223 Norway, 215 Nsouli, Muhieddin, 66n60 Okinawa, 196 Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 111

Index Osseiran, Adel, 69n92, 156, 173, 186, 189, 195, 206n63 Ottoman Empire, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16, 32n16, 32n19, 43, 101, 147, 192 Oueini, Hussein, 83, 119, 195, 200, 224 Pakistan, 70, 75, 96n64, 100, 192, 194, 201, 206n51, 209n98 Palestine, 29, 40, 45, 72, 74, 78, 101, 111 Panama, 159 Paris, 12–14, 16, 86, 115, 160 Parker, Richard(n67), 126 Parti Politique Syrienne (PPS), 29, 39n93, 46 Persian Gulf, 40, 85, 196, 201, 207n69 Phalange Party, 130, 147, 161, 198, 214, 224 Pharaon, Henri, 42, 145, 160–1, 172–3, 177 Philby, Kim, 174 Philippines, 91n17 Picot, George, 32n19; see also Sykes–Picot Agreement Pius XII, Pope, 215 Plaza, Galo, 215 Poincaré, Raymond, 12 Point IV program, 56, 60, 67n80, 80, 81, 112 Poland, 159 Ponsot, General, 15 Port au Prince, 133 Port Said, 188

Index Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) , 63n29, 64n49, 119, 146, 160, 169 Puaux, Gabriel, 18–19 Quai d’Orsay, 12, 32n18 Qubain, Fahim I., 3 Rashaya, 14, 24, 37n72 Rashid, Harun al-, 11 Rashid ‘Ali revolt, 19 Razzak, ‘Abd al-, 37n69 Riad, Mahmoud, 113, 212 Richards, James, 112, 117, 125n43, 138; see also Lebanese–Richards communiqué Rifa’i, Abdul Wahab al-, 56, 67n75, 157 Robertson, General Sir Brian, 77 Rockwell, Stuart W., 135 Rome, 115 Roncalli, Cardinal, 59 Rountree, William M., 188, 203n17 Sa’id, Ahmad, 222 Sa’id, Nuri al-, 47, 76, 168 Sa’id, Nuri al-(n95), 183 Saadeh, Antun, 29, 39n93, 46, 63n30 Said, Nuri al-, 36n68, 89n7, 103 Saida, 41, 102, 163 St George Club, 102 St Helena, 218 Salam, Muhammad, 178n4 Salam, Saeb, 39n96, 46, 50, 56, 63n33, 69n92, 73, 85, 97n78,

255

102, 104–6, 137, 139–40, 142–3, 148, 155–7, 160, 172–3, 176, 178n4, 182n84, 186, 190–1, 193, 195, 200, 230–1 Salam, Salim Ali, 10 Salem, Salah, 76, 103 Salem, Yusuf, 147 Salibi, Kamal, 152n66 San Remo Conference, 12 Santiago, 133 Sarraj, ‘Abd al-Hamid al-, 142, 143, 197 Saud, King, 87, 120, 128, 213 Saudi Arabia, 23, 70, 72, 76–7, 87, 89n7, 96n64, 100, 112, 120, 122n21, 125n59, 128, 133–4, 159, 188, 196, 233 Sawda, Yusuf al-, 34n46 Sawt al-’Urubah, 149n7 Scott, Ian D., 40, 71, 97n77, 144 Second World War, 7, 13, 18, 22, 25, 26, 28, 101 Shakar, George Ibrahim, 59, 68n89 Shemlan, 102, 191 Shishakli, Adib al-, 47, 110, 142 Shorrock, William I., 31n4 Shuf, the, 43, 45, 48, 50, 120, 145, 146, 158, 173, 182n76, 185, 191, 193, 218 Shuqair, Shawkat, 143, 218 Sidon, 14, 139, 175 Sinai, 104 Skaff, Joseph(n19), 203 Socialist Front, 29, 30 Société Française des Tramways et Eclairage de Beyrouth, 12

256 Sorbonne, 160 Soviet Union (USSR), 21, 70, 73, 92n27, 109, 111, 128, 134, 201, 211, 221 Spears, Major General Edward, 20, 22–5, 44, 35n55, 36n67, 44–5 Stanford University, 159 Stewart, Desmond S., 155, 173 Sudan, 78, 94n41, 122n21 Suez Canal, 19, 100, 109 Suez Canal Company, 101, 167, 219, 223 Suez crisis, 1–2, 4, 47, 72, 89, 98–101, 116, 160, 167, 189, 198, 213, 219, 228, 231 Sulh, Kazim al-, 10, 27, 46, 93n31 Sulh, Riyad al-, 9–10, 20, 23, 26–9, 45–6, 50, 57, 59, 92n29 Sulh, Sami al-, 10, 38n87, 39n94, 39n96, 56–7, 63n33, 69n92, 76, 83, 92n29, 103, 106, 119, 129, 135, 139, 141, 148, 152n66, 161–2, 167, 171–2, 176, 191, 203n19, 214, 219–20 Sulh, Takyeddine al-, 46–7, 144 Sunni, 9, 14, 16, 26, 33n30, 37, 37n69, 38n83, 46, 56, 64n41, 67n73, 67n78, 72, 83, 84, 85, 102, 106, 141, 171, 172, 189, 232, 239 Suwaidi, Taufiq, 163 Switzerland, 159 Sykes, Mark, 32n19; see also Sykes–Picot Agreement Sykes–Picot Agreement, 13, 30n1 Syria, 8–20, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30n1, 30n3, 31n4, 32n18, 32n19,

Index 33n31, 35n56, 37n69, 39n93, 39n94, 41–2, 47, 55, 57–9, 70, 76, 82, 85–6, 88, 91n18, 100, 102, 105–6, 110–14, 116, 120, 122n21, 123n25, 124n41, 128, 133–5, 139, 141–3, 154, 157–9, 170, 173–4, 186, 214, 218, 221, 223, 229–30, 233 Syrian Communist Party, 110, 111, 150n20 Syrian Protestant College, 12 Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), 187 Tacla, Selim, 21 Takieddine, Bahige, 52, 147 Takla, Philip, 117, 177 Third Force, 132, 160, 172–3, 177, 189 Tigris, River, 89 Tito, Marshal, 76, 93n33 Topeka, 133 Tosbat, Dikran, 64n40 Tramways et Eclairage d’Alep, 12 Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company (Tapline), 41, 53, 73, 91n18 Tripartite Declaration, 73, 115 Tripoli, 12, 14, 37n72, 40, 47, 58–9, 80, 86, 102, 129, 139, 155, 162, 165, 169–70, 172, 175, 185, 190, 193, 218 Truman Doctrine, 109 Tueini, Ghassan, 52, 64n40, 130, 132, 147, 199 Tunis, 15 Turco–Iraqi Pact, 83–4

Index Turkey, 60, 70, 75, 100, 103, 168, 192, 194, 201, 206n51, 209n98, 214 Tyre, 14, 102, 155, 158, 162–3, 171 United Arab Republic (UAR), 5, 10, 105, 114, 135, 142, 154–9, 162–3, 167–8, 170, 173–4, 186, 190–4, 197, 203n11, 207n69, 210–12, 214–21, 223, 225n18, 229, 231 United Nations (UN), 5, 45, 72, 82, 90n9, 104, 106, 114–15, 159, 175, 177, 190, 192, 198, 200, 210–17, 220, 222–3, 231 United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), 190, 210, 217 United States (USA), 1–2, 4–5, 25, 70, 73, 76–7, 81–2, 84, 88, 91n17, 92n24, 93n38, 95n58, 106, 108, 116–17, 120, 125n57, 128, 133–4, 138, 159, 162, 167, 174–5, 192, 194–5, 200, 211–12, 216, 218–23, 229 United States Information Service (ISIS), 172 USIA library in Tripoli, 165

257

Uwayni, Husayn al-, 82 Venezuela, 159 Venice, 59 Vichy, 19, 21 Vietnam, 133 Voice of the Arabs, 100–1, 103, 113, 222 Wadsworth, George, 23, 35n56 Waggoner, Edward L., 135 Warsaw, 133 Washington DC, 106–7, 115, 166, 188, 190, 193, 196–8, 211, 220, 222–3, 226n43 Weygand, General Maxime, 18–19 Wright, Sir Michael, 222 Yaeger, H. A., 199 Yafi, Abdallah al-, 46, 50, 56, 57, 59, 63n33, 65n55, 69n92, 85, 86, 104, 106, 127n74, 130, 132, 139, 140, 143, 155, 157, 160, 163, 169, 172, 186, 200, 231 Yemen, 76, 113 Za’im, Husni al-, 39n93, 142 Zahle, 59, 144 Zein, Yusuf al-, 37n69 Zghorta, 179n28 Zorlu, Foreign Minister, 214 Zouein, Colonel, 175

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Syrian Intervention in Lebanon

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Armies In Lebanon 1982-84

The 1950s (Eyewitness History Series)

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The Hayloft- a 1950s Mystery

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The Hayloft- a 1950s Mystery

The War of Desperation: Lebanon, 1982-85

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Historical Dictionary of Lebanon

Foreign Communities in Hong Kong, 1840s-1950s

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