Learnability and Cognition: The Acquisition of Argument Structure

SeriesForeword

This seriesin learning, development , andconceptualchangewill includestateof the art referenceworks, seminalbook-lengthmonographs, and texts on the . It will span learning in all developmentof conceptsand mental sb' Uctures domainsof knowledge, from syntaxto geometryto the social world, andwill be concernedwith all phasesof development , from infancy throughadulthood. The seriesintendsto engagesuchfundamentalquestionsas Thenatureand limits of learningand maturation: the influenceof the environment , of initial Sb'Uctures , andof maturationalchangesin the nervoussystemon humandevelopment; leamability theory; the problem of induction; domain. specificconstraintson development The nature of conceptual change: conceptualorganization and conceptual changein child development, in the acquisitionof expertise, andin the history of science. Lila Gleitman SusanCarey ElissaNewport ElizabethSpelke

Acknow ,ledgments

In developingthe ideaspresentedin this book, I waslucky to haveencountered audienceswho refusedto believe them, studentswho refused to pretendto understandthem, andchildrenwho refusedto behavein accordancewith them. Facingthesechallengesled me to discoveriesthat provided the mostsatisfying momentsof this research. JessGropenhassharedmy enthusiasmfor this topic during the entiretime I haveworked on the book, and I havebenefitedgreatlyfrom our discussionson every aspect. His independentproposals on how to grapple with various problems were invariably of great help, and the ingenious experimentshe . I am happyto beable developedandexecutedarea crucial part of the research to thankhim for theseinvaluablecontributions. Amongother graduatestudents at MIT , PaulBloomandKarin Stromswoldalsoprovidedhelpful commentsand discussions. Jill GauldingandMarc Light took on astheir seniorresearchprojectsthetask of implementingpartsof thetheoryasa computersimulation. Their penetrating formalism and learningalgorithmsled to countless analysisof therepresentational in the improvements precision, economy, andaccuracyof thesemechanisms andin the clarity of the exposition. Michelle Hollander and Richard Goldberg assistedin the developmental researchwith dedication, intelligence, and skill . Loren Ann Frost, Ronald Wilson, and Larry Rosendeservethanksfor their work on earlier experiments . I amalsovery gratefulto thechild-carecentersin theBostonareathatinvited us in to conductthe research . I am in debtto a numberof researchers who havesharedtheir findingsanddisagreements . Melissa Bowermanhas doubted whetherconstraintson lexical rulescould get the child out of the learnability paradoxI have addressed . Lila Gleitmanhasquestionedhow muchof a verb' s meaninga child couldlearnfrom thesituationsin which it is used. JaneGrimshawandJanetRandallhavewarned

Acknowledgments

xiv

againstneglectingpropertiesof the grammaticalrepresentationof argument structureasa sourceof learningconstraints.JanetFodorhasbeenskepticalabout how productivechildren' s useof rules really is. KennethWexier has argued againstassumingthatthebiologicalmechanismsof languageacquisitionremain unchangedthroughchildhood. I think that all of thesepeopleare right about , and I have strived toward a theory that is eclectic enough to something all of their insightsin someform, thoughnaturally thesepeoplecan encompass be expectedto continueto find its weaknesses . What makesthe topic so much fun to workon is thatit is clearthat theultimatebesttheory, thougheclectic, will not be a banalresignationto the effect that " anythingcan happen." There are strikingregularitiesin argumentstructureandits acquisition, andI amglad to be part of a researchcommunitythat is working toward discoveringthem. I alsohavebeenfortunateto haveworkedon this projectat MIT during a time whentheLexiconProjectat theCenterfor CognitiveSciencewasin full swing. BethLevin, directorof theprojectthrough 1987, hasofferedmanyhelpful comments on this work, andthetheoryowesa greatdealto her research.Levin , Jay Keyser, and KennethHale createda stimulating environmentwith a seminar seriesandtechnicalreportsthat were an important catalyst in the research. A visiting positionin the Departmentof Psychologyat BrandeisUniversity gave an official statusto my very helpful discussionswith Jane Grimshaw, Ray Jackendoff,Alan Prince, andJerry Samet. Lila Gleitman,JaneGrimshaw. RayJackendoff, BarbaraLandau, Beth Levin , and severalanonymousreviewersreadportionsof the manuscriptand offered . KatarinaRice editedthe manuscriptmasterfully . manyinvaluablesuggestions Michael Tarr, David Plotkin, and Kyle Cave gave me generousadvice on computer-relatedmatters, includingwhatto do with a blazingSun. I am grateful to all of them. I thankmy parents,Harry andRoslyn, andmy brotherand sister, Robert and Susan,for their interestandencouragement . AlthoughNancyEtcoff doesnot sharemy obsessionwith verbs, her interests encompassall aspectsof mind, and I have benefited from her insights on countlessmatters. For these" ninsights" and for her support, I thank her. This researchwasfundedby NIH grantHD 18381andby a grantfrom the Alfred P. SloanFoundationto the MIT Centerfor Cognitive Science.

Chapter 1 A Leamability

Paradox

Some of the most rewarding scientific pursuits begin with the discovery of a paradox. Nature does not go out of its way to befuddle us, and if some phenomenon seems to make no sense no matter how we look at it , we are probably in ignorance of deep and far -ranging principles . For anyone interested in the human mind , language offers many such opportunities for discovery . Language is created anew each generation, so details of grammar , even subtle and intricate ones, are products of the minds of children and bear the stamp of their learning abilities . This book is about a paradox in language acquisition . The paradox begins with a small linguistic puzzle : Why does He gave them a book sound natural , but He ' donated them a book sound odd? It is complicated by a fact about children s environment - that they are not corrected for speaking ungrammatically - and a fact about their behavior - that they do not confine themselves to the verb phrase structures they have heard other people use. In trying to resolve this paradox, we must face fundamental questions about language and cognition : When do children generalize and when do they stick with what they hear? What is the rationale behind linguistic constraints? How is the syntax of predicates and arguments related to their semantics? What is a possible word meaning ? Do languagesforce their speakersto construe the world in certain ways? Is there a ' difference between a word meaning and a concept ? Why does children s language seem different from that of adults? The goal of this work is to resolve the learning paradox and to show how the solution leads to insight into thesedeep questions. The strategy I will follow comes out of what is sometimes called the learnability approach to language acquisition ( Hamburger and Wexier , 1975; Pinker , 1979; Wexier and Culicover , 1980; Baker and McCarthy , 1981) . This approach focuses on the logical nature of the task facing the child ashe or shetries to learn a language and on the mental representations and processes that make

Chapter1

suchlearningsuccessful . I will pursuethesolutionto thelearningparadoxrelentlessly , trying to createa trail thatleadsfrom theprelinguisticchild to the adult' s commandof subtlediscriminationsof linguistic structure. Thoughpartsof the trail mayberoughgoing, whatis mostimportantis thateachsegmentlink upwith the next to form an unbrokenpathof explanationfrom children' s experienceto adults' knowledge. In thischapterI outlinetheproblem: first, thespecificdomainof languageand why it is important, thenthe logic of languagelearningin general, thenthejuxtaposition of thetwo thatcreatesthelearningpuzzle. ThenI considersomehalfdozensimplewaysin whichtheproblemmight beeliminated. All canbe shown to be incorrector unsatisfactory . In my mind this is what elevatesthe problem from a puzzleto a paradox, which the restof the book attemptsto solve. Chapter2 discusses phenomenathat point to a way out of the paradoxand presentsevidencethat thatpathis theright one. The next threechaptersoutline a theoryof adult linguistic knowledgethat is logically capableof resolvingthe paradoxwhile providinganexplanationfor theform of thatknowledge. Chapter 3 tries to makesenseof the phenomena , makingthem fallout of more general . 4 extends those principles Chapter principles so that the original linguistic problemscanbesolvedin detail. Chapter5 dealswith representation ; it presents andjustifies an explicit descriptionof the representationalstructuresfor verb meaningsandrulesthat the theoryneeds. The next two chapterstake up the psychologicalprocesses for acquiringthe linguistic knowledgeunderlyingthesolutionto the paradox. Chapter6 is about learning; it discussesthecomputationalproblemof how the linguistic structures areacquiredthroughinteractionwith theenvironment,andit outlinesa proposal for how the child doesthis. Chapter7 is aboutchildren' s development; in it I comparethe factsof child languagewith the acquisitionproblemsand mechanisms discussedpreviously. In theconcludingchapterI spell out someinteresting implications that the solution of the paradox holds for languageand cognition. Much of this book is aboutwords, andthis calls for a specialapology. People know tensof thousandsof words, no two alike, making the mental lexicon a domain of immeasurablerichness. Any theory that tries to find common organizing principles amongstthis richnesscan be confronted with a huge numberof empiricaltests. While this makesfor lively linguistic argumentation , at timesit canbeoverwhelming. In the middle chapters(3, 4, and5) I describe a theory of the mentalrepresentation of words and rules whosemachineryis outlinedexplicitly andwhichis buttressedwith manylinguistic data. I havetried, however, to organizethe materialso that it can be absorbedby readerswith

ofexpertise andinterest thosewithlittlebackground , including varying degrees in linguistics .

A Leamability Paradox The key ideasof thesemiddlechaptersarepresentedin overviewsectionsat the beginningandin summarysectionsat theend. Thefirst sectionof chapter3, section3.1, is a capsuledescriptionof the theorydiscussedin that chapter, and similarly section4.1 motivatesandpreviewsthe claimsof chapter4. The final sectionof chapter4 spellsout the relationshipbetweenthe two key partsof the theory, the one presentedin chapter3 and the onepresentedin chapter4. The in chapter5 is presentedin generaljustification for thetheoryof representation of thetheoryaresummarized sections5.1through5.4, andtheaccomplishments at the endof the chapter. Finally, chapter8 beginswith a brief recapitulationof everything that went before. The detailed linguistic discussionsin the middle of chapters3- 5 are also modularly organized. In each one I begin with linguistic evidencethat is independentof the problemsI try to solve. Thesecanbe foundin sections3.2, 4.2, and5.3- 5.4. I presentthetheoreticalclaimsexplicitly in sections3.3, 4.3 and 5.5. In the remaining sectionsI apply the theory to each of four linguistic . Becausethe , locative, andpassivealternations , thedative, causative phenomena I chosento have of is the of this book , psychology languageacquisition topic than and rather issues of book around the learning representation organize aroundthe linguistic phenomena , andthis meansthat I discusseachof the four alternationsa numberof times. Thesectionsin whichtheindividualalternations are discussedare self-contained , and specialists , labeled, andcross-referenced others . Readers who want or skim the can in one alternation with an interest skip to seethe theory appliedin detail to one illustrativealternationareencouraged to track the discussionsof the dative. But let me get on with the paradox. 1.1

Argument Structure and the Lexicon

Humanlanguagesdo notdefinestraightforwardmappingsbetweenthoughtsand words. To get a sentence , it is not enoughto selectthe appropriatewordsand string themtogetherin anorderthat conveysthe meaningrelationshipsamong them. Verbsarechoosy; not all verbscanappearin all sentences , evenwhenthe combinationsmakeperfectsense , as shownin ( 1.1). ( 1.1) Johnfell . . Johnfell the floor. Johndined. . Johndined the pizza. Johndevouredthe pizza. . Johndevoured.

Chapter1

Johnate. Johnatethe pizza. Johnput somethingsomewhere. * John put something. * Johnput somewhere . * Johnput. Thesefactsdemonstratethe phenomenonoften referredto assubcategorization : different subcategories of verbsmakedifferent demandson which of their must be , which canbe optionally expressed , and how the arguments expressed expressedargumentsareencodedgrammatically that is, as subjects, objects, or obliqueobjects(objectsof prepositionsor oblique cases). The propertiesof verbs in different subcategoriesare specified by their entries in the mental lexicon, in data structurescalled argument structures (also called predicate , caseframes, argumentstructures,subcategorizationframes, subcategorizations lexical forms, andthetagrids). Thus theargumentstructureoffall , dine, andthe intransitiveversionof eat would specify that only a subjectis permitted. The argumentstructuresfor devour and the transitive versionof eat would specify that a subjectandan object are required. The argumentstructurefor put would call for no moreand no lessthan a subject, an object, and an obliqueobject. Lexical argumentstructuresplay an extremely important role in modem theoriesof language.Beginningwith Aspectsof theTheoryof Syntax(Chomsky, 1965) andcontinuingto thepresent, it hasbecomeapparentthatmanyof thefacts of grammararecausedby propertiesof the particular lexical itemsthat go into . Recenttheoriesof grammarspecify rich collectionsof information sentences in lexical entries and relatively impoverished rules or principles in other componentsof grammar(e.g., Chomsky, 1981; Bresnan, I 982a). Sentences conformto thedemandsof the words in thembecauseof generalprinciples(for ' ' example, Chomskys Theta-Criterion andBresnans CoherenceandCompleteness Principles) that deema sentenceto be grammaticalonly if the arguments ' specifiedby theverb s argumentstructureareactuallypresentasconstituentsin the sentenceand vice versa. Chomsky' s ProjectionPrinciple specifiesfurther that the demandsof verbs' argumentstructuresmust be satisfiedat every level of sentencerepresentation , not just deepstructure. Sinceverbs' argumentstructuresassumesucha largeburdenin explainingthe facts of language , how argumentstructuresare acquiredis a correspondingly crucial part of the problemof explaining languageacquisition. (In fact, Elliott andWexler, in press,havegonesofar asto suggestthatlanguageacquisitionmay be nothingbut the acquisitionof information aboutthe wordsin the language .) How argumentstructuresare acquiredis intertwined with the questionof why

A LeamabilityParadox

1.2 The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition Languageacquisitionin general, andtheacquisitionof verbargumentstructures in panicular, canbe thoughtof in the following tenDS. The child hearsa finite numberof sentences from his or herparentsduring the language-learningyears, which aresymbolizedby the X ' s in ( 1.2). But a languageis an open-endedset, not a fixed list, so the child mustgeneralizefrom theseinputs to an infinite set of sentences thatincludesthe input samplebut goesbeyondit. This is shownin 1.2 with thearrow pointingto it. As in all induction problems, the as the circle ( ) hardpart is that an infinite numberof hypothesesareconsistentwith the input samplebut differ from eachother and from the correcthypothesis(the actual ) in ways that are not detectablegiven the input samplealone. targetlanguage Someof the incorrecthypothesesare depictedby the othercircles in ( 1.2). ( 1.2)

The solution to this (or any other) learning problem works as follows . Constraints on the learner force him to entertain a restricted set of hypotheses that includes the correct hypothesis but excludes many others. The learner can then compare the predictions ofa hypothesis ( which sentencesit generates) with the input data so that incorrect hypotheses can be rejected. ' There are four ways in which one of the the child s hypotheses can be incorrect ' before learning is successful. The child s language can be disjoint from the target language, as in ( 1.3a) . ln this caseany sentencein the input is sufficient to infonn the child that the hypothesis is wrong . Such sentences, called positive evidence,

Chapter1

aredepictedin thefigure with a " +" symbol. Likewise, if the languagegenerated ' by thechild s hypothesisgrammarintersectsthetargetlanguage,asin ( 1.3b), or is a subsetof it , as in ( 1.3c), positiveevidenceconsistingof input sentencesin the nonoverlappingregion of the targetlanguagesufficesto impel the child to . However, if thechild entertainsa grammargeneratinga rejectthe hypothesis of the superset targetlanguage,asin ( 1.3d), no amountof positive evidencecan strictly falsify the guess. What heor sheneedsis negativeevidence: evidence aboutwhichword stringsareungrammatical(thatis, not in the targetlanguage). This is shownas the " - " symbolsin ( 1.3d). Explaining successfullearning basicallyconsistsof showing that the learnercan entertain and stick with a correcthypothesisandcanfalsify any incorrectones(see, e.gOsherson , Stob, andWeinstein, 1985; Pinker, 1979; Wexier and Culicover, 1980). T H T T H ( 1.3) H

00 OJ @ @ (a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

The first important questionabout child languageacquisition is whether negativeevidenceis available. Obviously no one gives children a list of ungrammaticalsentencestaggedwith asterisks. The most psychologically plausiblekind of negativeevidencewouldbesomesortof parentalfeedbackthat childrenmight receiverelatedto whethertheir own utterancesare grammatical or not, suchascorrectionsor expressions of approval. The availableevidence suggeststhat children are not provided with such information. Brown and Hanion ( 1970) found that parentsdo not differentially expressapproval or ' disapprovalcontingenton whetherthechild s prior utterancewas well formed; nor do theyunderstandwell-formedquestionsbetterthan ill -formed ones. As a resultit is commonlyassumedthatchildrendo not dependon negativeevidence to acquire a language. This meansthat they cannot engage in the sort of hypothesisfalsificationillustratedin figure (2d); eitherthey neverentertainany hypothesisthat is a supersetof the target language, or, if they do, some force mustimpel themto abandonit , becausethe world will never endogenous force themto. On the other hand, childrencannotsimply stick with the exact sentences theyhear, becausetheymustgeneralizeto theinfinite languageof their community. This tension, betweenthe needto generalizeand the neednot to , characterizesmanyof the toughestproblemsin explaining generatesupersets humanlanguageacquisition. Someof theseare discussedby Baker ( 1979), Berwick ( 1986), Bowerman ( 1987a, 1987b), Braine ( 1971), Chomsky and Lasnik ( 1977), Pinker ( 1982, 1984), andWexier and Culicover ( 1980).

A LeamabilityParadox 1.3 BakeF' s Paradox Now we can juxtaposethe facts of argumentstructurewith the logic of the learningproblem. The acquisitionof thesyntacticpropertiesof verbsis oneof the clearestcasesin which the no-negative-evidenceproblemarises. Though GeorgiaGreen( 1974; pp. 3, 199) first pointedout a learningparadoxbasedon it , C. Lee Baker ( 1979) discussedit in a largercontextthatdrewmoreattention. Considera child hearingsentencepairs suchas thosein ( 1.4) andfonning the associatedargumentstructures. ( 1.4) John gave a dish to Sam. give: NPI - NP2 to- NP3 John gave Sama dish. give: NPI. - NP]- NP2 -

thesalamito Fred. Johnpassed

pass: NP. - NP2to- NPJ John passedFred the Salami. pass: NP. _ NPJNP2 John told a joke to Mary. tell: NP. - NP2to- NPJ John told Mary a joke . tell: NP. - NPJ NP2 It would seem to be a reasonablegeneralizationthat any verb with the NPI - NP2to- NPJargumentstructure(prepositionaldative) couldalsohavea NP. - NPJ NP2argumentstructure(double- objectdative). This generalization could be capturedin, say, a lexical rule suchasthat in ( 1.5), which wouldallow thechild to createa double-objectdativecorrespondingto anyprepositionalone for somenew verb (e.g., send), evenif heor shehadneverheardtheverbin the double- object form. ( 1.5) NP. - NP2to- NPJ - > NP, - NP3NP2 Theproblem is thatnot all theverbswith theprepositionalargumentstructure dativize (that is, appearin both versionsof the alternation), as( 1.6) shows. ( 1.6)

John donateda painting to the museum. * John donatedthe museuma painting. John reportedthe accidentto the police. * John reportedthe police the accident.

But the child hasno way of knowingthis, giventhenonavailabilityof negative ' in evidence. The fact that he or shehasnt heardthe ungrammaticalsentences ' ( 1.6) could simply reflect adults neverhavinghadanopportunityto utterthem

I Chapter in the child' s presence(after all , there are an infinite numberof gramm.atical sentencesthat the child will never hear). Therefore, the child should speak ungrammaticallyall his life- or moreaccurately, the languageshouldchangein a singlegenerationsothatexceptionalverbssuchasthosein ( 1.6) wouldbecome regular. I will call this learningproblem" Baker' s paradox." It hasattracteda greatdeal of attentionamonglanguageacquisitionresearchers , for example, Berwick and 1984 Bowerman 1983a 1987a 1987b , , ), ( ), Clark ( 1987), Fodor Weinberg ( ( 1985), FodorandCrain ( 1987), Maratsos, Gudeman,Gerard-Ngo, andDe Hart ( 1987), MacWhinney( 1987), Mazurkewich and White ( 1984), Pinker ( 1981a, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988), Pinker, LebeauxandFrost( 1987), Randall( 1987), and Roeper ( 1981). In Pinker ( 1984) I considered severalother lexicosyntactic alternationswhere the combinationof widespreadgeneralizationand lexical exceptionscreatesthe samelearnabilityproblem. Among themarethepassive, shown in ( 1.7), the lexical causativealternation, in ( 1.8), and the locative alternation, in ( 1.9). I will returnto thesefour alternationsrepeatedlyin this book in discussingthe resolutionof Baker' s paradox.I ( 1.7) JohntouchedFred. Fred wastouchedby John. (also hit , see, like , kick , etc.) JohnresembledFred. * Fred wasresembledby John. ( 1.8) The ball rolled. Johnrolled the ball. (also slide, melt , bounce, open, close, etc.) The baby cried. * Johncried the baby. ( 1.9)

Irv loadedeggsinto the basket. Irv loadedthe basketwith eggs. (also spray, cram, splash, stuff, etc.) Irv pouredwater into the glass. * Irv pouredthe glasswith water.

1.4

' Attempted Solutions to Baker s Paradox

1.4.1 Componentsof the Paradox Three aspectsof the problem give it its senseof paradox. First is the lack of negativeevidence:if childrencould count on beingcorrectedor on beinggiven someother signal for every ungrammaticalutterancethey made, then simply saying somethinglike J am resembledby Seth and attendingto the resulting feedbackwould suffice to expunge the passive lexical entry for resemble.

A LeamabilityParadox Second, productivity : if children simply stuck with the argument structures that were exemplified in parental speech, never fonning a productive rule such as that in ( 1.5 ), then they would never make errors to begin with and hence would have

noneedto figureouthowto avoidor expungethem. Third. arbitrariness: the fact thatnear-synonymshavedifferentkindsof argumentstructures.suchasgive and donate. or load andpour. or own(which passivizes ) andhave(which doesnot). or move(whichoccursin a lexicalcausative) andgo ( whichdoesnot) meansthat the child cannotusesomesimplesemanticguidelineindicatingwhereproductive rulescanbe appliedandwherethey areblocked. But in combinationthese three factorsmakeacquisitionof argumentstructurealternationsin the verb lexiconimpossibleto explain. Accordingly. thevarioussolutionsto theparadox . that havebeenproposedhavedeniedone or more of thesethreeassumptions 1.4.2 Solution #0: Nonsolutions Languageacquisitionresearchhasno shortageof vaguegeneralproposalsabout what languageacquisitionis like, andoften it hasbeensuggestedto me that the or is easilysolvedby oneof theseproposals.For example, problemdisappears Model" thatBraine' s( 1971) " DiscoveryProcedures Bowerman( 1987b)suggests ' might leadto a solutionof Baker s paradox, andMacWhinney( 1987) claimsthat his " CompetitionModel" solvesit outright. It hasalsobeensuggestedto me that " es that go by such namesas " abduction algorithms and " syntactic process " distributionalanalysis would do thejob . Thesesuggestionsarenot necessarily wrong, but theyareaboutasusefulassayingthatyou cangetrich by buying low ' and selling high. Sincenoneof them providesany detailsas to how Baker s paradoxmight be solved in any concreteinstance- the modelscannot even representthedistinctionsmadein the adult state, let aloneshow how they are acquired- thereis no needto discussthem further. 1.4. 3 Solution #1: Variants of Negative Evidence 1.4.3.1 Subtle NegativeEvidence The ideathat childrenhaveno accessto negativeevidencedoesnot sit well with many people. As Michael Maratsos ( 1986) hasput it , psychologistsseemto want to take the difficult problem of languageacquisitionawayfrom the helplesschild and return it to the handsof responsibleauthorities.Thusseveralinvestigatorshaverecentlytakena closer look at the negativeevidencequestion. Thesereexaminationshavereplicated BrownandHanlon' sfinding thatparentalexpressionsof approvalareindependent ' of the grammaticalityof the child s prior utterance. However, there have beenfound to be slight differencesin the frequencywith which somemothers ' repeat,alter, question,andfollow up in variouswaysontheirchild swell formed

ChapterI

versusill -fonnedutterances(Hirsch-Pasek,Treiman, andSchneidennan , 1984; Demetras, Post, and Snow, 1986; Penner, 1987; Bohannonand Stanowicz, 1988). Nonetheless , this feedbackis unlikely to solvethe learnability problem we are facedwith in this case, or probablyany otherone (seealso Bowennan, 1987a, 1987b,Gordon, in press,GrimshawandPinker, in press,andMorganand ' Travis, in press, for similar arguments ). For Baker s problem to go away, the following things would haveto be true: I . Negativeevidencewouldhaveto exist.Onethingis certain: childrendo not receivenegativeevidencein thetechnicalsenseof thetenn. Negativeevidence (seeGold, 1967; Pinker, 1979) is infonnation aboutthe ungrammaticality of ' everyungrammaticalstringcomposedof thelanguages vocabularyitems. None of thenewstudieshasshownthatall theungrammaticalsentences of all children elicit reliabledifferencesin parentalbehavior, only that somedo sometimes. In these studies, all fonns of ill -fonnednessare lumped together in the analyses.Thus we do not know whetherit is ungrammaticality in generalthat elicits differencesin parentalbehavior, or a particularsalientkind of ungram. In theHirsch-Paseket al. study, maticality suchasmissingmajor constituents only children in the youngestagegroup (2 year-olds) were found to receive partly diagnosticinputin thefonn of morefrequentrepetitionsof ungrammatical utterances(the analysiscombinedverbatimrepetitionswith thosein which the error wascorrected); for the3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, and5-year-olds, therewas no difference. Penner( 1987) also found that feedbackratesdeclined precipitously aftertheageof two. But thereis surelya lot of languageleft to beacquired at that age, includingthestructuresrelevantto Baker' s paradox. In fact Gropen, Pinker, Hollander, Goldberg, and Wilson ( 1989) documenteda number of that wereungrammatical examplesof childrenutteringdouble-objectsentences becauseof their verbs; in no casedid the parentsreact with disapproval, correction, repetition, or recasting. An equally seriousproblem is that it is unlikely that all children receive diagnostic parental feedback- but all children learn their native language. Exceptfor theDemetraset al. paper, thenewstudiesreportaggregatedata, rather thandatafrom individualchildren. Nonetheless eventheaggregatedatafrom the Hirsh-Pasekstudymake it clear that not everymotherof a 2-year-old in their middle-classsample(let alonemothersfrom otherclassesor cultures) differentially , and this is likely to be true of the repeatedungrammaticalutterances BohannonandStanowiczandPennerstudiesaswell. Notein this regardthatthe useof inferentialstatisticsin anattemptto generalizeto a populationof mothers is highly misleading. It is not the psychologyof the averagemother that is in questionherebut theavailability of certainkindsof infonnationto anychild who .2 learnsto Speak

A LearnabilityParadox

A third reasonto doubt thatchildrenreceivenegativeevidenceis thatmuchof theparentalfeedbackthat hasbeendocumentedmaynot evenbefeedbackabout grammaticality. In the Demetraset al. study, the three kinds of feedback measuresthathada probabilistic relationshipto theutterancesof all thechildren in the sample(clarification questions,signalsto " moveon" in theconversation , andverbatimrepetitions) werenot consistentlyrelatedto whetherthe utterance wasdeviantfor syntactic, phonological, semantic, or pragmaticreasons . Thus therewasno informationindicatingto thechildrenwhetherit wastheir grammar andlexiconthatneededfixing or their pronunciationor conversationalskills; a child who paidheedto parentalfeedbackcould needlesslymessup his rulesof syntaxor morphologywhen all hehaddonewaspronounceballoonasbawoon. The sameprobleminfects the Bohannonand Stanowicz( 1988) study. Finally, in no studywasanyof theforms of feedbackuniformly contingenton ' propertiesof the child s utterance. For example, Hirsh-Paseket al. found that 20% of thechild' s ungrammaticalutteranceswererepeated ; but sowere 12% of their grammaticalutterances.Soany child who changedhis or her grammarso asto rule out a repeatedutterancewould be makinghis grammarbettera fifth of thetime but makingit worseaneighthof the time. The otherstudiesof parental feedbackalsofoundthat its relationto the well-formednessof children' s speech washighly noisyat best; usuallythe meandifferencebetweenthe frequencyof a form of feedbackfollowing a well-formed utteranceand following an ill formedutterancewasa few ~ rcentagepoints. Again, we mustnot bemisledby thehabitof trying to detectweakeffectsby lookingataveragetendenciesin large samples.Although this might be appropriatefor a studyof the psychologyof mothers, it is not appropriatefor a study of the informationavailableto every child. The noisinessof parentalfeedbacksuggeststhat the child might be betteroff ignoring it altogetherand changinghis or her grammaronly in responseto positive evidence. According to some estimates(Newport, Gleitman, and Gleitman, 1977), parental speechis 99.93% free from speecherrors (putting asideirrelevanciessuchasellipsesandcasualspeechformsthatare" errors" only in aprescriptivesense). Relyingonpositiveevidencealone, in contrastto relying on negativeevidenceas well , would thus make the child' s grammarworse virtually never. Notealso that theextremelyhigh reliability of positiveevidence shows that skepticism about the value of noisy and inconsistentnegative evidenceis not basedon a naivefaith in a pristine, noise-free world. 2. Negativeevidence, even if it exists, would have to be useful. Although negativeevidencein the technicalsensesurelydoesnot exist, perhaps,it could beargued, thechildren that do receiveprobabilisticfeedbackcould makeuseof it in someway. For example, children might be able to aggregateinformation

I Chapter from thestatisticaltendenciesof parentalreactions, rejectinga sentenceif it had beenfollowed by a giventypeof feedbacksooften that the hypothesisthat it was ungrammaticalwas very much more probablethan the hypothesisthat it was grammatical. But how this would work is quiteunclear. Childrencertainlycannotaggregate informationaboutfeedbackto tokensof particularsentences ; nosentenceis used by a child often enough. So if they use feedback at all, they must lump " " equivalent kinds of sentencestogetherfor the tallies. How they hypothesize the right equivalenceclassesand assignsentencescorrectly to them simply reraises all the questionsaboutgeneralizationthat have to be answeredunderthe assumptionsthat positive evidencealoneis used. The usefulnessof the informationthat a kind of sentenceis ungrammaticalis highly questionabletoo. Sentencesaregeneratedby largenumbersof rulesand principlesthat vary crosslinguistically , notjust one. So evena child who is able to makea binary good/ baddecisionfacesa formidableexampleof whatartificial " " intelligence researcherscall the blame-assignment problem: figuring out which rule to single out for changeor abandonment . (As mentionedin the precedingdiscussion, in practicethe problem is even worsebecausethe child " " mayhaveno way of distinguishing errors thataredueto syntaxfrom thosedue to defective word meanings, bad pronunciation, or conversationalmaladroitness .) 3. Negativeevidence,evenif presentanduseful, would haveto be used. HirshPaseket al. arecarefulto point out thattheir studydoesnot establishthatchildren wereat all sensitiveto the contingenciesthey tried to document. We havevery little goodevidenceon this matter. But we do havea set of consistentobservations of parent-child interactionsuggestingthat parentalfeedback, even in the form of maximally clear and informative overt corrections, may be fruitless in changingthe grammarof the child. For example, McNeill ( 1966) reportsthe following dialogue: ' ( 1.10) Child: Nobody don t like me. " Mother: No, say Nobody likes me." Child: Nobody don' t like me. [dialoguerepeatedeight times] Mother: Now listen carefully, say " NOBODY LIKES ME." Child: Oh! Nobodydon' t likeS me. Braine( 1971) reportsthathemadeseveralextensiveefforts to changethe syntax of his two childrenthroughfeedback. Overa spanof severalweeks, for example, herepeatedlybut unsuccess fully tried to persuadehis daughterto substituteother N for other oneN , in interchangessuchasthe following :

A LearnabilityParadox

13

( 1.11) Child: Want other one spoon, Daddy. Father: You mean, you want THE OTHER SPOON. Child: Yes, I want other one spoon, please, Daddy. Father: Canyou say " the other spoon" ? Child: Other ... one ... spoon. Father: Say... " other." Child: Other. Father: " Spoon." Child: Spoon. Father: " Other ... spoon." Child: Other... spoon. Now give me other onespoon? Braine reports that " further tuition is ruled out by her protest, vigorously " from the supportedby my wife. Maratsos( 1986) hasreportedsimilarexchanges ' speechof Stan Kuczaj s son, and I chanceduponthe following dialoguefrom ' transcriptsof thespeechof Brian MacWhinney s sons(MacWhinneyandSnow, 1985): ( 1.12) Child: I turnedthe raining off. Parent: You meanyou turnedthe sprinkleroff? Child: I turnedthe raining off of the sprinkler. Thoughisolated, thereportsareconsistent,andI know of no demonstrations in which overt correction or other immediateparentalfeedbackhas led to ' . persistentchangesin children s language Although it is possiblethat correctionsor otherformsof enrichedinteraction with children might in the future be shownto leadto measurablechangesin the children' s speech, suchevidencewould haveto be interpretedcautiously. Any correctionby its verynaturealsoofferspositiveevidence, andpositiveevidence of a peculiarly relevant kind. So any study which purports to show that correctionsare actuallyusedby children canbe given the moreparsimonious explanationthatthisisjust anothercasewhererelevantpositiveevidenceis used. To makeany kind of casefor the role of correctionsasnegativeevidence,it is necessaryto distinguishthe statistical correlationbetweenpartial corrections and ungrammaticalutterancesfrom the contentof the correctionsthemselves , which is a form of positive evidence. 4. Negative evidence, even if used, would have to be necessaryto avoid or recoverfrom overgeneration. Even if the child were shownto learnfasterby virtueof usingnegativeevidence, it wouldhaveto bedemonstrated that negative evidencewasnecessaryto causethechange. If it simply spedup somechange that wasboundto happenbecauseof otherlearningmechanisms , we wouldstill have to explain how those other mechanismsworked. An analogy: It is

ChapterI

conceivablethat explicit languagedrills , such as in high school " language laboratories," could affect the child ' s acquisition of someaspectof grammar. Unlessthatdrill wastheonly way in which that learningaccomplishmentcould take place, a theorist could not rely on it to explain that facet of language acquisition. In fact, it seemsquite unlikely thatnegativeevidenceis necessaryfor the child to learn which verbs take which argument structures. Virtually every adult speakerof standardAmerican English would judge the sentencessuch as I ladeledthefloor with paint, Tenpounds was weighedby the boy, I murmured John the answer and He rejoiced the audienceto be ungrammatical . Is that becauseeveryonehasat somepoint uttered theseverbs in thesecontextsand benefited from negative feedback? If someone's personal history had not includedsuchevents, would he or shefind suchsentencesacceptable ? The low ' s and adults errors with them of these verbs and of children , , frequency combinedwith the uniformity of adults' judgmentsthat thesesentences sound bad, makesthat extremelyunlikely. We must look elsewhereto explain how children turn into adults. Two other ideasare often discussedin connectionwith negativeevidence. each aimed at showing that somekind of infonnation in the environmentis sufficient to tell the child which stringsare ungrammaticalin the language . not via some cue or but via a short inference . . directly indirectly physical signal 1.4.3.2 Nonoccurrence: A Surrogatefor NegativeEvidence? Occasionally it is suggestedthat if thechild notedthat certainfonns did not occurin theinput, thatcould serveasa kind of evidencethat suchfonns wereungrammatical(e.g., Chomsky, 1981). This is called indirect negative evidence. But on closer examinationit turns out to be far from clear what indirect negativeevidence could be. It can' t be true that thechild literally rulesout any sentenceheor she hasn't heard, becausethereis alwaysan infinity of sentences thatheor shehasn' t heardthataregrammatical(andthe discussionof conservatismbelowwill show that at no point in developmentdoes a speakerrule out all the verb-argument structurecombinationsthathavenot yet appearedin the input). And it is trivially true both that the child picks hypothesisgrammarsthat rule out someof the sentenceshe or shehasn't heard, and that if a child hearsa sentencehe or she will often entertaina differenthypothesisgrammarthanifhe or shehasn't heard it. So the question is, underexactly what circumstancesd~ s a child conclude that a nonwitnessedsentenceis ungrammatical? This is virtually a restatement of theoriginal learningproblem. Answering it requiresspecifyingsomedetailed learning strategy. It takesthe burdenof explaining learningout of theenviron-

A LeamabilityParadox

mentalinputandputsit backin thechild. Useof indirectnegativeevidence,even ' if true in somesense , is thus not, strictly speaking, a featureof the child s learningenvironment(assubtledirect negativeevidencewould be) but rathera featureof his learningstrategy,andhenceit mustbe fleshedout accordingto a , Stob, and Weinstein, particulartheoryof theselearningstrategies. (Osherson 1985,discussonetheoreticalpossibility, thoughit is not plausiblefor thepresent problem.) 1.4.3.3 Uniqueness:Another Surrogate for NegativeEvidence? It is also occasionallysuggestedthat the child hearssentencesin perceptualcontexts containinginformationaboutthe meaningof the sentencesratherthan disembodied stringsof words, andthat this gives him or her a substitutefor negative evidence(seePinker, 1979, 1982; Wexier andCulicover, 1980; Oshersonet al., 1985). Therearetwo versionsof this suggestion,and neitheroneof them can solveBaker's problemdirectly. On the one hand, a languagecanbe construed asa setof pairseachconsistingof a string anda semanticrepresentation . The child' s taskis to learnthe infinite set of legitimatepairs, and his or her input consistsof a sampleof such pairs (sentences , plus a representationof their , inferredfrom their contexts). Negativeevidencein this casewould meanings consistof informationthat certainmeaning-sentencepairingswereimpossible. But it is clearthatthe child doesnot receivethis kind of negativeevidenceeither. For example, the child would have to know thatJohn donatedthe museuma paintingis notamongthelegitimatewaysof expressingthepropositionthatJohn donateda painting to the museum, leading us back to the Brown and Hanion findings thatsuch informationis probably not available. On thesecondconstrual, thelanguagewould betreatedasa setof strings and thechild' s inputasa finite sampleof thosestrings, but thechild would assume that meaningsandstringspair up in one-to-onefashion. Thus if a given string washeardpairedwith aparticularmeaning, thechild couldrejectany hypothesis thatpaireda differentstringwith that meaning. In this way any ungrammatical sentence(aslong as it wasgiven a detenninatesemanticinterpretation) could beruledout. Theone-to-oneor Uniquenesspostulate(seeWexierandCulicover, 1980; Pinker, 1984; Clark, 1987) would be necessarybecauseif a language allowed synonymoussentences , hearingone sentencepaired with a meaning would not licensethe child to conclude that someother sentence with that . Onceagain, thereis no straightforward way in meaningwasungrammatical 's this Baker which solves problem. On the face of it , languagesdo contain , suchasGivethe bookto meandGivemethe book. Thus synonymoussentences if a child hearsDonatethebookto mehe cannotjustifiably infer thatDonateme

Chapter I

the book is ungrammatical . (If the child did erroneouslyassumethat Uniqueness wasthe unmarkedcase, relaxingit for give andthe scoresof verbslike it underthe pressureof witnessingboth versionsin the input, he would simply be adoptingthe conservatismstrategythat I discussin the next section.) Thus an ' ' appealto Uniquenesswill not resolveBaker s paradox. It s not that the logic of Uniquenessis faulty. Forexample,it worksin principlein thecaseof recovering from overgeneralization of past-tensemorphology,becausevirtually everyverb hasa uniquepast tense form: hearingbrokein a pasttensecontext is evidence that breakedis ungrammatical . Theproblemfor thecaseof argumentstructures is that thereis unlikely to bea perceptuallyrecoverablesemanticrepresentation that can be pairedup uniquelywith eachalternativeargumentstructure. BeforeI rejectthis optiontooquickly, it is worthnotingthatClark ( 1987) does review evidencesuggestingthat perfect synonymyis rare or nonexistentin naturallanguages . Shepointsout thatseeminglysynonymousconstructionscan differ in discourseproperties,entailments , speechregister(e.g., fonnal versus casual), andothersubtlefactors. For example,Erteschik-Shir ( 1979) pointsout that the two forms of thedativediffer in discoursefocus. Give the X to the Y is most felicitous whenX (the transferredobject) is known backgroundinformation andY (therecipient) is thenewinformationthat attentionis beingcalledto; Give the Y theX is appropriatewhenY is backgroundandX is foreground. But how could the learnerusethis informationto rule out *He donatedthe museum a painting? Basically, each combinationof a verb anda setof discourseroles for its argumentswould have to bepaireduniquelywith anargumentstructure. In Pinker( 1981a) I sketch the necessary kind of scenario. Therewould haveto be a situationin which the recipientis backgroundinformation and the transferred objectis newinformationbutthespeakerinsistson usingthenonfelicitous " prepositional-object form instead. For example, if a personwere to ask, What did Johndo with the museumthat inspiredits directorsto makehim a trustee?" and heardas an answer, " He donateda Vermeerto the museum," the listener could concludethat the double-object form of donateis ungrammatical. This scenario, of course, is highly implausible. Thoughchildren are demonstrably sensitiveto discoursepropertiesof thedativeforms (Gropenet al., 1989), their , in ordinary discoursea host sensitivity is statistical, not absolute. Furthermore of focusingdevices. suchaspronominalization , contrastivestress, andclefting, can override the default differencesin discoursefocus betweenalternative argumentstructures.Thus, in my example,He donateda VERMEERto it is a perfectly felicitous reply to the hypotheticalquestion. Uniquediscoursecorrelates of alternativeargumentstructureswould therefore be a tenuousbasisfor rejecting oneof them.

A Learnability Paradox

1.4.4 Solution #2: Strict Lexical Conservatism Baker( 1979) andFodor ( 1985; seealsoFodorandCrain, 1987) havesuggested thatchildrenaddan argumentstructureto the lexical entry of a verbonly when they hear the verb exemplified in parentalspeechin that argumentstructure. They do not deny that children recordsystematicgeneralizationsamongitems (e.g., betweenactivesandpassivesor betweenprepositionaldativesanddoublewouldnotbeextended objectdatives), but they believethatthesegeneralizations to newforms. The generalizationsmight be usedto storeexistinglexical entries in memorymore compactly, or to dictate theform of possiblelexical itemsif positiveevidencemandatedaddingthem to the lexicon. For example, givenan activeverb, someversionof a passiverule mightdictatethattheverbcouldhave a passiveparticiplethat wasrelatedto it in a particularway (i.e., its objectwould correspondto thepassivesubject, andsoon). But whetherinfact it hada passive participleof this form could beascertainedonly by observingwhetheradultshad utteredthat verb in the passive. As Wasow( 1981), Pinker ( 1984), and othershavepointedout, this hypothesis is prima facie implausible for adults, given thesheernumberof verbsin the adult lexicon andadults' apparentfreedomin usingverbsin passives , doubleobject datives, and other derived constructions. Verbs of arbitrarily low frequency , which most people have never heard passivizedor dativized, are instantlyrecognizableasgrammaticalin their passiveor dativeforms (e.g., The ' ' food was masticated, The matrix was diagonalized, Pierreflipped / slapped/ kicked / shot / tapped / poked him the puck). This is in stark contrastto the stubbornungrammaticality of thepassiveof haveor thedouble-objectdativeof explain. Furthermore, when new verbs enter the language, they seemto be passivizableordativizable immediately. For example, Wasownotesthatif one wereto inventaverbto satellitea messagetoBob, meaningto transmitamessage to him via satellite, the variant to satelliteBoba messagewould soundperfectly fine. (Wasowwasprophetic in spirit if not in detail: in 1988no oneis satelliting .) , but people are faxing each other documentswith a vengeance messages Likewise, neologismssuch astoformat and to xerox rapidly becomeperfectly ; in its manuscriptform, this book wasformattedandxeroxedmore passivizable times than I careto remember. Theargumentcanbemademoregeneral. Englishhasanumberof mechanisms for convertingnouns, including proper nouns, into new verbs (seeClark and Clark, 1979). Severalkinds of thesedenominalverbssatisfythe conditionsfor applicationof a lexical rule. Thus an essentiallyunboundedset of new verbs potentiallyenteringinto argumentstructurealternationscanbecreated.Though

Chapter1

the denominalverbs in the (a) lines of ( 1.13) sound unfamiliar, once they are acceptedby themselvesthe new, related argument structurescreatedby the lexical rulesandshownin (b) possessno incrementof oddnessor ungrammaticality over the original ones. This suggeststhat verbs are addedto the mental lexicon in setsrelatedby lexical rules; not every verb must be heardin every argumentstructure. ( 1.13) Dative: verbsderivedfrom meansof communication (a) I arpanetted/ kermitted/ Emailed / bitnetted / the messageto him. . (b) I arpanetted/ kermitted/ Emailed / bitnetted / him the message Causative: verbsderivedfrom meansof transportation ' ' ' ' (a) SheChevy d / Harley d / Winnebagod / Cessnad to New York. ' ' ' ' (b) Harry Chevy d / Harley d / Winnebagod / Cessnad her to New York. Passive: Verbsderivedfrom names (a) Artis Gilmore out-KareemedKareem/ out-Maloned Malone I out-ParishedParishlast night. (b) Kareemwasout-Kareemed/ Malonewas out-Maloned/ Parishwas out-Parishedlast night by Artis Gilmore. Locative: verbsderivedfrom instrumentof removal ' ' (a) SheHoovered / Electroluxed/ Hoky d / Eurekad ashesfrom the carpet. ' ' (b) SheHoovered/ Electroluxed/ Hoky d / Eurekad the carpet. There is good evidencethat children are not conservativeeither. ll1is evidence , which I will review in thenext two sections, comesin two forms: errors in spontaneous speech,and generalizationsmadein experimentsinvolving the teachingof new forms. 1.4.4.1

Evidence Against Strict Lexical Conservatism in Children : ' Spontaneous Speech In chapter 7 I will examine in detail children s errors with argument structures ; here it will suffice to show that children make the errors in spontaneous speech. Passives can be extracted from on- line transcripts of spontaneous speech by searching for instances of -ed, -en, and a few irregular endings ; once such a list has been extracted , one can check to see if any of them are unacceptable as adult forms and hence could not have been learned from adult speech models. We searched the corpora of speech of the children named Adam , Eve , and Sarah studied by Brown ( 1973), using the Child Language Data Exchange System ( Chi L DE S) database ( MacWhinney and Snow , 1985) . In addition , one can

A Leamability Paradox

examinepublishedaccountsof children' s creativeinventionof transitiveverbs, suchasverbscreatedfrom nouns(e.g., Canyou nut these? from Clark, 1982), or transitivecausativescreatedfrom intransitives (e.g., Don' t giggle me, Bowerman, 1982a, b). If childrenare productivepassivizers, someof thesenovel verbsshouldhavebeenproducedin thepassive,againwithoutbenefitof anadult model. Eachof thesesearch esyieldedpassivesthatfor a varietyof reasonscould not havebeenbaseddirectly on parentalspeech . Some, suchasI don' t want to be shooled, gaveevidenceof a productivemorphologicalprocessyielding passive participles, similar to classicmorphologicaloverregularizationssuchassinged or foots (Pinker, Lebeaux, and Frost, 1987, lists about twenty examples). A defenderof strict lexical conservatismcould reply that in thesecaseschildren could have noted the existenceof passivesin parental speechand simply forgotten their surfaceform, invoking a morphological rule to generateit. Therefore, themorerelevantcasesarethosewherenot eventheexistenceof the participle could havebeeninferred from adult speechbecausethe verb was inventedby thechild to beginwith. Thesearereproducedin ( 1.14), takenfrom Pinker, Lebeaux, andFrost( 1987): ' ( 1.14) Adam, 4; II : I m gonnaask Mommy if shehasany moregrain ... more stuff that sheneedsgrained. Adam, 4; II : All smokedup [referringto crackershe hascrushed]. Sarah, 3;8: He get died. From Clark (1982): ' ' LA , 2;0: C' estdeconstruit,c' est bulldoze. [ It s unbuilt, it s bulldozered.] . [Then RN, 2; 10: Da wird er glatt unddannwird er ausgeplatzelt ' ' it s gettingsmoothand thenit s caked/madeinto cakes.] S, 3;2: Is it all needled? . EB, 3;4: It wasbandaided HS, 3;6: Der LOffel ist besuppt. [ Thespoonis souped.] FS, 3;9: ... vollgeascht... [well-ashed; talking aboutsomething coveredin ashes ] ' EO, 3; 10: Ellesne sontpasencoregrainees. [They (plants) havent madeseedsyet/arenot seededyet.] CB, 4;2: But I needit wateredandsoaped[talking abouta rag for washinga car] . ? CB, 4;4: How wasit shoelaced HS, 4;7: ... zugebandst... [ribboned; talking abouthavingribbons on that neededtying]

Chapter 1

CB, 5;6: I don' t wantto bedogeared today[askingfor herhair~ot ". to bearranged in "dogears ] DL, 5;6: Hier ist Goldangestreift . [Thisis gold-striped .] EG, 6;8: ... painenoeuffe ... [eggedbread about breadwithegg ; talking on it] CG, 7;0: ... painenconfiture ... Uarnmed bread ; talkingaboutbreadwith jam on it ] CO, 7;4: Mon assietteest entartee. [ My plateis coveredwith tart.] MA , 9;3: ... uneprocessioneautee... [a wateredprocession ; describinga processionon the water] From Bowerman( / 9830) : CD, 3;6: If you don' t put them in for a very long time they won' t get staled. CD, 3;6: Until I ' m four I don' t haveto begone[= betakento thedentist] . CD, 4;3: Why is the laundryplacestayedopenall night? [= kept] . CD, 5; 1: I needto roundthiscircleverymuch. I needto havethis rounded very much [assherotatesknife tip in lump of clay to makea cut-out

circle] .

H, 4+: He' s gonnadie you, David. [ Turnsto mother] Thetiger will come andeatDavid andthenhe will bediedandI won' t havea little brother any more. From Tom Roeper(personalcommunication ): I don' t want to get waded. I don' t want to get wavedover. " " " " (Note: The childrenreferredto as EB and CB by Clark are Eva and Christy Bowerman,whosespeechis alsoreproducedin severalexamples from Bowerman.) Example( 1.15) presentsotherpassivesthat childrencould not havelearned directly from their parents,eitherbecausea verbtakesa prepositionthat cannot be strandedor becausethe phrasethat thechild promotedto subjectposition is not the direct object of the verb in its transitiveform. ' ( 1.15) Adam, 4;2: [Playingwith a cord of a toy telephone ] Oh, look it s ropted " " through here. [Pastparticipleof rope ] Adam, 4;2: [Anotherchild hasputabowlonAdam' smother' shead.] You look like a crashedlady. [ Mother: A crashedlady?] Yeah, like a crashedlady. Sarah, 3;5: It wasget burnedon my thorefingeh. Sarah, 4;2: We got all stuckedon eachother.

A LearnabilityParadox

Sarah, 4;7: She' s scribbled. Sarah, 4;7: I ' m making her picture scribbled. From Wasow(/ 98/ ) : 4+: I don' t like being failed down on! From Bowerman(/ 983aand personalcommunication ): EB, 3;8: [Watchingonechild sit on a potty, anotheron a toilet] Both are going to be go-enedin! CB, 3;3: [After putting small itemsinto ajewelry box anda coin purse] Both of thesethingscan be put things in. Double-objectdativescannotbefound aseasily, bothbecausetherearefewer potentiallydativizableverbsthanpassivizableones, andbecause theycontainno distinctiveaffix thatcanbesearchedfor in on line transcripts.Nonetheless , there are recurring reports of them in the literature, and JessGropen, Michelle Hollander, RichardGoldberg, RonaldWilson, andI (Gropenet al., 1989) turned up severalmorein searches of transcriptsof the spontaneous speechof Adam, ' Eve, andSarahandof BrianMacWhinney stwo sons, RossandMark(MacWhin3 neyand Snow, 1985). Theseare reproducedin ( 1.16). ' ( 1.16) Adam, 4; I : I gon put me all deserubber bandson. Adam, 4; 11: You finished me lots of rings. Adam, 5;2: Mommy, fix me my tiger. Ursla, fix me a tiger:. Ursla, fix me a tiger. Eve, 2;3: But I go write you a lady now. I go write you something. I go write you train. I writing you something. You pleasewrite me lady. You pleasewrite me lady. You canwrite me a lady on that page. Writing you someping. Write me anotherone right here. You pleasewrite me snowman. WhenFrasercomeback he goin' to write me anothersnowman. Eva, 2;0: [Driving in the country. Mother: Oh, look at the horsies.] Where'd thosehorsiesgo? [ Mother: We passedthem.] Passme some " morehorsies. [ Repeatedwith " silos" , " barns" , and" houses ] Ross, 2;8: Jay saidme no. Ross, 3;3: Don' t sayme that [askingadult not to tell him to put on his socks].

Chapter1

Ross, 3;3: You ate me my cracker. Mark, 3;8: Sodon' t please... keepmeafavor [askingbrothernot to throw up on a ride] . Mark, 4;0: Rossis gonnabreakinto theTV andis gonnaspendusmoney. [Father: What is he gonnado, Mark?] Spendus money [ i.e. to fix it will costus money, causeus to spendmoney] . FromMazurkewichand White( 1984) : 2;3: I ' ll brushhim his hair. 5;2: Pick me up all thesethings. 6;0: Mummy, open Hadwenthe door. From Bowerman( 1978, 1983a, 1987a): C, 3; I : I said her no. C, 3;3: You put mejust breadandbutter. C, 3;4: Put Eva the yukky onefirst. C, 3;6: Don' t say me thator you' ll makeme cry. C, 3;4: Button me the rest. C, 3;9: I do what my horsiesaysme to do. E, 2;4: Then put her somemore. E, 2;4: How come you' re putting me that kind of juice ? From E. Clark, personalcommunication : Damon, 8;0: Mattia demonstrated me that yesterday. Althoughsomeof theseerrorsmight havebeencausedby the direct substitution of oneverb stemfor a semanticallysimilar one(e.g., write for draw, keep afavorfor doafavor ) ratherthanby theapplicationof a dativerule, mostof them ' (e.g., Fix mea tiger) musthaveinvolvedtheuseof arule. EvenEve suseofwrite in the double-object fonn was probably createdby the application of adativization operation; she uttered prepositional-dative sentenceswith / or (e.g., Writea ladyfor mefour timesin thatsession , but neveruseddraw in thedoubleobjectform in any of her transcripts. This issuewill be discussedin detail in chapter7. . MelissaBowerman( 1982a) lists over 150examplesofspontaneCausatives ous causatives . Many of themarefrom hertwo daughters,Christy andEva, but ' examplescan be found in virtually any reasonably large sampleof children s . They have also been found in other languages , including Hebrew speech (Berman, 1982), Hungarian(MacWhinney, 1985), Portuguese(Figueira, 1984), French, Polish, andTurkish (Slobin, 1985). BecauseI will be discussingthese examplesin detail in chapter7, I reproducein ( 1.17) all of the novel causatives ' involving intransitiveverbsfrom Bowermans paper.

A LearnabilityParadnx

' ( 1.11) C, 2;9: I comeit closerso it won t fall [= bring it closer] . C, 3;4: Shecameit over there. Shebroughtit over there. Rachel, 5;5: Comeme out. [R in bathtub. Repeatsseveraltimes.] E, 5;5: Comebackon thelight. [= makeit comeback on] C, 3;6: Until I ' m four I don' t haveto begone[= be taken to the dentist] . C, 3; 10: Go me to the bathroombeforeyou go to bed [= take me] . E, 4;3: Why didn' t you wantto go your headunder? [= put] . E, 5; I : Go it over hereso it will be morebetter. E, 4; 11: Do you haveanythingelseyou' d like to go to China? [= send]. C, 2;8: Daddygo me around[= spin, turn] . C, 2;9: You go it in [= push]. C, 3;2: How cameshegoesonthebathtub,Mommy? [= turnson thetap] . C, 2;6: Mommy, canyou staythis open? [= keep] . C, 3;1: I want to staythis rubberbandon [= keep, leave] . C, 4;3: Why is the laundryplacestayedopenall night? [= kept] . C, 4;5: Eva won' t staythingswhereI want themto be [= leave] . E, 3;2: I ' m stayingit in thewater[= keeping]. E, 5;0: I want to sleepwith it ' causethey' ll stayme warmer[= keep] . C, 2;9: I ' m gonnajust fall this on her. E, 3;8: And the doggiehada head. And somebodyfell it off. Kendall, 2;3: Kendallfall thattoy. Stevie, 2;2: Tommy fall Stevietruck down. ' Hilary, 4+: He s gonnadie you, David. [Turnsto mother] The tiger will comeandeatDavid andthenhe will be died and I won' t havea little brotherany more. C, 5;0: O.K. If you wantit to die. Eva' s gonnadieit. She' s gonnamake it die. C, 3;3: But I can' t eat her! [= feed] . C, 3;8: No, Mommy, don' t eather yet, she's smelly! [= feed] . Rachel, 2;0: Don' t eat it me [as M feedsRachel]. C, 6; II : Will you pleaserememberme what I camein for? [= remind]. E, 4; 11: I keephaveto rememberyou [= I keephaving to remind you] . Mindy, 6;1: I haveto remembermy daddy... SaturdayWinnie the Pooh is on. Marcy, 6;4: Why do we haveto rise it? [re: crossbarof baby swing] . C, 6;8: It ' s rising me [C in tub, warm watermaking her float up] . C, 4;0: Will you haveme a lesson? [= give] . C, 4;2: How do you write " Marc," ' causeI want to have it to Marc.

Chapterl

C, 4;6: Would you like me to ... have... you some? C, 3;8: You feed me. Takeme little bites. Give me little bites. Robert, 11+: We took him a bathyesterdayandwe took him one this morning. Julie, 5+: When we go homeI ' m gonnatakeyou a bathwith cold water. ' ' ' Hilary , 4+: C mon, Mama, takeme a bath. C mon, David, Mama s gonnatake us a bath. C, 3;9: You betternot takemeaquiettime, youbettertakemeaquiettime [= give] . C, 3;5: A nice nurselady took me a ride. ' ' Hilary , 4+: David, let s takeMamaa ride. [ M: Dh, you re gonnagive me ' a ride?] Yes, we re gonnatakeyou a ride, Mama. Rachel, 4;6: I want you to takeme a camelride overyour shouldersinto my room. Jaime, 5; 10: I ' m taking my babiesa walk. E, 5;0: Be a hand up your nose. [ M: What?] Put a handup your nose. C, 3; 1: I wantabe it off. I wantaput it off [= take] . C, 5;0: C: Why do you haveto be it smoothbeforeyou put it in a pony tail? [ M: What?] Why do you haveto put it smoothbeforeyou put it in a pony tail? C, 3;5: Be a picture of Emily andme [= takea picture] . C, .5;5: I meantto be it like this [= makeit , haveit be] . C, 2; I : [ M: Close your eyes.] No! I want be my eyesopen. C, 3; I : I ' m singing him. [Pulling string on cow-shapedmusicbox] E, 2; II : Do you want to comewatchthe manssing their guitars? E, 2; II : [M: How do you usea piano?] You sing it. E, 2;2: I ' m talking my birdie. [Pulling stringon bird-shapedmusicbox] E, 4;0: Polly and Vicky aren't real. We just hold themup andtalk them . We talk for them. [ Re: her andC' s dolls] by themselves ' E, 3;0: Don t giggle me. [asD tickles E] E, 5;3: You cried her! [After M dropsE' s doll and it squeals ] C, 4;6: Spellthis " buy." Spellit " buy." [WantsM to rotateblockson toy " " spelling device until word buy is fonned] C, 4;3: Andrea. I want you to watchthis book. Andrea. I wantto watch you this book. [Shortly] Ijust wantyou to watchthis book. [C trying to get A ' s attention] E, 2; II : Watchyour faces! [Trying to getparents' attentionsotheir faces will " watch" something] E, 2; I : I wantaswim that. [Holdinganobjectin theair andwiggling it as if it wereswimming]

A Learnability Paradox

C, 3;4: [ M: Do you think Daddycan guessthatone?] [C turnstowardD] I ' m gonnaguessit to him. E, 3;1: Yawny Baby- you can push her mouthopen to drink her. C, 3; 1: Drink me. Vh ... put it in. [Asking for an orangehalf to be squeezedinto her mouth] Jaime, 6+: It soundsyou like a mouse. [Whenparentmakesa noise] E, 3;2: Will you climb me up there and hold me? E, 3;1: I ' m gonnaput the washrag in anddisappearsomethingunderthe washrag. C, 4;2: C: He disappeared himself. [ A momentlater] Hejust keepsdisappearing himself in different places. Jennifer, 6+: Do you want to seeus disappearour heads? Scott, 5;0: I disappeareda bearin the backof the car; that' s why ' you can t seehim. C, 1;8: Did they vanish" knock-knock" cups? [Noticing Dixie cups in new pack no longerhaveknock-knock jokes on them] C, 4;3: It alwayssweatsme. That sweateris a sweatyhot sweater. C, 3;6: Did shebleedit? [After E falls andhits headon edgeof table] E, 3;3: Carrie bleededa treeand we put a bandaidon it. [ After child at schoolmakessapoozefrom tree] Mindy , 5;8: Thesearenicebeds. [M : Yes, theyare.] Enoughto wishme that I hadone of thosebeds. C, 2;3: Bottle feel my feetsbetter [= makesthem feel better] . E, 5;3: This is achingmy legs. [As sheclimbs a long flight of stairs] Rachel; 4: 1: You achedme. Locatives. Finally, Bowerman( 1982b) reportspersistenterrorsin children' s use of verbs appearingin the locative alternation. Errors in fill -type verbs recordedby Bowermanandby JessGropenand me arereproducedin in ( 1.18); errorsin pour-typeverbsappearin ( 1.19) . GropenandI alsofoundthatchildren ' werequite proneto utteringsentenceslike He sfilling the water or He' sfilling waterinto theglasswhendescribingpicturesin anexperiment(Gropen, Pinker, andGoldberg, 1981; Gropen, 1989; Gropen, Pinker, Hollander, andGoldberg, in preparation). Sucherrorsoccurred53% of the time in our 2-to-3-year-old group, 53% of thetime in our 3-to-4-year-old group, and34% of thetime in our 4-to-5-year-old group. (Adults, by comparison, did so only 3% of the time.) ' ' Children also uttered sentencesof the fonn He s pouring the glass or He s pouring the glasswith water, thoughlessoften. ' ' ( 1.18) Adam 4;2: [Anotherchild hasput a bowl on Adam s mother s head.] You look like acrashedlady. [M : A crashedlady?] Yeah, like acrashed lady.

Chapter1

Adam, 4;2: Oh, look it ' s roptedthroughhere! [Playing with cord of toy ] telephone Adam, 4; II : See, it fills the grain in. Adam, 4; II : I filled the grain up. Sarah,4;7: She' s scribbled. Sarah,4;7: I ' m makingher picture scribbled. Mark, 4;1: And fill thelittle sugarsup in the bowl how muchyou should [= fill the bowl with as much cerealas you should] . From Bowerman(1981, 1982b): E, 3;0: My other hand' s not yukky. See? ' CauseI ' m going to touch it on your pants[= touchyour pantswith it ] . C, 4;3: [M: Simonsays, "Touch your toes." ] To what? [Interpretstoesas theme, is looking now for goal. A momentlater: M: Simon says, " " Touch your knees. ] To what? C, 6; 10: Feelyour handto that [= feel that with your hand] . E, 5;0: CanI fill somesalt into the bear? [fill a bear-shapedsalt shaker with somesalt] . E, 4;5: I ' m going to cover a screenover me. C, 4;9: She's gonnapinch it on my foot. E, 4; 1: I dido' t fill waterup to drink it ; I filled it upfor theflowers to drink it [= filled the wateringcan up with water] . E, 4; II : And I ' ll give you theseeggsyou canfill up. [Giving M beadsto put into cloth chicken-shapedcontainer] E, 5;3: Terri said if this were a diamondthenpeoplewould be trying to rob the shirt [= rob me of a shirt with rhinestones ]. C, 3; 11: Eva is just touchinggently on the plant. C, 4;2: Pinchon the balloon [= pinch the balloon] . ( 1.19) E, 2; 11: Pour, pour, pour. Mommy, I pouredyou. [Waving empty container nearMM : You pouredme?] Yeah, with water. E, 1;2: My belly holdswater! Look, Mom, I ' m gonnapour it with water, my belly. E, 4; 11: I don' t wantit becauseI spilledit of orangejuice [spilled orange juice on her toast] . C, 6;5: Oncethe PartridgeFamily got stolen. [M , puzzled: The whole family?] No, all their stuff. C, 3;4: I bumpedthis to me [= I bumpedmyself with this toy] . C, 3;8: I hitted this into my neck [ = I hit my neckwith this toy] .

A Learnability Paradnx

1.4.4.2 EvidenceAgainst Strict Lexical Conservatismin Children : Experiments In collaborationwith a numberof studentsI haveruna setof experiments basedon the following logic: if children productivelycreate new argumentstructuresfor verbs, then if we teachthemmade-up verbspresented only in a single argumentstructure, the children, given a suitablediscourse context, should be willing to use thoseverbs productively in an alternative argumentstructure. For thepassive(Pinker, Lebeaux,andFrost, 1987), we inventedverbs- using nonsensesyllablessuchaspi /k or gump- to describephysicalinteractionssuch asleapfroggingover, nuzzlingthenoseof, or backinginto. Childrenlearnedthe verbs by hearingthem in active-voice sentences describinga particularevent animals such as The bear is / , pi king thepig. Thenthey sawa new involving toy of the action such as a tiger " pilking" a horse, andwere , pair toys exemplifying ' " asked, " What s happeningto the horse? . Becausethe questionfocusedthe patient, the passivewasthe most felicitousform in which to answer. For the dative(Gropenet al., 1989), we inventedverbsfor physicaltransfers involving toy instruments, such as sendingan animal to a recipient in a toy gondolacaror lazy Susan. ChildrenwouldhearThebearis pi /king thepig to the giraffe (or, in someconditions, simply This is pi /king), while watchinga bear putting the pig in the gondolacar andsendingit to a waiting giraffe. Then they would seea tiger" pilking" a horseto acat, andwouldbeasked," What' s thetiger " doing with thecat? Sincetheidentityof thegoalis alreadyknownandthetheme is being focusedin the question, the naturalway to answeris usingthe doubleobject fonn: Pi/king him the horse. For the causative(Gropen, Pinker, and Roeper, in preparation ), children would seea pig doing a headstandandhearThepig is pi /king. Thenthey would ' " seea bearupendinga tigerandsendingit intoa headstand , andweasked, What s " the bear doing? (Possibleanswer: Pi/king the tiger.) For the locative(Gropen, 1989; Gropenet al., in preparation ), childrenin one experimentwould seethe experimenterrub a wet spongeagainsta wet cloth, causingit to changecolor, or would seethe experimenterplacingmarblesinto a small cloth hammock, causingit to sag, and would hearThis is mooping. Similar actionswere then perfonned, and the children were askedwhat the : Mooping the towel (with water), experimenterwas doing. (Possibleanswers cloth with marbles . the ) ( Mooping In all the experiments , severalactions, words, andsetsof toys wereused, all counterbalancedwithin an experiment. Of course we could not guaranteethat children would use the argument structurewe wereinterestedin evenif it wasavailableto themandeven when we usedquestionsthat focusedoneor anotherparticipant, makingthe targeted

1 Chapter fonn the most felicitous in the discoursecontext. To establisha baselineas to how successfulthe elicitation techniquewas, we alsoelicited passives , doubleobject datives, and causativeversionsof madeup verbs that we had actually taughtto thechildren in the passive, double- object, or lexical causative.In some experimentswe alsotried to elicit passivesanddativesof realEnglishverbssuch askick or give. Our successrate with theseverbsestablishedan upperlimit on how successfulwe could hopeto be with the made-up verbstaughtonly in the active, prepositional-object, or intransitive fonn, which should have been somewhatharderbecauseof thoseverbs' unfamiliarityandtherequirementthat a productiverule be applied. The table in ( 1.20) summarizessomeof the results. Eachline representsan experimentwith a different groupof subjects(therewereseveralreplicationsand a numberof manipulationswe can ignore for now). The first column of data displaystheresultsof interest: how oftenthechildrenproducedpassives , double" " objectdatives, lexical causatives,or containerobject locatives(like Load the wagon with hay) of verbs they had never heardin those fonns. The second columnof datashows, by comparison, how often the elicitation techniquewas successfulat drawingout suchfonns whenproductivitywasnot at issuebecause the verbshadbeentaught in the targetedfonns. The third columnof datagives theotherestimateof the limits of the techniqueby showingchildren' s frequency of utteringthe targetedfonn with existing Englishhigh-frequencyverbs. : they utteredproductivepassives Clearly, children were not strictly conservative anywherefrom 19% to 81% of the availableopportunities(dependingon age, stimulusmaterials, and so on), which is consistentlylessfrequent, but not by much, thantheir productionof verbsthattheyactuallyheardin thepassiveor of existing English verbs. Similarly, children uttereddouble- objectdativeson 40%- 53% of theopportunities(not muchlessthanthe56% productionratewhen on55%- 66% theyhadactuallyheardthoseforms); theyutteredlexicalcausatives of theavailableopportunities; andthey utteredlocativeverbswith thecontainer asdirect object78%- 100% of the time. Onepossibleobjection to this experimentis thatthechildrencould havebeen , stringing togetherad hoc respondingto experimentaldemandcharacteristics word sequencesin order to pleasethe experimenteror " play the game." This counterexplanationis quite unlikely . First of all, we have shown that the productivefonns elicited in theexperimentalsoshowup in spontaneous speech in naturalsettings. Second, contraryto the suspicionsof some, it is not possible to inducechildrento applyjust any linguistic generalizationin anexperimental setting. Major ( 1974), for example, hadchildrenparticipatein a gamein which they turneddeclarativesinto questions. Childrendid not indiscriminatelyplay along; for example, they would not reply to Youbettergo by askingBetteryou

A LearnabilityParadox

(1.1.0) Age

of trials Proportion oftrials Proportion of trials Proportion aproductive fonn anonproductive anexisting verb waselicited fonnwaselicited waselicited

Passive I' 3-4'2 3-4 4I 4'2 '- 5 5-6 S-6 7-8 7-8 Dative 6-8 5-7t 7t-8 -Causative 4 6- 7 Locative

: container

as direct

.25 .19 .59 .25 .56 .25 .8 .38

.38 .44 .62 .50 .75 .50 .88 .69

.44 .50 .53

.56 .78

.55 .66

-

.25 .38 .soi .69

.75 .56

object

3

.78

5

1.00

7

.84

go ? This is exactly the kind of error that children never make in their spontaneous speecheither (Kuczaj and Maratsos, 1979; Pinker , 1984) . Thus spontaneous speech and elicitation experiments can yield consistent evidence both for the occurrence and for the nonoccurrence of productive generalizations by children . Third , in the Gropen et al. experiments, we used a control condition in which children were exposed to a pseudoargumentstructure, I norped the mouse of a ball , in contexts identical to those we had usedfor the double -object form . When we elicited suchfonns with novel verbs, we were successful only 4% of the time , as compared to our 50% successrate for the double- object fonn . We concluded that our technique could not be usedto teacharbitrary verb- syntax combinations to children ; it simply provided a context in which children ' s prior knowledge of grammar could be brought to bear on newly learned verbs. In sum, this series of studies forces us to reject strict lexical conservatism the hypothesis that children record which verbs appear in which argument ' structures and stick to those combinations- as a solution to Baker s paradox . We have now rejected the most obvious kinds of resolutions of the paradox : those that seek to find some kind of negative evidence to guide children , and those that deny that children are productive .

Chapter 1

This leavesuswith oneoption: rejectingarbitrariness. Perhapstheverbsthat do or don' t participatein thesealternationsdo not belongto arbitrarylists after all. Lexical entriesspecify associations amongsemantic,syntactic, phonological, morphological, and pragmaticbits of information. Theseassociationsmay not becompletelyarbitrary. Perhapsa verb' s setof possibleargumentstructures canbe predictedfrom oneof theotherkindsof informationin its entry. If so, the isjust anillusion apparentarbitrarinessof argumentstructuresubcategorization naive first or from from a of stemming impressions faulty theory lexicalentries. If learnerscould acquire and enforcecriteria delineatingthe alternatingand nonaltematingclassesof verbs, they could productively generalizean alternation to verbsthatmeetthecriteriawithoutovergeneralizing it to thosethatdo not. In principle, anyof the tiers of informationassociatedwith a verbcouldbeused to detennine whethera rule appliesto it. I will first examinewhetherverbs' syntactic propertiescan delineatethe range of rule application; in the next chapterI will examinemorphologicaland semanticproperties.

1.4.5 Solution#3: Syntactiction as Criteria for the ApplicaRepresentations of LexicalRules

' It might seem that the most elegant theory of how children solve Baker s paradox would be to discover some syntactic property of verbs that perfectly predicts whether they enter into a given alternation , where the predictive contingency would be a consequenceof some theory of the nature of the alternation. After all , argument structures are syntactic entities , and the rules manipulating them ' should be subject to properties of the verbs syntactic representations. There have been several proposals of this kind in the linguistic literature . We shall see, ' however , that all such proposals either cannot resolve Baker s paradox or do not resolve it . But before we examine such proposals, it is necessaryto review very ' briefly the current theories about how the syntactic properties of verbs argument structures are represented.

1.4.5.1 Representations for Argument Structures Argument structures for a verb can be representedin a varietyof ways, so long asthereis a precise associationbetweensymbolsthatreferto grammaticalentitiesandsymbolsthat refer to the verb' s semanticor logical arguments . The classicalnotation, shown in ( 1.21). is simply one or moreorderedlists of the phrasalcategoriesthat may simultaneouslyappearwith the verb in a verb phrase, perhapsannotatedto indicate which argumentthey correspondto. ( 1.21) dine: NPI -

: NPI - NP2 devour : NP put , - NP2 PP3

A Leamability Paradox

Sincethis notationduplicatesinfonnation that is ordinarily statedin rules and principlesgoverningphrasestructureandotherwisehidesa varietyof generalizations, it is usedmainly asa transparentmnemonicratherthanasa hypothesis about the mental representationof argument structure infonnation. A more ' theoreticallymotivatednotation, basedon BresnanandKaplan s Lexical Functional Grammar(LFG; Bresnan, 1982a,b; Kaplan andBresnan, 1982) is shown in ( 1.22). ( 1.22) fall (SUBJ) theme dine (SUBJ) agent devour(SUBJ, OBJ) agent theme eat (SUBJ, OBJ) agent theme eat (SUBJ) agent put (SUBJ, OBJ, OBL ) agent theme location Eachargumentstructurein ( 1.22) indicateshow manysyntacticallyexpressed argumentstheverbtakes: onefor dineandthe intransitiveversionof eat, two for devour and the transitive version of eat, three for put. It also indicateswhat thematicrole, or " theta-role," eachargumentis an exampleof: an agentis the instigatorof anaction; a themeis theobjectassertedto havea particularlocation or to be changinglocation; a location, source, or goal correspondsto wherethe themeis, what it is moving from, and what it is moving to, respectively. According to the ThematicRelationsHypothesis(TRH ; Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1972, 1978, 1983), thematicroles can apply not only to literal physical motion but alsoin a quasi-metaphoricalway to changesof stateor possession , " of ideas asif states " and minds were abstract , , , possessors including possession " " places in an abstractspace(referred to as a semantic field) and objects, , andideasweremovablethings. Thus in Johnbequeathedhis house possessions to Mary, Johntold a storyto Mary, andJohn madethehousered, onecanidentify abstractthemesandgoals: the houseanda story are themes, Mary and red are goals. The ThematicRelationsHypothesisis motivatedby a hostof parallelisms betweenexpressionsfor physical location and expressionsfor abstractstates, and betweenexpressionsfor physical motion and expressionsfor abstract changes.ExamplesincludeJohn wentfrom Chicagoto Boston, John wentfrom

I Chapter beingsickto beingwell, andTheinheritancewentto theoldestson; Bill keptthe bookon theshelf, Bill kept the money, andBill kept his children in poverty. It . playsa prominentrole in manytheoriesof argumentstructurerepresentation In additionto specifyingthe numberand kind of argumentsa verb takes, its argumentstructurespecifiesthe grammatical device used to express each argument. In ( 1.22), this is done indirectly, by specifying the name of the grammaticalfunction or grammaticalrelation usedto expresseachargument. The functionSUBJ(subject) expressesthethemeargumentoffall and the agent argumentof dine, eat, devour, and put. OBJ (object) expresses the theme argumentsof devour, eat, andput. OBL (obliqueobject) expresses the location argumentof put. Otherrules, in the phrasestructureand morphologicalcomponents , spell out how subjects, objects, and oblique objects are actually expressedby surfacedevicessuch as phrasestructureposition or case and agreementmarkers. For example, English grammarspecifiesthat subjectsare -initial NPs, objectsare postverbalNPs within the VP, and oblique sentence argumentsarethe objectsof prepositions. By specifyingthe syntacticrealizationsof argumentsindirectly, via grammatical functions, ratherthandirectly in termsof surfacepositionsor morphological markings, we factor out a range of problems such as word order variations,cliticization, interactionsbetweencasemarkingandword order, and soon, soverbs' lexicalentriesaresparedfrom havingto worry aboutthesemore or lessindependent . For example, if a languagespecifiesthat direct phenomena objectscanappearpostverballyin matrix clauses, or preverballyin embedded clauses,or attachedto the verb as a clitic , and if the languagehas a complex inflectionalcase-markerparadigminvolving genderandnumber, eachof these factscanbe statedoncein the grammarwherethe symbol " OBJ" is cashedin, ratherthanreplicatedin everysingle verb that takesa direct object. A similareffectis attainedin a different way in theoriesof ,'transformational" grammar(Chomsky, 1965), in which the grammaticalroles of argumentsare encodedin termsof positionsin a canonical, abstractphrasestructurerepresentation which is then mappedonto surface phrasestructure by grammatical transformations andotherdevices. Thoughthetheoryhasundergonesignificant changesleadingto theGovernment-Binding formulation (GB; Chomsky, 1981, 1982), theassumptionthatverbs' argumentstructuresaredefinedin termsof the positionsof argumentsin an underlying syntactic representation(originally calleddeepstructure,now " d-structure" ) hasremainedin almostevery version of the theory. In what is probably the most popular current formulation, argumentsaresyntacticallydistinguishedin termsof whetherthey are internal or external(Williams, 1981). Roughly, an internal argumentis in the same ' phraseastheheadverbandcorrespondsto the verb s deep- structureobjectsand

A Learnability Paradox

. An externalargumentis outsidethe phrasecontainingthe head complements verb, and in single-clausesentencesit will end up asthe subject. The external argumentis relatedto thecombinationof theverbandits otherargumentsby the relationof " predication." Internalarguments arefurtherdifferentiatedby Marantz ( 1984) andLevin andRappaport( 1986) asbeingeitherdirect, that is, receiving athematicroledirectlyfrom theverb, or indirect, thatis, receivingathematicrole from an interveningpreposition. There are various typographical conventionsfor distinguishing external, direct internal, and indirect internalargumentsin a verb' s argumentstructure. Theoneusedby Levin andRappaportandby Marantzliststheexternalargument outsideof thebracketedargumentlist anditalicizesthedirectinternalargument, as in ( 1.23). ( 1.23) PUT: agent< theme, location> An alternativenotationeschewsthematicrole labelsasa meansof identifying a verb' ~argumentsandsimply usesarbitraryvariables(x, y, z) for the arguments. An exampleof this kind of notation, usedin Zubizaretta( 1987), is shown in ( 1.24a), wherethehyphenlinks thetheta-role-assigningelementto theargument that receivesthe role, and " loc P" standsfor a locativepreposition. A hybrid representationusedby RappaportandLevin ( 1986) is shownin ( 1.24b). ( 1.24) a. PUT- y, x; loc P- z b. PUT: x < y , Plocz > In all theseformulations,any phrasethatis associatedwith a verbbut is not one of its arguments(for example, " adjunct" phraseslike at three0 ' clockor in order to pleasehis mother) is simply not listedin theverb' s argumentstructure. When a verb hasan argumentthat can be expressedoptionally, suchasJohn ate the meat / John ate, the optional argumentcan be symbolizedin any of these formulations using parenthesesin the argumentstructure, as in eat: (SUBJ, (OBJ or EAT: x, < (Y) >. In theOB theory, someverbscanhavedirectobjectsinunderlyingd-structure but not in thesurfacestructure,or " s-structure," whichcorresponds moreclosely to thespokensentence . Passiveparticiplesandcertainkindsof intransitiveverbs " like arrive arethe main called " unaccusatives ( ) examples.(I will discussthe " difference betweenstandardintransitives, or " unergatives , and intransitive " " verbsthat aresaidto betransitivein underlyingstructure,or unaccusatives , in more detail later.) These forms are representedas having a direct internal argumentthat receivesa theta-role from the predicatebut does not receive " abstractcase" eitherfrom the ' predicateor from apreposition.SinceChomsky s CaseFilter would generallydisallow sentenceswith non-case-markedlexical NPs, the only way that such a sentencecan becomegrammatical is if a

ChapterI

transformation(" Move a " ) movesthe argumentinto subjectposition, whereit canbe case-markedby an abstracttenseelementin the INFL (inflection) node. (Anothermechanismthat forcesunaccusativeintransitives and passivesto get subjectsis me ExtendedProjectionPrinciple, which requiresall verbsto have subjects.) For theseverbs, the surfacesubjectwill correspondto the internal argument, not the external argument. The fact that the internal argumentis caselessis predictablefrom the fact the verb doesnot assigna theta-role to an externalargument;this is sometimesknownasBurzio' s Generalization(Burzio, 1986). A GB representationof theintransitiveverbfall would besomethinglike ( 1.25). ( 1.25) fall < x > The GB and LFG representationsare fairly intertranslatable(see, e.g., B. Levin, 1985, L. Levin , 1985. andJackendoff, I 987a, for discussion), andin most of the book I will usethe LFG andGB terminologyfor grammaticalrolesinterchangeabl y, exceptin thosefew caseswhereonemakesa distinctionignoredby theother. The main substantivedifferencebetweenthemis theGB differentiation betweensubjectsthat areexternalargumentsand subjectsthat aremoved internalarguments,thoughevenhereL. Levin hasshownthatthedistinctioncan easilybecapturedin LFG. The table in ( 1.26) showshow the translationworks for argumentstructuresand grammaticalfunctions. ( Thereis no consensus amongGB linguistsasto how to representthesecondobjectin double-objector ditransitivestructuressuchasGive methebook. I will simply call them" second direct internalarguments." ) Anothertheory, RelationalGrammar(RG; Perlmutter, 1980; Perlmutterand Rosen, 1984), combines featuresof both. As in LFG, the syntacticroles of " " argumentsare specified in terms of grammaticalrelations such as subject ratherthanconfigurationsin phrasestructure. As in GB, the grammaticalroles areassignedatanunderlyinglevelof representation thatis mappedontoasurface .A representationby transformationalrulesduring the derivationof a sentence fourth theory, GeneralizedPhraseStructureGrammar(GPSG; Gazdar, Klein, Pullum, andSag, 1985), resemblesLFG andGB in theoppositepair of respects : as in LFG, the representationin which the verb' s subcategorization is statedis not transformedin the derivation of a sentence is ; as in GB, the representation in termsof phraseconfigurations(specifically, in termsof a modifiedclassical notationlisting the categoriesof the phrasemates of the verb). 1.4. 5.2 Using Properties of Syntactic Representationsto Solvethe Learning Problem There have been a numberof suggestionsthat certain generalprinciplesof grammarare sensitiveto detailsof the syntacticrepresentation of verbs, allowing someverbsto undergoa lexical rule while superficially

. OBJ) ( SUBJ ( SUBJ) ( SUBJ)

Transitive Intransitive(unergative) Intransitive(unaccusative ) Transiti ve/prepositional Double- object Passivepaniciple Subject

, OBJ , OBL.oc ( SUBJ ) , OBJ) , OBJ2 ( SUBJ ' SUBJ ( OBLby ) SUBJ

Object

08J

x < y > < -y >

x x < y. P'oc- z > X < Z. Y > - X> < YoPbY externalargument x direct internal argument (no externalargument. no case) <x > direct internal argument (with externalargument. case- marked ) <x>

Obliqueobject

OBL

Secondobject

OBJ2

indirect internal argument < P- x > seconddirect internal argument < w. x >

similar oneswith different representationsare left untouched. For example,' Randall( 1987) suggeststhat dativizableverbs are representedas having two obligatoryinternalarguments,whereasfor nondativizableverbsthe goal argument is optional. A related suggestionis that the theme and goal phrases associatedwith dativizable verbs are both argumentsof the verb, whereas nondativizableverbs haveonly a themeargument, the goal being an adjunct. BorerandWexier( 1987) suggestthatthecausativizabilityof anintransitiveverb is predictableby whetherit is unaccusative or unergative, that is, whetherits sole is its in d structure or its argument object subject. Often it is suggestedthat a and its on whether verb passivizabilityhinges objectareadjacentin d-structure; it is also suggestedthat passivizabilityof NPs that are not objectsof the verb dependson the verb and object beingrepresentedas partsof a single complex verb. Thereis a problemwith proposedsolutionsof this ilk : as usually stated, they arelogically incapableof explainingBaker' s paradox. Abstractsyntacticrepresentations arecolorless, odorless, andtasteless . Saying that oneverb alternates anda superficiallysimilar onedoesnot becausethe first hassyntacticrepresentation A whereasthe secondhas syntacticrepresentationB only pushesthe questionbacka step: how doesthechild know which verbshaverepresentation

ChapterI

A and which haverepresentation B? Without an answer, the representational offers no over with theory advantage sayingthat onekind of verb is represented the abstractfeature[+dativizable] andthe other hasthe feature[- dativizable] . Two kindsof answersarepossible. One is that thereis somemorphological, phonological, or semanticpropertyof the verb that allows the child to predict which syntacticrepresentationit has. This makesthe learnability-theoretic aspectof the syntacticrepresentationaccountsreduceto the accountsI will discussin the restof this book, asfar assolving Baker' s paradoxis concerned , andtheconfigurationsthemselves havenodirect role to play in thesolution. That is not to saythat proposalsaboutthe abstractsyntacticrepresentations arefalse or useless- they could enter into the explanation of a variety of linguistic regularitiesthatensueoncethecorrectrepresentationis identifiedby thechildit ' sjust thattheydonotexplainthelearningproblemathand. I will saylittle about them, simply becauseit is the learningproblem that I am confronting here. The secondpossibleansweris that each of the representationshasother detectablesyntacticeffectsin the behaviorof the verbs. For example, all the verbs that alternatebetweenargumentstructuresX and Y could invariably appearin structureZ, while all the verbsthat fail to alternateneverappearin Z , or vice versa. This kind of solutionis logically capableof resolvingtheparadox: thechild couldnotewhichof theverbsappearingin X alsoappearin Z andcould ' success fully predictthatthoseverbsdo (or don t ) alternatebetweenX andY. (It is actuallythe vice versacase, whereZ predictsnot-Y , that is most interesting, becausetheZ-predicts-Y casewouldbesimilar to conservatism:thechild would simply wait to hearZ beforegeneralizingto Y , ratherthan waiting to hearY beforegeneralizingto Y.) Note, though, that there is a kernel of implausibility lying at thecenterof thiskind of account.The reasonwehavea learningparadox is that someverbsappearin X and Y and someappearonly in X. Presumably thereis somesetof factorsyet to be discoveredthat preventssomeof the verbs that appearin X from appearingin Y. But this accountrequiresthat whatever thosechoosyfactorsare, they are completely nullified when it comesto the alternationof X and Z- all verbs(or no verbs) that appearin X appearin Z, without exception.That is possible,of course, but if the X -Z alternationis even vaguelyin the domainof phenomenaencompassingthe X -Y alternation, it is unlikely. In fact, I will show that none of the proposalshinging on abstract makesthe right kind of predictionsaboutthe child' s syntacticrepresentations on the basisof independentinputs. discoveringthoserepresentations

A Learnability Paradox

ments, whereasnondativizableverbs specify only the themeas an obligatory argument. Sincepredicatesandtheir obligatory argumentsareadjacentwithin a phrasebut optional argumentsare generallyoutsidethe phrase(Jackendoff, 1977), two obligatory argumentscan switch placesin linear order whereasan optional argumentcannotintrudebetweena verb and its obligatoryargument without destroyingtheconnectivityof the treeor violatingotherprinciples. The generalprinciple is illustratedin ( 1.27), wherethe verbget hasan obligatory argumentfor the receivedobjectand an optionalargumentfor the sender. ( 1.27) Johngot an invitation from Mary. Johngot an,invitation. * Johngot from Mary. * ?Johngot from Mary an invitation. In the caseof dativization, Randallprovidesthe lexical entriesshownin ( 1.28) for the dativizablegive andthe undativizabledeliver. ( 1.28) give: - NP PP deliver: - NP (PP) Randall thereforepredictsthatonly nondativizableverbscanappearin simple transitivestructureswith themeobjects. Hearingsuchstructureswould thenbe sufficient for thechild to deducethattheverbis nondativizable . Forexample,the child, upon hearing Connie reported the news, would know that the goal argumentof report is optional, hencethat report cannothavea goal argument betweenitself andits (obligatory) themeargument,hencethatreport cannotbe dativized. Positive evidencewould suffice to avoid or unlearndouble-object phraseswith report: childrenshouldavoiddativizingreportwhenandonly when they hearreport usedwithout a goalargument.Randallsupportsherpredictions with the datareproducedin ( 1.29). ( 1.29) (a) Agamemnonreportedthe news. Pabloexplainedhis painting. Gertruderecitedthe recipe. Romeodeliveredthe posies. Cressidadictatedthe letter. Joancontributedsix warriors. (b) * Agamemnontold the news. * Pablogavehis painting. * Gertrudeshowedthe recipe. * Romeobroughtthe posies. * Cressidasentthe book. * Joanlent six warriors.

1 Chapter Randallnotesthatthesejudgmentsaresomewhatshakyandtries to showthat thesentences in ( 1.29b) areacceptableonly whentheverbiselliptical, idiomatic, or ambiguous . However, the accountdoesnot work in general. Bill told a story is fully grammatical,unambiguous,andpragmaticallyneutral, asareSamasked a question(cf. Samaskedmea question), In ' wrote a letter (cf. lrv wroteher a letter), andJohn threw I kickedI rolled the ball (cf. John threwI kickedI rolled me the bal/). Conversely, the sentencescontaining explain, contribute, and deliver in ( 1.29a) seem fairly elliptical- no less so, in any case, than the sentences with deliver, brought, sentor lent in ( 1.29b). Therearealsonondativizableverbswith obligatoryto-phrases;they shouldbeunlearnableon Randall' s hypothesis:Sheentrustedher child to the daycarecenterI * Sheentrustedher child I * Sheentrustedthe daycarecenterher child, andHe creditedthe money to my accountI * He credited the moneyI * He creditedmy accountthe money. SeeDowty ( 1979a) for a relatedset of phenomena . Thenoncorrelationbetweentheobligatorinessof anobliqueargumentandits , such ability to be promotedto direct object can be seenin otherconstructions asthelocativealternation. RappaportandLevin ( 1985) andLevin andRappaport ( 1986) point out that amongthe verbsthat alternatebetweenintolonto andwith forms, all logical possibilities for combinationsof optional and obligatory ' argumentscanbe found (thusspeakingagainstRandall s generalizationregardless of which of the variantsis thoughtto be derived from the other). Furthermore , verbs that do not alternatecan also have their oblique phraseseither obligatoryor optional. Examplesaregiven in ( 1.30). ( 1.30) Alternating, Themeobligatory, Goal optional: Johnpiled bookson the table/ John piled the table with books. Johnpiled the books. * John piled the table. Alternating, Themeoptional, Goal obligatory: Johnstuffed feathersinto the pillow / John stuffedthe pillow with feathers. * Johnstuffed the feathers. Johnstuffed the pillow . Alternating, Themeobligatory, Goal obligatory: Johnheapedbookson the shelf / John heapedthe shelf with books. * ?Johnheapedthe books. * John heapedthe shelf. Alternating, Themeoptional, Goal optional: Johnpackedbooks into the box / John packedthe box with books.

A LeamabilityParadox

( 1.31)

Johnpackedthe books. Johnpackedthe box. Nonalternating, Themeobject, Goal optional: Johnspilled souponto the tableI * Johnspilled the table with soup. Johnspilled soup. Nonalternating, Themeobject, Goal obligatory: Johnsloppedwateronto the floor / * Johnsloppedthe floor with water. * John sloppedwater. Nonalternating, Goal object, Themeoptional: Johnfilled the glasswith water/ * Johnfilled water into the glass. Johnfilled the glass.

Nonalternating,Goal object, Themeobligatory: Johnencrustedthe cakewith walnuts/ * Johnencrusted walnutsonto thecake. * Johnencrustedthe cake. ' Quite possiblyRandall s generalizationcould be salvagedby differentiating theverbsin ( 1.30) by variouscriteria, sothatsomeof theexampleswould involve not a singleverbextendedto a new surfaceargumentstructurebut two quasiindependent verbs. Of course, thisjust movestheresolutionof Baker' s paradox to a discussionof what thosecriteria are, therebycollapsingRandall' s solution with thoseconsideredlater in the book. 1.4. 5.4 Arguments Versus Nonarguments Randall ' s specific hypothesis can be generalized to make dativizability hinge on a more fundamental distinction , that between arguments and nonarguments. Intuitively , there is a big distinction betweenthe usesof the prepositional phrasenear the store in John remained near the store and John sang near the store. In the first case, the phrase in some sensecompletes the meaning of the verb or combines with it to define a single predicate; in the second, it is tacked on as a mere comment and the verb would denote pretty much the same event without it . In the first sentence, the PP is said to be an argument of the verb ; in the second, it is an adjunct . Generally arguments arethought to be representedsyntactically as sisters of the verb within the VP , whereasadjuncts are attached outside the VP in VP or S. A phrase could fail to be an argument of the verb for another reason: it could be an embedded ' modifier of one of the verb s arguments rather than an argument of the verb itself . For example, there is a clear difference between the in -phrasesof Bob put the hat in the box andJohn patched the hole in the rug . Some nonargument phrasescan have the prepositions to and for . This can lead to sentences that resemble dativizable ones in terms of literal word -by - word composition but that quite

ChapterI

obviouslydo not meettheconditionsfordativizability . For example,John told thejoke to death(adjunct) doesnot yield *John told deaththejoke ; Johnfound thetopto thejar (embeddedmodifier) doesnot yield *Johnfound thejar thetop. Similarly, Sarahracedmotorcycles for a thrill (adjunct) doesnot license* Sarah raceda thrill motorcycles; andSarahfound the casefor herflute (embedded modifier) doesnot license* Sarahfoundherflute the case. Thus, for analternationto apply, it is clearlya necessarycondition thatall the affectedphrasesbe argumentsof the verb. The question is, is it a sufficient conditionaswell? Perhapsonecouldarguethat in John threw the box to Mary, thephraseto Mary is an argumentof throw, whereasin John pulled the box to Mary, the phraseto Mary is merely an adjunct. That would accountfor the differencebetweenJohn threwMary the box and *John pulled Mary the box. Grimshaw( 1989) andothershavemadethis suggestion . " " To evaluatethe suggestion , we mustmakesurethat argument is not being " " definedin sucha way thatit is synonymouswith dativizable, thusbeggingthe questiononceagain. Fortunately,thereareindependentcriteria in the linguistics literaturefor whena phrasemaycountasanargument(Bresnan, 1982c; Dowty, 1982; Gazdaret aI., 1985). Thesecriteria associatethe argument/nonargument distinctionwith sentences andphrasesthatdo not involve the dative alternation for the directly, andhencecould be usedby thechild to acquirerepresentations verbsthat havepredictivepowerwith respectto dativizability. Unfortunately, whentheseindependentcriteria are invoked, they fail completely: . Compositionality.In arguments , theprepositioncanbea meaninglesssyntactic in the marker; adjuncts, interpretationof the meaningof the phrasedepends cruciallyon the inherentmeaningof thepreposition.A straightforwardexample is thecontrastbetweenthekingof France, whereof is meaninglessandof France is anargument,andthe kingfrom France, wherefromis usedas it alwaysis, to denotea source,andfromFranceis anadjunct. Theproblemis thatin Johnthrew theball to Mary, we wantto Mary to be anargument,but the prepositionto has aclearindependentmeaning. CompareJOMran to I past I around thestorewith Johnthrew the ball to I past I aroundMary. . Existential entailment. The use of a verb entails that the referents of its argumentsexist, evenwhentheargumentsarenot expressedovertly. However, thereneednot be anydefinitethingthatinvariablycorrespondsto the referentof a phrasethatcanappearasanadjunct. Forexample, if Susanis asister, shemust bethesisterof somespecificperson,soin Susanis thesisterof Steven,thephrase of Stevenis an argumentof sister. However, a sisterneednot be nearanything in particular, so in Susanis thesisternear the wall, the phrasenear the wall is not an argument. Similarly, Johnate impliesthat theremust be somethingthat Johnate, sotheapple in Johnate theapplemustbe an argument. The problem

A Learnability Paradox

is that there is no clearsensein which throwingor sliding entailsa definitegoal to which the objectmustbe thrownor slid at the sametime thatpulling or lifting doesnot entail a definite goal to which the object mustbe pulledor lifted. But sucha difference mustexist, accordingto the accountappealingto argumenthood . Similarly , onecanaska questionwithout therebeinganyoneto whomthe questionis addressed(it can be rhetorical), yet Ask him a questionis possible. . Uniqueness . Adjuncts can be iterated; argumentsmust appearsingly. For Paul example, sanga song in thepark near the tree acrossfrom thefenceat 3 ' o clock on a cloudyday to impressthe townfolk(iteratedadjuncts) is possible, whereas* Paul sanga songa pretty ballad (iteratedarguments ) is impossible. Anotherexample: Susanis the sisternear the wall underthemistletoe(iterated adjuncts), versus* Susanis the sister of Stevenof Robert(iteratedarguments ). The problem is that this criterion deemscertainphrasesto beargumentsthatthe dativizability accountwantsasadjuncts, suchas*Sampulled theboxto Mary to Sally, which has iteratedputative adjuncts. (Sampulled the boxpast Mary to Sally is fine, but so is Samthrew theball pastMary to Sally.) By this criterion, eventhefor argumentof prepositionaldativesmust be an argument:* / baked cakesfor Susanfor Mary, with the meaning" I bakedcakesintendedboth for Susanand for Mary." (If the actionof bakinga cakeintendedfor Susanaloneis donefor Mary ' s benefit, thefirst /or -phraseis uncontroversiallyanargument,the secondan adjunct.) . Obligatoriness. Arguments are often obligatory; adjuncts never are. For example, the verbdevourtakesanobligatoryargument: Johndevouredthesteak / *John devoured. No verb takesan obligatory adjunctsuchas thosedenoting time of day or theactor' s intentions. The problemis thattheempiricalproblems for Randall' s hypothesisapply hereexactly. For dativizableverbs, theto-phrase mustbe an argument, henceit shouldbe obligatory, but for someverbsit is not: John threw the ball ; John askeda question. Conversely, for nondativizable verbs, the to-phrasemustbe optional, but for someverbsit is not: 8abscredited themoneyto his account/ * 8abs creditedthemoney/ * 8abscreditedhisaccount the money. Examplescould bemultiplied, especiallywhenthesimilar locativealternation is examined; see( 1.30, 1.31). Thusif we apply independentcriteriafor whatan " " argument is, argumenthoodis a necessaryconditionfor dativizability, ruling out someblatantcounterexamples , but nota sufficientcondition, failing to make the right distinctions for the more subtlecases. 1.4.5.5 Unaccusativity Hagit Borer and Kenneth Wexier ( 1987) suggest that the difference betweencausativizableand uncausativizableintransitives correspondsto the difference between unaccusativeand unergativeverbs

ChapterI

(Perlmutter, 1978), which in GB theory is capturedby differencesin whether they specify their argumentsin deep subject or deepobject position (Burzio, 1986; seealsoL. Levin, 1985, for an LFG treatment, and Grimshaw, 1987, for a review).4The differenceis shownin ( 1.32). ( 1.32) laugh(unergative): x < > arrive (unaccusative ): <x> Becausearrive doesnot assigna thematicrole to a subject, it doesnot assigncase to its internalargument(Burzio' s Generalization), so the argumentwould have to be movedinto subjectposition, obscuringthe differencebetweenarrive and a verblike laughin surfacestructure. Causativizationwould simply insertanew, agentargumentinto the empty subjectposition, obviating the needfor movement . But in the unergativeentry, no empty slot is available, socausativization is blocked. Accordingto BorerandWexier, children areinitially incapableof registering the possibility that an intransitivemay have an object in underlyingstructure, becausethey lack the devicethat would link surfacesubjectswith the traceof their deepobject position. Only after neural maturationinstallsthis devicecan " theydifferentiatethetwo kindsof verbs, usingthefollowing criteria: First, only the ergative verbs appearin the object position (in causativeconstructions ). Second,only ergativeverbsappearaspassiveparticiples, either in adjectivalor in verbalconstructions ." Thefirst of thesepossibilities, or course, is simplystrict lexical conservatism , becausethe ability of a verb to take an object in the causativeisjust whatthechild is facedwith determining. The secondpossibility is basically the same, since verbal passiveparticiples of causativeverbs are simply derivedfrom causativeverbs. (The useof adjectivalparticiplesto predict theexistenceof lexical causativesdoesn't work: upswepthair / * Mary upswept her hair ; afallen sign / * Bil Ifell the sign,. an undescended testicle/ * Thedrug * undescended the testicle/ Thedrug descendedthe testicle.) In any case, theoriginal proposalthat causativizationappliesto unaccusative verbsis unsound. In ( 1.33a) thereare verbs that are unaccusative(by the usual criteria; seePerlmutter, 1984) but do not causativize; in ( 1.33b) thereareverbs that are unergativebut do causativize.(In section4.4.3, I explorethesepatterns systematically.) ( 1.33) (a) The ball fell. / * Johnfell the ball. The boy came. / * Samcamethe boy. The cloud appeared . / * The wind appearedthe cloud. * Samarrived. / Bob ~ ved Sam. A bug entered. / * Mary entereda bug. The smokeascended . / * Sueascendedthe smoke.

A Leamability Paradox

Thecat died. / * Johndied the cat. Thedirt vanished./ * Josephinevanishedthe dirt. A badsituationexisted. / * Reaganexisteda bad situation. (b) Johnwalkedhome. / I walked Johnhome. Cathydroveto Chicago. / I drove Cathy to Chicago. The soldiersmarchedacrossthe field. / The generalmarchedthe soldiersacrossthe field. Thehorseracedpastthe barn. / Thejockey racedthe horsepast the barn.

1.4.5.6 OtherProposals Therearemanyotherproposals thatarenoteven asexplicitasthoseof Randallandof BorerandWexier, in thattheyattribute somecrucialabstractpropertyto alternatingor nonaltemating verbsalone withoutanysuggestion whatsoever asto howthechildcouldtell thedifference . Forexample thatgivebutnotdonatemarksits second , Larson( 1988 ) suggests " " to is semantically objectashavingthethematicrole goal, sothatthepreposition redundant whenusedwithgivebut conveysinformationwhenusedwith donate . Therefore , applyingthe dative shift allows the role of the nowto berecovered lessargument for givebutnotfor donate . Donateis preposition thusundativizable because the deletionof to is unrecoverable , violatingthe ofdeletion . However , if thenotionof recoverability general principleofrecovery theta of rolesismeantliterally- could thespeaker figureoutwhichpreposition -objectsentence shouldgo with theprepositional to a double containing counterpart donate ?- the hypothesis is simplyfalse. Themeaningof donateis so closetothatofgivethatonecouldeasilyinferthatitsthirdargument isagoaland it so wouldhavetohavebeentothatwasdeleted . Thatis, noonecouldbein doubt asto whatrolethemwouldplayindonatethema book. If thenotionof assigning atheta-roleismoreabstract of whydonatebutnotgive , it onlybegsthequestion lackstheabstract . Another from Larsonandfrom comes property suggestion BellettiandRizzi( 1986 ), whoarguethatcertainverbsthatappearto havedirect totheseNPsin deepstructure objectsonthesurface maynotactuallybeadjacent butareseparated fromthembyanotherphrase ; thisintervening phrasewouldbe movedintosurface in active sentences , creatingtheillusionof subjectposition a transitiveverb. Theseverbscannotpassivize is an , because passivization operationthatmovestheargument adjacentto theverbin deepstructuresBut thereis a massive in Englishto reanalyze surfaceNPsas tendency postverbal and allow them to to anddiachroni (bothsynchronically objects hence passivize , 1982b ; Visser, 1963), resultingin suchformsasJohnwas cally- see Bresnan thoughtwell of. This raisesthe questionof how the child knowsthat the NPsof someverbs,butnotothers,is anunderlyingobject. postverbal

ChapterI

In sum, it is unlikely that children can usepropertiesof strictly syntactic as criteria to determinethe syntacticprivileges of verbs. The representations reasonsaretwofold: . If the syntactic criteria are completely abstract, then we are begging the them. This is a special questionof how thechild canpredictwhichverbspossess caseof the" bootstrapping problem" : how childrenrecognizetokensof abstract in the input (seePinker, 1982, 1984, 1987). grammaticalrepresentations . If the syntacticcriteria havedetectableconsequences suchasthe ability of the verb to appearwith somedistinct setof arguments would , thoseconsequences have to be perfectly correlatedwith the alterability of the verbs in question. Unfortunately, thosecasesdo not exist; manyso-calledadjuncts, andmanysocalled , areselectivein the verbsthey apply to in optionally deletedarguments that cross the ways classify selectivitywith respectto the argumentstructures of interest(see, e.g., Atkins, Kegl, and Levin, 1986).6 The point of this sectionis not to criticize theseproposalsgenerally; manyof them help capture other interestinglinguistic generalizationsand might be acceptedin someversionon thosegrounds: The~ int is thattheydo not provide the crucial first step in resolvingBaker' s paradox: differentiating a priori the verbsthattakedifferentsetsof argumentstructures . Oncethatstepis taken, some of thetheoriesI discussedcouldtakeoverandexplaina varietyof consequences of the choiceof representation , but how thatchoiceis first madeis the problem at hand. Note also that by taking Baker' s paradoxseriously, a variety of traditional mustbecalledinto question. Onecan conceptsconcerninglexicalrepresentation easily seenow why it is illegitimate to try to explaina phenomenonby calling a rule " partially productive" or " lessthanfully applicable" or having " idiosyncratic " " " exceptions, or describingthe lexicon asbeing partially structured or " " ' having accidentalgaps. In fact, this wasthe larger~ int of Baker s ( 1979) article: many devicescommonly usedin grammaticalexplanationraise major leamability problems. Given the failure of subtle negativeevidence, surrogatesfor negativeevidence ' , and strict lexical conservatismto solveBaker s paradox, criteria distinguishing thealternatorsfrom thenonalternatorsis theonly option standing. And since criteria pertaining to verbs' syntacticrepresentations do not solve the ' problem either, the child is left with two possiblekinds of cues for verbs . The next chapterexplores syntacticbehavior: their soundsandtheir meanings this path.

Chapter 2 Constraints on Lexical

Rules

For many yearslinguists have noted systematicsemanticand morphological differencesbetweenthe verbsthat enter into a constructionand those that are syntacticallysimilar but fail to enter into it. Some of these differences are commonlynotedin descriptivegrammarsof English; othershaveemergedin the literatureof generativegrammaraslinguistshaveattemptedto make grammars . Let usconsiderwhetherany of thesedifferencescould descriptivelyadequate serveascriteriagoverninga speaker's willingnessto generalize.

It hasoften beenpointed out that dativizableverbstend to have native (Germanic ), not Latinatestems(e.g., Green, 1974; Oehrle, 1976; Mazurkewich and White, 1984); examplesare given in (2.1). (2.1) Johngave/ donated/ presenteda painting to the museum. Johngave/ * donated/ * presentedthe museuma painting. Bill told / reported/ explainedthe story to them. Bill told / * reported/ * explainedthem the story. Suebuilt / constructed/ designedthe housefor us. Suebuilt / * constructed/ * designedus the house. Thiscorrelationis theresidueof oneof the manypeculiardevelopmentsin the , Englishhadcasemarkersfor accusative historyof English. In its earlier stages anddativecases(the lattercorres.pondingto the goal) andhadmore word-order freedomthancontemporaryEnglish. Accordingto Visser(.1963), in Old English theorder" V NP-datNP-acc" wasmorecommonthantheorder " V NP-accNP-

" dat." In MiddleEnglishthecasemarkers eroded . resultingin a" V NPpi NPtheme verbphrase similarto thedouble-objectconstruction of contemporary English. " " V few in the fonn toNPNP in early Middle Very verbsappeared prepositional

Chapter2

English. But in the fourteenthandfifteenth centuriesmany new verbsentered thelanguageasborrowingsfrom French, which markedthe goalphrasewith the prepositiona. When theseverbs were assimilatedinto English, the French , andthustheprepositionto (the translationof argumentstructurewastranslated a) wasusedto mark thegoalargument. Native verbswerethenallowedto take this argumentstructureaswell, presumablyvia the applicationof a dativerule " " operatingin what we now think of as the backward order, from the doubleobjectform to theprepositionalform. Thustheverbsthat takethedouble-object form are the onesthat werealreadyin the languagewhen that form cameinto being, and the verbs that fail to take that form came into the languagemore recently from French (and Latin as well), accompaniedby a French-like argumentstructure. Presumablychildren lack a collective racial memory for the history of the , sothenative/ Latinatedistinctionwould haveto involve someaudible language synchronicpropertyof verbs, not their etymology. It turns out that mostoften nativestemsare monosyllabicor, if polysyllabic, have stressonly on the first syllable. And in fact Latinateverbsthathavebeenassimilatedto thenativestress patterndo generallydativize, as(2.2) shows. Similarly, somespeakersuseotherwise undativizableverbsin thedouble-objectform but shift the stresssoasto conformto the native patternwhenthey do, as shownin (2.3). (2.2) Promise/Offer/ Recommend / Describeanythingto her, but give her ' Arp ege. Promise/Offer/ * Recommend / * Describeher anything, but give her ' Arp ege. (2.3) IBM doNAT ED / DOnatedsomecomputersto them. * IBM doNAT EDthemsome computers. ?IBM DOnatedthemsomecomputers. Grimshaw( 1985) andGrimshawandPrince( 1986) notethatthis definitionof the native class correspondsto a phonologicalnatural kind. The theory of metricalphonologypicksout monosyllables , andpolysyllableswith stressonly on thefirst syllable, asconstitutinga singlemetricalfoot. At first it mightappear thattherearecounterexamples in theform of dativizableverbsthatdo not match this definition, suchasassignhim a seat, allot him a space, award him a prize, or allow him onephonecan. However, they begin with an unstressedschwa, which Grimshawand Princesuggestis not a completefoot but an invisible or negligibleresidueof the metricalanalysisof the word. When the verb begins with an unstressedsyllable containing more than a schwa, such as return, explain, or obtain, dativizationis blocked, aspredicted. The constraintwould thenseemto bethatdativizationis restrictedto verbsthat haveno morethanone metricalfoot (moreprecisely, " no morefeet thanone" ).1

Constraintson Lexical Rules

There is an alternative fonnulation of the native/ Latinatedistinction: Latinateverbscould be thosethat arefonnedfrom any combinationof a fixed " suchas setof largely meaninglessstemsandprefixes(" cranberrymorphemes ), re- , de-,pre- , in - , con-, trans-, sub-, ad-, ex-,per- , -fer , -mit, -sume,-ceive, -duce, -nounce, -pel , -plain . and so on (Aronoff, 1976). This would be a morphological rather than a phonological definition of the class. Though I know of no proposalsthat it is the right definition for the dativizableclass, it is consistent with the ungrammaticality of * 1transferredhim somemoneyand* 1purchased him a jacket, both of which haveinitial stressand hencewould be " native" by strictly prosodiccriteria. (Promise, on theotherhand, is probablynot analyzed as pro + mise by modern speakers .) Therehasbeena proposalfor a strictly morphological constraint on dativizability: Stonn ( 1977) has suggestedthat dativizableverbsmustbemonomorphemic . This largelycoincideswith theproposal that dativizableverbsmust be (morphologically) non-Latinate, sincethe morphologicaldefinition of Latinateis thatit consistof combinationsof Latinate prefixesandstems. However, it differs in caseswherea verbis composedof two or more native morphemes . Unfortunatelyfor any accountbasedstrictly on seem to there be , morphology multimorphemicverbs(bothLatinateandnative) that do dativize: He bequeathedthemhisfortune; I telegraphedthemthe news; I reservedhim a seat,' Shereferred mea patient; andothers. An experiment by Randall ( 1980) suggeststhat both morphologicaland phonologicalfactorsmay be psychologicallyactive, at leastin otherareasof the lexicon. Sheaskedsubjectsto ratehow gooda nonsense word suffixedwith -ity sounded.The suffix appearsonly with Latinatewordsin English. Subjectsgave higherratingsto nounsfonned from Latinatestemsthatwerefamiliar in English thanto nounswhosestemshadLatinatestresspatternsbut werenotfamiliar. This suggeststhat subjectsweresensitiveto a morphologicaldistinction(whetheror not a word is composedof a setof knownmorphemes ) ratherthana phonological one. However, subjectsalso gave higher ratings to nounsfonned from unfamiliar Latinatestemsthanto nounsfonnedfrom familiar nativestems.This suggeststhatthephonologicalpropertiesof thenative/ Latinatedistinctionareattended " to aswell. Therefore, the distinctionis probably" morphophonological , in thatthereis a morphologicalclasswhosememberscanberecognizedpartially by their phonologicalproperties. I will returnto this issuein section4.4.1.

2.2 SemanticConstraints Virtually all argument structure alternations interact with semantics in one way or another. In Pinker ( 1984), I reviewed someof the more prominent interactions

2 Chapter that had been reported in the linguistics literature , and I suggested that a child who knew the morphological and semantic properties of words and the morpho logical and semantic constraints on the alternations could use the constraints as criteria in deciding how far to extend productive rules.

2.2.1 Dative Dativizableverbshavea semanticproperty in common: they mustbecapableof denoting prospectivepossessionof the referent of the secondobject by the referentof thefirst object(Green, 1974; MazurkewichandWhite, 1984; Oehrle, 1976). In thecaseof verbsthat appearin the prepositionalform with to, suchas give andsend, the first objectmustbe not only the goal to which the transferred . In thecase thing goesasthe resultof its movementor transfer, but its possessor of verbsthat appearin the prepositionalform withfor , the first objectnot only must be the beneficiaryof an act but must cometo possessa thing asthe result of it. The " possessoreffect," as I will call it , is illustrated in (2.4). (2.4) Johnsenta packageto the border/ boarder. Johnsentthe boarder/ * bordera package. Rebeccadrove her car to Chicago. * Rebeccadrove Chicagoher car. Bob made/ got / stirred/ tastedthe cakefor Phil. Bob made/ got / * stirred/ * tastedPhil the cake. Possessionneed not be literal; in accordancewith the Thematic Relations Hypothesis, verbs of communicationare treated as denoting the transferof or stimuli, which the recipientmetaphoricallypossess es. This canbe messages seenin sentences suchasHe told her the story. He askedher a question,andShe showedhim the answer. 2.2.2 Causative A lexical causativeis a transitiveverb signifying causationthat is identicalin fonn to an intransitiveverb signifying the causedevent. It hasoften beennoted that lexical causativesapply to casesof causationvia direct or physicalcontact but not to extendedchainsof causation. Indirect causalchainscan, by contrast, be expressedin a periphrasticcausative, in which the intransitive verb is embeddedasa complementof makeor someothercausalverb like causeor let (Fodor, 1970; McCawley, 1971; Shibatani, 1976; Gergely and Bever, 1986). The sentencesin (2.5) showthat lexical causativesare prohibitedfor causation mediatedby thevoluntaryactionsor psychologicalprocessesof thecausee . We can call this the " directnesseffect."

constrains the causative. Although to paint means something like " to cause to be " covered with paint , one does not paint a brush when one dips it in the can , and it is hard to say with a straight face that Michel angelo painted the ceiling when he caused the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel to be covered with paint . This might be called the " stereotypy effect ."

2.2.3 Locative The locative, also known as the " spray/load" or " figure/ ground" alternation, denotesa transferof a substance or setof objects(thetheme, content, or locatum) into or onto a containeror surface(the goal, container, or location). It is often assumedthatthestandardmemberof this pair of constructionsis theone taking theprepositionsinto or onto, which canbecalledthecontent-orientedor themeobjectform, andthat thelocativerule convertsit into a constructiontaking with , often calledthecontainer-orientedor goal-object form. The two forms are not . In thegoal-objectform, thegoalmustbecompletelyfilled or covered synonymous by the theme(seeS. Anderson, 1971; Talmy, 1976; Bowerman, I 982b; RappaportandLevin, 1985); if this is not a possibleeffect of the eventdenoted by the verb, the verb doesnot undergothe alternation, as(2.6) shows. (2.6) (a) Irv loadedhay into the wagon. Irv sprayedwateronto the flowers. Irv threw the cat into the room. Irv pushedthecar onto the road. (b) Irv loadedthe wagonwith hay. Irv sprayedthe flowers with water. * Irv threw the room with the cat. * Irv pushedthe road with the car. Thereis a similar pair of constructions,shownin (2.7), involving an alternation of from with of, wherethe verb denotesthat the surfaceor container(the source) containssomesubstance or objectsthatarethenremovedfrom it. In the o/ form (container-orientedor source-object), the sourcemust be completely . emptyor strippedfollowing the movementof the object or substance

2 Chapter (2.7) (a) Irv emptiedwaterfrom the bucket. Irv drainedmud from the pipes. Irv reada story from the book Irv threw the ball from the porch. (b) Irv emptiedthe bucketof water. Irv drainedthe pipesof mud. * Irv readthe book of a story. * Irv threw the of porch a ball. " " This holism effect not only rules out the goal-object and source-object constructionsfor verbs like push and read wherethe action cannot result in with verbs completefilling or depletion, but alterstheinterpretationof sentences that do alternate: the grammaticalsentences in (2.6b) and (2.7b), but not those in (2.6a) and(2.7a), entail that the wagonis completelyfull , the flowers totally wet, the bucketandpipescompetelyempty. 2.2.4 Passive Passivizationhaslongbeennotedto work bestwith verbsthat areactional, with an agent subjectand a patientobject. None of theseverbs (e.g., cut) fails to passivize; all the verbsthat do fail to passivizearestative(Quirk, Greenbaum , Leech, andSvartvik, 1971). Examplesaregiven in (2.8). (2.8) * Two hundredpoundsis weighedby John. * Five dollarsis cost this by pen. * Amy is resembled Sue. by * Four is equaledby two plus two. However, no simpledistinctionsuchasactional/nonactionalor stative/nonstative verbs. First, completelydistinguishespassivizablefrom nonpassivizable therearestativeandabstractpassivessuchasThisbookis ownedby thelibrary ; Thesedrasticmeasuresarejustified by thesituation; andTheteamwasliked by thefans . More dramatically, therearecaseswherethe underlyingobject is an idiom chunk, pleonasticelement, or nonargument , such as The hatchet was burled; It was thought to be raining,' The morning star was believedto be differentfrom the eveningstar. Thus, Jackendoff( 1972) offers a more subtle constraint. He proposedthat thematicrelationsare ordered in the hierarchy shown in (2.9). (2.9) theme source/goal/location agent In a passive, the surfacesubjectmusthavea thematicrole that is higher on the list in (2.9) thanthe object of by (or the argumentthat remainsunexpressedin short passiveslike John washit).

Constraintson Lexical Rules

This ThematicHierarchy Condition ( THC) rulesout the passivesof " measure " verbslike thoselisted in (2.8), wherea quality or quantityof oneentity is with a standard, becausein suchverbsthe entity actsasa themeand compared the standardactsas a metaphoricallocation. How do we know this? Because expressionsfor measurementsuse locative or goal prepositionsin other constructions , suchasGrapes are selling AT a dollar a dozen,. Bird weighedin AT 260pounds,. Jerry' s resemblanceTO Roger is uncanny,' Oneand one is equal TOtwo. In thepassivesin (2. 8), wegeta locationor goalmappedontothesubject anda thememappedonto the object of by, in violation of the constraint. In addition, Jackendoffnotesthatverbsthatareambiguousbetweenanagentlocationreadinganda theme-locationreadingin theactivevoiceexpressonly the agent-locationreadingwhen passivized, as (2. 10) shows. (2.10) Johntouchedthe wall (after he reachedfor it strenuously). [agent-location] Johntouchedthe wall (for two days, sincehismurdererhadproppedhis lifelessbody againstit ). [ theme-location] The wall was touchedby John (after he reachedfor it strenuously ). * The wall was touched John (for two by days, sincehis murdererhad proppedhis lifeless body againstit ). The THC alsorules out other examplesof nonpassivizable verbs. In *John was resembledby Bill , John is a goal, if we use prepositionsin related constructionsas our guide, becauseone can talk aboutBill ' s resemblanceTO John. Therefore the passive of resemble violates the THC. By similar ' , one would treat Bill in Bill s argumentsescapeme as a source, arguments because onealsosaysMary escapedFROM Sue. If so, theTHC wouldcorrectly rule out * / am escapedby Bill ' s arguments. SeeJackendoff( 1972), Pinker ( 1984), Pinkeret ale( 1987), andGrimshaw(in press) for otherpassivesruledout by this constraint.

2.3 HowSemanticand Paradox

IConstraintsMiaht Resolve Baker's

MazurkewichandWhite ( 1984) andPinker ( 1984) arguedthatthe semanticand morphologicalconstraintsdiscussedin sections2.1and2.2 might form thebasis of how children solve Baker' s learnability problem. If children could cometo know the criteria distinguishing, say, dativizable from nondativizableverbs, theycould appenda condition onto a productivedative rule constrainingit to applyonly to verbsthat meetthecondition. Thereaftertheywouldapplytherule productivelyonly to the setsof verbsfor which the alternationapplies. If there

Chapter2

are scatteredpositive exceptions(i.e., double-object verbs that violate the constraints), they could be learnedon a conservative, verb-by-verb basisfrom positive evidence. The learning sequenceproposed in Pinker ( 1984) was roughly asfollows: I . Recordthe argumentstructuresof verbsheardin the input. 2. Notewhethertherearea largenumberof verbsthat all occurin the sametwo argumentstructures. If so, createa productivelexical rule that would take as input the verb form with one argumentstructure and yield as output the correspondingform with the otherargumentstructure. 3. Note whetherthereare alsoa largenumberof verbs that all/ ail to occurin oneof the argumentstructureforms. If the verbsthat occur in both forms have someproperty- either a morphologicaVphonologicalpropertyof their stems, a semanticproperty of their predicates , or a thematic property of their arguments - in common, a propertythatis missingin the verbsthatoccur in only one form, bifurcate the verbs into two classesdistinguishedby that property and constrainthe rule to apply productivelyonly to the classdefinedby possession of that property. Apply the constraintretroactively so as to expungenonwitnessed verb forms generatedby the earlier unconstrainedversion of the rule if violate the newly learnedconstraint. they 4. If a hypothesizedconstraintbecomesfalsified becausea large numberof verbsviolating it appearin theinput, searchfor a new propertythat distinguishes the alternatingfrom nonalternatingverbsand replacethe old criterial property with the new one. This proceduremight appearto beusinga kind of indirect negativeevidence: it is sensitiveto the nonoccurrence of certainkinds of forms. It doesso, though, in the sense of only uninteresting acting differently dependingon whetherit hearsX or doesn't hearX , which is trueof virtually any learningalgorithm (see section1.4.3.2). It is not sensitiveto the nonoccurrenceof particular sentences or even verb-argumentstructurecombinationsin parentalspeech; rather, it is severallayersremovedfrom theinput, lookingat broadstatisticalpatternsacross the lexicon. This kind of solution to Baker' s paradox I will call " criteria-governed " productivity. 2.4

Evidence for Criteria - Governed Productivity

Thesetof procedures just describedcan, at leastin principle, accountfor how the child canbe a productivegeneralizerwhile speakinga languagethat maintains exceptionsto the generalization.To supportthetheory of criteria-governedpro-

Constraintson Lexical Rules

ductivity, my studentsand I haveattemptedto show two things: that adults respectthecriteria, eventheseeminglyobscureones, andthatchildrenarein the processof coming to respectthem. Of the criteria, the morphophonological constrainton the dative, being the result of an accidentin the history of the , seemstheleastlikely to be operativein the mindsof presentEnglishlanguage adult . JessGropenandI (Gropenet al., 1989) inventedeight new day speakers verbswhosemeaningswereexemplifiedin prepositional-dativesentencesin tersewritten stories, oneof which is presentedin (2.11). (2.11) Sue, who hadwantedthe deedto the housefor twenty years, was very excitedwhenherlawyercalledwith the goodnews. Her lawyertold her thatBob, thecurrentowner, wasreadyto begintonkation, theformal (and only legal) processby whichshecould obtainthe housefrom him. After Bob hadfinally tonkedthehouseto Sue, shetonkedherduplexto Francis. Half the verbs were monosyllabic(norp, moop, pell , tonk), and half were across polysyllabic (calimod, orgulate, repetrine, dorfinize), counterbalanced storiesandsubjects.After readingeachstory, subjectswereshownelevennew sentences containingtheverbandaskedto ratehow goodeachonesounded.One of thesentences wasa double- objectdative. In addition, we orthogonallyvaried whetherthe sentences involveda transferof possession - ( 2.11) involvessuch a transfer; (2.12) and (2.13) do not- and whether the verb involved the prepositionto, signifyinganactof transfer, asin (2.12), orfor , signifying an act ' s benefit as in 2.13 . donefor someone , ( ) (2.12) Ron, who hadpromisedDavethat he would try to help him makethe flight , enteredthegaragewith someregret. It hadbeena full monthsince he fired up theorgulator, and he was unsurehow it would handlethe . Later, after havingorgulatedDaveto the hotel, Ron roughatmosphere wasquite relieved. (2.13) Ned, a youngbut upcominginventor, waseagerto springhis latestidea on the unsuspecting world. He thoughthe' d begin with his neighbor, Cindy, by offeringto do herceiling with his newmooper. It is a profound understatement to saythatCindy wasdispleasedafter Ned hadmooped the ceiling for her. We found thatsubjectsratedthedouble-objectsentences in thequestionnaire , suchasFred tankedMary thehouse,assoundingmuchbetterif theverbsignified a transferof possession than if it did not. In addition, amongthe possession transferverbsinvolving the prepositionto, thosethat weremonosyllabicwere ratedas significantly bettersoundingthan thosethat were polysyllabic} As expected,no suchdifferenceswerefoundfor ratingsof the prepositional-dative forms. Thus the phonologicalandsemanticconstraintson dativizationare not

Chapter2

merehistorical residuesbut areactivein themindsof adult speakers , affecting whetheror not they judge novel verbs to be acceptablein the double- object construction. Similar effectsoccur when subjectsjudge the acceptabilityof noncewordssuffixed with -ity (Randall, 1980) or prefixedwith variousnegative affixes (Baldi, Broderick, and Palermo, 1985). Thoughwe have not yet run analogousexperimentsfor theother criteria and alternationsI havediscussed , the fact that adults are sensitiveto the most puzzling of the criteria, the morphophonologicalconstrainton the double-objectdative, leadsus to predict that other criteria are psychologicallyreal aswell. Children, too, are sensitiveto constraintson the dative, thoughthey do not apply themconsistently,asexamplessuchasBrushmemyhair andMattia demonstrated methat yesterdayfrom ( 1.16) attest. In thefirst experimentof Gropen et al. ( 1989), wherechildrenwere taughtnew verbsof transfer, we usedtwo monosyllabic and two polysyllabic nonsensewords and found that children producedsignificantly moredouble-objectdativeswith the monosyllabicthan with the polysyllabic verbs(55% versus39%) but showedno suchpreference with prepositional-object datives(36% versus39%). Thus the effect is not an artifactof polysyllabicverbs' beinggenerallyharderto learnor pronounce.This difference was replicated, thoughat a nonsignificantlevel, in a secondstudy (43% versus38%). In thatstudywe alsovariedwhethertheeventreferredto by theverbdenoteda transferof athingto atoy animal, whocouldplausiblypossess the thing, or simply to a locationindicatedby an inanimateobject, which could not. Children produceddouble-object forms significantly lessoften when the goal wasinanimatethanwhenit wasa toy animal(32% versus38%). Whenthe child himself or herselfwastherecipientof the thing, makingthe possibility of possessioneven more salient, evenmoredouble-objectsentences(52%) were elicited. Children occasionallydisobeythe adult constrainton the causative.Bowerman ( 1982a) givesexamplessuchasThoseare nicebeds... Enoughto wish me that I had oneof thosebedsandI wantto watchyou this book, which soundodd to adult ears becausethe causationinvolved is circuitous or nonphysical. However, thoughchildrendo makesucherrors, our experimenton productive causativizationin children(Gropen, Pinker, andRoeper,in preparation)showed that children are at leastprobabilisticallysensitiveto the directnessconstraint. In theconditionsI describedearlier, we hadonetoy animaldirectly manipulate a secondinto a postureor action. But in addition, we hada condition in which the causationwasmediatedby an interveningact: oneanimalthrewa marbleat the second, resulting in its assumingthe postureor engagingin the motion expressedby the intransitiveverb. Childrenusedlexical causativesmoreoften for direct causationthanfor mediatedcausation:55% versus0% for the4-year-

Constraints on Lexical Rules

olds; 66% versus22% for the 6-year-olds. However, theyshowedthe opposite preferencewhenproducingperiphrasticcausativeswith theverbmake, seldom usingthemin trialswith directcausationbut usingthemfairly oftenin trials with mediatedcausation( 10% versus50% for the4-year-olds, 0% versus31% for the 6-year-olds). Likewise, whenthey simply usedthe intransitiveform, omitting mentionof thecausalagentaltogether, it wasneverin trialswith directcausation (0% versus20% for the 4-year-olds; 0% versus25% for the 6-year-olds). Finally, Pinker, Lebeaux, andFrost( 1987) testedvariouspossibleconstraints on passivizationin children. Many experimentershaveshownthatchildrenhave difficulty comprehendingthe passivesof perceptualand psychologicalverbs such as seeand know, though they have no trouble with their corresponding activesor with thepassivesof actionalverbssuchaskick (Maratsos , Kuczaj, Fox and Chalkley, 1979; de Villiers , Phinney, and Avery, 1982; Maratsos, Fox, Becker, and Chalkley, 1985; Gordon and Chafetz, 1986; Borer and Wexier, 1987). Perhapschildrenareadheringto anactional-versus-stativecriterion that approximatesthedistinction notedby descriptivegrammariansto hold for adult English. Unfortunately, it turnsout that adultsshowroughlythesamepatternin their speech:passivesof perceptionandpsychologicalverbsarequiterare. Thus children may have simply recorded certain active and passiveversions of actionalandnonactionalverbsconservativelyfrom their parents' speech.Since input frequencywascontrolled exactly in our experiments,wecoulddistinguish thesepossibilities. In one experimentwe contrastednovel actionalverbswith novelperceptualverbsmeaning" to seethroughbinoculars" and" to hearthrough aneartrumpet." In two otherswe contrastedactionalverbswith verbsof spatial " " " " relationships, roughly, to suspend and to contain. By using a variety of teachingand testingconditions we were able to determinewhetherany reluctance on thepartof childrento passivizethesenonactionalverbswasdueto nonpassivizabilityper se, not just to their being more difficult to learnacrossthe board. We discoveredin four separategroupsof childrena selectivereluctance to passivizenonactionalverbsinvolving spatialor perceptualrelationsproductively (thesedifferences, thoughconsistent, did not resultin statisticalsignificance ). In two otherexperimentswe testedJackendoff's ThematicHierarchyCondition directly. In one, actionalverbsweretaught, but for half the verbsthe agent wasexpressedasthe object and the patientwasexpressedasthe subject. Thus for theseverbs The bear was pi /king the cow would meanthat the cow was knockingoverthebear. Suchverbscanbelearnedby youngschool-agechildren, not without difficulty (Marantz, 1982), but they are asstronga violation of the THC as one could imagine. So if children are criterion-governedpassivizers ,

2 Chapter " " they shouldfail to passivizethese anticanonical verbseven if they can learn them in the active voice. And indeed, we found a strong and statistically significantreluctanceto passivizetheseverbswhenthey had beentaughtin the activevoice, aboveandbeyondtheinherentdifficulty of using theseanticanonical verbs and the overall difficulty of passivizing any verb. In the other " experimentwetaughtverbsof spatialrelationships(meaning to hangfrom," " to " " " becenteredon, to be at the endof , and" to be wrappedaround" ) and varied whetherthe larger referenceobject, presumablyperceivedas a location, was subjector object. Thustheverbscould beeitherof thefonn Thepennyis pi /king therecord(themesubject, locationobject) or of the fonn The record is pi /king thepenny(location subject, themeobject). The THC predicts that when the locationis thesubjectof theactive, andhencethethemeis the surfacesubjectof the passive,the passivefonn shouldbe possible, but it should not be possible whenthethemeis the subjectof theactiveandthe locationis the surfacesubject of thepassive. Again, we founda selectivereluctanceto passivizethe verbsthat the THC deemsunpassivizable , though this effect was not as consistently observedasthe correspondingeffect for actionalverbs. Thus we concludedthat children wereconstrainingtheir productive rule of , at leastaccordingto somegradientofpassivizability , with agentpassivization , patient-subject/agentsubject/patient-object actional verbsmost passivizable actional verbs least and relation andperceptionverbs , object passivizable spatial in between,with spatialrelation verbsbeingfurther subdividedinto more and lesspassivizableversionsdependingon which argumentwas mappedonto the subjectrole. And moregenerally, we canconcludethat criteria that distinguish which verbsdo andwhich verbsdon' t participatein argumentstructurealternations areactivein themindsof childrenandadultsandnotjust historicalresidues, thoughchildrendo not applythemasconsistentlyor aspreciselyasdo adults. (In section7.3 I discussconstraintson children' s lexical rules in greaterdepth.) 2.5 Problemsfor the Criteria -Governed Productivity Theory The criteria-governedproductivity hypothesisoutlined at length in Pinker ( 1984) hasin its favor threethings. First, it is consistentwith the linguistic fact that the argumentstructurealternationsstudiedto datedo not apply acrossthe boardto all the verbsmatchingthe syntacticconditionsof the respectiverules, and they do not apply to arbitrary lists of verbs either. Rather, they are all governedby systematiccriteria. Second,we haveexperimentalevidencefor the psychologicalpotencyof the criteria as constraintson productive generalizations. And third, of course, it showsus a way out of Baker' s paradox. Unfortunately , it is alsofacedwith threeproblems.

Constraints on Lexical Rules

1. Do thecriteria really work? Whathappenswhentheydon' t?Therearetwo possiblekinds of exceptionsto a criterion. Positiveexceptionsare verbsthat shouldnot passivize,dativize, and so on, accordingto the constraints, but do. Examplesarelisted in (2.14), (2.15), and(2.16); someof them aretakenfrom Bowennan( 1987a,personalcommunication ), Fodor( 1985), Gee( 1974), Green ( 1974), Maratsoset at. ( 1987), andRandall( 1987). (2.14) Somepositiveexceptionsto thephonologicalconstrainton the dative: Dr. Bearreferredme a patient. I radioed/ telegraphed/ netmailedher the news. Kathy xeroxedme a copy. He bequeathed me his fortune. . forwarded me somemail. They Sheguaranteed / allocated/ reservedhim a seat. (2.15) Somepositiveexceptionsto the ThematicHierarchy Conditionon the passive: Theaudiencewasboredby themovie[audience= goal; cf. Themoviewas ]. boringTO the audience Russiawasinvadedby a hordeof locusts[Russia= goal] . The bedwascoveredby a down comforter[bed= location] . Johnwashit by a car [John= goal] . The mountainwascappedby snow [mountain= location] . The streetwas lined by trees[street= location] . The housewas surroundedby a moat[house= location] . (2.16) Somepositiveexceptionsto thedirectnessand stereotypyconstraintson the causative: Directness: John' s companygrowsorangesin the Imperial Valley. Oil CanBoyd walkedthe batter. Bond killed Drax by throwing him into the shark-filled pool. Stereotypyof manner: Johnbrokethe bicycleby riding it overa log / becausehe wastoo heavy for its racing wheels/ by smashingit with a sledgehammer . I meltedthe butterby tapingit to the exhaustmanifold of my Saab. The criterion hypothesisis not necessarilyrefuted by positive exceptions, becausetheyarelearnablefrom positiveevidence. Specifically, the theorycan toleratethem if (a) they are learnedconservatively , that is, on a verb-by-verb basisfrom positiveevidence;and(b) theyarefew enoughin number, compared to theobedientalternatingverbs, thatthechild will not betemptedto discardthe

Chapter2

criteria altogetheras ineffective. It is hardto assessthe truth of eitherof these escapehatches.But wherethetheoryfails moreclearlyis in thecaseof negative exceptions: verbsthat shouldalternatebut do not. Here, conservativelearning throughpositiveevidenceis notanoption; negativeevidenceis required. In fact, ' negativeexceptionsto criteriabringBaker s paradoxbackin full force. Though fewer exceptionalverbs are involved, as the hypothesisstandseven a single negativeexceptionrequiressomenovelmechanismto explainits existence,and onewould worry aboutwhethersucha mechanismcould sufficeto accountfor the acquisition of the entire patternof verb behavior, supplantingthe use of criteria altogether. Somenegativeexceptionsarepresentedin (2.17)-( 2.20). Someareblatantly penninedunderthe proposedcriteria. Forothers, thesituationreferredto by the verb could be construedpost hoc as failing a given criterion (for example, ' " " but only a way of perhapspulling isn t really a way of transferringpossession ' s location . But that would defeatthe purposeof invoking changingsomething ) thecriterion, which is to allow thechild to know on thebasisof theverbfonn or meaningalonewhetherthe verb canenterinto that argumentstructure. (2.17) Negativeexceptionsto thepossessorconstrainton the dative: * John pulled Bill the box [cf. JohnbroughtBill the box] . * Sam shoutedJohnthe story [cf. Samtold Johnthe story] . * Becky creditedBill the money[cf. Becky promisedBill the money] . * Mary choseLinda a dress[cf. Mary picked Linda out a dress]. (2.18) Negativeexceptionsto the directnessconstrainton the causative: * John went his dog into the room [cf. Johnslid his dog into the room] . * The ball fell becauseMarthafell it [cf. Theball droppedbecauseMartha droppedit ] . * Stephenlaughedthebabyby tickling it [cf. Stephenburpedthebabyby paning it ] . (2.19) Negativeexceptionsto the ThematicHierarchy Conditionon the passive: * The houseis had John [cf. The houseis owned John John= ; by by = = location house theme . , possessor ] * A disk is lacked that by computer[computer= location] . * Water is contained the bottle [cf. Water is held the bottle; bottle by by = location, water= theme]. * Water was drippedby theceiling [cf. Waterwasemittedby theceiling; = ceiling source, water= theme]. * Sapwasgushedby thetree [cf. Sapwasexudedby thetree; tree= source, sap= theme] .

Constraintson Lexical Rules

(2.20) Negativeexceptionsto the holism constrainton the locative: * 1pouredtheglasswith water [evenif the glassis full ; cf. I filled theglass with water] . * 1dribbledthefloor with paint [evenif thefloor is ; completelysplattered cf. I splatteredthe floor with paint] . * 1 vacuumedthe rug of lint [even if the floor is completelyclean; cf. I the stripped rug of lint ] . * 1stoleJohnof his money [even if Johnis penniless; cf. I robbedJohn of his money] . 2. Whydoesthe languagehavecriteria ? Whydoesthe child botherto learn them? Thesearetwo sidesof the samecoin. Comparetwo rulesfor productive dativization, one that licensesa pure alternationof argumentstructures , as in (2.21a), andonethat is constrainedby a criterion, as in (2.21b); both aretaken from Pinker ( 1984). (2. 21) (a) verb ( SUBJ, OBJ, OBL,o ) - > verb ( SUBJ, OB12, OBJ ) (b) verb ( SUBJ, OBJ, OBL,o ) - > verb ( SUBJ, OB12, OBJ ) ONLY IF: [verb is native] [object of OBL,Ois prospectivepossessorof OBJ] Fodor ( 1985) points out that rule (2. 21a) is simpler and that it requiresless informationto learn. We canaddtheobservationthat it confersmoreexpressive . To takeanexampleusedearlier, whenaskedthequestion poweron thespeaker " What did Johndo with the museumthat inspired its directorsto makehim a " trustee? a personpossessingthe first rule could answer" He donatedit that " pricelessVermeerhe had inheritedfrom his great-grandfather. If the speaker " hadbeensaddledwith (2. 21b) hewould beforcedto sayinstead Hedonatedthat " pricelessVermeerhe hadinheritedfrom his great-grandfatherto it. The latter is clumsier andlessfelicitous becauseits " heavy" noun phraseis in the middle ratherthanat theendandits " new," focusedmaterial, thepainting, comesearlier in the sentencethan its " old," topic material, the museum(seeErteschik-Shir, 1979). Given all thesedisadvantages to learninga constrainedrule, andthe fact that the simple, unconstrained rule is compatiblewith all the child ' s linguistic input, why, Fodorasks, doesthechild do it? Perhapschildrenaresimply built to learn the languageof their parents,evenif that involvescomplicatinga simplerule in theabsenceof evidenceforcing themto. But why, then, did theparentsmaintain theconstraintin theirlanguage(otherthanthefact thattheir parentshadit?). One could answerthattherearemanyarbitrary anddifficult patternsthatgeneration aftergenerationlearns(e.g., irregularmorphology), but mostsuchcasesinvolve the resolutionof conflictsbetweencompetingsubsystems(e.g., rule application

2 Chapter and memorization ; seePinker and Prince, 1988), not the adding of arbitrary conditionsto simplerules. 3. Whyare certain rules constrainedby certain criteria and not by others? How doesthe child figure out which rule is constrainedby which criterion ? Again, thesetwo questionsarereally onequestion, to theextentthatthe structure of thelanguageis causedby thestructureof the learner. Thecriteria listed above involve a motley collection of concepts: numberof metrical feet; prospective ; directnessof causation;holism of filling or covering; mappingonto possession a hierarchyof thematicroles. And theseare only for four rules in a single . Theheterogeneity of the list suggeststhattheuniverseof criteria from language which thechild would haveto samplemight be quite large. In Pinker ( 1984) I notedthatthelearningproceduresfor thecriteria-basedaccountrequire that the list not be open-endedand not be too large: if the list is open-ended, the child might neverfind therelevantcriterion; if it is finite but large, heor shemight not find it in a reasonableperiod of time. Furthermore, as new verbs are learned, hypothesizedconstraintsmight haveto be given up, so the child might haveto searchseveraltimes for the right constraint before he or she succeededin acquiringtheadultrule. ThoughI wasableto showthatmanyof thecomponents of the criteria, suchaschoiceof thematicroles and grossmetrical pattern, did seemto recuracrossa varietyof rules, it is difficult to comeup with an explicit list of the possiblecriteria. In addition, we still needan explanationasto why certaincriteria are paired with certainrules. Coulda languagehavea passivethatappliedto monosyllabic verbs? A dativerule that requiredholistic anddirect transferof a substanceto a ? A causativerule that requiredthe affectedentity also to be a source possessor " " (e.g., cause-to-send )? It seemsunlikely. Someof thesepossibilities may be ruledout becausetheywould apply to small unnaturalclassesof verbsor would be too constricting. But aswe haveseen, the constrainedEnglish dative rule is hardlya modelof optimaldesign, so generalutility considerationsare probably not a big factor. Sohowcanoneresolve, on theonehand, theexistenceof criteria, their useby adults and children, and the failure of other attemptedresolutionsof Baker' s paradox; andon theother, the problemswith the criteria-basedaccount? In the rest of this book I will showthat criteria are not units that the child explicitly searches for and appendsto rules, but are epiphenomenaof more general . In particular, the criteria are principles of argumentstructure assignment of structuresandprinciplesof grammarthatprovideanswersto the consequences : following questions . What is a possibleverb in a language? . How areverbs~ssociatedwith their syntacticargumentstructures?

onLexicalRules Constraints

61

. Whenmay two verbssharethe sameroot? . Whenmay a possibleverb actually be addedto a language ? By deriving the criteria from principles addressedto thesequestions,we can adopta newperspectivethateliminatesthetheoreticalproblemsassociatedwith . In addition, we will the criteria-basedaccountwhile preservingits advantages . attainrefinedcriteria that are more likely to be exceptionless

Chapter 3 Constraints and the Nature of Argument Structure

' In this chapterI pursuethe resolutionof Baker s paradoxthat hingeson the ' child s usingsemanticcriteria to constrainthe applicationof an alternationrule to only thoseverbsthat undergothealternationin theadult language.What I will try to showis that suchconstraintsare inherentlypredictablefrom the natureof lexicalrules, if thoserulesareseenin a different light. After presentingthe basic idea, I will examinea rangeof linguistic phenomenasupporting it. 3.1 Overview: Why Lexical Rules Carry Semantic Constraints ' Semanticcriteria on lexical rules are puzzling becauseordinarily one doesn t think of syntacticrules as being constrainedby arbitrary semanticconditions. But what if lexical rules were, at leastin part, semanticoperations? Then their sensitivityto semanticconditionswould be natural. In this chapterI will argue ' that part of what lexical rules do is changethe semanticstructuresof verbs lexicalentries. Syntacticargumentstructuresof verbsarepredictablefrom their semanticstructures , via the applicationof linking rules. So when a semantic structureis altered, it is automaticallyassigneda new argumentstructure. I will " " thenshowthatthephenomenaI havebeencharacterizingas semantic criteria ' on rule applicationarisebecauseof the semanticnatureof the rules operations. Becausea rule takesa semanticstructureasinput andaltersit in particularways , or redescribingarguments), the changesit tries to effect (adding, suppressing can interactwith the semanticstructurethat the verb has to begin with. Some semanticchanges , when applied to someverb meanings, may producea new ' verbmeaningthatjust doesnt hangtogether. For suchverbsthe rule is avoided; that is theequivalentof the rule being constrainedby a semanticcriterion. The differencebetweenthe view offered in the precedingchapter(seealso Pinker, 1984) and the refinementof it I will outline in this chapter can be summarizedin (3.1) and (3.2). In the old theory (3.1), a lexical rule takesthe

Constraintsandthe Natureof ArgumentStructure syntactic argument structure of a verb and transforms it into a different argument structure. The semantic representationitself is basically unchanged; the new and old verb fonD Sare synonymous. Verb- by - verb choosinessarises becausethe rule ' is stipulated to apply only if the verb s semantic representation meets certain ' criteria . In the second view , the lexical rule acts directly on the verb s semantic representation, transforming it into a new one. In other words , the new verb has a different meaning from the old one. Semantic structures are mapped onto ' syntactic argument structures, thanks to linking rules , so when the verb s meaning changes, its argument structure changes, too , as an automatic consequence . Verb- by - verb semantic choosinessarisesbecausethe semantic changes ' effected by a rule just don t make sense when applied to verbs with certain meanings. Rulethat changes

Output verb:

Rulethat changes semantic stnI Cture

linking rules

~

I

,

~

stnactu

Semantic

linking roles

'

Input verb:

'2 structure Argument

Semantic

(3.2)

'I Semantic structure

2

'I structure Argument

argument structure + semantic constraints

structu

Semantic 'I structure

Output verb:

~

Input verb:

12

( 3.1)

stnactu

I Argument

,

~

structu Argument

Whatkind of semanticchangeswould therulesperfonn? Considerthe dative alternation. Dativization, on this view, convertsa predicatemeaning" to cause X to go to r ' into a secondpredicate,meaning" to causeY to haveX." Thereis a linking rule that alwaysmapsthe argumentsignifying the causallyaffected entity onto the grammaticalfunction of object (direct internal argument), so whenthe predicateis reconstruedas involving an effect on a possessorrather thatbecomesthesyntacticobjectin argument thanon a theme, it is thepossessor structure: we havegiveJohn ... ratherthangivea book ... And becausethe rule ' " " asstatedchangesa goal(" causeto go to r ) into a possessor ( causeYto have ), " it cannotapplyto a verb whosemeaningis incompatiblewith causeto have." Thusdrive thecar to Chicagocannotbe convertedinto * drive Chicagothe car

Chapter3

becausedriving can' t causeanyoneto possessanythingandChicagoisn' t the sort of thing that can possesssomethingelseto begin with. Conceivingof the dative rule asa semanticoperationconverting" causeX to go to YO' into " cause Y to have X" thus unites two phenomenathat were fonnerly arbitrarily glued together: the syntacticchange, wherethe goal argumentis promotedto surface , wherebyonly verbsinvolving prospective objectposition, andthe semanticchoosiness could undergothechange. As we shallsee, otheraspectsof possessors the behaviorof the dative fall neatlyout of this conceptionaswell. Moreover, thesamekind of anal):'sisworksfor theotherrules. To continuethe preview: I will proposethat causativizationinvolves convertinga predicate " " " " meaning Y changes into a predicatemeaning to causeY to change. The causeris mappedonto the subject(externalargument) role, theaffectedthing to theobjectrole (directinternalargument). Verbswith nodirectlycausablechange are inherently incompatiblewith the rule; there is nothing for it to apply to. Locativization involvestaking a verbmeaning" to causeX to go into or onto YO' and converting it to a verb meaning" to causeY to changestateby meansof " putting X into or onto it. As in thecaseof the dative, theentity that is statedto be causally affected (the moving stuff, in the first version; the containeror surface, in the second) is mappedonto the surfaceobjectposition. If a verb has no meansof specifyingexactlyhow a containeror surfacechangesstatebecause of theadditionof somethinginto or onto it , thesemanticchangeis undefinedand cannotapply. Finally, passivizationconvertsa predicatemeaning"X actson YO' to a new predicatemeaning" Y is in the circumstanceof X actingon it." If there is no " acting on," there is no passivization. This portrayal of lexical rules leads immediatelyto a seriesof questions. Which verbs can be construedas meaning" causingto have" ? " causingto " " " " change ? actinguponan entity ? causingto changestateby meansof adding ' stuff ? Without answers,thereis no way of explainingwhichverbsa rulecanor cannotapply to. The generalanswer, it turnsout, is complexenoughto merit its own chapter, chapter4. To previewwhatI will saythere: Decisionsaboutwhich verbscanbeconstruedascapableof undergoinga givensemanticchangearenot madeby eachspeakerfor eachverb. Rather, the lexicon of a languagedefines subclass es consisting of verbs whose meaningsare variations of a single semanticplan, and it is thesesubclass es that preciselydelineatewhich verbsa construe in the two different speakermay wayscorrespondingto the input and " " " " output of the lexical rule (e.g., causeto go versus causeto have ). For example, English distinguishes two kinds of verbs of causedmotion, those involving the continuousapplicationof force to causemotion, like pull , and thoseinvolving theinstantaneous applicationof forcecausingaballisticmotion,

Constraints and the Nature of Argument Structure

like throw. Ballistic verbscanbe construedas meaningeither " causeto go" or " causeto have" andtherefore . theyundergodativization(throw theball to John / throwJohn theball); whereascontinuous-force verbscanbeconstruedonly as " " meaning causeto go. andthus they resist dativization (pull the box to John / *pull John the box). The reasonsfor the difference are partially motivatedand as shall . we see The . partially arbitrary principles governingthis construability define for a the difference betweenrulesthat predictthe . . phenomenon speaker a verb and rulesthat predict the existenceof a verb. form of This is a description. in a nutshell. of the conclusionsthat I will end up with in thesetwo chapters.Theypreservethe ideathat Bakers paradoxis resolvedby systematiccriteriaappliedto thechoiceof verbsthatmayundergoanalternation. while motivating the criteria as manifestationsof more generalprinciples. Let me now tracethe stepsthat leadto theseconclusions. 3.2 Constraints on Lexical Rules as Manifestations Phenomena

of More General

3.2.1 Constraints on Argument Structures That Are Independent of Lexical Rules A first hint thatthesemanticcriteriadiscussedin thepreviouschapterarespecial casesof more general principles comes from examining verbs that do not alternate betweentwo argumentstructuresbut occur only in a single form, specifically, theform usuallyseenasthederived versionor outputof the lexical rule. It turnsout thatsuchverbs, eventhoughthey couldnot havebeenproduced by therule, mustconformto the samekinds of criteria asthoseproposedfor the rule. For example, the double-object dativesin (3.3 and 3.4) could not havebeen derivedfrom prepositional-objectforms; the prepositionalforms arethemselves . But nonethelessthey confonn to the requirementthat the first ungrammatical be the object possessorof the secondobject (Green, 1974). In the caseof (3.3), thefirst objectis a currentor possiblepossessorof the secondobjectwho might losepossession of it asa resultof theeventdenotedby thepredicate; in (3.4), the first object is a metaphoricalpossessorof the secondobject. (3.3) Alex bet Leon $600 that the Red Sox would lose. * Alex bet $600 to Leon that the Red Sox would lose. That remarkmight cost you your job . * That remarkmight cost your job to you. . Pleasespareme your sarcasm * Pleasespareyour sarcasmto / from / of me.

Chapter3

Carolyn enviedher her good looks. * Carolynenviedher good looks to I from lof her. (3.4) Lendme your ears! * Lend your earsto me! I taughthim a goodlesson. * 1taughta goodlessonto him. They gaveme the flu. * They gavethe flu to me. Similarly, therearelexical causativeverbsthat could not havebeenderived from intransitives, but like derived lexical causatives , they entail that the causationwasdirectlyor proximally effected. In (3.5), Johncould not havebeen a governorwhorefusedto commutea deathsentence , Bill could not havesetup a remotecontrol whistle in an empty room, Amy could not have called her herwith punishmentif shedid not leave, andBob could daughterandthreatened not havegivenanorderto a waiter. Sucheventsare, though, compatiblewith the correspondingperiphrasticcausative(makeX die / come/ go / be cut). (3.5) Johnkilled Mary. * Mary killed [= died] . Bill broughtthe dog into the room. * The dog broughtinto the room. Amy took her daughterhome. * Amy' s daughtertook home. Bob cut the bread. * The breadcut. In the container locatives (i.e., those using with) in (3.6), the glass is completely filled , the bed completely covered, and the spongecompletely saturated , eventhoughnoneof theverb structurescould bethe productof a rule it deriving from a contentlocative(i.e., one usingint% nto). (3.6) I filled the glasswith water. * 1filled waterinto the glass. Shecoveredthe bed with a sheet. * Shecovereda sheetover the bed. They saturatedthe spongewith detergent. * They saturateddetergentinto the sponge. What theseexamplesshow is that some of the constraintsI have been discussingshouldnot be seenas applying to rules generatingone argument structure from another. Instead, they seem to apply directly to particular , regardlessof whetherthey werederivedfrom other arguargumentstructures

Constraintsandthe Natureof ArgumentStructure

mentstructures. This immediatelyallows us to factor the original problemwhat are the constraintson argumentstructurealternationrules?- into two, possiblymore tractableproblems: I . What aretheconstraintson particularkindsof argumentstructures? That is, whathasto betrueof a verbfor it to beassignedto atransitiveargumentstructure or a double-objectargumentstructureor a with-locativeargumentstructure? 2. When may two verbs involving different argumentstructuresshare the sameroot? Thatis, why is it thatin Englishwe canusethesamesoundto convey breakingandcausingto breakbut we mustusedifferentsoundsto conveydying andcausingto die? 3.2.2 Constraints on Grammatical Functions That Are Independent of Particular Argument Structures Someof theconstraintsapplyto unitsevensmallerthanargumentstructures:the individual grammaticalfunctionscomposingthem. For example, considerthe holistic requirementon the containerversion of the locative, whereby the grammaticalobjectmust be completelyaffected(covered, filled , etc.) by the actionof the verb(seeS. Anderson, 1971). This turnsout to be a characteristic of grammaticalobjects in general, not just of grammaticalobjects in the container-locativeconstruction(HopperandThompson, 1980; Rappaportand Levin, 1985), asshownin (3.7). (3.7) John drankfrom the glassof beer. John drankthe glassof beer. Beth climbedup the mountain. Beth climbedthe mountain. Bill paintedon the door. Bill paintedthe door. Betty put butteron the bread. Betty butteredthe bread. Jim removedpeel from the apple. Jim peeledthe apple. Gary wrotefor many TV shows. Gary wrotemanyTV shows. In eachpair, onlythesecondmember,in whichthesecondargumentis theobject, impliesthat theactioninvolvedthe completeextentor amountof the referentof the argument(i.e., all the beer was drunk, the entire height of the mountain scaled, the door completelypainted, the breadcompletelycovered, the apple completelyskinned, theentiretyof the showwrittenby the author). Thus in the locative alternationthe fact that the wagonis necessarilyfull when you load a

Chapter3

of wagonwith hay but not whenyou load hay onto the wagonis a consequence thefact that the wagon is the grammaticalobject in the fonDersentencebut not in the latter one. Similarly, the directnessconstrainton lexical causativeshassomethingto do with grammaticalobjects in general, notjust theobjectsof lexical causatives . In (3.8a), only the secondmemberof the pair, in which Mary is the direct object, entailsthatSally landeda directblow asintended(seeB. Levin, 1985). Similarly, in (3.8b), the transitive versionimplies that the action that Squeakyperfonned in affecting Ford, whereasthe prepositionalfonD is compatiblewith succeeded an absenceof any effect at all. (3.8) (a) Sally slapped/ hit / kicked at Mary. Sally slapped/ hit / kicked Mary. (b) SqueakyFromme shotat Ford. SqueakyFromme shot Ford. Thusthe direct object role is associatedwith the readingthat whatthe agent did hadanimmediateimpacton theentity thattheactionwasdirectedat. Perhaps thisis.whatmakeslexical causatives , but not periphrasticcausatives , entailsome notionof direct causation. Clearly thereis somethingaboutthe differencebetweenbeingan objectand not being an object of a verb that invokesa readingwherebythe statesignified by the verb is effected directly on the object andeffectedon all of it. Note that thisdifferenceis not contingenton theargument's merelybeinga surfaceobject. Not only arethe direct and holistic readingspreservedunderpassivization(The wagonwasloadedwith hay; Thewindowwasbrokenby John), but the locative alternationitself hasa closelyrelatedvariantwith nosurfaceobjectat all butwith the sameholistic/nonholistic difference in interpretation(see Salkoff, 1983; Rappaportand Levin , 1985), as shownin (3.9). (3.9) (a) Beesare swarming in the garden. Water dripped from the sponge. Vennin were crawling over the cheese. (a) The gardenswarmedwith bees. The spongedripped with water. The cheesewas crawling with vennin. In (3.9b) thereis an implication that beeswereallover the garden, notjust in onepart, thatthe water drippedfrom theentiresponge,notjust a comer, andthat vennincrawledover the entirecheese.Yet theseargumentsaresurfacesubjects in all cases,not objects. Whatevergeneralizationforcesargumentsto supporta holistic interpretationwhen they arenot oblique mustapply to somethingmore abstractthan the surface direct object: an object in someunderlyingstructure

Constraintsandthe Natureof ArgumentStructure (perhaps marked by a trace in surface structure ), or else some thematic role that gets mapped either onto surface objects or onto surface subjects if the verb is intransitive (these options will be discussed in more detail later ) .

3.2.3 Constraints on Verb ChoiceAre Also Constraints on Interpretation I have beendiscussingcriteria as if they acted as filters on classesof verbs potentiallyservingastheinput to a rule. In fact thefiltering function seemsto be a by-product of a more generalfunction of the constraints, namely forcing a certainkind of interpretationon a new argumentstructureassignedto a verb. Two of the criteria I havediscussed , while ruling out the applicationof lexical rulesto certainstemsaltogether, alsoalter themeaningof the stemsthat they do applyto. The directnessconstrainton the causative, for example, rules out * He laughedtheaudience. In (3.10), it allows causativizationto apply, resultingin a syntacticallywell-formed sentence(b), but in doing so it makesthe sentence imply thatdirectcontactwasinvolvedin theaction. Sincetheadjunctin sentence (b) explicitly contradictsthe contactreading, the sentenceasa whole is anomalous . Similarly, theholismconstrainton the locativerulesout * He threw theair with theconfetti. But whenit doesapplyin (3.11) it alsoaffectsits interpretation; the the (b) sentenceimplies that the wall is completelycovered. (3.10) (a) Johncausedthe window to breakby startling Bill , who was installing it. (b) * Johnbroke the window by startling Bill , who was installing it. (3.11) (a) Irv slathered paint on the wall. (b) Irv slathered the wall with paint. The possessor constrainton thedativedisplaysthe samedual roles. If a verb is incompatiblewith a meaning of causing to change possession , it cannot * dativize, as in 1 drove her the car. But if the verb does dativize, a successful changeof possessionis implied in the resulting double-object form. For example, Green( 1974) notesthat in (3.12a) thereis no commitmentasto what the studentstook away, but in (b) thereis an implication that the teachingwas successful . It is as if the prepositionaldative carries no implication about successfulpossession(in this case, possessionof knowledge), but the doubleobjectdativeenforcesthat reading. (3.12) (a) Mary taughtSpanishto the students. (b) Mary taughtthe studentsSpanish. A relatedphenomenoncan be seenin (3.13), an examplefrom JoanBresnan: (3.13) (a) I senta packageto the border. (b) I senta packageto the boarder.

Chapter3

(c) * 1sentthe borderapackaged ) 1 sentthe boardera package. It seemsthatsendin its prepositionalform is ambiguousasto whethera goalof location or a goal of possessionand location is involved; (a) and (b) involve different sensesof send, one spatial, one jointly spatial and possessional . Sentence(c) is ungrammatical , presumablybecausethe meaningof the doubleobject versionof send, unlike its prepositionalcounterpart, specifiesthat the transfermust involve possession . Finally, it haslong beennotedthatpassivizationis not semanticallyneutral. Beaversbuild damsimpliessomethingaboutall beaversand is true; Damsare built by beaversimplies somethingabout all damsand is false. Roughly, the surfacesubjectof the passiveis interpretedas a theme, an entity of which a locationor stateis predicated(seeAnderson, 1977). We cancall this the" predication effect" : whena verbis passivized , its surfacesubjectmustbe interpreted asa themeof a predicationif theverbhasa theme.. If theverb' s meaningis such thatits themeendsupastheby-objectinstead, it cannotbepassivizedat all (cost, weigh, stativetouch). Whatweareseeinghereisthatverbsmustbeinterpretedin acertainwaywhen they are assignedan argumentstructure composedof a particular set of " " grammaticalfunctions. Theseprinciples of interpretationact as criteria or filters becauseof an interactionbetweenthe mandatedinterpretationand the inherentmeaningsof verbsthat areextendedto that argumentstructure. If the combinationof the inherentmeaningof the verb andthe meaningcomponents forcedby thenewargumentstructureis inadmissible(in a senseto bediscussed later), the verb cannotundergothe alternation.

3.3 A Theoryof ArgumentStructure In the preceding section I tried to show that constraints on the application of lexical rules to verbs are epiphenomena of more general principles : those that enforce an interpretation on particular argument structures (regardless of where they come from ), those that link grammatical functions with particular kinds of semantic arguments, and those that effect changes on verbs ' meanings. In this section I spell out these principles in more detail . 3. 3.1 Background Assumptions Given that no current theory of linguistic representation has provided a solution ' to Baker s paradox, I will make a number of conservative assumptions about argument structure at the outset so as not to block off avenues in which the solution may be found. I will refer to grammatical roles using GB and LFG

Constraints and the Nature of Argument Structure

tem1inologyfairly interchange ably when possible, avoiding special theoryinternal devicesand tricks. All I absolutelyneedis the four-way distinction betweensubjects,objects, secondobjects, andprepositionalobjects, anda way of coindexingthemwith a verb' s arguments . (This hastheadditionaladvantage of allowing thecurrentwork to touchbasebothwith theLFG-relatedacquisition theoryI developedin Pinker, 1984,out of whichthisbookgrew, andwith thecurrently , since flourishing GB-basedwork on argumentstructure.) Furthem1ore notionslike " optionalargument" and " adjunct" maybegthequestionsthey are designedto solve (seesection1.4.5.2), I will assumethat everydistinct set of grammaticalfunctionsthataverbcanappearwith is licensedby adifferent, fully fom1edargumentstructureassociatedwith that verb. (Thustherewill be two argumentstructuresfor eat, correspondingto John ate andJohnate the apple, andtwo for run, correspondingto John ran andJohnran to thestore.) Third, so asnot to saddlemyself with unnecessary thatare , possiblyharmfulassumptions 's in I will assume a notation not that a verb are differentiated , implicit arguments in tem1Sof thematicrole labelssuch as " agent" and " theme" but will simply differentiatethemby variablessuchasX andY, following RappaportandLevin " " ( 1988) andothers. ThereforeI will usetheterm argumentstructure to refer to a strictly syntacticentity, namelythe informationthat specifieshow a verb' s argumentsareencodedin thesyntax. With RappaportandLevin ( 1988), Burzio ( 1986), L. Levin ( 1985), andothers, I will assumethat this is the only lexical structurepertainingto the thematicpropertiesof argumentsthatthe syntaxcan look at. Thematicinfom1ationgoesinto determininga verb' sargumentstructure, but thatis theextentof its influence; therestof thesyntaxcannot" see" it directly. To review the basic terminology: A lexical entry of a verb specifiesan associationamong (a) morphologicalinformation (the morphemesit is composed of , if it is multimorphemic); (b) phonologicalinformation(thesoundof the ); syntactic information, including (c) its part-of-speechcategory morphemes and (d) its argumentstructure, the specificationof the syntacticpropertiesof thoseof its argumentsthatareexpressedin the sentence ; and(e) its meaning, or semantic structure. What I will call semanticstructureor lexicosemantic structureis similar to the representation calledLexical ConceptualStructureby Hale and Laughren( 1983), Haleand Keyser( 1986, 1987), andRappaportand Levin ( 1988). I avoid their term because , as we shall see, lexical semantic structurescannotbe the samething as mentalrepresentations of conceptsfor typical actions, events, scripts, or scenariosin whichtheverbis used. Rather, we will see, they are essentiallyconstraintson particularaspectsof an event. As mentionedearlier, I will also assumethat the sameverb usedwith two different argumentstructuresactually consistsof two distinct lexical entries

Chapter3

sharinga morphologicalroot and componentsof their semanticstructures.A lexical rule, then, associatesonekind of lexical entry with another; it canbeseen astaking one lexical entry as input andproducinga secondasoutput. Thereare a numberof ways in which setsof words can sharea root, involving different kinds of rulesand principles. I will be focusingon a certainkind of alternation involving changesof argumentstructureamongverbs. Themoststraightforward case is the one where the verb stem remains unchangedbut the argument structurediffers. The causative, the dative, and severalvariantsof the locative alternationin English are the examplesI treat in detail, but we will alsocome acrossthe " conative" alternation (Bill slapped him I slapped at him), the " middle" alternation John cut the breadI Thebread cut easily), an alternation ( ' of John involving possessors parts ( punchedBill s arm I JohnpunchedBill on thearm), analternationthathassomethingin commonbothwith bothdativesand locatives(I suppliedsheetsto him I suppliedhim with sheets ), onethat involves theadditionof a pathargument(He hit theball I hit theball into centerfield) , and onethat deletesan object (John ate theappleI John ate). I predictthat thevery sameprincipleswill apply to other alternationsthat changeargumentstructure, suchas" raising-to-object" (I expectthatJohn will leaveII expectJohn to leave) and" resultativecomplementaddition" (Shehammeredthe boxI Shehammered the boxflat ). I also lavishattentionon the passive, which differs from thesealternationsin addingan affix to the verb and changingits morphosyntacticcategory, from a finite verb to a participle. According to Marantz ( 1984), rules of this sort are formally differentfrom thosethat leavethestemintact, andshouldnot besubject to semanticconstraints. This is a bit too strong: I will presentevidencefrom Englishandfrom cross-linguistic surveysshowingthat similar kinds of semantic principles apply to alternationsthat are accompaniedby affixation and to thosethat arenot. However, therecertainly are significantdifferencesbetween the passiveand the nonaffixing alternations, and in sections4.4.4 and 5.6.4 I ' modify Marantz s suggestionin an effort to pinpoint the grammaticalsourceof thesedifferences. One stepfurther we find rules that changea word' s syntacticcategory, such asthe rule that derivesadjectivesfrom participlesor the onethat derivesnouns from verbs. Thesealternationsappearto be more closelytied to puresyntactic , which propertiesof argumentstructure (such as the number of arguments argumentsareobligatory, andthe external/internalargumentdistinction) thanto the lexicosemanticpropertiesthat governthe alternationsI focuson, andI will not be concernedwith them. See Rappaportand Levin ( 1988and in press), Rappaport,Levin, and Laughren, ( 1987), and Marantz( 1984) for discussion.

Constraintsandthe Natureof Argument Structure

3.3.2 Semantic Conftation Classes as Thematic Cores of Argument Structures In section3.2.1I showedthat argumentstructuresareassociatedwith characteristic semanticproperties. Let' s saythat eachargumentstructurehasassociated with it oneor morethematiccores. Informally, a thematiccore is a schematiza tionof atypeof eventor relationshipthatliesatthecoreof themeaningsof aclass of possibleverbs. For example, the argumentstructuretypes discussedso far could havethethematiccoreslisted in (3.14). (3.14) Double-object: X causesY to haveZ. Transitive: X actson Y. UnergativeIntransitive: X acts. Unaccusativeintransitive: X is in a locationor stateor goesto a locationor state. Transitivewith oblique containingto: X causesY to go to Z. Transitivewith oblique containingwith: X causesY to go into a stateby causingZ to go to Y. Intransitivewith oblique containingto: X goesto Y. The thematiccore of an argumentstructureis an exampleof what Talmy ( 1985) calls a conflation of semanticelements, defined in a semanticfield in which theelementsaregiven a specific interpretation.Eachconflation defines a setof possiblepredicatesin a language,or aconflationclass. For now, imagine thatthepossiblesemanticelementsconsistof variablesstandingfor the participants in theevent(theX , Y, andZ) andtheelementarysemanticfunctions" act," " cause" " " " have" " be " and" to." Insteadof , go, , , labelingthe participantswith thematicroles, onecan simply distinguishthemby the argumentslots they fill in theseelementaryfunctions(RappaportandLevin, 1986; Jackendoff, 1987a). Thus(for now) thethematicrole agentcanbetreatedasa mnemonicfor the first " " " " argumentof cause, and patient would be the secondargumentof cause. " " " " Similarly, themeis a mnemonicfor the first argumentof go or be ; path to the secondargumentof " go," locationto the secondargumentof corresponds " " " be " and , goal to the secondargumentof to.

3 Chapter 3.3.3 Linking Rules A thematiccoreof an argumentstructureis a specificationof a conflationclass defininga kind of possibleverbmeaningin a language,including a specification " of which argumentsare 440pen arguments or variables. Open argumentsare thosewhosereferentscanbeexpressed syntacticallyby a phrasewithin thesame rules are regular ways of mapping open clause as the predicate. Linking argumentsontogrammaticalfunctionsor underlyingsyntacticconfigurationsby virtue of their thematicroles; theyarethe mechanismsthat createthe syntactic argumentstructureassociatedwith a given thematic core. Linking rules are discussedat lengthin Carter( 1976b), Ostler( 1980), andDowty ( 1987) andplay a prominentrole in manytheoriesof grammar,suchasthe UniversalAlignment Hypothesisin RelationalGrammar(PerlmutterandPostal, 1984), the Uniformity of ThetaAssignmentHypothesisin GB (Baker, 1985), and the Canonical MappingHypothesisin LFG (Pinker, 1984; L. Levin, 1985). Let us considerthe following linking rules as a first approximation. They would apply, in unorderedfashion, to the open argumentsof the semantic structureof a verb undertheconstraintsthat everyopenargumentbe linked to a grammaticalfunction(LFG) or underlyingargumentposition(GB) andthatno grammaticalfunction or argumentposition be linked to more than one open * , which rule out suchstringsas*Johnput and We argument.Theseconstraints drank the beer the bottles of Heineken, correspondto Function-Argument in Bresnan( 1982c)and, roughly, totheTheta-Criterionin Chomsky Biuniqueness ( 1981). (Seealso RappaportandLevin, 1988, andJackendoff, 1987a.) " 1. Link the first argumentof 44cause(the agent) to: the SUBJ function (LFG) / externalargument(GB). " the 2. Link thesecondargumentof 44cause ( patient) to: theOBJfunction(LFG) / direct internalargument(GB). " " 3. Link thefirst argumentof 44beor 44go(the theme) to: the SUBJfunction if it is not alreadylinked or to theOBJ function otherwise(LFG) / direct internal argument(GB). " 4. Link the argumentof 44to(the goal) to: the OBL function (LFG) / indirect internalargument(GB). ' " to have (Z in 44XcausesY to haveZ ) to: 5. Link thethird argumentof 44cause the OBJ2function (LFG) / seconddirect internalargument(GB). Oblique/ indirect argumentsare also linked to kinds of locationsand paths other than those expressedby the preposition to ; accordingly, the proper , to be discussedin chapter formulationof the linking rulefor obliquearguments of a The choice . is more 5, specificprepositionis actually determined general ' andthat by compatibilitybetweentheprepositionsown semanticrepresentation of the verb(seeJackendoff, 1983, 1987a). The mechanicsof this selectionwill

Constraintsand the Natureof ArgumentStructure

be mademore precisein chapter5; the linking rule listed abovecanbe seenas a fusion of a generallinking rule for obliqueobjectsandthe semanticstructure of oneversionof theprepositionto. As we shallsee. the linking rule for second objectsis also moregeneralthan the tentativeversionstatedhere. Notethat thethemerequiresa specialtreatmentbecauseit commonlyappears in both subject(Thespotdisappeared ) andobject(I killed thebug) positions. In the versionof LFG I elaboratedin Pinker( 1984). the two-part linking rule for themescan be derived from a canonicalmapping of thematicroles onto a hierarchyof grammaticalfunctions. so thatthe themeis assignedto the highest function in the list " SUBJ-OBJ-OBL" thatis not alreadylinked to anargument. A slightly more complexpossibility within the LFG frameworkwassuggested " " by L. Levin ( 1985). namely that the themefirst be classified as taking a " " general [ semantically] unrestrictedfunction. Then one of three function assignmentrules can apply to this class: one that mapsit onto SUBJ, onethat mapsit onto OBJ, or onethat mapsit ontoOBJ2. Whenthe verblacksanagent, only the first of thesethree rules can yield a well-formed argumentstructure containinga SUBJ. andit is the onethatapplies. Within RelationalGrammar,a themeis assignedasan object in an underlyinglevel of representation , but can be promotedto subjectin the surfacelevel by a generalrule if thesubjectrole is not already assigned . Within GB, the themewould be assignedas the direct internalargument,but if thereis no externalargument,therule " Movea " would apply. moving it into the surfacesubjectpositionandleavinga tracebehindto which it would be associatedin an " argumentchain." (Seethe discussionof " Burzio' s Generalization" in section 1.4.5.1. In other words ) , everytheoryhas : basically, theexistenceof intransitive somemeansof accountingfor unaccusativity verbs whosesubjectsare themes. It is importantto notethat the accountof thematicrolesandlinking I amusing representsa significantdeparturefrom the conceptionsoriginally proposedby Gruber ( 1965) and Fillmore ( 1968) and adoptedmore or lessintact by LFG (Bresnan, 1982a; Pinker. 1984) andthe ExtendedStandardTheoryof transformational grammar(Jackendoff. 1972) includingthe GB framework(Chomsky. 1981). The Fillmore accountand its descendants arebasedon thefollowing assumptions : (a) Thematicrolesareatomiclabelsdrawnfrom a fixed list. (b) The labelsareorderedin a hierarchy(usuallyagent-theme-location/source/goal) and arelinked to the syntacticpositionsSubject, Object, andObliquein sucha way as to preservethe relativerankingsof the two hierarchies(so that an agentis a subject; a themeis an object if thereis an agent, a subjectotherwise; a location is obliqueif thereis anagentandtheme. anobjectotherwise). (c) Everyargument hasexactly one thematicrole. (d) Linking rulesapply to argumentsin termsof the roles they play in motion events(thus Object is linked to the moving or locatedentity).

3 Chapter Dowty ( 1987), Jackendoff( 1987a), B. Levin ( 1985), andRappaportandLevin 1985 , 1988) presentseveralargumentsagainstthe Fillmore-style theory of ( " " thematicroles. First, therearemanyconceptsof thesamefonnal typeas source and" goal" thatdo not havetraditionallabels, suchasthe role of thehousein John passedthe house. Second, argumentsoften have multiple thematicroles; for instance,theball in I battedthe ball into centerfield is the goalof themotionof thebat andthethemeof themotion that tenninatesin centerfield. Similarly, the subjectof give is an agentanda source; the subjectof John intentionallyrolled down the hill is an agentand a theme. Third , the changein interpretationthat accompanieslexical rules is baffling to a theory of unanalyzedthematicrole labels: if thewagonhasidenticalrole labelsin load hay onto thewagonandload thewagonwith hay, why is it interpretedholistically in onebut not theother? But if it hasdifferent role labelsin the two structures, why is it interpretedin both phrasesas the destinationof the hay? Thealternativeview thatJackendoff, Levin, andRappaportarguefor, andthat : (a) Thematicroles are I expandhere, substitutesthe following assumptions Therefore . b semantic in a structured , theydo notfonD ( ) representation positions a fixed list that canbe orderedin a hierarchy; rather, eachthematicrole triggers a specificlinking rule. (c) Argumentscanbearseveralthematicrolessimultaneously by virtue of their simultaneousappearancein severalsemanticsubstructures " " " " (e.g., secondargumentof cause andfirst argumentof go ). (d) Linking rules can apply to the roles that entities play in any semanticfield, not just physicallocation. For example, a verb can havetwo argumentsplayingthe role of theme, one correspondingto what moves, the other correspondingto what changesstate. The main advantageof this newerfonnulation of thematicroles ' in dealingwith Baker s paradox, we shall see, is that it removesthearbitrariness of semanticconstraintsand their pairings with particular lexical rules. 3. 3.4 Lexical Rules Conflation classesbuilt around thematic cores are inherently incapableof allowing newfonns to bederivedproductively. A word is morethana meaning; it needsa sound, too, or peoplewon' t know how to pronounceit. Conflationclass definitions inherentlydon' t tell you wherethe soundfor a new word is supposed to comefrom. That function is reservedfor lexical rules, which allow a speaker to takethe soundpairedwith a verb in one conflationclassanduseit with a new, relatedmeaningbelongingto anotherconflation class. Theclearestanalysisof lexical rulesalongthelinesI am proposingherecomes ' from Rappaportand Levin s ( 1985) account of the locative alternation. By discussingit in somedetail, I will demonstratethe empirical benefitsof the theory, and my applicationof it to the other threealternationswill bestraight forward.

Constraintsandthe Natureof ArgumentStructure

3.3.4.1 The Locative Alternation Considerthe int% nto argumentstructure " by itself. independentof anyalternation. It hasthe thematiccore X moves " Y int% ntoZ. X. the agent. is thesubject. following the linking rule mentioned earlier. Y is the thing that changeslocationor themeandis anaffectedentity or patient. and thusis the object. Z definesboth theendof the paththat Y moves along and the location with respectto which Y is situatedfollowing the motion (i.e.. in the interior of . on thetop of . or againstthesurfaceot) . Sinceto Z means " " " " " along a pathendingatZ. in Z means at theinteriorof Z. andintoZ means to " in Z . the choice of preposition must be into. or. by similar logic. onto (Jackendoff. 1983).2 Generally when a verb specifiesmotion or change. it can also specify the mannerof suchmotion or changeand someof the propertiesof the entity that undergoesthe motion or change(Talmy. 1985). so manyof the verbsthat are built aroundthis thematiccorespecify the mannerof causationof motion of a substanceto a mediumor container. or the mannerof motion of a substanceto a mediumor container. Thatis. theverbconstrainseitherhow theagentinitiates the motion (e.g.. by spilling versusinjecting versusladling) or in whatmanner the object moves(e.g.. in a continuousstream. asin pouring. or asa mist. as in spraying). Notethattheverbsdonot haveto specifyhowthecontaineror surface changesastheresultof puttingsomethinginto or ontoit. For example. if I pour water into theglass. theglasscanbefull . partiallyfull . or evenempty(if theglass leaks). but I haveto causethewaterto moveasa cohesivestream; I cannotspray the water into the glass. usethe glassto bail waterout of a bathtub. let water condenseinto the glass. or leavethe glasson a windowsill during a rainstorm. In contrast. theargumentstructurecontaininganobjectanda with-objecthas the thematiccore" X causesYto changeits stateby meansof movingZ to Y." As before. whena verb specifiesachange.it canspecifythemanneror natureof the changeor thepropertiesof whatchanges.In this case. theentity corresponding to the goal of thephysicalmotionis treatedasanentity undergoinga changeof state. Specifically. verbs in theconflation classcorrespondingto the thematic core of this argumentstructurespecify that a surface. container. or medium undergoesa particularchangeresultingfrom theadditionof materialto it. The mere addition of material is not enough. andthe mannerin which the material moved or wascausedto moveis irrelevant; all that is capturedin the thematic core schematizationis thatthestateof theobjectis seento bedifferentasa result of the addition. For example. if Ifill a glasswith water. the glassmusthaveits entire interior occupiedby water. but thewatercouldhavegottentherebecause I pouredit in. becauseI usedtheglassto bail somewateroutof abathtub.because I left the glasson a windowsill during a rainstorm. and so on. Likewise. other verbs that have this argumentstructure. suchas adorn, blanket. impregnate, encrust, infect, riddle. .and saturate. specify a particular state of an object

Chapter3

subsequentto the addition of somethingto it. Once one specifiesthe semanticsof verbs in this conflation class, their commonargumentstructurefollows from the linking rules. The causalagentis the subject. Theentity that changesstateasan effect of whatthe agentdoesis a theme- in thefield of circumstancesor states,not physicallocations- soits link with the objectfunction or direct internal argumentpositionpreservesthe generalizationthataffectedthemesor patientsareobjects, evenif it is not thetheme of a changeof physicallocation. The mappingbetweenthewith-objectandthe ' thing whosemovementto Y changesY s stateis also nonarbitrary: with often signifies an instrument, as in She cracked the egg with a hammer. Though Rappaportand Levin argue that the with function is not strictly speakingan instrumentin locativeconstructionssuchasfloaded the wagonwith hay, it is easyto seethattheEnglishprepositionwith canembraceeithertrue instruments or more generallythe entity that by being movedis the meansby which a state " " changeis effected. Rappaportand Levin call it the displacedtheme ; I will informally " " call it the state-changer. The labelis irrelevant; wecansimplyassume that thereis a linking rule that mapstheZ in " X changesY by meansof moving Z to it " ontotheobliquefunction or indirect internalargument,andacorresponding lexical entry for the prepositionwith that makesit and no other preposition compatiblewith this role. As mentioned, the holism requirement generally applies to these verbs, whetheror not they are relatedto int% nto locatives: the entireobject, andnot just a partof it , mustbecompletelycovered, filled , or saturatedwith thematerial. RappaportandLevin suggestthat theholismeffect is actuallyanepiphenomenon of the fact that the verb specifiesa changeof state. They point out that, taken literally , theeffectdoesnot invariably hold: onecansayThevandalsprayedthe statuewith paint evenif thereis only a dab of paint on the statue. The reasonis that the statusof the statueas an object of beautychangeswith evena single blemishon it. Similarly, they point out that you can load a wagonwith a single box if a singlebox is normally consideredto be the standardloadfor the wagon (anobservationtheyattributeto RichardJ. Carter). Thustheholismrequirement is really just a state-changerequirementas it appliesto ordinary surfacesor containers:unlesstheyareentirely coveredor filled , thereis no pragmaticsense in which they canbe saidto havechangedstate. Theremaybeanevendeeperreasonthataffectingsomethingandaffectingall of it aresocloselytied. .Recallthat in throw thepaint ontothewall, paint= theme, wall = location; whereasin coat the wall with paint, wall = theme, paint = instrument/state-changer. Talmy ( 1983) offers an interestinggeneralization about the intuitive geometricsystemsin which languagesspecify the spatial relations that are encoded in their grammars. Most typically, a theme is conceivedasa pointlike or dimensionlessentity andis locatedwith respectto a

Constraints and the Nature of Argument Structure

placedefinedby a referenceobject. The referenceobject, unlike the theme, is spatiallydifferentiated,andplaceson it aredefinedwith respectto its dimensionality, orientation, shape, aspectratio, or endpoints. For example, the English phraseson thecup, under the cup, andin thecup pick out certain aspectsof the geometryof the cup as relevant, such as the top or bottom of its vertical dimensionor its interior region (andhencea prepositionlike in is incompatible with objectswhosegeometrylacksthe crucialgeometricproperty, e.g., * in the sheetof wood) . Howeverthe prepositionsarecompletelynonspecificaboutthe geometricpropertiesof the themeobjectthat is in, on, or under the cup. If the schematization of spaceandobjectsunderlyingspatialrelationsis carriedover to abstractthemesand locations, asthe ThematicRelationsHypothesiswould predict, thenthe promotionof wall to themeof a statechangeentailsthat it will beinterpretedasa pointlike entity, without differentiationof its internalpartsor geometry.The expressionpaint the wall is sayingsomethingaboutthe surface conceivedof as an undifferentiatedwhole; if paint is adheringto it , then the unmarkedinterpretationis that it is adheringto all of it} Givenall theseproposals, the locativealternationcan now be statedsimply: it is a rule thattakesa verbcontainingin its semanticstructurethe core" X causes Yto moveint% ntoZ," andconvertsit into a newverb whosesemanticstructure containsthecore"X causesZ to changestateby meansof moving Y int% nto it." Basically, it is a gestaltshift: onecaninterpretloading asmoving a theme(e.g., hay) to a location(e.g., a wagon), butonecanalsointerpretthe sameact in terms of changingthe stateof a theme(the wagon), in this casefrom empty to full , by meansof moving something (the hay) into it. The difference in argument structurefollowsfrom the linking rules: in theold verb, themoving thing wasthe themeandhencewaslinked to direct object; in the new verb, the location is the theme(of a statechange) andhenceis linked to object. The argumentnot linked to objectgetslinked to an oblique functionor positionby virtue of other linking rulesin combinationwith lexical entriesfor specificprepositions. The holism " " requirementfollows from the cognitive contentof the notion of theme or locatedentity, which is generallyconstruedasan undifferentiatedpoint. Thus, the two differentconstrualsof the sameeventin this gestaltshift , and the two different argumentstructures, are closely linked: loading hay into a wagon is somethingthat happensto hay; loading a wagon with hay is somethingthat happensto a wagon. A similar accountcan be provided for the intransitive variants, suchasBeesswarmedin thegardenversusThegardenswarmedwith bees,wherethegardenis athemeandhenceliableto aholistic interpretationonly in the secondsentence . The constraintsor criteria governingthe locativealternationstem, to a first , from the ability of a predicateto supportthis gestaltshift. What approximation is specialaboutan alternatingverb is that it specifiesthe motion of an objector

3 Chapter substance (andgenerallyitsmannerof motion), makingit eligiblefor theinto/ ontoconstruction aneffectonthe , andthatthiskindof motionpredictablycauses . Forexample surfacethatreceives thesubstance when a is , , it is liquid sprayed in mist fine . sent a or , asa resultof causingsuchmovement , dropletsHowever a surfaceto whichit movespredictablyhasan evencoatof deposited liquid adheringto it. Thispredictabilityis whatis crucial: thewith form requiresa of state,andthemeaning of averblikesprayallowsthespeaker specificchange to predictexactlywhatthatstatechangeis. Moregenerally , causedmotionof a substance in the directionof a particularobjectandin a particularspatial will resultin thesubstance in or on theobjectin configuration beingdeposited acharacteristic its state . This of for way, changing providespart theexplanation doesnotextendto verbsof puremannerof motionsuchas whythealternation , drag, pull, tug, yank) or verbsof pour, or to verbsof forceexertion(push : there is nowayto predictonthebasisof , , , positioning(lay placepositionput) theverbmeaning alonewhattheeffectonthegoalargument will be. Conversely , thisaccount helpsto explainwhyverbsof pureeffect, suchasfil' , whichdonot , cannottaketheint% ntoform. specifyanyspecifickindof motionof a theme and Levin a evidence for this Rappaport provide strongpieceof independent kindof account . Forsomespeakers it is possibleto addtheparticlefull topour whichintroduces aspecification howthecontainer isaffected :I pouredtheglass . the addition to in the , full Interestingly immediately qualifiespour participate locativealternation : I pouredtheglassfull withwater. Thegeneralideais summarized in (3.15). (3.15) SUUCIures : VNPinl% Argumenl VNPwith . nlONP . NP I I Themalic cores .'

'. Verbs

ovesu~ ~In apanlcular manne :r 10an object \ ,

': .pour ': 'spray "eft substance subs --~..moves in moves in astteam amist

Affecl object inapanicular waybyadding substance I \ 'spray ' : surface IS -.I WI cove .~ oth ~ by , LeXI ocaJ moving mist rule

. , o fill. : IS 0 Inlenor occupied

I am not claimingthat this view predictsthe constraintson the alternation , for example , to showthat exactly: it wouldtakesomesemantic gymnastics a effect on a surface whereas dribblenever sprayinevitablyyields predictable

Constraints andtheNature of ArgumentStructure does. But I do claim thatthis is theprinciplebehindthefact thatcriteriaexistand takethe kinds of forms that they do; the remainingpieceof the puzzle, which delineatesthe alternating and nonalternatingverbs more precisely, will be presentedin section4.4.2 and moreformally in section5.6.3. A closely parallel account can be given of the alternationthat involves removingsomethingfrom somethingelse, asin I emptiedgarbagefrom thebag / I emptiedthe bag of garbage. The argumentstructurethat includesan object andafrom -object hasthe thematiccore"X causesY to go awayfrom Z," as in Johngrabbedthesalt shakerfrom thetable, involving familiar linking rulesplus a lexicalentry forfrom that specifiesa sourcerole (cf. Theboyranfrom thedog). Theargumentstructureincorporatinganobjectandanof-objecthasthethematic core" X causesY to changestateby meansof takingZ awayfrom Y," asin John clearedthe table of dishes. The prepositionof might be usedfor variouskinds of themesby default, servingasthe" empty" prepositionin Englishwhichjumps intoactionwhena prepositionis syntacticallynecessary but whenno specialized role is involved. (A familiar examplecanbe seenwith argument-taking nouns andadjectives, whichareforbiddento havesyntacticobjects: * Theirdestruction the city / Their destruction of the city.) Alternatively, of may have a more specializedentry complementaryto with, indicatingstatechangeby subtraction; sometimesthis is called the abstrumentrole (Dowty, 1987). Verbs that appearin thefrom variantcanspecify an instrumentof removal suchasbrush, comb, hose, or mop, a mannerof causationof removalsuchasrub, rinse, scrub, or wipe, or the effect of physicalremoval, suchasclean, cleanse, empty, strip , clear, or drain. However, only verbs in the latter class, which specifytheeffect of removal, canappearin theof-objectform: I emptied/ * wiped the can of water. (Unlike the into/with versionof the alternation, however, the verbsare not restrictedfrom appearingin container-orientedformsaltogether; the restriction is only against the container-oriented form that includesthe oblique argument. Thus one can still sayI wiped / rubbed/ rinsed the can.) Again, if a particle addsan effect componentof meaningto oneof the verbsin thenonalternatingclasses , the verb- particlecombinationcantaketheofform : I shoveledthe walk clear of snow,' Theywipedthe table cleanof dirt. In sum, the behaviorof locative verbssupportsa conceptionof argument structurealternationsas operationsthat take a verb in one conflation class, servingasthe thematiccoreof onekind of argumentstructure,andcreatea new verb, sharing the sameroot but havingan alteredsemanticrepresentation that it in a different conflation classservingas the thematiccoreof adifferent places argumentstructure.Theargumentstructuresthemselvesarepredictablefrom of generallinking rules. RappaportandLevin ( 1985) summarizetheadvantages this kind of theory applied to the locativealternationby pointing out that it

Chapter3

providesanswersto four questionsthat at first glanceseemindependentof one another. First. why doesthe meaningof a verb changewhen it assumesa new argumentstructurein the locativealternation? Becausetherule alteringtheverb directly changesits semanticstructure; specifically. it changeswhich argument servesas the theme. Second. why is the meaningof the verb in one argument structuresocloselyrelatedto thenew meaningof the verb in theotherargument structure? Becausethe first meaning- move Z to Yis incorporatedaspart of . thesecondmeaning- changey s stateby movingZ to Y. Third. why do the two argumentstructurescontaina grammaticalobject. linked to differententitiesin the two fonns. andeitheran int% nto or a with oblique object. ratherthan any of the numerousother waysthat argumentscould link with grammaticalroles? Becausethereis a generallinking rule that makesthe themetheobject. whether it is a themeof a locationchangeor a themeof a statechange.andthereareother linking rulesandlexical entriesthat assignthe other argumentto its appropriate preposition. Fourth. why arelexical ruleschoosy? Becausethesemanticchange effectedby therule requiresthespecificationof infonnation- a specifickind of statechange- that canbepredictedfrom the theintrinsic meaningof someverbs but not others. Now let us seeif we cangain thesesameadvantagesby applyingthe theory to the other alternationsunderconsideration. The dative alternation embracestwo alternations The Dative Alternation , one involving the preposition to , one involving / or . The alternation with to can be seen as an operation that takes a verb with a semantic structure ' " containing X causesf to go to Z and converts it to a verb containing a structure " "X causesZ to have f . Linking rules , primarily the one that links the theme or patient to the object position , effect the difference in syntactic argument structures. In one case, the entity being caused to move becomes the object ; in the other , the entity causedto gain possession becomes the object . In both cases, more specific linking rules take care of the unlinked argument . As mentioned , evidence for the two thematic cores comes from nonalternating verbs: She ' " carried the letter to the mailbox shows that X causes f to go to Z is a possible substructure of an English verb and that such a verb is linked to a transitive argument structure incorporating a to -object ; They charged him five dollars ' shows that " X causesZ to have r is a possible substructure of an English verb definition ( in this case, causing someone not to have something) , which is mapped onto the double-object form . 3. 3.4.2

As in the locative alternation , there is often a change of interpretation accompanying the change of argument structure ; if both alternations are a result of changes in semantic structure, such changes are to be predicted . Becausethe pos

Constraintsandthe Natureof ArgumentStructure

sessorin thedouble-objectfonn is thepatientor theme(I distinguishtheselater) ratherthanthegoal, it shouldbe interpretedasbeingaffectedby the transaction ratherthansimplybeingits target. This accountsfor thecontrastbetweenteaching French to the students , possiblywith no effect, andteachingthe students French, with success , at leaston themostsalientreading(Green, 1974).1threw theball to JohncanmeanthatJohnis merelythe spatialtarget(possiblyasleep or dead), analogousto 1 threw the ball to the target, but 1 threw John the ball entails that he was meantto receiveit and invites the inferencethat he did. Similarly, it would be odd to say1 told John the newsif he weredeaf or dead, whereas1 told the newsto John may be a bit lessanomalousin thosecircumstances . A relatedeffectnotedby Greenis thattherecipient, whenit is theobject of the double-objectfonn, is entailedto exist. For example,Juanita told her sorrowsto God would come more easily out of the mouth of an atheist than Juanita told God her sorrows. RichardOehrle( 1977), in a review of Green's book, express es doubt about someof thesejudgments.He suggeststhat thefollowing sentences do not seem to becontradictory:1 read him thefigures . but when1 lookedup. he was gone, or WhenJ took him his mail. 1found that he had disappeared . However, most people find these sentencessomewhatodd, and in an unpublished paper coauthored with Hal Ross(Oehrleand Ross, n.d.), Oehrlehimself marks the sentenceJim threw the catcher the ball . but a bird got in the way as being , just asGreenpredicted. Nonetheless ungrammatical , Oehrlemay be right that theintuitionof asemanticchangecanbesomewhatweak, especiallyin sentences like 1gavea bookto John/ 1 gaveJohn a bookor 1 told a story to my children / 1toldmychildrena story. I suspectthatit is becausethemeaningsof thoseverbs : give cannot be used to mean the inherently specify changeof possession physicalmotionof an object (He * gave/ threwa bookonto the table); tell can be usedonly if thereis a comprehendinglistenerwho canextractthe contentof thespeech(He * ?told/mumbledthelessonto theblackboard ; in thisexampletold is naturalonly on an intentionallyironic reading). In suchcases,the dative shift doesnot add the notion of cause-to-change-possessionto a verb meaning; it rearrangesthe verb meaningto makethe cause-to-change-possessioncomponent asaffectedentity. Thusfor theseverbsthe meaning applyto thepossessor dativizationis logically vacuous:causingYto go into the changeaccompanying possessionof Z is barely different from causingZ to possessY. It is not , however, as it does have discourseconsequences psychologicallyvacuous , the to allowing speaker focuseitheron what is doneto thepossessor or on what is doneto thepossession (Erteschik-Shir, 1979). By the way, it shouldnot be surprisingthat whetheror not an argumentis playing the role of themeaffectsits discourseproperties. After all, a theme is

Chapter3

usuallydefinedasanentity in a locationor stateor changingits locationor state. But all objectsare in somelocationor state; whenan object plays the role of theme, it must be becausethe speakeris assertingor predicatinga particular locationor stateof theobject. Suchhighlightingor focusing, of course, is closely . (SeeHopperandThompson, 1980, fordiscussion tied to discourseconsiderations .) Another pieceof evidenceshowingthat the possessorin the double- object asa patientor themeis theexistenceof double-object constructionis represented idioms whosefirst objectshavean identicalsemanticrole to the sole objectof nonidiomatictransitiveverbs. Theroleof Johnin giveJohna kissis the sameas his role in kissJohn; likewise for giveJohna punch/ punchJohn, giveJohn a bath / batheJohn, and so on (Green, 1974). thedifferencesbetweentheprepositionaland Now thatwehavecharacterized double-objectforms, we canseehowthosedifferencesinteractwith theverbsin eitherclassthatthedativerulemighttry to reassignto theother. Generally, verbs canalternateonly if theysignify a transferof anobjectthatcanresultin its being . The inadmissibilityof * Shecarried the mailboxa letter stemsfrom possessed the inability of the action to result in the mailbox possessinganything. Conversely , the inadmissibilityof * Theysparedthat punishmentto the policeman stemsfrom thefact that the verb is assertingthatthe punishmentdoesnot go to the policeman, contraryto what theto-structurewould require. Thefor -dativealternationcanbe treatedsimilarly. Saythat transitiveargument structurescontainingfor -objectsareprojectedfrom verbscontainingthe " conflation " X actson Y for the benefitof Z. Beneficiarieswould be linked to ); the prepositionfor is the only oblique objects(indirect internal arguments structure whose semantic specifiesa benefactiverelation. Verbs preposition alternate will only if the agent, as a result of taking thefor dative structure affecting the patientin the mannerspecifiedby the verb, cancausethe beneficiary to possessthepatient.4Verbsspecifyingactsof creation(bake, sew, cook, make, etc.) dativizebecausecreatingsomethingis a meansof causingsomeone to possessit ; likewise, verbs of obtaining (get, buy, find , etc.) can dativize becauseoneperson's obtaininga thing is a meansof causingsomeotherperson to get it. However, verbsthat simply conveyactsdonefor the benefit of a third party, without allowingoneto predicttheway in whichthe actcanresultin that ' party s comingto possesstheaffectedobject, canappearin thefor prepositional fon11but not thedouble-objectform (e.g., / drovehis carfor him / * / drovehim his car). As in the discussionof the locativealternation, theseconsiderationsdo not give precisesufficientconditionsfor a verbto dativize. Theydo give necessary conditions, however, and provide an explanationfor the sufficient conditions that I will discussin section4.4.1 (alsoin section5.6.1).

Constraints andthe Nature of Argument Structure

" alternation 3.3.4.3 The Causative Alternation The causative(or " anticausative ) involvestwo argumentstructures:an intransitiveanda transitive. Let usassumethattheprincipal thematiccoregiving riseto the transitiveargument structureis " X actson Y." Manyactionverbs, for example,containthiscore, such ashitinl hit thewall. Y, the secondargumentof " act-on," is traditionallyreferred to asthepatient, andI would like to distinguishthatrole from therole of theme, the first argumentof " go" or " be" (seealsoJackendoff, 1987a, andRappaport andLevin, 1988, for argumentsthat they shouldbedistinguished ). A patientis actedor impingeduponor inherentlyinvolvedin anactionperformedby anagent but doesnot necessarilyundergoa specifiedchange. Of course, in real life a patientmayundergoa changeof stateor location, but if it does, theverbdoesnot carewhat that changeis (e.g., the wall could shatter, fall over, or tumbledown a hill , andtheverbhit would beequallyappropriate ). However, thepatientmust beinherentlyinvolvedin or affectedby theaction, playinga role in definingwhat theactionconsistsof. For example, movingone' s handto within a fractionof an inch of the wall, even if the accompanyingwind or staticelectricity causesthe wall to fall over, would not countashitting thewall, becausethekind of motion or actdenotedby hitting is inherentlydefinedasterminatingin contactwith some patient. Similarly, the patient has a role in temporallydelineatingthe event referredto by the verb; the hitting is over when the patient is contacted(see Dowty, 1987; Tenny, 1988). A theme, on the otherhand, is predicatedto be in a locationor stateor to undergoa changeof locationor state, whetheror not it wascausedby anagent. For example, if a bugdies(bug= theme), it is definitely dead, but it could havebecomesoat the handsof anexterminatoror becauseof old age. Someverbsspecify argumentsthat arebothpatientsandthemes: when I cut anapple, theapplemusthavea cut in it , andthecut musthavebeeneffected by my actingon it in a certainway(viz., by my movinganobjectinto contactwith it ; seeB. Levin, 1985; Hale andKeyser, 1986, 1987). As we shall seein section 4.2, this purelysemanticdistinction, involving differententailments,hasgrammatical . consequences A verb that specifiesan argumentthat is both a patientand a theme, suchas cut, chip, shatter, or kill , is a causativeverb. The agent, by acting on a patient, causesit to changestate or location. An elegant way of dealing with the directnessconditionon causativesis to deriveit from thethematicrolesassumed . Assumethat the notion of " acting on" that definesthe role of by the causee " " patientinherentlymeans directlyacton (thisis independentlymotivatedby the phenomenain example3.7 in section3.2.2 andby the largersetof phenomena discussedby Hopperand Thompson, 1980). Thenthe directnessconstrainton lexical causativesderives from the fact that in transitiveverbsin English, the causeeis a patientof the action denotedby the verb as well as a theme; in the

Chapter3

' periphrasticlocution involving an intransitive verb (cause to die, cause to shatter), the causeeis only a theme, Thusthe directnessconstrainton interpretation would fallout of the inherentdefinition of the thematicrole of patientin thesameway asthe holistic constrainton theinterpretationof locativesfalls out of thedefinition of the thematicroleof theme- and the premisethat Englishhas aconflationclass"X actson Y(= patient)" but noconflation class"X acts, causingY " (= theme) to move or change which could serve as a thematic core for transitiveverbslacking patients. In otherlanguages , suchsemanticconflations seemto bepossible, astherearerulesyielding indirect lexical causativesaswell as rules yielding direct lexical causatives , often differentiated by alternative suffixes on the verb (e.g., in Hebrew, Bennan, 1982; and in Hindi , Saksena , 1982). However, when languageshave both a lexical and a periphrasticor " " analytic causative,the lexical causativeis generally the onesignifying direct causation(Shibatani, 1976; Comrie, 1985). This suggeststhat the conflation of an agentanda patient/themeis morenaturalasa thematiccorethan the conflation of an agentand a pure theme. The cognitivecontentof thematicroles, suchas the directnessinterpretation accompanyingthe role of patient, must be treatedwith somesubtlety. Viewed with a sufficiently sharpmicroscope , thereis no such thing asdirect causation: whenI cut an apple, I first decideto do it , then sendneuralimpulsesto my arm andhand, whichcausethemusclesto contract, causingthehandto move, causing the knife to move, causingtheknife to contactthe surfaceof the apple, causing thesurfaceto rupture, andsoon. Nonetheless , thereis a clearsensein which this causationdiffers from paying a servantto cut an apple. When describingan event, onealwayschoosesa grainsizebelowwhich eventsaretreatedasinvisible or irrelevant. For physical actionsinitiated by a person, musculareventsand mostinterveningphysicaleventsarebelowthe grain size, sothat you canbreak a windowwith yourfist or by hittinga longfly ball, but theinterventionof another agent, suchasajittery window-installer, is seenasinterpolatingan intermediary of the samegrain as the original agent. That is why you cancausethe window to break by shouting" boo," but you ordinarily wouldn' t call that breaking a window. However, many verbscanbe extendedto yield a much more macroscopic , such as in Man reachesthe moon or Napoleon invades perspective Russia. Whena verb with a causativecomponentis usedat thatscale, suchasin NixonbombedCambodiaor John, thepresidentof United Fruit , grows bananas in Guatemala,thedirectnessconditionappliesat that scale. Thesesentences are the chain of causal links because the pennissibledespite very long intervening links arenot comparablein grainsizeto the decision makingor responsibilityassumingthatis predicatedof thesubject.Forthatreasonit wouldstill beunusual to say that The National SecurityCouncil bombedCambodiajust becauseit

Constraints and the Nature of Argument Structure

persuadedNixon to do so(likewise, Thevotersof everystatebut Massachusetts bombedCambodia) or thatHarvardgrowsbananasjust becausethe university holdsstock in UnitedFruit. Let usturnto intransitives. Theintransitiveargumentstructurehasat leasttwo distinct thematiccorespairedwith it: one underlyingunergativeverbs, where Xperforms someaction or activity (e.g., run, walk, sleep, eat, breathe, cry, dance), andoneunderlyingunaccusative verbs, whereX existsin or undergoes somechangeof locationor state(e.g., bounce,slide, melt, open). Thedefinitions of the unergativeverbsusuallyimply that theproximal instigationor causation of theact is dueto someinternalmechanism , force, or quality; thus, asagentlike entities, they qualify to be subjects . The subjectsof unaccusativeverbs are . They are not specifiedto be in a state or location as the generally themes resultof anycause;somethingcanopenor breakor slideall of a sudden necessary andfor no apparentreason. As discussedin sections1.4.5.1and3.3.1, theoriesof grammardiffer asto why boththe themeargumentof unaccusative verbsandthe agentor actorargument of unergativeverbsaremappedontothe surfacesubjectposition. For unaccusative verbs, GB positsmovementfrom theunderlyingobjectpositionto anempty ' subjectposition. L. Levin s versionof LFG positsthatthethemeis first mapped onto a classof functionsthat is uncommittedto either subjector object, which is thenmappedontosubjectif thatrole hasnotalreadybeenassigned . Relational Grammar posits that the theme is mappedonto the object relations in an underlyingstratumof grammaticalrelationsandpromotedto thesubjectrelation in a superficial one. The attention to unaccusativitywithin all the major frameworksstemsfrom a recognitionthat there are widespreadgrammatical of the unaccusative / unergativedistinction, requiring that the consequences distinctionbecapturedin somegrammaticalrepresentation . Oneexampleis the " " of possibility impersonal passivizationin Dutch: you can sayEr wordt hier door dejonge lui veelgedanst," It is dancedherea lot by the youngpeople," but not * Er werd door de kinderenin Amsterdamgebleven, " It was remainedin Amsterdambytheyoungpeople." Anotheris auxiliary selectionin Italian: unaccusatives " " takeessere , to be, asin Giovannie arrivato, " Giovanniis arrived," whereasunergativestake avere, " to have," as in Giovanni ha telefonato, " Giovanni has ." A third exampleis from English: intransitives can telephoned be convertedinto adjectivalpassivesin Englishonly if they are unaccusative : wilted lettuce, a/ alien leaf, * a run man, * a coughedpatient. If all of thesephenomena can be derivedas automaticgeneralconsequences of an argument's beingin directobjectposition, theGB-styleaccountswherebytheyareinitially in direct object positionis mandated . If they can be deriveddirectly from an ' s thematic statusasthemein a structurelackinganagent, versusagent argument

Chapter3

in a structurelacking a patient, no differencein a purelysyntacticrepresentation is needed. Grimshaw ( 1987) points out that not all of the reflexes of the unaccusative ; she suggests / unergativedistinction coincide in every language caused different thateachof thesyntacticdifferencesmaybe by propertiesof the various verbs (seealso Grimshaw, in press; Kiparsky, 1987). This would be consistentwith thespirit of thecurrenttheory, wherebythecriteriathatdelineate argumentstructurealternationsare statedin lexicosemanticstructure, not in argumentstructureitself. Amongthe four alternationsI discussin detail, thecausativealternationis the onethatis mostclearly semantic , asit addsanargumentwith a specificsemantic role, namely that of causalagent. Specifically, the theme argumentof an intransitivepredicateis assignedtheadditionalroleof beingthepatientof anact, " " anda newargument, theagentof thatact, is added: X goesto a locationor state " " is convertedto Y actson X, causingX to go to a locationor state. The theme is reconstruedas undergoinga changeastheresultof beinga patient, that is, as the result of being actedon by someagent. The argumentstructurefollows directly from thelinking rulesthatmapagentto subjector externalargumentand patientto object or direct internalargument. Thedirectnessinterpretationfalls out of theadditionalrole assignedto the theme, namelypatient. Argumentsthat werenotthemesto beginwith becausetheyactvoluntarilyor asa resultof causes internal to themselves , rather than passively changing, such as agents of ives like talk, do not submitto the rule. The presenceof an in transit unergative that internalcauseimplies anyexternalcausalentity cannoteffect thecausation directly; the causationis alwaysmediatedby the internalmechanismor force. Argumentsthat areboththemesof motionandagentsof unergativeintransitives, suchaslog (wherea changeof locationtakesplaceaswell asanaction), alsodo not submitto therule; againthereis no way to actonanagentivepotentiallogger causinghim tojog in thesamesensethatonecandirectlyactona windowcausing it to break. , this is not meantto As I emphasizedwhendiscussingthe otheralternations 's a verb of be a sufficient condition for the possibility alternating, only a one, andonethatsuppliespartof theexplanationfor thesufficientconditions necessary I will supply in in section4.4.3 (seealsosection5.6.2). Thereare also " somesubsidiaryalternationsthat appearto violatethe theme- > patientand " theme rule I havebeenproposing,includingJohndrove/ I droveJohnandBill cheeredup / I cheeredup Bill ; I will alsodeferdiscussingthesetill later. There are casesthat do not conform at all to my depictionof the causative alternation, but onecanshowthatthis is becausetheysimplyhavenothingto do . Clemenswalkedthe baller, for example, is with productive causativization surelyan isolatedverb thatis learnedby positiveevidence;no fan or announcer

Constraintsandthe Natureof Argumenl Structure * says Clemens singled / doubled / tripled / homered / flied out / grounded out / popped out the bauer . Similarly , He burped the baby and Dr . Smith bled the patient are freestanding items: * He vomited / ate / slept / cried / cooed the baby; * Dr . Smith coughed / vomited / urinated / spat the patient . These are the kinds of examples that have motivated a putative constraint of stereotypy of causation: one walks a batter only by throwing four balls , one burps a baby by patting it on the back; bleeding a patient was a common locution mainly when causing to bleed was a standard medical procedure (Gergely and Bever , 1986) . Therefore it is probably not accurate to say that a stereotypy condition applies to the causative alternation ; rather, it applies quite generally to the coining of isolated words. Surely words cannot be created whose meanings are basedon knowledge possessedonly by a single speaker; no one would understand him (Clark and Clark , 1978) . And as we have seen from ( 2.16), productive causativization does not conform to any obvious stereotypy -of -manner requirement .

3.3.4.4 The Active-PassiveRelation As I mentionedin section3.3.1, the passiveis differentin two waysfrom the otheralternationsI discussin detail: it involvesa morphologicalchange, andits rangeof applicationis far greater.I will discussthe significanceof thesedifferencesin detail in section4.4.4, but hereI wantto showthatthetheorythat argumentstructuresareprojectionsof thematic corescanbeappliedfruitfully to the passiveaswell. Thebasicmotivationis the sameasfor theothercases.Not all transitiveverbspassivize(thereis " passive " resistance , as Robin Lakoff , 1971, put it ). Since the verbs that submit to passivizationaredelineatedby semanticcriteria, at leastonepartof the process producing passivesmust be an operation on semanticstructure(see also L. Levin, 1985, whomakesa similar point). That is, theverbwisesensitivityof the passivecanbeexplainedby aninteractionbetweentheinherentlexicalsemantics of verbsand a particularsemanticchangerequiredby the passiverule. Passivizationchangesthe structureof transitiveverbs. This meansthat there aretwo waysthatonecouldtry to capturethesemanticchoosiness of thepassive. First, onecouldsaythatpassivizationis a purely syntacticoperationthat applies to any transitiveverb, but not all verbs that appearto be transitivereally are transitive. Thusthepostverbalargumentsof unpassivizableverbslike costand have would not really be direct objects, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding ; theymight, for example, be thesecondobjectof anunderlyingdoubleobjectstructurefrom which the first objecthasbeenmovedinto surfacesubject position. In thatcase, the semanticconstraintson passivizationwould really be semanticconstraintson whatkinds of argumentscanbelinkedto objectposition. Unpassivizableverbswould be those with an argumentthat is linked to a bare postverbalNP thatis not a genuinedirect objector direct internalargument; the

Chapter3

passiverule, which requiresa genuinedirect object, would be blocked. The secondpossibility is that verbsthat look transitivereally are transitive, andthat . It is difficult to tell thesehypotheses passivizationis sensitiveto verbsemantics thetraditionaltestof objecthoodin Englishis passivizabilityitself. apartbecause " Becausethereareno generallyacceptedteststhat distinguish " fake transitive " " verbsfrom real ones, andto maintainconsistencywith the other alternations, I treatconstraintson passivizableverbsasconstraintson the passiverule itself. This is not an iron-clad tenet of the theory, however; if it can be shown on independentgroundsthat all unpassivizableverbsare not genuinelytransitive and vice-versa, the semanticfilter I will argue for can be removedfrom the passiverule andplacedin the linking rule that createsthe verbs that look transitive ' but aren' t. The natureof the solutionto Baker s paradoxas it appliesto . passivizationwould remainunchanged What are the propertiesof the passivesurfacestructure, independentof the alternationthatproducestheverbin it? Fewor no verbsexist only in thepassive. / Someputativeexamples,suchasrumor in John is rumored to be a Communist * TheyrumoredJohn to be a Communist , are probably adjectives, and it is not clearwhatto makeof contrastswherethe passivesoundsmore naturalthanthe active, suchasMy motherwastwentywhenI was born versusMy mother was twentywhenshebore me (Bolinger, 1977a). In any casewe can considerthe ' thematicconcomitantsof the surfaceexpressionof the passiveconstructions two arguments , the subjectof be andthe objectof by. Jackendoff( 1983) argues " that be is not a meaninglesstense-carrierbut a predicateexpressingthe location " of a theme either in , physicalspace(John is in the room) or in one of the " that borrow the abstract" spaces vocabularyof physical space, suchas identification is Kent Clark ), possession(This is mine), or circumstance ( Superman (John is sick). This suggeststhat the subjectof the passiveparticiple may be a . That is,John washit means kind of theme, presumablya themeof circumstance ' John was in the circumstanceof someones having hit himis This would be " consistentwith the " predicationeffect of passivizationnoted in section3.2.3. ' AlthoughI havestatedthis hypothesisin termsof the underlying object s being directly assignedto the surfacesubject, it can also be statedin OB terms: the circumstantialthemerole canbelinked to aninternalargumentof apredicatethat doesnothaveanexternalargument;theinternalargumentwill generallyendup asthe surfacesubjectof simpleclauses. The secondargumentof the passiveis prototypically the object of by, which signifiesan agentlikerole in Englishfairly generally, not just in passives:This painting is by Monet; No tomfooleryby studentswill be tolerated; Bribe-taking " " ' by politicians will be severelypunished, Get your child Tony the Pony by ' Marx! It is not literally an agentrole becauseit doesnt makemuch senseto talk

Cnn~traint ~ andthe Natureof ArgumentStructure

aboutthe" agentof a pony" or the" agentof a painting" ; themoregeneralnotion " " " is of a" responsible entity or author. Thecentralityof this argumentrole in the verbalpassiveis underlinedby theinterpretationof shortpassiveslike John was hit. Despitetheabsenceof a by-phrase,theagentrole in shortpassivesis a welldefined " implicit argument" (Keyser and Roeper, 1984). For example, the sentenceTheship wassunkentailsthattherewassomeagentor force that sunk the ship; in the unaccusativecounterpartThe ship sank, no such implication exists. Therecould havebeenno apparentreason,or it could havebeena longterm consequence of a lack of preventivemaintenance . Moreover, purposive adjuncts, which require agentiveeventsto control them, can occur with short passives:Theshipwassunkto collecttheinsurance(cf. * Theshipsankto collect the insurance; seealso Lasnik, 1984). Thus a crucial differencebetweenthe passiveandotherintransitiveargumentstructureswith themesubjectsis thatthe passiveforcesan interpretationwherebytheexistenceof anagentlikeargument or partyresponsiblefor thecircumstance . We predicatedof thethemeis asserted cancall this the" agencyeffect." It is now necessary to find a thematiccorefor passiveargumentstructuresout of which shouldfall the agencyeffect and the predicationeffect,just asthedirectnesseffect, theholisticeffect, andthepossessor effect fell out of the thematiccoresfor the transitivecausative, the withlocative, andthe double-objectdative. Imaginethatthe following thematiccoreis createdby a passiverule: X is in the circumstancecharacterizedby Y' s actingon it (moregenerally, the circumstance " for whichY is responsible ; for now let me usetheterm " agent to refer to " " this generalsenseof causalefficacy and patient to refer to the entity that it affects or defines the state of) . That is, X is a theme in a semanticfield ; the position in that correspondingto being in variousstatesor circumstances field that X occupies(in other words, the circumstancethat John is now in) ' ' correspondsto X s beinga patientandY s beinganagent. The rule creatingthis thematiccorewould haveasits primaryoperationthe suppressionor demotion of the agentargument(seeZubizaretta, 1987), from the topmostlevel of the semanticstructureof the verb to an embeddedposition in the definition of the circumstancepredicatedof the other argument. With no agent role defined, linking ruleswould mapthe themeontothesubjectfunction (LFG), or onto the internal argumentposition, from which it would be movedto subjectposition (GB). Assumealso that semanticstructurescan specify argumentsthat are " " " " implicit , thatis, not open or linkableto grammaticalfunctions. An implicit argumenthasnoovert syntacticrealizationbut is still defined, ensuringthat it is entailedto existwhenthesentenceis interpretedsemanticallyandthatit canplay various grammaticalroles suchas defining the controller of certain adjuncts. Full passiveswouldbethesameasshortpassivesexceptthattheagentargument

3 Chapter in semanticstructurewould be markedasbeing" open" ; a phrasecontainingby would be linked to it becausethe dictionary entry of by and of no other prepositiondefinesa quasi-agentiverole for it. As mentioned, if the subjectof a passiveis beingredefinedasa kind of theme, thenthe predicationeffect or differencein interpretationbetweenBeaversbuild dams and Damsare built by beaverswould follow. As a consequence , verbs whoseobjects cannot be interpretedas themesshould not passivize. This is compatiblewith a numberof typesof nonpassivizability(see, Anderson, 1977, and Bolinger, 1977a, for similar analysesof constraintson the passive). For example, idiomsareoften citedasanexampleof the insensitivityof thepassive to semanticfactors, becausethe chunksof idioms aretakento be meaningless . But as Gazdaret al. ( 1985) point out, it is not that the chunksof all idioms are ' ; it s just that the meaningof a chunk cannotbe predicted utterly meaningless from the meaningof the samewordsin isolationor in otherphrases . It hasbeen widely noted that the easier it is to conceiveof a possibleor metaphorical meaningfor an idiom chunk, themorepassivizablethatchunkis (Fiengo, 1977; Gazdar, et al. 1985; Wasow, Sag, andNunberg, 1983). Thusin Tabswerekept on subversivesand The hatchetwasfinally burled, tabs can be interpretedas " and the " surveillance measures hatchet as " a dispute," of which one can . However, in * Thebucketwaskickedor predicatevariouspropertiesor changes * Thebullet wasbitten, the idiom chunkslack suchthemes. Similarly, cognateor " fake" , as in * A hearty laugh was laughed,' *A objects are unpassivizable horrible death wasdied. The requirementthat the statepredicatedof the themebedefinedin termsof the theme' s beinga quasi-patientof someagentor agentlikeresponsibleparty would, naturally, allow all actionalverbsto passivize. This would includethe alternatingformsof verbsin which thepatientcanbe alternativelyconstruedas the entity causedto undergoa locationchange(Thebook washandedto John,' The hay was loaded into the wagon) and as the entity causedto undergoa ' possessionalor physicalstatechange(Johnwashandeda book, Thewagonwas loadedwith hay). With a suitablyabstractcharacterizationof agentsandpatients motivatedby anextensionof theThematicRelationsHypothesis(to bediscussed in the next chapter), passivizationwould be compatible wi~ many abstract predicatesin which ideasor situationsareassertedto causeor beresponsiblefor oneanother, suchasThehorror of thelast warjustified thenewtreaty/ Thenew treaty was justified by the horror of the last war, which is analogousto the obviously agentivecounterpartsJohnjustified the new treaty/ Thenewtreaty wasjustified by John. Anothermanifestationof theagencyeffectcanbeseenin aphenomenon noted Perlmutter and Postal : 1984 that e. . This bed has ( ) by prepositionalpassives( g ,

Constraints and the Nature of Argument Structure

' beenslept in) areacceptablewith unergativeverbs, as in (3. 16a), but not with unaccusativeverbs, as in (3. 16b). (3.16) (a) The bedwassleptin by the Shah. The packagewassteppedon by a camel. * (b) The packagewasaccumulatedon by dust. * The ovenwasmeltedin an ice cube. by If unergativesinvolveanactorwhereasunaccusatives involve only a theme, the agency effect would be compatiblewith the former but not the latter. An additionalpragmaticfactorgoverningprepositionalpassiveshasbeennotedby Bolinger ( 1977a) and Davison ( 1980): they are most acceptablewhen the prepositionalobjectis seenasbeingaffectedin someway by virtueof anagent's ' having acteduponit , eitherphysically, as in This bed has beenslept in (it s a mess); This bridgehasbeendrivenon (its roadwayis damaged), or in termsof statusor interestvalue, asin Thisbedhasbeenslept in by GeorgeWashington ' (it s special) and This bridge has beenflown under (proving how high it is). When the theme/patientanalysisis unavailable, as in the examplesin (3.17), passivizationis impossible. (3.17) Johnranout duringthesymphony./ * The symphonywasrun out during by Bob. We talkedin the park. / ?* The park wastalked in by us. They drankafter the rugbygame. / * The rugby gamewasdrunk after. We walkedto the store. / * The storewaswalked to by us. Becausethepassiveargumentstructureexpress esanasymmetricalrelationin which the passivesubjectis in the circumstancecharacterizedby being acted uponby anagent, anyverbfor whichthereis no way of construingoneentity as anagentandanotherasapatientshouldfail to undergopassivization.This would accountfor the unpassivizabilityof " symmetricalpredicates" like resemble (e.g., * Geneis resembledbyTom; * Di wasmarriedby Charles; * Four is equaled by two plus two). Likewise, transitiveverbsof pure spatialrelations(contain, lack, fit , and the static spatialsenseof touch) and the transitive verb of pure have, with no possiblesenseof patienthoodthat could bepredicated possession of a theme, would be incompatiblewith the thematic core that the passive argumentstructureis a projectionof. Similarly, for measureverbs, suchas in *Five hours werelasted the by party, thereis no way to think of five hoursas in sort of circums "tance or of thepartyasdoing anythingto it. Though being any I will haveto givealternativeanalyses to manyof thephenomenathatJackendoff ( 1972) tried to explainwith theThematicHierarchyCondition, thegeneralspirit of the THC is that in the passive,the by-object shouldbe more agentive(or at least, not lessagentive)thanthesurfacesubject. This is a powerfulconstrainton

Chapter3

children' s passivizationof newly learnedverbs, and it is closely relatedto the currentproposal, in which the passiveis constrainedto haveits surfacesubject be a themein a circumstancecharacterizedby the actionof anagent, expressed as a by-object (Pinker, Lebeaux, and Frost, 1987). There is, then, a relationshipbetweenthe syntacticfonn of the passive, the , and the patternsof changeof interpretationthat accompaniespassivization verbwiseselectivityof the passive. Threequestionsarestill open- what is the exact changeeffectedby the passiverule, why are theresemanticallysimilar pairs of verbsthat diff ,-;r in passivizability, andwhy doesthe passiveappearto ?- and they will be apply with fewer restrictionsthan the other alternations 4.5 4.4.4 5.6.4. discussedin sections , , and

3.4 On Universality I havetried to showthatsemanticcriteriaon argumentstructurealternationsare of general notoddlittle conditionstackedontosyntacticrules, butmanifestations elements andhow out of thematic be of how principles predicatesmay composed see the same If we to onto thematic roles. so are , mightexpect arguments mapped . This kindsof constraintsoperatingon thesamekindsof rulesin otherlanguages was not predictedby the earlier view (e.g., Mazurkewichand White, 1984; Pinker, 1984), in which the criteria weresimply abstractedfrom a databaseof alternatingverbs in the language, learnedindividually. Nor is it an inevitable consequenceof the currenttheory; eachlanguagecould have its own special linking rules, learnedanewby eachchild, andthe lexical rulesin the language could displaypatternsof itemwise selectivitythatweresystematicandpredictable within that languagebutnotreplicatedin others. However, thetheorywould obviously be more interesting if it made stronger predictionsabout other languagesand aboutthe innateproclivities of the child. In manytheories, linking rulesof somesortareassumedto be universal(see, e.g., Perlmutterand Rosen, 1984), and thereis considerableevidencefor this position. Keenan( 1976) reviewscross-linguistic researchshowingthat agents ' andcausalforcesareuniversallyencodedassubjects,at leastin eachlanguages " " basicsentences . Healsoshowsthatanentity of which somethingis predicated is encodedas subjectwhen there is no agent. HopperandThompson( 1980) review evidencefor a closeassociationacrosslanguagesbetweengrammatical objectsand the argumentthat is actedupon and causedto undergoa change. Dryer ( 1986) reviewsa diversesampleof languageswith ditransitiveconstructions " " andnotesthat thesecondobject is notionallya patient/theme, generally " " nonhuman,in the contextof a first objectthat is a goal/ beneficiary, generally human. Thus rules that link agentto subject, themein a noncausativeverb to

Constraints and the Nature of Argument Structure

subject, patientto object, themeof a causativeverb to object, andthemeof a semanticallyditransitiveverbwith a goal/ beneficiaryargumentto secondobject seemto be widely applicableacrossthe world' s languages .6 I am not awareof analogoussurveysfor obliqueor indirect arguments,but mostof the languageparticularpropertiesof prepositionsandobliquecasemarkerscanbefactoredout of any linking rule for obliqueargumentsandlocalizedin the lexicalentriesfor thoseindividualmorphemes . Thus it is probablypossibleto definelinking rules for obliquenessitself that are likely to be universal; in chapter5 I suggesttwo. To the extent that the linking rules I have proposedare found in other , theargumentstructuresthey useshouldbe pairedwith verbshaving languages kinds similar of thematiccoresto thosewe find in English. Furthermore , lexical rulesthat mapbetweenthesamepairs of argumentstructuresshouldbe subject to the samekindsof constraintsasthosediscussedin this chapter.Thusthe new by assumptionsabouttheuniversalityof linking rules) makes theory(augmented a very strongprediction that the kinds of constraintsI havediscussedin this chaptershouldshowtendenciestoward universality. Eitherthecriteriashouldbe universalaccompaniments of homologousrules (to the extentthat they can be identified acrosslanguages ) or there should at least be a tendencyfor the particularkindsof criteria we seeon English lexical rulesto be associatedwith the samekinds of rules in other, historically unrelatedlanguages . Though an review of cross constraints on rules lexical is original linguistic obviously beyondthe scopeof this book, we can examinethe relatively theory-neutral cross-linguistic surveysdoneby others, suchas thosein Shopen( 1985a, b). Causative.Many languageshaveregularmorphologicalalternationsbetween a predicateX anda predicatecause-to-X. Accordingto Comrie' s ( 1985) review, " "The cause , apparentlyuniversally, appearsassubjectof thecausativeverb (p. " 335). Periphrasticcausativesare also widespread ; Comrie calls these analytical " " andcontraststhemwith lexical causativeswhich hecalls" , morphological. " He notes: In general, formationof analyticalcausativesis completelyproductive . ... The degreesof productivity of morphologicalcausativesvaries immensely from languageto language" (p. 332). This variability will bediscussed in detailin thenextchapter,but thevariationis within thelimits wewouldexpect: " One often finds that whena languagehasboth analytic and morphologicalor " lexical causatives , the former implies lessdirect causationthan the latter (p. 333). NedyalkovandSilnitsky ( 1973), in their surveyof causativeconstructions " in over one hundredlanguages , state that If a causativemorphemeforms [a es contact causativeverb] only from [an intransitive verb] , it usually express is causation.In thesecasesdistantcausation usuallyexpressedby combinations with emptycausativeverbs" (p. 14). Shibatani( 1976) offerssimilarconclusions. Thustheassociationbetweenaddinga subjectto a predicateandgettinga predi-

Chapter3

cate with a causativereading where the subject plays the role of agent is a , asis theassociationbetweenlexical causativesandthe widespread phenomenon directnessconstraint. Passive.Keenan( 1985) offers thefollowing generalizationsaboutpassivein theworld' s languages : " If a languagehasany passivesit hasonescharacterized asbasic... moreover, it may haveonly basicpassives," where" basicpassives" arecharacterized asfollows: " (i ) no agentphrase(e.g., by Mary) is present, (ii ) the main verb (in its non-passivefonn ) is transitive, and (iii ) the main verb esanactivity, takingagentsubjectsandpatientobjects" (p. 247). Among express thecorollariesandrelatedgeneralizationsKeenanoffers are the following : " If a languagehaspassivesof stativeverbs(e.g. lack. have, etc.) thenit haspassives of activity verbs. ... Passivesare often not fonned freely on transitive verbs whoseobjectsarenot patients, that is, not portrayedasbeing affected" (p. 249). Recallthatthecriteria surroundingpassivizationin English seemto stemfrom a predicationeffect(somestateis predicatedof the patient) andanagencyeffect (the stateis attributedto the force of someagent). Keenannotesthe cross" linguisticprevalenceof both: The subjectof a passiveVP is neverunderstood to be lessaffectedby the action than when it is presentedas the object of a transitiveverb" (p. 268); "The distinction betweenpassivesand middles or reflexivesis madeon semanticgrounds: theimplicationor presenceof anagent" (p. 254). Dative. Dryer ( 1986) presentsa " smallbut diverse" sampleof languagesthat haveditransitiveconstructions , includingOjibwaandCree(Algonkian), Huichol, Palauan(Micronesia), Chi-Mwi :ni (Bantu), Khasi (Mon-Khmer, Assam), Lahu (Bunnese-Lolo), Kokborok (Bodo-Garo, Assam), Kham (West Tibetan), Nez Perce(OregonPenutian), andTzotzil (Mayan). He notesthat the semanticroles of the first andsecondobjectsare " goal/ beneficiary" and " patient/theme," respectively,andall theexampleshecitesexceptone(a purebenefactive) contain verbs whose English translationsdativize. In other surveys we find other languagesunrelatedto English that have an alternation similar to the dative " " . Foley and Van Valin ( 1985) mention pertainingto recipient arguments Nengone(anAustronesianlanguagespokenin New Caledonia) andAcooli and Lango (Nilotic languagesspoken in Uganda) as examples; Shona, a Bantu , andBahasa , an Indonesianlanguage , both discussedbriefly in Dowty language 1979a be to similar. and Van Valin also note that in several ( ), appear Foley it is only verbsof giving thatundergothis alternation, andthey imply languages thatthis might betrue in generalwhenthe input fonn involvesthe equivalentof the prepositionto. In addition, many languagesadd a verb-adjacent object , andwhenthey do it generallyhasthe role of recipient, possessorof argument the theme, or benefactive / malefactive(Foley and Van Valin , 1985), as in the

Constraintsandthe Natureof Argumenl~Structure

Englishfor -dative(seesections3.3.4.2, 4.4.1, and 5.6.1). Alternationsof this generalsortarefound in severalMayanlanguages(FoleyandVan Valin , 1985) and in Swahili (Comrie, 1985). Locative. I amnot awareof anycross-linguistic surveysof locativeconstructions , but it is not hardto find evidencefor patternsof associationin a variety of . Alternationssimilar to the Englishlocative, often markedwith an languages affix on theverb, arefoundin HungarianandIndonesian(FoleyandVan Valin, 1985), Russianand Gennan(Comrie, 1985), Berber(Guerssel, 1986), Igbo (a ; Nwachukwu, 1987), andJapanese(Fukui, Miyagawa, and Nigerianlanguage 1985 . ) RappaportandLevin ( 1985) notethat" whena languagemanifests Tenny, thealternationtheverbsthatparticipatein thealternationfall into thesamebroad semanticclassastheEnglishlocativealternationverbs" (p. 36). Furthennore,the holisticeffectandphenomena relatedto it arenotrestrictedto English: Foleyand VanValin remarkon it in discussingHungarian,Comriedoessofor Russian,and Nwachukwunotesthat in Igbo theversionof the locativethat allows anequivalent of theprepositionwith requiresa verbthat is compoundedwith a predicate " " meaningfull , for example, pack-full = fill by packing. This is obviously reminiscentof thecontrastin Englishbetween* 1pouredtheglasswith waterand I filled theglasswith wateror I pouredtheglassfull with water. Thusthe theoryof argumentstructurealternationspresentedin this chapter, which wasintendedto explainconstraintson alternationsasmanifestationsof thenatureof thealternation,hasanunanticipated benefit: it is consistentwith the fact that the samealternationsin otherlanguagesare proneto applying to the samekindsof verbsandbeingconstrainedby thesamekindsof criteriaandshifts in interpretationas one finds in English. Of course, languagesdo differ in the exact setsof verbs that are allowed to undergoeachalternation; in the next chapterI try to explain wherethis variationcomesfrom and how it is defined preciselywithin a language.

Chapter

4

Possible

and Actual

Fonns

4.1 The Problemof NegativeExceptions Constraintson lexical rules that furnish criteria for selectingverbscan solve Baker' s paradoxin principle, but raisedtwo problemsin practice.First, why are they there? Second, are thereany that work? In chapter3, I tried to answerthe first question. I proposeda theoryin which semanticconstraintson lexicalrules aremotivatedby the very natureof thoserules, andI usedit to showwhy various verbsdo not participatein argumentstructurealternations . Suchverbsareclearly ruled out becausethey are cognitively incompatible with a thematic core associatedwith theargumentstructure.You cansell but not * driveMary thecar, becausethe double- objectform express escausationof a possession changeand selling but not driving resultsin a possession change.You canspraybut not *put theplant with water, becausethe with-locativerequiresa specificstatechange andputting doesnot specify whatit would be. You canslidebut not * decidethe , which is boy, becausethe lexical causativerequires unmediatedcausation possiblefor sliding but not deciding. And a hatchetcanbe burledbut a bucket can' t * be kicked, becausethe passivepredicatessomethingof a themeandthe hatchetbut not the bucket correspondsto a possibletheme. However, thesecondproblem, ruling out negativeexceptionsexactly, hasnot yet been solved. Clearly there are many differencesbetweenalternatingand nonaltematingverbs that cannot be ruled out by such coarsedifferencesin . meaning. One cannotsimply live with theseas unexplainedcounterexamples ' Becausethey arenegativeexceptions,Baker s paradoxwouldremainunsolved. Considerhow the theory asstatedso far would try to explainthedifferencesin (4.1), (4.2), and4.3). (4.1) John took Mary the ball. John threw Mary the ball.

Possibleand Actual Forms

* Johncanied

Mary the ball. John askedMary a question. * John shouted Mary a question. JohngaveMary sheets . * John sheets . suppliedMary Johnfound Mary a dress. * Johnchose Mary a dress.

(4.2) Betty splashedthe floor with suds. *

Betty spilled the floor with suds. Betty wrappedthe pole with ribbons. * Betty coiled the pole with ribbons. Betty smearedthe wall with paint. * Betty attachedthe wall with posters.

theball. (4.3) Sambounced * Samfell the ball.

Sammeltedthe butter. * Sam disappearedthe butter. SamwalkedAnnettehome. * Samwent Annettehome. Amy slid her daughteracrossthe floor. . Amy sweatedher daughter. Onemight try to appealto subtlemeaningdifferencesamongthe verbs. For " example, onecould saythattaking andthrowing can inherentlymean causeX to possessYby taking/ throwing Y to X" but that carrying doesnot mean" cause X to possessYby carryingYto X." Similarly, onecouldsaythataskinginherently implies communicationwith anotherparty and hence is a way of causing someoneto possessa message , whereasshouting is merely a kind of behavior, with no necessary causaleffecton a listener. FinallY,finding canmean" finding X asa meansof causingYto haveX ," whereaschoosingcannothavethemeaning of being a meansto suchan end. Similar accountscould beappliedto the locative. Splashingcould be saidto effecta predictablestatechangeon thefloor (it is coveredwith liquid overa large partof its surface), whereasspilling could be said to constrainonly the manner in which the liquid is causedto move, with no necessaryeffect on the surface wherethe liquid endsup. Similarly, the argumentwould go, being wrappedor

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' " smearedis a well -defined state, but having something coiled around oneself ' or " having something attached to oneself is not. ' There is clearly something right about all of .this , but that something can t ' solve Baker s paradox. The problem is, what ensuresthat the child has mastered ' ' the crucial difference in meaning? We certainly can t say that a word s meaning changesever so subtly when it appears in different argument structures and then assertthat the admissibility of the verb in the argument structure depends on that aspectof its meaning. For example , strictly speaking, the theory requires one to " say that the prepositional form of give means cause an object to go into " " ' someone s possession whereas the double - object form means cause someone "but it would be uselessto say that the only verbs to gain possessionof an object that can appear in the double object form are those with a meaning of causing someoneto possesssomething . The problem is that acts of causing an object to change possessionare also acts of causing a person to gain possession. Thus it is hard to seehow a learner could assign a given verb the requisite definition other than by hearing it in the argument structure in question . This is exactly the ' opposite of what we need for solving the leamability problem ! If a verb s syntactic behavior is a function of its complete meaning and its complete meaning is manifest only when it appears in full sentences, we are back to conservatism : the child must hear a verb in a particular argument structure in order it has the meaning that would license its appearing with that know whether to argument structure. " " So obviously the new meaning components added by an argument structure ' t have alternation rule can anything to do with the conditions allowing some but verbs to be affected all not by that rule . One does a bit better, but not well enough , " " " " by appealing to some notion of compatibility between the old meaning " " components possessedby a verb and the new ones added to it . Though that criterion can rule out obvious caseslike those discussed in the first paragraph of this chapter, it is not clear how much it would really help for examples like those in (4.1) - (4.3) . Perhapsshout, in encoding a particular manner of the speaker, " " is less about the recipient of the messagethan tell , and hence is lesshappy about " " being reinterpreted as an act done to the hearer. Splashing and smearing , which in all their uses involve a particular kind of action on particular kinds of substances, supports a reliable folk -physics deduction about the effect on the target of splashing or smearing, water and gooey substancesbeing what they are, whereas spilling encompasses a range of actions (e.g ., knocking over with an elbow , bumping into a table) and a variety of substances(coins , sand, etc.) that do not allow such a prediction . Again , this is not good enough. For one thing , the semanticintuitions appealedto are lesscompelling a priori than the intuitions about the ungrammaticality of the relevant sentences. Furthermore , an appeal to

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101

' pure semantic compatibility asa way out of Baker s paradox predicts that anyone who knows the meaning of a verb will use it predict ably in the argument structures we have been dealing with . This would seem to rule out dialect differences in the syntax of common concrete verbs. But such differences appear to exist : Georgia Green ( 1974), for example, finds shout him the answer and carry him the box to be grammatical in her dialect , unlike the one spoken by me. Yet surely Green and I do not differ in our knowledge of what shout and carry mean- unless the meaning difference is so abstract that it is virtually the same as the difference in syntax that we are trying to explain . In sum , the criteria that emerge from the natureof the semanticchange effected by the lexical rules seem to function as necessaryconditions for an alternation , specifying a meaning component that a verb must be capable of including if it is to alternate. But these criteria do not function as sufficient conditions : some verbs seem to be capable of containing the required meaning but still do not alternate. As we shall see, this difference is a consequence of an important dissociation between semantics and cognition .

verbs. Predictablelinkagesbetweenargumentstructuresand verbs' semantic structureshelpsolvetheproblem: if you knowwhata verbmeans,you canguess whatsyntaxit canusewithout your havingto learnits argumentstructurefrom theinput. But obviouslythepredictablelinkagescan' t consistof an innatelist of all possibleverb meaningsand their correspondingargumentstructures; new verbs that natural selectioncould not have anticipatedare constantly being invented(debug, slam-dunk, out-Reagan, etc.). Instead,we havebeengiven a muchsmallersetof semanticelementsthatrecurthroughthousandsof verbssuchthematicsubpredicates as" cause," " go," " be," " path," andtheir arguments " " " " " " " " agent, patient , theme, goal, and so on - and linkages to syntactic devices. By lookingfor suchelementsin thesemanticdecompositionsof verbs, a speakercanpredictthe verbs' syntacticprivileges, evenfor brand- new verbs, aslong as they containsomeof thoseelements . But how doesa speakerknow which semanticelementsarein which verbs? Perceptionandcognitionareflexible, andthiscausesaproblem. Most situations canbeconstruedin manydifferentwaysinvolvingthecrucialthematicelements, especiallysincethematicrelationscanapplyeitherliterally to spatiallocationor . WhenI hit a wall with a stick, is the metaphoricallyto statesandcircumstances wall an " affectedentity" andthe stick the" instrument" with which I affect it , or is the stick the affectedentity, becauseit moves, and the wall the goal of the

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movement? When I pour waterinto a glass, am I affectingthe waterby causing it to move, or am I affecting the glassby causingit to go from not beingfull to beingfull ? When Sue likes John, is shecausingherselfto think well of him, or is Johncausingher to approveof him? If Jim doesan impressionof Richard Nixon for Bill , is he causingBill ' s laughterin the sameway that hecancausea " " spoonto fall , or doesBill haveenoughfree will that causation is an inappropriate concept?When Mary shoutsacrossa noisyroomto Bob, whatis shedoing: acrossthe room, or just , moving the message affectingBob, creating a message her in muscles a certain ? moving way Even the choiceof the agentandpatient of an action event is not irreversiblyburnedinto our minds. " French-kiss my elbow!" shoutsthe hockey player. In general, thesechoicescan' t just beleft up to anindividualspeakerat themomentof thespeechact, becausetheycouldlead to conflicting applicationsof thematic-syntacticlinking rules- either Johnor Sue, eitherMary or Bob, couldbeconstruedastheagent, hencesubject, bringing backthe ambiguity that the designof languageshouldbe trying to minimize. I suggestthat languagehaschosena particularsolutionto theproblemit took on whenit tried to map flexible cognitiononto rigid syntax. Languageguardsits verbs' grammaticallyrelevantsemanticstructuresvigilantly. In ordinarynatural , speakerscannot construethe meaningof a verb howeverthey seefit speech beforemappingit onto syntax, even if sucha construalis consistentwith the referentevent. Rather, in casesof potentialthematicambiguity, new meanings canbe assignedto old verbsonly in fairly precisecircumstances . Only certain narrow classes of verb are the relatively meanings given privilege of beingreconstruable as having new, relatedverb meanings. Hereis anexample. In thecaseof thedative, whatgoodis it to knowthat" verbs cantakethe double-object argumentstructureonly if they involve causationof " if onecannottell a a changeof possession priori whethera given verbcanbe " " ? Certainverbslike construedasmeaning causea changeof possession give havethatmeaningby definition, andotherverbslike sleepdo notmeanthatunder construal, but whataboutverbsin thegrayarea, suchasthrowor anyreasonable or where changesof possessionare possiblebut not necessary bake , carry results? I will show that Englishmakesthe decisionfor us. It usesindependent , semi-arbitraryconfigurationsof semanticfeaturesascriteria aboutwhatkinds verbs have meaningsthat can be construedas ways of causinga changeof . For example, it turns out that verbs that denote instantaneous possession of imparting force to an objectcausingballistic physicalmotion- theclassthat includesthrow, toss, kick , slide, roll , andbounce- can begivena newmeaning, roughly to causesomeoneto possessan object by meansof instantaneously impartingforce to it . Thus an argumentthat is ordinarily a goal of a location changecannowalsobeassignedtherole of patientof apossession change. When

Possible andActualFonns

103

linking rules apply to the new verb fonn, the rules generatingdouble- object structuresfrom patientsof possession changeapply, and thus one can sayShe threw/ tossed/ kicked/ slid him thepuck. However, this lexical rule, essentially a rule of reconstrual, is so narrowly statedthat it doesnot apply to seemingly similar verbs, suchas thosewhosedefinitions involve continuousexertion of forceresultingin theguidedmotionof a theme, suchascarry ,pull ,push, schlep. Thoughthey arecognitivelyconstruableasresulting in a changeof possession (if theobjectis pushedover to a personwith the intent of giving it to him), they arenot linguistically construableassuchbecausethe licensinglinguistic rule is not statedbroadlyenoughto apply to them. As a result, the semanticstructure necessaryto trigger the double-object linking rules is never paired with these verbs, andtheydo not dativizeasa class: * Shepulled I lifted I loweredI dragged methe box. In other words, in caseswhere a verb is cognitively ambiguous, that is, consistentwith severalpossiblethematicanalyses , the grammarlooks at some 's of the verb and dictateswhich analysisor independentcomponent meaning the is ted use when analyses speaker permit to linking the verb to an argument structure.Theproductiveuseof a lexical rule is thusrestrictedto a narrowrange of verb meanings. This implies that subtlesemanticdistinctions among subclassesof verbscanresultin differencesin their syntacticbehavior, often giving the appearance of therebeingarbitrarylexical exceptionsto alternations. I will referto thesimpleoperationson semanticstructureintroducedin the preceding chapterasbroad-range lexical rules, and the classesof verbsthey apply to as broadconflationclasses.Themoreselectiveversionsof theserulesthatpick out narrow conflation classesof verbs(or " conflation subclasses" ) will be called narrow-rangerules. Membershipin a broadconflation classis only a necessary conditionfor averbto alternate; it is membershipin oneof thenarrowconflation classesthat is a sufficient condition.I How arethesenarrow lexical subclass es defined? We will seethat they are definedby adistinctive, grammaticallyrelevantsubsetof thesemanticstructures thatconstitutethemeaningof a verb(this is thesubjectof chapter5) andperhaps by salientmorphologicaldivisionsin the lexiconof the language. In the restof this chapterI will do threethings. First, I will motivate the addition of narrow conflationclassesto the theoryby examininga seeminglysimpleand homogeneous classof verbs- transitive actionverbs- whosesyntacticbehaviorilluminates the needto distinguishbroadandnarrowverb classes. This will serveas an independentmotivation for theclaim that thereare broad- andnarrow-range versionsof thefour rules we havebeenconcentratingon. Then I will apply the claimin detailto thedative, passive,locative, andcausativealternations,aiming for a delineationof the relevantclassesthat will leave no negativeexceptions.

4 Chapter

104

Finally, I will clarify therelationbetweenthe narrow-rangerulesthat I describe hereandthe broad-rangerulesdiscussedin the chapter3. 4.2 Transitive Action Verbs as Evidence for Narrow Subclasses The most prototypicalclassof verbsis surely transitiveaction verbs: they are amongthefirst verbsthatinfantsacquire, thefirst verbsonewouldcomeup with if askedto give examplesof verbs, andthe verbsthat appearto be syntactically simplest. However, BethLevin ( 1985) showsthat this simplicity is an illusion. Action verbsbreakdown into a variety of narrow conflation classes(shecalls them " semanticallycohesivesubclass es" ) that havepredictabledifferencesin their syntacticproperties. Considerthe conativealternation, shownin (4.4), in which a transitiveverb is allowedto takeanobliqueobjectintroducedby the prepositionat, indicating that the subjectis trying to affect the oblique object but mayor may not be . succeeding (4.4) Mary cut the bread. / Mary cut at the bread. Samchippedthe rock. / Samchippedat the rock. Bill hit the dog. / Bill hit at the dog. Irv kicked the wall. / Irv kicked at the wall. In the presentframework, we might say that thereis a lexical rule (of broad " " " range) thatappliesto thematiccoresof thefonn X acts-on Y, producing X goes " " " " " towardX acting-on Y, where goes and toward areinterpretedin a semantic field wherelocationsaretreatedas intendedstatesor events. A linking rule for ' ' pathsanda lexical entryfor at mapthe argumentof the path-function toward (correspondingto a paththatis orientedtoward, but doesnot necessarilyextend all thewayto, a location) ontoanobliqueor indirectinternalargumentcontaining at.2 This canbeseenin a similaruseof at in John threwtheball at thetree, which indicatesthattheball traveledin the directionof the treebut did not necessarily get there. However, (4.5) showsthat not all verbscanenterinto the construction,even if the combinationwould makesenseon cognitive grounds. (4.5) * Nancytouchedat the cat. * Janekissedat the child. * Jerry brokeat the bread. * Bob split at the wood. It turnsout thattheconativealternation,thoughit alwaysconveys" attempting," applies to much narrowerclassesof verb than those whose actions can be attempted.Verbsof cutting(cut, slash, chop, hack, chip, etc.) andverbsofhitting

PossibleandActual Fonns

105

(hit , beat, elbow, kick, punch, poke, rap, slap, strike, etc.) all enter into the alternation. Verbsthat fail to enterinto it includeverbsof touching(touch, kiss, hug, stroke, contact, etc.) and verbs of breaking(break, shatter, crack, split , crumble, etc.). More precisely, the subclass esof verbsthat areeligible to enter into the conativealternationmustsignify a typeof motionresultingin a type of contact. Laughren, Levin, andRappaport( 1986) discussanotheralternationinvolving action verbs, first studied by Fillmore ( 1967), which can be called " part." Examplesare shownin (4.6). possessorascension ' (4.6) Samcut Brian s arm. / Samcut Brian on the arm. Miriam hit the dog' s leg. / Miriam hit thedog on the leg. ' Terry touchedMavis s ear. / Terry touchedMavis on the ear. Again, the alternationis puzzlingly selective, as (4.7) indicates. (4.7) * Jim brokeTom on the leg. * Hagiersplit Leonardon the . lip There are threenarrow semanticsubclass eswhoseverbsbehavesimilarly with to the alternation : the verbs of respect hitting andtheverbsof cuttingparticipate, but the verbsof breakingdo not. More precisely, the subclass es of verbsthat signify physicalcontactmay alternate. Laughren, Levin, and Rappaportalso discussan alternationresemblingthe locative, involving physicalcontact. Examplesarepresentedin (4.8). (4.8) 1 hit the bat againstthe wall [cf. 1hit the wall with the bat] . Shebumpedthe glassagainstthe table. Bill slappedthe towel againstthe sink. * 1cut the knife againstthe bread[cf. 1cut the breadwith the knife] . * He the ax split againstthe log. * Phil shatteredthe hammer againstthe glass. * 1brokea spoonagainstthe egg. * 1 touched hand my againstthe cat. * 1kissed my lips againsthers. (The starredexamplesare grammaticalonly on a different reading, wherethe knife itself getscut, the ax getssplit, andso on.) Here, the verbsof hitting can enter into the alternation, but not the verbsof breaking. More generally, the subclassof verbsof motionfollowedby contactcanenterinto it , but thesubclass of verbs of motion followed by contactfollowed by a specificeffect (a cut, a break, a split) and the subclassof verbs of contactwithout a prior changeof location (touch, kiss) do not.)

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106

Keyserand Roeper( 1984) and Hale and Keyser ( 1987) discussthe middle alternation, which, roughly, specifies the easewith which an action can be performedon a patient. It too is selectiveaboveand beyonddifferencesin the " " degreeto which the easeof performing an action cognitively cohereswith variousverbmeanings.Specifically, it appliesonly to verbsthatsignify aneffect, regardlessof whether it is the result of motion or contact; no effect, no alternation. Examplesare provided in (4.9). (4.9) I broke the glass. / This glassbreakseasily. I cut the bread. / This breadcuts easily. ShekissedBill . / * ?Bill kisseseasily. He slappedthe wall. / * That wall slapseasily. They touchedthe wire. / * This wire toucheseasily. Finally, considerthe causativealternationapplying in reversedirection, converting a transitiveverbto anintransitive. This transformation,sometimescalled theanticausative , is distinct from the middle in that it pertainsto anactualevent that the themeundergoes , rather than the genericpropertyof the themecorresponding to how easily it undergoesthatkind of event. The anticausativealternation , shownin (4.10), appliesto verbsspecifying a particulareffect, eithera changeof stateor a changeof position, but only if they signify nothingbut an effect, that is, if they are mute as to what kind of eventcausedthe effect. ' (4.10) At exactly 3 o clock, the glassbroke. ' * At exactly 3 o clock, the breadcut. ' " * At exactly3 0 clock, Mary hit [ ungrammaticalif takento mean Mary " washit ] . ' * At exactly 3 o clock, John touched[ungrammaticalif takento mean " Johnwas touched" . ] The tablein (4.11) summarizesthe selectiveapplicationof thealternationsto varioussubclass es of transitive action verbs. 4. 3 The Nature of Narrow Conftation Classes

The analysisof thesealternationsin B Levin ( 1985) and Laughren, Levin, and Rappaport( 1986) illustrates some crucial properties of argumentstructure alternationsin general: . The verbs that enter into a construction fall into semanticallycohesive subclass es involving a narrowerrangeof meaningsthan that which is directly associatedwith the argumentstructure. . A commonsetof elementsof meaning, such ascontact, motion, and effect, enterinto the definitionsof the semanticallycohesiveclasses .

PossibleandActual Fonns

Verb

107

hit cut break

Elementsin semanticstructure defining subclassmembership motion, contact motion, contact, effect effect

touch

contact

-

-

. Whethera verbbelongsto a classdependsnoton thecharacteristicfeaturesof theeventin the world that the verb can refer to, but on the aspectsof the event that its semanticstructureconstrains. Thelastpoint, which Levin, Laughren, andRappaportdo not mentionexplicitly , is crucialto the theoryI am presenting. Verb meaningsdo not correspond ' to speakers conceptualcategoriesfor kindsof eventsor states,or to notionslike " " " " " " , whicharepopularconstructsin cognitive scripts or frames or stereotypes esof psychologyandartificial intelligence. And semanticallycohesivesubclass verbsarenot clustersof verbsrelatedby generalcognitive similarity (say, according to somecontinuousmetric calculatedover the number of sharedand distinctfeatures;Tversky, 1977). The problemwith theserepresentationsis that theycaptureprobableor characteristicfeaturesof a kind of event, thosethatoften or typically occur. In contrast, the semanticstructureassociatedwith a verb constrainscertainaspectsof theeventsor statestheverbcanrefer to andis mute about others, no matter how characteristic, often making surprisingly fine . Syntacticallyrelevantsemanticsubclass discriminations es dependon exactly which aspectsof the event or state the verb' s semanticstructure imposes conditionson. Theseconditionsaremanifestedas" semanticintuitions" of what kindsof circumstances a speakercould imagineusinga verb in. Otheraspectsof aneventmightbewell specifiedin that theyareknownto thespeakerandhearer, inferablefrom thediscoursecontext, or predictablefrom conceptualcategories or stereotypes of what typically happensin an event, but they are forbiddento enterinto the determinationof whethera verb can can feed a lexical rule that altersits thematicstructure.

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In thepresentexampleswe seethattheconativeconstructioninvolvesverbs of motion-then-contact, suchashit andcut. Motion is obligatorily involved: if ' s ann one were to causea bruiseon someone by pressingincreasinglyfinnly againstit , that would not behitting, just ascausingan incisionto appearby hard tugging or by rapidheatingfollowedby freezingis notcutting. Furthennore.the role of the motion in causingthe effect is specifiedby the verb: if one wereto wavea knife in the air aspart of a magicspell, causingthe breadto split, that would also not be a clear exampleof cutting the bread. (It ' s not that magical scenariosalter intuitions aboutverb usein general; it soundsperfectly natural, " " , to cut a brick with a feather, a given the right supernaturalcircumstances strandof thread, a shadow, or a breathof air). Contrastthis now with kissingor breaking. Clearly, the typical scenariofor kissing someoneis to move toward the kissee, thencontacthim or her, andtheninitiate the kiss. A typical chainof eventsin breakingsomethingis to do soby movingone' s handto contactit. But crucially, the typicality of an entire event of a given kind is irrelevant. The semanticsof kiss do not requirethat theeventincludeprior changeof location canstartkissinghoursafter their orthodonresultingin contact; two teenagers tureshavebecomeaccidentallyentangled . And the definition of breakdoesnot that the be break caused motion followed by contact; Johncanbreak require by ' a bicycle by riding it if he s too heavyfor it. In sum, it ' s not whatpossiblyor typically goeson in aneventthatmatters; it ' s what the verb' s semanticrepresentationis choosy about in that event that matters. I am stressingthis point- let me call it the " autonomyof lexical " - because the criteria that delineatethe domain of semantics applicationof lexical rulesdo not dependon generalcognitive similarity or typicality but on featuresthat are preciseenoughto guide finely differentiatedintuitions of a verb' s ability to refer to kinds of situations, and equally fine intuitions about . choiceof argumentstructures Onefinal point. I suggestthat in instancesof cognitive ambiguityor vagueness , lexical rulesapply productivelyonly to narrow-range, semanticallycohesive es subclass es. It would be unfortunateif the boundariesof thesesubclass werearbitrarily relatedto thenatureof thelexicalrule that respectedthem. That is not the case. Consider why the prepositionat is used in the conative construction. It is not literally being used in the same way as the spatial prepositionat, which refersto a pathorientedtowarda goal but not necessarily ' arriving there(e.g.,Johnthrewtherockat thetree). If Johncutsat thebread, it s notthattheknife neverarrivesatthebread; rather, thebreadwasnot properlycut. (Theeffect is magnifiedin Johnwascuttingawayat the bread: hereJohncould in putting oneor morecutsin it ; the implication is that he is not havesucceeded

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finished, thathehasnot yet cut thebreadto theextentthat he wantsto). Evenin Mary slappedat John, with no effectcomponent,the implication is not that her handnever arrived at John' s person, only that the type of contact ordinarily . But thereis a clear parallelismbetween implied by slap wasnot accomplished the " toward" relation in spaceand an analogousrelation in the domain of intentions.This parallelismwouldseemto playa role in explainingwhy it is the classof motion-contactverbs, ratherthan, say, any action verb or only effect verbs, thatcanundergotheconativealternation. The rationalemight be roughly thatin motion-contacteventssuchas~ohnhitting Bill , thereis a parallelbetween the physicalmotion of John' s hand, which is spatially aimed at Bill , and the " " temporalunfoldingof the actof hitting, which is aimed at thegoal of contact. " " A singlenotionof directiontowarda destination embracesbothdimensionsof theactof hitting. Theconativealternation" notices" the temporallycoterminous trajectoriesof spatialmotion andof realizationof the event in motion-contact events, and it suppliesa form that zoomsin on the preterminal ponion of the latter. ' I am not claimingthat all speakers graspthis rationale- they neednt do soto apply the alternation properly- or that there is a linguistic constraint that esthatconativealternationsmustapplyto motion-contactverbs. For preestablish it would not be surprisingif therewerelanguagesor evendialectsof , example in which one could sayJohn was breaking at the bread. Rather, the English historicalprocess es that causelexical rulesto be defined over somesubclass es but not othersseemto favor the addition and retention of verbs whoseown meaningsexemplify or echothe semanticstructurecreatedby the rule. I think thatthe conditionsthat characterizethe setof narrow classeslicensinga lexical rule arean exampleof whatGeorgeLakoff ( 1987) calls the " motivation" for a category. A motivatedclassis a family of itemswhosemembershipconditions aretoo variedand unusualto be deduceda priori from universalprinciplesor constraints , but whosemembershangtogetheraccordingto a rationalethatcan bediscoveredposthoc- so thefamily is not anunstructuredlist, either. Thefull motivationfor a subclassmay comefrom the psychologyof the first speakers creativeenoughor liberal enoughto extenda linguistic processto a new item, assuchspeakersareunlikely to makesuchextensionsat random. Thereafterthe subclassmight be learnedby simply memorizingits definition, by graspingits motivationall at oncewith theaid of a strokeof insight recapitulatingthatof the original coiners, or by dependingon someintermediatedegreeof appreciation of therationaleto learnits components efficiently, dependingon thespeakerand the subclassinvolved.4

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Defining and Motivating

110 Subclasses of Verbs Licensing the Four

Alternations If the theory I have outlined - involving thematic cores to motivate constraints on rules , and narrow conflation classesto implement them precisely- is on the right track , then we should be rewarded with criteria that actually work in distinguishing alternating and nonalternating verbs in each alternation ; negative exceptions should vanish. These criteria should not be arbitrary but should be motivatable in part in terms of an interaction between the meaning of a verb and the thematic core associated with the argument structure that the alternation ' yields . I will present hypotheses about the subclasses that do and don t submit to the four alternations we have considered. In the rest of the chapter I will describe the narrow classes and their motivations informally and then draw conclusions about the nature of narrow and broad classes in general. In chapter 5 I will return to each of the alternations one more time and propose explicit representationsfor the broad- and narrow - range classesin an attempt to characterize them precisely.

4.4.1 Dativizable Verbs The dative rule obviouslyappliesto verbsof giving, wherethe verb cannotbe usedin its literal senseunlessit denotesa giver having someobject and then causingit to enterinto the possessionof a recipient. Examplesare shown in (4.12). (4.12) give, pass, hand, sell, pay, trade, lend, loan, serve, feed This is theprototypicalsubclassof dativizableverbs; its definitionsarecompatible - by definition, as they say- with the notion of X causingY to haveZ. A relatedsubclassincludesverbswherea transferof possessionis mediatedby a separationin time and space, sometimesbridged by a particular meansof transfer: send, ship, mail. But amongthe verbs that can result in a changeof possessionbut do not escanbereinterpretedby a narrowlexical rule necessarilydo so, somesubclass to denotechangesof possession , by meansof which they inherit the doubleobject argumentstructure, and other cannot. I have already mentionedthe subclass esof verbsof instantaneous impartingof force in somemannercausing ballistic motion, asshownin (4.13), which allow dativization, andthe verbsof continuousimpartingof forcein somemannercausingaccompaniedmotion, as in (4.14), whichdo not. (4.13) Lafleurthrows/ tosses/ flips / slaps/ kicks / pokes/ flings / blastshim thepuck; he shoots, he scores!

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(4.14) * 1carried/ pulled / pushed/ schlepped/ lifted / lowered/ hauledJohn the box. It is striking that the verbsbring and take, which also signify continuous causationof accompaniedmotion but specifythe directionof the motion (" to here" versus" away from " here," respectively) and not its manner, do seemto take the double-object form: 1 brought/took him his lunch. Like the elements " motion " " " , contact, and" effect" that Levin andhercollaboratorsfocuson, the " " elements manner and" direction" turn up againandagainin defining conflation subclass es. Lexical rulesmind their manners . Anotherdativizableclass ,shownin (4. 15), containsverbswhereX makessome commitmentthat Y will haveor canhaveZ in thefuture, whatGreen( 1974) calls " verbsof future " having. Theactualactsreferredto by theverbsarenot changes of possessionbut proactivecommitmentsof somesort guaranteeingthem. (4.15) offer, promise, bequeath , leave, refer, forward, allocate, guarantee , allot, assign, advance , award, reserve,grant We havealreadyseenanothersubclassof verbs, shownin (4.16), for which X hasthepotentialor desireof causingYno longerto haveZ, the" verbsof future not having" (Green, 1974). (Anotherpossiblecharacterization wouldbein terms " of the first objectbeing a " malefactive" or " adversative argumentof the action or stateof thesubject, similar to the traditionalbenefactivecasebut of opposite affective valence. The objectof on in My cat diedon meis sometimesdescribed as having this role.) As mentionedin chapter2, noneof them(exceptpossibly deny) canappearin the usualprepositional-dativeform (* It costfive dollars to me / of me/ from me). Askis includedin its senseof Sheaskedhim thetime/ the way (cf. * Sheaskedthe time/ wayto him), wherethe informationreferredto by the secondobject is given by the addressee , not to him. Saveis includedin the senseof That savedme the trouble of makinga separatetrip. (4.16) cost, spare, envy, begrudge , bet, refuse, ask, save, charge,fine, forgive, ?deny -changeverbsconsistsof what B. Anothernondativizableclassof possession " but which Levin ( 1985) calls " verbs of presentation might better be called " verbsof " fulfilling . Examplesaregivenin (4.17). Theseverbs, whichdo appear in a constructionwith the prospectivepossessoras the first object- She presented the studentswith certificates,' Theyrewardedhim with apromotion mark tile transferredobjectwith the prepositionwith, not asa secondobject in a double-object form. The verbshavethefollowing properties:X transfersZ to Y, where (a) Z is not necessarilypossessed by X beforehand(X just enablesits ' transfer); (b) Z is somethingthat Y deserves , needs, or is worthy of; (c) Y s relation to Z hascertainproperties,usuallyspecifiedby thenominalcounterpart of the verb. In (4.17), thenominalcounterpartis listedalongsideeachsentence .'

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] (4.17) ?I presentedhim the award. [a presentation * 1creditedhis accountthe amountof the check. [a credit] * 1creditedhim the discovery. [credit for the discovery] * They rewardedhim a promotion. [a reward] * Bill entrustedhim the sacredchalice. [a trust in him] * The commissionerhonoredthem the award. [an honor] ?I suppliedthem a bag of groceries. [somesupplies] ?* They bestowedhim a fortune. [a bestowal] Among verbsof communicationwith a direct object signifying the message anda to-objectsignifying theaudience(Mike told / wrote/ shouted/ radioedthe storyto Mary), only somecanbegivenathematicreanalysiswherebythespeaker is treatedasanagentof a changeof possessionalstateof theaudience,that is, X causesY to know (perceive, apprehend , be aware of) Z, in turn enabling the " double- objectstructure. I will call one of theseclassesthe classof illocutionary " verbsof communication ; the examplesare in (4.18). They all involve a particularkindof communicatedcontentspecifiedby theverb(e.g., aperceptible objectfor show; a questionor problemfor ask,pose; written languagefor write). ' Thekind of messageis definedwith respectto the speakers intentionsconcerning how theheareris to interpretit. Forexample, theobjectof tell is eitherfactual informationfor the hearerto learnor a story to entertainhim (theobjectof spin hasa similar property), andthe object of ask is a question, which by definition is somethingcalling for ananswer.6As mentionedin section3.3.4.2, becausethe heareris a patientanda themein the doubleobject form, theseverbscanentail, or at leastconnote, successfulapprehensionof the ideaor stimulusin that form, most notablyfor the verb teach(Green, 1974). (4.18) tell, show, ask, teach, pose, write, spin, read, quote, cite The illocutionary verbs are noncommittal as to the mannerin which the : one canaskJohna questionin a scream,a whisper, messageis communicated and so on. There is a distinct class of verbs with complementarysemantic " " properties.These manne~-of -speaking verbs(4.19), thoughthey can be used to expressthe ideaof successfulcommunication, do not necessarilyimply that it hastakenplace; what they arechoosyaboutis the mannerin which the sender " .' Arnold Zwicky ( 1971), in an article entitled In a Manner sendsthe message " showsthat theseverbsshareelevendifferent of Speaking, syntacticproperties (surprisingly, he omits nondativizability). (4.19) * Johnshouted/ screamed/ murmured/ whispered/ shrieked/ yodeled / yelled/ bellowed/ grunted/ barked/ Bill the news. Theeffectof the illocutionary/ mannerdistinctionon dativizability appearsto be confirmedby a recentaddition to the language. Accordingto the OED, the

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transitiveverbto leakin thesenseof " to divulgesensitiveinfonnation" cameinto commonusein the 1950s(thoughsporadicexamples,usuallywith scarequotes, appearedin thesecondhalf of the nineteenthcenturyandearly in the twentieth century). It clearly refersto the natureof the messagerelative to the intended recipient(i.e., the messageis somethingthe recipientis not supposedto know) andimposesno generalconstraintson the manner. As predicted, it dativizes: I haveheardHe' s beenleakingmebits of informationfor severalmonths, and in my judgmentit is perfectlynatural. Oneof themostcommonverbsof communication(especiallyamongchildren), : Shetold/ * saida story,' Sheshouted/* said. say, falls into neitherof theseclasses The objectof say seemsto be individuatedby its contentrather than either its physicalor illocutionary properties. Unlike tell, it takesa clausal object (She said/ * told thatElvis died) , a quotation(Shesaid/ * told ..Hello! " ), or a quantified NP(Shesaid/ * told nothing/ something/ a lot / verylittle ; told is acceptableonly elliptically). Thoughit cantakea to-object, it cannotdativize: Shesaid nothing to me / * She said me nothing. Perhapsit belongs to a class of verbs of " " transparent contentof communication, whereone of the argumentsis the actual content of what the communicatormeans, and the communicator's attitudewith respectto the truth of that contentmay be specified by the verb. Assert, question,claim, think (aloudabout), anddoubt, andothers, may fall into this class. For presentpurposes , it is sufficientto showthatsay clearly belongs to a different classfrom tell. , a relatively newclassof verbsof communication Finally, for manyspeakers canalternate(seeRandall, 1987; Wasow, 1981). Theseareverbsspecifyingan instrumentof communication,asshownin (4.20); intuitions vary amongverbs andspeakers . Beth Levin hasprovidedme with an additionalexamplefrom an articlein theNew York Times- I ' ll modemhim tomorrow- and as mentioned, double-object constructionswith the new verb to fax (to transmit using a facsimilemachine) havemushroomedin the late 1980s. (4.20) JohnradioedI satellitedI Emailed I telegraphedI wired I telephonedher the news. Letmeturn now to verbsthat taketheprepositionfor . Theprepositionalfonn hasthe thematiccore "X acts-on Y for the benefitof Z." For the momentI will putasidethequestionof whetherthethematiccorefor thedouble-object version of theseverbsis the sameas that for the double-object fonn of verbs taking to, andwill first examinethenarrowclassesof verbsparticipatingin thefor -dative alternation. Onesubclass- shownin (4.21)-- includesverbsof creation, which in the double- object fonn expressthe notion of X causingY to come into existencefor the benefit of Z and then causingZ to have Y. These verbs can

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specifymeans(including specificinstrumentssuchasxerox, which like all instruments in Englisharepatientsin thesecondaryeventthat servesasthemeans of accomplishingthe main event), propertiesof the createdobject, or, most 8 typically, both. (4.21) bake, make, build, cook, sew, knit, toss(whena salad results), fix (when dinner results), pour (whena drink results) Anotheris the classof verbsof obtaining, whereX doesnol initially possessY ' , thencomesto possessit for Y sbenefitsothatX cangive it over to Y; examples aregiven in (4.22) (4.22) get, buy, find, steal, order, win, earn, grab In contrast, for mostspeakersverbsof choosing- see(4.23) - do not accept thedoubleobjectform, thoughlike othernondativizablesubclass estheyareconceptually with the of of . MelissaBowcompatible possibility change possession erman( 1987a)pointsout, however,thatI pickedher out a dressis grammatical. This is probablybecausetheparticleout whencombinedwith pick suppliesthe crucial missingelementof meaning, involving obtaining (or, more precisely, obtainingby removalfrom a location: I dug I scoopedI scrapedI pulled out the gold; I gotI broughtI tookoutmyguitar). Theparticlehasa similareffectonother nondativizableverbs: * 1pried I pulled I yankedher a gemstoneversus?I pried I pulledI yankedher outa gemstone . (Theparticlecanhavea similar effect when it producesverbsof creation: compare*Juan tappedI bangedher a tuneon the xylophonewith Juan tappedI bangedherout a tuneon thexylophone.) Thusthe effectof theparticleis analogousto thatof theparticlesin exampleslikel poured theglassfull with water or I wipedthe table cleanof crumbs, discussedin the 9 precedingchapter. (4.23) * 1chose/ picked/ selected/ favored/ indicated/ preferred/ designated her a dress. Mostoften, verbsthatsimplyconveyactsdonefor the benefitof a third party, withoutthatparty' s comingto possesstheaffectedobject, canappearin thefor prepositionalform but not thedouble-objectform (e.g., I drove his carfor him I * drovehimhis car). At first this wouldseemto bea consequence of thefact that thethematiccoreassociatedwith thedouble-objectform calls specificallyfor a . However, we shall seethat this is not quite right. The changeof possession double-object form is not absolutelybarredfrom appearingwith benefactive verbs, neitherin fact nor in principle. Let me discusseachin turn. A first suspicionthatpurebenefactivedouble-objectforms arenot invariably andabsolutelyungrammaticalcamefrom the studyof Gropenet ale( 1989), in whichadultsubjectsratedtheacceptabilityof novelverbs. Thoughwefoundthat double-object forms were always rated as soundingbetter with possession

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changesc~narios, thiseffectwassignificantlyweakerforfor -dativeverbs, where the contrastwas with benefactivescenarios , thanfor to-dativeverbs, wherethe contrastwas with transportationscenarios . This result leadsus to ask whether English speakersare capable of showingsome degreeof tolerancetoward double-object benefactives . In certaincircumstancesthis appearsto be so. In standardAmericanEnglish, therearesomehighly circumscribedsubclass es of double-object verbsthat seemonly to expressthe benefactiverelation, with no actualchangeof possession(Green, 1974). Examplesareshownin (4.24). (4.24) Idioms with give and do: Shegave him a hand. Shegave him a kick. Shegave him a kiss. Shedid him a favor. Shedid him a good deed. Artistic performances: Shedancedus a waltz. Sheplayed us her trombone. Symbolic acts of dedication: Sam promisedto move his lover a mountain. Cry me a river! God said to Abraham., " Kill me a son." IO In addition, thereis an Americancolloquialconstructionin which a pronoun is usedreflexively asthepostverbalobjectto indicateanactor statethatbenefits the subject. I have heardthe exampleslistedin (4.25), noneof themgrammatical in my (Canadian) dialect. (4.25 (a) From color commentaryon basketballgames: Vincent hadhimself ten pointsin the first half. Hinson hashimself a goodball gamegoing. Robert playedhimself oneheckof a ball game. I ' ll tell you, we' ve really hadourselvesa goodball game. ' (b) Why don t you take yourselfa caband go jump in the lake? (c) From a bluegrasssong: I ' ll pawnyou my diamondring. [Thesinger, appealingto a sheriffto releaseherjailed lover, is offeringto pawnher ring andgive him the proceeds. Notethat the referentof thefirst objectwould benefitfrom the pawningof the ring but would not cometo possessit.] ' (d) Five more minutes, he d havegot out andchewedhimself a hole through thefence. [ A truckdriveris referringto ananangrybusinessman whosecar was blockedby his truck.]

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, are they real? (e) BarbaraWalters: Tell me, Dolly ' ' m thekind"of I Barbara Well : , gal that, if they weren t , Parton , Dolly I ' d go out and get me some. In earlierperiodsof the language,from Old English until fairly recently, the double-objectconstructionwasusedmore freely with relationssuchasbenefac " asin " Theybrokehim hisshoulder tive, malefactive,or mere sympatheticinterest, devil andhim shortenhis the cometh Then for cites , . Visser( 1963) , example ate meup half a hamof He Old from English); days(word by word translation mehisnamein thebook enters bacon( 1711); Withgreatexactitudeof purposehe Aronoff ( 1820); andHe can knockyou offforty Latin versesin an hour ( 1835). . 1849 dated the OED ? in , me this will gash surgeon ( 1980) finds Who Furthermore, even when the dative alternation applied to for verbs does , thereis an overlayof benefactionconflatedwith involve a changeof possession Johna steak thepossession change.Thus, Green( 1974) suggeststhatSheburned ' t. doesn if he , She not but burned Similarly his steaks likes is well formedif John tone. ironic an have to bakedhim an arsenic lacedpie seems Yet anotherclassof double-object constructionscombining possessionand benefaction recently came to my attention. Bob Ryan, a sportswriter for the Boston Globe, justified a selectionon his personalAll -Star list by writing , " Meanwhile Jeff Maloneme no Jeff Malones." The Malone in questionwas a , well-reputedbasketballplayerwhomRyan did not carefor. I alsorecallthetitle twoof an editorial in Life magazinea few yearsback protestingthe standard , me letterabbreviationsfor Americanstatesintroducedby thepostalse! Vice: oUT " Don' t " This as translates , self consciousconstruction no UTs. semiproductive " ' think you redoingmeafavorby offering / sayingX to me. It is quitestereotyped ' by a few (cf. * Don t Jeff MalonemeanyJeff Malones) andis probablyinspired " a commonkind it was that notes 1968 ) well known literary sources. Harrison( ' s time. In 4.26), I " n ( quotepassagescited by Jesperse of idiom in Shakespeare ( 1938/ 1982). " " (4.26) My graciousuncle. "Tut tut, Graceme no Grace, nor Uncle me no Uncle: ' ' ' I am no traitor s uncle, and that word grace " In an ungraciousmouth is but profane. , Richard II , act II , scene3) (Shakespeare " What is this? ' ' Proud' and ' I thank you not, ' ' And yet not proud, Mistressminion , you, " Thank me no thankings, nor proud me no prouds. , Romeoand Jullet, act II , scene5) (Shakespeare

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"I " heartilywish I could, but " " Nay, but me no buts- 1havesetmy heartuponit. (Sir WalterScott, TheAntiquary) " Advanceandtake thy prize, the diamond; but he answered , Diamondme no diamonds! For God' s love, a little air! Prizeme no prizes, for my prize is death!" , Lancelotand Elaine) (Tennyson Doesthis meanwe shouldgive up the generalclaim that the double-object form is inherentlytied to changeof possession ? Probablynot. The cognitive " contentof thenotionsof " benefactive" and" gainingpossession maybesimilar. We talk of havinggoodfortune, having it made, havinga good time (a ball , a blast, etc.), havingit all , havingsomeone(sexually), andhavingsomeonewhere you wanthim. Green( 1974) suggeststhatin expressionslike Cry mea river , the " " " beneficiarycouldbe saidto possessthe river of tearsasa tokenor offering" ' of his or herlover s dedication.And if someonedoesyouafavor , might therebe somesensein whichyounowpossess (enjoy, takeadvantage of) thefavor?There is evena formof theverbhaveitself thathasacausative-benefactivereadingand a distinctmalefactivereading(Chomsky, 1965). I hadmy leg brokencan mean either " I paid an orthopedistto breakmy partially-healedleg and re-set it in a " -benefactive cast" (causative ), or Somethugscameandbroke my leg on me" (malefactive). Green ( 1974) notes that in Japanese , symbolic benefactive relationscan be expressedusing the verbs give and receive, in expressions " " " resembling St. Georgegave killed a dragonfor Mary and Mary received " killed by St. Georgea dragon. Thesesentences correspondto the English St. Georgekilled Mary a dragon, wherethedragonis neverliterally handedover to Mary. Finally, asnotedin chapter3, in otherlanguagesconstructionssimilar to the double- objectdativecan refer to recipients, benefactives , or both. This patternof similarity suggeststhatbenefactiverelationscanbesubsumed ascasesof metaphoricalpossession , extendingtheThematicRelationsHypothesis . A thematiccoreembracingpossession anda possibleextensionof it to benemale faction would underlie all verbs taking the double-object form. faction/ Thusnondativizablefordativessuchas* drive her thecar wouldberuledout not by an inherentincompatibilitywith the thematiccoreof thedouble-objecLform but by theabsencefrom the speaker's dialectof a narrowclassincluding those verbs. (Manyungrammaticalto-datives, on theotherhand, arestill ruled out by incompatibilitywith the thematiccore, suchas * drive Chicagothe car.) This accounthasseveraladvantages over any alternative. If therewere only a very generalthematiccore for all double-object forms meaning" causeto " changeto a beneficialstate, we would be left with no explanationfor why all

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esdo of theto-dativenarrowclassesandmostof thestandard / or-dativesubclass involve changeof possession . Even the more generalbenefactiverelations ' ' involving/ or-datives(Vincenthashimselftenpoints, Cry mea river , But meno buts) are often conflated with statesof possessionor support metaphoric extensionsof possession , andmanyactuallycontaintheverbshaveandget. Furthermore , if thethematiccorewererestrictedto literal possession , we could not accountfor the narrowclassesinvolving symbolicacts, reflexive benefactives , " in earlier " of and so on. As we shall see interest , , stages English sympathetic data, discussedin chapter7, thatsupporta thematic therearealsodevelopmental anda metaphoricalextension core for the double- objectthat embracespossession of it to benefactive / malefactiverelations. Motivationfor the dativizableclasses.Is therea motivationor rationalefor esaredativizable? For verbswherechangeof which of the conflationsubclass possessionis inherentto the meaningof the verb, suchasgive, the answeris obvious. More generally, if the thematic core of the double-object dative involves an actoractingon a recipientin sucha way thatcauseshim to possess something(asopposedto actingon an objectin sucha way asto causeit to go esthatsuggestthattheactioninherentlyinvolves to someone ), thenverbsubclass thebeneficiaryaspatientin somedirectfashionwouldbemorelikely to undergo dativization. Sincethrow to X verbs involve aiming in the direction of the receiverconcurrentlywith causingthe motion, whereasthe action in pull to X verbscanbeinitiatedwithout havingthereceiverin mind andcanhaveaneverchanginggoal throughoutits duration, thereis a sensein which the receiveris more involved in defining the action for throw and can be more naturally analyzedas a patient. So if we only knew that one of the two classeswas dativizable, wecouldpredictit wouldbethethrowclass. Similarly, whenasking a question, whatmakesit askingis how a hypotheticallisteneris supposedto reactto it , but whenshoutinga question, whatmakesit shoutinghasnothing to do with a listenerandcanbedefinedin termsof thebehaviorof thespeakeralone. Therefore we are not surprisedthat illocutionary verbs, but not manner-of , the learnabilitystory doesnot speakingverbs, dativize. As I haveemphasized and I such differences do not insist that the differencebe on , absolutelyhinge or beperfectlypredictiveacrosslanguagesanddialects. exploitedby all speakers It does appear, however, that wherein the semanticlandscapethe productive lines are drawn is not completelyarbitraryfrom a cognitivevantagepoint. 4.4.1.1 The Morphological Constraint on the Dative In explaining constraints on lexical rules in tenDsof the theoryof thematiccoresand conflation es, I havenot touchedon the morphologicalconstrainton the dative, subclass

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introducedin chapter2. How would it enterinto the subdivisionof verbsinto narrowclasses ? Interestingly, theconstraintdoesnotcompletelycross-classify the semanticsubclasses; it conjoins with someof them but not others. For example, the subclassof illocutionary communicationverbs demandsnative stems(tell/ * explain him the story), but the subclassof verbsof future having (promise/bequeathher myfortune,' offer/refer him a patient) doesnot. The fact thatmorphologyand semanticsinteract, assummarizedin (4.27), explainswhy the morphologicalconstraint is demonstrablypsychologicallyreal (Gropenet al., 1989) but apparentlyso vulnerableto counterexamples thatmostinvestigators areskepticalthat it could be(e.g., Green, 1974;Randall, 1987; Fodor, 1985). What is goingon is that the constraintis real but doesnot apply to certainsub' classes ; that s wherethe apparentcounterexamples comefrom. 4.27 ( ) Dativizablesubclasses sensitiveto the morphologicalconstraint: * donate, * contribute I . Giving: give, pass, handVERSUS * transport, ?deliver, 2. Sending: send, ship, mail VERSUS * ? air-freight, ?Federal-Express, ?* courier, ?* messenger * 3. Instantaneous causationof motion: throw, tossVERSUS propel, * release,* * alley oop, Iob pass * explain, * announce 4. Communication / illocutionary: tell , ask VERSUS , * describe, * admit, * confess, * * repeat, declare, * recount * construct, * create, * 5. Creation: build, cook, sewVERSUS design, * devise * * * 6. Obtaining: get, find , buy VERSUS purchase, obtain, collect Dativizablesubclasses insensitiveto the morphologicalconstraint: 7. Futurehaving: bequeath, refer, recommend,guarantee , permit 8. Malefactive/ future not having: envy, begrudge , deny, refuse 9. Instrumentof communication: radio, telegraph,telephone,satellite, netmail Somenondativizablesubclassesthat are cognitivelycompatiblewith change : of possession 10. Mannerof speaking: * shout, * scream II . Continuouscausationof motion in somemanner: * puIl, * push, * Iower 12. Transferringsomethingneeded / deserved: * entrust, * credit, * supply * 13. Selection / designation: choose, * pick, * select This summarygiven in (4.27) leavesopen the questionof why any of the subclass es shouldcare about morphologyin the first place. ThoughI cannot answerthis questiondefinitively , I will try to renderit a bit lessmysterious. First, themorphologicalor phonologicalconstraintis not adhocto theEnglish dative. Thenative/ Latinatedistinctionor someof its phonologicalcorrelatesare relevantto a variety of linguistic processes in English:

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. The 180or so English verbswith irregularpast-tensefonDS(go/went, hit/hit , / spent) are all either monosyllabic or monosyllableswith a sing/sang, spend recognizablenative prefix (e.g. understood,forgot , beset, mistook, withstood, upset) (Pinker and Prince, 1988). . The negativeprefix in- (with phonologically conditioned variants ii -, im-, ir -) canattachonly to Latinatestems: insatiable, illiterate , irreducible, improbable , * imborn, * illucky, * inhappy, * irrocky. Adult speakers , when askedto or of versions novel are sensitive to this , produce judge negative adjectives Baldi Broderick and Palenno, 1985). , , regularity ( . The comparativesuffixes-er and-estattachto monosyllabicadjectives(nice/ nicer/nicest, intelligent/ * intelligenter/ * intelligentest) or to polysyllables that are clearly native, with stresson the first syllable (pretty/prettier/prettiest,. simple/simpler/ simplest). . The suffixes-ion andation attachesonly to Latinate verbs: invert/inversion,. chart/ * chartion/ * chartation. The semantically similar suffix -ment is not choosy(Aronoff , 1976). . The suffixity attachesonly to the stems of certain Latinate adjectives: ferociouslferocity; probable/probability; purple/ *purpility " heavy/* heavily. Adults aresensitiveto this regularityin judging noncewordsendingin thesuffix (Randall, 1980). The semanticallysimilar suffix -hood attachesonly to native fonDs: mother/motherhood,.professor/*professorhood.Thesuffixness is indifferent (Aronoff, 1976). . The phonologicalrule of velar softening, which, for example, changesk to s in some environments, applies only to Latinate fonDs: electric/electricity,. mistake/* mistacen(ChomskyandHalle, 1968). . The particle up, signifying " to completion," combines with verbs that are monosyllabicor polysyllabic with stressonly on the first syllable: shakeit up, jiggle it up, breakit up, * vibrateit up, * destroyit up (Whorf, 1956). In fact the verbs in verb- particle combinationsin generalare overwhelmingly native (di Sciullo andWilliams, 1987): give up / out / away / in versus* donateup / out / away / in; makeup / out / over versus* createup / out / over; and so on. . Derivednominalsfrom causativeverbscan inherit their transitive argument structureonly if the verb takesa Latinatenominalizing suffix like -tion, not if it takesa native suffix: corn' s growth / * thefarmer ' s growth of corn versusthe ' ' girl s conversion/ the priest s conversionof the girl (Smith, 1972). Thusa varietyof morphologicalandmorphophonologicalrulesin Englishare sensitiveto the native/ Latinatedistinction. This leadsto two questions: why do verbsgroupthemselvesinto thesetwo classes , andwhy do theclassesgovernthe the of dative rule? application

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As for the first question, we know in generalthat many languagessubdivide their open-classvocabularyandlet differentkinds of morphologicalrulesapply to thesesubclass es (e.g., genderclasses , Hebrewbinyanim; seealso Aronoff, 1976). More specifically, McCarthyand Prince (in preparation) proposethat " " " " everylanguagehasa phonologicaldefinitionof its basic or minimal words, andmanymorphologicalprocess esarerestrictedto applyingonly to thesebasic words. In English(thoughnot, say, Italian), theminimal wordis onemetricalfoot ' long. This notion of basicnessmay also correlatewith speakers intuitions of which wordsin their languagearefelt to benatural, neutral, or native, andwhich arefelt to be foreign or learned(seeSelkirk and Dell , 1978, for a proposalthat [+learned] is a morphologicalfeaturein French). The native/ Latinatedistinction hassomeof this connotationfor Englishspeakers . It hasoften beennotedthat native verbstendto be high in frequencyand to include the commonsimpler . Latinatewordsareof lower frequencyand belong vocabularyof the language to the learnedvocabulary, often suggestinga more formal speechregister. I remembera coverstoryon ArethaFranklinin Timemagazinein themid- 1960s, " " which describedher in performance , perspirationstreamingdown her face. " " An irate readerwrote in: Arethadoesnot perspire. Aretha sweats. There is evidencethat English speakershave abstractedthe morphological andphonologicalsignaturesof thenative/ Latinatedistinctionascorrelatingwith thebasicversusnonbasicvocabularydistinction. Baldi, Broderick, andPalermo ( 1985) showedthat untutoredspeakerscanjudge fairly accuratelywhetherreal and nonsensenative and Latinate stemswere " native" versus" borrowedor " foreign. Randall( 1980) showedthatspeakers judgedthesuffixity assounding goodnot only with Latinatestemsbut with thosewhoseetymologywasGreek. Shesuggeststhat a senseof " classicality" wasinvolved. Sothenative/ Latinatedistinctionin Englishis a manifestationof animportant , onecontainingbasic, cleavageof thevocabularyinto two morphologicalclasses native, naturalwordsandtheothercontainingmarked, foreign-sounding,special words. Why doesthe dativerule careaboutthis distinction? Onepossibility is the following. In general, lexical rules can effect simultaneouschangesin semantics , argumentstructuresyntax, and morphology. The morphological is change seenin English only in the passive(and to a certain extent in the causativein earlierstagesof the language , leavingpairslike rise/raise,faillfell , " a . in sit/set, lie/ lay as residue) But severalother languages , thesealternations involve specificmorphologicalchanges . For example, the dativealternationis markedwith anaffix on theverbin Indonesian(Foley andVan Valin, 1985) and Shona, a Bantu language(Dowty, 1979a). The locative alternationcan be marked with a verbal affix in Indonesian , Russian, German, and Hungarian (Foley and Van Valin, 1985). The causativeand anticausativeare markedby

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morphological changes in many languages ( Comrie , 1985); causative rules that ' change a verb s membership in inflectional paradigms are subject to similar semantic constraints as causative rules ( like that of English ) that have no morpho logical effect ( Nedyalkov and Silnitsky , 1973) . The sensitivity of the English dative rule to morphological class could then be a consequenceof two assumptions : 1. Morphological rules can be selective in their application to different morpho logical classes. 2. Rules that alter argument structures count asmorphological rules, even if they do not effect an overt morphological change. Thus the English dative rule , though its hasno overt morphological operation , is formally a kind of rule that can have morphological operations, and therefore it can be sensitive to salient morphological subclasses in the vocabulary of the language. The dative is the only rule without a morphological change that we have seen be sensitive to the distinction , but in principle others could be. Interestingly , any child who was prepared for the possibility that a dative rule is conditioned by morphological class would find " evidence" to confirm that suspicion . In Gropen et al. ( 1989), we combed through the transcripts of Adam , Eve , Sarah, Ross, and Mark in the Chi L DE S database( MacWhinney and Snow , 1985), looking at all the prepositional -dative sentences( both to and/ or , including benefactives) in the speechof the adults who interacted with the children . Of course, there is no constraint forcing the verbs in these sentencesto be native . Nonetheless, the only verb with Latinate phonology from these thousands of examples was explain , used once each by the adults playing with Adam and Sarah. (Three other verbs were Latinate but had the native stress- initial prosodic pattern : measure, package, and finish , used once apiece in benefactive prepositional / or -datives.) So it seemsthat native verbsjust happento be the ones parents use when talking to their children , presumably becausethey are more basic and of higher frequency . But this statistical phenomenonhas an intriguing ' consequence: even if English didn t have a morphological constraint on the dative , children would think that it did . This also may have something to do with the fact that the subclassesthat don ' t obey the constraint (the bequeath class, the arpanet class) are learned later in life when long non-native words are common . Let me touch briefly on two more aspects of the morphological constraint . First , it is possible that verbs that are transparently derived from nouns, especially nouns perceived to be namelike , lie outside the binary native/ Latinate distinction . In many areasof morphology , tacit knowledge that a word ' s stem is from another category gives it a special status regarding the rules that apply to

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it. Irregular inflection is a notablecase: Thedefensemanof the TorontoMaple ' Leafs/ * Leaveshigh-sticked/* high-stuckthegoalie, Mary out-Sally-RidedSally Ride / * out-Sally-RodeSally Ride (seePinkerand Prince, 1988). Many of the salient examplesof productive dativization involve namesfor instruments (xerox, satellite, microwave, radio , arpanet, E-mail , modem,fax, etc.), usually with a clear origin asa familiar brand name, neologism, or jargon term. These examplesexisteventhoughsomeareverbsof creation, a subclassthatordinarily respectsthe native/ Latinatedistinction. (Suchviolations cannotbe placedin a " " separatesemanticsubclassof verbs specifying instrumentsof creation, because , and none, to many of the familiar creation verbsdo specify instruments ' is Latinate e. . She hammered me out a disc he , sawedme a , g, my knowledge, " " pieceof wood.) Thusit seemsthat verbsderivedfrom common special nouns , etc.) areperceivedto beneithernativenorLatinate/learned, (names,neologisms and as a result they escapeany restriction of a dativizablesubclassto native stems. This wouldaccountfor the findings of theGropenet al. ( 1989) questionnaire study, where we found that people rated double-object sentenceswith -change verbs as soundingmore natural than novel monosyllabicpossession -change verbs only for one of the four verb novel polysyllabic possession used . The verb meanings meaningthat induceda sensitivityto phonologywas theonein whichtheverbdenoteda kind of transferof possession (a legalmeans of propertytransfer). The other threeverbswereall denominalsinvolving some instrumentwhosenamecontributedtheverbstem: causationof motionin a sport by the use of a specialpiece of equipment, creation by the useof a specific machine, andobtainingby the useof a kind of currency. A final questionthat might beraisedis whetherthereis a semanticmotivation for thedistinctionbetweennativeandLatinateverbs. I think it ' spossible,though I would not bepreparedto pushthe point. Theargumentmight go like this. The Latinate verbs appearto be less basic on semanticas well as phonological and semanticcomplexity, they , becauseof their abstractness grounds. Perhaps connotelessof a senseof directly acting on or affectingtherecipientthannative wordsdo. Forexample, in orderto donatesomethingto someone , asopposedto merelygiving it , one must havepublicly charitablemotives, the recipientmust be an institution or an individual representingan institution or cause, and the donorneednotknow the recipientpersonally. Explaining, asopposedto telling, involvesattentionto unpackingthe contentof the message , notjust transferring it to a listenerdirectly; announcingis directedto a broadnonspecificaudience. If the dativizability of verbsis motivated by the generalnotion "X causesY to haveZ," a morphologicaldistinction that is correlatedwith thedirectnessof the interactionbetweenX andY might be motivatedasa conditionon dativizability as well.

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4.4.2 Locativizable Verbs In chapter3, I pointedout that a necessarycriterion for a verb to participatein the locativealternationis that it specifyor allow one to predict both a type of motionandan end state. This is what preventsthe alternationoffill (end state only; thusit appearsonly in thewith form) andpour (motion only ; thusit appears only in the int% nto form). Conversely, the verbs that do alternateconstrain aspectsof both: smearinvolves contactingand moving a substanceagainsta surfaceandadherence of thesubstance to it in a streakylayer; load involvesa unit or type of substanceappropriatefor the containing object that is put in a designatedlocation within the containingobject, enabling it to perform some function (e.g., a gun, a camera). However, theseconstraintsare not sufficient conditionsfor thealternationto occur, at leastnot without beggingthequestion of why somewordsspecifya motionor endstateandothersdo not. Forexample, it is not convincingto saythat the reasonthat * / dripped water onto thefloor is badis that no end stateis specified- why hasthe verbdrip not accumulateda componentof meaningspecifying that the surfaceis covered with drops, like sprinkle? Instead,therearefiner-grainedcriteria, independentof end statesor motions per se, thatantecedentlydeterminewhetherthe verb can retain componentsof meaningfor end statesor motions. Rappaportand Levin ( 1985) haveamassed a list of 142locativeverbsthat is probablynot far from being an exhaustivelist for English. Accordingto Levin (personalcommunication), theseincludeall the locativeverbslisted in previouspaperson the topic, plus any that either of the authorsheardor readover a spanof severalyearswhile working on the paper. They point out that most verbs taking either of these constructionsdo not alternate: only 34 of the 142appearin both forms. They did not mention any precisecriteriaspecificto thesealternatingverbs. A crucial test for the narrowclasstheory is whethersuchcriteria can be found given that the alternationis productivefor children but hasexceptionsfor adults. Here I presentthe results of my own examinationof their list. As the theory requires, there are narrow criteriagoverningthealternation; theyaresomewhatsurprisingbut, oncestated, fairly straightforward. Furthermore, I havefound that a handful of verbsthat RappaportandLevin failed to includefall neatlyinto thesubclassesthatI derived from their list, and display the syntacticbehaviorthat one would expectfrom suchclassification. I take this as supportfor the currentproposals. I beganwith the ideathat sincethereare many verbsthat take only the with form, and many that take only the int% nto form, there may be two rules es. I operatingin different directions, both of themdefinedover setsof subclass subdivided the verbs into for which those the rule seems tentatively alternating to take an int% nto baseform and derivesa with form, and those where the

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derivation goesin the oppositedirection. Directionality was detenninedas follows. If the locational theme(the content) is obligatory, it wasassumedthat thederivationis from into to with. For example, you cansayHe piled thebooks but not * He piled the shelf, this suggeststhat the verb naturally takes the locationalthemeas object and that the derivationis from " pile NP-theme" to " " " pile NP-themeonto NP-goal, which in turn leadsto pile NP-goal with NP" theme. Conversely, if the simple two-argumentfonn of the verb canappear with thelocationalgoal (thecontainer) but notthelocationaltheme, it is assumed thatthe verb" naturally" takesthegoal asdirectobjectandthatthefonn with the themeasobjectis derived from it ; for example,He stuffedtheturkey/ * He stuffed ' thebreadcrumbs . When both argumentsareoptional, the derivationcould have gonein eitherdirection (followed by deletionof anobliqueargument), but often oneof the simpletransitive fonns soundselliptical andcausesthe listenerto fill in or presuppose the existenceof the other argumentwhen hearingit. ThusHe loaded the gun sounds like a complete thought; He loaded the bullets is grammaticalbut feels like a truncatedversionof He loadedthe bulletsinto the gun. This is somewhatsubjective, but I would guessthat the directionof the . Finally, there are only six verbs asymmetryis fairly reliable acrossspeakers whereboth argumentsare obligatory, two of themdubiouslyclassifiedassuch, andtheseareignoredfor the purposeof finding thesubclass esfor eachrule and es later. I thentried to divide the 142verbs only placedin the relevant subclass into semantically cohesivesubclass essuchthatfor someof thesubclass es, all the memberverbsalternate; for others, noneof the memberverbsdo. The resultsof my analysisarethat verbsfor whichtheint% nto fonn is basic fall into aboutsevensubclasses, of which four allow derivationof thewith fonn, andverbsfor which the with fonn is basic fall into aboutsevensubclass es, of which two allow derivation of the int% nto fonn. The criteria for the class definitions include the thematic predicatesand featuresused in the previous discussionsand also a set of featurespertainingto force (seeTalmy, 1988), aspectsof the dimensional geometryof solids (seeTalmy, 1983; Jackendoff, 1987c), andaclassificationsimilar to the count/massdistinctionin whichmatter is construedeitheras a discreteboundedentity or asa boundarilesscontinuum; typically this will result in singleobjectsbeingdesignatedascountlike, andin of small indistinguishable , and aggregates liquids, powders, semisolid substances . as masslike objectsbeingdesignated Theexactdifferentiation of thenonalternatingclassesfrom oneanotheris not crucialaslongasthecriteria distinguishingthemfrom thealternatingclassesare clear. Similarly, there are severalnonalternatingclassesnot listed hereat all becausetheirmeaningis evenmoreremovedfrom thenotionof puttinganobject

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into or onto a surface or container , for example , verbs of applying force (push, shove,force , etc.) . The content-oriented or int% nto verbs fall into the following classes: I . Alternating . Simultaneous forceful contact and motion of a mass against a surface: He smeared grease on the axle / He smeared the axle with grease. Includes brush , dab , daub , plaster , rub , slather , smear , smudge, spread , streak. For many of the verbs a resulting shapeis specified , usually corresponding to the deverbal noun: a smear , a smudge, and so on ( Rappaport and Levin , 1985) . 2. Alternating . Vertical arrangement on a horizontal surface: He heaped bricks on the stool / He heaped the stool with bricks . Includes heap , pile , stack. 3. Alternating . Force is imparted to a mass, causing ballistic motion in a specified spatial distribution along a trajectory : She splashed water on the dog / Shesplashedthe dog with water. Includes inject , spatter , splash , splatter , spray , 12 sprinkle , squirt .

4. Alternating. Mass is causedto move in a widespreador nondirected distribution: Thefarmer scatteredseedsonto thefield / Thefarmer scatteredthe field with seeds(the latter is marginal for some speakers ). Includesbestrew, scatter, sow, strew. 5. Nonalternating.A massis enabledto move via the force of gravity: She dribbled paint onto the floor / * She dribbled the floor with paint . Includes dribble, drip , drizzle, dump, ladle, pour, shake, slop, slosh, spill . 6. Nonalternating.Flexible objectextendedin one dimensionis put around anotherobject(prepositionisaround) : He coiled the chainaroundthepole / * He coiled thepole with the chain. Includescoil , spin, twirl , twist, whirl , wind. 7. Nonalternating. Massis expelledfrom inside an entity: He spat tobacco juice onto the table / * He spat the table with tobaccojuice . Includes emit, excrete,expectorate,expel, exude,secrete,spew, vomit. (In the next sectionwe will seethat theseverbsalso behaveasa classwith respectto causativization.) We couldalsoaddan eighth, nonalternatingclass, not includedin Rappaport andLevin' s list: verbsof attachment , suchasattach,fasten, glue, nail ,paste,pin , stick and . all , , staple tape They imply theexistenceof anintermediateinstrument or substance object holding objectstogether, and usually specify the geometry of the attachmentregion (e.g., at a point versussharinga surface). The container-orientedor with verbsfall into the following classes: 1. Alternating. A massis forced into a container againstthe limits of its capacity: Theypackedoakuminto thecrack/ Theypackedthecrack with oakum. Includesthe waddingsenseof pack, as well as cram, crowd, jam , stuff, wad. 2. Alternating. A massof a size, shape,or type definedby the intendeduseof a container(andnot purely by its geometry) is put into the container, enabling it to accomplishits function: Max loaded the gun with bullets / Max loaded

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bulletsinto thegun. Includesload,pack(whatonedoesto suitcases ), stock(what onedoesto shelves). . A layercompletelycoversa surface: Theyinundatedthe 3. Nonalternating * field with waterI Theyinundatedwateronto thefield . The layermaybe liquid, asin deluge, douse,flood , andinundate, or solid, as in bandage, blanket, coat, cover, encrust,face, inlay,pad,pave,plate, shroud, smother, tile. Line andedge are similar, exceptwith one lessdimension;fill and perhapsoccupyare also similar, with onemoredimension. 4. Nonalternating. Addition of an object or mass to a location causesan estheticor qualitative, oftenevaluative,changein the location: Theyadornedthe gift with ribbons/ * Theyadornedribbonsonto the gift . Includesadorn, burden, clutter, deck,dirty , embellish,emblazon,endow, enrich,festoon,garnish. imbue, infect, litter , ornament,pollute, replenish, season, soil , stain, taint, trim. 5. Nonalternating.A massiscausedto becoextensivewith a solidor layerlike medium: Shesoakedthespongewith water/ * Shesoakedwaterinto thesponge. The mass may be composedof layers or strings, as in interlace, interlard, interleave, intersperse,interweave , lard , ripple, vein, or of liquids, asin drench, soak stain (what one doesto wood), suffuse. saturate , , , , impregnate infuse 6. Nonalternating.An objector massimpedesthefreemovementof , from, or throughtheobjectin whichit is put: 1cloggedthe sink with a cloth / * 1clogged a cloth into the sink,. Sheboundhim with rope / * Sheboundrope onto/around him. Includesverbspertainingto liquids in containers, asin block, choke, clog, dam,plug , stopup, andboundmovableobjects, asin bind, chain, entangle,lash, lasso, rope. 7. Nonalternating.A setof objectsis distributedovera surface: Theystudded the coat with metal stars / * Theystuddedmetal stars onto the coat. Includes bombard, blot, dapple,13riddle, speckle,splotch, spot. stud. The type of object is specifiedby the verb (a splotch, a hole, a stud, etc.). Finally, therearetwo alternatingverbsthathavea uniquegeometryandhence . String (asin Theystrunglights could be seenasbelongingto one-word classes on the roof / Theystrungtheroof with lights) involves a staticarrangementof a linear object alonga surface. Wrapat first glanceseemssimilar in someways to cover (with form only) andin otherwaysto wind or coil (aroundform only). Its absoluteminimumrequirementis thata flexible objectconformto partof the shapeof an object along two or more orthogonaldimensions. Thus it is not wrappingwhenoneinstallsshelfpapercut to theexactsizeof theshelf, but it can becalledwrappingif thepaperextendsbeyondthe edgesof theshelfandis bent aroundthem. . All the classesare clearly compatiblewith their Motivationfor the classes int% nto classesall specify the kind of force or thematic cores . The respective

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directionof motion accordingto which the thememovesor is causedto move: it is forcedagainstsomething(smear), aroundsomething(wrap), allover the place(scatter), thanksto gravity (dribble), againstgravity (pile), or with some impartedforce. The verbsin thewith classall specifya changeof stateresulting from theadditionof material, usuallypertainingto theentireobject: aqualitative change, usually with estheticor evaluativeconnotations(adorn, pollute); a decreasein freedomto move(block, bind) ; a definiJionallyholistic coextensive spatialarrangementeitherin a solid (saturate) or surface(cover).14 Themotivationfor whichclassesalternatecomesfrom two sources. First, as in the caseof the dative, the conversionof an int% nto-locative into a withlocativecausesa goal argumentto becomea patient. Therefore,typesof actions that canmoreeasily be construedas somethingthatcanhappento the goal are morelikely to supportthereconstrualof thegoalasa patientandmorelikely , as a class, to undergolocativization. Second, container-oriented(with-locative) verbscannotmerely specifythat a changeof statehasoccurredby covering or filling but must specify whatthat stateis; otherwisethey would all be synonymous withfill and cover (andwe know that languagesavoid true synonymity; this " Principle of Contrast," Clark, 1987, will be discussedin more detail in chapter6). Likewise, content-oriented(int% nto-locative) verbsmustnotmerely specify the movementof a substanceto a location but must specify some ; particularmannerof causationor motion or someparticularkind of substance otherwisethey would all be synonymouswith put. Thereforethe verbs in the alternatingcontent-orientedclassesshouldcontaininformationthat allows the speakerto predictaparticular statechangeof thegoal, notjust that the goal has esshouldcontain changedstate, and the alternatingcontainer-orientedsubclass informationthat allows the speakerto predictwhatkind of thing movesor how it moves, not just that somethingmoves. This kind of interpredictability, in addition to the generaleaseof cognitively reconstruinga motion as a state esalternate. change, seemsto characterizethe choiceof which subclass Thusin thesmearclassthelocationandmovedsubstance simultaneouslyfeel the forceof theaction, andin thesprayclasstheforceimpartedto theobject can aim it in a direction. This is in contrastto thepour class, wheregravity is a force mediatingbetweenthe immediateeffect on themovingobjectandthe effect on the destination. Furthermore,the kind of pressure , direction, andmotion specified in thesmearverbsallowsoneto predictwith reasonable specificitythe distribution of the substanceon the surface(a smear,a dab, etc.) thatcharacterizes how the surfacehaschanged . Similarly, in thesprayclassthereis a necessary of a and distribution of the theme, whosecross-sectionhelps imposition shape to predictthe shapeof the adheringlayer on thesurfaceat which it arrives. For verbs that alternatein the other direction, we would expectthat the specified

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effect on the containeror surfacealso imposesconstraintson theact of moving the contents. Thusfor stuff verbs, the amountmoved is definedas " too much" with respectto thecapacityof thecontainer; for load verbsthemovedobjectsare of a shape, size, andkind appropriateto the container. Whethermotivation-byinterpredictabilityis psychologicalor merely historical is an openquestion, of course; given the strongfunctional pressureto avoid synonymityin language acquisition(Clark, 1987), it could be psychological. If thegeneralanalysisdescri~ d in this sectionis correct, it is alsointeresting es can contain any numberof verbs, perhapseven that the conflation subclass one. That would suggestthat subclass-definedgeneralizationsarenot licensed by a statistical averagingprocess triggered by large numbersof similarly behavingverbs, but that eachalternatingverb definesa generalizableregionin semanticspacearoundit , with any verb falling into that regionautomatically sharingits privilegeto alternate.I will explorethis phenomenonin greaterdepth in chapters5 and6. RappaportandLevin call attentionto a numberof closelyrelatedalternations. As I would predict, all of them apply freely only within well-defined narrow subclass es, notjust to any verb in the relevantcognitive domain. For example, " " the among verbsof imageimpression, we have alternators(He brandedhis of nameonto thefence/ He brandedthefence with his name) andnonalternators * / bothkinds (He wrotehis nameinto the book He wrote thebookwith his name,. He illustrated thepagewith a picture / * He illustrated a pictureonto thepage). Theint% nto nonalternators , roughly, constrainpropertiesof thetypeof pattern either their source , (copy, plot , sketch, trace), mannerof creation impressed by (doodle, scrawl, scribble), or symbolic type (draw , letter, write). The with nonalternatorsentaila specifickind of esthetic, evaluative, or purposivechange of the surface(adorn, decorate, embellish, illustrate). The alternators, which includebrand, emboss , embroider, engrave, etch, imprint, inscribe, mark, set, stamp, andtattoo, specifya particularmanneror meansin whichthesurfacewas affectedandpropertiesof thesubstanceof theimageandthemediumontowhich it is put, all definedin concretephysical terms(e.g., with the useof a brandor thread, madefrom ink or burnedmaterial, underneathskin or on a surfaceor piercing cloth). What seemsto be crucial is that thesepropertiesare defined physically and not in terms of either the symbolic propertiesof image (e.g., drawingversuslettersversusnumbers) or theestheticpurposeof the inscription (e.g., decoration). Likewise, the relatedemptyalternation consistsof threealternatingclasses and severalnonalternatingclasses. One classof alternatorsincludethosethat specifya specifickind of void endstateregardlessof manner(He cleareddishes from the table/ He clearedthe table of dishes; alsoclean, cleanse,empty, strip).

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Therearealsoalternatorsthat area bit lessfree in thatthey allow eitherthefrom fonn or a fonn with the sourceasdirect object but lacking an of-phrase. These alternatorscanbe neatly characterizedasspecifyingeither a particularmanner of removalvia contactwith the source(Shewipedcrumbsfrom the table / She wiped the table (* of crumbs); also scrub, wash, wring, skim), or a particular instrumentof removal (He vacuumedlint from the carpet / He vacuumedthe . carpet(* oflint ), also comb,filter , hose, mop, sponge). Interestingly, Talmy ( 1985) points out that verbs involving the removal of ' objectsor conditionsfrom people s possession(alienableor inalienable) virtually neveralternate:Sherobbedhim of his money/ * Sherobbed his moneyfrom him; Shestolemoneyfrom him / * Shestolehim of his money. Verbsresembling stealincludeseize, recover, withhold, grab; verbsresemblingrob include bilk , cheat, cure,fleece, relieve, unburden. (Rip offis thechief exception; onecanrip off Ma Bell or Rip off moneyfrom Ma Bell.) This wholesale exclusion of -removalverbs is fortunate, becausesteal and rob in particular are possession basicallysynonymsexceptfor their choiceof direct object. If the restof their semanticfield could alternate, they would stand as embarrassingnegative .IS exceptions 4.4.3 CausativizableVerbs Not all intransitiveverbscan be transfonnedinto causativetransitives, and not all causativetransitivescanbe transfonnedin the oppositedirection, into " anticausative " intransitives. Therearethreemain classesof intransit ivesthat canbe causativized . First, thereareverbsof extrinsicchangeof physicalstate; examples are listed in (4.28). In the intransitive fonn the changeis not causedby an identifiableexternalagent; this distinguishes inchoativessuch as Theplastic shrankfrom passivessuchas Theplastic wasshrunk. (4.28) The box opened/ closed/ melted/ shrank/ shattered. I opened/ closed/ melted/ shrank/ shatteredthe box. A secondalternatingclass- see(4.29) - involves contained motion taking " " placein a particularmanner. By contained I meanthat it is possiblefor the centerof massof the moving object to remainroughly in one " place" while its partsmove, asin John slid in onespotfor an hour. 16The motion is of a kind that need not be internally caused; that is, skidding can be either voluntary or involuntary, andit belongsto this class; runningcanonly be voluntary, and it is excluded. (4.29) The log slid / skidded/ floated/ rolled / bounced. Brian slid / skidded/ floated/ rolled / bouncedthe log.

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A third kind of alternatingverb undergoesa semanticchangethat is not the sameasthatof thepreviousclasses . Onesubclass , presentedin (4.30a), involves mannerof locomotion, andin its transitiveversionthe senseis oneof coercing or encouragingthe locomotion. The othersubclass , shownin (4.30b), signifies an instrumentof transportation , andin the transitiveform it signifiesenabling and accompanyingthe transportation . (4.30) (a) The horsewalked/ galloped/ trotted/ raced/ ran/ jumped/ pastthe barn. I walked/ galloped/ trotted/ raced/ ran/ jumped/ logged the horse pastthe barn. (b) Shedrove/ flew / cycled/ ferried/ boated/ sailed/ motoredto New York. CaptainMarsdrove/ flew / cycled/ ferried/ boated/ sailed/ motored her to New York. Thereareseveralsubclass esof verbsthatmighthavebeenthoughtto alternate but in fact do not. Themostnotableis theclassof verbsof motion systematically in a lexically specifieddirection, asshownin (4.31). In contrastto verbsof manner of motion, theseverbstreatthe themeasa dimensionlesspoint undergoing . . a translationin space. (4.31) My sonwent to school. * 1went my sonto school. His sistercamehomefrom the hospital. * He camehis sisterhomefrom the hospital. The flag rose. * 1 rosethe flag. The shoefell. * He fell the shoe. (alsoascend , descend , leave, exit, enter, arrive) subclass esincludeverbsof volitional or internally Othernoncausativizable 17 causedactions, asin (4.32); verbsof cominginto or going out of existence,as in (4.33); 18most verbs of emotionalexpression , as in (4.34); and verbs of emissionincludingemissionof lights, sounds , and substances , as in (4.35). (4.32) Sally ate. * Ben ate [= fed] Sally. (Also jump, hop, run, drink, sing, etc.) (4.33) Bobbydied. * Catherinedied Bobby. (Also expire, decease , perish, croak, pass away, kick off , bite the dust, etc.; seeTalmy, 1985)

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The bird vanished. * Thepin vanishedthebubble. (Also , disintegrate , etc.) appear,disappear (4.34) The audiencesmiled. * Irv smiledhis audience. (Also cry, laugh, frown, blink, etc.)19 (4.35) The light glowed. * Barbaraglowed the light. (Also glitter, glisten, shimmer, blaze, etc.) The sawhowled. * Billy howled the saw. (Also whine, shriek, buzz, chatter, sing) The saucebubbled. * Hazelbubbledthe sauce.(Also erupt, smoke, sweat[e.g., asappliedto cheeseor wood] , ooze, puff, leak, bleed, shed.~ Note that the complementarysubclass es that expressthe samekinds of meaningsin transitiveverbsall resistthe reverseprocessof anticausativization formation: thetransitiveverbsof causationof directedmotioncannotbeusedintransitively, asshownin (4.36); norcanverbsof killing , creating,or destroying, as shown in (4.37); nor can verbsof inducingbehavior, asshownin (4.38). (4.36)

*

I took my son to school. My sontook to school.

I broughtmy sister home. * My sisterbrought home. I raisedthe flag . * The flag raised. (4.37) Catherinekilled Bobby. * Bobby killed [= died] . (Also slay, murder, dispatch, liquidate, assassinate , slaughter, exterminate , waste, do in, etc.; seeTalmy, 1985) They createda monster. * A monstercreated. (4.38) Jack tickled Sally. * , feed, bribe, convince, etc.) Sally tickled. (Also amuse, nauseate It is important not to confusethesepure inchoativesentences , which can denotespecific events, with middles, which asserta propertyof the subject. Typically middlesappearwith adverbials,asin Bureaucratsbribeeasily, though theadverbialmeaningcanalsobesuppliedby otherelementssuchasintonation or negation: This lock won' t pick (it ' s lammed); Around here, bureaucrats BRIBE! (seeKeyserand Roeper, 1984, and Hale andKeyser, 1986, 1987). In addition, as we noted with referenceto (4.10), verbsof motion-contacteffect do not anticausativize:* Thebreadcut / sliced/ hacked.This is trueeven

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thoughcausationis inherentto their meaningandvisible to otherselectivealternations suchasthemiddle, which requiresit (Thebreadcut I brokeI * hit easily), andthecontact-locativealternation,whichforbids it (I * cutI * brokeI hit theknife againstthe bread(= cut / broke/ hit the breadwith the knife)} \ Motivation for the causativizableclasses. As before, one can discern a motivationfor thedesignationof subclass esthat do or do not permit alternations in eachdirection. Interestingly, the rationalesare of two kinds. In somecases , the languagesimplydoesnot supplyanytransitiveverballowing oneto express the notion that X actson Y, causingY to change, act, or move as a result. For example, thereareno verbsthat meanto causesomeoneto rejoice, cry, shout, drink, talk, or sleep. It is asif sucheventsareinherentlynoncausable directlyby anexternalagent, sincetheyinvolveaninherentinternalcausethatmustmediate any effect of an externalagent. In English, most verbs of physical emission assimilateto this pattern, as if the ability to emit a light, sound, or substance inheresin the emitterandcanbecausedfrom the outsideonly indirectly. Conversely , there are caseswhere there is no way to use an intransitive verb to expressthe notion that a particularevent, usually caused,can occur spontaneously or in the absenceof a causeor agent, suchasbeingcut or amused.It is as if sucheventswereconceivedas being inherently unoccurrablewithout some externalcause. Thesearephenomenapertaining to the possibleconflationsof meaningelementswithin Englishverbs, motivatedby the cognitive contentof the notion " direct causation." (SeeB. Levin , 1985, and Guerssel, 1986, for of thedifferencebetweenintrinsic discussionsof thegrammaticalconsequences causation, whereit is implied that someproperty inherentto the object itself is responsiblefor its behavingin a certainway, andextrinsiccausation,wherethe .) causalantecedentmay not be inherentin the object' s essence Theotherkind of motivationis quitedifferent: For somekinds of events,both inchoativeintransitiveandcausativetransitive meaningsexist, but they arenot allowedto sharethesameverb root, suchaskill anddie, bring andcome, or take -depriving verbsin the andgo (this phenomenonis also seenin the possession locative class, such as steal and rob). This is due not to the existenceor nonexistenceof possibleconflationsof meaningbut to the existenceor nonexistence of narrow-rangelexical rulesthat map betweenthem. (Anotherway of putting it is that suchrulesdeterminewhetherstemscanbe sharedamongverbs .) Intuitively, the rules governing stem-sharing in different conflation classes ' reflecthow muchthe languageletsyou bendor enricha verb s meaningbefore it hasto be treatedasa completelydifferent verb. In effect, the lexicongroups somekinds of eventstogetherasexemplarsof the samekind, to be expressed by a singleverb, anddifferentiatesotherkindsof events. If Johnkills Bill , is thatjust causinghim to die, or is there somethingunique aboutthe act of killing that

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makes it different from the sum of its parts of causing and dying ? English provides one kind of answer to this question . In their surveyof causativealternations in over a hundred languages, Nedyalkov and Silnitsky ( 1973) offer intriguing partial support for the hypothesis that while the exact verbs that participate in causative alternations differ across languages, there are systematic patterns governing which verbs are most likely to alternate. They found that no language allowed a lexical causative form of laugh , or even a suppletive verb meaning " cause to laugh" (though some could express it with a separatecausativeaffix ) . Causing to laugh is simply not expressible as a simple lexical item. In contrast, break was quite likely to participate in a lexical causative alternation (as it does in English ) . Boil and burn were somewhere in between; they were also the only verbs among these four that ever appeared in suppletive causative/ noncausative pairs . One can speculate that these phenomena are related to those verbs ' being associated with notions of going out of existence and/ or of emitting substances, which in general are not causativizable in English , presumably becauseof the greater connotation of important internal causal influences. This all suggeststhat there is a universal continuum of lexical causativizability , presumably corresponding to the easeof conceiving of a given kind of event as being directly causable from without , running from verbs for human actions to verbs for simple state changes, perhaps with verbs for changes involving emission and disappearance in between.

4.4.4 PassivizableVerbs In section3.3.4.4 I proposedthat the thematiccore of passiveparticiples is "X is in the circumstancedefined by Yacting on it." That is, X is a theme in the circumstancefield; the position in that field thatX occupiesis defined in terms of X beinga patientand Y being an agent. Thus Mary was hit by John means " ' " roughly Mary is in thecircumstancecharacterizedby John s hitting her. I tried to show how certain kinds of verbs- symmetricalpredicates , prepositional passivesandidiomswith no possiblesenseof patienthoodassociatedwith the , possession object, and static relationsof spatial arrangement , and measurement - areunpassivizable becausetheyareincompatiblewith thisthematiccore. The logic was the sameas that used in explaining the dative, locative, and causativealternations : the syntacticform of the passive,the changein interpretation that it engenders , andits patternof selectivityacrossverbsare all manifestations of a single principle, the principle that argument structures are projectionsof thematiccores} 2 The discussionsof the dative, causative, and locative alternations in this chapterdealt with the problem that the thematiccore theory did not rule out enoughverbs: someverbsthat were cognitively compatiblewith the thematic

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core did not alternate(i.e., they were negativeexceptions ). This requiredthe additionalclaimthatthethematiccoresa.~sociatedwith broad-rangerulesdo not ruleout verbsdirectlybut motivatenarrow-rangerulesthatlicensetheactualinclusion or exclusionof verbs. For thepassive,the storyhasto be different. The ' problem isn t thatthe semanticcorrelatesof passivizationfail to excludesome verbs. On thecontrary, all verbsthatclearlyhaveagentsandpatients nonpassivizable passivize. Thereare no agent-patientverbsthat puzzleus in the way that throw and shoutdid for thedative, die andfall did for thecausative,or pour and coil did for thelocative. Thusthereis no needfor narrowconflationclassesand narrow-range rules that carve up the verbs with agentsand patients; the semanticsof thebroad-rangerule aresufficientto includethemall. Thepassivefacestheoppositeproblem. Manyverbsthatpassivizedo not have argumentsthat we would easily classifyasagentsandpatients. Thus we must explainhow thebroad-rangeruleof passivizationisextendedto coververbsthat do not appearto meet its semanticconditions, not how it is restricted from applyingto verbsthatdo. Theproblemis no lesshardthanthosewe facedfor the otheralternations,becausethedistinctionsbetweenverbslackingpatientobjects thatdo anddo notpassivizeappearobscure.First, therearepairsof verbsor verb formswith similarmeaningsbut differentthematicrolesassignedto their object arguments,andbothforms passivize.This wouldappearto vitiate any principle thatwould restrictpassivizationto verbswhoseobjectshaveparticularthematic roles. Examplesaretheformsrelatedby thedativeandlocativealternations,and pairsof psychologicalverbsoneof which hasanexperiencersubject, likefear , the other of which has a stimulus subject, like frighten. Second, there are passivizableconcreteevent verbswhosesubjectshaveroles other than agent, suchas receive, whosesubjectis a goal, andopen, whosesubjectcan be an instrument (as in Thedoor was openedby a brasskey). Third, althoughcertain highly stativeor abstractverbsfail to passivize(idiom chunks, measureverbs), manyothers do, suchasDrastic measureswerejustified by the dire situation. Fourth, verbs defining spatial relations sometimesdo (e.g., surround) and sometimesdon' t (e.g., contain) passivize. Fifth, verbsdefining possessional ' relationssometimesdo (e.g. own) andsometimesdon t (e.g., have) passivize. It is theseborderlinecasesthathavemadethesemanticboundariesof passivization so difficult to characterizein thepast; I know of no theorythat demarcates theseboundariesfully . ' theverybroadrangeof theEnglishpassive? It won t How canwecharacterize work to saythatthepassiveis a purelysyntacticrulethatappliesto anyverbwith a syntacticobject, becausethat is false. But if passivizabilityis dueonly to the thematicconcomitantsof thebroad-rangepassiverule, we would expectit to be confined to verbstaking obviousagentsand patients, which it is not. A third

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possibilityis thatpassivization, like theotheralternations,is actuallylicensedby a set of narrow-range rules with subtle semanticconditions and that these numerousmini-passiverules happento exhaustall of the subclass esof agentverbs in and embrace some but not all of the , , patient English nonagentive subclass es aswell. This is a possibility that I cannotrule out conclusively, but if true it would be surprisingthat we do not find at leasta few pocketsof unpassivizableagent-patient verbs, as we do for the other alternations. The solutionthat I think is most reasonabletakesoff from Bolinger ( 1977a) andS. Anderson( 1977), who suggestedthatpassivizationseemsto applywhen the object either is a patient or is capableof being construedas one. More precisely, I will suggestthe following . The broad-rangerule of passivization appliesproductively to all and only the transitiveverbs that haveagentsand patients.Thusit suppliesasufficientconditionfor a verbto alternate,andin that regardit is unlike the dative, causative, andlocativealternations,whosebroadrangerules merely define necessaryconditions(which then motivatea set of narrow-range rules that are the actual sourceof the sufficient conditions). However, simple action or changeverbsarenot the only onesthat haveagents and patients. English has a number of verbs that are ambiguousbetween meaningswith agent-patient roles and meaningswith other roles, and it hasa numberof rulesthat convertverbslackingagentsubjectsandpatientobjectsinto relatedformsthatdo havetheseassignments . It is theversionsof theseverbswith and that similar versions that lack theserolesdo not. ; agents patients passivize To support this analysis, I will rely on two assumptionsthat have already es. First, the notionof patient(like pervadedmy analysesof otherverb subclass otherthematicrelations) canbe usedin nonphysicalsemanticfields, so it does not refer only to entities that arephysically actedupon. (The abstractnotion of patientthat I employ is discussedin more detail in section5.5.7.) Second,the required agent-patient relations need constituteonly one componentof the verb' s meaning; any numberof other setsof semanticrelationscanalsobe defined and the passiverule will not be blockedby them. In the next five subsections , I will use theseassumptionsto show why passivizationdoesor doesnot apply to variouskindsof verbs, andthenI will try to explain why the passiveis different from the other alternations. 4.4.4.1 Passivizable Action Verbs Let me start with the most straightforward cases, involving verbs denoting actions. All the subclasses of two argument verbs discussed so far that have actional patients and themes, including verbs of effect ( i .e., lexical causatives) and motion -contact-effect (e.g ., cut ) obviously are compatible with the passive thematic core. There is already a state that the verb predicates of the passive subject, and a patient relation defined for

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it. Likewise, we have alreadyseenhow the verbs undergoingthe dative and locativealternationshavetwo relatedsemanticforms, eachof which assignsa patientand a themerole to the argumentappearingas direct object. In They loadedhayinto the wagon, theobjecthayis construedasthe patientof the action that resultsin its being the themeof a changeof location; in Theyloaded the wagonwith hay, theobjectthewagonis construedasthe patientof theactionthat resultsin its being the themeof a changeof state(from empty to full ). The todative alternationis similar. The prepositionalform with to is construedas havinganagentchangethe locationof its objectargument; theobjectis thusthe patient of the action perfonned by the agentand the theme of the resulting locationchange. Thus it is passivizable , asin Thebook wasgivento John. The doubleobject counterpartis construedas having an agent act on a person, causinghim to gain possessionof something.Thus the personis the patientof -changeevent. in thepossession theactperfonnedby theagentandthepossessor This specification of a patient makes the double-object fonn eligible for : John wasgivena book.23 passivization 4.4.4.2 The Thematic Relations Hypothesis Extended to Agent-Patient Relations Now what aboutnonactionaltransitiveverbs? Earlier I suggested thatthereis a moregeneralsenseof agencyandpatienthood, havingto do with , that allowedthe passivethematiccore to responsibilityand abstractcausation beextendedto manysubclass esof abstractverbs. Canthis bestatedmoreexplicitly ? Lakoff ( 1977) offers one proposal. He lists a set of properties that a" prototypical" causationevent, sothateventspossessing somebut characterize not all of thesepropertiesare still construableas involving causationbut less prototypicallyso. Prototypicalcausationinvolvesa single, willful , humanagent whodeliberatelytransfersenergytowarda singleperceivedpatientwho noticeably changesstateasa resultin a singlelocalevent. HopperandThompson( 1980) offer a similar definition of the prototypical" transitive" event, andMaratsoset al. ( 1985) specifically note its relevanceto passivizability. A somewhatmore systematicaccountcomesfrom Talmy ( 1988). Talmy offers a theory according to which the roles of agent and patient can be generalizedin a quasi-metaphoricalway to nonactionalfields, just as the roles of theme, goal, source, location, and path have been generalizedfrom literal , identity, communication, , possession spatiallocationto fields of circumstance andsoon (Gruber, 1965; Jackendoff, 1972, 1983, 1987a). Accordingto Talmy, thereis anintuitive notion of " forcedynamics" that pervadeslexical semantics, just asthereis a notion of topologythat underliesthe classicthematicrelations of themes, locations, and paths( Talmy, 1983). In this force-dynamic model, objectsareconceivedasbodieswith inherenttendenciestowardmotion or rest.

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An agonist is a body whosestateof motion or rest is being focusedon in a . An antagonistis a body impingingon anagonist, imposingacountersentence actingforcetowardmotionor rest, which sumsw.ith the inherenttendencyof the ' agonistto determinewhathappensto it. Whentheagonist s tendencyis toward ' rest andthe"antagonists is towardmotion and the latter is stronger, the agonist moves; thisis illustratedperiphrasticallyin (4.39a). Whentheagonist'stendency is toward motion and the antagonist's tendencytoward rest is stronger, the agoniststaysput; see(4.39b). Theseareexamplesof steady-statecausation.If the antagonistis not therefrom the beginningbut comesinto placeandexertsits effect, we haveonsetcausation , asin (4.39c, d). In all four of theseexamplesthe result is in oppositionto the agonist's intrinsic tendency. If an antagonistis removed, allowing the agonistto move or not move accordingto its inherent " " tendency, we haveonsetpermissiveor letting causation, as in (4.3ge, f) . (4.39) (a) The ball kept rolling becauseof the wind blowing on it. (b The log kept lying on the incline becauseof the ridge there. ' (c) The ball s hitting it madethe lamp topplefrom the table. ' (d) The water s drippingon it madethe fire die down. ' (e) The plug s cominglooselet the water flow from the tank. ' (f) The stirring rod s breakinglet the particlessettle. The force-dynamicanalysisoffers a common set of elementsout of which various relatednotionsassociatedwith agencyand causationcan be defined, including causationby anevent, an agent, or an instrument; causationby onset or within a steadystate; permissiveor " letting" causation;" inducive" causation of activity by an agent; andcausationof changeversusabsenceof change. (In chapter5 I will outline an explicit theory of how this spaceof possibilitiesis mentally representedin semanticstructure.) Furthermore, the domain of causationneednot bephysicalmotionandrest; Talmy givesexampleswherethe ' analysisextendsto intrapsychicforces, asin thecontrastbetweenHe didn t close thedoor andHe refrainedfromclosingthedoor, andsocialforces, asin thecontrast betweenShetold him to leaveandSheurgedhim to leave. He alsosuggests that they can be extendedto epistemicdomainsof inferenceand reasoning,as when one is " forced" to a conclusion. Of more immediateinterest, Talmy arguesthat the notion of agentcan be defined within this systemas an antagonistwhoseintrinsic force tendencyis volitional. Thussimplecausalsentences suchas} ohnbrokethelamparenotfundamentally different from The ball ' s hitting it broke the lamp. (In agent causation, as in othertypesof causation, a numberof microscopicintervening genericlinks in the causalchain are usually omitted.) Talmy also formalizes someof thekeysemanticelementsof a varietyof definitionsof open- andclosed-

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139 make , get, stop, try ,

What this analysisbuys us is a setof featuresthat canbe usedto extendthe notionsof agentandpatientin a way that allowsfor thepossibilitythat abstract verbshavesuchroles. In transitiveverbsin general, patientscorrespondto agonists, agentsto antagonists ; hencethe agonist is mappedonto object and 24 onto antagonistmapped subject. We can say that the minimal agent-patient relation is one where two entities are involved in a single asymmetrical ' relationship defined by one entity s exerting somecausalpower againstthe other; the natureof this exertionis specifiedby the particularverb. Thus many transitiveverbsthat are not actionalcannonetheless be seenashavingabstract agentandpatientroles, andpassivizationwill applyto them. Let meexaminethe circumstancesin which this canhappen. 4.4.4.3 PassivizableAbstract and Stative Verbs Instrumentalsubjects. Verbs whosesubjectsplay the role of instrumentcanpassivize:Thebrasskey openedthedoor I The door wasopenedby the brasskey. This is often takenas evidencethat the English passivecan apply regardlessof thematicrole. However that thesubjectof thesesentences , this assumes truly playsnosemanticrole other than instrument. This is false. Not just any instrumentcan becomea ' subject: * A spoon ate the cereal; * The telescopesaw the galaxy; * } ohn s graphite racketwonthe tennismatch. B. Levin ( 1985) andRappaportandLevin (in press) point out that only intermediaryinstrumentscanbecomesubjects,not just facilitating instruments. An intermediaryinstrumentis basicallya participant in the penultimate event of a causalchain, ordinarily unexpressedor . In other words, thereis a temporallyunfoldingchain" Johnacts backgrounded on key CAUSESkey actson door CAUSESdoor opens" but no causalchain " John actson " spoonCAUSESspoonactson cerealCAUSEScerealis eaten, becausein thelatter casethe specifiedgrain sizefor theeventsforcesinclusion of an additionaleventof Johnactingon thecerealin orderfor it to beeaten. Thus instrumentalsubjectsare also, by grammaticalnecessity , agentlikeproximal antagonistsor causes.Englishappearsto havea narrow-rangerule thatwe could call " intermediaryinstrumentpromotion," whichconvertsverbswith a multilink causalchaincontainingan intermediaryinstrumentargumentinto verbswith a two-link chainin which theinstrumentargumentis thefirst link , hencea kind of agent, hencesubject. That is the versionthat feedsthe passiverule. Epistemicand deontic verbs. Verbsexpressingabstractrelationscan sometimes be construedas involving generalizedagentsandpatients. Propositions and situationscanbe seento possessthe analogueof causalor forcetendencies that canresultin otherpropositionsor situationsbeingtrueor comingaboutthat

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otherwisewould not, or that by being eliminatedno longerpreventthemfrom beingtrueor comingabout. In fact, manyEnglishverbs- see(4.40) - take either animate or abstractreferents as their subjects, which is consistentwith the suggestionthat agentsare simply volitional causes.Englishseemsto haveone " or more rules that we could call " epistemicagentdisembodiment , converting verbs with an animateargument whoseactionscausean epistemicor deontic changeinto verbs with an abstractargumentthat ensuresor engenderssucha stateby meansof theforceof its content. If Talmy is correct, theseabstractverbs still havea kind of agentargument, andtheapplicability of passivizationto them follows. (4.40) Johnjustified the new treaty. / The new treaty wasjustified by John. Thehorrorsof thelast warjustified the newtreaty. / Thenew treatywas justified by the horrors of the last war. Thejudge nullified the amendment . / The amendmentwasnullified by thejudge. The principles of the constitution nullify such an amendment . / The amendmentis nullified by principlesof the constitution. Johnprovedthe theorem. / The theoremwasprovedby John. Thesestepsprovethe theorem. / The theoremis provedby thesesteps. Bob createda golden opportunity for us. / A goldenopportunitywas createdfor us by John. Falling interestrateshavecreateda goldenopportunityfor us. / A golden opportunityhasbeencreatedfor us by falling interestrates. " " Psych-verbs. Transitive psychologicalverbs, also lacking agentsandpatients , arean importanttopic of currentresearchon argumentstructurebecause they come in two complementaryforms: thoselike pleaseandfrighten, where the stimulusis the subject, and thoselike like andfear , wherethe experienceris the subject. Furthermore,they differ in how variousgrammaticalprocess esapply to their subjects,suchasthe binding of anaphoricelementswithin them(see, e.g., Belletti andRizzi, 1986; Grimshaw, in press). It is thereforecuriousthaton the faceof it , both kindsof verbs passivize:John wasfeared/liked by Bill ,' John wasfrightened/pleasedby Bill . But how could this be soin a theoryin which the links betweenthematicroles and grammaticalfunctionsarecritical? Thereare two possibilities. Onepossibility is thatonly one of thesesubclass eshasa mappingof thematic roles onto argumentstructurethat supportspassivization; the other subclassin fact lacks a verbalpassiveand the passive" participles" we seeareactuallyadjectives . This is clearly the casein Italian wherethe two kindsof passiveforms

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are morphologicallydistinct (Belletti and Rizzi, 1986). Grimshawnotes that thereis someevidencethat this might be true in Englishaswell; if so, it would beconsistentwith a newversionof Jackendoff'sThematicHierarchyCondition that she has developed . She points out thatfrighten verbs clearly can be , becausetheyhaveuniquelyadjectivalproperties. They can adjectivalpassives undergonegativeun-prefixation(Bettywasunperturbedby thesituation/ * The situation unperturbedBetty). Theyappearascomplementsto certainadjectiveselectingverbslike seem(Johnseemssick/frightenedbythesituation/ * running / * hit by Bill ). And they accepta variety of prepositions , not just the verbal ' passives by (Berry wasfrightened by / of / at I about the thoughtof leaving). Grimshaw also points out that v..11ereas frighten verbs can appearwith the in the The active situation was ( progressive depressingMary), it cannotdo soas felicitously in thepassive( ?Mary wasbeingdepressed by thesituation). This is exactlywhatonewouldexpectif thepassivewasadjectival(cf. ?Mary wasbeing sick). The otherpossibilityis thatfrighten verbsin Englishhavebothadjectivaland verbalpassives , becausetheyactuallydo assigna causal(hencequasi-agentive) role to the stimulusevent. Grimshawnotesthat the reasonthat passivesof frighten verbsarelessthanfully acceptablein theprogressiveis thattheyrequire the speakerto construethe by-object as a kind of agent, which is cognitively difficult whenit is somethingasnonagentiveasa situation. However, the sentences arenotentirelyungrammatical , especiallywhentheaspectualinteractions betweenthe psychologicalstateandtheeffect of theprogressiveareweakened, as in Mary sat aroundbeingdepressedby the situation. This suggeststhat the verbal passiveis possible and that it is accompaniedby an attribution of ' responsibility to the stimulussituation, as in Talmy s examplesin (4.39). As Dowty ( 1982) pointsout, thefrighten-verbscanall signify aneventof causation of a changeof state(hencea patient/themerolefor theobject) aswell asextended states(with only an experiencerrole): The thunderclapfrightened John could . The ability of the refer either to John's beingstartledor to his beingconcerned stimulus-subjectverbsto supporta causalreadingbecomesevenmoreapparent whenwe considerthefactthatvirtually all of themcanalsoappearwith volitional animatesubjects(e.g. Johndeliberatelytried tofrighten I worry I please/ arouse I exciteme; seeTalmy, 1985, for a list of onehundredof them). Thusit is likely that a rule similar to epistemicagentdisembodiment(the one discussedin relation to justify verbs) relatesthe two versionsof theseverbs. If sucha rule convertsthe versionof theseverbswith aneventreadinganda causalagentrole (perhapssubsumingcausationby aneventlike a thunderclap ) into a versionwith a stativereadingin the field of epistemicor psychologicalcausation,the stative

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versionwould continue to have an agentlikerole, therebybeing able to feed S passivization} Thus the passivizability of both fear andfrighten verbs follows from the thematiccore of the passive. This can be seenby consideringthe cognitive ambiguityinherentin the construalof perceptualevents. What is thecausein an actof perception? Is it theperceiver,becauseheor shemustbeengagedin mental activity (either phasic, such as moving the eyes, head, or an internal mental " " spotlight of attention, or tonic, suchashavingtheright kind of sensoriumand ' being in a conscious state)? This would be consistentwith Talmy s ( 1988) " suggestionthat the body and by extension, internal surrogatessuchas the ' " mind seye - is naturally consideredto beinert unlessanimatedby anintrapsychic willful force. Or is thestimulusthecause,becauseits salientpropertiescall attention to itself or becauseit puts itself into the perceiver's awareness involuntarily? Again , this option is within the realm of cognitive possibility: " " Talmy discussesa setof expressionssuggestingthatthe central componentof mind is generallyconceivedas having a naturalstateof reposeand requiresa strongerforcefrom moreperipheralpartsof themindto overcomethattendency. Given that cognition can avail itself of either conceptualgestalt, it shouldbe possiblefor languagesto grammaticizeeitheror bothpossibilitiesasconflation classesfor transitive perceptionverbs (seeDowty, 1982, for a similar suggestion -subjectverbsare seenin ). Indeedboth stimulus-subjectand experiencer many languages(Talmy , 1985). English hasboth, and passivizesboth} 6 Verbsof spatial relations. This takesusto verbsof spatialrelationships , some of whichpassivize, othersof which do not. Jackendoff( 1972) explicitly predicts thata spatial-relation passiveis possibleonly whenits surfacesubjectis a theme andits by- objector implicit argumentis a source,location, or goal. This fails in both directions: * Beer is containedby the bottle (surfacesubject= theme; see alsothe examplesin (2.19) in chapter2) andThemountainis cappedby snow (surfacesubject= location). I will proposea simpler solution: verbsof pure spatial events and relations (contain, gush, drip , lack, fit ) have no patient argumentsandthus do not passivize, period. Spatialverbsthat do passivizecan be shown, by independenttests, to encodemore than pure spatial relations. Specifically, they include in their definitions an abstractnotion of state-causation or responsibility that motivatesthe extensionof abstractversionsof the thematicrelations" agent" and" patient" to them. Passivizablespatial verbsfall into two subclass es. One set, shownin (4.41), wasusedby Gee( 1974) ashisprimarycaseof positiveexceptionsto Jackendoff's ThematicHierarchy Condition, which shouldrule out passiveswhosesurface subjectsare sourcesor goals.

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(4.41) (a) Hewashit byacar. Thehouse wasstruckbylightning . Therockswereslapped . waves bythebreaking wasinvaded of . a horde locusts (b) Russia by 's St. Sebastian . bodywaspierced byarrows Herbodywasinfected bya virus. asbelonging totheclasses of (4.4Ia) and(4.4Ib) arerecognizable Examples -contactverbsandmotion -contact -effectverbs(4.41b), respectively motion . do involve be sure to but also involve clear cut entities , , , They goals they patients thatarephysically indefining . Aslongasthereisapatient involved theaction , ' t carewhether thethematic coreof thepassive structure doesn some argument othersetof thematic rolesaredefined aswell. Thesecond setof examples called to Bowerman , , is myattention byMelissa in (4.42). presented 4.42 wascapped . ( ) (a) Themountain bysnow . (b) Thestreetwaslinedbytrees wassurrounded . (c) Thehouse byamoat d The a was headed () paragraph by catchytitle. wasspanned . (e) Thecanyon bya bridge wasbridged . (f) Thecanyon byaspan wasabutted . (g) Thesideof thehouse bya stonefence h The crater . was filled a lake () by . (i) Thebedwascovered byablanket soundbetterin their Ignorefor nowthefactthatmanyof thesesentences versions withinstead of by; thepointis thatfor most adjectival containing withby.) A curious verbs , but speakers theyaregrammatical thingaboutthese nottheunpassivizable that all verbs like contain lack or is , , gush , they also spatial in thewithversion of thelocative form, shownin (4.43). appear withsnow . Gloriacapped themountain (4.43) (a) Hurricane . linedthestreetwithtrees (b) Theplanner witha moat surrounded thehouse . (c) Thelandscapers d I headed title. the with a () paragraph catchy witha bridge thecanyon . (e) Theengineers spanned the with a . (f) Theengineers bridged canyon span abutted thehouse witha stonefence . (g) Thearchitect h rain with lake of filledthecrater a . ( ) Centuries thebedwithablanket . (i) Sheilacovered a shipwiththebottle }' (j) *1contained * . thebuildingof abathroom (k) Thearchitects foolishlylacked

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Wehavealreadyanalyzedthethematicrolesof sentences like (4.43a)-( 4.43i); their objectsarethemesof a changeof state, and their with-objectsare roughly like instruments ; more accurately, they are themesof changeof location in a subordinatemeansevent (Rappaportand Levin, 1985), or " state-changers." Thus (4.43a) canbe paraphrased as" HurricaneGloria changedthe stateof the mountainby addingsnowto it . coveringits top." Meanseventsarebasicallypenultimate eventsin causalchains; recallthatthis is alsotruefor someinstruments ' those that canbecomesubjects ( ). Let s saythat the verbsof (4.42) are derived from thoseof (4.43) by a rule similar or identical to intennediaryinstrument promotion. Whenthe beginningof a causalchain is truncatedby omitting the first eventandpromotingthepenultimateevent(themeans) to subject, thetheme of the meanseventnow servesasthe headof the chainandhenceis beingconstrued asthecausalagent. Thuspassivesentenceslike thosein (4.42) shouldbe analyzednot as having location subjectsand themeby-objectsbut as having patient/themesubjectsandstate-changerby-objects. That is, the active version of (4.42a) wouldbeparaphrased as" Thepresenceof snowon top of it causesthe mountainto bein a certainstate" andthepassiveversionas" Themountainis in the statecharacterizedby snow' s being on it." The active subject is a static , causingtheagonist(patient) to bein a statethat its proximalcauseor antagonist naturaltendencywould not havebroughtit into. Thus the passivesubjectis an abstractpatient, andthepassivizabilityof the subclassof verbsof state-changeby-addition follows. Some periphrasticelaborationsof theseverbs independentlysupport this analysis. Thepseudo-cleft construction,which is often saidto pick out events, appliesto thepassivizablebut not theunpassivizablespatialverbs: Whatthefur doesis line thecoat,' Whatthetreesdo is line thestreet, andsoon; but * Whatthis bottle doesis containtheshipand* Whatthis building doesis lack a bathroom. The pro-verb do can be substitutedfor the state-change-by-addition verbs becausethe state-changeris construedashaving somefunction in defining the state of the theme. In addition, explicit expressionsof the idea of an object existingin onestateandchangingto anotherby theadditionof anobjectto it differentiates the two subclass es: That mountainis much nicer now that snow is ' cappingit , Thatstreetis muchnicer nowthat treesare lining it ,' Thatparagraph is muchnicernowthat a catchytitle is headingit; but ?Thatpint of beeris much nicer now that a glassis containingit. One other classof spatialverbs is worth mentioning. Many verbs of pure motioncanappearwith eithervolitional or nonvolitional subjects;for example, John / The ball rolled down the hill . Though most such verbs specify path , making passivizabilitymoot, a few, argumentsandhencetakeobliquephrases suchasenterandapproach, takedirect- objectphrases. In suchcases,it is only

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the volitional-agentversionthatpassivizes : Theroom wasenteredby a strange man I * by a balloon; Biffwas approachedby a spy I * by the train (Bolinger, I 977a). Verbs of possession . Transitive verbs of possessioncan be analyzedin a similar way, though no rules deriving them from more complex forms are involved. Whenpurepossession is involved, passivizationis impossible;when possessionis conflatedwith thematicelementsinvolving extendedsensesof . As hasoftenbeenpointed agency, passivizationcanbeextendedto thesubclass -Laird, 1976), there are severalkinds of out (see, e.g., Miller and Johnson ' of property , including inalienablepossession possession (John s nose), possession ' ' ' (John s car), relationships(John s father), custody(John s library book), and temporaryassociation(John' s lottery number). Many of thesedistinctions are differentiated in morphologyor in multiple translationsof have in other , ignoring languages. Englishuseshaveto referto thepureconceptof possession all thesedistinctions, andownandpossessto refermainlyto propertypossession (John owns a car I *father I * noseI * Ilbrary book I * Iottery number91854) ; possessseemsto admit of custodyas well. What do propertyownershipand ? Perhapsan alienably custody entail above and beyond generic possession possessedobject is construableas having an inherenttendencyto move away from the owner, but the ownerexertsa strongeropposingforcekeepingit with him andallowing him to do with it whathepleases . If so, theownerwould have a quasi agentiveor antagonistrole with respectto thepossession / agonist. Thus ) might be seenas an exemplificationof property possession(own, possess (have, lack) specifies generalizedagent-patientrelations, whereaspurepossession a static spatial/possessional relationandnothingelse. This is why only the 8 property possessionverbspassivize} 4.4.4.4 Other Pa~ ivizable Verbs Lacking ConcreteAgentsand Patients Verbs of enabling. Oneof the toughestcasesfor any theoryof passivization appealingto thematicrolesis receive. The verb is puzzlingbecauseit seemsto violate the linking regularitythat when an eventinvolvesan agentand a goal (e.g., send) , it is the agentthat is the subject; for receive, the recipientor goal is the subject. Indeed, receiveis exceptionalin a numberof ways. Dowty ( 1987) notesthatverbswith goalor patientsubjects(undergoandsuccumbaretwo other examples) arefew in number, low in frequency,acquiredlate, andmorecommon in elevated than in casual speech . Higginbotham( 1988) suggeststhat the semanticsof theseverbsis fundamentallydifferentfrom thatof mostotherverbs. Whereasthe meaningsof mostverbscorrespondto a kind of eventor state, and their argumentsencodethethematicrolesof variousparticipantsin the eventor state, the meaningof receive(andverbslike it ) directly express esthe thematic

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role of oneof theparticipantsin an eventor statewhosenatureis otherwiseun" " specified.Thusreceivemeans to play therole of recipient/goal. Higginbotham " " suggeststhat light verbs suchasdo, have, be, andgo (discussedin chapter5) havesimilar kindsof meanings; they directly assertthattheir subjectsplaya particular thematicrole. Regardlessof how receive receivesits subject, we must accountfor why it passivizesgiventhatthesubjectis not agentlike. To beginwith, oneshouldnote that the subjectcannotbe a mere goal but must be a possessor : one cannottalk of a treereceivingan arrow or a mailbox receivinga package. But in addition, receiveappearsto beconsistentwith two slightly differentmeanings,onewhere a personmerelycomesto possesssomething, anotherwherea personenables . An enablingcausecanbe construedas somethingto comeinto his possession anabstract" agent" by Talmyan force-dynamicanalysis: theenablerremovesor weakenstheantagonisticforce that opposesthe tendencyof thethemeto arrive into his possession . The voluntary enablingsensecanbe seenin sentenceslike John refusedto receiveany morepackagesfrom theFruit -of-the-Month Clubor Bill receivedthepackagesto placate themailman. Although in manycasesthe two meaningsoverlap, thereare also caseswherethey do not. When someone receivesa snowballin theeyeor a blow to the head, clearly noenablingis going on. Conversely, when someonereceivesa guest (or when a personis " well received" or an institution sets up a " Receiving" department ), the receiveris doing somethingor at leastallowing somethingto happen.The passiveclearly distinguishestheseextremecases, applyingonly in thesecond,wherea senseof enablingis involved: *A blow to the head/ * A snowballin theeyewasreceived byJohn, versusTheguestswerereceivedby thedebutanteI Thepackagewasreceived by the clerk. I suggestthat even in the intermediatecases, the passive forces the enabling senseof receive to dominate. For example, it seems , but quite acceptableto sayFor monthsaffer his death, John receivedpackages odd to sayPackageswerereceivedby Johnfor monthsafter his death. Raising-to-objectverbs. The mostrecalcitrantclassof verbsfor ananalysisof " passivethatinvokesoperationson semanticstructureis theclassof exceptional " " " case-marking or raising-to-object verbs such as expect, consider, regard, view. Theseverbspassivize(John is consideredto beafool by hisfriends), but their objectsdo not evenappearto be argumentsof the verb, let alonearguments playing a particularthematicrole. What allows this classto passivize? Oehrle andRoss(n.d.) andLakoffand Johnson( 1980) notethat the raisedobject is not utterly devoidof a semanticrole with respectto thematrix verb: in Edfound the chair to be comfortable, it is implied that Ed directly experiencedthe chair by . sitting in it ; in Edfound that the chair wascomfortable, no contactis necessary Thusthephrasemayplay therole of a stimulusentertainedby thereferentof the

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subject, in additionto whateverrole it is assignedby the embeddedpredicate. Interestingly,thistestmayprovideinsightinto thebiggestchallengeof all to thematic constraintson the passive: passivizableraiseddummy elements, suchas Suefound it to bea drag to itemizedeductionslIt wasfound by Sueto bea drag to itemizedeductions;or Sir Edmundfound thereto berampantdiscontentin the coloniesI There wasfound to be rampant discontentin the colonies by Sir Edmund. (Note, though, that not all speakersacceptthesesentenceswith byto Suefound that it wasa drag to itemizedeductions .) Comparethesesentences phrases or Sir Edmundfound that therewasrampantdiscontentin thecolonies. In theformer (raising) sentences , thereis an implicationthat Sueactuallyfilled out herown tax forms andthat Sir Edmundvisited or directly studiedthe colonies , Suecould merelybe ; in thelatter(tensedsententialcomplement)sentences a tax commissionerreadinghumanfactorsstudiesandSir Edmunda readerof historicalnovels. This suggeststhatin theseexamplesit andthere vergetoward " " " " beingpronounsroughly referringto theaction or the situation there, which arestimulusargumentsoffind . The fact thatmostof theseverbsalso appearas simpletransitiveswith stimulusdirect objects(John expectedan earthquake; I consideredher offer; Theyviewedthepainting, etc.) hints that someaspectof thisanalysismightbecorrect. Di Sciullo andWilliams ( 1987) explicitly analyze theseconstructionsasassigninga thematicroleto theraisedobject: theypropose thatBill expectsJohnto win involvesthecomplexpredicate" expect-to-win" and the arguments" Bill " and " John." Thus this classof verbscould be treatedas havinga thematicanalysissimilar to that of the stimulus-object psychological verbs. 4.4.4.5 What Makesthe PassiveDifferent from Other Alternations ? As wehaveseen,thepassiveis strikingly differentfrom thedative, the locative, and thecausative.The passivebroad-rangerule suppliessufficient conditionsfor it esof verbsplay no role (except to beappliedproductively, andnarrowsubclass such as instrument for other rules as conditions , promotion, thatfeedthe possibly other threealternations, conditions . For the ) passivewith formsthat meetthose the conditionsof the broad range rule are necessarybut not sufficient, and narrow-rangerulesintervene. Why is thepassivedifferent, andhow do children know the difference? An obviousdifferencebetweenthe passiveand the other alternationsis that thepassiverule altersa verb' s argumentstructure,addsan affix to its stem, and changesits morphosyntacticstatusfrom finite verb to participle, whereasthe other rules only alter argument structure. Marantz ( 1984) suggeststhat in general, alternationsthat involve the addition of an affix are fundamentally differentfrom alternationsin which the stemsurvivesintact. Levin andRappa-

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port ( 1986; and RappaportandLevin, in press) makea similar suggestionwith regardto alternationsthatinvolveachangeof syntacticcategory. Roughly, when anaffix is added,thechangein argumentstructureis associateddirectly with that operation,andthecontentof theverbis ignored. Thussuchalternationsshould be entirely insensitiveto the verb' s meaning. When the identical verb form , however, the two instancesare treatedas appearsin two argumentstructures distinctverbssharinga stem. Accordingto Marantz, to the extentthat speakers cangeneralizesuchanalternationto otherverbs, it is a simpleanalogybasedon thecognitivesimilarity of thenewverbto oneof themembersof the alternating pair, andhereverb meaningwill playa role. This accountis consistentwith the conventionalwisdom of many linguists that the English verbal passiveis a textbookcaseof a purely syntacticoperation; in fact, somelinguistscall it " the " syntacticpassive. This is too strong. Not all transitiveverbspassivize, and thosethat do not . Baker' s logic is inexorable: if passivizecan be characterizedsemantically children learn a productive passiverule that toleratessome unpassivizable transitiveverbswithout thebenefitof negativeevidence, they mustbe wired to build the rule in a form that respectsthe semanticdifferencesbetweenthe verbs. Thereis a problemon the other sideof passivizableandnonpassivizable Marantz's dichotomy as well: as we haveseen, generalizationsof the dative, causative , and locative alternationsare governednot by overall cognitive similarity of verb meaningbut by well-specifiedcomponentsof their semantic structure. However, a weakerversionof thecorrelationbetweenaffixation andsemantic insensitivitymay be defensible.Perhapsrulesthat add affixes (and/ or change , and the input conditions for category) have broad-rangesemanticoperations thatoperationarebothnecessary andsufficientconditionsfor a verbto alternate. For rules that leave the stemunchanged , the broad-range operationsimpose but not sufficientconditions; a setof narrow-rangeoperationsapplying necessary to narrowconflationclassesmustbeacquiredto licensegeneralizations . The child would notice whetheran alternationinvolved the addition of an affix (or a changeof category) andwouldconstrainthe rule to narrowsubclass esif it did not. This is consistentwith the key tenetof the current theory that argument structuresare projections of semanticstructuresand hence that argument structurechangesmustbeaccompanied by semanticstructurechanges,changes thatcouldinteractwith verbs' inherentmeanings . However, it preservestwo of the intuitions behind Marantz's proposal. First, since a broad-range rule accompaniedby affixation usually gets its way in effecting the specified argumentstructurechange,onecouldconceiveof it asa rule thatdirectly actson syntacticargumentstructure,yieldinga changein semanticstructurevia linking

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rules acting " in reverse" (and thenblockedonly if the inherentmeaningof the verb madethis difficult or impossible). In otherwords, for affixation rulesone canthink of thesyntacticoperationasdoingthepulling andthesemanticchange as being the passenger , whereasfor nonaffixationrules the semanticchange, with its highly detailedsensitivity to verb semantics , would do the pulling and the syntacticchangewould follow. Second,it preservesthe intuition that when a rule createsa verb with a transparent" stem + affix " structure, the learner attributesthe argumentstructurechangeandthe semanticchangeto thetelltale affix and largely ignoresthe verb, whereaswhenthe verbappearsunchangedin form, the learnerperceivesthe alternationmore as a caseof polysemyand ' analyzesthe verb s semanticsin detail in order to understandthe chemistry betweenthe semanticchangeandthe partsof the verb' s inherentmeaningthat remain unchanged . It seemsreasonableto suggest , then, that the presenceof affixation (and possiblyalso anychangein morphologicalcategory, suchasfinite form versus participle) is the cue children use to recognizewhich argumentstructure changingrules are productiveas broad-rangesemanticoperationsthat can be appliedto any verb within the broadconflationclassdefinedby the rule. The English passiveis an example; othersincludemorphologicalcausativeaffixes, whichoften applyquitefreely andpermitindirectcausationreadings(Nedyalkov andSilnitsky , 1973; Comrie, 1985), and" applicative" affixes, whicharesimilar to the English benefactivefor -dativealternationbut lessrestrictive. " " Clearly, the notion of affixation must be madeprecise; the child cannot merelylook for anyverbsthatchangein form or havestuff addedontothem. To takethe simplestproblem, Englishirregularverbslike hit andcut haveno overt affixes in the passive. In the otherdirection, somelanguageshavephonologically relatedverbpairs that arenot truly derivedby anaffixation operation(the Englishvestigialcausativepairsrise/raiseandsit/setareexamplesthatareclose to home). Somehowthe child must analyzethe morphologicalsystemof the languageto distinguishgenuineaffixation operationsfrom meresimilarity of forms. I cannottreatthis problemherebut insteadreferthereaderto Pinkerand Prince( 1988), whereit is discussedin detail. Affixation may distinguish the English passivefrom alternationslike the dative and the causative, but what causesthe differencesin breadthof the ? It is unlikely that thereis a singleparameterof passivesof different languages breadthof application. Someof the differencesamongpassiverulesmight be traceableto differencesin their forms. Onepossiblefactoris thatanypassivethat is not markedby a generalaffixation rule shouldbeproductiveonly fornarrowrangesubclasses. Another is that someproductivepassivesmay haveslightly different broad-range conditions becausethey are not tenselessparticiples

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appearingwith bebutratherarefinite fonDSor complementsof morespecialized verbs(e.g., receiveor eveneat; seeKeenan, 1985). But the main factor I have relied on in thediscussionof passivizableverbsin Englishis the largeinventory of mechanismsthat English usesto create verb fonDS with patientobjectsin nonlocationalandnonactionalsemanticfields. It maybethattheEnglishpassive itself is not thatmuchbroaderin rangethanthat of otherlanguages , butthatmany otherrulesin thelanguagefeedit with eligible semanticfonDScontainingpatient objects. This is simply a lexicosemanticversionof themoretraditionalsyntactic accounts, in which the passiveis fed by rules that reanalyzecertainkinds of surfacephrasesasobjectsof theverb. (For example, [ytake] [Npadyantage ] [ppof John] is said to be reanalyzedas [ytake-advantage - of] [Nplohn], which then allows John was takenadvantageof, seeBresnan, 1982b, for discussionof a varietyof suchrules.) In thecurrentaccount, thecrucialantecedentof passivization in mostcasesis not the creationof surfaceobjects(if it were, containand have and weigh would passivize), but the creation of surfaceobjectsthat are patients. Nonetheless , the prevalenceof patient-object verbsin English, andthe rules creatingthem, couldhavearisenin responseto theneedfor avery generalpassive operation. In English, thepassiveservesseveralfunctionsthatareaccomplished in other languagesby other means. First, it servesto focus what is usually the objectargument,animportantfunctiongiven that thelanguagelacksconstituent order freedom, deletablesubjects, and grammaticalmarking of the sentence , the passivecan be used to avoid mentioning a specific topic. Furthermore . Crain , Thornton, and Murasugi( 1987) presenta nice exampleof this subject " evasive " passive: RonaldReagan,describingthe Iran-contrascandalbesetting his administration,admittedonly that" mistakesweremade." Third, theEnglish passivealso servesto move the object argumentto the front of the sentence , which canreducetheprocessingloadon the listenerin constructionslike relative clausesby minimizingthedurationof theresource-hungryprocessof remembering the headnoun until the gap appears(see Wanner and Maratsos, 1978); compareShetickledthemonkeythat thegiraffe kickedwith Shetickledthemonkey that waskickedby thegiraffe. In contrast, the freerconstituentordersin other languagesallow speakersto reordertheelementsof anembeddedclausewithout havingto resortto thepassivevoice(see, e.g., Hakuta, 1981). Thusit wouldnot be surprisingif mechanismsallowing the English passiveto be very broad in rangeevolvedunderpressurefor the passiveto fulfill thesefunctionsfor which no other grammaticaldeviceis available. (We know that in evenmoreextreme cases, this pressureseemsto havean effect. In somelanguages- manyBantu , for instance- one cannotquestionthe subjectposition, sopassivizalanguages tion is the only meansof questioning agent arguments- Who hit me? is

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and Van Valin, 1985.) The suggestionthat the Englishpassivediachronically increasedits rangein part for functionalreasonsis not new. Historiansof English suchas Cunne ( 1935/ 1983) andVisser( 1963) havespeculatedthat the passivespreadin English becauseof the lack of an indefinitepronounanalogousto the Frenchon or the Genoanman. They notethatthe equivalentpronounwaslost in English by thefourteenthcentury, at which time anexpansionin the rangeof passivization in English, suchasto prepositionalobjects, began. In fact, historicalaccountsof thepassivecommonlynotethatit is not a unitaryphenomenonbut appearsto be tied to a gradualtendencyto reanalyzeverbs as taking object arguments (argumentsthatareobjectsbecausethey arepatients, in my account) following the levelingof theaccusative /dativecasedistinction in the Middle English period . While Old Englishcontainedpassivesof transitiveverbs, moreextended classesseemto haveflourishedonly later, andprobably not all startingat the sametime. According to Lieber ( 1979) and Lightfoot ( 1981), passivesof double-objectformswerevery rarein Old Englishand increasedin the Middle English periodfrom the thirteenthcenturyon. Prepositionalpassivesbeganto appearin numbersin thefourteenthandfifteenthcenturies; passivesof predicative verbs(e.g. consider) increasedin thefifteenthcentury; passivesof complex verbs(e.g., advantagewastakenofJohn) first appearedin thefourteenthcentury but experiencedtheir biggestgrowth spurt in the eighteenthand nineteenth centuries. (Of course,vagariesin samplingmakethepicturea complicatedone.) Closer to home, Dowty ( 1979a) quotes Marchand ( 1951) as characterizing passivesof double-objectfor -dativesasa mid-twentieth-centurydevelopment: ' " In World War II it was so often repeatedhow necessaryit was to find the ' returningsoldiersajob thatit required[sic] thecharacterof a phrase.This paves ' the way for themenwould be found a job ' (Spectator, May 18, 1945, 441) ." In sum, the passivediffers from the other alternationsI have discussedin applying to anyverbmeetingits broad-rangeconditions(viz., havinga patient object) ratherthanmerelymotivatinga largesetof specificnarrow-rangerules. ' Presumablythis is relatedto thefact that it addsan affix andchangesthe verb s category; theresultingparticipleis perceivedasbeingcomposedof a meaning contributedby the original stemand a meaningchangelocalizedto the affix , ratherthanasa newlexical itemwith its own complexmeaning. Thereasonthat the English passiveextendsnot only to all transitiveaction verbsbut to many nonagentiveandstativeverbsaswell is thatthesepassivizableverbsactuallydo havepatients, accordingto the ThematicRelationsHypothesis.

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The Relation Between Narrow -Range and Broad - Range Rules

Let me summarizethetheory. In chapter3 I characterized argumentstructurealternationrulesas involving very generaloperationson lexical semanticstructure . I showedthatthisproposalhadtheright consequences for theirconcomitant in for the of choice , changes interpretation grammaticalfunctions associated with them, andfor necessary conditionsdefiningbroadpatternsof selectivityin the kinds of verbsthat canundergothe alternations . In this chapterI examined in detail thesufficientconditions. For thedative, thelocative, andthecausative, the fine patternsof selectivitycanbe explainedby the rules' beingrestrictedto eswasmotivated , wherethechoiceof thesubclass verynarrowconflationclasses by the thematiccoreof thebroadrule but thechoiceof individual verbswasdetermined ' . Forexample, locally by theverb s membershipin thenarrowsubclass * ShedroveChicagothecar is ruledout becauseit doesnot conformto thebroadrangedative rule, which makespossessionchangea necessarycondition for dativization. * Shepulled John the suitcase,thoughit doesmeetthe necessary condition, is ruledout becauseit doesnot conformto any of the narrow-range dativerules, eachof whichimposesa setof sufficientconditions(suchasballistic motion). For thepassive,on theotherhand, narrow-rangerulesplay no role; the broad-rangerule definesnecessaryand sufficientconditionsfor passivization. This raisesthequestionof therelationbetweenbroad-rangeandnarrow-range rulesfor thealternationsthathaveboth. Couldthebroad-rangerule beeliminated , replacedby the list of entirely from an accountof the psychologyof language narrow-range rules that actually determinehow speakersgeneralize? Recall what the argumentsfor broad-range rules are. First, the broad-range rules detenninewhatall thenarrow-rangeruleshavein common. All the mini-dative rules, for example,involve thedouble- objectconstructionwith thepossessoras first object, nota family of differentconstructionswith variouscombinationsof prepositionsor variousassignmentsof rolesto surfacefunctions. Second, the motivation for why certainsubclass esalternateandothersdon' t is providedby thebroad-rangerule. Forexample,thedativizabilityof thetell classascompared to the shoutclassis probablyrelatedto thefact that whatmakesa speechact an " " exampleof telling presupposes somethingaboutthe interactionbetweenthe and the of of information whereaswhat makesa the transfer speaker target " " speechactanexampleof shouting doesnot, andthefact thatthethematiccore of the double-objectform specifiesactingon therecipient. However, neitherof thesefacts strictly requiresthat all speakersmentally representbroad-range rules; eachof thenarrowclassescould be acquiredindividually. There is evidence,though, for the on-line operationof broad-rangerules in ' people s speechandwriting. Bowerman( 1982a) notedthat adultsoccasionally

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usecausativefonDSthat areobviouslyproductive(theysoundquiteunusual), but clearly recognizableas the causativeof someintransitivepredicate(seealso , 1982). In other words, suchforms areconsistentwith the broadSternberger rangecausativizationrule, but notlicensedby anyof thenarrow-rangerules. The examplesderivedfrom verbsarereproducedin (4.44). (4.44) (a) UL -approvedoutdoorlighting setsareweatherproofedsothatwater will not deterioratethe sockets. (b) He said that the Agnew and Watergateaffairs havetendedto deteriorateconfidencein the Americansystem. c The ( ) relatively steepnose-up attitudeafter take-off climbs the airplanequickly to decreasenoiseon the groundd ) Sparkleyour table with CapeCod classicglass-ware. (e) Zia confonns Pakistanlaw with Islam. (f) Mr. Castellito simply disappearedpermanentlyin 1961, but thejury apparentlybelievedthe testimonyof other figures who saidMr. Provenzanohadarrangedto disappearhim. " (g) At theendof the week Herelittle doggie, hereis your bone, now last " it until next week. ' ' ' h ( ) We re gonnasplashand we re gonnaspin ya. We re gonnascream andwe' re gonnagrin ya. [ In promotionalbrochurefor an amusement center] i The () aspirationshavebeenrisen again. ' ' (j ) They ve grown it to whereit s a largecompany. (k ) The experiencegrew me up in a hurry. ' (I) What s fussing her? [A Grandpawonderingwhy baby is crying] (m) He just popped it up out of the clearblue sky. [Wife telling how husbandthought of namefor their baby] (n) Theybreakher out. [Mother telling howdisposablediapersgive her child a rash] " Let mereferto thesekinds of utterancesas" Haigspeak , after thepresidential Chiefof Staff whoappalledthenationwith creativeusagessuchasLet mecaveat that and That statementneedsto be nuanced. (A MacNelly cartoonhad him " announcinghis resignation: I decisionedthe necessifactionof the resignatory action/ option dueto the dangerosityof the trendflowingof foreign policy away from our originatiouscareful coursingtowardsconsistensivity,purposity, steadfastnitude, and aboveall , clarity." ) The phenomenonis intriguing becauseit illuminatesthepsychologicalroleof broad-rangerulesin adultsand, aswe shall see in chapter 8, children. In the next section I show how pervasivethe phenomenonis anddiscusssomeof its salientproperties.Then I will discussits

Chapter4 implications for the respective roles of rules

154 broad-rang .e: and narrow -range lexical

4.5.1 Ungrammatical Usesof LexJcal Rules in Adult Language Productiveusesof argumentstructuresin adult speechandwriting arenot hard to find. ExamplesI haveheardor readin a 6-month periodarediscussedin this section. (I am afraidthey showthatmy freetime is not exactlyspentat theopera andtheballet.) For someof the examples,I cannotmakea crispjudgmentasto their naturalness ; I haveprefixedthem with a questionmark. Causatives . The examplesin (4.45) replicateBowerman' s observations. (4.45) (a) But if my client is a man, andwe get Shirley, I know we' re croaked. [A lawyer referringto a judge] (b) You shouldhangyourselfup. [To a computeruseron a dial-up line] Canyou hangyourselfup?! [ Shoutedto a personon anotherphone in the samehouse] (c) Well , that decidedme. ' ' (d) I don t know who I m going to pitch the first ballgame. [A baseball managerspeaking] ' They havent found the time to play him a whole lot of minutes (= let him play for a substantialportion of the basketballgame] . (e) Streamon the flavor! [TV ad for melted-butter dispenser] ' (f) If shesubscribesusup, she Il geta bonus[= givesour nameto a cable TV company, resultingin our subscribing]. (h) It startedin 1976whenthe Parti Quebecoisbeganto deterioratethe healthcaresystem. ' i Small () companysnewgolfball flies too far; couldobsoletemanygolf courses. [ Headlineof a fictitious news item in a magazinead] (j ) A lot of teamscollapsedzoneson him [= useda defensivestrategy wherebasketballplayersdistributedin " zones" convergeon an opposingoffensiveplayer] . (k) In early ModemEnglish, thevowel of the singularwasconformedto that of the plural. (I) He correspondedthe stagesto the training sets. (n) Sunbeamwhipsout theholeswherestaling air canhide. [Advertisement for bread] (m) Is the universeincluding man evolved by atomic force? [ Sermon title , found by Beth Levin] Bowermansaidshedid not noticeexamplesof productiveintransitivization, but asLord ( 1979) and Maratsoset al. ( 1987) point out in regardto children' s

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speech, sucherrorsaregenerallynot as salientto an observerunlessthey are specificallyattendedto. In (4.46), (4.47), and (4.48), respectively, I reproduce I haveheardof anticausatives , middles, andan unusualexan1plethat exan1ples is neither. (4.46) (a) Thebacterialive off thedissolvedmineralsthatexudefrom thevent. (b) [Frombasketballplay-by-play descriptions] The ball slapsaround. The reboundtips to the handsof Sichting. [From transitive tip = " " " touchwith the " fingertips, not intransitive tip over ] ThatcausesRobertto releasedownfloor. [Fromtransitiverelease= " " " allow a " playerto breakout of a pack, not relinquishthe ball ] Theball kicksaroundandendsup nearmidcourtin thehandsof Cavs guardRon Harper. It kicks out of boundsoff the Bullets. The ball hits into the right field stands. (c) Mary presentedasan attractive, neatly dressedwoman. (d) Cangennsharborin thesethings? (e) WhenI slow down at a comerand take my foot off the gasthe car wantsto kill [" die" or stall] . ' (f) If shewhips into shape, thenI ll seeher. (4.47) (a) Its batteriescanstoreupto tenyears. [Advertisementfor a flashlight] (b) The soupthateatslike a meal. [Advertisement] It eatslike steakbut costslike ordinarydry. [Advertisementfor dog food] . [Meat industry Steaksthat look the San1e may not eat the San1e executive] ' (c) This gan1eisn t playing very well. [A sloppy basketballmatch] ' (4.48) The aftereffects[of the operation] don t seem to be telling at all right ' now. (Saidby a basketballplayer; = " one can t tell that theoperation hadaftereffects; I don' t feel the aftereffectsof the operation." ]29 Datives. I havealsohearda varietyof violationsof the narrowconstraintson thedativealternation.Morphologicalviolationsarenot uncommon,asshownin (4.49). (4.49) (a) Sundonatedthema bunchof computers. What doeshe wantme to do- donate them blood? (b) I returnedher the books. (c) I explainedhim the problem. Can you explainme languagebreakdownd ) An intriguingdownsideto thethree-hourceremonies... wasthesnub extendedMichaelJackson.

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156 ?I just want to scheduleyou someappointments . I ' ll suggesther that shecomeover. ?If thefee scheduleis adjustedso thatyou would havepaid a lower amountthantheoneyou signedup for, InformationSystemswill reimburseyou the difference.

Therearealsosemanticviolationsinvolving verbsthataregrammaticalwith to orfor , shownin (4.50). Someofthem(e.g.,(j ) and(k arerenderedungrammatical (at leastto me) becauseof the presenceof a particle that changesthe meaningsubtly. (4.50) (a) Can you reachme that book? Will you reachme my socksfor me? Reachme my socks. b ( ) It [a letter of support] will add the granta little legitimacy. (c) Even if he dribblesme in one subjecta year ... (d) Mr. [ ] wasmadeno bonesaboutthe fact that ... ' . (e) When you go I m going to preachyou a greatFuneral I out a of . (f) put you big piece [ pie] (g) Fix me up [build] a handle. ' (h) Shedidn t haveto snapme aboutit. (i ) ?K . C. tried a new strategyand he lost themthe game. (j ) Shegaveme out a form to fill in. I don' t want to give you out his privatenumber. ' (k) I ll sendhim out the proposal. Interestingly, someexamplescould not be generatedevenby a broad-range rule for the dative alternation.as it is conventionallystated, sincethe prepositional form usesneithertheprepositionto norfor . In (4.51ab ), the preposition would haveto beat becauseEnglishconstruesvisualperceptionasinvolving the " motion" of one' s gazetoward, not all the way to, thetarget(seeGruber, 1965). In (c), the prepositionwould befrom. ' (4.51) (a) ?He shotme a look like you wouldn t believe. ' ?Shedoesnt shootme any looks. [Saidby the sameperson] ' (b) Thenexttimeyoumakeeyesat someone , makethemeyesthey ll find unforgettable. [magazineadvertisement for coloredcontactlenses]30 (c) He strippedhim the ball. [basketballplay-by-play] A numberof violations. shownin (4.52), arebasedon thepresentclass(verbs of fulfilling , deserving, or presenting). Semanticallytheseverbs involve the notion of giving but syntactically they behavelike locative verbs and thus alternatewith the prepositionalform containifl& with ratherthan the doubleto me, andI suspect objectform. (Someof theseformsaremarginallyacceptable that the distinction for theseverbsis eroding.)

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(4.52) (a) ?I am proudto presentyou this trophy. ?Thepresidentwaspresenteda policy thatwasn't annsfor hostages. ?Theyarepresentedthesecardsunderthreeconditions. (b) We havebeenservedpapersby the District Court. (c) ? ... thetubingthatwewould persuade[thecompany] to providehim. (d) ?Canyou furnish me an addressfor GeorgeAugusta? (e) Themostpreciousgift a father could bestowa son. [TV advertisement for a car] (t) Thebankcreditedmy account$100. ' (g) If you ll indulgemejust two in-jokes. [Note: only acceptableusing prepositionwith or in] ' (h) If you re not satisfied, return the recordwith your receiptwithin 2 weeksandwe' ll credityou backthefull purchasepricetowardany merchandisein the store. Theodddouble-objectformsshownin (4.53) alsodo nothavetheusualsource but would ordinarily require useof the prepositionin. The sentences , which seemto be basedon an analogywith the verb teach, are from graduateschool applicationmaterialswritten by computerexperts. fine teachingabilitiesin training otherstudentsthe (4.53) (a) Shedemonstrated complexproceduresand complexequipment we usein our lab. (b) Theusesof sucha programare myriad and includeuseas a compositionaldeviceand as a methodfor individually tutoring studentsmusicalimprovisation. Locatives. Examplesof both argumentstructuresparticipatingin the locative alternationcontainingverbsthat makethem marginalto ungrammaticalin my dialectarelistedin (4.54) and (4.55). ' (4.54) (a) He s trying to fob me off with that guy. Now I ' ll just fob her off with somecoloredpencils. (b) Theyfiled him with charges. (c) Theyanda lot of otherpublic figureswerebestowedyesterdaywith the 1987Bozo awards. (d) ?He waspumpedwith a liter and a half of glucosesolution. them [fish fillets ] with lemonjuice. (e) He squeezed (t) Drizzlethem [appleslices] with fresh lemonjuice. [From a cookbook ] from (g) [ recipesin a magazinearticle] This versionis dribbled with a . ...serveat oncewith lively Worcestershire-spiked mayonnaise toastedFrenchbreadroundsdribbled with olive oil. ...slices of

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158 uncookedbeefdrizzled with a Worcestershiremayonnaise. Arrangethemeaton aplatteranddribbleit all over with themayonnaise ....serveat oncewith crustyItalian breador toastedbread slicesdribbled with olive oil.

(4.55) (a) I saidI wassorryto servea manuscripton him. [A publisherreferring to a personhe hadaskedto review a manuscript; cf. " serve him " with a subpoena ] (b) Takea little of the mixture at a time and fill it into the zucchini. [Quotedby RappaportandLevin, 1985; from a cookbook] ' (c) I m just going to rinse somewaternow. [ A periodontistspeaking] (d) Sometimesbeforethey do brain surgery, they probe in electrodes. (e) ... by inoculatingliving R cells into mice ... (f) Shepiercedneedlesunderher fingernails. ' (g) It s not just all that waterfilling up ... [in the basement ; describing someone is ] why upset (h) Hejumpedboth kneeson it. [A goaliein hockeytrappinga puck; cf. " He " jumped on it with both knees] (i ) Shesaid we just dug up sometrashsomeonelittered. ' (j ) l lljust touch this to your ear. } to MIT ... (k ) If theyendow$400,(XX ' (I) Isn t thatjust anotherway to bilk moneyfrom the ignorant? ' (m)Endurancetraining at lessthan70- 80% of a cyclist s peakperformance depletesglycogenfrom the slow-twitch musclefibers. n As an actor , it hastheoddeffectof zappinghim- for lack of a better ( ) term- of a soul [" it " = thefact thattheactor' s mind is a " spinning " gyroscope] . (0) I hadto rob the front wheelsoff somesupportbikes to haveenough for changes. ' . (p) They re working on a plan to rob your resources ' ' (q) We re going to makethis a bettercommunity, andwe re going to rid the negativeelement. Just as we saw in the caseof the unusualproductivedatives, someof the locative-like constructionsarenot theproductof what we ordinarily think of as the locative alternation. Although they involve roughly the same kinds of meanings, theclosestrelatedform doesnot takethe expectedprepositions. In fact, (4.56c) is the inverseof the unusualdativeforms listed in (4.52). (4.56) (a) Normanand FrancesLear weredivorcedlast year after he settled approximately$125million on her.

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(b) Shehad to pinpoint it onto someone[blamesomeonefor it ] . (c) We havechargedyour Visa accountwith $300 for the required deposit. Other argumentstructures. Aside from the alternationsI havefocusedon, there are other argument structuresthat are occasionallyextendedto verbs outsidethe narrowclassesthatordinarily allow them. Theseincludethe usesof prepositionalphrasesand clausalcomplementslisted in (4.57). " (4.57) (a) I lookedtheball into my hands[= I lookedat theballall thewayuntil it reachedmy hands" ; from Landauand Gleitman, 1985]. (b) They areexcellentat creatingmissedshotsinto fast-breakopponunities at the otherend. (c) For purposesof counterbalancingagainstthe possibility that any effectsare due to a particular setof stimuli... (d) ... reinforcing subjectsthat versionis irrelevant... shouldremovethe needto discriminatebetweenversionsof a character[= " In our instructionsto the subjectsin our experiment, we reinforcedthe fact that which versionof a characterthey sawon the screenwas irrelevantto thediscriminationtasktheywereaskedto perform" ] . K.C. always reinforceshim to shoot. (e) Bouncepassto Bird who touchesit backto McHale. (f) Ainge savesit nicely to Acres. ' (g) I ll include the paperback to him. (h) I tried to hint this to her. (i ) Shetried to convinceme out of it. (j ) I expressedthat it would be difficult for onepersonto manageboth the Sunsand the Microvaxes. 'm k I ( ) proud of her to get someof that [credit] . (I) The bestway to solvemany of the problemswith taking too much time in both loadingthe imagefrom memoryandstoringit to the EGA is to usesmallerimages. ' (m) I don t think it can be done by a hackerfrom the outside. It is a potential that could occur by a disaffectedemployee[computer ]. sabotage Passives . According to the proposalin section4.4.4, passivizationis accomplished directly by a broad-rangerule, so blatantly ungrammaticalpassivesin speechand writing should be quite rare. I haveencounteredonly spontaneous two possibleexamples. The oneshown in (4.58a) involvesa purespatialverb, thoughit is possiblethat we haveanadjectivalpassivehere. Theother, in (4.58b),

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at first glanceseemsto involve a puretemporalrelationship, but thereis alsoan implicationof inter-eventcausationthat might allow the passivization. (4.58) (a) Breakout your favorite bicycle grease, but keepit containeduntil ' you re finished splashingsolventaround. (b) That was led up to by what happenedat the last party. The only other odd passivesI have heard, listed in (4.59), are the result of speakersaiming for a breezy, jocular, or emphaticeffect by passivizingidioms or otherspecializedforms. (4.59) (a) Well , the soot wasblown. [Richard Pryor commentingon his recklessdriving in a new sportscar, in responseto " They sayyou haveto blow the sootout of them once in a while." ] ' (b) Sometimesyou get a poochthat can t be screwed[The idiom to " screwthepooch= to commit a grievouserror." From the movie TheRight Stuff; commenton the lack of negative publicity ' following an astronauts mistakesduring the popular Mercury program.] c The ( ) public is havingthe hell scaredout of it. (d) They were wiped the floor with [= soundly defeated]. (e) [from a televisionscript] Him: What areyou doing? Her: I ' m making out my will . Him: Make sureyou leaveme something. Her: Consideryourselfleft. [Sheleaves.] 4.5.2 Property -Predicting Versus Existence-Predicting Rules Whatis thepsycholinguisticstatusof Haigspeakutterances ? They arecertainly not a reasonto abandonconstraintson lexical rules, becausethey are undoubtedly deviantto my earsandto thoseof mostpeopleI haveshownthemto. Though a few may come from dialects or idiolects in which they are well -formed sentences , mostdo not: WhenI wasableto confront the speakersof someof the sentences in (4.45H 4.57) with their utterances(mixed with distractorsentences they had never used), their reactionsrangedfrom mild cringing to outright incredulityatthesuggestionthattheythemselveshadutteredthem. On theother hand, they are not obviously speecherrorsof the standardsort (Spoonerisms , or substitutions etc. . are from written sources , ; ) perseverative anticipatory Many theydo not soundlike quasi-randomdistortions, wereneverself-corrected,and cannotall be systematicallyderivedfrom someintendedtargetby the effectsof internalnoise, decay, or interferencein someoutput buffer. Finally , they arenot obviouslyungrammatical,at leastnot in the samesenseasFuriously sleepideas green colorlessor Walks the boys. Chomsky ( 1965, 1987) has stressedthat

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191

Possible and Actual Forms

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terrible' d gracefully; I ' ve beenRolling Stonedand Beatled till I ' m blind ; I . wantedto RosemaryWoodsout that conversation ). According to Clark and Clark, the meaningof eachof thesefonns- in particular, which of severalpossible semanticrolesthereferentof thesourcenounplaysin theeventdenotedby thenewverb - is not predictableby any rule of grammar. Instead. the meaning must be createdby the speakeron the basisof his or her beliefsaboutwhat the hearercan infer on that occasionbasedon their mutual knowledge. Since languageis most usefulwhenit cancommunicatemeaningto any listenerI'll wny situation, we might expect there to be mechanismsto limit such extreme situation-sensitivity. Lexical rulesdo just that; they makeinterpretationlessa matterof sharedknowledgeandguessworkonthepartof thehearerbecausethey dictatewhya particularsoundwaschosento conveya newword. Of course, I am takingthis argumentonestepfarther- notjust anystem-sharinglexical rule can be usedto predict the existenceof fonns, only a narrow-rangeone. 4.5.3 Why Are Only Narrow -Range Rules Existence-Predicting? -predictingrules Thedistinctionbetweenproperty-predictingrulesandexistence leadto anobviousquestion:Why can' t thebroad-rangerules(otherthantheones thataddaffixes) beusedto predicttheexistenceof fonDs? If I amright, it appears thatlanguageshaveadeep-seatedconservatism built intotheirlexicons. Regardless of how pervasiveageneralizationacrossexistingpairsof lexicalentriesmay be, thedefault conditionis not to allow newentriesto be addedfreely by individual speakers. Thedefaultis abandonedonly for wordsthatarein somesense - new minimally different from ones that alreadyexhibit the generalization " wordsthatareof thesamemorphologicaltypeandwhosemeaningsare similar" (in a senseto be madeprecisein the next chapter) to thoseof existing words. Thus although I rejected;temw;se conservatismin chapterI , I am forced to a classwiseconservatismby the discussionin this chapter. The extensionof full existence-predicting productivity to narrow-rangerules, resultingin classwise rather than itemwise conservatism , may be a minor relaxationof a basically conservativepolicy : languagestie speakersnot to the exact verbs they have heard, but to the smallfamily of verbsthataresimilar to theonesheard. In fact, in the next two chaptersI will considerthe radicalbut simplepossibility that in somesensethe linguistic faculty hasno choice- it simply lacks the meansto " see" thedifferences amongthe verbsthatdisplayfull productivity, andblocks theextensionof syntacticprivilegesto anyverbthatit canseeasbeingdifferent from the onesthat havebeenheardin the input. Is therea goodreasonfor this minimally relaxedconservatism ? Perhapsthere is. Considerthe analogyof a monetarysystem. Currency, like language, is a systemof social exchangebasedon conventionalizedsymbols. Userscan treat

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the symbolsashavinga fixed value becausethey aregroundedin tacitly shared, arbitrarypairings: thegold standardor its equivalentfor currency,andthesoundmeaningrelationfor words. The mechanismsfor introducingnew tokensinto the systemmust be very sharply circumscribed, not left up to the desiresof individual playerson individual occasions,or else the systemwill collapsein inflationary chaos. Lest this seemtoo far-fetched in the caseof language, considertwo of the possible effects of rules affecting argumentstructuresif they were totally unconstrainedby semanticconsiderations. First, there is the possibility of rampantambiguity. Atkins, Kegl , andLevin ( 1986) notethatEnglishhasat least six distinct alternationsbetweentransitive and intransitiveforms (Beth Levin hassuggestedto me that there may a dozenor more in all). Severalinvolve disappearingobjects(e.g., unspecifiedobjectdeletion, asinJohneatsfood / John eats). Severalothersinvolve disappearingsubjects(e.g., anticausativization , as in Johnbrokethecup/ Thecupbroke). If therulescould beappliedproductively, , any transitiveverb could lead bidirectionally, andwithout regard to semantics to the derivationof anothertransitive verb with the oppositem~aning: X eatsY - > X eats(afterobjectdeletion) - > YeatsX (after causativization ). Similarly, intransitives with transitivecounterpartswould be totally ambiguous:X eatsY - > X eats(afterobjectdeletion); X eatsY- > Yeats(afteranticausativization ). It ' s not that languageshaveutterly avoidedsuchambiguities, as(4.60) shows. (4.60) Groucho: Call me a taxi. Chico: You' re a taxi. Waitressto Dick Gregory, Mississippi, 1960: We don' t servecolored peoplehere. Dick Gregory: That' s OK , I don' t eatcolored people. I ' d like a pieceof chicken.31 However, argumentstructureambiguities are fairly rare, at least in English, relativeto the numeroushypotheticalpossibilitiesfor creatingthemwith broad' rangerules. This functionalconsiderationis consistentwith Marantz s ( 1984) suggestionthatrulesthat addan affix to theverb arebroaderin rangethanrules . When thereis a telltale affix , it can be seenas that leavethe stemunchanged kind of a meaning change, and one can look up the lexical carrying specific entry of the affix to determinewhat it is. If thereis no affix , theverb itself must have acquireda new meaning, and the listener should be equippedwith an alternativeroute to determiningwhat that meaning changeis; given narrow' rangerules, the verb s semanticscan allow one to retracethe alternationsthat could havecreatedit.

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-predicting rules that aretoo ThesecondpossiblyhanDfuleffect of existence broadis indetenninacyof semanticcomposition. If the semanticoperationof a rule is very general, how it combineswith theoriginal meaningof a verb is often . It ' s utterly clear that John very hard to detennine. Considercausativization brokethecup meansthat Johnactedon the cup, causingit to break. Similarly, Bill bicycledSusanto Concord must meanthat Bill carried or accompanied Susanto Concordby bicycle. It may evenbe easilydeducible that That event decidedme meansthat that eventmademe cometo a decision, or that What' s ' " " fussingher? means What s causingherto fuss? But what exactly would Sam cameBill out in/ avor o/ Nixon or Sheilaran Susana mile in/ our minutesor Eric dancedFrancis mean? The semanticchangeaccomplishedby a broad-range lexical rule may be too vagueto yield outputwordswith predictablemeanings. In the caseof the locative alternation, the problem is even more severe: the derived with fonD defines a specific state or property that is simply absent from themeaningof the int% nto fonn , andthe speakerand listenermusthave someway of predicting what that state is. One advantageof restricting the -predictingpowersof lexical rulesto semanticallycohesivesubclass existence es is that any vaguenessin composingan input verb' s inherent meaningwith the new meaningcontributedby the rule can be eliminatedby a single schemeof , deriving a meaningfor the interpretationthat appliesacrosstheentiresubclass newfonn in a detenninateway from seedsof infonnationresiding in theold one. Each basic word in a languageinvolves an irreducible, arbitrary pairing betweensoundand meaning. Thus using words presupposesindependentbut identicalprior episodesof brute-force associativelearning on the part of each personwho speaksthe language. It would not be surprising if the language faculty usedthemeansavailableto it to restricttheautomatic, naturalusagesof wordsto highly circumscribedextensionsof existing forms.

Chapter 5 Representation

5.1 The Needfor a Theory of LexicosemanticRepresentation The reasonthat Baker' s paradoxcan be resolved, at least in principle, by appealingto semanticallydefinedclassesof verbsis that children haveto learn the meaningsof verbs anyway. They have to learn the difference between pouring andsplashingor betweenthrowingandpulling to usethemin the right situations, regardlessof syntax, and it is a nonobviousdiscovery that certain aspectsof thosedistinctionscorrelatewith certainof their syntacticprivileges. This of courseraisesthe importantquestionof how childrenrepresentandlearn verb meanings. Unlike someof theotherhypothesesI consideredin chapterI , the conflationclasshypothesiscannotpoint to any simple and obviousformal featureasthe crucial distinctionthat childrenmustrespect. That is, thereis no -in-input] associatedwith a elementaryfeaturelike [:f:obligatory] or [:f:attested verb that the learnercould look at in decidinghow to useit. The learnermust " ' " " insteaddecidewhethera " verb s meaning is " compatible with a conflation class," a muchmoreobscurenotion. Thereare two possibilitiesasto whatthat might mean. First, verb meanings could be cognitive categoriesfor certain types of events or relations, and conflationclassescouldbebK' adercategoriesof thesametype, andthedecision aboutwhethera verb belongsto a classcould be a caseof ordinary cognitive . Deciding whether cutting is a causativerelation would be categorization to analogous deciding whethera dog is an animal and would dependon the individual' s real-world knowledgeof causationand of what eventstypically happenin scenariosinvolving cutting. If so, the constraintson productive alternationswould ultimately be a part of the cognitive psychology of the categorizationof eventsandstates,andwouldsimplycorrespondto thewaysthat . a given culture finds it usefulto carveup the universeof possiblehappenings " Similarities" amongfamilies of verbscould be capturedin a variety of ways,

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suchas conceivingof their underlyingconceptsas nearbypoints in a multidimensional semanticspace, as setsof partially overlappingfeatures(Tversky, 1977), or as nonorthogonalvectorscomposedof large numbersof valuesof " microfeatures" e. . McClelland and Kawamoto 1986. In ( g, , ) principle, any culturally salientdistinction could be usedasa dimensionor featurehelpingto definesimilarity , andthe syntaxcouldreflect thosesimilarity clusterings. This is anotherway of sayingthat from thepoint of view of grammar, verbmeanings arenot constrainedat all. Let me call this the " UnrestrictedConceptualRepresentation " . hypothesisabout lexical semantics The secondpossibility would befar moreinteresting.Perhapsthereis a setof semanticelementsandrelationsthat is muchsmallerthanthe setof cognitively availableand culturally salientdistinctions, and verb meaningsare organized aroundthem. Linguistic process es, including the productivelexical rules that extendverbs to new argumentstructures , would be sensitiveonly to partsof semanticrepresentations whoseelementsaremembersof thisset. Thesetwould " and" Iocaconsistof symbolsthat havecognitivecontent, suchas" causation tion," but not all cognitively meaningfulconceptsaremembersof thisprivileged semanticmachinery. Thusa verblike 10buller wouldspecifyinfonnationabout butterand infonnation aboutcausation , but only thecausationpartcouldtrigger or block the applicationof lexical rulesor otherlinguisticprocess es. Let mecall " this the " GrammaticallyRelevantSubsystem hypothesis. The particular resolution of Baker' s paradoxthat I have beenpursuingis , but it would obviously compatible with either hypothesisabout lexical semantics be more satisfying if the GrammaticallyRelevantSubsystemhypothesis was true. A characterizationof a culture' s common-sensecategorizationof eventsand statesis closer to cognitiveanthropologythanto psycholinguistics , and the psychologicalmechanismsresponsiblefor their acquisitionandrepresentation aregoing to be thoseresponsiblefor knowledgein general,something thatwe arefar from beingableto characterizeprecisely. But withoutsuchacharacterization, the meaningdifferencescrucial to syntacticdifferencesaregoing to be vagueandad hoc, and how they are learnedwill remainobscure. On the other hand, if there is a relatively small and preciselycharacterizableset of of linguistic grammaticallyrelevantmeaningdistinctions, the characterization criteria could be suitably constrained . Furthennore, if the specialsubsystem involved decompositioninto structuredrepresentationswith a well-defined syntaxand vocabulary, we could point to the critical meaningcomponentsthat differentiateotherwisesimilar verbsandtry to explainwhy particularsemantic differenceshavepredictablesyntacticconsequences . Finally, if we could thoroughly characterizethe semanticsubsystemthat syntaxcaresabout, the theory of learning would be far more explicit. Despiteall its complexguises, learning

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" the can always be analyzedas a set of " hypotheses organism is capableof " " entertainingandof a confirmationfunction by which the environmentalinput tells the organism which one to keep (Fodor, 1975; Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein, 1985; Wexier and Culicover, 1980). Characterizingthe learner's (a possiblehypothesesis thefirst stepto characterizingits learningmechanisms task I will take up in the next chapter), and the more constrainedthe set of . , the betterthe explanationof how the learningsucceeds hypotheses The world is a messyenoughplace that a compromiseoutcomeis also envisionable. Perhapsmost syntacticallyrelevant meaningdistinctionswithin andacrosslanguageshingeon a smallnumberof recurringprivilegedelements, while a few hingeon idiosyncraticbits of cultural knowledge. However, in this chapterI will pushthe GrammaticallyRelevantSubsystemhypothesisasfar as possible. I will do soby proposinga theoryof semanticstructures,motivatedby cross-linguistic generalizationsandaspectsof grammarother thanthoseunder consideration,in which mostor all of thesubclassesI haveappealedto sofar can be characterizedmechanically. The theory of representationwill havemany tentativeand imperfectly motivatedassumptions,and I will not pretendto be laying out the uniquebesttheory. Rather, the primary goal is to flesh out the ' proposedresolutionof Baker s paradoxwith a fairly explicit andprecisetheory of the crucial distinctionsit appealsto rather than waving the hand; in doing so I alsohopeto showthat the Subsystemhypothesisis viable andquite probably true in someform. 5.2

Is a Theory of Lexical Semantics Feasible ?

S.2.1 Skepticism About DecompositionalTheories of Word Meaning The suggestionthat theremight be a theory of verb meaninginvolving a small set of recurring elementsmight be causefor alarm. Some linguistsand psycholinguists doubtthat therecanbeone. Previousattemptsat explicatingword meaningsby definitionsor decompositioninto smallermeaningelements(e.g., -Laird, Katz and Fodor, 1963; Ross, 1972; Schank, 1973; Miller and Johnson ' 1976) havebeencriticized on a numberof grounds(e.g., Fodor, 1970; Fodor, Fodor, andGarrett, 1975; DresherandHornstein, 1977; Fodor, Garrett, Walker, and Parkes, 1980; Fodor, 1981; Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman, 1983). There is skepticismboth about the idea that verb meaningsare autonomous structuresbuilt out of a constrainedsetof elementsandaboutthe ideathatthey are structuredentitiesat all. First, thereareargumentsagainstdecomposingverb meaningsinto configurations of morebasicmeaningelements,mainly put forward by JerryFodor(e.g., Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett, 1975; Fodor, et aI., 1980). Fodor points out, for

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example, that when putative decompositionsof verb meaningsinto smaller elementsaretranslatedbackinto English, theyleadto paraphrases that arerarely, perhapsnever, synonymouswith theoriginal word. Chaseis not the sameastry to catch, for example,andkill is not the sameascauseto die. Furthermore, often thereis no principledreasonto stop the decompositionat any given level of detail. Shouldrun be defined as " locomote rapidly by moving the legs" or " locomote ' rapidly by flexing the hip, bendingthe knee, shifting one s weight, " ..., or at anevenmoremicroscopiclevel? Thereis alsono reasonto prefer one decompositionat a given level of detail over another: shouldto paint mean" to " " " put painton something or to coversomethingusingpaint ? Finally , evidence from psychologicalexperimentssuchassentenceverificationresponsetimesor often fail to provide corroboratingevidencefor putative ratingsof relatedness of verb decompositions meanings(though seeJackendoff, 1983; Gergely and Bever, 1986; andGonsalves , 1988, for contraryarguments ). Second,somehavearguedthatthereis nocleardemarcationbetween" linguistic " " " knowledgepertainingto what a word meansand real-world knowledge pertainingto whatentitiestendto interactpredictablyin the world; betweenthe mentaldictionaryandthementalencyclopedia. For example, the verb deveinis a word that onenaturallyusesonly in referenceto shrimp; assassinateis done only to politically prominentpeople; diagonalizeis doneonly to matrices(McCawley, 1968). Sinceno one would proposelinguistic featureslike [:tshrimp], [:t:politically-prominent], or [: tmatrix], it meansthatarbitraryfactsaboutWestern cookingpractices,politics, or mathematicscanenterinto whateveraspects of so-calledword definitionsenforcetheir selectionrestrictions. Given thepresentgoals, theseobjectionsarebesidethe point. I will not try to come up with a small set of primitives and relationsout of which one can ' composedefinitionscapturingthe totality of a verb s meaning. Rather, the verb definitions sought will be hybrid structures, consisting of a scaffolding of universal,recurring,grammaticallyrelevantmeaningelementsplusslotsfor bits of conceptualinfonnationaboutthingslike shrimp, butter, fame, andso on. The rich andidiosyncraticnuancesof verbs' meaningswill derivefrom threefactors: (a) the infonnation in the grammatically irrelevant conceptualslots; (b) the cognitivecontentof the variousgrammaticallyrelevantelementsand configurations , for example,thedirectnessconstrainton theinterpretationof patientsor theholismconstrainton theinterpretationof themes,discussedin chapter3; and (c) generalprinciplesoflexicalization (suchasconventionality,genericness , and stereotypy)thatdictatethatwhena semanticstructureis lexicalizedinto a single word, this in and of itself can lead to emergentsemanticproperties. Thus a semanticstructuretranslatedinto a paraphraseneednot beexactlysynonymous with the singleword it is designedto represent.

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Furthenriore, sincethe purposeof positingarticulatedsemanticrepresentations is to capturegrammaticallyrelevantdistinctions,therearetwo converging of elementsare empirical constraintson whatgrainsizeandwhatarrangements mandated. The first and most obviousconstraintis that the elementsmust be " " : theycannotsimply be arbitrarydiacritics meaningful in the following sense " ' " (otherwise Bakers paradox would be solved vacuously) but must have translationsinto conceptualterms that can enter into defining the range of situations in which a speakercould truthfully and naturally use a verb. (For " " example, thenotionof an effect is whatallowsusto decidethatrubbinga knife againsta steelpipewith no changein thelatteris notanexampleof cutting.) The other constraintis that the elementsandconfigurationsmustdo somework in capturing grammaticalgeneralizationsand distinctions- ideally not only the ' argumentstructurealternationsthat defineBaker s paradoxbut other kinds of grammaticaldistinctionsas well. These kinds of empirical considerationsmakethe GrammaticallyRelevant Subsystemhypothesisquitebold: for it to betrue, therewouldhaveto bea single setof elementsthat is at onceconceptuallyinterpretable , muchsmallerthanthe setof possibleverbs, usedacrossall languages , usedby childrento formulateand generalizeverbmeanings,usedin specificallygrammaticalways(for example, ), and usedto differentiate the being lexicalized into closed-classmorphemes narrow classesthat are subjectto different setsof lexical rules. Let me review someevidencethat this is indeedthe case. 5.3 Evidence for a Semantic SubsystemUnderlying Verb Meanings Nonequivalencebetweencognitively and linguistically motivated semantic es delineatingexistence classes. Throughoutchapter4 I stressedthat the subclass -predicting lexical rules were defined by subtle semanticcriteria. By " subtle" I meantthat they would not correspondto thekinds of distinctionsthat would occur to someonewho was simply classifyingverbs into cognitively similar kinds of events. To takethe mostobviousexample, evenlinguists and psycholinguists, people who presumablyare quite reflective about cognitive " " distinctions relevantto language , areapt to talk about actionverbs as if that werea linguistically naturalclass. But we sawthat verbsascognitively similar es. The ascut, break, hit, touch, andraise belongto five very different subclass reasonfor thedisparityis thatcognitivesimilarity tendsto bedefinedby typical chainsof eventsasdefinedby mentalschemas , whereas , scripts, or stereotypes on a smaller set of is constraints semantic defined by similarity linguistic 4.2 for extensive discussion ;I necessarycompoqentsof events(seesection returnto this point in the final chapter). Similardisparitiesbetweencognitively

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availableandlinguistically significant featuresarisein thediscussionof all four lexical alternations; indeedit is this disparity, I suggest,that led linguistsand psycholinguiststo the prematureconclusionthat productivealternationsapply to arbitrarylists of idiosyncraticlexical items. Recurring semantic distinctions. Levin ( 1985) and Laughren, Levin, and Rappaport( 1986) showedthatcertainsemanticelementslike motion, causation, and contact recurred in different combinationsin delineating the range of different argument structure alternations. More generally, there are strong universaltendenciesfor largesetsof verbswithin andacrosslanguagesto make thesamekindsof semanticdistinctions(i.e., to bechoosyaboutthesituationsthat esto attend theyapplyto in the samekindsof ways) andfor grammaticalprocess to thosedistinctions. Conversely,thereareothersemanticdistinctionsthatverbs rarely makein any language(Carter, 1976a; Bybee, 1985; Talmy, 1985). I will summarizethesedistinctions in the next section. . Many of the recurringsemantic Interchangeabilitywith closed-classmorphemes elementsthat definecertainverb meaningscanappearin thedefinitions of closed-class morphemesand affixes in the same languageor in other languages(Bybee, 1985; Talmy, 1985). For example, some languageshave productivecausativeaffixes that turn an inchoativesteminto a causativetransitive . Sinceclosed-classmorphemesdrawtheir meaningsfrom a restrictedsetof possibleelements(by definition, in a given language ), and sinceproductively inflected and derived forms are semanticallycomplex, with a meaningcomposed of themeaningof thestemmodified by themeaningof theaffix , a similar analysisstronglysuggestsitself for synonymousverbselsewherein thelanguage or in otherlanguagesthat happennot to be morphologicallycomplex. Notethat closed-classelementshavedistinctive nonsemanticproperties,suchastypically , andin specialsyntacticpositions, sothisclaim is in no beingbound, unstressed dangerof being circular. An extremeexamplecanbe found in certainlanguageslike Lisu (seeLi and Thompson, 1976) that do not signalgrammaticalrelationseitherwith affixation or with stableword order. Ambiguity aboutgrammaticalrelationsin theselanguages is not asbad asan English-speakerwould predictbecauseits individual verbscanencodepropertiesof their arguments , selectingfeaturesthat in other can be in the case and languages specified agreement systems.In sucha language onesays, roughly, Asfor John, Bill bit or Asfor Bill , John bit andtheybothcan meaneitherthat John bit Bill or that Bill bit John. But for manyotherverbs, the ambiguity does not exist. For example, transitiveburn can apply only to an inanimatepatient; Asfor John, the stick burn andAsfor the stick, Johnburncan only meanthat John burnedthe stick, andAsfor John, Bill burn andAsfor Bill , Johnburnareungrammatical(a causativeconstructionsimilar toAsfor John, he

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causedBill to be burned would have to be used) . Another example is the equivalentof the verb kill , which, unlike English, does not require an animate " " patientargument, but insteadrequiresa nounphrasemeaning an end, soone " " saysthe equivalentof Asfor John, endkill ( John killed and an end resulted) and it could only be Johnwho did the killing . Variability of verb meaningsacrosslanguages. Though languagestend to makethe samekinds of distinctionsin defining verbs, they show considerable variability in theexactmeaningsof individual vocabularyitems. One language mayhavea verbmeaningto walk in a particularmanner; anothermay haveonly a verb for walking itself, which must combinewith one adverbor anotherto expressthatkind of walking. Somelanguageshavea singleverbfor makingand doing; othersdistinguishthem. SeeTalmy ( 1985), Gentner( 1981, 1982), andof courseWhorf ( 1956) for discussion. Sinceextreme linguistic determinismis false, verbsprobablydo not label unanalyzedconcepts, but varying amalgams of elements. Statisticalsimilarities to closed-classmorphemes.When we look at words' frequencyof occurrencein English, wefind thatverbsdisplaya statisticalprofile to closedthatdifferentiatesthemfrom nounsandrevealscertain resemblances 1981 . Closed -class classmorphemes(Gentner, ) morphemespredominatein the high frequencyquantiles, but their numbersdrop to zero in the middle andlow . Nouns show the oppositepattern: the lower the frequency, the frequencies the greater proportionof wordsthatarenounsandthe largertheabsolutenumber of nouns. Verbs are somewherein between: rarest in the high-frequency quantiles,peakingin thehigh-to-mediumfrequencies,anddroppingoff steadily in themediumandlow frequencies . This patternis consistentwith thepossibility that verbs are most naturally attachedto meanings that are neither wildly idiosyncraticnor rigidly tied to specific linguistic functions (e.g., tense), but somethingin between. In fact, thereis a set of verbsthat actssomethinglike a transitionalcase: the " " light verbs suchascome, go, make, be, bring, take, get, andgive. Syntactically they are full -fledged verbs, but semanticallythey are lessfilling , resembling closed-classelements. Their meaningsare fairly nonspecific and may correspond to simple semanticconfigurationsthat are encodedinto affixes in other languages(e.g., the use of make in the periphrastic causative). They often function as little more than tense-carriersor verb-slot-fillers in idioms whose . objectscarrymostof the meaningof the predicate(e.g., makelove, takea bath; go crazy; andmostusesof be). Somehaveauxiliary- like semanticandsyntactic ' properties(e.g., We re going to eat; How goesit ?; Have you any wool?; Are you hungry?) or are homophonouswith auxiliaries (possessionalhaveandthe copulabe).

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Adult psycholinguisticevidence.In thepsychologyof language , verbsdo not function as cohesive, indivisible gestalts. Comparedto nouns, verbs are not rememberedwell verbatim, do not survive intact in doubletranslations(where one bilingual speakertranslatesa passageand anothertranslatesit back), and of sentences frequentlydo not surviveintactin paraphrases (seeGentner, 1981, fora review). All of this suggeststhatverbsarestoredandprocessedin termsof assembliesthat can lose existing elementsor accumulatenew ones(seealso GergelyandBever, 1986). Developmentalpsycholinguisticevidence.Children acquireverbslater than nounsin general(Gentner, 1982) andareproneto makingerrorsin usingverbs with their correct meanings , errors that are in many casesattributable to or mislabeled semantic structures.Sincethis is an importanttopic in incomplete the presentstudy, I will discussthis evidencein detail in chapter8. . Intriguingly, verb meaningsmayberepresented in Neurolinguisticevidence the sameparts of the brain as information about grammar(Gentner, 1988). Damageto certainregionsof the left cerebralhemispherecanleadto agrammatism, a syndromecharacterized by dysfluency, reducedphraselength, a restriction of the range of syntacticconstructionsused, and frequentomission of closed-classmorphemes . Agrammaticaphasicsoften haveparticulardifficulty with verbs. Theymakeerrorsin inflecting them, havedifficulty producingthem, and often omit them entirely (Gleason, Goodglass, Obler, Green, Hyde, and Weintraub, 1980; Marin, Saffran, andSchwartz, 1976; Miceli , Mazzuchi, Menn, andGoodglass , 1983; Miceli , Silveri , Villa , andCaramazza , 1984). Sincethese deficits involve the useof verbsin sentences , they could reflect the difficulties in coordinatingsyntacticconstraintswith verbs' representations , rather than difficulties in representingor processingthe verbsthemselves . But Miceli et al. . Theysimply asked ( 1984) showedthatverbsthemselvessufferin agrammatism agrammaticsto nameobjectsand actions depicted in drawings; no sentence processingwasrequired. Agrammaticshadmoredifficulty namingactionsthan objects. This wasnot dueto the intrinsic difficulty of thetask; anomics- braininjured patients with general difficulties in naming- showed the opposite pattern, and intact control subjectsshowedno difference. As Gentnernotes, thesefindingssuggestthatverbmeaningsandsyntacticrulessharesomeof their neurologicalmachinery. 5.4

A Cross - linguistic Inventory of Components of Verb Meaning

If therearerecurringelementsof verb meaning, what arethey? An answerwill providethefirst bitsof evidencefor whatthecrucial meaningfeaturesorganizing verbs' semanticstr.ucturesare. Carter( 1976a, b) offeredsomesuggestionbased

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on English with a few comparisonsto other languages , but the mostextensive cross-linguistic surveyof verbmeaningscomesfrom the work of Talmy ( 1985) on whathecalls" Iexicalizationpatterns." Talmy is notcompletelyexplicit about what a lexicalizationpatternis; in particular, he doesnot distinguishbetween semanticdistinctionsmadeby largenumbersof verbs, roughly independentof thesyntacticframethattheverbappearsin (for example, distinctionsgoverning thesituationsin which onecould point to someeventandtruthfully say" This is " blicking ), andsemanticdistinctionsthat have widespreadgrammaticalconsequences . His examplessuggestthat thesetwo sensesof " Iexicalizationpattern" very oftencoincide. In fact, in thetheory 1am presenting,we shouldexpectsuch a correlation. If all verbsmustbe organizedarounda setof grammaticallyrelevant structuresthat canhaveslotsfor idiosyncraticcognitive elements,but not vice versa, this will lead to a sheerfrequency difference in which semantic distinctionsareprevalentacrosslanguages.An analogy: if onewereto doa word token frequencycount of a pile of college applicationforms, therewould be a largedifferencein the frequencyof the words like nameandaddresscompared to words like John, Smith, and Main, even if the latter are non-negligibly frequent. The universeof conceptualfeaturesthat, logically speaking, could be coopted into verbrepresentations is virtually limitless. McClellandandKawamoto ( 1986), for example, assume(without evidence) that one of the dimensionsof similarity amongverbsthathasconsequencesfor argumentassignmentis a 4: way distinctionconcerningthe natureof the changethat the patientundergoes " " " "" "" " into pieces, into shreds, chemical, or none. However, mostconceptual elementsare rarely or never systematically encodedin the predicatesof a language. Talmy claims that languagesrarely encodeinto verb meaningsthe mood, attitude, degreeof hedging, or stateof mind of the speaker; the rateof a moving or changing object; the symmetry, color, person, or genderof the participantsof an event; the relation of the event to comparableevents; the , indoors versus physical propertiesof the setting of the event (temperature outdoors, landversusair versussea); tense; andmanyother aspectsof theevent . Of that are possiblyor even typically entertainableon the part of a speaker course, individual verbscan encodeany of thesenotions, such as to redden, swelter, doubt, symmetrize , swim, and so on, but the distinctionsdo not apply acrosslarge numbersof verbs, do not differentiate verbs into syntactically . relevantsubclass es, anddo not receiveencodingby closed-classmorphemes Below I list thesetof semanticelementsthat accordingto Talmy areemployed by large numbersof verbsin many languages. I alsogive examplesof closedclassmorphemesthat expresssimilar meanings.

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event" .. a stateor motion. The " mainevent" is a position, state, or changeof positionor statepredicatedof a theme, for example, thefact that John movedin Johnran. Presumablyit would apply alsoto an act committed by an agentor actorin caseswherethereis no theme. The maineventis the backbone of a verb' s meaningandso hasno equivalentin the closed-classsystem; rather, it definesthe eventor relation whosetemporallocation is fixed by the tense markerson theverb, whosetemporaldistributionis specifiedby aspectmarkers, whosetruth valueis modified by the auxiliary, and so on. Path, direction, and location. A verb canspecify a particularpathof motion of a themewith respectto anobject(e.g., enter), with respectto thespeaker(e.g., come), or with respectto a specifickind of object (e.g., the ship berthed; other havemuchricherpossibilitiesof this sort). Verbscanalsoobligatorily languages specifytheexistenceof motionalonga path, with the pathitself specifiedin the verb' s arguments(Thebird darted into the house). In suchcasesthe exact kind of path is specifiedby closed-classmorphemessuchas prepositions,postpositions , casemarkers,or particles. The intuitive geometricsystemin which paths aredefinedhasspecialpropertiesdiscussedat length in Talmy ( 1983). Causation.Verbscanspecifywhetheraneventhasbeencausedor just occurs e. ( g., kill versusdie), what kind of causationis involved (e.g., by an agent, an instrument,or an event), and in somecaseswhat the causeis (e.g., the wind in The pencil blew off the table). Following Talmy' s later work ( 1988), this is extendibleto the various kinds of causationthat can be analyzedin terms of force-dynamicinteractions,suchasenabling, preventing, failing to prevent, and soon. Thesecorrespondto variousclosed-classmorphemesthatencodecausativity itself, suchasverb affixes in certainlanguages , or prepositions,complementizers,andcasemarkersfor variouscausalargumentsor subordinateclauses suchas agents(e.g., by), instruments(with), causingevents(from eating too much), andsoon. Manner. This refersto how anactoractsor a themechanges , or to something theactoror themeis doing concurrentlywith thechange. For example, it is the differencebetweenpunch andslap (mannersof action) or betweenbounceand roll (mannersof motion). Mannerelementscanalsobeexpressed grammatically in adverbialadjuncts, suchas Sally camehomeskipping or in adverbs, often markedwith the suffixly . Propertiesof a themeor actor. Verbscan specify that their argumentshave certainspecificproperties. Theseinclude materialand shapepropertiesof the themeor patient, suchasthe English verbsto rain or to drink wherethe theme mustbeliquid. (In certainnorthernCalifornianIndianlanguages , therearemany verb rootsexpressingthe fact that particulartypesof objectsor substancesare moving.) Otherallowablegenericdistinctionsincludesingularversusplural and

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humanversusnonhuman(asin theGermanessenversusfressen , verbsmeaning to eat but differing as to whetherit is a humanor an animal that is doing the eating), thoughmanyothers, suchasperson,gender, or color, areneverfound. In the closed-class system, determiners , pronouns, agreementand concord markerson verbsandadjectives,andotherkindsof " classifiers" aresensitiveto thesedistinctions(Allan, 1977; Denny, 1976). Temporal distribution (aspectand phase). Talmy notesthat verbs can describe situationsaspointlike events(hit) or asboundariless es(run); they process candescribeiteratedevents(beat); enteringa state(sit downasopposedto sit); pointlike eventsthatterminatea process(arrive); eventsconsistingof anon-off cycle [even ! GO (THING . PATH ) ]

BecauseJackendoff's linear notationcalls for unreadablestringsof brackets whenthe conceptsbecomecomplex, I will usea tree-structurenotation, shown in (5.2), to display the sameinformation. It can be interpretedroughly like a ' phrasemarkerfor an EnglishX : the mothernodeindicatesthetype of constituent ; the leftmostdaughterstandsfor the predicate; the other daughtersstandfor its arguments . (Note thatfunctions, arguments , andmodifiers aredistinguished in this notationonly by their labelsand positions, not by somevisual device.) (5.2)

EVENT 1""PATH / THING

PATH / " " from ~ f)rom awa ;(via toward GO asindicatedin (5.3). ThePATHcategory can be further expanded (5.3)

THING ) (PLACE

This structuredefinesa pathby naminga referenceobject (a PLACE or THING ) andapath-functionspecifyingsomepathor directionwith respectto it. Themost ' commonpath-functionsdefinepathsthat terminateat a referenceobject ( ' to or ' from' , dependingon the direction of travel along the path), that point in its ' ' direction but do not necessarilyreach it ( ' toward or ' away-from ), or that ' ' ' ' ' ' coincidewith it at someintermediatepoint ( via ) . Up and down could be treatedasmonadicpaths. A PLACE is a regiondefinedwith respectto anobject, suchastheinteriorof theobject, its surroundings , or oneof its surfaces.As shown " ' in (5.4), it is definedby specifyingan objectanda " place-function (e.g., ' on , ' under' ' near' ' around' . I use , , ) Englishprepositionsasmnemonicsfor different is highly inexact. Thereare path- andplace-functions, but the correspondence no namesfor, and instances has and functions that English many place path several distinct whereoneprepositionstandsfor place- or path-functions. (Accordingly , I usesinglequotationmarksto distinguishlower-casemnemonicsfor semanticelementsfrom actualEnglish words.) The cognitive contentof path structurescorrespondsto a certainschematizationof motion wherebya moving object is idealized as a point traversingsometrajectory (seeTalmy, 1983).

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'

" andareference themovingobjectiscalleda" locatum Occasionally object that " " . helpsdefineits placeor patha location (5.4) in on under around

THING

5.5.2 Interfacing SemanticStructures with Syntax To getfrom agenericconceptualstructureto a semanticstructuresuitablefor the -takingverb, it is necessaryto indicatewhich of th~ lexical entryof an argument " " conceptualconstituentscanserveasan openargument, linked to a syntactic ' role in a verb s argumentstructure. Jackendoff( 1983) proposesa constraint called the Lexical Variable Principle: argumentsmust always be complete " . For example, " to place[something] [ somewhere conceptualconstituents ] is a possibleverb, wheretheopenargumentsarea THING anda PLACE; whereas " to " placesomething[ in somespatialrelationto] an inanimateobject, wherethe " openargumentis a bareplace-function, and to try to [movein somedirection] " ananimal, wheretheopenargumentconsistsof a combinationof a GO function and a path, are not possibleverbs. We can thus indicate open argumentsin semanticstructuresby appendingopenbrackets(" [ ] " ) to a conceptualconstituent . Forexample,thesemanticstructuresfor theverbgo andtheprepositioninto " " (which Jackendoffpointsout really means to in ) are shown in (5.5). 1" Suppressed " argumentsthatareentailedto existbutnot expressedin thesyntax, such astheagentsof shortpassivesor the understoodpatientin Johnate, arelisted in semanticstructurebut lack the bracketsdesignatingthem as being open to syntax. : : into (5.5) go EVENT PATH /

1" " THING I)

/ PATH I)

'"

PLACE / "" THING [)

Theargumentstructuresfor thesewordsarethencreatedby theapplicationof linking rules. Linking rulesmapopenargumentsin a semanticstructureonto syntacticallydistinguishableargumenttypes, basedontheir positionin semantic structure. Threelinking rules- one mappingthemesonto direct internal arguments , onemappinggoals(andotherconstituentsof paths) onto indirectinternal , and a third mapping locations (and other places) onto indirect arguments internal arguments- might look somethinglike (5.6). Similar rules could be formulatedfor LFG.

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(5.6) EVENT

EVENT STATE / 1" , / 1" , / 1" , 00 THING PATHGO THING PATH BE THING PLACE II) II) IIJ II II II . . . diinternalarg Ulnenl

indirecl inlemal argumenl

indirect internal argumenl

There are also rules that Jackendoffcalls categorialcorrespondence rules. Major syntactic phrasal categoriessuch as NP, VP, AP, PP, and S must . There are probably universal correspondto completeconceptualcategories which contingenciesgoverning conceptualcategoriesmay be expressedby which majorphrasalcategories(seePinker, 1982, 1984,for atheoryof howthese correspondences helpthechild acquirehisor herfirst phrasestructurerules), and somelanguage-particularvariability aswell. In particular, NPscanexpressany to things. PPs conceptualcategory,thoughin theunmarkedcasetheycorrespond in and and sometimes as in Bobis in the expressplaces paths( English properties, rulesspecify dumps). S andVP expresseventsandstates.Thesecorrespondence how phrasescanstandfor semanticconstituents ; togetherwith phrasestructure rules or their equivalent, andtheargumentstructuresof predicates , they dictate how the semanticstructurefor a sentenceasa wholeis built out of the semantic structuresof theindividual wordscomposingit. Forexample,thesentence John went into the room is representedsemanticallyas in (5.7). ( Theparentheses aroundthe namesfor the contentof the argumentsindicatethatthey camefrom ' elsewherein the sentence , not from the verb s lexical entry.) (5.7)

EVENT '/(TH O "J!N """" )ohn PATH / '" PLACE / '" in THING ") ("room

Sentencestructuresarewell fonned only if theycontainphrasescorresponding to theconceptualcategoriesselectedby theverb(e.g. THING versusPLACE versus PATH), in configurations(GB) or with grammaticalfunctions (LFG) consistentwith theverb' sargumentstructure.Forexample,thefactthattheverb enter, which incorporatesa direction of motion, takesa direct object, not a prepositional phrase, is enforcedby its semanticstructurecontainingan open

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argumentcorrespondingto a thing, not a path, as(5.8) shows. At the sametime it showshowtheverbcaninternally specifythekind of pathandplaceordinarily expressedby the preposition into. A new linking rule, not shown, would associatethe argumentof place-functions and path-functionswith the object role; it wouldalsoapplywithin locativeprepositionalphrases , servingto link the syntactic objectsof prepositionswith the correspondingargumentpositions within the prepositions' semanticstructures. : (5.8) enter

EVENT / 1"",PATH THING ()

/ ""PLACE / ""THING in [)

Verbsthatselectfor certaintypesof directionalor locationalargumentcanbe representedin similar ways. For example, put, which requiresa preposition " " incorporatingthedirection to anda place(Sheput thepencil into / onto/ under ' the desk, * Sheput thepencil toward/ from the desk -, Jackendoff, 1987), hasan openargumentcorrespondingto a path stipulatedto containthe path-function ' to' as indicatedin 5.9 . As we saw in 5.5 the , ( ) ( ), prepositionsinto and onto ' to' ' in X ' or ' on X ' . Less the to the specify path leading place transparently, as such under and around are many English prepositions ambiguous, serving eitherasplace- designators or asa .to' pathleadingto thedesignatedkind of place (Jackendoff, 1983). Any of theseprepositionscanthusbefused(seeJackendoff, 1987a) with thesemanticstructurefor put. In contrast, anyprepositionincorporating an incompatible path-function or no place-function will lead to an inconsistent,unfusablepair of semanticstructures.(In (5.9) I omit the partof the semanticstructurespecifying the causativecomponent.)2 (5.9) put:

./'"E VENT "(]", 1 THING PATH () / ' " PLACE

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This treatmentof theselectionof obliqueobjectshastheadvantagethata verb thatselectsgenericargumentsfor locationsor directionsdoesnot haveto specify a list of all theprepositionsit canappearwith, a list that would in anycaseberedundant with thelexical entriesfor the individual prepositions. (The reasonfor this redundancyis that prepositionsneedtheir own free-standingdefinitions so theycanbeusedin nonargumentpositions, asin In thepark ,John metMary.) As we shall see, more abstractprepositionalargumentssuch as instrumentsand benefactivessubmitto the sametreatment.Anotheradvantageof this treatment is that it is consistentwith developmentalevidenceshowing that children are proneto confusingprepositionsin passivesandadjuncts, wherethey often mark theagentphraseusing/ rom or with insteadof by (e.g. Thedoll is scrunchedfrom somebody... but notfrom me; Bowerman, 1983b; Maratsosand Abramovitch, 1975; Clark andCarpenter,in press). I know of no caseswherechildren leave theagentphraseunmarked(Thedoll is scrunchedsomebody ), or wherethey use a randomprepositionunrelatedto notionsof causation,agency, or sources(e.g., Thedoll is scrunchedto somebody ). Childrenalsoconfusesemanticallyrelated , suchasThey wentto stay at prepositionsin locativeand temporalexpressions ' thepuppy; He spointing hisfinger to it; andHe tookmeat the circus (Menyuk, 1969). Thesephenomena suggestthatchildrenappreciatethatverbstakeoblique argumentsof a generalsemantictype at a level removedfrom specific knowledge of which prepositionit mustbe. At first glanceselectionof prepositionsby lexicosemanticstructuremayseem " " incompatiblewith the commonobservationthat verbscan idiosyncratically selecttheir prepositionsor casemarkers, as in John relied on Mary or You shouldn't put upwith that. However, this factcouldbecapturedin word-specific . aseasilyasin word-specificsyntacticrepresentations semanticrepresentations semantic Prepositionscould have multiple entries with different specialized . (It is importantto structures , and verbscould selectfor thoserepresentations bear in mind that semanticstructuresare partly conventionalizedlinguistic , a point I return to in , not conceptualcategoryrepresentations representations chapter8.) The advantageof this kind of accountover direct listing of prepositions in argumentstructuresis thatit lackstheharmfulandunnecessarydescriptive powerof literal listing, it naturallyrepresentsverbsthat selectfamilies of semanticallysimilar prepositionsinsteadof specific prepositions, and it is consistentwith thewidespreadsystematicityof howprepositionsarepairedwith kindsof verbs.3 It is important to note that this treatmentof the representationof open argumentsaspointersto syntaxandtheinstantiationof themby fusion is a strong theoreticalclaim, not merenotation. I discussthe importanceof this claim in section8.2.

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5.5.3Manner ofMotion Manner ofmotion it, islisted asanother node of , if theverb specifies daughter the EVENT structures forthetwoentries in(5.10)corresponding ,asinthesemantic toThe ballrolled and The ballrolled down thehill.Note that distinct entries are needed :inSpanish for the first exists in a lexical rule , example ,only ; English , creates thesecond from thefirst(agood ofwhy direction often , example phrases treated as"adjuncts betreated asbeing of argument ," cannot independent structure ). : roll : (5.1O~ roll EVENT EVENT / ' " I """, / ' "/ \ " " ' " GO THINGMANNERGO THING PATH MANNER "roiling " " (J (J (J "rolling There areseveral features ofthecognitive content ofthese structures important " isshorthand "rolling . First foradescription ofthephysical , thesymbol ofrolling theparticular manner encoded .Its ,specifying topography bytheverb internal structure isirrelevant forourpurposes because manners (as particular totheexistence ofaspecified manner noroleinthemapping of )play opposed verb semantics onto structure . For a about the mental ( argument hypothesis ofparticular and manners ofmotion Marr and Vaina ,see representation , postures 1982 foritsinterface withconceptual structure Jackendoff , and .) , see , 1987d This isanexample ofthehybrid nature ofsemantic structure thatI appealed to atthebeginning of thechapter . Theidiosyncratic information about the ofrolling isablack asfarasgrammar box isconcerned weneed ,and topography notbeconcerned about it whereas theinformation that there isa , decomposing manner and apath that cares about . ,oramanner ,issomething specified grammar Thedistinction isindicated inthisnotation marks around the byquotation -to-grammar material . opaque The content oftheMANNER constituent it is, interacts , whatever cognitive withthecontent oftheGOand PATH constituents inspecific . ForGO ways events withnoPAT Hs,theMANNER information the motion ofthe specifies theme orparts ofthetheme relative toitsown internal frame ofreference (i.e., itsprominent axes orcenter ofmass toitslocal environment ), orwithrespect , withnoimplication thatthere isanytranslation oftheobject asawhole with totheenvironment . Anobject should beable todisplay amanner of respect " " motion while in one : it is not to The remaining place contradictory say penguin I skidded I bounced rolled I slidI spun inone ontheiceforasolid minute . place AGOevent hand translation oftheobject asawhole with ,ontheother ,implies totheenvironment ofitsinternal orlocal motions . Although , independent respect * can in one on the ice a dimensionless can , nothing go place point gofrom AtoB.When anevent has both aGOand aMANNER motion is , acomposite

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synthesizedout of the global translationandthe setof local motions(rotations, oscillations, and so on). The motions are synthesizedby uniting the local referenceframe defining the within-objectmotion with partof theglobalreference frame defining its translation: Thebottlefloated into the cavemustmean that the cave is situatedon a bodyof water; it cannotrefer to aneventin which someonecarriesinto a cavea tub of waterwith a bottlefloatingin it. Theseschematizationsare crucial in delineatingcertainsyntacticallyrelevantdistinctions involving the causativeand the dative, amongothers. 5.5.4 States The other major conceptualcategorythat verbs expressare STATEs. An exampleof a stateis a thing beingsituatedat a place. which usesthe predicate BE. The verb be is the prototypicalexample; the lexical entry of one of its versionsis shown in (5.11). (5.11) be:

STATE IIJ"'"PLACE / THING IJ

GO is canonicallyan EVENT. andBE is canonicallya STATE. However. the . It is alsopossiblefor GOto beanexample two contrastsarenottotally redundant of a state. when thetrajectoryof a motioneventis frozenin time andconceived of as a static path: This road goesfrom Toledo to Columbusis an example (Jackendoffannotatesthe function GO with a specialsymbol to indicatethis ). but this is not necessaryif it is listed as a STATE). Conversely. (GOexi Jackendoffsuggeststhat a nonmotionalsituationcanbeanexampleof anevent: the function STAY indicatesthat a thing continuesto be situatedat a place. for examplein John stayedin the roomor Mary keptJohn in the room. Again. the newfunction nameis not strictly necessary ; wecouldexpresstherelationby simply allowing BE to be a kind of EVENT.

s.sis Properties Verbs can select more than just broadontological categoriessuchas THING . They can also specifya particularkind of versusPLACE asopenarguments those in Theship berthed; Sheboxed/bagged in verbs like for , , object example theapples,' Shebonedthefish , Shemilkedthecow, andShebutteredthebread; seeClark and Clark ( 1978). Other languages , suchas the nativeCalifornian havemuchmoresystematicpossibilities 1985 described ), ( Talmy by languageAtsugewi of this type. They haveverbparticlesthat can specifythe motionof a type of object (e.g., sphericalandshiny, slimy andrunny) or motionof anentity

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into anobjectof a certainkind (e.g., fire , the ground). The semanticstructurefor berth is shownin (5.12). Jackendoffsuggeststhat the machinerynecessaryto " also handlethese" incorporatedarguments gives rise to the setof phenomena " " known as selectionrestrictions when the specific information is associated with anopenargumentinsteadof aclosedone. Forexample, theverbsplash, also shownin (5.12), specifiesthatits argumentbe liquid: sandcanmovein roughly the samemanneras water, but it seemsodd to sayThesandsplashed. The difference in interpretationof the specificquotedtermsin berth andsplashis that in thelattertheinformationis associatedwith anopenargumentandis fusedwith the informationgatheredfrom anothersentenceconstituent(just like in the semantic representationof put when it is fused with its arguments). If there is a conflict of conceptualcategory type or other conceptual information, the sentenceis interpretedas being semantically anomalous. This rules out sentences like *John elapsedand * Thesand splashed.

EVEN EVE /1~/"Am / I " '" THIN MA " I ) "/"P LAC PRO " " l iquid T HIN IPRO "b" enh

: (5.12) benh

: splash

THING (J

spIaminl"

The fact thatspecifictenDsareintroducedas" properties" of argumentsin the notationreflectsaninterestingconstrainton theincorporationof thesetenD Sinto verbs' semanticstructures. Verbsnever specify a true constant, in the senseof an individual or even a very specific kind of object or substance . It is not to She buttered the bread with imitation contradictory say margarine, for " " and example(Rappaport Levin, 1985). Somehowwhena putative constant is incorporatedintoa verb, it becomesagenericspecification.This maybea special caseof a moregeneralprincipleproposedby di Sciullo andWilliams ( 1987) that word meaningsare " generic" or " nonreferential" (Aronoff , 1980, makes a similar point). Accordingto this principle, specificreferenceto things, times, or truth valuesis a phrase-level and sentence-level, not a word-level, assignment process. Di Sciullo and Williams note three phenomenain support of this principle. John is a bankrobber (wherebank robber is a compoundnoun) does notmeanthatJohnis currentlyrobbinga bank; it indicatesonly thekind of person he is (in fact, hemayneverhaverobbeda bank). In contrast, thephrasea robber of banksimpliesthat the personhasactually doneso (seeRappaportandLevin,

Representation

185

in press). Second , onecannotsay *John is a that-robber, pointing to a bank, or *John is an it -robber, referringto anantecedentin discourse,thoughonecanof coursesayJohnrobbedthat/ it. Finally, thereis a strongcontrastin acceptability betweensayingJohn is a Nixon-admirer in everysenseexceptthat he doesnot admireNixonandsaying*JohnadmiresNixon in everysenseexceptthat hedoes not admire Nixon. This genericnessconsb'aint would be implementedas the interpretive conventionthat the cognitive content of a constantX in verb definitions is a (presumablypragmatic) interpretationof an argumentas being similar to X.4 The GrammaticallyRelevantSubsystemhypothesis,of course, requiresthat the contentsof specific(quoted) termsbe opaqueto lexical rules. A rule can be sensitive to whethera verb specifies that a location argumenthave some property, anyproperty(asopposedto beingcompletelyfreein its properties), but it cannot interpretmaterial in quotes so as to apply selectivelyto arbitrary properties. For example, no rule shouldbe able to tell cognitively represented thedifferencebetween,say, verbsinvolving " butter" and"jam" on theonehand and verbs involving " oil " and " grease" on the other, or betweenverbs of " " " " " " " " splashing and spraying andverbsof splattering and spattering; they are all just atomicsymbols. However, rules in manylanguages , including English, aswe shallsee,canapplyselectivelyto itemscontainingcertainkindsof specific information( Talmy, 1985). I will suggesta versionof theSubsystemhypothesis that allows for sometransparencyof specific termswithout going all the way toward the UnrestrictedConceptualRepresentationhypothesisthat the full meaningsof specific termsare accessibleto linguistic rules. I will do so by proposinga small set of object propertiesthat will be representedby specific featuresthatlexicalrulescanbesensitiveto, ratherthanasquotedopaquetenns that merely point to conceptualcategories. A plausiblefirst approximationto thesefeaturesis that they are the ones that tend to turn up in classifier and agreementsystems(excludingdeictic featureslike personand morphological featureslike genderand declensionalclass); we know that theseare a small subsetof the specificobjectcategoriesthat languagescanhavenamesfor (see Denny, 1976; Allan, 1977). Specifically, somethinglike the following set of featuresseemsto expressmostof the recurringgrammaticallyrelevantdistinctions :' we find in Englishandother languages . Animacy: animateversusinanimate. . Humanness : humanversusnonhuman . Shape(extendedness or dimensionality). Grammardoesnot pick out Euclid" " " " " ean shapessuchas square or " circular, local geometrysuchas pointy or " " containingahole, or metricpropertiessuchasequilaterality. However, it often

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usesa categorizationin termsof how manydimensionsanobjectis extendedin. Objectscanbeextendedin onedimension(e.g., sticks, ropes), two dimensions , leaves), or threedimensions(e.g., boulders, apples). Shapescan (e.g., sheets also be specifiedmorefinely, especiallyin the semanticsof prepositionsandof several subclass es of verbs relevant to the locative alternation. Jackendoff in termsof " major" and " minor" ( 1987c) suggeststhat objectsareschematized dimensionalities(seealsoTalmy, 1983). Themajordimensionalityof an object is the numberof dimensionstheobjecthasin its sparsestrecognizablecaricature or schematization . The major dimensionalitycan be further constrainedto be bounded or not so constrained . The " minor" dimensionality is the " less " dimension , alwaysbounded,projectedovertheentireaxis of a major important dimension. Hence, a road, river, or ribbon is ID X ID (major dimensionis ID , either boundedor not; minor dimensionis I D). A spot is ODx 2D. A layer or slab is 2D X I D. A tubeor beamis I D X 2D. A Sphereis 3D. Naturally, the di mensionalitiesof themajorandminoraxeshaveto addupto 3 or less. In addition, a fixed dimensionalitycan apply to an objectasa whole, or to the boundaryof an object; for examplea " crust" is the 2D x I D surfaceof a 3D object, and an " " endpoint is the ODboundaryof a I D line. . Count/mass. Things are often subcategorized in terms of whether they are construedas bounded, formed, objectscapableof being individuated, or as unbounded or media. I will usethemnemonics" count" and , formlesssubstances " mass" to referto this distinction.6 . Rigidity . Objectsmay be classified in terms of whetherthey are rigid or flexible. . Substance . Massesmay beeitherhomogeneous / aggregate substances , which can be further subclassifiedas liquid or semisolid, or aggregatesof parts. The parts themselvescan be classifiedin termsof someof the propertiesusedto classify objectsasa whole, suchas substancetype or dimensionality. This setof objectpropertiesis summarizedin the schemashown in (5.13), which is alsotries to capturethe majordependencies amongthe propertiesto a first approximation . For example, only inanimateobjectscanbe categorizedin terms of their dimensionality; only massescan consistof aggregates . Setsof featureswithin parentheses areoptionalandmutuallyexclusivealternatives.The AGGREGATEfeaturecanfurtherbeelaboratedin termsof thePROPERTYthat each of its parts must possess . Becauseof the way the diagram captures features each of the rightmostlabelsin a line implies the , dependencies among entire horizontalchainof labelsextendingto its left. Thusa semanticrepresentation for a verb can imposeselectionrestrictionson its argumentsby listing setsin (5.13). Notethat sincethe exactlyonelabelfrom anyof theparenthesized values and mass values are not containedwithin a setof count/ dimensionality

187

Representation

. Some their own parentheses , they both may be specified simultaneously examples, appropriateperhapsfor argumentsof splash, fressen, and coil, are shownin the first three structuresin (5.14). The latter two could be usedto specifythe 2D boundaryof a 3D object(e.g., acontainer,forfill ) or anaggregate

liquid

.

~

~-Z /"~~ :

(5.14)

~ '.~c

-i .~u , 11 ~ me cue

~. '~ ~~

of dropsof liquid (e.g., for sprinkle). consisting PROPERTY (5.13)

nonhuman

PROPERTY 10

I I ? ~ / " ~ PRO RTY PRO TY p y ~~ ~~ PR7~ ~ ~ ~ BOUNDARY aggrel8l rn1NG PROPERTY PROPERTY 3D OD In addition, there may be a need for two mechanismsfor designating propertiesof thingsCornpositionally . Jackendoff( 1987b) suggeststhatcomplex propertiesmaybe defined from states,especiallyin the semanticrepresentation of adjectivephrases. For example, the meaningof coveredwith snowmay be " " " " somethinglike suchthat [snowcoversX] , where covers is a kind of state.He ' ' suggeststhe symbol such asan operatorthat effectsthis conversion. Another

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possiblecomplexobject propertymay haveto be specifiedfor objectsthat are definedin termsof their purpose.Forexample,theargumentof theverbpackcorresponding to suitcasesandlunchboxesmight haveto bespecifiedasa container designedfor thepurposeof containingobjects(cf. ?Johnpackedhis handwith candies, which can haveonly the" stuff/ wad" senseof pack, not the " load/put" sense ). I will call the operatorthat convertsa stateinto the property of having thatstateasits intendeduseor function ' for/ to' . Theseoperators, whoserepresentation is summarizedin (5.15), are probably too powerful as stated, asthey canleadto unnaturalembeddingsof clausesin verb meanings.One reasonable constraintis thattheycannotberecursivelyembeddedwithin themselvesor each other: no propertyis definedin termsof its participation in someeventor state involving otherobjectswhosepropertiesinvolve particulareventsor states.This at leastpreventstheseoperatorsfrom defining infinite setsof arbitrarily large semanticstructures. I assumethereareother constraintson theseoperatorsas well. PROPERTY (5. 15) PROPERTY ............ " ............ " " such STATE for/to STATE 5.5.6 Extension to Nonlocational Semantic Fields Severalthings must be definedto extendthe machineryfor spatial eventsand statesto nonlocationalfields in accordwith theThematicRelationsHypothesis. Accordingto Jackendoff( 1983), eachkind of extensionmustspecify(a) thetype of conceptualconstituentthat can serveasa theme, and the type of constituent that can serveas a referenceobject; (b) an interpretationschemethat mapsthe notionof ' 'a themebeingat a location" onto whateverrelationalnotion is central to thatfield. Forexample, in thepossessional field , themesandreferenceobjects both must be T HI NGs; the notion of "X being at location r ' is interpreted X. I will expressthis in the notationby appending cognitivelyas Y possessing the nameof the field to the maximal conceptualconstituent; this name will " " symbolizehow thebasicconceptof location is extendedin the particularfield underconsideration , andthusit will affect the interpretationof all the functions it immediatelydominates.That is, GO. ' to' , and other elementswill all receive the appropriateinterpretationanalogousto their spatial meanings.' Subsidiary classificationsof semanticfields, suchasdifferent kinds of possession , canbe expressedby additionalsymbolsappendedto the field name. Thepossessionalfield.Thusthe definition of belong might be as in (5.16). (I am assumingthat the central meaningof the English preposition at selects nonanimatespatiallocations, and that there is a version of to-that can indicate ' ' possessionalat .)

: STATE possessi 1 " " " / THING II/PLACE '" 189

Representation

(5.16)

: belong

AT

THING [) Despitethe appealof the ThematicRelationsHypothesisfor thepossessional fact: theverb field, in Jackendoff' s fonnulation it leavesuswith anembarrassing asin (5.16). But ifit is, why haveitself. Presumablyit too would ~ represented shouldit take a possessorsubjectanda possession , asa object? The possessor location, should be linked to an obliqueobject, andthe possession , asa theme, shouldbe linked to theintransitivesubject. Onecouldposita highly markedpair of linking rulesor anidiosyncraticargumentassignmentdirectlyassociated with theverbhavethatpreemptedthe usualones, but his leadsto two problems.First, asHustand Brame( 1976) and Pinker, Lebeaux, andFrost( 1987) point out, this ' assignmentrenderstheverb havein full accordwith Jackendoffs ThematicHierarchy Condition (the location argumentis mappedto subjectandis lower on thethematichierarchythan the theme, which is mappedontoobject). Therefore haveshould passivize- but it doesn't. Second, any theory that would depict haveas a highly markedexceptiongoing strongly againstthe thematicgrain wouldleaveit a mysterythathaveis sucha high-frequency, ubiquitousverb, and onethat children acquireearly and without any reversalsof subjectandobject or intrusionsof spatialprepositions(Bowerman, in press). I suggestan alternative. Possession canbe conceptualizedin two ways: asa relation betweena metaphoricalthemeand location, or, as involving a new primitive state type that I will call HAVE. The first argumentof HAVE, the , is linked to SUBJ (LFG) or to the externalargument(GB; alternatively possessor to an internalobjectin a structurelackinganexternalargument , , henceone thatwould bemovedinto subjectpositionto satisfytheCaseFilterandExtended ProjectionPrinciple). The secondargumentwould be linked to OBJ (LFG) or to aninternalargumentthat somehowreceivescase(GB). Theverbhave, whose representationis shown in (5.17), would expressnothing but this relation. Cognitively, the HAVE stateis simply the inverseof the BE state, treatingthe " location, rather than the locatum, as the " logical subject. How would the cognitiverelationbetweenHAVE andBE becaptured?Accordingto Jackendoff " " ( 1978, 1983), there are inferencerules, definedover semanticstructureby virtue of their cognitive content, that capture logical redundanciesamong distinct semanticconfigurations and supportcertain kinds of reasoning . For " If X GO to Y thenatsometime Jackendoff the inference rule , example, proposes

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X BE at Y." We could add the inferencerule " If X HAVE Y, then Y BE (placefunction) X," capturingtheir logicalequivalencewhile maintainingthelinguistic distinctivenessthat reflectsthis gestalt shift.

(5.17)

STATE 1 / THING "" HA VE (JTHING (J have :

There are four advantagesto introducing HAVE as a primitive in semantic . Two havealreadybeenmentioned: it explainstheexistenceand representation unmarkedness of theverbhave, andit explainsthe unpassivizabilityof haveand a numberof relatedverbs, to bediscussedlater. The third is that it mesheswell with an analysisof the representationof double-object verbsthat I will discuss in the next section. Finally, it explains the puzzling constructionThis box has applesin / on / under/ aroundit (Gruber, 1965). Jackendoff( 1987a) pointsout thatthisconstructionappearsto violateanyconditionthatwouldprohibita single thematicrole from beingassignedto two distinct nounphrases,in this casethis box and it. (He usesit to confront Chomsky' s ( 1981) Theta-Criterion, but it would apply to Bresnan's ( 1982c) BiuniquenessCondition as well. Indeed, virtually any grammaticaltheory would seem to need some version of this condition, to rule out countlessstrings such as * Bill ate suppereverypizza.) However, if HAVE and BE are distinct semantic predicates, the problem . Just as BE is ordinarily defined in the locational field but can be disappears extendedto the possessionalfield, HAVE is ordinarily defined in the possessional field but can be extendedto the locational field. However, its structure definesno slot for a place-function, soThis sheethasa stain (on it ), Thatgift has a ribbon (aroundit ), Thatpot hasdecaffeinatedcoffee(in it ), andMy househas a garage (near it ) are all possiblesentences , and This box has somebooksis . This is eliminated the vague vagueness by prepositionalphrase,however, so in This box has booksin it , this box plays the role of possessor(in the locational field) andit playstherole of location. Thus thesentenceis neithergrammatically ill formed nor cognitively redundant. Other SemanticFields Based on Location. The other main fields that, accordingto theThematicRelationsHypothesis, submit to a spatialanalysisare the temporal, the identificational, . the existential, and the epistemic. In the temporalfield, EVENTs or STATEs function as themesT I MEs as reference objects, andX beingat locationY is interpretedasevent/stateX occurringat time Y. Thusthedefinition of last in Themeetinglastedfrom 2:00 till 4:00 would be highly similar, exceptfor the field name, to thedefinition of go in Theroad went from Chicagoto Decatur.

Representation

In the identificationalfield, a THING canbe locatedat a PROPERTYand is interpretedashavingthat property. Someverbs, suchasbe, turn into, keep, or become,asin Johnbecamea doctor, expressthepropertyor typeasan open argument . Others, such as the intransitive change-of-state verbs, specify the propertyor type asa constantwithin the verb definition, as in Theglass broke. However, this analysisraisesa question. Many propertiesareall-or-none; it doesnot makemuchsenseto extendthe notion of a continuous" path" from not being brokento being broken. Jackendoff, in his 1983book, suggeststhat in certain fields pathssimply degenerateinto their end states. However, in his 1987bpaperheintroduceda new function, INCH (inchoative), thatmapsa state onto the eventof that state's coming into existence. Combinedwith the ' such' operatorthatmapsstatesonto properties, we havea possiblyredundantway of " ' " expressingobjects comingto take on new properties: X goesto propertyY, or " The stateof X beingat Y comesinto being." I will assumethat this is not a but correspondsto thedifferencebetweenconceptualizing spuriousredundancy via intennediate states(asin John wentfrombeingsickto beingwel/) and change instantaneous conceptualizing change(asinJohngot wel/). Insteadof addingthe function INCH to the currentinventory, I will extendthe existingnotation in a minimal way by allowing GO to takea PROPERTY(ratherthana PATH ) as a secondargumentwhenit is part of a nonlocationalevent, yielding the interpretation that theeventconsistsof a theme' s instantaneouslycomingto assumea property. Verbsthatdo expresscontinuouschangesin a propertywill specify a PATH as an argumentof GO, but the embeddedpath-functions will take PROPERTYsasargumentsin this field aswell eventhoughsofar theyhaveonly beenallowedto takePL A C Esor T HI NGs.This is becauseit makeslittle sense to have to define a PLACE by means of a place-function in these cases. Nonlocationalgo, inchoativeget (as in get sick), and break arerepresentedin (5.18). : : break get (5.18) go:

/

:idenl EVENT 1....... PATH THING 'V / \ " - '

f~

:ident EVENT . / 1 .............. 00

/

EVENT :idenl 1 ...........

THINGPROPERTY GO THINGPROPERTY "broken " II II II

to PROPERTY PROPERTY I) II

In the existentialfield , a THING or a STATE can be in or out of a single to thatthing or stateexisting, in verbssuchasexist, make, locationcorresponding create, destroy, bake, knit, andso on. A definition for existis shownin (5.19). Evidencethat existenceis treatedas a location in English comesfrom expressions suchascomeinto existence,comeinto being, go out of existence,stay in existence , andso on.

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exist :

: existential STATE / 1 ". . . BE THING PLACE / "() at existence Jackendoffalso suggeststhat there is a " circumstantial" semanticfield in which eventsor statesfunctionaslocations,anda themegoing into, beingin, or leaving thoselocationsis interpretedasthat entity startingto participatein that event, beingin theprocessof participatingin thatevent, or stoppingparticipation in theevent. This allowsoneto capturecertaingeneralizations involving choices of prepositionsor complementizers by certainverbs(e.g., John allowed Susan to go,. JohnpreventedSusan/ rom going) andrelationsamongthe meaningsof certainpolysemousverbs(e.giJohn keptthebookontheshelf/ John kepthisdog running in circles; seeJackendoff, 1978, 1983). In the representationwe could ' ' prune the unnecessaryat place-function and allow circumstantialstatesand " " " pathsto be representeddirectly as BE THING EVENT/ STATE and [path" function] EVENT/ STATE, respectively.Recall, too, that I havebeentreating the surfacesubjectsof passivesasplayingtheroleof themein thecircumstantial field ; explicit representations of passiveswill be discussedin section5.6.4. Jackendoffdoes not discussthe epistemicfield, but basedon the verbs discussedearlier it would appearthat THI NGs or EVENTs or STATEs can be interpretedasideas, andthatthelocations- or , morespecifically, possessorsof theseideascanbe interpretedassentientmindscontainingthe ideas. Thusa of theversionof knowthat takesNP complements part of thesemanticrepresentation be in might roughly captured (5.20).8 : (5.20) know STATE : epislemic / 1 " HAVE THING THING () () 5.5.7 Actions, Agents, and Patients Oddly, theoriesof thematicrelationshavetendedto dealwith oneof two disjoint realms. The Gruber/Jackendoffapproachhasconcentratedon expressionsfor , focusingon themes,locations, sources, spatialrelationshipsandtheir analogues and goals. The " agent" role is alsomentioned,but it doesnot really function as analternativeto theotherroles, whicharemutuallyexclusive(that is, no verbhas an argumentfunctioningboth assourceandaslocation, but manyverbs, suchas give, havea subjectargumentthat is both an agentand a source). Approaches associatedwith Fillmore ( 1968), while largely relegatingthe complexitiesof " " spatialrelationsto the location caserole, havea richer setof rolesconcerning

193

Representation

, and instrument. agency, such as agent, benefactive, manner, experiencer Rappaportand Levin ( 1988), Culicover and Wilkins ( 1986), and Jackendoff ( 1987a) suggestthat the two approaches maysimply be dealingwith different , oneconcerningagency, oneconcerninglocation, bothof whichcan subsystems bedefinedin thesemanticrepresentationof a verb. I will adoptthis assumption , which helpsto capturea numberof crucial phenomena . Unfortunatelyno one has outlined an explicit theory of how thesetwo systemsare related; I will proposea first approximationhere. Let' s considera new kind of event and functioninvolving actions. Actional eventsinvolve the function ACT , which takesone argument, an actor, or two , an agentand a patient. (The two-argumentfunctioncould becalled arguments " ACf -ON" but the difference betweenthe monadicand dyadic versionsprovides thenecessary disambiguation.) In thedyadicversion, thesecondargument, thepatient, canbeequatedwith Talmy ' s " agonist" ; thefirst argument,theagent, can be equatedwith Talmy' s " antagonist." Theseeventsmay also specify a numberof other subordinateroles. The simplestactional event has a single argumentandcanbe found in unergativeintransitiveverbs, mostof which also specifya manner. The exampleyawn is shownin (5.21). : (5.21) yawn EVENT 1 ........... / ACT THINGMANNER " ( ) "yawning Kiss, shown in (5.22), is an example of a dyadic A Cf event. The second " " argumentis theentity that is affected, but only in the sensethat it is involved in the act and its participation helps to definewhat kind of act it is; it doesnot necessarilychangestateor location. (5.22)

: kiss

ACT

~

EVENT / , ~ THINGTHING MANNER " () ( ) "kissing

Mannerof acting on for agent-patient relations, like mannerof motion for theme-path relations, is specified in a quotedgrammaticallyopaquesymbol, serving as a pointer to some cognitive representationof the physical and geometricpropertiesof the manner. And like mannerof motion in dyadicGO events, mannerof acting on (i.e., MANNER in a dyadic ACf ) is inherently definedasan interaction, in this casebetweentheagentandthepatient; it is not " " just a specificationof the motions of the agent. For example, in kissing the mannerspecifiesthe natureof the contactbetweenthe lips of the agentandthe body of the patientthat makesan event an exampleof kissing.

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It is importantto characterizetheabstractessenceof thedyadic ACT .relation with its agentandpatientargumentsbecausemy analysisof the passivedepends on it (seesections4.4.4 and5.6.4). First, an ACT definesa relation betweentwo entitiesthat is direct or unmediated , underlying the directnesseffect discussed in relation to the causative. Thereis experimentalevidencethat the subjective " closeness " of two argumentsis determinedmostly by whetherthey standin an relation: Fodoret al. ( 1980) found that peopleratedthe subjectand agentpatient the objectasbeing no more closelyrelatedin John killed Mary, whereMary is a patientanda theme, than in Johnbit Mary, where Mary is only a patient. The dyadicACT alsodefinesa relationthat is asymmetricin that the first argument is causallyresponsiblefor the relationship; it is also the assumedcauseof any of the agent-patientinteraction, changesexplicitly representedasconsequences with thepatientlinked to the themeof the change. Furthermore, an ACT event alsoservesasa locusfor a MANNER specificationthat definesthe exactnature of the relationshipbetweenagentand patient, making inherentreferenceto the roleof thepatient. Finally , Dowty ( 1987) andTenny ( 1988) notethat thepatient playsa role in the temporalinterpretationof the event: the event referredto by the verb is delimited or " measuredout" in tenDs of the time course of what happensto the patient. For example, an act of hitting hastakenplaceonly when the patient has received the blow. I will return to this point when I examine temporal/aspectualinformation in semanticstructures. Actors, agents, and patientsare linked to their associatedpositions inargument structureby the linking rules in (5.23). In LFG, " SUBJ," " SUBJ," and " OBJ " , respectively, would replacethe position labelslisted. EVENT EVE ~' T (5.23) EVENT / ACT

\

THING '.) " " " . external ~ nt argu

/ 1\ ACTTHING THING ,.) t external argument

1\ / ACTTHING THING ,.) I I . t direct internal argument

5.5.8 A PossibleFeatural Representationfor Basic Predicates In theunmarkedcase, Acr , like GO, will be an EVENT , thoughaswe shallsee it canbeextendedto STATEsaswell. Another unmarkedconflation will bethat the first argumentof Acr hasthe property ' animate' or ' human' . Sincethis is alsoanunmarkedconventionfor HAVE , we havean intuitive basisfor a feature setfor thefour kinds of predicatesexpandingconceptualconstituents,allowing naturalsubsetsto beexpressedby specifyingthe valueof oneof the features.Say onefeaturepicks out whethertheunmarkedkind of constituenttype in which the

195

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predicateis foundis anEVENT or a STATE; the featurecould be- ddynamic>. Saythe otherfeaturepicksout whetherin the unmarkedcasethe first argument of the predicateis humanandin control of the event/state; the featurecould be . GOandACf arecanonicallyEVENTs, HAVE andBE arecanonically STATEs. The first argumentof A Cf andHAVE canonicallyarehumans that control the action or possession ; the first argumentsof GO and BE are dimensionless will less , canonically points. The featural representationis summarizedin (5.24), together with its predictions about which pairs of couldtreatasinterchangeable . Exceptwhen predicatesasemanticrepresentation a rule is actuallynoncommittalbetweenthe membersof one of thesenatural classes , I will usethe mnemoniclabel for the predicateitself ratherthan its featuredecomposition . S.5.9 Inter- event Relations: Eft'ects, Means, and Coreference How are actsrelatedto other events, such as resulting changesof location? " " Jackendoff( 1987a ) suggeststhat the two systemsexist as separate tiers in semanticrepresentations , analogousto the independentbut cross-linked representations for stress,tone, consonants , vowels, andsoon in modemphonological see also Culicover Wilkins and , 1986). However, tiers areprobablynot theory( the right kind of representation for verb meanings. First of all, thereare often combinationsof severalactsandseveralchangesof locationin a verbstructure; onetier for actionsandonetier for locationscannotrepresentthemall. Second, the different events specified by a verb alwaysstandin somequasi-causal Features (5.24) Dynamic Control Predicates

GO BE

+

HAVE + Acr Possiblenaturalclasses GOandBE GOandAcr Acr andHAVE BEandHAVE naturalclasse5 Impossible GOandHAVB Acr andBE

-

+ +

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relation to one another; for example, one causesanother, is the meansfor attainingthe other, or is the purposeof another, Thereareno verbsthat mean " " Simultaneously, John yawnedand the cat fell off the roof, (Carter, 1976a, makesa similar point.) This is notjust dueto a pragmaticprincipleruling out verbsfor low-frequency or uninterestingconjunctionsof events, Therearemanydifferentkindsof interevent relations that verbsjust don' t like to encode, For example, there is no " English verb meaning to do A for a specifiedduration, thenB, thenrepeatthe ' " process,until onerealizesoneshoulddo C ; or to do A repeatedly,increasing the likelihood of B" ; or " to doA andfail to achieveB, requiringoneto do C '; or " to do A then do B ' " , , hopingthatC ; or to do A, changeyour mind, thendo B" ; " or to do A repeatedlyin orderfor B to happen,whereA cannotcauseB" ; or " to do A andexperienceB," To provethat thesenonoccurringrelationsarenot just ' " " logicians esoteric fantasies, we need only examinesome sniglets (Hall, " ' 1984), A sniglet, accordingto their creator, is any word thatdoesnt appearin thedictionary, but should" ; I suggesttheyareexamplesof culturally shared,cognitively salient, but linguistically impossiblelexical meanings , Hereis a sniglet for eachof the kinds of inter-eventrelationslisted above: wattbobble

To removea hot light bulb by turning it severalseconds,letting your fingers cool, then repeatingthe process, This is generaUy followed by the gloriousrevelationof using your shirttail,

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beembeddedin anothereventin which it playsan identifiablecausalrole. Thus in the currenttheory it is a formal constrainton lexicosemanticrepresentations that they aresingle-rooted, connectedgraphs, and a substantiveconstraintthat whenevera verbspecifiesmultiple events, they standin somecausalrelationto " one another(where" causalrelation refers to causationas conceivedby the ). languageuser, of course, not necessarilyliteral physicalcausation Themostobvioussubordinatingrelationis a successfulsequence of causeand effect: an actionresultsin someevent that is its effect. I will representthis by subordinatingto theACT function an EVENT thatcanbeinterpretedasits result or effect. One can consider this subordinatingrelation as anothertype of the " effect" or " result" argument, or one could considerit to be an argument I , adjunct; it makeslittle difference. In eithercaseit is helpful to annotatethis link with a mnemoniclabel, which I will call ' effect' . Another notationaldevice is neededto expressthe coreferencebetween entitiesinvolvedin anactionand in an ensuingeffect; I will useindexesX , Y, Z. Although an argumentcan havethematicroles specifiedfor it in severalplaces in a verb' s semanticstructure, only oneof theseplacescanserveasa triggerfor a linking rule. This primary position is the one symbolizedby the presenceof squarebrackets; other positions coindexed with the primary one are merely annotatedwith theindex. Thecoindexingof argumentsin semanticstructurecan alsobe usedto representrelationsof control (seeCulicoverandWilkins , 1986; Jackendoff, 1987a) and what Talmy calls " personation." Let us consider semanticstructuresfor the motion verb run, the pure causativeverbbreak, and the motion-contact-effect verb cut. Run, in its English version conflating a mannerof motion with translation alonga path, asin Johnran into the room, would representthemotionalongthe pathasa resultof therunningaction. Forrun, aswith manyotherverbs, it is not clear on conceptualgroundswhether we shouldrepresentthe eventas" to run, with the effect of motion along a path" or " to move alonga path, by meansof a " running action (Talmy, 1985). The former can be justified on linguistic grounds,however,asit helpsto differentiateverbsof voluntarymotion(typically ). It alsoyields unergative)from verbsof physicalmotion (typically unaccusative thedistinction necessaryto capturethe ambiguity of John rolled downthe hill , which canimply voluntarily initiated movement(= " Johnactedto roll down the hill " ) or pure motion identical to what an inanimateobject might undergo(= " " Johnmoveddown the hill , rolling ) , with no embeddingACT. The semantic structurefor run is shownin (5.25).

EVEN /!~ A Cf THING EVE "rGO [X )MAN unni /THIN "X"PAT [J

5 Chapter ( 5 .25 )

198

run :

The pure causative verb break , shown in (5.26), involves an unspecified type of direct interaction between agent and patient ( hence there is an A Cf function with no MANNER ) and a specified effect on the patient ( hence there is an effect argument, an identificational event , in which the patient assumes an additional role as the theme) . The periphrastic cause to break , formed out of entries for cause and intransitive break- see (5.18) - would not have the breaking entity listed as a patient in the actional event; this is a simple way of representing the directnesseffect. A similar representation could be used for languages that have verbs denoting indirect causation by meansof specialized causative verb affixes . (5.26)

break :

EVENT

/ I \ ". . . -. ACT THING THING EVENT I ':ident " (J (VJ /"THING PROPERTY " V "broken Not only doesthe verb cut specifya causativemeaning(the patientmustend up with a cut in it ), but, asmentionedin chapter4, thecausationmusthavebeen broughtaboutin a certain way, by moving an instrumentinto contactwith and throughthe patient(Hale and Laughren, 1983). There is again someintuitive uncertaintyaboutwhich eventsaresubordinateto which otherones, but themost parsimonioustheory is one where the semantic representationpredicts its syntacticfonn. Sincethe patient(not the instrument) is the direct object of cut in English, thereis no motivation for defining it as" to move an instrumentto X , " causingacut inX" ; instead, it shouldbe to effectacut in X BY MEANS OF moving " an instrumentagainst it. This introducesa new causal subordinating relation, ' means'. Cognitively, the meansby which an event happensis the penultimateevent in a causalchain resulting in that event (Talmy, 1988); in addition, thereis usuallyan implication thatthefinal eventin the chain is a goal of theagent's action. Thus "X causesY by meansof Z ' is similar to " X causesZ which causesr ' (where Y is the goal of the action). These are two ways of describinga multilink causalchain, involving different construalsof an event (onecoarse-grained, one slightly finer-grained), andthey can be expresseddifferently in language . To capturethefactthataneventcontaininga meansis being

199

Representation

thananevent construed atadifferent embracing grainsize onlythefirstcause ' ' I will as a distinct of labelmeans subordinated andthelasteffect , type event .Thus berepresented assomething like(5.27). To toanaction theverbcuImight foractors a bitmorereadable and maketherepresentation , I userealnames . in a reminder that their actual instead of indexes are , patients They parentheses in isnotspecified content ) byconstituents arguments bytheverbbut(foropen " . Therepresentation canbeparaphrased as Bobactson therestofthesentence ofacting onaknife the apear thepear tobecome cut,bymeans ,causing ,causing ." thepear knifetogoagainst andthrough (5.27) cut : ~ ' ~ - -'- Ql - ~-----_.. ........... ::::~ vr ~ :: ACI' THING :ident THINGEVENT EVENT "~ )] I(pear )] I(Bob / I ::::~ ~ !"""" / I"

GO THING PROPERTY THING "CUI " ACT (Bob (knife (p)ear ) THING )/ EVENT I' "

GO7I~ via PLACE 11fING through / \ 11fING ., ainst (pear )

(pear )

5.5.10 Linking Oblique Arguments for cut had If the patientargumentof the ' means' clausein the representation beenannotatedwith the squarebracketopenargumentdesignator , we would have the lexical entry underlyingthe versionof cut thatallows an instrumental with-phrase. A similar representationwould underliethe version of hit that ' ' appearsin John hit Bill with a stick, but it would lack the effect branch predicatinga changeof the patientof the hitting (Bill ). The prepositionwith would be selectedin theseentriesby a combinationof two structuresenforcing linking regularities: a linking rule for oblique arguments in general, anda lexical entry for the specificpreposition.The diagrams in (5.6) showedthat argumentsof GO or BE areobliquewhentheyarepathsor , we can unite these places. Now that we havea featuresetfor basicpredicates two linking rules; they would pertain to the secondargumentof predicates. A different linking rule would applyto argumentsof HA VE or A Cf (predicatesin theclass

1" " , THING

(I) I I I .

EVENT /STATE I"' " / THINGTHING [ \) I[ ) \\ II \ I

ilKii~ internal argument

ilKii~ internal argument

The lexical entryfor the instrumentalprepositionwith would call for anopen ' ' ; it is argumentcorrespondingto the patient within a means substructure depictedin (5.29). (5.29) with:

EVENT ..~q~... / ",~ /' " ACT THING X THING

EVENT 1 /THING "" A Cf Xnil (N JG

5.5.11 A Family of Causal Relations Given theseindependentmechanismsfor denotingacting upon and effecting, ' Talmy s ( 1985, 1988) types of causalinteractionscan be capturedexplicitly. Steady-stateor extendedcausation(e.g., The ball kept rolling becauseof the wind acting uponit ), in conttast to the " onsetcausation" we havediscussedso far, can be representedby having the ACT eventbe a STATE, not an EVENT. SuchstativeACTs would be involved in the definitionsof verbslike support, , occupy, andsoon, wherenotjust a spatialrelationshipis encoded, keep, suspend but the notion that someforce continuouslyexertedby an antagonistobjecton anagonistis responsiblefor the stateof the agonist. (Recallthatthis playsa role

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in thefact thatsomeverbsof spatialrelationshipsarepassivizablebut othersare not; seesection4.4.4.) The semanticrepresentationin (5.30) is anexample; the ' ' meaningof the new subordinatingcausal relation prevent is just what its mnemonicsuggests . : support (5.30)

STATE " " P R ~ ~ /ACT /THING , . EVEN [)THING [V )GO IY /THING ""PATH dI own

Two otherdistinctionsarenaturallyrepresentedin termsof different kinds of ' subordinatingrelations. Oneis whetherit is theresultof anagents action or the ' ' actionitself thatis focusedon asthemainevent. The effect link is usedfor verbs that focus on the causingaction, adding information that some other event ' ' ensues . Reversingthe perspectivedefinesa complementarylink called cause thatcanbeusedwhenthefocusis on theeffect, andinformationis addedthat the eventwascausedby someantecedentagent-patientrelation. The subordinating relation ' cause', like the other semanticprimitives I have invoked, can be . For example, in encodedelsewherein languageusingclosed-classmorphemes in and the because it is encoded in the prepositions/ or (in conjunction English I rewarded/ condemned John/ or his actions) and/ rom-(in Shebecamesick/ rom too muchdancing), andperhapsverb-internally in predicatessuchasconcede, , or relent. acquiesce The otherkind of subordinatingrelationsare definedby whetherthe agent/ antagonistis strongerthanthe patient/agonist, resultingin a change. If we take the ' cause' relationbut assertthat the agent/antagonistof the antecedentsubordinated eventfailedto affectthe inherenttendencyof thepatient/agonist, we get ' a newsubordinatingrelationthat we canrefer to usingthemnemonic' despite . It will befoundin thedefinition of the Englishconjunctionof the samename, or verb-internally, in the definition of verbs like resistor withstand. The fourth possiblecombinationdefined by thesecontrasts- reversing the ' ' perspectiveof despite- would consistof an agent-patientmain event and a subordinateeventin whicharesultingeffecton thepatient/agonistis assertednot to haveoccurred.This might correspondto verbssuchastry orfail andperhaps ' conativeconstructionssuchasJohn cut at the bread. ' But seemslike an apt ' ' mnemonicfor this subordinatingrelation; it and despite aresometimescalled concessiverelations. Enablingor letting, andpreventingor stopping, aretwo otherprominenttypes of subordinatingcausallinks. Letting correspondsto thecessationor nonoccurrenceof an agent-patienteventor state, with an effect involving a moving or

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changingtheme. Conversely, preventingcorrespondsto an agent-patientrelation whoseeffectis thecessationor failureof occurrenceof amovingor changing theme. A featureset suchas ' focus' (on the causeor on the effect), ' potency' (antagonistsucceedsin exertingits usualeffect on the agonistby virtue of its ' ' greaterstrength, or fails), and occurrence(the causeevent occursor fails to occur, andthe effect eventoccursor fails to occur) could capturethesecausal links, asshownin (5.31). Thereareseveralreasonsto believethatcausallinks arementallydecomposed in somethinglike this fashion. Somelanguageshave single devicesthat are indeterminatebetweencausingandletting. Somenovel causativesproducedby English speakershave meaningsthatcorrespondmore to letting than causing; seethe examplesin (4.45d). And aswe shall seein chapter7, children learning Englishoftenconfusethetwo (Bowerman, 1978). For notationalandmnemonic simplicity, however, I will simplyusethesix shorthandlabelsin thefirst column -Laird ( 1976), Talmy ( 1985, 1988), and of (5.31). See Miller and Johnson Jackendoff( 1983) for discussionof theadvantages anddisadvantages of atomic and decomposed for causalrelations. representations Another subordinatingrelation is intent, goal, or purpose. It is neededto capturepart of the distinction betweenkill andmurder, follow and chase, and pour and spill, and may be useful in characterizingthe meaningsof verbsof directedactionsuchastell in tell him to go, persuade,order, command,and so on. This canberepresented by spellingout thegoalstateandsubordinatingit to an actionalevent. Sincea purposeor intent eventis the goal that an event is ' ' expectedto cause,anda meansis aneventthatcausesa goalto comeabout, they might betakento refer to thesamecausallink betweenaneventandthegoal that it brings about, differing in whetherthe causeor effect is being foregrounded. Thus they could be distinguishedusingopposingvaluesof the feature in the featuresystemusedfor causallinks in (5.31), in conjunctionwith a new featurecalled that signifies that the final effect in the causalchain is the goal of the agent. For mnemonicpurposes, ( 5 .31 )

' effect' ' cause' ' ' despite ' but' ' let' ' ' prevent

Features

Focus

Potency

Cause occurrence

Effect occurrence

cause effect effect cause cause cause

success success failure failure success success

yes yes yes yes no

yes yes no no yes no

yes

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Representation

' ' though, I will continue to call the effect - focus subordinator for goals means ; I ' ' will use a mnemonic for the cause-focus subordinator for goals spelled for / to since in English these subordinates can be grammaticized periphrastically in purpose clauses using the complementizersfor and to (e.g., Richard built the housefor his daughter to live in it ) . A possible semantic structure for chase, a notoriously complex verb that incorporates a purpose, is shown in (5.32), with " real nouns serving as mnemonic indexes. Roughly , it can be glossed as The cat acts and goes toward the mouse (which is going away from it ) in order to be at " the mouse.

(5.32)

EVENT ./7~EVENT ~~

chase :

ACT THING ( (cat) ]

EVENT 1 ........... THING PLACE ) (cat / \ AT THING (mouse )

lYE GO THING PATH (c)/at \ /

THING )] ( (mouse I PROPERTY ,/ " such

toward

EVENT . / 1" THING PATH 00 ) (mouse

/ \

away-from

THING (cat)

A final dimensionof causal subordination, which is typically encodedin deonticauxiliarieslike shouldor oughI but mayturnup in thedefinitionsof main verbs, is obligation. Sometimesa verb might specifythat aneventcausesthere to bean obligationfor one of the partiesto do somethingin the future, asin buy or sell. Conversely,someverbsspecifyactsthataredoneto fulfill anobligation, suchasreward or repay. Again, the differenceis in cause-focus versuseffectfocus, sowecanagainborrow thecorrespondingfeatureintroducedin (5.31) and addthefeature<deontic> to the set, yielding theability for verbsto specifythat an event incurs an obligation or that it fulfills one. I will usethe mnemonics ' ' ' ' obligates and fulfills so that the depictionsof the relevant subordinating . linkageswill be more compactand transparent Parsimoniousformalists will note that the featuresystemfor causalsubordinatorshasallowed for a reduction in the representational machineryfrom ten features. causal subordination to six primitive primitive causalsubordinators

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This alsopredictsthat verbsin the world' s languagesarecapableof expressing 26= 64 possiblesubordinatingrelationsif no further constraintsare specified. Surelythereareconstraintsoncombinations(for example, goalsandobligations do not seemto cross-classifyin English, nor do obligations and potency), but verbs do seem able to expressfairly complex relations pertaining to the attainmentof meansand ends(e.g., manageto, / ai! to, succeedat). Thus the featuressystem's gain in parsimonyfor primitive symbolsand its concomitant increasein the numberof complexcausalrelationsthat areexpressibleseemsto be a good tradeoff. Onemore formal point is worth making. If ACTs could be embeddedinside one anotherwithout limit , an infinite numberof syntactically distinguishable kindsof verbswould bepossible. In fact, I havefound thatthefollowing two constraints hold for all the EnglishverbsI haveexamined, somequite complex: (a) no more than a single kind of subordinatedevent is possiblefor any level of semanticstructure(i.e., anA CI ' hasat mostone' effect' , one' means', andsoon); (b) embeddingis not recursivebut " Degree- I " (see Wexier and Culicover, 1980) - there canbeonly onelevel of subordinationwithin aneventthat is itself subordinated(i.e., not at the root). I suspectthat these generalizationsare justifiable asgeneralconstraints;Carter( 1976a) wasled to suggestsimilar ones. If so, causalsubordinationdoesnot result in an infinite numberof arbitrarily complexverb meanings. For example, no verb can specify an argumentthat is the meansof a goal of an effect of a preventedaction. This is not necessarilya conceptualconstraint on the maximum length of a causalchain that can be encodedasthemeaningof a verb, but it is a constrainton the lengthof thecausal chainthat linking rulesand lexical rules ever needto look at. 5.5.12 Nonphysical Semantic Fields for Acts According to the extensionof the ThematicRelations Hypothesisoutlined in chapter4 in connectionwith passivizability (section 4.4.4), the antagonistagonistor agent-patientrelation in A Cfs can be analogizedfrom the semantic field of physicalforce to nonphysicalsemanticdomainsin the sameway asthe theme-path or theme-location relation in physical spacecan be analogizedto . Thechoiceoffield canbeexpressedin thecurrent nonspatialfields like possession notationby appendingthe field nameto the EVENT or STA TE node, just asfor fields basedon location. Talmy hints at a social field , in which force is extendedto socialpressurein verbslike urgeandpersuade, an intrapsychicfield in which different partsof themind arepittedagainstoneanother(e.g., refrain), andan inferential field , in which someideashave implications for the truth or plausibility of others(e.g., imply). Anotherfield , which we cancall responsibility , expressesrelationsamongstatesthatareasymmetricallyresponsiblefor the

205

Representation

existence.of otherstates. Finally, wecanconsidera psychologicalfield , involving direct andasymmetricalrelationsbetWeenminds and ideas. Whenthe first ' ' ' ' argumentis a representedentity and the secondan animate entity, the interpretationis of a perceivedobject, event, or ideaimpinging on theperceiver, eventsuchasthe perceiverchangingstate possiblycausingsomesubordinated ' (e.g., The newscalmedJohn) or the perceptenteringthe perceivers storeof ' ' ' ' knowledge. Whenthefirst argumentis animate andthe second represented, somementalactivity or stateof theperceiveris responsiblefor theideastanding in somerelationto the mind of ~ e perceiver.Theseof coursearethe two kinds of psych-verbsdiscussedin section4.4.4. Simplifiedentriesfor oneof eachkind of verb, learn andremindoj, areshownin (5.33) and (5.34). : (5.33) learn

EVENT :psychological

4 ACTTHING )) [ (Bob I PRO ~ RTY animate

( 5 . 34 )

remind

ACT

\~ : epistemic THING EVENT )) / ' I " [ (lesson I GO THING PATH PROPERTY(lesson ) / \ represented to PLACE / " in THING (Bob )

: EVENT psychologica ...-;~ \~ :

:epistemic THING EVENT THING ( )J / 1 ~ ( (picture) ) ) THING Bf I PROPERTY PROPERTY ( (Mary) I I animate represented PROPERTY represented in THING

PATH / \ 10PLACE / \ (Bob)

5.5.13 Temporal Information One more kind of infonnation must be specified: time. For example, the distinctionsbetweenprocessesandpunctate events(run versussneeze ) and betweenachievementsand accomplishments . Funhennore, the temporal havenot yet beengiven anexplicit representation need to be expressed relationsamongcertainwithin verbsubevents , suchasthe difference betweengive and send; as we shall see, these differenceshave syntactic implications . Many linguists and logicians have suggested a modified time line for the as last. such representation of tense and of verbs that encode time explicitly .

Events and states are located as of the line and , dis parts aspe to how those are delinea . States or correspond es are of parts proc reg the line with no distinct boundar instant even ; such as ar hitt such ; as a circle are points bou at accomplis the drawing regio ends a achievem such as a ; race by point the en winning poin of a . More relation such as thos region effe , th complex tempora by addition of affixes can also be define in ten D , S of the tim aspectual l in " " in to a or a nonde representat wit a by z ooming point subr delimited sets of , into and so on s . ee e . region by , aggregat points , , regio ( g ' 1985 1987 . I will , ; , Jacke s 1 98 Talmy ) Langacke ( adopt ) sug that such a time l ine serve as a tier in the represen separ repr ' of a verb s semantic structure each EVEN and , ST A TE onto som mappin pa it s ee also 1987 in . A ( , , is sho in 5 . ) 3 5 Pustejovs press simple ( exam ) for the verbs eat in a eat s the and break a s in break ( the stick wh ) ar ( apple , ) and achievem verbs . accomplish , dot respec Larg ope sig in time b oundarie or events thick ( line points , ) punctat seg and dashed line , unbou ends of regions . segmen signify regi : ell : break (5.35 )ACT EVENT EVEN /ITHING /I : " " '" . THING MANNE ACT THING THIN iden " " :":JPR (I:.""" [Ieating //EVE [I[V GOT 5 Chapter

206

y

' e

e

.

e

:

.

"broken " -

-

-

5.5.14 A Remark on Redundancy, Constraints, and Decomposition For betteror worse, the time line introducesconsiderableredundancyin semantic . Eventsmust precedeor be simultaneouswith their ' effect' and representations ' but' subordinateevents ' ; they mustfollow their ' cause, and' despite' subordinate ' ' events. Purposive( for/ to ) substructures are interpretedasgoalsthat precede the eventstheyaresubordinatedto, themselves definedin termsof anevent that would haveto follow the main one if it took place. EVENTs presumably referto partsof thetime-line designatedwith boundaries , STATEsto unbounded regions. Furthermore,eventsboundedattheirendsareintimatelylinkedwith the notion of patientand theme: VendJer's ( 1957) examplesof activity verbswere usually intransitive, his examplesof achievementand accomplishmentverbs usually transitive. (Seealso Pustejovsky, 1987and in press, for discussionof some of the connectionsbetweenaspectualand thematicrelations.) Tenny ( 1988) proposesthatthe internalargumentof a verbcanbedefinedasthatwhich temporallydelimits or measuresout theevent; sheactuallyreversesthecurrent

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perspectiveby proposing that the temporal/aspectualrepresentationis the interfacebetweenlexical semanticsand argumentstructure, with the rest of . Theextentto which semanticrepresentations beingessentiallyepiphenomenal onecaneliminatecomponentsof causal/spatialsemanticstructureby predicting themfrom temporal/aspectualrepresentations , or vice versa, is beyondthescope I we need both. For example, thereareno . As far as cansee, of this discussion obviousaspectualdifferencesbetweenroll andbleed, ownandhave, chooseand win, or loadwithandftll with, thoughtheycontrastin their willingnessto undergo alternations.ThereforeI will useboth, leavingopenwhetherpossibleredundancies shouldbe eliminated, andif so, how. The needfor partlyredundantlexicosemanticstructuresmaybequitegeneral. of thesemanticstructureof cut in (5.27). Consider,for example,theverboseness On the one hand, theremust be an explicit representationof the motion of the instrument,theeffecton theobject, andthecontactof the instrumentagainstthe object so that various syntacticgeneralizationsdistinguishingdifferent subclassesof actionverbs, discussedin section4.2, canapplyproperly. Forexample, " " the grammaticalityof Shecut at it requiresthat a rule see the motion and ' contactcomponentsof cut s semanticstructure, and the ungrammaticality of * Shecut theknifeagainstthebreadrequiresthata rule seetheeffectcomponent. That' s why it wouldn' t sufficeto adopta morecompactrepresentationin which " cut" was a primitive unanalyzedterm implicitly incorporatingthe motion, contact, andcal&~3tion. (This strikesmeasa telling argumentagainstthe view of .) On the Fodoret al., 1980, that verb meaningsare not mentally decomposed otherhand, a structurecomposedoutof thatmanyindependentpartswould seem to licensetoomanyverbsthatprobablydo not exist, suchasactingonA to cause a changein B by meansof actingon C to causeD to move againstE. Thus we : certainrulesmust seethe componentialstructureof faceconflicting demands a verb, but not everyarrangementof thesecomponentscan serveasa possible verb.9 These conflicting demandssuggestthat we must dissociateprimitiveness - a theoryof possibleverb meaningscannotsimply fall from constrainedness set of semantic out of the primitives and the elementary syntax of their combinations.This dissociationis familiar in phonology: phonologicaltheory specifiesan inventoryof distinctive features, but not every subsetof feature valuesis a possiblesegment(for example, no segmentcan be [+vocalic] and theimportanceof rulesdefining broadconflation [-sonorant]). This underscores -specific) that license only certain classes(some universal, some language subsetsof the combinatoriallypossibleconfigurationsof semanticelements. They may do so, for example, by providing a setof intermediatelevel clusters but that serve to lexical rules is of elementswhoseinternalstructure transparent

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asthe smallestallowablebuilding blocksof semanticstructures . For example, to explainthe fact that(at leastin English) it is thepatientthatis thethemeof the changewhen an agentphysicallyactson a patientandproducesan effect, there couldbea prefabricatedconflationchunkin whichthesubordinated effectclause hasits themerole linked with the patientof thesuperordinate . Similarly, a prepackaged conflationchunkwould ensurethatwhenanagentactson a patientby meansof using an instrument, it is the agentthat actson the instrument, and if the instrumentmoves, it is towardthe patient. SoS.IS Summary of SemanticMachinery In (5.36) I list the semanticelements that I will assumelexical rulescanbe sensitiveto. Thoughthe inventory is morecomplex thanthe list of a half-dozenor so thematicrolesthat previous treatmentsof verb semanticshave appealedto, it is nonethelessquite constrained . First, in sheernumbersit is very small relative to the thousandsof semanticdistinctionsthattheverbsin a givenlanguagecanmake. Second,all of the elements have reflexes in particular closed-class morphemesin many , and most can be found in the closed-classvocabularyof English. languages Third, the elementsdefine simple semanticstrUcturesthat, unadornedwith " " " " idiosyncratic ( quoted ) information, could serveas the meaningsof light verbslike make, be, or give. Fourth, virtually all of themcorrespondin astraightforward way to the meaningelementsthat Talmy lists as recurring across . Furtherconstraintson which combinationsof themarewell-formed languages -specific conflation rules. The could be captured in universaland language questionI will ask in thenext sectionis whetherthe list candelineatethe fifty odd classesthat I have suggestedare the units of generalizationin Baker' s paradox. (5.36) ConceptualConstituents: EVENT STATE THING PATH PLACE PROPERTY MANNER Functionsexpandingconceptualconstituents : :!:dynarnic, :!:control (featuresyielding the predicatesACT, GO, BE, HAVE ) place-functions (at, on, in, under, ...) path-functions (to, into, toward, ...)

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Features of subordinating relations : cause-focus versus effect - focus successversus failure occurrence versus nonoccurrence purposive deontic

Properties: animate/inanimate human/nonhuman OD/ I D/ 2D/ 3D extendedness count/mass rigid/flexible substance / aggregate semisolid / liquid Temporalobjects: time-line point region : Other mechanisms openarguments coindexing semanticfield annotation quoted constants (manners, properties )

5.6 Explicit Representationsof Lexical Rules and Lexicosemantic Structures Now that we have an explicit system for representing verb meanings, we can try to characterize broad- and narrow -range lexical rules more precisely . To do that , we will first need to examine the semantic representations of the sets of words inside and outside the various conflation subclasses to see what kind of information must be statedin a rule to pick out the class properly . Once we know the relationship between semantic structures for words and semantic structures for the classes of words that rules apply to , we will be able to turn , in the next chapter, to the question of how the child learns the rules . In this section I will represent lexical rules by simply listing the entire input structure and the entire output structure related by the rule . This cannot be taken as the actual operation of the rule ; if a lexical rule really consisted of a fully specified input structure and a fully specified output structure , we would have no explanation for why much of the input structure is carried over verbatim in the

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output. Formally, the rule could just as easily pair two arbitrary, unrelated structures . A standardkind of explanationin linguistics (see, e.g., Pinker and Prince, 1988) is thatrulesconsistof individual operationsthattrcmsfonnpartsof ; the partsthat arenot specifically operateduponcome through representations untouched . Sincethe input andtheoutputdo overlapin lexical rules, they must be composedof moreelementaryoperationson partsof lexicosemanticstructures. It might bepossibleto characterizea setof semanticoperationsthat underlie the syntacticalternationsin grammaticalrelations that are prevalent crosslinguistically(see, e.g., PerlmutterandPostal, 1984; Marantz, 1984; Foley and Van Valin, 1985). Whenone looks at a variety of alternationsin English and otherlanguages , onefinds thattheymostcommonlyinvolve operationssuchas the following: . Add or deletea causeargument. . Make a patientargumenta themeof a predication. . Embedanact as the meansof accomplishingsomeeffect. . Add or deletepath, purpose, benefactive,or instrumentarguments. . Assign the patient role to an embeddedargumentsuch as a source, goal, , or instrument. beneficiary, possessor . Suppressnonspecificor characteristicarguments. Eachof these(and perhapsa small numberof others) could be made into an elementaryoperationon semanticstructure, and lexical rules could be constrained to consistof small setsof operationsof thesekinds. Presumablythese elementaryoperationsmight be motivatedby considerationsof the most likely " " " " possibilitiesfor cognitive reconstrualsor gestaltshifts : whattypesof events or statesareseenassimilarenoughthata singlelexicalroot canbe usedfor both. Synthesizingthecross-linguistic researchin a way that would layout a precise setof operations , andexplicitly decomposinglexical rulesinto setsof them, are beyondthescopeof the presentinvestigation. Thusmy listing of the input and output structuresfor eachrule shouldbe seenasan expedientshortcut. In the nextfour sectionsI lay out explicit representations for the broad- and narrow rangeversionsof the four alternations. They are intendedto show that a theoryof verbmeaninglike theoneoutlined in section5.5 is adequateto represent the syntactically relevant differences among narrow subclasses. A warning: thesesectionsareheavygoing andcanbe skippedby readerswho are not interestedin seeingsucha claim fleshedout. 5.6.1 Representationsfor the Dative The representation in (5.37) is a first approximationof a broad-range. propertypredictinglexical rule for the to-dative alternationin English. (Thefor -dative

211

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will be discussedshortly .) The thematic core of the prepositional - object fonn is on top , the thematic core for the double- object fonn is on the bottom . Real referent names are listed to make the diagram more readable.

EVENT ~ .(B .(rob ~ !)J/'ing "'"EVENT .~"[THING ~/)J'\"[THING I'" GO EVENT . ~ C ~ ~ / ~ . . / " ' STATE THING ACT (B) ob / 1""

(5.37)

.

THING PATH (ring)

/ IJ, to PLACE / at "THING (Sue )

THING )] [ (Sue

HAVETHING THING Sue [ (ring )

Therelevantlinking rulesfor theprepositionalfonn andfor thefirst two open . A possible argumentsof the double-object fonn havealreadybeendiscussed " in 5.38 would to a rule for second is shown it ( ); objects apply possession linking argumentembeddedin an act as a possibleeffect of that act. The causal subordinationfeature indicatesthat the embeddedevent is an effect, not a cause,but it doesnot specifywhethertheeventis actually effected or even whetherit occurs. Thus it embracesboth actual ' effects' and ' forlto ' intentions, as we will require, and is an explicit representationof the notion " " " " prospective in prospectivepossession (see, e.g., Oehrle, 1976; Mazurkewich and White, 1984). EVENT (5.38) ........... -fOCUS > ~. ~ ~ / I \ ACT THING THING STATE 1' Y / HAVETHING THING Y [.] I I I I .

di~ t internal second ugument There are two main differences between the prepositional and the double object representations. First . in the prepositional form . the transferred object is the patient ; in the double -object form the recipient is the patient . Though seemingly a minor change. this is the representational distinction that underlies the

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differencesdiscussedin sections3.3.4.2 and 4.4. I . It causesthe pragmatic differencesin which argumentis construedas " affected" or " actedon" in the double-object fonn (henceWhatJohn did to Bill wasgive him a bookI ?givea bookto him) and the entailmentdifferencesin tennsof the extentto which the recipient is affected (as in the difference betweenteaching Hebrew to the studentsandteachingthestudentsHebrew), andit providesa motivationfor why certain subclass es are more likely to have been deemeddativizable in the than others (e.g., the differencebetweenthe throw classandthepull language . class) Theotherdifferenceis thatin thedouble-objectfonn thechangeof possession is expressednot as an analogueofa motion of the objectgoing to (GO ' to' ) the has(HA VE) recipient, butasthedirect causationof a statewherebythepossessor theobject. This hasseveraldesirableconsequences . First, we haveseenthatthe double-objectfonn is incompatiblewith anyexpressionof purephysicalmotion. Although this fact could be stipulatedby sayingthat the double-objectfonn is linked to GO:possessionalandnot just GO, if thedouble-object form is simply field is the unmarkedone. In addition, projectedfrom HAVE , the possessional Green( 1974) points out that give- a verb whoserepresentations arevirtually identicalto the double-object thematiccore shownin (5.37) - hasa numberof idiomatic usesthat exist only in the double- objectfonn. Crucially, whenthey do, the senseis always compatiblewith the notion " causeto have" and often " " incompatiblewith the notion causeto go to. Forexample, (a) and(b) of (5.39) ' imply that Jack s daughterhad a bath and hadan inferiority complex, but it is nonsenseto talk about transferringa bathandan inferiority complexfrom Jack to his daughter; Jack needn't haveever hadthemhimself. The contrastis even clearerin (5.39c- f) . The double-object fonn is compatiblewith John' s being causedto have an idea, whether it is becausesomeoneelse (Janice) who originally hadthe ideatransferredit to him or becauseit wascausedto comeinto beingthroughanepisodeof inspiration. However, theprepositional-objectform is naturalonly when usedto denotetransferby communication.This difference is capturednicely by the distinction betweenthe GO and HAVE substructures in (5.37).

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semanticsof verbsof creation that enter into thefor -dative alternation. The following actualusageillustratesthe crucial contrast. A television character stumblesinto a roomwith his headin a pumpkinandshoutsWill someonecarve mesomeeyes?Obviouslythepredicatecouldbeparaphrased not as" makesome " " eyesandtransferthe eyesto me but as makesomeeyes, causingme to have the eyes." Now let usconsidernarrow-rangerules. Eachsuchrule will specifyan input structure,definingtheverbsit canapplyto, whichshouldcontaina versionof the input structureof the broad-rangerule in (5.37), and that portion of the input structurewill be changedin the mannerof (5.37). (The remainderof the input structurewill function like a contextterm in a context-sensitiverule.) Sincethe natureof the changeis predictable- that is why I called the broad-rangerules " " property-predicting - we can focus on the input structuresthemselvesand how theyfilter out nondativizableverbs. Wecurrentlyhaveneithera format for theinputstructureof a rule nor amatchingfunctionby whicha semanticstructure for a word would be deemedto matchor not to matcha rule; by examiningthe rangeof structuresof verbs in a semanticallycohesiveclass that undergoesa givenalternation,we canseehow to statetherule andmatchingfunction so that theycanincludeverbsthatweobserveto behavesimilarly while excludingthose that behavedifferently. In the caseof the dative, I am interestedonly in the processthatconvertsfrom the prepositionalform to the double-object form. In manycasestheprepositionalform itself will havebeencreatedby a prior lexical rule (e.g., throwX - > throwX to an inanimatetarget- > throw X to an animate possessor- > throw an animatepossessoran X) . I will usually showonly the immediateinput to the dativization rule, thoughto keepmatterssimple I will occasionallyomit certain minor bits of information that would have been providedby interveningrules. of the prepositional Verbsof giving. Let ' s considerthe semanticrepresentations forms of the verbs that inherently involve possessiontransfer, and the differencesamongthemthat the narrow-rangerule would haveto ignoreto encompass themall. Give would havea representation virtually identicalto that in ." theinputof rule(5.37), thoughwith thesemanticfield specifiedas" possessional " :physicalPasswouldspecifythesemanticfield moreprecisely, as possessional " ratherthan genericpossession(one can give, but not pass, a car to custody someoneby signingatitle transferagreement ; onecanpass,but perhapsnotgive, ' an objectonedoesnt own).IOHand would be similar to pass with the addition of a MANNER branchspecifyingthe useof the hands. The small subclassthat send,mail, andshipwouldberepresented embraces similarly, exceptin thetimeline componentof therepresentation , which would showthe ACT eventandthe event as being linked to distinct event times rather than the GO:possessional singleoneusedin the simpleverbsof giving. (ThoughI will often omit the time

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line in thedepictionsof narrowsemanticrepresentations in thischapter, I assume it is alwaysspecifiedin the representation .) Sell, trade, andpay would havea subordinatecountertransfereventto which theagentis committed, asin (5.40) (underlyingBob sold a ring to Suefor $100 = " acton thering, causingit to go to Sue, obligatingSueto act on $100, causing it to go to Bob" ). The actualparticipants(in parentheses ) arenot really specified in the verb' s meaning, of course, but the " money" property is. For pay, the " " money property would be attachedto the upstairs theme rather than the downstairs one; for trade, it would be absent. The patient/theme of the countertransfer ($ l 00, in this case) wouldbelinked to theobliqueargumentrole becauseof its beingembeddedunderACT, andit would be expressedwith the prepositionfor in particular, thanksto a lexical entry for for specific to such countertransferred objects. As the theory predicts, the lexical entry for this closed-classmorphemecaresaboutthesemanticrepresentationaltopologythat definesa countertransferbut is oblivious to idiosyncratic information about " " money and thusappliesfreely to trade. Possibly, lend and loan would have similar to (5.40) as well. representations ~": (5.40)

(r00 > J/EVEN ina I(r"> 11IINO P A (.111 ina Jr,~ /10 11IIN .) (5

- - - ~~ -~ . . ... - 7- ? ~ , - -

ACT

THING THING [ (Bob )

"

/../ r~ EVENT

ACI' 11tING THING (8_ > I ( >) Sf PROPERTYy O11f INGPLA~ " G ($100 )I

/ 1",

" NG .. nil (Bob )

Finally, serveandfeedwould be similar to give exceptthat they would append " ' ' anidiosyncratic" consumable propertyto thetheme, andperhapsa for/ to (i.e., ' ' purpose) or let subordinatestructurein which the goal argumentwould be " " " " specifiedas eating or consuming the theme. Verbsof communication . Accordingto the ThematicRelationsHypothesis, theseverbs involve a subfieldof possessioninvolving the communicationof ideas. In addition, verbslike tell, ask, and write differ by virtue of specifying messageswith different illocutionary force, differentiatedwith respectto an intendedeffecton a hearer.Thatis, themessage is suchthat a heareris supposed to cometo know it (tel/), learnit (teach), answerit (ask,pose), readit (write), see it (show), or hear and comprehendit (read) . That would result in a semantic structurelike thatin (5.41) for tell, in whichthetellableargumentis constrained ' ' by the for/ to propertysubstructureto besomethingthat a listeneris supposed

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to beableto know(obviouslythisis anapproximation ). Theotherverbswould ' for/to' and somewouldalsohave differwith regardto theembedded property, ' ' verbs like read, cite, and a from substructure listedaspartof thePATH(for quote). (5.41) tell: , :communication

: ~~:: EVENT ~ ~r: /~ /[THING THING ACT S IQry )] (B)][(ob EVENT / 1 ....... PATH GOTHING (Slory ) ()" / to PLACE / THING al ":epiSlemic (kids )

.~~~

for/to

THINGPLACE ) / \ (story at THING (kids)

One caneasily representverbsof instrumentof communication(radio, telegraph , etc.) usinga variation of (5.41). The PROPERTYspecificationfor the ' themewould be omitted, and a ' means substructurewould be addedin which " " theagentwouldACT on aTHING specifiedasaquotedconstant(e.g., a radio ). Verbsof mannerof speaking. This, of course, is a nondativizableclass. A plausible semanticstructurefor the versionof shout appropriateto shout the newstoJohnis shownin (5.42). Presumablyit is anelaborationcreatedby aprior rule from simplerstructuresusedin the two- argumenttransitiveversionof the verb, itself perhapsderivedfrom the intransitiveversion. The field of the root " eventmustbe" physical, becausethat is thefield in which the MANNER must be interpretedand the verb specifiesa manner. The themeis specifiedto be a soundso asto rule out * Bob shoutedsomespit to John. Otherverbsin the class wouldhaveidenticalrepresentations exceptfor thequotedmannerspecification, "" " ' which would be " muttering," " mumbling, ~" shrieking, yelling , and so on. : (5.42) shout

/(THIN )B ~ ~ ~ THIN EVE : MA p er " " I n / ob , ew )00 (PRO s h OOT PA n ew ( ) \ PLA ITH "to sou lId at (J) oh

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Verbsoffuture having. Theseverbsdiffers from verbsof havingin two ways. Grammatically, theyareinsensitiveto the morphologicalconstraintprohibiting Latinateverbs. Semantically , themaineventis not an act of giving but anact of commitment, with thepossession transferan" effect" of thecommitmentbound to a different eventon thetime-line. The act of commitmentcanbe contractual (bequeath,guarantee,reserve,assign, allot , leave) or verbal(refer, recommend, . offer), but in all casestheactby its natureinvolvesa designatedfuturepossessor I tentativelysuggestthat theseverb- specificpiecesof informationaresubordinated asmeanssubstructures , capturingthe intuition that the main eventis the act of commitmentthat hasas its effect a future possessiontransfer. Offering, , bequeathing , and so on, differ primarily in having assigning, recommending different meansof bringing aboutthat future event (throughpersuasionof the beneficiary, conveyingof information, legal acts, etc.). In (5.43), a representation " of the " bequeath meaningof leave, this information would be embedded in the position indicatedby a triangle. (5.43)

EVENT f~j"'~~~:: " , , " " " ~ / :::EVENT : THING ACTTHING ossessiona )) [(wealth ((Bob )V / j " :p "PATH GO THING ((wealtb )) / ()" to /PLACE "THING -.

.

e

.

- - --

-

- - - ), (, wife

e

Verbs of fulfilling /deserving. These difficult -to -characterize verbs (present, reward , honor , entrust, credit , supply , furnish ) generally do not dativize but encode the transferred theme as a with -object in the alternative form . Recall that the semantic threadthey have in common is the notion that the recipient deserves, needs, or is worthy of the theme before the transfer , and that the form of the verb itself is related to a noun standing for the relationship between the theme and who it is destined for (an honor , a present , a reward , a credit , some supplies , some furnishings ) . Do these verbs have any grammatical properties that give us hints as to how they are mentally represented? Note that verbs in the to -form shown in (5.45 ) are probably derived from the corresponding with - forms , not vice versa, and share certain properties with locative verbs such as load and decorate. Honor and reward are not even grammatical with a to -object ( * They rewarded/honored five hundred dollars to the man), presumably becausethe person bestowing the honor or reward is not necessarily transferring something that that person currently owns- cf . ( 5.39) . Reward , credit ,furnish , and supply exist as nonel -

217

Representation

liptical transitiveswith therecipientasgrammatical objectbutwith no overt theme,suggesting thatsomechange of stateof therecipientis beingasserted , of anytransferof anobject,ascanbeseenin (5.44). independently (5.44) I rewardedFido( byticklinghisneck). afterhim). TheyhonoredJohnlastnight(by naminga scholarship . He didn' t creditherproperly His companysuppliedtheanny. . Theyfurnishedhim adequately in theprefixen, Notealsothattheverbentrustgivesaclueto itsrepresentation " to intoastateof trust" cf. enslave encode that it means , , enrage ( ). put suggesting verbs involves thatthealternation All of this suggests representations involvingpresent of possession thatsharefeaturesbothwiththedativeverbs(thechange to ratherthanintoandonto) andthe , leadingto theuseof thepreposition of thewithform, linkedto locativeverbs(thechangeof stateandtheexistence . theentitywhosetransfereffectsthestatechange ) of thepresentverbssimilarto theone Thesefactsmotivatea representation to a indexescorresponding depictedin (5.45), in whichI haveusedmnemonic has themedalto Sue. Thetransferred sentence like Bobpresented object the " because " for the deontic cause(= to it of some recipient possess property ' fulfills' (inthetriangle ) bytheindividualverbs.The ) specifiedidiosyncratically to be structurecanbeglossedas" Bobactedonthemedal(whichis supposed Sue's becauseof somethingthat involvedSue), causingit to go into Sue's ." possession - - - (5.4 -~ ~ ... ... \ ~ ~ - sessional ACT THING THING .;>'f ~ )) ) ) (( ( (Bob I ' " / ' GO THINGP~~CE TI (medal ) / \ AT THING for/to ( Sue)

P TY ~ ~ 11 ~ ~ BE THING P E

(medal ) ~ ATTHING (Sue )

EAT L~.:~

' The question now arisesas to why the dative rule doesnt createadoubleobject fonn from the to-object versionsof supply, entrust, credit, andfurnish, standingside by sidewith the original with-objectversions. Onepossibility is that the dative rule doesapply, yieldinga structurein which thegoalis correctly of with fusedwith linked to the directobject, but thatthesemanticrepresentation thelinking rule for obliqueargumentsof ACTsblocksor preemptsthesecondob

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ject linking rule becauseit is morespecific thanthe one for thesecondobject. A slightly different possibility is that the prior existenceof the independentwith form blocksthe semanticstructurethat the dative rule would createbecauseof their near-synonymity. A possibleproblem for both theseaccountsis the existence of the verbspresent,furnish, andprovide which for manyspeakersadmit both the double- objectandthe with-object forms; see, e.g., (4.52). ThereforeI will go with a third, simpler possibility, that the precise configuration and subfield of thefurnish verbs, with their complex, deontically causedproperty affixed to thetheme, rendersthemso dissimilar to the conditionsfor the various narrow-rangedative rulesthat noneof theserules can apply. Verbsof causationof motion: throw versuspull versustake. Herewe wish to seedifferencesin representations among verbs like throw and verbslike pull , becausedespitetheir cognitivesimilarities the former dativizeandthe latterdo not. The crucial difference is an interaction between aspectualand forcedynamic componentsof the event: for throw verbs, the causingact is an instantaneousevent precedingthe motion of the object; for pull verbs, it is a continuousprocessthatis temporallycoextensivewith the motionof theobject. Althoughpull verbstypically havethe agentaccompanyingthe moving object (asin carry), this is not a necessaryfeature, sinceone canlift or lower a box to someoneusinga winchor ropeandthe verbsstill do not dativize. Thestructures in (5.46) and(5.47), appropriatefor the argumentstructuresin BobthrewI pulled the box to Bill , displaythis difference. : (5.46) throw

~ ~ _ ~~~ l ~ - ACTTHINGTHING "MANNER " Bob box : I ( ) ) I ( ).) throwing : : : e EVENT

EY~ / :\ " " GO THINGPATH box ) ) \ ~ TOTHING (Bill) : e

: (5.47) pull

-- ~--/ TrH _THING ~ ACT IN MANNER V "pulling " ...,_ 0~\0' " ((Bob )) ((box )Gooo )'00 -

".

-

' ."

- 0. . GO 0. THING PATH (box) ) \ TOTHING (Bill ) e

~

219

Representation

In contrast, a third subtypecomprisingbring and take, which do dativize, differs from the pull verbs in not specifying a manner, in specifying deictic infonnationconcerningthepath, andalsoin implyingthattheagentmoves- one canpull a box eitherwhile stayingin oneplace(usinga rope) or by moving with theobject, butonecan' t takeor bring a box anywherewhile seatedon a rock. The structurein (5.48) showsoneway to representthemeaningsof theseverbswhen they appearwith to-objects; it correspondsto the versionof bring that would appearin Bobbroughttheroseto Sue. ThedeicticvariableHEREsymbolizesthe or of a perspectivepoint thatthespeakerhas locationof thespeakeror addressee . The representationfor takewould be similar exceptfor setup in the discourse " " usingthe deictic variableTHERE, correspondingto not HERE. The same symbolswouldbeusedfor theverbscome, go, andperhapssend(seeMiller and -Laird, 1976). The path-function ' with ' is usedfor objectswhosepath Johnson of motion is definedas being whateverpath someother object happensto go along; it would also be usedfor verbs like carry and accompanyand for the it , the motion of comitativesenseof theprepositionwith. As I haverepresented the agentis implicit in the motion of the patient/themealonga pathandthe fact ' that thepatient/thememoves' with the agent. This hastwo theoreticaladvantages . It capturesthe intuition that the motion of the agentis in some sense ' entailedrather than asserted(for example, John didn t take the package to ' ChicagodoesnotnecessarilymeanthatJohndidn t goto Chicago). It alsospares me from havingto enrich the representationalapparatus(by, say, allowing an ' ACT to havetwo ' effects- the motionof theagentandthemotionof thepatient/ theme- or by allowing for conjunctionsof two THI NGs). The time-line links specifytheseasaccomplishmentverbs. : (5.48) bring

vf~--;frecr J . -~~--~--E ~ ~ : : : : THING ACT THING . "~\""" ))"" GO /."V ((B)]ob ((rose THING PATH (ro5e(

/ r" , ..... withTHING TOHERE (Sue (Bob ) )

.

. .

. e

For-datives: a broad-range rule. One versionof a broad-rangerule for lor , I have dativesis shownin (5.49). As with many of the other representations ) to improve readability, but depictedit with mnemoniclabels (in parentheses recallthattherule itself simply specifiesabstractindexesfor the arguments.Its input(top half) specifiesthekind of argumentstructurewe seein a sentencelike Bob bakeda cakefor Sue, involving an agentperformingsomeact on an object with the intentof allowing a third party to haveit. Roughly, the representation

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" as" Bobactedon a cakein orderfor Sueto havethecake. could be paraphrased Unlike thebroad-rangerule for theto-dative, no causationis specified; if I bake a cakefor someone , I wantthemto haveit but they may not actually haveit at ' ' thetime of thebaking. No possessionalfield is specifiedanywhere, sotherule would encompasspure benefactiveslike Miriam drove the car for Sam, asthe argumentsin section4.4.1mandate(recallthatbenefactivedouble objectforms in standardmodem English are ruled out by narrow range, not broad-range ' , wecouldrepresentbenefactiverelations rules). FollowingGreen s( 1974) suggestion , wherethe beneficiary asa form of havingdistinct from literal possession esthe acteduponobject (perhapsin an alteredstate metaphoricallypossess in a semanticfield for nonliteralpossession be could . This or location) represented " ' where" ' suchas benefactive, possessingsomethingis interpretedasbeing . Possiblythebenefactivefield alsohasa subfieldfor ableto enjoyits advantages the kind of symbolicbenefactiveexpressionsinvolving actsof dedicationdiscussed of HAVE and by Green( 1974). The linking rule for obliquearguments ' for to' substructure in the . embedded / / beneficiary ACT appliesto thepossessor out an open andfusesonly with the preposition/or . oneof whoseentriesspells . semantic that in configuration argument

(5.49)

Nl - - - bile---.. / jE ~:::THING - STATE THING ACT ,/ I ' " )) HA )) ((cake ((Bob VE THINGTHING ) )) (cake ((Sue I

E ____\THING ~ STATE ~THING - - EJfNT )I / I"", )1(Sue (Bob / I"" HAVETHING THING ACT THINGTHING ) (Bob) (cake )) ) I (cake (Sue

The outputof therule, thebottomhalf of (5.49), essentiallydemotesthe main actto theroleof themeansof fulfilling anintentionwith regardto thebeneficiary. to The beneficiary, now an argumentof ACT at the root level, is therebylinked " Bob as couldbeparaphrased approximately thefirst object. Therepresentation " actedon Sue, in order for Sueto havea cake, by meansof acting on the cake. is linked to thesecondobjectby rule (5.38), which recognizesthe Thepossession " " ' for to' link as / beinganexampleof a prospective effect by virtue of its feature decomposition. seem Putting thebeneficiaryas, in effect, a patientof the mainpredicatemay it is . However , first to the linked it to object like an ad hoc expedient get the between relation the agentand independentlydefensible. Greennotesthat

Representation

221

the beneficiaryis somewhatdifferent in the double-object fonn than in the prepositionalfonn, asshownin (5.50). In the double-objectfonn, the agentand the beneficiarymust exist at the sametime, and the agentmustknow that the beneficiaryexists. (5.50) I leavemy pokerchips andall my debtsto my children, howevermany theymay be. * 1 leaveany children my wife may bearme my pokerchipsandall my debts. The Americanambassadorbakeda cakefor JamesI. * The Americanambassadorb~ked JamesI a cake. I boughta ring for my wife in caseI shoulddecideto marry. *1 boughtmy wife a ring in caseI shoulddecideto marry. She's going to sing a song for her late lover. * She's going to sing her late lover a song. Green proposesthat the meaning of these double-object forms involves a " " " " component X intendsY to haveZ , andthat thepredicate intend, unlike, say, " hasa " wish " " want" or " , , presuppositionthatX believesYandZ to exist. hope, We could saythatX musthaveY in mind whenentertaininghis intention, andin ' fact that theX- Y relation is part of the definition of whatX s intentionis. That " would be theinterpretationof the representationX ACTs on Y for Y to HAVE Z ' in the lowerhalf of (5.49) and would motivatethe differencebetweenit and the prepositionalform. The actual action would be a meansto realizing this intention, though the intention itself needn't actually be realized. (See also , 1987, for relateddiscussion.) Dowty, 1979a Admittedly, this is a veryabstractdefinition of a patient, andonemight wonder if speakersinvariablyanalyzedouble-objectfor -dativesin thisway. In fact, there is evidencethatthey do not. As we haveseen, passivizationis linked to patienthood , andwhile somedouble-objectfor -dativeshavepassivesthataremarginally , for othersthe passiveis completelyout, asshownin (5.51). acceptable (5.51) (a) ?Bob was found a job by Sam. * Bob was stolena watch by Sam. ?Bob wasboughta presentby Sam. * Bob wasgottena watch by Sam. (b) ??Bob wascut a slice of pie by Sam. ?Bob wasbakeda cake by Sam. ?* Bob wasknit a sweaterby Sam. * ?Bob wasbuilt a houseby Sam. (c) * Bob wasearneda promotion by his hard work. * Bob wasgaineda friend by his warmth andgenerosity.

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(d) * ?Bobwasplayedthetrombone by Sam. (e) * ?Julie wascried a river by Sam.

The combinationof the piecemealpassivizabilityof double-objectfor -datives with theabstractness of thepatienthoodanalysisof their surfaceobjectssuggests that they can be representedin either of two ways, dependingon the verb and otherfactors. The representationin the lower part of (5.49) would underliethe passivizabledouble-object forms and the ones where the conceptual link betweenthe beneficiaryand the agent's intentionsis strongest(by hypothesis, theseforms should be the same). Unpassivizablefonns would be identical exceptthat the beneficiarywould not be representedas the secondargumentof thematrixACT. It would haveto bemappedontothesurfaceobjectrole by some linking rule that I hadnot neededto usebeforehand , perhapsone that would also " themes that embrace" causee are not patients in languageswith indirect . morphologicalcausatives the semantic field for HA VE is left unspecifiedin thebroad-rangerule Though soasto embracebenefactives , thedefaultsemanticfield for HA VE stateswould be literal possession , andwe would expectthat it would be statedin mostof the narrow-rangerules. The two main narrow-rangefor -dative rules perfonn the broad-rangetransformationon the representations of verbs of obtaining and verbsof creation, respectively. The verbget in its prepositionalfonn might be representedas in (5.52); with suitable fillers for the argument slots it is as" Bob actedon a ring, causingthering to go to Bob, in orderfor paraphrasable Sueto havethe ring." The representationfor get is the basisfor other verbsof obtaining, in which a variety of ancillary substructuresmay be specified. Buy " " specifiesa causedobligation of a countenransferof an object with money propertiesto a third party; grab specifiesa physicalmanner; win, earn, order involvemeans;find andstealspecifypropertiesof theobtainedobject, probably ' ' usingthe such operator.Theverbmakemight berepresentedasin (5.53), which whenfilled with real-world argumentscan be glossedas " Bob actedon a hat, " causingit to comeinto existence,in orderfor Sueto havethe hat. Other verbs of creatingwould have essentiallysimilar representations , but with slots for means,propertiesof the createdobject, or both. : (5.52) get

EVENT "' :,~..; ~_ - - forho - - --_.~ ~~ _.- / I " ~ !::::: ACTTHING THING :possessional EVENT :possessional ( Bob) ( ring) / I' " /EVjNT ~ GOTHING PLACE HAVETHINGTHING (ring ) I \ ) ( Sue) (ring atTHING (Bob )

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Representation (5.53)

~!E~~~~Ilk :!~- -----_.._---J . : ' : . :; :: ~ islen Iill ACT

: make

- THING THING ( Bob ) I (hat) ]

STATE 1 "", / HAVE THING THING ( Sue) (hat)

) ~ GOTHING THING ~~ cx PR TY (Bob 00 ) I(jam / \ TH " "MANNER ~THING = ~~h ~ . GO .}TI -TE " "smear ) . (jam ...mlNG ....-I ,,~--.....MANNER GO " ) PI : 6, (jam \' "smear .~ ::~

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A crucial aspectof this representationis that the propertypredicatedof the surfaceargumentin the with form is systematicallyrelatedto the motionof the substance argumentin theontoform. Themoststraightforwardwayof representing this dependencybetweenthe act of smearingandthe stateof beingsmeared with something is to use the stative version of GO (Jackendoff's GOex )' ordinarily employedin expressingstaticconfigurationssuchasThis road goes to Chicago. That is, the propertyof being smearedis simply the frozentraceof the act of smearing.14Other verbsin the classwould specifydifferent manner constantsfor the motion of the substanceitself (" smudge," " spread," " streak," etc.); somecould alsospecifyvariousmanneror meansspecificationsfor theact of causingthe motion (" dab," " daub," " brush" ). The presenceof the additional manneror meanslink in the ACT structurecorrelatesnegativelywith theability of the verb to appearwithout an agentivesubject: Whenshelookedup, herface wasa mess: makeupstreaked/* daubedher cheeksfrom top to bottom. This is probably just the anticausativizationrule discussedin the previouschapter, which is blocked when a manneror meansof acting is specified: The lamp doesn't work becausea wire broke/ * cut. Verbsin thesplashclasshaverepresentations in theontoform thataresimilar to thoseof the smearclassbut with severalsystematicdifferences. The moved substancegenerallyhasthe property ' liquid ' insteadof ' semisolids the path lacks the ' along againstTHI NG ' component. Perhapsmost important, the of thesmearverbswouldlink theACT eventandtheGO temporalrepresentation eventto the sameinterval on the time-line. Assumingthat complexpathshave ' ' ' ' separatelinks to the time-line for eachof their parts, the against and along parts would be co-linked with the ACT , representingthe fact that the agent continuesto act on the substanceas it movesalongthe surface. In contrast, the of thesplashverbswould havean ACT eventlinked to a point representations for or ( splash squirt) or an interval (for sprayor inject), andtheGO eventwould be linked to a distinct point or interval later on thetime-line; this correspondsto the fact that the agentis not necessarilyacting on the liquid at the momentit arrivesat the targetsurface.16(This is the samedistinction that split the throw verbsandthepull verbswith regardto dativization.) As before, the verb representationspecifiesa mannerof motion (e.g., the distributionof liquid that definesspray) andfor someverbsa manneror means of acting (e.g., for inject). As expected, mannerfulnessor meansfulnessblocks the anticausativizationof theseverbs (e.g., Water splashedagainst the sand castle/ * Water injectedinto the sand castle). The with versionsof the splash verbswould also be similar to thoseof the smearverbs, with the attainmentby the surfaceof a propertythat is definedby a stative, extensionalGO containing the samemannerasthedynamic version. This sharingof machinerymay seem

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, splattered,sprayed,andsoon, problematic,becausewhenanobjectis splashed it is not the frozentrajectoryof the substance throughspacethat definesa state, but the frozenresultsof themomentof impact(basically, a cross-sectionof the shapeof the moving liquid). However, since there already is an aspectual differencebetweenthemotionsof smearing(interval) andof splashing(point), a suitablyexplicit theoryof the effectsof staticizingmotion eventsinto states would presumablylead to this consequence automatically. Thus the narrowverbs andsplashverbsaresimilar and rules for the locativization of smear range perhapscould be collapsed; I tentatively keep them separatebecauseof the categorymight alsoembracesome possibility thatany collapsedsuperordinate nonlocativizableverbs. Pushverbsand pour verbs. Now we can look at some seeminglyclosely . Verbs of force exertion such aspush or relatedbut nonlocativizableclasses shove, evenwhenthey takeinto phrases , haveno specificationof any property of their patients(i.e., theyneednot be semisolidor liquid); they alwaysspecify a mannerwithin theACT structure;theyneverspecifya mannerof motionof the patient/themewithin theGO structure;andtheyneverspecifyparticularpath- or place-functionswithin the path structure(i.e., you can push Momma out the door, into thecar, from the train, aroundtheroom, etc.). For verbsin thepour class, involving enabledmotion of a massvia gravity, would look somethinglike (5.59). The representation therepresentation , appropriate to theentry for pour that appearsin Suepouredwater onto thefloor , can be glossedas" Sueactedon a mass, in this casewater, letting it go from inside " somethingdownto on thefloor, in a pouringmanner. Thoughthe representation is similar to that of sprayverbs, thereareseveralcrucial differences. The ' motionof thesubstanceis causedby gravity andmerelyenabledby the agents releasingit from somecontainer, ratherthanbeingcausedby the impartingof forcefrom theagent(hencethe subordinatinglink is annotatedby theclusterof force-dynamicfeaturesthat I abbreviateas ' let' ). And, possibly as a consequence , thepathsubstructurespecifies.a motiondownwardandonto an object. If we setasidedrip anddrizzle, which soundsomewhatunusualwith agentive theverbsin thisclassshare subjectsanyway, anadditionalsemanticsubstructure is that the moving substancecomesfrom inside somecontainer, unlike, say, ' splashing, which one can do with one s handswhile chest-deepin the ocean. ' ' ' (Interestingly, the path out-or or from in seemsto differentiate narrow classes , inhibiting productivity, in severalothercases:in thespewverbs, which resistlocativization, andverbsof emissionof light, sound, or matter, whichresist of thisspecificationof a source,these .) As aresultof thepresence causativization verbscanbe assignedopenargumentsallowing themto take overt/ rom or out o/ phrasesaswell. Althoughit is crucial thattheverbsspecifythatthesubstance

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is enabled( ' let' ) rather than forced to move, it is lessclearthat the downward direction is an essentialpart of the specificationof the subclass . That would on whether have a clear sensethatsentences like thefollowing are depend people grammaticallyanomalous:AstronautSallyRidepouredsomeTangup onto the ceiling of Space/ab. : (5.59) pour

_ )'E ~ ..~ . .ACT ~ ,PROPE THING > (W ] G O ier mass 'inTHING ~Edown THING [ (Sue)

~~~-?Vf ~:~PATH THING MANNER " " pouring / J ~ to p

from

~ ~ in/on THING (floor)

Other kinds of content-locativeverbs. Severalotherclassesof verbsspecify particularspatialarrangementsandpaths, andkindsof movedobjects. Verbsof circular arrangement(coil , spin, twirl , twist, whirl , wind) do not alternate; semantically , they specify a flexible objectwhosemajor axis is one-dimensional, which is movedalong a path ' to' the place' around' the goal object. Two other subclass es consist, as far as I know, of three verbs apiece. Verbs of vertical , which do alternate,requiremass(heap) or aggregate(pile, stack) arrangement themesand a path ' to ' a placedefinedby the place-function ' on' . In addition, theremust be somespecificationthat the parts of the moved assemblage are arrangedvertically with respectto oneanother. No setof path-functionsor place" functionswill sufficeto specifythisarrangement , becausethe GOTHING path" function (place-function THING ) representation inherentlyidealizesthetheme as a dimensionlesspoint that is simply locatedat a placeon the targetobject (Talmy, 1983), and we have to specify the arrangementof partsof the theme relativeto eachother. Herewe seeclearlythattherepresentational formatI have can be restrictive there is no to state theobvious adopted surprisingly easyway " " for ' ' procedure piling , namelyputtingonepart of the aggregatetheme on the surface, a secondpart ' on' the first part, a third ' on' the second,andso on. Nor haveI availed myself of a mechanismfor specifyingtwo distinct effectsof an action, in this case, putting the theme' on' the tableandarrangingthe themeso that it defines a vertical stack. The only option using the machineryI have introducedso far is to specify that the thememust alreadyhavethe propertyof being in a pile. The geometryof the pile can be enforcedby constrainingthe object to be an aggregatewhoseshapehas a one-dimensionalextension; its (my necessarilyvertical orientationcan be specifiedusingJackendoff's GOeKt

Representation

233

stativeGO) fonnalismwith the intransitivedirection ' up' . The representation in 5.60 shows this It in a one could be done. results : the sentence ( ) way prediction Irma piled bookson the table shouldbe availableasa way to describeanevent in which Inna picksupprearrangedpiles of booksandplaceseachpile on a table. This predictionseemsto becorrect. It is difficult to pinpoint a statedefinitionfor the surfacein the with fonn other than that piles areon it ; I will simply assume that sucha stateis definedusing ' such' and the relevantportion of (5.60). (5.60) pile:

~ : /~ -V : I oc THIN THIN ACT ~ ~ I " ) . (agg )~ J nn [g [PROP !JID PA TH 00 .PRO b oo ( ~ r J :~ T Y ) \ ~ to /00 \.THIN PL ate such / SJ TH on I"P t ab T H ) ( ~ up

Verbsof dispersal(scatter, sow, strew, bestrew) alternatefor somespeakers ; ' ' semantically, they requirepatient/themeswith the property aggregateand a path eventuatingin a place defined by a place-function roughly similar in meaningto the Englishpart.icles about, around, andall over. Containerlocatives.. verbsof covering. Now let us considerclassesof verbs that are usedexclusivelyor primarily in the with fonn (" containerlocative" ). Severalclassesthatdo not alternatespecify sometargetspatialdistributionof a movedobjectonto a locationobject, which I will representasa changeof state of the locationeffectedby meansof an agentactingon the movedobject. The representationof cover in (5.61) is paradigmaticfor the class that includes bandage, coat,face,pave, andotherverbs. Therepresentationcanbeglossedas " Bob actedon the bed , causingit to attain the propertyof havinga 2D object, " namelya sheet, on it , by meansof acting on the sheet. : (5.61) cover

- - - -- - :: 7 ~ ~ / .identificational THING ACT THING ~ :[""' bed IN Bob /'7V ( ) ( )/ r~ mlNG ACT THING Bob RTY PRO 00THING ( (sh ) ( Ft)) ~ I (bed ) SUCh / \ RTY PRO ~ ~ t ~ ,)T E BEmlNG PLj (sheet ) on I \~"THING (bed )

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Severalaspectsof the interpretationof thesesymbolsare important. Despite the Englishmnemonic, the place-function ' on' usedhereis different from the ' on' usedto specifythetop of anobject; it would correspondto coextensiveness of surfaces . The 2D propertyspecificationrequiresonly that the object can be construedas being extendedin two dimensions; it neednot literally be two. Becausethelocationobjectis assertedto changestate, the holistic dimensional , multiple propertiescan interpretationapplies. In therepresentational subsystem belisted, andit is conceivablethatsomemoreelementaryidiosyncraticproperty " or " invisible" or " " similar to " obscured unexposed is listedaswell. There is a ' means'substructuresoasto , providethetriggerfor thelinking rule thatprovides thewith-phrase.However, it neednot bethecasethattheagentcausesthe cover to GO ' to' the location; one can cover a bed by arrangingdisheveledsheets alreadystrewnon top of it. Thusno specificpathor specificmannerof motion, or eventheexistenceof a translationof theobjectasa whole, is mandatedby the verb, differentiatingthem from all the classesof alternatingverbs we have discussedso far. Otherverbsin theclasswould differ in termsof the propertiesassertedof the patientin the with-phrasethat helps to define the statechange, such as liquid of rigid 2D parts(tile); or morespecificidiosyncratic (flood, douse); anaggregate . properties(bandage,pave) Thefill classandothernonalternatingverbs. By usingdifferentcombinations of dimensionalitiesandpropertiesof the content(state- defining) and container (state-assuming ) objects, togetherwith variousplace-functions, onecould arrive at representations for verbsspecifyingcompletealignmentor coextensivity of selecteddimensionsof objects. For example, for line, the container is a I D boundaryof a 2D objector a 2D boundaryof a 3D object, the contentis I D or ' ' 2D, respectively , andthe place-function is on (a similar set of specifications wouldbeusedfor edge). Forfill , thecontentis mass, thecontaineris a 2D surface of a 3D object, andtheplace-function is ' in ' . For verbsin thesaturateclass, the containeris a 3D objectandthe contentis a 3D liquid (drench) or an aggregate of ODor ID or 2D parts(intersperse,vein, interleave); theplace-function is ' in ' . For verbsin theriddle class, the containeris a 2D objector a 2D boundaryof a 3D object, thecontentis anaggregateof OD parts, andtheplace-function is ' on' . Within eachof theseclasses , theverbswould bedifferentiatedfrom oneanother more by idiosyncraticobjectproperties(e.g., for stud or stain). Alternatingcontainer-orientedverbs.. load, pack, stock. The only two classes of container-orientedor with verbsthatcantrigger theformationof corresponding content-orientedor int% ntoforms involve the notion of a container' s intendedcapacity.Load, stock, andpackaresurprisinglycomplexverbs, eachof which pertainto thefilling of a containerdesignedfor a certainkind of item with

235

Representation

itemsof thatkind: if oneputsbulletsinto astoragereceptaclehiddenin thehandle of a gun, thatis not anexampleof loadingthegun. In addition, thelocationobject changesstateas a result of the action; that state is definedby someaction or capabilityof the locationobject with respectto the goalsof theagent. For load, it canbe firing bullets, recordingon a tape, taking pictures, or transportinghay; for pack, it canbe transportingsomething; for stock, it canbetemporarilyholding somecommodity. Note, for example, thata drugdealerslippingcocaineinto the suitcaseof an unsuspectingpassengeris not packing a suitcase. This " " purposivecomponentof the statedefinition (i.e., whena wagonis loaded, it is readyto do something) andof the specificationof thereceptacle(i.e., theplace in the wagonwherethe hay goesis designedfor holding stuff) can be captured ' ' of usingthe for/to propertyoperator. This is shownin (5.62), a representation theverbentryfor load in anargumentstructurelike thatin Bobloadedthewagon with hay. It canbe glossedas" Bob actedon the wagon, causingthe wagonto go into thestateof beingableto act asit wasdesignedto act, by meansof Bobacting on the hay, causingit to go to a placein the wagonintendedfor hay to be in it." " " of whata tapeplayer, ( As designed is theopaqueidiosyncraticrepresentation to do when they are camera and so on are intended , , gun, wagon, printer, '? loaded.) loId: (5.62)

r~~ :;;:_~:::;;;;.-,~ --.Vf~ ~ ACT p~'tH GO THt N G ~~

v ~ " ~ ) " J CI " ." ,'~~~:;~~ =

. ACT THING THING ) ) ( wagon )) ( (Bob

THING THING )) ( hay

(wlSon)

frx/lo

\ /ay .~Vf ~ MANNF _ R (h)10

ACT 11iING (wagon)

" "as designed

)'t~ ' in THING ~on (wfor )/-pl"~ason .);T !~ BETHING ) PlACE (hay \ ITHING in ) (WllOO

When the locativization rule applies in what we think of as the reverse direction, deriving the into fonn from the with form (seesection4.4.2), the changeof stateis no longerassertedto be an effect of the action; otherwisethe holistic effect would apply to it (for example, we do not want to rule out the possibilitythatBob loadedhay into thewagonbut stoppedbeforethewagonwas to load, exceptfor loaded). Packandstockwould havesimilar representations for load contains in the of the EVENT substructure that differences composition " '' the as designed manner.

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Verbsof stuffing. The otheralternatingclasscontainscram, crowd,jam , stuff, wad, andthesenseof pack thatonewould useto refer to fiberglassinsulationin cracksratherthanto clothesin suitcases . It is not clear how to characterizethis classfonnally, andits requirementrevealsa nonobviousconstraintof the model of spaceimplicit in the representationalsystem. The verbs in the with fonn all entailthatthecontaineris in somesense" overfull." But how shouldthis statebe ? Conceptually, it is not a " place" : thereis no placeassociatedwith represented a roomsuchthatpeoplearein thatplacewhentheroom is crowded. Nor is there somepath to a room such that when people traverseit the room becomes crowded. Morphologycorroboratestheseintuitions: there is no prepositionin English (nor, I would guess, in most other languages ) correspondingto the notion " overfull." Rather, the closestEnglish closed-classmorpheme, namely the prefix over- (modifying the meaning of verbs and adjectives to create prefixed fonns suchas overfill , overload, overstock, and overstuffed ) , clearly modifies a relation betweena substanceand a container- the action or state referredto is suchthat there is " too much" substancefor the capacity of the container.As in therepresentations of pile , heap, andstack, we seemconfronted with a casewherethe usual linguistic model of space, in which the theme is idealizedasa point, is too impoverishedto allow the necessaryspecificationof thesubclassat hand. In particular, thequantityof the themein this casemust be " " part of the definition of the relationship overfull underlying the stuff verbs. Jackendoff( 1983, I 987a) presentsno fonnalism to handlespatialrelationships whereboth the geometryof the themeand of the referenceobject are relevant (thushecouldnot easily representthemeaningof certaincomplex prepositions either, suchasacross; seeTalmy, 1983, for discussion). A naturalextensionto the existingmachinerywould be to allow a STA TE to be definedas [BE THING CONFIGURAnON ], where CONFIGURATION would be definedas [config-function THING ] . The CONFIGURATION constituent of BE stateswould be analogousto the PATH constituentof GO events. (In fact, we could maximize economyat the expenseof readability by using a single symbol to be interpretedas PATH when accompaniedby GO and as CONFIGURATION when accompaniedby BE.) Let us assumethat a small numberof configurationfunctionsareavailable. ' Perpendicular-to' and ' parallel -to' wouldpresumablybe includedin the setto help representthe meaningof ' over- ' would be like and across our for ; prepositions along presentpurposes, needed , signifyingthatthe themeexceedsthecapacityof the placeat which it is located. The int% nto fonn of the stuff verbsneednot imply the accomplishmentof sucha configuration- Bob cancrampencilsinto his briefcasethrougha narrow opening, eventhoughthe briefcaseis largely empty- but it doesspecify some

237

Representation

conditionof forcing somethinginto somecontaineragainstsomeresistingforce exertedby thecontainer.This is nicelycapturedby theclusterof force-dynamic link featuresabbreviatedas ' despite' (seethe table shown in (5.31 , and the asSTATEsconsistingof A Cfs staticexertionof force, whichI haverepresented of verbs like in the for ( example, supportshownin (5.30 . The representation of verbsof thisclass, then, wouldbeasin (5.63). Thetop diagram, representation representingthe verb entry in Bob stuffedbreadcrumbsinto the turkey and " fleshedout with correspondingmnemoniclabels, canbe glossedas Bob acted ' onbreadcrumbs , causingthemto gointo theturkey, despitetheturkey sresisting " . The bottom diagl' amdepictsthe entry in Bob stuffed the the breadcrumbs " , and can be glossedas Bob acted on the turkey, turkey with breadcrumbs , by meansof acting on the causingthe turkey to be overfull with breadcrumbs " the into the breadcrumbs to breadcrumbs , causing turkey. go : (5.63) stuff

~.,)E : .(B fie ; i i Ic . _ ..ITHING : : : ~Iob ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ THING f ' { T EY ~ c rumbs ( )I /' I" ./S"I'~""J

PATH ACT THING THING GOTHING (turkey ) (crumbs) (crumbs ) )\ toP / ~ in THING Y) - - - - -/ l ~ ~ - : : ACT NT THINGTHING ~ :identificational )] I(turkey )] I(Bob YE Vi" , I mJ GOTHING ~RTY 8v PROY (turkey ) / \

Yt~

such

BE THINGCOlll~ G (crumbs ) / "' over- P E ~ in THING (turkey )

The triangle in the with fonn is an abbreviationof the act-cause-motion . If so, the structurein theinto fonn, presumablyminusthe ' despite' substructure ' derivationof the ' despite structurewouldhaveto beinferredconceptuallyfrom the ' over. ' configuration(or vice versawhenthe rule is appliedin the reverse derivation), ratherthanbeingcreatedby a mechanicalrearrangementof semantic of the ' despite' clauseandthe structure. (Alternatively, the representations ' over- ' configurationmight overlapin somefiner-graineddecompositionthan I havepresentedhere.) The otherverbswithin the classwould differ from one

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anotherin their specificationof thenecessary propertiesof themovedsubstance mass for ( stuff, aggregateandpossiblyhumanfor crowd, 20 for wad, andsoon) and in specifying particularmannersof acting on for the verbscram, jam, and wad. Nongeometricstate-changeverbs. Verbsconveyingthe changeof an object to a statecharacterizednongeometrically(often with estheticor evaluativeconnotations ) by meansof puttingsomethingin or on thatobjectwill berepresented as in (5.64), a representationof the verbadorn as it appearsin Sueadornedthe car with decals. The glossis " Sueactedon thecar, causingit to becomeadorned, " by meansof Sueacting on decals, causingthem to go onto the car. : (5.64) adorn

~ ~ : ~ . . _ , ; ~ ~ . : /! ~ ACT THING THING : V i dentific ~ " ' l T ! ; . ~ # ar )J(c)GO (S Jue / " I " ~ THING PROPE ACT THING THIN ~ "ck ar ecal (c)"amed (S )I(d)Iue /EY \-... ,~Yf~

GO THING ) ) PJ\ I (decals 10P E ~ onTHING (car)

Othersin theclassincludeembellish,enrich, ornament, clutter, infect, andtaint. It is not clear whethertheevaluative/estheticmeaningitself mustbespecifiedor whetherthe listing of an idiosyncraticpropertynot cashedout in geometricor purposiveterms would suffice in distinguishingthe class. (A possibleway of characterizinga commonevaluativecomponentwould be to introducea new ' ' grammatically relevant property, eval , that would define this subclassand perhapsalsothepossessed objectsin benefactiveandmalefactivestructuresthat do not involve literal possession change. However, it is not clearwhethersuch a propertyis necessary .) Theverbsin theclasswould differ in termsof theidiosyncratic statespecifiedandin termsof otherproperties, both idiosyncraticand classificational, assertedof the participatingobjects(e.g., massand color for stain, weight for burden, andso on). Binding and clogging. Finally, verbs expressingthe changeof stateof an object to one wherebysomeothersubstanceor object is not free to leaveit can berepresentedasin (5.65), a representation of theentryof clog appearingin Sue cloggedthe sink with a rag. The only novel symbol is the subordinatingcausal link whose featuresare abbreviatedas ' prevent' . The representationcan be " glossedas Sueactson the sink, causingit to changeto a statesuchthat a rag statically actson a liquid , preventingthat liquid from going out of the sink, by meansof Sueacting on the rag, causingthe rag to go into the sink."

239

Representation

; : ; LZE ~ 5 , ink )[(s)ue [(S Yl ~ --~ , ~ ~ A I N C D ' H THIN G : I oca .. EY ~ f ' l T GOTHING PRO S ue ( ) [ ( r ) ag / I " . 1 , R F TY s ink (A )Cf /:.,.JI\G SUC "-~ ~ ~ T ~ THING

: (5.65) clog

~idf!n.if"l Ca Iinnal

~:)PROPER 'fX ~ GOTHI fliquid t\n H .~ /iPJ from THIN (s)ink GOTHING PJ~ IO ~ inTHING (sink )

This subclasscontainsa numberof verbslike clog pertainingto impededmotion (block, choke, clog, dam, plug, stopup), which would differ from oneanotherin imposingdifferentpropertyspecificationson theirarguments.Similarstructures would capturethe meaningsof verbsdenoting somekind of bondage,suchas bind, chain, entangle, lash, lasso, rope, and tie, exceptthat the movedobject would bespecifiedas I D andflexible andthe impededobjectasbeingprevented from moving ' from at' ratherthan ' from in ' thelocationobject. Individual verbs are free to specify idiosyncraticpropertiesof the moved object (e.g., chains, lassos, or ropes), andadditionalidiosyncraticinformation aboutthe mannerin which the movedobjectactson the boundobject (e.g., lashedversusentangled versustied.)

.

5.6.4 Representationsfor the Passive The broad-range rule of passivization is shown in (5.66). The passiveis " " representedhereasa circumstantialstate, in which the place or circumstance predicatedof the themeis an eventor statecorrespondingto the oneexpressed by the active form (thus an A Cf event is listed in the slot correspondingto PLACE in the circumstantialstate structure, omitting the redundantplacefunction ' at' ). (5.66) . 7r ~ ACT THING THING ( XI ( VI

/ BE

T ~~ stantial tT ~~ THING [ VJ , . ~ ACT THING THING Y (XI

.::~~~

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at first glancemight appearto collapsethe meanings Thoughthis representation of verbal and adjectival passives , the adjectival passiveform is represented ' ' differently: the semanticfield is identificational , andthe themeis predicated asbeingat a PROPERTY,specifically, the property' such' that the agentACTs on it. Thesecondopenargumentin (5.66) would beexpressed overtly asaby phrase thanksto the linking rule shownin (5.28) that associatesargumentsembedded in A CT/ HAVEstructureswith obliquephrases,andthe lexical entry for by containing anopenagentargumentthat is part of a circumstantial" place." Short or " " agentlesspassives(e.g., Johnwashit) arebasedon a structureidentical to that " of (5.66) but with the" suppressed agentargumentlacking the squarebrackets thatallow it to be" open" to syntacticexpression.Its presence , however, causes theverbform to beinterpretedasentailingtheexistenceof anagentor authorand canallow theeventto controladverbialssuchasdeliberatelywhenappropriate (seeKeyserandRoeper, 1984; Lasnik, 1988). Forthepassive,showingtherepresentations underlyingalternatingverbsdoes not requireenumeratinga setof narrow-rangerules. Recallthat thebroad-range rule of passivization , presumablybecauseit addsan affix , appliesto any verb with a compatiblesemanticstructure. Now we can say what that " compatible semanticstructure" is. The verb must havea dyadic ACT, becausethat is the substructurethat getsembeddedin the part of the passiverepresentationthat definesthecircumstance predicatedof thethemein which thethemeis a patient. . Obviously this Any verbthatis built aroundadyadicACT , then, is passivizable includesall actionverbs, includingbothversionsof thedativeandof thelocative, as discussedin section4.4.4. Now I will flesh out andjustify the claim that for nonactionalverbsthat passivizedo include a dyadic ACT , representations whereasthosethat do not passivizelack one. The representational theory providestwo loci associatedwith dyadic ACT structuresthat can embracenonactionalverbs. First, there is the EVENT/ STATE distinction. We have already seen- see (5.30) - that ACTs that are STATEs can be usedto representverbs of static exertion of force, such as , eventsor statesdefinedby ACTs canbedifferentiatedin terms support. Second of thesemanticfields in whichan ACT is defined. VerbswhoseACT eventsare definedin thepsychologicalfield wereshownin (5.33) for experiencer-subject verbs and in (5.34) for stimulus-subjectverbs. Similar representationsdominated ' ' by STATE insteadof EVENT (and with different kinds of effect substructures ) would characterizepsych-verbssuchaslike and the static sense of frighten. Likewise, field specifierssuchas ' deontic' or ' epistemic' (someof ' T HI NGs which allow STATEs, EVENTs, or ' represented to function in roles taken T H I N see Gs Jackendoff 1983 ; , ordinarily by physical ) would define the scaffoldingfor abstracttransitiveverbs like justify or refute, where ideas and

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Representation

situationsabstractly" act on" one another. Another semanticfield in which " ACTs can be definedmight be called " efficacy" (or perhaps" potency ), and would be appropriateto define situationsin which somequality of one object with respectto a secondallows thefirst to affectthesecond. This field might be usedto define theroleof instrumentalsubjectsandthe" state-changer" subjects of verbsof spatialrelations, wherethe first argumentof ACT is not the usual animate agent but an inanimate object serving as a proximal cause. The representationin (5.67) correspondsto Theknifecut thebread(which canyield Thebread wascut by the knife); its roughglossis "The knife effectively acted on the bread, causingthe breadto becomecut, by meansof someoneacting on " the knife, causingthe knife to go againstandthroughthe bread. CUI : (5.67)

~.-..-~:::~~vi't~~~ ~::-----.i~"- 11IINO l1IINO )] [ (knife)] ( IxeId

-~ EVENT :idem EVENT / 1 "' ~--~ / I .......... Acmll NG11fING~VENT PROPERTY 0011I1NO . . CUI ) / ' 1' " (knife ) (bre8d

GO11fING PATH ( knYJ \ ' "

viaPLAc;Ethrough 11fING / " (bIeId) apins & 11fING (bIeId)

to Snowcoveredthe ground (which The representation in (5.68) corresponds " can yield The groundwas coveredby snow); its glossis The snow statically " affectedthe ground,causingthegroundto bein thestateof havingsnowon it. IB

(5.68)

~ ~ ./f~ idenlifi THING THING ACT ~ 5 ) 1 (s)(now g)round /I'" cover :

BE mlNa PRO ~ TY ) / \ (ground S r ~ ~ BE mlNa PLA~E (snow ) / ~ on mlNa ) (ground

? Onepartof theproblemis, in a sense, Whatabouttheunpassivizable classes easy. Verbswith morethanoneargumentthatdonothaveanACT structuremust be built around someother structure, suchas BE and GO. But BE structures involve placesor pathsdefined by place-functionsand path-functions. These

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constituents , unlike the secondargumentof ACT, which is mappedonto the a object by linking rule, will be mappedonto an oblique phraseby the linking rules. Thustheyshouldnot passivizeandindeeddo not, to noone' s surprise(e.g., * The tree was walked toward by Sy). The exception, of course, occursin constructions like This chair hasbeensat in; theusualhypothesisis thatsuchverbs are reanalyzedas having their goal or locationargumentassumean alternative primary role asa kind of patient(seeBolinger, 1977a; Davison, 1980; Bresnan, 1982b; and section3.3.4.4.) The more challenging casesare oneswherethe verb doestake an adjacent nounphrasebut does not passivize. How do theseverbsget objectsin the first place, if objectscome from a linking rule that appliesto patientsor to themesof verbswith agents? We mustprovideplausiblerepresentations for verbsthatlack ACT structures(renderingthem unpassivizable , accordingto theory) but have structuresthattrigger linking rulesthatgive themtransitiveargumentstructures to begin with (or, argumentstructuresthat only appearto be transitive, for the alternativeaccount of passivizationmentionedin section4.4.4 in which the passivewould be a purely syntactic rule applying to any genuinetransitive structure). Unpassivizablepossessionverbs. Onesuchrepresentation is theHAVE structure , whosefirst argumentgenerally ends up in surfacesubjectposition and whosesecondargumentendsup in surfaceobject position. Thus for any verb built arounda HAVE statewe havea NP-V -NP structureto which the broadverbhave, of course,shown rangepassiverule cannotapply. The unpassivizable in (5.17), is a prime example. As I argued, verbsof alienahlepropertypossession suchasownwould be built aroundSTATE consistingof anACT (corresponding to Talmy' s notion of the staticexertion of force). This is shownin (5.69); the ' ' efficacy semanticfield usedpreviouslyfor verbstaking instrumentalsubjects might be used again to express the relevant kind of dependency. Lack would be represented similarly to have, except for additional information specifying its negative polarity , plus its quasi-deontic components ( i .e., that the nonpossessed " " " " object is in some sense needed or normally possessed ) . The senseof possess used for inalienable possession would be represented in a similar way to have, and as we would expect , it does not easily passivize: * ?A keen moral sense is possessedby Abe. own: (5.69 )

:efficacy STATE ....;'l~ / I " " IACT THING THING IX )

~ IV ) / SJi " " HAVETHING THING X V

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Unpassivizablespatial verbs. A goodcasecanbe madethat nonpassivizable transitivespatialverbsare also built aroundthe HAVE function, which would ' ' ' ' accepta locational semanticfield insteadof its unmarked possessionalone. (This would completethe symmetryof BE and HAVE I discussedwhen the HAVE function was introduced.) For one thing, the verbshaveand lack can : Thiscar has/lacksa radio. More striking themselvesbeusedin a physicalsense is the verb contain, always problematicbecauseit is one of the few transitive ' spatialverbsthatdo not passivize,conformityto Jackendoffs ThematicHierarchy Conditionnotwithstanding. As discussedin section4.4.4, contain doesnot lend itself to overt locutionsinvolving changesof state, presumablybecauseit lacksanACT structure.But if it is simplya BE-THING -PLACE verb, why is the location(thecontainer) in subjectpositionandthetheme(thecontents) in object position? It would be undesirableto invent a one-word, ad hoc linking rule that would supersedethe one mappinglocationsonto prepositionalobjects, especially since the translationsof contain in other languagesincluding French, GermanandSwedishalsohavethecontainerassubjectandalsofail to passivize (Carter, 1976b). The solutionis thatcontainis represented just like spatialhave but with the place-function ' in ' incorporatedinto it (it is not importantfor now ' which subordinatorwould embedthe structurewith the ' in function underthe HAVE structure). ThusTheboxcontainsbookswould benear-synonymouswith Thebox hasbooksin it, indeed, Thebox containsbooksin it soundsredundant. The nonpassivizabilityof contain would thusbe causedby the samerepresentational .'9 structurethat makeslack andhavenonpassivizable Why doesEnglish not have any other verbsconflating spatialhave with a " " specific place-function, such as hypotheticalverbs meaning have under it , " haveon it " andsoon? Carter 1976b , ( ) pointsout an interestinggeneralization: in two argumentverbsof spatialrelations, theargumentthat by definition must beaslargeor largerthanthe otheroneis theargumentthat appearsin the subject role. For example, if X coversY, X mustcover an areaat leastas large as the relevantsurfaceof Y. Similarly, he notes, whenX contains Y, X must define a volumeat leastaslargeasthevolumeof Y. Thegeneralizationis consistentwith " a broaderprinciple that Carterdefends,that the " more important argumentin , anyrelationis linked to the subjectrole: theagent, if there is one; the possessor if thereis one. This meta-linking rule is easilystatedin the currentformulation: we could collapsethe linking rulesfor HAVE andACT by havinga singlerule refer to the first argumentof the predicate-type defined by the feature; see(5.24). Thus any spatialrelationwith an argumentthat by definition is at leastasbig asits otherargumentcouldbeexpressedwith thelargerargument assubject, throughoneof two means:with thelargerargumentimposinga state via stativeACT, or with the largerargumentbeingthe first argumentof HA VE.

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This turnsthequestioninto thefollowing one: Why is only containbuilt around HA VE? The answerseemsto be that only contain incorporatesa common placefunction that entailsthe notionof " at leastas largeas'' as part of its definition: the place-function ' in ' . Generally, a place neednot be as large as the theme situatedat it. Either anelephantor a mousecan beat a phonebooth, against a phonebooth, on a phonebooth, neara phonebooth, undera (suspended ) phone booth, and soon. The notion" at leastas largeas,'' if it is to be expressedat all in connectionwith one of thesespatial relations, must be specifiedby other means, specifically, by coindexingthe larger argumentwith the stative-agent role in a container-orientedlocativeverbsuchascover, fill , surround, block, and so on, where it can be interpretedas being responsiblefor a holistic state predicatedof theother(smaller) argument,spelledout in a mannerspecificto the verb. The oneexceptionamongthecommonplace-functionsis ' in ' : the mouse, but not theelephant,canstandin thephonebooth, becauseit is part of the very notionof anobject' s beingin theinteriorof acontainerthatthecontainerbelarge enoughfor theobjectto fit inside. Thustheunadornedandunelaborated meaning of the place-function oint- but not of any of the other common place-functions " '' - assignsone of its argumentsthe role of being at leastas large as or " more " ' ' important. This allowsthesecondargumentof in to becoindexedwith thefirst argumentof HAVEt with nothingmoresaid, andallows it to bemapped onto the subjectpositionof a transitiveverb. However, that routeto subjecthood is not the one that allows it to passivize. since the ACT structurehas been . Anotherway of putting it is that for no commonspatial completelybypassed ' relation otherthan in ' is the locationargumentcompatiblewith the cognitive contentof thefirst argumentof HAVE , namelyan abstract" possessor ." Measureverbs. RecallthatJackendoffandGrubershowedthat the concepts underlying measureverbslike cost and weigh can involve a spatialschemain which measurements or amountsfunction aslocationson an abstractscale. It is not completely clear, then, why these verbs are transitive. The Thematic RelationsHypothesiswouldleadusto expectEnglishto mandate* Mosesweighs at 240 poundsand * Broccoli costsat $/ .75 a pound (which would havemade their nonpassivizabilityunsurprising ). For the presentpurposes, it suffices to notethatno ACT structureis mandatedfor anyreason.I will assumefor now that thereis a conflationaryrule in Englishthat allows measureverbsto associatean openargumentslot (squarebrackets)directly with their AMOUNT constituents rather than with the PLACE constituentsthat serve as their argumentsin semanticstructure. Therepresentation in (5.70) showsa semanticstructurefor . weigh

245

Representation

: (5.70) weigh BE

.........-

STATE I ..~- - THING ()

PLACE / " at AMOUNT () , PROPERTY "weight "

The role of the openargumentof measureverbswouldthusbeformally similar to that of the verb enter in theanalysisof Jackendoff( 1983, 1987a ), which has an openargumentassociateddirectly with a THING, not with thePLACE that the THING helpsdefine, andthatopenargumentwould haveto bematchedby the linking rule mentionedin connectionwith (5.8), which links argumentsof place- and path-functions with the object role. This predictsenter should not passivizewhen it is usedpurely spatially, with no componentof voluntary locomotion. As discussedin section4.4.4, this seemsto bethecase: * Theroom wasenteredby a balloon. Otherhighly specializedtransitivepredicativeverbs " " probably submit to a similar analysis, suchas* Cat is spelledby CAT . Symmetricalverbs. Supposedlysymmetricalverbsseemto subdivideinto two classes. Reciprocalverbs, suchasmarry andmeet(whichpassivizesonly in the senseof " wait for at an airport" ), can appearwith plural intransitivesubjects (John and Marsha met; John and Marsha married) , and probablycall for a special kind of compoundstructure, also usedfor sentenceswith reciprocal assigned anaphorssuchaseachother, in whicheachargumentis simultaneously two roles. I will not explorethemechanicsof this representation , but it is clear that whateverits form, it will beformally distinctfrom thatassignedto ordinary agent-patientverbs. Verbslike resemble,equal, andlast areprobablynot symmetrical at all , certainly not psychologically(Tversky, 1977; thoughseealso LandauandGleitman, 1985) andperhapsnot linguisticallyeitherin the senseof . Rather, they probablyinvolve BE-THING calling for reciprocalstructures PLACE structures, like those of the measureverbs, in an identificational semanticfield , with openargumentsassociatedwith the THING within an ' at . (Last T HI NG ' place, for equal, or within a ' nearT HING ' place, for resemble probably calls for a stativeGO THING PATH.) In all casesthe surfaceobject role is not assignedby the linking role for patientsof ACT, becausethereis no ACT , and thuspassivizationdoesnot apply.

5.7 Summary Some of the semantic analysesof verb classespresentedin this chapter may ~ave seemed complex and picayune, so it is important to summarize what I hope to

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haveaccomplished . I have presentedor describedexplicit representations for aboutfifty verbsubclass es, embracingmanyhundredsof verbs, usinga semantic vocabularythat was independentlymotivatedby syntacticand morphological criteria and fairly constrainedgiven the job that was demandedof it. The vocabularybasically included six kinds of conceptualconstituents(EVENT, STATE, THING, PLACE, PATH/ CONFIGURATION, MANNER), two binary featuresdefining predicatesfor kinds of events/states(the and features that define GO, BE, ACT , HAVE), six binary forcedynamicfeaturesdefiningcausalsubordinatingrelations(focus, potency, causeoccurrence , effect-occurrence,purposive,anddeontic), temporalentities(points andregions), abouta half-dozenplace-functions(at, in, on, around, over, under, near) and path-functions (to, from, toward, away-from), a dozenor so object properties(human, 20 , flexible , semisolid, andsoon) plusacoupleof devices' for to' and' such'- for / creatingpropertiesfrom states. By defining a varietyof semanticfields, this machinerycould be applied to widely different domains. Virtually everyelementof this semanticvocabularyenteredinto the definition of severalsubclass es, wasmotivatedby Talmy ' s cross-cultural survey, andwas shownto be be grammaticizedinto closed-classmorphemesor light verbsin . And of courseevery onehascognitivecontentthat Englishor other languages an essential role in plays delineatingthesituationsthattheindividualverbscould be appliedin andthat supportinferencesbasedon the verb' s meaning; noneof the elementswas a formal diacritic snuck in to make an ad hoc syntactic distinction. Furthermore,in mostcasesit waspossibleto motivateonerepresentation for a verb or subclassin preferenceto a numberof logically equivalent alternatives(e.g., " BE at" versus " HAVE " ) using semanticand syntactic judgmentsas data. I think that the systemcould be extendedto other lexical domainswith relativelyfew increasesin thenumberof representational devices. Needlessto say, the systemhas many indeterminacies , arbitrary decisions, andareasof vagueness , andI do not claim that it is anythinglike a formal theory. But working out a semanticsystemin somedetail andapplyingit to a varietyof syntacticconstructionswasnecessaryin pursuit of two goals. First, it showsthe viability of thehypothesisthat a restricted,grammaticallyrelevantsubsystemof conceptualrepresentationis sufficient to delineatethe boundariesof productivity for thekindsof argumentstructurealternationsthatproduceBaker' sparadox. In particular, themodicumof successattainedshoulddefuseanypessimismthat no suchsystemcouldeverbe constrainedor motivatedby evidence. Second,the representations presentedin this chapterhavebroughtus to the point wherewe can discusslearningmechanismsfor verbs and lexical rules with a degreeof precisionthan wasnot possiblebefore. That is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 6 Learning

If the account I have presented is true, one aspectof the learnability problem for ' verbs argument structures has been solved. Speakers in possession of correct verb definitions , narrow - range lexical rules , and linking rules can generalize beyond the argument structures they have heard in the input and productively " " extend verbs to new argument structures- learning them, in a sense. For speakersat this point in development , there is no longer any paradox . However , there is an aspectof the problem that has not been solved: how do children get to the point at which they possessthe right structures for verbs and rules? That is, how do children learn to do the right kind of learning ? Without an answer to this question, we do not know whether our resolution of the first paradox has created a secondone. There are several kinds of structures the child must possess: linking rules , conflation class definitions (broad and narrow ), broad- range lexical rules , ' narrow -range lexical rules , and verbs semantic structures. Of these, the two crucial ones are the lexicosemantic structures and narrow -range lexical rules. If the theory is correct , the subtleties of which verbs are permit ted to take which ' argument structures in a given language, giving rise to Baker s paradox , are lo calized in these structures, so it is especially important that plausible learning accounts be provided for them. In learning these structures, the child can arrange them into the hierarchy shown in (6.1) so that acquisition of one structure constrains the acquisition of the ones above and below it . ( 6.1) Linking rules Broad-range conflation classes and rules Narrow -range conflation classes and rules Semantic structures for individual verbs Conceptual structures for particular kinds of events and states

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Narrow conflation classes, for example, are generalizations of infonnation from individual verbs. A narrow -range rule maps one narrow conflation class onto another, and each such rule is a specific casesof a broad -range rule . Broad -range rules can be seen as generalizations of sets of narrow - range rules ( or of sets of alternating lexical entries) and also can be motivated by running linking rules backward from input sentences. Within this hierarchy of mutually constraining structures, the top and bottom levels have an obvious special status in that they can get the learning started. Linking rules, I will suggest, are essentially innate and don ' t have to be learned at all . Conceptual structures are fonned by the perception of the situations in which verbs are used, providing a set of constraints outside of the linguistic system altogether. Once we understand how these two kinds of structures are established, we can see how they might be used to guide the learning of the remaining structures, including the crucial narrow -range lexical rules. 6.1

Linking Rules

, as mentioned Linking rules probablypresentus with the easiestcase, because in chapter3, they seemto be near-universal in their essentialaspectsand thereforemay not be learnedat all. This is not an attempt to sweepdifficult problemsunderthe rug. Linking rulescanbe universalandinnatein thecurrent theory largely becausewhat they do is very simple and circumscribed. Their simplicity is the result of the claim of the theory (indeed, of much of current linguistictheory) thatwhatappearto becomplexrulescanoften befactoredinto interactionsamonga setof fairly simpleprinciplesin combinationwith complex lexicalentries(e.g., Chomsky, 1981). A linking rule links syntaxandsemantics . At thesyntacticend, theactualspellingout of grammaticalfunctionsor argument types into surface syntactic devices is accomplishedby lexical entries for prepositionsandmorphologicalcasemarkers,andrulesor principlespertaining to phrasestructure, government . That is, symbols like , and caseassignment " SUBJECT" and " external " are to information insidethese argument pointers othermodulesof grammar.At thesemanticendof the link , mostof the variation amongentriesas to how they map thematicroles onto syntacticargumentsis localizedin differencesin theirsemanticstructures.For example, the variantsin the locativealternationemploy the samelinking rule for surfaceobjects, but differ in terms of which entity is representedas the patient and theme. The simplicity and generalityof linking rules, of course, place a corresponding burdenon the learningtheoryfor phrasestructureand inflection (seePinker, 1984, for explicit proposalsas to how theseare learned) and on the learning

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theory for semanticstructures(discussedin this chapter). But given how this tradeoff offers an elegantway out of Baker' s paradox, I think it is the correct tradeoff. 6.1.1 Problems with Using Innate Linking Rules Thereare two problemsthat I mustaddress , however. First, sincelinking rules are not a bedrockupon which future learningcan proceedbut aconsistencyenforcing link betweentwo kinds of structureseachof which mustbe learned, there is a possibility of vicious circles arising during acquisition. Second, if linking rules are not 100% universal, how do we explain the acquisitionof languagesthat violate them? 6.1.1.1 Can Linking RulesForm ViciousCircles in Acquisition? Linking rulesconstraintherelationbetweensyntaxandsemantics , sotheycouldbeused to acquirebits of syntaxgiven reliable infonnation aboutbits of semantics , or could be usedto acquirebits of semanticsgiven reliableinformationaboutbits of syntax. An exampleof using linking rulesand infonnationaboutsemantics to learnsyntaxcanbefound in Pinker( 1982, 1984), whereI proposeda learning theory for phrasestructuresand inflections in which the child identifies the subjectandobjectpositionsin his languageby assigningthemin sucha waythat thatthe the universallinking rules are renderedtrue. That is, the child assumes he for the of is its and so or she looks an action verb , agent phrasethat subject and a builds syntactic structure expresses the agent argument of the verb , of course, that the child appropriateto its beingthe subject. This presupposes has analyzedthe semanticstructureof the verb accuratelyas having an open agent argument. But what if we also needto use linking rules plus correct ? If variation amongargument assumptionsabout syntax to learn semantics structuresof near synonymouslexical entriesis capturedby differencesin their semanticstructures(e.g., in theformsrelatedby thelocativealternation,whether " the moving objector the location is assignedasthe " patient" and" theme ), the child might haveto know the morphosyntacticcuesfor grammaticalfunctions . in the input in orderto assignthe verb entriestheir correctsemanticstructures For example, thechild might haveto learnthatthelocationargumentof loadthe wagonwith hay is the themeandpatientby virtue of the fact that it is a surface escould object (a processI discussin more detail below). This pair of process form a circle: phrasestructureandinflectionsare acquiredby applyinglinking rules from lexical entries, but somelexical entriesaresupposedto be acquired by applying linking rules backward from independentlyidentified phrase structuresor inflections. The worry is not thatthechild wouldbeperpetuallylost in thoughtbecauseof this circularity, but thatheor shemight build incorrectbut

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. mutuallycompatiblestructuresin the syntacticandlexicosemanticcomponents A stablebut incorrectconfigurationlike that is not hannless; it could ruin the complex chainsof inferencethat lead the child to countlesssubtledetails of grammarthatwe hopeto explain(seeGrimshaw, 1981, andPinker, 1984, 1987, for discussion). , but I do notplan Manydifficult issuesareinvolvedin theseinterdependencies to discussthem here (see Bowennan, 1987a; Elliott and Wexier, in press; Grimshaw, 1981; Landau and Gleitrnan, 1985; Lasnik, in press; Maratsos, 1988b; Morgan, 1986; Pinker, 1982, 1984, 1987). Rather, Ijust wantto showthat thereneedbe no viciouscircularity in the useof thesecomplementarylearning mechanisms . If I canmakethis basicpoint, wecanconcentrateon theproblems that aredirectly involved in the acquisition of argumentstructuresandthe full resolutionof Baker' s paradox. Logically, thecircle canbebrokenin two ways. Let us first considerthecase wherethelinking rulesarevalid for at leastpartof the language. Thechild could ' begin his learning in a stateat which the (;ircularity does no harm. Let s say parentsof very young children restrict themselvesto using verbsthat can be handledcorrectlyby universallinking rules andlexical semanticstructuresthat arereplicasof the child' s cognitive representationof the underlyingevent. For example, the adult would use, amongother things, a transitiveactionverb that - asinvolving thechild construes - correctly , asfar asthelanguageis concerned an agentanda patient, andtheverb mapsthemonto subjectanddirectobject, in accordwith universallinking rules. Then the child can with impunity assigna syntacticstructureto the sentencein which the agentis the subject. (A similar situationarisesif parentsusemoreproblematicconstructions, but the child can filter them out by virtue of specialintonation, a preponderanceof unfamiliar , special discoursecontexts, or other nonsyntacticcues.) If the morphemes resultingphrasestructuresareconsolidatedinto the grammarin phrasestructure rules or parametersettings, then later in development, subsequentencounters with new verbs with noncanonicalsemanticscan be handledby restructuring them so asto be consistentwith the phrasestructureassignmentslearnedin the first phase. SeePinker ( 1982, 1984) for an extensivediscussionof how this would work, and Hochbergand Pinker ( 1989) for a defenseof someof its . empirical assumptions The secondwayto breakthecircle, requiringlessstringentassumptions about 's in is to the or the child filters have the child , sequencing input nonsyntactic combinea varietyof sourcesof partially predictiveevidencein decidinghow to structurephrases,of which the satisfactionof universallinking rules would be one. This requiresthat the child give someweight to a variety of propertiesof, . For example, subjects say, subjectphrasesthatarecorrelatedacrosslanguages

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tendto precedeobjectsin linearorder, tendto occurhighin phrasestructuretrees, tend to have their featuresencodedinto agreementmarkerson verbs, are coreferential with understoodargumentsin embeddedand conjoinedclauses, . Thougheachof thesecuesis and may havecharacteristicprosodiccorrelates unreliablein isolation, especiallyin early stagesof acquisitionwhenthey may be imperfectly analyzed, theymay act in a conspiracythat correctlypoints the child to the subject configuration in input sentences , even in sentencesrequiring unorthodoxverb semanticstructuresor evennonuniversalversionsof rules (discussedin moredetail in the next section). SeePinker( 1987) linking asto how it might be implemented for a discussionof this possibilityandsuggestions as a constraint-satisfactionproblem in a symbol-passingnetworklike architecture. Regardlessof which of theseproposalsis correctin which form, all I needto assumeis thatsomemechanismthat reliably identifiesgrammaticalfunctionsis in place beforethe learningof non-cognitively-given verb semanticstructures begins. This digressionwasincludedsimply to makethatassumptionplausible in the face of the worry that learningmechanismsfor syntaxand inflectional morphologyinteractedperniciouslywith the learningmechanismfor argument structurethat I outline here. 6.1.1.2 Syntactic Ergativity Another problemariseswhen we note that linking rulesthemselvesarenotcompletelyuniversal.Themostblatantcounterexampleis thephenomenonof syntacticergativity(Comrie, 1978; Dixon, 1972; Marantz, 1984; Pye, in press), wherepatients,notagents,arelinkedto thesubject role, and transitive agents, not patients, are linked to the object role. These ' , accordingto languagesare rare (not morethan 5% of the world s languages Haider, 1987; seealsoComrie, 1978; Marantz, 1984), buttheydoexist, andthere may be variation in other linking rules aswell. A child could identify casesof syntacticergativity or othervariationsin linking rulesif hecould independently acquirephrasestructureandmorphology, on theonehand, andlexicosemantic structures, on the other, which the precedingsubsectionsuggestsmight be possiblein enoughcasesto breakany viciouscircles. But if linking rulesarean unmarked universal, why do syntactically ergativelanguagesexist to begin with? ObviouslyI will not solvethis challengingproblemhere(asfar asI know there are no successfulproposals ; see Pinker, 1984, and Pye, in press, for discussion) but will offer someremarksthat maymakethe phenomenonsome thing other than a total mysterygiven the centralityof linking rules within the presentframework. arealsomorphologicallyergative: objectsof Syntacticallyergativelanguages transitive verbsand subjectsof intransitiveverbsget one morphologicalcase

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marker , the absolutive , and subjects of transitive verbs get another, the ergative . This is in contrast to morphologically accusative languages like English , in which the subjects of transitive and intransitive sentencesget one case marker , the nominative , and the objects of transitive sentencesget another, the accusative . For example, English uses the same nominative pronoun , he, in He ate apples and He ran and uses an accusative pronoun , him , in Mary saw him. If English were morphologically ergative , one would say He ate apples , Him ran , and Mary saw him. Many morphologically ergative languages are split , with ergative marking in some parts of the language ( persons, tenses, clause types) and accusative marking in others. While all syntactically ergative languagesare at least in part morphologically ergative , the converse is not true: many languages use ergative case marking but associate transitive agents with the syntactic properties of subjects and patients with those of objects , as English does. Intuitively , we can understand the phenomenon of morphological and syntactic ergativity by noticing a basic mapping problem faced by all languages: the four - way thematic distinction among actors , agents, patients, and themes must be reduced to a two - way case distinction between surface subjects and surface objects . In solving this problem , languages seem to be trying to satisfy two constraints on morphological case marking . First , they always give different case markers to transitive agents ( first argument of dyadic ACT ) and transitive patient /themes (second argument of dyadic ACT , and often coindexed with the first argument of a subordinated effect structure ) . Since these are the argument types that can simultaneously appear in a single clause and that a listener thus must be able to distinguish , the universality of this case distinction is not surprising . Second, languages usually insist that all intransitive subjects receive the same case marker , whether they are actors , as in unergative in transit ives, or themes, as in unaccusative in transit ives. ( See Comrie , 1978, for cross- linguistic evidence for these two generalizations .) However , languagesact as if they have weaker convictions about how to fit the intransitive subjects into the binary contrast used for transitive agents and patients . (They can afford to , becauseby definition intransitive subjects never have to be discriminated from either transitive subjects or transitive objects within a given clause.) Accusative casemarking systems are impressed by the similarity between intransitive actors ( sole argument of monadic ACT in unergatives ) and transitive agents, and so they use the same case marker for agents and all in transit ives, whereas ergative case-marking systems are impressed by the similarity between intransitive themes (first argument of GO or BE in unaccusatives) and transitive patient/ themes, and so they use the same case marker for patients and all in transit ives. This is one way of understanding the morphologicalergativeparameter .

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? Let' s saythatthechild is subject Whataboutthe syntacticergativeparameter to two blases:a biasto retainthe linking rule thatmapsthefirst argumentof ACT ontosubjects , anda biasto keepthecase-markingsystemmaximally consistent with the linking rules in tenns of how subjectsare distinguishedfrom nonsubjects . All childrenfacea conflict betweensemanticsandsyntax/morphologyfor intransitivesubjectsbecausethey are thematicallyheterogeneous , comprising is resolved showed how this conflict themesandactors. The previousparagraph : theyretaintheunmarkedlinking rulesand in syntacticallyaccusativelanguages bendthecasesystemfor intransitivesubjec .ts in oneor theotherdirection. toward the transitivesubject(for morphologicallyaccusativelanguages ) or the transitive . For ) syntacticallyergative object(for morphologicallyergativelanguages . it is thelinking rulesthatarebent. To keepthegrammaticalfunctions languages consistentwith the morphologicalcase-marking system, which distinguishes agentsfrom actors, agentscannotalsobelinkedto subjects.Soactorsandagents . Agentsarelinked to objects, while patients, morphologically aredistinguished identicalto intransitiveactorsandthemes,aremadeto mimic themby alsobeing linked to subjects.(The differencebetweenmorphologicallyand syntactically couldbesignaledto learnersat thesurfaceby thenonthematic ergativelanguages , such as controlling propertiesof subjectslisted in the precedingsubsection understoodargumentsin embeddedandconjoinedclauses.) In other words, the child learninga syntacticallyergativelanguagedoesnot throw out the unmarked linking rulesand adopt a completely incompatiblesystem. The linking rules mappingintransitiveactorsandthemesto surfacesubjectsareretained; thelinking rules for the other two kinds of thematicroles, however, are bent to be consistentwith the ergativemorphology. Nothing hingeson the details of this rough sketchfor the vast majority of , whicharenot syntacticallyergative. It is simply oneway of showing languages that for the minority of languagesthat do not obey the putatively universal linking rules, thoserulesarepartially modifiedundertheinfluenceof anexternal factor, themorphologicalcasesystem, not utterly discarded.It would be helpful to thecurrenttheoryif somethinglike this wastrue. Linking rules arecentralto thetheory; it would be oddto haveto build a mechanisminto the child that gave him or her theoption of jettisoning themat the outset.

6.2 LexicalSemanticStructures 6.2.1 Event-Category Labeling The simplestpossibleassumptionabout how verbsarelearnedis that verbmeaningscorrespondto conceptsgiven by the child' s perceptualandcognitivemechanisms , andthatto acquirethem, thechild in the a sound uttered has to presenceof an exemplarof a concept simply map

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onto thementalrepresentation of thatconcept. For someverbs. this is p,robably correct. Children mustcarvethe flux of uniquesituationsinto recurringevent to expectthat amongthemareonesthat canbe types. andit is not unreasonable definedby chunksof semanticstructurecorrespondingto thedefinitionsof some commonverbs. Possessing an object. hitting an object. moving. acting on an it to move . actingon an object causingit to go into someones objectcausing of conceptualelementsthat the . andsoon. aresurelyconcatenations possession child naturallyforms in interactingwith the world andgeneralizingacrosssituations . And presumablyparentsuseverbslike have, hit , move, put andgive. or their equivalentsin otherlanguages . in talking to their children. I will assume that thechild canlink verbsto theseconceptualstructuresuponhearingtheverb usedin a situationexemplifyingthat structure. This is a commonproposalin . basedon the reasonableassumptionthat developmentalpsycholinguistics childrenthink aboutmanyeventsin roughly the sameway adultsdo. and in the nextchapterI discusssomeof theevidencefor it. Let mecall this processEventCategoryLabeling. 6.2.2 Semantic Structure HypothesisTesting Thereare, of course, severelimits on how muchof the verb lexiconthechild can learnby Event-CategoryLabeling. Different languagesconflatesetsof semantic elementsinto verb meaningsin different ways, anda single languageoften has wordsthatcross-classifyevents, suchaspour andfill in English. The ambiguity of what a verb meansin a single situation, however, is eliminatedby thebehaviorof theverbacrosssituations. Thougha giveninstance of filling a cup may beambiguousbetweenpouringandfilling ,pour but notfill will eventuallybe usedwhenwateris put in a glassup to the halfway mark, and fill but notpour will eventuallybe usedwhena glassis left on a windowsill in a rainstormlong enoughto makeit full . Thusfor a learnerwith the right kind of memoryacrosssituations, thereexists information in the nonlinguistic input relevantto distinguishingverb meanings . How could such learningwork? In the previous chapter I noted that the grammaticallyrelevantpartsof verb meaningsbeara closeresemblanceto the semanticfeaturestructureof closed-classmorphemes . Clearly, Event-Category Labelingwill not allow a child to learnthemeaningof -;ng or -en, andin Pinker ( 1982, 1984) I presenteda theoryof how suchmeaningsareacquired. The basic logic of that learning mechanismcan be extendedto the acquisitionof verb , asI suggestedin Pinker( 1984, p. 180). The mechanismis a version meanings of simplehypothesistesting. Considerthetargetin the learningof an inflection, namely, a list of features(e.g., [- singular] [+definite]). The featuresaredrawn from a finite universalsetof possiblegrammaticizablefeatures. Eachonehasa

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conceptual or perceptualcorrelate: the child can detennine, for example, whetherthe referentof a noun in a particularcontextis singularor plural, human or nonhuman. Whenattemptingto learnagiveninflection from its usein a given utterance,the child samplesa subsetof featureswith their currentlytrue values from the universal pool. If a previouslyhypothesizedfeaturevalue for that inflection is contradictedby the currentsituation, that featurevalue is pennafor thatmorpheme.Forexample,if the nentlystrickenfrom thelist of hypotheses child heardthemorphemeusedwith ahumanreferentin a sentence andsofalsely added[+human] to the morpheme's entry, that featurewould be expungedthe first time the inflection is usedin referenceto a nonhuman. As thechild continues to work on that morphemeover a large set of sentences , all incorrect hypotheseswill be discardedat somepoint or another, any correcthypothesis will be hypothesizedsooneror later (assumingevery featurein the universal finite sethasa nonzeroprobability of beinghypothesized ), andonly thecorrect ' oneswill survive in the limit . This mechanismcan easily be extendedto the acquisitionof verb meanings thatdo not correspondexactly to the child' s preexistingeventcategories . What we needto show is that the child is capableof entertainingasa hypothesisany possibleverb meaning, andthat heor sheis capableof eliminatinganyincorrect hypothesesas a resultof observinghow theverb is usedacrosssituations.Here we beginto reapthebenefitsof thesystemfor verbmeaningsoutlinedin chapter 5. First, the representationalschemeis constrained , asanysourceof hypotheses in a learning systemmust be. Placefunctionscan be encodedexplicitly, for ' , or therateof motion example, but the speakers mood, theambienttemperature cannotbe. Causalrelationsbetweenanactanda motioncanbecodedexplicitly, but the relation wherebyone event remindsthe speakerof anothercannotbe. Furthennore, if the tentativeconstraintsI proposedin chapter5 on the embedding of subordinatecausaleventsandproperty- definingoperatorsaretrue, then the semanticformalism defines a finite classof grammaticallydistinguishable . Thus the child neednot encodearbitrarily long causal verb representations chainsin a verb' s grammaticallyvisible semanticrepresentation ; in fact, he or sheneednot entertainmorethana singleeffectof a givenkind nor causalchains , sofor most longerthan threelinks. Of course, verbsareopen-classmorphemes of them parts of their semanticstructuresare not tightly constrainedand are drawn from an essentiallyunlimited pool, suchas " butterlike" in the verb to butter. But even thesebits of informationare allowed only as the valuesfor certainallowable slots, like MANNER or PROPERTY, introducedasdependents of other structuresthat play detenninaterolessuchasacts, themes,or locations (Clark and Clark, 1978)} As for eliminating the parts of hypothesized structuresthat are incorrect, one needonly note that the structuresall have

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conceptualcontent, and it is possible to test whether a specific structureis currently instantiatedin a concretecontext in which the verb is used. Let' s saythe child canmentallyrepresent, on oneoccasionor acrossvarious occasions,a varietyof thesemanticrelationstypically associatedwith theusage of a verb, usingstructuresof the fonn presentedin the precedingchapter. Most of thesestructureswill be irrelevant to the meaningof the particularverb, but somesubsetwill bethecorrectverbmeaning. Forexample, for thetransitiveverb fill , the child could encodea semanticstructurerepresentingthe presenceof an agent-patientrelation, themannerin which theagentcausesthe liquid to move, the fact that themoving thing is a liquid , the mannerin which the liquid moves, the shapeof the container, the end state of the container(full ), the goal of the are agent(e.g., to movethefull container), andsoon. Basically, thesehypotheses ' parts of the child s maximal possible conceptualrepresentationof a given instanceof aneventinvolving filling . If the child retainsthis representation over a numberof instancesin which transitivefill is used, addingstructuresto it ashe noticesvariousnewpotentiallygrammaticallyrelevantdetailsandpermanently erasingstructuresthat arecontradictedby the current situation(e.g., the shape of the container, the manner of causation of motion, the liquidity of the substance ), eventuallyanaccuraterepresentationwill survive. Let mecall these processesSemanticStructureHypothesisTesting. This process,thoughit is capable, given the right assumptions , of accounting for the acquisitionof verbmeaningin a brute-force way, is plausibleonly to the extent that the child can convergeon the correct configuration of semantic structuresreasonably quickly. The child must not spenddecadesrefuting silly hypothesesabouta verbmeaning(suchas thatseeselectsa semisolidobject, or that splashselectsa goal thing that is meantto betakenaway) while waiting for his mentaldiceto fall in sucha way asto causehim to posit thecorrectstructures. Thereareseveralsourcesof " practicalconstraints" on the child' s hypotheses .I call them " practical" constraintssince they act to reducethe sizeof configurations of semanticstructureand to increasethe likelihood of their beingcorrect, " constraintsdiscussedin as opposedto the " representational chapter5, which dictate the form andcontentof possible semanticstructures. First, theremay be helpful aspectsof the simpleevent-labelingprocessjust discussed . Surelychildrenassemblecombinationsof semantic-conceptualstructures not at randombut ratherin such a way asto define cohesivescenariosor typesof eventsover which cognitive generalizationscan be made. Although I havebeenemphasizingthat we cannotcount on children homingin on just the categoriesthat arelexically encodedin their targetlanguage, it is alsotrue that the various assembliesof elementsthat constitute their event categoriesare unlikely to be bizarrelyoff themark. Any degreeof overlap, of course, is useful

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asthechild' ssemantic in reducinglearningtime. Let mereferto thesetendencies . blases; I will discussthemat length in the chapteron development Second,discoursecontexts,especiallycontrastiveones, canoften narrow the options. For example,any situationin which an adult insiststhat a glassbe full by usingthe verbfill could give the child the ideathat the stateof being full is a componentof thedefinition offill . We know thatsuchfactorscanbe relevant in thelearningof adjectives.CareyandBartlett( 1978), for example, showedthat a casualcontrastiverequestto a child - " Give methechromiumone, not the red one"- inspiredmanychildrennotonly to retaintheword, but to know that it was acolorword in particular.Third, thereis animportantprinciplethatClark ( 1987) calls the Principleof Contrast: virtually no two wordshavethe samemeaning. Clarkshows, moreover,thatthereis goodevidencethatthechild adheresto such a principle in establishingthe meaningsof existing verbsand in coining new ones. The child thereforeshouldnot considera hypothesisfor a verb meaning that is identicalto the semanticstructureof someother verb. Since the basic structuresformedout of the simplecombinationsof semanticelementswill be usedupquickly by light verbssuchasbe, have, go, do. make,put . give, take, and get, the child will be forced to hypothesizeadditional semantic elements , means,objectproperties, and so on) for otherverbs. (manners 6.2.3 Syntactic Cueing of Semantic Structures ' Thereis anothersourceof constraintson the child s hypothesesthat cannot be exploitedin full at the very outsetof languageacquisition, unlike the processes discussedsofar, butcankick in oncesomegrammaticalstructureis in place. Because of thepossibilitiesfor circularity, though, it is importantto distinguishthe variouskinds of inferencesthat could be made, andevaluatethem separately. When a child hearsa verb usedin a sentence , the child is receiving direct ' evidenceaboutthe verb s argumentstructure. The clausewill contain overt phrasesin argumentpositionsin a sentence(i.e., in positionsother than those usedfor topics, appositives , and so on). If such , modifiers, complementizers 6.1 the child can record a see section can be ), recognized( phrasepositions syntacticargumentstructurefor the verb directly from the input. This is simply itemwiseconservativelearning, and it was the primary learningprocedurefor " argumentstructuresin the theory of Pinker ( 1984), where it was called L I : " Direct Learningfrom PositiveEvidence. However, it cannotbe adoptedintact in thecurrentversionof thetheory, becauseargumentstructuresareprojections . If an argumentstructureis picked up from the of verbs' semanticstructures ' and accurately, the verb s semanticstructuremust either already input directly be consistentwith it or be alteredto make it consistentvia the application of linking rules in a backwarddirection.

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It would becircularto sayin this sectionthatthechild learnedverb meanings from argumentstructureswhile in therestof thebookI havebeenclaiming that argumentstructuresareprojectedfrom verbmeanings , butthis circularity is only apparent.Strictly speaking,it arisesonly if thechild is usingsemanticstructures to deduceargumentstructuresandvice versaforthesameverb entry. Sincethe entire lexicon is not acquiredin one step, syntacticinformation can be usedin varying degreesof specificityat variousinterim stagesof the learningprocess. Using thepresenceof arguments.Themostbasicstrategyis for thechild to note which of the semanticargumentsof a predicatewerereflectedin the conservatively learnedargumentstructureand to define open argument slots in the semanticstructuresof therelevantpredicates . This would be necessaryto avoid such as the Theta Criterionor Bresnan's Coherence violating generalprinciples . GivenJackendoff's principleandwouldbesubjectto otherimportantconstraints ( 1983) Lexical Variable Principle(seesection5.5.2), the child will know that each of these open argumentsmust correspondto a complete conceptual constituentlike a THING or a PATH, not an arbitrarysubassemblyof semantic structure. Furthermore , thebasicarchitectureof the representational systemfor lexical semanticsandsyntaxassumedhereandin mostof linguistics rulesout a ' variety of logically possibleinfluencesof argumentson the rest of verbs semanticstructures ; someof thesewill be discussedin section8.2. Using linking rules and thegrammaticalfunctionsof arguments. More specifically , the child could apply universallinking rules in a backwarddirection. For example, a semanticallyindeterminateNP in objectposition of a transitive " " phrasewould suggestan open patient argumentslot (secondargumentof A Cf ) in the predicate's semanticstructure. Someform of this learningseems to be mandatedby my treatmentof verbsundergoingcertainalternations(e.g., the passiveandlocative), asit is doubtful thatthechild would inevitably assign the NP in objectpositionto a patientrole on thebasisof thecognitive contentof " " patient alone. Oncemade, this kind of assignmentis not merely notational, however. For one thing, interpretiveeffects(suchas directness) automatically , sinceA Cf -THING-THING structuresarethehostfor twoway apply. Furthermore ' MAN NERs, means', and ' effect' specificationsthat pertainto the dyadic interaction betweenthe agent and the argumenttreated as patient, which otherwisewould haveno structureto attachthemselvesto, the recognitionof a transitiveargumentstructurecouldtriggerthehypothesizingof candidatevalues for thesepotentialslots, especiallyif the verb would otherwisebe synonymous with anexistingverb. In addition, thechild wouldlist somespecificationof a semantic -agonistrelationcould be given cognitive field in which an antagonist content. For example, uponhearinga sentencesuchasShecoveredthebedwith a blanket, achild whorecognizedthatthebedwasin direct-objectpositionwould

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haveto createan open argumentslot for it in the entry for cover as a second argumentof ACT. If the child knew (through Event-CategoryLabeling or HypothesisTesting) that a statechangeof the bedwaspart of the structure, its ' ' placein semanticstructurewould haveto be asan embeddedeffect substructure of this ACT. Similarly , if the child had done a sufficiently complete syntacticanalysisto know thata blanketwasanobliqueobject, heor shewould haveto makeroom for it in the semanticstructure, in somepositionotherthan patientor theme. The conceptuallydriven procedurescould tell the child thata ' means' substructureis one possibleplace. Prepositionalphraseswhoseprepositions are semanticallytransparentbecauseof their usein othercontexts(e.g., the ball on the table) could inspire more specific substructuresin the form of . This would be places, paths, or other configurationsencodedby prepositions how verbswith semi idiosyncraticselectionsof prepositionswould receivethe right semanticstructures. Usingconflationclasses. All of this can takeplacecloseto the beginningof languagelearning, in principle. However, sincetheeffectsof linking rules in a givenlanguagearemediatedby theconflationsof semanticelementsfoundin its semanticstructures , it would bebetterif this reverselinking procedurewasdone in two steps. First, linking rulesareusedin the reversedirectionto helpacquire conflationclasses(a processI will describein somedetail in the next section). Second,theconflationclasses,onceacquired, areusedmoredirectly to drive the learningof semanticstructuresfor particularlexical entries. Recallthat conflation classesare incomplete semanticstructuresthat define a classof possible verb meaningsin a language. A child in possessionof a conflation classthat (throughlinking rules) definesan argumentstructurecorrespondingto the one thata currentverb is usedin could thenhypothesizestructuresthat areincluded in theconflationclassbut lacking in the currentverb. For example, a child with theEnglishconflationclassfor GO-THING -PATH-MANNER verbscouldhear a verbin a sentencelike The ball glippedinto theroomandguessthatthecurrent mannerof motionof the ball is encodedinto themeaningof glip . Althoughthere may be more than one conflation class that matchesthe syntactic argument structureof a given unknown verb (for example, ACT-THING -PATH-MAN NER for verbslike run and walk, GO-THING -PATH for move, GO-THINGPROPERTYfor turn, change, andshrink), semanticstructurehypothesistesting andconformityto the Principle of Contrastwill ruleout spuriousapplicationsof existingconflationclasses. Herewe arebeginningto flirt with circularity, becauseimposingconformity to conflationclasses , unlike running linking rulesbackwardor addingslotsfor argumentsin argumentphrasepositions, dependson prior learningwhich itself theacquisitionof correctsemanticstructures . This circularity-need presupposes

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not be vicious: the child could learn some verbs' semantic structuresvia HypothesisTesting or Event-CategoryLabeling, peel conflation classdefinitions off them, and usethoseclassesto guide the learningof the meaningsof futureverbssharingtheir argumentstructures.The potentialviciousnessis in the child' s hypothesizingan incorrectsemanticstructurefor a given verb, deriving a conflationclassfrom it , andusingtheconflation classto hypothesizeincorrect verbmeaningsfor a hostof syntacticallysimilar verbs, propagatingthedamage throughthe lexicon. For example, a Spanishchild who thought that entrar (to enter) meant" to float alongsomepath," becausehe first heardit in referenceto a balloonfloating into a room, could createthe incorrectconflation classGOTHING-PATH -MANNER andapply it to subir (to go up), bajar (to go down), andsoon, tackingon whatevermannerof motion wasfortuitously demonstrated by the themeon the occasionof its use. However, the presenceof the semantic structurehypothesis-testingmechanismto inactivateincorrectguessesimposes a strongbrake on the potential runawaycircularity , as the examplesuggests . " Surelyno child in his right mind would continue to think that bajar meant to " skip after hearingit usedin connectionwith a variety of events, all of them involving somethinggoing down, andmost of them not involving skipping! Hypothesistestingmust, for this reason,be the final arbiter in the acquisition of verb meaning; an inspectorthat would prune out any branch of a semantic structurethat did not stand up to a confrontation with the conceptualworld. Syntax-guided learning, especiallyas it exploits conflation classesor other learnedstructures, would playa different role: as a guide to the formation of likely hypothesisstructures, and as a strong influence on the form of these , preselectingsemanticstructuresthat arestructurallyconsistentwith hypotheses the syntax from amongthe variouscandidatesthat are roughly equivalentin conceptualcontent. Using sets of argumentstructuresas.fociated with a stem. An even more specificform of syntax-guidedlearningof verb meaninghasbeensuggestedby BarbaraLandauandLila Gleitman( 1985). They point out that the acquisitionof verb meaningsis surprisinglyrobust. Their congenitally blind subjectlearned themeaningsof nonphysicalverbslike seeandlook with surprisingease,despite manyareasof possibleindeterminacyin (what I call ) Event-CategoryLabeling and Hypothesis-Testing. They also note that sighted children' s accessto evidence aboutword meaningis different in degreebut not in kind. Thereforethey suggestthat children rely on a particularlyrich form of syntacticcueingof verb " meaning. This kind of inference, which they later call Syntactic Bootstrap" hasthechild ping, examininganentiresetof verb entriessharingthesamestem, and usingthem to narrowdown the meaningcomponentsthat are sharedby all of them. They write (pp. 138- 139):

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Inessence ourpositionwill bethatthesetof syntactic fonnatsfor averbprovides crucial cuesto theverbmeanings because these fonnats are abstract surface rei exes of the just . ... thereis verylittle information in anysinglesyntacticformatthatis attested meanings for someverb, for that formatservesmanydistinctuses . However... the set of framesassociated withaverbishighlyinformative aboutthemeaning subcategorization it conveys . In fact, sincethesurface formsarethecarriersof criticalsemantic information ofverbsispartlyindetenninant withoutthesubcategorization information , theconstrual . Hence for verbmeaningmustrecruit , in theend, a successful learningprocedure information frominspection of themanygrammatical fonnatsin whicheachverbparticipates . They give an exampleof how a child might learn the meaningof seeusing nothingbutlinguisticinput. Thestemsee, unliketouch, takessententialcomplements , suggestingthat it is a cognitive/ perceptualverb. It takesdirectional phrases(e.g., to seefrom the room), suggestingthat it hasan abstractmotion . But in comparisonwith look, it doesnot appearin the imperative, component that it is stative. Nor doesit appearin the pseudocleft * WhatJohn did showing wasseeBill or with purposiveto adjuncts, which showsthat it is nonagentive . Taken together, theseinferencesstrongly constrainwhat the verb see could mean. This is an interestinghypothesis . Within the presentframework, it would ' s useof lexical rulesand to the child correspond linking rules not only in their linguistic functions of predicting the existenceor form of verb argument structures , or as simplecuesin semanticlearninghelping to mold, prune, and selectfrom amongconceptuallydriven semanticstructuresfor a given verb entry. Rather, lexical rulesandlinking ruleswould be usedwith setsof related verbentriesasa major sourceof semanticstructures. Syntacticbootstrap ping doesnot necessarilyform a circle with the use of lexical rules and linking rules in grammaticalproductivity. Lexical rules are usedproductivelyto createnew, nonwitnessedargumentstructuresfor a verb. Syntactic bootstrap ping is used exactly when grammatical productivity is : whenthe child hasalreadyhearda verb form in all of the basic unnecessary argumentstructuresthat the languageallows it to appearin. ThoughLandauandGleitmanandI agreethat the learningof verbmeanings usesboth syntacticandcontextualinformation, we differ somewhatin perspective , asthey stronglyemphasizethe role of syntacticcues, and I will arguethat its role is highly circumscribedandthat it works in a somewhatdifferent way from the way they describeit. I will give reasonsto doubt that it can playa foundationalrole in the acquisitionof verb meanings, as their label " Syntactic " ; rather, it is parasiticon the prior acquisitionof Bootstrapping would suggest verbmeaningby thekindsof mechanismsI haveproposed.Second,I will show

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that the mechanismdoesnot really involve the useof a linguistic mappingrun backward, but rather a fonn of nonlinguisticcognitive inference. Thus it uses someof the samecognitivefacultiesasEvent-CategoryLabelingandSemantic StructureHypothesisTesting, and cannotbe assumedto be more reliable by virtue of exploiting fonnallinguistic rules. Landauand Gleitmanassumethat their mechanismexploits grammatically reliable syntax-semanticscorrelationsof the sort that I have beendiscussing throughoutthis book, runningthembackwardto go from argumentstructureto lexical semantics:" muchof the [semantic] infonnationcanbereadoff from the subcategorizationframesthemselvesby a generalschemefor interpretingthese " semantically (p. 142). The kind of verb meaningthey are interestedin is the commoncomponentof meaningsharedby a given morphologicalstemacross all of its related argumentstructures ; they explicitly note that a single verb argumentstructuredoesnotprovideenoughinfonnationto identify themeaning of that verb. (That is becausethereis an enonnousreductionof informationin ' going from a verb s semanticstructureto the argumentstructureit shareswith - any infonnationthatdifferentiatesthe verb relatedverbsin the samesubclass from semanticallyrelatedonesis lost- andanevenfurtherreductionwhenone goes to the syntacticargumentstructuretype in and of itself, becauseseveral different subclass es canbe mappedonto the sameargumentstructure.) However - inferring meaningfrom argument , strictly speaking, thesetwo assumptions structuresthroughreverselinking, andsimultaneouslyexamininganentire set of argumentstructuressharinga stem- aremutually incompatible. A centralfinding of theresearchI presentedin chapters3 and4 is that when a giveu stem is used in two argumentstructures , we are seeingtwo distinct semanticstructures(as, for example, the locativealternationmakesespecially clear). Certainsemanticcomponents will besharedacrossthetwo versionsof the verb, and some will differ. Crucially, the componentsof meaningthat are reliably predictablefrom a givenargumentstructurearethecomponentsthatare not sharedacrossthedifferentformsof a givenverb, but theonesthatareshared by manydifferent verbsappearingin that argumentstructure. For example, the appearanceof an into phrasein Theball floated into the cavemustnot be used asevidencethatfloat hassomethingto do with movinginto or evenwith moving; a ball canfloat without movinganywhere. Theform offloat thatco-occurswith into indeeddoesimply movementinto (just asit impliesthatfor roll into, bounce into, andsoon), but that is predictablefrom themeaningof into itself; it doesnot tell the child what the stemfloat itself meansacrossits different argument structures.This is why LandauandGleitmaneschewinferencesbasedon single argumentstructures. But the problemof runninglinking regularitiesbackward

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to derivesemanticstructuresdoesnot disappearasoneexaminesmoreandmore ; it only gets worse. Each additional argumentstructure argumentstructures adds its own characteristicsemanticcomponentthat is not necessarily simply sharedby that verb in any of its other argumentstructures. For example, She sewedmea shirt reliably indicatesan intendedtransferof possession ; Shesewed a shirt out of theremnantssuggeststhat an act of creationhastakenplace; She seweda pocketonto the shirt suggestsan accomplishmentof attachment ; She see sewed shows mere indicates mere She sewedtheshirt activity ( B. affecting; Levin, 1985). Thoughin eachcasewe learnsomethingaboutthe meaningthat a verbassumesin a particularargumentstructure, we learnnothingdirectlyfrom the languageaboutwhat it is that all of thesestructuressharethat makesthem all examplesof sewing. In general, the moreargumentstructuresfor a given verb one simultaneouslyexamines, the fewer grammaticallypredictablemeaning componentsaregoingto remainacrosstheset. Rather, in thelimit oneis left with exactly the componentof meaningthat is not at all predictablefrom argument structureinformation- the nuggetof idiosyncraticmeaningthat is associated with a sound in the brute-force, arbitrary listing in the lexicon that every meaningfulmorphememust submit to somewhereor other. Nonetheless , thereis usableinfonnation in the set, of two kinds. First, the kernelof meaningarbitrarily associatedwith a morphemeacrossall its argument structureshassomecognitivecontent, and thatcontentis inferentiallyrelatedto the different meaningcomponentsof the argumentstructuresthat the verb appearsin. Thusthe child could do a kind of cognitive problemsolving, using as premisesthe different semanticcomponentsthat are reliably predictedby working backwardfrom the different argumentstructuresa verb appearsin. " Imaginesolving the following riddle: What activity performedon an object, potentiallyattachingit to something, can result in the creationof a new object, " possiblyfor thepurposeof giving it to somebeneficiary? (Answer: sewing.) Or: " What state , involving a kind of nonagentive, inalienablemotionin a direction, of someproposition?" (Answer: seeing.) It would canresultin theapprehension certainly be fascinatingif children engagein this kind of riddle-solving, and I haveno particularreasonto believethat theydo or don' t. (Note, though, thatthis procedurewould be useful only for verbs that appearin a varietyof argument structures,henceprovidemanyclues in the riddle; for verbslike die or devour, which basicallyappearin a single structure, it is hard to seehow significant semanticdeductionscould be madefrom syntacticpremises.) But the crucial point is thatit is avarietyof cognitiveproblemsolving; it cannotbeaccomplished by using existing linguistic contingenciesand directly following the arrows backward.

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Thereis another, more specifically linguistic kind of information that is that the child could use as well. I have beenemphasizingthe fact that the truly productive, narrow-rangelexical rulesarehighly constrainedby complexesof semanticinformationdefiningnarrowclassesof verbs. For example, in English, motion verbsthat alternatebetweenintransitiveandcausativetransitiveforms cannotspecifya constantdirection but may specifya mannerof motion; verbs of communicationappearingin both versionsof the dative alternationcannot pertainto a mannerof speakingbut canpertainto the kind of illocutionary force of the message . Once thesenarrow-rangerules have been mastered, the child couldusethemin a backwarddirectionto predicttherange-delineatingmeaning componentsfor verbs that have beenwitnessedin the two relevantargument structures.(For reasonsdiscussedabove, though, this processcannotin general be carried backward through successivepairs of argument structures: sew dativizesbecauseit signifiescreationin thetransitiveform that feedsthenarrowrangedativerule, but it is only thattransitiveform thatinvolves creation, notsew in general.) However, as Landau and Gleitman point out, these kinds of conflationsof semanticinformationarehighly specific to a given classof verbs in a given language(unlike linking rules and broad-range lexical rules, which applyacrossthelanguageandareversionsof universalregularities). Masteryof that thesenarrow-rangerules to learnthesemeaningcomponentspresupposes thehighly detailedstructuresof theruleshavethemselvesbeencorrectlylearned. But it is impossibleto show how they were learnedwithout assumingthat the precisemeaningsof at least someof the verbs undergoing the narrow-range - whereelse would the languagealternationhavebeenlearnedindependently particular, somewhateccentricclassdefinitionsfor thenarrow-rangerulescome from? The precisemeaningsfor at leastsomeof thoseverbs must have been acquiredwithouttheuseof thenarrow-rangerules(or elsewe would becourting a truly viciouscircularity). Thus syntacticinformation of this sort cannotbe a " " major evidentiary source for the discovery of verb meaning (p. 136) or " " somethingthat is requiredfor verb learning (p. 154), becauseit presupposes that preciseverb meaningscan be acquiredby a completely different mechanism . It is thatother mechanismthat is required. Neither of these reservationsis meant to eliminate a role for semantic inferencesbasedon setsof independentlylearnedargumentstructures, which LandauandGleitman( 1985) defendin a rich andinsightful discussion(in which theyalsopoint out the needfor learningbasedon situationalinformation). I am only suggestingthat if their mechanismis used at all , it is usedeither as a sophisticatedform of cognitive problemsolving ratherthan a generalinterpretive linguistic scheme, or that it is usedas an adjunct to some other learning . mechanismfor verb meaningthat it must presuppose

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6.3 Broad Conftation Classes(Thematic Cores) and Broad-Range LexicalRules A thematiccoreis a semanticstructurethat is part of the meaningsof an entire setof semanticallyrelatedwords(a broadconflationclass) thataremappedonto a givenargumentstructureby a givensetof linking rules. A broad-rangelexical ruledefinesapossiblewayof sharingamorphemebetweentwo of thesethematic coreswhoseopenargumentscanbeputinto aroughconceptualcorrespondence ; formally it consistsof a setof semanticoperationsmappingan input thematic coreontoanoutputthematiccoreanda setof morphologicaloperationsmapping the stemof theinput onto the stemof the output(which would be null for most broad-rangerulesin English). From the learner's point of view, then, thematic coresand broad-range rules are constrainedfrom two directions. Since they involve a setof argumentsthat areexpressedin syntacticargumentstructures, they must be consistentwith linking rules or else one of the thematic cores involved in the rule would haveno way of expressingits argumentsin syntax. In fact, a broad-rangeclassor rule by definition is not clutteredby detailssuch ascomplexpathsor propertiesof things; its semanticstructureis composedof nothing but thosepiecesthat are immediatelylinked to the grammaticalfunctions in the argumentstructure. Second, they must be consistentwith the semanticstructuresof the setof wordstaking the relevantargumentstructure. Constrainingbroad conflationclassesusingsyntacticinformation. Imagine the following kind of procedurefor deriving a broad-range conflation class definition, say, for thedative. Thechild identifiesa syntacticargumentstructure andthenappliesanyapplicablelinking rulesbackwardfrom thelistedgrammatical functions. For the prepositionalform, this would give the child an A Cf structurewith openagentand patientslots, and if the prepositionto had been identified (through its participation in a variety of structures), a ' to' path. structurespresentedin chapter5, Accordingto theformalismfor lexicosemantic GO structures so a structure would also be created; since such , pathsrequire semanticstructuresin the presentformulationare single-rootedandconnected graphs, it wouldhaveto beintegratedwith theACf structure.GO structurescan be embeddedin A Cf structuresbut not vice versa, given the availablemachinery , so theembeddingwould be effected, usingan underspecifiedcausallink. For the double-object structure, an analogoussequenceof operationswould be performed, resulting in a distinct skeletalthematic core for it. An A Cf . Accordingto the linking structurewouldbe createdfor thefirst two arguments rule for secondobjects, the secondobject must be the first argumentof an embeddedHAVE, linked to the secondargumentof the matrix ACT, andthat is

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the structurethe child will build. Let me call this procedureConflationClass Skeleton-Building ThroughReverseLinking.3 Multiple candidateskeletonswill usually have to be built, becauseseveral kindsof semanticstructurecanbelinkedto a givensetof grammaticalfunctions. Forexample, atransitivesurfacestructurecouldcorrespondto anACT, aHA VE, aGO (e.g., enter), or a BE (e.g., weigh). Furthermore , somepiecesof information thatare neededto flesheachskeletonout into a cohesiveandcompletesemantic structureare left unspecifiedat this stage. In the currentexampleinvolving the dative, this includes the semanticfield and the featureslabeling the causal subordinatinglink betweenthe ACT andthe embeddedGO. Completing broad conjlation classesby abstracting over lexical entries. Thesedegreesof freedomcannow beeliminatedby examiningthe wordsthat the languageactually contains. Imaginethat the argumentstructurefor the thematiccore beingbuilt indexesall thelexical entriesof verbsassociatedwith tokens of that argumentstructure. Information resolvingthe ambiguitiesleft , EVENT/ STATE constituent open by reverselinking- semanticfield specifications labels, GO/ BE/ ACT/ HAVE predicatelabelsin somecases, labelsfor subordinatinglinks or place- or path-functionswhenanindependentlyacquired prepositiondoesnot specify them, andenoughcoreferencinglinks to yield the right numberof openarguments- is examinedin theseentries. Any pieceof information of thissortleft unspecifiedin theskeletonthatis sharedby all theverbs in the lexicon that arebuilt aroundthatkind of skeletonis extractedfrom those verbsand addedto the skeleton. If eachof two incompatiblecandidateskeletons correspondsto a set of verbs, both are filled in and retained; if a candidate skeletonhasno verbscorrespondingto it , it is discarded. For theprepositionaldative thematiccore, an examinationof the prepositional-dativelexical entries would basically addthe informationthatthe GO structurewould be embedded via an .effect' link , anda coreferencelink joining thepatientof theACT andthe theme of the GO. Any other putativepiece of information in the candidate skeleton, suchas a semanticfield specificto locationor possession , would be canceledout, asnot all verbsbuilt aroundthe ACT-GO structurewould shareit (for example, give as in give the houseto Mary is possessional , not locational, whereaslower in lower the box to thefloor is locational, not possessional ). Information that might be fortuitously sharedby many of the entries in an immature lexicon but not necessaryfor fleshing out a complete semantic structure around the skeleton, such as, perhaps, all themesbeing inanimate, would not be placedin the thematiccore. Call this procedureConjlationClass Completion ThroughLexical Abstraction. Jill Gaulding ( 1988) andMarc Light ( 1988) havepointedout to methatthere arecomputationaladvantagesto examiningthe argumentsin a particularorder

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in applyingtheSkeletonBuildingprocedure , andin intertwiningtheapplication of SkeletonBuilding and Lexical Abstractionrather than running one completely andthenrunningtheother. Sincetherearedependencies amongtypesof structure, resolvinga local ambiguityin onepart of the structurecanprunethe possibilitiesfor whattherestof thestructurecould be. Thus if the lexicon was checkedeverytimethereis anindeterminacyin a nodelabel, thatcouldspareone from havingto build a varietyof possibleexpansionsof the structurethat would laterproveuseless . For example,checkingthelexical entrieswith prepositional dativeforms wouldshowthatthereis a GO eventembeddedasan ' effect' under the A Cf . Thatmeansthat the obliqueargumentcan be linked to a PATH; the possibility thatit might be a PLACE insteadneednot be kept alive. In fact, the useof top-downlinking informationandbottom-up lexical informationmay be soclosely intertwinedthatputtingthemin separatecomputationalalgorithmsis probably a convenientfiction; they are better viewed as providing sets of constraintsthat must be simultaneouslysatisfied. Why is ReverseLinking evenneeded,given the potential powerof Lexical Abstractionalone? If all we hadto accountfor was the acquisitionof a single languageby a singlegenerationof learners,theneedwould belessevident. Since broad-rangeclassesandlexicalrulesareform-predicting, not existence-predicting , rules, speakerscould get by on a day-to-day basiswith the narrow-range classdefinitions and rules. What ReverseLinking does is make it difficult to learn a languagein which the class of verbs possessinga given argument structureor undergoinga givenalternationis " too narrow" or " too broad." On the one hand, they militate againsta languagethat might possess , say, only a to anargumentstructure. The highly specific singlenarrowclasscorresponding bits of information associatedwith individual verbs would not be directly attachedto thepiecesof semanticskeletonthatthelinking rulesmentionandthat ReverseLinking couldestablish. Thereforea speakerforming classeswith the aid of ReverseLinking wouldberequiredto keepsuchclassesbroadandwould bedisposedto creating- andasweshallsee, easilylearning- verbsin a variety of narrow-rangeclassesall of which fall within the broad-rangeclass. On the otherhand, ReverseLinking alsomilitatesagainsta languagethat hasa totally setof verbswith agivenargumentstructureor undergoingagiven heterogeneous from alternatingpairsto anyverbwith alternation, licensingfreegeneralizations . That languagewould be ruled the samenumberandkind of surfacearguments out becauseno semanticstructurecould embraceall of the verbs. In sum, ReverseLinking is thelearning-theoreticinstantiation- in onesense , theexplanation - ofthe generalizationthatthe individual narrow-rangeclassesandrules of a languagethatshareanargumentstructurealsosharea thematiccoreandare definednot by arbitraryconditionsbut by conditionsmotivatedby thatthematic

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core. That is, languagesdo notcontain, presumablybecauselearnersdo not like to learn, an argumentstructurerestrictedto a singleidiosyncraticnarrow class of verbs, or an argumentstructurepaired with a totally heterogeneousand . arbitrary set of narrowclasses In theactualcourseof languageacquisition, ReverseLinking wouldbeuseful in helping the child avoid overly narrow or vacuouslybroadclasses , because ' temptationsto form suchclassessurelyarise. Setsof lexicalentriesin a learner s lexicon at any given time are liable to have a variety of accidentalincorrect substructures(suchas ' for/ to' and object properties) that areorthogonalto the possibilitiesfor extendingtheargumentstructurein thelanguageandshouldnot standin theway of futuregeneralizations of theseargumentstructures.Similarly , we shall seein the next sectionthat they help in establishingthe boundariesof the narrow-rangeclassesandrules. Furthermore , ReverseLinking is necessary " in whicha to helpthechild copewith " syntacticsyncretisms given.setof surface argumentsembracestwo largeclasseseachof whichis semanticallycohesivebut which havelittle or nothingin commonwith oneanother. The unergativeand unaccusativeintransitives in English, if the child cannotdistinguishthem by , arean example. The Lexical Abstractionprocedure purely syntacticanalyses hasno way of recognizingsucha major split to posittwo thematiccores, rather than positing a single degenerateone comprisingthe null intersectionof the . However, ReverseLinking would begin the spuriously collapsedsuperclass processby formulatingtwo candidatesfor thematiccores, becausetwo different sets of linking rules could be applied in reverseto an intransitive surface structure: " actor- > subject," and" theme- > subject." (In GB, thelatterlinking " we would haveto rule would be " theme- > direct internalargument assume ; that the child always soughtto undo the possibleeffectsof " move a " before applying linking rules backward.) The fact thattwo linking rulescould be run backwardfrom theargumentstructurewouldinspiredistinctcandidateskeletons , respectively.Any lexicon consistingof one-argumentACT andGO structures that containeddistinct unergativeand unaccusativeverbswould supply ample evidencethat both suchcoresshouldbe retained. Broad-range lexical rules. Formationof a lexical rule would be triggeredby the existenceof a setof independentlyacquiredverbssharingthe sameroot but with somethematic , eachof whichis associated differing in argumentstructures core. Entrieswith a given root don' t necessarilycomein pairsbut in sets(e.g., sew, sewthe shirt, the shirt wassewed,sewthepocketontothe shirt, sewhim a shirt, etc.). Presumablythechild doesnot coin all possible[n(n- l )]/ 2 pairwise rules but sortsthe set into thepairs that arelikely to relatedby individual rules. The membersof each pair would be matchedup becausetheir semantic structureswereminimally different, in thatonecouldbeturnedinto theotherby

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thefewestnumberof componentoperationson semanticstructure. Forexample, thecriterionof minimal semanticchangewouldjuxtapose, for example.sewwith sewa shirt asneedinga rule, and sewa shirt with sewhim a shirt, but not sew with sewhim a shirt. In addition, for rules involving morphologicalalterations, input and output fon11scould be paired up on the basisof their stemsbeing minimally different, in that one could be turnedinto the other with the fewest numberof possiblemorphologicaloperations. A broad-rangerule would becoinedin thefollowing way. Whenstemsdiffer, a morphologicaloperationderiving one stemfrom the other would be posited. (I will not considerthe mechanismthat accomplishes this, nor the one that recognizesthemorphologicalrelatednessbetweenthe setsof wordpairsto begin with. SeePinker, 1984, chap. 5, and PinkerandPrince, 1988, for discussion.) A set of operationscapableof deriving one thematic core from another (the addition, suppression , embedding, and reassigningcomponentoperationson semanticstructurediscussedin section 5.6) would be set up as the semantic operationof the rule. Let me call the procedureBroad-RangeLexical Rule Formation. It is analogousto the procedurein Pinker ( 1984) that coins lexical rules, L3 , but very different in its product and mechanism . becausethe old ' procedurecoinedoperationsalteringargumentstructuresdirectly, raisingBaker s paradoxandrequiringthe puzzling subprocedurethat appendedsemanticcriteria onto thecoinedrule. Thusthereis a sensein which the generalnatureof the Broad-RangeLexical RuleFon11ation procedureis the key insightin thecurrent ' theory regardingBaker s paradox. 6.4

Narrow Conftation Classes and Narrow - Range Lexical Rules

Narrowconflationclassesdefine very specifickinds of possiblewordsin alanguage , basedon a structuralanalogy to existing words. Narrow-rangelexical rulesmaponenarrowconflationclassontoanother,allowing a verbin thesecond to becreatedonthebasisof theexistenceof a verbin thefirst. Recallthatnarrowrangelexical rulesarethe only existence-predictingrules for nonaffixing alternations . Narrowconflationclassesby themselvescannotbeexistence-predicting because , they leavethe speakerwithout the meansto pronouncea word he hascreatedin sucha way thathis addressees could understandhim. Broad-range ruleslackinganaffix in factarenot existence-predicting, perhapsbecausethesemantic operationthey consist of is too broad to guaranteethat the resulting semanticstructurefor the new verb is conceptuallycoherentin an arbitrary context. As such, it is the narrow-rangerulesthat bearthe burdenof delineating the precise sets of linguistic judgments that give rise to Baker' s paradox.

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Recognizing that a set of narrow range rules must be created before productive generalizations can be made is straightforward ; the child need only determine that the broad-range semantic change is not correlated with the presence of an affixing operation. But acquiring the exact semantic operations of narrow range two me first consider rules is a surprisingly difficult leamability problem . Let approaches that do not work .

6.4.1 Why Lexical Abstraction Doesn' t Work It is easy to see that Lexical Abstraction- which is basically a version of traditionalcategoryfonnation, appliedto lexical semanticstructures- is logically incapableof creating the narrow conflation classesthat define narrow rangerules. Considerjust thesetwo problems. First. thedistinctionbetweena featurethatis specifiedin differentwaysacross the exemplarsof a subclass,anda featurethat is not specifiedat all acrossthe exemplarsof aclass, is crucial. UponhearingHe shoutedthatJohnleft " Shemurmured that shewasin love" Theyscreamedthat theyneededhelp; andsoon, the child shouldnot concludethat becausethereis no consistentmannerspecified, the definition of the classappearingwith sententialcomplementssaysnothing aboutmanner. Rather, the child shouldconcludethat eachof the verbs must specifysomemanner, any manner, so that he or shecould excludetell. That is, meaningcomponentsmust be parameterized(e.g., MANNER = X ), not discarded , in forming classdefinitions from verb definitions. Second,the child cannot simply look for the most inclusive definition that esall the verbssharingan argumentstructure. The reasonis that this encompass would at bestresult in a broad-rangeclass, which is too coarse, rather than a narrow-rangeclass. The simplestdefinition thatwould fit with all thedativizable verbs(e.g., thetell verbsandthe throw verbs) would haveto mention no more . But this thanthattheverbsinvolved causationof abstractchangeof possession would include the nondativizablescream-type and pull -type verbs as well , ' bringing backBaker s paradox. At the level of existencepredicting rules, the and of small child mustbe impelled to hypothesizea set moderatelycomplex classesratherthana single largeand simpleclass. 6.4.2 Clustering Algorithms and ClasswiseIndirect Negative Evidence: Would They Work ? Whatcould impel the child to hypothesizeanythingother than a simple, broad class? It is instructiveto considerpossibilitiesthat arecapableof working even on logical grounds. One possibility is that any overly broad class will falsely ' predictthatmanyverbsshouldappearin thechild s lexicon in (say) the double

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object fonn , verbs that in fact are not listed in the double -object fonn because they have never been heard in the double-object fonn in the input . That is, the " " problem with causea change of possession asa definition for dativizable verbs is that it falsely predicts that the double-object fonn for verbs like shout and pull should be lying around in the child ' s lexicon. The child could detect that a partition of his or her lexicon into finer -grained classes (distinguishing possession of ideas from possessionof objects, specified from unspecified manners, and ballistic from accompanied motion ) can account in an economical way not only for the verbs that are known to dativize but for the verbs that are not known to dativize . First , the nondativized verbs are excluded by a sufficiently narrow class. Second, they themselvescould be succinctly defined with a set of their own narrow , but not broad, subclasses. Such a procedure would , in effect , use a fonn of indirect negative evidence defined over possible narrow classesof verbs rather than over individual verbs. This infonnation would be noisy , of course, because many of the nonobservedentries are actually dativizable and were not witnessed in the double-object fonn simply becausethe parent did not get around to using them in the presenceof the child . The way this would work is that the learner would examine the set of verbs occurring in one of the argument structures of a broad-range rule , attempt a variety of partitions of this set using subclassdefinitions of a variety of sizes, and choose the size that maximally predicts the distribution between witnessed and non witnessed fonns , while not favoring such a fine class size that there were hundreds of subclasses each spanning one or two words and making productivity impossible. Thus the procedure would try to jointly maximize the simplicity of the class definitions and minimize the inclusion of nonwitnessed verbs. This might be done by having the procedure choose the partition scheme with the greatestproduct of some accuracy index and some simplicity index . In principle , such intennediate-sized classescould lead to conservatism , if the classes were gerrymandered so as to include all and only the witnessed alternating fonns , spuriously excluding the nonwitnessed alternating as well as the nonwitnessed nonalternating fonns . However , if there were specific enough constraints on possible class definitions ( such as those outlined in chapter 5 ), this could not happen. That is, the verbs that happennot to have been heard to alternate should be a haphazardsample of the real alternating class, and so there should not be any available hypothesescomposed of the notions of manner, path , causality , and so on , that would fortuitously rule them out exactly while ruling in the observed alternators. Despite the conjecture entertained in Pinker ( 1989) that this multiple partitioning schememight provide a discovery procedure for narrow conflation classes,

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I nowthink thatit is basicallyonthewrongtrack. Theproblemof howto partition in termsof featurevalues a setof objects,eachwitha description , intoa setof categoriesthat optimizessomecriterionor criteriais well knownin " Artificial Intelligence research , whereit is called" conceptual clustering(e.g., MichalskiandStepp, 1983;Bobick, 1987). An inherentproblemin clustering algorithmsisthatthenumberof possible partitionsof asetof objectsintoclasses growsexplosivelywith the sizeof the setandcanbecomecomputationally intractableevenwith fairly smallsets. Within AI, muchof the research in consists of of these various the sets of algorithms developing ways pruning classes . In theabsence of anyhintasto howthechildwouldfind the to evaluate right kinds of candidateclasspartitioningsto beginwith, clusteringcannot solutionto thelearningproblemhere.Perhaps seriouslybeofferedasapossible theproblemcouldbesolved,butonewouldnotwantto positacomplexadhoc pruningalgorithmjust for thistask, asit is notthekindof taskthatthechildhas of narrow-rangeclasses andrulesshouldbe anystrongneedfor. Theexistence theby-productof somedevicebuilt to meetotherdesiderata . Theydonotpose a majorecologicalproblemthatnaturehasevolvedcomplexspecialmachinery to solve. Furthermore thesubclass esthatthechildmust , themorecloselyoneexamines delineate the less it seems that , likely any statisticalcriterionwouldfavora correctpartitioningdrawnfroma largesetof possibleonesandevaluated over thepartiallexiconthatthechild wouldhaveacquiredat anygivenpoint. An inherentpropertyof clusteringbasedonclasswiseindirectnegative evidence is thatit requiresclasses of nonalternating verbsthatarelargeenoughtoconvince theprocedure thattheyreallydoreflectunderlyingsystematic rather exceptions thanaccidentally . Theproblemisthatsomeofthenonalternating nonwitnessed alternators esarefairlysmall.Forexample subclass , Englishdoesnothavemany intransitiveinherentlydirectedmotionverbs(e.g., come , go, rise, fal /), all of which are noncausativizable a largenumberof verbs , but it doespossess -of-motionverbs). Verbsof involving motionin general(includingmanner circulararrangement of ID flexibleobjects(wind, coil, etc.), whicharenonlocativizable motion , numberabouthalfa dozen,whileverbsthatinvolvecaused of anonrigidthingtogoalobjectwouldbeatleastthreetimesasnumerous . There area tiny handfulof verbsof choosing(nondativizable ), butdozensof verbs acts.Recallthatthesubclass definitionsthatthe involvingpotentialbenefactive childmustsatisfyhimselfwithhaveto beabletotolerateafairproportion of noshowsassumed to be temporarygapscorresponding to legitimatealternating verbs.Theresultisthatavarietyof overlybroadcandidate classdefinitions could be thatride roughshod overpocketsof nondativizable verbs, easily accepted 4 whichwouldmistakenlybetreatedastemporary gaps.

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6.4.3 Parameterization of IdiosyncraticLexicalInformation 6.4.3.1 Key Facts About Narrow Classesand Rules Therearea few key featuresof narrowclasses . as describedin the precedingchapter. that provide important cluesaboutthe natureof the processthat acquiresthem: 1. Classescan be definedby propertiesthat are obligatorily specified. though specifiedto a different value in eachof the memberverbs(e.g., somedirection or somemanner). 2. The classescanbevery. very specific, sometimesspecifyingindividualpathfunctions, place-functions. or object geometries. In fact, a classdefinition can specify almostasmuchinformationasany of its memberverbs; sometimesthe classdefinition is identicalto its verbdefinitions up to specificationof idiosyncratic manners(e.g., smearingversusstreaking) or object properties(e.g.. studs versusspots). 3. Classmembershipcanbe arbitrarily small. Onelocative subclass , asfar as I know, is exhaustedby theverbsload,pack, andstock. Wrapandstring mayeach be a one-word subclass ~ 4. The semanticpropertiessharedby all the membersof a subclassare the " " grammatically relevant ones, that is, the ones that are widespreadcrosslinguistically, thatmaybeexpressedin closed-classmorphemes.andsoon----for example, the existenceof a specificdirection of motion, or solid versusliquid, but not the existenceof a specific rate of motion, or squareversusround, or pertainingto medicine. 5. Classesare rarely if ever delineatedby differences in a single semantic . Rather, two classesthat differ in syntacticprivileges will usually substructure havesemanticstructuresthat differ from one anotherin severalways. The last point canbe illustratedby the throw class(dativizable). thepull class (nondativizable), and the bring/take class (dativizable), which are closestto being minimally contrastingamongthe classesI haveexamined. In fact, they differ from oneanotherin severalaspects:throw verbsdiffer from pull verbsin being achievementsrather than activities, and also in specifying that the act precedesthemotionin time; thepull verbsdiffer from bring/takein thatthelatter specify no manner. do specify a direction, and require the agentand themeto move together. Similarly, tell verbs(dativizable) differ from shoutverbs(non' dativizable) in lackinga mannerof speakingand in specifyinga ' for/ to property . of the communicatedmessage 6.4. 3.2 A Strong Hypothesis for Narrow -Range Rule Formation The simplestlearningprocedurefor narrow conflation classes, then, would be the following . Takeasemanticstructurefor a verb. Replaceeachidiosyncraticpiece

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of infonnation- any manner, any objectpropertynot in the distinguishedsetin . The resultingclassthenembracesall verbs with the (5. 13) - with a parameter identicalsemanticstructureup to the idiosyncratic, nonlinguisticinformation, which is free to vary acrossthemembersof the classaslong asit is specifiedin someway. This could be representedby a variableor parametersitting in the sameplaceasthequotedconstantin the semanticstructureof the original verb. Call this Narrow ConflationClassFormation by Parameterizationof Idiosyncratic Lexical Information. The effect of possessingsuch a classwould be to equip the speakerwith the knowledgethat an item sharingthe grammatically relevantinfonnationof an existing verb, but differing in a manneror idiosyncratic objectproperty, is a possibleverb in the language.The speakerwould be in astatewhereheor shecouldcoinjust sucha verb, or understandsucha coinage by others, while still beingawarethat suchverbsare new coinages. A narrow-rangerule would then be an operationthat takesan existing verb fonn in a narrow classand createsa complete morphologicaland semantic specificationfor a newfonn, perceivedasa full -bloodedexistingmemberof the . Uponnoticingthata pair of individual verbsaremorphologicallyand language semanticallyrelatedin a way capturedby a nonaffixing broad-range rule, the learnerwould createa rule whose semanticoperationsmappedthe narrow confIationclassspecificationfor oneonto the narrowconflationclassspecification of theother. In otherwords, the generalizationthatthe learnerwould make wouldbe: if verbX alternates , otherverbswith the samegrammaticallyrelevant semanticstructurealternate,too. The referenceto a broad-range rule ensuresthat completely isolated and accidentalalternationsexhibitedby a single verb arenot madeinto productive narrow-rangerules. For example, the alternationblamethe accidenton John / blameJohnfor theaccidentis uniqueto theverbblame(pintheaccidentonJohn / *pin Johnfor theaccident; * criticize the accidenton John / criticize Johnfor the accident). Likewise the verb rip off is unique among the possession deprivationverbsin alternatingbetweenloot- objectandvictim-objectforms (rip . * * off / steal/ seize/ * rob / * cheatmoney, rip off / steal/ seize/ rob / cheatJohn). Sincebroad rangerulesarefonned by abstractionover setsof verbsdisplaying the samealternation,a singlealternatingverb will not leadto the creation of a broad-rangerule, hencenot of a narrow-range rule either. This is simply an of the actual exampleof the insightthat narrow-rangerules arerepresentations existenceof a possibleregularity statedin a broad rangerule. Whether type frequencyof exemplification(that is, thenumberof distinct word pairsthat lead to thecreationof thesamenarrow-rangerule) shouldplaya role in determining the " strength" of the narrow-rangerule directly is an openquestion. Given the arbitrarysizeof thedomainsof narrow-rangerules, I suspectits role is relatively

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minor; perhapsthequalitativedistinctionbetweenbeingexemplifiedby onepair and being exemplifiedby morethanonepair is sufficient. 6.4.3. 3 Learning the Variable Rangesof Rulesby Focusingon the Changing Arguments Simply copying lexical semanticstructuresof alternating verbs, with substitutionof variablesfor idiosyncraticconstants , is in fact a bit too . It make narrow rule narrow would , basically a stringent every range equally near-replicaof a singlealternatingverbadmittingonly of minor variantsof that verb. The classesthat undergocausativizationand middle fonnation, for example , appearto bebroaderthantheclassesthatundergolocativization, andwe would not expectthat children would haveto learnthe possibility of This salt pours easily in a separateinductive leapfrom the one that allows This paint sprayseasily. Furthennore,thenarrowclassesrespected by thevariousrulescan cross-classify one another, as we saw in examiningtransitive action verbs in section4.2. Thesedifferencesareprobablyrelatedto thescopeof the semanticoperation involved in thedifferent rules. The semanticstructurecarriedover from a verb entry to the correspondingnarrow-rangerule is the structurethat is closely associatedwith the argumentsthat are alteredby the rule. Middle fonnation affectsagentandpatient/themearguments ; anyotherargumentsarecarriedover intactfrom onestructureto another. Causativization , too, affectsonly thetheme or actorargumentof the intransitivefonD. Locativization, however, assignsnew semanticrolesto the patient/themeandto thelocationarguments.In the lexical entries, the themeargumentis often restrictedto having certain geometricor materialproperties,andthe locationargumentis specifiedby specific path- and place-functions. Thereforelocativizationhasto look at the entire semantictree of the verb (recallthat the patientis definedin the ACT structure, the themein theembeddedeffect-GO substructure , andthelocationin thefurther embedded PATH substructure ). These differencesin the scope of the argumentrearrangementsfor the different rulesmaypredictthethicknessof thenarrow-rangeslicesthat therules apply freely to. The fact that the locativerule mustprocessthe entire structure of the input verbmayexplainwhy theentiregrammaticallyrelevantstructureof any verb heardto enterinto the locativealternationis preservedin the creation of a (very) narrow-rangerule. An additionalfactorthat leadsthe locativeto accumulate highly specific context tenDS in its narrow-range variants is the requirementthatsomeinfonnationalsourcefor thecreationof a newpropertyin ' ' ' ' the with fonD beprovided. Typically thestateis definedby a such or for/ to operatorin whicha copy of the MANNER from theintolonto fonD resides, and

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asa result the existence-predicting rule requiressuchinfonnation to be stated explicitly , renderingit narrow in range.' Theanticausativeandmiddle, in contrast,affectonly theagentandthepatient! theme, in ACT and effect-GO structuresrespectively, leaving any internal constituentof a PATH substructureunaltered, so only the partsof a semantic structureimmediatelyattachedto the ACT andGO structureare relevant. The geometricand material propertiesof moved objectsand the place- and pathfunctionstheyaremoved to or situatedat would bedefinedin embeddedlayers of structure, so the generalizationsof individual middle andanticausativeverb fonDS to narrow-range existence-predicting middle and anticausativerules would be blind to them. Rather, the delineationsamongtheir subclass eswould be defined in tenus of the bits of infonnation surroundingthe A Cf and GO structures,suchasthe presenceof a statechangein a GO subordinatedto A Cf , theabsenceof a meansstructureappendedto the ACT, or thepresenceof a path (thoughnot its internal composition). Thus the narrow-rangerule fonnation procedurecanstepbacka bit from the entirety of the structureof a singleverb heardto alternate,anddoesnot haveto copyeverytwig of their semantictrees. Rather, I proposethatnarrow-rangerules containthenodesin semanticstructurethatareeither(a) dominatedby thesame nodesastheopenargumentsthat get remappedby the broad-rangelexical rule, or (b) coindexedwith such open arguments.6 The internal structureof more , such as the material/geometricpropertiesof deeply embeddedsubstructures themesof verbsundergoingcausativization,would beparameterized by a single that would the embrace entire substructure whatever its . Let contents , symbol me call this processNarrow-RangeRule Formation by Preservationof Argument -RelevantParameterizedLexicosemanticStructure. The logic is similarto thatof havingbroad-rangerulesbuilt aroundstructuressurroundingthealternating openarguments:lexical rulesarejust thosealterationsof semanticstructure thatareinvolvedin causingalterationsof argumentstructures(exceptthatin the caseof narrow-range rules, a much richer configurationof information surrounding the changing argumentsis preserved ). The preservationof only the infonnation that is associatedwith the remappedargumentsis a mechanical implementationof one aspectof the principle that narrow-range rules are " motivated" by the natureof the semanticchangecapturedin the broad-range rule. There are several theoretical advantagesto this theory of the learningof narrow-rangeclassesand rules. First, sincenarrow-rangerules are built from individual alternatingverbs, the complexity of the rules is a direct reflectionof the complexityof the information neededto know whata verbmeans.We need

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not be offendedby the positing of someprocessdedicatedto the painstaking constructionof intricate class definitions, resulting in narrow-range rules of limited usefulness; narrowrule definitionsarejust verb definitions, which have to beacquiredanyway, generalizeda minimal amount. Second,thevariablesize of the classesis an immediateconsequence , not a problem as it would be for a driven : statistically procedure everyalternatingverb createsits own micro-rule, and any verb sufficiently similar to it (accordingto the metric implicit in the of Iexi cosemanticstructure) is automaticallyincludedin therule. representation Thedifferencesin sizeamongthesubclass esincluded by a rule areepiphenomena of thenumberof wordsin thelanguagethathappento bebuilt arounda given semanticstructure. (The existenceof narrowconflation classesto paveparticular pathsfor new coinagesis what encouragesfamilies of structurally similar words to arise in the first place.) Third, the multiple redundantsemantic differencesbetweensemanticallysimilar narrow classesthat are and are not coveredby a rule would be a consequence of principles governing how word meaningsare spreadout to cover a multidimensionalsemanticspace. Talmy ( 1983) suggeststhat setsof word meanings,in effect, tend to be " noncoplanar" in semanticspace, correspondingto points that differ in severaldimensionsat once. Finally, if whatI havebeenproposingis true, the narrownessof the linguistic generalizationsallowed in this domainis not only comprehensible , it is almost inevitable. Grammaris exactlyasconservativeasit can be, but no moreconservative . A grammarcan " see" the differencebetweensmearingand pouring, or betweenshoutingandtelling, or betweengoingand sliding, or betweencoating andcontaining, becauseall of thesedistinctionscan be statedin terms of the privilegedsemanticvocabularythat is availableto it. Henceif it is designedto be conservative , generalizationsbetweentheseclassesare impossible. However " " , a grammarcannot see the differencebetweensmearingand smudging, betweenshouting and whispering, betweensliding and rolling, or between coating and covering. Hence it is powerlessto allow one of these verbs to alternatewhile preventing the other from doing so; as far as the grammar is concerned . , they are indistinguishable Let mecall this stronghypothesisColor-Blind Conservatism:the grammaris basicallyconservativebut cannotseemostcognitive distinctions, of which the real-world color of arguments' referentsis perhapsthe most paradigmatic. If sustainable , it would provide a very satisfyingexplanationasto why existencerules arenarrowly constrainedin the way that they are. Furthermore, predicting Color Blind Conservatismitself need not be stipulated as an independent restriction. It is animmediateconsequence of threeprinciples: ( I ) conservatism;

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; (3) independenceof the (2) grammaticallyrelevantsemanticsubvocabulary the of items in the lexicon (seedi from actual of listing principles morphology Sciullo andWilliams, 1987). Without this third principle, grammarscould be evenmoreconservative , restrictingexistenceto thoseindividual itemsthathave beenwitnessedin particularargumentstructures,resultingin thestrict itemwise conservatismthat wasrejectedin chapter1. The reasonthat languagesarenot ' that conservativemay be that they can t be that conservative.That is, lexical ' rulescan t differentiateverbsdownto thelevel of whichonesarelistedwith their , if true, would provide idiosyncratic properties. Color-Blind Conservatism 's Sciullo and Williams for di completeseparationof listedness strongsupport and morphological(lexical) rules. I will return to this issuein section8.5. 6.4.3.4 Other Waysof Preventingthe Rulesfrom Being Too Narrow The effectsof Color-Blind Conservatism probablyneedto be weakenedsomewhat. of setsof verbsbelongingto a Considerthe discussionsof the representations given subclassthat werepresentedin chapter5. Ideally, verbsin a classwould have identical semanticstructuresexceptfor idiosyncraticinformation about manners,properties,states,andsoon. But if theclassesareof thesizeI suggested in theprecedingchapter,this is not exactlyright. While it is truethat thereis no blockingof productivitybasedon verbsthatdiffer only in idiosyncraticinformation , it may not be truethatthereis inevitably a blocking of productivity based on verbs that differ in grammaticallyrelevant semantic information. For . belongto the sameclassasgive. but these example, sell andpay, I suggested verbsspecifytheobligationof acountertransfer . easilystatablein theprivileged . and in an , ( ) that would be parameterized money object property vocabulary Hand incorporatesinformationaboutthemeansof transfer, akind of information . Verbswithin the thatis notspecifiedbygive, sell, andotherputativeclassmates classesof obtaining and creation have a variety of instruments, manners, , means,andother information associatedwith them obligatedcountertransfers for (compare, example, buy, get, and steal; or make, bake, build, and sew). , someverbsseemto specifymanners Similarly, in thesprayandsmearclasses for the causationof motion(e.g., dab, inject), somefor the motionitself (smear. , moveis semanticallysimilar to roll , bounce, andso splash). In causativization on (one-argumentGO eventswithout a lexically specifiedpath), presumably explainingwhy theyall happilycausativize,butmoveis indifferentasto manner, whereasthe others specify one. Several other examplescan be found by reviewingthediscussionsin thepreviouschapterof how verbswithin a subclass candiffer from oneanother.How canColor-Blind Conservatismbe reconciled -blocking detail? with the existenceof this potentiallygeneralization

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1. Living with evennarrowerclasses.Theremaybea simplesolution. Perhaps es too thickly. Perhapssell. pay. and trade I have sliced someof the subclass would be . Thepsychologicalconsequence actuallybelongto their own subclass thatlearnerswould not beableto generalizeautomaticallyfrom thedativizability of give to the dativizability of sell; they would haveto hearsell in both fonns . from sell to pay and trade). . presumably (though they could then generalize Why, then, would the dativizability of verbs like sell intuitively seem so inevitablegiven the dativizability of give? Recallthat at the sametime as the narrow-range rules are allowing full -fledged generalizationsbetweenessentially identically representedverbs, therearebroad-rangerulesfor dativization would makethe extensionof dativizationto lesssimilar verbspossible, though . Perhaps, by intuitionsof completenaturalness they would not beaccompanied then, the broad-range rule makescoinageof many double-object verbs by a speakerextremelylikely . They will be perceived,by both speakerand listener, as a bit strangeon the first occurrence , but ascompletelycomprehensible , like Haigspeak . Oncea learnerhearsit , heor shewill andas" possible" expressions storetheitemconservatively,andextendthealternationit exemplifiesautomatically to other verbs sharingits narrow argument-relevantsemanticstructure. Every child would thusgo throughtheexperienceof first hearingdativizedsell . Sincemany of the as a new fonn , even if the give class had beenmastered structures are have semantic verbs that high in frequency, complex alternating and since in the next chapterwe will see that children early on acquire a collectionof alternatingverbsconservatively , theindividualconservative heterogeneous differences minor structural verbs with even of maynot betoo mastery far-fetched. This is simply anempiricalissuefor which we lack sufficient data. 2./ gnoringa singlesemanticdifference.It is possible,too, thatsomeitemsthat do not match a narrow-range rule down to every node are not necessarily excluded. Somekinds of deviationmay be consideredminor enoughthat the verbsarebasicallytreatedasbelongingto a narrowalternatingclasseventhough they havesomenoticeablesemanticdifferencefrom the definition of the class. I havenot discussedthe matchingfunction thatdetermineswhethera verb is a member of a narrow class, assumingthat is simply an exact match up to constants' being substitutedfor variables, but it maybea bit moreflexible than that. First of all , sinceno two classesdiffer by a single semanticstructure, a matchmetric that alloweda verb to enjoy theprivilegesof a classif it matched it exactlyexceptfor onedifference(anobjectproperty, a meanssubstructure , an an to is to ACT or whether a manner attached extra coindexing, a differencein a GO) would in fact not do anydamage:no nonaltematorswould be spuriously " included, on accountof the " scattering of narrowconflation classesthrough

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multidimensionalsemanticspace. Extendingthe ophthalmologicalmetaphor, we could referto the formation of narrow-rangerules asbeingboth color-blind andtunnel-visioned, sinceonly informationassociatedwith changingarguments is examined, and the matchingfunction as being a bit myopic, ignoring small differencesin fine semanticdetail. 3. 1gnoring certain kindsof semanticdifferences. The matchingprocessmay actually be a bit more constrainedthanthat. Somekinds of semanticstructure seemmore important, on the whole, in drawing boundariesbetweennarrow subclass es than others. Major aspectualdifferences(e.g., stateversusevent, accomplishmentversusachievement), eventtype differences(ACT versusGO versusHAVE ), major semanticfields (e.g., possessionalversuslocational), and propenies of objects that appear in different positions in the old and new structures(e.g., in a MANNER versusa PROPERTYdefinedby ' such' ) all seem to be crucial in blocking productivity.' However, a numberof semanticstructures that can be grammatically relevant in some circumstancesmay not inevitably be fatal to a verb being consideredfor admissionto somenarrowrange rule. Examplesare the existenceof an object type that is not crossreferencedelsewherein semantic structure (e.g., the specificationof theme types, suchasfood for feed or moneyfor pay asopposedto no specificationat all for handor give); a singleisolatedgoal ( ' for/ to' ) or a meanssubstructurethat doesnot changerole in the alternation; or a temporalorderingof two eventsthat areof the sameaspectualtype in the verbandthe narrow-rangerule. If you will allow me to pushthemetaphor, the matchingprocesswould bemoreastigmatic than merely myopic: it would make finer distinctions along somedimensions than along others. Thus we havea plausibleminor relaxationof Color-Blind Conservatism : a difference in relevant structure or even , perhaps single grammatically multiple differencesin the lessessentialkinds of structure, may result in the naturalextension of a narrow-rangerule to a verbthatdoesnot matchits definitionexactly. Conceivably, there may also be a continuum of relative acceptabilityamong verbs that fail even this slightly relaxedcondition (but obey the broad-range rule), sothatthelessa verbdeviatesfrom anexisting narrow-rangerule, the less , andthe more likely it is to be addedto the cringing it inducesamongspeakers languageasthe basisfor its own legitimatenarrow class. In sum, a narrow-rangerule is formed by taking the semanticstructureof an alternatingverb, pruning information that is distant in the tree from the open argumentsthat alternate, and substitutingvariablesfor grammaticallyidiosyncratic constants . In addition, thesetof verbsthatcanalternatemightbeexpanded somewhatbeyondthis extremely narrow class by a matchingmetric that can toleratesmallamountsof " minor" structuraldeviation.

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6.S Summaryof LearningMechanisms LetmesummarizethelearningmechanismsI haveinvokedin this chapterfor the structuresthat playa role in the theory. Linking rules arenot learnedat all. Syntacticallyergativelanguages, which constitutethe principal exception to the universality of the major linking regularities,arerare, andthey may requireanadjustmentof the linking rulesmakingtheACT-subjectrule pertainonly to theargumentof monadicACT , not to theargumentof dyadicACT , soasto maintainconsistencywith the morphological casesystem- ratherthan an abandoningof them. Lexicosemanticstructures are hypothesizedby Event-Category Labeling underthe influenceof practical constraintscoming from the child ' s semantic blases, attentionto the discoursecontext, and the Principle of Contrast. The arrangementand compositionof thesehypothesisstructuresis influenced by grammaticalrules(to the extentthat they areknown) at severalpossiblelevels of specificityby SyntacticCueing: openargumentsarepositedfor eachgrammatical functionin argumentstructure,reverselinking canconstrainthepossible rolesof thoseopenarguments,andconflationclassdefinitionscan fill out characteristic configurationsof semanticelementswith evengreaterspecificity and accuracyoncethey arelearned. (Possibly, cognitiveinferencesbasedon entire setsof relatedargumentstructuresandtheir associated linking rules, or so-called a role as well. ) syntacticbootstrapping, plays Broad ConflationClasses,definedby the thematiccoreof the meaningsof a set of similar verbs sharing an argumentstructure, are createdas a structure jointly consistentwith the universalsemanticconcomitantsof that kind of argument structure,via SkeletonBuilding ThroughReverseLinking, and a setof independently acquiredlexical entries, via ConflationClassCompletionThrough LexicalAbstraction. Broad-RangeRule Formation mapsone broad-rangeclassonto anotherby positinga setof basicoperationson semanticstructurecapableof effecting the changeand, whenpossible, by associatingthemwith a morphologicaloperation capableof relatingthe two words. Narrow ConflationClassesarecreatedby Parameterizationof Idiosyncratic LexicalInformation(color-blindness) in individual lexical entriesbelongingto a broadclass. Narrow-Range Rules are formed by Preservationof Argument-Relevant ParameterizedLexicosemanticStructures, and the function matching them againstindividual verbstoleratesmismatches involving small discrepanciesin certainkinds of structures.

Chapter 7 Development

' Baker s paradox is the simultaneous incompatibility of three assumptions: that learners receive no negative evidence, that the set of verbs that undergo a given rule is arbitrary , and that children use the rules productively . The theory I have outlined was propelled by evidence that the assumptions of no negative evidence and of childhood productivity are true and that therefore the assumption of arbitrariness must be false. Now that I have given some reasons to believe that lexical argument structure alternations are not arbitrary , it is necessaryto return to the claim that children are productive , not conservative , users of lexical rules. It is crucial to seewhether children userules in the way that the grammatical and learning theories say they should. Why is it so crucial ? The theory presentedin Pinker ( 1984) and Mazurkewich and White ( 1984) held that children coin lexical rules that map among syntactic argument structures and then append semantic and morphological conditions to them. This motivated a developmental prediction that children would first use the rules with no semantic constraints. In the theory I have been arguing for here, there is no such thing as a lexical rule mapping from argument structure to argument structure directly , free of semantic considerations ; rules inherently involve operations on lexicosemantic structure. Therefore it would be puzzling if children went through a stagein which they formulated rules of fundamentally the wrong type , that is , rules consisting of a direct mapping between one argument structure and another. The prediction that children should not pass through such a stage is thus an important empirical test distinguishing the two theories, buttressing the prior arguments that the new theory wins on grounds of motivation and linguistic accuracy. Second, if children do create argument structures with an overly broad rule , perhaps a semantically neutral one, it raises the question of how they attain the adult state in which the rules are suitably narrowed and the incorrect entries are expunged. A chief motivation for the new theory is that it seemed implausible

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that children would be equipped with a mechanism that did nothing but ' complicate their rules and restrict their expressive power . Given that children s errors do seem to decrease with time , is there a more plausible explanation for " why this happens? It is important that some solution to this unlearning " be provided that is consistent with the new theory . If children problem overgeneralize in a way not predicted by the theory and somehow recover , they ' would present us with a new version of Baker s paradox . ' Finally , the theory predicts very specific interactions between verbs semantic ' structures and their argument structures. Children do not know verbs ' meanings perfectly when they start to talk . Therefore , changes in children s ' argument structures should parallel changes in their knowledge of verbs meanings in some precise ways. Evidence that this occurs would offer strong support for the basic assumption that argument structures are projections of lexicosemantic structures. 7.1

Developmental Sequence for Argument Structure Alternations

Let me begin by reviewing the course of development of argument structure alternations in children . The general pattern is fairly uniform acrosschildren and across constructions.

7.1.1 Early Conservative UsagePreceding Onset of Errors Children first use both of the argumentstructuresinvolved in an alternation, usuallywith a relatively smallsetof verbsandwith no evidenceof productivity. This is consistentwith the assumptionthat the rule fonnation processdiscussed in chapter6 is triggeredby thepresencein thelexicon of severalverbswith pairs of argumentstructures, learnedconservatively. Causative.This patternwasfirst documentedfor causativeverbsby Bowerman( 1974, 1982a). The childrenshestudiedmost intensively, Christy andEva, " usedtransitiveand intransitiveverbscorrectly for " severalmonths beforethe first occurrenceof creativecausativeconstructions.Christy, for example, used thewordsopen, close, break, wet, dry , spill , hurt, andpop in both transitiveand intransitive(verb or adjective) phrasesby the time shebeganto overgeneralize thecausativerelationat age2;0. Maratsoset al. ( 1987) reporta similar lag in the ' speechof theseniorauthor s daughter, who usedgrammaticalintransitivesand transitivesbeginningat I ; II but productiveonesbeginning only at 2;6. Locative. Bowerman( 1982b) notesa similar pattern in the acquisition of locative forms. Both her daughterscorrectly used verbs whoseobjects were locationalthemes(e.g., put, pour, spill) andlocational goals(e.g., touch, cover, hit , bump) beforethe ageof 2;0. In fact, the two kinds of verbsemergedin each child' s speechwithin weeksof eachother(Bowerman, in press). Overextension

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of the locativealternationin fonns like / ' m going to touchit (her hand) on your pantsandMommy, / pouredyou. ... Yeah, with waterdid not beginuntil around the third birthdayand becomefrequentonly after the fourth. Passive.In our studyof thedevelopmentof thepassive(Pinker. Lebeaux. and Frost. 1987) wefoundthatthefirst productivepassivesalwayscamein laterthan the first nonproductiveonesin the spontaneousspeechof the threechildren we examined. Adamutteredhis first passiveat 3;0 andhis first productivepassive at 3;3; Eveutteredherfirst passivesat 1;7 andhadfailed to utterany productive passivesby 2;3; Sarahutteredher first passivesat 2;5 and her first productive passivesat 3;3. It is difficult to tell . or course. to whatextentthis delayedonset is a samplingartifact stemmingfrom the relative infrequencyof productive . passives Dative. JessGropen. Michelle Hollander. and I haveexaminedthe development of double- object datives and prepositional datives in the spontaneous speechof Adam. Eve. Sarah. Ross. andMark (Gropenet al.. 1989). The pattern of conservativeuseof bothversionsof thealternationwith a few verbs. followed ' by productiveextensionto newverbs. appearedagain. Adam s first overgeneralizationof thedouble- objectform occurredat theageof 4; 1(see1.16of chapter I ). Beforethat time. he had usedin dative consuuctionsthe dativizableverbs shownin (7.1). startingat theageslisted.

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ageslisted. (7.2) Double-object Prepositional 2;3 1; 10 bring 2 ;0 buy 2 find ;2 2;0 2;0 get 1 2;2 9 ; give 2;2 make 1;8 2;0 read show 1;9 We found no productivedouble-object fonns from Sarahby age5; I , though many conventionaldativesof eachtype wereproducedby then. The two stages arenot clearly demarcatedfor RossandMark, thougheachboyusedsomegrammatical of a recognizablyproductive dative fonns beforethe first appearance fonn. Rossincorrectly usedsayin the double objectfonn at 2;8; his preceding transcriptsshowgive (2;7) beingusedin the double- objectfonn andbuy (2;8) ' being used in the prepositionalfonn. Mark s overextensionsof the dative occurredat 3;8 and4;0; beforethat he hadusedthe double-objectfonn of take at 3;7 andpour at 3;8 and the prepositional-dativefonn of give at 3;5. The sequences for the acquisitionof thecausativeandthe locativeasstudied to showlargerandmoreconsistentlagsbetweentheonsetof Bowennan tend by thanthe sequences for conventionalfonns and the onsetof overgeneralization the acquisitionof the passiveandthe dative (for Rossand Mark) as studiedby my colleaguesand me. Sincethere is no systematicgrammaticaldifference uniting the constructionsshestudiedand differentiatingthem from ours, the quantitativediscrepancyis probablydueto thedifferencein methodology,with her continuousdiary databeingmore sensitiveto differencesin onsetthanour biweekly or monthly samplesof two hoursof speech(or less) apiece. A salientaspectof thedevelopmentof dativeandlocativefonnsis thatneither versionof eitheralternationconsistentlyemergesfirst. In Pinker( 1984) I noted that contrary to a widespreadassumption , the prepositionaldative does not 's .' The first in the fonn children double object spontaneousspeech precede double-object fonns of alternatingverbs appearbefore the first prepositional fonns for AdamandEve; theyappearin theoppositeorderfor Mark; theyappear within a monthof eachotherfor SarahandRoss. Thesamepatternoccurswhen we look at individual verbs: of the 28 caseswherea child useda verb in both

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fonns , the double -object version came first 16 times , the prepositional object version came first 9 times , and both appeared simultaneously 3 times (each child showed one acquisition order for some verbs , another for other verbs). Furthermore , 22 potentially alternating verbs were used only in the double - object fonn , and 24 were used only in the prepositional fonn . Bowerman ( in press) found essentially the same simultaneity in the first ' appearancesof the two versions of give , buy , and bring in Christy s speech. As mentioned , she also found that put and spill , on the one hand, and cover , on the other , which differ in whether the syntactic object corresponds to a locational theme or to a locational goal , emerge within weeks of each other. A related finding is that in simple transitive verbs, there is no consistent acquisition order governing the appearance of verbs whose subjects are themes and whose postverbal arguments are locations or goals , and verbs whose subjects are ' possessorsand whose objects are possessedentities . In Christy s transcripts , Baby fall down Daddy shirt and Toy stay home appear in the same week as Cow have ice, Daddy have cake, and [ get spoon; 8M coming birdie fanny appears within the sametwo weeks as [ lost other blanket . In Eva ' s transcripts , Necklace stay purse appearsin the same week asErnie got spoon and [ got necklace. Given these four examples of simultaneous emergence of verb fonns with contrasting mappings between thematic roles and syntactic positions (dative alternation , locative verbs, possessional transitive , locative transitive ), Bowennan argues that children in this stage make their lexical entries confonn to the argument structures displayed in the input . They show no proclivity to link postverbal arguments with themes as opposed to goals or possessors, or to link subjects with themes rather than with possessors when there is no agent. Bowennan actually makes a stronger claim : that children do not use innate linking rules at all at any age; the linking rules they use at later ages ( seePinker , 1984) are learned from the input . However , this conclusion is too strong for two reasons. First , as Bowennan herself pointed out in an earlier paper ( Bowennan , 1978) , the earliest usages of verbs in this age range are often quite restricted , concrete, or context -bound. The more schematized verb meanings that playa role in linguistic generalizations are only in evidence several months after the first usages( seesection 7.5. 1.3 ) . Thus there is at least a possibility that some of these very early usesmay reflect not the lexicosemantic structures and argument structures that theories of linking rules apply to , but some kind of preliminary , relatively unanalyzed placeholder for a word that is given a more abstract and structured sem~ tic representation only later. But there is a more important problem , one that applies regardless of the psycholinguistic status of the first ' usages. The predictions of acquisition order that Bowennan s data disconfinn are not consequencesof innate linking rules in general, but of one theory of

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' linking rulesthatis probablynot viableanyway. Specifically, Bowennan sclaim restson thepredictionthat only oneof the two versionsof dative, locative, and verbscanbegeneratedby linking rules. This is basedon the location/possession Fillmoretheoryof thematicrolesandlinking regularitiesdiscussedin chapter3. However,undertheJackendoff/ Rappaport / Levinconceptionthat I haveadopted andextended , both versionsof the dative andboth versionsof the locativeare consistentwith linking rules, sincein both versionsthe patient/themeis linked -subjectand theme-subjectverbs to syntacticobject. Similarly, both possessor areconsistentwith linking rules, oneapplyingto HAVE states, the otherto BE states. In fact, a centraltenetof thetheory is that all verbsshould be consistent with linking rules. Thusthelackof consistentasymmetryin acquisitionorderfor verbsexploitingdifferent setsof the availablelinking rules is exactly what the theorypredicts. 7.1.2 Overapplication of Argument Structure Alternations In chapter2 I claimed that at somepoint children ceasebeing conservative learnersof argumentstructuresbut apply rulesproductively. What is the logic behindthisconclusion? Any timechildrenuseafonn that is grammaticalin adult English, theycould in principle haveacquiredthefonn conservativelyfrom the input, so non-Englishfonns of varioussortsmustbe soughtasevidence. There arethreewaysof doing this. First, experimentscanbe run in which childrenaretaughtnovel verbsin one argumentstructureand given the opportunity to use them in new argument structures . This wastheapproachof Pinker, Lebeaux, andFrost ( 1987), Gropen et al. ( 1989), Gropenet al. (in preparation; seeGropen, 1989), and Gropen, Pinker, and Roeper(in preparation). Second,onecould look for caseswherechildrencreatea verb that is semantically or morphologicallyill formed in the adult languageand then useit in an unrelatedalternation.For example, Pinker, Lebeaux, andFrost ( 1987) lookedat ' corporaof children s creative denominaland causativetransitive verbs and askedwhetherchildren wereapt to passivizethem; seethe tables in ( 1.14) and ( 1.15) of chapterI . For datives, onecanlook at novel causativeverbsinvolving causationof possession , suchashave, andaskwhetherthey can be extendedto ' the double- object construction, as in Christy s Will you have me a lesson? Similarly, Eveusedwrite to meandraw asin / go write a ladyfor you andthen usedit in productivedouble-objectformssuchasWrite mea lady. Morphologicalerrorsareanothercluethatchildrenarenotreproducingparentalforms: in the ' ' passivewe get things like Adam s / want to be shootedor Sarah s Wegot all ' stuckedon eachotheror Allison sTheseare all bite-ed; in thecausative,we find ' ' ' ' ' Christy s/ m gonnasharpthispencil or Eva sDon t tight this cause/ tight this.

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Thereis a third kind of evidencefor productivityI havecited. If childrenapply arulein violationof thecriteriathatgoverntheadultversionof therule, weknow thattheyhavenot reproducedadultusages , becauseadultspresumablyobeythe criteria themselvesin their own speech . Adults do bend the rules in the HaigspeakexamplesI citedin section4.5.1, but no one looking at the examples in chapterI could possiblysuggestthat children' s errorsare reproductionsof adults' Haigspeak. ~errorsshownin ( 1.17) aretheclearestcaseof children' sflouting Thecausative of criteria. Children causativizeverbsof inherently directedmotion, such as come, go,/ all , andrise; verbsof being, suchasstay andbe; verbsof going out of existence , suchasdie, vanishanddisappear; verbsof physicalaction, suchas eat, drink, sing, talk, giggle, cry, swim, and climb; verbsof emission, suchas sweatandbleed; andverbsof psychologicalactivity, suchasremember,watch, , somesenseof directnessof causation guess,Jeel, ache. In the lastthreeclasses might be violatedas well. Childrenalsoextendthedativealternationsoasto expresspurelybenefactive or malefactiveargumentsassurfaceobjects, with no causedor intendedchange of possession . Examplesin ( 1.16) includetheverbsbrush, open, button, pick up, Fix, eat, put on, and pass. It is also used fairly frequently for the verb of communicationsaythat doesnot fall into the tell classfor reasonsdiscussedin chapter4. A lateerror with demonstrateviolatesthe morphologicalconstraint. Bowerman's ( 1982b) examplesof overextendedlocatives, plus the onesin ( 1.19) of chapter I , involve assigningthe locational theme, rather than the locationalgoal, to theobjectargumentin severalinappropriateclassesof verbs: actionverbslike / eel, touch, squeeze , andpinch that are not in the [+motion, +contact, - effect] subclassfor which this form (typically with the preposition against) is ordinarily licensed; verbsexpressingthe classof effects involving filling andcovering, suchasfill andcover; anda verbof possession deprivation, rob. Theoppositekind of error, wherethe locationalgoal, ratherthan the locational theme, is assignedto directobject, is overextendedto verbsin the classes of enablinggravity to movea substance(pour, spill ), placing flexible objects arounda location (rope), force exertion(crash), mannerof image impression loss(steal). In noneof thesecasesis it clear whether (scribble), andpossession the holism metaconstraintis violated. Pinker ( 1984) suggestedthat it was in Eva' s Mommy, I pouredyou. ... Yeah, with water becauseher mother wasnot thoroughlydrenched,but sinceit waspretendwaterthat wasbeingpoured, we cannotbe sure. It is muchlessobviouswhetherchildrenviolateconstraintson the passivein their spontaneous speech. Most of theproductiveforms aredueto morphological errorsor verbsthat aresemanticallyeligible for passivizationbut happento

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be transitive only in the lexicon of thechild (e.g., die). Therewereno passives . Someof the of measureverbs, symmetricalverbs, or verbsof purepossession strandedprepositionssoundclumsyto adultears, evenif themorphologyof the verbis corrected: to beput thingsin andto befallen downon violatea regularity that prepositionscanbe strandedby passivizationonly whenthe verbtakesno Johnwastaken otherpostverbalargument(in theseemingadultcounterexample is of an idiomatic advantageof, advantagepresumably part complexverbtakeadvantageof, seeBresnan, 1982b). For a toilet to begonein soundssomewhat childlike but probablydoesnot violate any constraint(cf. This toilet hasbeen spatin ). In sum, children clearly violate adult narrow-rangesemanticconstraintson the causative, the locative, and the dative. They do not seemto violate any constraintson the passive,but giventhatin thecurrenttheorythereareno direct narrow-range constraintson the passivein adult English, this is not surprising. 7.1.3 Progression Toward the Adult State Thetime courseof thereductionof children' sproductive errorsastheyapproach the adult state hasnot beendocumentedin detail. We know that the stageof overgeneralizationerrorspersistsover a spanof severalyears. Incorrectcausatives ' , from 2; 1to 7; II , appearover a spanof aboutsix yearsin Christy s speech ' andfrom 2; I to at least5;5 in Eva s. Similarly, incorrectlocativeslastfrom 3;4 to at least6; 10 for Christy and from 2; 11to at least7;2 in Eva. Accordingto MazurkewichandWhite' s examples,ungrammaticaldouble-objectdativescan occurin children asyoungas2;3 (seealsotheexamplesfrom Eve) andasold as 6 (seealsoDamonClark' s error at 8). Examplesof ungrammaticalpassivesspan a range from 2;0 to 9;3 in various children, though they may not involve violationsof constraintson passivization.A reasonablesummaryof the datais that overgeneralizationerrors persistover a long span of time shadinginto adulthood, diminishing in frequencyat different ratesfor different verbs. Onefactor that seemsto hastentheir demise, at leastin the caseof causativization, is the strengtheningof morphologicallyunrelatedformsthat havethe samemeaning as the ungrammaticalderived causative. Bowerman( 1982a) notesinformally thaterrorswith go, come,stay, die, andfall ebbastheuseof their counterpartstake/send/put, bring, keep/leave, kill , and drop/knock down increaseSome of these(bring , keep, andleave) had themselvesbeendisplaced when the overgeneralizationerrorsbeganto occur. This effect has completely also been demonstratedexperimentally. Hochberg( 1986) askedchildren to . On eachtrial oneof listento two puppetsrecitedifferent versionsof a sentence themutteredan ungrammaticalcausativesentence , theotherutteredagrammatical versionof it. Thechildren wereaskedto awarda gold starto thepuppetwho

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spokebetter. Whenintransitiveverbsusedungrammaticallyascausativeswere contrastedwith their quasi-suppletiveforms (come-bring,fall -drop, stay-keep, be-put , go-take), children readily chose the puppetuttering the correctquasisuppletive(78% of the 3-year-olds, 92% of the 4-year-olds). However, for intransitiveverbsthat lackquasi-suppletivesin English(sing, dance, run,jump , dive), which werecontrastedwith periphrasticversions, childrenwerelesssure: 3-year-old children choseeachpuppet equally often, and 4-year-old children preferredthe puppetusingthe grammaticalperiphrasticform only 68% of the time. One can imaginea similar progressionoccurring for pairs suchasrob and steal, but for mostof theerrors, thereareno relatedforms to displacethem. I will return to this issuelater in the chapter.

7.2 The UnlearningProblem As I mentionedat the outsetof chapter5, any speakerwho possess esthe adult versionsof narrow-rangerulesis immune from Baker' s paradox. Conceivably, childrencould acquiretheproductiverule in suchan adult form assoonasthey hadany versionof it at all. But we havejust seenthat this is exactlywhat does not happen. Whenchildrenbecomeproductive, they producegrammaticaland ' ungrammaticalstructuressideby side. This meansthat Baker s paradoxarises " " in a form that can be called the unlearning problem : what makesthe child abandonhis or her overly generalgrammar? Of the threekinds of empirical demonstrationsof productivity, the first two are innocuousfrom the point of view of the unlearningproblem. In the caseof theexperiments , wecanassumethatchildren simply forgetthenoncewordsthey aretaughtin the lab (at least, that is what I tell the HumanSubjectscommittees that occasionallyworry that a generationof Cambridgechildren will grow up talking aboutpilking this andJloozing that). For errorsinvolving verbswith incorrect semanticrepresentations , the SemanticStructureHypothesisTesting ' procedurediscussedin chapter6 will refine children s semanticrepresentations for the offendingverbsandcausethem no longerto be eligible to enterinto the lexical rules. For morphologicalerrors like bited or to sharp, the Uniqueness Principle discussedin Pinker ( 1984) - related to the Blocking Principle of Aronoff ( 1976) - would drive out the incorrectform oncethe correctone (and thephonologicalandmorphologicalprinciplesgoverningit ) hadbeenacquired. The third kind of error, wherethe adult constraintsareviolated, doesbring up the unlearningproblem. Thereare two subproblemsinvolved, one fairly easy, the other more serious. The easyproblem is what to do with the lexical entries thechild hasformedcontainingincorrectargumentstructuresduringthetime he

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or she has beenovergeneralizing a rule. The answeris that the child must somehowdistinguishbetweenforms he or shehasheardin the input and forms createdusing a productiverule. In Pinker ( 1984) I suggestedthat the child " " " " appendeda special nonwitnessed symbol( 1 ) to productivelycreatedentries. When the rule waslater acquiredin its correctform, nonwitnessedentriesthat violatedit wouldbeexpunged. The symbolalsowould be usedto let fonDSlike sharpendrive outformslike causativesharp, ratherthanvice versa. A logically equivalentschemewouldannotateforms with a specialsymbolif theyhavebeen witnessed , leavingunannotatedforms to be interpretedas having beencreated ' rule. This by symbolwould capturethe notion of an item s being listed in the lexicon(seedi SciulloandWilliams, 1987). In fact, sincethenonwitnesseditems are by definition generableby a rule, they can be thrown away as soonas they areusedandthenbere-createdwhenneededin thefuture. Sotheonly forms that might needto belistedare the forms that areheardin the input, sincethey may or may not be generableby a rule. These are the forms that I suggestedbe . Thus we candispensewith eitherkind of annotation. Verb speciallyannotated structures that havebeenwitnessedin the input, and only these, are argument listedin thelexicon, andtheyareguaranteedto becorrect. Incorrectproductively formedargumentstructures , like all productivelyformedargumentstructures, can be usedonceand then thrown away, and so there may be no unlearning problemfor them. The seriousproblemconcernsthe sharpeningof the rule itself. In Pinker ' ( 1984) I notedchildren s violationsof the adult constraintsand suggestedthat childrenstartoff with productiverulesthatarepurelysyntactic. Forexample, the symbolfor Subjectis replacedby the symbolfor Objectin the causative, or the symbol for Oblique-Object is replacedby the symbol for Object in the dative (e.g., asin KaplanandBresnan, 1982; Bresnan, 1982b). Gradually, semanticand morphologicalconstraintsareappendedto the rule. However, this is the theory that led to the odd picture in which children strive to make their rules more complex and less useful for no apparentreason. In the theory I have been presenting,lexicalrulesare inherentlyoperationson lexicosemanticstructure; there can be no stage in which a purely syntactic operation on argument structuresexists. But evenif children' s early rulesaresemanticallyconstrained, too broadly, we would needsomemechanismthat causes if theyareconstrained themto becomenarrowerasthe child grows. This, then, leavesus with two aspectsof the unlearningproblem. First, are children really oblivious to the semanticconstraintsthat are alleged consequences of theinherentnatureof the lexical rules, andif they are, how could we of whetherchildrenhaveaproductiverule thathas , regardless explainit1 Second no semanticconstraintsor onethat hastoo few of them, whatimpelschildren to

Chapter7 add more and more of these constraints so as to approach the adult state and rid

usof this lingeringpieceof Baker's paradox ?

7.2.1 A Simple Solution to the Unlearning Problem In the restof thischapterI will defenda hypothesisthatis sosimplethat it would " " be a shameif it wasn' t true. The hypothesis , which I will call the minimalist solution to theunlearningproblem, is statedin (7.3). (7.3) Children'sovergeneralization errorsaredueeithertotheapplication of broad-rangelexical rulesor to systematic aboutthemeanings of particularverbs. misconceptions Let me examinethesetwo purportedcausesof children' s errors separately , starting in this sectionwith broad-rangelexical rules. Recall that broad-rangelexical rulesthat arenot associatedwith affixes are property-predicting, not existence-predicting. They define potential lexical entriesthataresensedby speakersasbeingpossibleexpansionsof the language, ' thoughnot currentlypartof it. They enterinto an individual s linguistic life by giving rise to occasionalinstancesof Haigspeakandby facilitating the acquisition of narrow-rangerules, and they influencethe history of the languageby offering opportunitiesfor newnarrow-rangerulesto arise, presumablyat first as Haigspeak. Note whatwould happenif children' s errorsweredueto correctbroad-range rules. Therewould be no embarrassment for the theoryof argumentstructureI am proposing, for children would haverulesin their headsthat are the sameas the rules that adults have in their heads. Thus there would be no unlearning problem. Childrenwouldjust belittle Haigs, if you will forgive the unappealing like CanI fill somesalt into the bear? metaphor. Theywould producesentences usingthe samemechanismthatcausesadultsto write Takea little of themixture at a time andfil / it into thezucchini. No developmentalchange,of course, is the easiestkind of changeto explain. It should, I haveargued, serveas the null hypothesis in developmentalpsychology(Pinker, 1984). In the next sectionI will try to showthatseveraldifferentempiricaltestssupportit , andfew or noneare inconsistentwith it. Note, too, whatthe alternativewould be. Saythat children' s errorsweredue to narrow-rangeexistence-predictingrulesthatwerenotyetquitenarrowenough in their range, becausethey werenot yet complexenoughin their semanticconditions . Developmentwouldthenhaveto bedrivenby somemechanismthatsplit andcomplicatedchildren' s narrow-rangerules, from a singletoo- simplerule to , suchasthe manyvery complexones. It is possibleto imaginesuchmechanisms I in entertained 6 but conceptualclusteringalgorithms chapter , they raise the

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questionof why sucha mechanismshouldexist andwhetherit would actually work. Instead, I have suggestedthat narrow-rangerulesare low-level generaliza tionsof lexicosemanticrepresentations ; their complexitysimply reproducesthe ' complexityof verbs meaningsminusthe idiosyncraticbits of informationthat grammaris blind to. In the minimalist developmentaltheory I am proposing, children would project narrow-range rules from individual lexicosemantic structuresduringdevelopment, on a separatetrackfrom their useof broad-range rules. As they got older, they would have moreandmore narrow-rangerules, paralleling their increasein lexicosemanticknowledgeand allowing them to make legitimate grammatical generalizations(though these generalizations would be difficult for a psycholinguistto distinguishfrom conservativeusages outsideof experimentalsettings). They would engagein this courseof development at the same time as they were using broad-range rules to generate Haigspeakerrors. Narrow-rangerules would be minor bottom-up generaliza tions of lexical entries, tracking the developmentof verb meaning, and most instancesof theirusein spontaneous they speechwouldbeinvisibleto usbecause would be grammatical(to the extentthat their individual verb meaningswere accurate,an issueI take up in a latersection). Broad-rangeruleswould be large top-down generalizationsconstrainedby linking rulesand would changeminimally during development. 7.2.1.1 Why Children Would Sound Dift'erent from Adults Even If the Minimalist Solution Is Correct At first glancethe minimalist theory would seemimplausible, as manyof the overgeneralizationschildren make have an unmistakablychildlike soundto themandwould surely never be foundamongthekindsof innovativeor unconventional usagesshown by adults in exampleslike thosepresentedin section 4.5.1. But this reservationis inconclusive. Childrensoundchildlike for many reasonsotherthanhaving a badrule. Herearethreeimportantfactorsthatdifferentiate children from adults and could lead to qualitative differencesin the innovationsthat we would hearfrom eachof them. I . Lexical gapsand blocking. Causativeerrorswith verbslike be, stay, take, fall , come, go, have, die, and eat arestrikingly childlike, and it would be very surprisingif an adult ever usedthemcausativelyevenasa one-shotinnovation. Presumabl y thatis becauseof theexistenceof put, make, keep, give, drop, bring, take, give, kill , andfeed. I do not think that theseareliterally suppletivepairs, , unlikepast analogousto go/wentor be/wasin thepasttense,becausecausatives tenseforms, do not form a paradigmin Englishsuchthateveryverbhasno more andnolessthanonelexical causative.Most verbs, likedisappear, havenolexical

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causative;some, like beor have, haveseveral(e.g., makeandput for be, takeand give for have; seeMiller andJohnson-Laird, 1976, for a review). Nonetheless , if ungrammaticalHaigishcausativesare producedin responseto lexical gaps, that is, in discourseand sentencecontextscalling for a lexical causativethat is not available, then that situationwill simply never arisefor verbs like be and comein the adult state. Therewill alwaysbe a high-frequencyword available whosemeaningtransparentlyencodescausationof the intransitivemeaning,and adultcausativeerrorswith theseverbswould neveroccur(seethe semanticrepresentatio of theseverbsin chapter5). Clark ( 1987) has stressedthat children are faced with a problem: their vocabularyis ladenwith gaps, andeven the verbs they haveacquiredmay not have been acquired with complete and accurate semantic representations . Therefore, manytimeswhenchildrenwantto communicatea message will , they lack theadult' s meansof doingso. As a result, they will stretchtheir existingvocabulary to fill thegaps, resultingin ungrammaticalformsusedonceandthrown , the child will be in suchsituationsless away. As the adult forms aremastered often andmakeerrorslessoften. In particular, children may not havecausative forms like bring andkeepavailableandanalyzedproperly during the periodin which they arecausativizingthe intransitiveforms. In section7.1.3 I reviewed experimentaland naturalisticdata that suggestthat as the transitivesare remastered , the ungrammaticalcausativesdrop out. A similar processno doubt accountsfor the disappearance of many causativizedadjectiveswith existing lexical causatives(e.g., sad / sadden) and for the handful of verbs that have phonologicallysimilar causatives(e.g., rise / raise).2 2. MetalinguisticDifferences.Aronoff ( 1983) points out that manysemiproductive lexical rules (what I would call " property-predictingrules" ) call attention to themselveswhen used, and hencecan be employedto convey special " " pragmaticeffects, which hecollectivelycalls foregrounding. For example,the suffixes-nessand-ity areroughlysynonymousways of convertinganadjective to a noun, but only the -nessform is fully productive. However, productiveuses of the -ity form, becausethey arenot automaticallygeneratedby an existencepredictingrule, canbe usedto indicatethat the intendedmeaningis specialized or technical. Thusrelativity andproductivity havetechnicalmeaningsin physics and linguisticsthat mererelativenessor productivenesswould fail to connote. Aronoff then remarks(p. 167): Theuseof lessproductiveWFP's [wordfonnationpatterns of foregrounding ] for purposes is pervasive . Technicaltenns, jargon, highfalutinlanguage , advenising , academe se, all uselessproductive WFP's simplybecause . It theyaremoreremarkable is alsoof someinterestthatyoungchildrenapparently do notknowwhatis remarkable . Instead ; Bennan1980 (Clark1978 of theproductivity ) theycoinwordsatwill , regardless of thepattern . Children , in otherwords,arepureformalists.

Development

childrenandadultscanbetracedto thefactthatchildren's Thedifference between of it (Sinclair, of their awareness commandof their language growsindependently comeslate, perhaps Jarvella , andLevelt1978 ). Awareness onlyaftertheformalsystem onawareness hasdeveloped , childrenareincapable depends fully. Sinceforegrounding . of mostmetalinguistic activities of it, astheyareincapable Evenif theclaimsaboutdevelopmentaresomewhatoverstated , theoverallpoint ' is probably right. If so, someof children' s errors may seemunlike adults Haigspeakbecausethey do not exploit the pragmaticnuancesthat accompany productiveuseof property-predictingregularities. For example,causativization implies direct unmediatedcausation, which helps to rule out the causativeof actionverbsin grammaticalEnglishbut which may alsobeexploitedcreatively to convey the potencyof a causeor the passivity of the causee , as when a 's or when Richard a What her? about Pryor crying baby, fussing grandfathersays saidI tookacid. It sanedmeright up. Whenanadvertisementfor anamusement ' ' ' parksaysWe re gonnasplashandwe re gonnaspinya. We re gonnascreamand ' we re gonnagrin ya, wesensethattheungrarnmaticalityis excusedby- indeed, contributesto- the carefreetonethatthebrochureseeksto establish.If children areoblivious to thesenuances , theirerrorswouldberecognizablychildlike even if they were causedby a grammaticalmechanismthat remainedunchanged throughadulthood. . Muchin thetheorypresentedin thisbookdepends 3. Incorrect verbmeanings : conformity of a verb both to broadon accurateverbmeaningrepresentations ' rangeandto narrow rangerulesdependson theverb s lexicosemanticstructure. If an individual verb has an incorrectsemanticstructure, it could acquirean incorrectargumentstructure, even if all the rules that applied were perfectly adultlike. In section7.5 I will show that many of the errors children make (includingonesthatactuallysupplantcorrectforms) aredueto systematicerrors andblasesin children' s acquisitionof verb meaning. My evidencefor the minimalist hypothesisconsistsof threeparts: evidence that children' s rulesof argumentstructurealternationare alwayssemantically ' conditioned (section 7.3); evidencethat children s overgeneralizationsare generallydueto the useof property-predictingrules (section7.4); and, finally , areotherwisedueto incorrectverb evidencethatchildren' s overgeneralizations meanings(section7.5).

AreAlways Seman Rules 7.3 Children ' s Argument Structure Changing tically Conditioned Two sets of empirical outcomes have disconfinned the prediction of Pinker ( 1984) that children initially coin rules of argument structure alternation that operate directly on grammatical functions or structural positions . First , in the

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experiments I have run with JessGropen , Loren Ann Frost, and others, we failed to find evidence for any stageat which semantic constraints failed to operate. In fact , we failed even to find consistent increaseswith age in children ' s sensitivity to those constraints . Second, analyses of children ' s overgeneralizations show that they are a sharply constrained subset of the possible errors we would expect to find if they were really manipulating syntactic argument structures directly . The evidence, then, is consistent with the hypothesis that from the very start children use what I have beencalling broad- range lexical rules, rules that effect changes of lexicosemantic structure. I will discuss this evidence separately for each alternation . 7. 3.1

Semantic Constraints on Children ' 5 Causatives

7.3.1.1 Experimental Evidence In Gropen, Pinker, andRoeper(in preparation ) we taught children intransitiveaction verbsand askedthem to describe what washappeningwhena toy animalcauseda secondanimalto engagein the action. The causationwas shown either by having the first animal directly manipulatethe second, or by having an interveningevent in which the first animal would throw a marbleat the second, sendingit into the action. Children in our youngestgroup were4 yearsold, an ageat which causativeerrors are , they nevercausativextremelycommon in spontaneous speech. Nonetheless ized theintransitiveverbto referto casesof marble-mediatedcausation,though they causativizedthoseverbs55% of the time whenreferringto direct, unmediated causation.Childrenin theolder group (6 yearsold) were, if anything, a bit lessmindful of thedirectcausationconstraint: theycausativizedthe verbs22% of thetime whenthecausationwasmediated,andthemagnitudeof thedifference betweentheir causativizationratesfor direct andmediatedcausationeventswas smallerthan that for the youngergroup (44 versus55 percentagepoints). Sensitivity to direct causationin the interpretationof lexical causativesof existing verbswasshownfor evenyoungerchildrenin an experimentreported in Ammon( 1980). In thisexperiment(thethird oneshereports), Ammonrecited lexical andperiphrasticcausativesentences to childrenandaskedthemto choose oneoutof a setof threepicturesthatshowedthemeaningof eachsentence . Three verbs (bounce, spin, andshake) were presentedin lexical causativesentences each paired with a triplet of pictures. One picture depicteddirect stereotypic causation(e.g., a cartooncharacterbouncesa ball in the usual manner); one depictedsomethingthatcouldbe interpretedaspermissivecausation(the character watchesa ball bounce); andonedepictedmediatedcausation(thecharacter pointsa finger at a girl bouncinga ball, asif directingherto do so). The youngest groupof childrenrangedfrom 2;8 to 3i4. Despitetheir tenderagetheychosethe

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mediated-causationpicture0% of the time for bouncingtheball, 6% of thetime for spinningtheglobe, and 8% of the time for shakingErnie. This wasnot due to a distaste for the picture or to an inability to understandthe pictorial conventions, at leastfor bounceand spin: the mediated-causationpicture was chosen31% of the time as the best depictionof let the ball bounceand 27% of the time asthebestdepictionof havetheglobespun. Similarly, thepermissivecausationpicturewasnot generally attractiveto the youngchildren, who chose it 6% of the time for bouncing the ball (while choosingit 56% of the time in connectionwith let the ball bounce).) In contrast, the picture showingdirect stereotypiccausationwas chosen 94%, 44%, and 66% of the time by the youngestagegroupfor bounce, spin, andshake, respectively(chance= 33%). Therewassomeimprovementwith age: theoldestgroup, rangingfrom 5;8 to 6;0, neverchosethemediated-causationpicturefor any of thethreeverbsandchose thedirectcausationpicture88%, 88%, and100% of thetime. However, improvement with agein experimentaltaskscanoccurfor a varietyof reasons , andwhat is moststrikingaboutthesedataandthosefrom Gropenet al. is thatthesemantic condition seemsto operate, at least probabilistically, in the youngestchildren tested.4 7.3.1.2 Are Productive Transitives in SpontaneousSpeechNecessarily of overgenerated Causative? Bowennanhaslong arguedthat the appearance ' causativesin children' s spontaneousspeechis the product of the child s construingcomplexverb meaningsas having a causalcomponentand adding thatcomponentto newverbswhosemeaningslack it. In supportof this proposal, shenotesthatherchildren beganoverextendingthe alternationat the sametime thattheyfirst usedperiphrasticcausativessuchasmakeit open, wherecausation is expressedexplicitly . Shealso notesthat whenproductivecausativesappear, theyappearsimultaneouslywith intransitiveverbsandwith adjectives(e.g., You ' can t happyme up) despitethe grammaticaldifferencesbetweenthem, which childrenotherwiserespect. This suggeststhat the semanticoperationof adding a causeelementis the crucial step. ' ' Lord ( 1979) hasquestionedBowennan s assertionthatchildren s overextensions " " necessarilyinvolve the semanticelement cause ; shesuggeststhat they simply involve addingan argumentto an intransitivepredicate,making it transitive . Lord recordedabouttwo hundredexamplesof ungrammaticaltransitives ' . Sheconcedesthat derivedfrom intransitivepredicatesin herchildren s speech 's that the child' s with consistent Bowennan all them are of proposal virtually operation involves adding the notion of causation to the meaning of the intransitivepredicate,but emphasizesthreeexamples- shownin (7.4) - where this could not be true.

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(7.4) Benly, 2;8: Did you soundthat?! Did you soundthat funny guy?! [ B hears recordingof rock singer, comesto seeif M heardit too.] Benly, 3;0: I fit these. [B putson socks; cf~Thesefit .] Jennifer, 4;7: I ' m just gonnahold ' em and look at ' em, and, uh, interest ' em. [They are interesting; J is just going to be interestedin them.] Asidefrom thefact thatproductivenoncausative transitivesareextremelyrare (threeout of about two hundredexamplesin Lord' s data; zero out of over a hundredin Bowennan's), they are almost certainly derived from processes differentfrom thoseleadingto causativeovergeneralizations . If transitivesound is derivedfrom an intransitivefonn at all, it would haveto be from a form like He soundsfunny. However, this could easily be a narrow-rangegeneralization from alternationsdisplayedin adult Englishby verbsfor the other four senses , as(7.5) shows. (7.5) That man looks funny. / I lookedat the man. Thosesockssmell bad. / I smelledthe socks. This cheesetastesawful. / I tastedthe cheese. This rug feelssmooth. / I felt the rug. -free rule of transitivizaThustheycannotbe takenasevidencefor a semantics tion. As for theothertwo examples,Bowennan( I 982a) suggeststhatl fit thesemay be derivednot by transitivizing Thesefit but by confusing the roles of the two argumentsin thetransitiveThesefit me. Sincefit encodesa staticspatialrelation wherethedirectionof the asymmetrybetweenthemeandreferenceobject is not obvious, its linking with argumentstructureis unclear, so such a confusion wouldnot be surprising(indeed, adultsoccasionallyusethe verb asBenly did). ' Similarly, Jennifers useof interestcannotbetheresultof the transitivizationof an intransitivepredicate(* Thesebooksinterest,' * Thesebooksare interest) but couldbedueto a reversalof theargumentsof the transitiveverb in Thosebooks interestme. SinceEnglishcontainsperceptionverbsboth with stimulussubjects andwith experiencersubjects(seechapter4), occasionalconfusionsof this sort arenot unexpected , andBowennan(in press; seealsoBowerman, 1981) reports 1 don' t appeal to that (= " that doesn't appealto me" ) from Christy and eight errorswith the reverseargumentassignment(e.g., 1 saw a picture that enjoyed me) from ChristyandEva in their school-ageyears. In sum, productivenoncausative transitivesarevanishinglyrarein children' s speech,andthefew examples that do occurare not the productof the rule that leadsto productive causative transitives. Lord also discusses productive intransitive errors, of which she recorded aboutfifty -five from herchildren. Theexamplessheprovidedarereproducedin (7.6).'

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(7.6) Two- argumentverbs: ' (a) B , 3; 1: Come and seewhat Jennygot today. [B pulls on M s hand, M doesnot move.] Pull. Pull! Comeon! (b) B , 3;3: We have two kinds of Corn: popcorn, and Corn. Popcorn: it ' crunches. And Corndoesnt crunch; it eats! ' (c) B , 3;7: I think I betterput it down thereso it won t lose. ' (d) B, 3;8: They don t seemto see. Wherearethey? [B andM arelooking for Bs sandals.] e B , ( ) 3;9: Whatdoesit readabout? [Theprinteddial ofa toyblood- pressure gauge] ' (f) B , 3; 11: You re botheringme! You keepon talking to her! And that makesme bother! ' J 2 (g) , ;9: f can t hearit. [Putsclock to ear.] ftcan hearnow. [J hearsclock ticking.] ' (h) J, 8;3: Do you think it ll fix ? [ Fatheris trying to repairrefrigerator.] (i ) J, 8;5: They attract by the peanutsin thesnow. [Squirrelsseepeanuts in snow, come to porchfor more.] Three- argumentverbs: " " (j ) B, 2;8: Shecalls Fluffy Cat [= is called] . (k ) B, 2; 11: Lunch doesnot call a birthdaycake. [At lunch B wantsa birthdaycake, andwhenM suggeststheypretendhis peanutbutter .] sandwichis a birthdaycake, he is annoyed 't can on I it out so it J 2 10: I wanna take () , ; put my nose. [J wantsto take icecreamout of conesothat it won' t geton her noseasshe eatsit.] Bowennanquestionshow commonthe error patternis, as shefailed to find manyin thespeechof her childrenor in adult innovations. However, Lord notes that intransitivizationerrors arenot as noticeableto an observerastransitivization errorsandthatonceshestartedlisteningfor them, sheheardthemfrequently. ' I suspectthat this is true. SinceI startedrecordingadults argumentstructure innovationsI havefound that innovativeintransitivesareascommonasinnovative transitives(see(4.46) and(4.47) in chapter4). Furthennore,ungrammatical ' . Bowerman intransitivesarenot really thathardto find in mostchildren s speech herself( 1978) reproducesoneexamplefrom herdaughter(withoutcallingattention " to the intransitiveerror): Youput a placefor Eva to put in (= You should ' " makea placefor Eva to be put in ). Maratsoset al. ( 1987) provide/t s not losing ' (a balloon tied to a stroller) from the seniorauthors daughterandnotethatshe producedelevenotherswithin asix-monthspan.Recentlyastreeturchinof about ' 6 or 7 demandeda dollar from me after runninga squeegeeacrossmy car s windshield. Vigilant consumerthat I am, I pointedto a largesquashed bugstill ' " " stuckto the glass. That don t takeoff , he said.

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Bowennan( 1982a) finds suchexamples,manyof which arenot derivedby the subtractionof a " cause" elementfrom the transitive verb, " more difficult to " explainaway. But an examinationof the grammarof adult English eliminates thedifficulty . Recallthat Englishcontainsat leasttwo rulesof intransitivization (otherthanpassivization) that resultin thedeletionof the transitivesubjectand thepromotionof the object to intransitivesubject. As shownin sections3.3.4.3 and4.2, anticausativizationis theinverseof causativization;it subtractstheA Cf causalsuperstructure , making the verb expressan event whosecauseis nonexistent or unspecified. It is restrictedto subclasses of verbs whose semantic structurescontainan effect substructurepertaining to changeof stateor undirected mannerof motion andthatlack a manneror meansappendedto the ACT . Henceone cansayTheglassbroke or Theball bouncedbut not superstructure * Thepackage brought (directedmannerlessmotion) or * Thebread cut (means of causationspecified). Someof theexamplesin (7.6) canclearly be interpreted astheresultof a broad-rangeapplicationof anticausativizationthat is unmindful of thenarrowclassesit is restrictedto in adultEnglish, suchasthe sentenceswith pull ,Fix,put, andlose. Anticausativizationis alsoa likely sourcefor theexamples with eat(which clearly entailsa specificcausaleffect on thefood argument) and bother(which hascloserelativesthatdo undergoa causativization/anticausativizationalternationin adult English: John angeredI cheeredup I saddenedBill ; Bill slowly angeredI cheeredup I saddened ). Englishalsohasa rule of intransitivizationthat doesnot involve the subtraction of a causalsuperstructure . KeyserandRoeper( 1984) andHale and Keyser 1987 discuss the middle construction ( ) (see sections 3.3.4.3 and 4.2) which convertsa transitive predicate"X verbs r ' into an intransitive predicateY verbs," whosemeaningis not " Y undergoesthe event denotedby the verb but with an unspecifiedor nonexistentcause" but ratherY is such that the event denotedby the verb is doableto Y with degreeof ease2 ," where2 is expressed by anyof severaldevices. Most typically, it is an adverbialphrase, as in (7.7a), but it can also be a negative polarity element (7.7b) or markers of certain nonindicative modalities such as imperative syntax or exclamative stress (7.7c, d). (7.7) (a) This breadcuts easily. ' ' (b) This breadwon t cut (it s frozen). (c) Cut, damnyou! (d) Wow, this breadCUTS! As mentionedin earlier sections,the narrow-rangerulesof middle fonnation applymorebroadlythanthosefor anticausativization(e.g., theyapply to cut and bribe), but theydo not apply to just anytransitivepredicate(* Thesebirds watch easily; * ?Thewall slapseasily), only thosewith specifiedeffects. However, the

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presenceof aneffectis partof thenarrow-classdefinition only . Thebroad-range rule of middleformationdoesnot needa causingeventto subtract, and indeed it does not generallyrefer to an event at all: it is a generic, quasi-stative predicationof thepatient.Thisallowsfor theuseof middleformation(asabroadrangerule) to deriveintransitives from verbsthat were not causativeto begin with (see, for example, someof the Haigspeaksentencesin (4.47 . When we look back at Lord' s data, we see that most of her examplesthat are not middles, bothonsemanticgrounds, arealmostsurelyoverextended anticausatives becausethey expressa stative predicationof a patient rather than an event description, and on grammaticalgrounds, becausethey contain grammatical devicesindicatingeaseof acting on the patient. In (7.6a), we havepull in the imperative(cf. (7.7c ; in (b), eat is in anexclamation(cf. (7.7d ; in (c), loseis negatedandin futuretense(cf. (7.7b ; in (d), seeis negated;in (g) and(i ), there arequasi-genericpredicationsusingmodalandinstrumentalitemsthat arealso ' middle-like (cf. This breadwill cut now (it s thawedout),' ?This breadwill cut only with a verysharpknife). Of theremainingexamplesin (7.6), (e) (andpossiblyd ) and(g) aswell) could ' easily be the inverseof Benjy s error with soundin (7.4), basedon a narrow generalizationfrom thealternationdisplayedby smell, taste,feel, andlook (at). ' This leaves(I) and(k) astheonly examplesof children sproductiveintransitives thatcannotbeexplainedastheapplicationof broadbut semanticallyconditioned rules of anticausativization , middle formation, or sensory verb alternation. (Evenhere, it is not implausiblethattheerrorsstemfrom the fact thatthecorrect targetexpressionsuchasSheis called Fluffy Cat is a passivethat is perhaps higher in frequencythanits correspondingactiveand not transparentlyderived from it , leadingthechild to misanalyzeit.) Entirely absentareerrorssuchas* / " * ' " " just saw (= Someonejust sawme ), / m slapping! (= Someoneis slapping " " ' " me ), * / don t wantto tickle! (= betickled ), andso on, whereneitheranticausativization(becauseof thelack of effect) nor middle formation (becauseof the temporallyspecifiedevent) can be the source. 7. 3.1. 3 Choice of Causativized Predicates and Arguments in Causative ' Errors Let me discuss another way in which causative errors in children s spontaneousspeechare subject to semantic constraints similar to those governing broad-range causativization in adults. In chapters 4 and 6 I showed how broad- range rules might serve several functions : constraining the fonn of narrow - range rules, defining possibilities for expanding the stock of alternating ' verbs and narrow- range rules in the language, delimiting the amount of a verb s semantic structure that is reproduced in a narrow -range rule , and motivating which narrow subclasses of verbs were most likely to submit to an alternation in history and in one-time usages. The notion of direct causation , inherent in the

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definition of thebroad-rangerule of causativization , makesit likely thatclasses of verbs of physical motion or physical changeof state will be lexically causativizablein a languageandfar lesslikely that verbsof voluntaryactivity will be (Nedyalkovand Silnitsky, 1973). Someverbsmay fall into a gray area vis-a-vis direct causation, andlanguagesmay be expectedto differ in tenns of whethercausativizationis pennitted. For example, for verbsof involuntary activity, such as changesof mood (e.g., sadden, cheer up), verbs typically involving nonhuman,hencesemivolitional, actors(e.g., trot , gallop), andverbs involving inherentlydirectedmotion(e.g., rise, exit) or emissionof entities(e.g., sweat, shine), it is neitherobvious that the eventsare directly causableby an externalagentnor obviousthat they haveinternalcausesthat would makeany externalproddingindirect. Englishallows thecausativizationof a subsetof the first class and the secondclass, but not the third and fourth, though other languagesdiffer in this regard. If children' s overcausativizationresultsfrom a broad-rangerule basedon a semanticstructurewhosecognitive contentinvolvescausationby unmediated actingupon, their errorsshouldmirror thecross-linguisticpatterns;not all verbs would have an equal chanceof yielding ungrammaticalcausativesin their . Verbsthat areuncausativizable speech by virtue of thesubtlelinguistic criteria that delineatenarrow subclass es in English shouldbe causativizedmore often thanverbsthatareuncausativizable by virtue of beingcognitivelyincompatible with the notion of direct unmediatedcausation.For example, we might expect children to be especiallyproneto errors resultingfrom a failure to distinguish betweenverbsof mannerof motion and verbsof directionof motion, or from a failureto distinguishverbsof changingstatefrom verbsof beingin astateor from verbsof going out of existence.Conversely, theyshouldbe unlikely to produce ungrammaticallexical causativesfor verbsof voluntaryactivity, even though opportunitiesfor producingsucherrorsare rampant: parentsforcing, threatening , inducing, preventing,or allowingchildrento dothings, andchildrenenticing or badgeringtheir parentsor siblings to do things, haveto be amongthe most commoneventsinvolving somenotion of causationthat childrenare likely to think aboutor commenton. Thiscould in principleleadto avarietyof errorssuch asShe's alwayswashingmeup (= makingme washup); Sheplayedmeoutside; ' He s cookingher (= makinghercook); / ' m leavinghim mealone; / ' m trying to run her away; Stoptalking meinfront of peopleall thetime(= makingme talk), and so on. To test this prediction, I examinedthe 106 sentenceslisted by Bowennan ' verbs ( 1982a) that involved children s useof causativesof noncausativizable (i.e., the verbs derived from adjectiveswere excluded). They breakdown as shownin (7.8).

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Of thesesubclass es, thefirst five areclearlyeligible for broad-rangecausativization, sinceclassesof morphologically unrelatedverbsconflating causation with thekind of eventexpressedby theseverbsexist in English. Fordirectedmotion we havebring, take, put, drop , raise, lower; forgoing out of existencewe we have havekill , destroy; for being/ stayingwe havekeep, make; for possession have and take;6 for psychologicalverbs we have remind, show, hurt, teach. Thesesentences , eachof which involves a legitimatesemanticconflationclass with an illegitimately assignedstem, accountfor 77% of children' s causative errorsin the examplesprovidedby Bowerman. Another9 sentences (9% of the but involve events in modem do not have causative English counterparts sample) that have enoughof an involuntary componentthat direct causationis not inconceivable.andindeedtherearecausativeverbsthatarenotentirelyunrelated to causationof theseevents: bleed (as in what barber-surgeonsusedto do to patients), grow (what onedoesto plants), amuse, upset, andtickle. (In fact, the sentenceDon' t giggleme! mayevenhavebeena malapropismin which thechild confusedthe stemsgiggle and tickle. She was being tickled at the time, and intrusionsof wordsthat arephonologicallyand semanticallysimilar to a target arenot uncommonin children' s speech.PinkerandPrince( 1988) reportgrained for ground,fulled for filled , and breckedfor wrecked, for example.)

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This leaves14sentences( 13%) seeminglyinvolving voluntary actions. But closerexaminationreducesthis numberstill further. Eat was usedto meanfeed, and indeedmay have beena malapropismrather than a causativizationerror. Note thatfeed doesnot mean" causeto eat" in adult English. It really means " " " somethinglike give food to (actually, give food to so that the recipient may " eat ; seesection 5.6.1), as its participation in the dative alternation would . Forexample, onedoesnotfeeda child by approachinghim in the high suggest chair with his food alreadyin front of him andthenbribing or threateninghim; andonedoesnotfeed a rat by surgicallyremovingthe ventromedialnucleusof its hypothalamusor by electrically stimulatingthe lateral nucleusof its hypothalamus , thoughtheseeventscauseit to eat, ratherdirectly in the latter case. Wheneverthere is feeding, however, there is giving of food. The child ' s ungrammaticaluseof drink may be exactly the same; indeed historically the Englishverbdrenchwasmorphologicallyrelatedasa kind of causativeof drink (Curme, 1935), though causationof voluntary action was never part of its " " meaning.Thustheseexamplesare not really casesof causingto act. Of theremaining8 action verbs, 6 wereusedto refer to toys. This leaves2 sentences out of a total of 106 that involve voluntary action by a real-world animateagent. Thusa classwiseanalysisof causativizationerrorsrevealsa striking pattern: the majority of sucherrors denoteeventswhere direct causation, without the mediationof a voluntaryagent, canbecarriedout, andthe ungrammaticality of the sentences is due to the semiarbitrarydelineationof narrow-rangecausativizableclassesin English. Only 2% clearly involve causationof activity by an animatecausee , which the notion of direct causationthat is grammaticizedinto thecausativesemanticstructurerules out. This suggeststhat children' s rule of causativizationinvolves sucha structure. 7.3.1.4 Causativizationof Transitive Verbs If causativizationsimplyadded anexternalargumentto a predicate, we would expectthat sometransitiveverbs shouldbeconvertedto double- object(ditransitive) verbs. Note that it is unlikely thatadultEnglishhasa rule capableof doing this. For one thing, thereare very few Englishverbsthatalternatebetweentransitiveanddouble-objectfonDSwith thesubjectof thetransitivedemotedto thefirst objectof the double- object form andthe objectof the transitive demotedto secondobject of the double-object form (evenignoring the questionof whetherthe addedargumentis a cause).' That is, thereareno alternationslike Johnate theappleI * / ate John the apple; Thedog enteredthe room I * He enteredthe dog the room; and The explosion destroyedthehouseI * / destroyedtheexplosionthehouse. Furthermore, if there were, andif they werethe consequence of a rule that addedan argumentto an structure which would serveasa variable in the operation), ( arbitraryargument

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theprocesscould thenapplyto three- argumentverbs, yielding * / handedJohn Bill the ball (= " I causedJohnto handBill the ball" ) or * Merrill Lynch earned that investmentmea lot of money. It couldevenapply recursively, generating * Sheenteredhimthedogtheroom, * Thestormenteredher him thedogtheroom, andso on. This supportsthe claim thatthecausativerule doesnot simply add an argumentto a variablestandingfor anargumentstructure, but addsa causal ontospecificconfigurationsof semanticstructure. This is truenot superstructure ' in only English but cross-linguistically. Nedyalkov and Silnitsky s ( 1973) surveyshowsthat althoughsomelanguagescancausativizetransitiveverbsto , four-argumentcausativesare extremelyrare yield three-argumentcausatives andfive argumentcausativesdo not existat all. Thusthe rule of causativization 8 universallydoesnot iterate. If this is right, we get the prediction that children should not treat the -addition operation, increasing the causativizationrule as a pure argument valenceof arbitrary verbs, evenif the addedargumentwas invariably a cause. Therearea few caseswherechildrendo extendtwo-argumentverbsto become three-argumentdouble-objectverbs. Lord reproducesthreeclearexamples(she wereproducedfor five other mentionsthatproductivethree-argumentsentences verbs, but it is not clear how many were ditransitive). In the sample that Bowennan provides, I found fourteen(counting immediate repetitionsas a 9 examplesare reproducedin (7.9). singleexample). The seventeen (7.9) From Lord ( 1979): (a) B , 4;7: Take me a piggybackride! [ B wants a piggyback ride on father.] b J 3 ( ) , ;8: You candrink me the milk [feed, help to drink] . ' (c) J, 4;8: I m trying to guessAunt RuthwhatI have. [J wantsAunt Ruth to guesswhat shehasin her hand.] From Bowerman( 1982): ' ] (d) Rachel, 2;0: Don t eatit me. [As M feedsR cottagecheese in friend ? to adult me a lesson 4 Will have [Request (e) C, ;0: you swimmingpool] (f) C, 4;6: Would you like me to ... have ... you some? [Re: piece of gingerbreadCisholding , to M ] (g) C, 3;8: You feedme. Takeme little bites. Give me little bites. (h) Roben, 11+: We took him a bathyesterdayand we took him onethis morning. [Reportingon bathingbabybrother] ' i Julie , 5+: When we go homeI m gonnatake you a bath with cold () water. [To her doll] ' ' ' (j ) Hilary, 4+: C mon, Mama, takeme a bath. C mon, David, Mama s gonnatake us a bath.

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(k ) C, 3;9: You betternot takemea quiet time, you bettertakemea quiet time. [C paraphrasingfor D ' s benefita protestshe'd madeearlier whenM saidsheshouldhavea nap: " You betternotgivemea quiet time, you bettergive mea quiet time." Notethechangefrom give to take. After original sentenceshe laughedwhen she realized she'd madea mistake, intendingto say, " You betternot give me a nap, you bettergive me a quiet time." ] (1) C, 3;5: A nice nurselady took me a ride. [Reportingthat nursein hospitalhad pushedher in a wheel chair] ' (m) Hilary, 4+: David, let s takeMamaa ride. [ M: Oh, you' re gonnagive me a ride?] Yes, we' re gonnatake you a ride, Mama. (n) Rachel, 4;6: I want you to takeme a camelride over your shoulders into my room. ' (0) Jaime, 5; 10: I m taking my babiesa walk. [Pushingdolls in buggy aroundhouse] (p) C, 4;3: Andrea. I wantyouto watchthisbook. Andrea. I wantto watch you this book. [Shortly:] I just want you to watch this book. [C ' trying to get A s attentionso shewill look at the book] (q) C, 6; II : Rememberme what I camein for. Thesedatashowa unifonn pattern. Without exception,all theproductivetwoobject fonns involve a notion of possessionakin to that expressedin existing English double-object fonDs. Ten of the seventeenforms involvedtakein idioms that requiregive in adult English (a ride, four times; a bite; a bath, three times; a nap / " quiet time" ; a walk). These idioms also involve a senseof metaphoricalpossessionthat is transparentenoughto supportuseof the verb have: I already had a ride / a bite/ a bath / a nap / a walk. Two involvedhave outright, playingtherole of give. Two wereanalogoustofeed(eatanddrink once apiece), which participatesin thedativealternationandmeansroughlygivefood to (seetheprecedingsubsection). Finally, watch, guess,andrememberarebeing usedin sensesverycloseto show, ask, andtell , respectively,all dativizableverbs -transfermetaphor. that exploit the widespreadcommunication-as-possession (The children weresimply ignoringtheextraattributionof cognitiveactivity on the part of the recipientof communicationthat barstheseverbsfrom causativizing in adult English.) A similarpatternhasbeennotedby Maratsoset al. ( 1987), who remarkthatin the speechof Maratsos' s daughter,eatwastheonly transitive verb to be causativized. This is a striking finding , onethatoffersstrongsupportto thethecentralityof thematiccoresin the currenttheory. Beforelooking at thedata, we might have ' expectedany verb to gain an argumentthrough the child s applicationof the " causeaddingoperation(e.giShe killed methebug= causedmeto kill thebug" ).

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This should be expected even more strongly for the optionally transitive verbs that children do occasionally turn into causative transitives - since children say

' I ' m singing him, theycould alsosayI m singing him a song, meaning" causing " him to sing a song ; sincetheysayClimb me up there, they could alsosayClimb methetree, meaning" Help meclimb thetree." Instead, we find that 100% of the productive double-object utterancesinvolved verbs that in adult English are associatedasa semanticclasswith literal or metaphoricalchangeof possession , a notion which embracesall existingdouble-object forms in Englishandwhich tendsto characterizedouble-objectforms in otherlanguagesaswell. However, in few of thesecasescould the errorsbe derived by dativization- noneof the verbs is grammaticalin the prepositionalform for the adult, and only a few ' appearedin that fonn in the children s speech. The finding thus supportsthe hypothesisthat rules that changeargument structuresare mappingsamong thematiccores, wherethesethematiccoreshavean independentidentity in the lexicon asdefinitionsof the possibleverb meaningsunderlyinga given kind of , the dativerule maps argumentstructure. In Englishandmany other languages thematic core; apparently, fonns onto that stemsunderlyingprepositionalobject for children the causativerule is anotherroute to the sametype of structure, revealingtheexistenceof thatstructureindependentof thevariousrulesthatmap onto it. But theclinchercomesfromcross-linguisticevidence.NedyalkovandSilnitsky ( 1973) observethat if a causativemorphemein a languageis unproductivefor transitiveverbsbut admitsof a few exceptions, theseexceptionsareeitherpsychological " verbs, like " see/show," " remember/remind, or " understand / explain " or verbs , suchas , pertainingto the giving of somethingto be consumed " " " "" " eat/feed, drink/ give to drink, or suck/ suckle. Of coursethesearejust the kinds of transitiveverbsthat Englishchildren overgeneralizethe causativerule to. Apparently universally, causativeditransitive structuresare attractedto . Convergences conflationsof causationwith literal or metaphoricalpossession like this shouldgivecomfortto anyonewho likes to think of languageacquisition as a fonn of hypothesistesting. The sentencesin (7.9) show that English; speakingchildren areentertaininga correct hypothesisabout causativization it ' sjust that the languagesthatthehypothesisis correctin happennot to include English. 7. 3.2

Semantic Constraints on Children ' s Datives

7.3.2.1 Experimental Evidence In Gropen et ale ( 1989), we examined children' s willingnessto utterproductivedouble- objectdativesfor verbsinvolving specific instrumentsof transfer, as a function of the kind of targetof the transfer. We hopedto exploit the fact that when a toy was transferredto an

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inanimateobject(suchasa book), the child would be unlikely to perceiveit as " of the the" possessor transferredtoy, but that whenthe child himself or herself wasthe destination , a changeof possessionwould be a naturalinterpretation. Whena toy animalwasthedestination, thelikelihoodof a possessional interpretation shouldbesomewherein between. If so, andif childrenusethe dative rule to generatesemanticstructuresencodingchangeof possession , they should be mostlikely to sayYou' re mooping X the marble whenX refersto the child , less likely whenX refers to an animal toy, and least likely when X refers to an inanimateplace. This is what we found: the threepercentages were52%, 37%, and 32%, respectively , and both differences were statistically significant. Although theyoungestgroupof children we testedwasfrom 5;8 to 7;6, dative errorsin spontaneous speechstill occurduring thatagerange. Thusit was interesting that the effect of type of recipient on frequencyof productive doubleheldin thatagegroup(whosemeanswere54%, 40%, and34% objectutterances in thethreerespectiveconditions) andthe sizeof theeffect wasno larger in the older agegroupof 7;6 to 8; II (whosemeanswere51%, 34%, and30%). So we fail to find an age range in which children use a rule free of the notion of possession change,which is at the heartof the broad-rangedative rule, and we fail to find an age-relatedincreasein the degreeto which this notion affects . productiveusage 7.3.2.2 SpontaneousSpeech In ( 1.16) in chapterI , I reproducedtwenty-six productivedouble-object fom1s(not counting repetitionswithin a recording session) from Gropenet al. ( 1989). They breakdown as follows. Onewasa morphologicalviolation involving the Latinateverbdemonstrate. Four involved the use of put to mean give (seeBowem1an , 1978), which is ' to' in adult because a illegitimate English put specifies path and selectsfor a Jackendoff I 987a which cannot be satisfied by a word denoting a , ), place ( person. Sincethe children also usedput in the prepositional-dative fom1 in sentencessuchas Youput the pink one to me (Christy) and We' re putting our thingstoyou(Eva), thisappearsto betheresultof ageneraltendencyto substitute put for giveonoccasion,perhapswith thedativerule appliedto theprepositional fom1. In eithercase,theresultingdouble-objectform clearly is intendedto signal . Five sentencesinvolved the verb say. As discussedin changeof possession section4.4.1, sayis a verbof communicationtaking a transparentpropositional argumentthat makesit fall outside the narrow classof verbsof illocutionary communicationembracingtell , pose, andsoon, butotherwiseinvolvesthe same senseof causationof possession of a messagethatmotivatesthedativizability of the tell verbs. Five sentencetypes from one child involved write used as a synonymfor draw; usedin this way asa verb of creation, its dativizability is not

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surprising . One more involved the substitution of keepfor do in the double - object idiom do me a favor . Seven of the usages involved a pure benefactive interpretation , in which a conversion of the sentenceto thejor -prepositional form would render it grammatical in adult speech, but in which no literal possessionchange occurs. The verbs brush , button, finish , Fix, open, pass, and pick up were used in this way . Interestingly , in chapters4 and 5 I reviewed a rangeof evidence (much of it from Green, 1974) suggestingthat the benefactive relation can be subsumed under the thematic core usedto represent prospective possession, where the beneficiary is " treated as " possessing an advantageousobject , opportunity , or offering due to

the exertions of the agent. The developmentalevidencesuggeststhat this metaphoricextensionis quite naturalin the mind of the child. Two examplesfrom the MacWhinneyboysshow the sameparallelismbut with the oppositeaffective polarity, namelymalefactive. The sentenceshave " meaningsthat conflatethe maIefactiverelationwith the notion of prospective " lossof possession , ordinarily encodedin Englishverbssuchasbet, envy, cost, and sparethat appearonly in thedouble-objectfonn. Youate memy begrudge, andalsosuggestsbad fortune, as if cracker clearly involveslossof possession 10 Youate my crackeron mewasthetarget. Rossis gonnabreakinto the TV and is gonnaspendusmoneyis anexampleof causativizationof a transitiveleading to a double--objectfonn thatinvolveschangeof possession , asin section7.3.1.4, is awayfrom the causee. Indeed, cost only in this casethechangeof possession . substitutedfor spendin Mark' s sentencealmostmakesit acceptable I gon' put meall deserubberbandson is difficult to classify. Adam' s sentence The context of theutterancein the Brown transcriptsshowsclearly that Adam wasputting rubberbandsnot on himself, but ontoa boardon which the colored ' wasnot derivedfrom I gon rubberbandscouldfonn designs. Thusthesentence ' put all deserubberbandson meor I gon put all deserubber bandsto me. The immediatediscoursecontextis shownin (7.10). ' (7.10) Adam: I gon put each... all of the rubberbandson dere? Ursula: You can put themin all differentdirections. ' ' Adam: I gotmeanotherone. I gon put me... I gon put meail deserubber bandson. I can makea directionwith dis. Somekind of perseverationor priming from I got me another one might be occurring; if it is not an outright speecherror it might be a kind of reflexive benefactiveform of the sort discussedin chapter4 that appearsin colloquial American speech(e.g., Robertplayedhimselfoneheckof a ballgame). Thus all of the children' s errorsthat can be classifiedinvolve either literal ) or the benefactive/malefac(concreteor communicative changeof possession

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" ' to mean" That s some tea for you. This is presumably not an error in the argumentstructureof be but a mistakennoun phrasestructure. A phraselike makesometeafor you canbeparsedeitheras[make [ sometea] [for you]] or as [make[ some[tea for you] ]] . Lisa must havehearda sentencethat shouldhave beenparsedas [make[you] [sometea]] andgiven it the analogousparse[make [you sometea]] . This is a rare kind of error, I believe, but it shows that arepossible. If childrenwereableto allow suchsurfacemisanalyses misanalyses to be built into incorrectargumentstructuresassociatedwith verbs, resultingin frequenterrorslike thosein (7.11) and(7.12), it would countasevidenceagainst ' thepresenthypothesis.As I haveshown, children s argumentstructureoverextensions arein fact not of thatsortbutappearto bethe resultof adultlike thematic . generalizations 7.3.3 Semantic Constraints on Children ' s Locatives 7.3.3.1 Experimental Evidence JessGropen(Gropen, Pinker, and Gold' berg, 1987; Gropen, 1989; Gropen et al., in preparation) tested children s sensitivityto theregularitythattheverbsinvolving moving thingsselectastheir direct objects the entity that is affected in some salient verb-specific way. Specifically, a verb may expressthegoalof themotion asits surfaceobjectonly if the goal changesstateasthe resultof the addition of the themeof motion; if thereferentaction involvesno statechange,but insteada distinctive mannerof assurfaceobject. This regularity motion, it is themoving thing thatis expressed is aconsequence of thelinking rulefor objects. It is reflectedin thethematiccores for theint% nto andwith formsof thelocativealternation, andin thebroad-range rule underlyingthe alternation, whichconvertsa goal of motion into a themeof ' a statechange. It is expectedto constrainchildren s useof the two forms of the locativeto eventsinvolving a possiblestatechangeor a distinctive motion, respectively. Two similar experimentswererun in which children were presentedwith a " novel verb in an intransitivegerundiveform (" This is pilking ), paired with a demonstration of motionof a themeentity (e.g., a sponge) to a goal(e.g., a square of cloth) that either had a distinct manner(e.g., hopping or zigzagging) and resultedin no distinctive end state, or that had no distinctive mannerand did result in a distinctive end state(e.g., the goal object changedcolor when the themewasmovedto it ). The experimentis describedin more detail in section 7.5.3.3. In eachexperimentforty-eight children participated, sixteen 3-yearolds, sixteen5-year-olds, and sixteen7-year-olds. In addition, sixteen adult control subjectsweregiven the task. The resultsare shown in (7.23) and (7.24) in section7.5.3.3. The relevantdataare the differencesbetweenthe numberof

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utteredin responseto actionswith a distinctive goal-as-surface-objectsentences mannerandthe numberof suchsentencesutteredin responseto actionswith a distinctiveend state. If childrenaresensitiveto the constraint, thereshouldbe moreof the latter, andthe differenceshownin the tablesshouldbe positive. Two patternsarenoteworthy. First, evenchildren in the youngestagegroup weresensitiveto theconstraint.Second,therewasno consistentagetrendgoing from the 5-year-old groupto the 7-year-old group to the adult group: the effect sizesfor frequencyof goal-as-direct- object(" pilk the cloth" ) responses , averaged overthetwo experiments 47 were 42 , percentagepoints, percentage points, and 45.5 percentagepoints, respectively. (There was, however, a quantitative differencebetweenthe5-and-over' s andthe 3-year-olds, whoseeffect sizewas only 23.5 percentagepoints.) Note that the errors in using locativealternation verbsin spontaneous speechcomefrom children betweenthe agesof 2; II and 7;2 (Bowennan, 1981, 1982b). Thusfor thelocativealternation,asfor thedative and causativealternations , the experimentsfail to find a stageat which errorchildren are insensitive to theconstraintembodiedin thebroad-rangerule, prone and fail to showa developmentaltrend in the degreeto which children respect the regularityduring mostof the period in which trrors aremade. 7.3. 3.2 SpontaneousSpeech Bowennan( 1982b) hasalreadyconsideredthe ' questionof whetherchildren s locativeerrorsreflecta rule thatoperatesdirectly on surfaceroles(demotinga directobjectto an obliqueobjectandpromotingan oblique objectto direct object) or a rule that is restrictedto thematicrelations ' " " involving locationalthemesand goals (she usesTalmy s tenns figure and " . Shenotesthatall the " errorsshehasrecorded(reproducedin ( 1.19) of ground ) chapter1) involvephysicalmotionandanassociatedfigure-groundrelation. She reportsfailing to find syntacticallysimilar errors of the sort shown in (7.13), involving the locativizationof communication, perception, and instrumental relations, in her data. (7.13) 1reada book to Mary. ' * 1 readMary with a book. He reada poemout ?f (from) the book. , * He readthe book of a poem. Mothersaw(called) Johnnyfrom thewindow. ' * Mothersaw(called) the window of Johnny. 1atemy puddingwith a spoon. , * 1ate a spoonagainst(on, into) my pudding. 1openedthedoorwith my key. , * 1openedmy key against(on, into) the door. 1canaddseveralotherkindsof examplesof generalizationsthataresyntactically parallel to the locativealternationbut that have not been, and should not be, observedin children' s speech ; they areshownin (7.14). They involve changes

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of identity, accompaniednonagentivemotion, changesof circumstance , comitative relations, abstractantagonisticrelations, andothersdifficult to classify. (7.14) The fairy turnedthefrog into a prince. / * Thefairy turnedtheprincewith a frog. I followed him into the room. / * 1followed the room with him. Sheturnedhis friend againsthim. / * Sheturnedhim with his friend. Shehelpedhim with his homework. / * Shehelpedhis homeworkonto him. Shesaw Paris with him. / * Shesawhim into Paris. Shefought a battle with him. / * Shefought him into a battle. I remindedher of her brother. / * 1remindedher brotherfrom her. 7.3.4 Semantic Constraints on Children ' s Passives 7.3.4.1 Experimental Evidence Pinker, Lebeaux,andFrost( 1987) ranfive experiments in which children were taught verbs with different semantic to utterthemeither propertiesin eithertheactiveor passivevoiceandencouraged in the voice taughtor in the othervoice. Unlike the otheralternationswe have discussed , the passiverelatestwo forms one of which is significantly later acquired, more difficult , and more pragmaticallyspecializedthan the other. Becausewe wanted to disentangledifficulty in using the passivefrom the difficulty in generalizing to the passive, we measuredthe effects of verb semanticsby examiningthesizeof the 2 x 2 interactionbetweenverb semantics (moreor lesscanonicalfor thepassive) andvoice taught(passive,requiringno ). The magnitudeof this productivity, versusactive, requiring a generalization interaction, which we calledthe RelativePassivizabilityIndex(RPI), is simply a difference between differences: for each type of verb, one subtractsthe probability of utteringa passivewhenit wastaughtin theactivefrom theprobability of uttering a passivewhenit wastaughtin thepassive,andthensubtracts this differencefor oneverb typefrom thecorrespondingdifferencefor theother verb type. Fourexperimentsallowedbetween-subjectsexaminationsof agetrendsin the effect of verb semanticson passivizability. In the first, we comparedactional ' " verbs(meaning" to back into and" to slidedown the backof ) with two verbs " " " " denotingstatic spatialrelations( to suspend and to contain ). The effect size was.125for the 3-to-4! -year-oldchildren, andit was.125for the4t -to-5t -yearold children. In the secondexperiment, we comparedaction verbs whose " subjectswereagentsandwhoseobjectswerepatientswith difficult anticanoni" cal action verbswhosesubjectswerepatientsandwhoseobjectswereagents. The effect size for the 5-to- 6-year-old childrenwas.31; for the 7-to-8-year-old

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children it was .375. Though the Verb Semanticsx Voice Taught interaction capturingthis effect was significant, the three-way interactionincluding Age Groupwasnot. Furthermore, when the scoreswereadjustedto eliminatetrials in which thechild failed to learn the anticanonicalverbs, the effect of verb semantics remainedfor bothagegroups, but thedifferencein themagnitudeof this effectbetweentheolderandyoungerchildrenreversed:for theyoungerchildren it was.44; for theolderchildren it was.12. The third experimentwasareplication of the second. High error ratesmadeit mandatoryto eliminatetrials wherethe anticanonicalverb hadnot beenlearned; when this wasdonethe effect of verb semanticswas.35 for the 5-to-6-year-olds, and .11for the 7-to-8-year-olds. In thefourth experiment,we comparedverbsof spatialrelationsthatconformedto Jackendoff's ThematicHierarchy Condition (e.g., " to haveat one' s center," wherethesubjectis a locationandtheobject is a theme) with verbsthatviolated it (e.g., " to be at the centerof ," wherethe subjectis a themeandthe locationis anobject). In their elicited productions, the 5-to-6-year-old childrenshowedthe effect (RPI = .375) and the 7-to-8-year-old children did not (RPI = 0). In a -judgmenttask, whereboth kinds of passiveswerejudged separatesentence by the children as to whetherthey sounded" good" or " no good," the effect was shownbothby theyoungerchildren (RPI = .125) andby theolderchildren(RPI = .25). In sum, in thefive independentsetsof dataallowing agecomparisons , wefind that the effect of verb semanticson productive passivizability in the right directioncanbe detectedin the youngerof the two agegroupsin all five cases. Furthermore , the effect was strongerfor the older group in oneof the comparisons , strongerfor the youngerchildren in two of the comparisons , equalin the two groupsin a fourth, and strongerfor either the older or youngeragegroups, dependingon how the effect was calculated, in a fifth . 7. 3.4.2

Spontaneous Speech As mentioned in section 7.1.2, there were no good examples of children violating adult broad- range constraints on the passive. However , in the case of the passive, there may be even better evidence that children respect the broad constraints than for the other alternations: they may respect it more than adults do. Recall that the adult broad-range rule for the passive incorporates a predication effect , whereby the patient argument was the theme of a BE predication , and an agency or authorship effect , whereby what was assertedof this theme was that it had been acted upon or causedto be in its current state by an agent. This statement is abstract enough that no specific effect need be predicated of the theme other than that an agent had acted upon it (thus embracing hit and touch), but if the patient is being treated as a theme, it would be natural for a more concrete state or motion to be predicated of it as well as its

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circumstanceof beingthe targetof an agent's act; this would be the canonical way of representinga theme. (In fact, this is the dominantpattern in most ' : Keenan, 1985.) Thus it is conceivablethat children s broadrange languages rule for thepassiveincorporatesthepredicationeffectandtheagencyeffect, but the predicationeffect may be more concretein requiringa specific changeor motion. ' A conclusionvery muchalong theselines hasbeensuggestedfor children s speech(eliciteddescriptionsof pictures) by passivesin their semispontaneous " that . She 1978 ) ( suggested for a child, a passiveis usedasan after-theHorgan " fact observationonthestateof things. BorerandWexier( 1987) makea similar observationanduseit to arguethat for preschoolchildren, only the adjectival passiveexists, not the verbalpassive. Pinker, Lebeaux,andFrost( 1987) show thattheseclaimsaretoo strong. For example,theypresenteda setof passivesin Adam' s spontaneous speech, reproducedin (7.15), that are not after-the-fact observationson the statesof things. However, thereis a weakerversionof the . Everysingleoneof Horgan-Borer-Wexierobservationthatcanbesubstantiated thesepassivesinvolvesa verb with a specificeffect(i.e., theactiveverb would ' ' haveboth a patientanda theme, or in the schemeusedin chapter5, an effect link to a GO substructure ). Passivesof commonactionalverbs, like slap, hil , louch, kiss, andfeel, are entirely absent, as arepassivesof lessconcreteverbs suchas verbsof perception. For Eve andSarah,thepatternis evenstronger, as all of their spontaneous passiveswereambiguousbetweenstativeadjectivesand . It is clearthatchildrenarenowherenearpushingtheoutsideof verbalpassives theenvelopesurroundingthebroadclassof passivizableverbsin adult English. ' (7.15) 3;2: So it can t be cleaned? 3;3: WhenI get hurts, I put doseoneof dosebandageon. 3;3: Mommy, its will be cooked... in de minute. Yeah. It will be cookedin de minute. 3;4: He gon' get apared. 3;7: I don' t want the bird to get eated. 3;8: I wantto be shooted. 3; 10: Why he gon' be lockedin a cage? ' 3: 10: Sawthecowsbeingmilked [repetitionof Mother s " And sawthe " cowsbeing milked? ] . ' 3; 10: How could it go up if its not ... if it s not flyed? [a wheelof an airplane]. 3; 11: You don' t like to be rolled into clay. 4;0: Mommy, de cow gonnaget lockedup. Now de cow gonnaget lockedup.

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4;2: 4;2: 4;7: 4;8: 4;9: 4; 11:

Dh he got killed. Is dat where I wasbomed? I don' t want my animalsget killed. I wanna get somethingfixed. De top might get killed. I ' m gonnaaskMommy if shehasanymoregrain ... morestuff that she needsgrained. 4; 11: They gonnagetcut and cut [talking aboutcrackersbeing ground up] . 4; 11: It needssomepaint to be painted. 4; 11: Mommy , Paul wantsto be chained. 4; 11: You better sit down beforeyou get killed. 5;2: I don' t care if my table getsmessedup. 5;2: He' s not fixed yet. 7.3.5 Summary of Semantic Constraints on Children ' s Lexical Rules We haveexaminedteachingexperimentsandspontaneous speecherrorsfor four argumentstructurealternations. The resultsarehighly consistent.First, thereis no stageat which the effectsof semanticconstraintscannotbe measuredin the . Second, thereis no measurableagetrendin the sizeof the effects experiments of verb semantics(with oneminor exceptionin thecaseof the locative) during theyearsin which children areproneto overgeneralization . Third, in children' s spontaneous speech, their overgeneralizationerrorsare not due to treatingthe alternationsas manipulationsof phrasestructuresor evenof purely syntactic argumentstructures; the errorsalways fall within fairly well-definedsemantic boundariesthat betray the useof a rule mappingamongsemanticstructures , in eachcasevery close to what I haveproposedfor broad-rangerules for adults. Therearehighly surprisingfindings. Age trendsin experimentswith children areasinevitableas deathandtaxes, andthe experimentswereall designedwith theintentof finding them, basedon thepredictionsof Pinker( 1984). Theabsence of agetrendscannotbe attributedto insensitivityof themeasures , asthesemantic effect itself wasdetectablein the predicteddirectionin every caseandstatistically significant in most of them. Furthermore, the resultsof the spontaneous speechcorporarun completelycounterto beliefsheld by manydevelopmental ' psycholinguists(though never by me) that children s generalizationsare the resultof distributional analysesof surfaceregularitiesin the input. This pattern, then, is one important pillar of support for my solution for Baker' s paradox, which stemsfrom the inherentlexicosemanticnatureof thealternations , and for my explanationfor the developmentalversion of Baker' s ' paradox, namely that children s overgeneralizationerrors are the result of a

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mechanism that does not disappear and that undergoes little modification during development .

7.4 Do Children' s Errors Havethe SameCauseas Adults' ? What I have beentrying to avoid is needing a process that progressively splits and ' narrows a rule from the broad- range one that appearsto be the causeof children s errors to the set of narrow - range ones that delineate the alternation in the adult language, becausethere is no way to make senseof such a process. Rather, I have posited parallel pathways toward development of the adult state: a broad range rule that does not change, and 'aset of narrow range rules copied from lexicose' mantic structures in the child s lexicon and changing in synchrony with them as word meanings are refined . To support this simple parallel -tracks view , I must ' show that children s errors are due either to incorrect lexicosemantic structures for particular verbs ( which I take up in the section 7.5) or the useof a broad-range rule to generatesentencesdirectly . As mentioned , adults occasionally use broadrange rules in that way in the phenomenon I call Haigspeak ; the question is whether I can show that many of the errors children make reflect the same mechanism. ' There are two criteria that tell us that for adults , What sfussing her ? and He squeezedthefish with lemonjuice and Can you reach me that book? are one shot innovations rather than the product of existence predicting rules. First , they are ' far rarer than usagessuch as What s bothering her ? and He covered thefish with lemonjuice and Can you get me that book? Second, the majority of speakerswith a comparable linguistic background , and perhaps even the speaker himself or herself, would judge the sentencesas sounding odd. In the next two subsections, ' I show that by both of thesecriteria , many of children s overgeneralization errors ' can be shown to have the same genesis as adults errors . 7.4.1 Overall Tendency Toward Conservativism A key empirical assumption of the entire argument in this book , from chapter 1 on, has been that children are not conservative recorders of adult argument structures, and there is much evidence to support the assumption of productivity " over " strict itemwise conservatism. However , the theory developed herein allows only highly circumscribed productive mechanisms : use of broad-range rules as form -predicting constraints (except for rules that add affixes ), and extensions of conservatively acquired pairs of argument structures to small numbers of similar verbs in narrow conflation classes. Against these limited processes we require a pervasive background tendency of conservatism. We

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shouldI find that in children broad- range productivity indeed occurs, but conservatismI is the rule. 7.4.1.1 Experimental Evidence for Conservative Tendencies Experimentally , a tendencytowardconservatismcanclearly beseenin theexperiments of Gropenet al. ( 1989), in which children were taught different verbs in the prepositionalanddouble-objectdativeforms. Whenchildrenhearda verbin the prepositionalform, they usedthat verb in the prepositionalform 68.5% of the time whenansweringquestionsaboutsimilar eventsand usedit in the doubleobjectform 31% of thetime. However, whenchildrenheardaverb in thedoubleobject form, they usedit in the prepositionalform only 44% of the time, using the double-objectform 54% of the time. In Gropen, Pinker, andRoeper(in preparation), transitiveforms wereelicited moreoftenwhentheverbhadbeenmodeledin transitiveclausesthanwhenit had beenmodeledin intransitiveclauses,and intransitiveforms wereelicited more often whenthe verb hadbeenmodeledin intransitiveclausesthan when it had beenmodeledin transitiveclauses.Maratsoset al. ( 1987), in their studyeliciting productiveuseof a novel action verb, obtainedsimilar results. Subjectswho heardthe verb usedin a causativetransitiveform themselvesusedthe verb in a causativetransitiveform (or the sameform with the objectdeleted) on 98% of the opportunitiesfor doing so in variousproductiontasks. However, children who hadheardtheverbin ananticausativeor middle intransitiveform usedit in a causativetransitiveonly 26% of the time. Although in the experimentsof Pinker, Lebeaux, and Frost ( 1987) children passivizednovelactiveverbsreadily, they passivizedverbsthat they hadheard in thepassiveevenmorereadily. In everyexperiment, for everyagerange, and undereverycondition, we weremoresuccessfulin eliciting a sentencecontaining a particularvoicewhentheverbhadbeentaughtin that voice thanwhenthe verb had been taught in the other voice, an effect that reachedstatistical a verbsignificancein everycase.GordonandChafetz( 1986) alsodemonstrated effect in the acquisitionof the passivein a test retestexperiment. specificity They found that children wereconsistentfrom one week to the next in which verbsthey founddifficult to comprehendin the passive. 7.4.1.2

Conservative Tendencies in Spontaneous Speech From the errors reported in ( 1.14H 1.19) in chapter I , one might think that children use productive rules in many of the caseswhere they need a verb in a given argument structure, and that examples of such errors can be amassedsimply by listening to children speak for a while , much like overgeneralizations of past- tense mor " " phology . This is quite untrue. While the errors are common in the sensethat

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virtually all children makethem and in the sensethat enoughtokenscan be gatheredper child for us to know that theyarenot freakeventsor randomword ' strings, they arequite uncommonconsideredasa proportionof thechild s total ' speechor as a proportion of the child s sentencesinvolving the particular argumentstructures. Let usfirst considerdativeerrors, puttingasidefor nowthe questionof thesourceof theseerrors, andtreatthemasif theywereall theproduct of a productive dativization rule, even though someare surely the result of substituting the wrong stemfor a conservativelyacquireddouble-object verb (this issuewill bediscussedat lengthin thenextsection). Herearesomefigures . that put the frequencyin perspective Datives. For the productivedative constructionsshownin ( 1.16), 22 of the errors come from an analysisthat JessGropen, Michelle Hollander, and I performedon the speechof five children: Adam, Eve, andSarahfrom Brown ( 1973), and Rossand Mark, whosespeechBrian MacWhinneyrecordedand contributedto theChiL DESproject(MacWhinneyandSnow, 1985). Webelieve that thesesentencescontainall, or nearly all, of the clear productivedoubleobject datives in the transcriptsof their speechresidingin the ChiL DE Sfiles. How large was the pool of utterancesfrom which theseerrorscame? Adam produceda total of 22,303 utterancesin the transcripts; Eve produced9,482; Sarahproduced26,913; Rossproduced19,591; Mark produced8,043. Obviously werefrom stagesin whichutterancelengthswere manyof thesesentences too short to supportdouble-objectsentences , or werein contextswherepotentially dativizableverbswerenotcalledfor, but a rateof onedouble-objectform every 4, 111 sentences(.0002) gives one an idea of how rare theseerrorsare. .) (Recall that thedouble-objectform is a commonconstructionin casualspeech ' the vast of the child s double forms were Furthermore, grammatical majority object usageswith afew commonverbsin formsthatwereusedby theirparents. In (7.16) we seethat the numberof productive(ungrammatical ) double-object of thenumberof grammaticaldouble-objectforms forms wasa smallpercentage that could havebeenpickedup from parentalspeech.In fact, virtually all of the (7.16) Ungrammatical Grammatical Tokens Types TokensTypes Adam Eve Sarah Ross Mark

5 11 0 3 3

3 1 0 2 2

118 11 73 172 36

13 5 12 13 8

Grammatical typesalsoused by adults 11 5 10 11 7

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children' s grammaticaldouble-objectforms actuallydid appearin that form in adults' speechin their transcripts, asthelastcolumnshows(andothersundoubtedly appearedin their speechoutsidethe recordingsessions )." ' Thuson theaverage,about95% of achild s double-objectsentences (tokens), and about86% of the verbs the child usesin double-object sentences(types), could have beenbasedon argumentstructuresacquiredconservativelyfrom adultspeech . This is by no meansanobviousresult; giventhatchildrenareprone to using double-object forms to expressbenefactiverelations, the pool of possibledouble-objectforms includesevery transitiveverbin their vocabulary. Furthermore , only a smallnumberof theverbsthataredativizablein adultspeech wereactuallyusedin thedouble-objectform by thechildren. Knowing only how oftenchildrenusegrammaticaldouble-objectforms, andthattheyarecapableof productively using it for benefactives, it would be naturalto predict that the children' s ungrammaticaldouble-object forms would outnumbertheir grammatical ones, contraryto what we find. Locatives. Productiveuseof the locativealternationis evenrarer. I searched throughthetranscriptsof Adam, Eve, Sarah, Ross, andMark for severalclasses of high-frequencyverbs for which the locative alternationin either direction would benatural, thoughungrammatical, in English. Specifically, I lookedat all sentencesinvolving verbs in the coil andpour classes , which are grammatical only with locationalthemeobjects, andverbsin thefill , block, andsoakclasses , which aregrammaticalonly with locationalgoal objects. This searchturnedup a total of four clear errors out of the 86,(XX ) sentencesin the database . (In addition, Pinker, Lebeaux, and Frost, 1987, notedtwo errorsin which themeand goal wereconfused,eachutteredtwice, involving the verbscrashandscribble.) In comparison, there were hundredsof sentencesin which verbs involving themesor goalswereusedwith thecorrectdirect object, includingverbsin these classesandverbsin theprominentalternatingclasses(splashverbs, smearverbs, stuff verbs, load verbs, and pile verbs). Bowermanreportedsixteen errors involving theme-goal reversal with locative verbsand verbsof contactin her 1982bpaper, representativeof a somewhatlarger corpusof errors (size unreported ) that shehasgathered, from a databasethat onecanroughly estimateas " beingon the orderof a million sentencesper child.'2Shenotesthat at no time ' ' did one or the other rule completely take over. Most of the time, the various verbswerehandledin the conventionalway (only onePatternG [object= goal] verb per child- touch for Christy and fill for Eva- appears to have been " " completelyreinterpretedasa PatternF [object= theme] verbfor a time) (p. 342). (Eventheseconsistentreversals, we shall seein section7.5 of this chapter, may beattributedto processesother thanproductiverule application.) Thusovergen-

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eralizationof the locative alternationis a fairly uncommonevent, and correct usageof the adultargumentstructureseemsto be the norm. of the causative? In proportional . How frequentare overgeneralizations Causatives terms, thenumberof productivecausativeutterancesreportedin Bowerman( 1982a) - about 125, dependingon whatis included- is fairly small, considering ' differentchildren, includingBowermans thattheycomefrom seventeen two daughters , whose diary data may comprise on the order of a million sentences apiece(seenote 12). (However, the list providedis not exhaustive.) Furthermore , thenumberof grammaticalcausativeverbsthatchildren usesurely ' dwarfsthenumberof productiveones- mostof children s transitiveverbshave a causativecomponent , either with (e.g., break) or without (e.g., cut) an ' intransitivecounterpart.Virtually anypageof atranscriptof achild s speechwill containa causativetransitiveverb; finding a productiveone requiresconsiderable patience. On the other hand, there are some cases where productive causative verbs outnumber conservative usages. Bowerman ( 1982a) notes that Christy passed through a stage in which she used come and stay in transitive sentences, completely replacing bring , keep, and leave. This phenomenon, like the preponderance of incorrect usagesoffill and touch noted earlier , runs against the general ' pattern of children s conforming to adult argument structures in the vast majority of their utterancesinvolving the relevant argument structure . It calls out for a distinct explanation , which I try to provide in section 7.5. Passives. Recall that since passivization is marked by a productive affix , the theory does not predict the kind of narrow-class-based conservatism we saw for the other three alternations. Indeed , Pinker , Lebeaux , and Frost ( 1987) noted that productive passivization is not a rare phenomenon: 18 of the 72 passives we ' ' found in Adam s transcripts ( 25% ) and 7 of the 32 we found in Sarah s (22% ) could not have been baseddirectly on parental speech. Even the child ( Allison ) who produced only two passives in all produced one that was productive . Passives were also frequent in the examples of productive transitive verbs reported by Clark ( 1982) and Bowerman ( 1982a), neither of whom looked for passivesin particular . Granted , for most of these forms we could only be certain that they were productive in morphology , not in argument structure , becausethe ' verbs did have a grammatical passive participle in adult speech, such asI don t want the bird to get eated or His mouth is splitted . But it seems unlikely that in every one of thosecasesthe child heard the passive in adult speech, remembered the passive argument structure , and forgot its surface form . In sum, productive generalization of argument structures is robust in the sense that virtually all children do it and that they do it systematically enough that random causescan be ruled out . However , the experiments show that children

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find it easierto usea verb in an argumentstructurethey haveheardit in than in a newargumentstructurethatalternateswith it , andthe spontaneous speechdata showthat (with the exceptionof thepassiveand.ahandfulof particularverbsin ' thelocativeandcausativealternations ) thelargemajority of children s usagesof the argumentstructuresrelatedby an alternationare with verbsthat takethose . Apparentlychildren are wired to be very argumentstructuresin adult speech sensitiveto the combinationsof verbsandargumentstructuresthey hearin the input, andto stick to thosecombinationsmostof the time. 7.4.2 EvidenceThat Children Are Ambivalent About Their Own Errors ' Accordingto theminimalist theoryof the sourceof children s errors, the errors (other than passives ) should have the samestatuswith respectto children' s ' grammarsasHaigspeakdoeswith respectto adults grammars: they shouldbe theproductof property-predictingbutnotexistence-predictingrules. For adults. thisrelationis onethatleadsto intuitionsthatthenovelusagesareoddor unusual. Therefore,thetheorymakesthestrongpredictionthat childrenshouldfind their ownerrorsodd-soundingaswell. Of coursethis is very hardto demonstrate . The to make of well fonnedness is metalinguisticability judgments notoriously in preschoolchildren. Furthennore,manyof theerrorschildren underdeveloped makearesearnlesslywoveninto theirdiscourse , giving anobserverno reasonto tI1inkthatanythingin their headsis causingthemto balk or havesecondthoughts. Therefore, I will not be able to showthat all of children' s argumentstructure errorsoccur without their grammar's full sealof approval. However, there is evidencethatmanyof theirargumentstructureerrorsareof a fonn thatis notfully acceptableto the very children who areproneto making them. Bowennan( 1982a) notedan intriguingphenomenonin Christy' s speech.By a certainage, Christy beganto showmetalinguisticawarenessthat somecausatives arenotgrammaticalin English. Shebeganto correctherselfin midsentence ' andto judge her own andotherspeakers productivecausativeutterancesto be ill fonned. Examplesarepresentedin (7.17). (7.17) (a) 3;8: I haveto be- have it up! [Tugging on sock] ' (b) 3;8: And go - put it like that. [As M putsC s sockson; telling M to turn topsover in a certainway] c 4 7: She won' t sit me- let me sit next to her during readingtime. ; ( ) ' [Complainingaboutfriend s behaviorin school.] (d) 4; 10: C: Bigger my band. [To M , asrequestfor M to loosensports bandon her glasses . Intonationsuggestssherecognizes odd about the word.] M: Is that a real word? C: something " No. Smallermy band... smallmy band..." [Contemplative,

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" ' trying theseout] M: If I said I m going to biggeryour " band - does thatsoundlike somethingI wouldsay? C: No, becauseit ' s not a realword. M : How would I sayit? C: " I ' m ' going to bigger- I m going to makeyour bandbigger " today. (e) 5;3: C: You almostmademe fall down [to M ] . M: I almostfell you down. C: [Grinsbroadly.] M: Canyou saythat? C: No! You almostmademe fall down! 13 ' (f) 5;4: I m not going to pick up theCheeriosthatI fall- thatI dropon the floor . (g) 5; 11: [Hasbeenbeggingfor friend to be allowedto stayfor dinner; M hassaidshethoughtfriend' s family neededherlateron.] ' ' ' They re not gonnaneedher! We eat her! [Emphaticstress on eachword. Thenclapshandover mouthandsmiles sheepishly, recognizingerror.] " " (h) 6;2: Say rabbits earscookingon the stove [a family formulafor making unwilling child laugh] andseeif you canlaugh] ... makeme laugh. [breaksoff , pauses (i ) 6;3: E: Will you learnme how to readthat book? [to M ] . C: [Also to M , with pointedscorn] " Learn" you?Whatdoesshemean, " leam" you? ' (j ) 6;8: E: Christy, you fell me into the car! C: [LaughsandrepeatsE s error for M ' s benefit, with pointedemphasison wordfell .] One might think that the recognitionthat overgeneralizedcausativeswere deviant would coincide with the beginning of the end of the use of these . That is not so. The first evidencethat causativesin the child' s own speech Christyrecognizedthatnot all verbscanbecausativizedcameat3;8. Thoughthis is over a year after shestartedto makecausativeerrors, a full four yearslater (7; 11) shewasstill makingthem. In fact, 57% of the62 novelcausativesreported for Christy in Bowerman( 1982a) occurredduringor afterthemonthat whichshe startedto correct herselfand others, occupying73% of the agerangeat which causativeerrorswererecorded.Thusmostof Christy' scausativeerrorsoccurred duringa time at whichshewasawarethatthesetypesof error wereungrammatical .'4 Hochberg( 1986) rana grammaticalityjudgmentexperimentwhoseresultsare consistentwith that picture. Childrenawardeda gold starto oneof two puppets for speaking" better." Whenonepuppetutteredanungrammaticallexicalcausative with come,fall , stay, be, or go andtheotherusedacorrectversioncontaining bring, drop, keep, put, or take, the correctversion waschosenby 78% of the

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childrenin the3;4- 3; 10agegroup, andby 92% of thechildrenin the4; 1- 5;5 age ' group. Themajorityof Bowermans ( 1982) spontaneous speecherrorsinvolving theseverbsoccur in children within this agerange, including manyerrors by children4 andolder. Again, childrenboth makeerrorsandrealizethatsuchforms are errors. The situationis morecomplicatedfor the voluntaryaction verbssing, dance, run,jump, anddive, which wereutteredin a lexical causativeform by onepuppet and in a periphrasticsentenceby the other puppet. The olderchildrenchosethe grammaticalperiphrasticform 68% of the time. As I showedin (7.8), theseverbs appearin a smallminority of childrens errors, so it is difficult to verify whether . they areproducedduring theagerangeat which they arejudgedungrammatical Nonethelesswe do find cry. watch, and rememberusedcausativelyby children over the ageof 4, as I would predict. The behavior of the youngerchildren, however, doesnot fit into the picture I havebeenpainting. Their preferencesin the task were at chance(52%), and children of that age are proneto making causativeerrorswith action verbs in their spontaneousspeech.However, there is a confoundingfactor here. Periphrasticcausativesaresyntacticallycomplex, involving an embeddedclause. Ammon and Slobin ( 1979) showedthat 3- and 4-year-old English-speakingchildren comprehendthem poorly, about70% of the time. In contrast, children learning languagesthat expresscausativesin a single clause act them out nearly perfectly by age 4. Single-clause active sentenceswith Englishactionverbsarealsocomprehendednear-perfectlyby 3to- 5-yearoidchildren; see, for example, Pinker, Lebeaux, andFrost( 1987), table 6. Thus children may have failed to reject ungrammaticallexical causatives involving actionverbsin partbecausethe only availableAlternative - periphrastic - werenot easily parsedas naturalcausatives . soundingsentences 7.4.3 Summary of Differences Between Children ' s Errors and Adults ' I havebeentrying to explainwhy children speakdifferently from adults. Too big a differenceis anembarrassment : if adults' productivity is dueto a complicated ' rule and children s to a simple version of that samerule, we needto invoke a seeminglyuselessrule-complication procedure. A more eleganttheory is that adultsareproductivein two ways, one involving a simple rule, oneinvolving a complex rule, andthat childrens errors aredue to their useof the samesimple rule. If so, children' s errors should resembleadults' errors. I haveshowntwo ' errorsarefar rarerthan ways in which this is true. First, children s spontaneous their correctusages in and have a , experimentsthey strongtendencyto behave in a way thatwould makeerrorsimpossible: they like to reproducetheargument structuresin which they hear a novel verb used. Second, most of the errors children makeoccurat agesat which they aredemonstrablycapableof judging

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7oS Acquisition of Verb Meaning and Errors in Argument Structure

It is probablydifficult to maintainthatall of children' s productiveusagesarethe productof broad-scalerulesusedasone-shotinnovations. In at leasttwo cases, ungrammaticalformsdisplacedgrammaticalcounterpartsduring development: ' of bring, keep, andleavein favor of transitivecomeand Christy s abandonment stay, andthe systematicallyincorrectchoiceof direct objectfor the verb touch by Christy andfill by Eva. Clearly, the innovativeuseof a broad-rangerule on an ad hoc basisshouldnot leadto the elimination of a correctform. Moreover, Bowermancites a datum- reproducedin (7.18) - showingthat it is possible for a child to overextendan argumentstructure in comprehension , not just . production " " (7.18) M: Simonsays, Touchyour toes. C: To what? [Interpretstoesas Figure, is looking now for Ground] [A momentlater] M: Simonsays, " Touch your knees." C: To what? Suchanerrorwouldnotseemto betheresultof atemporaryinnovation; surely not eventhe cookbookwriter who told her readersto fill the mixture into the " zucchiniwouldinterpretfill theglassasmeaning" put theglassinto something. Rather, thereis a persistenterrorof somekind here. Perhapsit hassomethingto do with the child' s interpretationof the meaningof the verbtouch. The cornerstoneof the thematiccore theory is that lexical rules effecting ' argumentstructurealternationsinvolve manipulationsof a verb s lexicosemanof analternationstemsfrom thecompatibility of the tic structure.Thechoosiness with the semanticoperation existing semanticstructure, assessedby either cognitivecompatibility(for the useof broad-rangerules) or detailedcorrespondence of semanticstructure(for the useof narrow-rangerules). Now if children had correct lexical rules but incorrect lexicosemanticrepresentations , they . Take an extremecase: if children shouldutter someungrammaticalsentences thought touch meantmove, they could say Touch your hand to that; if they thoughtfill meantpour, they could sayFill salt into the bear, evenif the rest of theirgrammarswereidenticalto thoseof adults. Furthermore,outrightverb-forverb confusionis not a prerequisitefor this kind of error: if childrenthoughtthat fill hada meaningthat wasstructurallyidenticalto thatof pour exceptfor some

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differencethatwasnot grammar-relevant, suchasa different mannerof motion or mannerof actingupon, its grammaticalprivilegeswould be identicalto those of pour. I will try to show that this chain of eventscan and does occur in . To the extentthat it does, childrenwill utter errorsthat soundas development if they comefrom a badrule but in fact comefrom a bad word meaning----the errors would essentiallybe malapropismswith syntacticconsequences . For thoseerrors, thereis no needto explainhow therulechanges , becauseit doesn't. In this sectionI will do two.things. First, I will review the literatureon the developmentof verb meaning, which showsthat errorsin verb semanticsare ' pervasivein youngchildren. Second,I will showthatchildren s meaningerrors can be, andoften are, thecauseof their argumentstructureerrors. Specifically, I will showthat systematicblasesanderrorsin theacquisitionof verb meaning lead to predictablekinds of errorsin argumentstructure.

7.5.1 TheDevelopment of Verb Meaning -linguisticpatternsin language Siobin( 1985 in his extensive reviewof cross , ) that , suggests childrenseekthelinguisticmeans of expressing acquisition certain " are kindsof conceptual .Themostprominent ofthesegestalts or" scenes gestalts " " the manipulative , whereanagentactsona patientandcauses a activityscene " " wherean and the , scene , change figureground objectmoveswith respectto a reference frame.Theseof coursearethesameastheACf -THING-THING (agent-patient ) relationandtheGO-THING-PATHrelationthatconstitutethe basicsemantic substructures outof whichverbmeanings arecomposed in the currenttheory . Siobininvokestheseschemas to explaina varietyof crossbetween of someforms linguisticevidence showingcontrasts earlyacquisition -class and errorswith othersin acquisition , manyof theminvolvingclosed ' s verberrorsdo . children not , seem morphemesInterestingly to generally involveconfusions aboutthesebasicelements : theagencyandmotion / change of verbsarevirtuallyalwaysrespected in spontaneous and components speech in theexperiments on comprehension of verbmeaning to bediscussed below. Thedistinction between eventsandongoingprocess esor states punctual , which is represented asa point/regiondistinctiononthetimeline, thethirdmajortier of lexicosemantic to earlyandconsistently , is alsoattended representations by -linguistically(Slobin, 1985 childrencross ; Bickerton, 1981). Thusthe basic - agency semantic structures /force, motion / change underlyingverbmeanings , andtime- aresalient,easilyacquired notionsfor thechild, astheircentralityin therepresentational theorywouldpredict. However involvespecificpatterns , mostverbmeanings of conflationinvolving combinations of theseandothersemantic structures . At thebeginningof

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chapter5, especiallysection5.3, I showedthatmanyof thestructuresrepresenting particularverb meaningshadto be learnedby thechild. This wasnecessary becausemany syntactic distinctions were explainedby appealingto detailed , and thosesemanticstructureswere distinct propertiesof semanticstructures from conceptualcategoriesand varied from languageto language. Sincethe learningmechanismsfor specificverb meaningsproposedin chapter6 cannot succeedin a singletrial for anyverbthat is notsimplya labelfor acognitiveevent category, but requiresthe accumulationof evidenceover situations, we would expectchildrento makeerrorswith verb meanings.This would showup in their producingor acceptingverbs in situationsthat would be inappropriatein the . A great deal of evidencesuggeststhat childrendo that. adult language 7.5.1.1 Later Onset and Slower Rate Gentner ( 1982) presents extensive evidence that at the beginning of the acquisition process, children in a variety of languagecommunities acquire their first verbs later than their first nouns, and acquire verbs at a slower rate than nouns. She demonstratesthat this asymmetry is not explainable in tenns of frequency ( verbs have higher token frequencies than nouns) nor in tenns of serial position , phonological transparency, or other potentially confounding factors. She proposes that most nouns that children hear correspond to tightly interconnected representations for object categories that ' children s perceptual and conceptual systems assemble automatically , uniformly , and independently of language. Verb meanings, in contrast, consist of representations whose exact conflations of semantic components are more cognitively and perceptually arbitrary and more variable across languages. Hence the proper semantic structures must be assembledby the child as part of learning the language; they cannot simply be retrieved from a store of preexisting concepts and assigned a morpheme . This learning would correspond to the Semantic Structure Hypothesis Testing mechanism outlined in chapter 6.

7.5.1.2 Underspecified meanings One of the ways in which a child could havea defectiveverb meaningbeforelearningis completeis thatsemanticsubstructures . Gentner could be missing from a lexicosemanticrepresentation ( 1975) provides evidence that this occurs in the acquisition of transfer-of. possessionverbs. whose semanticstructureshave overlappingcomponents of a the causation in this Give and takeare the simplestverbs group. involving of . Pay andtradecontainthis conflationasa substructure transferof possession their meanings; on top of that. pay containsthe selectionrestriction that the . transferredobjectis moneyandtradecontainstheprovisionof acountertransfer Buy. sell. andspendare the mostcomplex. specifyingcausationof possession

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transfer, the selectionrestrictioninvolving money, anda countertransfer . Gentner askedchildrenbetweentheagesof 3t and 8! to act out sentencesinvolving theseverbswith dolls and toys. Children' s successratesin acting out the verb ' meaningsasanadult would wererelatedto theverbs semanticcomplexity. Give andtakewereactedout best, followed by pay and trade, followed by buy, sell, and spend. Errors generally consistedof omitting the countertransferor the selectionrestriction: buy wasactedout asif it meanttake; sell wasactedout as if it meantgive. 15This suggeststhat children' s early representationsof the meaningsof verbslike buy andsell haveonly a part of the semanticstructures that the verbshavein the adult language. Ammon ( 1980) has also demonstratedchildren' s failure to respectall the ' componentsof a verb s meaning. Shepresentedchildren with elevensentences involving verbsof causationof motion (hand, throw, hook, lock, skate, drive, shovel, scratch, andpinch). Eachsentencewaspairedwith threepictures, two of which wereinappropriateby virtueof havingan incorrectinstrument, body part, mannerof causationof motion, or pathof motion. Childrenbetweenthe agesof 2;8 and6 weretested. In almostall cases,performanceimprovedmarkedlywith age. A numberof semanticdistinctionswere particularly difficult for younger children. Theyoungestchildrenwereinsensitiveto thedistinctionbetweenhand andthrow that requiresproximal physicaltransfer for one and ballistic motion overa pathfor theother. They alsohadtroublewith verbsincorporatingspecific objecttypesinto their meanings,assigningthemthe role of patient/themerather thaninstrument.Specifically, theyoftenchosea depictionof throwinga skatefor skating, merelymoving a hookor lock for hookingor locking, andpushinga car for driving. Other studieshave also shownchildren acquiring parts of the meaningsof verbs, causingearlieracquisitionof simplerverbs in families suchascome, go, bring, andtake(Clark andGarnica, 1974) andask, promise, andtell (Chomsky, 1969). 7. 5.1. 3 Overspecified meanings Caseswhere a child has too much semantic structure in a verb- meaning representation are harder to detect than when the child hasnot enough semantic structure, becausethey result in the child ' s failing to usea verb in certain situations rather than using it incorrectly . However , there is someevidence that young children at first restrict verbs to small subsetsof their permissible contexts. Bowerman ( 1978, p. 982 ) notes: ' ChristyandEva s first usesof put, take, etc., wererestrictedto relativelyspecific, anddifferent contexts. For example, they initially usedput in the contextof donning clothing, " " " " placing small objectsonto surfacesor into containers( put on, put in ), returning " " " " thingsto anoriginal location( put back ), or storing things out of sight ( put away ). In

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contrast, they usedtakefor theremovalof clothing from the body or smallobjectsfrom " " surfacesor containers(" take off ," " take out ), for requeststo be takenoutside( take " outside ), and for asking that somethingbe removedor protesting its removal(" take " away ) . A child who is quitecapableof choosingthecorrectword in contextslike these ... may be at a losswhenshewantsto refer to a new act that doesnot fit clearly into any of thesecategories , suchas stickingher thumbsup. ' There is, of course, no contradiction between the observation that children s verb meanings can either be underspecified (causing overly general usages) or overspecified (causing overly specific usages) . It is plausible that children may " carve events into categories at a " basic level of specificity , as they seem to do for object categories ( Brown , 1958; Rosch, Mervis , Gray , Johnson, and BoyesBraem , 1976), and label these categories with verbs in the language they are acquiring . However , high - frequency verbs, unlike high - frequency nouns, do not in general seem to map onto basic event categories, and thus we would expect children to make errors for verbs whose meanings are more specific or less specific than those basic event categories.

7.5.1.4

Blasesin Semantic Development Children not only acquireverb meaningspiecemealbut alsoshowblasesin which aspectsof eventsthey like to . Gentner( 1978) notedthat a commonpatternin the encodeinto verbmeanings developmentof noun meaningwas for preschoolchildren to attend to the perceptualappearanceof objects, sometimesignoring information about an ' object s function. Shereasonedthat an analogousbias in the acquisitionof the meaningsof action verbsmight manifestitself as a sensitivity to mannerof motion and an insensitivity to specific change of state. In particular, she consideredthe verbsmix, stir , beat, andshake. According to her analysis, mix " " specifiesa particular changeof state ( an increasein homogeneity) but is noncommittalaboutthe kind of action that effects it. The other threeverbs, in contrast, are noncommittalabout the resulting state of the patient, but each requiresa particularmannerof motion: rotary motion, mediumrate, for stir; elliptical motion, rapidrate, for beat; oscillatingmotion for shake. Childrenaged 5 to 9 andadultswereaskedto describesix kindsof eventsandto verify whether eachof the four verbswasappropriateto them: a stirring, beating, or shaking motion performedon salt andwater(which could " mix " ) or on cream(which, substance , couldnot). Verbsencodingmannersof alreadybeingahomogeneous motionposednoproblemfor thechildren: 97% of the5-to-7-year-oldsand93% of the 7-to-9-year-olds paired the correct manner-of -motion verb with the appropriatemannerof motion. However, the end-staterequirementof mix was poorly grasped: the 5-to-7-year-olds usedmix on 48% of the trials wherethe patientwasmixableandon 46% of thetrials whereit wasnot. (The7-to-9-year-

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olds and adults were more discriminating, thoughnot invariably so, ~ rhaps becausethey sensedthat water is more aptly describedas dissolvingsalt than mixing with it or becauseof their knowledgethat milk productsare separable .) Gentnernotesthatthe indiscriminateuseof mix wasdueto a verb suspensions distorted so asto encodemannerratherthanendstate, not to a general meaning , unpublishedexperiment, she unfamiliarity with the verb itself: in a separate showedthat children understandmix asan actionverbsimilar to stir by the age of3t . Other phenomenareported in the literature may be related to this bias. Huttenlocher,Smiley, andCharney( 1983) observethatwhenchildrenuseverbs to refer to other people's actions, they usemanner-of-motion verbslike walk beforechange-of -stateverbslike open. Furthermore , mannersaresalientenough to childrenthattheyeasilyconflatethemwith motion-pathstructuresin waysnot sanctionedby their language . Bowerman( 1981) notesthatChristyandEva occasionally conflatedposturesor emotionalexpressions with motion, resultingin errorssuchasHe laughedall the waydownthehill andhelaughedon top of the otherpeople(Eva, 3; 11), OK, thenJ' mfrowning out thedoor (Eva, 5;0), andWe croucheddown the hill (Christy, 10;5). Evenin Spanish,a languagethat never allows mannerof motionto beconflatedwith translationalonga pathin the verb system(Talmy, 1985), childrenseemto think thatmannersarepossiblecomponents of complexmeanings ; Slobin ( 1985) citeserrorssuchascorrer abalo (run down). 7.5.1.5 Substitution Errors If children' s representations of verbmeanings are incomplete, biased, or in flux , this shouldbemanifestin their usingthem in . SincesomeEnglishverbsform inappropriatesituationsin spontaneous speech families of minimally differing members,sucherrorswill oftenconsistof using one verb whereadult Englishcalls for a differentverb. Menyuk( 1969) wasthe first investigatorI know of to documentincorrectverb usagesin spontaneous speech. She noted errors suchas thoseshownin (7.19) in her sampleof 152 children betweenthe agesof 3 and 7. ' (7.19) They ll closehim in jail . I want to say in the microphone. He doesinstruments . Shehasto makea lot of work. I didn' t seeat the otherpatients. Shealsonotedthat substitutionerrors involving the verbslistedin (7.20) were common. (7.20) go for do do for will , can, make

tell for say ask for tell

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speakfor say seefor look look for see sit for stay stay for sit hang for fall fall for hang Bowennan( 1978; seealso 1981, 1982c) provides a large numberof verb substitutionexamplesaccompanied by the full sentenceandthe ageof the child who producedthem. Representative examplesof eachtype of substitution, including theearliestexamplesprovidedfor eachof thetwo children, aregiven in (7.21). The semanticdistinctionsbeing flouted are locational versuspossessional transfer(put versusgive), locational versusstatechanges(put versus make), activeversuspennissivecausation(let versusmake), andpathsof motion ' ' ' ' distinguishingthepath-functions to and from andthedeicticplace-constants ' here' and ' there' (put versustake versusbring). make for do , play , have have for get get for become take for get , keep, put put for take close for put say for tell . speak

(7.21) put for give C 3;3: You put mejust breadand butter. C 3;4: You put the pink one to me. E 2;2: I go put it to Christy. give for put ' C 4;4: WheneverEvadoesnt needher towel shegives it on my table ' and whenI m done with it I give it backto her. E 2;7: Give someice in here, Mommy. Put someice in here, Mommy. E 2; 10: Don' t give thosenext to me. put for make C 3; I : Youputaplacefor Evato put in. [WantsM to makeadepression in a pillow in doll carriageso E canride] C 3;9: But nevereverput the door locked. E 2; 10: I wantto put it tight. [WantsM to let her tighten nipple on her bottle] E 4;7: I ' m not going to put it too long. [ E cutting piecesof yarn for a doll ' s hair] makefor put E 2;2: I makesomebutter my sandwich. [As E puts butteron bread] E 3;0: Makethembackup. [Wants M to put/settiny dolls back onto table; they' d just fallen off] let for make ' C 3;3: I don' t want Sandrato say goodnight. So don t let me.

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C 3; II : Don' t evereverlet mestayin my bedroomuntil I go to bed. [As M startsgettingC readyfor bedwithout officially endingC' s ] stay in her room for naughtiness makefor let C 3;6: But usuallypuppetsmake- let peopleput their handsin. [After M hadcalleddolls with toilet-paper-roll bodies" puppets"; C ] disagreeing C 3;9: Make me watchit. [Wantsfatherto let her watch a TV show] put for take, bring, drop, makego C 2;2: I haftaput theseoff soI cando it better. [Trying to takeringsoff her fingers] E 2; I : I go put rubberbandoff. [ Startingto take rubberbandoff deck of cards] takefor bring, put C 2; 1: Daddy takehis pantson. C 2;2: Hey, I takethis at home. [Findingdoll shehad broughthome earlier] E 2;0: I take it up. [Puttingbowl up onto shelf in cupboard] bring for take, put C 2; 1: Let bring this out. [Wantsto takecookedbaconout of panon stove] E 2;9: I ' m bringing it backto my pocket. [Puttinga pieceof gumback in her pocket] For many of theseexamplesthe mentalmechanismscausingthe errorsare difficult to identify uniquely. Therearethreeareasof indeterminacy. First, for verbsthat appearin an argumentstructurethat is inappropriatefor that verb in adult English, it is unclearwhetherthechild hadan impoverished,distorted, or mislabeledverb meaningthat wasfed into a correctrule of argumentstructure alternation, or a correct verb meaningthat wasfed into an overly broadrule of ' argumentstructurealternation, or both. For example, They ll close him in jail ' could reflecteither the child s usingclosewith a meaningsimilar to put or the child ' s applyingan overly broadlocativerule to closethejail . Similarly, when Christy usedput in a double-objectstructurein Youput mejust breadandbutter, it could be becauseshe usedput as if it meantgive, or because(for whatever reason) shealreadyhad a prepositional-dativeargumentstructurefor put, asin her utteranceYouput thepink oneto me, andappliedthe dative alternationto it (see Pinker, 1984, for a generaldiscussionof this methodologicalproblem). However, in somecaseslexical rulescanbe ruledout: for verbsthat appearin an argumentstructurethat is grammaticalfor adults but in a context that is

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' ' semanticallyinappropriate,asin I m bringing it backto mypocketor Don t ever everlet mestayin my bedroomuntil 1go to bed, it is clearthat theverbmeaning itself was inappropriate. A secondopenquestion is whetherthe errorsreflect a stablebut incorrect semanticrepresentationfor the verb, or a correctrepresentationthat is incompletely or improperly processedduring the on-line computationsinvolved in es speechproduction. In her 1978paperBowermansuggeststhaton line process of time before the for a the verbs arethe culprit: the child used period correctly errorsbeganto appear.andcorrectusagesoutnumberederrorsatall stages.Larry Rosenand I corroboratedthe rarity of theseerrors in two ways. We extracted from thetranscriptsof Adam, Eve, andSarahall sentences containingverbsthat of seemedlikely to beusedin errorsinvolving confusions locationaI, stative, and verbs, like the onesreportedin Bowerman( 1978, 1982c, 1983b): possessional become,bring,force , give, go, has, hold, is, keep, make, put, stand, stay, stick, take, andturn. The four examplesreproducedin (7.22a) werethe only oneswe found. Second, in an unpublishedexperiment, we askedchildren to describe , suchasa mothergiving aball picturesinvolvingchangesof stateandpossession to a girl or a boy coloring a pieceof paper. We stackedthe deck in an effort to elicit substitutionerrors by explicitly telling the child to use the typically ' " intrusiveverb. For example, we said, Can you tell me what she s doing, using ' the word put?" - hoping for an occasionalHe s putting the paper blue. Thirty childreneachdescribednineteenpictures, for a total of 570 invitationsto make an error. However, when childrenusedthe targetverb, they did so by exercising their optionto useit correctly, as in He put wateron him; the four utterances shownin (7.22b) were the only clear-cut errorsproduced. ' (7.22) (a) A 3; I : I goin put de door open. A 4;4: Now I think I takethe wholecrayoned.[Coloring in a picture] A 4;5: It ' s gonnastayraining. E 2;3: He put his breadand butter folded over. Mother takesball away from boy andputs it to girl . Squarego big. 3; 11 Boy puts flowers to girl . 4;7: Squarewent bigger. Althoughwe haveevidencethatverb substitutionsarein somewayslike onetime speecherrors, in a later unpublishedpaperBowerman( 1983c) pointsout somedifferencesbetweenthesubstitutionerrorsandordinaryslipsof thetongue ' of the sort adultsmake. First, children s errorsinvolve systematicpatternsof substitutionthatrecur within andbetweenchildren(in fact, they aresystematic enoughfor Rosenand me to havereplicatedthe existenceof someof her exact (b) 3;3:

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error patternsin severalotherchildren), whereasanyparticular substitutionin anadult' s speechis likely to bea random, extremelyrareevent. Second,adults' substitutionerrorsrarely involve verbs(approximately3% of adults' substitution errors; 81% involve nouns), whereaschildren' s substitutionerrorsvirtually neverinvolve nouns. Third, adults' errors are usually self-corrected, whereas thesechildhood errors were not. In addition, I doubt that adults make many substitutionerrorsof the kind ~isplayedin (7.21) or (7.22); I haveneverheard oneduringtheperiod of time I havebeenlistening for argumentstructureerrors in adults' speech(seesection4.5.1). Theseconsiderationsleadmeto suggestthat children' s substitutionerrorscannotbe explainedcompletelyby the properties of the mechanismsthat generateadults' slips of the tongue. The children' s of verb meaningsthemselvesmustbeshifting or poorly consolidated representations comparedto thoseof adults. A third openquestionis whetherthe substitutionerrors, assumingthey result from transientprocesses, resultfrom thechild ' s looking for one stemduring the word-finding processandincorrectlyfetchinga stemfor a relatedverb, or from thechild ' s representingoneentry incorrectly and applying it to a situationthat happensto be more aptly describedby an independententry in the adult language,with that otherentryplaying no causalrole. The fact that mostof the errorscanbe renderedmoregrammaticalby substitutinganotherverb suggests at first thatit is simply the word-finding processthat hasgoneastray. However, the semanticspacedefinedby causationof motion and possessionis fairly well filled in English, so the fact that we can think of a verb that would be more appropriatethan the one the child useddoesnot meanthat the child wastrying to retrievethatverb. In fact, for manyof theerrorsit is questionablewhetherthe child wasin factaiming for adistincttargetword. For example, thesentenceThey " put Dorothy different than in the book (after watching The Wizard of Oz" on television) andHe put his breadand butterfolded over canbe classifiedas"put for make" substitutions, but makeis not quite right either in adult English, so it is not obviousthat the child wasseekingit. And in a small numberof errors, the prepositionsareappropriatefor theverbthechild actuallyused, not theverbthat adultswould use(e.g., I ' m bringing it back to my pocket), suggestingthat the child wantedto usethat verb but did not know it was inappropriate, ratherthan wantingto usea different verbandfailing to retrieveits stem. Thuseitheror both escould be occurringin the errors. process Despitetheseindeterminaciesfor the psycholinguistinterestedin underlying mechanisms , onething is clear. Somethingaboutchildren' s semanticstructures is different from those of adults. Even when children know enoughabout a verb' s meaningto useit correctlymost of the time, the piecesare not consoli-

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datedfinnly enoughto preventoccasionalerrors, of predictablekinds, from occurring. And, of course,adultsdo not showthe kinds of systematicerrorsin experimentaltasksthatchildrendo. With convergingevidencefrom a variety of sourcesthatchildrenhavedifficulty with verb meanings, we canturn to the questionof whetherthesesemanticdifficulties can be lawfully and causally ' relatedto children s syntacticerrors. 7.5.2 RelationsBetweenthe Developmentof Verb Meaning and the Development of Argument Structure ' Childrenmakeerrorswith verbs argumentstructures,andtheymakeerrorswith . Cantheirerrorswith meaningssometimesbethecauseof their verbs' meanings ? Thetheorysaysthat this shouldhappen.Every errorswith argumentstructures to the unlearningproblemhasonelessdasolution time it does, theminimalist ' Turnto explain; asthe child s verb meaningsbecomeincreasinglytunedto the discussedin chapter6, someof adultstateby thesituation-sensitivemechanisms the sourcesof the argumentstructureerrorsdisappear. In this sectionI discussthreecorrelationallinkagesbetweensemanticstructure and argumentstructure in languagedevelopment. As always, causal relationsaremoredifficult to establish,requiringexperimentalinterventions. I will end the chapterby discussingexperimentsdesigned by Jess Gropen (Gropen, Pinker, andGoldberg, 1987; Gropen, 1989; Gropenet al., in preparation ), which representimportantstridesin this direction. 7.5.2.1 Onset of Errors The first link I discussis only a correlation, but it is an intriguing one. In her discussionof errors in verb semantics , Bowerman notesthat childreninitially usetheerror-proneverbsput, give, make, andlet accurately , thoughin restrictedsetsof contexts.Furthennore, whenerrorsbeginto occur, they arenot randomsubstitutionsbut representa subtleanalysisof verb meaningsinto abstractnotionssuchaschangeandcausation,exactlyastheThematic RelationsHypothesisof Gruber ( 1965) and Jackendoff( 1972) would predict. That is whyput (causea changeof location) andmake(causea change of identity or state) areinterchanged , why put is interchangedwith give (cause a changeof possession ), andwhy make(activelycause) is interchangedwith let ' (permissivelycause).16Furtherevidencethattheseerrorsstemfrom the child s perfonninga thematicanalysiscomesfrom the fact that similar errorsoccur in thedomainof prepositionsandnounsinvolving a spatialmetaphorfor time, such asCanI haveanyreadingbehindthedinner? or Do wehaveroombeforewego to bedfor anotherreading? (Bowerman, 1982c). In the prepositionalsystem, somelanguageshavedifferentprepositions(e.g., analogousto theEnglishto) for

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; childrenoftenconfusethem(Slobin, 1985). changesof locationandpossession However, substitutionsof verbsandprepositionsthatare not relatedby shared thematicsubstructuresarerareor nonexistent . Thefact that theseerrorsdo not occurat theonsetof useof the relevantverbs suggeststhat the early verb meaningsare not properly built aroundthe basic thematicnotionsof cause,change,andsoon, but mayhavebeenmoreundifferentiated schemasfor specific kinds of events. (This could correspondto the verbs' being ad hoc labelsfor gestaltscorrespondingto interestingkinds of events, bypassingthe representationalstructuresfor semanticstructurealtogether s' being temporarily cluttered by so many , or to the representation ' extraneoussubstructuresfor situation-specificmanners , objectproperties, fort ' to goals, and so on, that similaritiesamongverbsareobscured .) In either case, a changein the representations of verb meaningsseemsto occurthat makesthe similaritiesamongthematicallyrelatedverbsmoresalientto thechild, presumain the verbs' entries. bly becausethey aremoreexplicitly represented An initial periodof correctusefollowed by overextensions to ungrammatical casesis, of course, thefamiliar sequenceof developmentfor argumentstructure alternationsas well. Recall from section 7.3 that children' s ungrammatical , but at argumentstructuresareneverthe resultof puresyntacticrearrangements all stagesbetraytheapplicationof semanticoperationsmanipulatingnotionslike causation, possession , motion, and statechange. Until children analyzeverb meaningsas containingthesenotions, they will be unableeitherto abstractthe broad-rangerule from conservativelyacquiredverbpairsor to apply it productively to verbsacquiredin oneversionof thealternation.The suggestion,then, is that the reanalysisor abstractionprocessthat leadsto the appearance of verb substitutionerrors is a prerequisitefor the formationandapplicationof lexical rulesaffecting argumentstructure. Someof the agemilestonesfor variousverbusesin the speechof Christy and Eva are at least roughly consistentwith there being a correlation between semanticand syntacticchanges . As mentioned, the first usesof periphrastic causativesinvolving makeare synchronouswith the onsetof lexical causative errorsin their speechandin the speechof severalotherchildrennotedin Bowerman( 1982a). ForEva, earlyexamplesof thecorrectuseofput, give, make, and let runfrom 1; 11to 2;0; errorsin verbchoicebeginat2; I , andhercausativization errorsbeginat 2;2. For Christy, correctuseof thefour verbsaredocumentedfor theagerange2;0- 2;3; verbselectionerrorsbeginat 2; I , andhercausativeerrors alsobeginat 2; 1. Naturallyonewould not wantto maketoo muchof theserough correlations, but they areconsistentwith thepictureof relateddevelopmentsin lexical semanticsandargumentstructuresyntax.

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7.5.2.2 . Argument Structures in Verb Substitution Errors In chapterI I nonconservative presenteda largenumberof spontaneousspeechformsthatdemonstrate useof verbsin argumentstructures. Theseerrorscouldhaveresulted from anyof threeprocess es: applying a lexical rule too broadly; havingtheright verb in mind and retrieving the wrong stem (a speecherror or one-time malapropism); or havinga distorted or partially acquiredsemanticrepresentation of a verb that spuriously allows it to match a lexical rule (a stable malapropism). Distinguishingtheseprocessesis possiblefor someof theerrors, not for others. If for a given error no otherEnglish verb would beappropriatein that argumentstructure, if the semanticsof the verb usedwasappropriatein the context, andif thethematiccoreof thebroad-rangerule alsofit thecontext, it was probablyoverapplicationof a rule that wasthe cause.Brushmemy hair, Button metherest. andCanyou climb me up there?areexamples.However, if theverbargumentstructurecombinationthat would havebeentheinputto thelexicalrule doesnot exist in adult English. if one canthink of an existingEnglishverb that would be syntacticallyand semanticallyperfect if substitutedin the sentence , and if the meaningcomponentsuniquely possessedby the verb usedwerenot appropriateto the context, incorrect stemretrieval would haveto be the cause. An exampleof this kind is Keep me afavor; cf. * Keepafavor for me,' * Keepa favor . (Write me a snowmanis similar, but as mentionedin chapter 1, Eve actually usedsentenceslike Write a ladyfor me but neverusedsentenceslike Draw mea lady, so both a stable lexicosemanticerror andthe useof a rule are implicated.) The telltale signsof errorscausedby relatively stablemislearned verbmeaningswouldconsistof verb usewhosemeaningwasappropriateneither to the adult versionof that verb nor to the adult versionof anyother verb. This kind of erroris bestdetectedthroughexperiments,whichI will discussin thenext section. A large numberof the argument structureerrors reportedin chapter I are ' ambiguous. For example, many of Bowermans causativeerrors could have been the result of seekinga noncausativestem and retrieving its causative counterpartbecauseof themeaningcomponentsthey share: comewherebring or takewould beappropriate,go wheretake, put , or sendwould be appropriate, stayfor keepor leave,fall for drop , die for kill , eatforfeed, rememberfor remind, rise for raise. havefor takeor give (especiallyin idioms), andbe for put, make, or keep. Causative-for-noncausativemalapropismsmay be the sourceof someof the causativizationerrorsin languageslike Hebrew(Berman, 1982) andHungarian (Slobin, 1985), in which few or no words appearin identicalform with both causativeand noncausativeargument structures; morphologicaldifferences - - always distinguishsuch pairs in the language. The fact that 2 to 3 year-old

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childrenmaketheseerrorsis puzzlingbecausethe children could not simply be overgeneralizing a regularity in the input- there is none- at leastnot if they are attendingto morphologyat all. However, if they mistakenlypair the stemfor a verb with a causativemeaningwith a distinct, noncausative , verb, the errors would result. The fact that many of the verbs cited by Berman as being have nonhomophonouslexical causativeforms in the child ' s overgeneralized vocabularysupportsthis account. But this is not true in all cases(Berman, personalcommunication), so not all of the errors can be due to problems in retrieving stemsfor a known verb. Children may also create causativeverb meaningsfor which they lack stems, andmay borrow the stem for the noncausative verb that representsthe effect event, resultingin an error. In either case, thesyntacticerror could be tracedto a deviantpairing of stemand meaning, not to an overly broadrule.I' Amongthe errorswith double-object verbs, we find many usesof put rather thangive, but sincethe child alsosaidYouput thepink one to me, a lexical rule couldhavebeentheproximal cause.Theuseof saywhereanadult would usetell is ambiguous , asis spendus money, which probablycamefrom causativization -lossverb, but conceivablycould havebeenan of spendresultingin a possession intrusionof spendwherecost us moneywasthe target. In general, say is a very commonintruderin children' s speech.Aside from severalsubstitutionsfor tell in ( 1.16) in chapter1, we seeit usedfor talk or speakin (7.19), and it wasused " to meancall at leastthreetimesby RossMacWhinneyin " V NP NPcomple ~ t object structuresthat resemblethe double-object form (e.g., Him said me twerp,. You saidmea Skywalker). Rossalsousedtell in thedouble-objectform forask (Don' t tell meany morequestions) and for read (No, tell me Siegfriedfirst ). Amongthe locativeerrors, somecanbecharacterizedasdirectly substituting stealfor rob andvice versa; for mostof the others, the misusedword doesseem fully compatiblein meaningwith thecontext, thoughwe cannotcompletelyrule out thepossibility that cover wasusedfor put or fill for pour . In sum, an unknown proportion of children' s argument structure errors, greaterthanzerobut lessthan 100%, aremalapropismscausedby stemintrusions from semanticallysimilar verbs. Overappliedlexical ruleswerediscussedin the previoussection,andtheeffectson argumentstructureof systematicallymisconstrued verbmeaningswill be discussedin the next section, but is thereanything to belearnedfrom stemintrusionerrorsthemselves ? In this subsectionI would like to make a small point, but one that is not obvious and perhaps not insignificant. Thatis thatthephenomenonof stemintrusionsshowsthatchildren link argumentstructurestightly to detailsof verbs' semanticstructures, as the theoryrequires.

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Saythechild seeksverbV I whichhasmeaningMI ' argumentstructureA I' and stem SI. Instead, his retrieval mechanismgives him stem S2from verb V 2' becauseof thesimilarity of its meaning,~ , with M I. Now the questionis: will the argumentstructureusedby the child be ~ , becausethe stem is S2' or A I' becausethe meaningis MI ? Anotherway of putting it is, when a stemand a meaningpart company, doesthe stemget its way in choosing the argument structure,or doesthemeaning? Theempiricalansweris that whenAI andA2are different, we usually find A I' the argumentstructurebelonging to the target meaning, beingused. ChildrensayPut Eva theyukky onefirst , or Youput the pink one to me, not Put theyukkyoneint% nto Evafirst . Conversely, they say Give someice creamin here, not Givesomeice creamto here. Therearea very ' ' small numberof exceptions,suchas Eva s / m bringing it back to my pocket, wherebring wins out over thepossibletargetput andenforcesthe choiceof to over into, andmanyambiguouscases , suchas Write me a snowman, whereAI andA2arethesame(Draw mea snowman , Writemea letter). But it is significant that we observeargumentstructureerrorsaccompanyingapparentverb substitution errorsat all. Is this too obvious to mention? I don' t think so. The view that argument structuresarearbitrarily andconventionallypairedwith verbsdirectly andon a verb- by-verbbasis, with no consistentcontributionfrom lexical semanticsother than specifyingthe numberof arguments , would predict that an intruding verb shouldcarryits own argumentstructurealongwith it ; the fact that the child had a different meaningin mind would be irrelevant. thata verb' s meaningis in somesensethe Furthermore , it cannotbeassumed " 44most important partof its lexicalentry, sothatin hybrid stem-meaningpairings that aretheresultof processingerrors, the meaningwins out in determiningall other parts of the lexical hybrid entry merely becauseof its importanceor centrality. PinkerandPrince( 1988) point out that meaningplaysno systematic role in the formationof the pasttensein English. Irregular verbslike come, go, do, have, set, get, put, and standeachhavedozensof meanings, especiallyin combinationwith particleslike in, out, up, andoff. But eachof the verbshasthe sameirregularpasttenseformsin all of their semanticincarnations. This occurs even when thesestemsappearin combinationwith meaninglessprefixes. Conversely, synonymsneednot stood/understood , gotlforgot, came/overcame havethe samekinds of pasttenseforms: comparehitl hit with strike/struckwith . slap/slapped, which havesimilar meaningsbut different kinds of past tenses Thuspast-tensemorphologyis sensitiveto stems, not to meanings.Children, of course, very frequentlyovergeneralize past-tenseregularities, but interestingly, the generalizationsfollow the lines of morphologyand phonology- we find

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errorslike brang for brought andbotefor bit (cf. sing/sangandwrite/wrote) but children never, as far as I know, follow the lines of semantics : theyarenot temptedto sayhit/hut becauseof the semanticsimilarity of hit to strike/struck, or run/rane on the analogy of semanticallysimilar come/came, or write/wrew becauseof draw/drew. As far aschildrenareconcerned , verbentrieshavenotjust moreor less" important" partsfor generalization , but differentkindsof information that are relevantto different kindsof generalization . Thusit is noteworthy that regardlessof what causesthem, errorswith argumentstructuresareassociated with themeaningthatthechild hadin mind, andarenotgenerallysuppressed by the stem he or sheused. 7.5.2.3

Relations Between Blasesin Acquiring Verb Semanticsand Recurring Errors in Argument Structures A third suggestivecon-elationbetween errorsin verbsemanticsanderrorsin argumentstructureis thefactthatwe canusethe natureof the blasesin acquisitionof lexical semanticsto predictthe natureof thepersistentargumentstructureerrorsin spontaneous . Among speech the verb blasesthat have beendemonstrated experimentallyarea sensitivityto mannerof causationof motion combinedwith anundersensitivityto theendstate (Gentner, 1978) anda tendencyto interpretcertainarguments(e.g., instruments andthemesof meansevents) asprimarypatient/themesof causedmotion(Ammon, 1980). Among the argumentstructure error" that are not one-time innovationsbut actual stable replacementsfor the correctargumentstructure overa period of time areChristy' s useof touchwith its themeof motionasdirect object and/ or its goal of motion asoblique(as in Touchyour toes... To what?) andEva' s useof fill in the sameway (e;g., Can I fill somesalt into the bear?). , if theytaintedthesemantic Interestingly, theblasesin acquiringverbsemantics of touch and would representations fill , directly leadto the persistentargument structureerrors, accordingto the cunent theory. The thematiccoreof the intol onto locative form consistsof X causingYto moveto Z, andmostverbsin the broadclasshavea mannerattachedeitherto thecausationof themotionor to the motion itself. If a child mistakenlythoughtthat touchmeant" causeX to move into contactwith r ' ratherthan" causea bodypartto bein contactwith Y," asthe moving-theme/patientbias would predict, touch would fit the thematiccore of theintol onto locativeform. Likewise, if achild mistakenlythoughtthatfill meant " " '& " pourX into Y, making Y more full ratherthan causeY to befull , hereagain thethematiccoreof the intol onto locativeis satisfiedandincorrectuseof its argument structureshouldensue. Manyotherpossiblesemanticblasescouldresult in argumentstructureerrors as well, but theseareparticularlyinterestingcases becausethe semanticbias has beendemonstratedin independentexperiments andtheassociatedsyntacticerrorsareparticularlypersistent(andthuscannotbe

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. explained by occasional innovative use of broad -range rules ) . In the next section I discuss experimental evidence demonstrating that this intriguing correlation probably has a causal basis.

7.5.3 Experimental EvidenceShowingThat SemanticBlasesAt TectArgument Structures Fill the water-type errors are amongthe most persistentargumentstructure errors, supplantingcorrectfill theglass-type usagesin the speechof at leastone ch.ild andoccurringin at leastfour different children whosespeechwe haveexamined (Christy, Eva, Adam, and Ross). There is a semanticbias in acquiring verbmeaning, Gentner's manner-over-end-statebias, that could accountfor the error if the currenttheoryis correct. JessGropen and I thus choseerrorsof this ' kind as a casestudy for the theory s prediction that argumentstructuresare ' projectionsof lexicosemanticstructureand that someof children s argument structureerrors are the result of errors in verb semantics. What has to be ' demonstratedis that(a) themanner-over-end-statebiasactuallytaintschildren s of themeaningoffill , causingit to denotesomethinglike pouring, understanding means of pouring, or increasingthe contentsby meansof pouring; (b) filling by children who havean incorrectmeaningfor fill alsohavea tendencyto sayfill thewater; (c) acquiringa verbwith a given semanticrepresentationis sufficient to leadto the useof a particularargumentstructure. 7.5.3.1 Errors in Understanding Fill -type Verbs The first task assessed of verbslikefill andempty, which requirethelocational children' s understanding " container" asdirect IS source or object, and of verbs like pour anddump, goal/ " which require the locationalpatient/theme or " content as direct object. ( The verbs stuff and splash, which alternate, were also tested.) The task required childrento decidewhich of two sequences , eachconsistingof a before-and-after to the verb in question. To familiarize children pair of drawings, corresponded with thedrawingconventions , wefirst presenteda sequenceof drawingsthatwas wereconstructedsoas consistentwith bothpouringandfilling ; thesesequences to providedno infonnationto thechild as to what eitherpour orfill means,and could be usedprior to thetestingof either verb. For example, in thefirst frame, a womanpourswaterfrom a pitcherto a glassin a sink, andin thesecondframe, " theglassis shownfull of waterin thesink. Children weretold: Look at this [first ' frame] ... there s a woman, a pitcher, water, and a glass; look at this [second frame] ... there' s theglassandthe water; now look at both of them ... whenthe womandoesthis [pointing to first frame] and it endsup like that [pointing to " '" secondframe], it ' s called ' pouring (or " filling , dependingon which verb we were about to test with that set of pictures for that child.) Then the child was

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showntwo test sequences , each preservingone of the two frames from the demonstrationsequence . In one sequence , the first frame showedthe woman pouring waterfrom the pitcher to the glass, but the secondshowedthe glass empty, with poolsof waterlying in thesink. In theothersequence , the first frame showedthewomanfilling theglassby lifting thefaucethandle, which we thought would be a lessprototypicalmannerof pouring than useof a pitcher, and the secondframeshowedthe glassfull of water. For both sequences , the question was: " Whichof thesetwo setsof picturesis ' pouring' 1" (or " filling " , if that was theverbbeingtested). The " correct" answerswe hadin mind were the pitcherfor pouring andthe faucet-full sequencefor filling . (When we emptysequence administered thetaskto a groupof sixteenadult subjects,theymadethoseexact choicesin everycasebut one.) Eachverb wastestedtwice, the secondtime with a new setof picturesdepictinga different setof participants.Eachsequenceof pictureswasusedto testpour for half the children andfill for the other half. Similartripletsof sequences wereconstructedfor the other verbs. All the usual factorswerecounterbalanced . Threegroupswith sixteenchildren in eachgroup weretested:ages2;6- 3;5, 3;6- 4;5, and4;6- 5;5. The primary dependentmeasure wasthenumberof childrenwho chosethe sequenceappropriateto the adult verb meaningon both trials. The resultsshowedthat the manner-over-end-statebias indeedaffects the . For the manner- specific acquisitionof the meaningsof verbs in theseclasses verbspour anddump(which takethe theme/patientor contentasdirect object), childrenin all threeagegroupschosethe sequencedepictingthecorrectmanner andincompleteeffectfor bothpicturesetsin numberssignificantlyabovechance (thirteenof thesixteen2-to-3-year-olds, fourteenof thesixteen3-to-4-year-olds, thirteenof the sixteen4-to-5-year-olds; chance= 25% = four out of sixteen children). In contrast, children, unlike adults, did not insist that the end-statespecific verbsfill and empty apply to sequencesdepicting full or empty containersat theend: in noneof the threeagegroupsdid thechildrenchoosethe correctsequences in numberssignificantly greaterthanchance. Moreover, for somechildrenin theoldestgroup, therewasactuallya preferencefor the typical but semanticallyirrelevantmannerassociatedwith filling containers: for fill , half the childrenchosethe sequencedepicting pouring from a pitcher and an emptyglasson both opportunities, a proportion that is at the statisticalabovechancethreshold(p= .05), anda similar thoughweakerbiaswasin evidencefor empty. 7.5.3.2 Semanticand Syntactic Errors with Fal -type Verbs in the Same Children A secondtaskwaspresentedto the samegroupof children to verify thatthey, like thechildrenwhosespontaneous speecherrorshavebeenreported

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in the literature, wereproneto makingfill thewater-type syntacticerrors. After children chosea sequenceas depictinga given verb (which had always been presentedto themin theargumentless gerund), theywereaskedto describewhat washappening.Thedependentmeasurewaswhetherthe theme/patient/content or the source/goal/ containerwas usedasthe verb' s direct object. All the adult control subjectsbut oneexpressedthe contentasthe direct object of pour and weresplit for empty, dumpandthecontainerasthedirectobjectoffill (responses in the verb can alternate adult when thepreposition because English presumably from is used). ' Virtually all of the children s usesof the verbspour and dump with direct objects were adultlike, with the content argumentappearingin the object position; in fact, therewasno statisticaldifferencebetweenthechildren andthe adults. However, forfill , the (incorrect) contentargumentwasexpressedasthe direct object about as frequently as the (correct) containerargument was, a proportion significantly different from that of adults. The responseswere as follows: for the 2-to-3-year-olds, 17% content, 15% container; for the 3-t0-4year-olds, 17% content, 14% container; for the4-to-5-year-olds, 10% content, for emptywerealsosplit, thoughthis result is harder 18% container. Responses . to interpret given that it can alternatein adult speech in errors with The asymmetry syntactic , fill beingusedincorrectly far more often thanpour anddump, is consistentwith thedatafrom spontaneous speech. Bowermanreportselevenerrorswith container-object(fill -type) verbs, but only three errors with content- object (pour/dump-type) verbs. And it is consistent with the manner-over-end-statebiasin the interpretationof the verbs shownin the previous task: children of all agesknew that pour and dump specify a particular manner; at no agedid they consistentlydemonstrateknowledgethat fill and empty require a particular end state; and some of them may have mistakenlythoughtthatfill specifiesa particularmanner. Can this correlationbe extendedevenfurther, to individual children? If we consideronly rough age trends, we do not seea correlation: the tendencyto misinterpretfill asmeaningsomethinglike pour peaksin the oldest group, but the tendencyto makesyntacticerrorsis strongerfor the two youngergroups. More insight can be gained, however, by focusingon patternsof correlation acrossindividual children, particularlythe childrenin the oldestgroup, half of whom seemedsensitiveto a spuriousmannercorrelateof fill . In order to see whether individual children who misinterpretfill as specifying a pouringlike mannerarealsomoreproneto utteringerrorslikefill the water, we constructed a 2 x 2 contingencytable, with eachchild contributingone datapoint. On one " dimension, a child wasscoredas" semanticallybiasedto manner if he or she chosethe pouring-from-pitcher/empty-glasstype of sequenceon both trials,

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"

" semanticallysensitiveto endstate ifhe or shechosethe lifting -faucet-handle/ full -glasstype of sequenceon both trials. On the other, a child was scoredas " " syntacticallyerror-prone if he or she uttered at least one ungrammatical sentencewith the theme/ contentas direct object, and " not syntacticallyerror" prone ifhe or sheneverdid so. Given the noisein thetwo tasksandthefactthat four children gave inconsistentresponsesin the semantictest and had to be excluded, this is a very demandingtest, but a trendis visible: ninechildrenwere eithermanner-biasedanderror-proneor end-state-sensitiveandnot error-prone, and threedisplayedone of the conversepatterns; X2 ( 1) = 3.09, p < .08.19 7.5.3.3 Effects of the Semanticsof Newly Learned Verbs Themostpowerful evidencethat children' s representationsof verb meaning causetheir choicesof argumentstructuresmustcomefrom experimentswhereoneattempts to manipulatetheir semanticrepresentations of verbsthey learnthereandthen. in such cases can we be confident that children representmeaningsin a Only particular way, and that propertiesof the meaningrepresentationaffect the verbs' argumentstructuresratherthan vice-versa. Gropen( 1989) reasonedthat although children may havean overall biasto attendto mannerof motion overchangeof endstate, therearesituationsin which oneor theothermay be so salientthat the child would naturallyencodeit asthe main eventof the verb' s meaning. After all . we hypothesizethat the child' s linking rule for direct object specifiesthat objectsare patients(or patientsand themes), a rule that is neutralas to whetherthe patient/themeis definedwithin the field of physical location or physical state. Childrenshouldbe equippedto ' mapeitherkind of patient/themeonto syntacticobjects; Gentners mannerbias is simply a greatertendencyto construethe movingentity asthe patient/theme thanthechangingentity . (In fact, the simultaneousemergenceof verbslike put andverbslike cover suggestthat children arecapableof noticingeitherkind of change.) If we could arrangesituationsin which either the motion or the state changewasdistinctive, we shouldbeableto affectwhichentitychildrenconstrue asthe patient/theme. And if the theory is correct, this in turn shouldaffect their choiceof which entity to expressas the syntacticobject- even if they had no linguistic evidenceto go on whatsoever. As describedin Gropen ( 1989), two experimentswererun in which children were taughtnew verbs in the argumentlessgerundform: "This is pilking." In eachcasechildren were taughttwo new verbspertainingto an action in which a thing (the theme) was movedto a place (the goal). The actionscamein two versions: one involved a distinctive mannerof motion of the theme with no distinctivechangeof stateof the goal; the otherinvolveda distinctivechangeof

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stateof the goal with no distinctive mannerof motion of the theme. The two acrosschildren, as was order of versionsof eachaction werecounterbalanced . presentation In oneexperiment, a handfulof penniesor marbleswas movedto a pieceof cloth that wassuspendedlike a hammock. The experimentereither movedthe penniesinto thehammockin a hoppingmotion, or movedthemin a straightpath butmovedenoughof themthatthehammockcollapsedundertheir weight. In the secondexperiment, the experimentermoved a small cotton ball or piece of spongesaturatedwith liquid over to a larger squareof wet cloth. Either the spongewasmovedin a zigzagpath, or it wasmovedover directly andthe cloth 20 changedcolor as the result of a chemical reaction. In both experiments, " childrenwerethenshowntheactionandwereasked, Can you tell me whatI ' m ' " doing? Basedon children s spontaneous speechand pilot experiments,we did not expectthat thechildrenwould invariablyprovide a third , obliqueargument, especiallythewith-objectthatencodesthe themewhen the goal is direct object, andso we simply scoredwhetherthe direct object was the themeor goal. If no " objectwasprovided, we followed uptheinitial querywith Canyou tell mewhat ' " I m pilking? The resultsaresummarizedin (7.23) and (7.24). The differencebetweenthe " " " " responsefrequenciesfor manner and end state conditionsare listed in each case. Positivevaluesindicatethat subjectswere sensitiveto the regularity that thespecificallyaffectedentity (theonedisplayinga distinctive change, eitherin motion or in state) is encodedasthe direct object. (7.23) Age 3

Condition Pennieshop (manner) Cloth sags(end state) Difference

(Joal=object responses .06 .22 .16

Theme=object responses .94 .75 .19

5

Pennieshop (manner) Cloth sags(end state) Difference

.03 .22 .19

.97 .78 .19

7

Pennieshop (manner Cloth sags(end state) Difference

.16 .41 .25

.84 .56 .28

Adult

Pennieshop (manner) Cloth sags(end state) Difference

.19 .44 .25

.75 .56 .19

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( 7 .24 )

Age 3

Condition Sponge Cloth

zigzags

changes

Sponge Cloth

zigzags

changes

Sponge Cloth

zigzags

changes

Sponge Cloth

zigzags

changes

Difference

responses .53

( end state )

.78

. 16

.31

.37

( manner )

.25

.75

( end state )

1.00

.00

.75

.75

( manner )

.25

.75

( end state )

.84

. 16

Difference Adult

responses .47

Difference 7

Theme = object

( manner )

Difference 5

Goal = object

.59

.59

( manner )

.34

.66

( end state )

1.00

.00

.66

.66

The first thing that is apparent in the pennies experiment is a manner- overend - state bias: most of the utteranceshad the theme as object in both conditions , for the especially younger children . We suspect that this effect was accentuated by the fact that the change of state of the goal in this action - a collapsing of the hammocklike cloth - was accompanied by a distinctive path of motion of the theme (downward ), so that the experimenter ' s placing of pennies in the hammock could have been construed as forcing or stuffing the pennies, making the manner of their motion or the manner of causation of their motion to be salient even in the condition in which we hoped it would be " neutral." Nonetheless , superimposed on this bias is the effect we predicted : all age groups were more apt to encode the goal as the object if the manner of motion was nondescript and the goal underwent a distinctive statechange. The second experiment , involving a goal entity that changedcolor , was designed to minimize the manner-overend state bias. And in fact , for all age groups subjects were more likely to have the object encode the goal than the theme when the goal changed state, and more likely to have the object encode the theme than the goal when the theme moved in a distinctive manner. The experiments, therefore, strongly confirm the prediction that children ' s verb meanings constrain their argument structures. Arguments serving as theme/ patients in a verb ' s semantic representation are mapped onto object . Either a moving object or a changing object can be encoded as a theme/ patient

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of theverb' s mainevent. Thechoiceof which entity is encodedastheme/patient dependson whetherthemannerof motion (or mannerof causationof motion) or thechangeof stateis distinctive. superimposedwith anoverall biasto encodethe moving object andits manneras the main event. 7.6

Some Predictions About the Acquisition of Narrow - Range Rules

I have said little about the acquisitionof the narrow-range rules that license unqualified productive extensionsof verbs to new argument structuresfor nonaffixing alternationsin the adult language. Children may not be forthcoming with the kinds of subtlejudgments that would distinguish possiblebut nonlicensedgeneralizationsfrom possible and licensedgeneralizations(e.g., * squeezethefish with lemonjuice versusbrushthefish with lemonjuice). Therefore it is difficult to tell whethertheir generalizationsarelicensednarrow-range arein fact ones; I haveprovidedindirectevidencethat their overgeneralizations dueto broad-rangerules. Moreover, if thechild doesusenarrow-rangerulesand they areproperlyformulated, the outputswill be grammaticaland henceindistinguishable from conservativelylearnedargumentstructuresin spontaneous . A final methodologicalproblemis that youngchildren generallydo not speech of verbswith linguistically equivalentsemanticrepresentations entire families possess . (For ; they generallymasteronly a few verbs in eachnarrow subclass example, the five children whosedative forms we examinedusedbetweenone and three verbsof obtaining, and from zero to three verbsof creation. For the locative, the narrow classeswere even more sparselyrepresented , with most ' classeshavingbetweenzeroandtwo exemplarsin theyoungchildren s vocabulary .) This might make the questionof narrow-rangerules moot at this stage; therecould befew or no verbsin their vocabularyfor therule to applyto thatlack the argumentstructurein question. However, theevidencereviewedin this chaptershowsthat manyof thepieces are in place for children to make narrow-rangegeneralizationsfrom a known verbto a semanticall y similarverboncetheybeginto acquiresetsof relatedverbs and needto extendthem to new argumentstructures. We know that argument structuresare very tightly tied to lexical semanticsfor children: whenverb A is maximally similar to verb B- whenit is confusedwith it - B inheritsthe argument structureordinarily belongingto A. Thus it is not implausiblethat when ' word A is merely similar (in the right way) to B , it would also get to useB s argumentstructures. As verb meaningsbecomemore accurateand stable, existence-predicting argumentstructuregeneralizationsshould becomemore adultlike. It seemsquite likely , then, that narrow-rangerules would track the

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child ' s increasinglyrefined semanticrepresentations , so that once larger numbers of lower-frequencyverbsareacquired,correctnarrow-rangeruleswould be in place. The empirical prediction is that children, especiallyolder children, shouldspontaneously and freely generalizenew argumentstructuresto newly acquiredverbswhenthegrammaticallyrelevantpartsof theirsemanticrepresentations aresimilarto verbsthatalreadyalternatein their vocabulary. Conversely, if theyheara coupleof examplesof verbsof a newkind alternating, they should freely generalizeto verbsthataresemanticallysimilar to it in therelevantways, and only to suchsimilar verbs. The experimentsI have run on the dative offer some support for this prediction. Although in the two experimentsI havementioned(Gropen et al., 1989) we were successfulat eliciting productivedouble-object forms from children, this successdid not come easily. In a pilot experiment(originally reportedin Wilson, Pinker, Zaenen, and Lebeaux, 1981, and summarizedin Gropenet al., 1989), childrenproducedno double-object forms at all , not even for the verb give. The two subsequentexperimentsowe their successto some fairly strongmeasureswe took to makethe double-object constructionsalient (evenfor existingverbslike pass). Basically, we demonstratedsimilar kinds of actionswhile usingdouble- objectsentences (of course, neverwith the verbswe latertested), wehadthechild repeatthesentences , andwe calledattentionto the form itself asa way of describingtheevent. In hindsight, we canseewhy these measureswerenecessary . It wasnot becausechildrenhadnot yet masteredthe double-object form at all ; we knew that their spontaneousspeechcontained manydouble- objectforms. Rather, theactionsthatwehadhopedchildren would describeusingthedouble-objectform, suchasto transferanobjectto a recipient usinga clothesline,conflateda mannerandinstrumentof motion with causation of a changeof possession . But whenwe later analyzedthe subclasses of verbs that dativizein adults' andchildren' s speech , we learnedthat certain kinds of manner-of-causation - of-motion verbs(continuouscausationverbs, suchaspull andcarry) do notdativizeevenfor adults, andthatthe manner-of-causation-ofmotion verbsthat do dativize (ballistic motion verbssuchas throw, toss, and slide) wereneverusedin the double:"objectform in the children' s spontaneous speech. Childrensimply had not acquiredany narrow-rangedativization rule that appliesto verbsof mannerof causationof motion; all their double-object forms were from other subclass es of verbs. The effect of our pretraining measures , then, may havebeento providechildrenwith evidencethat mannerof-causation -of-motion verbs can dativize. With this knowledgeunder their belts, thechildrenfreely generalizedthedouble-objectform to the semantically similar novel verbswe taughtin the main conditionsof the experiment. If this

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interpretationis correct, it would confinn the prediction that children freely dativize verbs only with prior evidencethat other verbs within that narrow . semarjticsuhclassexist in the double-objectfonn in adult speech 7.6.1 A SpeculationAbout the Role of Maturation I would like to offer anotherpredictionabouttheacquisitionof narrow-classrules, thoughit doesnot fallout of thetheory. It is aspeculationthatI haveastronghunchaboutbut would ' not care to defendextensivelyat this point. The prediction is that an adult s narrow-classrulescorrespondto the verbsthat happento alternatein his or her lexiconat a maturationallydeterminedcritical point, presumablyaroundpuberty or shortly thereafter.Sucha hypothesishasbeensuggestedby Ritchie ( 1985) for the dativealternationin English, basedon thefact that manyof the Latinate nonalternatingverbsarepart of the learnedvocabularythat might be acquired speechreportedin section relatively late in life. The analysesof spontaneous : we found no Latinate-sounding 4.4.1.1 are consistentwith this hypothesis ' verbsin five children s dativeconstructions , andonly onein the speechof their . parents Why do I find this speculationaboutmaturationplausible? For onething, the minimal requirement , namelythat at leastonealternatingverb in eachnarrow classbemasteredby children, seemslikely to bemet. Eachof thealternatingsubclasseshasatleastoneor two verbsof highenoughfrequencythatchildrenwould . For example, each of the likely have acquiredthem by early adolescence es (except for the somewhatunusualdenominal verbs dativizable subclass or communicationwith the useof a namedinstrument) was creation denoting at least two verbsin thepooledvocabulariesof the five children exemplifiedby we studied, theoldestof whomwasonly 6t. Furthermore , I havethe impression thatnarrow-rangeconstraintsareamongthesubtlepointsof grammarthat even very successfuladult learnersof foreign languagesfrequentlyerr on. But what is moststriking to me is my own languagedevelopment , or, more 's specifically, lack of it. I havebeenworking on Baker paradoxfor over eight , rehearsed , said to myself, years. During that time I have read, pondered thousands hundreds out loud and , of tokensof , perhaps pronounced proofread, . I have also structures of verbs and argument ungrammaticalcombinations attendedto them in the natural speechand writing of others, finding several dozenexampleswhich I haveexaminedmanytimessincefirst notingthem. And * * yet, the ungrammaticalsentences- He donatedthe museuma painting, He ' * * squeezedthefish with lemonjuice , Shefilled water into the glass, What s fussing her?- sound asawful to my earstodayastheydid on theday I first read Baker' s article, no matterhow subtleor puzzlingthecriteria thatrule themout.

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True, I consciouslyknew that eachof the ungrammaticalsentencessounded ungrammaticalto me and other speakerson first hearing, and thus always entertainedthem in my mind as violations. but it seemsunlikely that this highlevel cogitation (for example, knowing what the notationalconventionof an asterisknext to a sentencemeans) could penetratedown to the unconscious mechanismsthat acquire vocabularyand syntax. Rather, I suspectthat I am simply beyondthe ageat which hearingbothversionsof analternatingverbcan affect my narrow-rangelexical rules. This comesasa surpriseto many~ ople, who suspectthat" afteryou listento " , theyall startto soundgood. Indeedthis happensto enoughof thosesentences me (andfrequentlyto audiencesI amtalking to) in the shortterm, overa spanof minutes, probably becauseof a syntactic analogueof the phenomenonof " semanticsatiation" whenyou saya word overandover again, it momentarseems to lose its meaningfulness . But whenthis habituationwearsoff andI ily confronttheexamplesanew, their subjectivegrammaticalityremainsunchanged . JaneGrimshawhascommentedto me on a similar phenomenon . Apparentlyit is commonlore amonglinguiststhatthebestinformantsfor linguisticjudgments in an areaof language- the peoplethat havethemoststableanddiscriminating reactionsto sentences - are usually other linguists working in the samearea. This is true even when the other linguist' s pet theorymakesno prediction, or a differentprediction, aboutwhich sentences shouldsoundgrammatical,andsoit is notjust a caseof observerbias. If peoplelearnlanguagethroughouttheir lives is puzzling. It should throughexposureto positiveexemplars,this phenomenon bejust thosespeakersthatheartheungrammaticalsentences mostoftenthathave ' theweakestnegativereactionsto them. But if anything, the subjectivediscriminations becomecrisper with increasingexposure . 7.7

Summary of Development

The goal of this chapter was to resolve the developmental version of Baker ' s paradox : that children overgeneralize argument structure alternations even beyond the boundaries of adult productivity , yet grow into adults without the benefit of negative evidence. In particular , I sought to explain their overgeneraIizations and unlearning of them without invoking an ad hoc mechanism that did nothing but take simple rules and make them needlessly more complicated . The ' following hypothesis was proposed: children s errors are of two kinds . The first consists of one shot innovations based on broad-range rules and thus have the same status as adult innovations , requiring no specific unlearning . The second is due to childhood malapropisms : semantic representationsthat are incorrect for that stem ( transiently or over a sustained period) in ways that cause incorrect

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argumentstructuresto be pairedwith them. The sourceof the syntacticerrors ' thus disappearsas an automaticconsequenceof the fine-tuning of the verbs . semanticrepresentations The hypothesiswas supportedby a wide range of data that are consistent acrossexperimentaland naturalisticmethodologies, and consistentacrossthe four alternationsI havebeenfocusingon (apartfrom differencesin productivity stemmingfrom the fact that the passiveis signaledby an affix ). Threefindings ' ' supportthe essentialcontinuity betweenchildren s errors and adults broad' are alwaysconsistentwith the rangerules. First, children s overgeneralizations constraints that characterize the adult broad-range rule. Second, semantic ' children s overall tendencyis toward conservatism; overgeneralizationerrors arethe exception. Third, children can be capableof displaying metalinguistic judgmentsin which they detectovergeneralizationerrors at the sametime that theymakethemin their own speech.And threefindings supporta causalrole for children' s undevelopedverb semanticsin their production of ungrammatical sentences . First, there is independentevidencethat children' s lexicosemantic areoften incomplete, distorted, or unstable, often in specifiable representations that would ways directly lead to the argumentstructure errors we hear them make. Second, there are correlationsbetweensemantic errors and syntactic errorsacrossindividual children, ages, andverbs. Third , experimentalefforts to ' manipulatechildren sverbmeanings,with no syntacticevidenceavailableto the children, causethem to make predictable choices for the verbs' argument structureswhenthey usethe verbs.

Chapter 8 - . Conclusions

No onecando sustainedresearchon the psychologyof languagewithout an inordinate fondnessfor linguistic detail. Still , I would not have written a fourhundred-pageexplanationof why the sentenceHe donatedus a book sounds funny if I did not think it would shedlight on psychologicalquestionsof some generality. In thischapterI first providea succinctsummaryof the resolutionof the learningparadoxintroducedin the first chapter, since the solution could . ThenI will spell easilyhavebeenlostsightof duringtheinterveningdiscussions out somenonobviousconclusionsaboutlanguageand mind that this solution entails, anddiscusssomeof their broaderimplications. 8.1 A Brief Summary of the Resolution of the Paradox The acquisitionof argumentstructureposesa learnability paradox: without the benefit of negativeevidence, children learn a grammarin which lexical rules allow productivegeneralizationsof many verbs to new argumentstructures, while excludingother verbsthat are otherwisesyntactically indistinguishable " ' " ( Baker s paradox, chapter1). The solutionI haveproposed,in a nutshell, is as follows: . Childrenandadultsuserulesproductivelybut respectsemanticandmorpho" criteria which verbs can logical determining they apply to. ( Criteria-governed " productivity, chapter2.) . Criteriaarisefrom aninteractionbetweenthenatureof lexical rulesandverbs' inherentmeanings . Argumentstructuresare projections(via linking rules) of verbs' semanticstructures ; lexical rules are operationsthat changesemantic structures. The semanticchangewill be more compatible with some verbs' meaningsthanothers. Thusthe lexical rules will apply more naturally to some verbsthanto others. ("Thematic cores," chapter3.)

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. In a given language, the verbsthat undergoa nonaffixing lexical rule most freely fall into numerousnarrow classeswith similar meaningsand fonns. " " ( Narrow conflation classes, chapter4.) ' . Verbs meaningrepresentations are built arounda distinctivesetof semantic structurescorrespondingto aspectsof motion, location, force, causation , time, in designated andobjecttype. Otherkindsof infonnationcanalsoberepresented " slotsprovidedby thesestructuresbut areignoredby grammar. ( Grammatically " relevant subsystem , chapter5.) ' . Verbs meaningsarelearnedthroughaninterplayof assigningverballabelsto , tuning theserepresentations by noting the preexisting conceptualcategories situationsin whicheachverbis usedby adults, andmaximizingtheirconsistency with existinglinguistic knowledge.Thenarrowclassesof verbsaffectedby a rule are learned by retaining parts of the grammaticallyrelevantportions of the semanticstructuresof verbsheardto undergothe rule and parameterizingthe " " , chapter6.) grammaticallyirrelevantportions. ( Color-blind conservatism ' . Children s lexical rules at all stagesare formally similar to thoseof adults. The main developmentalmechanismthat makesthem soundmorelike adults asthey grow up is theacquisitionof moreandmoreaccuratemeaningsfor more " " and more verbs. (" Minimalist hypothesis and " childhood malapropisms , chapter7.) The actual contentof the book consistedof making eachof the following notions in that capsuledescriptionexplicit andreviewingtherelevantevidence: " " " " semantic structures" " , linking rules, operationson semanticstructure, " " narrow classes" " " " , , applying naturally, compatibility with verb meanings " " " " " similar in es, acquisitionof accurate meaningandform, interplayof process " verb meanings," and " children soundingmore like adults. In the next few sectionsI will explore someof the interestingimplicationsof thesespecific hypotheses. 8.2 Argument Structure as a Pointer Between Syntactic Structure and " " Propositions: A Brief Comparison with a Connectionist Alternative These days it is hard to talk about argumentstructureamongpsychologists , new that a without and scientists , radically hearing computer philosophers approachto the topic can solveproblemsthat havebesettheclassicallinguistic treatment. The work I have presentedfalls squarelywithin that classical tradition, and it is importantto seewhy thereis no reasonto abandonit. Work on argument structure in contemporarylinguistics treats it as an interface betweenlexical semanticsand sententialsyntax(see, e.g., di Sciullo andWilliams , 1987; Grimshaw, in press; B. Levin, 1985; RappaportandLevin,

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1986). Linking rules generateargumentstructuresout of semanticrepresentations , but the information in the argumentstructureis all that the syntaxsees. Argumentstructuresfunction in sentenceinterpretationessentiallyby copying the representationsof words and phrasesfound in argumentpositions in the sentence(seesection5.5.2) . If the sentencehasthenounphraseColorlessgreen ideas in subjectposition, then the semanticrepresentationfor colorlessgreen ideasis copiedinto theopenargumentslot for theverbof thesentence , say,sleep, no matterhow unusualor implausible. When the representations of verb and argumentsarefused, conflicts betweenthe two, if any, will give rise to a sense of anomaly. This senseof anomalymay be reducedat times by selectingfrom amonga rangeof possiblemeaningsleft openby the words, or by embroidering the interpretationof the sentenceso as to define a scenarioin which it can be of interpretedastrue. But it cannotbe resolvedby rewriting the representations the argumenttermsto make the sentencemore plausible. McClellandandKawamoto( 1986) assumea radicallydifferentmechanismin their modelof argumentstructureassignment , which falls within the " connec" " " tionist or parallel distributed processing framework. In their model, arguments' representationsare not copied; the operationof copying, becauseit consistsby definition of dissociatingapatternfrom thehardwareit is instantiated in, is not a naturaloperationwithin connectionistarchitectures(seePinkerand Prince, 1988). Rather, there is a trainablenetwork of associationsbetweenan input vectorof featureseachof which representspropertiesof the verbor of the , and an output vectorof featureseachof which representsa phrasalarguments combinationof a property of the eventand a propertyof the semanticrole that one of the argumentsplays in the event. The associationsare strengthened " " and throughtrainingsessionsin which a teacher providesbothinput sentences their output interpretations. For example, a verb could pair the input features [subjectis soft and medium-sized], [object is food and female], and [verb is intenseandcausesa chemicalchange] with the outputfeatures[agentof causal event is round], [patient of no- changeevent is compact], and [instrumentof shredding-event is soft] . ( Theseare actual examplesof featuresused in the model, drawnfrom a setof 1,052 input featuresand2,500 output features.The reasonthat eachinput featurerepresentsa pair of attributesratherthana single attributeis thatit providesa partial remedyfor theproblemthatstandardconnectionist architectureshave difficulty binding arguments , objects, and attributes properly.) An immediateproblemthat themodelfacesis thatsincethereis no mechanism forcing the semanticpropertiesof input phrasesto be copiedinto the representation of the sentenceasa whole, very unnaturalverbsareeasily learnable. For

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example, the network would have no trouble learning a verb that always interpretsa humanmale subjectasa femalenonhumanpatientand a hardfood subjectasanagentconsistingof a soft tool. In practice, thecontingenciesof the . But since the world train the model to build more reasonableassociations constraintscomefrom the world andnot from the linguistic representation , the result is a massivelyknowledge-driven processof sentenceinterpretationin which the actualcontentsof the sentenceplaya small role, merely activating of whattypically happensin theworld. McClellandand preexistingassociations Kawamoto give the examplesshown in (8.1) of how their model assigns . (I have recastthe argumentsto predicatesduring sentencecomprehension otherwise left the interpretation a but have examplesinto the fonn of dialogue .) arrivedat by the model unchanged (8.1) Q: The plate broke. What broke? A: A vaseor a window. Q: The boy broke. What broke? A: A pieceof furniture. Q: The wolf ate a chicken. What did it eat? A: Cookedchickenmeat. ? Q: The bat broke the window. What happened A: A bat (animal) broke the window usinga baseballbat. Q: The pillow broke the window. What broke the window? A: Somethinghard. Q: JohntouchedMary. What did he do? A: He hit her. McClellandand Kawamototreat this behavioras supportfor their model, ' ' showing that one man s reductio ad absurdum is another man s universal principle. McClellandand Kawamotoareseekingto solvethe problemof how knowledgecandisambiguatetwo argumentstructuresthat are identical on the surface,suchasJohn ate thepasta with the clams/ with thefork . Thus they are impressedwith how their model brings backgroundknowledge to bear on sentenceinterpretation. But what they have done is collapseambiguity with , andthusthey failed to distinguishtheuseof backgroundknowledge vagueness toselectfrom a setof candidatemeaningsfrom theuseof backgroundknowledge to createa single meaning. AffectionateJohn, falsely accusedof beatinghis wife, is a victim of this collapsing. A relatedproblem, common in connectionist modelsof language(Pinker and Prince, 1988), is the lack of distinct for distinct lexical entriessharinga sound, which areblendedin representations . The result is the bat-wielding Vespertilio a single" distributed" representation pipistrellus.

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Effortslike the McClelland-Kawamotomodelareinstructivein showinghow eventhemostbasicassumptions aboutlinguisticrepresentation canbepowerful . The psychologicalhypotheses computationalrole of argumentstructureas a pointerbetweenlexically specifiedrolesandtheir syntacticallyspecifiedfillers is a basicdesignfeatureof humanlanguage . It allowsusto composedescriptions of possibleand imaginedeventsand to expect that the descriptionscan be interpretedliterally , no matterhow implausibleor unexpected(asin thefamous headline" ManBitesDog," or therecordalbumby NonnanGreenbaum newspaper , TheEggplantthat Ate Chicago.) In this book I haveconcentratedon oneaspect of the fonnal nature of argumentstructures , namely, their demand that a number of particular argumentslotsbe filled by phrasesof specific types. But aboveandbeyondthe subtletiesof which verbsmakewhich suchdemands,the fact thattheydemandfillable slotsto beginwith, ratherthanservingasconduits of associationbetweensentencepositionsandfrequentlycooccurringkinds of eventsandparticipants. is a significantaspectof the psychologyof language.

8.3 The Autonomyof SemanticRepresentation A centralclaim of thetheoryis thatlexical rulesinvolve operationson semantic structure, and accordinglyI haveemphasizedthe semanticpropertiesof verbs and semanticdevelopmentin childrenas key explanatoryfactors in language structureanddevelopment . I dosowith someapprehension , astheclaim is easily . The temptation is to equate lexicosemanticstructure with misunderstood conceptualstructure. This equationis madequite explicitly by Jackendoff ( 1983) and by Hale and Keyser( 1986, 1987), who call it Lexical Conceptual " Structure.Given how heavilyI rely on suchstructures , I fear that the semantics " = concepts equationwill arousea varietyof prejudicesthat will causereaders to acceptor reject the currenttheoryfor entirely wrong reasons. The ideathatargumentstructureis basedon conceptualstructureis appealing to theoristswho reject the possibility that linguistic knowledge is part of an autonomousmental faculty and who want to baseit directly on nonlinguistic cognitive representations (e.g., Lakoff, 1987). It is also appealingto theorists the holding completelyoppositeview, who want to segregateas many messy cognition relatedlanguagephenomenaas possiblefrom the languagefaculty, the better to portray that faculty as consistingonly of autonomousformal principles(e.g., Hale andKeyser, 1986). Anotherclassof theoristssharingthis overallphilosophymight nonetheless find thecurrentproposalsunappealing,as they seemto trivialize theessentiallyformal natureof linguistic regularitiesby glibly relegatingthemto an ad hoc, unexplained , and all-powerful conceptual . component

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So let me immediately withdraw any comfort or consternation provided to thesetheorists by denying the premise that semantic representationsare the same as conceptual representations. Everything I have discussedabout constraints on ' lexical rules has pointed to the conclusion that verbs semantic structures constitute an autonomous level of linguistic representation, not reducible to syntax or cognition . Like other linguistic representations, they contain semiarbitrary language -particular features while obeying formal and substantive universals . The argument for this distinction is fairly simple : the lexical representations that govern the applicability of argument-changing rules are not syntactic , and they are not conceptual . Let me consider each in turn. There are two ways in which syntactic distinctions do not succeedin distinguishing alternating from nonalternating verbs. First , the syntactic vocabulary in which argument structures themselvesare couched- internal versusexternal argument , direct versus indirect argument, argument versus adjunct, obligatory ' versus optional argument- simply don t do the job if we use standardsyntactic evidence for when they are applicable . (Of course they could always be made to do the job in a uselesssense, by discarding the syntactic content that motivates these criteria and simply equating their presence with susceptibility to the alternation in question, but that would explain nothing .) Furthermore, the criteria that do distinguish alternating from nonalternating verbs are not meaningless formal symbols but have cognitive content. That is, they can interface with conceptualizations of situations so as to yield intuitions about the kinds of ' situations that we feel the verb could be applied in , independent of the verb s syntactic properties . For example , the distinction betweenSpray theflowers with water and * Pour theflowers with water hinges on a property of the verbs that a/so leads us to feel that we would not use the verb spray in connection with a measuring cup nor the verb pour in connection with a water pistol . Any proposal about the lexical representations relevant to argument structure that fails to posit """ representations of this kind - semantic representations is simply at odds with the semantic choosiness of rules that alter argument structure. But the view that the syntactically relevant semantic features of lexical entries are simply copies of preexisting conceptual categories for kinds of events and states fares no better. The problem here is that the semantic distinctions ' can be so specific to the speaker s particular language or dialect , and so poorly motivated by independent principles of cognitive organization , that equating linguistic semantic representations with the conceptual categories underlying nonlinguistic thought is tantamount to a very strong and implausible Whorfian claim . Consider some of the semantic distinctions I have appealed to regarding the dative alternation . The distinction betweenGive the ball to him and Give him the

8 Chapter ball derivesfrom the distinctionbetween" causingYto go to Z ' and" causingZ to haveY." This distinctionis necessaryto motivatethe patternof choosinessof the dative alternation, which favors verbsthat can be interpretedasdenotinga , andit helpsexplain why theconstructionshavethegrammatical changeof possession functionstheydo, why theyresemblecertainnonalternatingverbs, some of thepragmaticdifferencesbetweenthe two dativeforms, somerestrictionson idioms, .and the changing interpretationof verbs like teach. But despitethe linguistic importanceof this semanticdistinction, its independentcognitive : importanceis negligible. Considerthe following phenomena I . The two constructionsare usually so cognitively interchangeablethat speakersandwritersoften cannotdecidewhich to use, andmanylinguistshave simply assumedthat there is no semanticdifference betweenthem. If the semanticstructuressimply consistedof thecognitivestructuresrepresentingthe contentof someonescommunicativeintentions, thenassoonasa speakerknew what he wantedto say. he would know which argumentstructureto use to say it. 2. Therearedialectaland idiolectal differencesin dativizability. As I have mentioned, GeorgiaGreen ( 1974), for example, finds I carried I dragged I hauledI pulled I pushedhim the box to be grammatical. but I do not. I would explain this in terms of theseverb entries having different sets of semantic representationsin her dialect than mine. Among the versionsof drag in her lexicon is onethat hasthe roughmeaning"X causesY to haveZ by causingZ to move in a draggingmannerwith X to r '; my lexicon lacks suchan entry and cannotattainit with any of my lexical rules. Yet surelyGreenandI do not have different conceptionsof what dragging is. 3. Languagesdiffer in the range of verbs that analogousalternationscan apply to. Even in a languageas closely related to English as Dutch, the equivalentsof sayandsuggestaregrammaticalin the closesttranslationsof the double-objectform. Nonetheless it seemsunlikely thatthe Dutchconceiveof the actsof sayingor suggestingdifferently from us, exceptat the momentthat they have to expressthem in words. Since all of the alternationsexaminedshow cross-linguistic variationin theexactsetsof wordsthey apply to, examplescan easily be multiplied. For example, in Hebrew there are lexical causatives correspondingto actionverbslike danceandwrite, but surelyHebrewspeakers do not conceiveof humansas will -lessautomata. 4. Any attemptto relatetheselinguistic differencesto stablecultural differences amonglanguagecommunitiesis surely doomedto failure. For example, one of the most widely discussedinteractions among verb semanticsand argumentstructureinvolvesmotion verbsandtheir complements , which Talmy

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has shown to fall into three patterns: conflation of motion and direction, conflation of motion and manner, and conflation of motion and object type. Aronoff ( 1987) pointsout that it is hard to find any cultural unity among the thatobeyeachone: Romance,Semitic, Polynesian,andNez groupsof languages Percefollow the first pattern, Chinese, English, and Caddofollow the second, and NavajoandAmericanSign Languagefollow the third. 5. The narrow subclass es of verbs that do or don' t alternateare basedon esthathave criteriathatwouldbeunlikelyto divideeventcategoriesinto subclass anythingimportantin commonwith respectto reasoning.In fact, thecriteria are so cognitivelysubtlethatevenlinguistswho havestudiedthe alternationshave es andhaveasserted , incorrectly I mostly not noticedthe natureof the subclass claim, that they aresemanticallyarbitrary. For example: . The three-way distinctionbetweenhanding, carrying, andtaking is unlikely to beascognitivelysalientasthedistinctionbetween,say, throwing, kicking, and rolling , yet asfar asthe dativeis concerned,eachof the first threebelongsto a different classwhile the latter threebelongto the sameclass. . The Englishlanguage , but not its speakerswhenthey arenot speaking, must considertelling to be a differentkind of activity thansaying, shouting, talking, or speaking,butthesamekind of activity asquoting, leaking, asking, posing, or , shoutingis no moresimilar to yelling or screamingthan it writing . Conversely is to whisperingandmurmuring. . Bakinga cakehasto be construedas similar to building a houseand writing but asdissimilar to warminga cake, burninga cake, a letter of recommendation . or reheatinga cake . Bettinghasto be represented asbeing like envying, sparing, andbegrudging but unlike selling, paying, or trading. Clearly it would be hardto claim that the English languageis following the naturallinesof fractureof eventconceptsinto psychologicalnaturalkinds, and it would beevenharderto do soafterotherlanguageswereexamined.But at the sametime, the crucial distinctionsare decidedlysemantic, in that they can be relatedto setsof situationsin the world wherethe verbscould be used, and not syntactic, asnoneof the availablesyntacticpropertiesof argumentsmakesthe right cuts. Thereforesemanticrepresentationsof words, and by extension of categories sentences , aredistinct from cognitive or conceptualrepresentations , events, scenes , propositions, and so on (thoughthey may be built out of ). When children learnthe semanticrepresentation overlappingprimitive vocabularies of averbwith agivenargumentstructure,theymustarriveatameaning that is mutuallyconsistentwith the situationsin which the verb representation canbe usedandwith the semanticconcomitantsof the argumentstructurethat

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thelanguagepairswith thatverb, usinglearningmechanisms with propertieslike thoseoutlinedin chapter6. The meaningof a sentenceis not a rich knowledgestructurefor a particular eventor stateor for a typical kind of eventor state. Rather,it is a highly schematic construalof aneventor state, anaustereidealizationinto astructurebuilt of foundational notionssuchascausation,motion, andchange.Thesamesituation, even the samestateof knowledgeabouta situation, mustfirst bemappedonto oneof themanypossibleidealizationsof it beforeit canbedescribedin words:spraying canbecausingwaterto moveor causinga wall to be wet, giving canbe causing a book to go or causinga personto have. One' s particularlanguagespellsout which of those possible idealizationsare available for linguistic encoding. Whorf wassurelywrong whenhe saidthatone' s languagedetermineshow one conceptualizes reality in general. But hewasprobablycorrectin a muchweaker sense:one' s languagedoesdeterminehow onemustconceptualizereality when one hasto talk aboutit.

8.4 Implicationsfor the SemanticBootstrapping Hypothesis It is widely recognizedboththatsyntaxis correlatedwith semanticsandthatsyntax is not reducibleto semantics . In other work I haveusedthis observationto to a fundamental try explain problemin languageacquisition: how thechild uses perceptualinput (soundsandsituations) to hypothesizegrammaticalstructures (grammaticalcategoriesand relations, phrasestructures , lexical entries) at the outset of the languageacquisitionprocess(Pinker, 1982, 1984, 1987). The suggestionis thatchildreninnatelyexpectsyntaxandsemanticsto becorrelated in certain ways in the speechthat they attend to, can derive the semantic representationby nongrammaticalmeans(attendingto the situation, making inferencesfrom themeaningsof individually acquiredwords), andcan thereby do a preliminarysyntacticanalysisof the first parentalutterancesthey process. For example, if childrenknow that a word refersto a thing, they can infer that it is a noun; if theyknow thatX is a predicateandY is its argument, they can infer thatX is theheadof a phrasethatincludesY; if theyknow thata phraseis playing the role of agent, they can infer that it is the subjectof the clause. With some grammaticalrulesundertheir belts, childrenwould now beequippedto handle sentencesviolating thesecorrelationsas they start to be relaxed in the input , wherethesubjectis notanagent, or deverbal speechtheyprocess(e.g., passives nouns, which do not refer to things). They can do this by classifying these nonbasicwordsin termsof their distributionwithin the grammaticalstructures that theyarenowcapableof analyzing. Forexample,a child could now infer that Z must be a nounbecauseit is in a nounposition.

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" Some version of this " semanticbootstrapping hypothesis appearsto be helpful in explaininghow languageacquisitiongetsstarted, but it is not without problems(seePinker, 1987, for discussion). First, like mostexplicit theoriesof that childrencanaccurately languageacquisition(seePinker, 1979), it assumes ' s . context the adult intended encodefrom meaning Second, if the correlations betweensyntaxand semanticsarenot universal, we needa specialexplanation for how childrenlearn languagesthat violate them. Third, if thecorrelationsare , we needto assume only probabilisticevenin themostcooperativeof languages that filter the noncorrelated structures either (passives,deverbalnouns, parents etc.) out of their own speech, or that children can filter them out of parents' speechusing some independentcriterion suchas complexity or nonstandard . illocutionary force. Thesearestrongassumptions In constructingthe semanticbootstrapping hypothesis , I prettymuchequated semanticstructureswith conceptualstructures. This was an expedientstep becauseI wastrying to showhowlanguageacquisitiongot started,andsoI could only allow input information that the child couldpossessbeforeheor sheknew a thing about the particular target language. The flow of information, and betweenstructures,areshown idealizedassumptionsaboutthecorrespondences in (8.2). context - - - - -- --_ .. (8.2) ~ -accurare & Perception by encoding Cognilion Id sentence

semant represe Semant Bootstra ping -- - ' ~ - -- - - - -

syntachc representation

I;stiC ~ wirhin correlarion andacross adultlanguages -excellent in " correlation "basic sentences ' s inchild input - - - -- ---~

However , the argument I just provided for the autonomy of semanticschanges the picture somewhat , making it simpler in one way and more complex in another. Since semantic representations are linguistic representations that are partially specific to a language, they cannot be inferred from context before language acquisition has started. Rather , it must be a separate conceptual structure that is created from context . The assumption that children can accu-

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ratelyencodethe meaningof an input sentencefrom contextwould be replaced . First, there is the innocuousassumptionthat children' s by two assumptions ' perceptualand cognitive mechanismsare enough like adults (at least in situationsin which they interactwith their parents) that theyconstruethe world in prettymuchthe sameway that the adultsspeakingto themdo. Second, there is a somewhatstrongerassumption: that in parent-to-child speech, the parent ' useswords whosesemanticrepresentations correspondclosely to the child s conceptualrepresentationfor that situation, so that event-categorylabelingand analogousprocesses for other grammaticalentities will generallybe accurate. Somethinglike that assumptionwas behind the successof the Gropen et ale experimentsin which we wereableto predict(on fairly common-senseassumptions aboutdistinctiveness ) that children would set up the semanticrepresentation for oneeventin termsof a statechangeandthe semanticrepresentationfor anotherasa kind of motion, eventhoughlogically either encodingwould have beenpossiblefor eitherevent. Thensemanticbootstrappingcantakeplace, using like thelinking rulesinvokedthroughoutthis syntax-semanticscorrespondences book. The new picture is shownin (8.3). context - (8.3) \ -accurate . &. rcePilc ;>n encoding by Cognition Id ~ ~ _ __- ,

sentence

- -....- - ..' conceptual stn ICture , cell -ex I correlalion -'"seninput ategory in Child Labeling (though subject 1 ses c $ , : ~ ---- - ---

semant re sentatio " ~ " " ' 1 tic Bootstra ping -excellent comaation within and KrosS adult - -- --_' J

syntactic ~ prcsentation

This new picture is more complicated in that it involves one extra link in the chain between perceptual input and grammatical output , and hence one more thing that can go wrong . However , its linguistic and psychological assumptions are simpler and more reasonable. First , the correspondences between syntax and

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semanticsare no longerprobabilisticcorrelationsthat thechild exploitsheuristically . Rather, theyaretheproductof fonnalgrammaticallinking principlesthat be may universaland exceptionless(exceptfor rare adjustmentslike thosein ). This comesat the cost, of course, of making syntactically ergativelanguages -particularand much the semanticrepresentationsmore abstractand language aboutthe . Second,the assumptions more loosely tied to conceptualcategories child ' s effective input (or " intake," asit is sometimescalled) aredifferent: rather thanparentshavingto useonly syntacticstructuresthatrespectsyntax-semantics correlations(or thechild having to filter out theviolationsthatslip through), the ' parentswould haveto useonly semanticstructuresthatcorrespondto thechild s conceptualencodingof the situation. Though in many individual casesthe assumptionswould be equivalent, the revisedpicture is moreplausibleon the whole. Heuristic correlations betweenperceptuallyderivableconceptual / semantic and difficult to both undesirable and are fonnally syntax categories defend empirically, comparedto linking regularitiesbetweensyntax and an abstractsemantics.(SeeLangacker, 1987,for anextensiveattemptto link syntax to semanticcategoriesthat arehighly abstractyet potentiallyinterfaceablewith nonlinguistic conceptualstructure.) Furthennore, it is easierto swallow the psychological assumptionthat parentsusewords and constructionsthat they think their children will understandin the sameway they do thanthat they use wordsandconstructionsthat belongto a speciallywell-behavedsubsetof grammar . In fact, a maindefenseof theearlierversionof thebootstrap pinghypothesis wasthe hope that in manycasesthesetwo assumptionswouldbe identical; it is clearly the fonDerassumptionthat is the untendentiousone. In concretetenDS, the differencewouldrun asfollows. In thesimplifiedtwobox version in (8.2), the child assumedthat agentsof physical actionswere subjects, and parentsavoided sentencesin which agentsof physical actions weren' t subjects(e.g., passives). In themorerealisticthree-boxversionin (8.3), thechild assumesthatthefirst argumentof anACT semanticstructure,or thefirst argumentof a BE structureif thereis no ACT structure, is a subject, andparents avoid sentencesin which the child would not be likely to construethe meaning as involving an ACT or BE relation (thusthey would be freeto usepassivesin contexts in which the child was likely to realize that somethingwas being predicatedof the patient). Similarly, in theolder view, the child would assume that patientsof physicalmotion wereobjects, andparentswould haveto avoid verbslike fill wherethat is not true. In thenewerview, childrenwould assume thatentitiesservingasthe secondargumentof ACT andthefirst argumentof GO were objects, and parentswould have to avoid verbswhoseobjectswere not motional patients only if the child would fail to construethat situation as involving a changeof stateof the motionalgoal. Again, notethatthe Gropenet

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aleexperimentssuggestthat children' s construalsof such eventscan be fairly predictableby adults. In sum, an autonomoussemanticsseparatefrom conceptualstructureallows the acquisitiontheoristto continueto exploit a correlation betweensyntaxand thechild ' s conceptionof theworld, but to breakup that correlationinto a formal andnearlyexceptionlessgrammaticallinkage betweensyntaxandsemanticsand a moreprobabilisticcognitivecorrelationbetweensemanticsin parental speech andchildlike concepts.Obviouslythis doesnot eliminatethe many complexities and unknownquantitiesin getting acquisition startedon the right foot, but it involves shifting someof the burdensof explanationonto subtheoriesthat are betterableto bearthem. 8.5

Conservatism , Listedness , and the Lexicon

A crucial part of my resolutionof Baker' s paradoxfor nonaffixing alternations is that a verb-argumentstructurecombination can have threekinds of psychological status: . Verbswitnessedin the input with a particular argumentstructurewill belisted directly in thelexiconashavingthatargumentstructure, andspeakerswill judge the combinationas soundingperfectly natural. . Verbswitnessedin the input with one argumentstructurebut not with another canbefed into a broad-rangelexical rule relating thosetwo argumentstructures . The resultingcombinationof anold verb with a new argumentstructurewill be " " '' , not as.an actual'' form , and will not soundfully perceivedasa possiblefOnJ1 grammatical. . Verbswitnessedin the input with oneargumentstructurebut not with another, and whosemeaningsare similar to (perhaps" grammatically indistinguishable from" ) listedverbsthat havebeenheardin both argumentstructures,maybefed into narrow-rangerules relatingthosetwo argumentstructures. The resulting combinationof an old verb with a new argumentstructurewill be perceivedas an actualfonJ1and will soundfully grammatical. As I discussedat theendof chapter4, at the heartof this three-way distinction is a fundamentalconservatism . Though people possesspowerful and lawful of fonJ1S the , generators possible only forms they readily acceptasa naturalpart of their languageare fonJ1sthat they have heardor forms that are semantically very, similar to forms that they have heard. Grammarsdefine pathsof lexical that generalizationbut allow themto betakenonly very grudgingly. I suggested this is relatedto the fact that theconnectionbetweenmeaningsand words, or at leastword roots, is conventionaland hencemust be treatedpsychologicallyas

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an irreversiblebrute-force memorization. Becausetherecan be a linguistically chemistrybetweentheinherentmeaningof a verbandthemeaning unpredictable effected by a broad-rangelexical rule, the senseof conventionalityand change the requirementfor memorizationfrom the input is extendedto inhibit the creationof newverb-meaningpairingsaswell (exceptfor wordshighly similar in therelevantwaysto thosealreadylisted in memorizedpairs, or whenan affix clearly signalsthechangeof meaning.) This impliesa sharpdissociat-ion betweenthe phenomenonof " formation by " " a rule andthephenomenonof " acceptanceasan actualform. Di Sciullo and Williams ( 1987) offer an insightful discussionof thedistinctionandits implications for the relation between syntax, morphology, and the lexicon. They " " considerthefollowing threeconcepts:" listedobjects or " listemes (entities that " areincludedasitemsin the lexicon), " morphologicalobjects (wordsformable " " by the rules of morphology), and syntactic objects (phrasesor sentences formableby therulesof syntax). The traditionalequation, they note, is between " " listeme" and" morphologicalobject : the lexicon is a structuredlist of words. They then summarizeargumentsthat this equationis wrong. Many syntactic objects, suchasidiomsandverb-particlecombinations,havepropertiesthat are not predictableby any rule of syntax, and so must be listed in the lexicon. Conversely,manymorphologicalobjectscannotbe listed: recursivelyfonned families of wordslike anti-antimissile -missilemissile, words in agglutinating languageseachof which may have ten thousandforms, freely formed compounds suchasChina report. They suggestthat the link betweenmorphology and the lexicon (or betweenmorphology and unproductivityor listedness) be severed:syntaxandmorphologyareboth productivesystems,building complex " " objectsof differentkinds out of different setsof atoms usingdifferent kinds of rules. The lexicon is simply a list of objectsof any type whoseproperties cannotbe predictedby the rules of formation. They write: " If conceivedof as the setof listemes, the lexicon, is incredibly boring by its very nature. ... The lexiconis like a prison- it containsonly the lawless, andthe only thing that its " inmateshavein commonis their lawlessness(p. 3; commasasin original ). Di Sciullo andWilliams notethat thereis oneprincipledexceptionto the dissociation betweenmorphologyandthe lexicon: the " atoms" of morphology, namely word roots, all mustbe listed, becauseof the arbitrary natureof the meaningsoundrelation. However, thereis anotherthreadthat di Sciullo and Williams may not have succeededin severing. One of the original motivations for the equation of ' morphologyandthe lexicon is speakerssenseof actualversuspossiblefonns. Lexical (morphological) rules of all sorts, not just the argumentstructure

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changing rules that I have examinedhere, can generatelawful fonns that : gracious! * graciosity, gold! speakersnonetheless perceiveto beungrammatical * golder, and so on. However, novel syntacticfonns generatedby rule are perceivedasgrammatical. Thereforethe necessaryconditionsfor actuality or grammaticalitywould seemto beeither(a) beinga syntacticfonn generatedby rule, or (b) being a morphological fonn listed in the lexicon (memorized conservatively). Unlisted rule-generatedmorphologicalfonns, then, are not automaticallyperceivedasgrammatical.Di Sciullo andWilliams argueagainst such a linkage, pointing out that someunlistedrule-generatedmorphological objects areperceivedas actual, and somerule-generatedsyntacticobjectsare perceivedaspotentialbut not actual. Thedifferenceis oneof degree, not kind, they suggest: of unitswhereeachunitisdefinedin tenDSof the Linguistictheorydefinesa hierarchy previousone: > word> compound > phrase > sentence[P. 14] ( 17) morpheme ... Theexplicationof theintuitionsaboutactual/potential wouldthenbethis: speakers haveanextremeintuitionaboutactualversuspotentialmorphemes ; theyhavea strong intuitionaboutactualandpotentialwords... ; theyhavea weakintuitionaboutactual versuspotentialcompounds ; they havelittle intuitionaboutactualversuspotential ; andtheyhavenosenseof a difference between actualandpotentialsentences phrases . [Po18] Di Sciullo andWilliams havesavedtheir dissociationof morphologyandthe lexicon, but at thecostof havingno explanationwhatsoeverof why somefonns at a given level of thehierarchyareperceivedasactualandothersasmerelypotential . Thedistinctioncannotbeidentifiedwith themorphology-syntaxboundary the ( boundarybetweencompoundsandphrases , in this hierarchy), nor can it be identified with the listed/ unlisteddistinction, nor with a conjunctionof the two. The licensingof " actual" fonns in the face of fonn-generatingrules is , though it is an importantphenomenonin the logical simply left unexplained ' of problem languageacquisition, at theheartof Baker s paradoxandmanyother fundamentalaspectsof acquisition. Let me point out in passingthat eventhe listednessof the morphemesof a language,andthecorrespondingpsychologicalhypothesisthat sound-meaning pairings are learnedconservatively, is not a trivial fact- it is, like gravity, the kind of phenomenon thatis obviousuntil onestartsto think aboutit. A speaker's " " competenceincludesphonologicalrules that define a possible word in the language. It is not terribly taxing for a speakerto makeup new roots that obey theserules (asmy collaboratorsandI do everytime we neednoncefonns like pilk , moop, keat, or flose for a developmentalexperiment). But we take it for ' grantedthatthevastmajority of children s utterancesconsistof wordsbasedon

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adult phonologicalfonns. This is true eventhoughit is conceivablethat in language developmenteach child might invent an idiosyncratic inventory of phonologicallypossible roots (subsequentlylearnedby his or her parentsto maintain communication), which the child would gradually replacewith the conventionalforms, perhapswhenheor shestartedplayingwith friendsor going to school. (Many parentscanprovide anecdotesof this happening , but thatonly underscores thefact that it is theexception.) Similarly, it is interestingthatin the of history languageslexical roots rarely appearab initio. Most rootseithercan be traced back as far as "there are historical recordsfor the languageor its ancestorsand neighbors, or are fonned by a limited set of manipulationsof existing roots; Bauer ( 1983) found only six wordsin all of Englishthat appear to havecomeout of the blue (seealso Aitchison, 1987). Evencreolelanguages , whosesyntaxand morphology are allegedlycreatedout of thin air by the first generationof children that speakthem, seemto be constrainedto borrowtheir lexical roots from a superstratelanguageincluding some approximationor vestige of their meanings (Bickerton, 1981). There are obvious functional reasonswhy speakersof a language must end up with the samestock of , of course. But this end stateis generallynot a mosaicreachedby morphemes piecemealcompromiseamonga Babel of speakers(child andparent, child and child, adult andadult) but ratherthe productof conservativelearningof rootsin any situationwherethis is at all possible. The conservativelearningof lexical roots(what Clark, 1987, calls The Principle of Conventionality) is a powerful constraintbuilt into languageacquisition, an aspectof the psychologyof the learnerthat is not at all obvious given the existenceof rules of lexical well. formedness The licensinginto existenceof fonns thatare generatedby rulesis a problem whosesolutionis much moreobscure. However, theconclusionsI havereached in the precedingchaptersmay suggestsomethingaboutthe natureof the principles " " " involved. We have seenthat the generationof " actual or existing lexical argumentstructuresdependson rules that require extremesimilarity betweena verb consideredfor generalizationand a verb already known to alternate. This kind of generalizationis basicallya structure-sensitiveanalogy . (seeGentner, 1983), familiar in other domainsof psychologicalgeneralization Indeed, I suggestedthat it might be seenasa minor extensionof conservatism -based-on-listedness: a form is perceivedto be grammatical(actual or actualness if listed or sufficiently similar to aform thatis listed. Of course,thebasis it is ) " for the analogy, the definition of " sufficiently similar, cannot be found in ordinary notionsof conceptualrelatednessthat might be lifted from cognitive psychology. Instead, it must come from the privilegedsetof grammaticizable semanticelementsand ways of structuringthem, anda metric that requiresthe

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baseand target fonDS in the analogyto have identical configurationsof such semanticstructures(at least, in theportionsof thosesemanticstructuresattached to the alternatingarguments) while toleratingarbitrary variation in conceptual elementsoutsidethat set. This " color-blind conservatism" is one novel kind of explanationof thedistinctionbetweenactualrule-generatedfonDSandpotential rule-generatedfonDs. Somepreliminary comparisonsto another system. Alan Prince has noted severalproperties of the past-tensesystem in English that raise intriguing questionsabout the generalrelation.betweenlawfulness and grammaticality. (PinkerandPrince, 1988). The Englishregularpast-tenserule (walk/ walked) is -predicting rule. It can apply regardless of the an existence phonology or semantics of thestem, andit outputsa form thatis invariably asnatural-sounding asthe stemthat servesas its input. Genuflectedsoundsas natural asgenuflect; fleechedsoundsasnaturalasfleech(evenif onehasneverheardfleechbeforeand hasno ideawhat it means). Similarly, Shecrookedherfinger soundsasnatural asShecrooksherfinger evenif theverbcrook is highly idiomatic. (The only exception is whenthereexistsan irregularcounterpartblocking the regularform: golwent/* goed.) The English irregular past tensesubregularities (e.g., hit/hit, cut/cut,put/put.. bear/bore, tear/tore, wear/wore.. sting/stung, sling/slung,flingl flung), though lawful in someways, are not existence-predicting. Generally, irregular verbs have to be heard in their past-tense form to be acceptedas soundingnatural. For example, someirregularyet partially lawful pastformsare of marginalgrammaticality (e.g., tread/ ?* trod and kneel/ ?knelt in American English). Some idioms with irregular past-tense forms do not inherit the naturalness either of the presenttenseform of the idiom' or of the nonidiomatic ' past-tenseform (e.g., / don t knowhow she ?* stood / could stand the bastard; / don' t know how she ?* bore / could bear the bastard) . Sometimeswhen an irregular past-tense regularity applies perfectly and exclusively to a lowfrequencystem, the result is nonetheless ungrammatical: ?* / forwent thepleasure of readingstudentpaperslast night. At this point one might wantto saythat past-tensesubregularities aresimply , which is how they have traditionally been characterized : the unproductive irregularsconstitutea list , the list mustbe memorizedduring languageacquisition , and in this domain " actual = listed." But that is not quite right . If the irregularswerenothing but a list, they shouldbe as lawlessasthe inmatesin di Sciullo andWilliams ' s metaphoricalprison. But in fact the 180 irregular past tenseformsfall into abouta dozenfamiliesof similar forms. The subregularities arepsychologicallystrongenoughthat at somepoints in the history of English new wordswereassimilatedto them; quit and cost, for example, were recently

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borrowedfrom French. Furthermore , if a nonceform is similar enoughto the prototypeof afamily of relatedirregulars,it canbeassignedthesubregularform. When askedfor the pasttenseform ofskring , for example, virtually everyone providesskrung, presumablybecauseof its similarity to spring/sprung, string/ of the strung, sting/stung, andSf' on (BybeeandModer, 1983). Generalizations subregularities arealsoseenin speecherrors(Bybeeand Siobin, 1982) and, of ' course, in children s speech(e.g., brang). Prince and I suggestedthat the English past tense subregularities have a peculiarstatusthat is very different from the existencepredictingproductivity of theregularrulebut not asstubbornlyunproductiveasthemembersof a list of . Rather, a stem that is similar to a cluster of related memorizedexceptions is irregulars perceivedas potentially having that past tenseform, and if its similarity is extremeenough(and if certain formal conditionsare met), the ." Thedimensions es" actualness judgmentof thegoodnessof theform approach of this psychologicalsimilarity are linguistic ones, however: global morphophonologicalproperties like alliteration, rhyme, and monosyllabicity. Semanticsimilarity playsno role, as we saw in the last chapter; nor doespure phonologicalsimilarity independentof morphologicalanalysis(seePinkerand Prince, 1988, for details). ' of speakers Thustheremaybeasuggestivecommonstrandin thephenomena " " " "" sensesof " existence , grammaticality, or actuality in irregularpast-tense regularitiesand in nonaffixing argumentstructurealternations. A regularity definespossibleforms; a senseof actualnessis bestowedonly on the basisof analogywith listedforms, wherethe dimensionsof similarity aredefinedover aparticularkindof grammaticalstructure.It appears,then, thatlinguisticobjects ' " cometo bedeemed" actual partsof one s languagein threeways: ( 1) by being -predictingrules, includingmostrulesof syntaxandsome generatedby existence rulesof morphology(suchastheregularpast-tenserule andthe rule of passive participle formation); (2) by being acquiredconservativelyand listed in the lexicon; and (3) by being generatedby property-predicting rules and being similar along the right linguistic dimensionsto listed alternatingforms. The analogyis by no meansexact, though; the narrow-rangerules appearto be far morefreely inclusivewhena word is similar in the right way to existing alternators, and far more fussy when it is not, than the gradedgeneralizationsof irregularinflectionpatterns. Why are somewell-formed linguistic objects grammaticalonly if they are listedor aresimilarto objectsthatarelisted, whereasotherlinguisticobjectsare acceptableautomatically,by virtueof their form? Most obviously, morphologi cal operationsthat yield completely predictableoutput forms transparently

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composedof a stem and affix (e.g., regular past tensesand passives) are existence-predicting, whereasthosewhoseoutput fonns are morphologically unchangedor unpredictablein fonn (e.g., irregularpasttensesandcausatives ) aremerelyproperty-predicting(seeAronoff, 1976, who makesa similar point). But this correlation only raises the question of why some operations are accompaniedby predictableaffixation andareproductivewhereasothershave nondetectableor irregularchangesthat leadto semiproductivity.The causative alternationcould be (and in otherlanguagesis) signaledby a regularaffix ; the fee/ife/l alternationcould be (and in Old English, may havebeen) a rule applying to any verb with the right phonologicalproperties; so why aren' t they in modem English? Perhapsit hassomethingto do with the distinction between operationswhoseeffectsareadditivewith thepropertiesof theobjectstheyapply to, and operationswhoseeffects lead to nonadditiveinteractionsor " mental " chemistry with thepropertiesof their inputs. Nonadditivesemanticswould lead to restrictionsof a rule to narrowclasses ; nonadditivephonologywould leadto . I irregularity can offer only some vague speculativeexamples. In lexical semantics,turning an assertionof an action into an assertionof a circumstance defined by that action (the semanticoperationaccompanyingpassivization) interacts minimally with the inherent nature of the action itself (e.g., the distinction betweenaneventof cutting anda circumstance of beingcut haslittle to do with anythingspecificto thenatureof cutting). But expressinganeventor stateas having beencauseddoesinteractwith the kind of eventor state, since some events are more causablethan others (e.g., the distinction between breakingandbeingcausedto breakis verydifferentfrom thedistinctionbetween walking and beingcausedto walk). In inflectionalmorphology, addingsyllabicing to a stemdoesnot affect its soundpattern; addingsubsyllabic-lid to a stem some of which alreadyend in I or d) , or ablautingits vowel, does. One can ( speculatethat this has somethingto do with why lexical irregularity and its concomitantpartial productivity is associatedwith therule thatadds-lid but not with the rule that adds-ing. Furtherexplorationof theseissuesis critical to understandingthe structureandacquisitionof linguistic regularity. 8.6

Spatial Schemas and Abstract Thought

The useof a physical " metaphor" to expressabstractrelations(the Thematic Relations Hypothesis) is ubiquitousin language . The choice of prepositions, verbs, idioms, andargumentstructures , andthe patternsof broad-rangegeneralizationsamongthemin a varietyof abstractfields, arebasedon a mappingof thosefields ontoa smallnumberof schemasbasedonspace,force, andtime. This ' parallelism is not just historical; children s speechshowsthat the metaphoris

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could be freed from their ties to peripheralsensoryand motor systemsand appliedto more abstracttasks that are partially isomorphic in computational structureto the one exerting the original selectiQnpressure. From this perspective, the interestof the ThematicRelations Hypothesisis obvious. Cognitive structuresthat evolvedto representthe locationsand paths of movableobjectsmay have beenco-opted in hominid evolution to represent abstractstatesandchanges;structuresthatrepresented exertion andresistanceof physicalforcecouldhavecometo beusefulfor representingmoreabstractfonDS of causation , agency, and responsibility. In phylogeny, physical and spatial schemasmayhavebeenextendedto fields suchaspossessionandcircumstance thataredeeplyencodedin manyhumanlanguages . They may alsobeextendible by individualsin their own lifetimes to more specificfields in analogies, metaphors , andinternalandexternalspatialmodelssuchas mental imagesor charts andgraphs(Gentner, 1983; Shepardand Cooper, 1982; Pinker, 1981b). But it is not just that we can think of an evolutionary story into which the ThematicRelationsHypothesisfits; storiesof that sort are all too easyto come by. Rather, thestudyof thematicrelationscontactsa wide-ranging, often highly : syntacticandlexical regularitiesin the grammarof preciseempiricaldatabase , historicallinguistics, experimentalstudiesof adult Englishandotherlanguages and , perception cognition developmentalpsycholinguistics, and perhapseven comparativecognitive psychology. Thereis no reasonwhy suchdatacould not be usedto pushspeculationsaboutthenatureandevolution of the " languageof " thought underlyingabstractcognitionin thedirectionof greaterspecificity and testabilitythanone usually associateswith suchproposals. I havean example of sucha nonobviousproposalin mind, basedon theconclusionoutlined in this chapterandin chapter4 that lexical semanticstructureis an autonomouslevel of representation . Onestriking propertyof the spatialm~taphorin languageis that it is a highly abstractand simple.idealization. In this regardit contrastswith " frames" and " " scripts, which are rich knowledgestructuresthat summarizecharacteristic propertiesof eventsfor usein common-senseprobabilistic reasoning. When I think abouta manfilling a glass, manybits of knowledgeabout the participants cometo mind: his goalsand intentions, the typical kinds of physical manipulation andinstrumentshe may use(e.g., a faucet), the path, rate, and shapeof the waterasit moves, whata typical glasslookslike , andsoon. But whenI talk about the event, my grammatical choices are governed by a much more skeletal abstraction . Thepossibility of my sayingHe pouredwater into the glasshinges on a conceptualizationof an undifferentiatedmassfollowing a trajectorycharacterizedasdownwardand tenninatingat a placein the object, which itself is characterizedonly as somethingthat hasa cavity; its statebefore and after the

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motion are unspecified. On the otherhand, in order to assembleHefilled the glass, I must undergoa gestaltshift in which the glass shrinks down to a " dimensionlesspoint changing" position in statespace(from not full to full ), with no conceptof the physicalmotionof the wateror the relationof its pathto thegeometriclayout of the glassplayingany role. A single script which listed defaultsfor boththetypicaleffectontheglassandthetypical motionof thewater -scenariofails to makethe distinction; we know that peopleare not in a fi J1ing confinedto consultingsucha script, becausetheydo not say*pour the glassor *fill the water. Theability to adoptoneof a setof cross-classifyingschemas,eachinvolving a sparse , precisely-structuredidealizationin which knowledgenot schematized is simply not entertained , no matterhow well-correlatedor cognitively salient, is acrucialpartof the logic of lexicalsemanticsandgeneralizationthat resolved theleamabilityparadoxconsideredin this book. I suspectthat it is alsoa crucial asfolk science esthatallow suchachievements propertyof thecognitiveprocess andformal science,kinshipandsocialstructure,musicandmathematics , ethics and law, notwithstandingthe current enthusiasmin cognitive science for massivenetworksof probabilisticbits of real-world knowledge. But that is a story for anotherday.

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Shopen, T., ed. ( 1985a) Languagetypologyand syntacticdescription. Vol. I : Clause structure. New York: CambridgeUniversityPress. Shopen,T., ed.. ( I 985b) Languagetypologyandsyntacticdescription. Vol. 3: Grammatical categoriesand the lexicon. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press. Sinclair, A. R., Jarvella, J., and Levelt, W. J. M. ( 1978) The child ' s conceptionof language. Berlin: Springer-Verlag(citedby Aronoff, 1982). Siobin, D. I. ( 1985) Crosslinguisticevidencefor the language-makingcapacity. In D. I. Siobin, ed., Thecrosslinguisticstudyof languageacquisition. Vol. 2: Theoreticalissues. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Smith, C. S. ( 1973) On causativeverbsand derived nominals in English. Linguistic Inquiry 3: 136- 138. Steele, S. (with Akmajian, A., Demers, R., Jelinek, E., Kitagawa, C., Dehrle, R., and Wasow, T.) ( 1981) An encyclopediaof AUX: A study of cross-linguistic equivalence . Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press. .Journal of PsycholinguisticResearch , J. P. ( 1982) Syntacticerrorsin speech Sternberger II : 313- 345. Storm, P. ( 1977) Predictingtheapplicabilityof dativemovement. In Thebookof squibs. Chicago: ChicagoLinguisticsSociety, Universityof Chicago. . Talmy, L. ( 1976) Semanticcausativetypes. In M. Shihatani, ed., Syntoxand semantics Vol. 6: Thegrammarof causativeconstructions . New York: AcademicPress. Talmy, L. ( 1983) How languagestructuresspace.In H. PickandL. Acredolo, eds., Spatial orientation: Theory, research,and application. New York: Plenum. Talmy, L. ( 1985) Lexicalizationpatterns: Semanticstructure in lexical forms. In T. Shopen,ed., Languagetypologyandsyntacticdescription. Vol. 3: Grammaticalcategories and the lexicon. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press. Talmy, L. ( 1988) Force dynamicsin languageand cognition. Cognitive Science12: 49- 100. . Proceedingsof theNorth EastLinguistics Tenny, C. ( 1988) The aspectualinterfacehypothesis Society 18. Tversky, A. ( 1977) Featuresof similarity. PsychologicalReview84: 327- 352. Vendier, Z. ( 1957) Verbsandtimes. PhilosophicalRevieK' 66: 143- 160. Visser, F. T. ( 1963) An historicalsyntaxof theEn?,lish Ian?,ua?,e. Part One: Syntactical units with one verb. Leiden: Brill . Wanner, E., andMaratsos,M. ( 1978) An ATN approachto comprehension . In M. Halle, J. Bresnan , and G. A. Miller , eds., Linguistic theoryand psycholo?,ical reality. Cambridge , Mass.: MIT Press. Wasow, T. ( 1977) Transformationsandthe lexicon. In P. W. Culicover, T. Wasow, and A. Akmajian, eds., Formal syntax. New York: AcademicPress. Wasow, T. ( 1981) Commentson thepaperby Baker. In C. L. BakerandJ. J. McCarthy, eds., Thelogical problem of Ian?,ua?,e acquisition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Wasow, T., Sag, I., andNunberg,G. ( 1983) Idioms: An interim report. In S. Hattori and I . Inoue. eds.. Proceedings of the Xlllth International Congress of Linguists . Tokyo : CIPL .

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Wexier, K. ( 1970) Semanticstructure: Psychologicalevidencefor hierarchicalfeatures. Paperpresentedat theResearchWorkshopon CognitiveOrganizationandPsychological Process es, sponsoredby the Councilon BasicResearchin Education,Huntington Beach, Calif., Aug . Wexier, K., and Culicover, P. ( 1980) Formal principles of languageacquisition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Whorf, B. ( 1956) Language. thought. and reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Williams, E. ( 1980) Predication. Linguistic Inquiry II : 203- 238. Williams, E. ( 1981) Argumentstructureandmorphology. LinguisticReviewI : 81- 114. Wilson, R., Pinker, S., Zaenen, A., and Lebeaux, D. ( 1981) Productivityandthe dative alternation. Paper presentedat the Sixth Annual Boston University Conferenceon LanguageDevelopment, Oct. 9- 11. Zaenen,A . ( 1986) Are thereunaccusativeverbsin Dutch?Proceedingsof theNorth East Linguistics Society 16. Zubizaretta, M . L . ( 1987) Levelsof representationin the lexiconand syntax. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Foris. Zwicky , A . ( 1971) In a mannerof speaking.Linguistic Inquiry 2: 223- 233.

Notes

Chapter 1: A Learnability Paradox 1. Thesealternationsare treatedby different kinds of mechanismsin different theories. In early versionsof TransfonnationalGenerativeGrammar(e.g., Chomsky, 1965) andin GenerativeSemantics(e.g., Lakoff, 1971), they were treatedas transfonnationalrules applying to phrasestructures. They are treatedas being the productsof lexical rules in Bresnan's Lexical FunctionalGrammar(LFG , Bresnan, I 982a, b; Pinker, 1984) and in mostversionsof theExtendedStandardTheoryof generativegrammar,suchasChomsky's Governmentand Binding framework(GB, Chomsky, 1981). This is true even for the " " passive, which involvesthe movea transfonnation: it is a specialpropertyof the participle , namelyfailure to assignaccusativecase, that triggersthe movementrule, andthe conversionof a verb into a passiveparticiple is accomplishedby a lexicalrule. In Gazdar, Klein, Pullum, and Sag' s ( 1985) GeneralizedPhraseStructureGrammar(GPSG), they consistof " metarules" thatderivenewphrasestructurerulesfrom old ones; in Perlmutter's RelationalGrammar(RG; Perlmutter, 1980; Perlmutterand Rosen, 1984), they consist of rulesthat operateon lists of symbolsrepresentinggrammaticalrelations. The learnability paradoxappliesto all thesefonnulations. 2. Furthennorethereare flaws in both of the statisticaltestspurportedto establishthe differencein the Hirsh-Paseket al. study. The I-testshowingthat mothersrepeattheir 2' year-oldchildren s ungrammaticalsentencesmoreoftenthantheir grammaticaloneswas significant only at a one-tailed significance level, whereasa two- tailed test is the appropriateone. It is the availability of infonnation to children that is at issue, not the exact fonn of parents' behavior, so consistentdifferential repetitionof ungrammatical over grammaticalsentencesor vice versawould serveasnegativeevidence. Indeed, the laterstudieswhichdifferentiatedverbatimfrom correctedrepetitionsfoundthatverbatim repetitionsfollowed grammaticalutterancesmoreoften. In addition, Hirsh-Paseket alis other analysis, a sign test, pooled the responsesof the different mothers, rather than of observations . treatingeachmotherasa unit, violating the assumptionof independence Thus the testcould havemagnifiedthe behaviorof a single motheror small subsample of mothersinto a significant overall result. 3. I thank my sister, SusanPinker, for providing the example from the speechof her daughter, Eva Boodman.

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" 4. In muchof theGB literature" ergative" is usedas a synonymof " unaccusative , and " " " intransitive" is used as a I will avoid this ambiguous synonym of unergative. terminology. 5. Oftenabstractdeep-structureconfigurationsaremotivatedby certainbindingphenomena , for example,the fact that Picturesof eachother impressedthe menis grammatical whereas. Picturesof each other absolvedthe men is not. It is assumedthat binding principles are sensitiveonly to phrasestructure configuration (Chomsky, 1981), so configurationsareproposedthatpreservethevalidity of thebindingprinciples. lfbinding is not exclusivelygovernedby configuration, though(see, e.g., Grimshaw, in press), the motivationfor theabstractdeep-structureconfigurationsdiminishes. SeealsoCulicover and Wilkins ( 1986), which makesa similar point regardingcontrol. 6. Of course.thereis atrivial wayin whichsyntacticcriteriacoulddifferentiatealternating from nonaltematingverbs. For example. one could say that any verb appearingin the . It is trivial becausewh-question frame What did John ? is causativizable formationis orthogonalto causativization , soobject- questionsaresimply variantsof the transitiveargumentstructurethat we areworried aboutto beginwith. We aresimply left . This is the problem with Borer and Wexler' s with a minor variant of conservatism of passivesasa cueto the causativizability suggestionthatthechild usesthe appearance of a verb. for example. 7. Funhennore. someof thesegeneralizationsmay apply to different kinds of lexical alternationsthan the onesdiscussedhere. such as category-changingrules (e.g.. the fonnation of adjectivalpassives ; Levin and Rappaport. 1986). Seealso section3.3. Chapter 2: Constraints on Lexical Rules I . Theextensionof theGrimshaw-Princeaccountthat is designedto handleschwa- initial verbsdoesnot work perfectly. Someschwa-initial verbsdo not dativize: * / announced him myplans; * He arrangedme a party ,' * Theyabandonedthe vandalsthe car ,' * She admittedmeherfaults (cf. Sheadvancedme the money). Someverbsbeginningwith an ' unstressed syllablethat is morethana schwado dativize: He referredmea patient, They reservedmea seat. In chapter4 I return to theseexamples. 2. We found no suchdifferencefor thefor -dativeverbs. I will discussa possiblereason for this in chapter4. Chapter 3: Constraints and the Nature or Argument Structure 1. I am using the tenn " predication" in its traditional sense, not the technical sense introducedby Williams ( 1980). 2. The English prepositionon is itself probably a homonym for at least two distinct " " locationfunctions: roughly, " at the top of , as in an apple on the table, and contacting " the outersurfaceof, as in a blister on the sole of your foot . SeeBowennan( 1989) and . Talmy ( 1983) for discussion 3. This predictsthat the holistic effect shouldapply to the objectof the int% nto fonns aswell. This seemsright: I loadedthehayinto the wagondoesentailthatall thehay being referredto wasloaded, andI piled a place settingonto the table ordinarily entailsthat all partsof theplacesettingweremoved, in contrastto I piled rice ontoa placesetting, which

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is compatiblewith theoutcomethatonly onepieceof theplacesettingendedup with rice on it . At first glancetheremight seemto becounterexamples : floaded hay into thewagon doesnot seemto meanthat I loadedall the availablehay. The apparentfailure of the holistic interpretation , however, is theresultof aninteractionwith theinterpretationof an indefinitemassor plural noun, andappliesin thewith variantaswell: Sheloadedwagons with haydoesnot meanthateverywagonin thefarmhashayin it. But all the wagonsthat did gethaywerecompletelyfilled ,just asin theintosentence all thehaythatdid getmoved endedup in the wagon. SeeDowty ( 1987) andFoley and Van Valin ( 1984). 4. In thenextchapterI considera variantof thisproposalwhichdoesnot invariablyrequire the double-objectform to involve literal changeof possession . 5. The first argumentof passivescanalsobethesubjector objectof get, theobjectof have, or unexpressed in appositives,but thesearealsorealizationsof the themerole. 6. Syntacticallyergativelanguages to this generalization, , atfirst glancecounterexamples will be discussedin chapter6. Chapter 4: Possibleand Actual Forms 1. It wasWhorf ( 1956) who first calledattentionto the fact thatcertainconstructionsare restrictedto narrowclassesof verbsdefinedby subtlecriteria; he called them " crypto" types. 2. More specifically, we would haveto assumethat the relevantdefinition of at would allow it to pertainto thepatientthatanactis intendedto involve in theusualway, but does not necessarilysucceedat so doing. 3. Thereareseveralothersubclass esof motionverbsparticipatingor failing to participate in this alternationthat I will not discuss.SeeDowty ( 1987) for an extensivelist of these verbs. 4. This is somewhatdifferent from Lakofrs ownposition. Lakoff introducedtheconcept of motivatedcategoriesin discussingthe family of sensesconnectedwith a polysemous word. He claims that these families reflect the nature of human categories, which thatthemotivationsaregraspedby all speakers . Maratsos( I 988a) questions presupposes this claim, notingthatmanymotivationsfor categoriesmayplaya role diachronically but . I shareMaratsos's doubts. may be opaqueto many speakersin a given generation of Judgments the well formednessor ill formednessof classmembersare often much morediscriminatingthanthe best" motivation" onecandiscover. Whenwe examinethe narrow verb classes , we will seethat speakersrejectmanyputativemembersthat are as well motivatedas those already in a category. Furthermore , motivations cannot be - not by the linguist, andthereforepresumablynot by the learner. predictedin advance Thus motivatedclassesmust be learnedas lists at leastpart of the time. 5. I havenot foundadetailedanalysisof theseverbsin thelinguisticliterature. They seem to be similar to verbsof incorporatedthemes,discussedby Rappaponand Levin ( 1985), Jackendoff( 1983, I 987b), andClark andClark( 1978), suchasto butteror to paint . They havesimilar paraphrases basedon the associated noun: to butterX = " to causebutter to " go on X" ; to reward/ credit / supplyX = to causea reward/ a credit / suppliesto go to X." They bothtakewith-objects, usuallyoptionally: He butteredthebread( with unsalted margarine); Herewardedher (with a kiss). Andthesemanticpropertiesof thewith-object must standin a certainrelation to thoseof the incorporatednominal, basically adding

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information: ?He butteredthebreadwith butter; ?He rewardedher with a nonredundant reward; ?He creditedher with a credit. -dativeform of askis not perfectlyacceptableto many speakerswith 6. Theprepositional the prepositionto, althoughit improveswith the prepositionof ??I already askedthat ' I ?I alreadyaskedthat questionof him. I haveheard, however, 1 don t questionto him ' re the knowif you right person to ask this to, but ... 7. Green( 1974) finds shoutand whisperto be dativizableto her and proposesthat they encodethemeansof communicationratherthanthemanner. The difference canbe seen and in the(;ontrastbetweenUsinga whisperI shout, hegavehera word of encouragement * Usinga mumbleI mutter I mention, he gaveher a word of encouragement . 8. Food-preparationusages , which arequite productive, may seemto fall into a different class, but I think thatcarefulanalysisof their semanticswould lump them with the verbs of creation. At first glance, usagessuchasI poured her somecoffee, Sheboiled me a , since nothing is lobster, andShefried mesomechickenappearto be counterexamples createdandthereforeonly a benefactiverelationholds. However, a closerlook showsthat this is not quiteright. Thesecasesinvolve food termsthat areambiguousbetweena raw materialor sourceanda unit or kind of item fit for consumption.Thus the verbsseemto entailcreationof theedibleproductprior to theactof giving. This predictsthatthereferent of thesecondobjectmustdenoteonly the edibleproductor unit created, not the original materialactedupon, and the prediction seemscorrect. First, consider the casewhere someonepourscoffeefrom a pot. It is muchbetterto sayCanyoupour mea cupof coffee I a cupof thatcoffeeI someof that coffee?, wheretherelevantpartis createdby theaction, thanto sayCanyou pour me that coffeeI a pot of coffeeI that pot of coffee? ( unlessthe entirepot is to be consumed ) . Second, whenedibleproductshave namesdistinct from their sources , the former are much more natural in the double-object construction. Compare,for example,Shecookeda pig I someporkfor mewith Shecookedmesomepork I * a pig ; Shetossedmea salad with * Shetossedmesomelettuce, tomatoes, and carrots. Third, whenoneof the verbs is usedwith an objectthat only changesstate, ratherthan turning into a new kind of object, the double-object form is blocked: Dave bakedthe * Plexiglaspanelfor me1 ?bakedmethePlexiglaspanel. Finally, Green( 1974) notesthat a bakedcakeis vaguelyredundant, andan unbakedcakevaguelycontradictory, which " " " " thatbakemeans" create, not" prepare or changethestateof , whenusedwith suggests food objects. 9. BethLevin hascalledmy attentionto discussionsin Bolinger ( 1971), Dowty ( 1979b), andGreen( 1973) of the generalability of paniciesto addaneffect meaningcomponent " to a verb, similarto " resultatives suchasShehammeredthe metalflat . 's 10. Line from Bob Dylan Highway 61 Revisited. II . The semiproductivecausativemorphologyoperatedonly in Old English anddid not changethe voweldirectly but simply addedthesuffix -jan ; the vowel changewasjust a phonologicaladjustment.WhentheOld Englishsuffixeseroded, only the vowel change survived(Visser, 1963). 12. Sprinkleis a borderlinecase. Prototypicallythe motion of the panicies is causedby downwardappliedforce (as in usinga salt shaker). Downwardnessmeetsthe criteria of classS; forcecausingamotion in a certainspatialdistributionalonga trajectorymeetsthe criteriaof class3. The involvementof forceseemsto allow it to enterclass3 andalternate.

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However,shakeis similarbut is confinedto class5. A possiblecauseis thefactthatshake, unlike sprinkleandmostof theotheralternatingverbs, haSa homophonouscounterpart thatdoesnot requirea massliketheme, hencethe with ~onn would containa gardenpath: . shakethe table with flour . A completelydifferent possibility for the locativizability of sprinkle that I will not explorefurther is its phonologicalsimilarity to spatter, splash, splatter, spray, andsquirt andperhapsalsoslather, smear, smudge,spread, andstreak, all in alternatingclassesandall somewhatonomatopoeic . 13. Might be in Class I of the int% nto verbs, both syntactically and semantically: 11 dappledpaint onto the canvas. 14. A niceexampleof how thechoiceof locativeform is governedby thegeometryof the contentandcontainer,with anonholisticdistributionleadingto thecontent-orientedintol onto form, comesfrom an article in the food sectionof the BostonGlobe of March 23, 1988. In it , Janeand MichaelSteminventa new locative verb, usethe verb in the into form, andstatethe relevantprinciplethemselves : " In someGrape-Nuts puddingswe' ve ' sampled,thecerealis mixedthroughoutthecustard. In Brandy Petes, it is ribbonedinto " the custardas a distinct separatearea. 15. Theirdifferentsyntax, accordingto thetheory, shouldnonethelessbeassociated with subtlydifferentmeaningsthatcanbeexploitedin discourse,poetry, andrhetoric. Because the only differencebetweenrob andstealis that oneis " doneto" peopleandthe otheris doneto" possessions , theBeatiescouldsingShecouldstealbut shecouldnot rob (in " She Camein Throughthe BathroomWindow" ) to suggestthat the subjectof the songwas motivatedto obtainobjectsbut not to hurt people. 16. Perhapssubsumedwithin thisclassareverbsof postureincorporatingparticles, which alternate: standup, sit down, bendover, lay down (in informal American speech ), lean against, andso on. 17. Thus the verb climb is ruled out doubly: as an action verb (He climbedacrossthe rubble) it is a verb of volition; asa purespatialverb (The airplane climbed) it is a verb of inherentlydirectedmotion. 18. It is necessaryto differentiatetheseverbs, which pertain to objects, from verbsthat pertainto aspectualpropertiesof events,whichdo.alternate,suchasstart, begin, continue, end,finish . 19. A few emotion-experiencingverbsincorporatingthesuffix -enor theparticleupseem to alternate:Theboysaddened I gladdenedI cheeredupI perkedup..TheysaddenedI gladdened I cheeredup I perkedup the boy with the news. 20. There are a number of harmlesspositive exceptionsto these generalizations harmlessbothbecausetheyare positive, hencelearnable,andbecauseonecanshowthat " " they are not purecausativeverbsmeaningsimply causeto verb but contain idiosyncratic meaningelementsspecific to the transitive version, so they must be learned individually. Onecanrattle something,but only by shakingit , not by, say, driving a car over a bump. Secrets , but not water, canbe leaked; pipes, but not poorly dyedclothing, can be bled; cigarettesand ham can be smoked(in two different specific senses ) but firewood and butter cannot. Transitiveshine can only mean" polish" (as in shoes) or " directa beam" asin " "" " ( flashlights), not put in sunlight, coat with high-glosspaint, and soon.

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21. Note also that there are scatteredpositive exceptionsin both directions, usually accumulatingbits of idiosyncraticmeaningin oneof the two fonDs, suchasSheburped the baby / The babyburped; Hefed the baby/ Thebabyfed ,' He droppedthe ball / The ball dropped,' Bill drowned / John drownedBill ; seealso section3.3.4.3 and note 18 above. Basically, theclassof transitiveverbsfor which anticausativization appearsto be state or causing of to of verbs consists change something physical causing productive somethingto move in some manner, as long as there is no lexical specificationof direction, mannerof causation, or motion of aninstrument. In otherwords, anticausativ izationappliesonly to causativeverbsthat couldhavebeenfonned from a causativiza tion rule to begin with. 22. Recall that this principle would alsoapplyto the alternativetreatmentof constraints on passivizabilityI discussed,accordingto whichthepassivewould beapurelysyntactic rule operating on any transitive argumentstructure. On this account, the thematic propertiesof verbs would detennine whetherthey have argumentstructuresthat are genuinelytransitive, that is, with a real syntacticobject, or that only resembletransitive structures, with someother kind of unmarkedpostverbalargument. 23. For double-object fonns that arenot derivedfrom the to prepositionalfonD (that is, for -dativesandbegrudge-type verbs), the situationis slightly different, thoughit fits the overall pattern. Unlike what happensin to-datives, it is not clear that the first object in thedouble-objectfonDSof theseverbsis in anywaya patient. Forexample,it is very hard to think of Bob as a patient of Sam' s action in Samstole Bob a watch; Bob may have nothingto do with thetheft. Likewise, if SambegrudgesBobhisgoodlooks, BobandSam do not standin anyclearagent-patientrelation. Thiswould predictthatthesefonDSshould not passivize, andindeedthey do not seemto do soeasily: * ?Bob wasstolena watchby Sam; * Bob was begrudgedhis good looks by Sam(seealso Dowty, 1987, who makes similar observations ). A full treatmentof thesecases, however, will haveto wait until for theseverb fonDSareexamined. section5.6.1, wherepreciserepresentations 24. In most of thesecases, however, the antagonistis the strongerbodyaswell. In some verbs, the agonistis stronger, and it can be mappedonto the subjectfunction, as in The wall resistedthe wind. Thus the most commonsubjectsare strongerantagonists , but weakerantagonistsand strongeragonistsare possibleas well. I know of no casesof weaker-agonistsubjectsof transitiveverbs. 25. There are other reasonsfor wonderingwhetherthe passivesof frighten verbsare ' invariablyadjectives.Grimshaw sobservationsshowthattheycanbeadjectives,butthey do not show that they cannot be verbal participles; this is a generalproblem in the . For example, most of the passives differentiation of adjectival from verbal passives cannotbe prefixed with un- (* unfrightened, * unscared, * undelighted, etc.), but all of themcan take the prepositionby. Furthennore,manyof thefear verbsdisplaythe same kindsof behaviorasthefrighten -verbswith respectto thepassivein theprogressive(e.g., ' ' John was coveting/ craving / enjoying Bill s wife / ??Bill s wife wasbeing coveted/ craved/ enjoyedby John), thoughthey shouldbebonafide verbalpassivesaccordingto the account. This suggeststhat stativity itself, and not only adjectivehood , taints the the of the stative sense of . , frighten progressivepassivesincluding progressivepassive for adifferent Interestingly, its other. eventivesensemay nottaketheprogressivepassive reason. It seemslikely that aspectualoperations(e.g.. the " zoomingin" on the intennediary componentof anevent for theprogressiveaspect) apply to the temporalproperties

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of the role playedby thesurfacesubjectargument. For many verbsit may bemuchmore difficult to expandthe temporalunfoldingof the changeof stateundergoneby thepatient thanof the actionperformedby the agent. This would makethe progressiveof any verb state-change,whetheror not it is a psychologicallikefrighten, denotingan instantaneous better in the active than in the passive. For example, compareJohn was bursting the /JOl/oon with ?Thebal/oon wasbeingburst by John, or Bi// wasswattingaj1y with ?Aj1y wasbeing swattedby Bi/i . 26. In addition, manylanguagesusea locational analysisthat is more familiar from the work of JackendoffandGruber, wherebytheexperienceris a goal to which ideas" move." ' 27. There is also a senseof contain that implies counteractingan object' s tendencyto escape: Moshe Dayan contained the Egyptian army.. The force field containedthe superhotplasma. Contain usedin this sensepassivizes- The army was containedby Dayan- andit alsopassestheotherteststo be outlined that the purely geometricversion of contain fails. Thus it is not a counterexample . 28. One form of havedoespassivize. The following areexamplesI haveheardor read: A splendidtime washad by a/I ,' A wondeiful day washad,' A more interestingmeasure of how wel/ thesystemi.\"doing canbehad by making useof the trigram decodingscheme discussedabove... . In all threethe implicit argumentis an experiencer,suggestingthat thereis a versionof havethat falls into thefear classof psych- verbs. 29. The speakerwasfrom a rural, predominantlyblack areaof Louisiana; I do not know whetherthis is standardin his dialect. 30. KatarinaRicehaspointedoutto methatthereis ananalternative, grammaticalreading that the writer may have intended: " make those eyes eyes that the personwill find unforgettable." 31. Gregorycontinuesthe story. A hostile crowd of onlookerswarnedhim, " Whatever ' " you .do to that chicken, we re going to do to you. So he picked up the pieceof chicken and kissedit. Chapter 5: Representation I . I ignore the deictic directionalcomponentof go for now. 2. I also ignoreothersensesof put suchasthat usedin I put the bookat the cornerof the desk(which specifiesa place, not a path) and He put a gun to his head(which specifies an ' against' place; seeJackendoff, 1987a). 3. A similar accountmay be justified for the selection of the phrasalcategoriesof arguments. Although verbs can selectfor NPs versusSs, holding semanticsroughly constant(e.g., I askedwhatthetimewasII askedthetimeversusI wonderedwhatthetime was I * 1 wonderedthe time), in the vast majority of casesthe selectionof the syntactic categoryof anargumentis predictablefrom its semanticproperties(seeGrimshaw, 1981). Funhennore many casesof putative selection of syntactic categoriesturn out to be selectionfor kindsof semanticcategories . For example, seemseemsto selectfor A Psbut not PPs- John seemshappy I *John seems in the room- but it is perhapsbetter characterizedasselectingfor " propenies," sinceJohn seemsin trouble / in thedumpsis grammatical; seeMating ( 1983).

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4. Anothertypical, thoughperhapsnot necessary , condition on theseincorporatedarguments maybethattheyoccurin verbswhoserootscomefrom or arerelatedto nounsfor the argumenttypes(e.g., butter). 5. I omit a few categoriesanddistinctionsthat arenot aswidespreadcross-linguistically andnot importantin the English verb system; seeAllan ( 1977). andformednessmaybeseparateobject 6. Jackendoff( 1987c)suggeststhatboundedness ' s sake. I for will them ; simplicity collapse qualities 7. Jackendoffappendsthe field specifierto the GO function, but sincethechoiceof field affectsthe interpretationnot only of the type of function but alsoof all its panicipantsfor example, a THING in the locational field must be a physical object, but in the psychologicalfield it is an idea- it seemsmore transparentto appendit to the dominating categorytype. 8. Of course,knowmustbedistinguishedfrom otherepistemicverbs, suchasbelieve, by the propertythat a speakerusing know must himself or herselfbelieve in the truth or " existenceof the idea. This lexical difference, an exampleof the " factivity information in English, such thatTalmy findscrosslinguistically, hassentencescopeconsequences like I don' t think he' s verybright. Thedistinction might be asin " neg-raising" sentences capturedin a featurethat distinguishesthingsor propositionsfrom their representations ' in pictures, narratives , or other peoples minds; seeJackendoff( 1983) and Fauconnier ( 1984). than I have 9. In fact, thereis certainlyevenmorecomplexity in semanticrepresentations depicted.Thelist of place-functionsandpath-functions, for example, mustbe defined in termsof morebasicnotionssuchasboundaries,directions, dimensionality,andsoon (see , 1987c). Talmy, 1983; Jackendoff versionof pass, asin Passthepart downtheassembly 10. Thereis alsoa nonpossessional line, but this appearsto be fairly specialized. 11. B. Levin' s ( 1985) syntacticcriteria discussedin section4.2 are roughly consistent with this analysis: *John touched I chose,' * She touched at I chose at John, and * HandsomementouchI chooseeasily. SomewhatlesscleararetheexamplesShetouched Johnon the/ aceI * ShechoseJohn on the/ ace1* ?ShechoseJohn on his/ aceI Shechose John on his merits. 12. It maybethattranslationin a specifieddirection is more importantthanmannerlessnessin killing thepossibilityof causativization.Verbslike soarandswoop, which do have a mannerbut also havea direction, do not causativize; the verb move, which lacks a mannerandadirection, doescausativize.Thecorrelationbetweendirectionalityandmannerlessness probablyoccursbecauseif a verbof motiondoesnot specifyamanner, it must specifya directionor elseit would be synonymouswith move, violating the Principle of Contrastwhich generallyrules out synonymity (see Bolinger, 1977b; Clark, 1987) . Another possibility, however, is that soar and swoop imply self-poweredmotion and asACTs, like run. hencearerepresented becauseit existsin both transitive 13. Theverbsinkmight appearto bea counterexample andintransitiveformsbutspecifiesadirectionof motion(downward). However, it is easy to seethat transitivesink is not the productof a causativizationrule at all: * 8ill sank the ' bird I hisfishinR line I John s spirits I the/ eather. Rather, it is an independentverb

Notes

400

specifyinga meansof causationaswell asthefact of causation;roughly, to causeto sink in water by meansof causingto be full of water. Thus it is like cut, which specifiesan effect and a means,not like break, which specifiesonly an effect. 14. Jackendoff( 1987b), in his discussionof similar verbs, suggeststhat the changeis specifiedusingan inchoative(INCH) functionrepresentingthe bringing into beingof a statewhereinthe substancewasALL IN or ALL ON the surface. For example, smear " " might be definedas causeto becomeX all-on Y. There are two problemswith this . representation First, it stipulatesthe holistic effect using complex place-functions involving the newsymbolALL , ratherthanallowing it to be a directconsequence of the interpretationof thesurfaceasundergoinga changeof state. Second, it doesnot allow a straightforwardwayof definingthe idiosyncraticspatialdistributionof the substanceon the surfacethat theseverbsrequire. IS. The rule would probablyspecify ' mass', which would embraceaggregatessuchas sandandjimmies aswell as liquids andsemisolids. 16. Note that althoughthe actorcanacton the liquid at the sametime assomeliquid hits a surface, as in spraying, thatneednot be thecase, and it is literally different individual bits of matterthat leavetheagentandthat arriveat the goal at a given instantin time, as the representationwould leadusto expect. This differs from thesmearverbs, wherethe stuff the agentis pushingis the exactsamestuff that is moving along the surfaceat any instant. 17. Although the receptaclehas the propertyof being designedto contain the moved object, in this form of the verb there is no constraintthat the moved objects have the property of being appropriateto the location: Biff loaded his gun with jellybeans is a " naturalsentence . However, whenthewith-objectis absent,an" appropriateness interpretation ensues: Biff loaded his gun strongly implies that bullets, not jellybeans, were inserted. This phenomenonis similar to the effects of the rule of unspecifiedobject deletionappliedto transitiveverbs, wherebySal ate impliesthat food, not pencils, were consumed, even though Sal ate the pencils is not ungrammatical . This would be " representedby appendinga propertyon the substructurerepresentingthe " suppressed ' ' non ( open) object, definedin termsof the forlto operatoradjacentto a replica of the " superordinateactionstructure.HenceX ate= X atesomethingwith thepropertyof being " intendedfor eating. 18. A Cfs in theefficacyfield caneitherbestatesin which it is assertedthat oneentity in a relationshipis responsiblefor thecircumstance of asecond,or eventsin which oneentity actually exerts its causalefficacy to bring about a statechangeof a second; this is responsiblefor the ambiguityof Snowcoveredthe ground. 19. I suggestthata similar accountcanapply to anothersemanticfield in which HAVE is defined, namelythat applying to wholesand their parts. The English verb havecan expressthis relation(Canadahastenprovinces), andothertransitiveverbsthat express it more specifically also do not passivize: * Biffs nameis included by the list ,' * Ten provincesare comprisedby Canada. Chapter 6: Learning I . Of course, manyclosed-classmorphemes , suchasthosesensitiveto genderor declensional class, do not haveperceptualcorrelates.The acquisitionof such morphemesis discussedin Pinker( 1984).

Notes

401

2. In addition. the verbs like butter that are most specific about propertiesof their referencesoftenmakethis idiosyncraticinformationmorphologicallytransparentby the similarity of the verb to a relatednoun. as I pointedout in chapter4. 3. I have not dealt with the aspectualor time-line representationin discussingthese . but I assumethat broad-rangeandnarrow-rangerulesincludethem. perhaps procedures with only a coarsepoint/region distinction for the former. 4. A relatedproblemis that the verbsthat the child is likely to hearin both formsof analternation may not be a randomsampleof the onesin the alternatingclass. For example. verbsmay havemorecomplexdefinitions. If any legitimatesemantic the nonwitnessed structurestatisticallycorrelateswith the samplethe child is likely to hear. a clustering procedurecould excludethe nonwitnessedones. preventingproductiveextensionof the alternationto them. 5. In termsof information content. geometricandmaterialpropertiescould be attached eitherto a patientin an ACT structureor to a themein a GO structure. as they will be coindexed. However. specificationsof shapesand materialsfor locative verbs are inherentlymoreinterdependentwith their pathanddestinationastheymovethanwith the agentthat actson them- for example. the propertiesof anobjectloadedinto a container aresuchthat the object be of a sizeand shapeappropriateto the container; the fact that sprayedstuff is liquid is intimately relatedto the shapeit assumesasit is moving. andso on. I will usethesecognitive considerationsto motivatea constraint. necessaryfor the current learning account to work. that object propertiesof locative verbs are in fact attachedto thethemeargumentin theGO structureandnot to the patientargumentin the A Cf structure. 6. A possibleproblematic case involves the stuff verbs. In analyzing their semantic structures- see(5.63) - 1 suggestedthat the stateof the with variant was relatedto the mannerof the into variant not by virtue of copying identicalstructures.but by a kind of cognitiveinference: insertingthecontentsagainstresistancein the into form is relatedto or thecontainer's beingoverfull in the with form. It is not clearif this is really necessary if thereis actually a set of commonsymbolsmentionedin both the resistanceand the overfull specification. If the former. the rule-creationprocesswould alsohaveto include in therule not only the partsof the input structurethatarecoindexedwith alternatingarguments but alsoany parts that arenecessarypremisesfor the inferenceof structuresin the derivationof the secondform. ' 7. Theimportanceof aspectualdifferencesis consistentwith the spirit of Tenny s ( 1988) proposalthat aspectis a key interfacebetweenlexical semanticsand syntax. Chapter 7: Development , probablybecausethepair I . Theasymmetryoccursonly in comprehensionexperiments ' ' of adjacentunmarkedNPs taxesthechild s parser, asit doesthe adult s. You canclearly feel this in trying to understanda sentencelike Thehorsesentthe tiger theelephant. See Pinker( 1984, p. 398) and Gropenet al. ( 1989) for discussion. 2. Clark andClark ( 1979) suggestthatsomeinnovativetransitiveverbsmight beblocked ' by homonymitywith existing verbs. If so, errorslike J m singing him might be blocked ' ' by J m singing the song when the latter argumentstructureis consolidatedin thechild s lexicon.

Notes

402

3. The pennissive-causationpicturewas nevershown for shake; for spin it waschosen 42% of thetime in connectionwith thelexicalcausative,perhapsbecauseaglobecanspin long after the causingevent hastakenplace, making the permissive-causationpicture consistentwith pastdirect causationaswell. For let the globe spin it waschosen46% of the time. 4. Ammon usedthreeother verbsaswell, but her nononhogonaldesigndoesnot allow therelevantcomparisonsto bemadefor them. Squirt was not pairedwith a picturetriplet contrastingdirect andindirectcausation.Openwasneverpresentedin a lexical causative form. Pour wasdepictedwith a geniewho workedmagic in oneof the pictures, making the permissive-causationpicture alsoconstruableas involving magic and hencehighly ambiguous. 5. Lord andBowermandiscussat lengththefact thatthe appearance of novel intransitives is inconsistentwith thenotionof a unidirectionalcausativizationrule deriving transitives from intransitives (seealso Hochberg, 1986). But this is orthogonalto the questionof whethereither suchrule operateson lexicosemanticstructure(adding, or subtracting,a " cause" ) or on syntacticargumentstructure (adding, or subtracting, an superstructure externalargument), and thus is not relevantto that issue. 6. Strictly speaking, verbsof beingandhavingdo violate the broad-rangerule for adult EnglishasI statedit in (5.54) in chapter5, whichexcludesthe predicatesBE and HAVE. Possibly this bit of overgeneralityin the child ' s rule is the result of the indetenninateness of ReverseLinking; Lexical Abstraction would eventuallytriggerthe ' slight narrowing that would be neededto bring the child s broad-range rule into ' conformity with the adult s. 7. The only exceptionI know of is for someverbsof obtaining wherea phrasedenoting anabstractcausecanbeadded: Johnearnedconsiderablefame I Perseverance andtalent earnedJohn considerablefame (alsoget, win, gain, ?attain ). 8. Perhaps , it might be suggested , the principlesgoverning compatibility betweenargument structuresand sententialsyntaxwould filter out iteratedcausationif a lexical rule permittedit : L FG containsa universallyavailableOB12function, butno OBJ3, OBJ4, and soon, andGB would haveto strugglefor a mechanismto assignthe later argumentscase giventheir non-adjacencyto the verbor to anypreposition. However, it is not clearhow thesolutionsadoptedto handlesecondobjects(such-astheOB12functionin LFG, or verbobject incorporation or various special fonDS of case marking in GB ), which were somewhatad hoc to begin with, would be preventedfrom extendingnaturally to handle a third or fourth object. 9. I excludethe exampleSpell this " buy" (whereChristy is askingher mother to rotate theblockson a toy until theword" buy" is formed), becausea verbwith a quotedargument is not generallya double- objectform. Most likely , it is an object-predicatecomplement construction, as in She calls him "Hoss" ,' They deemedhim a fool ,' We electedhim ' " " " president; and I spell relief R, 0 , L , A, I , D , S . I O. Green( 1974) notesthat malefactiveargumentscolloquially expressedusingon asin Sheplayeda trick on uscandativize: Sheplayedus a trick . This exampleis marginalto me, however, andothersareevenworse: Thecar snappedafan belt on us I . snappedus afan belt.

Notes

403

' II . Usagesof theprepositionalfonnsof dativizableverbsin thesechildren s speechalso closely mirrored the adult input: 79% of the dativizableverbs(types) appearingin the 's speechalsoappearedin theprepositionalfonn in the prepositionalfonn in thechildren ' speechof adultsin that child s transcripts. at a rateof abouttwo hundredper hour, andfour 12. Adam andEveproducedsentences hoursa day is a roughestimateof theamountof time in which a linguistic error from the child would havebeennoticed. At a conservativeestimateof tenmonthsa year, six years of speechfrom Christy(age2- 7) would amountto about 1.4 million utterancesandfour . yearsof speechfrom Eva (age2- 5) would amountto .96 million utterances 13. Bowermannotesthatapartfrom the two examplesin (d) and(e), shevirtually never called attentionto Christy' s errorsor discussedthem with her. 14. Bowermandoes not discusswhether this phenomenonalso occurred with Eva. Howeverin thedatashereports, thereis a self-correctionby Evaat 5;0 (Bea handupyour nose. [ M : What?] Put a handup your nose), andfive othercausativeerrorsthatoccurred at that ageor later, the latestat 5;5 (which is roughly asfar asthe diariesfor Eva went at that point). 15. KatarinaRicehastold methat whenshegetscashfrom an automaticteller machine, ' her 2-year-old sonasks, ..Are we buying moneynow, Momr 16. Interestingly, makeandgivearenot interchangedwith eachother. This confirmsthat or state/circumstance locationis thebasedomainwhichcanbeextendedto possessional fields, rather thantherebeinga completelycontent-free coordinatesystemthat can be . instantiatedvariouslyaslocation, possession , or state/circumstance 17.1thankRuthBennanfor generouslysharingherfindingsandinterpretationssurrounding . this phenomenon 18. Emptycanalsooccurwith the themeasdirect object if afrom - objectis included, as in emptywaterfrom theglass, but in a simpletransitiveform it is the sourceor container that must be the object: * emptythe water. 19. In a secondexperimenttestingonly the wordfill (Gropen, 1989; Gropenet al., in preparation), we havereplicatedthe semanticmannerbias, thecontent-as-objectsyntactic errors, and the weak contingencybetweenthesetwo error types acrossindividual children. 20. For the curious: Boil smallpiecesof purplecabbagein water, thendrain, and let the purpleliquid cool. If you adda baseto it (e.g., bakingsoda), it will turn green; if you add anacid to it (e.g., lemonjuice), it will turn pink. The cabbagejuice sold in supermarkets is red becausevinegar has already been added. Thanks go to JessGropen for this explanation.

Index

Abramovitch , R., 181 Absolutivecase , 252. SeealsoErgative languages , 42, 90, 120, 143, 257, 315, 393, Adjectives 397 , 33, 39ff., 44, 71, 91, 182, 223 Adjuncts -classmorphemes Affixes. SeeClosed , Morphology Africanlanguages , 96. SeealsoBantu; Swahili , 55, 73, 74, 78, 90, 93, 94, Agent, 31, 32, SO 96, 102, 137, 139, 192, 201, 252. 27S Agonist.SeeFon:edynamics Aitchison . J., 367 Allan, K.. 175, 185,399 AmericanIndianlanguages . 96, 174, 183 AmericanSignLanguage . 3S9 Ammon.M. S. H.. 296. 324, 328. 340 Anderson . J. M.. 371 Anderson . S. R.. 49, 67. 70, 92, 136 . SeeFOrtie dynamics Antagonist Anticausarives . 106. 132. 155. 223ff., 276. . SeealsoCausatives of, 300, 402 development . 172 Aphasia . 96, 149 Applicativeconstruction 3Off., 6S. 67. 7Off.. structure 3ff., , Argument 33S ' Ong Armsb . S. L.. 167 . Aronoff, M.. 116, 120. 121, 184. 290. 294. 359. 370 . 194. 20Sff.. . 50. 85. 102. 138. 17S Aspect 218, 240. 252. 326, 400 Atkins, B. T., 44, 163 Auxiliaries , 17S ,'203 Avery, A., SS

Baker,C. L., 1, 6, 7, 17, 44 Baker,M., 74 Baker's paradox , 7ft'., 35, 58, 64, 98, 100, 148, 167, 169, 176,247, 249, 283, 290.

316.352 Baldi.P.. 54. 120 . I: Bantu . 96. 120 Bartlett . E.. 257 Bauer . L.. 367 Belletti . A.. 43. 140 :tive, 48, 84, 94, 95, 115 Benefac , 116 , 117 , 193 , 220,221,223,309 Bennan , R. A., 22, 86, 294,337,338,403 Berwick , R. C., 6 Bever , 172 , T. G., 48, 49, 89, 168 Bickenon , D., 326,367 Bobick , A., 272 BohaMon , J. N., 10, II BolingerD., 90, 92, 93, 136 , 145 , 395,399 , 44, 250,3roff. Bootstrap pingpoblem Borer , H., 35, 41, 42, 43, 55, 315,393 Bowennan , M., 6, 8, 9, 10, 18,20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 49, S7, 114 , 202, , IS2, 1S4 , 181 , 143 250,283,28S , 286,288,289,297,298, 299,300,302,303,3OS , 308,312,320, 321,322,323,324,325,328,330,331, 333,33S , 336,337,343,393,402,403 -B~ m. P.. 329 Boyes Braine . M. D. S.. 6. 9. 12. 13 Brame . M.. 189 Bresnan . 190 . . J.. 4. 31. 40.43. 74. 7S. ISO 200.242.289.291.392 -range lexicalrules Broad . ISI. IS2. . 103 . 13S 16Off .. 209ff.. 210.219.223.227.228. .. 281.292 .. 268ff 239.247.26Sff Broderick . 121 . V.. S4. 120

406

Index

Brown . R.. 6. 15. 18.309.319.329 Burzio . L.. 34. 42. 71. 75 's Burzio . 34. 75 generalization . J. L.. 170 . 369 Bybee

Culicover , P. W., 1, 6, IS, 167 , 193 , 19S , 197 , 204 Cunne , G., ISI, 304 Darwin , C., 371

Caramazza . A.. 172 Datives , 37, 48, 54, 57, 58, 63, 65, 69, 110ft ., 137 , 155 CaRy. S.. 257 , 210ft., 307 -linguistic . K.. 181 cross Carpenter evidence , 96 Caner , R. J., 74, 78, 170. 172, 176. 196,204. of, 21ff., 27ff., 54, 122 , 284ff., development 223. 243 288,307ff., 319,338, 348,358 Case , 32, 252. S~~ alsoAbsolutivecase Davison : , A., 93, 242 DeHan , G., 8, 57, 283 Ergativelanguages Casefilter. 33 Deixis , 111 , 185 , 219, 224 Causatives Dell, F., 121 , 27ff.. 41, 48, 57. 58. 64, 66. 68, 69, 85ff., I~ , 13Off .. 154, 198, 223, 262, Demetras , M. J., 10, II 263, 270, 275, 288. S~~ alsoAnticausatives Denny , J. P., 175 , 185 -linguisticevidence cross , 95 Denominals , 17, 120 , 122,161 , 183 , 229, of, 22ff.. 54. 202. 283. 288, 255,394,398,400 development

., 321,336 296ff Chafetz , J., 55, 318 , M., 55, 137 Chalkley , R., 330 Charney Chinese , 359

, N., 4, 6, 32, 33, 74, 75, 117, 160, Chomsky ICX ), 248, 328, 371, 392 Clark, E. V., 8, IS, 16, 17, 18, 19, 89, 128, 129, 161, 162, 181, 183, 255, 294, 321, 328, 367, 394, 399, 401 Clark, H. H., 17, 89, 161, 162, 183,255, 371, 394, 401 Classifiers , 185 Closed -classmorphemes , 121, 147ff., 148, 170, 171,254, 269, 326, 400. Seealso Morphology Comrie , B., 86, 95, 97. 122. 149. 251. 252 Conative alternation , 72, 104, 108 Conflation classes , 73. 76. 103. 104, 161, 247. 259, 265. 269ft., 279. 281. Seealso Narrowconflationclasses Connectionism . SeeParallelDistributed Processing Conservatism . 17ff.. 27ff.. 162. 277ff., 283. 317ff.. 318. 353, 364 , L. A., 371, 372 Cooper Crain,S.. 8. 17. ISO Cross -linguisticcomparisons . 2. 86, 87. 94ff.. 121. 134. 149ff.. 170. 172ff.. 185. 202. 210. 225, 228. 246. 248, 251. 302. 307, 315. 358 -linguisticstudyof language Cross . 19. 22. 326. 330. 337 acquisition

deVilliers , J. G., 54 DiKhroniccomparisons , 43, 45, 116 , 151 , 304,367,370,395 Directness constraint , 54, 57, 66, 68, 69, 85, 86 di Sciullo , A. M., 147,184,278,291,353, 365,368 Discourse , 16,59, 83, 84, 396 Dixon , R. M. W., 251 , D. R., 38, 40, 74, 76, 81, 85, 96, 121 Dowty , 141 , 142 , 151 , 194,221, 394,395,397 Dresher , E. B., 167 , M. S., 94, 96 Dryer Dutch , 87, 358

Elliott, N., 4, 250 , 25Iff ., 394 Ergativelanguages -Shir, N., 16, 83 Eneschik Evolution , 371ff. -markingS~~ Raising -toCase Exceptional object Extended ProjectionPrinciple, 14, 34 Externalargument , 32- 3S, 12, 74, 248. S~~ alsoSubject

Fauconnier , G., 399 , R., 92 Fiengo Figueira , R. A.. 22 /groundalternationS,.,. Locatives Figure Fillmore.C. J.. 7S. 76. 10S. 196. 192 Fodor . J. A.. 8. 17. S7. S9. 119. 161 Fodor.J. D.. 48. 49. 167. 194. 207. 371 Foley.W. A.. 96. 97. 121. ISI . 210. 393

407

Index

.. 218.397 Force . 137ft dynamics Fox.D. E.. 55. 137 French . 19.22. 46 . 171 . 272.274.401.402 , 122 Frequency Frost , 284, . L. A., 8, 19,27, 51, 55, 94, 189 287,296.313,315,318,320,321.324 Fukui , N., 97 Garnica , 0 ., 328 Garrett , M. F., 49, 167 , J., 266 Gaulding Gazdar , G., 34, 40, 92, 392 -BindingTheory GB. SeeGovernment Gee.J. P., 57, 142 Grammar Phrase Structure Generalized , 34, 392 Generative Semantics , 176 Gentner , D.. 171, 172, 327. 328. 329. 330, 340. 344. 367. 372 , 78. 229ff.. 238. 243ff.. 370, 396. Geometry

399.400.401 -Ngo.P.. 8. 57. 283 Gerard . 172 . G.. 48. 49. 89. 168 Gergely Gennan . 175 . 19.97. 121 Gleason . J. B.. 172 Gleitman . H.. II . 167 Gleitman . 245.250.260. . L. R.. II . 159 . 167 261.262.264 Goal . 73. 74. 77. 94. 95. 177 . . 31. 48. 49. SO 179 . 202 Gold.E. M.. 10 . . R.. 10. 16.21. 27. 29. 53. 54. 114 Goldberg 119 . 123 . 284.287.297.308.311. . 122 318.335.348.362.401 Gonsalves . R. J.. 168 . H.. 172 Goodglass Gordon . P.. 318 Gould . S. J.. 371 -Binding Government . 32. 34. 71. 74. Theory 75. 87. 90. 392 . SeeGeneralized Phrase Structure GPSG Grammar Grammatical functions . 32. 67. 74. 94ff.. 248. 25I . 258. 3ro. Seealso Object ; Oblique object; Subject object;Second Gray. W. D.. 329 Green . G. M.. 7. 45. 48. 57. 65. 69. 83. 84. 101. 110. 111. 112. 115. 116. 117. 119. 172. 176.212. 220. 221. 309. 358. 395. 402 Greenbaum . S.. 50. 356 Grimshaw . J.. 10. 42. 43. 46. 51. 88. 140.

141.225. 250. 311. 350. 353. 393. 397. 398 . J.. 10. 16. 21. 2S. 27. 29. 53. 114. Gropen 119. 122. 123. 284. 287. 296. 297. 307. 308. 311. 318. 319. 335. 341. 344. 348. 362. 401. 403 Gruber . J.. 31. 75. 137. 156. 190. 192. 244. 335 Gudeman . R.. 8. 57 Guerssel . M.. 97. 133 Haider . H.. 251 . 153ff.. 288 Haigspeak Hakuta . K.. ISO Hale. K.. 71. 85. 106. 132. 176. 197. 300. 356 Hall. R.. 196 Halle. M.. 120 . H.. I Hamburger Hanion . C.. 6. 15 Harrison . G. B.. 116 Hebrew . 22. 86. 337. 338 . J.. 145. 146 Higginbotham Hindu. 86 Hirsh-Pasek . II . 12. 392 . K.. 1O . SeeDiachronic Historicallinguistics comparisons . 289. 323. 402 . J.. 25O Hochberg Holismconstraint . 49. 50. 59. 66. 68. 69. 78. 79. 393 Hollander . 16. 21. 27. 29. 53. 54. 114. . M.. 1O 119. 122. 123.284. 287. 297. 308. 311. 318. 319. 335. 348. 362. 401 . P. J.. 67. 84. 85. 94. 137 Hopper . D.. 315 Horgan Hornstein . N.. 167 . 22. 97. 121. 337 Hungarian

Idioms , 84, 115, 212 , SO , 91, 240 Implicitargument Inchoative , 132, 224 evidence Indirectnegative , 14, 52 Indonesian , 96, 97, 121 Instrument , 78, 101, 139, 193, 198 Internalargument , 32, 34, 35, 72, 74, 75, 78. SeealsoObject; UnKcusatives Intransitives, 72, 73, 75, 85, 87, 91, 130ft.,

252.268 Italian . 87

Index

Jackendoff , R. S., 31, 34, 37, 50, 51, 55, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 85,90, 93, 125 , 137 , 142 , 168 , 175 , 176 , 177 , 178,179 , ISO , 184 , 186 , 187,188 , 189 , 190,191 , 192 , 193 , 195 , 197202,206,224,230,232,236,240, 244,245,258,287,308,314,335,356, 371,394,398,399 , 97 Japanese Jarvella , J., 295 n, 0 ., 116 Jesperse Johnson . D. M.. 329 Johnson , M., 146 -Laird, P. N., 145, 167, 176,202, Johnson 219, 294

, R. M., 31, 200,291 Kaplan Katz . J. J., 167 Kawamoto , A. H., 166 , 173 , 354,355,356 Keenan , E. 0., 94, 96, 149 , 151 , 315 Kegl,J., 44, 163 Keil, F. C., 176 , S. J., 71, 85, 91, 106,132 , 240,300, Keyser 356 , P., 88 Kiparsky Klein,E., 34, 40, 92, 392 , S. A. 11 , 29, 55, 137 Kuczaj I..akoff , G., I~ , 137 , 146 , 176,223,356,371, 392,394 I..akoff , R., 89 Landau , B., 159 , 245,250,260,261,262,264 , R. W., 206,363,371 Langacker Larson , R. K., 43 Lasnik , H., 91, 240,250 Latin,46 Latinate , 46, 47, 120 , 121 , 123 vocabulary , M., 71, 72, 105 , 106 , 107 , 170 , Laughren 176 , 198 , I , 5ff., 51, 166 , 247 Leamability Lebeaux , D. S., 8, 19,27, 51, 55, 94, 189 , 284,287,313,315,318,320,321,324,348 Leech , G., SO Levett , W. J. M., 295 Levin,B., 33, 34, 38, 44, 49, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, SO , 81, 85, 89, 97, 104 , 105 , 106 , III , 124 , 107,110 , 126 , 129 , 133 , 139 , 144 , 147 , 148 , 158 , 163 , 170 , 184 , 193 , 263,287,353,393,394,399 Levin,L., 34, 42, 71, 74, 75, 87 LexicalFunctional Grammar , II , 31, 34, 74, 75, 392

408 Lexicalrule, 7, 62, 63, 65, 71, 72, 76ff., lOS, 154, 162, 209, 276, 282. SeealsoBroad ; Datives ; rangelexicalrules; Causatives -rangelexical Locatives ; Mi(klles; Narrow rules; Passives LexicalVariablePrinciple , 178, 258 Lexicon , 3ff., 44, 185,278, 291, 364ff. LFG. SeeLexicalFunctional Grammar Li, C., 170 Lieber,R., ISI Lieberman , P., 371 Light, M., 266 LightfootD., 151 , 171,208 Light verbs Linguisticrelativity, 171.358, 360 Linkingrules, 62, 74ff., 75. 76. 81, 94, 95, 178ff., 180, 199,211, 245, 247, 248ff., 25Iff., 258, 262, 265. 267, 281, 286, 353 Lisu, 170 Locatives , 38, 49, SO , 59, 64, 66-69, 77ff., lOS, 124ff., 137, 157, 174, 178, 192,228 -linguisticevidence cross , 97 of, 25ff., 27ff., 283, 288, 311, development 320, 338, 341 Lord, C., 154, 297, 298, 299, 301, 402 , J. J., 1 McCarthy , J. D., 48, 168, 176 McCawley McClelland , J. L., 166, 173,354, 355, 356 McNeill, D., II , 12 , B., 8, 9, 13, 18, 21, 22, 122, MacWhinney 3~ , 319, 338 Major, D., 28 Maling, J., 398 Manner , 71, 110, 181, 193,208, 213, 215, 224, 226, 229, 230, 258, 270 Marantz , A., 33, 55, 72, 147, 148, 163,210, 251 Maratsos , M. P., 8, 9, 13, 29, 55, 57, 137, 147, 150, 154, 181, 250, 283, 299, 306, 318, 394 Marchand , H., 151 Marin, O. S. M., 172 Marr, D., 182 Maturation , 349 Mazurkewich , I., 8, 21, 22, 45, 48, 5I 94, 211, 282, 289 Mazzucchi , A., 172 Means , 95, 198,200, 202, 258 MeM , L., 172 , P., 181, 330 Menyuk

409

Index

Miceli. G.. 172 Michalski.R. S.. 272 Middles.72. 106. 132. 155.275. 276 of. 300 development Miller. G. A.. 145. 167. 176.202. 219. 294 . S.. 97 Miyagawa Moder.C. L.. 369 . J. L.. 10. 250 Morgan . 32. 45. 47. 53. 54. 72. 118. 121. Morphology 122. 147. 155. 251. 252. 269. 287. 290. 337. 339. 365. 366. 368. 370 Motivationfor rules. 109. 118. 127. 133

Movea. 34. 69. 75. 268.392 . L.. 150 Murasugi Nadel. L.. 71 Narrowconflationclasses . 64. 104. 106. 269. 353. 359 Narrow-rangelexicalrules. 103. IOS. 135. 151. 152ff.. 160. 162.209ff.. 213. 229. 240. 247. 269ff.. 275. 281. 347. 392 . V. P.. 95. 122. 134. 149. 302. Nedyalkov 305. 307 . 6ff.. 9ff. SeealsoIndirect Negativeevidence negativeevidence . 172 Neurolinguistics Newpon.E. L.. II . G.. 92. Nunberg Nwachukwu . P. A.. 97 Object,32, 55, 71, 74, 75, 89, 94, 95, 248, 252. SeealsoSecond object Obler, L., 172 , 33, 36ft., 41, 44, 71, 227 Obligatoriness Obliqueobject, 32, 72, 74, 75, 78, 95, 181, 199 Oehrle , R. T., 45, 48, 83, 146,211 O' Keefe,J., 371, 372 . SeeObligatoriness Optionality Oshenon . D. N.. 6. IS. 167 Ostler. N. D. M.. 74 Palenno . 121 . D.. 54. 12O ParallelDistributed . 166. 173. Processing 353ff Parkes . C. H.. 49. 167 Particles . 8O. 120 Part-possessor ascension . 105 Passives . 55. 57. 58. 64. 7O.89ff.. . 43. SO 134. 159. 194. 239ff.

-linguistic evidence cross . 96 of. 18ff.. 27ff.. 55. 94. 221. development 284. 288.321 Pasttense . 120 . 123 . 339.368.369 Patient . 136 . . 55. 73. 74. 85. 91- 96. 102 192ff.. 211.222.252.275 PDP.SeeParallel Distributed Processing Penner . S.. 10 causative . 55. 66. 68. 86. 171 . Periphrastic 198.324 Perlmutter . D.. 34. 42. 74. 92.94. 210.225. 227. 392 . M.. 55 Phinney constraint . 45-47. 57. 118ff Phonological . 366.370.393.396 . 46. 57. 120 Phonology Pinker . S.. 1. 6. 8. 10. 15. 16. 17. 18.25. 27. 29. 42. 44. 46. 47. 51. 52. 53. 54. 56. 59. 60. 62. 71. 74. 75. 94. 114 . 119 . 122 . 123 . 149. 189 . 248.249.250.251.254.257. 269.271.282.284.285.286.287.288. 290.291.292.295.296.297.303.307. 308.311.313.315.316.318.319.320. 321.324.332.333.335.339.341.348. 354.355.360.361.362.368.369.372. 392.400.401 Polish . 22 . 22 Portuguese Post . K. N.. 10. 11. Postal . P.. 92. 210 . SeealsoDiscourse . 93. 196 Pragmatics . 92. 242.289 passives Prepositional . . 33. 74. 77. 78. 79. 81. 82. 108 Prepositions 143.174 . 199 . 200.201.224. . 180 . 181 234.240.265.335.393 of. 181 development Prince . 121 . 123 . . A.. 10.42. 46. 51. 60. 120 149.269.303.339.354.368.369.393.398 of Contrast . 128 . 257.259.281 Principle of Conventionality . 367 Principle .. 147 verbs . 14Off . . 55. 135 Psychological 205.261.330.393.397 Pullum , G. K., 34, 40, 92, 392 , J., 176 , 206 Pustejovsky Pye,C., 251

. R.. 50 Quirk -to-object . 72. 146 Raising Randall . J. H.. 8. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 41.43. 46. 47. 54. 113 . 119 . M.. 33. 38. 49. 67. 68. 71. 72. 74. Rappapon 76. 78. 81. 85. 124 . 144 . 147 . . 126 . 139

Index . M.. (cont.) Rappopon 148. 158. 170. 176. 183. 193.287. 353. 393. 394 . 43. ISO Reanalysis of deletion . 43 Recovery Relational . 34. 75. 392 grammar Resulwives . 72 RO. St't' Relational grammar Ritchie . W. C.. 349 Rizzi. L.. 43. 140. 141 . T.. 27. 54. 91. 106. 132.240. 287. Roeper 296. 300. 318 Romance . 175.359. St't' also languages French . Italian. Ponuguese . Spanish Rosch . E.. 329 Rosen . C.. 333. 392 Ross . J. R.. 83. 146. 167. 176 Rozin.P.. 371 Russian . 97. 121

Saffran . E. M.. 172 . I. A.. 34. 40. 92. 392 Sag Saksena . A.. 86 Salkoff . M.. 68 Schank . R. C.. 167 . 176 Schneiderman . M.. 10. 11 Schwanz . M. F.. 172 . 107 . 167 . 176 . 372 Scripts

Second , 34, 71, 74, 75, 94, 95, 211, object 265 Selkirk,E. 0 ., 121 Semantic tK>Otstrapping , 179 Semitic , 359. SeealsoHebrew , 116 Shakespeare , R. N., 371, 372 Shepard Shibarani , M., 48, 86, 95 , T., 95 Shapen Shanpassives , 91, 240 , G. G., 95, 122, 134, 149, 302, 305, Silnitsky

307 i , M. C., 172 Silver Sinclair , A. R., 295

Siobin , D. I., 22,324 , 326 , 330 , 336 . 337 . 369, 370, 371 Smiley,P., 330 Smith,C. S., 120 , 196 Sniglet Snow,C., 10, II , 13, 18, 21, 122, 319 Source , 31, SO , 177 , 182,260 Spanish errors , IS3, 169,322ff., 333ff., 339 Speech

410 Spray - -/load alternation. SeeLocatives Stanowicz , Lot10, II Steele , So , 175 , JoPo , 153 , Sternberger , RoEo , 272,355 Stepp , 49, 57, 89, 168 Stereotypy Stob , Mo,6, IS, 167 Stonn , Po , 47 , 4, 30 Subcategorization , 32, 34, 55, 71, 74, 75, 78, 94, 95, Subject 248,250,252,268 Svartvik , J., 50 Swahili , 97 , 72, 179 , 360, 393,398 SyntaCtic categories

Talmy. L.. 49. 77. 78. 125. 130. 137. 138. 140. 141. 142. 170. 171. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 185. 186. 193. 197. 198. 200. 202. 204. 206. 208. 232. 236. 242. 246. 312. 330. 359. 371. 393. 399 TeMY. C.. 85. 97. 194. 206. 401 Thematic core. 73. 77. 82. 85. 87. 97. 265. 352 ThematicHierarchyCondition . SO.51. SS. 56. 57. 58. 93. 142. 314 ThematicRelations . 31. 48. 79. Hypothesis 92. 117. 136. 137. 151. 188ff.. 203. 214. 220. 244. 403 Thematic roles. 31. 43. 71. 75. 86. 101ft.. 144.SeealsoAgent; Benefactive ; Goal; Instrument : e; Theme ; Patient ; Soun Theme . 32. 71. 73- 75. 85. 88. 94. 95. 174, 252. 268. 275 Theories of grammar . 4. JOff.. 35. 87. 392. SeealsoGeneralized PhraseStructure Semantics Grammar ; Generative ; -BindingTheory; Lexical Government Functional Grammar ; RelationalGrammar Theta - Criterioo . 4. 74. 190 . S. A.. 67. 84. 85. 94. 137. 170 Thompson Thornton . R.. ISO Transitives . 73. 85. 89. 90. l04ff.. 130ft.. 137. 241. 397

Travis . L. L.. 10 Treiman . R.. 10. II Turkish . 22 , A., 107 , 166 , 245 Tversky Unaccusatives . 33. 3S.41. 73. 87. 91. 93. 225.268.393 . 33. 3S.93. 227.252 Unergatives . IS. 218.289.290.293 Uniqueness

Index Universality. Stt Cross-linguistic comparisoils

Vaina , L., 182 VanValin,R. D., 96, 97, 121 , 151 , 210,394 Vendier , z. , 175 , 206 Villa, G., 172 Visser , F. T., 43, 45, 151 , 395 Walker,E. C. T., 49, 167 Wallace , A. R., 371 Wanner , E., ISO Wasow , T., 17. 21. 92, 113, 227 , A., 8 Weinberg Weinstein , S., 6. 15. 167 Weinttaub , S., 172 Wexier,K., 1. 4. 6, 15, 35. 41, 42, 43, 55, 167, 204, 250, 315, 371, 393 White. L., 8. 21. 22, 45, 48, 51, 94, 211, 289 Wharf, B., 171, 394 Wilkins, W., 193, 195, 197, 393 Williams, E.. 32, 147, 184. 278, 294, 353. 365. 369, 393 Wilson, R., 10, 16, 21, 27, 53, 54, 114, 119, 122, 123, 284, 287, 308, 318, 348, 401 Zaenen , A., 348 Zubizaretta , M. L., 33, 91 Zwicky, A., 112

411