Laws of Freedom : A study of Kant's method of applying the categorical imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten

LAWS OF FREEDOM A Study o f Kant*s M e t h o d o f A p p l y i n g the C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e i n t h e Metapnysik der Sitten

By M A R Y

NEW BARNES

&

J.

GREGOR

Y O R K NOBLE,

INC.

C O N T E N T S

\ Foreword Preface Bibliographical N o t e Chapter I II

Kant's C o n c e p t i o n o f a 'Metaphysic o f Morals' T h e Divisions o f M o r a l Philosophy .

HI

T h e Universal Principle o f L a w

IV

T h e Principles o f A c q u i r e d R i g h t

V VI VH VIQ

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T h e N o t i o n and C o n t e n t o f Tugendlehre . Pure Practical R e a s o n and the Ends o f A c t i o n . Perfect and Imperfect D u t y

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T h e N a t u r e o f Perfect Duties to Oneself

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Perfect Duties to O n e s e l f as a M o r a l B e i n g w i t h an A n i m a l N a t u r e . . . . .

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Perfect Duties to O n e s e l f M e r e l y as a M o r a l Being . . . . .

XI XH

Imperfect Duties to Oneself

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Duties o f Virtue to O t h e r M e n Conclusion .

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F O R E W O R D I f w e are to understand Kant's moral philosophy w e must k n o w some­ thing o f his Metaphysic of Morals; for it is there that the formal prin­ ciples expounded in the Groundwork and in the Critique of Practical Reason are applied, first to the sphere o f l a w and politics (in The Doctrine of Law), and secondly to the sphere o f ethics proper (in The Doctrine of Virtue), W i t h o u t a study o f this w o r k w e are in danger o f misunder­ standing, not only the methods b y w h i c h Kant- sought to a p p l y his formal principles, but even the nature o f the principles themselves and their bearing upon human freedom. It is strange that this all-important topic—so far as I have been able to discover—has never yet had a b o o k devoted entirely to itself in any language. T h e interpretation o f Kant's moral philosophy, and indeed o f his o w n moral attitude, has suffered . grievously from this lack o f a scholarly introduction to a w o r k which, although it is easy in some respects, is extraordinarily difficult in others. T h e absence o f any usable English translation, especially for The Doctrine of Virtue, has made the position in this country, and perhaps also in America, even more unhappy. 5

Mrs Gregor's commentary is therefore the w o r k of a pioneer, and it is all the more valuable because she has also supplied us w i t h a n e w translation. A l t h o u g h she has not been able to examine Kant's legal and political doctrines in detail—this w o u l d require a b o o k to itself—she has given us enough to s h o w h o w they fit into his system o f moral philosophy as a w h o l e . It is o n l y against this w i d e r background that his ethical doctrines (in the narrower sense) can be understood. These ethical doctrines she has e x p o u n d e d w i t h great acuteness and has at­ tempted to analyse the method b y w h i c h Kant seeks to m o v e from his purely formal principles to their particular applications—that is, to. the discussion and classification o f particular moral virtues. This analysis seems to m e one o f the outstanding merits o f her b o o k . S o m e puzzles m a y remain unsolved, but at the v e r y least she has helped to make things easier for her successors, and w h i c h o f us can hope to do m o r e ? •. There was a t i m e - ^ i f I m a y lapse into autobiography—when, even after having acquired some k n o w l e d g e o f Kant's theoretical philosophy b y writing Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, I still despaired o f being able to understand his Metaphysic of Morals;and during that period a w o r k o f this kind w o u l d have saved m e a great deal o f labour and misix

understanding. I hope tha*-Mrs Gregor's b o o k w i l l n o w p e r f o r m this office for others, as it is w e l l qualified to d o ; and it is in this h o p e that I commend it to all students o f K a n t and t o all students o f moral philosophy. This is one o f the f e w books w h i c h n o critic o f Kant's ethics can afford to neglect. H . J. P A T O N

19 February 1962

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PREFACE^ In his Preface to the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten Kant tells us that this w o r k is a treatise preUminary to the Metaphysik der Sitten w h i c h he w i l l some day write. A s the tide o f the Grundlegung implies, its purpose is to lay the foundation for the projected Metaphysik der Sitten, to investigate the supreme principle o f morality, from which, in the subsequent w o r k , 'the w h o l e system' o f duties w i l l be derived. It w a s not until 1797, t w e l v e years after the Grundlegung, that K a n t was finally able to fulfil his promise. S o far as the great majority o f his students and critics are ^concerned, he m i g h t as w e l l n o t have written t h e Metaphysik der Siften at all. ' W h i l e the Grundlegung and, to a lesser extent, the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft are w i d e l y studied, Kant's third major w o r k in moral philo­ sophy is almost completely ignored. A t first glance w e m i g h t regard this omission as a rather unfortunate, y e t not too serious one. Since the Grundlegung is logically prior to the Metaphysik der Sitten w e should be able to understand and evaluate the earlier w o r k apart from the later one. B u t in fact the neglect o f the Metaphysik der Sitten has left us w i t h a distorted v i e w o f Kant's moral philosophy as a w h o l e , Had the p r o g r a m m e o f Kantian studies included, from the beginning, due attention to the Metaphysik der Sitten, the v i e w that Kant's position implies, for example, that the consequences, ends and circumstances o f our actions are morally irrelevant, or that the test o f a m a x i m ' s morality is its freedom frpm logical contradiction w h e n regarded as universal l a w , could never have taken root. A s the situation stands, the c o m m o n practice o f Kant's critics is to construct their o w n versions o f a meta­ physic o f morals: in other w o r d s to decide, according to their under­ standing o f Kant's 'formalism', h o w he ought to h a v e applied the categorical imperative. Since their conception o f Kant's formalism rules out, in advance, the possibility o f criterk for systematicaUj^applying the supreme moral principle, they imagine K a n t attempting, w i t h o u t further ado, to conceive various m a x i m s o f action as universal l a w . B y censuring the results o f such a procedure they g i v e the illusion o f an easy victory over Kant. B u t it is only an illusion. W h a t they have censured is not Kant's application o f the supreme m o r a l principle, but „ rather the product o f t h e i r ' o w n imagination. T h e Metaphysik der Sitten is not a head-long plunge f r o m the supreme xi ' 1

lii

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PREFACE

moral principle to specific duties. It is, rather, a systematic application o f this principle, a procedure w h i c h implies' a patient search for criteria through which duties can be derived, step b y step, f r o m the categorical imperative. M y purpose in this commentary is only t o set forth, in so far as I understand it, the method b y w h i c h K a n t applies his,supreme moral principle. I have, for the most part, stopped short o f any attempt to evaluate Kant's basic assumptions and procedure, other than f r o m the point o f v i e w o f his self-consistency—consistency w i t h i n the Metaphysik der Sitten itself and b e t w e e n it and his earlier writings in moral philosophy. For at this preliminary stage, w h e n the c o n t e n T b f the Metaphysik der Sitten is as yet largely urifamiliar, to m i x evaluation with exposition w o u l d only confuse matters. A g o o d deal remains to be done toward understanding o f Kant's applied m o r a l philosophy before it is time for criticism o f it. M y h o p e is that this prehrninary exposition o f Kant's method will lead students o f K a n t to undertake their o w n research o n the problems w h i c h I have n o t been able to solve. T h e Metaphysik der Sitten, admittedly, presents special difficulties which may have been, to some extent, responsible for its neglect. B y the time circumstances permitted K a n t to issue his l o n g - a w a i t e d metaphysic o f morals he w a s 73 and, in v i e w o f all that remained to be done, time was running short. T h e w r i t i n g o f the Metaphysik der Sitten is often hurried, and this evident haste, c o m b i n e d w i t h Kant's habitual tendency to assume that the reader grasps the full significance o f every term, more than cancels out the 'popular' nature o f his subject-matter. T h e purpose o f the Metaphysik der Sitten is to supply criteria for deter­ mining w h i c h o f our maxims could qualify for g i v i n g universal l a w , and Kant formulates carefully the w i d e r criteria o f juridical and ethical duty. From these, h o w e v e r , he plunges directly into discussions o f specific duties, leaving the reader to abstract from these discussions the subordinate principles operative in them. N o d o u b t these principles are, to Kant, so obvious that o n l y the most casual reference to t h e m is necessary: they are something w h i c h he left behind l o n g a g o and w h i c h , he assumes, must be equally evident to his reader. B u t a m o r e syste­ matic exposition o f the system might-have made the w o r k m o r e readily, and hence more w i d e l y , appreciated. It is in order to emphasize the full significance o f Kant's t e r m 'laws o f freedom' that I have used the phrase as the title o f this c o m m e n t a r y . That moral laws are laws o f freedom is the theme o f the Metaphysik der Sitten in both'its parts. Freedom, for K a n t , is the p o w e r o f pure reason to be practical, and the categorical imperative is the l a w o f pure

PREFACE

practical reason's functioning. Hence the categorical imperative is called the l a w o f freedom. T h i s m u c h is ncept of a finite rational- being, like that of a rational being as such, can be denved^from reason's reflection upon its own activity, it is difficult to know how much he would include in this pure con­ cept. On the theoretical side frnitude seems rs imply an element of passivity in knowledge, or sensibility in general. The practical equivalent of sensibility appears to be inclination toward the objects of needs and wants arising from our frnitude. But there is no indication that Kant regards our knowledge of the particular senses as contained in our concept of sensibility in general, nor is there any evi­ dence that he thinks we can deduce from the notion of inclination in general such specific inclinations as those for self-preservation, sex and nourishment. 8 1

(

K A N T ' S C O N C E P T I O N OF A ' M E T A P H Y S I C OF M O R A L S '

II

22

Grundlegung. O n l y in the Metaphysik der Sitten, in the actual process o f applying the supreme moral principle, does he suggest that another type o f knowledge is required for this second part o f a metaphysic o f morals. In the Metaphysik der Sitten, as in the Grundlegung, Kant's discussions o f a metaphysic o f morals ate concerned primarily w i t h the source o f moral laws in pure practical reason and only secondarily w i t h the type of concept contained in these laws. A t first glance the situation appears to show little improvement over the Grundlegung. A metaphysic o f morals is still described as 'pure moral philosophy', and occasional passages could be cited as evidence that he still thinks o f it is pure knowledge in the proper sense o f the t e r m . B u t there is other evidence to show that, despite these continuing hesitations, he recognizes the presence o f empirical elements in a metaphysic o f morals and that, in his descriptions o f this w o r k as pure moral philosophy, the term 'pure' means only 'a priori'. T h e Metaphysik der Sitten, he suggests, is a type o f metaphysics different from that o f the Grundlegung. 83

The Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant tells us, follows upon the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft just as the already published Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft follows upon the Kritik der reinen Vernunft: the Metaphysical First Principles of Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre are 'counterparts' to the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science. * The parallel is again drawn w i t h reference to the need for principles applying the universal moral laws to human nature and the universal laws o f nature to objects o f experience. A l t h o u g h Kant tells us little about the kind o f knowledge contained in a metaphysic o f morals, he provides sufficient clues for us to connect the metaphysics o f practical reason with the more fully developed notion of.its theoretical counter­ part, and justifies our drawing upon the broad outline o f a metaphysic 3

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3 2

The examples o£ duties obtained by applying the supreme moral principle are not really an integral part of the Grundlegung. ' Cf. M.d.S., 375 and 217. The latter text, which asserts that 'we shall often have to take as our object the particular nature of man, which is known only through experience, in order to show in it the consequences of the universal moral principles,' could easily be mistaken for an explicit recognition of empirical know­ ledge in a metaphysic of morals. If it is taken in its context, however, and com­ pared withV>., 412, it appears to imply, on the contrary,- an exclusion of empirical elements; for the 'universal moral principles' seem, to be what we have called applied moral laws, and their application to empirical knowledge of man seems to he outside a metaphysic of morals, as an appHcation of it to anthropology. • M.d.S., 205. Ibid., 216. 3 3

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LAWS OF F R E E D O M

o f nature in order to develop the concept o f a metaphysic o f morals. Kant distinguishes t w o kinds o f metaphysics o f nature: the 'trans­ cendental part' and the 'metaphysics o f corporeal and thinking nature'. The transcendental part sets forth the system o f a priori concepts and principles which make possible our experience o f objects in general. Kant regards his first Critique as the framework o f such a system. Because the elements o f knowledge w i t h w h i c h it deals are conditions o f the possibility o f our knowing any object whatsoever, they have no special reference to this or that type o f object w h i c h may be given to the senses. T h e transcendental part o f a metaphysic o f nature con­ tains, by definition, only pure concepts and principles together with the pure forms o f intuition; and this implies that, being unable to draw upon sensuous experience, it must be altogether ^determinate regarding objects o f sensuous experience. T h e second division o f a meta­ physic o f nature contains, on the other hand, w h a t can be k n o w n a priori regarding one or the other type o f object o f e x p e r i e n c e corporeal nature or thinking nature. It must, therefore, admit a certain minimal empirical knowledge, namely, that w h i c h is necessary to give us the concept o f an object o f outer or inner sense in general. 36

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The point o f interest to us in this division is that in order to deter­ mine the a priori principles relating to a specific kind o f object as dis­ tinguished from objects in general, a metaphysic o f nature must admit an empirical concept: matter as characterized b y its most fundamental predicate, motion—or, for the metaphysics o f thinking nature, the empirical representation 'I think'. Since these concepts are o f a posteriori origin, this type o f metaphysics cannot be pure knowledge. W i t h the help o f these empirical concepts it will obviously be able to say a good deal more about the laws o f nature than will the trans­ cendental part. B u t the question naturally arises: h o w , i f it contains empirical.elements, can this science be metaphysics? H o w is it to be distinguished from empiricd^rysics? 38

3 8

The necessity of elaborating the notion of a metaphysic of nature and at the same time selecting from it only what is relevant to its practical counterpart will, I hope, excuse the oversimplification WHKant's thought in the following paragaphs. \ M.AJ.N., 469-70; KJ.r.V. B 873 ff. \ However, Kant continues, there can be no metaphysics of thinking nature; for metaphysical knowledge must be able to construct concepts relating to the mere possibility of the object, in order to proceed without further recourse to experi­ ence. It therefore needs the pure form of space, whereas the empirical representa­ tion 'I think' is in the form of time only. Cf. M.AJ.N., 470-r. 37

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I T h e w a y in which Kant poses the question is significant. ' H o w , ' he / asks, 'can I hope to have knowledge a priori (and therefore a metaphysics) o f objects in so far as they are given to our senses, that is, given in an a posteriori manner?' T h e essential characteristic o f this type o f meta­ physics is n o w located in the a priori character o f its propositions rather than in the purity o f its concepts, and Kant's answer to the question specifies further the sense in 'which metaphysical propositions must be a priori. W e take nothing more from experience, he explains, than what is needed to give us an object o f outer or inner sense. In a metaphysical treatment o f these objects w e must 'entirely dispense w i t h all empirical principles which profess to add to these concepts any more special experience with a v i e w to our passing further judgments upon the objects'. A metaphysic o f corporeal nature admits the empirical concept, matter, but in such a w a y that 'except for what is contained in this concept no other empirical principle is used for the knowledge o f matter'. Given this one empirical concept, a metaphysic o f cor­ poreal nature will proceed to construct, in the pure form o f space, the intuition corresponding to this concept and so determine a priori, through mathematical principles, the most fundamental laws o f matter. As metaphysics, it is limited to such laws o f matter as can be determined b y reason w o r k i n g upon the concept o f an object o f outer sense with only the categories and the forms o f intuition. It cannot deal with any o f the more detailed laws o f nature which w o u l d have to be learned from experience. Although these more detailed laws, as laws, contain an a priori element, they are nevertheless 'learned from e x ­ perience' in so far as observation o f a temporal sequence o f events is required before the l a w can be formulated. Metaphysics formulates a priori propositions, not merely in the sense in which any l a w is an a priori proposition, but in the sense that no further experience is re­ quired for them beyond the experience o f matter in motion. 39

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If w e apply Kant's discussion o f a metaphysic o f nature to moral philosophy, w e obtain the t w o divisions o f a metaphysic o f morals foreshadowed in t i e Grundlegung and assumed, for the most part, in the Metaphysik der Sitten: a 'transcendental part' which deals w i t h the supreme moral principle as a l a w for rational beings in general, even as its theoretical Counterpart deals w i m the principles relating to objects o f experience in general; and a part, corresponding to the metaphysics o f corporeal nature, w h i c h has to do w i t h such laws o f human conduct 8

* K.d.r.V., B 875. Italics mine. *° Ibid., B 876. Ibid. « M.AJ.N., 4 1

470.

LAWS

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as can be determined by applying the supreme moral principle to a limited amount o f empirical k n o w l e d g e concerning man. T h e minimal empirical elements admissible in a metaphysic o f morals must be more extensive than those admitted in a metaphysic o f nature. In theoretical knowledge Kant has at his disposal not only the categories o f the understanding but also the forms o f intuition, so that he can proceed further with fewer empirical elements. In practical metaphysics the minimal a posteriori elements are characterized more vaguely as what pertains to 'men considered simply as m e n ' , and include man's various instincts, inclinations and powers, his relation to animate and inanimate objects, etc. In distinction from what pertains to men as such, a meta­ physic o f morals cannot admit k n o w l e d g e o f the contingent circum­ stances and conditions in which m e n m a y find themselves. It will, therefore, determine moral laws valid for every man merely b y virtue o f his human nature. It cannot consider the special forms which these laws will take in reference to individual m e n or classes o f men. It can determine, for example, the duties o f respect which every man has to every other man as such: it cannot determine the duties o f respect which the y o u n g have to the old, the learned to the ignorant, etc. For the rules enjoining such duties are n o t 'principles o f obligation o f men as such to one a n o t h e r . . . but only rules modified according to the differences o f the subjects' to w h o m the laws are applied in cases met with in experience. :

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But moral laws ought to serve as guides in action, and action takes place under just such contingent circumstances as have been excluded from a metaphysic o f morals. R e c o g n i z i n g this, Kant envisages an 'appendix' to the metaphysic o f morals in w h i c h a further application o f moral laws is to be made. "While moral concepts have their source in pure reason, he argues, they l o o k to their application in concrete cases, and for this application experience is required. T h e final, most concrete application o f the l a w in moral action is made b y judgment, and moral philosophy cannot, o f course, descend to individual j u d g ­ ments o f right and wrong, gbod_and evil, in particular cases. B u t it ought not to stop with the universal principles o f duty for men as such. It ought also to 'schematize^ these principles, as it were, and t3

MJ.S., 468. Ibid. Kant makes the same point again With specific reference to Rechtslehre, suggesting that the application of metaphysical first principles of Law to particu­ lar cases be made in notes to the text, in order that we may clearly distinguish what is metaphysics from what is merely 'empirical practice of Law'. Cf. M.d.S., 205-6. 4 4

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A l l o w them as ready for morally-practical use . However, this /adaptation o f the universal moral principles cannot take place within ' a metaphysic o f morals itself. T h e 'schematization' o f moral laws is necessary to the completeness o f our exposition o f the system, but it cannot be an integral part o f the system itself. W h i l e a comparison o f practical with theoretical metaphysics pro­ vides the principle according to which Kant selects the empirical ele­ ments admissible in the Metaphysik der Sitten, there is a significant difference in the reasons w h i c h he gives for limiting the amount o f empirical knowledge in the t w o . His reason for excluding from a metaphysic o f morals such moral rules as w o u l d require further empirical knowledge is not so much that these rules fall short o f the a. priori requirements o f metaphysical propositions, but rather that they are not capable o f being systematically classified. G n c e w e begin to consider the innumerable circumstances and conditions i n which m e n may happen to find themselves, he argues, w e can never be sure o f the completeness o f our enumeration o f duties; for they' w i l l have to be classified o n merely empirical grounds. A metaphysic 6 f morals, on the other hand, will limit empirical elements and thereby be able to give an a priori, and hence exhaustive, enumeration o f the duties o f m e n qua men. In Kant's v i e w the a priori and the ideal o f systematic totality i n a science are closely related; for he holds that a science cannot achieve the status o f a system until w e have grasped the Idea o f that science and are thereby in a position to give, merely on the basis o f that Idea and without further recourse to experience, an exhaustive account o f the scope and divisions o f the science. In both a metaphysic o f nature and a metaphysic o f morals the systematic totality o f our knowledge is said to follow from the fact that it is metaphysics, i.e. from the limitation o f empirical concepts in it. B u t Kant's reason for excluding further empirical elements from theoretical metaphysics is that meta­ physical knowledge differs in kind from the rest o f our knowledge o f nature. It is a priori k n o w l e d g e in the sense described above and can46

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M.d.S., 468-9. * This view does not imply that the content of the science can be deduced .a priori from principles of reason. Even metaphysics must, when it wishes to say something about a specific type of object, admit a concept of sensuous origin; and because, the empirical elements in metaphysics are strictly limited, so too are the propositions of metaphysics limited to the most universal and ^determinate laws In'order to obtain more" detailed laws we must descend to the empirical part of science, where sensuous experience is as essential a component in know­ ledge as are the a priori principles of the mind. 4 6

IS OF ACTION OI This notion o f a system o f pure rational ends is seldom mentioned explicitly in the Tugendlehre. Y e t , as w e shall see, it is the implicit theme o f this w o r k and dominates Kant's derivation o f ethics as a system o f duties. Again, this concept is n o innovation on the part o f the Tugendlehre; the Grundlegung utilizes it, especially in its formula o f the kingdom o f ends, and the second Critique discusses at some length the w a y in which the duty o f promoting the highest good arises from the nature o f pure practical rekson itself. Kant's doctrine o f the summum bonum has, as a rule, been either overlooked or treated 'as a rritre appen­ dage to his moral philosophy. But just as the morality o f every free act o f choice depends o n our having the law as our motive, so the legality o f every free determination o f choice, Kant notes, depends o n 'the end which is also m y m o t i v e ' . A s w e have seen, the ethical legality o f an act o f choice means its conformity w i t h ethical law, that is', its having as the matter o f its maxim the ends o f pure practical reason. Hence the system o f these ends, the summum bonum, is to be the framework o f ethics o n its material side or as a system o f duties. T h e command to promote the highest g o o d is the comprehensive c o m ­ mand underlying specific ethical laws to promote particular obligatory ends, and it is our determination o f choice to the summum bonum that makes all our maxims, and not merely^ those o f promoting specific obligatory ends, ethically right or legal. 42

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As soon as w e g o beyond the province o f outer legislation and regard pure practical reason, not merely as providing the norm for action,' but as itself legislative, it is as a power o f ends and o f a system o f ends that reason determines duties. Enough has been said o f pure practical reason as a p o w e r o f ends; w e should, however, recall briefly Kant's views on reason as a systematizing power. T h e Dialectic o f the Critique of Pure Reason examines at length the systematizing nature o f theoreti­ cal reason, but the relevance o f this to the question at hand lies only in

subordinate the ends w h i c h w e have (those that m a k e up o u r happiness) to those w h i c h w e o u g h t t o have, o r t o seek our happiness as a part o f the system o f pure rational ends. 4 2

" For this reason, ethics can also be defined as the s y s t e m o f the ends o f pure practical reason." M.d.S., 3 8 1 . 4 3

Cf. Gr., 433 ff. and K.d.p.V., n o . T h e relevant sections o f the second Critique

o n the content o f the summum bonum are those f r o m p a g e 107 t o page 113. 4 4

M.d.S., 398. A c c o r d i n g t o ibid., 3 9 6 - 7 , the end i n question could also be taken as " virtue " in the sense described b e l o w , pp.' 170-1, the steadfast " c o n ­ formity o f t h e w i l l w i t h e v e r y d u t y " (M.d.S., 3 9 s ) , i n c l u d i n g duty according t o ethical laws. This interpretation w o u l d also be suggested b y K.d.p.V., 57 ff.

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its illustration o f the fundamental importance which Kant's metaphysics o f theoretical reason assigns to this characteristic o f reason. It is o f n o less importance to Kant's moral philosophy that reason in its practical function is a systematizing p o w e r and hence a p o w e r o f determining choice according to the Idea o f a system o f ends. B o t h in its pragmatic function, where it unites the ends o f our desires into the ideal o f happi­ ness, and in its moral function, where it projects an ideal o f systematic completeness among the necessary objects o f a finite rational will, pure practical reason is a power o f uniting our ends in a systematic whole. As the supreme moral principle expresses, in Professor Paton's terms, the necessary law o f pure practical reason's functioning, so the first principle of ethics expressesthe law o f its activity specifically as a p o w e r of ends; and this principle is, implicitly, a command to strive for the highest good, a system o f pure rational ends. Throughout his ethical writings Kant conceives a necessary connec­ tion bet.veen the disinterested rational will, the will acting in accord­ ance with universal law, and what he calls 'the essential ends o f reason'. As distinguished from arbitrary or contingent ends which the individual may or may not have, these are ends which everyone must have (in so far as he wills rationally) because they belong to the nature of pure practical reason itself. T h e first o f these ends is, o f course, the absolute and unconditioned g o o d , a g o o d w i l l ; and since w e are speak­ ing o f the practical reason o f an imperfectly rational being, the per­ fection of the moral will is virtue. B u t while virtue is the supreme good, it is not, Kant argues, the w h o l e and complete object o f pure practical reason. T o inquire after the highest g o o d is to ask what state o f affairs would satisfy completely the requirements o f pure practical reason, and this state o f affairs must include the happiness o f rational beings, subject to their worthiness to be happy. Happiness is not, like virtue, an absolute and unconditioned good. Impartial reason considers it to be good, not in itself and under all circumstances, but only in so far as the person possessing happiness is w o r t h y o f it. B u t the happiness o f rational beings, conditioned b y their virtue or worthiness to be happy, is the whole and complete object w h i c h pure practical reason w o u l d necessarily produce if it were in complete; control o f human action and 45

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/

4 5

Cf. K.d.r.V. B 828, w h e r e K a n t notes that 'the w h o l e business o f reason' in its pragmatic function 'consists i n uniting all the ends w h i c h are prescribed t o us b y our desires into the o n e single end, happiness, and i n c o o r d i n a t i n g the m e a n s for attaining it'. This is true e v e n o f the pre-critical Fragment (c. 1775) and the early Vorlesung (c. 1781).' Cf. b e l o w , p . 203 ff. 4 6

PURE PRACTICAL REASON AND THE ENDS^OF ACTION

93

/if it were in control of nature, on whose co-operation happiness 1 depends. T h e highest good, it is clear, contains more^ than our specific obliga­ tory ends. First, w e can be under obligation td do only what it is within our p o w e r to do, and the realization o f the highest good is not c o m ­ pletely within our power. For example, the summum bonum contains the perfection o f all men, whereas, Kant holds, each man can promote only his o w n perfection. Moreover, our duty o f promoting the highest g o o d through those elements which are within our power is not so much a duty o f producing this state o f affairs as rather o f having a maxim o f striving for it. Secondly, our o w n happiness, as an object o f hope, is an important element in the summum bonum, although it is not directly relevant to a doctrine o f duties. Y e t , while the production o f the highest g o o d is beyond our power, ethics, as a doctrine of duties, is " t h e system o f the ends o f pure practical reason," and our obligatory ends are, in a sense, abstractions from this system. 47

48

N o w the fact that our o w n happiness is included in the highest good, to w h i c h the hrst principle o f etlhcs'clirects our will, seems to give added urgency to Kant's argument that the connection between the first principle o f duty as such and the first principle o f ethics is a synthetic one. His v i e w that the principle o f duty 4s a formal one is directly opposed to any system o f moral philosophy which w o u l d base the moral law on man's natural desire for happiness. A t the same time he holds that happiness is an end not only o f reason in its prudential function but also o f pure practical reason. T h e happiness o f rational beings as such, ourselves included, is an element in the system of ends which the first principle o f ethical law commands us to promote. It is, therefore, o f utmost importance for Kant to clarify the relation between the first principle o f duty and the highest good, lest it be thought that reason needs the hope o f happiness contained in the highest good in order to assist it in determining choice. Accordingly, he insists that pure practical reason takes the highest g o o d as its end and makes it our duty to strive ^or it in every action, not through any need or lack on the side o f the motive, but rather, so to speak, f r o m the fulness o f the morally determined will, which seeks to manifest its disposition in 49

4 7

Cf. KJ.p.V., n o : 'For t o n e e d happiness, t o be w o r t h y o f it, and n o t to par­ ticipate in it is inconsistent w i t h the perfect w i l l o f a rational being, i f this being at the same time has all power'. . •' R e g a r d i n g these limitations o n our obligatory ends, cf. b e l o w , p. 176 ff. and p . 186 ff. 0

4 8

4 9

Cf. KJ.p.V., 104 and 109.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

94

producing an object adequate-to itself. He suggests an analogy between the moral will and God, W h o may be thought to create not from any natural need but rather from a moral need to manifest His perfec­ tion. So too, the moral will seeks to produce the highest good, not in order to gain anything, but because it needs -an object to strive for in its actions. In so far as our happiness is an element in the highest good, our moral will's regard for our happiness is an unselfish one: it requires happiness because impartial reason determines this as an object and not merely because, as the private will o f a finite being, it seeks the satis­ faction o f our mclinations. T h e fundamental thesis o f Kant^s moral philosophy does not require him to ignore man's happiness. It requires him only to assign happiness, along w i t h the other objects o f a rational will, to a secondary and derivative position. A n d it cannot fairly be charged that, within these limits, he fails to give due regard to the natural element in man's being. 50

51

50 61

Uberden Gemeinspruch, 279 note. Cf. KJ.p.V., 129-30.

CHAPTER VTI \

PERFECT A N D IMPERFECT

DUTY

It is sometimes said that Kant's ethics is o f a 'legalistic' character or that his account o f the moral life is too closely modelled upon the legal structure o f the State. If this observation is to be valid, it must take into account that which, Kant holds, is the proper subject-matter o f ethics. M a n y o f our duties are juridical duties: their principles are established in L a w and they are only 'mdirectly ethical'. It is only after analysing Kant's doctrine o f imperfect duties that w e can justly esti­ mate the character o f his ethics, as distinguished from his philosophy o f L a w ; for imperfect duties are 'direcdy ethical', and. Kant's ethics is primarily a study o f these duties. Although this is not to be taken as the essential principle o f distinction between the t w o parts o f moral philosophy, it should at least warn us to suspend judgment regarding the 'juridical' character o f Kant's ethics until w e have examined the kind o f duty proper to Tugendlehre. T h e distinction between perfect and imperfect duty seems to be one that Kant w o r k e d out gradually. T h e complex doctrine o f the Meta­ physik der Sitten stands in sharp contrast w i t h the simple and clear-cut distinction w h i c h he draws in the Vorlesung, his early lectures on ethics based on Baumgarten's texts. Since L a w is the system-of duties to which w e can be externally compelled and ethics the system o f duties to which only self-constraint is possible, the simplest and, so to speak, most economical distinction between perfect and imperfect duty would be to equate the first with juridical duty and the second w i t h ethical duty. This is, in fact, the distinction proposed in the Vorlesung. There it is said that external obligation is necessitation through the will o f another, whereas interior obligation is necessitation through one's uown will. Interior obligations or duties are said to be imperfect because one can­ not be compelled b y other m e n to fulfil them, and external.obligations perfect because one can be so compelled. 1

B u t the simplest w a y m a y not be able to account for all the relevant facts, and in the Grundlegung Kant is led to reject this cListinetion through his recognition that there are perfect duties to oneself. Having made the 1

Vorlesung, 39. 95

96

LAWS OF F R E E D O M

reservation that the division o f perfect and imperfect duties belongs properly to a metaphysic o f morals, he remarks that his understanding of perfect duty' is not that commonly adopted in the schools. 'Further, I understand here b y a perfect duty one w h i c h allows no exceptions in. the interests o f inclination, and so I recognise among perfect duties not only outer ones but also inner ones'. Since w e cannot be compelled by others to fulfil these perfect duties to ourselves, Kant's recognition of such duties clearly implies that his o w n principle o f division must differ from that put forward in the Vorksung; but as regards this prin­ ciple itself, the Grundlegung gives us little help. For a formal discussion of this division w e must, as he notes, await his metaphysic o f morals. The Metaphysik der Sitten, however, presents what may be yet an­ other concept o f imperfect duty. In the Grundlegung, as w e have seen, Kant discards the commonly accepted division between perfect and imperfect duty in favour o f a distinction according to which perfect duty permits no arbitrary exceptions or exceptions in favour o f the mclinations, and imperfect duty, presumably, permits such exceptions. In the Metaphysik der -Sitten Kant does not return to the traditional distinction in terms o f the possibility or impossibility o f external c o m ­ pulsion, but, it might be argued, neither does he w o r k out consistendy the implications o f the v i e w sketched in the Grundlegung. T h e Grundle­ gung and the Metaphysik der Sitten agree that imperfect duties consist in the adoption o f certain ends rather than in determinate actions and that they accordingly leave a 'latitude' between our aims and our ac­ tions in realization o f these aims—a latitude in which judgment must determine the action left unspecified b y the law. B u t whereas the Grundlegung implies that this latitude is a r o o m for arbitrary excep­ tions, the Metaphysik der Sitten argues, in such a w a y as to invite a rigoristic interpretation, that the latitude is only a permission to limit one maxim o f duty b y another. 2

But this difficult question o f whether the weight o f evidence in the later w o r k favours a rigoristic v i e w o f imperfect duty will be taken up in due course. Whatever the nature o f the latitude present in imperfect 2

Gr., 421 n. In the examples o f duties f o l l o w i n g the 'universal l a w o f nature' formula, w e find that m a x i m s contrary ,te~pirfect duties are such as cannot e v e n be conceived w i t h o u t contradiction as universal laws o f nature, whereas m a x i m s contrary to imperfect duties can b e conceived as laws o f nature but cannot b e so willed. Gr., 423. In applying the formula o f h u m a n i t y as an end-in-itself, w e find that treating persons as mere means t o our subjective ends involves violation o f perfect duty, whereas failure to adopt m a x i m s o f treating persons positively as ends violates imperfect duty. Gr., 430.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

97

duty may be, it is the nature o f the principles underlying juridical and ethical laws respectively that permits a latitude o f any sort in our observance o f ethical laws, and the nature o f these principles is, accord­ ingly, the more basic question. \ Since w e must examine separately the different aspects o f the pro­ blem, a distinction should be drawn between the matter and the form o f obligation, i.e. between the duty itself, that t o which w e are obli­ gated {Pflicht, ojflciutn) and^the moral necessitation to this duty (Verpflichtung, obligatio). A s for Kant's terminology, ' w i d e obligation' and 'imperfect obligation' are synonymous, as are the corresponding set o f terms, 'strict or narrow obligation' and 'perfect obligation'. E x ­ plaining his use o f the terms 'perfect and imperfect' with reference to the form o f obligation, Kant tells us that the laws are, respectively, stride and 'late* determining. His further usage o f Latin terms c o n ­ firms this identification. W h e n the obligation is perfect {obligatio perfecta) the law obliges stricdy (is stride obligatts): w h e n the obligation is imperfect the law is not o f narrow but only o f w i d e obligation (is late obligans). Less fiequendy, Kant uses 'non-essential or contingent' as synonymous with 'imperfect' duty, and 'necessary' as synonymous w i t h 'perfect' duty. Although he seems more often t o use the terms 'strict' and 'wide' with reference to the obligation and 'perfect' and 'imperfect' with reference to the duty, any term w h i c h can be used t o describe a duty can, apparendy, also be used to describe the correspond­ ing obligation. 1

3

4.

5

From Kant's recognition o f perfect duties t o oneself it is clear that strict obligation is not identical with legal obligation. T h e terms 'strict and w i d e ' obligation, o n the one hand, and 'legal and ethical' obligation, on the other hand, refer t o different things. T h e first pair o f terms refers to the type o f necessity itself: the second, t o the actively necessitating or constraining power. It is not the possible source o f constraint that distinguishes a perfect duty from a n imperfect d u t y , ' but rather the nature o f the l a w itself and the principle from which it is derived. Since, for the purposes o f this chapter, laws enjoining per- , 8

H.N.(23), 393. According t o this passage, s y n o n y m o u s terms for perfect and

imperfect duty are 'due* duty (schuldigePflicht) and 'meritorious' duty (verdienst-

liche Pflicht). Ibid., 394. 4 8

K.d.p.V., 159. This passage distinguishes b e t w e e n a l a w that is 'really o b l i g a ­ tory' and a l a w that furnishes, m e r e l y a principle o f obligation, i.e. a ground o f obligation, w h i c h is n o t always sufficient actually t o oblige. (Cf. M.d.S., 224.) O n the basis for asserting that 'necessary or essential' and 'contingent' correspond w i t h 'strict' and 'wide' respectively, cf. b e l o w , p . 102 ff.

98

LAWS OF FREEDOM

feet duties to oneself can be considered as o f the same nature as juridical laws, w e can discuss the distinction between strict and wide obligation in terms o f the obligation accompanying juridical and ethical laws respectively, provided w e keep in mind the fact that the former prin­ ciples extend beyond juridical laws in the proper sense o f the term, to include the 'inner ius' comprising perfect duties to oneself. The fact that juridical laws are o f strict obligation and ethical laws of wide obligation follows, Kant tells us, from the fact that juridical laws are laws for actions whereas ethical laws are laws for the maxims of actions. If the law has to do in a determinate and immediate w a y with actions, specifying the manner and extent o f the action, then the law obliges strictly. If, on the other hand, the law commands immediately only that w e have certain maxims o f action, this is a sign that it leaves a latitude to judgment in our observance o f the l a w . A l a w carries with it strict obligation* Kant maintains, i f it commands precise actions and leaves us no choice regarding (a) making exceptions to the l a w or (b) determining the manner and extent o f our actions in fulfilment o f the law. Conversely, i f the l a w leaves the subject's judgment free to make exceptions to the l a w and to determine the w a y in which and the extent to which he will act, then the law is o f wide obligation. Ethical laws refer directly and immediately to our maxims and only indirectly and mediately to our actions 'in a general w a y ' , leaving it to o ur judgment to decide through what action w e shall observe the l a w . 6

7

8

f

9

The distinction which Kant has in mind is that between a law c o m ­ manding (or prohibiting) an action and a l a w prescribing the pursuit o f an end; and if w e g o back to the principle from which laws for actions are derived, w e can see at once w h y these laws cannot leave the subject free to decide when, h o w , and to w h a t extent he will observe the law. Laws for actions have to do only with the form o f our actions in ab­ straction from our ends. T h e y are applications o f the first principle o f all duty, which merely states the form o f lawfulness as such: so act that your maxim could become a universal law. Laws which determine precisely the action which is morally necessary or impossible do so * O n perfect duties toward oneself, VLTI. A l t h o u g h the separation o f strict from legal obligation is m o s t o b v i o u s in the case o f perfect duties to oneself, the t w o are sometimes separated in the case o f duties toward others. For example, obligation according to principles o f justice w h i c h cannot be e m b o d i e d in juridical laws (i.e. matters o f ' e q u i v o c a l right') s e e m t o be o f strict obligation. Cf. the

discussion o f equity (ius late dictum) in Vorlesung, 42. ''M.d.S., 390. H.N.(23), 394Ibid., 391, and M.d.S., 390. 8

9

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

99

because just this action or omission is necessary in order to harmonize w i t h universal law. T h e l a w cannot, therefore, leave the subject free to determine what action he will perform or whether he will act at all; for in so doing it w o u l d leave h im free to do what is never morally permissible, i.e. to act on a maxim which could not serve as universal law. A s Kant puts it forcefully: since laws for actions express the mini­ m u m in an action that is necessary to make the action lawful, nothing can be subtracted from what they specify as duty—they 'cannot be 'indulgent' regarding their appHcation. T h e y can permit no latitude for choice because there is, here, no area o f the morally mdifferent in which choice might be allowed free play. 10

Preparing the ground for the a^tinction between strict and w i d e obligation, Kant argues that whereas i«s gives laws for actions, ethics gives laws only for the rnaxims o f actions. Since the formal principle o f action—whether it be regarded as the law o f our o w n will or as the law o f will as such—abstracts from our ends, the*laws obtained b y applying it cannot make it our duty to adopt maxims o f promoting certain ends. T h e formal principle o f action regards our material maxims as given and requires only that w e reject such o f them as could not become universal law. ' T h e maxims', K a n t explains, 'are here regarded as such subjective principles as merely qualify for giving universal law, which is only a negative principle, n o t to conflict with law as such'. ' T h e maxims o f action can be arbitrary and come only under the limiting condition o f their capacity for giving universal law, as the formal principle o f a c t i o n ' . A

11

O n the other hand, i f the duty in question is n o t a specific action but rather the adoption o f an end, the law has to d o w i t h the matter o f choice rather than w i t h the form o f the a c t i o n . It commands, not that w e reject given maxims o f action w h i c h are o f a form inconsistent with universal law, but rather that w e have a m a x i m o f promoting a 12

1 0

H.N.(2 ), 394M.d.S., 389. A l t h o u g h positive laws c o m m a n d , as w e l l as prohibit, certainactions, the principle o f all laws for actions is essentially a negative and restrictive principle. Hence, Kant notes, ethical laws should n o t be called 'laws' i n the strict sense, since they are 'not based only upon the formal condition o f all duty, namely freedom according t o universal laws w h i c h formal condition alone is necessary'. H.N.(23), 391. T h e lawfulness o f actions is determined i n abstraction from ends, and only principles relating t o actions and their form are unconditioned. (Ibid., 380.) Hence only such principles are properly called 'laws', i.e. 'principles o f the precise determination o f actions according to their quality and measure'. Principals w h i c h d o n o t necessitate strictly should, rather, be called 'admonitions'. Cf. also 3

1 1

1 2

?

Ibid.,2S9.

F

LAWS OF FREEDOM

100

certain end. Our actions, as means to this end, are o f course subject to the formal principle o f action. B u t it is not the ethical l a w that pre­ scribes this limiting condition. T h e ethical law prescribes, immediately, only the adoption of a maxim o f promoting a certain end. A n d because the ethical law is not merely the negative principle o f lawfulness as such, to make an exception to an ethical law (i.e. to do nothing, in given, circumstances, toward the obligatory end) is not eo ipso to act w r o n g l y . Since duty here consists in adopting a maxim, a violation o f duty must be on the same level, so to speak: it must also consist in adopting a maxim—a maxim of mdifferenc'e to the obligatory end. Many terms, such as 'duty o f virtue' and 'wide obligation', w h i c h seem precise and clear-cut in the abstract, become flexible in their appli­ cation. Hence it is not surprising to find that there are, so to speak, degrees o f wideness in w i d e obligation. ' T h e wider the duty', Kant asserts, 'the more imperfect, therefore, is the obligation o f m e n to the action.' O u r obligation to the action is a mediate one, through our obligation to have a maxim o f promoting an end. B u t i f the m a x i m in question is one o f benevolence to our parents, w e may have less latitude for exceptions and for determining the extent to w h i c h w e should satisfy their needs than w h e n the m a x i m is one o f benevolence to men in general. So long as the m a x i m is really one of benevolence— so long, that is to say, as the matter is not one o f right—our obligation is wide. But in some cases the obligation will approach more closely to' strict obligation than in others. W i d e obligation, then, results in the latitude which characterizes imperfect duties, and it is this latitude w h i c h essentially distinguishes them from imperfect duties. T o understand the nature o f the latitude which imperfect duty permits, w e should first consider the type o f excep­ tions permitted and excluded b y laws enjoining rterfect duties. So far as laws enjoining perfect duties are concerned, Kant is some­ times content to state that these laws admit o f no exceptions. In at least one instance he seems prepared to defend this unqualified state­ ment in its literal f o r m . B u t o n the w h o l e he intends it to be supple­ mented b y an explanation to the effect that such laws do not admit the moral possibility o f arbitrary exceptions^or exceptions made on merely subjective grounds. If a l a w determines an action precisely, he tells us, 'there remains to us no further choice, either for exceptions, if the law 13

)

14

18

MJ.S. 390. i.e. in his essay Uber ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu liigen, VIII, 423 ff. t

14

O n Kant's attitude toward lying, cf. b e l o w , p . 150 ff.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DU^Y

101

is valid in its universality', or for determining what and h o w much w c shall do in observing the l a w . This suggests that the l a w may admit certain necessary exceptions or that it may not be applicable under all conditions. Kant does not wish, in fact, to state his position in quite these terms. He criticizes the practice, c o m m o n in State law, of enacting a prohibition and then listing exceptions to it or conditions under which it does not apply. W h a t the legislator should do, he suggests, is to in­ clude a permissive law within the prohibitive law, as a limitation upon the prohibition. His objection to listing exceptions to a prohibition is that this practice indicates that the permissions are given haphazardly or added to the law as particular cases come up. T h e y ought, rather, to be determined according to a principle and so included within the law itself. For i f the legislator first enacts an unqualified prohibition and then permits exceptions to it, the prohibition was merely general and not truly universal, i.e. it was valid on the whole but not in every case. A n d mere generality is contrary to the nature o f l a w itself. T o take a crude example, the legislator ought not to formulate a l a w : thou shalt not kill, and then add that this law does not apply to soldiers in time o f war, public executioners, etc. He ought rather to formulate the l a w with quasi-mathematical precision as a prohibition against murder, defining murder in such a w a y as to make the concept inapplicable to morally permissible killing. In this w a y the prohibition will be valid for everyone, including soldiers in time o f war, executioners, etc. 1 5

16

Concrete examples o f this principle in operation will be found within the discussions o f specific ethical duties o f omission. O n e example, Kant's handling' o f suicide, will serve here to clarify the point and to show its significance regarding the exceptions w h i c h imperfect duty permits. In a metaphysic o f morals, it will be recalled, w e are dealing only with the duties o f 'men considered merely as men', and on this level w e find a general prohibition against suicide. Suicide is a vice, self-murder, because in abstraction from, the contingent ckcumstances and conditions in which men may find themselves w e can assume that the motive for suicide is one o f self-love. B u t w h e n w e descend into casuistry, admitting empirical knowledge o f these circumstances, w e 1 5

H.N.(23), 394. Italics m i n e . Cf. Zum ewigen Frieden, 347 n . A prohibitive a n d a permissive law, Kant explains, cannot have the same object regarded under the same aspect; if they did, they w o u l d contradict each other—-the o n e giving us a m o r a l tide t o d o w h a t the other makes morally impossible. But i f the prohibition is n o t universally valid, the permissive l a w included w i t h i n it does not have the same object as the prohibi­ tion. Cf. also H.N.(23), 384 and M.d.S., 223. 1 6

102

LAWS OF FREEDOM

find exceptions to the general prohibition, cases in which suicide would not be the vice o f self-murder. Under certain conditions a man may commit suicide because he thinks that his "ground o f obligation not to destroy himself is in conflict w i t h a stronger ground o f obligation (e.g. of benevolence to others). Such cases must be given casuistical treatment to determine which ground o f obligation is stronger and hence really obligatory. If the opposing ground o f obligation turns out to be stronger, then the man has a moral title to kill himself because he has an mdirect duty to do so. T h e prohibition against suicide permits no arbitrary exceptions, but w h e n w e descend into contingent circum­ stances it does admit morally necessary exceptions. 17

It is important, therefore, to distinguish between the formal principle ' of action and the specific laws derived from this principle. T h e formal principle o f duty permits absolutely n o exceptions. Specific laws de­ rived from the formal principle o f action, Kant argues, also permit no exceptions when once they have been properly formulated. But this is because they already contain all the necessary exceptions to the pro­ hibition against a certain type o f action, so that any further exceptions will be arbitrary ones. N o w if, in the case o f perfect duty, w e find necessary exceptions to the general prohibition when w e admit empirical knowledge o f men's circumstances and conditions, w e should expect that the latitude present in imperfect duty implies that, w h e n w e admit such empirical k n o w ­ ledge, the duty does permit arbitrary exceptions. In view o f Kant's treatment o f perfect duty w e should expect, in other words, that in order to distinguish perfect from imperfect duty it w o u l d not be sufficient to say that the latitude o f imperfect duty allows us to refuse, in given circumstances, to act on a m a x i m o f benevolence toward men in general on the ground that our duty here and n o w is, rather, to help our parents. Perfect duty, too, admits the possibility o f this sort o f exception. T o make the necessary distinction w e should have to say that w e can refuse, in given circumstances, to act on a maxim o f bene­ volence toward men in general in the absence o f any opposing claim and merely, as the Grundlegung indicates, on subjective grounds. A n early passage in the Metaphysik der Sitten, where Kant contrasts the precision at which Rechtslehre aimsj^ith the wide duties which are the proper subject-matter o f Tugendlehre, seems to imply such an arbitrary element in imperfect duty. Because o f the nature o f juridical laws, he points out, Rechtslehre aims at determining with a precision " Cf. below, p. 135 ff.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

103

Analogous to mathematical exactitude what is due to each subject of the /law. D u t y according to ethical law, on the other hand, consists only 'in the adoption o f ends or purposes. N o w the adoption o f an end is not merely an idle wish. It must manifest itself in action toward the end, and there is no great harm in referring to these actions as 'ethical duties', as Kant occasionally does. B u t it is important to remember that, stricdy speaking, duty according to ethical laws does not consist in these actions but rather in having maxims o f promoting certain ends. Hence Kant concludes that trie precision with which Rechtslehre deter­ mines our duties cannot be expected in Tugendlehre, 'which cannot deny a certain r o o m for exceptions (latitudinem)', 18

19

N o w although Rechtslehre may aim at determining exacdy what is due each subject o f the law, this aim is not achieved in the meta-* physical first principles o f L a w nor even in positive laws, but'rather in a court's decision o f right in particular cases. A n d in both the making o f positive l a w and its final appHcation Kant allows Hberal scope for the empirical conditions o f a given time and p l a c e . His denial that there is r o o m for casuistry in the appHcation of laws enjoining perfect duty is qualified b y his recognition'that this is true only w h e n the l a w has been so precisely formulated as to include within it all the neces­ sary exceptions to a general prohibition. In fact, each o f his discussions o f perfect duty toward oneself is followed by casuistical questions. Once the law has been properly formulated it remains for judgment only to subsume the action under the law, and from this there follows the 'verdict' that the act is contrary to duty. B u t there is room for casuistry between the loosely formulated general prohibition and the precisely formulated universal prohibition. In matters o f Law, the function which the j u d g e must at times fulfil is similar to this form o f casuistry: in applying the law he must interpret it and so formulate it with greater precision. ; 20

If it is not Rechtslehre that determines precisely the actions necessary according to juridical laws, the contrast between juridical and ethical laws should be drawn, not in terms o f the metaphysical first principles 18

Cf. M.d.S., 220.

1 9

Ibid., 233; cf. also 411. A t times, as in H.N.(23), 389,Kant speaks as ifjuridical laws left nothing whatsoever t o the subject's free choice, w h i c h is n o t strictly true. T h e l a w cannot extend t o every detail o f an action, nor is there a n y reason w h y it should, since m a n y aspects o f the action are quite irrelevant t o right. For'a brief summary o f s o m e points i n w h i c h Kant recognized the empirical limitations to w h i c h positive l a w is subject, cf.; H . J. P a t o n : The Categorical 2 0

Imperative, p. 194, n. 2.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

104

of Law and ethics, but rather in terms o f a court applying juridical laws and our o w n judgment applying ethical laws. The distinction asserted: that juridical duty consists in determinate actions whereas ethical duty consists only in having certain maxims o f action, must remain at this level. A n d it does not remain in full force if an arbitrary decision not to act, here and now, or to do less than one could is a v i o ­ lation o f duty according to ethical law. If ethics lacks the precision o f Law, it is because ethical laws leave r o o m , between the obligatory maxim and our action upon it, for a really arbitrary, subjective factor. So far Kant seems to be reasserting the v i e w o f the Grundlegung. B u t his formal discussion o f imperfect duty could be taken as a reversal o f this position. For while he there admits a latitude for free choice in the observance o f ethical laws, he adds that under a wide duty w e are not to understand a permission to make exceptions to the maxims o f actions but only a permission to limit one m a x i m o f duty by another, e.g. love o f mankind in general b y love o f one's parents. N o w i f w e i interpret 'exceptions to the maxims o f actions' as arbitrary decisions not to act, here and now, on a maxim o f benevolence, this assertion would deny an arbitrary element in the latitude, at least so far as the most important aspects of the latitude are concerned. T h e law w o u l d still, presumably, leave us free to decide what means w e should use to realize the e n d . But even though the ethical l a w could not specifyh o w much w e should do, it w o u l d not leave choice really free to decide whether to act or h o w much to do. T h e latitude w o u l d be present only because moral philosophy cannot admit sufficient empirical knowledge of the situation in. which w e find ourselves, and hence cannot k n o w 21

22

23

21 2 2

M.d.S., 390.

S o m e support for this rigoristic interpretation could be drawn from the confused passage in H.N. (23), 394. H a v i n g asserted that perfect duty admits n o exception if the l a w is valid in its universality (thereby seeming to i m p l y that imperfect duty does admit exceptions), Kant continues w i t h the statement that under ethical laws it is left to the subject's j u d g m e n t 'freely t o determine the w a y in which and the extent to w h i c h the c o m m a n d should b e carried out, and it is only necessary for us to d o as m u c h as is possible under the g i v e n circumstances'. Obviously, w e could n o t d o m o r e than is possible under the g i v e n circumstances; but the question is whether w e need always d o as m u c h as is possible. If so, h o w can j u d g m e n t 'freely' determine the extent t o w h i c h the c o m m a n d is to be carried out? Is this n o t already determined b y the l a w ^ m the sense that, o n c e the empirical factors are brought into relation w i t h the l a w , it is n o longer left ^ d e t e r m i n a t e h o w m u c h the the subject must do ? O u r choice o f means to the end is subject, n o t t o moral rules (except for the formal principle o f action), but rather to rules o f skill and prudence. Cf. M.d.S., 433 n. If the end can be promoted effectively b y t n o r e than o n e means w e are, presumably, free t o follow our inclinations in the matter. 2 3

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

/

IOS

*

/ h o w much w e are capable o f doing toward the end and whether an [ opposing ground o f obligation is present which over-rides the necessity / o f acting; toward the end here and n o w or limits the extent to which w e must act. 5 Even this rigoristic v i e w does not deny that there is a place in the moral life for choice that is, in a sense, arbitrary. It must allow for Kant's principle that w e are free to pursue our o w n happiness, subject to the formal principle o f action, and this itself involves a latitude which is arbitrary in relation to morality. Since Kant's example is in terms o f benevolence, let us continue with this illustration. O u r moral title to pursue our o w n happiness, Kant argues, means that w e have no obli­ gation to sacrifice 'our true needs', those satisfactions which are essential to our happiness, in order to promote the well-being o f others; indeed, on the level o f men as such, a maxim o f self-sacrifice would contradict itself were it made universal l a w . A n d as for what constitutes our true needs, this depends largely on 'our o w n w a y of feeling'. Because happi­ ness is an ^determinate concept w h i c h the individu4 must fill with content on the basis o f his o w n inclinations, there must be an arbitrary element in our decision as to what subjective ends w e shall adopt. W h a t the rigoristic view does imply is that w h e n w e can, without prejudice to our true needs, afford help to> someone else, w e should be violating our duty b y arbitrarily deriding not to help this person or to do less for him than w e are capable o f d o i n g . T h e sphere from which this v i e w excludes arbitrary choice is precisely the sphere o f our i m ­ perfect duty o f benevolence, the field o f activity that remains after the satisfaction o f our o w n true needs. B u t it is not at allmecessary to interpret the passage in question in this rigoristic sense. W h e n Kant says that a wide duty is not 'a permission to make exceptions to the m a x i m o f actions', the 'exceptions' m a y mean a relmqmshing o f the maxims o f promoting obligatory ends, rather than a mere refusal to act, here and n o w , in pursuit o f such an end. Hence the text w o u l d mean simply that w e are not allowed to give up our maxim o f benevolence toward men in general; even though our special obligation o f supporting a sick or aged parent may curtail sharply our obligation to promote the well-being o f men in general, w e cannot use it as an excuse for never doing an act o f kindness toward ™ M.d.S., 3932 4

25

2 5

Ibid., 390. According to this text, the adoption o f a maximx o f indifference, i.e. a principle o f not observing the duty, w o u l d be a violation.of imperfect duty w h i c h is a vice. A minimal practice o f m e virtue w o u l d be a violation o f imperfect duty w h i c h is merely lack o f moral w o r t h or moral weakness.

106

LAWS OF FREEDOM

anyone else. In more general terms, the exception which constitutes a violation of imperfect duty w o u l d be, not an arbitrary refusal to act, here and now, in pursuit o f an obligatory end, but rather (i) the adop­ tion of a maxim of indifference toward that end or (2) a policy o f minimal and grudging action toward that end. As Kant points out, there is a hmitation on the latitude which imperfect duty permits. The necessitation present in every duty concerns, in imperfect duty, only our intentions or maxims, and a latitude is left for choice, 'pro­ vided only that it [the latitude] does not specifically change the inten­ tion and the principle o f this intention'. A n d this w o u l d seem to indicate that the exceptions which w e are not permitted to make are exceptions in the order o f our intentions rather than in our actions aimed at realizing these intentions. 26

j

The presence o f some hesitation and confusion in Kant's assertions regarding the latitude o f imperfect duty cannot be denied. This state­ ment, in the Nachlass, about its being necessary only to do the maxi­ mum possible in any given situation indicates that he at least entertained the rigoristic v i e w o f imperfect duty. B u t the Nachlass (which itself is not free from confusion on the subject) cannot be taken as Kant's definitive position, and in support o f the non-rigoristic v i e w w e find passages in the Metaphysik der Sitten which favour an arbitrary element in imperfect duty. Equally important, w e find, as I shall attempt to show, that the implications o f the rigoristic v i e w clash w i t h certain basic principles which Kant has adopted in his ethics. It might be thought that his actual handling o f our imperfect duties to promote our o w n perfection and the happiness o f other men w o u l d resolve the question. Unfortunately, it does not. T h e arbitrary element w o u l d show itself in judgment's final application o f ethical laws, while Kant's discussion remains on the most general level, explaining w h y our abstract notions o f perfection and happiness must be given their content on the basis o f our given capacities and mclinations. In v i e w o f all this, the basis for a decision as to w h i c h interpretation o f the latitude is, even if not assuredly Kant's view, more in keeping w i t h his principles can best be provided b y a clear exposition o f the alternatives and their implications. What is really at stake in this question o f latitude is whether the subjective element which prevents the l a w from deterinining actions escapes the law merely b y accident, as it were, or essentially and b y its very nature. T h e rigoristic v i e w w o u l d maintain that the reason w h y 2 8

H.N.(23), 391-.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

107

phics cannot give laws for actions is that the metaphysical first prin(ciples o f virtue cannot admit empirical knowledge o f the situation in which w e are deliberating about action in pursuit o f an obligatory end. The opposite view would maintain that, even gjiven unlimited empirical knowledge, w e could still not say that a man's duty consists in acting to a certain extent toward an obligatory end because there still remains a subjective factor which cannot be brought under an objective rule. Kant's assertion: 'Ethics does not give a law for actions (Jus does that), but only for the maxims o f actions' means, according to this view, that no matter h o w much empirical knowledge w e admit, w e still cannot say that a man's duty consists in a definite action, because he would not violate his duty in deciding not to act or to do less than he might do. It might be suggested that this non-rigoristic v i e w o f the latitude' is an invitation to laxity in our fulfilment o f imperfect duties'. B u t this suggestion seems to me to confuse t w o essentially different con­ siderations : that an imperfect duty may, o f its very nature, admit arbitrary exceptions, and that the more virtuous man will tend to make fewer exceptions and, on the whole, to do more rather than less. '. . . the closer man brings the maxim o f fulfilling this [imperfect] duty to narrow duty or to L a w (in his attitude o f will), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action'. O n e whose moral attitude of will is developed to only a slight degree will be content w i t h an occasional act o f e.g. benevolence; the more virtuous man will practice bene­ volence to a greater extent. B u t if an imperfect duty is o f such a nature as to permit arbitrary exceptions, the virtuous man can still, without prejudice to his virtue, refuse on merely subjective. grounds a parti­ cular claim upon his. benevolence. Such a refusal w o u l d not be moral weakness and a violation o f imperfect duty. O n the contrary, it w o u l d be a part o f his practice o f virtue, and his benevolent actions would be no less perfect because they proceed from an attitude o f will which does not regard choice as bound, on every occasion, to do the maximum which is morally possible. 1

27

O n the other hand, the rigoristic v i e w o f imperfect duty would seem to open the door to that attitude which Kant has condemned as 'fan-, tastic virtue'. This view regards us as bound to do the maximum pos­ sible under given circumstances toward the obligatory end and con­ siders a failure to do so, not indeed a vice, hut at least a lack o f moral worth and a violation o f imperfect duty. It regards choice-as bound on every side b y duty and reduces judgment's latitude, for the most part, n

M.d.S., 390.

LAWS OF FREEDOM

io8

to a weighing o f one ground o f obligation against another. N o w Kant himself warns us that our practice o f virtue is only an approximation to perfection, which remains an ideal, and that to regard ourselves as bound to realize this ideal here and n o w introduces a quality o f the 'fantastic' into our principles. The ideal o f perfection may, indeed, consist in doing the maximum possible to us on every occasion; but is not the man w h o holds himself bound to realize this ideal here and n o w one w h o , as Kant put it, 'strews all his steps w i t h duties, as with man traps'? 28

29

Whatever Kant's view on this fundamental issue m a y be, his in­ formal remarks concerning the virtues contrary to those vices which are violations o f perfect duties toward oneself throw important side­ lights on the latitude present in imperfect duty. W h i l e w e are under strict obligation to avoid the vices o f lying, intemperance, avarice, etc., cultivation o f the contrary virtues o f truthfulness, moderation and liberality belongs to the imperfect duty o f promoting our moral per­ fection, which consists in our possession o f all the virtues necessary to a morally g o o d life. Kant distinguishes three relations in w h i c h actions may stand to the moral l a w . Certain actions are morally impossible or forbidden b y the law; others are morally necessary or commanded b y the l a w ; and still others are morally permissible in so far as the law neither commands nor prohibits them. Morally impossible actions are violations o f right— either the rights o f other men or 'the right o f humanity in our o w n person'. Morally necessary actions are those which can be required by right: in other words such actions as, presupposing some juridical act on the part o f another, are necessary in order to maintain outer free­ dom. But apart from laws prohibiting morally impossible actions and prescribing morally necessary ones, there are only ethical laws en­ joining maxims o f promoting certain ends. T h e area o f morally per­ missible actions left over from juridical and quasi-juridical laws is, in a sense, not without its l a w ; for w e must do something toward the ends enjoined b y ethical laws. Y e t this area is really one o f morally ^differ­ ent actions, since no specific action is made necessary b y ethical l a w s . Between our m a x i m o f e.g. temperanc^pr truthfulness and our action upon this maxim, there is a latitude for prudential judgment to deter3 0

31

2 8

M.d.S., 453 n .

3 0

M.d.S., 223.

3 1

2 9

O n 'fantastic virtue' cf. above, p. 74.

W h e n Kant denies, in Religion, 23, that there are morally indifferent actions he is referring, n o t to the objective relation o f actions t o the law, but rather t o the moral attitude o f will o f the acting subject.

PERFECT AND IMPERFECT DUTY

109

mine what constitutes a temperate or truthful action for us under these circumstances. / T h e role w h i c h prudence plays in determining actions according to maxims o f virtue is brought out in Kant's attack o n the Aristotelian principle that virtue lies in the mean between t w o extremes. This prin­ ciple, Kant argues, does not serve to differentiate vice from virtue, as it is intended to do, since the distinction between vice and virtue is to be found in our maxims themselves and not in the degree to which w e act on our principles. T h e dictum: 'one ought not to do too much or too little' has its proper place in the deliberation w h i c h must take place w h e n a m a x i m o f virtue is to be embodied in action; for in the latitude between the m a x i m and the action one can do too much or too little. B u t here the dictum, while indeed true, is useless, since the mean must be determined b y prudential judgment and not b y moral laws. W h e n w e are trying to decide h o w to act on our m a x i m o f truthfulness w e must ask whether w e should, under the circumstances, say all that w e k n o w or believe about the subject. That w e should reveal neither too much nor too little is self-evident; but it is experience and not morality that will teach us the mean between excess and default. T h e moralist cannot determine b y a priori rules the mean between frankness and reticence, 'for both duties o f virtue have a latitude in the appH­ cation, and what is to be done can be discerned only by judgment according to rules o f prudence or pragmatic rules, not according to moraHty or moral rules'. 32

S3

T h e role assigned to prudential judgment in our observance o f ethical laws is one important aspect o f their latitude. Equally important are Kant's remarks regarding the free play which the mclinations may have in this type o f duty. A m o n g his problems in casuistry w e find the question: w h e n is the Hmitation o f a wide obHgation to be considered a 'purism' or 'pedantry' in our observance o f dirty, and a free play to be allowed our animal inclinations, even though w e thereby expose, ourselves to the risk o f transgressing, the moral l a w ? O u r perfect duty toward ourselves, Kant holds, excludes only that exercise p f the in­ clinations w h i c h is actually vice. O u r imperfect duty o f practising the contrary virtue consists in the adoption o f a. m a x i m o f virtue and leaves it to our j u d g m e n t to determine virtuous actions in accordance with this m a x i m . Generally speaking, Kant suggests, this virtuous maxim'restricts the play o f our mclinations more narrowly than docs the l a w prohibiting vice, and requires that the exercise o f the mclina3 4

& MAS., 404,

**Ibid., 433 n.

^ Ibid., 426.

LAWS

110

OF

FREEDOM

tions should not only not extend to vice but should also not occasion the danger o f vice. In other w o r d s , j u d g m e n t should be guided b y the general principle that w e ought to deny ourselves certain satisfactions which are in themselves innocent; for i f w e m a k e it our principle t o give free rein to the inclinations and check t h e m only at the brink o f vice, there is danger that at this point the inclinations will have gathered such impetus as to escape the control o f reason arid carry lis o h to a violation o f perfect duty. A s a rule, the practice o f virtue excludes not only vice but also a policy o f brinkmanship w i t h regard to vice. B u t , Kant suggests, there are times w h e n a rigid adherence to this principle o f containing the inclinations within safe limits w o u l d be m o r a l 'pedantry'. T h e r e are times w h e n the advantages to be gained b y allowing free play to the mclinations m a y counterbalance the danger that the mclinations, exercised to this extent, m a y lead o n to vice. W h e n brinkmanship in the exercise o f our inclinations is in question, it would seem that some opposing moral consideration is required t o release us from the obligation o f containing t h e m within safe limits. For example, in the question o f whether a use o f w i n e w h i c h borders on intoxication is permissible, or w h e t h e r w e have a moral title to attend a banquet w h i c h is likely to turn into an o r g y , K a n t points out that the dangers i n v o l v e d are to be w e i g h e d against considerations that the qualities p r o m o t e d b y the free use o f w i n e and b y the banquet— lively conversation, candour and sociability—are a m o n g the virtues o f social intercourse, w h i c h w e have an obligation to c u l t i v a t e . In a further casuistical question o f this t y p e he suggests that a too narrow restriction o f an animal impulse m a y itself b e the occasion o f v i c e . But, it should be noted, the question o f o u r m o r a l title to incur the danger o f vice is fundamentally different f r o m that o f our moral title not to do the m a x i m u m possible o n e v e r y occasion toward our obligatory ends. Kant's position that w e are morally entitled to expose ourselves to the risk o f vice only i f w e h a v e g o o d reason, o n moral grounds, for d o i n g so does n o t o f itself i m p l y that w e can refuse to d o the m a x i m u m possible t o w a r d p r o m o t i n g o u r obligatory ends o n l y w h e n some opposing ground o f obligation exists. 35

36

If the Grundlegung tends to neglectjhje role o f j u d g m e n t in moral action, the Metaphysik der Sitten clearly counteracts this tendency. E v e n w i t h regard to perfect duties j u d g m e n t has an essential function t o perform, w h e n these duties are n o t matters o f strict right. For although a l a w enjoining perfect duty, w h e n it is precisely formulated, admits MAS., 428. « Ibid., 426. 36

8

PERFECT A N D IMPERFECT

DUTY

III

o f n o exceptions, j u d g m e n t must determine whether or not this par­ ticular case falls under the prohibitive law. In the application o f ethical laws the role o f j u d g m e n t becomes, as it were, creative. M o r a l p h i l o ­ sophy tells us only to promote our obligatdry ends and to do so through actions w h i c h are not contrary to the formal principle o f action. From this point on it is for j u d g m e n t to deterarine w h e r e our duty lies and, w i t h the help o f principles o f skill and prudence, h o w to fulfil the d u t y . ^ 37

So far as the latitude. present in imperfect duty is concerned, the Metaphysik der Sitten seems, in summary, to be o p e n to t w o interpre­ tations : the rigoristic v i e w that w e violate an imperfect duty w h e n , in the absence o f any opposing ground o f obligation, w e do less than w e couJcTtoward the obligatory end, and the v i e w that imperfect duty o f ' its nature admits the possibility o f an arbitrary and subjective choice not to act t o w a r d the end in this particular situation or to do less than w e m i g h t do. Just because the first o f these v i e w s is rigoristic, it is likely to be considered the more 'Kantian'. B u t the second v i e w is in n o w a y inconsistent w i t h the high;standards o f Kant's moral p h i l o ­ sophy. A t the same time, it maintains the sharp and radical distinction between perfect and imperfect duty on w h i c h K a n t insists and allows full scope for the spontaneity w h i c h he regards as essential to a virtuous attitude o f w i l l and in recognition o f w h i c h he condemns 'fantastic virtue'. T h e virtuous man, K a n t insists, recognizes a field o f action w h i c h is neither c o m m a n d e d nor prohibited b y moral l a w s . T h e p r o b l e m o f the latitude in imperfect duty is the question o f whether this r o o m for arbitrary choice is, limited to the morally irrelevant details o f action and to actions w h i c h are excluded from the sphere, o f imperfect duty or whether it enters into our observance o f ethical laws themselves. N o determinate action is made necessary b y ethical l a w s . B u t is this o n l y because an ethical l a w m a y , in a concrete situation, c o m e into conflict w i t h another ground o f obligation? O r is it because these laws leaver o o m for a subjective, arbitrary element in moral action w h i c h , o f its nature, cannot be b r o u g h t under objective rules ? A c c o r d i n g to the first alternative Kant's stress o n the free play o f the mclinations in the field o f the morally permissible seems out o f proportion to its practical 38

x

3 7

A r o u g h parallel m i g h t b e suggested b e t w e e n the functions, o f j u d g m e n t in d e t e r m i n i n g perfect and i m p e r f e c t duties and 'determinant' and 'reflective' j u d g m e n t as described in K.d. 17., 179 ff. ' M . i . S . , 409. a8

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LAWS

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FREEDOM

consequences. T h e second alternative, o n the other hand, brings an element o f arbitrary choice into our fulfilment o f duty itself. W h e t h e r the charge o f 'legalism' is relevant to -Kant's ethics depends, in large part, on the w a y in w h i c h w e interpret the latitude o f imperfect duty.

CHAPTER V m

THE

N A T U R E TO

^

OF P E R F E C T

DUTIES

ONESELF

W h i l e ethics on its formal side has to do w i t h our intention in fulfilling all our duties, as a system o f duties it is the doctrine o f duties oFvirtue. These are its proper subject-matter. 'Tugendlehre,' K a n t tells us, ' c o n ­ tains o n l y w i d e duties.' So far as w h a t is formal in our fulfilment o f duty is concerned, ethics treats o f all duties: but so far as duties t h e m ­ selves are concerned, 'ethics is the part o f moral philosophy w h i c h contains o n l y w i d e duties'. N o w this assertion is not a fortuitous one; it is, rather, the logical conclusion o f an argument that begins w i t h Kant's most fundamental and consistently maintained principle o f division between jurisprudence and ethics. Jurisprudenee, w e m a y re­ call, is the system o f duties according to laws w h i c h can be p r o ­ mulgated through outer legislation: ethics, the system o f duties for w h i c h o n l y inner legislation is possible. Hence the duties w h i c h c o m prise ethics must consist in obligatory ends,'since, K a n t argued, there is n o other determination o f choice w h i c h 'in its v e r y concept' excludes the possibility o f external constraint except determination t o an e n d . T h e adoption o f an end is an 'inner act o f the m i n d ' for which n o outer legislation is possible. F r o m this there f o l l o w e d the proposition that ethics gives laws only for the maxims o f actions, not for action? themselves; and f r o m this, in turn, the .conclusion that duties o f virtue are imperfect duties o f w i d e obligation. In v i e w o f all this w e m i g h t reasonably expect some explanation o f the fact that the greater part o f the Tugendlehre is devoted to perfect duties to oneself. Y e t Kant p r o ­ vides n o such explanation. 1

2

7

3

4

U p o n reflection, the presence o f perfect duties t o ourselves within ethics seems both natural and necessary. So far as our duties to others are concerned, ethics can begin straightway w i t h imperfect duties because jurisprudence has dealt w i t h perfect duties. A n d it seems natural, too, that there should be perfect duties to ourselves. As the , c o m m a n d o f benevolence presupposes the prohibitive laws o f justice, so too, in our relations w i t h ourselves, the c o m m a n d positively to p r o m o t e our perfection presupposes the prohibitibn against destroying H.N.(23), 389. Ibid., 384. M.d.S., 381., Ibid., 239. 1

2

3

113

4

H4

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

our nature. In general, the c o m m a n d to m a k e rational beings our end in the positive sense comes o v e r and a b o v e the prohibition against using them as mere means. B u t w h i l e w e m a y agree o n the necessity of mduding perfect duties to ourselves w i t h i n ethics, w e m a y w e l l ask h o w , in v i e w o f the principles b y w h i c h K a n t divides moral phil­ osophy, they can be located there. But even i f w e succeed, to some extent, in accounting for the pre­ sence o f perfect duties within Tugendlehre, a still more difficult p r o b l e m confronts us. From the preceding chapters it should be clear that 'duty of virtue' is a technical term for K a n t . A d u t y o f virtue, according to his definition, is a duty according t o a l a w w h i c h prescribes an end, object or matter to choice; and w e m a y recall that in the Introduction to the Tugendlehre he took pains t o preserve the precise, technical mean­ ing o f the term. For example, he distinguished carefully between duties o f virtue and the 'ethical d u t y ' o f determining choice through the motive o f duty, on the ground that the latter has to do merely w i t h what is formal in the determination o f choice whereas the former concern the matter o f choice. N o t e v e r y virtuous action, he argued, is the fulfilment o f a duty o f virtue: o n l y w h e n the l a w enjoining duty is an ethical l a w prescribing a m a x i m o f pursuing a certain end d o w e fulfil a duty o f virtue in observing the l a w . N o w f r o m the fact that an ethical l a w prescribes o n l y a m a x i m o f pursuing a certain end it follows that our duty according to ethical l a w is imperfect. A n d since duties o f virtue are, apparently, imperfect duties, Kant's reference to perfect duties to oneself as Tugendpjlichten or duties o f virtue comes as a surprise. 5

6

But the Metaphysik der Sitten s f e w references to the nature o f perfect duty to oneself, far from explaining h o w such duties can be called 'duties o f virtue', seem only to sharpen the contrast already implicit in the fact that they are perfect duties. Perfect duties to oneself first appear within the Rechtslehre, as 'inner juridical duties (innere Rechtspflichten)\ D i v i d i n g a metaphysic o f morals in general, K a n t proposes 5

Cf. above, p . 69. In H.N.fa), 395, K a n t d o e s n o t e that: ' S o far as duties o f

virtue are concerned, they w o u l d contain qfficiaxthices ethica as w e l l as officia ethices iuridica: that is t o say, duties o f virtue woulcTnocrude t h e observance o f all duties, whether o f perfect o r imperfect o b l i g a t i o n , f r o m a m o r a l attitude o f w i l l i n ful­ filling one's d u t y i n general'. This passage, h o w e v e r , represents a radical departure f r o m Kant's n o r m a l usage o f t h e t e r m ' d u t y o f virtue'. W h e n the Tugendlehre refers t o perfect duties t o w a r d o n e s e l f as Tugendpjlichten, it appears t o b e taking the term in a narrower sense than d o e s this passage, b u t n o t y e t i n the technical sense. • ,

'M.d.S., 390. .

'Ibid., 419.

I

THE N A T U R E

OF P E R F E C T D U T I E S

T O ONESELF

115

l 'the right o f humanity in our o w n person' and 'the rights o f other m e n ' as the basis for distmgmshing our perfect duties into 'inner' and 'outer' juridical duties. H e promises that 'in what follows' he will explain o u r 'inner juridical duties' as 'obligation from the right o f humanity in o u r o w n person'. T h e v a g u e reference to 'what follows' seems to indicate the opening chapters o f the Tugendlehre, w h i c h deal w i t h perfect d u t y to oneself; but the promised explanation is not forthcoming. Instead w e find that our inner juridical duties have n o w b e c o m e ' duties o f virtue. Kant's handling o f this subject is as g o o d a p r o o f as any that the Metaphysik der Sitten is a hurriedly written and, in fact, unfinished w o r k . A g a i n w e must turn for explanation to his prelinrinary notes t o this w o r k , w h i c h contain a more elaborate, i f still somewhat i n c o n ­ clusive, discussion o f the nature o f perfect duty to oneself. 8

9

Let us, then, begin w i t h the first p r o b l e m : i f ethics contains o n l y imperfect duties, h o w can perfect duties—even perfect duties t o o n e ­ self—be located witliin Tugendlehre ? Kant's reply is that perfect duties to oneself 'according to their content' do n o t b e l o n g to Tugendlehre: they belong, rather, to moral philosophy in general and so to Rechts­ lehre as the doctrine o f the highest limiting condition. 'In themselves,' h o w e v e r , they belong to Tugendlehre. T o consider duties 'according to their content' is to consider merely the nature o f w h a t is required b y the law, i.e. whether the duty consists in an action or in the adoption o f a m a x i m . T o consider them 'in themselves' is t o v i e w the l a w i n ' relation to the legislation in w h i c h it arises. W h a t K a n t means in this passage is that i f w e abstract from the legislation w h i c h promulgates the l a w and consider only the type o f l a w w h i c h enjoins perfect d u t y to oneself, w e find that it is a l a w only for actions and not for the maxims o f actions. T h e principle o f division, w h i c h gives us t w o mutually exclusive systems o f duties, L a w and ethics, is based o n the type o f legislation w h i c h can enact the l a w or the t y p e o f constraint w h i c h can accompany the l a w . F r o m this point o f v i e w , juridical duties are duties according to laws that can be promulgated externally,< and they can be only duties to other m e n . B u t i f w e adopt a different point o f v i e w , prescmding entirely from the legislation and considering10

1 1

8

M.d.S., p p . 236-7. Cf. also the diagram o n p . 240. T h e explanation o f the possibility o f d u t y t o w a r d o n e s e l f i n M.d.S., 4 1 7 - 8 , w i t h its distinction b e t w e e n t h e o b h g a t i n g subject, homo nohmenon, a n d t h e obligated subject, homo phaenomenon, m i g h t b e taken^as a n a c c o u n t o f 'the r i g h t o f h u m a n i t y i n one's o w n person'; If this is t h e passage t o w h i c h Kant is r e f e r r i n g , the e x p l a n a t i o n is an o b l i q u e o n e . 9

10

H.N.(23), 385.

1 1

Ibid., 379-

Il6

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

only the nature o f the l a w ^ t h e n juridical laws are laws for actions, ethical laws, laws for the maxims o f actions; and i f there are laws p r o ­ hibiting certain uses o f our o w n person, w e can call our duties according to these laws juridical duties'. W h e n w e abstract from the legislation in which the duty arises and consider ' o n l y w h a t concerns legality', then, 'since it is a question only o f the c o n f o r m i t y o f actions w i t h the law, and the subjective determining g r o u n d m a y or m a y n o t ' b e the thought o f the law, our duties are either m e r e l y negative duties, i.e. duties which merely limit freedom in its inner or outer exercise and are called juridical duties in the general sense, of the term, o r they are positive and widening through the end they p r o v i d e ' . If, b y juridical duty', w e mean not so m u c h a duty w h i c h w e can be compelled b y others to perform as rather a duty w h i c h consists m e r e l y in an action, then w e can have juridical duties to ourselves as w e l l as to other men. Perfect iduties to o'irselves, Kant remarks, are officia iuris interni (erga seipsum) even as juridical duties i n the proper sense are officia iuris externi sive juridica. 12

13

W h a t led K a n t originally t o the n o t i o n o f 'inner juridical duty' was, apparently, the fact that there are prohibitions regarding our use o f our o w n person—prohibitions against self-murder, self-abuse, in­ temperance, l y i n g , avarice and servility—which leave us n o latitude in observing them. I f our principle for ckssifying our duties as juridical or ethical is ' o n l y the form o f obligation, w h e t h e r it be strict or w i d e ' , w e can say that there are inner, as w e l l as outer, juridical duties. A s w e saw in the preceding chapter, a l a w o f strict obligation is a l a w for actions, a negative and limiting principle w h i c h requires us o n l y to reject such o f our material m a x i m s as could n o t b e c o m e universal l a w ; and this, in turn, implies that laws enjoining perfect duty to oneself are applications o f the formal principle o f action. Perfect duties to oneself are not, even considered merely 'according t o their content', juridical duties properly speaking, because t h e y are n o t derived from the first principle o f Law. Neither are they ethical duties, because they are not derived from the special first principle o f ethics. T h e y are, rather, derived f r o m the first principle o f all d u t y prior to its differ­ entiation into the special first principle o f juridical d u t y and that o f ethical duty, and they therefore b e l o n ^ n e i t h e r to jurisprudence nor to ethics, but rather to 'moral philosophy in general'. 1 4

As soon as w e regard the formal principle o f duty as the principle o f laws which arise i n juridical legislation, w e H m i t its extension. Because n

HM(23),

268. Italics mine.

1 3

Ibid., 395.

1 4

Ibid.

T H E N A T U R E OF P E R F E C T D U T I E S T O O N E S E L F

/

.

.

.

117

^

' o f the hmited sphere witfiin w h i c h external compulsion is morally possible, the first principle o f juridical law is not the principle: so act that y o u r m a x i m could become, a universal law, but rather the narrower principle: act externally so that y o u r exercise o f freedom is consistent w i t h the freedom o f others under universal l a w . W h e n , on the other hand, w e regard the categorical imperative as the principle o f laws for w h i c h only inner legislation is possible, it is n o longer a principle for actions but rather for our ;intentions. Accordingly,, i f there are l a w s w h i c h prohibit actions because the maxims o f these actions "could n o t become universal law, w h i l e yet these actions are entirely consistent w i t h the freedom o f other men, such laws are derived neither from the first principle o f L a w nor from that o f ethical duty. T h e y must be applications o f the first principle o f duty as such. Considered 'according to their content', laws enjoining perfect duties to oneself have m o r e in c o m m o n w i t h juridical laws than w i t h ethical laws, since they merely prohibit actions o f a f o r m contrary to universal l a w . It is, therefore, appropriate to describe them as 'juridical duties'. B u t the universal law in question is not a l a w o f outer freedom. Hence, according to their content, perfect duties to oneself belong, n o t to jurisprudence, b u t rather to moral philosophy in general. B u t Kant's reason for referring to these duties as Rechtspjlichten is not merely that they bear a certain resemblance to juridical duties proper. It is the m o r e fundamental reason that moral philosophy in general is Rechtslehre, the doctrine o f ' R i g h t ' as the highest limiting condition u p o n our actions. Needless to say, i f Rechtslehre is here used as equivalent to-moral philosophy in general it cannot be Rechtslehre as the first division,of m o r a l philosophy. Rechtslehre in this wider sense is the doctrine o f perfect duties, w h e r e b y our freedom is limited i n either its external or its interior use, the doctrine o f laws based o n l y on 'personality and freedom'—more precisely, o n the Hmitation o f o u r freedom through personality. In our use o f our o w n person o u r choice stands under the Hmiting condition o f our personahty e v e n as, in our use o f other men, it is subject to the limiting condition imposed • by their status as persons or ends in themselves. I f the right o f an­ other person, in'the legal sense, is a limitation u p o n our tide to use w h a t is his, then, using the t e r m 'right' in a wider m o r a l sense, w e can say that the personality o f other m e n is the right o f humanity in thenperson and that our o w n ' p e r s o n a h t y is the right o f humanity in our o w n person. In other w o r d s , the personahty o f m e n as such is the H . N . ( 2 3 ) , 3 9 3 ; cf. also 3 9 2 . Ibid., 390. Ibid., 3 9 1 . N

15

16

17

S l 5

1 6

1 7

Il8

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first limitation upon our moral title t o m a k e use o f t h e m : w e cannot dispose o f persons as mere means to our subjective ends. Moreover, b y r e m o v i n g from the term ' R i g h t ' all that makes it properly juridical, w e can also speak o f the ' R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person' as an 'inner ius'. B y analogy w i t h the definition o f L a w in the proper sense o f the term, this inner ius m i g h t be described as the limitation o f our inner exercise o f freedom to the condition o f its formal consistency w i t h itself. W h e n o n l y our use o f our o w n person is in question, the formal consistency o f freedom w i t h itself must have a quite different significance f r o m w h a t it has in our relations w i t h other men. A l t h o u g h the development o f this notion must await Kant's detailed analysis o f our specific duties, the passage in the Vork­ sung where he argues that freedom is in contradiction w i t h itself unless every exercise o f freedom is consistent w i t h the fullest use o f i t is relevant to the notion o f inner ius. I f w e m a k e use o f our non-deter­ mination b y immediate sensuous impulse in such a w a y as to destroy or weaken our natural and moral capacities for action, w e might be said to be using our freedom in such a w a y as to abrogate it. Perfect duties to ourselves are prohibitions against destroying our powers or hindering our use o f them, and inner ius comprises the laws w h i c h make our inner use o f freedom self-consistent. O u r exercise o f freedom in the use o f our o w n person, as in the use o f other men, is 'limited in its Idea'. In its outward exercise it can also be actively limited b y other men: in its inner exercise it cannot be so hrnited. B u t as soon as w e begin to discuss the active limitation o f our freedom b y other m e n or b y ourselves, i.e. the constraint w h i c h can a c c o m p a n y the law, w e have entered into either L a w or ethics. In moral philosophy in general, where perfect duties to ourselves b e l o n g according to their content, w e can discuss only the relation o f the l a w itself to choice, w i t h o u t reference to the possibility o f constraint. 18

T h e essential characteristics o f perfect duties t o ourselves b y virtue o f which they can be called officia iuris interni are implicit in the fact that their principle is merely the first principle o f duty as such, as it appears in 'moral philosophy in general'. Kant's further remarks about the R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n persoa-dr4w out the final implication o f this fact. R i g h t in the stricter sense requires o n l y actions, and not that w e make the principle o f L a w our m a x i m in performing these actions. So too, Kant argues, the R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person does not require that w e refrain from violating the integrity o f our o w n 18

Vorksung, 151.

i

THE

NATURE

OF PERFECT DUTIES

TO ONESELF

119

(humanity from a motive o f duty, but only that w e refrain from such factions as w o u l d violate i t . T h e requirement that w e make the principle o f Flight itself our m a x i m is an ethical requirement pertaining to inner legislation, and the R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person does not yet belong to ethics. B u t moral laws are practical principles, and although w e can c o n ­ sider them abstractly or 'according to their content', they must be accompanied b y moral constraint in order to fulfil their function as practical principles. N o w it is obvious, at least in a negative w a y , that all duties to ourselves must, as such, be situated within ethics rather than within jurisprudence. In so far as a violation o f duty to oneself does not affect the freedom o f other men, constraint b y others w o u l d be morally, impossible. A l l obligation to ourselves must be 'ethical obligation' in the*sense o f necessitation b y our o w n w i l l ; and the actions thus neces­ sitated 'ethical (not juridical) duties'; for ' i f the m o t i v e o f the action were not duty itself, w h a t w o u l d otherwise constrain us m o r a l l y . . . ? ' A l l duties to oneself must belong to ethics, the doctrine o f duties for w h i c h only inner legislation is possible. T h e y must, as Kant puts it, be a m o n g the 'special duties o f e t h i c s ' . B u t to say that the actions in question are not matters o f outer freedom and therefore fall outside the scope o f State legislation is to take only a negative v i e w o f the matter. It is to say, in effect, that since perfect duties to oneself cannot be the concern o f jurisprudence, they must be the concern o f ethics, the other division o f moral philosophy. W e also have to take into account Kant's positive v i e w o f the content o f ethics, the doctrine o f duties o f virtue. 19

2 0

21

F r o m Kant's analysis o f ethical prohibitions it follows that perfect duties to oneself cannot be duties o f virtue in the technical sense o f the term. If they are 'duties o f virtue' it is only in some wider sense; for the laws enjoining them are prohibitions against actions, not c o m ­ mands to adopt certain ends. A t the same time, it is clear that the c o n ­ nection between, these duties and inner legislation is not parallel to that between juridical duties and self-constraint through the motive o f duty. A l t h o u g h ethical prohibitions' merely limit our freedom in the use o f our o w n person even as juridical laws limit our freedom in the use o f other men, our freedom, in the sense o f our lawless freedom, is always limited w i t h a v i e w to some end; and this end is itself freedom in the normative sense. O u t e r freedom is the ratio essendi o£juridical k w s : it as in order to realize outer freedom that L a w restricts our actions. 19

H.N.(23), 390 and 381.

20

Ibid., 393.

21

M.d.S., 220.

120

L A W S OF F R E E D O M

But in v i e w o f what does the ' R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person' limit our actions affecting ourselves? T h e answer is, surely, in v i e w o f the inner freedom, and so o f the moral integrity, o f the subject. O u t e r freedom, as w e have seen, has in itself n o ethical significance. It is a condition that can be realized quite independently o f the subjects' motives, and in this sense the connection b e t w e e n juridical laws and ethical legislation is an extrinsic one. B u t 'inner freedom' is essentially an ethical concept. It refers to the subject's m o r a l attitude o f will, and ethical prohibitions, in so far as they are laws o f inner freedom, are intrinsically connected w i t h that legislation w h i c h includes the m o t i v e in the law. W e are not inwardly free i f w e refrain f r o m l y i n g f r o m a motive o f fear that our deception w i l l be discovered. W e cannot fulfil a duty o f inner freedom i f one m o t i v e o f sensuous origin checks the influence o f other motives o f sensuous origin, but o n l y i f motives o f sensuous origin as such are o v e r c o m e b y a m o t i v e o f reverence for the law. B o t h juridical laws and ethical prohibitions, according to w h a t they command, are indifferent to our motives. B u t the end o f the one can be achieved independently o f our attitude o f w i l l , whereas that o f the. other cannot. Other m e n can be o u t w a r d l y free although w e are mdifferent to or even hostile t o w a r d their freedom, but w e cannot be inwardly free and y e t mdifferent to our o w n freedom. W e are i n w a r d l y free only b y reason o f our attitude t o w a r d the l a w . T o put the matter in slightly different terms, it is clear that outer freedom can be disrupted merely b y an action. Because it is something fully external, its violation too is something external, an o u t w a r d action considered in abstraction f r o m the inner determination o f choice from which it proceeds. B u t this does n o t seem to be true in the case o f inner freedom. W h a t makes certain actions violations o f inner freedom is just the attitude o f w i l l manifested in these actions. Certain actions affecting one's o w n person are o f such a nature that to perform them necessarily implies a subjection o f one's attitude o f w i l l to the inclinations, and it is this that makes the action a violation o f duty t o oneself. T o take an example w i t h w h i c h w e are already farniliar: i f w e consider merely the bare act ofjielf-destruction, w e cannot say whether it is a violation o f duty to oneself; w e must also take into consideration the attitude o f w i l l f r o m w h i c h the action proceeds. Moreover, one class o f violations o f perfect duty to oneself consists not so much in particular external actions as rather in the adoption o f certain principles o f action. T h e v i c e o f avarice, for example, does n o t consist in refusing to spend one's m o n e y o n any g i v e n occasion: such

/

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an action in itself could not be distinguished from the practice o f the virtue o f thrift. Avarice consists, rather, in acting u p o n a principle w h i c h subjects one's attitude o f will to riches. If an action is a violation o f duty to oneself, it is, apparently, because the action manifests an attitude o f w i l l w h i c h is contrary to inner freedom. A n y l a w , whether it be a juridical law, an ethical prohibition, or an ethical l a w properly speaking, can be considered in abstraction from the legislation w h i c h enacts it, and w e can call the adoption o f our natural perfection as an end from a m o t i v e o f self-interest 'legal' just as our fulfilment o f a contract from fear o f the l a w ' s sanctions is legal. B u t i f w e v i e w laws concretely, as practical principles actively c o n ­ straining choice, juridical duties arise in legislation w h i c h is mdifferent to our motives, whereas perfect duties to ourselves and duties o f virtue arise in legislation w h i c h includes the m o t i v e o f duty in the l a w . Ethical prohibitions, like juridical laws, c o m m a n d o n l y actions; and they are thus distinguished from ethical laws, w h i c h prescribe m a x i m s o f pursuing certain ends. B u t like ethical laws, ethical prohibitions are intrinsically connected w i t h inner legislation, so that our ethical duties o f omission, considered 'in themselves' or as duties o f inner freedom, cannot be fulfilled independendy o f our^ attitude o f will. A n d this locates them, according to Kant's principle o f division, within ethics. T h e division between Rechtslehre and Tugendlehre, he explains, is based o n the fact that the concept o f freedom, w h i c h is c o m m o n to both, necessitates the division o f duties into those o f outer freedom and those o f inner freedom, ' o n l y the latter o f w h i c h are ethical'. 7

22

T o summarize Karit's s o m e w h a t complicated answer to the p r o b l e m raised b y the presence o f perfect duties within ethics, the doctrine o f imperfect duties: the manner in w h i c h w e describe perfect duties t o ourselves w i l l depend upon the point o f v i e w w h i c h w e adopt. A c c o r d ­ ing to the division o f duties w h i c h follows w h e n w e consider whether the l a w prescribes, o n the one hand, an object o f choice or, on the other hand, merely the form o f the action, perfect duties t o ourselves d o not belong within Tugendlehre. B u t from the point o f v i e w which lays d o w n the essential distinction between the t w o divisions o f m o r a l philosophy—the distinction o f duties o f outer freedom and duties o f inner freedom—perfect duties to ourselves d o b e l o n g to Tugendlehre. It is true that, in his treatment o f ethical prohibitions as such; K a n t presents the first point o f v i e w m o r e clearly than the second. In c o n ­ firmation o f the second, h o w e v e r , he does note that, from the v i e w 22

M.d.S., 406.

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point o f our obligation to the-duty, duties are distinguished according to whether 'the determining ground o f choice contains the principle': act according to a m a x i m w h i c h could b e c o m e universal l a w or, o n the other hand, 'make it y o u r m a x i m so to act as i f y o u w e r e g i v i n g universal l a w through that m a x i m , under the condition that in this legislation y o u can be consistent w i t h y o u r s e l f ' . W h e n the principle o f duty contained in the moral constraint says nothing about the subject's inner attitude o f will, he continues, duties w i l l consist merely in external actions or actions directed t o w a r d other people, and outer legislation can impose these duties. T h e doctrine o f these duties w i l l be Rechtslehre as the first division o f m o r a l philosophy. A c c o r d i n g t o the principle w h i c h commands us t o make it o u r m a x i m to act c o n ­ sistently w i t h universal law, our choice cannot be subject to the w i l l o f another person; and y e t this principle t o o , K a n t maintains, gives rise to perfect- duties (to ourselves) as w e l l as t o imperfect d u t i e s . Perfect duties t o ourselves, along w i t h duties o f virtue, are the proper subject-matter o f ethics, i f our principle o f division is based upon moral constraint according t o the l a w , a n d this n o t merely b y default o f external constraint; for they arise i n ethical legislation and belong intrinsically t o the doctrine o f duties f r o m self-constraint, the principle o f which has to d o w i t h our moral attitude o f will. 23

24

O n the basis o f this intrinsic connection b e t w e e n ethical prohibitions and inner legislation w e can g o o n t o the second, and m o r e difficult, problem regarding perfect duties t o oneself: the problem, namely, in what respect these duties can be called 'duties o f virtue'. It m i g h t be thought that w e are making the p r o b l e m unnecessarily difficult—that ethical duties o f omission are 'duties o f virtue' simply because the moral necessity o f making our perfection o u r end implies the necessity o f re­ fraining from certain actions w h i c h w o u l d frustrate this end. T h e l a w commanding us t o m a k e our perfection o u r end, it m i g h t be argued, implies a prohibition against transgressing this duty, and hence m a y be o f imperfect obligation i n w h a t it enjoins b u t o f perfect obligation in what it prohibits. This argument has m u c h t o r e c o m m e n d it, and, in fact, its essential point is v e r y close t o the conclusion w h i c h w e shall reach b y a m o r e devious path. B u t it_does n o t seem adequate to the complexities o f Kant's thought. T o b e g i n w i t h , it is not b y violating 2 3

T h e concluding phrase, 'under the c o n d i t i o n that i n this, legislation y o u c a n b e consistent w i t h yourself', a l t h o u g h its reference is m o r e general, seems t o b e particularly relevant t o duties t o oneself. H.N/(23), 380. 24

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123

our ethical duties o f omission that w e transgress the l a w enjoining our /perfection as an end; it is, rather, b y failing to pursue our perfection, either from a m a x i m o f indifference to this end or from moral w e a k ­ ness in acting upon our m a x i m o f perfection) Perfect duties to oneself are, apparently, o f a different order from duties o f virtue. Further, since the principle o f ethical prohibitions is logically prior to the prin­ ciple o f duties o f virtue, it is difficult to see h o w the former could be derived from the latter. A l t h o u g h the end-result o f .the t w o lines o f thought m a y be the same, the order o f Kant's argument seems to re­ quire that w e begin w i t h the formal principle o f action as the principle o f certain 'duties o f inner freedom', rather than attempt to argue to ethical duties o f omission from the principle o f duties o f virtue. M o r e o v e r , it is quite possible that Kant conceives a closer relation between ethical duties o f omission and duties o f virtue than is s u g ­ gested b y this argument. A l t h o u g h the nature o f ethical prohibitions implies that duties enjoined b y them can be called 'duties o f virtue' only in a w i d e sense, it y e t seems probable that the analogy b e t w e e n the t w o is to be located in that w h i c h is the characteristic property o f duties o f virtue, namely, their reference to ends. T h i s is, at least, a hypothesis w o r t h considering. If it is correct, w e should begin w i t h the formal principle o f action as the principle o f certain duties intrinsically connected w i t h inner legislation and attempt to argue from this to the presence, in these duties, o f something that could be called an o b l i g a ­ tory end. T h e Metaphysik der Sitten gives us, so to speak, only the start­ ing point o f the argument—'the Plight o f humanity in our o w n person' —and its conclusion—the reference to these perfect duties as 'duties o f virtue'. A s for the^argument from the one to the other, what little guidance Kant provides in the cryptic notations o f the Nachlass suggests that w e can f o l l o w out the hypothesis mentioned, a b o v e . W e can, perhaps, best begin b y examining the text in w h i c h Kant's reference to these 'duties o f virtue' o c c u r s . O u r imperfect duties to ourselves, he asserts, are 'that w h i c h is material' in duty to oneself: they consist in making our natural and moral perfection,an end or matter o f choice; they have as their object our moral affluence and pertain to our melius esse or opulentia moralis; their principle is contained in the dictum, make yourself more perfect than mere nature made y o u . Perfect duties to oneself, o n the other hand, are 'that w h i c h is fprmal' in duty to oneself: they are prohibitions against acting 'contrary t o the ends o f our nature'; they pertain to our 'moral' health' or moral 'esse'; ^ MAS., 419. 25

!24

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

their principle is contained in the Stoic dictum, live according to nature or preserve yourself in the perfection o f y o u r nature. In v i e w o f w h a t Kant has said regarding the nature o f ethical prohibitions, the m o r e obvious meaning o f his assertion that they are the formal element in duty to oneself is that these prohibitions are concerned w i t h the form o f our actions rather than w i t h the matter o f our choice. B u t the asser­ tion, taken in its context, seems also to mean\that the object o f these duties is the preservation o f ourselves as subjects o f duty. Strictly speaking, w e are, o f course, subjects o f duty merely b y the fact that w e are persons or subjects o f pure practical reason. B u t our actual moral condition is in conformity w i t h our nature as subjects o f duty only in so far as pure practical reason is in control o f our choice. N o w , as w e shall see, there are t w o w a y s in w h i c h w e can disturb moral reason's sovereignty over action and choice: b y arbitrarily depriving ourselves o f the physical, and hence o f the moral, use o f our p o w e r s ; and b y subjecting our attitude o f w i l l to the ends o f inclination. T a k e n together, these t w o classes o f vice are the destruction o f our moral esse, and in this sense the object o f ethical prohibitions is the preservation o f our prerogative as moral beings, our capacity to determine action b y pure practical reason. N o w , as the conclusion o f these remarks, K a n t adds the k e y phrase: b o t h our perfect and o u r imperfect duties to o u r ­ selves pertain to virtue'—the former as duties o f omission, the latter as duties o f commission, 'both, h o w e v e r , as duties o f virtue'. The t w o w a y s in w h i c h perfect duties t o ourselves can be called 'that which is formal' in duty t o w a r d oneself seem to be merely t w o facets o f the same principle; and this principle is, in turn, o n l y another w a y o f describing w h a t K a n t has previously called 'the R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person'. Ethical prohibitions h m i t our use o f our o w n person to the condition o f lawfulness, and that w h i c h determines the lawfulness o f such actions is their consistency w i t h the 'ends o f our nature', i.e. w i t h the order w h i c h should exist a m o n g the components o f our being and w h i c h is dictated b y the fact that w e are beings capable o f moral action. T h e ' R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person', w e m a y recall, was identified w i t h the hmitation imposed u p o n our choice b y the 'Idea o f our personality', and sinte^ciur personality consists in our capacity to g i v e the l a w t o ourselves, this restriction is, m o r e c o n ­ cretely, a prohibition against interfering w i t h our o w n capacity to determine choice autonomously. T h e importance o f the fact that ethical prohibitions comprise the inner ius w h i c h Kant describes in his 26

2 6

Cf. above, pp. 46-8,'and H . N . f o ) , 383.

I

THE N A T U R E OF PERFECT D U T I E S

TO

0*>£SELF

i 25

nptes to the Metaphysik der Sitten lies in the fact that the Tugendlehre ' reference to perfect duties to ourselves as 'duties o f virtue' can then be viewed in the light of the transition, made ir^ these notes, from the ' R i g h t o f humanity in our o w n person' to the 'end o f humanity in our o w n person'. If perfect duties to oneself are, in some sense, duties o f virtue, it must be b y reason o f the 'end o f humanity in one's o w n per­ son' w h i c h is their object. Despite the fragmentary and cryptic nature o f the evidence, it seems quite certain that Kant does, in fact, make this transition and that it is this transition w h i c h underlies the metamorphosis o f the Rechtslehre's 'inner juridical duties' into the Tugendlehre's 'duties o f virtue'. T h e 'ends o f humanity' are ends w h i c h belong to us as subjects o f pure practical reason, in distinction f r o m the 'ends o f men' w h i c h belong to ,us as natural beings, i.e. the ends w h i c h g « * o make up our happiness. W e r e it not for the problem o f perfect duties to oneself, w e should, o n the basis o f Kant's division o f duties, identify the.'ends o f humanity in our o w n person' w i t h the objects o f our imperfect duties to ourselves, i.e. w i t h our natural and moral perfection as objects o f c h o i c e . B u t K a n t tells us that s o m e o f the duties having to do w i t h our perfection, m o r e specifically w i t h our moral perfection, are merely negative duties or duties o f omission. ' T h e end o f humanity" in one's o w n person', he notes further, 'is either consistency w i t h the nature o f man or its cultivation according to laws o f f r e e d o m . ' N o w 'consistency w i t h the nature o f man' is a clear reference to the principle o f perfect duty t o w a r d oneself formulated in the Tugendlehre: 'live according t o nature' or ' d o not act contrary to the ends o f y o u r nature'. Accordingly, one aspect o f our perfection, the end o f humanity in our o w n person, is our 'moral self-preservation, health or esse'. M o r e o v e r , Kant indi­ cates that this is the g r o u n d o n w h i c h perfect duties to oneself are, in a wider sense, duties of virtue. ' O n e ' s o w n perfection as an end is either. stricte or late a duty o f virtue to oneself.' 27

28

29

30

Ethical prohibitions, then, enjoin duties o f virtue in a wide sense because they i n v o l v e the adoption o f our moral self-preservation as an end. B u t in w h a t sense is this an 'end' ? First, the integrity o f o u r : humanity is an end only in a negative sense. Speaking o f these p r o 27

Cf. the diagram on p. 240, with its distinction between 'the right of humanity in our own person' and 'the end of humanity in our own person'. According to the texts cited below, however, the 'end of humanity' seems to include the 'ends of our nature' which we ought not to act against, as well as the objects which ethrcai laws command us to take up as ends. H.N.(23), 398. Ibid., 387. Ibid., 3%%* 28

29

30

LAWS

126

OF

FREEDOM

bibitions, Kant notes that 'the end w h i c h w e should have w i t h regard to our o w n person is negative: humanity w i t h i n us wills that w e should not degrade man to a mere means'.' A l t h o u g h he has said that the object o f these duties can be called our 'moral perfection', it is o n l y the negative and formal aspect o f moral perfection that these duties i n ­ volve as our end in restricting our actions. A n d since duties correspond­ ing to this type o f end are essentially duties o f omission, the sharp distinction between ethical prohibitions and ethical laws enjoining duties o f virtue in the strict sense remains intact. This distinction lies in the fact that ethical prohibitions require us to reject certain m a x i m s o f self-love, whereas ethical laws require us to adopt maxims o f realiz­ ing certain ends or o f bringing certain states o f affairs into being. Y e t ethical duties o f omission can be called duties o f virtue in a wide sense, whereas juridical duties, e v e n w h e n accompanied b y ethical legislation, cannot be called duties o f virtue. Ethics requires us, Kant has said, to make the principle o f L a w our m a x i m in fulfilling juridical duties, and so to m a k e the right o f others our end; but he denied that this requirement changes the juridical character o f the duty. T h e essential difference here is that ethical prohibitions, c o n ­ sidered 'in themselves,' arise in inner legislation; and this implies that w e cannot fulfill these duties w i t h o u t directing our will to pure practical reason's system o f ends, according to the first principle o f ethical law. Juridical duties, o n the other hand, arise in outer legislation"; and though the ethical legislation that always accompanies t h e m brings our m a x i m under the categorical imperative o f ends, w h i c h prescribes the right o f others as our end, juridical duties can still be ftdfiled independently o f our motives and ends. Since external c o n ­ straint to these duties remains m o r a l l y possible, they are duties o f outer freedom, actions w h o s e m o r a l necessity is independent o f the agent's attitude o f will. Ethical prohibitions, o n the other hand, enjoin duties o f inner freedom, w h i c h w e cannot fulfill w i t h o u t g o i n g beyond the mere prohibition and adopting the 'integrity o f humanity in our person' as our end. 31

32

In the final analysis, our ethical duties o f omission remain something o f an anomaly, participating in cerjaijv: characteristics o f both juridical duties and duties o f virtue, y e t mclining, apparently, toward duties o f virtue. Because the principle o f these duties is a restrictive one, a p r o ­ hibition against certain actions, they can be called 'inner juridical 3 1

H.N.(23), 398.

.

3 2

Cf. a b o v e , p p .

84-5.

THE

/

NATURE

OF PERFECT D U T I E S

TO

ONESELF

*

127

\

duties folio w i n g from . the right o f humanity in our o w n person.' B u t because ethical prohibitions are laws o f inner freedom, the type o f constraint implied in these duties can be o n l y the self-constraint o f moral reason; and, given the purposive nature o f h u m a n action, w e cannot fulfil them w i t h o u t adopting the system o f ends enjoined b y the first principle o f ethical law. A n ethical duty o f omission is not a duty o f virtue in the full sense because the duty itself does not consist in adopting an end but only in^ omitting an action. Y e t it is a duty o f virtue in a w i d e r sense because w e cannot observe it, as a duty, w i t h o u t going b e y o n d the mere prohibition and taking as our end the formal aspect o f our moral perfection. T h e fact that ethical prohibitions prescribe duties o f virtue in this wider sense determines, in turn, the method b y w h i c h Kant, must derive specific ethical prohibitions. T h e principle o f these duties is that o f hunting our maxims to those o f such a f o r m that w e could give universal l a w through them. B u t because ethical prohibitions have as their object the preservation o f our m o r a l integrity, w e can discover w h a t maxims are lawful in their f o r m o n l y b y referring our maxims o f using ourselves in pursuit o f our subjective ends to the system o f objective ends that w e ought to w i l l , the ends that it is rational for us to will in v i e w o f both our physical and our m o r a l nature.

CHAPTER IX

PERFECT MORAL

DUTIES TO

BEING

WITH A N

ONESELF AS A ANIMAL

N A T U R E

Man is a being possessing the p o w e r o f pure practical reason. A t the same time, he has an animal nature. A n d because the t w o ' n a t u r e s , animal and moral, are united in the same being, m a n must treat his animal nature w i t h due regard for the fact that it belongs to the subject of pure practical reason. This is not m e r e l y another f o r m o f the prin­ ciple that any action o f a moral agent (and so also those directed t o ­ ward his o w n person) should be in accordance w i t h the commands o f pure practical reason. In order to deterrriine w h a t sort o f actions affecting other m e n conform w i t h principles o f legislative reason w e had to consider that our actions are directed t o w a r d beings w h o have the right to express their freedom o u t w a r d l y . Here w e are considering actions that affect our o w n person, a b e i n g capable o f rational and moral action and obligated n o t t o interfere w i t h these capacities. While our o w n humanity is the ultimate g r o u n d o f all our duties, it is also the proximate ground o f perfect duties t o ourselves. 1

These duties, Kant holds, are the most important o f all our duties since our observance o f them is the condition o f moral action, in w h i c h the absolute g o o d — a g o o d will—manifests itself. Y e t they are also the most difficult to establish; for in treating an action as a violation o f duty to ourselves w e must establish its i m m o r a l i t y in abstraction from its possible effects o n others, b y considering it merely in so far as it affects our o w n person. In the question o f perfect duties to ourselves, accordingly, Kant's general p r o b l e m is t o find criteria for determining what sort o f maxims fail, because o f their relation t o our o w n h u m ­ anity, to qualifyJior giving universal l a w . Certain maxims w i l l be dis­ qualified b e c a u s e j a e y disrupt the rational order a m o n g the ends o f man's composite animal,' rational, jaaaA m o r a l being, and the prohi2

1

Because a n y action is a use o f o u r o w n p e r s o n a n d affects it t o s o m e extent, Kant suggests that all-our duties are indirectly duties t o ourselves. For e x a m p l e , a duty o f f o r g i v i n g s o m e o n e w h o has injured us is indirectly a d u t y t o ourselves o f n o t degrading our soul w i t h hatred, a n d o u r d u t y o f b e n e v o l e n c e t o others is indirectly a d u t y t o ourselves o f m a k i n g ourselves the source o f others' happiness. C f . H . N . ( 2 ) , 403. 3

2

Cf. Vorksung, 14.6-7. 128

PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF ^

/ /

120

•

bitions against such actions will comprise perfect duties to oneself /as a moral being w i t h an animal nature. Other maxims will be dis­ qualified because, while the actions have nc\ adverse effects o n our animal nature, they are directly opposed to inner freedom and so to man's end as a moral b e i n g ; these prohibitions w i l l comprise perfect duties to oneself merely as a moral being. The first o f Kant's criteria,,, valid for both classes o f perfect duty to oneself, seems to be the formulation o f the categorical imperative w h i c h considers humanity, and more particularly humanity in one's o w n person, as an end in itself. From his general discussion o f perfect duties to oneself, it is clear that Kant intends this formula, so restricted, to indicate the immediate ground o f these duties. I have suggested' above that this principle is already an application o f the supreme'moral principle and indicated h o w it is derived' from the formula o f uni­ versal l a w . So i f K a n t can s h o w that certain maxims o f action i n v o l v e the use o f our o w n person as a mere means to our subjective ends—or, as he puts it here, i n v o l v e an 'abasement o f o u r personahty'—it w i l l follow that such maxims are inconsistent w i t h universal l a w . H i s p r o b ­ lem, then, reduces to finding criteria b y w h i c h w e can tell what sort o f maxims w o u l d i n v o l v e an abasement o f our personahty. Here, it must be admitted, Kant might have simplified matters for Iris reader. T h e most important o f his principles for bringing actions affecting our animal nature under the categorical imperative is c o n ­ tained in a remark, prelirriinary to his discussion o f these duties, w h i c h m i g h t w e l l be mistaken for a preliniinary definition o f suicide and o v e r ­ looked in favour o f his formal discussion o f that particular vice. B u t this definition o f ' a r b i t r a r y physical death' is, in fact, a definition o f all the vices o f this class qua vices; in other words, it points out the c h a r a c ­ teristic o f a m a x i m w h i c h makes our adoption o f it an abasement o f o u r personahty. Self-destruction, K a n t here explains, is either total or partial. T o t a l self-destruction is suicide; partial self-destruction consists in depriving oneself o f an organ or integral part o f the b o d y , or depriving oneself, permanently or temporarily, o f the physical and so indirecdy o f the moral use o f a p o w e r . T h a t suicide, along w i t h self-mutilation, comes 3

4

5

3

Cf. a b o v e , C h . VIII and M.d.S., 417-8-

4

Cf. a b o v e , p . 39 ff.

5

M.d.S., 421. In the Nachlass relating t o the Tugendlehre Kant suggests t h e formula mens sane in corpore sano^zs the principle o f d u t i e s t o oneself. B u t t h e ;

p r o b l e m , h e notes, is t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t constitutes 'health'. If this term is t a k e n in a w i d e e n o u g h sense, as the d u e order a m o n g the c o m p o n e n t s o f h u m a n nature, the formula w o u l d s u m m a r i z e Kant's argument. ' : 10'

JJO

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

under this definition is sufficiently clear: B u t the principle extends beyond the usual meaning o f ' s u i c i d e ' . W e shall find that in discussing the t w i n vices o f intemperance, gluttony and drunkenness, Kant c o n ­ centrates o n the fact that through them w e deprive ourselves, for a time, o f our use o f reason or o f our capacity for skilful and reflective action. O n the basis o f the Tugendlehre alone it is not clear that the re­ maining vice o f self-abuse falls under this principle; but in the P'ddagogik Kant asserts that the practice o f this vice has harmful effects—that it results in sterility, early old age, etc., so that it t o o can be described as destroying or hindering the use o f one's p o w e r s . 6

W h i l e this definition is not y e t a formal argument, it is obvious what use can be made o f it. In estabhshing that certain actions affecting ourselves are vices w e are to s h o w that the m a x i m s o f these actions are not objectively valid, in other Words, that they are irrational. N o w practical reason in general is a p o w e r o f setting and realizing ends and, this being the case, it is irrational arbitrarily to deprive ourselves o f our powers o f setting and realizing ends. It is irrational arbitrarily to impair our use o f reason itself or to deprive reason o f its use o f the other p o w e r s in effecting its purposes. This criterion, it w o u l d seem, could easily bring the actions in question directly under the supreme moral principle itself. B u t it is also clear that a m a x i m o f arbitrary self-destruction is an 'abasement o f our personality' since it subordinates our ends as rational and moral beings to the ends o f mere inclination. A n d since the principle o f our o w n humanity as an end in itself indicates the immediate g r o u n d o f perfect duties to ourselves, it is appropriate that the maxims should, be brought under this principle. Despite the apparent completeness o f this argument, K a n t goes o n to offer further criteria: the Stoic principle 'five according t o nature' and, closely related to it, the teleological conception o f our animal instincts as 'natural purposes'. A n action w h i c h is contrary to 'nature' and to 'nature's purposes', he suggests, involves an abasement o f our personality. This superfluity o f criteria itself poses a serious problem, that o f their function in the argument. B u t first w e must consider the meaning and implication o f these printioles. 7

In accordance w i t h the dictum 'live according to nature, d o not act against the ends o f y o u r nature', K a n t divides these duties o n the basis o f our animal instincts for self-preservation, sex, and nourishment. His reason is that the object o f our instincts, taken as a w h o l e , is the pre­ servation o f our animal nature and its p o w e r s , so that actions in w h i c h 8

Padagogik, 497.

7

M.d.S., 419.

8

Ibid., 420.

'

PERFECT DUTIES

TO ONESELF

I3I

w e arbitrarily destroy or w e a k e n our powers coincide with the direc­ tion o f our instincts a w a y from the objects t o w a r d w h i c h , apart f r o m the intervention o f practical reason, they w^ould inevitably tend. In themselves the animal instincts do not require practical reason in order to produce their effects. T h e y pertain, in Kant's terms, to 'natural and mechanical self-love', and in the l o w e r animals, w h i c h belong w h o l l y to nature in the narrower sense (as opposed to freedom), they are n e c ­ essarily determined to these effects. In man, h o w e v e r , 'the instincts are released from their subjective necessity. T h r o u g h his practical reason man can set up arbitrary ends for the animal instincts or use them for mere pleasure in such a w a y as to prevent them from producing the results they w o u l d inevitably produce i f he w e r e a mere animal. K a n t insists that w h i l e vices can be built o n the. instincts, the instincts are n o t themselves the root o f these vices. It is, rather, the deviation o f the i n ­ stincts from their natural function that constitutes vice,.the root o f w h i c h is therefore to be found solely in man's freedom. \ x

9

Because in man, unlike the l o w e r animals, the exercise o f the animal instincts does not take place blindly but rather according to m a x i m s , man needs a rule to guide h i m in the free use o f his instincts. T h e m o r e obvious meaning o f this rule, live according to nature, is that w e o u g h t not to divert the instincts from their natural function. B u t the dictum, so understood, can serve as a moral principle only in so far as 'nature' also means ' h u m a n nature', the g r o u n d o f all our p o w e r s — ' animal, rational, and m o r a l . T h e animal instincts are only; o n e element within the nature o f m a n and their ends must be determined, w i t h regard for his nature as a w h o l e . T h e other element in h u m a n nature is practical reason, and the fact that reason can determine a c t i o n independently o f the mclinations indicates that the end o f reason is n o t merely to procure pleasure or even happiness for man. Hence i f w e use practical reason to pervert the animal instincts, to destroy or w e a k e n the animal substratum o f h u m a n action for the sake o f mere pleasure, w e are acting contrary, to the end o f practical reason itself and s o contrary to the nature o f m a n as a w h o l e . T h e mere fact that a certain use o f the instincts is 'unnatural' is itself w i t h o u t moral significance. It becomes morally relevant o n l y o n the assumption that the 'natural' effect o f the instincts is an object w h i c h a moral being necessarily wills in so far as he has an animal nature. A s moral beings w i t h an animal 1 0

9

1 0

Cf. Religion, 26-28; cf. also Voxlesung, 151-2. F o r this use o f the t e r m 'nature' and for a discussion o f the three e l e m e n t s i n

h u m a n nature, cf. Religion, 26 ff.

132

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

nature w e necessarily will (in so far as w e w i l l rationally) the pre­ servation o f the animal m e d i u m for rational and moral action. T h u s it is our end as moral beings that ultimately determines w h a t ends w e must freely assign to our instincts and, in so far as the natural function o f the instincts coincides w i t h these ends, allows K a n t to use 'nature' in the narrower sense as an index o f moral action. Kant does not argue, simply, that w e o u g h t not to frustrate pur animal instincts; o n the contrary, he leaves it open to question whether it may not at times be obligatory, and so permissible, to act contrary to our instinct for e.g. self-preservation. T o act contrary to an instinct and to pervert it are t w o quite different things, and only the latter contains the note—all-important in Kant's procedure—that our end in acting is an arbitrary one. T h e mere frustration o f an instinct leaves it open what purpose w e m a y have in acting and whether our m a x i m o f action-toward-an-end is consistent w i t h the ends o f our being in its totality. T h e ends o f our animal nature m a y , in special cases, have to be sacrificed to the ends* o f the higher components in our being. B u t the perversion o f an instinct implies that w e sacrifice the welfare o f our animal nature to a merely subjective end and so subordinate the w i d e r ends o f our being to the ends o f mere inclination. B u t this does not y e t exhaust the implications o f 'nature' in Kant's argument. W h a t has been said so far about the instincts could be established merely b y empirical observation: it is e n o u g h t o k n o w that the instincts d o , in fact, produce actions w h i c h preserve our animal nature and its powers, and w e need n o t suppose that nature destines them to this end. B u t Kant's v i e w o f nature is a teleological o n e : through the ariimal instincts, he maintains, nature 'aims at' the pre­ servation o f the animal, o f the species, and o f the animal's p o w e r s . In the case o f each vice he argues, in effect, that an action w h i c h involves the use o f an instinct or p o w e r contrary to 'nature's purpose' for that p o w e r is a violation o f d u t y to oneself. W i t h the introduction o f these teleological considerations, the p r o b l e m o f determining the function o f 'nature' in Kant's argument becomes acute. For, according to his Critical principles, 'nature's purposes' cannot i n themselves be taken as manifestations o f (divine) reason f~the teleological v i e w o f nature has only a regulative function i n h u m a n k n o w l e d g e . T h e liberal use w h i c h K a n t makes o f natural teleology does n o t mean that he has t h r o w n his Critical caution to the w i n d s . It is in the discussion o f duties regarding the sexual instinct that the teleological aspect o f the argument is most pronounced, and it is here that K a n t refers us

PERFECT

DUTIES TO

ONESELF

133

back to the Critique of Judgment and its explanation o f natural teleo­ l o g y . There are certain phenomena in nature—namely organisms— which, he there explains, w e cannot understand merely according to the principle o f mechanical causality. O u r progress in the study o f o r g a n ­ isms depends largely u p o n our conceiving t h e m as effects o f a cause w h i c h produces them in accordance w i t h its pre-existing Idea o f them. In other w o r d s , there comes'\ a point in our study o f .nature w h e n w e must turn to the notion o f final causality, not as an explanation for the existence o f organisms (for w e do not assert that organisms are, in fact, the products o f an intelligent cause), but only as a regulative or heuristic principle for our investigation o f organized matter. T h e structure o f the human mind is such that w e cannot conceive this connection other­ wise than as if it w e r e the Idea o f the effect^ or the end, that determined the cause to act. B u t the teleological principle is a subjective one in the sense that it tells us nothing about objects o f experience themselves. Accordingly, the Tugendlehre's assertion that the instjnets are 'natural purposes' is followed b y the definition o f a 'natural purpose' as such a connection o f cause and effect that, w i t h o u t attributing intelhgence to nature, w e must conceive this connection b y analogy w i t h an inten­ tional or purposive o n e . 1 1

12

Unless Kant w e r e to argue that nature's purposes are in themselves manifestations o f reason, the teleological principle cannot o f itself establish a violation o f duty. In recognition o f this, Kant distinguishes clearly b e t w e e n our v i e w that an action is 'unnatural' and the 'rational p r o o f that the action is i m m o r a l . In connection w i t h the principle 'live according to nature' I suggested that the unnatural character o f an action is itself morally irrelevant and that 'nature' becomes morally, significant only in so far as the natural use o f our instincts coincides w i t h a rational system o f ends. T h e same point is valid for the t e l e o ­ logical consideration o f nature. A n d i f this, is the case, the criteria re­ garding 'nature' are really n o t an essential and integral part o f the argument. T h e p r o o f in fact depends, not o n a n y special attribute o f nature, but o n the relation o f a m a x i m to the order which a fully rational being w o u l d necessarily institute a m o n g the ends o f h i s - c o m 13

11

Cf. K.d.U., 372 ff.

1 2

M.d.S., 424. A distinction should b e maintained b e t w e e n the terms ^Natur-

,

.

zweck and Zweck.der Natur. A Naturzweck (natural purpose, natural end, nature's purpose) is the t y p e o f c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i n nature described a b o v e . T h e e n d o f nature (Zweck der Natur), i.e. the final end t o w h i c h nature as a w h o l e is o r d e r e d , lies b e y o n d nature. Kant h i m s e l f is n o t always careful i n his use o f these t w o t e r m s . 13

M.d.S., 425.

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

posite being. If the subsequent appeal to nature' is possible o n l y because its function and supposed purposes can be seen to coincide w i t h this rational system o f ends, then the criteria d r a w n from nature' belong only to the exposition, not to the discovery, o f w h a t c o n ­ stitutes our duty. B u t these criteria m i g h t indeed prove useful in a 'popular' w o r k on moral philosophy, such as the Metaphysik der Sitten is supposed to b e . Given the popular Stoic ethics o f Kant's time and the eighteenth century's acceptance o f a teleological nature, K a n t might well hope to 'gain an entrance to the c o m m o n understanding' by connecting his ethics w i t h 'nature' and 'nature's purposes'. T o d a y , the value o f this connection w o u l d be considerably diminished. B u t if the role of'nature' is only that o f a convenient m e d i u m for e x p o u n d ­ ing a moral argument established independently o f it, n o serious o b ­ jection can be brought to its presence in the argument. It can simply be removed without affecting the 'rational p r o o f itself. . Kant seems originally to have intended this sort o f procedure and, for the most part, to have carried it out. B u t the general coincidence o f 'nature's purposes' w i t h our rational ends, together w i t h the personal belief in a teleological nature w h i c h he betrays w h e n he is not speaking Critically, m a y have led h i m occasionally to attribute some inde­ pendent significance to nature or at least to neglect the rational p r o o f in favour o f teleological considerations. In the case o f t w o vices, selfabuse and l y i n g , he speaks as i f the mere fact that the action is ' u n ­ natural' were p r o o f o f its immorahty. Here Kant's failure to s h o w that the actions are inconsistent w i t h the ends o f human nature as a w h o l e gives the impression that he needs natural teleology in order to estab­ lish the immorahty o f actions w h i c h are c o m m o n l y considered vices. Such a conclusion w o u l d , I thmk, be unjustified or at least unduly simplified. B u t these questions can best be handled within the dis­ cussion o f specific vices. 14

15

If the relation o f Kant's criteria is as I have suggested, his procedure meets his o w n requirement for a valid moral proof: namely, that for any one duty there can be o n l y one p r o o f . For the definition o f these vices as arbitrary self-destruction brings the actions under the cate­ gorical imperative, w h i l e the considerations regarding 'nature', far from being independent proofs, are merely devices useful in e x p o u n d 16

1 4

1 5

Gr., 391. Cf. b e l o w , p. 145 f t . For examples o f non-Critical statements regarding the purposiveness o f o u r

powers, cf. Gr., 423 and 395-6. 18

M . < £ S . , 403.

O n the contrast b e t w e e n m a t h e m a t i c s and p h i l o s o p h y m e n ­

tioned here, cf. K.d.r.V. B 741 f f

^

PERFECT

DUTIES TO ONESELF^"

135

i n g the proof. A t the-same time it answers the charge that Kant's derivation o f these duties is a haphazard affair that seizes on whatever comes to hand in order to establish the traditional duties. O n the c o n ­ trary, his procedure is a systematic one. A l t h o u g h the loss o f our powers m a y predominate in his exposition o f one duty and 'nature's purposes' in another, all the considerations discussed above are present at least imphcitly in each argument. T h e systematic unity o f Kant's. method is, in fact, not limited to this particular class, o f duties; the principles e m p l o y e d here will, w i t h appropriate modifications, be carried o v e r into the discussion o f all other classes o f duties to o u r ­ selves. First, h o w e v e r , let us see h o w the argument w o r k s out in the case o f perfect duties to ourselves as moral beings w i t h an animal nature; A. . S E L F - M U R D E R

K a n t reminds us first that suicide can be called self-murder only if w e can prove that it is a transgression o f duty and that, since w e are c o n ­ sidering suicide only as a possible violation o f duty°to ourselves, w e must not p r o v e that the action is a w r o n g b y arguing from its effects o n others. T h e action may, indeed, be a violation o f our duty to others. B u t w e can prove that it is a violation o f duty t o ourselves only if, abstracting from all effects o f the action on other men, w e can s h o w that our personality lays on us an obhgation to preserve our o w n l i f e . S o far as a metaphysic o f morals is concerned, suicide is equivalent to taking one's o w n life for the sake o f an arbitrary or merely sub­ jective end. In a metaphysic o f morals, it w i l l b e recalled, w e must re­ main on the level o f ' m e n considered merely as m e n ' : w e cannot des­ cend into the contingent circumstances in w h i c h individual men m a y find themselves. A n d it is only under contingent circumstances that there might occur a case o f suicide w h i c h w o u l d not be directed to a purely subjective end. U n d e r special conditions there could arise questions o f a collision between.grounds o f obhgation, in w h i c h we might allege a duty (and hence a right) to suicide o n the grounds that our continued existence w o u l d i m p l y violation o f another duty. Such 17

"M.d.S., 422. '

•;.

„

V

1 8

In Vorlesung, 193 ff., K a n t seems t o a d m i t o n l y o n e g r o u n d o n w h i c h it is m o r a l l y permissible t o take one's o w n life: n a m e l y , i n o r d e r t o prevent a v i o l a t i o n o f h u m a n i t y in one's o w n person. T h e casuistical questions i n M.d.S., 423-4 m a y indicate further g r o u n d s . In a n y case, the distinction b e t w e e n m e r e suicide arid self-murder t o be d r a w n in casuistry is indicated clearly i n H-N.fa), 400, w h e r e , listing the topics t o b e discussed under this h e a d i n g , K a n t n o t e s : 'Die Selbstent-

leibung nicht Selbstmord'. A parallel.distinction is i m p l i e d i n t h e subsidiary question, o f self-mutilation.

*

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questions are problems in casuistry, and the fact that Kant raises them as such is another refutation o f his alleged rigorism. In principle, as w e have seen, he is quite willing to admit the existence o f necessary exceptions to the sort o f moral laws discussed in the Metaphysik der Sitten. But o n the level o f ' m e n considered merely as men', only the inclinations can provide the m o t i v e for suicide; as in the Grundle­ gung's examples, the m a x i m o f suicide w h i c h w e are to consider is n o t simply 'I will destroy m y life', but rather 'I w i l l destroy m y life w h e n life promises more pain than satisfaction'. The argument to s h o w that arbitrary suicide is a vice—self-murder— is put forward briefly. ' T o destroy the subject o f morality in one's o w n person is to root out the existence o f morality itself from the w o r l d , so far as this is in one's p o w e r ; and y e t morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose o f oneself as a mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's o w n person (homo noumenon), w h i c h was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation'. In cornmitting suicide w e are destroying the natural substratum o f personality; and i f w e destroy it merely t o a v o i d an object o f aversion to the mclinations, w e are disposing o f the subject o f morality as a mere means to our subjective e n d s . 19

20

21

Self-murder is, then, the supreme e x a m p l e o f arbitrarily depriving ourselves o f our capacity for moral actions. In analysing the concept o f 'the right o f humanity in our o w n person', w e saw that our freedom in disposing o f our o w n person is limited t o the condition o f consis­ tency with itself, and the Vorlesung explains clearly h o w arbitrary suicide is opposed to the inner ius that comprises our perfect duties to ourselves. T h e act o f self-murder, K a n t notes, oversteps every h m i t a ­ tion on the exercise o f free choice, for the exercise o f free choice is possible only i f the subject e x i s t s . M o r e specifically, our exercise o f free choice must be consistent w i t h our nature as moral agents, and 22

1 9

Gr., 422. T h e nature o f a m a x i m requires that it specify certain c o n d i t i o n s or circumstances in w h i c h w e p r o p o s e t o act i n a g i v e n w a y . This statement (in M.d.S., 423) d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o natural t e l e o l o g y , w h i c h must remain w i t h i n 'nature' in the n a r r o w e r sense. T h e religious overtones o f this assertion are d e v e l o p e d at l e n g t h i n Vorlesung, ji93- W e are, Kant says, placed in the w o r l d for a certain p u r p o s e ; t h e seh^rrmrderer is i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the e n d o f his Creator and arrives before H i m as a soldier w h o has deserted his post. T h i s is also hinted at i n M.d.S., 422. C o m p a r e Vorlesung, 53, w h e r e K a n t locates t h e 'contradiction' in a m a x i m o f self-murder i n the fact that our i n t e n t i o n t o free ourselves f r o m pain and trouble b y destroying o u r life subordinates h u m a n nature t o animal nature. 2 0

2 1

22

Vorlesung, 187.

PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF

117

/ from this it follows that w e cannot destroy the subject o f duty unless w e have the moral title to do so. As the Tugendlehre puts it, 'man cannot 'renounce his personahty so long as he is a subject o f duty, hence so l o n g as he lives; and that he should have the W o r a l title to w i t h d r a w from all obhgation, i.e. freely to act as i f he needed no moral title for this action, is a contradiction'. T h e only ground on w h i c h w e could, consistently w i t h our status as subjects o f duty, destroy ourselves w o u l d be that duty requires it and s 6 gives us the moral title .to do it. B u t o n the level o f m e n as such, our first duty to ourselves as' moral beings with an animal nature is to preserve our animal nature. T h e teleological aspect o f Kant's argument against self-murder is not to be found w i t h i n his formal discussion o f this vice. That he v i e w s the matter in the light o f natural teleology is clear, h o w e v e r , both f r o m his previous classification o f the animal instincts and f r o m incidental remarks in his subsequent discussion o f self-abuse. Just as the natural function o f ' l o v e o f life' is to preserve the individual, he argues, so that o f sexual l o v e is to preserve the species. T h e v i e w that b o t h o f these instincts are 'natural purposes' takes us back t o the Grundlegung s discussion o f suicide: in committing arbitrary suicide w e are using our 'love o f life', our instinct for self-preservation, contrary to nature's purpose and so violating a duty to ourselves. F r o m Kant's 'rational p r o o f regarding self-murder, it is clear that the immorality o f arbitrary suicide can be established independendy o f teleological considerations and that these can serve only as a device for the popular exposition o f the proof. B u t the impact o f this device is weakened b y the fact that, at first glance, arbitrary suicide does n o t really l o o k like the use o f an instinct contrary to its natural end. I f we regard the instinct for self-preservation as directed t o the preservation o f the individual, it follows that in self-murder w e are acting c o n ­ trary to its natural end. B u t it is not clear that w e are using this same instinct contrary to its natural end, i.e. that it is the instinct for "selfpreservation that leads us to destroy ourselves. It w o u l d seem, rather, that w e are using ^another natural desire—our desire for happiness—to frustrate our ' l o v e o f life' and prevent it from fulfilling its function. I f the role o f natural teleology in the Tugendlehre is at all similar to its role in the Grundlegung (and I shall argue that it is), the question is o f s o m e importance. For in order to obtain the necessary contradiction in o u r maxini conceived as a l a w o f nature, it must be one and the same instinct that acts contrary to its'natural end. M.d.S., 422. Ibid., 424. 23

24

23

2 4

1

I38

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The close connection that Kant conceives between the instinct for self-preservation and the natural desire for happiness found in rational beings with a sensuous nature seems to provide the link required. W h a t the Tugendlehre calls ' l o v e o f life' is described in the Grundlegung as 'self-love', a feeling whose fimction it is t o promote life. In c o m ­ mitting suicide o n the ' m a x i m o f self-love', that is, the m a x i m o f cutting short one's life w h e n its continued existence promises m o r e pain than enjoyment, one is destroying life t h r o u g h the same feeling whose function it is to promote l i f e . N o w K a n t identifies the rational prin­ ciple o f self-love w i t h that o f prudence, w h i c h prescribes the means for the agent to attain happiness. If self-love w e r e reduced to the level o f mere animal instinct it w o u l d b e c o m e an undifferentiated desire for well-being in general, and this is presumably w h a t Kant means b y ' l o v e o f life'. O n the level o f animal instinct n o distinction is made between life itself and a particular condition o f life: in other w o r d s , the animal's instinct for self-preservation is one w i t h its desire for well-being. T h e same instinct, K a n t seems to say, is present in man. B u t m a n does not act blindly upon this instinct. H e bases m a x i m s o n it, and in these he can distinguish between life itself and a state o f well-being or happiness. T h e ' p o i n t o f the argument seems to b e that nature's purpose in this instinct is not the happiness o f the individual but rather his self-preser­ vation, that his l o v e o f well-being is intended b y nature to lead h i m to avoid obstacles to his continued existence. A n d w h e n man uses his l o v e o f well-being, not to preserve his life, but to destroy it, he is using his love o f life contrary to its natural end. 26

26

There are several points o f interest in this discussion o f self-murder. O n e is that the teleological considerations add nothing to the argument itself and that K a n t indicates this b y the cursory w a y in w h i c h he introduces them. Another is that the use o f our instinct for self-preser­ vation contrary to its natural end coincides exactly w i t h the carefully defined act o f self-murder. If w e sacrifice our life on the grounds that it is our duty, w e are not using our instinct for self-preservation c o n ­ trary to its natural end (although w e are acting contrary to this instinct), and .neither are w e committing self-murder. O n l y the use o f this instinct contrary to its natural end enibodies all the conditions that make the act a violation o f duty, and it is because o f this coincidence that the teleological principle can be used to point out an abasement o f personality. Kant's discussion o f self-murder is a m o d e l one w i t h Gr., 422.

26

KJ.py.i36.

/

PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF

I39

regard to the relation o f the principles involved. B u t the following discussion o f self-abuse presents complications. B.

SELF-ABUSE

2 7

If Kant made only a perfunctory use o f the teleological principle in his discussion o f self-murder, he allows it to dominate his discussion o f self-abuse, to the extent o f obscuring the rational p r o o f itself. T h e moral argument here, as in all the vices o f this class, turns up6n the abasement o f personahty i n v o l v e d in subordinating the rational ends o f our being to mere inclination. B u t Kant fails to explain the precise meaning o f the objective, moral end in question. T h e Padagogik, w e have seen, discusses the vice in terms o f the p r e ­ servation o f the individual's powers and so brings it clearly under the definition o f all these vices as total or partial suicide. B u t this point is not mentioned in the Tugendlehre's formal discussion o f the vice. Referring back to his classification o f the instincts in terms o f nature's purposes, Kant stresses instead the deviation o f the instinct from its natural end, and nature's purpose in the sexual instinct is not the pre­ servation o f the agent but rather o f the species. Hence the rational proof here m a y be s o m e w h a t different f r o m that used in self-murder and intemperance, w h e r e K a n t is dealing w i t h the preservation o f the agent and his powers. Kant's emphasis o n natural teleology here makes his argument, implicitly, that o f the Vorlesung: that the preservation o f the species, the production o f moral agents, is one o f the 'ends o f humanity', one o f the objects o f man's rational w i l l . Accordingly, in using the sexual instinct for mere pleasure w h i l e preventing nature's purpose from being realized, one is subordinating the rational ends o f one's animal being to the ends o f mere mclination. , 2 8

Granting that K a n t can p r o v e the immorahty o f self-abuse indepen­ dently o f the teleological principle, o n the basis o f its opposition to man's system o f rational ends, it m a y seem strange that he should put such emphasis o n teleological considerations here w h e n he mentioned them only in passing w i t h regard to self-murder. T h e answer seems t o 2 7

Kant's title, ' O n Carnal S e l f - D e f i l e m e n t ' , a l o n g w i t h certain remarks i n b o t h the formal discussion a n d casuistical questions, m a y i n d i c a t e that h e intends these principles t o c o v e r unnatural v i c e in general, as a transgression o f d u t y t o oneself. Vorlesung, 212-4. K a n t also m e n t i o n s , i n Padagogik, 497, that the practice ofthis v i c e results i n a state o f m i n d inconsistent w i t h m o r a l i t y . H e is p r o b a b l y referring t o the loss o f respect for one's o w n person m e n t i o n e d i n the Tugend­ lehre. T o stress this p o i n t , h o w e v e r , w o u l d b e to treat the v i c e m o r e as a v i o l a t i o n o f d u t y t o o n e s e l f ' m e r e l y as a m o r a l being'. ' 2 8

P

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be that only the vice o f self-abuse provides Kant w i t h the opportunity to connect his moral argument clearly w i t h natural teleology and so to utilize the credentials to be gained b y such a connection. Apart from the preliminary classification o f the instincts in terms o f nature's pur­ poses, the connection between natural teleology and the vices o f selfmurder and intemperance can be made only b y a tour de force. In the case o f self-abuse, h o w e v e r , natural teleology is m o r e closely c o n ­ nected w i t h the moral proof, and this because o f our moral intuition o f the action. 'That such an unnatural use (and so misuse) o f one's sexual p o w e r is a violation o f duty to o n e s e l f . . . ,' K a n t asserts, 'occurs to everyone immediately, along w i t h the thought o f i t . . . ' A s soon as w e see w h a t the action involves, w e have an immediate insight into its moral character, w h i c h precedes our reasoning about duty. In fact, our i m ­ mediate recognition o f the action's i m m o r a h t y is based, not on the belief that it is unnatural, but on our obscure consciousness o f our d i g ­ nity as subjects o f morally legislative r e a s o n . B u t t o call the vice 'unnatural' is to arouse this feeling for our o w n humanity. In the order o f nature enjoyment accompanies the exercise o f the animal instincts, but this pleasure is not itself'nature's purpose'. T o carry out the per­ sonification o f nature i n v o l v e d in the teleological v i e w o f organisms, w e might conceive o f nature as adding this enjoyment as a means to assure that its end, the preservation o f the animal, w i l l be realized. In the unnatural use o f an instinct w e disregard the welfare o f our animal nature and take as our end merely the pleasure that accompanies the exercise o f the instinct. W e use w h a t is distinctively h u m a n in our actions (practical reason) in order to deny, practically speaking, our distinctively h u m a n end and so, in a sense, degrade ourselves b e l o w the level o f the brute animals. W h a t produces our m o r a l intuition o f an unnatural action is, then, our recognition o f the discrepancy between our dignity as subjects o f legislative reason and the use o f ourselves as mere means for gratifying the animal appetites. 2 9

30

N o w this discrepancy is present in self-murder and intemperance, as well as in self-abuse: it is w h a t constitutes the abasement o f person­ ality involved in ail o f them. Y e t o u r j s e r c e p t i o n o f the 'unnatural' character o f suicide produces n o such moral intuition; o n the contrary, Kant reminds us, the Stoics considered suicide the prerogative o f the Sage. T h e reason for this failure o f insight, he suggests, is that the attitude o f will required for suicide is quite different from that present 29

M.d.S., 425.

3 0

Ibid., 216.

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in self-abuse, w h i c h , as a mere 'feeble surrender' to the animal impulses, robs the agent o f all respect for his o w n person. T h o u g h our end in arbitrary suicide is an end o f inclination, the means for attaining this end requires courage, an attitude w h i c h is analogous, in some respects, to a moral attitude o f will and w h i c h is therefore compadble w i t h re­ spect for our o w n p e r s o n . In the discussion o f suicide, accordingly, Kant relegates the teleological v i e w o f the action t o the background. In the case o f intemperance, toQ, there are obstacles t o this v i e w : the teleological principle does not cover all the actions that Kant wants to include under intemperance; moreover, the irrationality o f the actions 'leaps to the e y e ' quite apart from their relation t o 'nature'. H a v i n g chosen natural teleology as the general m e d i u m for expounding the vices o f this category, K a n t does connect the moral arguments for suicide and intemperance w i t h 'nature's purposes', but in the most casual w a y . O n l y in the question o f self-abuse does he find a real opportunity for clairrung the advantages to be gained b y an appeal t o nature and its purposes. „ 31

T h e casuistical questions that f o l l o w Kant's formal discussion o f self-abuse are o f interest for t w o reasons: first, his suggestion that the rational end involved in the sexual iiLstinct is not limited to procreation, and second, his remarks o n the imperfect duty o f practising the virtues opposed t o vices w h i c h are violations o f perfect duty to oneself. Since Kant gives us only the problems and n o t the answers to them, there is undoubtedly some danger i n v o l v e d in d r a w i n g conclusions regarding his o w n position. Y e t certain general principles seem to be implicit in his discussion. Certain aspects o f the relation between the sexes have been treated in the Rechtslehre. Here K a n t is concerned only w i t h duty to oneself, so that the questions n o w raised apply even to relations within marriage. In brief, he suggests that, w h i l e the actual frustration o f 'nature's p u r ­ pose' is vice, the use o f the sexual p o w e r merely ' w i t h o u t regard for' that purpose—that is, at times w h e n the wife cannot conceive—is open to casuistical treatment. Is such action, like the unnatural use o f the p o w e r , a transgression o f duty? O r is there, in this case, 'a permissive l a w o f morally practical reason w h i c h , in the clash o f its determiriing grounds, makes permissible something that is in itself n o t allowed (as i f indulgently), in order to prevent a greater violation o f d u t y ? ' ^ 52

3

31

M.d.S., 425.

3 2

Cf. M.d.S., 276 ff. This is the discussion t o w h i c h K a n t is referring i n ibid., 424.

33

M.d.S., 426.

•

•: •

: ,,

142

LAWS

OF F R E E D O M

Although Kant's manner o f posing the question is not altogether free from confusion, he seems to suggest mat the action is not a violation o f perfect duty to oneself and that the exception w h i c h morally practical reason might permit in this case is an exception t o the imperfect d u t y o f practising the virtue opposed t o the v i c e o f impurity. N , o w the practice o f a virtue requires n o t merely that one refrain from vice but also that, as a general rule, one restrict the mclinations w i t h i n such limits that they w i l l not occasion the danger o f v i c e . B u t these limits are difficult to determine. A c c o r d i n g l y , K a n t n o w asks at w h a t point the hmitation o f the latitude present in w i d e duty becomes moral' purism or pedantry, and w h e n a certain free play should be permitted the inclinations, even considering the risk o f vice i n v o l v e d in it. I f s o m e good end is to be achieved b y the free play o f the inclinations, then it may be permissible to relax the restrictions that virtue generally i m ­ poses on them, even i f there is s o m e danger that the inclination, gather­ ing strength from its exercise, m i g h t tempt one to vice. A n d in the case at hand Kant seems to suggest that there are g o o d ends to be achieved: in the first place, the freedom permitted m a y prevent 'a greater v i o ­ lation o f duty' (although i f the freedom is really permitted, h o w can it be a transgression o f duty at all?); in the second place, he argues that while the sexual instinct in itself has nothing in c o m m o n w i t h 'moral love', w h i c h is an attitude o f w i l l , 'it can enter into close union w i t h moral love under the limiting conditions o f practical r e a s o n . ' A l ­ though these casuistical questions are problems for the individual's judgment, K a n t does seem to provide certain general principles for the guidance o f j u d g m e n t in applying the l a w . 3 4

35

C. I N T E M P E R A N C E

3 6

T h e keynote o f this discussion is set in Kant's definition o f intemper­ ance—a definition w h i c h is o n l y a m o r e specific f o r m o f that o f 'partial self-murder'. W e ought not, he explains, to consider drunkenness and gluttony in terms o f the painful effects or diseases they m a y produce, that is to say, in terms o f their relation t o our happiness; for such c o n ­ siderations w o u l d p r o v e only that t h e y a r e contrary to prudential rules. In defining these vices w e must rather indicate i n w h a t the transgression o f duty consists. Thus w e define intemperance in f o o d and drink as a misuse o f these b y w h i c h w e impair our ability to use our p o w e r s 8 4

3 5

Cf. above, p . 109 ff. M.d.S„ 426. Again, Kant's title is 'On Self-Stupefaction by Immoderation in the Use of Food and Drink'I The title indicates where the vice lies, i.e. in 'self-stupefaction'. 3 6

(

PERFECT DUTIES

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ONESELF

143

37

pylrposively. T h r o u g h intemperance w e hinder first, our use o f reason itself and secondly, our capacity for carrying out actions in accordance w i t h reason. B y drunkenness, Kant explains, w e renounce for a time the use o f our rational powers and so reduce ourselves to the level o f animals. B y gluttony w e render ourselves incapable o f actions w h i c h w o u l d require adroitness and deliberation. W h a t makes in­ temperance a violation o f duty; to oneself is the fact that it involves impairing the rational use o f one's powers for an arbitrary end. That a transgression o f duty is i n v o l v e d in deliberately placing oneself in such a state, again, 'leaps to the e y e ' . A l t h o u g h Kant's argument stops at this point, it is obviously to be completed b y the assertion that such a use o f one's o w n person is an abasement o f one's personahty. A l t h o u g h the connection o f intemperance w i t h the teleological principle has been made in Kant's prehminary classification o f duties, the rational argument in this case is so clear that no reference to the un­ natural character o f the action is made in t h e formal discussion o f the vice. M o r e o v e r , the teleological principle does not serve to illustrate all the actions that K a n t wishes to consider under the vice o f intem­ perance. E v e n i f w e agree that gluttony comes under the notion o f using an instinct contrary to its natural end, it is difficult to believe that excess in the use o f alcoholic beverages is a perversion o f our instinct for nourishment. A n d in the discussion itself, as w e l l as in the casuistical questions, K a n t mentions actions w h i c h are related to intemperance in so far as they liinder our capacity for rational action, but w h i c h could hardly be regarded as perversions o f a natural instinct—for example, the use o f o p i u m and other drugs. T h e only principle invoked in the argument itself is the definition o f all these actions as arbitrary self-destruction, the impairment o f our rational p o w e r s merely for the sake o f pleasure. In w h a t w o u l d strictly be called intemperance w e can reasonably assume that the agent's end is mere enjoyment. In actions w h e r e this assumption cannot be made, Kant specifies that the vice consists in the action-toward-an-end considered as a w h o l e . H e notes, for example, t h a t t h e use o f narcotics for the sake o f the false sense o f , well-being they produce is w r o n g , whereas their medicinal use,, a l ­ though it too hinders our capacity for rational action, is permissible. 38

W e have noticed before Kant's v i e w that the vices o f this category are a renunciation, for the sake o f animal satisfaction, ofiwhat is dis­ tinctively h u m a n in our actions; and i f it is practical reason that dis­ tinguishes h u m a n action from animal behaviour, intemperance is per37

, M . d . S . , 420 and 427.

3 8

Ibid., 428.

^

*

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haps the clearest example o f reversing the hierarchy a m o n g the elements in our being. K a n t carries This argument so far as to assert that, o f the t w o forms o f intemperance, gluttony is the more degrading because it has to do only w i t h the passive p o w e r o f sense, whereas excess in drink at least stimulates the active p o w e r o f i m a g i n a t i o n . This remark is undoubtedly connected w i t h Kant's v i e w that the use o f w i n e has a moral end, b e y o n d mere physical enjoyment, since it stimulates the free exchange o f ideas and so promotes the virtues o f social inter­ course. B u t the contrast noted b e t w e e n sense and imagination ii also a contrast between the purely animal p o w e r s and the distinctively human powers. In so far as imagination is an active p o w e r it is closely associated w i t h the understanding, and excess in drink is the less degrad­ ing o f the t w o vices because, w h i l e it hinders full rational use o f the powers, it at least stimulates a p o w e r that is distinctively human rather than purely animal. 39

40

W i t h the discussion o f intemperance K a n t concludes his analysis o f perfect duties to oneself as a moral being w i t h an animal nature. I have suggested that Kant's criterion for deriving these duties is the notion that certain actions arbitrarily destroy or impair our natural p o w e r s and so our capacity for moral action. T h i s principle, along w i t h the prohibition against abasing our personality, w h i c h indicates the i m m e ­ diate ground o f perfect duties t o oneself, forms the moral p r o o f . Having established that certain actions are immoral, K a n t then turns to the notion o f a teleological nature in order to gain admittance for his conclusions t o the rninds o f his readers. Despite occasional lapses, the proper role o f nature's purposes is o n l y that o f bringing the moral laws in question 'closer to intuition'. T h e connection between the moral argument and the teleological principle m i g h t be left at this. B u t o n the other hand it seems likely that in appealing to nature's purposes K a n t is referring us back to his 'universal l a w o f nature' formulation o f the categorical imperative, or attempting to s h o w us that maxims o f action which are violations o f duty cannot be conceived as universal (teleo­ logical) laws o f nature. 41

39

4 1

MAS., 427.

4 0

Ibid., 428; cf. also Vorlesung, 200.

In Vorlesung, 151-4, Kant argues that i f o u r f r e e d o m o r n o n - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y immediate .sensuous impulse is used .in such a w a y as t o b e inconsistent w i t h t h e greatest use o f f r e e d o m , w e are i n conflict w i t h 'the essential ends o f h u m a n i t y ' and so w i t h ourselves. T h i s passage s h o u l d b e read i n its entirety, since it is a m o r e abstract and general statement o f t h e principles implicit i n Kant's derivation o f duties to ourselves.

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145

/If this is the case, the role w h i c h natural teleology plays in the Tugendlehre is already foreshadowed in the Grundlegung. In his c o m ­ mentary o n the latter w o r k Professor Paton has s h o w n that the 'universal law o f nature' formula, particularly in questions o f duty to oneself, takes ' l a w o f nature' to be teleological l a w . In order to deterrnine whether our m a x i m can be conceived and willed as universal law, K a n t tells us, w e should ask whether w e can conceive and w i l l it as a l a w o f n a t u r e . For example, in order t o determine w h e t h e r a m a x i m o f ar­ bitrary suicide is objectively valid w e should ask w h e t h e r i t could b e a universal l a w o f nature that the instinct for self-preservation should function to the end o f destroying, rather than maintaining, life. W e cannot, he argues, conceive a system o f nature i n w h i c h end-directed powers w o u l d produce the contrary o f their natural ends; and w e can­ not, therefore, conceive such a m a x i m as a universal l a w o f nature. In the Tugendlehre Kant appears to extend'this procedure to all o u r animal instincts and natural powers. T h e possibility o f doing so m a y , in fact, have given him further reason for inaking the animal instincts the basis o f division in our duties regarding o u r animal nature. 4 2

43

T h e conclusions o f Professor R e i c h ' s study o n ' K a n t and G r e e k Ethics', especially w i t h regard to the status o f the ' l a w o f nature' for­ mula and its relation to the supreme moral principle, seem to confirm indirectly the v i e w that Kant's appeal to 'nature's purposes' is an i m ­ plicit use o f the l a w o f nature f o r m u l a . This study suggests that it w a s the popular Stoic formula convenienter naturae vivere w h i c h gave K a n t his clue that the notion o f a l a w o f nature could b e used to represent the moral l a w . W h i l e K a n t maintains that w e must n o t derive the supreme moral principle f r o m the constitution o f h u m a n nature, so that the conformity o f actions w i t h the l a w o f nature is n o t the p r i n - ' ciple o f morality itself, he can, b y interpreting 'nature' as an ideal o r w h a t w e can rationally w i l l t o be, take advantage 6f the effects w h i c h the notion o f a l a w o f nature will have. N o w if, in o u r use o f the animal instincts, w h a t w e can rationally will t o b e coincides w i t h the actually existing tendencies o f nature, the effect o f representing moral laws as teleological laws o f nature will be even greater. W h a t w e can rationally w i l l to be must b e determined independently, without refer­ ence to 'nature's purposes'. B u t i f w e then find.that the supposed teleo44

42

Cf. The Categorical Imperative, p . 146 ff.

4 3

O n the v a l u e o f using the l a w o f nature formula, cf. K.d.p.V., 69-70. * C f . Klaus R e i c h : 'Kant a n d Greek Ethics', Mind X L V I I I (1939), pp. 338-54 and 446-63. 4

11

>

I46

LAWS

OF

FREBDOM

l o g y o f nature is w o r k i n g t o w a r d moral ends, w e can refer t o the propensities and constitution o f h u m a n nature as concrete repre­ sentations o f moral law. The formula o f the l a w o f nature, so interpreted, is subject to Hmitations. As w e have seen, the moral principles m a y establish that actions which do not i n v o l v e the use o f an instinct contrary to its natural end are vices in relation to our animal nature. In the case o f these actipns it could still be argued, o f course, that w e cannot conceive the m a x i m as a law o f nature; but the argument w o u l d not have the full effect it has in the other cases. T h e m o r e serious hmitation o n the formula, h o w r ever, is revealed in Kant's discussion o f l y i n g , w h e r e the use o f our power o f speech contrary to its natural end is not necessarily the use o f it for our merely subjective ends. W e m a y n o t be able to conceive it as a teleological l a w o f nature that our p o w e r o f speech should be directed a w a y from its natural purposiveness, the communication o f bur thoughts, and yet w e m a y hesitate t o accept Kant's v i e w that e v e r y intentional untruth is a*violation o f duty. O n c e w e enter into duties to ourselves merely as moral beings, w h e r e v i c e consists not in the use o f specific powers or instincts contrary to the ends o f our natural being but rather in the adoption o f principles contrary to the end o f our moral being,, the l a w o f nature formula is less effective. Perhaps it is because o f these limitations that Kant's use o f the formula is not an explicit, thorough-going and methodical one. Y e t in spite o f them, he apparendy thinks its value is sufficient to justify its use w h e r e v e r possible. Before g o i n g o n to the next class o f duties, h o w e v e r , w e should take this occasion t o note the injustice w i t h w h i c h some o f Kant's critics attribute to h i m the v i e w that in determining our duties w e must ignore the consequences o f our actions. T h e point o f this criticism— that w e cannot j u d g e the m o r a l character o f an action in abstraction from its results—is w e l l made. B u t Kant's actual derivation o f duties makes it quite clear that nothing is further f r o m his mind. A l t h o u g h w e have not followed his derivation o f imperfect duties, it seems clear that this criticism cannot refer t o duties^vhich consist in h a v i n g m a x i m s o f promoting certain ends o r s t n v i n g t o effect certain results. T h e criticism must have to d o w i t h Kant's position regarding perfect duty, and it seems to arise f r o m his v i e w that the principle o f d u t y is a formal one. Kant's radical opposition t o ethical hedonism in any form and his stress on the a^riori source o f the moral l a w lead liim to insist repeatedly

/

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147

/that w e cannot regard an action as moral or i m m o r a l merely o n the grounds that w e like or dislike the results o f the action, nor even o n the grounds that the action w i l l contribute to\our happiness or be pre­ judicial to it. It is, rather, the form o f the maxim—its consistency o r inconsistency w i t h universal law—that determines its morality. B u t in order to decide w h a t f o r m our m a x i m has, w e must take into c o n ­ sideration the immediate results o f the action. In the case o f juridical duties, w e determine the legality o f actions b y reference to their effects o n outer freedom; i f an action has as its consequence interference w i t h another's pursuit o f his ends, the action is contrary to the principle o f L a w . B u t it is in perfect duties to ourselves regarding our animal nature that the relevance o f consequences is most striking. W h a t makes certain actions vices o f this type is precisely the fact that these actions have the consequence o f destroying our powers or hmdering us in the use o f them. C o u l d w e ask for a clearer refutation o f the charge b r o u g h t against K a n t than his definition o f these vices as 'total or partial selfmurder' ? It is arbitrary to d r a w a line between an action itself and its i m m e ­ diate consequences—between the action o f m u r d e r or theft and its effect o f depriving the v i c t i m o f his life or property, between the action o f suicide or intemperance and the total o r partial destruction o f our capacities for rational and moral action. A n d Kant has n e v e r suggested that w e can j u d g e the form o f an action in abstraction f r o m these consequences. H e insists that i f the action is, b y its form, a v i o ­ lation o f outer freedom or an abasement o f o u r personahty , then the m o r e remote consequences o f the action d o n o t justify us i n seeking them b y means o f the action. B u t in j u d g i n g the f o r m o f the m a x i m o f action w e cannot abstract from such consequences as are, in fact, a part o f the action itself. 4

CHAPTER X

PERFECT MERELY

DUTIES

T O

AS A M O R A L

ONESELF BEING

All transgressions o f perfect duty to oneself consist o f maxims contrary, to the ends o f our nature; the principle 'live according to nature, do not act contrary to the ends o f y o u r nature' is the principle o f all perfect duties to oneself. T h e vices discussed in the preceding chapter were, w e found, actions contrary in the first place to the objective ends of our animal nature and so contrary to the ends o f human nature as. a whole. T h e special principle o f perfect duties to oneself merely as a moral being is the prohibition against acting contrary to the end o f our nature as moral beings, and Kant explains in w h a t this end c o n ­ sists. Such violations o f duty, he tells us, are directed against 'man's character as a moral being (according to its v e r y form)—that is, c o n ­ trary to inner freedom, the inherent dignity o f man'. Inner freedom is an attitude in w h i c h choice is free f r o m the influence o f the mclinations and open to that o f pure practical reason; and w h a t makes lying, avar­ ice, and servility vices is that the m a x i m o f each is a principle o f subordmating our p o w e r o f choice t o the ends o f mclination. T h e prin­ ciple o f this class o f duties is, accordingly, a 'prohibition against r o b b i n g oneself o f a moral being's prerogative—that o f acting according t o ' principles (i.e. inner freedom)—and so m a k i n g oneself a plaything o f mere mclination and hence a t h i n g ' . 1

A l l violations o f perfect duty to oneself are, admittedly, contrary to inner freedom. W h a t Kant wishes to point out b y defining the vices n o w in question in terms o f their direct opposition to inner freedom is that these vices consist not so m u c h in isolated actions as in the re­ flective adoption o f certain maxims. It is b y actions that w e destroy our animal nature, but it is b y attitudes o f w i l l that w e negate our moral being. In performing any action w e act u p o n a m a x i m ; but there can be, so to^speak, different levels o f m a x i m s or principles. There is a basic difference between the moral attitude o f a m a n w h o has adopted a virtuous principle but, under the influence o f some strong sensuous impulse, performs an action that deviates f r o m this principle, and that o f the man w h o has deliberately adopted a vice into his character. In the first case, assuming that the action is really a human action, the agent acts upon a m a x i m ; but w h e n the impulse subsides he rejects M.d.S., 420. 1

148

Hi

PERFECT

DUTIES TO ONESELF

149

tfhat m a x i m . Such actions Kant attributes to the 'frailty o f human hature', w h i c h means that w e are often hindered b y oUr mclinations 'when it comes to putting our virtuous resolutions into practice. B u t avarice, servility, and the kind o f decdtfufntss w i t h w h i c h Kant is particularly concerned are not isolated actions to w h i c h one is swept b y a sudden impulse. T h e y consist, rather, in reflectively adopted principles or (to use Professor Paton's term) 'policies o f action'. T h e y are directly opposed to inner freedom because in t h e m w e adopt a basic attitude o f disregard for our end as moral beings. In self-deceit w e refuse to regard ourselves as subject to an unconditioned imperative as such; in avarice w e subject our state o f mind to riches; in servility w e g i v e up our dignity as persons in order to obtain favour w i t h others. These vices are, practically speaking, a false valuation o f ourselves—the contrary virtue is iustum sui aestimium—because in them w e rnake\it our principle to g i v e o v e r the determination o f our choice to the mclinations. 2

3

T o consider the matter from a slightly different viewpoint, w e m i g h t ask whether a so-called impulsive.action, together w i t h its m o m e n t ­ arily adopted m a x i m , is a vice. In one sense, i f the action is a violation o f perfect duty it must be called a vice. T h e scheme w h i c h Kant p r o ­ poses is: let virtue equal 'a', absence o f virtue or moral weakness equal '0', and vice equal ' — a ' ; and any violation o f perfect duty is v i c e . B u t he also refers to a 'true vice' or 'qualified vice', describing this as a vice in the sense o f a basic principle. In the case o f a permanent p r o ­ pensity as distinguished f r o m a sudden and transient impulse, he tells us, w e have the opportunity to reflect upon the propensity, 'to Brood o n it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up the evil, as premeditated, into our m a x i m ; and it is then a qualified evil, i.e. a true v i c e ' . N o w the fact that an exercise o f the animal instincts tends to be accompanied or preceded b y sensuous impulse implies that such actions are likely t o occur under conditions in w h i c h they w o u l d n o t be 'true vices'. S u c h transgressions o f duty m i g h t , o f course, b e c o m e policies o f action; b u t the deliberate, reflective adoption o f a principle o f vice is not included in their concept. T h e frailty o f human nature, as K a n t points out, is quite compatible w i t h a. g o o d will. O n the other hand, violations o f 4

5

2

Cf. b e l o w , p. 157 and 172-6.

5

Ibid.,

.

3

M.d.S., 420.

4

Bid., 384.

408. In this passage Kant is distinguishing b e t w e e n Affekten and Leidenschaften, according t o the principles m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , p . 73. A l t h o u g h I d o n o t m e a n t o i m p l y that p r o p e n s i t i e s , t o self-deceit, avarice a n d servility are Leidenslhaften, t h e y s e e m t o share the reflective, premeditated character o f the vices w h i c h can be built o n these.

LAWS

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OF

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perfect duty to oneself merely as a moral being arc, b y definition, settled and habitual attitudes o f disregard for our capacity for moral choice, based o n permanent propensities to self-deceit, hypocrisy, and avarice. A s such, they are directly Contrary to our end as moral beings because inner freedom, and hence virtue, cannot co-exist w i t h any one o f them. In the vices n o w under discussion, accordingly, it is the attitude from which our actions proceed, rather than the actions themselves, that constitutes vice. Since Kant treats avarice and servility in just this w a y , his discussions o f these vices are relatively simple and straightforward. In the case o f lying, h o w e v e r , the rigour o f his attitude on this subject leads him to depart from the definition o f vice in relation to our m o r a l end which he has just laid d o w n and to regard every deliberate untruth as a violation o f duty. His discussion o f l y i n g is, accordingly, in some respects the weak point in his derivation o f duties. A.

LYING

A t a casual reading, Kant's discussion o f l y i n g is, perhaps, one o f the most perlexing chapters in the Tugendlehre. O n the one hand K a n t makes it quite clear that he considers truthfulness a duty o f singular importance. L y i n g , he maintains, is the greatest violation o f man's duty to humanity in his o w n person; b y a he m a n 'throws a w a y and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a m a n ' . O n the other hand w e search this chapter in vain for any real p r o o f that lying, as K a n t explicitly defines the term, is a violation o f d u t y to oneself. In defining the vice o f l y i n g as a violation o f duty to ourselves rather than to others, K a n t reminds us, w e must n o t take into consideration the harm that a He might d o to other m e n . If w e treat l y i n g as a violation o f duty t o others, then certain lies violate the rights o f others and b e l o n g to Rechtslehre, while other lies, w h i c h m a y h a r m others but w h i c h can­ not be brought under strict right, violate our duty o f benevolence to others. B u t i f w e treat l y i n g as a violation o f duty to ourselves, then every intentional untruth, and n o t merely those that are harmful t o others, must be considered a lie, that is, a violation o f duty. A he (in 6

7

6 7

MAS., 429. Cf. MAS., 238 and note, and 403. In4flVcssay On an Alleged Right to Lie from

Benevolence, K a n t treats l y i n g as a v i o l a t i o n o f d u t y t o others. H e r e h e argues that any intentional untruth, e v e n t h o u g h it h a r m s n o particular person, is a v i o l a t i o n o f 'the right o f h u m a n i t y ' and so a v i o l a t i o n o f d u t y t o others because it u n d e r m i n e s the basis o f contracts and civil s o c i e t y is f o u n d o n a contract. N e e d l e s s t o say, h e is here using 'right' in a sense w i d e r t h a n t h e juridical m e a n i n g .

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/the ethical rather than the legal sense) is any deliberate untruth, whether it be told maliciously Or in jest or even in order to achieve a 'really g o o d end', such as the welfare o f others. T o prove the i m m o r a l i t y o f any intentional untruth, even one told unselfishly to save the life o f an innocent person, seems a formidable task, and w e should expect an argument in proportion to it. B u t K a n t seems to regard any such p r o o f as almost superfluous. 'It is clear o f itself, he remarks, that in ethics every intentional untruth must be considered a violation o f duty, since 'dishonour . . . accompanies the liar like his s h a d o w ' . A s the discussion progresses, h o w e v e r , he does add t w o remarks—one d r a w n from the notion o f perfect duty as such, the other from natural t e l e o l o g y — w h i c h m a y be intended as proofs. In each case, though, there are serious objections to the argument implied. 8

9

H a v i n g asserted that it is morally impossible to he in any c i r c u m ­ stances, K a n t explains that a he, even as a'means to a really g o o d end, is ' b y its mere form a w r o n g to one's o w n p e r s o n ' . This statement he apparently considers a particular appHcation o f the principle under­ l y i n g perfect duty as such: namely, that the m a x i m o f an 'action, as a means to an end', comes under the limiting condition o f the formal principle o f action—so act that y o u r m a x i m could b e c o m e a universal l a w . It w i l l be noted, h o w e v e r , that in applying this principle t o lying, K a n t wishes, apparently, to consider the m a x i m o f lying i n a b ­ straction from its purposiveness or to make the end for w h i c h w e are acting irrelevant in j u d g i n g the moraHty o f the action, and in this w a y to m a k e the prohibition against deHberate untruth an absolutely u n ­ conditioned one. B u t i f his criterion for deriving perfect duties to o n e ­ self is the consistency o f our ends w i t h the ends o f h u m a n nature as a w h o l e , this manner o f j u d g i n g the form o f the m a x i m leaves us, i n effect, w i t h n o criterion for determining the moraHty or irnmoraHty o f telling a deHberate untruth. In general terms, his procedure w i t h regard to l y i n g is not consistent w i t h his n o t i o n o f perfect d u t y as such, w h i c h excludes o n l y arbitrary exceptions t o moral laws for ' m e n considered merely as m e n ' . A n d m o r e specifically, his procedure here excludes the criterion so far used in deriving perfect duties to oneself, while providing n o special criterion for this duty. 10

1 1

In the course o f the discussion K a n t remarks, firrther, that the m a n w h o deliberately tells an untruth 'has a purpose directly opposed to the natural purposiveness o f the p o w e r o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g one's thoughts 8

9

«• M.d.S., 430. Ibid., 4 2 9 . ' Ibid., 389. Cf. above, p . 81 ff. 11

1 0

Ibid., 430.

1^2

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM 1 2

and therefore renounces his, personality . . . ' N o w i f this assertion is intended as a p r o o f that every intentional untruth is a violation o f duty, it too is open to objections. In the preceding chapter w e saw that 'nature's purposes' can be used as illustrations o f the moral principles regarding our use o f the animal instincts because nature's purpose, the preservation o f our animal nature, is a necessary object o f our rational will, in so far as w e have an animal nature. So too, it could be argued, a moral being that is sociable b y nature rationally wills to communicate its thoughts to others: that is to say, nature's purpose in our p o w e r o f speech is at the same time a moral end. B u t f r o m this it follows o n l y that w e ought not, as a general rule, to use our p o w e r o f speech inorder to deceive. Kant did not argue that it is never permissible t o act contrary to the preservation o f our animal nature, but only that w e m a y not frustrate this end merely for the sake o f pleasure. In the case o f the animal instincts it so happens that to use them contrary to nature's purpose is to use therh merely for the ends o f inclination, w i t h o u t regard for their moral end; and it is for this reason that the unnatural use o f the instincts is an abasement o f our personality. B u t the connection between natural teleology and the moral principles i n v o l v e d seems to be only a contingent one, w h i c h breaks d o w n in the case o f lying. For here the use o f our p o w e r o f speech contrary to nature's purpose is not necessarily the use o f it for the ends o f mere inclination—our end can be a 'really g o o d end'. Here the essential link b e t w e e n natural tele­ ology and a violation o f duty, i.e. the subjection o f a m o r a l end to mere enjoyment, is wanting, and Kant seems to be m a k i n g an unwarranted extension o f teleology beyond the sphere o f the moral principles w h i c h , as a rule, it illustrates. W e must conclude, I think, that K a n t fails to establish w h a t he set out to p r o v e : that every intentional untruth is an abasement o f our per­ sonality. His assertion that a deliberate untruth, b y its form, is a w r o n g to our o w n humanity is not c o n v i n c i n g ; for unless w e include in the definition o f a He the qualification that it is told for the sake o f our subjective ends—and this Kant refuses t o do—the m a x i m o f the action does not necessarily e m b o d y the ascendancy o f inclination o v e r pure practical reason. K a n t m a y .have recognized that this argument cannot support his condemnation o f e v e r y deliberate untruth and added the argument f r o m natural teleology to p r o v e this assertion. B u t his use o f the teleological principle, unsupported b y the moral principles w h i c h it hitherto illustrated, again produces n o satisfactory result. " M i l , 429. .

PERFECT

DUTIES TO ONESELF

IS"?

/ T h e difficulty in this discussion o f l y i n g is that K a n t intends it to c o v e r three things: the action o f lying, lying as a reflectively adopted 'principle or policy o f action, and the attitude o f self-deceit. In the question o f self-deceit Kant's argument is a powerful one, though it requires to be supplemented by material outside the present discussion. As for the habitual attitude o f falsehood to others, K a n t indicates that this is an extension o f self-deceit and can be disposed o f by the same a r g u m e n t . In any case, heiis on stronger ground here, since he is thinJcing o f lying as a policy o f submission to the mclinations and so as an attitude opposed to inner freedom. W h a t he fails to account for is the exceptional he told o n moral grounds, e.g. to save the life o f an innocent person. B u t i f w e cannot accept Kant's position on the latter point, w e can at least understand h o w he came to adopt it. If the habit' o f falsehood has its ground in self-deceit, and i f self-deceit, according to Kant, destroys the condition o f moral action as such, then it is not difficult to see h o w he m i g h t have been led to extend his condemnation o f l y i n g to every intentional untruth and, for once,, to fall into the rigorism generally attributed to h i m . 13

1 4

T h e question o f the 'inner He' is raised early in the discussion, w h e n Kant tells us that his remarks about lying in general are intended to cover both lying to others and, what is worse, l y i n g to ourselves. T o resolve the paradox inherent in the notion o f dehberately deceiving oneself, Kant again, as in the question o f obhgation t o oneself as such, invokes his distinction between the noumenal T and the phenomenal T , between man as a moral being and man as a natural being. A n inner He is, essentiaHy, -using our natural being to conceal from our moral being (in the role of our conscience) our true attitude o f w i l l . W h a t is at issue in Kant's discussion o f l y i n g is primarily our relations w i t h . our pure practical reason, considered first as legislator and then as j u d g e , and the tentative explanation here is to be completed b y his discussion o f 'the first c o m m a n d o f all duties to oneself', i.e. ' k n o w thyself', and o f our duty to ourselves as 'our o w n innate j u d g e ' . M o r e o v e r , K a n t 15

16

r

1 7

13

M.d.S., 430-1; of. also Religion, 381

1 4

' -

T h e same rigorism is apparent i n Kant's attitude t o w a r d l y i n g as a v i o l a t i o n o f d u t y to others, at least so far as the general p e r i o d o f t h e Metaphysik der Sitten is concerned. For s o m e w h a t ' d i f f e r e n t v i e w s o n the essay m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , i n n o t e 7, cf. H . J. P a t o n : ' A n A l l e g e d R i g h t to Lie: A P r o b l e m i n Kantian Ethics', Kantstudien X L V (1953-54), PP- 1907203, and J. E b b i n g h a u s : 'Kant's A b l e i t u n g des Ver'botes der L u g e a u s d e m R e c h t s der M e n s c h h e i t ' , Revuetlntemationalede Philosophie N o . 30 (1954), Fasc. 4. Kant's treatment o f , l y i n g i n Vorlesung, 283 ff., is n o t rigoristic.

,

15

M.d.S., 429.

i« Ibid., 430.

1 7

Ibid., 441 ff. and 438 ff.

LAWS

154

OF F R E E D O M

concludes his discussion o f l y i n g w i t h a note, c o u c h e d in biblical terms, which identifies man's propensity to self-deceit o r hypocrisy w i t h the radical evil in human nature. W h e n w e have examined these three aspects o f the question, w e shall find that Kant's condemnation o f selfdeceit as an anrhhilation o f one's dignity as a m a n and the greatest possible w r o n g to one's o w n humanity is n o t mere rhetoric but literal truth. 18

-

Passing over the difficulties inherent i n the notion o f a 'radical propensity to moral evil', let us take f r o m this concept only w h a t is directly relevant to our problem; A s a radical propensity, this tendency must be inherent in human nature itself; a n d as a propensity t o moral evil, it must have its origin in man's freedom rather than in his natural being. A propensity to moral evil is 'the subjective g r o u n d o f the possi­ bility of the deviation o f maxims f r o m the m o r a l l a w ' : and this ground o f all particular maxims contrary t o the moral l a w must itself be a maxim e m b o d y i n g our fundamental attitude o f choice toward the moral l a w . M o r e specifically, K a n t means that the propensity t o moral evil cannot be located in the natural appetites belonging to man's sensuous nature. W e r e a m a n t o act merely o n sensuous impulse, w i t h ­ out reference t o the moral l a w , his actions w o u l d b e merely animal and not human actions, and so neither g o o d n o r evil b u t simply amoral. O n the other hand, were it n o t for the fact that man's mclinations provide h i m w i t h the basis for motives i n his conduct, there w o u l d b e ' no possibility o f his acting contrary t o the l a w ; for i n that case it w o u l d have to be reason, alone and o f itself, that determined action, and it is unthinkable that pure practical reason should determine action c o n ­ trary t o the l a w . T h e ground o f m o r a l evil lies i n our imperfectly rational nature; b u t the mere fact that w e h a v e sensuous inclinations does not account for our choosing t o a l l o w motives based o n them, rather than a pure rational m o t i v e , t o determine o u r actions. M o r a l l y evil maxims are those i n w h i c h w e freely a l l o w o u r choice t o be deter­ mined b y motives o f sensuous origin, and the source o f moral evil, as the w o r k o f freedom, must b e a fundamental attitude—a 'supreme m a x i m ' — o f f o l l o w i n g our mclinations rather than the l a w . 1 9

2 0

1 9

Cf. Religion 21 n . and 23-24; cf. ak&~-m.d.S., 431. T h i s implies that t h e

propensity t o m o r a l evil is unintelligible; f o r ' e x c e p t f o r a m a x i m n o d e t e r m i n i n g ground o f free c h o i c e c a n o r s h o u l d b e a d d u c e d ' , a n d w e c a n n o t explain, o r assign a cause t o , man's a d o p t i o n o f a certain m a x i m rather than its contrary. C £ Religion, 35. A s K a n t remarks, w h e n w e are l o o k i n g f o r t h e g r o u n d o f moral evil t h e sensuous appetites c o m p r i s e t o o little a n d a satanic reason, m a k i n g opposition t o t h e l a w itself the m o t i v e , c o m p r i s e s t o o m u c h . 2 0

PERFECT

DUTIES

1U U N t S h L f

153

(Because the inclinations and pure practical reason are both essential elements in human nature, w e cannot ignore either o f these rival claimants to the determination o f choice w h e n w e take up a funda­ mental attitude o f will. Consciousness o f the m o p d l a w and recognition o f its bmding p o w e r b e l o n g to our moral being even as our inclina­ tions belong to our natural being, and w e must adopt both into our supreme m a x i m . B u t these t w o motives cannot exist o n the same level. T h e one has its source in freeqjom, the other in nature; and since they spring from independent sources in our being, there is n o necessary concordance between them. T h e y m a y c o m e into conflict w i t h each other, and their relation in our m a x i m must, accordingly, be one o f subordination. W e must choose between a resolution to satisfy our mclinations only in so far as the moral l a w permits and a determination to o b e y the l a w only in so far as our mclinations agree w i t h w h a t it commands. O u r free choice o f the latter alternative is the propensity to moral evil in us, w h i c h can thus be defined as a reversal o f the m o r a l order o f our motives in our supreme m a x i m . 2 1

N o w Kant mamtains that this propensity to moral 6vil is inner fal­ sity, deceiving ourselves about the meaning o f the moral l a w to the prejudice o f the l a w . W h a t he means is that in adopting any morally evil m a x i m w e do not simply recognize the m o r a l l a w for the cate­ gorical imperative that it is and then, in the face o f it, adopt a contrary m a x i m . O u r moral consciousness w o u l d prevent such a forthright denial o f the claims o f morality. W e can adopt a m a x i m contrary t o the l a w only because in our supreme m a x i m w e have sophistically reduced the moral l a w to the status o f an imperative conditioned'by self-love. O n l y b y ' t h r o w i n g dust in our o w n eyes', deceiving ourselves about the meaning o f the moral law, can w e silence the moral element in our being sufficiently to let ourselves follow our mclinations. In so far as w e are moral beings the propensity to moral evil must be, at the same time, self-deceit regarding the categorical nature o f the m o r a l law and the relation o f our maxims to the l a w . 2 2

2 3

W e r e it not for this 'cunning o f the human heart' implicit in a m o r a l l y evil attitude o f w i l l , our 'natural predisposition for the g o o d ' w o u l d soon assert itself and shake us out o f this attitude. In our possession! o f pure practical reason and our emotional receptivity t o the n o t i o n 24

2 1

Religion, 36. T h e m a x i m o f the m o r a l l y g o o d m a n , K a n t explains, is displtig u i s h e d ^ o m that o f t h e e v i l m a n , n o t b y its substance (for the rnaxim i n e a c h case includes b o t h the inclinations and the l a w ) , but rather b y its f o r m , b y w h i c h o f these t w o is m a d e the c o n d i t i o n o f t h e other. •> 22

Religion, 42 n.

2 3

Ibid., 38 and 30.

2 4

Urn/., 38.

156

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

of duty w e have, Kant maintains, a 'seed o f goodness' w h i c h , w e r e it not hindered b y inner falsity, w o u l d develop. There are on the emotional side o f our nature certain capacities for being affected b y moral concepts, w h i c h are powerful m o t i v e forces in our moral de­ v e l o p m e n t . A m o n g these the most important are the capacity to feel reverence for the l a w and the capacity to be emotionally affected b y reason's judgments o n the moral w o r t h o f our actions, or conscience. But these feelings are aroused, respectively, b y our recognition o f an unconditioned l a w in all its strictness and b y the comparison o f our actions w i t h the requirements o f this l a w . S o l o n g as w e regard the moral law as a conditioned principle and j u d g e our actions b y this false standard, neither reverence for the l a w nor conscience can c o m e effectively into play. For the m o m e n t , K a n t focuses his attention on the relation o f conscience to self-deceit. 25

26

Since a conscience belongs essentially t o our moral being, K a n t argues, w e cannot avoid comparing our actions w i t h the requirements o f the moral law. B u t i f W e have reduced the l a w to a mere conditioned principle, w e can confuse and disrupt the w h o l e matter o f moral i m ­ putation. T h e moral l a w commands not only that w e perform right actions but also that w e do this out o f reverence for the law. T h r o u g h self-deceit w e make the agreement o f our inclinations w i t h the l a w the condition under w h i c h w e propose to o b e y it, and in so doing r e m o v e from the l a w all reference t o our motives. S o l o n g as our actions are legal, w e can then regard t h e m as g o o d and even meritorious, al2 5

In the Tugendlehre Kant lists four 'prehminary concepts o f the mind's aes­ thetic capacity for b e i n g affected b y t h e c o n c e p t o f d u t y , ' that is t o say, four p r e ­ conditions, o n the side o f feeling, o f o u r responsiveness t o the claims o f m o r a l i t y . T h e y are moral feeling, conscience, self-esteem and l o v e . Cf. M.d.S., 398-403. W e can have n o d u t y t o acquire these dispositions, K a n t argues, since it is o n l y b y means o f t h e m that w e can r e c o g n i z e d u t y i n general; h o w e v e r , w e h a v e a d u t y to'cultivate and strengthen t h e m . F r o m t h e fact that h e includes l o v e a m o n g t h e m , it w o u l d s e e m that K a n t is speaking i n v e r y concrete terms a b o u t h o w w e are actually m o v e d t o fulfil the claims o f d u t y , rather than analyzing w h a t is required o n the part o f an imperfectly rational b e i n g i n order t o r e c o g n i z e the claims o f morality. 2 6

For Kant, the f u n c t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e j s j j o t t o m a k e objective j u d g m e n t s about the tightness o r w r o n g n e s s o f actions, b u t rather t o j u d g e the subject's attitude i n - p e r f o r m i n g m o r a l actions. It is c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h e t h e r w e h a v e sincerely tried t o discover and fulfil o u r d u t y a n d w h e t h e r w e are striving t o act from the m o t i v e o f duty. A l t h o u g h I e m p h a s i z e t h e latter p o i n t in this discussion, it is clear that the m a n w h o has r e d u c e d the m o r a l l a w t o a c o n d i t i o n e d principle can a c c o m m o d a t e the matter o f the l a w t o his inclinations and d e c e i v e h i m s e l f regarding the c o n t e n t o f his duty. Professor P a t o n has discussed the f u n c t i o n o f conscience in an unpublished paper, 'Kant a n d C o n s c i e n c e ' .

I

PERFECT

DUTIES

TO ONESELF

**

157

though w e do them only from motives o f sensuous origin. As Kant points out, w h e n our attitude is morally evil, even the legality o f o u r actions is contingent since our attitude coulct equally well, under different circumstances, result in w r o n g or illegal actions. B u t his point is that even t h o u g h no w r o n g action should ever be performed, our attitude o f will, and so the actions proceedhig from it, are morally evil, and that so l o n g as this attitude persists w e are incapable o f any morally g o o d m a x i m or action and so a fortiori incapable o f virtue, because our moral attitude has been 'corrupted at its root'. Kant speaks o f a 'revolution' in our attitude o f will w h e n w e m a k e the moral l a w rather than mclination the first condition in our supreme maxim. This does not mean that there w i l l be n o further lapses f r o m the law in our actions—'for b e t w e e n the m a x i m and the action there is a great g a p ' . It does mean, h o w e v e r , that w e have a ' g o o d heart' and are in a position to acquire v i r t u e . B u t so l o n g as w e remain in the unwarranted state o f self-approbation possible through inner falsehood, --at peace w i t h our conscience because w e have disrupted our moral judgment, no such moral revolution can occur. 27

A c c o r d i n g l y Kant formulates the first c o m m a n d o f all duties to o n e ­ self as: ' K n o w (scrutinize, fathom) yourself . . . in terms o f your' moral attitude in relation to y o u r duty; k n o w y o u r heart—whether it be g o o d or evil, whether the spring o f y o u r actions be pure or i m ­ pure'. _ S i n c e r i t y _ w i t h ^ 28

29

(

virtue as rather 'the_formal condition o f all v i r t u e s ' . Neither is the contrary vice o f self-deceit merely one vice among~others and o n the same level w i t h them, It is the formal ground o f e v e r y 'true vice', o f every reflectively grounded principle subjecting our attitude o f will to the inclinations. Hence self-knowledge o f this sort is the beginning o f all human w i s d o m ; for i f w i s d o m is the h a r m o n y ' o f a finite being's will w i t h his final end, it presupposes, so far as m a n is concerned, the" removal o f the inner obstacle to his moral development, namely a bad will. U n t i l w e admit that our motives, as w e l l as our actions,,must be brought into conformity w i t h the l a w and try t o j u d g e ourselves accordingly, n o progress in the moral life is possible, and our inherent capacity for the g o o d must remain dormant. Because o f the impossi­ bility o f being certain o f our o w n motives, this c o m m a n d enjoins o n l y an imperfect duty. B u t it is "at least w i t h i n our p o w e r not.deliberately to deceive ourselves, and this prohibition—a specific f o r m o f the p r o hibition against lying as such—prescribes a perfect duty. "Religion, 47 and 38. MJ.S., 441. H.N.(23), 400. 2 8

2 9

158

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

In discussing the vice o f l y i n g , K a n t remarks o n the worthlessness o f a man ' w h o himself does not believe w h a t he tells another (even a merely ideal Person) T . l / This hint o n the relation b e t w e e n sincerity and the duty o f religion is developed somewhat later, in his discussion o f conscience. For Kant, morality leads t o religion in the sense that it requires us to regard all our duties as divine commands. This is not to say that w e have a duty to believe in the existence o f G o d , or that, w e have special duties to G o d . B u t w e have a duty t o ourselves to v i e w moral laws as i f they w e r e divine commands, in order t o strengthen the moral motive proceeding f r o m our o w n legislative reason; and this duty, apart f r o m its general connection w i t h our striving for the summum bonutn, has a particular connection w i t h the vice o f self-deceit. As a counterbalance to our tendency t o w a r d inner falsehood, K a n t maintains, w e have a duty to conceive o f G o d as the j u d g e o f all our moral actions. 3 0

3 1

32

Kant represents the process b y w h i c h w e accuse, defend, and j u d g e ourselves in conscience h y analogy w i t h a court o f l a w . T h e j u d g e within us is, o f course, our o w n pure practical reason w h i c h first gives the law and then, after j u d g m e n t has subsumed an action under the l a w , announces the verdict that w e deserve either to be punished or to g o free. But it is b o t h natural and morally necessary to represent the judge as distinct from ourselves, the accused. It is natural to d o so b e ­ cause our imperfectly rational nature makes the judgments, as w e l l as the commands, o f pure practical reason appear as i f imposed o n us from without; conscience, as K a n t points out, is not something that w e freely make, nor can w e either dictate or silence its j u d g m e n t s . Moreover, it is morally necessary to conceive o f our conscience as a person distinct from ourselves, since otherwise 'the prosecutor w o u l d lose every c a s e ' . G i v e n our tendency t o self-deceit, it is o n l y b y c o n ­ ceiving the j u d g e w i t h i n us as a 'scrutinizer o f hearts' distinct from ourselves that w e can achieve, in cases o f conscience, the strictness and impartiahty o f a court o f l a w . For as self-deceit makes the w h o l e matter o f moral imputation uncertain, the notion that w e are respons­ ible for our actions to a being w h o knojws our motives and j u d g e s us 33

80

M.d.S., 429.

3 2

.

3 1

Cf. M.d.S., 440-1, 443-4 and 486 ff.

O u r duty o f striving t o realize t h e h i g h e s t g o o d leads us t o postulate t h e existence o f a m o r a l author o f nature as t h e c o n d i t i o n o f o u r pursuit o f this object, since the realization o f t h e h i g h e s t g o o d is, s o far as w e can see, possible o n l y through H i s existence a n d w e d o n o t strive t o bring a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h seems impossible. Cf. K-.d.p.V., 131 ff. 33

M.d.S., 438.-

\

PERFECT

DUTIES

TO

ONESELF

159

according t o them compels us, on our o w n part, to scrutinize our attitude o f w i l l and value our actions b y the rigour o f the law. T h e thought o f all our duties as 'public duties', that is, as duties enjoined b y the w i l l o f a divine legislator, enables us to fulfil the duty o f sin­ cerity. 34

Self-deceit is, then, the greatest w r o n g to ourselves merely as moral beings and an 'annihilation' o f our dignity as m e n because it strikes directly at the essence o f our humanity, namely, our capacity to' deter­ mine choice in accordance w i t h a categorical imperative. In so far as Kant's discussion o f l y i n g is essentially concerned w i t h self-deceit, w e can n o w better understand the importance he attaches to the sub­ ject. A n d w h i l e it is logically unjustifiable for hirri t o include every intentional untruth under this heading, w e can at least understand w h y he should have adopted such an uncompromising attitude toward l y i n g in general. His statement that every deHberate untruth is a violation o f duty to oneself is, in fact, out o f place in -a discussion o f vices w h i c h consist in adopting a basic principle contrary to inner freedom. It is essentially a p o h c y o f falsehood—toward others and especially t o w a r d oneself—that is a vice o f this category.

B.

AVARICE

T h e fact that K a n t is considering avarice as a violation o f duty to our­ selves rather than to others defines the type o f avarice w i t h w h i c h he is concerned. I f avarice in general is the hoarding o f m o n e y out o f all proportion to our needs, it is the intention w e h a v e that determines whether avarice is directly a violation o f duty t o ourselves or to others. • If w e refuse to share w h a t w e have o v e r and a b o v e our true needs because w e intend to spend the m o n e y o n ourselves', our attitude m i g h t be called 'self-seeking avarice', and it is primarily a violation o f our duty o f benevolence to others. T h e avarice that is a direct violation o f d u t y to ourselves is 'miserly avarice', a m a x i m o f acquiring m o n e y w i t h the intention o f merely possessing it rather than using it t o satisfy our true needs. W e violate our duty to ourselves w h e n , for the sake o f riches, w e leave our o w n needs unsatisfied. 35

T h e i m m o r a h t y o f miserly avarice Hes in the fact that its m a x i m 'is directly contrary t o duty t o oneself in relation t o the end'. It is contrary, first, to the end o f our moral being because it is a slavish subjection o f oneself to riches' and so a denial o f inner freedom, 'a »* H.N.(23), 401.

3 5

M.d.S., 432-3.

100

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

fraud that the agent perpetrates on h i m s e l f . In this respect it is opposed to liberality, 'to the principle o f independence from everything except the l a w ' . Moreover, it is a violatidn o f duty in relation to the end because what w e adopt as our ultimate end, namely riches, is not really an end at all but only a means to the enjoyments that m o n e y can b u y . Through avarice w e make an end o f w h a t , in itself, has the value only o f a means. O u r happiness, o n the other hand, including the enjoyment o f material comforts w h i c h is an element in it, has. the value o f an end, although a conditioned end. A n d one o f the w a y s in which inner freedom manifests itself is in the pursuit o f our o w n happiness, in so far as this is included a m o n g the ends o f moral reason. Again, the principle operative here is that o f the integration o f the ends of our nature as a w h o l e . 36

37

C.

SERVJLITY

W h a t makes self-deceit, avarice, and servility vices is the fact that their maxims are directly opposed to inner freedom. A l l these vices i m p l y , in a practical w a y , a false valuation o f ourselves or a disregard for what constitutes our true w o r t h , n a m e l y our capacity to determine actions through maxims not based o n desire for an object. B u t the vice o f servility o r false humihty is, so t o speak, an explicit rejection o f our worth as persons, and K a n t accordingly takes this occasion to dis­ cuss the immediate ground o f perfect duties to ourselves merely as moral beings. In terms familiar f r o m the Grundlegung he distinguishes between man as a part o f nature and m a n as a person or subject o f pure practical reason. A s a natural being or 'rational animal', m a n has only the relative value o f a means t o an end. Because m a n possesses practical reason, this value in terms o f his usefulness is greater than that o f the other animals and, b y the same token, one m a n is m o r e valuable than another. Considered as a person, h o w e v e r , m a n is to be valued as an end in himself and possesses an 'absolute inner w o r t h or dignity'. A s the subject o f legislative reason, m a n has a value w h i c h is not merely that o f a means t o the ends o f others or to his o w n ends. And, since all m e n are conscious o f their o w n absolute w o r t h , to dis­ claim one's o w n dignity in relation tt5l5tners is false or l y i n g h u m i l i t y . 38

3 6

M.d.S., 434. O h the d u t y o f ' l i b e r a l i t y ' as h e r e defined, cf. H.N.fo), 400. O n Kant's criticism o f the Aristotelian distinction b e t w e e n t h e v i r t u e o f ' g o o d m a n a g e m e n t ' and the o p p o s i n g v i c e s o f avarice and p r o d i g a l i t y i n terms o f the degree t o w h i c h the agent acts o n his m a x i m , cf. a b o v e , p . 109 ff. 3 7

38

M.d.S., 434-5; cf. Grundlegung, 434-6.

PERFECT DUTIES TO ONESELF

/

.

l6l +

(

Subservience to others, K a n t notes, is always falsehood; 'for every men is conscious o f his inahenable right o f e q u a l i t y ' . ' If, in order to curry favour w i t h others, w e disclaim our right to the respect that others o w e us as men, w e are rrlaking ourselves a mere means to their self-esteem, and this because w e falsely value our o w n person as a mere means to our subjective ends. A l t h o u g h it is essentially an attitude o f w i l l that is in question, Kant mentions some specific actions that he considers manifestations o f a servile attitude. W e ought not, he asserts, to flatter others, to allow t h e m to tread o n our rights unpunished, to incur debts unless w e can g i v e full security for them, to m a k e ourselves dependent o n others' benevolence, to kneel d o w n or prostrate ourselves, not even before h o l y objects. A l l such actions, he mamtains, are contrary to the dignity o f humanity in our ' o w n person. A n d , w h i l e he includes courtesy a m o n g the virtues o f social intercourse, he questions the excessive concern w i t h formalities o f manner and address in his time; although these are trifles, he notes, they can lead to m o r e serious t h i n g s . W h i l e Kant's critics sometimes seize o n such questions as evidence ^of an excessive concern w i t h tri­ vialities—the ' m i c r o l o g y ' that Kant warns us against—they w o u f c L seem to be, rather, evidence o f his personal spirit o f independence and o f his strong feeling for the dignity o f the human being. 'Humility in c o m p a r i n g ourselves w i t h other m e n (and indeed w i t h any finite being, even a seraph)', Kant mamtains, 'is n o d u t y . ' T h e only humility to w h i c h w e are obligated is the humility w h i c h follows inevitably w h e n w e c o m p a r e ourselves frankly and sincerely w i t h the holiness and strictness o f the moral l a w . B u t this genuine humility is, at the same time, the,-highest valuation o f ourselves; for in recognizing our deficiencies in relation to the law, w e realize that it is w e ourselves' w h o g i v e the l a w , and the natural m a n in us feels compelled to rever­ ence humanity in his o w n p e r s o n . A spurious or false hurnility is 39


- , 8

;

9

8

Cf. K.d.U., 429 ff. Kant's discussion o f o u r d u t y o f natural perfection s h o u l d be read against the b a c k g r o u n d o f .his p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s t o r y , as set forth i n ' t h e

appendix t o the Kritik der Urteilskraft and i n his t w o essays: MutmasslicherAtifang V/er Menschengeschichte and Idee zu einer allgemeitien Geschichte in weltburgerlich Ahficht. For a b r i e f s u m m a r y o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y o f history, cf. E. F a c k e ^ e i m : 'Kant's C o n c e p t o f History', Kantstudien, v o l . 48 (1956-57),'pp. 381-98. 'Cf. M.d.S., 392 and especially 444-5. In the Grundlegung K a n t uses t h e t e l e ­ ological principle that nature takes the proper means t o its ends i n order to illustrate his p o i n t that practical reason m u s t h a v e an e n d other t h a n that w h i c h c o u l d - b e attained b y instinct. Cf. Gr,, 395-7 and also 423. ' . -> 9

LAWS B. T H E D U T Y

OF M O R A L

OF

FREEDOM

PERFECTION

W h i l e our nature as rational animals is the immediate ground for willing the cultivation o f our animal and rational powers, it is, again, our nature as moral beings that provides the highest principle o f order among the ends o f our being. In the duty o f moral perfection K a n t takes the final step in considering the hierarchy a m o n g the components o f human nature. A s beings capable n o t o n l y o f setting ends in general but o f settings ends in complete independence from nature as a w h o l e , w e necessarily w i l l the development o f our capacity for pure rational action as w e l l as o f our capacity for rational action as such. A s the end o f our animal nature is subordinated to our capacity for setting ends in general, so our rational nature is ordered to our capacity for moral action. T h e duty o f striving for moral perfection is, again, summarized in t w o general principles: 'be h o l y ' and ' b e perfect'. A c c o r d i n g to the first w e ought to strive for purity o f m o t i v e in our moral actions, and according to the second, t o strive t o fulfil all our d u t i e s . These t w o principles correspond to w h a t K a n t has called 'that w h i c h is formal in virtue', i.e. the resolution to m a k e reverence for the l a w our m o t i v e in every action, and 'that w h i c h is material in virtue', i.e. the extension o f virtue to all the objects o f a moral w i l l . O u r one virtuous attitude o f will, Kant has explained, manifests itself in striving to acquire supre­ macy over our various inclinations and propensities to e.g. intemper­ ance, avarice, lying, so that f r o m this point o f v i e w it is differentiated into the specific virtues o f moderation, hberahty, sincerity. Hence the command 'be perfect' prescribes that w e acquire all the virtues neces­ sary to fulfil every duty. 10

1 1

O u r duty o f moral perfection is, in short, the duty o f acquiring v i r ­ tue. But in Kant's discussions o f the ends o f moral action, 'virtue' appears as an end o n t w o different levels. O n the one hand, it is a specific object o f choice, along w i t h our natural perfection and the happiness o f others. O n the other hand, it is the end present in e v e r y moral determination o f choice, w h e t h e r to the fulfilment o f a juridical duty, to a merely permissible action, orjto the duty o f promoting, e.g. 10

1 1

M.d.S., 446.

Ibid., 395 and 406. Cf. also H.N.fa), 388: ' V i r t u e is the p o w e r o f ruling o v e r one's inclinations i n so,far as t h e y are obstacles t o practical reason; h e n c e . i t is self-mastery. F r o m this p o i n t o f v i e w there can b e n o distinctions w i t h i n v i r t u e except those o f degree. T h e distinction o f t h e inclinations as obstacles is w h a t makes the material distinction o f virtues, a n d f r o m this p o i n t o f v i e w there are m a n y virtues'.

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j.e happiness o f others. If, in order to strengthen our feeling o f reverlce for the law, w e deliberately reflect upon the presence o f pure practical reason within us, the end or matter, o f our m a x i m is,the strengthening o f our moral resolution. If, on trie other hand, w e help someone in need, our specific end is that person's welfare; yet, i f w e strive to do this from a m o t i v e o f duty our end, in a somewhat different sense, is virtue. T h e r e is only a limited field o f action in w h i c h virtue is the matter or content o f the morally g o o d man's maxims. B u t in every moral determination o f choice a will in conformity w i t h the l a w is the effect, the thought o f w h i c h determines choice to the action. In Kant's account o f the moral life, it is the cultivation o f virtue as an end in the latter sense that should be stressed. T h e self-conscious development o f character is essentially a preparation for the exercise o f virtue; but b y far the greater part o f man's moral development takes place implicitly in his actual exercise o f virtue in fulfilling his other duties. His moral perfection cannot be realized in abstraction from his moral life as a w h o l e . A t times, h o w e v e r , it w i l l be our duty to m a k e our moral perfection the matter or content o f our m a x i m s and to strive to develop our character, both through such positive measures as contemplating the moral l a w within us and cultivating our feelings o f natural sympathy and through the a ^ d p l i n a r y measures w h i c h Kant calls 'moral ascetic'. 12

Kant's primary concern in discussing 'moral ascetic' is to contrast the strength and gladness o f the truly virtuous m a n w i t h the servile fear o f what he calls the 'monastic ascetic'. Y e t the broad outlines o f his moral self-disripline can be discerned. It is, he tells us, 'a kind o f hygiene for man, in/order to preserve his moral health'. Apart f r o m the excesses w h i c h K a n t attributes to monastic asceticism, his o w n 'ethical gymnastic' seems to differ from this not so m u c h in content as in spirit and purpose. T o lay upon oneself a punishment (e.g. a fast) for a past violation o f duty is, he notes, a v e r y different thing f r o m denying oneself certain legitimate satisfactions in order t o strengthen oneself against futtire temptations to violate one's duty. Ethical selfdiscipline consists in struggling against the mclinations and curbing them, but only for the purpose o f being able to master them w h e n they threaten morality and o n l y to the extent necessary for this end. r e p e a t i n g his condemnation o f moral 'purism', K a n t adds that e x ­ cessive discipline o f the mclinations or ch^dpline o f t h e m in the w r o n g spirit w o u l d be contrary to virtue and w o u l d lead us secretly to hate 1 2

On m o r a l ascetic, cf. M.d.S., 484-5.

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virtue. W e ought not to try to exterminate the inclinations, but o n l y to curb them to the degree necessary t o safeguard ourselves against vice—a degree w h i c h cannot be determined a priori. T h e pursuit o f moral perfection requires, not the habit o f asceticism, but rather a maxim to be applied spontaneously as j u d g m e n t sees fit under the circumstances. Kant recognizes that the commands 'be h o l y ' and 'be perfect' i m p l y only wide obligation because virtue consists in approximation to an ideal which cannot be fully realized in this life. E v e n in its highest stages human morality remains virtue, and virtue is distinguished from holiness because it implies the presence o f mclinations w h i c h d o not o f themselves accord w i t h the l a w . W e o u g h t not to be satisfied w i t h an ideal l o w e r than that o f a w i l l completely in accordance w i t h the law. B u t w e fulfil our duty o f holiness, and perfection w h e n w e adopt a maxim o f striving after purity o f m o t i v e in the observance o f every duty. O u r duty o f moral perfection, K a n t tells us, is 'according to its quality strict and perfect, but according to its degree w i d e and i m ­ perfect, and this because o f the frailty o f h u m a n n a t u r e ' . In other words, the end w h i c h the l a w sets for us is perfectly definite: that w e be holy, and perfect. B u t the l a w requires, not the interior act itself o f deterrnining choice, in every instance, t h r o u g h a pure moral motive, but only the adoption o f a m a x i m o f striving t o w a r d this e n d . A little reflection, however, reveals the discrepancy between the notion o f imperfect duty and this account o f w h y our duty o f holiness is an imperfect one. For the characteristic feature o f an imperfect duty, as Kant previously defined the term, is the latitude w h i c h it permits between our virtuous m a x i m and our action u p o n this m a x i m ; and, no matter h o w the, 'latitude' is interpreted, there seems to be n o r o o m for it in the duty o f striving for holiness. In the case o f natural per­ fection and happiness the l a w determines our end only in an abstract and general w a y . It cannot determine these ends m o r e precisely because empirical ..elements enter in w h e n w e c o m e to decide w h a t specific ends comprise our natural perfection^arid the happiness o f others. Moreover, w h e n once the end is determined specifically, in an a posteriori w a y , it is still left t o j u d g m e n t to decide, in the given cir­ cumstances, whether w e shall realize that specific end and, i f so, t o what extent and b y w h a t means. B u t all this seems inapplicable t o our duty o f striving for holiness. Here the end is determinate and, w e r e it 13

14

18 14

1

M.4.S., 446. Ibid., 392-3.

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not for 'the frailty o f h u m a n nature', so too w o u l d be the action re­ quired b y the law. ' T o complicate the matter further, Kant seems t o offer yet another account o f w h y our duty o f striving for holiness is an imperfect one. O u r duty o f making reverence for the l a w our m o t i v e is an imperfect one, he tells us, because a m a d cannot so scrutinize his o w n motives as to be certain, in even a single instance, that he is acting from' duty. Even w h e n w e are conscious o f having this m o t i v e , w e cannot b e sure that it is our sufficient m o t i v e : there m a y be motives o f sensuous origin, present together w i t h the motive o f duty, w h i c h are in fact our determining motive. In the absence o f these the motive o f duty m i g h t not, b y itself, be strong e n o u g h to determine our choice. In order to k n o w that duty is our sufficient motive w e should have t o k n o w the non-existence o f some hidden determining motive, and this w e can never k n o w . This explanation, h o w e v e r , is open to the same difficulty as the preceding o n e : namely, that it locates the imperfect character o f the duty, not in a latitude w h i c h the l a w permits between our m a x i m and our action, but rather in something extrinsic to the notion o f imperfect duty as such. 1 5

B u t it is possible that neither o f these arguments i n itself is intended as a complete explanation o f w h y the duty is imperfect. I f w e take as our clues the fact that in the first argument 'the frailty o f human nature' is g i v e n as the reason w h y the duty is 'according to its degree w i d e and imperfect', and the fact that in the second argument Kant speaks o f duty as the sufficient, rather than as the sole, motive in moral action, w e m a y be able to supplement these explanations in such a w a y as to bind them together and, at the same time, bring the duty of holiness closer to 'imperfect duty' as such. W e shall argue that because o f ' t h e frailty o f h u m a n nature' it is permissible for m a n to allow other motives to co-operate w i t h duty in determining choice and that it is forNjridgrnent to decide, in any g i v e n case, whether this should be done, It should be added at once that Kant himself does not develop this position; yet, considering his attitude toward the inclinations at the time o f the Metaphysik der Sitten, it m a y w e l l be implied in his ex­ planations. A l t h o u g h Kant's manner o f speaking about the mclinatiohs and duty invites misinterpretation, it w o u l d be w r o n g to suppose that, even in his earlier writings, he adopts a completely negative attitude toward the inclinations. True, he there asserts that 'it must be the universal 16

M.d.S., 447 and 392-3: Uber den Gemeinspruch, 284-5.

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wish o f every rational being to be w h o l l y free f r o m ' inclinations— mcluding, so it seems, such inclinations as l o v e for our fellow men. B u t even this assertion is qualified b y its context, for K a n t is here arguing that w e ought not to let our inclinations s w a y us in determining where our duty lies. O n c e reason has determined w h a t constitutes our duty, he continues, an mclination t o w a r d w h a t is usually right (e.g. benevolence) can help us to carry out our moral purposes, even t h o u g h it cannot o f itself produce a moral m a x i m . In his later writings, this view that the inclinations can be put to g o o d use becomes even m o r e pronounced. 1 6

D u t y must, o f course, be the decisive m o t i v e in any morally g o o d action. B u t this leaves open the question o f whether duty should be the sole or only the sufficient motive—that is to say, a m o t i v e w h i c h could o f itself and without the co-operation o f other motives determine choice, but which does not exclude the help o f other motives. In favour o f the second alternative several passages could be cited. In the Tugend­ lehre Kant argues that since w e have a duty o f helping others w e h a v e an indirect duty to cultivate our feelings o f natural sympathy, 'because this is one o f the impulses w h i c h nature has placed in us to accomplish what the thought o f duty b y itself w o u l d not d o ' . A l o n g the same line, he argues that l o v e is a necessary element in human perfection: 'for what one does reluctantly, one does so sparingly and, indeed, with such sophistical evasions o f duty's c o m m a n d that from the latter [duty] as motive, without the accession o f the former [love], not t o o much m a y be e x p e c t e d ' . Similar considerations probably account for his including love, along w i t h moral feeling, conscience and selfesteem, a m o n g the 'preconceptions o f the mind's emotional receptivity for the concept o f duty'. In n o case does he i m p l y that the concept o f duty could not, b y itself, determine choice, but o n l y that, g i v e n h u m a n nature as it is, m a n needs the help o f his mclinations in order to lead a morally g o o d life. K a n t is here considering, not so m u c h the nature o f moral action in the abstract, as rather the conditions under w h i c h man is likely to exercise his p o w e r o f morally g o o d action. 1 7

18

Such statements s h o w that at the time^of the Metaphysik der Sitten, at least, Kant is willing freely to admit the importance o f our inclina­ tions and feelings in g i v i n g effect to our moral resolutions. N o r is this admission inconsistent w i t h his v i e w s o n inner freedom. W h a t he 1 8

KJ.p.V., 118. T h e animal inclinations, it w i l l b e recalled, are an e l e m e n t i n man's natural predisposition for the g o o d . 17

MAS., 456-7. Cf. b e l o w , p . 197 ff.

1 8

Das Ende alter Dinge, 338.

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says regarding mclinations that hinder our fulfilment o f duty—namely, that while w e are not responsible for our having mclinations, w e are responsible for the indulgence w h i c h allows them to influence c h o i c e —is true also o f those mclinations w h i c h facilitate our fulfilment o f duty. In so far as they have previously been cultivated w i t h a v i e w to this purpose they are, in part, the w o r k o f freedom. Y e t for all this it remains true that the mclinations have their source-in nature, as opposed to freedom, that they have no necessary connection "with morality, and that they m a y at any time g o out to something contrary to duty. Hence, in a l l o w i n g the mclinations to co-operate with the m o t i v e o f duty, pure practical reason must remain in control o f the situation, able to restrain the mclinations should circumstances require it. O u r supreme m a x i m must, o f course, be one o f f o l l o w i n g the l a w whatever our mclinations in the matter m a y be. B u t w h e n it comes to translating this m a x i m into action, it is open to K a n t to say that j u d g m e n t must decide whether certain mclinations w o u l d make our moral m a x i m m o r e effective or whether, on the contrary, these i n ­ clinations w o u l d , i f encouraged, endanger the self-sufiiciency o f d u t y as our motive. H e m a y w e l l have this in mind w h e n he attributes the imperfect character o f our duty o f holiness to 'the frailty o f human nature'. 19

B y this phrase Kant means, as w e have seen, our weakness in acting upon our moral resolutions;. and it is because o f this weakness that our duty o f moral perfection, w h i c h is objectively strict and perfect, becomes in relation to us w i d e and imperfect. Objectively speaking, a holy w i l l is superior to a virtuous w i l l , and a w i l l determined solely b y the thought o f duty is preferable to a w i l l determined b y the thought o f duty together w i t h motives o f sensuous origin. B u t , taking human nature as it is, w e should make use o f our inclinations to ensure that our moral resolutions will issue in g o o d actions. W e r e w e to take the c o m m a n d 'be h o l y ' literally, w e should have to try to exterminate the mclinations, and the, result, w o u l d , Kant suggests, be disastrous for h u m a n moral action. T h e reason w h y the duty is imperfect is n o t simply that w e cannot achieve holiness but rather that, in v i e w o f human nature, w e must take the path t o w a r d perfection that is open .to us. A n d this path is not that o f holiness or the absence o f all i n ­ clinations that m i g h t tend to something contrary to the law; but rather that "of using our potentially dangerous mclinations for our moral purposes. 2 0

1 9

Gr., 458.

2 0

M.d.S., 396-7 and 405.

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It is only w i t h this further explanation that the emphasis in Kant's first argument falls in the right place and that something resembling a latitude enters into the determination o f m o r a l choice itself. His further remarks about the diniculty o f scrutinizing our motives are, perhaps, merely comments upon the difficulties confronting j u d g m e n t w h i c h must, in deciding to encourage certain inclinations, see to it, that they are kept subordinate to duty as our sufficient m o t i v e . T h e imperfect character o f our duty o f holiness does differ f r o m that o f our other obligatory ends: it is essentially a concession to h u m a n weakness. Y e t this duty m a y have more ih c o m m o n w i t h our other imperfect duties than is apparent on the surface o f Kant's account.

C.

THE I N D I R E C T

OWN

DUTY

OF P R O M O T I N G

ONE'S

HAPPINESS

T h e first principle o f Tugendlehre commands, w e have seen, that w e direct all our moral actions t o w a r d the summum bonum, w h i c h consists o f the happiness o f finite-rational beings in proportion to their virtue. But when it comes to deriving f r o m the first principle o f ethics ethical laws enjoining the pursuit o f ends, K a n t holds that our duty is hmited to the pursuit o f our o w n perfection and the happiness o f other men. So far as the limitation o n our obligatory pursuit o f happiness is c o n ­ cerned, Kant's argument is that the concept o f d u t y implies necessi­ tation to a reluctantly adopted end', whereas 'their o w n happiness is an end which all m e n have (by reason o f the impulses o f their n a t u r e ) ' . Hence w e can have n o duty to adopt our o w n happiness as our end. In concluding this analysis o f imperfect duties to ourselves w e should examine more closely the moral relation b e t w e e n choice and the end o f our o w n happiness. 21

It should be quite clear, from all K a n t has said, that he has n o inten­ tion o f questioning the morality o f our pursuit o f our o w n happiness. He has always insisted that happiness is a necessary element in the end o f a finite rational being. Like natural and m o r a l perfection, it is a necessary object o f the rational w i l l o f a finite being. B u t Kant m a i n ­ tains that whereas all three o f these ends are objectively necessary, our happiness differs f r o m the other t w 6 m that it is also subjectively necessary. N o w it does not take m u c h observation t o convince ourselves that men are capable o f acting contrary t o their o w n happiness. A n d this 21

MJ.S., 385-6 and 388.

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learn to the question, w h e t h e r K a n t does not attribute greater prudence t o / m e n than they actually possess. I f happiness is an object o f our rational will, and i f w e can—and often do—act^ to the detriment o f our happiness, d o w e n o t have a duty to pursue our happiness even as w e have a duty to strive for perfection? Kant's position is, in fact, quite consistent w i t h his explicit recognition that m e n d o behave imprudendy and ruin their o w n chances o f happiness. A s finite beings w e spontaneously w i l l the ideal state o f satisfaction o f our needs and wants that w e call happiness. B u t like natural perfection and the happi­ ness o f other men, 'our o w n happiness' is an abstract concept. It d e ­ scribes only an ideal state, w i t h o u t telling us .what elements g o t o make up that state. A n d K a n t does not exclude the possibility o f c o n ­ straint to take as our ends certain things w h i c h , f r o m an objective point o f v i e w , pertain to our happiness. 1

W h e t h e r w e regard happiness as a m a x i m u m o f pleasure accompany­ ing our w h o l e existence or as an integration o f ends, a m o n g which, pleasure is only one, w e can g i v e n o precise definition o f happiness w h i c h w o u l d be valid for everyone. 'Happiness', K a n t holds, is o n l y an ideal w h i c h each m a n projects in his o w n w a y according to the relative strength o f his various mclinations, his background, education, etc. M o r e o v e r , as soon as w e speak o f happiness w e are speaking o f an end set b y practical reason. A brute animal does not seek happiness, b u t only the satisfaction o f the particular impulse o f the m o m e n t . If happi­ ness is a m a x i m u m o f pleasure, it is still for reason t o estimate h o w any particular satisfaction w i l l affect our contentment throughout the w h o l e o f our existence; and i f happiness is an integration o f ends, it is for reason to determine w h i c h o f our ends can b e combined into a w h o l e and w h i c h are incompatible w i t h one another. A n d reason, urilike instinct, can be m i s t a k e n . 8

22

W h a t is relevant to the question o f duty is not, h o w e v e r , a simple error o f j u d g m e n t . It is, rather, w h a t m i g h t be called a deHberate error, as w h e n some-strong inclination clouds our j u d g m e n t and w e act, in a sense, deliberately contrary to our o w n happiness. W e can choose to satisfy some pressing mclination even t h o u g h w e k n o w that this is contrary to the w i d e r state o f satisfaction w h i c h , i n our m o r e fully rational moments, w e call our happiness. T h e sick m a n can choose to satisfy his.desire for harmful f o o d and drink, convincing himself that health is not an essential c o m p o n e n t in his happiness. T h e miser can choose to indulge in the mere pleasure o f possession, thereby denying " Cf. KJ.U., 43o;KJ.p.V., 25-26; Gr., 417-8. 13

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himself the necessary comforts w h i c h his m o n e y could b u y and w h i c h the normal person w o u l d regard as an essential part o f happiness. In order to achieve a m a x i m u m satisfaction o f the inclinations w e must sacrifice certain present satisfactions. ' T h e precept o f happiness/ Kant notes, 'is often o f such a sort that it greatly interferes w i t h some in­ clinations, and y e t a man can form n o definite and certain concept o f the sum o f the satisfaction o f all o f them, w h i c h is called happiness.' T h e precepts o f prudence are imperatives, and this implies that the sulject o f these rules will not necessarily act in accordance w i t h them. T h e vagueness and mdeterminateness o f the concept o f happiness and the uncertainty o f attaining it even according to the counsels o f pru­ dence enable us, w h e n faced w i t h a strong inclination, to persuade ourselves that the satisfaction o f this inclination w i l l not decisively affect our prospects o f happiness, even t h o u g h , in the absence o f this mclination, our rational decision w o u l d b e t o the contrary. 33

In his examples o f the sick m a n and the miser K a n t indicates that, despite his insistence o n the vagueness o f the concept o f happiness and the lack o f consensus concerning it, he y e t conceives a certain objectivity in this notion. T h e r e are certain basic needs and wants arising from human nature, and the satisfaction o f these must b e reckoned, o n objective grounds, as pertaining t o e v e r y man's happiness. T h e ideal o f happiness w i l l be compounded in v a r y i n g w a y s , but there are certain satisfactions w h i c h , b y a consideration o f the nature c o m m o n to all men, must be included in the concept o f h u m a n happiness, whatever else m a y be super-added o n the basis o f individual differ­ ences. Kant implies this in noting that the m a n w h o risks his health for the pleasures o f food and drink m a y n o t r e c k o n health in his cal­ culations about happiness; nevertheless he is under obligation to preserve his health, and this comes under the duty o f pursuing w h a t pertains to his happiness. T h e miser, again, does n o t r e c k o n enjoyment o f the g o o d things o f life in his happiness. B u t , K a n t suggests, w e r e it not for the influence o f these temporary inclinations or permanent propensities u p o n one's j u d g m e n t , all w o u l d agree that e.g. health and pleasures are elements in happiness. T h e individuals in question have, in fact, c o m p o u n d e d their notions o f happiness differently f r o m 24

2 3

Gr., 399. In M.d.S., 451-2, Kant argues that w e can h a v e a d u t y t o b e b e n e ficient t o ourselves, i.e. t o p r o v i d e ourselves w i t h w h a t w e n e e d t o e n j o y life. T h e contrary o f this is t o deprive ourselves, ' t h r o u g h servile avarice, o f w h a t is necessary for the cheerful e n j o y m e n t o f life'. Cf. K.d.U., 430, w h e r e Kant speaks o f o u r 'true natural needs, a b o u t w h i c h our race is i n t h o r o u g h agreement.' 2 4

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t h e / w a y in w h i c h a fully rational agent w o u l d conceive happiness. A n d this is w h y their duty o f pursuing what, objectively speaking, pertains to their happiness is not a duty o f m a k i n g their happiness their end. ^ If our 'subjective' concept o f happiness is opposed to the 'objective' concept o f happiness, our duty to act contrary to our i n c l i n a t i o n t o ­ ward, e.g. avarice and provide ourselves w i t h w h a t w e need for 'a cheerful enjoyment o f life' is not a duty o f making our o w n happiness our end. For in so far as w e are mclined to avarice, w e do riot include this enjoyment in our notion o f happiness, since it cannot be integrated w i t h the essential element in our concept o f happiness—the satisfaction w e find in keeping our m o n e y . In other w o r d s , so far as something pertains to our notion o f happiness at any given m o m e n t , w e cannot be under obhgation to pursue it because w e necessarily desire it. A n d in so far as w e are under obhgation t o pursue" it, it does not pertain t o our present notion o f happiness and w e are not seeking it as an element in our happiness. W e are not, therefore, m a k i n g our happiness our end; for an object can b e c o m e an end only in so far as it is conceived by us, and our concept o f an ideal state o f satisfaction is not an i m ­ partial, rational one. 1

This seems to be the reasoning w h i c h underlies Kant's assertions, within the same paragraph, that w e cannot have a duty o f pursuing our o w n happiness and that w e can have a duty o f m a k i n g , e.g. health, prosperity and strength our ends. B u t in this case, he adds, our end is not our happiness but rather our moral integrity, and w e seek these things as means to moraHty, since their opposites are temptations t o vice. I f I seek prosperity for m y s e l f o n the g r o u n d that poverty is a temptation to vice, ' m y end is not m y happiness b u t rather the pre­ servation o f the integrity o f m y moraHty, w h i c h is at the same time m y duty'. T h e alleged duty o f p r o m o t i n g our o w n happiness, Kant c o n ­ cludes, is only an indirect duty o f pursuing these elements in happiness as a means to preserving our moral i n t e g r i t y . 25

Despite the distinctions w h i c h made this conclusion possible, it is difficult to avoid—bdth here and elsewhere—the impression that K a n t has d r a w n his division o f our o b h g a t o r y ends s o m e w h a t too sharply and then gone to considerable lengths to maintain the division, at least verbaHy. B u t this is a relatively m i n o r point. T h e m o r e important thing is that Kant recognizes, three types o f object o f a finite rational will—those w h i c h provide the content for our abstract notions o f M.d.S., 388. 26

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happiness, natural perfection and moral perfection. O u r pursuit o f these ends, corning over and a b o v e the preservation o f our integrity as animal and moral beings, completes the system o f ends w i t h i n our o w n will w h i c h the first principle o f ethics, in part, requires us to promote.

CHAPTER XU

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E

TO

\

O T H E R

MEN

A l t h o u g h Kant's division o f obligatory ends left the impression that our duties o f virtue to others consist only in pursuing their happiness, he has already hinted that this is not the case. In connection w i t h the vice o f servility he explained that every man, b y virtue o f his person­ ahty, has a claim to respect from every other man. W e need only look at this relation from the v i e w p o i n t o f its other term to see that every man has a duty o f respect to every other m a n as such. B y mcluding duties o f respect a m o n g duties o f virtue to others K a n t makes provision for a class o f duties absolutely essential to men's moral relations, w h i c h are not adequately defined b y juridical duties and duties o f helping them to realize their subjective ends. W i t h i n the hmits o f the latter t w o types o f duty w e could, for example, help another person in such a w a y as to humiliate h i m and deprive h i m o f his self-respect. I f w e are under obhgation npt o n l y to help others out o f difficulties but also to do it in such a w a y as t o leave their selfrespect intact, it is because our moral i n a x i m o f l o v e always contains an admixture o f obhgation to respect. 1

But Kant's discussion o f our duties o f virtue to others repeats the pattern o f difficulties w h i c h w e found in perfect duties to ourselves. The problem is, again, to subsume the duties in question under the concept 'duty o f virtue'. A duty o f virtue, it w i l l b e recalled, consists only in a m a x i m o f striving to realize a certain end and hence leaves a latitude to j u d g m e n t in determining actions upon, this maxim. Y e t our duty o f respect shows such an analogy to j u r i d i c a l duty that Kant, at one point, can call it an 'ethische Rechtspflicht'. H o w , then, can these quasi-juridical duties be called duties o f virtue? F o r a m o r e precise formulation o f the p r o b l e m itself, as w e l l as for its possible solution, w e must consider carefully Kant's distinction between the t w o classes o f duty o f virtue t o others. 2

1

A l t h o u g h K a n t uses the t e r m Achtung t o describe b o t h one's feeling for t h e m o r a l l a w and for v i r t u o u s m e n ' o n the o n e hand, a n d t h e duties w h i c h o n e o w e s t o all m e n as such o n the o t h e r h a n d , h e translates t h e f o r m e r as reverentia and the :

latter as observantia aliis praestanda. Cf. M.d.S.-, 402, 462. I shall call the former 'reverence' and the latter 'respect'. 2

Cf. H.N.(23), 407. 181

LAWS

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^_ The first division o f these duties, he explains, can be made according .to whether or not, in fulfilling the duty, we-put the other person under / obligation. If, b y fulfilling it, w e p u t the other person under o b l i g a ­ tion to us, the duty is one o f l o v e ; i f not, it is one o f respect. A l t h o u g h Kant mentions that the duties are called duties o f l o v e and respect because o f the feelings w h i c h accompany our observance o f t h e m , he does not mean that our duty consists in having these feelings for other men. W h a t the l a w commands must always be w i t h i n our p o w e r , and w e cannot at will s u m m o n up a certain emotion. T h e l o v e and respect which it is our duty to extend to others are, rather, l o v e and respect 'in a practical sense', the adoption o f certain m a x i m s in our relations w i t h them. O u r duty o f l o v e consists in adopting a m a x i m o f making the subjective ends o f other m e n our o w n ends; our duty o f respect, in adopting a m a x i m o f restricting our actions in relation to others through our recognition o f their status as moral agents. 3

4

5

O u r observance o f a duty o f l o v e is, in relation to the person w h o receives our benevolence, meritorious: that is to say, it puts h i m under an obligation o f gratitude, w h i c h includes returning a like service to us in so far as he can. B u t our fulfdment o f a duty o f respect is not meritorious so far as the other person is concerned: the respect is merely what is due h i m . T h o u g h w e have an obligation o f benevolence to others, they have n o right to demand benevolence f r o m us, and in receiving it they get m o r e than their due. B u t in fulfilling a duty o f respect, as in a juridical duty, w e are merely rendering to others w h a t is rightfully theirs. It is clear, o f course, that 'due' and 'right', w h e n used with regard t o duties o f respect, d o not refer to legal obligation and strict right: since n o violation o f outer freedom is i n v o l v e d here, the other person cannot i n v o k e the p o w e r o f the State to c o m p e l us to fulfil our duty. M o r e o v e r , duties o f respect consist not merely in refraining from manifestations o f contempt but in refraining f r o m them through an attitude o f modesty, i.e. voluntarily hmiting our 6

7

8

MJ.S., 448, 450. Cf. also H.N.(23), 410. It is, o f course, the other person's pure practical reason that lays o b l i g a t i o n o n h i m , b u t our acts o f b e n e v o l e n c e provide the g r o u n d for his serf-imposition o f t h e d u t y o f gratitude. M-d.S., 448. T h e feelings o f l o v e a n d respect,for others can o c c u r separately, but practical l o v e and respect are a l w a y s uniterHri a d u t y o f v i r t u e t o others. 4

8

M.d.S., 449 and 450. Cf. also H.N.fa), 407.

e

Fulfilment o f a d u t y o f respect is a m e r i t o r i o u s act i n the sense that it g o e s b e y o n d that t o w h i c h w e can be externally c o m p e l l e d . It is n o t m e r i t o r i o u s in the sense o f establishing a claim, o n t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , t o gratitude. O n t h e first

sense o f ' m e r i t o r i o u s ' cf. M.d.S., 227: o n the second, ibid., 448.

Ibid., 448, 450, 462-4.

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E T O O T H E R

MEik

18}

/ claim to be esteemed b y others through our practical recognition in them o f the w o r t h w h i c h w e posit in ourselves. If, for prudential reasons, w e s h o w others all due respect w h i l e still inwardly c o n ­ temning them, w e are in fact violating our d u t y o f respect. But these points o f chstinction between duties o f respect and juridical duties d o not yet subsume the former under 'duty o f virtue' in a positive w a y , while the fact that w e must b o r r o w the t e r m i n o l o g y o f L a w to d e ­ scribe them indicates their analogy w i t h juridical duties. T h e different aspects o f this analogy are b r o u g h t out in several passages concerning duties o f respect. First, these duties are 'negative' duties or duties o f omission: the laws enjoining t h e m are limiting or restrictive principles, i.e. prohibitions against depriving another o f something due h i m . F r o m this it follows, secondly, that a violation o f a fluty o f respect is not merely lack o f moral w o r t h but vice, n o t merely failure to d o something meritorious but disregard for the hmitation w h i c h l a w places upon our f r e e d o m . Finally, duties o f respect, because they are negative duties o f h o t exalting ourselves at the expense o f others' self-esteem, are 'analogous' to the juridical duty o f 'not encroaclhng o n another's property'. Their principle is contained in the m a x i m : 'not to degrade another t o a mere means to m y end (not to demand that another abase' M m s e l f in order to sub­ serve m y e n d ) . ' D o e s not all this mean that the m a x i m o f respect involves the personahty o f others as an 'end' o n l y in a negative and hmiting sense, so that duties o f respect, like perfect duties to oneself, are duties o f virtue only in some w i d e r sense o f the term? : A l t h o u g h K a n t is not altogether clear o n this point, he seems to say that, despite certain shnilarities, duties o f respect differ in nature from perfect duties to oneself. I f w e compare the t w o classes o f duties o f virtue t o others, he notes, duties o f respect are to be considered strict in relation to duties o f love, w h i c h are w i d e . . B u t it w o u l d 8

9

10

1

11

;

12

• H.N.(2s), 407 and 411. T h e principle o f duties o f respect, K a n t notes,, is distinguished f r o m b o t h that o f juridical duties a n d that o f duties o f l o v e b y its b e i n g the principle o f consistency b e t w e e n o u r ends a n d t h e f r e e d o m o f others, . m o r e specifically, the,right t o equality w h i c h t h e y h a v e as m e n . B u t this 'right' t o > equality, h e adds, is n o t o b j e c t i v e r i g h t but rather the s u b j e c t i v e right o f another t o value h i m s e l f according t o h i s ' w o r t h as a p e r s o n . I n m a t t e r s o f strict or objective right o n l y the relation o f m y external actions t o those o f a n o t h e r is i n question. In • matters o f respect, it is rather the relation o f m y attitude o f w i l l t o the attitude o f others. D u t i e s o f respect e x t e n d the relations o f f r e e d o m a n d equality b e y o n d the sphere o f external c o m p u l s i o n i n t o that o f attitudes o f w i l l a n d l i m i t n o t m e r e l y external actions b u t also, in a sense, o u r ends t h e m s e l v e s . 9

M.d S., 449. T

1 0

Ibid., 464.

n

Ibid., 449.

,

1 2

Ibid., 449-50.

184

L A W S OF

FREEDOM

seem that 'strict' and ' w i d e ' are here used only as relative terms. Duties o f respect are in themselves 'mere duties o f virtue' and so, apparently, o f w i d e obligation. A n d this seems to i m p l y that the 'end' contained in the m a x i m o f respect is n o t a mere limiting condition oh our actions but rather the g r o u n d for a m a x i m o f striving to bring some state o f affairs into being. Hence w e cannot derive duties o f respect directly from the first principle o f all duty as such, as w e d e ­ rived perfect duties to oneself. Since the l a w enjoining duties o f respect prescribes only the adoption o f an end, w e must derive them f r o m the special first principle o f ethical duty. T o find this end, w e must consider that the m a x i m s o f both l o v e and respect are themselves abstractions f r o m the m o r e fundamental m a x i m o f realizing moral relations a m o n g men. M o r a l laws g o v e r n i n g the relations o f m e n to one another, K a n t explains, are the laws o f an 'intelhgible w o r l d ' sustained b y the forces o f l o v e and respect, w h i c h can' be compared w i t h the forces o f attraction and repulsion in the physical world. A s the laws o f attraction and repulsion are both essen­ tial to the existence o f nature, so the l a w o f l o v e , w h i c h bids m e n d r a w together, and the l a w o f respect, w h i c h commands them to keep a proper distance from one another, together provide the tension w i t h o u t which the moral w o r l d w o u l d collapse. A m a x i m o f l o v e w i t h o u t respect, or o f respect w i t h o u t l o v e , w o u l d not really be a moral relation at all. T h e m a x i m o f d u t y o f virtue to others is always a mixture o f l o v e and respect, and it is o n l y because at times the one and at times the other is the m o r e prominent aspect o f the relation that, for purposes o f analysis, w e speak o f duties o f l o v e and duties o f respect. 13

The end to be brought into existence, then, is the 'moral w o r l d ' , and between the m a x i m o f striving for this end and action u p o n this m a x i m w e find the latitude characteristic o f imperfect duty. M a x i m s of benevolence and beneficence, as w e shall see, can be abstracted from this basic moral relation and treated as duties o f l o v e ; but K a n t insists that the correct moral attitude t o w a r d other m e n is n o t that o f a philanthropist but rather that expressedm^the term 'a friend o f m a n ' . T h e philanthropist as such acts o n l y o n a m a x i m o f love, but the m a x i m o f friendship is one o f equal l o v e and respect. W h i l e Kant's later discussion o f friendship as a d u t y w i l l clarify these concepts, it is clear that a latitude remains for j u d g m e n t in, determining actions o n 14

u

M.d.S.', 448 and 449. Cf. also H . Z V . f o ) , 406,

14

M.d.S., 473. Cf. b e l o w , p . 199 ff.

410.

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E T O O T H E R

MEN

I85

tfj/e m a x i m o f friendship. It is w r o n g , Kant points out, to reduce another to a mere means, even out o f l o v e for h i m , ancl it is for j u d g m e n t to decide, in any given case, h o w the respect necessary to preserve the other's independence is to be manifested and the relation o f equality maintained. It is true that the specific duties o f respect w h i c h Kant discusses— refraining from manifestations o f contempt, detraction "and ridicule— are, in a sense, duties o f omission. M o r e precisely, the duty o f respect 'is expressed only mchrectly (through the prohibition o f the o p p o ­ s i t e ) ' . T h e m a x i m o f respect w h i c h the l a w enjoins is that o f r e c o g ­ nizing an inherent w o r t h or dignity in other men, b y virtue o f w h i c h w e cannot use them as mere means to heightening our o w n ^elfesteem. Thus in c o m m a n d i n g immediately that w e adopt a m a x i m o f respect, the l a w prohibits, mdirectly and through the medium o f this m a x i m , such actions as w o u l d e m b o d y an attitude o f contempt for others. B u t the fact that the l a w implicitly prohibits certain kinds o f actions does n o t change the imperfect character o f the duty o f respect itself. Duties o f l o v e are clearly imperfect duties; y e t the l a w w h i c h enjoins the m a x i m o f love implicitly forbids a m a x i m o f hatred and hence such actions as w o u l d manifest hatred. For this reason Kant's discussions o f specific duties o f love—benevolence, gratitude and sympathy—are followed b y discussions o f the contrary vices o f hatred. In general, the m a x i m o f striving to realize the m o r a l w o r l d excludes the contrary m a x i m and hence such actions as w o u l d destroy moral relations a m o n g men. 15

Y e t , while the restrictive character o f duties o f respect must be thus qualified, it remains true that in duties o f respect, as distinguished f r o m duties o f love, the emphasis falls on the negative aspect o f the duty. This is inherent in the nature o f the respect w h i c h w e are bound t o s h o w others as m e n ; for, as K a n t points out, ' l a m n o t under obhgation to honour others (regarded merely as men), i.e., to s h o w them positive high e s t e e m ' ; and^a metaphysic o f morals cannot descend i n t o the relations o f respect proper to m e n under contingent conditions (age, sex, position, m o r a l character, etc.), w h e r e positive marks o f respect m i g h t be called for. O u r universal duty o f respect for others consists in adopting a m a x i m in consequence o f w h i c h w e d o nothing to d e ­ tract from the dignity w h i c h they, as subjects o f the l a w , °are entitled 16

15

1 8

M.d.S., 464-5.

Ibid., 467. Cf. also 468: ' O n t h e Ethical D u t i e s o f M e n t o O n e A n o t h e r with" R e g a r d t o T h e i r Circumstances'. *• '

186

LAWS

OF

FREEDOM

to posit in themselves. T h e end here, so far as actions are concerned, is to be realized b y negative means, and this accounts for the relative strictness o f duties o f respect in relation t o duties o f l o v e , the m a x i m o f which is to be embodied in positive pursuit o f others' subjective ends. Love and respect can be considered separately, but, as w e have seen, 'in their basis according to the law. they are always j o i n e d together in a duty, only in such a w a y that n o w the one, n o w the other, comprises the subject's principle, to w h i c h the other is j o i n e d in an accessory w a y ' . W e have noted, in general terms, h o w respect is j o i n e d as an accessory principle w i t h love. It remains to be seen h o w l o v e combines with the m a x i m o f respect w h e n the latter predorninates in a duty, and here w e must consider that aspect o f l o v e w h i c h K a n t treats under the heading 'the moral well-being o f others'. 17

T o Kant's division o f obligatory ends—our o w n perfection and the happiness o f others—it might be objected that the line is t o o sharply drawn. Against Kant's exclusion o f the perfection o f others from our obligatory ends it might be said that, w h i l e w e admittedly cannot perform a moral action for another person, w e can still p r o v i d e the conditions w h i c h w i l l help, or at least n o t hinder, others i n their selfimposition o f duty. In fact, K a n t does n o t fail to recognize that our actions and attitudes can influence the m o r a l development o f others: his discussion o f practical anthropology presupposes this, and w h e n he descends into the relations o f an adult t o a child or y o u t h , o r a teacher to his pupil, he discusses at some length w h a t the adult can d o to assist his charge in developing moral character and to prepare h i m for his adoption o f moral purposes. B u t the Metaphysik der Sitten has to d o only w i t h the relations w h i c h m e n as such h a v e t o w a r d one another, and in these relations K a n t is w a r y o f any attempt t o intrude u p o n an­ other's moral life. It is not merely the principle that w e cannot make the perfection o f others our end that leads K a n t t o exclude this from our obligatory ends; it is also his conviction that t o p r y into the moral state o f another and busy oneself with-^nT^roving his character w o u l d be a violation o f the respect due h i m . T h u s he limits our concern for the moral welfare o f other m e n t o the negative duty o f not tempting them to vice and, at the same time, subsumes this duty under the 18

17

1 8

MAS., 448. Discussions o f this kind are to b e f o u n d i n the Pddagogik and i n t h e Methoden-

lehre o f the Tugendlehre. M A S . , 466. 1 9

DUTIES

OF V I R T U E

TO

OTHER

MEN

187

obligatory end o f their happiness. W e have, Kant maintains, a duty o f avoiding scandal, i.e. anything w h i c h , the nature o f m e n being what it is, 'could be a seduction' to them to violate the m o r a l l a w ; and, since freedom from the pangs o f conscience pertains tQ happiness, this is a duty o f p r o m o t i n g other men's happiness, a duty o f l o v e . 2 0

(

W e have seen that one and the same action, regarded under different aspects, can constitute different vices. Thus any violation o f the law, if it is committed publicly, can be scandal in the general sense. T o give genuine scandal, 'an example o f lack o f reverence for the l a w , w h i c h m a y have harmful consequences', is contrary to duty in the highest degree. Y e t , in a sense, our duty o f not seducing others to,vice is a w i d e one, since 'our concern for another's m o r a l self-satisfaction does not permit determinate limits to be assigned i t ' . W h a t K a n t means is that it m a y be permissible and even morally necessary at times to perform actions w h i c h , because o f the ignorance or prejudice o f others, will have the same effect as scandal. I f others find scandal in conduct that is simply unconventional rather than immoral, w e must w e i g h the possible effect o f our action upon others w i t h our duty t o ourselves o f not being bound, b y the tyranny o f popular conduct, to a blind c o p y i n g o f the prevalent mores, w h i c h w o u l d destroy real v i r t u e . Hence our concern for the moral welfare o f others is, in. general terms, the g r o u n d o f only a w i d e obhgation. 21

22

B u t our duty o f concern for the moral well-being o f others takes o n more precise f o r m w h e n it combines w i t h the m a x i m s o f specific duties o f respect. T h e g r o u n d for duties o f respect is simply that other men, as moral agents, are entitled t o posit an absolute inner w o r t h in them­ selves. B u t at the basis o f this moral title is their; obhgation to selfesteem, and the vices o f contempt for others are such that, in practising them, w e m a y w e l l hinder others from fulfilling their duty to t h e m ­ selves. T h e nature o f respect is such that the m a x i m o f love w h i c h combines most readily w i t h it is one o f concern for others' moral w e l l being; and since the means available to us for p r o m o t i n g this aspect o f their happiness are, for the m o s t part, limited t o avoiding scandal, the accessory principle o f l o v e j o i n e d w i t h the m a x i m o f respect means that we,refrain f r o m contempt w i t h a v i e w to n o t detracting f r o m others' self-esteem. T o this extent, the m a x i m o f l o v e introduces a 4

-7

positive element into our fiilfilment o f duties o f respect. Man's predisposition for the g o o d consists i n the p o w e r o f pure reason to be practical, and as one condition necessary for m a n s deterM.d.S., 394. Ibid. Ibid., 464. 20

22

LAWSi)F

i88

FREEDOM

mination o f actions by pure practical reason K a n t mentioned certain capacities on the side o f feeling to be affected b y the thought o f duty. A m o n g these he mentioned 'self-esteem', w h i c h is a valuing o f oneself as die subject o f the moral l a w . Unless w e felt reverence for the l a w , and thereby reverence for ourselves as the subjects o f the moral l a w , w e | could not respond to the claims o f morality. N o w our predis­ position for the g o o d can never be lost entirely (unless, w e cease to be moral agents); but it can be hindered f r o m fulfilling itself in moral action, and one o f the w a y s in w h i c h it can be hindered is through the actions and attitudes o f other men. I f others s h o w contempt for a man, it will be more difficult for h i m t o feel the reverence for himself, as the subject o f the law, w h i c h belongs essentially to his capacity for moral action. K a n t seems to have this in m i n d w h e n he describes con­ tempt as a vice because it 'takes a w a y something that w o u l d otherwise be for the g o o d o f the subject'. A g a i n , in observing a duty o f respect w e contain ourselves vrithin certain limits 'in order t o detract nothing from the w o r t h w h i c h another person, as a man, is entitled t o posit in himself'. This line o f argument, h o w e v e r , becomes m o r e explicit and forceful w h e n K a n t turns t o the specific vices o f contempt. Since this introduction has been concerned primarily w i t h problems arising from duties o f respect, w e shall, reverse Kant's order and treat duties o f respect before duties o f l o v e . T h e m a x i m o f respect, it will be recalled, excludes a m a x i m o f contempt, w h i c h can manifest itself in several w a y s . Hence duties o f respect are t o be treated indirectly, through the prohibition o f these contrary vices. 2 3

24

25

A. PRIDE

While all violations o f duties o f respect manifest an attitude o f c o n ­ tempt for others, the m a x i m o f pride is the general expression o f contempt. Kant distinguishes b e t w e e n t w o attitudes: Hochmut {superbid), which m i g h t be called 'arrogance', and Stolz {animus elatus), w h i c h could be called 'self-respect' or 'a proper pride'. T h e first is described as a kind o f ambition, a striving always to be higher than others, b y reason o f w h i c h one demands o f others*~tnat they value themselves slightly in comparison w i t h oneself This is contrasted w i t h Stolz, which is qualified as 'noble' and described as anxiety to yield up none o f one's w o r t h as a m a n in comparison w i t h other m e n . T h e differ26

23 2 9

M.d.S., -402-3.

2 4

Ibid., 464.

25

Ibid., 450.

Ibid., 465. Stolz is identified here w i t h Ehrliebe, the external manifestation o f w h i c h is Ehrbarkheit (honestas externa). T h e fact that t h e latter is set forth as a

/

D U T I E S OF V I R T U E T O OTHER

MEN

l8Q

ence between these t w o attitudes is a fundamental one. Self-respect is . based o n one's consciousness o f one's dignity as^ a person and o f the rights flowing from personahty, and does not deny a similar recogni­ tion to others: arrogance is based o n contingent circumstances and violates the respect due others b y requiring that they sacrifice their dignity in order to heighten one's o w n self-esteem. T h e arrogant man, Kant points out, is really lacking in proper pride: he is always servile in the depths o f his soul, since he w o u l d not demand that others behave in a servile w a y to h i m unless he felt that, should his fortune change, it w o u l d not be difficult for liim to f a w n upon others and give up all claim to respect from them. W h i l e Kant notes that contemptuous treatment o f others is c o n ­ trary to principles o f both skill and prudence, i t is n o t these considera­ tions that make pride a vice. Its character as a vice lies simply in the fact that it is a denial o f the respect due others as m e n . ' T o contemn others is always contrary to duty, for they are men.' T h e fact that the ground for the respect due others as m e n is their capacity for moral action, not their actual attainment o f virtue, implies that the contempt w h i c h w e cannot help feeling for certain individual m e n w h o pay n o attention to the l a w cannot extend to a denial o f their inalienable w o r t h as subjects o f pure practical reason. B o t h the principle o f practical respect and its admixture o f practical love require us to conceal e v e n the contempt w e inevitably feel for immoral persons. Should w e find it necessary to censure their vice, Kant notes, it is unjust and e v e n incorrect in a theoretical w a y t o deny their inherent w o r t h as m e n ; for w e are then assuming that they can never improve, an assumption ' w h i c h is inconsistent w i t h the Idea o f a man, w h o as such (as a m o r a l being) can never lose;all predisposition to the g o o d ' . It is also contrary to practical l o v e , t o our. necessary concern for their moral w e l l - b e i n g , w h i c h requires that w e censure their vice in such a w a y as t o m a k e t h e m realize their capacity for i m ­ provement. In a characteristic aside, K a n t notes that o u r d u t y ofirespect extends even into our discussions w i t h others o n theoretical matters. In arguing a point w i t h s o m e o n e w e o u g h t not t o dismiss his errors as 'absurdities' or 'poor j u d g m e n t ' , but rather t o l o o k for the element :

2 7

principle o f the general division o f juridical duties i n M.d.S., 237, a g a i n s h o w s that perfect duties t o w a r d o n e s e l f a n d duties o f respect c o m p r i s e , m a sense, relations o f justice ( t o w a r d one's o w n ' h u m a n i t y and t o w a r d o t h e r m e n ) carried b e y o n d the sphere o f external c o m p u l s i o n . 1

27

M.d.S., 464.

190

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OE. F R E E D O M

o f truth in his argument and then explain to h i m h o w he c a m e to err, thus preserving his respect for his o w n understanding; for ' i f one denies him all understanding . . . , h o w can one m a k e h i m understand that he has erred?' 28

B. D E T R A C T I O N

Detraction is described as a propensity t o bring into the open s o m e • thing prejudicial t o another, w h i c h w i l l detract f r o m the respect due * him. Although Kant describes this propensity as h a v i n g n o particular end in view, he is probably speaking m o r e precisely w h e n he adds, later, that w e are actually striving to maintain o r heighten esteem for ourselves. B y discrediting others t h r o u g h evil gossip w e are trying to ensure an opinion that w e ourselves are as g o o d as, or at least n o w o r s e than, other m e a . Since duties o f respect are duties o f virtue, Kant distinguishes carefully between detraction and slander. T h e latter is a false statement, prejudicial to another's h o n o u r , w h i c h can be taken to court. That w h i c h comprises detraction cannot be taken to L a w . W h a t is said about the other m a y be true; nevertheless, K a n t m a i n ­ tains, t o say it is contrary t o our d u t y o f practical respect. 2 9

s

Here again, as in the case o f pride, the violation o f the respect due to others hardly requires elaboration. Instead, K a n t stresses the acces­ sory obligation o f striving to p r o m o t e the m o r a l w e l l - b e i n g o f others through the primarily negative means at o u r disposal. H e points out that men in general, as w e l l as the particular person w h o s e faults are made public, are harmed b y this vice, since the repeated direction o f their attention to men's failings weakens their respect for the human race as such and 'finally throws the s h a d o w o f worthlessness over our whole species', m a k i n g cynicism the dominant w a y o f thinking. D e ­ traction can eventually blunt and stultify m o r a l feeling itself, i.e. the feeling o f reverence for humanity as such and so for humanity vvithin one's o w n person. B u t in an interesting remark K a n t seems to suggest that our duty o f concern for the m o r a l w e l l - b e i n g o f others is not strictly limited'to refraining from w h a t m i g h t h a r m them. W e ought, he notes, to throw the veil o f b e n e v o l e n c e - ^ v e r the faults o f others, 'not merely b y softening our j u d g m e n t but also b y concealing these faults. For the example o f respect w h i c h w e g i v e another could arouse his striving to be w o r t h y o f this r e s p e c t ' . A l t h o u g h the available means for promoting the moral welfare o f others are primarily negat­ ive, this passage suggests that they are n o t strictly so. M.d.S., 463. ^ Ibid., 466. *> Ibid. 30

28

/ C.

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IQI

SCORN

Scorn is described as the propensity to ridicule others for their real or imagined faults. Here again K a n t suggests that it is the agent's attitude o f will, as w e l l as his external actions, that comprises the vice. T h e propensity w h i c h leads to the vice is a spiritus causticus, and the ridicule is aimed at depriving another person o f the respect due him. T h e vice is distinguished from the good-natured banter w h i c h is the prerogative o f friends, not merely b y the fact that the latter is directed at what is merely 'the appearance o f a fault' whereas ridicule singles out real faults (or at least w h a t the agent regards as real faults), but also b y the fact that the m o c k e r y contains n o scorn in it. W h a t makes ridicule a vice is, essentially, the fact that it is a denial o f the respect due another. But, Kant adds, the immediate delight in another's faults manifested here makes it so m u c h the m o r e contrary to duty because it contains something o f a fiendish j o y . 3 1

As contempt is the general attitude t o w a r d others prohibited b y the principle o f practical respect, so benevolence or weU-wishing is the general attitude t o w a r d m e n as such enjoined b y the principle o f practi­ cal love. This attitude, again, manifests itself in'specific duties o f l o v e : beneficence or active benevolence, gratitude and sympathy. A n d as the moral necessity o f an attitude o f benevolence excludes the possi­ bility o f hatred t o w a r d m e n as such, so the laws enjoining particular duties o f l o v e implicitly prohibit the contrary vices o f hatred: envy, ingratitude and dehght in others' misfortunes. Here again the love w h i c h w e are obliged t o extend others is not the e m o t i o n o f love. A l t h o u g h Kant holds that w i t h o u t the capacity for feeling l o v e w e should accomplish little in the w a y o f duty and that fulfilment o f our duties o f love leads us eventually to feel l o v e for other m e n , it remains true that w e cannot s u m m o n up a feeling merely because w e w i l l t o . T h e l o v e w h i c h it is our duty to have for other m e n is, rather, practical love, a m a x i m o f concern for their welfare. K a n t characterizes the basic m a x i m o f benevolence somewhat ' differently depending o n w h e t h e r he is stressing its distinction from a mere e m p t y wish or f r o m the activity o f helping others. O n the one hand, it is not a mere matter o f feeling, a natural k i n d l y disposition w h i c h m a y remain permanently ineffectual. It is, rather, a" practical benevolence, w h i c h 'concerns the maxims o f actions—a m a x i m o f benevolence (as practical) w h i c h has beneficence, as its consequence'. M.d.S., 467. Ibid., 401-2 and 449. Ibid., 449. 3 2

33

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O n the other hand, in contrasting it w i t h beneficence K a n t calls it 'a mere benevolence o f wish, w h i c h is really only a satisfaction in the well-being o f others without one's h a v i n g ' t o d o anything t o w a r d this' and which 'costs us n o t h i n g ' . These t w o descriptions, h o w e v e r , d o not really contradict each other. W e are under obligation to h a v e a maxim o f benevolence toward all men, and although as such, i.e. in its universality, is it only a wish, still it is a practical attitude w h i c h , in its relation to certain m e n within our field o f activity, has as its conse­ quence our making the welfare o f these m e n our end and acting t o promote this end. A l t h o u g h it is our duty to have an attitude o f b e n e ­ volence toward all men, w e cannot extend active benevolence t o t h e m all; and by this distinction the universality o f the m a x i m o f b e n e ­ volence is reconciled w i t h a distinction according to persons in m a k i n g their subjective ends our o w n . 'For in m y w i s h I can w i s h e v e r y o n e well equally, but in m y actions the measure can still be v e r y different . . . without violating the universality o f the m a x i m ' . Kant admits that, o f the several possible attitudes t o w a r d m e n as such, it is not immediately evident that w e are under obligation t o adopt that o f benevolence as our m a x i m . O n the contrary, the attitude o f indifference expressed in the saying ' e v e r y m a n for himself and G o d for us all' seems to be the most natural o n e . A n attitude o f concern for our O w n happiness and indifference t o that o f others must be c o n ­ sidered the natural and given situation in the relations o f m e n as such to one another because, w h i l e w e can presuppose one's o w n happiness as the subjectively necessary end o f e v e r y finite rational being, w h e t h e r one concerns oneself w i t h the happiness o f others is, apart f r o m moral laws, contingent upon one's having certain altruistic mclinations. B u t , Kant argues, this natural situation is morally impossible. O n e ' s o w n happiness is a necessary object o f a finite rational will, and if, as is morally necessary, one adopts this end o n the basis o f its rational valid­ ity, one cannot at the same time b e mdifferent to the happiness o f others. I f I adopt m y happiness as an end, n o t merely o n the basis o f m y natural desire for happiness but rather o n the g r o u n d that it is rational for any being w i t h needs and wants t o w i l l the satisfaction o f these, then m y w i l l is not a private w i l l b u t j a t h e r , i f the description is taken without metaphysical implications, a universal w i l l . A n d so M.d.S., 452. Ibid-. 34

3 5

36

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**Ibid. Kant actually uses this expression t o e x e m p l i f y the contrary o f b e n e ­ ficence; but since the attitude o f b e n e v o l e n c e is itself practical, a m a x i m o f n o n indifference t o the welfare o f others, i t expresses e q u a l l y w e l l the c o n t r a r y o f benevolence i n general.

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m y attitude t o w a r d happiness is n o t an attitude merely toward m y happiness but rather t o w a r d the happiness o f men as such. T o will m y o w n happiness and, at the same time, be mdifferent t^o the happiness o f others w o u l d be morally w r o n g because m y m a x i m regarding happi­ ness w o u l d lack the universality o f a law. Kant puts this point forcefully. M y m a x i m regarding happiness, he argues, must have the universality o f a law, and hence I cannot be in­ different to the happiness o f other* men. 'Since, h o w e v e r ; all other m e n w i t h the exception o f m y s e l f do not comprise all men, and accordingly the m a x i m w o u l d not have in itself the universality o f a law, w h i c h is necessary for obhgation, so the l a w o f the duty o f bene­ volence includes m y s e l f within the c o m m a n d o f practical reason, as its object'. This does not mean that I a m under obhgation to l o v e my-, self, since I cannot have a duty t o d o w h a t I d o spontaneously and in­ evitably. It means, rather, that it is morally permissible for m e to be benevolent to m y s e l f (as I inevitably am) only under the condition that I also wish every other man well. For only w h e n m y m a x i m o f bene­ volence is one t o w a r d men as such can it qualify for g i v i n g universal law, 'on w h i c h principle every l a w o f duty is based'. 37

O u r obhgation to have a m a x i m o f benevolence t o w a r d mankind as such, Kant notes, is the greatest in extension a m o n g our duties o f love, and at the same time the least so far as the degree o f practical love is concerned. T o fulfil this duty to another it is o n l y necessary not to be mdifferent to him, and our obhgation to this minimal practical love is an obhgation to all m e n as such. B u t it is this attitude o f nonmdifference to the welfare o f m e n as such that leads us to adopt the subjective ends o f certain m e n as our ends and so to fulfil our duty o f beneficence. Certain men, K a n t explains, are 'closer t o m e in the relation o f duty' than are others, and accordingly I a m obliged to extend practical l o v e to t h e m in a greater degree. In discussing our indirect duty o f promoting our o w n happiness, w e noted Kant's v i e w that w h d e w e cannot have a duty o f benevolence t o ourselves w e can have a duty o f beneficence to ourselves., T a m closer to m y s e l f (even according to duty) than to any other', and I a m therefore under obhga­ tion to myself to provide for m y o w n true n e e d s . Here, however, w e are discussing duties o f virtue to other men, so that this ground o f obhgation enters into the discussion only as a limitation u p o n one's duty o f beneficence to others. 38

6

37 88

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MAS., 451 Ibid.

LAWS

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BENEFICENCE

T h e proof o f our obligation to beneficence, again, turns o n the i m ­ possibility o f willing our m a x i m o f selfishness as universal l a w . A s in the Grundlegung, Kant argues that our m a x i m o f refusing to help others w h o are in need w o u l d contradict itself w e r e it made a universal law. For our m a x i m o f selfishness, made into a universal l a w , w o u l d be a universal permissive l a w entitling others to deny us help w h e n w e are in need, and in so far as w e w i l l our o w n happiness, w e w i s h for others to be prepared to assist us w h e n their help is essential to our happiness. In so far as moral laws, rather than pragmatic rules,'are in question, it need hardly be pointed out that the argument does not involve the assumption that m y refusal t o help others in need w i l l have the result o f making everyone deny m e help w h e n I need it. N o r is it necessary to assume that at some time I shall need help o r w a n t it from others: 1 m a y feel assured against ever needing help f r o m others, or I may be strong enough not to w a n t their help i f I a m in need. Such considerations w o u l d not change the force o f Kant's argument that w e are under obligation to adopt a m a x i m o f helping others w h o are in need and w h o d o w a n t our h e l p . It is o n l y necessary t o assume that I do will m y o w n happiness, and f r o m this it follows, according to Kant's argument, that I must also w i l l the happiness o f others and must, therefore, have a m a x i m o f helping t h e m w h e n they are in need and want m y help. 39

4 0

' W e have already noticed, in general terms, the reasons w h y our duty i o f beneficence is an imperfect one. E v e n apart from the question o f whether imperfect duty permits arbitrary exceptions, K a n t holds that empirical factors enter into j u d g m e n t ' s determination o f b o t h the extent to which w e should act and the sort o f thing w h i c h is to be done. T h e extent to w h i c h w e should practice beneficence depends, first, u p o n the extent o f our o w n true needs and the resources w h i c h w e have. H o w far, Kant asks in his casuistical questions, should one expend his resources in helping others? and replies: ' N o t to such an extent that he eventually brings himself to need another's b e n e f i c e n c e ' . T o d o so w o u l d be contrary t o one's d u t y o f self-esteem for oneself, w h i c h requires maintaining the status o f independence befitting a man, in MAS., 453, Cf. also Gr., 423. 41

89

4 0

Cf. J. Ebbinghaus: 'Interpretation a n d Misinterpretation o f the Categorical Imperative'; The Philosophical Quarterly, 1954. F o r Kant's v i e w that t h e m a n w h o is strong e n o u g h n o t t o seek help f r o m others still has a d u t y o f b e n e f i c e n c e t o " t h e m , cf. Gr., 398-9 a n d also 430, n . 1. «Af.rf.S.,454.

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