Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada: A Silent War (Palgrave Studies in Minority Languages and Communities)

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Palgrave Studies in Minority Languages and Communities Series Editor: Gabrielle Hogan-Brun, University of Bristol, UK Worldwide migration and unprecedented economic, political and social integration in Europe present serious challenges to the nature and position of language minorities. Some communities receive protective legislation and active support from states through policies that promote and sustain cultural and linguistic diversity; others succumb to global homogenisation and assimilation. At the same time, discourses on diversity and emancipation have produced greater demands for the management of difference. This series publishes new research based on single or comparative case studies on minority languages worldwide. We focus on their use, status and prospects, and on linguistic pluralism in areas with immigrant or traditional minority communities or with shifting borders. Each volume is written in an accessible style for researchers and students in linguistics, education, anthropology, politics and other disciplines, and for practitioners interested in language minorities and diversity. Titles include: Jean-Bernard Adrey DISCOURSE AND STRUGGLE IN MINORITY LANGUAGE POLICY FORMATION Corsican Language Policy in the EU Context of Governance Nancy H. Hornberger (editor) CAN SCHOOLS SAVE INDIGENOUS LANGUAGES? Policy and Practice on Four Continents Anne Judge LINGUISTIC POLICIES AND THE SURVIVAL OF REGIONAL LANGUAGES IN FRANCE AND BRITAIN Yasuko Kanno LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN JAPAN Unequal Access to Bilingualism Janet Muller LANGUAGE AND CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND CANADA A Silent War Máiréad Nic Craith EUROPE AND THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE Citizens, Migrants and Outsiders Máiréad Nic Craith (editor) LANGUAGE, POWER AND IDENTITY POLITICS Anne Pauwels, Joanne Winter and Joseph Lo Bianco (editors) MAINTAINING MINORITY LANGUAGES IN TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXTS Australian and European Perspectives Susanna Pertot, Tom M. S. Priestly and Colin H. Williams (editors) RIGHTS, PROMOTION AND INTEGRATION ISSUES FOR MINORITY LANGUAGES IN EUROPE

Linda Tsung MINORITY LANGUAGES, EDUCATION AND COMMUNITIES IN CHINA Glyn Williams SUSTAINING LANGUAGE DIVERSITY IN EUROPE Evidence from the Euromosaic project Forthcoming titles: Dovid Katz YIDDISH AND POWER Ten Overhauls of a Stateless Language Maya Khemlani David, Vanithamani Saravanan and Peter Sercombe (editors) LANGUAGE, IDENTITIES AND EDUCATION IN ASIA Bernadette O’Rourke ATTITUDES TOWARDS WEAK AND STRONG MINORITY LANGUAGES Galician and Irish in the European Context Vanessa Pupavac (editor) LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN CONFLICT Serbo-Croatian Language Politics Graham Hodson Turner A SOCIOLINGUISTIC HISTORY OF BRITISH SIGN LANGUAGE

Palgrave Studies in Minority Languages and Communities Series Standing Order ISBN 978–1–4039–3732–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada A Silent War

Janet Muller

© Janet Muller 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–23065–1 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Muller, Janet, 1957– Language and conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada : a silent war / Janet Muller. p. cm.—(Palgrave studies in minority languages and communities) ISBN 978–0–230–23065–1 (alk. paper) 1. Irish language – Political aspects – Northern Ireland. 2. Irish language – Social aspects – Northern Ireland. 3. Language policy – Northern Ireland. 4. Language planning – Northern Ireland. 5. Sociolinguistics – Northern Ireland. 6. French language – Political aspects – Québec (Province) 7. Language policy – Québec (Province) 8. Language planning – Québec (Province) I. Title. PB1298.N67M87 2010 306.44⬘9416—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

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Contents List of Illustrations

vi

List of Abbreviations

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

Abstract

xii

Introduction

1

1. A Silent War: Conflict Resolution and Language Policy and Planning in the North of Ireland and Quebec / Canada

5

2. The Irish Language in the North of Ireland: Statistics

38

3. The Irish Language and the Good Friday Agreement

56

4. The Ratification and Application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

77

5. Irish Language Broadcasting since the Good Friday Agreement: Sop in áit na scuaibe? Sword or Ploughshare?

99

6. The British Government Commitment to Enact the Irish Language Act

119

7. The Submissions of the Political Parties to the First Public Consultation on Proposed Irish Language Legislation for NI

147

8. Submissions from Key Public Bodies and a 20 per cent Sample of Individual Responses to the Public Consultation on the Proposed Irish Language Legislation

168

9. Quebec v. the Rest in the Twenty-First Century: Coming-of-Age, or Losing the Plot?

196

Conclusions

227

Notes

232

Bibliography

252

Index

269

v

Illustrations Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

2.5

2.6 2.7

2.8 2.9 2.10

2.11

2.12

2.13 2.14 2.15

1911 and 1991 Census: Figures and percentages of overall population with knowledge of Irish 2001 Census: Knowledge and skills in Irish 2001 Census figures: Percentage comparison (1991–2001) in respect of District ward areas in NI 2001 Census: Belfast Area: Ten Wards with highest percentage of Irish indicated: Comparative figures on those indicating knowledge of Irish and those with ability in full skills range 2001 Census: Belfast Area: Ten Wards with lowest percentage of Irish indicated: Comparative figures on those indicating knowledge of Irish and those with ability in full skills range 1991 Census: Knowledge of Irish by age 2001 Census: Knowledge of Irish by age (All persons), Table population: All persons aged 3 and over (and column percentages) 2001 Census: Figures and percentages for women and men with knowledge of Irish 2001 Census: Figures and percentages for women and men with knowledge of Irish according to religion 1991 Census: knowledge of Irish by religion, Table population: All persons aged 3 years and over (and column percentages) 2001 Census: Knowledge of Irish by religion: Table population: All persons aged 3 years and over (and column percentages) 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Figures and percentages with knowledge of Ulster Scots and gender breakdown 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Knowledge of Ulster Scots by age 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Knowledge of Ulster Scots by religion 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Knowledge of Ulster Scots by political opinion

vi

40 41 42

43

43 44

44 45 45

46

46

47 48 49 49

Illustrations

2.16

2.17

2.18

2.19 2.20 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

4.5

4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14

2003–4 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures 2006–7 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures 2008–9 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures Number of schools and pupils in the North by management type 2003–8 Figures for A level Examinations taken in modern languages ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: preschool ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: primary school ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: secondary school ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: vocational and technical education ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: university and higher education ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Other sub-paragraphs in Article 8 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Administration of Justice: Article 9 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Administrative Authorities: Article 10 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11

vii

51

52

52 54 54 81 82 82

82

82 82 83 84 85 85 85 85 85 85

viii

4.15 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.2 8.1

8.2

8.3 9.1 9.2 9.3

Illustrations

ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 Total spend by hours on television and radio for Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Comparative data on indigenous languages CCG / ILBF – Hours of Irish language programming funded over 7 funding rounds 2005–7 CCG / ILBF Commissions by genre and total CCG / ILBF spend Results of Two DCAL consultations on proposed Irish language legislation Figures for both consultations on proposed Irish language legislation DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of individual submissions by viewpoint on legislation and the model preferred DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of individual submissions by support for legislation in subject areas listed in DCAL consultation paper DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of submissions with comments 2001 and 2006, Percentage of the population of Quebec for whom French is mother tongue 2001 Percentage of French mother-tongue speakers using French only or with another language in the workplace Percentage of immigrants using predominantly French, English or another language in the workplace

86 101 102 113 116 130 131

180

187 192 206 218 218

Figure 9.1

Age structure of English and French mother tongues, 5 year age groups, Canada less Quebec, 2006

204

Maps 1.1

Map of Ireland showing border established under Government of Ireland Act 1920 1.2 Outline map showing the North of Ireland with counties 1.3 Map showing Canada with provinces 1.4 Map of Quebec

20 21 25 27

Abbreviations ByI /WLB B&BC BBC (NI) CAJ CCG / ILBF CCEA CCMS CCR CCRF / CCDL CFL / CLF CnaGta CNnaG COL / CLO COMEX CR DCAL DCMS DENI DETI DES DUP ECRML EME FCFA FIE GOLI ICCPR ICIG IME InaG LLO / OLA

Bwrdd Yr Iaith / Welsh Language Board Bilingualism and Biculturalism Commission (Canada) British Broadcasting Company (Northern Ireland) Committee on the Administration of Justice Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge / Irish Language Broadcast Fund Council for Curriculum Examination and Assessment Council for Catholic Maintained Schools Community Relations Council The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms / La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés The Charter for the French Language / La Charte de la langue française Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta (The Council for Irish Medium Education) Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge The Commissioner of Official Languages / Commissaire aux langues officielles Committee of Experts (on the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) Conflict Resolution Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (NI) Department for Culture, Media and Sport (UK) Department of Education (NI) Department of Enterprise, Training and Investment (NI) Department for Education and Skills (UK) Democratic Unionist Party European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages English Medium Education Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes French Immersion Education Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Interdepartmental Charter Implementation Group Irish Medium Education Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta (The Irish Medium Education Trust) Loi sur les langues officielles / Official Languages Act (Canada) ix

x

Abbreviations

LPP NGO NI NIO NISRA NoI OQLF Q/C RGE / DFA RGPTG / DCRGA

RML ROC RoI SACHR SDLP SF UUP

Language Policy and Planning Non-Governmental Organisation Northern Ireland Northern Ireland Office Northern Ireland Statistics and Research North of Ireland Office québécoise de la langue française Quebec / Canada Roinn Gnóthaí Eachtracha / Department of Foreign Affairs (RoI) Roinn Gnóthaí Pobail, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta / the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (RoI) Regional or Minority Language Rest of Canada Republic of Ireland Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights Social Democratic and Labour Party Sinn Féin Ulster Unionist Party

Buíochas / Acknowledgements My thanks to the Irish speaking community for the energy, support, information sharing and endless good humour (in spite of everything); to my employers, POBAL who have given me invaluable encouragement, time, support and assistance for over ten years, and also to all my co-workers during this whole period. Thanks to Kevin Callaghan (McGill University, Montreal) and Linda Cardinal (Université d’Ottawa) who helped me to establish some key networks in Quebec and Canada. Also to all those who agreed to be interviewed for the book over two bouts, in 2006 and 2009. The social partnership, Concordia NI helped me with a 2006 study visit to Canada, and although space considerations mean that many interviews completed in 2006 have not featured here in detail, each one contributed enormously to my understanding. Continuing weaknesses in this respect are no one’s fault but mine. Thanks to Professors Máiréad Nic Craith and Christine Bell (University of Ulster), and Professor Colin Williams (University of Cardiff) for previous PhD guidance. Colin Williams (Cardiff University) gave me invaluable advice prior to and during the writing of this book, and he and Wilson McLeod (University of Edinburgh) commented on the Canada chapter drafts. Grá agus buíochas / remerciements et bisous à: Sylvie Gaultier and Kat Ó Brien in Montreal. Thanks to Frankie Quinn for use on the book cover of his photograph, North Belfast Peaceline 2004. Thanks to all at Palgrave Macmillan for support and help in publishing the book. Some sections in Chapter 4 have been published in the Council of Europe’s book, The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Legal Challenges and Opportunities (2007), Eds: Dunbar, R and Parry, G. Council of Europe. The Council of Europe holds copyright to these sections and I am grateful for permission to reproduce some material from these sections here. My family came to mind often whilst I was writing the book, especially my mother (1917–1999) and my brother Chris (1948–2003). Final and best thanks go to Karen and Éadaoin for endless encouragement. Daoibh féin beirt atá an saothar seo, le grá is buíochas ó lán mo chroí. Janet Muller 30 September 2009

xi

Abstract The theme of this book is the impact of conflict and conflict resolution (CR) on language policy and planning (LPP) in Northern Ireland and in Quebec / Canada. The primary focus is the Irish language in the North from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to the present (with brief references to LPP in the Republic of Ireland). LPP in respect of the Northern conflict has been neglected in both sociolinguistic and CR analysis. The book seeks to address this gap and also to place both CR and LPP in the NoI in an international context, drawing on Quebec / Canada as a mirror, through an examination of developments in relations since the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession. Chapter 1 examines LPP formulation in the CR approaches to deep-rooted, ethno-linguistic conflicts of hegemonic (or dominant) powers. It studies the interplay in the North of Ireland and in Quebec / Canada of domestic and international law, the principle of self-determination, language protection and definitions of minority / majority rights and briefly establishes the historical background to current LPP and CR. The aim of the Irish language section of this book (Chapters 2–8) is to contribute to the visibility of the Irish language in the North within the field of sociolinguistics, and help to dispel misconceptions as to its specific circumstances in the current climate. Chapter 2 gives a thumb-nail sketch of the current state of the language through demographic information and a brief examination of Irish in education. Chapter 3 describes LPP prior to the 1990s and the importance of the Irish language in political negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement (1998). The ratification and implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is detailed in Chapter 4, drawing on UK, Committee of Experts and NGO reports over three monitoring cycles. Irish language broadcasting provision, legislation and funding is discussed in Chapter 5. Irish speaking community proposals for an Irish Language Act and the commitment by the British government in the St Andrews Agreement (2006) to enact legislation is detailed in Chapter 6, followed by an account of the treatment of the Irish language in the devolved institutions established in 2007 to the present. This chapter also examines two government consultations on the proposed legislation, drawing on submissions to the first consultation from Irish language NGOs and statutory organizations. In Chapters 7 and 8, the submissions of the NI political parties to the first consultation and those of key Englishlanguage NGOs and public bodies are discussed. An examination of a sample 20 per cent of individual replies to the consultation is also presented.

xii

Abstract xiii

Chapter 9 contains a brief analysis of LPP and CR in Quebec and Canada since the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession. There is an examination of current federal and Quebec LPP and interviews with key figures in LPP. The findings of the book are that the practice of CR by hegemonic states tends to reinforce its own dominant position, and that these goals influence the formulation of LPP. Domestic and international law can be doubleedged swords, although effective legislation can be central in transforming the position of minoritised languages. Achieving and maintaining progressive LPP requires great reserves of determination and energy on the part of minoritised language communities who must also protect their independence within the political sphere.

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Introduction

Being a long-term resident of the North of Ireland (NoI), I have acquired a particular interest in how conflict, conflict resolution (CR) and language policy and planning (LPP) are interlinked. My professional work1 in LPP has provided me with direct experience of the results of CR on a minoritised language community, and an interest in how competing demands from different sections of society interact with historical colonial interests, hegemonic power and particularist regimes, with minority and human rights concerns, with international law and best international practice. As for many concerned with LPP, the combination of personal and professional experience has drawn my attention to Canada, to the historic and contemporary tensions around the competing linguistic and political groupings in Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC). In Chapter 1, there is a discussion of the similarities as well as the differences in the situations of NoI and Quebec / Canada (Q / C). The two situations provide a useful contextual framework to examine how conflict, CR and LPP intermesh. In the last chapter of the book, I shall examine both Canadian federal and Quebec LPP from the most recent Quebec referendum on secession in 1995 to the present. The aim of the Irish language section of this book (Chapters 2–8) is to contribute to the visibility of the Irish language in NoI within the field of sociolinguistics, and help to dispel misconceptions as to its specific circumstances in the current climate. This in turn may help to inform future study on the most beneficial approaches to the development of the Irish language throughout the island of Ireland. Although the Irish language is the indigenous language of Ireland, since partition in the 1920s, its development (some might say under-development) has been subject to two different sets of LPP, one British and one Irish. I shall make reference to the current impact of these two approaches thoughout the book. LPP in the North has been neglected in much of the sociolinguistic study of Irish, which tend to focus to a significant degree on the language in the South. Those contemporary works which deal with the Irish language in the North contain valuable 1

2

Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada

material relevant to the current context but do not have CR as the specific framework for their analysis. In Chapters 2–8, I shall focus on how CR has influenced British government LPP in NoI within the most recent decade of the NI peace process. The 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) contains significant references to the Irish language, but although CR in the North has been widely commented nationally and internationally to date, paradoxically few accounts analyse in any significant degree the importance of LPP within the process. Many contemporary texts offering political analysis tend to refer only peripherally, if at all, to the Irish language. The relative demographic weakness of the Irish speaking community in the North, and its marginalised position within the collective psyche and within legislative, social and policy frameworks are of course contributory factors in this. However, the neglect of LPP within policy analysis belies its central importance to the North’s community of Irish speakers (10.4 per cent of the overall population or 167,000 people2) and to the much larger percentage of people who support and hold the language in esteem. It would also appear to seriously underestimate the fact that, as I shall show in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, the Irish language has featured continuously in negotiations prior to both the GFA and the 2006 St Andrews’ Agreement (SAA). In addition, in the period between 1998 and 2008 the Irish language has been shown to have enormous symbolic and political importance to the British government and to both nationalist and unionist political parties in the NoI. This suggests that its positioning as an issue of minimal or minority interest within mainstream commentary is a false one that ignores or misinterprets the reality of British government interest in ethnic and linguistic relations in the colonial context in this part of the world. Of course, a detailed comparison of the centrality of the issue within CR for successive Irish governments is a worthwhile subject for study, but for reasons of space, it is one which this book cannot undertake in depth, although I shall allude to it in different sections of the book. Chapter 1 examines definitions of conflict and the theory and practice of conflict resolution (CR). In addition, it addresses the common threads in Q / C and Irish historic experience, the impact of domestic and international legislation and the lack of clarity in relation to the principle of self-determination and the effect this has had on LPP up to the 1995 referendum on secession in the case of Quebec and the 1998 GFA in the case of the NoI. This will set the scene for further discussion on Q / C in the final chapter. In Chapter 2, I shall briefly cite NoI demographic information from official sources including the 2001 Census in order to create a statistical profile of the Irish language, Ulster Scots and ethnic minority communities in the NoI. I shall also present some information on the growth of Irish Medium Education (IME) in the North and note current education policy trends. In Chapter 3, I shall first identify the LPP context and relationship of the Irish speaking community with the State in the period prior to the CR

Introduction 3

arrangements of 1998. Following this, I shall examine published and leaked accounts of the Irish language within the CR negotiations leading up to the GFA, and briefly assess the structure for devolved institutions established under the GFA. Chapter 4 examines the UK implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in respect of Irish, and in Chapter 5 I shall detail Irish language broadcasting provision. Chapter 6 looks at the emergence since the GFA of a consensus among Irish speakers, spearheaded and developed by POBAL, the umbrella non-governmental organisation (NGO) that effective legislation in the North is a key LPP issue. I shall then examine the British government commitment in the SAA to enact Irish language legislation, its consultation process on the issue and the resulting impacts, from May 2007 to late 2009, of the reestablishment of the NI devolved institutions on LPP. In the final section of this chapter, I analyse the responses of Irish language NGOs and state bodies to the first governmental consultation on the proposal to enact Irish language legislation. I shall argue that the actions of the British government in exacerbating division and undermining the position of the Irish language during the political negotiations of 2006–7, shines a light on its own role and practice within CR in the North. Chapters 7 and 8 gives further in-depth analysis of a sample of responses to the consultation process, initially from the North’s political parties, then from key NGOs and public bodies and finally from a random sample of individual respondents. Chapter 9 contains an analysis, albeit in abbreviated form, of the interaction between LPP and CR in Q / C, focussing on approaches and attitudes since the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession. I examine current federal and Quebec LPP initiatives and interview key players within language policy.

Translations, language versions and endnotes Throughout the book, where quotations are given, they are carried in the main text in the language in which they were made. The translation then follows, with a note as to whether the translation is my own or from some other source. In Chapters 2–8, where submissions or documents by Irish speakers or Irish language organisations have been made in English, I have not translated. Where Irish speaking respondents comment on their reasons for writing in English, I reflect this. In some cases, public or government bodies have translated Irish language submissions into English where publishing summaries or when making them available to the public. Where this has been the case, I have used the English language version. In the case of books or documents produced bilingually in Q / C or the NoI, I have opted wherever practicable to use the French or Irish language version first in my text, with translation following. I have decided upon this

4


method to ensure consistency in the presentation of quotations, but it is not without some difficulties. A citation may, for example, appear on different pages in each language version. Where this is the case, I have recorded in brackets in the main text the page reference for the language version quoted. Thus, if the quote is in Irish, the page number quoted in the main text relates to the Irish language version of the document. I then give both page references in an endnote. More problematic is the fact that in the case of British government documents, or those from NoI departments, the documents all appear to have been drafted in English and subsequently translated into Irish. At times, the Irish language translation does not convey the same meaning as the English. At others, part of the text given in English is missing in the Irish language version. At still others, the grammar, syntax or spelling of Irish used in official documents may be unconventional. This poses a dilemma. In the case of textual interpretation, I have recorded in the endnote where there is a discrepancy in my view, in the meaning of the English and Irish texts, and I have similarly dealt with missing text in the two language versions. As to any other matters of grammar, spelling and style, for the most part, I have carried the Irish language version as it appears in the official document, without correction or comment. I should add that any imperfections in the rest of the text, in Irish, French or English, are my own alone.

Terminology and abbreviations The naming of places and their description as countries, provinces, regions, states etc is often part of mega-conflict. I have attempted to pick a path through the minefield by referring to the six counties of Ireland variously as ‘the North of Ireland’ (NoI), ‘the North’ or ‘Northern Ireland’ (NI). I refer to the 26 counties as ‘the South of Ireland,’ ‘the South’ or the ‘Republic of Ireland’ (RoI). I refer to Ireland (32 counties) and Canada as ‘countries’. I use the abbreviation ROC to mean the Rest of Canada, that is, not including Quebec. I acknowledge the position of Quebec as a province within the Canadian federation and legal / administrative system, but I have opted to refer to ‘federal LPP’, ‘federal government’ etc, and ‘Quebec LPP’, ‘Quebec government’ rather than ‘Canadian’ or ‘provincial’ this, that or the other. I refer to the people of Quebec as as ‘the Québécois’. I give a list of commonly used abbreviations at the start of the book.

1 A Silent War: Conflict Resolution and Language Policy and Planning in the North of Ireland and Quebec / Canada

The theme of this book is the impact of conflict and conflict resolution (CR) on language policy and planning (LPP). To illustrate this interaction, I shall examine recent developments in the North of Ireland (NoI), with linking references to LPP in the Republic of Ireland (RoI) and in Quebec / Canada (Q /C). My primary focus is the Irish language in the NoI from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to the present (with brief contextual references where relevant to LPP in the Republic of Ireland [RoI]). LPP in respect of the Northern conflict has been neglected in both sociolinguistic and CR analysis. The book seeks to address this gap and also to place both CR and LPP in the NoI in an international context, drawing on Q / C as a mirror, through an examination of developments in federal – Quebec relations since the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession. There are some obvious similarities between the NoI and Q / C, as well as distinct and significant differences. It is not my intention to make forced comparison for the sake of illusory symmetry. Whilst both conflicts can be defined as ethnic in origin, in the NoI, current CR and LPP have their roots in tensions between the indigenous Irish population and British colonial power. In Canada, it is the power relationship between two settler colonial populations, one British and one French which forms the context for CR and LPP. The ‘British’ population of Canada has, from the eighteenth century contained within it a large proportion of Irish immigrants, including at different times a significant number of Presbyterian settlers from the North leaving Ireland at the time of the Penal laws to seek further advancement, and in later phases, of Catholic refugees from the famine. The interplay of these various Irish immigrant groupings and their politico-religious networks and societies has shaped ‘British’ Canadian history. In itself, this is a rich field for study, but one for a different book. 5

6


Both the Q / C and NoI conflicts witnessed explosions of protest in the late 1960s, with the resultant imposition of emergency powers. The scale and duration of violence has been quite different in the two disputes, of course. In the NoI, the 1969 crisis re-ignited a further forty– year phase of armed conflict. In Canada, it led to the public acknowledgement that the country was facing its worst crisis since confederation, and from that to CR approaches which led to two secession referenda in Quebec. Counterpoising the NoI with Canada facilitates a more general examination of LPP formulation in the CR approaches to deep-rooted, ethno-linguistic conflicts of hegemonic (or dominant) powers. In the history of Q / C and the NoI, there is a common thread linking the interplay of domestic and international law, the principle of self-determination, language protection and definitions of minority / majority rights. In both places, consociational arrangements have been established as part of the response to struggles for independence. I shall examine to what extent therefore, actions ostensibly intended to increase separation have resulted in present-day institutional arrangements which create by their nature, greater governmental interdependency and closer connections between opposing elites. In looking at how all of these issues affect the relationship between law, minority language communities and politicians in the North and in Q / C, it is not my intention to offer definitive explanations of conflict, of theoretical LPP, of the comparative status of the Irish language North and South nor of the historical background to the Q / C conflict, worthwhile as all of these subjects are. Instead I shall attempt to identify the interplay of mechanisms and approaches that have featured in the reaching of two distinct contemporary junctures in conflict relations. I shall examine what measure of success has been achieved in the protection of Irish in the North and of French in Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC) and to what extent the shape, structure and goals of CR have harmonised with the needs of minoritised language communities. In the next section, therefore, I shall look briefly at definitions of conflict and CR approaches in order to evaluate the impact of CR on LPP. Has the issue of LPP been neglected generally in conflict theory and if so, what effect does this have? What particular challenges face minoritised language communities? In the final sections of this chapter, I shall briefly set the historical context in order to assess the impact of domestic and international law, and the principle of self-determination on LPP in both the NoI and Q / C. In later chapters, I shall explore key aspects of LPP and CR in the NoI and Q / C in the last ten – fifteen years, from the signing of the GFA by the British and Irish governments in 1998 in the first instance, and from the most recent referendum on Quebec independence in 1995 in the second. Whilst these different events create significant punctuation marks in the stories of both conflicts, they do not represent ‘beginnings’ nor I think, ‘endings.’ Time will tell.

A Silent War: Conflict and Language Policy

7

Conflict in society The stabilising, centralising tendencies of today’s nation states and their powerful, embedded processes, institutions, internal and external relationships mitigate against root-and-branch change. Foucault (1982, p. 211), Derrida (1994, p. 48) and May (2001, p. 53) argue that it is resistance that defines both the shape of power and of dissent. Indeed, Foucault advocates using this resistance to cast light upon power relations in order to understand and define them. Gramsci (Simon 1982, p. 40) asserts that hegemonic states work to maintain their own power through the constant shifting and renegotiation of the system of alliances on which they are based. He warns that if opportunities for change are not realised, the balance of power swings back in favour of the dominant, hegemonic class, even though the alliances upon which this domination is built may appear different. For Bourdieu (1991, p. 45), conflict encompasses ‘la violence symbolique’ / ‘the symbolic violence’ of the everyday interaction of political systems. Foucault (1997, p. 16) acknowledges the influence of Clausewitz’s classic text on warfare, stating that it is the role of politics to ‘réinscrire perpétuellement ce rapport de force, par une sorte de guerre silencieuse, et de le réinscrire dans les institutions, dans les inégalités économiques, dans le langage, jusque dans les corps des uns et des autres.’ / ‘perpetually re-inscribe this power relationship, by a sort of silent war, and to re-inscribe it in the institutions, in economic inequalities, in language, right into individual human bodies’ (Author’s translation). If politics is indeed a silent war, is the theory of CR as it exists at present robust enough to impact significantly on the fluid expression and methodologies of hegemonic power, and what implications does this have for linguistic communities?

LPP and conflict theory It is [...] inevitable, therefore, as modernisation and language consciousness both increase in a multilingual/multicultural world, and in multilingual/ multicultural nations, that the link between language status planning and ethnicity will increase rather than decrease. Language status planning becomes a means of assuring social control and social ascendency for those ethnically related interests that are already in power, just as it becomes a desideratum for those ethnically related interests that seek to increase their power or at least gain sufficient control over their own lives to assure their intergenerational ethnocultural continuity. Fishman (1989, p. 266) It is not unusual for minoritised LPP to evolve within a conflict situation. In fact, it tends to be the norm, since it is social, economic and political marginalisation which leads to the creation of linguistic minorities in the modern

8


nation state. Language diversity is not, in itself, the cause of civil discord. Denial of language rights is often, however, a contributory cause (Fishman 1989, De Varennes 1996). However, although language is often blamed for strife, until recently, linguistic discrimination has been ignored or misinterpreted in many sociological works, thus creating a type of double bind for minoritised language communities – responsible for all the problems but absent at the shaping of solutions. Part of the neglect or misrepresentation of language in conflict appears to be connected with its association with ethnic struggle. Conversi (2004, p. 49) points out that ethnic conflicts are among the commonest form of contemporary strife. Nationalism and the issue of self-determination are often central characteristics, as is their longterm nature. While it is now increasingly recognised that ‘minority’ nationalisms can be open, progressive, multicultural societies (Kymlicka 2001b, p. 70), the dominant view of minority nationalism remains that of ‘a periodic plague’ or a ‘mass psychology run amok’ (Latouche 2004, pp. 181–2). This attitude is often transferred to minoritised languages (Fishman 1989, p. 270) even as, or perhaps because, some sociologists emphasise the central importance of language within ethnicity and nationalism (Snyder 1954, Friedrich 1963). In addition, it is not uncommon to find a level of ambivalence to history in the writings of CR and social science theorists and since minoritised languages are seen as a direct link with that past, it also suffers from dubious and anti-modern associations in the writings of some theorists (Smith 1983, Blake and Moulton 1984). Tidwell (1998, p. 1190) contends that, ‘History is more than a mere description of the past; it provides insight into the deeper layers of meaning.’ Language issues, ‘tarred with the same brush’ as ethnicity and nationalism, have been left inexplicit in much CR theory. This increases the danger that language communities may be ‘exploited for mobilisation purposes’ (Fishman 1989, p. 623), leading to their political disempowerment and alienation. CR frameworks must ensure that linguistic minorities are included in the measures adopted to build the required new, more plural post-conflict society (May 2000). Language survival in minoritised circumstances depends on creating space in which the language can function (relatively) free from assimilationist tendencies (Donneur 1975, Laponce 1987, Mackey 1990). Kymlicka (2001a) notes that marginalisation occurs where the institutions of the state all operate in another language, leaving renegotiated integration, competitive ‘nation building’ or permanent marginalisation as alternatives for linguistic minorities. However, once a given language ceases to be used as a community language, it is too late to defend it (Baker and Prys Jones, 1998). Promoting a minoritised language may lead to accusations of discrimination against the dominant one, yet minority-language decline always occurs in situations of bilingualism or multilingualism – when languages are in contact (May 2001). The insistence upon false equality between languages for which the prevailing political conflict creates different contextual


9

circumstances can lead to a minoritised language community being doubly disempowered – portrayed as ‘aggressor’ without the concomitant power to effectively protect its language. Williams (2000) has pointed out that in relation to community development policies, for government to exhort the disadvantaged to take control of their social, political and cultural development can be little more than the bestowing of responsibility for dispossession on those who by definition lack the power to significantly affect their own environment. Legislation has a particularly important role to play in the ‘normalisation’ of language issues, as the experience of Wales and Quebec demonstrates (Dunbar 2000, 2006a, 2006b, De Varennes 1996, Williams 1991, 1994, 2001a, 2001b, Mac Giolla Chríost 2003, 2005). Legislation may be necessary to establish the status of a minoritised language and /or to clarify the place of LPP within the existing legislative framework, alongside antidiscrimination, public service provision and equality laws. Additionally, it can delineate the nature and extent of duties placed on the state, making it easier for civil servants to know what to do and how to do it, and helping the public to understand and use its rights and entitlements. As Dunbar (2000, 2001, 2002–3, 2005, 2006b) and McLeod (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c) point out, the enactment of appropriate legislation can be the most effective catalyst in the changing of attitudes, policy and practice. Theoretically, legislation can remove minoritised languages from the political arena, protecting them from day-to-day vacillation or factionalism. As I shall note throughout this book however, legislation per se is not free from political influence and if the goal of government or the legislative body is something less than language ‘normalisation’, this will shape the laws it makes – or does not make – accordingly. Cardinal (2003) argues that appropriate legislation is compensation for the damage done to a language and should be accompanied by genuine equality and partnership in governance. However, she and others (Dunbar 2006, McLeod 2006, De Varennes 1996, Mac Giolla Chríost 2003) have also warned that legislation can be a blunt instrument, better adapted to the needs of government than the sensitive process of language revitalisation. Diglossia, a mismatch of skills, training and qualifications and a relatively small pool of workers to draw from can combine with hostility, minimalism and a lack of commitment to enforcement to undermine legislation in the absence of proactive language planning mechanisms and practice. Cardinal (2003) and P. Ó Riagáin (1997) emphasise the importance of enforcement of language legislation to ensure compliance and respect of state institutions for language rights. However, they contend that even where the purpose of legislation is progressive, LPP must be closely integrated across a wide range of trends and initiatives if it is to maximise its success. Where legislation, or its absence, is employed against minoritised language communities, the mainstreaming and resourcing of language initiatives by those more favourable to positive development can be of key

10 Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada

importance (Chevrier 2003, Keating 1997). In theory, it can provide some security for projects and organisations and enable longer-term planning and development. It can also establish a new framework for relationships between government and language activists. However, this is only the case where there exists both sympathy for the language and autonomy of action over significant resources or service provision. In the absence of this, ‘ghettoisation’ is reinforced, entrenching identification of a minoritised language with ethno-political issues and / or certain political parties, potentially increasing factional political influence over the minoritised language community without significantly stabilising the position of the language in the broader society. Indeed, where government refuses to mainstream services, the tokenistic use of a minoritised language in public is unlikely to ‘have a significant positive impact on language attitudes’ (Mac Giolla Chríost, 2003, p. 127). In addition, Williams (2000, p. 17) warns that as such negotiation and concession within shifting CR play out, language communities should be wary of ‘rule by quango.’ Independence can be lost through overreliance on the state playing the role of ‘a benign benefactor.’ Therefore, since the search for an overall resolution of conflict is likely to have a significant impact on minoritised language communities, they may have to make intense and difficult decisions during CR processes that are not directly geared at meeting their needs. So precarious is this task that Fishman (2005, p. 1) remarks that small languages lacking control of state machinery ‘had it better when the iron fist was still in fashion.’ In totalitarian times, he argues, the way forward is more apparent, even if it is one that depends entirely on self-reliance outside of the state apparatus. He (2005, p. 10) notes that reliance upon more permissive policies by states can be ‘tantamount to succumbing to slow-paced euthanasia rather than to the firing squad.’ Minoritised language communities have much to lose within CR encompassing broader social and political issues, and to maximise gains, these must be well-defined and achievable within the parameters of the larger process. However, to reach even this point requires considerable skills in analysis, negotiation and power brokering, and the ability to distinguish that which is illusory from that which is real within CR.

Conflict resolution theory and practice The practice of peace building has been running ahead of peace building theory. Knight (2004, p. 355) The chaos amongst theoreticians is even greater than the chaos in the nation-state organisation of the world itself. Adelman (2002, p. 14)


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Those who have not been directly involved in conflict may assume that resolution comes when two sides decide one day that enough is enough. Like children in the playground, they shake hands and make up. Reality, even in the playground, is rarely so simple. There is no one definition of conflict. Some social scientists focus on cause and cure, others on the behaviour associated with discord (Schelling 1980, p. 3). Conflicts are said to arise over non-negotiable issues, such basic human requirements as land, water or food. Increasingly, there is recognition of the effects of globalisation; the advance of multinational corporations, mass communications, the internationalisation of human rights standards; the pursuit by hegemonic powers of their interests on a worldwide basis and the increasing recognition of the role of economic drivers in conflict. Klein (2008) argues that corporate and state interests have become indistinguishable in the execution of foreign policy and Robinson (2008) states that all struggle is about the power to determine the sharing of resources.1 For some, globalisation will lead to a ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Linklater 1998, Held 2003), others point to the increasing pressure on language minorities from global communications and cultural imperialism (Fishman 1991, Dunbar, 2001.) Honneth (1995, p. 1, 161) opposes the separation of ‘interests’ from ‘the everyday web of moral feelings’ and underlines the concept of morally motivated struggle.’ Whilst Kreisberg (1998) suggests that groups must have a sense of common identity to engage in conflict, as noted previously, Marx (1910), Foucault (1982) and Derrida (1994) believe that conflict defines the group identity. Unfortunately, contemporary CR processes are as varied as the definitions of conflict. Theorists disagree on cause and effect. Adelman (2002, p. 15) comments that whilst universities continue to pursue ‘their medieval mission to create and set universal moral standards for society’, academics have found it hard to agree, or to speak with authority to those with the power to act. The gap between theory and policy appears very difficult to bridge. Are conflict and dispute separate, with conflict occurring only where human needs are denied and negotiable interests concerned (Burton 1990), or is conflict better viewed as a continuum? (Tidwell 1998, p. 9) Are the fundamentals of CR found in management science or in international relations? Are the best approaches found in game theory (Aumann and Maschler 1995, Schelling 1980, Reinelt and Hewitt 2003) or in meeting the needs of all sides, whilst simultaneously achieving mutual respect for the underlying values and ideals of all parties? (Lederach 1995, 1997.) The wish-lists are numerous and contradictory and may contribute to the view that some forms of CR resemble ‘an industry’, misappropriating the politician’s role and selling people products they neither understand nor want2 and that are incapable of meeting their needs. Deciding to ‘resolve’ conflict is a subjective value choice (Tidwell 1998, p. 3) and not all attempts to bring parties to the negotiating table are genuine. Tidwell (1998, p. 173) suggests, ‘Talks may happen, agreements may be

12


struck, but while the head is in the negotiations, the heart is on the battlefield.’ On the other hand, the more powerful may systematically exclude some parties or some issues from negotiations. This may contribute to the definition of a conflict as unsolvable (Coy and Woehrle 2000, p. 8) and also bring pressure to bear on one set of opponents to renounce or redefine a particular strand of their approach to the conflict. Dispossession and the issue of who speaks for the minority and how they prioritise the shifting range of issues within a negotiation are key factors. The trust which a minority group places in its political or broader community representatives empowers since it may allow for access to elite group negotiations but also, by its very nature, marginalises. The gap between representative and represented may widen where the minoritised language is not the constant identifier amongst the negotiators. Even where it is, when negotiation is undertaken by those with party-political goals, there may be an additional layer of organisational self-interest. Minoritised communities must constantly measure shifting advantage and disadvantage occurring in milieux to which they have little access. Not surprisingly, this presents considerable challenges.

Measuring progress and evaluating strategies Marginalised language communities may have the power to describe the conflict, but not to define it. The control and dispersion of information during conflict is crucial. Within overarching CR processes, linguistic minorities must weigh approaches, filter information, decipher encoded gestures and symbols and decide on what basis decisions can be made. What can be conceded and when must a stand be taken? Conflict is fluid and change similarly moves through different phases and approaches. Definitions shift, causal links are disputed, political or pragmatic approaches may clash with international law, best practice and common sense. In LPP, short-term gain may lead to long-term assimilation, the dismantling of hard-won recognition or the imposition of state-appointed quangos in place of guaranteed rights. Apparently, minor processes or technical questions may be intimately connected to the core issues. Location, format and access to negotiations may prove key. Timing, sequencing and enforcement of agreed provisions affect the temporary or permanent nature of measures introduced (Bloomfield 1998, p. 190). There are often tensions between ‘finely-balanced trade-offs and ongoing bargaining’ on substantive issues (Bell, 2000, p. 7). Language communities must interpret which of these are negotiable, which are not, and how the community imposes its own interpretation on political negotiators. Judging gains made is a complex process. Parsons (1951, p. 481) proposes distinguishing between changes to processes within the system and the processes of change of the system. He defines the latter as occurring when


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major structural relations, all basic institutions and value systems have been drastically altered. Marx (1910) argues that this type of change, as for instance in the end of feudalism, can only be understood by examining the state of play within feudalism itself. Whether conflict leads to actual change or simply to the non-functioning of the current system and the formation of a new one depends on the rigidity of the system and its ability to resist change. The mechanisms by which the system retains control may be malleable and flexible enough to reshape themselves under pressure. Coser (1967, p. 29) points out that the rigidity of the system and the intensity of the conflict are not divorced from each other, but that rather, ‘rigid systems which suppress the incidence of conflict exert pressure towards the emergence of radical cleavages and violent forms of conflict.’ Alternatively, more elastic systems adjust more easily to shifting power alliances and ‘are less likely to be menaced by basic and explosive alignments within their midst.’ Kriesberg (1998, p. 20) states that it is often the outcome of a conflict or micro-conflict which has most impact upon its perceived shape and standing, that is, it is only with hindsight that one can judge what has been achieved. Progress towards ‘victory’ for one party or another can also be measured by comparison with the starting point of the various sides in conflict, of course as long as ‘the starting point’ can actually be identified and agreed upon. Definitions of what conditions existed for each side at a given point in time may also be contested because such details are often at the heart of the meta-conflict. What has been gained may also be open to debate, since goals and objectives shift, leadership figures and intragrouping power-factions change, proposals rejected in an earlier phase of conflict may later be embraced by those who previously denounced them. Antagonists may appear to have irreconcilable aims made more bitter and entrenched by the conflict. The different sides may set out with the goal of greater freedom and independence, coupled with a higher standard of social and linguistic justice. They may continue to voice firm belief in their objectives even as their tactics change and adapt. Yet, as Kreisberg (1998, p. 20) points out, the resultant societal and political swings may appear to produce very different effects. As he notes, Some conflicts are waged with one side seeking greater separation from its adversary, for example in wars of secession or wars of national liberation. Other conflicts are waged to gain more integration, for example in the form of reduced segregation and free participation in governance. Even if not an intentional goal, the outcome may entail movement toward increased integration or increased separation. One of the key issues in this book will be the evaluation of how such contradictions are to be weighed in the case of LPP in the NoI and Canada.

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Domestic and international law in protracted conflicts It may be assumed in most cases of prolonged conflict that domestic legislation has failed to resolve the key issues. Everywhere, societal structures, including domestic law and the system for administration of justice, are determined by the dominant interests of the state. Where there has been long-standing discord, these structures are likely to be shaped by power relations, thus rendering them an inadequate, even inappropriate touchstone for resolution of either political or sociolinguistic inequality. In the NoI, this has been the case in respect of the broader civil strife whose most recent manifestation began in the 1960s. As I shall demonstrate in Chapters 2–8, it remains strikingly true in respect of the status and protection of the Irish language. In Canada, as I shall outline later in this chapter, domestic law has been used historically to copper-fasten English language dominance and in more recent years to counter-pose two opposing forms of LPP, in order to combat Quebec nationalism. In Quebec itself, on the other hand, provincial law has been wielded in support of radical and effective LPP. Where domestic law is unfit to meet demands for reform and recognition of language and other human rights, the need for a yard stick external to the conflict and against which progress can be measured becomes the more compelling. The self-reinforcing compact between nation states (Adelman 2002, p. 4) has produced some institutions and a body of law and practice, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 the United Nations Charter and indeed the United Nations (UN) itself. Tidwell (1998, p. 12) notes that although the UN has consistently sought to establish new methods to resolve disagreement, it has ‘failed to provide any truly systematic method’ for CR, and that its own record, ‘has been so dismal that it is arguable that the organisation has provided a model showing the alternatives to be avoided.’ He states that rather than creating an alternative to power politics, the UN has ‘provided only another method through which power politics may be played out.’ Nonetheless, many commentators feel that international law and human rights standards have an important role in CR. However, those seeking to improve equality and justice in a given conflict may be accused of being partisan or unrealistic, thus endangering peace. In some cases, attempts to integrate international standards into negotiation have been attacked for delaying resolution whilst delivering little discernible benefit.4 However, such cases may be less a protest at the attempt than a complaint about the result. There is ample evidence of fundamental weaknesses in international law, in its scope, its enforceability, its interconnectedness to the interests of the hegemonic power and its particular inability to function well in conflict situations. The broadening of human rights discourse in recent decades has occurred partly as a response to the demands for recognition of cultural and linguistic diversity (Bell 2000, Kymlicka 2001a, May 2001). However,


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pressure results in counter-pressure ad infinitum. Attempts have been made to limit the scope of human rights through claims of cultural relativism (Bell 2000, p. 34) and more expansive interpretations of articles within international conventions have been systematically restricted (De Varennes, 1996, p. 276). In addition, hegemonic powers are likely to attempt to manipulate the introduction of human rights standards for their own ends, as a ‘resolution first, justice after’ approach or as a bargaining chip in negotiation. Whilst commentators may argue that this is inappropriate (Bell 2000), there are few examples of dominant proponents in conflict acting unilaterally to make concessions on language or other rights. Within nation states, civil society, trade unions, universities, languagebased groups, companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) increasingly play an important role in plugging the democratic deficit. In particular, NGO monitoring can highlight non-implementation of international law instruments at a sub-national, regional / provincial level, rather than at a nation-state level, which may increase the nation state’s vulnerability to international criticism. However, tensions between the state or hegemonic powers result in many challenges to the authority of civic and community voices, especially when they touch upon issues at the core of societal conflict. The fundamental imbalance in power between NGOs, political parties and governments can leave NGOs exposed. They may be accused of usurping the role of politicians.5 Those NGOs documenting failure, voicing criticism publicly and pointing out their preferred pathway to change may find their work impaired or disrupted through withholding or withdrawing of resources; accusations that the organisation is unaccountable, unrepresentative or guilty of mismanagement; or that its political analysis is flawed or incomplete. NGOs can also find themselves the subject of intense political pressure, with members attacked, maligned, imprisoned or even murdered by government or its agents (Griffin, 2009, p. 8, para 30).

‘Minority’ status: hard definitions, soft law Thornberry (1999, p. 2) notes that during the sixties and seventies, many European states were ‘concerned with Empire, with suppressing and then accommodating liberation movements,’ and therefore, more interested in ‘playing the minorities card – or the indigenous suit – to beat off the ideologues of decolonisation.’ In more recent decades, the resurgence of the issue of minority rights and its interaction with the human rights discourse has led to a changing picture in international rights law, introducing and refining appreciation of cultural, social and economic rights. In Kymlicka’s view (2007, p. 3), the old uni-lingual, uni-cultural nation-state model has been increasingly replaced in recent decades with a multicultural and multilingual one because, ‘a number of countries have concluded that the older models were not appropriate given their specific demographic or historical

16


circumstances.’ This rather begs the question – appropriate for what purpose? Whilst Kymlicka (2007, p. 3) refers to ‘a veritable revolution’ brought about by intense endogenous pressure, Wheatley (1999, p. 201) comments that conflict, and by extension, conflict resolution, is, ‘a sign of the failure of democracy in a multi-ethnic State, not of its success.’ The bestowing or acceptance of the label ‘minority’ on some communities or groups can itself be contradictory and at times, strongly contested (Eide 1996). This indeed is the case in both Quebec, where Francophones are the majority, although a minority within Canada, and in the NoI, where those whose national identity is Irish are an artificial minority, in which Irish speakers are further marginalised in spite of it being the primary indigenous language of the Irish. One of the reasons for the controversy that surrounds minority status is that it may effectively block access to other rights available only to majorities or ‘peoples’ as a whole. This is particularly important in respect of the right to self-determination, which the UN has deemed to be inapplicable to minorities (Epseill 1980, p. 9, para 56). I shall return to the manner in which this issue has been interpreted in Q / C and in the NoI later in this chapter. Where linguistic groups do opt to pursue their goals through minority rights protections, they may discover other, equally problematic issues since minority rights law has developed largely through the same soft law or nonlegal mechanisms as the other elements of international law: declarations of principles, codes of practice, recommendations, guidelines, standards, charters, resolutions and so on. According to Bothe (1980), their ‘softness’ may be one of the elements that encourages adoption of international instruments, but he argues that ratification can raise expectations and create pressure for change. Yet, De Varennes (1996), Dunbar (2000), McLeod (2006) and Eide (1996) point out that although international legal instruments are intended to impose a moral commitment to effective implementation, this is by no means always the case. Eide (1996) argues that the question of enforceability of international law is one that must be addressed. Hadden (1999), Ní Aoláin (1995) and Fitzpatrick (1994) have all shown that in conflict situations the potential of soft law mechanisms to effect meaningful change is likely to be compromised. Indeed, Hadden (1999) argues that central to international instruments and standards is the assumption they will be applied in functioning liberal democracies, thus making their effectiveness in conflict situations fundamentally flawed. In the context of the NoI in the 1970s and 1980s, both Bell (2000) and Livingstone (1990, p. 57) have been critical of the impact on actual law or practice of even those instruments with the strongest enforcement mechanisms, including the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Bell (2000, p. 58) points out that in the twenty-five year period 1969–94, the British government was found to be in violation of the convention more than any other European member state. However, in respect


17

of human rights violations in the North, she categorises the ECHR as ‘strikingly ineffective’ and states that it ‘repeatedly proved incapable of significantly curbing a number of persistent patterns of abuse, including use of plastic bullets, continuance of emergency legislation, and the use of lethal force by security forces.’ I shall explore the issue of the effectiveness of individual international instruments in language conflict in respect of the implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in Chapter 4. In the next section I shall examine how the issue of self-determination has been dealt with in existing international norms, prior to briefly detailing the historic circumstances in the NoI and Quebec which have led to political autonomy being central in current LPP and CR debate.

Self-determination in international law International law traditionally recognises both the right (or faculty) of states to safeguard their own rights through the resort to unilateral measures of self-help as well as the obligation of states to settle their own disputes by accepted and recognised diplomatic and judicial methods. Both concepts are based on their own merits, which are still valid in contemporary law. Noortmann (2005, p. 3) Both language rights and self-determination have been particularly poorly served in the body of international law instruments. In spite of some significant references in international conventions and the advent of the language-specific ECRML, minority languages remain inadequately defined. Whilst there is a wealth of referential material and analysis of the principle of self-determination,6 there remains a lack of clarity since international law now contains within it a number of contradictory principles on selfdetermination. These stem from the conflicting seventeenth and eighteenth century right to territorial integrity and the twentieth century right of selfdetermination of peoples. Carley (1996, p. v) states that the controversy and obscurity surrounding the principle of self-determination arise not from disagreement as to whether such a right exists, but rather from the failure ‘to define exactly who is entitled to claim this right – a group, a people, or a nation – and what exactly the right confers.’ Attempts to resolve the clash have created intense political and scholarly debate, which because of space constraints cannot be rehearsed in full here. However, Eide (1996, p. 6, para 15) states, ‘For reasons of international peace and stability, international law as it stands today gives territorial integrity precedence over assertions of rights to secession or change of borders.’ Crucially, he notes that there are some exceptions to this practice. These occur: a) for non-self-governing territories fulfilling the criteria of


identification contained in the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)7, and b) in ‘exceptional cases’, where the population of the state has been subject to consistent and systematic discrimination and when the government of the state is not representative of that part of the population. In this respect, it is useful to note Bell’s assertion (2000, p. 1) that, ‘where conflicts involve claims to self-determination by an ethno-national group, conflict resolution initiatives typically centre around attempts to redefine state structures and access to power by the group making the claim for self-determination, combined with systematised protection of individual rights.’ Eide (1996, p. 6, para 16) highlights a final exception, noting that in international law, there is no obstacle to self-determination where it can be achieved through agreement with all parties and where such agreement is capable of achieving the recognition of the authorities in power. This has particular relevance in discussion of Quebec’s secession from Canada, as I shall highlight in the final section of this chapter. In the cases of the NoI and Q / C, I shall argue that domestic institutions, including the law, have become associated with the problem rather than the solution. History is not the key focus of this book, and I shall therefore simply outline some of the salient facts in order to clarify my argument that domestic law has impacted negatively on linguistic – and other – matters. I shall first turn to Ireland. However, since Chapters 2–8 of this book focus in detail on the Irish language, this section will be accordingly brief. Following it, I shall turn to a short description of the Q / C historical relationship.

Some points of Irish history Irish nationalists within Northern Ireland are not in a similar position to minorities created by the independence of colonies within colonial borders, for the colonial power is still in power. (Bell 1999, p. 310) Contextualising the separation of the North from the rest of Ireland, the current actions of the British government and the highly polarised views of nationalists8 and unionists9 to the Irish language requires a short examination of historical factors. English domination of Ireland steered a turbulent and bloody path from military conquest in 1169 onwards, provoking rebellion and uprising in every century. The imposition of the invaders’ language, coupled with the suppression of that of the conquered is proposed by Spenser (1596), a practice further described by Memmi (1965) and Freire (1972). Political, economic and legal measures were used to suppress the Irish language to ensure greater social, economic and political control by the English (De Fréine 1978; Curtis 1984, 1994; Mac Síomóin 1994 and Crowley 1996, 2000, 2005). Some, including Edwards (1985) and Comerford (2003) view linguistic shift from Irish as the result of the free


19

choice and self-interest of the Irish people. This view is strongly rejected by others (Gellner 1964; De Fréine 1978; Ó Conaire 1986; Nic Craith 2002) who emphasise the trauma and internalised self-hatred resulting from language shift. Kiberd (1995) asserts that language shift is complex and connected with the interaction, both ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’, of the English and Irish psyche. From the early 1600s, the native Irish population was dispossessed in the plantations of Ireland. In the early 1700s, the Penal Code, a series of discriminatory laws were imposed on Catholics, Presbyterians and nonconformists by the Protestant minority (Mac Curtain 2008, p. 337). In 1737, the Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) was introduced, declaring that English would be the only language permitted in the courts of Ireland. This law is still actively implemented in the NoI today as noted in Chapters 5 and 6. In the penal period, agricultural and economic measures intended to maximise the income of landlords created an artificial dependency on the potato as staple food of the native population. Potato blights of 1845–52 devastated the Irish peasant population, over one million dying of starvation and related disease whilst the export of Irish crops and other agricultural produce continued unabated. At least a further estimated 1.5 million Irish people were forced to emigrate, with many dying before or shortly after reaching their destinations. Resistance to British rule continued, however. Pressure in the late nineteenth century for independence forced the British government to introduce a series of Home Rule bills. Home rule was opposed by armed and organised Protestants, most notably in the north-east of Ireland, where the Protestant population was most numerous. Elliott (2000, p. 453) suggests that negativity towards the Irish language amongst the Protestant population stems from the marginalised position of Catholics at this time when the language, she argues, provided an essential link with an identity under attack. The emergence of radical social, labour, national, Irish language and women’s organisations during the early years of the twentieth century culminated in the 1916 Easter Rising. The rising failed in military terms although the execution of its remaining leaders by the British galvanised Irish public opinion. The War of Independence lasted from January 1991 to mid-1921. As part of its CR strategy of the time, the British government negotiated a settlement with some of the nationalist leaders. The Treaty divided the Irish, leading to a bloody and bitter civil war. The combined British and pro-Treaty forces prevailed and in fulfilment of the Treaty, Ireland was partitioned. Twenty-six counties became the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland) and Britain retained control of the north-eastern part of the island, six counties of nine in the ancient province of Ulster, which they named ‘Northern Ireland’. In the NoI, partition and the Government of Ireland Act 1920 created a mixture of Catholic disempowerment, economic and social discrimination.

20


Northern Ireland

Republic of Ireland

Map 1.1 Map of Ireland showing border established under Government of Ireland Act 1920

Oiled by British indifference, abusive unionist governance intensely hostile to all expressions of Irishness prevailed (Livingstone, 1990). By the end of the 1960s, the refusal to grant the most basic civil rights to the nationalist population led to escalating violence. In August 1969, the British government deployed its army on the streets of the North. By 1971, it had introduced internment without trial, (overwhelmingly targeting the Catholic population), imposed a curfew on the Catholic Falls Road area of Belfast and among other lethal military actions, shot dead 13 nationalist civilians in Derry during a civil rights march in 1972. In the face of growing Catholic outrage, the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act was introduced by the British parliament, suspending the Northern parliament and imposing direct rule from Westminster. Livingstone (1990, p. 57) notes that from the 1970s onwards, there were frequent claims of human rights abuses and says, ‘The fact that many have either been substantiated or remain unresolved, suggests that the rule of law is a long way from prevailing in Northern Ireland.’ In spite of the poor legal basis for challenges and the widespread lack of confidence in the independence of the judiciary, a number of human rights cases were brought. Some were lost, others were won but led to snail’s-pace reform rather than rapid


21

Derry/Londonderry Antrim

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Map 1.2 Outline map showing the North of Ireland with counties

remedial action. Still others yielded judgments that were mired in legalese. Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard (1975, p. 23) comment, ‘When the guarantors of civil rights take refuge in technicalities, aggrieved complainants are more likely to take to the streets.’10 Two Northern Irish human rights solicitors, Pat Finucane (1989) and Rosemary Nelson (1998) have been murdered amidst claims of collusion between loyalist11 murder gangs and state forces. As described further in Chapter 3, many Irish speakers, doubly marginalised within a hostile state, directed their efforts to promote the Irish language towards bold and unconventional self-help community initiatives. Andrews (1991), Bardon (2000) and Mac Póilín (1993) have noted hostility towards the Irish language from the inception of the Northern state, a situation illustrated in more recent times by Hayes (1995), Bloomfield (1994) and Needham (1998) in their autobiographies. Elliott (2000) suggests that the perception continues that Irish is a form of ‘Catholic code,’ whilst Foster (1988) states that it is to be expected that nationalists see the Irish language as an expression of identity and belonging. There has been over centuries, he says, an overlap between opposition to the Irish language and the more vociferous anti-nationalist / anti-Catholic elements of unionism. Blaney (1996) has shown that the Irish language was in use by Protestant planters to Ireland, at times in order to allow them to proselytise to the

22


native people in their own language. McCoy (2006, p. 151) has cast doubt upon the expectation that the language be capable of separating itself from the sectarianism of the state without significant action to redress its status and context. Hepburn (1996, p. 134) has drawn similar conclusions and Malcolm (2009) has argued that Protestants should take possession of the Irish language as part of the North’s shared cultural wealth, an argument that tallies with those of Ó Snodaigh (1995), Rushe (1921, pp. 25–6), de Blácam (1935), and Mac Con Midhe (1968). These writers cast doubts on the presumption that most planters came from English stock, suggesting that a percentage originated in Gaelic-speaking areas of the Highlands. As examined later in this chapter, the primacy of Westminster legislation in security matters, in the courts and the policing and justice systems of the North, the reality of Direct British rule and the physical presence of British troops on the streets of the North for such extensive periods in the current phase of the conflict are direct evidence of British control over all aspects of its governance. Before I examine the implications of these facts for the principle of self-determination, however, I shall briefly outline some aspects of the Quebec-Canada historical background. The historical contexts of Ireland and Canada share a number of features, largely because they have in common the central importance of British influence on economic, military and CR policies. During the Elizabethan age to the mid-nineteenth century, both were considered ‘settler’ societies. Writing about the role of the Protestant Irish in the settlement of Canada pre-famine, Houston & Smyth (1990, p. 185) point out that British North America was being created, ‘in the image of a British colony, not an independent, separate state.’ Contending that, ‘Britain’s first colony had been Ireland,’ they continue, ‘In creating the rules for life in the new environment the tried and proven Old World models of behaviour and organisation were the prime points of reference, the main source of inspiration – loyalty, Protestantism and conservatism.’ Historically, as conflict escalated in Ireland and Canada, the British adopted varying strategies of containment, in both cases yielding some ground in order to bolster its overall dominance. In Canada, as I shall note in the next section, this led to the eventual creation of a confederation based theoretically on equal partnership between the French- and Englishspeaking communities. The reality of modern Quebec – Canada discord has been shaped by complex colonial interests, by inter- and intra- power relationships among immigrant groupings and by CR approaches adopted at this time.

Some points in the history of Quebec and Canada Federalism is a supremely difficult form of government to operate. It is not so difficult to create; the problem is in sustaining it. One of two impulses generally prevails in the long run: the pull


23

of the centrifugal forces which lead in the direction of disintegration; or the pull of the integrating forces which move the country towards an increasingly centralized form of government. One might say that the health of a federation as a federation depends on the interplay and balance of these two opposing forces. Cameron 1974, p. 108 In contrast with the NoI, it has been argued (Morton & Knopff, 2000) that Canadian society is overly litigious, largely because of the over-representation of members of the legal profession within the all spheres of political and public life. For some, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CCRF / CCDL) has provided a framework for remodelling society through constitutional law rather than political activity, whilst for others (Cardinal 2000) it uses law as a facet of political activity. Lawyers, judges and legal interest groups in Canada are accused of usurping the role of politics, an accusation underlined by the upheaval at political levels and the failures of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 and of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992 to resolve the issue of Quebec’s position within the federation. Taylor (1993, p. 95) points out that there is an oppositional element in the relationship of the individual with the state when that person chooses to seek legal redress on a rights issue. The more members of a collective identity choose to go that route, the more obvious the tensions between the majority decision and the minoritised group. Thus, when minority groups perceive their welfare as being poorly defended within the state, they are more likely to pursue resolution through the law. Be that as it may, the comparison between Canada and the NoI highlights a stark reality. One of the reasons for the litigious basis of LLP in Canada and Quebec is the simple fact that domestic legislation, and particularly language legislation, has been one of the key instruments in use by both federal and Quebec governments in the last forty years. Unlike the minoritised Irish language community in the NoI, Quebec has had the ability to legislate, and has done so. In 1763, the ceding of New France to the British placed some 75,000 French colonists in Canada under the rule of a government they saw as foreign, and with a different dominant religion, language and legal system. In 1791, Upper Canada was established for some 10,000 people of British descent whilst Lower Canada was set aside for the other 150,000 of the population, the Francophones living in the St Lawrence Valley. In July 1867, an alliance of contrasting forces established the Dominion of Canada, a new British colony created from the union of Upper and Lower Canada, the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia. Chevrier (2003, p. 120) states that, ‘This new political entity was a unique combination or empire and colony, monarchy and democracy, federation and unitary state.’ The 1867 Constitution split governmental power between the federal and provincial levels of government. Pocock (1998) has shown that


amongst North America’s founding fathers, there were few illusions as to the efficacy of federalism in ancient history. In addition, as Kymlicka (2005) and McRoberts (2001) note, Canadian federalism has had the added complexity of two different interpretations of what the founding pact of 1867 means – the Canadian reading and the Quebec reading. More recently, the place of the First Nations in the federation has resulted in intense debate as to whether the 1867 pact brings together nations, provinces or peoples (Romney 1999). Various authors have also sought to define the principles of federalism (Wheare 1963, Elazar 1994, Delmartino & Deschouwer 1994) whilst others highlight the relationships and interaction between the federal state and federalised components thereof (Friedrich 1974, Théret 2005). Riker (1962) points out that the simple balance sheet approach renders less complex results than an examination of the more fundamental issues of adoption and maintenance of federal systems. WS Livingstone (1968) warns against mechanistic or mathematical analysis that fails to take into account the social and cultural contexts of different forms of federalism. The establishment of the Dominion was never subjected to popular approval. For Francophones, the 1867 British North America Act (BNAA) afforded them equal status with Anglo-Canadians as founding peoples. This interpretation was, however, ‘systematically rejected or ignored by many politicians and constitutional lawyers in English Canada’ (Chevrier 2003, p. 121). In fact, as Gagné and Langlois (2002, p. 91) note, the Constitution effectively vested power in ‘un État-providence’, a state based upon increasing location of power within each province, and including the shifting of political influence from the Church to the state. MacMillan (2003, p. 81) states that the 1867 Constitution was based on the pragmatic realisation by the British that some language rights must be ceded to the sizeable Francophone population in order to avoid destabilisation. Thus, it re-affirmed the bilingualism measures in the courts that had been in place in Quebec under British rule, extending them to the federation. Legislation was to be adopted in both French and English, and there was to be a guarantee that participants from a range of sectors would have access to court proceedings through either English or French. The Constitution also placed a duty upon Quebec to maintain both Catholic and Protestant schools and ensured that Anglophone Québécois had control over English language schools. These same provisions were extended to other provinces. However, for over one hundred years, Quebec remained the only part of Canada that made significant provision for bilingualism, in spite of the fact that its majority population was French-speaking. Although Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan also had bilingual duties under federal law, they did not fulfil them. Manitoba proved particularly unsympathetic to the needs of Francophones, declaring English the province’s only

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official language in 1890. Although legal challenges led by the Catholic Archbishop of Manitoba, Langevin, forced it to concede instruction in French in 1896, this was withdrawn twenty years later to devastating effect. It was only in 1985 that the Supreme Court of Canada,12 ruling on a speeding ticket issued only in English, determined that since the province’s founding document gave equal rights to French and English, Manitoba would have to translate existing and future legislation into French for them to be valid.13 In 1897, Ontario made English the only language of the justice system. In 1913, it severely restricted the teaching of French in Catholic schools14 which, unsurprisingly, Franco-Ontarians interpreted as an indicator of a systematic policy of assimilation. Alberta was made a province in 1905, but the Northwest Territories Act which had regulated the region before the province’s founding was still in effect. Section 110 of the Act provided for use of English and French in government debates. In 1987, an attempt to address the Alberta Legislative Assembly in French was ruled out of order. The resultant furore, including rallies for Francophone rights, raised the profile of the issue. In February 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada15 ruled that although Section 110 was still in force in both Saskatchewan and Alberta, the provinces’ assemblies were empowered to modify the language rights contained within it.16 The Alberta Legislature subsequently allowed members to speak in French, but only after notification and provision in advance of a written translation. In 1931, sovereignty was granted to the Dominion of Canada by Westminster statute. London, however, retained many legislative powers, including those which could affect the Canadian Constitution. For a period of fifty years, between 1931 and 1982, much of the debate around constitutional reform focused on the ‘patriation’ of the Canadian Constitution, which would restrict to Canada alone the ability to alter its constitution. The final steps in the patriation of the constitution were taken directly as a result of Quebec demands for secession. In the 1960s, the Preliminary Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B&BC) identified real disadvantage in economic and social terms suffered by Francophones in Canada. Not only did Francophones tend to receive significantly lower wages but they also were grossly under-represented in government employment and the federal civil service, and they had fewer or no public services available to them through the medium of French (Fraser 2006, p. 53). Many Quebec language planners felt that the clear solution was for Quebec to have full jurisdiction over language matters in its territory, and for there to be territorial protections within Ontario and New Brunswick. Donneur (1975) and Laponce (1987) have outlined the territorial approach to LPP in Quebec. Instead, the B&BC called for federal government to recognise formal equality of English and French throughout Canada. Chevrier (2003, p. 123) notes that in this, ‘The report of the Commission ran counter,


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in its spirit, to what would become later the basis of Quebec’s linguistic policy.’ The B&BC findings led to the enactment of the Official Languages Act (LLO / OLA) by the federal government in 1969. With the introduction in 1976

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of Quebec’s Law 101, the Charter for the French Language (CFL / CLF), Canada had two different language planning and policy approaches. Levine (1990) has detailed the dramatic effect of Quebec’s CFL / CLF on the linguistic gateway city of Montreal. For some, the 1969 federal LLO / OLA had as its overriding political purpose the shoring up of the power base and longevity of Anglophone rejectionists in Quebec and of undermining Quebec nationalism (Lacorne 2003). On the other hand, Quebec’s CFL / CLF attracts considerable criticism and is ‘often depicted as an unnecessary, illiberal and capricious law that promotes, at the expense of interests viewed as fundamental rights, the rebel language of a minority refusing to jump into the Anglo-American continental mainstream’ (Chevrier 2003, p. 118). Throughout the 1970s, Quebec simmered with a combination of resentment at discrimination based on linguistic, religious and political grounds and the energy of a society in the process of massive internal redefinition. The specifically Canadian consociational model – two solitudes – had established structured separation and autonomy between the two culturally distinct elements of Canadian society. However, the Quiet Revolution saw a new, more secular and more confident middleclass élite emerging post-World War II with a determination to defend the French language ‘at home’ (Taylor 1965, Guindon 1990, Levine 1990) and define the best way forward for the changing Québécois society (Bourque et Laurin-Frenette 1972, Leslie 1977, Simard 1979). Gagné and Langlois (2002, p. 130) characterise this new wave as one that, ‘a vécu dans une certaine prospérité et, sensible à des courants d’idées allant de l’existentialisme au marxisme en passant par le féminisme radical, [ elle ] a été portée par une éthique du réformisme social basé sur l’expertise en matière de “besoins” ’ / ‘enjoyed a certain prosperity and influenced by the flow of ideas went from existentialism to Marxism via radical feminism, [it] was carried forward by the social reform ethic based on the expertise in the area of “need” ’ (Author’s translation.) The Parti québécois (PQ) was the glue that bound the two generations together in a common vision, creating consternation in the rest of Canada (ROC) which perceived the PQ to be ‘committed to the dismantling of the country’ (Rotstein 1995, p. 372). Opinion continued to polarize, fed by increasing incidents of civil unrest, some Anglophone and others Francophone, some spontaneous, and others decidedly less so. As noted previously, the CFL / CLF was introduced in 1976, transforming the status of Francophones from ‘minority’ to ‘majority’ within Quebec overnight. There was an Anglophone backlash. Hundreds of thousands left Quebec. In 1980, the PQ set a referendum to enable it to negotiate sovereignty for Quebec and a new political, economic and linguistic relationship with the rest of Canada. Opponents of secession argued that a vote against separation would facilitate constitutional amendments that could address long-standing Quebec grievance. Sixty per cent of


29

those who voted in the referendum opposed separation and the PQ was dealt a severe blow. Nevertheless, the party was re-elected the following year, albeit campaigning on Lévesque’s promise not to hold another referendum. Latouche (1986), Premdas, Samarasinghe & Anderson (1990), Buchanan (1991, 1997a, 1997b), Corbeil & Montambault (1990) have written about the different views on the legitimacy of Quebec secession. In 1982, the Canadian Constitution was patriated, as noted earlier, and the Canadian Charter for Rights and Freedoms (CCRF / CCDL) was adopted. In 1988, it was amended to incorporate the LLO / OLA17 Freidrich (1974), Cardinal (2008) and Foucher (2008) have examined linguistic rights within a constitutional context. The doctrine of federal paramountcy means that in the case of conflict between provincial and federal laws or any part thereof, federal law prevails.18 For many, the reinforcing of Canadian constitutional measures simply emphasise the different power bases of Anglo- and Franco-Canadians. Gagné and Langlois (2002, p. 94) comment that whilst Francophone Québécois society is undermined by such measures, Anglophone society is not. They contend, ‘Mieux: les Anglos-Québécois appartiennent à une nation qui s’est même affirmée avec une force nouvelle dans la foulée du nation building canadien impulsé par la Loi constitutionelle de 1982.’ / ‘Better yet: the AngloQuébécois belong to a nation that has even reaffirmed itself with new vigour in the spurt of Canadian nation building brought about by the 1982 Constitutional Law’ (Author’s translation). Equally significant, Canadian constitutional and LPP measures have created or exacerbated tensions between Francophone Québécois and Acadians and French-speaking clusters in other parts of Canada. Francophones outside Quebec have historically felt ‘abandoned’ or categorised as ‘cadavres encore chauds’ (still-warm corpses).19 Nonetheless, Cardinal (2000, 2008), Castonguay (1999, 2000, 2008) and Chevrier (2003) assert that federal language policy, based on the portability or personality principle is ineffective, making provision for recognition of language rights only where numbers warrant. This places vulnerable Francophone minorities in an ‘unhealthy’ relationship of dependence on the state and upon federal legislation. Cardinal (2000) states, ‘The quid pro quo for this federal generosity toward official-language minorities has been that they accept being used ... as accomplices in campaigns designed to undermine Quebec’s demands on language and other matters.’ Canada now has ten provinces and three territories in the federal system, each of them with their own constitution. Each can regulate its own tax system and can also enact legislation. Whilst a number of Canadian provinces and territories have enacted language legislation, the most comprehensive, controversial and important of these remains that of Quebec. New Brunswick has now adopted the status of a bilingual province. In addition, in 2009, two pieces of new legislation were introduced to protect


and promote the endangered Inuit language, Inuktitut, in the territory of Nunavut. The legislation adopts a territorial approach, strengthens the position of Inuktitut as an official language of the territory and provides for the appointment of a Language Commissioner. The Nunavut government consulted with both the federal Official Languages Commission and Quebec’s Office québécoise de la langue française (OQLF) in the drafting of the legislation. They have also made representations to the Canadian government for federal services in the territory to be delivered through the medium of the Inuktitut language. However, as yet, no agreement has been reached on this matter and it remains to be seen what implications the increasing confidence of Canada’s First Nations will have for LPP for English and French. The interface between Quebec and the federalist system of government in Canada has been the subject of much academic debate, both within and without Quebec. I shall examine in detail in Chapter 9 the current discussion around the nature and implications of symmetrical and asymmetrical federalism in Canada. In the next section of this chapter, I shall examine the impact of international law on the right of Quebec to secede from the Canadian federation. But first, I shall address the issue of self-determination in the NoI.

Self-determination in Northern Ireland As noted earlier, the Government of Ireland Act 1920 provided for a ‘Northern’ Ireland parliament modelled structurally on Westminster, but with limited legislative powers subject also to review. Hadfield (1992) argues that the counterpart to this government was to be a similar one in the South, but the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 put an end to this approach. In 1937, the Irish Free State, as the 26 counties became known, established its Constitution, which included substantial protections for the Irish language within the state. Through Articles 2 and 3, the new Constitution also claimed sovereignty over the whole island.20 However, ‘pending the reintegration of the national territory’, the Constitution stated that the parliament, Dáil Éireann, would establish the laws for the Irish Free State alone. In 1949, the Dáil renounced its dominion status to become the Republic of Ireland. In 1973, the British government reiterated its own position in relation to the status of the North as a part of the United Kingdom in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act. Guelke (1985, p. 37) asserts that the issue fundamental to the resolution of conflict in the North has been ‘the prevailing interpretation of the principle of self-determination and its emphasis on majority rule.’ The European Parliament (Haggerup, 1984, p. 37) has conceded that the North is ‘a constitutional oddity’, whilst academics have questioned its international legitimacy (Wight 1977, p. 153). The main tenets of the argument for the


31

application of the principle of self-determination to Northern Ireland are its artificial creation in contrast with the integral political unit of the island of Ireland in the centuries preceding partition;21 the drawing of boundaries during partition which illegitimates ‘Northern Ireland’ by creating an unrepresentative political and religious majority,22 the inclusion of the North in the UK contrary to the express wishes of the majority of the Irish people at the last all-Ireland elections in 1918, thus imposing a division on the country constituting a direct denial of the right of self-determination of the majority of inhabitants within the island.23 Contrasting with this view is the assertion by the UK government that Northern Ireland is an integral part of the UK, an independent internationally recognised state. Adherence to this interpretation places an obligation on the international community under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter not to interfere ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.’ The opportunity to interpret the principle of self- determination with specific reference to the contrasting positions on Northern Ireland arose in August 1969. Escalating state violence against Civil Rights campaigners and the nationalist community in the North brought demands from within Taoiseach Jack Lynch’s Cabinet for intervention by the Irish army. The Irish government instead requested an urgent meeting with the UN Security Council prior to which it publicised its intention to ask the Security Council to send a UN peace-keeping force to the North. Under Article 2(7), the British government objected to the inclusion of the issue on the agenda. Guelke (1985, p. 42) states, ‘The Security Council ducked the question of whether the disturbances were a domestic matter simply by voting to adjourn but this effectively killed the Irish initiative.’ A further attempt by the Irish government to raise the matter through the agenda of the General Assembly also failed.24 The Irish army did not intervene militarily in the North and no other attempts were made by the Irish government to draw the UN into the issue. Guelke (1985, p. 42) suggests this may have been to avoid the danger of a negative ruling. Whatever the reasons for the lacklustre approach, the argument posed by the British government that the North is an integral part of the UK failed to reassure unionists throughout the period up to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), perhaps because although it has remained the UK’s consistent position, its permanence has not been made explicit.25 In fact, the Irish government’s timid action in 1969 can be interpreted as a token challenge not to foreign rule in the North, but rather to Britain’s poor conflict management practice of the time. However, the raising of governance and policing swung the Irish government into the orbit of internal and external self-determination, perhaps rather against its wishes. Whatever the reality, the Irish government’s approach sent out rather mixed messages to both domestic protagonists and to the international community. On the one hand, the Republic of Ireland, with Articles 2 and 3 of its Constitution


laying claim to all the territory, the islands and the seas of the island of Ireland had taken a step to assert its right to make representations. On the other hand, these representations were utterly ineffective and were not pursued; undermining the constitutionally competing claims of the UK and Ireland and calling into question the seriousness of the Irish government. The ambivalence of successive Irish governments in respect of NoI has undoubtedly been a contributory factor in the uncertain international acceptance of the North as an integral part of the UK. Leaving the matter of military action aside, the Irish government was arguably in a position to make a much stronger political stand, based not simply on the historical arguments and its own Constitution but also on the basis of a different, more expansive reading of self-determination as the final decades of the twentieth century passed. If external self- determination is defined as the ‘status of a people in relation to another people,’ internal self-determination focuses on the ‘relationship between a people and “its own” state or government’ (Thornberry 1993, pp. 101–2). Internal self- determination is viewed as a process rather than a one-off action creating independence and is intimately connected with the issues of democratic practice, fair representation and good governance (Bell 2000, p. 165, Thornberry 1993, Crawford 1993). The Irish government and nationalists seeking to have the principle of self-determination applied to the North had clear grounds to argue their case. This understanding may have contributed to the request by the Irish government for the examination of how a solution to the Northern Irish situation might be shaped using international instruments (Eide 1996). It is necessary, however, to note that whilst the common connection in international law instruments between equal rights and the legitimacy of states strengthens the arguments of nationalists in the North, Thornberry (1993, p. 118) cautions that ‘international law is not a suicide pact for states’ and is unlikely to be applied in a manner that will endanger hegemonic interests. Ambiguity in international law is more often advantageous to the strong than to the weak. Current self-determination interpretations are a conundrum which may in part contribute to the emergence of ‘solutions’ that stop short of autonomy. With the issue of self-determination for the NoI effectively shelved, over a period of thirty years Irish protagonists in the conflict eventually engaged with more partial solutions. The GFA exploits the imprecise nature of international law terminology and emphasises internal self- determination. The devolved institutions and mechanisms put in place in establishing the Stormont26 government and its Executive27 are similar in many aspects to those of the short-lived 1974 Sunningdale period of shared government, rejected by both unionists and nationalists, and brought down by the Loyalist Workers’ Strike. The GFA disposes entirely with the broad notions of statehood and sovereignty and instead establishes consociational governmental structures. It guarantees ‘minority’ input within a devolved British


33

administration (Bell and Cavaunaugh 1999). The GFA makes provision for constitutional change only with the consent of the ‘majority ‘in two separate referenda, North and South, and only then if subsequently in a further referendum, a majority in the North continue to agree to the change. The Agreement, having appeared to lock in a double veto, then fudges the precise mechanism by which consent will be measured,28 an approach which, as I shall show in the next section, shares something with the Quebec / Canada conflict.

Self-determination in Quebec La tâche de la Cour était de clarifier le cadre juridique dans lequel des décisions politiques doivent être prises ‘en vertu de la Constitution’, et non d’usurper les prérogatives des forces politiques qui agissent à l’intérieur de ce cadre ... Dans la mesure où les questions abordées au cours des négociations seraient politiques, les tribunaux, conscients du rôle qui leur revient dans le régime constitutionnel, n’auraient aucun rôle de surveillance à jouer. Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 The task of the Court has been to clarify the legal framework within which political decisions are to be taken ‘under the Constitution’ and not to usurp the prerogatives of the political forces that operate within that framework ... To the extent issues addressed in the course of negotiation are political, the courts, appreciating their proper role in the constitutional scheme, would have no supervisory role. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 In spite of the 1980 referendum result, the possibility that Quebec might indeed secede in future from the Canadian federation was the single most pressing matter in the country. Patriation provided a framework for Canada to change its Constitution and incorporate into it a US-style Bill of Rights, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CCRF / CCDL). In 1988, the Official Languages Act 1969 (LLO / OLA) was amended and integrated into the CCRF / CCDL, giving constitutional status to the OLA’s approach to language rights. The CCRF / CCDL created the possibility of legal challenge to any and all provincial laws. It also declared that French and English must be treated equally, in spite of the threatened circumstances of the French language in a North American linguistic context. In the 1994 Quebec election, Jacques Parizeau’s PQ secured a 5 per cent increase in votes, taking 77 of the 125 seats. The date of 30 October 1995 was set for the secession referendum, with attempts by Quebec federalists to ban it failing.29 In December 1994, the PQ presented a draft Bill incorporating its plan for secession should the referendum vote be won. The

34


ROC debated fiercely what would happen if the vote were won by separatists. Some felt that without Quebec, Canada would be ‘free’ to revert to a core English-Canadian identity (Resnick 1994). Others felt that even if the principle of self-determination was found applicable to Quebec, other Canadians would not accept this (Vegh 1992, Williams 1992, Finkelstein & Coyne 1995,30 Monahan 1995). Others queried whether if Quebec was found to have no right to unilaterally secede, should the rest of Canada simply exclude Quebec. Ironically, it appeared that public opinion would be rather more supportive of forcing Quebec to remain within the federation. If Quebec seceded, English Canadians would feel a ‘sense of loss or bitterness or both.’ Clearly, the partnership arrangement would have failed and moreover, the rest of Canada would have to deal with, ‘a new condition filled with uncertainties that most of its residents neither desired nor anticipated’ (McRoberts 1995, pp. 406, 409). In the event, the referendum, based on the issue of sovereignty with an optional partnership with Canada, was lost by a tiny margin, with only 1 per cent more of the voters opting to remain part of the Canadian federation than those voting to separate. Post-vote, sovereigntists accused the federal government of financial corruption31 and vote manipulation through the fast tracking of tens of thousands of citizenship applications in order to counterbalance the vote for separation. The controversial manner in which the allegations were expressed and reported by the Anglophone media cost Quebec Premier Jacques Parizeau his position.32 The referendum verdict created a conundrum for all parties. Whilst the result was tantalisingly close, the PQ feared the negative fallout of a further failed referendum. Federal government was relieved that the vote had been lost, but unsure of the way that Quebec would pursue the issue. Meanwhile, a further court challenge was lodged by Quebec lawyer, Guy Bertrand, asking that any further referenda on sovereignty should be disbarred.33 The challenge was withdrawn when federal Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, initiated a request for an advisory opinion on the application of the principle of self-determination under international law in the case of Quebec and on the province’s right to secede unilaterally from the federation. In what Choudhry and Howse (2000, p. 166) call, ‘a brilliant institutional wager’, Chrétian sought a ruling on which would take precedence if there was conflict between domestic and international law on the question of secession. His confrontational response was viewed as a further sign of federal Canada’s unwillingness to negotiate. Indeed, for some, the reference to the Supreme Court was ‘one of the key elements in a series of politically calculated moves made by the Chrétien government intended to counteract both the sovereigntist threat and the appearance of federalist ineptitude in the face of that threat’ (Schneiderman 1999, 1). A very high percentage of Québécois had voted for separation, yet it appeared that Chrétien had adopted an antagonistic and legalistic approach rather than make a conciliatory gesture in the search for a consensual approach (Laponce 2003, p. 303). In effect, Chrétien was interposing


35

the court between his government and the necessity of negotiation with Quebec. Predictably, since the action had been instigated by those fundamentally opposed to secession, Quebec refused to participate in the proceedings initiated by Chrétien’s government. In its ruling,34 the Court found that unilateral secession would be unlawful in that it would contravene the authority of the constitution as supreme law of Canada and would also usurp federal powers not within the remit of provincial governments. The ruling similarly rejected Quebec’s right of self-determination under international law. Arguably, the detail of the judgment not only reveals the contradictions in international law which I have highlighted previously, it also appears to make use of the same conflicted arguments in order to frame any future Quebec claim within a particular context. The ruling states, Même s’il est certain que la majeure partie de la population du Québec partage bon nombre des traits qui caractérisent un peuple, il n’est pas nécessaire de trancher la question de l’existence d’un “peuple”, quelle que soit la réponse exacte à cette question dans le contexte du Québec, puisqu’un droit de sécession ne prend naissance en vertu du principe de l’autodétermination des peuples en droit international que dans le cas d’ “un peuple” gouverné en tant que partie d’un empire colonial, dans le cas d’ “un peuple” soumis à la subjugation, à la domination ou à l’exploitation étrangères, et aussi, peut-être, dans le cas d’ “un peuple” empêché d’exercer utilement son droit à l’autodétermination à l’intérieur de l’État dont il fait partie. Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Emphasis added) Although much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the characteristics of a people, it is not necessary to decide the ‘people’ issue because, whatever may be the correct determination of this issue in the context of Quebec, a right to secession only arises under the principle of selfdetermination of people at international law where ‘a people’ is governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a people’ is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where ‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part. Reference [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Ofﬁcial English language version, emphasis added) In effect, the Court acknowledges its intention to sidestep making ‘the correct determination’ in respect of the Québécois identification as a people by arguing that even if it were valid, the right of self-determination would not apply. Of course, a clear ruling on the matter of the Québécois as a people might have obviated the need for any past or future referenda. The

36


Supreme Court would, in effect, have decided whether or not Quebec was indeed a distinct nation simply by dint of its ruling on the legality of any future attempt to secede. In doing so, it would also have established a legal precedent in respect of existing international law standards and provided an important interpretation of the right of self-determination within the current contradictory international framework. Of course, this may be precisely why the Court veered from this path. Instead, the ruling moved on to rebuff Quebec secession on the basis of abuse of rights. It noted, ‘Le Québec ne constitue pas un peuple colonisé ou opprimé, et on ne peut pas prétendre non plus que les Québécois se voient refuser un accès réel au gouvernement pour assurer leur développement politique, économique, culturel et social.’ / ‘Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial people or an oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that Quebecers have been denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and social development’ (Official English language version). Crucially, however, the court ruled that should Quebec decide by referendum to secede, the members of the federation ‘n’auraient aucune raison valable de nier au gouvernement du Québec le droit de chercher à réaliser la secession’ / ‘would have no basis to deny the right to the government of Quebec to pursue secession.’ This is an interesting finding which counterbalances perfectly the assertion that unilateral secession would be unlawful in domestic and international law. It would appear to reinforce the status of Quebec as an entity entitled to exercise the right of self-determination under certain circumstances, which whilst they might prove difficult to clarify politically, are none too arduous legally. Ruling that the four fundamental tenets of the Canadian Constitution, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, federalism and protection for minorities could not be separated from each other, the ruling stated that in the event of a ‘une majorité claire en réponse à une question claire’ / a clear majority on a clear question,’’ the ROC would have to enter negotiations on the terms of Quebec independence. Neither the precise meaning of ‘une majorité claire’ / ‘a clear majority’ nor ‘une question claire’ / ‘a clear question’ was defined. Instead, the Court specified that this would be a matter for politicians to decide. Both supporters of secession and those opposed to it welcomed some aspects of the Supreme Court ruling, although this approach may owe more to realpolitik than considered legal or political evaluation. Schneiderman (1999, p. 6) in fact reports some sovereigntists comparing the Court ruling to the Tower of Pisa, that is, leaning significantly in one direction – in their view, towards the federal position. Ten years after the Supreme Court’s opinion, Newman (2008, p. 1) says, ‘The brilliance of the Supreme Court’s ruling (...) lies in the Court’s having had the vision to wed the value of constitutional legality with that of political legitimacy.’


37

The value of peace and the silence of war Our society sees peace as a core value, yet finds it hard to define and harder to achieve. Linguistic equality is a neglected area, and language is often used as a bargaining chip in the larger processes. Bell’s assessment (2003: xiii) of the importance of justice and fair treatment in CR is appropriate to LPP in both Quebec and the NoI. She says that the manner in which the rights components of a peace agreement are implemented, ‘determines the nature and direction of transition, and whether or not that direction is towards liberal democracy, towards a new discriminatory hegemony, or towards an unstable limbo, which at best is less violent than what went before.’ In relation to the CR process in the NoI, Ruane (1999) has interrogated whether the GFA represents ‘the end of history.’ In Chapters 2–8, I shall investigate whether the GFA can indeed be termed a ‘solution’ or rather a further chapter in an ongoing conflict. In respect of Quebec and Canada, ten years after the second Quebec referendum on secession, Fraser (2006, p. 306) reiterates the questions put to Canadians by the B&BC forty years before. He asks, ‘Can English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians live together, and do they want to do so?’ The answer, he states, ‘will determine whether, and how, Canada survives.’ In Chapter 9, I shall describe the current position of LPP in federal Canada and in Quebec and examine their interaction since the 1995 Quebec referendum on secession. Perhaps the examination of LLP and CR in the NoI and in Q / C will enable the reader to assess the validity of Foucault’s proposal, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, that history is nothing but the story of conflict and politics, nothing but the waging of a kind of silent war.

2 The Irish Language in the North of Ireland: Statistics

The Irish language is an integral part of the social, cultural and economic identity of Ireland as a whole. As noted earlier, LPP as it affects Irish is formulated in two different jurisdictions by two different governments, each with distinct goals in relation to the language and the political, social and cultural circumstances in which it exists, North and South. Since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA), a changing conflict resolution (CR) context in the North has been trumpeted and in Chapters 2–8 of this book I shall examine to what extent, and in what manner, these changes have impacted on the protection and promotion of Irish in the NoI. As discussed in the next chapter, the language provisions contained in the text of the GFA focus on the British government alone, placing no specific LPP duties on the Irish government. Certain of the arrangements deriving from CR talks of the late 1990s signal an all-Ireland approach to LPP, of course. Most notable of these is the establishment of an all-Ireland language body, an Foras Teanga,1 answerable jointly to the South’s Roinn Gnóthaí Pobail, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta / Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (RGPTG / DCRGA) and the North’s Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL). Foras na Gaeilge, the Irish language component of the language board, therefore not only carries great responsibility for effective LPP for Irish, but also its structural relationship with the two governments makes it a two-way conduit whereby British / unionist influence can be exerted on LPP North and South. Of course, Irish government policy can also flow back into the North. However, perhaps unforeseen in the GFA negotiations, this may also have an adverse effect. When the Irish government unilaterally cut the budget2 of An Foras Teanga in 2002, under the agreed proportional funding formula, the British government immediately, and unsurprisingly, followed suit. As discussed later, there were indications in 2009 that severe cut-backs to Irish government spending proposed by the McCarthy Commission3 might impact directly and indirectly on Irish in the North: directly through Foras na Gaeilge, indirectly through cuts to neighbouring Gaeltacht areas and cuts to TG4, the Irish language television channel. As discussed in Chapter 5, 38

Irish Language in the NoI

39

TG4 is funded solely by the RoI, but its transmission in the North has been the subject of complex negotiations since the GFA. Thus, it is not simply ‘favourable’ LPP emanating in the South that can impact on Irish speakers in the North. Broader economic contexts, poor practice, RoI-centric approaches combined with a lack of adequately defined LPP responsibilities in relation to the North can all have detrimental effects. Of course, one can argue that these are factors in LPP anywhere. However, in Ireland, the legacy of colonialism and partition is an unresolved democratic deficiency. Irish speakers in the South may impact directly on their political representatives. In the North, this is a more complex issue. In Chapter 6, I shall explore the effect of continuous unionist control of the North’s DCAL throughout both periods of devolved government to date, which as noted may be perceived to interfere in Southern LPP through the CR structures agreed in the GFA. Undoubtedly, however it is in the North that unionist control impacts most. Not only does it institutionalise within the consociational devolved institutions the formulation of hostile LPP, but in addition, it exacerbates the disenfranchising of Northern Irish speakers, left with little effective mechanism to advance positive LPP appropriate to their own circumstances. To establish some statistical indicators relative to the position of Irish, in this chapter, I shall examine evidence of growth of the Irish speaking community in NoI, with brief references to RoI census statistics also. I shall refer to the figures from the last three NI censuses, that is, 1911, 1991 and 2001, in which there were specific questions about the Irish language. Finally, to facilitate understanding of the policy context that will be referred to in later chapters, I shall comment on the statistical information in respect of the Ulster Scots and ethnic minority language communities in the North. In the final section of this chapter, I shall briefly explore developments in relation to Irish in education.

Irish on the island of Ireland The dependability and interpretation of census figures is often a subject for debate and controversy, as I shall note in Chapter 9 in respect of Q / C. In spite of some critical analysis, the census remains the basis for social planning on a range of areas including language. The 2006 Census in the South of Ireland4 shows 1,656,790 people who regard themselves as having good Irish (41.9 per cent of the total population). Of these 538,283 (32.5 per cent) indicate that they speak Irish on a daily basis.5

The Northern Irish censuses: 1991, 2001 In 1991, for the first time since 1911, the NI census forms contained a question on the Irish language. It asked, ‘Can the person speak, read or write


Irish?’ and allowed space to respond to each of these questions or to indicate ‘Does not know Irish’. The information gathered affords useful statistics but very limited information on fluency and frequency of use of Irish. Nic Craith (2003, p. 85) states that the limited scope of the census questions does not however make the results of the 1991 and 2001 Censuses unreliable. She notes, ‘As a minimum, these figures illustrate a very positive attitude towards the language.’

Growth of the Irish speaking community in NI The figures returned in 1991 show an increase since 1911 (see Table 2.1) from 2.3 per cent of the population who indicate knowledge of Irish, to 9.45 per cent. A total of 142,003 people indicate in the 1991 Census that they know Irish as opposed to 28,725 in 1911.

Comparison of the 1991–2001 Censuses The 2001 Census forms contained an additional Irish language skills question: Could the respondent understand Irish? The 2001 Census does not therefore substantially increase available information, but it does make for added complication in the direct comparison of the figures from 1991 to 2001. It is possible, however to note some trends in the 2001 figures. In 2001, 167,490 people had knowledge of Irish compared with the 1991 figure of 142,003 (see Table 2.2). This represents 10.4 per cent of the population of the North, a significant proportion. McLeod (2006, p. 28) notes that ‘a density of 8 per cent minority language speakers’ has been used ‘as a benchmark for designating a particular district as bilingual’ in Swedish speaking areas of Sweden and has further pointed out that the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005 applies throughout Scotland, where the density of Scottish Gaelic speakers is 1.2 per cent (McLeod 2006, p. 28). De Varennes (1996, p. 181) comments that the Draft Protocols to the International Convention on the Protection of National or Ethnic Minorities or Groups has also attempted to quantify the percentage Table 2.1 1911 and 1991 Census: Figures and percentages of overall population with knowledge of Irish 1911 Census Total population Knowledge of Irish Percentage

1,250,031 28,725 (2.30%)

Source: Northern Ireland Statistics website: www.nisra.gov.uk

1991 Census 1,502,385 142,003 (9.45%)


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of the population required in order for official status to be given to their preferred language. These are, in administrative or judicial districts, ‘at least 6 per cent, or in larger administrative entities, at least 5 per cent of the residing population.’ Canada has a rather complex variable cross referencing process in respect of the two Official languages (English and French).6 This comprises either the total number or the percentage of speakers of either of the English or French and also the type of service to be provided. Most bilingual federal government services are made available when the population in a census sub division includes 5 per cent of speakers of the official language minority, or in the case of major cities of over 100,000 people, when the minoritised community constitutes 5,000 individuals. In half of the district ward areas of the North the overall percentage of 10.4 per cent is surpassed, in some cases to a significant degree (see Table 2.3). Magherafelt district shows 17.54 per cent, Dungannon shows 19.10 per cent and Newry and Mourne shows 20.41 per cent of the total population of the district having knowledge of Irish. The indicative pattern of these figures shows a consistent increase across all geographic areas of the North in knowledge of Irish. This includes small but significant increases in those district ward areas not traditionally associated with the language, for example, in Ards, Castlereagh, Coleraine, Larne, Newtownards and North Down. There are, however, five district ward areas (Armagh, Cookstown, Derry, Down and Dungannon) where one would expect to see the same pattern of growth but which in fact shows a slight fall in numbers indicating knowledge of Irish. The NI Statistics and Research Agency have indicated that Table 2.2

2001 Census: Knowledge and skills in Irish Understands spoken Irish but cannot read, write or speak Irish Speaks but does not read or write Irish Speaks and reads but does not write Irish Speaks, reads, writes and understands Irish Other combination of skills

Has knowledge of Irish All persons

36,479

24,536 7,183 75,125 24,167 167,489 1,617,957

10.4% 100.0%

NB: Ability to speak, read or write Irish does not imply ability to understand spoken Irish unless stated. Persons in these categories may or may not have the ability to understand Irish. Source: Northern Ireland Statistics website: www.nisra.gov.uk

42


Table 2.3 2001 Census figures: Percentage comparison (1991–2001) in respect of District ward areas in NI

District ward area

Numbers indicating knowledge of Irish as a percentage of population

Antrim Ards Armagh Banbridge Belfast Ballymena Ballymoney Carrickfergus Castlereagh Coleraine Cookstown Craigavon Derry Down Dungannon Fermanagh Larne Limavady Lisburn Magherafelt Moyle Newtownards Newry and Mourne North Down Omagh Strabane

1991 6.53 2.27 14.41 5.56 10.86 4.42 5.31 1.58 2.53 3.96 15.84 8.99 16.67 10.12 23.22 11.92 3.65 7.63 6.08 16.83 12.03 2.83 18.92 2.10 15.41 9.87

2001 7.87 3.02 14.l7 6.15 13.57 4.99 7.03 1.95 4.28 6.26 14.41 10.44 13.75 9.79 19.10 12.88 4.40 10.84 7.84 17.54 14.37 4.33 20.41 2.67 16.19 11.76


in its view, this is due to a specific change in data analysis between the 1991 and 2001 Census. In 1991, students were recorded at their home addresses whilst in 2001, it was decided that as they were more likely to draw upon services more intensively when at their term time address, they were recorded at this address.7

Knowledge versus fluency Belfast district area Belfast, with an overall population of 267,716, shows the greatest concentration of people indicating knowledge of Irish, with 36,317 responding


43

Table 2.4 2001 Census: Belfast Area: Ten Wards with highest percentage of Irish indicated: Comparative figures on those indicating knowledge of Irish and those with ability in full skills range Belfast top ten wards in terms of Irish Andersonstown Ardoyne Beechmount Botanic Glencolin Stranmillis Falls Park Ladybook Glen Road Clonard

People indicating knowledge of Irish

People indicating they can read, write, speak and understand Irish

5,605 6,268 5,277 9,605 6,769 7,434 5,681 6,152 5,671 4,233

1,669 1,289 1,453 2,578 2,052 1,332 1,693 1,671 1,848 1,187


Table 2.5 2001 Census: Belfast Area: Ten wards with lowest percentage of Irish indicated: Comparative figures on those indicating knowledge of Irish and those with ability in full skills range Belfast bottom ten People indicating a People indicating they can read, wards in terms of Irish knowledge of Irish write, speak and understand Irish Woodvale Stormont Orangefield Knock Crumlin Shankill Belmont Cherryvalley Ballysillan Blackstaff

4,439 5,370 5,294 4,859 4,238 3,624 5,801 5,737 5,813 3,827

90 94 92 83 92 105 105 118 139 121


positively. A breakdown of the ten wards where most people indicate knowledge of Irish, with a comparative figure for those indicating some competence in all four listed skills produces some interesting results (See Table 2.4). Even in the ten areas with the lowest statistical indications of knowledge of Irish, there are still people who indicate competence in all four listed language skills (See Table 2.5).

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Knowledge of Irish by age The direct comparison of detailed breakdown of knowledge of Irish by age between 1991 and 2001 is compromised by the additional category in the later census (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7). However, the 2001 Census appears to show the ongoing results of the revival of the Irish language in the younger age groups (see Table 2.7). It found that people aged 12–15 were the most likely to have some knowledge of Irish, followed by people aged 16–24. Those aged 75 and over were least likely to have some knowledge of Irish. Excluding children aged 3–11, knowledge of Irish decreases with age, confirming the nature of Irish as a revitalised language. Knowledge of Irish by gender In common with the 1991 Census, the representation of women to men in the 2001 figures remains slightly higher in favour of women (see Table 2.8). Women appear to be in a slight majority in all categories and across all religious backgrounds (see Table 2.9).

Table 2.6

1991 Census: Knowledge of Irish by age Age 3–11

12–15

16–24

25–39

40–59

60–74

+ 75

All

Speak, read and 5,678 15,934 18,597 19,186 13,209 5,141 1,267 79,012 write Irish (4.5%) (12.6%) (14.7%) (15.2%) (10.4%) (4.1%) (1.0%) (100%) Source: Northern Ireland Statistics website: www.nisra.gov.uk

Table 2.7 2001 Census: Knowledge of Irish by age (All persons), Table population: All persons aged 3 and over (and column percentages) Age

3–11

12–15

16–24

Some knowledge

13,710 (6.1%)

25,662 (23.8%)

No knowledge

209,420 (93.9%)

All persons

223,130 (100%)

25–39

40–59

60–74

+ 75

33,874 39,784 (16.0%) (10.7%)

36,772 (9.0%)

12,735 (6.5%)

4,953 (4.9%)

81,954 (76.2%)

177,608 332,076 (84.0%) (89.3%)

370,185 184,045 95,179 (91.0%) (93.5%) (95.1%)

107,616 (100%)

211,482 371,860 (100%) (100%)

406,957 196,780 100,132 1,617,957 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)


All 167,490 (10.4%) 1,450,467 (89.6%)


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Table 2.8 2001 Census: Figures and percentages for women and men with knowledge of Irish Knowledge of Irish

Speaks, reads, writes and understands Irish

87,632 (10.5%) 79,858 (10.1%)

39,860 35,265

Women Men


Table 2.9 2001 Census: Figures and percentages for women and men with knowledge of Irish according to religion Knowledge of Irish

Catholic

Overall figure Women Men

154,622 80,679 73,943

Protestant and other Christian 10,987 6,136 4,851

As I shall note in the next chapter, however, Donoghue (2004, p. 32)8 has shown that in the Irish language voluntary sector in the North, women are outnumbered on committees at a ratio of 1:5, over twice as high as the unfavourable ratio in Southern Irish language voluntary organisations. Knowledge of Irish by community background In the North, this is a key issue in perceptions, policy and practice in relation to the Irish language. Once more, the nature of the question asked in 1991 and 2001 makes direct comparison difficult. Nonetheless, it appears clear from both censuses that nationalists / Catholics are more likely to have knowledge of Irish than unionists / Protestants (see Tables 2.10 and 2.11). Thus, in examining the figures in respect of knowledge of Irish by community background, we can note that by 2001 there was an increase in knowledge of Irish in all categories, including small increases in all of the non-Catholic or non-religious categories (see Table 2.11). In spite of the difficulties of interpretation of census figures over different periods, it appears that there has been incremental growth in the Irish speaking community, particularly in the younger age groups. In the tenyear period between censuses there are consistent patterns suggesting small increases in traditionally non-Irish speaking sections of the community and geographic areas, both at District and Ward level. However, there has been little substantial impact on the differentials between Protestants and Catholics with knowledge of Irish. Catholics (22.2 per cent) are still more likely to have knowledge of Irish than Protestants and ‘other Christians’

46


Table 2.10 1991 Census: knowledge of Irish by religion, Table population: All persons aged 3 years and over (and column percentages) Some knowledge of Irish

Irish speakers as % of total population

126,626 1,614 2,012 296 11,455

22.15 0.50 0.75 0.52 4.09

142,003

9.45

Catholic Presbyterian Church in Ireland Church of Ireland Methodist Church in Ireland Total other (including no religion or none stated) All persons


Table 2.11 2001 Census: knowledge of Irish by religion: Table population: All persons aged 3 years and over (and column percentages) Knowledge of Irish Catholic Presbyterian Church in Ireland Church of Ireland Methodist Church in Ireland Total other (including no religion or none stated)

Irish speakers as percentage of total population

144,346 3,608

22.2 1.1

3,146 634

1.3 1.1

15,755

4.8


(3.5 per cent); Catholics are more likely to speak Irish (29 per cent) than Protestants (3 per cent). Nationalists (31 per cent) are more likely to speak Irish than either unionists (2 per cent) or those classified as neither nationalist nor unionist (12 per cent).9 These statistics would appear to support the need for a range of initiatives, including the teaching of Irish in Protestant schools, led by government and involving public, private and community sectors as well as civil society to address the historic demographic disparities in respect of opportunity to learn and attitudes towards the Irish language.

Statistics relating to other communities in the North The importance of the protection and promotion of the Irish language is often counterbalanced by demands for identical measures for Ulster Scots


47

or by direct comparison with the need to provide access to services for users of ethnic minority languages. Given the frequent recurrence of these matters in a range of policy and social areas, in the next section, I shall examine the available statistics on the Ulster Scots and ethnic language population. Ulster Scots To date, the census in the North has not collected data about Ulster Scots, although as noted in Chapter 4, this may change in 2011. At present, however, there are few official figures for Ulster Scots. As a basis for its own policy and practice and in respect of advice given to other departments and bodies (DCAL 2004 Guidance), the DCAL uses figures on Ulster Scots collated from the 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey based on a representative sample of 2,200 adults. The survey then extrapolates overall figures, based on the small sample, and gives a calculation of some 30,000 people in the North with knowledge of Ulster Scots. As only two per cent of respondents to this survey identified themselves as Ulster Scots speakers, the profiles of Ulster Scots speakers used by DCAL are based therefore on 43 respondents (see Table 2.12). The Life and Times Survey provides data for adults only, and contains information on both Irish and Ulster Scots. Unlike the census, the survey simply asks whether a respondent can ‘speak’ Irish or Ulster Scots. Since we can draw on the statistically more representative information from the census in respect of Irish, it is sufficient to note that the 1999 Life and Times Survey reflects a high level of concurrence with 2001 Census data in relation to knowledge of Irish. For example, the 1999 Life and Times Survey found that, broadly speaking, the younger the age group, the higher the proportion of Irish speakers; the youngest age group (18–24) was the most likely to speak Irish and people aged 65 and over were the least likely; it revealed similar proportions of males (14 per cent) and females (13 per cent) who could speak Irish; it showed that nationalists (31 per cent) were more likely to speak Irish than unionists or those not categorised as either nationalist or unionist (12 per cent).

Table 2.12 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Figures and percentages with knowledge of Ulster Scots and gender breakdown Speak US

Total

Percentage

All

43

2200

2

Gender Men Women

25 18

940 1260

3 1

48


Figures and gender Of the 43 respondents to the Life and Times Survey who indicated that they spoke Ulster Scots (see Table 2.12), men (3 per cent) were marginally more likely to speak Ulster Scots than women (1 per cent). Age As Table 2.13 shows, people aged 65 and over were the most likely to have knowledge of Ulster Scots (3 per cent) and the youngest group (18–24) was the least likely (1 per cent). As shown in Table 2.14, the Life and Times Survey also revealed that Protestants were more likely (2 per cent) to have knowledge of Ulster Scots than Catholics (1 per cent). The same survey did not significantly indicate that unionists or nationalists were relatively any more or less likely to have knowledge of Ulster Scots, although in absolute terms there were more unionists than nationalists with knowledge of Ulster Scots (see Table 2.15). Given the lack of information based on a larger sample of the population, it is difficult to give credence to the many ‘guesstimates’ made as to the overall figures of Ulster Scots speakers in the North, which vary between 30,000 and 200,000. Falconer (2005, p. 85) suggests there are 30,000 speakers. He says that his calculation is based on ‘... the c. 30,000 speakers of “Ulster-Scots” identified by the 1999 NI Life and Times Survey, the number of Scots-born residents according to the 2001 NI Census, and the 1996 estimate by the General Register Office for Scotland that 30 per cent of Scots residents (c. 1.5 million) are users of the language.’ At the more extreme end of the scale, the Scotch-Irish website quotes unnamed ‘studies that were done in the 1960s’ which ‘estimated that there were 200,000 native speakers with 20,000 to 60,000 monoglot speakers and the rest bilingual.’ Since Ulster Scots is widely seen to be on a spectrum with English, it is unclear how the terms ‘bilingual’ and ‘monoglot’ are being used in this case.

Table 2.13 by age Age 18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+

1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Knowledge of Ulster Scots

Knowledge of US

Total

Percentage

2 7 9 7 5 12

243 441 444 352 291 418

1 2 2 2 2 3


49

Table 2.14 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Knowledge of Ulster Scots by religion Speak US Religion Catholics Protestants No religion

10 23 7

Total

Percentage

830 1070 207

1 2 3

Table 2.15 1999 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey: Knowledge of Ulster Scots by political opinion Speak US

Total

Percentage

20 10 11

871 600 671

2 2 2

Political opinion Unionist Nationalist Neither

Whilst it may be expected that supporters of Ulster Scots are likely to be generous in their calculations, it appears unusual that government policy and practice should be based on information obtained solely from such an exceedingly small survey sample as the 1999 Life and Times Survey. In addition, as I shall note in Chapter 5, in the absence of an officially accepted grammar, syntax and structure for Ulster Scots and since it is generally recognised as being part of a continuum with English, there may be a need for considerable clarification as to what constitutes an Ulster Scots speaker. O’Connor (2002, p. 232) points out that there is a political dimension to the discussion of the existence and status of Ulster Scots in the North. She says, ‘Many Protestants, including some senior Unionists, are embarrassed by official approval for a recent invention which is supposed to be a vital part of their identity.’ Ethnic minority languages All languages are entitled to respect. Access to public services must be provided for those from ethnic minorities who do not speak the dominant language. However, much international practice in respect of language rights is based upon recognition of the different circumstances and needs of indigenous languages, and in particular of those indigenous languages that are


under threat, as is the Irish language. In the past, the North has not attracted a particularly high level of immigrants, undoubtedly because of the poor economic climate and the effect of violent conflict. However, Irish political, social and economic changes in recent years and increased immigration from Eastern Europe have changed this to some extent in the past decade. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA)10 report that since 2004, the overall annual rate of population increase due to migration was approximately 7,000 per annum. However, no doubt as a result of the global economic downturn in the late 2000s, in 2007–8, the net migration gain was 5,700, significantly less than the reported figure of 9,800 for 2006–7. The 2001 Census therefore reflects a low percentage (1.1 per cent) of people from an ethnic minority background. The census forms to date have contained no questions about languages other than Irish, although as noted earlier and in Chapter 4, this may change in 2011. No official statistics exist concerning what other languages ethnic minorities in the North speak, and no information on what percentage of members of ethnic minority groups are non-English speaking. Some further information on this point is provided however by the response to a written parliamentary question on the comparative numbers of people in NI who on a daily basis speak Irish and Chinese.11 Lord Rooker cites the 2001 Census figures for Irish and cites 2003 research funded by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) and the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) estimating that there are around 8,000 people of Chinese origin in the North, with around 10 per cent speaking Mandarin and around 80–90 per cent speaking Cantonese.12 As I shall note later, however, the myth that there are more ‘Chinese’ speakers than Irish speakers in the North is frequently cited by opponents of the Irish language. In later chapters, I shall note examples of the manner in which the entitlement of different language groupings is counterbalanced in the politically charged atmosphere of the North of Ireland.

Irish Medium Education in Ireland Irish Medium Education (IME) in Ireland is based on immersion education, an internationally recognised method of language learning where children learn an additional language while being taught other subjects through the medium of this additional language. The different LPP context for IME North and South is illustrated by the fact that 86 per cent of the total number of children in IME are being educated in the South. By September 2008 there were 139 primary schools and 36 post-primary schools in the SoI (outside of the Gaeltacht areas13). This accounts for some 37,800 children who attend IME.14 However, in 2008, a moratorium on new school development except in designated areas of rapid expansion was imposed by the South’s Education Minister, Bat Ó Keefe. Proposals from development


51

committees for seven new IME schools in the RoI, all of them in designated rapid growth areas, were frozen in spite of significant growth in enrolment figures up to the year 2013.15

Growth of Irish Medium Education in the North It was not until 1998 that the Education (Northern Ireland) Order of that year placed a statutory duty upon the Department of Education (DENI) to encourage and facilitate the development of IME. In 1991, there were 4 Irish Medium primary schools. By 2008–9, this has grown to 31. The number of pre-school establishments also increased to 42 in 2006–7 and to 46 in 2008–9. The number of post-primary settings has not changed, remaining fixed at three, only one of these being a free-standing IM school.16 Since 2005, a second free-standing IM post-primary school, Coláiste Speirín in Dungannon, has had formal development proposals refused by both British Direct Rule Minister Angela Smith (2005) and by devolved SF Minister Caitríona Ruane (2008). In 2009, the school submitted its third proposal for recognition but was forced to announce it would not re-open for the 2009–10 term due to lack of funding. A comparison of figures for 2003–4 and 2006–7 shows steady increases in the number of schools and pupils in the period (See Tables 2.16 and 2.17). In addition, the figures also reflect the year by year growth of the number of primary school pupils from previous years, with Year 7 being the eldest pupils in primary education and Year 1 being the youngest. Thus, we can see an increase (Year 7 in Table 2.16) from 197 pupils in IM primary education in 1997 to 471 pupils in IM primary education in 2007 (Year 1 in Table 2.17). However, Table 2.18 shows the breakdown of figures at May 2009, prior to finalisation usually carried out in October of each year. These provisional figures appear to show a consistent drop in pupil figures from Year 3 to Year 7 in 2009 over the 2007 figures. This decrease, whilst small, is significant,

Table 2.16 2003–4 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures School type

No. of schools

No. of Year Year pupils 1 2

Year Year Year 3 4 5

Year 6

Year Years 7 8–12

Nursery Primary Postprimary

38 28 3

831 2117 481

423 136

377 106

– 322 121

– 302 87

– 271 24

– 215 17

– 197 –

427

Total

69

3429

423

377

332

302

271

215

197

427

Source: Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta August 2004

–

52


Table 2.17 2006–7 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures School Type Nursery Primary Postprimary Total

No. of schools

No. of Pupils

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Year 7

Years 8–12

42 32 3

920 2542 610

359 471 119

561 395 136

– 384 106

– 363 121

– 349 87

– 311 24

– 269 17

610

77

4072

471

395

384

363

349

311

269

610

–

Source: Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta August 2007

Table 2.18 2008–9 Figures relating to numbers and type of Irish Medium school: With Year by Year breakdown of pupil figures School Type Nursery Primary Postprimary Total

No. of schools

No. of Pupils

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

Year 7

Years 8–12

46 31 3

998 2,745 633

481

453

– 426

– 369

– 359

– 335

– 322

– – 633

80

4,376

481

453

426

369

359

335

322

633

Source: Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta May 2009

and should it be upheld in the verified figures to be prepared in autumn 2009, the precise cause should be identified. The Report of the Chief Inspector (2009, p. 43) records that in recent years there has been a ‘slow down in the growth of the IM primary sector’ but it states that this ‘has allowed for consolidation.’ However, it offers no further information to clarify this assertion, and it is difficult therefore to state with certainty whether a more proactive developmental approach to the sector in the same period could have yielded similar levels of consolidation whilst also allowing for an expanded rate of growth. In 2008 Review of Irish Medium Education highlights the issue of poor schools accommodation and viability criteria (DENI 2008, pp. 73–6) both of which have disproportional impact on IME, particularly in rural areas and in relation to post-primary provision (DENI 2008, pp. 77–85). Furthermore, the Review indicates that whilst statutory pre-school provision is available in the North to 70 per cent of children in the EM sector, this is the case for only 17 per


53

cent of IM children (DENI 2008, p. 59). Therefore, children in the IM sector for whom statutory provision is not available (83 per cent) receive pre-school provision in voluntary IM nurseries which do not receive the same level of funding as statutory provision and cannot access support services for children experiencing Special Needs. In respect of post-primary education, the Review places particular emphasis on the establishment of post-primary units within EM. Whilst free-standing IM secondary schools are not ruled out, the rejection of development proposals from Coláiste Speirín to which I have referred earlier is a negative sign. It illustrates that in spite of the considerable advancements of the period since the 1998 Education Order, the establishment and maintenance of IM schools in their earliest and most vulnerable period still fall on parents, voluntary local input and the drive and commitment of less than a handful of non-governmental organisations.

The teaching of Irish as a subject in English Medium schools Throughout Ireland, the vast majority of children do not have access to IME at present. Within English Medium Education (EME) Irish as a curriculum subject in the RoI has a controversial history. Observers have often questioned its apparent limitations in revitalising every day use of the language in the South (P. Ó Riagáin 1997, 2001) and critics have called for its removal as a compulsory subject. In the North, there are over 330,000 children in full-time EME. The EM sector can be divided (as shown in Table 2.19) into school categories defined according to religious management. It should be noted that in general, Irish is not taught as a subject in Protestant controlled17 schools in the North and is not consistently offered in voluntary or integrated schools. Nor, in fact is it offered in all Catholic maintained schools. The 1989 Education (Northern Ireland) Order states that every grant-aided school must offer all pupils in key stages three and four the opportunity to be taught French, German, Italian or Spanish.18 Pre-Good Friday Agreement, the Irish language was not therefore listed as one of the modern languages that secondary schools must offer to pupils. This position was not altered until 2006 when any official language of the European Union (other than English, and, in Irish speaking schools, Irish) was recognised. Previous to this, the model in which all Year 8 (first year of post-primary) pupils learned at least two modern languages was much more prevalent (30 per cent of schools in the North followed this model) in the North than in the UK (10 per cent of schools in the UK). McKendry (2002, p. 138) attributes this high prevalence solely to the provision for Irish in the North. In NI, Irish remains the third most popular modern language at GCSE level in spite of ‘its narrower base in the Maintained or Catholic sector’ (McKendry 2001, p. 214).

54


Table 2.19 Number of schools and pupils in the North by management type School management type Controlleda Catholic maintainedb Other maintained

Number of pupils 132,927 118,601 2,500 439

Irish Mediumc Other

Integrated

Controlled integrated Grant maintained

4,522 14,864

Voluntary

Under Catholic management Under other management

27,479 22,129

Non-grant aided Voluntary pre-school centresd Total

712 6,110 330,802

NB a. Includes one Irish Medium nursery school, with 69 pupils b. Includes 26 pupils in a nursery class in one Irish Medium school, one Irish Medium primary school with 135 pupils and 634 pupils in Irish Medium units in 9 primary schools. Also includes 132 pupils in Irish Medium units in 2 secondary schools. c. Excludes one Irish Medium Controlled school and one Irish Medium Catholic Maintained school d. Figures revised on 15 May 2009 to include one voluntary play group previously omitted Source: NI School Census 2008–9 (provisional figures) May 2009

Table 2.20 2003–8 Figures for A level Examinations taken in modern languages Subject

2003–4

2004–5

2005–6

2006–7

2007–8

Irish French German Italian Spanish

274 792 184 15 432

295 725 133 18 402

308 701 143 10 406

254 662 145 7 458

238 694 159 0 415

Source: Adapted from DENI February 200919

Table 2.20 shows the numbers of children taking ‘A’ level (usually taken at age 17–18) in modern languages in the North. Almost three times as many took French as took Irish, and significantly larger numbers took Spanish. The fact that the total number of pupils taking A level Irish in 2007–8 was 238, almost three times fewer than those taking French, and some 40 per cent fewer than those taking Spanish appears to support the argument that the promotion of Irish as an indigenous language, different in its meaning and relationship to other aspects of a child’s educational life, is inadequate.


55

Nor has a 2007 DENI initiative to encourage language learning in primary schools (Irish and Spanish) proved able to impact as yet upon take-up differentials between Catholic and Protestant schools. Although 323 schools took part in the language element in 2008–9, most chose Spanish. Only 76 schools chose to teach Irish, none of them in the controlled Protestant sector.20 Having thus briefly sketched the demographic picture, in the next chapter, I shall examine more closely the policy context for Irish in the North in the period immediately preceding the 1998 GFA.

3 The Irish Language and the Good Friday Agreement

Those who seek to defend a threatened language ... are obliged to wage a total struggle. One cannot save the value of a competence unless one saves the market, in other words, the whole set of political and social conditions of production of the producers/ consumers. (Bourdieu 1991, p. 57)

Relationships and revitalisation Since partition, Irish speakers in the North have operated in a hostile environment, unable to benefit directly from Southern Constitutional protections for Irish, from Southern policy initiatives or funding for the language. Under such circumstances, they undoubtedly recognised the totality of need within their community. From the 1940s and for some four decades, they focussed on small-scale, independent projects to revitalise the language and increase incrementally their own personal Irish Medium social, employment and educational spheres. Today, observers of the language revival may see IME as a venture of extraordinary scope and range, and arguably, there were those involved in the establishment of Belfast’s Shaw’s Road Gaeltacht initiative and the first IM school in 1971 that had a complete vision of how to proceed and of what could be achieved. Even so, in general, Irish language initiatives have grown slowly in localised, bite-sized pieces from initially tiny, self-funded projects set up by enthusiasts. Local committees, largely untrained and unsupported by anything other than the experience of those who had gone before, have struggled to overcome each obstacle as they encountered it. Irish language activists chose this path, or perhaps had it forced upon them, by a belief that success could only be achieved through their own, self-sustainable efforts. Attempts to impact upon, form partnerships with statutory authorities and with government or to expand provision through legislative approaches were so negative in this period that 56

Irish Language and the GFA 57

many Irish language activists continue to place significant emphasis on selfsufficiency. In 2004, a newspaper article1 announcing the first contribution of £20,000 to IME trust, Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta (InaG), from TACA, one of its fundraising arms, contains some characteristic elements. Chief Executive of InaG, Pilib Ó Ruanaí, comments, This money is made up of the pennies thrown into TACA collection boxes in shops, pubs and clubs throughout the North and from the scratch cards bought by local customers throughout Belfast. This money can and does make a difference. This is yet another example of the can-do attitude of the Irish speaking community which does not wait on money coming in but gets out and actively fundraises. In the coming chapters, I shall examine the extent to which CR has changed the relationship between the state and the Irish language community. It should be noted at this point that questions of independence and self-sustainability have particular resonance at present. As stated, the Irish government is currently considering cuts of €5 billion to public expenditure. Proposals from the McCarthy Commission include 85 recommendations affecting Irish language provision and Gaeltacht areas in particular. Of course, from time to time, governments are forced, or inclined, to make such changes. However, compounding the situation has been the complex manoevering around the status of the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (RGPTG / DCRGA) under Minister Éamon Ó Cuív. Although current Taoiseach, Brian Cowan2 has rejected McCarthy’s proposal to close the RCPTG / DCRGA, the Opposition leader has endorsed it3 and the South’s Department of Finance has attacked Ó Cuív management of government grants.4 Ó Cuív has threatened to forcibly merge all core-funded Irish language organisations, North and South, into one federated Dublin-based organisation whose role is the implementation of a Twenty-Year Plan for the Irish language, drafted by his own department and grounded exclusively in the circumstances of the Southern state. The lack of written proposals, discussion documents or detailed consultation materials regarding strategic changes to LPP or the future of Irish language organisations plus a certain fluidity of content in the Minister’s statements have increased a sense of confusion and disempowerment. In September 2009, TG4 news5 revealed that cuts to the Gaeltacht and Irish language organisations were discussed between the RGPTG / DCRGA and the McCarthy Commission as early as April 2009, and even prior to that, in January 2009, that the North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) had agreed in principle that there was potential to ‘collapse’ the number of Irish language organisations. At the time of writing, it is not clear to what extent Ó Cuív’s approach is his own initiative or the product of political pressures from within government, North or South. Along with the McCarthy proposals, his statements have provoked


consternation and anger, raised fears that back-room deals have already been done without any form of consultation and called into question the exact nature of collaboration between the RoI and the North’s devolved institutions in respect of RoI policy. Ambiguity and ineffectiveness in Southern LPP is not a recent phenomenon. Gardner, Puigdevall i Serralvo & Williams (2000, p. 318) have pointed out that, ‘Too often in the literature related to lesser-used languages, the Irish (sic) example is quoted as a missed opportunity, or an illustration of how difficult it is for government top-down planning to initiate processes of language revitalisation.’ Certainly during the 1980s and 1990s, many Northern Irish speakers, influenced by what they saw in the South, were sceptical as to what lasting benefits might be achieved through approaches to strengthen legislation or to co-ordinate and collaborate with the government and public sectors. In addition to functioning in the absence of domestic protections for Irish, the Irish language voluntary sector in the North differs in significant ways from that in the South. Donoghue (2004, p. 31) points out that in the North, Irish language NGOs are smaller and younger than in the South, both in terms of the establishment date of the groups and their membership.6 On average, women are outnumbered 1:5 by men on voluntary committees in the North, a far greater disparity than in the South (1:2 ratio in favour of men).7 In the North, the groups tend to be based in urban areas and clearly identified with and focussed upon their local Irish speaking communities. Although smaller, organisations in the North tended to have a greater average income and less dependence upon voluntary workers. Donoghue notes the different relationship between Irish language organisations and the state on either side of the border. She says, (2004, p. 51) Nuair a chuirtear i gcomparáid iad le heagraíochtaí i dTuaisceart Éireann feictear go soiléir an seasamh atá ag eagraíochtaí i bPoblacht na hÉireann ... bhí eagraíochtaí i dTuaisceart Éireann gafa le tógáil pobail i stát eile agus, fairis sin, bhíodar ag dul i ngleic le constaicí caidrimh pobail, áit a raibh an mothú ann gurb iad siúd an dream ‘eile’ agus go raibh gá féiniúlacht dhearfach a chur in iúl a bheadh bunaithe air.8 A comparison with Irish language organisations in Northern Ireland emphasises the position of Irish language organisations in the Republic of Ireland ... Northern Irish organisations were engaged in community building in a different jurisdiction and, furthermore, within the confines of community relations where there was a sense of being ‘other’ and of having to assert a positive identity based on that. (Official bilingual document) In spite of an oft-stated and apparent mistrust of government amongst many individual Irish speakers in the North, the Irish language community sector is a young one and the focus on survival has tended to fragment communication amongst groups focused on local objectives. Discussing the value of


an independent non-governmental sector in general, Donoghue notes that in 2004 there appeared to be a greater awareness historically in the South of threats to that independence from funders and government than there was in the North. This is particularly the case amongst longer-established groups in the South. Her report makes reference to the concerns expressed in the South at the time of her report in respect of government policy towards the Irish language voluntary sector.9 She (2004, p. 1) says, ‘Rud eile is léir...ó thaobh na n-eagraíochtaí deonacha de, ná go bhfuil easpa aitheantais ann do neamhspleáchas na n-eagraíochtaí sin, nó fiú easpa tuisceana nach géaga de chuid an stát atá iontu go léir.’ / ‘What is also apparent ... from the perspective of voluntary organisations is the absence of recognition of the independence of such organisations, or the lack of sense that they are not necessarily arms of the state.’ (Official bilingual version). Donoghue attributes this to a ‘teorainn dhoiléir / fuzziness’ in the boundaries between the state and the voluntary sector in the South, which she sees as occurring in other fields of life, and which Ó Ferrall (2000) attributes to the absence of a philosophy of voluntary action on the part of the Irish state. Certainly, Donoghue (2004, p. 36) reports that both in North and South, Irish language organisations show a lack of sectoral awareness or identity, and that in the North, ... bhí an mothú ann gurb iad na ‘leanaí úra’ iad agus go raibh orthu a fhoghlaim conas comhchaidrimh a chur ar bun le heagraíochtaí deonacha eile agus leis an stát-chóras...Mheas eagraíochtaí deonacha i dTuaisceart Éireann go raibh ceangail níos láidre ag eagraíochtaí deonacha eile sa Tuaisceart lena chéile agus leis an stát-chóras. Chuir sé sin leis an dearcadh aonaránach a bhí le sonrú agus iad ag cur síos orthu féin agus na cúinsí a bhí acu. ... there was a sense of being ‘the new kids on the block’ and of having to learn how to initiate relationships with other voluntary organisations and with the state apparatus ... Northern Irish voluntary organisations tended to view other voluntary organisations in Northern Ireland as having stronger ties both with each other and with the state apparatus, which led to nuances of isolation in descriptions of their position. (Official bilingual document)10 Of course, as noted in the previous chapter, the CR process of the 1990s included certain language provisions in the GFA and the creation of an allIreland governmental language funding body. Williams (1994, p. 141) states that there is ‘a deep ambiguity’ about the dominance of government in language revitalisation in Wales because of the tendency of institutionalisation to create dependency, severing control of language promotion from the community. Gruffudd (2000) notes the contradictions that often become apparent when grassroots energies become re-routed through institutions

60


and / or through the increasing professionalisation of language planning. However, he states that whilst popular activism can be a key element in language survival, ‘such actions, while achieving reasonable success in recognisable and tangible objectives, can often be severely lacking in influence over more intricate and less easily defined domains’ (Gruffudd 2000, p. 174). Where an expert or more nuanced approach is required as time goes on, he asserts, ‘Simplistic youthful campaigns are no longer effective.’ The early debate around the best approaches for Irish speakers in the North in the new atmosphere generated by the GFA and the establishment of new devolved institutions reflects the different experience North and South as well as common arguments from further afield. McCoy (2001, p. 209) highlights the way in which Irish language organisations had to decide either to work in a consensual or conflictual way. He points out that there are dangers to both approaches. In the former, organisations risk being co-opted by the state and isolated from their peers, in the latter, they risk being unable to influence beyond their own constituency. McCoy (2001, p. 212) and Ó Murchú (2000, pp. 83–4) have pointed out that some Irish speakers had reservations about the creation of a new statutory Irish language sector in the North. They suggest that as the board members of the cross-border implementation body, Foras na Gaeilge are political appointees, there were fears they would tend to promote the party rather than the language and that they would prove unaccountable to the community. McCoy (2001, p. 209) notes that his own employer, Iontaobhas Ultach has been accused of being ‘co-opted by the state, and even as a branch of the NIO’ and as ‘a distant, politically servile and unaccountable quango, outside the language movement proper.’ Amongst the changes he points to in the period following the GFA, he states that the relatively newly formed umbrella organisation, POBAL was beginning on a process that would shift the ‘rights’ discourse into the common vocabulary of grassroots non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the North (McCoy 2001, p. 209). In spite of their anxieties, Irish speakers saw the potential for positive and unprecedented change in LPP. A new society was being built and they were keen to test its boundaries. In the coming chapters, I shall examine their experience in this respect in detail.

Community relations and abrasive gaels By the 1980s, the British government was clearly aware of the efforts of Irish language enthusiasts to revitalise the language. Meetings between activists and government, in particular with representatives of the DENI, had taken place from 1971 onwards, and although the importance of Irish language initiatives in official government policy has been rather a concealed one, there is no doubt that the activity on the ground provoked a reaction. Nonetheless, there were few unsolicited ministerial statements,


little in the way of written and publicly available policy statements and few, if any, apparent departmental strategies. By 1987, the Irish language was being incorporated into the policy area entitled ‘Community Relations’ which imposed, at least initially, a compulsory (and demographically rather challenging – see Chapter 2) cross community element upon language projects if they were to be eligible for funding. More significant in the long term was the tendency of the community relations context to charge Irish speakers themselves with the responsibility of proving that the Irish language was a resource for all, without adequate funding, without the support of positive government strategies, and in the face of ongoing official attempts to marginalise the revival as a symbol of political and ethnic rebellion. Responsibility for the implementation of government policy on community relations was co-ordinated through the Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU), whose head, Tony Canavan, had specific responsibility for the Irish language among his other duties. I shall return to the subject of CCRU advice on the Irish language in a later section of this chapter.

Ministerial impacts Richard Needham, to date Britain’s longest serving minister in the NoI under direct rule, provides an insight into his own attitude to the Irish language in his autobiography. He notes that whilst on the surface meetings between the Irish and British government following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 brought little apparent change, the situation behind the scenes was ‘more tangled.’ In 1986, a number of proposals intended to raise the profile of Gaelic / nationalist culture in the North were raised at the AngloIrish Intergovernmental conference. Needham (1998, p. 88) comments, One suggestion was that we should move towards using Gaelic as a second language in government. Another was that we should produce a map of the North using Irish place-names and that we should have street names in both languages. The first idea was ridiculous in that virtually no-one in the public service in the North spoke Irish, and much the same could be said of the position in the South. Apart from the cost, the opportunities for misunderstanding, mistranslation and mischief were endless. As far as the map and the street names were concerned, I was not too bothered. But as the Irish were being so unsympathetic about the declaration against violence,11 I did not see why I should further antagonise unionists without anything in return. (Author’s emphasis) Douglas Hurd succeeded in raising the profile of the Irish language rather more in 1989 when he withdrew funding from the west Belfast branch of Glór na nGael under the British government policy that became known as


‘political vetting’. The Irish language organisation was the first of some 40 small community-based groups who had funding frozen on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations of supporting terrorism. The subsequent campaign won broad-based support and eventually, the British government was forced to restore funding since it was unable to make specific allegations of mismanagement. The policy attracted a great deal of bad publicity for the British government. In addition, however, even after all funding was re-established the implied smear remained, increasing the real threat to the well-being of individuals associated with certain types of community work. Concurrent with the removal of funding from the community-based Glór na nGael, the first Irish language organisation supported directly by the British government, Iontaobhas Ultach / the Ultach Trust was established with an initial grant of £50,000. The step was welcomed by some Irish speakers and treated with scepticism by others. Kenneth Bloomfield is deemed to have been close to the centre of politics in the North for over 40 years. Private Secretary to three Stormont Cabinet Ministers, head of the Stormont government’s New York office, close aide to Terence Ó Neill, key advisor to Prime Ministers James Chichester Clark and Brian Faulkner and later, under direct rule, to William Whitelaw. Head of the power-sharing executive, he was eventually appointed as head of the NI Civil Service – over 28,000 industrial and non-industrial staff – a role he fulfilled from 1984 to 1991. His substantial autobiography, recounting his 40 years of experience in all these fields of policy and politics, refers (1994, p. 262) to the community relations policy and its high priority rating in government circles: Now, in the late eighties, we came to the conclusion at Stormont Castle that community relations, broadly defined, lay at the very heart of the Northern Ireland problem, and could only be given a fitting priority if pushed forward from the centre of the system, with the clout of the Secretary of State and the influence of the head of the Northern Ireland civil service behind it. Bloomfield (1994, p. 262) asserts that the CCRU and the Cultural Traditions Group (CTG) carried out ‘pioneering work in the cultural sphere,’ and describes his own lead role within departments. However, his autobiography makes no direct reference to the Irish language at all. Maurice Hayes (1995), another senior figure, gives a rather more personalised account of his experience within the NI Civil Service and indeed as a key player within Community Relations. Appointed Town Clerk in Downpatrick in 1955, he went on to fulfil roles as Chairman of the Community Relations Commission, Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, assistant secretary to the power-sharing Executive and permanent secretary in the Department of Health and Social Services. His autobiography prefaces a comment on his


‘diverse and distinguished career, including holding some of the most influential posts in local administration’ with the qualification, ‘unusually for a Catholic’. Invited in 1969 to become involved in a Ministry for Community Relations, Hayes comments, ‘It was rather a contradiction in terms, given their exclusivity over the previous fifty years, for a unionist government to contemplate a Ministry of Community Relations’ (1995, p. 76). In a key reference to the Irish language, Hayes recounts an incident from his work as Ombudsman at the beginning of the 1980s when he received a letter from an Irish speaker complaining that the education authorities would not answer him when he wrote in Irish. Hayes (1995, p. 305) comments, He was, I think, surprised when I replied in Irish, although I did take the precaution of attaching the English version too so that other people in the office could deal with the file. I was able to establish that government departments had a policy, when someone wrote to them in Irish, of having the letter translated and the matter dealt with and a reply sent in English. Which I suppose, at the time, was better than ignoring it, as the education board had done. It is interesting to note that the practice described by Hayes is the same one that the British government selected under Article 10 of Part III of the ECRML more than 20 years later. Describing the outcome of the complaint, Hayes says that the complainant had withdrawn his children from EME in order to educate them at home through Irish. Given the atmosphere at this time around IME, with parents fighting daily for the right to the smallest recognition, Hayes’ matter-of-fact tone belies the importance of his response. Speaking of the complainant he (Hayes 1995, p. 305) says, He was not asking for the earth – simply some help with equipment and some of the time of a French assistant to help with conversation. The board seemed not to have been too assiduous in pursuing its statutory duty to see that the children were being adequately educated at home, and it seemed to have taken fright at the political and linguistic challenges of the case. If Hayes’ reasoning represents a major leap of imagination and courage for a public servant at the time, his subsequent actions were grounded in the pragmatic approach of the civil servant. He ‘established the average amount the board would spend on providing the services requested to children in their own schools, and in the end it was agreed to make the complainant a grant which would enable him to buy them for himself’ (Hayes 1995, p. 305). Typically, Hayes notes his pleasure many years later to hear that the children concerned had ach in turn attended university and obtained first class degrees.

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The CR process and the Irish language The most pressing issue facing the people of Ireland and Britain, as now appears to be agreed by all sides, is the question of a lasting peace and how it can best be achieved. (Hume-Adams Joint Statement, 20 November 1993) The mode for both construction and preservation of identity in NI is contestation: that contestation will either have to become a game, or be otherwise decoupled from its outward manifestation in open strife for the communities to live together. That or one side must win: and such an aim, much more in common with the deep history of the North’s identities than their reduction to irony or jouissance, is unsurprisingly the aim of both Sinn Féin and the Ulster Unionists. It may be enough on its own for a peace which shares means but not ends, which in its turn of course depends on how close or achievable these ends appear. (Pittock 1999, p. 134) From the 1990s, the almost reckless self-belief and self-help ethos of the Irish language community was symbolised by the enormously challenging expansion of IME in some of the most deprived areas of the North; and the blossoming out of the rubble of the conflict of Irish language cultural and arts centres, economic projects and Irish language media. Difficulties were still at the heart of negotiations between the state and Irish language projects, even as the CR process unfolded around them. In the next section of this chapter, I shall examine two contrasting views to the background to the Irish language references in the GFA. The first is the viewpoint as reflected in contemporaneous accounts of negotiations written by SF president and chief negotiator, Gerry Adams. The second is the British government viewpoint, as indicated in the internal briefing paper mentioned above, written by Tony Canavan, senior government advisor to the Secretary of State.

‘A different political approach’ In 1988, the two leaders of nationalism in the North, John Hume of the SDLP12 and Gerry Adams of SF13, embarked on a series of personal meetings aimed at achieving a nationalist consensus. The subsequent support of the then Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, for this process created a dynamic that led to a further five years of intensive, multifaceted talks which would outlast Taoisigh, Prime Ministers, American Presidents, Secretaries of State and senior civil servants. Writing contemporaneously,


Ruane (1999, p. 145) asserts that the CR process proved to be contentious and difficult. His assertion that, ‘The goal was not just a truce, or a temporary settlement, but a final and complete end to the centuries-old conflict’ may be an apt illustration of Kriesberg’s comment (1998, p. 20), noted in chapter 1, that whatever goals are set at the beginning, it is often only with hindsight that one can judge what has been achieved in a given CR process. Understandably, the political parties and government representatives on all sides used different tactics based on their very varied analysis of where they wanted to be by the end of the talks and how they would get there. By October 1996 the CR process was still moving at a slow pace. Gerry Adams comments that the party’s experience of the British side was that, ‘...their interpretation of word formulae in agreements tended towards the minimal rather than the generous side ... They loved ambiguous texts which left them wriggle room. We wanted direct, non-complicated, tied-down commitments’ (Adams 2003, p. 268). To what extent this is an accurate interpretation may be open to discussion, but it is clear that differences in style and method were not unique to SF and the British Government. Early in the process of multiparty talks, David Trimble, then leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)14 commented that the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) had ‘a different habit of mind, a different approach’ (Quoted in Routledge 1997, p. 292). One of the UUP’s chief negotiators, Reg Empey felt that difficulties arose in negotiations with the SDLP and in particular with John Hume, because: ‘We are looking at the text, and they are looking at the context’ (Quoted in Routledge 1997, p. 292). Not surprisingly, the UUP had severe problems throughout the process in their dealings with SF. The tensions took many forms, frustrating and confounding even the most seasoned and experienced of outside facilitators. Mallie and McKittrick (2001, p. 261) quote ex-US Senator George Mitchell, who describes the atmosphere when he was asked to return to Belfast to conduct a review in the autumn of 1999. Mitchell says, ‘The first meetings were disastrous – angry, harsh recrimination – “You’re a liar” – “Don’t call me a liar.” ’ SF negotiator, Martin McGuinness reports an exasperated Mitchell warning him Gerry Adams, SF President, ‘You guys have a life and this is it. I have a life and this is not it.’ In 1999, United States President, Bill Clinton, addressing a Canadian audience in 1999 caused controversy (quoted in Maillie and McKittrick 2001, p. 261) when he said, I spend an enormous amount of time trying to help the people in Ireland to get over 600 years of religious fights. And every time they make an agreement to do it, they’re like a couple of drunks walking out of a bar for the last time. When they reach the swinging doors they just turn right round and go back in and say – ‘just can’t quite get there.’

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In late 1998, reflecting on the stage of negotiations that had resulted in the GFA, David Trimble (quoted in Mallie and McKittrick 2001, p. 256) was to remark to a hard-line audience of Young Unionists, The event that has caused the greatest problems to Unionists in recent years is the adoption by the republican movement of a different political approach. When the republican movement was wholly involved in terrorism, it was simple enough: we knew what we were dealing with, we had lived with it year in, year out, and our response was straightforward and simple. But then they changed their approach. Now we can discuss it, analyse it and argue about the nature of that change. Was it just as republicans would now represent it? Or was it a series of changes as they adjusted to events as they happened? On the motivation of republicans, he comments, ‘I think that they decided that, while the campaign still had some life in it, they would try and cash it in for political advantage – some political concessions or developments. That basically is the origin of the so-called peace process, the HumeAdams process, call it what you will’ (Quoted in Mallie and McKittrick 2001, p. 256). Recognising the fundamental reality that they had neither initiated nor foreseen the instigation of a process that had drawn them into direct negotiation with both republicans and the Irish government, Trimble’s comments (Quoted in Mallie and McKittrick 2001, p. 257), intended to win over the young sceptics in his own party, rather underlines the fundamental problem of ideologies built on negative responses. His speech continues, You cannot be a spectator, you cannot be someone who deals purely with an idealised situation or a situation as you would want it. You have to engage with it as it is. It is not always the way you like, and you can never be certain how it is going to work out, but you have to engage. In September 1997, multiparty talks opened at Stormont. With it being agreed that the talks process itself would be divided into several stages based upon the structures that had preceded them: Constitutional Issues, Strand One (Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland), Strand Two (North South Ministerial Council), Strand Three (British-Irish Council), which included the provision for the Economic, Social and Cultural Issues). It was clear by this stage that the Irish language would feature as part of the negotiation process. Representatives of the Irish government were regular visitors to the North, meeting both formally and informally with Irish speakers to discuss the progress and shortcomings in the political talks and sound out the views of the community on the ground regarding structures, institutions and


legislative protections as the CR negotiations continued. Throughout the lengthy and convoluted process, Irish speakers placed emphasis on the need for visible change, for increased legislative protection for Irish, to be accompanied by increased funding and new structures to take the lead on the development of the language. The need to secure and develop the future of IME and of particular threatened schools was a source of great concern and determination, and the issue of increased media resources, including the expansion of the new Irish language television station, then called Teilifís na Gaeilge, were all recurring features of discussions.

Irish in the negotiations Such necessities at a grassroots level were reflected in the CR process. Adams (2003, p. 268) comments that from an early stage, ‘The British seemed to oppose the Irish language in a completely irrational way. They removed the issue of Irish from the draft we gave them.’ By mid-November, the CR talks had progressed and there was some sense of movement. De Bréadun (2001, p. 197) states, however, that the views of the two northern nationalist parties on the importance of the Irish language were rather different. There was believed to be a strong possibility of agreement on an additional North-South body to promote the Irish language. The SDLP wanted strategic transport planning, with its potential to organise future North-South road, rail and air links, and was irritated when Dublin let this one go, in favour of Irish. ‘Dublin wanted to keep Trimble on board at all costs,’ SDLP sources said later. ‘Sinn Féin fell into a unionist trap when they were looking for Irish; the unionists were always ready to buy Irish as a lightweight body. Dublin lost its nerve and put the pressure on a reluctant Mallon to accept Irish instead of strategic transport planning or tourism.’ De Bréadún’s (2001, p. 198) assertion that, ‘The unionists did not feel threatened by Irish’ takes little account of the experience of Irish speakers and does not explain his acknowledgement that they ‘insisted on adding the little-known Ulster-Scots dialect as a responsibility of the new language body, which SDLP sources regarded as ludicrous.’ At this stage, the UUP and the SDLP appeared to be united on a key issue in relation to equality and human rights, the overall category that included the Irish language. Whilst a separate Department of Equality had been mooted, the two parties favoured the proposal that responsibility for such issues should be located within the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister. This would have clear implications for the status of such issues and for ministerial control. De Bréadún cites the d’Hondt mechanism for allocating ministries as the

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rationale behind this alliance. Based upon the number of votes received, De Bréadún (2001, p. 197) says, ... the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) would quite possibly be able to take the equality portfolio. That wouldn’t suit the SDLP. Alternatively, the prospect of a SF minister for Equality was enough to give unionists the heebie-jeebies and would not necessarily delight the SDLP either. It is interesting to note that when relationships between the parties became particularly strained, the Irish language and its place within the different parties’ negotiation strategies became part of the war of words. In December 1997, at what should have been a moment of significant progress, conflict between the UUP and SDLP erupted. Séamus Mallon and John Taylor both engaged in confrontational media interviews. In De Bréadun’s (2001, p. 199) words, Taylor of the UUP, ‘taunted Mallon over rejecting a body for the promotion of the Irish language.’ Clearly, the UUP understood well enough the need for nationalist parties to at least appear to be promoting the Irish language within the CR agenda. Todd (1999, p. 60) has analysed the importance of the Irish language in SF’s negotiation strategy. Discussing the dominant republican discourses apparent during the talks process, she notes ‘an ideological symbiosis between the universalisable principles and the traditional goals’. She continues, National self determination is affirmed in two senses simultaneously. As a democratic principle of self-determination on the island free from British interference, it belongs with the first principles ... . But now Irish unity can be achieved incrementally. Thus, the second level aims, – cultural equality including for the Irish language, radical reform of the police, total demilitarisation of British army presence and posts, and of the legally as well as illegally held weapons in the North, and strong North-South linkages which would open the possibility of an eventual united Irish nation state – are at once an application of the first principles and stages necessary to move towards the goal. By the end of December 1997, the format had been established and the NorthSouth body. An Foras Teanga was one of six implementation bodies, including trade and business development and special European programmes. The three others were those proposed by the UUP – inland waterways, aquaculture and food safety. Further difficulties, including the exclusion of SF from the CR process for a period of weeks followed, but a Joint Statement from the British and Irish governments issued on 5 March commented, ‘The Conference15 agreed on the importance of steps to promote the Irish language and discussed a number of options which the British Government is actively considering.’


There had been considerable difficulties over the issue of North-South Bodies, the British government was still being pressed by SF for changes to its Constitution and the Irish government had reached the stage of agreeing to the removal of Articles 2 and 3 of its own Constitution. As I have noted in Chapter 1, these articles gave constitutional expression to the Irish nation and its territory. However, arguments continued about the legislative basis for the North South Ministerial Council and the unionists were pressing for North-South structures to be incorporated in a structure covering relations between Britain and Ireland, rather than in the establishment of stand-alone, all-Ireland bodies. Relationships in the final phase of intensive all-night negotiations that preceded the GFA deteriorated further. Adams (2001, p. 54) states, There were also intensive talks about the status and the resourcing of the Irish language. Irish had no official status in the North. We were determined to change this and for months had been putting pressure on the British government to sign up to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages ... . At Castle Buildings we continued to push the Irish government and the British on the equality agenda, the Irish language and on the demilitarisation and policing issues in advance of agreed papers being submitted by them to Senator Mitchell. Also in this period, Adams (quoted in Adams 2001, p. 53) writes in his column for the American newspaper, The Irish Voice, ‘We began to get a clearer sense of positions agreed between the Irish and British governments on issues of equality and demilitarisation, including policing, rights, justice and the Irish language. We continued to push hard for improvements on this range of issues.’ According to the SF president’s account of the negotiations, therefore, (Adams 2001, p. 55) the Irish language remained a key issue for negotiation until the very last moment. On Monday 6 April, we held a major review of all the issues under negotiation. On the basis of this, we decided to have a series of focused engagements with the two governments, urging them to improve their position on a number of matters, including the Irish language, prisoners, policing and the equality agenda. On Thursday 9 April, with Strand One still unresolved, Adams (2001, p. 57) notes the need to continue to push the British government on the Irish language and equality issues, ‘Two phone calls between myself and President Clinton underlined our need for movement on these issues.’ Of course, one must take into account the subjectivity of any one participant in any event, and this is doubly so for those engaged in complex CR negotiations like the North’s talks process. What is apparent from Adams’ contemporaneous


accounts is that the Irish language was one of a number of key equality issues under discussion from the beginning to the end of the negotiation process that resulted in the GFA. The importance of Irish, not simply to the NI CR settlement, but to the formulation of broader British government policy in relation to devolution in Scotland and Wales is illustrated in an official British government document that I shall examine in the next section.

A British government view Having examined some comments relating to the role of the Irish language in the talks process by those involved in negotiations, I shall now look at the way in which a document16 drafted during the talks process by Tony Canavan, Head of the Central Community Relations Unit and senior civil servant charged with responsibility for the Irish language, casts light on the background to the interactions from the British government side. It was only after the signing by all parties of the GFA on 10 April 1998, that Canavan’s document came to light. Canavan’s document, a submission for the then Minister, forewarning him of ‘forthcoming Cabinet level correspondence’ (Canavan 1998, p. 1, para 1) on the subject of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) was leaked to the press on 22 April by the then Belfast City Councillor, Nelson McCausland of the DUP.17 That the implications of the CR process had broader ramifications to UK LPP is reflected in his text. Both the Scottish and Welsh Offices were in favour of early ratification of the ECRML for Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh in Wales respectively. Canavan (1998, p. 4, para 8) notes, however, In all previous dealings with the Welsh Office and other Departments on the Charter, it was widely accepted that the Northern Ireland Peace Process was of considerably greater importance than the signature of the Charter. Other Departments were always ready to make allowances for any problems which might be created in Northern Ireland. Interestingly, Canavan (1998, p. 5, para 9) comments that ‘the only real pressure for signing the Charter within Northern Ireland has come from Irish language organisations and political parties which support them.’ He (1998, p. 5, para 10) says, Of the specific objectives and principles set out in Part II, most are unexceptionable (sic) and coincide with existing government policy. One or two might be cited by Irish language organisations as involving a commitment to greater efforts on behalf of Irish, eg ‘resolute action to promote’, ‘facilitation and/or encouragement ... in public and private life’. What these worthy sentiments might mean in practice is a matter of


interpretation and we could argue that our interpretation is as valid as anyone else’s. He (1998, p. 5 para 10) characterises the potential for controversy should the British fail to energetically implement the ECRML as follows, ‘We can expect a three-sided correspondence on this between Government, the Committee of Experts and local Irish language groups when the periodic reports on the UK’s performance under the Charter is considered ... ‘ Clearly, not a matter of undue concern to Mr. Canavan. Nor does he (1998, p. 5, para 11) foresee any major legislative problems in the ratification of Part II, With the repeal in 1995 of the old Stormont legislation on street names, the main discrimination against Irish on the statute book has been removed. There remains one possibly relevant law applying in Northern Ireland, which is not the responsibility of the Secretary of State, but of the Lord Chancellor. This is the Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) 1737, an antiquated statute which declares that the language of the Courts shall be English but which apparently was not really directed at Irish but at medieval survivals in legal language. The Act bears little relation to the current practice in Courts where interpreting facilities are available for people who cannot speak English. The removal of this Act should not imply any form of bilingualism in the Courts. Illustrating the viewpoint of SF leader, Gerry Adams that the British like to keep things vague, Canavan comments, ‘If agreement can be reached on its repeal, an undertaking to do so at some point in the future would be sufficient to enable us to accept Part II of the Charter.’ As discussed in Chapter 4, the second monitoring report of the Committee of Experts (COMEX 2007, p. 17, para 148) on the UK implementation of the ECRML notes that the 1737 Act is still in operation and calls for the removal of obstacles to the protection and promotion of Irish. The 2008–9 Judicial Review of the 1737 Act, taken ten years after the writing of Canavan’s document, saw the British government vigorously defend the Act’s continuing application in the North. The judge ruled in favour of the British government.18 If acceptance of ‘the worthy sentiments’ of Part II appear to cause Canavan little concern, his attitude to Part III is rather different. This he writes (1998, p. 6, para 12), ‘would be much more difficult for Northern Ireland, without a quantum leap in the Government’s approach to the language ... . I estimate that, on current policies, we could meet the requirements of 20–5 of the paragraphs in Part III, falling well short of the threshold of 35.’ Canavan does not foresee rapid change, ‘Any narrowing of the gap would need to be achieved gradually, taking account of resource and political implications.’ (1998, p. 6, para 12). He (Canavan 1998, p. 6, para 12) is not inclined to urge radical action, ‘Short of a major development in the context


of the Talks process, it is not realistic to expect that Irish could be specified, along with Welsh, at the time of ratification as meeting Part III requirements, nor could it be added in the short to medium term.’ As senior civil servant with responsibility for the Irish language, it is clear that Canavan’s advice closely reflects the British government position. Politicians, however, may remark that it is the role of civil servants to be cautious, even conservative, to counterbalance the tendency of politicians to come up with the creative – though not always practical – solution. Whatever the reality in this case, Canavan’s advice on the ratification of Part III of the ECRML was not followed. Whether through a commitment to more rapid progress or as a result of the political pressures brought to bear by Irish language organisations and supportive political parties in the CR process, it is something that can perhaps be best assessed through an examination of the subsequent implementation of the commitments made in the GFA, a matter I shall address in the coming chapters. At the time of Canavan’s advice to the British government, Adams (2001, p. 55) characterises the attitude of unionism thus, ‘...the unionists were opposed to the establishment of the North-South Council and its implementation bodies by legislation in Westminster and Leinster House, and they also wanted it to function after, rather than simultaneously with, a Northern Assembly.’ Whilst nationalist parties pressed for recognition of the Irish language, some unionists were also raising a new matter. Canavan (1998, p. 6, para 13) notes that there is a new factor to bear in mind in the CR process, In Northern Ireland, Unionists have demanded parity of treatment between Ulster-Scots and Irish. In terms of Part III obligations, this does not present a problem, if we rule out specifying Irish. However, the Ulster-Scots movement would claim that the more general declaratory provisions of Part II should also apply to them. We would therefore need, in close conjunction with the Scottish Office, to make a firm decision on whether Ulster-Scots is to be regarded as a regional/minority language entitled to whatever benefits derive from Part II. The other major issue at the time of writing the document was, according to Canavan, the CR process itself. He says, ‘The Irish language is given particular importance by the Irish government, the SDLP and above all, SF. Though it is unlikely to make or break the process, concessions on Irish could help make a settlement package more attractive to Nationalists’ (1998, p. 6, para 14). A decision to ratify, and its announcement, ... could be presented at an early stage as a confidence building measure for Nationalists; it could be retained as a possibly relatively minor concession at a later point in negotiations; or Part III status for Irish could be held out as a substantive development of Government policy on Irish


and a concession of real weight. The views of NIO colleagues on this point would be particularly welcome. (Canavan 1998, p. 7 para 14) On the choice of languages that would be specified at the time of ratification, Canavan (1998, p. 7, para 15) points out that this is not an issue of concern to the north of Ireland alone. Welsh will clearly be specified. Mr Wilson19 ... is keen to specify Gaelic also at the time of ratification. This could present serious problems for us. If Irish was the only Celtic indigenous minority language not to be specified, Nationalists and Irish language supporters would be critical ... . Our preference should be therefore for Irish and Scottish (sic) to be unspecified, at least at the time of ratification. The Scottish Office, at official level, is aware of the Northern Ireland concerns and it may be necessary to broker a bilateral deal with Scottish Ministers on how to play the issue of ratification. In conclusion, he (1998, p. 7, para 15) notes, One possibility might be a commitment to keep the matter of Irish and Gaelic under review, perhaps with the objective of ratification at some point in the future. It would seem to make good tactical sense to keep along similar lines to Scotland in the approach to Irish, as well as to Ulster-Scots.

The finalised Good Friday Agreement: Resolution? The GFA was signed on 10 April 1998. It is an international treaty entered into by all parties except the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)20 in the North and then ratified by the British and Irish governments. A substantial document, with detailed sections outlining agreement on a number of key areas, the GFA makes significant references to linguistic diversity, and, in particular, to the Irish language, under its section, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity: Economic, Social and Cultural Issues. The first point in this section relates to a commitment by the British government, pending devolution, to pursue ‘broad policies for sustained economic growth and stability in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion, including in particular, community development and the advancement of women in public life’ (GFA 1998). Point two commits the British government to move quickly on the establishment of a new regional strategy geared towards tackling the particular problems of ‘a divided society’, a new economic development strategy and measures on employment equality as set out in the White Paper ‘Partnership for Equality’. Point three states, ‘All participants recognise the importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots


and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which are part of the cultural wealth of the island of Ireland. Point four outlines a number of specific commitments to the Irish language. It says, In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK signing the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the British government will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where appropriate and where people so desire it:

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take resolute action to promote the language facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the language; make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their views to public authorities and investigating complaints; place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education; explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in cooperation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more widespread availability of Teilifís na Gaeilge in Northern Ireland; seek more efficient ways to encourage and provide financial support for Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland; and encourage the parties to secure agreement that this commitment will be sustained by the new Assembly in a way which takes account of the desires and sensitivities of the community.

The detailed and specific references to the Irish language are in contrast to the more general references to linguistic diversity that precede them. The first two bullet points above are taken directly from Part II of the ECRML, (although, as detailed in Chapter 4, the first point in the GFA is a somewhat abridged version) whilst others more clearly relate to specific issues in provision. Clearly, now British LPP in respect of Irish had been subsumed into the CR process itself, and the future context of the Irish language within the Northern state would be influenced by the success or failure of the power-sharing arrangements conceived under the GFA. It is significant, however, that whilst other parts of the GFA outline actions to be taken by the Irish government,21 none of these creates explicit agreed duties in respect of LPP for Irish, North or South


The basis of the CR accord of 1998 is the establishment of a consociational government, a model often attributed to Arend Lijphart. Both the Northern Irish arrangements and the interworkings of the Canadian federation are often referred to as models of consociationalism. Political stability, survival of power-sharing government between deeply divided segments of society and the absence of political violence are its basic goals. However, consociationalism has been criticised since it tends to fossilise division within new power-sharing structures. In addition, whilst it facilitates the coming together of elites within an agreed and regulated context, it does not address division elsewhere in society, mitigating against deep-rooted change and potentially contributing to the marginalisation of some minorities, such as linguistic groups, since only members of elites have direct systemic inter-elite access. In effect, in spite of endorsement of culturally sensitive policies and laws within Lijphart’s model, the possibility of minorities bringing this about depends entirely on their ability to influence the elites. Ó Leary (2001, p. 58), whilst critical of the model chosen for the North’s new Assembly, has referred to the GFA’s ‘double protection model’ which he says is ‘...designed to withstand major demographic and electoral change’ and to develop equivalent legal protections of collective and individual rights in both the North and South of Ireland. He says, ‘In effect, the Agreement promised protection to Northern Irish nationalists now on the same terms that they would be given to Ulster unionists should they ever become a minority in a unified Ireland.’ In the Agreement (GFA 1998), and the devolved structures established under it, the two governments affirm, ... the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction (in the North) shall be exercised with rigourous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities. However, Lijphart’s proposition depends upon the ability of internal CR arrangements to equalise the power of the elites, free from external interference in favour of one pillar or another. In addition, his assertion that a key characteristic of consociationalism, the ‘mutual veto’ will enhance the progression of government business (since each side will seek to avoid deadlock) depends entirely on the will of the elite pillars to actually make the arrangement ‘work’. Elites whose goal is linked to the continuation of hegemony, albeit perhaps in a more flexible guise, are unlikely to adhere to


such rules. As Noel (2001, p. 222) points out, power-sharing is about more than constitutions and written contracts. He says, What it is about is developing a politics of accommodation, and that requires a willingness on the part of politicians from the different communities to meet as equals, to bargain in good faith, to think in the short term as well as the long term, and to settle for outcomes that they regard as less than ideal but that on balance are of greater benefit to the people they represent than any likely alternative. Ruane (1999, p. 157) comments, ‘... it is a relatively easy matter to give financial support to the Irish language, to grant the right to fly the Irish flag, or even to re-route Orange marches. It will be much more difficult to rid the culture of the stock of epithets and assumptions which devalue nationalists and Irish culture.’ In the coming chapters I shall examine the extent to which the commitments and institutions established under the GFA have been capable of bringing about and maintaining positive change to British and RoI LPP as it impacts on Irish in the North.

4 The Ratification and Application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages

In December 1999, the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly was established at Stormont Buildings in East Belfast under the CR provisions of the GFA. The ECRML was ratified by the British government in June 2001 (Charter, Strasbourg, 5.XI.1992). The contemporary CR context was particularly troubled. In July 2001 the British government moved unilaterally to suspend the operations of the Assembly in the face of unionist opposition to the agreed power-sharing arrangements. The Irish government acquiesced. The Assembly was further temporarily suspended in August and again in September 2001. Finally, in October 2002, it was suspended once again. This time the suspension was to last for five years. During this period, Direct Rule by British Ministers elected at Westminster was administered. As I shall discuss in the next chapter, it was not until May 2007 that devolution was re-established under the provisions of the St Andrews’ Agreement (SAA). In this chapter, I shall briefly comment on the nature of language protections within human rights legislation before detailing the background and structure of the ECRML. I shall then examine key parts of the UK ratification instrument. Following this, in three further sections, there will be a discussion on the implementation of the ECRML in respect of Irish in the three monitoring cycles to date, drawing on UK periodical reports, on the findings of the Council of Europe (CoE) Committee of Experts (COMEX) and on monitoring reports from the Irish language NGO, POBAL. In relation to the third monitoring cycle (2005–8), I shall discuss the implications of the late submission by the UK government of an incomplete periodical report. Having outlined its contents, I shall draw on the findings of the key watchdog NGO, POBAL in respect of implementation in this period. At the time of writing, the response of the COMEX to the 2005–8 monitoring cycle is not available. At the end of the chapter I shall make some general comments about the ability of the ECRML to identify and help progress

77

78


fundamental issues of LPP in a CR situation. I shall also analyse some issues which impact on the interface between NGOs and the monitoring process. I am grateful to the Council of Europe for permission to reproduce some sections of this chapter, which can also be found in the Council of Europe’s publication, The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Legal Challenges and Opportunities (2007), Eds. Dunbar, R. & Parry, G. Council of Europe (Muller 2007).

The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages The aims and application of the Charter The ECRML, drafted within the Council of Europe, was adopted by the Council on 5 November 1992 and entered into force on 1 March 1998. It is the first international instrument directed solely at linguistic minorities and focuses solely on those autochtonous languages of long standing in European states. Cardinal (2003) has argued that since language legislation is intended to stem the damage already done to minoritised languages, it is in itself a sign of historic and existing disadvantage. The ECRML preamble echoes this view, stating that languages must be promoted in a range of areas of life because, ‘Only in this way can such languages be compensated, where necessary, for unfavourable conditions in the past and preserved and developed as a living facet of Europe’s cultural identity’ (Charter Part I). The connection between the ECRML and CR processes is specifically outlined in the preamble, While the Charter is not concerned with the problem of nationalities who aspire after independence or alterations to frontiers, it may be expected to help, in a measured and realistic fashion, to assuage the problem of minorities whose language is their distinguishing feature, by enabling them to feel at ease in the state in which history has placed them. Far from reinforcing disintegrating tendencies, the enhancement of the possibility to use regional or minority languages in the various spheres of life can only encourage the groups who speak them to put behind them the resentments of the past which prevented them from accepting their place in the country in which they live and in Europe as a whole. (ECRML, Explanatory Report, pt. 13) Recognising that there may be more than one indigenous threatened language in a specific territory, the ECRML proposes the establishment of ‘a proper place’ for each RML. How this ‘proper place’ may be determined in reality may prove more problematic, since in CR, the treatment of different languages may be subject to manipulation by hegemonic forces. Within the ECRML, the defining of appropriate treatment for each language depends

Ratification and Application of the ECRML

79

primarily upon abstract terminology relating to ‘sufficient numbers’ and ‘demand’. Protection under Parts II and III Clearly the ECRML is intended to allow initial flexibility by a number of different states, selecting provision for given languages in a range of circumstances. Parts II and III of the Charter, in particular, afford very different protections, with Part II establishing ‘a common core of principles’ that apply to all RMLs in ratifying states, whilst Part III contains specific provisions, many comprising options of different degrees of stringency. States must apply one of these, ‘according to the situation of each language.’ The ECRML preamble adds, ‘ The role of the states will be, not to choose arbitrarily between these alternatives, but to seek for each regional or minority language the wording which best fits the characteristics and state of development of that language.’ Under Part III, states are required to commit themselves to at least 35 specific measures out of a list of some 100 clauses, broken down into different articles. Whilst the ECRML preamble illustrates the potential for clear and unequivocal interpretation, it does not ensure that states do indeed tailor their commitments in any objective fashion to meet the needs of each language community concerned. States have great flexibility in how and why they select given clauses within Part III, with little or no apparent mechanism available for the users of given languages to challenge this selection except through representation to the same state. Nor is the selection of clauses the only source of difficulty. As Dunbar (2000, p. 69) states, the ECRML ‘... articulates no coherent theory of language rights nor does it clearly evidence any coherent linguistic or sociological theory of minority language maintenance and development.’ Perhaps ominously for the Irish language, he concludes, ‘While some States have arguably used the Charter creatively and in a principled way in the development of minority language policy and practice, there is nothing in the Charter which guarantees such an outcome.’ Part IV of the Charter: Monitoring and enforcing Where the ECRML is not incorporated into domestic law it remains unenforceable through the courts. Therefore, the ECRML relies entirely upon the desire of governments to be seen to be fulfilling the obligations they have themselves selected. Each ratifying state commits to provide a report to a CoE COMEX at the end of the first year following ratification, and at three yearly intervals thereafter. The COMEX is selected through appointment of individuals with appropriate expertise, chosen by the government of countries that are signatories of the ECRML. As Bucci (1998) reports, the composition of the COMEX has been the subject of some controversy, with the original proposal for ‘independent’ experts, that is, chosen by the

80


CoE Committee of Ministers, being rejected by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) in 1987. He states that this triggered a change of direction, with controls geared towards strong protections for languages being put aside in favour of the establishment of a committee of experts chosen by ratifying states. These individuals were to be deemed people of the highest integrity, in that they would not take instructions from their respective governments. Acknowledging that the COMEX is still evolving, Emyr Lewis (2004, Belfast) its UK representative, points out that members are not full-time and that, ‘The volume of work increases every time a new state ratifies the Charter.’ The ratification instrument of the ECRML In his analysis of the ECRML, Grin (2003, p. 41) argues that its ratification by States implies an obligation not simply to act, but to act effectively. Pointing to Article 7 of the ECRML as an example, he notes that in the phrases ‘the need for resolute action to promote regional or minority languages in order to safeguard them’ and ‘the facilitation and / or encouragement of the use of regional or minority languages’ the ECRML, ‘... goes beyond positive rights, and calls for actual results’ (Grin 2003, p. 85, Grin’s emphasis). It is of interest to note that the examples cited by Grin are among those written into the text of the GFA in relation to the Irish language. However, in the GFA, the words that Grin emphasises, ‘in order to safeguard them’, have been omitted. Whilst this has no impact upon the ratification of the ECRML itself, it could be argued that it displays a particular mindset at the level of the British government. In respect of the issue of selection of appropriate clauses by ratifying states, Grin (2003, p. 11) has noted that the ECRML ‘is an instrument of great originality and cunning design, yet it raises problems of choice, which have to be solved.’ The selection of clauses for Irish in the North provide an interesting illustration of this observation. McAlister1 (2003) reports that the clauses were selected by a working group of departmental officials, representatives of the NIO and the NI Courts Service with advice from special counselor, Dónall Ó Riagáin. McAlister (2003, p. 47) says that the common themes to emerge across departments included, ‘the low level of activity, the desire of officials for detailed advice on meeting Charter commitments, concern at resource implications if there were a significant rise in demand for Irish language services, the need for staff training and for translation and interpreting services.’ If there was, however, a more rigorous system of assessment and evaluation in place, McAlister gives no indication of it. She (2003, p. 48) asserts, ‘The fact of the matter was of course that the Charter gives no leeway. Only those provisions where activity is underway at the time of coming into force of the Charter can be applied.’ This represents a problematic and singularly unambitious reading of an international instrument that aims to promote, protect and safeguard


81

languages. Where deep-rooted conflict has resulted in only the lowest level of provision for an RML, establishing this low level as a benchmark fossilises conflict LPP. In this case, the ECRML may be perceived, at least initially, as a hindrance rather than a help. Dunbar (2000, p. 69) makes the point that it is the structure of Part III of the ECRML itself that has allowed a minimalist UK ratification, ‘rather than encouraging the UK to think in a coherent and principled way about how the Charter might be used to enhance (the) linguistic security and vitality.’ He suggests (2000, p. 69) that the UK seems to be ‘driven in significant measure by political expediency’ and he contends that at least in the case of Britain the ECRML can be seen as ‘a political document rather than a minority rights document.’

The UK Part III languages and copperfastening disparity In 2001, the British government ratified the ECRML for the whole of the UK. Under the general protections of Part II, recognition was given to Welsh in Wales and to Gaelic and Scots in Scotland. In the North of Ireland, it was given to the Irish language and Ulster Scots.2 Under Part III, the British government selected 52 paragraphs for Welsh in Wales,3 39 for Gaelic in Scotland4 and 36 paragraphs for Irish in the North. Of these, 305 paragraphs relate to matters that are the responsibility of the devolved administration in the North, and six relate to reserved and excepted matters.6 It is significant that apart from the low number of provisions selected for Irish, the UK government has in a number of cases adopted the ‘weakest’ of the options available. In the next section, I shall compare the UK ratification of Part III Articles 8 (Education), 9 (Judicial Authorities), 10 (Administrative Authorities) and 11 (The Media) for Welsh in Wales, for Gaelic in Scotland and for Irish in the North. Article 8 Education An examination of the clauses for education ratified for Irish in comparison with those ratified for Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh in Wales shows that there is a consistent pattern of selection of weaker clauses for the Irish language in Article 8. It is a measure of the minimalism of the ratification throughout the other articles of the Charter, that Article 8 is nonetheless the most significant in terms of the ratification for Irish. Table 4.1 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: preschool Sub-para 1a Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

82 Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada Table 4.2 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: primary school Sub-para 1b Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Table 4.3 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: secondary school Sub-para 1c Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Table 4.4 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: vocational and technical education Sub-para 1d Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Table 4.5 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Education Article 8: university and higher education Sub-para 1e Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Table 4.6 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Other sub-paragraphs in Article 8 Welsh Gaelic Irish

1f(ii) 1f(iii)

1g 1g

1h 1h

1i 1i

2 2


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Table 4.7 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Administration of Justice: Article 9 Sub-para 1a Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Sub-para 1b Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Sub-para 1c Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

1d

2b

Other Sub-para Welsh Gaelic Irish

3

Article 9 Administration of Justice As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, the selection of paragraphs in Article 9 has been the subject of some commentary by the COMEX. Although the ratification for Gaelic in Scotland is also weak, it is significant that Sub-paragraph 1b (iii) allows for the limited use of Gaelic in the administration of justice in Scotland. The UK government has selected only one paragraph for Irish, relating to the translation of legal texts (see Table 4.7). The minimalism of this choice is compounded by the failure to date to repeal the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland), which prohibits the use of languages other than English in the North’s courts. The regular facilitation in the courts of ethnic minority languages through interpretation means that the retention of the Act on statute impacts disproportionately on the Irish language. This apparent contravention of the ECRML is noted in the 1998 leaked advice (Canavan 1998, p. 5, para 11) from a senior civil servant to the British government to which I have referred in Chapter 3. I shall further discuss the 1737 Act in a later section, as well referring to it in Chapter 6. Article 10 Administrative Authorities The most notable omission in this Article is the failure to place an obligation upon government departments and public bodies to respond to correspondence received in Irish in the same language, an option ratified for both Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland (see Table 4.8).

84 Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada Table 4.8 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Administrative Authorities: Article 10 Sub-para 1a Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

Ii

iii

iv

Sub-para 1b Welsh Gaelic Irish

i 1b

Ii

iii

iv

Sub-para 1c Welsh Gaelic Irish

i 1c 1c 1c

Ii

iii

iv

Other paragraphs and sub-paragraphs in Article 10 Welsh Gaelic Irish

2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 3a, 4a, 4b, 5 2a, 2b, 2d, 2e, 2f, 2g, 5 2b, 2e, 2f, 2g, 3c, 4a, 5

Article 11 The Media Broadcasting in Welsh in Wales and in Gaelic in Scotland are the subject of domestic legislative protections in addition to the ECRML. The weak ratification for Irish in relation to broadcasting (see Tables 4.9–4.15) is compounded by the lack of any such domestic legislative protections for Irish. It is possible to interpret the UK ratification instrument as providing greatest levels of protection under the ECRML to those RMLs in the ‘strongest’ position. However, as I have pointed out, census figures show more people with knowledge of Irish in the North than with knowledge of Gaelic in Scotland, although because of historical factors, a greater number of the latter are native speakers. In both Wales and Scotland, however, a certain proportion of those who appear in statistics are likely to be adult or child learners over the age of 3, just as in the North. These proportions appear likely to increase in future. Indeed, successful LPP relies upon it. However, current UK-wide LPP appears to be based upon fewer and ‘weaker’ provision for non-native speakers, at least in the case of Irish in the North. The extension of this approach to Welsh and Gaelic as its population of non-native speakers increases could have serious repercussions for these languages. In turn, the decision not to extend it might imply that a different set of value criteria are in use for Irish speakers in the North.


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Table 4.9 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 Sub-para 1a Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Table 4.10 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 Sub-para 1b Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Table 4.11 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 Sub-para 1c Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Table 4.12 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 Sub-para 1d Welsh Gaelic Irish

1d 1d

Table 4.13 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 Sub-para 1e Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

Table 4.14 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 Sub-para 1f Welsh Gaelic Irish

i

ii

iii

iv

86


Table 4.15 ECRML UK Ratification in respect of Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Media: Article 11 Sub-para 1g Welsh Gaelic Irish

1g

Sub-para 2 Welsh Gaelic Irish

Sub-para 3 Welsh Gaelic Irish

Ulster Scots in the ECRML ratification I shall examine in detail the application of the ECRML in respect of Irish in the coming sections of this chapter. Before doing so, it is necessary to discuss why the announcement by the British government that it had ratified the ECRML up to Part II for Ulster Scots created some controversy. Preratification, Ulster Scots, in as much as it was deemed to exist at all, was felt to be a dialect, rather than a language and suffered from a poor public image. Walker (2003, p. 37) attributes the adverse attention given to the UK ratification to innate anti-unionist/Protestant prejudice, although other commentators read the roots of the contemporary power balance rather differently. O’Gallagher (2005, p. 238) notes frequent examples of anti-Irish sentiment in some key examples of early twentieth century Scots literature. He (2005, p. 239) states that, ‘For many, fears about the future of the Scots language were part of a wider fear for the future of the Scots race, Irish immigration was seen as a threat to both and as such lent momentum to the Scots-language revival and influenced the future directions that movement would later assume.’ It is implicit in O’Gallagher that the elements of sectarianism related to the historical relationship with Ireland and the localised racial tensions deriving from contemporary waves of immigration from Ireland (and particularly from the recently partitioned North) fed upon each other. Leonard (1990, p. 50) quotes Grant’s introduction to the Scottish National Dictionary (Grant 1931, xxvii), which blames the ‘influx of Irish and foreign immigrants’ into Glasgow for the fact that ‘the dialect has become hopelessly corrupt.’ Herbison (2005, p. 82) also attributes upsurges in interest in Scots / Ulster Scots as intimately related to the loss of political power of unionism / Protestantism in both Scotland during the Unions of 1707 and 1800 and the North of Ireland due to ‘the loss of Stormont in 1972.’ He asserts (2005, p. 82) that for Protestants, ‘While the sense of Britishness still functions as a political identity, it is no longer sufficiently cohesive or distinctive to sustain allegiance as a cultural identity.’ The GFA does not specifically refer to Ulster Scots as a language.7 In the legislation enacted to establish An Foras Teanga,8 the all-Ireland Language Board that comprises two parts, Foras na Gaeilge and the Ulster Scots Agency, the role of the Ulster-Scots Agency is defined as ‘promotion of


87

greater awareness and use of Ullans and of Ulster-Scots cultural issues, both within Northern Ireland and throughout the island.’ Ulster Scots cultural issues are defined as those which relate to the cultural traditions of the section of the population of the North and the border counties who are of Scottish ancestry. The 1999 North/South Co-operation (Implementation Bodies) (Northern Ireland) Order states that ‘Ullans is to be understood as the variety of the Scots language traditionally found in parts of Northern Ireland and Donegal.’ The 2000 ratification of the ECRML says that the UK government ‘... recognises that Scots and Ulster Scots meet the Charter’s definition of a regional or minority language.’ Falconer (2005, p. 84) notes that the word ‘language’ is in the singular, and asserts, ‘The legislative framework for the promotion of Ulster Scots is vague and apparently contradictory ... . The charter declaration seems to overturn the implementation body’s definition of Ulster Scots by treating it as an independent language. If “Ullans” is a “variety of the Scots language” ... why should it be necessary to mention it separately?’ This, he says (2005, p. 84), may be evidence of ‘bureaucratic reasons’ on the part of the British government, or as a result of recognition for Scots, or ‘... it could be interpreted as indicating a general weakening of the criteria for languageness.’ In Falconer’s view, Scots is a language and Ulster Scots is a dialect of it. Like Herbison (2005), Falconer sees CR-related political and party-political motivation as the rationale for the way in which Ulster Scots is currently promoted. He (2005, p. 84) says, ‘the band of those who believe Ulster Scots a separate and independent language is overwhelmingly limited to NI and to the Protestant and Unionist communities,’ adding in a footnote (2005, 83/35) that ‘[s]ome observers might even claim that promoters of Ulster Scots as an independent language are not merely Unionist but exhibit a bias – declared or undeclared – towards the “no” camp in their attitude to the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.9 Whatever the reality of this, the promotion of Ulster Scots within British LPP and CR appears consistently to pivot on its use to counterbalance the Irish language. The Observer newspaper, reporting a leaked Northern Ireland Office (NIO) memo, records that ‘[i]n every concession to republicans, such as more money for the Irish language, the comments section advises that there be a reciprocal amount of largesse for unionist causes.’10 Shortly after ratification of the ECRML, D. Ó Riagáin (2001, p. 54) asserts, ‘One of the problems bedeviling reform in Northern Ireland is that any change in policy can be interpreted by one community as being a concession to the other.’ However, this implies that both communities in the North have an equal ability to impact on the nature of such ‘reform’ whereas, as I shall argue in a later section, the de facto extension to Ulster Scots of some Part III provisions of the ECRML appears to suggest an imbalance in objective criteria concerning LPP. In the coming sections of this chapter, I shall examine the findings of COMEX and the UK government as well as from the NGO POBAL during the


first two ECRML monitoring cycles, 2001–2 and 2002–5. Following this, I shall discuss the third monitoring cycle, still underway at the time of writing.

The first monitoring cycle of the European Charter 2001–2 In July 2002, the British government submitted its first report on the implementation of the ECRML. The subsequent COMEX report comments on the, ‘... differences in approach and commitment’ to RMLs in different parts of the UK; calls for improved co-ordination (COMEX 2004, p. 57, para B) and flags up the failure to enact the ECRML into domestic legislation. In addition, it makes detailed comments on a variety of areas including the paucity of resources and materials for Irish Medium schools (COMEX 2004, pp. 46–7, paras 304, 305, 312; 2004, p. 57, para G). It also ‘encourages’ the authorities to investigate the need for higher education through Irish (COMEX 2004, p. 48, para 318). In relation to arts and culture, the Experts call for ‘concrete policies’ instead of ‘ad hoc provision’ (COMEX 2004, p. 55, paras 369, 370) and in the case of the newspaper, Lá, they place emphasis on the need for adequate funding to be made available to ensure the paper’s continuance (COMEX 2004, p. 53, para 361). Further comments include the use of Irish in the courts (COMEX 2004, p. 58, para 1); concerns about the adequacy of the voicemail facility for verbal requests from Irish speakers (COMEX 2004, p. 50, para 335) and strategic policy coordination at all levels. The Committee of Ministers recommend that the British government should improve and increase Irish language television broadcasting immediately, and encourage private radio stations to broadcast in Irish (RecChL (2004)1). The tone of the COMEX report in general is positive in spite of their finding that in the case of 11 of the clauses ratified for Irish, almost a third, the British government has either failed to fulfil their commitment or only partly fulfilled it, or else have given insufficient information. In the case of Article 10, the use of Irish in government departments, councils and public bodies, only half of the clauses ratified have been fulfilled. Emyr Lewis describes implementation of this Article as ‘patchy and inconsistent, depending on which administration, what services and where.’ (Lewis 2004, Belfast). There are areas of the report where the finding of compliance might be deemed surprising. In seven clear examples, (COMEX 2004, paras 307, 312, 319, 325, 330, 369, 377) the Experts make findings of fulfillment whilst simultaneously acknowledging evidence or community concerns to the contrary. The Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure Guidance on the Charter More than 3 years after ratification, and 2 months before public release of the first COMEX report, the North’s Interdepartmental Charter Implementation


89

Group (ICIG) issued a circular, Guidance on Meeting UK Government Commitments in Respect of Irish and Ulster Scots. The Guidance, in spite of its title, provides detailed direction only on Article 10 of Part III of the ECRML, thus adding to potential confusion on the actual range of government obligations. There is a lack of clarity in the document around the different protections provided under Part II, which applies to both Irish and Ulster Scots and the Part III protections that apply to Irish alone. The Guidance advises that the Article 10 provisions be applied to Ulster Scots. The particular interpretation of LPP in the North prompted DCAL special advisor Dónall Ó Riagáin (2004, Belfast) to comment ‘the quid pro quo concept, although understandable politically, is bad for language planning.’ He goes on to express the hope that in future, the ECRML would be applied more objectively. I shall return to this issue in the later sections and again in Chapter 6. The overall implementation and monitoring of the ECRML in the first cycle supports Grin’s (2003, p. 11) assertion that there is a need for ‘a compass to help decision-makers navigate these issues and make coherent choices in the context of the Charter’ for where such an instrument is left entirely open to interpretation by government, it may prove to be to the detriment of the ECRML’s own aims.

The second ECRML monitoring cycle 2002–5 Rather than detecting progression in the implementation of the ECRML since its ratification, the 2007 COMEX report identifies many of the weaknesses previously noted. These include an ongoing lack of co-ordination and strategic direction in the UK implementation in respect of Irish (COMEX 2007, p. 62, point A). In its December 2005 submission, POBAL notes that, in contrast with legislative developments in Wales and the enactment in Scotland of the Gaelic Language Act 2005, there had been no progress in the intervening period in respect of domestic legislation for Irish in the North. The organisation calls on the COMEX to support an Irish language Act. In respect of education, the 2007 COMEX report makes several unequivocal statements. Thus, in relation to refusal to fund five Irish language preschools, the COMEX notes that this cannot be justified by overprovision in EME (COMEX 2007, p. 48, para 420). They comment also on the need for greater flexibility in enrolment criteria (COMEX 2007, p. 48, para 422), on the failure to recognise five new primary schools (COMEX 2007, p. 48, para 425), on concerns relating to support for newly qualified teachers, special needs provision, curriculum support and funding cuts (COMEX 2007, p. 49, para 428), the eligibility criteria for secondary schools and the unsuitability of Irish language units attached to EM schools (COMEX 2007, p. 49, para 430), resources, shortages of qualified teachers for certain subjects, travelling distances and failure to cover pupil transport costs (COMEX 2007, p. 49, para 433). However, as in the first report, the COMEX


tends to find each undertaking fulfilled. This appears to be particularly contradictory in the light of the report’s findings (2007, p. 62, para G) highlighting concerns, ‘with regard to teaching materials, teacher training and mentoring’ and the warning that, ‘the lack of continuity from primary to secondary education is of considerable concern for all Part III languages.’ On Higher and Further Education (HFE), the COMEX raises significant concerns regarding funding, communication, the level of information available to the COMEX itself, post-primary regulations which place an additional burden on Irish Medium schools, lack of resources etc (COMEX 2007, p.50, paras 436, 437, 438, 439, 440 respectively). The COMEX asks for further information on the number of pupils enrolling in Irish Medium courses, but in common with the previous section, find the undertaking fulfilled. On higher education, the Experts express ‘serious concern’ at the rejection by the DENI of requests increase teacher training numbers (COMEX 200, p. 51, para 447). In the light of this, it finds this undertaking ‘partly fulfilled’. In response to comments by COMEX in its first report, the UK gave a commitment to consider the scope of Article 9 with a view to ratifying further clauses from it. (COMEX 2004, Appendix II, Comments by UK Govt). However, with no further action taken in the interim, the 2007 COMEX report notes under the examination of the Part II obligations, that there is a need to remove the ‘contradiction between the 1737 Language Act and the Good Friday Agreement regarding the use of Irish in the courts.’ This paragraph concludes with the Experts encouraging the removal of obstacles to the use of Irish in the administration of justice (COMEX 2007, p. 17, para 148). Concerning administrative authorities, COMEX notes continuing complaints about the use of a voicemail facility to field telephone calls in Irish, and the need for a better service regarding written applications (COMEX 2007, p. 52, paras 451,452, 468). It comments, ‘Although certain administrative authorities accept submissions in Irish, the service is in need of improvement’ (COMEX 2007, p. 63, point H). This leads them to conclude that the undertaking is only partly fulfilled. Monitoring by POBAL (2002; 2005) has shown that 19 out of 26 local councils accept applications in Irish whilst others have refused or simply do not publicise the availability of any such service. The COMEX reports, ‘The authorities claimed that it was at each local authority’s discretion to provide an Irish language service. The Committee of Experts gained the impression that there is a need for more direction from the authorities on this matter’ (COMEX 2007, p. 52, para 460). The Experts then note poor advertising of Irish language version of documents (COMEX 2007, p. 52, para 455), but consider this undertaking fulfilled. In relation to the encouragement of the use of Irish in local assemblies, COMEX asks for evidence and subsequently form no conclusion in respect of this undertaking (COMEX 2007: 53, para 463). POBAL’s report notes the


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reluctance of several local councils to facilitate the erection of Irish language street names and suggests that the 1995 Local Government Order be replaced with stronger legislation. In its second report, the Committee of Experts notes that the authorities should comment on this issue in their next periodical report (COMEX 2007, p. 53, para 465). As I shall describe in Chapter 5, the broadcasting regulator Ofcom (2005, p. 100) highlights both the need for further provision for Irish language programming and the historic differential in expenditure on Irish in comparison with Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland. In 2005–6, the BBC broadcast 524 hours of Welsh language programming for S4C in contrast with 21 hours of Irish language programming11 The COMEX finding, therefore, that ‘the shortcomings in ... Irish broadcasting ... observed in the last report are in the process of being overcome’ is surprising (COMEX 2007, p. 63 para I). COMEX notes public advertising revenue (approx £17.2 million in 2004) is not available to the Irish language print media (COMEX 2007, p. 56, para 489). The CoM recommend increased support for the print media in Irish and Scottish Gaelic (RecChL (2007)2, para 4). Later in this chapter, I shall examine the subsequent closure of Lá12 in 2009 in the light of this recommendation. The failure to establish an adequate mechanism to roll out improved provision leads to the recommendation by the Committee of Ministers that a comprehensive Irish language policy should be developed, including progression in IME (RecChL (2007)2, para 2). However, the finding of the Committee of Experts, in respect of the overall UK approach, that ‘significant measures in the form of new legislation, funding, policies, guidelines and planned activities have been undertaken since the last monitoring round’ (COMEX 2007, p. 62, point B) can only highlight the absence of any clear statement by them in respect of Irish language legislation. The reference welcoming ‘consultation’ and ‘ongoing dialogue’ (COMEX 2007, p. 62, point B) is unfortunate given the widespread perception that the UK government manipulated consultation on proposed legislation for political ends. I shall examine this further in Chapter 6. During the second monitoring cycle, the lack of an agreed official definition of what constitutes Ulster Scots, continued to lead to policy confusion. In 2007, the NI Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) published draft changes to questions for the 2011 Census, including the proposal that respondents be asked if they could read, write, speak or understand Ulster Scots.13 In the same period, the BBC Audience Council asserts that peak viewing Irish language programming displaces the English language, but that Ulster Scots can be mainstreamed. Their submission to the BBC Trust (May 2007, p. 8, point E) states, ‘Ulster-Scots is largely accessible to mainstream audiences, except at the highly differentiated end of the linguistic spectrum.’ If one accepts the BBC’s assertion, there are considerable challenges facing the census agency in the interpretation of the data on Ulster Scots that they propose to collect in 2011.

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The tendency to link Irish and Ulster Scots in an inappropriate and disadvantageous way for the Irish language is noted in 2007 by the COMEX (2007, p. 7, para 32) In Northern Ireland, representatives of Irish speakers reported practical problems of language promotion due to calls for parity of treatment with Ulster Scots. The Committee of Experts were informed that in a number of instances, the request for action appropriate to the Irish language therefore led to the result that no measures were taken, since it was not practically possible to apply identical measures to Ulster Scots. The Committee of Experts wishes to underline that each regional or minority language should be protected and promoted according to its own situation.

The third monitoring cycle 2005–8 The UK government was expected to provide its third periodical report on 1 July 2008. However, it was not until 26 May 2009 that it submitted a document to the CoE, some eleven months delay. Extraordinarily, the UK government states that the 364-page report provides no information about the implementation of the ECRML relating to 30 paragraphs and sub-paragraphs relating to devolved matters in the North, suggesting that this central information will be provided in a ‘supplementary report to follow’ from the NI Executive. In the interim, the UK government confines its reporting to 6 paragraphs and sub-paragraphs relating to reserved matters under its direct control. Correspondence14 to the NGO POBAL acknowledges that the missing information has not been included, ‘de barr nár aontaíodh go fóill é’ / ‘as it has not yet been agreed.’ Consociational arrangements pertaining to Lijphart’s ‘mutual veto’ model to which I have referred in Chapter 3, requires agreement on all Executive matters between the two dominant Assembly parties as represented through the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). SF told Irish language NGO POBAL15 that in the party’s view, the CAL draft report on ECRML implementation was incomplete, misrepresented the relative development of Irish and Ulster Scots and gave insufficient information on the ongoing failure to enact the Irish language Act, and the funding position of the Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge / Irish language Broadcast Fund (CCG / ILBF). On 15 May 2009, in response to a SF question in the Assembly, CAL Minister Gregory Campbell16 acknowledges that his department’s report did not include, ‘Issues that were not taken forward ...’ in the period concerned. This implies that where a specific governmental commitment is made but not fulfilled, the failure has no relevance to monitoring duties. DCAL subsequently rejected SF amendments put forward. SF consequently refused to sign off on the report. The NGO POBAL contends that the


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log jam is indicative of the depth of the crisis in the protection of the Irish language since the UK failure to enact the Irish language Act and the re-establishment of devolution.17 To date, there is no indication that agreement will be reached within OFMDFM on the contents of the DCAL report.

The third UK periodical report on the ECRML POBAL states that the third monitoring cycle has been a period of unprecedented attacks on the Irish language. According to the NGO, ‘devolved government has proven to be detrimental to the Irish language’ since the failure to fulfil the British commitment to enact the Irish language Act has signalled the vulnerability of the language to hostile political forces. POBAL states that a two-tier system is in place within devolved government with approaches to the Irish language depending on the party-political stance of the Minister. The draft report18 says that this ‘adds to the ghettoisation and politicisation of the Irish language and of the ECRML.’ The report further notes that DCAL, which has core responsibility for RMLs and the ECRML, is under the control of a Minister whose party is hostile to the Irish language (POBAL 2009). However, the changed context for Irish in the North is not referred to in the third UK report. Whilst acknowledging the St Andrews’ Agreement commitment to enact the Irish Language Act (UK 2009, p. 16), the UK report fails to account for the failure to date to introduce such legislation at Westminster or at the devolved Assembly. Nor does it refer to any strategy to ensure that the obligation is fulfilled in future. Required to list policies or provisions (UK 2009, p. 22) considered ‘essential’ to the implementation of the ECRML, the UK lists none whatsoever for the Irish language. Asked for recent relevant case law, it cites none, thereby omitting the victory at appeal in the case of Máire Nic an Bhaird,19 and the granting in April 2008 of a Judicial Review of the continuing operation of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland).20 In response to all other questions in the preliminary report, the UK says ‘supplementary report to follow’. The UK government (UK 2009, p. 96) states that, it ‘does not believe that there are any unjustified distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences relating to the use of Irish.’ However, under Article 7, relating to policies, legislation and practice, POBAL’s monitoring report highlights previous criticism by the COMEX concerning the continuing operation of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) and calls for its repeal. It further notes the failure of the UK to enact the ECRML into domestic law and cites the stern reiteration of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (UNESC 2009 E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, para 13) that, ‘irrespective of the system through which international law is incorporated in the domestic legal order (monism or dualism), following ratification of an international


instrument, the State party is under a legal obligation to comply with such an instrument and to give it full effect in its domestic legal order.’ POBAL pinpoints legislative disparities between Part III languages acknowledged by the UK in previous monitoring rounds. It calls for the enactment of the Irish Language Act as specified in the St Andrews’ Agreement, citing a further recommendation of the UNESC (2009, para 37) that either, ‘the State party or the devolved administration in Northern Ireland, adopt an Irish Language Act.’ POBAL points to the ongoing exclusion of provision for Irish language broadcasting from UK legislation, to the uncertain position of TG4 following digital switchover (the only broadcasting issue referred to in this section of the UK report (UK 2009, p. 53) and to the threat to continued funding for the CCG / ILBF. I shall examine the issues relating to broadcasting in Chapter 5. Summarising its achievements in respect of the 2007 CoM recommendations, the UK notes the 2006 St Andrews Act which places a duty on the Executive to adopt a strategy for the Irish language, but refers to the ‘supplementary report to follow’ for further information on this and the need for further support for the print media (UK 2009, p.45). In its monitoring report, POBAL states that by the end of the third monitoring period, no strategy to enhance the development of the Irish language had been published. In addition, it points out that two successive CAL Ministers, the DUP’s Edwin Poots and Gregory Campbell, had both indicated that no additional funding would be made available for any such strategy and that it will formally link the Irish language with Ulster Scots, thus contravening the advice of the COMEX in 2007 (POBAL 2009). In respect of the print media, POBAL’s report highlights the Foras na Gaeilge 2008 decision to end funding for the Irish language newspaper Lá Nua. It points out that inadequate support from the funding body and the refusal to include the Irish language print media in the Review of Public Advertising, noted by the COMEX in 2007, resulted in a series of financial crises for the newspaper throughout 2007–8. POBAL states that the ending of funding contravenes Article 11(ii) of the ECRML as ratified.21 In addition, the report continues, the decision, ‘means that Foras na Gaeilge is in contravention of the domestic legislation under which it was established, since this requires it to promote the use of the Irish language in both written and spoken forms in Northern Ireland in the context of the ECRML’ (POBAL 2009). Lá Nua was forced to close down in December 2008 with the loss of 8 posts.22 I shall briefly refer to both the Irish language strategy and the closure of Lá Nua in the next chapter. The UK government report refers to the establishment of An Foras Teanga/ The Language Board (UK 2009, p. 94, 103), but notes that its duties fall under the NI Executive and that it cannot therefore offer further information pending the ‘supplementary report’. It states (UK 2009, p. 69) that the NIO, HM Revenue and Customs and the NI Courts Service all have Codes


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of Courtesy23 in relation to Irish, although, unsurprisingly, it does not mention that in the latter case, Irish may not be used within the courts. The UK reports (UK 2009, p. 70) that the Police Service of NI (PSNI) held one public meeting (7 days before the submission of the UK report) during the 3 year period with interpretation from Irish and that the Office of the Police Ombudsman (OPONI) allows for complaints to be made in Irish (UK 2009, p. 69). In addition, the NI Prison Service (NIPS), it states, employs two parttime teachers of Irish ‘at its main prison establishment’ (UK 2009, p. 81). In all other sections of its response to Article 7, the UK refers the COMEX to the absent ‘supplementary paper’. In the UK report, of 64 pages relating to Part II, less than 1 page relates to the Irish language, plus 3 pages of census tables. Part III of the UK report is similarly lightweight. Under Article 8 (Education) only paragraph 2 is discussed, with rather bald assertions that Irish is available as a GCSE, A level and university level in the UK. No information is given as to where precisely this is the case, nor as to rates or patterns of take-up (UK 2009, p. 118). In the matter of the other provisions for education, and for Article 9 (Judicial Authorities), 24 the UK government advises that there is a ‘supplementary report to follow.’ It does the same for Article 10 (Administrative Authorities), but repeats the information given earlier in respect of Codes of Courtesy in 3 UK-wide government Departments. This section notes that the law governing street names is a devolved matter and thereby refers the reader to the ‘supplementary report’ (UK 2009, p. 118). POBAL’s monitoring report contains detailed information on the tendency for some local councils to delay the erection of bilingual signs, to refuse the naming of new estates in Irish or to devise policies in a way that mitigates against Irish language signage. As in 2005, the NGO (POBAL 2007, p. 71) calls for the replacement of the 1995 Local Government Act in favour of more proactive legislation promoting the use of Irish in street signage. In relation to the voicemail facility, the UK report notes that the NI Courts Service operates a translation service for documents and that ‘no requests have been received for translations into Irish in the past three years’ (UK 2009, p. 119). However, in POBAL’s monitoring report, the NGO details contact between DCAL, DENI and an individual Irish speaker seeking a copy in Irish of the Education Order 1998. The translated copy, once located, had not been proofed. 25 This took a further seven days prior to being sent to the applicant with a note stating that the English version was the authoritative one. 26 In addition to the apparently unreliable completion of translation of even a minimal number of legal texts, it is clear that neither the public nor government bodies are made aware of how to access the three available texts in Irish. The UK’s reference to lack of demand for translated texts appears mischievous, and rather ironic given the effective blanket ban

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on the use of Irish in the courts which clearly curtails the demand for legal translation. Under Article 11 (The Media) the UK report acknowledges that, ‘there is no statutory requirement for broadcasters in NI to deliver Irish language programming’ (UK 2009, p. 119). Interestingly, the UK go on to say that the lack of statutory requirements for Irish language broadcasting arises from the GFA Intergovernmental Agreement (2 March 2005) when theoretical access to TG4 was extended to the North.27 In Chapter 5, I shall discuss at greater length the lack of provision for Irish in UK domestic broadcasting legislation. At this juncture, I shall simply note that the UK’s assertion is rather surprising since the UK Communications Act, minus provision for Irish, was enacted two years before the intergovernmental conference referred to in the UK report. Also legislative provision for Welsh language broadcasting in Wales and Gaelic language broadcasting in Scotland pre-dates the 2003 Act by many years but has not prevented inclusion of provisions for both these languages in the Act. The boosting of the signal from the Divis transmitter in order to facilitate reception of TG4 is also mentioned (UK 2009, p. 120), although as I shall discuss in Chapter 5, the technical problems associated with improved and extended reception of TG4 throughout the North have not been resolved. Given that this has been a consistent concern for several years, the UK’s assertion (UK 2009, p. 120) that work, ‘on the best technical solution to ensure the continued widespread availability (sic) of TG4 after the Digital Switchover in 2012 is ongoing’ does not reassure. It is noticeable that no commitment to ensuring widespread availability is made. This section of the UK report also refers to additional funding from the BBC for Irish language broadcasting, to which I shall refer in further detail in Chapter 5, and to the commitment of BBC radio to ‘maintaining dedicated slots’ for Irish language programming. Again, as I shall note in the next chapter, Irish speakers were disappointed in 2006 at the halving of the popular Irish language radio Caschlár programme, half of the air-time then being allocated to Ulster Scots. The provisions of Article 11 relating to the print media and training of journalists, those relating to Articles 12 (Cultural Activities) and 13 (Social and Economic Life) will be contained, the report says, in the ‘supplementary report to follow.’ On Article 14, (Transfrontier Exchanges), the UK government makes passing reference to the existence of Foras na Gaeilge and to its own participation in the British-Irish Council, whose indigenous and minority languages work-stream, ‘facilitates co-operation and understanding across the UK and Ireland on issues relating to all minority languages’ (UK 2009, p. 121). Sadly, the report fails to elucidate further on these UK-wide improvements in co-operation and understanding.


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In Chapter 1, I have referred to the view of some commentators (Bell, 2000; Livingstone, 1990) that international human rights instruments prove particularly inadequate in conflict situations. The UK’s third periodical report on the ECRML brings this into sharp focus. Of itself, the report’s inability to provide information on devolved matters is indicative of the deep malaise in effective LPP in the North. It raises questions as to how the COMEX will respond through the monitoring report structure, and how the influence of the British government at European member state level will affect the findings of the Committee of Ministers and the Council of Europe. To date, the overall limitations of the ECRML have been illustrated by the NI experience, where weak ratification, failure to adopt the ECRML provisions into domestic legislation and manipulation of protections in respect of RMLs at different levels of development have impacted adversely on the Irish language. Following the developments during the third monitoring cycle, it appears that the issue of Irish in the North of Ireland is set to be a litmus test for the application of the ECRML. The ECRML must improve its ability to protect and promote RMLs; by encouraging the consistent application of transparent standards in legislation, policy and funding by ratifying states in respect of Part III languages. The Council of Europe places importance on the input of NGOs. However, this can be undermined if key issues, clearly identified by the grassroots community, are inadequately dealt with during the monitoring and reporting cycles. The mechanisms for overall recommendations must be adequate to deal with sensitive or difficult issues. The detailed reporting on paragraphs and sub-paragraphs must not distract from a realistic appraisal of the overall circumstances of a given language. Unhelpful ambiguity is created when findings in respect of the fulfilment of undertakings appear at odds with the commentary. Clear, challenging guidelines and benchmarks for implementation of Part II and Part III should be developed to increase transparency. There is a need to develop and secure appropriate sources of consistent, independent technical advice for both states and NGOs. Concordats or service provision agreements between NGOs and state-sponsored language agencies should be developed to secure continuity and quality in NGO monitoring. A three-pronged approach should be developed, including: studies of existing ratification instruments, research geared towards detailed analysis of best practice and further development of key NGO networks. These measures alone, however, are not sufficient to maximise the potential of the ECRML in the development of consistent, appropriate and transparent language planning. As noted previously, the enforceability of soft law mechanisms must be urgently addressed, and further sustained efforts are needed to ensure rigourous impartiality coupled with robust and effective challenge to state tokenism and obfuscation.


In Chapters 6–8, I shall examine in detail the campaign for legislation to protect the Irish language and analyse the consultation processes of 2006–7, relating to the British government commitment to enact the Irish language Act. Following this, I shall briefly outline some key aspects in the treatment of the Irish language since the re-establishment of the devolved NI Assembly in May 2007 to September 2009.

5 Irish Language Broadcasting since the Good Friday Agreement: Sop in áit na scuaibe? Sword or Ploughshare?

The Agreement provides the opportunity to wrest the Irish language from the grip of strife. If it is allowed to do so, its provisions will demonstrate that the language is not a sword. It is a ploughshare. (Anderson 1999, p. 19) In this chapter, I shall examine LPP in respect of Irish language broadcasting in the North. Broadcasting is one of a number of matters which the British government ‘reserves’ to Westminster control. Therefore, although some of the events that I shall describe in the coming sections of this chapter relate to periods of British Direct Rule and others to the two separate periods of devolved government in Northern Ireland, (2000–2 and 2007 ongoing), during the whole of this time, responsibility for broadcasting has remained consistently and solely that of the British government. In this chapter, I shall discuss the disparity in British government treatment of Welsh- and Gaelic language broadcasting in comparison with Irish language broadcasting. The central role of the UK’s main public service broadcaster (PSB), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the South’s Irish language television station, TG4 will be highlighted, as will the historical relationship between the BBC and Irish speakers. I shall discuss public consultations on the 2003 UK Communications Act and the 2005 Review of the BBC’s Royal Charter. Following this, I shall analyse the 2007–8 consultation by the BBC Audience Council regarding minority language broadcasting in NoI and the position in respect of reception of TG4 in homes in the North. I shall then outline issues concerning the Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge / Irish Language Broadcast Fund (CCG / ILBF) and its future funding. 99


Since the establishment of Mercator Media Forum in 1995 and the inclusion of media provisions in recent language legislation, including the ECRML, there has been an increase in research and debate on broadcasting in minority languages, with a number of studies looking at the issue in both general and specific terms (for example: Cormack 1995, 1998, 2006, Hourigan 2001, Watson 2002.) This has increased recognition of complex issues around broadcasting, and highlighted its role in enhancing the status of and access to marginalised languages. Fishman (1991, 2001) however gives it less priority in language transmission than the use of the language in the home or community, in education or the work place (Fishman 1991, p. 395). Browne (1996), Cormack (1999) and Dunbar (2001, 2006b) have also raised concerns about the degree of energy and resourcing sometimes directed towards broadcasting. Dunbar (2001: 251) argues that this can lead to a dearth of development in other areas key to minoritised languages. Along with Williams (1994, p. 127), Dunbar (2001, p. 251) highlights the importance of the integration of broadcasting into a holistic approach to LPP. Like other areas of service provision available to the users of the dominant language, broadcasting can assume an additional importance when it is withheld, or appears to be withheld, by the state. In such circumstances, the minoritised language community feels a sense of injustice and exclusion. However, the majority community is also affected by the relative invisibility of the minoritised language since it reinforces the view that the minoritised language is unacceptable, controversial or dangerous. In the next section, I shall examine evidence of differential treatment for broadcasting in Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland in comparison with broadcasting in Irish in the North.

Disparities in broadcasting provision for Welsh in Wales, for Gaelic in Scotland, and for Irish in the North Whilst long-standing legislative commitments exist for broadcasting in Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland, no such statutory provision exists for Irish, a situation explored in further detail later in this chapter and subsequently in Chapter 4 on the ECRML and in Chapters 6–8 in respect of the 2006–7 proposed Irish language legislation for NoI. Broadcasting in indigenous languages is one of the few forms of Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) in direct receipt of government funding. However, Ofcom, the independent UK communications regulator, (2005, p. 100.) notes, ‘Historically, the BBC has spent less per head on serving its Irish-speaking audience than on the Gaelic and Welsh-speaking populations.’ It reiterates the point in 2007, (Ofcom 2007, p. 83 para 5.80) stating that, ‘The nature and amount of funding for each language varies considerably, as does the source.’ In addition, since the BBC may contribute to the costs of programming in some regions, the result is that, ‘there is a different model in use for broadcasting

Irish Language Broadcasting since GFA

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Table 5.1 Total spend by hours on television and radio for Welsh, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish Television 2003–4 Total spend

Total hours

Wales

£20.3m/S4C

521

Scotland

£2.065m1including online

NI

£424,000

36 8.24

Radio 2003–4 Total spend

Total hours

£9m/Radio Cymru

7528

£2.95ma Raidió nan Gaidheal

2782

£238,000

256.04

Note: a Not including Gaelic Media Service spend Source: Response to Freedom of Information request submitted by POBAL, from Mark Adair, Secretary and Head of Public Policy, BBC NI, 22 February 2005

for each of the languages.’ (Ofcom 2007, p. 83, para 5.82) Table 5.1 shows the situation for the UK’s three primary indigenous languages in 2003–4. From 2005 onwards, the BBC changed the manner in which it calculated its spend figures, from cost per hour averages to actual spend. This makes direct comparison of figures between 2003 and 2009 problematic. Ofcom (2007, p. 8) notes that the Welsh station S4C spent £65m in 2005 on a broad range of genres for Welsh speakers whilst the BBC funded from the licence fee an additional ten hours of Welsh language output per week. In Scotland, the Gaelic Media Service disposed of a commissioning fund of some £7 million in 2005–6 to facilitate the production of Gaelic language output on the BBC and on ITV1. In this period, preparations were underway for a Gaelic digital channel. As explored later in this chapter, 2005 was the first year in which the CCG / ILBF in NoI accessed its four-year budget of £3 million per annum for Irish language programming. Table 5.2 presents some comparative data on the combination of public funding and input from the BBC for Welsh in Wales, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish in NI, the three languages in the UK recognised under Part III of the ECRML, with side notes on Ulster Scots, recognised under Part II only of the ECRML along with Scots, Manx and Cornish. In a report to the United Nations (UK to UNESC 2009, p. 44, para 296, 297), the British government confirms that for the financial year 2008–9, Wales’ S4C received from it a grant, ‘estimated to be £98 million’. In September 2008, BBC Alba, the Gaelic digital channel, was awarded £11.9 million per annum by the Scottish Executive with a further £2.5 million per annum cash and in-kind support provided by the BBC itself. In comparison with this, the British government provided a time-limited grant of £3 million per annum for four years (2005–9) for the CCG / ILBF, with a further £6 million for the period up to March 2011 allocated in 2009, after considerable community and political pressure. I shall discuss the

Table 5.2

Comparative data on indigenous languages Welsh

Irisha

Gaelic

Ulster Scots

Part III of ECRML (specific broadcasting requirements)

Part II b (general requirement only)

Welsh language Act 1993 (Westminster)

Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005

Good Friday Agreement 1998 (broadcasting commitments)

GFA 1998 (no broadcasting commitments undertaken)

Census statistics

580,000 speakers (20.8 %)

92,000 speakers (2 %)

167,000 knowledge (10.4 %); 75,000 with 4 skills. 2006 Census in RoI, 1.6 m (42%)

No official statistics. Projection from 1999 NI Life and Times Survey (sample size of 2,000 people) 30,000 (2%)

Public funding p.a

£94m (DCMS to S4C)

£12m – Scottish government to MG Alba (formerly GMS)

£3m via DCAL to CCG / ILBF until 2009. From UK government 2009–2011.

Ulster Scots Agency supports some shortterm RSLs

BBC/ PSB input p.a.

c. 520 hrs of content to S4C (value £22.5 m)

£9.7 m in funding content

£950,000 of content from BBCNI from 2009 (365hrs from RTE to TG4 in RoI)

£400,000 of content from BBCNI from 2009

Channel availability

S4C analogue: S4C Digidol/S4C2 on all platforms

BBC Alba (from Sept 2008) on dig. sat, dig. cab. and FreeSat TeleGDTT BBC Scotland/stv-all platforms

BBCNI-all platforms TG4 and RTE from RoI available in NI on analogue spillover, dig. sat and dig cab TG4 also analogue boost from Divis

BBCNI-all platforms and BBC Radio Ulster

European status UK status

Ofcom The Future of DTT proposed making space on PSB mix for S4C in Wales, GDS (BBC Alba) and TG4 in NI Content

S4C- 6 hrs daily S4C Digidol – 12 hrs daily S4C2 Welsh Assembly

BBC Alba – up to 7 hrs daily TeleG 30 – 60 mins per day Stv – 2 hrs per week

BBC NI – 12 hrs for whole of 2007 TG4 6 hrs min. daily

BBCNI 5 hrs for 2007

Note: a Irish is also an Official language of the European Union and the First Official Language of the South of Ireland. All languages ratified under Part III of the ECRML are also protected under the general requirements of Part II.

b

Source: Adapted from Ofcom’s Second PSB Review, Phase 2: Preparing for the Digital Future, consultation document, 25th September 2008.


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CCG / ILBF later in this chapter. In 2008, Ofcom states that the shortterm nature of funding for broadcasting in Irish was raised by ‘many respondents’ to the regulator’s PSB consultation. Ofcom (2008, p. 85, para 5.88) notes the ‘lack of equity in the funding arrangements ... whether on the part of the government or the BBC.’ Although the regulator suggests (Ofcom 2008, p. 85, para 5.94) that there is now better quality broadcasting content than in the past, it also notes, ‘there is perceived concern at the lack of consistency and equity, and sometimes certainty, in the current arrangements for funding and delivery which are in place in different parts of the UK.’

The Irish language and BBC NI The historical attitude of the BBC to Irish language broadcasting in the North PSB in Britain and Ireland is financed by a range of direct and indirect public subsidies, which in turn place obligations on PSB broadcasters. The communications market has altered fundamentally since the introduction of the UK Communications Act in 2003, with digital television, Freeview and access to broadband services all contributing dramatically to expanded public service content. However, in Britain and the NoI,1 the BBC has privileged access to public funding and free broadcasting spectrum in return for its well-recognised PS duties. The BBC also enjoys special status and freedom from some forms of legislative regulation through its Royal Charter, granted once every ten years, most recently in 2005. In addition, of course, the BBC is the only UK broadcaster to dispose of a licence fee. 2 The BBC began regionally based broadcasting in the North in 1924, two years after the partition of Ireland. Bardon (2000) has documented the history of the BBC’s struggle with cultural and linguistic inclusivity in the North. He notes repeated examples of the effects of the close structural links with unionism and the BBC’s apparent unwillingness to provoke even the risk of unionist disapproval. It is not surprising that Bardon notes (2000, p. 16), ‘the Corporation shied away from Irish language broadcasts’ and in 57 years of regional broadcasting up till 1981, the BBC broadcast only one series of Irish language programmes. During the 1980s and 1990s, although the Irish language fared somewhat better on radio, with some 4 hours per week, television programming through Irish was rare. Mac Póilin (2003, p. 88) characterises radio provision during the 1980s as hovering, ‘somewhere in the no-man’s-land between minimalist and undetectable.’ Television broadcasts in the 1990s were restricted to an average of one per year, at unpredictable intervals and times, or according to Mac Póilin (2003, p. 88), ‘blink-and you’ve missed it’ programming.

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In addition to heated meetings between the BBC and Irish speakers, and well-publicised occasional campaigns by individual Irish speakers refusing to pay their BBC Licence fee due to ongoing failure to provide a service to Irish speakers, a series of more formal approaches included the publication in 1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999 by Iontaobhas Ultach (IU) of four different reports (De Napier 1990; Andrews and Mac Póilin 1993; Mac Póilin 1997; Anderson 1999), proposing an Irish language television training and production fund in NI and access in the North to a comprehensive Irish language television service. By 2003, the BBC was still being described as, ‘primarily, and overwhelmingly, an English language service, and has rarely broadcast Irish language programming during peak hours’ (Eirug 2003, p. 35). Irish language broadcasting in the CR talks The GFA, signed by both the British and Irish governments, contains specific reference to the need to improve Irish language broadcasting. As well as committing the British government to ‘seek more effective ways to provide financial support for Irish language film and television production in Northern Ireland’, it binds it to ‘provide more extensive access to Teilifís na Gaeilge.’3 With the ratification of the ECRML, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the UK government selected an obligation to ‘make adequate provision so that broadcasters offer programmes (in the Irish language).’4 The consultation process that followed the White Paper on the Communications Bill5 attracted significant input from supporters of Irish language broadcasting. Official feedback notes, ‘We received over 300 responses to the consultation plus 590 postcard responses from supporters of Irish language broadcasting in Northern Ireland’ (DTIUK/DCMSUK 2002). Indeed, it acknowledges that there were twice as many responses relating to Irish than to all of the other issues in the draft document. The Putnam Committee, which published its report a week before the end of the consultative period, also acknowledges responses from Irish speakers (Putnam 2002, Vol 1: 93, para 363). However, whilst Irish language groups were lobbying strongly for inclusion of Irish in the legislative process as part of their commitments under the GFA, the British government6 were insisting that they were in compliance with their commitments under Article 11 of Part III of the ECRML7 by ‘offering Irish language programmes on a daily basis on Radio Ulster and occasionally transmitting programmes on television’ (Author’s emphasis). Instead of honouring the GFA commitment to establish a film and television broadcasting fund, the British government announced in 2002 the start of a two-year Irish language TV and film production training scheme. Many Irish speakers welcomed provision for training but were not convinced that it fulfilled the GFA engagement.


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An editorial in Dublin-based newspaper8 The Irish Times took the British government to task, The disregard shown by the British government towards the Irish language in its Communications Bill is disheartening. The Bill will determine the future of broadcasting for Celtic languages in Britain and Northern Ireland for the foreseeable future ... . By failing to mention Irish language broadcasting in the Bill, the British government has sent out the wrong signal – that the language has no part to play in Northern society. This is unacceptable and inaccurate. Subsequently, the Putnam Committee report on the consultation made no concrete recommendations on Irish language broadcasting, although it did make strong proposals in relation to both Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland. The final version of the Bill contains no reference whatsoever to the Irish Language. Representations to the British government by the Irish government, Northern political parties and proponents of Irish language broadcasting were met with a range of responses from civil servants in the DCMS. An internal Irish government document (Irish Gov: DFA 2003 Briefing paper) characterises the responses thus: ‘The DCMS civil servants say that: ● ● ●

It’s too late to change the Bill; It’s not necessary to change it; They have no intention of changing it.’

Political parties North and South seized upon what they saw as British government bad faith and maintained consistent pressure for legislative change. The Irish government argued for an amendment to the Bill based upon the text of provisions for Gaelic in Scotland in the Broadcasting Act of 1990, some twelve years previously. It also adopted a fall-back position of demanding that the British government bring forward a Northern Ireland Order that would provide for its commitments under the GFA. The Irish government maintained pressure at a high political level through the personal interventions of Brian Cowen, then Minister for Foreign Affairs.9 At the same time, however, it had set itself non-legislative goals. An Irish government briefing paper states, ‘The main thrust of these tactics is to ensure that funding is made available. It will be less easy to put pressure on the Government after the Bill becomes law’ (Irish Gov: DFA 2003 Briefing paper). In April 2003, following many months of set-backs to the CR process in the North, the British and Irish governments issued a Joint Declaration (UK and Irish Govs: 2003, Joint Declaration, point 30) which included references to the establishment of a film and television production fund and

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to improved access to TG4. By this time, unionist politicians had politically linked the broadcasting fund to demands for equal funding for Ulster Scots. The Joint Declaration therefore also notes the allocation of substantial funding for an Ulster Scots Academy. The BBC Charter Review 2005 In 2005, the British government published its Green Paper on the Review of the BBC’s Royal Charter, which takes place only every ten years. The Green Paper recommends increased provision in Welsh through SC4, and floats the idea of a dedicated channel for Gaelic in Scotland to bring about ‘a sustainable strategy for Gaelic television.’ The BBC has, says the Green Paper, ‘a crucial role to play in safeguarding Gaelic cultural heritage’ (UK Green Paper 2005, p. 42). This role, however, is clearly limited to Scotland. The Green Paper makes no reference whatsoever to the Irish Language in the NoI. Iontaobhas Ultach (IU) finds the omission of Irish ‘regrettable’, accusing the British government of failing to recognise its commitments under the GFA and the ECRML, points also taken up by Foras na Gaeilge (FnaG) and the non-governmental organisation POBAL. In its submission to the Green Paper, Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta (CnaGta, 30 January 2006) the statutory Council for Irish Medium Education, comments that as the representatives of parents of Irish speaking children, it ... can only interpret this omission as a calculated insult to them and to their language by the British Government ... . There is no doubt that the failure to include Irish in the Green Paper is deliberate, given that Northern Ireland is mentioned in the context of ‘provisions in indigenous minority languages’ and in the ‘devolved nations’ on Page 41 of the Paper, and ignored in the following section. In spite of the flurry of submissions and protests, the BBC Charter was subsequently renewed at Westminster, without any reference to the Irish language.

DCAL consultation paper on proposed Irish language legislation 2006–7 and the BBC Audience Council Consultation on the Review of Indigenous Minority Languages, March 2007 As noted in the next chapter, the British government makes no proposals in respect of broadcasting in Irish in the 2006–7 DCAL consultation papers arising from the St Andrews Agreement (SAA) commitment on proposed Irish language legislation. Instead, in March 2007, the BBC Audience


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Council (BBCAC), on behalf of the BBC Trust, commenced a two-stage consultation process on BBC output on radio and television for minority indigenous languages. The BBC received 28 written submissions (plus a further 18 which it judged to have arrived after the deadline, but which it passed on for consideration by the BBC Trust.) In addition, it hosted two ‘accountability’ breakfasts – one in respect of the Irish language and the other in respect of Ulster Scots. The Audience Council released its own submission to the BBC Trust based on the first part of the consultation in May 2006.

Analysis of the submissions Sixteen of the submissions, along with Ofcom’s 2005 review of broadcasting of Indigenous Minority Languages10 are contained in a BBC Audience Council document11, Responses to Audience Council NI Review of Indigenous Minority Languages (2007c)12 The Ofcom Review of Broadcasting (2005) constitutes 33 of 106 pages of the BBC’s Responses document. 14 of the subsequent 16 submissions that follow are from Irish language organisations or Irish speaking individuals. Two further submissions do not state whether the respondents speak Irish or not. One calls for improved Irish language broadcasting. Both are critical of the Ulster Scots lobby in relation to broadcasting. As noted previously, the conclusions in the Ofcom Review (2005) recognise the historical under-provision for the Irish language and the programming and funding disparity between Welsh in Wales, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish in the North. It highlights the importance of improved reception of TG4, but pinpoints the anomaly of British government reliance on an RoI broadcaster for provision to Irish speakers in the North. The Ofcom statement also comments that it received no consultation submissions in relation to Ulster Scots, although representatives of Ulster Scots groups attended a consultation meeting. Ofcom (2007c, p.33 in BBC Responses document) records that these representatives of Ulster Scots acknowledge that it is ‘at a different stage of development to Irish’ and that ‘... a sense of Ulster Scots identity is based on music, heritage and other cultural factors, as well as linguistic difference.’ Of the 16 other submissions carried in the document, 15 state that current BBC television programming for Irish is inadequate, although several comment that the small amount of programmes produced are of good quality. The submission from An Droichead (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 40), a Belfast Irish language centre, calls the level of progamming ‘disgracefully low’, whilst FnaG (BBC Responses, 2007c, p.42) states that it is ‘totally inadequate’. The submission from An Tobar (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 52), an independent television production company, calls it ‘grossly inadequate’. IU (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 63) note that an adequate Irish language service is an entitlement. It states, ‘It is not a matter of grace and


favour.’ IU (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 65) proposes that Irish language television provision should be built up by incremental stages, to 50 hours per annum by 2009–10, 100 hours by 2012–13 and to 150 hours per annum by 2016–17. Radio provision attracts less criticism, although several respondents note the increasing use of English in Irish language programming (BBC Responses, 2007c: Mac Ruairí, p. 2; McKendry, p. 60). An Tobar, FnaG and IU recommend 200 hours of radio programming for 2009–10, rising to 250 by 2011–12 and to 300 by 2012–13. An Tobar and POBAL complain of the halving of the popular Radio Ulster Irish language programme CasChlár, and the replacement of the second half of the programme with Ulster Scots. An Tobar (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 56) notes that the Ulster Scots programming could be broadcast in another time slot, and states, ‘It is high time the BBC stopped pitching Irish language provision against Ulster Scots.’ Online provision is deemed by all those who comment on it to be inadequate. Several respondents place particular emphasis on the provision of a wide range of educational materials online (BBC Responses, 2007c: IU, p. 66; FnaG, p. 44; An Tobar, p. 55). Asked to comment on what criteria should inform the BBC’s commitment to the indigenous minority language services, POBAL (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 35) notes that the BBC’s obligations in relation to Irish should be enshrined in Westminster legislation. In common with Foras na Gaeilge, it also notes obligations under the ECRML and the GFA. The submissions from CnaGta and IU also place considerable emphasis on the legislative framework, recalling their submissions to the 2003 UK Communications Bill and the Review of the BBC Charter in 2005. Others refer to the demographics of the Irish speaking community (BBC Responses, 2007c: An Droichead, p. 41; An Tobar, p. 53), to the particular richness and value of the Irish language (BBC Responses, 2007c: FnaG, p. 44) and to its importance to community development and the history of local communities (BBC Responses, 2007c: An Carn, p. 101). The disparity in expenditure and programming for Irish in the North and that for Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland is frequently highlighted. (POBAL, IU, FnaG, An Tobar, An Carn and CnaGta). POBAL (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 36) notes that Irish, Welsh and Gaelic were all recognised in the UK ratification of Part III of the ECRML, but that only Irish is not subject to domestic legislative protections in relation to broadcasting. CnaGta (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 51) notes that the BBC could play as significant a role in supporting the Irish language as it does for Welsh in Wales and for Gaelic in Scotland. The submission states, ‘The fact that it has chosen not to is at best a dereliction of its duty as a Public Service Broadcaster and at worst discrimination against Irish speakers in the UK.’ Asked to comment on whether there should be an equivalence in expenditure on Irish and Ulster Scots, all respondents reply that there should not. IU (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 68) comments that ‘direct comparisons are not helpful as the needs of each community are very different,’ and states


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(BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 63), ‘[we] regret that some of the questions asked imply a potential competition for resources between supporters of Irish and Ulster Scots.’ POBAL (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 36) points out that the stage of development of the Irish speaking community and of the language itself requires a different level of support, citing also Part III recognition for Irish in the ECRML and the SAA commitment by the British government to enact Irish language legislation. An Tobar (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 55) points out that, ‘... there are no Ulster Scots schools, there is no tangible Ulster Scots speaking community, there is little demand for Ulster Scots “language” programming ... . The current provision creates the myth that both situations are similar with a similar demand’ (Respondent’s own use of inverted commas.). Others (BBC Responses, 2007c: FnaG, p. 45; IU, p. 68) contend that the Irish speaking community is younger and has a greater presence in urban areas than the rural and more elderly profile for Ulster Scots. In common with others, (BBC Responses, 2007c: McKendry, p. 61; An Tobar, p. 55) it points out that Ulster Scots is comprehensible to most English speakers and that those with an interest in Ulster Scots appear to express this more readily through music, dance and other cultural means. One respondent, R. Cuan (BBC Responses, 2007c, p. 96) from Co. Antrim, expresses strong support for increased Irish language broadcasting, noting that it is ‘about time the BBC carried out its duty in relation to properly serving the needs of the North’s Irish speakers.’ The submission goes on to note, ‘As an Ulster Scots speaker I would regret if the BBC, along with some political elements, called for Ullans to be treated on an equal footing with Irish Gaelic. There is no comparison between the situation of the two tongues.’ The final submission, from H. Thompson, Co. Down, challenges the term ‘indigenous’ in respect of Ulster Scots and asserts that many of the writer’s friends switch off BBC radio between 6.30 – 7.00 because of ‘the insertion of Irish language programmes’ and instead now listen to RTÉ, the Southern-based state radio station.13 In addition, H. Thompson notes that subtitles should be used on Irish language television programmes, but not for Ulster Scots, ‘... since anyone who can speak English is able to follow Ulster-Scots without much difficulty, supposin they hae a mine tae dae so (which incidentally, is of itself sufficient to settle any argument about whether “Ulster-Scots” is a separate language, or simply a dialect of English)’ (BBC Responses, 2007c: Thompson, p. 104, Respondent’s own emphasis; brackets; inverted commas).

The findings of the BBC Audience Council In June 2007, the BBC Audience Council released its findings in the form of its own submission to the BBC Trust. The submission notes that the BBC’s own Licence Fee payer research, although based on a small sample, shows a high level of dissatisfaction with language programming. The survey measures the gap between the level of importance a respondent attaches to an issue

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and how well the BBC performs. In connection with languages, the research shows a large gap of 37 points in NoI between importance and performance,14 a much higher level of dissatisfaction than in Scotland or Wales. The document places some emphasis on the shortcomings of the BBC NI in respect of indigenous language programming and notes unfavourable comparisons with expenditure and programming hours in Scotland and Wales. There is, however, a noticeable and unfortunate tendency within the document to blur the distinctions between Irish and Ulster Scots and the legal commitments made to them. Thus, the document (BBCAC 2007b, p. 3) states, ‘Council notes the significant disparities in the volume of hours of output between Irish and Ulster Scots on the one hand and Welsh and Scottish Gaelic (the other Part III languages under the European Charter) on the other.’ The statement seems to imply that both Irish and Ulster Scots are Part III languages of the ECRML along with Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland, when in fact only Irish has been included under Part III to date. The document continues this obfuscation even as it claims to seek fairer distribution of resources and programming than has been the historic case for Irish. Notably, the BBCAC (2007b, p. 4) states, ‘Ulster-Scots is at a particular stage of development whereby it needs programmes and content to raise awareness which will in turn stimulate demand and provide greater public value.’ Given the historic exclusion of the Irish language from BBC broadcasting, such support appears exceptional. There is no similar statement for Irish. The report (2007b, p.4) offers as rationale, ‘There was an acknowledgement ... that if there were going to be programmes in Irish, there should also be programmes for the Ulster-Scots community.’ Stating that the BBC ‘has a unique role to play in supporting indigenous minority languages’ (2007b, p. 1) the report notes nonetheless that Irish language programming on television during peak times causes ‘displacement’ for those who do not speak Irish. It states, (2007b, p.8), ‘Ulster-Scots is largely accessible to mainstream audiences, except at the highly differentiated end of the linguistic spectrum and so this is much less of an issue.’15 Asserting the need for additional funding for the BBCNI to provide ‘incremental enhancements’ in provision for Irish and Ulster Scots, the AC (2007b, p. 8) urges ‘greater parity of spend between Irish and Ulster-Scots.’ It also calls for a reduction in the gap in spend with Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh, but fails to clarify whether this recommendation is intended to encompass both Irish and Ulster Scots or whether a similar comparison for expenditure on Scots and Ulster Scots is intended. A response to a POBAL query under the Freedom of Information Act16 details the manner in which BBC Scotland approach the issue of volume of programming and amount of expenditure on Scots, ... there is no obligation on BBC Scotland to specifically produce radio and television programmes reflecting the Scots language. This


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means that it is entirely BBC Scotland’s choice whether to produce any programmes relating to the Scots language and if so, to decide how many programmes it will produce and what form these programmes will take. The BBC announced in April 2008 that additional funding of £950,000 per annum would be made available for Irish language output across a television, radio and online services and £400,000 for a similar range of Ulster Scots programming.

Reception of TG4 Digital provision and Ofcom proposals It is difficult to assess whether all of the parties involved in the GFA anticipated with any accuracy the difficulties and delays that would be involved in realising the commitment to improve reception of TG4 throughout the North. Whilst different sources (Anderson, 2003; Irish Government DFA 2003) express a belief that poor reception was in part due to a British blocking signal, there seems to have been genuine perplexity at the delays and problems that have dogged improved reception to TG4 throughout the NoI. Initial negotiations on how best to improve the signal were protracted and technical. However, by 2002, the then Secretary of State, John Reid, was asserting that the British government had agreed to ‘a unique arrangement’ intended to increase transmission power from the Clermont Carn transmitter in the RoI, even though this action had also required ‘complex consequential work at other UK sites.’17 Whilst claiming that this action had increased TG4 coverage from around 30 per cent to 65–70 per cent of the North, Reid nonetheless acknowledges that ‘analogue terrestrial TG4 services are still not available to a significant number of the population.’ By 2003, Anderson (2003, p. 9) was noting that, ‘Tá deireadh sroichte maidir leis an obair seo mar gheall ar chúinsí teicneolaíochta agus tír-raon.’ / ‘enhancing legally acceptable overspill from terrestrial transmitters’ had progressed as far ‘as the technology and the terrain will allow’ (Official bilingual document). The problem of the physical signal from transmitters had by this time been matched by a further issue, that of international copyright conventions and protocols. Further protracted and complex maneuvering took place over a period of time, and further solutions, including cable or digital services, and satellite free-to-air digital service without encryption were mooted. By 2004, the British government was continuing to announce power increases in transmitters closer to the target audience in the North, this time at Divis Mountain overlooking Belfast. In private, this may have given rise to some consternation, in the light of the British government briefing paper (UK Government 2003, Note to the Irish Side, Agenda

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Item 2 – TG4) dated a full year previously, in which it is noted, in relation to the Divis transmitter, Frequency availability in the area is poor; even if a frequency could be identified, coverage is likely to be limited and there may be problems from interference with a number of home VCRs, which would have to be retuned at a significant cost to the broadcaster (the ITC estimate between 5,000 and 17,000 homes could be affected). The theoretical coverage benefits could be in the order of 100,000 homes. In response to queries from residents seeking better reception following the boosting of the Divis power, DCAL referred residents to Ofcom, although they did acknowledge that to benefit from the enhanced signal, it was necessary to acquire a new aerial, to retune one’s television set and risk losing access to RTÉ 1 and 2 in the process. Ofcom acknowledges that the difficulties surrounding widespread reception of TG4 in the North remain. NI Director of Ofcom, Wolinski says,18 If powers were increased, interference would potentially be caused to transmitters using the same frequency elsewhere in Northern Ireland, as well as to others in Scotland, Wales and Northern England. Therefore it is not technically possible to provide coverage of TG4 in analogue form throughout all of Northern Ireland as there are not enough clear frequencies to do so. In 2008, Ofcom proposed that in order to accommodate Channel Five, S4C, TG4 and GDS after the digital switchover, these services should be included on Multiplex 2. The issue of post-analogue access to TG4 is likely to preoccupy Irish speakers in the coming period as discussed in Chapter 4. As noted earlier, the McCarthy proposals in 2009 for cuts in Irish government expenditure19 include reforming the funding of TG4 with partial contribution directly from the TV Licence, leading to reciprocal savings to the Irish Exchequer. The report does not recommend any increase in the licence fee paid by the public. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen which of the McCarthy proposals will be implemented, and what their effect will be on the Irish language all over the island. Whilst Irish speakers across the country have decried the McCarthy proposals, the nature of the CR structures put in place for the North have allowed the responsibility of the British government for Irish language broadcasting to be diverted to the Irish government, whilst simultaneously offering no guarantees that the specific needs of the NoI’s Irish speakers will be taken into account by the Irish government.


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The Irish language film and television production fund As noted in an earlier section, the progress towards establishment of the GFApromised fund for Irish language film and television was slow. Throughout 2004 and much of 2005, the Commission of the European Union raised questions regarding the level of subsidy available from the Fund to programmes to be broadcast potentially on mainstream stations such as the BBC, TG4 and RTÉ. Compromises had to be reached, including in the level of funding for a given production, and the percentage of productions that could be funded. It was not until June 2005 that the Fund, now called An Ciste Craoltóireacht Gaeilge / The Irish Language Broadcasting Fund (CCG / ILBF), received a firm indication that it would be able to distribute funding to the companies to whom it had already promised grant aid in its first commissioning bout in April 2005. The apparent progress that the European decision represented was somewhat obscured by the furore around the first bout of commissioning in 2005. Questions were raised by some applicants as to the Fund’s consistency, expertise in television production and decision-making processes. The perceived lack of emphasis on support for the Northern independent production sector and the centrality of the BBC within the Fund caused concern. Mac Póilin (2003, p. 99) comments, ‘The overwhelming instinct of Irish speakers in Northern Ireland is that the Corporation should not be allowed within an ass’s roar of any new fund until it has proved its commitment, from within its own considerable resources, by at least equalling the Gaelic service of BBC Scotland.’

Table 5.3 CCG / ILBF – Hours of Irish language programming funded over 7 funding rounds 2005–7 Year

Funding round

Minutes funded

2005–6

2005 Round 1 2005 Round 2 2005 Round 3 2006 Round 1 Total for period

1200 2040 540 2568 6348

20.00 34.00 9.00 42.80 105.80

2006–7

2006 Round 2 2006 Round 3 2007 Round 1 Total for period

1804 640 1980 4424

30.07 10.67 33.00 73.73

Overall total (7 funding rounds)

10772

179.53

Source: CCG / ILBF Programme data (Quoted in Deloitte 2007, p. 82)

Hours funded

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In the first year following its inception, CCG / ILBF funded 27.50 hours of Irish language programming, falling far short of its target of 70 hours per annum set by government. However, by 2006–7, CCG / ILBF had overcome its slow start, funding 75.57 broadcast hours. Between the four funding rounds from 2005–6, the CCG / ILBF funded over 105 hours of Irish language programming, over 50 per cent higher than the target figure (see Table 5.3).

Targets on audience development and satisfaction By December 2008, CCG / ILBF was to develop an audience of 25,000 viewers each week for Irish language programming. This is challenging given that CCG / ILBF-funded programming is unlikely to be available on a weekly basis. Neither are any measures in place for the Broadcasters Audience Research Board (BARB) or Nielsen, which provides figures for viewing in the North of RTÉ and TG4, to extrapolate accurate figures for Irish language viewers (Deloitte 2007, p. 32). However, a baseline (representative sample, size 1013 adults) and benchmarking survey (representative sample, size 1029 adults)20 shows that between April 2006 and April 2007, the segment of the population of the North who watched Irish language programming remained constant at 10 per cent, with an increasing number of people with little or no knowledge of the language watching Irish language programming. As well as showing an increase in the sample itself of adults understanding the Irish language (from 9 per cent in 2006 to 17 per cent in 2007), the 2007 benchmark survey shows that almost half (47 per cent) of the sample with knowledge of Irish watch Irish language television output with varying degrees of regularity compared to over a third (39 per cent) in the previous wave. Over half (54 per cent) of those who watch Irish language television output rate it as good compared to 45 per cent in the previous wave. In both surveys, a quarter (26 per cent) of those who watch Irish language television output state that it encouraged their interest in the Irish language. Deloitte (2007, p. 42) states that available information indicates that CCG / ILBF has successfully met its targets in relation to audience development. Measuring audience satisfaction has also proved problematic. At its inception, the CCG / ILBF was charged with achieving a 60 per cent level of audience satisfaction. Deloitte (2007, p. 41) initiated a stakeholder survey which highlights that since 72.4 per cent of all CCG / ILBF-funded programming is broadcast on TG4, access to the Irish language station, discussed previously, impacts crucially on audience development. Only 15.9 per cent of CCG / ILBF-funded programming is broadcast by BBC NI and 4.6 per cent by RTÉ, low percentages remarked upon, according to Deloitte (2007, p. 41), by ‘many’ in the stakeholder survey. Significantly, it notes that all-Ireland broadcasters (presumably TG4 and RTÉ21) acknowledge some difficulty in the brief of the CCG / ILBF, which prioritises development of the NoI production sector


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and of content relevant to the NoI audience. Deloitte (2007, p. 41, footnote 28) records that one broadcaster defines this as ‘limiting the appeal’ of the programming. Deloitte further notes the comment that ‘the primary audience for TG4 is composed primarily of fluent Irish speakers living in the west of Ireland.’ Whilst Deloitte finds that the CCG / ILBF programming has achieved a ‘substantial’ increase in Northern Irish storylines, content and accents particularly on TG4, it is clear that this comes from a very low baseline. Several consultees highlight the dearth of Northern Irish news coverage in Irish on TG4 and RTÉ, and the fact that there is none at all on BBC NI. Other key stakeholder comments concern the need for consistency in quality and broadcast time-slots, and the view that at this early stage in sectoral development, capacity building should be given priority ahead of simple numerical accounts of audience development.

Funding and sectoral development In relation to the independent production sector in the North, the CCG / ILBF sought to increase the volume of programming by the sector from an average of five productions by the sector pre-CCG / ILBF, to an average of 15 per annum; to improve quality, in the first year of the CCG / ILBF; to increase from five to 15 those employed on a freelance basis and in each subsequent year to increase this to 20. In addition, CCG / ILBF sought to achieve 70 per cent spend in the North in all productions in which it invested 75 per cent in the overall production costs. Where CCG / ILBF investment was lower, Northern Irish spend was set at the same proportionality. In its relations with the sector, CCG / ILBF sought 60 per cent satisfaction within the sector. Over 4 funding rounds in 2005–6, 33 commissions were awarded, 29 of which were for productions and 4 for developmental work. A further 21 commissions were made in the following 3 funding rounds of 2006–7, 15 productions and 6 for development. These awards amounted to £6,751,039 million, and levered in a further £2,225,000 to the sector.22 In terms of the range of programming, a key factor in sectoral development, the most common genre funded was that of factual entertainment series, with series for children following in second place. Table 5.4 shows the breakdown of commissions by genre. Between 2005 and March 2007, CCG / ILBF awards were made to 23 different production companies, 2 of which received funding in connection with training schemes. Stirling Productions was the most successful of these companies, receiving ten commissions and £1,379,549. Prior to the establishment of the CCG / ILBF, there were four companies in receipt of programming support, rising to ten by 2006–7. Of these, three (Aisling Ghéar, An Tobar, Sonas23) were new, predominantly or all Irish language production companies located and driven from within the North. A number of others,

Table 5.4

CCG / ILBF Commissions by genre and total CCG / ILBF spend Number of commissions

Total CCG / ILBF/ILBF spend (in £)

Genre

Developments

Productions

Total

Developments

Productions

Total

Children’s series Documentary Documentary series Drama Drama series Factual entertainment series Light entertainment series Music programme Music series New media Reversioned animation Youth series

3 0 0 2 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 0

7 6 2 1 5 11 2 1 3 0 3 3

10 6 2 3 5 12 5 1 3 1 3 3

20,400 0 0 32,500 0 4,000 20,000 0 0 11,350 0 0

1,313,289 273,145 252,268 154,224 1,672,217 158,426 427,516 63,359 558,433 0 296,877 525,535

1,333,689 273,145 252,268 154,224 1,672,217 1,162,426 447,516 63,359 558,433 11,350 296,877 525,535

Total

10

44

54

88,250

6,662,789

6,751,039

Source: CCG / ILBF Programme data, adapted from DCAL 2007, p. 46


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including some of the most successful applicants to the CCG / ILBF (Stirling, Westway, Waddell Media, Green Inc) were Northern-based, predominantly English language companies. Others, such as Magma, were established companies originating from and working predominantly in the South. In terms of the target for proportional Northern Irish spend, of 24 projects delivered by the end of the 2006–7 financial year, 18 (75 per cent) were in compliance. Most significant of the factors noted for the failure to deliver this target would seem to be the preference of some companies for working with crews from the RoI. Since Deloitte offers little additional information on this point, it is difficult to judge whether this highlights a training failure or skills gap in the North, or whether it is a tendency amongst those companies established in the South to use Southern-based crews. Whilst CCG / ILBF states that its preference would be to fund wholly Northern Irish companies, it suggests that the newness and relative inexperience of the sector makes this problematic. New Northern companies tend to be effectively excluded from accessing funding for larger productions, including drama, and there is a clear trade-off between quality productions and the encouraging of newer and smaller companies. Between its inception and the first round of funding in 2007, the CCG / ILBF commissioned 44 Irish language productions and 10 Irish language development projects; assisted in the development of an independent Irish language production sector in the North, overseeing a ten-fold increase in turnover and providing a range of support to over 21 different production companies, although, as noted, its approach in this respect has not been without pitfalls. Deloitte (2007, p. 89) states that by the end of March 2007, the CCG / ILBF had levered spend of over £4 million into the economy of the North and had created employment for 539 Irish speakers in a mixture of long-term and freelance employment. Between 2005–6, CCG / ILBF provided 81 people with training. Whilst cost per minute of Irish language programming over the 46 productions broadcast by March 2007 failed to meet the set target (£583 per minute) in 67 per cent of cases, the average cost of £623 per minute can arguably be counterbalanced by non-monetary factors. Examination of costs per minute of programming by the Gaelic Media Service in Scotland (£1,296 per minute) and the South of Ireland (£1,400 per minute) shows much higher averages, although direct comparison is problematic given the different circumstances, administration and monitoring processes in place.

Future funding for the CCG / ILBF With new CEO Áine Walsh appointed in November 2007, the CCG / ILBF succeeded in further stabilising its relationship with the North’s independent production sector. However, in December 2007, there was consternation on the publication of the NI Assembly’s draft budget. The three-year budget

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projections, approved by all political parties, contained no reference to renewal of funding to CCG / ILBF after its original end date of March 2009. The perceived nonchalance of nationalist politicians towards securing the future of the CCG / ILBF caused comment, especially following so rapidly on the heels of British and unionist refusal to honour the SAA commitment on Irish language legislation, outlined in greater detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Irish speakers responded angrily to the threatened demise of the CCG / ILBF, with independent TV producer, Pilib Mac Cathmhaoil writing in Lá Nua that if the CCG / ILBF disappeared, votes would follow.24 Over a matter of a few short weeks during Christmas / New Year, pressure built up to secure commitments to continued funding for the CCG / ILBF. However, on 21 January 2008 the NI Assembly Executive passed the three-year budget with no amendments. Lá Nua headlined with ‘Tost na náire faoi Chiste’ / ‘The Silence of Shame about the Fund’ (Author’s translation). In the interim, tensions between the largest party in the Assembly, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the second largest party, the nationalist Sinn Féin (SF), had been increasing. Accusations were traded regarding commitments relating to the timescale for devolution of Policing and Justice Powers and other issues and by mid-March, SF ceased attending business meetings of the Executive, creating the impression that the Assembly was teetering on the edge once more. In March 2008, at a meeting with POBAL, SF acknowledged the considerable difficulties in the CR process and stated that the party intended to place a series of demands before British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. Although SF acknowledged that its first priority was Policing and Justice, it asserted that the Irish Language Act was the second, with a contested sports stadium proposal and CCG / ILBF funding also being priorities.25 Following immediately on a meeting in Downing Street, SF returned to full Assembly business. On 10 June 2008, DCAL Minister Poots was replaced in a Ministerial reshuffle by another hard-line DUP colleague, Gregory Campbell. On 18 June 2008, SF announced that Gordon Brown had agreed to allocate a further two years funding to the CCG / ILBF, totalling £6 million. Responding to the allocation, the newly appointed second DUP Minister for CAL, Gregory Campbell told the media that he welcomed the decision and was looking forward to ensuring equal funding between Irish and Ulster Scots.26 His DUP colleague27 culture spokesperson, Nelson McCausland said that the £6 million agreed was ‘a fig-leaf’ for Sinn Féin to cover the failure to secure the Irish Language Act which, he said, ‘the DUP has vetoed.’28

6 The British Government Commitment to Enact the Irish Language Act

The previous chapters in this book have dealt with the Irish language context in the period preceding the 1998 GFA, the establishment of the devolved Assembly in 1999 and its five-year suspension from 2002. This suspension period was characterised by fragmented stop-start CR talks culminating in October 2006 with the St Andrews Agreement (SAA) which outlined agreed measures designed to re-establish devolution. In the SAA, the British government committed itself to enacting an Irish language Act. The British and Irish governments set a deadline of 26 March 2007 for devolution and warned that if the two key parties, Sinn Féin (SF) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) had not entered power-sharing arrangements by then, they faced prolonged direct rule and the dissolving of the devolved institutions for the foreseeable future. The period 2002–7 witnessed a major shift in the power bases of the four key unionist / nationalist parties. Whereas the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)1 under former leader David Trimble and the SDLP2 under former leader John Hume, wielded the key electoral power in the early period of the first Assembly, (Ian Paisley’s DUP3 refused to take up their seats in the first Executive) the suspension period from 2002–7 saw increasing polarisation and a categoric swing, on the unionist side to the DUP and on the nationalist side, to SF4 under Gerry Adams.5 Immediately post SAA, nationalist-unionist electoral division consolidated as the smaller SDLP and UUP parties vied for votes with their more powerful political rivals in SF and the DUP. In the case of the UUP, this led to a more openly confrontational stance on the Irish language than between 1998–2002. From 2007 on, as well as some sporadic political violence, internal dissention within both the DUP and SF has seen resignations from both parties, including, as noted later, that of then DUP European MP, Jim Allister. He now leads Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV). TUV ate into DUP support in a 2008 by-election,6 and although not returned as MEP in the 2009 European elections, Allister split the unionist 119


vote, taking 13.7 per cent of first preference votes and receiving 70,481 votes in total. Contemporaneous with the most significant shifts in political and CR processes since the Millenium, the mobilisation in favour of legislation, of the Irish speaking community by a small NGO, POBAL was entering a new phase. I shall now describe the events surrounding the demand for the Irish language Act. Following this, I shall present an overview of two government consultations on Irish language legislation promised in the SAA, and then briefly assess the consequences of British CR and its affect on Irish in the NoI from the re-establishment of devolution up to July 2009, encompassing some elements of Irish government reaction. In the second section of this chapter, and in Chapters 7 and 8, I shall detail a range of submissions to the first consultation on proposed legislation in 2006–7.7

Overview of current protections for Irish In the RoI, Irish is recognised in the Constitution as first Official language. It is also subject to the protection of the Official Languages Act 2003. These do not apply in the North. By 2006, with the exception of one clause of the Education Order (NI) 1998, and the references in the GFA, the ECRML was still the only source of protection for Irish in the NoI, as discussed in Chapter 4. With the status of the Irish language in the North insecure, from 2002, the umbrella organisation for the Irish speaking community, POBAL initiated community education, information and consultation on the issue of Irish language legislation. Based on the findings of an international conference in 2004, the NGO issued detailed draft proposals. Further public consultation followed, including sectoral meetings with trade unionists and human rights organisations, with political parties, with Irish language organisations North and South, complemented by a series of public meetings throughout the North. The final POBAL document Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI,8 contains commentary on the rationale behind the recommendations, followed by the detailed legislative proposals, drafted according to feedback during consultation with expert advice and support from Robert Dunbar (Aberdeen University) and Wilson McLeod (University of Edinburgh). Fernand de Varennes (Murdock University, Australia) and Colin Williams (University of Cardiff) also contributed chapters to the final document. It proposes that a rights-based Act should be introduced at Westminster to establish Official status for Irish and provide for a wide range of public services in the fields of broadcasting, education, political institutions, the courts and economic life. To oversee the implementation and enforcement of the Act, the document proposes the establishment of two new bodies, the Office of the Irish Language Commissioner, Coimisinéir na

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Gaeilge TÉ, and Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge. Further, a Schedule would be attached to the Act in which the government and public bodies with greatest responsibility for the provision of services through the medium of Irish would be listed. Other bodies, not on the Schedule, would work with the Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge to prepare clearly defined Language Plans to outline what services they would provide and when.

The St Andrews’ Agreement and proposed Irish language legislation From February 2006, POBAL undertook an intense period of information and lobbying work on the legislative proposals. It also established an all-Ireland Co-ordinating Group to assist it. In October 2006, a series of protracted and tense political talks geared at re-establishing devolution culminated in the publication by the UK and Irish governments of their agreed document, the St Andrews’ Agreement (SAA). In it (UK and Irish Governments, 13 October 2006), the UK government makes the following commitment, ‘The Government will introduce an Irish Language Act reflecting on the experience of Wales and Ireland and work with the incoming Executive to enhance and protect the development of the Irish Language.’ Whilst the commitment was welcomed by human rights and Irish language organisations, it provoked fury from unionists. Jim Allister, then DUP MEP 9 said that protection for Irish would ‘sanitise the British identity’ in the North; the UUP’s Michael McGimpsey10 accused the DUP of being weak in its opposition to Irish during the St Andrews’ CR talks, noting that he had himself been ‘a unionist Minister for Culture’ during the first Assembly (2000–2) and had exercised a veto over the development of the Irish language. UUP member, Roy Garland, stated in a regular newspaper column11 that promoting the Irish language was ‘raising unionist hackles.’ Nationalist politicians, including Seán Farren of the SDLP called upon their unionist counterparts to stop ‘using the Irish language as a political football.’ Farren12 stated that unionist party attacks ‘have little to do with the Irish Language Act and a lot to do with (the) negative political positioning.’ Amending legislation13 arising from the SAA was passed at Westminster in November 2006. To the disappointment of Irish speakers, it makes no mention of an Irish Language Act, but it places a duty upon the NI Assembly Executive to adopt strategies ‘to enhance and protect the development of the Irish language, and ‘to enhance and develop the Ulster Scots language, heritage and culture’, the other clause in the SAA relating to language. In spite of recognition14 by Direct Rule CAL Minister, Maria Eagle, for the POBAL proposals (‘Aithním gur cuimsitheach agus gur mionsonraithe


moltaí POBAL agus go raibh cuid mhór oibre agus saineolas bainte leo’ / ‘I recognise that POBAL’s proposals are comprehensive and detailed, and that a great deal of work and expertise has been involved.’ (Official DCAL English language version of bilingual letter) she declined to use them as the basis of a consultation document on proposed legislation. Instead the POBAL model was one of four (including the Welsh, Scottish and RoI models) outlined in the DCAL consultation document, which finally appeared in December 2006. The foreword (DCAL 2006, p. 3) asserts that the consultation will ensure, ‘gur féidir reachtaíocht a thabhairt chun tosaigh go gasta ina dhiaidh sin, de réir Chomhaontú Chill Rímhinn’/ ‘that legislation can be taken forward quickly thereafter in line with the St Andrews Agreement’ (Official English language version). For legislation to be enacted at Westminster, however, the UK government stated that it must introduce the Act by 19 March 2007 to beat the deadline for re-establishment of devolution set by itself and the Irish government. This was a position challenged by Irish language organisations both in face-to-face meetings15 between POBAL and the Minister, in correspondence16 and in submissions during the first consultation process, discussed in detail later in this chapter. Peter Hain, Secretary of State for NI reinforced the British government’s stand at NI Question Time at Westminster, when in response to a question from DUP MP Peter Robinson, he stated that should the devolved Assembly be reestablished before Irish language legislation was passed at Westminster, the responsibility for any such legislation would pass to the Assembly.17 This was highly significant, given the stated aim of unionists in the media to block any such legislation.18 By the February 2007 elections, the DUP had listed the destruction of the Irish language Act in election manifestos, along with the assertion that, ‘Irish and Gaelic culture should not be allowed to dominate funding.’19

The DCAL consultation document 13 December 2006 The body of the document itself comprises some 59 pages with a further 54 pages of annexes. The annexes include a Financial Impact Assessment, an Equality Impact Assessment, three annexes relating respectively to the GFA, the ECRML and ‘Current government activity’ in respect of the Irish language. Two further annexes give some information on developments in IME and training, and the final annex is a short, descriptive section dealing with provision for the media in Scottish Gaelic, Welsh and Irish. This annex contains the only references in the document to broadcasting and the media. Following the Ministerial Foreword by Maria Eagle, an introductory chapter and state-of-provision description in Chapter 2, four further chapters list proposals and invite comments regarding: the status of Irish; implementation and enforcement of the legislation, capacity issues and then,


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under Further Areas for Consideration, the status of Irish, Education, the NI Assembly, Courts and Tribunals and Streetnames.

The Ministerial Foreword Maria Eagle restates that failure to enact legislation prior to devolution would remove the issue from Westminster responsibility. As noted, this produced responses in a number of submissions, including POBAL, (2007, p. 4) and Iontaobhas Ultach (IU) who state (2007 Submission)20 that it is imperative to enact the legislation at Westminster to ensure ‘adequate support for Irish language broadcasting, a matter reserved to Westminster.’ In addition, it points out that the Act ‘was promised by, and only by, the British government’ and that the North ‘is currently in an unstable political state, and a new assembly, on the past records of such Assemblies, will be taken up more with shadow boxing and posturing than with developing new legislation.’

The Introduction The introduction (DCAL 2006, p. 6) contains a number of comments juxtaposing ‘bailíocht an éilimh ar reachtaíocht Ghaeilge’ / ‘the validity of the desire for Irish language legislation’, with, ‘réimse d’íogaireachtaí polaitiúla is gá a chur san áireamh go cúramach agus moltaí á dtabhairt chun tosaigh maidir le reachtaíocht Ghaeilge i dTuaisceart Éireann’ / ‘a range of political sensitivities that need to be fully considered in bringing forward proposals for Irish language legislation in Northern Ireland.’ It states, Agus an comhairliúchán seo á thabhairt chun tosaigh, aithníonn an Rialtas go mb’fhéidir, i gcás casta Thuaisceart Éireann, go mbeadh mianaidhmeanna dlisteanacha pobail amháin (cearta na nGaeilgeoirí ar aitheantas oifigiúil agus ar chosaint don teanga) ina gcúiseanna imní macánta ag pobal eile (buaireamh an phobail Aontachtaigh go bhféadfaí baint dá bhféiniúlacht Bhriotanach). In bringing forward this consultation, Government acknowledges that, in the complex situation in Northern Ireland, the legitimate aspirations of one community (the rights of Irish speakers to official recognition and protection of the language) may be the genuinely held fears of another (the concern of the Unionist community that their British identity may be undermined). (DCAL’s Official English language version) It (DCAL 2006, p. 6) concludes, ‘Is ceann d’aidhmeanna pholasaí Gaeilge an Rialtais é, mar sin, go dtabharfaí aghaidh ar na híogaireachtaí polaitiúla sa dóigh gurbh fhéidir buntáistí cultúrtha agus teangeolaíocha na teanga a roinnt arís i measc na bpobal i dTuaisceart Éireann.’ / ‘One of the aims of


Government’s Irish language policy is, therefore, to address the political sensitivities, so that the cultural and linguistic benefits of the language can once more be shared across the communities in Northern Ireland’ (DCAL Official English language version.) Among those to challenge the juxtaposition of rights with ‘sensitivities’ were POBAL, Comhaltas Uladh (CU) and the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ). POBAL (2007, p. 12) notes that DCAL’s position encourages a view that Irish cannot be a shared language and must therefore give way before the aspirations to Britishness of unionists. It further notes that where consensus is not anticipated, the argument for a rights-based approach for legislation is further enhanced.

The proposals and feedback on the DCAL consultation paper Four chapters describe specific issues, and in most cases, put forward some limited views on the manner in which the four models (legislative models in Wales, Scotland and the RoI and the POBAL proposals) deal with them: This approach, however, is not a consistent one. For example there is little reference to capacity building experience from other jurisdictions, and as noted later, CAJ (2007, p. 2 para C) points out that the POBAL model ‘is the least explored in the consultation paper.’ DCAL asserts (2006, p. 30) that demand for public services in Irish is ‘relatively modest’21 though it notes this may be due to ‘the level of services available’ through Irish. It continues, ‘D’fhéadfadh sé go mbeadh de thoradh ar reachtaíocht ... go n-ardódh an leibhéal éilimh ar sheirbhísí poiblí trí Ghaeilge’ / ‘Legislation ... could have the effect of raising the level of demand for public services in Irish’. In the next section (DCAL 2006, p. 30) it appears to show partiality in possible approaches to increased demand, saying it will show, ‘na bealaí a bhféadfadh scéim teanga cur chuige incriminteach’ / ‘the potential for a language scheme to facilitate an incremental approach’, whilst a rightsbased approach, ‘a bhionn níos indibhidiúlaíche ina nádúr’ / ‘being more individualistic in nature’ could create ‘ceangal díréireach ... do chomhlachtaí poiblí.’ / ‘a disproportionate requirement on public bodies.’ Schemes allow for ‘solúbthacht’ / ‘flexiblity,’ (DCAL 2006, p. 41), and for developing ‘go hincriminteach’ / ‘incrementally,’22 but a rights-based approach is termed disadvantageous (DCAL 2006, p. 40). The ECRML approach is referred to as ‘incriminteach’ / ‘incremental’, ‘céimnithe’ / ‘graduated’ and ‘níba thomhaiste’ / ‘more measured.’ (DCAL 2006, p. 54). POBAL (2007, p. 6) rejects this interpretation which it calls, ‘míchruinn agus ar an chuid is measa de, baineann sé drochúsáid as an Chairt’ / ‘inaccurate and at worst a misuse of the Charter.’ Other organisations (Conradh na Gaeilge, Stádas, CAJ) highlight further important inaccuracies and omissions in the DCAL document, as shall be


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detailed later. In its submission, Foras na Gaeilge (FnaG) are among a number of organisations (POBAL, Conradh na Gaeilge, Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge, Glór na nGael, Comhaltas Uladh, CAJ) who express concern at the omission of broadcasting from the document. FnaG (2007, p. 3) states, ‘Níl aon cheist ach go bhfuil ról lárnach ag an chraoltóireacht i dtodhchaí na teanga agus sa phróiseas normalaithe. Gan freastal a bheith á dhéanamh ó thaobh craoltóireachta de ní féidir a rá go bhfuil freastal mar is cuí á dhéanamh ar phobal labhartha na Gaeilge.’ / ‘Broadcasting is undoubtedly central to the future of the language and the normalisation process. A failure to cater for the Irish-speaking community in terms of broadcasting must be seen as a failure to cater adequately for them.’ (FnaG’s English language version of submission). A Financial Impact Assessment23 consisting of 7 annexes, including an initial Equality Impact Assessment (EQIA), required under the North’s Equality legislation, Section 75, closes the consultation document (DCAL 2006, p. 68) saying, Is é dearcadh RCEF go bhféadfadh tionchar dearfach a bheith ag an pholasaí Bille Gaeilge a thabhairt isteach ar chainteoirí Gaeilge agus dá réir sin go hindíreach ar Chaitlicigh, ar náisiúnaithe agus ar dhaoine óga, i.e. na grúpaí ar dóiche go mbeadh Gaeilge acu. I dtaca leis an Mheasúnú Tionchair Chomhionannais (MTC) a cuireadh i gcrích, is é cinneadh RCEF nach bhfuil aon tionchair díobhálacha ann.24 It is DCAL’s view that the policy to introduce an Irish Language Bill can have a positive impact on Irish speakers and therefore indirectly on Roman Catholics, nationalists and younger people, which are the groups most likely to speak Irish. In relation to the Equality Impact Assessment carried out to date, DCAL has found no adverse impacts. (DCAL Official English Language version) In spite of its positive conclusion, the DCAL document states that a further EQIA will be carried out in January 2007, during the first consultation (DCAL EQIA 2007). This later EQIA upholds the finding of no adverse impact in respect of the political institutions (DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 10 para 6.13), and does not rule out any of the models in respect of the courts (although it details at length concerns about delays in proceedings25). However, it is in the area of education that the EQIA departs completely from the earlier finding. It (DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 9, para 6.12.8) asserts, D’fhéadfadh tionchar diúltach a bheith ag cur chuige bunaithe ar chearta i dtaca le soláthar Gaelscolaíochta de ar an chomhionannas ar an ábhar go bhfuil cur chun cinn na Gaelscolaíochta chomh dlúthcheangailte le cleamhnú polaitiúil agus reiligiúnach i dTÉ. D’fhéadfaí dearcadh ar

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chéim le ceart ar leith a thabhairt don tuairim aonarach seo ar oideachas mar chóir fhabhrach do ghrúpa reiligiúnach (nó polaitiúil) seachas grúpaí eile.26 To extend a rights based approach to the provision of Irish Medium education could impact adversely on equality since the promotion of Irish Medium education is so closely aligned to political and religious affiliation in NI. A step to accord a particular right to this single view of education could be viewed as one religious (or political) grouping being treated more favourably than others. (Official DCAL English language version) Further, it states (DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 9 para 6.12.9) that a schemes-based approach would have less potential for adverse impacts because the placing of a statutory duty on a public body does not create a statutory right to a service. This strikingly controversial finding is challenged in several submissions, as noted later. Once again, the rights of Irish speakers are juxtaposed against the ‘sensitivities’ of those opposed to the language and its use in public. The document (DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 20, para 7.1) says, Measann RCEF go bhful sé d’acmhainn ag tabhairt isteach Bille Gaeilge caidreamh maith a fheabhsú, nó beidh sé d’acmhainn aige ardán níos inrochtana ag gach cuid den phobal a thabhairt don Ghaeilge. Os a choinne sin, tá íogaireacht sna pobail Aontachta / Phrotastúnacha i dtaobh úsáid na Gaeilge i ngnó poiblí agus is gá sin a chur san áireamh. DCAL considers that the introduction of an Irish Language Bill has the potential to improve good relations, as it will potentially give the Irish language a more accessible platform for all sections of the community. On the other hand, there is a sensitivity in the Unionist / Protestant communities to the use of Irish in public business that needs to be taken account of. (Official English language version) A summary of responses to the January EQIA, (DCAL EQIA Summary 2007) records criticism from the Equality Commission that DCAL had not provided ‘... any quantitative or qualitative evidence to support the idea put forward ... that the Unionist community had concerns that its British identity may be undermined by Irish language legislation’ (DCAL EQIA Summary 2007, p.17, para 6.6). DCAL quotes (EQIA Summary, 2007, p. 3, para 1.5) the following from the Equality Commission’s submission, The notion that providing equality or protection for one group limits their availability for another is both unfounded in itself and acts to the detriment of all who seek to live in a society that is fair and equitable and should be avoided in the drafting of public policy.


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The government response to the consultation results While several thousand Irish speakers marched into Belfast city centre in support of the POBAL proposals, DCAL published the draft indicative clauses and consultation results, accounting for submissions in a rather different way than they were to do later, as I shall detail. DCAL states that it received 668 substantive replies to the consultation document plus some 5000 names on various petitions. It (DCAL March 2007, p. 6) comments, Astu siúd a chuir fhreagra isteach, bhí tromlach thar na bearta (93 %) ar son reachtaíocht Ghaeilge a thabhairt isteach; agus bhí mionlach beag daoine nár aontaigh leis an mholadh ar chor ar bith. Luaigh na daoine a bhí ina éadan (7 %) cúrsaí costais agus d’aithin siad go mbeadh reachtaíocht ina hábhar deighilte go polaitiúil. (See endnote on translation) This reflects a significant level of interest in the issues raised in the paper. Of those who responded, the overwhelming majority (93 per cent) favoured the adoption of Irish language legislation; while a small minority of respondents strongly disagreed with the proposal. Those in favour preferred a rights-based approach. Those against (7 per cent) cited cost issues and the perception that legislation would be politically divisive. (Official DCAL English language version, see endnote on translation)27 In spite of the overwhelmingly positive response to the consultation, the UK Government did not enact the legislation as promised. Instead, on 13 March 2007, it announced a further 12-week consultation, which would therefore over run the deadline for the re-establishment of devolution. Responsibility for the proposed legislation would thereby pass to an Assembly whose two unionist parties had stated their intention to destroy it. POBAL accused Downing Street of acting in ‘extreme bad faith’,28 whilst Irish News columnist, Robert McMillen commented that in spite of the overwhelming support for the proposed legislation, ‘46 submissions decided that Irish speakers shouldn’t have rights and so the diligent work by the many was scuppered by the few.’29 The SDLP accused the British government of ‘pandering’ to ‘the virulent anti-Irish lobby in the DUP’ and called on Downing Street to ‘stand by its commitment, abandon further consultation and begin the process of enacting legislation.’30 SF, meanwhile, called for street protest in support of the legislation. POBAL wrote to British Prime Minister, Tony Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern. In correspondence on Blair’s behalf from Maria Eagle, by this time Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for NI, Eagle reiterates the SAA commitment, states that two consultations were undertaken and that the matter now lies with the Assembly.31 There is, she states no reason why the Assembly could not legislate on ‘reserved’ matters with the consent of the


Secretary of State. Correspondence from Dermot Ahern, Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Éamon Ó Cuív,32 in turn reiterates the relevant section of the SAA, notes that departmental officials have met with nationalist political parties and says that they will also meet with ‘their British counterparts and with POBAL ... in the near future.’ In spite of the anger of the Irish speaking community, however, the failure to fulfil the SAA did not appear to be sufficiently central to the Irish government or to either Northern nationalist party to endanger their participation in a re-established Assembly. Nonetheless, the Irish language Act remained in use as a bargaining chip in the CR negotiations, as shown by a statement from Secretary of State, Peter Hain.33 In it, Hain tells the leaders of the DUP and SF that if they do not act on the deadline for re-establishment of the Assembly, then, ‘The Assembly will close down, the salaries will stop, the allowances will stop... The Irish language legislation will be taken forward at Westminster.’ DUP spokesperson on Culture, Nelson McCausland,34 a staunch opponent of Irish language legislation, notes, ‘The message is that if unionists go into an executive and the assembly is operational the Irish language act will become a devolved matter and unionists can veto it. Once again Downing Street and the Northern Ireland Office have politicised the Irish language.’35 When a date was subsequently agreed for the entry into a new Assembly, Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP, and newly nominated First Minister for the North, said, ‘The claim that an Irish language Act will be forced upon us is now gone forever ... . No Assembly the DUP lead will pass such an act.’36

The second DCAL consultation document The second DCAL consultation document (13 March 2007)37 reports the results of the first consultation and contains draft indicative legislative clauses. It is a 28-page document in the English language version (31 pages in Irish), with a Ministerial Foreword, Introduction, Overview of the Indicative clauses and finally, the Indicative clauses themselves. The first paragraph of its Foreword acknowledges the high level of response to the first consultation and the overwhelmingly positive support for rights-based legislation. It (DCAL 2007, p. 3) asserts that government supports the desire of Irish speakers to use the language but, ‘Aithnímid, ag an am chéanna, áfach, go bhfuil éagsúlacht shuntasach leathan tuairimí ann laistigh de Thuaisceart Éireann maidir le ról na Gaeilge sa saol poiblí.’ / ‘At the same time, however, we recognise that there is a pronounced divergence of views within in Northern Ireland with respect to the role of the Irish language in public life’ (Official DCAL English language version).. The document, which contains no proposals in respect of education, broadcasting, the use of Irish in the political institutions or the status of the Irish language purports to represent a ‘middle-ground’ approach to the issue


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and to draw heavily on the experience of Wales and the South of Ireland. Both of these assertions are rejected by all of the key Irish language organisations and the two nationalist parties, SF and the SDLP. With elections for the proposed new Assembly over, unionist politicians focused on rallying opposition to the legislation through the media.38 The UUP called for united action against the Act39 whilst the DUP invited the public to call in to its offices and sign a letter stating that the legislation, ‘offends our community.’40 DUP Culture spokesperson, Nelson McCausland stated that Irish was a SF ‘cultural weapon ... that will not be decommissioned. Indeed, one might well regard their demand for an Irish language Act as part of their cultural rearmament.’41

The proposed legislation and the new Assembly On Monday 2 April 2007, the new ministerial portfolios were shared out as stipulated in the GFA, using the D’Hondt mechanism. This is a mathematical formula which reflects the strength of a party’s total support, based on its share of votes in relation to seats won. Irish speakers watched anxiously to see which party would appoint the Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure with core responsibility for language issues. SF had three opportunities to select the Ministry, whilst the SDLP had one. Both nationalist parties bypassed the portfolio. Culture, Arts and Leisure was the last Ministry to be allocated, claimed finally by the DUP. The period following the re-establishment of devolution on 8 May 2007 saw unprecedented attacks from unionist politicians on the Irish language, both in the media and in the Assembly chamber. In addition to bitter, ugly contributions to debates on IME (18 September 2007; 13 November 2007, 14 January 2008, 13 May 2008), the UUP proposed a formal motion42 to ban the use of spoken and written Irish within the Assembly (9 October 2007) and announced43 the reversal (1 October 2007) of the limited but positive Department of Health Irish language advertising and publicity policy introduced in 2000 by the then Minister.44 Once devolution was restored, DUP politicians began to brief the media of their intention to put an end to the Irish language Act.45 On 16 October 2007, Edwin Poots, the first of three DUP Culture Ministers to date, duly published the results of the second DCAL consultation on the Irish language Act in an official statement to the Assembly. Rather than dividing the responses according to ‘substantive submissions’ and petitions as in the first process, the long-awaited results simply state (DCAL October 2007, p. 4, point. 2) that of 11,629 responses received, 7,500 (68 per cent) supported Irish language legislation and 3,500 were opposed to legislation of any kind. DCAL (October 2007, p. 4, point 5) says that ‘approximately’ 170 organisations made submissions. It further states (DCAL October 2007, p. 4, point 3) that ‘approximately’ 80 per cent of responses were in the form of templates, but gives no information as to

130 Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada Table 6.1 Results of Two DCAL consultations on Proposed Irish language legislation Number of first consultation responses (Dec 2006–March 2007) Total no. of responses Petitions, postcards and advertisement Revised total For legislation Against legislation

668 4,566 5,234 5,187 47

99% 1%

Number of second consultation responses (March–June 2007) Total no of responses Petitions

11,000 629

Revised total For legislation Against legislation

11,629 7,500 4,129

65%a 35%b

Note: a This is the figure given in tabular form in the DCAL Summary. However, in the written analysis (p. 4, point 2) the figure is given as 68 per cent b This is the figure given in tabular form in the DCAL Summary. However, in the written analysis, (p. 4, point 2) the figure is given as 32 per cent Source: DCAL Summary of Responses to 2nd Consultation October 2007

what percentage of these either supported or opposed legislation (DCAL Oct 2007, p. 5). The DCAL Summary presents the figures in relation to each of the two consultations, as shown in Table 6.1. As noted above, the DCAL Summary (October 2007) contains contradictory figures in tabular and written form. Also, the tabular figures relating to the first consultation differ from those given in the second DCAL consultation paper (13 March 2007), in that the DCAL Summary (October 2007) cites 99 per cent of respondents to the first consultation as supporting the legislation, as opposed to the 93 per cent previously stated. The DCAL Summary (October 2007) lists some of the points made by respondents to the second consultation but uses vague and unquantifiable terminology, ‘a large number of responses,’ ‘a common comment’ (October 2007, p. 5, point 8); ‘some respondents’ (October 2007, p. 5, point 9); ‘a number of respondents’ (October 2007, p. 5, point 11); ‘some organisations felt’ (October 2007, p. 6, point 17). The submissions to the second consultation have not themselves been made public. DCAL presents the overall results of the consultations as shown in Table 6.2. According to the DCAL Summary (October 2007, p. 7, point 14), Irish language organisations preferred a rights-based approach, whilst government and public sector bodies tended to emphasise a language schemes approach. This appears to indicate that these bodies did not oppose the proposed legislation in principle. When the results of the first and second consultations are combined, DCAL’s figures show 75 per cent of respondents in favour of the legislation, and 25 per cent opposed (see Table 6.2). In spite of these findings, the DUP Minister declared himself ‘unpersuaded that there is a compelling case for bringing forward Irish language legislation’,46 citing the

UK Government Commitment to Legislate Table 6.2

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Figures for both consultations on proposed Irish language legislation

Overall total number of responses (1st and 2nd consultation) In favour of legislation Against legislation

16,863 12,687 4,176

75% 25%

Source: DCAL Summary of Responses to 2nd Consultation October 2007

‘divisive’ nature of the proposal and the high cost of legislation. The nationalist parties, although eager to condemn the announcement, did not appear to have any strategy for challenging it. Following Poots’ announcement, there was a unionist-led media storm47 when Monica McWilliams, Chief Commissioner of the NI Human Rights Commission (NIHRC)48 wrote to new Secretary of State, Shaun Woodward to ask how he now intended to ensure compliance with international human rights standards on minoritised languages. Woodward reiterated the British government position, that the Irish language legislation was now a matter for the devolved government. McWilliams contended that refusal by the devolved institutions to meet commitments did not release Britain from its international treaty obligations, a point reiterated by the NIHRC in its 2009 submission to the Committee of Experts on the ECRML.49 Having met with representatives of POBAL in 2007, the Advisory Group on the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities took up the issue (2007, para 190), urging the British government to, ‘ensure that the process of adopting the Irish language Act is not dominated by political considerations, and reflects as far as possible the needs of the Irish-speaking population as set out in the responses submitted to the Government’s public consultation process.’50 As noted in Chapter 4, following representations from POBAL, supported by the NIHRC and CAJ, the United Nations Economic and Social Committee (UNESC) noted the disparity in legislative protections for Welsh in Wales, Gaelic in Scotland and Irish in the North and recommended that, ‘the State party or the devolved administration in Northern Ireland, adopt an Irish language Act’.51

Irish language issues: Attack, react, attack In addition to incessant negative references and debates around Irish in the Assembly chamber, in December 2007, as noted in Chapter 5, the CAL Minister announced that under the draft budget, agreed by all parties, funding for the CCG / Irish Language Film Board would end in March 2009. The apparent unwillingness of nationalist parties to take a stand on Irish language issues created initial confusion and then anger. In January 2008, the Irish language newspaper, Lá Nua, published a front page article


with pictures of the six SF and SDLP ministers and junior minister, and the headline, ‘Cá raibh na hAirí seo le linn sceanairt Poots?’ / 'Where were these Ministers during Poots’ hatchet job?’ On the inside pages, there is a further half page column piece by veteran reporter, Eoghan Ó Neill entitled, ‘Cá raibh sibh, a chairde sa chúirt?’ / ‘Where were you, our friends on the inside?’52 (Author’s translations.) The following day, the paper published a lengthy letter from independent television producer, Pilib Mac Cathmhaoil,53 warning that nationalist parties would lose votes if they did not defend funding for the CCG / ILBF. The same day carried an editorial entitled, ‘Na cairde nár tháinig i gcabhair ... go fóill’ / ‘The friends who have not come to our aid ... yet’54 (Author’s translation). The addition of the qualification ‘go fóill’ / ‘yet’ of course, implies the opportunity for nationalist politicians to redeem themselves. Perhaps it may also reflect the double bind in which many minoritised language communities find themselves. How far can they go in criticising the parties most likely to act in a positive manner on their behalf? Funding to Lá Nua was ended by Foras na Gaeilge in 2008 resulting in the loss of eight posts, as noted in Chapter 4. SF members of Foras’s Board55 defended the decision, although the party’s president, Gerry Adams later commended the newspaper. One of Lá Nua’s former editors states that the paper was closed because of its criticism of SF and ‘the way the Irish language was being treated in the “new dispensation” between SF and the DUP.’56 Since the announcement of Poots’ decision on the Irish Language Act, DUP spokespersons have repeatedly cited this, and increased provision for Ulster Scots, as proof of the party’s effectiveness. Poots himself praised his party’s entry into the devolved Assembly since it had enabled it to put an end to the Irish language Act.57 At the same time, The Irish News reported that in the finalised NI budget 2008–11, for the first time funding for Ulster Scots for each of the three years would exceed that of funding for Irish.58 The CAL Minister’s fellow party member, Jimmy Spratt59 congratulated Poots for ‘rubbishing the Irish language Act’ and noted, ‘For the first time, funding to Ulster-Scots will be greater than funding to the Irish sector. This money can be used for capacity building in order to increase community activity within the Unionist and Protestant family.’ On 11 March, prospective DUP party leader, Nigel Dodds noted during a BBC radio interview that there had been an end to the Irish language Act, ‘courtesy of the DUP.’ Ian Paisley signalling his resignation as First Minister, noted in March 2008 that without his party entering devolved government, ‘there would have been that language change.’ On 3 March, Poots acknowledged that since his appointment nine months earlier, he had accepted no invitations to Irish language events, but had attended five Ulster Scots events as Minister in the same period. Poots defended his decision by saying that since he did not speak Irish he would have little to offer.60 Asked by The Irish News if he therefore spoke


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Ulster Scots, his department replied that he did not but that this did not matter since no Ulster Scots had been used at any of the ‘Ulster Scots’ events.61 In April 2008, Gregory Campbell was appointed as the new DUP CAL Minister, charged with progressing the Assembly’s duty to develop two strategies, one for Irish language and one for Ulster Scots. Campbell announced that there would in fact be a single strategy. Acknowledging that Irish is more developed than Ulster Scots, he states, ‘I am adamant that I will look at a strategy that narrows or eliminates the disparity.’62 Questioned as to when he would introduce the Irish language Act, he stated, ‘I do not intend to do so.’63 Shortly before the end of his period as CAL Minister, Campbell awarded £250,000 to the Ulster Scots Agency to employ six additional workers.64 In June 2009, Campbell was replaced as CAL Minister by DUP colleague, Nelson McCausland, described in the media as, ‘at the forefront of the DUP policy of investing in the Ulster-Scots sector to help it catch up with the large Irish language sector.’65 The NI Assembly has ten departments plus the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). As well as the SF Deputy First Minister,66 nationalists hold four ministries in the Assembly.67 There are positive examples of engagement with the Irish language in nationalist-controlled departments. However, it can be argued that these simply underline the existence of a dual system within devolved government, which further marginalises the language and discourages Irish speakers from engaging with the institution as a whole. Of the four nationalist ministers, SF’s Minister for Education, Caitríona Ruane arguably has greatest day-today responsibility for the Irish language. Ruane acted rapidly upon taking office to approve the development proposals by three Irish Medium schools, one of them by Gaelscoil Éanna, whose funding had previously been refused in 2006 by the British Direct Rule Minister, Maria Eagle. The SF Minister has made consistent positive public statements about the importance of IME and in 2009 she introduced an Irish language administrative policy into the DENI. However, the DENI’s Review of Irish Medium Education published in December 2008, begun under Direct Rule, controversially states that IM primary schools should be federated with EM schools and that post-primary IME should be progressed through the establishment of units / streams in EM schools. Ruane has refused development proposals from the small free-standing IM Coláiste Speirín in Tyrone (one of only two free-standing post-primary IM schools in the North), arguing that the school has insufficient numbers to meet viability criteria of 50 pupils in first year enrolment over 3 consequtive years. Many IME supporters argue that the criteria are too high and that by the time they are reached in the case of Coláiste Speirín, in excess of 400 children will have already gone through local IM primary schools without the opportunity to continue in secondary IME. In August 2009,


Coláiste Speirín announced it would be unable to open for the 2009–10 term. Its pupils must now either enroll in EM schools locally or travel considerable distances to Belfast or into the RoI for IM education. At the time of writing, it appears that overall demand and community unease at the direction of DENI policy on IME may force DENI to consider a second free-standing IM school in the near future, although it does not appear that this will be in the Sperrins area. Conor Murphy, SF Minister for Regional Development (DRD) has confirmed that he will take some ‘céimeanna beaga, praiticiúla’ (‘small, practical steps’)68 to improve basic Irish language administrative services within his Department including an increased use of Irish on the website (along with Ulster Scots and a range of ethnic minority languages). With his encouragement, the North’s public transport company, Translink, has produced some limited Irish language materials and introduced an element of bilingual signage in a new train station in Newry. Murphy has drafted a policy69 regarding some use of bilingual road signage in town / village place names; certain supplementary plates to standard warning signs, for example, schools; and signs funded by owners of private premises relating to tourist destinations, churches and certain commercial premises. Bilingual signs will only be placed where a local council has requested them, is willing to pay for them, can show local support and has undertaken a full equality (EQIA) and other statutory appraisals. The policy appears somewhat limited in scope and its proposed application seems rather indirect and complicated. In addition, the DRD states that since the policy has ‘cross-cutting’ implications, it will require the approval of the Assembly Executive. Based on current experience, it appears unlikely that any proposal with positive implications for the status of the Irish language, however limited, will survive such a requirement. The one SDLP Minister, Margaret Ritchie (Department of Social Development) appears less engaged with Irish language issues. In December 2008, SDLP MLA Dominic Bradley stated his intention to introduce an Assembly Private Members Bill regarding Irish language legislation. The draft bill, identical to the POBAL proposals in all but name70 is due to go forward in coming months, although leadership changes within the SDLP may impact on this.71 Whether the Bill will get beyond the earliest stages of debate remains to be seen. LPP in the North is now influenced by British government actions, by unionist control of core language responsibilities in the NI Assembly and by LPP in the RoI. In contrast with some of the rhetoric around all-Ireland approaches, since the GFA no sustained attempts have been undertaken to agree all-Ireland LPP strategy in consultation with the Irish speaking community, in spite of the establishment of two separate bodies theoretically capable of doing so. In addition to Foras na Gaeilge, in July 2004 the RGPTG / DCRGA set up Fóram na Gaeilge, made up of all-Ireland party-political nominees and independent of the CR structures. Although both bodies discussed strategic


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proposals, RGPTG / DCRGA Minister, Éamon Ó Cuív referred the 20-year plan to his own Department, thus confining its scope to the RoI alone. In December 2006, the Irish government published a statement on the Irish language unequivocally focusing its vision on the South.72 In 2008, consultation meetings were held in the South alone on Ó Cuív’s draft 20-year plan.73 Ó Cuív acknowledges that the 20-year ‘national’ plan for the Irish Language is confined to the 26 counties, and that intervening in LPP in the North is beyond his authority.74 The draft plan will depend on an analysis grounded exclusively in Constitutional, legislative and demographic circumstances applicable only in the South. Attempts to implement elements of such a plan in the North risk being mismatched, ad hoc and dependent upon that rare commodity, good will. Meanwhile, the North appears little closer to the adoption of favourable LPP. As noted, at a time of unprecedented economic pressure, Taoiseach Brian Cowan75 has rejected the proposed closure of the RGPTG / DCRGA, commiting himself to support the Gaeltacht. But Opposition leader, Enda Kenny has said if Fine Gael wins what is likely to be a close next election, he will implement McCarthy’s cuts. Leaked minutes of a Southern government meeting also reveal a long-standing North South Ministerial Council (NSMC) agreement in principle ‘to collapse’ the Irish language organisations.76 Without formal documentation or prior consultation, in December 2009, the NSMC further ordered the reconfiguring of Foras na Gaeilge support to 19 core-funded Irish language NGOs. From 2010, applications will only be accepted from one, or a limited number of service-providing advocacy organisations or from integrated local area projects (NSMC 2 Dec 2009, point 10), clearly endangering future funding of a significant number of the 19 organisations. The absence of transparency and accountability77 reinforces the democratic deficit and undermines fair treatment, independence and good governance. The precise relationship between cuts, forced mergers and increasing political influence over Irish language NGOs is as yet unclear. It is therefore difficult to fully assess what drives the threat to core-funded organisations. The role and aims of a hostile Northern CAL Minister in shaping future funding raises considerable doubts. However the ending of funding to any given organisation cannot proceed unless the North’s nationalist parties are either ineffective or complicit.78 At the time of writing, it is difficult to make definitive statements about what the future holds. In addition to threatened closure or hostile merger, recent experience in relation to the Irish language print media indicates a top-down trend towards competitive tendering, which can force funding below subsistence levels, disempower and divide. Tendering, initially limited to several ill-fated newspapers, may prove to have knock-on effects for all. As a result of these latest developments, the North’s Irish speaking community as a whole may soon find that its hard-fought gains, specific expertise and, crucially, its valued independence have all been eroded in ways that will have far-reaching implications.


The submissions to the consultation process on proposed Irish language legislation from Irish language organisations In this section, I shall examine submissions to the first DCAL consultation on proposed Irish language legislation from seven Irish language NGOs; POBAL, who spearheaded the work on the Irish language Act, Comhaltas Uladh, the Northern section of Conradh na Gaeilge.; Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge, Conradh na Gaeilge, Gael Linn and Glór na nGael, as well as the campaign umbrella group, Stádas. These submissions were selected because these NGOs carry out work in the NoI or have specific experience on legislation in the RoI. Section three will examine submissions from the North’s Irish language statutory sector; Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta / the Council for Irish Medium Education (CnaGta), from the language board, Foras na Gaeilge (FnaG) and from Iontaobhas Ultach / The Ultach Trust (IU). In Chapters 7 and 8, I shall examine submissions from the five main political parties in the North and then the responses of several key public sector and non-Irish language NGOs, before analysing a 20 per cent sample of responses from individuals. In Chapter 9, I shall examine in greater detail LPP within CR in Q / C, prior to making my overall conclusions. In the first part of this section, I shall examine initially the POBAL proposals published in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI (February 2006)79 and POBAL’s own submission. I shall then study submissions from the six other NGOs, and shall organise their comments according to the layout and format of the DCAL paper to which the submissions respond. POBAL was established in 1998 to develop expertise, strategies and leadership for the embryonic sector in the North and to promote the status of Irish. Comhaltas Uladh (CU) was founded in 1926 to carry out the work of Conradh na Gaeilge (CnaG) in the ten counties of Ulster and Louth, with the objective of encouraging the speaking of Irish. It runs classes and undertakes publication work. Conradh na Gaeilge (CnaG) has branches throughout the country, and others worldwide. Its members work on a voluntary basis. Established in 1943, Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge (CNnaG) is the Dublin-based central council of voluntary sector Irish language NGOs. It works primarily in the SoI. Gael Linn (GL) has been active for over 50 years. Its aims are to promote the Irish language and its heritage throughout the country in different ways, through music, song, debating and courses in schools and outside and through sport. Founded in 1962, Glór na nGael (GnanG) was established as a competition between communities in the promotion of the Irish language. Stádas is an RoI-based umbrella campaign formed in 2004 to promote Irish as an Official language of the European Union, a status achieved in January 2007. The organisation now monitors its implementation. The submissions vary in length from 2 pages in total to POBAL’s 38 pages with the document Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI (POBAL


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2006a) attached as an appendix. All seven NGOs support the POBAL model for rights-based legislation. Three of the submissions, from POBAL, CU and CNnaG, detail the reasons for each NGOs support for this particular approach, citing the contested circumstances of the North; the unlikelihood of achieving all-party support for legislation; and the consensus achieved during POBAL’s community consultation and drafting process (POBAL 2007, p. 5). CU notes that DCAL is ambiguous when it asserts that there are disadvantages to a rights-based approach. The organisation says, ‘Má is mí-bhuntáistí iad, ní hé do lucht na Gaeilge, atá ag iarraidh an Achta, atá siad mí-bhuntáisteach’ / ‘If they are disadvantageous, they are not disadvantageous to the Irish speaking community, the community which is asking for the Act’ (CU’s use of bold for emphasis; CU’s own English language version of submission).80 CNnaG’s submission is 10 pages long, and includes a resolution passed in support of POBAL at a one-day conference in Dublin.81 CNnaG (2007, p. 3) cites experience with the Official Languages Act (2003) in the RoI and the trend in Wales towards new rights-based legislation.

Status of the Irish language All seven of the NGO submissions call for Official status for Irish, with specific references made to the creation of rights to give shape and form to this status82; the need for political as well as economic, social and cultural rights (CnaG 2007, p. 2), and inaccurate and overly narrow DCAL interpretation of the implications of EU Official status for Irish (Stádas 2007, p. 1). Education Six of the seven submissions refer to the creation of rights in education. POBAL rejects the assertion in the January 19 DCAL Equality Impact Assessment that the creation of rights in education would give rise to inequality. The group notes, ‘Is é a mhaítear anseo gur oideachas stáit amháin, trí mheán an Bhéarla, atá ina cheart. Seasann sé seo an reachtaíocht chomhionannais ar a cloigeann.’ / ‘The implications are that only state education through the medium of English is a right. This turns equality legislation on its head’ (POBAL’s English language version of submission).83 POBAL makes detailed proposals for IME and children who have received primary education through Irish. It notes that the DCAL document contains no proposals for the Irish language outside IME. It calls for adequate funding for teaching of Irish in EME, and the right for all parents who wish to to have their children learn Irish as a school subject. Resourcing, teacher training, curriculum support and development are also raised. POBAL highlights the lack of significant references to further and higher education (FHE) in the DCAL document, thus neglecting the needs of fluent adults and learners and impacting upon capacity building. POBAL proposes the placing of a duty


upon the DEL and on third level institutions to devise adequate courses to meet the needs of the community and to train those who will deliver services under the Act.84 CU, CNnaG and CnaG all agree with a rights-based approach to IME, to teaching of Irish in EME and to provision of FHE courses and training. CNnaG (2007, p. 8) and CnaG (2007, pp. 7–9) quote the POBAL proposals in detail. Specific issues raised include: the teaching of Irish in primary schools,85 the recurring issue of Irish as a subject in EME in the RoI (CNnaG 2007, p. 8); IME primary children for whom there is no IM post-primary provision; IM digital curriculum services, cross sectoral issues, like health (CnaG 2007, p. 6); an all-Ireland strategy with universities on teacher training, and training for other professionals, and provision of support and teaching materials (GnanG 2007, p. 4). The use of Irish in the courts All seven of the submissions call for a rights-based approach to the use of Irish in the administration of justice. POBAL (2007, p. 36) calls for the repeal of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) to which I have referred in Chapter 4, and the creation of guaranteed rights for any person to use Irish in hearings before any court or tribunal. POBAL (2007, p. 36), CNnaG (2007, p. 9) and GnanG (2007, p. 3) state that there should be no disadvantage or financial charge to the individual and a right to documentation in Irish relating to or issuing from the courts. POBAL, GnanG (2007, pp. 3–4) and CNnaG (2007, p. 9) call for certain documentation in Irish, including passports, visas, birth, death, marriage and civil partnership certificates and for marriage and civil partnership services through Irish. There are challenges to the accuracy of the DCAL paper: CnaG (2007, p. 11) cites Ó Beoláin v. Fahy (2001, 2 I.R. 279) as evidence of the right to use Irish in RoI courts, Stádas (2007, p. 1) states that Article 9(2) of the OLA 2003 is generally viewed as conveying a right to receive correspondence in Irish, and POBAL (2007, p. 5) challenges DCAL’s interpretation of a ‘graduated approach’ in respect of Article 9(1) of the ECRML.86 The political institutions Five of the submissions from NGOs make reference to the use of Irish in the political institutions. POBAL proposes the right to use and the duty to facilitate Irish language in debates and any other proceedings, in committees or other bodies. POBAL also refers to accurate recording of the use of Irish in official records, with translations included afterwards; simultaneous publication of Assembly enactments in Irish and English and a five-year review after five years of one-way simultaneous translation.87 Furthermore, the POBAL proposals contain a number of clauses specifically outlining the public services, which public bodies including the Assembly and council will provide. These include the use, and encouraging


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and promoting the use of Irish in all internal operations and the provision of public services through Irish ‘to the maximum extent possible’. POBAL’s document provides for the attachment to the Act of a Schedule of public bodies with the greatest responsibility to provide Irish language services and the proposals go on to describe what ‘to the maximum extent possible’ means in the context of these public bodies through inclusion of a comprehensive list of duties.88 In relation to the DCAL consultation document, POBAL points out that the limited range of public services outlined is inappropriate, but the view that both the NI Assembly and local councils should be bound to provide similar provision, as long as that provision provides for a significant range of appropriate services.89 CU (2007, p 6), GnanG (2007, pp. 1–2) and POBAL call for Official status for Irish in the NI Assembly and in local councils; for official records of proceedings to reflect use of Irish; for its use to be facilitated through simultaneous translation in debates and committees; for its use in correspondence; and for signage. CNnaG states that the OLA 2003 sets a minimum standard. With CnaG, it proposes the POBAL model for the North.90 Broadcasting POBAL (2007, p. 37, Annex G) deplores the absence of references to broadcasting in the DCAL document. GnanG (2007, p. 5) points out that as broadcasting is a reserved matter, Westminster legislation will be required. With CnaG, it supports the POBAL proposals. POBAL, CnaG (2007, pp.16–17) and CU (2007, p. 6) propose the Act creates a duty to promote television and radio through Irish, POBAL calls for availability of Irish language broadcasts from RoI, supports an Irish language broadcasting fund; an Irish language radio station reflecting regional input and interests; and adequate provision in Irish by all broadcasters. On the print media, POBAL and CU call for continued publication and financial support for at least one daily newspaper in Irish.91 Enforcement of the Act POBAL’s proposals call for the creation of two new and separate bodies to deal with the administration and enforcement of the Act, the office of Coimisinéir na Gaeilge, and a planning and rights body, Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge (BCPG). The latter is intended to work with public bodies not listed on the Act’s Schedule in the preparation of schemes covering a wide range of public services in Irish. The Irish language Commissioner, Coimisinéir na Gaeilge, is to be appointed by the Secretary of State. POBAL notes that only someone fluent in Irish may be appointed and that the office must be independent and adequately resourced. The organisation proposes the Commissioner’s Office has a three-fold role: to take all necessary actions and measures within its authority to ensure implementation of the Act; to carry out investigations on its own initiative or in respect of a complaint; to

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review any regulations / directives under the Act itself, or any other legislation impacting the Act and comment on this in an Annual Report presented to the Assembly and Parliament. The POBAL proposals also call for close liaison between the Office, the South’s Language Commissioner, Foras na Gaeilge and the Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge. The POBAL proposals detail the powers of the Commissioner in respect of investigations, recommendations regarding action to be taken and setting of timescales. Failure to act on the recommendations within a reasonable delay may then result in the findings of the Commissioner being reported to the Secretary of State. POBAL proposes a Court Remedy and compensation scheme and power for the Commissioner to apply to the court on behalf of a complainant.92 Five submissions93 support the establishment of a Commissioner’s Office with full powers to set timescales for completion of duties and obligations; four explicitly support the creation of a second institution, (referred to by POBAL as the BCPG) to oversee the preparation of schemes by public bodies not listed in the Act’s Schedule. CNnaG (2007, pp. 4–6) stresses the importance of independence from government, and like CnaG (2007, pp. 4–6) and GL (2007, p.1) it calls for compensation in the case of non-compliance and quotes the POBAL proposals. Streetnames The POBAL document contains detailed recommendations in respect of public signage. Although the Welsh Language Act and the OLA 2003 in the RoI, upon which the proposed legislation is supposed to be based provide for a wide range of public signage including streetnames, place names, organisational and direction signs etc DCAL makes reference only to streetnames. It focuses on what percentage of residents in favour of Irish language street signs should be required before signs are erected. POBAL (2007, p. 35), CU (2007, p. 3) and CnaG (2007, pp 10–11) believe the DCAL section on signage is too narrow and the discussion of percentages is ‘a distraction’. POBAL (2007, p. 37) asserts, ‘Caithfidh an Ghaeilge bheith le feiceáil sa saol poiblí i réimse leathan áiteanna agus ní faoi réir shocruithe mí-oiriúnacha mar gheall ar dhoicheall forasach’ / ‘The Irish language must be visible in public life in a wide range of places and not subject to inappropriate decisions because of institutional hostility’ (POBAL’s English language version). GL (2007, p. 1) feels that signage requires significant duties upon public bodies. GnanG (2007, p. 4) and CnaG (2007, pp. 10–11) note that Irish forms of addresses must be recognised in all documentation. Commentary on other issues All of the submissions raise a number of issues in addition to the title headings in the DCAL consultation document. The POBAL submission is the most comprehensive in respect of this, providing background to its proposals and highlighting omissions, gaps and inaccuracies in the DCAL document.


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POBAL (2007, p. 4) challenges the timescale for Westminster legislation established by the British government, pointing out that it has given an unequivocal commitment to enact the legislation. As noted, it challenges the finding of the second EQIA (EQIA 19 January 2007) in respect of education, and, along with CNnaG (2007, p. 11) criticises the unusual inclusion of a Financial Impact Assessment in the DCAL paper. POBAL declares itself disappointed at the emphasis in the DCAL document, ‘B’oiriúnaí ag an pháipéar dul i láthair na reachtaíochta ó dhearcadh an chustaiméara seachas ó dhearcadh an fhorais nó an chomhlachta rialtais/phoiblí.’ / ‘It would be more appropriate for the paper to approach the issue of legislation from the view point of the customer rather than from the view point of the institution or government / public body’ (POBAL’s English language version).94 POBAL and CU (2007, p. 6) propose Irish language rights in the workplace, and CU calls upon the British government to apologise for historic damage done to the Irish language. CnaG highlights a rights-based approach to capacity building, stating that this is a training and development issue, not an excuse for inaction. Gael Linn (2007, p. 2) says, ‘Chinnteodh Acht na Gaeilge stádas don teanga agus in áit go mbeadh ar dhaoine bheith ag síor-achainí, bheadh dualgas ar an státchóras freastal ar rogha teanga an phobail.’ / ‘The Irish Language Act would ensure status for the language and instead of people continually petitioning, the state system would have the responsibility of the people’s language choice’ (Gael Linn’s English language version). The submissions from the Irish language NGOs show a high level of agreement around core issues in respect of the legislation. It is apparent that the proposals published by POBAL have been absorbed by all of the key Irish language NGOs, who show a detailed understanding of the proposals themselves and their implications. The submissions also show considerable engagement with the DCAL document, with significant challenges made to the accuracy of information contained in it. Of course, NGOs have, by definition a degree of independence from the state. It could be argued, therefore, that Irish language NGOs are likely to be more radical in their proposals and more critical than others in their assessment of the government’s position document. The views therefore of the statutory Irish language sector on the consultation will now be examined to determine what level of agreement exists across the whole of the Irish language sector.

Submissions from Irish language state sector organisations In this section, I shall examine the submissions from the North’s small statutory Irish language sector, Iontaobhas Ultach / Ultach Trust (IU), Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta / The Council for Irish Medium Education (CnaGta) and Foras na Gaeilge (FnaG), the Irish language part of the Cross Border Implementation body, to establish what level of consensus there is between these statutory organisations on the proposed legislation, and to what extent their views diverge from those of the non-governmental sector.

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As noted in Chapter 3, IU was the first Irish language organisation directly established by the state in the North, followed in 2000 by CnaGta with corefunding from DENI. CnaGta’s submission (2007, p. 4) contends, ‘nach leor cur chuige bunaithe ar scéimeanna amháin i gcomhthéacs thuaisceart na hÉireann, ach gur féidir le scéimeanna cur go mór le cur i gcrích reachtaíochta atá bunaithe ar chearta.’ / ‘an approach based soley on schemes is not enough in NI, but that schemes can go a long way to implement legislation based on rights’ (DCAL English language version). CnaGta supports detailed obligations to build capacity, in line with legislation in Wales and Scotland, but warns that if legislation is limited by demand, it can be an excuse to do little. The submission proposes that rights be established to ensure bodies develop the use of Irish in external and internal operations, and duties imposed regarding development schemes for Irish and further schemes for services. It states that a rights-based approach is not problematic if reasonableness and practicality are qualified properly. An Foras Teanga was established in 1999 under the GFA. An all-Ireland body, it is divided into FnaG, the Irish language body, and the Ulster Scots Agency. FnaG describes its function as advising both administrations, public bodies and the voluntary sector, and distributing funding to Irish language groups. FnaG supports proposed legislation to build on existing limited services and to cater to the Irish speaking community. It proposes a combined approach of rights and schemes, co-operation to build capacity and public / government sector staff audits to ascertain current skills. It says schemes should include Irish language forms, correspondence, addresses, verbal contact, Executive summaries in Irish of Annual Reports of education and health institutions, local councils in areas with a high percentage of Irish speakers etc. It calls for timescales for service delivery (Fna G, 2007, p. 5). Like CnaGta, IU (2007, p. 2) calls for a combined approach, with rights in the key areas of IME and teaching of Irish in EME. IU recommends adoption of relevant ECRML paragraphs on public and private life, use of Irish forms of names and the creation of rolling duties, subject to regular review. Education, culture, media and economic development bodies should be obliged to provide ‘services which will enable the language community to develop to its fullest extent’ (IU 2007, p. 3). DCAL and the Arts Council should develop schemes, which, it states is not ‘a soft option’ or ‘a voluntary option’. The duties of public bodies ‘to support coherent language planning initiatives should be laid out in the legislation’ IU (2007, p. 4) supports the call for Westminster legislation and notes significant gaps in the DCAL paper, including broadcasting; opportunities to learn the language at all levels of education, signage and key documentation.

The status of the Irish language Both FnaG (2007, p. 7) and CnaGta (2007, p. 7) support Official status. CnaGta sees this as a strong statement of goodwill by government whilst


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FnaG says every citizen has an inalienable right to use Irish in public and private life. IU (2007, p. 4) appears equivocal on Official status, recommending that ‘at the very least’ the Irish language should be recognised as an ‘...indigenous, living language ... an important part of the cultural heritage of our society ... valued by the state, and which the state is committed to maintaining and developing. There is no particular reason why Irish cannot be recognised as an official minority (or lesser-used) language.’ Education CnaGta (2007, p. 8) criticises inaccuracies in the DCAL document, challenging the statement that IM schools are funded if they meet the criterion regarding number of pupils, since this is not guaranteed. It calls for a demand-based right to IME, with inclusion as of right to adequate accommodation, resources, access and Special Needs provision. CnaGta (2007, pp. 8–10) emphasises the developmental role of the legislation, and lists duties including curriculum, examination and assessment development and support for students and teachers. Obligations should be placed on education, health agencies and departments. School transport should be guaranteed for IM pupils and Irish taught as a subject in EME where there is demand. FnaG (2007, pp. 7–10) says that it is a ‘slight’ on pupils in EME that Irish as a subject is not mentioned by DCAL. It calls for heritage and culture belonging to the Irish language to be taught in all schools. It calls for a right to primary IME based on the current viability criteria. Since post-primary criteria are too high, it calls for post-primary units within EME. It deplores lack of provision in HFE for life-long learning, for schools leavers, or in respect of careers advice for young Irish speakers. FnaG (2007, pp. 7–10) states that the ECRML has proved inadequate and that a planned approach is needed, which would oblige DEL to prepare a scheme for Irish language use in internal and external operations. IU (2007, p. 4) supports the POBAL proposals on education, saying, ‘it is the area in which most emphasis should be put on the rights approach.’ It states: the current lack of opportunity for children outside the Catholic education sector to learn Irish is ‘deplorable’ (IU 2007, p. 5); IME viability criteria in rural areas are unreasonable; and IME at pre-school / nursery level, infrastructural support and Special Needs provision should be supported in the legislation. The North, it states, ‘has a bilingual statutory education system that thinks it is monolingual.’ It proposes Irish Language Impact Assessments on all policies. Courts CnaGta (2007, pp. 12–13) supports Official status for Irish in the courts and use of Irish to be allowed where reasonable and feasible, with the onus on the courts service to explain why this might not be the case. FnaG and IU call for the repeal of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act

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(Ireland). FnaG (2007, p. 15) calls for lessons to be learnt from Wales; additional training; a pool of interpreters for all levels of the courts service; terminology development through Coiste na Téarmaíochta / The Terminology Committee95; relevant paragraphs of the ECRML to be integrated into the legislation,96 for the use of spoken Irish and for the admissibility and preparation of documentation in Irish. IU (2007, p. 5) says that use of Irish should become a ‘matter of judicial discretion’ and states, ‘a language scheme will become both desirable and necessary.’ NI Assembly CnaGta (2007, p. 10) calls for Irish to be an Official language of the Assembly and local councils, used in their internal operations and public services. It proposes simultaneous translation during debates, bilingual signage and stationery, and that an obligation be made to increase Irish language services. Also required is two-way correspondence in Irish and the continual development in the duty to facilitate, develop and promote the language in all its aspects. The Assembly should prepare a developmental scheme: to create opportunities for the use of Irish in specific occasions; in the deliberations of committees discussing language itself; when a significant number of the audience or the speakers in a debate or meeting have Irish. But, Irish should not be used in committees unless requested in advance and does not add to costs; only documents of special interest to Irish speakers should be bilingual. FnaG (2007, pp. 10–11) refers to signage in Irish in relation to its status. In the Assembly, use of Irish initially should be subject to prior notice for members of three days and of five days for the public. Failure to provide notice would result in the requirement to self-translate. In local councils, the provision of notice extends to five days notice for members and to seven days for the public. FnaG supports staff skills audits. IU (2007, p. 5) notes that the use of Irish in the Assembly increases the status of the language, since, ‘such high profile use can have a positive effect on how communities value the language.’ Simultaneous translation should be made available in debates with prior notice, they assert, although they feel that Committee proceedings are less important. It concurs (2007, p. 6) with POBAL that the learning of the language be encouraged amongst staff, and it refers to the use of bilingual or multilingual signage, and bilingual or multilingual headed paper. Broadcasting CnaGta (2007, p. 16) states that the British and Irish governments should work to provide a radio and television service for the North. Adequate funding is needed for the print media. FnaG (200, p. 15) makes no reference to broadcasting, but in its final section it lists a series of nine recommendations for action, one of which concerns broadcasting. IU (2007, p. 6) notes the absence of DCAL references to broadcasting and states that this is an


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area in which rights must be created. Surprisingly perhaps, given the Trust’s interest in broadcasting matters noted in chapter 5, the submission makes no detailed comments on this area. Regulation and enforcement CnaGta (2007, pp. 5–6) favours the establishment of the Office of the Irish Language Commissioner but it should have a limited role in implementing legislation; a strong role in helping and advising bodies in relation to the Act; a strong advisory role in respect of the public; a strong monitoring role; and a key role in creating and implementing language policy. The Minister would issue instructions as a last resort in cases of failure to implement the legislation, and the power to make binding recommendations and to operate compensation. FnaG (2007, p. 6) favours the establishment of a Commissioner, proposing the Office be divided into two, one side to oversee preparation of schemes by public and government bodies, and the other to monitor their implementation. The OFMDFM and the Secretary of State should establish the Office, and in case of failure to prepare or to put into effect a scheme, the Commissioner should give ‘agreed guidance’ to impose agreed binding direction, and compensation. The submission does not make it clear who this guidance, binding direction or compensation should be agreed with, but it does appear to limit the power of the Commissioner to act independently. IU (2007, p. 6) supports the creation of a Commissioner, calls for a ministerial role in instructing bodies on their obligations and sanctions in the event of non-compliance. It stresses the importance of the independence of the office. Streetnames CnaGta (2007, p. 14) and IU (2007, p. 7) express concern that DCAL limits signage to streetnames. CnaGta calls for the DoE to develop a scheme for bilingual roadsigns over a period of time; Ordnance Survey to prepare a scheme to make available official Irish Language versions of every road, street, town, region, administration area and electoral constituency. Bilingual streetnames should be the norm, with an opt-out clause where 50 per cent do not want it. Irish language versions of addresses should be valid on all forms of official documentation. FnaG (2007, p. 14) notes that the full Irish language version of addresses, and not simply the streetname, should be valid in all forms of documentation, regardless of whether the Irish language version is displayed on a street sign or not. On the percentage required for erection of bilingual streetsigns, FnaG says that 60% of residents in a street should be adequate for the erection of signs. IU (2007, p. 7) states that the Irish language version alone of addresses should be permissible in correspondence; where there is majority support

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for bilingual signage, it should be mandatory; where 80 per cent of residents so demand, monolingual Irish language signs should be erected. The state has a poor record on tourist signage, including information plaques, boundaries to townlands, rivers etc and this should be addressed in legislation. Other issues raised in the submissions Both CnaGta and IU raise capacity building and costs. CnaGta (2007, p. 6) accuses the DCAL document of presenting, ‘cur síos claonta’ / ‘a biased account’ failing to recognise past neglect and the need for investment to build capacity. CnaGta (2007, p.7) advises weighting of competing priorities, questioning whether language is to be compared with heritage/culture issues; with arts, sport and leisure; or with overall budget issues such as the education, health and environment. It says that increased services do not necessarily require substantial additional costs. Human resource issues can be resolved at recruitment if Irish is stipulated or training provided, but workers must not find themselves disadvantaged in terms of promotion or their workload. Incentives for Irish speakers should be offered in recognition of the added value their skills bring. In addition, in terms of costs, it must be taken into account that when Irish speaking workers are not dealing with other Irish speakers, they will be dealing with English speaking members of the public. The cost, therefore, is for the service, not the language. IU (2007, p. 3) raises the DCAL comments on capacity building and finance, pointing out that, ‘it is expressed in entirely negative terms, and could be a charter for inaction and foot-dragging.’ IU says it is disappointed at the lack of references to state responsibility to ‘maintain, promote and develop’ the Irish language and to the duty in respect of the ECRML. It suggests that (2007, p. 3) the act should be linked to ‘developmental milestones that would act as trigger mechanisms for a review’ and with a preamble outlining the state’s commitment to support the further development of the Irish language community. The Irish language state sector organisations show unanimous support for the enactment of comprehensive legislation and make similar criticisms to the NGOs of certain sections of the DCAL document. The state sector tends to be more conservative in its proposals than the NGOs. Nonetheless, it is clear that during the consultation, there was significant support from all Irish language sectors for the proposals arising from the POBAL grassrootsled campaign for legislation. In the next chapter of the research, I shall examine the responses to the consultation of the five main political parties in the North. Following this, I shall study submissions from key public sector and non-governmental, nonIrish language organisations before analysing a sample section of individual responses. I shall then turn to an examination of LPP in Canada.

7 The Submissions of the Political Parties to the First Public Consultation on proposed Irish language legislation for NI

As discussed in the previous chapter, the October 2006 St Andrews’ Agreement (SAA) contained a British government commitment to enact Irish language legislation reflecting the experience of Wales and the RoI (UK and Irish Govt, 13 October 2006). The first consultation paper on the proposed legislation was published in December 2006 by the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL 2006), under the direction of Maria Eagle, Direct Rule Minister. Following a 12-week consultation, DCAL announced that it had received 668 substantive replies to the document, 1376 postcards, a newspaper advertisement with 800 signatures and a 2500 name petition, all supporting legislation based on the POBAL proposals. DCAL notes the high level of interest in the issue and the fact that over 93 per cent of respondents supported Irish language legislation and the POBAL rights-based model, although as noted, figures provided by DCAL in October 2007 show an even higher level of support. It says that the small number (7 per cent) of responses opposing the legislation cited cost issues and ‘the perception that the legislation would be divisive’ (DCAL March 2007, p. 6). The key substantive submissions from Irish language NGOs as well as from statutory Irish language organisations are detailed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I shall analyse the submissions made by the North’s main political parties. Following this, in Chapter 8, there will be an examination of submissions from key public bodies and non-Irish language NGOs, and finally, an analysis of a random 20 per cent sample of individual responses posted on the DCAL website. As noted in Chapter 6, although a second consultation was held in 2007, the submissions to this second process were never made public and therefore cannot be subject to the same analysis. During the second consultation, there is evidence that unionist parties 147

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sought to mobilise against the legislation. Figures published by DCAL nonetheless show 68 per cent of all responses to the second consultation supported the Irish language Act.

Responses of the political parties and political representatives to the first public consultation on proposed Irish language legislation for NI As noted, the period during which the first consultation on proposed Irish language legislation took place (13 December 2006–2 March 2007) included the active electioneering period prior to the 7 March Assembly elections. On the nationalist side, the SDLP and Sinn Féin (SF) were competing for votes, and on the unionist side, there was intense rivalry between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). In general, it has to be noted that whilst polarised views emerge in the submissions, this is not uncharacteristic of the usual stances of the various political parties. The second consultation on the legislation took place post-election, and unionist parties appear to have focused more effort on counteracting the overwhelmingly positive response to the first process, resulting in more negative replies. However, in the second consultation, DCAL treated petitions or one-line responses on the same basis as substantive submissions. None of the responses have been made public. In this chapter, there will be an in-depth analysis of the submissions made by the five main political parties in the North, the nationalist SDLP and SF and the unionist DUP, UUP and Alliance.1 The DUP submission notes that it is presenting a formal party response (DUP 2007) but that in addition, it recognises a separate submission from the party’s then elected Member of the European Parliament, Jim Allister.2 As discussed later, the Allister submission is the lengthier, although both are very similar in the points they make, and at times, in the terminology they use. I have felt it important however to include the Allister submission since it appears characteristic of oppositional attitudes to legislation. As noted, Allister now leads the Traditional Unionist Vote (TVU) widely seen to be in competition with the DUP for hard-line unionist votes. The party-political submissions SF received the second largest percentage of the vote at the March 2007 election, with 26.16 per cent. SF Ard Chomhairle’s (Executive Committee) 13-page submission in Irish was marked as confidential and therefore was not initially placed on the DCAL website. Both the SF and SDLP submissions address the consultation document in a concise, detailed manner, with little discussion of the political or historical context of the Irish language.

Political Parties’ Submissions to Consultation

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The SDLP took 15.22 per cent of the vote in the March 2007 elections. The party’s submission carries the name of SDLP Newry and Mourne MLA Spokesperson on Culture, Dominic Bradley (Dominic Ó Brolcháin). It is a 10½-page submission, which, in common with the SF submission, focuses on the specific questions put in the consultation paper. The submission has no preamble or conclusions section. The DUP received the largest percentage of the vote (30.09 per cent) in the March 2007 elections. As noted earlier, its submission is similar to that of the party’s then MEP, Jim Allister, and refers to the Allister submission. This is rather unusual and it may be that separation between the two submissions is reflective of some political distance between Allister and the main DUP party on issues other than the proposed Irish language legislation. It may also reflect a desire by the party to achieve additional impact through the submission of two separate documents. Whatever the reality Allister, a senior party member and practising Queen’s Counsel, resigned from the DUP on 27 March 2007 as a result of the entry by his former party into government with SF. He now leads the TUV. In 2009, he lost his seat as a member of the European parliament, but split the DUP vote. His submission is 37 pages long plus annexes. It is written in the third person plural, although it is signed in Allister’s name alone. The UUP took 14.94 per cent of the vote in the March 2007 elections. The submission from the Policy Unit of the Ulster Unionist Party is a little over two pages long. It starts with some general comments regarding the party’s commitment ‘to working for a stable and peaceful NI within the Union ...,’ and states that the UUP, ‘... respects cultural diversity as a key foundation for a stable, peaceful, pluralist society’ (UUP 2007, p. 1). The Alliance Party took seven seats in the Assembly elections of March 2007. It is the smallest of the five ‘main’ political parties. Its submission, signed by party General Secretary, Stephen Farry, consists of a five-page introduction, ranging through arguments from the intrinsic value of language, to its ‘natural’ demise and language shift provoked in part, they acknowledge, by repressive policy but in the main by the ‘benefits and advantages’ of switching to dominant languages; via the ‘shared’ cultural heritage of the North, which appears at one point to be a shared Gaelic heritage and at another one Irish and one Scots language heritage. The submission concludes with 3 pages of direct commentary on the text of the consultation document. The attitude of the political parties to the proposed Irish language legislation SF’s submission begins by placing the SAA and its commitment to enact Irish language legislation in the context of the party’s understanding of the political relationship with the British government in respect of the North

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(SF 2007, p. 3). SF say they will evaluate the best proposed approach to the legislation according to four basic principles: that the British government must fulfil its SAA commitment; that the rights of Irish speakers should be at the heart of the Act; that the Act should be resourced at Westminster and that an Irish Language Commissioner, with appropriate powers and resources be appointed.3 SF states that the DCAL consultation document, specifying that the legislation will deal only with the public and government sectors and not with the business or private sectors, is in contravention of the GFA which contains specific provision in relation to the use of Irish in private life (SF 2007, p. 5). Crucially, the second point relates to the enactment at Westminster, in accordance with the St Andrews commitment. ‘Tá muid buartha nach rithfear an reachtaíocht fríd Westminster. Ní bheadh sin inghlactha.’ / ‘We are concerned that the legislation will not be passed at Westminster. This would be unacceptable’ (Author’s translation). The SDLP submission states that, ‘The rights-based approach put forward by POBAL ... is the approach we feel to be the most suitable’ (SDLP 2007, p. 1). Like SF, they believe that the legislation should be passed at Westminster because this is the only place where legislation relating to ‘reserved matters’ can be passed, and also, because, ‘... a number of aspects of Irish Language development in the North are already regulated to a certain extent by cross-border institutions, and only the UK Government has the authority to deal with the Republic of Ireland in respect of such matters’ (SDLP 2007, p. 1). Both the DUP and Allister submissions state that they had no knowledge of the proposal to enact an Irish language Act in the SAA until the detail of the Agreement was published. There follows a substantial section on the Equality Impact Assessment carried out in relation to the proposal (DCAL EQIA 2007) and on the consultation process itself. The DUP, echoing the Allister submission, notes that requests under the Freedom of Information Act show that there was no documentation regarding Irish language legislation prior to 6 Oct 2006 (DUP 2007, p. 1), and that this ‘... clearly shows that there had been no thought given within Government for such an Act and that the proposals are politically driven to meet demands by republicans’ (DUP 2007, p. 2). Therefore, like Allister’s submission, the party argues that the whole process is flawed and that the DCAL finding that there will be ‘no adverse impacts’ from legislation shows that, ‘... pre-determined outcomes were reached by the Department’ (DUP 2007, p. 2). It calls for the consultation document to be immediately withdrawn. The party criticises the 12-week consultation period for the Irish language legislation as being too short and refers to other longer consultations undertaken by DCAL (DUP 2007, p. 2).4 Since the party believes the proposal to legislate for the Irish language has been politically driven, it


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notes that it is therefore open to challenge through Judicial Review. This section, and the following one, is very similar to the Allister submission, as I shall note later. In a further section, entitled, ‘The Need for an Irish Language Act’, the submission notes, ‘...in the event of devolution being restored that the DUP would require the introduction of an Irish Language Act to be passed by cross-community consent.’ Following devolution, the party says, ‘The DUP would not support the introduction of any Irish Language Act in these circumstances’ (DUP 2007, p. 3, DUP use of bold type for emphasis). Further clarification follows, ‘The Democratic Unionist Party does not support the introduction of any Irish Language Act into Northern Ireland. We believe that the proposal ... has already proven to be very politically divisive and any Act would increase division and community tensions.’ The DUP’s opposition to Irish language legislation, is because, ‘... the Irish language has been used as a political tool by Irish nationalists and republicans in an attempt to alienate unionists’ (DUP 2007, p. 3). This echoes Allister’s submission (Allister 2007, p. 16), in which he says, ‘All matters pertaining to the promotion and development of the Irish language should be left solely to the NI Assembly to determine’. Allister (2007, p. 17) then gives an insight into the view that the proposed legislation is being used as a negotiating tool in CR talks. He says, Whereas in the St Andrews Agreement, ‘concessions’ such as water rates and the retention of academic selection were made conditional on the return of devolution at Stormont, the Irish Language Act will proceed without devolution ... Indeed, the threat of an Irish language Act is still being used as a ‘stick’ to compel Unionists into devolution. In the interests of even-handedness we oppose any legislation touching upon the Irish Language until devolution is restored.’ (Respondent’s use of bold and italics) The DUP and Allister’s submissions are of one mind also regarding comparison between protections for the Irish language and ‘attempts to promote minority languages in other areas of Europe or around the world’ (DUP 2007, p. 3). The Irish language is, the DUP say, a specific case because it is ‘tightly linked’ to nationalism in the North and ‘it serves no purpose in communication, but simply the promotion of a political cause.’ This is different from elsewhere, the DUP submission asserts because, ‘In other parts of the world, regional languages are widely spoken and used in daily life but this is clearly not the case with the Irish language.’ Allister (2007, p. 31) is emphatic, ‘Some foolish people try to compare the promotion of Irish with steps taken elsewhere in Europe in regard to living minority languages ...’ however, according to Allister, the promotion of minoritised languages ‘in


countries such as Spain and Finland have no political strings or baggage.’ This appears a rather surprising assertion. The DUP (2007, p. 4) states, ... none of the options set out in the consultation document are either necessary or acceptable. We do not accept that there is a need for an Irish Language Act to be introduced. No-one in Northern Ireland uses Irish as a first language and if money is to be spent aiding minority languages then it would be better spent helping some people from minority ethnic communities who find real difficulties integrating into life here because of language difficulties. However, failing the above alternative, the party reverts to support for Ulster Scots. Having argued that Irish should not get support, the party nonetheless notes that, ‘Government is not giving similar priority to Ulster Scots’ and complains about what it sees as a disparity in funding. They argue, ‘Instead of further increasing the level of support for the Irish language, we believe that the Government should be reviewing the levels of support for the Ulster Scots language and culture and bringing these into line with Irish’ (DUP 2007, p. 4). Both the DUP and Allister challenge the census figures for Irish speakers in the North. Allister (2007, p. 12) ‘is not satisfied that sufficient demand ... exists,’ whilst the DUP state that the figure of 10.4 per cent of people indicating knowledge of Irish is too low to justify legislative protection.5 At times, the vocabulary and terminology of Jim Allister’s submission are rather emphatic. Allister (2007, p. 6) refers, for example, to the DCAL EQIA document as, ‘pathetic in its composition and conclusion.’ Its approach is ‘slapdash and appalling,’ and ‘hasty and patently inadequate’ and it puts forward ‘premature and unwarranted conclusions.’ The process, he says is ‘flawed’ and ‘tainted’ (2007, p. 32). The ‘ill-conceived’ proposal to legislate for Irish would elevate the language to a place that is ‘unmerited and totally unnecessary’ (2007, p. 13). He claims ‘with certainty’ that Irish has been in use from the nineteenth century to express anti-British feeling (2007, p. 9). He asserts there can be ‘no question whatsoever’ of Official status for Irish (2007, p. 17). In response to a question in the DCAL consultation paper to whether a new body is required to regulate the legislation, he replies, ‘no, it is not’ (2007, p. 15). As to what functions it should have, he replies, ‘none’ (2007, p. 15). In respect of what kind of Irish language services should be provided, he replies variously, ‘none’ (2007, p. 18), and ‘no special provision’ (2007, p. 18). He says that the idea that the use of Irish in the courts could improve community relations is ‘preposterous’ and ‘inane’ (2007, p. 36). The process of consultation has been ‘farcical and partisan’ and the consultation paper is ‘irredeemably flawed’ and ‘delivers a deficient product’ (2007,


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p. 37). Allister further claims, ‘No reasonable person today could attempt to claim that nationalist politics and the promotion of the Irish language are two divisible aims. They are clearly two sides of the same coin’ (2007, p. 11). In common with the DUP’s submission, Allister (2007, p. 8) states, ‘If devolution is not established, this legislation should not be formulated or brought forward.’ The submission continues with three pages of background, including some of the same quotes used by the DUP in their submission, through which Allister seeks to illustrate the political nature of the Irish language. Allister argues that instead of asking what type of legislation should be introduced, emphasis should be on whether or not the Act is needed at all (2007, p. 12). He notes that all the approaches described, ‘... have massive public resource implications ... and in our opinion will deliver such a minimal return and will ferment undesirable divisions that we do not find ourselves in a position to support any of them. We regret the failure to properly cost these options (2007, p. 12). There appears a contradiction here in that in the same paragraph Allister pinpoints what he sees as a lack of authoritative information on costs and yet feels able to assert that they will be ‘massive’ (2007, p. 12). The UUP comments on the referendum held on the GFA and says, ‘In this context, the decision at St Andrews to introduce an Irish Language Act is profoundly unsettling, with potentially very damaging implications for community relations and respect for cultural diversity’ (UUP 2007, p. 1). The commitment given in the SAA to enact legislation reflecting the experience of Wales and “Ireland” (sic) are, according to the party ‘... at best disingenuous’. The Irish language, say the UUP, has political associations and ‘cannot be viewed as a “neutral” form of cultural expression, having no impact on community relations’ (UUP 2007, p. 1). Nor is there the same percentage of the population of the North with knowledge of the Irish language as those in Wales or the RoI with knowledge of Welsh and Irish. The UUP are ‘... strongly of the view that there is no case for or merit in seeking to undermine the 1998 arrangements with the introduction of an Act based on irrelevant experiences from other jurisdictions’ (UUP 2007, p. 2). The Alliance Party submission starts by welcoming the consultation but notes, ‘However, we have major reservations over these proposals’ (2007, p. 1). The submission rejects a rights-based approach as being ‘most problematic’. ‘It would create entitlements and associated duties/burdens on public bodies out of all proportion to need’ (2007, p. 6). Rights-based legislation would, it says, ‘invite opportunities for litigious individuals to make vexatious demands on public bodies’ (2007, p. 7). The Alliance submission, whilst on the whole opposed to proposed legislation at all, nonetheless comments that a language scheme approach would be preferable, because of ‘... the greater scope for flexibility in terms of the provision of services,

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and ... (the) greater regard to need and available resources.’ Specifically, the submission states that schemes ‘could address Irish, Ulster Scots and other languages’ (2007, p. 7). The Alliance submission then includes a lengthy and rather confused discussion around the ‘sensitive’ issue of language, the complexity of language maintenance and the ‘natural’ loss of languages through ‘evolution’ (2007, p. 1). The Irish language is contextualised as a valuable, but doomed, resource through repeated references to the impossibility of its protection. Alliance (2007, p. 2) next states that, ‘Change is in the nature of human existence’ and follows up this assertion with reference to the disappearance of many languages previously in common use on the island of Ireland. The submission describes the current situation, saying, ‘There are no longer any monoglot adult or teenage speakers of Irish in NI.’ This is an interesting statement. It appears to imply that the author of the comment may be aware of the existence of monoglot Irish speaking children. If this is the case, it is significant in that it appears to indicate an awareness that does not inform the rest of the submission. The first reference to Irish Medium schools is one that sets them in the context of children with English speaking parents. It then makes a surprising comparison, ‘Those who choose to learn and speak Irish do so by personal choice; just as many millions of our forebears chose to move to speaking English. The benefits were obvious and attractive’ (2007, p. 2). Unfortunately, the writer does not detail what those benefits may have been for native Irish speakers or why the English language is deemed to have appeared so attractive. This comment echoes a later one in the submission6 which also appears to place language shift and decline in a neutral context, without consideration of the systematic social, political and economic policies that bring it about. At the end of this paragraph, having mooted the point that Irish is essentially a valuable but no longer living component of cultural life in the North, and that change is natural, inevitable and desirable (as long as we curate the concomitant linguistic losses), the submission (2007, p. 2) notes: The question that the consultation paper poses for Northern Ireland society is whether, and to what extent, the public sector should be required to provide facilities in the Irish language for these members of our community (who choose to learn and speak Irish) The use of the word ‘whether’ in this context is retrograde, supposing a return to the period pre-dating the internationally binding obligations to take resolute action to protect and promote the Irish language contained in the ECRML and the GFA. Having asserted that ‘one international language’ would be ‘highly desirable’ (2007, p. 2), the Alliance submission moves on to a discussion of ethnic minority languages and the issues faced by the


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recent increased immigration into the North. With so many languages in our ‘modern international life’, the writer (2007, p. 3) says, ... we feel bound to question whether the particular effort to achieve fluency in Irish or Scots is more valuable than a similar effort to become fluent in one of the major international languages which would allow us direct access to one or more of the major international language groups with hundreds of millions of speakers such as: Mandarin, Spanish, Hindi or Arabic.

The approach the legislation should take SF (2007, p. 6) states that Westminster legislation is the best way to establish a legal basis for Irish in the North. It is also the best way to place specific duties upon the Executive once re-established, to strengthen the development and protection for the language, they believe. As noted, the SDLP supports POBAL’s rights-based approach (2007, p. 1). The DUP (2007, p. 8) states that it does not support any type of Irish language legislation and that the consultation is flawed. It says, ‘There is no doubt that the process should be halted and if there is viewed to be a need to bring it forward in the future that the normal processes should be followed.’ They propose that in this case, the matter should then be settled by the Assembly. Jim Allister is not satisfied that the detailed legislative proposals from the Irish speaking community themselves reflect appropriate demand, ‘it is apparent that POBAL, an organisation which in our view meets the definition of a small but dedicated interest group, have had a direct and disproportionate influence on the formation of the Department’s discussion document’ (2007, p. 13). This, of course, is a viewpoint he shares with both the DUP and the Alliance Party, the Alliance noting that it ‘is concerned that this consultation is giving such regard to the proposals from one sectional NGO’ (Alliance 2007, p. 7). Jim Allister (2007, p. 13). feels that there is ‘no need whatsoever’ for ‘such draconian and heavy-handed legislation’ because, ‘English is the every-day language of almost everyone in Northern Ireland; it is absurd and unnecessarily costly therefore to accommodate the demands of a small minority of enthusiasts in this way.’ Allister clarifies his position, ‘Furthermore, we reject wholesale, the very notion which lies at the heart of this proposed legislation, namely, “the enhancement and protection of the development of the Irish language is an important and significant matter for Northern Ireland.” ’7 In relation to the adoption of a combined approach to the legislation, the then MEP reiterates once more his rejectionist stance, ‘... We oppose any scheme which places any legal responsibility on any public body to communicate in Irish. We oppose the creation of an Irish Language Commissioner

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whose job it would be to force public bodies and statutory agencies to communicate in Irish’ (Allister 2007, p. 15). Public money should not be spent on a regulatory body because the Irish language, Allister asserts, already receives significant funding, ‘in stark contrast to the paltry levels of funding awarded to the Ulster Scots sector’ (2007, p. 15). In this particular section, however, he does not appear to support service provision in Ulster Scots either, ‘Public sector bodies and statutory agencies conduct their business perfectly adequately through the medium of the English language; forcing them to do otherwise in order to pander to a blatantly political agenda is unacceptable.’ In contradiction with its promotion of a schemes-based approach, the Alliance warns that models from other parts of the ‘British Isles’ should not be copied because the ‘context in which Irish is used in Northern Ireland is different from that of Welsh in Wales, Scots Gaelic in Scotland and Irish itself in the Republic of Ireland.’ (2007, p. 6). The paper goes on to comment, ‘The rationale that there is one section of the population who require official recognition of the Irish language, and there is another section that ought to tolerate this reinforces the sectarian approach taken to this issue.’ Regulation and enforcement SF (2007, p. 7) supports the POBAL proposal for the Office of the Irish Language Commissioner which should, they say, be ‘láidir, neamhspleách go hiomlán ar rialtas’ / ‘strong, completely independent of government’ (Author’s translation) and which should produce an independent report on the progress made in implementing the Act. The report should be presented annually to the Assembly through the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), or in the absence of this, through the office of the relevant Minister. SF however departs at this point from the POBAL recommendations, proposing instead that the Commissioner’s office should itself be split into two parts. In relation to the establishment of a new regulatory body, the SDLP submission expresses support for the POBAL proposals for the establishment and in relation to the powers of two new bodies, the Coimisinéir na Gaeilge and the Bord Um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge (BUCPG), since they state that, ‘These two agencies carry out two different roles and both are needed’ (2007, p. 2). The submission gives little detail on the functions of these bodies, or on who should appoint them, but it specifically supports the attaching of a Schedule to the Act which would list those bodies with greatest responsibility for providing Irish language services, leaving other bodies to work with the BUCPG in drawing up schemes. In the case of failure to agree or enact a scheme, the BUCPG should ‘have the power to approve a Plan as submitted (or with its own modifications) or to make a Plan for the public body which would be binding in law,’ and furthermore, the SDLP (2007, p. 2) submission supports the creation of a


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compensation scheme to be applied upon advice from the Irish Language Commissioner. The DUP make no specific references to enforcement and regulation of the legislation. In response to the question, ‘Should enforcement powers be included?’ Jim Allister unwittingly highlights the need for such. He says, ‘No. Statutory agencies and public sector bodies should be free to implement their own policy in relation to the Irish language’ (2007, p. 17). He adds, ‘... There can be no question of public sector bodies being bound by a Minister or the courts to implement a bilingual policy.’ On Implementation and Enforcement, Alliance is opposed to any enforcement mechanism that allows individuals to go to court. The submission, however, does concede that some external regulatory body ‘either a Government-appointed Board or Commissioner’ could regulate schemes. The party resolutely opposes any financial compensation for those whose rights have been breached (2007, p. 7).

The status of the Irish language On enhancing the status of Irish, in common with the POBAL proposals, SF calls for Official status in the title and text of the Act. They also state (2007, p. 8) that the Act should contain a clear statement ‘... gur ceart dochlóite i ceart saoránaigh an dlinse an Ghaeilge a úsáid sa saol poiblí agus príobháideach.’ / ‘... that the use of the Irish language in public and private life is an inalienable right’ (Author’s translation). The SDLP (2007, p. 3) support Official status for the Irish language in both the text and title of the Act and state that, ‘The guaranteed rights created in the Act must reflect the official status of the language.’ In relation to the best approach to enhancing the status of Irish, Allister (2007, p. 17) says, ‘As the Irish language movement is so closely bound with political nationalism there can be no question whatsoever of Irish becoming an official language in Northern Ireland.’ Adequate legal protections already exist, he argues, ‘... the recognition afforded under the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages is perfectly sufficient,’ in fact, ‘... under the Charter immense promotion of Irish has already taken place ... . New legislation is not necessary at this stage’ (2007, p. 18). It is unclear from the submission at what stage Allister considers that new legislation would be necessary. Alliance (2007, p. 3) states that Irish should not have Official, or indeed ‘equal’ status (it does not say what with). Rather it should be recognised as an ‘historic’, ‘traditional’, ‘minority’ or ‘indigenous’ language, in line with the ECRML terminology Education On Education, the SF submission reflects the points made by POBAL, including the NGO’s criticism of the limited remit of the consultation paper, which


gives no consideration to aspects of education outside IME. Again, in common with POBAL and the SDLP submissions, SF highlights the consultation paper’s failure to propose the creation of a right for parents to choose to have their children taught Irish at primary and secondary level (2007, p. 8). The party notes, not completely accurately, that Higher and Further Education is relegated to an annex in the document and that this diminishes its importance. SF then refers to two of the clauses from the POBAL document in relation to encouraging, funding and facilitating HFE, but proposes that the best way for these duties to be fulfilled is through a Language Scheme to be agreed by the Commissioner. The party makes similar proposals in relation to the POBAL clause that Queens’ University Belfast and the University of Ulster should take appropriate steps in relation to the development of higher education through the medium of Irish and in the teaching of Irish, ‘agus chun scéim forbartha agus pleanála Gaeilge maidir leis na hábhair seo, aontaithe leis an choimisinéir Gaeilge, a cur le chéile agus a fheidhmiú.’ / ‘And to put together and operate a development and planning scheme in relation to these issues, agreed with the Irish Language Commissioner’ (SF 2007, p. 8. Author’s translation). On IME, SF (2007, p. 8) states that the legislation should clarify the role and duties of the Department of Education (DENI) and of bodies such as Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta and Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta. The party then calls for the adoption of the POBAL proposals on IME and carries in full 15 clauses from the POBAL document (2007, pp. 9–12). The SDLP submission (2007, p. 3) states in its section on education that this part of the DCAL document takes a minimalist and grudging approach to IME. In particular, it points out (2007, p. 3) that there are no provisions mooted in relation to, ... teacher training, resourcing, curriculum development or materials for the sector. Nor is there any recognition in this section of the need for cross sectoral services and collaboration or for joined-up thinking in relation to the interfaces between education and health services or the new digital curriculum to be provided by the BBC. In relation to the approach to education in the legislation, the SDLP, like SF, supports the POBAL proposals, noting that the consultation document makes no reference to education outside IME. Like SF, it supports the creation of the right for ‘all parents in Northern Ireland to have their children taught the Irish language at all stages of primary and post-primary school education’ (SDLP 2007, p. 4) and call upon the DENI and the UK Department for Education and Skills to take, ... resolute action to encourage, facilitate and provide adequate funding for the teaching of Irish as a subject in English-medium primary and


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secondary schools, including adequate measures for the teaching of Irish as a subject to secondary pupils who received some or all of their primary education through the medium of Irish. The SDLP, like SF, calls upon government to implement the POBAL proposals for education, and they carry these proposals in full. They also emphasise that duties should be placed upon the DENI to include ‘development and adequate provision of Irish-language educational books, software and audio-visual and web-based teaching material, and of the development and provision of a curriculum appropriate to the needs of pupils learning Irish in English-medium schools’ (SDLP 2007, pp. 4–7). The submission goes on to give support to a further six clauses of the POBAL document, dealing with education sector issues including transport, developmental funding for preschools, health care and materials, funding for further and higher vocational training and teaching of Irish, and specific training and educational requirements for both Queen’s University Belfast and the University of Ulster in relation to teaching of Irish and development of higher education (2007, p. 8). The DUP outline its objections to the inclusion of education in the proposed legislation. According to the DUP submission, IME is already provided for by government and in a manner that discriminates against state-controlled schools. In addition, it says, there are political reasons for opposing IME, because, ‘Irish Medium schools also play a part in the politicisation of the Irish Language’ (DUP 2007, p. 5). In a shortened quotation from Maguire’s 1991 research into the formation of the Shaw’s Road Bunscoil, the DUP (2007, p. 5) asserts that political motivations were shown to be prime. In fact, Maguire finds that nationalism was not the primary rationale. Quality of education was placed first, with Irish identity, cultural awareness, the benefit for a child in acquiring a second language and the survival of the language itself following. Only after these advantages are factors relating to nationalist or republican tradition listed, rated on a par with parental involvement in IME 8. The DUP state that money destined for IME should instead be diverted to ‘delivery of front-line services,’ although presumably only through English. The submission equates IME, or educational services through Irish with ‘unnecessary services’ and implies that such services are a threat to, ‘... small schools which are vital to the community life of many rural areas.’ Once more, it can only be assumed that the reference is to small English Medium rural schools. Intriguingly, (2007, p. 4) it says, ‘There is nothing which prevents any parent having their child educated through the medium of the Irish Language. However, it should not be necessary for this to be funded by the tax payer. Within mainstream education if any student wishes to learn Irish then it can be studied as an academic subject like any other.’ It is unclear whether this assertion springs from a lack of awareness of the nature

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of the model of immersion education common in the North, whereby all subjects are taught through the medium of the Irish language, quite different than the inclusion of the language as one of a number of subjects on a curriculum taught through the medium of English. A further irony is the general absence of Irish as a curriculum subject in the vast majority of Protestant schools in the North, noted in Chapter 2. In his submission, Allister (2007, p. 18) states that there should be no special provision for IME. Such schools, he says, are closing for lack of demand, a statement at odds with his earlier assertion that IME has been on the increase since the Anglo-Irish Agreement.9 Alliance is ‘happy for Irish to be offered as an option within the curriculum,’ although it is not clear if they would support this within Protestant Maintained schools. They oppose it becoming a compulsory subject, or requiring teachers to ‘have a knowledge of Irish’. In fact, the party feels that the Irish government should remove any such Irish language requirement in the South ‘to break down barriers obstructing better understanding’ (2007, p. 7, Author’s emphasis). The Assembly SF refers only to the internal workings of the Assembly, in which it reflects the POBAL proposals. However it makes no reference to services through Irish for members of the public. It states that the same rights that are proposed for the Assembly should also apply to local councils as a consequence of the Official Status for the language that they feel should be included in the Act (2007, p. 12). The SDLP submission refers again to the POBAL proposals in relation to both the Assembly and local councils, calling for guaranteed rights not just in relation to the internal working of these institutions, but also in relation to service provision (2007, p. 8). The DUP oppose the use of Irish in the Assembly, referring to existing translation services within the suspended Assembly for any members who wish to speak Irish or Ulster Scots during debates. The submission notes, ‘These services are not necessary for the efficient operation of the Assembly and only lead to a further burden on the Northern Ireland taxpayer’ (2007, p. 5). In relation to the Assembly, Allister appears to be of the view that its smooth and effective running can only be assured by the sole use of English. The consultation paper, he says, gives no consideration of the, ‘hugely expensive translation service’ (2007, p. 34). As a then-serving MEP, he makes the following comment, ‘One need only look at the European Parliament to see the stultifying impact of multi-language on debate ... the Assembly itself would be the loser if the Irish language was introduced as anticipated and thereby the entirety of the people of NI would be denied a parliamentary chamber of vibrancy and effect.’ His concern, however, is not


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about translation. The adverse impact, ‘... comes from the alignment of Irish to a particular religious and political affiliation. English on the other hand is cross-party and cross-community and thus unaligned to any political or religious affiliation and thereby incapable of impacting adversely on equality’ (2007, p. 35, Author’s emphasis). Alliance feels that the matter should be left to the discretion of standing orders. ‘...the current regime is more than sufficient’. The ‘current system’ as it is described, of course allows only for translation to the Speaker of the house in Assembly debates. MLAs wishing to use Irish in Assembly debates must self-translate for the benefit of other members, thus severely limiting their time allowance in some debates or Question Time sessions. Again, Alliance states its opposition to official status for Irish in the Assembly, this time linking this with their opposition to the use of Irish ‘on corporate materials alongside English’ (2007, p. 8). Courts and tribunals SF state that the use of Irish in the courts, without disadvantage to the user should be enshrined in the Act. It also calls for the repeal of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland).10 Guaranteed rights are called for in relation to the courts in the SDLP submission and the POBAL proposals are cited and quoted in some detail (2007, p. 8). The DUP submission (2007, p. 5) makes an all-encompassing assessment of this section of the consultation paper, There are none of the proposals for the use of Irish in Court and Tribunal proceedings which are either necessary or acceptable to the DUP ... . We do not believe that there is any need to specify Irish as a language to be provided for. There is no-one taking part in these proceedings who requires the use of Irish in order for them to understand what is going on and the proposal to introduce their use is simply for political reasons. There follows a series of assertions detailing objections to the concept of Irish language services in the administration of justice, from the rather broad statement that ‘any Act would fundamentally damage the possibility of justice being served in many cases,’ to more specific concerns related to the undermining of cross examination, giving witnesses time ‘... to evade questions and dodge the issue’. It concludes, ‘It would seem that DCAL does not care if its introduction could lead to these huge and fundamental problems within the justice system.’ Again, the issue of costs is raised, with the proposal that any such monies ‘... should be diverted towards services which actually benefit the public’ (2007, p. 5). The use of Irish in the courts will slow down a service already subject to long delays, the DUP state. They note that the consultation document refers

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to proposals aimed at preventing this but dismisses them without explanation, saying it is, ‘unlikely that these will succeed’ (2007, p. 6). Of the statement in the DCAL EQIA 2007 that use of Irish in the courts could improve community relations, Allister says, ‘What nonsense!’ Himself a Queen’s Counsel, Allister raises a number of issues concerning the impact of Irish on cross examination and delay, which as we have seen are echoed in the DUP’s submission also. In common with the DUP and UUP, Alliance expresses the view, not reflected in the consultation paper, ‘that there would be significant financial impact’ of an Irish language Act and laments the failure to provide estimates of costs so that other priorities could be considered (2007, p. 8). Streetnames Only the two nationalist parties comment on the DCAL proposal in respect of street names. SF criticises the lack of discussion in the consultation paper of public signage other than in relation to street names. Instead, it notes that the Act should contain clauses that ‘normalise’ rather than limit public signage. A universal standard should be set across all council areas, whereby if 50 per cent of residents in any street agree, bilingual signs should be erected upon request from a resident (2007, p. 13). Its proposal that, ‘ba chóir fosta scéim aontaithe maidir le forbairt comharthaíocht poiblí bheith curtha le chéile ag Coimisinéir na Gaeilge agus curtha i gcrích ag an údarás cuí fríd treoir ceangailteacht más gá’ / ‘there should also be an agreed scheme in relation to public signage put together by the Irish Language Commissioner and implemented by the relevant authority through binding direction if necessary’ (Author’s translation) points again to a schemes-based approach on this issue rather than a rights-based one. In relation to signage, the SDLP notes, ‘The Irish language must be visible in public life in a wide variety of places and not subject to inappropriate decisions because of institutional hostility’ (2007, p. 9). It refers to the situation in relation to signage in Wales and the South and points out that this is a broader issue than the limited section on street signs in the consultation document implies. Like the DUP, Alliance ‘is content for local authorities to have the power to create dual-language street names’ (2007, p. 6). Costs and capacity The SDLP rejects the section of the DCAL document outlining a financial assessment of the proposed legislation, and points out that the primary costs of services are staffing costs which would have to be met even if the service were only provided in English (2007, p. 10). The DUP is highly critical of the lack of financial projections for the costs of an Irish language Act. The DUP is, however, clear that they see no benefits to such legislation. All the four options outlined in the consultation paper will lead to increased expenditure, it contends amidst references to tax


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payers, ‘facing massive increases in their domestic rates bill and the prospect of water charges being introduced.’11 The DUP say that it is therefore resolutely opposed to Irish language legislation, although there is an indication that the party is able to accept a small number of street signs under current practice within the local Councils. The party reiterates its opposition to the Irish language receiving funding that is not available to Ulster Scots. The submission returns to its earlier point, saying, ‘Instead of pouring further money into the Irish language there should be a focus on not just Ulster Scots but those minority languages which are actually the first language of some of our minority ethnic communities in Northern Ireland (2007, p. 6). The UUP (2007, p. 3) notes that the document does not provide detailed costings, and asserts that legislation cannot be mooted without the inclusion of costs. This would be, it states, ‘... neglect of government’s duty to promote fiscal responsibility and accountability.’ Alliance (2007, p. 4) warns that, ‘There is a legitimate question as to how far the population as a whole should subsidise the sectional demands of one section of society.’ This implies that only services for the majority should be funded from the public purse, a proposal that would have serious repercussions for all minority groups, including carers, the disabled and the ethnic minorities whose interests Alliance purports to support. The submission further notes that language may be a low priority for training within public bodies. The party does not appear to feel that this is an issue that could or should be addressed. Furthermore, ‘Consideration also needs to be given to those wishing to engage through the medium of Irish with the public bodies in question, taking into account vexatious individuals’ (2007, p. 7, Author’s emphasis). Other issues raised in the party-political submissions SF (2007, p. 5) calls for a right for all citizens to use their full address in Irish in relation to all official documents, and also points out the omission of broadcasting from the consultation paper. ‘Caithfear cearta sonraithe a lua in aon Acht a chruthaíonn cearta i dtaca le craoltóireacht tri mheán na Gaeilge’ / ‘Significant rights must be mentioned in any Act that creates rights in relation to broadcasting through the medium of Irish’ (Author’s translation). The SDLP also criticises the exclusion of broadcasting from all but an annex of the document. It (2007, p. 10) says that the failure to include this issue centrally in the proposed legislative models is unacceptable. Allister’s submission (2007, p. 24) contains a substantial section on the ECRML. Although he has strenuously opposed funding for RMLs, Allister does not appear averse to using an instrument intended to protect both Irish and Ulster Scots to belittle the Irish language. He quotes the 2004 monitoring report of the CoE COMEX on the implementation of the ECRML, noting the experts’ comment that the Irish speaking community in the North is a revivalist movement, whilst the Ulster Scots movement ‘involves both

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native speakers and revivalists. The Ulster Scots language is still actively spoken ...’ (Respondent’s use of bold and italics). This Introductory remark by the COMEX is proof, states Allister, that the commitment to enact Irish language legislation, ‘... is not being implemented out of necessity but to satisfy another agenda, namely that of the Republican movement.’ Unionists, he says have not campaigned for Official status for Ulster Scots, ‘... understanding only too well the costs and implications of advancing such a language.’ Allister (2007, p. 30) draws on the UK’s own reports on ECRML implementation and on the general findings of the 2004 COMEX report to indicate that the approach of the UK government meets with approval. In fact, as explored in Chapter 4, in its first report (24 March 2004) the COMEX raises a number of areas for immediate action by the UK government. It also raises a number of significant question marks in almost one third of all the clauses ratified for Irish by the British government. In the case of 11 of the clauses, the report finds that the British government has either failed to fulfil its commitment or only partly fulfilled it, or else the Experts say they have not been given enough information. In the case of Article 10, which relates to the use of Irish in the Assembly, in Councils and in public bodies, only half of the clauses ratified were deemed to have been fulfilled. Whilst Allister’s argument is clearly partial, this section of his submission illustrates some of the weaknesses in the ECRML reporting mechanism that have been noted in Chapter 4 and again in Chapter 6 in relation to the Judicial Review of the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland). Noting that at the time of writing his submission, the second COMEX report was not available, Allister says, ‘No doubt, as in the past the Government will be swift to act on any recommendations: further confirming the lack of need for an Irish language Act.’ The UUP (2007, p. 3) state that the Equality Impact Assessment (DCAL EQIA 2007) considerations are ‘... worryingly divorced from reality’. The experience of the SoI, it says proves that there is an equality element to language skills. The submission gives no explanation of this assertion. The submission says, ‘The negative equality impact in terms of a potential requirement or expectation that public servants have knowledge of the Irish language is deeply disturbing and would rightly be interpreted as contradicting the principle of parity of esteem.’ However, the DCAL consultation paper does not propose in any of its sections that such a requirement be introduced in the North. Nor is there any such proposal in the POBAL document, Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI. Echoing the stance of the UUP and DUP, Alliance (2007, p. 3) says that the proposed legislation is a political concession ‘rather (than) any objective assessment of the overall legislation requirements with respect to language matters for NI.’ Ironically, the submission then asserts that Irish should not be the subject of legislation without all other languages being included also. Having referred to the ECRML designations of different categories


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of language a few lines previously, the Alliance (2007, p. 3) now moves to regarding languages as competing interests, While there may well be more speakers of Irish in Northern Ireland than any other language, there are more people who speak other languages as their first language. Furthermore there are more speakers of other languages who have difficulty in communicating in English than Irish speakers who experience such problems. This argument would appear to mitigate against protections for any indigenous language where intergeneration transmission has been broken, or where there is a high percentage of learners. Bilingualism is in effect to lead to the loss of language rights. This position has no basis in either domestic or international law. Alliance (2007, p. 4) continues, Priority in language policy should be given to ensuring that those speakers of non-indigenous languages whether they be ethnic minorities or first or second generation immigrants from Europe or further afield. It is such persons who suffer most disadvantage in their dealings with public bodies. It is interesting to note that in the above comment, Alliance now argues that the language needs of first and second generation ethnic minorities should be prioritised. Continuing in the same voice, the submission notes that uneven provision for the users of ethnic minority languages suggests clear scope for ‘creating standard statutory rights and duties in this regard’. Many would agree with this point but note that this does not mitigate against an Irish language Act. Alliance (2007, p. 5) appears to disagree and notes as its final comment in this section of the paper, It is ironic that the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages (sic) only deals with indigenous languages. It is not flexible to deal with changing demographic patterns. Even in its limited scope, there is a danger of its terms being misapplied to Northern Ireland. Given the broadness of the allegation against the use of the ECRML, it is unfortunate that Alliance does not detail evidence behind this assertion. The submission simply ends on this statement before making specific comments on the consultation document. Community relations In respect of the community relations, Allister (2007, p. 32) notes, ‘Lest there be any doubt, we say there are very definitive (sic) adverse impacts for the majority community in NI in the introduction of an Irish Language Act,

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irrespective of which approach, or model, is adopted.’ Nor does he understand the finding of the DCAL EQIA 2007 that a rights-based approach to education would create adverse impacts since, ‘... by the same token, the promotion of the Irish language itself could have the same impact because it is every bit as much aligned to religious and political affiliation as is education through that medium’ (2007, p. 34). Nor does he accept that schemes would ensure that the ‘adverse impact is likely to be less’. A language scheme which inevitably promotes the Irish language, inescapably causes an adverse impact on equality because of the close alignment to political and religious affiliation. Statutory duties on public bodies, which are inspired by a desire to promote something, manifestly translate into benefit, adverse to the interest of others, for those benefited. It is fatuous to pretend otherwise. The UUP (2007, p. 3), ‘entirely rejects the proposed Irish Language Act as profoundly harmful to community relations.’ Quoting the section of the GFA, the party notes, without trace of irony, that, ‘... “The importance of respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity” will be fundamentally undermined by the proposed Act.’ Although the UUP do not deny that there may be community relations benefits of legislation to protect and promote the Irish language, it asserts that such benefits cannot be elevated to the same level as the ‘sensitivities’ of the Unionist community. Any attempt to do so, ‘demonstrates a willful ignorance of the views of a wide range of political and community stakeholders in NI.’ Alliance says that the DCAL consultation paper has a number of ‘major flaws’. The consultation ‘often works on the premise that the Irish language is a matter for the nationalist/Catholic tradition when the historical evidence would suggest otherwise,’ (2007, p. 3) but the submission does not develop this point. The proposals it says should be screened for their impact upon good relations and the submission then notes, ‘It almost goes without saying that people have the right to use whatever language they wish in their private affairs.’ Almost but not quite. Although no reasons are given, Alliance (2007, p. 8) disputes the conclusion in the DCAL document that the proposals would have a positive impact on good relations and states that the impacts on people of neither unionist nor nationalist identity have not been considered.

Conclusions on the political party submissions The submissions are divided along sectarian lines, with the nationalist parties focusing on practical issues in relation to the legislation, whilst the unionist parties, including the Alliance, appear to be struggling to come to terms with a number of basic human and language rights issues. The tone of


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the submissions from the main unionist parties, the UUP and DUP, and the submission from former DUP MEP Jim Allister is emphatic and rejectionist, not simply in relation to the models put forward, but also in terms of any protection for the Irish language. It is interesting to note the comments regarding the ECRML in the unionist submissions. Whilst there are attempts to use this international instrument to assert that all is well with LPP in the North, there are also clear indications that some of the parties would like to reverse existing obligations. Nonetheless, in all cases the ECRML is spoken of in terms of a fait accompli. Such acceptance would suggest that had Irish language legislation been introduced, within a relatively short period of time the debate could have shifted in a similar manner.

8 Submissions from Key Public Bodies and a 20 per cent Sample of Individual Responses to the Public Consultation on the Proposed Irish Language Legislation

In the first part of this chapter, I shall consider eight submissions to the first DCAL consultation on Proposed Irish Language Legislation by key governmental, public and voluntary sector organisations. First, I shall examine the submissions of the public sector bodies, the Community Relations Council (CRC), Ofcom, the Lord Chief Justice’s Office (LCJO), HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the NI Prison Service (NIPS). Following this, I shall examine the submissions made by the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), the Welsh Language Board (ByI / WLB) and the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland (GOLI). In the second part of this Chapter I shall analyse a random 20 per cent sample of individual submissions to the consultation, prior to drawing some conclusions on the overall response to the consultation.

Submission by the Community Relations Council The response from CRC is a significant 3½-page submission which states that the CRC views Irish ‘... as an integral element of a rich cultural tapestry which we all share’ (CRC 2007, p. 1). It notes that whilst the census and the figures in the consultation document reflect a larger percentage of Catholics with an interest and knowledge of Irish, there have been initiatives taken to promote the Irish language in the Protestant community, and this work should be developed (2007, p. 2). CRC (2007, p. 2) calls for ‘a new approach’ to language in order that society can move towards ‘inclusion.’ It continues, The task of political leadership in divided societies is to turn issues previously understood as the property of one side into opportunities to 168

Key Public Bodies’ and Individual Submissions

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establish new links, partnerships and new appreciations for the entire community. The quid pro quo of rights in this area is that our languages are understood as the possession of the whole community, without violence and aggression or particular political connotation, and that steps to embed rights should be accompanied by active efforts to ensure real opportunities to participate in language activities for all. The submission proposes that the ECRML and the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) should guide any new legislation. It notes (2007, pp. 2–3) that as progress made in LPP since the GFA represents political consensus, ‘such agreements that were reached under the St Andrews Agreement should be endorsed.’ CRC suggests that Irish in the North ‘... should not be treated in a manner less favourable than the treatment accorded to Gaelic in Scotland or Welsh in Wales.’ It points out that, ‘In neither case is there any evidence that legal support for these languages has further segregated society, nor impacted on access to the economy’ (2007, p. 3). The submission calls for provision in education, government and broadcasting, but notes that signage may prove more difficult. However, fears of controversy must not ‘justify inaction or timidity’. It urges an approach by government that will create ‘a warm house for all’ through the principles of equity, diversity and interdependence, and ‘a clear commitment to public education aimed at people who are currently not using the language.’ This is a highly significant submission in the context of the CRC’s specific role and expertise and the emphasis of the DCAL consultation paper on promoting good community relations.

Submission by Ofcom In what appears to be an oblique reference to the lack of legislative protections for Irish, Ofcom, the independent Office of Communications, states that it has experience in meeting consumer expectations, ‘as far as Welsh and Scots Gaelic are concerned and would endeavour to act in a similar way in relation to Irish should it be required to do so.’1 Ofcom’s submission consists of links to a press release2 and a June 2005 Statement on Programming for the Nations and Regions (‘The Statement’).3 The Statement notes the need for improvements in both access and content for Irish speakers in the North, and points out that the BBC broadcast five hours of Irish language programming on television during 2004–5, a decrease from 7 hours in 2003–4 (Ofcom 2007, p. 24, para 4.54). With reference to the accessibility of TG4, the Statement refers to improved reception of TG4 from the transmitter at Divis Mountain in Belfast, and the satellite availability from April 2005 of TG4 on the Sky platform. Ofcom (2007, p. 24, para 4.57) states that TG4 is the ‘obvious vehicle’ for, ‘a dedicated


digital service’ for Irish speakers, but points out that primary funding from the RoI alone is not, ‘appropriate’ and that the NI audience has, ‘distinct needs that may not be met by TG4 programming alone.’ Ofcom recommends further work on ‘an appropriate and properly funded service in a digital environment (2007, p. 24, para 4.56). Following a brief reference to the role of the BBC in the then newly established CCG / ILBF (2007, p. 24, paras 4.43, 4.54), the Statement highlights the legislative disparity between Irish, Gaelic in Scotland and Welsh in Wales noted in Chapter 5. In addition, Ofcom (2007, p. 24, para 4.59). reports that this disparity, the ‘absence of statutory provision and of sufficient funding’ and lack of appropriate programming were the most common complaints during its first PSB consultation. Perhaps most significantly, the final paragraph in the Statement (2007, p. 24, para 4.63) in respect of Irish notes that, ‘it is for Government to provide the enabling framework which will address the particular needs of audiences in NI who wish to receive Irish language programming.’ Whilst it is not possible to assert the exact reasons behind the recycling of materials previously issued by Ofcom as the bulk of their submission, the repetition of proposals made two years prior to the consultation on Irish language legislation highlights the lack of progress made in the intervening period in respect of broadcasting and the Irish language.

Submission by the Lord Chief Justice’s Office This is a detailed four-page submission, which sets out the views of the Lord Chief Justice’s Office (LCJO) on the use of Irish in the courts, ‘following consultation with the judiciary of Northern Ireland’ (2007, p. 1). LCJO states that the judiciary’s key concern is ensuring justice and fair treatment for all in the courts, avoiding undue delays or ‘adding complexity’ in the administration of justice. Among the issues considered are: the availability of accredited translation services capable of providing adequate court services; the impact on resources; availability of necessary technology; costs; and whether services would be restricted to some types of proceeding or some parts of proceedings. The letter notes that without answers to such questions and clear indications of demand it is not possible to assess the full impact of proposed legislation (2007, p. 1). It asserts, ‘The test in any case where a party is seeking to have a case conducted in whole, or in part, in a language other than English should be whether it is in the interests of justice that a case should be so conducted’ (2007, p. 1, LCJO use of bold type for emphasis). It continues, noting that ‘the concept of justice involves many facets including the requirement for a fair trial for all involved’ (2007, p. 1, LCJO use of bold type for emphasis). It cites the example of a witness or expert wishing to use Irish and the need to balance this against the rights of the defendant or victim to monitor the


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way in which the evidence is given. ‘Defendants or victims may feel they are being disadvantaged or excluded by hearing the witness’s evidence “second hand” ’ (2007, pp. 1–2). Child victims or ‘vulnerable’ witnesses being cross examined in two languages, time spent on the witness stand, and the requirement for an Irish speaking jury, which it states would have logistical problems ‘as well as being contrary to the policy of widening the jury pool’ (2007, p. 2) are raised. The submission recommends notice of desire to use Irish be given, and a fine imposed in the case of failure. However, it then asserts that ‘flexibility’ should be employed as to a right to use Irish ‘where the defendant (or whoever has made the request that the proceedings be conducted in Irish) can speak English’ (2007, p. 2). This should most particularly be applied where proceedings may be organised at short notice, and they go on to give a significant list including, ‘first remands, bail hearings, Saturday courts and extensions ... care proceedings ...’ (2007, p. 2). Concerns are expressed about simultaneous translation, cancellation of cases, delay in translating documents, especially where there is a considerable volume, where they are complex or where disclosure from third parties is required, quality control and confidentiality (2007, pp. 2–3). LCJO proposes that there should a ‘pool of translators available for private litigants’ and recommend an audit be carried out to establish how many translators are available. Considerable emphasis is placed on the capacity of the translator to assure the credibility of the evidence is assuring through inflexion, pace and intonation. The final area of concern is that ‘... it is vital that the cost of ... the use of Irish does not come from existing judicial and courts budgets.’ It lists the type of costs that might be incurred (2007, p. 3). The submissions concludes with the point that no rights or duties should commence until, ‘... the necessary arrangements have been put in place ... an appropriate translation service, training for those who require it, and installation of translation equipment’ (2007, p. 4). Whilst there are, at times, indications of a lack of emphasis on the justice and rights issues as they affect Irish speakers in this submission, it is nonetheless a practical and relatively measured response to the consultation.

Submission by HM Revenue and Customs This is a short submission, a little over one page, which focuses on areas where there is a perceived impact of the proposed legislation on the work of the body itself. The submission states that HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) favours a schemes-based approach, because this would enable it to understand and meet needs, would entail a phased implementation and give the opportunity to build capacity. HMRC favours the creation of a new regulatory body, and refers to the model of the Equality Commission, which combines

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enforcement with advice-giving and facilitation. It states that since HMRC does not have the capacity to provide for bilingualism, they oppose official status for Irish as it would, ‘... create unrealistic expectations of bilingualism.’ In relation to the courts, HMRC ‘strongly’ advocates measures to ensure that delays do not occur (2007, p. 1). It is difficult in such a short submission to weigh the arguments of the HMRC in relation to a rights-based approach and in relation to Official Status. The tendency to make unsupported statements about the implications of each of these issues is unfortunate, although rather more detail is given in relation to the body’s desire to move forward in an incremental manner, suggesting a cautious, but not overtly hostile attitude.

Submission by NI Prison Service This is a one and a half page submission containing comments from the NI Prison Service (NIPS). The initial point made is that, ‘the way forward must surely take account of financial constraints across the entire public sector, as they may apply not just to the promotion of the Irish language, but also to Ulster Scots’ (2007, p. 1). It recommends the schemes-based approach in use principally in ‘the three other jurisdictions,’ although it casts some doubt on the evidence in Wales and Scotland, ‘of the value that is added through having for example documents provided in more than one language’ (2007, p. 1). The submission notes that a rights-based approach ‘would create a disproportionate requirement on public bodies.’ However, it also rejects detailed duties (2007, p. 1). Oddly, given the often quoted impact of the learning of Irish in the prisons in the North during the 70s, 80s and 90s, the submission takes a shorter view of history and notes, ‘It may be instructive to consider the use that is currently made of provisions for teaching the Irish language in NI prisons. This facility is primarily provided through the education department in Maghaberry Prison, where not more than ten individuals have been enrolled at any time’ (2007, p. 2). Again, the submission refers to costs, and again it makes the assertion that Ulster Scots would also have to be included, and that as a consequence there would be ‘a reduction in the quality of provision for other prisoners, their families and their representatives’ (2007, p. 2). This is the most negative of the submissions by public and state bodies and may reflect the political and religious make-up of the NIPS, and its specific role in the recent history of the North. The submissions from the five public sector organisations show a variety of responses to the legislation. In spite of the different opinions, all the submissions show a high level of acceptance of the proposal to legislate for the Irish language, and an ability to apply issues arising from this proposal to the practical functions of the respondent organisation.


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Submissions from the Committee of the Administration of Justice, the Welsh Language Board and the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland The three submissions in this section are from very different organisations which all represent key viewpoints. CAJ is the key human rights NGO in the NoI. The Welsh Language Board (ByI / WLB) has a particular significance because of the centrality of the Welsh experience to the SAA commitment to legislate. The Grand Orange Order of Ireland submission can be deemed to be broadly representative of the views of the Orange Lodges4 and although negative responses to the consultation represented only 7 per cent of the overall submissions received, it was felt important to include this view point in the analysis. Submission by the Committee on the Administration of Justice CAJ is a cross community independent human rights group working in the North. The submission is five pages long with a further nine pages of annexes attached, detailing a number of case studies where CAJ deem the rights of Irish speakers have been infringed in the workplace. CAJ state that they have, ‘... no particular expertise in questions of language, and our contribution to the debate on Irish language legislation is premised on concern to protect and promote language rights and minority rights more generally’ (2007, p. 1). The submission refers to the commitments made in the GFA, the ECRML and the SAA before making some introductory remarks (2007, p. 1) on the consultation document and the historical use of Irish. The submission states, ‘... it is presumably uncontested that the Irish language was actively discriminated against in the past, and that its large-scale destruction as the majority language is not merely the incidental result of rapid industrialisation? Yet the current text implies otherwise’ (2007: 1, para a). The submission goes on to point out that accuracy on the historical context ‘is important to understanding some of the political sensitivities that may surround the language’ and because, ‘... there are unfortunately modern-day experiences of people experiencing discrimination on grounds of their use of the Irish language, and the passage of an Irish Language Act is important in addressing this reality on the ground’ (2007, pp. 1–2, para a). Regarding the financial impact assessment included with the DCAL consultation document, the submission notes that CAJ has no objection in principle to this. However, it states that it has never before seen such an assessment in a consultation document (2007, p. 3, para d). It continues, ‘it is quite unacceptable for public bodies to indicate the costs of translation of texts, when they disregard the costs of producing and publishing the material in English.’ Turning to the DCAL consultation paper itself, CAJ supports a rights-based approach to the legislation and cites the case history appendices attached to the submission as proof that, ‘this debate is not

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an esoteric one’ (2007, p. 3). Furthermore, the submission challenges some of the characterisations of a rights-based approach set down in the DCAL paper. CAJ points out that in supporting a rights-based approach for the proposed legislation, it does not intend to argue that any language rights are absolute. It does however believe, ‘that the international commitments of the government must be complied with, and that there be a duty on government to seek to extend the ability of Irish language speakers to exercise their rights fully in all private and public spheres’ (2007, p. 3). Referring to the broad-based consultation and international expertise associated with the POBAL proposals, CAJ (2007, p. 2, para c) ‘finds it highly unfortunate that government did not take the POBAL proposals as a starting point for the discussions and indicate in what ways it agreed with, or disagreed with, the carefully considered proposals already on the table. In the view of CAJ, ‘... the approach to Irish language legislative provision should be rights-based, but that this is best done by a mixture of rights, duties, and language schemes’ (2007, p. 4). The submission states, however, ‘This option is the least explored in the consultation paper, so it is difficult to comment in much more detail.’ CAJ challenges the assertion that a rights-based approach to Irish Medium Education could impact adversely on equality because of the correlation made by DCAL between language interests and community affiliation. The submission (2007, p. 4, para 6.12.8) points out that the DCAL document does not explain, ‘... why this adverse impact would derive from the rightsbased approach per se, rather than simply the provision of IME for any reason whatsoever.’ CAJ asserts (2007, p. 4, para 6.12.8, Respondent’s emphasis) that provision of education to any group, ... because of a rights-based approach would assist in countering any negative connotations. Education provided on the basis of rights, and in compliance with government’s international commitments to promote minority languages and minority rights, cannot be portrayed as arising on the basis of merely who shouts loudest, or who has money, or who is politically popular at any particular time. As such, a rights based approach should assist policy makers transcend partisan interests. In respect of the use of Irish in the courts as dealt with in the DCAL EQIA, CAJ note that the document could usefully have referred, ‘... to the fact that the courts and tribunals will have a duty to provide Article 6 rights (fair trial) in the context of Article 14 (non-discrimination on grounds of, amongst other things, language)’ (2007, p. 4, para 8.3). CAJ goes on to note the lack of discussion in the DCAL document on the impact on recruitment, training and organisational culture that greater use of languages other than English would have (2007, p. 5). The submission notes the encouragement that this could provide for more Irish speakers to seek posts within the civil


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service and public bodies, and therefore reduce perceived or real obstacles to the recruitment of those with Irish language skills. The annexes to the submission detail a court case involving the dismissal of a security guard from his employment in Belfast for using Irish,5 a care worker refused support by the Department of Social Development to study Irish,6 an individual worker with the Social Security Agency who was told not to speak Irish in a private telephone conversation,7 the insistence that an advert for a fluent Irish speaker be only produced in English.8 This is an expert and thorough submission from the leading human rights NGO in the North.

Submission by the Welsh Language Board This is a one and a half page submission on behalf of the Bwrdd Yr Iaith / Welsh Language Board (ByI / WLB) which starts by offering the Board’s support to the ‘principle of introducing Irish language legislation in NI’ (ByI / WLB 2007, p. 1). It notes that the paper makes several references to the position of Welsh in Wales and to legislation there. They feel the references are ‘all pertinent to the arguments in favour of legislating’ (2007, p. 1). The ByI /WLB say they prefer not to offer detailed comments on the specific issues in the consultation but make the offer of ‘detailed assistance at a future stage on the basis of our extensive experience’ (2007, p. 1) once it has been decided what type of legislation will be introduced. They note, nonetheless, that the legislation should ‘above all else, facilitate the process of enabling those who wish to use Irish in their dealings with the public sector in NI to do so with the greatest ease and the least hindrance’ (2007, p. 1). It states unequivocally that this does not affect or diminish the rights of those who wish to use English instead. As goals for the legislation, it proposes (2007, p. 1) three issues above all else, Firstly, the rights of those who wish to use Irish must be set out in it and protected by it. Secondly, the responsibilities of public bodies to provide services must also be clearly set out in the legislation and be capable of being practically and reasonably delivered (if necessary, on a staged basis, in view of the capacity considerations to which the consultation paper alludes). Thirdly, it must be declared at the very least that anything done in Irish within the context of the legislation is equally valid as if it had been done in English. Noting that the Welsh Language Act has made significant contributions to the position of Welsh, the submission (2007, p. 2). nonetheless makes the point that the legislation has shortcomings, including, ‘it does not effectively protect the rights of those who wish to use Welsh; it only places

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responsibilities on public bodies to implement the (highly laudable) principle that Welsh and English should be treated on a basis of equality. In the second place, it does not contain sufficient sanctions to ensure compliance by public bodies.’ It notes also several recent occasions when the Board has itself ‘pressed the Welsh Assembly Government to secure a firm legislative basis for protecting the Welsh language in future.’ Given the wording of the commitment in the SAA, this is a highly significant submission. It expresses support for the legislation and sets out a number of key goals. In addition, it refers, obliquely, to contemporary work to improve language legislation in Wales, and offers practical support and expertise. Submission by the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland This is a three and a half page submission from the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland (GOLI) with accompanying letter acknowledging the extension granted to the Order for its submission, ‘which allowed this matter to be more fully discussed at our Central Committee and with Grand Lodge Officers.’9 The submission begins with the statement that Grand Lodge ‘views with deep concern and alarm the thrust of the document’ which they say could have ‘long-term and damaging repercussions in relation to community relations’ (2007, p. 1). The submission notes the ‘bona fides’ of ‘the many genuine and dedicated Irish language enthusiasts ...’ However, it opposes the use of Irish ‘by some’ as a political weapon,’... this extends to speaking in Irish, writing in Irish, erecting street signs in Irish, and so on’ (2007, p. 1). It would appear that this does not leave many ‘non-political’ options for the ‘genuine’ Irish speaker. The submission complains of the inability of militant republicans to accept other viewpoints and states that the Grand Lodge believes ‘that they would attempt to use any new legislation to try and legally change the face of Northern Ireland.’ The submission gives no further information on what this means, or why Irish language legislation would be required to do it. Instead, it simply states that an Irish language Act would have ‘the most serious repercussions and create the greatest damage imaginable to community relations’ (2007, p. 1). Grand Lodge disagrees that the legislation would have a positive effect on community relations, declaring itself ‘amazed’. The submission next opposes the creation of rights in respect of use of Irish in a variety of fields on the grounds that as well as creating tensions, it would also ‘... portray us as a backwards society to others seeking to invest’ (2007, p. 1). It is not clear whether it is the association with the creation of rights that would have this impact, or the association with the Irish language. The Grand Lodge is concerned about costs and notes Foras na Gaeilge’s number of employees and budget in comparison with that available to Ulster Scots.10 Noting the percentage of the populations of Wales (21 per cent), the RoI (43 per cent) and Scotland (1.16 per cent) that speak


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Welsh, Irish and Gaelic respectively, in comparison with the North’s 10 per cent of Irish speakers, they advise an amount of funding ‘much less than accorded in Wales, or in the Republic of Ireland ...’ yet in an apparent sudden departure from the proportionality argument, ‘on a basis of parity with funding for Ulster Scots’ (2007, p. 1). In respect of the consultation paper, they make the following points: first, that legislation for Irish is not appropriate, but if it is to go ahead, they would favour ‘the least intrusive option,’ language schemes. In relation to the Commissioner, they twice state that they do not support the creation of a new regulatory body, which would not have ‘the approval of the Grand Orange Lodge.’ Any appointments, however, should be made by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and there should be no Ministerial power to ‘make binding directions and/or a power to make a compensation scheme.’ In addition, Irish should be ‘a matter of personal preference and funded by those interested in it’ (2007, p. 2). Furthermore, the Grand Lodge, ‘could never agree to a status which would place a minority language on the same basis as English.’ Should such an action be taken, it states, the same must apply to Ulster Scots, Mandarin and Polish. However, such a development would be ‘a charter for bilingualism and multilingualism’. It asserts that this would be ‘... contrary to the idea of developing a strong shared future.’ Instead it suggests, in common with the Alliance Party, that Irish could perhaps be recognised as a historic or minority language, in line with the terminology in the ECRML, as this would not ‘amount to official or equal status.’ It concludes this section with the words, ‘This is as much as the Grand Orange Lodge feels its members could accept’ (2007, p. 2). On education, it asserts that IME is not as popular as claimed and that any further provision should be scheme- and demand-based and achieved within existing budgets. In particular, it must not impinge on Protestant Maintained schools. The submission states, ‘To allow minimal numbers to engage in study of Irish, which is clearly not a major world language, is to ignore the realities of the opportunities that our education system needs to provide for young people’ (2007, p. 2). In the political institutions, it opposes any ‘further’ (sic) language legislation in the Assembly, the creation of any rights, or furthermore, the adoption of a scheme. This is because, ‘the use of the Irish language from those representing the minority community will be divisive and increase costs and duties at the Assembly.’ In addition, local authorities should not be ‘forced to adopt Irish language measures’ (2007, p. 2). In relation to the courts, there should be no provision for the use of Irish if: the person concerned can speak English, and or if the same provision is not made for Ulster Scots. The use of Irish will be used, it contends, ‘... as a political weapon and statement, and given the removal of the Royal Coat of Arms from the courtrooms, will further add to the sense of alienation among the majority


of the people of Northern Ireland’ (2007, p. 3). Furthermore, the use of Irish in the courts ‘... will also increase lack of respect for the law and legal system among young Protestants’ (2007, p. 3). This seems a curious assertion, since, by the logic of the GOLI, it appears unlikely that ‘young Protestants’ would request to have their cases heard in Irish. On the other hand, the fact that the refusal of the right to be heard in Irish might impact on the views of young Irish speakers is not considered. On street names, the GOLI ‘would oppose any provision of street names in Irish.’ To adopt such signs where a percentage of people in the street were in favour of it would create, they say, ‘... a very dangerous situation in our view.’ In an extraordinary paragraph, it asserts, ‘Those who have shown they are prepared to resort to violence could sway opinions through intimidation and the threat of violence. This would be providing a weapon for those engaged in “cultural warfare” and would greatly assist those who have a fascist approach to their culture’ (2007, p. 3). It reinforces its message by stating, ‘... No one should be able to use Irish in correspondence. No one should be able to use Irish street names in official documents. Public bodies should not be required to use an Irish street name in correspondence’ (2007, p. 3). Examination of the points made by the Grand Lodge show that underlying their submission appears to be the view that, with the exception of IME, which should not be allowed to develop further, all Irish language services, including streetnames in Irish should be opposed. The submissions from the above organisations indicate the depth of penetration of the issue of Irish language legislation into the broad human rights agenda and the work of international language organisations including the Welsh Language Board, which like Foras na Gaeilge (whose submission is examined along with those of other statutory Irish language organisations in a different section) is a statutory Language Board with particular expertise in the field. The significance of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland submission is two-fold. It is representative of a small number of negative replies (7 per cent or 46 submissions out of 668, according to DCAL’s Summary of Responses) to the consultation. It also indicates an attitude of rejectionism common to the negative submissions. In the next part of this chapter, I shall analyse a random 20 per cent sample of individual submissions to the consultation document, prior to drawing some conclusions about the overall response.

A random 20 per cent sample of individual responses to the consultation In addition to the responses attributed by DCAL to organisations, 205 numbered individual submissions were also posted on the departmental website. In each case, the name and address of the contributor has been


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removed from these submissions by DCAL. In this part of the chapter, I shall attempt to give a snap shot of these individual responses, by analysing and commenting on a 20 per cent random sample. The sample was made by selecting the first and every fifth submission as numbered on the DCAL website, a total of 42 responses categorised by the Department itself as individual submissions. One submission (no. 15 on the website) failed to open after repeated attempts and this failure was simply recorded as part of the sample. In this part of the chapter, I shall attribute comments from quoted submissions in the main text, except where a large number of submissions are involved. In these cases, the references will be carried as endnotes. To assist in a clear analysis of what is a relatively large number of submissions, I include information in tabular form in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. Of the 42 responses sampled, 40 were supportive of Irish language legislation. One was opposed to legislation of any kind for Irish, and 1 submission, as noted earlier, failed to download from the DCAL website.

The responses supporting proposed legislation Fourteen of the submissions are written in Irish, with a further two consisting of a lead section in Irish and the body of the submission in English. One further submission, written primarily in English, makes specific reference to the respondent’s concern that there may be no-one in DCAL able to understand a submission in Irish, and one other submission states the respondent’s support for the legislation in Irish, then adds a translation of this specific phrase in English in brackets, before continuing in Irish. One submission consists of a bilingual email covering letter, with bilingual attachment. The responses vary in format and length. Six are handwritten. Two of these are short A5 letters, four are over one and a half A4 pages and the lengthiest is two and a half handwritten A4 pages. Eleven submissions are in the form of emails and range from a few lines to one page. Nine of the typed submissions are over one and a half pages in length. One typed submission is three and a half pages. In nine of the submissions, there is some reference to the personal circumstances of the respondent. One submission is made by a person learning the language, one by a pensioner with a large extended family of Irish speakers and grandchildren in IME, one by a fifth year school student and one by the parents of two children being raised with Irish as the language of the home (no. 40, no. 150, no. 160 and no. 195 respectively). Six separate submissions make reference to the respondents being the parent(s) of children in IME (no. 45, no. 50, no. 85), or to them being concerned that children should have the right to IME, (no. 65, no. 145) and one refers to the respondent having a child of school age (no. 170). One submission states that IME is not available in the respondent’s locality and points out the loss

Table 8.1 DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of individual submissions by viewpoint on legislation and the model preferred No. on DCAL Language of website submission English

5

English

10 15

20

English Submission did not download English

25 30 35

English Irish English

40

Personal details given Support for about respondent proposed Act?

Support for a rights- Reference to POBAL based approach? proposals by name?

1pg handwritten 1 ½ pg

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

1 ½ pg

Yes

as part of POBAL proposals Yes

Yes

as part of POBAL proposals

Yes

Yes Schemes-based

Yes

English

1 pg handwritten 12 lines 1 ½ pg 20 line e mail 1 ½ pg

Yes

45

English

1 pg

50

English

1 ½ pg

55

English

1 full pg

180

1

Length

No Yes Yes

Yes

Learner

Yes

Parent with child in IM Mother of child in IM, and learner

Yes

as part of POBAL model Yes

Yes

Yes

Refers to 4 postcard points (See Note A.) Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

181

60

English

14 line email

Yes

Yes

65

English

2 lines

Yes

Yes

70 75

English Irish

3 line e mail 2 ½ pg handwritten

Yes Yes

Yes

80 85

English English

12 lines 1 pg

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

90

English

1 ½ pg

Yes

Yes

95

English

1 ½ pg

Yes

Yes,

100

Irish

1½ handwritten

Yes

Yes

ref to child having right to IM

Parent of child in IM

105

English

4 lines

Yes

Yes

110 115 120

Irish Irish Irish

12 lines 1 page 1 ½ page

Yes Yes Yes

Welsh model Yes Yes

125

English

6 lines

Yes

Yes

Yes POBAL has a central role Yes Refers to 4 postcard points (See Note A) Because of POBAL’s expertise Knowledge of the community; consultation done Yes, agreed after long and complex consultation Yes Yes Yes because of community input

Continued

Table 8.1 Continued No. on DCAL Language of website submission

Length

130 135

Personal details given Support for about respondent proposed Act?

Support for a rights- Reference to POBAL based approach? proposals by name?

182

7 lines 3 lines

Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

140

Irish Bilingual (See Note C) English

5 lines

Yes

Yes

145

English

6 lines

Yes

Yes

Yes, POBAL worked very hard and it’s time for this Act Yes

150

English

1 pg

Yes

Yes

Yes

155

Irish

1 ½ pg

Yes

Yes

160

English

Yes

Yes

165 170

Irish English

1 pg handwritten 1 ½ pg 1 ½ pg

Yes, POBAL carried out consultation Yes

Yes Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

175

Bilingual (see Note B)

1 page e mail

Yes

Yes

Yes

Children will have the right to IM Pensioner, children and grandchildren with Irish

5th year pupil

Parent of school age children

180

English

185 190

Irish English

195 200

Bilingual (see Note D) English

205

English

2 pg hand written 16 lines 20 lines e mail 3 ½ pages 11 line e mail 20 line e mail

Yes

Duties also mentions rights

Yes Yes

Yes

Parents of 2 children being raised with Irish

Yes

Rights and schemes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Written by one of the academics involved in drafting and consultation on POBAL proposals

Yes

Yes

Yes, painstaking work based on international standards

Painstaking, wide ranging consultation

183

Note: A Postcard13 supporting the Irish Language Act contains the following four points: Keep to the time-frame and spirit of the St Andrews commitment; place Irish speakers’ rights at the heart of the Act; make available adequate resources to implement the Act; appoint an Irish Language Commissioner. B Submission written in English, but preceded by note in Irish ‘Ar eagla na heagla nach bhfuil Gaeilge agat, seo é mo thuairim i mBéarla’ (‘In case you don’t speak Irish, here is my opinion in English’ – Author’s translation.) C Submission written in Irish, with English translation of one line in brackets ‘(I am in favour of the Irish language Act.)’ D Submission consists of bilingual email, with bilingual submission attached

184


this represents to local children (no. 170). One of these submissions also notes that the respondent is learning the language (no 50). Of the 40 submissions supporting legislation, 32 propose a rights-based approach; 29 of these make specific reference to rights-based legislation. One further submission refers to a mixture of rights and schemes and another refers to rights and duties. Another prefers the Welsh model, and one other calls for a schemes-based approach and refers to ‘Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland’ (no. 195, no. 180, no. 110, no. 35). Two submissions refer to four demands including the principle of a rights-based Act, resourced and enacted by Westminster (no. 45, no. 85). Three submissions make no reference to the legislative model but are supportive of legislation (no. 70, no. 135, no. 185). Twenty nine of the submissions make specific reference to their full support for the implementation of the POBAL proposals, and several make additional explanatory comments. These include, ‘I think (the POBAL document) is a reasonable document and I am impressed by the experts who have lent their name to it. I doubt the British government could find better qualified people,’ (no. 40) and, ‘Is é POBAL an scáthghrúpa Gaeilge i dTÉ é. Tugann POBAL treoir agus éisteacht dúinn mar Ghaeilgeoirí – tá a ról lárnach i saol an Ghaeilgeora i dTÉ.’ / ‘POBAL is the Irish language umbrella group in NI. POBAL gives guidance to Irish speakers and listens to them – their role is central to the Irish speaker’s life in NI’ (DCAL translation attached to submission on website, respondent’s own emphasis).11 Also, ‘I think the POBAL proposals should be given full weight because they have been put together well and based on expert knowledge’ (no. 90). Several submissions refer to the community consultation and input of Irish speakers into the POBAL proposals, ‘I think POBAL’s ideas are best because they know the community and what people need. Government departments often talk about consultation and this was carried out by POBAL when they went round to talk to people about the Irish language Act before’ (no. 95). And (no. 100), ‘Aontaím leis na moltaí atá á ndéanamh ag an eagraíocht “Pobal” moltaí a tháinig ann dóibh tar éis próiseas fada cuimsitheach comhairliúcháin le pobal na Gaeilge ó thuaidh.’ / I agree with the proposals which the organisation “Pobal” are making, proposals which have come about after a long and comprehensive consultation process with the Irish speaking community in the North’ (attached DCAL translation). In addition (no. 120), ‘Thug POBAL an deis do phobal na Gaeilge ionchur a bheith acu ar dhréachtú Acht Gaeilge agus tacaím le cáipéis s’acu,’ / ‘POBAL gave the Irish language community the opportunity to provide input into the drafting of the Irish Language Act and I support their document’ (attached DCAL translation) and (no. 155), ‘Sílim go bhfuil obair níos fearr déanta ar Acht na Gaeilge ag an phobal féin. Ba cheart moltaí comhaontaithe POBAL a chur i gcrích mar go gclúdaíonn siad réimse leathan de phointí a aontaíodh ag cruinnithe níos mó ná bliain ó shin,’ / ‘I think that


185

better work has been done on Acht na Gaeilge by the people themselves. The recommendations of POBAL should be accepted and acted on as they cover a broader range of points that were agreed in meetings more than a year ago.’ (attached DCAL translation) and, ‘The POBAL approach has the merit of being based on a painstaking and wide-ranging consultation with the Irish language community in Northern Ireland. It is coherent, practical and reasonable’ (no. 190). Eight of the submissions state that Irish should have Official status in the legislation.12 One submission calls for status for Irish in the North on a par with the status of Irish in the SoI (no. 195). Another states that Irish should have equal status with English (no. 125). Thirteen respondents refer specifically to the need for provision for education to be included in the legislation.14 Three refer to funding difficulties for a Belfast Gaelscoil.15 One other calls for support services and school transport for IM schools to be included in the Act. A further respondent calls for provision for adult learners of the language. In respect of the use of Irish in the courts, six respondents make specific reference to this (nos. 5, 10, 40, 50, 55, 90) with one noting the case of Máire Níc An Bhaird to which I have referred in Chapter 4 (no. 90). Nine respondents make comments on the use of Irish in the political institutions16 with one specific reference to the duty imposed on the Irish speaking former Minister of Health, Bairbre de Brún to self-translate at Ministers’ Question Time, without any increase in time allowed for each response (no. 5). Fourteen submissions refer to broadcasting and the media17 and several make specific comments, with one respondent noting that broadcasting in the Irish language is ‘crucial’ (no. 170), a further respondent stating that the scope of legislation should be broad enough to encompass, ‘réimsí mar chraolachán agus chánachas’ / ‘areas like broadcasting and taxation’ and other reserved matters,18 and another stating that they have themselves undertaken an Irish language television production training course (no. 120). Fourteen submissions specifically comment on the need to appoint an Irish Language Commissioner,19 with five of these also stating that a further Board would be needed to ensure that there was clarity in the regulatory roles (nos, 75, 90, 115, 120, 155). Two respondents refer to the need to ensure liaison with An Coimisinéir Teanga / The Language Commissioner in the RoI (nos. 95, 195), with submission 195 proposing that the duty of the Southern Commissioner should simply be extended to the North also. Other comments relate to acceptance of the need for Commissioners in other human rights areas, the importance of the neutrality or independence of the Commissioner and the need for an Annual Report instead of the proposed three-yearly report mentioned in the DCAL consultation paper (nos. 100, 175, 155 respectively).

186


The issue of streetnames in the DCAL consultation document generates commentary from eight respondents,20 six of whom specifically note the need for provision to extend to signage issues beyond street names to include townland and place names, personal and organisational names and signage in general (nos. 10, 55, 60, 90, 170, 175). The present perceived difficulty of getting bilingual street signage is referred to, as is the scarcity of Irish language signage. ‘At the moment, it is rare to see the language in public unless it is surrounded by 30 other languages. I think Irish has a specific place in the North and this should be recognised’ (nos. 95 and 90 respectively). Table 8.2 indicates respondents who make specific comments in their submissions relating to one or more of the issues raised in the consultation document. It can be understood that those respondents expressing support for the POBAL proposals are also giving their support to all of the specific matters listed on the grid (and any others contained in the POBAL proposals) unless stated otherwise. Many of the submissions raise other detailed issues also, including health services through Irish; adequate resourcing to enable the legislation, a timetable for implementation; the need for Westminster legislation and provision from Crown bodies; Irish language rights in the workplace; the importance of the GFA in respect of Irish; the need for rights in the business sector; commentaries on the Equality Impact Assessment (EQIA) on the consultation; the need to ensure that the emphasis is on the practical delivery of services; the importance of basic documentation like birth certificates, passports etc; the perceived key role that British policy and law has played in the decline of the Irish language; the damage done to the language by unionist hostility; the shared nature of the language as a resource for all; the need to remove the Irish language from the political arena and the opportunity which the legislation presents for government to do this; that the ECRML has not been adequate to protect the rights of Irish speakers; the need to build capacity within the Irish speaking community and the opportunity that the legislation represents to do this.21 Several submissions reveal a range of concerns in relation to language legislation. One of these (no. 190) notes that the Act, ‘will provide a benchmark to guide the wider community’ and makes comparison with the ban on smoking and the wearing of seatbelts to modify behaviour. However, the respondent highlights the danger of creating, ‘a legalistic approach’ rather than the much-needed, ‘liberal, altruistic spirit’. The submission concludes, ‘However, this is a risk that has to be taken,’ adding that over time, ‘a more relaxed, positive and ultimately nourishing attitude to the language will emerge.’ The submission goes on to support the POBAL proposals as the basis of the legislation. A further submission (no. 180) recognises the crucial importance of legislation for the Irish language, but notes, ‘... that the final legislation could go a different direction and set in motion years of significant energy being

Table 8.2 DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of individual submissions by support for legislation in subject areas listed in DCAL consultation paper

No. on DCAL website

Support for POBAL proposals by name

1

Yes

5 10

Yes Yes

15

Status

Education

Official

Yes, also refers to Gaelscoil Éanna

Use in the Courts

Yes Yes

Political institutions

Broadcasting

Commissioner

Yes

Yes

Yes Yes

Street names

Signage in general

187

Submission did not download

20 25 30

Yes Yes

35 40

Yes

45

Refers to 4 postcard points (See Note A)

50

Yes

Yes, also refers to Gaelscoil Éanna Official

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes Continued

Table 8.2

Continued

No. on DCAL website


Status

55

Yes

Official

60

Yes

Official

188

65 70 75

Yes

80

Yes

85

Refers to 4 postcard points (See Note A) Yes Official

90

Education

Use in the Courts


Broadcasting

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Commissioner

Street names Signage, place names, personal names Place names, addresses valid in all correspond-ance, personal names

Yes

Yes Yes

Yes, and Bord um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge Yes, BBC must be more representative Yes

Yes, also refers to Gaelscoil Éanna

Yes

Yes and Bord um Chearta agus Pleanáil na Gaeilge

Signage generally appropriate to the primary indigenous language

95

Yes

Official

Yes, also refers to rights for adult learners

100

Yes

105 110 115 120

Yes

Yes

Yes Yes

Yes

189 125 130

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes, to liaise with south

Make it easier to change street names

Yes

Yes

Commissioners appointed in other human rights areas

Yes Yes and Bord Yes, did training Yes and Bord course in TV production

Equal with English Yes

135 140 145 150

Yes Yes Yes

155

Yes

160

Yes

Yes Yes Yes, and Bord too, independence, annual report

Continued

Table 8.2

Continued

No. on DCAL website


165 170

Yes

175

Yes

Status

Education

Yes, and with transport

190 180

Official status on par with Welsh and Gaelic in Scotland Equal /official status

185 190 195

Yes

200 205

Yes Yes

Parity with status in south

Yes

Use in the Courts


Broadcasting

Commissioner

Yes, crucial

Roadsigns too

Yes

Neutral Commissioner

Yes

Yes, ombudsman

Yes, as well as all reserved matters

Yes, but extended from south, not two separate Commissioners

Yes

Street names

Place names, townlands, personal and organisation names Yes

Signage: lack of visibility of Irish noticeable when crossing between north and south


191

deployed to bring the legislation back to placing the Irish language on an equal basis with English.’ The respondent goes on to outline the requirements of legislation to minimise this risk and notes, ‘Legislation that moves our society forward on an equal basis or parity of esteem, can only enhance civilisation.’ One submission (no. 35) strikes a rather less sympathetic tone, but nonetheless supports legislation. The respondent places emphasis on value for money, and calls for expenditure instead on services for ethnic minorities. On this basis, the appointment of an Irish Language Commissioner, according to the respondent, would be, ‘a completely nonsensical waste of money.’ The submission opposes a rights-based approach stating that spending, ‘vast amounts of money on translations will only increase hostility towards use of the language as it will be seen, rightly, as a sop to political interests.’ Instead of a rights-based act, the submission calls for an act based on the ECRML ‘or the Scottish model’. The next paragraph again refers to schemesbased approaches in Wales, Scotland and the RoI’ (no. 35).

The response opposing the proposed legislation Out of 42 sampled submissions, one of which was inaccessible, there was one response opposed to proposed Irish language legislation (no. 25). It is written in English and takes the form of a half page letter. The submission opposes legislation because the proposal ‘fails totally and absolutely to give equality of opportunity to the vast majority of the community who do not speak Irish nor wish to speak it.’ In terminology reminiscent of the DUP and Jim Allister submissions, which I have discussed in Chapter 7, the respondent notes that the DCAL EQIA is ‘fatally flawed’. Since the document ‘completely ignores’ the ‘sensitivities’ of the unionist community, the respondent states that the majority of this community, ‘would find this proposed act grossly offensive and discriminatory.’ An Irish language Act will, in the eyes of the respondent, lead to ‘further division in the community’ (no. 25). The extremely high proportion of the 20 per cent sample supportive of legislation appears to supports the overall pattern of submissions to the consultation. The sample indicates a great degree of penetration of ideas and awareness of language legislation into the general community. For the most part, the submissions show a high level of individuality which reinforces the strong consensus that emerges. To a large extent, there appears to be a distillation amongst respondents of certain principles behind the legislative models under discussion. There is a high level of awareness of the issues and overwhelming support for the POBAL proposals, including a rights-based approach, provision on broadcasting, education, signage, in the political institutions and the courts all of which are referred to directly in a significant number of submissions without them being

192


Table 8.3 DCAL 13 December 2006, Breakdown of 20 per cent sample of submissions with comments No. on Support for a DCAL rights-based website approach

Reference to POBAL proposals Other specific comments by name? made by respondent

1

Yes

Yes

5


Yes

Asks for anonymity, and states that his / her concern is further proof of the need for the legislation.

10

Yes

Yes

Wide range of public services needed, including in Health. ECRML has not been adequate

15

Submission did not download

20


Yes

Resources and timescale

Yes

Yes

Westminster legislation needed, Crown bodies

Yes

Westminster legislation needed; rights in workplace

25 30 35

Schemes-based

40

as part of POBAL model

45

Yes

50

Yes

Yes

EQIA poorly publicised and unfair

55

Yes

Yes

Emphasis should be on practical service delivery not documents

60

Yes

Yes

Westminster legislation needed for broadcasting provision

65 70

Yes

75

Yes

Yes

Adequate resourcing needed; no mention of British policies as reason for decline of Irish; taxpayers; 10% of population have Irish

80

Yes

Yes

Westminster

85

Yes

90 95 100

Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

105

Yes

Yes

110

Welsh model

115

Yes

Good Friday Agreement; use in business or private life

Good Friday Agreement, use of Irish in private and business life

Westminster legislation needed Westminster, help for learners, defence for rights of Irish speakers in all aspects of life

Yes

No confidence in NI minister

Continued

Key Public Bodies’ and Individual Submissions Table 8.3

Continued

No. on Support for a DCAL rights-based website approach

Reference to POBAL proposals Other specific comments by name? made by respondent

125 130

Ancient language that must survive Yes

Yes

Adequate resources; this is a litmus test of UK government commitment to equality

Yes

Yes

Driving licence, passport, birth certificate and other documents

135 140

193

Language is for everyone

145

Yes

Yes

150

Yes

Yes

Good Friday Agreement, private and business

155

Yes

Yes

European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has not been enough

160

Yes

Yes

165

Yes

Yes

170

Yes

175

Yes

180

Duties also mentions rights

Westminster; emphasis on influence of British policy and of relationship with unionism Opportunity for UK government to de-politicise language

Yes

Act will help in skills building; hostility to language has damaged it; debt to repay; Westminster legislation and adequately resourced Weak legislation could do damage and involve Irish speakers in many years of struggle to achieve what is really needed in Irish language legislation

185

Westminster: comments on Glens of Antrim history and importance of the language

190

Yes

195

Rights and schemes

Yes

Rights-based legislation can have disadvantages but this is what is needed in current context Private and public life; rights as Irish citizen; Westminster legislation; lack of faith in hostile politicians in future Assembly

200

Yes

Yes

Westminster legislation

205

Yes

Yes

Unusually distinct circumstances in north; Prompt introduction of Westminster legislation based on POBAL proposals is needed

194


formulaic. The impacts that the legislation could have on the day-to-day experience of Irish speakers, particular children and learners, feature in a number of the submissions, showing the ability of the community at large to concretise the concepts involved. The sole negative response in the sample takes a rejectionist position common to the other 45 negative responses received during the consultation.

Overview of the consultation responses The first consultation on Proposed Irish language Legislation attracted a very high level of interest and reaction within the Irish speaking community, amongst human rights bodies and those who are favourable to the protection and promotion of the language. There is a high level of cohesion and engagement with the complex issues under discussion. The variety of responses, both in terms of their form and content, serve to highlight a high degree of agreement around core principles, including the need for a rightsbased approach. There is also considerable evidence of a widespread sense of ownership of the POBAL proposals. The consultation also attracted a number of highly significant submissions from public sector agencies and bodies including key organisations involved at the highest levels in broadcasting, the administration of justice and community relations. CAJ makes a comprehensive and sympathetic submission to the consultation, whilst the input of the Equality Commission, advising that the provision of equality for one social group does not limit its availability to another is endorsed in DCAL’s own Summary of Responses to the EQIA. The submissions from the five main political parties in the North reflect divisions between nationalism and unionism. Whilst the nationalist parties present more concise, direct responses to the consultation paper, the unionist submissions, including the Alliance Party submission, display a lack of focus and understanding of indigenous minority issues and of current practice and trends in respect of their protection. The submissions from the DUP (based on a response by then MEP Jim Allister who is no longer a party member) and UUP tend to the emphatic rejection of any protection or provision for the Irish language. As discussed, before and during the consultation, the reaction of unionist political parties to the proposed legislation was consistently and voluably one of intense opposition. As noted, during the second consultation, freed from the pressures of electioneering, the unionist parties organised a rejectionist campaign. However, even though this increased the number of negative responses to the second consultation, 68 per cent of submissions still favoured the legislation, with 75 per cent over two consultations calling for its enactment. The low level of individual negative responses may suggest that even with the catalyst of an organised party-political campaign, Irish


195

language legislation arouses less grassroots hostility than claimed. Certainly, had the British government wished to fulfil its SAA commitment, the unequivocal results of the first consultation gave it ample rationale for doing so. Equally, such a high level of public support for the legislation from a range of sources should have galvanised the Irish government and both nationalist political parties into taking a firmer stance when the British government reneged on its obligation. SF is the stronger nationalist party electorally, and therefore its lacklustre response appears the more striking, especially since it is credited with putting forward the proposal at St Andrews. Whether the party drastically overestimated its ability to achieve implementation of the commitment or whether it simply looked on it as an optional extra that could be left aside if difficulties arose is open to debate. Some may argue that the prospect of a devolved Assembly after five years of uncertainty would have been too great a price to pay for an Irish language Act. Even so, it cannot be ignored that on re-establishment of devolution, the failure of SF and the SDLP to select the portfolio for Culture, Arts and Leisure has compounded negative LPP. Since under D’Hondt, SF had three ministries to the SDLP’s one, its failure may be deemed to be the more telling. To date, neither party has made a commitment to secure the Ministry in future. As noted earlier, an SDLP’s Private Member’s Bill based on the POBAL proposals may succeed in raising the issue of legislation once more, but it remains to be seen whether it can reshape current policy approaches. Successive DUP CAL ministers in the North have adopted a dual LPP strategy, impeding progress for Irish whilst simultaneously promoting Ulster Scots beyond any objective criteria. At present, the Irish government appears to be ready to impose drastic cut-backs, many targeted on Irish language provision and impacting North and South. In addition, there is now the question of the role of Nationalist parties in 2009 in intergovernmental proposals to ‘collapse’ Irish language bodies as noted in Chapter 6. To date, the promise, implicit in the GFA, the 2003 Joint Statement and the 2006 St Andrews’ Agreement that consociational arrangements would be good for the Irish language and good for governance appears to have failed on both counts.

9 Quebec v. the Rest in the Twenty-First Century: Coming-of-Age, or Losing the Plot?

The focus of this chapter will be on the current conflict interfaces between sovereignty and LPP in Canada, with primary emphasis on parallel provincial LPP in Quebec and federal LPP in the rest of Canada (ROC) in the period following the 1995 referendum on Quebec secession up to the present. As I have noted in Chapter 1, control and interpretation of information is an important factor in conflict, and I shall therefore briefly examine the controversy around the interpretation of census and other statistical information in Canada and the impact this has on LPP. I shall then contextualise the current ‘linguistic peace’ through a brief examination of recent incidents of linguistic tension, current LPP policy, including the Roadmap for Linguistic Duality 2008–13, preparations prior to the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver, and implications for the application of Part VII of the LLO / OLA of the FCFA and Desrochers cases. Following this, in a section focusing on Quebec LPP, I shall examine the current application of Law 101, the Charter for the French Language (CFL / CLF) in respect of Bill 104 and recent initiatives in respect of the francisation of companies. This albeit truncated analysis will provide a language policy context for assessment of current political and social trends in CR both internal to Quebec and between the federal and Quebec governments. In the aftermath of the 1995 Quebec referendum on secession, there have been two main and differing political approaches to CR within federal government. The hard line of Prime Minister Chrétien, referred to in Chapter 1, contrasted somewhat with the less aggressive attitude of his successor Paul Martin. Martin’s Liberals lost support during the sponsorship scandal,1 however, and this along with the perception that their leader tended to dither thereafter over key decisions contributed to the election in 2006 of the Conservatives under Stephen Harper. In the next section, I shall examine to what extent Harper’s strategy to date has focussed on the same goal as that of Chrétien and previous federal leaders – Canadian national unity. As 196

Quebec v. the Rest 197

I have noted in the first chapter in relation to Canada, and in Chapters 2–8 on the NoI, demands apparently unequivocally geared towards complete and formal self-determination may be satisfied – or re-defined – by much less far-reaching CR measures. In Canada and Quebec since the start of the new millennium, debate has revolved around the ability of asymmetrical federalism to fulfil Quebec’s aspirations to greater independence and control of its affairs through a more flexible approach to federal-provincial interaction. Following an earlier accord in 2004, the then federal Prime Minister Paul Martin’s minority Liberal government announced a non-constitutional health accord with the provinces. 2 The 2004 agreement ratified a new type of asymmetrical federalism, more significant potentially than that already in place between the federal government and other provinces. Theoretically, it would deliver a process more responsive to the needs of the different partners in the federation, and allow for greater policy variation from province to province. High-profile Quebec Liberals, including Benoît Pelletier (2005, quoted in Cardinal 2008, p. 21), Quebec Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs, welcomed the initiative, which according to him, would permit the key players, ‘d’augmenter la confiance mutuelle et d’améliorer de façon durable les rapports entre le Québec et le reste du Canada’ / ‘to augment mutual confidence and to improve in a durable manner relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada’ (Author’s translation). Some Canadian federalists (Joyal 20043; Roberts 2005) resolutely opposed compromise and decentralisation of federal power as a threat to Canadian sovereignty whilst advocates of the ‘Calgary School’ promoted asymmetry within a pro-West of Canada agenda (Bercuson & Cooper 1994, Brodie 2002, Morton 2004). Sceptical Quebec researchers pointed out that since the accord applied to all provinces equally it compromised Quebec’s much-reclaimed ‘distinct’ status. In addition, it was argued that a non-enforceable accord was of little real value, especially since its definition of asymmetry was vague. Such obscurity meant its outworking would lie in the political sphere, not the legal or constitutional one (Seymour 2008). Believing on the one hand that the federal government lacked sincerity and on the other that Quebec’s Liberal government lacked radical drive, Graefe (2008, p. 150–1) suggests that Quebec might derive slight short-term advantage from accords like the one on health, but that, ‘sans veto ni reconnaissance, cette situation comporte plusieurs dangers évidents’ / ‘without either a veto or recognition, this situation holds several obvious dangers’ (Author’s translation). The following year, the signing of the Entente sur les congés parentaux / the Agreement on Parental Leave4 appeared to offer Quebec power to withdraw from federal programmes whilst receiving financial compensation. The ‘power’, however, would only exist where the Quebec government took on the responsibility for the same programme, and appears to follow the same

198


path as the earlier Entente-cadre sur l’union sociale / Framework Agreement on Social Union.5 As noted previously, in January 2006, Harper’s Conservatives, with unprecedented support from Quebec voters, crushed the Liberal Party in federal elections to take power. In the aftermath of the elections, and following earlier propositions that Quebec be formally recognised as a nation within Canada,6 Harper initially denied that this was the ‘real question.’7 His reluctance was pounced upon by the electorally battered federal Liberals, including Stéphane Dion, Bob Rae and current Prime Ministerial challenger, Michael Ignatieff, an outspoken critic of Quebec nationalism and LPP in the past. Bloc québécois leader, Gilles Duceppe proposed a House of Commons motion demanding recognition of the Quebec nation.8 Harper cut a deal with the federal Liberals and the NDP, proposing a reworded motion to recognise the ‘Québécois’ as a nation within a united Canada. Thus the status of geo-political Quebec is side-stepped in favour of that more nebulous constitutional entity, the ‘Québécois’. For some students of semantics, the use of the term in French in the English language version of the proposal may imply that nation status is confined conceptually to the traditional Québécois ‘de souche’ rather than to the modern, multi-ethnic Francophone Quebec. The motion was passed by 266 votes to 16. It awakened hopes in some of a new beginning in intergovernmental relations, and in others the suspicion of ongoing political fancy footwork. Quebec federalists have been constantly critical of the search for independence, accusing sovereigntists of abusing the terminology of imperialism and ignoring the reality that limitation of the power of Quebec to determine its own policies is similar to the position of other provinces. For them, the failure to recognise the legitimacy of the federal government consigns Quebec politicians to the role of cannon-fodder in a political war and condemns the population to eternal disappointment (Leclair 2008, p. 59). Benoît Pelletier, a member of Quebec’s ruling PLQ, defines as fundamental the right of the Quebec electorate to choose whether or not it wishes to remain within the federation. Nonetheless, his own government supports federalism, arguing that strides have been made in recent years towards asymmetrical federalism, greater participation by Quebec in inter-provincial affairs, and in improved relations with the rest of Canadian francophonie. Where Quebec’s interests are not served by federalism, Pelletier advises that it should simply opt out. He says, ‘le Québec favorise la collaboration avec ses partenaires fédératifs lorsque celle-ci est possible et opportune. Elle ne l’est pas toujours’ / ‘Quebec favours collaboration with its federalist partners when this is possible and opportune. It is not always so’ (2006, p. 538; Author’s translation. Pelletier’s emphasis). The shifting nature of debate in Quebec is something Létourneau (2006, p. 129) celebrates, lauding the flexibility of spirit of the Québécois, ‘la


nation pragmatiste’ / ‘the pragmatic nation.’ Whilst she characterises it as, ‘réaliste, inventive et astucieuse’ / ‘realistic, inventive and resourceful,’ she recognises (2006, p. 134) that for some, these same qualities are, ‘un signe de déchéance, d’aliénation, de servitude et de somnolence’ / ‘a sign of failure, of alienation, of servitude and of somnolence’ (Author’s translations). She concludes, nonetheless, that Quebec should remain ambiguous in its identification with the Quebec nation as its primary focus, but within a permanent relationship with federal Canada. Whilst Pelletier (2006, p. 536) proclaims the establishment of the Conseil de la fédération / The Federation Council, other analysts denounce what they see as a particularly diluted form of asymmetrical federalism. Seymour (2006) states unequivocally that reform of the federal system will fail, that fiscal inequality, the issue of provincial power or the international ambitions of Quebec to representation at UNESCO will also be unlikely to achieve positive results. Although it is widely debated that asymmetrical federalism might in theory be capable of resolving the issue of Quebec secession, Seymour is convinced that Quebec is being led further away from any satisfactory solution, a view in which he is supported by Facal (2006), former Canadian Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs. Facal argues (2006) that initiatives to transform the Canadian political system have two main aims: the adaptation of the Canadian federal system into one better suited to dealing with increasing globalisation, and the minimising of the possibility of Quebec’s secession in future. Harper was brought to power in 2006 in part by the election in Quebec of 10 Conservative Francophone MPs, and a further 3 MPs from the ROC whose seats also depended upon Francophone votes. Characterised by Graham Fraser, Official Languages Commissioner 9 as, ‘a Prime Minister who learns’, Harper’s government is currently under threat and may not survive another term. To date, however, he has maintained a strong bilingual political persona both in Canada and abroad. Whilst his government has come under considerable pressure in recent times, its 3 MPs dependent on Francophone votes have all been re-elected and two new seats with important Francophone minorities were gained in October 2007. Fraser is of the opinion that the Harper government exploits the relative calm around language issues at present and also ‘the thickness of the language barrier’ to adopt a range of positive actions on Official Languages but without trumpeting them to the Anglophone media. Nonetheless, there appears to be a lack of transparency in funding allocation and motivation, as discussed later in relation to the FCFA case on Part VII of the LLO / OLA. Such practice can create extreme difficulties for minorities, not wishing to ‘rock the boat’ by asking too many questions, but constantly aware that if the prevailing wind changes direction they may be left stranded. Harper’s tendency towards relative obscurity of policy and funding decisions at a federal level is likely to be one capable of raising Quebec hackles due to


the long-standing and bitter dispute about financial relations with the federal government. Various commentators have argued that whilst the 1990s were dominated by discord on constitutional matters, it is unequal financial decisions in respect of provincial payments and receipts that has dominated in more recent years. They warn that whilst Harper talks of open government, his practice is somewhat detrimental to democracy (Noël 2006; Caron, Laforest et Vaillières-Roland 2006). Others believe that new opportunities exist to break the mould. Fraser10 assesses current Quebec psychology following the poor performance of the Parti Québécois (PQ) in the 2007 election thus, ‘A whole chunk of the political class in Quebec had psychologically been in the departure lounge for another country and that election announced that the flight had been cancelled.’ He believes that the reappraisal of Québécois Francophone identity has also introduced, a whole series of strategic, small ‘p’ political questions for the federal government that are very different from ‘how do we stop them from leaving?’ It becomes, ‘how do we respond to their staying?’ And I think the ability of the federal government to respond to that is absolutely critical and language is a big part of that. He rejects the view that since sovereignty does not appear to be an immediate option, Quebec has lost negotiating power in relation to LPP and other issues. He states,11 The reverse is true. The presence of a sovereignist government enabled the federal government to reflexively say no to Quebec without thinking about it ... . Quebec is more engaged with the federal government and the rest of Canada than it has been for years. Having to deal with a sovereigntist movement in Quebec, ‘whether directly when the PQ is in power or indirectly when the Liberals have tried to manage nationalist pressures,’12 had created problems for successive federal governments. Fraser cites Quebec’s resistance to interference in the application of the CFL /CLF in respect of public signage as the cause of much resentment in the ROC, and states that it had resulted in a reluctance by some provinces to make provision for their Francophone minorities, ‘when they perceived that there was a threat of Quebec independence.’ In order to strengthen intergovernmental relations Fraser proposes, ‘more recognition of the needs of the Quebec English-speaking community, both by the federal government and the Quebec government.’ Although he has highlighted13 the fact that the LLO / OLA does not make any direct reference to the existence of Quebec at all, he states that he is ‘reluctant to see explicit formal recognition of the CFL / CLF in the Constitution when other provinces are making quiet


progress towards providing more French-language services to their Frenchspeaking minorities.’ Fraser’s responses highlight the question of what role asymmetrical federalism should play in the disentangling of Canada’s two types of LPP. As shown, federal LPP was devised to neutralise Quebec nationalism. Inevitably, federal LPP counterpoints Francophone communities in the ROC with Quebec’s French speaking population. Quebec as a radical, focused spokesperson for a united Canadian community of French speakers is a prospect that sent shivers through the federal government in previous decades. Drawing an apparently more compliant PLQ-led Quebec government into a form of partnership of the dispossessed could possibly now prove a greater attraction to Canadian federalists, however, since it could serve to dilute Quebec’s latent sovereigntist aspirations. Clearly, Francophone minorities in the ROC would seek a CR resolution with superior ability to defend their interests than Quebec’s sovereignty proposition has previously demonstrated. It is often assumed that smaller, more isolated Francophone communities in the ROC have borne the brunt of provincial and Anglophone media backlash in the face of Quebec’s separatist agenda. It is clear, however, that Quebec Francophones themselves have also internalised the threat. Cazabon (2007, p. 265) states, ‘Ce n’est pas le bien-fondé de l’indépendance qui s’assoit mal dans nos têtes, mais la peur des représailles. La francophonie canadienne hors Québec devient une monnaie d’échange.’ / ‘It is not the validity of independence that sits uncomfortable in our minds, but the fear of reprisals. Canadian Francophones outside Quebec are becoming a bartering token’ (Author’s translation). It appears unlikely that the current asymmetrical model being promoted by federal government and the PLQ, having no recourse to specific constitutional force, can guarantee the transformation of Francophone relations. However, given genuine political will, it could provide a framework for productive joint Francophone action. ROC Francophone communities recognise that moves towards rapprochement with Quebec Francophonie is currently dependent on the continuing political influence of the PLQ in the province. In addition, the expectation that Quebec will take the lead, the divergent interests of Francophone organisations outside Quebec, and the development of appropriate modi vivendi are all codas cited by Rioux and Brady (2008, p.402) in respect of any such undertaking. There are many factors which militate against the success of continuing undertakings and it appears that if a genuine will to positively reshape Francophone interaction indeed exists within federal Canada at present, it would be helpful to signpost and structure this more clearly. The Canadian judiciary has played a key role in shaping majority-minority relationships and minority language rights, and continues to be a crucial factor in this respect (Cardinal 2000; Foucher 2008, p. 279, 284). Clearly,


one of the key strategies being adopted by Quebec federalism in respect of the interface with federal LPP may be to circumnavigate the more obvious political paths, engaging instead more directly with the Francophone population in the ROC. Whether this is designed to strengthen Francophones politically or to further neutralise radicalism in Quebec is a matter of conjecture at this stage. A number of initiatives have been undertaken to date, including Pelletier’s Centre de la francophonie des Amériques.14 The success of such undertakings must depend upon the continuing success of Quebec’s own LPP in addressing Francophone assimilation, however, and I shall examine in more detail the application of Quebec’s language laws in a later section of this chapter. Outside Canada, Gerotto (2008) has shown that asymmetrical federalism has not guaranteed protection or provision appropriate to Italy’s various linguistic minorities, however, and whilst the relationship between the NoI’s devolved institutions and the Irish and British governments has not as yet been formally defined as ‘federal’,15 current unilateral arrangements offer ample evidence of capacity to manipulate constitutional and international legal arrangements to the detriment of the North’s linguistic ‘minority’ of Irish speakers. As Foucher (2008, p. 284) points out, ‘Le concept juridique d’égalité, répétons-le, ne signifie pas le traitement identique sans égard à la situation sociale réelle; il représente une aspiration à faire plus et mieux pour garantir le redressement des inégalités.’ / ‘The judicial concept of equality, let’s say it again, does not signify identical treatment without regard to the actual social situation; it represents an aspiration to do more and better to guarantee the redressing of inequalities’ (Author’s translation). It remains to be seen whether greater equity is the driving force behind Harper’s asymmetrical initiatives, or whether his motivation lies elsewhere. In the next sections of this chapter, I shall examine the issue of LPP in respect of statistics and official figures for the ROC and Quebec. Following this, I shall briefly explore some aspects of federal LPP in respect of minority Francophone communities in the ROC. Then I shall turn to a similar examination of LPP and political developments in Quebec, before drawing some conclusions on intergovernmental relations between federal and Quebec government in the last ten years.

Measuring position and progress: Language statistics in Canada As noted in Chapter 1, the control and interpretation of information is an important factor in conflict. Census figures and other official statistics provide a common basis for LPP (and indeed other forms of social and policy planning), and as such they are a key element in determining ‘where we are, how we are doing, what now needs to be done and by whom?’ Perhaps


because of their centrality in the planning process, official figures are often the cause of controversy and dispute, as discussed in Chapter 2. Confusion becomes particularly widespread when statistical information is challenged at a sustained and expert level. In such cases, the answers to the ‘simple’ questions outlined earlier become a matter of political interpretation and choosing the correct way forward to bolster a threatened language becomes extremely challenging and potentially divisive. Intra-community relationships, as well as those with the state or with a dominant political party, are called into question. Chronic lack of certainty regarding strategies disempowers and discourages, favouring the dominant power faction and its interests. Such fundamental questions over the use of official statistics in some instances pose a dilemma for an author of a book of this kind, since it is common to quote such figures in order to establish a ‘factual’ overview of the linguistic situation. In the next section, I shall indeed refer briefly to some commonly cited federal and Quebec governmental figures. However, I shall also refer to challenges to the accuracy of this information. Readers will, I am afraid, have to make up their mind as to the validity of the arguments.

Statistics on official languages in the ROC In Canada, unlike the NoI, there is a wealth of statistical data and analysis concerning language. According to the federal agency, Statistics Canada, the 2006 Census indicates over 18 million Anglophones in Canada, compared with some 6.9 million Francophones. 98 per cent of the population of Canada can speak one or both of the country’s official languages. 94 per cent of Canadians speak French or English at home regularly or even more frequently. For 89 per cent of the population, English or French is spoken most often at home, sometimes in combination with another, non-official language. There is a sizeable and growing allophone (those for whom neither English nor French is the mother tongue) population. Between 2001 and 2006, Statistics Canada reports that the Anglophone population increased by 3 per cent, but the Francophone population by only 1.6 per cent. In both cases, the increase is slightly larger than in the preceding five-year period. In all the provinces in the ROC, and indeed in Quebec, there are indications of ongoing assimilation of Francophones, even given the small increases in the numbers continuing to speak French regularly at home after switching the main home language to English. In 2006, 17.4 per cent of Canadians report ability to conduct a conversation in English and French, a slight decrease (from 17.7 per cent) in the 2001 figures. Statistics Canada states that the decrease is ‘mainly due’ to a decrease overall in the Francophone mother-tongue population. In addition, it alleges a campaign encouraging Francophones to under-report bilingualism (amidst fears that it would lead to cut-backs to French language services) and states

204


that because of these factors, it ‘didn’t want to place the emphasis on that decrease in our analysis’.16 A mere 7.5 per cent of Anglophones living outside Quebec report themselves as bilinguals. Compared with an extremely high 83.6 per cent for Francophones in the ROC, this clearly suggests that of the two official language communities, it is Francophones outside Quebec who are forced to switch language to conduct their business. The age structure of the Anglophone and Francophone populations in the ROC shows that there are considerably fewer young people among Francophones than among Anglophones. As shown in Figure 9.1, the greater numbers of Anglophones in the various age groups continues up to 34 years. In the group aged 35 to 39 years, the numbers for Francophones and Anglophones equalise, and then, from the age group 40 to 44 years and onwards, the age structure is inverted. In spite of sustained use of both official languages in the home, language shift to English amongst Francophones has risen steadily since 1971. In 2006, 39 per cent of Francophones used English most often at home, compared with 38 per cent in 2001, 35 per cent in 1991 and just under 30 per cent in 1971. For most provinces and territories, this proportion was also higher in 2006 than in 2001. Immigration of Francophones from other

80 years and over

French English

75 to 79 70 to 74 65 to 69 60 to 64 55 to 59 50 to 54 45 to 49 40 to 44 35 to 39 30 to 34 25 to 29 20 to 24 15 to 19 10 to 14 5 to 9 0 to 4 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

percentage

Figure 9.1 Age structure of English and French mother tongues, 5 year age groups, Canada less Quebec 2006 Source: Statistics Canada, Language, 2006 Census catalogue 97–555, Released 4 December 2007.


countries is widely cited as a key element in the viability of Canada’s LPP. In the ROC Francophones comprise 5 per cent of immigrants (as opposed to 19 per cent who are Anglophone mother-tongue users). Castonguay (2008, p. 75) has argued that the levels of immigration are too low, and insufficiently targeted geographically to adequately impact on assimilation rates and that the attractive force of English impacts negatively on Francophone immigrants to areas with weak service provision through French. Castonguay (1993, 1999, 2002, 2008) has further accused both federal and Quebec governments of consistently interpreting figures in such a way as to downplay the failures existing in both LPP processes. In the period since the 1995 referendum, he has warned (Castonguay, 1999) that federal government is at best deluded about the imminent risk of Francophone assimilation as signposted in the 1996 figures, and at worst, dishonest about the failure of its LPP. He accuses (1999, p. 43) federal officials of emphasising falling fertility rates among Francophones rather than addressing increasing rates of assimilation, and of ignoring the implications of the growing imbalances in the proportions of young Francophones and young Anglophones. He argues (1999, p. 50) that the portability approach is ‘inherently assimilationist’ and ‘no more than a subtle manner of securing the slow but sure Anglicization of French Canada so firmly recommended by Lord Durham.’ Cardinal (2008, p. 63) concurs with Castonguay’s view that federal interpretations of statistics tend towards the rose-tinted, and she identifies two specific points of note in the 2006 figures: ‘the growth of inequality between the official language groups and the rise of nonofficial languages.’ Like Castonguay ten years before, she highlights the lost ground in New Brunswick and Ontario (where 11.2 per cent and 41.8 per cent respectively of Francophone mothers used English most often at home) and states that Ontario Francophones have reached a critical point at which their language behaviour closely resembles that of allophone immigrants or Francophones living in much less favourable demographic situations in other provinces.

Statistics on official languages in Quebec In Quebec, Statistics Canada indicate that the 2006 Census shows that the population is almost 7.5 million people, with some 6 million of these indicating that of the two official languages, French is their mother tongue. Only one tenth of this number indicates that their mother tongue is English. However, for the first time since 1976, the number of Anglophones in Quebec increased in 2006, with the growth rate of the Anglophone population (2.7 per cent) being higher than that of the Francophone population (2.0 per cent). Over 4 million people have knowledge only of French. Over 3 million have knowledge of both federal official languages. Only around 70,000 have knowledge of neither French nor English, although


more than half of the English mother-tongue speakers state that they have knowledge of English only. French remains the language most frequently spoken at home. However, the number of people using English most frequently at home is higher than those using a non-official language. In terms of immigration since 2001 to Quebec, 75 per cent of recent arrivals were allophones, 20 per cent were Francophones and the remaining 5 per cent were Anglophones. On the Island of Montreal only 50 per cent of the population were mother-tongue French speakers, representing a decline of some 69,470 people on the previous figures. Whilst Quebec remains a majority Francophone society, both the relative proportions of those who have French as their mother tongue and those who use French most frequently as the language of the home fell in the five years between 2001 and 2006, throughout the province as a whole and in the key census areas of Metropolitan Montreal and the Island of Montreal. The Office québécoise de la langue française (OQLF) synopsis (Synthèse, p. 5) of the 2006 Census acknowledges that whilst figures may show a consistent pattern of rise and fall over a period of years, in 2006, for the first time, the percentage of those with French as their mother tongue dipped under 80 per cent throughout the province of Quebec. Quebec uses both federal statistics and its own research analysis, carried out under the auspices of the OQLF. In the period 1971–2001, The OQLF concludes that French has shown renewed vigour. However, Castonguay (2005, p. 33) states that in both absolute and relative terms, the English language has made greater progress and shown greater vitality. As one of those tasked17 by the Quebec government in 2002 with presenting a comprehensive five-year report of the linguistic position in Quebec, Castonguay accuses the OQLF of obscuring the committee’s findings through undue delay and the publication of amalgams of previous research statistics without adequate analysis or conclusions. Some of Castonguay’s criticisms have been challenged by others,18 the result, according to Catonguay himself, of a mixture of self-interest and fear of

Table 9.1 2001 and 2006, Percentage of the population of Quebec for whom French is mother tongue

Year 2001 2006

Montreal metropolitan Island of Montreal census Quebec (in %) census region (MMCR) (in %) region (IMCR) (in %) 81.4 79.6

68.3 65.7

53.2 49.8

Source: Statistics Canada, Language, 2006 Census, catalogue 97–555, Released 4 December 2007.


the culture of government denigration of those who speak out on current LPP in Quebec. For Castonguay (2008, p. 98), the massaging of figures he alleges in Quebec is attributable to appeasement, ‘Tout pour conforter les Québécois dans l’inaction’ / ‘All in order to comfort the Québécois in their inaction’ (Author’s translation). Nor is he alone in his assessment. Mario Beaulieu,19 President of Montreal’s oldest non-governmental Francophone Association, the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec (SSJBQ) also believes that the Quebec government conceals the reality of threats to the French language, delays and obscures unfavourable research studies and has embarked on an LPP approach which favours bilingualism above the promotion of the French language as the majority and public language of Quebec. I shall examine Quebec LPP in more detail in a later section of this chapter. Given the very different attitudes towards federal official figures and the application of federal LPP, I shall now study some examples of provision, initiatives and controversies in respect of federal provision for Francophone communities in the ROC.

The federal framework for provision in the ROC The majority of Francophones in the ROC live within relative proximity to Quebec, along the New Brunswick / Ontario axis. Other, smaller Francophone communities are dispersed throughout Canada, and their ability to access services through French is largely dependent upon the protections for the language put in place in provincial legislation. Provision varies, with some communities benefiting from full education, health or justice systems through French whilst others have no access at all. In recent years, following the introduction of an Access to Justice programme, 20 some significant gains have been made in respect of the use of French in the courts. The Canadian Criminal Code grants an accused the right to a trial in the official language of his or her choice, regardless of where in Canada the trial is held, and in front of a judge or jury that understands the official language of the accused without the use of translation or simultaneous interpretation. Laws and policies in this area have been adopted in many provinces and territories, although they vary considerably in terms of the rights they recognise. Amongst the most significant are New Brunswick’s Official Languages Act and Ontario’s Courts of Justice Act. An initiative by the government of Manitoba 21 has established a bilingual provincial circuit court and in-depth work has been carried out in Nova Scotia 22 to provide for fuller provision for the Francophone community. 23 In 2008, the Criminal Code was amended, clarifying language rights within the courts both in respect of the accused and in respect of the language of proceedings. The Code now requires judges in criminal proceedings throughout Canada to advise all accused of this


right, regardless of whether they are represented by counsel. Nonetheless, there are significant operational difficulties involved in the application of these initiatives and laws, including a lack of adequately trained bilingual personnel at all levels to enable the exercising of these rights in full confidence. Following its three-year term, the federal government’s Action Plan, the cornerstone of its LPP, was replaced in 2008 by a new five-year plan, Feuille de route pour la dualité linguistique canadienne 2008–2013: agir pour l’avenir. The Roadmap is a slim document, a bare 18 pages in each language version, including 3 pages of maps and tables. It lists five key areas for action including: valuing linguistic duality, youth, access to services, economic benefits and governance. However, it does not lay out any new vision for the future. Whilst an apparently substantial budget increase accompanies the Roadmap (from $750 million for the three-year Action Plan, to $1.1 billion per year for the five-year Roadmap), in his annual report for 2008–9, COL / CLO Graham Fraser states that these increases, ‘ne suffiront pas à relever l’ensemble des nouveaux défis auxquels les communautés devront faire face d’ici 2013.’ / ‘will not be sufficient to meet all the new challenges that communities will face between now and 2013.’24 He is critical of the failure to establish targets and goals for federal agencies within the plan, and deplores changes in governance structures that have weakened good practice. Efforts by federal agencies to promote bilingualism and the LLO / OLA betray signs of ‘la stagnation’ or have ‘plateaued.’25 Nonetheless, Fraser states that in respect of federal government’s approach, ‘I can hardly argue that this is a linguistic apocalypse.’26 Clearly, Canadian bilingualism could hardly have a broader national and international audience for its achievements and failures than the 2010 Olympics. COL / CLO Graham Fraser warns that the place afforded to bilingualism in the Games, ‘témoignera certainement de la mesure dans laquelle le gouvernement fédéral saura harmoniser ces approches pour faire valoir le caractère bilingue du pays. ‘ / ‘The place of bilingualism at the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games will certainly attest to the federal government’s ability to harmonise these approaches in order to promote the country’s bilingual character.’27 Fraser confirms28 that the weaknesses initially identified by the Commission include, ‘translation, interpretation, signage, welcoming of visitors by volunteers, and French-language content in the ceremonies.’ Asked how he would define ‘failure’ in respect of federal LPP and the Games, he states, At the one-year countdown event, there was an embarrassing lack of French-language cultural content; a similar absence at the Opening and Closing ceremonies would be a failure ... . If Francophone visitors have difficulty getting the information they need, that would be a failure. The implications would be embarrassment, nationally and internationally, for the government and for the Games.29


Furthermore, there has been an unresolved broadcast and media issue at the heart of the 2010 Olympics, given the federal government’s decision that the OLA does not require free universal access to broadcasts, thus effectively ruling out access to French television coverage of the Games for those Francophones throughout Canada not equipped with digital, cable or satellite television (Canada 2007, p. 13). In addition, the different market position of the Francophone print media has discouraged the organising committee for the Games from adopting similar sponsorship agreements to those signed with the Globe and Mail and with Canwest publishing in 2008. Fraser has pointed out that failure to resolve the media issue will mean that the two official language groups, ‘ne sont pas, dans ce cas, traités de façon égale’ / ‘are not in this case being treated equally.’30

Linguistic peace: Waiting for the spark In recent years, whilst the period has been described as one of relative calm, there have been continual skirmishes on language rights throughout the Canadian provinces. Department of Justice Head of Official Languages Law Group, Marc Tremblay31 notes that whilst it is true that linguistic issues are now approached with a greater maturity in Canada, linguistic peace is a relative matter and, ‘On ne sait jamais d’où viendra la prochaine crise, minicrise, plus grande-crise, c’est toujours un peu difficile à en juger.‘ / ‘One never knows where the next crisis, mini-crisis, bigger crisis will come from, it’s always a bit difficult to judge.’32 The courts may themselves be the source of friction, he states, ‘autant l’étincelle pourrait venir du fait qu’on n’a pas eu de réponses à certaines questions, autant elle pourrait revenir parce qu’on a des réponses.’ / ‘the spark might come from the fact that we do not have answers to certain questions, or equally, it might come from the fact that we do have answers.’ Examples of recent community tensions include those generated in June 2008 by an initiative in Russell, eastern Ontario to introduce additional commercial signage in French, which resulted in public confrontation on the main street between Anglophones and Francophones armed with placards; the Ontario electoral candidate for the Progressive Conservative party who campaigned in March 2009 on a platform to reduce French language services and remove Toronto’s designation under the LLO / OLA33; the injunction sought in June 2009 by residents of Windsor, Ontario against CBC’s decision to terminate local radio news in French34; the divisions in the New Brunswick Francophone population itself over proposed changes to the provision of health services in French, and the attempt in 2008 in the same province to end access to French immersion education, resulting instead after a hard-fought campaign, in its restriction at certain levels. 35 In a development which may prove to be more significant than any other, the Alberta case of Gilles Caron, served with a traffic ticket in English only, and subsequently presented with a bill for interpretation when he

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requested a court hearing in French, has the potential to impact on earlier court rulings in respect of the ability of provincial governments to override federal statute. Understandably, given the Alberta Supreme Court’s ruling in 198836 in respect of Section 110 of the Northwest Territories Act, to which I have briefly referred in Chapter 1, this is a case that is drawing close attention. As discussed later in this section, Cardinal (2000) asserts that the judicisation of LPP in Canada has been brought about by a deliberate policy decision of Trudeau’s Executive. It is interesting to note that Tremblay feels that the deliberate, slow pace of change within the legal system can have a calming influence on what might otherwise be contentious and damaging engagements either between linguistic minorities, or between them and the federal government. In his opinion, ‘Ça maintient certains acquis de société, et le changement se fait de façon progressive.’ / ‘This maintains certain social gains, and change is made in a progressive manner.’ He comments that the law has, ‘... un rythme déterminé, ça ouvre la place à la discussion ... On a l’occasion de prendre des décisions qui vont mieux aménager le paysage linguistique.’ / ‘... a defined rhythm which opens up space for discussion. ... This gives the opportunity to develop the linguistic landscape better’ (Author’s translations).37 However, at a community level, the extremely slow progress in defining laws which in some cases have been on the statute book for 40 years leads to great frustration. To date, successive COL / CLO have been reluctant to call upon government to introduce regulation. In Fraser’s view, regulation can lead to limitation of possibilities, the creation of a ‘ceiling’ to provision rather than a firm basis. To combat this tendency he says, ‘I really want as many different innovations and initiatives to have taken place first so that the regulation is written to encourage and not to limit.’ To this end, he has set no firm timetable for drafting of regulation to the LLO / OLA. In the coming period, Francophone communities themselves in the ROC, caught like so many minorities at the interfaces between politics, policy and provision face certain new challenges. Rioux and Brady note (2008, p. 405) that Francophones must ensure not only that their priorities are incorporated into those of government, but that they themselves have a voice in negotiations between federal and provincial governments in respect of service agreements. The danger in this approach is that it, ‘requiert un temps énorme’ / ‘requires an enormous amount of time’ (Author’s translation) and may lead to the neglect of community mobilisation and service provision by Francophone communities themselves. In addition, the question of who is entitled to speak for communities and what structures are best-suited is a recurring one, and given past experience, the possibility of federal government opposing Quebec’s interests with those of francophonie in the ROC remains a key concern.


Part VII of the OLA Part VII (Section 41) of the 1988 LLO / OLA makes a link between community vitality and the provisions of the constitution. However, from 199638 onwards, a series of federal government sponsored reports highlighted deficiencies of the most fundamental type in the application of Part VII. In spite of this, federal government consistently argued that Section 41 commitments were of a policy nature, binding on federal agencies, but creating no enforceable rights,39 a view at odds with that of successive COL / CLOs and of the Francophone community itself.40 Finally, after four previous attempts, on 25 November 2005, Law S-341 was passed, reinforcing and concretising the positive measures federal bodies must employ in the implementation of Section 41, providing a regulatory framework, and finally making Part VII justicible in the courts. Ironically, the first test of Law S-3 came after a bout of funding cuts in October 2006 which terminated the Court Challenges Programme / Programme de contestation judiciare (CCP / PCJ), a federal initiative established in 1978 initially around language rights and broadened after 1982 to include other discrimination and equality issues under the CCRF / CCDL. Cardinal (2000, p. 55) has argued that the CCP / PCJ was deliberately created by the federal Executive as a judicial buffer zone between Quebec LPP and Trudeau’s drive for national unity. Since the basis of federal LPP is the equality of both OLs, decisions in favour of minority Francophone rights in the ROC bolstered the rights of the Anglophone minority in Quebec. Thus, between 1994 and 2006, the CCP funded 160 language rights cases, around 30 per cent of the total number of cases funded under the programme. It has been said that the CCP / PCJ, ‘a joué un rôle dans presque toutes les décisions d’importance rendues par des tribunaux depuis 1994 sur des questions relatives aux droits des minorités de langue officielle au Canada.’ / ‘has played a role in almost all the decisions of importance given by tribunals since 1994 on matters relative to the rights of official language minorities in Canada.’42 Nonetheless, the CCP / PCJ had a chequered history.43 It was criticised for a structural lack of transparency, and attacked by social conservatives as being little more than ‘a slush-fund for left-leaning groups to circumvent the will of elected legislators by challenging them in court.’44 Progressive NGOs45 criticised the cut to the programme. The Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes du Canada (FCFA) filed a challenge, providing the first opportunity for Canadian courts to rule on the scope of Part VII of the Act as amended in 2005. Marc Tremblay46 lists three key reasons for the importance of the FCFA case. First of all, because it gave rise to the belief ‘qu’il y a aura éventuellement une considération par les tribunaux de ce que toute cette nouvelle Partie VII pouvait signifier, cette obligation de

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prendre des mesures positives’ / ‘that there would eventually be a consideration by the courts of what this new Part VII, this obligation to take positive measures, might signify’ (Author’s translation).47 Second, since the evidence was presented in detailed written form, by the FCFA, by the Official Languages Commissioner and by the Procurator-General, the case would be founded upon ‘un débat assez bien développé ‘ / ‘a fairly well developed debate.’ Finally, the FCFA’s arguments were orientated towards a definition not simply of the need to consult, but of the participatory role of communities in decision-making on federal measures affecting minority language communities. Several days before the judgement was to be made by the court, federal government proposed the Language Rights Programme, with the single focus of access to funding for court challenges grounded in the LLO / OLA, a much narrower equality focus than the previous CCP / PCJ. It offered a tripled budget, from some $2 million to $5.5 million, and agreed a degree of flexibility within the different programme budget lines. Tremblay contends that the rationale for exclusion was that since the FCFA litigation focussed on Article 16, the language rights clause, the settlement did the same. Graham Fraser, COL / CLO, however, comments48 that he had been privately assured by MPs and other government figures that the CCP /PCJ had been cut initially in order to restrict access to funding not to linguistic minorities, but rather to gay, lesbian and transgender groups. He acknowledges some doubts about the narrow focus of the settlement on offer, but decided, ‘My mandate covers language. That is the lens through which I am going to look at this.’ On his opinion on the offer, he comments, My conclusion after our legal people looked at this was that this was an appropriate way to go. I have occasionally had second thoughts since ... . At some point we have got a rendezvous with the Supreme Court to define the scope of Part VII of the Act. At that moment, I wasn’t sure that this was the best case to pursue for the subsequent good five years that it would take to go through the court process. The decision, however, he stresses, lay with the FCFA. ‘It was a decision that caused a fair amount of dissension within the Executive of the FCFA. There were people who felt that the government couldn’t be trusted, that any progress they had made had been through court decision, not government decisions.’ Stormy scenes followed, with New Brunswick MP and FCFA Executive member, Yvon Cadet, accusing the COL / CLO of overstepping his brief and accepting a ‘half a loaf’ decision. Fraser rejects the accusation, but acknowledges, ‘If the program in support of language rights turns out to be ineffective, he will be right. But hindsight is always 20–20 and you have to make your decisions based on what you know.’ Indications are now that the Language Rights Programme will be established by the end of 2009. Fraser


notes the importance of underlining its independence, saying, ‘The key thing, and it will be pretty clear from the outset I think, is the organisation being set up to be effective? Or to appear to be effective, but not to be?’ Within a year of the out-of-court FCFA settlement, the Desrochers case,49 with intervention from the OL Commissioner, had brought Part VII back into the courts, this time terminating in a court ruling which, whilst finding against the plaintiff, opened the way to a redefinition of the interconnected nature of obligations under Part VII. Tremblay comments, ‘Et ça, c’est nouveau’ / ‘And that, that’s new.50‘

LLP and CR in Quebec Parmi l’oeuvre durable de tous les hommes politiques contemporains, celle de Camille Laurin est une des plus essentielles ... S’il n’avait pas eu l’intelligence et le courage de mettre de l’avant la loi 101, de la défendre et de la faire approuver, ce n’est pas certain que la résilience québécoise serait encore possible.51 Among the lasting work of all contemporary politicians, that of Camille Laurin is one the most essential. If he had not had the intelligence and the courage to put Law 101 to the fore, to defend it and to get it approved, it is not certain that Québécois resilience would still be possible (Author’s translation). Bernand Landry, former Prime Minister of Quebec (2009) While the Québécois population is reassured by the remarkable progress French has made in the last generation, its political and intellectual elites are aware of the fragility of these gains. If I am right, then it follows that the Québécois will not achieve independence: too many feel too secure to want it now and they will be too weak to have it – or even want it – later. Laponce 2003, p. 302 In this section, I shall briefly outline some of the dominant and deeply contrasting views from within Quebec of current LPP in the period after the 1995 referendum on secession to the present. I have noted in Chapter 1 that Quebec, as a ‘settler’ society having a majority Francophone population of some 6 million people, fits somewhat oddly (though not uniquely in linguistic terms52) into the category of ‘minority.’ I have also attempted to show how federal approaches to CR over 40 years have established a legislative and policy framework that affects both Quebec’s internal and external relationships as well as its LPP. Minority ‘status’ in conflict carries with it many complexities; the underlying questioning of self-worth, hidden anger and mistrust and their partial counterparts, the aggression and narrow focus borne of insecurity; great courage and drive for change

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co-existent with frustration and boredom at apparently endless repetition of the same scenarios. Space limitations in this book curtail the in-depth investigation of many important trends affecting Quebec (and Canadian) society. At this juncture, it is appropriate nonetheless to note that discussion of LPP in Quebec takes place in the context of intense ongoing debate on the nature of Québécois identity, on contrasting arguments around ethnicity and modernisation; on the use of French as the common language of public life, and on the accommodations appropriate for Quebec society to make in respect of its growing immigrant population.53

The application of the CFL / CLF, Quebec’s Loi 101 As noted in Chapter 1, the introduction in 1976 of Law 101, the Charter for the French Language (CFL / CLF), in Quebec was a defining moment in Canadian LPP. Not only does Quebec’s territorial approach to LPP run counter to the personality approach of federal LPP, since 1988 when sections of the federal OLA were incorporated into the Canadian Constitution, the CFL / CLF has clashed in some key respects with the Canadian Constitution, most notably in the cases of public signage, education, and in respect of Article 133 of the CCRF / CCDL, which declares that both English and French are official languages throughout Canada. Since 1995, the CFL / CLF has been modified three times, in 1997, to facilitate administrative arrangements, 54 and to ensure that all software available in French elsewhere was also marketed in Quebec; in 2000, to define when a municipal organisation could use bilingual signage; and in 2002, when Bill 104 was unanimously adopted by the Quebec parliament, to improve the use and quality of French in colleges and universities, to close a loophole whereby the better-off could purchase a year of English Medium private education, thus gaining access to English Medium Quebec-state funded education thereafter and passing on the right to English Medium Education to the next generation in the family. Additionally, Bill 104 sought to improve trade union representation in francisation committees in the workplace, provides for training and monitoring of francisation agreements. Bill 104 was immediately subject to court challenge on the basis that it contravened the CCRF / CCDL. Anglophone activist and lawyer, Brent Tyler, acting on behalf of 25 families, defended the right of some 57 children to access Quebec government-funded English Medium education on the basis of having been enrolled in private English Medium schools the previous year. In August 2007, two of three Quebec Appeal Court judges ruled in favour of the challenge, arousing strong reaction in Quebec,55 not least because of the well-established former links of one of the judges, Allan Hilton with Anglophone pressure group, Alliance Quebec.56 The Quebec government immediately applied for the ruling to be suspended pending challenge in


a higher court. In December 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada heard the cases.57 Quebec’s government defended the constitutionality of Bill 104, and was supported by the Procurator General of Canada in the Nguyen case. The federal COL / CLO, Graham Fraser, intervened, stating in support of the challenge to Bill 104 that the interpretation adopted by the Court in relation to Section 23(2)58 of the CCRF / CCDL had potentially significant repercussions for the Anglophone minority in Quebec. The Supreme Court is expected to give its judgement in the case by the end of 2009. In terms of modifications to the CFL / CLF over a period of years, Counsellor and spokeswoman for the Secrétariat de la politique linguistique (SPL), Gisèle Delage, 59 agrees that the law has been weakened, but she believes that it remains, ‘une loi qui nous permet de montrer la valeur de vivre en français ... La Charte a eu des effets très positifs. Ce qu’on a perdu de la Charte, c’était peut-être inévitable’ / ‘a law which permits us to demonstrate the value of living through the French language ... The Charter has had some very positive effects. What we have lost from the Charter [text] was perhaps inevitable’ (Author’s translation).60 Further, she points out that a number of the amendments made to the CFL / CLF were necessary to update the legislation in order to encompass new technology and other changes in public life over 30 years. The high percentage of complaints successfully resolved by the Office québécoise de la langue française (OQLF) without recourse to the courts is an indication for the SPL of the efficacy of the approach of the CFL / CLF61 but it is also clear that the SPL prefers negotiation and mediation over the courts. Delage’s comments may imply a certain defensiveness in Quebec society on language issues. She says of the CFL / CLF, ‘On avait besoin de cette loi-là. On veut tellement la préserver que l’on cherche toujours la paix linguistique pour protéger la loi.’ / ‘We needed this Act. We want to preserve it so much that we always seek linguistic peace in order to protect the Act’ (Author’s translation).

Quebec Policy on provision of services through the French language The SPL notes in its 2005 strategic plan the need to strengthen the French language in the workplace, in the business and commercial sectors; to promote and develop the quality of the French language in use in Quebec and to consolidate Quebec’s LPP. However in 2008, Robert Dutrisac, a journalist with Le Devoir newspaper, denounced the approach of the Quebec government,62 alleging that over 75 per cent of immigrants were receiving provincial services in English. He also established that having once asked to use English with Quebec government institutions, immigrants could then receive all correspondence and services from the Quebec government in English in perpetuity. Amidst public consternation, Quebec minister

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responsible for the CFL / CLF, Christine Saint-Pierre quickly declared that, ‘Les services en anglais aux immigrants Anglophones ne seront plus permanents.’ / ‘Services in English to English-speaking immigrants will no longer be permanent.’ Meanwhile, Le Devoir was demanding that a parliamentary commission be appointed to examine the application of the CFL / CLF by government bodies,63 pointing out that some government bodies themselves communicate in English with companies in Quebec,64 and use more English than French on websites.65 In a strongly worded response to the media storm, the government body with ultimate responsibility for the CFL / CLF, the Conseil supérieur de la langue française (CSLF), stated that Prime Minister Charest should intervene to ensure that immigrants commenced receiving services in French at an early juncture after arrival and that the practice of government departments in Quebec communicating in English with companies stop immediately.66 Following broad public consultation, the Quebec government launched a ministerial action plan, drafted in conjunction with the SPL. Réussir ensemble en français dovetails with a five-year initiative launched in October 2008 by Quebec’s Prime Minister, Jean Charest, and Isabelle Hudon, the director of Montreal’s Chamber of Commerce.67 For Jacques Gosselin, Director of the SPL,68 the initiative represents part of ‘un vaste plan’ / ‘a vast plan’ by the government of Quebec to reinforce the francisation of immigrants and to underline the position of French as the province’s official language, and as, ‘une des valeurs communes fondamentales de la société québécoise’ / ‘one of the fundamental shared values of Quebec society’ (Author’s translation). Other commentators remain sceptical. Castonguay asserts (2008 p. 75), ‘Pendant que les uns et les autres se félicitent de l’effet de la loi 101 sur la francisation des allophones à l’étranger, à Montréal l’anglais continue d’assimiler une proportion démesurée d’allophones de même qu’un nombre non négligeable de Francophones.’ / ‘Whilst this one and that one congratulate themselves on the effect of Law 101 on the francisation of allophones abroad, in Montreal the English language continues to assimilate a disproportionate number of allophones as well as a less than negligible number of Francophones’ (Author’s translation). Mario Beaulieu,69 President of the SSJB is also highly critical of the role of the current Quebec government in the application of the CFL / CLF, and says that in recent years, On est revenu à un bilinguisme institutionnel. La loi 101 essentiellement avait dit, c’est le français la langue de l’état, la langue officielle, avec des mesures d’exception pour la minorité historique anglophone. Ce qui est arrivé, c’est qu’on est revenu à un bilinguisme officiel pour tout le monde, ou a peu près.


We have returned to an institutional bilingualism. Law 101 essentially had said that French is the language of the state, the Official language, with exceptional measures for the historic Anglophone minority. What has happened is that we have come back to an official bilingualism for almost everyone, or more or less. (Author’s translation) Beaulieu deplores the reluctance of the Quebec government to challenge the ongoing federal practice of hearing in English court cases in Quebec falling under the remit of federal institutions (as for example in the case of immigration appeals);70 the failure to francisise higher and third level education; the ongoing funding imbalance in favour of Quebec’s English language universities; and the increasingly common use of bilingual public information signage by government itself.

Francisation of companies Francisation satisfies both the federalists and the separatists. For the federalists, if the Charter [CFL / CLF] succeeds, it helps French speakers to accept that they can live in Canada and be culturally sovereign. For sovereigntists, they believe that the success of the Charter will make Québec so French that in the long term people will choose sovereignty... The language issue can’t be separated from the political fabric of Canada. It comes back again and again. Any politician who tries to be indifferent to it will be reminded very quickly. It is part of the political fibre in Quebec especially. (Gérald Paquette, 200671) In the 1970s, there was intense opposition from Anglophone business society to the articles of the CFL / CLF dedicated to changing the language of the Quebec workplace from English to French. This led to significant modifications in the original version of the law.72 Francisation provides for the negotiation between the Quebec state and a given company of an agreed timescale for use of French as the predominant language of work and internal communication, in the firm’s written documents and in communication with clientele, suppliers and the general public; in advertising and recruitment. In turn, it provides for the establishment of francisation committees in the workplace and gives protection for workers using French in the workplace. The legislation itself applies only to companies employing more than 50 people, but as noted earlier, a new voluntary initiative for companies employing between 11 and 49 workers was introduced in 2008. The OQLF contends that between 1991 and 2001 the French mothertongue population was the most active (64.9 per cent) within the Quebec workforce overall, compared with 63.1 per cent of the English mothertongue population and 59.6 per cent of the allophone mother-tongue


population active in the workplace.73 However, as noted, the overwhelmingly Francophone nature of Quebec may obscure patterns of change in more linguistically vulnerable areas when information is recorded in this manner. As noted earlier in this chapter, Castonguay (2008) has been highly critical of the statistical work of the OQLF, asserting that it does not reveal what language is most commonly in use by Francophones when addressing Anglophone colleagues on work matters, and that it attempts to disguise the increasing power of English in the workplace in Montreal. Indeed, the OQLF concedes that the use of the French language in the workplace appears to be falling in the Montreal region in both government and non-governmental employment and that this is most noticeable on the Island of Montreal. Statistics quoted in relation to language of use in the workplace in the Montreal Metropolitan Region and on the Island of Montreal also show significant differences, as shown in Table 9.2. Conversely, 69 per cent of mother-tongue English speakers are reported to use English only or mainly in the workplace within the MMR, rising to 73.6 per cent on the Island of Montreal; 41 per cent of allophones in both the MMR and the Island areas use French only or mainly in the workplace, whilst 38 per cent use English only or mainly. The fall in use of French by recent immigrants gives cause for concern, showing that in the MMR, 49.4 per cent of immigrants in the period 1971–90 used French in the workplace, compared

Table 9.2 2001 Percentage of French mother-tongue speakers using French only or with another language in the workplace Outside Montreal Metropolitan Region % of French mother tongue using French

96.2

Within Montreal Island of Metropolitan Region Montreal 88.1

84.4

Source: Quebec government, Synthèse p. 25

Table 9.3 Percentage of immigrants using predominantly French, English or another language in the workplace Language of workplace French only / mainly No French at all English only / mainly French and English equally Other language (s)

Percentage 48.5 22.2 32.8 12.8 2.2


with 45 per cent of those arriving since 1991. By 2001, the workplace language of immigrants to Quebec is said to be very varied, as shown in Table 9.3. To implement the CFL / CFL, there is a list of companies in Quebec employing more than 50 employees who are obliged to comply with a process of francisation overseen by the OQLF. However, not all the companies that employ such numbers fall within the remit of the CFL / CLF. With estimates of the overall number of companies in Quebec reaching as many as 50,000, only some 5640 of these are bound by the legislation at present. Those that are found to be compliant are awarded a Certificat de francisation. In recent years, a three-year renewal of certification has been introduced to ensure permanent and ongoing change. Any listed company which fails to meet its obligations can be subject to a modest fine, although it appears that this is a relatively rare phenomenon, with 98 per cent of such cases being settled before they reach court. For the incorrigible, however, Paragraph 22 of the CFL / CLF prevents businesses not in compliance from receiving government subsidies or contracts, a potentially more powerful persuader. Of the 5640 companies that fall under the CFL / CLF, 4551 have complied with the law and been certified. Of 2155 public service networks in the health, social services, municipal and education fields, 1917 are compliant. Most government bodies under the CFL / CLF (139 of 163) have complied with their obligations.74 Martin Bergeron, Public Relations Officer and OQLF spokesperson75 notes that in recent years a loophole in the CFL / CLF has been identified which allowed companies to display no signage other than their registered trademark, which may not be in French, thus impacting on the French ‘face’ of Quebec. The OQLF has adjusted its policy to ensure that any such trademark is officially registered, and now further requires the company to add description in French to its signage. Bergeron emphasises the softly, softly approach of OQLF counsellors in francisation work, but acknowledges, ‘C’est certain qu’au bout de la line, la loi doit être respectée.’ / ‘It’s certain that at the end of the day the law must be respected’ (Author’s translation). In spite of the CFL / CLF stipulation that francisation be completed by 1983, it is in fact a work in progress, Bergeron states, due to new company registration and three yearly visits to ensure compliance. He emphasises that the OQLF is committed to the task. On the 2008 government / SPL policy voluntary initiative in respect of companies of fewer than 50 employees, he cites the availability of financial support for some of the costs of francisation as the key incentive for small companies to register for such a scheme. He states, Peut-être qu’ils prévoient, ces entreprises-là, justement à un moment donné, avoir cinquante employés ou plus, et donc qu’ils seront obligés de se franciser. Alors, les entreprises qui voient long-terme se disent, je vais le faire tout de suite parce que je peux avoir une contribution finan-

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cière de la part de l’Office. Alors, je vais m’inscrire volontairement et l’Office défraie 50 pour cent des coûts de ce qui concerne la technologie de l’information.76 Perhaps these companies foresee at a given moment having 50 employees or more, and therefore that they will be obliged to francisise. So, the companies with a long-term view say, I am going to do that straight away because I can get a financial contribution from l’Office, so I am going to join voluntarily and l’Office will defray 50 per cent of the costs involved with information technology. (Author’s translation) Less far-sighted companies, however, or those that do not envisage having more than 50 employees in the near future, may have less reason to volunteer for inspection. The success of this initiative will no doubt be tested over time, but international experience shows that compliance with voluntary initiatives is rarely as effective as legal obligation.

The price of language peace Hostility from some of the Anglophone media as well as some in the Anglophone community within Quebec creates a negative aspect to the French language context which impacts in a variety of ways. Nonetheless, Paquette (OQLF) says that open, active opposition to the protection and promotion of the French language in Quebec is restricted to a few ‘die-hards’, The resistance comes from older people and they may be the kind of people who also resist changes in weights and measures and won’t accept the change to kilometres and so on. They were at ease before, and happy like that and now they resist all social change. Asked about the attitude of the public at large in 2009, Bergeron notes that in the current period, Nous avons l’impression que peut-être les jeunes connaissent un peu moins la Charte [CFL / CLF], connaissent un peu moins l’Office [OQLF]. Pourquoi? Parce qu’ils n’ont pas, eux, connu les guerres linguistiques des années 1970s. Ils ont été habitués de vivre dans ce que certains appellent la paix linguistique, alors ils ont appris à vivre à travers ça. Donc, ils sentent peut-être moins le besoin de se plaindre. Ils connaissent peut-être moins leurs droits, non plus.77 We have the impression that perhaps young people are less aware of the Charter, less aware of the Office. Why? Because they themselves have not gone through the linguistic wars of the 1970s. They are perhaps used to living under what certain people call linguistic peace. So they have


learned to live through this and so they perhaps feel less the need to complain. They are less aware of their rights, too (Author’s translation.) He refers to the detrimental effect of some of the Anglophone media and cites the example of the application of the 1997 amendment to the CFL / CFL in respect of video games, referred to earlier. In 2007, the OQLF signed an entente with the Association canadien du logiciel (ACL), suspending for two years complaints regarding video games in English to allow the association to develop new French language distribution systems. However, on 1 April 2009, the day that French language games finally became available, a Toronto newspaper78 headlined that video games in English had been banned in Quebec. Bergeron remarks, Ça, c’est répandu très rapidement au Canada anglais, aux États Unis et même ailleurs alors que nous, notre moyen de diffusion, c’est surtout au Québec. Mais on a vraiment voulu essayer de rattraper la nouvelle. Mais avec l’internet, ça va tellement vite qu’on n’en est pas capable. Heureusement, les membres de l’Association (ACL) se sont tournés vers l’Association pour demander, ‘Est-ce qu’il y a quelque chose de nouveau là ou est-ce que ça, c’est vraiment l’entente?’ L’Association a pu rassurer tout le monde. Nous ici, on rassurait les gens qui nous appelaient pour leur expliquer l’entente. Des investisseurs étrangers, ils vont souvent nous appeler parce que, justement, ils entendent des histoires et ils veulent vérifier avant de venir. Lorsqu’ils vérifient, ils sont souvent très soulagés de voir la différence entre ce qu’ils ont entendu et la réalité. Now that, that spread very quickly through English Canada, to the United States and even beyond, whereas for us, our information networks are mainly in Quebec. But we really wanted to try to catch back the news story. But with the internet, it moves so fast that we are not able to. Fortunately, members of the Association (ACL) turned to the Association to ask, ‘Is there something new there, or is that, is it really the accord?’ The Association was able to reassure everyone. We too, we reassured people who called us for our explanation of the accord. Foreign investors often call us, precisely because they hear stories and they want to check before they come. When they check, they are often very relieved to see the difference between what they have heard and the reality (Author’s translation.) Mario Beaulieu of the SSJBQ is also highly aware of the value of information in the communications war. He feels that the Québécois mindset has been limited to a great degree by the constant stream of negative reporting in the Anglophone media. He points out that the failure to equalise funding for Francophone and Anglophone higher and third level institutions would be easy to resolve and would require no legislative action. He notes,

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however, that such an initiative would provoke the Anglophone media and, ‘c’est ça qui terrorise un peu les souverainistes – les gens – tout ce pouvoir médiatique-là du côté anglophone.’ / ‘That’s what terrorises a bit the sovereigntists – the people – all that media power that the Anglophones have’ (Author’s translation).

LPP, mass movement and political parties In spite of being ‘humbled’79 in the 2007 election and being overtaken in some electoral areas by the right-wing Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ), in the December 2008 elections, the PQ rallied. With commentators predicting a comfortable victory for the Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ), the turnout for the provincial elections in Quebec fell to a low of 57.33 per cent. The Liberals took the overall victory, but by a much closer margin than had been predicted, 66 seats and 42 per cent of the vote to the PQ’s 51 seats and 35 per cent. It appeared that less than two years since their poor showing in the previous provincial election, PQ leader Pauline Marois had guided the party back to Official Opposition status, in so doing becoming Quebec’s first woman leader of the Opposition. At the same time, projected support for ADQ was not reflected in the results, with its total of elected representatives dropping from 41 in 2007 to a mere 7, forcing the retirement of its party leader. If the PQ itself might have wished for even more significant shows of support, Radio Canada dubbed the party’s performance, ‘éclatante’ / ‘dazzling’80 and CBC commented that Marois had, ‘rebuilt a venerable Quebec political institution.’81 In turn, Marois celebrated the new surge of energy amongst the younger electorate which she attributed to a fresh commitment to the sovereigntist position of her party.82 This point was vigourously rebutted by newly elected Premier Jean Charest, who stated, ‘Les électeurs n’ont pas donné le mandat à Pauline Marois de ramener la souveraineté à l’avant-plan du débat public.’ / ‘The electorate have not given Pauline Marois a mandate to bring sovereignty back to the forefront of political debate’ (Author’s translation).83 Rather, he asserted, the electorate sought a resolution of the economic downturn and he accused Marois of having made no reference to sovereignty during several previous elections. His complaint84 that Marois’ speech owed more to electionnight enthusiasm than active party policy will be judged in the coming period, but his characterisation of sovereignty as ‘Pandora’s box’ speaks volumes.

Another referendum? If intergovernmental relations remain the subject of debate in Quebec so does the probability – and indeed, the desirability – of another referendum


on independence. Having studied extensively opinion polls in the period preceding and following the 1995 referendum, Gagné and Langlois (2002) conclude that the segment of the Quebec population most likely to vote in favour of secession in any future referendum encompasses all sections of the population, and are characterised by an interest in and commitment to a changed future. They state (2002, p. 9) that, Un référendum sur la souveraineté du Québec ... porte quant à lui sur l’avenir, sur un projet de société, et il met donc en cause chez les citoyens la capacité de se projeter dans cet avenir. La capacité de lui donner un sens et d’en imaginer les implications pour eux-mêmes, à plus forte raison si ce projet implique une part de risques – risques réels ou perçus comme réels. A referendum on Quebec sovereignty ... deals in itself with the future, with a social project, and so it brings into question the capacity of its citizens to project themselves into that future. The capacity to give it a sense and to imagine its implications for themselves, all the more so if this project carries with it some risks, risks that are real or perceived as real. (Author’s translation) Thus, they state that the key supporters for any future attempt to achieve independence will be in the 18–55 age group, Francophones, immigrants and others active in the labour market (although they may be students or temporarily unemployed people) and people having the resources to meet their needs. Gagné and Langlois (2002, p.28) state that these groups all consider, ‘la société québécoise comme un état de fait, et c’est la raison pour laquelle ils réclament pour elle un état de droit’ / ‘Quebec society as a state in fact, and this is why they demand for it a state in law’ (Author’s translation). Whilst there has been much stereotyping of who would or would not vote either way in any given referendum, they challenge the notion that women per se, or immigrants per se tend to vote against independence. Those groups or intra-groupings who perceive that they have least to gain from change are most inclined to oppose it, with Gagné and Langlois citing in particular retired people, women working in the home, older Francophones and Anglophones. Support for sovereignty, they aver (2002, p. 128), is not due to unchangeable historic conviction, but rather, ‘elle fluctue plutôt comme une prise de position en faveur d’un objet d’État sur lequel ces électeurs portent des jugements sensibles au contexte.’ / ‘it fluctuates rather like a stance in favour of a State objective on which the voters make their judgements according to context’ (Author’s translation). It is clear that the issue of Quebec independence is still very much a living issue, albeit one that will require a significant gear-shift in order to move it


away from its current stasis. However, the current ‘sovereignty movement’ appears fractured and disempowered, with the spontaneity and diversity of political viewpoint that characterises broad mass action having been lost. Nor is there a clear leadership from the political elite, which, drawn from within the movement in the 1970s, coalesced into today’s PQ. Now a part of Quebec’s establishment for over 33 years, the PQ has been accused of promoting itself at the expense of the issues and of belonging to the social groupings who have gained most from institutional change. Gagné and Langlois (2002, p. 136) assert that not only have party members forsaken political progress for personal gain but also they no longer know the difference. As noted in the previous section, Mario Beaulieu, President of SSJBQ, is also concerned that fatigue, disillusion and a lack of leadership threaten Quebec’s LPP. He states that current PLQ government policy is in default of Quebec’s CFL / CLF and that there is a malaise within LPP, brought about by lack of commitment to fundamental issues. In spite of the 2008 election result, he is highly critical of the PQ’s ability to move forward in opposition either on the issue of linguistic rights or on sovereignty. He points out that the party appears unsure of itself, tokenistic in support of linguistic rights and sovereignty and reluctant to be branded ‘extremist’. Instead, the party is endorsing more ‘liberal’ policies in respect of multiculturalism and citizenship whilst maintaining a superficial allegiance to more traditional party values of language, identity and sovereignty. In his view the party appears to lack ability and direction. He states, ‘En ce moment les députés du Parti québécois ne seraient pas capable de se défendre vraiment. Ils ne connaissent pas les dossiers, ils ne comprennent pas, ils ne savent pas pourquoi la Loi 101 est là.’ / ‘At the moment, the PQ’s elected representatives would not really be capable of defending themselves. They don’t know the documentation, they don’t understand, they don’t know why Law 101 is there’ (Author’s translation). There is clearly a question mark as to whether or not the PQ will show itself capable of adequate transformation in future. In the meantime, Beaulieu believes that social change will come, but that it may not be as dramatic as in the past. There is a growing unease in the population about LPP, he says. ‘Je ne dirais pas nécessairement une crise, mais une évolution’ / ‘I would not say necessarily a crisis, but an evolution.’ He asserts, ‘Il faut se remobiliser, redescendre dans la rue ... Au niveau politique, c’est bloqué ... Donc, en ce moment il n’y a pas vraiment d’alternative politique, donc on mobilise la société civile.’ / ‘We have to remobilise, get out onto the street again. At the political level, it’s blocked ... So, at the moment, there is really no political alternative, so we mobilise civil society’ (Author’s translations).


Some conclusions on Quebec / Canada At the heart of the matters addressed in the above chapter, there is the question of intergovernmental relations between federal government and Quebec. In the period since the last secession referendum in Quebec, federal LPP has continued to walk the same path, in spite of changes of government: renewing programmes, continuing with funding, committing to a bilingual face, but also missing opportunities, tending towards protectionist secrecy and lacking somewhat in vision and scope. Quebec LPP, having achieved enviable success in redressing some key aspects of language behaviour, appears moribund. It is unclear why there should be a lack of determination within government to drive LPP forward into areas like higher and further education, to ensure delivery of federal services through French, or to ensure that Quebec government practice itself consistently captures best practice. The result of the 1995 referendum, the fluctuating fortunes of the various political parties and the constant high-frequency multifaceted challenges to Quebec LPP are clearly all contributory factors. At the present time, Quebec LPP appears to lean towards the bilingualism that will dismantle its fundamental tenets, since for Francophones, the gaining of a second language means the loss of their first. Quebec political life is currently dominated by the PLQ, and its Francophone community exhibits the strain of constantly fighting against the tide in terms of language assimilation and the broader political issues. Quebec society is relatively prosperous and peaceful, if deeply preoccupied with issues of common identity for a highly ethnically and culturally mixed population. The adoption of the CLF / CFL dramatically changed the position of Quebec Francophones from a ‘minority’ to a ‘majority’ in provincial linguistic matters. However, the imbalance in power between English and French in North America means that merely maintaining the status quo for French will always result in a diminution of its influence and further assimilation. The investment of intellectual, physical and emotional energy required to mount a continuing language battle should not be underestimated. Interestingly, both in Quebec and in the ROC, those questioning the effectiveness of current LPP are met universally by officialdom with the same epithets in both official languages – ‘pessimiste’, ‘depressing’, ‘noir’. In spite of the wealth of commentary on LPP, there is an apparent reluctance at both provincial and federal governmental levels to engage with negative analysis of the effectiveness of each of the two different language policies. It appears unlikely that were the constitutional conflict between Quebec and the ROC to be resolved by some radical initiative, its origins would be in a Conservative government. The underlying aim of Canadian unity, defined and reinforced very specifically by Trudeau’s Liberals and their use of federal LPP in the 1980s to counterbalance Quebec nationalism, is deeply embedded in the Canadian mindset. There appears little

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sign that Harper’s government intends to move away from the pursuit of nation-statism. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that Canada’s reputation as a place that has acquired great theoretical and practical language expertise is well-deserved, both at a federal level and in Quebec LPP. Although many challenges have been identified and debated, there is measurable and enviable achievement as well as awareness and commitment at government, academic and community levels. Organisations and individuals carry out laudable and effective work. The symbolic status of two official languages has been balanced by federal government, contributing to relatively high levels of bilingualism amongst the dominant language grouping, the Anglophones. This is notable particularly since, worldwide, English-speakers tend to be notoriously monolingual, and since in a North American context, they overwhelmingly outnumber any other linguistic grouping. In Quebec, radical, far-reaching legislation to protect the French language has been in force for some 25 years. The English appearance of Montreal was transformed, the status of French as the common language of Quebec has been established. Challenges remain in Quebec, but as Guy Boutillier states,85 LPP in Quebec, ‘n’est certainement pas un échec’ / ‘is certainly not a failure’ (Author’s translation). It is important and relatively easy to note the successes of federal and Quebec LPP. However, what the observer must ascertain is whether in today’s climate the two different LPP approaches are capable of complementary interaction, or whether they remain oppositional in fact as well as in intention. As noted in Chapter 1, for those living with struggle, at certain political stages, when the situation quietens or when the paths of erstwhile antagonists converge for a time, the litany of ‘reasons to be cheerful’ delivered by politicians and their spin doctors through the media, and through selected community voices can be hard to disentangle from less self-interested analysis. Mass communications for a given political aim can stifle all but the most strident of dissenters, marginalising discordant notes and preventing valid and progressive criticism from bringing about the degree, range and type of change necessary for minority groups to flourish. On one hand, the need for security and safety is hard-wired into the human system. Most of us do not want conflict, we want peace. On the other hand, as noted previously, dominant societal systems are often flexible enough to protect their power whilst appearing to change. The challenge for minoritised language communities is to decide whether the fundamental conflict has been resolved to their satisfaction, and if not, how they should act.

Conclusions

Languages may be minoritised as part of deep-rooted and long-lasting power conflicts, often colonial, ethnic or nationalist in nature. Definitions of conflict are fluid, and the theory and practice of conflict resolution contains within it contradictions and inconsistencies. Where struggle has been ongoing over a period of years, evaluating the success of any given CR process is influenced by changing values and political priorities as well as the moulding of relationships among the conflict parties. Domestic law is often part of the arsenal of the state in maintaining its dominance. Since World War II, the international ‘club’ of nation states has devised self-protecting approaches to conflict resolution geared towards the maintenance of stability within individual member states and at a broader international level. Mechanisms to protect human, minority and, to a lesser extent, linguistic rights have grown from this context. Soft law has been criticised for particular failure in conflict situations. It remains unjusticiable in domestic courts. In the case of self-determination, the shifting goals of nation states in different centuries have created an ongoing confusion in the law which disadvantages the less powerful in nationalist conflicts. Language rights are currently poorly served in soft law instruments, contributing to the marginalisation of minoritised language communities within the broader antidiscrimination, equality and human rights debate. The goal of minoritised language communities is to seek to promote and protect their languages through effective action. The nature of linguistic assimilation means that revitalisation requires the instigation and management of change in societal behaviour. Whilst many gains can be made at an individual, family and community level, the treatment of minoritised languages at the interface between State and speaker impacts deeply on language maintenance. It affects the perceived and real status of a language, its use in various spheres of life and therefore corpus development, funding, human resourcing and integration into other areas of state policy. Whereas state LPP should comprise a set of discrete proposals geared to language promotion and protection, it may in fact more closely resemble domination 227

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politics in another guise. In this way, even where the policy of the state is to have no policy, this approach is in fact its LPP. It is inevitable therefore, that evaluating how best to relate to the state is a constant concern for minoritised language communities. As noted in Chapter 1, the experience of the Francophone linguistic minority in Canada and that of the Irish speaking community in Ireland has some similarities. Both situations share themes including: British colonial influence and impacts on constitutional, administration and domestic and international legal matters; institutionalised power and linguistic imbalances between ethnic groups, in favour of the pro-British settler group; consociational CR arrangements, and evidence of LPP devised by the dominant power to achieve broader political aims. However, whilst Quebec provides an internationally important example of LPP which has effectively changed language behaviour in favour of the minoritised French language, as noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the Irish experience, post-partition, has been far less successful. Successive Irish governments have been criticised for failing to revitalise the Irish language in line with its constitutional status of ‘first official language’ of the RoI. The GFA has not provided a sufficiently robust mechanism to ensure the development of positive LPP in the North, or to encourage effective, appropriate all-Ireland approaches to LPP grounded in the realities of the two jurisdictions. Therefore the CR arrangements put in place in the later 1990s contain within them the seed of current difficulties: ongoing management of the CR process in British and Unionist interests, marginalisation of the Irish speaking community within the ‘nationalist’ elite pillar of the consociational structures, the locked-in double veto of the two main elites, failure to engender genuine all-Ireland LPP. The ability of international instruments to impact in conflict situations is examined in Chapter 4 in which the UK application of the ECRML to date is outlined. The British government has selected the least number of paragraphs and ‘weakest’ options for Irish. There is a disparity in treatment of Irish in the North in comparison with the other two languages recognised under Part III, Welsh in Wales and Gaelic in Scotland. Application of the provisions for Irish to date has been unfocussed and lacklustre. In addition, whilst the ECRML has proven inadequate to protect the Irish language, it has been used to provide a framework for the persistent linking of Irish language provisions with Ulster Scots, in spite of advice from the COMEX that this is inappropriate. In fact, this practice has increasingly driven devolved LPP since 2007, as noted in Chapter 6. The failure of the UK government to deliver an agreed report for the Council of Europe during the third monitoring cycle of the ECRML has highlighted the increasingly conflictual context in which the Irish language exists in the North. The response of the COMEX to this phase in monitoring will prove most significant, not simply for its application in the UK, but in terms of its future credibility as a instrument to structure and measure positive LPP.

Conclusions 229

In spite of the GFA and the ECRML, the British government has continued to exclude the Irish language from UK broadcasting legislation. Chapter 5 describes the consultation and background to the UK Communications Act 2003 and the BBC Royal Charter 2005. The historic suspicion of the BBC towards Irish still impacts Irish language provision from the main PSB broadcaster, and is now increasingly linked to Ulster Scots programming, in spite of apparent confusion as to what exactly this is. The technical difficulties surrounding access to TG4 throughout the North and the inadequacy of transferring responsibility for Irish language programming solely to an Irish state broadcaster are discussed, in the light of attitudes within TG4 as to who is its primary audience and of the 2009 proposals McCarthy Commission for cuts to TG4’s budget. The fact that the positive performance of the CCG / ILBF has not led to a secure funding future shows that small gains made post-GFA have not become mainstreamed. There is impressive vitality and cohesion in the Irish speaking community in the NoI. Efforts by the Irish language community to favourably influence British LLP in the period following the GFA culminated in well-developed proposals for Irish language legislation and a commitment within the SAA, a joint British-Irish government accord, that the British government would enact an Irish Language Act. Chapter 6 outlines the manner in which the overwhelmingly supportive response to the proposed legislation was sidelined to allow the British government to use the Irish language as a bartering tool. Arguably, this outcome is advertised in the governmental consultation documents themselves which place emphasis throughout on ‘unionist sensitivities’, incorporate unusual features including a Financial Impact Assessment, and encompass two separate Equality Impact Assessments, one finding no adverse outcomes to Irish language legislation, and the other making the bizarre assertion that a rights-based approach to Irish Medium Education would be discriminatory, whereas a schemes-based approach would not. The failure to date of the Irish government and the North’s nationalist parties to challenge effectively the broken British promise has reinforced the use of the Irish language as a political football within the devolved institutions. In addition, the decision by both Northern nationalist parties to allow the ministry responsible for LPP, Culture, Arts and Leisure to be taken by the party most hostile to the Irish language, the DUP, has further marginalised the Irish speaking community within the political process and the consociational institutions at the present time. Perceived political protectionism, secrecy and ineffectiveness in the nationalist parties have eroded confidence. Chapters 7 and 8 seek to uncover and examine societal, sectoral and organisational attitudes to the proposed Irish language legislation, as shown in responses to the first governmental consultation in 2006–7. The responses from a wide range of submissions show that prior to the re-establishment of devolution in the North, there was a relative openness of attitude towards


Irish language legislation within society in general. However, a narrow band of political unionism holds rejectionist views, and it was these that were used by the British government to reinforce arguments for unionist participation in devolution. There is a dilemma for minoritised language communities in their dealings with political forces, a dilemma illustrated both in the North and in Quebec as illustrated in Chapters 6 and 9. Effective LPP can fundamentally alter the language behaviour of a society, but in conflict situations, dominant political and linguistic forces will view both CR and LPP as instruments to be wielded and moulded to protect hegemonic / majority interests. Minoritised language communities face many difficult and challenging decisions, particularly where their LPP goals are part of a wider conflict and where they may find themselves at arm’s length from CR talks, negotiating through political parties or movements which have priorities other than language. Seeking the means to set benchmarks, to secure targets and create objective standards to counteract the fluctuating interests of political parties often orients minoritised language communities towards legal protections. Quebec’s CLF / CFL illustrates how central comprehensive, rightsbased legislation can be in effective LPP. However, where hegemonic powers control domestic legislation, it is likely to be drafted, enacted and implemented according to their aims, rather than those of minoritised language communities. In contrast to Quebec LPP, federal LPP in Canada co-opts the needs of Official language communities for the united Canada project. It crystalises and systematises division on linguistic power lines, pitching the powerful Anglophone minority in Montreal in opposition to the CLF / CFL and contributing to divisions between Quebec and isolated Francophone communities elsewhere. In the South of Ireland, LPP has been found wanting in spite of the apparent freedom of the state over 85 years to devise and implement effective strategies. The level of ambiguity towards LPP in the RoI impacts disproportionately on the North, where Irish government intervention in support of the minoritised language community has not always been consistent, strategic or effective, a situation unlikely to be resolved by a 20-year plan entirely focused on southern conditions. In the NoI, British government LPP has been implemented entirely in accordance with British political interests, clearly delineated in the period since the GFA by minimalism in the protection, promotion or development of the Irish language, and disproportional generosity in the promotion of Ulster Scots. In both Quebec and the NoI, those with a specific language promotion agenda express disillusion at the ability of political parties to move the LPP agenda forward. In turn, this leads to a degree of deep-seated instability within intra- and inter-group political relations. As Tremblay remarks in Chapter 9, there is no knowing which spark will start a blaze. Former advocates of independence, now seemingly supporting institutions which reinforce interlocking relations may experience unease and insecurity. In

Conclusions 231

turn, this may result in defensive / aggressive action to stifle criticism in the media and in the community; to vilify analytical commentators as ‘negative’; to sideline particular NGOs; to withdraw funding and so on. Such apparently punitive action leads to a cycle of reaction, which may culminate in the transfer of sufficient electoral support to change the intra-group balances in power. However, the consociational model tends to fossilise relationships, making vote transfer outside each pillar rather unlikely. This narrows the options and minoritised language communities may be faced with a choice of those by whom they feel let down, or those who have previously been less radical or less active on language issues. If the dichotomy becomes one of ‘be used or be ignored’, it can only lead to deep disillusion and further division detrimental to the minoritised language community and the broader struggle against hegemonic power. Of course, new political parties may spring up, although the extent to which a single party may be able to unpick a complex CR structure developed over a period of time is doubtful. The ousting of one-time popular leaders or entire parties by ‘new Turks’ is a repetitive cycle unlikely to resolve the roots of conflict. In Q / C and Ireland, North and South, it appears that for the moment anyway, power relations have become stabilised within a CR context favouring the interests of the dominant power. However, the Quebec experience suggests that even in these circumstances, effective LPP can bring about positive change within an overall conflict situation, as long as its implementation can be delineated and protected by those who support its discrete language-based goals. It is unclear at the time of writing whether such circumstances can be created in the North, but the Irish speaking community is determined and active. Developments in Quebec also shows however, that to maintain LPP gains and to expand them exponentially into increasing areas of life over time requires great resolve and focus, enormous reserves of energy, a clear united vision and the ability to withstand the constant negative attention of the majority power. In Ireland and Quebec, independent community voices are a vital part of the process to build effective LPP for a stable, peaceful and forward-looking future.

Notes Introduction 1. The author has been Chief Executive of the Irish language non-governmental organisation POBAL since 1999. POBAL means ‘community’. 2. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Census 2001.

1 A Silent War: Conflict Resolution and Language Policy and Planning in the North of Ireland and Quebec / Canada 1. ‘The struggle for human rights is inevitably a struggle for power, and one that is generally tied to resources.’ Mary Robinson, Human Rights: A Global Perspective, UN Global Compact U.S. Network Meeting, ‘Business and Human Rights’ 28 April 2008, Harvard Business School. 2. Henry Patterson, Truth and Reconciliation in NI? Not much hope of either, Parliamentary Brief, 9 February 2009, http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/ articles/2/new/truth-and-969_67_0.html, downloaded on 18/02/2009. 3. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/043/88/IMG/NR004388. pdf?OpenElement.downloaded 24/02/09. 4. Anonymous (1996, p. 258) Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, Human Rights Quarterly 18, pp. 249–258. 5. Henry Patterson, Truth and Reconciliation in NI? Not much hope of either, Parliamentary Brief, 9 February 2009, http://www.parliamentarybrief.com/ articles/2/new/truth-and-969_67_0.html, downloaded on 18/02/2009. 6. See for example Buchanan (1991, 1997a, 1997b), Cassese (1998), Copp (1997, 1999), Epseill (1980). 7. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), http://daccessdds.un.org/ doc/R ESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/152/88/IMG/NR015288.pdf?OpenElement, downloaded 01/03/09. 8. The term ‘nationalist’ in the context of the north’s political parties implies support for an all-Ireland political framework. Nationalists tend to be Catholic and regard themselves as Irish. They are a significant minority of the population of NI, 43.8 per cent of the overall population of 1,685,267 according to the 2001 Census. 9. Unionism is the term applied to support for a full constitutional and institutional relationship between Ireland and Great Britain, based on the Act of Union 1800, which sought to merge both countries into the UK. Following Partition, in 1922, only the six north-eastern counties of Ireland (‘Northern Ireland’) remain under UK jurisdiction. Unionists tend generally to be Protestant and regard themselves as British. They are the majority section of the population in NI, 53.1 per cent of the overall population of 1,685,267 according to the 2001 Census. 10. For an analysis of this period, see Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard (1975). 11. Loyalist is the term used to describe those who support and / or engage in militant paramilitary methods as their primary means to oppose the reunification of Ireland. Members of loyalist organisations tend to be overwhelmingly

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Notes 233

12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

Protestant and are generally regarded as being of a working-class background. During the CR process in the 1990s, two main loyalist paramilitary organisations, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) established legally constituted political parties, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), respectively. Due to disagreement between the UDA and the UDP regarding power-sharing, the UDP dissolved in 2001. Its former role is now carried out mainly by the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG), which has no elected representatives. The PUP won one Assembly seat in the 2007 elections. Both the UDA and the UVF have publically resisted decommissioning of their arsenals. In 2009, the Independent Monitoring Committee (IMC) stated that the UVF had put some arms beyond use. Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721. CBC News, 13 June 1985, 4,000 Manitoba laws declared invalid http://archives.cbc. ca/politics/provincial_territorial_politics/clips/13460/, downloaded 01/03/09. Regulation 17, July 1912, amended 1913. An Ontario Ministry of Education regulation it restricted French as language of instruction after the first year of school and banned its teaching after the fourth year. R. v. Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234. I shall refer to the 2007 Caron v. Alberta case in relation to this earlier ruling in Chapter 9. It was also amended in 2005, as I shall examine in the final chapter. Prior to the 1960s, federal law prevailed even in cases where there was no conflict. The now well-established practice of adopting a more flexible interpretation of paramountcy is seen in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Smith v. The Queen [1960] S.C.R. 776, and in Multiple Access v. McCutcheon. [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 and the Law Society of British Columbia v. Magat [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113. Attributed to Novelist Yves Beauchemin, cited in Dubé P. (1994) ‘Je est un autre ... et l’autre est moi. Essai sur l’identité albertaine.’ Dir. Létourneau, J. & Bernard, R., La question identitaire au Canada francophone. Récits, parcours, enjeux, hors-lieux, Québec. pp. 79–99. This situation was to pertain until the period of the Good Friday Agreement which revised these two Articles by means of the 19th Amendment announced by David Andrews, the South’s Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2 December 1999. The amended Articles, accepted by Referendum, affords the right to all those born on the island of Ireland the right to be ‘part of the Irish Nation.’ They allow for the unification of the island subject to the consent of all the people living there, although the exact mechanism and choreography of determining this consent has never been made explicit. New Ireland Forum Report, Stationery Office, Dublin 1984, p. 8. Ibid, p. 44. Ibid, p. 17. Everyman’s United Nations, pp. 66–67. At present, unionism remains divided as to whether the current arrangements secure the future of the North within the UK for all time, or undermine it fatally. The Democratic Unionist Party, now the largest party in the consociational NI Assembly have never accepted the Good Friday Agreement. The devolved government sits at Stormont in East Belfast. The Executive consists of the First and Deputy First Ministers and the ten Departmental Ministers in the devolved government. During the first period of

234 Notes

28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

33. 34.

devolution 2000–2, the two Democratic Unionist Party members boycotted the Executive in protest at power-sharing. For a more detailed analysis of the GFA, see Bell (2000, pp. 172–176). Bertrand v. AG Quebec (1995), 127 D.L.R. (4th) 408. Coyne, A. (1995) ‘It’s no “narrow” legalism to ask if Quebeckers want a law-based state, The Globe and Mail’, 23 January 1995, A15. The federal government’s sponsorship programme was established to highlight federal investment in Quebec and combat Parti québécois initiatives. It ran from 1993–2006. Amid widespread allegations of political corruption, it was investigated by the Gomery Commission, itself accused of political bias in favour of the Canadian Liberal Party. Gomery, J. (2005) Who is Responsible? Phase 1 Report, Public Works and Government Services Canada, Ottawa. Parizeau urged Quebec, and particularly those in favour of separation, not to lose heart since the vote had been very close and could be won in future. He stated that the vote had only been narrowly lost because of ‘l’argent et puis des votes ethniques’ / ‘money and then some ethnic votes’. The remarks were reported in the media as ‘money and the ethnic vote’. Bertrand v. AG Quebec (1996), 138 D.L.R. (4th) 481. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.

2 The Irish Language in the North of Ireland Statistics 1. An Foras Teanga consists of two parts, Foras na Gaeilge and the Ulster Scots Agency. 2. The Irish government announced a unilateral cut of 1.5 million euros in November 2002, sparking protests in the North by Irish language groups who saw it as an attack on hard-won GFA provisions. 3. In 2008, the Irish government tasked University College Dublin economist Colm McCarthy with heading an expert team to prepare proposals on public expenditure. The McCarthy Commission on Taxation (also known as An Bord Snip) devised cuts of 5 billion euros to health, education and welfare and so on. The report includes 85 recommendations affecting Irish language provision and the Gaeltacht. 4. These statistics do not include Northern Ireland. 5. Source: An Phríomh-Oifig Staidrimh / Central Statistics Office, Census 2006, Volume 9, Irish language, http://www.cso.ie/census/census2006results/volume_9/ volume_9_irish_language_entire_volume.pdf, downloaded 18/08/2009. 6. Canada Official Languages: Regulations 1991 SOR/92–48. 7. E-mail correspondence 13 June 2003, from Carrie Doole, Customer Services, Census Office for NI, Belfast to author. 8. Donoghue, F. (2004) p. 32 in Irish language versions, p. 33 in English language version. 9. Statistics in brackets from DCAL EQIA (January 2007) Reachtaíocht atá Molta i dTaobh na Gaeilge: Comhairliúcháin ar Mheasúnú Tionchair ar an Chomhionannas, 19 Eanáir / Proposed Irish Language Legislation : Consultation on Equality Impact Assessment, 19 January, p.5, points 6.4, 6.5. 10. NISRA, 27 August 2009, Statistics Press Notice, Migration Estimates NI (2008–9), http://www.nisra.gov.uk/archive/demography/population/migration/Migration_ PR(2008).pdf, downloaded 7/09/2009. 11. Hansard WA218 (HL2717) 22 March 2007.

Notes 235 12. Hansard WA219, 22 March 2007. 13. Areas where the Irish language is the first language of the population, as designated by the Irish government. 14. Statistics from the organisation Gaelscoileanna 2009. 15. Press release from Gaelscoileanna, May 2009, Gaelscolaíocht Séanta ar an Céadta Tuismitheoirí dá bPáistí / Hundreds of Parents Denied Irish Medium Education http:// w w w.gaelscoileanna.ie/index.php?page=news&action=view_item&news_ id=117, downloaded 13 September 2009. 16. Coláiste Feirste in Belfast. 17. The terminology ‘controlled’ and ‘maintained’ schools is used by the Department of Education to denote the funding package relationship between the school sector and the state. ‘Maintained’ schools in general receive a smaller percentage grant than controlled schools, particularly in respect of maintenance and capital expenditure. They are under the direction of the Catholic Church. 18. Education Order Article 5(5) 1989. 19. DENI 4 February 2009, Statistics provided in written answer AQW 4474/09 from Education Minister Caitríona Ruane to MLA Dominic Bradley (Ó Brolcháin). 20. The Irish News, 7 September 2009, Simon Doyle, Scheme to push language ‘ignored’.

3

The Irish Language and the Good Friday Agreement

1. The Irish News, 7 January 2004, Irish language schools get funding. 2. Nuacht TG4, 25 September 2009. 3. Nuacht TG4, 25 September 2009, Fine Gael’s Enda Kenny said if in government his party would close the RGPTG / DCRGA. He also criticised Ó Cuív year-long delay in publishing the Plan for the Irish language. 4. The Sunday Tribune, 6 September 2009, by Martin Frawley, Ó Cuív attacked as Finance opens fire on Gaeltacht department. 5. Nuacht TG4, 15 September 2009, revealed minutes of a meeting on 9 April 2009 between the McCarthy Commission and the RGPTG / DCRGA at which cuts were discussed. The minutes were obtained by TG4 under a Freedom of Information request. 6. Donoghue, F. (2004) p. 31 in Irish language version, p. 32 in English language version. 7. Donoghue, F. (2004) ibid, p. 32 in Irish language version, p. 33 in English language version. 8. Donoghue, F. (2004) ibid, p. 51 in Irish language version, p. 53 in English language version. 9. An Roinn Ealaíon, Cultúir agus Gaeltachta 1997, Treo 2000. 10. Donoghue, F. (2004) ibid, p. 36 in Irish version, p. 37 in English language version. 11. The proposed requirement that all elected representatives of political parties should sign a Declaration against Violence before being allowed to take up their seats in local councils in the North. Sinn Féin said it was intended to exclude them from taking their seats since ‘violence’ was narrowly defined as the actions of the Irish Republican Army. 12. The Social Democratic and Labour Party, led during this period by John Hume and subsequently by Mark Durkan, supports the reunification of Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement. For thirty years, it was the largest nationalist party in

236

13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21.

Notes the north in terms of electoral support, until overtaken in 2003 by Sinn Féin. The changed position was reinforced in the 2007 elections. Sinn Féin, led by Gerry Adams, supports the reunification of Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement. The Ulster Unionist Party, led by David Trimble and subsequently by Reg Empey, supports the union of Britain and the north of Ireland. It supports the Good Friday Agreement. It was the largest unionist party in the north in terms of electoral support until 2003, when it was overtaken by the DUP. The changed position of the two parties was reinforced in the 2007 elections. Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (5 March 1998), Joint Statement, Dublin. Canavan, J.A. (1998) Submission for the Minister on the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and Other Irish Language Issues, leaked to the media on 22 April, 1998 by Democratic Unionist Party representative, Nelson McCausland. Nelson McCausland was named by the DUP as Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure in 2009. In the Matter of an Application by Caoimhín Mac Giolla Catháin for Judicial Review and in the matter of a decision by the NI Court Service and in the matter of the Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) 1737, Ref: TRE7587, Belfast High Court, 8 July 2009. Brian Wilson, then Scottish Office Minister responsible for Gaelic and the Islands. Canavan’s text continues, in brackets ‘(Other Scottish Office Ministers have not yet considered this issue).’ The DUP are now the largest party in the NI Assembly, as I shall discuss further in Chapter 6. For example, the amending of Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution; the coagreement of certain political principles including freedom of political thought, religious observance, political or constitutional change by democratic means, equality of opportunity and non-discrimination on the basis of class, creed, gender, disability or ethnicity (NB language is not mentioned); the establishment of an Irish Human Rights Commission and Joint Human Rights Committee; the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and so on.

4 The Ratification and Application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 1. Former head of the Linguistic Diversity Unit in the North’s Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL). 2. Manx and Cornish were later added to the ratifying instrument. 3. The Part III clauses ratified for Welsh are: Article 8: Education, Paragraphs 1a (i) 1b (i) 1c (i) 1d(iv) 1e (iii) 1f (ii) 1g 1h 1i, Total: 9. Article 9: Judicial authorities, Paragraphs 1a (ii) 1a (iii) 1b (ii) 1b (iii) 1c (ii) 1c (iii) 1d 2b, Total: 8 Article 10: Administrative authorities and public services, Paragraphs 1a (i) 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 2g 3a 4a 4b 5, Total: 14 Article 11: Media, Paragraphs 1a (i) 1d 1e (i) 1f (ii) 2 3, Total: 6 Article 12: Cultural activities and facilities, Paragraphs 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 1g 1h 2 3, Total: 10. Article 13: Economic and social life, Paragraphs 1a 1c 2b 2c 2e, Total: 5.

Notes 237 4. The 39 Part III clauses for Gaelic in Scotland are: Article 8: Education, Paragraphs 1a (i) 1b (i) 1c (i) 1d(iv) 1e (iii) 1f (iii) 1g 1h 1i 2, Total: 10. Article 9: Judicial authorities, Paragraph 1b (iii), Total: 1. Article 10: Administrative authorities and public services, Paragraphs 1c 2a 2b 2d 2e 2f 2g 5, Total: 8. Article 11: Media, Paragraphs 1a (ii) 1b (ii) 1c (ii) 1d 1e (ii) 1f (ii) 1g 2, Total: 8. Article 12: Cultural activities and facilities, Paragraphs 1a 1d 1e 1f 1g 1h 2 3, Total: 8. Article 13: Economic and social life, Paragraphs 1a 1c, Total: 2. Article 14: Transfrontier exchanges, Paragraphs a b, Total: 2. 5. The 30 Part III clauses relating to Irish, and which are the responsibility of the devolved administration are: Article 8: Education, Paragraphs 1a (iii) 1b (iv) 1c (iv) 1d(iv) 1e (iii) 1f (ii) 1g 1h, Total: 8. Article 9: Judicial authorities, Paragraph 3 Total: 1. Article 10: Administrative authorities and public services, Paragraphs 1a (iv) 1c 2b 2e 2f 2g 3c 4a 5 Total: 9. Article 11: Media, Paragraphs 1d 1e (i) 1f (ii) 1g , Total: 4. Article 12: Cultural activities and facilities, Paragraphs 1a 1d 1e 1f 1h 2 3, Total: 7. Article 13: Economic and social life, Paragraph 1d, Total: 1 6. The 6 paragraphs relating to matters which are the responsibility of the UK government in the north are: Article 8: Education, Paragraph 2, Total: 1. Article 11: Media, Paragraphs 1a (iii) 1b (ii) 2, Total: 3. Article 14: Transfrontier exchanges, Paragraphs a b, Total: 2. 7. However, as we shall see in the next section, the word ‘language’ has now been used in connection with Ulster Scots in legislation passed at Westminster in November 2006 (St Andrews Act 2006). 8. The Language Body was established under the British-Irish Agreement Act 1999 and the North-South Co-operation (Implementation Bodies) (Northern Ireland) Order 1999. 9. The DUP refused to sign the GFA and were prominent in broader unionist campaigns to vote ‘no’ in the referendum on its provisions. 10. The Observer, 16 January 2005, reporting on the UK government memo, Iceberg Watch 2004. 11. BBC (2007) Annual Report and Accounts 2006–7, pp. 63–64. The report contains no comparative listings for Gaelic programming in Scotland, but in June 2007, plans for a new Gaelic digital television station were announced. 12. The newspaper was renamed Lá Nua in 2007. 13. The 1991 and 2001 Censuses contained similar questions in relation to Irish alone. 14. Correspondence 2 May 2009, from CAL Minister Gregory Campbell, to the author as CEO of POBAL. 15. Briefing for Irish language groups by Sinn Féin advisors, Ciarán Quinn, Séanna Breathnach, Rosie McCorlaigh, 5 May 2009, Stormont. 16. NI Assembly Hansard, AQW7502/09. 17. The Andersonstown News, 30 May, 2009, Irish group criticise government. 18. Finalised print copy of report not available at time of writing, therefore no finalised page numbers available.

238 Notes 19. Máire Nic an Bhaird, 26 February 2007 was initially found guilty of disorderly conduct and fined £100 following an incident in May 2006 in Belfast. Her defense team argued she had been arrested for speaking Irish to companions in the street. She was acquitted on appeal on 14 September 2007. 20. The Judicial Review was heard in October 2008, and judgement given on 8 July 2009. Judge Treasey found in favour of the NIO. He comments in his judgement that he will not rule on whether or not the continuing operation of the Act contravenes the ECRML. An appeal has been launched. 21. This requires the UK government, ‘To encourage and / or facilitate the creation and /or maintenance of at least one newspaper in the regional or minority language.’ 22. In August 2009, Foras na Gaeilge also refused additional funding to the Conamara-based Irish language newspaper, Foinse, which was subsequently also forced to close. 23. The Codes of Courtesy for Irish and Ulster Scots are part of the 2004 Guidance on the ECRML document to which I have referred earlier. 24. Although the 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) concerning the use of languages other than English in the NI courts is a ‘reserved’ matter, the UK government’s ratification of Article 9 only commits it to translation of key legal texts. 25. Phone call from Hilda Emerson, Management Support Unit, DENI to member of public, 8 April 2008. 26. Note, signed ‘Kim’ on behalf of Hilda Emerson DENI with copy of translated text, 15 April 2008. 27. Joint Communiqué – British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, Iveagh House, Dublin, 2 March 2005. ‘TG4 Reception: The Conference was pleased that all issues relating to increasing TG4 reception had now been addressed, and the two Joint Chairs signed an Intergovernmental Agreement granting authority for TG4 to use a UK frequency to broadcast in Northern Ireland.’

5 Irish Language Broadcasting since the Good Friday Agreement: Sop in áit na scuaibe? Sword or Ploughshare? 1. In fact, the BBC channels are also widely available in the RoI although there is no formal intergovernmental arrangement regarding this, in contrast with those concerning access from the North to TG4, the Irish language channel. 2. In the RoI, RTÉ receives a licence fee. 3. Now called TG4. 4. ECRML, Part III, Article 11, 1a (iii). 5. UK government, White Paper A New Future for Communications, December 2000. 6. Correspondence 18 April 2002, from Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State, Department of Culture, Media and Sport, to POBAL. 7. The British government ratified clauses 1a(iii), b(ii), d, e (i), f(ii) and g of Article 11 – Media of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in June 2001. 8. The Irish Times, 20 August 2002, Editorial Preserving Irish. 9. Brian Cowan was appointed Taoiseach (Prime Minister) in May 2008.

Notes 239 10. Conducted as part of the Ofcom review of Nations and Regions’ programming in 2005. 11. Throughout this section, I quote from submissions contained in the document Responses to Audience Council NI Review of Indigenous Minority Languages (2007c). Each reference is attributed to the organisation or individual making it, whilst page numbers pertain to the Responses document. 12. BBC Audience Council (2007c) Responses to Review. One further submission was directed to the BBC Trust’s consultation on Purpose Remits, which includes indigenous minority languages in its scope, and was not included in the BBC’s summary. Another was withheld under the Data Protection Act 1998. The BBC state in a response to a Freedom of Information request (BBC, July 2007, FoI RF12007000536) that they withheld the further 9 submissions received subject to permission from their respondents to make them public. It should be noted that although some, if not all of the submissions contained in this document were written in Irish or bilingually, the Audience Council’s document is in English alone. 13. RTÉ broadcast primarily in English, with Southern state Irish language radio programming being predominantly on Raidió na Gaeltachta and television programming on TG4. 14. BBC Trust Purpose Remit Consultation: Licence Fee Payer Quantitative Research (BMRB). Sample size for the north was 59. 15. Audience Council NI, ibid, p. 8. The implications of this statement, that those who do not have Ulster Scots can usually understand it nonetheless, are discussed in Chapter 4 on the implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and in connection with a proposed new question on Ulster Scots for the 2011 Census. 16. BBC Freedom of Information (8 August 2007) RF12007000526 to the author as CEO of POBAL, from Andrea Chard, Advisor, BBC Information Policy and Compliance. 17. Correspondence 9 May 2002, from John Reid, Secretary of State for NI, to Gerry Adams, SF MP for West Belfast. 18. Correspondence 10 November 2005, from Denis Wolinski, NI Director, Ofcom to POBAL. 19. Made by the McCarthy Commission, refered to earlier. 20. Millward, Brown, Ulster Baseline Survey (April 2006) and Benchmark Survey (April 2007). 21. Although as noted, the vast majority of programming is on TG4. 22. CCG / ILBF Programme data. 23. For different reasons, only one of these companies is actively engaged in programme making or preparation in the 2008–9 period. 24. Lá Nua, 29 January 2008, Pilib Mac Cathmhaoil, Litir oscailte ar son Ciste Craoltóireachta na Gaeilge ó Léiritheoir, ‘Má imíonn an Ciste Craoltóireachta go buan, leanfaidh na vótaí é...’ 25. Meeting between Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams and POBAL’s Co-ordinating Group on the Irish Language Act, on 29 May 2008 in SF offices, Sevastopol Street, Belfast. 26. Lá Nua, 18 June 2008, Colm Ó Broin, Tarrtháil déanta ar Chiste Craoltóireachta go 2010. 27. Now also Campbell’s successor as DUP Minister for CAL. Nelson McCausland replaced him in 2009. 28. BBC NI Newsline, 17 June 2008, Reporter, Martina Purdy.

240 Notes

6 The British Government Commitment to Enact the Irish Language Act 1. The Ulster Unionist Party, formerly led by David Trimble, supports the union of Britain and the north of Ireland. The party supported the GFA and is now led by Sir Reg Empey. The largest unionist party in the north since the imposition of partition, the party was overtaken by the DUP in the 2003 and 2007 elections. In 2007, the UUP received 14.94 per cent of the vote in the Assembly elections and took 18 seats, a decrease of 9 seats from the 2003 election. 2. The Social Democratic and Labour Party formerly led by John Hume, supports the reunification of Ireland. The party supported the GFA and is now led by Mark Durkan. The largest nationalist party in NI for 30 years, it was overtaken by Sinn Féin in the 2003 and 2007 elections. In the 2007 Assembly elections, the SDLP received 15.22 per cent of the vote and took 16 seats, a decrease in 2 seats since the 2003 elections. 3. The Democratic Unionist Party, led by Ian Paisley, supports the union of Britain and the north of Ireland. It opposed the GFA and is now led by Peter Robinson. It is the largest of the unionist parties in NI, and took 30.09 per cent of the vote at the 2007 Assembly elections, giving it 36 seats, an increase of 6 seats from the 2003 elections. It is currently the largest party in the NI Assembly. First Ian Paisley and now Peter Robinson hold the position of First Minister. 4. Sinn Féin, led by Gerry Adams, supports the reunification of Ireland. The party supported the GFA. In the 2007 Assembly elections the party took 28 seats, an increase of 4 from the previous election, receiving 26.16 per cent of the vote. It is currently the second largest party in the NI Assembly. Martin McGuinness holds the position of Deputy First Minister. 5. The Alliance Party took 7 seats, an increase of 1 from the previous election, receiving 5.24 per cent of the vote. The Green Party and the Progressive Unionist Party took 1 seat each, as did Independent candidate, Kieran Deeney. 6. 14 February 2008, the Dromore by-election was won by the UUP, but the TUV, in its first election, took almost 20 per cent of the first preference votes, finishing third, and their transfers to the UUP ended up eliminating the DUP candidate. 7. As I shall note later, the substantive responses to the first consultation were placed on the DCAL website. Although the same process was promised prior to the second consultation, submissions subsequently received were not made public. 8. POBAL 2006, Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI is available on www. pobal.org, downloaded 10/09/2009. 9. As noted, Allister resigned from the DUP on 27 March 2007 in protest against power sharing in the NI Assembly. He now leads the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) party and although not re-elected to the European parliament as TUV candidate in 2009, he received over 70,000 votes. 10. BBC Radio Ulster, 25 October 2006, McGimpsey, Michael, Senior UUP Negotiator, South Belfast MLA and former Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure in the NI Assembly 1999–2002, re-broadcast on Radio Ulster Irish language programme, Blas. 11. The Irish News, 24 October 2006, Roy Garland, Changing Times Signals the End for the Rhetoric. 12. Farren, S. 24 October 2006, Press release from senior SDLP negotiator and North Antrim MLA.

Notes 241 13. (NI [St Andrews Agreement Bill] 2006). 14. At meetings with Maria Eagle, Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure and researcher as CEO of POBAL on Monday 30 October 2006 and again on Monday 4 December 2006, Stormont Buildings. 15. Video link meeting Stormont-Westminster, 6 December 2006, POBAL and CAL Minister, Maria Eagle. 16. Correspondence 1 November 2006, from POBAL to Maria Eagle, Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure. 17. Hansard 100588, Column 531, 22 November 2006, under the heading Sewel Convention, Secretary of State, Peter Hain in response to question from DUP MP, Peter Robinson. 18. See for example, The Irish News, 24 October 2006, Roy Garland, Changing Times signals the end for the Rhetoric; The News Letter, 14 November 2006, Scepticism over Government Offer on Ulster Scots; The News Letter, 17 November 2006, The Trojan Threat of the Irish Language Act; The News Letter, 20 December 2006, Allister broadside attack on Irish language Bill document. 19. DUP Manifesto 2007, Getting it Right. 20. Bracketed references in the coming sections of this chapter, and in Chapters 7 and 8, refer to the written submissions made by various organisations in response to the first DCAL consultation documents (referred to throughout as DCAL 2006 and DCAL EQIA 2007) on proposed Irish language legislation. To avoid repetition of the consultation phase or submission title each time, in each case the name of the organisation making the submission is followed by the date 2007 and a section or page number, where this applies. 21. DCAL 2006, p. 30 in both language versions. NB the term ‘relatively modest’ in English is rendered as ‘réasúnta’ in Irish, which means literally ‘reasonable’. The two language versions do not therefore necessarily convey the same meaning. 22. DCAL 2006, p. 42 in Irish language version, p. 43 in English language version. 23. The Department of Finance and Personnel, 8 February 2007 (FoI 12163) confirmed to POBAL that of seven consultation documents issued by them in 2006, none contained an FIA. The unusual nature of the inclusion of an FIA in the DCAL paper was taken up by various respondents including POBAL and CAJ. 24. DCAL 2006, Point 6.12, p. 70 in English language version, p. 68 in Irish language version. 25. DCAL EQIA 2007, p. 18 para 6.14.4; also 2007, p. 19 para 6.14.5. 26. DCAL EQIA 2007, ibid p. 9, para 6.12.8 in both language versions. 27. DCAL 13 March 2007, Introduction, p. 6, NB: The two language versions differ, with the English language version containing two phrases not in the Irish language version. These sentences are: ‘This reflects a significant level of interest in the issues raised in the paper’, and ‘Those in favour preferred a rights-based approach.’ 28. POBAL, BBC News 24, 15 March 2007. 29. The Irish News, 4 March 2007, Robert McMillen, ‘Minister Strangles Irish Language Act’. 30. The News Letter, 14 March, 2007a, Irish Language Act in Assembly’s Hands. 31. Correspondence 19 June 2007, from Maria Eagle, Under-Secretary of State for NI to POBAL. 32. Correspondence 2 April 2007, from Dermot Ahern to Éamon Ó Cuív, Minister for Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs and forwarded to POBAL.

242 Notes 33. Hain, P., 20 March 2007, Press release from Secretary of State’s office. 34. Nelson McCausland was made third DUP Minister for Culture, Arts and Leisure in June 2009. 35. The News Letter, 14 March 2007b, Act is a shillelagh to coerce unionists into Stormont, article by Nelson McCausland, DUP spokesperson on Culture. 36. The New Letter, 2 April 2007, Paisley. 37. The second consultation document was published the day before the long-expected release of the second COMEX monitoring report on the ECRML. 38. News Letter, Wednesday 14 March 2007, Irish language Act in Assembly’s Hands; and News Letter, same edition, article by Nelson McCausland, Act is a Shillelagh to Coerce unionists into Stormont. 39. News Letter, Monday 4 June 2007, letter from David McNarry, UUP Chief Whip and Deputy chair of Assembly Committee on CAL, Unite against Language Act. 40. News Letter, Thursday 31 May 2007, Letter from DUP MLA, Jim Shannon, Don’t throw good money away on Irish Language Act. 41. News Letter, 13 June 2007, letter from Nelson McCausland, SF has turned Irish Language into a Weapon. 42. David McNarry, UUP proposed this motion which triggered a Petition of Concern or cross-community vote, whereby all parties are required to designate themselves either ‘nationalist’ or ‘unionist’. The house then divides into these two sides to vote. To be carried, a motion then requires a majority of both ‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’ votes. McNarry’s motion received a majority of unionist votes, but fell because ‘nationalists’ voted against it. A similar Petition of Concern was again used on 13 May 2008 when the DUP’s Lord Morrow and Arlene Foster proposed a motion to end funding to an IM school in Dungannon. The motion was passed by the unionist block, but rejected by the nationalist one. 43. Michael McGimpsey, UUP Minister for Health, Social Services and Public Safety. During five years of Direct rule by the British government, this policy had remained in place. 44. Bairbre de Brún, SF was Minister for HSSPS from 2000–2. 45. The Irish Times, 15 August 2007, Paisley to block Irish language Act; News Letter, 10 October 2007, Stephen Dempster, Poots ‘to scrap Irish Language Act plan’. 46. NI Assembly Hansard, 16 October 2007. 47. Irish News, 18 October 2007, Human Rights Commission enters Irish language Row. 48. BBC Radio Ulster, Newsline, 18 October 2007. 49. NIHRC, September 2009, ECRML, Parallel Report to the COMEX on the Third Periodical Report of the UK. 50. Council of Europe, Second Opinion on the UK, ACFC/OP/II(2007)003, adopted 6 June 2007, para 190. 51. United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/C.12/GBR/CO/5, 22 May 2009, ibid, para 37. 52. Lá Nua, 28 January 2008. 53. Lá Nua, 29 January 2008, Pilib Mac Cathmhaoil, Litir oscailte ar son Ciste Craoltóireachta na Gaeilge ó Léiritheoir, ‘Má imíonn an Ciste Craoltóireachta go buan, leanfaidh na vótaí é...’ also noted in Chapter 5. 54. Lá Nua, 29 January 2008. 55. All appointees to the Board of An Foras Teanga / The Language Board are nominated by political parties North and South, the number of nominations per party being set according to the D’Hondt mechanism. Foras na Gaeilge has 16 Board

Notes 243

56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69.

70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76.

77.

members, 4 of whom are nominated by SF. Two SF nominees, Marcas Mac Ruairí and Eoghan Mac Cormaic defended Foras na Gaeilge’s decision. The Irish News, 17 December 2008, Lá Nua a victim of ‘dispensation of powersharing’ says former editor, Concubhar Ó Liathain. BBC NI Hearts and Minds, 14 February 2008, Edwin Poots. DUP press release, 14 February 2008, Nelson McCausland, the DUP culture spokesperson congratulated his colleague for ending the funding being ‘lavished on the Irish language.’ DUP press release, 25 February 2008, Spratt, J. NI Assembly Hansard, 3 March 2008, Ref: AQW 4300/08. The Irish News, 4 March 2008, by Diana Rusk, Poots Tongue-Tied over Irish Events. NI Assembly Hansard, 4 December 2008, NI Assembly Committee for Culture, Arts and Leisure, Language Strategy. NI Assembly Hansard, 4 December 2008, NI Assembly, ibid. Nuacht 24, 21 August 2009, Maoin Ultaise. Belfast Telegraph, 23 June 2009, Stephen McCaffrey, Greens and Irish language activists hope for change in DUP direction. Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness. Sinn Féin Ministers are Caitríona Ruane (Education), Conor Murphy (Regional Development) and Michelle Gildernew (Agriculture). The SDLP Minister is Margaret Ritchie (Social Development). Correspondence 2 April 2008 from Conor Murphy to the researcher as CEO of POBAL. Author’s translation. Correspondence 17 September 2007 from G.W. Allister Acting CEO, NI Road Services Division to Tomaí Ó Conghaile, Lá Nua. The Minister’s commitment to enact this legislation was confirmed at a meeting with POBAL on 6 February 2008 and again in email correspondence on 8 September 2009. The POBAL proposals relating to broadcasting and other reserved matters have also been removed from the draft since it is intended for the NI Assembly. On 21 September, current SDLP leader, Mark Durkan announced that he will stand down as party leader in February 2010. Rialtas na hÉireann (2006) Ráiteas i Leith na Gaeilge / The Government of Ireland (2006) Statement on the Irish Language. The only reference to an all-Ireland approach is an oblique one, on p. 18, ‘Leanfar leis an tacaíocht a thugann an Stát d’Fhoras na Gaeilge de réir an Achta um Chomhaontú na Breataine-na hÉireann 1999.’ / ‘The State will continue to support Foras naGaeilge in the context of the British-Irish Agreement Act 1999.’ http://www. pobail.ie/en/IrishLanguage/StatementontheIrishLanguage2006/file,7802,en. pdf, downloaded 09/09/2009. The Plan has not been subject to public consultation outside of the RoI. Nuacht 24, 15 May 2009, by Eoghan Ó Neill, Soiscéal Éamoin. Nuacht TG4, 25 September 2009. Meeting of the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs with Special Group on Expenditure Control, 8 April 2009. In relation to a query about Irish language organisations funded by Foras an Gaeilge, the minutes state, ‘At NSMC it was decided that there was potential for collapsing the number.’ Minutes of the North South Ministerial Council are not made available and although a request for disclosure was made by POBAL, a response from DCAL on 8 July 2009 stated that the minutes and other documentation were to be withheld under Section 27 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

244 Notes 78. NMSC 23 January 2009, 10 NoI delegates: 4 DUP, 6 nationalist. SF: McGuinness (Deputy First Minister), Gildernew (Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development), Ruane (Minister for Education), Murphy (Minister for Regional Development), Kelly (Junior Minister). SDLP: Ritchie (Minister for Social Development). Full list, see http://www.northsouthministerialcouncil.org/index/publications/jointcommuniques/plenary-jc/plenary_jc_ 23_january_ 2009.htm, downloaded 20 September 2009. Also NMSC Language Sectoral meeting, 2 December 2009, DCAL Minister McCausland and DGPTG / DCRGA Minister Ó Cuív, with SF Minister for Regional Development, Conor Murphy, attended. See http://www. northsouthministerialcouncil.org/351_02_12_2009.pdf, downloaded 20/12/09 79. Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act (POBAL 2006a) is available on POBAL’s website, www.pobal.org, downloaded 10/09/2009. 80. Comhaltas Uladh 2007, p. 4 in Irish language version, p. 3 (not numbered) in DCAL translation. 81. Conference An Ghaeilge is do Vóta / The Irish Language and Your Vote, organised by Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge, 25 February 2007, Dublin. 82. POBAL 2007 Submission, p. 32 in Irish language version, p. 33 in English language version. 83. POBAL 2007, p. 33 in Irish language version and p. 34 in English language version. 84. POBAL 2007 pp. 33–34 in Irish, pp. 34–35 in English. 85. Comhaltas Uladh, 2007 p. 5 in the Irish language version, p. 6 in English language version (un-numbered pages). 86. Article 9(1) has not been ratified for the Irish language. As discussed in Chapter 4, the only provision made in respect of the courts in the UK ratification of the ECRML is Article 9(3), which commits the UK government to, ‘make available ... the most important national statutory texts ...’ in Irish. 87. POBAL 2007, p. 36, also clauses 22–27 in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI. 88. POBAL 2007, p. 37, also clauses 7–12, 13–21, 28–38 in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI. 89. POBAL 2007, p. 34 in Irish language version, p. 35 in English language version. 90. Comdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge 2007, the submission goes on to quote in full clauses 31–33 and 33–34 of the POBAL proposals from the document Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI. 91. POBAL 2007, p. 36 in Irish, p. 37 in English language version, also clauses 57–58 in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI. 92. POBAL 2007, p. 17, 23–24, 26–27, also clauses 59–88 in Acht na Gaeilge TÉ / The Irish Language Act NI. 93. CNnaG, pp. 4–6; CnaG, p. 5; GL, p. 1; CU, p. 4; GL, p. 1. 94. POBAL 2007, p. 7 in Irish language version, p. 8 in English language version. 95. Under the remit of Foras na Gaeilge. 96. The submission calls for the adoption under Article 9(1) of clauses, a) b) c) d)

in criminal proceedings (ii), (iii), (iv) civil, (ii), (iii) Administration, (i), (ii) No additional expense

Notes 245

7 Submissions of the Political Parties to the First Public Consultation on Proposed Irish Language Legislation for NI 1. It should be noted that the Alliance Party’s policy on Irish Language legislation has changed since it made the submission discussed in this chapter. The party adopted a resolution at its party conference in 2008 in support of limited Irish language legislation since this commitment was given in the SAA. However, party spokesperson on Education, Trevor Lunn has said that the Act must come, ‘at no expense to the public purse and serve to promote rather than politicise the language.’ Alliance Party Press Release, 25 November 2008. 2. As noted previously, Allister resigned from membership of the DUP on 27 March 2007 when the party announced that it would enter into government with Sinn Féin from 8 May 2007. 3. These are the same points made on a number of pre-printed postcards submitted to the first consultation. 4. Whatever one’s view of the optimum consultation period, 12 weeks is common. The DUP has itself used the 12-week period for subsequent consultations on key policy matters. On 12 June, 2007, Peter Robinson, DUP Minister for Finance and Personal in the newly re-established Assembly announced a 12-week consultation on Water Charges, a key electoral issue and bargaining point for the DUP during the political talks preceding and after the SAA. 5. As noted in Chapter 2, this percentage is higher than in many countries here legislation already exists for RMLs. 6. Alliance Party 2007, p. 3, ‘Centralised, Anglophone Governments have certainly been biased in favour of their dominant English language. But it is also true to say that the enormous advantages of using English have consistently recommended its use to generations of our ancestors over recent centuries. Government pressured local people into speaking English; but the advantages of doing so were also obvious to those people.’ 7. J. Allister 2007, p. 13, the quotation refers to p. 3 of the DCAL consultation paper. 8. Maguire, G. (1991). Her findings are echoed in O’Hagan, K. (2000) Cultural Competence in the Caring Professions, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London. 9. J. Allister submission, ibid p. 11, Allister quotes Goldenburg’s paper, The Symbolic Significance of the Irish Language in the NI Conflict and states that, ‘Since 1990, Irish medium schools have been opening at a rate of six to seven per year.’ 10. As examined previously, the Administration of Justice (Ireland) Act 1737 currently prevents the use of Irish in the courts. 11. Expenditure to date on Irish language translation and interpretation has been rather modest. The DCAL consultation document quotes less than £100,000 throughout all government departments for the period 2004–5, with a number of departments recording no expenditure whatsoever on the Irish language. Other expenditure, often attributed to ‘Irish language costs’ should be attributed to service provision, the costs of which, to the same or similar degree, would have to be met regardless of the language in which the service was provided.

246

Notes

8 Submissions from Key Public Bodies and a 20 per cent Sample of Individual Responses to the Public Consultation on the Proposed Irish Language Legislation 1. Ofcom 2007, p. 1 (that is, in accompanying email letter). 2. Ofcom, 9 June 2005, Press statement, Ofcom publishes statements on programming for the Nations and Regions and ITV Networking Arrangements, http://www.ofcom. org.uk/consult/condocs/psb3/statement and http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/ news/2005/06/nr_20050609, downloaded 10/08/2009. 3. Ofcom, 9 June 2005, Statement on Programming for the Nations and Regions. 4. As noted in the DCAL Summary of Responses document, June 2007, 9 Orange. lodges made submissions to the consultation process. They are all similar. 5. Aodhan Ó Connolly v. Botanic Inns Ltd. A settlement was reached on 2 March 2006 regarding Connolly’s dismissal. CAJ note that the use of other languages than Irish with tourists and patrons of the bar was not discouraged. 6. Support was refused to a care worker who applied to study Irish (in line with Civil Service Circular 29/91) although others in similar posts had been granted permission to study other languages (specific case of study of Russian is cited). In September 2004, almost two years after his initial appeal, he was granted support, but too late to apply for the course in 2004–5. 7. The individual was recognised by the Agency as someone able to deal with Irish speaking customers on their behalf. After a complaint was made by another member of staff about his use of Irish in a conversation with his young son in Irish, he was told not to speak in Irish again. The case highlighted multiple confusion from a variety of agencies as to the meaning of ‘a neutral working environment’ and the prohibition of languages other than English in the workplace. The case was resolved, but the worker moved to another office because he felt uncomfortable in speaking Irish. 8. 2003 POBAL and the Department of Employment and Learning. POBAL complained that they were not allowed to place an advertisement for a vacancy requiring fluent Irish unless it was placed in English also. The annex notes that this is an ongoing problem. 9. Correspondence 8 March 2007 from David Hume, Director of Services, Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland to Margaret Ó Keeffe, DCAL. 10. GOLI submission, ibid p. 1 Foras na Gaeilge is one part of the Cross-Border Implementation body (Language). The other part is the Ulster Scots Agency. Funding and staffing levels are set by agreement between the British and Irish governments, based on the proportions of users of the Irish language and Ulster Scots in Ireland, North and South. 11. Submission no.75; Note that the emphatic use of ‘an scáthghrúpa’, ‘the umbrella group’ has escaped the translator. It appears to be a reference to the characterisation in the DCAL document of POBAL as ‘an umbrella group’. 12. Submission no. 10, no. 40, no. 55, no. 60, no. 90, no. 95, no. 105, no. 180. 13. Postcards issued by campaign sub group Acht. The four points are similar to those in Sinn Féin’s submission. 14. Submission no. 10, no. 30, no. 40, no. 50, no. 55, no. 65, no. 90, no. 95, no. 105, no. 115, no. 145, no.170, no. 180. 15. A development proposal for Gaelscoil Éanna in Glengormley just outside Belfast was turned down in 2007 in spite of the school meeting all DENI criteria. 16. Submission no. 5, no. 10, no. 40, no. 50, no. 55, no. 75, no. 80, no. 95, no. 115.

Notes 247 17. Submission no. 5, no. 30, no. 40, no. 50, no. 55, no. 95, no. 100, no. 115, no. 120, no. 170, no. 175, no. 180, no. 195, no. 200. 18. Submission no. 195, Respondent’s own translation, included with submission. 19. Submission no. 5, no. 10, no. 75, no. 85, no. 90, no. 95, no. 100, no. 115, no. 120, no. 150, no. 155, no. 175, no. 180, no. 195. 20. Submission no. 10, no. 55, no. 60, no. 90, no. 95, no. 170, no. 175, no. 180. 21. Submission no. 5, no. 10, no. 20, no. 30, no. 40, no. 45, no. 50, no. 55, no. 60, no. 75, no. 80, no. 85, no. 105, no. 110, no. 115, no. 120, no. 125, no. 130, no. 135, no. 140, no. 150, no. 155, no. 165, no. 170, no. 175, no. 180, no. 185, no. 190, no. 195, no. 200, no. 205.

9 Quebec v. the Rest in the Twenty-First Century: Coming-of-Age or Losing the Plot? 1. Refered to in Chapter 1. 2. The ten-year accord between Canada’s Prime Minister and Provincial and Territorial Premiers, 16 September 2004 agreed that in return for $41.2 billion in long-term federal funding, the provinces and territories will report to taxpayers on health-care services. 3. Joyal, S. (2004) La Presse, 22 October 2004, Le fédéralisme asymétrique : une solution gagnant-gagnant?, p. A20. 4. Congés parentaux: entente entre le Canada et le Québec sur le Régime québécois d’assurance parentale, signed by the Canada and Quebec governments, 1 March, 2005. 5. The 1996 Social Union Framework Agreement concentrated the efforts of federal and provincial governments to modernise Canadian social policy. 6. Put forward at various times by the Bloc québécois (BQ), the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the federal Liberals in Quebec. 7. Le Devoir, Antoine Robitaille, 24 June 2006, Harper dit non à la nation québécoise. 8. La Presse, Joël-Denis Bellavance, 1 November 2006, Le Bloc sauté dans la mêlée. 9. Interviewed by the author, 14 May 2009. 10. Interview with author, 14 May 2009. 11. Graham Fraser, in response to follow-up written questions, answers received by email 29 May 2009. 12. Graham Fraser, written responses, ibid. 13. Graham Fraser, 12 March 2009, Towards Equality: Canada’s Language Policies after 40 Years of the Official Languages Act, Speech at the 4th Symposium on Official Language Minorities in Canada, Gatineau. 14. Benoît Pelletier, ‘Notes pour une allocution du ministre délégué aux Affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes et aux Affaires autochtones devant la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Moncton et l’Institut canadien de recherche sur les minorités linguistiques,’ Moncton, 13 October, 2004. 15. Federal solutions to Ireland’s British problem were rejected in the 1970s, but resurfaced in 2009 Sinn Féin meetings in the USA examining a United Ireland. Brendan Ó Leary proposed a federal solution. 16. Email correspondence, 2 September between author and Patrick Thibeault, Data Diffusion Officer and 9 September 2009, and Jean-Francois Lepage, Sociologist / analyst, Language Statistics Section, Statistics, Canada. 17. Comité de suivi de la situation linguistique entre 2003 et 2007.

248

Notes

18. On 5 March 2008, researcher Michel Paillé accused the Comité de suivi, and Castonguay personally of delaying the publication of the final dozen documents needed for the publication of the progress report. 19. Interview with the author, 19 May 2009. 20. Interview by the author with Andrée Duchesne, Avocate-conseil et gestionnaire, Justice en Langues Officielles /Senior Counsel and Manager, Justice in Official Languages, Department of Justice Canada, 16 June 2006. 21. Strategic Plan 2005–6 to 2008–9 Canada-Manitoba Agreement on French Language Services, http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/lo-ol/entente-agreement/services/ mb/05–09-PlanServices-Manitoba-eng.cfm, downloaded 20/09/09. 22. Nova Scotia Department of Justice French Language Services Plan 2009–10, http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/publications/docs/FLS%20Plan%20English%20 Final%202009%2004%2029.pdf, downloaded 20/09/09. 23. Interview by the author with Annette Boucher, Registrar / Pronothaire, Cour Supreme de la Nouvelle Écosse / Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, 3 August 2006. 24. Feuille de route pour la dualité linguistique canadienne 2008–2013 : agir pour l’avenir, p. 66 in French version, page 62 in English version. 25. CLO, Rapport annuel 2008–9 : Deux langues officielles, un espace commun : 40 e anniversaire de la Loi sur les langues officielles. Ministre des Travaux publics et des Services gouvernementaux Canada 2009. OCOL Annual Report, 2008–9, Two Official Languages, One Common Space: 40th anniversary of the Official Languages Act. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 2009. p. II. 26. In Interview with the researcher, 14 May 2009, Ottawa. 27. CLO Rapport Annuel 2008–9, p. 39 in English language version, p. 43 in French version. 28. Graham Fraser, 28 May 2009, written email response to the researcher’s additional questions following interview, 14 May 2009 in Ottawa. 29. Graham Fraser, written answers to follow-up email questions, 29 May 2009. 30. CLO, Une occasion en or, p. 38 / OCOL Raising our Game p. 37. 31. In June 2009, Marc Tremblay was appointed to a new position. 32. Marc Tremblay, in interview with the author, 12 May 2009, Ottawa. 33. Radio Canada, 30 March 2009, Deux candidats dans la course, Candidate Randy Hillier opposes French language services. 34. The Globe and Mail, Friday 19 June, 2009, Guy Dixon, Windsor residents seek injunction against CBC. 35. CBC, Tuesday August 5 2008, NB revamps changes to French Language Education, The Canadian Press. 36. R. v Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234. 37. Tremblay, interview with the author, 12 May, 2009. 38. Un tracé pour agir: La mise en oeuvre de la partie VII de la Loi sur les langues officielles de 1988 – février 1996, Rapport du Commissaire aux langues officielles sur la mise en oeuvre par le gouvernement fédéral de la partie VII de la loi sur les langues officielles, 1996. 39. http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/stu_etu_021996_f.php, downloaded 28/03/2009. 40. A Blueprint for Action: Implementing Part VII of the Official Languages Act 1988-February 1996, Report of the Commissioner of Official Languages on the Federal Government’s Implementation of Part VII of the Official Languages Act, 1996, p. 73, http://www.ocol-clo.gc.ca/html/stu_etu_021996_e.php#CONC, downloaded 28/03/1009; Savoie (1998), Collectivités minoritaires de langues

Notes 249

41.

42.

43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

officielles : promouvoir un objectif gouvernemental ; Fontaine, Yvon et al., (1999) Maintenir le cap: la dualité linguistique au défi des transformations gouvernementales, Rapport du Groupe de travail sur les transformations gouvernementales et les langues officielles, Conseil du Trésor du Canada, Ottawa; Canada (2003) Le prochain Acte: Un nouvel élan pour la dualité linguistique canadienne. Le plan d’action pour les languages officielles / The Next Act: A new momentum for Canada’s linguistic duality. The Action Plan for Official Languages. See the Official Languages Accountability and Coordination Framework (Action Plan for Official Languages), 2003, section 16. Also see Forum des maires de la péninsule acadienne v. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2003 F.C.1048, sections 45 and 46. Lastly, see Commissioner of Official Languages v. Canada (Department of Justice), 2001 FCT 239, section 55. The FCFA’s appearance before the Standing Committee on Official Languages of the House of Commons, 16 June 2005, 38th Parliament, 1st session, no. 39 (0910). An Act to amend the Official Languages Act (promotion of English and French). OCOL Rapport Annuel 2007–8, ‘was linked to virtually all major court decisions on minority language rights in Canada since 1994.’ Official English language version, p. 97. It was expanded by Premier Brian Mulroney in 1985 following the enactment of the equality section of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; had its funding withdrawn controversially by the same Brian Mulroney in 1992 and was re-established by Premier Jean Chretien in 1994. CanWest News Service, 7 September 2006, Funding for minority groups to challenge federal laws under review, CanWest Media Publications Inc, http://www. canada.com/topics/news/politics/story.html?id=ec0f ba5e-7399– 4431-8e5f1ec6b13838df&k=23441, downloaded 21/06/09. Conseil des Canadiens avec déficiences / Council of Canadians with Disabilities, Annual Report 2007–8, http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/about/ board/annualreports/2008, downloaded 21/06/09 ; CCD, Soutien au fonds de défense juridique des droits des personnes handicapées, http://www. ccdonline.ca/fr/donate, downloaded 21/06/09 ; Press release, FAFIA / AFAI, ‘Les droits à l’égalité n’ont aucune signification au Canada si les femmes, et d’autres Canadiens qui sont victimes de discrimination, ne peuvent les utiliser,’ / ‘Equality rights have no meaning in Canada if women, and other Canadians who face discrimination, cannot use them.’ Organisation’s translation, FAFIA /AFAI, Des coupures à condition féminine Canada et au programme de contestation judiciaire sapent l’engagement du gouvernement envers l’égalité des femmes / http://www.fafia-afai.org/fr/des_coupures_a_condition_feminine_ canada _et _ au _programme_de_contestation _judiciaire_ sapent _ lengagement_du_gouvernement_envers_le Cuts to status of Women and Court Challenges program Undermine Government’s Commitment to Women’s Equality, 25 September 2006, http://www.fafia-afai.org/ en/node/361, downloaded 21/06/09. Interview with Marc Tremblay, 12 May 2009. Ibid, Marc Tremblay, 12 May 2009. Interview between Graham Fraser and the author, 14 May 2009. Desrochers c. Canada (Industrie), 2009 CSC 8, February 2009. Tremblay, 12 May 2009. Author’s translation.

250 Notes 54. Le Devoir, 21 / 22 March 2009, Aléxandre Shields, Hommage à Camille Laurin – Landry craint une brèche dans la loi 10. 55. Catalan is just one further example of a ‘minority’ language spoken by several million people, although it does not benefit, as French does, from the existence of a separate nation state in which the language is in common use for all state and private purposes, nor from its use as the dominant language in many former colonies. 56. For further information on the issue of accommodation, see Bouchard, G. & Taylor, C. (2008) Fonder l’avenir.Le temps de conciliation / Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Commission de consultation sur les pratiques d’accommodation reliées aux différences culturelles, Québec. 57. The amendment restored the Commission de la protection de la langue française. 58. Press release, 24 August 2007, Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Québec, Montréal, La SSJB de Québec : le jugement sur la loi 104 met en danger la paix linguistique au Québec. 59. The Gazette, Saturday 22 March 2008, Don MacPherson, Bill 104 isn’t the English boards’ biggest problem. 60. Québec (Ministre de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport) v. Nguyen, case no. 32229, appeal heard by the Supreme Court of Canada 15 December, 2008. 61. Québec (Ministre de l’Éducation, du Loisir et du Sport) v. Bindra, case no. 32319, appeal heard by the Supreme Court of Canada 15 December, 2008. 62. Section 23(2) says, ‘[l]es citoyens canadiens dont un enfant a reçu ou reçoit son instruction, au niveau primaire ou secondaire, en français ou en anglais au Canada ont le droit de faire instruire tous leurs enfants, aux niveaux primaire et secondaire, dans la langue de cette instruction.’ / ‘[c]itizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving primary or secondary school instruction in English or French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the same language.’ 63. 21 Commissioner of Official Languages, Factum of the Intervenor, Commissioner of Official Languages for Canada. 64. Interview with the author, Tuesday 11 July 2006, Gisèle Delage, Counsellor et Normand Maillet, Counsellor, Secrétariat de la politique française, Department of Culture and Communication, Bloc A, 225 Grande Allée Est, Québec. 65. Ibid, Delage, 11 July 2006. 66. In its report, Étude des crédits alloués au dossier linguistique pour l’année 2006–2007, the Secretariat notes that its relevant branch, the Office québécois de la langue francaise, received 3,652 complaints in the period 2005–6, a slight increase (+ 80 complaints) on the previous year. 51.5 per cent of complaints had been dealt with within 6 months and 89.5 per cent resolved without recourse to the courts (the Procureur general). http://www.spl.gouv.qc.ca/secretariat/d_credits2006_2007. html, downloaded 06/06/2009. 67. Le Devoir, 8 April, 2008 Robert Dutrisac, ‘Québec s’adresse en anglais aux trois quarts des immigrants allophones’. 68. Le Devoir, 17 April 2008, Editorial, Bernard Descoteaux. 69. Including the Commission de l’équité salariale. 70. However, other governmental websites do display more French than English, even when, as in the case of the Ministère de développement économique, de l’innovation et de l’exportation, their work encompasses contact with more companies outside than within Quebec.

Notes 251 71. Le Devoir, Robert Dutrisac, 19 / 20 April 2008, ‘Les communications en anglais entre l’État et les entreprises du Québec – Il faut que cela cesse, dit le CSLF’. 72. Le français, c’est notre affaire à tous. Stratégie commune d’intervention pour Montréal 2008–2013, Gouvernement du Québec. 73. Jacques Gosselin, Director, Secrétariat à la politique linguistique, email response to author’s written questions, 10 June 2009. 74. Mario Beaulieu, in interview with the author, 19 May 2009, Montreal. 75. Journal SSJBQ, April 2009. 76. Interviewed by the author on 14 July 2006, in Montreal (Interview conducted in English). 77. Levine (1990) describes in detail the demarche of the francisation programme during this period. 78. Rapport sur l’évolution de la situation linguistique au Québec 2002–2007, Synthèse, Gouvernement du Québec , no publication date, p. 23. 79. Rapport sur l’évolution de la situation linguistique au Québec 2002–2007, Synthèse, Gouvernement du Québec , no publication date, p. 23. 80. Bergeron, (Chargé des relations publiques et porte-parole) Interviewed by the author on 19 May 2009. 81. Bergeron, 19 May 2009. 82. Bergeron, 19 May 2009. 83. The Toronto Star, 1April 2009, New Quebec law turns Lara Croft into Francophone. Sale of English-only video games prohibited if French version exists. 84. CBC news, 8 Friday June, 2007, PQ humbled, finishes third. 85. Radio Canada, 9 December 2008, L’espoir ravivé. 86. http://elections.radio-canada.ca/elections/quebec2008/2008/12/09/014-maroislendemain.shtml, downloaded 19/04/09. 87. CBS News, Daniel McHardie, 9 December, 2008, PQ gains help Marois rebuild party from disastrous 2007 election. 88. http://www.cbc.ca/news/quebecvotes2008/story/2008/12/08/qv-marois-pq.html, downloaded 19/04/09. 89 Radio Canada, 9 December 2008, L’espoir ravivé, ibid. 90. Radio Canada, 9 December 2008, Fermer la boite de Pandore, Jean Charest. 91. http://elections.radio-canada.ca/elections/quebec2008/2008/12/09/024-charestmarois-souv.shtml, downloaded 19/04/09. 92. Radio Canada, Fermer la boite de Pandore, ibid, ‘C’est le scénario type du soir de l’élection: il n’est pas question de souveraineté et de référendum pendant toute la campagne, puis le soir de l’élection, c’est comme si c’était la seule chose dont on avait parlé.’ / ‘It’s an election results-night scenario : sovereignty and referendum have not been an issue during the whole campaign, then on election night, it’s as if it’s the only thing we have talked about’ (Author’s translation). 93. Guy Boutillier in interview with the author, 12 June 2006, in Montreal.

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Index

Entries in this index are listed in letter-by-letter order, except for legislative acts, listed chronologically. Bold print indicates principle references. The letter t following a page number denotes a table, the letter m denotes a map, the letter f denotes a figure. Endnotes are referred to by page, the letter n (nn for more than one consecutive endnote) followed by the endnote number. 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland), 19, 71, 83, 90, 93, 138, 143, 161, 164, 236n18, 238n20, 238n24, 245n10, see also Irish in the courts 1867 British North America Act, 24 1875 North-West Territories Act, Section 26, 110, 210 1920 Government of Ireland Act, 1, 19, 30, 20m1.1, 30, 31, 56, 86, 103, 228, 232n9, see also partition 1969 Official Languages Act (Canada) also 1969 Loi sur les langues officielles, 27, 28–9, 33, 120, 196, 199, 200, 208–10, 211–13, 214, 247n13, 248n38–40, 249n43 1972 Northern Ireland, Temporary Provisions Act, 20, see also direct rule 1976 Charter for the French Language also Charte de la langue française, 28, 196, 200, 214–22, 224, 250nn58–62 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, also Charte canadienne des droits et des libertés, 23, 29, 33, 211, 214–15 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 113, 169, 236n21 1995 Local Government Order, 61, 71, 91, 95, 134, 140, 162, 178, 186, 187–90t, see also signage 1998 Education Order Northern Ireland, 53, 95, 120

1999 North/South Co-operation (Implementation Bodies) (Northern Ireland) Act, see under An Foras Teanga 2003 Acht na dTeangacha Oifigiúla also 2003 Official Languages Act (RoI), 120, 137, 138, 140 2003 UK Communications Act, 96, 99, 103–4, 229, see also broadcasting, 2003 Joint Declaration, 105–6 disparity, Wales and Scotland, 96, 105 Putnam Report, 104–5 White Paper, 104, 238n5 2005 BBC Royal Charter, 103, 106, 229, see also broadcasting 2006 St Andrews’ Act, 94, 121, 241n13, 243n63 Adams, G. 64–72, 119, 132, 236n13, 239n17, 239n25, 240n4, see also Sinn Féin Alberta, 24, 25m1.3, 26, 209–10, 233n16,see also Caron, G. Alliance Party, 148, 149, 153, 154–6, 157, 160–6, 240n5, 245n1, 245n6, Allister, J. 119, 121, 148, 149, 150–65, 167, 191, 194, 240n9, 240n18, 245n2, 245n7, 245n9, see also Traditional Unionist Voice All-Ireland, 31, 38, 59, 69, 86, 114, 121, 134–5, 137, 142, 228, 232n8, 243n73–4 An Bord Snip see under McCarthy Commission An Foras Teanga / The Language Board, 38, 68, 86, 94, 142, 234n1, 243n56, see also Foras na Gaeilge

269

270

Index

Anglo-Irish Agreement, 61, 134, 160 Assembly, see under NI Assembly, see also consociational, Good Friday Agreement assimilation, 8, 12, 26, 202, 203, 205, 225 asymmetrical federalism, 198–202 see also federal, -ism bargaining chip also political football, 15, 37, 121, 128, 229, 193t8.3, 245n1, see also politicised Beaulieu, M. 207, 216, 217, 221, 224, 251n74, see also Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec Bell, C. 12, 15, 16, 18, 32, 33, 37, 97, 234n28 Bergeron, M. 219–21, 251n80, see also Office québécoise de la langue française, and Paquette, G. bilingualism 8, 24, 71, 165, 172, 177, 203, 207, 208, 216, 217, 225, 226 Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Royal Commission 26, 27, 37 Bill 104, see 1976 Charter for the French Language / Charte de la langue française boundaries, 25m, 31, 59, 60, 146 Boutillier, G. 226, 251n93, see also Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Québec Bradley, D. see under Ó Brolcháin, D. BBC, 91, 96, 99, 100–6, 101t, 102t, see also broadcasting, BBC Audience Council, BBC Trust BBC Audience Council, 91, 99, 239n15, see also broadcasting, BBC Trust BBC Alba see also disparity, 101, 102t BBC Scotland also Scots, 102t, 110, 111, 113 Review of Indigenous Minority Languages, consultation, 106–9, 238–9nn11–12 An Carn, 108 An Droichead, 107, 108 An Tobar, 107, 108, 109 Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta, 108 Cuan, R. 109 Foras na Gaeilge, 107, 108 Iontaobas Ultach, 107, 108, 109 McKendry, E. 108, 109

Mac Ruairí, M. 108 POBAL, 108, 109 Thompson, H. 109 BBC Audience Council, consultation findings submitted to BBC Trust, 109–11 British Constitution, 69, influence on Ireland and Canada 26, 228, see also Irish-, CanadianConstitution British-Irish Council, 66, 96 broadcasting, in general, 3, 74, 84, 88, 91, 94, 96, 99, 100, 139, 142, 144, 145, 163, 169, 170, 185, 187–90t, 191, 192t, 194, 229, 243n71, see also BBC, BBC Audience Council, BBC Trust, TG4, Ciste Craoltóireacht Gaeilge disparity, Wales and Scotland, 99, 100–3, 107, 108, 131, 170 Iontaobhas Ultach, 104 RTÉ, 102t, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 238n2, 239n13, 239n21 see also 2003 UK Communications Act, 2005 BBC Royal Charter Campbell, G. 92, 94, 118, 133, 237n14, 239n27, see also DCAL Ministers, Democratic Unionist Party Canada, history and language, 6, 22–8 Canadian Constitution, in general, 23, 24, 197, see also British-, IrishConstitution federal paramountcy, doctrine of, 29 language rights, 33, 212–4 patriation, 26, 29, 33 provincial, 29 Quebec, effect on; language laws, conflict with 24, 33, 211, 214–215 secession, 26, 28, 29, 33–6, 225 Canavan, T. 61, 64, 70–3, 83, 236n16, 236n19, see also ratification of ECRML Cardinal, L. 9, 23, 29, 78, 197, 201, 205 Caron, G. 209, 233n16, see also Supreme Court, Alberta Castonguay, C. 29, 205–7, 216, 218, 248n18 Cazabon, B. 201

Index 271 Census, in general 39, see also demand 40–1, controversy in NI 152, in Canada 196, 202–3 North, compare 1911 (all Ireland) with 1991, 2001 (NI), 39–42 questions, in NI Census, Irish 39–40, Ulster Scots, 91 South, 2006 (RoI), 39 Charlottetown Accord, 23 Chevrier, M. 10, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29 Chrétien, J. see also Prime Minister, 34–5, 97, 196, 249n45, Ciste Craoltóireachta na Gaeilge also Irish Language Broadcast Fund, in general, 92, 94, 99, 101, 102t, 113–18, 132, 170, 229 budget, 117–18 fig-leaf, 118 Lá Nua, reporting in, 117, 118, 132 Ulster Scots, equal funding for, 106 west of Ireland, primary audience, 115 civil rights, 20, 21, 31 Clausewitz C. Von, 7 Clinton, B. 65 Codes of Courtesy 95, 238n23, see also Guidance on ECRML 47, 88–9 collapsing, see under North South Ministerial Council colony, -isation 22, 23, 35 also decolonisation 15 COMEX reports, 71, 77, 80, 83, 88–95, 242n39, see also ECRML 2004 recommendations, 88 2007 recommendations, 91, 94 Commissioner, in general 30, 185 An Coimisinéir Teanga, RoI, 185 Irish Language Act, proposal for, 120, 139–40, 145, 150, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 183t, 185, 187–90t, 191 Official languages, Canada 199–201, 208–9, 210, 212, 213, 215, 247nn10–13, 248nn38–40, 249n41, see also Fraser, G. see also NIHRC, 131 Community Relations, also – Council, Central Community Relations Unit see also Canavan, T. 58, 60–3, 70, 152, 153, 162, 165, 166, 168–9, 176, 194, 203

compensation, 9, 78, 140, 145, 157, 177, 197 concession, in general, 10, 15, 64, 66 ECRML, 72–3 Irish language Act, 151, 164 quid pro quo, 29, 87, 89, 169 conflict, in general, 1, 2, 4, 5–7 assessing progress, 12–13 causes and definitions, 11–12 containment, see also hegemony, 6, 7, 11, 22, 37, 75, 78, 230–1 domestic law, 14–15 international instruments, see also ECRML, 14–15, 16–17, 32 language, and, 7–10, 16 nationalism, and, 8 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, 80 consensual, also conflictual, 34, 60 consociation, see also Good Friday Agreement, Assembly, devolution, 6, 28, 32, 39, 74–75, 195, 228, 229, 233n25 double-, mutual-veto, 33, 75, 92, 228, see also cross-community consent, 151, 242n43 fossilise, 231 Lijphart, A. 74–75, 92 constitution, -al 23, 76, 232n9, see also British-, Irish-, Canadian Constitution, Good Friday Agreement change, 33, 66 competing aims, 32 oddity, 30 consultations see under BBC Audience Council, Irish Language Act corruption, see also Gomery Commission, 34, 234n31 Court Challenges Programme also Programme de contestation judiciaire, Canada, 211–13, see also Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes court remedy, also compensation, 140, 145, 157, 177, 197, see also courts, Irish in the courts

272 Index courts, 22, 79, 227, see also 1737 Act, Supreme Court of Canada Canada, in, 207, 209, 211, 213 North, in, 22, 80, 88, 94–6, 120, 123, 125, 138, 143, 152, 157, 161, 162, 170, 171, 172, 174, 177, 178, 185, 187t, 191 Quebec, in, 24, 33, 215, 250n66 cross-community consent, 151, 242n43, see also double-, mutual-veto Crowley, T. 18 cultural imperialism, 11 cultural relativism, 15 cultural weapon, 129, 176, 177, 178 Dáil Éireann, also Leinster House, 30, 72 De Brún, B. 185, 242n45, see also Sinn Féin Delage, G. 215, 250n64, see also Secrétariat de la politique linguistique, and Gosselin, J. Delmartino, F. & Deschouwer, K. 24 demand, see also Census, 40–1, Irish language Act, for services, 124 democratic deficit, -iency, 15, 39, 135 Democratic Unionist Party, 118, 236n14, 236n20, 240n6, 244n79, 245n2, see also Dodds, N, Paisley, I., Robinson, P. and First Ministers Culture, Arts and Leisure, Minister for, 94, 118, 129–31, 132, 133, 195, 229, 236n17, 239n27, 242n35, see also DCAL Ministers ECRML, attitude to, 70 Good Friday Agreement, 68, 70, 73, 119, 128, 237n9, 240n3, 240n9, see also power-sharing Irish Language Act, and, 118, 127, 128, 129–31, 132, 133, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 191, 194, 241n17, 242n36–7, 242n39, 242nn41–3, 242nn46–7, 242n49, 243nn58–65, 243n66, 245n4 manifesto, 122, 241n19 Traditional Unionist Voice, and, 119, 121, 148, 149, 150–65, 167, 191, 194, 240n9, 240n18, 245n2, 245n7, 245n9, see also Allister, J.

Ulster Scots, and, 87, 92, 94, 106, 118, 122, 132, 133, 152, 156, 160, 163, 164, 195, 243n65 veto, 118, 122 Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, also Roinn Gnóthaí Pobail, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta, 38, 57, 134, 135, 235nn2–5 DCRG Minister, 57, 128, 135, 235n5, 241n33, see also Ó Cuív, É. Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure ECRML, UK reporting failure, 92–3, 93, 94, 95, 96 Guidance on ECRML, 47, 88–9, see also codes of courtesy, 95, 238n23 Ministers, Culture, Arts and Leisure Campbell, G. 92, 94, 118, 133, 237n14, 239n27 Eagle, M. 121, 122, 123, 127, 133, 147, 241nn14–5, 241n16, 241n32, see also direct rule McCausland, N. (prior to appointment), 70, 118, 128, 129, 236n16, 239n27, 214n37, 242n36, 242n42, 243n59, (as Minister), 133, 236n17, 242n35 McGimpsey, M. 121, 240n10, 242n44 Poots, E. 94, 118, 129, 131, 132, 242nn46–7, 243n58, 243n62 see also Irish language Act, consultations Deputy First Minister see also First Minister Mallon, S. (prior to appointment), 67, 68 McGuinness, M. (prior to appointment), 65, 243n67, 244n79, 249n4 Desrochers c. Canada (Industrie) 2009 CSC, 8, 196, 213, 249n52, see also enforcement LLO/OLA Section VII De Varennes, F. 8, 9, 15, 16, 40, 120 devolution, -ed, in general, 70, 73, 77, 93, 118, 233nn26–7, see also consociational, Assembly, Good Friday Agreement Irish language Act, effect on, 93, 121–31, 151, 153, 155, 229–30, 245n4 re-establishment of, implications 77, 93, 98, 119–21, 129, 195

Index 273 devolved matters, 92, 95, 97, 122, 127, 128, 241nn16–17, see also reserved, excepted matters D’Hondt mechanism, 67, 195, 243n56, portfolio, ministerial, 129, 229, see also consociationalism digital switchover, see under Ofcom, TG4 direct rule, 20, 51, 61, 62, 77, 99, 119, 121, 133, 147, 242n44, see also, Eagle M., DCAL Ministers discrimination, anti-, dispossession, 8, 9, 12, 18, 19, 28, 39, 57, 71, 75, 108, 173, 174, 211, 227, 236n21, 249n47 disparity, 81, see also parity, ECRML, broadcasting Dodds, N. 132 domestic legislation, in general, 2, 14, 18, 31, 227, 230 Canada / Quebec, 6, 23, 31, 34, 36, 228 North of Ireland, 6, 31, 58, 79, 84, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 108, 165, 228 Donneur, A.P. 8, 26 Dunbar, R. 9, 11, 16, 78, 79, 81, 100, 120 Durkan, M. 235n12, 240n2, 243n72 Eagle, M. 121, 122, 123, 127, 133, 147, 241nn14–15, 241n16, 241n32, see also direct rule, DCAL Ministers Education, in general, 100, 172 Canada, French Medium, French Immersion, 207, 209, 233n14, 248n35, ECRML, COMEX reports, 81, 82t4.2–6, 88, 89, 90, 95, 236nn3–5 North of Ireland, 39, 55, 56, 63, 74, 235nn17–18, 243n6, 244n79 Quebec, English Medium, 214–15, 250nn58–63, see also 1976 Charter for the French Language Quebec French Medium, 217, 219, 225 South of Ireland, 234n3 see also Irish in the curriculum see also Irish Medium education, Irish Medium schools Education Order (NI) 1998, 53, 95, 120, 235n18

Eide, A. 16, 17, 18, 32 Eirug, A. 104, see also broadcasting elections, All-Ireland, 31 Canada, 198 European, 119, 149 Irish language Act, and, 122, 129, 148 North of Ireland, 119, 122, 149, 233n11, 235n12, 236n14, 240n1, 240nn2–6 Quebec, 222, 251n84, 251n85–92 South of Ireland, 135, 235n3 enforcement, in general, 9, 12 International instruments, ECRML of, 16, 79 Irish language Act, mechanisms, 120, 122, 139, 145, 156, 157, 172 LLO / OLA, Canada, 2005 Law S-3, 211–13 Article, 133, 214 Quebec, 197, 215–16, 217, 219–20 Section VII, 196, 211–13 Section 23(2), 215, see also 1976 Charter for the French language ethnic, – minorities, – languages, -interests, Census, NI, 39, 40, 47, 49–50 conflict, 5, 7, 8, 16, 227, 228 Irish immigrants, 5, 86 Irish language Act, and 152, 154, 163, 165, 191 Quebec and Canada immigration, impact on language, 205, 215–16, 218, 250n67–8 Quebec identity, and, 198, 214, 223, 225 Quebec referenda, and, 234n32 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, in general, 78 conflict situations, effectiveness in, 17, 79, 81, 97 Preamble, Parts II and III, 78–9 Ratification instrument, 80 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, UK ratification, 3 Irish, background to, 77, 80 ratification, prior to, 63, 70–3 Ulster Scots, 86–8 UK ratification instrument, 81–3 Welsh, Gaelic, Irish, 81–6

274 Index ECRML Committee of Experts, 79–80 2004 COMEX report, 88 2007 COMEX report, 89–92 POBAL, and, 77, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95 Third monitoring cycle, UK report, 92, 93–6 see also Lewis, E. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 16, 17 European parliament, 30, 148, 149, – debates, 160 Facal, J. 199 false equality, 8, see also parity, Ulster Scots federal, -ism, -ist, 22, 24, 30, 36, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 247n3, see also asymmetrical federalism Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes, 196, 199, 211–13, 249n42, see also enforcement, LLO/OLA Section VII Feuille de route pour la dualité linguistique canadienne see also Roadmap for Canada’s linguistic duality, 208, 248n24 financial, see under corruption First Ministers see also under individual names Paisley, I. (prior to appointment), 119, (as First Minister), 128, 132, 240n3, 242n37, 242n46 Robinson, P. 122, 240n3, 241n17, 245n4, (as First Minister), 240n3 Trimble, D. 119, 236n14, (as First Minister), 65, 66, 67, 236n14, 240n1 Fishman, J.A. 7, 8, 10, 11, 100 flawed, 15, 16, 150, 152, 155, 191 Foinse, 238n22 Fóram na Gaeilge, 134 Foras na Gaeilge, 38, 60, 86, 96, 134, 136, 142, 234n1, 238n22, 243n73, 243n77, 244n96, 246n10, see also An Foras Teanga broadcasting, and, 106, 108 funding provided, 243nn77, 244nn78–9

government funding of, 33, 243n73, see also McCarthy Commission Irish language Act, consultation, 125, 136, 139, 141, 142, 176, 178 Lá Nua, and, 94, 132, 238n22, 243n56 Foucault, M. 7, 11, 37 Foucher, P. 29, 201, 202 francisation, 196, 214, 216, 220, 221, 222, 251n77, of companies, 217–20 Francophones in Quebec, 28, 203, 206, 209, 210 outside Quebec, 24, 26, 29, 203, 204, 205, 207, 209, 210, 211 relationships between, 29, 202 Fraser, G. 26, 37, 199, 200, 201, 208, 209, 210, 212, 215, 247nn9–13, 248n28–9, 249n51, see also Commissioner, LLO/OLA Gagné, G. & Langlois, S. 24, 28, 29, 223–4 Good Friday Agreement, 31, 32–3, 37, 38, 39, 55, 59, 60, 66, 69, 70, 72, 77, 119, 120, 129, 134, 135, 195, 228, 234n28, 237n9, 240nn1–4, see also consociational, NI Assembly broadcasting, 96, 102t, 104, 105, 106, 108, 111, 113, 229 consociational model, 75–6 Irish language Act, consultation, 122, 150, 153, 154, 166, 169, 173, 186 language provisions, 2, 3, 4, 6, 64, 73–4, 80, 86, 120, 134, 135, 195, 228, 230, 234n2 North-South bodies, 69, 142, see also An Foras Teanga, Foras na Gaeilge Gomery report, see under corruption Gosselin, J. 216, 251n73, see also Secrétariat de la politique linguistique, and Delage, G. Graefe, P. 197 Grin, F. 80, 89 guaranteed rights, 12, 138, 157, 160, 161 Guelke, A. 30, 31 guerre linguistique, language war, 220, also war of words, 68 guerre silencieuse, silent war, 7, 37, see also Foucault

Index 275 Hain, P. 122, 241n17, see also Secretary of State Hayes, M. 21, 62, 63 hegemony, -ic states, 1, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 32, 37, 75, 78, 230, 231 HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), see under Irish language Act consultations hostile, -lity, 9, 20, 21, 39, 56, 93, 135, 140, 162, 172, 186, 191, 193t, 195, 220, 229 Hume, J. 64, 65, 66, 119, 235n12, 240n2, see also SDLP Hurd, D. 61, see also Secretary of State integration, re-, dis-, 8, 13, 23, 30, 100, 227 see also, separation Inter Departmental Charter Implementation Group (ICIG), 89 international law, also human rights standards, instruments 15–17, 32, 97, 131, 227, 228 Inuktitut, 30 Ireland, history and language, 18–19 Irish Constitution, 30, 32 Articles 1 & 2, in, 31–2, 69, 236n21 language rights, in, 56, 120, 135, 228 Irish Free State, 19, 30 Irish government, see also Dáil Éireann, 2, 6, 31–2, 38, 57, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 77, 104, 105, 111, 112, 119, 120, 121, 122, 128, 135, 144, 160, 195, 228, 229, 230, 234nn2–3, 235n14, 243–4nn77–9, 246n10 Irish in the courts, 71, 83, 90, 93, 164, 238n24, see also 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) Irish in the curriculum North, 53–5 South, 160 Irish language Act, consultations see also Irish language Act submissions cost, of, 127, 131, 144, 146, 147, 150, 153, 154, 155, 161, 162, 163, 164, 170, 171, 172, 173, 176, 177, 183t, 184, 186, 192t, 245n11 DCAL first consultation document, 121–4

DCAL Second consultation document, 128–9 EQIAs, positive impact, 162, 164, 174, 186, 191, 192–3t8.3, 194, 241nn26–7 legislative models, 122, 155 political sensitivities, legitimate aspirations, 74, 123–4, 126, 154, 166, 173, 191, 229, results, of consultations, 127–8, 129–31 Irish language Act, submissions political parties, from, 147–67 Irish language NGOs, from, 135–41 Comhaltas Uladh, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 244n94 Comhdháil Náisiúnta na Gaeilge, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 244n82, 244n91, 244n94 Conradh na Gaeilge, 124, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 244n94 Gael-Linn, 135, 136, 141 Glór na nGael, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140 POBAL, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 164, 174, 180–3t, 184, 185, 186, 187–90t, 191, 192–3t, 194, 195, 241n14–15, 241n16, 241n29, 241nn32–3, 243n71, 244nn88–93, 246n8, 246n11, see also individual organisational heading Stádas, 124, 135, 136, 137, 138 Irish language state sector, from, Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta, Foras na Gaeilge, Iontaobhas Ultach, 141–6 English language state sector, key submissions, 168–72 Community Relations Council, 168–9 HM Revenue and Customs, 171–2 Lord Chief Justice’s Office, 170–1 NI Prison Service, 172 Ofcom, 169–70 non-governmental sector, key submissions Committee on the Administration of Justice, 173–5

276 Index Irish language Act, submissions – continued Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, 176–8 Welsh Language Board, 175–6 individuals, submissions from, 178–94 Irish Language Broadcast Fund, see under Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge Irish Medium Education see also Education consolidation v. expansion, 52 Irish language Act, consultation, 120, 123, 125, 126, 128, 137, 140, 142, 143, 146, 157–60, 166, 169, 174, 177, 185, 187t, 191, 229, 245n1 North, 2, 50, 51–3, 56, 106, 108, 133, 134 Review of Irish Medium Education, 52, 133 South, 50, 235nn15–16 Irish Medium schools and IM bodies Coláiste Speirín, 51, 53, 134 Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta, 51, 52, 106, 135, 136, 141, 158 Gaelscoil Éanna, 133, 187t, 188t, 246n15 Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta, 57, 158 iron fist, 10 joint statement British-Irish, 68, 195, 236n15 Hume-Adams, 64 judicial review, see under 1737 Administration of Justice (Language)Act (Ireland) judicisation, 210, 211 Kymlicka, W. 8, 14, 15, 16, 24 Lacorne, D. 28 Lá / Lá Nua, 94, 237n12, see also ECRML, Foras, Irish language Act broadcasting, reporting on 118, 239n24, 239n26, 242nn53–4 ECRML, in, 91, 94 Foras na Gaeilge, and, 94, 132, 242–3nn55–7

Irish language Act, reporting on, 132, 139, 144, 242n53 language policy and planning, in general, 1, 5, 99, 100, 227–8, 230 Canada, 24–8, 29–30, 136, 146, 196, 200–11, 225–6, 230, 248n24 North, 18–20, 56–60, 60–4, 67–73, 97, 134, 135, 167, 169, 195, 228–9, 244nn78–9 Quebec, 28–9, 198, 200, 213, 214–24, 225–6, 230, 231 South, 57, 58, 128, 135, 230, 235nn2–5, 243–4nn73–9 language war, guerre linguistique, 220, also, war of words, 68 Laponce, J. 8, 34, 213 Latouche, D. 8, 29 legislation, in general, 2, 3, 9, 14, 17, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 58, 71, 72, 77, 78, 86, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 229–31 ability to legislate, 23 litigation, litigious, vexatious, 23, 153, 212 see under individual acts Letourneau, J. 198 Lévèsque, R. 29 Levine, M.V. 28, 251n77 Lewis, E. 80, 88, see also ECRML Committee of Experts Liberal Party of Canada, 196–7, 198, 210, 211, 225, 234n31, see also Trudeau, P. Liberal Party of Quebec, see under Parti libéral du Québec Lijphart, A. see under consociationalism linguistic shift, 18, 19, 149, 154, 204 litmus test, 97, 193t Livingstone, S. 20, 97 Mac Giolla Catháin, C. see under 1737 Administration of Justice (Language) Act (Ireland) Manitoba, 24, 25m, 26, 207, 233nn12–13, 248n21 marginalisation, 7, 8, 75, 227, 228, also ghetto, -isation, 10, 93 Marois, P. 222, 251nn85–92, see also Parti québécois May, S. 7, 8, 14

Index 277 McCarthy Commission, 38, 57, 112, 135, 229, 234nn3–5, 239n19, 243nn77 McCausland, N. 70, 118, 128, 129, 236n16, 239n27, 242n36, 242n39, 242n42, 243n59, (as Minister), 133, 236n17, 242n35, see also DCAL Ministers McLeod, W. 9, 16, 40, 120 McRoberts, K. 24, 34 Meech Lake Accord, 23 members’ club, compact, 14, 227 minority status, 15–16 Mitchell, G. 65 Murphy, C. 134, 243nn68–70, 244n79, see also Sinn Féin nation-state, 7, 10, 14, 15, 68, 227, 250n55 New Brunswick, 23, 25m, 26, 29, 205, 207, 209, 212 Nic An Bhaird, M. 93, 185, 238n19, see also courts non-governmental organisation, 3, 15, 58, 60, 77, 78, 87, 92, 93, 95, 97, 120, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 146, 147, 155, 157, 173, 175, 211, 231 normalisation, 9, 125, 162 NI Assembly, in general, 72, 98, 232n11, 233nn26–7, 236n20, 240n1, 240nn2–6, 240n9, see also consociation, Good Friday Agreement, Ciste Craoltóireachta Gaeilge, budget and, 117–18 ECRML, 92–3, 164, 237n16 Irish language Act, consultation, 121–31, 144, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 156, 160–1, 164, 177, 193t, 229–30, 241n31, 242nn34–7, 242nn39–40, 245n4 Irish language Act, decision, 121, 122, 123, 129, 195, devolved matter, 127, 128, refusal, 129–30, 242nn45–8, 243nn58–61, 243nn63–4, 243n71, 245n4 model, 74–5, 233n25 re-establishment, 77, 93, 98, 119, 120, 128 suspension, 77, 119

NI Census, see under Census NI Human Rights Commission, 131 NI Life and Times Survey (1999), 47–9, 102t, see also Ulster Scots NI Office, 87, 128 NI Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), 41–6tt, 50, 91, 234n11 North South Ministerial Council, see also collapsing, 57, 135, 243–4nn77–9 North-South bodies, see under An Foras Teanga, Foras na Gaeilge Ó Brolcháin, D. 134, 149, 235n19, see also SDLP Ó Cuív, É. 57, 128, 135, 235nn3–5, 241n33, see also Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs / Roinn Gnóthaí Pobail, Tuaithe agus Gaeltachta Ofcom NI digital switchover, 112 Irish language Act, 168, 169–70, 246nn1–3 TG4, reception of, 112, 239n18 Ulster Scots, broadcasting, 107 Wales and Scotland, disparity of provision, 91, 100–1, 102t, 103, 107, 239n10 Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 50, 92, 93, 133, 145, 156, see also First Minister and Deputy First Minister Office québécoise de la langue française, 30, 206–7, 215–21 Official status, in general, 41, 69 Irish language act, consultation, 120, 137, 139, 142, 143, 152, 157, 160, 161, 172, 185, 190t Ulster Scots, consultation, 164 Official Unionist Party (Ulster Unionist Party), 65, 119, 148, 149, 236n14, 240n1, see also Trimble, D. and McGimpsey, M. Olympic Games, 196, 208–9, see also Vancouver Ontario, 25m, 26, 27m, 205, 207, 233n14

278

Index

Paisley, I. 119, 128, 132, 240n3, 242n37, 242n46, see also First Minister, Democratic Unionist Party paix linguistique, 215, 220, 250n58 Paquette, G. 217, 220, see also Office québécoise de la langue française, Bergeron, M. parity, in general, 75, 190t, 191, see also disparity Irish and Ulster Scots, between, 72, 92, 110, 133, 152, 164, 171, 177, 228 Parizeau, J. 33, 34, 234n32, see also Prime Minister Parti libéral du Québec, 197, 200, 201, 222, 224, 225 Parti québécois, 28, 200, 222, 224, 234n31, 251n84, 251nn85–92, see also Marois, P. partition, 1, 19, 31, 39, 56, 86, 103, 228, 232n9, 240n1 partnership, 9, 22, 34, 56, 73, 138, 169, 201 patriation see under Constitution (Canada) peace, language and, 215, 220, 250n58 peace process, 2, 66, 70 Pelletier, B. 198, 199, 202, 247n14 people(s), 16, 17, 24, 32, 35, 36, see also self determination, secession personality (portability) approach, 29, 205, 214, see also Trudeau, P., territorial approach planters see under settlers, – society POBAL, in general, 232n1 broadcasting, 101, 106, 108, 109, 110, 118, 238n6, 239n16, 239n18, 239n25 discourse, rights, 60 ECRML, monitoring and implementation, 77, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95 influence of, 122, 124, 155 Irish language Act, 3, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 164, 174, 180–3t, 184, 185, 186, 187–90t, 191, 192–3t, 194, 195, 237n14, 240n8, 241n14–15, 241n16, 241n24, 241n29, 241nn32–3,

243nn69–70, 243n71, 244n80, 244nn82–5, 244nn88–94, 244n95, 246n8, 246n11, see also Irish language Act consultation political parties, see under individual party names political vetting, 62 politicised, 93, 127, 128, 152, 153, 156, 159, 176, 177, 246n7, see also bargaining chip, political football Poots, E. 94, 118, 129, 131, 132, 242nn46–7, 243n58, 243n62, see also DCAL Ministers power-relations, 5, 7, 14, 231 Prime Minister Britain, Blair, T. 127, Brown, G. 118 Canada, Chrétien, J. 34–5, 196, 249n45 Harper, S. 196, 198, 199, 200, 202, 226, 247n7 Martin, P. 196, 197 Trudeau, P. 29, 205, 210, 211, 214, 225 Quebec, Charest, J. 216, 222, 251n90, Parizeau, J. 33, 34, 234n32 print media, 209, see also Lá / Lá Nua, Foinse Public Service Broadcasting, see broadcasting public services, 26, 49, 120, 124, 138, 139, 144, 192t, 236nn3–4, 237n5 quango, 10, 12, 60 Quiet Revolution, 28 radio see also broadcasting BBC Radio Ulster, 102t, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 240n10, 242n49 ECRML, 88, 96, 101t RTÉ, 109 Ulster Scots, 96, 111 Windsor, Canada, 209 RTÉ, see also broadcasting, radio, 102t, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 238n2, 239n13, 239n21 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2, SCR, 217, also Renvoi relative a la sécession du Québec [1988], 2, SRC, 217, 33, 35, 36, 234n34, see also secession, Supreme Court of Canada

Index 279 Referendum, -a North, 2, 33, 36, 37, 153, 237n9 Quebec, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 28–9, 33–5, 37, 196, 205, 213, 222, 223, 225, 251n92 South, 33, 233n20 rejectionist, 28, 155, 167, 178, 194, 220, 230 Renvoi relative a la sécession du Québec [1988], 2, SRC, 217, 33, 35, 36, 234n34, also Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2, SCR, 217, see also secession, Supreme Court of Canada Republic of Ireland also South, 1, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20m, 30, 31, 33, 38–9, 45, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57–60, 61, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 87, 99, 102t, 105, 107, 109, 111, 117, 120, 122, 124, 129, 134–5, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 147, 150, 153, 156, 160, 162, 170, 176–7, 184–5, 189t, 190t, 191, 195, 228, 230, 231, 233n20, 238nn1–2, 243nn73–4, 244n79 reserved, excepted matters, 81, 92, 123, 127, 139, 150, 185, 190t, 238n24, 243n71, see also devolved matters resistance, 7, 19, 200, 220 resources, 80, 88, 89, 90, 109, 110, 113, 139, 143, 199, 223, 232n1 Irish language Act, consultation, 150, 153, 154, 170, 183t, 184, 186, 192t, see also ILA cost Review of Public Advertising, 91, 94, see also Lá / Lá Nua rights-based approach, 124, 126, 127, 136, 137, 138, 142, 150, 153, 155, 166, 172, 173, 174, 184, 191, 192t, 229, 241n28, rights discourse, 14, 15, 60, see also schemes-based approach, Irish language Act Ritchie, M. 134, 243n68, 244n79 see also SDLP Roadmap for Canada’s Linguistic Duality, see also Feuille de route pour la dualité linguistique canadienne 196, 208, 248n24 Robinson, P. 122, 240n3, 241n17, 245n4, see also First Minister

Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 26, 27, 37, see also bilingualism Ruane, C. 51, 133, 235nn19–20, 243n68, 244n79, see also Sinn Féin, education rubbished, 132 St. Andrews’ Agreement, in general, 2, 77, 119, 195 Irish language Act, 93, 94, 106, 109, 118, 120, 121–2, 127, 128, 147, 149, 150, 151, 153, 169, 173, 176, 183t, 195, 229, 245n1, 245n4 language strategies, 94, 133, 237n7 St Andrews’ Act 2006, 94, 121, 240n13, 243n63 Saskatchewan, 24, 25m, 26 schemes-based, 126, 156, 162, 171, 172, 180t, 184, 192t, 229, see also rights-based secession, in general see also selfdetermination, 2, 8, 13, 16, 17, 197 internal and external, 32, 223, 225, see also consociational, asymmetrical international law, in, 17–18, 227 Quebec, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 18, 26–9, 33–6, 37, 196, 199, 213, 234nn29–34 Secrétariat de la politique linguistique, 215, 250n66, 251n73, see also Delage, G., Gosselin, J. Secretary of State, see also under individual names Hain, P. 122, 128, 241n17, 242n34 Hurd, D. 61 Needham, R. 21, 61 Whitelaw, W. 62 Woodward, S. 131 self-determination, in general, 2, 8, 13, 16, 17, 197, see also secession internal and external, 32, 223, 225, see also consociational, asymmetrical international law, in, 17–18, 227 North of Ireland, and, 6, 19–22, 30–3, 68 Quebec, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 18, 26–9, 33–6, 196, 199, 213, 234nn29–34

280 Index separation, 6, 11, 13, 18, 25m, 28–9, 34, 149, 234n32, see also integration, re-, dis-, 8, 13, 23, 30, 100, 227 settlers, – society, 5, 21, 22, 213, 228 Sewel Convention, 122, 128, 241n17, 242n34, see also Secretary of State, and Hain, P. Seymour, M. 197, 199 Shaws Road Gaeltacht, 56, 159 signage, streetnames North, in, 95, 123, 134, 139, 140, 142, 144, 145, 146, 162, 169, 178, 186, 187–90t, 191, 243n70 Quebec, in, 200, 208, 209, 214, 217, 219 silent war, guerre silencieuse, 7, 37, see also Foucault Sinn Féin, 51, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 92, 118, 119, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 148, 149, 150, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 195, 235nn11–13, 237n15, 239n17, 239n25, 240n2, 240n4, 242n41, 242n44, 242nn55, 243n56, 243nn66–9, 244n78, 245nn2–3, 246n13, 247n15, see also Adams, A., De Brún, B., McGuinness, M., Murphy, C., Ruane, C. Social Democratic and Labour Party, 64, 65, 67, 68, 72, 119, 121, 127, 129, 132, 134, 148, 149, 150, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 195, 240n2, 240n12, 243n68, 243n72, 244n79, see also Durkan, M., Hume, J., Mallon, S., Ó Brolcháin, D., Ritchie, M. Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste du Québec, 207, 250n58, 251n75, see also Beaulieu, M. 207, 216, 217, 221, 224, 251n74 Special Educational Needs, 53, 89, 143 sponsorship scandal, Gomery report, see under corruption streetnames, see under signage Stormont, see under consociational, NI Assembly Supreme Court of Canada, 233n18 Bill 104, Quebec, 196, 214–15, 250nn58–62

see also enforcement LLO / OLA, Section see also Renvoi/Reference, secession see under Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan Taoiseach, Irish, Lynch, J. 31 Ahern, B. 127 Cowan, B. 57, 135, 238n9 TG4, 34, 38, 57, 94, 96, 99, 102t, 106, 107, 111–12, 113, 114, 115, 169–70, 229, 235nn2–3, 235n5, 238n1, 238n3, 238n5, 238n27, 239n13, 239n21, 243n76 territorial approach, 26, 30, 214, see also Trudeau, P. and personality approach Traditional Unionist Voice, see also Allister, J. 119, 121, 148, 149, 150–65, 167, 191, 194, 240n9, 240n18, 245n2, 245n7, 245n9 Tremblay, M. 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 230, 248nn31–2, 248n37, 249n49–50, 249n53 Trimble, D. 65, 66, 67, 119, 236n14, 240n1, see also First Minister, Official Unionist Party Trudeau, P. 29, 205, 210, 211, 214, 225, see also Canadian Constitution, Liberal Party (Canada), personality approach two solitudes, 28 Ulster Scots Agency, 38, 86, 243n56, 102t, 133, 142, 234n1, 246n10, see also an Foras Teanga Ulster Scots Academy, 106 dialect/language, 49, 67, 86, 87, 91, 107, 109, 110, 132 ECRML, in, 81, 86, 87, 89, 92, 101, 102t, 163–4, 228 GFA, in, 86 identical treatment, de facto, 46, 49, 67, 72, 73, 87, 89, 91, 94, 96, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 118, 132, 152, 154, 156, 163, 172, 176, 177, 195, 229, 230, see also parity

Index 281 Ulster Scots – continued Irish language Act, consultation, 152, 154, 163, 160, 166 sectarianism, 86, 87, 132 statistical information, lack of, 2, 39, 47–9 strategy, for, 121 Ulster Unionist Party, see under Official Unionist Party, also David Trimble UK ratification, see under European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages UK reports on ECRML, see under European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages United Nations Charter, 14, 31 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 18, 232n7 Security Council and NI, 31 UN Economic and Social Council, 93, 94, 101, 131, 242n52 UNESCO, 199 unionist,-ism, in general, 21, 31, 45–9, 63, 72, 86, 193, 232n9, 233n11, 235n17, 236n14, 240n1, 240n3, 240nn5, 240n9 broadcasting, and, 103, 106, 118, 119, 120 devolution, and, 32, 38, 39, 63, 64, 65–73, 87, 119, 134, 228, 230, 233n25, 233n27, 237n9 electoral shift, and, 119–20, 240n6 ECRML, and, 77, 86, 87, 230

hostility to Irish, and, 18, 20, 21, 38, 140, 162, 186, 191, 193, 195 Irish language Act, consultation and, 2, 118, 119, 120–9, 131, 132, 134, 147, 148, 149, 151, 164, 166, 167, 191, 194, 229, 240nn10–11, 242nn35–7, 242nn39–40, 242nn41–4 quid pro quo, 61, 89, 169 Ulster Scots, and, 49, 87, 132, 164 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 14 usurping power, 15, 23 Vancouver Olympic Games, 196, 208–9, see also Olympic Games veto, double veto, 33, 75, 92, 118, 121, 128, 197, 228, see also consociation victory, 13, 93, 222 Westminster, general, 20, 22, 26, 30, 72 broadcasting, and, 99, 102t, 106, 108 ECRML, and, 77, 93 Irish language Act, and, 120, 121, 122, 123, 128, 139, 141, 142, 150, 155, 184, 186, 192t, 237n7, 241n15 Whitelaw, W. 62, see also Secretary of State Williams, C.H. 9, 10, 34, 58, 59, 100, 120 Woodward, S. 131, see also Secretary of State workplace, 141, 173, 186, 192t, 214–19, 245nn5–6, 246nn7–8 yard stick, 14

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