Language and Comprehension, Volume 9 (Advances in Psychology)

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION

ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY 9 Editors

G . E. STELMACH

P. A. VROON

NORTH-HOLLAND PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK OXFORD

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION Edited by

Jean-Fraqois LE NY U .E.R . de Psychologie Universite de Paris VZZZ and

Walter KINTSCH Department of Psychology University of Colorado

1982

NORTH-HOLLAND PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK . OXFORD

North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982 A11 rights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,recordingor otherwise, without the prior permissionof the copyright owner.

ISBN: 0444 86538 1

Publishers: NORTH-HOLLAND PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK . OXFORD

Soledistributors to the U.S.A.and Canada: ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. 52 VANDERBILT AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

V

PREFACE

This book has been originally edited for publication in French, in a special issue of the Bulletin de Psychologie' ,1982, volume XXXV, under the t i t l e "Language e t Comprehension". We are grateful to this journal's director, D. Voutsinas, for having kindly permitted this simultaneous publication in English. Although largely developed now, objective study of comprehension in i t s relationship to language is a rather new problem; not too long ago, science oriented psychologists would not have dared to set it, and even, to use, in a research context, such a word as discourse "comprehension". This word then belonged t o what the surrealist poet Paul Eluard described in a book t i t l e as "quelques-uns de ces mots qui m'btaient jusqu'ici mystgrieusement interdits" - " some of these words that were till now mysteriously forbidden to me".

It is a sign of the progress cognitive psychology, and more widely cognitive research, has made that it is a t present possible to publish in the series "Advances in Psychology" such a set of articles. Yet this is only a sample, which we have tried t o make reasonably representative, of the many studies made throughout the world on this matter. What is comprehension? It is difficult to give a precise answer t o this question, and the reader might turn out t o find it even more difficult, rather than easier, when he has read through this book.

So, the criteria that have led to the collection of these articles have a touch of arbitrariness. We started from an a priori allotment of space, approximately balanced among American, non-French European, and French authors. We unfortunately could not request for an article all the authors it was desirable t o publish; and not all the authors we asked could comply with our request, or wanted to;with the limits and regrets that such a venture involves, we have yet the satisfaction t o have collected a large set of very representative papers. We are very grateful to all authors who sent a contribution for this book, with particular mention for our colleagues working in the field of Artificial Intelligence, who wrote their articles according to the expectations of a psychological audience. By this "audience design" they have, in a way Clark and Murphy very well explain below, not only written about comprehension, but also for comprehension. We are grateful as well to M.Y. Carfantan, who has been a major help for the book's organization and preparation. 'Bulletin

de Psychologie, 17 Rue de la Sorbonne, 75005, Paris, France.

vi

Preface

Such a range of authors introduced some heterogeneity in the design of the articles: according to the first editing, some authors were requested to rather present a synthesis of their recent work; the other authors have, as a rule, written more specific articles. We believe this variety to have more advantage than disadvantage,

It has been difficult to classify and t o order the articles. We first took into consideration a gross and simple subdivision: comprehension of large versus small sections of discourse, of which sentence and whole text are respective prototypes. Within this subdivision we took into account proximity created by presence of such matters of cognitive (lexical, conceptual, imaged) structures, importance attached to syntactic versus semantic processing, emphasis on reading activity or on pragmatics, modelizationand simulation, etc. Paul Eluard, to quote him again, entitled an anthology of poems collected by him "the best selection of poems is the one everybody makes by himself". We hope that, from this book and the references it contains, every reader may better apply this maxim to the study of comprehension.

Jean-Francois Le Ny and Walter Kintsch

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

V

1. COGNITION, ATTITUDES AND COMPREHENSION F. Klix, J. Hoffmann and E. van der Meer The Storage of Concepts and their Cognitive Application

1

M. Denis Images and Semantic Representations

17

R.J. Spiro Subjectivity and Memory

29

T.A.van Dijk Opinions and Attitudes in Discourse Comprehension

35

2. PERCEPTION, IDENTIFICATION AND COMPREHENSION C.A. Perfetti Discourse Context, Word Identification and Reading Ability

53

J. Segui, J.Y. Dommergues, U. Frauenfelder and J. Mehler The Perceptual Integration of Sentences: Syntactic and Semantic Aspects

63

R.J. Jarvella and T. Russell Nelson Focus of Information and General Knowledge in Sentence Understanding

73

3. SENTENCE COMPREHENSION D. Dubois Lexicon and Representations in Sentence Comprehension

87

viii

Table o f Contents

J. Engelkamp, H.D. Zimmer and P. Leclere Focusing and Presupposition in the Understandingof Sentences

97

G. Noizet Operative Activity during Sentence Reading

107

J.-F. Le Ny, M. Carfantan and J.C. Verstiggel Accessibility from Working Memory and the Role of Reprocessing in Sentence Comprehension

123

G. Bramaud du Boucheron Comprehension and Sentences Describing Unfamiliar Events in 4-to-8-Year-OldChildren

135

4. COMPREHENSION AND TEXT MEMORIZATION A.J. Sanford and S.C. Garrod Towards a Psychological Model of Written Discourse Comprehension

147

M.-F. Ehrlich An Experimental Study of the Relationship between Comprehension and Memorization of a Text

157

S. Ehrlich Construction of Text Representation in Semantic Memory

169

R. de Beaugrande General Constraints on Process Models

179

5. COMPREHENSION AND STRUCTURATION M.J. Adams Models of Reading

193

J.M. Mandler Recent Research on Story Grammars

207

G. Denhiere Do We Really Mean Schemata?

219

Table of Contents

K. Haberlandt Reader Expectations in Text Comprehension

ix

239

6. COMPREHENSION AND COMMUNICATION

H. Hormann Hidden Determinants of Understanding

251

0. Findahl and B. Hoijer The Problem of Comprehension and Recall of Broadcast News

261

M. Hupet and J. Costermans Towards a Functional Approach of Language Processing in Context

273

H.H. Clark and G.L. Murphy Audience Design in Meaning and Reference

287

7. MODELIZATION AND SIMULATION OF COMPREHENSION W. Kintsch Aspects of Text Comprehension

301

G. Sabah A Natural Language Comprehension

313

D. Coulon and D. Kayser Understanding: A Variable-Depth Process

325

M.G. Dyer and W.G. Lehnert Question Answering for Narrative Memory

339

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LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors) @ North-Holland Publishing Company, 1982

1

THE STORAGE OF CONCEPTS AND THEIR COGNITIVE APPLICATION Friedhart Klix Joachim Hoffmann Elke van der Meer Department of Psychology Humboldt University of Berlin Berlin G.D.R. Concepts are independently formed classes of objects and phenclllena of OUK environment that are represented as cognitive units in our mermry. They are the basis of m s t different cognitive activities. The present investigations analyze the use made of Conceptual kncwldge in the conceptual identification of objects, the verification of relations between sub- and superconcepts and the fulfihmt of conceptual analogy tasks. It can be s h m that the cognitive effort required in coping with conditions is systaMtically dependent on the specifics of the feature characteristics of concepts. INTRODUCTION The meaning of a word is comprehended by the linguistic stimulus activating memory contents that represent our knowledge of the things and phenomena denoted by the word. Investigations have been made over the last few years to try and analyze this process of comprehension in detail (Frederiksen, Kroll ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; Rosinski, Golinkoff, Kukish ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; Rayner, Posnanski ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; Taft ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; Adams ( 1 9 7 9 ) ) . Results show that word meaning can only in exceptional cases be immediately activated by the linguistic stimulus. As a rule, the complex stimulus of the given word must be recognized as a certain lexical unit to allow its meaning to be grasped. It was then demonstrated that visually offered words do not have to be phonetically recoded before their meaning is recognizable. Visual stimulus structure alone can provide access to meaning - at least for experienced readers. Far more diversified are, however, the considerations concerning the characteristics of the memory structures activated by a word. What matters here is the question of the representation of concepts in memory. How is our knowledge of the mode of manifestation of classes of objects or events organized in memory? Answers differ. Arguments have been put forward that suggest a representation in the form of a set of individual examples (Landauer, Maier ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Anderson, Bower ( 1 9 7 3 ) ) . And investigations have been made that support the idea of prototype representation (Rosch ( 1 9 7 3 , 1 9 7 5 ) ; Hacker et al. ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Oden ( 1 9 7 7 ) ) . According to these investigations, a set of objects united into a concept is represented by a cognitive unit, a prototypical member, ideally uniting the essential properties of the whole set. We, on our part, hold a third view: that concept representations can be described by a well-ordered set of features that reflect the essential properties of the phenomena united by a concept. The latter view has repeatedly been expressed in literature and is sometimes used to explain empirical phenomena (Rips, Shoben, Smith

2

F. Kiix etai.

(1973, (1976,

1 9 7 4 ) ; Tversky ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; Hayes-Roth, Hayes-Roth ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; Linny 1 9 8 0 ) ) . In these investigations, links were, on the whole,

observed to exist between the typicality of concept relations, on the one hand, and the degree of abstraction of concepts and the cognitive performance depending on it, on the other. The connections were explained by means of ad hoc assumptions concerning the relative feature composition of the concepts used. This paper seeks to differentiate the connections even further. Proceeding from empirical analyses, it makes statements on the kind of features characterizing concept representations, and gives examples that show how cognitive performance over concept representations is being determined by the specific feature composition of the concepts in question. FEATURE CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPT REPRESENTATIONS Concepts unite individually different objects and phenomena of our environment into cognitive units. The objects and phenomena have real properties; they occur in certain relations, enter into relations with other objects and phenomena, and can be proved to have an effect on the fulfilment of our needs. In accordance with laws that we can hardly keep track of, some of these objective properties are reflected in our conceptual knowledge of our environment. We know that a tree is made up of roots, a trunk and a top, that there are deciduous and coniferous trees, that a tree offers shelter from the rain, and that we can use wood to make paper or to kindle a fire to warm our bodies. All these are obviously features of our conceptional knowledge of TREE. In our memory, they reflect objective, real properties of the objects belonging to the concept; and, as a result, they permit the differentiation of concept representations. In other words, we define conceptual features as cognitive units reflecting properties of our environment and allowing us to distinguish between concept representations. Starting from these ideas, Klix ( 1 9 8 0 , 1 9 8 2 ) proposed a systematization of conceptual features, which is shown in Fig. 1 . Distinctions are made between simple and complex features,

Phoneticographemic

dog

Canplex

features

Defining features

Occasional features

Characteristic relations

paw tail hair paws bark tam keep watch kennel hunt breeding

Figure 1 Hypothetical assumption concerning the feature representation of concepts exemplified by the concept of DOG

The Storage of Concepts

3

and optional and compulsory ones, which can refer either directly to sensory effects of the objects belonging to the concept, or to abstract derived properties. It is particularly important that relations with other concepts are included in the feature characteristics of a concept. Two kinds of relational features are distinguished: fixed references other concepts (in the sense of output relations), and fixed references from other concepts (in the sense of input relations). These relational features give rise to an additional differentiation of concepts in accordance with the different contexts in which they occur. In this way, features link information on the mode of manifestation of the objects belonging to the concept, with information on important situational relations in which they occur. To subject these feature assumptions to empirical verification, we analyzed the feature characteristics of a total of 1 6 5 concepts of different degrees of abstraction. The concepts comprised classes of objects from the following (partly overlapping) spheres: plants, trees, tools, food, vehicles, ships, birds, musical instruments, and weapons. Fig. 2 shows three examples of the conceptual hierarchies used.

Level of abstraction Superconcept Medium-leve1 concepts

owl predatory bird

Subconcepts

eagle goshawk vulture

vegetable fruit rose tulip narcissus

IaPPle

I

Figure 2 Examples of the conceptual hierarchies used. What are called primary concepts are marked in every hierarchy.

Subjects were told, e.g., to name, for every concept, features that they thought could be used to recognize an object belonging to the concept. They were given 40 sec to do so. We will here give only some of the data obtained (cf Hoffmann, Ziessler (1982)). What strikes us first is that subjects named very different information as features. Table l illustrates this, relying on the feature characteristics of two concepts. Some of the features referred to the immediate sensory effects of the objects classified. We called them figurative features. Sensory qualities such as colour and form were named, and so were complex features relating to sensorily distinguishable parts of the objects. The non-figurative features mainly included relations to superconcepts, the listing of subconcepts, and relations to our knowledge of properties of materials, their uses, situational conditions of

F. Klix etal.

4

Table 1 Figurative and non-figurative features of two concepts named by subjects when being questioned about features. The figures show the relative frequency with which the particular features were named. TREE Figurative features

VEHICLE

Foliage/leaves Trunk Branches Twigs Needles

0.79

TOP Green Tall/large Fruit/fruits "Stout"

0.24

Wood Plant Roots Oak-tree Deciduous tree Coniferous tree Pine

0.24

. ..

Non-f igurative features

0.76 0.53 0.29

Wheels Seats Body Steering wheel

0.43 0.17 0.14

..

0.06

0.29

0.20 0.20

0.09

0.06

0.20

0.15 0.09 0.09 0.09

0.06

Car Transportation Means of locomotion Engine Move Ship Bus Train Driving gear Quick Persons Lorry

...

0.43 0.23 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.09

0.09 0.09

0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06

their occurence, etc. Some of the features named can be regarded as compulsory: they were named by most subjects. Others reflect to a considerable extent individual experience, which was shared by a very few subjects only. To the extent that the namings of features allow assessing the information linked with a concept in memory, they confirm the hypothetical feature characteristics of concept representations in Fig. 1. Comparable results have been described by other authors (Ashcraft ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; Hzuser ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Denis ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . Since our material used concepts on three different levels of abstraction (cf Fig. 2 ) , changes in composition of the features of concepts can be verified in dependence on their degree of abstraction. Three basic trends have been established. ( 1 ) The higher the degree of abstraction, the smaller the number of feature namings. Concrete concepts,

The Storap of Concepts

5

it seems, are linked with a larger number of differentiating pieces of information in memory than abstract ones are. ( 2 ) The higher the degree of abstraction, the smaller the relative share of figurative features. And among the non-figurative features, there is an increase in the enumeration of subconcepts relative to the total set of the features namedl). (3) Superconcepts are named as features. The higher the degree of abstraction, the relatively rarer are, however, such references to superconcepts (cf Fig. 3 ) .

Id B

V W

5

C

V

r

g w

$

.?

_. -

30

25 520 a

15 !I0 5

5k

SUB.

SUP MID.

SUP MID SUB SUP MID. SUB. Abstraction l e v e l of the presented concepts

Figure 3 Changes in the feature characteristics of concepts with different degrees of abstraction THE IDENTIFICATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CONCEPTS We can regard as a fundamental property of man's intelligence his ability to use cognitive operations for processing not only information obtained from the environment, but also information stored in memory. Results of information processing can, in turn, be subjected to cognitive operations independently of the influence of the environment and any number of times. This very performance may be one of the essential sources of the superiority of human intelligence. From this general statement we can derive the assumption that many of the pieces of information available to us are not directly stored in memcry, but must be generated by applying cognitive procedures to the data stored in memory. This consideration leads to a strict separation of factual and procedural information storing in human long-term memory. The analysis of mechanisms of procedural information processing gives us the opportunity to verify the feature representation of natural concepts empirically if the procedural derivation of information can be shown to rely on a comparison between the features of two concept representations. This is extremely likely to apply to a number of relational links between concepts. To start with, let us consider some of the relations occurring between natural concepts. The relation existing between GRASS and GREEN, or CHALK and.WHITE can, we think, best be described as an attribute relation. If we believe in a feature representation, we will arrive at the assumption that, by the representation of the feature, the attribute relation is stored immediately in the conceptual unit. Its recognition will, accordingly, require nothing but the activation of the conceptual features and the

F. Klix et al.

6

identification of the critical feature in the set of features activated. Concepts such as DAY and NIGHT, or LIGHT and SHADOW are linked by a contrast relation. It is not very likely that all possible contrast relations between concepts are stored in a direct manner. We can assume instead that the recognition of a contrast relation usually relies on a comparison of the feature characteristics of the two concepts. The comparison procedure must, in addition to the activation of conceptual feature sets, include at least two further operations: the identification of a common feature dimension in which the contrast becomes recognizable, and the identification of the opposite direction of feature localization in this dimension. Let us finally consider the comparative relation existing between concepts like MOUNTAIN and HILL, or WIND and STORM. The relation is based on feature differences that are specific not with regard to their direction, but with regard to the degree of localization in one direction of the feature dimension. We are inclined to assume that at least three operations are needed to recognize it: the identification of the common feature dimension, the identification of the same direction of the feature localization, and the identification of the different degrees of feature localization in this direction of the common feature dimension. Proceeding from the assumption that there is a feature representation, we have in this way derived hypotheses on the cognitive efforts to be expected if relations are to be recognized. Should corresponding cognitive procedures be attributed to these feature characteristics, attribute relations would have to be recognized more rapidly than contrast relations, and the latter, in turn, more rapidly than comparative relations. This expectation was experimentally verified by means of the analogy recognition method (Klix, van der Meer (1978,

1979,

1980)).

Subjects were offered two pairs of words and were asked to decide as rapidly as possible whether the relation between the two concepts of the second pair was analogous to that between the concepts of the first. They were to decide, e.g., whether GRASS is related to GREEN like CHALK to WHITE, or DAY to NIGHT like LIGHT to SHADOW, or MOUNTAIN to HILL like STORM to WIND. We do not at this point wish to deal with the details of the modelling of the processes underlying the acceptance of analogies of this kind (cf the literature given). We would merely like to emphasize that the acceptance of analogies presupposes the recognition of the particular critical relations between the two concepts of a pair. The derived differences in the cognitive efforts required to recognize the three relations were, as a result, expected to have an effect on the time needed to accept corresponding analogies. This expectation is confirmed by the data obtained (cf Fig. 4 ) . With conditions otherwise the same, analogies on the basis of the attribute relation are recognized more rapidly than analogies on the basis of the contrast relation, and the latter, in turn, more rapidly than analogies on the basis of comparative relations. THE IDENTIFICATION OF RELATIONS IN CONCEPTUAL HIERARCHIES The analysis of cognitive processes underlying the identification of relations between sub- and superconcepts has been the subject of a large number of investigations (Collins, Quillian ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; Collins, Loftus ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; Rips, Shoben, Smith ( 1 9 7 3 , 1 9 7 4 ) ; Rosch et al. ( 1 9 7 6 ) ; etc.). The investigations concentrated on the influence exercised by the degree of abstraction of concepts, the distance between concepts

The Storage of Concepts

7

01

E

2600

2

4-

B

5 2LOO c C

Q,

z

2 200

2 000

Attribute Contrast Comparative Type o f semantic relation

Figure 4 Recognition times for attribute, contrast and comparative relations within a hierarchy, and the typicality degree of the relation between concepts, on the time needed to identify or verify a sub-superconcept relation. In the interpretation of the findings, a controversy has developed between the advocates of what are called network models and those of conceptual feature representation (cf Hollan ( 1 9 7 5 ) ) . We do not, however, wish to discuss the controversy in any detail. Suffice it to say that even those who believe in feature representation have no more than vaguely tried in the experiments made so far, to relate the interpretation of the data and the model considerations to concrete, empirically verifiable feature characteristics of the concepts used (cf Smith, Shoben, Rips ( 1 9 7 3 ) ) . On the basis of empirically obtained feature characteristics of natural concepts, the attempt has been made at our laboratory to explain phenomena of the identification of the relations between sub-superconcepts and super-subconcepts. What we tried to prove was the effect of special conceptual feature characteristics on the course of cognitive processes over information stored in memory. The experiments were made by Hauser ( 1 9 8 1 ) . In our considerations we started from the observation that the feature characteristics of many concepts contain references to the relevant superconcept. In the case of feature characteristics of this kind, the superconcept is, in the sense of a complex feature, a direct component of the feature characteristics of the particular subconcept. In accordance with our assumptions, the detection of one or several common features is the pre-condition for the identification of subsuperconcept relations or super-subconcept relations respectively. If the set of features of a subconcept contains a superconcept as a complex feature, the recognition of a sub-superconcept relation should get considerably simplified. The time required to identify a relation of this kind can thus be regarded as a function of the probability with which the particular superconcept is represented as a feature in the feature characteristics of the subconcept. The greater the distance is between the sub- and the superconcepts within

8

F. Klix eta/.

a conceptual hierarchy, the lesser this probability. We assume that when the distance between the sub- and superconcepts is great, the detection of common features of the two concepts is made possible through a process of division of complex features (superconcept). This breakdown of stored sets of features for the next level of the hierarchy requires additional cognitive effort. As a result, the times required for the recognition of sub-superconcept relations that are more than one stage apart in the hierarchy must be expected to be longer. Let us now take a somewhat closer look at the super-subconcept relations. Our empirical analyses of feature characteristics of concepts reveal that superconcepts represented on relatively concrete levels within a conceptual hierarchy will hardly include references to subconcepts in their set of features. When there is a super-subconcept relation with a minor distance within the hierarchy in concrete categories, its recognition will, in comparison with the subsuperconcept relation, require additional cognitive effort, because the feature characteristics of the superconcept that is decoded first do not yet include a feature belonging also to the subconcept. These common features can only be detected by activating the feature characteristics of the subconcept and subsequently comparing the two sets of features. These considerations explain the asymmetry of the amount of effort required for the recognition of sub-superconcepts. Recognition should be more rapid from sub- to superconcept than from the latter to the former. This statement should, however, apply only to more concrete categories. The reason is as follows. Our empirical analyses of features have shown that the higher the degree of abstraction of the concepts to be defined is, the lower is the relative frequency of the namings of superconcepts. With many abstract concepts there is even a trend for subconcepts to be named as complex features. In the case of more abstract categories, the concept is directly available as a complex feature through the activation of the set of features of the superconcept. The presence of this condition should make the identification of the super-subconcept relation easier so that the asymmetry effect will vanish. These expectations were experimentally tested by means of the analogy recognition method. Subjects were offered another two pairs of words and were asked to decide as rapidly as they could whether the relations between the concepts of the two pairs were identical or analogous. The investigations proceeded from three-stage conceptual hierarchies (Fig. 5). Conceptual hierarchies of this kind offer splendid opportunities for varying distance within a hierarchy (e.g. dove:bird or dove:animal) and also the sequence in which the relation is offered (e.g. bird: dove as a member for the super-subconcept relation, and dove:bird as one for the reverse relation). As Fig. 6 shows, these experimental variations lead to the effects predicted. Three aspects are worth emphasizing: ( 1 ) The recognition of sub-superconcept terms of the cognitive effort required. more rapidly when the direction is from when it is reversed (see test condition

relations is asymmetric in The relations are recognized sub- to superconcept than l/l).

The Storap of Concepts

9

Sub

Figure 5 Test programme to check the efforts involved in recognizing relations between sub- and superconcepts in analogies. Three-stage conceptual hierarchies are used (on the left: general characteristics: on the right: examples).

6 E

2000

-

W

c

c 1800 -

9

w

0

u

1600 -

C

W

z!

1400

-

Figure 6 Characteristics of the efforts to detect analogies in sub-super- and super-subconcept relations ( 2 ) The asymmetry is not generally valid, but depends on the level of abstraction. It does not occur with abstract categories (see test condition 2 / 2 , the differences not being significant). These results cannot be found reasons for if we assume that concept relations of this kind are stored stationarily in memory. They point out that the type of conceptual relations described is determined by cognitive operations.

( 3 ) The efforts required to recognize analogy in sub-superconcept relations and their reversal are the greater, the greater the

10

F. Klix etal.

distance is between the particular concepts within the conceptual hierarchy. These are effects that can be seen as due to laws of the feature characteristics of natural concepts. THE CONCEPTUAL IDENTIFICATION OF OBJECTS Concept formation and concept representation hold out very important advantages in the exchange of information. The amount of information to be perceived and processed can be dramatically reduced. Not all sensory effects of an individual object retain their importance for the calculation of behaviour after they have been conceptually united: only those do which mark the object as an element of the concept. Individual details can be neglected in processing. On the other hand, concept representation leads to an extraordinary reduction in insecurity within the exchange of information because the organism is now in a position to respond appropriately to objects never known and perceived before, as long as they can be recognized as an element of a concept already formed. The realization of the advantages requires concepts to be so represented in memory that contents of perception can be attributed to them both rapidly and reliably, and can thus be given conceptual identification. Our assumptions concerning the feature representation of concepts appear to suggest that, of all the features stored in memory, the figurative ones play a special role in the process of conceptual object identification. Since we can at first rely only on the sensory effects of an object in the process of recognition, every conceptual object identification must be assumed to begin with a comparison between sensory effects of the object and figurative features stored in memory. The characteristics of figurative features therefore become our most important concern. The feature analysis of natural concepts cited above revealed that the individual concepts are marked by figurative features in differing degrees (Hoffmann, Ziessler ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . Table 1 contrasts two concepts whose feature characteristics are very different indeed. While the concept of TREE is almost predominantly marked by figurative features 6'2% of all feature namings), the concept of FOOD is almost completely defined by the listing of subconcepts (58% of all feature namings). In accordance with their relative share of figurative features, concepts can, in the first place, be roughly divided into two classes. Sensory concepts are marked more by figurative features than by enumerations of subconcepts, whereas for categorial concepts subconcepts are named as features relatively more frequently than figurative properties. Although the criterion chosen for the division is as simple as anything can be, there are a number of empirical data that support the psychic reality of the distinction emerging in the process between sensory and categorial concept representations (cf Hoffmann, Ziessler ( 1 9 8 2 ) : Hoffmann ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . It is hardly surprising that the higher the degree of abstraction, the rarer is the occurrence of sensory concepts (cf Hauser ( 1 9 8 1 ) ) . What strikes us here is that in virtually all the conceptual hierarchies we have investigated, the transition from sensorily to categorially represented concepts is final. Within a rising hierarchy, concrete concepts are up to a certain degree of abstraction described by sensory representation. Moving further up, we find only categorially represented concepts. It seems that sensory abstraction is the preferred strategy of human concept formation. The following rule appears to apply: whenever this is possible, sensory properties

The Storage of Concepts

11

of the objects united are used to mark concepts. Only when, with a rising degree of abstraction, the sets of objects become so heterogeneous that no sensory properties characterizing the total set can be abstracted any more, will conceptual characterization take place in accordance with other, non-figurative features (cf Hoffmann ( 1 9 8 1 ) ) . That is why, within a conceptual hierarchy, the relatively most abstract, but still sensorily defined concept takes a special place. We call it primary concept. It represents in our memory the relatively largest set of objects that can still be characterized and united by a few common sensory effects. The differentiation of special subconcepts requires account to be taken of additional figurative features, while more abstract superconcepts are categorially repres nted, i.e. almost without any reference to figurative features?)

.

Proceeding from the assumption that conceptual object identification is essentially determined by a comparison between the sensory effects of an object and figurative features, we can derive accurate assumptions as to the amount of cognitive effort in a conceptual object identification from the feature assumptions that have been explained. The identification of an object as belonging to the primary concept can be expected to require the least cognitive effort. A comparison of relatively few features will here already allow the object to be attributed to a concept. The identification of more special subconcepts should, in contrast, require additional efforts for the comparison of further features. Attribution to more abstract, categorial concepts should similarly require more effort since, because of the non-figurative feature characteristics of categorial concepts, attribution must first be mediated via a sensory subconcept. These expectations were checked by means of different methods in a number of experiments (Hoffmann, Ziessler ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; Hoffmann ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . Subjects were asked to decide as rapidly as they could whether an object presented in the form of a drawing could be attributed to a concept that had earlier been named verbally. The time was measured that passed between the presentation of the object and the response by the subjects. The critical variable was the feature characteristics of concepts on different levels of abstraction. In our material, three types of hierarchies can be distinguished according to the relative level of abstraction of the particular primary concepts: hierarchies with primary concepts on the upper, the medium and the lower levels. Fig. 2 gives one example of each type. It is worth remembering that, according to our feature analyses, the particular primary concept, whatever its degree of abstraction, is represented with relatively few figurative features, and that more concrete sensory subconcepts are stored in memory through additional figurative features, and abstract categorial superconcepts primarily through the enumeration of subconcepts. A s Fig. 7 shows, the average times needed for conceptual object identification correspond to these qualitative feature characteristics. Whatever the degree of abstraction of the particular concept, the same objects are attributed to the primary concepts with the greatest speed. Attribution to more concrete sensory subconcepts and to more abstract categorial superconcepts requires additional effort, which is probably due to the comparison of further figurative features or to the activation of sub-superconcept relations. It has thus been shown how conceptual recognition performance is determined by the feature characteristics of the concept representations stored in

12

ms

F. Klix et al.

4

EAGLE

4

i

BANANA SUP

PRIMARY

PRIMARY

M;D

@ PRIMARY

Figure 7 Average response times for identifying objects (drawings) as belonging to concepts of different degrees of abstraction memory. CONCLUSIONS

The interior structure of our memory store can only be ascertained through the close observation of its effects on cognitive performance. This paper has given examples to show that the concept representations activated by words in our memory can influence the course of cognitive processes via or by their features. They influence the identification of relations between concepts, determine the amount of cognitive effort necessary to recognize sub-superconcept relations, and constitute what the conceptual identification of objects in our environment crucially depends on. Concepts are not inseparable cognitive units in our memory. They can be split into smaller units that can produce differentiating effects, depending on requirements. These units, which differentiate the effect of concept representations in cognitive performances, are called by us features of concept representations. They reflect in our memory real properties of the objects united into a concept: In the process, sensory effects of objects are taken into account to the same extent as situational relations that objects in our environment enter into with other phenomena. What is represented will probably depend on criteria such as conspicuousness, frequency of occurrence, and significance for the control of behaviour. How this is represented depends on the type of information. The representation of singular features can be thought to form a well-ordered list. The representation of situational, context-dependent relations, however, can be considered to take the form of relational references to or from other concepts. Properties of feature models are in this conception linked with properties of network models. The lists of features allow objects to be identified swiftly and reliably. Relational links ensure that, together with the conceptual identification of an object, concept-specific, contextdependent eqperience and situational relations become immediately

The Storage of Concepts

13

available; and the latter are often more important for our behaviour than object-specific properties. Features and relations that are stationarily stored in our memory are the data that are drawn upon in cognitive operations when information is being perceived and also when new information is being derived or generated. This allows the conspicuous, the frequent and the significant to be represented directly in our memory in a quickly retrievable manner, without the inconspicuous, the rare and the insignificant getting lost as long as they remain derivable from the stationarily stored by means of cognitive operations. FOOTNOTES "Hoffmann and Ziessler ( 1 9 8 2 ) have shown that their relation can even be differentiated by distinguishing different types of conceptual hierarchies. 2, Rosch and her assistants, proceeding from their analyses, arrived

at similar statements on the structure of conceptual hierarchies. The "basic level" that she proposed corresponds to a far-reaching extent to our considerations concerning the level of the primary concepts within a conceptual hierarchy. Differences of view mainly concern the assumptions regarding representation. While Rosch, on the whole, proceeds from prototype representation, our own considerations suggest that the level of the primary concepts inevitably results from the mutual relations of the feature characteristics of all concepts of a hierarchy (cf Hoffmann ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) .

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and language comprehension, in: Gregg, L.W. (ed.) , Cognition in learning and memory (New York, 1 9 7 2 ) .

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[ 9 ] Hauser, D., Untersuchungen zur Reprasentation semantischer

Beziehungen im menschlichen Langzeitgedachtnis, Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of Psychol., Humboldt Univ. of Berlin (1981).

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[111 Hoffmann, J., Begriffe, ihre Herausbildung, Reprasentation und Identifikation, Proceedings of the XXIInd International Congress of Psychology (Leipzig, 1980). [121 Hoffmann, J., Representation of concepts and the classification of objects, in: Klix, F., Hoffmann, J. and van der Meer, E.

(eds.), Cognitive research in psychology (Berlin, Amsterdam,

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[131 Hoffmann, J. and Ziessler, M., Components of perceptual classification, 2. Psychol. 189 (1981) 14-24. [141 Hoffmann, J. und Ziessler, M., Begriffe und ihre Merkmale, 2. Psychol. 190/1 (1982) 46-77. [I51 Hollan, J.D., Features and semantic memory: set-theoretic or network model? Psychol. Res. 82 (1975) 154-155. [161 Klix, F . ,

ffber Grundstrukturen und Funktionsprinzipien kognitiver Prozesse, in: Klix, F. (Hrsg.), Psychologische Beitrage zur Analyse kognitiver Prozesse (Berlin, 1976).

[171 Klix, F., Erwachendes Denken (Berlin, 198oa). [181 Klix, F., On stationary and inferential knowledge representation - an experimental approach, in: Klix, F., Hoffmann, J. and van

der Meer, E. (eds.), Cognitive research in psychology (Berlin, Amsterdam, 1982).

[191 Klix, F., Die allgemeine Psychologie und die Erforschung kognitiver Prozesse, 2. Psychol. 188 (1980) 117-139.

- an approach to cognitive microprocesses as well as to intelligence performance, 2. Psychol. 186/1 (1978a) 39-47.

[201 Klix, F. and van der Meer, E., Analogical reasoning

- an approach to mechanisms underlying human intelligence performances, 2 . Psychol. 186/2 (1978b) 170-188.

[211 Klix, F. and van der Meer, E., Analogical reasoning

[221 Klix, F. and van der Meer, E., The method of analogy recognition

for the determination of semantic relations in long-term memory, in: Klix, F. and Hoffmann, J. (eds.), Cognition and Memory (Berlin, 1980)

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[231 Landauer, T.K. and Meyer, D.E., Category size and semantic

memory retrieval, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 1 1 (1972) 539-549.

[241 Le Ny, J.F., Der semantische Transfer bei der Einpragung von Satzen, 2. Psychol. 184 (1976) 432-444.

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[ 2 5 ] Le Ny, J . F . ,

Selective activities and elective forgetting in the process of understanding and in the recall of semantic contents, in: Klix, F. and Hoffmann, J. (eds.), Cognition and Memory (Berlin, 1 9 8 0 ) .

[ 2 6 1 Oden, G.G., Fuzziness in semantic memory: choosing exemplars of subjective categories, Memory and Cognition 5 ( 1 9 7 7 ) 1 9 8 - 2 0 4 . 1 2 7 1 Rayner, K. and Posnansky, C., Stages of processing in word identification, J. exper. Psychol. General 107 ( 1 9 7 8 ) 6 4 - 8 0 . [ 2 8 1 Rips, L.J., Shoben, E.J., Smith, E.E.,

Semantic distance and the verification of semantic relations, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 1 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) 1 - 2 0 .

[ 2 9 1 Rosch, E., Cognitive representations of semantic categories, J. exper. Psychol. 104 ( 1 9 7 5 ) 1 9 2 - 2 3 3 . [ 3 0 1 Rosch, E . , Mervis, C.B., Gray, W.D.,

Johnson, D.M., BoyesBraem, P., Basic objects in natural categories, Cogn. Psychol. 8 ( 1 9 7 6 ) 382-439.

[ 3 1 ] Rosinski, R.R., Golinkoff, R.M., Kukish, K., Automatic semantic

processing in a picture-word interference task, Child Development 5 6 ( 1 9 7 5 ) 2 4 7 - 2 5 3 .

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Shoben, E.J., Rips, L.J., Structure and process in semantic memory: a featural model for semantic decisions, Psychol. Rev. 8 1 ( 1 9 7 4 ) 2 1 4 - 2 4 1 .

[ 3 3 1 Taft, M., Lexical access via an orthographic code: the basic

orthographic syllabic structure (BOSS), Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 1 8 ( 1 9 7 9 ) 2 1 - 3 9 .

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LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Nv, W. Kintsch (editors) 0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

IMAGES AND SEMANTIC

REPRESENTATIONS

M i c h e l Denis L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I Sai nt-Deni s , France

I n t h i s c h a p t e r a r e summarized and discussed s e l e c t e d d a t a f r o m a r e s e a r c h program on t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between imagery and semantic processing. W i t h i n t h e framework o f a f e a t u r a l approach t o conceptu a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , imagery i s viewed as a c o n s t r u c t i v e process t h a t s e l e c t i v e l y a p p l i e s t o , and t r a n s i e n t l y a c t u a l i z e s , s p e c i f i c subsets o f semantic f e a t u r e s , t h e s o - c a l l e d f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s . INTRODUCTION The l a s t t w e l v e y e a r s o f r e s e a r c h i n psychology have been c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a number a o f t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l e f f o r t s w i t h t h e aim o f g i v i n g mental imagery l o n g - s t a n d i n g theme i n our d i s c i p l i n e - a renewed t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t u s . Research has s i m u l t a n e o u s l y developed i n two main d i r e c t i o n s . On t h e one hand, imagery was i n v e s t i g a t e d as a n independent v a r i a b l e , i . e . , as a process i n t e r v e n i n g o r l i k e l y t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e course o f many p s y c h o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , such as memorization, comprehension o f sentences, problem s o l v i n g , e t c . As a general c o n c l u s i o n , i t may be s t a t e d t h a t t h e use o f imagery has p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s o n most o f these a c t i v i t i e s , whatever t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f performance.

-

However t h i s k i n d o f approach i s u n l i k e l y t o t h r o w much l i g h t on what a n image i s and how t h e i n t r i n s i c p r o p e r t i e s o f t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v e n t may a c c o u n t f o r i t s e f f i z n c y . Thus, what can be named t h e "second g e n e r a t i o n " o f contemporaneous r e s e a r c h i n imagery i s more concerned w i t h q u e s t i o n s such as : What a r e t h e chara c t e r i s t i c s o f images, i n c o n t r a s t w i t h o t h e r ways people evoke concepts ? What i s t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v e n t ? To what e x t e n t s h a l l we c o n s i d e r i t as an " a n a l o g i c a l " mode o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ? Must we c o n s i d e r t h a t images have genuine s p a t i a l p r o p e r t i e s ? How s h a l l we c o n s i d e r t h e i r temporal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ? Whatever t h e r e s e a r c h e r s ' s p e c i f i c f o c u s as r e g a r d s imagery, i t i s obvious t h a t r e s e a r c h i n t h i s f i e l d i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y concerned w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between images and knowledge. No d o u b t t h a t images a r e a p r i v i l e g e d modal i t y f o r a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f some aspects o f knowledge, b u t a number o f o t h e r a s p e c t s a r e u n a b l e t o be f i g u r a t i v e l y r e p r e s e n t e d . I n any case, a p e r s i s t e n t f e a t u r e i n t h e l a s t t e n o r t w e l v e y e a r s o f psychology w i l l have been t h e f e e b l e e f f o r t , o r t h e l a c k o f a widespread e f f o r t , t o s y s t e m a t i c a l l y connect t h e s t u d y o f imagery t o t h e w i d e r f i e l d o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f knowledge. D u r i n g a l o n g time, r e s e a r c h i n imagery developed w i t h o u t any concern o f c o n v e r g i n g w i t h t h e models o f semantic memory t h a t attempted t o d e s c r i b e t h e s t r u c t u r e o f knowledge and i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n i n l o n g t e r m memory. We a r e s t i l l g r e a t l y unaware o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between, on t h e one hand, a c t i v a t i o n o f semantic s t r u c t u r e s l e a d i n g t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f meaning i n t h e mind o f a r e a d e r who has t o v e r i f y a statement (such as : A canary has wings . . . ) and, on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e imagery e l i c i t e d by t h i s statement. These q u e s t i o n s i n f a c t were expressed i n s e v e r a l e m p i r i c a l approaches w i t h v a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l backgrounds, b u t w i t h t h e common concern o f d e l i b e r a t e l y i n t r o d u c i n g imagery i n t h e s t u d y o f semantic a c t i v i t i e s - c o n t r a r y t o what was t h e case i n s e v e r a l former, l e a d i n g models ( c f . C o l l i n s and Q u i l l i a n , 1969 ; Smith, Shoben, and Rips, 1974). One widespread e m p i r i c a l approach was sentence

18

M. Denis

verification, in an attempt t o measure verification latencies of sentences varying in t h e i r a b i l i t y t o e l i c i t visual images t h at represent t h e i r content. Results i n i t i a l l y presented by Jorgensen and Kintsch (1973), and l a t e r by Holmes and Langford (1976), attested a f a c i l i t a t i n g ef f ect of the imagery value of sentences on t h e i r verification. However such a relationship i s d i f f i c u l t t o inte rpre t, mainly because of the d i f f i cu l t y in distinguishing the e ffe c ts of imagery from the e f f e c t s of the semantic complexity of sentences ( c f . Holyoak, 1974). More recent experiments by Glass, Eddy and Schwanenflugel (1980) demonstrated t h a t the reading of descriptive sentences may in f act be accompanied with a n imagery a c t i v i t y , objectively detected by appropriate experimental procedures, b u t without allowing the researcher t o ascribe t o these images a decisive role in verification processes per se. Such a conclusion i s i t s e l f in agreement with hypotheses concerning the abstract, amodal format of representation of sentence meaning ( c f . Potter, Valian,and Faulconer, 1977). An other procedure, in some respects similar t o the former one, was equally used f o r examining the possible role o f imagery in sentence verification - the mental comparison technique. In these tasks, the subject has to evaluate as true or f a l s e sentences asserting a r el at i o n , such as : A lobster i s larger t h a n a crayfish. I n opposition t o Paivio's (1975, 1978) arguments favoring the explanatory role of visual imagery in the evaluation of such sentences, c r i t i c a l arguments, such as Friedman's (1978), were developed in favor of different forms of mental representa tio n , other than "analogical". The most recent trends seem t o favor mixed models, postulating parallel processing of analogical representations, such as visual images, and propositional representations ( c f . Kosslyn, 1980 ; Kosslyn, Murphy, Bemesderfer, and Feinstein, 1977). Lastly, a paradigm t hat looks relevant t o the f i el d of research discussed above i s the so-called sentence-picture comparison paradigm, where a picture i s to be compared by subjects with the semantic content of a descriptive sentence (such as: The plus i s above the s t a r . . . ) . After a long lasting controversy between proponents of "imagistic" interpretations ( c f . Huttenlocher, 1968) and those of "propositional" accounts ( cf . Carpenter and J u s t , 1975 ; Chase and Clark, 1972), t h i s paradigm was more recently used in a new perspective, emphasizing stra te gie s t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a t e individuals in such tasks ( c f . MacLeod, Hunt,and Mathews, 1978). Thus i t i s possible to identify subjects w i t h c le a r preferences f o r " ling u is t i c " s t r a t e g i e s (they compare a l i n g u i s t i c description of the picture t o the semantic representation of the sentence) and subjects inclined t o "visual" s t r a t e gies (they more readily compare the picture t o the visual image of the pattern described in the sentence) (see also Beech, 1980 ; Dubois and Weil-Barais, 1980). The major idea stemming from these current research trends i s tha t the role of radical imagistic positions in the f i e l d of language understanding has lessened and t h a t presently more weight i s given t o propositional interpretations, c a lling upon abstract, amodal semantic representations, which are neither linguistic nor imaginal, b u t which have the open p o s s i b i l i t y of optional stra te gie s making use of visual imagery. In t h i s paper I briefly describe a s er i es of steps which are part of a research program devoted t o the question of the relationships between the domain of images - more s p e c i f i c al l y , images involved with l i n g uistic a c t i v i t y , mainly comprehension of sentences - and the domain of semantics, by a n approach i n i t i a l l y concerned with lexical u n i t s , then with sentences. FIGURATIVE SEMANTIC FEATURES The major working hypothesis here i s t h at there i s no de finite separation between the conceptual approaches t o imaginal representations and to semantic representations. More precisely, the idea developed here i s tha t imagery i s a modality for the actualization of semantic representations o f sentences, through a highly

Im@s and Semantic Representations

19

s p e c i f i c f o r m a t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , m a i n l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s s t r u c t u r a l analogy w i t h p e r c e p t u a l events. Semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s can be analyzed i n t o components, some of which may be a c t u a l i z e d under a s p e c i f i c f o r m a t and r e s u l t i n t h e e l a b o r a t i o n of c o g n i t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s ' m i m i c k i n g p e r c e p t u a l experiences t o some e x t e n t ( c f . Oenis, 1979). The approach i l l u s t r a t e d h e r e r e l i e s upon t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e f o r m a t o f t h e most elementary u n i t s o f c o g n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i s l o w e r t h a n t h e l e x i c a l format. A f u l l e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e arguments s u p p o r t i n g t h i s c l a i m , o r r a t h e r t h e f a m i l y o f t h e o r i e s h a v i n g t h i s c l a i m i n common, i s i m p o s s i b l e h e r e . L e t us however c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e i d e a t h a t concepts t o which l e x i c a l i t e m s a r e a t t a c h e d can be analyzed i n t o more elementary u n i t s o f meaning, o r semantic f e a t u r e s . T h i s s t a t e ment does n o t o n l y mean t h a t humans (among them, p s y c h o l o g i s t s ) a r e capable o f a n a l y z i n g a concept i n t o s m a l l e r p i e c e s o f meaning, b u t t h a t t h e r e e x i s t arguments i n s u p p o r t o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o t i o n o f semantic f e a t u r e s as elementary components o f c o g n i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (e.g., Eysenck, 1979 ; Le Ny, 1979 ; M i l l e r and Johnson-Laird, 1976). For i n s t a n c e , l e t us c o n s i d e r t h e meaning a t t a c h e d t o t h e l e x i c a l u n i t k n i f e . The concept t o which t h e word k n i f e r e f e r s may be analyzed i n t o a s e t o f f e a t u r e s among which we would p r o b a b l y i n d : BLADE, HANDLE, LENGTHENED SHAPE, CUTS, USEFUL, DANGEROUS, e t c . Two general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f such f e a t u r e s e t s should be underl i n e d : ( a ) t h e i r h i e r a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , which r e f l e c t s t h e unequal c o n t r i b u t i o n o f these f e a t u r e s t o t h e concept ; ( b ) t h e i r f l e x i b i l i t y , i.e., t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r a n s i e n t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f t h e h i e r a r c h y , depending on f a c t o r s such as l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e x t , i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n , e t c . However, my paper w i l l t r e a t e s s e n t i a l l y t h e m a j o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f meaning a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h a t i s : Meaning e l i c i t e d by a word i s a c o g n i t i v e c o n s t r u c t which r e s u l t s f r o m t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f a s e t o f semantic f e a t u r e s . Among t h e s e t o f f e a t u r e s t h a t d e f i n e t h e concept KNIFE, some f e a t u r e s a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s o f k n i v e s , i . e . , p r o p e r t i e s t h a t have been p e r c e p t u a l l y experienced as such by t h e i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s i s t h e case o f f e a t u r e s such as BLADE, HANDLE, e t c . These u n i t s a r e presumably i n v o l v e d i n sone p r i v i l e g e d way n o t o n l y i n v i s u a l imagery e l i c i t e d by t h e word k n i f e , b u t a l s o i n any a c t i v i t y a i m i n g a t d e p i c t i n g t h e f i g u r a l appearance o f a k m as i n a p i c t o r i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . F o r t h i s reason, I c a l l such u n i t s o f meaning " f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s " , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h o t h e r k i n d s o f f e a t u r e s t h a t do n o t d i r e c t l y r e f l e c t t h e f i q u r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f o b j e c t s . Such i s p r o b a b l y t h e case f o r USEFUL and f o r DANGEROUS. We c e r t a i n l y a r e a b l e t o c o n s t r u c t v i s u a l images t h a t r e f l e c t t h r o u g h some k i n d o f a s s o c i a t i v e imagery t h e u s e f u l n e s s o r t h e danger o f a k n i f e . However i t i s obvious t h a t such an imagery i s n o t as " d i r e c t " as when t h e f e a t u r e s BLADE o r HANDLE a r e used t o evoke t h e concept KNIFE. That i s why i t seems more a p p r o p r i a t e t o q u a l i f y f e a t u r e s as t o t h e p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h which imagery processes may a p p l y t o them. I n t h i s manner i t would be p o s s i b l e t o i s o l a t e from among t h e s e t o f f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g a concept a subset o f f e a t u r e s t o which imagery processes may a p p l y w i t h maximal p r o b a b i l i t y . These a r e t h e f e a t u r e s I s h a l l c a l l i n a b b r e v i a t e d f o r m " f i g u r a t i v e (semantic) f e a t u r e s " . I n my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , imagery i s t o be viewed as a c o n s t r u c t i v e process t h a t g i v e s a s p e c i f i c , l i m i t e d subset o f f e a t u r e s a t r a n s i e n t c o g n i t i v e a c t u a l i t y , t h r o u g h a s p e c i f i c t y p e o f mental e x p e r i e n c e ( m a i n l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s s t r u c t u r a l analogy w i t h p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e ) . IMAGERY VALUE AN0 SEMANTIC COMPOSITION Several techniques have been developed i n o r d e r t o "measure" imagery e l i c i t e d by l i n g u i s t i c i n p u t s . One o f them r e l i e s on t h e n o t i o n o f "imagery v a l u e " , t o which r e s e a r c h gave a n e m p i r i c a l s t a t u s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e renewal o f p s y c h o l o g i s t s ' i n t e r e s t f o r imagery (see P a i v i o , 1971). Imagery v a l u e o f a word i s d e f i n e d as t h e a b i l i t y o f t h i s word t o e l i c i t an i m a g i n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l , t h a t i s a c o g n i t i v e e v e n t w i t h a f i g u r a t i v e c o n t e n t . I t i s o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d by t h e

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mean v a l u e g i v e n t o t h i s word by cases a seven-point scale, whose one hand, "no image" and, on t h e r a t e a sample o f words on such a meaningful, and words i n general t h i s i n d i c a t o r a l s o shows a h i g h

M. Denis a group o f s u b j e c t s on a r a t i n g s c a l e , i n most extreme p o i n t s f o r i n s t a n c e a r e l a b e l e d , on t h e o t h e r hand, " h i g h l y v i v i d image". When s u b j e c t s s c a l e , n o t o n l y i s t h i s t a s k accepted as s c a t t e r o v e r t h e whole range o f t h e s c a l e , b u t degree o f i n t e r - and i n t r a i n d i v i d u a l c o n s i s t e n c y .

Defined i n t h i s way, t h e imagery v a l u e o f words has proved t o be a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n many k i n d s o f p r o c e s s i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c m a t e r i a l : comprehension, v e r i f i c a t i o n , memorization, e t c . L i n g u i s t i c messages made w i t h high-imagery words a r e b e t t e r memorized t h a n messages made w i t h low-imagery words. However, t h e q u e s t i o n s t h a t were s u r p r i s i n g l y absent f r o m r e c e n t d i s c u s s i o n s a r e : What does imagery v a l u e measure ? What does i t r e f l e c t , e s p e c i a l l y r e g a r d i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e o f knowledge about c o r r e s p o n d i n g o b j e c t s ? I n o t h e r words, what happens i n someone's mind when he o r she c o n s t r u c t s an image i n o r d e r t o e v a l u a t e i t s v i v i d n e s s , i t s c l a r i t y , o r i t s richness ?

My t e n t a t i v e answer i s t h a t imaging r e s u l t s f r o m a process t h a t a p p l i e s t o t h e

subset o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s o f a concept. C o n s t r u c t i n g images i n response t o words i s i d e n t i f i e d as t h e a c t u a l i z a t i o n , i n a s p e c i a l i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l system, o f f i g u r a t i v e components o f concepts, through a s p e c i a l i z e d process whose major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s t h e a b i l i t y t o c o n s t r u c t mental events w i t h a s t r u c t u r e and an i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t a r e a n a l o g i c a l w i t h those o f percept u a l events. T h i s a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s presumably takes p l a c e w i t h i n a "framework", a k i n d o f a G e s t a l t s p a t i a l scheme, which i s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e g l o b a l shape o f t h e o b j e c t ( c f . t h e n o t i o n o f " s k e l e t a l encoding" i n Kosslyn, 1980). Whatever t h i s h y p o t h e t i c a l framework, t h e v e r y f i r s t s t e p i n my r e s e a r c h program c o n s i s t e d i n t e s t i n g t h e main consequence o f t h e assumption t h a t l i n k s imagery and semantic s t r u c t u r e s , i.e., one s h o u l d p r e d i c t t h e imagery v a l u e o f words from t h e r i c h n e s s o f t h e corresponding concepts i n t h e s o - c a l l e d f i g u r a t i v e features. The f i r s t experiment whose o b j e c t i v e was t o examine t h i s h y p o t h e s i s i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e imagery v a l u e o f general and s p e c i f i c words, and i t s r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e semant i c composition o f t h e s e words. The g e n e r a l i t y - s p e c i f i c i t y dimension i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o a dimension t h a t one may c a l l r i c h n e s s o f concepts i n f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s . I f one c o n s i d e r s a branch i n a taxonomy whose u l t i m a t e t e r m i s a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t - f o r i n s t a n c e , LIVING BEING - ANIMAL BIRD - PARROT, - i t i s obvious t h a t , as one moves down t h e taxonomy, n o t o n l y do concepts grow r i c h e r i n semantic f e a t u r e s , b u t t h e y a l s o grow r i c h e r i n semantic f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s . A c o r o l l a r y o f t h i s statement i s t h a t t h e more s p e c i f i c t h e concepts, t h e e a s i e r t h e y a r e t o evoke t h e o b j e c t s as images, whereas images f o r more general concepts s h o u l d e i t h e r be v e r y poor o r c o n s i s t i n i n s t a n t i a t i o n s ( t h a t i s , images o f subconcepts r i c h e r i n f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s ) .

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I t has been demonstrated t h a t general terms, such as f u r n i t u r e , c l o t h i n , e t c . a r e l e s s l i k e l y t o e l i c i t images t h a n more s p e c i f i c terms, such pants, e t c . But t h i s i s m a i n l y apparent i n t a s k s emphasizing t h e speed w i t T i T K c h images a r e t o be c o n s t r u c t e d . As a general r e s u l t , imagery l a t e n c i e s a r e l o n g e r t o general terms t h a n t o s p e c i f i c terms. T h i s d i f f e r e n c e a l s o h o l d s f o r drawing l a t e n c i e s t o t h e s e terms. However, when one c o n s i d e r s imagery values ( t h a t a r e g i v e n w i t h o u t any temporal c o n s t r a i n t s ) , t h e r e i s i n most cases v e r y l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between general and s p e c i f i c terms. A l i k e l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t when s u b j e c t s have t o r a t e f o r imagery v a l u e a general t e r m t h a t i s poor i n f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s , t h e y t e n d t o l o o k f o r a s p e c i f i c exemplar i n t h e c a t e g o r y , and t h e y f i n a l l y g i v e t h e experimenter t h e imagery v a l u e f o r t h e a s s o c i a t e d s p e c i f i c term, n o t t h e imagery v a l u e f o r t h e general term i t s e l f .

4,

F i g u r e 1 i s a schematic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f f o u r h y p o t h e t i c a l l e v e l s i n a taxonomy, f r o m t h e h i g h e s t , more general l e v e l ( I ) t o t h e l o w e s t , more s p e c i f i c l e v e l ( I V ) .

Imaps and Semantic Representations

21

A t each l e v e l t h e f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g t h e corresponding concept a r e l i s t e d as lower-case l e t t e r s . According t o such an approach, a concept a t any l e v e l i s composed o f t h e s e t o f f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g t h e s u p e r o r d i n a t e concept, p l u s a s p e c i f i c s e t o f f e a t u r e s . For i n s t a n c e , BIRD would comprise a l l t h e f e a t u r e s f o r ANIMAL, p l u s some new ones : WINGS, FEATHERS, e t c . A t t h e l o w e r l e v e l , PARROT would comp r i s e a l l t h e f e a t u r e s f o r BIRD, p l u s some new, s p e c i f i c ones : MANY-COLOURED, REPEATS, e t c . ( c f . Le Ny, 1979). I n t h i s framework, s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e m a i n l y viewed as a semantic enrichment.

I (a, b, c l I 1 t a , b, c l & 111 { a , b, c l &

(4, e, ti,

fl

e, f l &

Iq, h, i )

Figure 1 Schematic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r f o u r h y p o t h e t i c a l l e v e l s i n a taxonomy I n F i g u r e 1, u n d e r l i n e d l e t t e r s correspond t o f e a t u r e s t h a t a r e supposed t o be f i g u r a t i v e ones, i.e., f e a t u r e s r e f l e c t i n g o b j e c t p r o p e r t i e s d i r e c t l y accessed by p e r c e p t u a l processes ( v i s u a l , i n t h e examples discussed h e r e ) . Thus, i n most taxonomies, t h e h i g h e r l e v e l concept would e s s e n t i a l l y be composed o f n o n - f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s , corresponding t o v e r y g e n e r a l , a b s t r a c t p r o p e r t i e s (a, b, c ) . The i m m e d i a t l y l o w e r concept would be composed o f t h e same s e t o f f e a t u r e s (a, b, c ) , p l u s a f u r t h e r s e t (d, e , f ) , i n which f e a t u r e d would r e f l e c t a p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t y and would be l i k e l y To be f i g u r a t i v e l y represented, e i t h e r i n a v i s u a l image o r i n a drawing. My c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t such f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s become more and more numerous as one goes down f r o m one l e v e l t o a l o w e r l e v e l i n t h e h i e r a r c h y . I t i s l i k e l y t h a t such an a n a l y s i s w i l l make t h e p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between imagery value and s p e c i f i c i t y more obvious, n o t o n l y because more s p e c i f i c concepts a r e composed o f a g r e a t e r number o f f e a t u r e s , b u t because t h e y a r e composed o f a g r e a t e r r e l a t i v e number o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s i n t h e whole s e t o f f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g these concepts. ( I s h a l l i n s i s t a g a i n t h a t i t i s f o r b r e v i t y ' s sake t h a t I speak of " f i g u r a t i v e " v e r s u s " n o n - f i g u r a t i v e " f e a t u r e s . I t i s more l i k e l y indeed t h a t any semantic f e a t u r e i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e degree o r t h e p r o b a b i l i t y w i t h which i t can be r e p r e s e n t e d i n an image.) My i n i t i a l e f f o r t c o n s i s t e d i n d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t ( a ) general concepts a r e composed o f a l e s s e r number o f f e a t u r e s t h a n more s p e c i f i c ones, and ( b ) s p e c i f i c concepts a r e composed o f a r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r number o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s ( o r , a c c o r d i n g t o an a l t e r n a t e f o r m u l a t i o n , t h e mean " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " o f f e a t u r e s comp o s i n g s p e c i f i c concepts i s h i g h e r than f o r more general concepts). I n t h i s exper i m e n t , p a i r s o f s u b s t a n t i v e s were used, one general and one s p e c i f i c . (One should however keep i n mind t h a t t h e r e a r e no a b s o l u t e " g e n e r a l " n o r " s p e c i f i c " words. G e n e r a l i t y o r s p e c i f i c i t y o f a word i s always r e l a t i v e t o t h a t o f another word. T h a t i s why t h e s t r i c t e s t f o r m u l a t i o n would be t h a t , i n p a i r s of s u b s t a n t i ves, one was more g e n e r a l , o r l e s s s p e c i f i c , t h a n t h e o t h e r one.)

Two k i n d s o f general concepts were c o n s i d e r e d : general concepts A (such as TREE, BIRD, FISH, e t c . ) and general concepts B (such as VEHICLE, FURNITURE, VEGETABLE, e t c . ) . General concepts A subsume members t h a t have a g r e a t number o f f i g u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common. F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e r e i s a h i g h degree o f s i m i l a r i t y between most b i r d s as t o t h e i r g l o b a l shape, t h e p a r t s t h a t compose them,and t 2 e r e l a t i o n s between these p a r t s . Such concepts a r e c l o s e t o "base l e v e l concepts a c c o r d i n g t o Rosch's t e r m i n o l o g y ( c f . Rosch, M e r v i s , Gray, Johnson, and BoyesBraem, 1976), t h a t i s concepts a t t h e most i n c l u s i v e l e v e l where t h e v a r i o u s members have a g r e a t number o f p r o p e r t i e s i n common, e l i c i t s i m i l a r b e h a v i o r a l

22

M. Denis

programs, and possess h i g h l y s i m i l a r f i g u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . These concepts a r e c l o s e a l s o t o what Hoffmann (1982) d e f i n e d as " p r i m a r y concepts" i n a s i m i l a r , independent approach. General concepts 8 , on t h e o t h e r hand, subsume members w i t h a h i g h degree o f f i g u r a l d i s c r i m i n a b i l i t y . For i n s t a n c e , when one c o n s i d e r s t h e c a t e g o r y o f v e h i c l e s , t h e f i g u r a l appearance o f a t r u c k i s s t r o n g l y d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t o f a b i c y c l e , o r a h e l i c o p t e r , o r a space r o c k e t .

A s p e c i f i c t e r m was p a i r e d w i t h each general term. I t was a h i g h a s s o c i a t e , non ambiguous word, whose frequency was equated w i t h t h e frequency o f t h e g e n e r a l term. A f i r s t group o f s u b j e c t s were presented w i t h t h e s e l e c t e d terms ( d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s were presented w i t h t h e general o r t h e s p e c i f i c t e r m i n a p a i r ) , and t h e y gave l i s t s o f p r o p e r t i e s f o r t h e designated c l a s s e s o f o b j e c t s . From these l i s t s were d e r i v e d l i s t s o f f e a t u r e s h y p o t h e t i c a l l y d e f i n i n g each o f t h e general and s p e c i f i c concepts. Features were l e x i c a l l y expressed e i t h e r by s u b s t a n t i v e s ( f o r i n s t a n c e , f o r t h e concept SNAKE : SCALES, TONGUE, VENOM), o r by a d j e c t i v e s (LONG), o r by verbs (CRAWLS). Only responses g i v e n by a t l e a s t 30 p e r c e n t of t h e s u b j e c t s were considered. T h i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , i s t h e l i s t o f f e a t u r e s d e f i n i n g t h e concept FLOWER, presented i n decreasing o r d e r o f t h e i r frequency : PETALS, STEM, LEAVES, STAMENS, POLLEN, PISTIL, SMELL. I t was found, as expected, t h a t t h e mean number o f f e a t u r e s was l o w e r f o r general t h a n f o r s p e c i f i c concepts. However, when c o n s i d e r i n g o n l y general concepts A and t h e i r s p e c i f i c c o u n t e r p a r t s , t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s h a r d l y n o t i c e a b l e , whereas t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s v e r y c l e a r i n t h e case o f general concepts B. The n e x t s t e p c o n s i s t e d i n o b t a i n i n g an i n d i c a t o r o f t h e " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " o f f e a t u r e s . T h i s was performed by a s k i n g a new group o f s u b j e c t s t o r a t e a l l t h e f e a t u r e s o n a s c a l e s i m i l a r t o t h e imagery v a l u e scale. Then i t was p o s s i b l e t o sum t h e o b t a i n e d mean values f o r a l l t h e f e a t u r e s composing a concept, t h i s r e s u l t i n g i n a "Composite imagery v a l u e " f o r each o f t h e general and s p e c i f i c terms. When one l o o k s a t t h e whole m a t e r i a l , i t appears t h a t t h e composite imagery v a l u e i s lower f o r general t h a n f o r s p e c i f i c terms. As p r e v i o u s l y seen, t h e r e i s a v e r y small d i f f e r e n c e between general terms A and t h e i r s p e c i f i c c o u n t e r p a r t s , whereas between general terms B and t h e i r s p e c i f i c c o u n t e r p a r t s t h e d i f f e r e n c e i s l a r g e and s i g n i f i c a n t . The composite imagery v a l u e o f general terms B i s t h e l o w e s t . These terms do then r e f e r , as p r e v i o u s l y argued, t o concepts whose f e a t u r e s have a v e r y low degree o f " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " . Moreover t h e c o n t r a s t beween t h e s e terms and a l l t h e o t h e r s i s much more pronounced than was t h e c o n t r a s t p r e v i o u s l y observed when " g l o b a l imagery v a l u e s " were considered. I t t h u s appears t h a t "composite imagery v a l u e " g i v e s a b e t t e r r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " o f t h e semantic components o f concepts, and t h a t t h i s i n d i c a t o r i s much l e s s l i k e l y t o be b i a s e d by i n s t a n t i a t i o n processes t h a n i s t h e " g l o b a l imagery v a l u e " . One however has t o examine t h e f o l l o w i n g argument : The a d d i t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e h y p o t h e s i s i l l u s t r a t e d by F i g u r e 1 i s such t h a t i t i s j u s t s t a t i s t i c a l l y l i k e l y t h a t t h e composite imagery values i n c r e a s e when t h e number o f f e a t u r e s t a k e n i n t o account i n c r e a s e s . The answer i s t h a t when one computes t h e mean imagery v a l u e f o r a s i n g l e f e a t u r e , t h i s value i s s t i l l t h e l o w e s t f o r general concepts, and s t i l l l o w e r f o r f e a t u r e s composing general concepts B t h a n f o r f e a t u r e s composing any o f t h e o t h e r concepts. I t must be noted however t h a t t h e range o f t h i s i n d i c a t o r i s l i m i t e d , due t o t h e f a c t t h a t a l l t h e considered concepts are, on t h e whole, on t h e " p o s i t i v e " s i d e o f imagery values. They a l l subsume p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s o r c l a s s e s o f p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s . T h a t i s why I t u r n e d t o o t h e r m a t e r i a l s , i n t h e hope t h a t t h e y would produce c l e a r e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s . The general purpose was t h e same, w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n a l a t t e m p t t o demonstrate t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e number o f f e a t u r e s composing a concept and t h e i r " f i g u r a t i v e n e s s " . I n o t h e r words, concepts r i c h i n semantic f e a t u r e s - as was t h e case a t t h e l o w e s t l e v e l s o f t h e taxonomies, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r e v i o u s approach - would by t h i s v e r y f a c t be r i c h i n f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s , whereas concepts p o o r e r i n semantic f e a t u r e s - f o r i n s t a n c e , a t t h e t o p o f taxonomies would be poorer i n f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s .

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Images and Semantic Representations

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Having looked f o r a corpus whose elements would w i d e l y s c a t t e r on t h e r a t i n g scal e s t o be used and furthermore would n o t be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y h i e r a r c h i z e d a l o n g t h e g e n e r a l i t y - s p e c i f i c i t y dimension, I t u r n e d t o terms d e s i g n a t i n g o c c u p a t i o n s . T h i s semantic f i e l d i s v e r y l a r g e , w i t h a wide v a r i e t y o f elements d i s p e r s e d o v e r t h e whole range o f t h e imagery v a l u e scale, f r o m occupations w i t h s a l i e n t f i g u r a t i v e a t t r i b u t e s , such as f i r e m a n o r judge, t o occupations w i t h none o r almost none o f these a t t r i b u t e s , s u c h d i t o r m a n a g e r . From a l i s t o f 155 terms d e s i g n a t i n g occupations t h a t had been r a t e d f o r imagery v a l u e by a group o f s u b j e c t s , I s e l e c t e d f o u r groups o f items ( A , B, C, D ) f r o m t h e l o w e s t t o t h e h i g h e s t imagery value.

m-)

Without d e s c r i b i n g h e r e t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e analyses - which f o l l o w e d t h e same steps as i n t h e p r e v i o u s experiment, - t h e main r e s u l t s were s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . The mean number o f f e a t u r e s p e r concept i s p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e imagery v a l u e o f corresponding terms. I n o t h e r words, t h e imagery value o f a word i s c l o s e l y dependent o n t h e r i c h n e s s o f t h e corresponding concept i n semantic f e a t u r e s . Furthermore, concepts r i c h e r i n semantic f e a t u r e s a r e r i c h e r i n f i g u r a t i v e semant i c f e a t u r e s . A c t u a l l y , n o t o n l y t h e composite imagery v a l u e a t t a c h e d t o concepts i n c r e a s e s from i t e m s A t o items D, b u t t h e mean imagery v a l u e f o r a s i n g l e f e a t u r e i t s e l f i n c r e a s e s f r o m items A t o items D. A s i g n i f i c a n t , p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n was computed between t h e g l o b a l imagery v a l u e o f words and t h e l a t t e r i n d i c a t o r . The mean imagery v a l u e f o r a s i n g l e f e a t u r e i s t h u s l i k e l y t o r e f l e c t t h e r i c h ness o f t h e corresponding concept i n f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s ( c f . Denis, 1982 a ) . ACTUALIZATION OF FIGURATIVE SEMANTIC FEATURES AND THE COMPREHENSION OF SENTENCES The p r e s e n t s e c t i o n i s i n t e n d e d t o g i v e some s u p p o r t t o t h e hypothesized v a l i d i t y o f t h e f e a t u r a l approach. One c o u l d indeed argue t h a t such an a n a l y s i s i s a p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l , s p e c u l a t i v e m a t t e r , and t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e human mind t h a t resembles f e a t u r e s , as components o f l e x i c a l meaning. A f u r t h e r s e r i e s o f e x p e r i ments were d i r e c t e d towards t h i s p o i n t , i . e . , t o demonstrate t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a c t u a l i z e i n someone's mind n o t o n l y w h o l i s t i c concepts, b u t a l s o p a r t s o n l y o f concepts, t h a t i s subsets o f f e a t u r e s . The f o l l o w i n g experiments were a l l concerned w i t h s e l e c t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f f i g u r a t i v e ( o r n o n - f i g u r a t i v e ) components o f conceptual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , m a i n l y d u r i n g sentence comprehension (see Denis, 1982 b ) . The n o t i o n o f s e l e c t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n i s c e n t r a l i n a componential model of conc e p t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . When p o s t u l a t i n g t h a t a concept can be analyzed i n t o a s e r i e s o f components, one s i m u l t a n e o u s l y p o s t u l a t e s t h a t a c t i v a t i n g processes may s e l e c t i v e l y a p p l y t o some o f these components, o r groups o f c o r r e l a t e d components. C o g n i t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a concept may be " g l o b a l " when a l l t h e f e a t u r e s t h a t compose i t a r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a c t i v a t e d . I t may be " p a r t i a l " as w e l l when a s m a l l e r number o f such components a r e a c t i v a t e d . So I attempted t o e x p e r i m e n t a l l y a c t i v a t e some s p e c i f i c components o f a conceptual r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and then d e t e c t b y some a p p r o p r i a t e procedure t h e g r e a t e r c o g n i t i v e a c t u a l i t y o f these components r e l a t i v e l y t o o t h e r s . For i n s t a n c e , when f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s o f a concept have been a c t i v a t e d , i t may be expected t h a t t r a n s i e n t l y p e r s i s t e n t t r a c e s o f t h i s c o g n i t i v e e v e n t w i l l l a t e r f a c i l i t a t e t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a p i c t o r i a l s t i m u l u s showing t h e corresponding p r o p e r t i e s .

I n one experiment, s u b j e c t s had t o l i s t e n t o l i s t s o f words d e s i g n a t i n g o b j e c t s i n c l a s s e s , f o r i n s t a n c e a l i s t o f musical i n s t r u m e n t s . They then had t o search i n t h e i r memory whether t h e i n s t r u m e n t s possessed such o r such f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t y . For i n s t a n c e , when presented w i t h words such as piano, v i o l i n , a c c o r d i o n , cymbal, e t c . , s u b j e c t s had t o c l a s s i f y them a c c o r d i n g t o m r p o s s e s s i o n o f c e r t a m s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s , such as has s t r i n g s , o r has keys. T h i s t a s k was p u r p o r t e d l y a c t i v a t i n g i n s u b j e c t s ' w o r k i n g memory some f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s o f t h e corresponding concepts and i t was hypothesized t h a t , as a r e s u l t , these f e a t u r e s would t r a n s i e n -

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t l y be maintained a t some s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l o f c o g n i t i v e a c t u a l i t y . I n an o t h e r c o n d i t i o n , o t h e r s u b j e c t s had t o c l a s s i f y t h e same l i s t o f words, b u t a c c o r d i n g t o o t h e r , n o n - f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s , such as i s o l d (i.e., b e f o r e t h e 2 0 t h c e n t u r y , as p r e v i o u s l y i n d i c a t e d ) , o r i s d i f f i c u l t t o W T h i s t a s k was p u r p o r t e d l y a c t i v a t i n g some n o n - f i g u r a t i v e ( o r v e r y p o o r l y f i ' g u r a t i v e ) f e a t u r e s o f t h e same concepts. A f t e r t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , s u b j e c t s were unexpectedly presented w i t h p i c t u r e s r e p r e s e n t i n g musical i n s t r u m e n t s , among which t h e y had t o r e c o g n i z e as f a s t as p o s s i b l e those p r e v i o u s l y c l a s s i f i e d , from d i s t r a c t o r s . Although a l l s u b j e c t s , i n b o t h c o n d i t i o n s , had p r e v i o u s l y processed t h e v e r y same l i s t o f concepts, s u b j e c t s i n t h e f i r s t c o n d i t i o n gave r e c o g n i t i o n responses s y s t e m a t i c a l l y f a s t e r t h a n s u b j e c t s i n t h e second c o n d i t i o n . Such a r e s u l t may be accounted f o r i f one assumes t h a t s u b j e c t s i n t h e f i r s t c o n d i t i o n , a t t h e end o f t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t a s k , m a i n t a i n e d i n t h e i r w o r k i n g memory a t r a n s i e n t t r a c e o f p r e v i o u s l y a c t u a l i z e d f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s . These s u b j e c t s t h u s were i n a f a v o u r a b l e p o s i t i o n f o r responding t o p i c t u r e s s i n c e t h e m a j o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f any p i c t o r i a l mater i a l i s t o d i r e c t l y show t h e f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s o f o b j e c t s . Conversely, s u b j e c t s i n t h e second c o n d i t i o n i n i t i a l l y a c t u a l i z e d n o n - f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s o f concepts and thus were l e s s a b l e than o t h e r s t o r e c o g n i z e s t i m u l i ( p i c t u r e s ) showing p r o p e r t i e s o f another k i n d ( f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s ) . T h e r e f o r e s e l e c t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f f i g u r a t i v e semantic f e a t u r e s i s r e f l e c t e d i n t h e way s u b j e c t s l a t e r process a p i c t o r i a l m a t e r i a l . One should a l s o mention t h a t when s u b j e c t s had t o g i v e t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n responses n o t t o p i c t u r e s b u t t o w r i t t e n names o f i n s truments, t h e r e was no l o n g e r any d i f f e r e n c e between t h e two c o n d i t i o n s . On t h e whole, c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h i s experiment a r e i n agreement w i t h r e s u l t s such as those presented by Johnson-Laird, Gibbs,and de Mowbray (1978), a c c o r d i n g t o which t h e semantic p r o c e s s i n g o f a word does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e a l l t h e elements o f i t s meaning.

A f u r t h e r s t e p i n t h i s r e s e a r c h c o n s i s t e d i n demonstrating t h a t s e l e c t i v e a c t u a l i z a t i o n may o p e r a t e w i t h i n t h e subset o f f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s as w e l l . I n l i n e w i t h a componential approach o f mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ( c f . Le Ny, 1979), t h e f o l l o w i n g h y p o t h e s i s was examined, i . e . , semantic a n a l y s i s o f a sentence a c t u a l i z e s i n a r e a d e r ' s mind s p e c i f i e d subsets o f f e a t u r e s , r a t h e r t h a n whole s e t s o f f e a t u r e s composing a l l t h e concepts r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e sentence. For i n s t a n c e , t h e concept u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r t h e word e a g l e i s l i k e l y t o be composed w i t h f e a t u r e s such as HOOKED BEAK, LARGE WINGS, C L A W m L D , DANGEROUS, e t c . However, when one reads a sentence as : The e a g l e suddenly swooped down and snatched t h e weasel, i t i s supposed t h a t a p r e f e r e n t i a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e f e a t u r e CLAWS occurs, w h i l e t h e r e i s a l e s s e r a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e o t h e r f e a t u r e s , o r even no a c t u a l i z a t i o n a t a l l f o r some o f them. There i s some evidence f o r t h i s i n an experiment t h a t was conducted w i t h J.-F. Le Ny. A f t e r h a v i n g r e a d such a sentence, s u b j e c t s were p r e sented w i t h a p i c t u r e showing a p a r t o f an eagle, and t h e y were i n s t r u c t e d t o say whether t h e p i c t u r e i l l u s t r a t e d a p a r t o f an o b j e c t d e s c r i b e d i n t h e sentence. When t h e s u b j e c t s were presented w i t h a p i c t u r e showing an e a g l e ' s claws, t h e i r responses were f a s t e r t h a n when t h e y were presented w i t h f o r i n s t a n c e e a g l e ' s wings. I n t h e same way, a f t e r r e a d i n g a sentence whose c o n t e n t focused on t h e f e a t u r e WINGS, such as : The e a g l e soared s l o w l y and m a j e s t i c a l l y i n t o t h e heavens, s u b j e c t s now responded f a s t e r t o t h e p i c t u r e o f wings than t o t h e p i c t u r e m s . Such r e s u l t s may be accounted f o r i f we a d m i t t h a t semantic p r o c e s s i n g o f d e s c r i p t i v e sentences u n e q u a l l y a c t i v a t e s components o f meaning. The f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s focused on by t h e sentence a r e p r i m a r i l y a c t i v a t e d and m a i n t a i n e d i n memory, whereas o t h e r f i g u r a t i v e f e a t u r e s a r e a c t i v a t e d a t a l o w e r degree, o r even n o t a c t i v a t e d a t a l l . I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n l a t e n c i e s was no l o n g e r observed when s u b j e c t s had t o respond, n o t t o p i c t u r e s , b u t t o w r i t t e n words ( i n t h i s example, t h e word claws or t h e word w i n g s ) . T h i s r e s u l t was o b t a i n e d i n a f u r t h e r e x p e r i ment, a n d i t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n e l a b o r a t e d by t h e r e a d e r o f t h e sentence, t h a t i s m a i n t a i n e d w h i l e he o r she i s w a i t i n g f o r t h e t a r g e t item, a c t u a l l y c o n t a i n s a s p e c i f i c a l l y f i g u r a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n . Is t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v e n t t o be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a v i s u a l image ? Is i t " o n l y " a c o g n i t i v e , non

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i m a g i n a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t have been evoked i n t h e sentence ? A d e f i n i t e answer i s hard t o g i v e . I w i l l however n o t e t h a t t h e e x i s tence o f such t r a n s i e n t mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o n t a i n i n g some a c t u a l l y f i g u r a t i ve i n f o r m a t i o n has been suggested by r e s u l t s d e r i v e d f r o m an o t h e r experiment, which was conducted w i t h D. Dubois. Without d i s c u s s i n g t h e d e t a i l s o f t h i s experiment, I w i l l o n l y m e n t i o n t h a t , i n one c o n d i t i o n , s u b j e c t s had t o r e a d d e s c r i p t i v e sentences, such as : A m a j e s t i c swan was s i l e n t l y g l i d i n g on t h e l a k e i n t h e park, and t h e n t o d e c i d e whether a p i c t u r e c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d as an i l l u s t r a t i o n t o t h e sentence. F o r p i c t u r e s supposed t o e l i c i t p o s i t i v e responses, l a t e n c i e s were s h o r t e r t o t h e p i c t u r e o f a t y p i c a l swan t h a n t o t h e p i c t u r e o f a l e s s t y p i c a l one (such as a b l a c k swan). But t h e r e l e v a n t f i n d i n g here i s t h a t f o r p i c t u r e s supposed t o e l i c i t n e g a t i v e responses, l a t e n c i e s were l o n g e r t o p i c t u r e s t h a t c o n t a i n e d more f i g u r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e t y p i c a l i t e m . F o r i n s t a n c e , n e g a t i v e c o r r e c t responses were slower t h e p i c t u r e o f a goose ( a b i r d t h a t possesses a number o f f i g u r a t i v e p r o p e r t i e s i n common w i t h t h e t y p i c a l swan, such as t h e c o l o r w h i t e , a long neck, e t c . ) t h a n t o t h e p i c t u r e o f an owl. So i t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e semantic represent a t i o n o f t h e t h i n g s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e sentence has an a c t u a l l y f i g u r a t i v e cont e n t , b u t i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o s t a t e t h a t t h i s c o n t e n t i s always and f o r e v e r y body expressed through a conscious c o g n i t i v e experience, as a v i s u a l image. As a f i n a l comment, I w i l l r e l a t e t h e r e s e a r c h e f f o r t s d e s c r i b e d above t o t h e c u r r e n t t r e n d t h a t g i v e s a growing importance t o p a r t i a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n and focal i z a t i o n processes i n c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t i e s . I t i s a m a t t e r of f a c t t h a t r e l a t i n g t h e s t u d y o f f i g u r a t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o t h e s t u d y o f language comprehension gave prominence t o t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c o g n i t i v e processes. More g e n e r a l l y , h a v i n g s t u d i e d t h e d a t a , t h e r e a r e good reasons f o r o u r b e l i e v i n g i n t h e f r u i t f u l n e s s o f a mutual s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e approaches o f r e s e a r c h e r s i n language comprehension and o f those i n imagery. NOTE The r e s e a r c h r e p o r t e d above and t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r were supported n o 235. by t h e L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie, Equipe de Recherche associee au C.N.R.S. A u t h o r ' s address : L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie, E.R.A. au C.N.R.S. no 235, U n i v e r s i t @ de P a r i s V I I I , 2, r u e de l a L i b e r t e , 93526 Saint-Denis Cedex 2, France. REFERENCES Beech, J.R., An a l t e r n a t i v e model t o account f o r t h e C l a r k and Chase p i c t u r e v e r i f i c a t i o n experiments, J o u r n a l o f Mental Imagery, 1980, 4, 1-11. Carpenter, P.A., and J u s t , M.A., Sentence comprehension : A p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c p r o c e s s i n g model o f v e r i f i c a t i o n , P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review, 1975, 82, 45-73. Chase, W.G., and C l a r k , H.H., Mental o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e comparison o f sentences and p i c t u r e s , i n L.W. Gregg (ed.), C o g n i t i o n i n l e a r n i n g and memory, New York, Wiley, 1972. C o l l i n s , A . M . , and Q u i l l i a n , M.P., R e t r i e v a l t i m e f r o m semantic memory, J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1969, 8, 240-247. Denis, M.,

Les images mentales, P a r i s , Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1979.

Denis, M., V a l e u r d ' i m a g e r i e e t c o m p o s i t i o n semantique : a n a l y s e de deux e c h a n t i l l o n s de s u b s t a n t i f s , U n i v e r s i t e de P a r i s V I I I , Documents du L a b o r a t o i r e de Psychologie, 1982 ( a ) . Denis, M., On f i g u r a t i v e components o f mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , i n F. K l i x , J. Hoffmann and E. van d e r Meer (eds.), C o g n i t i v e r e s e a r c h i n psychology :

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Recent approaches, designs and r e s u l t s , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1982 ( b ) . and Weil-Barais, A . , A c t i v i t e s a n t i c i p a t r i c e s dans une tdche de comparaison de dessins e t de phrases, i n J . Requin ( e d . ) , A n t i c i p a t i o n e t 1980. comportement, P a r i s , E d i t i o n s du C.N.R.S.,

(8) Dubois, D.,

(9) Eysenck, M.W., The f e e l i n g o f knowing a word's meaning, B r i t i s h J o u r n a l o f Psychology, 1979, 70, 243-251. (10) Friedman, A., Memorial comparisons w i t h o u t t h e "mind's eye", J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1978, 17, 427-444.

(11) Glass, A.L., Eddy, J.K., and Schwanenflugel, P.J., The v e r i f i c a t i o n o f h i g h and low imagery sentences, J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology : Human L e a r n i n g and Memory, 1980, 6, 692-704. (12) Hoffmann, J . , R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f concepts and t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f o b j e c t s , i n F. K l i x , J. Hoffmann and E. van d e r Meer (eds.), C o g n i t i v e r e s e a r c h i n psychology : Recent approaches, designs and r e s u l t s , Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1982. and Langford, J., Comprehension and r e c a l l o f a b s t r a c t and con(13) Holmes, V.M., c r e t e sentences, J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1976, 15, 559-566. (14) Holyoak, K.J., The r o l e o f imagery i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f sentences : Imagery o r semantic f a c t o r s ? J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1974, 13, 162-166. (15) H u t t e n l o c h e r , J . , C o n s t r u c t i n g s p a t i a l images : A s t r a t e g y i n reasoning, P s y c h o l o g i c a l Review, 1968, 75, 550-560. (16) Johnson-Laird, P.N., s i n g , and memory f o r (17) Jorgensen, C.C., and sentences, C o g n i t i v e (18) Kosslyn, S.M., 1980.

Gibbs, G., and de Mowbray, J., Meaning, amount o f proceswords, Memory and C o g n i t i o n , 1978, 6, 372-375. Kintsch, W . , The r o l e o f imagery i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f Psychology, 1973, 4, 110-116.

Image and mind, Cambridge, Mass.,

Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press,

(19) Kosslyn, S.M., Murphy, G.L., Bemesderfer, M.E., and F e i n s t e i n , K.J., Category and continuum i n mental comparisons, J o u r n a l o f Experimental Psychology : General, 1977, 106, 341-375. (20) Le Ny, J.-F., La semantique psychologique, P a r i s , Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1979. (21) MacLeod, C.M., Hunt, E.B., and Mathews, N.N., I n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n o f s e n t e n c e - p i c t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1978, 17, 493-507. (22) M i l l e r , G.A., and Johnson-Laird, P.N., Language and p e r c e p t i o n , Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press ; Cambridge, England, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1976. (23) P a i v i o , A., Imagery and v e r b a l processes, New York, H o l t , R i n e h a r t E Winston, 1971 (Second p r i n t i n g , H i l l s d a l e , N.J., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1979). (24) P a i v i o , A., Perceptual comparisons through t h e m i n d ' s eye, Memory and Cognit i o n , 1975, 3, 635-647. (25) P a i v i o , A . , Mental comparisons i n v o l v i n g a b s t r a c t a t t r i b u t e s . Memory and Cognition, 1978, 6, 199-208. (26) P o t t e r , M.C., Valian, V . V . , and Faulconer, B.A., R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a sentence and i t s p r a g m a t i c i m p l i c a t i o n s : Verbal, i m a g i s t i c , o r a b s t r a c t ? J o u r n a l o f Verbal L e a r n i n g and Verbal Behavior, 1977, 16, 1-12. (27) Rosch, E., Mervis, C.B., Gray, W., Johnson, D., and Boyes-Braem, P., B a s i c o b j e c t s i n n a t u r a l c a t e g o r i e s , C o g n i t i v e Psychology, 1976, 8, 382-439.

Images and Semantic Representations

27

(28) Smith, E.E., Shoben, E.J., and Rips, L.J., Structure and process i n semantic memory : A featural model for semantic decisions, Psychological Review, 1974, 81, 214-241.

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29

SUBJECTIVITY AND MEMORY Rand J . S p i r o Center f o r t h e Study o f Reading U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l i n o i s a t Urbana-Champaign U.S.A.

Imagine y o u r s e l f ( o r someone you a r e r e a d i n g a b o u t ) w a l k i n g along a dockside l a t e on a foggy n i g h t . For most people t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n evokes a mood, one o f m y s t e r y o r , perhaps, suspense. Whatever words you choose, however, t h e d e s c r i p t i o n w i l l d i f f e r f r o m t h e a c t u a l experience o f t h e mood.

Saying something i s

m y s t e r i o u s i s o b v i o u s l y d i f f e r e n t from f e e l i n g t h e sense o f m y s t e r y .

What does

contemporary c o g n i t i v e science have t o say about these two ways o f t h i n k i n g about t h i n g s ? latter.

A l i t t l e b i t about t h e former and n e x t t o n o t h i n g about t h e

Almost a l l r e c e n t Anglo-American r e s e a r c h has focused on aspects o f

mental a c t i v i t y t h a t can be p u t i n t o words o r a t l e a s t r e p r e s e n t e d i n some d i s c r e t e p r o p o s i t i o n a l form.

Other than a small amount o f r e c e n t work on s t a t e -

dependent r e t r i e v a l processes, t h e p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e o f i n t e r n a l experience on c o g n i t i o n has been ignored.

When a f f e c t i s c l e a r l y i n v o l v e d i n understanding

( f o r example, i f a c h a r a c t e r i n a s t o r y i s a n g r y enough t o i n f l u e n c e h i s a c t i o n s ) , t h e t e m p t a t i o n i s t o p r e d i c a t e a v e r b a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e a f f e c t i v e s t a t e as a property o f the individual.

The a f f e c t i v e s t a t e may be analyzed t o determine,

among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e k i n d s o f i n f e r e n c e s i t enables.

Such an approach i s

c e r t a i n l y u s e f u l , b u t i t does n o t c a p t u r e t h e d i r e c t , e x p e r i e n t i a l aspect o f t h e state.

The l a t t e r i s n o t j u s t a n o t h e r p r o p e r t y , b u t something t h a t pervades t h e

things the individual thinks

about.

Furthermore, i t w i l l o f t e n f u n c t i o n as a

background t o foregrounded a c t i v i t i e s . and a c t a n g r i l y .

So i f someone i s angry, t h e y w i l l t h i n k

The q u e s t i o n t h a t must be asked i s whether t h e k i n d o f perva-

s i v e background ' ' c o l o r a t i o n ' ' t h a t seems t o c h a r a c t e r i z e moods and o t h e r a f f e c t i v e s t a t e s has any f u n c t i o n a l r o l e i n c o g n i t i o n and, i f so, whether such r o l e s can be studied empirically. F i r s t , i t s e m s somewhat s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n has n o t r e c e i v e d more attention.

B a r t l e t t . (1932) p l a c e d vague, l a r g e l y a f f e c t i v e , general impressions

o f t h e whole of a p a s t event ( w h i c h he c a l l e d a t t i t u d e s ) a t t h e c e n t e r of h i s t h e o r y o f r e c o n s t r u c ' t i v e memory. T h i s aspect o f h i s t h e o r y i s v i r t u a l l y t h e only one t h a t has n o t l e d t o f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h i n t h e l a s t t e n y e a r s .

Four common

b e l i e f s can be o f f e r e d as reasons f o r t h i s n e g l e c t . F i r s t , i n t e r n a l experience i s p r i v a t e . You cannot know what a n o t h e r f e e l s as he f e e l s i t . T h i s i s

30

R.J. Spiro

certainly true.

Second, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t f e e l i n g s f u n c t i o n a s background

g e s t a l t s t h e y c o u l d n o t be modeled even i f t h e y were n o t p r i v a t e .

When you

a n a l y z e something you p u t i t i n t o t h e foreground, t h u s making i t i n t o a d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f t h i n g , and when you a n a l y z e a whole i n t o i t s p a r t s you l o s e i t s h o l i s t i c character.

This i s also true.

The t h i r d and f o u r t h reasons a r e t h a t background

f e e l i n g s and moods a r e n o t causal agents i n c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y ( i . e . ,

they are

epiphenomenal) and, i n any case, q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g them cannot be e m p i r i c a l . I t i s w i t h t h e s e two assumptions t h a t I d i s a g r e e .

F i r s t , even i f f e e l i n g s do

have epiphenomenal o r i g i n s , once had t h e y c o u l d t h e n become u s e f u l .

Second, i f

you cannot model some h y p o t h e s i z e d a s p e c t o f mental f u n c t i o n i n g , you can s t i l l t e s t i t i n d i r e c t l y by d e s i g n i n g experiments t h e r e s u l t s o f which may p r e c l u d e a l t e r n a t i v e a c c o u n t s t o t h o s e i n v o k i n g t h e proposed c o n s t r u c t .

I n t h i s paper, I

w i l l o u t l i n e some ways phenomena r e l a t e d t o mental s t a t e s may be i n v o l v e d i n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and r e c a l l o f t e x t and r e a l e v e n t s . ARGUMENTS FOR FEELINGS BEING REPRESENTED I N MEMORY I t seems l i k e l y t h a t f e e l i n g s a r e l e f t behind i n some d u r a b l e f a s h i o n i n

l o n g - t e r m memory.

T h i s would make sense f r o m an e v o l u t i o n a r y p o i n t o f v i e w .

Remembering t h a t a c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i s l i k e a p a s t one t h a t was f e a r f u l , f o r example, b e f o r e remembering any o f t h e e p i s o d i c p a r t i c u l a r s would have o b v i o u s a d a p t i v e value.

To t h e e x t e n t t h a t f e e l i n g s a r e s o m a t i c a l l y i n v o l v i n g t h e y may

be more e n d u r i n g .

To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e g e s t a l t s t h e y would be h i g h l y

chunked and t h u s amenable t o e f f i c i e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and r a p i d scanning i n memory (see b e l o w ) .

Perhaps most i m p o r t a n t , t h e y a r e f r e e b y - p r o d u c t s o f l i v i n g .

You u s u a l l y do n o t have t o engage i n any e f f o r t f u l p r o c e s s i n g t o have f e e l i n g s ; t h e y j u s t happen. Beyond t h e s e common-sense arguments, t h e r e i s some s u p p o r t i v e d a t a , a l b e i t scant.

B a r t l e t t found t h a t vague h o l i s t i c i m p r e s s i o n s were t h e f i r s t t h i n g s t o

come t o mind i n remembering s t o r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e a n e c d o t a l r e p o r t s o f h i s memory s u b j e c t s .

Recent work on state-dependent r e t r i e v a l (e.g.,

Bower, 1980)

shows t h a t b e i n g i n a d i f f e r e n t emotional mood s t a t e a t t h e t i m e o f r e c a l l t h a n a t t h e t i m e o f a c q u i s i t i o n i n h i b i t s memory performance.

I would l i k e t o argue,

however, t h a t t h e state-dependent approach c o n s i d e r s o n l y a s m a l l p a r t o f t h e f u n c t i o n of f e e l i n g s i n memory.

Feelings are n o t j u s t another f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g

t h e a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n memory.

Rather, t h e y may p l a y a u b i q u i t o u s

f u n c t i o n i n v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f t e x t r e c a l l ( a s w e l l as i n m e t a c o g n i t i o n and accommodative l e a r n i n g ; see S p i r o , i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) .

The q u e s t i o n t h a t we w i l l

ask, then, i s n o t m e r e l y do you need a mood match between a c q u i s i t i o n and r e c a l l , b u t how does h a v i n g a mood i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e make a d i f f e r e n c e .

Subjwtivity and Memory

SIGNATURE FEELINGS:

31

THE P E R V A S I V E COLORATION MODEL

The e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h on f e l t . experience and memory i n my l a b o r a t o r y i s guided by a f a i r l y s i m p l e model, t h e r u d i m e n t s o f which can be o u t l i n e d s u c c i n c t l y ( f o r more d e t a i l and some o m i t t e d c o m p l e x i t i e s , see S p i r o , i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) . proposed t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t e x t and r e a l events has two a s p e c t s :

It i s

proposi-

t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of c o n t e n t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f r e l e v a n t p r e e x i s t i n g knowledge schemata and analog r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l e x p e r i e n t i a l s t a t e s .

An e a r l y

Much as a hand-

metaphor we used t o d e s c r i b e t h e l a t t e r i n v o l v e d h a n d w r i t i n g .

w r i t i n g e x p e r t can draw c o n c l u s i o n s about t h e a f f e c t i v e s t a t e o f a w r i t e r based on a specimen o f h i s h a n d w r i t i n g , t h e r e i s a mental " h a n d w r i t i n g . "

Furthermore,

we a r e a l l f a i r l y e x p e r t , i n v a r y i n g degrees, i n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

Thus i n

a d d i t i o n t o r e p r e s e n t i n g c o n t e n t , something a b o u t t h e manner o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c a r r i e s i n f o r m a t i o n about e x p e r i e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

A l t h o u g h t h i s metaphor

i s u s e f u l i n g i v i n g a f i r s t a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l n o t i o n , we no l o n g e r employ i t ( f o r reasons t o o l e n g t h y t o go i n t o h e r e ) .

A more a c c u r a t e

n o t i o n can be g o t t e n by t h i n k i n g o f a l l c o n t e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as h a v i n g a backThe n a t u r e o f t h e c o l o r a t i o n corresponds t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e

ground c o l o r a t i o n . f e l t experience.

When an event has a c o n t i n u o u s dominant e x p e r i e n t i a l q u a l i t y ,

as events o f t e n do ( c f . , James, 1890), t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e event w i l l have a r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous background c o l o r a t i o n .

When such homogeneity p r e v a i l s ,

I r e f e r t o t h e event as having a s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g ( I use s i g n a t u r e i n much t h e same way as m u s i c i a n s w i l l r e f e r t o t h e compositions o f Beethoven, f o r example, as having c e r t a i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t a c t as h i s s i g n a t u r e ) . The r o l e o f f e e l i n g - b a s e d background c o l o r a t i o n i n memory can t h e n be summarized as f o l l o w s : 1.

R e t r i e v a l i n d e x i n g and e f f i c i e n c y .

I t i s hypothesized t h a t , f i g u r a -

t i v e l y speaking, background c o l o r a t i o n i s v i s i b l e f r o m a g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e than specific content.

I n f o r m a t i o n i n r e t r i e v a l c o n t e x t s f i r s t l e a d s t o memory f i l e s

t h a t c o n t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n about s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g s .

T h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i s t h e n used

f o r a p r e l i m i n a r y scan o f t h e more d e t a i l e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , b u t a t a " d i s t a n c e " t h a t allows detection o f coloration but not content specifics.

When a c o l o r a t i o n

match i s found, t h e memory area w i t h t h a t c o l o r a t i o n i s t h e n " m a g n i f i e d " a l l o w i n g r e t r i e v a l of s p e c i f i c memorial i n f o r m a t i o n . [The process i s a c t u a l l y q u i t e a b i t more complicated, i n v o l v i n g a p r o g r e s s i v e refinement o f t h e t a r g e t c o l o r a t i o n w i t h succeeding r e t r i e v a l passes, b u t t h e d e t a i l s a r e beyond t h e scope of t h i s paper.]

Since c o l o r a t i o n i s v i s i b l e f r o m g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e s and can be checked

r e l a t i v e l y r a p i d l y " a t a glance," t h i s f i r s t pass h e u r i s t i c scan i n c r e a s e s t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f remembering ( w i t h some c o s t s r e l a t e d t o f a l s e p o s i t i v e r e t r i e v a l s t h a t may be d e t e c t e d i n t h e more c a r e f u l second stage a n a l y t i c check). 2.

Cohesion.

To t h e e x t e n t t h a t c o n t e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e a s s o c i a t e d

32

R.J. Spiro

w i t h homogeneous e x p e r i e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s ( i .e.,

high conformity t o signature

f e e l i n g s ) , t h e c o l o r a t i o n w i l l a c t as a k i n d o f cohesive g l u e t o i n h i b i t d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f memories o v e r t i m e .

T h i s mood-based cohesion i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t

from t h e t r a d i t i o n a l k i n d s o f s y n t a c t i c and semantic cohesion. 3.

C o n s t r a i n t s on r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .

p a s s i v e r e t r i e v a l o f s t o r e d memory t r a c e s .

Remembering i s more t h a n j u s t t h e A c t i v e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e processes a l s o

p l a y a v e r y i m p o r t a n t p a r t ( B a r t l e t t , 1932; S p i r o , 1977).

Since r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s

a r e l i k e l y t o be incomplete, w i t h much i n f o r m a t i o n processed a t i n p u t i n such a way as t o l e a v e i t t o be d e r i v e d l a t e r i f needed ( S p i r o & E s p o s i t o , i n p r e s s ) , many s p e c i f i c s a r e i n f e r r e d a t t h e t i m e o f r e c a l l i n such a way as t o make t h e complete r e c o l l e c t i o n b o t h i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and c o n s i s t e n t w i t h knowledge o f t h e way t h e w o r l d u s u a l l y works.

The s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g c o n s t r a i n s t h i s process

by a c t i n g as a check on generated c a n d i d a t e memories.

I n f o r m a t i o n t h a t may

l o g i c a l l y and p r a g m a t i c a l l y f i t w i t h t h e r e s t o f an e v e n t can be d i s c o u n t e d Furthermore, t h e

i f i t would s e r i o u s l y d i s t o r t t h e s t a b l e s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g .

s i g n a t u r e f e e l i n g can be used as a c r i t e r i o n g u i d i n g t h e i n i t i a l g e n e r a t i o n o f candidates.

A PRELIMINARY TEST OF THE MODEL I w i l l i l l u s t r a t e one o f t h e paradigms we have developed and one s e t o f r e s u l t s t h a t bear on t h e f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n . To s t a r t a t t h e beginning, i t makes sense t o i n q u i r e as t o what h a v i n g a c l e a r and s a l i e n t mood does f o r you as compared t o n o t h a v i n g one.

A s t u d y by

S p i r o and Crismore ( i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) addressed t h a t q u e s t i o n .

Subjects read v e r y

d r y and t o n e l e s s passages about c h a r a c t e r s e x e c u t i n g chores.

These passages were

n o t e v o c a t i v e o f any mood.

I n t h e experimental c o n d i t i o n , s u b j e c t s were presented

w i t h b r i e f e x c e r p t s from poems such as t h e f o l l o w i n g one f r o m C o l e r i d g e ' s

Frost

a t Midnight: ' T i s calm indeed! so calm t h a t i t d i s t u r b s And vexes m e d i t a t i o n w i t h i t s s t r a n g e and extreme s i l e n t n e s s .

A poem e x c e r p t was presented b e f o r e each o f two passages.

S u b j e c t s were i n s t r u c -

t e d t o read t h e poem e x c e r p t and t o t r y t o g e t a f e e l i n g o r mood from i t .

They

were t o l d t h a t t h e r e were no r i g h t o r wrong moods, t h a t whatever t h e y f e l t was right.

The i n s t r u c t i o n f o r u s i n g t h e poem was s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d :

t h e y were t o

keep t h e f e e l i n g o r mood i n t h e back o f t h e i r minds w h i l e r e a d i n g t h e passage, much l i k e background music i n a movie. It was hypothesized t h a t i n t h e poem c o n d i t i o n t h e background mood would

p r o v i d e a p e r v a s i v e background c o l o r a t i o n t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e events i n t h e passages, whereas i n t h e c o n t r o l c o n d i t i o n no such u n i f y i n g c o l o r a t i o n would be a v a i l a b l e .

A c c o r d i n g l y , i t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e events i n

Subjtctivity and Memory

t h e passages over t i m e would be lessened i n t h e poem c o n d i t i o n . T h i s should be e s p e c i a l l y t r u e f o r i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t had l e s s cohesive support from p r e e x i s t i n g knowledge s t r u c t u r e s (a more e f f i c i e n t way t o connect i n f o r m a t i o n ) .

The passages

each c o n s i s t e d o f four general t o p i c s (e.g., c l e a n i n g , working on photographs, r e p a i r i n g t h i n g s ) . I t was expected t h a t these t o p i c s would n o t have s u b s t a n t i a l p r e e x i s t i n g knowledge c o n n e c t i o n s . For each general t o p i c , t h r e e s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s were mentioned i n t h e passages (e.g., the topic "cleaning").

washing t h e f l o o r o r d o i n g t h e d i s h e s f o r

Given t o p i c a v a i l a b i l i t y , knowledge-based cohesion was

expected t o be g r e a t e r w i t h i n t o p i c s t h a n across them. The r e s u l t s were as p r e d i c t e d by t h e c o l o r a t i o n model.

Immediate f r e e r e c a l l

i n d i c a t e d a s l i g h t b u t s t a t i s t i c a l l y n o n s i g n i f i c a n t advantage i n t o p i c r e c a l l f o r t h e no-poems c o n t r o l c o n d i t i o n .

However, a f t e r two t o f o u r weeks s u b j e c t s i n t h e

poem c o n d i t i o n r e c a l l e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y more o f t h e general t o p i c s than were r e called i n the control condition.

T h i s t r e n d was e s p e c i a l l y pronounced f o r sub-

j e c t s s c o r i n g below t h e median on a vocabulary t e s t , s u b j e c t s you would expect t o have l e s s w e l l developed v e r b a l - a n a l y t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s and perhaps t o manifest a g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on mood-based cohesion as compensation.

There was no

d i f f e r e n c e between poem and c o n t r o l s u b j e c t s i n t h e c o n d i t i o n a l p r o b a b i l i t y o f r e c a l l i n g s p e c i f i c a c t i o n s g i v e n t h a t t h e general t o p i c was r e c a l l e d .

This

i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a cohesive mood background f a c i l i t a t e d r e c a l l p r i m a r i l y by h o l d i n g t o g e t h e r t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n which had l e s s e r a p r i o r i conncctedness, i n accordance w i t h t h e c o l o r a t i o n model.

The g e n e r a l i t y o f t h e s e r e s u l t s

i s a t t e s t e d t o by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a p p l i e d t o m a n i p u l a t e d moods as d i f f e r e n t as t h o s e o f calmness and t u r b u l e n c e , suggesting t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s a r e n o t t h e mere r e s u l t o f emotional a r o u s a l o r t r a n q u i l i z a t i o n .

Furthermore, t h e r e was no seman-

t i c c o n n e c t i o n between t h e poem e x c e r p t s and t h e passage c o n t e n t s , and t h e r e was no c o r r e l a t i o n between whether s u b j e c t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y had t r i e d t o f i n d a c o n n e c t i o n between t h e poems and t h e passages o r n o t and t h e amount o f r e c a l l , making depth o f p r o c e s s i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s u n l i k e l y .

A l s o , enhanced imagery

based on t h e poem's mood i s an u n l i k e l y account o f t h e r e s u l t s - - s u b j e c t s would be u n l i k e l y t o e l a b o r a t e g e n e r i c c a t e g o r i e s w i t h mood i n f o r m a t i o n w h i l e n o t e l a b o r a t i n g the s p e c i f i c concrete actions (e.g.,

calmness p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g t h e c a t e g o r y

" c l e a n i n g " b u t n o t t h e c o n c r e t e a c t o f washing t h e f l o o r ) .

It i s also interest-

i n g t o n o t e t h a t d e b r i e f i n g responses i n d i c a t e d t h a t s u b j e c t s d i d n o t appear t o have t o r e c a l l t h e poem mood a t t h e t i m e o f r e c a l l f o r t h a t mood t o have a f a v o r able e f f e c t . THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE M I N D What a r e mental moods? There a r e obvious l i m i t a t i o n s on answering t h i s q u e s t i o n , such as t h e p r i v a c y problem mentioned e a r l i e r . D e s p i t e t h e c o n s t r a i n t s , an approach a t a v e r y general l e v e l i s p o s s i b l e .

Most would accept t h e n o t i o n

R.J. Spiro

34

t h a t t h e r e i s a stream o f thought something l i k e t h a t d e s c r i b e d by, say, W i l l i a m James (1890) o r , perhaps Henri Bergson (1903).

I f one f u r t h e r a l l o w s t h a t t h i s

.e., stream i s sometimes experienced by us i n some d i r e c t p r e s e n t a t i o n a l way (i we can be aware o f o u r mental s t a t e s w i t h o u t m e d i a t i o n a l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s ) , than i t i s t h a t immediate s u b j e c t i v e aspect (Dewey, 1910) t h a t I r e f e r t o as f e l t experience o r mental mood.

I t h i n k t h a t most o f u s would agree t h a t a p a l p a b l e

atmosphere pcrmeates o u r thought, p a r t i c u l a r l y when o u r purposes do n o t wander much.

It i s

our awareness o f t h e s e atmospheres t h a t leads, f o r example, t o t h e

spark o f r e c o g n i t i o n we f i n d i n t h e n o v e l s o f stream o f consciousness w r i t e r s l i k e James Joyce, V i r g i n i a Woolf, and Marcel P r o u s t (whose view o f memory and a f f e c t i s n o t t h a t d i s s i m i l a r from t h a t advanced h e r e ) .

The n a t u r e o f t h i s mental atmo-

sphere may n o t be t h e same f o r everybody ( i t almost c e r t a i n l y i s n o t , beyond t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f some general l e v e l s i m i l a r i t i e s ) , b u t i f i t e x i s t s , and i t i s a n a t u r a l and e f f o r t l e s s by-product o f thought, then i t would be h i g h l y w a s t e f u l f o r i t n o t t o be p u t t o some i n t e r n a l use.

REFERENCES B a r t l e t t , F.C. Bergson, H.

1903.

Bower, G. H. Dewey, J.

1932.

Cambridge:

"Mood and Memory."

1890.

S p i r o , R. J.

New York:

The P r i n c i p l e s o f Psychology.

1977.

hpproach."

New York:

( I n J. Dewey, The

H o l t , R i n e h a r t & Winston.)

New York:

"Remembering I n f o r m a t i o n from T e x t :

I n R.C.

Bobbs-Merrill.

American P s y c h o l o g i s t 36, 129-148.

"The P o s t u l a t e o f Immediate Empiricism."

I n f l u e n c e o f Darwin on Philosophy. James, W.

Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press.

An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Metaphysics.

1980.

1936.

Remembering.

Henry H o l t . The ' S t a t e o f Schema'

Anderson, R. J. S p i r o , & W . E. Montague (Eds.),

Schooling and t h e A c q u i s i t i o n o f Knowledge.

H i l l s d a l e , New Jersey:

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. FOOTNOTE T h i s r e s e a r c h was supported i n p a r t by t h e N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e o f Education under C o n t r a c t No. US-NIE-C-400-76-0116.

Many he1 p f u l d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Avon

Crismore and Terrence Turner a r e g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged.

LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION

J.-F. Le Ny, W. Kintsch (editors)

0 North-HollandPublishing Company, 1982

35

OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES IN DISCOURSE COMPREHENSION Teun A. van Dijk University of Amsterdam Dept. of General Literary Studies Section of Discourse Studies

Not only knowledge but also opinions and attitudes play an important role in the comprehension and cognitive representation of discourse. To model this 'subjective understanding' we need a format for the representation of opinions and attitudes in semantic memory and strategies for their use in comprehension. It is shown how opinions and attitudes are involved in the establishment of local and global coherence and how this personal 'bias' in understanding is represented in episodic memory.

1. INTRODUCTION One of the most important contributions of psychology and A1 to the study of discourse in the last decade has been the recognition of the pervasive role of knowledge in discourse processing. It has been shown that discourse understanding involves both bottom-up and top-down processing and that many inferences must be made in order to establish local and global coherence in textual representations. Both kinds of processing presuppose large amounts of world knowledge --besides the textual and contextual information conveyed in the communicative situation. In order to access and use this information effectively, it has been assumed that knowledge must be intelligently organized. Notions such as frame (Minsky, 1975), script (Schank & Abelson, 1977) and schema (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975) have been proposed for the representation formats of knowledge in long term memory. At the same time, it has been shown in psychology that these kinds of knowledge organization indeed play a role in understanding and representing discourse (Bower, Black & Turner, 1979; Haberlandt & Bingham, 1982; Reiser & Black, 1 9 8 2 ) . In this paper it will be argued that similar observations may be made for the role of other kinds of cognitive information,such as opinions and attitudes. That is, language users in natural communicative situations will not only bring to bear their knowledge about persons, objects, events, actions or episodes referred to by a text, but also organized sets of e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s . The use of such beliefs will not only imply that a language user assigns evaluations to textual information, but also that the very processes of understanding may be affected. In this way, lexical search, the assignment of propositions to clauses, the establishment of local coherence between propositions and the derivation of semantic macrostructures (discourse topics) may take place under the control of a personal, subjective b i a s . And, of course, the result of these subjectively controlled processes will be a subjective representation of a discourse in episodic memory. In order to model these processes of subjective understanding, we first need to devise an appropriate representation format for beliefs, opinions and attitudes. Despite a long research tradition in social psychology about opinions and attitudes, we still know very little about their nature and their structures. Secondly, we also need to formulate the basic principles, the rules and strategies, for the

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T.A. van Dijk

effective use of opinions and attitudes in various cognitive tasks, such as understanding actions and episodes or the discourses about these. It might be assumed that theory formation in this area of cognitive information processing could simply extend our current insights about the structures and the use of knowledge to such forms of 'hot' or 'soft' cognition as opinions and attitudes. And indeed, it seems plausible that there will be an analogy between the fundamental principles of organization and use in both sub-domains. On the other hand, opinions and attitudes involve evaluations and are related to values and norms, which are notions that are traditionally linked with reputedly vague things like affect and emotions. In other words, the extension from a model of objective or inter-subjective understanding to a model of subjective understanding might not be straighforward. The discussion about the role of opinions and attitudes in discourse comprehension will take place against the background of my earlier work, partly in collaboration with Walter Kintsch, on the structures and processing of discourse (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). In this strategic model of discourse processing it has been shown how various kinds of information (textual, contextual and epistemic) are effectively used, at various levels of understanding, in the construction of textual representations in episodic memory. Strategic understanding is an on-line process accepting incomplete information from various sources and yielding semantic representations, in the form of proposition schemata, for clauses, sentences, sequences of sentences and whole discourses. This process is monitored by a control system featuring semantic macrostructures, superstructures (textual schemata, such as narrative or argumentative ones), and a representation of the actual communicative context, e.g. involving goals and perspective. It is also assumed in this model that strategic understanding not only leads to the construction of a textual representation (TR) in episodic memory, but also to the construction or up-dating of a so-called situation m d e l in episodic memory. Such an episodic situation model (SM) is an integrated structure featuring traces of previous experiences about the same or a similar situation the actual discourse 'is about'. These previous experiences may be representations of previous events, actions or discourses, and will permanently up-date what we know about concrete persons, events, actions or episodes, such as the actual civil war in El Salvador. A situation model, once activated --or actually being constructed, will not only supply the necessary basis of reference and co-reference for textual expressions, but will a l s o serve as the locus for the actual use and integration of more general knowledge needed during comprehension. We will see below that situation models will also be crucial in the use of opinions and attitudes during the comprehension of discourse. 2 . SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

Recent work in A1 has shown some interest for processes of subjective understanding. After earlier work by Abelson (Abelson, 1973, 1979; Abelson & Carroll, 1965) on belief systems, Carbonell, jr. developed a computer model of subjective understanding, specifically designed to process politically relevant discourse, such as newspaper stories (Carbonell, 1979). He has shown that newsstories about international political events involving the USA and the Soviet Union presuppose knowledge about the respective ideologies of the international policies of these countries Such ideologies will not only feature general values and norms but also beliefs about mutual goals. Modelling a subjective reader of newsstories, then, means a representation of his or her beliefs, and inferred expectations, about what e.g. the american administration will decide to do in a situation in which its basic goals are threatened by actions of the russians. Similarly, Wegman (1981) devised a computer model for the understanding of beliefs as expressed in interviews about nuclear energy. Expressions about a belief-object like nuclear energy may thus be understood as exhibiting beliefs about the fulfillment or blocking of goals of a

Opinions and Attitudes in Discourse Comprehension

37

believer. These models are important first steps in our understanding of the role of speaker's and hearer's beliefs in discourse processing. Yet, they do not fully account for possible differences between knowledge and subjective beliefs, nor do they explicitly discuss the nature and representation of opinions and attitudes. And finally they only provide a partial answer to the problem of the actual psychological processes and memory constraints involved in the use of beliefs, opinions or attitudes. Abelson (1979) has listed some of the differences between knowledge and belief: (i) there is no consensus about beliefs, (ii) beliefs are often about the existence of entities (such as God), (iii) beliefs often involve 'alternative worlds' (such as a more just social world in socialist or communist belief systems), (iv) beliefs have affective or evaluative components, (v) belief systems are more 'open', and feature personal experiences, and (vi) beliefs can be held with varying degrees of certitude. This --provisional-- list contains important suggestions for a more specific representation format of beliefs, opinions and attitudes, and we will see below what additional features should be made explicit. Before we are able to provide some further conceptual analysis of subjective cognitions, some more general remarks are in order about the very nature of subjective discourse understanding. First, a distinction should be made between a subjective understanding of a discourse and a subjective understanding of the situation a discourse is about. In the first case, the object of belief, opinion or attitude will be a direct function of the actual communicative context, and will involve an evaluation of the discourse, or some discourse properties (such as style, semantic coherence or expressed opinions), or an evaluation of the speech act performed by the utterance of the discourse, or --by attribution-- an evaluation of the speaker. In the second case, the beliefs, opinions or attitudes are formed or activated with respect to the referents, local or global, of the discourse, such as a political event, a social situation or participants in such events and situations. We have assumed above that we make a distinction between a textual representation (TR) and a situation model (SM) in episodic memory. The difference between opinions about the discourse and opinions about the referents of the discourse can be represented easily in the framework of these two kinds of episodic structures. Of course, these different kinds of evaluation may mutually affect each other: a negative opinion about a speaker or discourse may lead to a negative opinion about the topic and whence about the object of reference, and vice versa (one of the reasons why messengers of bad news risked to be killed). Secondly, subjective understanding involves both the use of already established beliefs, opinions and attitudes, and the formation of new ones.'In the first case, just as for knowledge, we assume that belief structures are accessed and selectively instantiated, and thereby control the whole understanding process, including the representation of 'factual' information. In the second case, the language user may evaluate the information, thus represented, and assign new beliefs or opinions or 'confirm' instantiated previous ones. Again, although cognitively distinct, these two processes will often be closely cooperating. Thirdly, subjective understanding takes place both at the local and at the global level. Evaluations may be attached to single concepts or propositions, as expressed by the sentences of a discourse, but may also (or only) be assigned to higher level structures, such as the theme or topic of the discourse, or to the whole (complex) action, event or episode denoted by such a macroproposition. Finally, just like understanding in general, subjective understanding is a strategic process. Evaluations are not assigned to sentences or discourses 'after the fact', but on line, that is at the same time as the formation of atomic and complex propositions in a text base and the activation and up-dating of a situation model. This means, first, that the assignment of opinions may be both a topdown and a bottom-up process. ~ f for , instance, we already have a situation model about the civil war in El Salvador, featuring specific opinions, reading a newsstory about a recent episode in this war may well influence, top-down, the formation of particular opinions about this episode (or about the newsstory about this episode). Secondly, strategic subjective understanding will also mean that a language user will operate on incomplete extant or incoming information and thus

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form hypothetical opinions, for instance based on only a few words or sentences in the discourse. This evaluative hypothesis may later of course be revised or confirmed. Thirdly, textual, contextual or already present cognitive information need not always lead to the inference of the same belief or opinion. Thus, our situation model about the civil war in El Salvador may contain negative evaluations about the fascist regime in that country, but a newsstory about the outcome of the elections might contain information which is subjectively incoherent with inferences drawn from this situation model: we do not expect that fascists win elections, unless we suppose the elections have not been free. Similarly, we may have a conflict between contextual information about a speaker and the information conveyed by his or her discourse. A strategic model of discourse comprehension will have to specify what the eventual representation will be,given such conflicting information. The goals and interests of the reader or listener may in such a case be decisive in the formation of a more or less 'neutral' text representation (as may be the case in a recall task for instance) or of a more personally biased up-dating of the situation model. 3 . BELIEFS, OPINIONS, ATTITUDES

One of the first tasks of an adequate model of subjective understanding is an explicit analysis of such notions as belief, opinion and attitude. Despite a vast amount of experimental work in social psychology, a precise cognitive analysis has never been provided. The notions of opinion and attitude have usually been lumped together as 'evaluative beliefs', where evaluation is taken as a scalar concept, most often studied on the basis of sophisticated scaling techniques and corresponding experimental designs (Himmelfarb & Eagly, 1974; Fishbein E Ajzen, 1 9 7 5 ) . In recent years there has been a rather strong reaction against this traditional approach and a plea has been held for a more cognitive social psychology (Stotland E Canon, 1972; Carroll E Payne, 1976, Abelson, 1976; Cushman E McPhee, 1980). Social cognition in these approaches has been modelled in terms of e.g. frames, schemata or scripts. After the early example of Bartlett ( 1 9 3 2 ) , who not only used the notion of schema in order to account for discourse processing and knowledge, but also as a foundation for social psychology (see the rumor studies by Allport E Postman, 1947, inspired by him), it was above all Abelson (1973) who has been one of the main inspirators of this new approach. Against the background of this development we would first like to make a number of distinctions between the notions involved. First, the notion of belief. We will indeed take this notion as the basic one. Generally speaking, each proposition (or similar structure) of an individual's cognitive system may be taken as a belief. In logical terms, this would mean that a belief is any cognitive unit which may be true or false in some possible world. More specifically, again in logical terms, such a truth value would be evaluated respective to the possibleworlds accessible from the individual (see Hughes E Cresswell, 1968; Hintikka, 1 9 7 1 ) . Hence, such propositions may denote facts also in 'private' worlds, such as dreamworlds and other 'imagined' states of affairs. A proposition is essentially a semantic structure consisting of an n-place predicate, a number of arguments (in various semantic roles, such as Agent, Patient or Instrument), and overall modalities, for instance for tense or necessity (for details, see van Dijk E Kintsch, 1 9 8 3 ) . At the referential level such a proposition would be interpreted as a property of or a relation between individuals. Beliefs, taken as propositions, may be atomic, as in 'This is a knife', or a complex structure of atomic propositions, as in 'This knife was used in the murder of the postman', whereas complex propositions may again be organized in different compound and hierarchical configurations. This notion of belief is fairly general and abstract, though. In more mundane terms, beliefs are usually taken as a specific kind of personal knowledge, as e.g. specified by Abelson (1979; see above): they are non-consensual, non-certain, more open and may involve personal experiences. We here are confronted with the usual distinction between knowledge and belief

Opinionsand Attitudes in Discourse Comprehension

39

Already in philosophy, such a distinction has often been made (Hintikka, 1962). Thus, if we say that someone knows p , this implies that p is true, an implication which does not hold when we use the 'propositional attitude' of belief. Apart from the many philosophical, logical and linguistic intricacies involved, a model of social cognition would need to operate on the basis of beliefs. Knowledge in that case consists of beliefs which are (i) assumed by the speaker or observer to be true, or more generally (ii) which are true or verifiable with respect to the truth-criteria of a socio-cultural group. Knowledge in this sense, thus, is 'justified' belief. It follows that if we consider an individual cognitive system, there is no point to make a distinction between knowledge and belief. If however we compare individual beliefs with those of others, or with certain norms or criteria, such a distinction becomes relevant. Since persons do evaluate their own beliefs relative to those of others or to generally accepted norms or truth-criteria, they may of course also distinguish among their own beliefs between those which are merely privately held and those which are based on certain kinds of evidence, such as observation, credible sources or discourse and inference. If this evidence is estimated to be sufficient, the individual will self-evaluate his or her beliefs as knowledge. To cut a long discussion short, we will assume that in strictly cognitive terms there is no distinction between knowledge and belief, but that such a distinction becomes relevant in a model of social cognition, in which beliefs of others and of ourselves are evaluated with respect to those of others,or with respect to the norms and criteria shared in a group or culture. In this theoretical perspective, we will further assume that beliefs therefore are organized in ways which have been made explicit for knowledge, for instance in terms of frames, scripts o r schemata. There is one interesting difference however. Frame- or script-like organization of knowledge presupposes that hierarchically organized clusters of propositions are about stereotypical objects or episodes: they organize general, socially shared beliefs. These are necessary to be able to participate in many social interactions, such as discourse understanding. Personal beliefs however are much less able to thus organize social interaction, although they will of course be a component in personal actions or the interpretation of actions of others. Beliefs, therefore, are much more episodic, based on personal experiences or personal inferences. As soon as more evidence is available and socially normalized, learning may take place, through processes of abstraction, generalization and de-contextualization, leading from accumulated beliefs to more general, 'accepted' knowledge of a more permanent kind. Yet, for both knowledge and beliefs, as well as for the notion of opinion to be introduced below, we will make a distinction between p a r t i c u l a r and general cognitions. Thus, particular beliefs are about particular individuals and/or particular properties or relations. General beliefs are rather context-free, and about classes or generic concepts. Thus, 'John is ill' would be a particular belief (or knowledge) and 'Tigers have stripes' or 'God exists' a more general belief. Opinions, next, will be taken as evaluative beliefs. That is, the predicate of the proposition defining an opinion must be an evaluative predicate. Although it may not always be easy to make a precise distinction between evaluative and other predicates, we assume that typically an evaluative predicate denotes a scalar property of an individual relative to some dimension (e.g. 'stupid' on the dimension of intelligence, or 'ugly' on the dimension of beauty). We will also call predicates evaluative though when they imply such a scalar value assignment. Thus, 'John is a traitor' or 'Mary cheated Larry' would be opinions if 'to be a traitor' or 'to cheat' imply negative values (e.g. on the goodness dimension). Opinions are commonsense categories to denote personal, subjective evaluative beliefs: they embody the individually variable assignment of values to objects, persons, states, events and actions. People may have the same opinions, so that we can speak about group or public opinions, but whereas for knowledge we are expected to conform to social norms and criteria of truth, opinions are allowed to be held and to vary individually. This does not mean that opinions should not be socially accounted for, e.g. in terms of general, shared values and norms.

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There may even be laws regulating the expression of opinions in social contexts, e.g. anti-discrimination or anti-libel laws. Hence, it makes sense to distinguish between opinions which are instantiations of or inferred from general norms or values (e.g. 'John is a traitor') and opinions based on purely personal preferences (e.g. 'I like this apple'), even if both types of opinions are individually held. For reasons of simplicity we will call these social and personal opinions, respectively. As we suggested above, another distinction should be made, viz. between particular and general opinions, defined in the same way as particular and general beliefs. Thus, 'I like this apple' is a particular, personal opinion, and 'Traitors should be punished' a general, social opinion. In order to retrieve and use opinions effectively, we should assume that they are organized. Their organizing principles, however, cannot simply be derived from those elaborated in A1 for frames or scripts. Objects or episodes may be assigned conventional or stereotypical structures or properties, but their evaluation does not seem to allow a straightforward application of knowledge organization formats. We know much about houses or about episodes such as taking trains, but opinions, taken as evaluative personal beliefs may be more ad hoc, accidental and episodic: we may like this house, but not anoter, or may prefer on certain occasions to take a train above taking our car or perhaps, in general, like train rides. Organization becomes relevant however as soon as we have clusters of opinions about objects. Such organized packages of opinions, especially of general opinions, will be called a t t i t u d e s . We here deviate from the definition of an attitude as an evaluation of an object (e.g. in Fishbein & Ajzen, 1 9 7 5 ) . Attitudes are schema-like organizations of general opinions. A first organization principle is hierarchy: attitudes will feature higher (more general) and lower (less general) opinions. Thus, the attitude opinion 'I am against nuclear energy' will be more general than the opinion 'Nuclear radiation is dangerous'. Higher level opinions are macropropositions (van Dijk, 1980) relative to their lower level opinions. Secondly, opinions in an attitude should be, directly or indirectly, about the same object, which implies organizational coherence for an attitude. This object will mostly be a 'social' object, that is a thing, person, group, event, issue --or types of these-which are relevant in social interaction for social members. The attitudinal organization of opinions, thus, is related to an effective planning, execution and evaluation of our and others' social actions. We have attitudes about social groups, such as businessmen or blacks, about issues such as nuclear energy or birth control, but not about an apple or apples or other objects which are not involved in a complex system of opinions and social interactions. Thirdly, attitudes may be organized according to their prominence or relevance for an individual. A lower level opinion such as 'Waste products of nuclear plants ruin the ecological system' may well for certain individuals be more relevant or prominent than higher level ones about dangers of radiation (Rokeach, 1968, 1973). Finally, attitudes are themselves organized in complex systems of i d e o l o g i e s . That is, there may be systematic relations, e.g. of coherence, between different attitudes, such as those about 'American foreign policy', 'social structure', 'economic power' and 'international communications', for instance within a socialist political ideology. Since attitudes organize many beliefs and ideologies organize many attitudes, ideologies are the fundamental system underlying social interaction, and will hence pertain to group membership, group interests and conflicts, and general values and norms for the actions leading to group goals. We will not further explore the nature of ideologies here, nor other general systems such as those of norms and values. Also, we will further ignore the emotional or affective basis of opinions and attitudes, regulating, among other things, the strength of evaluations and the nature of motivational structures (desires, wishes, preferences) underlying decision making and planning of action.

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After this sketchy specification of the nature and organization of opinions and attitudes, we need some more insight into their use, so that below we can investigate how they are involved in discourse comprehension. As soon as we encounter an attitude object, either directly or as represented in a discourse, the corresrepresented ponding attitude system will be activated. Depending on context , in the control system as discussed above, this attitude schema will be searched for the relevant general opinions. If a particular object or property is processed in STM, such a general opinion will be instantiated and integrated into the actual situation model. Thus, if I address the general opinion 'I am against american foreign policy', this opinion may be instantiated as 'I am against the aid given to the regime in El Salvador' as soon as the information 'american aid to the regime in El Salvador' is processed. Hence, the situation model will not only contain a model of the actual situation, including events, actions and participants, but also instantiated or inferred opinions about this situation. We have seen earlier that a general opinion may be taken up as an evaluative macroprcposition in the control system and thus monitor, top down, the local opinions about individual actions or events. From this sketch of some principles of the use of opinions and attitudes we may conclude that attitudes are used only in an indirect way, that is via general opinions, which need instantiation or which allow inferences in order to become relevant for the local and global evaluation of incoming information about social objects.

4. OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES IN DISCOURSE UNDERSTANDING In order to be able to become more specific let us now try to develop a number of hypotheses about the role of opinions and attitudes in the understanding of discourse. Above, it was already suggested that this kind of subjective understanding may involve both the evaluation of the text or the speaker, and the evaluation of the referents of the discourse, as represented in the situation model. For our discussion we will limit ourselves to the latter kind of evaluation: how do the opinions and attitudes about some object influence understanding the discourse about such an object? As an example we will use fragments from a text which appeared in Newsweek (March 1, 1982, p. 16). Details about the comprehension processes involved in understanding this text are given in van Dijk & Kintsch (1983). This text is part of a vast newsflow, both in the USA and internationally, about events in Central America and in particular in El Salvador. The present text is about the situation in Guatemala, and presupposes knowledge about this situation in El Salvador. The first paragraph of this text runs as follows (we do not respect the column boundaries of the weekly and have numbered the respective sentences):

(1)

GUATEMALA : NO CHOICES ( 1 ) Compared with the relative shades of gray in El Salvador, Guatemala is a study in black and white. (2) On the left is a collection of extreme Marxist-Leninist

groups led by what one diplomat calls "a pretty faceless bunch of people " ( 3 ) On the right is an entrenched elite that has dominated Central America's most populous country since a CIAbacked coup deposed the reformist government of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzmsn in 1 9 5 4 . ( 4 ) Moderates of the political center, embattled but alive in El Salvador, have virtually disappeared in Guatemala --joining more than 30,000 victims of terror over the last fifteen years. ( 5 ) "The situation in Guatemala is much more serious than in E l Salvador,"declares one Latin American diplomat, "The oligarchy is that much more reactionary, and the choices are far fewer."

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Let us assume that this text is read by a reader who has acquired knowledge about the events in Central America from several news sources, who is not directly engaged in any political action in or with respect to Guatemala, and has a 'lefti&'or socialist ideology. Without fully spelling out all details of the opinions or attitudes of such a reader, we may partly reconstruct the evaluative, subjective understanding of this passage within the overall strategic model as it is been specified in van Dijk & Kintsch (1983): After having activated knowledge and beliefs about the communicative situation (reading a weekly), about Newsweek, and about the political opinions of this weekly (and about the american media in general), the reader first will have constructed in the control system an overall representation of his or her goals and interests, e.g. with a proposition such as 'I want to know what the actual situation is in Central America'. The situation model about the communicative situation itself will feature the relevant information about the weekly and about reading weeklies and previous experiences, including opinions about this weekly. Under control of this contextual information, the reader will first process the (boldly printed, on top) title, specifying fragments of the macrostructure (topic) of this text. The major argument of the macroproposition is 'Guatemala' and the predicate is more or less vague or general, but with the contextual information that the weekly will (now) probably specify political information, a strategic choice may be made for a topic like 'There are no political choices in Guatemala'. This macroproposition will be added to the information in the control system and will control further processing. That is, first general information (knowledge and beliefs) about Guatemala will be activated (e.g. that it is a country in Central America), as well as a current state of the situation model, featuring traces of previous information about the actual political situation in Guatemala. Part of this information may be in the form of opinions, such as 'Guatemala has a fascist regime' and 'The regime systematically kills all her opponents'. If indeed such opinions are part of the situation model, they will trigger more general opinions and attitudes about the political situation in aentral America, about fascist regimes, and about the role of the USA. In other words, the title alone will provisionally activate and instantiate many general and episodic opinions and will also activate some fragments of relevant attitudes (e.g. opinions about fascism in Latin America rather than opinions about fascism in Nazi Germany). For the understanding process the activation of such opinions and attitudes will imply that besides the topical macroproposition, there may also be a topical macroopinion stored in the Control System, e.g. 'Guatemala has a fascist regime', which will also control understanding and evaluation. Of course, another reader,with less political information or different opinions,will have no or different controlling information in the Control System o r in the episodic model. The first, metaphorical, sentence will allow only partial interpretation. The information constructed or activated so far hardly allows a complete comprehension of the color metaphors. But we know that two countries are compared, and we may infer that this comparision will probably be about the political situations in these countries (activating a POLITICS frame). 'Black and white' in this frame might in that case be interpreted as 'marked political contrast', a strategic interpretation which will indeed be confirmed by the following sentences. The scalar predicates used, even if they are metaphorical, also suggest that a political evaluation (by the journalist) is denoted. More specifically it may be inferred that the journalist thinks that the situation in Guatemala is much worse than in El Salvador. Obviously, our reader will activate his or her opinions about the respective countries, maybe involving an evaluation of El Salvador which is much less positive. If that is the case, the reader will match the own opinions with those expressed in the text, and this may lead to an evaluation of the journalist or the weekly.

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The second sentence needs the activation of much political knowledge and opinions: we need to know about political parties involved, in particular about communist ones,and the evaluation of such parties by other participants in the conflict. Besides the usual processes of comprehension (which will not be detailed here), there are indications in the sentence that specifically call upon the opinions and attitudes of the reader. First, a leftist reader will activate his or her positive opinions about leftist guerrilla forces in fascist countries, and beliefs about the opinions of the USA and american media regarding such groups. The interpretation of the word 'extreme' in that case may imply an evaluation ('They find all communists extreme') confirming such beliefs. Similarly, the interpretation of the embedded opinion clause "a pretty faceless bunch of people" may conflict with the own (positive) opinion of the reader, and hence may result in a negative opinion about the cited diplomat. That the opinion of the diplomat may be believed to be congruent with an american evaluation is shown in one of the recall protocols collected for this text, in which the opinion is ascribed to an "american congressman". The third sentence expresses information which is fairly consistent with the activated opinions and attitudes: conservative regimes are indeed entrenched elites and have been in power a long time in Central America. The CIA, next, may activate rather strong opinions, such as 'They protect the interests of american foreign policy and business' or 'They destabilize groups or governments opposed to american interests'. Part of the activated situation model around the concept CIA may for instance feature their action in Chile and other Latin American countries. That they deposed a reformist government in Guatemala, therefore, comes as no surprise and will merely instantiate these general opinions, and the information may be added to the situation model about actions of the CIA. In the fourth sentence there may be a further conflict between the opinions of our reader and the information given in the text. On the one hand, the opinion that fascist regimes kill their opponents will be instantiated and confirmed. On the other hand, the evaluation of the centrist regime in El Salvador as 'moderate' may not be congruent with the activated opinion that also in that country the regime is responsible for many killings (according to the situation model of the reader). The interpretation of the verb 'embattled' therefore becomes problematic: in El Salvador the Christian Democrat regime is opposed by progressive forces, whereas in Guatemala it is decimated by the regime itself. Finally, the expression '30,000 victims of terror' will again be a confirmation of the expectation, derived from the FASCISM attitude schema, that fascist regimes commit mass murders. Finally, the next sentences confront the opinion about the situation given by another (anonymous) diplomat with the opinions of the reader: the reader may agree that the situation in Guatemala is also very serious, but that 'moderates' in El Salvador are also murderous. This opinion is also not quite congruent with the denoted opinion that the choices are fewer in Guatemala, if it is believed that the political center is not a democratic solution either. From this, still very informal, analysis of the first few sentences of the text, we may conclude that besides the usual frames and scripts, such as those around the concepts GUATEMALA, EL SALVAWR, CENTRAL AMERICA, COMMUNISM, FASCISM, CIA and USA, the reader will activate the corresponding attitudes and opinions. At some points these opinions lead to expectations that are confirmed by the information in the text. At other points, the evaluations expressed or denoted by the text are in conflict with those of the reader, especially when the evaluation of the role of the guerrilla forces and the Christian Democrats is concerned. Both the topical macroproposition and the macro-opinion, strategically formed upon the information in the title (and corresponding frames and attitudes) do organize the expressed information in the text on the one hand and the possible opinions of the reader on the other hand. At the local level, new opinions are formed, by instantiation and inference, e.g. about the role of the CIA and the fascist regime in Guatemala.

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The 'doxastic' (from Greek d o x P , opinion) interpretation of the rest of the text runs along similar lines. Depending on the precise point of view, the information that Jimmy Carter cut military aid to Guatemala because of human rights abuses, may be evaluated positively or more or less negatively if it is believed that Carter's humanrights policy was merely superficial face keeping and never really affected the fascist regimes in Latin America if fundamental american interests were involved. Similarly, against the background of opinions about the current (Reagan) administration in the US, the reader may confirm his expectation that fascist regimes in Latin America would welcome Reagan's election, as it is later stated in this text. When the reader also obtains information that a White House aide had business relations with Guatemala, the attitudes about the american foreign policy will be coupled with those about big business, an expectation derived from the more general ideological system involving coherence between capitalism and fascism. Another interesting doxastic conflict may arise in a later sentence in which it is stated that especially Israel is the principal source of weapons and training personnel for the Guatemalan regime. For some readers such an information may be consistent with the view that Israel, because of its violent anti-PLO politics, is itself fascist or at least anti-revolutionary. For anti-fascist readers of the left who have a more positive opinion about Israel --explaining the anti-PLO policy as a necessary policy of self-defense or survival-- the information cannot easily be dealt with: how could a positively evaluated country help a fascist regime? At the local level, such an information may result in a local negative opinion about Israel (the 'criticism of friends' strategy), or higher level opinions may be activated to explain such an action (e.g. 'Israel must sell weapons in order to survive economically'). The resolution of this kind of cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962) appears to involve several possible doxastic strategies, such as the 'exception to the rule' strategy, which allows lower level opinions to conflict with higher level ones, or the activation of other attitude schemata providing opinions which can act as 'bridges' to explain apparently incoherent facts, so that the doxastic system need not be changed. It is indeed the aim of our model to spell out in detail the complex cognitive strategies that are involved in such rather vague traditional terms as cognitive dissonance (see Abelson et al. 1 9 6 8 ) . A final example provides the sentence about the guerrilla forces: "They may also be bolstered by assistance and training from Communist-bloc countries". This modalized ('may') proposition, suggesting communist outside help, may activate in the reader not only international POLITICS frames and attitudes, but will more in particular 'remind' him or her of a information in a situation model saying that the usual american allegations about foreign help (by Cuba, the Soviet Union) for guerrilla forces in Central America are seldom proven and rather taken as a justification to interfere in internal political situations of these countries itself. On the basis of such an opinion, the reader will be able to infer the opinion that also in Guatemala the 'international communtst conspiracy' is again taken as an excuse for killing and terrorizing the people, or for aid to governments who claim to fight international communism. The few informally analyzed examples of this text yield some insights into the role of opinions and attitudes in discourse comprehension. These results may be generalized in the following hypotheses: (a) Reading a politically relevant text, e.g. in the press, will usually not only activate appropriate knowledge frames or scripts, but also relevant attitude schemata. (b) Given information from text and context,relevant fragments of these attitude schemata may be instantiated and integrated into the situation model now activated or constructed in episodic memory. (c) Initial information from the text, e.g. as expressed in the title, will first lead to the formation of a (partial) macroproposition representing the topic of the text (on the basis of frames and scripts), and will secondly lead to

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the instantiation or inference Jf a macro-opinion from the situation model. These two types of macro-information will be inserted into the Control System and will further control comprehension and evaluation at the local level. At the local level, we will first encounter the activation and possible actualization or formation of opinions about each concept denoted by the text, as well as about the lexical choice of the author to describe this concept. Such concepts are combined into propositions, denoting facts, and the reader will next evaluate each fact with respect to the attitudes and inferred opinions activated by the concepts themselves. In our text, for instance, the evaluation of the fact 'The CIA deposed a reformist government' will be a function of the attitude and hence the specific opinions and episodic information about the CIA. Propositions, next, are organized into sequences (a text base) which must be both locally and globally coherent. Local coherence presupposes for instance conditional (causal or other) relations between facts or functional relations between propositions (e.g. specification or contrast) (van Dijk, 1977). According to the opinions of the reader such relations may well not hold, even if the speaker/text do presuppose them. In our example, sentence (5) expresses a (functional) conclusion with respect to the previous sentences, but this conclusion may not be acceptable to the reader. In other words, from a subjective point of view, there would not be a sufficient condition for local coherence. The reader, however, also has a partial model about the opinions and attitudes of the author, and will therefore be able to assign what might be called intended or speaker coherence to the passage. The activation, actualization and formation of opinions is an on-line, strategic process, using various kinds of contextual information, fragments from the text, as processed linearly, together with inferences from general attitudes and episodic experiences. The various doxastic comprehension steps described above should therefore be considered to occur at several levels and in cooperation. Thus, sometimes a reader may directly activate certain opinions; in other cases 'judgement may be suspended' until a large part or the whole of the text has been read. On the other hand, this kind of after the fact, explicit (macro-)opinions probably do not exclude the possibility that less conscious activation and use of opinions and attitudes takes place and influences comprehension. From these few hypothetical conclusions we obtain a view of discourse comprehension which is rather different from the current models. In these models it is merely the information expressed in the text together with world knowledge which leads to the construction of a textual representation. We have first stressed that natural discourse processes take place in communicative contexts, and hence involve pragmatic and interactive goals, about which the reader or hearer will have opinions and attitudes, which will determine the understanding process. Secondly, the reader will not only try to construct or up-date a situation model, but such a model will also feature specific opinions (or previous opinions) about the whole situation, about similar actions or events or the same participants. Again, also this doxastic information will be used in the local and global comprehension of the text. Doxastic comprehension takes two forms, however. On the one hand evaluative beliefs are formed about elements in the situation (or about the way the text represents the situation). These beliefs will be added to the situation model and to the controlling mechanisms. On the other hand, these opinions may also influence the other aspects of comprehension, such as the specific understanding of words (lexical search), the formation of complex propositions (which may lead to foregrounding or backgrounding of propositions --see van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), the establishment of local coherence (conditional or functional relations may not hold for the reader), and the formation of global macrostructures (the reader may find other facts relevant or important than the text indicates). Besides a representation of the opinions of the reader in his or her model of the situation, we may therefore also have a different, personal, or 'biased' text representation.

T.A. van Dijk

5. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS

What are the empirical implications ofthis theoretical sketch of the role of opinions in discourse comprehension? As yet we have little experimental evidence to substantiate the various assumptions. One of the obvious expectations would be that subjects exhibit some of the opinions formed during processing in free recall protocols. Since such opinions are not integral part of the text, they may be expressed as 'meta-statements' --which of course may be expressions of opinions formed during understanding, but which may also be formed during retrieval. In our earlier experimental work (e.g. Kintsch & van Dijk, 1975; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; van Dijk, 1979) we indeed find many of such evaluative meta-statements in free recall protocols. Next, we expect that opinions may influence recall elements of the text 'itself'. Thus, our main theoretical assumption has always been that macropropositions will be best recalled. However, we also repeatedly found that subjects may have a more specific retention pattern about what we called 'salient details'. In the framework of the doxastic comprehension model outlined above many of such salient details would involve the actualization of opinions. This means that a proposition which is structurally or according to world knowledge not very important, may well be in the light of underlying opinions, and even become a doxastic macroproposition. In some free recall protocols collected among Amsterdam students who read the Guatemala text during a course, immediate recall would in all cases show accurate retention of the structural detail '30,000 victims'. Similarly, in another experiment, in which immediate and delayed recalls and summaries were obtained, in several countries, for a text about the murder of ten women in a Dutch concentration camp --a text which appeared in the german weekly Der Stern-similar recall for numbers which have high attitudinal function but low structural value was observed (see Note). On the basis of an analysis of the recall of macropropositions of the same text (in French), Martins (1982) found that 'affective' information was better recalled. It follows, as hypothezised above, that besides the structurally important macropropositions subjects will recall detail propositions which are linked with several, high-level, opinions, and that such detail propositions may even be accorded macro-status because of this kind of 'personal relevance'. We here touch upon theoretical and experimental results which cannot be fully accounted for in this paper. First, if opinions and attitudes, as we assumed, are related with values and norms on the one hand and with emotions or 'affect' on the other hand, the very 'affect loadings'.assigned to textual concepts or the things they denote may influence recall. Dutta & Kanungo (1975) conclude from previous research and their own experiences that, on the whole, memory is better for positively evaluated than for negatively evaluated information, according to the opinions of the subjects: subjects have better recall for the positive terms describing their own group than for the negative ones, and the reverse holds for opposed groups. Of course, such an effect reed not be an encoding result, but in our terms may well also be explained in terms of the top-down inferences drawn from (positive) self-attitudes during recall. This would also better explain why negative concepts are better recalled for opposing groups (see Martins, 1981). Another hypothesis, namely that subjects will tend to better recall the information in the text which is congruent with their own opinions and attitudes, has often been tested in the classical attitude change paradigm in social psychology (see Fishbein E Ajzen, 1975 and Himmelfarb E Eagly, 1974 for surveys) and would be a predicted outcome of traditional cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962; Abelson et al. 1968). In terms of our model, this would not be a straightfomard conclusion. If indeed readers will use the general strategy and a goal which preferentially looks for information in a text which is a possible confirmation of the expectations derived from own opinions and attitudes, then indeed the result is predictable. If however the strategy would be to be critical of the opinions of others, as expressed by the text, then the results might even be the reverse. Note also that better recall for doxastically coherent information from a text can

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easily be explained again by a top-down retrieval strategy monitored by the own opinions and attitudes of the subject: we may assume that subjects know their own opinions better than those of others (if different), so that similar opinions will be easier to access or reconstruct during recall. That active generation of own opinions during discourse comprehension takes place especially in contexts and with texts in which the author exhibits a different opinion seems to be confirmed by a number of studies (see Sandell, 1977, for review and discussion) which found that attitude change in general is less when the position of the author is expressed in more intense stylistic terms. This finding was often contrary to expectation --according to a naive model of persuasion -but would be consistent with the view that extreme opinions will often be countered by more extreme counter-opinions as a 'defense mechanism'. Without entering into the complex issue of attitude change, we may simply assume first that comprehension and recall are essential components in any process of 'doxastic learning', that is in opinion formation and change. If stylistic surface structure, together with semantic information and general textual and contextual information about the opinions of the text/author, signals --by extreme terms-- an opinion which is different from that of the reader, we will indeed expect that the reader will infer as many opinions as possible to evaluate the opinions of the author. Secondly, we assume that this process takes place during comprehension, and that both the opposed and the larger amount of inferred own opinions will become part of the situation model. Hence, the very situation model about the communicative process will better represent the fact that reader and author have opposed opinions, which alone would explain a lower probability for subsequent acceptance of the opinions of the author and hence less persuasion. But if we remain at the level of pure recall, the predictions are less clear. If the reader actualized more own opinions and if in addition such opinions are a better retrieval cue, then own opinions and opinions coherent with them will be better recalled. But if the opinions of the author are marked by the rhetorical device of 'contrast' these would also be easily retrievable. Much will in that case depend on the strategy of the reader (e.g. to acquire information, or to criticize the author). In recent work Spiro and his associates (e.9. Spiro, Crissmore & Turner, 1982) have shown that discourse comprehension involves two kinds of processing and two kinds of representation, leading to differences in recall. Besides the usual knowledge based construction of coherent propositional text bases, they also assume an affective process to 'color' the information. They see this process as a pervasive 'overlay' of experiental information, much in the same way as we have assumed the role of beliefs and attitudes. Sometimes, a previously established affective state may simply influence the full comprehension process, and when such affective information is relevant to the information in the text (as is the case in our opinions and attitudes) it may complement the construction of a text base. In somewhat more specific terms our (sketch of a) model also assumed that on the one hand opinions and attitudes (and hence emotions) control the very comprehension process, leading to 'biased' text representations, and on the other hand that local and global opinions about the situation denoted by the text (or about the text and author themselves) are separately represented as part of the situation model. In other words, we have an (up-dated) idea what the text was about coupled with our own opinions about the things, persons, events or actions. This means that previous experiences, as represented in the episodic model, as well as initially formed macro-opinions (based on information about the author or derived from information in the title or the first sentences of the text), will indeed 'color' comprehension and further opinion formation during the actual local steps of the strategic understanding process. Bower (1980) similarly supposes that affective states will result in selective processing of information. Despite the results of some of the experimental studies briefly mentioned above, the empirical assessment of a model of discourse comprehension in which also opinions, attitudes and ideologies are taken into account still requires much further research.

T.A. van Diik 6 . CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have argued that a model of 'real' discourse comprehension not only needs representation formats and strategic principles for the use of knowledge, but also an important 'doxastic' component, featuring opinions, attitudes, and indirectly also norms, values and ideologies and their associated 'emotions'. Such a programmatic statement implies first that we go beyond the extant models for the representation of knowledge. Some recent work on belief systems, also in AI, shows us one direction in such a complicated endeavor. Secondly, it means that cognitive psychology should finally 'go social' and develop process models, specific strategies, and memory representations which its disciplinary sister, social psychology, failed to specify despite the vast amount of work in the area of attitudes, It should indeed be realized that discourse production and comprehension is not an 'individual' affair, or a process which can be modelled only in the usual cognitive framework. On the contrary, understanding is also a component in a more complex process of communication and interaction in the social context. Texts are products of local and global speech acts performed with communicative intentions. Both in production and in comprehension, therefore, the social dimensions of knowledge, beliefs, opinions and attitudes play a role. Conversely, such social dimensions require their own cognitive modelling. Hence the necessity to go beyond the naive statements about the nature of opinions and attitudes and devise formats for their representation and use in strategies of 'subjective understanding'. Referring to some recent other work, we have specified some of the characteristics of subjective understanding. Also we have tried to briefly indicate some essential differences between knowledge, beliefs, opinions and attitudes. Apart from such cognitive properties as 'degree of certitude', we discovered that the essential differences between knowledge and beliefs should be formulated in social terms, such as consensus and socially based truth or verification criteria. Similarly, opinions --taken as evaluative beliefs-- show this distinction between more or less personal dimensions and social dimensions, the latter being based on culturally and socially shared values and norms. It also appeared that another dimension, viz. along such categories as 'particular' and 'general', is important in the representation and use of beliefs. A memorial consequence of this distinction has been sought in differential storage of such beliefs in episodic situation models or in more general 'semantic' memory, respectively. Attitudes are taken as higher level organizational packages of (socially relevant) opinions. Organizational principles are not only those familiar from frame- and script theory (or its current, more flexible, versions), but may also involve notions such as personal and contextual relevance. It may be the case, by the way, that attitudes not only organize opinions, but also other beliefs (knowledge) about attitude objects, thus 'assembling' from various sources both consensual generalizations about things and facts and personal evaluations of these. Ideologies are taken as the basic, by definition also social, organizing systems of attitudes, assigning the necessary coherence between opinions about various objects, and hence, indirectly,some coherence in interpretation, decision making and action. Obviously, this is a necessary feature for any sound model of social cognition. Against the background of our earlier work (with Kintsch) on discourse comprehension we then formulated a number of strategic processes involved in doxastic comprehension, as illustrated on the understanding of fragments of a political newsstory. We have seen that in such a process general opinions from attitudes may be activated, instantiated or inferences drawn for the formation of new opinions. Eventually these are stored in the current situation model and, as part of the Control System, macro-opinions may control more local opinion formation.

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The information for this kind of strategically derived doxastic propositions will be inferred from the communicative context, from 'previous experiences' as represented in the situation model, together with initial information from the text (title, first sentences). Local semantic structures and stylistic surface structure may confirm or disconfirm such expectations. At this local level, individual words or concepts will activate the respective attitude frames,and propositions their relevant general opinions. Their instantiations can in that case be matched with the information expressed in the text, leading to consent or dissent with the explicit or implied opinions of the text/author. Local coherence between propositions, finally, will in this model also be assigned in a subjectively biased way: underlying conditional or functional relations between facts or propositions may not hold for the reader. On the whole,the process of comprehension now has a pure interpretation component and an evaluation component. These may in a sense be rather autonomous, but will also interact. On the one hand, we may have a representation of the information conveyed by the text, or by the author, but the situation model which represents what a text is about will also feature the personal opinions of the reader of this situation, its events, actions or participants. On the other hand, we also saw that the opinions may control the interpretation process, e.g. in the selection of lexical readings, the activation of alternative knowledge and beliefs, the formation of complex proposition schemata (foregrounding and backgrounding component propositions), the establishment of local coherence, and the derivation of semantic macrostructures. Indeed, the interpretation, despite the intentions of the author, may thus become subjectively biased. General communicative principles might have some external, social control on this kind of subjective variability in understanding, especially in cases where the understanding of intentions is crucial (as in conversation, job interviews or text book learning), but to a lesser or larger degree our model of comprehension always need to account for this kind of subjectivity. The experimental evidence for our sketchy hypotheses is still skimpy. Some attention has been paid to the role of affect (a component in opinions) in recall, and some well-known results from classical work on attitude formation and cognitive dissonance can now be formulated in somewhat more satisfactory terms. Our earlier observations about the nature of personal variation in summaries and recall protocols can now partly be explained. And finally, all work done in the area of taskand goal-dependent comprehension should now be embedded in a broader framework of 'subjective' and contextually specific cognitions. Most of the experimental work, however, is still to be done, and most of our assumptions and predictions need testing. At the theoretical level too, most work is still ahead of us. Even after some promising attempts in modelling belief systems, we still know very little about the nature and representation of opinions and attitudes, let alone about their multiple links with values, norms, ideologies and emotions, which each are notions deserving booklength theoretical analysis. Then, also the strategies used in the activation and inference procedures of opinions and the precise role of opinions in short term memory processing require further attention. NOTE This paper is a preliminary report of ongoing research at the University of Amsterdam on the role of opinions, attitudes and prejudice in discourse processing. It partly resumes a number of working papers (including the article in the special issue of the B u l l e t i n d e p s y c h o l o g i e , ed. LeNy) Experimental evidence, collected in a international recall and summary task (Netherlands,Germany, France, USA) for a text in a german weekly, is now being analysed for differences due to variations in opinions and attitudes (about war crimes) in these countries. More specific data are collected in a project about prejudices in conversations about ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (see van Dijk, 1 9 8 2 ) .

.

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T.A. van Dijk REFERENCES

Abelson, Robert P. 1973. The Structure of Belief Systems. In: R.C. Schank & K.M. Colby (eds.) Computer Models of Thought and Language. San Francisco: Freeman. 287-340.

Abelson, Robert P. 1976. Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision Making. In: Carroll & Payne (eds.), 33-46. Abelson, Robert P. 1979. Differences between Belief and Knowledge Systems. Cognitive Science 3, 355-366. Abelson, R.P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W . J . , Newcomb, T.M., Rosenberg, M.J. & Tannenbaum, P.H. (eds.) 1968. Theories of Cognitive Dissonance. Chicago: Rand-McNally. Abelson, Robert P. & Carroll, J. 1965. Computer Simulations of Individual Belief Systems. American Behavioral Scientist 8, 24-30. Allport, Gordon W.

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Postman, Leo. 1947. The Psychology of Rumor. New York: Holt.

Bartlett, F.C. 1932. Remembering. London: Cambridge U.P. Bower, Gordon H. 1980. Mood and Memory. American Psychologist 36, 129-148. Bower, Gordon H., Black, John B. & Turner, Terence J. 1979. Scripts in Memory for Texts. Cognitive Psychology 11, 177-220. Carbonell, Jr. Jaime. 1979. Subjective Understanding. Computer Models of Belief Systems. Ph. D. Diss. Yale University. Technical Report 150. Dept. of Computer Science. Carroll, John S. & Payne, John W. (eds.) 1976. Cognition and Social Behavior. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Cushman, Donald P. & McPhee, Robert D. (eds.) 1980.. Message Relationship. New York: Academic Press.

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Dijk, Teun A. van. 1977. Text and Context. London: Longman. Dijk, Teun A. van. 1979. Recalling and Summarizing Complex Discourse. In: W. Burghardt & K. HBlker (eds.) Text Processing. Textverarbeitung. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. 49-118. Dijk, Teun A. van. 1980. Macrostructures. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Dijk, Teun A. van. 1982. Towards a Model of Ethnic Prejudice in Cognition and Discourse. University of Amsterdam. Dijk, Teun A. van & Kintsch, Walter. 1983. Strategies of Discourse Comprehension. New York: Academic Press. Dutta, S.

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Kanungo, R.N. 1975. Affect and Memory. London: Pergamon Press.

Festinger, Leon. 1962. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. ( 1 9 5 7 ) . Stanford: Stanford U.P. Fishbein, Martin & Ajzen, Icek. 1975. Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Haberlandt, Karl & Bingham, Geoffrey. 1982. The Role of Scripts in the Comprehension and Retention of Texts. TEXT 2, nr. 1-2. Himelfarb, Samuel & Eagly, Alice H. (eds.) 1974. Readings in Attitude Change. New York: Wiley.

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Hintikka, Jaakko. 1962. Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca: Cornell U.P. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1971. Semantics for Propositional Attitudes. In: L. Linsky (ed.) Reference and Modality. London: Oxford U.P. 145-167. Hughes, G.E. Methuen.

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Cresswell, M.J. 1968. An Introduction to Modal Logic. London: Methuen.

Kintsch, Walter & Dijk, Teun A. van. 1975. Comment on se rappelle et on resume des histoires. Langages 40, 98-116. Kintsch, Walter & Dijk, Teun A. van. 1978. Toward a Model of Text Comprehension and Production. Psychological Review 85, 363-394. Martins, Daniel. 1981. Affectivite, personnalite et mdmoire verbale. L'annee psychologique 81, 485-510. Martins, Daniel. 1982. Influence of Affect on Comprehension of Text. TEXT 2, nr. 1-2.

Minsky, Marvin. 1975. A Framework for Representing Knowledge. In: P.H.Winston (ed.) The Psychology of Computer Vision. New York: McGraw-Hill. Norman, Donald A. & Rumelhart, David (eds.) 1975. Explorations in Cognition. San Francisco: Freeman. Reiser, Brian J. & Black, John B. 1982. Processing and Structural Models of Comprehension. TEXT 2, nr. 1-2. Rokeach, Milton. 1968. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Rokeach, Milton. 1973. The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press. Sandell, Rolf. 1977. Linguistic Style and Persuasion. London: Academic Press. Schank, Roger C. & Abelson, Robert P. 1977. Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum. Spiro, Rand J., Crismore, Avon & Turner, Terence J. 1982. On the Role of Pervasive Coloration in Memory. TEXT 2, nr. 1-2. Stotland, Ezra & Canon, Lance K. 1972. Social Pyschology. A Cognitive Approach. Philadelphia: Saunders. Wegman, Cornelis. 1981. Conceptual Representation of Belief Systems. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11,3, 279-305.

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DISCOURSE CONTEXT, WORD IDENTIFICATION AND READING ABILITY

Charles A . P e r f e t t i L e a r n i n g Research and Development Center University o f Pittsburgh P i t t s b u r g h , Pennsylvania U.S.A.

I n t h i s paper, I d i s c u s s some r e l a t i o n s h i p s between c h i l d r e n ' s r e a d i n g a b i l i t y and t h e processes o f word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t s . I n so doing, I w i l l discuss i n t e r a c t i v e processes i n r e a d i n g and a t t e m p t t o demonstrate how some r e l a t i v e l y weak i n t e r a c t i v e assumptions can p r o v i d e a framework f o r understanding reading a b i l i t y . I n t e r a c t i v e Processes i n Reading The e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f an i n t e r a c t i v e model i s t h a t m u l t i p l e sources o f i n f o r mation combine t o produce some process such as word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Models which a r e weakly i n t e r a c t i v e do n o t have d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e s o f one i n f o r m a t i o n source on another source, w h i l e models which a r e s t r o n g l y i n t e r a c t i v e do have such i n f l u ences. Examples o f t h e former a r e M o r t o n ' s (1969) logogen model, M c C l e l l a n d ' s (1979) Cascade model, and t h e r e a d i n g a b i l i t y model d e s c r i b e d by P e r f e t t i & Roth (1981). I n these models, t h e processes a r e i n t e r a c t i v e i n t h a t d e c i s i o n s o f word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a r e guided by b o t h h i g h e r - l e v e l conceptual i n f o r m a t i o n and by g r a p h i c i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t (conceptual guidance) and t h e p r i n t e d l e t t e r s a f f e c t word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , b u t do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y d i r e c t l y i n f l u ence each o t h e r . By c o n t r a s t , models t h a t a r e p o w e r f u l l y i n t e r a c t i v e (Rumelhart, 1977; Rumelhart ! I McClelland, 1981) n o t o n l y d e s c r i b e word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as dependent on b o t h g r a p h i c d a t a and conceptual data, b u t t h e y a l s o a l l o w d i r e c t i n fluences between c o n t e x t u a l processes and g r a p h i c processes. I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e more p o w e r f u l l y i n t e r a c t i v e models w i l l prove t o be c o r r e c t o r a t l e a s t necessary f o r some processes o f word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (see Kumelhart ti McClelland, 1981). However, weakly i n t e r a c t i v e models a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o examine c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s o f r e a d i n g a b i l i t y . I n f a c t t h e y a r e q u i t e s u f f i c i e n t t o account f o r r a t h e r i n t r i c a t e i n f l u e n c e s o f c o n t e x t on i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (Flassaro, 1980). For r e a d i n g a b i l i t y , an i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n i s t h i s : Do c h i l d r e n o f d i f f e r e n t r e a d i n g a b i l i t i e s d i f f e r i n t h e i t - l o w e r - l e v e l processes, t h e i r h i q h e r - l e v e l p r o cesses o r b o t h ? O f course, b o t h " h i g h e r - l e v e l " and " l o w e r - l e v e l ' ' i n c l u d e a l a r g e domain o f comprehension and i d e n t i f i c a t ' o n processes and i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t c h i l d r e n o f d i f f e r e n t r e a d i n q a b i l i t y F 1 l d i t f e r i n many o f these processes. Here, I r e s t r i c t d i s c u s s i o n t o j u s t t h y process o f i d e n t i t y i n g p r i n t e d words and t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h i s process o f l o w e r - l e v e l word c o d i n g a b i l i t y and h i g h e r l e v e l e x p e c t a t i o n s based on sentence comprehension. F o r i n d i v i d u a l s t h e r e a r e two r e l e v a n t p r o c e s s i n g components: ( 1 ) The speed o f b a s i c word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (blord T d e n t i t i c a t i o n Speed) and ( 2 ) The accuracy o f word p r e d i c t i o n , g i v e n a d i s course c o n t e x t (Context S e n s i t i v i t y ) . The q u e s t i o n s a r e how these two components a f f e c t a r e a d e r ' s t i m e t o i d e n t i f y a word i n c o n t e x t and, e s p e c i a l l y , i s t h e problem o f t h e low a b i l i t y reader m a i n l y i n word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o r c o n t e x t s e n s i t i v i t y ? E q u i v a l e n t l y , i s t h e advantage o f t h e s k i l l e d r e a d e r m a i n l y i n word ident i f i c a t i o n , context s e n s i t i v i t y , o r both? The model I propose i s one o f t h e weakly i n t e r a c t i v e t y p e t h a t assumes t h e t i m e t o i d e n t i f y a word i n c o n t e x t i s an a c t i v a t i o n f u n c t i o n , where t h e t i m e t o a c t i v a t e a word i n memory beyond some c r i t e r i a 1 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h r e s h o l d i s a m u l t i -

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plicative function of context and a person's basic word processing ra te . The word processing r a t e function grows exponentially over time, quickly reaching asymptote. Further, b o t h the word processing rate (11) and the context component ( k ) can be considered parameters of individual differences or of texts and words. T h s a skilled reader has a f a s t e r r at e (r)t h a n an unskilled reader and a short and frequent word has a f a s t e r r at e than a long and rare word. Similarly, a s k ille d individual o f high context s en s i t i v i t y has a higher k value than a le ss s k ille d individual and a highly predictable context has a higher k value than a less predictable context. This model makes certain predictions f o r individual differences in the time t o read a word in context. I t predicts, in p ar t i cu l ar, tha t i f two individuals diff e r in basic coding r at e (r), the one with the slower ra te will be more affected by context. Relative t o a condition of no context, i . e . , isolated word i d e n t i f i cation, a f a c i l i t a t i v e context increases the word identification rate of a l l reade r s . However i t increases the r at e of the slow readers more than the f a s t readers. Interestingly, a misleading context should have the same e f f e c t , b u t in the oppos i t e direction. I t should slow the r at e of the slow reader more than the ra te of the f a s t reader. The formal basis f o r these predictions i s t h a t the word identification ra te (c) i s an exponential growth function whereas the context fa c tor (k)i s a multiplicative constant. Context does n o t d i r ect l y af f ect the process of word identification. Instead, i t adds activation t o the word's location in memory, in e ffe c t reducing the amount of data required from the graphemic level. However, identification can occur quite well without a context, b u t not without a word. Thus, the contextfree word identification r at e i s the overall rate limiting fa c tor in the activation of a word in memory. Discourse Context and Predictabi 1 i t y I t i s commonplace t o assume t h a t word identitication i s aided by discourse context. How i s t h i s accomplished? I t i s possible that. active predictive processes operate during reading. Thus, a reader [ o r , f o r t h a t matter, a l i s t e n e r ) may actively generate predictions about what will appear. Indeed, in the studies t o be summarized here, asking subjects t o predict words in texts i s the way tha t context u a l constraint i s assessed. However, i f we think about the process of skille d reading, we can imagine instead t h at active prediction, as anything more than a metaphor, i s an unlikely process. I n most contexts, predicting words takes longer than reading them. Furthermore, texts seldom contain words t h a t are completely predictable, and except f o r such complete redundancy, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine any advantage t o predicting a word and then having to replace the prediction with the actually occurring word. Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s tha t context e ffe c ts are passive processes, rather than active ones. The mechanism for context e ffe c ts would be something more akin t o spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), although i t might be rather more constrained by syntactic factors than i s the case with other situations of memory activation. Furthermore, in the case of te xt reading, activation o f semantic links may be t h o u g h t o f as resulting from the general semantic content of the t ex t and the more specific semantic links a c t i vated by the sentence currently being read. Much remains t o be understood a b o u t such processes, b u t the assumptions t h at there are rapid passive activation processes as well as slower, active predictive processes are seen in the general f a c i l i t a t i o n and inhibition model of Posner and Snyder (1975). This model has been applied t o the specific case of reading words in context by Stanovich and West (1979; Stanovich, 1981). By t h i s view, i t i s the passive attention-free mechanism t h a t provides most of the context f a c i l i t a t i o n e f f e c t . This view of contextual processes i s n o t t o deny the role of active, predictive processes in comprehension. The mental a c t i v i t i e s associated with integrating te x t propositions with memory structures and anticipating te xt structures a re just

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Discourse Context, Word Identification and Reading Ability

two examples o f comprehension a c t i v i t i e s t n a t seem t o i n v o l v e some a c t i v e processes t h a t have p r e d i c t i o n - 1 i K e q u a l i t i e s . However, because such processes make demands on c e n t r a l p r o c e s s i n g resources, t h a t i s a l l t h e more reason t o suppose t h a t s i m p l e r word processes s h o u l d n o t make heavy demands on t h e s e same r e s o u r c e s . Thus a p a s s i v e " p r e d i c t i v e " system serves b e t t e r t h a n an a c t i v e one as t a r as words a r e concerned. Botn i n t h e model discussed above and t h e experiments d i s cussed below, t h e assumption i s t h a t t h e c o n t e x t f a c t o r i s one t h a t d e s c r i b e s t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f words i n t e x t s , b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e a c t i v e p r e d i c t i o n o f words by r e a d e r s .

-

S t u d i e s o f C o n t e x t and I d e n t i f i c a t i o n The model d i s c u s s e d above i m p l i e s t h a t , compared w i t h h i g h a b i l i t y readers, low a b i l i t y r e a d e r s should have word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r a t e s t n a t a r e slower, i n c r e a s e d more by f a c i l i t a t i v e c o n t e x t , and decreased more by m i s l e a d i n g c o n t e x t . The f i r s t o f t h e p r e d i c t i o n s i s a l r e a d y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d (e.g., P e r f e t t i E Hogaboam, 1975). Low a b i l i t y readers nave slower t i m e s i n i d e n t i f y i n g words. I n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e framework, t h e q u e s t i o n s a r e how c o n t e x t and g r a p h i c d a t a combine i n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and whether l o w a b i l i t y readers a r e l e s s s k i l l e d a t use o f cont e x t , g r a p h i c data, o r both. An experimental approach t o these q u e s t i o n s i s t o v a r y t n e p r e d i c t i v e q u a l i t y o f c o n t e x t , t h u s o b s e r v i n g t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f cont e x t , and t h e g r a p h i c q u a l i t y o f t h e word, thus o b s e r v i n g t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f g r a p h i c data. I n t h e f i r s t experiment t o be discussed, c h i l d r e n (average age 9 ) were p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h r e e k i n d s o f c o n t e x t s , d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o whether a g i v e n word was highly p r e d i c t a b l e , u n p r e d i c t a b l e , o r anomalous i n t h e g i v e n c o n t e x t . The c o n t e x t s were two sentences i n l e n g t h . Examples o f each t y p e a r e g i v e n below t o r t h e wora

m.

P r e d i c t a b l e . The l i o n was t h e most dangerous animal we ha0 seen a t t h e zoo. guard warned us n o t t o s t i c k o u r hands through t h e bars o f h i s cage. U n p r e d i c t a b l e . We d i s c o v e r e d n a v i n g a p e t i s n ' t easy. o f t h i n g s , b u t f i r s t o f a l l , we g o t him a

x.

The

Our new p e t needed l o t s

Anomalous. There were l o t s o f t h i n g s that. John had t o do b e f o r e he c o u l d go o u t and p l a y w i t n h i s f r i e n d . He had t o wash t h e dishes, f i n i s h h i s school work, and c l e a n up h i s czgg. Fop t h e American c h i l d r e n o f o u r r e s e a r c h p o p u l a t i o n , t h e word i n the highly p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t was, i n f a c t , h i g h l y p r e d i c t a b l e . We measured t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f these c o n t e x t s by a s k i n g c h i l d r e n t o p r e d i c t what word would o c c u r a t t h e end o f t h e second sentence. The average p r e d i c t a b i l i t y was 80% t o r t h e h i g h l y p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s , 3% f o r t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s , and 0% f o r t h e anomalous c o n t e x t s . I f we compare t h e s e t h r e e c o n t e x t types t o n o r m a l l y occurr i n g t e x t s , we conclude t h a t t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e t y p e i s r a t h e r t y p i c a l . Exact words a r e n o t o f t e n p r e d i c t a b l e . However t h e d i f t e r e n c e s between an u n p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t and an anomalous one i s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n a mere 3% p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . An u n p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t i s u n p r e d i c t a b l e o n l y i n t h a t t h e word t h a t occurs i s one o f many t h a t c o u l d o c c u r i n t h a t c o n t e x t . The word conforms t o t h e semantic cons t r a i n t o f t h e c o n t e x t . By c o n t r a s t , an anomalous c o n t e x t i s one which imposes semantic c o n s t r a i n t s d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e semantic p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e t a r g e t word. Thus, t h e f i n a l word i s n o t m e r e l y u n p r e d i c t a b l e , i t i s s e m a n t i c a l l y anomalous.

How w i l l r e a d e r s o f d i f f e r e n t s k i l l i d e n t i f y t h e t a r g e t words i n such c o n t e x t s ? A c c o r d i n g t o general f e a t u r e s o f t h e model, p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s s h o u l d produce s h o r t e r l a t e n c i e s t h a n u n p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s , r e g a r d l e s s o f r e a d i n g s k i l l . Howe v e r t h e t a c i l i t a t i v e e f f e c t o f p r e d i c t a b i l i t y s h o u l d be g r e a t e r f o r l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s t h a n f o r s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . As f o r anomalous c o n t e x t s , t h e y m i g h t be exp e c t e d t o have some e f f e c t i n i n c r e a s i n g i d e n t i f i c a t i o n l a t e n c i e s . However, t h i s

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CA. Perfetti

n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s h o u l d be g r e a t e r f o r less s k i l l e d r e a d e r s t h a n f o r s k i l l e d reade r s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e model. (bee P e r t e t t i & Roth, 1981, f o r i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f these predictions.) The r e s u l t s o f t h i s experiment a r e shown i n F i g u r e 1.

Relative t o unpredictable

Anornolous (0%) Unpredictable(3%) Predictable (80%) Context Type F i g . 1. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n l a t e n c i e s o f s k i l l e d and l e s s - s k i l l e d readers f o r t h r e e types o f c o n t e x t s . Data from P e r f e t t i S Roth (1981). c o n t e x t s , p r e d i c t a b l e c o n t e x t s were f a c i l i t a t e d f o r l a t e n c i e s o f b o t h s k i l l e d and l e s s s k i l l e d readers, b u t more so f o r l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . Anomalous c o n t e x t s produced l o n g e r l a t e n c i e s only f o r l e s s s k i l l e d readers, a t age 9. For s u b j e c t s one-year younger, t h e r e s u l t s ( n o t shown) were t h a t b o t h s k i l l e d and l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s were n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t e d by c o n t e x t . A p o s s i b l e age d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e e f f e c t o f anomaly i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e s u l t s o f S t a n o v i c h and West (1979) t h a t c h i l d r e n , b u t n o t a d u l t s , were n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t e d by anomalous c o n t e x t s . Thus t h e r e i s s u p p o r t i n these d a t a f o r t h e p r e d i c t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t i a l c o n t e x t e f f e c t s f o r r e a d e r s o f d i f f e r e n t s k i l l . T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e general assumptions o f t h e model t h a t t h e e f f e c t s o f c o n t e x t w i l l depend on t h e b a s i c cont e x t - f r e e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r a t e and t h a t i t i s t h i s r a t e t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s r e a d e r s of d i f f e r e n t s k i l l . S k i l l e d r e a d e r s a r e l e s s a f f e c t e d by c o n t e x t because t h e i r b a s i c word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n process executes v e r y r a p i d l y . Readers o f l o w e r s k i l l have slower b a s i c r a t e s t h a t have n o t executed b e f o r e t h e e f f e c t o f c o n t e x t i s seen. Because o f t h e general developmental d i f f e r e n c e s ( S t a n o v i c h & West, 1979) as w e l l as d i f f e r e n c e s between s k i l l l e v e l s , i t may be c o r r e c t t o suggest t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l i z a t i o n : As an i n d i v i d u a l becomes o l d e r and more s k i l l e d i n r e a d i n g , h i s r e l i a n c e on c o n t e x t i s reduced. H i s b a s i c c o n t e x t - f r e e processes become more i m p o r t a n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f words i n c o n t e x t .

Discourse Context, Word Identification and Reading Ability

57

I n t h e experiment discussed above, words were always seen i n some c o n t e x t . Thus, t h e r e was no comparison between i d e n t i f i c a t i o n times i n c o n t e x t and b a s i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n times. By d e f i n i t i o n , t h e l a t t e r a r e based on words viewed i n i s o l a t i o n . Such comparisons a r e a v a i l a b l e f r o m t h e experiments o f P e r f e t t i , Goldman, and Hogaboam (1979), which were c a r r i e d on w i t h s u b j e c t s f r o m t h e same p o p u l a t i o n . I n these experiments, t h e c o n t e x t was a c t u a l l y an e n t i r e s h o r t s t o r y w i t h occas i o n a l t a r g e t words t o be i d e n t i f i e d on a screen. The t a r g e t words v a r i e d w i d e l y i n t h e i r p r e d i c t a b i l i t y f r o m t h e t e x t . The m a j o r r e s u l t s were s i m i l a r t o those d e s c r i b e d above. The f u n c t i o n r e l a t i n g i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t i m e t o p r e d i c t a b i l i t y showed a l a r g e r s l o p e f o r l e s s s k i l l e d readers t h a n f o r s k i l l e d r e a d e r s ( i n t e r c e p t s , o f course, were a l s o d i f f e r e n t ) . T h a t i s , an i n c r e a s e i n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a l a r g e r r e d u c t i o n i n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t i m e f o r l e s s s k i l l e d readers. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e P e r f e t t i e t a1 (1979) experiments had a c o n d i t i o n i n which words, comparable t o those f r o m t h e s t o r y , were viewed i n i s o l a t i o n . I n t h e i s o l a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s , a b i l i t y d i f f e r e n c e s were a t t h e i r l a r g e s t . I n f a c t , t h e s k i l l e d r e a d e r s were about as f a s t i n i d e n t i f y i n g an i s o l a t e d word as t h e y were a t i d e n t i f y i n g an u n p r e d i c t a b l e word i n c o n t e x t . Less s k i l l e d r e a d e r s , by c o n t r a s t , were helped even by u n p r e d i c t a b l e words i n c o n t e x t (compared w i t h i s o l a t e d words). T h i s l a s t f a c t demonstrates t h a t c o n t e x t has e f f e c t s t h a t a r e n ' t measurable by t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t s u b j e c t s w i l l p r e d i c t a g i v e n word, a t l e a s t when t h e sample i s n o t l a r g e . The main p o i n t i s t h a t when b a s i c word i d e n t i f i c a t i o r i i s compared w i t h c o n t e n t - a i d e d word i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , t h e a b i l i t y f a c t o r i s seen most c l e a r l y i n b a s i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n time. P r e d i c t i v e c o n t e x t s h e l p t h e l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r more t h a n t h e s k i l l e d r e a d e r and t h e more p r e d i c t a b l e t h e word i s , t h e more he i s helped. And when t h e word i s anomalous r a t h e r t h a n p r e d i c t a b l e t h e l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r i s slowed even more. S t u d i e s o f Degrading and Context The s t r a t e g y o f t h e s t u d i e s summarized above was t o observe t h e i n f l u e n c e o f cont e x t b y v a r y i n g t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f a word. This, i n e f f e c t , reduces t h e r e l i ance on b a s i c word processing, except where t h e c o n t e x t and t h e t a r g e t word a r e anomalous. W i t h i n an i n t e r a c t i v e model, t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e problem can be examined by m a n i p u l a t i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f word processing. One way t o do t h i s i s t o v i s u a l l y degrade t h e word t a r g e t . The assumption i s t h a t d e g r a d a t i o n slows t h e r i s e o f t h e word a c t i v a t i o n f u n c t i o n , because g r a p h i c d a t a accumulates more s l o w l y . I t f o r c e s a g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on word knowledge and decoding a b i l i t y . I t a l s o p r e s e n t s an o p p o r t u n i t y t o slow down t h e word p r o c e s s i n g o f s k i l l e d r e a d e r s t o observe whether t h e y then mimic l e s s s k i l l e d r e a d e r s . Examples o f t h e s o r t o f degrading we ( P e r f e t t i & Roth, 1981) c a r r i e d o u t a r e shown i n F i g u r e 2. These t h r e e l e v e l s o f degrading, d e f i n e d by t h e percentage o f

I

21

x

42

x

e pp t r

p L. ;'?

? :*

F i g . 2. Examples o f words o f 0, 21, and 42 p e r c e n t degrading.

C.A. Perfetti

58

f e a t u r e s d e l e t e d , were used i n one experiment and i n arlother experiment t h e r e were f o u r 1evels.beyond z e r o - 14%, 21%, 28% and 42%. I n a d d i t i o n t o v a r y i n g t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e word through degrading, we v a r i e d t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o t t h e word i n d i s c o u r s e c o n t e x t . I n one experiment c o n t e x t was p r o v i d e d b y sentence p a i r s and i n a n o t h e r experiment by one o f t h e s t o r i e s o f P e r f e t t i e t a1 (1979). Since t h e experiments produced s i m i l a r r e s u l t s , I w i l l d e s c r i b e j u s t one. Cont e x t s were high, moderate, and low i n t h e c o n s t r a i n t on t a r g e t words p r o v i d e d by c o n t e n t s . I n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a more s e n s i t i v e measure o f p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , subj e c t s were g i v e n 15 seconds t o p r e d i c t words t h a t m i g h t complete a two-sentence t e x t . High c o n s t r a i n t c o n t e x t s a l l o w e d p r e d i c t i o n o f t h e t a r g e t by n e a r l y a l l s u b j e c t s (93.5%) w h i l e t h e low c o n s t r a i n t c o n t e x t s p r a c t i c a l l y never a l l o w e d c o r r e c t p r e d i c t i o n ( CHOICE AND PREPARATION OF THE TEXTS Each s u b j e c t had t o r e a d t h e 16 experimental t e x t s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f f a c t o r s T, P , R and 0. We t h u s had t o use 16 b a s i c t e x t s , each c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a theme, and each s u b j e c t r e a d one b a s i c t e x t combined w i t h one and o n l y one l e v e l f o r f a c t o r c r o s s i n g . Each s u b j e c t t h e r e f o r e had t h e 16 experimental process i n g s and 16 b a s i c t e x t s proposed t o h i m (see Caverni and N o i z e t (1981) f o r a d i s c u s s i o n on t h e methodological problems r a i s e d by experiments o f t h i s t y p e ) . I n more d e t a i l , two b l o c k s o f 8 b a s i c t e x t s were used. The f i r s t i n v o l v e d events i n c l u d i n g temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f a n t e r i o r i t y , p o s t e r i o r i t y o r s i m u l t a n e i t y . The second b l o c k i n v o l v e d events w i t h a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p ( i n t h e broad sense), e i t h e r cause and e f f e c t (antecedent cause) o r means t o an end ( f i n a l cause). It i s c l e a r t h a t t h e s e two b l o c k s c o u l d o n l y be embedded i n t h e o p e r a t o r f a c t o r and n o t be crossed w i t h i t . The p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e two b a s i c t e x t b l o c k s and t h u s t h e two l e v e l s o f t h e o p e r a t o r f a c t o r was d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t h e experiment and was s y s t e m a t i c a l l y counterbalanced. The a s s o c i a t i o n o f e x p e r i m e n t a l p r o c e s s i n g s and b a s i c t e x t s , as t h e o r d e r o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l t e x t s w i t h i n each b l o c k , however, was randomly chosen f o r each s u b j e c t w i t h a randomizing s u b r o u t i n e . I n t h e t e x t b l o c k s i n c l u d i n g a temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e t h r e e events d e s c r i b e d

111

OperativeActivity during Sentence Reading

by t h e t h r e e clauses o f t h e complex sentence were t o t a l l y independent i n t h e same c o n t e x t , s i t u a t e d by t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y sentence (see ( 1 ) ) . T h i s c o n d i t i o n o f i n d e pendence must be r e s p e c t e d i n o r d e r t h a t no o t h e r t y p e o f i m p u t a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y o f a causal n a t u r e , c o u l d be performed by t h e r e a d e r . It f o l l o w s t h a t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e f a c t o r P c r e a t e s no d i f f i c u l t y i n p r e p a r i n g t h e t e x t s o f t h i s f i r s t b l o c k , as shown by comparing ( 1 ) and ( 4 ) .

(4) l e s magasins v o n t b i e n t s t f e r m e r

l a c l i e n t e met ses gants avant que l e passant allume sa p i p e e t que l a p l u i e commence

a

tomber

( t h e s t o r e s a r e g o i n g t o c l o s e soon t h e shopper p u t s on h e r gloves b e f o r e t h e passerby l i g h t s h i s p i p e and t h e r a i n begins t o f a l l ) The same i s o b v i o u s l y n o t t r u e f o r t h e b l o c k o f t e x t s i n which t h e r e i s a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between events. I n t h i s case, a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f antecedent and consequence i s e s t a b l i s h e d between e v e n t E l " l e clown f a i t des grimaces" ( t h e clown makes h i s f a c e s ) and e v e n t E2 " l e s e n f a n t s se d i v e r t i s s e n t " ( t h e c h i l d r e n amuse themselves) i n example ( 2 ) . I n o r d e r t o be a b l e t o oppose t h e two o p e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s P 1 and P2, however, e v e n t E3 must be e i t h e r independent o f E l and E2 i n l e v e l P1 o r c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d t o E l and E2 i n l e v e l P2, causing us t o m o d i f y i t somewhat. Thus, e v e n t E3 " l e t r o m p e t t i s t e j o u e f o r t " ( t h e t r u m p e t e r p l a y s l o u d l y ) i n l e v e l M1 becomes " l e t r o m p e t t i s t e j o u e f a u x " ( t h e t r u m p e t e r p l a y s f a l s e ) i n l e v e l P2. Furthermore, e v e n t E3 must be chosen i n l e v e l P2 i n such way t h a t i t i s e i t h e r dependent on E l w i t h t h e o p e r a t o r " a f i n que" ( i n o r d e r t h a t ) , as i n ( 3 ) , o r as t h e antecedent o f E2 w i t h t h e o p e r a t o r "parce que" (because), as i n ( 5 ) .

(5)

l e c h a p i t e a u se dresse majestueusement l e s e n f a n t s se d i v e r t i s s e n t parce que l e clown f a i t des grimaces e t que l e t r o m p e t t i s t e j o u e f a u x ( t h e t e n t i s majestically erected t h e c h i 1d r e n amuse themsel ves because t h e clown makes h i s faces and t h e t r u m p e t e r p l a y s f a l s e )

DATA COLLECTING AND PROCESSING As s t a t e d , each experimental t e x t c o n t a i n e d f o u r clauses, and t h e segmentation proposed t o t h e s u b j e c t was one by clause. Clauses were arranged on t h r e e l i n e s on t h e screen. Before c l a u s e F1 appeared on t h e f i r s t l i n e , a symbol i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e n e x t press on t h e pushbutton would make i t appear. When t h e complex sentence i n c l u d e d two clauses ( P l ) , t h e main and dependent c l a u s e s appeared s u c c e s s i v e l y on t h e same l i n e s i d e by s i d e , w h i l e t h e c l a u s e c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e main c l a u s e was on a n o t h e r l i n e (one s u b s c r i p t s i g n i n d i c a t e d e n d - o f - l i n e and another end-of-sentence). When t h e complex sentence i n c l u d e d t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s ( P Z ) , t h e main c l a u s e was on one l i n e and t h e two c o o r d i n a t e d dependent c l a u s e s were s i d e by s i d e on a n o t h e r l i n e . Reading exposure t i m e s (RET) were measured f o r t h e t h r e e clauses o f t h e complex sentence. The means p r e s e n t e d below a r e t h e geometric means; d a t a were g a t h e r e d from 3 8 U n i v e r s i t y l e v e l a d u l t s whose n a t i v e language was French. Data were s u b j e c t e d t o an a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e w i t h t h e VAR 3 program (Rouanet and Lepine

(1977)).

I n t h i s t y p e o f experiment, i t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r reasons o f semantic p l a u s i b i l i t y and i m p o s s i b l e f o r reasons o f c r o s s i n g e x p e r i m e n t a l f a c t o r s , t o m a i n t a i n c l a u s e l e n g t h s a b s o l u t e l y c o n s t a n t . Table 1 shows t h e means (m) and s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s ( s ) o f these l e n g t h s . The d i f f e r e n c e s between M and D r e s u l t f r o m t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t o r i n D and t h e same i s t r u e f o r MD d i f f e r e n c e s between P 1 and

G. Noizet

112

Table 1 Lengths of clauses (number of c h a r a c t e r s , including spaces) Temporal operator (01)

m M D MD/P1 MO/P2

S

26.3 37.6

3.0 3.5

28.0 33.6

3.4 3.4

Causal o p e r a t o r (02)

m 28.8 38.6 26.8 29.8

S

2.6 3.1

7.7 4.5

P2. Other d i f f e r e n c e s a r e explained by changes of verb tense imposed by syntax. The d i f f e r e n c e s due t o t h e sub-operator ( a n t e r i o r i t y vs. p o s t e r i o r i t y , f i n a l cause vs. antecedent c a u s e ) , however, remain low: R2 c l a u s e s were g l o b a l l y longer than R 1 by 1.1 l e t t e r when a temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p was involved and by 0.6 l e t t e r when a c a u s a l i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p was involved. The mean RETs per treatment a r e shown i n appendix 1.

EFFECT OF ORDER OF PRESENTATION The data c o l l e c t e d f u r n i s h an element f o r responding t o an i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n , t h a t of t h e development of t h e a c t i v i t y of comprehension during the reading of a complex sentence. Let us take t h e case of complex sentences with two operations e can c a l c u l a t e t h e RETs of clauses read f i r s t o r second and compare them, (Pl). W s i n c e they a r e the same kernel sentences, which a r e equally d i s t r i b u t e d between

Table 2 E f f e c t of order of presentation of P 1 clauses r e l a t e d by a subordination operation (geometric means i n ms)

First ( F 2 ) Avant que ( b e f o r e ) PlRlOl Apres que ( a f t e r ) PlR201 Afin que ( i n o r d e r t h a t ) PlR102 Parce que (because) PlR202

Second (F3)

Difference

1411

1667

+258

1456

1719

+263

1343

, r n r

13LO

+lU3

1358

1671

+313

. 3 n_l

Operative Activity during Sentence Reading

113

f i r s t and second appearance; t h e same i s t r u e o f t h e s y n t a c t i c s t a t u s o f t h e clauses (main vs. dependent) and t h e i r l e n g t h . It can be seen i n Table 2 t h a t , a l l o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , t h e c l a u s e r e a d second r e q u i r e s a l o n g e r r e a d i n g t i m e t h a n t h a t r e a d f i r s t , w i t h a mean i n c r e a s e o f 254 ms ( F ' (1,37) = 68.13, p < .001). A s i m p l e e x p l a n a t i o n coming t o mind i s t h a t when t h e r e a d e r reads t h e second clause, he must n o t o n l y process t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , b u t a l s o t h e o p e r a t i o n u n i t i n g t h i s c l a u s e t o t h e f i r s t . Reading t i m e i s t h u s prolonged b y t h e double p r o c e s s i n g , which i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r const r u c t i n g t h e meaning o f t h e sentence.

T h i s r e s u l t c o n f i r m s p r e v i o u s l y observed d i f f e r e n c e s , e.g. a 360 ms o r d e r e f f e c t w i t h second degree sentences ( i . e . two-clause sentences) w i t h a temporal o r causal s u b o r d i n a t i o n r e l a t i o n , b u t presented o u t o f any c o n t e x t and w i t h a phrase segment a t i o n , t h u s f i n e r t h a n t h a t i n t h e p r e s e n t e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n ( N o i z e t (1980), pp. 208-210). S i m i l a r l y , a 238 ms o r d e r e f f e c t was observed f o r second degree sentences w i t h a temporal o p e r a t o r b u t i n s e r t e d i n l a r g e t e x t s ( N o i z e t and Pynte (1981)). I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s c o n f i r m a t i o n , t h e p r e s e n t experiment f u r n i s h e s o r i g i n a l data: t h e sentences a r e t h i r d degree and t h e p a i r o f clauses r e l a t e d by a s u b o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t o r i n c o n d i t i o n P1, t h e o n l y one a l l o w i n g s i m p l e comparisons, i s always f o l l o w e d by a t h i r d c l a u s e c o o r d i n a t e d t o t h e main clause. The r e s u l t o f t h i s f e a t u r e i s t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f o r d e r cannot be i n t e r p r e t e d as a s i m p l e "end o f sentence" e f f e c t , s i n c e i t i s m a n i f e s t e d f o r t h e second c l a u s e i n a sentence c o n t a i n i n g t h r e e clauses. Using an experimental paradigm s i m i l a r t o o u r s , b u t w i t h word-by-word segmentation, Aaronson and Scarborough (1976) a l s o observed l o n g e r r e a d i n g t i m e s a t phrase boundaries w i t h an accentuated e f f e c t w i t h s e r i a l p o s i t i o n o f t h e boundary w i t h i n t h e sentence. They a t t r i b u t e d t h i s e l o n g a t i o n t o t h e memory t a s k imposed on t h e i r s u b j e c t s : h i g h values would r e s u l t f r o m a recapi t u l a t i o n , f a c i l i t a t i n g memory s t o r a g e ( t h i s e f f e c t disappeared i n a c o n t r o l s i t u a t i o n o f s i m p l e comprehension). The r e s u l t s analyzed above show t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f o r d e r c o n s t i t u t e s an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t phenomenon t h a n t h a t observed by Aaronson and Scarborough, b o t h h a v i n g a d i f f e r e n t type o f explanation. EFFECT OF ORDER OF PROCESSING M A I N AND DEPENDENT CLAUSES

A decisive t e s t f o r demonstrating operative a c t i v i t y i n reading i s the examination o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n which a s u b o r d i n a t i o n o p e r a t i o n i s processed. T h i s o p e r a t i o n i s c l e a r l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a grammatical d e s c r i p t i o n i n t h e case o f sentences. T h i s t y p e o f d e s c r i p t i o n , however, i s necessary b u t n o t s u f f i c i e n t . The o b j e c t i v e i s t o determine how t h e r e a d e r o r g a n i z e s two s u b - s t r u c t u r e s , each c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a system o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i n t o a g l o b a l c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e and, f o r example, i n t o t h e c a t e g o r y o f t e m p o r a l i t y o r c a u s a l i t y . He does t h i s by u t i l i z i n g an o p e r a t i o n which i s n o t comnutative, i n t h e sense t h a t t h e two terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , 1.e. A t the syntactic level, t h i s t h e two s u b - s t r u c t u r e s i n v o l v e d , a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . . non-commutativity i s r e f l e c t e d by a d i f f e r e n t i a l s t a t u s between c l a u s e s (main and dependent) which s a t i s f a c t o r i l y summarizes t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n term. I f an o p e r a t i v e a c t i v i t y i s indeed i n v o l v e d i n r e a d i n g , we must t a k e i n t o account t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n which t h e terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a r e a v a i l a b l e d u r i n g temporal processing. These c o n d i t i o n s may w e l l a f f e c t t h e speed w i t h which t h e o p e r a t i o n may be executed. N a t u r a l l y , t h i s consequence i s meaningful o n l y i f t h e r e i s a r e l e v a n t d i s t i n c t i o n o f t h e terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , which i s t h e case o f noncommutative o p e r a t i o n s . I t may be asked why t h a t which i s observed i n t h e domain o f logico-mathematics would n o t be observed i n t h a t o f t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c operative.

G. Noizet

114

Our hypothesis i n v o l v e s t h e importance o f t h e o r d e r o f t r e a t i n g t h e main and depend e n t clauses, imposed by t h e l i n e a r i t y o f t h e t e x t , t h e s e c l a u s e s b e i n g t h e terms o f an o p e r a t i o n e s t a b l i s h i n g a temporal o r causal r e l a t i o n s h i p . The r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n w i l l be a c c e l e r a t e d o r d e c e l e r a t e d by t h i s o r d e r . Thus, when t h e r e a d e r can process t h e s u b - s t r u c t u r e which i s t h e p i v o t e n t i t y o f t h e s t r u c t u r e , t h e main c l a u s e i n t h i s case, b e f o r e p r o c e s s i n g t h e s u b - s t r u c t u r e which m o d i f i e s i t , t h e n o v e r a l l p r o c e s s i n g w i l l be more r a p i d t h a n i n t h e o p p o s i t e case. T h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n i n v o l v e s d e f i n i n g t h e w i t h i n - c l a u s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , e.g. a c t a n t / a c t i o n / i n s t r u m e n t , o f t h e p i v o t s t r u c t u r e by i n t e g r a t i n g them i n t o a between-clause tempor a l o r causal r e l a t i o n s h i p . Table 3 presents t h e mean i n d i c e s e n a b l i n g us t o t e s t t h e e f f e c t o f t h e o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g terms o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . When t h e complex sentence i n c l u d e d two operat i o n s ( P l ) , we c a l c u l a t e d t h e t o t a l r e a d i n g t i m e o f t h e main and dependent clauses. The r e s u l t i s seen t o be unequivocal. Thus, when p r o c e s s i n g occurs i n t h e o r d e r M+D, i t s mean t i m e i s 275 ms l e s s t h a n when p r o c e s s i n g i s i n t h e o r d e r D+M

Table 3 E f f e c t o f o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g main and dependent clauses ( g e o m e t r i c means i n ms)

Order

Avant que (before)

Apres que (after)

Difference

M+D ( T l )

D t M (T2)

P1

2898

3257

+359

P2*

2717

3017

+300

P2

4486

4710

+224

P1

2958

3391

+433

P2*

2834

2911

+ 77

P2

4781

4540

-241

P1 A f i n que P2* ( i n order that) P2

2815

2923

+lo8

2552

3070

+518

4276

4695

+419

P1

2929

3127

+198

P2*

2694

2912

+218

P2

4481

4716

+235

Parce que (because)

P1:

sum o f RETs M+O

PZ*:

sum o f RETS M + D ~

P2:

sum o f RETs MtDl+D2

(F' (1,37) = 54.04, p < .001). The observed d i f f e r e n c e i s c l o s e t o t h a t o f 290 ms p r e v i o u s l y observed when second degree sentences were p r e s e n t e d s e p a r a t e l y ( N o i z e t (1978)). As a r e s u l t o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e p r e s e n t experiment, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o

Operative Activity during Sentence Reading

115

n o t e t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e due t o t h e o r d e r o f p r o c e s s i n g i s n o t m a n i f e s t e d f o r t h e t h i r d clause, t h a t c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h t h e main c l a u s e and which, i n t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n i n q u e s t i o n , i s always i n t h i r d place. The mean p r o c e s s i n g t i m e o f t h i s c l a u s e i s 1461 ms when c l a u s e s 1 and 2 a r e i n t h e o r d e r M+D and i s 1446 ms when t h e o r d e r i s D+M. These values a r e s t a t i s t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l . When t h e complex sentences i n c l u d e t h r e e o p e r a t i o n s (PP), d a t a a n a l y s i s p r e s e n t s a d i f f i c u l t y a r i s i n g from the f a c t t h a t the three clauses are inserted i n the same s u b o r d i n a t i o n s t r u c t u r e . The experimental d e s i g n enables us t o compare two o r d e r s o f processing, M+D+MD and D+MO+M ( i n t h i s s t r u c t u r e , MD has t h e s t a t u s o f a dependent c l a u s e and we may w r i t e M+DltD2 and Dl+D2+M). I t appears t o be c o n s i s t e n t t o c a l c u l a t e a t o t a l RET f o r M and D i n o r d e r t o generate a comparison between c o n d i t i o n P1, o f which we have j u s t spoken, and t h i s c o n d i t i o n P2 (remember t h a t t h e k e r n e l sentences a r e t h e same). T h i s choice, however, l e a d s t o a summation o f t h e RETs o f clauses i n d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s ( 1 and 2 i n one o r d e r , 1 and 3 i n t h e o t h e r ) . Another s o l u t i o n i n v o l v e s c a l c u l a t i n g t h e t o t a l RET f o r t h e t h r e e clauses, b u t t h e disadvantage here i s t h a t t h e p r o c e s s i n g o n t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n between t h e two dependent clauses a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e s . We c a l c u l a t e d t h e two i n d i c e s ( T a b l e 3), t h e f i r s t d e s i g n a t e d by P2*, t h e second by P2. With one e x c e p t i o n (P2R201), t h e observed d i f f e r e n c e s a l l i n v o l v e an e l o n g a t i o n o f p r o c e s s i n g when t h e main c l a u s e i s processed l a s t . The d i f f e r e n c e w i t h P2* i s 278 ms ( F ' (1.37) = 11.51, p