r'
a . , , . THE TIDE TURNS
--
IN THE EAST MARK HEALY
.
For m j son, Bmjamin
CONTENTS -7
The Origins oftbe Battle The~ppoaring~mnmanders
13 13
TheWtthe^^^^
14
r n ~ A r I n l P S
-
'BeC%nkaPmry L&w& The Soviet Atany
%7
E7
'Thebman%aw
The Battle afK&
17
20 23
OkwJuiwmdTh.SOvletPburs 'Ihe%aDcb
f7
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Z9 31
T H E ORIGINS OF T H E BATTLE It was with the onset of the 'rpsputit8~'- the p m thaw &at prrslys the return of spring m Rusak in mid-Mnreh of 1943 that the die for the p a t battle of Kursk was nn.The rising temperatures turned rivers, now being fed by the h w i n g snow, inm unbridgeable IS and the roads inm quagmires, impsable to man and machine alike. For the SS Panzer Corps,the cutting edge of the Guman counrnaffmive in the Ukraine, my
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ationawhicharueq,haveamajorimpactonthei unfol*d*. For Nazi Gtrmuly and Soviet Russia, the war inthe~nwhad~8~oimofsasi~.~ab inevitable CWof and the Red Army, in be decisive in d
mtheE.snm ndMmnonhmrdsbeyond&Igaodfloundmd a profwnd manner, m mah.lrinamamideuansformedintoaseaof mnflin between the Ms and mud and in the fpfe of rapidly hardening Soviet Europe.
resistance. While the exhausted G e n m and
Alllcd
~rorrn, in'
After two summer campaigns Gammy had
Swiet armies took a d v u l m of the temporpry lull not d in destmying the Sosiet Army. imposed on dmn by nature, m nst and refit &r Indeed, by the spring of 1943 there was s Wit the pmdiious exntiom of the winter, phning
llrrept~nceamong
wns already under way ss to how the war in Russia G e n d
many senior ofRcerq m the
Sam and in the Osthcci thm it
WY
wns m be prosecuted m e the O N K of ~ the wanner w e a h . As the phnnhg stsffs of STAVKA and
OKH pondered the possiiitieq their deliberations were governed by a number of consider-
acmmmodation airh Germany. For t h So* ~ Union, hpving weathered the great and nearly f a d U0 stnm of l!%l and 1942. ~h sudva.! longer in doubt. ~ n a b to ~ iMthe decisive vimw over the Wehrmacht in southern Russia dur splin had m desperately desirrd in the winter ampaign of 1942/3. the prioriv ofsoviet sbww for the 1943 summer d m became that of the desmnion of the capaciiy 2 tJu Wehnuacht m d t h d the leasina offensive m w u of the Red ~rm~.Funhe~mrnither&pwnstJmcany douh that the southern a m o r wns the major theme of decision for the whole of the Fastern Front. In mither the N h e r n nor C m d s s t o n . w m sucb hmmant militsry. vdifkd and nowmic matters & eonnotion % . ; as they pored over 7
THE ORIGINS OF THE BAlTLE
the situation maps of Southern Russia, it is hardly surprising that the gaze of German and Russian alike should become fuated on the great salient to the north of Kharkov and centred on the ancient city of K u d . Projecting from the Soviet into the German lines like a Iist, and with a frontage of same 250 miles but a mere 70 miles across its base, this mrssive feature, with a total land area roughly half V
~
~
.
I
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IGnmm expcrtkh mobile openm hit the oycfumrded~wict --on the 8.aChntld', UI.tkd di-dy m tiwdUddcof
m n Hidorhacis
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M n a r ( a . . ~ g r s r i o o h t Immhir~1)mmrndof r&Swlu.k.Uawdm ArmyGmmpSautbio &&&Mnrh w 1944. 1943,M d then me tbe @",dc~) rrAmd-erdMoo* died m t h e m ~ n
the sue of England, very quickly came to dominate the plans of STAVM and the OKH. T o the Germans and Russians alike, the great salient, so pregnant with military possibilities, became the focus of effort and intentions whose climax was to lead to one of the greatest battles of the Second World War and whose outcome was to seal the fate of Hitler's 'thousand-year Reich'. Even as Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein's counter-stroke aminst the over-extended Soviet forces racing far the River Dnieper was beginning in late February of 1943, tentative discussionshad already .bemn - concerningthe s h a ~ ofe the summer campaign. It was apparent, however, that the options being considered by Hider, OKH and von Manstein w& far less ambitious in scam than in previous years. Although by the onset of the thaw the German offensive had inflicted a maior defeat on the Soviets and had given back to the ~ ~ r m a n s , if only temporarily, the initiative in the south, nothing could disguise the fact that at Stahgrad and in the subsequent drive westwards fmm the Volga, the Red Army had inflicted grievous losses on the Wehrmacht. It was the reality of some
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twenty-six divisions wiped from the German Army order of battle between January and March 1943 that gave form and shape to the strategic deliberations concerning the forthcoming summer campaign Suength ;elurns indieareithat hy March the .inn). war short of 470,000 men in the East alone, while the fihwre for all theatres revealed that the Feldheer wa;7~,000 men below establishment. ln January 1943 a call from OKW for 800,000 men to be found for service in the Wehrmacht nened only half that f w r e , and it was symptomatic of the relative dedine in Germany's manpower strength that many of these were drafted from the vital war industries. In addition, the panzer divisions, the main offensive weapon of the German Army and the instrument ofvictory in the years of expansion, was in a deplorable state. By the end of the winter of 1943 barely 600 machines were available for service in the eighteen panzer divisions operating along the whole of the Eastern Front. Unless there were a radical overhaul of the panzer arm and a siunificantincrease in its size and effectiveness. the ~ e h r m a c h in t Russia would be overwhelmed by the flood of Soviet armour issuing frob the m a t tank factories beyond the Urals. To address this vital task, Hitler recalled General Heinz Guderian in Febmaq 1943 and appointed him 'Inspector-General of Armoured Troops'; his brief being the fundamental overhaul and revamping of the panzer arm. At a Fiihrer Conference on 9 March Guderian argued that Germany should forego any sbategic offensive on the Eastern Front in 1943, in favour of building 4GsrdHcbu
e the bc~rv-dlrin~.
up' the strength of the pznzer divisions. For Guderian it was axiomatic that the rehabilitation of the panzer arm and the creation of a strong and effective armoured reserve were essential if Germany's longer-term survival both on the Eastern Front and in the West, were to be ensured. Adoption of such a policy would enable the German Army to resume the offensive in 1944, with armoured units D ~ O D ~ equioved ~IY for the rask. '1.0 achieve this end i; wa; miiit;iy d!sirablr that the German Army adopr a policy of strategic defence in the E p t thmughout 1943. Herein lay the quandary for he,&nnnna Politically, Hider needed a p e a t milirnrJr a y m reassure his allies, s a n e of *frolll b d I q begun to believe that they had W.'& hone. Furthermore, a defensive pwnoc we& scarcely induce Turkey to enter the wak on the side of the Axis powers, a political objective of high priority for Hitler. Nor was the doctrine of strategic defence as simple in practice as it appeared desirable in theory. The great loss of manpower during the winter campaign, precluded the possibility of a passive, static defence; there were simply not enough d i i i o n s avaiIable for the task. How then, was the German Army to nspond to the growing power of the Red h y , and dm summer offensive it was assmdtbPt S i d h muld launch as swn as he was ready? It m$ mn Manstein's view thai Germany's only &aiitm in the East lay in the concept of an 'elastic' defence that exploited to the full the tactical expertise of German command staffs and the undoubted fighting qualities of the uwps. Above all, it would depend on employing to the full their repeatedly demonstrated ex~ertisein mobile ooerahons. This would entail 'dealing the enemy blows of a localized nature which would sap his strength to a decisive de@e - fint and foremost through losses in prisoners'. Von Manstein's proviso, howwer, was that the t h e available to Germany to deliver such blows against the Red Army was very short. Offensive action would need to be t&n quickly, before Soviet military strength became overwhelming. In addition, the anticipated collapse of the Axis position in Tunisia, would be followed s h o e thereafter by an AUied invasion of southern Europe. With the bulk of the Wehrmacht
THE ORIGINSOFTHE B A m E
serving in Russia, it would be to the already hard pressed Ostheer, that Hitler would turn for divisions to counter such landings. Time was therefore of the essence. At best Germany had only a few months, following the return of the dry weather in the East, to inflict a major defeat an the Red Army, before the presence of a large Allied force on the E u m ~ e a nmainland laced a dead hand on aperationsbn the Eastern &nt. Bv mid-March the decision had, in principle, been made. Rejecting other possibilities, Hitler determined that as soon as the weather was suitable he would launch Operation 'Citadel', a combined attack on the Kursk salient by Army Groups Centre and South. In a classic pincer operation, the salient would be eliminated and the enemy force therein extinguished. Much, it was assumed, would flow from this success. The destruction of Soviet units, particularly armour, would seriously disrupt the coming Soviet summer offensive and the prisoners netted would be removed to Germany as slave labour for the war economy. Such a rapid victory would also go far, Hitler believed. in demonstratinn to waverine allies that Germany 'could still win the war andVcause Turkey finally to declare for the Axis. In the wake of the ;uccesbful offensive, the front line would be straightened, allowing for a more economical use of divisions in defence. Those released would form a reserve which could be deployed, if needed, to respond to the Allied landings in southern Europe. Furthermore, a rapidly executed attack would conserve the strength of the valuable pamer units and preserve them for future use. On 15 April the rationale and design for 'Citadel' was set forth in Operation Order No. 6. No one reading the document could be in any doubt that it was imperative for the operation to succeed, but success would depend owrapid execution. The fact that this rapidiry was not achieved - delay after delay, as spring moved into the high summer of 1943 - has too frequently been laid at Hider's door, the assumption being that he was the arbiter of the events that were about to unfold. But the fact is that the ruin of 'Citadel' had already been ensured by decisions taken in Moscow many months before the panzers finally rolled across their start3nes in July. 10
For the Russians, the clearest indications that the Germans intended to launch an early offensive, came with the thaw in March. The de&oyment of strong enemy forces, particularly panzer and motorized infantry units at the northern and southern necks of the Kursk salient, pointed to a Gennan intention to eliminate it by a concentric attack. In this a~vreciationof German intentions. Stalin received overwhelming verification through reports from 'Lucy', the Swiss-based Soviet aaent. who had access on an almost daily basis t i the deliberations of the German High Command (OKW). Thus, by early April Stalin had knowledge of the substance of Hider's Operation Order No. 6 ('Citadel'). Printed on the 15th, only thirteen cavies of the document were made available. and thise for the eyes ofsenior commanders only.'The substance of 'Lucy's' Intellixence was further canfnmed by an independent source when, at the end of March, the British forwarded via their Miitan, Mission in Moscow information concerning ~ e i m a noffensive intentions against the Kursk salient. The Russians were not told, however, that the information came from the reading and interpretation of Luftwaffe 'Enigma' transmissions by the Ultra team at Bletchley Park in England. In early April Marshal Zhukov submitted to Stalin a major report based on information obtained from a wide-ranging reconnaissance of German dispositions and reserves initiated by the General Staff at the end of March. As a preface to his recommendations he identified the rationale for a German offensive against the Kursk salient, in terms very similar to those used by the Germans themselves, but concluded that there was little paint in the Red Army pre-empting the German offensive with one of its own. Rather, Zhukov concluded, 'it will be better if we wear the enemy out in defensive action, destroy his tanks, and then, taking in fresh reserves, by going over to an all-out offensive, we will finish off the enemy's main grouping'. This then was the thrust of the case presented to Stalin at the major STAVKA conference on the evening of 12 April. Accordimg to Zhukov, 'Stalin listened as never before' and, by the end of the conference, the essential strategic decision that would determine the outcome of
.
'Citadel' had been taken. Shelving the STAVKA d a n for the offensive that Hitler and his generals L d been so right in as sum in^ the ~ u s s ~ had ns intended to launch, Stalin acceded to the case argued by Zhukov and the Front commanders, that the German offensive should be met and gmund dawn in a debierately defensive battle, with the
Kunk & ; ru w'e.imph.m-che i-o~h~anra
desmction of the German amour being the primary aim. As the orders flowedfrom STAVKA to tra"sform the K m k salient into one immense fomess, there were few among the Soviet generals who doubted that in the ferocious and cruel battle to come, the decisive moment of the war against Nazi Gennany, had at last arrived.
THE ORIGINS OFME BATTLE
T H E OPPOSING COMMANDERS
The Soviet Commanders
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In the wake of Stdingrad an enormous surge of mnfdence swept the Soviet h y . Notwithstanding the reverse at Khprlrw in Mnrch, there was a very strong sense that not 0 4 had the tide w e d against the Gennan invader, but that mctmy was now certain. Such confidence was clearly manifest in the decision m engage the Geman Army in a deliierately defensive hanle. By no means the least important factor in this resurgence of confidence was the emergence of a tiff ofsenior ofkers, a new military elite, who had proven themselvs in warfare. Foremost amongst these was Georgi S. Zhukov. ommoted m Marshal of the Swiet Union in ~anu&1943, who could claim an unbroken series of victories to his credit, datina from the defeat of the Japanese Kwgntuq AG at K h a b Gol in 1939. Ha- bested the Gemans at LzLeningnd and in fmnt of Moscow in 1941 and at Stdingrad in 1942,he now intended to do the same at Kursk. A taskmaster, he had an eye for military talent and and under his hltelage a number of asp* pmmising g e n d , some to serve at Kursk, npidly rose m the fore. Of these, the most d&cant for our purposes were the troika of VaNtin, Rokoswdq and Konev. All three had panicipated in the heavy fighting in southern R u s h in 1942. Like Stnlin, Zhukw had a pvtiollsrly high regard for the talenfs of Vamtin. He it was d o fordhl~armed the case for f%ing 'down the Gamm offinsivi, in m'ms that later would be much srrrrr extensively msoned bv Zhukav M. kbkhwkv was one d those k e birds in the Red kmy,.t senior olXcerwhohadsunivedthrapsYanNKVD during the purges. He WM & a d in 1940inthewlLeof~ pious some teeth!
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mted by Stalin, who ordered his release. Seriously wounded during the Moscow munter-offensive, he did not return m active service until September 1942 when he assumed cammand of the Don Front. Iran Kono, Pgpohaed to rcllamsad rh StMilitary Dis& infisrc4W3, (3,rrrliro I
veteran of the first two years of the war. After KursL, early in 1944, Vatutin was killed by Uki*nian nationalists; the other two were promoted, eventually becoming Marshals of the Soviet Union. It was against these 'new' men that the Genasn Army would pit some its ablest 'sons'.
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The G+rman Commanders &@foremost r m a n soldier involved in 'Citadel' yae Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, regarded by many as t h one ~ of greatest saategists of the w r . His credentials in armoured warfare were impeccable, having masterminded the plan for the
'. In July
1943 he was commander of
1942. Although the genesis of his own proposals to Hifler &.the conduct ofthe summer campaign and was inspired by his own victory in the cnunterofinsive at Kharkov, he became increasingly sceptical of its success, as delay followed delay. Nevertheless, he was not as forthright as was Guderian in opposing the scheme, being as the latter observed, never at his best when faced by Hider. tits prmer in his labours on the southern M. of the salient was Hermann Hoth, com&r of Fourth Panzrr Army, a rcspunribility t h t he assumed in June 1942 and was to hold until dismissed bv Hider in November 1943. A hiuhl) - . experienced W k commander, having his own Panzer Gmop during 'Barbamssa', he took part in many of the great encirclement banles of 1941. Shartng many of yon Manstein's doubts about 'Citadel', be nevenheless devoted much care to nurimtzing its chances of success, given the &cumstances. Ostens~blythe commander of the northern q@ w the salient, Field Marshal Giinther von amlr a back seat role to his subordinate, WsMw Model, commanding general of Ninth Amy. This was ns much a reflection of hii lack of enthusiasm for the pffensive as it was of Wtker's f&t in Model, though von Kluge's ambi+&ue
when it m e m openly,epressing his doubts led to his position bemg reBprdcd ns IWO-fad. Model's rix had b a n pdigiow. A divisional
m n r m n d c r U m e ~ o f ' ~ ' , ~ e x p e r k in defensive watfare and his pro-Nazi stance bmught him m Hider's attention. In a v c y real wnse 'Gadel' bssme Model's baa*. His commn demud for more urnour led to delay &r delay is the sacngth of the Soviet defences became apparent While Model's own seength did inerruie, it was in h e end mote than m t e r bhadbymeSovindefmsive~tiws, whicham rm a seslc n m r before experienced.
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II
THE OPWSING COMMANDER
ORDER OF BATTLE GERMAN FORCES, I JULY 1943
T H E OPPOSING ARMIES
I
ARMY GROUP CENTRE: Fie14 m h . 1 von Klup.
I
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Blh ARMI: CoIGen W e 1
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Nevertheless a total of 23 infantry divisions were earmarked forthe offensive. Hider's continued commiment to 'Citadel' The lull in operations prior to the launch of Yliudel' on 5 July, allowed the German forces was ultimately gmunded in his conviction that the m a r k e d for the oneration to achieve a lwel of pRparedness never before seen on the Eastern Front. But there were weaknesses in the order of vfi&eduldproduad 10 hule which were to have a significant impact on ,a-mnrqumrrof the Wc6rmrbt's the conduct of the operation. The most important of these lay in the decline '-Nsiatbe ~ d Y r u p r i o r T - 3 4 dprig-rrr ofthe number of available infantry divisions and a nndKv-l . . u ~ b w snd-&hetth.titvu d u c t i o n in their respective manpower strengths. orw&mws: ahe bciolldmdm-~ Tbe losses of the winter had resulted in infantry h d c r v r s a p e m d m mm;rscb,i@de divisions being reduced from nine to six battalions. l*arsm Bs 1943 the 17,734men ofthe 1939 establishment b s d e t i d d . ~ r v r s d ~gaithpmblcmaio I& been reduced N, 12,772 Dcspi~ctheir bvcatcr umourrd,vldsrmsduid dcdn*cm&huvsm firepower, thir rhortag 01 infantq was to lead a, mmiocdfw a~e*cPmabmwcrr ahe liopr. Duarr units being reuuired to take uonn them- -,1 ~ . , . i . , ~ d ~ ~ l i r d,~ mundedv~ -&es tasks t i e preserve of the infanby. umoursrloryruy. The T h e German Army
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ARMY GROUPSOUW F \ M Marshe%van Mansbin
ARMY DEIACHMENT KEMPF:
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THEOPPOSING ARMIES
1
THEGERPIAN ARMY
E-'W, an h h m ~ afthc 'Gmsdcutsehland'
D i ~ 0 s0 a Y ~ e s f i ~ in the initid German h c e s r K u r s k . Ofnote is the disrinm'n YiD'mff band on the "ghf s l e w and the mmollnmmcd
rbeer weight and momentum of the panzer divi- 73 machines. The stmngest panzer units in the dons must carry the Germans to victory. Indeed, battle were the three Waffen SS panzer grenadier
1
a d e l ' wimessed the greatest assembly of Gerrmn armow ever deployed for an offensive on arb a limited front. Just two years before, Hitler bd deployed 3,332 tanks to invade the Soviet Union along a total frontage of 930 miles. Far 'Citadel' he would deploy 2,700 panzers and =ult guns along a front just sixty miles wide and, fa the rust time since 'Barbarossa', the German h v would be fielding tanks suoerior to those of the Red Amy. By dinthprodigibus efforts on the puduction lines and by ruthlessly denuding other sectors, 63 per cent of all the 'battleworthy' pmzers available on the Eastern Front were rlbcated to von Manstein and von Kluge. In ddition to the 1,850 panzen, there were 533 =ult guns and 200 obsolete panzen serving with the divisions. These machines were disuibuted mrong sixteen panzer and panzer grenadier divih, and three assault gun brigades. In theory a 1943 panzer division had a nominal smmgth of 15,600 men with h m 150 to 200 machines, organized into a tan!i regiment of two a three battalions, a panzer grenadier brigade, an a e r y regiment and diiional support units. In practice, however, there was great variation in divisional size and strength. At Kurslq the average aclual strength of Army p a w divbias was just
divisions of 11 SS Panzer Corps, and the CLite Army panzer grenadier division 'Grossdeutschland'. On 5 July 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitter', 'Das Reich' and 'Totenkopf each deployed on average 131 panzers and 35 assault guns with 'Grossdeutschland' deploying 160 panzen and 35 erarult guns. The bulk of the panzers at K u d were late model Panzer 111s and Panzer Ns, but it wm the triumvirate of T i m 1 and Panther tanks and the Ferdinand self-iropelled gun that Hider looked to secure victory at Kursk. The Tiger had already acquired a formidable reputation on the Eastern front. Apart from the three Waffen SS divisions and 'Grossdeutschland', which had their own Tiger companies, all other ta& of this type were issued to the specially formed heavy tank battalions. These were allocated at m y or corps level, and were sent to serve with other units as needs arose. The Panther was an unknown quantity, although much was expected of it. Designed in response m the superior T-34 and KV-1, it was to restore technical superiority to the P ~ ~ I X I I W in the East. On paper it could counter all known Soviet amour, but it was being committed to battle mo early. Impatient to have this new vehicle for the offensive, Hider ignored Guderian's protestations that it was being deployed before the It
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THELUFTWAFFE
THE OPPOIINGAWIES
technical problems anending its inucduction had been ironed out, but the stait date of the offensive was delayed to ensure the Panther's employment. By 5 July suf6cient Panthers were available to equip 1st Battalion 'Grossdwtschland' and two more Amy barnlions which together fonned 10 P a w r Btigade with ZOO of the tgpe on men@. Some Panthers were also in operation with the Waffen SS divisions. A design of great potential, at Kursk it was prove a disappointment A similar tale of unrealbed exyectations attended the debut of the Jagdpanzer Ferdinand wmmined to action with Ninth Army. Outwardly irppressive, mounting a powerful 8 . 8 ~ 1gun, the ntachine was nevertheless castigated by Guderian as being excessively complex in design and for bdne devoid of even one machine-mn for closein defence. Ninety were issued to the two barnlions orgpnized as Jagdpanzer Regiment 656. The w e d e s s assault gun. being cheaoer and easier to manufacture than-a tank, & de&oyed in growing numbers. Althawh designed for infanny sumort, by 1943 it wa.- se&g principally as a&bnk destroyer. A total of 533 of them were integrated into the p m e r divisions and independent assault gun brigades. Alongside them appeared a range of ather vehicles, some of which were a h making their combat ddhut at Kursk. One of thase was the 'Bmmnb'lr', a havily armoured assault infantry gun mounted on a Paneer IV chassis and sparting a 15.cm howitzer. S*tg-six of these were issued to Stormpauzerabteilung 216 aftached to Model's Ninth Army. The 'Nashorn', mount@ the PaK 43/1 (I.171) 8 . h gun, and the 'Hummel' and
Wespe' self-propelled guns wete also employed in large numbers for the first time.
The LuftwafFe To suowtt this minhtv armowed a the ~uftwa'ffehad asseibied 1,800 air&&, representing some two-thirds of all aircraft available in the ea&. In support of Ninth Amry Lufttlone 4, had allocated 1st Luftwaffe Air Division, while the whole of Lnfttloae 6 was available to suppat the southern thrwt. 0 4 the crowded airfields around Or?& Belgorod and Kharkov were grouped the Heidel He I1 1s and J d e r sJu 88s of KGs 3,27 and 55; fighter units were drawn fmJGs 3,51, 52 and 54, flying Focke-Wulf Fw 190A-5s and Messerschmin Bf I09G-6s. Although the Sariet Air force had made great strides, the L u f M e still held the edge, both in the qualifyof its fighters and the exyertise of its pilots. Of pardeular imcnmnce. was the fust deoloment en nrarrc. of th; Schlachtgeschwader unk flying Far 190s and Henscbel Hs 129s. 'Ciradel' also saw the last widespread use of the S - W in the clsssic dive-bomber role. ,
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Tlger I 2501d1. I2 Flam 16old1 1201d1 75AG
1AGs. 3901d1 U)dd.lFh-m 35Aa.12 dd' 14 F1om 35A&,7dd' WAG* I old' 35AG%801d1
Weight in Action
b
R
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the PMZcrUI ended Anyat 1943.
~~
m.tzbmd. A8 w'th the
. ..
'Swrm-r 'BrummW' (Grinly Bay): 64 m m ewloyed fm the first tim s Ku& by 216th Rnrsr (Swrm) bmlmn. 'Only Inad 2nd &-la of rRAbr 505 mllakle at the o n a d'ciudel'. 3rd C o m p y n n m m i n e d u h l 8July. AG &k Gun. AT SeK-proplled mti-tank weapon*. m m n t eirher 7.5m RK 40 n In M d e r 11. IIi a the 8.8cm RK 43/l m n e d an the Gw lllllV 'Hornine'nuwd during'Ciude1'. Flom F l u n t h m n r Rnrer IllAd'M'. Obr Obrelntlon Of the Tpcr r R W Vs. IVs md Ilk employed orr.ng'Cudel'. 5. 110 md 80 rupnrrk wn mmmW 18dchlmuenL In dl. 60 n m .
INFANTRY GUNS AND HEAVY ARTILLERY Weigkd Shell
W
7th R Dir 46 41 19th R D l v 48 22 &It Gun Brigrder: m.393.905 XXlV R n r v C o p (Army Gmup South RHem for ,ciudel) SthSSR 20 11 6AGgl5old Gmn Div l3rd R Div 40 21 llold
38dd' 16dd' 17dd1 mold1 430ld1 2501d1
ynr.
Army Gmyr South F m i h P m e r lmry 3rd R Div 33 il r h R D i v 48 'GD'RGmnDir 141W
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smslkraiacmemtthsria ~nrtringcouldnot accommodate the long-
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f
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deal uith Sa*ietnrmaur. lbeModclMillusmRd hem S.h m . ..carried .. .the -.. V6llsndsehuneosnd wns cquippedfordeep
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lessons that even now were still being assimilated. But a growing sense of professionalism was pervading the army, that was of itself to have a omfound imoact on the result of the corninn b a d e P~~litical slogans were eschewed a5 bring no substirule for knuwledae of the 'an of uxr'. It was certainly no longer &e case that the Germans could depict the Red Army as merely a rabble of uniformedpeasants. Upsurge in morale was matched by the increasing size and strength of the m y : As the Germans wrestled with the problem of declining
T h e Soviet Army
ven as the German Army began its numerical and tive dedme, the Soviet Amv was evolvinn an organization totally unlike that uf even a before. The re-introduction of uniform in'a, the designating of certain units as 'Guards' tions in the Tsarist fashion, imparted to the Army a sense of its awn destiny that had found psychological benefitr to its collective + m e of purpose. During the fust two years of F a r e they had received harsh and terrible
F
I
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ORDER OF BAlTLE: SOVIET FORCES, I JULY 1943 BTILlN I
STAVKA I
S1avka R e p ~ n l m I m Iw 8.W 01 KursL: M m n h l Zhukov n d H.M*v a s ~ b n ~ y
I
ram A m : U - O m RommeM tam AW: uaen mmv m m ~ m y :U.GM a m i n 6SnAmy: U-OnB W EQmAmy:Ltmsn ChnnyaboW h d ~ ~ l U~- a mmR ~D ~: I ~ tlM1Alrkmy: U M m M Rudr*o
m:
mG u m u a mm e w WIQU~TU* *my: ~ t ~ ~eo tnm l s w m~ny: ~+a~n~ronrnsnlo ~ A W L: ! - Q ~RFW M W :LIGm M O M I V m u * : c.I.Q.~ (ioryunor
38th Amr U O n Moshbr*o I O ~ A W : u.o.~~ s h b w ~ct~m ~rmy: h U-GenKmbr 6th B U M 8 &my: LtGsn ChWW 71b~ua3s&my:~ t . ~ . n % u r n w
2ndAkArmy: AkMWU W a W
THE X l n E T A W l l
manpower, Soviet Army numbers had never been higher. At the beginning of July a total of 16,442,000 offcen and men were under arms. While equipment levels were impressively high they could also be misleading. Of the 9,918 tanks in service, nearly one-thud were light tanks, of dubious value on the modem battlefield. In artillery, more than 50 per cent of the 103,085 guns and mortars were the less effective 7.6cm and 8.2c?1 calibres. Both areas were to see major shifts towards the production of large numbers of technically superior weapons. Soviet tank production had been ruthlessly restricted to a few models since the beginning of the war. Updating designs, such as that of the T-34, had been deliberately avoided so as to maintain continuity and hence volume of output. But rumours of new German designs and the capture ofthe fust Tiger in December 1942 shook up the Commissariat for Tank Production. The decision to revamp the T-34 with a new, 8.5cm gun was initiated, but the model was t w late to see senice at Kursk. The new SU-85 tank destroyer was also t w late for the batrle. The hastily developed SU-152 was employed, in limited numbers but with devastating effect. Nevertheless
the Soviet Army won the tank battles at Kursk even though, for the fust time since 1941, the Germans were fielding qualitatively superior machines. But the greatest U e r of German armour and vwps was the Soviets' 'Queen of the battlefield', the artillery, deployed in unprecedented numbers during the battle. Anti-tank guns were organized into brigades;as were the howitzers of 152mm and
II
ASSAULT GUNS1 TANK DESTROYERS Ar-r
~eS&mwhOtz
(fmnd ride) WMmm
Gun (mph) 7,km Suk 40 u48
Sped
Weight
I
(tons)
25
23.9
I I
203mm cakire. In late 1942 sixteen of the twentysu arallem dmions were oreanized as 'breakthrough &ions' deploying i n unprecedented 356 m s in their firine line. Other wrmutltions on &e mass fire theme, such as m e 'artillery breakthrough corps' and the Katyusha divisions, were introduced. In mobility and in the air the Soviet Army a h began m see significant changes. The influx of 183,OW Lend Lease lorries by mid-1943 went some way to imparting mobility m some of the major units but demand always outsaipped supply. In the air new fighters such as the Yakovlev Yak-9D and the Lavochkin La-SFN began to appear in large numbers, as did the improved
.
I I, I
'
I I
.
..
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
Ilyushin Il-2m3 mounting a 37mm &-tank w o n that was to d so much havoc amongst German -our during the bade. In terms of quality and quantity the LuftwafTe was fmding matters more difficult in the air on the Fastem front, to the unhappiness of the gmund units. Whereas there is a s w n g sense that the Wehrmacht had not perceived this fundamental and continuing qualitative change in the Soviet Army by the beginning of 'Citadel', they were always conscious of Soviet quantitative superiority. While in many areits the Soviet h y had yet to match the sophistication of the WeIumach5 them is no doubting that h e Red Army of 1943 tns 8 very different animal fmmtha ofJune 1941.
II
I
BOMBERS
TANKS A m r
MainGun
(fd
Speed (mph)
dde)
ANTI-TANK GUNS weight ~f ~ = k ~netnt~m Shell (lb) Velocity ((pr) A dH
KwKM U48
PuaDl VAurf IMV45mm 7.5071 D Panher P-erVI AudETyer
GROUND-ATTACK A N D DIVE-BOMBER AIRCRAFT
Y
KwK4l VIP
IW160mm
a h
Phx
23
spd (nph)
KwK36 U56
hriet
T-34 Model 47164mm 76.2mm 43 F-34 KV-I Model 75i7Smm 7 6 h AI
Sowlet
6-34
I
4.5m Mode142 1.09'
ISW
5.7cm Model
4,100
3.8'
5hrm lr SWm lWmm at SMm
'indioa. weigh oftuynen-cwod mmunilion.
(Ib)
Ganu, J U ~ W ~ J U V D~i ~ 4 m 3.960 HMd*llbl25% 253 29,530 llQ'
31 35
CdlM (k)
'm
I
RuUt
Mu
(mi1.s)
rpd (nph)
Celliw (k)
Bomb (Ib)
19.500
1.311'
RuU. (h*l)
h**t 373 547
w m n p b p d at M m tho IU d l rmd*riha%P*IO3rmmh.6dc4abema$ &h+ ~ 3 or7 P-3i w m k =T,I 11-tn3 dm d
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W(AS
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7.62nm nd ll.7rnmrhl-*Ithorry
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THE WPOIMGAWUES
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1 PLANS AND PREPARATIONS
+tbca1943
~~~~'
mdabwldu-bourn.
I '1 ,
It was not until 1 July that Hitler told his senior Eastern Front commanders that he intended to hunch 'Citadel' on the 5th. The die was now irrevocably cast, yet throughout the months of vacillation and delay, despite irrefutable evidence that the Soviets had transformed the salient into an enormous defensive bastion, no substantive anempt had been made to alter the plans for the offensive. Although the design for 'Citadel' remained as set forth in Operation Order No. 6, the conditions and rationale that had given rise to the OKH plan in April had long ceased to have any validity. Only in the build-up of the immense German forces, over and above those originally envisaged as being necessary for 'Citadel', was there anv sumstion that account had been taken of" t k e &tion Despite the strenuous and ingenious attempts they employed to disguise their intentions. the build-uo of German forces on each side of the neck of the' Kursk salient was on such a scale that it was impossible for the enemy not to know what was coming. Strategic surprise was dead. Within twenty-four hours of the conference at the Wolfsschanze, Stalin was able (courtesy of intelligence from 'Lucy') to inform the commanders of the Voronezh, Cenual and Steppe Fronts that the Germans yould go over to the offensive between 3 and 6 July. AU the Germans could hope for now was that they could achieve tactical surprise in terms of chwsing the time, place and main weight of the attack, and the method to be emvloved. . .
The German Ptans The OKH plan for 'Citadel' prmided for a concenuic attack by units of Anny Groups Centre and South against Kursk. The aims of the offensive were simply stated to sul off the Kursk salient along the line v - K u r s k -
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Belgomd and bring to battle and destroy the very strong Soviet forces therein. By July the forces thought adequate to achieve this end had been assembled. The final disposition of Gennan units and their specific attack abjmives on the eve of the offensive were as follows. UNB of Army Group G U ~ , Ninth Armv. were to break t h r o d thc $& defenrcs albng a line k w e e n th; Kwk-(kd highway and railway and then drive southwards to Kursk. In addition OKH had tasked Ninth Army uith pushing the fmnt line eastwards as far as .\laloarkhanaclsk, to establish continuirv with the right wing i f Second Panzer Army. TO achieve these objectives Ninth &my had been allocated V Corps Headquarters with fiWeen infantry divisions and seven panzer and panzer grenadier divisions. The units of Army Group South earmarked for 'Citadel' were divided between Fourth Pnnzer Army and Army Detachment 'KempP. Hemurm Hath, commander of Fourrh Panzer Army, had been allocated 'Grossdeutschhnd' Division, I1 SS Panzer Corps, five panzer divisions, 10 Panzer (Panther) Brigade and two infantry divisions, making it the most powerful armoured formation ever assembled for an offensive under a single commander in the history of the German Army. This immense phalanx of armour was tasked with crashing thmugh the Soviet defences along a thirty-mile front, between Belgorod and Gertsovka, and driving a wedge through to the town of Obovan and thence to Kursk. A viaorous flank cover for the thrust by ~ a u r t h~anzer'irm~would be provided by the units of Army Detachment 'KempP. Driving northwards, they would meet units of Ninth Army, at a point to the ,east of Kursk, in order to establish the new front line. This secondq attack, between Belgorod and Koracha, was to be launched an a front of just fifteen miles. Total forces allocated to Army
PLANS AND PREPAR4llONS
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