PUBLICATIONS OF LUTHER-AGRICOLA SOCIETY B
19
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KNOWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN MEDIEVAL
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PUBLICATIONS OF LUTHER-AGRICOLA SOCIETY B
19
loo ;cvj
s
KNOWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN MEDIEVAL
PHILOSOPHY
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (S.I.E.P.M.)
VOL.
II
Edited by
SIMO KNUUTTILA REIJO TYORINOJA
STEN EBBESEN
HELSINKI
1990
KNOWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (S.I.E.P.M.)
Helsinki 24-29 August 1987
VOL.
II
Edited by
SIMO KNUUTTILA REIJO TYORINOJA
STEN EBBESEN
PUBLICATIONS OF LUTHER-AGRICOLA SOCIETY SERIES B HELSINKI
1990
19
HAY25W93 $, ISBN
951-9047-26-3
ISSN 0357-3095 Helsinki 1990
Yliopistopaino
PREFACE
The
Congress of Medieval Philosophy (Societe Etude de la Philosophic Medicvalc) was held in
International
Eighth
Internationale
pour
Helsinki, Finland, 24
1
-
29 August 1987. The general theme of the congress
was Knowledge and the Sciences
in
Medieval Philosophy. The program
consisted of plenary sessions with invited papers, sections with contrib
uted papers, and meetings of the commissions of the S.I.E.P.M. The titles of the sections were as follows: (1) The Origin of Medieval Notions of
and the Divisions of the Sciences, (2) Basic Epistemological Issues as Related to Medieval Conceptions of Science, (3) Trivium and the
Science
The Nature and Methods of Theoretical Sciences, (5) The Nature and Methods of Practical Sciences, (6) Theology as a Science, (7)
Sciences, (4)
New
Conceptions of Science
in
Late Medieval and Early Renaissance
Philosophy.
The
reports of the commissions have been published in the Bulletin de
Philosophic Medievale Invited papers
29 (1987), pp.
and 30 (1988), pp. 10-38.
12-70
and contributed papers are published
present three
in the
volume work, edited by the members of the program committee (Monika Asztalos, Sten Ebbesen, Dagfinn F^llesdal, Simo Knuuttila, Anja Inkeri Lehtinen, John E. Murdoch, Ilkka Niiniluoto) in collaboration with Reijo Toivo
Tyorinoja.
Holopainen
has
served
Volume I (Acta Philosophica Fennica, The contributed papers of the sections
as
assistant
to
the
editors.
vol. 48) contains the invited papers.
(Publications of Luther- Agricola Society,
(l)-(3) are included in
B
19).
Volume
III
volume
II
(Annals of the
Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics, 55) contains the contrib uted papers of the sections (4)-(7). All papers offered are published.
Every volume is provided with an index of manuscripts and an index of names. Ancient Greek and medieval Western names are in a Latin form.
The congress was
financially supported
by the Ministry of Education
of Finland, the Finnish Cultural Foundation, the
UNESCO,
and the University of Helsinki.
Helsinki, 15
The Editors
August 1990
Academy
of Finland, the
CONTENTS
Preface
Contents Section One. The Origin of Medieval Notions of Science and the Division of the Sciences
Walter
W. ARTUS, Two
Science Listings in the Writings of
Ramon
Llull
E.P. BOS, Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science C.S.F. BURNETT, Innovations in the Classification of the Sciences in the Twelfth Century ELIA Scnso e dimcnsione della reductio ad Francesco .
.
.
D
philosophiam uelle discipline matematiche nelle Institutiones di Cassiodoro Mario GRIGNASCHI, Le DC divisione philosophic de Domimcus Sextum Mctales Gundissalinus et Questiones II-V in Tandun de de Jean physiconun Danielle JACQUART, La notion d ingenium dans la medccine medievale Jean JOLIVET, Le jeu des sciences theoretiqucs selon Gilbert de .
62
Poitiers
Steven J. LIVESEY, John of Reading on the Subalternation of the Sciences Piero MORPURGO, I comment! salernitani zVCArticella Carlos Arthur RIBEIRO NASCIMENTO, L arbre de la
DO
philos(yphie
Olga WEIJERS,
106
L appellation
des sciences aux XII
C
des disciplines dans les classifications e siecles (resume) et XIII
113
Section Two. Basic Epistcmological Issues as Related to Medieval Conceptions of Science interpretation de la definition Veritas est adaequatio rci et jntcllectiis che/. St. Thomas d Aquin Bernardo Carlos BAZAN, Science, experience ct memoire Luca BIANCHI, Potcntia Dei absoluta: logique de la decouverte ou rhetorique de Pargumentation scientifique? Jer/y BURCHARDT, Les sources et les genres de la connaissance humaine d aprps Witelo Yasuo CHISAKA, Uber die Bedeutung der Erfahrung bei Fran/, von
Tomasz BARTEL, Nouyelle
.
.
Assisi
.
.
.
....
127
.....
138 146 1^5
Contents
vi
Theorie de la connaissance et dans la Somme TJicologiquc, la S. Thomas d Aquin Andre GODDU, The Dialectic of Certitude and Demonstrability among Fourteenth-Century Ockhamists Onorato GRASSI. The Object of Scientific Knowledge in Some Authors of trie Fourteenth Century Elzbieta JUNG-PALCZEWSKA Discussion on infmitas vigoris Dei in Averroists in the 13th and 14th Centuries Hcikki KIRJAVAINEN, Existential Presuppositions in Semantics According to Ockham and Holcot Gyula KLIMA, On Being and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas s Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science Simo KNUUTTILA, Nomic Necessities in Late Medieval Thought Martin KUSCH, Natural Necessity in William of Ockham Douglas C. LANGSTON, Scotus and Possible Worlds Thomas A. LOSONCY, Ideas as Evidence(s) for Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being Costantino MARMO, Gregory of Rimini: notitia intuitiva, species and Semiotics of Images Miklos MAROTH, Tasawwur and tasdlq John H. NEWELL Jr., Grammaticus et Ethicus: William of Conches Search for Order PASCHETTO, Perspectiva e conoscenza scientifica Eugenia nell opera di Witelo Olaf PLUTA, Das natiirliche Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit. eines Fall Arguments der mctaphysischcn Aufsticg und
Lambros
COULOUBARITSIS,
de Pars, Q. 84 de
scientificite
la
physique
.
.
....
.
Psychologic in der Philosophic des Mittelalters
Josep PUIG, Averroes and Aquinas on Physics VIII 1: A Search for the Roots of Dissent Jeannine QUILLET, Nicole Oresme et la science nouvclle dans le Livre da del el dii Monde Eugenio RANDI, Plurality of Worlds: Fourteenth-Century Theological Debates Italo RONCA, Reason and Faith in the Dragniaticon: The Problematic Relation between philosophica ratio and diuina .
paguia Cecilia
TRIFOGLI, The
Place of the Last Sphere
in
...
WHITE, Ockham and Hume
171
180 190 196
210 222 231
240
248 257 265 275 285
293 307
314 322 111 331
Late-Ancient
342
and Medieval Commentaries Question John F. WIPPEL, Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents (Quodlibet II, qu. 5) Rega WOOD, Calculating Grace: The Debate about Latitude of Forms According to Adam de Wodcham Jack ZUPKO, John Buridan On Abstraction and Universal G.
163
s
Cognition
351
364 373 392
Section Three. Trivium and the Sciences
Paul of Venice on Obligations: The Sources for both the Logica Mama and the Logica Parva Versions .... Naida Anna BACCIN, Homenis est poeta: un caso di predicazione E.J.
ASHWORTH,
secundum accidens Joel
BIARD, Verbes Albert de Saxe
.
cognitifs
et
appellation
de
la
407 416
forme selon 427
Contents
vii
BOH, Medieval Rules of Consequences and the Idea of Demonstrative Science Hartmut BRANDS, Die zwcifache Einteilung der formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood Marcia L. CQLISH, Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot s Conception of Nihil Angel D ORS, On Stump s Interpretation of Burley s De Ivan
...... ........ .........
obligationibus
Alvin P.
............... ................. ... De Occamensis
DOBSEVAGE,
Guillelmi
DONATI, Ancora una Egidio Romano
Silvia
dialectica
.
.
.......
HAAPARANTA, Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method Brian HENDLEY, A New Look at Jonn of Salisbury s Educational Leila
Theory
.................... von
KANN, Zur Gerhard KRIEGER, Christoph
445 455 468 479
volta sulla nozione di quantitas materiae
...... A
in
436
Sachsen Suppositionstheorie Alberts supponit simpliciter pro natiira". Der .
.
483 491
502 512
">Homo
ndon:
Oxford
Two
However, Llull s accounts of Demonstrativae^ recall
them
rather
Nichomachean
the
in
12
He
habits."
the
Ethics.
clearly as intellectual virtues,
acquired) qualities or
and of
"science"
Arils
distinction
Ramon
Science Listings in
11
5
Llull
an Introdiictoria
in
"art"
Aristotelian
In
and
account
another book he explains
though he
them
calls
"artificial
(i.e.,
thereby distinguishes them from innate
or spontaneously operative dispositions and inclinations, because science
and
are
art
normally In
acts.
appropriate
and
acquired
and
addition
and
intellectual virtues of science
retained
rightly,
any moral qualities and virtues
art with
or,
even
On
the distinction between science and
through repeated does not confuse the
only
Llull
with any purely physical non-intellectual operative habits.
less,
after noting that
art, just
people
sometimes use the terms interchangeably, Llull cautions that precision dictates that the distinction be clearly grasped because science has to do properly with
much knowledge,
entails
activities.
or
Its
rule or
is
object
make them
13
qua
"speculabilia
talia."
Art on the other hand, though
end concerns
the
in
"operable
things",
itself
it
with operations or
not in order simply to mirror,
present, within our minds but in order to have a cognitive
measure
suitable for their production. Art accomplishes this
by
determining the manner of their entitative being and of their execution or production. distinguishes
14
art
It
precisely this determining or regulative aspect that
is
as
such.
consider operations and of
course
"operable"
then
one prescinds from
If
"operable
instead
of
more complete
we have know it.
listings
original
Catalan
Doctrina
Pueril,
Ch.
1
in
numerous
s
language. The is
an
Raymundi
Haeffner, 1722), Vol.
and
earlier
ed.
of the
manual
Ivo
Ramon
"Ars
bilia 3, p.
...
56.
ut
enim
in
their
two books, a Libre de
of
instruction
Salzinger
(Mainz:
tr.
W.D.
Ross
i
Llull, Introductoria Artis,
14
the
are found in
for
young
Henry
George
(London:
Oxford
Llull, Arbre de Sciencia, part 5, 5, 5, ed. Tomas Joaquin Obrcs Essentials (Barcelona: Editorial Selecta, 1957), Vol. 1, p. 629.
in
at
3, p. 56.
Bk. VI, ch. 2, The Student s Oxford Aristotle, University Press, 1942), Vol. 5, 1139b, 17-18.
Artau
tasks,
both of them
extant
writings,
Opera,
looks
of the various bodies of knowledge,
encyclopedic
Lulli
which
science
by brief accounts of their nature
accompanied two of the author
one may indeed
it,
but in a speculative fashion. But
art,
but simply in order to
Llull s
things"
Vol.
3, p.
Carreras
i
56.
proprie est recta mensura operandi, et circa operationes et operaea regulet, et eis praefigat modum, aut determinet." Llull, Introductoria, Vol.
Artus
6
adolescents.
15
was
It
Dominic by name.
first
LlulPs
addressed by the author to his young son,
main intention
work was
the
in
make
to
young persons the essentials of knowledge for their age and order to determine rationally whether to go on with university studies or to attach themselves as apprentices to a master in some profession or available to in
The second of Llull s writings with a classification of the sciences 16 more learned and likewise encyclopedic Arbre de Sciencia. Above
trade. is
the
all
of scientific
notions
basic
of Science Llull aimed
in this Tree
else,
knowledge and at establishing and fundamental principles,
and methodology of his Art. Though the two listings or
many bodies
at unifying the
chapters their
in
its
many
all
in
conformity
with
the
principles
mentioned are
in
classifications
the
writings
just
and general agreement, there are two noticeable the order in which the various studies or disciplines, as
in basic
differences. First
well as their groupings, are given
is
not altogether the same. Secondly,
and contrary to what we may have expected, the accounts in the earlier Doctrina Pueril of the advanced university studies of philosophy and of medicine Arbre.
11
somewhat longer and more
are
The Doctrinal account
of
those
than
detailed
philosophy gives
us
a
in
division
the
of
the general speculative philosophy by acquainting us with the titles and content of the books which make up the Aristotelian corpus, exclusive of
the logical, ethical and poetical writings.
We "science"
have noted that
and
"art"
Llull
18
distinguished
on the basis of
their
directed to the truth of knowledge of what
knowledge in
for the sake of like
question,
uses the term liberal arts
of
Hugh
some St.
the
intellectual finalities:
distinct is
virtues
of
science
is
simply, art to the truth of
action or work. But in the two listings
Victor in the Didascalion,
19
he obviously
broadly so as to cover both the traditional seven
"science"
and a number of non-liberal
pursuits.
A
possible reason for
doing so was the recognition that, as an intellectual virtue, art consists 15
See
n.
2 above.
Already referred to above
in n. 12.
17
For the comparison see Ramon Llull, Libre de Doctrina Pueril, ed. M. Obrador and Arbre, part 5, 5, Bennassar (Barcelona: Gustau Gili, 1907), chs. 78-79, pp. 193-208 y 5, in
Obres, Vol.
18 Llull,
19
1,
pp. 632-33.
Doctrina, ch. 77, pp. 197-99.
"Mechanicae
septem
scientiae
agriculturam, venationem, medicinam, ch.
continet: thetricam."
lanificium,
Hugh
20 ed. C.H. Butimer (Washington: 1939), pp. 38-9.
of
St.
armaturam,
navigationem,
Victor, Didascalion, bk. 2,
Two
Science Listings
Ramon Hull
in
1
not principally, in knowledge, regulative of course of activities directed to ends other than simply knowledge. 20 In LlulPs book in great
of
if
measure,
instructions
chapters
on
to
each
young
people,
of
seven
the
on the
"mechanical
reader
the
has
clear
impression
well in at least one of them, for in
they
the classification with them,
it
names and
more necessary manual
in the
work,
are
singly,
considered
21
On
little
this
very
matter of the
differently. Starting
explains briefly a
pursuits. If the
number
of
author dealt with
was probably because they are not
it
major
young people be schooled that fashion they will be prepared
anywhere on the earth. manual or mechanical arts the Arbre proceeds a
first
separate
on the four
that
for a gainful occupation
them
short
across a single brief chapter
that
recommends
important. Indeed the author
the at that time
of
Even though none of them are explained
arts."
the
and
arts
we come
university disciplines of the day,
number
a
after liberal
exclusively
an extensive use of our bodily limbs and of instruments designed to assist our hands. Moreover they are directed primarily and almost exclusively to satisfying our physical wants and intellectual, since they entail
needs within society and individually. Probably to match the number of the traditional liberal arts, seven i.e., acquired non-liberal "artificial,"
are
arts
agriculture,
indicated:
or
iron-
metal-working,
toolmaking,
tailoring,
22 commerce, seamanship and knighthood.
In the Arbre the seven paragraph discussion of the mechanical arts is
followed by a slightly longer treatment of the traditional seven liberal 23 In the Doctrina which calls one of them 24 a "science," the latter
arts.
had been introduced briefly
In both writings however, the liberal arts are
first.
and the
explained in their traditional groupings of the trivium that
the
in
earlier
taken
quadrivium, except writing geometry up before arithmetic. Though concise, the explanations of the nature, task and purpose of each of the liberal arts show understanding and is
appreciation on the part of the author.
Separate chapters or (in the Arbre) paragraph-sections, briefly examining each of the four major bodies of systematic studies which 20
See note 14 above.
21 Llull,
Doctrina, ch. 79, p. 208.
Llull,
Arbre, part
22 23
5, 5, 5, in
Ibid., part 5, 5, 5, in
Obres, Vol.
Obres, Vol.
1,
1,
pp. 629-30.
pp. 630-32.
24
Namely astronomy.
Llull,
describes a mechanical art as
"a
Doctrina,
manual
ch.
lucrative
74,
p.
science,"
187.
In
p. 208.
chapter
79
the
Doctrina
Artus
sum and peak much of the
constituted the
of university post-baccalaureate or graduate
Mediaeval period into Modern times, 25 complete LlulPs enumeration of the sciences in the two works mentioned. In the Arbre they are taken up last and in this order: law or education during
late
jurisprudence, medicine, philosophy and theology.
names theology
other hand follows
and
philosophy)
medicine.
canon
27
The Doctrina on
and
The longer treatment
studies in the Doctrina suggest great interest
science
natural
civil
of
these
and a greater
the part of the author in the early part of his
life.
28
the
and
after the traditional liberal arts,
first,
both
law
with
26
it
(i.e.,
two
last
on
familiarity
At the same time
theology stands out clearly as the noblest science because it speaks of God s entitative interior and of His attributes and their immanent activity,
as well as of His
ad
extra
operations vis-a-vis created beings.
An
authentic science, theology begins with and has
the
truths
rational
Since
of faith.
basis
it
a
is
fact
main support
in
however, that creatures offer a
some demonstrative knowledge
for
its
29
of the
existence
and
Being within an actually sound philosophy, the 30 and theology cannot but be in harmonious agreement ultimately. Philosophy can and must assist the work of theology, defending and
perfections of the First latter
theological
strengthening
with
truths
some
understanding
whenever
possible and without forgetting the superiority of the truths of faith by reason of their divine source. History shows two things: a) philosophers
deprived of
Wcishcipl,
26
faith,
op.cit.,
Part 5, 5, 5, Vol.
Plato and Aristotle, have failed to arrive at an
e.g.,
pp. 143-44.
1,
pp. 632-33.
Chs. 75-78, pp. 189, 191, 193, 200.
28
in Actually Llull had an interest and familiarity with all four disciplines early that as evidenced by his efforts to apply the principles of the Art to all four. I reason he wrote a Liber Principiorum Theologiae, a Liber Principiorum Philosophiae a Liber ftincipiorum Juris and a Liber Principiorum Mcdicinae. liach of these works may -"or
life,
,
be
read
in
Ravmundi
Lulli
Opera,
Ivo
ed.
Sal/.ingcr
(Main?.:
John George Haeffner,
Hook on
the Principles of
Selected Writings of Ramon Llull, tr. and ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), Vol. 2, pp. 1119-1214.
Anthony Bonncr
1721),
Vol.
Medicine
may be
The
607-813.
pp.
1,
read
first
LInglish
version of The
in
de Deu en quant la sua essencia, proprietats, dignitats e les mateix e en les creatures." Arbre, part 5, 5, 5, in Obres, Vol. 1, p. 633. Theologia est finis omnium aliarum scientiarum, utpote tractans de ultimo fine, et est impressio summae sapientiae, per finem enim judicatur de iis, quae sunt ad finem." "Lo
tcolcg
parla
obres que ha en
Llull, Introductoria, "...
per
asso
si
Vol.
3, p.
57.
theologia
Doctrina, ch. 75, p. 190.
se
cove
a
la
filosofia,
qui
es
ciencia
natural."
Llull,
Two
Science Listings
Ramon Hull
in
9
31 adequate knowledge of the First Being; b) theology has been developed two valid rise to either a scriptural or positive along ways giving
The
theology or to a dialectical or discursive one.
kind of theology
latter
has been engaged in mainly by philosopher-theologians. 32
Of philosophy of
33
first
things in
reality
declares that
Llull
itself
its
By means
science
this
knowledge of the
of
"first
Being or God.
First
of the whole
therefore
of
34 simply out of love for the truth.
after
sought
principles,
of
science
a
principles),
(i.e.,
the universal science
is
it
we rise even to some This we can accomplish only on
things"
35
the basis of our prior knowledge of beings that are the effects of the "first
things,"
God
of which
the
first
principles.
with
us
the 36
significant
of the various
objects
are the visible effects of
world"
"the
distinct
The innumerable
absolutely the First One.
is
we designate Of them the more
beings that together
and numerous provide
departments of speculative
with which Llull acquaints us on the basis of
philosophy
1
Aristotelian
much
of the
course first the order of corpus? Metaphysics importance since not only is it the science of the basic notions common to all science, but also a science of the first realities and of the First of
is
in
Being through reason alone. Without entering into discussions on the various parts of philosophy, the Arbre notes in
its
classification that the
things of which philosophy speaks are the subject matter developed
first
in its
"natural
not
are
trees."
Other
"trees,"
e.g.,
the moral and imperial ones, 38
of speculative philosophy. Yet their inclusion within the
parts
Arbre proves that Llull was not ignorant of moral or practical philosophy.
no pogren,
conexensa de "...
e
Plato
e
"Aristotil
fe
Deu
per
e
"...
..."
un
los
a^o
34
delectacio pusca ...
"En
coses
...
ama
es,
aver conexensa de Deu sens que poguessen aver declaradament
volfen
qui
enteniment
....
han
filosofs
Arbre, part
E
per
major
5, 5, 5, in
ac.6
lo
de
les
Deu."
Loc.
delectacio
Obres, Vol.
cit.
que
altres,
les
coses
que
an
consira
filosof
los
per
co
633.
1, p.
Llull,
la
veritat
Arbre, part
5, 5, 5, in
coses
per
Obres, Vol.
1, p.
c_o
primeres
e
"Scientiae
aquell
saber
633.
enten lo philosof ... e tracta de les primeres coses a quis sustancies spirituals ... per so que pusque venir atrobar primera e terrenal infinida, complida, qui sia primera causa e fi de totes
les
espiritual
36
Llull,
Llull,
saber
haver."
e aquest es
37
filosofs
lur
metafisica
cove esser, so substancia
alt
cit.
filosof
"Lo
teologs ..."
universal
habit
Loc.
tant
ne de ses obres ne de so perque horn va a
car atenycn de necessitat
reals
altrcs
los
pujar
fill,
Deu."
Llull,
enim dividuntur
Doctrina, ch. 77, pp. 197-98. ut
res."
Llull, Introditctoria,
Doctrina, ch. 77, pp. 197-99.
TO
See parts 6-7 of Arbre
in
Obres, Vol.
1,
pp. 635-74.
Vol.
3, p. 56.
Artus
10
The two remaining classifications
Law
humans
peace, to the end that
must be constructed so as for the public
to
good between canon and particular
made
live
harmony and
in
to insure that
common good and civil
each member
Arbre
classification.
s
41 and, emperor and pope and an "apostolic" "imperial"
later
in
own The good.
common
law briefly taken up
to
Particular laws
of society care and
not simply for their
of the
exclusion
the
in the
orderly
already noted.
faithfully carry out 40
towards one another and before God.
their obligations
explicitly
we have
has to do with the principles of justice and of
or jurisprudence
work
39
Llull s
in
listed
disciplines
university
are jurisprudence and medicine,
the
in
Doctrina
we have an
Instead
parts,
private or distinction
the
not
is
allusion
an
of
development
"trees."
Other writings intended Art demonstrate Lullian the the
medical the
explains
knowledge essential
of
to establish medicine Llull s
42
his
day.
of
character
In
on the foundations of
and modest
interest
the Arbre
medicine
as
a
s
familiarity with
he
classification
body
of knowledge
touching on things necessary for health, as well as for the prevention 43 Since a great measure of its concern is and cure of possible illnesses. with the causes of health and disease, medicine presupposes and requires in natural acquaintance with a number of principles and truths established 44 But of course medicine calls also for a great deal philosophy or science. of experience and observations in order to see how general scientific
principles apply to particular cases.
45
bodies of knowledge are clearly of a the result and sufficiently sound grasp characteristic of a orderly cultured and well-educated person. We have seen first of all that he was aware of the strict distinction between science and art and that he Llull s classifications of the various
the moral recognized their intellectual character, different from that of virtues. Conscious however of a wider usage wherein "science" and
"art"
are interchangeable he chose this wider usage in the classifications 39
Sec Doctrina, chs. Obres, Vol. 1, p. 632. 40 Arbre, part
Llull,
41
42
Loc.
See
Llull,
AS
78,
pp.
191,
200.
Also
5, 5, 5, in
Obres, Vol.
1,
p. 632.
5, 5, 5, in
Obres, Vol.
1,
pp. 632-33.
cit.
n.
43 44
76,
28 above.
Arbre, part
Loc.
cit.
Loc.
cit.
Llull,
Arbre,
part
5,
5,
5,
we in
Two have
alluded
writings
to.
With
basically
yield
that
Ramon Hull
understanding
mechanical
needs generally
the
traditional
in
trivium
developing more more advanced
arts,
and
48
quadrivium,
man s
important
for
arts
of
satisfy
b) the liberal arts of
which
man
assist
rational cognitive nature;
distinct
studies
university
Obviously given
the
who must
beings 47
others;
49
theology.
a)
disciplines:
particularly
human
community with
effectively his
both
in
46
meeting the physical needs and wants of their
11
classifications
his
same three groups of
the
or
non-liberal
manual,
Science Listings in
medicine,
law,
ultimate destiny and
philosophy
more
in
c) the
and
particularly
the nobility of the object studied in theology, as well as the source and basis of
its
highest teachings, required that the Christian Llull declared
the highest and objectively most important science. 50
of the purely
human
On
it
the other hand,
studies philosophy in at least
its highest part, i.e., metaphysics, must be seen as highest by reason of the universal scope of its
object
which allows
philosophical theology.
to
it
The
help in the construction
of a
dialectical
value and significance lastly of the studies of
law and medicine can and must be gauged by their contribution, in theory and in practice, to the better understanding and realization of man s well-being, physically
the well-being of
and
man
socially.
It
by reason of
is
and teachings of philosophy, especially the parts of natural philosophy and philosophical anthropology. 51
St.
John
46 Llull, "...
s
University,
per donar sustentacio a vida Doctrina,
Llull,
chs.
concern with
it
we name today
New York
Doctrina, ch. 79, p. 208; Arbre, part
48
their
that they have to take into account the principles
73-4,
5, 5, 5, in
corporal."
pp.
Obres, Vol.
1,
pp. 628-30.
Llull, Doctrina, ch. 79, p. 208.
183-88;
Arbre,
part
5,
5,
5,
in
Obres,
Vol.
1,
pp. 630-32.
4Q Llull,
Doctrina, chs. 75-78, pp. 189-208.
est finis omnium scicntiarum, utpote tractans de ultimo fine, et est "Theologia impressio summae sapientiae." Llull, Introductoria Vol. 3, p. 57. "On aquesta sciencia de theologia ... cs pus noble sciencia que totes les altres." Llull, Doctrina, ch. 75, p. 189. ,
One may wonder why Llull did not include his Art on either of the two lists which we have examined. Probably because the lists were meant to include bodies of knowledge generally accepted by the learned world at large. This was not the case of course with the Art that he himself had developed, though he desired that it be so accepted.
BOS
E.P.
Marsilius of Inghcn on the Subject of a Science
1
.
Introduction
1340-1396
(shortly
before
who
discussed
Marsilius
of Inghcn
medieval
philosophers
(subiectum scientific), or, to express
of the
first
or
first
)
was one of the many
notion
the
science
and proper
1
it
of the
more
of
subject
a
precisely, the notion
and adequate subject of a science 2
proprium or primum et adaequatum scientiae) The the fundamental characteristics of the notion formulated thinkers medieval and determined its nature. They referred to Aristotle as the one who had et
primum
(subiectum
the developed this notion; indeed, we find the idea developed (under in s Aristotle to to Greek term hypokcirnenon ) especially genos 3 Aristotle s and Posterior Analytics*. In accordance with Metaphysics
some
terminology,
subiectum
of
the
medieval
spoke
philosophers
of
a
genus
.
With the help of the notion
subject
of a
science
the
medieval
of the unity of a philosophers primarily tried to determine the foundation from another. differed science one in what science and, as a result, way
What was
the bearer of the science, or, to use another medieval phrase,
what was
its
5
(natural) place
knowledge of one a collection
See
of Terms 2
See
Cuyk
e.g.
quaestio !
single conclusion, in
ii, f.
Marsilius
in
St.
Agatha,
of
Bos
define scientia its
Marsilius
in:
Inghen,
full
and X, I,
of Inghen,
in
(
science
)
as the
The question was:
Treatises
on the Properties
Quaestiones in Aristotelis Physicam, in manuscript (Monastery of the Crutched Friars) C 12,
4.
7 and
John Buridan, Quaestiones
especially required
sense the term referred to
2rb.
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, e.g.
The problem
Kruisherenklooster
Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 3
See
?
of things known, notably of conclusions.
Ritter, 1921: pp. 7-15; 6-9. ..., ed. 1983: pp.
en
1
)
because, although one could
attention
1
(locus
I,
9.
Physicam,
I,
quaestio
ii, f.
3ra.
Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science
what
the
is
among
place
central
notion
13
from which a science derives
other sciences and other characteristics?
its
unity,
its
6
problem of the two present diverging views on the status of the subiecturn scientiae which were upheld in the Middle In the present contribution
subject of a science in general;
Ages and which may serve interpretation ( 2). Then I order
do
to
it
so,
is
as
I
shall,
a background
the
elucidate
to
way
of
interpretation
the
own view
3).
(
In
fundamental
Marsilius
which he distinguishes between
in
the level of thought and the level of things
Marsilius
understand Marsilius
to
discuss Marsilius
shall
necessary viz.
philosophical viewpoint,
discuss the
first,
shall
I
subiectum
3.1).
(
Then
I
shall discuss
from some of
scientiae
his
works on natural philosophy. I have chosen some of his commentaries on one of the two versions of his Commentary (questions) on
Aristotle:
Aristotle s
mundo
8
his
Physics^,
and
his
Commentary
9
corruptione
3.2).
(
Commentary
A
on
(questions)
next section
on
(questions)
De
the
De
caelo
et
generatione
et
the
devoted to Marsilius
is
view on the
problem found in his Commentary (questions) on the Sentences, where he seems to put a different emphasis in his interpretation of the nature of the subiectum scientiae, which
nature between science) and e.g.
is
the result,
Viz.
the
lra-123ra.
science,
which
is
on the one hand, as opposed to speculative ( 3.3), on the other. A (
4).
3.3
version
in
preserved
ms Cuyk en
St.
Agatha, Kruisherenklooster
C
12,
ff.
manuscript, see De Rijk and Weycrs, 1981: pp. 7-17. Marsilius other commentary (questions) preserved in ms
For a description of
Markowski (1973) describes Vienna, 6.N.B., V.P.L. 5437, in this
of the differences in
logic (a practical science)
natural
See below,
feel,
theology (primarily a speculative, but also a practical
conclusion winds up this contribution
1
I
this
ff.
68ra-141ra (the
first
six
books have been handed down
manuscript). For a discussion of the authenticity, see Bos, 1979.
o
Preserved
in
the authenticity,
9
ms Cuyk en cf.
Bos, 1979.
Ed. Venetiis, 1505.
St.
Agatha, Kniisherenklooster
C
12,
ff.
125ra-171vb.
For
Bos
14
2. Ttie
problem of the first subject of a science
medieval thinker accepted the notion of one single subject of a will be science (which was not, by the way, accepted by everyone, as 10 this kind what arose the subject of thing problem pointed out below ), of a science was. Thirteenth and fourteenth century philosophers largely formal its differed on this, though they agreed, by and large, on
If
a
viz.
characteristics,
to
function
its
one science from another
distinguish
of
First
all,
human
bearer of the science should be the of
subject
was not understood
science
a
to
science,
etcetera.
11 was generally denied
it
the
to
unity
give
the subiectum
that
Taken
soul.
one
belonging to
as
the
as
in this sense, the
single
science: for one soul could possess many sciences. views on the nature of the Secondly, there were two diverging
subiectum.
12
John Duns Scotus
was a
subject of a science
man in human the
thing in reality outside the
God
the case of biology or theology, though the
first
its
human
case of theology.
in the
human mind
God) by
subject (viz.
1265-1308/9) held the view that the
(ca.
is
hampered
13
in its
soul, e.g. a
Even
our
in
knowledge of
to imperfect powers, a theologian tries 14
out of God. unfold, so to speak, the theological truths Another opinion was that the subiectum scientiae
general term, known by an a
in
studied
Thomas Aquinas word
:
all
in
science
and that
intellect,
certain
a
15
(1245-1274).
This
unity.
The
it
subject of
all
comprehends is
opinion
grammar,
names, verbs, particles etcetera have
adjectival
was the most
e.g.
objects
of
that
for example,
common
in
is
that
they are words.
10
See
3.3.
E.g.
by William
11
Ockham,
of
see
his
Ordinatio,
book
I,
qu.
IX,
ed.
1967:
pp.
views
on
246-250.
12
Marsilius
gives
a
catalogue
the subject of theology 19vb. 13
his
in
Duns Scotus focussed
as science
and extrapolated
his
(which
Texts
in
Zimmerman,
very
precise)
of
Commentary on the Sentences, book
interest,
it
seems
this reconstruction to
14 For a recent discussion on Duns Scotus as for literature, see Krop, 1987, esp. pp. 33-47. 15
not
is
1965: pp. 160
ff.,
to
me,
on
different I,
qu.
ii
ed.
reconstructing
1501,
f.
theology
other sciences.
view on the subject of a science, as well
notably pp. 162-163.
Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science
3.
15
Marsilius of Inghen on the subject of a science
After these introductory remarks
view on the
I
shall
now
discuss Marsilius of Inghen
subject of a science. This view can be found in
first
many
s
of
his works.
A
should
distinction
the
of
characteristics
made between what
be
and
notion,
its
I
formal
the
call
With the same formal
nature.
characteristics in hand, Marsilius determines the nature of the subiectum scientiae
with
sciences
for
differently
a
of
nature
its
between
shall distinguish
I
nature
different
some
speculative or, at least partly, practical, in
sense). In
either
(viz.
my
discussion
works on natural philosophy
his
notably contained in his Commentaries on Aristotle (written in the late 1360ies in Paris, or partly in Heidelberg) and his voluminous theological
Commentary on
the Sentences (completed in 1394 in Heidelberg), because
Marsilius determines the nature of the subiectum scientiae differently in both groups of commentaries.
Before entering into a discussion of the formal characteristics of the
let
subiectum,
us,
first,
about
something
say
Marsilius
philosophical outlook which dominates the problem, that
which he distinguishes between the
level
and the
of thought
general
the
is,
way level
in
of
things (his nominalism).
3.1. Tfie level
of thought and the
All kinds of knowledge, that as
well
as
individual
intellectual
is
of things
both knowledge acquired by the senses, are
knowledge material,
(both
things
level
such
acts,
as
16
Marsilius
cows,
says,
men,
etcetera,
about
and
immaterial, such as emotions, acts of knowledge, etcetera). Things of a
general realities.
nature,
such
Generality
of spoken
Platonic
as
17 is
Ideas,
do not
independent
and written terms. These contents of thought can refer to
individual things in the outside world.
Now
Marsilius distinguishes sharply
See Marsilius of Inghen, Commentary on the Sentences, book
Not even
as
exist
a property of concepts, or, subordinate of these,
God.
I,
qu.
ii,
f.
lOrb.
and fourteenth century view that in general God Ideas only exist as thought objects, which have a lesser kind of existence than substances, which have real existence. See for Ockham s view e.g. Maurer, 1976; Bos, 1984/5.
in
It
is
a
thirteenth
Bos
16
thought and the level of things. Those philosophers ascribe generality to mental terms of nouns are called nominalists
between the
who in
level of
the Middle
nomen
noun
(
Ages (because the
a property of the mental
is
universality
though there are different degrees
)),
which they draw
in
this distinction.
This distinction
is
used separately, terms have signification refer
to
some
at
anything existing
to Marsilius
According
place.
of signification occurs only in
in
so far as
Though
time
some
or
(suppositio), or, in
Marsilius
is
modern terms and
not as radical an extensionalist as e.g.
18
he emphasi/es that the generally connoted by Ockham, Sortes is white is not to be found in reality.
formal
In
Commentary
on
(questions)
Aristotle s
defines subiectum as opposed to obiectum intellect
20
Pliysics
19
This
is
one of the works
).
characteristics
in
of the subiectum disposition
from a book on physics;
21
(
in
The
primum. He
(habitus)
in all
which
is
clearly
an object to an
Commentary
on
the
which Marsilius discusses the formal that
says
scientia
can be
about one single conclusion,
more commonly,
conclusions contained
Marsilius
Physics
that
traditional.
is
opposition
interpreted as a
manv
white
e.g.
characteristics of the subject of a science
3.2. Tlie
his
particular
view, reference to things in the
applicable to Marsilius
is
it
(significalio),
particular
When
but they do not
and contemporary logicians the latter kind a proposition, in which it is explained in
terms of the theory of supposition
outside world.
theory of truth.
also reflected in Marsilius
e.g.
however, as a disposition of
books of the science.
Now
the question
18 to advocate that the predicate term extensionally E.g. Marsilius docs not seem refers to things in the outside world, but rather that it connotes an aspect under which the thing, or things, referred to by the subject term is (are) considered; e.g. in term white brings to the mind the concept of white Socrates is white the
predicate ness (existing individually in Socrates) under which Socrates is considered: see Marsilius of Inghen, Treatises on the Properties of Terms ..., ed. 1983: esp. p. 128).
Bos
in:
19 Note that obiectum has another meaning than the word object which can e.g. be taken to refer to things in the world outside the human subject without reference to an intellect. In
21
ms Cuyk en
See
Marsilius
Kruisherenklooster,
St.
Agatha, Kruisherenklooster
of
C
Inghen,
12,
f.
2vb.
in
C
12,
quaestio
ii,
in
f.
Physicam, Quaestiones As often in the Middle Ages,
conclusions contained in books, esp. by Aristotle.
2ra
f.
ms Cuyk en science
is
St.
Agatha,
knowledge of
Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science
17
which conclusions are proved? matter and form, a quantity of water, a bundle of straw or a heap of stones, but it is a unity of attribution order (ordo), like in an army everything is directed (attributio) or is
what causes the unity of the science
This unity
is
not that of
in
e.g.
towards a leader, Marsilius says. All things studied in a science are thus related to the first subject. The exact nature of the subiectum scientiae
whether
(viz.
it is
a thing, or concept) remains to be determined.
on Aristotle
In the other commentaries
same view on the formal shall
characteristics of the
these characteristics by
list
Marsilius
works,
his
viz.
(
subject of a science
.
I
of an example drawn from one of
way
Commentary
generatione et corruptione: the
formam
works Marsilius holds the
s
of this science
subject
being moving towards a form
on
(questions)
is
Aristotle s
De
ens mobile
ad
This concept bears the science
).
which investigates generation and corruption and all objects studied are brought into relation with it. These formal characteristics can be found in different places of Marsilius works. It
1.
is
the most general concept that can be said of
objects studied in this science. E.g. that they are in
view,
movement towards
it
all
principal
can be said of a cow or a horse
a form.
the subject of a science in fact
is
22
So, as
I
interpret Marsilius
a predicate term that can be
said of the principal objects which, in turn, are the subject terms (e.g. this
horse
is
a being
moving towards a form
etcetera).
All objects of this science are related to this subject (here the
2.
called the subiectum attributionis}?^
subiectum scientiae
is
principal objects as
mentioned under characteristic
or
parts,
negations
of
these
principal
objects.
1
Not only the
are meant, but also
For
science
the
on
generation and corruption also studies bones, blood (which are parts of the subject) and rotten organisms (which are negations of the subject).
See Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones
in
Cuyk en St. Agatha, Kruishcrenklooster C book I, qu. ii, ed. 1501: f. 19va. 23
See
Marsilius
ed.
of
Inghen,
1505, f. 65rb; Agatha, Kruisherenklooster ii, ed. 1501, f. 19va.
qu.
i,
id.,
C
De
12,
f.
caelo
et
125va;
mundo, book I, Commentary on
qu. the
1,
in
Quaestiones in De generatione et corruptione, book Quaestiones in Physicam, book I, qu. i, ms Cuyk en
12,
f.
3ra;
id.,
Commentary on
the
Sentences,
ms
Sentences,
book
I,
I,
St.
qu.
Bos
18
The
3.
24
for, as
science,
being moving towards a form
subject
has been said,
all
gives
the
unity to
objects are related to this subject. 25
The subject does not exceed the borders (mete) of the science. one subject is not at the same time the subject of another
4.
This implies:
The
science.
on
science
generation
and
is
corruption
a
necessary
discipline, not superfluous.
The
5.
known
being moving towards a form
subject
in the science,
27
that
the term
is
26
first
not in a chronological, but in the logical tries to demonstrate the
is,
sense. The science on generation and corruption essential properties of the subject.
The
6.
can supposit for
The
7.
The
3.3.
a sign, which can refer to (or, in technical terms
is
subject
other things.
)
subject
is
primarily a mental term.
of the
nature
28
of a
subject
29
science
on
works
Marsilius
in
natural philosophy
These are the main formal conceives
Marsilius
characteristics of the subject of a science as
works
the
In
it.
mentioned
which
above,
are
commentaries on Aristotle and works on natural philosophy, and therefore he seems to follow Buridan (ca. 13(X)- shortly after speculative sciences, 30
1358).
It
noted
should be
in
that
view the subject of a
Marsilius
with science is the subicctum attributionis. Though he compares a science an army in which all elements are ordered towards the leader, the subject consideration by which a scientist studies he is primarily the way of 24
en
Sec St.
qu. 25 I,
ms Cuyk in Marsilius of Inghen, Quacstiones in Physicam, book I, qu. i, book f. 2vh; id., Commentary on the Sentences, Agatha, Kruisherenkloostcr C 12, article v, ed. 1501,
ii,
19ra-rb.
ff.
See Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones
Agatha, Kruistercnklooster 19va. qu. ii, ed 1501, f. 26
27 qu.
28 29
Marsilius says terminus
See i,
Marsilius
ed. 1505,
f.
of
65 rb;
See f.
f.
,
f.
id.,
of
2vb;
in
Physicam, book
Commentary on
id.,
where we would say object Quacstiones
Commentary on
in
I,
qu.
in
book
ms Cuyk en
St.
I,
.
De generation
the Sentences,
i,
the Sentences,
book
I,
qu.
et ii,
corruption,
ed. 1501,
f.
book
I,
19va.
27.
Inghen,
Commentary
on
the
Sentences,
book
I,
qu.
ii,
ed.
19va.
See
1509,
Marsilius
12,
Inghen,
For references, see note
1501,
30
C
John
3ra.
Buridan,
Quaestiones
in
Physicam,
book
I,
qu.
ii,
conclusion
vii,
ed.
Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science
objects. Attribution
considerare
in
here to the concept. Often, Marsilius uses the term
is
this
19
E.g.
respect.
Commentary on
his
in
Marsilius
et
Aristotle s
that
De
natural
repeatedly says comiptione science which considers things in so far as they are mobile. So the subject of a science is a concept which can supposit for
generatione
a
is
philosophy
human
things in the world outside the
intellect.
In his commentaries on Aristotle
works mentioned above Marsilius
s
advocates the conception of the subject according to which emphasis is laid on the way of consideration by the intellect, though he used different intellect
comparisons to elucidate the notion. This consideration by the is also advocated by e.g. Thomas Aquinas. E.g. we may also find
comparison of the way a science obtains unity with the unity
Marsilius
of sense-knowledge.
Marsilius
also
uses
the
31
There
analogy, like Buridan.
notion
a kind
of
a kind of analogy between the objects
is
and the subject of a science,
of unity by attribution,
just
urine
as
food
or
is
healthy in
an
analogous way to the health of a natural body, to which food and urine are related. This kind of subject as the subiectum attribulionis, can already be found in
nature of the
Tlie
3.4.
Henry of Ghent (1200(?)-1296).
subject
of a science
Marsilius
in
Commentary
on the Sentences
his Commentary on the Sentences Marsilius seems to advocate the same view on the subject of a science but when he discusses the unity
In
;
of theology, of
article
in
which he
question
ii
is
book
of
interpretation
comes forward.
In
Commentary on
define
his
the
science.
that logic goal:
the
of theology,
interested I
to
that 32
it,
Sentences
and
its
the
devotes a separate
another
Marsilius
function
for
emphasis
primarily the
unity
in
his
tries
to
of the
concludes that theology and other sciences (note, however, his other example) are one because these sciences have one
is
God
theology
subject
He
so
is
tells
the goal of
men how
human
beings on their way to Paradise, and
to obtain eternal blessedness. In logic everything
For a recent discussion on the subject of physics, see Thijssen, 1987, 3.1.1.3, pp. 101-104.
See reference
in
note 22.
his
Bos
20
is
argument. In Marsilius view, logic is practical things with a view to use them to advance other
studied to frame an
because
studies
it
sciences.
33
This
science
in
everything
of
interpretation is
studied
to
as
siibiectum
the
obtain
whereby
goal,
another
is
something,
in Marsilius work. interpretation of the nature of the siibiectum sdentiae No doubt this interpretation is suggested by the problem of the nature of
Though
theology. speculative,
and
according
secondarily a
Marsilius
to
practical
is
theology
science,
that
is:
a
primarily is
it
primarily
knowledge, and secondarily to learn how to obtain eternal blessedness, everything in theology is directed to God, that which every directed
to
theologian included, tries to attain.
the
being,
He
says:
The
complete
in the proper sense goal of the Bible and theology immediately and
man
s
obtain blessedness It
its
how
salvation, vi/.
viatores,
i.e.
men on
their
way
is
to Paradise, can
34 .
should be noted that John Buridan defines ethics with regard to
goal: in practical sciences the goal
is
the formal basis of consideration
5
(ratio
fonnalis considerandi)? could think that Marsilius changed his view on the nature of of a science in his later works. I prefer to think that the
One
the subject a real existing, individual very nature of theology, which is about God, of theology) thing and the goal of human life (in Marsilius conception
brought Marsilius to a view different from Aristotle.
The other example
Sentences, to
is
logic:
his
commentaries on
Commentary on
Marsilius uses in his
the
he conceives of logic as a practical science, directed
frame arguments to advance other sciences:
of logic
earlier
syllogism
is
the
I,
qu.
subject
36 .
33
Sec Marsilius of Inghcn, Quacstiones in librum Porphyrii, Vienna, O.N.B., V.P.L. 4998, ff. 3va^rb. 34 Marsilius of Inghen, Commentary on the Sentences, book
book
I,
i,
in
ms
qu.
ii,
ed.
1501,
f.
qu.
ii,
ed.
1501,
f.
20ra.
35
36
John Buridan, Quaestiones Marsilius
19va.
of
Inghen,
in
Ethicam, book
Commentary on
I,
the
qu.
i,
ed. 1509,
f.
4vb.
Sentences, book
I,
Marsilius of Inghcn on the Subject of a Science
and William of Ockham on
Marsilius of Inghcn
3.5.
21
the
subject
of a
science
In respect of the problem discussed in this paper, Marsilius differs from
Ockham
whereas the is
latter
of a conclusion
the subject sciences
many science
is
to
who
ask
So there are
as
sense,
case,
in
for the unity science:
king of the world,
the
is
Taken
conclusions.
one can not ask
says,
science.
that
in
But one can also speak of science as a collection of things known. But in that
are
this
one.
numerically viz.
known
each
there
as
broader sense,
Ockham
former does acknowledge the unity of a science, docs not. Ockham says that the subject of a science 37
the
that
in
or
it
is
in
a
equally absurd
of Christianity:
there
for
is
none. conclusions of a science, however, there can be a certain
Among
order, either according to the subject terms, or to the predicate terms,
An
or both.
same
the
example of an order according
proved
term,
subject
hierarchic
a
in
terms
predicate
a geometrical figure,
e.g.
order,
ordered
are
to predicate
e.g.
line,
according
Ockhamist
complexity.
An
Ockham,
,
,
,
reasonable
is
The
can be proved of animal man this man to both and ordering according subject predicate terms would often given only few examples), e.g. animal is a sensitive
An
be (Ockham
man
are
properties
according to
of
properties can be proved of subject terms in a hierarchic
sensitive animal
order. E.g. etcetera.
is,
when
is
quadrangle.
increasing
example of an order according to subject terms
when common
many
triangle,
to
terms
in
In
.
strict
any
this
respect,
Marsilius
cannot be labelled an
sense as well as in others indicated by Ritter
(1921).
In his
Commentary on
can have an unity
is
the Sentences
strict
sense.
according to changing aspects.
more says,
difficult
insofar
possess this,
to
as
infused
determine, all
faith
it
Christians (fides
There
The
Ockham
denies that a science
only a unity of collection
is
difference
between the sciences
seems. Theology has a unity,
and
infusa}.
therefore Marsilius
all
Christian
is
Ockham
theologians
certainly does not deny
but he goes further than Ockham: he also acknowledges unity on the
objective side of the science (viz. in acquired faith (fides acquisita}).
William prologue, qu.
of
Ockham, Scriptum
ix,
ed. 1967, pp. 247-248.
in
librum
primum
Sententiarum.
Ordinatio,
book
I,
Bos
22
In 38
Prologue to
the
Ockham
logic
his
formulates
Commentary
the subiectum
interprets the problem of the
of
causes efficient
cause
is
of logic
in
on the books of another way: he
the problem of the
as
causes:
the
Aristotle; the final cause are acts of knowledge.
The
Then,
logic.
subject
(expositio)
of logic
he
two
are
there
says,
of course: subject cannot be the formal cause, not does Ockham in the accept. way unity
external
this
would give
logic a
Conclusion
4.
Marsilius of Inghen is not a very original parts of his philosophy others in important respects, but he also on thinker: he not only depends and theologians which arc of other to combine In
many
tries
opinions
sometimes hard
to
dependent
on
combine. In
Buridan,
at
philosophers view of the subiectum scientiae he
is
his
least
as
regards
sciences.
natural
In
his
of a science as a Commentary on the Sentences he interprets the subject
the subject continues to
goal, while
fulfil
its
other function, like giving
here theology, which, though primarily a unity etcetera. The example a practical science, for it aims to expose how speculative science, is also the faithful should act to obtain eternal blessedness. In this commentary is
logic
is
science,
provides
described in the same way as theology: logic to frame arguments. which logic aims.
aims
which
the goal at
The
is
fully a practical
subject
of
logic
too,
University of Leiden
Bibliography
I
.
Manuscripts
Ms Cuyk en St. Agatha, Kruisherenklooster (Monastery of Friars), C 12. Ms Vienna, Osterreichische Nazionalbibliothek, V.P.L., 4998. -
the Crutched
-
-
38
id.,
5437
William
of
Ockham, Expositions
2, line 15; p. 3, line
50
-
p.
6 line 83.
in
libros
artis
logicae
prooemium,
ed.
1978,
p.
Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science
2. -
Primary
-
am
Frankfurt
am
Marsilius
libros
in
super octo
Physicorum
1509
(reprint
Quaestiones super quattuor Libros Sententiarum,
De
libros
in
Quaestiones
id.,
Parisiis
libros,
Main, 1964).
of Inghen,
am
Strassburg 1501 (reprint Frankfurt -
Physicorum, Parisiis 1509 (reprint
Main, 1964).
Quaestiones
id.,
-
literature
John Buridan, Quaestiones
Frankfurt
23
Main, 1966). 1505
generatione et corruptione, Venetiis
am Main, 1970). on the Properties of
(reprint Frankfurt -
Treatises
id.,
the
Ampliationes,
Suppositiones,
Introduction,
First
and
Tertns.
and Appendices
Notes
Translation,
A
Restrictiones
Critical
Edition
of
Alienationes
with
Egbert
P.
Bos,
ingeleid
en
van
by
Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster (Reidel), 1983. -
id.,
Kennis,
en
wetenschap
theologie,
aantekeningen voorzien door E.P. Bos, Baarn -
William of Ockham, Scriptum et
Prologus
distinctio
Bonaventure (N.Y.)
3. -
Secondary E.P.
Bos,
DC
Proefschrift. -
Sententiarum. Ordinatio.
Gal adlaborante
S.
Brown,
St.
Bonaventure University), 1967.
A
1979:
s
Note on an Unknown Manuscript Bearing upon Philosophy of Nature in Vivarium, 17, 1, pp. 61-68. ,
H.A. Krop, 1987: De
Scotus.
G.
(Ambo),
primum
1987.
literature
Marsilius of Inghen -
librum
edidit
prima,
(St.
in
uitgegeven,
van de theologie volgens Johannes Duns tussen theologie en metaphysica. Academisch
status
verhouding
Amsterdam (Rodopi).
M. Markowski,
1973:
1st
Marsilius von Inghen der Verfasser der in der
Handschrift 5437 der Osterreichischen Na/ionalbibliothek sich befindenden
Quaestiones
in
I-HI libros
VI Physicae Aristotelis?
De anima in
Aristotelis
und der Quaestiones
in I-
Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonomm, XVIII,
pp. 35-50.
A.A. Maurer, 1976: William of Ockham -
The Role in
of the Divine Ideas in the Theology of
Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, edited
by R.S. Almagno and C.L. Harkins,
St.
Bonaventure (N.Y.) (Franciscan
Institute Publications), pp. 357-377.
G. Ritter, Studien zur Spatscholastik. I. Marsilius von Inghen und die Okkamistische Schule in Deutschland (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger -
Akademie Heidelberg.
der
Wissenschaften.
Philosophisch-historische
Klasse,
4),
Bos
24
-
L.M. dc Rijk and
().
medii Weycrs, 1981: Repertorium Commentariomm
Koninklijke
Latinomm, quae in bibliothecis publids asservantur, Academic van Wctcnschappen, afdcling Nederlandsc
Letterkundc,
Verhandclingcn,
aevi
in
Aristotelem
Nicuwc
recks,
dcel
109,
Oxford/New York (North Holland Publishing Company). J.M.M.H. Thijsscn, 1988: Johannes Buridanus over het onderzoek
naar
zijn
theorie
over het
wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie. Deel
I:
oneindige
in
het
Amsterdam/ oneindige.
Een
kader van
zijn
studie; deel II: teksten.
Nijmegen
(Ingenium Publishers). A. Zimmcrmann, 1965: Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion iiber den Gegcnstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Tcxte und Untersuchungen Leiden/Cologne. .
C.S.F.
BURNETT
Innovations in the Classification of the Sciences in the Twelfth
Century
Nearly forty years ago Richard Hunt wrote,
The
important article on
in his
1
Twelfth
that the Century first half of the twelfth century, and more especially the second third, was a time when questions of method were a matter of deep concern ...
Introductions
in the
men
hands of
the
to
like
Hugh
the
in
"Artes"
of St Victor, Gilbert de la Porree, Peter
Abelard, Thierry of Chartres and William of Conches, traditional terms
and
schemata
formulation of of
new
into
sprang
new problems. and
philosophical
It
and
life is
works
scientific
from
make an impact on Western
beginning to
the
provided
at precisely this
basis
the
for
time that translations
Greek were
and
Arabic
scholarship.
Several authors
attempted to reformulate introductions to the seven liberal arts, and to 2 propose novel divisions of science to take into account the new texts. that of Dominicus Gundissalinus, who, blended together Latin material from of St Victor with Arabic material from al-
Perhaps the best-known example in
his
De
Thierry of Chartres and
Farabi
s
is
divisione philosophiae
Hugh
Classification of the Sciences? In this article three introductions
which divisions of knowledge are made, are discussed. Of printed and has occasionally been referred to; the other two
to the arts in
these one
is
are hitherto unknown.
The
first
text to
be considered
is
an introduction to Boethius
s
De
arithmetica in a twelfth-century manuscript from the Franciscan Convent
now
in Coventry,
1
in Trinity College,
Cambridge.
4
The
Studia Mediae\ alia R.J. Martin O.P. (Bruges, 1948), pp. 85-112, see
ultimate origin of
p. 85.
For the principal divisions of science current in the twelfth century see J. WeisMediac\al Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), p. 46. John of Salisbury is the earliest medieval author to show knowledge of the Posterior Analytics, which is summarized in his Metalogicon (written 1159). the
s
translations
of the
B.G.
1120s onwards;
,
o
37 The instrument of [arithmetic] is the abacus (i.e. set of ten ). It is the Pythagorean table on which multiplications and divisions are practised. 38 But we say that (a) it is not of this part that the abacus is an instrument, nor (b) is the duty of this part of arithmetic to multiply and divide. For abacists even divide the unit, which arithmeticians refuse to do. The description of the abacus as mensa pitagorica is found in both Bocthius"s Geometria II, ed. M. Folkerts (Wiesbaden, 1970), p. 139, and Adelard of Bath s Regale abaci, ed. B. Boncompagni, Bullcttino di bibliografia e di storia dclle scienze matematiche efisiche, 14 (1881), p. 91. 9
.
.
Qusja
translated
ibn
.
Luqa was an Greek into
from
eminent Arabic,
ninth-century other
among
mathematician things,
and
Diophantus
doctor s
who
Arithmetic,
Thcodosius s Sphaerica, and Pseudo-Plutarch s (Aetius s) Placita Pliilosophorum, and wrote commentaries on Euclid s Elements. How our author might have known this is obscure, since the only works of Qusta ibn Luqa available in Latin in the mid-twelfth century were two medical works: De differentia anime et spiritus, translated by John of Seville (earliest MS, National Library of Scotland, Adv. MS. 18-6-11, and De s.xii) ligaturis physicis, translated by Constantine of Africa (earliest MS British Library, Add. 22,719, s.xii). His works on spherical geometry - Praaica spherae solidae and Tractatus were not translated until the early fourteenth century; see M.-T. spherae volubilis d Alverny, Translations and Translators in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth
Burnett
28
that
appear
might
new
these
been
have
authorities
made
to
fit
of the seven arts. However, there are
comfortably into the old scheme the traditional scheme without some signs that our author did not accept that grammar is qualms. First of all he admits that certain people deny be as can there that one of the seven liberal arts, saying many grammars
as
languages and therefore as the
to
physics
amongst the
highest
as
Ptolemy
as the cause of the arts
arts,
and of Aristotle
(nostri}
considers
author
our
located
On
in
should be placed above the
the authority of his
art
reason.
citation
it
These men, he says, raise which we do not number
book of the De
an
grammar his
says,
first
more than one
interesting for
have not yet
(55).
the
in
arts.
science
a
position,
since,
arts,
many
after
First
of
sophisticis elenchis,
11
This
all. all,
the Almagest,
own people
he
cites
the
is
passage Ptolemy.
Tctrabiblos,
I
the
if it is not a precise citation Centiloquium, or a doxography, but even from any of these sources, it shows that our author was keen to adduce
known by hearsay before the early twelfth century. Secondly, he knows of authorities who have substituted physics for grammar. Physics, according to our author s own
the authority of a great scientist
definition
is
(14),
who was
only
concerned with the natures of
things, judging bodies
amongst the seven arts obviously pu/./.lcd our author, since one of the two marginal notes with which his introduction ends appears to be a memorandum to himself: invisible causes of visible things. Its position
and the
cd.
Century,
Qus}a
ihn
Benson and G. Constable (Oxford,
R.L.
Luqa
of Scientific
Dictionary
,
Biography,
1982), p. 446 and E.R. Harvey, ed. C.C. Gillispic (New York,
1975), vol. 11, pp. 244-6.
John and William arc not identifiable as well-known twelfth-century geometers. A Johannes Ocreatus (who might be the same as the author of the book on the Arabic of Adelard s translation of Euiclid s Elements helccp ) is credited with a version known as Adelard II (see Adelard of Rath, op. cit., p. 170), and both John and William 10
may have been 11
pupils of Adelard.
to see which statement of Ptolemy he is referring to, since his does not correspond to any of the sayings of Ptolemy collected by al-Mubashshir ibn Fatik which preface Gerard of Cremona s translation of the Almagest (P. nor to anything in Ptolemy s own Kunitzsch, Der Almagest (Wiesbaden, 1974), p. 98), author could be division of science in the first paragraphs of the Almagest. The to Ptolemy s Planisphere which begins Hermann of Carinthia s It
difficult
is
citation
preface
remembering
que cunctis disciplinalibus scientiis finis est, ipsa earundem omnium principium existit and describes physics as being the study of the ed. J.L. Heiberg, Ptolemaei opera astronomica minora of all
Quemadmodum Ptholomeus
...
[dicit], ,
principles (Leipzig,
quoniam
the
book of De
The only reference to grammar in 165b30-32 (ed. B.C. Dod, Aristoteles latinus, 6.1-3 (Bruxelleshuiusmodi orationes, ut 1975), p. 8): Sunt autem secundum aequivocationem discunt scientes: nam secundum os discunt grammatici.
sophisticis
Leiden,
coming-to-be;
1907), p. elenchis
clxxxiii.
is
first
Innovations
more
[Say]
about
in the Classification
those
which
things
moreover, point to one such scholar -
that
is,
who
12
concern
One
physics.
substituted physics for
Petrus Alfonsi, whose division of science
Whereas
29
of the Sciences
we
will
can,
grammar
consider next.
the author of the introduction to Boethius s
De
arithmetica
did not get as far as astronomy, Petrus Alfonsi wrote a short text which
an introduction to astronomy, and accompanies his own version of astronomical tables. This text has been edited by Jose-Maria is
specifically
Millas-Vallicrosa,
and
is
Peripatetics of France.
Huesca
in
in
known
generally
Petrus Alfonsi, as in
Aragon,
but
1106,
by
is
The
as
letter
well known,
had
then
to
the
was baptised
already
acquired
considerable status in the Jewish community in Spain. His learning was formed by the rich resources of the Arabs in Spain, and in his letter he is
advertising the
the
new
science of astronomy, and himself as a teacher, to
of Europe. 14
scholars
Out of consideration
for
his
readers Petrus
takes the Latin division of the liberal arts and investigates whether they
are useful in themselves and/or to each other. In so doing he mentions that
grammar should not be included amongst
does not
prove
anything;
it
is
the seven arts, because
not an argumentalis sdentia.
it
Like the
author of the Coventry introduction, he adds the objection that grammar 15 is not the same in all Petrus omits reference to rhetoric languages. altogether,
and
examines the
states that dialectic
is
validity of arguments.
useful in that, like a touchstone,
Then he passes
via arithmetic
it
and
music to physics, which he evidently considers to be on a par with the other subjects. His conclusion, as one would expect, is that astronomy is the most useful of the arts, and the rest of the letter concerns the justification of the science of the stars, the
the division of
12
terrestrial
specifically, medicine, for
See below, Edited
way
it
should be taught and
what we may call celestial physics, 16 For Petrus Alfonsi physica physics. is that art through which health can
subject-matter into
geometry and
spherical
means
its
it
p. 22.
by J.-M.
Millas-Vallicrosa,
La aportacion astronomica de
Pedro Alfonso
,
Sefarad 3 (1943), pp. 97-105.
Trancia
probably reflects the Arabic word
Firanja
which referred to Europe as
a
whole.
Ed. studentes
98: Invenimus autem nonnullos ex vobis grammatice p. quamvis inter artes VII nequeat computari cum neque sit nee in omnibus linguis eadem sed omnino diversa, tamen et ad
Millas-Vallicrosa, scientie,
que
argumentalis scientia artes est necessaria.
16
Ed. Millas-Vallicrosa,
p. 105.
Burnett
30
17 Of be preserved and length of life in this world can be assured. well as involves theoretical as medicine course, practical knowledge
knowledge of the elements and humours, diseases. In this respect
the
ibn
mentions. the
very
al18
c
Abbas
Constantine
by
Out of deference
been formed
of medicines and
as
of
name
whose
Africa,
arts,
Petrus
makes use of
but his mental attitude has clearly
the context of the Arabic philosophy in which he had
in
been educated. In
this
philosophy physics was clearly defined, coming
between theology and mathematics. In exemplary
as well
the kind of subject described in
to his Latin audience Petrus
seven liberal
into
division
much
the translation of the Kitab al-maliki of
-
part of the Pantechni
first
CA1I
is
it
his collection of
Hebrew and Arabic
the Discipline] clcricalis, Petrus sketches a
tales,
seven arts similar to that assumed France.
He
that
grammar.
that
states
the
are
six
first
scheme of the
the letter to the Peripatetics of
in
dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, medicine (phisica), music, astronomy, but as for the seventh, those who admit the possibility of prophecies say that it is necromancy; those who do not, say it is philosophy, and those who do not study philosophy say 1
it is
The
**
of science
division
third
most
the
is
bi/.arre
and seems
to
disregard the division according to the seven arts altogether. It occurs in two manuscripts, in each case adjacent to works of Adclard of Bath. The earlier
manuscript
20 English and of the late twelfth century.
is
The
I Ut testatur Ergaphalau after its call it an introduction to the science of the stars, but docs not
is
untitled, but
It
is
itself
to
text
opening words.
this
science,
as
since,
Ergaphalau
no
states,
restrict
one
can
understand any subject unless he has thoroughly mastered the sciences
Ed. Millas-Vallicrosa, in
p.
99:
Sit
ars
ilia
quam
per
salus
servari
lihro
suo
ct
diuturnitas vite
hoc valcat mundo agnosci. Constantinus
Ed. Millas-Vallicrosa, p. 99: sicut racena transtulit in latinam testatur. 19 sint
Ed. A. Hilka and artes
habent
et
septem
enumerares.
geometria, sententiae
phisica,
W. Sodcrhjelm probitatcs
(Helsinki,
et
septem Enumerabo.
Magister: musica, astronomia.
De
in
1911),
p.
Hae
sunt
scptima
10:
vcllem
industriae,
artes:
vcro
quem de
[Discipulus]: ut
haec
lingua
sar-
cum septem
mihi
sicut
se
arithmetica, plurimorum sunt
Dialectica,
diversae
aiunt nigromantiam esse volunt esse septimam. Aliqui ex illis videlicet qui prophetiis non credunt, philosophiam vel elementa mundana praecellit. Quidam qui philosophiae naturales res quae septimam, non student, grammaticam esse affirmant.
quaenam
This text
is
sit:
Philosophi
discussed
qui
and edited
the Stars, \nAdelard of Bath, op.
cit.,
in
prophetias
my
pp. 133^45.
sectantur,
Adelard, Ergaphalau and the Science of
Innovations
in the Classification
21
which precede that subject.
of the Sciences
Thus the author
the science of the stars within a general
31
of
first
scheme of
seeks to locate
all
science. This takes
the following form. Scientia
and
the
divided into two:
is
of
science
the
body
the science of the soul or the
or
The
nature.
latter
is
will,
completely
unconnected with book-learning. Rather, it is the knowledge of how to eat and drink, how to run and fight, and how to bring up one s children, and as such is shared by men and brute animals. The science of the will,
on the other hand, requires study, and is divided into philosophy, wisdom science The last division is not described, and of (sapientia) and .
all
philosophy
that
said
is
that
is
it
is
either concerned with fables
under
hidden 22 or works through similes - revealing the nature of higher beings through the consideration of lower ones. It is to sapientia that the author devotes his attention for the rest of the
which the truth
introduction.
23
essence first
Sapientia
been
have
is
the
is
with
allotted It
.
is
the
understanding of those things to which consent of nature unchangeability of
three subjects of the traditional quadrivium -
we
are described as ministering, but
geometry science which they
Physica alone
serve:
-
kinds.
and the stations
The
first
the health of
second
kind
ministered
is
,
leads
it
according to the
way
[of the heavenly bodies].
in that
the
is
24
Physica
is
of two
the science of tempering qualities, to preserve
is
man. This
is
medicine, or the
microcosmic science
.
The
the science of investigating the fixed state and motions of the
is
greater world, and this the
music, arithmetic and
find that physica
out the natural changes of things in a controlled transits]
The
divided into a ministering and a ministered part.
science of stars
is
called the
megacosmic science
.
The
latter is
divided into a part which uses instruments and a
,
is employed. To this second part belong mathematical astronomy, as well as the kind of astronomy which appears in the form of myths or the astrology which deals with political events.
part in which the intellect alone
21
Ed.
cit.
p.
Ut
143:
testatur
Ergaphalau,
absoluta
non potest
haberi
alicuius
rei
noticia nisi precedentium, velud ratio deposcit, doctrina elucescat.
Martianus Capclla is
s
given as an example of
Ed. sue
cit.,
volente
arithmetica,
p.
143:
(presumably
Philosophy
his
De
nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii)
this.
Est sapientia
...
comprehensio rerum que inmutabilitatem essentie is modelled on that of Boethius in De
natura sortiuntur. This definition I, 1;
ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), p. 8, lines 11-15.
Est igitur sola phisica ministrata que naturales immutationes rerum secundum transitum et moras continenter absolvit. Ibid.:
Burnett
32
The
first
and
is
on instruments
part which relies
involved
with
the
prediction
is
the experimental science,
manipulation of the future.
or
receives several divisions, depending on what form of prediction
whether
and
and
talismans
For
used.
are
incantations
is
each
It
used,
of
the
divisions of the science of the stars the author gives an authority. Among those that are recognizable are Hermes and Alexander [the Great],
Martianus, al-Farghanl, and Ibn Daud.
The reference
a
to
Latin
authority,
and
Martianus,
the
verbal
echoes of Boethius, show that this text was written in Latin and is not a translation of an Arabic of Jewish text. The references to al-Farghani and Ibn Daud, along with the astronomy of certain Arabs author was aware of translations from the Arabic. translations
in
particular
which,
on
the
one
hand,
gave
substance
Aristotle s
to
It
hand,
rethinking of the old Western division into the seven
other
show
,
these
precipitated
arts,
of
division
the
that
was
but,
a
on the into
learning
was described by Ptolemy theology, mathematics and physics. This division at the beginning of the Almagest, but was known in the West largely 25 However, no early mediaeval Latin through Boethius s DC trinitate. scholar was clear about what the subject-matter of physics was meant to be. In
Arabic works such as al-Farabi
the anonymous work On
the
s
Classification of the Sciences
and
follows
the
Rise of the Sciences,
four sciences of the quadrivium, and
physics
defined in terms of the subject-
is
matter of the physical works of Aristotle. Awareness of this Aristotelian s DC esscntiis (written in physics is apparent in Hermann of Carinthia
De
1143) and Gundissalinus
s
mundi. 26 Medicine, the
physics of the microcosm
testatur
twelfth
century,
made
of
a
developed
Ergaphalau)
African
divisionc philosophiae
largely
through
more the
and De processione the words of Ut
(in
dimension
theoretical
translations
of
in
the
Constantine
the
end of the eleventh century. Astrology, the physics fitted awkwardly into the mathematical discipline of
at the
macrocosm
as astronomy, but was convincingly described by Hermann of Carinthia have introduction the of author The of may Coventry physics. part
stopped writing where he did 25
De
trinitate,
chapter
2,
in
Philosophy, ed. H.F. Stewart, E.K.
26
For a
History 389-94.
fuller discussion
of Twelfth-Century
-
Boethius,
before
tackling
The Theological
astronomy and whilst
Tractates,
Rand and SJ. Tester (Cambridge, Mass.
The Consolation of 1973), p.
8.
of this subject see C. Burnett, Hermann of Carinthia in A Western Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), pp. ,
33
Innovations in the Classification of the Sciences
more about physica - simply because he no the new texts such as those on astrology and
noting that he should say
knew how
longer
to
fit
medicine into his tidy schema of knowledge.
Appendix: Edition of the Coventry Introduction to Boethius metica
The
edition
following
is
a
diplomatic
Cambridge, Trinity College, R. 15.16, indicated by \/;
editorial
Ex cerebro Arcium
1
testardi
B v -3 r
fols.
additions by
abbreviations are placed in round brackets
of
transcript
the
Scribal
,
s
De
arith-
MS
in
text
additions
are
Realizations of ambiguous
.
().
27
sermonum proprietate conrerum natura consolidatur. In sermonum proprietate
summatur, aut in arcium liberalium
aut
doctrina
liberalium
tripliciter
consistit
in
secundum quam
conitio,
distinguntur artes, grammatica, dialectica, rethorica,
quarum prima
tres
loqui
docet ad intelligendum, secunda ad credendum, tercia ad persuadendum.
Quoniam
est
prius
igitur
loqui
precedit
quadruvialium
disciplinarum
breviter sunt consideranda:
Que
materia.
que
species.
28
Que
Quid partes.
Post
iure
trivialis
trivialem
industria
\vero/
decus
non verborum, habent pronunc insistendum, cuius gratia hec
rerum,
arithmetica, cui
est
philosofari
2
sollerciam.
quadruvialem
fessionem, prima
quam
ipsa
sit.
Quod
Quod genus officium.
eius.
Que
eius
3 Addunt preterea
longiloquium libere de his que norunt facientes hec. Quis artifex. Quod instrumentum. Quis finis. Que ratio nominis. Quo ordine ipsa sit docenda
Adhuc quoque quod ubique queritur: auctor, \intencio eius,/ titulus libri, modus agendi, \cui supponitur/. 4 Sed tot extra queri ridiculum scientibus, fastidium est nescientibus. Nee placet amodo 29 5 Ut vero sit adiutum dicere, tot huiusmodi laudis temporisque venatio et
addiscenda.
.
secundum modernos finis,
Note 28 29
in
top margin.
Quaestio vel
in principio
modus, ordo, genusque,
in
margin
redemptio suprascr.
cuiusque
libri
querantur: auctor, materia,
quorum duo prima
in titulo
patere debent,
Burnett
34
qui
utique
opere,
pars
libri
ad libitum
et
cst.
prima
Cetera quatuor ex toto perpenduntur Nos vero volentibus dabimus copiam,
dic/rtis dicenda.
ut quid velint, elegant. 6 Est 30 igitur arithmetica disciplina multitudinis per se,
Quod
naturas et proprietates contemplans.
cum
habet
de
non tamen per
numeris,
proporcionaliter,
eorum
ex
quod hec quidem -
diapente
contemplans
inquit,
se
-
in duplici
ad
scd
manifesta
relacione
est huius artis,
quod proprium
alios sit
hec
-
ut diapason
Numerorum
proportione. 8
consistat
in
gemetria
apponitur ad differentiam musice que
Per se
ut
scilicet
una,
immobili, reliqua circa magnitudinem [im]mobilem
consistit
magnitudine
quarum
periciam,
versatur idonea. 7
natura,
commune
ad differentiam
est
,
,
astronomic, quo non proprie multitudinis, sed magnitudinis
geometric sibi vendicaverunt
agat
numerorum
disciplina
quod additur multitudinis
alii\s/ artibus, et
vel
dicitur
etsi sit scilicet
rclatis,
consonantiarum
in sesqualtera
-
ut
proprietates et naturas
hec enim quasi quadam
prerogativa docct dignitate, ut quis par, quis impar, pariter vel impariter
numerus,
primus
quisve
vel
et
cubus,
alia
prout
in
serie
lectionum
determinabitur, hoc tantum nunc dicto, quod natura et proprietas
tam parvo est
natura
9
distant
-
ut
indifferenter vicissim
eorum
ponantur. Altera tamen
-
id
generalior est in suis accidcntibus, ut digitus, articulus.
Genus 31
Mathcmatica
est
mathesis,
media
\h/
32
aspirata
et
correpta.
que abstractam considerat
latine dicitur doctrinalis scicntia,
quantitatem. Abstracta quanlitas est quod intellcctu a matcria separantcs, vel
ab
aliis
accidentibus vel sub(stan)t(i)is, ut est par vel impar, in sola
raciocinacione tractamus,
sunt
cuius species
.iiii.,
hec.
quarum prima
10 Generalissimum vero eius genus philosophia. Tola enim philosophia
secundum est.
tres naturales questiones
que omnibus sunt communes,
divisa
11 Dubitant enim homines de causis rerum, aut accionibus rerum, aut
racionibus rerum; iuxta
rerum causis
-
primam discretionem
constituitur
theorica,
sed
-
qua
scilicet
dubitatur de
dc accionibus, ethica,
et
de
inquisitione veritatis, logica. 12 In his tribus spccicbus tota philosophia sumitur, quarum unaqueque tripertito dividitur. Ethicam subdividunt in sexus, elates, officia; logica paries habet scienliam diffiniendi, dividendi, -in
Ars heading 31
in
Genus heading
margin in
margin
Note the form of h Haskins,
Studies
Mass., 1927), p. 45,
in n. 7.
the
used by the scribe: History
h
of Mediae\*al
(
= Greek rough breathing; Science, second edition
cf.
also C.H.
(Cambridge,
Innovations
in the Classification
35
of the Sciences
argumen\tan/di. 13 Scd iam dc sola theorica videamus, cetcre nichil ad prcsens ncgocium. Theorica igitur tres habct species, sccundum tria rerum
unum genus
genera. 14 Est substantie, circa
de
ratio
res incorporee vel extra corporea, ut divine est theorice,
que prima species Est aliud genus
deis.
-
ipsa
quibus
est
secunda species, phisica,
genus
est
in
16 vocetur?
Queritur
Ad
diximus,
productum
quomodo
sola
ista
species
lene,
cum
divinatio,
philosophic
doctrinalis
promti sumus in cognicione et incorporeorum de quibus corporum de quibus fisica raciocinatur. 17 Verbi gratia, visa in
elementis,
et
concordi composicione eorum et
celestium corporum, necessitas ingerit nobis
pociorem
longe
existere,
eorum aliquem creatorem
sicque
18 Cognita quoque proporcione qualitatum
corpore
correpta
quod dicimus quod habita perfecta cognitione illorum de
proporcione que est
in
et
agit,
theologia et
omnibus
media
vero
m.d.di.ma.
facit
quibus hec
ut
enim,
doctrina,
interpretatur
aspiratione,
unde: Scire
est
que corporibus adiacent, sicut sunt quantitates, de quibus est tercia species, scilicet
Mathesis
15
est theologia, id est
diiudicans
sed
incorporea,
accidencia, qualitates et
mathematica.
id
que
de corpora de naturis rerum. Tercium
scilicet
animalis, ipsius corporis cito
et
ad
incorporea
his
traducimur.
commixtionum habitudine
ut
natura cognoscitur, et inde medici
iuxta cognitas qualitates medicinas contempcrant. Itaque per proportiones
venimus ad istorum cognitionem. 19 Presens vero sciencia de illis est que corporibus adiacent. Omnis enim numerus rerum est. Per excellentiam ergo doctrinalis sciencia dicitur
humanorum aliter
et
omnium
quadruvium, quoniam per earn ad divinorum
et
nature rerum cognitionem ascenditur. 20 Solent et
hec dicere. Theologia
est
de
invisibilibus
invisibilium causis, fisica
33 de visibilibus mat\h/ematica invisibilium formis, mecanice autem artes sunt de visibilibus [in]visibilium, vero mathematice quia specialiter in doctrina consistunt. predicte
de
visibilium
invisibilibus
causis,
21 Quicquid enim ibi docetur vel addiscitur, subiectis figuris demonstratur. 22 De materia 34 huius artis non tanta erit dicenda. Nam incipientibus multa occurrunt, et
grammatica
et
et
arithmetica, quia prime
sunt /fol. 2r/ bifide vie sapientie, multa habent preostendere. 23 Materia
huius est numerus multipliciter variatus, secundum quod hec sciencia est introductoria ad tres vel fortasse plures facultates.
The same unusual form of Materia heading
in
margin
h has been added here.
Burnett
36
24 Species 35 eius due docet Euclides in
quam
probabilis,
et
.vii.
digessit
sunt. Est
.viii.
et
.ix.
enim quedam demonstrativa quam volumine artis geometrice, alia est
Nichomacus. 25
dicunt
Alii
huius species sui
generis esse divisionem, easque habet species quas et sua materia, scilicet et
imparem numerum
enim numeri
Sint
et
huiusmodi, quamvis possit
species, par et
autem utrorumque
artis
impar numerus,
parem
fieri distinctio.
sciencie.
26 Partes 36 relative,
huius
artis
de numero
figurali,
sunt
.iiii.:
de numero per se, de numero et medietate numerorum.
de proportionalitate
27 Quatuor autem hee paries secundum quattuor disciplinas matheseos assignantur. Sciencia numerandi per se quantum ad suam propriam conceptionem, scientia de numeris ad aliud relatis, quan ad armonice subtilem
disquisitionem,
numerum
geometricum,
Nam
genituram. 28
numerandi
sciencia fit
ad
modum
quadratus a quadrangulo
dicitur a ternario ut et
et
dicunt
quod
ordinatam
geometricarum
figurarum
numerus formatur ad
et
figuraliter,
trianguli, et triangulus
quadrangulus a
.iiii.
et
deinceps secundum naturalem progressionem numerorum in infinitum. Quo eadem consideratio a corporalibus non recedat figuris, que etiam
sic
numerorum
racione et
proporcionandi
constat
dividend!
esse
distinctionibus horarum, signorum
et
29
formata.
astronomice
Sciencia
dificultati
paralellorum.
multiplicand!, ut
in
in
hac
subservit,
Horum omnium
arte assignantur raciones, sicut sequentia huius voluminis expedient, et hie
ordo predictus
scilicet
in libri tractatu intelligitur. Alii
unde
de predictis
dicunt.
30
De
quapropter
speciebus huius artis nichil in auctoribus invenimus dictum, supersedendum. Similitcr de eius partibus. Arismetica,
his
non habet quia simplex est, et non eget ceteris artibus. vero ipsa egent. Sic dividunt qui dividere nesciunt vel nollunt. 38 huius artis est virtutes numerorum perpendere ad 31 Officium
inquiunt, partes Illae
37
speculationem virtute
persone
nature
numerorum congruus
rerum,
speculari. actus,
Partes heading in margin
The
a appears to be expunged.
Officium heading
in
margin
-
scilicet
32 Aut quia officium
officium
Species heading in margin
TO
econverso
et
huius
artis
erit
naturas est
quod
rerum
alicuius
debet
in
certe artifex
37
Innovations in the Classification of the Sciences
secundum
facere
contemplari
facultatem
propositam
numerorum
33 Quis ergo
et
hoc
est
secundum
artem
facile.
Porro
naturas et proprictates. 39
ex officio
artifex
sit
cognosci
patet
enim qui dupliciter qualibet docet artem, alius qui agit secundum artem. Artifex ergo qui docet hanc artem dicitur arithmeticus, et qui secundum artem agit, computator. arte
in
consideratur
34 Alius
artifex.
est
35 Hec enim et ex arte contingit duplicitas. Sciencia enim numerorum quam dicimus arithmeticam, sicut et alie artes, bifariam dividitur, scilicet in scienciam et operationem, quam discrecionem Graii theoricam
dicunt
sine
occurrunt,
et
In
practicam.
neutra
quibus
sciri
autem
utraque potest,
tres
de
scilicet
inspectiones proprietatibus
numerorum, de proportionibus eorundem et de caracteribus ipsorum. His ergo doctus et docens, ab horum distat operatore. 36 Quandoque vero hoc quandoque
dignius,
illud,
maxime
grammatica et theologia. 37 Instrumentum 40 huius decenus; mensa
in
artis
est
magis naturalibus
et necessariis ut
secundum quosdam abacus, quod in
qua multiplicationes et divisiones exercentur. 38 Sed dicimus nee huius instrumentum esse abacum, interpretatur
pitagorica,
nee officium huius partis arismetice multiplicare et dividere. unitatem etiam dividunt, quod recusat arithmetice.
Nam
abaciste
igitur eius instrumentum rimachia per quam ipsa exercetur, animadvertunt quod qui eius ludi sunt periti. Interpretatur autem rithmachia quod in ea docetur, id est pugna numerorum. Rithmus enim
39 Erit satis
numerus, machia est pugna, unde et sichomachia, id est anime pugna. 40 Sed videamus cui supponatur abacus, cuius causa omnium artium videamus instrumenta, que proprie sunt oblectationes. 41 Trivii, scedulis et est
tabellis
exceptis,
sumpseris similiter
.vii.
et
est
nisi
forte
que
et
vocum
sunt
In
modus
quoniam
Rerum enim
instrumentum
quadruvio vero predictum erit predicte, 42 At abacus geometrie est quantitatis pocius quam numeri habet specu-
instrumenta.
secundus
instrumentum, lationem.
nullum
scaccarii.
quantitatem investigans,
dum
per figure posituram
per campeolos \arte/ vagatur, quam multum quamve parvum consideratur. 44 Troianum etiam vel Thebanum diludium quod
aliquid
sit
a captura
Scaccarium dicunt teste diligentia geometrica pollet industria. Quidque etiam figurarum geometrie non paucas in solido dant admirationes. 39
artifex
heading
in
margin
instrumentum heading
in
margin
Burnett
38
45 Porro musicc cum plura
instrumcnta, duo que priora nostris animis
sint
monocordum, que nunc cordarum varietatem
magis vicina plusque impcrativa, scilicet fistula et
prima conducta pro instrumentorum. 46 Astrologie comprehensa iocunditas compeg<er>unt 41 vel horoscopio, necnon spera mundi vel celi et in horologio spectatur
ab
varietate
invencione
astrolapso Tholomei.
47 Septem vero mecanicarum artium infmita cuilibet sunt exempla, armature id est fabrilis, navigatio, id est lanificii, id est vestiture,
ut
negotiatio,
quod trivium magis
pertinent, relique magis ad ea
adultcrina
48
dum
artificis
opere
vero
Liberalium
ea
ad
nos
extrinsecus
que
decet
intrinsecus, id est agricultura, venatio
que
medicina. Sed hec nobis postponenda, quia
id est
vel piscatio, confectio,
est
a natura mutuantur
est
philosophia
commercium.
vel
quia
tantum
ingenuis
et
aut quia ingcniosis danda, vel quia liberos et expeditos requirunt animos, liberc et caste et sole, aut libere, id est propter se quia sui et
<non>
merces
est,
propter aliud addiscenda.
49 Finis 42 huius
per ea que docentur in arte ista /fol. subiacet 2v/ generalis expellatur ignorantia. Humana enim natura triplici incommoditati: vicio, egritudini, ignorantie. Contra has tres incommoditates
rerum
ethicam,
remedium: contra
deus triplex nobis contulit
opifex
contra
ut
est
artis
fisicam,
egritudines,
contra
.vii.
ignorantiam,
vicia
artes
liberales.
50 Unde cleganter Gal(icnus): ab animo vicium, a corpore langor
Omni et
causa laborandum ut abscidatur
a ventre saturitas,
que ignorancie
fastidicns mater.
51
Utilitas
ergo
huis
artis
est
excepta
cognicione
virtutum
et
habitudinum officiorumque numerorum universalis speculacio nature rerum visibilium et invisibilium. 52 Ars etiam ex re nomen habens dicitur 43
arit\h/metica,
ab
numerus, quoniam
53 Eo autem
quidcm
libris
ares
in
quod interpretatur virtute numeri versatur.
ordine
specialiter,
44
The
variant form of h
Finis heading in
43
is
in
quod
est
communia
doctrinaliter, designenturque
used here.
margin
The
ordo heading
rithmus
quo et docenda in singulis ad omnes autem communiter ut sit. 54 Pre-
has peculiar form of h hich has been corrected from areth-.
44
et
ars hec disccnda,
mittantur peticiones arceanturque
^
virtus,
margin
been inserted between
V
and
m
of arithmetica,
Innovations
in the Classification
proprictates et diffcrcntie. Sic presens
instat
liber.
ordo modusque agendi. gratia de reliquis.
of the Sciences
Tune secundum hoc Isque modus agcndi
De
auctoribus
55 Grammaticam unam
.vii.
45
39
quelibct sunt arte cogcnda. cst
ncque multum
distant
huius artis iam dicendum, ciusquc
artium
libcralium
quidam
diffitentur,
instantes tot esse posse
grammaticas quot idiomata, tot ergo et artes, et loco suppremo phisicam efferunt, quam nos inter eas non connumeramus, que, teste Tholomeo rege, super artes causa[que] artium ponenda est. 56 Sed auctoritate nostrorum Aristotilisque dictis in primo elencorum ars erit. Manifestum est, inquit, quoniam et ars quedam hoc potest facere
quod orationes non conligant soloecismum. 57 Hec ars primum in Egipto que mater est artium reperta est, tempore Osiris mariti Ysidis. Inde in
Greciam
sicque in Latinitatem est profecta et perfecta. 58 Herodia-
crevit,
nus et Apollonius Grece compegerunt artem primitus,
membranas
biblos et ars
pictoria
scriptitetur, in
grammatica
sparsius vagaret. Sicut
per volvolas
et
pitacia
solidum forsan adhuc
et
aliis
est
hodie cernere, quod
ob litteratorum artis
in
diligentiam
ipsa
compegenda volumen,
factum
constat
quodam
46 sunt quoniam prius elaborata
enim
antea per
licet
artibus
particulariter et
sic et
de
Aristotile
discrete
deinde aumentabantur ab
acceperunt postea quousque in artem sint create. 59 Dionisius quidem siJlabarum omnium aptissimas formas fecit; et ob id statua his
qui
honoratus
est.
dederunt
artes.
47
libertati
artem
Aristarcus et Plinius et Cicero singuli singulas grammatice Seneca vero summus philosophus addens dictis Tullii
Ciceronis, et aquile libertati
48
Mecenatis \et/ aliorum inventis
scripsit notariam, cuius iam usus periit.
60 Totam autem Donatus artem tissime Priscianus. Servius
quoque
digessit,
49
et
sed novissime
et
perfec-
Ysidorus in libro ethimo-
id est origine vocabulorum - per interpretationem multa ad logiarum hanc artem descripsit utilia. 61 Huic etiam adiacet Priscianus de
accentibus Virgilii.
45
46
47 48 49
et
Priscianus
Lucilius
quidem
auctores heading in margin e above final a
or
liberti.
or
liberti.
space of about 30 letters
de barbarismis c.
et
Priscianus
genera soloecismorum
de
distinxit
xii
versibus
que omnia
Burnett
40
sum<m>opere
spcctant
Ad
vitanda profitentibus grammaticam. 62
quecumque
hanc etiam artem
sunt metrorum, figurarum, historiarum, fabularum.
63 Rhetoricam Aristotilcs ampliavit prout a magistris Socrate
idem
scilicet
suis,
Platone susceperat, contemporaneus quoque eius Gorgias ut
et
Aristotiles
dicit
omnes
orationes
rethoricas
circa
quod
artes
Tisias
accidit
et
plene
priorum sparsas quidem autem post Theodorus vero inventiones primus, Trasimacus post Tisiam, hunc et multi alii. 64 Novissime Grece digesserunt artem plenissime,
circa
alias
.
post
Demostenes, Gorgias, Aristotiles et Ermagoras, Corax quoque apud Siracusas, Moises apud Hebreos. 65 Deinde apud Latinos magis translatores invcntores
quam
pollebant,
plenissime
Quintilianus,
Tisias,
50
vero
artem
digissit
tribus
inventionibus rethoricis, et nova rethorica,
immensum
sibi
sparsim
scilicet
et
omnium legum
topicis
sanxit
queque leges
Numa
antiquas
leges
de in
enim
Moises primum Hebrcis Phoroneus Grecis, Solon
natio.
Pompilius qui Romulo leges. 68 Consul vero Pompeius
statuere
scilicet
66 Abhinc
dequisitionibus, quid
solempnitcr scripsit leges. Mercurius Egiptiis, 51 Socrates Atheniensibus, Ligurius Lacedemoniis, Caldcis,
suis.
rethorica docet et dc orando. 67 In divisione orbis
quomodo
rethorica, terre
ars evehitur
-
Tacianus, Cato. Cicero
voluminibus,
Belus
Archadcmicis,
successit Romanis, celebres primi
.x.virorum
Solonis
qui
lulius
et
interpretes
Cesar
post
primi
tabulis
.xii.
leges
exposuerc Romanis, in libros cepere redigere leges, sed morte prevent! sunt. 69 Thcodosius vero minor augustus ad similitudinem Grecorum codicem fecit omnium constitutionum a Constantini temporibus sub proprio cuiusque
titulo
imperatoris
Novissime
lustinianus
opusque Theodosianum artem perfecit in libro de
imperator
incipiens et Codice Digestisquc
alii
augcndo,
alii
est.
Plato
fugiens in rupe conscdit non
vero
post
mortem
sui
partes
Socratis
Primum
magistri
sui,
Unde
et
dialectica inventa
primum Grecis ab
Aristotiles discipulus eius,
Egipto Athenas rediens logicam instituit. primus et solus totam comprehendit, ampliavit,
50
alii
dederunt;
a Parmenide qui cctus
modico tempore, Sed
redegit.
diversi
perficiendo, artes invenerunt.
plures eius artis auctores leguntur. 71
hominum
institutis
consummans.
70 Dialecticam secundum plures
enim incipiendo,
vocavit.
deposuit
et
perfecit
72 Marcus Terentius Varro primus dialecticam
transtulit,
in
artem
nobisque
sic
The
scribe
originally
rected his mistake.
swapped
Atheniensibus
and
Lacedemoniis
,
but
then
cor
Innovations
of the Sciences
in the Classification
Nonnulla quoque de rcthorice eiusque quoque super hec nostris addidit. dedit.
41
digessit discretione. Cicero
73 Boetius vero plus omnibus nostris transtulit, et commentatus est, multa auxit et invenit industria. Verbi gratia, Aristotiles x.
suaque
primus
chatheg(oricas)
generatione
sillogismi
primum Greci
sic
contra
artem primus duobus
Sit
quid.
predicamenta,
ergo
sicque
quid,
queritur,
Porfirius
prior
cum ea
ipsa
libris
Deinde
3r/ His ergo non sine exercicio
/f.
qui vetus novaque vocantur ars dialectica
secundum quod
De
disposuit.
duobus. 74 Commentati sunt super hec
Cicero, Boecius. 75
erit instructio,
ordiuntur,
in
libris
ut Themistius, Andronicus, Alexander, Theofrastus.
latini ut Porfirius,
plena
medii
inventione
et
de soph(istic)is
digessit, similiter
duobus
Architam/
\post
quo modo
ad
Ysagogarum
distinctione
est
que
qui
libris,
ad quid
et
et
Aristotilis
sex
predica-
mentorum.
Quorum
76 infinite
52
analecticorum
libri
de chategoricis
quod
reliquorum genera, id est sentiuncule magistrorum
ut
commenta et
ypoteticis
ars
specialiter
translatoribus
elenchorum
multa.
Sequuntur
eiusdem, priorum
Tullii
periarmenias
post
Aristotilis,
posteriorum, precedentibus quidem
sillogismis
Boetius voluminibus. 77 Deinde
Aristotelis
dicitur
topicis,
et
Boetiique
topicorum
topicis
libri
datis
viii.
Tandem
divisionibus.
et
liber Aristotilis.
78 Quadruvio post trivium insistimus, in quo prior est presens. igitur artem numerandi apud grecos Samius Pitagoras et Arist(oscripserunt, diffusiusque Nichomacus et Euclides, licet et alii in
79 Hanc tiles)
aeadem
florerent, ut
Era
duo quos
interpres et
Burnett
42
commcntor quam
inventor
extitit.
Sicut et
quidam modernorum
in
eadcm
clarucrunt, ut Alardus, Ioh(anne)s, Will(elmu)s. 53
Musicam
Warburg
^3
Institute, University of
London
Here the copy ends, except for two notes in the bottom margin of fol. 2v which might be reminders for what the scribe wished to write next: 1) quid circa fisicam amplius de his two words at 2) pitag(oras), ypoc(ras), apoll(o), merc(urius) qui tetracord(um) (these zeno linus, to (?), amphio(n). , orpheus, mercurius) right-angles
FRANCESCO D ELIA
Senso c dimcnsionc dclla reductio ad philosophiam dclle discipline
E
matcmatichc nclle
Institutiones di
da premettere che Cassiodoro, piu chc un
Cassiodoro
filosofo, si
come
presenta
un raffinato divulgatore e un pensatore rivolto al concrete. Egli non dispone felYhabitus mentale del filosofo nel senso piu appropriate del
non esprime una
termine, poiche
viva passione per
problemi metafisici e
i
idee pure e nelle sue esposizioni dottrinali non raggiunge mai
le
livello
speculativo
e
il
vigore
sono
che
intellettuale,
note
le
1
alto
carat-
suo contemporaneo Boezio, in cui confluiscono in perfetto equilibrio i temi piu ardui e le piu vive speculazioni dello spiritualismo greco-romano, assunti e rielaborati in funzione di una teristiche del pensiero del
filosofia
cristiana.
fondamentale motivo
II
da parte
attenzione ascrivere
1
Cassiodoro
di
o
disinteresse
ridotta
metafisica
della
esigenze
di
e
mutate condizioni storico-ambientali,
alle
principalmente
alle
di
da che
la tragica scomparsa del filosofo-senatore, una cultura largamente depotenziata e in progressive decline. 2
determinano, soprattutto dopo il
quadro
di
Eppure monaci una
fondatore
il
di
Vivarium, nella prospettiva di fornire
formazione
valida
culturale,
che
affondi
le
ai
suoi
radici
nei
presupposti teoretici del pensiero classico, elabora nelle sue Institutiones
un
piano
di
articolato
studi,
-
anche
se
in
gran
parte
inteso,
in
cristianesimo di Boezio e fuori discussione da
quando A. Holder ha scoperto in un granducale di Karlsruhe, attualmente catologato Karolisruhensis 106, un frammento della perduta opera di Cassiodoro, Ordo generis Cassiodororum edito da H. Usener col titolo: Anecdoton Holderi. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Roms in ostogothischcr Zeit, Bonn 1877, dove a p. 4 si fa esplicito riferimento all attivita teologica di Boezio: "Scripsit (Boethius) librum de Sancta Trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica", II
ms.
della
Bibl.
,
ecc. dc\\
Attualmente abbiamo altre due preziose testimonianze relative Anecdoton su Boezio: un ms. del sec. IX, scoperto da F. Troncarelli
British
del
L
Libr.,
Harley 3095, del
Mabillon,
attestazione
passato
nouveau
i
f.
Iv,
90,
di
temoin
e la trascrizione
ora
Cassiodoro a
di
circoli
ms.
perduto,
riguardo,
come
studio piu di quanto non
fragmentaire
de
ad opera
della
YAnccdoton
e
di
in
notizie
London,
Th. Ruinart, collaboratore
Biblioteca
dato cosi
alle
municipale di
rilevare,
di
Chartres.
interessava
nel
potesse pensare. Cfr. F. Dolbeau, "Un in Re\ iie d histoire des textes, Holderi",
si
12-13 (1982-83), pp. 397-399. 2
Tali considerazioni sono esposte in un nostro recentissimo saggio, L Antropologia di Cassiodoro tra ispirazione agostiniana e suggestions del mondo classico. Note teoretiche e fdologiche sul
"De
anima
",
Roma
1987, pp. 11-14.
D
44
alia
corrispondenza
fondamcnto
di
indispensabilc
a\\ intelligentia
dell
prassi
Scripturarum
-
due gruppi
liberal!, ripartite in
Elia
insegnamento e
mctodologia
come
patristico-tcologico,
forma/ionc
propedeutica
programmazionc canonica delle arti distinti ma complementari nella formazione
nella
grammatica, rctorica e dialettica, cioe le artes Mediocvo costituiranno il trivium; propriamente dette, che nel corso del
del
medievale:
civis
musica,
aritmetica,
con
classificate di
la
riduttivo
formazione
filosofica
per
del
1
e
rnagistcr
ancor
di autentico
3
e
Per
la
denominazione dclle arti Medioevo, cfr. P. Rajna,
ncl
o
carenza
acccnnata
auditores a recepire un messaggio
attrihuita
e
proprie
discorso filosofico, sia pure a livello
del
sfera
vere
le
di
elevate
alia
cioe
mathematica e che verranno
quadrivium? Queste ultime, in linea da una funzione Institutiones nelle
denominazione
puramente empirica teoreticamcnte
astronomia,
articola la scienza
si
vengono
principio,
e
geometria
disciplinae, nelle quali
per
piu
di
inadeguatezza
dcgli
incapacita
1
spessore culturale.
4
ad esse discipline e per rimportanza in denominazioni Trivium e Quadrivium
dcllc
"Ix;
",
Giacone, "Arti lihcrali e classificazione delle 58-72. II tcrminc Cassiodoro", in Ae\ um, 48 (1974), pp. scienzc: csempio di in quadmium) compare per la prima volta in fissato sara in appresso quadruvium (che 7: "Constare Bocth., DC institutione arithmetica (I, 1), ed. G. Friedlein, Lipsiae 1867, p. cumulum pcrfectionis in baud manifestum philosophiae disciplinis ad
Studi
1
Mcdic\*ali, 1
R.
quemquam
est,
nisi
evadere,
4-36;
pp. Boezio e
(1928),
cui
talis
prudcntiae nobilitas
quodam
quasi quadruvio
quadruvium est, quo his viandum nobiscum procreatis sensibus ad intelligcntiac ccrtiora
9-10:
"Hoc
igitur illud
come indurrebbe bocziano;
infatti
a lo
credere
sit,
perducitur".
Rajna, che Cassiodoro ignori
il
ricorda nella lettera scritta a
TU
nome artem
di
vcstigatur";
ibid.,
pp.
quihus cxcellentior animus a 1
Ne
si
esistcnza del
Teodorico
a
puo
pensare^,
"neologismo"
Boezio,
sia
pure
per quadrifarias praedictam CCL 96, Turnholti 1973, p. 50. I ridh, mathesis ianuas introisti", il ruolo Percio a buon diritto si puo parlare di quadrivio in Cassiodoro, anche per come vedremo meglio in scguito, attribuiscc alle quattro discipline, specifico, che egli, un quadruplice sviluppo della scienza mathematica. configurandole essenzialmente come
con
una
leggera
variantc
lessicografica: Karl. 45, ed. A.J.
4
.
.
dei
culturale Cassiodoro, soprattutto perche consapcvole del generate dcpaupcramento suo discorso alle capacita intcllettive dell uditorio il tempi, intende adeguare o et impoliti), riducendo al minimo le nozioni teoriche e traducendo (fratres simplices edizione del traslittcrando in latino la nomenclatura tccnica greca, quale si legge nell
suoi
che utilizza, almeno per il secondo libro, una redazione delle Institutiones da quella definitiva. Per un aggiornamento degli studi sulla tradizione manosde la tradition et de critta del manuale di Cassiodoro cfr. L. Holt/, "Quelques aspects della settimana la diffusion des Institutions", in Fla\ io Magno Aurelio Cassiodoro (Atti Soveria Mannelli di studi Cosenza-Squillace 19-24 settembre 1983), a c. di S. Uanza, si 281-312. Nonostante la carente formazione filosofica (occorre rilevarlo) 1986,
Migne,
diversa
pp.
ultimo retore e filologo di stampo antico in Occidente" zu Cassiodor, Goteborg 1983, trad. ital. di D. Gianotti, Roma 1988, p. 208), Cristianesimo latino e cultura classica da Tertulliano a Cassiodoro, adattandolo alia nuova realta la preoccupazione di salvare e trasmettere alia posterita, Le litterae saeculares, storica e ambientale, il patrimonio spirituale della classicita. loro nella subordinate in Cassiodoro alia vera Sapientia, sono tuttavia "garantite ne recupera e ne autenticita proprio dalla nuova sistemazione gerarchizzante, che
aweile
in
Cassiodoro, che e
(H. Hagendahl, Von
"1
Tcrtullian
Reductio ad philosophiam
E
matematiche
delle discipline
45
che
vero
nel contesto programmatico della cultura cristianofondamentale medievale, insegnamento di Agostino alle conclusioni bonaventuriane del XIII secolo, piu che sulla reductio artium ad dal
philosophiam le
ad theologiam,
discorso verte sulla reductio
il
rappresentano un
arti liberal!
nel senso che
efficace base preparatoria
intellezione
all
delle Scritture e alia contemplazione degli arcana Dei. Cassiodoro aderisce
pienamente al canone della gerarchizzazione delle arti e delle discipline culminano nella teologia. 5 Ma, quando a proposito del suo
che
orientamento
programmatico, parliamo di reductio ad philosophiam, intendiamo rilevare che il maestro di Vivarium, senza prospettare alcuna
forma
di
matematiche
scienze
delle
ancillarita
delle
(cioe
discipline
canoniche del quadrivio medievale) alia filosofia, conferisce ad esse un supporto se non proprio un ruolo filosofico, naturalmente nel senso ricordato, perche, per defmizione, Paritmetica, la musica, la geometria e
astronomia confluiscono o piu propriamente sono le componenti essenziali e costitutive della filosofia teoretica. Cassiodoro segue a riguardo una 1
linea in parte divergente dalla lezione agostiniana.
ad philosophiam
reductio artium delle
discipline
scientifiche
all
si
deve intendere
la
una progressiva ascensione
Sommo
di Dio, in cui si placa ogni
dell
et
si
6
del
agostiniana
potrebbe
disciplinarum,
disciplina
carattere
preparatorio
della verita
filosofica.
raggiungimento enuncia la definizione
classica,
humanarumque
in
riconduce
la
matematiche
finalizza
-
culturale",
Flavio
rerum,
1
arti
di sofferta ricerca
dell
uomo.
la filosofia ars
che e
la
intellettiva, del
la
segua delle
artium traccia
discipline
al
allorche in prima istanza ne
Ma,
Cassiodoro,
humanae
res
dell acquisizione
e
origine
come egregiamente
Magno Aurelio
delle
ambito
nobilitandone
sembrare delle
anima
compendiandola nella formula di divinarutn quantum homini possibile est, probabilis scientia?
conoscenza nell
Ipponese, per
funzione propedeutica
forma
posa ogni ansia esistenziale del cuore Quando Cassiodoro denomina genericamente
dell intelletto,
1
attingimento del certo e del vero, per
conquista finale, in
Vero, cioe
Secondo
si
giustificandone
esprime G. Arico,
cit.,
e
quindi
presenza
-
il
"Cassiodoro
e
la
la
delle
discipline
Considerando
filosofica.
la
messaggio etico e cultura
latina",
in
p. 172.
Per una chiara e precisa valutazione della quaestio, cfr. T. Gregory, reductio artium ad theologiam da Cassiodoro a S. Bonaventura", in // pensiero pedagogico del Medioevo, a c. di B. Nardi, Firenze 1956, pp. 279-301. "La
:
Cassiodori
Senatoris,
(repr. 1961), p. 110.
7
Ibid.
Institutiones
(II,
3,5),
Per ogni ulteriore citazione
si
edited
by R.A.B. Mynors, Oxford 1937
fara riferimento a questa edizione.
D
46
tradizionalc
dclla
triadica
ripartizione
Elia
filosofia
in
impcctiva (trasposizione latina dclla tcrminologia grcca: AO^CKT), tfewp-nxcK-n), occorre notare chc e proprio
o tcoretica), che, trascendendo
tiva
attingere
dell attivita
Ora
spcculativa.
da Cassiodoro
prefcrenza
doctrinalis (in greco
8
-
(visibilia)
per
una
secondo di
Ermia,
esscnzialmcnte
comprcndc
la
piu
seguita
a
philosophic!
qualc, connotandosi propriamcntc
la
/ja#7)/_iaTLK7)),
.
Cremone
avec
traduit
dans Pouvrage galenique et, a de Dominicus Gundisalvi, dans le De scientiis d al-Farabi. Un 1 instar meme mot arabe et un meme mot latin renvoient ainsi a deux notions Constance hilat
a
par ingenium
fois
la
19
d autre part. de mechane grecques, celle de methodos d une part, celle L une et 1 autre contiennent, certes, le sens d astuce et de ruse, mais le
repond sans doute a une autre "une machine (hilat) est tout logique. Ainsi que le rappelle George Saliba, d accomplir des procede qui permet de surmonter la resistance naturelle et 20 Pour naturelle". la tendance a contraires Galien, traduit de actions
mot en arabe
choix d un seul
en
et
latin
arabe par Gerard de Cremone, "Yintentio ingeniandi sanitatis n est rien d autre que de restaurer la sante dans les corps malades, c esl-a-dire de 21 II s agit aclion des membres". trailer toul prejudice survenant dans 1
1
ulilisanl les moyens propres a une dans perspective aristotelicienne, en tentant techne, d actualiser des principes existant en potentialite.
aussi d aller a
1
encontre d un processus en
c est-a-dire,
la
Les medecins
De
scientiis
d al-Farabi,
universcls
principes
qu
ils
XIV e
XV e siecles
et
a
generalement
connaissent
des
propos
connaissance a Iravers
la
savoir
le
el
,
citent
au medecin:
necessaires
verlus
e des XIII
italiens
livres
les
le
deux des
acquis par une longue obscrvalion de 22 II n est
Faction des medicaments dans de nombreux corps particuliers. alors
V ingenium
^
d imaginer
impossible
pas
la
et
sanitatis
qu
ils
aient
etabli
un parallcle entre
ingeniomm (ou science des machines)
scientia
sont adresses a que les Nawadir d Ibn Masawayh mcntionnes ci-dessus celui-ci est en train de traduire le Therapeutike methodos. On ou un moment Hunayn achevement du abandonne pas, 6 mon fils, en effet, a la fin des Nawadir: lit service que tu rendras au commun des hommcs et par lequel tu rejouis mon ame, grace au livre, d une importance considerable et d une grande utilite, dont tu as entrepris la aide de Dieu et traduction en arabe, livre que composa cclui qui fut assiste de
Signalons a
1
"N
1
langue solidement verse dans
DJacquart
et
la
sagesse,
G.Troupeau,
1
op.cit.,
eminent Galien, qui p.222). Le traducteur
1
intitula latin
Kitab hilat al-bur
rend
le
litre
de
1
(ed.
ouvrage
galenique par Megategni. 19 I
Cf.
R.Bourgne,
du
histoire
(CNRS), 20
"Mechanastai"
"Mechane",
vocabulaire
dans Platon, de la national
chez
n8,
Institut
mechanical
devices
scientifique,
Documents langue
pour
franchise
1986, p.9-31.
G.Saliba,
The
function
of
in
medieval
Islamic
society,
dans
Annals of New York Academy of sciences, 1985, p.14-51. 21
22
Ms.Paris, Bibl.nat.,
Cette
citation
lat.
d al-Farabi
Conciliator de Pietro d practica").
11860, XlV^s.J.Wlrb. (De ingenio sanitatis
Abano
est
des
(Diff.IV,
plus
1,5).
dans le repandues; elle figure notamment medicina non sit theorica ostenditur sed
"Quod
La d al-Farabi,
notion
d ingenium dans demarches
deux
les
adaptation des corps naturels a subir
la
medecine medievale
une
necessitant
action concue par
69
une
preparation,
esprit humain: "Ingeniorum yero scientia est scientia preparations ad faciendum convenire omnia quorum modi demonstrantur in doctrinis quarum narratio preteriit cum sermone et demonstratiqne super corpora naturalia et in acceptione eorum et situ ipsorum in eis actu 1
1
.
Le reside
principal
dans
la
obstacle
difficulte
a
de
la
la
fiabilite
de
mesure,
celle-ci
la
"machine
devant
XIV e
medecine medievale, a Pintensite des qualites. Au resume toute connaissance en Foligno constate: "en
medecin
laquelle le
de
quantite 24
estimative".
therapeutique"
s
appliquer,
siecle,
cette
en
Gentile da
science pour
un jugement sur une mesure determinee extensive est conjecturale ou arbitraire ou
doit emettre
intensive
ou
Arnaud de
Villeneuve,
dont
les
25 Aphorismi de gradibus
proposent, en se fondant sur al-Kindi, une methode mathematique pour calculer 1 intensite des qualites contenues au sein des medicaments
composes et pour en determiner le dosage precis, insiste sur le probleme de la mesure dans son commentaire au De malitia complexionis diverse de Galien: definition de la malitia complexionis diverse en general est bien exposee ci-dessus; c est en effet une qualite non naturelle en acte, alterant le membre et corrompant sa complexion naturelle. Cette consideration n est utile a Vingenium samtatis, vers lequel cette science est ordoimee, que pour connaitre la virtus de la cause responsable de la sante cette connaissance est des plus faciles et tres banale; en revanche mesurer la virtus de cette cause est difficile et demande une evaluation a 1 aide de 1 art (artificiali "La
estimatione)" .
En
savoir que telle fievre est chaude en general ne suffit pas; il en determiner la qualite et sa variation depuis le point de depart
effet,
faut
enim ad operandum potius regulabitur jusqu au point d aboutissement: 27 artifex, etenim opus istud ad ingenium sanitatis ordinatur". "Sic
A.Gonzalez Palencia
Catalogo de las ciencas, Madrid-Grenade, 1932 de Gerard de Cremone).
(ed.), Al-Farabi,
(reed., 1953), p.154 (traduction
24
Comm. au Canon d Avicenne, omnium fere scibilium in hac arte vel Ex3.
ed. Venise, 1520, t.I, f.32 (question scientia possit haberi certa cognitio").
M.R.Mc.Vaugh, Amaldi de VManova Opera medico omnia
II,
"Dubitatur
utrum
Grenade-Barcelone,
1975. ^f\
Commentum
Ballester et
super tractatum Galieni De malicia complexionis diverse, ed. L.Garcia E.Sanchez Salor, Amaldi de Villanova Opera medica omnia XV, Barcelone,
1985, p.164-5.
27 Ibid., p.224.
70
Jacquarl
L
e du De ingenio sanitatis de Galicn, au cour dcs XIII et donnc a ingenium associe a curativum ou curationis ou
assimilation
XIV c siecles, d autres
un sens precis en medecinc:
semblablcs
termcs
il
s agit
de
indissociable des principes 1 approche thcrapeutique dans son ensemble, le universels de la science naturellc dont elle est 1 application dans
domaine du la
reflexion,
passces,
la
particulier. Cette
observation dcs signes presents,
1
decision
traductions de
1
et
la
choix
le
le
septieme partie 2* Dans
Colligct
de
la
du
D
traitement.
autres
ou a ses derives dans une
d Averroes, traduit a
medecine
la
connaissance livresque,
souvenir des experiences
le
detaille
memc mot
arabe rccourent au
perspective semblable. Dans
XlII e siecle,
demarche cnglobe
est
la
nommce
fin
du
ingenium
le Grabadin du pseudo-Mesue, ingcniatio rcmotionis egritudinum. des mesures destinees, par exemple, a trailer une qualifie 1 ensemble action sur la matiere rcsponsable (dont un Cela
comprend
plcuresie.
1
suivant la nature humorale ou vcnteuse de regimen ingeniatimm variable la cause), la correction des accidents, un regime d accompagncment.-
Grace
a
emploi
1
mot ingenium,
du
pour
qualifier
une
facultc
nombre de mcdecins
mentalc ou une operation, il semble qu un certain aient pu eviter impasse dans laqucllc les menaient 1
questions du type:
"La
medecine
est-elle
a 1 theorique ou pratique?". Grace d autres contextes (en particulier
insensiblement passer de 1
la
le
plus souvent les
une science ou un
art?",
"Est-clle
dans ambiguite du termc, a son emploi che/, al-Farabi), les auteurs pouvaient
science a
1
art,
de
la
theorie a la pratique, de
universel au particulier, sans avoir a justifier leur
demarche d un point
de vue philosophique.
Centre National dc
28
Opera latin
Scicntifique, Paris
Mesue, s.l, 1541, 1,2,2. On ne connait pas le a pas etc retrouve a ce jour. original arabe n
divi loannis
de ce texte dont
Recherche
L.I, c.l et L.I.
Ed. Venise, 1497,
29
la
1
nom du
traducteur
JEAN JOLIVET
Lc jcu dcs
sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers
Jean de Salisbury resume en deux phrases la methode pratiquee par Gilbert dans son travail scientifique, et particulierement en theologie: "scion
requetes de son sujet
les
des ressources de toutes
usait
il
les
sachant qu en chaque domaine toutes choses dependent de aide qu elles se pretent mutuellement. II considerait en effet que les
disciplines, 1
disciplines sont liees les la theologie;
son 1
il
1
genre
unes aux autres,
et
mettait au service de
les
il
maintenait aussi les regies de chacune dans
Ce
.
propre"
texte
associe
un domaine
assignation a chcune d
la
les limites
des
pluralite
sciences,
connexions qui font demande en fait pour
particulier, et les
de leur ensemble un systeme; clair en surface, il etre compris entierement une analyse que nous allons tenter de faire en nous bornant aux
de
ici,
dont Gilbert parle le plus souvent et autrement que par allusions; ce sont les seules sans doute que Jean avail en tete.
L enumeration
trois sciences
des
sciences
theoretiques
(scientie
speculative)
est,
du moins dans ses grandes lignes, un des points les mieux connus de la pensee de Gilbert; je veux dire, un de ceux qui sont le plus souvent cites. Rappelons-en cependant science
la
2
(theologica)
.
1
essentiel.
y a
II
la
science naturelle (naturalis), science
la mathematique (mathematical Cette enumeration est reprise du De
Gilbert suit encore
quand
il
enumere
les objets et
chacune de ces sciences. Elles se distinguent quant a celui de la physique (nous appellerons dorenavant naturalis) "sans
[
est
"en
mouvement
non
et
separe";
non
scpare";
de
celui
de
celui
la theologie,
1
objet,
en ce que
ainsi
la
la
scientia
mathematique,
"sans
mouvement
16 20 "
Historia
cohibebat
ed.
R.
L.
Poole,
Oxford,
28
"Utebatur, prout res quippe sciens auxiliis mutuis Habebat enim connexas disciplinas casque theologie servire faciebat,
Pontificate,
exigebat, omnium universa constare. et
mouvement et
theologique
de Boece, que methodes respcctifs de
Trinitate
adminiculo
omnium
disciplinarum,
regulas infra proprii generis
in
1927,
limitem".
The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, Les citations des commentaires de Gilbert 1966, 8(T .
suivait renverront
dorenavant a cette edition.
:
singulis
ed. et
N.M. Haring, Toronto, du texte de Boece qu il
J olivet
72 3
ct
une expression de Boece, ajoute sont "exterieurs", ceux de la
Gilbert, sollicitant d ailleurs
.
separc"
les
pour sa part que mathematique,
objets de la physique
4
ceux de
et
"interieurs",
la theologie,
"secrets"
.
Quant a
la
done discursivement methode, la physique procede rationaliter, raisonnant sur
les
subsistants,
disciplinaliter,
par une Tous les
etres
les
c est-a-dire
par
la
concrets;
la
abstraction;
mathematique theologie,
procede
intellectualiter,
sont en eux-memes separes specifique des etres qui ne sont pas capables de ces sciences, et selon leurs .
intuition esprits
celle de ils se rangent en une hierarchic parallele a capacites respectives 6 de interet seul rappeler, pour la Ce bref tableau n a pas le leurs objets .
du
commodite
lecteur,
connues.
bien
choscs
des
II
semble
surtout
contenu essentiel du texte de Jean de Salisbury cite plus differences quant a haul: s il y a entre les sciences theoretiques de telles acuite la methode, la dignite, et meme 1 objet, la saisie des choses, les accrocher s done ou peuvent d esprit que chacune requiert, tenu etre ne peut Gilbert y aurait vues? Pourtant Jean "connexions"
contredire
le
1
que
et de fait, nous allons le voir, ces connexions pour un mauvais temoin; de Gilbert a sont evoquees en de nombreux passages des commentaires
Boece.
Avant de au
De
les
commentaire examiner, considerons quelques lignes du de
voisines
Trinitate,
remuneration des
qu on
celles
trois sciences.
On
y
lit
dcja citees:
a
une
suite
ellcs
precedent de dichotomies ou le
ce qu il annonce, et choix des termes est particuliercment significatif en rencontrerons nous plus loin. en quelque facon prepare, un resultat que sont soil Voici done I essentiel de ce nouveau tableau: les sciences
theoretiques
c cst-a-dire
(theorice),
speculates
c est-a-dire concernant pratiques (practice),
1
(speculative),
soil
action (active). Les sciences
5 13 6-7. Ce classement 85-91. 57-61. de Boece cst en 371 texte c g5 85 80 1026 a 13notamment combinatoi re remonte evidemment a Aristote, Metaphysique, E, 1, conformement a la tradition la 16 On laissc de cote la question de savoir s il faut lire, ou est un temoin, "non separes" (akhorista, inabstracta) plus ancienne dont Boece 3
,
moderne correction la selon deviendrait abstracta), qui et une trouvera une bibliographic resumee de la question Physique porte-t-elle sur traditionnclle dans V. Decarie, la lecon de justification Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, 38 (19 des non-separes dans Etudes aristoteliciennes. Metaphysique et Theologie, Vrin, 1985, 7-9). 468 (khbrista,
"separes"
1848)
(Schwegler
ce
On
"La
",
(repris
4 5 6
Exterioribus, interioribus, intimis:
86
16
-87
45 ;
23 45
Boece 371
42 6T
"
184
Trinitate,
ce passage n est plus, mais aux Hebdomades. ;
;
Boece, 369
14 - 17
comme
les
precedents, dans
le
commentaire au De
Le jeu des speculatives
"s
sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers
unes
les
appellent",
physiques
73
c est-a-dire
(phisice)
naturelles (naturales), les autres ethiqucs, c est-a-dire morales, les autres c est-a-dire
logiques,
souvent on appelle
Les
rationnelles.
"speculatives"
("que
sciences naturelles, que plus uno nomine naturales dicuntur que
etiam usu majore speculative vocantur") se repartissent en trois: une, sous le nom qui est universellement celui de toutes, est appelee "1
specialement naturelle dicitur
naturalis")",
theologique trois
Suivons
.
etages de ces
"naturelles",
designe,
"physiques",
et,
fil
les
appelle
nous observons sciences
sciences
dites
les
specifiquement,
1
des corps avec leur
matiere".
la
science
et,
mot:
ce
"naturelles";
sciences
trois,
la
"speculatives"
"theoretiques",
autrement
dites
celle
naturalis, "etudie
Remontons maintenant
par glissements successifs
synecdoques:
ou
trois
une des
mot
le
autrement
"physiques"
generiquement,
ceci:
un peu plus has Gilbert recopiant Boece,
le dira
specialiter
mathematique, et la troisieme, des sciences premieres nominees a chacun des s
divisions,
les
specifiquement,
comme
le
generiquement,
designe,
que universali omnium nomine
("una
autre
1
les
qui,
formes
cette
cascade de
naturelle
en vient a
apparaitre comme la science speculative ou theoretique par excellence, puisque son nom se donne aussi en commun aux trois sciences enumerees
d autre part qui les dit
qu en ce dernier usage
et
Boece,
par
il
equivaut
a
"speculative",
qui
applique aux sciences theoretiques dans la division premiere separe des sciences pratiques. Croyons Jean de Salisbury quand il s
que Gilbert
faisait servir toutes les sciences a la theologie;
mais nous
retiendrons que sa nomenclature donne a la physique une place privilegiee. Cette presomption se confirme d un autre point de vue quand nous
abordons
commentaire du passage ou Boece examine
le
des predicaments. specialites
Des
scientifiques
choses dont
les
1
attribution a
Dieu
premieres lignes Gilbert expose que certes
(facilitates)
sont
diverses
"selon
les
genres
les
de
en est une, c est la physique, qui y est traite", mais qu au plus pres du langage usuel et est la source premiere des 8 Les lignes transpositions analogiques de termes d une discipline a 1 autre se
il
il
tient
.
suivantes en donnent quelques exemples:
proprement en physique (quantus (transferuntur) 7
79
43
quantum
et qualis
en mathematique (quanta
homo
et quale, qui se disent
vel lapis} se transposent
et qualis
lined)
et
en theologie
56
-80
.
o
secundum genera rerum de quibus in ipsis agitur diverse naturalis, que in humane locutionis usu promptior transferendorum sermonum proporcionibue prior"; 115 "...cum
tamen
facultates
est,
scilicet
.
sint...
est
et
una in
74
J olivet
et
(quantus
de
transfere
la
La
notammcnt.
Deus),
quails
oppose blancheur et
qui
physique,
de
relation
blanc
le
et
contrariete
se
a
la
le
noir,
la noirceur, et a la theologie mathematique, qui oppose la 9 entame le commentaire de la Puis Gilbert le mal bien et le qui oppose .
des predicaments reproduite par Boece; nous lirons de plus pres
le
debut de ce passage, la ou sont etudiccs la substance, puis la qualite la quantite: nous y verrons mieux les rapports entre la physique et
et
liste
la
mathematique, quant aux transpositions de mots. * * *
Commencons
par
le
second
de qualitas
cas, celui
et quantitas:
ainsi
nomme
les
Bocce. Ces mots propres aux "mathematiciens" designent le les quantites plus general de toutes les qualitcs et toutes
le
genre
elles resident sont respectivemcnt. Celles-ci font que les subsistants ou
Or
qualia et quanta. tant
qu
ils
qualitas et quale, quantitas et
deux a
sont,
mathematique ou
la
deux,
"les
participation
noms
qui
quantum, different en
exprimcnt
abstraction
1
(mathcmatice abstractions,
physique"
naturalis participations}; mais cctte difference ne fait pas de qualitas et
ou
quale,
de
diversa)
.
"Genre",
comme
abstrait,
le
ct
genres differents" (genera quantum, notons-le, nc doit pas etrc compris ici au sens le plus premier tcrme de la liste porphyricnne des prcdicables,
quantitas
10
"des
mais au sens de genre de Petre, categoric: c est bien la meme categoric ou par quantitas ct quantum. qui est signifiee par qualitas et par quale, Mais cette coincidence dans le meme genre n empechc pas unc difference dans
la
couples
"de
:
que
impossible
clairemcnt pas 9
qu on prend un ou autre des termes de ces ce dont on peut prediquer quelque chose, il est
predication, selon 11
7 18
tout soit ici
predique
1
1
le
de rapports de
genre classes
de -
cela
a
12 meme"
II
.
"
115
;
nous avons
de cote quclques allusions a la politique exemple donnc a la 1. 12 est surprenant.
laissc
la
logique (in rationalibusy, 46-54 10
1
ne
s agit
moins qu on n accepte de
(in
civilibus} et a
U6
11
Si
Ton
suit
le
Compendium Logicac Porretanum (mais dans
le
tcxte
qu on etudie
ici
Gilbert parait moins strict) ce n est qu en physique que Ton peut parler a la rigueur de naturalibus proprie praedicamentum did predicaments et de predication: tantum in est Tinstrument de la predication un et predicament ), potest (78 (instrumental 11 4 ); dans les autres "facultes" on n a que des "quasi-predicaments" (78 oraedicgndi; 4 2 ils cites: nommement sont mathematici ou les genres et 78 -79 distinguent subsistants qui sont, nous le savons, objet propre cspeces en se fondant sur ccux des "leurs"
,
;
1
des naturales}. Voir Compendium Logicae Porretanum, ed. S. Ebbesen, K.M. Fredborg, L.O. Nielsen, Copenhague, 1983 ("Cahiers de Institut du Moyen Age et latin", 46). 1
12 "De
]1759-60_
quocumque enim
est genus aliquid praedicatur, impossibile
ejusdem
praedicari";
Le jeu des
sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers
faire
soutenir a Gilbert que
peut
lui
attribuer
"animal".
et
quantum]
(quale,
le
en
s agit
genre
dont
categoric)
(la
a Socratc,
"hommc"
du rapport entre
fait
du rapport entre
c est-a-dire
quantitas)\
Ton attribuc
si
II
75
les
objets
releve
il
et
on ne
le predicat
(qualitas,
pratiques de deux
mathematique degage les formes abstraites, par exemple la blancheur, et la physique enonce la participation de cette 13 forme par un subsistant en lui attribuant le predicat La regie
sciences
differentes:
la
"blanc"
enoncee par Gilbert dire
s
precisent:
on ne peut
interprete ainsi: Socrate est blanc, mais
Les rapports entre outre ceux qu on a deja enumeres est
"Socrate
.
les
blancheur".
methodes, difference entre
la participatio
deux sciences se
diversite
Vabstractio
et
d objets,
de
apparait une
-
autre difference, connexe de cette derniere et d ordre logico-grammatical,
concerne
la
mathematique
et
ellc
puisqu a
la
Compendium 14 "blanc"
la
physique entre
physique.
le
"se
relations
entre
(principale,
noms
la
telles
que
quantum
quantites
.
analyse la
les
mode
-
II
implique
s
la
d efficience la
que
termes de mathematique tout en y bornant 15
c est par abstraction
opere done un connaissance d une part, et d autre
et le
sumptum)
quantite au
comme
blancheur du blanc.
la
que mathematique renversement entre 1 ordre reel de
la
Si
comme
-
terminologie
de
la qualite
philosophic exprime en
de ces qualites et De ces relations extremement complexes ressort en derniere du moins par priorite reelle de la physique et de ses objets la realite
mathematique et aux siens. nous remontons maintenant de ces accidents a
rapport a
nomen
par exemple entre "blancheur" et avons vu plus haul, la contrariete constatee par la blanc et le noir transpose" en mathematique en
tire
grammaticale au quale, de
le
1
la
les
le lexique propre termes empruntes au
ce sont les rapports entre
contrariete entre la blancheur et la noirceur;
part
En
nomen sumptum,
le
Or, nous
.
de
celui
logicae porretanum,
et
principale
predication et les rapports entre
la
aurait
du nous y
inciter
d abord
1
la
substance,
ordre du texte de Gilbert, nous
Voir plus haul la naturalis participatio vs. la mathematica abstraction et, dans le commentaire aux Hebdomades: au sens strict un subsistant ne particioe aue de ses accidents, et non de ses genres et differences, lesquels constituent son esse (210 ). 68 - 69
14
Op.cit.n.11,26 vero in mathematicis omnium qualitatum generalissimum est; et quantitas quantitatum. Et sunt quod dicuntur non a causis que in ipsis intelligantur sed ab efficiendo ea, in quibus sunt, subsistencia, ille quidem qualia, ista vero quanta" "nichil enim naturalium nisi per causam et (116 souligne par moi). Cf. 241 "Qualitas
omnium
"
;
nichil
mathematicorum
;
nisi
per
efficiendi
potestatem concipi
potest".
Jolivct
76
trouvons une situation complexe aussi, mais d une autre facon. Le mot en effet n est pas tire "substance" genre des choses physiques" mais "du
d une
commune
"raison"
a tout ce qui est Vesse des subsistants, c est-a-
dire aux subsistances, pour etre dans
subsistances
et
aux
subsistants:
un second moment attribue
parce
qu
il
n existe
de
pas
et
aux
nom
qui
et incorporels, a pourrait etre attribue a tous les subsistants, corporels litre de leur nom le plus general en vertu de la subsistance qui leur est
commune,
souvent
mettent
Latins
les 16
a
cctte
place
vide
le
nom
dc
Ce texte presente plusieurs difficultes. II y est question d une metonymie qui va des subsistances aux subsistants: la physique en "substance"
est
done
-
.
point d arrivee et non
le
nous semblait facultas
compte
la
a
la
alors
En
etablie.
cette
second
metonymie
commune"
"raison
lieu Gilbert
etc
a
originc, par exception a la regie qui
1
instauree;
ne precise pas dans quelle physique prend-elle en
la
des subsistances?
C est
douteux; on pense
mathematique, qui opererait alors une double abstraction a
nous lisons un pcu plus loin que les partir des subsistants. D autre part mathematiciens rangent les "subsistances ou substances", simples ou animatio, humanitas
-
composees
sous un ou plusieurs des
-
"neuf
genres",
c est-a-dire des categories qui precisement ne sont pas la substance au sens que Gilbert vient de degager; il scmble en outre que ce soient les
logiciens
qui
aient
Un
en charge ces
pris
sont eux du moins qui
les
nomment 17
loin encore,
peu plus
"subsistances
ou
substances",
ce
.
nous
lisons
qu
il
n y a pas asse/ de
noms
noms sont pour que chaque chose ait le sicn, que pour cette raison des a d facullcs de certaine d une en vcrtu autres, analogic, "transferes", surtout a partir des choses naturcllcs (ct maxime a naturalibus)". Ainsi "et
nous disons que Dieu
nommc
"est
18
trcs
grand par
vers
la
quantitc" -
theologie
celui,
.
Dieu par substance, juste par
qualite,
semble bien maintenant que ce transfert precisement, du mot "substance" qui a ici le II
pour origine la physique. Cela nous remet dans une perspective connue mais ne peut entierement nous satisfaire. La
sens de
^
"subsistance"
"Hoc
nomen, quod
omnium que
sunt
esse
subsistenciis sed etiam
-
est
ait
substancia,
illis
quorum
a genere naturalium scd a communi ratione inditum est non solum illis que sunt esse i.e.
non
subsistencium, ipse
sunt esse
i.e.
omnibus
subsistentibus.
Quoniam
illorum corporalium et incorporalium subsistencium, quod ab subsistencia communi generalissimum esset, nomen non habetur, sepe Latini hoc pro eo
tamen omnium, ponunt";
17
18
.
\\(>
117 84_ U8
i.e.
96
et
Le jeu des
sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers
theologie,
manquant d un
meme
cmprunte parce qu
a
1
certain tcrme, il
cmprunte a
1
la
77
manquait, mais toutefois pour signifier
lui
ramene
aulre chose: enchainement de catachreses done, mais qui nous
notre interrogation:
oil
nom
le
elle-
physique qui
constitue?
s est-il
originel
a
semble, tout
II
bien pese, que ce soil dans la mathematique, operant en quelque sorte au
second degre; nous avons
mathematique a
Un
la
un
transfert, mediatise par la physique,
de
la
la theologie.
couple de concepts voisins de celui de substance, puisque ce sont
concepts d individualite, ou diversite numerique, et de nature, pose d une autre facon la question des rapports entre la physique et la les
que ces concepts autorisent ou non dans chacune de ces deux sciences. Car (c est ici Boece qui parle) on dit:
theologie, par le biais des inferences
le
Pere
Fils et
a
est
le Fils est
Dieu,
Esprit saint sont
1
inference
cette
Dieu,
un
1
Esprit saint est Dieu, done le Pere, le
Dieu
seul
celle
theologique
non
et
qui
trois dieux. Gilbert
en
vaut
oppose
(secundum
physique
naturalium rationem): Platon est homme, Ciceron est homme, Aristote est homme, done Platon, Ciceron et Aristote sont trois hommes, et non un scul
homme
dans
la singularite
de sa subsistance. Cette opposition reflete
regies de la logique propre a chacune des deux sciences la difference en leurs objets respectifs, des rapports entre la nature et la diversite numerique. Cette diversite est reelle, que Ton parle de trois
dans
les
hommes ou qu on a
citees le predicat:
Mais dans
diversis).
repete
des trois Personnes de
signifie
en
le fait
dans chacune des premisses affirme de plusieurs sujets (de
la Trinite:
homme, Dieu
est
cas de la premisse physique le predicat trois fois a
chaque
des natures differentes
fois
naturas; de alio aliud dicitur); en thcologie au contraire 1
des termes et de leur signification
de noms
differentes
predique:
et
chacun
dans
nom
Pere, le Fils et
1
des
Ciceron,
Platon,
repetition du
et
de
la
trois
il
("homme"
sujets
Aristote);
chose
Esprit, dont
la
la
("Dieu"
est
de
sujets". point de vue proposition physique s analyse en
de choses
diversite
(diversas
singularite
Au
essence trois fois prediquee est jointe aux trois
identite
"la
dont
signifiant des natures il
est
proposition
signifie la
meme
successivement theologique,
essence dans
successivement predique).
Au
en le
point de
vue ontologique 1 analyse de la proposition physique implique la doctrine de la confortnitas\ selon celle-ci, Gilbert le dit ailleurs, les subsistances sont diverses dans des sujets divers, de sorte qu a la pluralite des
correspond
cependant
une de
dire
pluralite
qu
ils
d humanites, sont
"un
leur
homme"
conformite
hommes
permettant
(specifiquement:
"diverses
78
Jolivct
la
implique -
On
une
sont
subsistances
Panalyse de
comment une
ici
la
proposition theologique
entre les trois Personnes
indifferentia,
"non-difference",
clairement
voit
espece");
logique de
la
19 .
se
physique peut
opposer a une logique de la theologie: se comparer parce qu elles ont en commun les concepts d unite, de diversite, d essence communaute du moins formclle ou fonctionnclle, pour ce dernier concept; et s
comparer
opposer parce que leurs contenus respectifs ne sont pas homogenes 1 un a autre. Or ces relations entre ces deux sciences se projettent egalement
s
1
un jeu
dans
d identite
de
et
axiomes: leurs rationes et leurs
entre
diversite
sujet,
les
la
communes
"raisons"
fait
dcs
Gilbert formule avec une
souvent quel que diverses
done
les
son
soil
Dans
sciences.
comme
choses se passent parfois
parfois de facon differente;
dans
le
les
conceptions de
la
mathematiquc ne doivent etre, en theologie, ni toutes il faut done marquer quelles sont les raisons
la
a toutes ces sciences, et celles qui sont propres a chacune
en d autres termes,
Trinitate,
le
il
ni toutes refusees:
acceptees
Ou
de
et
les
les
theologie
autres sciences,
physique
entre
rapports
domaine de
comme
abstraite,
leurs
et
"raisons"
regiilae.
Dans son commentaire du Contra Euticen grande precision
leurs
bien
"ou
comme
il
des raisons qui
lui
philosophie des
hommes permet que
ce discernement experience",
1
ccrit
"est
comme
.
De
dans son commentaire au
theologie dans sa majeste revendique pour sont propres, ou bien quelque analogic entre
la
20
elle seule elle et la
certaines leur soient communes"
21 .
Or
d une philosophie trcs perspicace et de longue dit a la fin du passage du Contra Euticen qu on
le fait il
le
vient de citer: c est pourquoi
beaucoup d hercsies en matierc de theologie
phrase cc pajragranhc reprcnd, en en modifiant la Notre analyse finale repose sur un passage dc Gilbert: 72 -73 multa unum dici contingit, vel conformitatc aliqua, qualiter plures "scpe homines dicuntur unus homo quoniam scilicet qui suis suhsistcntiis, que a mathematicis nominari possunt humanitatcs, sunt homines et earum numerali pluralitate plures, mais la carundem conformitate similes ct similitudine sunt conformes", 16/
Jusqu a
disposition cet autrc:
son
avant-derniere
interne,
.
"
;
conformitc diversas,
autant
implique,
immo
que
la
rcsscmblance,
numero
quia conformes ergo
la
diversas, a
diversite:
se
"conformes
invicem
natures",
72
tamcm ".
A
rapprocher du premier texte cite dans cette note, celui-ci: "diverse ... subsistentie que Voir encore 78 Y indifferentia comme raison propre a la theologie. una sunt species", 75 :
.
de rebus creatis intelligi volumus. In theologicis enim enim omnia aliqua quidem similiter, aliqua vero aliter esse sequentia nos docebunt. Non ncque nulla que in naturalibus aut mathematicis intelliguntur, in theologicis accipienda sentimus: ideoque subtilissime atque exercitatjssime philosophie esse communes utrisque ct proprias singulorum rationes notare"; 294 "Sed
hec
omnia non
nisi
"
.
majestas sibi proprias yendicat theologice quas philosophie ad ipsam qualiscumque proportio communes admittit"; 53 "...rationibus
vel
"
.
vel
humane
Le jeu des
sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers
d un mauvais usage dcs raisons, scion qu on a etendu a
trinitaire resultent
une seule ou qu on
plusieurs specialites des raisons qui etaient propres a
comme
en a considere toutes
du
22 .
De
Gilbert en
Trinitate
79
une
a
propres
seule,
qui
une sorte de deduction dans
fait
a
second prologue
le
Soient d abord deux raisons propres a
.
communes
etaient
physique: a
la
proprietes diverses, subsistances diverses; une subsistance fonde un seul subsistant.
on
Si
a
transfere
les
la
theologie,
on
Arius,
rejoint
entre
d autres. Si outre ce transfer! on neglige aussi une raison qui vaut dans tous les "genres de choses": divers propres ne peuvent se rencontrer en une seule personne, on obtient Pheresie de Sabellius, et d autres. Ces
deux heresies qu on juge generalement inverses ont done selon Gilbert une racine commune, et, dit-il expressement, une conclusion commune: "concevant
correctement
la singularite
de
la divinite, ils
ont estime, selon
une raison propre aux physiciens, non seulement que le seul Dieu est un, mais encore que Dieu est seul en son unicite" 24 "Maintenant, d autres ont .
compris,
correctement,
le
que
le
Pere,
Personnes numeriquement diverses du dirons-nous,
car,
ils
une raison propre a sont
la
De
subsistances.
conclu que
cette
ont,
meme
de
raison
commune
des
sont
saint
Esprit
diverses"
-
a tous les genres
Arius, transpose a la theologie
mais d essence semblable
sont
numeriquement diverses
1
la premiere ils ont n etaient Esprit pas de meme essence
Parmi ceux-ci
.
leurs
indument jointe a
Pere, le Fils et
le
comme
1
physique: les proprietes de sujets numeriquement
et
diverses,
il
et
de leurs proprietes
fait
ont retenu cette raison
qu a oubliee Sabellius; mais divers
Fils
certains
retiennent la raison
propre a la physique selon laquelle des caracteres divers sont attaches aux subsistances diverses d un subsistant unique: chez le meme homme par exemple,
la
connaissance a
Dieu
le fait
couleur a
la
la
rationalite;
d etre
corporeite, ils
attribuent
la
passion a
done a
Pere, a sa sagesse d etre le
le
hcc quidem propter imperitos, qui diversarum communicant proprias aut appropriant communes, tetigimus"; 294 "Et
23
58
40
-61
la
sensibilite,
la
toute-puissance de
la
a sa bonte d etre
Fils,
facultatum
rationcs
aut
.
15 .
quidem omnes, de divinitatis singularitate recte sentientes, juxta naturalium rationem opinaji sunt non modo quod unus sit Deus solus verum etiam quod solus unus sit Deus"; 60 L essence divine etant commune aux trois Personnes, chacune d elles a Punicite divine, et reciproquement: point qu Arius et Sabellius ont, selon la theologie catholique, differemment mais egalement meconnu. "Et
hi
.
de Macedonius: le Pere et le Fils sont un seul Dieu; Esprit n est pas Dieu, mais n a aucune substance.
La-dessus se greffe substance ou essence et
commune aux
deux, et
il
1
heresie
sont
1
de la
meme divinite
80
1
Jolivet
comme
diverses
congoivent done un Dicu
ils
Esprit saint;
De des
theologie trinitairc
la
d Abelard
avcc des essences
On
des parties diverses.
elles etaient
si
point principal de
"triforme",
a reconnu la
le
26 .
ces divers textes retenons sculement que la theologie a certes
raisons
sont
lui
qui
mais qu y ont aussi leur place des
propres,
raisons qui valent en d autres sciences; a vrai dire Gilbert ne cite que des raisons physiques. Reduite a ses lignes principales, la theologie trinitaire
deux doctrines:
se concentre en 1
essence
de
Boece a expose
dit Gilbert,
seconde
celle
et
divine"
des
selon
Hebdomades
il
fait
"la
la
raisons
de
celle
de
singularite et simplicite
"la
nombrable des
diversite
or,
Personnes";
premiere selon des raisons theologiques, la 27 Dans son commentaire des physiques .
a plusicurs reprises
remarquer
que seule
est
propre a
la theologie la septieme des regies enoncces par Boece: "tout simple omne simplex esse suum et concentre en un seul son etre ct ce qu il 2 id quod est unum habet ^. Cette regie concerne exclusivemcnt 1 essence est",
divine. Mais, redisons-le, la theologie
qui
principes
ailleurs aussi,
que nc
laissait
propres,
ne se referme pas sur une serie de en accueille qui sont valides
elle
notamment sinon exclusivement en physique. Voici done une
de plus que
fois
seraient
lui
theoretiques admettent des communications
les sciences
pas prevoir
premiere presentation qui en a etc donnee.
la
* * *
Jusqu
nous
ici
n avons
considere,
en
fait
de
rapports
entre
la
theologie, que des cas ou les objets de chacune de ccs physique sciences etaient pris independamment 1 un de 1 autre. Nous allons et
maintenant
qu
ils
la
examiner
les
sont, respectivement,
relation
1
endroit ou Gilbert qui
ces
commente
concerne Yesse
qu en Dieu
et
comme
occasion pour presenter quelque chose que se font
les
26
194
86-89.
199
19-20
apparaissent
en
tant
Crcateur, done dans cette est-a-dire la communication de est tire
des Hebdomades, a
seconde des regies formulecs par Boece: Yid quod est en leur diversite (leur unite la
nous venons de
la
rappelcr).
II
en prend
conceptions differentes dc Yetre et de Yetre
les
theologiens d une part, les philosophes de
Voir aussi 7$-79^: distinction entre raisons avec une refutation d Arius fondee sur ce principe. 27 26 29 61 -62 28
objets le
qu est la creation, c communication du bien. Le premier
etre et la
n etant
ou
creatures et
particuliere
1
celle
textes
trois
theologiques
et
raisons
physiques,
Le jeu des sciences
theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers
81
29
nous Done, selon les premiers, quand nous disons "Dieu 1 essence or cette essence est Petre de toutes de Dieu divine, prediquons Pautre
.
est",
"Phomme dans des propositions comme corps une certaine denomination extrinseque (quadam exprime
les creatures:
cet etre est
"le
est",
"par
du
extrinseca denominatione) a partir de Pessence
Phomme. Cependant
le
Phomme,
corps,
En un
corporeite, par Phumanite.
qui en
soit,
est
lui
par
la
mot: tout subsistant, toute creature,
est
objets
etre
Pour certains
quelque chose: ainsi le verbe font des distinctions; selon eux
que ne
le
(dividii)
de ce a quoi
ni
predicat
y ajoute, a savoir par les
s
done equivoque. Plus reviendra
Gilbert
sur
cette II
31
.
quelque
chose,
ni
loin,
Petre-quelque-chose, pas plus
Done
entre
la
theologie et la
dans son commentaire de
difference
n ont en eux rien qui reellement ni analogiquement ils
proportione)\ toutefois certains d entre eux
contenu
rationnel"
pleine
"propriete
la
193 51. 194
30 "Illorum
principle esse
des
(ex
fasse etre
(nee
nee
re
constitues des parties de
"sont
-
ce
c est-a-dire,
premieres"
sont
la
d apres
le
subsistance singuliere de chacune, evoquee plus haut
-
et sa
77 vero
philosophorum
ceperunt...",
retrouve
dans
predicaments principaux Gilbert ne nomme pas
quibus
sue
facultatis
genera
la
sunt
sola
ilia
que ex
193
le -
commentaire du De substance,
qualite,
Trinitate
quantite
-
cette et
les philosophes qu il range dans premiere le nom d Aristote nous vient a de Gilbert lui-meme, a la suite de Boece.
pour
les
sue rationis partibus constant):
substances
la regie
propos des rapports entre une breve allusion au mode
a
meme
y fera
d etre des objets mathematiques:
classes;
predicaments
que Pabstraction mathematique separe
sont attribues
Petre et Petre-quelque-chose.
On
par leurs
d objet engendre des differences dans la nature du propositions d une science a celles de Pautre ce
des
"est";
predicat est
contexte,
subsistants sont
la difference
physique
etre
ni
Petre,
font tous les predicats ils
un predicat equivoque.
est
les
et leurs qualites; les sept autres
n attribuent a ces subsistants
29
il
equivalent de dire etre
est
il
"est"
mesures de leurs dimensions
leur
par un genre, quel qu
sien.
subsistances et sont quelque chose par ce qui
ni
quelque chose par une
,
D autres
7,
chose"
Quant aux autres philosophes, qui considerent leurs 30 ils se repartissent independamment du fait qu ils ont ete crees est
qui
sur ce point en deux ecoles. et
quelque
est
c est-a-dire
creee,
du corps, de
Principe"
"sont
par Pessence de son principe, qui est Dieu, et subsistance
est",
distinction
entre
les
trois
autres (voir p. 115-138). une et 1 autre de ces deux
les 1
1
esprit;
pour
la
seconde celui
82
J olivet
32 "subsistancc
Ces quclques
.
specifique"
lignes, qui
d aillcurs meriteraient
une analyse speciale, sont interessantes en ce qu elles mettent en jeu une science sur laquelle Gilbert ne
etend gucre:
s
s
il
interesse principalement
a la physique et a la theologie. etre des essence divine a complexe qui va de creatures s exprime au plan du langage par 1 equivocite du predicat Une analyse de meme allure decrit la relation entre le Bien qu est Dieu et
La
relation
1
1
"est".
bien qui est celui des creatures. On sail que Pobjet des Hebdomades de Boece est de fonder ontologiquement cette derniere attribution; la solution
le
creatures apporte a ce probleme se concentre en une phrase: 33 sont dites bonnes parce que leur etre a emane de la volontc du Bien"
qu
"les
il
.
Gilbert dans son commentaire a cctte phrase dcveloppc 1
la
mention de
une fa^on qui bien entendu evoque ses propres analyses, fait le entre la question du bien et celle de etre, et introduit dans son
etre d
lien
1
analyse linguistique un concept plus operatoire que se contentait plus haul a
il
des creatures
mais
subsistance],
question de dites
ce
aussi
et
subsistant],
non seulement ce qui
-
quoi etre
les
j
ai
est
cela
et
emane de
essence] a
1
1
bonnes par denomination
une interpretation que
que
par
encore
cclui d equivocite dont
provisoire sans doute:
titre
la
et
est
tout esse
qui est quelque chose
ou
est
quelque
chose
de
[le [la
la
Petre-quelque-chose
[rappel
volonte du Bien,
creatures sont
4 (denominative)"^ 35
proposee
"puisque
ailleurs
statuts ontologiques differents de
.
les
Je nc reprendrai pas
ici
Je relevcrai simplement
.
Dicu
et
de
la
creature, objets
trouvent respectifs de la theologie et de la physique, et leurs rapports, les dans le langage une expression dont Gilbert emprunte moyens a la rhetorique. Le mot denominative, que plus haul on a simplement
en
transpose
francais,
designe
en
realite,
comme
denominatio,
la
metonymie (qiiadam denominatione que Gracce methonomia vocatur) ou la 6 et non la paronymie comme chez d autres metalepse (transsumptio)^ ,
32
^^21-25 Q. g6 27-28. (es o kj ets ^ c moins d inherer a des subsistants". 1
"Iccirco
I^e
34 3^
quoniam
esse
eorum
raisonnement entier de Boece 220
est
a boni
en 382
j
a
malhcmatique
"ne
sont
voluntate defluxit, bona esse -383
Jolivet,
Aspects
de
la
pensce
medie\ ale: Abelard;
doctrines
Gilbert origines de la Logica Modernorum: contemporains, edite par J. Jolivet et A. de Libera, Napoli, 1987, 183-197.
36
dicuntur";
382
.
.
58 61
J.
1987,
absolumcnt rien a
293-311
220
71 - 72
Aux
(et
95 -
,221
%
du langage, de Poitiers
Paris, et
ses
Gilbert de Poitiers
Lejeu des sciences theoretiques selon
83
meme "poque.Entre la theologie et la physique s introduit mediation d un art du langage, en pleine clarte methodologique. Les analyses partielles dont ces deux textes nous ont donne
auteurs de la ici la
1
occasion nous ont achemine vers celle d un troisieme,
Trinitate.
On
En void
tire celui-ci
du De
la traduction:
pas de n importe quel sujet (de quolibet) qu il est par la propriete de son essence. Mais, de Celui qui est a proprement parler, par sa propre essence et non par une autre, a ce qui est quelque chose en vertu d une forme creee par Lui, a cette forme creee ellememe, et enfm a tout ce qu on peut vendiquement attribuer a ces choses (ad omnia que de ipsis vere dicuntur)^ puisque ces choses sont a partir de Lui comme de leur principe ce mot [est] se transpose par metonymie (dictio ista transsumitur) de sorte qu on est en droit de dire de chacune: elle est, par participation de la forme divine. Or cela n est pas sans rapport avec la fa?on de raisonner des physiciens (quod non otnnino a naturalium ratione diversum est},
ne
dit
puisqu en forme.
Ces
tout
physique
En
second
lieu,
D abord,
la
et
physique
communication
cette
subsistants
les
on peut cependant
lignes parlent d elles-memes,
quelques observations.
chez
etre
va
la
vient
faire a leur s
theologie
de
1
une
a
de
la
propos
y touchent. 1
autre
et
reciproquement, mais ce croisement ne se fait pas sur le meme plan. On va de la theologie a la physique sur celui de Pontologie, censee exprimer la realite des choses: 1 etre divin descend, pour s y infuser en quelque facon (on se rappelle
le
defluxit
des Hebdomades), dans les subsistants,
les subsistances et les accidents qui s y attachent.
chemin que
la
chose: c est par
sont, et cela implique
propositions
oii
le
que
mot
le
Et
le
mot
suit le
meme
metonymie qu on dit des creatures qu elles mot se trouve dans les
sens propre du
"Dieu"
est
sujet.
"est"
Mais inversement ce scheme
au plan des structures methodologiques, par avec le analogic principe de physique selon lequel Petre vient de la forme: c est sans doute parce que cette science a etabli ce point que les theologique
est
compris,
theologiens ont pu le transposer dans
dans ce texte
la leur.
On
meme
peut
apercevoir
mathematique, presence muette. Car la physique ne saisit pas bien un esse aliquid si la mathematique n en explicite le fondement: la causalite de la forme est percue en elle-meme par cette science-ci, et en la
"
formula presque analogue a la derniere phrase: On aura note que Gilbert n est pas constant dans sa fac,on de comprendre la participation (voir plus haul n. 13; et surtout 208 -210 ou toutefois il dit que la participation des accidents Test 88
8ali, 13 (1972), pp. 919-939; J. Preaux, comtnentaire de Martin de Laon sur oeuvre de Martianus Capella", Latomus, 12 (1953), pp. 437-459; C.E. Lutz (ed.), Dunchad: Glosae in Martianum, American Philosophical Ass. Monograph. XII, Lancaster 1943 e cfr. C.E. Lutz, lohannis Scotti Annotationes in
"Le
1
Marcianum, Cambridge
1939.
.
le loro glosse.
G. Constable (edd.), Renaissance and Renewal
Mediae\-al
Nequam
commento
il
che
salernitani. Si consideri poi
verra adottata dai salernitani. Inoltre nei
"Martianus
commentariorum:
il
soprattutto Alexander
e
,
dicono anche
nuptiis i
tra
commenti
i
successivamente di
Henri d Andeli4
sono rispondenze
Infatti vi
del
Silvestre,
98
Morpurgo 8
e presente quella forma di accessus che ritorna nolle glossule
Rcmigio
E
salemitane.
che
anonimi
De
al
che introduce
sara a qucsta tipologia,
rifaranno anche
si
lettore
il
nuptiis, quelle rappresentate dai mss. di
al
testo,
commenti
gli autori delle tre diverse tradi/.ioni di
Cambridge, Trinity
Roma, BAV, Barberiniano, lat. 10; e Ottoboniano lat. 3291. Si aggiunga che dal commento di Thierry di Chartres dipende il ms. di Avranches, Bibl. Mun. 226 contenente un altro testimone della College B.1.29; di
tradizione
commentarii
dei
Montecassino e conservato
E non
sara
maestri salernitani
erano formati
dai
centri
della
1
9
una dipendenza del XII secolo che si
ipotesi di
rinascita
Inghiltcrra e in Francia
in
un caso che a
poi
ms. 332 testimone di un ulteriore tradizione
Marziano. Sembrerebbe dunque che
di glosse a
dei
anonimi. il
possa avere una sua
validita.
Queste osservazioni confortano quanto dicevo su una possibile dipendenza
Mauro
dei maestri Bartolomeo,
quella
aveva ricordato
il
Ursone da una scuola parigina come commento alia Microtegni Ursone
Adam}
magistrum mciim
come Adamo
individuato
e
Pont. Proprio nel suo
Petit
di
di Petit Pont.
L
Adam
Questo
poteva cssere
un suo riscontro
ipotesi trovava
ncl fatto che Giovanni di Salisbury, tenace oppositore della dialettica dei
Parvipontani, aveva definito
i
sczione dedicata alia medicina. Infine offerto da Alexander
1175 e
1182
il
12
che
il
Baldwin,
Nequam
P.
Morpurgo, Italia
in
di
parigina
Petit
I.
Ilaskins,
Han ard
Studies in
filiorum
Ade
quam
Ed
il
veniva
ci
e
-
tra
nel
il
suo
corso di studi
che poi vcrranno identificati
19
(1960),
pp.
"Le
Social
Perspective",
in
R.L.
di Michclc Scoto e la circolazione dei manoscritti dipendenza della scuola medica salernitana da quella diffusione delle scienze islamiche nel Mcdioe\ o europeo,
traduzioni
meridionale: Pont",
A
in
La
la
Ace. Lincei, 1987, pp. 169-191.
-
C.I
testi
at Paris from 1179 to 1215: Renaissance and Renewal, Oxford 1982.
loannis Saresberiensis, Metalogicon, Lib. 12
ricorda quale fossa
"Masters
et al. (edd.),
scientifici
Roma
una
cfr.
J.W.
Benson
dato piu significative
Lutz, "One formula of accessus in Remigius Works", Latomus mss. Roma, BAV, Vat.I^at., 2743 e Firenze, Riccardiana, 916.
C.E.
Per
c era
questi nel suo soggiorno parigino
medicina elcncando esattamente quei
774-780;
9
Pont
di Petit
era stato alia scuola dei Parvipontani.
-
Saccrdos ad altare
Nequam,
il
11
dei pessimi filosofi.
sappiamo da Henri d Andeli che nella scuola
di piu
in
come
Salernitani
sed
list
of
Textbooks
I,
IV, p.13,14.
from
the
Close
of
the
Twelfth
Century",
Classical Philology, 20 (1909), 75-94, p.93: "Studium medicine usibus et tarn Aphorismos perutile subire quis desiderans audiat lohannicium,
Ypocratis, et Tegni Galieni et Pantegni. Huius translator Constantinus. Legal etiam, tarn particulares
Pronostica
Galienus
"A
opens
quam
auctor
est
universales,
Ysaac, et Libra Urinarum, et Viaticum Constantini cum Libra Pulsuum, et Dioscoriden in quibus de naturis herbarum cogitur." Dal ms. di Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Lib. 385.
Dietas
I commenti salemitani 0// Articella
nome
col
di Articella
13 ,
ma
quel che e piu significative e che dice che
questo aweniva usibus filiorum Ade, dunque secondo di
Petit Pont.
II
99
fatto diventa
ancor piu rilevante se
usi della scuola
gli
considera che, in
si
questa del Nequam e la prima e 1 unica testimonianza di un curriculum analogo a quello usato dai commentatori salemitani. assoluto,
Per
avere
indicazioni
altre
scuola bolognese di
vediamo come
questi schemi
cosi
bisognera
esplicite
Taddeo Alderotti 14
attendere
del tardo sec. XIII.
nella tradizione dei
Galeno sino ad Alfano e Costantino Africano
la
Inoltre da
commentaria che va da
sia
assente
il
metodo
di
introduzione alle artes:
GALENO Commentaria
ed.
AGNELLUS RAVENNATIS,
Kuhn,
sec.
VI
Scolia Peri Hereseon Galeni
19, p.62
intentio
lOHANNITiyS
utilitas
Expositio Aforismi "
verus causa suprascriptionis ordo legendi habitus doctrine
I
al-Razi: In Isagoge
Alfano
di Salerno:
De pulsibus
particularis divisio
modus Assenza
di accessus
didascalicus
ad auctores
NON in versio
Burgundionis
anno 1185 In
questo
caso,
non
la
utilizzazione
della
versio
Burgundionis fa
adozione degli accessus sia awenuta prima traduttore pisano con i maestri salemitani. pensare che
1
Pertanto bisogna pensare che avuto
modo
di
conoscere
i
i
maestri salemitani dovrebbero aver
testi della
scuola alessandrina attingendo a una
circolazione libraria diversa da quella cui proveniva
Burgundione.
Non
c e
dell incontro del
dubbio che questo fosse
il
testo tradotto
possibile, infatti
i
da
medici
antologia prese il nome dalVArs parva di Galeno poi volgarizzato in originariamente si componeva dell Isagoge di loannizio, degli Aforismi e dei Pronostica di Ippocrate e dei relativi commenti di Galeno, del De urinis di Teofilo, del
Questa
Artesella;
De
pulsibus di Filareto, della Tegni o Ars di Galeno e del relative
ibn
Ridwan, del ticella dal 1483
L Articella
e
il
Taddeo
di
Haly
regimine acutorum di Ippocrate. Sulla multiplicatio a stampa delVAral 1535, cfr. T. Pesenti, "Editoria medica tra Quattro e Cinquecento Fasciculus medicine", in E. Riondato, Trattati scientific! nel Veneto fra
UXVe UXVIsecolo, Vicenza 14
commento
De
1985, pp. 1-29.
Alderotti
seguira la cosiddetta translatio antiqua attribuita a Costantino translationem ConstanDurling infra, adducendo queste ragioni: tini persequar, non quia melior sed quia communior. Nam ipsa pessima est et superflua quandoque nam ille insanus monachus in transferendo peccavit quantitate et qualitate, tamen translatio Burgundionis pisani melior cfr. Thaddei florentini Expositiones in
Africano,
ma
vedi
"Et
est",
arduum aphorismorum 1527,
fol. 1
rA; Kibre,
Ipocratis
...
"Hippocrates
In subtilissimum Joannitii Isagogarum librum, Venetiis
latinus",
Traditio, 32 (1976), p.289.
100
Morpurgo
potrebbero esscr dal ms. Ambrosiano G. 108 salernitani
commcntario Alcssandrino.
VI
al libro
stall inf.
delle
quclla tradizione tcstimoniata
a
Icgati
e dal ms. Vat. greco 300 contenentc
Epidemic
il
Giovanni
Ippocrate attribuito a
di
15
GUNDISSALINUS 16
PARVIPONTANI Summa sophisticonim
De
elenchorum:
Nos
igitur sequcntcs predictos auctorcs artcm extrinsccam
premittamus. In qua hcc consideranda: quid sit hcc ars
divisione
philosophiae quid sit
genus matcria
sint
partes species oificium
que intcntio que materia
finis
quod officium
vcl
instrumentum
quod opus
quis finis
artifex
quod genus que partes vel species qupa instrumentum quis opifex et unde dicatur
quare
Commcntaria Johannis
intentio
Alexandrini ms. 1079
BAV,
sic
vocetur
quo ordine et
discenda
sit
Circa librum
Pal. lat.
utilitas
nomcn
auctoris
intentio
titulus
titulus
ordo ad quam partem
ordo
philosophic suppositio
spcctct
divisio
dlstinctio libri
Qui va detto che Hunt aveva ben messo
in
quattro modi
introdurre
partc mediate
di
suo studio
nel
come
evidenza
alle
sull
origine
principio del secolo XII
al
e
arti,
qucste
accessus
degli
introductiones
fossero
vi
erano
in
dalla tradi/ione della retorica antica:
A) con persona,
locus,
di
tempus
cui
continuo a servire
si
Ugo
di
San Vittore. 17 B)
con
vita,
titulus
opens,
canninis,
qualitas
scribentis
intentio,
numerus librorum, ordo librorum, explanatio usato da Servio nel
commento C) basato
a Virgilio. sui
commend
di
Boezio
alia
Isagoge di Porfirio e alle
Categoric di Aristotele.
D) dipendente
dal
De
15
differentiis topicis di
"Greek Cfr. J. Fragments of Duffy, Conference. Abstracts of Papers 4 (1978), p.13.
John
Boezio.
of
Alexandria",
Byzantine
Studies
Summa super Rhetorica ha: genus/ quid sit ars/ materia/ instrumentum/ cur vocetur. species/ officium/ finis/ partes/ 17 W.M. Green, "De tribus maximis circumstantiis", Speculum, 18 (1943), pp. 488-492. Thierry
di
Chartres nella
/
commend
Quest ultima forma masters to revive
di
it,
Porrettano, da Pietro
dunque
Hunt, anche di
completo del
sec.
Lombardo 19
"reinvento"
Hunt chc
"the
first
quei
fatto che questo tipo che caratterizzarono la
Gundisalvi
dal
la
Salemitani.
i
a
Gilberto
a Pietro Elia, a Thierry di Chartres. Se
utilizzazione
impone anche
si
XII,
filosofi
occorrera aggiungere,
Parvipontani e
i
chi
tutti
dodicesimo secolo:
del
teoria e valida,
la
101
have been able to discover, were those of
I
da
"riutili/zato"
scientifica"
"rinascita
Articella
Questo e dimostrato dal
Chartres".
accessus fu
fl//
accessus fece ritcnere a
di
as far 18
the school of
salemitani
cosi
la
ai
Appare
nomi
cosi
ricordati
da
un quadro piu
degli accessus nella Francia
questione
di
una dipendenza
della Schola Salernitana.
"francese"
GILBERTUS PORRETANUS
PETRUS ABAELARDUS
ante 1117 Glossa in Psalterium
Glossa
materia
in Categorias
intenlio
modus
materia
finis
utilitas
titulus
utrum
Ipgice supponitur inscriptio
genus prophetie
nomen
nomen auctoris modus tractandi
libri
numerus psalmorum
THIERRY di CHARTRES Swnma super rhetoricam
PETRUS HELIAS Swnma super grammaticarn
genus
quid
quid sit ars materia officium
genus materia
sit
genus
officium
finis
finis
partes species
partes species
instrumentum
instrumentum
artifex
artifex
cur vocetur
quare
g.
dicatur
quo ordine
sit
docenda
Circa librum intentio utilitas
18
19
R. Hunt,
R.
draw
introduction
The
if
a
common
we were
clearly defined type,
on zu
...",
cit.,
p. 129.
125: cit., p. may be objected that is unsafe to from these didascalica. The schemata, it may be said, are fund on which all teachers draw. Such an objection might be
introduction
Hunt, any conclusions
traditional,
serious
"The
dealing with certain
which was
in
"It
...",
types of prologue;
but
we
vogue for a comparatively short space of
Oxford, mss. Balliol Coll. 36; Auct. D.2.1 2312.
are dealing with time."
a
Morpurgo
102
MAURUS SA^ERNITANUS 21 Super Ysagogas lohannicius vcro lohannis
Alcxandrjni asscrit
filius ut
quidam
..."
Super Tcgni
Omnium
igitur
arcium, tcsle
Varrone, duplex doctrina traditur cxtrinsccus: undo dicatur hcc ars ct
quid
sit
ipsa eius
quod genus
que species que materia que partes qupu officium quis finis
Questa divisione espositiva
quod instrumentum
na ncl commento
di Guglielmo Conches Super Priscianum:
quis artifex que causa inventionis qui inventores ...
et intrinsecus:
WHILELMUS
que sit auctoris intentio que causa intentionis que utilitas pperis
modus
et
dc
di
CONCHIS
extrinsecus:
quid
cui parti philosophie
quis
ritor-
ordo tractandi
libri titulus
sit
genus materia partes species
instrumentum artifex de arte officium ex arte finis
quare vocetur
quo ordine
sit
docenda
et
cliscenda intrinsecus; intentio utilitas
causa suscepti laboris modus agendi
qrdo titulus
21
Ncl
commento
a
loanni/.io
Mauro
si
intentionis causa/ utilitas/ suppositio operis/
22
era
limitato
a
dividcre
eiusdem particio/ modus
in:
et
materia/ intentio/
ordo tractandi.
commento a loannizio: "Sed quia liber iste tante difficultatis lohannis Alexandrini discipulus, hac de causa penitus a scolaribus dimittentur, librum Galieni facilior indu ctus, has Ysagogas id est introductiones, composuit; ut ad II
erat,
cssct
ms. Digby 108 ncl
ut
adhitus."
commcnti
/
E
commcnto contcnuto
cosi, a ncl
103
salernitani a// Articclla
ncl ms. di Erfurt 335 e attribuito
del re Manfredi:
ai qucsiti
MANFREDI Close circa Ysagogas lohannici Alexandrini
que matcria que causa suscepti opcris
modus agendi quid ergo doctrine quis
que quis
divisiq operis libri titulus
confronto tra questi
II
accessus mette in luce una unita di
di
tipi
metodi sostanziale, tuttavia sarebbe stato certamente piu probante una totale identita, su questo ostacolo si sono arenati tutti i tentativi di ricostruzione distinzioni e
di
teoria
ad auctores
a questa fonte
commenta,
Servio a Virgilio e
diffusione
delPAristotclc
fondavono
sul
aggiungevano
materiale e finale.
23
del
latino
-
da
permettere
poter
L origine
dell utilizzazione
Boezio In Isagogen Porphyrii sin dal sec.
IX
-
il
commento -
sec.
XIII
-
nelle
un
sunt, ncll introdurre
formule libro
con
la
che
si
o un campo
quattro cause aristoteliche: formale, efficiente,
le
E
tale
invcntione di Cicerone. In seguito
quae consideranda
furono inserite
di studi,
risale al testo di si
De
il
accessus
degli
in indirizzi di scuole.
accorpamenti
degli accessus
di
una
pertanto evidente la complessita di un indagine
che voglia ricondurre ad un unico cenlro la diffusione del sistema degli 1 ipotcsi, fatta da Hunt, di un origine "francese" resta la
accessus, tuttavia
piu valida; e qui
con se in
la
di
tesi
da un lato parte
vorremmo
rilevare che e
un
ipotesi che
una dipendenza parigina dei maestri
si
concilia anche
salernitani. In realta,
elementi offerti da queste tabelle possono essere ritenuti in insoddisfacenti, quanto non sufficientemente unificanti, gli
dalPallro
questi
analizzati
non solo
dati
aprono
nelle
loro
un
strada:
altra
forme
di
i
accessus,
testi
ma
possono essere anche nella loro 24
di composizione. Questo vuol dire che se in codici non miscellanei, datazione non incerta, si ritrovino non solo gli accessus, ma anche una
disposizione allora
si
assunta
Cfr.
antologica
che permetta
potra ben parlare di
come
di
communis
riscontrare
affinita
di
opinio, e questa potra
"scuola"
ben essere
necessario carattere distintivo di una scuola. Intendo dire
J.B. Allen,
"Commentary as
Late Mediaeval Accessus", in Lovaniensis (1973), pp. 29-48.
J.
Formal Cause, Discursive Form and the Kessler (edd.), Ada Conventus Neo-Latini
Criticism:
Ijsewijn
-
II.
Cfr. L. Thorndike, "The problem of the composite manuscript", Giovanni Mercati, Studi e Testi 126, Roma 1946, vol. 6, pp. 93-104.
in
Miscellanea
104
Morpurgo
una schola, all interno di qucsta dovcvano cssere comuni non solo gli stcssi mctodi di ricerca e di commcnto (accessus), ma anche, oltrc a un canone di tcsti da glossare (Articella), doveva esscrci una produzione che se
vi fu
che
tale
libraria
manoscritti
forniva
cui
in
si
potevano
leggere
tutte
Ad opere che costituivano esempio un manoscritto che contenesse Marziano, Calcidio, Aristotele, fondamento culturale
il
quelle
Galcno, e
commento
il
Bartolomeo a loanni/io, che
di
un ottima
XII-XIII potrebbe costituire schola gia cosi affermata che e capace al
sec.
o
libraria
della schola.
si
possa far
incidere
di
sulla
averne addirittura una propria. Questa ricerca
di
owiamente
si
una
produ/ione e presentata
piu un opera,
laboriosa dovendosi cercare non
assai
risalirc
traccia dell esisten/.a di
ma
un
mi complesso di testi ed esprimere poi un giudizio di omogeneita. Qui e di non e estremamente tre indicare poco limito ad significativi, esempi conto che due siano tratti dai censimenti dell Aristotelcs Latinus: II ms. di Parigi, BN, Par. lat. 14700 del sec. XIII, provcnientc da 1)
San Vittore presenta una
Pan ipontanus,
Aristoteles,
Algazel,
Alfredus Anglicus, owerro alia
vicini
un canone
ma
galcnica,
intrapreso da 2)
commento
non
possa
offrire
il
abba/ia presente
di
e
possibile
alia
del
quadro
il
Alban sembra
St.
DC tcmpcramcnto
Elenchi Sophistici
medicina ippocraticocurriculum che vcniva
ci
una
risposta:
commento
sia la
in
Galcno, Prisciano, un
una Glossa super
del
sono
67, del. sec. XII,
lat.
offrire di
di Aristotele,
Rabano Mauro, un frammento
Conches a Prisciano. Dunque qui
Introduct.
di
Guglielmo medicina galenica sia
di la
fondata sugli accessus e che Hunt ricollega a centri francesi
dialettica
come
ambienti
chiedersi:
dunquc
limitato
Galcnus,
in
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud.
di
e
agli
di
quei
Bathoniensis,
circolavano
che
testi
Occorrc
testi,
di
Adelardus
Adamus
chi volesse studiare filosofia naturale?
dall
provcniente questo caso
Porphyry
che
ms.
II
tutti
salernitana".
"schola
rintracciare
che comprendono
colle/.ione di autori
Chartres.
25
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Selden, sup. 24, del sec. certamente si XII, proveniente da St. Albans, tratteremo anche piu avanti, 3)
presenta filosofia
Del ms.
come uno
le
il
dei
piu
importanti
nella
Questo codice contiene:
naturale.
Nicomachea, queste
di
De
opere
generatione
che
et
la
ricerca
rappresentano
un canone
di
Metaphysica vetus, VEthica
corruptione,
una
di
delle
i
Metereologica,
prime
sono
testimonianze
nelle correnti filosofiche del sec. XII. delPingresso delFAristotele latino
25 R.W. Hunt, "Studies on Priscian sance Studies, 2 (1950), pp. 1-19.
in
the Twelfth Century
II",
Mediawal and Renais
/ commenti salemitani
a// Articella
Quel chc e veramente considerevole e che Alfredo
medico
Anglico,
con
contatto
in
il
riscontrare
nelle
hanno preso
loro
le
riscontri
ulteriori
ma
salemitani,
De
del
vetus
translatio
salemitani.
dei
glossule
generatione
citazioni.
tra
Pipotesi
di
1
organizzazione
e
che
stile
quello
Inoltre
proprio
da
si
di
puo
questa
Bartolomeo, Mauro e Ursone che andranno sviluppati
E ben owio manoscritti
questi di
che
testo prescnta le glosse di
Salerno,
queste glosse sembra essere un antedecente
105
lavoro
in
e
antologici
questo
caso
si
le
opere
presenta
ricca
dei di
prospettive.
Quanto abbiamo esposto
offre elementi sufficienti perche
Minio Paluello, che riteneva che centro dell Aristotele
affiancare
la
latino tesi
di
fosse
la
Normandia
Hunt
su
un origine
auctores, per poi verificare se
Mauro
e
Ursone
Universita di
alia ricerca di
Roma
di
diffusione
o
1
Inghilterra,
francese
da questo milieux siano nuovi
testi.
delle
all
idea di
traduzioni si
possa
ad
degli
accessus
partiti
Bartolomeo,
CARLOS ARTHUR RIBEIRO DO NASCIMENTO
L arbrc de la philosophic
La
comparaison faite par Descartes dans la Principcs de la philosophic entrc la philosophic
connue
et
frequemmcnt
de
lettre-preface
un arbre
et
est
ses
assez
citee:
philosophic cst comme un arbrc dont les racines sont le tronc cst la physique, et les branches qui sortent de cc tronc sont toutes les autres sciences, qui se reduisent a trois principalcs, a savoir la medccine, la mecanique ct la morale; entcnds la plus haute et la plus parfaite morale, qui, presupposant j une entierp connaissance dcs autres sciences, est le dernier degre dc
Ainsi toute la
la
la
metaphysique,
sagesse.
Cette comparaison est encore prolongce de la maniere suivante: Or, comme ce n est pas des racines ni du tronc des arbres qu on cucille les fruits, mais seulement des extrcmites de leurs branches, de ses parties ainsi la principale utilite de la philosophic depend qu on ne peut apprendre que les dernieres."
La metaphore cartesienne met ccrtainemcnt en des racines aux rameaux, en passant par
"Ix;s
Gihcrt,
principcs dc la Vol. I, p. 87.
dans
philosophic",
le
relief
tronc
-
1
unitc
-
son orientation
et
Oemrcs de Descanes,
du savoir
Lib.
Paris,
Joseph
s.d.,
Au Philosophic sagesse",
mctaphorcs utilisccs par Descartes il y a quelqucs travaux dc puissance metaphorique dc Descartes", dans Cahicrs dc Royaumont, arbrc de la 1957, p. 273-301; P. Mesnard, Paris, Ikl. de Minuit, des
sujet
M.Th. Spoerri,
"1,3
"L
II,
dans
Ibidem,
p.
A.
336-349;
Negri,
Descartes
politico,
O
della
ragione\ ole
quc dcs references par M. Gueroult, Descartes scion I ordre dcs raisons, Paris, Aubicr-Montaignc, 1968, Vol. II, p. 226-227, n. 1965, Chap. 26; G. Canguilhem, La connaissance de la vie, Paris, Lib. J. Vrin, Machine et organisme; FL Gilson, Discours dc la mcthodc, Tcxte et commentaire, Paris, idcologia,
Lib.
J.
Milan,
Feltrinclli,
1970,
ainsi
9-17;
p.
Vrin, 1967. e
Notons que le P. Clavius, Luiclidc modcrnc du XVII sieclc, dont Descartes a La Fleche les Oeu\res mathematiques ou, en tout cas, les aurait lus introduction arbre dans un autre contexte dans plus tard, emploie la metaphore de I
aurait
utilise
1
1
dc ses Oeuvres: I^aissant de cote d autres philosophcs, de ja la varicte des sectes des pcripateticiens suffit pour le prouver (1 incertitude des sciences, exceptee la mathematique). Nees toutes elles d Aristote, comme les divers rameaux d un tronc commun, elles luttent entre elles et parfois avec Aristote meme, leur source commune, de tclle maniere qu il est completement impossible de savoir ce qu a etc Aristote plus tard et si sa philosophic se rapportait premierement aux mots ou aux choses. Apud E. Gilson, La
unidad de ~
la experiencia fllosofica,
Les principes de
la philosophic
,
Ed.
Madrid, cit.,
lid. Rialp, 1973, p.
p. 87.
152-154.
L
arbre de la philosophic
on
pratique: Ics fruits de la philosophic,
mecanique
et
de
la
morale
107
les cueille
(le dernier degre de
la
de
la
medecine, de
la
sagesse).
Nous trouvons chez Roger Bacon une comparaison assez prochc de celle
de Descartes: I arbre attentivement de la examine, done, sagesse ai retourne ses racines principales, j ai signale philosophique, j Felevation du tronc robuste et la production des rameaux les plus grands, j ai flaire les fleurs de la plus douce intelligence, j ai recherche diligemment les chaumes dores de Ceres et les sarments murs pour les fruits de Bacchus; et p9ur qu il ne manquat pas 1 utile et 1 agreable verdure des feuilles, j ai rassemble avec concision, suivant les voies des saints et des philosophies, les regies de I eloquence, qui sont designees par les feuilles, dans la derniere partie du volume, considerant que la sagesse sans I eloquence est comme une epee aiguisee dans la main d un paralytique, ainsi que I eloquence, a part de la sagesse, est comme une epee aiguisee dans
J ai
main d un
la
fou.
Nous pouvons observer que Bacon, differemment de Descartes,
explicite
dans ce passage, la place de I eloquence. Pour les autres disciplines nous devons parcourir le texte de VOpus tertium. Notons aussi
seulement,
que Bacon ajoute a la metaphore de la main d un paralytique ou d un Descartes,
dictum
nous verifions que,
chez
franciscain
Descartes,
De
anglais.
fait,
developpee presente dans
arbre celle de
fou.
Confrontant
epee aiguisee, dans encore Bacon et
metaphore de arbre est un obter une constante dans les textes du I
elle
si
1
la
si
est
elle
I
ne
revet
pas
toujours
la
forme
de VOpus tertium que nous venons de elle citer, est, pourtant, presente de quelque facon dans de nombreux passages de ses oeuvres. Sans aucune pretention d exhaustivite, rapportons le texte
renommees racines quelques exemples. L Opus majus pretend exposer de la sagesse"4 qui dependent du pouvoir des langues, de la mathematique, de la perspective (optique), de la science experimentale et de la "les
philosophic morale.
L etude de
des agents est declaree
"Opus
inedita,
tertium",
Vol.
I,
Reprint Ltd., 1965,
dans
Londres,
J.S.
"la
la multiplication
racine
Brewer,
supreme
Ed.,
Her Majesty s
Fr.
des especes et des forces
et principale
Rogeri Bacon
Stationery
Office,
de
la
5 sagesse."
opera
quaedam hactenus
1859,
Wiesbaden,
Kraus
p.4.
Opus majus, Ed. J.II. Bridges, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1897, Frankfurt/Main, Minerva G.m.b.H., Unveranderter Nachdruck, 1964, Vol. I, p. 97; cf. Vol. II, p. 1-2, 167 et 223.
Opus
tertium, Ed.
cit.,
p. 38.
Ribciro
108
La
c est-a-dire
perspective,
Encore au
sujet
de
1
Do
optique
Nascimcnto
est
la
multiplication des especes,
la
de
flcur
la
6
philosophic.
Bacon declare dans
le
Fragment Gasquet: etablis toutes les racines qui concernent la multiplication et j Faction conjointement ayec les rameaux, les fleurs et les fruits necessaires a cette persuasion.
Ainsi,
La metaphore de
1
arbre met aussi en
pratique de la connaissance et
de
la
1
relief
chc/ Bacon
unite dc celle-ci.
septieme partie de YOpus majus
il
dit
En
au sujet de
la
1
orientation
au debut
effet, tout
morale:
racines d une cinquicme Maintenant, toutefois, je desire remuer les toutes cellcs deja qui est meilleure et plus noble que nommees (connaissance des langues, mathematique, optique, science toutes pratique, c est-a-dire, experimentale); cette science est parmi dans cette vie et dans 1 autrc; operative, traitant de nos oeuvrcs
science
toutes les autres sont speculatives.
A
cette affirmation
il
faut joindre ce qui est dit
au chapitre d ouverture
de VOpus majus:
La consideration parfaite de la sagesse consiste en deux choses, a manicre qu elle qu on voit ce qui est requis par elle de telle soil connue de la meilleure maniere- ensuite, comment cflc se de sorte que celles-ci soient rapporte a toutes les autres choses En effet, PEglise de Dieu convenables. facons de clle dirigees par est ordonnee par la lumiere de la sagesse, la Republique des fideles
savoir:
conversion des infideles est operee et ceux qui sont malice peuvent etre reprimes nar la force de la mieux ecartes a plus loin des limites sorte de sagesse qu ils soient de 1 Eglise que par 1 effusion du sang chrctien. est organises, la obstines dans la
D
un autre
cote, la
metaphore dc
une idee chere a Bacon,
celle
de
la
1
arbrc exprime d une maniere plastique
connexion des sciences:
et qu on ne souleve pas une question du fait que j affirme que chacune de ces sciences que j enumere ici a du nouvoir sur les autres et qu on ne peut pas connaitre une d entre elles sans toutes. Car toutes les sciences sont connexes comme les parties dans le tout En et chacune est utile non seulement a soi mais a toutes les autres. aide de toutes, etre connue sans effet, aucune d elle ne peut pas deuxieme livre des Questions puisque Ciceron affirme dans le Tusculanes: quelqu un ne peut pas connaitre peu de choses si la 1
6 dans D.C. Lindberg, Ed., Roger Bacon s Philosophy of "De multiplicatione specierum", avec Opus majus, I!d. Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 198, lin. 56; comparer 3. Vol. II, p. cit., 7
F.A. Gasquet,
"An
Unpublished Fragment of a Work by Roger
Bacon",
dans English
Historical Re\ iew, 12 (1897), p. 512.
8
Ed. E. Massa, Turici, Thesauri Mundi, 1953, Rogeri Baconis Moralis Philosophia,
9
p. 3.
ce sujet E. Gilson, Les metamorphoses de Opus majus, Ed. cit., Vol. II, p. 1. Voir a la cite de Dieu, Louvain, Paris, Publ. Univ. de Louvain, Lib. J. Vrin, 1952, Chap. 3, p. 75-109.
L
arbre de la philosophic
109
plupart ou toutes ne lui soicnt pas connues. Ainsi, n importc quelle d entre elles depend des autres et elles se pretent des aides mutuelles. II
meme
serait
sagesse
d
necessaire
aller
plus
loin
et
evoquer
de
unite
1
la
que Bacon la conceit: a une sagesse parfaite qui y
telle
est contenue dans les Saintes Ecritures et des racines de laquelfe est sortie toute la verite. Je dis done qu il - y - a une science maitresse des autres, soit, la theologie a laquelle toutes les autres sont totalement necessaires et sans lesquelles elle ne reussit pas a arriyer a la realisation dont elle revendique la force dans son droit, et a 1 ordre et au commandement de laquelle toutes les autres sont soumises pour mieux dire, il - y - a une sagesse parfaite qui est totalement contenue dans PEcriture Sainte, a etre expliquee par le droit canonique et par la philosophic. En effet, on obtient Pexposition de la verite divine par le moyen de ces sciences. Car, ceile-la avec
IJ
comme
la main et, cependant, par sagesse dans le poing; car toute la sagesse a ete donnee par un seul Dieu a un seul monde et pour une seule fin. ou 1 unite appartenant a cette sagesse, en vue de cette
celles-ci s
ouvre
soi-meme
dans
paume de
la
elle recueille toute la
D
triple relation.
Ce passage
contient une nouvelle metaphore
du poing renferme
-
de
celle
la
paume etendue
-
qui peut-etre nous oriente vers une lointaine racine de la metaphore de 1 arbre. En effet, la metaphore de la paume et du poing reprend une semblable utilisee par Zenon, le stoi cien: et
Zenon montrait
sa
main puverte,
les
disant:
"Voici
etendus:
doigts
representation", disait-il; puis il contractait 1 assentiment". Puis il fermait la "yoici
legerement
"Voici
les
la
doigts:
main et serrait le poing, en c est d ailleurs d apres cette image
la comprehension";
il a donne a cet acte un nom qui n existait pas auparavant, cemi de catalepsis; puis avec la main gauche, qu il approcnait, il serrait fortement le poing droit en disant: "Voici la science, que personne ne possede sinon le sage."
au
les
Or,
ont
stoi ciens
utilise,
entre
rapproche assez de la metaphore de
une
autres, 1
arbre.
En
comparaison
effet,
philosophic a un animal (la logique = les os et les muscles; les
est
= parties charnues; la physique la logique, puis vient la morale
"une
ville
bien
fortifiee
et
1
ame), a un oeuf et tout a
gouvernee
1
("la
la
se
la
morale =
partie extcrieure
interieur la
selon
qui
ont compare la
ils
physique")
raison".
et a
Transcrivons
Fragment Gasquet, Loc. cit., p. 512. Cf. Opus tertium, Ed. Brewer, p. 18 et 37. II de noter qu a ce sujet Bacon defend une these diametralement opposee a a ae celle de Thomas d Aquin. Voir Somme de theologie, I II q. 65, a. 1, ad 3m. est interessant
Opus majus, Ed.
cit.,
Vol.
Ill, p.
36.
Ciceron, "Premiers academiqucs", II, 145, Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1964, p. 255.
dans
E.
Brehier,
Les
stoi ciens,
Paris,
Do
Ribeiro
110
litteralement
metaphore de
Ou
avant-derniere
1
Nascimento
comparaison
se
qui
de
rapproche
la
arbrc:
1
la cloture qui 1 entoure terre et les arbres la
encore a un champ en pleine production: la
est
les
logique,
fruits
la
la
morale,
physique.
Nous pouvons, sto icisme,
comme
une hypothese. Les systemes cartcsianisme le et baconienne
peut-etre, risquer
la
sagesse
le
insistent
sur 1 unite de la quoique pour des raisons differentes puissamment La orientation son connaissance humaine et sur metaphore de pratique. -
1
arbre
se
comme
prcsente
dans cette
naturellcment
dans
Une
perspective.
a
sensibles
la systemes plus ce C est du savoir. secteur de chaque specificite d objet et dc methode Aristote et Thomas d Aquin. Dans ces avec arriverait, exemple, par qui la de trait de il n a cas metaphore de 1 arbre ni de metaphores pas y
autre
se
rencontrerait
de
cette
attitude
les
cquivalentes.
En
plus
baconienne
sagesse
d indiquer une
filiation
structurelle
isomorphie le
ct
cartesianisme,
il
entre
est,
Bacon
historique gcnerale:
le
sans
sto icisme,
doute,
la
possible
Descartes ont etc
et
des grands lecteurs de Ciceron et de Seneque et ils se sont inspires de ces deux derniers quant au traitement de la morale. Voila, une fois de question de
la
plus,
aurait-elle conduit a
mcmcs
la 1
usage des
antimetaphorique d Aristote de Bacon pour
nom
ftarbor
1
alchimie. Or,
philosophica
oeuf:
l
isomorphic de
sources ou, a
isomorphie de
1
traits
et
1
memes
sources aurait-il conduit a
Notons encore deux
de
et
poule
la
1
de Thomas d Aquin. alchimie,
(symbole
du
1
D
14
arbre de
reste,
marche
1
attitude
un autre, Pinteret
la
science recoit le
de
cvolutif,
processus
pensee
usage des
pensee? D un cote,
croissance d une idee, d une vocation ou d une force);
II
1
complementaires.
"en
philosophies equivaut a mettre en
envers,
la
planter
1
toute
arbre des
1 1
imagination
crcatrice."
nous pourrions pourtant, une autre direction dans laquelle baconien: la tradition judeo-chretienne. II 1 arbre
chercher les racines de
semble que
^
1
allusion ne serait pas tant a
Diogcne Laerce,
"Vies
et
opinions des
cit., p.
14
Voir M.-D. Chenu, Introduction a
d Et. Med., Paris, 15
Cf.
arbre de
philosophes",
la
vie"
et a
"1
arbre
Livre VII, 40, dans E. Brehicr,
50.
Op.
vcrhum
"1
J.
Juan-Eduardo "Arvore"
I
etude de saint
Thomas d Aquin, Montreal,
Inst.
Vrin, 1950, p. 144-146. Cirlot,
Dicionario
a (p. 102), qui renvoit
de
simbolos,
Jung, Psychologic
et
Lisboa, Ed. alchimie.
Moraes,
1984,
Ad
L arbre de
la
de
la
connaissance du bien
de
du
ct
la
11
philosophic
mal"
dc
la
16
Genese
(2,9)
,
mais a
1
1
arbre
un arbre dc
vie pour qui la saisit, celui qui VApocalypse (22,1-2) dit: son cote (Pr. 3,18). 1 le fleuve de Puis Anje me montra Vie, limpide comme du cristal, qui jaillissait du trone de Dieu et de PAgneau. Au milieu de la place, de part et d autre du fleuve, il y a des arbres de Vie qui frutifient douze fois, une fois chaque mois; et leurs feuilles peuvent guerir les
sagesse: celle-ci
la tient
devient
est
"c
De
heureux"
pai ens.
Ce passage reprend des elements d Ezechiel
(47,1-12) et sera utilise par
Saint Bonaventure pour structurer son opuscule
quelques lignes du prologue de
L
arbre de la vie. Voici
celui-ci:
Et
des que 1 imagination favorise 1 intelligence, j ai ordonne et dispose le peu de cnoses en quoi va resume le tres copieux argument dans un arbre ideal de la rnaniere suivante: dans la premiere ramification inferieure j ai decrit 1 origine et la vie du Sauveur; dans celle du milieu, la passion; et en naut la glorification. Dans la premiere serie ae rameaux vont places d un cote et de 1 autre quatre versets en ordre alphabetique; et le meme dans la seconde et dans la troisieme ramification, de chacune desquelles pend, a la maniere de fruit, un seul bourgeon- et ainsi les douze rameaux offrent les douze misterieux fruits de I Arore de la Vie.
Nous pourrions encore 1
arbre dans
signaler plusieurs ramifications de la
contexte judeo-chretien.
le
L image du
metaphore de
juste qui
comme
"est
un arbre plante pres du cours des eaux, qui donne son fruit en la saison et jamais son feuillage ne seche" (Ps. 1,3; cf. Jr. 17,8); le theme de la vigne d Israel qui, partant du prophete Osee (10,1), se rencontre chez Isai e (5,
1-7),
Jeremie
(2,21; 5,10; 6,9; 12,10) et Ezechiel (15, 1-8; 17, 3-
10; 19, 10-14) et est reinterprete
44
et Jn.
"Ainsi
15,
1-2).
dans
le
Nouveau Testament (Mt.
vaudrait la peine encore citer la parole de Jesus:
II
done, c est a leurs fruits que vous les
Notons, cependant, que dans ces references nous soteriologique ou moral et
C est
ce
qui
arrive
21, 23-
aussi
reconnaitrez"
(Mt. 7,20).
sommes dans un
contexte
non pas dans un contexte de connaissance. les fameux du Saint Esprit", a
avec
"fruits
propos desquels Thomas d Aquin explicite avec toute clarte les regies d usage de la metaphore. 18 La descendance iconographique medievale dans Pour traduite
les
citations
de
en franqais sous la
la
Bible
direction
nous avons utilise le texte de La Sainte Bible de I Ecole Biblique de Jerusalem, Paris, Les Ed.
du Cerf, 1956. 17 "A
arvore
da
vida",
Prologue,
n
2,
dans L.A.
De
Boni,
Sao Boaventura, Obras
escolhidas, Escola Sup. de Teologia S. Louren^o de Brindes, 1983, p. 375. 18 Somme de theologie, I a H ae q. 70, a. 1.
Ribeiro
112
Do
Nascimento
ce contcxte seraient les arbres des vertus et des vices dont
J.
Le Goff
nous offre un exemplc du XII e siecle. 19 En fin de comptc, qucl fruit tirerons nous dc ce parcours? Peutetre avons-nous divague sans une direction precise et meritons la malediction du figuier sterile qui exhibait seulement des feuilles et aucun fruit
(Mt. 21, 18-19).
Pontificia Universidade Catolica,
)
La ch ilisation de
hymnes de Vepres
et
I
Sao Paulo
occident medieval,
Laudes du Temps de
la
Paris,
Arthaud,
Passion: arbre de
1972,
p.
la croix.
644.
Voir aussi
les
OLGA WEIJERS
L appcllation dcs disciplines dans les dcs sciences aux XII C et XHI e siecles
classifications
Le vocabulaire des n a pas recu point de vue
Mon
1
qu on appelle
textes
attention
qu
il
merite.
II
stylistique et linguistique
objectif relevant
de
plutot
1
les
des sciences
classifications
serait interessant
comme un
histoire
1
(resume)
genre
de
etudier d un
1
litteraire distinct.
intellectuelle, je
me
aux termes par lesquels sont designees, dans cc genre de diverses sciences
ou
bornerai
textes,
les
disciplines.
mon
choix de la periode etudiee est assez large, comprenant les XII e et XIII e siecles, c est pour englober la profonde modification de la Si
science a la suite de la decouverte du nouvel Aristote et des philosophes arabes.
Le choix des auteurs ete edites et
qu
ils
a ete determine par le
represented
les differents
fait
que leurs
textes ont
courants et tendances qu on
pu discerner dans cette matiere. II s agit de Hugues de Saint- Victor, Guillaume de Conches, Gilbert de Poitiers, Dominique Gundisalvi, Raoul de a
Longchamps, Robert Kilwardby, Aubry de Reims, Jean de Dacie
et Gilles
de Rome.
Pour ce qui concerne
les
limite car elles sont basees sur la
statistiques,
un choix de
d un interet necessairement textes,
on peut noter que sur
soixantaine de denominations de disciplines ou de groupes de disciplines
on compte 21
disciplines
noms
voire quatre
differentes,
en tenant compte de la constater qu Aubry de Reims gagne
Kilwardby
est le plus
bien entendu fait
qu
On 1987.
il
est le
trouvera
Comme
trois,
la
palme de
Poriginalite et
que Robert
que Hugues de Saint-Victor merite richesse du vocabulaire compte tenu du
complet, tandis
admiration pour la plus ancien des auteurs etudies.
1
ici il
souvent designees par deux,
Lorsqu on dresse un tableau des occurrences banalite ou de la rarete des termes, on peut
differents.
resume de la communication que j ai presentee a Helsinki en aout difficile de developper ce sujet dans espacc restreint autorise prefere publier le texte dans sa totalite dans Archivum Latinitatis
le
etait
pour les actes, j ai MediiAe\ i (Bulletin Du Cange) 46 (1987)
1
[1989].
114
Wcijers
Un
certain
nombre de termcs
qui rcmonte a Boece, Cassiodorc
appartient naturcllcment a la tradition
Cependant, plus de
ct Isidore.
moitie
la
des appellations retenues ont etc puisees dans d autres sources ou ont ete
par les auteurs en question. Je termes nouveaux
inventees
les
appellerai
dans
la
suite
.
d une
Etudiant
les
part
comprenant chacune plusieurs
divisions
employees
appellations
pour
definir
les
noms
des
sciences, d autre part les
disciplines individuelles, je suis arrivee a quclques conclusions provisoires.
D la
abord, on pcut dire que,
meme
ou
discipline
seulement du au
fait
un auteur
si
utilise plusieurs
le
meme
groupe de
il
utilise
des sources differentes.
qu
disciplines,
termes pour ce n est pas y a aussi
II
clairement un les
interet, chcz certains auteurs, pour le vocabulaire et pour nuances des diverses appellations. Robert Kilwardby en est un bon
exemple. Son traite contient une grande quantite de termes differents ct il ne les utilise pas indifferemment. Au contraire, il tente de les cerner
au plus pres practica, "De
d en expliquer et
Au
;
1
istorum
et proprietatc
comme
emploi,
ac
leur
et
les trois appellations
vocabulorum:
practicum
intitule:
activum
,
et
differentia".
nivcau des termes eux-memes, je n
diversite
pour
consacre un chapitre
il
auxquclles
operativa,
appropriatione
operativum leur
et
activa
Ce
nombre.
sont
ai
plus bcsoin d insistcr sur
parfois
mots
des
classiques
(commc eloquentia) ou appartenant au latin medieval (commc sermocinalis) qui trouvent ici un nouvel emploi. Mais beaucoup dc termes viennent, par 1
intermediaire des traducteurs, d Aristote et des philosophes arabes.
certains
cas,
ou
dcmonstratio
d autres
s agit
il
c est
aristoteliciennes
demonstrative!
du
nouvelle
vague
la
arabes
et
imaginativa ) qui est a
L
innovation
nouvelles
ou
de
grecque
occonomica, dans
le
ancien
grec
des
anode L^LC,),
creditiva
appellations
et
origine du vocabulaire.
dans
le
en
provient
du
systeme d autres
Papplication
de
partie
savoir
(solitaria,
privata
et
publica
1
insertion
de
etude
des
1
(telle
noms
des
a
exemple pour donner des variantes
politico).
dans
oeuvres
des
traductions les
Dans
traduction
la
(par exemple
terme
(comme pour
terminologique
traditionnelles, par
d origine
1
disciplines
meteores)
d un heritage
latines
au
lieu
disciplines
aux termes de
Mais une cause peut-etre plus importante
renouvellement des schemas de
d autres
classification.
noms.
D autres mot
ethica,
est situee
divisions
liberalis Ainsi, pourvues traditionnellement lie aux arts liberaux, recoit une nouvelle fonction dans
doivent
etre
le
L appellation
des disciplines dans
schema de Jean
Ic
^e
Dacic,
les classifications
distinguant
speculative des arts mecaniques,
la
des sciences
philosophic
et
pratique
terme classique sapientia
le
115
est
utilise
par Guillaume de Conches pour designer une categoric de sciences en opposition avec eloquentia. D autrc part, de vieillcs divisions recoivent
noms nouveaux,
des
parfois
comme
puises a de nouvelles sources,
par
exemple philosophie pratique appelee par Robert Kilwardby et Aubry de Reims operativa et la philosophie theorique ou speculative qui se nomme la
chcz Aubry de Reims considerativa Dans le domaine des sciences .
particulierement importante, ce qui
s
du
1
langage,
innovation
explique d une part par
ces disciplines n etaient pas toujours considerces
comme une
parait
le fait
que
partie de
la
philosophie et qu elles ont ete inserees dans les schemas aristoteliciens de
d autre
part par Pampleur de leur evolution, que du vocabulaire. La tradition du latin medieval a complexite termes utilises dans ce domaine (dont litteralis, plusieurs
differentes reflete
fac,ons,
la
fourni
sennocinalis,
dissertiva),
ce qui
montre
le
caractere proprcment latin du
developpement mentionne. Finalement,
faut
il
noter
que
la
des
terminologie
divisions
des
sciences n est pas fixe ni entierement depourvue de confusion. Outre le fait
la
que
comme
decouverte de nouvelles sources apporte des termes nouveaux, le cas par exemple de factiva comme synonyme de
c est
mechanica, on constate aussi que certains termes ont, a Pinterieur mcme des divisions des sciences, des emplois differents. Ainsi, les mots naturalis et
physica dcsignent tantot
physique
proprement
general, les sciences
dite;
ensemble des sciences theoriques, tantot la le terme logica definit au debut, au sens
1
du langage ou
scientiae rationales,
mais
est applique
ensuite a la seule dialectiquc.
En savoir 1
recapitulant, je
d une
schemas; de
moins, qui
voudrais souligner deux elements essentiels, a
extraordinaire
richesse
de
ce
vocabulaire
due
a
de nouvelles sources, mais aussi au renouvellement constant
utilisation
des
part,
1
s
1
autre,
le
souci de precision,
exprime non seulement par
elles-memes, mais aussi dans
la
pour arriver a un resultat precis
et sans
le
de certains auteurs au
remaniement des
classifications
terminologie utilisee consciencieusement ambiguite.
N.W.O. (Organisation Neerlandaise pour de la Recherche Scientifique), La Haye
le
Developpement
SECTION
TWO
BASIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES
AS RELATED TO
MEDIEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE
TOMASZ BARTEL
Nouvcllc interpretation de adaequatio
Dans
la definition Veritas est
chcz
St.
Thomas d Aquin
presente communication je tache de rassembler
la
travail
grand
plus
rei et intellectus
au problcme de
sacrifie
d un
les resultats
chez
verite
la
Thomas
St.
d Aquin, prenant surtout en consideration Quaestio disputata de Veritate.
La definition de
la
-
verite
Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus
non seulcment encore une determination de mais
realite
la
c est
de connaissance,
determine aussi un certain ordre (ordo) de considcrer la verite. Elle penetre alors a la methode d exercer la science sur devoilements elle
"les
de
Dieu".
Thomas
"La
nouveaute"
consiste
en
de
1
interpretation de
premier
lieu
dans
ce
ladite
qu
il
consequemment au point de vue metaphysique, comme a
un certain
intellect,
substituant
des termes res et intellectus.
de
d objets
la
II
connaissance
tour
tour
congoit
diflercntes
par
rapport
alors sa propre position dans
soil
aux qualites 1
intcllect
de
la
relation d
obtient de cette maniere une
pouvoirs qui les recoient, quoique ce
prend
a
definition
un objet
significations
gamme
Les
Veritas
est
sources
adaequatio
humain ou
et
de
Divin.
II
une discussion visiblement animee sur
d interpretation
traditionnelles rei
riche
individuelles
la nature de la verite, qui le place dans un meme rang plutot Aristote qu avec Auguslin, Avicenne ou bien avec Anselme.
1)
St.
verite
intellectus
et
leur
de
la
avec
definition
influence
sur
des
disputes sur la nature de la verite.
Thomas lui-meme
St.
a
impute cette definition a Isaac
Israeli
se
referant plutot a la source de puisement qu a sa paternite. Saint Albert le
Grand, de
meme
que Vilhelm d Auvergne, constatent clairement que c est une definition d Avicenne. L ctude de Muckle: Isaac Israeli s Definition of Truth
porter
le
confirme egalement. Lorsque c
avec
elle
une
comprehension
est ainsi, ladite definition devait
de
la
chose
et
de
1
intellect
d Avicenne. Le problemc de la verite a etc placce dans la logique, ou les essences des choses ont etc conceptions d etres non necessaires dans des notions de genre et d espece.
Muckle
J.T.: Isaac Israeli s
Definition of Truth,
A/IDLM 8
(1933), p. 5-8.
Bartcl
120
DCS retentisscmcnts de
la
dispute sur
Sentences de Pierre Lombard dans
1
articlc
commc
verite
Thomas dans
etre peuvcnt etre trouves chcz St.
1
la
essence de
commcntaires sur
les
vcritc est-ce
"La
les
essence dc
1
constate qu aucun ctre n est connu separcmcnt du principe de la verile, en plus 1 etre est plus primordiale quc la verite, car il est etre. L etre precede la impossible dc connaitre la verite sans connaitre verite par notion et c est lui qui est la premiere notion dc 1 intellect. Ce intellect: imaginatio intcllcctus etre sc referc aux deux actions dc la
II
chose?".
1
1
1
certaines images de Pintcllcct, qui sont dcterminces par la connaissance de ce que consiste indivisiblcment dans la perception des creatures la foi qui consiste dans une simples ct une scconde, qui sc nomme fides La de premiere action se refere a jugements. composition et division -
essence
1
-
quidditas
de
la
deuxieme conccrnc
la
chose,
existence elle-
1
Lorsque dans la chose esscnce ct cxistencc sont existcncc rccllemenl differenciees, une base dc la verite forme plutot 2 existence Lc nom de de la chose que Pesscnce, constate Aquinat.
meme
1
1
ipsius).
(csse
1
1
d exister
provicnt
comprenant
1
(ens
csse),
1
ellc est,
une relation d adaequation se
ellc,
nature de
consiste la
dans
ct
existencc de la chose telle qu
a
assimilation
ab
la verite. St.
Thomas termine
de
action
grace a
1
intellect
une certaine dans cc quc
realise,
son argumentation par
pretend alors, que une constatation d unc importance extraordinaire: existencc de la chose c est la cause de la verite, car la chose est "Je
1
connue par intellect". 2) La conception de 1
De
la
definition
examinee dans Quaestio disputata
Veritate.
Lc
du premier
litre
Thomas
s
exprime:
probleme enticr -
verite
denote dans
"Qu
ce,
la
que
s agit
il
ici
ou bien
tradition
Quaestio disputata
cst-cc
verite
la
comme une
entitulc
est
cst-ce
qu
"La
article
c est
la
verite?".
mcme
probleme de
chose
question
Veritate
quc
sur
1
1
la verite
esscnce
a
1
dc
etre?".
La these du premier
d unc identification de le
De
de
St.
Le la
article
etre qui est
converlibilite de la verite et
de
dcs mcthodes de decrire
ce qui le succcde, des possibilites cettc discussion n cxistcrait s il n y avail une fort rcgnante ct
1
ctre,
et
1
etre.
Toute
a cet epoque-la position de St. Augustin, identifiant la verite a 1 etre, et cela a 1 Etre Supreme, qui peut ctre atleinlc grace a la parlicipalion dans les
idecs
!
cf. St.
dc
Thomas,
Dieu.
In
I
1
St.
Thomas,
Sent. d. 19, q. 5,
a. 1.
qui
est
deja
sous
1
influence
de
Veritas est adacquatio rci ct intellect us chez
1
St.
121
Tliotnas
antropologie d Aristote, tache de mettre d accord les theses des autorites
presentant differents aspects de perception de
Dans
Thomas
premier article, une repartition en
fait
de
la verite.
premiere question De Veritate St. qualites pour determiner la verite: la
la
trois
chose, en definitions, dans lesquelles se realise formellement raison de la verite, et en definitions qui concernent la verite presentee
de
verite la
le
dans
la
Pintellect,
Parmi definition tot
les
dans sa conception. groupes de definitions formelles,
Thomas nomme
St.
Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Faisant
Panalyse
de
1
existence
appartient a chaque Petre,
prise
du
des
cote
la
cependant plus generales
qualites
qui
delibere sur ce que consiste Pessence de la
il
relation entre Pobjet et Pintellect et
il
determine
de cette
les conditions
un fragment caracteristique, qui illustre ce probleme: "Alio modo secundum convenientam unius entis ad aliud, et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente; hoc autem est anima, quae "quodam modo est omnia", ut dicitur in III De Anima: in anima autem est vis cognitiya et appetitiva; convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, unde in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod "bonum est quod omnia appetunt convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cogmtiqnis, sicut visus per hoc disponitur secundum speciem coloris cognoscit colorem: prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui concordet, quae quidem concordia adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur, et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum super ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus, ad quam
relation. Voici
,
conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei: sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus.
Le fragment Interpretation de
Primo,
Thomas un
c est
d Aristote du Ill-eme certain
sens
donne beaucoup de donnees
cite St.
c est
traitement livre
sur
d une
L ame, 4
tout,
quoi
existe"
,
ame dans un certain sens devient Pame se produit done Passimilation du "L
connu. Cette these presente verite est bien plus riche
essentielles
pour
lire
sur la definition examinee.
la
des
theses
qui annonce que
antropologiques "L
ame dans un
ou bien dans une autre la
totalite
de ses
objets".
place:
Dans
pouvoir, qui connait avec un objet
conscience de Thomas, que Pordre de
que
cela
s est
presente
dans
la
la
culture
philosophique jusqu a present. Jusqu a present le probleme de la verite et
St.
Thomas, De
cf.
Aristote,
Veritate, q. 1, a. le.
De Anima,
III,
431
h.
Bartel
122
de
adequation de
1
et
composant
la
connaissancc
partageant,
clairemcnt situe dans Pintellect
etait
rcalisant deja,
scicmment, dcs
ainsi dire,
pour
Thomas montre, qu on peut
reflexions sur le materiel cognitif. St.
parler
adequation dans un sens de reception des teneurs cote de existence connue, d une sorte de manifestatio du coulent qui esse. La relation de la verite est reelle lorsque un mouvement se produit sur la verite et sur
1
1
entre
realite
la
Pintcllect
et
dans un certain sens
ordre
possible
reversible,
existence
1
notre
On
conception.
Autrement
dans laquelle
et
che/.
remarqucr de Petre, ou bien de
dit
on peut decider de
de
la
de
relation
son
de
la
chose vcrs verite
reception
troisicme
par
article
Chaque chose
pouvoir
comme
la
verite
comme
d une
d ordre des
verite
la
du procede. dans cette relation se produit
le
la
la
de Pordre de
claire differenciation
Pordre
verite,
de
chose.
Secundo. Attire Pattention une connaissance
verite
Thomas
la
certaine propriete transcendentale de Petre et de idees, certaine decision
St.
met en
il
la
exprime
il
alors
peut
differentiation de la verite sur la chose.
qu
aussi
activite,
dans des opinions
recipiee
par Petre. Cctte relation du cote de Pintellect,
slimule
c.a.d.
son tour, existe une certaine
a
actif
est
intellectuelle,
intellect
qu
il
et
theorique,
est
base de
la
intellcctio
va
aussi
la
de Petre,
nommer fin
la
la
dans
le
de
ce
qui coule du cote des objets-memcs, c est la verite presente Pintellect. On peut parler cepcndant d une certaine verite, sur
mouvement dans
on
laquelle
attirait
dans
Pattention
Veritas est adaequatio rti ct intellectus,
dcs donnecs de
Pintellect
avec
la
Interpretation
que
chose.
de
la
definition
une certaine conformite
c est
Che/
St.
Thomas Petape de
precedee par la perception de Petre, la une certaine consequence de la verite, quelque chose plus retardec que la conformite. La conformite se presente alors deja dans un seul contact de Petre avec Pintellect.
connaitre
la
connaissance
verite
est
elle-meme
Etymologiquement
c est
le
terme
adaequatio
signifie
"la
comparaison"
un proces, le contact de la acquatio). Quand a la comparaison (ad chose et de Pintellect, du pouvoir qui recoil et de Pobjet, produit un Passimilation d un ecrit St. Thomas acte. Dans la connaissance c est
-
chose pour connaitre se realise, la realite a alors aussi son aspect dynamique - c est une tendence vers une fin quelconque, qui est une assimilation de pouvoir connaissante a son objet. connaissant a
Une dans
le
la
comprendre la conformite se trouve question, ou St. Thomas constate, que:
indication importante pour
troisieme article de ladite
Vcritas est adacquatio rci ct intellectus chez
enim
"Vcri
meme
ajoutc en
5 est".
d adequation jouc un role
de
obtention
relative
la
ct
intellectus",
autem non adaequatur
semble
sibi
dans
que
alors,
123
le
mais ipsi
il
sed
probleme
principe de difference entre les periodes de
le
Lc mouvcment
relation.
la
II
Tliomas
rci
adacquatione "idem
temps, que:
divcrsorum
aequalitas
in
consistit
ratio
St.
dont
cognitif,
verite,
est
le
parce que
possible
une
fait
repos
1
certaine
adequation se
realise entre differentes choscs.
Les definitions formelles de 1
de
ordre
La
relation.
la
la
verite dirigent la consideration vers
verite
exige
connaissance des deux termes rapport,
une
correctement
possibilite d identifier
En
seulement conceptuelle.
comme
La
la
cas du
de
probleme de
comme
reelle
la verite, la
la
Cela donne
relation.
la
la relation
cherche
qui
celui,
fm de
ou bien
question est
seulement quelque conceptionnellement ou bien reellement? Ici arrive le plus souvent une erreur d un melange de la propriete transcendentale de la verite qui est suit:
verite
chose
ajoute-elle
a
Petre
en droit de chaque etre par raison de son intelligibilite et une notion transcendentale de la verite, qui a, comme chaque notion, son etendue formee et separee dans la connaissance de 1 existence sur mesure de
du pouvoir intellectuelle, qui realise justement 1 operation dans ce cas operation de 1 adequation. cognitive, Examinons dans quel sens Thomas comprend les deux but de la
1
habilete
1
notamment
relation,
Commentaires Veritate
res
firmum
per
quod secundum quod hoc,
enim
"Simplicitcr
res
dicitur
St.
6 1
7
est
rationem eius
et
Thomas, De
1
Sent. 25,
1,
4c.
natura
;
"Res
places
des
dans
question
De
modo
Veritate, q.
1, 2, 4.
1, a.
1,
non
est
duo considerare
distincta."
;"Hoc
in
la
re,
3c.
le ct ad 4.
nomine
completa
nomen scilicet
sumitur quod
quod habet esse ratum accepto
est
7
aliis
dicitur res
hoc
Trinitate,
in
ab
et esse ipsius, et a quidditate
Sent. 25, 14c; 2 Sent. 37,
Super De
8
differentes et
rei
diffcrunt,
vel
Dans Lombard
intellectus.
St.
quasi aliquid ratum et nisi
et
Sentences de Pierre
Thomas revele differentes comprehensions du terme res: ad utrumque se habet, et ad id quod est in anima, prout res a reor (reris), et ad id, quod est extra animam, prout res dicitur
"Nomen
dicitur
aiix
rei,
et
ens
in esse, et
res
quidditatem
nomen
firmum
res
;
in natura,
secundum quod habet
124
Bartcl
quidditatem vel essentiam quandam, ens vcro, sccundum quod habct esse" "Quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomcn res exprimit quidditatem
,
sive essentiam entis. St.
Thomas remarque, que
chose
la
d un cote une certaine
(res) est
conception de 1 etre, mais il comprend egalement dehors de ame qui connait. Le probleme de connaitre 1 intellect presente
chose"
"la
comme
etant
1
Sommc
autres dans la
intellect peut que maniere comme ce que etre prcnd a comme universel ct de autre cote 1
ecrit,
de
defini
1
conscience
la
intellect
1
1
pouvoir
Thomas
entre
le
:
1
certain
St.
probleme sur la volonte, ou il 11 En une etre compris de deux manicres
Tfieologique dans
un
dans
ame,
et veritable,
est
acte
compris
L
defini.
compris
comme un intellect
est
compris d un cote comme un pouvoir, et de autre cote comme resultat d une conception de la realite. La differenciation des intellects, ainsi que 1
differentcs
conceptions
de
adequation lorsque on fait connaitre de la definition Veritas est adaequatio rci
la
1
Dans la
la
DC
question
de
relation
1
intellcct
Potcntia
peut
etre
niveaux
des
presentcnt
res,
verite,
possibles
faisant claire le
de
contenu
ct intellectus.
St.
Thomas
dit,
c.a.d.
que adaequatio,
en quatres manieres,
realise
et
cela
selon diffcrents objets qui les touchent:
Primo, d objets,
1
intellect
auquels
1
peut se rapporter a
intellect
se
referrc,
1
objet,
ici
dans cetle composition du res comme un
s agit
il
certain type de realite, des objets reels, exterieurs;
Secundo, intcllect peut se rapporter aux species, mentales cognitives, qui ressemble aux objets; 1
Tertio, ainsi
dire,
peut se rapporter a sa connaissance, renfermer dans son acte de reflexion il
c.a.d.
c.a.d. le
il
aux formes
peut, pour
proces
de
sa
connaissance; II 1
enfin
peut
intellect,
son produit.
sc
rapporter
et
examiner
Les differents degres et dimensions de objets lesquels on substitut dans la definition.
2 Sent. 37,
De 12
1,
le.
Veritate, q. 1, a. le.
Summa
1
idee
elle-meme
de
12
cf. St.
Thomas,
cf. St.
Thomas, De Potentia,
Thcologica,
q. 82, a. 4c.
q. 8, a. 1.
1
adequation dependent des
Veritas est adacquatio rci ct intcllcctus chez
chose
la
Lorsquc
trouve en dehors de la
comme une
comprise
(res),
structure cognitive,
la
Tliomas
St.
125
existence
reelle,
se
adequation se produit entre
1
conception de Pintellect et un objet, qui existe reellement. Nous avons un crytere d une subsistance et d une description quelle est
a faire avec
conception de
la
Dans
mode
etre.
1
deuxieme
le
d interpreter
concerne plutot
intellectus
plus grande partie des definitions et
la
cas,
du
definition de la verite Veritas est adaequatio rei et
la
conformite au niveau de species,
la
et elle est
comprise de deux manieres: comme un certain type de mouvement qui n a pas encore son repos; ou bien comme une fin, la realisation du mouvement cognitif dans
fait
Intellect
intellect.
I
renfermes, dans un
sens
tel
connaissance. Cependant
propre,
choses".
"La
se
situation
connaissance,
la
est
elle
methode
traite
De Anima nous avons
dont
le
debut
ensemble par 1
fait
1
objet
1
et
saisissons
1
de
1
et
objet
ensuite
Le
le
d une
s agit
il
comme une dans
de
acte
1
la
est
le
relation.
Ill-erne livre
le
premier chose se repete
-
1
1
du
analyse,
enfin
connaissance,
objet dans
cet
analyse de la prise
acte.
1
propre
certaine
comprend
on commence par
si
c est
esprit
objet. s
acte le pouvoir qui
meme
la
ensemble nous saisissons
1
L identification
identique.
fixee par Aristote
alors
objet,
lui
autrement
comprise
acte, devient apergue. Ensuite,
intellectuelle
a
de son
de
objet
a faire avec un certain proces de
objet, 1
et
intellect et
presente
lorsque
Conformement a
intellect
I
I
comme
centre
par
Species
quelque chose specifique de est arrivee enfin dans 1 acte de
La
adequat par rapport aux objets y le repos dans cela, dont il a deja
adequation ne se realise ainsi dans un sens conformite c est une comparaison de
1
Thomas que
ecrit
differents
est
trouve
il
Par
par
1
pouvoir, qui se fait connaitre dans
1
nous
acte
acte
1
et
acte.
1
objet
13
plus de definitions et de determinations concernent pourtant la
conception de
I
car
intellect,
I
intellect,
arme en
regies
d une reflexion
en cryteres de verites assumees, realise plus facilement une logique deduction reguliere se servant de conceptions bien construites. et
Saint
Thomas demande egalemcnt qu
est-ce
qui
est
le
premier,
utilisant
differentes significations de ces termes prius-posterius, la verite
dans
chose ou bien
d une
la
telle
maniere, que
La naissance de
!
cf.
Aristote,
la
De Anima
verite
la la
verite
II,
415
a.
dans
nature de contenu,
I
intellect.
II
resolve ce
la verite se realise
dans
dans
probleme I
intellect.
un sens d une cause, nous
Bartcl
126
trouvons cepcndant dans verite peut etre c est
1
ordre de
examinee 1
la
chose elle-meme.
comme
si
c etait
En connexion
deux ordres
-
le
essence, et alors nous examinons la verite
de
second ordre de
1
la -
connaissance de
verite
comme
essence
comme un toute la
ici
de
1
etre,
c est la subsistance ct.d. constitution interieure de
essence et de Pexistence.
Wars/.awa
la
la
premier ordre
certain resultat de la connaissance intellectuelle nous avons tradition
avec cela,
1
le
etre
BERNARDO CARLOS BAZAN
memoire
Science, experience et
La memoire occupe une place de un c Platon et d Aristote: pour 1
travers
le
processus
possedions
{
pour
deja;
de
sensible
de
la
fugacite
point
experience,
1
de
vers
la
qui
lui
faculte
est
de
depart
en sauvant
permet
propre,
connaissance
la
nous
qui
connaissance
la
qui,
epistemologies de
les
faculte
la
est
reminiscence, autre,
dans
privilege
1
ramene, a que nous impression de
constitution
la
nous
que
devons
nous pouvons facilement 1 une de deux dualiste, pour laquelle la opposition anthropologies, 1 memoire est un mouvement de Tame seule; autre ayant un conception
acquerir. Derriere la divergence epistemologique
deceler
1
de Phomme, pour laquelle
unitaire
la
memoire
est
une
faculte sensible
organique du compose. L opposition entre ces deux epistemologies et entre ces deux visions de Phomme va presider Phistoire des conceptions sur la
memoire. Bien entendu, on ne exclusives,
et
les a
pas toujours considerees
au cours des siecles
syntheses plus ou moins heureuses.
elles
comme
etant
ont ete rapprochees dans des
Comme
resultat
de cette combinaison
d elements, et des enrichissements apportes par des medecins, philosophes et commentateurs, la notion de memoire est devenue complexe, sa veritable nature et portee difficiles a determiner XIII e
Vers
le
milieu du
siecle, le
1 .
probleme prenait
la
forme d une
opposition entre les conceptions augustinienne et aristotelicienne de la
memoire:
coi ncide-t-elle
Pame
avec Pessence de
ou
spirituelle,
est-elle
une simple faculte organique du compose? Cette opposition avait les memes implications anthropologiqucs et epistemologiques que nous avons signalces
au
sujet
du
conflit
entre
Platon
tradition latine le type de pensee qui -
profondement modifie bien entendu
Augustin.
Nous
Dans
aliens
la
ncgliger
Nous y sommes
synthese
delibcrement
et
remonte a Platon -
par
augustinienne,
la
Aristote.
tradition
le
Mais dans etait
represente
neoplatonisme de Saint memoire est, avec
la
rhctorique
romaine,
en
particulier
obliges par les dimensions de ce travail. Cf. F. Yates, The of memory, Chigago, 1966, et P. Rossi, Claris universalis, Milan-Naples, 1960.
Ciceron.
la
an
un des elements qui composcnt
intelligence ct la volonte,
1
rhomme 2 Meme sont une meme vie,
dans
Trinite
spirituelles, vita
"una
una mens
...
identifiee a
d une
.
1
faut
esprit,
faculte
simple
plus,
meme
un
3
una
...
il
ces
substantia"
trois esprit,
meme
la
memoire
substance:
sa nature soil bien plus haute
que
destince
organique
des
conservcr
a
la
strictement
unc
Pour que
.
image de
1
facultes,
soil ainsi
que
celle
impressions
sensibles.
L ame
est
connaissance nature: s
Cela
vie.
et
enim tam
"quid
a
presente
in
car
elle-meme,
qu
implique
ne
elle
est?"
Ce
soucis
n est pas que car
plus,
"pense"
Tame ne
faut
II
se connaisse pas, c
qu
elle
est,
done
qu
elle
reorientc
volonte alienee et pense a elle-meme: 5
sed undc non soi
est
cogitabat"
memoire. Et
tache morale. Dans se
elle
nouveau;
si
.
1
Si
"invenict
Pignorance de
oubli
semble
I
la
1
d autres
par
attention
de
sa
autem non quod nesciebat, et
ame
react ualise
elle
presence qui la est qu elle ne se
"distraite"
soi est
alienation
est
ce processus de retour
rcconnait,
la
ce
oublic
a
elle
alienent.
1
qui
ignorer par
Si parfois elle
trompc une sorte d alienation qui 1 a rendue absente a
constitue.
d etre
sur sa veritable nature, cela doit ctre du
ignorer, et souvent se
a
est s
pas
peut 4
mente quam mens
nature
sa
un oubli, la
chute,
le
retour a
memoire
n engendre pas
est
un savoir
conscience de soi qui
la
6
La memoire augustinienne comme recupere sa nature avec experience de la conscience commun en trails des processus a done decrite par Hegel dans la Plienomenologie dc I Esprit. Mais la memoire elle
constitue,
.
1
processus de recuperation de la conscience de soi, moteur qui le declenche ct anime. Personne ne cherche
n est pas seulement elle est aussi le
ce s
2
qu
il
1
ignore totalcment. Si c est
aime,
le
qu
elle
I
ame sc cherche, c est qu elle s aime; si L oubli de soi-meme ne peut jamais
elle
etre
se connait.
DC Trinitate, IX, 2, 2-5 (mcns-notitia-amor); DC Trinitate, X, 11, 16 (memoria (Memoria-intelligcntia-voluntas); De Trinitate, XIV, 8, 11-12, surtout mis en relief la deuxieme de ces Dei-intclligentia-amor). Pierre I^ombard avail Libri IV Sententiamm, I, d. 3, c. 2, et 3; ed. Quaracchi, 1916, I, pp. 33structures Cf.
17-12,
S.
Augustin,
19
(Cf.
39).
3
De
XIII
e
X,
Trinitate,
siecle
et
11,
apres,
et scs facultes.
4
DC
Trinitate, X, 8, 11.
5
De
Trinitate,
X,
De
Trinitate,
XIV,
6
5, 8. 6, 8.
Ce
18.
pour
s
texte
opposer
est
a
la
1
autorite
fondamentale
doctrine de
la
qu on
distinction
reelle
avancera, au ame entre 1
memoire
Science, experience et
total
7
Ce que
.
et
conserve, 1
Palienation
et
souvenir ne
cessera
morale ont d etre
pas
est gratifiee
d abord par
le fait
elle
qu
la
aboli,
present
a retourner sur elle-meme pour se retrouver
inciter
Pame
Poubli
ce
129
8 .
memoire
Pame Dans ce a
et
1
a
de
retour
trouve en elle des contenus
9
dont la presence est expliquee dans le De magistro: les en nous, non pas parce que nous les avons acquises du dehors, ou dans une vie anterieure, mais parce qu elles sont suscitees en nous par le maitre interieur. Seulement nous n avions pas conscience intelligibles
,
verites
sont
d
Dans ce sens
elles.
la
memoire des
comme
intelligibles,
memoire de
la
soi, est un processus par lequel on eleve la connaissance inconsciente au 10 niveau de la conscience Mais Pame n accomplirait pas ce mouvement de .
retour vers elle-meme et vers la verite trouvait aussi cette certitude,
ne trouvera jamais
verite elle
que Pame
verite,
identifie
12 ,
qu a moins de se connaitre elle-meme et 11 le bonheur Le desir du bonheur et de .
est la
latente de la verite beatifiante.
chose
maitre
au fond de sa memoire ne se
si
telle verite
de
et
que Dieu, regie possede done memoire de Dieu. Dans son degre
ne saurait etre autre
toute le
L homme
verite.
plus haul la
memoire
memoire metaphysique du fondement et de la fin derniere 13 done la memoire en tant que connaissance latente de soi, de la est
beatifiante et de Dieu, 7
Con/, X, 18,27
la
manifestation claire de cette presence
Or une
interieur
la
que Saint Augustin place parmi
les
.
C est verite
elements de
et 19, 28.
u
De Trinitate, XIX, 11, 14. C est le texte qui est a la base de la notion de memoire du present, elaboree par E. Gilson et acceptee par la grande majorite des historiens. Cette notion a etc mise en question par R. Teske "Platonic Reminiscence and Memory of the Present in St. Augustine", The New Scholasticism, LVIII, n 2, (1984), pp. 220235. Ses conclusions, qui ne me semblent pas entierement convaincantes, ne touchent cependant pas notre point, limite a 9
Cow/, X,
conscience que
1
ame
a d
elle-meme.
10, 17.
Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness, The Hague, Gilson, Introduction a I etude de S. Augustin, Paris, 1949, p. 135, J. temps et I etemite chez Plotin et S. Augustin, Paris, 4 ed., 1971, p. 244, n. 4. Ph.
Cf.
73-76,
Le
la
E.
Le point
a
etc admirablement expose
par E. Gilson, op.
cit.
p.
135.
Cf.
1969,
p.
Guitton,
aussi
De
Trinitate, X, 3, 5.
La beatitude n etant que Conf., spirituel 21.
le
gaudium de
veritate (Co/?/,
X, 25, 36. La memoire de Dieu ne
comme
1
homme,
1
X, 23, 33).
que traduire, dans le cas d un etre omnipresence de Dieu aux choses; cf. De Trinitate, XIV, 15, fait
Bazan
130
image de Dieu, et il peut le faire car elle est 1 ista vis est memoriae. ..et hoc animus est, et hoc ego
1
d Aristote
jeunes
et
Thomas d Aquin
difficulte
principale
Aristote,
enseigne organique,
Dans
aux
memoire
la
s
"magna
14
ipse
sum"
.
1
e milieu du XIII siecle les
se
dans
demandaient
leurs
possible de conserver la memoire 15 Leur image de la Trinite dans 1 homme etait
il
provenait
Galien
commune
conception de
Bonavcnture
et
termes composant
les
Au
de ses commentateurs.
commentaires des Sentences parmi
lui-meme:
tradition augustinienne allait etre mise en crise par Pentree des
La ecrits
esprit
et
.
du
fait
les
la
que
commentateurs,
hommes
une
est
1
ont
puissance
Cette
animaux.
aux
et
comme
memoire,
nouvelle
a son origine en quatre oeuvres d Aristote.
Seconds Analytiques II, 19 et Metaphysique I, 1 Aristote, apres avoir rejete Pinneisme platonicicn, postule que toute connaissance de Puniversel, y compris celle des premiers principes, est une les
connaissance
acquise
a
donnees
des
partir
externes n en sont pas, bien entendu,
cause suffisante.
la
Mais
sensibles.
En
sens
les
effet,
il
faut
que Panimal, en plus de la puissance de recevoir des donnees sensibles, ait la capacite de depasser le caractere ponctuel de la sensation en 1 impression sensible afin que celle-ci, ainsi preservee, et accumulee avec d autres impressions semblables, puisse constituer la base de ce qu Aristote appelle une experience, d ou on pourra tirer Puniversel.
conservant
Cette capacite de conserver
ou memoire, tout en etant de
les sensations,
Pordre des puissances sensibles, n est cependant pas
animaux;
comme
ne Pest pas non plus
la
commune
a tous les
capacite de former, a partir de
Un
passage celebre synthetise le Vest ainsi que de la de la connaissance: premier expose de cette theorie sensation vient ce que nous appelons le souvenir, et du souvenir plusieurs 1
experience, une notion
fois
repete d une
meme
universelle.
chose vient
1
experience... Et c est de
1
experience
a son tour. ..que vient le principe de Part et de la science, de Part en ce qui regarde le devenir, et de la science en ce qui regarde
16 Petre"
.
les sources plotiniennes de la Conf., X, 17, 26. Nous aimerions pouvoir signaler doctrine que nous venons d exposer, aussi bien que les points fondamentaux d accord et de desaccord entre Plotin et Saint Augustin, mais les limites de cette communication
nous empechent de 15
q.l. 16
Cf. S.
le faire.
Thomas,
In I Sent., d.
Aristote, Anal. Post.,
II,
19,
Ill,
q.
4,
a.
1;
S.
100 a 5-9. Cf. Metaph.,
I,
Bonaventura, In I
1,
980 b 22 sqq.
Sent.,
d.
Ill,
a.
1,
Science, experience et
Dans
De anima
le
mais
memoire,
131
ne trouvc aucun traitement special consacre a des puissances ou de Tame, le probleme de savoir ou devrait elre siluee
or.
theorie
la
souleve
developpee,
memoire
"parties"
la
y la
memoire dans ce cadre general des facultes operatives de Panimal. En outre, le De anima developpe une distinction fondamentale entre Petal une faculte cognitive (sensible ou dianoetique) qui doit encore connaissances, et Petal potenliel de celte meme faculte
potentiel d
acquerir
des
lorsque,
toul
acluellemenl -
dont
en
17
ayanl
la
acquis
L affirmation de
.
de
Pordre
Pexercice
qu intellectuel sera la cle dont se surmonter Popposilion entre Aristole et sensible
De anima
contribution significative du
exlernes
el
Arislole
cependanl ne Celle
Pimaginalion.
pas
est
niveau
Thomas pour Augustin. Une autre
servira S.
S.
distinction
la
au
lanl
enlre les sens
de Pelude de leurs objels respeclifs 18 allarde qu a Pelude du sens commun el de
a
"inlernes"
Pexerce
Pexistence d une connaissance habituelle
de
sera
Pactualisalion
ne
elle
connaissance,
parlir
s
.
clairemenl une faculte sensible
en
tout
derniere, 20
etanl
difficile
a
classer
19
esl
,
21
et son par consequence au corps est lenu du fait Pintellecl extraordinaire, compte importance que "jamais ne pense sans image" 22 Pour que Pimaginalion remplisse bien son role ,
liee
,
.
d intermediaire entre
des
"persislance
sensation el la pensee il faudrail assurer une donl Arislole parle en 429 a 4-5 (voir aussi 433
la
images",
Pon pourrait voir une n utilise pas le mot Arislote qu
a 10) et ou esl
pas retenu son allenlion dans
Dans de
son
le
De memoria
comme une
ou
(hexis)
17
De anima,
18
On
qu 19
20
elle
432 b
Car
"la
429 b
"sens
(pathos)
De anima, De mem.
esl,
par conlre, au cenlre
des
reservoir etal
facultes
de
habiluel
sensitive
et
5-6.
internes"
n a
pas
etc
utilisee
par Aristote,
mais
428 b 11-14. sensible
n existe
pas
independamment du
(429 b 5).
23
en
1-5.
III, 3,
faculte
22
le fail
nous occupe n a
presenlee comme un exaclement comme un
affection
que expression provient des commentateurs.
Cf. Ill, 9,
esl
plus
;
19. Cf. aussi
1
De anima,
separe"
417 b
II, 5,
salt
que
memoire. Mais
la faculte qui
reminiscentia elle
et
connaissances deja acquises 23
et
De anima.
le
La memoire
interet.
allusion a la
III, 7,
431 a
et rem., 1,
15;
431 b
449 b 15-20.
1-5; III, 8,
432 a 5-10.
corps,
1
intellect
en est
Bazan
132
qu 1
vue
dc
point
comme
conserve
elle
du
habitus,
dianoetique:
en puissance;
memoire
Mais
.
et
ecoule,
distinctif.
que
Or
moyens que et
il
le
incorpore temps - mesure du mouvement
La
meme
essentiellement a la
deux
sens
mouvement, memoire par partie de
on
incidentelle (kata symbebekos)
mentales que
une
dans
dianoetique,
partie
faculte
a
c est-a-dire
internes,
la
1
-
la
est
soit
doit
appartenir
a laquelle appartiennent ccs sensitive
partie
ou
la
comme trait saisi par les memes par le sens commun
consequent
ame
temps se
certain
c est-a-dire
peut dire aussi
mesure
conservee par
etc
son objet
a
temps
imagination.
1
du point de vue de
a
qui
etc
ait
quantite et le
la
et
d actualisation
capacite
memoire qu un
est essentiel a la
ce
la
affection,
impression qui a modifie ces facultes 24
de
la
qu
pensee
elle
a
25
de
;
facon
appartient a
besoin
la
d images
memoire peut lui fournir 26 La memoire done n est pas exclusive de hommc; elle se trouve aussi en plusieurs la
.
I
animaux superieurs. Elle
est
comme un
habitus intentionnel capable de
image presentement consideree avec objet qui 1 a et travaille done en ctroitc collaboration avec le produite auparavant sens commun ct imagination en tant que facultes perceptrices du mettre en rapport
1
1
27
,
1
temps
28 .
Saint Augustin et Aristote ont dresse ainsi deux imposantes theories
de
la
connaissance,
opposent,
ellc-meme
ou
il
la
et
en
trouver
la
verite,
la
memoire
profondes
qui
les
memoire
est,
dans
1
est,
dans
rilluminisme
acquisition de la science et de reservoir d images liees a la notion de
condition de possibilite de
sagesse. Faculte organique et la
differences
1
pourra
temps,
des
depit
memoire joue un role central. Presence latente de 1 ame a moteur du processus de retour de esprit a son for interieur
augustinien, la la
ou,
1
abstractionisme aristotelicien,
la
condition
de possibilite de la constitution de experience a partir de laquelle sont C constitues 1 art et la science. Pour un penseur du XIII siecle 1 opposition 1
entre S. Augustin et Aristote etait deja un formidable defi theorique. 24 Ibid.,
449 b
Ibid.,
450 a 23-25.
Ibid.,
450 a 10-15.
Ibid.,
450 b 20-27.
25
26
27 28
Le
25.
examiner Ibid., 451 a 2-17. Nous ne pouvons pas auquel Aristote consacre le reste du traite.
ici
le
processus de reminiscence,
Science, experience et
dcvenait
dossier
encore
cep~ndant
grecs et arabes,
commentateurs,
memoire
complique
plus
dont
133
par
1
neoplatonisme, et appuyees par les idees de Galien, superposees au cadre aristotelicien primitif. II serait naif de
du
exposer
Penorme
ici
des
apport
les interpretations, parfois inspirees
richesse de cette tradition, mais
s
etaient
vouloir
est impossible
il
de
ne pas faire mention d une doctrine qui a conditionne fortement le debat au XIII e siecle. II s agit de Pilluminisme extrinseciste avicennien, ou la
memoire
meme
plus le
joue
role, car
vers
de
que
plutot
intelligibles:
tourner
en continuant de rendre possible 1 experience, ne 1 experience n est plus la source des formes
sensible, tout
dixieme
la
memoire
les
abstraire,
Intelligence
recevoir
les
pour
humain
intellect
1
29
doit
Quant a
.
se la
entierement impossible, selon Avicenne, intellectuelle, car une forme intelligible en acte ne saurait etre gardee dans la 30 L extrinsecisme puissance intellectuelle sans etre actuellement pensee est ainsi renforce: si la memoire intellectuelle n existe pas, les elle
est
.
accordes a
intelligibles doivent etre le
Dator formarum^ 1
Nous avons ad
dit plus
Sentences, a ete pour
lui
La premiere
traditions.
haul que
homme, chaque
la
Thomas
Saint
que
imaginem",
1
fois
qu
il
pense, par
.
1
question souleve
"utrum
dans
memoria
pertineat
commentaire des
le
occasion de confronter toutes ces differentes
reaction du jeune
Thomas
est conciliatrice, et elle
linguistique: tiomen memoriae aequivocatur. II y a la memoire sensible, celle qu Avicenne, a la suite d Aristote et de Galien, a
un plan
se situe sur
dans
situe
"intentions"
qui
29
la
partie
sensibles,
abstraction
fait
postcrieure et
il
de
du
cerveau
y a en outre
toute
la
difference
Avicenne, Shifa I, 356, trad. A.M. Goichon, Le textes d Avicenne, Paris, 1959, p. 170.
et
dont
memoire temporelle
recit
1
objet
sont
les
intellectuelle,
celle
ne
peut
et
qui
de ffayy Ibn Yaqzan commente
par des 5Q
Avicenne,
On
De anima,
aurait voulu
memoire,
mais
la
(ed.
Van
Riet) V,
6, p. 147.
ajouter quelques lignes au sujet de la conception averroi ste de la nature de cette communication ne le permet pas. Pour une
globale de la theorie des sens internes selon Averroes et les autres commentateurs on consultera article classique de H.A. Wolfson, "The internal senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts", Harvard Theological Review, XXVTII 2, (1935), n pp. 69-133. Pour Averroes en particulier cf. aussi mes travaux noetica de Averroes", Philosophia 38 (1972) pp. 19^49 et "Intellectum Speculativum",
presentation
1
"La
Journal of the History of Philosophy, XIX, 4 (1981), pp. 425-446.
Bazan
134
appartenir qu a ct
car
Aristote,
32
ame
1
parlent de
ils
supplemental dc
spirituelle
memoire
de
effort
cet
c est
caracteristique de la
dc
vcritate
rcconnait que
il
celle-ci
situe
est
sensible:
faculte
qu
synthese
methode de
ne peut etre appliquce a de
la
Saint
De
un
notion dc
"locus
cllc
ct
temporcllemcnt,
spccierum"
est,
car
En
mais aussi son
effet,
acte
d
le
I
objet
unc
1
plutot
et
occasion
connait
Pintellect
intelliger.
Et
sail
il
in
est
dernier mot,
Papprofondissement
par
supcrficicl
aristotcliciennes.
objet,
dc 429 a 27-28
consequent,
par
D.
les Q.
quod mcmoria, proprie loquendo, non
"constat
doctrines
.
comme
relief
memoire au sens proprc du terme,
la
rapprochement
sculement son
des formes anima33 Et
Thomas. Mais deja dans
.
certaines
"lieu
en
mettre
faut
il
34 Est-ce parte intellectiva, sed sensitiva tantum" rupture avec la tradition augustinicnnc? C est
dcpasscr
cssaie d identifier
Augustin avec ce
dans le (locus specienim} dont parle Aristote
intelligibles"
effort
eviter le conflit entre les
commun, Thomas
intellectuelle dont parle S.
Augustin
Mais dans un
differentes.
non pas a
synthcse, qui vise
traditions mais a trouver les points en la
conflit alors cntre S.
Pas dc
.
realites
la
de de
non qu
il
il ne les situe pas dans le passe. possede certaines connaissances, meme s etant une comme son contenu de et Cette saisie (notitid) de son acte
connaissance deja acquise peut etre appelee memoire: "omnis notitia non 35 Ce contenu a pu etre objet d une de novo accepta potest dici memoria" .
ou discontinue.
intellection continue
avons une connaissance intellectuelle, car
qui ne faisait illius
rei
autem
il
habere memoriam
in actu; ct sic
34 35
36
37
la
Thomas,
/ Sf/Jf, d. 3, q. 4, a.
S.
Thomas,
ibid.; cf.
S.
Thomas, Dever.,
Ibid.
Cf. plus haul, n. 17.
si
Aristote,
,
2
1.
De anima, c.
dicamur
prius habitualiter cognoscebamus,
est in parte intellectiva nostrac 37 et habituelle vient d Aristotc
pcnsee a etc connue par Saint
S.
Ibid.
quam
"ut
memoria
q. 10, a.
nous
laquelle peut etre appelee memoire d une connaissance que nous possedions mais
actuelle: pas objet de notrc consideration
d Aphrodise, dont
33
cette derniere hypothese
"habituelle",
s agit
La notion dc connaissance
32
Dans
429 a 27-28.
Thomas
non 36
animac"
.
Alexandre a travers
memoire
Science, experience et
une piece importante de sa noetique 38 Thomas done qu approfondir la tradition peripateticienne pour batir un
Averroes, avail
ne
fait
d
fait
elle
.
pont entre celle-ci et la tradition augustinienne. Ainsi ebauchee, la notion de memoire
defendue centre
objections d Avicenne,
les
Thomas dans
Saint
fait
135
De
le
veritate,
devait
intellectuelle
precisement ce que
c est
et
etre
sans que pourtant aucun des trois
39 II faudra arguments y developpes ne louche au fond du probleme attendre jusqu a la la Somme contre les Gentils pour trouver une attaque .
conlre
efficace
entre
distingue
intermediaire inlellecl
1
une qui
Celte
(I
1
acte
1
derniere
par
Avicenne n a pas
these:
la
en
(Pintelleclion
el
acle)
1
etat
a oublie que vis-a-vis des formes intelligibles -
a enseigne Arislole
actualise
s
parfait II
habitus).
comme
-
1
fondemenl theorique de
le
1
implique
du
acquisition la
comme une
a
1
savoir,
dans
presence,
double puissance,
autre
1
exercice.
de
formes
par
Pintellecl,
prealablement acquises, qui ne sont pas objet de consideration mais sur lesquelles 1 intellect peut revenir quand il veut 40 La
intelligibles
actuelle,
.
de
refutation
avicennienne
these
la
abstractionisle de la connaissance et d
intermediaire
entre
sur
base
la
une conception de
d inlelleclion
I
d une
theorie
habitus
comme
simplement en 41 dans la Somme de mais S. Thomas y puissance, reprise Tfieologie ajoute un argument de type anlhropologique auquel il tiendra dorenavant: dans 1 extrinsecisme avicennien 1 union de 1 ame et du corps devient 42 La maitrise des lextes arisloleliciens que Thomas met en superflue 1
acte
et
science
la
est
,
.
dans
relief
Somme
la
est fruit
du contact assidu
et
approfondi qu
il
a eu
TO Cf.
1985,
R-A.^Gauthier,
intellectu",
39
S.
Thomas Aq.
Sentcntia
libri
d Averroes y cites, et Revue Phil. deLouvain, 71 (1973) pp. 468-487.
100
p.
et
les
De
veritate,
q.
sensus,
oportet
quod
10,
textes
d.
2:
a)
species
in
"cum
De mon
Sensu, ed. Leonine travail
"L
intellectus
possibilis sit stabilioris stabilius recipiatur"... b)
eo recepta
XLV,
t.
authenticite
naturae
"si
du
2,
De
quam
intellectu
in
non conservarentur aliquae species, sed sola habilitas convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, aequaliter remaneret homo habilis ad quodcumque intelligibile"... c) "hoc videtur expresse contrarium sententiae Philosophi in III De anima qui commendat
possibili
antiques de hoc quod posuerunt pa item".
Summa contra S.
texte 1
II
II,
esse locum specierum
quantum ad
intellectivam
74.
79, 6. Deja dans ScG II, 74 Saint Thomas utilisait comme argument le 429 b 5 pour expliquer que actualisation de habitus est de ordre de reprend toutes ces references dans la Somme de Theologie.
Theol.
I,
De anima
exercice.
42
Gentiles,
animam
S. Theol.,
I,
1
84, 4.
I
1
Bazan
136
avec
De anima
le
de
lors
dc
redaction
la
Sententia.
sa
dans cc
Et
commcntaire, en effet, nous trouvons, autour de 429 b 5, une version habituelle rigoureuse de la refutation d Avicenne fondee sur la presence des
especes -
la
intelligibles
memoire
memes arguments memona 44
et
43
dans
intelligibles
1
esprit
meme
le
La
.
-
intellectuelle
dans
textuel,
appui
formes
des
permanence
encore reaffirmed, avec
est
les
De
Sententia
la
.
la
si
Ce qui a commence comme une preoccupation theologique (a savoir, memoire peut faire partie de image de la Trinite) est devenu un I
probleme
philosophique leur
intelligibles,
touchant
fondamental, et
origine
la
parvenu a depasser opposition entre Aristote base d un principe aristotelicicn. Mais le fait 1
cxistence d une
1
memoire
des
1
et Saint
intellect.
Augustin sur
Thomas
qui
constitue,
reccptif
dans son
que
La memoire
illumination.
1
afin
lui-meme
intellectuelle
45
acquiert
qui
,
interieur
for
les
elle
especes
la
intelligibles
est
a
la
et
presence recevoir
puisse
de Saint Thomas
la
affirme
que ne doit pas nous tromper sur essaic d etablir entre Augustin
intellectuelle
veritable portee du rapprochement qu il Aristote. La memoire augustinienne est le retour de Tame sur la
especes
En permanence textes du De anima, Saint Thomas
approfondissant Pexegese dc certains est
nature
dans
leur
1
intellcct
de
partir
et qui ne peut pas expcrience rendue possible par la memoire sensitive, a 1 etat habituel, il conserve s les meme passer a 1 acte de les contempler, 1
sans se convertir aux images scnsiblcs dont elle aussi,
immediate
4^ 1
-
comme
Cf.
la
De anima,
Sententia
libri
Sententia
De memona,
Cf.
De
veritate,
intellect possible
46
memoire
d elle-meme,
avoir
peut
43
par
la
q.
est
il
mcmoria
III, 2,
tr. II,
10
sensitive
a.
46 .
clair
la
qu
permanence a etc assurce,
a la connaissance
Quant elle
n est
pas une
sui de Saint Augustin
1
que
1
ame
conscience
mais
le
intellectuelle
et
exige
-
32-50 (ed. Leonine).
70-85. 3,
ou Thomas montre que
la
memoire
ne sont pas deux puissances diffcrentes.
La these est claire depuis le debut jusqu a la fin de la carriere de Saint Thomas. de veritate, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7m: "quantumcumque aliquam speciem intelligibilem
Q.
apud
se
habeat, numquam ad sed
convertendo
intelligibilium...non est sine
tamem
actu aliquid considerat
phantasmata";
fantasmate" (tr. II,
Sent.
De
147-150).
secundum
memoria:
illam
speciem,
"memoria
nisi
...etiam
Science, experience et
resultat sujet
d une reflexion de
du monde: anima
I
ame
memoire
137
sur la connaissance qu elle a acquise au
intelligendo alia intelligit
se^1
.
Bref, dans son effort d assumer des traditions heterogenes dans une synthese personnelle, Saint Thomas a etc coherent depuis le debut de sa
coherence
Cette
carriere.
memoire sensu
stricto,
en
manifeste
se
est
une
faculte
affirmations:
trois
sensitive
organique
qui
1)
la
rend
possible la conservation des images sensibles en tant que passees; 2) au
sens large du
mot on peut
aussi
lequel cependant n encadre pas la
les
appeler
formes
memoire
intelligibles
categoric du temps passe; 3) Pexistence d une
signifie
aucunement qu on puisse
Pintellect
qu
memoire
se passer de la
il
habituel,
conserve dans
intellectuelle
memoire
ne
sensible car
jamais Pintellect ne pense sans image. La memoire sensitive, en tant que condition
de
possibilite
de Pexperience
est
la
clef
de voute tant dans
Pacquisition de la science que dans Pexercice de la science deja acquise. En depit de tout ce que Pon dit de Pinfluence du neoplatonisme sur Saint Thomas, il y a un point ou il Pa rejete entierement, et c est en theorie
de
la
connaissance.
Le rapport entre
science, experience et
memoire
le
met bien en evidence.
Universite d Ottawa
Cf.
mon
travail
"La
ciencia del
(Mendoza), n 35 (1969), pp. 111-153.
anima y
el
conocimiento de
si
mismo",
Philosophia
LUCA BIANCHI
Potentia Dei absoluta: logiquc dc la dccouvcrtc
ou rhctoriquc dc 1 argumcntation
Au
dc
debut
notrc
pousse
siecle,
une
religieuses
precises
polcmiquc
antipositiviste,
historiographiquc
destinee
aristotelicien
la
devcnir
a
fut
et
consequente affirmation du principc de
Duhcm
savons que
naissance
de
etait alle
ideologiques
substance dans prcsque Unite
meme
medievale:
science
schematiqucment dans 1277"
de
la
la
que,
ce
dc 1277
moderee dans
comme these
le
dc
se
ton
elle
reccmmcnt, "The
ct
Effect of the
nous
retrouvc
encore
est
-
"Pannee
litterature successive sur Phistoire
chapitrc
qui
puissance absoluc de Dieu.
cette
moderne"
la
des
these
de
de en la
presentee
Condemnation of
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy?
Je voudrais, toute
le
et
savoir
antiaverroi ste
jusqu a parlcr de 1277
science
la
la
une
avanca
processus de dissolution du
le
condamnation
la
forte
catholique
Peglise
a
cclebre:
dcclcncha
une
convcntionnaliste,
Duhem
et
theoriques
exigences
defendre
Pierre
Privec de ses presuppositions
la
de
desir
entrama une attitude critique paradigmc
dcs
epistemologie
le
d obscurantisme
accusations
par
scicntifiquc?
ici,
question,
atlirer
en
Pattention
evilant
dcs
sur
la
necessite
simplifications
de recxaminer
caricaturales
de
la
ce qui a etc bien raremcnt dynamique dc Phistoire et en tenant comptc dix annees fertilcs dernieres fait des acquisitions importantcs de ces pour la recherche. II est en particulicr indispensable de prcndrc conscience que Phistoire dc Pinflucnce rcelle du Sillabus de Tempier sur
pensee medievale, scienlifique ou autre, doit encore etre ccrite. Et pour le fairc, il nc suffit pas de reparcourir Panalyse dc Duhem, fondec la
sur
deux
articles
seulement
(les
27
et
66
dans
la
numeration
dc
Mandonnet-Hissette) et limitee au concept de Pespace. en consideration aussi les articles ayant trait aux concepts de temps et d infini, a astrologie et a la magic, a Panimation et a Pinfluence des 11
faudrait prendre
1
Cf. P. Duhcm, Le systcme du tnonde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques dc Platon a Copernic, Hermann, Paris 1913-1959, VI, 66; VII, 206; IX, 373-374.
2
Cf. E. Grant, The Effect of the Condemnation of 1277, dans The Cambridge History 537-539. of Later Medie\-al Philosophy, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge 1982, pp.
Potentia Dei absoluta
corps
a
celestes,
resultats
des anges, a Peternite du monde:
localisation
la
on
si
peut
139
de
risquer
des
faire
vraisemblablement bien peu enthousiasmants. 3
II
les
seraient
previsions
faudrait aussi considerer
avec attention quelles sont les reactions provoquees par les accusations de
de
Peveque
averroistes
Paris et
Pencontre
a
de
des
naturelle
Pepistemologie
quelles sont les consequences effectives de son insistance
Pomnipotence divine. On devrait deja retenir apres les etudes fondamentales de Courtenay et apres certains travaux recents italiens que la distinction entre la puissance absolue et la puissance ordonnee de sur
-
Dieu ne et
1277,
pas diffusee a la suite
s est
qu
nominaliste
;
ne
elle
elle fut
fut
un
pas
a cause de
et
instrument
au contraire tracee des
la
condamnation de
conceptuel typiquement debut du XIHe siecle et
le
connut des interpretations et des utilisations assez diverses. 4 On ne peut plus debiter des equations commodes mais restrictives du genre condamnation de 1277 = potentia Dei absoluta = nominalisme = critique de elle
Paristotelisme II
est
absoluta
ait
.
dans une certaine mesure incontestable que joue un role dans la nouvelle physique du
assumant une fonction heuristique de
lire
des
qu
elle
et analytique
representa Pantidote decisif au
averroistes
qu
,
libera
elle
contre-factuelles
,
potentia Dei siecle,
importante. Mais
dogmatisme
il
en
arrive
aristotelicien
scientifique et qu elle de prendre en consideration des d elaborer des experiences de pensee
Pimagination
permit de poser des nouvelles questions situations
la
XlVe
,
suggestives, d introduire des hypotheses et des theories
audacieuses
,
de
construire des modeles de la realite subfiles et originaux. 5
Tout
ceci
epistemologies a
peut la
sembler
reconfortant
mode, mais a
le
a
la
lumiere
certaines
defaut d etre depourvu de perspective
Pour un premier bilan sur influence de la condamnation du La condanna del 1277 e la crisi dell aristotelismo scolastico. 1
de
1277, voir
ma
these de
doctoral 4
Cf. W.J.
dans Divine
Courtenay, The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages, Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medie\ al Philosophy, Reidel, Dordrecht
243-269; L. Bianchi, Onnipotenza divina e ordine del mondo fra XIII e XIV Medioevo, 10 (1984), pp. 105-153; E. Randi, // so\rano e I orologiaio. Due immagini di Dio net dibattito sulla potentia absoluta fra XIII e XIV secolo, La Nuova 1985, pp.
secolo,
Italia,
Firenze 1987.
Voir pour exemple les travaux de E. Grant, Medieval and Seventeenth Century Conceptions of an Infinite Void Space beyond the Cosmos, ISIS, 60 (1969), pp. 50-51; Place and Space in Medieval Physical Thought, dans Motion and Time, Space and Matter: Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and Science, Ohio State Univ. Press, Columbus 1976, pp. 141-142; The Condemnation of 1277, God s Absolute Power and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages, Viator, 10 (1979), pp. 214-217, 239-241.
Bianchi
140
D abord
il est temps dc sc convaincre quc le dogmatisme un mythe qui provient d une projection anachronique sur le XlVe siecle d une situation propre au XVIIe siecle. Siger de
historique.
avcrroi ste
XHIe
est
et le
Brabant, Boece de Dacie et leurs collegues de
la faculte
tout, comme on s obstine a le Galilee. Au contraire ils furent les
des arts de Paris devanciers du
ne furent pas du
croire, les
Simplicius de
premiers, dans
le
monde
programme de recherche autonome sur la realite naturelle; un programme de recherche qui s en appelait a la physique et a la cosmologie d Aristote non pas par adhesion preconc.ue ou par incapacite chretien, a etablir un
mais
critique,
manque d
sincere
constatation
la
par
valables.
alternatives
XHIe
raristotelisme, deja au
6
et
et
de
monde
1
la
hypothese que
du
1
exulter devant toute sortie anti-aristotelicienne. partir
douloureuse
parfois
Done on ne doit pas identifier dans XlVe siecle, obstacle a surmontcr, pour
destruction de
1
Le
faire
image
serait
d
ailleurs
aristotelicienne
du
aurait etc favorisee plus par les attaques incidentcs et exterieures
de quelque theologien - une petite page de Scot sur le mouvement des existence du vide quc par la anges, deux lignes de Holkot sur 1
de
constatation
ses
moins
travail
importante pour
une les
aussi
est
II
mais
spcctaculaire
commentateurs:
de
prise
peres de
la
contradictions
et
difficultes
pas
conscience,
science moderne.
indispensable
donner
dc
autant
pour en
fruit
inlcrieures,
realite,
du des
sterile
extremement
7
quclques
sur
precisions
la
XlVe siecle pretendue nouveaute des problemes qui ont etc affrontes au elle permit tout ou de dans bien absoluta: Dei la a cas, potentia grace plus
de
considerer
a
nouveau et
discutees,
amplcment
des
qui
hypotheses
ensuite
avaient
dans
refusees,
deja
la
ete
tradition
Mais prendre 1277 comme terminus a quo de thematiques de la pluralite des mondes, du mouvement de la terre ou du
aristotelicienne.
comme
6
Cf.
edizione
celles
L.
Bianchi,
Velare
Quaestiones
della
philosophiam in
non
Metaphysicam
est
bonum
de Sigeri
di
.
A
proposito della nuova Brabante, Rivista di storia
della filosofia, 40 (1985), pp. 260-263.
hue usque quasi indicem illarum contradictionum, quas legendo, et conferendo hosce libros inter se, observare mihi licuit...Dixi porro, conferendo libros nam si eosdam cum caetcris operibus conferamus: Deum inter Scholasticos se, "Habes
Scholasticos
immortalem! Aristoteleos,
quot I,
Cannstatt 1964),
apparebunt!".
8,
dans
III,
pp. 147-148.
Opera
P.
Omnia,
Gassendi,
Lugduni
Exercitationes
1658
paradoxicae
(Frommann,
Stuttgart
ad\ ersus -
Bad
Potentia Dei absoluta
vide intra ou extra cosmique fait
a
qu
tradition
"Utrum
precedente.
cela ne peut etre
inexact et deviant:
est
ou
d oublier
condition
la
8
141
de
minimiser
vacuo
in
les
motus
fieri
possit
de
apports
la
violentus",
vacuo possit esse quies alicuius mobili", "utrum, posito vacuo concavitate caeli, posset caelum moveri", "utrum, posito vacuo "utrum
in
concavitate caeli, latera caeli
nos
de
historiographie,
dans
la
physique absoluta par des Mediavilla,
telles
du
les
auraient
Stagirite,
auteurs
influences et
caelo":
ete
,
si
vacuum
esset
in
inter
d apres une certaine
des situations
impossibles
soulevees de potentia Dei
par Tempier
Oresme
commentaires
"utrum,
in
traitant
questions,
Ockham, Buridan
dans
lettre
la
concurrerent",
caelum, videremus aliquid parvum
et
in
comme
Richard de
a vrai dire, je les ai trouvees a
de Roger Bacon
aristoteliciens
et
des
certains maitres averroi stes contemporains de Siger.
Par
si
ailleurs,
potentia Dei absoluta
la
apparait
souvent dans
la
formulation de ces experiences de pensee typiques de la science du XlVe dans mesure en et siecle, quelle dependent-elles, logiquement II
historiquement?
chez Locke
Phomme
-
est sans
doute
significatif
que chez Buridan
-
encore
et
Dieu qui mene aux confins hypothetiques du cosmos il mission d accomplir Texperience du bras est tout
ce soil
qui a la
;
que chez Richard de Mediavilla ou chez Nicole Oresme chez Samuel Clarke - la translation de 1 univers a ete pensee
aussi significatif -
et
meme
comme
effet
d une intervention divine
66 de Tempier.
11
Mais
les
-
parfois en se referant a
noms d Archyte, de Cleomedes
et
1
article
de Lucrece
devraient suffire pour nous rappeler que ces themes pouvaient etre, et en fait
ont ete formules a
Cf.
E.
Grant,
1
Much Ado
Middle Ages to the scienza nel medioevo,
Scientific II
origine sans la
moindre stimulation theologique;
about Nothing. Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Rwolution, Cambridge Univ. Press, London, p. 116; La
Mulino, Bologna 1983,
p. 96.
1
Cf. E. Grant,
The condemnation of 1277, pp. 240-241.
Rogerus Baco, Q. supra libros quatuor Physicorum, IV, dans Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, Clarendon, Oxford 1905-1940, VIII, pp. 210-214; Siger de Brabant. Questions sur la Physique d Aristote, IV, 26, 27, ed. Ph. Delhaye, Inst. de Philosophic, Louvain 1941, pp. 183-185; In libros Aristotelis de Anima, II, 31, ed. F. Van Cf.
Steenberghen
dans
Trois
commentaires
anonymes
sur
le
Traite
de
I
Ame d Aristote,
Publ. Universitaires, Louvain 1971, pp. 259-261. Cf. Johannes Buridanus, Q. in octo libros Physicorum, IV, 10, f. 77v; J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II, 13, 21, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975, pp. 175-176; Richardus de Media Villa, Clarissimi...Richardi de Media Villa...super quatuor libros Sententiarum, II, 14, 3, 3, Apud V. Sabbium, Brixiae 1591, p. 168; Nicole Oresme, Le livre du del et monde, II, 8, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1968, p. 368; S. Clarke, dans Correspondance Leibniz-Clarke, 3, PUF, Paris 1957, p. 69.
Bianchi
142
et
devrait suffire de citer Ic
il
pour nous assurer qu et
commentaire sur
se
demande
I
argumentation
Simplicius
12
mesure
alors inevitablement dans quelle
potentia Dei absoluta concerne justification et dans quelle mesure scientifique
il
II
.
logique de
la
la
de
De Caelo dc
furent reintroduits en Occident latin avant 1277,
ils
sans se soucier des droits du Tout-Puissant.
On
le
la
concerne, par contre, est
difficile
langage de
le
decouverte
de
se
la
et
de
la
rhetorique
a
soustraire
ou Ton a vu une fonction heuristique et analytique impression que il n souvent y ait qu une technique persuasive, un effort de indispensable, la
1
donner une forme dramatique, d offrir une traduction intuitive et realiste a une hypothese d etude. On pense a des formules comme les suivantes: "sit
autem
omnipotentiam Dei
libra imaginaria, vel vera per
per ymaginationem vel divinam potentiam aliqua pars
sphera
"pose
ignis...";
par ymaginacion
Dieu par sa puissance creart
ii
et
comme
si
corps separes un de
facta...";
"si
celi
poneretur in
est
possible que
il
1I autre..."
On objectera que le principe de la potentia Dei absoluta permit au moins de conceptualiser des situations retenues auparavant absurdes et impensables, en dissipant equivoque entre les impossibilitcs physiques et 1
les impossibilites logiques. etre 1
dans
present
un equivoque qui etait pent mais non pas dans classique,
toutefois d
meme
affirmaient qu un certain etat de
ils
Lorsqu du vide
s agit
medieval:
chretien
aristotelisme
II
Paristotelisme
-
est
impossible,
explicitement
ils
chez
pas fait
-
entendaient dire
mais possible pour une cause surnaturelle fait est possible de potentia Dei absoluta,
naturaliter,
etat
de
Dans
contradiction (simpliciter).
il
14 .
I
.
existencc
impossible
Affirmer que cet
ou
thcoriquement qu une question de principe logique de non
Dieu, mais impossible naturalitef n est
possible pour
terminologie.
averroi stes
les
par exemple
qui
S
il
les
deux cas
determine
est vrai
ce
c est bien le
qui
est
possible
que du XHIe au XlVe
en
siecle le
sens
absolu
domaine des
Grant rappelle la traduction de Simplicius et son utilisation par Thomas d Aquin, et reconnait que "John Buridan s discussion. ..was probably occasioned by knowledge of
il Simplicius account" (Medieval and Seventeenth Century, pp. 40-42). Cependant accent sur la condamnation du 1277 et sur la puissance absolue de persiste a mettre Dieu: cf. pour exemple Place and Space, pp. 143-144. 1
13 Cf. Thomas Bradwardine, De Causa Dei contra Pelagium, I, 1, 40, London 1618 de Celo (Minerva, Frankfurt a.M. 1964), p. 129 D; Nicole Oresme, The Questiones super Nicole Oresme, Le of Nicole Oresme, I, 9, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison 1965, p. 129; livre
14
du
del,
II, 8,
p. 370.
Cf. L. Bianchi,
Omnipotenza divina
e ordine del
mondo, pp.
121-129.
Potentia Dei absoluta
143
choses retenues possibles s etandit considerablement cela ne dependit pas de 1 appel a la puissance absolue de Dieu, mais d une extension du ,
critere
ce
etablit
qui
de
celui
emblematique,
Un
contradictoire.
est
qui
I
infmi.
Malgre
d argumentations de potentia Dei absoluta,
les
exemple 1
me
utilisation
semble massive
discussions engagees a ce
propos ne depasserent pas ce que Anneliese Maier appellait le Tmitisme d Aristote jusqu a la chute du prejudice centre Pinfini en acte, par la mise en discussion de Pevidence intuitive de Paxiome que le tout est plus 16
grand de la partie. Les perplexites soulevees jusqu
ici
discussion et a approfondir le sujet.
veulent
II
visent seulement a
emettre une sentence definitive centre
pas
son
provoquer
bon de souligner qu
est
la
elles
dialectique
la
ne des
au progres scientifique ne pouvoirs etre une etude pourra comprise que par systematique de sa frequence, qui permette d evaluer ou et comment elle agit concretement. divins
:
effective
Une recommandation
contribution
est toutefois indispensable:
faudra toujours,
il
dans ce genre d enquete, se souvenir que la potentia Dei absoluta fut en soi un instrument neutre, potentiellement eversif et potentiellement compatible avec n importe quel systeme theorique. Ainsi, si du XHIe au
XlVe
siecle
elle
-
si
XVIIe
au
-
en
put
naturelle d Aristote,
quelque maniere agir contre la philosophie Pont suggere Margaret Osier et Francis
comme
siecle
favoriser
sa substitution par le d une fois poussa ou meme plus en de cette En d autres opera faveur termes, la potentia Dei philosophie.
Oakley
mechanisme
et
elle
Patomisme 17
,
put
celle-ci
absoluta trouva a la fois des fonctions critiques et
des fonctions conservatrices et de prudence.
pour des exigences theologiques,
revolutionnaires
D ailleurs
des
le
XlVe
et
siecle,
adopta de facon toujours plus marquee ce ton conventionnaliste que Pon exalte pour son modernisme et qui cependant permit de preserver aisement le paradigme traditionnel du dcfi de toute autre alternative: en reduisant la construction de le savoir
,
nouvelles
explications
de
la
realite
ainsi
que
la
falsification
des
explications passees a un pur exercice secundum imaginationem. Garantir
Cf.
W.J.
Courtenay, Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion, dans The Pursuit of and Renaissance Religion, Brill, Leiden 1974, pp. 39^0.
Holiness in Late Medieval 1
Cf. J.E.
17
Murdoch,
M.J.
Infinity
and Continuity, dans The Cambridge
Providence
and
History, pp. 568-573.
s Views on Scientific Knowledge, Journal of the History of Ideas, 44 (1983), pp. 549-560; F. Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order. An Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abelard
Cf.
Osier,
to Leibniz, Cornell
Divine
Will
Univ. Press, Ithaca 1984, pp. 67-92.
in
Gassendi
Bianchi
144
monde
a Dieu la pleine liberle dc choisir pour le
1
ordre qu
il
voulait,
dcvint simplement la premise pour reaffirmer, sans courir de risque, qu lui
donne de facto
avail
justement
ordre decril par
1
ou qu
-
pu au moins
aurait
il
donner
lui
il
-
le Stagirite.
par exemple, aux premiers thomistes pour lesquels la mondes servait de potentia Dei absoluta de la pluralite des possibilile raisons seulemcnt a confirmer la validite physique des pour Punicite du
Pensons,
monde 18 pensons ;
Venise, ou
averroiste
a la tradition
theses
les
de Jean de Jandun a Paul de
,
caracteristiques de
la
Physique
et
du De Caelo
accompagnees par un hommage formel aux 19 ou pensons a Buridan, qui dessins incomprehensibles du Tout-Puissant de la doctrine en avancant ^impetus invoquait la potentia divina non pas
claienl
systematiquement
;
mais pour poser les conditions de possibilite des lois aristoteliciennes du mouvement, qu il venait de falsifier sur le plan 20 Et il ne s agit pas de cas isoles, mais des sources d une empirique.
pour
criliquer,
XVIIe siecle, comme le longue tradition qui remonterait jusqu au XVIe et 21 ou Pietro Pompona/zi Alessandro autres entre Piccolomini, tcmoigncnt 22 Bartolomeo Amici.
Comme
ai
j
souligne
contre
singuliere,
ailleurs,
sainte
cette
justement centre cette convergence entre
alliance
le
que deja dans thcologique et Paristotelisme philosophique avail prouve de connaitre et que soil le pape Urbain VIII -
contingentisme les Juvenilia
soil le jesuile
Jean-Baplisle Morin chercherenl a opposer au coperniciennisme 18
Le Correctorium
Cf.
Correctorium
Quacstione
,
9,
Herder,
Corruptorii
Circa
Corruptorii
Romae
,
8,
Quare Herder,
,
9,
Kain,
Romae,
p.
il
-
Galilee
1^ Saulchoir 1927, p. 49; Le 51; Le Correctorium Corruptorii
1954, p. 55.
19
Sur Jean de Jandun voir S. MacClintock, Perversity and Error. Studies on the Avaroist John of Jandun, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington 1956, pp. 88-95. 20 Cf. Johannes Buridanus, Q. in octo libros Physicorum, VII, 7, f. 108v. Sur ce texte
La scienza degli occamisti. La scienza tardo-medie\>ale dalle origini del alia rivoluzione scientific a, Maggioli, Rimini 1982, pp. 212-213. nominalista paradigma voir
21
F.
Bottin,
Alessandro Piccolomini, Delia filosofia naturale di M. Alessandro Piccolomini, II, de Cavalli, Venezia 1565, pp. 238-241; Pietro Pomponazzi, Petri Pomponatii Mantuani libri quinque de fato, del libero arbitrio et de praedcstinatione, V, 4, 32, In Aed. Thesaurus Mundi, Lucani 1957, p. 411. 24,
22
Cf.
G.
Bartolomeo
entre
puissance
a
une connaissance excellente du debat scholastique sur la distinction et puissance ordonnee de Dieu: cf. In Aristotelis libros de
absolue
459-460. II Ill, 18, 6, Apud S. Roncaliolum, Neapoli 1626-1629, II, pp. effort de rendre theologiquement acceptable son souvent cette distinction dans impossibilite adhesion aux theses de la philosophic aristotelicienne: pour exemple naturelle du vide (voir a ce sujet E. Grant, The Condemnation of 1277, n. 16, p. 216), du ciel, impossibilite de infini en acte.
Physico Auditu..., utilise
1
1
rincorruptibilite
1
1
Potentia Dei absoluta
eleva des protestations energiques; et
recherchcr
Un
fatto".
"non...quello
indiqua a
che Iddio poteva
fare,
la
ma
science
le
devoir de
quello che Egli ha
realisme pourra sembler un peu ingenu et fideistique par
tel
rapport au
il
145
conventionnalisme
desabuse de certains penseurs du XlVe il Test, en s inspirant lui aussi a une
Et dans une certaine mesure
siecle.
hypothese theologique indemontrable: a savoir que le Createur a prefere un ideal de simplicite a 1 exhibition exuberante de sa puissance par la 23 realisation de merveilles de toute sorte. II s agit toutefois d une reaction energique, et necessaire, centre le vice originaire de toutes les conditionnelles
methodologies 1
basees
sur
la
potentia
Dei
absoluta,
introduction d une fracture irremediable, d un divorce definitif entre la
realite
scheme conceptuel destine a la comprendre; dans la aucune ne puisse etre demontree comme vraie, que toutes qu insuffisantes en relation a ce que Dieu, dans egalement et
tout
conviction
sont
Pimpenetrabilite de son dessin, pouvait avoir decrete. Pour Galilee, par centre, les theories n etaient pas des simples modeles, et
done compatibles, des mondes
infinis
des descriptions incompatibles de ce le
hypotheses, permettant
incommensurables
que Dieu aurait pu creer, mais qui en fait existe. Les
monde unique
choix entre les theories, cessent ainsi d etre de
simples exercices dialectiques, pour devenir
le
cas
limite
de ce qui
la
nature nous montre concretement, les conditions ideales des phenomenes,
experimentables par qui
"difalchi
gli
impedimenti della
materia".
24
Universita degli Studi di Milano
Bianchi, Uccelli d oro e pesci di piombo: Galileo Galilei e la potentia Dei dans Sopra la volta del mondo. Onnipotenza e potenza assoluta di Dio tra medioe\ o e eta moderna, Lubrina, Bergamo 1986, pp. 139-146. Aux textes utilises dans cet article (en particulier le Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi..., 4, et la reponse a J.B. Morin dans Le Opere di Galileo Galilei, VII, pp. 488-489 et 565-566) on peut non ho detto, ne ardirei di dire, che alia natura e a Dio fusse ajouter le suivant: impossibile il conferir quella velocita, che voi dite, immediatamente; ma diro bene che de facto la natura non lo fa; talche il farlo verrebbe ad esser operazione fuora del corso naturale, e pero miracolosa." Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi..., \, p. 45. Cf.
absoluta
L. ,
"lo
Ibidem, naturelle
du
Funkenstein,
2,
p.
234.
La
differente
fonction
de
1
hypothese
dans
la
philosophic
XlVe siecle et dans la science moderne est bien reconnue par A. The Dialectical Preparation for Scientific Revolutions. On the Role of
Hypothetical Reasoning in the Emergence of Copernican Astronomy and Galilean Mechanics, dans The Copernican Achie\>ement, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1975, pp. 186 et 190-191.
JERZY BURCHARDT
Lcs sources
Witelo,
Tils
Vitcrbc
ct
des
qu
genres de
ct Ics
il
la
commc
continuait dc considerer la Polognc 2
d un
Fils
habitabilis).
Polonais"
alors
,
sommet dc
au
parvenu
1
dcs
et
Thuringiens etait
connaissance humainc d aprcs Witelo
residait
il
(terra
dc
duds)
(procurator
a
du savant,
son pays domiciliaire
ducal
administratcur
qu
carriere
sa
Wroclaw, Henricus de Ciz (en polonais: Henryk / Zytyc; en allcmand: 3 Hcinrich von Zeit/ ) et d une Polonaise de la famille des chevaliers de
Borow4
avail
il
,
etudie,
libcraux, puis
annees 1253 a 1258, a Paris,
vers les
rcndu, vcrs 1262, a Padoue, ou
s etait
1268, y faisant dcs etudes dc droit canon
dcs
arts.
s
y cnseignant a la facultc
ct
6
Quand pas
5
arts
les
demeura jusqu en
il
il
problemes philosophiqucs, Witelo cntendait ne thcologic, qu il defmissait commc la science de la
rcsolvait les
opposer a la mais preferait suivre une autre
7
voie, qu il appelait la voie de la de en raison (via rationisP) ou, mots, la voie naturellc ct possible plus 9 D aillcurs il ajoutait par la nature (via naturalis et possibilis natura }.
vcritc
,
Witelo, Pcrspcctiva, Naturforscher des XIII. Mittelaltcrs, Bd. Ill, H. fratri
(Clemens
prologus
Jahrhnndcrts, 2,
Munster
filius
1
Witelo, Perspcctiva, Basileae 1572, p. 467:)
lib. "in
circa latitudinem quinquaginta
X,
prop.
terra
74
nostra,
X)8,
p.
Thuringorum
irrcfracto mentis radio felicem intuitum ct intellcctum
~
(
(Opticae scilicet
127,
1
o n
i
Jerzy Burchardt, Witelo, filosofo della natura del XIII sec., Polacca delle Scienze, Biblioteca e Centro di Studi a Roma,
Ossolineum, 1984,
5
6
Ibidem,
p.
25
Ibidem,
p.
38
Fcdericus
edidit
a
e,
habitabili,
26.
-
Una
biografta,
Conferenze
39, p. 42.
causa primaria paenitentiae in hominibus et de natura 11 - 13. Georgius Burchardt, Studia Copemicana, vol. XIX, p. 161,
De
Witelonis
De
causa primaria...,
p. 161,
5-6.
Witelonis
De
causa primaria...,
p. 165,
184
-
186.
Witelonis
De
causa primaria...,
167, 278
-
279.
1
Risner,
quae
est
Accademia Wroctew
87,
p. 23-25.
-
Witelonis
y
des
amatori aeternae lucis
"Veritatis
1-3:)
graduum..."
3
4
und
suhscriptorum".
Thesaurus,
P o
dcr
Polonorum,
et
perspicuum
Philosoph Philosophic
ein
Witelo,
Geschichte
zur
Westfalen
in
Wilhelmo de Morbcka Witelo,
Bacumker,
Beitrdge
p.
daemonum,
edidit
Les sources
qu le
meme
n avait
il
faire
11
philosophic, qu
de
pa^ eludie
il
la
iheologie
il
se
lettre
paenitenliae in
encore qu
,
il
147
eut le desir de
limitait a suivre les principes
rendit
compte que, sur
raison devait se soumettre a la foi chretienne.
La
humaine d apres Witelo
de
la
Cependant, tout en cheminant le long
avail compris.
nouvelle voie,
la
genres de la connaissance
que sa competence se
et
,
et les
le
plan superieur, la
13
padouane de Witelo, qui porte le litre De causa primaria hominibus el de nalura daemonum 14 conslilue un exemple ,
d applicalion pralique de celle voie nouvelle. de Calcidius Wilelo y demonlre, a 1 aide de
En
corrigeanl les opinions
argumenl plalonicien de la ordre de 1 univers (ordo universi),
,
1
double proporlion conlinue, que, dans 1 demons se trouvent entre les moteurs des spheres celesles el les elres humains. 16 Par consequenl, les demons sonl plus parfails que les homines. les
Us n apparaissenl done que Ires raremenl a ceux-ci. Pour cela, il faul que, devenus pecheurs, le peche les ait fait lomber de la place elevee qu ils occupenl normalemenl dans 1 ordre de 1 univers a un niveau inferieur,
a savoir celui des
hommes. 17 En
suivanl la voie de la raison,
Wilelo rejelle aussi le dogme de la chulle des anges. 18 Dans sa lellre padouane, il formule aussi une Iheorie psychopalhologique nouvelle porlanl sur les illusions de demons, principalemenl en vue de comballre la peur sociale
1
de son epoque. 19
Witelonis
De
causa primaria..., p. 161, 6-7.
Witelonis
De
causa primaria...,
Witelonis
De
causa primaria...,
p.
Witelonis
De
causa
p. 168,
p. 180,
primaria..."
858
-
863.
161, 1-5.
312
-
314; ibidem, p. 323
-
327.
XIX, Wrodaw, Ossolineum 1979, p. 161 -180 (avec une - 158 et un commentaire edition latin, p. 200 preface latine, p. 155 208). Voir aussi non commentee: Witelo, Epistula de primaria causa poenitentiae in hominibus et de Studio
Copemicana,
vol.
1
substantia
daemonum, dans le livre: Eugenia Paschetto, Demoni di Witelo e di Oresme, G. Giappichelli, Torino 1978, p. 89 - 132.
natura
et
Note su alcuni
scritti
Jerzy Burchardt, List Witelona do Ludwika we teoriopoznawcza, kosmologiczna medyczna, Wroclaw XIX, p. 120 - 123. i
De
Witelonis
causa primaria..., p.
175,
605
-
p.
16,
e prodigi,
Lwowku 1979,
650.
Slaskim Problematyka Studia Copemicana, vol.
J.
Burchardt, op.
cit.,
p.
124-125. 17
Witelonis
ibidem, 10
p. 173,
Witelo 278
-
De 542
De
causa primaria..., p. 178, 778 - p. 179, 793. Ibidem, p. 168, 333 543, p. 176, 681 - 688; conf. ibidem, p. 178, 777 - p. 179, 793.
causa primaria...,
284. Ibidem, p. 168, 326
19
-
334;
p.
167,
-
-
p.
167, 268
-
p.
168, 328.
Voir surtout ibidem,
327.
Burchardt, op. cit., p. 119 - 123. Idem, La psicopatologia nei concetti di Witelo, della natura del XIII secolo, Accademia Polacca delle Scienze, Biblioteca e Centro di Studi a Roma, Conferenze 94, Ossolineum, Wroclaw 1986, p. 3 - 20; idem, Les J.
filosofo
Burchardt
148
Une
fois ses
la curie pontificale
etudes achevees, Witelo se rendit a
de Viterbe, en tant qu envoye de Wtodzistaw, due de Silesie, chancelier du 20 de royaume de Boheme et archeveque de Sal/bourg. Son ami, Guillaume et
Moerbeke, chapelain de
libre
temps
penitencier
du pape,
attente prolongee de
1
1
election
lui
d
conscilla
du pape par 1
utiliser
le
les querelles
Ce
vaste traite Perspectiva? annces des 1270-1271, durant la d optique fut compose a Viterbe au cours vacance du Saint-Siege, mais le prologue de 1 oeuvre, dedie a Guillaume de
cardinaux
des
1272, les
infinies,
ecrivant
les
que penitencier de cglise romaine, dut etre ecrit en nominations des employes conferees dans la curie pontificale par
Moerbeke en
le
en
tant
1
22 Witelo y pape nouveau, Gregoire X.
des
savoir
opticiens
arabes
grecs,
et
recueillc,
en
en
latins,
le
repensant,
un
suivant
le
ordre
2
en prenant pour modele les Elements d Euclide. ete 1274, Witelo, qui etait devenu chapelain cours de
gcometrique
Au
et
1
et
de Prague pour diplomate de F^mys! Otakar II, roi de Boheme, partit de son Lyon afin de gagner le coeur de Gregoire X pour la politique elements nouveaux de psychopathologie dans la lettre de Witelo, Bulletin dc philosophic 142; idem, Nowe elcmcnty Witeloriskiegp mcdievalc, Ix)uvain-I^-Ncuvc 1983, p. 138 sredniowiecza i renesansu w rozwoj Wkfad le dans startymosci, ujccia psychopatologii, nauk medycznych, Uniwersytet im. Mikotaja Kopcrnika, Ro/prawy, Torun 1983, p. 45-51.
20
Burchardt,
Jer/.y
Witelo,
filosofo
della
natura
del
XIII
secolo,
Una
biografia,
Accademia Polacca dclle Scienze, Biblioteca e Ccntro di Studi a Roma, Conferenze 87, - 49. Alors qu il se trouvait deja a Padoue, Witelo cut Wroclaw, Ossolineum 1984, p. 48 un cntretien avec un homme venu de Sal/.bourg, vraisemhlablcmcnt un messager dc
De causa primaria..., p. 174, 559archeveque Wtod/.istew; voir a ce propos Witelo, dicto Salezpurgum..." ..ut dictum fuit mihi per bonum tcstimonium dc quodam castro
1
560:".
21
Witelo,
Perspectiva,
prologus (C. Baeumkcr, Witelo, op.
cit.,
p.
127,
1
-
3,
p.
128,
34-36). 22
natura del XIII secolo, Una biografia, p. 51. 1272 (August Potthast, Regesta pontificum Gregoire les Romanorum, vol. 2, Berolini 1875, p. 1652). II donna, sans doute, sous peu nominations aux employes de la curie pontificale. Nous savons que Guillaume de Moerbeke avec un nom alterc" de frater Guilelmus dc Moibccta, en tant que penitencier du pape jugeait en 1272, a Orvieto, un prieur des augustiniens de Paverano, qui avail d Allaro, du meme ordre monastique. T. Hirschfeld, un autre maltraite J.
Burchardt,
X
vint
Witelo,
a
filosofo
Viterbe
le
delta
10
Janvier
prieur,
Genuesischc Dokumente zur Geschichte Roms und des Papstums im 13. Jahrhundcrt, Archiven und Ribliotheken, 17 (1914 - 1924), Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen traduttorc il 6. Martin Grabmann, Gugliclmo di Moerbeke, O.P., numero 140, 108, p. dclle 50.
juillet
23 vol.
opere
D autre
di
vol. XI, Roma 1946, p. 49Aristotele, Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae, a Orvieto depuis le 5 se trouvait sa curie avec pontificale Gregoire
part,
1272 jusqu au 2 juin 1273 (A. Potthast, op.
cit., p.
1656
-
1670).
Aleksander Birkenmajer, Witelo, le plus ancien savant silesien, Studio Copernicana, 26 - 32. IV, Wroclaw 1972, p. 420 426. Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus,..., p. 129,
Les sources
souverain
24 ,
Thuringiens
et les
mais et
genres de la connaissance
sa
mission
echoua.
humaine d apres Witelo
Le 10
le
1275,
juillct
des Polonais, eleve un pcu auparavant a
la
149
fils
dcs
de
dignite
chanoine de Wroclaw, recut des mains d Henri IV, due de Silesie 25 Revenu en Italic, seigneur de Wroclaw, la prebende de ^orawina. assista,
7 fevrier 1277, a Viterbe, a
le
Simone
ami, le cardinal
Paltanieri.
26
la
et il
redaction du testament de son
Depuis 1272, toujours
pris
dans un
tourbillon d affaires politiques, Witelo n avait pas reussi a reprendre ses activites savantes.
27
En 1280, maitre Witelo passa, non pas sans accord de son souverain de Wroclaw, au service du roi des Remains, Rodolphe I. On le retrouve a Vienne, le 12 decembre 1280 et, avec le roi, a Nurenberg, le 20 aout 1281.
28
probablement dans le Hainaut, au couvent des mais la date exacte de sa mort reste toujours premontres de Vicogne II
mourut,
fort
29
,
inconnue. 24 J.
59.
Burchardt,
Codex
Witelo, fllosofo della natura del XIII et epistolaris regni Bohemiae, t.
di|>lomaticus
Sebanek 25 J.
62, p.
Sasa Duskova, Prague 1981, nr 769,
et
sec.,
V,
Una fasc.
2,
biografia,...,
p.
58-
ediderunt Jindrich
p. 439.
Burchardt, Witelo, filosofo della natura 77 - 79 et, particulierement, p. 77 et 78.
del XIII
sec.,
Una
biografia,...,
p.
60-
Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani, Witelo et la science optique a la cour pontificate de (1277), dans: Melanges de I Ecole Franqaise de Rome, Moycn Age, Temps Modernes, vol. 87, 1975, 2, p. 427 - 437. Viterbe
Le
10
le
nouveau
pape, Gregoire X, etait arrive a Viterbe (A. confera a Guillaume de Moerbeke les fonctions de chapelain et de penitencier, sans doute, dans les premiers mois de son pontifical, en 1272. Alors Witelo, qui avail deja redige ses Perspectiva, y ajouta le prologue, dedie a Guillaume. Voir Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker, Witelo,..., p. 128, 30 32). II semble qu apres que toutes les affaires silesiennes eurent etc reglees par le pape conformement aux voeux du due Wtodzistew, decede ensuile le 27 avril 1270, Wilelo ail Potthast,
Janvier
op.
cit.,
1272,
p.
1652).
II
jusqu aux premiers jours de juin 1273, la curie ponlificale a Vilerbe, Rome el Orvielo, lout en s occupant de plus en plus des inlerels Icheques. Puis, lorsque le pape a Lyon, Witelo se rendit a quitta Orvieto pour Prague. II y devinl chapelain du suivi,
Caller
roi de Boheme, Premysl Otakar II. En aoul 1274, celui-ci envoya en mission diplomalique au concile de Lyon, aupres de Gregoire X, aux fins de le gagner a ses nouvelles propositions. Mais le pape, cedanl a Rodolphe I, elu roi des Remains, s y opposa. J. Burchardt, Witelo, filosofo della natura del XIII sec., Una biografia,..., p. 58 - 59. En 1275, Witelo se trouvail en Pologne el devinl chanoine de Wroctew. Ce n est que le 7 fevrier 1277 que nous retrouvons sa trace a Viterbe (grace au travail d Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani), ou il accomplil, sans doule, une mission diplomatique pour le due de Silesie et seigneur de Wroclaw, Henri IV, dit en latin Probus. Depuis 1273 jusqu au 1277 Witelo elait en tout cas loin d avoir le loisir necessaire au savant. 28 J. Burchardt, Witelo, filosofo della natura del XIII sec., Una biografia,..., p. 70, ainsi que les documents qui s y Irouvenl publics p. 79 - 86. 1
V Bern, Burgerbibliolhek, codex 61, f. 318 Explicit perspectiua Magistri Wilelonis de Viconia conlinel aulem 807. J.R. codicum Sinner, proposiliones Catalogus :
manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bernensis, Bernae 1772,
p. 14. C.
Baeumker,
Witelo..., p. 222.
Burchardt
150
Witelo a
,
1
tous
a
interesse
s cst
30
naturelle
astronomie 31
a
,
33
a
et
de
principale entier.
35
1
entite,
La lumiere les
superieurs,
monde
La
sensible.
lumiere
de
astres,
specifiques et individuelles.
Les lumicres ligne droite. cclui
maticres
39
Cette
il
formes sensibles.
les
30
le
les
naturelle
42
40
du
formes
37
41
actions
les
tout
est
meme
sur
objective,
Ceux-ci servent a signaliser,
nature.
la
inferieur,
L homme
connait, par les
naturelles,
formes
a la puissance de sa raison,
Grace
dans
conservces
1
combinaisons
les
imagination,
sont creees par syncretiques et erronnees de cclles-ci, qui
sans
corps
faire la distinction entrc les objets naturels (res), leurs
pcut nettement
representations
monde
corps
etcndues,
deja
du monde
action
mais non pas a causer les actions de les actions des intelligences ct par intelligibles et
les
corporelles,
le
les
par
la
source
Ainsi, elle complete les objets naturels.
perception des sens.
la
diffusee
et
la
en par consequent, toutes les formes, se diffusent
indivisible.
independante de
lumiere divine
la
sensibile),
Elles agissent sur tout point
est
qui
et,
36
C est
mathematicien.
et
substances
aux
en ajoutant
inferieur,
38
(lumen les
psychologic.
(divinum lumen) et de la vitalite dans
Pintelligibilite
forme
philosophic
est
divine
sensible
la
32
la
pourquoi il se disait lui-meme naturalistc Witelo distingue deux sortes de lumiere: lumiere
de
domaincs
les
optique
1
controle
de
la
Mark
Witelonis Persp. liber quintus edidit A. - 12. 1983, prop. 18, p. 207, 10
de
fictions
les
et
raison,
la 1
phantasia,
imagination
Smith, Studio Copemicana, vol. XXIII,
Wroclaw
X
31
Witelo, Perspectiva, lib. Basilae 1572, p. 447, 52 - 53).
32
33
Witelo, Perspectiva,
Witelonis
De
prop.
53
(Opticae
prop. 58 (Opticae Thesaurus...,
lib. Ill,
causa primaria...,
Federicus
edidit
Thesaurus,
p. Ill, 14
-
16).
naturalis... p. 173, 537:
Ibidem, mathematicus. 35
Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker,
36
37 38 39
Witelo,..., p. 127, -
17
-
p. 128, 3).
Witelo, op.
cit.,
prologus (editio
cit.,
4 p. 128,
Witelo, op.
cit.,
prologus (editio
cit.,
p. 127, 11, p. 129, 13, p. 129, 21).
Witelo, Perspectiva,
lib. II,
Witelo, Perspectiva,
lib. Ill,
prop.
1
10).
(Opticae Thesaurus...,
prop. 6 (editio
cit.,
p. 88, 15
-
p. 63,
35
Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker,
Witelo..., p. 129,
12
-
41
Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker,
Witelo..., p. 131,
29
-
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
p. 163,
95
-
99.
36).
18).
40
42
-
15).
30).
Risner,
Les sources
et les
humaine d apres Witelo
genres de la connaissance
151
mathematique, utilisees avec succes en optique, mais qui n existent pas dans la nature. 43 Witelo souligne que
connaissances humaines (scientiae) et les
les
ames humaines,
biens (bonitates) parviennent aux les
par
corps,
1
44
aussi
intelligences
hommes
et
,
savent dans
la
45 Les qui se trouvent identifies avec les anges.
mesure ou
tissent et edifient
ils
connaissances pratiques acquises grace a Ainsi apprennent-ils, par
nature et toute
que sont
ci
a
1
1
1
contenu
enseignement sur
puissances cooperantes de
Une
d optique.
A
catoptrique.
1
aide
de
les
difficile
Dans d abord,
ses
la
inventee par Anthemius.
De
Witelo, concetti
di
filosofo
la
homme
1
Witelo
47 Puis,
il
forme
de
1
y explique
On
le
y examine est
optique
de
et
la
raisonnements
de miroirs
miroirs
cinq
des
miroirs
349
et
s
attache
-
351.
J.
il
plans
qui
est possible
Burchardt,
Tout
ardents.
XIII
del
La
-
p.
d allumer du
psicopatologia net
secolo,
170, 386. Witelo,
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
p. 164,
122
-
124.
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
p. 168,
302
-
304, ibidem, p. 163, 116
causa primaria...,
p. 165, 194
-
-
ete
avait
Accademia Polacca Studi a Roma, Conferenze, vol. 94, Wroclaw 1986, natura
Witelo, De causa primaria..., p. 168, 335 prop. 3 (Opticae..., p. 63, 59 61).
Witelo,
analyse des formes
visible.
decrit
10.
De
construction
a allumer du feu, une tache
demontre qu
169,
p.
della
Scienze, Biblioteca e Centro di
46
la
ame humaine. On
differents types
combinaison
causa primaria...,
Witelo,
y
1
siecle.
Perspectiva,
discute
il
au
1
fait
importante de figures
partie
surtout a ceux qui peuvent aider encore XIII e
-
On
de
termes,
geometriques, celle-ci etudie
bien
lumiere de Pintellect possible.
la
lumiere corporelle, sur
la
et les conditions necessaires
illusions
alors par leurs
la
les
par
,
etude, a connaitre toute la philosophie de la
oeil, sur le processus de la vision.
visibles
les
1
46
mathematique, et particulierement les parties de celleastronomie et 1 optique (perspectiva), Cette derniere fournit
homme un
de
qui sont plongees dans
intermediaire des moteurs des spheres celestes, appeles
Perspectiva,
delle p.
lib.
7II,
p. 164, 121.
195. Conf. Aristoteles
De anima
408 b 12
13.
Witelo, Perspectiva, lib. V, prop. 65 (Witelonis Perspectivae liber quintus, edidit A. Studia Copemicana, vol. XXIII, Wroclaw 1983, p. 252, 1 - 28). Plutot que donner ce litre a 1 oeuvre principale de Witelo, ainsi que le font les savants
Mark Smith, de
employant un singulier feminin, nous soutenons que, d apres Witelo, au neutre pluriel, voir Wilelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker, 129, 7 10:) "...praemissorum per modum entium visibilium perscrutatio
americains,
en
Perspectiva
est
Witelo...,
p.
et eadem viris qui ante nos plurimi tractaverunt huius scientiae negotium, perspectivorum nomine nuncupantes. Quorum et ego nominationem ut placitam approbo..."
placuit,
sicut
Burchardt
152
48
Ensuite, il aide de miroirs spheriques concaves opposes au soleil. entcnd prouver qu une certaine combinaison de ces miroirs peut constituer feu a
1
49 Plus un miroir ardent.
une nouvelle combinaison des
decrit
il
loin,
miroirs coniques qui pourrait allumer du feu.
d Ibn
ardent
parabolique
51
Witelo connaissait non seulement
mais aussi
largo,
la
Enfm,
De
al-Haytham.
indications pratiques aux artisans ingenieux.
50
la
nature.
53
s
homme
1
effet,
tend a
toute
la
de
philosophic
ctre
48
49 50 51
nature
la
ct
telle
accompagne
est
la
embrasse vise
que
toute
est
cette
1
Humana
(scientia
ut coniuncti).
56
Witelo, Perspectiva,
lib.
VIII, prop. 68 (Opticae Thesaurus..., p. 365, 51
Witelo, Perspectiva,
IX, prop. 37 (Opticae Thesaurus...,
62
-
lib.
lib.
IX, prop. 38 (Opticae Thesaurus..., p. 394, 42
-
Witelo, Perspectiva, Witelo,
Perspectiva,
und
Heiberg
lib.
Hilhard
Bibliotheca
Hohlspiegel,
p. 392,
-
p.366, 53).
p. 394, 41).
p.398, 22).
(Opticae Thesaurus..., p. 401, 19 Wiedemann, Ibn al-llaithams Schrift uber
IX, prop.43
mathematica,
3.
Folge,
10
(1909
Abdalhamid Ibrahim Sabra, Ibn al-Haytham, Dictionary of New York 1972, p. 195, p. 206. 52
fin
ct
Witelo appelle activite, qui propre a hommc, en tant que science d un etres humains, la science de
compose
J.L.
De
comprend.
bicn qu encore eloignee de la en va de la matiere humaine qu
55
connaissancc humaine. tous les
Chaque
il
a la forme. Cette tendance
unir
s
que aux
ame humaine,
science actuelle, dcvicnt savante, ainsi qui
est
il
appliquait
possible.
tel, celui qui sail et qui
dcvicnt alors en tant que
maniere, en
cette
mode
acquerait la science sur un
et
qu
declarait
II
1
sensibles
ainsi
c est
et
parvenu a domincr toute la philosophie de homme rentrait en lui-meme, intellect possible de objets
des
mathematique medievale sensu
la
la
(
donne
il
sorte,
52
physiologique;
psychologic
discute le miroir
il
-
1910),
Scientific
p.
-
p.
402,
14).
parabolische 293 - 307.
Biography, vol. VI,
Witelo parle d un artisan quand il traite du miroir parabolique, 44 lib. IX, (Opticae prop. Witelo, Perspectiva, artifcx}, (ingcniosus de Jean Fusoris, un grand et celebre Thesaurus..., p. 402, 2). II devait s agir, au futur, sur les constructeur parisien d instruments astronomiques, qui, dans un Commcntaire vers 1410, essaya de completer les indications ecrivit il Perspecth a de Witelo, qu fabrication du miroir parabolique. Dijon, Bibliotheque techniques necessaires pour la Divio-Godranii), le manuscrit numero 441, f. 191 Collegii publica (Bibliotheca publique
Par
exemple,
ingenieux
-
197
53
.
Voir
les
Aristoteles,
verso
54 55
56
notes
Physica,
30 lib.
et I,
Conf. Witelo, De causa primaria..., 184 a 21 - 25, editio Venetiana 1483,
32.
178, 765 3 - 4, f.
-
768.
AA
2
lib.
I,
col. 1.
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
190
-
193.
Witelo,
De
causa primaria..., p. 165, 199
-
203.
Witelo,
408 b
p. tc.
13.
De
p. 165,
causa primaria...,
p.
165,
194
-
197.
Conf. Aristoteles,
De anima,
Les sources
qu
il
et les
genres de la connaissance
humaine d apres
153
Witclo
Witclo ne surcstimait pourtant pas cetie science temporelle, parce croyait qu il y avail un autre genre de la science, bien plus
eminente, qui n est pas propre a tout essence, a leurs
1
homme, mais seulement
a son
Tame
intellective, laquelle, chez certaines personnes, grace a 57 se trouve exposee aux influences dcs moteurs celestes.
efforts,
Selon Witelo, celles-ci pouvaient agir sur 1 homme, dont ame est plongee dans le corps, a certaines conditions: homme devait liberer son ame des 1
1
plaisirs
corporels
naturelles
en
et
repos
concentrer
se
et
rester
faire
terrestres,
influences des intelligences superieures et parfois
aux
hommes
sur s
scs les
offraient
puissances objets ainsi
sensibles
eternels.
58
et
Les
aux epileptiques
occupes a rever, et parvenaient aussi aux savants
59 melancoliques assidument appliques a 1 etude, aux grands contemplatifs 60 et a ceux qui s emancipaient des souillures du peche. A un degre encore ces influences assuraient aux hommes saints et aux prophetes, plus eleve,
pendant leurs etats de contemplation, le retour de ame a soi-meme, le contact immediat avec 1 eternite et, par consequent, la connaissance de 1
Pavenir.
61
Cette
science,
62
sua)
,
toujours
actuelle,
imperissable,
que
Witelo
ame dans
son essence (scientia animae in essentia fournissait aux ames intellectives des hommes la connaissance des
appelait la science de
1
principes des objets naturels
63
Witelo pensait qu une
et le savoir
fois
65 que substance celeste et pure
,
du
futur.
64
separee du corps,
Fame humaine, en
tant
obtiendrait ses connaissances et ses biens
immediatement de Dieu meme. 66
II estimait cependant que les ignorants, n ont les sciences et qui que mepris pour pour les biens eternels, et qui, de plus, durant leur vie temporelle, se conduisent comme des betes, commettant des mefaits ou se contentant de manger et de boire, seraient
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
p. 164,
122
-
124.
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
p. 164, 146
-
149.
CO
De
causa primaria..., p. 164, 149 - 154. Conf. Pseudo-Aristoteles, ftoblemata Witelo, vulgataXXX, cap. 1, editio I. Bekkeri, Berolini 1831, 954 a 10 - 12. fJT\
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
p. 165,
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
61
62 63 64
Vide notam
65
-
172.
165, 171
-
178.
197
-
198. Conf. Liber
p. 165, 198
-
199.
109
-
112.
163, 112
-
116.
p.
61.
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
Witelo,
De
causa primaria...,
f-jf\
169
p. 165,
p. 163, p.
de causis
XIV
125.
Burchardt
154
chaties
en etant ecartes dc
homme
philosophe
polonais,
consacrant
aux ocuvres
sociale
artisans
civilis).
(vita 71
dans
,
etrc sur le ils
de
la
de
1
67
En effet, scion le presence dc Dieu. doit parvenir au Bien Eternel en se
intelligence
et
en
prenant
la
part
a
la
vie
70
69
68
intellectuels
qu
1
la
et les les savants sans doutc, Ics religieux C aux travaux s adonnaient-ils societe de XIII siecle,
Et,
,
(operationes intellectus). Certes,
bon chemin, mais
faisaient usage,
pour
le
ils
ils
jouissaicnt de
n etaient pas les seuls a 1
cstime de Witelo parce
bien du prochain et de
la societe
(civitas),
puissance intellectuelle et supreme de leur ame.
Wroclaw
67 137
^ 69 70
Dc causa primaria..., - 182. 141, ibidem, p. 165, 178
Witelo, -
Witelo,
De
Witelo,
De
Witelo,
De
p.
222
166,
-
226,
ibidem, 229
p. 166,
226
-
229.
causa primaria...,
p. 172,
493
-
495.
causa primaria...,
p. 173,
525
-
527, ibidem, p. 535
causa primaria...,
71
Witelo, Perspectiva,
lib.
VIII, prop. 68 (Opticae Thesaurus...,
-
-
232,
ibidem,
538.
p. 366,
49
-
53).
p.
164,
YASUO CHISAKA
Ubcr
Bonaventura
die
Bcdeutung dcr Erfahrung bci Franz von Assisi
schreibt,
Franziskus von Gott,
den
"Untcr
dcm generosen
iibcrnatiirlichcn
wclche
Gaben,
Schenker, erhalten hattc, war seine
Liebe zur absoluten Armut, welche ein besondcres Privileg war, das ihm 1 im reich ermoglichte, und er fiihrt weiter spirituellen Sinnc zu werden", aus,
daB Franziskus
Briider so festlegte:
unsere
Demut und
selbst "Mogen
die
Zweite Ordensregel fur die Minderen
wir
immer gemaB unserer Armut leben und
das Evangelium unseres Herrn Jesus Christ
bewahren".
2
Indessen schreibt Sabatier, daB die Zweite Ordensregel von 1223 von Franziskus fur seinen Orden keineswegs gewollt war, sondern mit Gewalt von auBen eingefiihrt wurde und 1209 bwz. 1210 die Erste
Ordensregel war und daB beide Regeln nur die Bezeichnung gemeinsam 3 Tatsachlich wurde die Zweite Rcgel gemaB der Ersten
hatten.
entsprechend gemildert, die Erste jedoch war aber cine Regel, welche frei und angenehm befolgt wurde, die andere jedoch, so nimmt man an, erstarrte in allgemeiner Form. Es sind aber nur wenige Schriften des Franziskus iiberliefert und ihre Grundlagen sind die Armut, der Gehorsam und die Keuschheit. Bei diesen Begriffen handelt es sich nicht um
Ausdrucke abstrakter Ideen. Fur Franz von strcng in die Praxis
Assisi
warcn
es
Worte, die cr
umsetzte und keine bloBe Theorie.
Fur ihn war Jesus Christus das Beispiel zu leben
Beispiel, seine Sendung war, dieses und den Menschen nahe zu bringen, diesen Weg nicht
auBerhalb sondern innerhalb der Menschen zu gehen. Dafiir entledigte er ganzen Besitzes. Fur ihn war die Besitzlosigkeit unabdingbare
sich seines
Voraussetzung der Reinheit und Schlichtheit. Fur ihn bcdeutete die Armut selbstvcrstandlich cine materielle
Armut, besondcrs die
"Armut
im
Herzen"
Bonaventura, Vita scu Lcgenda maior S. Francisci, VII, De amore pauperitatis mira suppletione defectuum. (Analccta Franciscans sive Chronica aliaque varia documcnta ad Historian Fratrum Minorum spcctantia edita a Patribus Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Tomus X, 1926-41, Quaracchi-Fircn/.c). et
Opuscula sancti Patris Francisci Assisiensis, ed. Caietanus Hsser, Cf. P. Sabatier, Vie
dc
S.
Francois
d Assise,
p. 289, 1894, Paris.
p. 237, 1978,
Roma.
Chisaka
156
dem Herzen kommcndcr
aus
als ein
Wille zur Entsagung allcr wcltlicher
Giiter.
So war
die
Er
setzte
auf diesem cine
Armut ohne
mehr nicht. ein Leben
eines Beispiels,
weder cine abstrakte Ideen-Welt, noch
Glaubenslehre oder Philosophic,
religiose
war das Lcben
lang die Besitzlosigkeit in die Praxis um, und
es fur ihn
Wege gab
sie
personliche Bcdcutung,
er
an
hatte
ihnen
als
wissenschaftliche Kategorien keinerlei Interesse, sondern nahm in allem einen freien Standpunkt ein und bewahrte nichts als einen freien Willen
Ablehnung aller abstrakten Ideen. Er wollte nur ein Leben in Schlichtheit und Armut leben, fur das Christus ein konkretes Beispiel zur
gegeben
hatte.
Werk
Im
Nictzsches
erinnert. Dieser Heilige sagt: ich Lieder
"Ich
mache, lache, weinc und
Der Heilige
hat
Mensch, der an Franziskus mache Lieder und singe sie, und wenn ein
erschcint
brumme Welt
dcr
sich
ich:
Also lobe ich
entzogen
und
Gott".
meditiert
in
der
Zuruckgezogenheit der Waldeinsamkcit iiber Gott. Fur Franziskus dagcgcn als einem gewohnlichen Menschen gibt es keincn Unterschied zwischcn der Weltabgelegenheit eines Klosters oder er lebt als ein gewohnlicher
und
fiihrt
Leben im
ein
Mensch
taglichen
dem
lauten
lieber untcr
Umgange
Leben
in
der Stadt,
gewohnlichen Menschen
mit ihnen in ihrer weltlichen
cine Methode Sphare. Sein Leben war fur ihn auch nicht einen Augenblick der Verwirklichung abstrakter Ideenvorstellungcn, sondern eine Frage des
konkreten Lebcns, fernab
aller
Kontemplationen. Fur Franziskus lag die Freiheit des Menschen in dem Privileg der Aufgabe des Besitzes, der Loslosung von Wissenschaft und Tradition, des absoluten ungeachtet des Ortes. Er sah in der Armut eine Moglichkeit Gehorsames Gott gegeniiber. Hatte denn Christus nicht auch so gelebt?
Wissenschaften,
hinzugeben,
Menschen
Glaube
Ideen,
an
nicht gerade
der
Besitz,
von
all
Wunsch,
und
Autoritaten
sich
Formen,
diesen
werden
Dingen denn die
diesen beherrscht in ihrer Existenz, und
eingeschrankt?
dem MaGe,
wie die Abhangigkeit zunimmt, bringt sie Unreinheit, Untreue und Unkeuschheit hervor und wird zur Ursache der zunehmenden In
Untreue zu Gott. Der Mensch, der den sich von der Autoritat, welcher Art
4
Nietzsche,
Kroner,
S. 7).
Also
sprach
Zarathustra,
Weg
sie
der
Armut
beschreitet, befreit
auch sein mag, und auch
Vorrede
2,
(Samtliche
Werke,
Bd.
vom VI,
Uber die Bcdeutung der Erfahning bci Franz von Assisi
La rm dcr Welt und nimmt den uns
157
alles vcrhiillcndcn Schlcicr
wcg und
gewahrt den Blick auf die Wahrhcit. AuBcrhalb der Armut und ihrer Demut und grenzenlosen Licbe zu Gott gibt es keincn anderen, wie auch
immer
der wesentlichen Praxis.
Weg
gestalteten
Auf der einen
Seite gibt
es die Moglichkeit der inbriinstigen Nichtung des eigenen Ichs, auf der
anderen
so Franziskus, gibt uns die Besitzlosigkeit ein Geschenk
Seite,
leuchtender Herrlichkeit und wunderbarer Bedeutung. Die Armut ist ohne jede Schmerzlichkeit, sic gewahrt uns die hochste Freude. Durch die
voll
Armut und
Menschen und der
Besitzlosigkeit wird uns die Existenz aller
gesamten Natur,
schlieBlich
der
ganzen Welt und
in
der eigenen
ihr
Existenz als das Geschenk der grenzenlosen Liebe Gottes zuteil. Nicht etwa nur besonderen Menschen, sondern alien Menschen, welche ein
Leben
in
Die
Armut
fiihren,
werden
Worte
folgenden
alle
von
Dinge
zuteil.
Franziskus
lehren
uns
verschiedene
Einsichten und geben gleichzeitig etwas von seinem Gefiihl zu erkennen:
Et postquam Dominus dedit mini de fratribus, auid deberem facere, sed ipse Altissimus
nemo
ostendebat mini
rcvelavit
mihi, quod secundum formam sancti Evangelii. Et ego paucis yerbis et simpliciter feci scribi et dominus papa confirmavit mmi. Et illi qui veniebant ad recipiendam vitam omnia quae habere poterant,
aeberem
vivere
t
dabant
pauperibus: et erant contenti tunica una, intus et fpris repeciata, cum cingulo et braccis. Et nolebamus plus habere. Officium dicebamus clerici secundum alios clericos, laici dicebant: Pater noster: et satis libenter manebamus in ecclesiis. Et eramus idiotae et subditi omnibus. Et ego manibus meis laborabam, et volo laborare; et omnis alii fratres firmiter volo, quod laborent de laboritio, quod ad honestcm. Qui nesciunt. discant, non propter pertinent
cupiditatem recipiendi pretium laboris, sea propter exemplum et ad repellendam otiositatem. Et quando non daretur nobis pretium laboris,
recurramus ad mensam Domini, pctendo elcemosynam ostiatim. Salutatk)nem mihi Dominus revelavit, ut diceremus: Dominus del tibi
pacem. Dieses Wort fahrt
fort,
Fremdlinge und Pilger
Das bedeutet
erleben und uns als dies das Folgen des
haben"
nichts
Beispiels die tagliche
"denn
wir sollen darin stets nur Herberge wie
(sicut
advenae
et peregrini}.
anderes, als daB wir im taglichen
Leben des
und endlose Erfahrung immer wieder von neuem Reisende auf einer endlosen Reise befinden. Es ist
Experimentes und das Stehen im taglichen ProzeB des
Experimentes.
Es kann nur
die Erfahrung oder den rcinigenden ProzeB der Praxis Die geben. Reinigung durch die Armut ist die Selbst-Verneinung und
Testamentum (Opuscula, pp. 310-11).
Chisaka
158
bedeutet die Befreiung von weltlichen Dingen und damit unscrc Selbstwerdung. Wenn hierin die Selbst-Verneinung den hochsten Grad erreicht, das Selbst sich
auf
sich
Gott
und
sich selbst versenkt
tief in
konzentiert,
verdichtet
einem
in
alles
sich
Gott uberlaBt und
alles
und
selbst
gelangt zur Verinnerlichung.
Die Selbstverleugnung ist ein Weg, die Liebe Gottes wahrzunehmen, die Verleugnung ist in anderen Worten der Beweis der eigenen Existenz, alles wegzuwerfen bedeutet schlieBlich, alien Reichtum zu erlangen, die ist
Verneinung
gleichz.eitig
die
Armut
Bejahung. Die
ist
ein
GefaB, in
Dinge hineingieBen, und die Reinigung der Erfahrung ist der Versuch, dieses GefaB zur vergroBern. Ohne zu schreiben und ohne zu sprechen inbriinstig das Beispiel Christi nachzuahmen.
welches wir
alle
In der Erfahrung und, daraus folgend, gerade auch im Experiment,
das
der Weg, den uns Franziskus konkret und direkt gezeigt hat. Die Minoritenbriider, welche sich unter Franziskus zusammen
ist
gefunden
hatten,
gleichen
verstanden, lehnten alle ab,
und weil
Dingen
sie eine
Gemiites
ihm
mit
waren
und
sein
Herz
Macht, welche aus weltlichem Besitz hervorging
Gemeinschaft wurden, die
befreit hatte, laBt sich sagen,
sich
von alien weltlichen
daB die Franziskaner den Charakter
und verbreiteten Kongregation aufwiesen. Ein weiterer Grund fur ihre Verbreitung iiber alle Stadte und Dorfer hinweg als Kongregation von Menschen ungeachtet aller gcsellschaftlichcn Untereiner natiirlich gewachsenen
schiede wie Beruf, sozialer
Sowohl
in
Rang und
den Stadten
als
Stellung
auch
ist
in
hierin zu sehen.
den Dorfern, ohne Ansehen
des Berufes, des Standcs und des Ranges gesellschaftlicher Unterschiede waren sie iiberall verbreitet, und deshalb ist es nur natiirlich, daB sich die
Lehre des Franziskus der ganzen Welt ihr,
tiefe
stimmten
mitteilte, die
ihr einhellig bei, driickten ihre
Verehrung in ihren Herzen. Jedoch wendeten sich die
Menschen
fiihlten
mit
Zustimmung aus und fiihlten
Franziskaner
nach
dem
Tode
des
Franziskus von dem, was er urspriinglich gewollt hatte, ab und anderten ihren Charakter, indem sie sich, wie auch die Dominikaner, dem Studium der Wissenschaften zuwandten. So ergab es sich zwangslaufig, daB sie die Wissenschaften und die Prinzipien der Vernunft erforschten und dafiir
Abstraktion und festgelegte Begriffe forderten und sich eine allgemeine und objektive Theorie erwarben. Diese griechische Tradition, welche hatte ungemein zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaften bcigetragen hatte, Franziskus ganzlich ausgeschlossen. Was fur ihn bedeutend war, war allein
Uber die Bedeutung der Erfahning bei Franz von Assist die
dcr Wissenschaften
fern
halten.
und vereinfacht
wird,
und
Mysteriums,
gottlichen
aufrichtigc
Erfahrung fern
allcr
59
wissen-
Tradition, im gegenteil, er wollte sich von der Entwicklung
schaftlicher
gereinigt
und
einfache
unmittelbare,
1
dem MaBe, entdeckt man in In
hierin
sich
laBt
Tendenz im denken der Franziskaner
in
dem
ihr
die
die
die
Erfahrung Wahrheit des mystische
eigentliche
finden.
Folgen wir z.B. Bonaventura, so lassen sich die einzelnen Stufen der Reise der Seele zu Gott bei sorgfaltiger Forschung genau und logisch erforschen. Die Frage nun, ob, wie etwa bei Bonaventura, sich die einzelnen Stufen der Reise der Seele zu Gott sorgfaltig und genau und logisch erforschen lassen, oder in
ob man die Erkenntnis, welche man nicht
der Theorie erlangt, der mystischen Intuition iiberlassen
sollte,
diese
Frage erhob sich gleichzeitig mit der Tradition der Wissenschaft und war moglicherweise
zum
erstenmal Gegenstand dieser Diskussion.
Fur Franziskus
mehr noch,
es
nichts,
war eine solche Diskussion
gab gar keinen
Raum
fur
sie.
die
vollig
unnotig,
Gerade im Leben des
war der eigene Korper, das Selbst
Beispiels Christi
und weil
selbst
die Absicht gewesen,
Erfahrung vollig ausreichte, gab es dariiber hinaus was noch notig gewesen ware. dafiir
Bei Franziskus z.B. war die Erfahrung ein vertieftes, verinnerlichtes
Erleben und jeder konnte
in
diese
fur
Intuition
begreifen,
Armut und Bescheidenheit und Keuschheit die
weder eine entwickelte Wissenschaft,
noch Gelehrsamkeit notig war. Natiirlich war das Begehen dieses Weges eine ureigene Gnade, und von Gott gesegnet, er sollte das Mysterium sein.
Da
aber die Erfahrung von einfacher, klarer Natur sein sollte, war das Mysterium des Franziskus ganzlich ohne jede hergcbrachte Tradition, es
war neu und
frisch,
mehr noch, es war klarer Mystizismus. in ein Leben der Armut, gerade die Abwendung von
Die Versenkung
den irdischen Dingen war das Mysterium, es war eine Mystik, die jeder durch seine eigene Erfahrung verwirklichen konnte. In der Armut Christi nachfolgen, in der Erfahrung das Beispiel Christi leben, dergestalt durch diese
Erfahrung
erblickend,
durch
die
zu
Mensch-Sein
das
muBte man
in
Worten
im
menschgewordenen
das Reich der strahlenden greifende
Predigt,
Gnade
nicht
Christus
gelangen. Nicht
durch
die
durch
Gelehrsamkeit iiberzeugen wollende Theorie, sondern durch die direkte, konkrete Erfahrung empfangt man die klare und deutliche Liebe Gottes.
Die Absicht des Franziskus jedoch wurde durch die damaligen gesellschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, durch die Tradition der Wissenschaften und
Chisaka
160
Probleme inncrhalb dcr Kongrcgation und viclcs andcre mchr verandert. Natiirlich war dicsc Verandcrung cin unauswcichliches Ergebnis. durch
Die Tradition dcs Franziskus jedoch Sic
ist
die
Grundlage
ist
nichts andcrcs als die Erfahrung.
seiner Lehre.
der EinfluB von allgemein bekannt, war im 13. Jahrhundert Aristoteles bestimmend, vor allem war es seine Metaphysik, welche
Wie
die
Gcdankenwelt
verschiedenen
des
Mittelalters
man
Universitat in Paris hielt
Logikcr und
man nahm
Schon damals
seine
der
ihn fur eincn wichtigen Metaphysiker
und
Kontinents,
aber
besonders
Methode der Begriffsanwendung
man
loste
den
an
des
Universitatcn
An
beeinfluBte.
nachhaltig
sich
positiv auf.
an der Universitat Oxford von den
dcr hergebrachten Autoritaten und der Geist der positiven Fcststellung und Urteile beruhender Begriffe und der auf eigcner Interpretation
Meinungen stand Studium
in
ebenso dcr Gcist der
Bliite,
der Heiligen Schrift hinein wirkte
und
Kritik, der
auch
als Bibelkritik
in
das
bcdeutsam
wurde.
Beim Studium dcr wahrnehmbaren Welt bediente man
sich
dcr
Naturwisscnschaft und dcr Thcologie und dcr Philosophisch-Naturwissenschaftlichcn Fakultat und vcrglichcn mit dcr Universitat Paris hatte in
Natur groBc Fortschrittc gcmacht. Auf der sich die Lchre des Franziskus in England, anderen Seite jedoch mit dem Kontincnt, besonders schnell vcrbreitct. Die ersten in
Oxford
das
Studium
dcr
hattc
verglichen
in Armut und Geniigsamkeit England gclandetcn Minoriten-Briidcr hatten verwirklicht und ich Franziskus und in rciner Naivitat die Lehrc dcs nchme an, daB wahrschcinlich der Kontakt von Robert Grossetcste mit den
Mindcrcn Briidern und der schaft cine entscheidcnde
Eintritt
Alexander von Hales
in die
Bruder-
Vcranderung bcwirkt haben.
Hattc die cinsetzendc Amtcrverteilung im Dicnstc dcr Lehre Gottes nicht ncgiercn konncn, wiirdc gestanden, hattc man die Gelchrsamkeit aber dem Geist dcr Armut die Gelchrsamkeit hinzugcfugt, wiirdc die
Wirkung eine ungchcurc Wisscnschaften ein Grund
sein,
und auf jedcn
fur die
Fall
war das Studium der
Vcranderung dcs Charakters der Brudcr-
schaft.
dem dem
Dicse Art zu denken entstand auch bci den Minderen Briidern auf Kontinent. Aber es gab auch Punkte, in denen sich das Denken von der Briider in England unterschied, z.B. den, daB auf dem Kontinent
Betrachtungen und Kommentare der Naturwissenschaftlcr den wichtigsten Hauptstrom darstellten, wohingegen unverandcrt
die
Aristotelischen
Uber die Bedeutung der Erfaiming bei Franz von Assisi
161
England die Beobachtung und das wisscnschaftliche Experiment das positive Studium bestimmten. in
Besonders Robert Grosseteste,
alter
als
Franziskus und an einem
von ihm weit entfernten Orte lebend, dazu von starrsinnigem Naturell, diirfte Franziskus personlich nicht gekannt haben. Und doch lernte er die
Gesinnung des Franziskus verehren und
nachdem
Gefiihl
ihr
in
einem besonderen
dem nach England
mil
er
zugetan sein, gelangten Franziskanern in Beriihrung gekommen war. Grosseteste hatte die Lehren des Aristoteles gut gekannt und von ihnen guten Gebrauch gemacht, nicht
ohne jedesmal
von ihnen zu fordern, und er hatte so auf der Grundlage eigener Erfahrungen zu den Studien der Natur beigetragen. Roger Bacon war geistiger nachfolger dieses Grosseteste und Adam alles
von Marsh. Zur Zeit Bacons nahm die Abhangigkeit von den althergebrachten Autoritaten ab und wurde schwacher und man befragte jetzt direkt
die
Heilige Schrift und studierte das Griechentum. Zitieren wir
Empirismus des Claude Bernard zum Punkte der
den
z.B.
bestimmung wie
L Empirisme inconsciente
pratique
Begriffs-
folgt:
n est
meme
autre
rien
comme
et
chose
instinctive
qu une
acquise
d experience habitude et la
sort
par
1
des choses.
Wie verwandt
ist diese Definition der von Bacon, auf der Grundlage der Mathematik die unbekannte Tatsache durch das Experiment zu beweisen. Die Tatsache, daB er namlich ohne vorgegebene Beweise und Kommentare
verfuhr, zeigt seine Orinigalitat, Scientia
Diese
Experimentalis
ist,
und wenn Grosseteste der Ursprung der muB Bacon als ihr Vollender gelten.
dann
Dinge verdanken ihren Urspung keineswegs nur einem
sondern
hier
wirkte
charakteristischer
erfolgreich
die
Weiterentwicklung
Merkmale der Oxforder Franziskaner
Zufall,
traditioneller
nach. Sic beruhen
namlich nicht auf spekulativen Anmerkungen und Kommentaren, sondern sind ein Weg der Erkenntnis, die sich auf experimentelle Weise und in selbstbewuBter Untersuchung herausbildete.
Die Briidern
Originalitat
herkamen,
Ockham und
der
unter
andere,
und
Denker, welche von den Franziskanischen auch Duns Scotus und Wilhelm von
ihnen ihre
auf einem
freien
Geist
und
geistiger
Erleuchtung beruhenden Erfolge konnen nicht geleugnet werden. Diese, Manner eines reichen und kritischen Geistes, gaben dem Denken cine neue Richtung,
1
Cl.
indem
sie
die
Erfahrung
zum Kernpunkt
Bernard, Principe de Medecine experimentale, 44.
ihres
Forschens
Chisaka
162
Hier entstand im Abwerfen dcr abstrakten und spckulativen
machtcn.
Erkenntnis und der philosophischen Bcweisfiihrung durch die Annahme einer direkten und eindcutigen Mcthode dcr Erkenntnis, welche auf der
Erfahrung beruhte, als dem einzig richtigen Verfahren ein neues Denken. Dies wurde zum Ursprung eines Empirismus, welcher als Morgenrote eines neuzeitlichen Geistes als sein Ursprung auf die Entstehung einer
drangte und die Morgendammerung einer 20. Jahrhunderts verkiindete. Naturlich bedarf des groBen Geistesstromung es eingehender Diskussionen, ob es zwischen dem Leben des Beispiels
Wissenschaft
neuzeitlichen
Christi bei Franziskus
und seinem Leben
in
Armut und dem Empirismus,
welcher ja in Wirklichkeit England entstand, eine direkte Beziehung kcin endgiiltiges Urtcil fallen. gibt oder nicht. Auch wir konncn dariiber in
die
Dennoch,
Menschen
inncrhalb
Franziskus trugen in ihren Herzen
der
englischen
Bruderschaft
eine tiefe Verehrung
fiir
des
Franziskus,
und im einflihlendcm Verstandnis seines Gemiites sctzten sic sein Leben in Armut in cine positive Praxis urn, und daB sic von da aus ihr eigcnes neues SelbstbewuBtscin
und
ihrc
eigenc
Originalitat
entdcckten,
daran
kann cs kcinen Zwcifel geben. Naturlich kann man nicht sagen, daB der Ursprung des Empirismus allcin auf der Person des Franziskus beruht.
Abcr
es
ist
leicht vorstellbar,
daB
Elcmente des Franziskus wirktcn und
Empirismus Erfahrung,
Rahmen
gcstaltete
und
es
laBt
hohem MaBe wesentlichc Wescn die Erfahrung zum
hier in sein sich
zum Gemiit geworden, von neuem,
durchaus
folgern,
daB
gleich einer Revolution,
die
den
der Scholastik sprcngte und so zur Antricbskraft einer ncuen
Entwicklung des Dcnkens wurde.
Kyoto Seika University
LAMBROS COULOUBARITSIS
Theorie dc dans
Au
cours de
d idealisme
la
Somme
la
connaissancc ct
Theologique,
mise en question qu
la
de son epoque, dans
Thomas
Tlieologique, S.
de connaitre
les
considere que
la
souleve
impossible. scientificite
de
S.
la
physique
Thomas d Aquin
entreprend de toutes Q. 84 de la Pars de
probleme de
la possibilite
montre
1
la
Somme
la
pour
I
ame
science physique qui deviendrait
au
importance qu il accorde theorie de la connaissance.
physique et Je souhaite, ici, relever ce lien entre theorie de la
de
formes
les
corps d une facon intellectuelle. Or, d entree de jeu, il science se trouve dans Pintelligence et que celle-ci doit
connaitre les corps, sans quoi c est
Cela
Q. 84 dc
il
la
le
dc
scicntificilc
la Pars,
rapport
entre
connaissance
la
et
physique dans le texte en question, en tenant compte de son Commentaire de la Physique d Aristote, ou cependant S. Thomas scientificite
la
occulte le sens reel de la
demarche d Aristote qui accentue
le
caractere
instaurateur de sa physique au detriment d un lien immediat et exclusif
entre
scientificite
evidence
1
et
theorie de la connaissance 1
de
originalite
1
analyse
de
.
Par
Thomas
S.
la
je
dans
mettrai en la
Somme
Tfieologique. II apparaitra ainsi que ce texte constitue un des temoins d un deplacement de centre de gravite de la metaphysique traditionnelle,
qui prepare le critique
Des
les
d Aristote,
dans
1
S.
matiere.
la
connaissance.
premieres lignes de son Commentaire du Traite de Physique Thomas affirme que dans la mesure ou toute science est
intellect,
intelligible
moderne de
il
faut
comprendre quelque chose comme etant rendu il est, en un certain sens, abstrait de la
en acte en tant qu
De
sorte
que s il existe differentes sciences, c est parce que les choses se rapportent differemment a la matiere. A cette premiere premisse fondamentale de sa pensee,
S.
statut
il
en ajoute une autre, tout aussi importante:
Thomas d Aquin, Opera Omnia, de
ce
texte,
voir
A.
ed.
Mansion,
Leonine, "Sur
le
Sur de editions des Commentaires de
II,
Rome,
texte
de
1884,
la
I,
lectio
version
1.
le
latine
la
S. Metaphysique et de la Physique d Aristote dans les Thomas d Aquin", Re\>ue Neoscolastique de Philosophic, 34, 1934, pp. 65-69,ainsi que lnroduction de VJ. Bourke a la traduction anglaise du Commentaire a la Physique d Aristote, par R.J. Blackwell, R.J. Spath et W. Edmund Thirlkel, Routledge-Kegan Paul, XV-XXXII. Londres, 1963, pp. I
Couloubaritsis
164
dans
la
dans
la
mcsure ou, dit-il, chaquc science mcsure aussi ou la definition
demonstration,
definition
interesse le present
est
le
et
demonstration,
moyen terme dans une
neccssaire que les sciences soicnt distinguees selon
est
il
modes de
divers
est etablic par
2 .
De
deux premisses, seule la premiere cepcndant, elle ne semblc pas, du
ces
Comme
travail.
telle
moins a premiere vue, de grandc utilite pour son Commentaire de la Physique, qu clle soit ou non sous-jacente a tout ce quc S. Thomas dit de abstraction ct du statut de objet de la physique. Son importance 1
1
apparait surtout dans
Q. 84 en question. Quoiquc cette premisse puisse Traite dc I Ame d Aristote, celui-ci ne la porte
la
trouver un appui dans sur
jamais surtout
le
dans
plan 1
le
d une
ordre de
illustration
systematisation,
la
sa
connaissance des
donne
du
statut
de
thematisation
Seules,
intelligibles.
amc
limilant
se
scion
d une
Pentelechie
qu premiere et intelcchic seconde a partir d une science comme possedce et d une science en acte ct, d autre part, la clarification qu il ajoute dc 1
part,
il
I
1
cette
et
possession
de son actualisation, c est-a-dire
le
theorem
qu elle domaine
rend possible, permettent d entamer cette thematisation vers le d une possible integration dc la science dans Pintellect. Cela suppose que science en acte soit egalement
cette
identique a
la
chose dont
est
ellc
Aristote admet que Pintellcct est (III, 7, 431al-2). Mais alors qu un eidos eidon, et meme que le sens est un eidos aisthcton (III, 9, 432alest une cpistcme episteton. Pourtant I intellect 3), jamais il nc dit que science
une
ne serait pas incompatible a
assertion
telle
rapports entre intellect et science,
1
idee qu
notamment quand
une etude plus approfondic de son oeuvre devrait montrer, s
quc
il
evite
instauration,
pareille les
sens,
assertion, la
constituc, des le depart,
de
1
C est
evolution
de
1
pour dire que
c est
memoire une
ct
faculte
quc 1
de
la
il
sc
me
semble-t-il,
hommc,
1
intcllect
qui se manifeste au
fil
ct s actualise par 1 action des intelligibles d une identification cntrc intellect et science these
embryon la
des
Mais
science suppose, dans son
imagination, tandis que 1
fait
les identifie.
il
.
vue. L absence au plus complexe qu elle n apparait a premiere demeurant d une thematisation plus decisive de cette perspective chez est
Aristote nous oblige d etre prudent.
pas beaucoup plus simples, dans co-extcnsivite
z
Id. ibid.,
de
rintellect
et
la
de
Thomas, les choscs nc sont mesure ou cclui-ci n affirme jamais la
Chez
la
S.
science,
mais
soutient
sculement
I, 1.
Sur cette question, je me permets dc renvoyer le lecteur a mon etude du Nous ihurathen", dans Melanges E.P. Papanoutsos, Athenes, 1980, 159-197.
"Le
probleme
Tlicorie
dc la connaissance
de
et scientificite
la
165
physique
appartcnancc de la science a 1 intcllect. Toutefois, comme il prolonge sensiblement Aristote sur ce point et envisage cette identification comme une premisse de son etude de la science, cette proposition prend une 1
autre dimension et devient centrale dans sa pensee.
En
d autres termes,
que chez Aristote cette question est presente dans ces textes mais en restant toujours en retrait, chez S. Thomas, en revanche, elle acquiert tandis
C est ce glissement decisif, qui atteste, nous le de celui-ci et une ouverture vers la verrons, Poriginalite pensee moderne. Quant a la seconde premisse, celle qui affirme que chaque science une nouvelle consistance.
est
etablie
moyen
par demonstration et qui situe d une demonstration, elle
problematique, car S.
elle se refere,
Thomas en
a
comme
me de
du
sur le plan
beaucoup
parait
d ailleurs
theorie
la
definition
la
terme
la suite
plus
de Pexpose de
des Seconds temoigne, d Aristote, qui n est pourtant jamais prise en consideration 1 instar de la plupart des par celui-ci dans ses oeuvres scientifiques. science
la
Analytiques
A
commentateurs anciens,
S.
Thomas
s
efforce de
comprendre
entre
le lien
ce type de science et Pexpose scientifique du Stagirite, sans jamais se la de savoir il s n poser question y a pas entre ces deux demarches une incompatibilite interpretes
de
fait
meme
ou
de
droit.
modernes d Aristote ont montre
Depuis longtemps deja, la difficulte de concilier
les la
theorie de la science selon Aristote et sa pratique des textes, et n ont cesse d insister sur cette incompatibilite de fait; mais, a leur tour, ils s interrogent sur son statut comme crois Pavoir peu reel, qui est, je
montre
quelques-unes de mes etudes, une incompatibilite non seulement de fait mais de droit 4 J ai montre que cette pratique d Aristote
dans
.
encore que Papplication d une demonstration - celle-ci seulement une reconstitution retrospective d un savoir
est plus originaire
constituant
deja
dans
acquis
la
mesure
ou
elle
concerne
Pinstauration
meme
des
principes. Plus concretement, cette instauration des principes n est pas de
Pordre
de
la
principalement
demonstration selon
un
mais
mode
dialectique refutative et des
de
Pargumentation;
aporetique,
ou
se
elle
Aristote
deploie
associe
methodes plus productives, parmi
une
lesquelles
Voir, en plus de mon livre, L a\>enemcnt de la science physique. Essai sur la Physique d Aristote, Ousia, Bruxelles, 1980, mes articles "Dialectique et Philosophic chez Centre de Recherches sur la Philosophic Aristote", Philosophia (Annales du grecque de Acade mie d Athenes), 8-9, 1978-79, 229-256; "Sophia et Philosophia chez Aristote", Annales de I lnstitut de Philosophic de I Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1979, 7-38; "Y-at-il une intuition des principes chez Aristote?", Rc\ ue Internationale de 1
Philosophic,
133-134,
1980,
440^71;
"Rhetorique,
dialectique
et
critique
metaphysique a la rhetorique, ed. M. Meyer, Bruxelles, 1986, 103-118.
chez
Aristote",
De
la
166
Couloubaritsis
figurcnt
1
induction, la division et
5 1
etant systematiquement elude par
argumcntation philosophiquc 1
Ce
.
point
interpretation traditionnelle bien avant
comprend que la demarche de S. Thomas perde de vue essentiel de la Physique d Aristote et de la conception chose d quelque de la science de celui-ci. Dans le cas particulicr qui nous preoccupe ici, il ne discerne pas suffisamment que le livre I de la Physique ne se contente notre epoque, on
pas seulement de mettre en relief des principes, mais les institue comme condition de la scientificite d une etude du devenir, a partir d une analyse
demarche philosophique
d une
et
logico-ontologique
occultation, S.
une demarche qui comprend autrement c est-a-dire une demarche axee, d une definition
et
Pintellection. inscrire,
C est texte
(c est-a-dire
d une
principes). Mais paradoxalement, en se permettant cette Thomas met en place, a partir de ses propres premisses,
methode des
de
la
demonstration
Autrement
dans
1
dit,
de
histoire
1
la
et,
la
scientificite
sur
part,
d autrc
occultation
la
de
la
pensee scientifique,
bien cettc seconde justification relative a
la
lui
sert
a
propre originalite.
intellection
1
de
question de
du texte d Aristote sa
physique,
question
sur
part,
la
qu eclaire
le
6
la Somme theologique auquel je me refere Comme on le sait, les Q. 84 a 86 de ce texte
de
.
s
intcrrogent au sujet
la connaissance par 1 ame des realites corporelles lorsqu elle est unie au corps. Cctte etude se deploie selon trois etapes: la premiere traite du moycn par lequel se realise cette connaissance (Q. 84), la seconde se
de
dcmande comment
et
selon
troisieme ctudie ce que
contexte
done,
la
I
qucl
amc
ordre
elle
ct
la
Dans
ce
en question en cernant
le
s
accomplit
(Q.
85)
connait de ces realites (Q. 86).
Q. 84 introduit
1
analyse
Voir la note precedcnte. Je dois cepcndant preciser un point qui n cst pas toujours suffisamment mis en evidence dans mes etudes preccdcntcs: importance de la methode de "division" che/. Aristote. Ix; role de cettc methode a etc systematiquement neglige en particulier par ses interpretes. Pourtant, tout porte a croirc qu elle est ccntrale, pour instauration des principes, et ceci scion divers precedes, dont le plus originaire est la recherche des differents sens d un tcrme (second instrument dc la dialectique), et le mieux articule se trouve expressemcnt etabli au debut de la Physique (I, 1, 184al6-26) (cf. mon livre cite a la note precedente, 76 ss.). J ai insiste sur importance Un de cette methode dans plusieurs etudes recentcs, comme par exemple, "LT-tre et 49-98 et chez Aristote", Re\ ue de Philosophic ancienne, 143-195; I, 1983, de philosophic grecque", dans Doctrines et Concepts. Cinquante ans dc Philosophic langue franqaise, 1937-1987, ed. A. Robinet, Vrin, Paris, 1988, 89-108, 103 et 108. 1
1
1
1
"La
C est la un point sur lequel j ai insiste dans le livre que j ai consacre a la Physique, pour ne pas devoir y revenir plus longuemcnt ici (voir note 3 ci-dcssus). Je rappelle seulement que la scientificite de la physique est etablie par Aristote des le premier ctre et le livre de sa Physique, a partir de deux theses preliminaires, la plurivocite de fait que Yousia est sujet ultime de toute predication, et se trouve definitivement fondee au deuxieme livre, par sa theorie des quatre causes. 1
de
Ttieorie
moyen de
la
connaissance
dc
et scientificite
la
167
physique
cettc connaissance. Or, la premiere question qui est posee est
precisemcnt celle qui concerne Pintellection, c est-a-dire, des Particle S.
et
Thomas il
demande
se
souligne que
une
exister
(scientia
ce
naturalis)
1
ame
des
S.
c est
Thomas,
se
science
la
il
ne saurait dans
trouve
de
nature
la
En
corps mobile qui disparait.
le
ayant pour objet
science
la
puisque
corps, dit
cas,
1,
a une connaissance intellectuelle du corps,
Pintelligence ne connait pas les corps,
si
science
Dans
Pintellect.
si
1 enjeu est d une importance considerable, puisque, en premisse selon laquelle la science est dans Pintellect ou, si Pon prefere, dans Pintelligence, il ne peut exister de science de la nature que si Pame peut avoir une connaissance intellectuelle des corps.
d autres termes,
admettant
la
Avant de venir aux arguments qui etayent semble la
utile
bien
la la
de nature au 12 e siecle
Thomas
S.
fait
d autre part, de
et,
textes scientifiques d Aristote.
Cependant,
decouverte parallele des revient au texte meme
la
Pon
si
d Aristote, on constate que celui-ci ne considere pas
comme un une
fait
mais
applique a
s
d accent
difference
me
il
agit comme s il considerait que on ne qu peut pas mettre en question. d une d une rehabilitation de la notion consequence, part,
de remarquer que
science physique etait un
C est
cette affirmation,
mais
instaurer
1
de
7
et
fond,
la
elle
explique
glissement de Panalyse de S. Thomas. Sculement, et cela
seconde remarque, pour partie incompatible avec
S.
Thomas,
1
science physique
Cette difference n est pas
.
me
en
partie
le
conduit a une
existence d une telle science est en
idealisme, du moins avec idealisme radical qui domine a son epoque. Car, bien entendu, il ne pouvait soupconner, qu un
autre type d idealisme,
d autres
1
1
comme
armes en faveur de
celui
que proposera plus tard Kant, cachait scientificite de la physique, que Kant
la
considere aussi, a Pinstar de S. Thomas,
comme un
fait,
mais cette
fois-ci
selon les donnees d une nouvelle physique, celle de Newton. Cela suffit a faire
voir
que
Panalyse
de
Thomas
S.
se
limite
aux donnees
physique ancienne, preoccupee surtout a etablir des conditions
de ce qui
est mobile, sans lesquelles
Ces eclaircissements
me
une science poserait des
d une
immuables difficultes.
permettent maintenant d aborder plus directement
son analyse.
En
deux
fait,
Je
me
refere
1963 (1930), que je
ici
a
la
traduction
me permets
de
mais
differentes
analyses
enchevetrent dans son expose: choses corporelles, tandis que
s
1
une concerne Pautre
J.
complementaires
Pintelligibilite
meme
des
a
leur
Webert, panic aux editions du Cerf,
Paris,
parfois de corriger.
se
rapporte
surtout
Couloubaritsis
168
La premiere analyse
scientificite.
objections retenues centre
illustree
est
Ce
corps, et la seconde par la troisieme objection.
deux analyses,
lien entre ces la
dans
science est
1
deux premieres
les
par
these d une connaissance intellectuelle du
la
c est
precisement
qui rend possible un
premisse selon laquelle
la
intellect.
La premiere objection sur
1
se refere a S. Augustin (Soliloq. 2.4) et insiste des corps au moyen de 1 intellect, connaissance d une impossibilite
sont
ils
qu
parce
des
Pobjet
sens.
Augustin en expliquant qu il rejette nullement une connaissance par des concerne
objection
d autre
part,
des
connaissance
peuvent appartenir rapport, d une part, entre
le
entre
intellect
realites
solution proposee par S.
et
intelligible,
n est
sprituelles
Thomas
est
immaterielles et
(species)
"especes"
nature
par
qui
intelligibles
Cependant S. Thomas justifie S. une saisie materielle des corps mais a
1
ame.
sens
pour
La seconde sensible
et
indiquer les
par
possible
ct,
qu aucunc sens.
d origine neoplatonicienne, puisqu
La clle
suppose qu une puissance superieure peut exercer 1 acte d une puissance inferieure sous un mode plus elcve, sans quoi on admettrait que Dieu et les anges ne connaissent pas les etres corporels. Ces deux premieres et
objections capacitc
de
les la
reponses que S. Thomas donne insistent bien sur la connaissance intellectuelle, qui n atteint du corps que
Vespccc immaterielle et
intelligible.
De
sorte
premiere analyse constitue une la connaissance intentionnelle qui
qu on pourrait dire que
cette
prcambule a sa problematique de
sorte de suit.
un pas supplemental, dans particulier de la scientificite, a
a la seconde analyse, elle franchit
la
Quant mesure ou
savoir
elle
penetre au domaine
L
necessaire.
le
objcction
qui
surgit
en
1
occurrence centre une
des corps se fonde sur le fait que 1 intellect connaissance concerne des choses qui sont necessaires et qui sont toujours de la meme maniere, tandis que les corps sont, au contraire, mobiles et existent sous intellectuelle
des
modes
la scientificite
suppose entraine
pourquoi
de
la
On comprend
que si cette objection peut concerner science des corps en devenir, c est bien parce qu elle
differents.
comme premisse que la science est dans en meme temps la necessite commune de la
reponse que
S.
le statut
qu
pour comprendre
Thomas donne il
accorde a
1
intellect,
leurs
ce
objets.
qui
C est
a cette objection est capitale
la scientificite
de
la
physique:
"Tout mouvement, dit-i! suppose quelque chose d immqbile: lorsqu il la substance demeure immobile, et a quahtatif, changement y forme substantielle, la matiere la de il a changement lorsqu y demeure immobile. Meme les choses qui se meuvent ont des bien que Socrate ne soil pas dispositions immobiles: par exemple, 2
de
Tlieorie
la
connaissance
et scicntificitc
de
la
169
physique
il est cependanl immuablement vrai quo lorsqu il est demeurc en un lieu. Par suite, rien n empeche d avoir une science immuable des choses en mouvement".
toujours assis, il
assis,
En
d autres termes, en supposant a
de
et celui
Thomas
la necessite, S.
qua non d une science principalement par son immuabilite, du ses
yeux, sine
Bien plus,
releve
il
changement immobile;
le
si
des
fait
c est
trois la
substance
la
1
la
intellection
condition, a
depuis Platon, se comprend de Pimmobilite de son objet.
qui,
accidents,
changement concerne
demeure immobile;
problemc de
le
immobilite scion
cette
au niveau
fois
la
oriente sa reponse vers
perspectives:
substance
meme,
qui
s
y a
il
demeure
c est le substrat
changement concerne la chose individuelle dans un contexte, la disposition suppose immobilite du lieu. Si S. Thomas se permet cette analyse, qui renvoie a un arriere-fond metaphysique, de la qui
et si le
1
metaphysique ancienne, c est parce que 1 argumentation qui precede ses differentes reponses ou solutions aux objections s appuie sur une de la philosophic prearistotelicienne qui etait preoccupee du conception
moyens de
devenir et des
de Platon revele qu d une sauvegarde de
le
la
position
apport de celui-ci par la recherche certitude de la connaissance intellectuelle en
la
1
mais cela au detriment d une connaissance
etablissant les idees immuables,
possible du mouvement
Son interpretation de
connaitre.
considere
il
matiere, ou prennent egalement part les demonstrations au moyen des causes efficientes et materielles. Des lors,
etablir
que
meme
la
recoil les
immatericl
condition
la
scientificite
est
intellect
de
et
"especes"
immobile,
qui recoit (in recipiente per
Thomas, n
1
mode
sous un
et
de
la
necessaire
necessite.
le
modiim et
recipientis), constitue,
prealable
pour
cela
pour
circonscrire
S. la
il
s
autorise
a
ajouter,
sans
deux modes supplementaires:
statut,
1
en montrer
universalite
et
ici
la
conclut-il, que 1 amc connait les corps au moyen de d une connaissance immatcrielle, universelle et necessaire".
"Disons,
rintelligence,
Cette absence de preuve n amoindrit en rien atteste
mode de
science de la nature. Sans nulle doute cette condition
pas suffisante, puisqu
exactement
des corps materiels et mobiles,
c est-a-dire sous le
non seulement une recherche qui
la
portee de son analyse qui
vise a la saisie
de
rintelligibilite
des corps sensibles, mais aussi au lien incontournable de cette recherche
avec dire,
le
fait
parce
qu
qu
il
il
existc
y
a
une science des corps. C est meme, pourrait-on possibilite d une connaissance intellectuelle de
rintelligibilite propre aux corps sensibles et materiels qu il y a egalement possibilite d une connaissance scientifique de la nature; et, a 1 inverse,
Couloubaritsis
170
c est la
jamais
1
une mediation que la pensee d Aristotc suppose de cette fa?on.
En
guise de conclusion, je peux dire que
concernant cette
certes,
mais sans
etablir
la
de
scientificite
qui
originalite
se
la
physique ne
realise
fait
originalite
de
S.
Thomas
aucun doute. Bien
une
a
grace
1
prolongation
plus,
de
la
problematique aristotelicienne de la science, constitue un dans Phistoire de la pensee occidentale: d abord, parce qu elle s ecarte d une approche symbolique des choses de la nature, issue de la tradition
tournant decisif
8
dionysienne
et
,
ensuite,
la
raison
pure
lie
qu
parce
elle
une
inaugure
sommet chez Kant, dont
epistemologique qui attcindra son
une
expressement
theorie
de
la
demarche
la Critique
connaissance,
de
ou
de
la scientificite ccpendant d une science physique qui cst consideree comme un fait. Dans cette une position histoire, la position de S. Thomas me semble constituer
Pintellection
est
ccartce,
a
la
question
C charniere, qui ouvre aux conceptions de la physique de la fin dcs 13 et 14 C siecles, mais dont un des defauts tient dans sa reference a une
physique qui
s
avercra, quelques siecles plus tard,
comme
insuffisante.
Universite dc Bruxelles
8
Qu on
pourrait qualifier de
de M.-D. Chenu,
La
theologie
"mentalite
au douzieme
symbolique",
siecle,
pour reprendre
Vrin, 1976, 159-209, 159.
ici
une expression
ANDRE GODDU
The
and Demonstrability among Fourteenth-Century Ockhamists Dialectic of Certitude
The paper begins with
few general remarks about probability, which arc followed by a brief discussion of the difference between the late medieval and modern understanding of the word "evidence". Then, I turn
to the subject proper;
developments this
more
The modern
common
notion
inductive
inference
construed
in
and
general
of
no
to a
number
title
of
in
expression a
as
way
I].
definitive history of the
of individual instances.
namely of quantification
probability,
century [Sheynin, 137; Hacking, point,
as used in the
"ockhamist"
the character of a family-resemblance term than a
description of an attribute
a
consider very briefly important, relevant
I
finally,
Ockham. The term
after
paper has
a
mathematical
discovery
or
terms,
invention
In spite of general
may be
of the
17th
agreement on
emergence of probability has
of
that
been
yet
written, but the evidence gathered so far suggests the following emphasis:
The development
that
distinguishes
later
from
earlier
conceptions
of
emergence of an empirically or inductively grounded notion of empirical ratios, that is, statistically stable ratios. There was a the
probability
is
qualitative
idea
of
statistical
probabilities,
but
not
yet
an
empirical
recognition of the stability of statistical ratios. In other words, a notion of frequency 122-27].
The
is
not the
transition
same to
as a calculation of frequencies [Van Brakel,
empirical
study did not
conceptual revolution alleged by Ian Hacking [Garber
require the sort of
and
Zabell, 33].
On
seem to be part of a major conceptual development that involves the transition from deductivism to inductivism and to a conception of science that accommodates the accidental, so that
the other hand, the transition does
what occurs by chance or randomly can be studied and known [Van The modern sense of probability, then, should be 134].
Brakel,
distinguished from a
which
is
associated
and with what
is
more
qualitative
historically
approvable
in
and
intuitive
sense of probability,
with verisimilitude, with what the sense of being likely to
given case [Hacking, 18-30; Sheynin, 117-21, 139-41].
is
likely,
work
in a
Goddu
172
We may
modern notion
the
that
infer
additionally
of probability
depends on a conception of evidence that was available prior to the 17th century, but certainly "evidence" was used differently in the 14th century. In
make
order to
Ockham notion
of
intuition.
immediate included
point as clear as possible,
this
understanding of
s
Ockham
s
addition
in
would suggest
intuition
terms,
as
propositions
I
corresponds more
and
In
apprehension,
self-evident
"evidence"
well
such
to as
is
restricted
to
Ockham
cognition
conclusions
that
modern
to the
demonstrated
from evidently known necessary propositions. Evidence in the modem sense, however, is understood to be in the service of indirect knowledge
and usually inductive knowledge failure to be explicit about
at
The
great deal of confusion.
that
The notion
Hanson,
[Achinstein, 1-9;
this difference
53-62].
has been the source of a
of evidence as evidence of something
else suggests inductive support for a hypothesis. To attribute that notion without qualification to any philosopher of the 14th century constitutes an anachronistic fallacy. For Ockham, intuitive cognition does not "provide
rather does
evidence,"
cause evident assent [Ord.,
it
Adams, 390-92]. As is well known, Ockham required
Prol.,
q.
1;
the object as partial cause of a
natural intuitive cognition. In addition, an evident cognition requires the
correspondence between an objective content and the then,
"Evidence,"
means
the
objective content and an act
act
of judgment.
agreement between an of judgment [Quodl., V, 4]. While knowledge correspondence
or
correspondence, not all certain truths, for example theological truths, possess the warrant of evidence or direct apprehension. Such truths are believed because there is strictly speaking no requires
such
apprehended correspondence, even though such correspondence to be certainly true [Ord., Prol., q. 7].
is
believed
Hence, according to Ockham s account, there are three kinds of evident knowledge and three sources of evident truth: self-evidence, demonstrated
conclusions
propositions, and
the certainty of faith
are
nonevident.
but
certain
adherence. Accordingly, Scripture,
rational
introduced
discourse
a
source
Such
Ockham
discourse,
inadvertently is
from
strictly
evidently
known
necessary
and immediate experience. As Ockham s views on and Scripture reveal, however, there are truths that
direct
a
possess
the
certainty
of
distinguished three sources of certitude:
and
confusion
only
truths
of
immediate
experience.
when he suggested
evident
certainty.
In
that fact,
Ockham rational
Ockham
Certitude
maintained
well
as
and Demonstrability among Ockhamists that
nonevidently known
of
identification
initial
adherence.
In
in
some
discursive
the
fact,
arguments
The source
conclusions.
non-evident details
of
with
own account
s
of
certainty
third
a
suggest
Ockham
of demonstrable propositions [Ord.,
characteristics II,
Ockham
is
addition to evident certainty and the certainty of adherence.
category This result emerges from a brief consideration of
Sent.,
the
73
but
certain
yield
of this ambiguity
certainty his
1
qq. 12-13; Sent.,
Ill, q. 8;
Quodl. IV,
6;
S
d.
L.,3,
views on the
s
30,
and
1
qq.
3;
1,1].
Although rational discourse is a source of evident certainty, Ockham maintained that propositions which must be demonstrated are initially dubitable.
the
Ockham
respect to the demonstrability of existence, essence,
obstacles with
attributes, strict
on demonstration are well known, namely
s restrictions
and cause. The end
effect
is
few cases
that there are
to
which
demonstration applies [Webering, 85-172]. In addition, there are conclusions arrived at discursively by
means
of induction. Although inductive inferences follow from experience, the
are not known evidently, because our knowledge of them on the consistency of the laws of nature, which are not first depends
conclusions
self-evident,
principles,
Nevertheless, necessary, 18,6].
In
probable.
Ockham
and certain
Ockham
s
They are
nor
demonstrable,
knowable.
intuitively
held that inductively inferred propositions are true, [Ord.,
d.
2,
q.
10;
Sent.
Ill,
Exp. Elench.,
1;
q.
terms, then, such propositions are both certain and true,
although
the
certainty
of their
truth
evident. Their probability refers to the fact that their necessity
is
is
not
neither
logical nor metaphysical but only hypothetical. Evident experience serves The effect to cause. as a foundation for demonstration from
generalization of such inferences inductively does not yield evidently true, necessary,
and certain propositions, but probably
certain conclusions.
It
necessary,
true,
follows that our knowledge of nature
falls
under the category of probable knowledge. Ockham s views on demonstrability can be summarized class
of
probable
propositions
dubitable propositions, for
and some are with
the
false.
class
propositions,
for
of
The
some
is
not
coextensive
with
broadly
briefly.
the
and
class
The of
dubitable propositions are demonstrable
class of certain propositions
self-evident,
some nonevident
demonstrable,
or
is
not coextensive
intuitively
known
propositions are true, necessary, and
Probable propositions, then, are coextensive with the class of nonevidently true, hypothctically necessary, and certain propositions. certain.
Goddu
174
Because the expression better
perhaps certainty,
which
probable
but
certain
in
"probable
render
to
seems confused
certainty"
certainty
as
"relative"
or
to
us,
it
is
"nonevidcnt"
turn must be distinguished from yet a third class of
uncertain
propositions
reducible to clearly
such
(or
are
probable)
neutrally
certain
nonevidently
propositions.
because
they
evident sources. Hence, they do not remove
Probably are all
not
doubt,
nor do they end the process of questioning. Probable propositions, which
seem
to constitute a large part of natural philosophy, invite further
and
deeper inquiry. Much has quite rightly been made of imaginative possibilities in 14th-century theology and natural philosophy, but just as important is the constructive skepticism which the ambiguity so well captured by certitude"
suggests
[Miethke,
193].
By
"constructive
skepticism"
"probable
is
meant
the following: 1) questions about the reliability of inferences from effect to cause, 2) doubts as to whether or not the genuine cause of an event
had been correctly isolated and identified, 3) the shadow this doubt casts on the generalization of such causes by means of inductive inference, and 4)
skepticism to
is
critical
phenomena could be deduced. Such
constructive because the questions and doubts are challenges
provide support.
In
few words as possible, a feeling of general
as
knowledge was accompanied by ever greater distance about inferences from sense experience and the reliability
certainty
of
shadow about the formulation of
the insecurity at the center of this
natural laws from which the observed
about
natural
and constructive critical distance, Imagination, are presuppositions of an experimental philosophy which has
generalization.
skepticism
abandoned completely the ideal of demonstrative rigor. Ockham nor did certainly did not abandon the Aristotelian ideal of demonstration, modal s use of it. Ockham for substitute clear he offer some strategies not
and hypothetical arguments was an implausibly
in the
end a merely formal concession to
rigid conception of science.
The dialectical context of 14th-century discussions makes the story somewhat more complicated than general summaries suggest, but the extremes of the dialectic have not been altered so much by subsequent research skeptical
as
to
falsify
the
general
pattern,
namely
that
an
explicitly
account position was countered by a positivistically reductive The moderate more a positivist or position. turn, provoked
which,
in
logical
account
belongs,
of
course,
to
Nicholas
of Autrecourt
whose
response to explicitly held skepticism was to reduce certitude to evident
Certitude
nonevident
eliminated
Nicholas
certitude.
and Demonstrability among Ockhamists
175
and
certitude
with
any which might be attached to different degrees of probability. to say, a probable proposition may itself be only more probable it
significance
That
is
than
its
more
opposite, not necessarily closer to the truth and in that sense
true [Universal Treatise, 106].
The standard
response, such as Buridan
validity of experience q.
s,
was
to fall
back on the
and the method of incomplete induction [Physics
I,
15]. Although not capable of generating absolutely evident conclusions,
does
induction
Buridan
s
possess
evidence
certainty of inductive
the
extent
account,
"evidence"
is
a
in
sense
hypothetical
inference
is
and to
that
not merely subjective.
In
used to refer to both direct and indirect
knowledge. Buridan included the conclusions of inductive arguments under evidently known propositions without ascribing to them the same degree of certainty that
conclusions
first
principles have. Buridan avoided characterizing the
inferences
of inductive
propositions always
as
probable,
retain a hypothetical
propositions are at best highly probable.
Oresme
inductively
yet
character.
It
will
known
follows that such
not hesitate to call
propositions probable [Maier, 393-403]. Because of the probable character of inductive inference and because an explanatory function is
such
attributed to inductive generalizations, Buridan
s
be considered as the
to the notion of evidence
in the
modern
At in
this
clear approximation
first
account of evidence can
sense. point, however,
14th-century
analyses.
we arrive at an impasse and sticking-point As we all know, hypothetical reasoning
stimulated criticism of Aristotelian natural philosophy. In order to save
was generally sufficient either that the known phenomena could have been otherwise or observed phenomena can be shown to follow from alternative the contingency of the laws of nature,
The
contexts of Buridan
s
it
discussions of evidence and certitude
to
show
that the
theories.
show
that
he was concerned to preserve the possibility of our knowledge of nature.
Unlike
many
inconclusive
accounts,
Buridan
s
general
acceptance
of
explanations firmly on what he took to be a conclusive argument. Indeed, Buridan usually left little doubt that he considered the relevant Aristotelian or his own alternative account to be
Aristotelian
is
based
certainly correct. This sort of conservatism
the second
half of the
[Funkenstein,
III;
14th century, not
is
encountered repeatedly in of all in Pierre d Ailly
least
Grant, 105-24; Maier, 406-413].
Goddu
176
The more
astonishing views
Although
there
attaining
scientific
scientific
is
disagreement
knowledge
Oresme seem
of Nicole
about
whether or
altogether
of
knowledge [Grant, 111-22; Molland, 206-20],
of the problem of the diurnal rotation of the earth
exceptional.
was
he
skeptical
empirical
attaining
Oresme is
of
s
resolution
entirely consistent
the concept of probability which I have sketched above. In that well-known text, Oresme says that the heavens move and not the earth,
with
arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, because they are persuasions which do not conclude evidently" [Oresme, 536]. That is to
"the
say, the
conclusion in behalf of diurnal rotation
as the belief in the that
motion of the heavens
Oresme regarded both
as
more
is
is
probable, but inasmuch
also not evident,
it
seems
or less equally probable. Neither
possessed nonevident or probable certainty. Oresme s reinterpretation of Scripture should be taken as hypothetical, that is, as a possible way of
understanding Scripture should the hypothesis of diurnal rotation turn out to be correct. No sooner does Oresme seem to concede greater probability to the hypothesis of diurnal rotation than
he questions the reasonableness
of such a hypothesis. Seen from the perspective of the standard accounts of certitude, 14th-century natural philosophers including
Oresme
fell
back
on the only remaining source of certitude they possessed, the authority of This view can be termed "ockhamist" as a convenient Scripture. expression,
nothing
more,
in
the
family-resemblance
sense
I
indicated
earlier.
These arguments
remarks in
Book
arguments very
provide I
of
carefully,
reasons, Copernicus
a
significant
context
for
Copcrnicus
De
s
Revolutionibus. Copernicus structured and while he did so in part for rhetorical
his
he was introducing a new kind of controversial conclusions. Just before he
was aware
that
reasoning to support his introduced all of his hypotheses about the motions of the earth in 1.9, Copernicus countered arguments on behalf of geocentricity and geostability in
demonstrative
chapter 8 with arguments that are persuasive rather than The concluding sentence of 1.8 reads:
in character.
see, therefore, that from all of these arguments it is more especially in probable that the earth moves than that it is at rest the case of daily rotations as belonging properly to the earth.
You
The beginning
of
1.9 indicates
how we
are to understand that conclusion:
Therefore, since nothing hinders the mobility of the earth, I think we should now see whether several motions belong to it, so that it can be regarded as one of the wandering stars.
Certitude
By my emphasis on with the
diurnal
and Demonstt-ability among Ockhamists
structure
I
meant the
of the
rotation
earth
The argument begins new idea), which is
following:
a
(hardly
177
advanced as being more probable (a new emphasis), followed by the first genuinely innovative move. The greater probability of diurnal rotation is used to
justify consideration of additional motions,
which
in turn require
the sun to be placed at rest at or near the center of the world. Only
then comes the principal argument in 1. 10: // the hypotheses are true, then the observations of the bounded elongations of Mercury and Venus
and the observations of the retrograde motions of all the planets follow of necessarily. Copernicus summarized the argument in one sentence: these phenomena proceed from the same cause, the motion of the earth." "All
What Copernicus gave
us
is
the
case
first
known
are
me where
to
clearly retroductive reasoning was introduced into astronomy.
Phenomena
observed which would be explicable as a matter of course
probable hypothesis were hypothesis
is
true.
true; hence, there
is
if
a
a reason to think that the
Copernicus went even further: that the observations is taken as a warrant for declaring
follow necessarily from the hypothesis the truth of the hypothesis. There
is, however, one crucially important have ignored purposely. Although the motion of the earth is characterized as a cause of our observations, all of the demonstrations
fact that
I
provided by Copernicus are mathematical, not physical. Precisely because of the necessity with which the conclusions follow from the assumptions, the mathematical demonstrations carried conviction and seemed to provide a causal explanation of the
phenomena. Copernicus himself asserted that mathematicians would be persuaded presumably because only they only would be sufficiently impressed by the demonstrations and the harmony of the system to accept probable assumptions as evidently true.
The use
if
they were physically
is repeated certainly by Galileo and, somewhat does not disappear entirely from Newton s Principia
demonstrations
causal
more
of mathematical demonstrations as
surprising,
[Galileo, 245-46;
discover
the
Newton,
cause
of
III,
Prop. XIII, Th. XIII].
gravitation
meant
that
the
Newton
s
failure to
demonstration
was
incomplete; nevertheless, the mathematical demonstrations of mechanics
seemed
be demonstratively explanatory. In retrospect we can see that Newton to
s
disavowal of hypotheses
is
unpersuasive [General Scholium]. Hypotheses arrived at retroductively are
probable character.
if
they are directly unknowable and yet causally explanatory in
The
directly
unobservable
entities
postulated
as
causes
are
Gocidu
178
precisely because they provide causal explanation by
theoretical
theory and because
they remain to
some degree unknowable,
way
of
fallible,
need of experimental support [McMulKn], It revisable, the 14th-century discussions went some that was this sense of probability distance in developing philosophically, but which fell short of their goal and continuously
in
in part by their lack of mathematical syntax and structure, experimental technique and adequate
to
Aristotelian
supplement
demonstration,
but moreso by the genuine dilemmas posed by the Aristotelian ideal of scientific truth, as that ideal was so rigidly understood in the 14th century.
To sum strategies
science.
up, the 14th-century
for
approximating
None
of
them was
problem of certitude provoked numerous
the
Aristotelian
successful, yet
out
ideal
of
demonstrative
of these efforts
emerged
an increased respect for probable knowledge. Nevertheless, the notion of the presupposes the probable character of hypotheses and and be resisted underdetermination of theory by evidence continued to
science that
disguised well into the 19th century.
University of Notre
Dame
References Achinstein, Peter, ed., Ttie Concept of Evidence (Oxford, 1983).
Adams, Marilyn, Ockham,"
Copernicus,
"Intuitive
Cognition, Certainty, and Scepticism in William
Traditio 26 (1970) 389-98.
De
Revolutionibus, ed., Nobis and Sticker, Gesamtausgabe
II
(Hildesheim, 1983). Funkenstein,
Amos,
and
TJieology
the
Imagination
Scientific
(Princeton,
1987).
Galileo,
Two New Sciences,
Garber, D. and
S. Zabell,
tr.
S.
"On
Drake (Madison, the
1974).
Emergence of
Probability,"
Archive for
the History of Exact Sciences 21 (1979) 33-53.
Grant,
Edward,
Studies
in
Medieval
Science
and Natural Philosophy
(London, 1981). Hacking, Ian, The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge, 1975). Hanson, N. R., "The Logic of Discovery" in Achinstein, pp. 53-62.
Certitude
and Demonstrability among Ockhamists
Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones Physicorum McMullin, Ernan,
"Two
179
(Paris, 1509).
Ideals of Explanation in Natural
Science,"
Midwest
Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984) 205-220.
Maier, Anncliese,
Problem der Evidenz
"Das
Jahrhunderts,"
Ausgehendes
Miethke, Jiirgen, Ockhams
A. G.,
Molland,
"Nicole
Mittelalter II
in
der Philosophic des
(Rome,
Weg zur Sozialphilosophie Oresme and Scientific
14.
1961).
(Berlin, 1969). Progress,"
Miscellanea
Mediaevalia 9 (1974) 206-220. Newton, Isaac, Mathematical Principles
of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World, tr. F. Cajori (Berkeley, 1934). Nicholas of Autrecourt, The Universal Treatise, tr. L. Kennedy
(Milwaukee, 1971). Nicole Oresme,
Denomy Sheynin,
O.
Le
livre
du del
et
du monde,
ed.,
A. Menut and A.
(Madison, 1968). B.,
"On
the Prehistory of
Probability,"
Archive for History
of Exact Sciences 12 (1974) 97-141.
van Brakel,
J.
Statistical
"Some
Remarks on
Probability,"
the Prehistory of the Concept of Archive for History of Exact Sciences 16
(1976) 119-36.
Webering,
Damascene,
Ttieory
of Demonstration According to
William
Ockham
(St. Bonaventure, 1953). William of Ockham: Exp. Elench. = Exposition super libros Elenchorum; Ord. = Ordinatio; Quodl. = Quodlibeta Sent. = on
septetn;
the Sentences;
S
L.
-
Summa Logicae.
Commentary
ONORATO GRASSI
The Object
Some Authors
of Scientific Knowledge in
of the
Fourteenth Century
Ockham
William of
describes the actus iudicativus
the intellectual act
(i.e.
tanlum rcspcctu complexi, because both complex knowledge) and dissent are inherent in propositions through which we as
peculiar to assent
we
Inceptor
and
truth
recognize
falsehood.
1
more than one
find
the
In
or
demonstrationis
or,
when he
again, -
scientific
knowledge most of
his
Vcncrabilis
when he
the latter being the
or
-
asserts
when
est rcspectu
to
referring
that sola propositio scitur.
surprising that
-
the tola propositio nota\
with natural science he maintains omnis scientia
complexonim\
the
similar statement: for instance
distinguishes the subject of science from the object
conclusio
of
writings
2
the
truth
vcl
of
therefore hardly
is
It
dealing
complexi
contemporaries, as well as some later authors,
consider him one of the foremost supporters of the cotnplcxum -theory.
We
not
will
deny that many of
interpretation,
Ockham
and
absolute,
as
be
could
thorough
considered the
demonstrating
Adam Wodeham
position embraced.
statements might lead to such an
his
more
a
upon
yet
statements
s
3
vast
examination
as
relative
range
of
rather
of different
context,
than levels
as his
had already reali/ed the necessity of a
deeper consideration of Ockham s thought. In the Prologue to Lectnra Secunda, q. 6, he noted that "frater Vilelmus ... semper ponit extra propositiones ipsa intellecta, sive sint
ficta
sive
res
ipsae extra, et
G.de Ockham, Scriptum in Libnim primum Sententiamm, Prol. St.Bonavcnture N.Y., 1967, O.T. I, p.16,12-16). 2 Ibid., q.9 (O.T. V.Richter-G.Ixibold,
45);
Id,
Scriptum
I,
I,
p.266,17-22);
Id,
St.Bonavcnture N.Y., dist.
2,
q.
4
(ed.
p.135,18-140,13). 3
See
Prol.,
q.l,
a.l
(cd.
G.Gal,
Exp. super VII libros Physic. Prol. (ed. O.P. IV, p.9,88-91; p.ll, 15-22; p.12,41S.Brown, St.Bonaventure, N.Y. 1970, O.T. II,
a.l
In
1985,
(ed.
M.E.Reina, Rivista
critica
di Storia delta
pp.48-74 and 290-314; pp.52-53) and Reportatio, I, dist. 22, a.l C.Knudsen, Cahiers de I lnstitut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin, 14 (1975), pp.1-26; Prol. et Secundum Sententiarum no.4); Gregorii Ariminensis, Lectura super Primum
File-Sofia,
(ed.
G.Chatton, Sent.
e.g.
q.l,
non
25
p.15, q.l, a.l (ed.
(1970),
,
D.Trapp-V.Marcolino, Berlin-N cw York 1981,
t.l,
pp.2-3).
Tfie Object
In the
intentiones".
ipsae
two
different
ways the
is
"complexiim
first
of
d.
book,
of
assent".
reality through the proposition because
known. Here the
res
proposition 1
Now,
Wodeham,
says
Ockham
formulation of
-
-
complex knowledge reminds us
it
only
of
the
consider the direct
to
or,
of
generally speaking,
would be the former one. 6
the intellect assents necessarily to that
whose meaning corresponds
to the aforesaid
complexum can be learnt and become, Such
terms
the
an intuition leading to an evident judgment
res,
(compositio evidens); through
then, the
if
according to Ockham, knowledge starts with a
that,
simplex apprehensio of
even
assent,
bestowed solely on the
is
we come
if
theory of assent
s
which
to
according
According to the first we reach its terms stand for what is being
a proper interpretation
Wodeham
proposition
thesis
and the assent
as intentiones
act
complexiim-
the
to
According
partial.
he explained there are
1,
q.
immediate object of second interpretation,
the
is
1,
the
interpreting
object
181
of Scientific Knowledge
judgment; only an object of
in its turn,
position, far from being alien to can be traced in those Quodlibeta, which philosophy, easily were probably discussed between 1322 and 1324 and written up fully assent.
Ockham during
a
the
of
different
form is
knows
or
what
that
proceeds
-
of
to
say
knowledge: is is
not
-
formatio complexi, not
each
through
the
is
true.
assent
its
apprehension.
Adam Wodeham,
kind
of
Lectura Secunda, Prol., See Ockham, Summa Logicae, Pars St.Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974, O.P. I, p.42,19-22).
and
8
q.
two different to
corresponding
knows
intellect
first,
this
reasoning
kind
requires
Following
an
f.!24rb).
7
III,
a
that
way; through the second, intellect
the
instead only what the proposition says.
Wodeham,
Quodlibet
9 first
In
proper object of this kind of assent, even
6
In
sciendi,
in a specific
known
that
8
Avignon.
Venerabilis Inceptor distinguishes
and of actus
assent
something
16 the
q.
in
years
following
Quodlibet IV, kinds
"non-terministic"
s
It
if is
fact,
the res
Ockham only
the
are
the
extra
we never know
things, but
only through the formation
q.
6 (Caius
&
I,
c.12 (ed.
Ph.Boehner, G.Gal,
Gondville College 281/674, S.
Brown,
Lectura, d.l, q.l, a.l (ed. G.Gal, Franc. Studies 37 (1977), p.79,29).
Ibid, (p.79,30). Ibid,
(pp.81-82,34).
See
Ockham, Scriptum
I
Prol.
q.l,
a.l
(O.T.
I,
p.!6,6ff.,
and
p.31,17ff.). o
See venture, 9
the
Introduction
N.Y,
to
G.de
Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem
(ed.
J.C.Wey,
St.Bona
1980, O.T. IX, pp.37*-38*).
Ockham, Quodl. Ill, q. 8 (O.T. IX, 233,12-18). Cf. Quodl. IV, q. 16 (O.T. IX, 376,15377,26) and Quodl. V, q. 6 (O.T. IX, 500,16-18).
Grass!
182
of a proposition in our for instance, that
On
the
contrary,
the
to
refers
object,
stone
"a
mind is
know
to
esse in
"sic
re",
10
no
the
we manage
that
donkey".
second kind of assent, having truth as
its
inherent
in
truth
for
complcxiim,
is
always
11
What follows is that intellect assents propositions rather than in things. to the complexiim even in sc et absolute and not only when this is the of a
subicclum
sicut
istam
propositionem never concern things nor is
said through the
this
for
complex proposition, in
est -
12 -
science and assent
rate,
what
to
is
be known.
to
something that may render a proposition sometimes a
false;
defined
something
Sumnia Logicae
in 13
denoted by the proposition. from the proposition;
the
quite
and respectively, a true proposition
a
est
falsilas
ita
is
sometimes
true,
csse
one
(verifas
when
Still,
falsa).
propositio
they
reverse,
false
14
el
as
It
a parte
rci
Truth and falsehood are not res distictae
realiter
vcra
importatur per
"sic
propositions; they refer to what
i.e.
itself,
proposition
At any
re".
ultimately
knows
it
a
coincide est
true
with,
propositio
proposition
would not mean that it has changed, nor that it in itself; it would simply mean that that element has acquired some new 15 Of the three as they really are. proposition has ceased to denote things Ockham considered by Bocthius, of propositions kinds different
becomes a
false one, this
always refer to the former (in mente). According to him, the truth of spoken and written that is to sentences always depends on the corresponding mental one
maintains that the latter two
say,
depends on
it
its
voce and
(in
meaning:
"propositio
est vera significans, ideo tune propositio est auditor
concipere
in script o}
est
verum
oratio
eius prolatione natus
quando ex
formare propositionem mentalem
et
mental propositions are not made of things, but between predicate and subject identity perfect
17 veram".
of concepts;
10
Ockham, Quodl.
Ill,
q.
8
IX,
(O.T.
233.20-234.25) and
falsum
vel
IV, q.
Id.,
Quodl.
Id.,
Quodl. IV,
Id.,
Quodl. V,
Id.,
Summa
12 13
14 15
16
17 18
Ibid. (O.P.
Ill, q.
q. 16
I,
q.
16 (O.T. IX, 377,37-43).
(O.T. IX, 377,26-30).
q. 6 (O.T. IX, 501,27-502,47).
Logicae, pars
Bocthius, In
I,
cap. 43 (O.P.
I,
129,202-130,210).
130,214-131,254). Sec Quodl. V, q. 24 (O.T. IX, 580,136-140). lib.
Ockham, Quodl. Ibid.
8 (O.T. IX, 234,40-42) and Quodl. IV,
DC
Interpret., ed.2a,
Ill, q.
I, c.
DC
signis
(PL
13 (O.T. IX, 251,10-13) and
(O.T. IX, 247.19-248,27);
Id.,
Scriptum
1
q.
64,
414D).
12 (O.T. IX, 247,13-17).
Prol. q. 2 (O.T.
I,
109,12-111,4).
true
16 (O.T.
377,32-34). 1
Now,
so the
by
required
Quodl.
18
IX,
The Object of Scientific Knowledge
183
propositions must be an identity between what each term presumes. is
eodem"
pro
"supponere
universal.
Ockham Ockham
19
s s
We
do not mean
it
in
singular,
itself
the
establish
to
indefinite
particular,
or
to discuss here the value of suppositio in
will
confine
ourselves
to
observation:
this
consideration of terms in a proposition proceeds from what the
whole
a
as
proposition
"denotatur
sentence,
we
philosophy;
reason
a sufficient
of any assertive sentence, be
truth
The
20
stands
Indeed
for.
a
through
res importata per subiectum
quod These are words
true
sit
assertive
res importata
remind us very closely of the expression used by the Dominican William of Crathorn when he explained the content of a true proposition: "nichil enim aliud importari videtur per per
praedicatum".
propositionem affirmativam veram sit
we
res importata per praedicatum".
are dealing with here
complexum
-
complex knowledge proposition and from entities
and
science
complexum.
22
quod
It
res importata per subiectum
may be
quite different
helpful to observe the res
from the
res
realists,
in
individual
nisi 21
significata per such as Chatton, used to speak of. Along with whose apprehension he disregarded as being useless even
propositionem that the
is
that
-
Chatton refused any entity (fictum) distinct from he assumed the res extra (i.e. real, reality;
from proposition) to be the direct object of and, by consequence, to be the meaning of
distinct
of
assent
On
the contrary in the above mentioned statements
we
find
be reduced to the meaning of separate terms and that the denotatum cannot exist apart from the denotation, even though the that the res cannot
former never coincides with the proposition
meaning
it
is
the
and the
object
of.
Dominican Robert Holkot maintained the
In contrast the
terministic
doctrine of identity between denotatum and denotalio against realism as well as against every theory implying that the object and the truth of
have
complex knowledge proposition 19 Id.,
20
itself.
As
Summa Logicae,
Ockham, Quodl.
pars
Ill, q.
an
existence
of
their
own,
apart
from
the
the assent relates to the signum, not to external
II,
cc.2-7 (O.P.
I,
251-272).
12 (O.T. IX, 250,89-90).
21
G. Crathorn, Quaestiones de universalibus (ed. J.Kraus, Aschendorff, 1937, p.13,24See Crathorn, In Sent. (Basel B V 77, quoted by Il.Schepers, "Holkot contra dicta Crathorn, Philosophise hes Jahrbuch, 79 (1972), pp.106-136, p.123, n.77). 27).
II",
22
Chatton, Sent. Prol. q.l, a.l (ed. Reina, pp.54-55); Id., Rcportatio, G.Gal, Franciscan Studies, 27 (1967), pp.191-212; pp.202-203; Id., Sent. (ed. Reina, pp.53-56).
I,
d.3,
Prol.,
q.2 q.l,
(ed. a.l
Grass!
184 23
Holkot assumed the complexum to be the sole object of science, and opinion and he denied that the truth and the meaning of a
things, faith
from the proposition itself, as if proposition could possibly be separated in or absolute terms: on the inherent it, they were absolute qualities
The proof can be found
contrary, they coincide with the proposition.
-
Holkot says - in negative or possible sentences which do not denote a res can still undoubtedly be true: presently and actually existing and yet
non
propositionis
"veritas
non
Caesar 24 rebus".
est
propositionem, quia tune
est res significata per
aliqua propositio esset vera
chimera
quae ubi
,
nulla haberet veritatem, ut patet de ista
termini
After having thus criticized the
non supponunt pro aliquibus Holkot advances the same
res,
In the first of his argument against the significatum per propositionem. refuses the fact he Sex Articuli, probably meant to confute Crathorn, that the significatum might have an existence of its own and he often identifies
with the res per complexum significata, thus discarding the per propositionem as the proper object of complex knowledge.
it
significatum
He
value
the
instead
defends
complexum mentale
of
that
is
not,
Crathorn maintained, a similitudo of written and spoken sentences: not
(scitur)
"know"
composition obiectum est
of
"things"
terms
in
a
or
"denoted
sentence: 25
complexum
mentale".
things";
what we know
"cuiuscumque
In
his
Holkot does not speculate upon - nor does he explain known: he only repeats that "obiectum scitum, creditum et
complexum statements not
fully
not
res
27 significata".
Nevertheless
-
vel
the
26
controversy, to
be
opinatum
est
what
there
is
are
some
which he seems to recognize that the terministic solution is of mental adequate, e.g. when he deals with the denotation in
between signum and res, or propositions, or with the relationship 23
is
asscrtivae
notitiae
anti-realism
as
we do
Robert Holkot,
24
Sent.
I,
q. 2
(Lugduni 1518; Oxford, Oriel College,
when he
15, f.!98ra).
Deus possit scire I (Oriel College 15, f.!99rb); der Philosophic, 53 (1971), pp.lGeschichte Archiv fur Courtenay, (ed. plum quam Satz als Zeichen der theologischen Aussage bei 21; p.7,1 1.81-88). See F.Hoffmann, "Der der Repraesentatio im Holcot, Crathorn und Gregor von Rimini", in Der Begriff Mittelalter (hrsg. von A.Zimmermann), Berlin 1971, pp.296-313; Id., Die theologische Methode des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Robert Holcot, B.G.P.T.M.A, N.F.5, Miinster i.W. 1972; Schepers, Holcot contra dicta... pp.!27ff. Ibid.;
Sex
Id.,
"Utrum
Articuli,
scit"
II",
25
Holkot, Sent.
26
II,
q.2,
a.4 (Lugduni 1518 H).
Sent. q.2 (Oriel 15, f.!98rb); (Oriel College 15, ff.!99va-200ra). Id.,
Sent.
I,
"Utrum Deus..."
(ed. Courtenay, 5,46-47).
II,
q.2,
a.4
(Lugduni 1518 H); Sex
Art.,
I
The Object of Scientific Knowledge
185
not to give a merely terministic explanation of complexum.
tries
Holkot
cannot go Crathorn observed et
signa
beyond these
who
-
did not
hints,
manage
as
draw a sharp outline was to Crathorn himself of
to
This very distinction
significata".
But -
those
among
remaining
28
"inter
primary importance, as Schepers has shown, for without it we cannot understand what is - according to him - the real object of intellectual knowledge: neither the mental nor the spoken proposition, but what is signified
through
the
i.e.
it,
whole meaning of the proposition
We
cannot
know
("totale
meaning either in se or natural but ad through concepts, only through signa placitum instituta, an which Crathorn means to include the terms, voces and expression by significatum
propositionis").
this
concepts forming the proposition. Thus the meaning does not coincide with the proposition,
it
rather
through the complexum
("illud
totale
being expressed
quod exprimitur per
significatum
meaning denoted by
it.
a mutual influence cannot be conclusively proved, Crathorn
solution shows
more than one
similarity with
as
for
instance,
in
Wodeham
same because of
not possible to consider them the differences,
is
Accordingly, instead of referring to the conclusion,
istud complexum").
science refers to the
Though
corresponds to what
their
s.
However,
it
s is
several remarkable
of
understanding
the
nature
of
mental complexum? Entering the
controversy over
overcome the
the
object
of science,
31
Wodeham
between realism and terminism, for neither could adequately answer the problem. His refusal of both theories was due to certain difficulties he had met with, and he thought he could tried
to
solve
them with
his
fixed choice
own
doctrine of the obiectum totale propositionis? 2
"78
Id.,
Sent.
II,
q.2,
a.4
7,96-101; 16,291-293); Sex Art.
(Lugduni I
1518, O); (Oriel 15, f.200ra).
29 Cf. Schepers, Holkot contra dicta... Sentences quoted in the footnotes 79 and 90.
and WJ.Courtenay, Leiden 1978, pp.95-106.
Ibid, pp.1 18-120
Writings,
G.
Nuchelmans,
II",
Deus..."
pp.123-125,
and
Adam Wodeham. An
Wodeham on
"Adam
"Utrum
the
meaning
Courtenay 5,43^6;
(ed.
Crathorn
text
of
the
Introduction to his
life
and
of
s
declarative
sentences",
K.A.Tachau, The Response to Ockham s and Aureol s Epistemology (1320-1340)", in English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries (a cura di A.Maieru), Bibliopolis Napoli 1982, pp.185-217; M.E.Reina, intuitiva ed esperienza interiore in Adamo Wodeham", Rivista di Storia "Cognizione
Historiographia
Linguistica,
delta
41
Filosofia,
1
(1980),
pp. 177-187.
(1986), pp.19^49; 211-244; O.Grassi, Intuizione delta conoscenza nel XIV secolo, Milano 1986.
Wodeham ed il problema 32
Wodeham,
Lect. Sec., d.l, q.l (Gal p.83,39-40; p.86,52).
e
significato.
Adam
Grassi
186
His studying was especially devoted to assent and to give a satisfactory explanation of its dynamics. From the analysis of the relationship between apprehension and assent, and of the necessity of this same relationship (because we assent only to what we know, that is to what we learned),
Wodeham
he comes to discard complexum as the direct object of assent.
resumes Ockham
theory of the Quodlibeta,^ maintaining that
s
complexum takes shape it
assent,
the
latter
by
Wodeham
it,
by a
as
As
non
sic
est
sibi
esse sicut
and
Deum"
esse does not proceed
a parte rd\
is
instance
est
"homo
esse
formed
sentences,
with
"signified"
is
conclusion,
assent,
i.e.
the
is
the sic esse
that
is
to say the
are respectively
verb
from any signum,
terms,
If
one out of two sentences
in
we
will
obtain
meanings. Therefore the
distinct
esse
denoted by single terms.
"thing",
tense
identical
meaning of "Deum
Anyway, as Crathorn had already means propositions, because the sic
act of consciousness nor
cannot be a the
-
two
different
esse
sic
a mental
can be
vel divisuni).
complexum (signum compositum complexum or a res as the object of assent; could not be the dictum of the proposition either. The direct
he
states,
is
what
is
"signified"
per complexum. The
significabile
33
sixth
refuses either a
this object
object,
it
with
two
only by
Wodeham
yet,
This significatum
albus"
album".
from an
we change
otherwise
his
per propositionem denotatur, which corresponds to
"hominem
for
in
same
the
complexum inducing the
observed, these significata are by no
but
In
cause.
praesuppositae".
and of
Deus"
stated
object of assent, though assent
the infinitive expression of the sentence "Deus
clearly
ad
assensus
pars dicti
propositionis immediate sibi conformis, concausantis
totale
necessario
et
is
solution: the direct object of the assenting
the whole object of that
is
est
"non
it
necessitating
own
introduces his
"significatum
\>el
35 necessitat".
complexum cannot be the
conclusion,
ilium
s
therefore
reflexus;
non
quem ipsum
act
the
34 does not necessarily do the same with the act of knowing: and it is may come later - anyway it is not necessary
induced by a actus
induced
one
in
when
mind, while always inducing an act of
Ockham, Quodl.
Ill,
q.
8
(O.T.
object
IX,
by the of assent
233,12-235,60);
dictum, is
Quodl.
i.e.
quoddam
then a something
IV,
q.
16
(O.T.
IX,
376,15-377,43).
34
Wodeham, Led.
Sec.,
d.l,
q.l,
a.l
(f.l29vb):
quod est obiectum actus anima non assentit Quia ad assensum non praecognoscitur
"...
otnne
assentiendi partiale vel totale prius natura comprehenditur. nisi
cognito
assensui,
35
Ibid.
Sed complexum
...
igitur".
I
necessitat
prefer this transcription to Gal
(Gal p.85,46-47).
s (p.83,41).
...
The Object of Scientific Knowledge seen in
meaning of
its
accident.
36
On
esse
quid rather than
in
187
of substance or
that
Wodeham
the basis of this definition,
turns his attention
object of scientific knowledge. Strictly speaking,
to the
judgement which necessarily causes the
assent:
37
is
it
Ockham
as
an evident "notitia
says,
evidens veri necessarii nata causari per praemissas ad ipsum per discursum 38
syllogisticum
object
is
applicatas".
conclusion
the
through
Real science
caused by direct acts and
is
its
the sic esse a parte rei denoted through the premise as well as 39
demonstrative
of
Therefore
syllogism.
the
peculiar and adequate object of science cannot be the significatum totale
conclusionis or rather propositions, because however certain the assent
bestowed on a
discarded
this
meaning might
as
being,
the discursus as a whole.
Now, different
the
the
at
most,
similarity.
His
science.
this
we
we
41
has
is
the
be
to
The
meaning of
far
it
to
be
as the nature of
concerned, these authors show a
is
as
develops
discover
will
as
although,
s,
Gregory disregards conclusio
reasoning
demonstration,
concludes,
solution closely,
of complex knowledge
remarkable
science
object of an actus reflexus.
Wodeham
from Gregory of Rimini
object
of
object
40
we observe
if
could never attain an evident nor as
the
and proper object of science,
right
it
be,
The conclusion
nature.
scientific
as the direct object of
we
when
follows:
consider
a
meaning of its conclusion, and the from the knowledge of this
directly refer to the
truth or falsehood of the premise proceed
meaning, a meaning that can be either true of false. But he also refuses to consider the whole demonstration or the significata omnium propositionum
demonstrations
knowledge. The one and only totale
to
36
37
conclusionis?
cause
Ibid.
2
fact,
it
adequate
its
complex
then the significatum
is
meaning, mental conclusion suffices
the
is
of the
object
object of science
Because of
In
assent.
the
as
assent
for
itself,
assenting
means
(Gal p.86,49; p.87,57; p.88,59; p.89,61; p.90,64).
Ibid, a.2
(Gal p.99, n.102).
30
Lectura
d.l,
39
40 41
Lectura
s.
a.l (f.!32rb). See Ockham, Scriptum Phys. Prol. (O.P. IV, p.6,46-48).
d.l, q.l, a.2
Ibid, q.l a.2
See
q.2,
and Exp.
p.87,20-88,2)
Prol.,
q.2,
a.2
(O.T.
I,
(Gal p.99,105); q.2 (f.!32rb).
(Gal p.99,104; p.100,106 and 108).
W.Eckermann,
L.D.Davis,
I
"Knowledge
O.S.A.,
Wort und Wirklichkeit, Wurzburg 1978, pp.45-105, and to Gregory of Rimini", The New Scholasticism, 55
according
(1981), pp.331-347.
Gregorii
Ariminensis,
Lectura
p.7,17-23; p.10,26-28); d.2, q.l (ed.
Prol.
Trapp,
I,
q.l,
a.l
(ed.
p.282,17-19).
Trapp,
I,
p.4,11-13;
p.5,17ff.;
188
Grassi
judging things as they really are,
which
i.e.
mentaliter quod sic
"enuntiare
est",
43
the essential
component of a real scientific act. Obviously the name conclusio would involve its very being inferred, yet Gregory does not consider the whole demonstration necessary before having scientific is
knowledge and
Ockham, long as
from
44
we do
truth
not have
the
process
a
Ockham
is
45
s
reasoning,
science per demonstrationem there it
we do
"knows"
know
is
what distinguishes order
in
another way to attain asserts
as
well .
facts: this
the
truth:
scientific
a science per experientiam
is
scire
know
to
that
not merely acquire a knowledge of empirical
a certain event can
remains as
it
from evidence and through a
Wodeham
absolutely non-scientific knowledge,
Wodeham and
and such
itself
necessary
process
conclusion as well. Yet there following
in
demonstrated. This
it
-
according to
contrary,
dubitabilis
is
only the former
intelligere:
demonstrative
On
assent.
scientific
a
as
Through would be
we
lacking necessity; by experience (e.g. the eclipses of the
moon, fire s happen Such knowledge we would never attain through a demonstrative process. We do not reach a categorical judgment, but 46
power of
heating).
hypothetical one:
be possible
moon is moon to be
the
//
for the
eclipsed, the
character of necessity dwell here in possible,
and
In this case
is
it
we
moon
can eclipse or
44
Ibid. (ed.
absolutely not impossible, that
reach a knowledge of
Trapp,
I,
Ockham, Scriptum
a.2
must the
"it
"the
moon
moon
the
being
is
eclipsed
eclipsable",
meaning of a proposition describing things the way they the way they can be or must be possible. 43
it
The scientific approach and the modus of the sentence:
eclipsed.
i.e.
is ".
the
are, or rather,
p.27,9-23; p.28,4ff.; p.30, 15-21). I
Prol., q.2, a.2
(f.!34vb; f.!35ra). Ibid., q.2, a.l Hie sciendi cadat immediate super
(O.T.
I
(f.!33va): sic
esse,
p.76,13-16). "...
sed
anima
Wodeham, Lectura
I,
d.l, q.2,
non quod actus super demonstrationem quae cadit scit
sic
super sic esse...". 45 See Ockham, Scriptum I Prol., q.2, a.2 (O.T. I p.88,9-12). mediante conclusione eadem, est scibilis q.2, a.3 (f.!37ra): significat, tarn a priori quam a posteriori, demonstrative et per "...
csse,
Wodeham, sic
esse
Lectura, d.l, conclusio
sicut
experientiam".
See
ibid.
q.2, a.l (f.!33vb).
Ibid. "Ad (f.!34ra): primum dico quod licet non habeatur iudicium evidens categoricum quod luna eclipsatur, habetur tamen evidens iudicium hypotheticum, scilicet quod ita est, nisi Deus decipiat me; et ex hac statim est evidens quod ita esse est possibile et non impossibile, et per hoc ad illud unumquodque etc. concede. Et sic est licet nulla propositio mere de hie hypothetice, licet non categorice"; (f.!34rb): praesenti esset vera ubi affirmatur aliquid de igne, tamen affirmativa de possibili est vera, tune sicut nunc". "...
Tfie Object
What comes
out here
is
189
of Scientific Knowledge that scientific truth
is
always the same in
nature, even though the ways through which it can be reached differ, because it corresponds to the content or meaning of the proposition in demonstrative and in experimental science. Thus we have a new its
confirmation semantics,
of
which
that
close
represents
relationship
one
of
the
philosophical debate during the 14th century.
Milano
between
most
epistemology
peculiar
features
and of
ELZBIETA JUNG-PALCZEWSKA
Discussion on infinilas vigoris Dei in Avcrroists in the 13th
Maicr
and 14th Centuries
Metaphysische Hintcrgriindc der spatscholastischen 1 Naturphilosophie, talking about the history of the problem of motion
Anncliese
shows
in
the
that
scholastic
conception,
modern mechanics, which the conclusions which came
radically
conception of
is
arrived
to
after
at
many 2
In
energy.
centuries with
different
from
based on the law of
the
inertia,
consciousness only
scientific
discovery of the law of conservation of
the
her considerations Maier does not give
much
attention
to
Averroism; she says that it does not give any impulse to development of scholastic physics. This enunciation is based on the knowledge of the questions on Physics by John of Jandun and some parts of the question
Utnim
esscntia divina
sit infinite!
intensive by
Thomas
Wilton.
3
Using Averroistic manuscripts that have been recently discovered, namely the question by John of Jandun De infinitale vigoris Dei and the 5 whole question by Thomas Wilton, we make an attempt to answer the problem; whether Averroism really did not contribute anything new to the
problem of motion
The
starting point
the Middle of
in scholastic physics.
Physics,
of consideration of the philosophy of nature in
are the laws of motion formulated in the seventh
Ages where
shows
Aristotle
the
book
between
interdependence
vis
in movcns, resistance, way and time. He does not use the term of on the in end the the which this book, eighth book, appears only occasion of solution of the problem if any power can be active in infinite "velocity"
time.
Cf.
Aristotle
answers
A.
"Bewegungskrafte
Maier,
this
spatscholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2
question
und
Roma
in
three ways:
Encrgicn",
in:
he says that
first
Metaphysische Hintergrunde der
1966, p.227-269.
Ibidem.
3
Ibidem, p.247-248. *
This
question
wistyczne, 24,
This
ms
1,
was
discovered
and
published
by
Z.
Kuksewicz
in:
Studio
Medie-
1985, p.77-152.
question is Vat. Lat. Borgh. 36,
known ff.
from two manuscripts: 47ra-55va; Firenze Bibl. Nation.
Thomas II, II
281.
Wilton
Quodlibeta
(q.l)
Discussion on infinitas vigoris Dei
no
191
in Averroisls
something potentially infinite and the case of substances not even the latter, because the world is finite.
there in
is
in
infinitiim
aclu, but only
Secondly: movens finitum can not
motion
move tcmpore
i.e.
infinite,
the infinite
time presupposes intensively infinite power. Thirdly: primus movens, which causes eternal motion, can not be in magnitudine, but it
must
in
be
because
immaterial,
substance
can
not
According to Maier, Aristotle can not prove the 6 used a new concept, which was later called energy.
Even Aristotle
s
thought.
some
had
Averroes
He
last
with
problems
take
infinite
power.
theorem because he
the
of
interpretation
gives three acceptable solutions of the problem,
why power of motion, which has immaterial nature, can move per tempus infmilum, but can not move with infinite velocity. The infinite
namely:
first
the
problem can be found in Averroes Commentary on where he Physics says that Aristotle wanted to prove only the solution of this
immateriality of is
primum movens, because power which
is
not in substance
not finite or infinite, and that he did not want to prove the infinity
of primum
movens?
The second
solution can be found in the Commentary on the where Averroes introduced two different terms for active Metaphysics the reason of eternal motion, and motor agents: infinite motor separatus
coniunctus
The
-
the cause of finite velocity of motion.
third interpretation
is
contained in
8
De
substantia orbis, and
it
proves only the temporal infinity of the power of 9 movens. primum In medieval philosophy the problem touched by Averroes is presented in other way. The question does not concern the acceptation or rejection states
that Aristotle
of the infinite
power of God, because
whether
question
is:
power by
rational means.
This works.
is
the
The
Averroism
-
it
solution
Phys.
cit.
presented
s
p.229.
Vlllcomm. 78-79.
Metaph. XII comm. 41.
De substantia
a
dogma
possible to prove that
Siger of Brabant,
Cf.A. Maicrop.
7
is
orbis, cap. 3.
last
is
by
known
the
of Faith.
God
problem which Latin Averroisls
Liber de causis, Siger 6
is
it
first
Now
the
possesses infinite
to
try
solve
in
their
representative
of
only from a short question from
work. Unfortunately, Siger
s
commentary
to
192
Jung-Palczewska
book of Physics and the Commentary to the twelfth book of not know any 13th century works Metaphysics are unknown. We also do the eighth
by other Averroists which touch this problem. 10 In his question Utnim causa prima sit infmiti vigoris in movendo Averroes and some arguments by Siger shows three interpretations by
Thomas
power of God. infinite et
who
of Aquinas,
power:
11
esscndum semper,
"ad
movendo inquantum
in
in
God
est".
And
infinite
has a triple
causando
virtus infinita perfecta in 12
se
the
proves
conclusion Siger states that
the
In
misinterpreting Aristotle
since the primus
motor can 13
take only infinite temporal power, prima causa has power like that. The broad discussion of the problem of infinite power of
can be found only
Averroists
in
the
14th
14
God by
This problem
century.
is
with by John of Jandun in his questions on the Physics and the
dealt
Metaphysics and at
relating,
in
a
the
question the
length,
great
Thomas
Averroist
power
the
in
Wilton,
who
infmitate
vigoris
arguments by
his
similarly discussed the
question:
separate
DC
Utrurn
cssenlia
where he
Dei,
older
colleague
is -
problem of
infinite
divina
infinita
sit
intensive.^
Both John of Jandun and Thomas Wilton arguments of advocates and
in
their
works report on
infinite opponents of the thesis about the
10 Libntm dc causis, q. 56 Siger from Brabant, Quaestiones super divina sit infinita intensive), in: Philosophcs Mcdifcaux, T.XII, Ixiuvain, 1972. 1 1
12 13
14
Maicr op.
Cf. A.
cit.
cit.
Ibidem. of have not any information about the possible questions on infinite power Averroists like Boethius from Dacia, Taddeo from Parma, Anthony from Parma. even do not know if the Commentaries on the eighth book of Physics and on the
We
God by
We
twelfth
^ The
csscntia
p.236-237.
Siger from Brabant op.
Cf.
(Utrum
book of Metaphysics were written by them.
This title:
a schema of the question by Thomas Wilton: Utrum esscntia divina sit infinita intensive.
is
Ratio principalis: Ex partc distinctions essentiac divinae.
Corpus quacstionis. Argument: Contra improbans (analysis of the problem) 1. Contrary arguments to Wilton 2. Response on these arguments. 3. Proper Wilton s solution. 4.Adrationemprincipalem: 5. Dubia. 6. Answers on dubia.
s position.
Ad primam
rationem principalem respondeo
Discussion on infinitas vigoris Dei
16 power of God. They discuss the problem of the themselves on the authority of Aristotle and Averroes.
of
First
Averroes -
gives careful
solutions, namely the one from the
God
that
John of Jandun
all,
has neither
nor
finite
Commentary on the Metaphysics 18 of two motors. In his actual point
infinite
193
in Averroists
infinite
power basing
consideration to two of
Commentary on
power
17
the Physics
and the one from the
which Averroes assumes the existence
in
John of Jandun assumes
that
God
has infinite
temporal power, because time has no limits and neither Aristotle nor Averroes said that God has virtus infmita intensive. 19
The
Thomas Wilton
question by
quodlibetal
and
analysis of opinions of Aristotle,
and
same time
the
at
Wilton
thinks
De
discusses
all
penetratingly
three
Commentary on
following order: the
Metaphysics,
it
Averroes
that
of
first
includes
a
profound
of his Commentator,
other
interpretations the Physics, the
are
interpretations. in
given
Commentary on
the the
and that each of them had to correct
subslantia orbis
the preceding one, and that the last one properly interpreted the world
of Aristotle. 20 In Wilton
opinion the
s
interpretation of Averroes
first
i.e.
the one
from the Commentary on the Physics omits and does not resolve the Aristotle, because of two reasons: Firstly, Aristotle
problem posed by was proving that a
virtus
moving
that such a virtus can not
be
the location of the infinite
power
it
moved
in
infinite
time
is
infinite
itself,
and
magnitudine. Secondly, irrespectively of
in
in
magnitudine or extra magnitudinem,
the heavens in an infinitely short time, but time as a measure
can not be zero.
John
Cf.
essentia divina
17 18
of sit
De
Jandun,
infinitate
vigoris
Dei
and
Thomas
Wilton,
Utrum
infmita intensive.
John of Jandun op.
cit.
Ibidem.
19 "Et
idco
minorum infinitus
concederet
1,
magnitudine meveret locis,
quam
modis.
tribus scripsit
Borgh. 36,
f.
est
48va.
vigor
(scil.
Dcus)
sit
infinitus
per
negationem
ter-
ita
1985, p. 151.
cum
aliud
eius
numquam incipit nee numquam tcrminatur. Sed quod sit quod omncm alium vigorem improportionaliter excedat non nee Commentator." John of Jandun, De infinitate... in: Studia
quia
Aristoteles
Medievistyczne, 24, "Ad
quod
dico,
durationis, intensivae
quod Philosophus dicit quod si ilia virtus esset in non tempore - ad istam rationem respondet Commentator tribus
dicitur, in
Duo
primi
sufficiens."
sunt
Thomas
insufficientcs
Wilton,
ut
Utrum
videbitur, sed ultima responsio essentia divina... ms Vat. Lat.
194
Jung-Palczcwska
For
separate motors is assumed there ihcprimum mobile directly or not? If
with
we
velocity,
coniunctus takes
we
if
the
once
on
the
existence
of
two
the
accept
whether they move
must occur
it
the
latter,
a
in
a
moment
question
i.e.
motor
if
primum movens can be
or infinite motion from
finite
Commentary
arises a question:
accept the former solution,
infinite
in
provided insufficient, because
also
is
Metaphysics
answer
the
Wilton,
asked.
Moreover, when Averroes virtus from primum movens, he
motor coniunctus takes some
states that is
in
contradiction with himself, because
substances separated from matter are pure acts and have no receptive
Wilton proves that substantia prima potency. Moreover, quoting Averroes, acts as aim and causa cfficicns, and because of this it moves as what acts.
Averroes Aristotle
that
movens?-
1
proposal from
last
intended
Wilton
show
only to this
proves
DC
would move
fmita and
in
temporal
infinity
of
primum
that
by showing substance, because in firstly
it
is
case
this
non-time (according to Aristotle s statement) or a virtus would be able to move a body for the same
in
a virtus infmita
because
time,
the
statement
impossible for temporal infinity to be it
substantia orbis correctly assumes
time, which
is
paries
finite
virtutis
the measure of
could
be added to
virtus
and
fmita
motion, would be equal with the time of
its
infinite power action, which is possible in respect of the ratio of time. is Next, Wilton unfortunately not giving any satisfactory proofs, the Commentary on De caelo and referring to De substantia orbis and to
asserts that there i.e.
of God,
comprehended
infinity of the
actionis
et
a difference
is
between the
infinity
of the
first
as infmitum actionis et passionis in se
cause
and the
motors moving the heavens, comprehended as infmitae
passionis
in
tempore;
but fmitas
in
se
in
velocitate
et
in
vigore.
Wilton
s
final
conclusion,
taken
as
true,
is
the
following:
neither
the Philosopher nor the Commentator, nor any rational reasons allow to
prove that
God
is
in vigore. infinitive virtutis intensive
Commentator circa illud sciendum, "Dico igitur tertiam responsionem quam ponit intendit ostendere, quod virtus infinita quod Aristoteles per primam dcmonstrationem duratione quae non potest esse in corpore requiritur ad motum perpetuum, nee etiam de "
alia infinitate
loquitur."
Thomas
Wilton, op.
cit. f.
50vb.
Discussion on infinitas vigoris Dei
in
A verroists
195
Summarizing, it should be stated that Averroist considerations took Averroes theses as the most important authority, widely quoting and discussing his three versions of the solution of Aristotle on problem.
The
God
third thesis that
has only infinite temporal power seemed
most interesting and best proved
the
contradiction with Aquinas
them. This statement was in
for
position which, at that time,
was
obligatory.
Referring to the misunderstood Aristotelian supposition he was arguing for God to have infinite intensive power. In
the
opinion
and
Averroists
of
Peter
particularly
Aureoli,
Averroes
penetratingly discussed
taken
by by Wilton does not position
problem completely, because such a distinguishing of the
solve the
first
cause as infinitely permanent does not characterize
it. Wilton stopped in midway, although he aptly proved that Aristotle wanted to show nothing more than that the first cause is immaterial and that the cause of
infinite
motion
is
virtus incomiplibilis et infaligabilis.
Coming back the
development surrounded by
to our basic
of medieval
"their"
22
problem about the role of Averroism in mechanics it should be said that being
problems and basing themselves very strongly on
the authority of Averroes, they, unfortunately do not develop the problem
of the motion.
The of
thesis about the infinite
of
interests
power of God
who
philosophers
take
into
is
also within the sphere
their
considerations
the
improvement of the thesis, and come into similar conclusions. Francis from Marchia, William Ockham, Walter Burley and possibility
of
John Buridan also realized infinity
in their considerations
specifying to
that
of the
is
God
"vis"
definition
of
A. Maier, Metaphysische...
Ibidem, p. 269.
s
to
prove
power. What
vis
infatigabilis is
is
only
the
important
et fatigabilis
p. 248.
which leads
not possible because of the
within the sphere of earthly events. 23
Lodz
Cf.
wanted
the appearance, by the way, of the problem of
the conclusion that pcrpeiuum mobile
lack of that
23
Aristotle
of time but not the intensity of
HEIKKI KIRJAVAINEN
Existential Presuppositions in Semantics
According to
1.
One
Introduction
of the
Ockham and Holcot
main disputes between Ockham and Holcot
According to Ockham we may Holcot criticizes this of nonexistent things. 1
concerns the idea of intuitive knowledge.
have
intuitive
knowledge
view although he
first
takes sides,
to
certain
a
extent,
with
Ockham
s
conception of theology by saying that the blessed can have theological knowledge through divine causation, although not in the natural way, 3
But then he continues by arguing that being a wayfarer and a blessed one are compatible notions and, therefore, we can in fact have intuitive theological knowledge within the natural through secondary causes.
viz.
order.
The
texts of the dispute are
the
first
book of Ockham
of Sentences
(Sent. Prol., q. 1); Quodlibeta septem V, on that in his quodlibctal disputation
comments
Quodlibct Question of Robert Holcot O.P, Ed.
The
(1958).
theological intuitive "...ita
actuali
knowledge.
theological
non
est
J.
background of the dispute
general
Ockham
maintains
that
s
5
Ordinatio on the
and VI,
first
book
and Holcot
6
q.
s
Utrum Theologia sit scientia. A T. Muckle C.S.B, Medical Studies XX is
the
there
question
is
in
of the
principle
a
quod Deus causet visionem sui But according to Ockham, there is no
in
intellectu
factual
of
possibility
for
possibility
knowledge by divine power (potentia absoluta). Quodlibeta VI,
possibile
praesentia."
q.
nisi
exhibita
q.
6:
sua
occasion for this kind
knowledge within the natural order (potentia ordinata). Accordingly, divine matters are accepted by faith alone.
of intuitive
Cf.
conclusio est quod naturaliter cognitio intuitiva non potcst causari nee naturaliter notitia non existente." Liber I, Prologus, q. I p. 38: notitiae inpossit esse sine existentia rei, quae est vere causa efficiens
"Secunda
conservari, intuitiva
obiecto
non
"...
mediata vel immediata, sicut alias dicetur." p. 30: "Dico igitur quantum ad istum articulum quod respectu incomplexi potest esse duplex notitia, quarum una potest vocari modum: quia notitia intuitiva. ... Sed et alia abstractiva per istum distinguuntur intuitiva rei est talis notitia virtute cuius potest sciri utrum res sit vel non, ita quod si res sit, statim intellectus iudicat earn esse et evidenter cognoscit earn esse, nisi forte impediatur propter imperfectionem illius notitiae. Et eodem modo si esset perfecta talis tuitivae
notitia per potentiam divinam conservata de incomplexae evidenter cognosceret illam rem non
3
re
non
existente,
virtute
illius
notitiae
esse."
Utrum theologia sit scientia: "Quod tamen omnes (articuli) sint scibiles secundo per notitiam, videlicet intuitivam, aliquarum rerum credo esse verum." ... "Nulla notitia quam viator potest naturaliter adquirere de articulis fidei est scientia secundo Cf.
modo modo
vel tertio
dicta."
(My
italics)
Existential Presuppositions in Semantics
Holcot the
s
main
criticism against
same which was
earlier expressed
that
viz.
Fontaines,
Ockham
has usually been taken to be
by Duns Scotus and by Godfrey of speak of knowing
to
inconsistent
is
it
197
nonexistent things so that the intuitive cognition
the
is
"total"
intuitively
cause of
our judgement concerning some contingent things and that we can, at the time, maintain that there are no such things within the natural
same
order.
4
This
is
Holcot
criticism; rather,
most interesting point in Holcot s interested in an even more fundamental point:
however,
not,
is
the
he wants to show what are the ultimate semantic consequences speak about intuitively knowing nonexistent things.
My
purpose
in the following will
Ockham and Holcot
if
we
be to consider the dispute between
wider perspective than perhaps is usual, and ask: what bearings does the dispute have on semantics in general in a slightly
and on religious language in particular? My presentation is nothing more than a sketch for an argument which attempts to show how far the difference might go between Holcot and Ockham when their epistemological solutions are put into the context of semantics.
introduce
the
illustrate
Holcot
2.
Ockham on
be taken
do not
one
this
we adopt
that
view and
his
then
The criticism against Ockham may way. The trivial way implies that we Truth Criterion of
the line of argument that
it
is
this
epistemic
inconsistent to
when non-p is the case. The nontrivial emerges when we realize that Ockham did not want to knows
that
p
metalogical Criterion, and further, that he did not want to criterion
apply this
shall first try to
it.
epistemic contradiction
that
viz.
interpretation
knows
comments on
in a trivial or a nontrivial
that
violate
s
directly violate the metalogical
attitude,
say
problems Ockham has with
crucial
I
a
in
something
merely negative way by saying that
not the case then
is
it
is
not. Therefore,
if
one
we meet
here a real noncircular problem, viz. the question: in what sense does Ockham claim that we can have intuitive cognition of nonexistent beings? Ockham s claims referred to in footnote 2 lead one to question what is
and
consistent
means
cognition. This
Cf.
divinam
what
p.
31:
"Et
de
re
cognosceret
illam
disputation; see the
"contra"
eodem modo non
rem non
contradictory
we have
that
conservata
Prologus,
is
existente,
esse."
Holcot
si
to
the
context
of
intuitive
explore the metalogical criteria
esset
virtute
in
perfecta illius
comments on
part of his second conclusion.
talis
notitiae this
at
notitia per potentiam incomplexae evidenter the beginning of his
198
Kirjavainen
Ockham wants idea
to apply in the context of intuitive knowledge.
by Ockham
aptly illustrated
is
main argument
in his quodlibetal
The
basic
himself in the answer he gives to the
question VI:
contradiction that an act of seeing should exist while that seen neither exists nor can exist in reality. Hence it is a contradiction that a chimera should be intuitively seen. But it is no contradiction that what is seen should be nothing actually existing outside its cause, provided only that it can exist in reality or has 5 once been in the universe. (Boehner s translation) a
is
It
which
is
merely concerns, however, the well-known distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge; we may have the latter kind of knowledge of things which are not actually present provided only that
This
answer
they
are
logically
possible
God
concerns whether even
The
beings.
can produce
crucial
in us
therefore,
question,
such an
intuitive
knowledge
where the object is nonexistent. Ockham s way of expressing himself seems to be somewhat obscure on this point. In one place he says that the
as
God,
Prime
Cause,
can
knowledge of a nonexistent thing. is
immediately 6
On
in
produce
us
intuitive
the other hand, he says that this
not possible in the sense of evident intuitive knowledge, because this
would imply a contradiction: I ... say that God cannot cause in us such a cognition through which a thing appears to be present to us when it is absent because this 7 implies a contradiction.
dilemma one could suggest
In order to explain this
qualify the
metalogical criterion for intuitive cognition.
one which implies the
Then he
actual reality of the cognition
it
spite
non
est
latter
view
nee
esse
possit.
itself,
applies
it
so that
it
only implies the
with or without the existence of the
a thing
and
in
judge whether
ct quod illud quod videtur non sit in vidcatur intuitive. Sed quod chimaera quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra suam causam, aliquando fuit in rerum natura." Quodl. VI, q. 6.
quod
est,
Ideo
visio
contradictio
contradictio, quod illud possit esse in effectu, vel
dummodo
tries to
is
quod contradictio
"Dico
effectu
qualifies
presented by Ockham as follows: is not a contradiction that we have a vision of of that we do not, on the basis of that vision,
The
...
Ockham He first
logical connection with the actual reality of the
object (Truth Criterion).
object.
that
sit
est,
6
Cf. Quodlibet, q. VI: "...omnem effectum quern potest Deus mediante causa secunda, mediante obiecto; potest immediate per se; sed in notitiam intuitivam corporalem potest igitur potest in earn immediate per se."
dico quod Deus non potest causare in nobis Quodlibet V, 5, (ad instantiam 1): est cognitionem talem per quam evidenter apparet nobis rem esse praesentem quando absens, quia hoc includit contradictionem." "...
Existential Presuppositions in Semantics
199
this thing exists or not. This is because God can make without any assent to it; but naturally this cannot happen.
This, however,
seems
and
intuitive cognition is
exist
.
On
meanings of
the one hand, according to
Ockham,
it
clearly inconsistent to speak of intuitive cognition without presupposing
the
of the Truth Criterion with existence; on the other hand,
validity
Ockham would follows
there
also take into account the case
where
in the existential sense but
satisfied "it
to lead into ambiguities concerning the
this vision
the
(from
nonexistent
previous
as
sensitive
is
10
well
not
this criterion is
he, nevertheless, claims that
clarifications)
as
where
intellectual
that
is
it
intuitive
possible
knowledge
that
of
a
This case has to be checked against the following
thing".
quotation which crystallizes
Ockham
s
problem:
admit, however, that God can cause an assent of the same species as is the evidential assent which we get in respect to the contingent sentence this whiteness exists when that whiteness does not exist,
I
but
this assent is
italics)
Ockham wants
Apparently,
similar to the case
What
not evident.(My
to say that the assent produced by God is where the Truth Criterion does not include existence.
troubles us here
is
that according to
Ockham
of the following
all
statements seem to be claimed as simultaneously true: (a)
a has intuitive vision of a star which does not Divine Power
(b)
a knows that this star does not exist / Assumption in Prologus q. I if
(c)
exist /
by
the star does not exist then it is impossible for a to intuitive vision of it / Principle in Quodlibet V,
have an
Ibid
instantiam
(ad
3):
"...
,quia
non
est
contradictio
quod
visio
rei
sit
et
tamen
visionem nee iudicem rem esse nee non esse, quia Deus potest facere visionem sine omni tali assensu; sed per naturam non potest hoc fieri." Cf. Prologus, q. I: "omnis res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta, potest per divinam potentiam absolutam existere sine ilia, quia non videtur verisimile quod si Deus vult destruere unam rem absolutam existentem in caelo quod necessitetur destruere unam aliam rem existentem in terra. Sed visio intuitiva, tarn sensitiva quam intellectiva, est res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab obiecto."
quod per
illam
n E.g.
when we
see something ceasing to be
not exist any more. Cf. Prol. q. termination of a thing. 10
Prol. q.
I,
(Corollarium)
s.
I,
s.
36:
6-12,
we
intuitively
know
where Ockham has
that in
the thing does precisely the
mind
38: 15.
Cf. Quodl. V, 5 (ad inst. 4): "Concede tamen quod Deus potest facere assensum eiusdem speciei cum illo assensu evident! respectu huius contingentis haec albedo est quando albedo non est; sed ille assensus non est evidens, ..."
200
Kirjavainen
One
gains the impression that of existence as such which causes
semantic implications of
is
it
not only the tacit presupposition but also the very basic
difficulties
this presupposition.
The formal explication On behalf of what was said above, Ockham seems in the first place to support the following eccentric situation:
3.
K a b&~(Ex)(x
(1)
12
=
b)
But as we have seen, he not only says that we may know something which does not exist, but that if we have a cognition of the being b
which does not
then
exist,
we know
K a b&Ka ~(Ex)(x
(2)
One
it
does not,
refers to there
i.e.
= b).
a interpretation of (2) says that
V
whoever
that
is
knows b and
also
knows
no such being. This interpretation
is
that
due
to
the de dicto reading of the latter part of the formula. This clearly seems to imply an inconsistency: it is not possible, i.e. it is a contradiction, knows something and that whoever or whatever that being that is
somebody is no such being which
there
that
K a ~(Ex)(x
from
=
b)
it
supposed to be known. This means follows on the basis of the Truth Criterion is
= b) is the case, and this of course is in contradiction with ~(Ex)(x = which seems to be implied by knowing b intuitively. b) (Ex)(x
that
,
Consequently, (1) seems to be inconsistent.
But what not
follow
~(Ex)(x
==
is
from b)
.
J^b Is,
depends on whether is
by
really implied
alone
then,
Ka b
that
Ka b
?
It
can be shown that
knowing b
is
consistent after all?
(1)
Whether
Ex )( x = b ) or not (
implies
taken with this existential presupposition or not.
it
does
compatible with
not
l
-
c
-
it
is
or not
whcthcr
>
And whether
Ka b it
way depends on what we mean by knowing somebody to be very careful with something intuitively. Consequently, we have to this in a moment. return I shall tacit implied here.
taken
this
presuppositions If instead of (2) (2
)
we have de re
Ka b&~(Ex)Ka (x
reading
we
is
or
the
get
= b).
This formula says that a knows b, but of no actual being does a know is that it is b, i.e. a does not know who b actually is. In one sense (2 ) 12 for
The expression K^b might seem "knowledge
by
acquaintance".
ill-formed, but
we can
think of
it
as a convention
Existential Presuppositions in Semantics
not
inconsistent,
we can
because
someone but could not things
known
formula quite
it
actually
to us. This
sensible:
a
known
actually
only of the sort:
4.
Ockham on
"I
a
~(Ex)(x = b)
is
no b
in
but
who
is
b
At
first
Does
(3)
What
(3)
Ka
"something"
it
is
valid; this is intuitively
it,
if
),
there
only no
is is
any,
is
1
anyway?"
then ask
how
did
Ockham
in addition to truth, also
presuppose might seem to be taken in
sight the criterion
closer inspection, this
is
clearly not the case. In
in the sense of
intuitive
semantic metatheory,
cognition not in the
modal
form of material implication =
br>(Ex)(x
says
latter part of the
an absolute sense; there
We may
order to express the Truth Criterion we have to say that it determines in the
existent
but cannot know who b actually is, known acquaintances is b. But from this it
the Truth Criterion
modal way. 14 But on
form but
is
So the inconsistency of (2
to a.
know b,
conceive of this Criterion. existence, or not?
among
person
we know
the
might know b his actually
does not follow that there b
that
say
sensibly
that
possible because from the
is
does not follow that
because none of
quite
find
201
is
that
if
b).
somebody
intuitively
actually exists. Apparently (1)
knows something then
and
this
(3) are contradictory, but
not so clear what exactly are the other implications of (3).
The
standard theory of epistemic logic (2) cannot be true if K b implies the a = It can also be shown that although the Condition (C.EK ), i.e. if = = then is the e pi, valid, fi, (Ex)K a (x b) b) (Ex)(x corresponding negative condition (C.~EK = ) is not. Cf. J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1962, p. 160. Adam Wodeham also criticizes Ockham and follows Walter Chatton at this point when he says that while the intuitive cognition together with the existing object suffice to produce a judgement of existence, intuitive cognition cannot in the same way produce a judge ment of nonexistence. Cf. Quaestiones in I librum Sententiariim, Prologus, q. II, sec. In
the
actual existence of b.
24 (according to Marilyn McCord Adams, William Press, Notre Dame, Indiana 1987, Vol. II p. 602).
The passage Quodl.
~M(Ka b &
VI,
6
(quoted
in
the
Ockham, University of Notre Dame
note 5)
gives
a
de dicto
reading (*)
~(Ex)(x = b)). But from the de dicto reading of the passage - and Ockham is well aware of this - the formula (**) Ka b 3 N(Ex)(x = b) or (***) K fl b D (Ex)N(x = b) does not logically follow. These two are variations of the de re reading of the modal form of the Truth Criterion. (**) says that if somebody knows b, then it is necessary that b actually exists. But it is not necessary because one can perfectly well speak of knowing a real being which is not actual. The existence of b is a necessary rather than a contingent matter and we can speak of knowing contingent things which are not actual at a certain moment of time. (***), instead, says that something real necessarily is b. But again, something being b is not a necessary but a contingent matter.
202
Kirjavaincn
only
b)
a
there
if
can
plausible: we can move from K a b to (Ex)(x an actual individual of which a knows that it is
seems
following, at least,
is
This
identify b.
say that
to
we have
=
b,
to
presuppose that = is fulfilled because this in K a b is not that 7? (Ex)K a (x b) guarantees In other words: a has to know precisely who or what empty. actually is. We can namely quantify existentially in epistemic contexts only if it is i.e.
is
V
about.
15
The
formula is
presupposition the term
we can somehow
that
presupposed
the
that
precisely
we
are
it
does not say = (x
speaking
quantificational
that in the context of intuitive
viz.
fulfilled,
not empty. But
is
/?
says
(3)
entities
identify
knowledge
we words, we
knowing only
that,
b,
can identify any actual being as (Ex)K a b) says. In other may have a kind of intuitive knowledge where we are acquainted with a actual being without being able
real
from not being able to properly know whether it
identify
it
to
it
identify
properly,
exists or not either.
it
This
And, then,
properly.
follows
to say that
is
have a kind of semantically loose knowledge which
we cannot we may
that
the general
satisfies
existential presupposition, but not the personal identity condition.
We may
conclude that the fulfilment of existential presupposition follows from the condition (Ex)K a (x = b) i.e. from the condition that we
Kab
can identify 7/. This condition, therefore, implies both b)
converse
Holcotian
Ockham by
crucial
implication
holds.
approach, could assert
as
sense of (2 a
the
However,
.
condition
the
like
Criterion of Truth
as
this
to
cognition
(Ex)K a (x
behind Holcot
is
is
It
well
remains,
question
the
of
namely,
to
is
:
b)
.
Speculum puerorum nonexistent
criticism.
s
We Since
shall
see
See Jaakko Hintikka, Vol.
Tokyo
1987,
lid.
8,
285;
p.
Synthese 60 (1984),
p.
beings 7?
is
that
Ockham does
the
tradition.
only
and
much
16
the
in
not specified precisely
this
say that the
be taken with the existential presupposition
the case of intuitive knowledge, but does not say
Profiles,
(Ex)(x
which brings us to the
the sense that the individual term
in
i.e.
),
condition
question
and
whether
in
of that sort in
Jaakko Hintikka. Synthcse Library, Dordrecht/Boston/I^ncaster/ there nonexistent objects? Why not? But where are they?"
"Replies
R.J.
Bogdan,
"Are
Comments"
Reidel
Publ.
in
Comp.,
45M58.
The discussion concerning the relationship between epistemic and semantic condi became quite explicit shortly after Holcot s time. Martin of Alnwick, Richard Billingham and Edward Upton became famous by their tracts on the "probationes
tions
terminorum".
Cf.
L.M. de define
Sonic 14th Century Tracts on the
relations, viz. in
PROBATIONES TERMINORUM.
Ed.
Nijmcgcn Ingcnium Publishers 1982. These authors tried to would govern semantic tics in different sorts of semantic "rcsolubilia", "exponibilia" and "officiabilia".
Rijk, Artistarium the rules which
3,
Existential Presuppositions in Semantics
where the cognition of a nonexistent thing
case
the
203
clearly rejects (2) but not perhaps (2
we do
if
Furthermore,
at
is
he
stake,
).
not
the
realize
import of existential and
specifiability presuppositions for the logic of intuitive
knowledge, then
it
very problematic indeed to consider (1), (2) and (3) as compatible with each other. And if they are incompatible, then Ockham seems to be is
forced to end up with a choice between two alternatives: either he has to accept the ambiguity of knowing or he has to accept the equivocity of
term
the
exist
would now
I
.
explore these alternatives a
to
like
little
further.
5.
Hie univocity of
however,
two
exist
Ockham
reveal
fully
types
of
concerning
the
and knowing
involved:
of
existence
do
)
as
are,
existential
and
b\
and (2
(2)
There
basic difficulty.
s
presuppositions actual
Formulae
not,
see
I
it,
presuppositions
semantic
presuppositions
b\ Consequently, we get the following alternatives for reformulations of (2) and (2 ): concerning the identifiability of
Ex (2
)
Ka b &
(Ex)(x
&
(Ex)(x
Ex (2
)
iy>
Eb (2
)
Ka b &
(Ey)(y
&
(Ey)(y
Eb (2 If (2
see
Ex )
is
knowing
b)
& ~ (Ex)Ka (x & Ka ~(Ex)(x & ~ (Ex)Ka (x
= b)
and
Ockham
If
is
it
epistemically
Ockham
limits
is
s
b)
= b) = b)
,
,
,
.
thought, then
it
easy to
is
become ambiguous and Ockham
exist
is
that
which
=
b)
=
inconsistent simpliciter.
formulation, then to
=
b)
& K a ~(Ex)(x
which sense the formula
is
position to say in
=
b)
the correct explication of
both
that
suggest
K,b
)
=
Ex (2
)
is
the case, then
inconsistent,
inconsistent.
If
though Eb (2
I
hard
would
like to
the
correct
is
)
is
it
s
proposing that one always knows according
something
knowable
is
i.e.
intuitive
knowledge
is
Eb
17
restricted by the semantics of absolute terms. In this sense (2 ) can be said to be restrictedly inconsistent. If, lastly, (2 Eb ) is the case, then Ockham is not speaking epistemically inconsistently (though he may be
speaking ambiguously) because only the condition of the identifiability of the object of intuitive cognition is not fulfilled.
Which one of
Ockham
s
thought?
See the footnote
21.
these cases
We
can,
is
the
most plausible interpretation of
according
to
Ockham,
talk
sensibly
of
204
Kirjavaincn
making knowledge claims in the form of categorical K a 6(b) are the objects of predications. These predications of the form intuitive intuitive knowledge the existence of the knowledge. By individuals only by
which
individuals
about
are
claims
the
is
because the individuals compose the domain of in
categorical sentences. Therefore,
presupposed,
semantically all
references of the terms
Ockham seems
to
accept Existential
Importation when he thinks that intuitive cognition implies the following formula:
0(b)D(Ex)e(x)
(4)
The
existence
of the
individuals
met
intuitive
in
knowledge is always what it needs
semantically presupposed, as seen from formula (4), because for
its
-
validity
exists,
i.e.
(5) is
-
precisely that
is
presupposes
(Ex)(x
=
Criterion
the individual in question actually
that
b)
But precisely
true.
Truth
it
has been shown for general semantic purposes by
as
18 Jaakko Hintikka
in
this
hh (2
)
presupposition was secured via the cpistemic and (2 hx ). Therefore, the presupposition of
Ockham
Existential Importation relating to absolute terms in
semantics
s
in strongly supports the view that he would be helplessly ambiguous 19 What he needs, trying to offer (2) as an explication of his thought.
instead, l
b\ That
sort of differentiation concerning the semantic roles of
some
is is,
in
order to avoid an inconsistency,
Ockham must
allow
some
kind of non-identifiability for the object of intuitive knowledge. In this Lh is the most sense (2 plausible candidate for Ockham. Consequently, )
when he says mean that it intuitive
6.
Tfie
that in such
not
is
a case the assent
what
evident
or
who
"is
not
actually
20 evident"
is
the
he must object
of
knowledge. Holcotian approach
I
would now
like
to
turn
to
Holcot. His
discussion many places, mostly because of the corruption of the text. In any case, he does not share Ockham s view concerning the Ockham in claiming cognition of nonexistent beings, although he follows is
18
Cf.
confused
"Existential
Philosophy, vol.
Presuppositions
56 (1959), pp. 125-137.
See the quotation 20
in
Seethe footnote
in
11.
footnote 7 above.
and
Existential
Commitments".
Journal
of
205
Existential Presuppositions in Semantics
mental language as acts of the mind is the access to in three The semantic to culminate conditions, according Holcot, reality.
that
"natural"
context
the
in
contexts,
of:
the
(i)
sentences,
epistemic
categorical
referential
and existence, (iii) the compossibility of knowledge and the natural order. Criterion
Concerning the individual
via
first
intuitive
Holcot
knowledge,
consider a negative existential proposition in
then,
intuitive
theological
the
says
we
following: If
Socrates does not exist
e.g.
order to become a genuine object of intuitive knowledge, is
proposition
simple
be seen as a
to
i.e.
"exponents",
in
and
negative
knowing the nonexistence of an
i.e.
context,
of
tics
interdependence of the Truth
the
(ii)
sum
logical
,
this
of the existentially relevant
truth conditions or existential presuppositions expressible
categorical
sentences. But
candidates
the
all
such
for
in our example are simple sentences of sensation, such as I "exponents" do not see Socrates now or I do not touch Socrates now However 5
.
logically follow from them that the sentence
Consequently, the idea of Holcot
true.
we compose,
sentences of immediate sensation
many such
criticism against
s
a particular and negative existential proposition factual
empirical
because
"exponents",
does not
it
Socrates does not exist
is
not verifiable
do
they
Ockham
not
is
is
that
through
constitute
the
semantic or quantificational truth conditions of the sentence. many such "exponents" we have we do not know all
sufficient
Therefore, however
of the truth conditions of the sentence expressing intuitive knowledge of the non-existence of a certain being.
Furthermore, exist
is
the truth value of the sentence
if
not settled via
empirical
Socrates does not
or truth conditions, then
"exponents"
semantic presuppositions for knowing a nonexistent being are not settled either. This is because if we can specify among our acquaintances the
who
Socrates
is,
then Socrates
not follow that he does not
and
(2),
more
is
theoretical
or
possibility
less
for
exists,
exist.
but
This
is
if
we
cannot,
to say that
it
certainly does
Holcot
is
rejecting
consciously relying on (2 ), which only is a Ockham. But Holcot is clearly saying even
more. 21
Another way of putting Holcot
s
idea
is
to say that even
if
every intuitively known
which categorical proposition makes its contradictory false, this is not enough to say of all the possible propositions con-tradictory to intuitively known ones are false, i.e. we cannot define the whole Universe of Discourse. This is crucial, because it implies
could
that
know
we it
cannot,
only
if
logically speaking,
we
could
list
all
know the
the cause of non-existence because existent
beings against
the
we
non-existent
206
Kirjavainen
Concerning the second context, i.e. the interdependence of the Truth Criterion and existence, Holcot tries to is the specify the semantic conditions of existential propositions. (This
7.
Hie
univocity
exist
of
main content of the discussion of the not forgetting
He,
many
too,
exist
secundum adiacens and latter part of
Holcot
s
is
i.e.
some
reality of
tertium
in
adiacens.
because,
Below
I
text.)
equivocal
shall
discuss
in
the
disputation.
has
"exponents"
Holcot
innumerable
fact
in
it
res.
disputation,
is
is
although
univocal,
Every proposition as a truth claim "implicative"
s
considerable difficulties in the exegesis of the
that
thinks
Holcot
latter part of
semantically
s
truth
(if
not simple and categorical)
is
or truth conditions which imply the
unusual theory seems to be that there are conditions for each cognitive expression every
speaking,
cognitive
expression
identified
is
an adequate mental act, and thus the meaning of the expression becomes a semantic function of the innumerable indexical truth
with
The most crucial truth condition for any existential expression this is called secundum adiacens meaning this thing ( the if we But implicative proposition we are not negate
conditions. is
what
exists
).
is
supposing that anything
exists.
Holcot
says:
of possible to say that in order to get the contradictory part an implicative proposition, we have to put the negation before the And this as follows: no chimera exists. implicative proposition holds for alt implicative propositions ... In a usual way of speaking mat an whether true or not one could say more easily implication before the negation does not posit anything as existing is
It
and thus we can say: what God. (My italics) 22
What Holcot means here
is,
is
I
bigger than
think,
that
God
only
is
not bigger than
explicitly
not what quantified sentences import existential truth claim,
existentially is
referred
to via exponents.
In
supposition,
ones. fore,
22
technical jargon: the semantic rules of personal distributive i.e. the descent to singulars, do give us the semantic rules
more
And if we cannot know we cannot intuitively know
Cf.
"Utrum
Theologia
Sit
the cause of something
we simply cannot know
it.
There
non-existent things. Scientia."
Ed.
habendum contradictorium propositions
J.
T. Muckle p. 149:
implicativae,
oportet
"Et
posset dici
ponere Et sic
quod ad
negationem ante est de omnibus
non chimera est. implicationem et sic haec concedenda: dici propter usum loquentium, sive verius sive non, quod implicativis. Levius posset et concedere tales: melius deo non est implicatio ante negationem non possit aliquid melius deo
..."
Existential Presuppositions in Semantics
an
of
existential
implicative
have:
"this
be that
to
(is
defined for
is
etc.
not)"
no sense does the being
"this"
of
an
extension. In that case
we
the
Correspondingly, its
proposition empties
not) and this
(is
in
that this
expression.
existential
all
in
Therefore, the conclusion must
question exist (provided of course
speak of knowing nonexistent things intuitively. But this is not what is the most crucial
ingeniously thinks
that
negation
it
objects). Consequently,
we cannot
207
idea
inconsistent
Holcot
here.
the semantic
exhaust
is
conditions via
epistemic conditions. These two sets of conditions are not on a par. If
we
having arrived
ask,
what
is
"this"!
at
the final point of our descending procedure:
(pointing to something), the answer must be that
not exhaustively
know
it
because
we cannot know
its
we do
complete concept,
in an absolute sense. It follows we cannot semantically identify that we can, while knowing something, fail to know for semantic reasons what it really is. And if we cannot do that, we cannot know, for i.e.
"this"
semantic reasons again, which extensions are empty and which not absolute sense. On the other hand, if we cannot intuitively nonexistent things without spoiling the logic of knowing, then, that the objects of intuitive cognition, although real
and
in
an
know
must be
it
existent, are not
semantically ready made. Therefore, Holcot wants to remind us of something which could be expressed in modern clothing by saying that we
may
to
fail
identify
an object of
intuitive
in
cognition
some
of the
relevant possible worlds.
With the help of the separation of the semantic
rules
epistemic conditions Holcot can support the consistency of his that
viz.
it
is
impossible to define the
could assimilate the semantic
God".
or
this
or
refers
etc.
to
23
The semantic
leo
we
A
few
lines later
from the
conditions
ace.
to
non
est
for
"this"
could imply that
God. But the innumerable semantic conditions which
Muckle
ed.:"Probari
deus potest esse quaelibet res de
quod
view,
such a way that
of this term with the epistemic
could set up the relation between the term
Cf.
in
above Holcot says that "there is no demonstration that a lion is This is because God could be anything in the world, i.e. this
not
"this"
"exponents"
of the corresponding statements.
"exponents"
citation
God
term
from the
own
deus..."
lion
and
God do
not
tell
us
ergo potcst octava conclusio quia fide tenetur quod simul et per consequens non potest probari
mundo
208
Kirjavainen
what epistemic to
"exponents"
have to be satisfied
order for us to be able
in
make epistemic truth claims concerning God. 24
8.
What was
The theological context
,
V
the term
the sentence F(b),
in
of the proposition
we know who he
we
that
the
lack
cognitive
without definite knowledge of i.e.
we
identify
him
for is
like
This
further
is
know
however, is
in
principle
in spite
of the
But
identification.
we can know
that he judges,
as a judging being.
Furthermore, Holcot theological
means
who God
is.
one
complexum where the
God signifies. We can, God judges because God
identifiable as a being before fact
a
is
nicely
He says that if God cannot be
what
parts only indirectly signify
the truth
God
i.e.
comes out
said above
concerning the third context of Holcot s discussion. knows intuitively that God judges then the term
is
of the opinion that
because
knowledge
x
could
be
Ka F(x)
is
identified,
the form of
not
only
metaphysically as being (as Scotus said), but also as something specific in the world. This is in fact the case with Christ; it means that we can intuitively
relevant
know
a theological proposition of the
"exponents"
evidence
cognitive
form
F(b)
even
if
the
within the natural order do not offer us sufficient for
reaching
the
complete
identification. In
other
words, we may have intuitive knowledge without knowledge of what it really is about in some ontologically more perfect sense. If we have this kind of intuitive cognition, perhaps without any mediation by the Prime Cause, are we not forced to give up the univocity of exist ? In a sense, we are not. We could deal with divine things without supposing for them any peculiar ontological category. We should our world could only remember that these perfectly normal individuals of
be bearers of considerably deeper semantic burdens than can be seen on the surface level. In this sense ordinary terms of our language must be understood as becoming metaphorical, so that those individuals which we made in any ontological quantify over via these terms are not ready sense.
24 25
25
See the footnote
15.
This Holcotian idea
is
not to be assimilated to
some modern
ideas in this area. E.g.
between two distinct quantifiers here, one ranging over acquainted individuals, another ranging over public figures. Cf. of Knowledge and Belief: Acquaintances and Public Figures", The Intentions of "Objects and Other New Models for Modalities. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Hintikka
suggests
that
we have
to
distinguish
Intentionally
Dordrecht-Holland / Boston-U.SA. 1975,
p. 43-58.
Existential Presuppositions in Semantics
9.
The main
Conclusion
the
nature
intuitive
of
difference between
semantic
the
language.
individuals. Instead,
what Holcot wants
not wrong,
first
know
the
in
nonexistent
in
place,
According to Ockham, and well specified
remind
to
this
us,
is
we
somewhat
is
concerns
existent
maintaining that
although
things,
Ockham and Holcot
domain of
presupposes a
cognition
of
ties
209
that
Ockham
is
could intuitively
peculiar
from the
point of view of his theory concerning absolute terms. So, according to
Holcot,
quantification
Holcot
Admittedly
to
say
that
is
not the only problem here.
Ockham
s
presupposition
of
concerning absolute terms in the context of cannot be the semantic "exponent", because in that knowledge
existential intuitive
over nonexistents
wants
generalization
we would be bound to infer ambiguously the existence of a nonexistent. The crucial point, however, is that and in any case our case
commitment
to
an object of
concerning the identifiability failures
in
satisfying
these
intuitive
knowledge sets up requirements of that object, and furthermore, that the requirements are not simply due to our
epistemic incapabilities, but to the ways our language works. Intuitive
cognition,
of terms.
according to Holcot, then, allows a continuous This
seen in theological sentences which might acquire their meaning through the language of our everyday world without us having a perfect semantic metatheory for setting up specification
how
they
radical or
manage
this.
sceptical
as
This
is
is
Ockham
especially
why, in
opinion,
He
is
rather drawing from
ideas conclusions which go a step further towards
theory.
University of Helsinki
Holcot
is
not
as
concerning the cognitive possibilities of
the semantics of religious language.
own
my
Ockham
s
modern semantic
GYULA KLIMA
On Being and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas s Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science In
this
reconstruction of
they
function
would
I
paper
his
s
of
outlines
the
present
Thomas Aquinas
St.
in
to
like
formal
a
concepts of being and essence as
metaphysics and philosophy of science. This
will
some formalism, however, I try to keep between formal and informal presentation so that we can steer our way safely between the Scylla of empty concepts and the the introduction of
necessitate
certain balance
Charybdis of blind
intuition.
we
as
Now, secundum quod copula
dicitur
well,
"esse
duobus modis
Uno modo
dicitur.
veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est esse, quod pertinct ad naturam rei, secundum 1
decem
secundum
dividitur
quod
know
significat
modo
Alio
...
all
So
(3SN.d.6.q.2.a.2.)
genera."
copulative est signifies the truth of a proposition. But what is it that makes a proposition true? Well,
is
it
the
the actual
existence of an individualized form, or nature, signified by the predicate term in the individual supposited for, i.e. referred to by the subject term
time of the predication.
at the
2
For what individualizes a form of which in
"forma
1
[Since analysis,
is
it
form. Such a form
a
what
is
St.
supposito singulari existens per quod
severely restricted space did me ask the reader to "take
let
an eye on
in the first instance is the individual
the
texts
referred
to
allow
not
my
notes
me
individuatur".
to
indulge
seriously",
below, secundum
illud
Thomas speaks
i.e.
vulgo
dictum:
(STl.q.13.
detailed
in
to read
my
of as
textual
paper with
melius
est
esse
iimum quam caecum.] Cf. 1SN 19.5.1.adl.; 1SN 33.1.1.adl.; 2SN 34.1.1.; 2SN 37.1.2.adl.&ad3.; De Fnte 1.; De Pot 7.2.adl.; De Malo I.l.adl9.; Quodl 9.2.2(3).; in Meta 4.1.; in Meta 5.9.; in Meta 6.2.; in Meta 6.4.; in Meta 11.8.; ST1 3.4.ad2.; ST1 16.3.ad2.; ST1 48.2.ad2.; ST1-2 36.1; ScG ScG 1.58.; ScG 3.9.; cf. also Cajetan: Comm. in de Ente, c.l. in princ. in: 1.12.; Summa Philosophiae, Tom. 1. Sect. II.5.1. Opuscula Omnia, (Lugduni, 1577); Alamannus: to Saint Thomas Aquinas 1888); R.W.Schmidt: The Domain of Logic according (Paris,
(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) Part Cf.
"Sicut
cum
dico,
Socrates
compositione formae humanae ad homo."
in
Meta
9.11. vide
totum locum;
II.
ch.4.
&
Part
III.
ch.VIII.
est homo, veritas huius enuntiationis causatur ex materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hie cf.
also Schmidt, op.
cit.
pp.212-214
&
224-226.
Being and Essence
in
Tliomas Aquinas
3
But the other individuating condition dividual can have numerically the same form a.9.)
is
time:
211
even
for
an
if
at different times,
in
the
still,
form once emitted cannot recur numerically the same, "quia quod omnino in nihilum decidit idem numero resumi non potest". (4SN.d.22.q.l. a.l.)
So predicates different
course
)
individuals
and may be
signify different forms.
an individual u
in
same
in the
time
t,
same
hoc enim quod aliquid
quam
propositione,
same time cannot
the significate of a predicate
which, therefore, can be denoted as a this:
Sgt(P)(u)(t).
copula."
(in
rerum natura
in
P
intellectus
Meta
time
t
if
term,
of u at
"ex
t):
est sequitur veritas vel falsitas in
per hoc verbum
significat
est
prout est
6
5.9.)
But so we can say that a proposition of the form at
of
individual at different times.
for the truth of a predication (namely, of predicating
verbalis
divinity,
the existence of such an individualized form that accounts
is
it
of
case
individual at the
value of a function for these arguments like
Now
the
for
So we can speak of at
which are numerically
forms,
(except
different in the
But the same predicate
P
individualized
signify
different
in
S
est
according to a given supposition, or acception of
the significate of
P
in the individual supposited for
P
is
its
by S
true
subject at
time
homo, et illud homo, quod eadem sit numero non est eadem albedo numero" 2SN 17.1.1.; cf. e.g. ST1 85.1. & 2.ad2.; cf. also Alamannus, op.cit. q.2. aa.1-3. Note that from the point of view of this reconstruction it makes no difference whether we speak of Cf.
"Non
enim oportet
humanitas utriusque,
sicut
si
hoc
est
duobus
in
albis
Socrates s humanity or of the humanity individualized by Socrates s matter, i.e. by the materia signata that makes Socrates this individual. Indeed, these are one and the same form, the forma totius of Socrates. Cf. also the references of the next note. 4
In
Cf.
Phys.
5.6.;
Quodl.
4.3.2.;
Quodl.
11.6.;
ScG
4.80
&
81;
4SN
44.1.1.;
Comp.
Theol. 1.154. Cf. ST1 39.2 & 3.; 1SN 9.1.2.; De Pot. 9.6. By the way, this approach offers a very is the same F as as good criterion of truth for relative identity statements, like The former holds is identical with opposed to absolute identity statements like iff the F in the suppositum of a is identical with the significate of significate of F in the suppositum of b So "Filius est idem Deus cum Patre" is true, for Deus Filius and in the suppositum of signifies the same nature in the suppositum of Pater But "Filius est idem cum Patre" is false, since the Son and the Father are "a
b",
b".
"a
.
.
distinct
supposita
of
this
nature,
while
this
sentence
states
the
identity
of
these
supposita. 1
Cf.
1SN
19.5.1.;
propositionibus
...
1SN
fundatur
33.1.1.adl: in esse
rei";
"esse
quod
Schmidt, op.
significat
cit.
veritatem
pp.232-237.
compositionis
in
Klima
212
time
at
t,
exists.
t
founds the truth of
But from this
For
the
facit,
the significate of
the
can
dividends".
say
when
(Quodl.9.2.2(3)).
what
that
and only
if
is
the predicate
is
the
in
is
such that
significate of the predicate
it
to
propositional in
is
signifies
9
the
(In
some
of
case,
real form, not a
these latter cases also the
In
rationis.
See
n.17.)
idea a formal expression consider the following.
this
give
would be an ens
sense.
first
negation or relation of reason.
Now
a
by
signified
the form signified by the predicate in
if
suppositum of the subject
privation,
in reality.
a sort of ens rationis signified by the copula, which
is
the second sense,
course,
which
copula,
cuiuslibet enuntiationis
is
we
so
composition
us suppose that everything that can be signified by any means 10 Let us suppose further either actual or not actual at a given time t. let
First,
which
that everything
ens reale. is
is
also
involves
proposition
actu animae componentis ct
is
form
this
quam "significans compositionem unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in
For the copula
But
that
significate
composition, which need not have a direct counterpart
signifies
the
this
7
does not follow that
it
of
existence
actual
this proposition.
this
proposition.
anima
the
is
It
11
is
actual
mere ens
either a
is
or also an
rationis
significate of a predicate P in an individual u at time
The
W(t), where W(t) actual or not actual are either which signifiable things
an element of one of these domains: Sgt(P)(u)(t)
the set of
Cf.
all
Schmidt,
Thomas
pp.224-228.,
op.cit.
Aquinas",
also
cf.
Knuuttila
S.
in:
-
J.
II.
The
Weidcmann: The
Hintikka:
Logic
of
Ix>gic
of Being
Iking
t
is
at
in
(Dordrecht,
Holland, 1986). ^
This
is
point
out
brought
nicely
in
Wcidemann,
sect. IV;
op.cit.
cf.
also
Schmidt,
op.cit. pp.238-239.
would
I
tentatively identify the significate the proposition, expressly called
expressed
by
41.1.5.
say:
I
enuntiabile
of
as
a
enunciation"
24.1.1b.; 14.14.;
1SN
ST1
because
"tentatively",
for
synonym Schmidt,
De
38.1.3.;
14.15.ad3.;
op.cit.
Ver.
ST1
of
enuntiatio
St.
of
by
(although
ST3
1.2.ad2.
For
Thomas s
Thomas 2.7.;
a
res
tendency
"cmphasi/.ing
a
as
proposition
Thomas
p.223. n.84.). For St. 2.13.ad7.; 1.6.; 14.8.;
16.7.;
a St.
1.5.;
s
to
the
the
enuntiabile
rationis
use
in
the
objective
1SN term
meaning
use of the term see
3SN
Quodl.
ST1
14.12.;
clear expression
4.9.2.;
of the view that
the significate of a proposition see e.g. Logica Modernorum, vol.11. is also: Peter of Spain: Traaatus See de L.M. two Assen, 1967) pp.208-213. Rijk, (ed.: part Cf. also G. Nuchelmans: Theories of the (ed.: L.M. de Rijk, Assen, 1972.) pp.205-207. Ancient and Medie\>al Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity Proposition
an enuntiabile
(Amsterdam-London, 10
1973.) pp. 165-194.
c.l. For a medieval-style resolution of the problems involved in e.g. nonexistents see my "Existence, Quantification and referring to and quantifying over the Mediaeval Theory of Ampliation", Doxa 9(1987) pp.83-112.
11
De
Cf.
Cf.
2SN
Princ.
34.1.1.
Being and Essence time
in
so that the set A(t) / = Ra(t)/
t,
Tfwmas Aquinas
213
a part of W(t), and Re(t)
is
is
a
part of Ra(t).
Now for
this
may be
significate
the argument
construed as the value of a function
But so the function
t.
itself
can be got from
this
by
lambda-abstraction as follows: At(Sgt(P)(u)(t))
But
again,
this,
u.
argument
So,
can be regarded as a value of a function for the
we
again,
abstraction to u too
-
and
let
me =
Sg(P)
Now
us
let
the function itself by applying lambda-
get
call the result
u
Au(At(Sgt(P)(u)(t)))
further
suppose
the signification ofP:
what
that
the
copula,
the
sign
of
composition composes are this function and its consecutive arguments, supplied by the subject term and the time of the predication. So we can write:
= Sgt(S est 2 P)(t)(Sp) Sgt(est 2 )(Sg(P))(Sp(S)(t))(t),
where
Sp(S)(t)e{u: otherwise Sp(S)(t)
=
13
and
0,
not
empty,
Sgt(est 2 )(V)(u)(t) eW(t),
where
set
this
if
Sgt(S)(u)(t)EA(t)},
is
V(u)(t)eW(t) and Sgt(est 2 )(V)(u)(t)eA(t) iff V(u)(t)eA(t). That is, what is signified by a proposition (at time t according to a given supposition, or acception of its subject term) is what is signified by the copula when to
(according subject
its
time
(at
aliquod esse
For the
rei"
of
use
it
composes the nature
absolute t)
at
consideration
time
t:
for
(STl.q.l4.a.l4.ad2.).
14
signified
with
)
the
suppositum of
enuntiabilis
"compositio
It is this
by the predicate
composition of the
its
significat intellect
see A. Church, Introduction to Mathematical Concerning the close parallelism between functional abstraction, on the one hand, and the Aristotelian conception of abstraction, on the other, see P.T. Geach, "Form and Existence", in: God and the Soul (London, 1969) and Thomas Aquinas on the Meaning of Words", Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 3-4(1984) my
Logic (Princeton,
lambda-abstraction
1956.),
pp.15-23.
"St.
pp.298-313. (in Hungarian with course, the terms "signification"
English
and
abstract).
As are
"significate"
for
not
the to
be
terminology used, of regarded as strictly
St. Thomas s use of significatio and significatum. What I call most frequently referred to by St. Thomas as forma significata (per natura individuata pracdicatum), and what I call "significate" is St. Thomas s forma
to
corresponding
is
"signification"
\ux,
University of Notre 14 Brill,
15
Leiden 1984.
Ibid. p. 68.
"Ockham
Dame
on
Generality",
in
Ockham have shaved Wyman
M. Loux, Ockham
Press 1974, pp. 23-46, here p. 41.
s
s
Theory of Terms,
Natural Necessity
A
worlds.
is
proposition
true of a world
referred to by the proposition
affairs
proposition
is
referred to
is
known
true
a
in
in
world w^
and only
if
the state of
if
A
part of the ontology of w^. and only if the state of affairs
some world
w2
as being part of the ontology of
Goddu makes
w1
235
is
if
part of the ontology of
Ockham
in
or other, say
Using
Wj.
the following suggestions as to
how
w2
,
but
this distinction
different notions of
(3)
be distinguished: = true of every possible world logical df = true in every possible world metaphysical df = true in
(4)
and maximally of every possible world = true in physical every possible world
necessity can (1) (2)
logical metaphysical
minimally
df
every possible world
df
=
16
of every possible world Goddu observes that Ockham does not differentiate between logical and metaphysical necessity, and he therefore feels that only categories (3), ontological
(5)
df true
can be attributed to Ockham. Examples given for logicaland non-A cannot be true at the same metaphysical necessity include (4),
and
(5)
"A
time",
"If
man
As examples
is,
man
is
a rational
for physical necessity
animal",
Goddu
and
"If
man
provides an example for ontological necessity "God exists". 17 The problems I have in understanding Goddu
"Man
is,
is
he
is
risible",
risible".
and as
treatment are the
s
following:
of
First
all
it
remains unclear to what extent
Goddu
intends his
suggestions as providing a general framework for systematic as well as historical study of
to
evaluate
Goddu s, Ockham s is
also
modal
Ockham
s
distinctions, 1
meanings".
of
systematic
notions. Occasionally he writes as
notions
against
the
if
background of
he wanted
his,
that
is
yet he also writes that "these distinctions reflect In case Goddu does want to provide a theory that interest,
I
think
his
theory
is
open
to
several
serious objections. In his model, the defmientia of ontological and logical
and so do the defmientia of metaphysical and physical Furthermore, the distinction between truth of and truth in possible worlds needs to be related to such much-debated issues like necessity coincide,
necessity.
16 17 18
Ibid. p. 69-70.
Ibid.
Md.
Kusch
236
world-indexed and unindexed attributes or accessibility relations holding 19 between possible worlds.
(or not holding)
To make my
uneasiness
will suffice here.
examples
more
Goddu
as being logical-metaphysical, while regarding
risible"
Goddu
Sticking with
necessity.
physical
expressing
Goddu
concrete, a brief glance at
treats the necessity of
man
"If
own
seems
is,
s is
risible"
as
definitions
of
is
"Man
s
he
once
explicitly logical-metaphysical and physical necessity, these two cases, for between no difference there however, is, out, spelled it
both cases amount to saying that
he
exists,
and
risible,
this
every possible world
about those worlds
he regards the proprium
explicitly,
in
necessity
Ockham
s
Ockham.
In
reasoning for
man
which
known
in
all
as
this
Ockham
says
hard to accept,
by Ockham
are told that
God
the conclusion that
But
to propria in general.
own
s
we
Goddu draws
on pcccabilitas applies for
clear
main case of physical conclusion Goddu relies on the
discussion of pcccabilitas in d. 44, where
could separate this attribute from man.
is
in
Goddu makes
the last example already suggested and as
As
what
is
worlds."
possible
also
is
"In
fact
that
criteria peccabilitas
this
cannot be
of regarded as a proprium of homo. Peccabilitas is not only predicated the species homo but also of the species angclus. Thus the soli et semper
condition context
of proprium
of d.44
is
Ockham
not
met here.
noteworthy that
is
It
the
in
never refers to peccabilitas as a proprium
of
homo.
The reason why
this
point
bring the discussion of d.44
is
rather important
somehow
into line with
we have to what Ockham writes is
that
on proprium and accidens inseparable in Summa Logicae I, cap. 24 & 25. For in these passages Ockham states quite explicitly that he regards the accidentia
inseparabilia
necessity. For instance
man;
God
The it
such that
20
constituting
Ockham
the
true
writes that
belongs to every man, and could not create a man without making him for
hands,
19
as
See
e.g.
"...
only to
it
area of merely natural risible
is
a property of
man, and always
risible
to
man.
20 ..."
s predicated with a necessity that binds even God proprium human a make is omni-soli-semper true, since God cannot being is
it
cannot laugh. The attempt to make the proposition
the works by Hintikka, Plantinga and Lewis cited in note
Loux, op.
cit.
p. 101.
1
above.
homo
est
Natural Necessity
false
risibile
would amount
would involve God to trying to
in
make human
Ockham
in
a
237
contradiction
in
terms since
it
beings non-human.
This case of logical-metaphysical necessity is contrasted by Ockham in the following chapter (SL c. 25) with God s and nature s abilities vis a-vis accidentia:
accidents are separable or inseparable.
...
A
separable accident
is
be removed from its without the destruction of that subject; whereas an subject inseparable accident is one that cannot. It could, however, be so removed by divine power. Inseparable accidents differ from properties in that although an inseparable accident cannot as a matter of natural fact be taken away from the subjects whose inseparable accident it is, it could be taken away from some other subject without the destruction of that subject. ... A 21property, on the other hand, cannot be taken away from anything.
one which can as a matter of natural
Here God
God
s
potentia
fact
contrasted with that of nature: even though
is
as seen above separate the proprium from its subject, God can nevertheless separate the accidens inseparable. Nature can separate accidentia separabilia, but it cannot separate accidentia inseparabilia
cannot
-
-
.
More
questions arise from these passages than can be dealt with
Therefore
here.
have
I
confine
to
myself
to
three
brief
concluding
remarks. First
of
Ockham
all,
proprium suggest a
Goddu
definitions
s
more complex
of
accidens
inseparable
and
definition of necessary attributes than
provides us with. Such definitions must take into account possible
worlds, time and comparisons of different species.
As
the key to such an
enterprise one can use Ockham s idea that worlds themselves come species and that the belonging of a world to a given species of worlds
in is
determined by the natural species that that world contains. Thus one might suggest an Ockhamian definition of proprium along the following lines: If
attributed
A
the proprium of species
s has,
(2)
no other species has^l
(3)
Furthermore, since
in
A
is
iff
(3.1) s is a part of Wj,
and
Ibid. p. 104.
then
member
w2
of s
a disposition
s at least 2,
there
(3)
is
at
least
one possible world
vv
(possibly identical with
?
Wj) in which another species t has A for some time only. Secondly, even though I have not as yet found any other medieval
author
who
draws
the
between proprium and accidens between metaphysical and natural necessity does, many schoolmen, when commenting on distinction
inseparabile as the distinction as
still
Porphyry, driving
Ockham come close
as
clearly
behind
force
of
interpretation
committed
to suggesting such a kind of distinction.
modalities
to treating
There are two main
moves
such 22
since
one
might
suspect this
prima facie
the
As
the
statistical
conception
seems
proprium and accidens inseparabile on equal terms. strategies in medieval thinkers in dealing with this
on the one hand the de omni case of the inseparable accident unequivocally accepted as a per se case and thus accepted as a
difficulty: is
necessary de re predication. the
more
to explain
usual approach
why
the de
-
On
we
the other hand
find the
omni case of
facie de omni; thus the
-
and
this
was perhaps
commentators engaged
the inseparable accident
commentators draw attention
is
in
attempts
only prima
to the fact that the
accident in question must first develop, that the same accident appears separably in other species, or that the prima facie de omni case still allows for exceptions or changes. In parentheses,
it
must be mentioned
whole tradition of commentators does not give an exhaustive list of possible forms of attributions, e.g. the question as to how we are to that the
classify cases
like peccabilitas
tackled. Neither case can is
or
having two hands
is
never sufficiently
be handled as proprium since the ^//-condition
not met, nor can they be treated as accidentia inseparabilia, since
we
See the study by Hintikka et al. in note 2 above, as well as Simo Knuuttila (ed.), 1981. Reforging the Great Chain of Being, Synthese Historical Library 20, Reidel, Dordrecht
Natural Necessity
in
Ockham
239
can refer to no second species of which they could be separated time or other.
at
some
Thirdly and
finally, it should be pointed out that an intensional of interpretation proprium and accidentia is only justified as far as their
ontological status capacities,
is
we have
concerned. to
worlds Wj, w2 identity can in some cases
initially
,
Due
to the limitations of
human
epistemic
add to both definitions given above that at least and w3 have to be identical. As science proceeds,
and in some cases only be given up. Scotus held that in natural science there remain inductive generalizations that cannot be reduced to conceptual truths. 23 Perhaps Ockham commits this
-
-
same stand when he states that knowledge by demonstration and knowledge by experience are of the same kind. 24 But Ockham does not seem to state his position on this issue as as himself
the
to
clearly
Scotus does.
University of Oulu, Finland
23 94
Ord.
SL
I,
Dist. 3, Pars
111:2,
p.
Bonaventure 1967-.
524.
1,
qu. 4,
n.
237.
Opera philosophica
et
theologica,
The Franciscan
Institute,
St.
DOUGLAS
C.
LANGSTON
Scotus and Possible Worlds
In Ordinatio,
Book
one
as
to
five
Scotus explains
how
explains
in
explanation
as
immutability of
the
in
are
God knows consistent
is
39, questions
of the Lectura,
then
indicates
with
the
first
how
this
and
certainty
knowledge of contingents. According
s
He
future contingents:
he
contingencies;
contingency
God
sections
corresponding
two parts how
there
of
two and distinction
distinction 38, part
I,
well
to
Scotus,
an essential order of causes for every effect in the universe. Moreover, all these essential orders are ordered to one cause, God. His there
is
sustains
activity
effects
with
every chain of co-existing causes and co-causes
of every essential order. Since Scotus equates
"having
been caused
follows
it
contingently,"
"being
that
the
all
contingent"
be
can
there
contingents only if God causes contingently. If God necessarily produces whatever he produces, all the essential orders of causes would be orders of necessary causes and there would be no contingent causes or effects. 1
Since Scotus believes that
God
causes
obvious that there are contingents,
is
it
on
Thus,
contingently.
contingents because there are some things logically have refrained from producing.
Scotus
Since will,
it
is
not surprising
important part of the
claims
eternal
now,
God
s
the
that that
all
Scotus
God
analysis,
of affairs.
intellect
Out of
possible
states
chooses
one possible consistent
activity of
God
all
set
presents
to
the
s
will
A
Treatise
on
God
as
Franciscan Herald Press, 1966)
First p. 85.
s
an
will
all
these possibilities, the divine will to
exist
in
willed
existence.
Scotus believes that whatever the divine will causes to exist
comes
as
to Scotus, in
divine
divine intellect then grasps the determination of the divine will.
existence necessarily
God
occurrences are co-caused by
he sees the
are
has willed that he could
knowledge of contingents. According divine
follows
it
there
The
Because in
willed
to exist in actual existence, Scotus concludes
Principle,
translated
by Allan
B.
Wolter
(Chicago:
Scotus and Possible Worlds
knows with
that the divine intellect
certainty
241
what
states of affairs exist
Of course, these states of affairs are known with certainty since God could
in actual existence.
contingent even
though they are
will
existence
some
We
into willed
other consistent set of contingents. analysis in terms of possible worlds. Instead
can recast Scotus
of thinking about consistent sets of possibilities presented to God, think of
worlds.
God
s
intellect as
Thus God,
in
presented with an
creating a world,
is
number of
infinite
we can possible
effectively willing that
some
one possible world be actual. The actual world, on that account, is contingent because God could have willed some other possible world to be actual than the
one
he, in fact, did.
world because he knows
God knows what
the complete content of
all
occurs in the actual possible worlds and
he knows what possible world he wills to become actual. These possible worlds are perhaps best understood as maximal or
complete states of affairs, i.e., a state of affairs such that no additional 2 of affairs can be included in it without causing a contradiction.
state
They are populated by and so on. Each item history of
all
in
Dixon,
Shirley
is
is
a possible world carries with
Temple
a complete world we are
it
in the actual
named Ronald who was born Jane Wyman, who starred with who will meet with Hagen
also a possible world, there
in
who was married a movie named
in
to
"That
in 1988,
Ronald Reagan
Thus,
it.
a person
is
the current president of the United States,
Illinois,
Gorbachev
in
that occurs concerning
part of, which
Reagan, who
possible persons, possible chairs, possible events,
and so on. Since
Girl,"
God knows
the complete history of
our world and knows that our world
is
actual,
he knows
what Ronald Reagan in our actual world does at any time in his life. Of course, all of Ronald Reagan s actions are contingent because God could have made actual some other possible world than the one he did. He might have
Reagan. Of
made
actual, for example, a
course,
God
world
in
world with Ronald Reagan as we know him. Let us think some more about Ronald reasonable to think that the is
no Ronald actual our
Reagan, however. It is in our world
Ronald Reagan we know about
not the only Ronald Reagan there could be. Surely, in the infinite
Plantinga, Alvin God, Freedom, 35.
is
make
which there
did not so choose; he chose to
and
Evil
(New York: Harper and Row,
inc.,
1974) p.
242
Langston
number
God
of possible worlds
conceives
there
of,
a possible world in
is
which Ronald Reagan, instead of Jimmie Stewart, starred in the movie s a Wonderful Life," went on to true cinematic success, and ignored "It
This perhaps seems obvious, but
politics.
the relationship between our Ronald
which world we
Life,"
identical to
shall
Ronald Reagan
in
make
perfect
sense
saying that our Ronald
Wonderful
Life."
The
in
for short.
s
a Wonderful
Ronald Reagan
Is
"It
W
in
is
found
in
W
and
Ronald Reagan
that
This
Life."
in
in
is
W
seems
It
our Ronald Reagan
Wonderful
a
s
possible person should not deter us from
a
"It
to think that they are identical.
Reagan fact
W
call
us to say that
for
world could have starred
only
think carefully about
our world and the Ronald
our world?
There are strong reasons to
in
the possible world in which he starred in
in
Reagan
we must
Reagan
in
our
captured by
stars in
"It
possible world
s
W
a is
equating our actual
Ronald Reagan with Ronald Reagan in W. After all, since every actuality is also a possibility, our actual Ronald Reagan can also be described as a possible person.
On
wonder
Ronald Reagan Ronald Reagan. The complete history associated with our Ronald Reagan is different from the complete history of Ronald Reagan in W. There are a number of similarities between the two histories, but there arc significant differences. Most importantly, however, in
W
the other hand, there are reasons to
identical to our
is
Ronald Reagan
the fact that
characteristic of the world in
our world
is
inhabiting
and
it
some person
in
W
W just
is
in
world
W
seems
as the fact that our
to
be an essential
Ronald Reagan
an essential characteristic of our world. That
makes
of what
part
if
a
world, by definition
world the world
characteristics.
their
different
possible
If
there
is
it
is,
some
is
is
the
is
to say,
persons
characteristic of
from the characteristics of the person in the actual are talking about a possible world different from
we
our actual world. It
Reagan entity
is
for
in
W
that
is
such reasons that some philosophers claim that Ronald is a counterpart of our Ronald Reagan. A counterpart is an very
much
like
some
real
entity,
in
fact
it
is
more
like
the actual entity than anything else in the relevant possible world; but is
not
bound found
identical
to
the
real
entity.
W
can
exist
only in
these
counterparts
are
Thus the counterpart of Ronald Reagan W. Likewise, the actual Ronald Reagan can
to the worlds they are in. in
Moreover,
it
Scotus and Possible Worlds
243
only in our actual world. This counterpart view has been defended
exist
most strongly by David Lewis. 3 Those who claim that Ronald Reagan can be found in more than one possible world dismiss the types of problems I have described by about world-indexed properties. In general, they wish to talking s a Wonderful is acknowledge that Ronald Reagan who starred in found in possible worlds different from our own. But they insist that it is our Ronald Reagan but with different properties who is found in these Life"
"It
This
worlds.
properties starred
in
because
so
is
like
Wonderful Life
a
It s
Ronald
our
W
possible world
"in
"
and
characteristic of not having starred in
the
actual
Ronald Reagan
Reagan
exists in,
various
worlds
short,
all
the
the
"in
world-indexed
actual
world has the
a Wonderful Life
It s
differ
So
it
is
from world to world. This type of analysis of
been developed at great length by Alvin Plantinga. appear to be at least two ways of understanding
there
would Duns Scotus have endorsed? While of question to ask, invitation
".
the different possible worlds Ronald
possible worlds: the counterpart view and the canonical view.
an
of having
characteristic
but the properties that characterize his existence in the
possible worlds has
In
in
has
Reagan
has
to
it
is
decide
this is
not without meaning.
which view better
If
fits
Which one
obviously a peculiar sort
we
see the question as
his
texts,
we
stand
a
chance of answering it in an intelligible way. To be sure, any answer will be less than certain, but this should not deter us from attempting an answer. Since at
II.
we cannot
a particularly relevant
possibly examine
all
relevant texts, let us look
one from Ordinatio, Book
I,
d.
44, q. unica, n.
4
essays "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic" and "Possible which are reprinted in Michael J. Loux s The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modalities (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979) pp. 110-128 and 182-89. See also his book On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Black-well s Press, 1986). In
his
Worlds"
The
presented by Simo Knuuttila in "Being Qua Being in Thomas Aquinas Scotus" (in The Logic of Being (Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 217-8, footnote 56) as showing that Scotus believed that individuals exist in more than one possible world. His article is the occasion for my text
and John
is
Duns
present paper. I am grateful to him for sending the article and for raising the question about Scotus views about possible worlds. The Latin text is found in Duns Scotus Opera Omnia, Vatican Edition (Vatican City: Vatican Press, 1950- ), Volume VI, pp. 367-68.
244
Langston
The
text
is:
A
power is said to be ordained according to the order of universal law and not according to the order 01 a right law about some This is clear from the fact that God can save someone particular. ne does not save, [someone] who will die in final impenitence and be damned. It is not granted, however, that he can save Judas already damned ([even though] this is not impossible for God s absolute power because it does not involve a contradiction). Therefore, this [phrase] "save Judas" is impossible in the same order in which it is possible to save the someone [who will die impenitentl. Therefore, he can save this someone by his ordained power and cannot save Judas by it. Not, however, py a particular order (which is only of particular agents and operations), out by a universal order; because if he saves this someone, this fact would obtain together with pre-established right laws concerning the salvation and damnation of individuals. For the fact would obtain one who dies evil will be damned/ (which is a with this law, is so] because this someone is fixed law about the damned). [This not yet a sinner at the end of his life, and can refrain from sinning especially while he is alive since God can with his grace prevent him [from sinning]. It is like the case of the king who prevents someone from committing murder and by not damning him does not act contrary to his universal law concerning murder. The fact that God saves Judas, however, cannot obtain together with the specific law [that one who dies impenitent will be damned]. God can see that Judas can be saved by ordained power, but in some order different from the present order brought about by God s absolute power. 1
"that
The
point at issue here
save. will
how God can
is
save
someone whom he does not
There are two people discussed: Judas, who die in the state of final sin;
is
some person who
already will
damned and
die in the state
sin. According to Scotus, God cannot save Judas by his presently ordained power because on that power Judas will die in final impenitence who dies in final impenitence will and there is a universal law that be damned." Scotus thinks this apparently because what he means by
of final
"he
Judas being already damned ("iam of Judas identity that he will be
damnatum") is that
in
who where the general law must be damned. Judas obtains,
that in an order will
be
damned"
Of
course,
damned. By
"he
by
his
his absolute
absolute
is
power God can save Judas already
who
general
damned
unless he followed Christ
e.g.
"he
fixed as part
dies in final impenitence
power God could make an order
rules
obtain,
it
the state of final impenitence and
as
dies
in
final
in
which other
impenitence
will
a disciple for at least one
year."
new ordained Judas already damned in
Since Judas followed Christ for at least one year, in this
order (different from the one that now obtains), the present ordained order could be saved.
be
Scotus and Possible Worlds
In the case of the
the situation
he
who
will die in the state of final
sin"
the person dies in the state of final impenitence,
If
be damned because the general law "one who dies in the state of impenitence will be damned" obtains in the present ordained order.
will
final If
this.
is
"someone
245
he does not die
It
impenitence because
in the state of final
him from so doing by
his grace,
he
will
God
prevents
not be damned.
very easy to regard these cases as in line with the canonical
is
interpretation of possible worlds.
On
one would claim that
this reading,
it
same Judas in one order (or possible world) who is saved and another order (another possible world) who is damned. Likewise, it is the same person who is damned without God s help in one possible world and who is saved with God s help in another possible world. To is
the very
in
substantiate this canonical reading of these cases, one might point to the
tone
general
is
question
of
whole
the
investigating
about some individual.
who
is
there
is
is
s
ability
to
one would argue,
change
asking whether
God
the
the
truths
contingent
can save some person
damned.
This
is,
of course, a very plausible reading of the text. Yet,
an equally plausible alternative reading, which
is
what
It
Clearly,
question.
God
is
in
I
line
think
with
have described as the counterpart theory of possible worlds. That to say, were God to save someone in the actual world whose history I
included
the
which
fact
new
establish a
the
that
he
will
state of affairs.
did
individual
would be
not
die
in
final
He would die
from
impenitence,
God would
need to bring about a world final
impenitence.
in
The new
from the old individual precisely in not in final but would otherwise be very much like the old dying impenitence individual. In fact, the new individual would be a counterpart of the old
individual
one who It
different
will die in final is
impenitence.
perhaps not elegant to describe alternatives for individuals by
means of counterparts. Yet, I believe that this counterpart reading of the text is more consistent with Scotus remarks on how God knows contingents
I
sketched above than the canonical interpretation, and so
should be the preferred reading. Recall that in Scotus discussion
of
God s knowledge God
it
is
presented with an infinite variety of possible worlds. Also recall that these worlds are complete: the individual entities of these worlds have
complete histories associated with them and
God knows what
occurs at
246
Langston
any time in any possible world by knowing these histories. In the possible s a Wonderful world W, Ronald Reagan has the property of starring in "It
among many
Life"
other properties that give a complete history for him.
In the possible world
we
live
in,
the actual world, Ronald
i.e.,
complete history does not include starring in cannot be found course, Ronald Reagan in
"It
W
Wonderful
a
s
in the actual
Reagan
s
Of
Life."
world for
in
s a Wonderful Life." Reagan does not star in Likewise, our Ronald Reagan cannot exist in W, for Ronald Reagan in stars in s a Wonderful Life" and his so starring is one of the factors
the actual world Ronald
"It
W
"It
constitute the possible world.
that
Scotus.
"world-bound"
for
possible world.
Thus God,
That
It
is
to
is
then, that individuals are
clear,
they can
say,
in creating the
what circumstances to place Ronald Reagan in; Ronald Reagan to make actual. Moreover, God s the
world
actual
whose
includes
history
impenitence is really God s ability possible world than the one he did.
only
one
God
he chooses which
rather,
ability to
in
dying
made
have
to
in
exist
world he does, does not choose
save
the
someone of
state
actual
a
in
final
different
does not change the individual
conditions of possible worlds to change the histories of actual individuals;
he
changes
instantiating
the a
contingent
different
possible
world.
It
counterpart view of possible worlds with individuals better captures this tie in
of
components its
the
seems
views about
to
insistence
me
that
by the
on world-bound
between individuals and possible worlds
Scotus thought than does the canonical view. I also believe we reach a similar conclusion
Scotus
world
actual
human freedom. One
when we
think about
of the motivations for ascribing
the canonical view of possible worlds to Scotus that Scotus accepts a libertarian definition of
is
to undergird a claim
freedom
as the ability
and
opportunity of an agent to do other than he does. It is held that this notion of freedom is best presented in terms of the canonical view of
Ronald Reagan has the ability and opportunity to resign from the presidency and this can be represented by saying that in some possible world, our Ronald Reagan resigns from the presidency. possible worlds. Thus,
Similarly,
if
there
is
no possible world
in
able to run a mile in under one minute,
which our Ronald Reagan is say he is not free to
we would
under one minute. Of course, the counterpart view does not offer much hope for a libertarian analysis of freedom. Simply put, run the mile
since
it
is
in
not our Ronald Reagan, but
some counterpart
to our
Ronald
Scotus and Possible Worlds
Reagan, who
is
found
in
247
other possible worlds, our Ronald Reagan does
not really have the ability and opportunity to do other than he does.
Each counterpart of Ronald Reagan,
as well as
Ronald Reagan
himself,
can only perform the actions he performs in the relevant possible world. Scotus does not, however, subscribe to the libertarian definition of
have argued elsewhere, 5 he offers what today we would In Scotus eyes, God brings a compatibilist definition of freedom
freedom call
As
.
I
.
about the actions of
all
free
agents, but they nonetheless remain free.
These actions are brought about by God through his choice of which possible world to make actual. That there is a being very much like our
Ronald Reagan who exists in another possible world and performs actions very different from our Ronald Reagan is an interesting fact but has to
little
do with the
ability or
Once
other than he does.
better matches Scotus
about
human freedom
again,
opportunity of our Ronald Reagan to do it
claims for
seems it
to
me
that the counterpart view
seems more
than the canonical view.
It
in line with
his views
me
thus seems to
that
were Scotus asked which view of possible worlds he would endorse, he would opt for the counterpart view. 6
do not want to misrepresent the argument I am making in this paper. I certainly have not shown that the canonical view of possible worlds cannot be used to discuss Scotus views. I have shown, however, I
that the counterpart fact
seems
to
human freedom
New College
fit
view can be used to interpret Scotus claims and in with Scotus views on God s knowledge and
better
than the canonical view.
of the University of South Florida,
Sarasota
I argue for this in my book God s Willing Knowledge: The Influence of Scotus Analysis of Omniscience (University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1986) and in my article "Scotus Conception of Human Freedom" in L Homme Et Son Univers Au Moycn-Age. Actes du septieme congres international de Philosophic Medievale, edited
by Christian Wenin (Paris:
Vrin, 1986).
am presenting obviously of God s Willing Knowledge.
The Scotus chapter five
J.
I
bears great similarity to Leibniz as
I
argue
in
THOMAS A. LOSONCY
Ideas as Evidence(s) for Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being
for is hard for me to recount all this as if I were a God, not fitting for men to understand intellectually or to explain verbally all the dispositions of the Divine work.
But
it
it
is
"Philosophy"
the
avers a restraint in this passage that rightly captures
many medieval thinkers. They profess a reluctance to which they somehow frequently speak about and investigate.
of
stance
address that
Such expressions of inadequacy and reluctance didn t prevent Pseudocoelesti Dionysius from writing the De divinis nominibus and the De hierarchia.
St.
Augustine
developed
a
argument
lengthy
for
God
s
Book II of the De libero arbitrio which he would conclude existence 2 work of reason. was the somewhat 3 Later St. Anselm would tease the reader of the Proslogion with in
"tenuous"
the following:
do not try, Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way equal to it. But I do desire to understand Your truth to some extent (aliquatenus)... (chap. 1.)
1)
I
2)
I
thank You, good Lord, I give thanks to You, since what I believed before through Your free gift I now so understand through Your illumination that if I did not want to believe that You existed, I should nevertheless be unable not to understand it.
Therefore, Lord, not only are You that than which a greater cannot be thought, but You are also something greater than can be thought, (chap. 15.)
3)
1
(chap. 4.)
Homer, Iliad XII, 176; Consolation of Philosophy. Book IV, prose 6 & Richard Green), N.Y. & Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1962, p. *
Bocthius, (tr.
96.
2
This
reflection
3
remark
upon the
is
not
difficult
the strength of Augustine reasoning process involved.
about
s
argument
but
rather
a
The translations are those of M.J. Charlesworth, St. Anselm s Proslogion with and The Author s Reply to Gaunilo. Oxford: Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo Clarendon Press, 1965. Any variations are my own.
A
Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being
249
The list of thinkers and works could be extended well beyond such Moses Maimonides, Avicebron, the Liber de Causis and others but it of this paper to focus briefly on the use of
the intent
"ideas"
as is
(species
knowledge of angelic and divine being. The of and continuing investigation making precise man s knowledge of ideas enables him to expand his knowledge of separate substances (angelic
intelligibiles)
in trying to gain
beings) and God.
Plato
world
s
which were
his
of
trademark.
no
definite, fixed, with
immaterial
the
It
is
is
notable
for
certain
features
characterized as a world where being
past, present, or future,
4
becoming, the material, which is changing and fleeting. Recalling Saint Paul s words that the world is divided into
and
seen
5
medieval
early
unseen",
thinkers,
contrast the material with the immaterial in
Citing numbers, Augustine
will
is
and unlike the world of
such
as
St.
"things
Augustine,
words suggestive of
Plato.
claim the realm of reason differs from
that of the senses in the following fashion:
Even if I did perceive numbers with the bodily senses, I would not be able to perceive with the bodily senses the meaning of division and addition. It is with the light of the mind that I would prove wrong the man who makes an error in addition or subtraction. Whatever I may experience with my bodily senses, such as this air and earth and whatever corporeal matter they contain, I cannot know how long it will endure. But seven and three are ten, not only now, but forever. There has never been a time when seven and three were not ten. Therefore, I have said that the truth of number is incorruptible and common to all who think. Augustine further asserts a difference between the material and immaterial on the grounds that material things are constantly changing 7 into one another whereas the immaterial things do not. Boethius too distinguishes the material and the immaterial in terms reminiscent of Plato.
8
These characteristics are detailed in the following works: Laches 198DE and 199BC; Gorgias 482A; Meno 97E-98A; Cratylus 400AB; Symposium 210E-211A. See also my, The Platonic Ideas: Some Permanent Contributions to Medieval Philosophies of VII (1979), 105-110, and for St. Thomas, R.J. Henle, SJ, Saint Thomas Man", Diotima, and Platonism. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956. Epistle to Corinthians
De
libero
Hackstaff Ind.:
7 8
The
De
arbitrio,
II, 4,
II,
8.
18.
The
translation
On
Free Choice of the Will. (ed. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964. in
Genesi ad Litteram VII,
Liber de Persona
et
12, 19;
Migne,
duabus Naturis,
6;
is that of Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. The Library of Liberal Arts), Indianapolis,
PL XXXIV, 362. PL LXIV, 1349C-D.
Migne,
250
Losoncy
VHIth
In the
John Erigena
century,
repeat the division between
will
the material and immaterial in typically Platonic fashion and enlarge the division.
9
immaterial
the
upon
Set within the context of a Christian view of the universe, is
repeatedly
given
Platonic
distinctly
features
and
overtones in early medieval thinkers.
Although thinkers throughout the Middle Ages
continue to echo
will
Plato in speaking of the immaterial new precisions and refinements will be introduced so that what appears as Platonic is frequently new material
new
a
in
Rome
Aquinas and Giles of
man
in
present
s
new
invokes
setting that
refer to ideas,
intellect,
now
manner
a
in
For example,
principles.
Thomas
St.
labelled universals
that
and
Plato
recalls
still
s
description of the immaterial. Ideas, they claim, are abstracted from the
now
here and
As
of the material world.
from change and made permanent. 10 These same ideas, in the human
constitute
intellect,
a gateway to
of the entire realm of immaterial being. This
the exploration
man
imply that
abstractions, ideas are set free
actually experiences or
not to
is
knows the essences of such beings
as God, angels, or even the human soul. Rather, according to St. Thomas, and later Giles, man gains some knowledge of such beings through
examining the immaterial aspects of Homilia "...
in
l*rologum
intcllectus
S.
Evangelii
intcllcgcndo
his
own
11
ideas.
secundum Joanncm. Mignc, PL
dicitur
ahstrahcrc
a
(
matcria,
XXII, 294A-B. quia
intcllcgcndo
rcm
iam non considcrat formam ut cst hie ct nunc ct ut hahct essc matcrialc, scd considcrat totam rcm ct totam quidditatcm ut hahct cssc formalc. Hrgo ratio intclligihilitatis ct abstractionis sumitur ex forma, quia in hac, ut dictum cst, ctiam ipsa matcria trahitur ad conditiones formac." Giles of Rome, Thcorcmata XXII de Esse ct abstractam
Essentia (1278-85/6), ed. lid gar Hoccdc/) Ixmvain:
1930; X; pp. 55, 1. 24-p. 56, I. 4. Cf. edition cited is Expositio in Librum dc Causis, (c. 1290); Prop. XXIV, dub.; fol. 84v. 1-112 fols. Also IZxpositio in Aristotelis Libros (IVenice: 1550; fols. ai-aviii, bi-bviii III) dc Anima, (1273); Lib. I, Comm. 75, dub. The edition cited is Venice: 1496, 86 fols. I"hc
&
"List
ctiam
ct
agcntcm..."
Pontifical
in
a
phantasmata
St.
anima invenirc quamdam virtutem activam materialibus
conditionibus
abstrahit.
lit
Thomas, Quaestiones de Anima, Q. V,
Institute
of
Mediaeval
Studies,
1968.
Cf.
immatcrialitatis,
hoc
(ed.
pcrtinet
James
Tractatus
II.
de
ad
quae
ipsa
intcllcctum
Robb), Toronto: Unitate
intcllectus
contra Avcrroistas, cap. V, 111. "Secundo,
quia
per
intellectum
nostrum
et
per
ea
quac
experimur
in
nobis
sumus
apti nati ascenderc ad ea quae sunt in intellectu angclico, assignabimus differentias inter intellectum nostrum et angelicum, ut ex differentiis illis possumus videre quod
sit de angelico intellectu." Giles of Rome, De Cognitione Angelorum, q. VI; A; Venice edition (1503), by Simon de Lucre, fols. 76r-119r. For St. Thomas see, Quaestiones de Anima, q. XVI, (ed. Robb), pp. 224-225. St. Thomas also cautions one that this docs not mean one comprehends the quiddity of separate substances through this knowledge of them, "Unde per hoc quod intellectus noster intclligit quidditates rcrum materialium, non sequitur quod intelligat quidditates separatas." Ibid., p. 244. For
tencndum fol.
89r,
Man s Knowledge oj Angelic and Divine Being Some
from
texts
specific
St.
They both represent an
effort.
Thomas
In
some
"Whether
An
body?"
V
article
at
work on these problems.
of Concerning Spiritual
substance
spiritual
is
provide details of this
survey of these philosophical
historical
endeavors and reveal a specific thinker
will
251
created
that
Thomas
St.
Creatures, is
not
united
asks,
a
to
elaborate response leads to additional questions about one
s
knowledge of separate substances, God, and human knowledge as such.
Thomas
First
scans the previous philosophical research into being
and the gradual advances made in understanding human knowing itself. His review moves from the early naturalists (materialists) to the awareness of the immaterial by Plato and Aristotle. He then comments on the
For
methods surveyed: this
reason
ways to show what
He
first
these ways are not very suited to us
"However
is proposed."
12
from the
argues
"perfection
necessary for separate substances to exist. of
substance
such
is
....
necessary for us to proceed in different (other)
is
it
that
as
exist
it
of the
He
universe"
that
it
is
notes that just as the ratio
not
in
inhering
another,
as
contrasted with the existence of an accident, so this distinction should
apply to the very genus of substance in order that
some substance
without any dependence upon a body. This, of course,
and not
God who
is
exist
said of creatures
exists outside of
any genus. Next Thomas argues that from the very order of things, there should exist a middle ground between any two extremes. The universe,
be thought of as comprised of beings with degrees vertical arrangement. Consequently as one finds
for this reason, should
of
excellence
in
a
extremes for the material realm of beings so too extremes exist for the immaterial realm of beings. St. Thomas adds that God is one extreme in the intellectual hierarchy albeit not a fitting
then that between
God and
member
of any class or genus.
beings, both those joined to matter and those wholly separate Lastly,
he
this
resolving
considers
the
question.
Since
act
It
is
material beings there exist immaterial
of the
intellection
human
itself
intellect
from as
can
it.
a
key
to
operate
background material to this discussion and subsequent material in this paper John O. Riedl, "The Nature of the Angels", Essays in Thomism. (Ed. Robert E. Brennan, OP), N.Y.: Sheed & Ward, 1942, 111-148. See also, Anton C. Pegis, "Penitus Manet Ignotum", Mediaeval Studies, XXVII (1965), 212-226. further
consult,
"Sed
procedere
istae viae
ad
q. unica, art. 5,
... Unde oportet nos aliis viis Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis,
non sunt nobis multum accommodae:
manifestationem respondeo.
propositi."
252
Losoncy
independently of matter it must be an entity with esse independent of matter. Yet, as an intellectual being, this substance is so weak that it
must learn through the material and so what the
bespeaks
genus
that
in
perfect
an
genus,
than perfect
less
is
a
in
being that
intellectual
neither operates through matter nor exists in a body.
The
overtones
Platonic
the
in
are
question
twofold.
St.
First,
is developing something inherent in the Platonic view of ideas. he takes the experience of the intellectual act and uses it to Second,
Thomas form
about the natures of intelligences. Specifically, Aquinas
insights
that any class
two arguments exploit the Platonic position
first
He
and a worst.
best
most and a
consists of extremes, a
-
metaphysics of participation
-
then converts this insight into an
using a least,
works
insight
independence of the
argument
Aristotelian
The
ostensibly
the
position,
from the material. This, however, depends
intellectual
the additional assessment of the difference of both the intellect and
upon its
an
out
a
for the
existence of a highest species in the created genus of intelligences.
second
s
contents,
Boethius
exceeds
that
Boethius
reasons.
additional
for
Aquinas
Aristotle s
Soul.
the
Concerning
is
In
question
this
fails
Thomas,
late in
the
Concerning
instead,
craftsman
He
question. to
compares
who does
not
then
dictum
a
study
position"
contribution
is
from
from
raises in his Disputed
the Disputed
after
Thomas career. 13 Soul, Thomas inquires, Origen is said to s view of the
specifically?"
the
product
of
maker.
its
the creation of the universe to the
make
a
observes that Origen
properly
appreciate
of
This
These were written
or not an angel and a soul differ
be behind universe
from
VII,
Aristotelian
Thomas
St.
obviously,
is,
cogni/ant
principle.
Questions Concerning Spiritual Creatures and
"Whether
latter
"ostensibly
evident in questions which
is
Questions
The
sensible.
by Plato. The nuance of an
initiated
made
from the
ideas,
the parts of his
work equal
St.
work of a
as this
would
be detrimental to the good of the whole. For, just as all the parts of a house are not equal in their contribution and value to the whole so too there
exists
a
diversity
whole as good and as a 13
See
Intro,
14
the
art. 8.
in
for
carries
instance,
on
St.
its
universe
the
creator.
that
constitutes
Questions on the Soul, Wise.; Marquette University Press, 1984; 2-8. of II,
the
14
Thomas Aquinas, OP,
discussion and line Contra Gentiles, Book
this
Summa
in
reflection of
by James H. Robb), Milwaukee,
Thomas
See,
discussion
fit
of beings
argumentation chap. 46;
De
in
various
(tr.
w.
places.
spiritualibus creaturis,
Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being
253
Aquinas next discusses the way in which a difference of species is and one s discernment of same. He adds that to
realized in the universe arrive
at
a
knowledge of immaterial substances one must begin with a how material substances are known. Material substances
consideration of
moving from the simple to the complex additional reason of the properties each more complex being possesses. by are said to be differentiated by
He
concludes
this part as follows:
It is because of this that the Philosopher, in Book VIII of the Metaphysics, states that the species of natural things are like the species of numbers, in which the addition or the subtraction of a unit brings about a change in species. In a similar fashion, therefore, a diverse grade of natural perfection brings about a difference of species in immaterial substances. Nevertheless, the way in which species are diversified among immaterial substances is different in some respects from their diversification in material substances.
To the
explain these
of
perfection
For
material
levels
principle.
differences"
"respective
results
from
substances
Thomas the
this
notes that diversity in
level s
relation
from
results
to
their
a
single
relation
to
The more numerous and complex parts. For immaterial substances the opposite occurs. The relation immaterial substances bear to the First Efficient Cause is responsible for their hierarchical order. St. Thomas lowest such substances are the simplest while the highest are
matter.
those with
writes:
Now
the supreme perfection of the First Efficient Cause consists in in simple unity the totality of goodness and perfection. Hence the closer an immaterial substance is to the First Efficient Cause, the more perfectly it possesses its goodness in its own simple nature, and the less it neecls inhering forms for its own fulfilment. And indeed this process continues step by step down to the human soul, which holas the lowest rank among immaterial substances, just as prime matter does in the genus of sensible
His
possessing
16
things.
Two observes
further observations will elucidate St. that
because
separate
substances
Thomas
and
the
s
claim here.
human
soul
He are
constituted differently in species the very acts of operating in the genus
of intelligences,
their
respective
know by means of an know discursively and
acts
of knowing,
intellectual species innate to
The 16
translation
Ibid, 106.
is
that of
they
Robb,
ed.
abstract
cit.,
105-106.
their
are different. Angels
them but human
intelligible
species
souls
from
254
Losoncy
17 Even more, diverse angels have intelligible species which phantasms. differ in kind and so the angels themselves are specifically different. In
effect,
the
an angelic being
closer
fewer and more efficacious are
Thomas
St.
its
the
to
is
ideas.
Efficient
First
human and
enlarges upon the difference between
XV
ideas in question
of this
Cause the
18
series when he asks,
"Whether
angelic
or not the
soul can understand in a separated state from the body?" He answers that although human souls may know by reason of the influx of ideas from angels this is not especially beneficial for the human soul.
human
Such ideas are extremely universal whereas the human soul
is
attuned to
19 (Thomas does allow knowing singulars with the assistance of the senses. that one retains previous knowledge of singulars and will know whatever
additional knowledge of singulars
is
provided by
God
s
special grace or
20
allowance.) In question
human
XVI,
St.
know
can
soul
Thomas separate
inquires outright,
substances
"Whether
from
the
or not the
principles
of
philosophy and by knowing their quiddities directly such as it knows the of quiddities of material things?" The response invokes another survey philosophy states
s
that
history. all
phantasms and,
But
proper
going
"his
own
human knowing
for this reason,
is
way"
on
directed
this
issue
Aquinas toward the use of
one cannot know what angelic quiddities
Rather, one knows of such beings through the reflective the intellect on its effects and the effects of beings of a superior order: are
like.
Therefore a
soul, while united to
its
act of
body, can rise to only such a
knowledge of separate substances as that to which it can be led through species received from phantasms. Now in this fashion a soul is not able to understand what separate substances are, since such substances are utterly disproportionate to intelligible objects derived from phantasms; but we can in this way and in some fashion know that separate substances exist. In the same way we can proceed from lowly effects to a knowledge of higher causes, so that we know only that these causes exist; and at the same time that we [know] that these causes are superior, we know that they cannot be of the same order as the effects we observe. And this is rather to know what they are not than to know what they are. And in this sense it is to some extent true that insofar as we understand our intellect, in quiddities which we abstract from material things, turning toward those quiddities, can understand separate substances, 17 Ibid.,(\.
18 Ibid.,
19 Ibid.,q.
20
Vll,adlm;
ad 5m; XV,
Ibid., 190.
107.
107-108. 189.
Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being
255
to be immaterial, like those quiddities it understands them themselves which are abstracted from matter. And thus through the reflective activity of our intellect we are led to a knowledge of separate intelligible substances.
so that
Imbedded
in
these
discussions
latter
important principles hinted
at
earlier.
will
It
of
St.
Thomas
help to identify
From Boethius he
assess their respective roles in the questions he treats.
the
adopts
important
principle
that,
"the
according to the manner of being of the
known
knower."
22
some them and
are
knower
the
in
is
This principle
is
used
explain and account for the different knowing activities of human souls, angelic beings and God, their differing respective intelligible objects, and their respective ways of being. Coupled to this principle is to
the Aristotelian principle that
"the
higher includes, in
the lower
itself,
s
23
However, Aristotle s De Anima a kind of principle suggests quantitative complexity whereas St. Thomas s to the realm of approach intelligences complexity is from a different
more
features and something
Angelic
perspective.
the
regards
power and the
universal
besides."
is
complexity
not
of their ideas which
power
of
their
quantitative
but
are innate and
intellects
which
as
intensive
more
deal
or less
with
these
intelligible objects. Varying degrees of intellectual power are indicative of
a hierarchical ranking of intellectual beings. St.
Thomas
explains this as
follows:
For
more powerful an intellect is, the more it many meanings from a few instances. An example
clear that the
is
it
able to grasp
is
of this is that things must be explained one by one to ignorant persons and slow learners, and particular examples used for each single instance.
Thomas
St.
in
s
approach
is
also discernible in St.
Bonaventure
s
argument
another context.
Asking whether the world has been produced in time or from in his Commentary on the Sentences?5 Bonaventure comments
eternity that
if
one were
to
wonder whether an angel could make
or throw a stone in spite of it
is
21 Ibid., q.
22 23 24 25
its
lack of hands the answer
capable of doing such without these
XVI,
200.
The Consolation of Philosophy, V, prose
De anima Robb,
Book
q. II,
II, 3;
414b29-415a.
XVIII, 217. d.
I,
p. 1; a. 1, q. 2,
ad 6m.
4.
a pottery cup
would be
human organs because
that
of
its
256
Losoncy
He
higher being and power.
world from
nothing without
God
adds that similarly
any change
in
God
s
could create the
being.
The human
problem conceiving things separating one s from their thinking imagination. To what extent then have things changed as medieval thinkers over the centuries repeatedly pondered man s knowledge of God and angels?
difficulty
What,
such
in
especially,
clues
important
was the
role of ideas?
and evidence
regarding
their origin (innate or abstracted)
and
of
a
is
Certainly ideas provided these
questions.
their intensity
many
Furthermore
and number would
be used to assert a hierarchical array of intellectual beings. Still the initial caution endured if St. Thomas and numerous others
him are considered. Indeed, with Ockham and later medievalists, the approach became more cautious and wary. Yet there are
before
and
after
specifics of the problems are refined. The an intellectual being has grown with the help of the studies of the intellect by Aristotle, the Arabian commentators, and
also
vast
changes.
comprehension of the
university
The
man
faculties
sounded as a prayer
as
of the
in the
XHIth Century. Thus, what
St.
Anselm
Xlth Century:
O
God, that I may know You and love You, so that I may You. And if I cannot do so fully in this life may I until it comes to fulness. Let the knowledge of progress gradually You grow in me here, and there [in heaven] be made complete; I
pray, rejoice
in
...
St.
Thomas echoes with the metaphysician s calm statement: The ultimate perfection for a human soul in the order
of natural
knowledge is to understand separate substances. But it can achieve this knowledge more perfectly DV the fact that while in the body it can be disposed to this end through study and more especially through 2 merit. Consequently it is not united to its body to no purpose.
Villanova University
Proslogion, chap. 26.
27
Robb,
q.
XVII, ad 3m, 207-208.
MARMO
COSTANTINO
Gregory of Rimini: notitia intuitiva, species and Semiotics of Images
Introduction
0.
In this paper
of Rimini
I
will briefly
regarded
as
examine three cognitive problems that Gregory
preliminary to
every science:
his
definition
of
and abstractive cognition, his theory of cognitive species and his reflections on signs. For the sake of conciseness, however, I will give intuitive
only a sketchy account of the
As
one.
will
it
Augustine
s
one,
first
Rimini
appear,
a renewal which implies a lessening of the cognitive
value of sign and arises in opposition to
In
least
at
three
intuitive cognition,
know
not that their is
it
Ockham
s
opinion.
and species
Intuitive cognition
1.
two topics and focus on the third is a radical renewal of
semiotics
s
places,
Rimini argues against
charging
it
with circularity. 1
Ockham
s
definition of
The reason why we can
contingent truths through abstractive cognition
is
just the fact
does not terminate in the real things outside the mind, but to
images.
The
distinction
traced then not along
Wodeham
(as also
did
2 ),
between
Ockham
s
intuitive
steps, that
and abstractive cognition is
starting
by
their effects
but by directly looking at their nature:
intuitiva est notitia simplex,
"notitia
qua formaliter aliquid immediate in se ipso
cognoscitur. Abstractiva vero est notitia simplex, qua formaliter aliquid in
In
2 Sent.
d. 7, q. 3 Additionalis, vol. V, p. 107, 6-11. See also In 2 Sent. d. 7, V, p. 122 (against Franciscus de Trivisio and Joannes Scotus); and In 1 Sent. 1, art. 1, vol. I, p. 307. For Ockham s definition, see Ord., Prol., q. 1,
q.
3,
vol.
d.
3,
q. p. 6.
vol.
2
I,
See Grassi 1986,
OTH
p. 81.
Mar mo
258
medio repraesentativo cognoscitur". 3 The representative media both sensible and intellectual cognition are called by Rimini aliquo
for
"species".
Rimini he employs
use of the term species
s
all,
explain the physical process of perception, along the
to
it
rather problematic. First of
is
lines layed down by the perspectivi. Although his adherence to their verum sit view could seem cautious in a passage - where he says in medio" de commune dictum (ibid., p. 331, 24multiplicationc specierum "si
he certainly does not question such a common teaching, as Ockham Furthermore, he argues against Ockham s total rejection of species in
-
5)
did.
his
II
dist.
book,
Rimini,
7,
q.
3 additionalis (vol. V, pp. 102-4). According to
corpus
"quodlibet
multiplicando speciem
immutabit medium
visibile
suam"
Sent.
1
(In
d.
3,
q.
et
etiam organum,
art. 2, vol.
1,
I,
p. 328,
Every organ not only receives species, but also keeps the species absence of the objects, just as wax receives and keeps the figure of a
20-1). in
seal
332,
p.
(ibid.,
Thanks
21-26).
to
the
Aurcol
retention, Rimini can rebut Peter
s
natural possibility to have a notitia intuitiva rei
He
clearly accepted
could wonder what
is
physical
process of species
arguments in support of the non existentis. 5
the theory of mutliplicatio specierum.
But we
according to him the nature of multiplied species,
whether they share the semiotic status of the intelligible and sensible species. To answer this question, it is important what Rimini says that
a quaestio
in
Sent.
a
is
form
which 6
d.
7,
q. 3).
"quae
is
kept only by the Venetian print of 1522 (In 2
There he declares
est similitudo seu
anima... apta nata ducere similitudo"
(ibid.,
non sunt
sensitiva exterior!
which
species,
3
In
1
Sent.
Rimini
as
He On
3,
3,
q.
-
species"
principles, in
art.
after
which
1,
vol.
in
is
and firmly
(ibid.,
389,
organs,
34
distinguishes
virtualiter
manens
is
naturaliter in
states that
105,
p.
sense
pp.
I,
explains,
proper sense, species
rei cognitae,
notitiam rei cuius ipsa est imago et
in
105, 2)
impressed
immediately
knowledge of 4
d.
are
imago
animam
pp. 104, 33
that, in the
11-2).
"in
The
potentia
multiplied
have
therefore
no
390, 2. The adverb formatter, from the abstractive cognition
-
included that of the conclusion.
Sent. d. 3, q. 1, art. 2, vol. I, p. 328, 20the perspecth i and, in general, on the problem of vision in medieval philosophy see: Federici Vescovini 1965; Lindberg 1976; Tachau 1981 and 1982. 6.
refers
at
least
to
Witelo
in
In
1
quotes from Aureol, Scriptum, I, prooem., s. 2, art. 3, vol. I, pp. 198where five experiences are listed, and does not refer to d. 3, s. 14, vol. II, pp. 696-7, where are the eight famous experiences against which Ockham, Chatton and Rimini
200,
Wodeham
argued.
Venicius
Markolino pointed out the importance of volume of the critical edition (1981, p. LXIX).
tion to the first
this
edition
in
his
introduc
Gregory of Rimini and Semiotics of Images
value:
representative
are
they
not
iconic
of
signs
259
the
species in the widest sense
7
Only
knowledge
V,
3,
2, vol.
a.
1,
q.
I,
p.
way, intuitive cognition can be said to be a direct
in
this
of
outside
yielded by the
They are
and they are the forms received and kept by
the sense organs in perception (see In 1 Sent. d. 340).
since,
objects,
probably, they are just the objects themselves or their forms.
with
Species
objects.
2 Sent.
intuition of a thing (In
first
force
representative d.
7,
q.
are
3 add., vol.
p. 116, 17-8). It
of a
possibility
out
points
the context of the rejection of Aureol
in
is
a
possibility that
knowledge of non-existent things that Rimini difference between his definition of
natural
noticeable
further
intuitive cognition, as
God
compared
Ockham
to
which
keep
it
as a notitia, that
of Rodington
us
of
definition
parallelism
is,
God
he admits the
a
as
its
can keep the thing or
s
ones:
connotative
as
just
He
can not
argument reminds
upon the
they pivoted
Rimini
term,
but
object,
as a real knowledge. His
and Holcot
s
visio
that
if
could produce or keep the perception of an absent or
the notitia intuitiva without
is
Even
one.
s
non-existent object, he states precisely that quality
hypothesis of the
s
the
stresses
strict
holds between the relation of fatherhood and the term
"quamvis patrem deus facere possit tamen potest conservare patrem sine filio
sine
notitia:
et conservare,
filio
non
quod pater sit pater non habens filium". 8 In other words, God can create a male without sons, but not as father, since He would yield a contradictory state of affairs: quod sit
pater
pater
non
habens filium.
In
et
the
case
of
a
intervention in the sphere of cognition, the visio produced by
not be actual, but only potential, just as a male
is
in case of supernatural intervention,
that,
The
quality which
God
assent or to dissent
God would
a possible father. In
why Rimini holds
opinion, this argument can better explain the reason
my
supernatural
no judgement can be
can produce in sense organs
on a contingent proposition.
epoch?, therefore, accompanies the possible
God
A s
is
elicited.
not sufficient to
sort of unintentional
interference in
human
9
cognition.
Ibid,
ad
p.
notitiam
24-6: "Uno modo, communissime [accipitur species] pro omni forma habendam concurrente. Et secundum hunc modum etiam forma corporis,
104,
quod cognoscitur, 8
On
dicitur
species."
Rodington and Holcot, see Tachau 1981, pp. 232,
n.
8 and 296,
n. 8.
o
See
ibid,
p.
334,
14-9.
Here,
Rimini
agrees
partially
with
Ockham,
in
denying
the possibility of a supernatural affirmative existential judgement, and with his fictitious
Marmo
260
2.
I
Rimini
on
s reflections
and
signs
their place in late
medieval semiotics
not repeat what Francesco Corvino already said in
will
Rimini
s
1978 about
notion of intelligible species or about his particular interest in
explaining in detail the process of concepts point out
Rimini
is
of signs,
s
formation. as
What
he sketches
I
want
to his
it
along conception treatment of received and constructed species. Both of them are images, but they differ in the fact that while we don t have naturally a received species of a thing that
we
didn
t
359, 29-30),
we can
we imagine
a likeness of Christ
p.
360,
But also
1-5).
construct the final one
mind,
it
in
this
(ibid., p.
know
necessary to
is
perceive immediately in
construct a species of a thing s
we
itself (ibid.,
p.
never saw, just as
even if we never saw him (ibid., we need some received species to 10 Whatever species we have in 5-7).
face,
case,
360,
previously something similar to
order that they can play their cognitive
role.
Rimini
clarifies that
sensibilia necesse est
quod per species receptas cognoscamus
them "ad
in
hoc
nos habere
habituales notitias illorum, per quas cognoscamus hanc esse speciem huius et
hanc
illius,
et
sic
de
singulis"
we
case of species of things
something similar to
them
p.
(ibid.,
we have
never saw,
And
360, 9-11).
also in the
to perceive previously
(ibid., p. 360, 13-5).
Rimini explains in the same question (d. 3, q. 1) that a species in mind is both res secimdum se and imago vel similitudo alterius rei. Therefore, there are two different kinds of cognition of a species: one which takes it as a thing and one which regards it as an image of
another thing. The of the image and
last
cognition
memory
-
Rimini says
as
function in
includes perception
of the thing represented by the image
342, 23-6). Rimini clearly repeats here a
is
-
common
(ibid., p.
how images Ockham. As it
teaching on
human knowledge, which goes back at least to Ockham employed these explanations to rebut
well known,
the theory
of cognitive species: since they are images or likenesses of the things, they require a previous knowledge (intuitive cognition), therefore they are not useful as cognitive tools.
At the outset of
his
Summa
logicae,
Ockham
opponent, in rebutting the opposite possibility (see Ockham, Ord., Prol., q. 1, vol. I, pp. 56 and 70-1). It seems to me that, in the quoted addition 13, he could have developped his position shadowing his partial agreement with Ockham.
He L, vol.
I,
refers p. 351.
here to Augustine,
De
trinitate
XI,
8,
14,
Corpus
Christ.,
Series Latina,
Gregory of Rimini and Semiotics of Images
261
such as images and footsteps, a radically
sets against representative signs,
"Propter tamen protervos est sciendum quod signum Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid
different kind of sign:
dupliciter accipitur.
quamvis non facial mentem venire ostensum [Ord. d. 3, q. 9, vol.
aliud facit in cognitionem venire,
primam cognitionem
eius, sicut alibi est
pp. 544-545; Rep.
qq. 12-13, p. 274], sed in actualem post
(Summa
logicae
II,
53-6, pp. 8-9).
1,
I,
n
This
Ockham
is
shows all,
it
christ.
I,
ii,
2). It
at least two changes in comparison to the previous ones. First of omits any reference to the sensible nature of signs. But this is not
a novelty,
we remember Roger Bacon
if
s
every kind of knowledge mediated by signs.
Ockham
s
conception
common
previous
between
teaching. According
and
species
things
It
is
Ockham
12
signis.
depreciates
far
from
different
to Bacon, for example, there
which
of
how
interesting to note
knowledge was
mediated
of
De
definition in his
Secondly, as a consequence of his theory of relations,
gap
II,
habitualem"
reformulation of
s
the traditional Augustinian definition of sign (De doctr.
in
they
are
is
no
The
likenesses.
and likeness of the species in comparison with the not discovered a posteriori, but is given: the species, like the
relations of conformity
thing
is
real images, agree
a priori with
reality. In virtue
former
the
Bacon
stresses
meanings (De
employ
better,
or,
species,
I,
in
from
infer the latter
cognition,
must be better known
also that signs
signis
of the real relation that
we can immediately
holds between species and thing,
instead of thing.
13
for us than their
p. 83), recalling a feature of the Stoic notion of
5,
Thomas also shared, at least in which Ockham put partially aside. I say partially since Ockham with sign, that
his theory of perception
14
and
5
second meaning of sign recovers the priority of the knowledge through signs he seemed to have rebutted:
"Aliter
cognitionem
signum
accipitur
venire
natum
et
est
pro
pro
illo
his
illo
quod
supponere vel
in
facit
aliquid tali
addi
in
See, on this subject, Tabarroni 1984.
12
I, 2, p. 82. On his semiotics, pp. 16-9 and Tabarroni 1984, pp. 65-7.
De
see
Pinborg 1981, Maloney 1983, Eco
et
al.
1984,
modus signi naturalis est quando non propter aliquid, se propter conformitatem et configurationem unius rei in partibus et proprietatibus, ut imagines et picturae et similitudines et similia et species colorum et saporum et sonorum et omnium rerum tarn substantiarum signis
illationem
5,
I,
aliquam ad aliud
p.
83:
"Secundus
significatur
quam
accidentium, quoniam points out this feature again in his
14
Perspectiva
I,
d. 1, 4,
omnia haec sunt configurata in
his
pp. 7-9.
See, for example, Sent.
lib.
De an.
II,
et
conformata
aliis."
Bacon
Tractatus de multiplicatione specierum, p. 421, and
12, p. 115; 24, p. 169.
Marmo
262 15
(SL
propositione"
These natural
59-64, p. 9).
I,
which are then completely different with things.
our author, we are
to
position on
s
From
signs.
should be clear that Rimini doesn like
signs:
even
these,
the
is
opinion,
aliqua
(ficti)
d.
3,
1,
q.
nisi
by our mind. What
2, vol.
art.
numquam quam dormiens
elephantis et
vidit
occur runt"
it
t
mean
to
res
re penitus
ilia
17
know
As he
to
ipsum
illius,
ignorata"
(In 1
This implies that to have "Unde
it:
qui fmgit
formam
non plus elephantem
vel phreneticus cognoscit per
phantasmata, quae
again stresses, in order to
something through a species or a concept, it
my
on species per nullum
signis ut
elephantem, per illam
(ibid, p. 360, 23-5).
notitia habitualis of
important, in
reflections
his
360, 20-32).
p.
I,
is
cognoscantur esse signa
ipsa
a concept of something doesn
cognoscit
able to better appraise
distinguish concepts from other iconic
t
esse alicuius rei cognosci non potest
quoque
now
which has been stated above
generale omnibus
est
"hoc
cognosci,
possit
that
Rimini extends
that
fact
every kind of signs:
sibi
other signs: they
concepts also are images and likenesses of the thing,
they are constructed
if
Sent.
all
16
Coming back Rimini
signs are the concepts
nature from
fact, a sort of spontaneous reaction of the intellect confronted
in
are,
in
we have
or of something else similar to
to
keep
in
know
mind
a
it.
Conclusions
To
conclude
I
would say
Rimini
that
s
opinions on the complexity of
same
these subject matters constitute a real novelty and, at the
As
of the
for
Francesco
the
time, a
Corvino
already species, past. recovery noted the development of the notion of intelligible species from Duns Scotus to Rimini, but, as from many places of his Commentary on the
Sentences can be seen, his theory of multiplied and impressed species
appears to be a revival of Bacon s and Witelo s theories. As for intuitive cognition, Rimini shows himself quite independent of the English
For a 1978.
On
approach to the notion of natural signification see McCord conception of the mental sign, see also Tabarroni 1984, pp. 79-81.
critical
his
Ockham
,
them
compares
to
the
relation
infirmorum and the pain they suffer. See on
among
which
holds
between
De Andres
topic,
the
gemitus
pp.
99-100,
Christ.,
Series
1969,
others.
Here, I
this
Adams
he
-atina, L, vol.
I,
refers p. 312.
to
Augustine,
De
trinitate
X,
1,
2,
Corpus
Gregory of Rimini and Semiotics of Images
discussions
after
Ockham,
particularly
Adam Wodeham
of
which, often in contemporary criticism, throw Rimini shade.
As
263
s
positions,
s originality
into the
well as his notion of intuitive cognition, his semiotics, though
radically divergent from Ockham s one, appears to be deeply indebted to Augustine s theory of knowledge. Anyway, much work has to be done in order to achieve a better understanding of his thought and of it
is
contemporaries and to
his relationship to his
his authorities.
Bologna
References
a.
Sources
Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, eds. A.D. Trapp, V. Markohno et. al., 6 vols, Berlin-New York 19791984.
Peter Aureol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, Proemium - dist. 8, ed. E.M. Buytaert, 2 vols., St. Bonaventure, N.Y.-Louvain-Paderborn 1952-1956.
Roger Bacon, De multiplicatione specierum, ed. J.H. Bridges, in The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon, vol. II (reprint: Frankfurt am M. 1964).
De
signis,
ed.
K.M. Fredborg,
Unedited Part of Roger Bacon 34 (1978), pp. 81-136. Perspectiva
-
Opus maius V,
ed.
L. s
Nielsen and
Opus Maius
cit.,
vol.
of
Ockham,
(Reportatio),
ed.
Quaestiones
in
J.
De
Pinborg, in signis
,
"An
Traditio
I.
Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima, omniaXLV,!, Roma-Paris 1984. William
:
R.-A. Gauthier, Opera
ed.
librum
secundum
Sententiarum
G. Gal and R. Wood, Opera Theologica V,
St.
Bonaventure, N.Y. 1981. Scriptum
in
librum
primum Sententiarum
G. Etzkorn and F. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1967-1979.
Brown,
Summa
logicae,
Philosophica
I,
St.
Kelley,
(Ordinatio), eds. G. Gal, S. Theologica I-IV, St.
Opera
Ph. Boehner, G. Gal Bonaventure, N.Y. 1974.
ed.
and
S.
Brown, Opera
Marmo
264
b.
Secondary Literature
Corvino, Francesco nozione di 1978
da Duns Scoto ai maestri specie intelligibile agostiniani del secolo XIV (Gregorio da Rimini e Ugolino da Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 70, pp. 149-78. Orvieto)", "La
De Andres, Teodoro 1969 El nominalismo de Guillemio de Madrid.
Ockham como
filosofia del lenguaje,
Eco, U., Lambertini, R., Marmq, C., Tabarroni, A. 1984 "On Animal Language in the Medieval Classification of Signs", Versus. Quademi ai Studi Semiotici 38/39, pp. 3-38, (now in Eco. U. & Marmo, C. (eds.), The Medieval Theories of Signs, Amsterdam, 1989, pp. 3-41).
Federici Vescovini, Graziella 1965 Studi sulla prospettiva medievale, Torino. Grassi, Onorato 1986 Intuizione e significato. Adam conoscenza nel XTv secolo, Milano.
Wodeham
ed
il
problema
della
Lindberg, David 1976 Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler, Chicago.
Maloney, Thomas S. 1983 "The Semiotics of Roger
Bacon",
Mediaeval Studies 45, pp. 120-54.
McCord Adams, Marilyn 1978
"Ockham s
Theory of Natural
Signification",
The Monist
61, pp. 444-
59.
Pinborg, Jan 1981 "Roger Bacon on Signs: Newly Recovered Part of the Opus Mams", in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, ed. J.P. Beckmann et al., Berlin-New York (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/1).
A
Tabarroni, Andrea 1984 "Segno mentale e teoria della rappresentazione in Ockham", Versus. in Quademi di Studi Semiotici 38/39, pp. 63-90, (now in Engl. transl. Marmo, C. (eds.), Trie Medieval Theories of Signs, Eco, U.
&
Amsterdam,
1989, pp. 195-224).
Tachau, Katherine H. 1981 Vision and Certitude
1982
"The
in the
Age of Ockham,
Problem of the species
after Ockham",
in
Mediaeval Studies
medio
Diss.,
at
Winsconsin.
Oxford
44, pp. 394-443.
in the
Generation
MIKLOS MAROTH
Tasawwur and
Tasawwur and
modern
baffled
are the two basic concepts in the center of the logic, "but the origin of these two Arabic terms has
tasdiq
Arabic
traditional
tasdiq
scholarship for over a
They are mentioned
first
century",
by al-Farabi,
2
as
HA.
but even All
Wolfson
1
writes.
Sam! al-Nas^ar
discussion of logical methodology, written as late as in 1947, has
s
been
centered round them. 3
Our knowledge, moon,
sun,
or
spheres"
as al-Farabi says, can
intellect, "the
world
is
(e.g.
and tasdiq (e.g. heaven consists of and compound every compound thing is created,
soul)
the world
be divided into tasawwur "the
4
his examples show tasawwur ). As and tasdiq refers to a phrase or group of phrases. Assent, the traditional translation of tasdiq, comprises both and
consequently,
refers
to
"group
of
is
created".
concept
"phrase"
phrases".
Concept and assent are mentioned
in al-Farabfs works,
which from
the logical point of view are not of primary importance. In this respect the situation has been can see completely changed with Ibn SIna.
We
these terms discussed in the that
they
became
chapters of his logical works, showing the guiding principles of his logic. "Every knowledge
of concept
consists "Concept
is
a
and
first
assent"
-
as
knowledge comprised
he wrote in
a
in
definition
his
or
Kitab
al-na&at.
similar
things,
HA. Wolfson: "The Terms Tasawwur and Tasdiq in Arabic Philosophy and Greek, Latin and Hebrew equivalents." The Muslim World 33(1943), p. 114. Uyun al-masa Leiden 1890.
al-Farabl: Dieterici.
Ali
il,
Sami Nassar Manahig
46.
al-Farabi: loc.
cit.
p.
56.
Ed. c
al-baht_
in:
their
Alfarabl s philosophische Abhandluneen
inda mufakkirl al-isfam. Cairo 1947,
p.
F
25 and p.
Maroth
266
assent
is
a syllogism or a similar thing. Definition
two instruments to acquire new Ibn Sina
s
knowledge."
Behmanayar account of the same views. He pupil
concept and
assent.
Concept
(hypographe,
rasm),
assent
and similar
syllogism
tasawwur and
tasdiq,
and syllogism arc the
5
is is
ibn Mar/.ban gives an even that
says
contained a
of
a definition or a description
an
or
syllogism
explicit
consists
every knowledge
in
mental
more
induction.
Definition,
the terms operations comprised and these are the two instruments to gather new
are
in
information. In
his
assents.
We
encyclopaedia Ibn Sina asserts that the
philosophical
large
only aim of
is
logic
can state
two axes of the Arabic
human
supply the
to
intellect
brief that tasawwur
in
with concepts and
and tasdiq constitute the
logic.
This structure of Arabic logic differs from that of the Greek. the
reason
the
why
question
was
It
is
what was the origin of the
raised:
Arabic system. There are two answers given.
Modern (pav-cavCa.
scholarship
and
the second one
seeks
to
cru^KaTatfecrLC,.
These
have been well known
-
these
identify
8
two
terms
expressions
in Stoic
cpistemology,
with
especially it
means,
they are to be explained in terms of Stoic logic.
This opinion seems to be based on an accidental coincidence of words. QavTao-Ca.
and
(nj^Kardtfecric,
are
really
terms
of
Stoic
cpistemology, but not that of the logic, to begin with. Furthermore, in epistemology the four words, phantasia, synkatathcsis, katalepsis,
Stoic
Ibn Sina: Kitab al-nagat. Cairo 1938, le monde Arabe. Paris 1969, 53-56.
p.
See
3.
also:
I.
Madkour:
L organon d Aristote
dans
IJehmanayar ibn Mar/ban: al-Tafeil. lid. Murtada Mutahhari. Tehran 1970, p. 4. Kullu un in wa imma tasdiq un Wa M-tasawwuru huwa al- c ilmu 1-awwalu fa imma tasawwur wa yuktasabu bi- l-haddi wa ma yagri magrahu ka- l-rasmi...wa innama 1-tasdiqu c
ilm
.
yuktasabu bi-M-qiyasi wa
ma
yagri
magrahu
La logique. I. Ibn Sina: al-Shifa c gayatu ilmi 1-mantiqi an yuflda 1-dihna .
ka- I-mitali
L isagoge. ma c rifata
wa
l-istiqra
i.
Ed. I. Madkour. Cairo 1952, hadaini M-say aini faqat.
p.
18:
Fa
Wolfson: op. cit. P. Kraus: Re\-ue des etudes islamiques. 1935 N 4, p. 220. Simon van den Bergh: Averroes Tahafut al-Tahafut. Vol. II. London 1954, p.l. A.S. Nassar: op. 1
cit.
p. 23. etc.
Tasawwur and
267
tasdiq
and phantasia kataleptike form a system together, 9 where each one of them can be regarded as a more and more perfect and clear form or a higher grade of the
admit
not
did
the
same improving knowledge. Since
the Stoic philosophy
referred
to individuals, knowledge whereas in Arabic logic concept was always universal. In Stoic epistemology synkatathesis is to assent to a phantasia evoked in our soul by an individual being, whereas tasdiq means connection of phantasiai, i.e.
or
"sentence"
universals,
we
If
"syllogism".
we should
opinio, then
this
attach
ourselves
the
to
communis
find an explanation of these structural differences
between the Stoic and Arabic systems. According to my knowledge there has been no effort to reconcile them, so it seems to me that the Stoic line is to be rejected, as it has been done by F. Jadaane. He pointed out that tasawwur was based on a definition, it
which consists of genus proximum and differentia specified, so 11 origin. And this is the second answer.
had to have an Aristotelian
In connection with tasawwur he tried to
show the
peripatetic origin
of the term tasdiq as well, but because of his poor argumentation his
conclusion
is
not convincing. But even
if
he were
right,
his result
would
Arabic system. As it is well satisfactory known the theory of concepts and that of sentences have been treated in the first two books of Aristotle s Organon, in the Categoriae and the De not
account
a
give
interpretatione,
constitute
the
which
have
or
important part of the Organon illustration first
I
the
introductory
core of the Aristotelian logic,
important Prior Analytics
The
an
of
refer
to
to
not
opposed to the more that was the most
Posterior Analytics
in the
Philoponus
as
do
and
character
s
Neoplatonic tradition.
Commentary on
To
furnish an
Posterior Analytics.
sentences run as follows:
9
7 A.A. Long: Hellenistic Philosophy. ^Berkeley and Los Angeles 1986, p. 126. G. Reale: History of Ancient Philosophy. III. The Systems of the Hellenistic Age. Albany 1985, p. 222. Cicero: Academica priora II, p. 145.
A
A. Graeser: The Stoic Categories", in: Les Sto iciens et leur Logique. Actes du colloque de Chantilly 18-22 septembre 1976. Paris 1978, p. 201: "Sextus reports that a true presentation is one of which it is possible to make a true affirmatio (kateThe passage shows the difference between our terminology and that of the Stoics. gorian)." 1
F.
106-113.
Jadaane:
L influence du
stoicisme
sur la pensee musulmane.
Beyrouth
1968,
p.
Maroth
268
The theory of demonstration is the aim of logical sciences. Aristotle gave his other books on logic to us only for the sake of demonstration. Here one can reler to the teaching on simple words in the on sentences in the De mterpretatione and Categpriae, syllogisms in Prior Analytics.
Ibn
Sina
holds
book the
-
same view
the
He
Posterior Analytics.
says
-
including Prior Analytics
and evident
real
in
is
commentary on
his
Aristotle
s
highest reason of every previous
the
that
method of acquiring
to attain to the
This purpose
pursued by the science of and without the contribution of the other branches of
demonstration
truth.
is
^ logic.
and demonstration first
most important book of the Organon the core of logic, then Ibn Sma s words in the
Posterior Analytics
If
of
chapter
is
Kit ab
the
is
al-burh an
of special
arc
The passage
interest.
quoted reads as follows: After having mentioned the purpose of the book - that is to show the way to the true assent and right concept - the benefit of the book has already been evident: it is the attainment of evidently true sciences and true concepts which are useful for us. 3 Ibn Sina refers here to the
he speaks of assents and concepts
be
sentence of his book. There, too,
first
15
explicitly.
Examining the structure of Ibn Sma s Kit ab al-burh~an we find it to accordance with the words just quoted. The first three parts of
in
loannis Philoponi in
An.
Arist.
Post.
Commcntaria.
lid.
M.
1,5-10. TOIJTO TeAoc, CCTTL TT/C, \ofLKTic, Trpay^aTccac,, anode TOC yap aAAa AoyLKa crtiyypcqa^ocTa OLO. (.
ea>
.
6
1909, p.
6
ncpl
r&v
npo-taucrcDv
ctnX&v ev T
FIcpi.
dci
~cu>
A. Badawi. Cahirae 1966, p. 7. Wa hada 1-garadu yu-
~\ :A.
1-haqqi
A6?o
TOLC, ITporcpotc;
ci>
Lcr^iI>v
TT/L>
rrcpt
i&v
of)
1-yaqini.
1-fununi.
iri
c
TC,
TT)L>
ncpl
TT)L>
cnl TauTTji^
K.a.1
65(J3
1-garada fiduhu hada 1-fannu duna sa
c qi ati
KCCC
ai.c,
De Demonstratione
anna
li-
Ae?w
AptcrroTcATjc,,
5t5ao:aA(. ai; cv
Bcrolini
Wallies.
T)^IL
l-ta^awwuri
ulumi
I-kitabi
1-haqIqF.
1-yaqiniyyati
wa
-
wa huwa Fa 1-
ifadatu
manta c atu
tasawwurati
1-muM-turuqi un ?ahirat
M-kitabi
1-haqiqiyyati
1-na-
Tasawwur and book arc devoted
the to
while the
assent}, 16
All
concept). of
that
this
Aristotle
to the theory of demonstrative syllogisms (that
fourth
means
programme marked by the should try to throw Ibn Sina
s
part that
Posterior
s
269
tasdiq
light
gives this
a
treatment of definitions
structure,
Analytics,
is
which the
summarized
of
the
then
we
on the meaning of tasawwur and ta$diq taking in
my
my
treatise to
results
must
be be
as follows.
demonstration
of illustration
I
is
always based on a Tabula Porphyriana. By way
refer to a scholastic textbook of logic.
Substancia
materialis
immaterialis
corpus
animatum
inanimatwn
animal
rationale
irrationale
homo Caius, Plautus, Tiberius
On
If so,
(i.e.
from
theory of demonstration as a basis for our examination.
have investigated Ibn SIna s Kit ab al-burh an 17 Before continuing this paper published later.
17
different
realization
duality of assent and concept.
I
A
is
is
pp. 3-192 and 193-258.
The book has
the
title
Greek questions
in
Arabic sciences.
Maroth
270
On
the
of
basis
Tabula
this
one
can
the
compose
following
demonstration:
Every material being is substance every body is material every body
is
substance
Every animated being is body every living being is animated every living being
is
body
Every sensitive being every animal
is
is living being sensitive
every animal
is
living
being
Every rational being
is
every
man
is
rational
every
man
is
animal.
animal
This scheme has been abstracted from Greek works, but true in respect to Arabic logic as well.
with
some quotations Ibn
Sina in
genera
18
In another passage
species.
As
the
for
below
species
its
forbeing
genus
in
in
of
theory
will
my
prove
statement
highest
demonstration
genus
be
to
in
the
that
the
lowest
as follows:
the middle, each the species below
one of them is reason and in the individual
it
that.
The Arabic expressions navf
his
make the we read
middle
the
I
holds
only.
describing
says
Here
it
al-$ins
c
al-akhir,
al-anw~a al-mutawassita
al-mutawassit, etc.
al-^ins
c al-a fa,
al-
have no meaning, except
in
terms of Tabula Porphyriana. 20 18
-
Sec the Tabula
195-196:
Fa
inna
Donat: Logica. Oeniponte 1914, 1-mutawassita yugibu wuguda 1-ginsa in
J.
-
Ibn Sina: al-Burhan, c c f7 M-nau l-a la M-ginsi
p.
45.
i
p. 1-
ahir.
Op.
cit.
y
r
_
fi
yt
f.
M-naw
W.
Dubislavc
Die
Keleten.
Budapest
1980,
1887, p. 1-22.
Fa inna __
248-249:
p.
li-wugudi ginsihi
i
lladi
Definition. p.
c
54-59
-v-
l-anwa a M-mutawassitata kullu nau -
dunahu wa
fi
Leipzig
*_
cm minha sabab un
1-ashasi tahtahu.
1931,
passim.
Maroth
M.:
A
gorog
logika
and 59-64. Porphyrii Isagoge. Ed. A. Busse. Berolini
Tasawwur and
The found
short
of the Arabic theory of demonstration
summary
in the following
271
tasdiq
is
to
be
passage of al-Suhrawardl:
If you take the lowest consequence, then you arrive at the highest cause in the end ... and if you begin with going down, you find the highest cause first. It is so with the genus generalissimum and species specialissima and with the others. The demonstration ... is based on this chain. 21
After having seen these unambiguous words of the passage quoted now, we must recall what we know about definition. It is the common teaching of Arabic logic that definition consists of genus 22
differentia
These terms too are
specified.
be
to
proximum and
understood
Tabula Porphyriana. So we have to say that definition and syllogism, assent are based equally on a Tabula Porphyriana,
on the
basis of
potentially a hierarchic order of definitions (e.g.
animal is
is
a sensitive living being, living being
is
man
is
concept and which contains
i.e.
a rational animal,
an animated body, body
a material substance) and a hierarchic series of syllogisms.
These
and syllogisms are convertible, they imply one
definitions
another mutually. Let us see only one example: vs.
rational being
"Every
every
man
definition
which
is
is
animal,
man
The same items
is
"Man
is
rational
animal"
rational being, consequently,
to be found in both the and the syllogism. According to this theory of demonstration, based on the Neoplatonic Tabula Porphyriana, sciences are is
transformed
animal".
into
are
a
hierarchic system of definitions and a hierarchic system of syllogisms running parallel to one another. The elements of this system appeared already in the second book of Aristotle
s
Blond has pointed out. 23 This most advanced and systematic form in the
Posterior Analytics,
Aristotelian line reached
its
wa
al-Suhrawardi: Kitab al-masarf Oeu\res_ philpsophiques et ^mystiques. 303.
Hakada
fi
ginsi
1-agnasi c
yubtana burhanu 1-nihayati
J.M.
dit
en
le
Mfyar al-
Blond: Logique
c
wa nau
ilm. Ed. et
J.
c i
c i
le
l-mut arahat.
In: Shihaboddin Yahya Sohravardi. Ed. H. Corbin. Paris-Teheran 1976, p. 302c 1- anwa wa gayriha, wa c ala hadihl 1- salasili ahadiha.
Tome
inda igtima
00 E.g. al-Gazzali:
as
I.
i
Suleyman Dunya. Cairo 1961,
methode chez
Aristote.
Paris
p. 269.
1939, p. 167. "Nous avons qu une telle conception du raisonnement scientifique tend a transformer la science une hierarchic de definitions: Aristote semble ici le realiser dans une certaine
mesure..."
Maroth
272
Neoplatonic and Arabic theory of demonstration under discussion. definitions
common
and syllogisms,
s
"assents",
serve with
As
their
source, the Tabula Porphyriana, for theoretical background of
we can understand
demonstrations, Slna
concepts and
i.e.
and
his successors logic.
new and emphasized role in Ibn the explanation why tasawwur and
their
This
is
tasdiq are the two axes of the Arabic logical Organon.
After having seen the theory,
The
text of the well
known grammar
let
us turn to a practical example.
written by Ibn Agurriim begins with
the following sentences:
a meaningful complex of sounds." This is a definition. the defined species, "meaningful" is differentia specified, is genus proximum. Speech can be divided into "complex of sounds" three parts: nouns, verbs and particles. Noun is marked by / of "Speech
"Speech"
is
is
"
etc.
genitive, al-
"Verb
is
These arc descriptions, which
marked oy qad,
saufa,
..."
etc.
substitute the definitions.
24
The
text suggests
the following Tabula: lafy
uncompound, not meaningful
compound, meaningful 1
,
speech
-L-
ral-,
-i,
tanwin,
-r-
saufa, qad, etc.
etc.
noun
verb
This Tabula, which
is
others
particles
suggested by the definitions and descriptions
of the text, implies the following order of syllogisms: All meaningful complex entities are sounds
every speech
is
compound and meaningful
every speech
is
a complex of sounds
al-,
24
Kit ab
p. 171.
-i,
are characterizing speech characterized by al-, -i, etc.
etc.
noun
is
noun
is
speech
al-Ajurrumiyya.
In:
Briinnow-Fischer:
Arabische
Chrestomathie.
Leipzig
1964,
Tasawwur and Speech characterized by al-, "al-Agurrumiyyati" is
is
"al-Ag\irrumiyyati"
Kit abu
arrangement like
logic,
typical
noun -/
a noun.
of
mathematics,
etc. is
characterized by al- and
an introductory textbook of grammar.
is
l-~A^umimiyyati is
-i,
273
tasdiq
so
etc.,
introductions
similar
all
it
is
suitable
into
show
to
other
Its
sciences
general what
in
was the Arabic practice in arranging sciences. But there is a difficulty left. The terms phantasia and synkatathesis do not occur in Neoplatonic logical texts. problem, if we turn to the Greek commentaries on Aristotle s De anima. Alexander of Aphrodisias says in his commentary written before Neoplatonic times that the sensitive
seems a solution
It
human
faculty of the tithesthai.
25
Phantasia
followed by horme, there
sciences
26
synkatathesis. is
synkatathesis
the
to
and synkatafollowed by synkatathesis, which on its turn is
soul has the duty of phantasiousthai is
movement
of body. In the case of the theoretical
is no movement, since phantasia is followed only by They are different terms, because phantasia is simple and
compound.
27
There
a
is
harmony between these passages
and between that of Simplikios who says that synkatathesis reasoning
connection parallel
diexodos)
(logon
to
of
concepts
definitions
through
already
defined.
a psychological phantasia,
as
28
as
the
way of
Assent
(horous).
Thus
well
is
is
definition
logical
a logical syllogism
a is
is
parallel to a psychological synkatathesis.
The same picture is given by Ibn SIna. According to him we get our concepts and assents with the aid of our bodily organs. Our sense abstracts the universals from the individual perception beings (i.e. sense perception
Alexandri 26
Op.
cit.
is
the source of our ta$awwurat. This
De anima
73 from line
liber
cum
mantissa. Ed.
I.
is
one cognitive
Bruns. Berolini 1887,
activity
p. 119, 12-13.
12.
optcrrticak; Simplikios describes the two ways of thinking: Simplikios de Anima. Ed. M. Hayduck. Berolini 1882, p. 46.
and
ccTroScc
98 Simplikios: op.
p. 204, 25.
cit.
Ibn Sma: Al-sifa
.
1974, p. 197: Fa 1-nafsu li-1-tasawwuri wa 1-tasdiqi.
c
Al-nafs. Ed. G. Anawati and Sa id Zayed. Cairo c 1-insaniyyatu tasta inu bi- l-badani li-tahsili hadihi 1-mabadi a
Al-Tabfiyyat
6.
Maroth
274
of the
human
connection, and
and
Then our
soul.
we
get acquainted with true propositions from experience
These are the three ways
tradition.
second cognitive
activity of the
Tasawwur and of
concepts
soul brings the universals (tasawwurat) into
logic.
tasdiq,
They
psychology as well. So,
human
to obtain tasalq at.
30
This
is
the
soul.
as our quotations show, are not only central
are
two basic notions of Greek and Arabic
we can summari/e
as follows: in the late
Greek
and Arabic philosophy there is a tripartite structure of the soul with hierarchically ordered faculties. The sensitive part of soul abstracts elementary tasawwurat and tasdiq at through sense perception from the world.
outside
The
theoretical
part
is
supplied
with
evidently
true
tasawwurat and tasdiq at by the divine intellect. Tasawwurat and tasdiq at acquired from sense perception and divine intellect through induction and deduction
are
arranged
in
Tabulas,
which
constitute
the
basis
for
sciences.
The Neoplatonic concept of logic together with late Greek and Arabic psychology can give a clearer and system bound account for the difficulties connected with the terms tasawwur and tasdiq.
University of Budapest
-sn
.
.
Ihn Sina:
loc. cit.
JOHN H. NEWELL Jr.
Grammaticus
ct Ethicus:
William of Conches Search for Order
William
Conches
of
was
a
and
grammarian
twelfth-century
natural
philosopher of the school of Chartres. In addition to glosses on Plato Consolatio philosophise, and Macrobius
Timaeus, Boethius
s
commentary
on the S omnium Scipionis, William composed the Philosophia mundi and the Dragmaticon, encyclopedic
of
compendia of
all
the scientific knowledge
1
Throughout these works, William strives to establish an orderly system and to follow that system to its logical conclusions and implications. Thus for example, in his grammatical studies, he perceives his
day.
Rome as of continuing value and not at all with Christian doctrine; consequently, in the most salacious incompatible the ancient myths of pagan
of the adulteries of the gods,
tales
cosmological essence
of
truths.
2
human
he finds the matter for moral or
In his discussion of moral philosophy, he sees the
nature
residing
therefore, he rigorously expunges
in
from
man his
which might interfere with the individual
freedom
s
of choice;
and,
system of ethics any factors
moral autonomy. Similarly in explorations of natural philosophy, William posits an orderly and
his
benign
universe
comprehensible
operating
to
human
to
certain
laws
natural
set
reason. In explaining the creation and adorning
of the universe, he strives to possible and to
according
s
limit severely
make
these natural laws as
autonomous
as
any intrusions into the natural functioning
of the universe.
Like
many
of
his
fellow
Chartrians,
William
philosophy on a kind of Christian Platonism.
He
bases insists
his that,
natural in
the
On
William s life and works see especially Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the of Medieval Thought and Learning, 2nd rev.ed. (Ixjndon, 1920), 106-112 and 294-314; J. M. Parent, La doctrine de la creation dans I ecole de Chartres, Publications de lnstitut d etudes medicvales d Ottawa, vol. 8 (Paris, 1938), esp. 11-25; Tullio Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches c la scuola di Chartres (Florence, 1955); and Nikolaus M. Haring, "Chartres and Paris Revisited," in Essays in Honor of Anton Charles Pegis, cd. J. Reginald O Donncll (Toronto, 1974), 294-95. History
I
See for example Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth Medieval Platonism, Mittellateinische Studien und Texte, Band 9 (I,eyden, 1974), 13-78.
in
Newell
276
beginning, unity,
God, existed by
i.e.
mind from
in his
the
and some of
individuals.
form
or
of
it
containing the forms of eternity
came
all
things in his
all
from eternity which form would Some of these forms are of genera, some of
mind before he makes
idea
this unity
the forms of
eternity because he provided
agree with which thing. species,
and from
itself
God had
the multiplicity of the universe.
and
3
and likenesses of
4
The archetype
of
things has existed as the unity of
all
reality,
mind.
his
in
the truest reality.
is
Just as a carpenter visualizes something
so God, before he created anything, had
it,
From
this true reality
come
which constitute the universe
-
world
the
God from the images
the
sensible
world.
Things
in
the
world can never equal the
sensible
reality
of the
divine mind, for the things of the created world always remain imperfect
made
copies, just like a circle
copy of
reality,
mud
or water. 5 But although only a
everything which exists does bear
God. And the creation 6
in the
as a
whole
some resemblance mind on which
reflects the divine
to it
is
Man
can know only the images of the divine mind united with itself; but what is important for William is that the status of the world as a reflection of the divine mind makes the
based.
matter, not the archetype
man through the investigation source of only knowledge. views the matter which is united with the
greater reality of the latter accessible to
of the sensible world,
William
man
naturally
reflections of the divine
from
nothing.
As he
s
mind says,
to
make up
"The
the sensible world as created
Creator
is
prior
to
everything
for
Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.14., MS. Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class fol. 7vb, ed. Helen Rodnite Lemay, The Doctrine of the Trinity in Guillaume de Conches Glosses on Macrobius: Texts and Studies, diss. Columbia Univ., 1973, 125-26: "Ideas vero omnium rerum deus in mente ab eterno habuit quia providit ab eterno que forma cui rei conveniret. Sed idearum qucdam sunt generales, quedam speciales, quedam individuales." In the following references to William s works, I will provide the Latin only for references drawn from manuscripts or other unpublished sources.
40,
Glosae super Platonem, ed. Edouard Jeauneau
(Paris, 1965), 99.
Glosae super Platonem, 112-15. Glosae
super
Macrobium
(longer
redaction)
1.6.8,
Munich
MS
14557,
fols.
119v-
creaturarum que dicuntur sequi ipsum creatorem in hoc quod ab eo contrahunt existentiam et ei etiam in aliquo sunt consimiles. Nulla enim est creatura 120r:
"...
id
est
que cum ipso non obtineat similitudinem, sive maximam, sive minimam, sive inter Cum autem ita omnia in aliquo conveniant cum creatore, per unitatem utrumque. tamen creator ab eis sequestratur, in hoc scilicet quod ipse solus vera est unitas." Cf. Lemay, Doctrine of the Trinity, 172-76. For a discussion of the importance of this theme in the Chartrians see Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century (Princeton, 1972), 16-17, 31-32, and 172-73. ...
Grammaticus
everything receives
its
et
Ethicus: William of Conches
existence from
him and he from
277 7
nothing."
William
Plato as agreeing with Christian doctrine on the creation of
interprets
matter. According to his interpretation, Plato ascribes to
God
the creation
matter from nothing. William argues that, when the ancients said that the world never began, they did not deny that the world began but of
all
began in time. For Plato and for Aristotle, as much as for 8 Augustine, the world began with time. Believing firmly in the sacredness of both the Bible and Plato, William consistently interprets them as in only that
it
agreement.
The prime matter, which God created from nothing, has no form and quality of its own but is able to receive the forms and qualities of all things. Everything is able to be composed from it because it becomes whatever form but
from
it
has received.
form
its
it
is
9
From prime matter
made
to
be what
a thing
is.
it
is
made
to be,
William gives as an
example that a statue is not called a statue of Achilles because it is made from copper but because it is imprinted in Achilles form. 10 Prime matter itself.
is
God
able to be understood by itself but
it
is
not able to exist by
simultaneously created both the prime matter and the elements
which are composed from prime matter joined with form. 11 William explains that the elements - pure earth, water, air and fire are the simple and minimal particles of which all bodies are formed. Unlike prime matter, the elements have their
own
distinct
forms and
but like prime matter, they are unable to exist by themselves. Although they cannot exist by themselves, these elements, when mixed qualities,
with one another, are present in the composition of
and
all
bodies. Visible
which are also commonly called elements, are each composed of a combination of these four simple elements and are named after the element which dominates in their make-up. William earth, water, air,
suggest that call
if
fire,
we wanted
to use a
more
precise terminology,
we would
the simple particles elements (clementa) and the four bodies which
Philosophia, ed. Gregor Maurach (Pretoria, 1980), 18. For discussion of William s and the other Chartrians views on creation from nothing, see Parent, 40-43 and 95107; Gregory, 189-97; and Heinrich Flatten, Die Philosophic des Wilhelm von Conches
(Coblenz, 1929), 122-26. 8
Glosae super Platoncm, 104 and 180. Cf. 108 and 176-81. Glosae super Platonem, 168-69 and 258.
Glosae super Platonem, 261. Glosae super Platonem, 259-60.
Newell
278
elemented things (elcmentata). 12 Since William describes the elements as existing only in the composition of elemented things, he are
seen,
apparently considers the elemented things to have been created by
God
simultaneously with the prime matter, the elements, and time. with
Consistent
emphasis on the orderliness of the
constant
his
creation as a reflection of the divine mind, William emphatically rejects the
of chaos,
existence
tradition:
they
say that the opinion they propound
"We
follow
is
13
understood."
doctrine supported by ancient and Christian
a
inappropriate,
William
existing in chaos
is
first
and the
ridiculous.
From
cite
the reasoning is
not
well
their original creation the elements,
some
in
occupy some
some
if
false,
explains that the idea of elements originally
which are the matter of bodies, had to be space. But
is
they
authority
they were
where they are now or someplace
The elements were,
else,
space, since
all
bodies
space, they were either but outside of the elements no
in
where they are now, even not so disposed as they are now: some above, some below, and some place
exists.
therefore,
the middle. But, since the elements occupied
could not at the same time
all
all
if
in
the space there was, they
arise or all descend; therefore, there
was
14
no chaos.
William then rejects the reason proposed for the existence of namely that God created chaos to show what confusion there
chaos,
would be
if
he had not ordered the world.
already
angels created,
knew
the
He
nature of things and
there was no one to
whom
argues that, since the
men had
not yet been
15
Next William
he could show
it.
attacks the proponents of chaos for misinterpreting their authorities.
concludes that Plato said that
God
led the elements to order
He
from an
unordered tossing about not because there ever was such a disordered confusion, but because without God s direction there could have been. For
where
is
creation
when God disposes everything? 16 The movement from a potential disorderly
there a place for disorder is
then for William the
chaos to an actual, ordered universitas
.
Glosae super Platonem, 129-30 and 278-80. For discussion of the significance of the term elcmcntatum see "Elementatum: Its Appearance Among the Twelfth-Century and Peter Dronke, "New Approaches to the School Cosmogonists," MS 16 (1954): 156-62; of Chartrcs," Annuario de estudios medie\ ales 6 (1969): 129-31. 1-1
Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 34. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 34. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 34-35.
Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 35.
Grammaticus
et
Ethicus: William of Conches
279
opponents view of chaos, William gives his own view of the original condition of the elements. All the elements were from the beginning where they are now and had the same
Having disposed of
substantial
his
but not
qualities,
all
their
present accidental qualities.
The
earth was covered with water, and the other elements were thicker and
darker than they are now, but there was never any disordered tossing 17 about of the elements. God created in the sensible world an ordered whole, a universe, which reflects the order in the divine mind and which
man
can rationally comprehend. Following
the
God
s
creation of the four elements from nothing
unfolding of the universe.
which was mixed
The
stars
comes
were formed from the water
in the air:
From what
they were [by their fiery nature] they immediately began to be moved. And from their motion they began to warm the air underneath and, by the mediation of the air, the water. From the warmed water were created two kinds of animals: flying and aquatic .... But since those were made from water, the water was dried up in places and muddy earth appeared. In certain places it was thinner and there, warmed by the neat of the sun the earth 18 produced various kind of animals, namely reptiles and man.
William supposes that what occurred after the original creation of the four elements was done, not directly by God, but by the laws of nature.
While
these
autonomously rational
after
explication
owe
laws
natural
their
their
creation.
of the
basically as a closed system.
origins
existence
William of things,
God may
thus for
to
God,
they
presents
a
operate
rigorously
he sees the universe
choose to enter
this closed
system through miracles, but William seeks to limit the occurrence of such incursions to a minimum, such as the virgin birth. 19 at times
The
creation of the
human
body, like the rest of the adorning of the universe, occurs within the closed system of nature. William explains that,
17
human body was where there was an equality among
following the creation of the other animals, the
made from
a certain part of the earth
Glosae super Platonem,
1 19.
Cf. Philosophia, 28-29.
10
Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9. 5, Leipzig MS 1253, fols. 60v-61r; Munich MS 4603, fol. ita facta sunt 162v, Troyes MS 1101, fol. 7v, and Troyes MS 1381, fol. 52r: corpora stellarum que statim ex quo fuerunt moveri ceperunt, et ex motu suo subditum aerem calefacere et acre mediante aquam. Sed ex aqua calefacta creata sunt duo genera animalium: volatilia scilicet et aquatilia. ... Sed cum ita ex aqua fierent ilia desiccata "Et
est
per loca
et apparuit terra limosa.
calefacta diversa genera
In quibusdam locis tenuior fuerat, que calore animalium produxit, scilicet reptilia et hominem."
ed. Guilielmus Dragmaticon, Gratarolus, (Strasbourg, 1567; rpt. Frankfurt, 1967) 120-32.
Dialogus
de
substantiis
solis
physicis
280
Newell
the four elements. This
man from
mud
the
the
is
of the
God formed meaning of Genesis 2:8: 20 For William, the account in Genesis "and
earth."
God directly created the human body, but that the God had created, produced the human body, like the other land animals, from the mud of the earth. Having his body created by natural causes strengthens man s ties to nature. He is not mean
does not
that
forces of nature, which
distinct
from
the
world,
naturalistic explanation of
Again someone was so created.
but
man
rather
part
of
it.
William
defends
his
creation:
s
detracts from divine power to say man respond that on the contrary it confers to God both to have given such a nature to things and thus to have created the human body through the working of nature. will
We
say
it
By thus explaining the creation of man s body in terms of secondary cause, William further insists on the comprehensibility of the world and emphasizes that man himself is a part of nature. William also endeavors to apply a naturalistic
Eve
interpretation
to
creation:
s
But since what
somewhat
is nearest to equality is, even if less, nevertheless temperate, it is likely that the body of woman was
from nearby mud. And, therefore, woman is neither the man nor is she entirely different from man. Nor is she so temperate as man because the hottest woman is colder than the coldest man. And this is what the divine page says, "God made woman from the side of man." For it oui*ht not to be believed 22 literally that God tore a rib from the first man. created
same
In
as
order to
William
ascribe
interprets
the
the
creation
biblical
of
woman
account
of
s body to natural causes, Eve s creation as a myth.
Woman
was not formed by God from the side of man, but by natural forces from mud which was near the mud where the first man was formed. Obviously he uses the same method
man and
the rest of the universe, but his account of the
St.
first
woman
s
more
blatantly from the Bible. Under attack from William William Thierry, replaces his naturalistic account of Eve s creation
creation differs
of
in explaining the creation of
with the biblical account in his Dragtnaticon. 23 Nevertheless, except for the account of the creation of woman, William retains his explanation of the creation through secondary causes. His retraction, under criticism, of 20
Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 38.
Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 39.
22
Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 38.
Dragmaticon,
1.
Grammaticus
the explanation of
Eve
et
Ethicus: William of Conches
281
creation seems a withdrawal from a minor point
s
rather than a real change in his thinking.
William
In
s
the world,
view,
a reflection of the
as
divine
mind,
must be not only ordered but also good. Goodness was, of course, one of God s main attributes in all Christian tradition, and Augustine had referred to the beauty and order of God reflected in the William follows Augustine in identifying the final cause of the world with God s goodness. 25 Throughout the early middle ages, the frequently
world.
24
monastic writers viewed the natural world as good and beautiful primarily as a consequence of the fact that the world symbolized the beauty and 26 Like the monastic writers, William finds the basis for goodness of God. the world s beauty in the world s relation to God, but William emphasizes that the world is good and beautiful because God created it in harmony
and order. William says that while man cannot know divine actions, he can know that all things disposed by to
God
are directed
some good. 27 William significantly extends
to
the causes of
all
his
include the postlapsarian world.
praise of the goodness of nature
The
Fall
of
man was
for
monastic
theme of any discussion of nature and man. The Fall corrupted, stupefied, and despoiled man so that, incapable of recovering 28 William naturally cites the Fall himself, he has to be restored by God.
writers the central
as the source of evil in the world, but the scarcity of references to the Fall in his
works
though
period,
William
is it
striking.
lack
may
differences with
s
prominent
especially
writers describe
all
He
insists
that nature in the postlapsarian
remains
perfection,
29
essentially
good.
the monastic view of the natural world are
in his discussion
of sexual relations.
Many
monastic
sexual desires and relations as sinful in themselves
For examples of Augustine s statements on the beauty of the world, see Enchiridion Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 29 (Turnhout, 1970), 233-34.
4.13-15,
25
Glosae super Platonem, pp.
On
60, 62,
and 97-99.
monastic attitude which found beauty in nature because of its symbolic connotations see Robert Bultot, La doctrine du mepris du monde (Louvain, 1963-64), the
4.1:112-16.
27
Glosae super Platonem, William, see Gregory, 98-106. 28
176.
On
the
theme
of
the
goodness
See for example Anselm of Canterbury, Cur deus homo, Anselmi opera omnia, 6 vols. (Rome and Edinburgh, 1939-61) 2:5. ?Q
Glosae
2.3,
ed.
of
F.
the
S.
world
Schmitt,
in
S.
Platonem, 117-18. Cf. 213 and 219. These are the only three in William s Glosae super Platonem. His other works similarly deemphasize the theme. references
super the
to
Fall
Newell
282
arc the means of propagating a sinful nature. Sexual described as irrational and beastly, and Anselm of Canterbury,
because
they
pleasure
is
be accomplished without But in the Dragmaticon when the Duke suggest that William his discussion of coitus because it is not respectable
for example, argues that sexual relations should
any desire.
30
discontinue
(honesta), William replies,
"Nothing
which
is
natural
ugly for
is
the
is
it
31
For William, the world retains its value and goodness; of creation." remains worthy of study because of its order, harmony, and goodness as a creation in the image of the divine mind.
gift it
Belief in
goodness of
the
all
includes
creation
a
belief
in
God
s
providential ordering of the universe. William describes the universe as 32 Nature is the structured and functioning according to God s will.
creation of
God
serving to unfold his
will,
and
it
is
God
s
will that the
universe be as good as possible. William explains that the motion of the planets is contrary to that of the firmament because if both moved in the
same to
stand
earth
speed would be so great that nothing would be able on the earth. 33 The sun moves obliquely around the
direction, the
or
live
because
if
it
were always
directly
overhead there would be no
change of seasons, and without the change of seasons the earth would never conceive, fruits would never mature, and so nothing would be able to
live.
the
air,
34
After giving a physical explanation for the absence of stars
in
William continues:
But what is more important it was not the will of the creator for be in the air. For since air is near the earth, if stars were in it, they would burn the j^arth by their nearness and nothing would be able to live on earth. stars to
The
structure of the world
willed that
it
reflect his divine
is
good because
in
creating the world
God
order and goodness.
Although the world is the result of God s will, it nevertheless remains subject to certain orderly and discernable rules. William limits the direct actions of God in the world to the original creation of the elements
from
nothing
and rare miracles
Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Dcus homo, Dragmaticon, 244. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 39. !
Dragmaticon, 116-17. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 62-63.
Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 37.
2.16,
like
Opera, 2:119.
the
virgin
birth,
which
Grammaticus
Ethicus: William of Conches
et
occur against the usual course of nature.
adorning of the universe and of
effects
God
but
the
differences.
William, the
to
37 As through nature. view of the work of nature bears certain
this
to Augustine s Both allow for
similarities
According
continuing operation are not the direct
its
effects
Gregory has shown,
Tullio
36
283
of
God working
rationes
God
s
seminales
instantaneous
but
with
creation
important
of souls
and
elements from nothing and for the further development through agents of God. But Augustine used the rationes seminales to reconcile the doctrine of the simultaneous creation of
new
all
things with the daily appearance of
so that he could then deny the appearance of any truly new William of Conches, on the other hand, places his definition of
birth,
being.
nature
as
a
presupposition
of
a
vision
scientific
of the
world which
38 For permits him to attribute a proper efficacy to secondary causes.
William, nature has a true efficacy of
conformity Since
the
to
the
will
of
rules
interventions of
God
its
own
and, though created in
and mind of God, enjoys a
relative autonomy. unchangeable except for the rare and since they are ordered reflections of the divine
nature
are
mind, they are in general comprehensible to
human
reason.
Even
in his
Dragmaticon, where he retracts a number of his specific speculations such as his explanation of Eve s birth, William steadfastly retains his doctrines of the creation through secondary cause and of the In
the
asserting
efficacy
recognizes the autonomy he
is
autonomy places on God
of
secondary
autonomy of nature. causes,
William
clearly
ascribing to nature and the restrictions
power. In the Dragmaticon, William has four elements were necessary in the Philosopher explain construction of the universe. Earth and fire, the two elements necessary
this
the
for
s
that
the world
to
be seen and touched, had to be separated by some fire would burn up whatever was on the earth. A
medium. Otherwise single
medium would
water more the
Duke
not have sufficed because air was
like earth; therefore,
raises
more
like fire
two media were necessary. At
and
this point
an objection:
obvious even to the bleary eyed and tonsured that these and other disagreeable things would follow if only one of these were placed in the middle. But I wish you would say whether God could not have created some body which would be equidistant from both extremes. It
36
x
is
Glosae super Platonem, 104. Dragmaticon, 31-32.
->o
Gregory, Anima, 179-81.
284
Newell
I do not place a limit on divine power, but I will tell he had done that there would be neither air ... nor water, whose use is necessary to man in many ways.
Philosopher:
you that
if
Duke:
God had wanted
If
to make the world without these extremes could have sufficed.
medium between
Philosopher: No, not
if
man one
the nature of things remains. 39
William specifically states that he is not placing limits on God s power, since God could have done whatever he willed. But in creating the nature of things as he has,
God
has given autonomy to secondary causes, and he
has voluntarily limited himself.
William argues that such a view does not really detract from
God
s
power because it confirms divine power granted such a nature to things and through nature created other things. 40 All the works of nature are ultimately the result of the will and
power of God, and the autonomy of
nature does not detract from God. Establishing the efficacy of secondary causes does, however, make an examination of the nature and causes of things
a valid
subject
for
certain comprehensible
human
and orderly
study,
of the world and time.
College of Charleston, Charleston, S. C.
Dragmaticon, 46. Glosae super Boetium
3.
m.
9. 5.
because they are governed by
rules willed
See above note
20.
by
God
at the
beginning
EUGENIA PASCHETTO
Perspectiva c conosccnza scicntifica ncll opcra di Witclo
Ncll Introduzione alia Perspectiva, Witelo afferma d csscre stato sollecitato
da Gugliclmo
ma
di
Mocrbckc
a
quanto
annoiato dalla prolissita del perspective, intcrcssato dalla loro problematica, auspicava la nascita d un trattato
base
in
chc,
delucidare
i
come
stato
precedentemente
fondamentali
problemi perspecliva medioevale percio,
era
che,
infatti e la
di
questa
scien/a.
sin dall inizio del nostro sccolo e stato puntualizzato la
perspectiva
rappresentazione artistica della realta, mentre dai
fatti
forniti
dall occhio
e
la
da E.
artificialis
pingendi del Rinascimento: quest ultima e la formulazione delle
muove
La
scienza della luce e dei corpi luminosi
Panofsky, essa non ha nulla a che fare con
la
potesse
ipotizzato,
complessa
o
norme per
prima e un sapere che
che privilegia tra
sensazioni
le
la
una scienza piu ampia e complessa anatomia ottica araba, vuoi pcrche le
In questo senso la perspectives e
vista.
dell ottica
geometrica euclidea e
dell
abbraccia entrambe, vuoi perche piu di esse comporta la valutazione della sensazione e del sensibile. Da un lato infatti la perspectiva s interroga
natura della luce e dei fenomeni ad essa connessi, chiamando in
sulla
causa
fisica e matematica; dall altro implica 1 analisi dell origine, della trasmissione e dell utilizzazione del dato sensoriale, nonche la valutazione
delle
facolta
chc
vi
prendono
parte,
ed
in
questo
caso
presuppone
gnoseologia, psicologia e medicina.
A greca, fisico
e
determinare talc quadro concorsero in varia misura oltre da Euclide a Tolomco e alle successive rielaborazioni
ed empiristico dovute ad Alkindi e ad Alhazen, della
ncoplatonica
galenica,
con
animali;
nonche
divulgate
E.
dai
Panofsky,
la
sua
problemi
elaborata
gnoseologia basata
conoscenze
le
sulla
biologiche
la
ed
"Die
medie\>ale,
senso
circolazione
anatomiche in
la
medicina
degli
spirit!
dcll occhio,
gran parte
als Symbolische Form" Vortrage dcr Bibliothck Per un interpretazione e un ampia bihliografia dei principali di prospettiva mcdicvale: G. Fcderici Vescovini, Studi sulla
Perspective
storico-filosofici
ottica
visione metafisica
da Avicenna;
mcdici arabi Hunain, Jesus Hali, Rasis ed
Warburg 1924-25, 258-330. prospcttiva
conoscenza,
all
in
Torino 1965.
,
Paschctto
286
tradotte
vanno
prohlematica Per tali
Dcmctrio c
di
Costantino
di
Pinterpreta/ione
relativa ai concetti di spa/io, di continue, di
Africano; ne
1
e
luce
dclla
sostanzialistica
la
distan/a."
la perspectiva ha un posto ambiguo nel sapere: fisica da Arislotele, e assimilata alia metafisica da e geometria
situata tra
R.
ad opera
latino
in
dimcnticatc
ragioni
ed
Grossatcsta
ricondotta
e
da
Bacone
Ruggero
tra
scien/.e
le
alia fine del Medioevo, da Biagio sperimentali, per poi essere awicinata,
Pelacani da Parma, alia matematica intesa
come conoscen/a
delle quantita.
in tempi a noi Perspectiva di Witelo, diffusissima nel Medioevo, una parafrasi del De aspectibus di piu vicini fu definita fin troppo spesso
La
tuttavia di Alha/.en, per gli evident! debiti nei confront! dell opera araba; recente e stato sottolineato che Witelo introduce nel suo testo rcttifiche,
ben apparen/a marginali, ma tali da dare allo scritto caratteristiche 3 della Witelo dall diverse. A cominciare introdu/ione, importan/a precisa in
1
d ogni
altra
puo
cercheremmo
in
della
forma
che e
e
terra
sulla
scien/.a
quale
perspectiva:
e
essa
cose,
la
infiuen/c
le
disciplina
conoscerc
e
essen/.a
l
cogliere
che trasmette
luce,
delle
celcsti
che meglio
Invano
verita.
la
Alha/.en una affcrma/.ione del genere che Witelo deve
aver ripreso invece dal neoplatonismo arabo e dalla metafisica della luce, sostenuta dalla corrente francescana di Roberto Grossatesta.
A
differen/a
ripropone nel
De
del
una
I.I
dagli Elcmenti d Euclide.
che Witelo ruolo
sia
2
A.
medie\
ma
geometrichc
dei
Rccherches
sur
che
la
tratte
catoptriquc
il
infatti,
grecquc
perloppiu
non
significa
un
tale scien/a riconosca
4
predeccssori:
witeloniana
Perspectiva
e stato giustamente notato, cio
semplicemente
quello
di
Ixjjeune, ales,
Com
la
poi,
un grande matematico, ne che a
predominante,
sistematico
aspcctibus
seric di dimostra/.ioni
suo
procedere
dovendo
d aprcs
Ics
far
sources
e
piu
frequente
antiques
et
and
Medicine, 1954; R.K Sicgcl, Galen s System of Physiology 1968 c Galen on Sense Perception, ibid. 1970; D.C. Lindhcrg, "Lines
Bruxellcs
Basilca New York of Influence in ITiirteenth Century Optics: Bacon, Witelo, 66-83; J.J. (\984), 91-130. I,
3 del
un 4
G.
Bono,
Fedcrici
Trecento
e
"Medical
Vescovini,
Biagio
Spirits
Aslrologia
Pelacani
and the Medical
c
scienza.
da Parma,
La
Firen/.e
Pccham", Speculum 46 (1971), Traditio XL language of Life",
crisi
1979,
deiraristotclismo
155-177
che
sul
riporta
cadcre
anche
esscn/.iale hihliografia di Alhax.cn.
and Thirteenth Century Mathematics: an Assessment of His introduzione all ed. critica Vitelonis 63 (1972), IV, 496-508, nonche Varsavia 1977 ed il commento alle prop. Perspectivae liber I, Studia Copernicana XV, Witelo si trovano per intero in Alhazeni Arabis 22, 39, 66-72. I testi d Alhazen e Vnellonis Thuringopoloni opticae 1. X, ed. F. Risncrus, VII, Opticae Thesaurus I. Basileae 1572; una scelta di passi di Witelo fu edita da Cl. Baeumker, Philosophisch S.
Unguru,
Contributions",
"Witelo
Isis
1
Pcrspcctiva e conoscenza scientifica nell opera di Witelo
a
ricorso
no/.ioni
diffusione
dclla
gcomctrichc
nozioni
tali
preponc
luce,
chiarirc
per
alia
alia
perche
trattazione,
Cio prova che
lettore possa averle present! all occorrenza.
rclativi
problemi
i
287
il
la perspective!
d Alhazen, e piu geometrica che sua dottrina della conoscenza piu razionalistica che empiristica;
di Witelo, a differenza di quella
fisica e
la
ma
indica pure che
della perspectiva.
d
cio
ruolo della matematica e strumentale rispetto a quello
il
Tuttavia,
la
poiche
Witelo
di
posizione
s
arricchisce
spunti, 6 indispensabile darne conto, seppur brevemente, prima di
altri
tentarne una classificazione e una valutazione.
L organo capace di cogliere la luce e formato da quattro tuniche e tre umori, cristallino
o umor
1
occhio,
il
piu
Pelemento fondamentale
glaciale, e
che Witelo ritiene
interne
dei
quali,
il
della visione. Tutte
tuniche sono traversate dal foro della pupilla, per cui penetra il cono luminoso recante 1 immagine visiva al cristallino. La descrizione di Witelo le
segue Alhazen e
rifiuta
1
interpretazione di Jesus Hali che, nel
a sostenere che nelPocchio
oltre
vi
primaria importanza alia retina, per
sono
De
oculis,
tuniche, aveva attribuito
sette
sua capacita di reagire a stimoli
la
nervosi.
Alhazen consistenza
invece
umorosa,
privilegio
che
il
rende
lo
basandosi
cristallino,
simile
all
e
acqua
sua
sulla
al
vetro;
di
conseguenza, la visione non e che il passaggio del cono visivo da un mezzo ad un altro di diversa densita, percio e soggetta alle leggi della rifrazione
5
Accettando 1 impostazione d Alhazen, Witelo a sua volta ricollcga la perspectiva all ottica geometrica, indi apre una parentesi medica: qualsiasi parte dell occhio sia malata o lesa
studiate
nell ottica
geometrica.
impedisce o deforma temporaneamnente
purche non a
esposto
si
del
tratti
malattie,
ma
cristallino,
che
e
la
ma
visione,
e curabile
che 6 certo piu protetto e
incurabile
percio,
meno
malanno
qualsiasi
lo
6
provoca 1 inguaribile perdita della vista. occhio sano al contrario non fallisce
colpisca,
L
consiste nell accogliere
bedeutsame Abschnitte aus d.
Mittelaltcrs,
cono luminoso recante
Witelo s
"Perspectiva",
Beitrage
1
z.
il
suo
compito che
immagine Gcschichte
d.
Philosophic
127-179. Inoltre D.C. Lindberg, Introduction to a 1908, of the 3rd ed. (Risner) of Perspectivae of Alhazen and Witelo,
New York
1973; K. Hedwig, Sphaera lucis. Studien zur Intelligibilitdt des Seienden im mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation, Beitrage z. Geschichte d. Philosophic Theologie d. Mittelalters, Neue Folge, 18, Aschendorff 1980, 218-222.
Kontext
und
dell oggetto
Munster
of Alhazen
Facsimile
il
mai
der
Jesus Hali, Tractatus de oculis, Venetiis 1500, 6
Witeio, Perspectiva,
111,4.
1,4 e 10,
Alhazeni Opticae,
1,16.
288
Paschetto
estcrno,
per
trasmcttcrla
poi
L
ccrvcllo.
al
punti chiave dclla concezione witcloniana:
-
medioevo
ripresa nel
da Grossatesta
latino
chiarisce
Jesus Hali
rifiuta la tesi di
secondo
-
tre
pari d Alhazcn e della
al
1)
Witelo
di perspectivi e medici,
maggioranza
affermazionc
la
quale
1
occhio
emette anzicche accogliere i raggi atti a formare Pimmagine visiva. 2) A differenza d Alhazen Witelo, quando asserisce che la visione inizia
ma
conclude nel cervello, contrappone la sensazione visiva o che e ricezione del sensibile per se, alia comprensione o aspcctus simplex, intuitio diligens, che coglie il sensibile per accidens. 3) Come Aristotele, ncll
occhio
si
Witelo ritiene che Peventuale errore non nasca
ma
sensazione
da quello che
dall
organo che riceve
la
la valuta.
Witelo dunque segue Alhazen nella descrizione del meccanismo dclla visione, ma non nc accetta Pempirismo gnoseologico di matrice stoicoepicurea
tanto
intelligibile,
cosicche sensibile
il
1
a
rifarsi
preferendo
che,
pone una duplice distinzione:
una
sul
fonti
platonico-aristoteliche,
piano ontologico, tra sensible e
piano gnoseologico tra sensazione e comprensione, sensibile per se, oggctto dell aspectus, e subordinato sia al altra sul
1
accidens,
per
sia
dell intuitio,
oggetto
all intelligibile
oggetto
della cognitio. I
termini aspectus, intuitio, cognitio sono gia in Alhazen,
diverse significato perche per
comprensione
dell oggetto sia
confuso, sia che manifcsti
come
misurare, etc.
ma
il
si
presenti
il
filosofo
che
come
arabo
verifichi
si
intuitio,
che
in
la
come
modo
aspectus, in
momentaneo
prevalere
il
d una
attivita
sulle
con
modo
piu
piu nitido, sia che
prevcde paragonare, Le diverse denominazioni indicano non cognitio,
ma
sensazione visiva e gia
il
la
altre
distinguere,
si il
subordinazione,
perche
la
vista,
essendo perfettamente idonea a cogliere la verita dell oggetto esterno, non c uno strumcnto inferiore alia comprensione. Anche per Witelo la sensazione visiva non sbaglia, ma solo perche, pura ricezione della luce fisica e dell immagine, non e conoscenza ne
comprensione della quiddita: 1
esatta corrispondenza tra
essa
infatti
immagine
non
e
in
grado
visiva e oggetto veduto,
di
valutare
ne
la reale
esistenza di quest ultimo. Tale valutazione e compito dcWintuitio diligens
che certifica le
sue
I
immagine
intenzioni
dcll universale,
cui
della cosa vista attraverso la conoscenza di tutte
particolari; si
giunge
Alhazeni, Opticae, 11,64-65, 67, 69-70.
mentre
dopo
la
molte
cognitio intuitiones
e
comprensione e
attraverso
il
Perspectiva e conoscenza scientifica nell opera di Wltelo
confronto tra
la
nella
forma quiescens
memoria
289
e la forma dell oggetto
8
pcrcepito.
In tutte queste opcrazioni e possibile
causa rcmota e visione:
retta
9
1
questi casi
all
e
distinctiva
la
con
cognitio,
perspectiva, riescono agevolmente a spiegare.
A
errori
tali
correggere
di
capacita
condizioni In
eccessiva distanza.
aiuto
1
Ma
e
distinguere
non e
confrontare,
delle
talvolta
6 percepito di misura assai diversa dal reale, cioe piccolo.
di
possono avere immagini visive imprecise e confuse che
si
virtus
la
pero
e
incerte
alle
illuminazione,
alia
gran numero
un
contempla
diversa densita dei mezzi
alia
atmosferiche, tutti
alPinsufficiente
relativi
problemi
Witelo
di
cui
la
assenza d una delle otto condizioni indispensabili casistica
la
insorgere dcll errore,
1
1
della
leggi
oggetto esterno
estremamente grande o con la sua
sufficiente la cognitio,
sicche
gli
credono che
ignoranti
quelle immagini smisurate corrispondano realmente ad oggetti enormi
Benedetta
sia la
il
vera causa di questi errori e
la
spiega
attraverso
angolo d incidenza
dall dell
ci
permette
calcolo dell angolo d incidenza del
il
si
potesse desumere
il
visiva e dell oggetto, era a quei
immagine
successivamente
e,
fenomeno, lo attribuiscono all inganno dei demoni. matematica, esclama quindi Witelo, perche tale scienza
incapaci di spiegarsi
criticata
e
abbandonata,
di valutarne la gravita
cono
visivo.
rapporto tra
tempi
perche
assai
La
le
tesi
dimensioni
comune,
inesatta
e
che
di
ma
fu
difficile
10
applicazione.
Piu disciplina
interessante
e
che illumina
le
calcolo,
esaltata
che per
1
1
percio
esattezza e
1
il
richiamo
alia
matematica,
vere cause dei fenomeni che
come guida
vista
come
piu
come
scienza del
conoscenza della quidditas, piu obbiettivita dei suoi metodi. Witelo intuisce infatti alia
importanza della matematica ma, legato ad un idea di scienza di tipo da un lato le attribuisce un valore qualitativo, sostanzialistico
aristotelico,
Witelo, Perspectiva, in
superficie
visus
...
111,51:
intuitio
"...
aspectus simplex est solum receptio formae sensibilis veritatem formarum comprehensarum Ibid.,
certifies!
..."
enim non comprehendit veram formam rei visae nisi per comprehensionem omnium intentionum particularium quae sunt in ilia forma Visus numquam potest comprehendere veram formam rei visae in primo aspectu sed solum post diligentem "Visus
111,56:
...
intuitionem." Ibid., Ill,
58-59, 61.
Q Ibid.,
aeris,
IV,1:
"...
tempus, sanitas
L analisi
Lux, visus".
distantia,
Tutto
il
situs
oppositio,
l.IV e dedicate all
magnitude,
esame
soliditas,
diaphanitas
dei diversi errori.
e delle loro cause e ripresa, brevemente ma con grande de primaria causa poenitentiae in hominibus et de substantia et natura daemonum, edita da noi in Demoni e prodigi, Torino 1978 e da J. Burchardt, List Witelona do Ludwika we Lwowku Slaskim, Studia Copernicana XIX, Varsavia 1979.
acume,
degli
ne\\ Epistola
errori
290
non
e 1
Paschetto
(come faranno invccc
quantitative)
inserisce
un enciclopcdia
in
subordina
alia
perspective/,
del sapcre riconoscendo
d individuare Pintelligibile sotto
matematica
physici del sec. XIV); dall altro
i
di
che
gerarchico,
tipo
qucst ultima
a
la
la
capacita
apparen/.e sensibili e riservando alia
le
ruolo strumentale di eliminare errori e supersti/ioni che
il
la retta visionc.
impediscono
Altra fonte d errore e la mancan/a d una pcrfetta salute e poiche Witelo accoglie la posi/ione aristotelica che crrore nasce dall organo di giudi/io piu che da quello di senso, non solo dovra essere sano occhio, ma anche il cervello, nei cui ventricoli risiedono cinque sensi interni. 11 1
1
i
A
diffcrcn/a dell occhio, la cui fun/.ione c simile a quella d
che solo se incrinato deforma assolvere
1
immagine,
sensi
i
interni
uno specchio non possono
loro compito per diverse ragioni, le une piu gravi e durature,
il
quali malattie e lesioni del cervello, le altre piu lievi e transitorie, dovute
umore
alPcccesso d
Com
c
nell
T eucrasia",
cioe
organismo. aveva
Galcno
noto, il
perfetto
che
sostenuto dei
equilibrio
prcvalcn/a d uno di essi e gia sintomo
malattia.
di
uomini
gli
e
collerici
sanguigni,
lievemente d un
dotati
prevalente
di
nonche
la
sugli
nei in
altri;
ncll
pare
tali
poiche
la
teoria, per la sua
per ritenere sani non
un umore
casi
ha
chi
infatti
la
si
melanconici,
manifestasse
sovrabbondan/a
in
tesi
qucsta
una
serie di
malanni sintomatici,
12
umore
cccesso d un
seguire
La
anche flemmatici, quali
solo
specifica caratterizzazione fisica e psicologica,
stato patologico in atto.
Indicando ci
coloro
propensione ad incorrere
ma non uno Witelo
eucrasia,
ossia
umore determina una
ma
fini
si
c
umori,
quattro
eccessiva rigidita, fu ben presto modificata e solo
sano
e
la
causa
fonderla
di certi errori di giudi/io
con
le
conce/.ioni
sulla
Sulla conoscenza in Witelo: A. Birkenmajer, Etudes d histoire des sciences en Cologne, Studia Copernicana IV, Wroclaw 1972, 97-434; J. Burchardt, Witclo filosofo della natura del sec. XIII. Una biografia, Accadcmia polacca dellc scienze. Biblioteca e
Centre
di
studi
a
Roma
della natura del XIII sec., nell
introduzione
dell ed.
n.87,
1984 e
Ibid.,
n.94,
critica.
La
psicopatologia nei concetti di
1986 che
Per
una
in
diversa
Witelo filosofo
gran parte riprende quanto gia detto interpretazione:
J.A.
Lohne,
"Der
eigcnartige IZinfluB Witelos auf die Entwicklung der Dioptrik", Archh es for History of Exact Sciences 5 (1968), 414-426; A. Paravicini Bagliani, "Der Naturforscher und Philosoph Witelo, Domherr von Breslau 1275-77", Archiv fur schles. Kirchengcschichte 34 (1976),
31eseg.
~
Su complessioni e umori R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, F. Saxl, Satumo e la Melanconia, Torino 1983. Sull interpretazione degli umori in Witelo ci sia concesso rinviare al nostro: "Alcune fonti mediche arabe dell Epistola de natura daemonum di Witelo", Oricntalische
344-357.
Kultur
und Europaisches
Mittelalter,
Miscellanea
Mediaevalia
17,
1985,
Pcrspcctiva e conoscenza scientifica nell opera di Witelo
circolazione differentia
dcgli
animali,
spirit!
et
spiritus
espostc
291
da Qusta ben Luqa ncl
De
animae. Quando una causa occasionale, qualc
la
fcbbre, provoca un notevole aumento del calore corporeo in un individuo umore in eccesso tende a muoversi liberamente privo d eucrasia, 1
nelForganismo ed a salire prima verso lo stomaco, indi nelPipocondrio e infme nel cervello. Se la massa umorale, o il fumo da essa sprigionato, invade uno o piu ventricoli cerebrali, blocca
che
vi
questi
risiedono e trasmette casi
il
paziente
monocromatiche
cui
il
1
non recepira
reali
i
colore e quello dell
del
attivita
sua colorazione
la
alle
interni
In
immagini
visive.
ma
immagini
colori,
umore
sensi
in
solo
eccesso:
sicche
il
flemmatico recepira immagini bianche, il melanconico nere etc. Inoltre non potendo valutarle con il senso comune e il giudizio, ne confrontarle con le
forme quiescenti nella memoria, perche
parzialmente,
impediti
dall
umore
tali
sensi interni sono,
dovra
eccessivo,
giudicarle
almeno con
la
13 phantasia incorrendo cosi in ogni tipo d errori.
Mentre a proposito autonomia,
le
matematica Witelo non dimostra grande
della
sue osservazioni su questi problemi medici sono nuove,
precise e denotano
una capacita
dovuta
frequentazione
forse
diagnosticate,
alia
secondo
le
anamnesi non comune a quei tempi,
di
malati
di
conoscenze
il
dell epoca,
cui in
stato
modo
patologico assai
e
nitido.
Witelo possedeva quindi un ampio bagaglio di nozioni mediche, il gusto dell osservazione puntuale e, cosa ancora piu importante, la convinzione
non come
dell utilita della medicina, intesa
pratica terapeutica
ma come
disciplina teorica.
Proprio su questo punto stesso valore
ci
sembra
si
possano cogliere al tempo infatti, sebbene le sue
e limite della posizione di Witelo:
cognizioni risentano di osservazioni personal!, alia diagnosi Witelo seguire la prognosi, ne
si
che lo stato del malato, lo interessa sue
cause.
Cosi,
a
differenza
di
trascurar la teoria per vedere solo
Witelo
13
s
awicina
a
quanti
non
fa
sofferma sulla possibile cura, perche ben piu la
razionalizzazione del male e delle
certi 1
medici
del
tempo,
accusati
di
applicazione pratica della loro arte,
apprezzano
nella
medicina
il
solo
aspetto
Costa ben Lucae, De differentia animae et spiritus, ed. C.S. Barach, Insbruck 1878; Norpoth, Der pseudo-augustinische Traktat De spiritu et anima, Koln Bochum 1971; M. Putscher, Pneuma, Spiritus, Geist, Wiesbaden 1973, 46-48. Per gli errori che, secondo Witelo, alimentarono la credenza nei demoni ci permettiamo rinviare ai nostri: De natura daemonum di Witelo", Atti deU Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, n.109, sez.II, 1975, 231-271 e "Witelo et Pietro d Abano a propos des demons", L homme et son univers au Moyen Age, Louvain-la-Neuve 1986, II, 675-682. L.
"II
Paschetto
292
teorico,
con
il
pericolo di
malato
con
i
suoi
fame un sapere
D altro
problemi.
capace
speculativa,
cause
le
spiegare
il
canto, sebbene Witelo riconosca
che non e ars mechanica
validita scientifica alia medicina, di
astratto che perde di vista
naturali
di
ma
certi
disciplina
fenomeni,
non sembra concederle piu autonomia di quanta ne abbia concessa matematica: anche la medicina non e considerata per il suo valore
tuttavia alia
ma
intrinseco,
per le
subordinate;
la
sue
sua funzione propedeutica e merita percio un ruolo conoscitive
capacita
infatti
riguardano
forme
le
corporee e materiali, cioe un oggetto ontologicamente imperfetto, essa piu alti livelli di conoscenza, non quindi, utile ma incapace d attingere i
in nobilta \aperspectiva.
puo eguagliare
La subordinazione
di
matematica e medicina
indichi nel pensiero di Witelo
nonostante
1
quest ultima
perspectiva, dalla
forma;
sensazione e dall esperienza,
questo
d Alhazen,
ci
fatto,
unito
all
non
diminuisce
sistematicita, per la
costante
razionalismo, biologici,
la
valore
favori
delle la
ma
dell
la
con
la
ruolo
privilegiato perche perche puo conoscere la
qualitativa
opera
cause
di
e
medici contribuendo a creare fisiche.
la le
e sostanzialistica.
Witelo
che,
per
la
Ma sua
matematiche e mediche, per
delPerrore
conoscenza
nuove scienze
e
delFempirismo gnoseologico perspectiva di Witelo non e una
la rielaborazione di nozioni
ricerca
alia nascita delle
Torino
il
ma
pare
infatti
abbandono
pare dimostrare che
scienza quantitativa e sperimentale cio
suo
il
aristotelici:
metafisica
della
sapere,
assume
alia perspectiva ci
schemi
fisico-matematiche
discipline
del
non
di
persistere
le
per
nell enciclopedia
sostituzione,
muove
interesse
il
e
premesse
il
per
diffusione
di
suo
coerente
problemi
fisici,
culturali indispensabili
OLAF PLUTA
Das
naturliche Verlangen nach Unstcrblichkeit
Aufstieg und Fall eines Arguments der metaphysischen Psychologic in der Philosophie des Mittelalters
sibi
enim quisquam tune
se vitamque requirit, corpus sopita quiescunt; licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem, nee desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum." "Nee
cum nam
pariter
mens
et
(Titus Lucretius Carus:
Das
"Land
der
Wahrheit"
ist
-
De rerum
natura,
III,
919-22)
nach einer bekannten Metapher Kants
-
"umgeben von einem weiten und stiirmischen Ozeane, dem eigentlichen Sitze des Scheins, wo manche Nebelbank, und manches bald wegschmelzende Eis neue Lander liigt, und ... den auf Entdeckungen
herumschwarmenden 1 tauscht".
Seefahrer
unaufhorlich
mit
leeren
Hoffnungen
Eine der natiirlichen und unvermeidlichen, wenn auch nicht
unaufloslichen
weiten und stiirmischen Ozeans
dieses
ist nach Kant die metaphysische Psychologie. Die Destruktion der metaphysischen Psychologie beginnt aber nicht erst in der Aufklarung mit Humes Essay On the Immortality of the Soul und Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Bereits im spaten Mittelalter gab Illusionen"
es eine Tradition methodologisch streng philosophischer Kritik
Unsterblichkeitsbeweisen.
3
Die
mittelalterliche
physischen Psychologie und ihrer Kritik eines ihrer zentralen
Argumente
Verlangen (desiderium naturale)
-
-
soil hier
Geschichte exemplarisch
dem Argument
aus
dem
and den
der
am
meta Beispiel
natiirlichen
dargestellt werden.
Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A235f, B295. 2
Vgl. Vgl.
KrVA298. Olaf
Pluta:
Kritiker
der
Unsterblichkeitsdoktrin
Amsterdam 1986 (Bochumer Studien zur
Philosophie, 7).
in
Mittelalter
und Renaissance,
Pluta
294
4
Das Argument aus dcm natiirlichen Vcrlangcn hat cine lange Tradition. Der Grundgedanke dieses Arguments findct sich bei Aristoteles und in Augustinus, Averroes und Avicenna. Dominicus Gundissalinus hat es 5 seiner Abhandlung De immortalitatc animae weiter ausgearbeitet. Durch Wilhelm von Paris (Auvergne) wird Uberraschend haufig fmdet bei
es weiter verbrcitet. sich
6
das desiderium-naturale-Argumcni
Thomas von Aquino. 7 der
In
Summa
Form
folgendcn
fiihrt
(1259-64)
Thomas
es
in
dcr
naturale} kann
an:
nicht vergcbens scin, intelligcns}
(quilibet
contra gentiles
Ein natiirlichcs Vcrlangen (desidcriurn 8 da die Natur nichts umsonst tut; aber jeder Mensch hat cin natiirlichcs Vcrlangen nach individuellcr
9
blciben. folglich kann dieses Verlangen nicht unerfullt Bcwcis des Untersatzes unterschcidet Thomas /unachst ein bewufttes
Unstcrblichkcit;
Zum y.ur
Gcschichtc
"Desidcriurn
Bd.2,
Darmstadt
Mittclalters, Bd.3,
5
Zum
Dominicus
desidcrium
des
naturale",
1972,
in:
Historisches
Paulus Engelhardt: Art. naturalc -Bcgriffs vgl. Wortcrbuch dcr Philosophic, hrsg. von J. Ritter,
Sp.118-130; ders.: Art. "Desidcriurn 1986, Sp.723-724.
naturale",
Lexikon
in:
des
Munchen/Zurich
Gundissalinus bei dcsiderium-naturale-A.Tgumcni Gundissalinus Schrift von der Unstcrblichkcit dcr
Georg
vgl.
Seele,
Billow:
herausgegeben
Des und
Ncbst cinem Anhangc, cnthaltend die Abhandlung philosophicgcschichtlich untcrsucht. des Wilhelm von Paris (Auvergne) De immortalitate animae, Munster 1897 (Beitrage zur Gcschichte dcr Philosophic des Mittclalters, 11,3), S. 120-125; G. Verbeke: "Methode eincr dcr Sccle", in: Albert Zimmermann philosophischcn Bcweisfiihrung: die Unstcrblichkcit Methoden in Wissenschaft und Kunst des Mittclaltcrs, Ikrlin 1970 (Miscellanea (Hrsg.):
mcdiaevalia, ()
7), S.23-49,
Wilhelm von
Appendix,
cbd. S.31f.
Auvergne:
DC
immortalitatc
animae,
hrsg.
von
Biilow,
Gcorg
a.a.O.,
S. 39-61.
Sccle im System des Thomas von Aquin. Ein Beitrag Vgl. Johannes Mundhcnk: Die zur Klarung und Beurteilung dcr Grundbcgriffc dcr thomistischcn Psychologic, Hamburg zu den 1980, S.121. Die Unsterblichkeit der Sccle gchort fur Thomas von Aquino
Glaubcnswahrhciten, die mittels der Vernunft bcwiescn werdcn konnen. Die Auffur Thomas - ncben crstchung des Ixibes und das Jungste Gericht hingcgen gchorcn zu denjenigen dcr Drcifaltigkcit, der Menschwerdung Christi und den Sakramenten Wahrhcitcn, die nur geglaubt werden konnen, wcshalb er sic im vierten Buch der Summa contra gentiles erortert, das diejcnigen Wahrhciten behandclt, die auBerhalb der Rcichwcite der menschlichcn Vernunft licgen. Zur Literatur vgl. Engelhardt, a.a.O., O Connor: The eternal quest. The teaching of St. Thomas Sp.127. Vgl. vor allem William
York 1947; ders.: The natural desire for Aquinas on the natural desire for God, New God, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 1948 (Marquette University. The Aquinas Lecture, 1948). 8 "Impossible
(Summa
cst
naturale
contra gentiles,
9 "Scd
quilibet
desiderium
lib. II, c.55;
intelligcns
esse
inane:
natura
enim
nihil
facit
frustra."
ed. Leonina, S.394b).
naturaliter
desidcrat
sed etiam pcrpctuctur esse secundum speciem,
esse
individuum."
perpetuum:
(ebd.).
non
solum
ut
Das und ein
natiirliche Vcrlangen
nach Unsterblichkeit
295
10
Bci dcnjcnigen Wescn, die unbewuBtes Verlangcn nach dem Scin haben, gibt es solche denen die Kraft inncwohnt, ihr Sein als Einzelwescn (wie die Sterne), secunditm numerum - zu erhalten, und solche (wie die Pflanzen), die unbewiifites natiirlichcs Vcrlangen.
lediglich ein
vermittels
speciem
nur als Art - secundum Fortpflanzungsvermogens bewahren konnen. 11 Den gleichen Unterschied muB es, Thomas per analogiam, ebenso bei den Lebewesen geben, die ihres
-
ihr Sein
so folgert
auch ein bewuBtes Verlangen nach
dem
Sein haben. Die Tiere, die nur das
gegenwartige Sein (esse ut mine) erkennen, verlangen auch nur nach dem gegenwartigen Sein und konnen ihr Sein nur secundum speciem bewahren, die
Menschen
(substantiae intelligentes) hingegen, die das immerwahrende Sein (esse perpetuum) erkennen, verlangen nach ihm und konnen ihr Sein
secundum numerum Spa ter
faBt
erhalten.
Thomas
12
diesen
Gedankengang kurz wie
folgt
zusammen:
nicht
vergeblich
Ein
natiirliches
sein;
aber der Mensch (homo) verlangt von Natur aus danach, fortdauernd
Verlangen
(appetitus
naturalis)
kann
zu sein (perpetuo manere). Zum Beweis des Untersatzes fuhrt Thomas aus: Es ist das Sein, das von alien erstrebt wird (esse est quod ab omnibus appetitur).
nur
als
Der Mensch aber gegenwartiges
(simplidter) und
"Quod
sicut
lupus
naturaliter inclinatione
sic
(ut
erfaBt durch seinen Intellekt das Sein nicht
mine)
wie
hinsichtlich jeder Zeit
patct.
die
sondern
Tiere,
(secundum omne
Naturalis enim appetitus quibusdam desiderat occisionem animalium
naturaliter
quidem ex
schlechthin 1*
tempus).
inest ex apprehension e: pascitur, et homo
quibus
desiderat felicitatem. Quibusdam vero absque apprehensione, ex sola naturalium principiorum, quae naturalis appetitus in quibusdam dicitur: sicut
grave appetit esse
deorsum."
(ebd., S.394b-395a).
autem modo
inest rebus naturale desiderium essendi: cuius "Utroque signum est quia et ea quae cognitione carent, resistunt corrumpentibus secundum virtutem suorum principiorum naturalium; et ea quae cognitionem habent, resistunt eisdem secundum
modum
suae cognitionis.
Ilia
igitur cognitione
carentia
quorum
principiis
inest virtus
ad
conservandum esse perpetuum ita quod maneant semper eadem secundum numerum, naturaliter appetunt esse perpetuum etiam secundum idem numero. Quorum autem principia non habent ad hoc virtutem, sed solum ad conservandum esse perpetuum secundum idem specie, etiam sic naturaliter appetunt perpetuitatem." (ebd., S.395a). et in his inveniri quibus desiderium essendi igitur differentiam oportet cognitione inest: ut scilicet ilia quae non cognoscunt esse nisi ut nunc, desiderant esse ut nunc; non autem semper, quia esse sempiternum non apprehcndunt. Desiderant tamen esse perpetuum specie: tamen absque cognitione; quia virtus generativa, ad "Hanc
cum
quae
hoc deservit, praeambula est, et non subiacens cognitioni. Ilia igitur quae ipsum esse perpetuum cognoscunt et apprehendunt, desiderant ipsum natural) desiderio. Hoc autem convenit omnibus substantiis "Impossible
perpetuo manere.
est
intelligentibus."
Quod
(ebd.).
naturalem esse patet ex hoc quod esse
appetitum
frustra. est
Sed
homo
naturaliter
quod ab omnibus
appetitur:
appetit
homo
296
Pluta
Thomas hat den Gedankengang dcs dcsiderium-naturale-ATgumcnts weitercn Schriftcn in mehreren Hinsichten prazisiert. Im
Summa
erstcn Teil dcr
inwiefern
Weise
die
Thomas,
theologiae (1266-68) bcgriindet
Erkennens
des
das
fur
in
natiirliche
Verlangen ist: Jedes Wesen auf seine Weise von Natur aus richtungsweisend verlangt nach dem Sein. Bei den erkennenden Wescn aber folgt das Verlangen der 1*
Erkenntnis (desiderium ... sequiturcognitionctn). In der Quaestio disputata de anima (1269) verdeutlicht Thomas, daB der
Mensch nach dem Sein In der Sententia
als
secundum
namlich nichts anderes
als
se) strebt.
15
schlieBlich begriindet
Thomas
Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit nicht
natiirliche
vergeblich und illusorisch (inane ist
(esse
Ethicomm (1271)
libri
eingehend, weshalb das
solchem
et
vacuum]
sein kann: dieses
Verlangen
cine durch die von Gott gegebene Natur-
16 Ware dieses Verlangen ordnung den Dingen innewohncnde Neigung. nicht erfullbar, dann miiBte man annehmcn, daB Gott den Menschen als
Wesen
geschaffen hat, desscn Verlangen niemals bcfricdigt werden dessen Existenz mithin absurd ist. Das dcsidcrium-naturalc-Argumcni kann, setzt also einen christlich-aristotclischcn Naturbegriff voraus: Die Natur ein
wird gedacht
als
ein
wohlgeordnetes, hierarchisch gegliedcrtes Ganzes,
erschaffcn und erhalten von eincm weisen und guten Gott.
autcm per intellcctum apprchcndit esse non solum ut nunc, sicut bruta animalia, sed simpliciter. Consequitur ergo homo perpetuitatcm secundum animam, qua esse simpliciter et secundum omne tempus apprehendit." (Summa contra gentiles, lib. II, c.79; cd. Leonina, S.498a). "unumquodque naturalitcr suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Scnsus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hie et nunc; sed intellectus apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne habens intellectual naturalitcr desiderat esse semper. Naturale autem desiderium non
potest
Omnis igitur intellectuals substantia est incorruptibilis." (Summa q.75, a. 7; ed. Marietti, S.356). Das natiirliche Verlangen ist zwingend und nicht dem freien Willen, frei ist der Mensch lediglich in der Wahl der
esse
theologiae,
unterliegt
inane.
I,
kontingenten Mittel "Signum
(vgl.
autem
Summa
huius
ex
theologiae,
duobus
I,
q.83, a.l).
accipi
potest.
...
Secundo,
ex
naturali
appetitu
Videmus enim in hominibus appetitum esse perpetuitatis quia cum ipsum esse secundum se sit appetibile, oportet quod ab
qui in nulla re frustrari potest.
hoc rationabiliter;
et
intelligente
esse
qui
simpliciter
inanis;
sed
apprehendit esse simpliciter, et secundum omne tempus.
quod
homo secundum animam
disputata de anima, a.14, ed. Marietti, 8.Aufl. q.14, ed J. H. Robb, Toronto 1968, S.202). 1
"ergo
et
non
Unde
hie
intellectivam
Rom
nunc, appetatur naturaliter
et
videtur
quod sit
iste
appetitus non
incorruptibilis."
sit
(Quaestio
1949, S.334b; Quaestiones de anima,
seque(re)tur quod naturale desiderium sit inane et vacuum; sed hoc est naturale desiderium nihil aliud est quam inclinatio inhaerens rebus ex
impossibile, quia
ordinatione primi moventis, quae non potest esse lib.I, com.2; ed. Leonina, S.8a).
supervacua"
(Sententia
libri
Ethicorum,
Das
Duns Scotus
Bereits Johannes
oxoniense,
naturliche Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit
weist in seinem Sentenzenkommentar
daB
nach,
1300-01)
297
das
unzulassige theologische Voraussctzungen macht; philosophisch
Argument non potest
17
nicht schliissig.
18
esse
frustra."
Das Diktum des Averroes
dieses
Der Mensch
hat
ein
Unsterblichkeit. In bezug auf diesen Satz
um
naturale
gesteht Scotus den Vertretern des desiderium-
naturale-ATguments
es sich hier wirklich
dieses
ist
"Desiderium
Seine Zweifel richten sich gegen den Obersatz
zu.
Arguments:
(Opus
desiderium-naturale-Argdm&nt
Verlangen nach er sich die Frage: Handelt
natiirliches
stellt
ein natiirliches Verlangen?
folgt: Unabhangig davon, ob man den im Verlangen eigentlichen Sinne (proprie dictum) als Begriff eine unbewuBte natiirliche Neigung oder im uneigentlichen Sinne (minus
Scotus antwortet darauf wie natiirliches
proprie dictum) als ein der naturlichen Neigung entsprechendes bewuBtes ist
Verlangen versteht,
um
hier
ein
der
Moglichkeit
Natiirlichkeit des
daB man
nicht beweisen kann,
wenn man
Verlangen handelt, im Bereich
der
Unsterblichkeit
andernfalls wiirde
gesagt",
klar,
natiirliches
man
setzt
dem
naturlichen Verlangen
Mit
dem
ist
nachweist;
machen. 19 Die
naturliche Erfiillbarkeit voraus.
schlieBt er seine diesbeziiglichen Ausfiihrungen,
anscheinend
sich
nicht zuvor die
Natur
sich einer petitio principii schuldig
Verlangens
daB es
"kein
"Kurz
Beweis aus
20 schliissig".
Zerfall der mittelalterlichen Gesellschaft, die wirtschaftlich
vom
GroBgrundbesitz, geistig von der Kirche bestimmt wird, zerfallt auch der christlich-aristotelische Naturbegriff. Kaisertum und Papsttum, die beiden einigenden
Machte
dieser
Gesellschaftsordnung,
verlieren
im
spaten
Zur Literatur vgl. Engelhardt, a.a.O., Sp.l28f. Vgl. vor allem A. Wolter: "Duns Scotus on the natural desire for the supernatural", in: The New Scholasticism 23 (1949), S.281-317. 10
Averroes: In Metaphys., II, com.l. Vgl. Johannes Duns Scotus: In IV Sent. (Opus selection oxoniense), d.43, q.2; ed. Wolter, in: Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings. edited and translated by Allan Wolter, Edinburgh/London/Melbourne 1962, S.134.
A
19 "planum
est,
primo probetur est petitio
principii"
"Breviter
S.159).
quod
non
possibilitas
ergo
in
potest probari desiderium naturale ad aliquid, nisi natura ad illud, et per consequens e converse arguendo
(ebd., S.158).
omne medium
ex
desiderio
naturali
videtur
esse
inefficax"
(ebd.,
Pluta
298
an Ansehen und Macht. Papst Bonifaz VIII. wird 1303 in Anagni gedemiitigt, seine Nachfolger stehen von 1309 an unter dem EinfluB des franzosischen Konigs. Kaiser Heinrich VII. unternimmt 1310Mittelalter
1313 einen letzten erfolglosen Italienfeldzug.
Die
den
aus
sich
Umwalzungen
ergebende Verunsicherung der Menschen laBt sie an den herkommlichen Autoritaten zweifeln. Die Frage nach der Evidenz wird zu einem brennenden Problem.
Annahme
Die
des
Weltgeschehens wird
mittelalterlichen
Gesellschaftsordnung
durchgangigen Finalitat
einer
des
angesichts
gesellschaftlichen
Niedergangs
der
unglaubwiirdig.
Wilhelm von Ockham
zieht die philosophischen
21
Konsequenzen.
Er
wie bereits die Gutachter der gegen ihn eingesetzten papstlichen die Grundlagen fast der gesamten damaligen 22 Eine durchgangige Finalitat der Philosophic und Theologie zerstort.
hat
-
Kommission erkannten
Ockham
nach
Natur
ist
These
-
(finis
ultimus)
natiirlichcn
Vcrlangen die
kann wollen, verniinftige
nicht
zu
Menschen
zukiinftiges
Damit
Scienden.
allcs
,
Gott
dem
ist
sein
sich
ist
glaubcn,
als
auch
21
Zur Diskussion des Problems der Finalitat Anncliese Maier: "Finalkausalitat und Naturgesctz",
offen gegen die "Man
viele
sowohl Glaubige, die an Unglaubige, die an ein
bei in:
dem
aus
Verlangen nach dem Sein: Die Annahme ist offenbar, weil -
die
das letzte Ziel
natiirliches ...
(multi utentes ratione}
Lebcn
sei
Argument
Grundlage entzogen. (1317-18) wendet er
Im Sentenzenkommentar These, jeder Mensch habe ein
ein
Noch weniger beweisbar
nicht beweisbar.
hierin stimmt er mit Scotus iiberein
Wilhelm
von
Ockham
vgl.
dies.:
Metaphysische Hintergrunde der spdtscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Rom 1955, S.271-335; Harry R. Klocker: "Ockham and Efficient Causality", in: The Thomist 23 (1960), S.106-123; ders.: "Ockham and in: The Modern Schoolman 43 (1965-66), S.233-247; Gordon Leff: William of Finality",
The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse, Manchester 1975, S.543-547, 580Gottes bei Wilhelm von Ockham. 584; Klaus Bannach: Die Lehre von der doppclten Macht und Bedeutung, Theol. Diss. Miinchen 1974, Voraussetzungen
Ockham.
Problemgeschichtliche Wiesbaden 1975 (Veroffentlichungen des Instituts fur europaische Geschichte Mainz, 75), Wilhelm von Ockham", in: S.300-304; Gerhard Leibold: "Zum Problem der Finalitat bei Philosophisches Jahrbuch 89 (1982), S.347-383.
22 "Quod
dicere
et
tenere
per
modum,
quern
iste
tenet,
esset
subvertere
fere
Aktenstucke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon gefuhrten Prozess", in: Recherches de theologie ancienne et medie\>ale 1 (1935), S.350-380, 8 (1936), S.79-93, 168-197; wieder abgedruckt Josef Koch: Kleine Schriften, Bd. 2, Rom 1973 (Storia e letteratura, 128), S.275in: auch den Satz "quod voluntas 365; ebd. S.344. Als haretisch verurteilt die Kommission
totam doctrinam tarn theologie
...
potest nolle beatitudinem sibi
quam
inesse"
philosophic.
(ebd., S.321).
(Josef Koch:
"Neue
Das naturliche Leben
zukiinftigcs
Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit
-
nicht glauben
sich sclbst umbringen."
das ewige Leben glaubt, hat also nach
nach
ewiger
Gliickseligkeit.
daB eine
"glauben,
299
Ockham
wer an
Selbst
kein natiirliches Verlangen
kann
Ebensogut
23
Mensch aber auch
ein
(zukiinftige) Gliickseligkeit nicht moglich
denn
ist,
er
kann glauben, daB nur der (gegenwartige) Zustand, den wir tatsachlich sehen, fiir ihn moglich ist; folglich kann er alles das, was mil dem Zustand, den wir sehen, unvereinbar er
die
Gliickseligkeit
(zukiinftige)
(causa finalis)
ist
24
nicht
Ockham
namlich nach
-
nicht wollen
ist,
und
kann
Zweckursache
Die
wollen."
folglich
bestimmte
nichts anderes als eine
Wirkursache (causa efficiens), namlich die Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes im Hinblick auf seine Verwirklichung derart, daB diese Vorstellung die entsprechende Handlung bewirkt. Ein natiirliches Verlangen des Menschen nach einem letzten Ziel gibt es also nicht. 25
den
In
Brevis
in
libros
Physicorum
sumtna
Aristotelis
libri
Summula
-
Schriften
naturphilosophischen
naturalis (1319-21),
philosophiae
Physicorum (1321-23), -
(1322-24)
findet
sich
Expositio
bereits
die
Bemerkung, daB eine Naturfmalitat nicht beweisbar ist: Ockham hebt nicht nur hervor, daB fast alle antiken Philosophen vor Aristoteles eine Natur-
"aliquis
efficaciter
potest
beatum
non
velle
consequens ad non
ct
esse,
evidenter
sciri
potest
quod
non
ergo potest velle non esse beatus, et per consequens nolle beatitudinem. Assumptum probatur, quia multi utentes ratione - tarn fideles credentes vitam futuram quam infideles nullam vitam futuram credentesinterfecerunt se ipsos et exposuerunt se morti; ergo volebant non esse." (In I Sent. esse
est
[Ordinatio], d.l, q.6;
24
Opera
theologica,
I,
esse;
S.504, 3-9).
nullam beatitudinem esse possibilem, quia potest potest credere tantum statum quem de facto videmus esse sibi possibilem; ergo potest nolle omne illud quod isti statui quem videmus repugnat, et per consequens potest nolle beatitudinem. S.503, (ebd., 12-17) Vgl. die entsprechenden Ausfiihrungen in der Reportatio zum vierten Buch der Sentenzen: "Sed intellectus potest credere nullum esse finem ultimum nee beatitudinem, et per consequens potest dictare finem ultimum sive beatitudinem esse nolendam." (In IV Sent. [Reportatio], q.16; Opera theologica VII, S.350, 8-11). John Mair (Johannes Maior) hat Ockhams Gedanken im vierten Buch seines Sentenzenkommentars aufgegriffen: "voluntas viae potest non velle et nolle beatitudinem ... intellectus potest credere nullam beatitudinem esse possibilem, ut patet de multis infidelibus et haereticis, ergo voluntas potest beatitudinem nolle" (In quartum Sentencredere
intellectus
"sed
"
tiarum, d.49, q.6; Paris 1509, f.H2ra).
ultimum".
Argument Sent.,
naturaliter inclinatur in principale dico quod voluntas non (Ebd., S.507, 9-10). Ausdriicklich greift Ockham das desiderium-naturalein seiner Quaestio zur distinctio 43 des vierten Buches der Sentenzen (In IV
argumentum
"Ad
finem
q.12:
beziiglich
ratione
respectu
Utrum omnes homines
der
resurgent
Frage "Utrum resurrectio sit naturali beweisen konne. "Videtur beatitudinis.
Sed
auf.
incorruptibiles)
possibilis"
quod non possumus perfecte
igitur etc." (Opera theologica VII, S.247, 18-20). ist in der uberlieferten Reportatio nicht enthalten.
sic,
ist,
ob
quia
beatificari
Ockhams
man
Einer der die
dcsiderium nisi
Zweifel
Auferstehung est
naturale
post resurrectionem, Antwort auf diesen Zweifel
Pluta
300
verneint
finalitat
Averroes kraft
26
haben,
sondcrn
-
weist
er
unter
auf
Berufung
darauf hin, daB die Argumcntc des Aristoteles keine Beweis-
-
haben.
27
man
Betrachtet
die
Beweise zugunsten einer
bisherigen
man, so Ockham, fest, daB entweder das zu Naturfinalitat, ebenso Ungewisses vorausgesetzt wird. 28 oder etwas selbst Beweisende In den Quodlibeta (1322-25) fiihrt Ockham in zwei Quaestionen dann
stellt
daB weder eine durchgangige
detailliert aus, 29
Finalitat der
noch die These, Gott sei das Ziel alles Seienden.
ist,
Natur beweisbar
30
Die Kritik
am
desiderium-naturale-Argumcnt wird hicr noch verscharft. Im Sentenzenkommentar hatte Ockham ausgefiihrt, der Mcnsch konne das ewige Leben
unabhangig davon, ob er an ein Weiterleben nach den Tode In den Quodlibeta weist er darauf hin, daB der Mensch nicht. odcr glaubt 31 Das auch nach etwas verlangen kann, das iiberhaupt nicht existiert. dessen Natiirlichkeit Ockham Vcrlangen nach dem ewigen Leben nicht wollen
-
antiqui,
"aliqui
immo
fere
omnes,
omnes
rcducehant
necessaries
tarn
effectus,
negando causam cfficientem agentem in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, 1.2, c.12; Opera philosophica finem." (Expositio propter IV, S.367, 17-20). antiqui dixerunt quod ilia quae fiunt naturaliter sine cognitione ct dcliberatione, non fiunt propter aliqucm fincm." (Ebd., S.371, 4-6).
quam
hanc causam,
in
alios,
scilicet
matcrialem,
"isti
"notandum
sed
quas adducit Philosophus, non sunt simpliciter persuasivac et convincentes adversarium ex propriis conclusio non possit simpliciter dcmonstrari, scilicet quod rationcs
istae
quod
demonstrative,
sunt
magis
Quod autcm ista omne agens naturale agit propter dictis.
57,
...
Vgl.
61-63).
"notandum,
die
aliquid, dicit cxpresse Commentator" (Ebd., S.374, 55der Bre\ is summa libri Physicorum: Stelle in
entsprechende
secundum Commcntatorem, quod
dcmonstrari non potcst, sed tantum
conclusio
ista
pcrsuadcri."
(1.2,
c.6;
natura agit
propter finem
Opera philosophica
VI, S.36f,
24-26).
^o
ideo
"Et
aliqui
volentes
conclusioncm
istam
petunt
quod deberent probare,
patere
discurrendo per rationes eorum.
vel
accipiunt
hie
aeque
Sed causa
probare,
vcl
in
rationibus
ignotum conclusioni,
brevitatis
pertranseo."
suis
sicut
posset
(Ebd.,
S.375,
68-71).
effectus potest probari ex per se notis nee per experientiam quod quilibet causam finalem nee distinctam nee indistinctam ab efficiente, quia non potest finalem." (Quodl.IV, q.l; probari sufficienter quod quilibet effectus habet aliquam causam "non
habet
Opera theologica "Et
dico
IX, S.295, 53-56).
non
quod
potest
probari
sufficienter
quod
Deus
sit
causa
finalis
secundae intelligentiae in se ... Nee potest probari quod Deus sit causa finalis secundae dico quod non potest probari quod Deus sit causa intelligentiae in essendo ... Secundo finalis agentis naturalis sine cognitione" (Ebd., q.2; S.302f, 40-41, 51-52, 59-60).
3*
esse potest desiderari quamvis non sit; et ideo potest (Ebd., q.2; S.294, 38-39). Bereits in der Summula philosophiae naturalis hat Ockham auf diese Moglichkeit hingewiesen: "sicut aliquid potest desiderari esse quando non est, ita potest esse causa finalis quando non est, quia nihil aliud est "finis
causa
potest
finalis licet
causam finalem
amari
non
nisi
et
sit."
esse
Opera philosophica VI,
amatum
S.223f, 82-85).
vel
desideratum propter quod agens
agit."
(1.2,
c.4;
Das
nach Unsterblichkeit
fmdet moglicherweise keine
-
bestreitet
natiirliche Verlangen
301
Damit wird denkbar,
Erfiillung.
Glaube an ein ewiges Lcbcn cine Illusion ist. Ein der natiirlichen Vernunft folgendcr Mench
dafi dcr
(homo sequens naturalem rationem) wiirde nach Ockham annehmen, daB unser Denken Akt einer korperlichen und zerstorbaren Form ist. Wir erfahren unser Denken nicht
als
Vernunft folgenden Menschen
natiirlichen
der Seele nicht
die Unsterblichkeit
fur
hinaus
immateriellen
einer
Tatigkeit
die
der
Abhangigkeit
Substanz. 32 ist
einen
Fiir
mehr moglich, sondern
der
Beweis
also nicht nur ein
dariiber
und
die
desiderium-naturale-Argument
ad
Denktatigkeit von
der
Materie
Sterblichkeit der Seele gewiB.
von
Nikolaus
absurdum
Autrecourt
das
hat
1346 wurde er
gefiihrt.
dafiir verurteilt.
Einer der originellsten
Denker des
Mittelalters verlor seine Magisterwiirde; er muBte seine Lehren widerrufen und seine Biicher vor versammelter Universitat verbrennen. Ein
der
Artikel
Verurteilungsurkunde
papstlichen
lautet:
"Welter
hat
er
in
einer Disputation gesagt: Weil ein natiirliches Verlangen nicht vergeblich
werden wir
ist,
erreichen.
(Nostra ihr
alles
Daher wird
das,
jeder,
wonach wir verlangen, irgendwann einmal der das Verlangen hat, zur Jungfrau Maria
Domina, Notre Dame)
[in
den Himmel] zu kommen, eines Tages zu
kommen.
32 Quodl.I,
Vgl.
"Quod
corporis.
q.10: sic:
Utrum
possit
demonstrari
Quia experimur quod
quod
intellectio
anima
est
in
intellectiva
nobis;
et
sit
forma
intellectio
est
hominis; igitur eius causa efficiens et subiectum recipiens est in nobis. Hoc non potest esse intelligentia separata, quia operationem talis substantiae non possumus experiri; nee esset talis operatio alicuius compositi; igitur receptivum illius operationis est aliquid hominis; non materia, igitur forma. ... Ad principale, concederet sequens naturalem rationem quod experimur intellectionem in nobis, quae est actus formac operatio
consequenter quod talis forma recipitur in forma quae est operatio propria substantiae immaterialis; et ideo per intellectionem non concludimus illam substantiam incorruptibilem esse in nobis tamquam formam. Et forte si experiremur illam intellectionem esse in nobis, non possumus plus concludere nisi quod eius subiectum est in nobis sicut et
corporea extensa.
corruptibilis;
diceret
et
Non autem experimur
motor, non autem sicut "Item
[dixit
in
forma."
quadam
illam intellectionem
(Opera theologica IX,
disputajtione,
S.62, 4-10,
...
S.65, 88-97).
quod quia desiderium naturale non
est frustra
desiderajmus, aliquando adipiscimus. Unde quicunque appetit ire [ad Nostram Dominam] aliquando Denifle/Chatelain (Hrsg.): Chartularium Universitatis ide[o
quicquid
ibit."
Parisiensis, Bd.2, Paris 1891, S.583. Eine entsprechende Stelle findet
sich in seinem - nur unvollstandig in einer einzigen Traktat Exigit ordo executionis. arguebatur quod desiderium naturale hominum quod est ad aeternitatem non est
Ilandschrift erhaltenen "Cum
-
Pluta
302
und
Pietro
Pomponazzi den (1516) bilden
34 Abhandlung De immortalitate animae
seine
Auseinandersetzung um das natiirlichen Verlangen. Die Ansicht des Thomas von
Argument aus dem Aquino (Pomponazzi
vom
spricht
der
in
Hohepunkt
Thomas
"Divus
sich
in
35 wohlbegriindet"
im
bezeichnet,
achten
iiber
die
"wahr
und
hingegen
als
Aquinas")
Unsterblichkeit der Seele wird im Vorwort der Abhandlung Kapitel
als
unhaltbar erwiesen, nicht ohne daB Pomponazzi ironisch bemerkt, seine Ausfiihrungen gegen Thomas dienten nicht dazu, einem so bedeutenden
Philosophen zu widersprechen
-
"was
vermag denn schon
ein Floh gegen
arguitur contra primo quia videmus quod multa sunt frustra ut desiderium naturale essendi ad aliqucm locum et tamen numquam erit ibi. Hoc non obstat, immo videtur confirmare magis propositum: illud desiderium naturale est res quae semper erit et licet non sequatur nunc itio ad talem rem, alias sequetur nee etiam est nunc frustra. Propter quod sciendum est quod in hac materia sic frustra
ut
videtur,
aliquis habet
ita quod imaginor: quaelibet res est sub intentionc naturae primo per se ipsam, et secundum hoc est quaclibet res habet quasi propriam deitatcm et propriam bonitatem, sub intentione naturae primo, et secundario quantum ad intentionem sccundariam reperi-
tur connexio quodammodo inter entia, ita quod unum est propter aliud. Nunc igitur si ad rem numquam sequcretur illud propter quod est secundario, videretur inconveniens; sed si aliquo tempore non sequatur, non videtur inconveniens quia remanet ratio prima secundum quam erat sub intentione naturae, et ita diceretur hie. Unde istud desiderium est aliqua res ad quam aliquando sequetur motus ad Nostram Dominant. (Itxigit ordo executions, ed. J. Reginald O Donnell, in: Mediae\ al Studies 1 (1939), S.I 79-267; ebd.,
S.193Q.
von Autrecourt, wiewohl es strengubcr/eugcnd. Ga be es kein I^ben nach dem Tode, dann waren die Menschen voller Trauer und das Leben kame ihnen vor wie ein ludus batcrellorum (= ludus batellerorum): "Illud quod appetit omnis homo naturaliter et quo non habito non quiescit, immo habet quasi quamdam displicentiam super suo esse, est; sed aeternitatem sui quilibet homo appetit; ergo etc. Major videtur nota quia
Das desiderium-naturale-Argumcni
genommen
talis
Beweiskraft
keine
appetitus
uni\ ersalis
Minor
in
experitur
naturaliter
ipsi
desinent
desinunt
naturaliter,
modo
modo non
baterellorum,
34
nobis.
est
fiir
videtur
<non>
frustra,
alitcr
esset
esse
omnem legem positivam ad modum equorum de
tristabuntur est,
or
i
est,
videbitur
et
or n
i
est
une."
eis
et
ordinatio
videretur
universalis appetitus ad illud quod Desiderat enim omnis homo aeternitatem
sic
unde circumscribe
tendit;
hominum quod simpliciter
natura
in
inconveniens universi quod
Nikolaus
halt
besit/,e,
numquam sui
et
in
inerit.
earn
propone communitati
quibus
quod
aestimant
non
sit
nisi
quod ludus
(ebd., S.203).
Bardili, Tubingen 1791; hrsg. von Bologna 1516; hrsg. Giovanni Gentile, Messina/Roma 1925 (Opuscoli filosofici. Testi e document; inediti o von William rari, 1); hrsg. von Gianfranco Morra, Bologna 1954; englische Ubersetzung Henry Hay II, bearbeitet von John Herman Randall und Paul Oskar Kristeller, in: The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Selections in translation, hrsg. von Ernst Cassirer/Paul Oskar Kristeller/John Herman Randall, Chicago/London 1948, S.280-381; deutsche
von
Christ.
Godofr.
Ubersetzung von Burkhard Mojsisch (Manuskript). 35 "veram
et in se firmissimam" (ed. Gentile, S.5; ed.
Morra, S.36).
Das cinen
natiirliche Verlangen
Elefanten?":
36
der Floh
nach Unsterblichkeit
303
dcr klcinc Perctto, 37 der Elefant
ist
ist
der
massigen Korperbau bekannte Thomas. Pomponazzi mochte seine einer, Ausfiihrungen gegen die Ansicht des Thomas auch nur machen fur seinen
"als
der zweifelt, nicht jedoch als einer, der GewiBheit fur sich in Anspruch 38 "und
nimmt";
vielleicht",
so hofft er verschmitzt,
Dominikaner diese Zeilen daB
mir von seinen
"wird
hochst gelehrten Anhangern die Wahrheit entdeckt
werden".
DaB
richtig verstanden haben, beweist der
nach Erscheinen des Buches lautstark nach
sie gleich
39
die
Umstand,
dem
Scheiter-
haufen riefen: Alle erreichbaren Exemplare des Buches wurden in Venedig 40 offentlich verbrannt; Pomponazzi selbst kam mil dem Leben davon, weil
Bembo, Sekretar des Papstes und
Pietro
Freund Pomponazzis, seine schiitzende Hand
Im
siebten Kapitel der genannten
iiber ihn hielt.
41
stellt
Abhandlung
Pomponazzi
Beweise des Thomas fur die Unsterblichkeit der Seele auch
das
desiderium-naturale-Argumeni:
naturgemaB
folgt
auf
die
Intellekt aber erfaBt das Allgemeine,
Denn
Weise,
zu
ist;
Wille
das
Ewige
erstrebt;
natiirliches
ein
Streben
der
erkennen;
daher
der Wille das Ewige ersehnen. Ein solches Ersehnen aber jeder
auch
die Weise, etwas zu
etwas
welches ewig
die
darunter
vor,
sich
laBt
"Dafiir
einleuchtender Erfahrungsnachweis erbringen. erstreben,
und guter
ein ehemaliger Schiiler
diirfte
auch
ist natiirlich,
aber
kann
da
nicht
zwecklos sein, da, so im ersten Buch der Schrift Uber den Himmel, Gott
und die Natur
ohne Zweck
nichts
schlechthin unsterblich
Intellekt
tun. 42
ist."
Damit ist nachgewiesen, daB der Im folgenden Kapitel werden die
Beweise des Thomas fur die Unsterblichkeit der Seele widerlegt. Mil ganz ahnlichen Griinden namlich, so Pomponazzi, laBt sich das genaue Gegenteil 1
enim pulex contra
"quid
elephantem?" (ed.
Gentile, S.42; ed. Morra, S.102).
Pomponazzi wurde wegen seiner kleinen Gestalt Peretto oder Pierino genannt. TO "per
modum
dubitantis et non
asserentis"
(ed. Gentile, S.30; ed.
Morra,
S.82).
on "fortassisque
Martin
Vgl.
mihi ab eius doctissimis sectatoribus veritas L.
Padua 1986 (Saggi e 41
Pine:
Pietro
testi, 21),
aperietur"
(ebd.).
Pomponazzi: Radical Philosopher of the Renaissance,
S.47 und S.125f.
Vgl. Pine, a.a.O., S.127.
42
hoc evidenter probatur. Nam modus appetendi naturaliter cognoscendi; intellectus autem universale apprehendit, quod est aeternum, quare et voluntas aeternum desiderabit. Tale autem desiderium naturale est, cum omnes voluntates hoc appetant; naturalis autem appetitus frustrari non potest, cum, "A
signo
insequitur
etiam
modum
primo De caelo, Deus simpliciter S.76).
et
immortalem."
natura nihil agunt frustra. Quare convincitur intellectum esse
(De immortalitate animae, VII,
ed.
Gentile,
S.27f,
ed.
Morra,
Pluta
304
-
natiirlichen
daB
der
Sterblichkeit
die
es
Weise auch
Verlangen bemerkt
(ein wirkt,
eines
beweisen.
er:
"Mit
Wesen wie der Mensch) als wahrnehmende Seele
ist.
Organs bewiesen sein,
Das
...
als
beweiskraftiger
eine
Zum Argument
gleichem Recht aber
nicht alle
damit,
nach
wahrhaft
es
Und
Formen aufnimmt,
und
namlich
ist
Argument
andere."
dem
aus
diirfte
vegetative Seele auf stoffliche
als
daB
44
das
43
bedient
korperlichen strebt,
Hinfalligem sterblich
-
Seele
weiter
und
schlechthin nicht
offensichtlich
unten
sich
und
Zeitlichem
unter
es
heiBt
Berufung auf Aristoteles: "Was nun das Argument beziiglich der Erfahrung es der HI. Thomas betrifft, bin ich besonders dariiber verwundert, wie angefiihrt hat,
bemerkt doch Aristoteles im
Wille
sich
richtet
dritten
wie etwa auf Unmogliches, daher gilt: Wenn unser
Buch der beim
Von
Unsterblichkeit:
Erkenntnisseele anzutreffen
ist,
und wenn
Erstreben
nur
Wille
in
Der der
der
er nach Aristoteles durch das
Erstreben der Unsterblichkeit auf Unmogliches aus
menschliche Seele nicht unsterblich
Ethik.
ist,
dann kann die
45 sein."
Ein vemiinftiger Glaube war im spaten Mittelalter nicht mehr moglich, denn der Versuch, die ratio fidei, die Verniinftigkeit des Glaubens, nachzuweisen, war gescheitert. Pomponazzi stellte fest: "Wer die Wahrheit 46 finden will, muB in der Philosophic ein Haretiker sein." Moglich blieb ein
Glaube gegen
willentlicher
iiberdeutlich
aus:
"Wider
ermessen und ausforschen 43
consimilibus
"quoniam
Vernunft.
die
solches
alles,
was
will, ja,
rationibus
quibus
was alle
hanc
Luther sprach dies 1532 Vernunft eingibt oder
die
Sinne fiihlen und begreifen,
probat,
opposita
probari
potest."
(Ebd., VIII, ed. Gentile, S.30, ed. Morra, S.82).
44 "Sed
pariter,
cum
ipsa
materialiter
operetur,
ut
vegetativa,
non
omnes formas
caduca sit mortalis. ... Non enim maior probabitur quod ipsa veraciter et simpliciter uno quam de altero esse videtur." (Ebd., VIII, ed. Gentile, S.30f, ed. Morra, S.82, 84). recipit,
ut
45
et
sensitiva,
eadem organo corporeo
utitur,
temporalia
et
affectat,
ratio
de
Divus Thomas illud experimento, in primis miror quomodo tertio Ethicorum, dicat voluntatem esse impossibilium, veluti in appetendo immortalitatem; unde, si voluntas nostra non est nisi in anima intellectiva, anima humana si appetendo immortalitatem per Aristotelem appetit impossible, non ergo ed. Morra, S.146). potest esse immortalis." (Ebd., X, ed. Gentile, S.67f, "Ad
adduxerit,
vero
illud
cum
46
de
Aristoteles,
veritatem invenire cupit." (zitiert philosophia haereticum esse, qui sull insegnamento di Pietro Pomponazzi", in: Giornale critico della fllosofia italiana 1 (1926), S.274. Vgl. Bruno Nardi: Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi, Florenz 1965, S.19f und Pine, a.a.O., S.18). "Oportet
enim
nach Cesare Oliva:
in
"Note
Das
naturliche Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit
am Wort
miissen wir lernen
ob wir wohl
fur
halten und schlecht nach demselben richten,
sehen, daB der
Augen
305
Mensch unter
die
Erde gelegt
wird,
und muB
verwesen und den Wiirmern zu fressen gegeben dazu, daB er soil Die Schrift mehr ist denn aller und endlich gar zu Staub werden Menschen Gedanken, Fiihlen und Erfahren."47 Der Glaube an ein Weiterleben nach dem Tode griindet sich nach Luther also allein auf die Schrift. ...
Damit gerat ist
er aber in einen circulus vitiosus:
wahr, da
Schrift
ist
sie
in
Die Auferstehung Christi und die heilige
der heiligen Schrift gelehrt wird,
wahr, weil die Auferstehung Christi dies bezeugt.
Das desiderium-naturale-Argument fiihrt vor Augen, wie stark der Glaube an die Unsterblichkeit vom Wunsch nach Unsterblichkeit motiviert ist. "Mich wird niemand von der Unsterblichkeit abbringen" nemo de ("me
48 depellet"), sagt Cicero in den Tusculanae disputationes, und deutlicher noch im Cato Maior. "Wenn ich aber in dem Glauben irren
immortalitate
die Seelen der
sollte,
und
irren,
erfreue,
Menschen
seien unsterblich, so will ich darin
haben, daB mir dieser Irrtum, an
will es nicht
entwunden werde, so lange
ich
49 lebe."
dem
ich
gem mich
Ein Glaube aber, in ist - wie Freud
dessen Motivierung sich die Wunscherfiillung vordrangt, gezeigt hat
-
eine Illusion.
muB
Angesichts dessen der
50
Unsterblichkeitsdoktrin
Mensch
ein
sofern dies
es wirklich iiberraschen,
noch heute
oft
daB die Vertreter
darauf hinweisen,
daB der
Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit verspiire. Denn spricht es nicht fur, sondern gegen die Wahrheit des
natiirliches zutrifft,
Unsterblichkeitsglaubens; gerade dieses Bediirfnis erklart namlich, weshalb die
Uberzeugung von einem Weiterleben nach dem Tode entsteht und sie auch dann noch hartnackig verteidigt
bestehen bleibt, und weshalb
Vidder
solchs alles, was die vernunfft ein gibt odder ermessen und aus forschen was alle sinne fuelen und begreiffen, mussen wir lernen am Wort halten und schlecht nach dem selben richten, Ob wir wol fur augen sehen, das der mensch unter die erden gelegt wird, dazu, das er sol und mus verwesen und den wuermen zufressen gegeben und endlich gar zu staub werden ... die Schrifft mehr ist denn aller menschen gedancken, fulen und erfaren." (Das 15. Capitel der Ersten Epistel S. Pauli aw die
wil,
ja
Corinther. Predigt
am
11.
August 1532;
Cicero: Tusculanae disputationes,
WA Bd.36, S.494, 13-17
I,
...
S.496, 33).
77.
49
in hoc erro, qui animos hominum immortales esse credam, libenter erro "quodsi nee mihi hunc errorem quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo" (Cicero: Cato Maior de
senectute, 85).
Vgl. Sigmund Schriften, Frankfurt
Freud:
am Main
Die
Zukunft
1986, S.165.
einer
Illusion,
VI,
in:
Kulturtheoretische
Pluta
306
wird,
wenn
auch wahr
es keincn guten
sci.
Grund mchr
fur die
Annahme
gibt,
daB
sic
51
Ruhr-Universitat
Bochum
Dieses Argument hat John Leslie Mackie in anderem Zusammenhang vorgetragen The Miracle of Theism. Arguments for and against the Existence of God, Oxford 1982, S.198; Deutsch von Rudolf Ginters: Das Wunder des Theismus. Argumente fur und gegen die Existenz Gottes, Stuttgart 1985, S.314. Es findet sich aber bereits in David Hume s Essay Of the Immortality of the Soul, wo dieser bemerkt: "Alle Lehren, die von unseren Neigungen begiinstigt werden, sind verdachtig, und die Hoffnungen und Angste, die diese Lehren verursachen, liegen offen auf der Hand." (David Hume: Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and the Posthumous Essays of the Immortality of the Soul and of Suicide, ed. Richard H. Popkin, Cambridge 1980, S.96. Deutsche Ubersetzung: David Hume: Die Naturgeschichte der Religion. Uber Aberglaube und Schwarmerei. Uber und herausgegeben von Obersetzt Uber Selbstmord. der Seele. die Unsterblichkeit Lothar Kreimendahl, Hamburg 1984 S.86). Vgl. zu diesem Essay: J.CA. Gaskin: Hume s s Philosophy of Religion, London 1978, Kap.6, S.85-102; Josef Bucheggen David Hume Argumente gegen das Christentum, Frankfurt am Main/Bern/New York/Paris 1987 (Europaische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 20: Philosophic, 225), Kap.IV, S.42-53. in:
JOSEP PUIG
Averroes and Aquinas on Physics VIII Roots of Dissent
The beginning
of the
first
1:
chapter of Aristotle
A Search for the
Physics VIII seems to be
s
and best defining the aim of the book. The question is one of whether there always has been and always will be motion. 1 Therefore the very clear
Greek commentators of Simplicius (d.
proof of
Aristotle,
like
Themistius (d.388) or the
last,
533) focused their analysis on the arguments leading to a 2 thesis. Themistius reads Aristotle s passage of 251alO-blO
this
and points out the basic argument, which leans on the very definition of movement: eyTcAe^eca TOV KLVTJTOU TJ KLLVJITOV. According to it, before any movement or change occurs, there always must be something capable of it. If the things capable of motion have been in existence for ever, but their change started at a given moment, some antecedent change must have happened, which removed the hindrance to their motion. existence,
it
is
granting them
Of jLtcya
we may
differentiate
and the
tells
way
1
2 3
came into movement
as active capacities.
It
is
movement simply
the
,
First
4
Principle.
Trpa^/jcara
same
The Neo-
line that Simplicius will
commentaries give us much more
mean any
dvvd-
look basically at the
will
particular
(arc Awe; KtyTjcrcc,)
search here ends and that the metaphysical one
toward the
prior
themselves.
in
6uva/iecc,
us that Aristotle does not here
change, but
between the
of interpretation, like Themistius
follow, although his painstaking
He
some
evident that there must have been
KLLVCLCT-&OLL
SwancLc,
the things capable of motion
existence.
course,
Platonist
If
3
detail.
movement
or
and that the physical starts and moves
now
That suggests that the
"capacities"
cannot
Physics VIII.1 250511-13. Cf. D. Ross, Aristotle, Oxford 1949, pp. 93-94. In Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis,
In Physicorum
W
4 Ibidem, 1126,1.
posteriores
CA.G. V. Ed. A.
Schenkl, Berlin, 1900, p. 210,2-211,20.
Commentaria, C.A.G. X. Ed. H. Diels, Berlin, 1895,
p. 1126,21.
308
Puig
become
active without a prior change,
the eternity of
We
and therefore another argument
for
movement.
need not refer
need not mention
his
to Simplicius
and
to the passage
commentary
polemic with the Christian thinker John Philoponus (d. 580-), author also of a commentary of
John the Grammarian
or
Aristotle s Physics.
number of pages
The polemic
against Philoponus covers quite a large
(ibidem, 1157,2-1169,8) and
Contra Aristotelem 5 and to the
De
refers mainly to the lost
it
Mundi
Aetemitate
contra Proclum (d.
6
485)
.
Seldom
in the history
of philosophy has so short a passage (251a28-
many works with the subject and has enkindled so many discussions. Simplicius accuses him of writing a lot of but he
blO) supplied so
"rubbish"
does
not
lose
his
(cTrt^ccpYjfiaTa). questions:
function
we
If
of
movement
when
temper
For
our
I
purpose,
take the definition of motion and assume the specific
potentiality,
we have
temporally anterior to
is
4 thesis Philoponus want to underline two
refuting
to
agree
the
that
potency
of
any
7 it.
Philoponus however did not accept this priority in all kinds of change or movement. According to the old theory of the four natural elements, earth, water, air and fire, these have changes of place, for instance fire goes upwards by nature. Philoponus maintained "natural"
that
of this
potentiality
generates
fire,
(cvaviia.)
means
to
On
are found in the necessity
a
heavy and
show falls
the
in
contradiction
same of
that there
is
down, but as
fire
the
wood, which burns and
Two
occurs:
contraries
object.
a
deny the eternity of the
very keen to
the other hand,
movement upward
because
Denying the
is
To be we cannot place
here potentiality exists simultaneously with movement.
and to ascend belong together. 8
potentiality
prior
no contradiction it
to
any movement
movement. Simplicius was therefore
becomes
fire,
in
the fact that
wood
moves upwards: bodies
Simplicius Commentary remains our basic source of information about its contents. The Arabs however knew the book; Ibn an-Nadim (Fihrist, p. 254), al-Qiftl (Ta rih alHukama p. 356) and Ibn Abl Usaibi c a flfyun al-Anba I, p. 105) witness its existence. ,
,
Ed. H. Raabe, Leipzig, 1899; R Hildesheim, 1963. For Philoponus commentary, Aristotelis Physicorum libros ..., CA.G. XVI-XVII. Ed. H. Vitelli, Berlin, 1887-88.
Festschrift
In
Physicorum VIII,1 1126,29 & passim. For the general polemic, v. W. Ewigkeit der Welt. Der Streit zwischen Philoponos und Simplicius", H.G. Gadamer, (Tubingen, 1960) pp. 291-316.
Simplicii
Wieland,
v.
In
"Die
8 Ibidem, 1133,16-1135,27.
Averroes and Aquinas on Physics
can have one quality in act and
warm
and cold
actually
movement of
the
contrary in potentiality,
its
The main
potentially.
the 4 elements
9
i.e.
be
to
point lies in proving that
posterior to
is
309
VIII, 1
real possibility
its
and
not simultaneous with their coming to be:
come into existence moves upwards, but us say as long as it is being generated in the air, that what is in potencv acts foregoing that what is in actuality and that what is found potentially in the fuel foregoes Fire
soon as
as
has
it
during the passage,
what
that
is
Simplicius
actual.
position
by al-Farabi (d.950). Aristotle s
De
let
Caelo,
was
We
VIII
"Treatise
mutagayyira,
about
made made
al-Farabi wrote
text is extant.
not unfortunately, but
is
content.
its
M.
taken up by the Falsafa and especially
can see his influence
since
Yahya an-Nahwi and the
later
11
we know
on the mutable Steinschneider
in
Averroes and Maimonides.
in
Avempace and
12
We
The its
in
the discussion about Ar-Radd cafa
a refutation,
parallel writing to Physics
title,
beings"
was the
Kit ab al-mau^udat al-
as well first
as
things
to collect references
can add to them more references
works of Averroes. 13 As
in other
some
far as
we can
see from these references, al-Farabi was very aware of the link between
very clear in
movement and
which appeared the case of the circular movement but dubious in that of
the Aristotelian definition of
its
eternity,
the animal after rest and in that of the 4 elements. I
would say
(d.1138).
In his
that his answer
commentary
is
not different from that of Ibn Bag^a
the Physics
to
14
he quotes al-Farabi and
an explanation of the problem presented by the wood fire, which now becomes an oil fire. Avempace tries to solve it by stating a looks for
9
Cf. 1138,6-11.
10
Ibidem, 1139,31-1140,2.
M. Mahdi, The Arabic Text of Alfarabi s Against John the Grammarian in Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz S. Atiya, Leiden, 1972, pp. 268284. English tr.: M. Mahdi, "Alfarabi against Philoponus", / of NESt. 36(1967) 233-260. "
Al-Farabi (Alpharabius) Petersburg, 1869, pp. 119-123. 13
des
arabischen
Philosophen
und
Leben
Schriften.
St.
as-Samcf af-Tabfi (Abbrev. Ed. M. Fakhry. Beirut, 1973, zr/z). c Rasa il Falsafiya, ed. G. al- AIawT, Beirut, 1983, p. 110. c Ibn Rusd, Tafslr ma ba d at-Tabfa. Ed. M. Bouyges. BA.S, VI, Beirut, 1942 (R 1964) c pp. 884-886. Taltij ma ba d a t-Tabfa. Ed. U. Amm, Cairo, 1958, p. 125. Epitome in Physicorum Libras (V. Arabica) (Abbrev. Epit. Phys.). Madrid, 1983, pp. 134-135. Al-MaIbn
Bagga,
zr
pp. 134, 144-145, 153;
sa
il
al-Falsafiya
English
tr.:
(Masa
H.T.
[Thesis], 1956, pp. 49-52).
14
%arh, pp. 144-145.
il).
Ed.
Goldstein,
c
G. al- Alawi, Casablanca, Averroes: Quaestiones in
1985,
pp.
Physica.
231-233
(v.
also
Harvard-Radcliffe,
310
Puig
homonymy in the use (tartib) among them: The
(quwa) and a ranking or order
[movement] upward, of the heat and of by nature but in a ranking This is Grammarian did not heed or feigned not to heed. all
exist in the oil
concerns the
it
"potentiality"
of the
potentialities
the lightening what John the
As
of
homonymy
of quwa, he gives us as an instance:
The
potentiality of the fire exists in the oil in a kind very different
that
of the heat in the
the
fire.
coined
has
16
Starting from the Neo-Platonic
own
its
value
from
tradition,
of
"potentiality" (quwa) clearly (imkan) placed between a pure metaphysical one and the concrete things, where it is now to be found. This is the point of view which Averroes (d.1198) has inherited when he writes in 1159 about his first commentary (short) to the
Falsafa
from that of
distinguished
11
or later his long
Physics In
steps:
"possibility"
the
movement
commentary of the
18 .
(tafsir)
natural
He
follows
the
elements,
Avempace
s
was
potentiality
from which the movable (the element) is generated. The potentiality of moving upward was found in wood, from which fire existent in the body,
arose, but
related
of being fire. There the potentiality of although in a ranking. I mean, the potentiality motion exists only [in the wood] tnrough the potentiality of 1 the
to
its
movement
of
its
being
[fire].
Averroes
commentary
tradition.
Falsafa
and
definition valid for
potentiality
exists,
aims
It
therefore
fits
at
motion
"in
counters Philoponus
it
general"
thesis
that
as
and
Neo-Platonist it
this
results
from
definition
is
its
not
movements of the four Empedoclean reason we are very surprised when we read in other
some movements,
elements. For this
the
into
i.e.,
the
places of Averroes himself a very different interpretation. In a second "editing"
text
15
of
of his summary, the
&w#,
p. 145.
zr/i,
p. 144.
16
long
20
in
his
commentary,
21
Quaestiones
although
in
or even in the
form
of
a
same
"revisionary"
Epit. Phys., pp. 129-135, lower part. The date appears at the end of his of the Metereologica (v.g. Haidarabad print: Rasa il, 1947, p. 104.
summary
10 Aristotelis
Opera Omnia cum Averois
Venice, 1562-72.
R Frankfurt
19 Epit. Phys., p. 132,
20 21
1.
1962. Vol. IV,
15-17.
Epit. Phys., pp. 129-135.
Masa
c
il,
ed. al- AlawT, pp. 231-235.
...
fol.
commentariis (Junctas). Ed. 338r-342v.
"apud
Junctas",
Averroes and Aquinas on Physics 22
he
observation,
VIII of
Book
mind
from
tells
us that Aristotle
to prove that heavenly
is
s
aim
movement
311
VIII, 1
the beginning of the
at is
Such a change moves away
eternal.
involves, of course a change in the argument which
the
Aristotelian
movement
as an everlasting
movable
now mentions
Averroes
line.
only in order to
show
that
it
the
definition
of
needs an eternal mover as well
object.
We
need not doubt the import of his words. He insists: Aristotle s here is not to demonstrate that motion does not passes away as purpose genus (bi-l-^ins) as opposed to numerical identity, because he investigates
now
whole
"the
universe"
23
and not a part of
it,
where movements are
following one after the other. Averroes himself acknowledges that before he adhered to the "traditional" opinion, but he was aliquantulum in errore.
24
when he has recognized
Since
the true meaning of Aristotle
s
words. 25
Aquinas was reading Averroes to Aristotle s Physics.
expositio
26
At
long commentary while writing his that
point
of the
could not say about this interpretation other than
With
it
is
commentary he omnino falsum.
and sharpness he enumerates several reasons Laubenthal s dissertation 27 treated them again and I would
his usual wit
refusal.
point out the
main one,
in
for his like to
my view:
xiii) inquirere intendens de sempiternitate primi motus, utitur eo quod hie demonstratur, quasi principio: qilpd nullo modo faceret, si hie probasset primum motum esse aeternum.
Aristoteles inferius (lect.
Therefore, Aquinas search for possibility
of
Creation: this
no doubt
has
that
Aristotle
intends
here to
communi and his concern is one of reconciling the an eternal movement with the faith and the doctrine of
motu
is
in
the matter of his Lectio
II.
Junctas, fol. 339r. It is obviously inlaid later by Averroes himself. M. Alonso ("La cronologia en las obras de Averroes", Misceldnea Camillas, 1943; vol. I, pp. 443-460) considers that the tafslr was written in 1186. I dare to say that this was the year of the
first editing.
23 Epit. Phys., p. 133,
24 Junctas,
fol.
1.
25 Epit. Phys., p. 135, S.
Thomae
7.
Junctas,
fol.
339r,
#D.
339r #C. 1.
9-10. V.
Aquinatis:
In
Note
22.
Octo Libras Physicorum
Ed. P.M. Maggiolo, Torino-Rome, 1965. 27 R. Laubenthal: Das Verhdltnis des Hlg. Thomas seinem Physikkommentar. Kallmuenz, 1934. Pp. 79-82. 28
Expositio, VIII, lectio
I,
966 (p.500).
Aristotelis
von Aquin
Expositio
zu
(Expositio).
den Arabern
in
312
Puig
But we want to know why Ibn Rus d interpretated the passage in We find a textual explanation following the lines where he
manner.
this
informs us of his change of mind. Apart from the
motions"
"first
no
generated (h adit) movement precedes another movement essentially. It happens only accidentally and this is the mistake made by "Plato, the Kafam people of both religions" but obviously also by al-Farabi and himself.
29
How
Averroes come to hold
did
this
view?
Let
us
30
where he defends
passages
this
look
we
polemics with al-Gazali (d.llll): in his Tah afut at-Tah~afut
at
his
find three
theory of a double causality. Let us
look at the second one: Al-Gazali argues that the philosophers have to acknowledge that there are new events happening in the world ant that they have causes. These events cannot lead one to another without limit. If there is a limit, this must be eternal and consequently, temporal beings can proceed from an eternal being. The last sentence is asserted by the mutakailimun, but denied by the fafasifa. Al-Gazall attacks a weak point
of the Aristotelian system, but Averroes provides an answer:
The philosophers permit the existence of a temporal being ad in an accidental way, when this is repeated in a finite infmitum 31 matter.
This
existence
of
something ad infmitum
among
the
generated
way how they share something of the eternity of the First Mover. This participation happens by means of His direct activity: Every movement depends therefore on this [First] Mover and its
beings
the
is
setting in It
motion
not
is
essentially, not accidentally.
difficult
to
understand
that
this
Averroistic
theory
rebounds negatively upon the argument for the everlasting nature of motion or change which is based on the definition itself. May be it more fully
explains
"mechanically"
far as
acts
upon His
well run universe.
beings;
However,
it
no doubt,
it
depicts
a
also affects causality in so
primary substances loose their capacity to act as essential causes.
29 Junctas,
VI
how God
fol.
339r, 341r. Epit. Phys., p. 134.
Masa
il,
p. 231.
Tahafut al-Tahafut. Ed. M. Bouyges, B.A.S. VIII. Beirut, 1930. Passages in pp. 20-22; 265-269. For the translation, S. van den Bergh: Averroes Tahafut al-Tahafut,
56-60;
London
1954,
31
Ibidem,
R
1969, 2v., pp. 10-12; 32-34; 157-159.
p. 56; tr. p. 33.
32 Ibidem, p. 59;
tr.
p. 34.
Averroes and Aquinas on Physics
313
VIII, 1
we
not a denial of causality, of course, and in any case a Metaphysics with a physical, natural orientation. It
is
Definitely,
Aquinas saw
Aristotle
this.
On
had
not
thought
such
of
a
stay before
he was not very prone to resort to
his side,
As
stays in this case closer to al-Gazali.
is
well known,
and
distinction
33
it:
he
Aquinas does
not think that reason can decide between the arguments for or against the eternity of motion. He has a respectful but critical attitude towards Aristotle,
him an
and the
Patristic tradition to
issue through
We may
its
finally
Divinity as the essential
was not
which he somehow belongs offers
conception of faith. ask -
why Averroes
ourselves
and
direct
34
-
cause of
would say
all
solution,
changes
i.e.
the
in the world,
was a physical solution and not an ontological one and Thomas, since his earlier works like De Ente et Essentia, went the way of the ontology of being, which attractive to Aquinas.
I
that
it
emphasizes just the dependency for being on the Creator. This ontology enables him to express the radical dependency of each individual in the it receives permanently from the First Esse: Averroes and Aquinas - want to underline.
esse -
A
dependency
that both
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
V.g., in the
34 Cf.,
on
Summa
his
contra Gentiles,
relation
II,
with Averroes:
Wissen bei Averroes. Paderborn, 1911.
38, ed.
Leon. (Rome, 1934).
G.M. Manser, Das
Verhaltnis von
Glaube und
JEANNINE QUILLET
Orcsme
Nicole
dans
cell. ..Nam
librum
"Eccc
nullus
potior
in
Ic Livre
ct la science nouvelle
du Ciel et du Monde
naturalis liber
orbe
fuit",
du Peri ouranou
ccrit
unquam philosophic Nicole Orcsme a la
Pulcrior aut
dc
fin
de
d Aristotc,
sa
n a
Lisicux
que Peveque connu qu a travcrs la nova translatio du grcc en latin, commencee vers 1250 par Robert Grossetestc, corrigee et complctce par Guillaumc de
"translation"
Moerbccke
vers 1265
homme
n est
1
mortcl
philosophic naturellc
ne en
nc en
latin,
Orcsme
a
1
.
Et qui
que
il
ajoute:
onques est
francois",
"...
veist
cestui,
je ose dire
ne
bel
plus
me
et
meilleur
qu
il
de
livrc
ne en ebreu, ne en grec ou arable
ce qui n est pas un mince eloge
d Aristote, bicn que son caractere une louange ad homincm.
oeuvre
laisser croirc a
fort
fais
qu adrcssc
ambigu puissc
admiration exprimce envers ocuvre du Stagirite n empcche pas son commcntateur du XIV siccle de nier 1 une des theses les plus fondamcntales dc la physique aristoteliciennc, a savoir que le
Quoiqu
monde
est le
(malgrc
en
il
soit,
un grand
1
1
vivant.
Lc realisme archaique de
caractere revolutionnairc de Pidec d un
creation originairc ni catastrophe finale) tient a
la
cette cosmologie
monde
cternel,
sans
survivance de Pidee du
commc
grand animal vivant. Conception impie du point dc vuc judco-chretien, mais qui s est conservee longtemps, soit sous la forme simplement nai vc d une figiira mundi, avec haul et bas, droite et gauche,
cosmos
soit
a
dcs imaginations pseudo-hcrmetiqucs ou jouc
travcrs
TJicos-Cosmos-Anthropos avec
microcosmc. nouvelle",
ou,
les multiples
analogies cntre
Faut-il voir dans cette negation
du moins, sa condition de
le
triangle
macrocosme
Pcmergence d une
et
"science
possibilite, lice a la speculation
sur la puissance absolue dc Dieu, qui a constituc,
notamment depuis
la
condamnation dc 1277, un instrument d analysc puissant en matiere de philosophic naturelle?
49 de
1
la
a deja soulignc Pimportance des articles 34 et
condamnation, a savoir, que Dicu peut faire plusieurs mondes,
Le Li\re du Ciel et du Monde, A.D. Menut, Madison, Milwaukee and London,
Nicole Oresme,
Intr.
On
ed.
A.D. Menut
et J.
Denomy,
1968, Introduction, p. 10-11.
trad, et
Nicole Oresme
d unc part,
et que,
meme
ligne droite,
et la
315
science nouvelle
d autrc part, il pout mouvoir le s il faut admettre que, dans ce
ou
cicl,
il
cas,
monde, en 2 y ait du vide Ic
.
Certes, Dieu n a pu creer actuellement d autres mondes, mais
de formuler des arguments cherchant a
interdit
moins au plan de
Dans sont
n est pas rendre possibles, au
les
il
Pintelligibilite.
cette perspective, les gloses d
Qu
eclairantes.
particulierement
potentia Dei absoluta
tres
est
Oresme au De Coelo d Aristote se
il
clair:
de
prevaille
ainsi,
Pargument de
propos de
a
plusieurs mondes, Peveque de Lisieux, apres avoir
1
de
existence
commente
la position
que Pen puet dire en ceste matiere sanz regarder a autorite de homme, mais seulement a pure rayson". La reference, ici, a la raison est connexe d une intervention d Aristote, renvoie a
la
consideration
"selonc
verite ce
de Pimagination: on peut imaginer que plusieurs mondes soient en trois manieres, nous dit le glossateur infidele d Aristote. Apres avoir evoque la
comme on
doctrine stoi cienne de Vekpurosis, inspiree,
d Empedocle,
qu Aristote
et
avoir
peust
annichilier ce
monde
critique
mais
impossible naturellement, faire,
3 il
,
et apres creer
de Platon
sail,
considere
la
"...combien
ajoute:
tellement
faict
auteur
notre
et
comme
que Dieu pourroit
de sa toute puissance ou du tout
un
Mais
autre".
cette hypothese lui
beaucoup moins interessante que
celle qu il developpe aussitot esbatement et au de c est-a-dire apres, toujours plan Pimagination, pour exercitation de engin"; a la difference de la premiere, cette en d autres termes, il rayson", hypothese ne lui parait pas impossible
parait
"par
"par
n
est
pas necessaire
ici
de
faire appel a la potentia
Dei absoluta pour en pas recevable au plan
rendre compte, et pour conclure que si elle n est de la nature, elle est vraisemblable. II s agit, la, de
mondes
plusieurs
"imagination"
emboites
les
intervcnir
fait
uns
dans de
Pargument
Oresme invoque
la
les 1
la
consideration de
autres.
existence divine
La
troisieme
du
vide,
et,
oppose aux
qu Dieu pourrait par sa toute puissance creer du neant une nouvelle matiere et faire un autre monde4 Le recours a la potentia Dei absoluta est encore plus explicite correlativement, raisons
aristoteliciennes
de
la
puissance
rejeter.
En
il
effet,
.
dans Pargumentation, puisque Peveque de Lisieux considere que
le
vide
The Condemnation of 1277, God s absolute power, and Physical Thought in Late Middle Ages, dans Viator, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vol. 10 (1979), Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, p. 211-244. E. Grant,
the
3 Aristote,
4
De
Coelo,
1,
10 279 b et Livre du Cicl, ed.
Li\re du del, p. 174 38 c-d.
cit. p.
166 sq,
f
35d.
316
pcut
Quillet
non,
existcr,
au plan dc
ccrtes,
chose ymaginable sans contradiction la
la
ce
ne
que
estre
pourroit
fait
vertu
par
Certes, la connaissance de notre entendcment
sont corporels, "espace
font
possible, ja 5 naturelle..."
depend de nos
sens,
.
qui
bien que nous ne saurions comprendre, ni concevoir un
si
incorporel qui est hors
connaitre
purement
ce
s agit
II
faire".
symplement
"et
est
"toutfoys
quc Dieu pourroit
et
d une chose imaginable sans contradiction
soit
mais
nature,
qu
le
raison et verite nous
et toutefois,
ciel",
Oresme de terminer
Et
existe.
il
discussion:
la
"Je
conclu donqucs que Dieu puct ct pourroit faire par sa toute puissance un autre monde que cestuy ou plusieurs semblablcs ou dessemblables, et
ne autre ne prouva onqucs souffisammcnt le contraire; mais fait ne fu et ja ne sera fors quc un seul monde corporel, si
Aristote
onques de
comme
il
est
6
dit
d un espace vide
devant"
et infini,
.
On
mais
le
Orasme n
voit,
de
la possibilite
affirme pas Pexistence
concevoir par
le
raison
la
humaine, eu cgard a la puissance infinie de Dieu.
Comme
nous
dimensions du directions
1
monde
montrc
avons
sensible, ligne,
article
recent
ne
droite-gauche
7 ,
les
meme
surface, volume, de
dessus-dessous,
haut-bas,
un
dans
trois les
que
sauraient
etre
autrement qu elles ne sont dans la hierarchic naturelle des etres doues de mouvement; cependant, dans Pabsolu, peut-on les maintenir? Ontcllcs
encore un sens? La rcponse
est
car ces distinctions ne
negative,
sont valables que par rapport a nous. Pour Aristote, tout corps parfait,
du
celui
cicl,
contraires, ce
cxemple,
par
les
comporte
dimensions
trois
leurs
et
qu Oresme ne saurait admettre, car cela voudrait dire que
est un vivant, et, pour notre glossateur, cela ne peut s entendre de maniere figuree. Droitc et gauche, pour ne prendre que ces deux que directions, ne peuvent ctre dites du ciel, car, s il est vrai qu on peut le
ciel
appliquer ces qualites a des vivants, on ne peut "qui
ciel,
le
n ont vie fors par similitude ou en relation" 8 ce qu Oresme va montrer. Sans entrer dans
,
faire
pour
comme le
les
choses
c est le cas
detail
du
de ses gloses,
mentionnons que si le geant Atlas mouvait le ciel d Est en Quest, c est-adire de droite a gauche comme le dit Aristote, sa droite serait a 1 Est et sa gauche a 5
6
Ibid. p. 176 Ibid. p.
8
Ouest; mais
s
il
meut
le ciel
continucllement, alors sa droite
39 a-b.
176-178 39 b-c.
Jeannine
Economies
1
La
Quillet,
et Societes,
n
1
Li\re du Ciel, p. 314, 77
droite
et
la
gauche
(1987), Paris, p. 119-127. c.
du
ciel
scion
Nicole
Oresme,
dans
Nicole Oresme
317
science nouvelle
et la
gauche a Test; on aura ainsi totalement retourne Atlas, devant-derriere. Done, on ne saurait dire que 1 Est est a droite et 1 Ouest a gauche, ni meme que 1 Est ou 1 Ouest soient a droite en ouest
sera
le
ni a
gauche; ou alors
soir
sa
et
il
faudrait admettre
qu Atlas
immobile, ce qui
est
est contradictoire.
Oresme ne met pas en
Certes,
1
espace euclidien
comme
nom
de Vomnipotentia divine. Dieu pourrait faire mouvoir circulaire en ligne droite, malgre les impossibilites tirees de
au
tel,
question
monde
physique aristotelicienne, mais ce mouvement de translation se
le
la
en
ferait,
toute hypothese, dans un espace galileen (ou newtonien), sans haut ni has, droite
comme
ou gauche
dimensions euclidiennes. nouvelle mecanique,
Oresme,
monde
le
de dieu. Cela
et lorsqu
gauche",
(faisant est
1
echo a
la
antarctique
mouvement
est
dit,il
realites absolues,
C est,
On
le
naturelle,
reste,
une chose inanimee continue
a
croire
non
1
comme
questions
comme
de cette figure. d une maniere generate, au niveau de
voit,
1
essentiel le
cosmos
dit-il
il
s agit
la
alors
1
horizon
des
le
mouvements
et le
comme on
theologique,
et
ciel"
que
que
nous
"despend
comme
les
il
leur
de Dieu Lui
a dit
il
9
le
le
les
fondement. les
"sauver
attribuons
une
createur qui
10 .
Dieu, dans
choses soient autrement qu elles
Grant, Nicole Oresme, dans The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Livre du Ciel, p. 298, 73 b.
,
notamment
plaira"
q 547-549. 10
1
Livre du Ciel que c est pour
du
garde en estre tant
sa puissance infinie, peut faire
E.
philosophie
qui a rendre egalement plausibles les solutions alternatives aux
pas lui-meme dans
conserve
continue a
1
d une strategic,
regularite necessaire; en verite, le ciel le
il
argumentation de potentia Dei conduit a considerer les preuves strictement demonstratives
physiques,
apparences
le
aristotelicien:
considerations sur la puissance absolue de Dieu, en seraient
Ne
monde
"naturel"
"parfait"
inadequates. S
consisterait
pole nord du
oeuvre convenable de Dieu en raison
Oresme ne recuse pas pour le
le
pose
il
est
inverse de celui des aiguilles d une horloge. Et
comme
fils
plus noble que un homme la tete en bas
que
arctique),
non un dieu ou un
"droit
imagine le cosmos comme these d Aristote selon laquelle
reste le cadre de sa reflexion. Cependant,
absoluta
et creee,
il
terrestre,
cadre des trois
le
dans cet espace que se situe la au sublunaire et au supra-lunaire. Pour
commune
parler de la sphericite du ciel
du caractere
du
mais dans
New York
1967
p.
318
Quillet
ne sont 11
commc
Et,
.
nous
1
avons vu,
1
homme
peut imagincr hors du
monde un espace infini et immobile, dans lequel un mouvement rectiligne. Et, ajoute Oresmc,
monde
le
le
"dire
condamne
article
12 de 1277
.
De
a
Paris",
meme
la
comme
manierc,
sont egalement plausibles; qu
egalement
comme
nous
1
il
y
le
le
note Particle 49 de
mouvement du
ait
domaine du
le
a
aristotelicienne
la
mu
par
condamnation
ciel et celui
un seul monde ou une
de
la terre
pluralite Test
avons mentionnc plus haul.
Peut-on, dans ces conditions, se demander
dans
serait
contraire est un
savoir,
dans
au
permis
les
savoir
limites,
si
1
irruption
de
toutefois,
de
Pelargissement
de
la
foi
la
science
son
champ
d investigation par 1 exercice, notamment, des puissances de 1 imagination speculative et de la raison? C est a ce niveau que 1 analyse du role et des la pensee d Oresme est lice a Dei absolutam, et a la consideration du argumentation per potentiam
de
fonctions 1
1
comme
possible
imagination
dans
Ainsi, la phusis aristotelicienne est
tel.
un modele possible
parmi d autres, car possible se dit de ce qui peut etre imagine, meme si cela n cxiste pas au niveau de la nature, sans pour autant que nous entrions dans le domaine de la fiction pure et simple, puisque usage 1
d imagination est quasiment equivalent a celui dc raison, scion les termes
meme
de notre glossateur. Le Livre du Ciel est explicite sur ce point: impossible rcnvoie, non pas seulement a cc qui implique contradiction dans ne peut estre naturellement", a savoir, dans absolu, mais aussi a ce 1
la
est
"qui
de notre monde. En revanche, possible se dit tout ce qui possible en quelconquc maniere, soit necessaire ou contingent, commc
realite
"de
Secondement
de ce qui pourrait estre selon ymagination sanz contradiction, combien que ce ne puisse estre mis en 1 On le voit, le respect du principe de naturellement" ^. estre
que ce
soit".
contradiction
est
a
1
"possible
hori/on
de
est dit
1
imagination
speculative,
et
nous
que nous ne sommes pas dans la fiction pure, dans le chimerique fantaisie, dans le pur arbitraire, mais aussi que peut s ouvrir largement 1 argumentation de potentia Dei absoluta, etant cntendu que la
garantit lie
a
la
puissance ordonnee divine
correspond, en gros est possible
11
p.
a,
a la Creation, etabli un ordre naturel qui
paradoxalement, au cadre aristotelicien.
que un autre monde
Ibid. p. 294, 72
Ibid.
et
soit, et
Lhre du
lieu soit
du tout
"Et
ainsi
vieu,
ou
c.
368, 93 c et
R. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219 articles p. 118-120.
7 Mars 7277, Louvain-Paris 1977, notamment 13
que un
Ciel, p.
208 sq, 48 b sq.
condamnes a Paris
le
Nicole Oresme
quc soit
319
repouse ou que la terre soil mcue hors de son perciee et que Ten voie de 1 autre part et de telles
Ic cicl
entre le possible et le reel, dont
lien
le
science nouvelle
et la
charniere est
la
ou que
lieu
choses".
la
elle
Tel est
puissance
divine absolue.
Une
telle attitude
n est pas seulement d ordre epistemologique; mais
remet-elle en cause, au plan ontologique, un possible ordre des choses? Si
phusis aristotelicienne peut etre mise a la question, en est-il de meme pour les mathematiques, dont Oresme remettrait en cause la valeur la
absolue?
Sur cette vexata quaestio, les opinions sont partagees: un passage du Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum et motuum autorise son editeur,
M.
Clagett, a considerer qu Oresme tient les objets mathematiques comme de pures fictions: "Etsi nichil sunt puncta indivisibilia aut linee, tamem oportet mathematice fingere pro rerum mensuris et earum proportionibus 14 .
cognoscendis" 1
a
oppose
Sans entrer dans
aux
Maier
d A.L.
analyses
de
le detail
la discussion doctrinale qui
15 ,
qui
conteste
les
que
configurationes ne soient que des representations graphiques et les tient
pour des
spatiales veritables et tres reelles des
"formes
qualites",
on
doit
d un usage des mathematiques appliquees a la realite des mathematiques elles-meme, comme discipline En tout etat de cause, seule une analyse exhaustive de scientifique pure. 1 usage et de la signification de 1 imagination dans Poeuvre d Oresme noter qu
physique,
s agit la
il
non
et
pourrait contribuer a eclairer le debat; on peut dire d ores et deja que, dans sa dimension speculative, cette fonction de la pensee et son exercice
permettent de mesurer reflexion
sur
naturelle
et
ses le
la
distance entre une lecture de la Nature et une
fondements ontologiques. La distinction entre realite possible sans contradiction s oppose aux perspectives
pour lesquelles realite, necessite et intelligibilite sont au plan d une science de la phusis. cet usage de 1 imagination correspond la reference a la subtilitas,
aristoteliciennes,
identifiables
A
que Ton peut, M.
comme on
configurationibus qualitatum
A.L.
L
dit
16 ,
et motuum",
comme une
considerer
categorie
Geometry of Qualities and Motions: Intensities
Madison, 1968
known
as
"Tractatus
A de
p. 164.
Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Geistesgeschichte des 1967, et M. Clagett, ed. cit. p. 451.
Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter:
Jahrhunderts, vol. F.
a
Clagett, Nicole Oresme and the Medieval on the Uniformity and Difformity of
Treatise
14.
1
Bottin,
La
imagination selon (1987) p. 219-227.
1, p.
342-43,
scienza
Nicole
Rome
degli
Occamisti,
Rimini
1982,
p.
344
et
Jeannine
Oresme, dans Archh es de Philosophic, tome
50,
Quillet,
cahier
2
320
Quillet
dc la pensee du Moycn Age tardif, c est-a-dire comme la d cxpliqucr de maniere coherente et rationnelle, mais aussi capacite nouvcllc, tous les aspects du reel, mais aussi du possible. S il est vrai
csscntielle
qu alors
valeur scientifique d une explication se mesure a la subtilite
la
avec laquelle on pose un probleme, qui, lui, n est pas nouveau, alors, on comprend de quelle maniere intime se noue le rapport de Pimagination et
de
Cette derniere
subtilite.
la
fait
fonctionner
imagination pour reperer logiquement possibles dans univers. Dans la plupart probleme pose est "fictif, en ce premier sens qu il est pour cause d orthodoxie, de le situer dans un univers
toutes les situations
des
le
cas,
preferable,
1
1
concerne des situations impossibles a verifier ou a observer au niveau de Pexperience. S agit-il pour autant de imaginaire, mais aussi parce qu
simples
"experiences
arbitraires,
de
il
pensee",
d evocation de casus, sinon purement
du moins sans rapport a
realite
la
Pour ce qui dans la mesure ou
naturelle?
la pensee d Oresme, ce n est guere plausible, Lisieux manifeste un souci de "sauver les apparences", c est-ade Peveque dire de ne pas contredire les doctrines aristoteliciennes lorsqu elles sont
concerne
accord
en
avec
la
comme, par exemple, pour Phypothese d une Apres en avoir montre la possibilite, Oresme
foi,
possible rotation de la terre.
son
qualifie
evidemment"
de
la
A
la
Oresme
foi,
nature
.
subtilite
non Pevidence de
certitude,
des
de
argumentation 17
la
"persuasions
mesure, c
physique
possible, cette
pas
Pimagination speculative des contraintes de la observer, experimenter, ccrtes, mais aussi calculer, la
quantification et a
un autre univers mental que s ouvre Pesprit de la vouee a Pexploration de Pimaginaire et du "nouvclle",
est
dite
concluent
libere
choses:
cnvisager les cas, faire des hypotheses, recourir a la
ne
qui
de Pimagination correspond le degre de verite. Par souci de preserver Porthodoxie
a
pensee du possible dont
la
puissance absolue de Dieu reste
le chiffre indelebile.
de Pastrologie, Pintroduction de Pirrationnel a propos des corps celestes, sont autant d exemples de la conviction de Peveque de Lisieux, qu on ne saurait limiter notre connaissance de Poeuvre de Dieu a
La
la
critique
philosophic
naturelle
d Aristote,
mais,
qu au contraire,
il
s agit
de
mobiliser toutes les puissances de Pame, et singulierement Pimagination, liee
17
a
Pexercice
de
la
subtilitas,
pour parvenir, sinon a
Li\re du del, p. 355-7; 364; 536; 89 d-90 b; 92 a-b; 143 d sq.
la
verite,
du
Nicole Oresme
et la
science nouvelle
moins a une certitude probable; en tous secrets de la philosophic".
En n
est
d autres termes,
pas toujours bonne.
Universite de Paris XII
cas,
s
321
efforcer de percer
du rationnel au raisonnable,
la
"les
consequence
EUGENIC) RANDI
Plurality of Worlds: Fourteenth-Century Theological Debates*
Just as
other themes in
many
modern
philosophy, the idea of a plurality
or an infinity of possible worlds can be retraced in the scholastic debates
of the
late
Aristotle
s
Middle Ages. strong
It
defence
is
of
widely accepted
the
unicity
of
that
the
the
rejection
of
should
be
universe
connected to the well-known condemnation issued by the Archbishop of 1 Paris in 1277. This condemnation, it is argued, pushed the theologians to place
I
the possibilities open to God s absolute power: could thus go beyond the confines of Aristotelian natural inquiry philosophy with its particular set of physical and metaphysical doctrines into a broader area in which Aristotelian laws might be
more emphasis upon
am
very grateful to Miss Nathalie Rochon,
who
kindly revised the English text.
It the well-known opinion of Pierre Duhcm: is decrct du 1277 marque done un rcnvcrsement complet dans opinion des maitrcs parisicns touchant la pluralite dcs mondcs. Avant ce ils accumulent les raisons tirees dc la decret, Physique afin d etablir existencc de mondcs cst unc pc ripateticienne quc plusieurs "\jc
1
1
ce
mcmc
tous
Ics theologiens ticnnent pour certain quc Dieu pourrait, s il le voulait, creer des mondcs multiples; ils s appliquent soil a ruincr Ics raisons de Physique qu on avail opposces a ccttc proposition, soit a les interpreter dc telle maniere qu ellcs nc soicnt plus des objections" (P. Duhem, Le systeme du mondc, Ifistoirc dcs doctrines cosmologiques de Platon a Copernic, Paris: Hermann, 10 vols., 1913-59, 9, p. 380. See the english translation by Roger Anew in P. Duhem,
impossibilite...
Mcdie\ al
Apres
Cosmology.
Theories
decrct,
of
Place,
Time,
and
Void,
the
Plurality of by the harsh Koyrc s attacks, Edward Grant observed: "Despite the exaggerated and indefensible character of Pierre Duhem s claim that the Condemnation of 1277 was birth of modern science", he was right to emphasize the special significance of two articles, 34, which made it mandatory to concede that God could make more than one world, and 49, which compelled assent to the claim that God could move the heavens, or world, with a rectilinear motion even though such motion might leave behind a vacuum. Since these two articles struck at fundamental ideas in Aristotelian natural philosophy..." (E. Grant, The Condemnation of 1277, God s Absolute Power and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages", Viator 10 (1979), pp. 211-244; cfr. E. Grant, Much Ado About Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Nothing. Re\ olution, Cambridge (Mass.): University Press, 1981, p. 103. See also, by the same the Middle Ages, author, Physical Science in Cambridge: University Press, 1971; in D. Lindberg (ed.), Science in the Middle Ages, pp. 265-302, now also in "Cosmology", E. Grant, Studies in Medieval Science and Natural Philosophy, London: Variorum
Worlds,
Chicago:
University
Press,
Infinity,
1985).
Defending
Duhcm
s
thesis
"the
Reprints, 1981,
II).
Plurality
of Worlds
323
violated. The result was that Aristotle s arguments and conceptions were put through an unprecedented process o? logical testing.
The
increasing presence of philosophical subjects and arguments in
theological works such as the Sentences
Commentaries should then be
viewed as part of the campaign against aristotelianism led by theology. To check the accuracy of this well-known picture, it would be
theologians, clarify
examine
to
necessary
the
development of the problem among the the Arts Faculties and in the scientific works, and to
at
and how theology had
if
influence
any
writings of the natural philosophers.
At
present,
on I
the
will
thought
limit
and
myself to
some general remarks based on the Sentences Commentaries, and approach more closely the treatment of the problem by a dominican of the early XlVth century, Bernard Lombard!, 3 who is among the theologians who
God
admit that
de potentia absoluta could have created more than one
goes without saying that the present contribution has a very limited purpose, that is to present a sketch intended to puzzle a current
world.
It
interpretation as far as fourteenth-century theologians are concerned.
Murdoch, E.D. Sylla, The Science of Motion", in D. Lindberg (ed.), Science in Middle Ages, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978, pp. 206-64, p. 218. See also J.E. Murdoch, "From social into intellectual factors: an aspect of the unitary character of late medieval learning", in J. Murdoch, E.D. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, Proceedings of the 1st International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science and Theology in the Middle Ages, sept.1973, Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel, 1975, pp. J.E.
the
271-339 (discussion, pp. 339-348).
Bernard Geistesleben,
scuola
Lombardi has been studied by Grabmann (M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliche Munchen: Hiiber, 3 vols., 1926-61, 1, pp. 330, 416; 3, pp. 372, 385; Id., "La
tomistica
italiana",
Rivista
di
Filosofia
Neoscolastica
15
(1932),
pp.
143-153),
Koch (J. Koch, Durandus de S.Porciano OP. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Munster: Aschendorff, BGPMA 26.1, 1927, esp. pp. 314-39), and more recently by Porebski, who edited a question from his Sentences Commentary (SA. Porebski, question de Bernard Lombardi concernant la difference reelle entre essence et 17 (1973), pp. existence", Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum "La
1
157-86).
(1938),
Romae: became
See also
1
P.
Fournier,
Th.
"Bernard
Lombardi",
Histoire Litteraire de la
France 37
Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, I (A-F), Ad S.Sabinae, 1970, pp. 227-9. Bernard read in Paris on 1327-28, and there he master in theology (probably on 1331-32). He is depicted as an independent
p.
517-22;
Kaeppeli,
whose purpose was to defend Aquinas from the attack of Durandus; in fact Koch s judgement - he stands between them, autonomously searching his own way.
thomist, it
is
In the Sentences-Commentary, Bernard discusses recent authors like Ghent, Scotus, Aureolus, and his confreres Peter de la Palu, Hervaeus, John of Naples. In his later Quodlibet, he shows familiarity to english authors like Ockham and Chatton, to Bertrand de Alemania, and to Francis of Meyronnes.
Randi
324
As
far as it can be judged from the Sentences Commentaries, theological interest in the problem of the plurality of worlds didn t grow significantly after 1277.
1.
As
has often been noticed, the place to look for the cosmological problem in the Sentences Commentaries is in the section of the first
book devoted
to
God
omnipotence, that
s
is
distinctions 42 to 44.
Then, a
problem comes from
general indication about the relevance of the
first,
the frequency, in this section of the Commentaries, of questions devoted to the study of the possible existence of another universe.
on
4
some
A
preliminary
50
Sentences performed questions Commentaries composed between 1230 and 1345, suggests the following test,
the
of
list
of
remarks: a.
there
b.
A
is
a general trend of reduction of the
little
some
In
and/or
number of
concerned can be noticed. These, however, constitute a part of all the questions devoted to God s power.
questions
c.
of questions. 5
but constant increase in the incidence of the
slight
very
number
cases
problem has been treated under a different most likely, in connection to the problem 6 of a better world. At all events, the questions
the
less specific label;
of the possibility
concerning the possibility of the creation of a better world, which are more frequent than questions on plurality, decrease considerably
from the
late Xlllth century.
Furthermore,
it
might be interesting to observe that
the problem of the plurality of worlds almost disappears from the
d.
English commentaries of the fourteenth century, while
number
by a See
J.
of
continental
Pinborg and A. Kenny,
authors,
"Medieval
usually
Philosophical
Literature",
Pinborg, E. Stump (eds.), The Cambridge Philosophy, Cambridge: University Press, 1982, pp. 21-42, p. 30.
A.
Kenny,
On
the
J.
general
tendency
to
reduce
number
the
of
ranked
History
questions
it
is
treated
among
the
in N. Kretzmann, of Late Medieval
see
P.
Glorieux,
de Theologie Catholique 14-2 (1941), cols. 1860-84, esp. 1871-78; "Jean de Falisca. \j& formation d un maitre en theologie au XIV siecle", Archh es d Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age 33 (1966), pp. 23-104, p. 74; enseignement au Moyen Age", Archives d Histoire Doctrinale et "Sentences
(Commentaires sur
les)",
Dictionnaire
"L
Litteraire
du Moyen Age 35
(1968), pp. 65-186, p.
1
15.
is e.g. the case for William Ockham, Sent. I, d.44, q.un. (Opera Theologica 4, eds. Etzkorn, F.E. Kelley, St.Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1979, pp. 650-61); on this text see A. Maurer, "Ockham on the Possibility of a Better World", Mediaeval Studies 38 (1976), pp. 291-312; A. Ghisalberti, "Onnipotenza divina e contingenza del mondo in Guglielmo di Ockham", in M.T. Beonio-Brocchieri (ed.), Sopra la volta del
It
G.I.
mondo. Onnipotenza Lubrina, pp. 33-56.
e potenza assoluta di
Dio
fra
Medioevo ed Eta Modema, Bergamo:
Plurality
traditional
Thomas
the
theologians:
of Strasbourg,
or
of Worlds
325
augustinians Augustin
Ancona and
of
dominicans Jean Quidort and our
the
Bernard Lombardi. 7
The
2.
possibility of a plurality of
worlds was admitted before 1277.
Before and around 1277, Aristotle world was caelo
One
accepted.
critically
chs.
8 and
and
s
defence of the unicity of the
of his main arguments, exposed in
in
chs.
7 and
was
De
that the
9, Physica VIII, another world would be impossible because no other raw materials exist. This position was challenged by a I,
world includes
number these
all
9,
possible matter
of theologians
still
who appealed
maintained that
it
God s
omnipotence. Yet, some of possible to demonstrate the unicity of the
is
world: Albert the Great, Aquinas,
to
8 Roger Bacon, Godfrey of Fontaines.
Peter of Tarantasia, the pope Innocent V, writing around 1258, doesn t limit himself to claim the absolute freedom and power of God, but also technically discusses the famous arguments against the plurality of the world based on the theory of the natural places: the earth of a second world, Aristotle argued, couldn t avoid moving towards the center of the first
this
world,
since
contradiction,
towards is,
its
own
it,
second earth would
the
same
at the
claiming that
same or of another
A
9
place.
This at
the
would
involve
a
same time move
center and towards the center of the other earth, that
inward and outward
and refuses
natural
its
being
God
species.
time. Peter presents this argument,
could produce infinite worlds of the
In such
a case,
each earth would move
question or article concerning the plurality of worlds does appear in the (bk. I, dd. 43 or 44) of Peter Tarantasia, William de la Mare, Richard Middletown, Peter de la Palu, Augustine of Ancona, John of Paris, Alexander of Alexandria, Hugh of Novocastro, Bernard Lombardi, William of Rubione, Thomas of Strasbourg; do not appear (even if the problem is in some cases treated under a different heading) in the commentaries by Albert the Great, Eudes Rigaud, Bonaventure, Hannibaldus, Walter of Bruges, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Giles of Rome, Matthew of Aquasparta, Scotus, John of Sterngassen, Humbert of Prully, William Peter Godin, James of Metz, William of Ware, Robert Cowton, Hervaeus Natalis, John of Bassoles, specific
commentaries
Durandus, James of Lausanne, the anonymous of Paris BN lat. 14570, Antonius Andreae, Aureol, Landulphus Caraccioli, Ockham, Francis of Marchia, Peter of Atarrabia, Francis Meyronnes, Anfredus Gonteri, John Baconthorp, Peter Thomae, Gerard of Odo, Gerard of Siena, Fitzralph, Peter of Aquila, Gregory of Rimini, Alphonsus Vargas, Buckingham, Mirecourt, Michael of Bologna, Conrad of Soltau, Conrad of Ebrach, Marsile of Inghen nor in the so-called "question-commentaries", like Wodeham s, Holkot s, Chatton s,
-
Halifax
See 9
See
s,
P.
and so on.
Duhem, Le systeme du monde,
e.g.
Aristotle, De caelo,
I,
8,
9,
pp. 375-80.
276b4-20.
Randi
326
towards
own
its
center,
identical
to
every other
center in specie, but
individually distinct:
cum isto aliud facere universum, id est aliud mundunij infinites mundos sive ex rebus eiusdem generis sive alterius... Si tamen fieret ex rebus eiusdem generis, non sequeretur quod moverentur partes terrae alterius adidem centrum numero, sea ad idem specie et natura: Jiunc vero omnes moventur ad idem numero, quia non est nisi unum. potest etiam
et
In
case
the
Peter
of
subsequent authors,
we
of
as
Tarantasia,
the
is
case
for
many
are simply dealing with a few lines of physical
much longer theological context. We should keep mind, to avoid overemphasizing the scientific contribution of this of work. Tarantasia, however, testifies for the existence of a
speculation placed in a in
this
kind
somehow
elaborated
criticism
of Aristotle
need further evidence to confirm that position in the
fifties.
this
However, we do know
s
before
positions
We
1277.
was a common or widespread
that
it
existed.
To admit
to the possibility of a plurality of worlds doesn t entail a rejection of Aristotle s physical principles: the other way around, it is usually conceived as a refinement of his arguments.
3.
to
Bernard Lombardi shares the theological statement that produce more than one world; nevertheless he offers an
solution
the
to
hypotheses
of a
creation
composed by
a
God
is
able
aristotelian plurality
of
universes:
Eadem
proportio vel connaturalitas mobilis pertinet respectu alicuius distinctarum situ, sicut si essent distmcte loco et subiecto. Quod autem moveantur ad unam partem respectu illarum partium et non ad aliam, hoc est per accidens, scilicet quia una est propinquior alia et alia remotior, dato quod naturaliter ad utramque possit moveri ad utramque partem; et idem iudicium est de quiete, loci
quia
divisibilis
idem
naturaliter
potest
quiescere
modo
in
diversis
modo
partibus
situ
hie ibi hoc est per accidens, distinctis, sed quod quiescat quia illud est sibi magis propinquum. Verbi gratia constat quod grave naturaliter appetit centrum et ibi quicscit; centrum autem est in partes situ distinctas, et ideo lapis ita naturaliter quiesceret in ista parte centri sicut in ilia. Sed quare hie quiescit, hoc est per accidens, quia ista pars centri est sibi propinquior et alia remotior.
divisibile
Bernard twenties:
s
is
position
before
him,
it
neither original nor rare
at
the end of the
was maintained by a number of theologians,
Peter of Tarantasia, Sent. I, d.44, q.un., a.5 (Innocentii PP. V in IV libros Sententiarum Commentaria, Tolosae, Colomerio, 1652, repr. Ridgewood: Gregg, 1964, pp. 366a resp.; 366b ad 5). 1
11
Bernard Lombardi,
Sent.
I,
d.44, q.un. (ms.
Napoli Bibl. Naz. VII.G.98 f.53vb).
Plurality
whom
among
Middletown, Peter de
above
the
(besides la
of Worlds
327
mentioned
Palu (one of Bernard
Peter
s
of
Tarantasia)
sources), Augustine of
Ancona, Alexander of Alexandria, John Bassoles, Hugh of Newcastle, Ockham. 12 This position is obviously interesting, inasmuch as it seems to
some
introduce
determinations
quantitative
one) which
in
framework
a
(the
essentially qualitative. Namely, he admittedly refuses the averroistic interpretation according to which distance doesn t aristotelian
is
have influence on motion. 13 In position of a body with
movement.
It
this case,
respect
to
Bernard
clearly claims that the
a center of gravity determines
its
important to observe that the admission of a possible is not intended to dismiss the aristotelian theory of
is
plurality of worlds
motion, but on the contrary,
is
seen as a refinement of
worlds, closed to each other, would
still
-
it.
Two
different
according to Bernard, and to
most of the authors conceiving such a hypothesis - work according to, and be ruled, by the aristotelian laws. Within this, the actual world, ut mine, the validity of the scientific arguments remains unchallenged.
12
See Peter de la Palu, Sent. I, d.42, q.l (ms. Basel Univ. B.II.21, f.234ra): se habet mobile ad unum locum divisibilem et ad diversas partes eiusdem loci divisibili... ut si duo centra movebitur naturaliter ad illud centrum quod est sibi propinponatur and, among others, Alexander of Alexandria, Scriptum super I Sententiarum quius"; (revised edition, post 1307, of the first redaction of 1303), d.44, q.2 (ms. Paris B.N. "sic
f.lat.
15859, f.!72rb):
quo non
in
"Posset
enim dicere
aliquis
quod Deus potest
facere alium
mundum
cum terra potest dici quod movetur mundi. Que enim sub una connexione sunt, moventur ad centrum
est terra; vel
si
facit
a
centr
(ms.: a centro) proprii proprie connexionis; duo autem mundi haberent due connexiones et duo centra, sicut etiam duo homines habent duo corda et duo cerebra"; but see a very similar argument in the augustinians Augustin Triumphus (Lectura super I Sententiarum, completed 1303, d.44, a.2, q.l, ms. Troyes 269, f.202vb: Ad III. dicendum quod posset facere ex rebus
eiusdem generis
ex rebus alterius generis, sicut sibi placeret, nee esset inconveniens universi moverentur a centro et ad centrum; non tarn respectu
et
terre
quod partes
illius
numero, sed respectu eiusdem in specie) and Thomas of Strasbourg, a.4 (Thomae de Argentina, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum, Venetiis: Zelettus, 1564, repr. Ridgewood: Gregg, 1965, f.HSra 11.40-45). Cf. the famous argument by Richard Middletown, Sent. I, d.44, a.l, q.2 (Ricnardi de Mediavilla... Super eiusdem centri
Sent.
IVor
I,
d.44,
libros
continentes,
in
q.un.,
Sententiarum 2 vols.,
Brixiae:
Quaestiones
... Quolibeta quaestiones LXXX Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1963, 1, p.
subtilissimae
Gonzaga, 1591,
repr.
392b) and William Ockham, Ord. I, d.44, q.un. (OTh 4, pp. 657-8) concerning the two fires burning in Paris and in Oxford: they share the same natural place, but each one is directed towards a different part of the heaven. Middletown s and Ockham s texts are discussed by Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277", and Maurer, "Ockham on the Possibility of a Better 1
World",
Based on Aristotle
monde,
9,
pp. 363-74,
8,
s
De
respectively.
caelo
pp. 231-319.
I,
8,
276b23-27, 276b29-277al3;
Duhem, Le
systeme du
Randi
328
The
4.
idea
of potcntia
absolute/,
Bernard discussion
question
text
s
also
is
be
he introduces into
his
s
because
interesting
God
of
notion
the
could
conceived,
traditionally
used to confirm the actual validity of Aristotle
cosmology.
whole
the
absolute
power. Moreover, conceived as the testing of a hypothesis de potentia absoluta.
is
s
At the very beginning, Bernard defines
God
s
absolute power as follows:
In ista questione est communis opinio philosophorum et theologorum quod de facto non est nisi unus mundus; sed cum questio querat de
Ubi sciendum quod potcntia Dei quedam est autcm potentia absoluta ilia que non incluuit repugnantiam terminorum et ista respicit omnia possibilia que crunt et que non erunt. Ordinata autem respicit solum que erunt. Et de ista similitcr est communis oppinio, scilicet quod de potentia Dei ordinata non potest facere plures mundos; sed questio nostra querit de potentia absoluta utrum possit. possibili, est difficultas.
absoluta.
ordinata; vocatur
quedam
Bernard uses the potcntia absoluta in a rather traditional way the way used, in both Aquinas and Peter of Tarantasia s mainstream
e.g.
Bernard clearly stresses the hypothetical character of any reasoning de potcntia absoluta: the absolute power of God covers the whole set of ideas.
Summa
the
also
very
franciscan
Logicae, and later in
close
Geraldus
Bernard; which 14
la
meaning
Odonis,
in short, a
is,
Bernard Ixmibardi,
Peter de
the
to
Sent.
Palu, Sent.
I,
d.42,
I,
Franciscan
lecturing
his political
to
common and
the
Paris
in
reali/.ed.
in his sixth
traditional
a
is
Quodlibet,
works.
15
distinction
the
in
It
But by
same year
view.
16
it
the
Namely,
as it
q.un. (ms. Napoli Bihl. N az. VII.G.98, f.53va). Cf. (ms. Basel Univ. B.II.21, f.232vb): "omnes sancti et quod non sit nisi unus mundus nee essc possit de
q.l
q.l
1980,
modcrnos sunt
(Opera theologica pp.
585-6);
9,
Summa
tres
ed.
opiniones...".
J.C.
logicae,
Wey, St.Bonaventure: III,
4,
ch.6
(Opera
Brown, St.Bonaventure: The Franciscan 1974, pp. 779-88); Opus nonaginta dierum, ch. 95 (Opera politica, eds. U.S.
philosophica Institute,
Institute,
some of
attributed
philosophi conscntiunt potentia ordinata, sed de potentia absoluta inter
ITie
be
never
d.44,
modern!
See Quodlibcta septcm, VI,
will
one Ockham presented
definition very close to the in
which
those
including
possibilities,
1,
Ph.
eds.
G.
Bochner,
Gal,
S.
Manchester: University Press, 3 vols., 1956-1974, 2, pp. 715-19, 724minorcs (Opera politica, 3, p. 14), Contra loannem, ch.22 (Opera politica 3, p. 88), Contra Bcncdictum, III ch.3, VI ch.2 (Opera politica 3, pp. 230-34, 273). For a discussion of those passages see H. Randi, // So\rano e I Orologiaio. Due Offler,
J.
Sikes,
26), Epistula
immagini
Nuova
di
Italia,
ad
fratres
Dio ncl 1987,
inedito di Giovanni
dibattito sulla potentia
esp.
pp.
65-76,
XXII", Mcdioe\
tune
si
faceret
aliter,
esset
ordinata, et ita non posset facere nisi distinction between potentia absoluta and
preordinatum
quod
faceret...".
potentia
et
On
ordinata,
tune
non
the
history
see
W.J.
esset
nisi
of
the
Courtenay,
and Causality in Medie\p/i/ce
tractabimus".
Reason and Faith
As
the
for
relative
in the
337
Dragmaticon of
interchangeability
terms
the
the
in
Philosophia, William of St Thierry had not missed the opportunity to expose the philosopher s explanation of the divine Persons and the
man
creation of
8.
We
as that of a disguised physicus.
now
can
sketch the complex relation between philosophica ratio
and auctoritas diuinae paginae in the Dragmaticon: a) Theory.
The
central role played by ratio in William s remarkable
I shall recall only the main points: ratio is epistemology soul to formulate defined as the faculty of the true and firm judgment
is
well known;
"a
on a physical rebus as
rationem quaerere, reddere de the task of the natural philosopher. His arguments ought to be
is
as
far
12
(Dragm. VI, 307)
thing"
possible
accessible
to
"necessary".
sensory perception
But
:
world
the
since
(the basis of rational
not
is
knowledge), the
philosopher must often be content with probable arguments, as a physicus. Ratio "fluctuating
always
if
he were
further said to derive from uera opinio, a true but
is
and uncertain
judgment",
when
confirmed either by the
is
"it
agreement of those who know or by necessary
arguments"
(si
uel assensu
sapientum uel argumentis necessariis confirmetur).
We
can see that auctoritas, in
written by a sapiens
must be
,
is
metonymical sense of something connected with uera opinio: to be reliable, both its
either assensu sapientum
"confirmed
or argumentis
Consequently, auctoritas is theoretically inferior to what Adelard of Bath had claimed. 13
reason
necessariis".
This
.
in
is
fact
b)
In
ratio
practice
Dragmaticon,
with
and,
the
and
auctoritas
of
exception
go
hand
in
hand
in
the 14
a
single
allusion,
cryptic
PL 180,339A "homo physicus et philosophus physice de Deo philosophatur; ... creationem primi hominis philosophice, seu magis physice describens"; 340A physico illud sensu interpretans..." "Et
12
"Here the Gratarolus edition, following the wrong reading of a small class of mss. which omit two lines of text, must be emended to read: Si uero hoc iudicium de re
corporea
enim
ratio
hoc
sit
ostendat, uel utilitatem
ad quam hoc
sit praetendat"
(Dragm.
111,68-9).
CECILIA TRIFOGLI
The Place
of the Last Sphere in Late-Ancient and
Medieval Commentaries
Aristotle
treatment
s
frequently discussed
of
the
place
of
the
last
of his doctrine of place
topic
the
is
sphere
most
Late-ancient
among
and Medieval commentators. 1 They raise many questions about it and attempt different solutions which often reflect either conceptions of place different
from Aristotle
The
exposition
primary concern of consider
the
to the
it
of
Rome
To
this paper.
s
position
on
this
context
of
the
and
problem
doctrine of place seems to be inconsistent
s
same
topic
we
introduce his position
is
the
shall briefly
the
major
when
applied
proposed by the commentators.
heavens since
but, at the
or innovations introduced in the doctrine.
Aristotelian
interpretations of
Aristotle
s
of Giles
it
turns out that the heavens cannot be in a place,
time, must be in a place. In particular, the definition of
place as an external
container"
and the derived
criterion for being in a
3
deny a place to the heavens. For this criterion claims that only bodies which are contained by another external body are in a place. As a consequence, the heavens or the outermost body of the universe cannot place
be
in a place, since they are not
however,
heavens
other
must
contained by another body. There are,
primary assumptions about place which show that the be in a place. They concern the essential connection
between place and
local
motion;
this requires that
every body that moves
wish to thank prof. F. Del Punta for advice and comments on this paper; I am Rega Wood for her patience in helping me to elucidate some of the linguistic oddities and for her precious remarks and encouragement. I
also indebted to dr.
On
the
history
of Aristotle
Systeme du
Monde
(10 vols.),
s
of place, see, for instance: P. Duhem, Le A. Hermann, 1913-1959; vol.1, pp.197-205, 297-300,
doctrine
Paris,
313-320, 333-350; vol.7, pp.158-302; vol. 10, pp.50, 79-81, 100, 157-160, 204-210, 396-412; E. Grant, "The Medieval Doctrine of Place: some Fundamental Problems and Solutions",
XIV
secolo
Paravicini Bagliani)
Roma,
in:
Studi sul
in
memoria
di Anneliese
Maier
(a
cura
di
A.
Maieru e A.
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1981, pp.57-59.
See Aristotle s Physics (a Revised Text with Introduction and 1 Ross), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936 IV.4, 212a20-21. 3 See Aristotle, Physics, IV.5, 212a31-32. ,
Commentary by W.D.
TJie
with
motion must be
local
circular
motion,
Aristotle
s
in
Place of the Last Sphere
i.e.
4
a
in
343
But the heavens move with
place.
with a kind of local motion. So the problem with
doctrine can be
summed up
as follows: the heavens cannot
be
a place, since they are not contained, but must be in a place, since
they
move with In
local motion. this
facing
the
problem,
Aristotelian
reached
two
unavoidable
and
tradition
different positions:
the
1)
first
declares
that
contradiction
the
is
the Aristotelian doctrine of place completely. This position was
rejects
who
supported by Simplicius and Philoponus, Following
place.
Damascius
doctrine,
formulate other doctrines of defines
Simplicius
as
place
measure of the position of the bodies, whereas Philoponus defines three-dimensional incorporeal extension.
Proponents
2)
of
second
the
the
it
as a
remove
the
5
to
attempt
position
contradiction without giving up the whole Aristotelian doctrine, but by
some
modifying
principles
from
which
it
This
derives.
was
position
supported by some Greek commentators and commonly by the Medieval commentators. These commentators, however, followed different routes to save
Aristotle
difficult
s
doctrine;
all
them
of
reflect
of
interpretations
the
passage of Physics IV.5 where Aristotle attempts to deal with the 6
place of the heavens.
Aristotle claims that only the parts of the heavens are in a place
move from
since only they
a place to another; the heavens as a whole
are not in a place since they do not change place, as they rotate. This solution assumes that circular motion for
right, its
it
is
not the rotating body
is
not a local motion in
parts.
There are two main terminological ambiguities which
commentators.
The
first
for the
concerns
ambiguity
the
See, in particular, Aristotle, Physics,
See Simplicii In
Aristotelis
term
and the universe,
continuous parts which compose the
(
Aristotle
text
s
this
last
parts
.
Since
term can stand
sphere or
(ii)
for
IV A, 211al2-14.
Physicorum
Physicorum Commentaria, ed. H. Regia Borussica, Berlin 1887, pp.557,8-585,4.
Aristotelis
See Aristotle, Physics, IV.5, 212a31-b22.
ed. H. Diels (CA.G. vol.IX), 1882, pp.601, 1-645, 19; loannis Philoponi In
Commentaria,
Academia Litterarum Regia Borussica, Berlin
6
in
justify the different reconstructions of his solution offered by the
Aristotle mentions both the heavens (i)
own
its
changes place, but only
itself that
Vitelli
(C.A.G.
vol. XVI),
Academia Litterarum
344
Trifogli
the single celestial spheres
as
parts of the celestial region or
(iii)
for
spheres and the sublunar elements as parts of the universe. The second ambiguity concerns the expression per accidens
both the
celestial
.
For Aristotle
s
heavens
the
account of the place of the heavens clearly indicates that are in a place in virtue of their parts, but Aristotle
concludes that they are If
only
the
second
of
Aristotle
reconstructions
The
traditions.
per paries
in a place per accidens.
ambiguity solution
s
1)
the
different
broad
exegetic
considered,
two
into
assumes that per accidens simply means the second tradition makes a distinction between the meaning
;
tradition
first
of per accidens and that of per paries
The
.
seems chronologically
tradition also
first
and
Themistius
in
is
fall
for
first
it
appears
and
in
Philoponus paraphrasis Simplicius commentaries. 7 These commentaries also show that this tradition divides into two, according to the interpretation given to the first ambiguity, to
the term
refers
are
parts
According
.
continuous
the
second they are the single the Middle
the
Ages
commentary, who Themistius, in faithful
of
parts celestial
the
it
i.e.
the parts to which Aristotle
first,
last
sphere,
according
to
the
spheres and the sublunar elements. In
interpretation reappears in
first
accepts
to the
but falsely ascribes
it
Thomas Aquinas
to Themistius.
8
For
follows the second. Both these interpretations remain
fact,
on two important aspects: 1) they accept motion of a body can be reduced to the local
to Aristotle s doctrine
the view that the circular
motion of
its
parts;
definition of place
is
2)
they assume
that
an essential element of the
containing the located body. Both these aspects are
rejected by the second exegetic tradition. 2)
This
second tradition
Albert the Great, criticized by
Rome
and such important
See Themistii In
starts
from Averroes;
it
followed
is
Thomas Aquinas, and defended by
later
authors as Walter Burley.
Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis,
Academia Litterarum Regia Borussica,
Berlin,
ed.
9
Its
by
Giles of peculiar
H. Schenk (C.A.G. vol.V,
p.
II),
1900, pp.119,12-121,20. Simplicius, Physics,
pp.588,1-595,26. loannes Philoponus, Physics, pp.593,1 1-597,4; 600,25-604,19. o See S. Thomae Aquinatis In octo Libras Physicorum Expositio, ed. Torino-Roma, Marietti 1965, Bk.IV, lectio 7, pars. 478-480, pp.232-233.
P.M. Maggiolo,
See Averrois Cordubensis Aristotelis de Physico audito (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. IV), Venetiis 1562 (repr. Minerva G.M.B.H., Frankfurt 1963), Bk.IV, Comment 43, fol.!41L-M; Comment 45, fols. 143M-144E. Alberti Magni Physicorum Libri
VIII (Opera
Omnia,
Thomas Aquinas, Romani Commentaria in
p.269.
ed. A. Borgnet, Parisiis 1890, Bk.IV, tract.I, cap.XIII, Bk.IV, lectio 7, par.477, p.232; par.486, p.234. Aegidii octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Venetiis 1502 (repr. Minerva vol.III),
Physics,
The Place of the Last Sphere
the distinction between being in a place per paries and being in a
trait is
which refer
place per accidens,
heavens
When
.
turn
in
to
different
meanings of
the
the heavens are conceived as the whole celestial region,
because the single celestial spheres a place; but when the heavens are conceived as the last sphere,
they are in a place per paries, are in
345
i.e.
they are in a place per accidens,
i.e.
per centrum, namely the earth. This is clearly an innovation
account of the accidental location of the heavens introduced by Averroes and, furthermore, Aristotle
it presupposes the rejection of which reduces circular motion to the motion of the principle
s
parts of the rotating body. I
will
discuss
treatment of the accidental location of
Giles
next
the heavens.
To
Giles
clarify
position
claim that the last sphere
is
in
it is necessary to analyze further the a place in virtue of the earth. It includes
two assumptions which are conceptually and factually distinct. The first comes out from the spatial relationship between the sphere and the not contain
earth.
So
The
earth
is
contained by the
last
last
sphere but does
in
attempting to solve the problem of the place of the heavens, the second tradition gives up the primary axiom on place, that of containment, and admits an internal place, at least for the bodies it.
which move with circular motion.
But
this
does not yet explain why,
contained inside the is
chosen to define
last its
among
all
the bodies which are
sphere, the one most distant from
place.
The explanation
is
it,
the earth,
provided by the second
assumption concerning the immobility of place: place must be immobile and the earth is the only body in Aristotle s universe which is properly immobile. All the followers of the second exegetic tradition share both these
assumptions and occasionally repeat the arguments which Averroes used to support them.
Regarding internal place, Averroes declares that it is not necessary to have an external place, since they move circa and not in continente. aliquid Furthermore, he seems to accept for
spherical bodies
Avempace
G.M.B.H., Aristotelis
s
arguments on
Frankfurt Expositio
et
1968),
this
Bk.IV,
Quaestiones,
York, 1972), Bk.IV, fol.l02vb.
topic:
lectio
Venetiis
8,
unlike the rectilinear bodies,
fol.82ra-b.
1501
(repr.
Walter
Hurley,
In
the
Physicam
Georg Olms, Hildesheim-New
346
Trifogli
sphere
is
by something
does not need to be completed
in itself and, therefore,
complete else, a
10
containing place.
Regarding the immobility of place, he declares that the heavens are in
a place because of the earth since the immobility of the earth
cause of the /lv/0 of the heavens.
is
the
11
Besides repeating these arguments, Giles formulates other arguments in
favour of the opinion that the heavens are in a place per centrum.
These arguments describe a new interpretation of the connection between place and local motion. For they stress the function of place in the description of local motion, but they deny any real dependence of local
A
motion on place. from this function. In
new
quantitative concept of place
what follows
aspects
I
shall
try to
Giles
in
appear
sphere and of the immobility of the treatment of the
In
framework
within
emphasi/ed. Giles against
Thomas
of
virtue
its
parts,
before and after
it.
claim, showing that these last
first
problem, the function of place as a
and
are
rest
described
is
chiefly
main argument formulated by
position.
Thomas
Following Aristotle, in
derive
place.
appears, for instance, in the
It
to
treatment both of the place of the
motion
which
this
prove
seems also
held that the
since each
Giles
part
criticism
is
is
last
sphere
in a place
is
contained by those which are
the following:
with the relative order of the parts of the
last
if
place
is
identified
sphere, the last sphere
undergoes motion, but it cannot be recogni/.ed and described, since this order does not change, as it moves. The correct frame of reference is an internal
i.e.
the
because the position of the
last
sphere changes with respect to the earth, as it rotates. For, as Giles explains: Moto enim celo, partes celi habent alium ordinem ad paries centri. Pars
enim
place,
earth,
que prius respiciebat hanc partem aliam partem terre. Totum ergo celum semper ilia
terre,
moto
respicit
celo,
respicit
totam terram, sed
non semper respicit earn eodem modo, partes vero celi non semper respiciunt easdcm partes terre, propter quod, si comparamus celum ad centrum
10
See
Comment 11
et
partes celi ad partes centri, inveniemus
Averroes,
Physics, 45, fol.l44B.
Bk.IV,
See Averroes, Physics, Bk.IV,
Comment
Comment
43,
quod totum celum
fols.!41M-142B,
43, fo!.142G.
142E,
142M-143A;
347
The Place of the Last Sphere
mutat locum secundum dispositionem, partes vero eius mutant locum
secundum substantiam
The same
12 .
criticism
raised against the opinion that identifies the
is
place of the last sphere with
cum ad
convex surface:
its
huiusmodi superficies
Si
celum semper uniformiter se habeat, sequeretur quod celum ex motu suo nullo modo mutaret locum, esset locus celi,
quod
est
illam superficiem
omnino inconveniens
The
function
description of local
of place in the
underlined
definitively
13 .
the
in
third
argument
motion
favour
in
is
also
of Averroes
Tertia via sumitur ex parte eorum que debemus salvare circa locum. Sic enim tribuendus est alicui locus ut per motum eius localem opinion:
modo
mutet locum. Si enim ponemus celum nullo Alexander, vel
ponemus ipsum
si
posuit Themistius, vel ultime, ut
Sed
si
quidam
alii
si
esse in loco solum
diceremus ipsum esse
posuerunt,
ponimus ipsum esse
esse in loco, ut posuit
secundum
nunquam per motum
in loco per
partes, ut
in loco ratione superficiei
eius mutaret locum.
comparationem ad centrum
vel per
comparationem ad terram, cum totum celum semper respicit eandem terram, partes vero celi non semper respiciant easdem partes terre, salvabimus in celo quod per eius
motum mutet locum
et
salvabimus quod
quantum ad eius partes mutet locum secundum substantiam, quantum ad se totum mutet locum secundum dispositionem 14 .
These passages show first that the causal connection between the motion or rest of the heavens and the earth, maintained by Averroes, has completely
disappeared.
Furthermore,
they
show a
sharp
distinction
between the existence of motion and the elements necessary to describe it it, and place appears to be relevant only for the description. From this follows that Giles gives
of
place.
Place,
Aristotelian
surface
provided that this function
it
it it
no
clear indications about the physical properties
be
seems,
could
of
container,
the
either
a
of
space
several
or
things
an internal
-
the
place-
allows a suitable description of motion. But to perform
must meet an
essential requirement:
it
must not only be
physically separated from the mobile body but immobile since, as Giles Omnis enim motus fit respectu alicuius immobilis; nunquam explains: 12
Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio
8,
fol.82vb.
fol.83ra. This opinion is not mentioned Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, by Averroes, but by Albert the Great, who ascribes it to Gilbertus Porretanus (see Albertus Magnus, Physics, Bk.IV, tract.I, cap.XIII, p.270). lectio 8,
14
Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio
8, fol.83rb.
348
Trifogli
cnim possumus imaginari motum 15 cuius aliquid dicatur moveri
nisi
imagincmur
aliquid
immobile respectu
.
The
espoused by all the followers of the second exegetic tradition, whereas the second is introduced by Giles. It contains an explanation of the immobility of place that is clearly conclusion in this passage
first
congenial to the
new
is
function of place. Averroes himself, for instance,
explained this point in a different way: the place towards which a body moves must be immobile because: Si aliquid movetur ad motam rem, tune
motus eius This Aristotle
esset ociosus
explanation,
16 .
that
real connection
absent
completely
in
it
to
assumes a
between place and motion based on the nature of bodies. of the immobility of place also shows which
physical properties place
These
rest.
refers
Giles,
treatment
Giles
and
is
doctrine of natural place and motion. Therefore,
s
must have
out
turn
properties
provide a description of motion
to
be
to
different
from
those
of
Aristotle s place.
To
explain
this
point
we must
turn
Giles
to
distinction
between
introduced to counter an
formal and material place. This distinction
is
objection against the immobility of place:
place, according to Aristotle,
if
the surface of a natural body, since each natural
is
can
be
place
answered
if
and
body
immobile?
Giles
admits
that
this
body can move, how objection cannot be
completely reduced to the surface of the containing place Locus est immobilis formulates the following distinction: is
formalitcr, mobilis vero materialiter.
The of the place fixed
material place coincides with the Aristotelian place as surface
containing body in
is
the ordo
points
contact
ad universum of
of the
universe
with
the
contained,
this surface,
(the
earth
i.e.
and the
its
whereas formal
relationship to the poles). The Thomas Aquinas
celestial
of this distinction already appear commentators offer an explicit definition of the ordo Neither commentary. ad universum; there are, however, some differences in the terms and essential
in
traits
examples they use which
illustrate
Giles
place.
15
16
Acgidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio Averroes, Physics, Bk.IV,
Comment
8, fol.83rb.
41, fol.!40A.
1
Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio
7, fol.Slra.
quantitative
notion of formal
The Place of the Last Sphere
To
how
349
ad universum remains unchanged when the founded vary Thomas introduces the following analogy: Sicut etiam dicitur idem ignis manere quantum ad formam, licet secundum materiam varietur, consumptis et additis quibusdam lignis 18 explain
on which
surfaces
the ordo is
it
.
Thomas
ordo, therefore,
common
to
the
all
similar to Aristotle s form, being a quality
is
containing surfaces and conferring the function of
place upon them. But there
no analogy between place and form
is
in
commentary. For Giles explains the permanence of place by the permanence of the distance between the located body and the fixed points Giles
consequenter ponitur, ideo locus est immobilis quia, licet, te quiescente, possit moveri aer qui est iuxta te vel aliquod aliud corpus circumdans te, semper tamen diceris esse in eodem loco quia of universe:
semper
es in
From
Nam,
ut
eadem
distantia
this
it
passage
ad centrum evident
is
et
ad polos
that
19 .
Giles
replaces
the
generic
notion of ordo with the quantitative notion of distantia. This distance
can be measured and, therefore, the formal place conceived as distance is
a suitable
framework
The comparison
for the description of local
motion and
rest.
of the quoted example with other similar examples
offered by Giles reveals a doctrinal aspect that, though not systematically
developed
by
position. For,
located
body
the
consequences of his example, Giles refers to the distance between the and the fixed points of the universe, whereas in the elucidates
Giles,
theoretical
in this itself
examples he refers to the distance between the surface of the containing body and these points. How can this be explained? Perhaps, other
the explanation could be
when considering formal
found place,
remark by Edward Grant 20 that, the Medieval authors speak indifferently a
in
measured from the place itself or from the body in that since place and the external surface of the located body are
of the distances place,
coincident, according to Aristotle. Consequently, the distance
both cases formal
is
place,
identified
with
simply completes Aristotle but
seems
to
replace
essentially to evaluate
it.
s
a
no longer something
is
distance,
in
Thomas Aquinas,
motion and
in
rest
fact,
and
it
according
performs
Physics, Bk.IV, lectio 6, par.468, p.227.
10
Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio
7,
See E. Grant,
Place"...,
"The
that
notion of place as surface of the container, Place,
10
?n
measured
the same. This explanation has a further implication: the
Medieval Doctrine of
fol.Slrb.
p.65, note 25.
to
Giles,
this function
serves
when
350
it
is
Trifogli
defined as a distance that remains the same,
at rest,
and
indifferently itself
varies,
if
satisfied
the located body
when
the
is
distance
if
the located
to
introduce
the
is
motion. Both conditions are
is
measured from the located
and from the surface of the body containing
body it seems superfluous
body
in
containing
located body, at least as far as the description of motion
it.
Consequently, besides the
surface is
concerned.
emphasis on the role of place in the description of motion seems to lead to a quantitative and relational notion of place. In conclusion, Giles
Giles, however,
does not completely substitute the Aristotelian notion of is only one of the
place for that of place as a distance. Place as distance
two notions of place which appear in his commentary. The other, which is related to material place, assumes an intrinsic connection between place and the located body
that cannot
Universita degli Studi di Pisa
be founded on distance alone.
WHITE
G.
Ockham and Hume s Question
There has been, bring of
Ockham
scepticism",
secondary
some
no shortage of attempts to
literature,
sort of meaningful relationship with
however
Such
conceived.
Ockham
link
to
attempts
in the
into
with
later
attempts
figures;
thus
about induction and the
possibility of a scepticism
Goddu 1
problem with
go
generally
the
raises
reliability of causal
Ockham
connections, which gains a hold because of
"the
s
principle that the
existence of one thing cannot necessitate the existence of another thing.
Even though have, as
this
later did
it
Goddu seems fact
principle did not lead
Hume; and
to think, needs to
Ockham
the fact that
to scepticism,
didn
t
is
it
could
something
that,
be explained.
We
find a similar chain of thought in
that
Ockham subscribed to that God could cause
principle
it
a
certain
us
to
Adams. 2 Again, we have principle
believe
-
in
this
falsehoods
assertion that this principle leads to a form of scepticism
-
-
case,
the the
and the
in this case,
3 scepticism about mind-independent material objects. Here, too, the path from the principle to fully-fledged scepticism is one that Ockham didn t
take, but
1.
somebody
else
-
in this case
Prepositional Structure, Assent,
Descartes
-
did.
and Cause
Ockham s key texts: the Prologue to concerned here with the structure4 of acts of
Let us start by examining one of his
Ordinatio.
Ockham
is
Andre Goddu, The Physics of William of Gcistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 16 (Leiden 1984), p. 217. "
Marilyn Ockham",
In
McCord Adams,
Cognition,
Certainty,
Studien
und
and Scepticism
Texte
in
zur
William
Traditio 26 (1970), pp. 389-398. See p. 394.
her
Scepticism",
A. C. Pegis,
definition in
of
scepticism,
she
follows
Etienne
Gilson,
The
Road
to
The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York 1937), pp. 61-91, and
"Concerning
John Boler, 85-98. See p. 86: Cf.
"Intuitive
Ockham.
William of
"Ockham "the
Ockham",
doctrine
Traditio 2 (1944), pp. 465-480.
Cognition", Franciscan Studies NS 36 (1976), pp. of intuitive cognition depends upon an analysis of the
on Evident
White
352
assent
more
with
(specifically
evident
assent
to
theological
here interested
He
the evident assent which belongs to science
in
but
propositions,
generally with evident assent to propositions in general.)
not
is
(i.e.
that
comes from knowledge of first principles and the like; 5 such in principles are known when the terms occurring in them are known
which
Ockham
fact,
statement
of
knowledge
first
(complcxa) which
knowledge of called
I
terms. it
-
their
knowledge
(notitia
someone
broad definition of
s
it
know
-
applies
is
white.
Ockham
as
sees
Socrates and being
at
9
and whiteness existing
Socrates
sees
intuitively
knowledge of
intuitive
extends to the sort of knowledge of
it
someone has when looking
Socrates, then (s)he can
evidently that Socrates
is
in
white.
thought."
Sent.
Ockham, Bonavcnture "Si
with
contrast
by
intuitiva),
a rather general definition, and
able to judge on that basis that Socrates
structure of
However,
with will be like
(notitia abstracted).
Ockham
empirical facts which
if
the
to
to a variety of cases. Firstly,
...
6
in that it is knowledge of propositions be caused simply by (a certain sort of) terms (incomplexa}? The sort of knowledge of terms
able
knowledge
is
contains
terms".
principles
is
shall call this It
which
Aristotle
we know their Ockham is concerned
in that
principles
intuitive
abstractive
in
passage
of evident assent that
the sort
is
a
to
refers
know
"We
NY
dicatur
Prol.
qu.
quod
Opera
1,
Theologica
ed.
I,
G.
Brown
S.
Gal,
(St.
6:
1967), p.
cvidens veritatis
notitia
contingentis
nunquam
causatur sufficicnter
incomplcxa terminorum, quia tune scirctur cognitis terminis. Sed omnc tale 18est principium per se notum, secundum Philosophum I Posteriorum [c. 3 t. 21, 72 26]. Sed nulla veritas contingens est per se nota; igitur etc.: Dicendum quod propositio per se nota est ilia quae scitur evidentcr ex quacumque notitia terminorum ipsius propositionis, sive abstractive sive intuitiva. Sed de propositione contingente non est hoc possibile ex
notitia
..."
"Principia
cognoscimus
in
quantum terminos
cognoscimus."
Post. Anal.
3
c.
t.
21, 72
18-26. "Notitia
evidens
est
cognitio
vcri
alicuius
incomplexa immediate vel mediate nata sufficientcr O.Th. I, p. 5.
complexi, causari."
ex
terminorum
notitia
Ockham,
Sent.
Prol.
qu.l,
Q
The this is
existence
proved
"...si
in
aliquis
of such a
Ockham, videat
ibid.
distinction
intuitive
evidenter scire quod Sortes est
is
Conclusio
1
of qu.
1
(Ockham,
ibid.
p.
15);
pp. 22-30.
Sortem
albus."
et
Ockham,
albedinem
Sent. Prol. qu.
exsistentem 1,
O.Th.
I,
in
p. 6.
Sorte,
potest
Ockham and Hume s much
applies to
it
Secondly,
evident
is
Ockham mental
states.
above;
such
(This
mental
associated with terms
-
-
incomplexa
and thus
we have
in the technical -
things
huiusmodi
et
tristitiae
delectationes,
are
the
-
our
argues
own
of our
described
way
intellectiones,
and
-
10
have:
love, are happy or are
fact,
that
intuitiva
be interpreted
states
we
that
contingent
to notitia
to
is
of a
is
knowledge,
must be due
-
we
introspective knowledge that
knowledge that we understand something, sad
353
Question
affectiones,
notitia
intuitiva
is
referring to these things.)
polemics against Scotus, Ockham seems to insist on this precisely property of intuitive cognition - that it guarantees of the propositions that it occurs in. But we can also see now knowledge in
And,
the
his
of
point
certain
Ockham
that
objections
made
Scotus
to
characterisation of the distinction:
When
(1)
Scotus
said
some diminished whatever
11
When
(2)
the
in
est
quod
notitia
aliqua
refers
not
-
"according
to
objects to this that, according to
anything,
and,
one
can
must be
it
consequently,
doubt
12 abstractively under that description.
in
that,
whereas
intelligibile
cuius
or
exist
know something
Scotus said
omne
"...
sensibile,
one
description
motive,
Ockham
similitude".
whether that thing possible to
intuitive
knowledge only has to do with the object
abstractive
to
knowledge has to do with the description" (sub perfecta ratione), whereas
that
a complete
"under
object
a
intuitive
knowledge, the thing
abstractive
solo
intellectu sufficit
incomplexa
knowledge
ad
itself
is
it
is
some
apprehensibile et nullo modo notitiam evidentiam alicuius
de eo et aliqua notitia incomplexa eiusdem non sufficit, potest duabus cognitionibus specie distinctis. Sed intellectiones, affec tiones, delectationes, tristitiae et huiusmodi sunt intelligibiles et nullo modo sensibiles, et aliqua notitia incomplexa earum sufficit ad notitia evidentem utrum sint vel non sint,
veritatis
contingentis
ab
cognosci
et etc.
intellectu
utrum sint in tali subiecto vel non, Minor quantum ad primum partem
et
aliqua
patet,
notitia
earundem non
sufficit;
delectatur, tristatur; et ista notitia, cum sit respectu contingentis, ligit, diligit, potest accipi ex propositionibus necessariis." Ockham, Sent. Prol. qu. 1, O.Th. I, p. 28.
qu. 6 n.
Scotus, Quodl.
Ockham,
Sent. Prol.
O.Th.
1
Ockham,
Sent.
(Oxford
1982), misidentification
Prol.
p.
I,
8;
Wadding, XII,
145; ed.
and
tr.
non
Wolter, pp. 135f. Cf.
p. 34.
O.Th.
219:
ed.
igitur
quia quilibet experitur in se quod intel-
"...
pp. 36f. Cf. the property
I,
Gareth Evans, The of
being
Varieties
of Reference through of a term] is not one
immune
to
error
[which corresponds to Ockham s notitia intuitiva which applies to propositions simpliciter, but one which applies only to judgments made on this or that basis. Once we appreciate this relativity to a basis, which arguably must be taken into account in the case of mental self-ascription as well, the fact that there
are
cases
the involving the self-ascription of physical predicates in which error has been provided for [these correspond to Ockham s notitia abstractiva] will be seen not to impugn the fact that there are cases in which it just as clearly has not." possibility
of
White
354
representative of the thing.
comes about by natural acting
God
directly;
13
Ockham thus
located at
God
Rome
about
bring
knowledge of things without the things point talks of
God
can be brought about by
causality
can
objects to this that whatever
14
acting.
an
such
intuitive
And Ockham
at
one
bringing about intuitive knowledge of something
(presumably when he
is
15 away from Rome.)
A
modern philosopher may have a few reservations good. describing mental states as things, and describing psychological
So about
far so
language as referential tout court, but otherwise John Boler seems to be more or less on track when he remarks, citing Jerry Fodor, that 16 I think Ockham s enterprise [could] be ... fruitfully compared to ... those recent studies which claim some relation between logical form and linguistic structure, and between those and cognitive psychology.
And
Ockham
all
Socrates
we
that
way
white
is
attitudes (let
has surely done I
,
am happy
-
to
is
and
certain
analyse
to
claim that,
propositions
we
if
-
analyse the
deal with such propositions there must be different mental us say) corresponding to the terms; these mental attitudes
give us, for each term, a grasp of the corresponding object.
Very
similar
made by Gareth Evans when he
talks
about
been
have
distinctions
personal pronouns; he 17 "Ideas".
Now
in
the mental attitudes corresponding to terms
calls
Ockham
s
analysis,
there
two ways of having a
are
we know
grasp of objects, corresponding to whether or not proposition evidently;
too,
so,
in
knowledge that we can have of propositions such 13
Scotus, Quodl. qu. 13,
Ockham, 14
15
Sent. Prol.
Ockham,
O.Th.
Sent. Prol.
Ockham,
II
Sent.
I,
n.
cd Wadding, XII,
p.
My
as
311; ed.
and
tr.
legs are crossed
Woltcr,
p.
292. Cf.
p. 34.
O.Th. qq.
10;
the relevant
theory, there are two sorts of
Evans
I,
p. 37.
12/13,
O.Th. V, ed. G. Gal, R.
Wood
(St.
Bonaventure
NY
per cognitio intuitivam iudicamus rem esse quando hoc est, et cognitio naturaliter causetur sive supernaturaliter a solo Deo. Nam si naturaliter causaretur, tune non potest esse nisi obiectum exsistat praesens in debito approximatione, quia tanta potest esse distantia inter obiectum et potcntiam quod naturaliter non potest potentia tale obiectum intueri. Et quando p.
258:
obiectum
est
1981),
igitur patet quod gcneraliter sive intuitiva "Sic
sic
praesens
modo approximatum, modo praedicto. Si autem
tali
potest
intellectus
per
actum
supernaturalis, puta si Deus causaret in me cognitionem intuitivam de aliqua obiecto exsistente Romae, statim habita ita bene cognitione eius intuitiva possum iudicare quod illud quod intueor et video est, ilia sicut si cognitio haberetur naturaliter." Ockham does say elsewhere that
assentiendi iudicare
rem
esse,
sit
"in
cognitione intuitiva [obiectum] est praesens in 16 J. Boler, "Ockham on Evident Cognition",
se";
Thought (New York, 1975). Evans, The Varieties of Reference, p. 104.
II
p.
Sent. 12/13, 86;
he
O.Th. V,
cites J.
p. 310.
Fodor, The Language of
Ockham and Hume s or
(evident
corresponding precisely to two different
this
non-evident);
355
Question
18 And these two uses will differ person pronoun. in whether the utterances precisely they are used in are grounded by
uses
of
other
the
first
or
propositions
concerns and
Adams
not;
this
analysis of
establishes
Ockham
s
a
these
19
position.
However, things are not as simple as illuminating to say that
continuity between
that.
It
is
possible,
and
20
... the doctrine of intuitive cognition depends on an analysis of the structure of thought, an analysis which is controlled directly not by any observation of the parade of cognitive activity but rather by the demands of the analysis of propositions.
It is maybe even when he says: 21
true.
a concept
And Ockham
himself says something very similar
given so that
it corresponds to utterances, so understood by an external utterance, so understood] by the concept signified [by the utterance]. ...
However,
Ockham
is
as something
just
the
is
continuities
that
this
establishes,
is
between
thought and modern philosophy of mind, are entirely of one are to do, that is, with the functional role of language, mental they
sort;
s
attitudes,
and the
like.
Now
there are two sides to the philosophy of
mind; on the one hand, you have to
talk
various theoretical entities that you use. tell
analysis
that, [it
certain causal stories which describe
about the functional role of the
On
the other hand, you have to
how our
brains (or our souls)
And the work that I have just described ignores another in Ockham s theory, besides the analysis of ingredient propositions; it ignores, that is, Ockham s ontology and his physics. My claim is that it is these which give Ockham s theory some of its most actually do the
distinctive
and
stuff.
features,
and which are responsible
for
its
major
difficulties
peculiarities.
10
Evans, The Varieties of Reference pp. 215-220. Cf. Sidney Shoemaker, "SelfReference and Self-Awareness", in S. Shoemaker, Identity, Cause and Mind (Cambridge ,
1984), pp. 6-18; 1958), pp. 66-7.
19
Adams,
and Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Blackwell, Oxford
"Intuitive
Cognition in
Ockham", p.
393.
on J.
Boler,
21
"Ockham
on Evident
Cognition",
p. 86.
conceptus ponitur ut correspondeat vocibus, ut sicut aliquid intelligeretur prolata voce et concepto suo significato." Ockham, Questione in Libras Physicorum Aristotelis qu. 5, ed. Stephen Brown, Opera Philosophica VI (St. Bonaventure NY 1984), p. 405. (Cf. Ockham, Exp. Periherm. I, Proem, 4, O.Ph. II, pp. 349f.) ...
White
356
1.1
Logical Atomism
Now Ockham evident
a
to
proposition.
I
proposition was;
and immediately by
Now
as
this quaestio,
began
assent
it
(a certain sort of)
this definition is not,
have described, by defining what is assent that is caused solely
knowledge of the terms of
any particular analysis of the proposition
in
that
biased in favour of
at this stage,
question.
One
for
could,
example, very well introduce the distinction in the way that Gareth Evans does: in Evans terms, such knowledge is not identification-dependent; is not the result of knowledge that b is thus, knowledge that a is
F
F
and
a
that
firstly,
is
that
propositions
work
b\ But Evans
done
is
it
terms
in
he
from Ockham
subject-predicate 22
interested
is
differs
a
of
in;
two ways;
in
s
of
analysis
secondly, he does not
the as
talk,
23 does Ockham, of knowledge being caused by other pieces of knowledge - Evans talks, rather, of propositions being deduced from, or grounded
on, others.
However, elsewhere Ockham imports a bias intuitive
knowledge of terms (this
is,
remember,
just that
knowledge of
terms that causes evident assent to the propositions that they occur
He
defines
it
as follows:
of
definition
his
in
in).
24
knowledge of a thing is such knowledge by virtue of can be known whether the thing exists or not, in such a way that if the thing exists, the intellect always judges that it unless perhaps it is it exists and evidently Knows that exists, impeded because of an imperfection of that knowledge. And, in the same way, if a perfect such knowledge were conserved, by divine power, when the thing did not exist, by virtue of that knowledge of a term [notitia incomplexa] it would evidently be known that the thing did not exist." ...
Now
intuitive
which
it
this
is,
on
the
of
face
it,
term can occur
propositions that the
of a term a, then, according to
a
on
restriction
in;
Ockham
if
we have
s
broad
the
of
analysis
intuitive
knowledge this
definition,
should
guarantee knowledge of a whole variety of propositions with a occurring 22 23
Evans, The Varieties of Reference, pp. 180ff.
Note
that
praemissorum
Ockham est
causa
explicitly talks of efficient causality notitiae conclusionis" (Ockham, Sent.
in
this
Prol.
qu.
context; 8;
"notitia
O.Th.
I,
p.
Furthermore, he defines per se notae propositions in this way, "propositio per se nota cognoscitur ex notitia terminorum" (Sent. Prol. qu. 2, O.Th. I, p. 81), as well as ratione propositions scibilis est quod eius the idea of a knowable proposition;
222).
"de
notitia possit causari ex notitia principiorum" (ibid., p. 82).
24
Ockham,
Sent. Prol. qu.
1;
O.Th.
I,
p. 31.
Ockham and Hume s them.
in
In
actual
a
Ockham
though,
fact,
and a does not
357
Question
two
about
talks
only
25
(And, in fact, only the propositions; former applies in the normal course of events.) Let us call this Ockham s narrow definition of intuitive knowledge of a term. He adds to it (as an exists
extension? a corollary?
it is
exist
not quite clear) that
.
26
knowledge is such that, when several things are of which one inheres in the other, or one is spatially distant from the other, or is related to the other in some other way, then always, by virtue of that knowledge of terms [corresponding to] those things, it is known if the things inhere in each other or not, if they are distant from each other or not, and so on for other contingent truths ... Thus, if Socrates is, in fact, white, that knowledge of Socrates and of whiteness, by virtue of which it can evidently be known that Socrates is white, is called intuitive knowledge. And generally every knowledge of terms ... by virtue of which some contingent truth can evidently be known ... is intuitive Similarly, intuitive
known
knowledge.
Ockham
thus seems to be sliding between the narrow definition and
There are probably several reasons
the broad definition.
One
for this.
Scotus originally defined intuitive cognition by saying that
that
se
"per
existence."
This
of
existence,
27
This
is
and
one
the
attains
it
the
factor;
fact
in
object that
intuitive
was
it
own
its
is
actual
was
cognition
not simply an isolated oversight;
in Ockham, II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, mediante qua cognoscitur res esse quando est, et non esse quando non (p. 256); and ibid.: quolibet sensu, qui habet aliquam cognitionem virtute cuius potest cognoscere rem esse quando est et non esse quando non est, est cognitio intuitiva et experimentalis. Quia ilia est cognitio intuitiva per quam sic cognosce rem esse vel non esse". (pp. 268f.) See also ibid., pp. 286f.
we
is
have:
est
intuitiva
"[cognitia]
ilia
est"
notitia
"Similiter,
una inhaeret statim
virtute si
inhaeret,
Sortes
in
omnis I,
aliqua
intuitiva
una
vel
non
veritate
sit
quod
est
distat
talis
res
quod quando aliquae
loco
ab altera vel
alio
modo
cognoscuntur quarum habet ad alteram,
se
incomplexae illarum rerum scitur si res inhaeret vel non et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus ... Sicut si
notitiae
vel
cognosci
notitia
cognosci
illius
distat rei
evidenter
O.Th.
alteri
"in
distat,
albus,
Sortes
incomplexa termini veritas contingens
albus,
vel ...
Sortis
notitia
ilia
est
dicitur
terminorum
est
notitia
et
albedinis
notitia ...
virtute
intuitiva."
virtute
Et
intuitiva.
cuius
Ockham,
cuius
potest Sent.
potest
universaliter
evidenter
Prol.
qu.
1,
pp. 31f.
Similarly, immediately after the passage similar analysis of the proposition
from
II
Sent,
above
cited
(n.
25),
there
is
a
this is introduced with corpus est album so it seems as if it is supposed to follow from the definition in terms of quia existence and non-existence. (Nothing of the sort is added after the second passage referred to there.) And in IV Sent. qu. 2 there is the claim that per cognitionem alicuius accidentis absoluti devenitur in O.Th. VII subiecti"; cognitionem (St. Bonaventure NY 1984), p. 23. There is no indication of whether this happens necessarily, or only in the normal course of events.
very
;
,
"...
27 Scotus,
Ockham Logic in
s
Quodl.
and
Italy in the
XXV:521. Cf. Katherine M. Tachau, "The Response to Epistemology (1320-1340)", in Alfonso Maieru (ed.), English and 15th Centuries (Naples 1982), pp. 185-217. See p. 192. Vives
13;
Aureol If"
s
White
358
designed,
Another
the
factor
is
to
which
according
the
solve
to
initially,
shape
many
of
problem
Ockham
of
semantics
s
are
propositions
of
existence.
and
ontology,
knowledge
equivalent
logically
propositions which assert that a certain relation holds between a
set
to
of
Now
this corresponds to a very important strain in Ockham s Goddu rather vigorously summarises his views, 28 reduced natural phenomena to Ockham s philosophy of nature
terms.
thought; as
...
and their functions, [and] existences expression of relations, acts, and events functionally. absolute
Now
this
is
rather problematic. For example,
the
prescribed
leads to an analysis of
it
I am happy into a proposition asserting that there is a 29 in Ockham was which inheres me; and, as we have seen, happiness in and to describe our such terms, correspondingly, quite willing to talk 5
the proposition
knowledge of our mental
states in
terms of
However, those of us
things as happinesses.
intuitive
probably find such reification disturbing. This semantic assumption, however, explains
will
so
between
easily
broad
the
and
the
interested
the
in
intuitive
was mainly interested
in
it
read Wittgenstein
how Ockham
could
slip
definitions.
Since
his
narrow
semantics treated individuals so prominently,
knowledge of such
who have
why he was so and why he
explains
knowledge of referential terms,
one particular
sort of proposition: a proposition
asserting the existence, or non-existence, of an individual. to
this
has
it
later;
to
do
with
We
narrow definition
the
return
will
of
intuitive
knowledge.
1.2
The Razor at Work
However, there
one of Ockham
is
s
objections to Scotus which seems
much more
problematic, and which has attained
Scotus
that
says 30
objects,
capacity,
28
29
Ockham and
essential
its
intuitive
its
objects to this that
30 Scotus, 552f.
(Vivs
intuitive
When
notoriety. existent,
knowledge
is
present
a mental
object (the thing the term refers to) cannot be one of
causes.
It
can therefore continue to
Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, Above,
some
knowledge can only be of
exist
with
the
thing
p. 236.
p. 2.
Opus Oxoniense II dist. 3 pars 2 qu. 2 nn. 318-322 Ockham, Sent. Prol., O.Th. I, p. 33.
qu. 9 n. 6.) Cf.
(ed. Vaticana
1973), pp.
Ockham and Hume s we can
destroyed;
have
therefore
359
Question
intuitive
knowledge
nonexistent
of
31
objects.
Now
there are two separate things here that
may seem
problematic,
only one of which is, I think, genuinely so. The first is the very idea that we can have intuitive knowledge of nonexistent objects at all. Now if we think of this in terms of Ockham s broad definition of intuitive
knowledge,
this
knowledge
in
will
terms
lead us to give an abstract definition of intuitive
of
a
functional
but
role;
a
functional
role
is
something which is manifested when the term occurs in a range of propositions; and here this range of propositions seems to include the a does not exist Now in the normal course of events, we have intuitive knowledge of a when we stand in certain causal relations to it (when we can see it, and so on). Thus, the empirical realities of the proposition
way
that
that
we
.
we have
intuitive
knowledge rule out the semantic
could have intuitive knowledge form. However, there
this particular
about by direct divine causality that -
nonexistents
just
knowledge of what chains
apparently
we
general
could,
going on in sort
problematic
nonexistents; and
very
is
usual
of the
as
Ockham
definition
lets
of
nothing to prevent
we could have divine
by
Rome
about
and the
himself in for intuitive
it
causality,
us.
causing
component
bringing
it
knowledge of have
intuitive
there are no causal
This
is
one of the
knowledge of because he gives a simply intuitive
knowledge
of the truth
God
intuitive
(that
knowledge of some component of a proposition which evident
possibility
figured in a proposition of
Rome, even though
between things
is
when a
is,
is
that
is
it
suitable
for
of propositions containing the
knowledge and because he does not specify any particular
in question),
how this knowledge should arise. I also suspect that much about intuitive knowledge of nonexistents because
causal story about
Ockham
talks so
existence assertions are so prominent in his semantics anyway, so that
if
he wanted to establish a clear difference from Scotus, since Scotus would not have found the intuitive knowledge of existence problematic,
Ockham
had to commit himself firmly to the intuitive knowledge of nonexistence. In fact, one of the major differences between Ockham and
his
contemporaries seems to be that his contemporaries would define intuitive
and abstractive cognition case by case, in terms of such things as the presence or absence of the object; e.g. Richard Campsall says that the Sent. Prol., O.Th. I, pp. 35f. There is an extensive A. Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, pp. 32-51.
Ockham, argument
in
treatment
of
this
White
360
same mental
when
intuitive cognition 32
is
entity
abstractive cognition
when
it is
the object
is
present,
and
absent.
However, there is something genuinely problematic about Ockham 33 position, and that is the way that he argues for it. He says:
s
... every absolute thing, different in place and subject from some other absolute thing, can, by absolute divine power, exist without the latter thing (since it does not seem likely that, if God wanted to destroy one absolute thing existing in the sky, that (s)he would necessarily have to destroy another thing existing on the earth.) But intuitive vision - sensitive or intellectual - is an absolute thing, distinct in place and subject from its object. Just as, if I see whether intuitively a star existing in the sky, that intuitive vision sensitive or intellectual - is distinct in place and subject from the object seen; therefore, that vision can remain, with the star destroyed; therefore, etc.
What
is
here
problematic
is
Ockham
that
simply
of the
thinks
vision, or, generally, the intuitive knowledge corresponding to a term, as 34
which
Ockham
talks
an absolute thing, generally,
mental
of
naturally supposit for their objects.
when
that,
of
knowledge
guarantee
A
constant.
absoluta
res
this
36
propositions
modern philosopher
-
entities
mind.
s
And Ockham seems
held
is
constant, that
it
for example,
its
Evans
of the grasp of propositional components in the
that
Ockham
32
is,
Katherine M. Tachau,
Oxford
Thought",
in
is
"The
in)
who
-
same
is is
of Richard
(to
held
willing to
of
way
same
sort
Campsall on Fourteenth-Century
(eds.), From 1987), p. 112.
Anne Hudson, Michael Wilks
Studies in Church History, Subsidia 5 (Blackwcll, Oxford
role also
sort
willing to talk of certainty in the
Influence
assume
to just
functional
occurs
talk
and who
35
And, more which ("intellectiones")
located in the knower
is
Ockham
to
Wyclif;
1
res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta, potest per "...omnis divinam potentiam absolutam existere sine ilia, quia non videtur verisimile quod si Deus vult destruere unam rem absolutam exsistentem in caelo quod necessitetur destruere unam aliam rem exsistentem in terra. Sed visio intuitiva, tarn sensitiva quam intellective, est res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab obiecto. Sicut si videam
exsistentem in caelo, ilia visio intuitiva, sive sit sensitiva sive manere distinguitur loco et subiecto ab obiecto viso; igitur ista visio potest
stellam
intuitive
intellectiva,
Stella destructa; igitur
34 35
Cf.
etc."
Ockham,
Sent. Pro/, qu.
1,
O.Th.
A. Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, pp.
I,
pp. 38f.
30f.
One
be careful, however, to notice that, for Ockham, something should intellectual does not per se have a physical location; it is "subiective in intellectu, non extensive in aliquo composite sive organo corporali" (II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, p. est in loco, quia corpus est in loco" 285). Correspondingly, "Anima enim per accidensh O.Ph. V, p. 100). (Expositio in Libros Physicorum IV cap. 8 3, t. 45 212 7-13, 36 sicut vox ita 411: O.Ph. VI, p. Ockham, Quaestiones physicorum qu. 7, naturaliter pro supponit ex institutione pro suo significato, ita ista intellectio supponit "Et
re cuius
est."
Ockham and Hume s would probably be much more
of way,
knowledge
components would
prepositional
-
reticent about talking of intuitive
In fact, such an intuitive grasp of
a thing in this sense.
as
361
Question
normal case
the
in
-
involve
the
functioning of suitable causal chains from the object to the knower, and if
the object, or the causal chains
Such an
also go.
This
head.
Fontaines.
1.2.1
"intuitive
grasp",
is
someone
not really located in
made by Godfrey
already
s
of
37
Action at a Distance
However, we should notice
Ockham
explanation in believed
action
in
propagation of
medium 39
-
lynxes
e.g.
then,
objection which was
an
is
were destroyed, then the grasp would
means of
s
-
light
41
in
this
is
he
that
connection
the
in the
Now when Ockham fulfills
of
Rega Wood,
In this connection, one can even talk of
of a distant object, brought about by divine power, and
me and
without anything caused between
Century
cited
which does not happen by means of species
action at a distance.
cognitions
he
distance;
a strong element of causal
still
of the crucial factors
and the action of magnets. 40 Furthermore, certain animalcan see through walls, and this too is to be explained by
intuitive vision
which
is
One 38
a
at
that there
theory.
a
certain
the
of
in
42
of a notitia intuitiva,
functional
existence
"Intuitive
Perspective",
talks
the object.
the
role:
namely,
when
object
it
Cognition and Divine Omnipotence:
Anne Hudson, Michael Wilks
(eds.),
this it
is
something
causes
and of
exists,
Ockham
evident
in
its
Fourteenth-
From Ockham
to
Wyclif,
pp. 51-61.
38
Ockham,
III Sent.
qu.
2,
O.Th. VI
(St.
Bonaventure
NY
1982), pp. 48-58.
-JO
Although sometimes the light source causes illumination of the medium: aliquando causatur aliquid a colore in medio, sicut prius dictum est ... Sed quando est et quando non, difficile est dare experientiam in visu..." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. "...
VI, p. 81.
Tertia experientia est de magnete, qui secundum Commentatorem, commento ferrum distans ab eo localiter: trahit, dico, immediate et non virtute aliqua medio vel in ferro." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. VI, p. 53. trahit
aliquod
"...
murum, 2,
et
O.Th. VI,
illud
animal videt per
medium non
medium opacem,
recipit
sicut
speciem aliquam,
patet
igitur
9,
in
de lynce qui videt per
etc."
Ockham,
III
Sent.
qu.
p. 81.
objectum distans ab angelo et a me potest intuitive videri ab angelo et a me, per potentiam divinam objectum nihil causet in medio, nee speciem nee cognitionem." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. VI, pp. 55f. "...
etiam
si
White
362
when
noncxistencc
be told
to
it
does not
each case:
in
exist.
"the
And
there are relevant causal stories
judgment of existence
is
caused by the
cognition together with the object, while the judgment of nonexistence
is
43
caused by the cognition in the absence of its object." Thus, we have an which fulfills a certain functional and a causal role, entity story about how it does it; the difference from the modern theory is this, that
nowadays one talks about information propagating through the physical environment by means of physical processes, whereas Ockham talked of things acting directly at a distance.
Now
one asked him why this intuitive cognition was a cognition 44 And object, he would have a story about similitude to tell.
of this
Ockham
if
about representation quite generally
talks
in
terms of similitude;
Ockham
example, representation is transitive because similitude is. had clearly not read Nelson Goodman. And since, quite for
causation
of
is
46
like
by
like,
as
is
this
representation,
generally,
brings
the
semantic and causal categories very close to one another, in Ockham s view. Tfms he can talk of knowledge of the premises of an argument being the efficient cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, he can talk first principles as being those propositions knowledge of whose terms causes assent to the proposition, and of a demonstration being the cause of assent to its conclusion (so that one cannot demonstrate
of the
principles;
2.
one already assents
to
them when one knows
their terms.)
Hume now
Let us
think about
Hume. Why was Hume
a sceptic? Well, he
project of basing a philosophical methodology upon a
and such a science of of
associative
Rcga Wood, 44 "...
anima
sensitivam
utraque
est
relations
"Intuitive
est
by which the
45
46
man",
Cognition and Divine
mind constructed thoughts and
Omnipotence", pp. 51-61.
per cognitionem omnium. Nam per cogmtionem per cognitionem intellectivam omnia intelligibilia. Et
est
sensibilia ita
et
perfecta
similitudo
obiecti
Ockham, II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, p. of Later Medical Philosophy (Cambridge
Campsall", p.
had a
have, as a major component, a theory
ligibilis]."
History
of
quoddammodo omnia
omnia
cognitio
man would
"science
121.
Ockham,
II
Sent. qq. 12/13,
O.Th. V,
p. 304.
Ockham,
II
Sent. qq. 12/13,
O.Th. V,
p.
287 f.
et perfectio quam species [intel309. Cf. M. Adams, in the Cambridge
1982),
p.
439;
K.M. Tachau,
"Richard
Ockham and Hume s theories out of the ideas presented to
was constructed
man"
in the
way
363
Question 47
it.
And, because
his
"science
of
was, he thought he had a grasp of
it
mechanisms underlying the functioning of the mind which (although not complete) was enough to undermine the usual views of common sense. Thus, one s causal theory of the mind has to have a the
causal
certain sort of their
pursue
autonomy
for
one
be a Humean; causal explanations the world, and do not satisfy the to
own way through
requirements of grounding propositions.
Not so they do not
seem
be
to
for
Ockham. Although he does
seem
postulated
in
order
semantic facts he has discovered. very interested in
And
because of
talk of causal
to figure in his theory in their
"the
physics,
He
to
implement
own
mechanisms,
right;
whatever
they mostly interesting
does not, as Tachau remarks, seem
psychology, or mathematics of
this disinterest,
48 vision".
even though he assumed a rather naive
psychological parallelism, the causal mechanisms that he proposed were so flexible
that
he
ended
Wittgenstinian malgre is
lui\
up
as
what
one
can
only
describe
the significant factor in his philosophy of
as
a
mind
given by the prepositional and semantic component, not by the causal
mechanisms.
Clare Hall, Cambridge
Cf.
J.
Passmore,
Tachau,
Hume s Intentions (London
"Response",
p. 198.
1980), p. 106.
JOHN
Thomas
WIPPEL
F.
of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents
(Quodlibet
While the date of Thomas Sutton
comes some time
clearly
comes
after
after the criticism of
Moreover, Sutton with
Henry
would suggest
s
s
theory
.
death
Aquinas
treatment of
Ghent
of
qu 5)
Quodlibet
s
the
of future contingents by William of
II,
s
of
intention
Sutton
s
is
still
uncertain,
Thomas Aquinas.
it
also
It
views concerning divine knowledge
Mare
la
this issue
in the latter s
Correctoriwn
presupposes that he
of essential
is
.
familiar
being (esse essentiae). This
that Sutton s Quodlibet should date
1280s, or as other indications suggest,
the
II
in
some time from
the
1290s.
1
It
is
within
not
my
here to attempt to settle the question of the exact dating of Quodlibet, but rather to turn to him as one representative of the
English Dominican school who was strongly influenced by the views of Thomas Aquinas. This should be useful in enabling us to determine of future divine knowledge s of and Aquinas position. understanding application As regards Aquinas s position, medieval, renaissance, and twentiethcentury interpreters have differed with respect to one issue in particular.
Sutton
s
contingents, and
Qn
Aquinas
I -"or
views
personal
s
detailed
concerning
his
by reason of their eternal presence to
account,
is
it
discussion
of
conflicting
opinions
concerning
the
dating
of
God
Sutton
s
two quodlibets see the Introduction to M. Schmaus s edition of Sutton s Quodlibeta (Munich, 1969), pp. xvi-xxii (as early as 1284-1285 or as late as the mid-1290s). Schmaus s remark that Sutton s Quodlibet I, qu. 14 is refuted by Godfrey of Fontaines first
Quodlibet VII, qu. 9 (of 1290, or possibly 1291/1292, as I have suggested elsewhere) is need not be to highly questionable, it seems to me. The alleged reference by Godfrey Sutton. But Schmaus is correct in noting how difficult it is to arrive at any exact of these dating for these first two Quodlibets, and in his acknowledgment that any proposed datings seems to be too early if Sutton only became a Master in Theology in 1299/1300 (see p. xix, commenting on Gloricux). For a strong defense of an early see F. dating for Sutton s becoming a Master and for Quodlibet I, i.e., 1284 or before, Kellcy,
Introduction
Aristotelis
1976),
De
1-31.
pp.
For
SchneyJer^ Introduction pp. 44 .57 .
Thomae Aquinatis in Libros edition of Expositionis D. de Sutona (Munich, corruptions. Continuatio per Thomam reaction to this and defense of a later dating see J. critical
to
his
generatione
et
to
his
ed.
of Sutton
s
Quaestiones
Ordinariae
(Munich,
1977),
Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future he knows future contingents? Or
that
awareness of the eternal decrees of that
is
365
Contingents
God
rather by reason of
it
s
concerning such contingents
his will
he knows them? 2 In Quodlibet
II,
qu. 5, the following question
Did God have from
was posed
aetemo) certain knowledge of future
eternity (ab
contingents insofar as they are contingents?
3
Sutton comments that the
question has been properly phrased since the reduplication they are
-
contingents"
would pose only by fact that
little
God
is
-
"insofar
as
Without the reduplication, the question is contingent can be known not
crucial.
difficulty;
even what
but by us once
you are now
for Sutton:
has been realized in actuality. Thus the
it
Even
anyone here can be once such a contingent Hence, not undetermined but necessary in the
sitting is contingent.
so,
certain of this simply by using his eyes.
event
is
realized in actuality,
one
sense that while
When
is
it
is
sitting,
it
is
necessary for him to be
sitting.
viewed as future and as contingent, however, it is not something yet determined to one side or the other. Therefore, when it is so viewed, it cannot be known with certainty. Hence it seems to remain in doubt is
whether even
God
can know such a contingent as contingent.
It
is
clear,
continues Sutton, that no created intellect can do so; for then
it
could
only
know such
a contingent as
it
exists in its causes.
And
these causes
4
may be impeded from producing their effect. Sutton now begins to develop his reply by
God knows But God knows God s knowledge is
arguing that
all future contingents insofar as they are in their causes.
them with
certainty
measured by
and from
eternity. This
is
because
But eternity is iota simul and nonetheless contains the whole of time. Therefore all things which are in eternity just as
is
his being.
time or in any part of time are always present to God, and were so present from eternity.
2
For
Hence Sutton reasons
that the divine vision bears
recent interpreters of Aquinas concerning this see J. Dei futurorum contingentium secundum S. Thomam eiusque primos sequaces (Krakow, 1938), pp. 7-10. For this in classical commentators on Thomas see F. Schmitt, Die Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin vom gottlichen Wissen des Zukunftig Kontingenten bet seinen grossen Kommentatoren (Nijmegen, 1950), especially pp. 196-202. differences
Groblicki,
De
among
scientia
Schmaus ed., p. 202. "...utrum deus ab aeterno futurorum contingentium, secundum quod contingentia sunt." 4
Ed.
cit.,
pp. 202-03.
habuit
certam
cognitionem
366
Wippcl
such things from eternity (ab aeterno) even though they take 5 place only in the course of time. Moreover, Sutton continues, it is not only the essences of such all
upon
known by God from eternity when such a contingent exists even Therefore,
things but their actual existences which are as
present in
only
God its
s
himself.
to
its
its
cause,
coming in
knowledge and,
when
cause as
future
it
time.
This
is
when
contingent himself.
6
because
In
it
is
support
cause
its
as present before
is
actually does
the is
future for us as
upon
Sutton
comes
it
present forth
same degree of
bears
of this
still
to
from
turns
certainty
actually realized in itself in
God s knowledge
still
is
Hence, argues Sutton, any such
so.
future in itself as
still
is
fact,
from
known by God with when it
is
contingent
when
it
forth
to
upon any such future that
the
which
well
is
present to
known view
of
Boethius as set forth in his Consolation of Philosophy, V. This follows, Sutton continues, because for
Then Sutton present to
God from
God
there
is
no past or
warning. Even though
a
issues
eternity in
future. all
things
have been
terms of their actual existence,
it
does
not follow from this that they have actually existed in themselves from 8
of la
reminded of an objection raised by William Mare against the position of Thomas Aquinas, and of Henry of
Ghent
s
Here the reader
eternity.
effort to avoid
the objection
is
this:
is
being driven to if
this
same
conclusion.
The
point of
things are eternally present to God, they must
9 have actually existed from eternity. Sutton counters that for something to be said to be present to God s knowledge from eternity, it is enough
5 Ibid.,
p.
quacumque 6
203.
See
parte eius,
especially:
"...et
ideo
semper sunt deo praesentia
omnia, quae sunt in toto et ab aeterno fuerunt...."
tempore
vel
Ed.cit., pp. 203-04.
^
For Boethius see The Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, by H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, S.J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), Bk V, 6, p. 426:77-80, 61-66. Sutton also cites Augustine. See De ch itate Dei XI, c. 21 (CSEL 40.1, p. 541). 8
Ed.
cit.,
p. 205.
See William s criticism of Aquinas s ST I, q. 14, a. 13 in his Correctorium. See ed. by P. Glorieux Les premieres polemiques thomistes: I. - Le Correctorium Quare (Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgium, 1927), p. 18. While the date of this work has been disputed for some time, the general consensus now is that it falls ca. 1278-1279. See R. Wielockx, ,
IILI. Apologia (Florence, 1985), p. 39, n. 68, for the and especially V. Heynck, "Zur Datierung des Correctorium Wilhelms de la Mare," Franziskanische Studien 49 (1967), pp. 1-21. For fratris Thomae Henry see Quodlibet VIII, qu. 2 (Paris, 1518), fol. 303v. For discussion see my Meta 267-70. physical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp.
Aegidii
Romani opera omnia
important
references,
Tfiomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents for
it
God
to enjoy actual existence at any point in time. This
s
to
present
future.
support from
embraces
It
other texts in
existence in
existing
in
This
itself.
when viewed
future
in
that
something
God from
is
it
one
that
it
Henry
defend in meeting William s challenge. As Sutton continues, something its
when
existence
present exceeds
the
as
owing
divine
to the
To
warning.
now
does not
time. This
actually
distinguish
essence
immensity of
possibles
that to say its
existence
enjoys actual existence from
of
la
Mare
in his critique
Ghent had attempted
to
may be
present to
God
in
terms of
actually exist in itself; for the divine that the divine present contains both
exists
and that
in
which
it
does not,
a
proper likeness for all creatures 12 But now Sutton introduces a perfection.
itself its
of pure
11
means
which the contingent
that time in just
all
it
to
eternity in terms of
eternity. This point was not granted by William of
of Aquinas, though
Sutton
Thus Sutton can hold
not the same as to say that
is
(esse)
enable
God s knowledge
and
in actuality.
present to
is
should
as
of any contingent, whether past or present or
itself,
which are never realized
God
be viewed by
not
precision
God s knowledge
between
finds
1
helpful point. If something never enjoys
will
it
itself,
Once more Sutton
Consolation.
s
so because
is
from past through
transition
of time.
all
Boethius
Here Sutton has made a actual
no
eternal and admits of
is
present
367
hold that things are
is
known by God from
eternity because
they are eternally present to him should not be taken as implying that
from eternity they are what they are through their own essences as distinct from the divine essence and as realized in some way outside God. This would be contrary to the faith which maintains that thing (res)
from
Sutton essential
Sutton to
nature, 10
12 13
refers to
what
I
existential
i.e.,
Ed.
cit.,
See
n.
an
p. 205.
is
true
Pp. 205-06.
we
is
a
intrinsic
theory of hold that Henry, might
i.e.,
limit the
name
"thing"
s
(res)
to that
which enjoys or is a of It would be contrary to principle operation.
being belongs,
or
See Boethius, Consolation V, 6
9 above. For Sutton see p. 205.
Ibid.
if
Henry of Ghent
take to be
being (esse essentiae). Someone,
which
alone
eternity.
now
previous denial
s
God
13
to
that
(p. 432).
368
Wippcl hold that any such
to
faith
from God. 14 But
if
divine
or
intellect,
by
"thing"
we
"thing"
mean
be such things from
God
it
is
not opposed to faith for essences to
One
might even argue that it is necessary to be things in this sense from eternity. And
eternity.
for essences other than
that
thereby
impossible, one might hold that
such things might also be said to be outside the expression
from eternity in distinction mind an object of the which is not intrinsically
existed
rather have in
God from
eternity
if
we
take
in the negative sense,
meaning thereby that such things are not God. Defenders of this view, i.e. Henry, would not claim that such things exist outside God in the subjective sense from "outside
God"
15
eternity.
other words, Sutton
In
is
presenting in his
own way Henry s view
because the essences of things arc objects of God s knowledge from eternity and thereby constituted as intrinsically possible in themselves, that
may
they often
put
also it,
be called
one
may
"things"
(res)
accordingly
from
ascribe
eternity.
an
As Henry would
eternal
esse
essentiae
Yet, Henry would always insist, this is not to (essential being) say that they actually exist in themselves from eternity. Existence comes to them only in the course of time owing to the added intervention of to them.
the divine will, to them.
when
it
communicates
existential being (esse existenliae)
16
Sutton will have no part of this theory. But, like Henry, he has defended the eternal presence of contingents to God s knowledge against the
by William of la Mare that this entails admitting But now he quickly distances himself from theory of an eternal essential being (esse essentiae) which the
charge
raised
eternally existing creatures.
Henry s P. 206.
Ibid. For discussions of Henry s complicated theory see J. Paulus, Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa metaphysique (Paris, 1938), pp. 69-74, 123-25; J. Gomez Caffarena, Ser participado y ser subsistente en la mctafisica de Enrique de Gante (Rome, 1958), pp. 65-92; J. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 66-79; "Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Reality of Nonexisting Possibles," in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, pp. 173-80; S. Marrone, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 104-29.
On my (as distinguished from Godfrey s) reading of Henry, he assigns an eternal real (but not actual) being to possibles or essences insofar as they are objects of God s eternal knowledge. Marrone (pp. 122, 123, and n. 83, and 124-29) seems to overlook this distinction in my reading; hence the need for me to state it explicitly here.
Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future
And
Master from Ghent assigns to such possible creatures.
Henry
appreciates
that
such a theory
is
Sutton clearly
taken from
as
res
reor,
one
if
required
to
is
not merely
fact that nonexisting possibles are truly res,
account for the
chimerae (or
claim
s
369
Contingents
but genuine essences and
reris),
1
objects of knowledge (res as taken from ratitudine.}.^ Sutton begins his criticism of this part of
observing that in this case poison
from
the
eternity
intellect.
But
intellect
it
it
were
objects
does not follow that whenever something
also
is
hidden under honey.
creatures
of
essences
is
Henry
a thing
especially
(res),
when
s
by
position
He
grants that
of
the
is
the latter
divine
an object of is taken in
Henry s strict sense. For something can be understood by human intellects even when it does not exist. For instance, today I can understand yesterday even though yesterday
is
not
now
a thing
(res). If
the fact that
something is known suffices for it to be called a res, it would follow from the fact that I understand yesterday here and now that yesterday is 18 here and now a res, and, adds Sutton, an actually existing thing. In
like
fashion,
continues
Sutton,
God knew
all
creatures
from
eternity, not merely in terms of their essences but also in terms of their
actual existences.
enough
for us to regard
existed,
for the sake of discussion
them
as things (res).
they were understood by
that
fact
Suppose
such creatures were understood by
the fact that
which now
exist,
God
It will
that
or which ever will
all
we
Henry
grant
God from
that
eternity
also follow
is
from the
creatures which have
exist
must have enjoyed
actual existence from eternity. Sutton rejects this conclusion. Therefore
he also rejects the claim that whatever
is
an object of
intellect
must
also
19
be a
thing.
Sutton
from
counters
eternity
and
that that
the
they
essences
were
of
not
creatures
essences
were not things from
In
eternity.
themselves from eternity they were simply nothing. Otherwise they would not have been created by God in the course of time; for creation is
production ex nihilo. But if they were nothing from eternity, they were not for nothing means the same as thing" (nulla res). This "no
"things";
For a good presentation of 18
this distinction in
Henry see Marrone,
pp. 108-13.
Ed.cit., pp. 206-07.
19
P. 207. Henry, of course, would not admit that, simply because a creature thing (res) in the sense of enjoying essential being, it therefore enjoys actual existence.
is
a
370
Wippel
objection
creation
concerning
was frequently
others, for instance, by Godfrey of Fontaines.
Nor, continues Sutton, does the mere
something to
for it
be realized
raised
fact that
it
as a thing (res). In other words, intrinsic possibility
technical sense.
not repugnant
is
in actual existence suffice for
us to describe something as a
when
"thing"
Here Sutton appears
Henry by
against
20
is
us to refer to
not enough for
term
is taken in Henry s mind Henry s claim that
that
to have in
something is not contradictory in itself, i.e., if it is be a res. Against possible, it must enjoy essential being and
if
counters that such a possible
still
is
of the soul of the Antichrist.
true
nothing
21
in
his
(In
itself,
own
intrinsically this
much
as
Sutton is
now
discussion of divine
2, Henry had contingents 22 of the the issue to attention considerable devoted Antichrist.)
knowledge
Sutton is
in
of future
insists
not enough for
Quodlibet VIII, qu.
that the fact that it
to
be a
thing.
something
He
they have actually existed
recall that, as
to say that
God
(extra Deutri) amounts to from eternity. 23 Here we should
essences were things from eternity outside saying that
the object of an idea
is
repeats his criticism:
Sutton had earlier presented Henry
s
position,
Henry does
not admit that essences were things from eternity and outside God sense, i.e., as existing apart from God. They are "subjective"
in the
"outside"
God
in
the
in
not
are
that
God. Sutton
they negative sense, only apparently regards this distinction as a subterfuge: to say that essences other than God were things from eternity and outside God in the negative
20
For Godfrey see Quodlibet VIII, qu. 3 (1292/1293 by my dating). If he things he has created in the same way he knows things he is to create, must know their existence as well as their essential being from eternity. Hence Henry should grant the eternity of all things, past, present, and future, both as regards their essence and existence (Les Philosophes Beiges, Vol. 4, p. 37). Moreover, Godfrey argues P.
207.
God knows
Henry s view really implies God, they are not thereby created
that
that
when
(p. 45).
creatures
receive
existential
See Quodlibet IX, qu. 2
(p.
190),
being
and
from
my The
Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey, pp. 136, 140. 21 Ed. cit., p. 207. For other texts from Henry see, for instance, Quodlibet III, 9 (Macken ed., pp. 53-55); Quodlibet IX, qq. 1-2 q. 1 (f. 61r, bottom); Quodlibet I, q. (Macken ed., pp. 7-8, 22-23, 34-37); Quodlibet X, q. 7 (Macken ed., pp. 151-52); Summa
quaestionum Ordinariarum, 22 23
See Quodlibet VIII, qu. P. 207.
a. 28, q.
2, ff.
4 (Paris, 1520), Vol.
301v-302v.
1, fol
167v.
Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future sense
is
ho-d they existed outside
to
really
sense, that
"subjective"
is,
in
that they actually existed apart
sums up by
Sutton
God
the
and
stronger
from God. 24
from eternity
that
stating
371
Contingents
God had
certain
knowledge of future contingents insofar as they are contingents; but from eternity. 25
such contingents did not enjoy the status of In assessing Sutton s position, which
"things"
we
should
Sutton
that
recall
grounds
contingents on the eternal mode of God
s
taken largely from Aquinas,
is
God
knowledge of future knowledge and therefore on the s
eternal presence of such contingents to God. There is no indication that Sutton would account for this by appealing to God s knowledge of the
decrees of his
will,
Sutton
therefore,
as
Henry of Ghent ends by
appears
me
to
be
to
an
doing.
accurate
On
this
point,
interpreter
of
Aquinas.
to
On the other hand, Sutton states that God in terms of their actual existence,
eternal existence in themselves. First of
God
his
were eternally present
terminology could be misleading.
as did Aquinas, Sutton speaks of things as being present to
all,
"from
Here
things
without their having enjoyed
eternity"
(ab aeterno}. This could give the mistaken impression
27 In fact temporal succession. both Sutton and Aquinas would deny this. Secondly, for Sutton to say that things were eternally present to God is misleading. It would be
that he regards eternity itself as subject to
better for
him
to say that they are eternally present to
Sutton
Finally,
Cf.
p.
the
rejects
God
presence of creatures to
claim
as their
that
God. 28
admission
knower
entails
of
the
ascribing eternal
For Sutton s rejection of a third esse between being extra intellectum see Quaest. Ord. 26 (Schneider ed., p. 725).
206.
and ens naturae
eternal
in
the
mind
dicendum quod ab aeterno deus habuit certain cognitionem futurorum contingentium secundum quod contingentia, quae tamen non fuerunt res ab aeterno" (p. "Et
207).
See the references given reading of Aquinas see
in
n.
2
above.
my Metaphysical Themes,
For
justification
of this
as
the
correct
pp. 244-64.
For Thomas see ST I, q. 14, a. 13: "Unde omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt: sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate" (Marietti ed., Turin-Rome, 1950, pp. 86-87). For discussion see my Metaphysical Themes, 28 Perhaps Sutton
p. 268, n. 82.
s usage was partly determined by the way the question was framed (see n. 3 above). But for other texts where he uses similar language see p. 205:73-74; and the concluding text cited above in n. 25.
372
Wippel
(actual) existence to them. In
making this point, he is in agreement with Henry of Ghent. But Sutton has distanced himself from Henry s theory of an eternal essential being which would be enjoyed by all possibles insofar as they are eternally objects of
God s
The Catholic University of America
knowledge.
REGA WOOD
Calculating Grace:
The Debate about
Latitude of Forms
According to Adam de
Most
today believe
Christians
the
that
and
Scholastics
Wodeham
nature
of
is
grace
veiled
in
achieved
sought greater precision. They determined that grace was an accident not a subject. They asked: to which of the nine categories of accidents, described by Aristotle in his mystery.
was
a
to which of the four species of quality does
it
does
Categories,
inquired:
it
belong?
Concluding
that
it
quality,
they
belong? They
belonged to the first species; it was a habit or disposition. And since any such quality is subject to increase and decrease, they felt obliged to ask how grace increased or decreased. The intensification and decided that
remission
it
of
was
grace
one
of
most
the
hotly
debated
theological
questions in fourteenth century Oxford.
At the same
time, increasing and decreasing forms, like grace,
a subject of intense controversy
among
were
natural philosophers. Although
masters of arts were forbidden to discuss theological questions, most fourteenth century philosophers and theologians assumed that degrees of charity were gained or lost in exactly the same way heat was intensified or
Whether spiritual or physical, any quality which was and subject to change by degree was considered a form with Arguments about latitude of forms dealt with continua and the
diminished.
divisible latitude.
1
nature of gradual change.
Many
of the
same
issues raised in discussion of
the intensification of charity were also topics in the discussion of time
and motion. 2 Hence fourteenth century theology on degrees of charity Chatton, Reportatio,
I,
d.
17,
q.
2,
a.
1,
cod.
Paris.
Bibl.
Nat.
lat.
15,887, fol. 48rb:
subiectum sub calore corrumpendo, et ille non est indivisibilis, cum sit eiusdem rationis cum praecedente, et per consequens habeat latitudinem, ergo adhuc restat pars corrumpenda post istud instans ... Si in illo instanti est sub frigore, idem argumentum est, quia illud non est indivisible sed habet latitudinem." "Si
2
in
instanti
Wodeham,
[alteratione,
illo
Tractatus
motu
indivisibilibus,
est
et
quaest.
1,
50 omnibus his cap. (Continuum): "[D]e par ratio sicut de continue." fol. 139va); Tractatus de quaest. 3, dub. 4: "(Djifficultas est aequalis de omnibus
alphabeticus,
tempore] art.
1;
est
Wood
374
was
scientific
not just
also in the sense that
it
sense that
the
in
was a
was
it
logically
but
rigorous,
topic in natural science: latitude of forms.
Edith Sylla discusses the debate about latitude of forms among the 3 Oxford Mertonians from about 1320 to 1337. Sylla describes three positions:
(1)
and
the
(3)
succession of forms theory (2) the admixture theory
the
addition
intensification of
theory.
The
succession
theory
describes
the
forms as a series of instantaneous changes. The addition
theory describes a gradual change over time as infinitesimal parts are gained or lost. Sylla considers Walter Burley as a proponent of the succession
admixture
the
represented by Roger Swineshead, and the addition theory by John Dumbleton and Richard theory;
is
theory
Swineshead.
The English Franciscan
theologian,
Adam Wodeham
discusses Oxford
opinions on the subject of latitude of form, in the period 1316-1329, in his Tractatus alphabeticus,
dated about 1333.
4
Thus Wodeham was writing
about a period that overlaps with the earlier period Sylla has described for the Mertonians. Wodeham was chiefly concerned with the views of
Wodeham
and
5
Ockham,
Fitzralph.
Fitzralph,
and
himself are addition theorists. Chatton adheres to an admixture
identified
theory,
Chatton
Ockham,
Campsall,
by
Wodeham
Thomas Aquinas. 6 Campsall
as
held a
a
"modern
associated
theory"
new theory according
to
with
Wodeham,
compositis divisibilibus, sivc intensive sive extensive ... [et] apud me ilia quae inducunt difficultatem [in] inquisito, omnia inducunt difficultatem circa continuum, licet non e converse."
et
...
"Et
nota quod omnia haec duhia aequaliter possunt fieri in augmentatione sicut de continue." (ed. R. Wood, Dordrecht, 1988, pp. 34, 180).
decremento formarum
of dating Burley s works, it is not clear exactly what the difficulty under discussion. But Weisheipl dates Burley s Tractatus primus, 1320 to 1327. Roger Swineshead wrote his Descriptiones motuum between 1328 and 1337. See James Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians," Mediac\>al Studies 30 (1968), p. 185, 1%, 212 and Sylla, "Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms," Archives d histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen age 40 (1973), p. 240n.
Given
period
4
is
Codex
Re
Erfurt, Stadtsbibliothek,
CampsalPs
Wyclif, ed.
see
dates,
Amplon., Folio 133,
Tachau,
A. Hudson and M. Wilks,
p.
134ra-145va.
fol.
"Richard
K.,
Campsall,"
in
From
Ockham
to
HOn.
Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 2 (Aciio maxime reperitur in qualitate): contra hoc et pro ista conclusione arguitur et contra argumentum Thomae, I Sent. d. 17, q. 2, art. 2, cuius est opinio quod calor remissus per <prima parte Summae
Wodeham,
"Sed
E>,
approximationem agentis modernos eadem res ut esse, est
A
calor."
great
(fol.
many
fit
est
postea intensus, nulla (!) sibi addito, ita quod secundum transmutatione est latitudo quaedam, ut autem in quieto
in
134ra).
theories
were
theories. Quaest. in III Sent., q. 8
current.
(OTh
Ockham
list
four
kinds
of
addition
VI, 220s.). Aureol describes six possible opinions
Calculating Grace: Adam de
one which we
will
succession of forms
is
In this paper
I
call
connotation
a
Wodeham
theory.
No
375
of
proponent
the
named. 8 will discuss three issues in the
theory of latitude of
Do
forms undergo intension and remission? (2) How are intensified? and (3) Are maximal degrees in the intensity of qualities forms possible? I will be chiefly concerned with the views presented by forms:
(1)
Adam Wodeham
by reference to the views discussed by another fourteenth Walter Chatton, and by Edith Sylla. The least
amplified
century
but the discussion will be
in his Tractatus alphabeticus,
Franciscan,
controversial of these issues for fourteenth century philosophers
1.
is first:
Do forms undergo intension and remission?
Addition and succession of forms theorists agree on this issue; in no sense is it true that the same form undergoes remission or intension.
For the simultaneous existence of contrary forms in exactly the same subject is impossible. Ockham and Wodeham held that strictly speaking it is the subject, not the form, which becomes more white, more hot or
more
charitable.
added
of intensification, parts are
case
same form which was remiss does not become new form appears in which the additional parts are and the new form is more intense than the previous form
As Anneliese Maier
succession
like
the
in
though
Rather, a
incorporated, 10
And
to the form, the
intense.
was.
9
succession of
theorists,
new
forms.
pointed out, this means that addition theorists,
hold
They
on augmentation. Scriptum super 1 Sent.,
that
intensification
differ only in
dist. 17,
pars 17,
is
the
result
of
a
claiming that the parts of
a. 1
(ed.
Romae 15%,
427-35).
Q
Scotus,
and
Ockham
Scotus, Ordinatio, I Sent., dist. 17, q. 5
loquendo de ipsa
fit
Non quod ideo
talis
plures
1
vi
si
intensior,
this
2,
q.
(ed.
non vel
(OTh
III,
de quantitate
extensiva."
(OTh
Ockham, Scriptum
in
V, 418s.).
481ss.).
"Ultra dico (Augmentatio): quod etiam et remitti. Sed auctores hoc errant, quod additur formae alia forma, ex qua
subtrahitur aliqua
pars ut
forma remissior
numero primo sit intensa forma habet veram latitudinem intensivam realiter
Godfrey of Fontaines.
15 alphabeticus, cap. nulla forma potest intendi,
aliqua una forma
partes
view to
Vaticana, V, 234ss.).
pars
485); Quaest. in II Sent., q. 19
in I Sent., dist. 17, q. 4
vocis,
attribute
III,
Tractatus
dicentes intendunt, et
him,
17,
(OTh
Ockham, Scriptum
Wodeham,
d.
I,
following
distinctas (fol.
constituentes earn
135rb).
sit
quam
praefuit.
et post remissa vel e converse. vel gradualem, quia habet in
[ut]
qualitatem,
sicut
suo
modo
Et se est
Wood
376
11
the old form are not destroyed in the process. at
stake
lower
whether there
is
is
As
Sylla puts
it
"What
is
within the higher degree a part equal to the
12 degree."
Chatton subject
too
agrees
that
undergoes
statement forma suscepit magis
speaking
strictly
and
intension
et
remission.
minus
not
the
form
but
its
13
Strictly
the
speaking
is false.
Wodeham
is expressing a common view when he argues that properly dearness cannot be increased, because no underlying, constant speaking 14 subject remains. According to Wodeham, when we say that the dearness
increases, this
greater than
more and
it
less.
parts of the
means
same dearness
that the
that formerly existed
is
now
formerly was. But one and the same thing cannot be both 15
However, according
same form can be added
to
proponents of the addition theory, which were
to the parts of dearness
and the new parts together with the old parts make which the form inheres more dear. And wherever there
originally present,
the substance in
genuine latitude of form, it must be possible to add and subtract parts of that form to an underlying substance. When Peter become dearer, his is
former
dearness
is
not
really
intensified.
Rather
additional
parts
of
dearness reach him and combine with the preexisting form to produce a
Annclicsc Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, zur Naturphilosophie dcr Spatseholastik II (Rome, 2nd cd., 1951), p. 54.
Studien
"
Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 231s.
est hie una opinio quod non est Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. 3, a. 4: dicendum quod forma suscipiat magis et minus Contra. Unde calorem suscipere magis et minus non est nisi subiectum suum esse calidius. Sed tamen ad hoc bene requiritur quod forma sit maior vel perfection Et si hoc intendebant quidam dicentes "Et
...
istam augmentationem
fieri
Norman Kretzmann
per inesse subiecto, discusses
a
similar
bene."
(fol.
problem
Aristotelian Anti-Atomism," History of Philosophy Quarterly
Wodeham, secundo quod vel
logice
Tractatus sicut
loquendo,
non per
alphabeticus, suscipit,
illo
cap.
...
51va). in 1
his
"Adam
Wodeham
s
Anti-
(1984), 381-97.
(Augmentatio): "Dico
modo
praedicationem
crementum huiusmodi cum hoc adverbio
magis quia non potest dici quod forma talis, puta albedo sit magis albedo quam ante. Immo, quod plus est, nee intensa albedo est talis magis albedo quam sit remissa, licet sit maior, id est intension Sed
minus album
et
postea magis vel e
converse." (fol.
135 ra).
Calculating Grace:
Adam
16
form of greater
377
form combine
distinct parts of a
Numerically
intensity.
Wodeham
de
to constitute a unified whole.
When
intensify,
qualities
according to this account, the preexisting
form becomes part of something greater. Only Richard Campsall presented obvious
the
to
objection
view:
this
this
"On
account
is
nothing
more
intense; and neither augmented." the resulting whole nor the new part existed before, so they cannot have been intensified.
For what was there before
not
is
But though most fourteenth century medievals agree on
common
their views are not the result of
views
are
contrary
sense observation. Indeed, these
our ordinary experience
to
increase and decrease in their intensity.
another;
was a
God
-
namely, that qualities wall can be whiter than
The ground
by Aristotle
supported
consideration,
logical
One
love for Peter can increase.
s
this subject,
s
for this denial
authority:
a form
cannot increase or decrease while retaining its identity any more than a number can. 18 Different accidents can inhere in the same subject at different times,
of the
19
but different degrees of whiteness cannot be predicated to examples: Peter can be dearer, but his
same form. Returning
grace cannot increase while retaining its identity. If one wall is whiter than another, a different form of whiteness inheres in it; a wall which increases in whiteness by being painted gains a
new form.
How are forms intensified?
2.
Considering qualities as Aristotelian forms,
change more
qualitative
1
Tractatus
Wodeham, intelligi
non
ad
etiam bene
vim
vocis,
difficult.
Emphasis on
alphabeticus,
cap.
15
commune dictum quod
illud
alicui
quia
made medieval
formae
advenit
(Augmentatio):
forma aliquid
discussions of
a related logical dictum
suscipit
modo
"Alio
magis
constituens
et
cum
potest
minus ilia
-
,
licet
formam
perfectiorem. Et ideo dicitur suscipere magis et minus. Aliquando veto subtrahitur pars aliqua, qua subtracta non remanet ilia forma sed alia minor priore, non quod eadem sit et post minor, nee e converse. Et potest improprie dici quod maior cuius pars subtrahitur minuitur, vel adhuc magis proprie quod minor quae remanet minuitur,
primo maior pro eo quod
ista est
minor
ilia totali
quae
praefuit."
(fol. 135ra).
est 3: I, 17, 2, opinio (marg.: Campsale), q. augmentatio per additionem], quia si aliquando sic, tune nihil esset auctum, quia nee pars nova, cum ilia non praefuit, nee praecedens, quia ilia non est intensior quam prius, nee totum, quia non praefuit." (fol. 49ra).
Chatton,
d.
Reportatio,
quod nunquam
[est
18 Aristot., Metaph., VIII,
19 Aristot., Topica,
II, c.
c.
3 (1044a 9-10).
7 (113a 34-35).
a.
"Et
Wood
378
contrary
cannot
qualities
raises similar
What
problems
inhere
simultaneously
same
the
in
subject
-
second issue discussed here.
in considering the
the process by which forms intensify? Fourteenth century medieval authors tried to answer this question in such a way as would is
allow them to affirm that (1) qualitative change
is
gradual (2) the quality
resulting
from change constitutes a unified whole and
do
exist
not
simultaneously
of
paradigm
of qualities
The
are added.
parts
nature of change.
added
same
also allows that as a quality increases,
It
a
is
would combine
parts are
new
qualitative
it
could not account for
whole. According to Richard
unified
Campsall, a Mertonian contemporary of believe that old and
new
form which remains.
new form
the
that
change.
theory readily accounts for the gradual
addition
to the preexisting
fact
quantitative
forms
theorists
a successive process in which infinitesimal
is
Opponents of the addition theory claimed the
(3) contrary
Addition
subject.
resembles
change
qualitative
Intensification
the
in
Ockham, there -
parts
is
no reason
or individuals of a form
to -
produce a unified whole. For the only things which one, are actual beings which can be combined with
to
when combined make or
beings,
potential
entities
receiving
which
can
combined
be
with
would be parts of the same the same subject, they would not constitute a
received entities. But parts of a single form kind, so
if
they inhered in
whole, but remain separate individuals. Consequently, any intensible form
acquired over time would be composed of an infinite number of separate 20 parts and constitute an actual infinity, which is absurd.
Campsall claims
the infinitely
that
many new and
preexisting parts
posited by addition theorists would remain separate and unintegrated and
an
constitute
20
actual
Chatton, Reportatio,
91
detur
secundum,
Addition
alphabeticus,
quod
in
cap.
quolibet
secundum inconveniens,
scquitur
21
scilicet
sit
sequitur:
quod alteratum
consequentiae, quia quacumque infinitae albedines tantae virtutis sunt
est infinitae virtutis
maioris virtutis ilia.
-
argumentum
Et in
si
sit
in
fine
virtutis
infinitae
in
demonstrata in actu, hoc subiecto, igitur hoc subiectum
albedine in
Consequentia patet, quia actualiter habet infinitas quia cito post hoc instans habebit tune
quam
and
data,
.
isto posito, erit
Aristotle
57 (Infmitum in augmentatione conlinua): nova albedo praecedcntibus remanentibus,
Probatio
vigore.
like
theorists,
d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, fol. 49rb.
Tractatus
Wodeham,
"Si
I,
infinite.
quam
virtutes.
Hoc dato antecedens patet quarum quaelibet
infinitas qualitates
quia quaelibet adquisita post datam erit intensior rcmissior ordinate, contra: illo modo tenet ipse fundasti TE, igitur argumentum tuum contra TE
virtus data,
quaelibet
sequens
hoc argumento
cum
fuerit
(Campsall).
Respondeo concedendo
illud
quod
infertur
in
ista
forma qua
infertur.
Et hoc etiam
Calculating Grace:
almost
all
actual
medieval thinkers,
in
agreed
de
Wodeham
Wodeham
that
states
simply
379
the
rejecting
But addition theorists had no
infinity.
objection.
Adam
possibility
replying to this
difficulty
infinitely
of an
many
parts
qualitative
infinite, provided each producing successive part is less than the part which preceded it. Although attacks of this kind were not taken seriously by addition
added
be
can
an
without
actual
were committed
theorists, they did take seriously the claim that they
holding that contraries simultaneously coexisted in the
same
subject.
to
By
same genus but are maximally different appears to be the case that when something
definition contraries belong the
from
each
other.
gradually changes
period
22 its
It
color from white to black, there
when we might
say that
is
it
is
an intermediate
both black and white, which
is
a
contradiction.
Ockham and Wodeham
agree with succession of forms theorists that contraries cannot inhere in the same subject. They disagree with Chatton
who
holds that addition theorists must embrace the claim that remiss 23
Ockham degrees of contrary forms can coexist in the same subject. explains that it is unnecessary to posit that remiss degrees of contrary qualities inhere in the
same
subject; the degrees of quality
added when
forms are intensified are not contraries, but individuals of the same kind, numerically not specifically different. It is the addition of numerically distinct individuals of a form which produces intension. And these distinct constitute together a single unified form. No change in when tepid water is added to tepid water, because recorded intensity 24 the forms involved remain in distinct subjects. Change takes place individuals
is
successively, part
CAMPSALE,
25
by
part.
cuius est argumentum, concedere habct de partibus albedinis extensae,
neget indivisibilia." (fol. 140vb). Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. componeretur ex infinitis partibus,
2,
a.
3:
tempore mensurante ilium motum sunt novum quod nunquam praefuit." (fol. 49ra). 22 23 2,
Aquinas, In Metaph.
Ockham, Quaest. a.
sis,...
1:
Sed
gradibus, formae."
24 25
"Dicunt
isti
quidquid quia
(fol.
aliter
X,
nulla
infinita
lect. 5, n.
19
in II Sent.,
q.
quod aqua
est
tune quaelibet forma augmentabilis alia nee pars alterius, quia in
est
instantia,
in
quolibet
est
aliquid
V, 418s.). Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. quia calor et frigus sunt in partibus diver-
(OTh
tepida
de hoc, teneo quod non salvaretur successio
sit
in I Sent., dist. 17, q.
Quaest. in II Sent., q. 19
et
2032^4.
[contraria] in
motu
et
48va).
Ockham, Scriptum Ockham,
Aristot.,
"Item,
quarum
cum
7
(OTh
(OTh V,
III,
418s.).
542-5).
compatiuntur in
se
adquisitione
in
remissis
partiali
talis
Wood
380
The forms.
addition theory
We
come now
was the most popular theory of the
to the minority views. Succession of
latitude of
forms
theories
change on substantial change, the kind of change described as generation and corruption. According to succession theorists,
model
qualitative
a quality appears to increase, a more remiss quality is replaced by an entirely different form of greater intensity. When something changes
when
from white to black, there is no intermediate period when the subject is partly white and partly black, rather there are a series of entirely forms; all the various shades of white, grey and black succeed each other. This means that what appears to be gradual change is really different
a series of sudden changes.
A
succession theorist can readily deny that contrary forms coexist
same
the
in
subject.
forms with
entirely
For intensification
new
intense
is
the result of replacing remiss
But
forms.
succession
difficulty accounting for the fact that qualitative
is
have
theorists
gradual, since
change change takes place suddenly, and forms cannot be intensified by adding parts.
Not only was the succession theory vulnerable was contrary
to the charge that
to our experience of gradual qualitative change,
it
was
it
also
attacked as a form of indivisibilism. According to Richard Campsall,
if
qualitative change involves the annihilation and replacement of forms,
it
is
is
instantaneous. But
composed
principles,
if
this is
motion,
of indivisibles, which as a
common
is
we have
to conclude that
motion
contrary to Aristotelian philosophical
opinion concedes. So according to
Wodeham,
Campsall claimed that adherents of the succession theory were committed to indivisibilism, just as addition theorists were committed to defending an actual
infinity.
Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 57 (Infmitum in augmentatione continua): hoc ALIQUI arguunt quod si in tola transmutatione non maneat eadem lectio dubia> mensuretur instanti vel qualitas maior et minor, sequitur vel quod motio quod alteratum sit infinitae perfectionis in vigore. Consequentiam probant, quia si non maneat etc., aut igitur in quolibet instanti est alia et alia forma corrupta priori; aut priori manente si corrupta praecedente, tune ille motus solum mensuratur instanti, quia ille motus non est nisi ista qualitas secundum quam movetur mobile. Ire enim ad calorem est calor quoquo modo. Sed ista qualitas tune non mensuratur nisi instanti. Et praeterea lectio dubia> si motus ille tune non sit haec qualitas nunc exsistens,
Wodeham,
"Et
ideo ex
mensuretur
instanti vel
140vb).
(OTh
III,
formae accidentalis
481ss.). fiat
Fitzralph,
per additionem,
Sent.,
cod.
Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 15 (Augmentatio), instanti, as cited by Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 234n.
fol.
De
in 1),
0
Perreiah, op.cit., p.341, points out that the Logica Parva rules omit the phrase He believes this to be important, but I scitum esse tale infra tempus obligationis think it could be explained by the brevity of the text. In the Logica Magna s treatment .
of sophisms 39 Strode,
The
little
seems to hinge on the presence or absence of the phrase
op.cit.,
fol.VS^.
relations are as follows:
Sophism
1
(LP
p.[122])
is
of Mantua. Sophism 2 (LP p.[123]) (following Strode) Peter ra Candia, op.cit., fol.67 Sophism 3 (LP p.[124]) is
LM
.
Sophism 4 (LP
in question.
LM
and found
LM is
found in Strode and one in Peter of found in Strode alone.
1.1,
similar to
3.3,
a variety of sources. Sophism 5 7.1 and found in a variety of sources. Sophism 6 (LP p.[126]) is p.[125]) is 9.1 and is found in Albert of Saxony and Strode. Sophism 7 (LP p. [127]) is
LM
found found
in
p.[125])
is
4.1
in
Strode and the Logica Oxoniensis. Sophism 8 (LP p.[128])
LM
is
LM LM 11.1
(LP 8.2
and and
Sophism 9 (LP p.[128]) is LM 12.1 and is similar to a sophism in Strode. Sophism 10 (LP p.[129]) is LM 12.2. For full references, see my edition cited in note 12. In the case of sophism 3, Perreiah s punctuation (op.cit., pp.218-219) obscures the sense. It should read: I posit to you this proposition: "You run and You do not run is to be conceded by you". 41
in
LP
a variety of sources.
pp.[129]-[134].
Ashworth
414
is
Logica Magna, and the
in the
no such separate section
six rules
found
in Logica Parva are not in the Logica Magna. Nor do they feature in here a case have so we I that authors know, may any of the other which Paul included new material in the Logica Parva, only to change his in the
mind about
its
Be
value before he wrote the Logica Magna.
may, the bulk of the section on interchangeable propositions the discussion of one sophism, I posit to you: "There is a
human being
is
a
donkey
are
interchangeable".
is
that as
it
devoted to
God and A
This sophism
is
discussed
in three separate places in the Logica Magna, and the third discussion, which owes a great deal to the long and elaborate discussion found in
extremely long and elaborate, occupying one whole page in 42 the 1499 edition. My hunch is that Buser inspired Paul s interest in the is itself
Buser,
this interest in the
sophism, that Paul indulged
worked
The fully
more
through the material yet fourth section
discussed
is
fully in
on similars and
is
dissimilars.
also discussed in the Logica
the sophism mentioned previously,
it
Logica Parva, and that he
the Logica
Magna
Magna. 43
The one sophism
at length and,
like
44
The
derives from William Buser.
the Logica package of rules is the same in both the Logica Parva and in any of be found is to no such and neatly organized package Magna; the other sources that I know.
The
final section
is
on
45
Here the Logica Parva has
depositio.
five
where the Logica Magna has twelve. Of the Logica Magna rules, the first two appear as general principles rather than as rules in the sources. Rule three of the Logica Magna is rule one of the Logica Parva. Rules rules
four and ten of the Logica
Magna
are included in rule two of the Logica
Parva; rules five and six are included in rule three; and rules seven and nine in rule four. Most of rule twelve is captured by rule five of the in Logica Parva. Rule eight of the Logica Magna, which also appears of Peter of Candia, does not appear in the Logica Parva .^ Rule eleven
the Logica
Magna appears
a definition given after the rules in the
as
Logica Parva. Apart from the placing of the Logica twelve, the content and ordering is virtually the
LM foLlTB*;
1
1
foI.lSO"
*; fol.lSS va
LP
pp.[134]-[138];
44
LP
fol.76 pp.[134]-[135]; Buser, op.cit.,
45
46
fol.l90
Buser, rb
"*;
43
LM
same
-fol.!91
-fol.75
op.cit., fol.74
.
vb
ra
-fol.77
LM foLWl^-foUM*; LP pp.[138]-[142]. LM 01.191^; Peter of Candia, op.cit.,
;
LM
va fol.!90
"
.
rules ten
in
va
va
3
"
42
Magna
.
and
both cases.
Paul of Venice on Obligations
While
415
have already argued that Peter of Candia was the main source for the Logica Magna rules, he was not responsible for their ordering. I
depositio.
are
there
Finally,
One
four
sophisms
the Logica Parva
in
section
on
of these features in the Logica Oxoniensis but not in the
A
47
second is given a different wording in the Logica but the discussion, which largely derives from Peter of Candia, is
Magna
Logica
Magna
,
same. 48 The remaining two sophisms appear 49 Magna, and they both come from Strode. exactly the
To sum
up: the pattern of sources for the Logica Parva
of obligations
Magna
Logica
in
is
s
the
exactly
same
We
treatment.
as
the
pattern
the Logica
treatment
s
of sources
for
the
find Albert of Saxony, Buser, the Logica
The rules given are generally standard rules, but their organization is idiosyncratic, and common to both the Logica Magna and the Logica Parva. The sophisms in the Logica Oxoniensis, Strode and Peter of Candia.
Parva are nearly all found in the Logica Magna. Given these facts, I would be astounded to discover that the same man had not compiled both treatises. Whether similar conclusions can be drawn for other parts of the Logica Parva remains to be seen.
University of Waterloo
47
Antichristus
non
est
albus
Oxoniensis, see English restored to the text found there.
Logica 48
Tu
homo
es
est
homo
animal
:
vel
tu
49
Aliquae op.cit.,
fol.192
fol.89 ;
propositiones .
Tu
es
et
Antichristus
Romae
es
LM fol.191
vel
Obligationes
-fol.192
:
.
LP
Strode, op.cit., fol.89
.
tibi
,
p.326.
pp.[139]-[140];
Peter of Candia,
non sunt simul verae
omne
coloratus
est
Texts
depositum
:
est
LP
:
Tu
LP a
non
should be
Romae
es
va
op.cit., fol.69
For the
p.[140].
The word
vel
aliquis
.
ra
LM
p.[140]; te negandum
fol.192 :
LP
;
Strode,
p.[141];
LM
NAIDA ANNA BACCIN
Homerus
estpoeta:
un caso
di prcdicazionc
secundum accidens
Con del
distinzione tra predicazione
la
CLVOLL
verbo
il
passo
Kcttf
21 a 25-28
auTO De
ancor oggi un oggetto di complesse discussioni. Non voglio addentrarmi nel problcma
Kara
e
del
Interpretatione
dell interpretazione
costituisce
del testo
la traduzione boeziana, della quale si greco, ma mi limitero a proporne awalgono commentatori medievali: Verum autem dicere de aliquo et simpliciter, ut quendam hominem hominem aut quendam alburn hominem album; non semper autem, sed quando in adiecto quidem aliquid oppositorum inest quae consequitur sed falsum est, ut mortuum hominem contradictiq, non verum hominem dicere, quando autem non inest, verum. Vel etiam quando inest quidem semper non verum, quando vero non inest, non semper verum, ut Homerus est aliquid. ut poeta. ergo etiam est an non? secundum accidens enim praedicatur esse de poeto est, sed non secundum se, Homcro; quoniam praedicatur de Homero quoniam est. i
<enim>
Nella prima parte del capitolo undicesimo del De Interpretatione si sono delineate le condizioni d inferenza da un enunciate con predicazione disiunctim
da e si
al
corrispondenteco/im/icf/w: est
"Socrates
da
inferire:
L inferenza non
si
per esempio, da
dato infenire
coniunctim
1
Per
la
posteriore
a
pu6
est
inverso,
est
homo
albus".
tuttavia generalizzare, senza
"Socrates
est
bonus"
bonus
ossia
e da
"Socrates
veda
in
opportune est
restrizioni:
citharedus"
non e
citharedus".
d inferenza
quello
una disiunctim, presenta analoghe
difficolta si
albus"
"Socrates
"Socrates
caso
II
est
"Socrates
puo
homo"
CLVOLL degli usi di e particolare: S. Knuuttila in
da
una
restrizioni.
predicazione L inferenza
e nella tradizione filosofica Hintikka, The Logic of Being, Reidel:
Aristotele J.
Dordrecht 1986. 2
Cfr.
A.M.S. Boetii Commentarii
Meiser, Lipsiae 1877, pp. 370, 373.
in
librum Aristotelis
ITepc Epfrnvet occ;,
II
ed.,
rec.
Un caso non e
una qualche forma
ci sia
quando
valida,
-
della predicazione
componenti
secundum accidens
di predicazione
oppositio
opposizione tra
di
le parti
-
adiecto
in
417
-
oppure quando passi da una predicazione
si parafrasando con una terminologia moderna con il verbo esse in accezione puramente copulativa -
sua accezione
alia
esistenziale.
testo
II
due
dunque
complesse come dall accezione
inferenza
(ossia
da
A
est
sua scia
sulla
B
A
ad
in
Nel
est).
di
et C,
De
De
del
ossia
esse
A
ergo
est
convinzioni
da
inferenza
A
et
est C, e
sua forma esistenziale
alia
Sophisticis Elenchis*
nuovo accomunati e
i
due schemi
classificati
come
4
tende
si
Interpretation
1
B
accomuna
-
nostre
le
differenti:
B
di
tardo-antica
dall esegesi
undicesimo
est
secundum quid et simpliciter.
casi $\ fallacia
Fin
A
medievale
esegesi
secondo
che,
copulativa
d inferenza vengono
validi
1
sostanzialmente
appaiono
predicazioni
non
e
d inferenza,
tipi
semantiche,
1
-
greco
alia
connettere
a
il
secundum
fallacia
passo et
quid
simpliciter degli Elenchi, secondo una linea, che tende a sviluppare una
tradizione
comune
Nel medioevo da
due opere.5
alle I
esempio
"Homerus est
spiega con la contaminazione tra
Ci6 forse
si
forniti nel
De
"Quod
non
poeta"
che e ricondotto a
"Homerus est in opinione",
est, est opinabile,
di "Homerus est
ergo
i
est poeta,
"Homerus
Interpretatione:
6
In ogni
est".
viene a volte sostituito
"Homerus est opinabilis".
due seguenti esempi, ergo
modo
una maggiore uniformita nella trattazione dei due valida o fallacia secundum quid. Sembra infatti che
in
entrambi
natura della determinazione, che funge da predicato
o
da
*
predicato
De Sophisticis Elenchis Occam
c.5,
("est
homo
mortuus"),
a
e
("est
i
ad
non
di inferenza
tipi
la
parte
est"
trasformazione
in "Homerus est in opinione/opinabilis" porta
poeta"
del
Homerus la
casi sia
opinabilis")
condizionare
la
167a sgg.
la necessita di precisare che la fallacia secundum quid et due modi: un modo, per cui si passa da est tertium adiacens ad est secundum adiacens; un secondo modo, per cui parte eiusdem extremi, vel a compositione sumpta cum determinatione, arguitur ab aliquo sumpto cum addito ad ipsummet sumptum sine addito". (Si veda: Guillelmi de Ockham, Expositio super libros Elenchorum in: Opera Philosophica et Theologica, III, ed. F. del Punta, St. Bonaventure
Tuttavia gia
simpliciter
si
sente
articola in
"a
University 1979, p. 54). 5
Cfr. S. Ebbesen, "The dead man is alive", Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle s
in:
Synthese,
40 (1979),
Sophistici Elenchi,
v.L,
p. 43 e idem, Leiden 1981, p.
171. 1
L esempio
di
inferenza
dato talvolta nella versione:
non
valida
"Chimera
"Quod
non
est opinabilis,
ergo
est, est".
est
opinabile,
ergo
est"
viene
Baccin
418
era piuttosto
poeta"
ad
inferenze coniunctim-disitmctim
di
possibilita
1
in
(mentre
est
"Homerus
uso contestuale a decidcre del senso da annettere
est).
entrano in gioco nella spiegazione dei due tipi non di e diminuens di detenninatio d inferenza: quella quella
Due validi
nozioni
detrahens
determinatio
come
mortuus
dcterminazione
homo
alter!
"Socrates
(distraint]
mentre
il
L
distrahens.
comunemente,
piu
o,
fondamentale e che in espressioni
homo
est
come
mortuus",
la
termine
del
significato
idea
est
in
determinazione attenui (diminuit) o indebolisca il grado opinione", essere espresso dalla copula. Si ammette infatti che il verbo esse,
di
-
delerminato
,
in
espressioni
"Homerus
la
in
almeno presenza di certa determinazioni, pcrda importo esistenziale - e che di indebolito un a nel senso di esse extra grado designare passi -
1
essere, quale
A
comportino uniscono.
8
1
Se
accetta la
si
e
Vimpositio assai
irripetibile
problematico
cui
per
secolo,
("voces
acccttare
,
il
significato
per
che,
dei
dei
suis
csempio,
su
ossia
cui
termini,
diffusa nella
non cadunt a
-
poiche pare che esse
significato
comunemente
tesi,
9
tredicesimo
del
distrahentes
-
adiccto
in
sostanziale
alterazionc
e soprattutto dalle quaestiones,
determinazioni
sulle
focalizzata
e
tuttavia,
che implicano un oppositio
quelle
del
commenti
giudicare dai
attenzione
1
essere mcntale, quello immaginato e cosi via.
1
si
seconda meta
termini
6
fisso
significatis"),
e
diventa
neU espressione
homo
- manca - "Homerus est una predicazione, che rimandi poeta" esempio originate mentale o che esprima una qualchc no/.ione di modalita, e dunque li si di Boezio, secondo cui cio di cui si asserisce prcferisce mantencre la spiegazione cssere non e quanto e designate dal soggctto, ma dal predicate poeta). In altri commenti c e una netta distinzione tra il caso di oppositio in adiecto e quello di classificati come casi di predicazione predicazione accidentale, poiche entrambi vcngono con una nozione diminuens: come opinibalis diminuisce il senso di est in "Chimera est cosi fa mortuus nei riguardi di homo o pictus rispetto ad homo o ad animal opinabilis", Tractatus Called Afterwards Summule Logicales, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Petrus
Ncll
al
piano
1
Hispanus,
(cfr.
Assen 1972,
p. 158.
1
S.
9
Ebbesen,
Cfr.
History
J.
"The
dead man
Pinborg,
of
is
alive",
op.
cit.,
pp. 43-7.
Problems of Semantic Representation in Medieval Logic", in H. Parrel, Thought and Contemporary Linguistics a cura di
"Some
Linguistic
Berlino-New York 1976. Idem, Ebbesen,
"The
contributions in
a
English
"The
to
sophisma"
dead the in:
contribution man",
cit.;
discussion
the
to
H.A.G.
on univocal
Medieval Semantics and
Logic",
Synthese
Braakhuis,
40
"Kilwardby
(1979),
versus
pp.
Bacon?
19^2;
The
of being and non-being found de Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L.M.
signification
et Niimega, 1985; A. de Libera, "Roger Bacon and Semantics from the End of the 12th Century to the time of Ockham and Burleigh. Acts of the 4th European 1981. Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, a cura di Braakhuis, Niimega
Rijk, a cura di Bos, Artistarium Suppl. 2,
le
probleme de Tappellatio
univoca",
in:
English Logic
Un caso mortuus
vivum
-
congiunzione con
in
sccundum accidens
perda
mantenere una
nell impossibilita di di esse
homo
termine
il
di predicazione
suo
il
419
originario
significato,
delle sue proprieta essenziali
la
-
quella
determinazione mortuum.
Se dunque si condivide la tesi della fissita del significato, occorre individuare un interpretazione semantica, capace di render conto di cio che awiene in espressioni come homo mortuus ed anche, in diversa misura, di cio che determina
come
est
"Homerus
Tra
opinione".
i
sostenitori
della
tesi
"radicale"
trovano alcuni esponenti di quella che permanenza in particolare Pietro d Alvernia e ha chiamato modista: Pinborg logica del significato
della J.
in
accezione indebolita di esse in espressioni,
1
Simone
di
si
Faversham.
mi occupero delPargomento relativamente ad alcune di Pietro d Alvernia; ricorrero anche ad un questioni In Perihermeneias In questa sede
passo, tratto dal
commento
di
Tommaso
Erfurt In Perihermeneias
di
Infme attraverso alcune delle argomentazioni
1
a
individuare
potra
di
esigenza
secondo
il
linee
larghe le
garantire
modello degli Analitici
una nuova
si
semantiche
e
scelte
Posteriori.
secundum quid o con oppositio
in adiecto
riflessione sulla teoria del singificato?
e che considerare
fatto
le
e plausibile chiedersi: perche la presenza nel linguaggio di
Ordunque
II
tra
da Rodolfo Brito 12
condizioni fondamentali del sapere scientifico,
predicazioni con determinazioni esige
nesso
il
tratte
n .
sostanzialemente
differente in
significato di
il
un termine quale homo
un espressione come
"x
est
homo
mortuus"
da quello in espressioni del tipo est homo" equivale ad ammettere che un cambiamento contestuale - quale la presenza della determinazione mortuum - o un mutamento di referenza - nel caso di est homo "x
"x
variabile
la
mortuus"
come
x
varia su
un dominio
di
enti
-
nel passato
non
solo, aspetta, possano cambiare le condizioni di verita, ma la stessa struttura semantica dei termini. Cio viola la tesi della fissita del ci
si
significato dei termini
nozioni di
tempo o
ed anche quella della
di modalita,
totale indifferenza dei
come insegna
il
nomi a
secondo capitolo del De
Interpretatione^
Si sono esaminati il Ms. F = Firenze, Ms. P = Paris BN lat. 16170.
11
12
Ms. L = Ms.
UB Leipzig
Vat. lat.
Cfr.
communi
distribuat
Ms.
B
Laur. S.Croce Plut. XII Sin.3 e
il
1356.
2141 e Ms. Vat.
Pietro
il
d Alvernia,
lat.
3061.
"Utrum quaestio signum universale additum ipsum pro suppositis presentibus, preteritis et futuris" (Ms.
terminis F,
f.lOrb
Baccin
420
Una
soluzione praticabilc potrcbbc consistere ncl mantencre
dell immutabilita
del
termini
significato,
delle
e
della suppositio
ratione
essendi.
logica
terministica
a
sviluppando,
loro
mezzi della
ai
una
volta,
di
logica
tipo dalla
costituita
appunto portante connotazione dei termini e non dalla loro funzione denotativa. intensionale,
Cio comporta che certe
espressioni,
verbo esse vada cercata
La nozione, termini
cui
piano dei
si
fa
-
analoghi:
tanto
di
I
ed
i
che cio che
pictus
prius-posterius e
&3\Vimpositio
est similis
-
rientra,
di
una
est
mortuus":
est
gia
(Homo termine
il
significati
secondari sussiste sempre una
mette
quondam
attributionern): nel caso
una relazione
in
di
continuita
fuit
materia
homini
sulla
la
"
La relazione
hominis".
tra
pura somiglianza pittorica
vero").
conta,
piu
cosi
dire,
nel
tale
relazione
"programma
un opportuna determinazione o nell atto
inscritta
quod terminus communis
la
e
fissata
del
semantico" -
nel caso del
funzione significativa,
dell imposizione,
substantialis
sicut
homo
che
in
non
ratione
nullum".
"Die Logik der Modistae", Studio Meditwistyczne, 16 (1975), pp.39-97; idem, Problems of Semantic Representation in Medieval Logic", cit., pp.263-4.
Pietro d Alvernia, q. Si sequatur: Sor f.lOva 20-1.
a
analoghi sono regolati secondo una relazione
per
di
uniti
secondario
significalo ("Homo
un opportune contesto modifica
regola,
"Intelligendum
sua tempus includit
vivus);
un
a
mentre
vivus che a quello di cadaver).
che
cio
e,
La presenza
verbo esserc
rimandano
homo
fonda invece
si
significati dei termini
secondo
un
di
tipi
verbo esse) vanno
il
infatti
homo
a
del
dei referenti.
analogia. Alcuni
vivo con quella di cadaverc sia la materia:
quod
pictus,
termine.
essi
se,
ad
concetto di
al
enim de cadavere quod
homo ed homo
55-6):
per
somiglianza (secundum
homo sembra nozione di uomo di
("Homo
non
di
"aberrante"
occorrenze
certe
di
di
quella
cadaver), oppure ad entrambi
qualche forma
di
di
presi
significato primario
dicitur
e
homo rimanda
homo rimanda il
significati e
ricorso
primario (es.: determinazioni rimandano
certe
Tra
predicativa,
sul
significato
mortuus
o
termini di sostanze corruttibili ed
i
(tutti
considerati
spiegazione del comportamento
la
funzione
in
de
diminutio
di
e
struttura
la tesi
tecnica
la
espressioni con
le
nozioni
sembrano rinunciare
modisti
i
14
cui
la
temiinonim
contenenti
comunque
Tuttavia
attraverso
nell analizzare
altre proprieties
o
distrahentes
c
est
homo
mortuus, ergo Sor
est
"Some
homo, Ms.
F,
Un caso dunque
implica
mutamento
il
sccundum accidens
di predicazionc
del
e
significato
421
reversibilita
la
dell impositio.
La nozione
di analogia
trattazione uniforme
adiecto
e
di
nell oppositio
il
in
di
tipo
adiecto
un
offre
altro vantaggio:
riconduce ad una
different! casi di predicazione
predicazione e
predicazioni
due
i
secundwn
chc
termine,
e
quid.
Cio
viene
con oppositio in nelle due
muta
che
interessato
dall analogia:
sempre un nome, che entra a comporre
il
predicate, ad essere analogo (homo), mentre nella predicazione accidentale
e analogo
il
verbo esse.
Occorre precisare che la soluzione, che si awale del criterio di come vedremo analogia, non e adottata da tutti i modisti: mentre alcuni nel caso di Rodolfo Brito
-
da quello esposto,
come
altri,
Paccolgono,
ma di
Sigieri
commento boeziano. 16 Tommaso
in
senso notevolmente diverse
Courtrai,
ripetono
il
vecchio
Erfurt riporta tanto la spiegazione
di
boeziana che quella fondata sull analogia e dell invenzione di quest ultima 17 attribuisce il merito ad Ammonio. Non e possibile in questa sede esaminare tutte le conseguenze di quest uso della nozione di analogia 1 ^;
mi limitero ad alcune considerazioni. verbo
esse,
del
usi
gli
ha
il
vantaggio
verbo;
di garantire
ambiti,
gli
per
interessata da nozioni di modalita di
seconda intenzione
II
modello analogico, applicato
una pur tenue forma
esempio,
in
("Chimera est
cui
la
di unita tra
predicazione
opinabilis")
("Homerus est in opinione")
al
e
o da termini
vengono esaminati
alia
luce dei significati secondari del verbo esse, che rappresentano, per cosi
che vuol dire che, per esempio, la di "Chimera est opinabilis, ergo Chimera non e dovuta alia netta separazione tra un uso puramente copulative ed uno esistenziale di gradi indeboliti
dire,
di
essere.
II
falsita
esse,
est"
ma
al
passaggio illegittimo da un grado forte d esistenza ad uno
debole.
Sigieri di Courtrai inserisce
comunque a qucsto proposito un rimando ad Ammonio. van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias. Inleidende studie en tekstuitgave door C. Verhaak S.J. Verhandelingen von de koninklijke vlaamse academic voor wetenschappen, letteren en schone kunsten van Belgie. Klasse der Letteren. Cfr.
Zeger
Jaargang XXVI, 1964, n.52. Brussel 1964, p.143. 17
Ms.
18
L, f.26ra 80.
Va anche
nei testi del
Inoltre part. -
an.
detto che non dodicesimo secolo.
nelle
640b
si
tratta
di
un idea totalmente originale: era gia presente
opere biologiche di Aristotele (De gen. 726b 24, 734b 25, 735a 8; De 412b 14; ma anche: Meteor. IV, c.12 389b 31) si trovano alcuni passi
36,
del resto citati dai modisti
-
sull
equivocita dei termini di sostanze corruttibili.
Baccin
422
La
non
teoria
comunque
priva
di
di
esse,
che
viene
extra!
E
e
primario
significato
esse
dall espressione
in
re
ambiguita.
infatti
il
indicate
genericamente
suo importo
il
Qual e
csisten/.iale
(esse
in
oppure il suo riferimcnto ad essenze in atto? Alcuni passi della lettcratura modista sembrano attribuirc al significato primario di esse un
effectu}
csistcnziale.
importo
che
ritiene
il
ncll esscre
19
Tuttavia
significato
o
pcnsato
immaginato
contrapposizione
al significato
Pcrtanto
extra
Vesse
non
ma
secundum adiacens,
proposito della
fallacia
sia
(cs.:
ncl
csaurisi
dell analogia,
che
qucllo est
"Chimera 1
come
"Homcrus
in
est
esse
come
Tommaso
opinione,
in
cssere extramentale.
puro
chc
csistere
consistc
opinabilis"),
esistenziale
va intcso nclla sua contrapposizione
vicne confermata da un passo di
ipotesi
dottrina
la
esse
di
primario, chc dcsigna
puo
mcntali o fantastichc, tanto
L
sosticnc
chi
sccondario
essere di
o
entita
allc
dell essenza.
Erfurt,
che,
ergo Homerus
a
est",
afferma:
Omne ...
enim
Et ratio
verbum
"est"
effectu
et
quocumque In ogni
che
oppinione diminuit de ratione essendi absoluta subiecti est ista: quod secundum quod dicit Armonius hoc est terminus analocus, quia prius supponit pro esse in essentie el per consequens pro esse in anima et pro in
alia
modo
rinviare
1
le
secundum e
alio esse.
fa applicazione del concetto di analogia al verbo esse non tradizionali difficolta, che sussistono nel rapporto tra
tertium adiacens, alle
nuove nozioni
di significato
primario e
secondario del verbo esse. Notevoli pcrplessita affiorano anche nell applicazione dcWanalogia termini di sostanza corruttibile, di
mondo
sostanze fisiche del
significato,
different!
ma
anche
^ J.
Si
veda
Pinborg,
pp.260 sgg. 20
Ms.
21
la
distinzione
L espressione
ai
nomi
perche sussiste un etcrogeneita profonda tra termine homo annovera, per esempio, secondo suoi significati secondari, individui, che sono in
i
umane (homo
"Bezeichnung
i
sublunare verrebbero a possedere piu di un
potenza uomini, individui nel passato
sembianze
tutti
i
11
analogati.
Pietro d Alvernia, tra
come homo: non solo perche
21
pictus).
= (
cadaveri),
Ordunque,
ma
in
due accezioni di esse in effectu nella q. 56 In An.Pr. in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts", Misc. Med., 8 (1971),
tra in
anche immagini e che modo, se non
ricorrc piu volte nella letteratura modista.
L, f.26rb 20-3.
Pietro d Alvernia, Ms. F, f.lOva 17-20.
Un caso puramentc equivoce statua?
si
di predicazione
sccundum accidens
di
puo parlarc
per un immagine o una
"uomo"
22
La quanto
scelta
di
di
tradurre
in
una
trovare
potrebbe
estensionale
problcmi di teoria del significato anche sua comoda interpretazione a livello
Alcuni tra
modisti non accettano
i
mantenendo
concetto
il
di
con
fmisce
terminonim,
proprieties
significato di aspetti difficilmente riconducibili
pur
conseguenze della
le
Uno
della logica terministica.
materiale (id
quod
della
permanenza
risulti
de
significatur),
proprio quello
sermonis
virtute
una semantica, che
ottiene
egli
di analogia.
nettamente due accezioni
significant,
Rodolfo Brito. Distinguendo nella (significatum ut significatum) ed uno
che uno dei concetti, che
pro
e,
agli sviluppi consueti
una continua reimposizione dei nomi, ma che dei supposita una condizione imprescindibile per la verita quindi naturale
radicale
tesi
ratio
necessita di
e
il
di questi e
un elemento formale
significatio
caricare
il
ad unita.
sviluppando una semantica per certi versi piu affine
Ed
423
Nella
q.
eius
primario
si
degli enunciati.
trova
a ridiscutere
Utrum terminus analogus 2^ Autore
significato
terminus analogus: una,
di
evita la
fa dell esistenza
1
stet
separa
come
nel caso di
termine ha piu significati, ma secondo una relazione di sanus, prius-posterius; la seconda e quella dei termini come homo, che hanno un in cui
solo
il
significato
e
che
impropriamente
sono
impiegati
per
designare
o semplici immagini. Questa seconda non e una vera e propria analogia, ma solo una certa forma di similitudo o di attributio, che viene delta analogia solo in senso lato e che non ne possiede le individui morti
caratteristiche.
permettere espressioni fare con
homo
con
"programmato"
linguistico,
il
una vaga idea
solo
di
linguistico
come homo
un
coincide
Pertanto
alPuso
homo
pictus o
deminutus.
Si
nell imposizione; il
si
somiglianza in re
termini
di
homo
Pietro
homo
come
mortuus, dove in verita
badi che questo
secondario
significato
che non intacca
impiegare
di
si
homo
in
ha a che
deminutus non d Alvernia,
tratta piuttosto del risultato di
significato di
puo
preso di per
se,
gia
un atto
ma
che
La regola sui termini analoghi pone qualche difficolta a Pietro d Alvernia. Nella q. Utrum sequatur est homo mortuus, ergo est homo (Ms. F, f.lOra 71-2) il magister accetta che ex usu auctorum un qualsiasi termine analogo, preso per se, rimandi solo al suo primo significato. Precisa tuttavia che cio non awiene de virtute sermonis: infatti secondo la natura del linguaggio un termine analogo pone tanto il suo significato primario che quello secondario. Parzialmente edita da Ebbesen,
"The
dead
man...",
pp.60-1.
424
Baccin
piega
a
espressione
1
designate
in
cui
di
cio,
passato
termine era
il
un esse secundum quid e non un esse simpliciter. L insistenza con cui PAutore ribadisce che un nome di sostanza
predicabile, ossia
puo essere usato
corruttibile la
solo equivoce per riferirsi agli individui
dopo
loro corruzione, evidenzia la sua convinzione che, al fine di confutare
semantica radicale, occorra ricondurre
la tesi
termini a quello che realmente sono: cui
in
luogo sofisma
dove
Sorte non existente,
due
intrecciano
si
fa
risalire
1
sit
quella
significative:
consueta
status
sullo
E
esistenti, poiche nel in
homo teoria
della
semantico all
tratta
si
Sortes est
vera:
II
del 25 ",
del
asserti
degli
autorita di Aristotele
idea della fondamentale equivocita dei
secundum Philosophum
Item,
non
nomi
riferiti
De animalibus si dice che: De animalibus, membrum mortuum
membrum, nisi equivoce, sicut diceret aliquis statuam regis hominem vel etiam ymaginem hominis esse hominem et non est
est
esse
equivoce.
Una
dottrina semantica, che leghi se
referenza,
e
primari
tematiche:
epistemologica
ad individui non piu
nisi
ista
presunti usi analogic! dei equivocita dei termini.
di
e
e sulla validita di alcune scicnze.
scientifici
egli
una
e
significato
che
questa
ripete
"Utrum,
casi
osservazione
i
secondari, al
ambiguita
da un lato
scientifico.
rischia
linguaggio: se
Infatti,
libera
si
e
tuttavia
non solo
nelle
il
dalla
scien/e
significato alia sussistenza della
proliferazione dei significati in
di
a
conferire
quello
una
ordinario,
biologiche
i
nomi
fondamentale
ma di
a
quello
sostanze
godono sempre di referenza, secondo quanto dice Aristotele, awiene per la scienza contenuta nel Meteorologica. In che modo
corruttibili
non
cosi
possono fare dunque asserzioni scicntifiche su fenomeni transeunti, come un eclissi, la pioggia o il tuono? 27 Nella q. Utrum rebus corruptis, corrumpatur scientia de rebus 2^ Rodolfo Brito si awale di una soluzione molto articolata, che nasce da si
presupposti gnoseologici
e
semantici ben
precisi.
usare nomi in completa assenza di referenza e
che
attraverso
Ci6
si
Radulphi 25
26
Ms.
i
phantasmata
supplisce
Ci6 che permette
la facolta della
all attualita
della
in
Vat. lat. 3061, f.44ra.
Ibidem, f.44ra, 35 sgg. Cfr. T.K. Scott,
"J.
Buridan on the Objects of Demonstrative
Science",
(1965), pp.666-7.
28
percezione:
nella questione Utrum sequatur homo mortuus, ergo homo, Quaestiones in artem veterem, ed. Venezia 1499, f.lSvb.
puo constatare
Briti
di
memoria,
Rodolfo Brito, Quaestiones In An. Po., Ms.
Vat. lat. 2141, f.205ra-206ra.
Speculum 40
Un caso condizione passato:
semantico
la
che
dell
di scienza;
A
cio
sul
corrisponde
elemento formale del
La duplice natura
425
awenuta una percezione
sia
esse.
nel
piano
dunque un sussistenza di un
significato:
rimane garantito almeno dalla
pluvia
significato formale.
modello
solo
habuerit
prius
permanenza
come
termine
e
indispensabile
dummodo
secundum accidens
di pre dicazione
un duplice
del significato permette
primo esige, accanto al significato formale, anche da una scienza qua scitur res esse et ex quibus
il
Pattualita dei referenti e
L altro
causis passiones sibi insunt.
formali
del
significato,
modello
si
costituisce sui soli element!
prescindendo dal problema della sussistenza
di
e la scienza qua scitur ex quibus causis res potest esse et ex
referenti:
29 Questa scienza studia le possunt inesse. condizioni del verificarsi dei fatti scientifici, senza presumerne 1 esistenza,
quibus causis passiones
ma si
sibi
richiede una condizione minimale d esistenza: che dei fenomeni studiati
modo da
dato un qualche caso nel passato, in
sia
nella
averne un immagine
memoria.
La
struttura
logico-grammaticale degli asserti
relativi
scientifici,
al
secondo modello, deve essere probabilmente espressa in forma implicitamente ipotetica e non categorica: sappiamo infatti che un asserto del tipo "Homo
est
sarebbe falso per Rodolfo Brito, se non esistesse piu
animal"
alcun uomo;
31
modificato in
"Si
est
homo, homo
est
animal",
esso risulta
invece sempre vero.
Quest interpretazione
Cum
dicitur:
ci
viene suggerita da un altro passo: se
que per
insunt de omni,
insunt,
quacumque
yerum
est,
sicut
differentia
temporis ponitur pro subiectum, ponitur etiam predicatum, sicut Philosophus exponit, si verum est cucere esse hominem, verum est dicere esse animal. Et si intelligendo:
pro
verum
est dicere mine esse hominem, verum est dicere nunc esse animal. Ista est sua intentio: pro quocumque tempore ponitur homo, ponitur et animal.
Pertanto un asserto generale su fenomeni transeunti, e sempre costituito nel
29 30
primo modello Ibidem, f.205rb 45-va
di scienza
da una proposizione, che
risulta essere
per
5.
Ibidem, f.205va 2-28:
"Dico
quod, corrupta
re,
non corrumpitur
scientia
de
re,
qua
scitur ex quibus et qualibus causis res potest esse et passiones sibi possunt inesse ... si res non sit, dummodo prius habuerit esse, potest esse scientia de ipsa, qua scitur ex quibus et qualibus causis possit esse."
Rodolfo Brito, Quaestiones "Sor
32
est
homo",
f.!89vb 13-5.
Ibidem, f.!98vb 22 sgg.
in
An. Po., Ms.
Vat.
lat.
2141, q.
Utrum
ista
sit
per
se:
Baccin
426
se,
ma non sempre
A
vera.
sempre
conclusione
ci
a
sottesa
semantica,
mentre ncl sccondo modello e
vera,
proposizione per se e
potrebbe chiedere quali sia la questo secondo modello di scienza.
senso
modo
riappaia
come
termini,
li
poiche
lato,
la
nozione
tonitms,
E
di analogia
eclipsis,
pluvia
mia
presa in
etc.,
ma
senza alcuna relazione a\Vesse actuate del fenomeno,
usati
struttura
si
convinzione che in qualche
da una
costituito
33
sono
solo
in
relazione alia loro possibilita d esscrc. Inoltre la condizione gnoseologica,
che rende possibile,
il
sapere scientifico su insiemi di oggetti, che non
siano sempre esistenti, e data dalla presenza dei phantasmata: e Rodolfo
anima
Brito osserva che Yesse in et
secundum
Detto
quid.
subiscono un ampliazione, possibili:
La
altrimcnti,
nel
i
stare per supposita
non
ma
attuali, 34
e questo e per Rodolfo Brito un uso analogice del linguaggio.
formale e materiale - della funzionc componenti dei termini rende comunque plausibile la teoria dei due
duplicita delle
significativa
modelli di scienza, anche se -
attuale dei referenti, pare libro
modo da
in
sempre un esse deminutum secondo modello termini
delle cose e
degli
Analytica di
"ipotetico";
universalita,
di
fatto
il
tipo di scienza, che
1
in osserva nza al capitolo iniziale del
postcriora
pero
presuppone
e
rispetto
privilegiato
quest ultimo
a
garantire
i
al
esistenza
secondo modello
caratteri
di
necessita e di onnitemporalita, che sono tipici del sapere
scientifico.
Universita
Una "Zur
"La
Sapienza"
di
Roma
J. Pinborg, posizione per certi versi affine e quclla di Boezio di Dacia: si veda 15 des Boethius de Dacia: ein Uberblick", Studio Mediewistyczne
Philosophic
,
(1974), pp.165-85. Cfr.
ratione cit.,
In
pro
pp.274-75.
Topica, suppositis
q.
6
Utrum
praesentibus,
terminus praeteritis
communis et
futuris,
distribuat in:
aequaliter
Pinborg,
et
unica
"Bezeichnung",
JOEL BIARD
Vcrbes
de
cognitifs ct appellation
la
forme
selon Albert de Saxe
Les Sophismata
de Saxe contiennent plusieurs sophismes, au
d Albert
demeurant classiques dans leur formulation, qui comprennent dans leur enonce le verbe savoir. De maniere generate, ces sophismes sont traites
la distinction
du sens compose
appel systematiquement pour resoudre
fait
la
grace a
troisieme
partie
du
recueil.
et
les
du sens
sophismes 20,
1
propositions modales, par exemple dans
II
n
1 .
32
Albert y
33 de
et
Bien evidemment, cette distinction
familiere a tous ses contemporains. Jean Buridan
Mais
divise
le
livre
est
evoque a propos des des Consequently
2 .
pour autant mise en rapport avec 1 etude des propositions comportant un verbe cognitif. Lorsqu il examine les problemes semantiques souleves par des verbes signifiant des actes de 1 esprit, Jean elle
est
pas
Buridan retrouve bien
n en
la division
du sens compose
et
du sens
divise,
pas principal moyen de resolution des difficultes; pour ce faire un concept forge a cet effet: Pappellation de raison. le
fait
il
mais
utilise
Curieusement pour quelqu un qui a etudie puis enseigne a Paris a Pepoque de Buridan, Albert n evoque pas cette notion, pourtant promise a un certain succes. En revanche, il fait un usage qui au premier abord peut paraitre curieux de
appellation de la
l
forme.
C est
pour tenter de
determiner ce qu il entend par cette expression, et pour preciser a travers comment Albert se situe par rapport a ses predecesseurs ou a ses eme contemporains que je voudrais etudier ici le sophisme 34 de la IH cela
Sortes patrem
partie:
On
suppose que
marche a quatre
Hoc
suum le
pattes.
credit esse
asinum.
pere de Socrate
Le sophisme
est revetu
d une peau d ane et
se prouve de la maniere suivante:
Sortes credit esse asinum, hoc est pater suus, ergo patrem
suum
Cf. J. Biard, Les sophismes du savoir. Albert de Saxe entre Jean Buridan et Guillaume Heytesbury, a paraitre dans Vivarium. Albert de Saxe, Sophismata, Paris, eme eme 1490, sophismes 33, 34 et 47 de la II partie, et sophismes 20, 32 et 33 de la
m
partie.
Cf.
Louvain
Jean -
Buridan,
Tractatus
Paris, 1976, pp. 56-57.
de consequents,
livre
II,
chapitre
2,
ed.
H.
Hubien,
Biard
428
asinum
csse
credit
3
L improbatio,
.
c est-a-dire
demonstration de
la
la
faussete de la proposition, procede quant a elle de la maniere suivante: Sortcs patrcm suum credit esse asinum, ergo Sortes credit quod pater
suus est asinus; hoc est falsum; la
faussete de
la
du consequent. Mais
faussete
refutee
est
Vimprobatio
infercrait le sens
le
a
grace
la
compose du sens
1
anteccdent resulterait de tenu
est
sophisme
pour
vrai,
et
d une consequence qui Dans son principe, le mode de
non-validite
divise.
resolution propose par Albert de Saxe est identique a celui
qu
il
a mis en
oeuvre pour les sophismes contenant le verbe savoir: il repose sur la these selon laquclle on ne peut pas systematiquement convertir 1 une en 1
une
autre
memes
les
comportant
sens
au
prise
proposition
mais
termes,
et
compose au
prise
sens
une
proposition
divise
longuement devcloppe par Guillaumc Heytesbury Un sophisme semblable est examine par Jean Buridan:
principe
.
esse asinum
accentue
Car
si
est
un
5 .
le
un ane, est
c est parce
voisine
de
c est-a-dirc
tu ne crois pas
est plus cxpeditive:
ctait
la
que -
vraie
que
celle
sais que tu n cs pas un ane. Mais la resolution differe. Tout d abord,
tu
elle
tu es
que
La probatio
ane.
Vimprobatio
que
credis te
paradoxe,
tu crois
voisins,
Tu
un peu differente qui En depit d une formulation le casus permet de rapprocher les deux sophismes. initiate
proposition initiale est
tu crois
que ton pere par
proposee
un ane parce
tu es
que
Albert.
les
sophismes paraissent sophisme doit etre nie, fausse, alors que chez Albert si
le
ce qui est une difference notable. Sans doute est-ce a
Vimprobatio tellc qu elle a etc ici formulee, immediate du savoir de soi et de sa propre nature humaine. Reste alors a refuter la probatio. En admettant le casus, on peut Pour quelle a conceder: aller patrem meum credo esse asinum
de
cause
1
evidence
reposant sur
1
de
intuition
jusqu raison? Jean
.
Buridan
reste
ici
asse/
elliptique:
quia
patrem
meum
meus credebam esse asinum, sed non secundum hanc propositionem Ainsi, contrairement a est asinus" scd secundum istam "Hoc est asinus". sens compose et du du distinction la a il ne fait aucunement appel "Pater
Albert,
sens divise, qui aurait pu etre 3 4
Albert de Saxe, Sophismata,
5
Guillaume
Jean Buridan, Sophismata, IV,
p. 73.
6
sign,
pertinente.
m
II
II
est vrai
Id., ibid., p. 81.
11,
ed.
qu
il
n explicite
vb.
Heytesbury, Tractalus de sensu composite P 2ra et f Bra. Sophismatibus, Venise, 1494, en part.
Cf.
cum
XXXIV,
ici
et
dn-iso,
Regule eiusdem
Th. K. Scott, Stuttgart -Bad Cannstatt, 1977,
Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe
son
guere
raisonnement,
mais
de
suffit
il
429
dans son
celui-ci
replacer
contexte pour Peclairer.
Pour resoudre toute
la
serie
prend place, Jean Buridan juge nomme Pappellation de raison
de sophismes dans laquelle celui-ci de faire appel a ce qu il Cette derniere, resultant de la
necessaire .
presence de verbes comme comprendre, connaitre, savoir, ne doit etre prise en compte que si le terme suit un tel verbe. Selon la theorie
credo patrem le
proposition,
difference entre
la
buridanienne,
meum
patrem
esse asinum
vient
meum du
terme patrem n appelle pas
comme
individu est compris et signifie
fait
credo esse asinum
que dans
la
et
premiere
raison selon laquelle cet
la -
pour que la proposition soit vraie, il suffit done que je croie que ceci, de maniere indeterminee, est un ane - tandis que dans la seconde proposition, le terme appelle sa Par
raison.
la
s eclaire
la
que c etait un ane, non pas selon mais selon la proposition est un "ceci
Rien de parait bien
autre chose.
s
de
formulation buridanienne:
croyais ane"
pere
la
proposition
mon
"mon
pere, je
pere est un
ane".
ne se retrouve chez Albert de Saxe. Le sophisme 33 approcher de cette idee, mais il s y agit en verite de tout
tel
A
1
argumentation qui a ete presentee plus haut,
auteur
1
ajoute ceci: li a sequitur hoc verbum scit, appellat suam formam. Et ideo hec est falsa a Sortes scit esse idem ipsi a. Quando enim precedit hoc verbum scit, tune non appellat suam formam. Et ideo nee bene conceditur: Sortes a ipsi a scit esse idem
Quando enim
.
Puisque cette appellation de la forme vient de ce qu une expression suit un verbe intentionnel, on pourrait au premier abord faire Phypothese qu il s agit
d une reformulation de
alors attribuer a Albert
la
doctrine buridanienne. Mais
il
faudrait
un grossier contresens, revenant a confondre ce
que precisement Jean Buridan differencie, a savoir Pappellation d un terme - c est-a-dire le renvoi d un terme, dans une proposition, a pour sa forme Propter ista sophisma sciendum est quod ista verba huiusmodi, de quibus post dicemus, et participia et nomina inde descendentia [...] faciunt in terminis cum quibus construuntur quosdam modos speciales appellationum. [...] Talia verba faciunt terminos cum quibus construuntur appellare rationes secundum quas imposita sunt nomina ad significandum, et non solum res cognitas ad extra, sicut faciunt alia verba; a propos de cette notion, cf. J. Biard, Le cheval de Buridan. Logique et philosophic du langage dans analyse Cf.
id.,
intelligo
,
ibid.,
pp.
cognosce
,
73-74:
scio
et
1
d un verbe intentionnel, in Die Philosophic irn 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, in memoriam K. - ou Ton trouvera Michalski, O. Pluta, ed., Amsterdam, 1988, pp. 119-137 egalement des references a de nombreux articles anterieurs sur le meme sujet. 8
Albert de Saxe, Sophismata,
XXXIV,
sign. m.II. va.
Biard
430
ce qu -
et
connote, done
il
1
Bethune,
ne suppose pas selon le maitre de
pour quoi cependant
de raison qui seule
appellation les
9
signifie, et
caracterise,
verbes signifiant des actes de
1
il
On
esprit.
peut avancer une
hypothese differente. L exemple n est pas necessairement emprunte a Buridan, car il ne est pas propre et la formulation d Albert est un peu differente. revanche, on trouve une fois de plus
meme
le
lui
En
enonce chez Guillaume
mode de division et Heytesbury, parmi tuum credis esse Patrem de composition: asinum, igitur credis patrem les
tuum
esse asinum
sens
le
La
fait
de
1
appellations.
le
encore, Heytesbury se contente d opposer
ici
sens
divise.
II
done a expliquer
reste
1
usage
appcllation.
Perutilis
L
Mais
.
et
compose
qu Albert
10
exemples relevant du huitieme
un
comprend
logica
existence
d un
tel
sur
portant
chapitre
les
chapitre, dans un oeuvre a bien des logicac de Guillaume d Ockham, traduit
egards tres proche de la Summa la place prise par ce concept d appellation dans au milieu parisien, et 1 importance nouvelle qui
les
discussions propres
lui
a etc conferee par
Jean Buridan. Mais en ce qui concerne le contenu du chapitre, Albert s ecarte de son maitre. En vertu du vieil adage selon lequel le predicat appellation est presentee comme une propricte du appelle sa forme, 1
predicat.
Mais
il
ne
s agit
ni
de reduire immediatement
1
appellation a
une espece de la supposition (comme le faisait Guillaume d Ockham), ni de nommer appellation tout renvoi a des choses que le terme signifie et pour lesquelles il ne suppose pas (comme die/ Jean Buridan), ni a plus raison
forte
penser par
(comme
la le
c etait
le
cas
avec
Guillaume de Sherwood), de
commune. Que
renvoi a une forme
le
predicat appelle sa
simplement que dans la forme mentale ou vocale selon se trouve predique dans une proposition, il peut se un terme laquelle verifier, dans une autre proposition au present, du pronom demonstratif
forme
signifie
qui renvoie a ce pour quoi suppose si
dit,
animal
qu
il
est
un animal
en montrant un homme,
est le
vraie,
11
premiere
peux
dire
.
Autrement
ceci
predicat devant conserver la
M.
est
un
forme
par ex. Jean Buridan, Summulae dialecticac, IV (Tractatus de suppositionibus), V, E. Reina in Rivista critica di storia delta Filosofta, 1957, fasc. II III, p. 343.
&
Guillaume Heytesbury, Tractatus de sensu composito 11
je
la
a dans la proposition initiale.
Cf.
ed.
Phomme
de
le sujet
Cf. Albert
de Saxe,
Perutilis logica, Venise, 1522,
F
et diviso,
16rb.
F
3va.
Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe
Ceci
tres
est
des
proche
ou
passages
Le
allusion a cette formule traditionnelle.
431
Ockham
Guillaume d
fait
evoque a trois reprises dans la Somme de logique. Le plus important de ces passages se trouve dans le chapitre 72 de la premiere partie. II vient a la d un
suite
developpement
contenant,
exemple,
par
a
qui
un
Venerabilis Inceptor
au
une
dans
que
precise
verbe
proposition
introduire
faut
il
passe,
1
une
terme suppose pour des choses qui existent ou que pour des choses qui ont existe. Mais, ajoute 1 auteur, cette distinction ne concerne que le terme qui est sujet et non pas celui qui est predicat distinction selon
le
puisque
d
le
A
12
appelle sa forme
predicat
.
occasion, Guillaume
cette
Ockham explique comment il comprend cette formule: Quod est sic intelligendum: non quod supponat
pro se vel pro
conceptu, sed quod per talem propositionem denotatur quod propositio in qua ipsummet praedicatum sub propria forma, hoc est ipsummet et non aliud, praedicatur de illo pro quo subiectum supponit fuit vera, si tails propositio sit de praeterito; vel quod erit vera si talis propositio sit de ruturo; vel quod sit possibilis si prima propositio sit de possibili... .
Apres avoir ecarte une hypothese selon laquelle 1 appellation de la forme serait le renvoi au terme lui-meme ou au concept (done la supposition
ou simple), Guillaume propose quelques elements d
materielle
En
premier
Autrement expliciter
le
lieu,
dans
dit,
cette
terme les
propositions
on
appellation,
bien que
chose,
si
terme
lui-meme,
morphologic du
la
et
signifiant.
sub
considere
Ton
que
va
explication.
forma. reformuler pour propria
trouver ce terme et non pas autre
doit
forme au
etre
doit
nous oriente chef
premier
En meme
ici
vers
du
ou
la
configuration
est indique
il
temps,
vers la materialitd
la
par
la
qu une
proposition dans laquelle ce terme est predique, sous cette forme propre,
de
ce
pour
quoi
proposition initiate 1
suppose le sujet, a ete est au passe; autrement
vraie, dit,
si
appellation de la forme par le predicat implique qu
sub propria forma, temporalites
ou
Sortes est albus modalites.
Par
-
et
verbe
le
si
Sortes il
fuit
fut vrai
de
la
albus, de dire,
pareillement pour les autres
consequent,
cette
formule
implique
egalement une relation semantique, qui se traduit comme c est souvent le cas par une predication, ainsi que le respect des temporalites, le privilege
donne
au
present
dans
la
formulation
predication/supposition se traduisant par 12
Cf.
Guillaume d Ockham,
13 Id., ibid., p.
216,
1.
61-68.
Summa logicae,
I,
de
la
relation
une indexation temporelle de
chap.72, p. 216.
de la
432
Biard
de
valcur
de
verite
la
DCS considerations semblables
proposition.
retrouvent dans les deux autres passages de allusion a
1
appellation de la forme par
le
Somme
la
se
de logique qui font
14
predicat
.
Tous ces elements sont bien ceux par Icsqucls Albert de Saxe explique appellation de la forme par le predicat dans son chapitre 1
lequel toutefois est 1
beaucoup plus complet sur
1
appellation que ne
1
etait
oeuvre ockhamiste.
Jean Buridan, le
lequel
il
evoque lui aussi enonce commun selon 15 sa forme Mais en depit de certaines
vrai,
appelle
predicat
convergences,
est
1
.
interpretation de cet adage
1
pas vrai au sens propre des mots
16
-
Si
le
dont
-
il
precise
qu
n
il
est
est quelque peu differente. II se propose d analyser les causes de verite de propositions comportant des termes appellatifs, qui signifient ou cosignifient des choses pour
lesquelles
ils
ne supposent pas.
terme en question
est
sujet,
il
chose, selon auteur, non seulement en appelle expression de relation au temps du verbe mais selon une disjonction de ce temps et du temps present. Par exemple, le blanc qu appelle le terme album lorsqu il sa
est
sujet
1
d une
1
au
proposition
futur,
peut
etre
signifie
comme
etant
presentemcnt ou dans un temps futur adjacent au suppot. On pcut ainsi considerer comme equivalente a album erit nigrum, la disjonction quod est vel erit album erit nigrum. Pour qu une proposition au futur soil il
vraie,
n est
pas requis que dans
futur
le
la
proposition
au present
simplement qu une certaine reduction au s Mais dans ce cas, present puisse operer. appellation doit disparaitre et le sujet doit etre transforme en terme non appellatif. II suffira en effet correspondante
soit vraie.
faut
II
1
qu
il
ait
etc vrai de dire
hoc
est
album, en montrant
proposition actuelle, qui a ce moment-la sera noir.
pour
le
predicat car celui-ci appellant
sa chose
II
le
sujet
de
la
en va diffdremment
en relation determinee
au temps du verbe de la proposition, il doit toujours, si Ton de telles transformations ou reductions, conserver la meme forme: opere 17 ... debet manere in propria forma quantum ad appellationes On et exclusive
.
retrouve ainsi Pambivalence de cette notion de
terme doit rester 14
16
17
le
meme
quant
Cf.
id., ibid., II,
Cf.
Jean Buridan, Sophismata, chap. IV,
Id., ibid., p. 64. Id., ibid., p. 63.
chap.
7, p.
a
la
materialite
271; et III-l, chap. 43, p. 473. p. 64.
forme
qui indique que le
du
signifiant,
mais
433
Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe
comporte en meme temps une indeniable composante semantique puisque la forme est aussi Pobjet meme de appellation telle que 1 a definie Buridan. 1
De
la resulte
forme
1
interpretation que Buridan propose de
tout terme, des lors
realite
et ceci vaut
qu
le sujet;
egalement pour
la
adage classique: en
comme
mais
exclusivement en relation au temps du verbe,
dans
1
par definition sa
est appellatif, appelle
il
formulation des causes de verite, qu
il
n
est
il
ne Pappelle pas
pas indispensable,
reste sub propria
forma 18 que ce doit etre le cas du predicat Dans ces d6veloppements de Buridan, on retrouve des questions evoquees par Albert, puisqu il s y agit, identiquement, des termes
cum
il
appellatione, alors
appellatifs.
.
De meme, on
peut deceler une facon identique de designer
la
du terme. Cependant, le developpement de Buridan insere sans equivoque dans une conception de 1 appellation de la forme
forme propre s
(comme
type de renvoi signifiant contredistingue de la supposition) qui est
absente de Pexpos6 d Albert. En revanche celui-ci met sur le meme plan questions liees aux determinations temporelles et leur effet sur le
les
predicat d une part et les problemes particuliers suscites par des verbes intentionnels d autre part, avec
comme
denominateur
commun une
idee de
qu indiquait deja Guillaume d Ockham. Si done les deux champs que Buridan traite a 1 aide des notions d appellation de forme et d appellation de raison sont de ce fait rassembles, il ne s agit forme
reduite au seul aspect
pas pour autant de confondre indument les deux concepts buridaniens; s agit
plutot de les remplacer par
d une certaine
qui,
la
vague que usage ockhamiste. avoir enumere des apres
qui est plus proche de
En
un concept d appellation de
est plus
fac,on,
effet,
la
il
forme
notion buridanienne et
1
regies
qui
concernent
appellation dans une proposition au present, au passe, au futur puis a la modalite du possible, Albert ajoute une cinquieme regie qui prend en compte les verbes tels qu intelligo, scio, cognosco. Us sont caracterises
1
que lorsqu ils sont suivis d une complexio, et non pas seulement d un adjectif ou seulement d un substantif, 1 adjectif n appelle le
par
fait
pas seulement sa forme
egalement sa complexio substantif.
Ce n
Par exemple, cette
il
est
proposition
18 Id., ibid., p.64.
pas
est vrai
-
au sens qui a etc precise plus haul - mais ici son union, sa conjonction - avec un
done
le cas,
que
6quivaut
en revanche,
Deum a
si
trinum et
hoc
le
terme precede
unum
cognovit
le
verbe.
cognovit Aristoteles;
Aristoteles,
ou
hoc
Biard
434
Mais
renverrait a Dieu.
Deum unum
Aristoteles cognovit
trinum
et
est
faux, parce que impliqucrait quo non sculement le Philosophe ait connu Dieu, ce qui etait le cas, mais encore qu il 1 ait connu comme un et 19 On retrouve encore une fois des trine, ce qui n etait pas le cas
cela
.
voisins de ceux qui etaient etudies par Jean Buridan.
phenomenes
Albert se garde d introduire Pidee d appellation de raison,
Mais
meme
la
ou
Buridan y faisait appel, par exemple a propos de Penonce canonique, d inspiration aristotelicienne, Sortem venientem tu cognoscis. Cette demarche s etend aux cas ou la complexio qui suit le verbe est
une proposition. Supposons par exemple que a signifie la proposition Deus est mais que tu 1 ignores. a scis esse verum doit etre tenue pour hoc scias esse verum, hoc renvoyant au vraie: il suffit pour cela que sujet
de
la
a
proposition
scis esse
vcrum. En
revanche, d aucune chose
hypothese tu ignores que Deus est la proposition a. On pcut done estimer que dans les cas ou la est proposition suit le verbe, elle appelle sa forme, ce qui a Pevidence
vraie tu ne
sais
c est a, puisque par
que
croyance porte sur la proposition Deus est elle-meme, ou plus prdcisement que on sache que a signifie Deus est. La forme n est done pas simplement ici Pidentitc a soi materielle du
que
ici
implique
le
ou
savoir
la
1
bien
terme,
qu
elle
qui
specifique,
etre
devrait
un
ni
impliquc,
I
renvoi
des
distingue
de supposition, mais Pidentite du terme simple ou complexe.
qu
il
soil
Meme
dans
si
concernant
Perutilis
logica,
signifiant
eclairer
suffit
de
comme
de Saxe rcste assez
Albert
cela
dernier
ce
type
habituelles
relations
signification et tel,
d un
semantique
allusif
les
quelques pour exemple, phrases des Sophismata qui avaient initialement retenu notre attention. Le
sophisme XXXIII precise: 20 appellat suam formam universali patrem suum
forma
et
in
-,
Socrate a ce
un
;
particular!. est
un
..
mais d apres
moment
En
homme est
le
li
hominem sed
effet,
-
il
Socrate
tient,
casus, la
ceci est
individu qui est son pere, alors
Id., ibid.,
m
II,
vb.
ignorat
sail
qu
le il
pronom
hoc
in
propria
cette
proposition
la
croyance de
ceci
renvoyant a
ignore cette identite.
meme
"scit",
de maniere generate
forme propre de
un ane,
meme
verbum
Sortes in dicto casu in
a juste litre,
On peut noter au passage qu on trouve le Heytesbury, attribue a Averroes. 20 Albert de Saxe, Sophismata, XXXIII, sign, m II, va. 21
a sequitur hoc
sophisme XXXIV:
esse
scit
21
que son pere pour vraie
Quando enim et le
exemple
chez
Toute
Guillaume
Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe
proposition qui suit
fonde
la
peu qu est
ou
croire
appelle sa forme, ce qui
savoir
non-substituabilite d expressions de reference equivalente, pour
elles soient
assez
ratio
verbe
le
435
de
forme
differente.
Le sens
exact de cette notion
a preciser mais elle est sensiblement differente de
difficile
Non seulement
buridanienne.
la
concerne aussi bien des termes
elle
mentaux que des termes vocaux, mais elle implique a la fois le respect de la litteralite du terme et une portee semantique qui peut se traduire par des propositions du genre s agit
pas
d une
simple
ceci est
confusion
un x.
II
entre
en tout cas qu il ne deux types d appellation
est clair
les
distingues par Jean Buridan. Albert cherche a elaborer, en integrant les
phenomenes semantiques que son aine raison,
de
1
done
les
appellation
demarque
ainsi
expliquait grace a Pappellation de
problemes suscites par qui
s
appuie
sur
consciemment de
Centre National de
la
Recherche
la
les
seule
la theorie
verbes cognitifs, une theorie notion de forme, et il se
buridanienne.
Scientifique, Paris
IVAN BOH
Medieval Rules of Consequences and the Idea of Demonstrative Science
Introduction. Medieval logic rules.
The
inferential for
truth,
rules
in
question
moves are such
are
been
basically a logic of
indicating what
devices
metalinguistic
help us in our rational search
that they will
such that they
i.e.,
said to have
may be
never lead from truth to
will
falsity;
and
seemingly correct inferential moves are faulty, e.i., of the sort which can lead from truth to falsity. While truth of propositions was correctness of inferences, the rules of sharply distinguished from
what
consequence were nevertheless conceived scmantically and, in the case of obligational and epistcmic logic, they essentially involved a pragmatic relation or reference to a user of language signs.
was
Logic specifically
characterized
always
one
as it
of
one
as
listed
sermocinal
of
arts.
the
and
arts
liberal
But
medieval
authors
would make a
as a science. Occasionally, they
more also
distinction
between logica utens and logica doccns, the former concept stressing the nature of logic as an ars and the latter suggesting the nature of logic as a system of correct principles which can be learned so as to enable us
speak
"to
enables us
Obviously,
truly".
"to
speak
the
congruously"
In their investigations
relation
of
was never quite
on the nature of
logic
to
grammar which
coincidental.
logic medievals
were led
to
two related questions. One was primarily ontological: If logic is a science in the sense of an enterprise of formulating a set of true propositions, it must have its proper object. But then, what is this object? Philosophers
who
spoke
of
second-intentional
being
were
Acknowledgements: The author gratefully acknowledges State
University
&
for
granting
him
the
sabbatical
year
his
ontologically
inclined
indebtedness to the Ohio
1986/87,
to
the
International
Exchange Board (I.R.E.X.), and to the U.S. Department of Education for their research grants to the German Democratic Republic and to Poland during the same academic year. Most special personal thanks are due to Dr. Gunther Schenk of the Martin Luther University (Halle) who always found ample time to share his views on the history and philosophy of logic. Research
Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science philosophers of logic
who
answer
tried to
this first question.
437
The
present
paper does not concern itself with this line of discussion. The second question in the discussion of the nature of logic became prominent soon after the recovery in the Latin West of Aristotle s Posterior
Analytics
the
in
translated into Latin by
half
first
demonstration?
limited
to
If
categorical
so,
syllogistics?
1
century
meet the Aristotelian requirements of
what
in
when it was The question now was: Does
twelfth
James of Venice.
logic itself conceived as a science strict
of
It
sense? is
the
demonstrative
Is
science
impact of the recovery of
on the conception of logic that interests us in this The has two parts. The first one deals with the rules of study. paper consequence considered as the very core of medieval logic. The second
Posterior Analytics
part
relates
the
systems of consequences to the idea of demonstrative
knowledge as formulated
in the Posterior Analytics.
A
concluding section
summari/.es the findings.
Pan One. Some of
history
years of progressively intensified research in the
sixty
medieval
logic,
from
pioneering
work of H.
Scholz,
I.M.
Boehner, through the studies and editions by EA. J. Pinborg, S. Ebbesen, N. Kretzmann, A. Maieru, V.Munoz Delgado, E.J. Ashworth, etc., and through a long and expanding list of other prominent investigators and editors, there can be no doubt Bocheriski,
and
Moody, L.M. De
about
the
P.
Rijk,
centrality
medieval logical
of
treatise.
rules
of
consequence
in
any
Nor can there be any doubt
comprehensive
that the idea of
consequence itself and of its types developed significantly through the centuries from the seeds found in Aristotle s Topics and Prior Analytics
and possibly from other sources. One can also observe a progressive extension of areas brought under the umbrella of a comprehensive system of rules
of consequence,
culminating,
perhaps,
in
the
treatise
entitled
Conscquentiae by Ralph Strode. This English logician collected rather eclectically, twenty four general rules of consequence among which one could find rules of prepositional logic, of alethic modal logic, of a "logic
of
quality",
of obligational disputations,
and of epistemic and doxastic
Cf. E. Serene, "Demonstrative Science", in The Cambridge History of Later Philosophy. Ed. N. Kretzmann et al., Cambridge: University Press, 1982, pp. 496-517.
Medie\>al
Boh
438
The only notable absence from
logic.
axiological rules.
The
the
set
and
of deontic
that
is
2
earlier systems of
consequences such as that of Walter Burley,
system of John Buridan
s Consequentiae developed in the 3 mid-1300s on the Continent, were indeed more perfect than the system of Strode if we consider them simply as quasi-axiomatic structures. There
or the
is
"mature"
made
a clear distinction
in
Burley and Buridan between the principal
and the derived rules of prepositional logic and the proofs of the latter from the former are consciously and carefully worked out; while in Strode all
24 general rules seem to be treated as
of
them are shown
be
to
"reducible"
"principal",
even though some
to another. This shows, of course,
independent and that from a strictly axiomatic point of view Strode could have done with fewer than 24 principal rules. Strode s that they are not
admirers
and
critics
such
as
Alexander
logicians such as Peter of
work by
raising
many
Paul
Sermoneta,
Cajetan of Thiene, and Frachantianus of Vicenza,
of
Pergula,
as well as other great
Mantua and Paul of Venice continued Strode
interesting
questions
about
various
s
problematic
points of his text.
The medieval correctly be
rules
of consequence
are
done and what should be avoided
relations in various areas of discourse. This in the controversies
of what
descriptive in
can
considering inferential
comes out
especially vividly
over the definition of consequence and in the implied
or even explicit attitude toward certain problematic rules. Everyone, of course, agreed that no consequence could be sound unless
it
rules out the
case where the antecedent obtains but the consequent not. While keeping in
mind the
distinction
between the so-called material implication,
implication, and relevant entailment, and
This
is
not
to say that medievals did
have
stipulating
a
strict
new symbol
not pursue deontic logic at
all,
=>
but only that
been
integrated into a comprehensive quasi-axiomatic system. For developments in this area, see the pioneering work of Simo Knuuttila: "The Emergence of Deontic Logic in the Fourteenth Century", in New Studies in Deontic M. Logic. Ed. R. Hilpinen, Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1981, pp. 225-248; and S. Knuuttila
deontic
rules
not
yet
&
Yrjonsuuri, "Norms and Action in Obligational Disputations", in Die Philosophic im 14. and 15. Jahrhundert (Bochum Studien zur Philosophic 10). Ed. O. Pluta, Amsterdam: B.R. Griiner, 1988, pp. 191-202. Cf.
Tractatus de Consequentiis. Ed. H. Hubien (Philosophes Medievaux 16). Louvain,
1976.
For relevant texts, see Consequentiae Strodi cum commento Alexandri Sermonetae, Gaetani in easdem Consequentias, Dubia Magistri Pauli Pergulensis,
Declarationes
Obligationes eiusdem Strodi ... Quaestiones in Frachantiani Vicentini. Venice 1517.
Consequentias Strodi perutiles
...
Antonii
Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science
439
ergo ) to represent systematically-ambiguously all the consequential structures of medievals, we can say that everyone agreed that if P Q is (read
=>
to
be sound, then
satisfied
as
at least
necessary
~(P & ~Q)
~O(P & ~Q)
must be
Whether these conditions were
conditions.
soundness of
sufficient conditions for
not even
if
P
=*
Q
seems
matter of some dispute throughout the ages. The
Ex
to have
also
remained a
impossibili quodlibet
and the Ex falso quodlibet rules which come along with the acceptance of ~(P & ~Q) or ~O(P & ~Q) as sufficient conditions for the soundness of
P
=>
Q also remained a source of perplexity. We should stress that medieval rules
when
there
is
a
question
of
the
of
whole
of the intellectual structures (or
"constitutive"
not formally constitute them in the
way
consequence,
system
of
"games"):
especially
them, that
is,
not
are
they do
in which, say, the rules of chess
may be said to constitute the game of chess, or in the way in which the formation rules and definitions may be said to constitute certain systems. Rather, they take the intellectual structures or
as already given.
"games"
They merely bring out explicitly the most general features inherent in or and they help to organize and tacitly assumed in those structures, possibly
the
reorganize
framework
materials.
They
also
a
provide
theoretical
comparison and contrast of various deductive fields. the mutual Thus, consequential rule which in fact allows us to use P Q and ~Q =$~P interchangeably may be seen to be operative in the system of alethic modalities, e.g., allowing for interchange of OP nQ and for the
=>
=>
~OQ
=>
of
system
CP [P
=>
~OP,
with
the
obligational
possible
proviso
disputation
and
e.g.,
that
allowing
N%Q =*N%P The general consequential rules, such as Q] and known by a to be sound [Ka (P =>C^0
n(P
(with the proviso that If =>
=>
and
Q));
for
in
interchange
the of
Ka (P=* Q)). a consequence Q)], then
is
sound
P is to be [CQ]\ should if
conceded by a [C%P], then Q must also be conceded by a not be confused with constitutive rules of the game of obligation such as the following three rules from Paul of Pergula
which
s
Obligationes:
Everything
possible and posited to you and known by you to be such must be admitted by you Everything which is possible and posited to you, is
;
and admitted by you
be conceded by you for as long as the Everything which follows from what has been posited and admitted from it alone or from it together with some thing which has
obligatio lasts
is
to
;
been conceded, or some things which have been conceded, is to be conceded The constitutive rules are sufficient to play the game, while .
Boh
440
the general rules of consequence help to explicate the logical force of
to-be-conceded, to-be-denied,
and to understand the conceptual or
etc.,
theoretical underpinnings of various types of obligationes.
Mutatis mutandis, one could
make
remarks about the rules of
parallel
a consequence is sound such as Strode s Rule 13, then if he knows the it to be sound [K (P = and a knows Q)], [P Q] a antecedent [K^], then he also knows the consequent [Ka Q]\ in relation to our first order knowledge, opinion, and justification claims in various If
epistemic logic, =>
areas of
human
We
Part Two. in
logic
will
now
some medieval views on
explore
general and of the theory of consequence
demonstrative
of
ideal
endeavor.
science
as
in
expressed
in
the
the relation of
particular to the
newly
recovered
Posterior Analytics.
As
already noted, the medievals since Boethius characterized logic loosely as both art and science. It was cultivated together with grammar, rhetoric
opposed
and other to
the
liberal
"real"
arts
-
as
opposed
and
sciences,
to mechanical arts, i.e.
The recovery
sophy, metaphysics, and theology.
and also as
mathematics, natural philo of Posterior Analytics in
the mid-twelfth century changed greatly the discussions of the nature of these disciplines. Arguments were set up to establish the status of
demonstrative science for
all
these disciplines,
-
a status which
seems
have become a high desideratum. As for logic, two remarkable phenomena should be observed.
On
to
the
one hand there was a progressive development by logicians such as Abelard, Peter of Spain, and others, of certain ideas on inference found Aristotle
in
Megaric
s
Prior Analytics
tradition),
culminating
systems of consequences.
development,
the
5
On
appeared
in
(and possibly in the Stoicformulation of quasi-axiomatic
Topics a
the other hand, and concomitantly with this -
under
the
influence
of
the
Posterior
a rising tendency to claim for logic itself the status of a demonstrative science. This tendency became especially strong by first half of the 13th century when Robert Grosseteste wrote a
Analytics strict
there
and
On
-
the relation of topics to consequence see E. Stump, Topics: their development Later Medieval Philos consequences", in The Cambridge History of
and absorption into
Kretzmann et al., Cambridge: University Press, 1982, pp. 273-299. See also Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of Topics in the Middle Ages, Miinchen: Philosophia
ophy. Ed. N. N.J.
Verlag, 1984.
441
Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science
detailed
commentary on every aspect of the
particular on
central concept,
its
The requirements
of
i.e.,
Prior Analytics,
and
in
that of scientific demonstration.
demonstration
scientific
as
understood
by
medievals were rather restrictive and stringent. Scientific knowledge was supposed to consist of syllogisms in Barbara whose premisses are true, universal,
better to
and necessary, as well as immediate, and more certain and the conclusion to be demonstrated. While restrictions
known than
seem
have been incorporated into the very of science and while scientific demonstration was originally syllogism
categorical
definition
to
phenomena and
thought to be a model to explain natural
certain metaphysical propositions, the concept of science
demonstration was
extended
soon
geometry and arithmetic, as well as
to
cover
other
grammar and
to establish
and of
disciplines
scientific
such
as
logic.
But although the criteria of demonstrative science were in a sense relaxed, there were still some definite criteria to be met. Thus, the
anonymous author of a mid-14th century Petri
I-III
Hispani
rules,
in logic
"for
treatise Quaestiones in tractatus
emphatically denies that logic requisites of
all
its
is
a
mere
being a science are
collection of found".
The
requisites he listed are three, viz.
the subject of which a property
which
(dignitas} means or
More
is
being demonstrated, the property
been demonstrated of the
has
subject,
and the principle
known
proposition which serves as demonstration that the property belongs to that subject.
or
the per se
the
concretely,
logic has a subject, such as syllogism ... it also has properties, such as demonstrative probable and^ apparent (as are the enthymeme, the induction, and many other things). Moreover, it has principles (dignitates), e.g. if that which appears less to inhere inheres, then that whicn appears more [to inhere] also inheres , or to whatever fits the defimens, the deiiniendum also , and many others, as is evident from Topics and from the fifth treatise of this book [i.e., Summulae Petri Hispani}. ,
Several
centuries
later,
John Versor
question of whether logic can
He
first
"analysis",
points
and
out
that
is
the
"first
material principles of syllogism,
Cf.
Jan Pinborg,
"Anonymi
(1982), pp. 1-170; pp. 12f.
means
Quaestiones
Analytics
"resolutio".
resolution"
i.e.
concerned with the same
claim to be a demonstrative science.
(etymologically)
that in Latin this
explain that there
1
itself
is
when one
have to
do with
Then he goes on
to
points out both the
terms and propositions, as well as the
in
Tractatus Petri Hispani
I-III",
CIMAGL
41
Boh
442
formal principles, i.e., the mode and figure and the regulative principles, i.e. the dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo. But after this first there
resolution
the
is
second
one
which
is
a
of
resolution
the
consequent or of the thing concluded into the principles and causes of that consequent, these causes being signified
remarked
be
and of
circularity his
Vcrsor
that
commentary on
infinite
is
fully
regress,
Prior Analytics
as seen
where he
of
It
premisses."
the
from the
initial
should
charge
possible
of
paragraph of
says:
of a conclusion acquired by a syllogism; therefore, if there be knowledge of syllogism, it too must be through syllogism. Thus, such a syllogism is either known or not known. Not the first, because then it would be known by another syllogism, and that one by another, and so there would be a process in infinitum. Nor could one say the second, because then there would he no principle on the basis of which to come to knowledge of syllogism.
Every science
demonstration;
Versor consists
possession
now demonstration
is
escape from both circularity and the recourse to the distinction between the
s
in
a
is
firm
aware
by the
a
knowledge by resolution There is no doubt
infinite
.
were
that medieval authors
fully
conscious of the
significance of the structure of their systems of consequences
procedures of deriving
regress
two senses of
some
rules
and of the
from others. Four cases should
suffice
to illustrate the point. [1]
puritate [i.e.,
rules
with
De
Walter Burley (12757-1345?), explaining artis
logicae:
Tractatus
regulis generalibus
longior,
he
consequentiarum
his
says: ]
in the
procedures "In
are laid
the
first
down
which ought to be assumed as the principles in this the rejection of incorrect rules which lead to the
De
chapter
the general
art",
together
fallacy
of
second chapter Dc modo arguendi enthymematice consequent ...; in conditionalibus ] it will be explained in what way one ought to argue on the basis of these rules in the realm of enthymematic consequences. in the
[
John Buridan (1295/1300 Consequentiae, states his aim as
[2]
of his
d.after 1358), in the
opening sentence
follows:
In this book I wish to discuss consequences, dealing as much as I can with their causes, about which many things have sufficiently been proved by others in an a posteriori manner, although perhaps they were not reduced [by them] to the first causes in virtue of
Cf.
8
Johannes Dorp, Super omnes
Ed. P. Boehner,
p. 60.
libros
nove
logice,
Koln, 1503, a2 rA.
Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science
Now
which they are saki to hold.
it
443
will
be necessary to put forward
his
discussion
some assumptions. Johannes
[3]
Dorp
sciences,
points out that,
of other sciences at
in
(fl.c.1400),
whether logic can establish
its
first
own
of
principles logic
all,
but only shows
all,
of the
question
or only those
of other
does not establish principles
how one can
correctly derive
conclusions from premisses in any science. Having said that, that
"in
principles,
from
its
Dorp adds its own
sense logic also provides a method in respect of
this
because
own
it
teaches 10
principles]."
how
form argumentation from these
to
The use
[i.e.
of logic in a deduction of derived
from the principal ones in closely analogous to the deduction of conclusions from principles of particular sciences.
rules
[4]
Alexander Sermoneta (d.1486),
on Strode tract
on
s
in the
Prologue to his commentary
Consequentiae, speculates on the proper location which a
on consequences should have
in a systematically
ordered textbook
logic:
say that this book [Consequentiae] is the most universal part of the Prior Analytics, or else is introductory to it; and therefore it should be placed immediately after the De Interpretatione, and before the Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and Posterior Analytics. This order is evident, because this book is concerned with consequence as its subject, and this is more universal than any kind of argumentation or syllogism, with which the Prior special Analytics is concerned. I
Conclusion. Medieval rules of consequence can be seen as metalinguistic
formulations of the logic of propositions and also of the most general principles of particular sub-branches of logic. The principal rules are
analogous to axiom-rules, and the derived rules are analogous to theorems in our natural deduction systems. The function of the rules of
consequence was not only to provide a logical tool for reasoning in any subject-matter and in all sciences and speculative arts, but also to make explicit
The
the most general logical presuppositions in any inferential area.
recovery
of
the
Posterior
Analytics
stimulated
the
subsequent
n
Ed. H. Hubien, p. 17. Cf. also P. King, Jean Buridan s Logic: Supposition; The Treatise on Consequences. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.
The
Treatise
on
Johannes Dorp, Commentary on Buridan s Dialectica; quoted in E.A. Moody, Truth in Mediaeval Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1953, pp. 14f.
and Consequence
Alexander Sermoneta, 1493.
in
the Prologue to his
Commentary on Strode
s
Consequences,
Boh
444
discussions that logic
on the nature of is
because they
The Ohio
itself
logic
itself.
Medievals did come to believe
a demonstrative knowledge, but this was possible only
in fact re-defined
State University
and extended the concept of science.
HARTMUT BRANDS
Die zweifache Einteilung dcr formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood
Von den Anfangen
bis
heute hat
man
die verschiedenen Einteilungen der
Arten und Unterarten durch sogenannte porphyriaSupposition nische Baume darzustellen versucht. Es verdient eine gewisse Beachtung, in
daB
ein
ihre
solches,
Unternehmen
im
und
triviales
Prinzip
auch
unproblematisches
von William of Sherwood gegebene Einteilung bis heute nicht adaquat gelungen ist. Der Grund hierfiir ist ohne Zweifel, daB William
of
fur die
Sherwood
bei
der
formalen
Supposition
Einteilung vornimmt. Diese wird namlich einerseits personale, andererseits in die diskrete
Es
und allgemeine
eine
zweifache
in die einfache
und
eingeteilt.
gibt zwei Modelle, diese zweifache Einteilung in die
stammbaum-
artige Darstellung zu integrieren. Das erste findet sich bereits als Marginalie in der Pariser Handschrift und faBt die zweifache Einteilung selbst als eine Zweiteilung auf.
Dies hat zur Konsequenz, daB aus zwei
Zweiteilungen eine Vierteilung wird. Da das genannte Schema in keiner der beiden Editionen 1 der Introductions in logicam des William of
Sherwood enthalten
ist,
fiihre ich es hier an:
2
Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood. Einleitung und Textausgabe von Martin Grabmann, Miinchen 1937. William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam: Critical Text. By with Peter Kunze and Bernhard Mussler. New York 1983. (Edition Lohr)
2
MS Paris
Bibliotheque Nationale,
lat.
16617,
fol. 14r.
Literarhistorische
Charles
H.
Lohr
Brands
446
Die weitcren Einteilungcn schlieBcn an die personale Supposition an und sollen hier iibergangen wcrden. Im Prin/.ip gleiche Darstellungcn finden sich in
3 4 neueren Arbeiten bei Enders und Marenbon
Modell
Das zweite
.
denkbar einfach: die Einteilung der formalen
ist
Supposition in eine diskrete und allgemeine wird weggelassen. Dieser Umstand wird von Kneale/Kneale allerdings angemerkt: "Apart from one
be noticed
pair to
later,
all
the varieties of suppositio distinguished by
6 5 William of Shyreswood are shown in the (...) table." Bei de Rijk und 7 Heyer die wohl auf Kneale/Kneale /uriickgreifen, wird die Unvollstandigkeit des Schemas indessen nicht vermerkt. Moglicherweise ist das Schema ,
bei
deshalb
Kneale/Kneale
Verhaltnis
der
denn
erschien,
one distinction
sie is
Zweiteilung monieren: he docs not explain
in
"...
allerdings,
ihnen
das
anderen nicht hinreichnend klar
/,ur
related to the
meine
Ich
weil
geblieben,
unvollstiindig
einen
how
detail
the
8 other."
daB William of Sherwood dieses Verhaltnis
keineswegs ganzlich uncrklart liiBt, merkt er doch eigens an, daB es sich bei beiden Einteilungen um vollstandige Disjunktionen handelt. nota, totaliter sub se divisionum suppositionem, comprehcndit quod utraqiie "Et
formalem
Omnis cnim
dico.
Aut
Item.
discreta.
accipitur
suppositio, out pro re defcrente
muB man
Jacobi
10
supponens out
dictio
pro forma significata
formam
et
tune est
communis
est et
aut
tune est simplex 9
personalis."
Insofern
zustimmen, daB mil dieser zwcifachen Einteilung der
formalen Supposition eigentlich eine Kreu/.klassifikation vorliege, wenn er
H.
Enders,
Munchen J.
5
Sprachlogische
Traktate
des
Mittelalters
und
der
Semantikbegriff,
1975, S. 81.
Marenbon, Later Medie\-al Philosophy, Ixmdon/Ncw York
W. Kncale and M. Kneale, The of
Peter
Spain,
Tractatus.
De\<elopment
First
1987, S. 44.
of Logic, Oxford 1962,
Critical
Edition
S. 253.
from the LXXVIII.
(Kneale/Kneale)
Manuscripts
with
an
Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Asscn 1972. Introduction, S. in: Peter of Spain, Tractatus K. Jacobi, Rez. von Philosophise he Vgl. hierzu: dem Diagramm, das de Rijk von der Rundschau 22 (1976), S. 48 - 64; bes. S. 58: ,
"In
bei
Einteilung
communis
-
Wilhelm
von
Shyreswood
discreta gar nicht vor. Dies
ist
gibt,
jedoch
kommt
G. Heyer, Generische Kennzeichnungen, Munchen 1987, 8
(Kneale/Kneale), 9 K.
Jacobi,
Unterteilung
suppositio
S. 68.
S. 256.
S. 266.
(Edition Lohr), 1
die
unrichtig."
in den Die Ai Modalbegriffe - Koln 1980, S. 414, Anm. 127.
Shyreswood, Leiden
logischen
Schriften
des
Wilhelm
von
Die Einteilung der formalen Supposition bci William of Sherwood
auch bei
schematischen
der
11
447
von dieser Einsicht
Darstcllung
keinen
Gebrauch macht. Alle genannten
Darstellungen der
William of Sherwood
in
der Supposition des
Einteilung
Stammbaumform
miissen als wesentlich unvoll-
angesehen werden, weil keine von ihnen die von William of
standig
Sherwood eigens hervorgehobene und thematisierte suppositio simplex discreta
AuBerdem wird Williams
enthalt.
Einteilung
schematische ausgesetzt
anderen
mit
ist,
aus
diesen
den
Darstellung,
die
hatte folgende
Form:
kritischer
Schemata
nicht
vorgebrachten
seiner
Vergleich verstandlich.
Eine
Einwanden
nicht
suppositio formalis
communis
discreta
L
I
simplex
simplex
personalis
personalis
Hierauf bezogen wird unmittelbar verstandlich, was William of Sherwood an anderen Einteilungen verwirft, und es erscheint die Annahme gerechtfertigt,
daB William of Sherwood
Supposition gerade wegen hat. sit
"Volunt
divisio
discreta
die zweifache Einteilung der formalen der suppositio simplex discreta vorgenommen
enim quidam, quod haec
communis
suppositionis,
divisio, alia simplex, alia personalis,
non
quia
cadit
haec
diversitas
in
12 suppositione."
Fur diese diskrete und einfache Supposition
gibt
William of Sherwood
einen Beispielsatz, zu dessen Verstandnis es sinnvoll erscheint, zunachst
kommenden
die hier in Betracht
Definitionen der einzelnen Suppositions-
arten durchzugehen. Ein formal supponierender Terminus supponiert
immer
signifikativ. Supponiert er einfach, so supponiert er unmittelbar fur sein
Signifikat
(und
nicht,
wie bei der personalen Supposition, mittelbar fur GemaB der Definition von significatio,
eine unter dieses fallende Sache).
worunter William of Sherwood die begriffliche Vergegenwartigung bzw. Darstellung einer Form versteht, bedeutet einfach zu supponieren auch,
Form - pro forma significata enim nomen significat solam formam
fur
11
12
eine
K. Jacobi, a.a.O., S. 163.
(Edition Lohr), S. 267.
13
(Edition Lohr),
S. 268.
-
zu supponieren. Denn: 13
,.."
"Omne
Diskret schlieBlich supponiert
Brands
448
um
ein Terminus, sofern es sich
handelt wie Sokrates oder dieser
aus
Das
sich
der
Kreuzklassifikation
Mensch
Problem
stellcnde
hier
einen diskreten bzw. singularen Terminus .
offensichtlich
sich
ergibt
beiden
der
Einteilungen
gerade formalen
der
Supposition, d.h. speziell aus der Kombination von einfachcr und diskreter Supposition.
Was
soil
daB ein singularer
darunter verstanden wcrden,
Terminus, insbesondere ein Eigenname eine Form bezeichnetl Genau namlich eine Form zu bezeichnen, behauptet William of Sherwood Sokrates
Subject
seines
und
einfache
die
fiir
diskrete
dies,
vom
Supposition
gcgebenen Beispielsatzes. "Cum dico Socrates est praedicabile de uno 14 Dem Verstandnis solo respicitur pro forma significata per nomen." ,
Eigenname cine Form bezeichnct, kommt man wohl ein Stuck naher, wcnn man sich um ein Verstandnis des von William of Sherwood angefiihrten Beispielsatzes bcmuht. dessen, was es heiBt, daB ein
Kneale/Kneale erscheint
Sherwood
offensichtlich
sowohl die von William of
postuliertc suppositio simplex discreta
und
die damit
Annahme, daB singulare Termini eine Form bezeichnen, Beispielsatz abwegig:
be
said
to
a
signify
suppositio.
As
substance,
Socrates
he
"...
example means anything Socrates Socrates
is is
and
rightly
not
is
at
that
this
remarked
predicable all,
verbundene
auch Williams
name can
very strangely that a proper
insists
form
Aristotle
als
it
of
is
in
essential
to
doctrine
his
anything.
If
its
having
of
primary William s last
must mean either that being-called-
one thing or that being-identical-withpredicable predicable of only one thing, and in neither case is a form of of only
1
Socraticity
Die
involved."
kritische
Interpretation von Kneale/Kneale leuchtet ein,
man das esse praedicabile als Wenn Aristoteles sagt, daB erste
Pradikat-(in
einem Urteil)-sein
Substanzen weder
in
wenn
auffaBt.
etwas sind noch von
etwas ausgesagt werden, so besagt dies in logischer Terminologie, daB singulare Termini in einer Aussage niemals an Pradikatsstelle stehen
konnen. Folglich rekonstruieren Kneale/Kneale
Sokrates
als
einen auf
genau ein Objekt zutreffenden allgemeinen Terminus, und zwar in Form einer Relation zu Sokrates (als Person) bzw. zu Sokrates (als Namen), in der
nur Sokrates selbst
steht.
DaB
Sokrates
nur von einem
einzigen
ausgesagt wird, besagt dann, daB die als offene Schemata dargestellten 14
(Edition Lohr), S. 267.
15
(Kneale/Kneale),
S. 257.
Die Einteilung derformalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood Pradikate
x
x wird
bzw.
identisch mil Sokrates
1st
Sokrates
nur von einem einem einzigen Objekt, namlich Sokrates
449
genannt
selbst,
erfiillt
werden.
Es
mir
erscheint
Intention Williams
ob
zweifelhaft,
Es
wird.
getroffen
mit
dieser sich
bietet
die
Interpretation
namlich ein anderes
Verstandnis des esse praedicabile und damit auch des von William of Sherwood gegebenen Beispielsatzes an, da der Ausdruck esse praedicabile de uno solo als Defmiens im Pradikabilien-Kapitel der Introductiones
vorkommt, und zwar
als
Defmiens des Definiendums Individuum
individuum, quod de uno solo
:
est
"Et
nomen proprium
est praedicabile, ut est
et
pronomen et dictio communis cum pronomine. Dicitur enim individuum, eo 1 quod non dividitur in partes subiectivas." Die Erlauterungen, die William of Sherwood der Definition hinzufiigt, *
erleichtern zunachst das Verstandnis des Satzes nicht.
einen Schritt sichtlich
in
kommen: Der
weiter
den
Socrates
aquivalenten
Form
angefiihrte
Dennoch kann man
individuum
est
darf offen-
Beispielsatz
transformiert
von Kneale/Kneale keine Parallele zu Aussagen wie eine Ansatzpunkte mehr. Ferner ergibt sich Homo est species insofern species zu sein bedeutet, daB homo von werden. In dieser
bietet er fur die Kritik
,
mehreren ausgesagt werden kann. "Species autem est, quod praedicatur de 17 Weiterhin kann gesagt werden, daB wegen der angefiihrten pluribus ,.."
Socrates
innerhalb des transformierten Beispielsatzes vorliegt. Historisch
und systematisch
Wenn nun
in
einfach
von Interesse, daB W. Burleigh im gleichen praedicatur de pluribus und Socrates est
hier
ist
Homo
Kontext die Beispielsatze 18 individuum verwendet.
Socrates
der einfachen Supposition auch im Falle von
Modus
Parallele der erste
dem
Satz
Socrates est individuum
supponieren
soil,
so
kann er nicht
der Eigenname fur
die
Person
Sokrates supponieren. Folglich kann individuum nicht als solcher Begriff verstanden werden, der auf Personon zutrifft. Die Erlauterung ut est
nomen proprium sonst
Socrates
William
of
...
kann aber auch
material
Sherwood
nicht wortlich
(Edition Lohr),
17 (Edition Lohr),
W. St.
Burleigh,
weil
supponieren wiirde. Vorlaufig bleibt der von
fur
die
suppositio
simplex
Beispielsatz in beiden Versionen problematisch. 16
genommen werden, discreta
angefiihrte
Zur Vorbereitung eines
S. 237. S. 238.
De
puritate
Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955,
S.
17
artis u. 19.
logicae
tractates
longior,
edited
by Ph.
Boehner,
Brands
450
angemessenen Verstandnisses gehe vorlaufig zu dcr Frage zuriick, was cine
Form
es heiBt,
und kehre
Umweg
daB ein diskreter Terminus
bczeichnct.
Wort
Ein
ich einen kleinen
(material) noch
wenn
einfach,
supponiert
es
weder
fur
sich
selbst
Gegenstande (personal) supponiert. Dasjenige, was von etwas ausgesagt wird, sind nun aber auch weder Worter ( Sokrates ) noch entgegen der bei Aristoteles iiblichen Ausdruckweise Gegenstande fiir
(Sokrates). Ausgesagt werden in der Regel Eigenschaften bzw. Begriffe. Beide sind Kandidaten fiir dasjenige, was als Bedeutung eines Terminus im
Unterschied zu seiner Referenz Sokrates
Es
ist
Betracht gezogen wird. Die Person
das Referenzobjekt des Eigennamens Sokrates
als
Supposition
.
keine groBen Schwierigkeiten bereiten, die Theorie der
diirfte
Sherwood
in
Referenztheorie
cine
aufzufassen.
19
Fiir
William
of
wcitergehende Auffassung, daB die Referenz eines Terminus ausschliefllich eine Sache seiner Supposition sei. offensichtlich
gilt
die
Hiervon zu trennen
ist die Signifikation: die Bezcichnungsfunktion eines Terminus ist die Darstellung einer Form. So auch des singularen jeden kann sich auch durch den jeweiligen Satzkontext immer nur die -
d.h.
Supposition
20
Signifikation.
konscquent
Referenz
Was
Terminus wandeln,
eines
nicht
aber
wir somit bci William of Sherwood vorfinden,
durchgefiihrte,
die
d.h.
singularen
Termini
seine
ist
eine
einbeziehende
Semantiken sind uns
in der Gegenwarts"Wenn wir die Trennung zwischen Bedeutung wohl vertraut. philosophie und Referenz richtig beachten, spaltcn sich die Probleme dessen, was so
dualistische Semantik. Derartige
leichthin
Semantik genannt wird,
verschieden sind, daB
sic
Wir konnen von der
Tfieorie dcr
21
(
denn
Eigennamen
er
trennt
in
Namen
nicht
so fundamental
mehr
verdienen.
Bedeutung und der Tfieorie der Referenz kommt William of Sherwood sehr
ubercinstimmend
Sache
der
die
signiflcatio
)
an,
dann
muB
singulare
Termini,
speziell
eine Entitat benannt werden, die als Bedeutung
P.V. Spade, The Semantics of Medie\ al Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, theory of reference."
"71
die
Gebiete,
von der suppositio ( Referenz ). Wcndet man diesen Dualismus auf
Bedeutung
20
zwei
Dieser modernen Sicht
sprechen."
nahe,
in
einen gemeinsamen
in:
Terms",
S.
192:
The
The
Cambridge
History
of Later
theory of supposition proper
is
a
Vgl. (Edition Lohr), S. 267 (1. Dubitatio); ferner: (Kneale/Kneale), S. 254.
W.V.O. Quine,
"Anmerkungen
zur
logischen Standpunkt, Frankfurt 1979, S. 125.
Theorie
der
Referenz",
in:
ders.,
Von einem
Die Einteilung derformalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood
451
Unterschied zu ihrer Referenz fungiert. Hierbei so vermute ich, um dicjenigen Entitaten, die nur von
singularer Termini in:
handelt es sich,
einem einzigen ausgesagt werden konnen: die Individua. Diesen mochte ich mich nun in Form eines kleinen Exkurses in die Semantik der
Gegenwart zuwenden. Von den verschiedenen dualistischen Semantiken der 22 Gegenwart wahle ich die von R. Carnap in Bedeutung und Notwendigkeit entwickelte Theorie von Extension und Intension.
Carnap
semantischen Begriffe der Extension und Intension
fiihrt die
per Abstraktion ein. Dabei handelt es sich um das prazisierende Verfahren der Begriffsexplikation, bezogen auf bekannte Begriffspaare wie Umfang
oder Freges Bedeutung und Sinn Der Begriff der Intension wird vor allem im Hinblick auf die Modallogik eingefiihrt und ist nicht
und
Inhalt
.
identisch mit
dem umfassenden
Begriff der Bedeutung in
Abgrenzung zur
Referenz. Nicht nur aus diesem Grunde sind Analogisierungen zwischen
der significatio bei William of Sherwood und dem der 23 iiberhaupt nur cum grano salis zulassig. Bevor Wesenheiten gesucht werden, die als Extension bzw. Intension
dem
Begriff
Intension
wenn
Frage kommen, wird die Gleichheit, bzw. allgemein die Aquivalenz von Extension und Intension festgelegt. Ich beschranke mich hier auf die von auf die singularen d.h. Carnap so genannten Individuenausdriicke in
,
Termini. Zwei Individuenausdriicke sind extensionsgleich gdw. der Satz a = b wahr ist; sie sind intensionsgleich gdw. dieser L-wahr ist. Ein Satz
L-wahr
soil
heiBen,
Tatsachenwissen kann.
Da
wenn
seine
iiber
Wahrheit
unabhangig
von
aufgrund semantischer Regeln entschieden werden a = b genau dann wahr ist, wenn a und b auf
allein
der Satz
dasselbe Objekt referieren,
kommt
als
Extension eines singularen Terminus
nur das jeweilige Referenzobjekt in Frage. Der Begriff der L- Wahrheit ist an sich umstritten. Davon unabhangig bereitet es gewisse Schwierigkeiten, sich einen L-wahren Satz der Form a=b
vorzustellen, vor
sollen.
allem
wenn
Dementsprechend bieten
sich
a
und
b
echte
Eigennamen
sein
auch keine Wesenheiten unmittelbar
an, die als Intensionen singularer Termini in Frage
kamen. Das hiermit
angedeutete Problem scheint mir demjenigen analog zu sein, welches sich als Frage nach der durch einen singularen Terminus bezeichneten Form darstellte.
7? R. 1
und
23
Da
bei den anderen Designatoren als jeweilige Intensionen sich
Carnap, Bedeutung und Notwendigkeit,
9.
Vgl. P.V. Spade, a.a.O., S. 188.
Wien
-
New
York,
1972,
insbes.
Kap.
Brands
452
solche Wesenhcitcn ergaben, die gewohnlich als Bedcutungen odcr Begriffe
bezeichnet wcrden, Individuenbegriff
Terminus
fuhrt
zur
Carnap
Entsprechung dazu den Ausdruck
in
der
Bezeichnung
Intension
eines
singularen
ein.
In Ansehung der Analogic, aber auch im BewuBtsein der Differenzen zwischen den dualistischen Semantiken William s of Sherwood und R.
Carnaps mochte ich vorschlagen, den von William of Sherwood eindurch Individuum Terminus Individuenbegriff im Sinne gefiihrten Carnaps zu iibersetzen. Williams Erlauterung ware danach wie folgt zu verstehen: Ein Individuenbegriff ist dasjenigc, was nur von einem einzigen ausgesagt werden kann, wie dies bei der Verwendung singularer Termini der
Fall
werden
Sie
weil
sie
(im Unterschied zu Allgemeinbegriffen) keine untcrgeordneten Begriffe haben. Entsprechend ware species in dem Satz homo est species durch ist.
Individuenbegriffe
genannt,
24
Artbegriff wiederzugeben.
von
Die
hiermit
der
durch
vorgcschlagene Interpretation, welche ihren Ausgang William of Sherwood eingefiihrten suppositio simplex
kann selbstverstandlich nicht ohne Folgen fur ein Verstandnis der suppositio simplex im allgcmeinen bleiben. Es hat den
discreta
genommen
hat,
Anschein angesichts der verschiedenen, Beispielsatze,
angefiihrten
wenn
als
supponierende Termini Suppositionsart auch ganz
fur einfach
diese
verschiedene Gebrauchsweisen von Termini abdecken wiirde, welche der
personalen oder materialen Supposition nicht zugeordnet werden konnen. Feststeht, daB ein an Subjektstelle einfach supponierender Terminus durch ein bestimmtes Pradikat determiniert sein muB, und daB unter
diesem Subjektterminus ein descensus ad singularia generell nicht moglich ist. Die Griinde fiir die Unmoglichkeit eines Descensus sind allerdings andere
als bei
der immobilen Supposition.
Angesichts der Frage nach
dem
quantitativen Status von Satzen mit
einfach supponierendem Subjekt, weist William of
Sherwood
die Auffas-
sung, derartige Satze seien singular, deshalb zuriick, weil sie eine mit Semantik unvereinbare Deutung der einfachen dualistischen seiner
Supposition voraussetzt. Diese faBt namlich species
als
Eigennamen
muB fiir William Terminus homo indem
Interpretation
der
24
,
So
z.B. Kant, Logik,
A
150.
homo
in
dem
Satz
homo
est
einer Art auf, also als singularen Terminus. Diese
of er
Sherwood unakzeptabel erscheinen, weil nicht mehr als konkreter allgemeiner
Die Einteilung derfortnalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood
Terminus sondern
abstraktcr singularer Terminus 25 fungieren wiirde,
als
seine Signifikation andern wiirde.
personal und
Dann
homo ohne
aber wiirde
Zweifel
supponieren. Die gleiche Konsequenz ergabe sich einen material supponierenden Terminus durch
diskret
wenn man
iibrigens,
453
Hinzufiigen von Anfiihrungszeichen modifizieren wiirde.
Es
den
hat
wiirden
Kneale/Kneale die einfache Supposition als miBliche Folge des Umstands verstehn, daB wir zwischen abstrakten, singularen und konkreten, allgemeinen Termini im gewohnals
Anschein,
lichen Sprachgebrauch nicht hinreichend scharf unterscheiden:
use the
new
word homo
as a substitute for the
But William refuses to admit
sense.
account
incoherent
two
of
kinds
we
word humanitas, we give it a this, and produces instead an 26
of
if
"For
suppositio."
Da
dieses
sich
Verstandnis der einfachen Supposition offensichtlich mit der dualistischen
Semantik
Williams
vereinbaren
nicht
la Bt,
man
konnte
andere
eine
erwagen, welche den Vorzug hat, daB sie sich aus unserer Interpretation von Williams semantischem Dualismus ergibt und zugleich erklart, warum ein derart einfach supponierender Subjektterminus keinen Descensus zula Bt.
Wenn
es so
ist,
daB ein Terminus
nach unserer Interpretation
Signifikat,
in einfacher fiir
Supposition
sein
fiir
einen Begriff steht und dies
durch den spezifischen Charakter des Pradikats bewirkt wird, dann liegt es nahe, derartige Pradikate im Sinne Freges als Begriffe zweiter Stufe aufzufassen.
Individuum,
solche Begriffe, welche
species,
und praedicabile de uno solo
immer nur auf andere
Begriffe zutreffen.
sinde
Nun
sind
allerdings die durch solche Begriffe zweiter Stufe Begriffen erster Stufe
zugesprochenen Eigenschaften nicht auch schon deshalb Eigenschaften der unter diese fallenden Gegenstande. Das ist der Grund dafiir, daB ein
Descensus
diesem Fall nicht moglich
in
ist.
Die Beziehung der Unter-
ordnung eines Begriffs unter einen andcren, wie animal
,
ist
transitiv,
anderen, wie in
Zum FaBt
25
diejenige
Satz
homo
AbschluB mochte
man,
wie
Zweiteilungen auf,
dem
erhalt
Vgl. hierzu:
man
Fallens
est species
,
ist
(Kneale/Kneale),
dem
Satz
Begriffs
homo
unter
est
einen
dies nicht.
noch auf ein Problem
am Rande
die
W.V.O. Quine, Grundzuge der Logik, Frankfurt
26
in
eines
hinweisen.
Ausfiihrungen Williams nahelegen, beide formalen Supposition als vollstandige Disjunktionen einen Stammbaum der Arten und Unterarten der
dies
der
ich
des
S. 255.
1969, S. 262
f.
Brands
454
Supposition,
dcr den
Intentioncn von William
of
Sherwood zumindest
dahingehend entspricht,
daB
Nun
daB William dann auch die suppositio personalis
ist
es zweifellos so,
schon
discreta
einfiihren
die suppositio
simplex discreta
fiihrt
Zweiteilung
der
Supposition
personalen
determinierte und eine konfuse. Konfuse Supposition dictio
27
supponit pro
diskreten nicht fur
Ich
enthalt.
Abgrenzungsgriinden, wie das Schema ausweist, aber zu Schwierigkeiten mil der nachfolgend
aus
muB. Das
vorgcnommenen
er
multis".
Supposition sein,
liegt
vor,
in
cine
"quando
Dies kann aber keine echte Unterart der
da ein diskreter Terminus per defmitionem
mehreres supponieren kann. hoffe
gezeigt
zu
haben,
daB
die
zweifache
Einteilung
der
formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood mil einer Reihe nicht nur formaler Probleme verbunden ist. Die Einbe/iehung der modernen Semantik hatte nicht nur den Sinn, diese Probleme besser zu verstehen, sondern
auch zu zeigen, wie modern William of Sherwood
Universitat Diisseldorf
27
(Edition Lohr), S. 266.
ist.
MARCIA L. COLISH
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
The importance
s
Conception ofNihil
of John the Scot in the history of medieval thought has
always rested squarely on his transmission and use of Neoplatonism.
1
To
the extent that scholars have sought to bring the Latin school tradition
bear on their assessment of John
to
the
as
logic,
discipline
conceptual tool. his
2
There
which he is,
philosophy they have turned to applied the most consistently as a s
however, a key juncture in John s thought, 3, at which he distances
analysis of the term nihil in Periphyseon
himself both from the Neoplatonic tradition and from the discipline of
As
logic.
with
other
medieval
authors
confronted
with
the
task
of
explaining the idea of creation ex nihilo, John canvasses the liberal arts
and the philosophy available to him for assistance. But, in this case, he finds the help he seeks in the science of arithmetic, as it had come down to him in the works of Boethius and Martianus Capella, whom John and his
studied
associates
appeals
to
school
foundation of
all
and glossed. The
arithmetic
is
the
critical
point
at
of monad,
definition
which John the
abstract
numbers. Can the monad be equated with the deity, as Can the monad be defined as nihil!
the later Neoplatonists had argued?
I
would
like
to
acknowledge the support of the
Princeton, where this paper was written
The
in
Institute
for
Advanced Study,
1987.
conspectus on John and his relation to his Neoplatonic sources is Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the ftehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden, 1978) and Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, 1986). For
provided
best
by
overall
Stephen
see Marcia L. Colish, "John the Scot s Christology and Soteriology in Relation to His Greek Sources," Downside Re\ icw, 100 (1982), 138-51. For the influence of Marius Victorinus in particular see Gustavo A. Piemonte, expression quae sunt et 6 Jean Scot et Marius Victorinus," Jean Scot ecrivain: Actes du IV quae non sunt 28 aout-2 ed. G.-H. Allard international, Montreal, 1983, colloque septembre earlier literature
"L
:
Vita in omnia pervenit El vitalismo eriugeniano y Mario Victorino," Patristica et Mediae\>alia 1 (1986), 3-48. I would like thank Dr. Piemonte for making offprints of these two papers available to me. "
(Montreal/Paris, 1986), pp. 81-113; la
to
influencia de
:
}
John Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre: Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981); Gangolf Schrimpf, Das Werk des Johannes Scottus Eriugena im Rahmcn des Wissenschafts\<erstdndnisses seiner Zeit: Eine Hinfuhrung zu Periphyseon, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters, n.F. 23 (Miinster, 1982). See, especially,
Logic,
456
Colish
Can it
nihil
be viewed as the privation of essence, species, or habitusl Can logical opposite of aliquid, which it excludes? All of
be defined as the
these
contemporary
Carolingian
patristic sources.
grounds It
more
and
possibilities
3
had
been well
as
masters,
In the Periphyseon
John
and
as
by
rejects
all
their
ancient
and
these options and
argument instead on the arithmetical notion of the monad. should be noted that Periphyseon 3 is not the only place where
prologue to
John
St.
argument, and one
s
nihil.
He
does so as well
in his
all
things. Further,
coeternal and coessential with the Trinity. Since the
was not made
line
of
tune with the Boethian logic of opposition. In ipso factum est nichil
"Sine
quod factum
observes that nothing was created except through the includes
homily on the
Gospel, where he uses a much simpler
fully in
explicating the line
that
earlier
his
John addresses the idea of
Word
by
ventilated
Word is the in Him and
Word
est,"
John
because the
is
impossible to envision anything
Word
except the other Persons of the
it
logos of creation, 4
"nothing
Nihil here
at
all
remains
nihil
omnino, through of omnia in and at the the created all, nothing conceptual opposite through the Word, which omnia logically negates. The Boethian logic of Him."
is
mutually exclusive opposites is sufficient for John s task in this homily, is not the case in Periphyseon 3, where he sets for himself a much more complicated assignment. For it is here that John develops his
but this
doctrine of the primordial
causes.
It
invokes the mathematical idea of the
Periphyseon
is
largely for this reason that
monad
in his
he
handling of nihil in
3.
Before we
proceed to the Periphyseon it must be stressed that ancient Greek mathematicians had developed a standard notion of the later Neoplatonists rang their own changes. The mathematical definition of the monad as the abstract substratum of all
monad, on which the numbers, to which the
all
numbers can be reduced, was
first
formulated by
Pythagoreans. While the Pythagoreans were not averse to number
symbolism in other areas, their treatment of the monad was straight forward and strictly mathematical. This perspective was continued by the
Neopythagorean
A
mathematicians,
detailed investigation focusing
provided by Marcia L. Colish, Theological
Method,"
whose most
influential
exponent was
on Fredegisus of Tours and Ratramnus of Corbie Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae: A Study
"Carolingian
is
in
Speculum, 59 (1984), 757-95.
John the Scot, Homelie sur le Prologue de Jean 8, ed. Edouard Jeauneau, Sources chretiennes, 151 (Paris, 1969), p. 240: "nichil omnino relinquit quod in ipso et per ipsum factum For the whole argument see pp. 238-40. sit."
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
Nicomachus of Gerasa. Written remained the
teaching and
Nicomachus
debt
the
to
conception of the monad.
5
main currents of Neopythagorean
the
textbook in the
classic
Pythagoreans
can be
centuries.
for
field
seen especially
in
his
Eschewing any cosmological applications of the
he treats number as the structure of
idea,
457
Conception c/Nihil
the second century A.D., his Intro
in
summed up
duction to Arithmetic
s
reality.
The monad and
the
and dyad, the two most primitive elements of number, refer not to as actual numbers but to the metaphysical principles of unity and alterity underlying them. According to Nicomachus, all actual numbers "one"
"two"
monad, which is a pure intelligible simple, and alone incomposite, and
derive their essential natures from the
mind
the
in
constituted
"in
When textbooks
it
of
God,
primary,
accordance with
6 itself."
Boethius was preparing his translations of the quadrivium was to Nicomachus that he turned as the authority on
arithmetic. His treatment of the
aequalitas in Latin,
the
preserves
not by any other but by
itself,
monad, which he renders
more abbreviated than
is
of
essentials
Nicomachus
as unitas or
Nicomachus, but he
that of
Boethius
Numbers,
teaching.
agrees, are diverse in themselves. They can be reduced to the concepts of "odd number" and "even number," which in turn "come forth from one 7 source."
This source
is
equality,
from which
all
inequalities are derived
8
With these definitions in hand, in which they are all resolved. Boethius propels the strictly mathematical Neopythagorean view of the monad firmly on its course in the Latin school tradition. and
The
later
Neopythagorean handling of Plato For their
part,
they sought
were
however,
Neoplatonists,
to
with
dissatisfied
this
doctrine of the one and the many.
s
explore
broader metaphysical and
the
On Nicomachus and his place in the arithmetical tradition see Frank Egleston Robbins and Louis Charles Karpinski, "Studies in Greek Mathematics," the intro. to Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic, trans. Martin Luther d Ooge (New York,
1926),
16-17,
pp.
35,
37-38,
99-102;
Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction arithmetique 1
Dernier,
Nicomachus
trans.
of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic d Ooge, pp. 190, 192, 211-12. The quotation is at 1.6.4,
De
Boethius, 13:
Janine
"ex
Number
institutione arithmetica
una tamen genitura Theory:
A
profluunt."
Translation
of the
to
intro.
her
trans,
of
(Paris, 1978), pp. 16, 24-25. 1.7.1,
1.6.1-4,
1.16.9-10,
2.1.1,
p. 190.
Godofredus Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), p. a translation by Michael Masi, Boethian De institutione arithmetica (Amsterdam, 1983), p. 1.2,
ed.
There
is
76.
o
De
arith.
inst.
aequalitate
2.1,
processerit.
componuntur,
The same point
et is
in
p.
77:
Tota
inaequalitatis
Sed quae rerum elementa
eadem
rursus resolutione facta
also found at 1.32, p. 66.
substantia sunt,
a
principe
ex hisdem
solvuntur."
The
sui
generis
principaliter translation is
omnia mine.
Colish
458
monad
monad,
concern we can document
a
Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagitc. Since they saw the
in
especially
of the
implications
cosmological
as the opposite of
Neoplatonists held
plurality, these
all
be
to
it
even as identical with, a higher hypostasis of being. analogous Proclus envisions each order of being, not merely numbers, as starting from a monad and as being reducible to the monad at the top of its or
to,
He
particular order of being.
the deity.
and
is
9
A
similar view
docs not hesitate to equate the monad with found widely among the late Neoplatonists,
further elaborated by Dionysius. Recasting the
and the many
in
above
creation,
each order of being to the
all
the archetypes.
or
directly
Creation
simple and beings that are composite.
monad "Every
the
number it
is is
unified in the
monad,
distinguished
and
number
of
in
its
whole. In Stephen Gcrsh
monad
in
relation
Neoplatonists gave
monad
But
the
God
to this
s
more
10
restricted
sense
idea a
is
the
all
unity levels
are
that
As Dionysius it
puts
it,
proceeds from
having transferred the to
the
11 number."
warm welcome,
of
beings
creation
words, Dionysius has also recast
which creation
status
alone shares with the
but inasmuch as
multiplied,"
its
supreme
monad
contains
the quality of radical and indivisible unicity.
monad
concept
level of the
God becomes
indirectly.
problem of the one
monad up from
numerical terms, he moves the
as the archetype of that stands
of
is
God
as
as
a
"the
Other Christian
treating the deity as the
and physical worlds. They sei/cd on this notion as a useful way of conceptuali/ing the emanation of plurality from unity that harmoni/ed with the additions and revisions they imported into in relation to the angelic
the pagan Ncoplatonic view of the spiritual order.
are
12
While the Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean theories of the monad manifestly different, they were sometimes combined by authors in
Proclus, Theologia Platonis 138, 231, ed. H.D. Saffcy and I,.G. Wcstcrink (Paris, 1968- ); In Timaeum 3.106.1-17, cd. E. Dichl (Ixipzig, 1903-06); Institutio theologica 24.1-3, 2nd cd., cd. E.R. Dodds (Oxford, 1965). On this whole development sec Gcrsh, to Eriugena, pp. 63, 99, 141 n. 81, to whom this account is much A.C. Lloyd, "The later Neoplatonists." The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mcdic\ al Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1970), p. 307; Philip Merlan, "Zur Zahlenlehre im Platonismus (Neuplatonismus) und im Sefer Yezira," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 3 (1965), 175-76.
From lamblichus indebted;
also
Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominihus 5.6, ed. B. Cordier, PG, 821A. The trans, is that of Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena, p. 140. Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena, p. Neoplatonists more generally see ibid., pp. 140-41. 12
Ibid., pp. 175-77.
140.
On
Dionysius
and
3:
820D-
other
late
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
s
459
Conception o/Nihil
Favonius Eulogius, a pupil of Augustine, produced a de Somnio Scipionis in the late fourth century which reflects a Disputatio blend of this sort. On the one hand, Favonius describes the monad as an late
antiquity.
which generates
indivisible unity
and
first
numbers 13 and, on the
all
causes manifested as God,
final
14
mind,
15
other, as the
or soul.
16
As
with
monad can be viewed as the deity The reasons leading mind or soul are far from clear. A much
Dionysius later on, he thinks that the
because of
him
primordial incapacity to suffer division.
to extend this idea to the
more
influential
commentator on the dream of
Scipio, Macrobius, follows
Consistent with his generally Neoplatonic outlook, Macrobius defines
suit.
the
its
monad
as that
"which
is
the beginning and end of
knows neither beginning nor end, distinguishes our understanding of
is
to
applied
Him from
the
all
things but itself
highest
God and
the plurality of things and
17 But, in the same passage, Macrobius goes powers subsequent to Him." on to say that the monad can also be found in the ranks of creatures
below
God,
He
which
innumerable forms of
generates,
including
intellect,
soul,
and
the
1
things.
Also open to some confusion is an author even more central than Macrobius to the educational enterprise of John the Scot and his Martianus Capella. In the seventh book of his Marriage of Mercury and Philology, devoted to arithmetic, Martianus offers both the associates,
Neopythagorean
unambiguous,
crisp,
which they return, creator
God,
Favonius
in
15 16
and a Neoplatonic
contrast with matter in
Eulogius,
Scarpa (Padova, 1974). 14
19
of
definition
principle of numbers, the source from which
all
the
monad
definition of the
a state
monad
of generation.
de Somnio Scipionis 3.1, 4.1-2, 5.12, author see Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:739.
Disputatio
On
this
the
as
numbers proceed and
as the
20
6.1-2,
to
Even
ed.
L.
Disp. 5.4. Ibid. 6.3, 7.3.
Ibid. 5.2.
Somnium Scipionis 1.6.8, ed. JA. Willis (Leipzig, 1963), 2:19: "Haec finisque omnium, neque ipsa principii aut finis sciens, ad summum refertur deum eiusque intellectum a sequentium numero rerum et potestatum sequestrat, nee in inferiore post deum gradu frustra earn desideraveris." The translation is that of Macrobius, In
monas
initium
Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:525. 18
In Som. Scip. 1.6.8-9, Willis, 2:19-20.
Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae Willis (Leipzig, 1983), pp. 263, 269, 270. 20
Ibid. 7.733, p. 264.
et
Mercurii
7.732,
7.743,
7.745,
cd.
J.A.
Colish
460
more problematic
is
the speech of Arithmetica which opens Book
together in
Before
all
things,
let
monad be
the
disparate notions
these
way Martianus lumps
the
7:
numbers coming
called sacred;
have taught that before everything the monad is the original quickener. For if form is an accident 01 to that anything that exists, and if that which numbers is prior which is numbered, it is fitting to venerate the monad before that which has been called the beginning. Then too, I shall not neglect to point out to those who examine the matter that because the monad is unity, it is alone self-sufficient. From it other things are is generated; it alone is the seminal force of all numbers; it alone the measure and cause of increases and the extent of losses. The monad is everywhere a part, and everywhere the whole; it endures through all things. For that which is prior to things existing and which does not disappear when they pass away, must be eternal. and Jove - a conclusion Rightly is the monad called Father of All, corroborated by the causative force of its ideal and intelligible form. have called the monad Concord, others Piety or Friendship, ... Some because it is so compact that it is not cut into parts. But more and father of the properly is it called Jupiter, because it is the head after
and associated with
it
it
gods.
Richard Johnson and E.R.
Burge,
their
in
commentary on Martianus
acknowledge the eclectic character of his treatment of the monad. But, they stress, despite his comparisons between the monad, the in practice Martianus tends to deity, and various benevolent attitudes,
arithmetic,
confine
his
application
of the
function of undergirding
all
monad more
rigorously
to
the
numbers, from the dyad on down,
abstract
in the less
rhapsodic manner of the Neopythagoreans.
Given
this
array
of
possibilities,
Neopythagorean mathematical approaches, how did John the Scot come literalism
from
Neoplatonic
to texts that freely
use
as
it
a
strictly
mathematical
to
mingle these
monad? Was he of the monad and
to grips with the
able to dismiss as an allegorical fancy the theologi/.ing to
theology
concept,
or
did
he
tread
the
monas esto, quam ante Quae si species est accidens cuilibet extantium primo, priusque est quod numeral quam illud numerandum, rite earn ante ipsum, quem principem dixere, veneramur. Nee dissimulabo ex eo, quod monas, retractantibus unum solum ipsam esse ab eaque cetera procreari omniumque numerorum solam seminarium esse solamque mcnsuram et incrementorum causam statumdum per cuncta perque detrimentorum. Quae tamen ubique pars est, ubique totum, Ibid.
cuncta
7.731,
vibrantem
pp.
262-63:
sociati
"Prae
cunctis
igitur
postmodum numeri
affata
principia
sacra
docuerunt.
non absconditur, neque enim, quae est ante extantia et quae post absumpta omnium lovem rite esse nominatam, quod potest non esse perpetua. Hanc igitur patrem testatur. ... Hanc quoque alii quidem idealis illius intellectualisque speciei vis causativa in Concordiam, hanc Pietatem Amicitiamque dixere, quod ita nectatur, ut non secetur sit idem caput ac pater deorum." The partes; tamen rectius luppitur nuncupatur, quod William H. Stahl et al., Martianus Capclla and the Seven Liberal Arts translation is petua;
by
(New York,
1977), 2:276-77.
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
Ncoplatonic path, equating the
monad
s
Conception o/Nihil
with the deity? John
s
461
work both
as
pedagogue and as a philosopher affords an unambiguous answer. In Periphyseon 3 he adheres expressly to the Neopythagorean concept of the monad. As was suggested earlier, his inspiration here was the need a
to
distinguish
came
causes from God. But even before John
the primordial
to address that problem,
he and
had taken
his circle of educators
a solidly Neopythagorean stand on the
monad
in their
commentaries on
Martianus Capella.
There
some
is
commentaries and
on the relationships among these is not likely to be resolved
scholarly debate
their
authorship, which
a complete critical edition of all the known manuscripts has been made. 22 None the less, a scholarly consensus has been achieved on two until
main
points:
systematic
First,
study
of
while the
who
was Alcuin
it
liberal
whose
in
arts,
first
out
mapped
service
the
Martianus
the
were produced, the program was not activated until the middle of the ninth century under the leadership of Martin of Laon, John the Scot,
glosses
and other Hiberno-Latin masters. Second, while the
literary
form of the
commentary is by nature somewhat fluid, making attribution within a group of scholars joined in a common pedagogical pursuit rather difficult, it
is
agreed that the glosses contained
in a Paris
manuscript published by and those preserved in an Oxford manuscript, Book 1 of has been published by Edouard Jeauneau, 24 may be read as 23
Cora Lutz, which
authentic
brought
indices to
the
to text
the
learning,
and the point of view, which John
of Martianus. 25
In
the
addition,
continental
first
On the status of this question and the scholarly literature pertaining to it, see Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:799 n. 100; Michael Ilcrren, "The. Commentary on Martianus Attributed to John Scottus: Its Hiberno-I^tin Background," Jean Scot ecrivain, pp. 26571; Claudio Leonardi, "Martianus Capella et Jean Scot: Nouvelle presentation d un vieux ibid.,
probleme,"
21-23,
35-36,
pp.
37-48,
"Martianus Lutz, Kristeller and F.E.
196-207; Schrimpf, 133-34. Authors not
Capella,"
Catalogus
Das Wcrk discussed
des Johannes Scottus Eriugena, pp. by these scholars include Cora E.
Translationum
Commentariorum
et
ed.
,
P.O.
Cranz (Washington, 1971), 2:367-78, who at that point attributed to Martin of Laon the commentary she had earlier published and assigned to Dunchad; and M.L.W. Laistner, "Martianus Capella and His Ninth-Century Commentators," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 9 (1925), 130-38, who attributes to Martin the Paris MS. 12960 which was later edited by Lutz and which subsequent scholars have agreed in assigning to John.
John
the
Scot,
Annotationes
in
Marcianum,
ed.
Cora E. Lutz (Cambridge,
MA,
1939).
Edouard Jeauneau, Quatre themes
erigeniens (Montreal/Paris, 1978), pp. 91-166.
Commentary on Martianus," Das Werk des Johannes Scottus Eriugena, pp. Herren,
"The
pp.
269,
21-23,
271,
35-36,
272,
37-48,
274,
285;
133-34;
Schrimpf,
"Zur
Frage
Colish
462
master to gloss Martianus, Remigius of Auxcrrc, shows a close dependence 26
and, on both the Paris and the Oxford stages of the Eriugenian project, as we will see, he shares and expands on John s treatment of the monad in particular.
One
now
of the leading scholars
Leonard!, has argued that this outlook
made
asserts,
to
recover
however,
the
decidedly Neoplatonic. John, he
guide to Martianus, in whose work he sought 27 With respect to the monad, cast of mind.
Platonic
exactly
is
Claudio
texts,
his
Dionysius
the
work on these
at
reverse
is
the
Not only does John avoid speech that would have allowed
case.
lemmatizing the portion of Arithmctica
s
on the Neoplatonic description of the monad as the line dependent on Boethius deity, he also takes a strictly Neopythagorcan He proceeds in a nomonad. the discuss he does in those glosses where
him
to
expatiate
nonsense and non-metaphorical manner. The monad, he states, is the mathematical substratum underlying all numbers, and abstract 28 Whatever their capacity for subdivision and of all numbers."
"the
principle
he
composition,
continues,
numbers are
"all
likewise
reducible
29 Finally, he notes, "once monad, which alone is irreducible." have been reduced, the monad endures ... because above
nothing, since the end of the
In
may be
line
that lies
numbers
all
constituted in
is
there
it
is
it."-
cited
time John had moved
translations,
more
to consider
dcr Authentizitat unscrcr Tcxtc von Johannes Scottus J.J.
By the work he had had the
the Periphyseon.
Platonic theory of the
and he was able
ed.
in
to the composition of that
opportunity to acquire a
Mind of Eriugena,
the
John does not speculate on what the nihil above the monad, or how they are related. This theme is last
one to which he devotes extended attention
Greek
to
numbers
all
O Meara
and
its
monad thanks
to his
merits side by side
Annotationcs
Ludwig Biclcr (Dublin,
in
Martianum,
1973),
pp.
The
125-39;
Scottus Eriugena und die Re/.cption dcs Martianus Capella im karolingischen ed. W. Beicrwaltes (Heidelberg, Eriugena: Studien zu scincn Qncllen,
"Johannes
Bildungswcsen,"
1980), pp. 135-48.
26
27 28
Herren,
The Commentary on
I^eonardi,
John
"Martianus
the
Scot,
numerorum
"omnium
Martianus," p.
Capella et
Annotations principium."
Jean
Scot,"
272.
pp. 202-03.
in Marcianurn, Musica 490.14, ed. Lut/., p. 202: Similarly Arithmctica 366.20, 367.18; Musica 490.15, pp.
155, 202.
2^ Ibid.,
Arithmctica 367.13,
quae non potest 30 Ibid.,
remanet
...
p.
155:
"quando
rcsolvuntur numeri ad
monadem
pcrvenitur
resolvi."
Arithmetica
367.15,
quia supra earn nihil
p.
155:
est,
quia
"postquam
finis
omnium
omnes numeri consummantur, monas in
ea
constat."
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
s
monad which he
with the Neopythagorean understanding of the
463
Conception o/ Nihil
reflects in
Martianus glosses. In Periphyseon 2, the first point in the work where 31 he holds up these two alternatives almost as he refers to the monad, of the monad as the cause and end of all the notion He cites parallels. his
numbers
one instance of the general philosophical maxim
as
cause can have
effects.
many
32
He
also quotes Dionysius
mathematical understanding of the monad to the 33 and Maximus Confessor s similar analysis in cause,
that a single
yoking of the
monad
as
the
first
commentary on monadic teaching
Gregory Nazianzus, whom Maximus reports as principle that no difference should be admitted into the
Book
not until
is
It
his
"the
First
34 Cause."
3 of the Periphyseon, in the context of defining
and explaining creation ex nihilo, that John makes a preclusive choice between these contrasting approaches. His ultimate goal in this section of the work is to dismiss one Neoplatonic conception of nihil in
nihil
As he
poses the question of nihil, he asks "whether it is the complete privation of essence or substance or accident, 3 or the excellence of the divine superessentiality." The Neoplatonism of of another.
favor
initially
*
both the
which he doctrine
which John supports, and of the privative theory, has been noted by previous commentators on John s
latter position,
rejects,
of nihil,
as
well
as
the
fact
Carolingian discussions of the subject
Cf.
Greek
I.
P.
Sheldon-Williams,
monad and
identifies
it
Philosophy, with God as
which, however, does not mention the
Hiberniae, 9 (Dublin, 1972),
Ibid.
2.618B-C,
p.
Eriugena, p. 140 n. 76. 34 Periphyseon 2.615B, introducatur."
The
trans,
p.
202:
is
responding to recent
addition to older debates.
Eriugena,"
36
What
Cambridge History of Later
522, who claims that John the first cause in Periphyseon
adverts 1.1,
a
to
the
passage
at all.
ed.
and
trans.
I.
P.
Sheldon-Williams, Scriptores
p. 174.
210. This passage
is
he
p.
monad
John the Scot, Periphyseon 2.602B, Ixitini
Scottus
"Johannes
and Early Medieval
in
that
"de
has been noted by Gersh,
monade rationcm
ut
Prom lamblichus
non separatio
in
primo
to
causali
at p. 203.
3.634B, ed. and trans. I. P. Sheldon-Williams and Ludwig Bieler, Scriptores Hiberniae, 11 (Dublin, 1981), p. 60: "utrum privatio totius essentiae vel substantiae vel accidentis an divinae superessentialitatis excellentia." The trans, is at p. 61. Ibid.
I^atini
36
The
fullest
A. Piemonte,
study to date of John s doctrine of nihil in the Periphyseon is Gustavo sobre la creatio ex nihilo en Juan Escoto Eriugena," Sapientia, 23
"Notas
Donald F. Duclow, "Divine Nothingness and Self-Creation in John Journal of Religion, 57 (1977), 110-15 and Sheldon-Williams, intro. to his ed. of Periphyseon 3, pp. 5-11. Briefer accounts are given by Henry Belt, Johannes Scotus Eriugena: A Study in Medie\>al Philosophy (New York, 1964 [repr. of 1925 ed.]), (1968), 37-58; see also
Scotus
Eriugena,"
97 and Maieul Cappuyns, Jean Scot Erigene: Sa vie, son oeuwe, sa pensee (Bruxelles, 1964 [repr. of 1933 ed.]), pp. 344-50. The first scholar to note that John was respond-
p.
Colish
464
has not been appreciated
his use of the
is
Neopythagorean view of the
to exclude the Neoplatonic identification of the
monad
monad
with the
nihil, preserving nihil as a denomination for his handling of nihil in his Johannine homily, with God alone. In contrast where he treats it as the opposite of omnia, in Periphyseon 3 John
and the monad with
deity
of aliquid, here equates the divine nihil with omnia, seen as the opposite with omnia and nihil superessence. In identifying aliquid with essence and arriving at
that
John also has
destination,
to
define the nature of the
which remain eternal in primordial causes, which are created by God and themselves God. For not which are but the mind of God once created, this
purpose
as
the
well,
strictly
supplies him with conceptual
tools
notion
mathematical that
help him
of
the
monad
to obtain the desired
result.
John presents the idea of
as
nihil
the privation of being as the
major traditional position he needs to refute, including under this heading nihil as the absence of species, accidents, and habitus as well as the absence of essence
He
itself.
insists
that
there
is
between
a difference
the privation of being, on the one hand, and the apophatic method as an to the latter, he epistemic approach to God, on the other. With respect reflect appropriate to predicate negations of God, for they not denote do and our awareness of His transcendence any privation they
agrees,
is
it
of substance
means the view, says
already
37
on His
Nihil,
part.
however,
is
when
not acceptable
it
or aptitude of being. Such a privation of being or any function from a being of something it removal John, would involve the
possesses.
the
But,
nihil
that
before the
requires
when
explanation
there were
is
the
no created
creation, nothingness present of their essences or of beings yet in existence that could be deprived 38 second definition of nihil which John rejects, although anything else.
A
the exegetical tradition than he claims, is the identification of nihil with unformed matter. "For He Who made the
there
less
is
support for
it
in
and contemporaries and not just to a remoter past ing to his Carolingian predecessors J.A. Endres, Forschungen zur Gescluchte der fruhmittelalterlichen Philosophic, zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, 17:2-3 (Miinster, 1915), pp. 12-
was
Beitrage 13,
although this forerunner
is
not acknowledged by Piemonte,
"Notas,"
pp.
4M2
n.
6.
Carolingian background see Colish, "Carolingian Debates," scholars mentioned above has noticed the Speculum, 59 (1984), 757-95. None of the mathematical and anti-Neoplatonic aspects of John s treatment of nihil.
For more
37 38
details
on
the
128. Periphyseon 3.634C-D, 3.663C, pp. 60-62, Ibid.
3.634C-D, 3.686A-687B, pp. 60-62, 178-80.
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot
all,"
he plainly
backing up
states,
idea with a
this
465
Conception o/Nihil
made unformed matter
world out of unformed matter 39
s
out of nothing at
number of
familiar
40
arguments.
Having cleared the decks of these alternatives, John turns to two other theories, one of which he plans to refute and the other of which he intends to support. The
equated with
In the
nihil.
first
the
is
section of
idea
that
monad can be
the
Book 3 where he
considers this
John does not mention Martianus
specially, although he cites Boethius as an authority on arithmetic, summarizing and applying the Boethian doctrine of the monad, which we also find in the Martianus
possibility
41
Numbers, John notes, are themselves pure concepts, which can be reduced to the monad, the monad ... is the beginning and the middle and the end of all numbers."42 While they may explain the nature of changeable realities in act and operation, numbers remain eternal in glosses.
"for
their condition as
pure
intelligibles
and share,
in the
monad,
attribute
its
of abstract unity and indivisibility. Given that status, can the
monad be
regarded as the nihil out of which number was created and, through number, the phenomenal world that number can describe? After due consideration,
monad
the
John
with the
monad
reflected
it
any attempt to equate
cause. In thus de-Neoplatonizing the
first
John may well have had in mind nihil lies above the monad. This the
and with
rejects this idea,
remark
his
in the
monad,
Martianus gloss that
clear decision to bring his doctrine of
into line with a purely mathematical understanding of
and
more
still
it
is
commentary on
in
pointedly, Remigius Remigius expressly abandons the philosophical, that is, the 43 Neoplatonic, monad in favor of the exclusively mathematical monad. later,
Martianus.
39
Ibid.
3.636D, p. 66:
materiam de omnino 40
Ibid.
"Qui "
nihil.
The
enim
fecit
trans,
is
mundum
de materia informi ipse
fecit
informem
at p. 67.
3.637C-638C, 3.650B-651A, pp. 68-70, 98-100.
For the whole passage see
3.652B-663A, pp. 102-10. References to Boethius in have been noted by Goulven Madec, "Jean Scot et ses Scot ecrivain, p. 166, who emphasizes the fact that John cites Boethius auteurs," Jean primarily as a mathematician; and Alison White, "Boethius in the Medieval Quadrivium," Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 169, this
section of the Periphyseon
195
n.
51,
arith. 1.32
who emphasizes John
and
Periphyseon
3.652C,
monas."
The
367.7,
quotations from Boethius on the
102: "est enim p. trans, is at p. 103.
Remigius of Auxerre, 367.6,
s
monad
at
De
inst.
2.1.
42
numerorum
ibid.
367.9,
367.13,
Commentum 367.15,
376.9,
in
principium
et
medium
Manianum Capellam,
377.10,
et
365.9, 377.18, 378.5, 378.12, ed.
finis
omnium
365.15,
367.4,
Cora A. Lutz
Colish
466
But John
for that choice.
Remigius offers no reasons
s
reasons for making
He has two aims in mind. First, Periphyseon are quite specific. of any unique metaphysical status by he wants to deprive the monad causes. And second, he wants to use treating it as one of the primordial for the monad as a model for explaining the primordial causes and in the
it
showing why they are not
The primordial
nihil either.
causes,
John agrees, are
eternal,
and they are the 44
Word brings all things into being. agents through which the are not nihil and they are not identical with God Himself. ,
several limitations.
creation
causes
to
They have
While they are eternal once created, they are created. causes have the capacity to be and not to be,
Hence, the primordial which is not true either of the
Yet, they
God
or of nihil. Further, before
God
ordained
phenomenal world, the capacity of the primordial 45 The actualizing of this causes was only potential.
of the
act
as
their own autonomous power but through a capacity occurred not through 46 Thus, the seminal force (vis seminalis) implanted in them by God.
called nihil. Nor, since they are created, are primordial causes cannot be dwell in the mind of God. The they identical with God, even though they nihil out of
which the world was created
Word, John
in the
says,
must be
no creature can possess, even consubstantial with the Word, those causes that occupy the second, or created and creative, subdivision a status that
of nature.
47
With
this
reasoning in place, John arrives
at
his positive definition of nihil as the superessential
aliquid,
the nihil-as-omnia
that
denotes
God
s
his
final
conclusion,
God, the opposite of
superabundant goodness.
that is infra-real but Nihil-as-omnia, John stresses, refers not to a being that are to a being that is hyper-real, "beyond all things that are and 48 In John s terms the divine nothingness is the direct antithesis of not."
the idea of
omnino
nihil,
and
it
is
the only conceivable nihil out of which
196-99. At 367.16-368.18, pp. 182-84, Remigius 1962-65), 2:177, 178, 180-82, the association of the monad with Jupiter by Martianus, and argues vigorously no way are to be under that his remarks here are merely allegorical and that they in
(Leiden, tackles
stood
44 45
46 47 48
literally.
Periphyseon 3.641C-D,
p. 78.
Ibid.
3.642C-644A, 3.663B-670D, pp. 80-82, 126-44.
Ibid.
3.672A-C, 3.679B-C, pp. 146-48, 162-64.
Ibid.
3.679C-680B,
p. 164.
Ibid. 3.681C, p. 168:
"ultra
omnia quae sunt
et
quae non
sunt."
The
trans,
is
at p. 169.
Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot s Conception o/ Nihil the world can have been created.
As
the
name
of God, nihil
is
467
thus an
accurate denotation of a divine nature that admits of no privations and
an adequate reflection of the divine transcendence which makes the negativa apposite to the deity.
This
conclusion
is
via
49
of
is,
course,
compatible
perfectly
with
the
Neoplatonic theology which John derived from his Greek sources. But, as paper has sought to show, in the argument John develops enroute to
this
that
conclusion he displays a willingness to dissociate himself from the
Neoplatonic tradition, not only by rejecting a privative view of nihil but also by detaching himself from the Neoplatonic doctrine of the monad.
For
it
he substitutes the Neopythagorean understanding of the monad, by Nicomachus, Boethius, and the Latin transmitters and
mediated
accepted by John himself as a way of teasing the purely mathematical idea
of
monad
arithmetic.
out
of the
tangled
how
After
eclecticism
he
of Martianus this
observing applies metaphysical problems he addresses in Periphyseon conclusions
of our
own.
First,
3,
Capella to
principle
s
the
we may draw two
John was no mere imitator or passive
conduit of his Greek Neoplatonic sources; rather, he wields them with
independence and discrimination. Second, in investigating the intellectual principles that informed John s philosophy, we need to widen our perspective to include the science of school arithmetic, which at
work
in the case just
examined.
Oberlin College
49
Ibid.
3.684C-685A, pp. 174-76.
is
clearly
ANGEL D ORS
On Stump s Interpretation of Barley s De obligationibus
her
In
contribution
valuable
the
to
History of Later Medieval Philosophy
1
important reader Jlie Cambridge Eleonore Stump has looked into
the doctrine on obligations according to Walter Burley (ca. 1275-1344/5)
2
one of the apparently paradoxical examples analyzed In her work, E. Stump the which present paper will focus upon. by Burley does the following: a) tend to the interpretation of two texts by Burley which he respectively formulates and solves the paradox); b) reject and
specifically into
(in
offered by Burley;
solution
the
paradox. In
new
the
my
and
c)
propose a new solution to the
of Burley opinion, both the rejection
s
solution as well as
solution proposed by Stump come about by means of an incorrect of Burley s texts. Burley s solution can be defended. This is
interpretation
of the object of this paper, and along with it a greater comprehension be in my view, the nature and history of the doctrine on obligations can,
obtained.
1.
On
The
the Interpretation of Burley s texts
texts
which Stump tends are the following: ex posito et opposite Item, probatur quod non omne sequens es Romae vel bene negati sit concedendum. Et ponatur ista:
by Burley
321-
to
"tu
A. From the beginning to the early fourteenth century", in J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 315-334. E. Stump has also gathered together a large Philosophy, Cambridge, 1982, pp. Logic of carried out in this work in a later work: the of analyses part 63 (1985), pp. 355-374, in Walter Burley s Treatise on obligations", Synthese disputation to which we can apply everything said in this paper. 1
E.
Stump,
"Obligations:
N. Kretzmann, A.
Kenny
&
"ITie
2
Burley
Treatise
s
unpublished,
by
R.
DC
of a doctoral dissertation, as yet obligationibus is the topic to at the Catholic University of Louvain: An Introduction
Green
texts of William of Sherwood (?) been able to consult this work and texts I have stuck exclusively to the texts therefore s life and works see Una offered in Stump s work. For a complete reference of Burley cultural de Walter Burley, Biblioteca Contexto XIV. del La siglo Juarez, A., Filosofia Ciudad de Dios", Real Monasterio del Escorial, Madrid, 1978.
the
and
"La
Treatise
logical
Walter
De
obligationibus. I
With
have
Burley. Unfortunately for the analysis of Burley s
critical
not
Stump on Burley s De
469
obligationibus
Romae
te esse
est concedendum". Deinde, esse prpponatur: est concedendum". Haec est falsa et impertinens, igitur
Romae
"te
Deinde,
neganda.
proponatur:
posito et opposito bene negati". conditionahs est necessaria:
"si
Romae
concedendum, sed
est
cedendum,
igitur tu es Romae".
Romae
esse
"te
ex haec
sequitur
Haec
est necessaria, quia tu es vel te te esse non est Concessa ista te esse
Romae Romae
esse
con
Romae
"
sequitur ex posito et opposito bene negati", proponatur ista: esse Romae est concedendum". Si concedas, idem concessisti et negasti, igitur male. Si neges, cedat tempus, negasti sequens per regulam. Quia si regula sit bona, tune sequitur: te esse Romae sequitur ex posito et opposito bene negati, igitur "te
"
Romae
te esse
quod haec
Dicitur
3.22:
est concedendum". "
est
te
neganda:
esse
Romae
sequitur ex
opposito bene negati". Nee haec est necessaria. Et, si sit necessanum te esse Romae sequi ex disiunctiva, quae ponitur cum opposito alterius partis, tamen non est necesposito et t
sarium istam disiunctivam poni. E.
Stump
formulated
-
analyzes
the
in the following terms:
Oponens
Romae
est
conce-
dendum
which
the
paradox
is
Ratio
(la)
T
(2a)
F
(Ib) estpositum
(2b) est falsa et imperti-
nens
Romae sequitur e posito et opposito bene negati
(3) te esse
Romae
est
(3a)
conce-
The paradox concede
(4)
T
(3b) (3) follows from the truth of (1) and the falsity of (2)
(4a) ?
dendum
either
in
Respondens
Romae vel te esse Romae est concedendum
(4) te esse
-
3
(1) tu es
(2) te esse
text
first
resides in the fact that the respondent can not in (4a)
because
it
is
the
same proposition
(2)
which he has
already denied, or deny (4) because from (3) which has been conceded there follows the truth of (4). In
my
opinion, in this analysis
incorrect interpretation which
paradox. This
we can
already find the root of the
Stump makes of Burley
s
treatment of
this
so for at least three reasons:
first, because she analyzes the answers given by the respondent in terms of truth (T) and falsehood whereas in the text are in terms of concession and (F) they presented is
negation; second, because (3b) does not constitute an adequate analysis of
P. 323. In the presentation of these analyses I have recuperated of the enunciations translated into English by E. Stump.
the
Latin version
D
470
0rs
the concession of (3); the reason explicitly given in this text in favor of third column and third, because by introducing within the analysis as a the
reasons
given
inadequately in
my
favor
in
opinion
-
respondent s answers, it seems as though these reasons come to be part of of
-
the
the respondent. By the dialogue maintained between the opponent and in her analysis the concession of (3) in terms of truth (T), interpreting is then taken to interpret the negation of (3), which Burley
Stump
the paradox, as a declaration of the falsehood proposes as the solution to what I believe to be Hurley s intention. On the other (F) of (3), against in his text in favor of the concession of hand, the reason Burley gives the not the one to be found in Stump s analysis, but rather is (3)
conditional proposition whose consequent is not necessity of a determined in the first part of the disjunctive (1). If we analy/.e (1) (3) but rather text in the ultimate the form of (pvq), the reason alleged in Burley s the conditional instance in favor of (3) is the necessity (validity) of the of in favor reasons the given Finally, (((pvq)A-iq)^p).
not be interpreted as part of the dialogue respondent s answers must which is initially maintained between the opponent and the respondent of a metadialogue which both maintain around the but rather as part
if the respondent has rules of the the not does obey answered correctly or not and which
initial
dialogue
but
obligations
with
the
rather
object
strict
of
determining
considerations
of
truth
or
falsehood;
the
be even more urgent when and a the very initial dialogue bears upon the conditions of the dialogue, the as same enunciation can be presented as a proposed enunciation and as in the reason for one of the respondent s answers in that dialogue, distinction
between either dialogue
paradoxical
case being analy/ed
is
in
made
to
which an enunciation which
in
the
true is denied in the dialogue metadialogue would be recogni/ed as being has its of repugnance with regard to what in spite of its truth by reason
The relevance of these three observations will previously been conceded. of be made more clearly manifest when we analy/c Stump s interpretation the solution offered by Burley.
Stump
offers
two interpretations of the second
text in
which Burley
to formulates his solution to the paradox: one, more immediate, according and a which Burley s solution would be, in her opinion, extravagant, her opinion, also second more elaborated solution which is, according to
Stump on Burley s DC
4 inadequate although apparently more reasonable. According to of these two interpretations, Burlcy would have maintained in
logically
the
471
obligationibus
first
text that the answer given to (3) is incorrect given that (3) must not be conceded but rather denied and this by virtue of the fact that (3) is not necessary, a fact which according to Stump Burley would have this
concluded by is
is
derived,
text
s
Burley
completely
such a solution would effectively be, as Stump points out, 6 extravagant and completely do away with doctrine on
But what
obligations.
In
virtue, in turn, of the fact that premise (1), from which (3) not necessary. 5 If this happened to really be the meaning of
the
face
is
Stump attempts
leads,
the textual fundament of this
of the
extravagance
to
which
first
interpretation?
this
first
interpretation
a second interpretation which allows a reasonable
meaning to Burley s solution, but this interpretation, in her opinion, makes an important confusion to become manifest. 7 This interpretation is based upon a new analysis of the paradox in the following terms: 8
Oponens
Respondent (1 a)
T
(2
)
q
(2 a)
F
(3
)
p
seqiiitur ex posito et opposito bene negati
(3 a)
T
Ratio
(3 b) (3) follows from the truth of (1) and the falsity
The Stump,
9
previously mentioned confusion would be found, according to it is p and not (3 ) what follows from the truth of (! ) and
that
the falsehood of (2 favor
),
10
"On
8 9
has
to
);
be
sustained in (3 b) as the reason in
such a case, according to Stump s considered as impertinent and, in
the face of
premisses
7
(3)
is
in
Pp. 324-325. it, then, Burley is saying that (3) is to be denied because it is not reason for claiming that (3) is not necessary is that one of the derived from, namely (1), is not necessary" (p.324).
and
necessary,
6
against what
or the concession of (3
interpretation, 4
of (2)
it
is
his
P. 324. P. 324. P. 324. P. 324. "Suppose
we then consider
(3)
irrelevant
and judge
it
on
own
its
merits.
According
Burley, we ought to judge it false. If (3) had read That you are in Rome follows from the conjunction of this disjunction - namely, "You are in Rome or that you are in Rome is to be granted" - with the denial of the second disjunct then Burlcy would, I to
,
D
472
Ors
agreement with Stump s reading of Burley, to be considered as false. This es Romae" follows requires that we do not interpret (3) as if meant "(u
from
Romae
es
"tu
vel
le
Romae non
est
concede
but rather in
1
(3),
concedendum
would not
"ex
posito"
be
false and, in
its
,
my
necessarily refer to the
opinion,
I fail
meaning
my
opinion,
not say that (3)
disjunctive
Stump
s
(1),
esse
te
(3)
would
interpretation, (3)
two interpretations
of Burley
texts.
s
As
three confusions previously mentioned.
we
"
to understand).
of these
neither
and
concedendum"
agreement with Burley as to
ascertaining the true
if
est
which case Burley would have to sense in which case the expression
in
literal
has to be denied (for what reason In
Romae
esse
capable of both are the Underlying is
for the first interpretation, in
meaning of the texts, Burley docs must be denied because (3) is not necessary, but rather stick
to the literal
he says that (3) has to be denied and that (3) is not necessary; neither does he say that (3) is not necessary because premise (1), from which (3)
alleged
not
is
derives,
in
favor
of
(3),
and
to
necessity
necessary,
the this
but
concession is
so
rather because the (metadialogue
positum is not necessary because (1) should be posited.
As grasp
-
for the
since
I
rather
not s) it
of
that
the
(3)
does
because
(1)
necessary not is
not
enunciation which says that (1) is
in
its
necessary but is
the
contingent that such an enunciation
second interpretation, whose meaning I fail to completely fail to understand, as I have already stated, the value and
meaning of the alleged reason in favor of the falsehood of (3) said,
proposition
communicate
-
it
can be
opinion and for reasons I shall soon put forth, that Burley try to defend that (3) should be impertinent and false but
my
docs not
on the contrary, and here is the key to the solution proposed by him, that in the metadialogue from the moment that (2) is denied both (3) and (4) are true but repugnant with regard to the opposite of the rather,
enunciation (2) already negated; for this in the dialogue by virtue of rule 2 of the obligations (omne repugnans opposito bene negati est negandum), although they are true they must be negated. The reason for which
Burley has recourse to the non-necessary nature of (3)
is
not the defense
think, agree that (3) had to be granted. But (3) does not read that way; and if we are considering (3) as it stands, on its own merits, then Burley seems to think we should deny it because the phrase from the positum need not refer to the particular disjunction which just happens to be the positum in this particular case of obligations.
other positum; but unless it refers to It could refer to some Therefore, on Burley s view, it is a mistake to grant (pp. 324-325). (3)"
this
one,
(3)
is
false.
Stump on Barley s De of the falsehood of (3), but rather of in
order for
to
it
because what
is
its
contingency, a needed condition
be repugnant with regard
necessary
is
473
obligationibus
to
some other
From whence
not repugnant to anything.
not necessary) and should be (since
enunciation, (3)
repugnant to In the the opposite of (2)) negated. proposed interpretations it can be seen how by virtue of the inadequate analysis of the reason alleged in favor of (3) there is no adequate separation of the conditions of the can (because
it
is
it
is
dialogue and of the conditions of the metadialogue, and that there comes about an undue transposition of questions relative to the concession or the negation of enunciations in the dialogue to questions relative to the truth or falsehood of enunciations in the metadialogue.
In
opinion, in order to adequately
my
comprehend Burley
need to tend to the global meaning of the stated question: -
pretended with the paradox is to the absurd which furthermore is
is
11
s texts
that
we
which
by means of a procedure of reduction a dialogue
-
to
make problematic
the
value of one of the parts of rule 1 of the obligations: quicquid sequitur ex posito
et
opposite bene negati
est
concedendum, which can also be
expressed in the following terms:
Ax(x sequitur ex posito
etc.
->
x est concedendum),
which has the form of a universal enunciation, one of whose singulars is:
(p sequitur ex posito etc.
->
p
est
The argument around which ponendo ponens (which
Rl
I
shall call
(3)
(p sequitur ex posito etc. p sequitur ex posito etc.
(4)
p
est
from which follows
from
it
concedendum). the question revolves
is
the elemental
argument Al): ->
p
est
concedendum)
concedendum is
(3)
argued (an argument I shall call A2) that given that (4) and Rl, and that (3) has been conceded, if Rl were and
admissible rule (4) would have to be conceded (by virtue of the other part of this same Rule 1 which states: quicquid sequitur ex posito et
concedendum); now, since (4) is the same enunciation (2) which before has been denied we can now not concede it but rather we
concesso
est
to the question in a global manner and this is probably the root of her incomprehension; even in the English translation which she offers of Burley s texts she omits the initial enunciation in which the main question is
E.
what
is
Stump does not tend at
formulated
(p. 323).
D
474
must negate
it
Ors
and therefore we either have
an admissible rule (which
to conclude that (3) should
what Burley concludes) or that Rl what the objection pretends), and since
not have been conceded (this is
is
not
is
(3)
is
(supposedly) necessary and therefore must be conceded, it is concluded that Rl is not an admissible rule. Both arguments, Al and A2, are in my
opinion logically impeccable.
The key
to
s
Burley
solution,
has been
as
denial of the supposed necessity of (3) which
indicated,
lies
the
in
held in the final part of
is
argument A2. Now, why does Burley deny the necessity of (3)? In the paradox, the argument put forth in favor of the concession of (3)
and the argument put
necessity
following argument (which
of
favor
in
its
necessity
its
is is
the
argument Bl): ct
nq
opposite benc ncgati
argumented (an argument I shall call B2) that given that true and necessary since the conditional (((pvq)A-iq) ^p) in
is
(3 b)
ct
p sequitur exposito
)
from which
which
shall call
p sequitur ex (p vq)
(3 b) (3
I
forth
it
fundamenled
is
it
is
necessary, and given
is
that
Burley rejects argument
(3
Bl:
necessary )
is
the
(3
(valid),
necessary,
(3
)
is
)
has
to
true
also
does not follow from
conclusion
and
be conceded. this
premise only but rather requires two complementary premises; argument
Bl must be transformed
into the following
argument (which
I
shall call
argument Cl): p sequitur ex (p v q)
(3 b)
-iq est
ii)
(3
from which
-iq
oppositum bcne ncgali
p sequitur ex posito
)
ct
(P vcl) est positum
i)
it
is
ct
opposito benc ncgati
argumented (an argument
the three premises are true, the conclusion (3 b)
is
necessary given that both
contingent,
we can
not
i)
and
conclude that
shall call
I
is
ii)
(3
)
C2) that given that
also true but that although
are not necessary but rather is
necessary and
is
in
fact
contingent.
This
is,
in
my
opinion, the true
problem put forth by Burley. interpretation offered by in
meaning of the texts and of the is what lies beneath the second
Argument Bl
Stump but however
it
does not come to the fore
her interpretation because she does not approach the matter from the
theory of argumentation but rather from the theory of signification. She considers - incorrectly in my opinion - that (3 b) and (3 ) are two possible equivocal meanings of (3), and that Burley got
them confused
Stump on Burley s DC
475
obligationibus
understand the already mentioned confusion to which Stump alludes). But, in my opinion, this is not the analysis which Burley s text, completely removed from such a confusion, requires. Burley clearly distinguishes between (3 b) and (3 ) and he considers that both (only in this sense can
What Burley
are true. relation
I
denies
there should exist between the two a
is
and hence he denies the truth of the second
of consequence
premise and therefore the truth of the conclusion of argument B2.
2.
Critique of Burley s Solution
Whatever the meaning of Burley
s texts,
whatever his reasons for denying
Stump maintains
(3) as the solution of the paradox,
that Burley s solution does not solve the paradox since the paradox reproduces itself regardless of (3), in spite of the negation of (3), because with just (1) and (2) we would be obliged to concede (4). 12 Her argument (which I shall call Dl) in favor of this thesis is the following:
conceded we also have is
to
concede
Burley has accepted that
(4), that is (4)
if
(3)
follows from (3); and
is it
a condition, in order to admit this, that one also admit the following
argument (which
I
shall call
D2):
P
p
est
concedendum
and, for the
p
est
p E.
est
same
reason, the following argumentation as well:
concedendum concedendum
Stump
est
concedendum.
further considers that there are reasons within the art of
obligations in order to admit this argumentation and she presupposes that 13
Burley admits it. the enunciation p
conceded, and
if
In this manner,
later
if
instead of (3)
we were
to
propose
enunciation would have had to be Romae), we were to propose (4) once more, in virtue of D2,
(tu es
this
seems to have in mind the mistaken notion that if (a) is false, (c) is false hence we can deny (4) and the paradox is solved. But of course, he has not solved the paradox by such means since (c) can be true even if (a) is false. Furthermore, if Burley is willing to accept the inference from (a) to (c), we can show him that on his own views (c) must be true" (p. 325). (a) is here enunciation (3) and (c) enunciation (4). "lie
inference from (a) to (c) depends on accepting as valid the inference from (b) Rome to (c) That you arc in Rome must be granted and there is some reason for accepting the inference from (b) to (c) in an obligations disputation" (p. 325). "The
You
are in
;
D
476
it
would also have
Ors
be conceded, with the resulting reproduction of the
to
14 paradox regardless of the primitive enunciation (3).
There
however here a
is
follows from I
argument
clear
error.
If
Burley admits that
(4)
argument Dl, it is only by virtue of the have called Al whose first premise, for being precisely a rule (3)
as
said in
is
presupposed and whose fundament is none other than ponendo ponens. Why would argumentation D2 also have to be admitted? On the contrary, there are very good reasons making us think
of obligations,
is
the
D2
that
is
an inadmissible argument within the framework of obligations. in the strict sense, would lead us to absolutely concede all
To admit D2,
on obligations not only allow us but even force us to deny true enunciations which are repugnant with regard to previously conceded enunciations or with regard to the opposite of
true enunciations,
and the
rules
previously denied enunciations.
paradox
3.
is
D2
not reproduced. Burley
s
can not be admitted and therefore the solution, therefore, can
be defended.
Stump s Solution
E.
the supposition that the paradox put forth by Burley happens to
Upon
not be solved by him and that
reproduces itself regardless of (3), in argument D2, Stump proposes her own personal solution to the paradox. In order to do this she relies on both argumentation D2 as well it
virtue of
as
on
its
p
inverse (which
est
I
shall call
D3):
concedendum
P
from which she concludes the equivalency of both parts, p and disjunctive (1) which for the same reason would be equivalent
q,
of the
to
(pvq)
or to (qvq) and, in virtue of the idempotency of the disjunctive, also to
"Even
with the denial of
(3),
however, from the truth of (1) and the
Rome. And
falsity
of (2),
given the validity of the inference from (b) Rome it follows that You are in Rome is to be granted. Hence even with the denial of (3), we are committed, on Burley s own views, to the truth of (4). And so, even if we give Burley all he wants, the falsity of (3) and the validity of the inference from (a) to (c), we can demonstrate that the paradox remains. follows that you are in to (c), from You are in it
The respondent
is
same proposition
at
committed (2a)"
to
the
(pp. 325-326).
so,
truth of (4) although
he has correctly denied the
Stump on Barley s DC
p,
or to q.
15
In such a case,
with respect
q,
clear that p (or q) are not impertinent
(pvq) but rather pertinent, equivalents, and that they and therefore (2), which is none other than
to
follow from
is
it
477
obligationibus
that disjunction
insofar as
follows from (1), should not have been denied but rather
it
conceded. This not only would have solved the paradox but indeed it 16 This is Stump s proposed would have impeded its very apparition. Obviously, once D2 is rejected, and for analogous reasons D3 the art of obligations allows to concede something which is false (since
solution.
it follows from something already conceded), we can no longer admit such an equivalency between the parts of the disjunctive, nor can
when
we admit Stump
proposed solution. Burley
s
s
my
solution, in
opinion,
is
the only admissible solution, given the general rules on obligations.
4.
Conclusion
Having seen the foregoing analyses, of
insufficiencies
believe to have clearly
I
of Burley
s
s
texts
shown the
and to have
Stump interpretation come closer to the real meaning of those texts. As a result I do believe that some of the consequences to which Stump comes from her analysis of the nature of the rules on obligations within Burley
would require
revised, but such a task
a
more
s
work have
to
be
detailed study of the whole
work and of course goes beyond the scope of this paper. These analyses, however, do not merely pretend to rectify the
of Burley
s
made by Stump concerning these all, to shed some light on the
interpretations
rather hope, above
on
the doctrine
In
obligations.
my
opinion,
texts
by Burley, but
nature and history of
the distinctions established
between the dialogue and the metadialogue, between the conditions of truth and falsehood in the metadialogue and the conditions of concession and negation in the dialogue, which allow us to deny in the dialogue an enunciation which in the metadialogue
is
recognized as true,
lies
at
the
"And we can also show the converse, that if q is true, p is true. If you grant q, you are granting that p is to be granted. But if you grant that p must be granted, you cannot consistently deny p, and so you must also grant p. Hence, if q is true, so is p. Consequently, p and q are equivalent" (p. 326).
"Hence,
irrelevant.
in
In
between p and really
solved;
place"
(p. 326).
this fact,
q.
or,
case, it
And more
it
is
a
from
mistake
to
consider
(2)
in
the
schematisation
as
the positum and the implicit logical relationship so (2) ought to be granted. In this way, I think, the paradox is accurately, in this way the paradox fails to arise in the first
follows
D
478
Ors
"revolution" brought about by Swyneshed within the rules of P.V. which and Spade speaks of in his contribution to the obligations
root of the
17 same reader.
University of Navarra
17
P.V.
335-341.
Spade,
"Obligations:
B.
Developments
in
the
fourteenth
century",
op.
cit.,
pp.
ALVIN
P.
DOBSEVAGE
DC Guillclmi Occamcnsis dialcctica
Salvete
domini
omncs,
dominacquc,
philosophiae et certe sodales
litteris
professores,
fovendis
latinis.
Hodie argumenta rcnovare volo utrum nominalista sit
studiorum
cultores
aut conccptualista
noster Inceptor Venerabilis.
esse
Et responsum facile in mcntcm evenit. Sunt qui aiunt Guillclmum antcccdentem illorum Rcnati Descartes et Emmanualis Kant et
Summam
delatorem philosophiae scholasticae. Est nobis tigare ad haec omnia noscenda.
Cum nisi
de tempore
et loco
compositions
Summae
Logicae inves-
Logicae non habeamus
coniecturam... Londinii in Anglia fuisse compositam (notat G. Gal). Ibi
amicos Chatton
et
Wodeham
ciae Angliae habuit. Et
Londiniensis. Chatton
Sed
in
"Prologo"
ex ordine Fratrum
Ockham
ct
Wodeham
Summam
Logicae
Summae
Logicae
legit
Minorem
erant
(Gal
et socios
Provin-
socii
Custodiae
Adam
de Anglia
quoque
p. 55-56).
fratris et magistri
notatur:
Quam magnos
veritatis
sectatoribus
afferat
fructus
sermocinalis
scientia, quam logicam dicimus, multorum peritorum docet auctoritas, ratioque et experientia liquido cpmprobat et convincit. Unde Aristoteles, auctor praecipuus huius scientiae, nunc introductoriam
methodum, nunc viam
sciendi
modum, nunc dans
scientiam omnibus
communcm
nulli ad Averroes sapientiam patet accessus nisi in quoque, Aristotelis interpres, in Physicis dialectam dicit esse "instrumentum discernendi verum a falso". Ipsa namque cuncta dubia definit, cunctas Scripturarum difficultates dissolvit et penetrat, ut testatur doctor egregius Augustinus.
et
Et deinde
in
veritatis
"Epistola
Logica enim
appellat,
Prooemialis"
ex
his intellegere quod scientia logica erudito.
Ockham
ipse notat:
omnium
artium aptissimum instrumentum, sine qua potest, quae non more materialism instrumentorum usu crebro consumitur, sed per cuiuslibct alterius scientiae studipsum exercitium continuum recipit incrementum. Sicut enim mechanicus sui instrument! perfecta carens notitia utendo epdem recipit pleniorem, sic in solidis logicae principiis eruditus dum aliis scientns operam impendit sollicite simul istius artis maiorem in logica labilis ars adquirit periliam. Unde illud vulgare solis sapientiale studium negligentibus locum reputo obtinere. nulla
est
scientia
perfecte
sciri
"ars
est"
480
Dobsevage
eorum Swincshcad, Hcytcsbury, Gcrson
In scriptis cst
nominalista
cum
ct
conditorcm
d
ct
suae
scholac
Ailly,
crcdunt.
Ockham Ockham
ct hanc male venit partim Avicennae. Porphyrius quoque partim Augustini, partim huius problematis erat. In libcllo suo Isagogc (sive introductione in Catcgorias Aristotelis) notat Porphyrius a. Genera et species suntne
Aristotclcm a Scotistis male interpretari credit ex auctoritate
St.
substantia aut mentis notioncs? b.
corporalia vel incorporalia?
Si
c.
Si,
modo
fortassc, in se constant, suntne vel
sunt incorporalia, suntne in rebus
sensibus percipi vel eis rebus separata?
Ens horum disputationum Medii Acvi scientiae
mctaphysicam
per
Ockham scqucns
philosophiam
Aristotelem
logicam
e
erat ct
logicam
ct
theologiam
metaphysica
doctrinam
interpretari.
philosophia
et
e
theologia disiungere inccpit.
Primum de
divisione
terminorum
scribit,
subordinata conceptibus scu intentionibus
et
notat
animae".
"voces
esse signa
In cap. 4 ad
metam
venit dicens:
quia terminorum quidam sunt categorcmatici, quidem syncategoTermini categorcmatici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomcn homo significat omnes homines et noc nomcn animal omnia animalia, et hoc nomcn albedo omnes albedincs.... Termini autem syncatcgorcmatici, cuiusmodi sunt tales tantum totus nullus omnis inquantum et aliquis practer huiusmodi, non habent finitam significationem et certam, nee significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per categoremata. (p. 25) ...
rematici.
,
,
Per se
omnis
,
nihil significat,
sed ante
,
,
,
nomcn hominem
est classis
omnium hominum. Hie videtur logica esse instrumentum ad philosophiam naturalem fovendam. Philosophia naturalis est de rebus. Logica est de sententiis
de terminis universalibus. Et
mentis, est
de multis praedicabilc.
Ockham numquam
Cum
omne
univcrsale est
de scientia humana loquitur universalia apud
sunt individualia. Et logica universali post
rem
refert.
universalia non sunt res extra animam. Propter quod non sunt de csscntia rerum nee partes rerum extra, sed sunt quaedam entia in anima, distincta inter se et a rebus extra, quarum aliqua sunt signa rerum extra, aliqua sunt signa illorum signorum. Sicut hoc nomen universale est commune ad omnia universalia, et per conscqucns est signum omnium aliorum universalium a se. Et ideo potest concedi quod illud universale quod est pracdicabile de quinque universalibus, non tamen pro se sed pro universalibus, est genus ad universalia; sicut aliqua dictio praedicabilis de omnibus dictionibus est nomen, et ...
non verbum, nee participium, nee coniunctio Qui
vult
pleniorem
notitiam
de
universalibus
etc. (p.
et
83)
proprietatibus
habere, legere poterit Porphyrii librum. Sed Porphyrius duabus
eorum
sellis
sedet
De
Guillelmi Occamensis dialectica
ut notat Bocthius. Est inter et
Ockham
alii
scripsisse
Platonem logicam
481
Aristotclcm. Dicit Pater Boehner
ct
Aristoteleam
reapse
formalem
et
universe certam.
Ex
(signum universale) et ex haeccitate (signum individuale), aut connotatione et denotatione, ut hodie dicimus, Duns Scotus viam ad nominalisticam philosophiam logicam discipulo suo Ockham offert.
Et
quidditate
animo
in
illius
Ecclesiae Catholicae movit.
modo
Ockham est omnia eum contra Papam
in et
quaestionem vocare. Amor et Philippo et Ludovico
pro
Logicus erat qui salutem Ecclesiae promovere voluit. Sed hoc contra Papam et pro regibus ille ex ordine fratrum minorum optavit.
Praecepta Ecclesiae Catholicae in toto per fidem, non per philo sophiam noscuntur. Creatio ex nihilo non demonstratur sed sentitur.
Multum de rebus audimus
externis individualibus quas videmus, tangimus, olfacimus,
gustamus ut res particulares notantur. Universalia sunt signa mentis, sunt nomina. Benigne Guillelmo Ockham et Scoto philosophia scholastica fracta et
est.
Ockham fundamentum logicae modernae mathematicae incepit cum terminis syncategorematicis. Necesse esset hoc
Et fortasse formulare
ratum facere per logicos huius temporis ut Quine, Hiz, et al. (Aliquid de theoria Occamensi et quantificationis terminorum et propositionum de modali notatur ab Alfredo J. Freddoso: Ockhatris quoque logica TJieory
hodie
of Propositions. Part unus qui logicam
est
II
of the
Summa
Occamensem
Logicae, pp.
terminis
logicae
19-28.
Ille
hodiernae
investigat et describit.)
Hoc
loco necesse
sit,
credo, tacere. Sed
non
sine
mentione horum
logicorum hodiernorum et eruditorum historiae philosophiae naturalis qui non multum de Venerabilis Inceptoris scriptis logicis investigant. Satinest, si
vobis
quiretis?
acroasin meam ita dedi expolitam, ut improbare non multum De me quidem vestrum erit iudicium. Valete et plaudite.
Western Ct State University
482
Dobscvage
Bibliographia:
Guillelmi de
Cura
Ockham
s
Ockham. Summa
Theory of Propositions. Introduction ab Alfred
Univ of Notre Philotheus
Boehncr G. Gal, Bonavcnturc Univ. N.Y. 1974.
logicae. Ed. P.
Instituti Franciscan!. St.
Dame
J.
S.
Brown.
Freddoso.
Press, Indiana, 46556. 1980.
Boehner. Collected Articles Bonaventure, N.Y. 1858.
on
Ockham.
Institute. St.
Ernest A. Moody. The Logic of Ockham.
New York.
1935.
Ed.
Franciscan
SILVIA
Ancora una volta
DONATI
sulla
nozione di quantitas
materiae in Egidio
II
tema
di
elaborata attirato la si
1
questa
comunicazione
e
Romano*
nozione
la
di
quantitas
materiae
da Egidio Romano. La dottrina egidiana ha gia in passato attenzione degli studiosi; A. Maier fu la prima a sottolineare che
nozione quantitativa introdotta da Egidio, distinguendosi dall estensione, awicina al concetto moderno di massa. 1 II merito di Egidio starebbe
nell aver
fatto
e
analisi
di
oggetto
riconosciuto
quantitative una nozione che, come vedremo, anche
e
presuppongono
utilizzano
loro
nella
come altri
descrizione
un
concetto
autori medievali
dei
mutamenti
pero darne una precisa definizione. stato anche osservato che le maggiori innovazioni medievali sulla
quantitativi senza
E nozione alle
di quantita si
numerose
Un altra
sono avute
discussioni
occasione
di
in
un contesto
connesse
riflessione
per
con i
il
2
teologico;
problema
pensatori
basti pensare
delPEucarestia.
medievali e costituita
dalla questione della creazione di Eva, questione che viene affrontata in
genere nel corso dei commenti
appunto
problema
dell applicazione
della
creazione
al
secondo
libro
delle Sentenze. Ora, e
della nozione egidiana di quantitas materiae al di
Eva che intendiamo occuparci
in
questa
comunicazione.
Questo articolo e il frutto delle ricerche condotte grazie ad una borsa di studio Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (Bonn). Intendo ritornare su questo tema in uno studio piu ampio attualmente in corso di preparazione. della
Cfr. 14.
Problem der quantitas materiae", in- Die Vorldufer Galileis im Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1966 p.26-52; cfr. inoltre, J.A. Concept of Matter in Fourteenth Century Science", in: The Concept of
A. Maier,
"Das
Roma,
Jahrhundert,
Weisheipl, The Matter in Greek
,
and Medieval Philosophy, E. McMullin ed., Notre Dame, Indiana, The University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p.147-169; E. Sylla, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion with Respect to Quantity of the Eucharist", in: Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier, a cura di A. Maieru e A. Paravicini Bagliani, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1981, p.105-141. 2
Cfr. E. Sylla,
"Godfrey
of
Fontaines...",
p.107.
484
Donati
Secondo di
Adamo.
la
Bibbia? Eva
Pietro
un interpretazione sola
dalla
lettcralc:
costola,
4
secondo
libro dellc Sentenze,
Eva
intcro corpo di
si
fu
attiene a a partire
prodotto senza alcuna aggiunta cstrinscca. In caso contrario, 1
dovrebbe dire che Eva
infatti, si
da Dio a partire da una costola
fu prodotta
ncl
Lombardo,
anche a partire dal materiale
fu prodotta
teorico che
problema pone teologi successivi e dunque qucllo di un aumento non accompagnato da nessuna aggiunta. Parlando di un aumento non dovuto ad alcuna addizione, teologi II
aggiunto.
ai
si
i
medievali vogliono escludere
sia
ipotesi che la materia aggiunta esistcsse
1
precedenza sotto altra forma, sia ipotesi che essa venga creata ex novo da Dio, giacche anche nel caso della creazione di nuova materia il in
1
Eva contcrrebbc
di
corpo
In
costola.
trasformare
la
formazione
di
intero
in
una costola
umano
corpo
Eva rappresenta
non era contenuta
che
discussione
della
materia contenuta
un
a
sufficiente
materia
della
nocciolo
il
effetti,
senza
e
proprio
una quantita
in
creare
un caso limite
allora
se
altra
nella
Dio puo di
materia
materia.
di
La
in
aumento, cui, una ccrta quantita di materia, senza alcuna addizione estrinseca, gra/ie a una sorta di espansione, cresce fino a diventare una quantita maggiore. Per
riformulare
medievali,
porzione
di
la
nei
questionc
termini
adottati
tecnici
dagli
autori
un aumento quantitativo da parte di una ccrta materia che in se stessa rimane sostanzialmentc idcntica.
si
tratta
di
Questo processo appare chiaramente in contrasto con le norme che regolano Paumento in natura. Nella filosofia della natura medievale vengono
distinti
rarefazione. Ora, gli
due
base
della
Nell
aumento
coppia
nozione
la
comunque
autori medievali
aumento, Paumcnto vcro e propria e
di
tipi
di quantita di
sembrano distinguere di
concetti
i
quantita
due di
tipi
di
mutamento
materia
variazione
la
la
materia venga intcsa,
e
delle
sulla
estensione
dimensioni
.
e
propriamcnte intcso, accompagnata da un aumento della quantita di materia. La rarefazione, cstensione aumenta, la invece, non e un aumento reale, giacche, se materia rimane invariata. Ora, aumento reale in natura e sempre un 1
I
aumento per additionem; 3
1
agente
naturale,
che
non ha
il
potere
di
Cfr. Genesi, Lib.I, cap.2, w.21-22. Cfr.
logiae
Lombardi Sententiarum
Petri
cursus
completus,
series
libri
secunda
quatuor, Lib. II, dist. XVIII, cap.5, in: Patroaccurante J.P. Migne, t.192, Parisiis,
(latina),
1880, col.688. Sulla
distinzione
Fontaines...",
medievale
p.105-107.
tra
i
due
tipi
di
aumento
cfr.
E.
Sylla,
"Godfrey
of
La nozione
di quantitas matcriae in Egidio
Romano
485
trasformare poca materia in molta ne di creare nuova materia, puo far crescere un corpo solo aggiungendo dclla materia gia esistente sotto altra
forma. Sulla
possibilita
da parte
Dio
di
causare un tipo di aumento
di
diverse sia dall addizione che dalla rarefazione, un
registrano
aumenta
materia
di
quantita
tredicesimo
nel
S.Tommaso escludono questo sibile e di
senza
secolo
conseguenza respingono
1
la
possibilita di
rarefactione in natura, lo
un
aggiunta
discordant!.
opinioni
cio6 in cui la estrinseca,
Pensatori
si
come
aumento come teoricamente impos-
tipo di
interpretazione letterale della Genesi
data da Pietro Lombardo. Altri autori,
pur negando
alcuna
aumento
come per esempio Egidio Romano,
tipo di
aumento
sine additione et sine
ritengono possibile per Dio.
problema viene chiaramente impostato da S.Tommaso. Nel commento al secondo libro delle Sentenze egli respinge la posizione di II
Pietro
Lombardo defmendola
inintelligibile.
S.Tommaso
distingue due
modi
materia puo aumentare: o secundum quantitatem tantum oppure secundum essentiam. Nel caso di un aumento solo secundum quantitatem, in cui la
una certa materia, numericamente ad un certo momento avra una data estensione e in seguito
cioe relative soltanto alle dimensioni, identica,
acquistera un estensione maggiore. Ora, questo tipo di mutamento, che
comporta soltanto
la
variazione
delle
processo di rarefazione. Se invece essentiam, allora nel corpo, quella
che c era
materia,
alPinizio.
non importa
dopo In
1
la
aumento,
altri
se creata ex
dimensioni,
non e
altro
che un
materia aumenta anche secundum
termini,
novo o
ci
sara altra materia oltre a
sara
stata
preesistente.
aggiunta
Un
nuova
terzo tipo di
6 aumento, diverse da questi due per S.Tommaso non e possibile. Questo passo rappresenta un tipico esempio del modo di procedere che si e menzionato prima: se da una parte S.Tommaso distingue un
Cfr.
Thomas Aquinas,
In
II
dist. XVIII, q.l, a.l, in: Scriptum super libros M.F. Moos, Parisiis, Lethielleux, 1929-1947, vol.11, enim per multiplicationem materiae hoc factum dicant, oportet multiplicatiop.448: nem hanc aut secundum quantitatem tantum attendi, aut secundum essentiam materiae. Si primo modo, sic oportet ut eadem materia numero quae fuit primo sub parvis dimensionibus, postmodum majores dimensiones recipiat: hoc autem idem est quod rarefieri... Si vero multiplicatio essentiam materiae attingat, cum nihil aliud sit multiplicari quam aliquid fieri quod prius non erat, oportet quod aliquid materiae sit sub forma corporis mulieris quod prius sub forma costae non erat...". Cfr. inoltre Summa Theologiae, Pars
Sententiarum,
ed.
P.
Mandonnet
Sent., -
"Si
I,
q.92, a.3,
Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1952, p.452.
Donati
486
aumcnto
da un aumcnto della quantita
dclla sola estensione
di materia,
7
non introduce alcun concetto quantitative divcrso da quello aumento della quantita di materia Tommaso di estensione. Per descrivere essentiam materiae, usa cioe un concetto secundum di multiplicatio parla dall altra, egli
1
non quantitative. D altronde, poiche aumento della quantita di materia e in se concepito da S.Tommaso come una moltiplicazione della materia 1
come
stessa e
sostrato, e evidente che
1
idea di una
medesima porzione
di
materia che aumcnta quantitativamente pur rimanendo sostanzialmcnte identica
gli
A
volte.
piu
appare
problema
II
inintelligibile.
della creazione di
questo argomento e
Quodlibet; piu tardi al
secondo
il
problema vicne
libro delle Scntcnze.
dottrinale:
continuita
Eva viene discusso da Egidio Romano dedicata una questione del secondo
8
trattato
nuovamente
polemica con S.Tommaso,
in
accetta
egli
pretazione di Pietro Lombardo. La soluzione del problema
un applicazione
della
nozione
egidiana
di
quantitas
commento
nel
una sostanziale
In questi testi troviamo
si
materiae.
1
inter-
fonda su Infatti,
e
proprio grazie a un concetto quantitative diverse da quello di estensione che Egidio puo difcndere 1 idea di un tipo di aumento diverse sia
addizione che dalla rarefazione.
dall
Considcriamo brevemente
Come
e
noto,
Egidio,
la
accanto
nozione egidiana alia
introduce una nozione non spaziale
di quantita.
di quantitas
nozione
tradizionale
di
materiae. estensione,
Egli distingue la quantita
occupa un certo spazio dalla quantita in molta o poca. Infatti, se la medesima quale materia, in condizioni diverse, puo assumere volumi differenti, estensione e quantitas materiae sono carattcristiche diverse. In che cosa consiste la novita di Egidio? Osservando che nella descrizione dci mutamenti in
virtu
dclla quale la materia
della
virtu
la
materia
nozione
quantitative, accanto alia
A
questo
cd.cit.,
8
proposito
cfr.
e
anche
di
volume, compaiono anche espressioni
Thomas Aquinas,
In
II
Sent.,
dist.XXX,
q.2,
a.l,
p.778-779.
anast. rist. Acgidii Columnae Romani Quodlibcta, II, q.ll, Lovanii, 1646, Frankfurt a.M., 1966, p.76-79; In If Sent., dist. XVIII, q.l, a.3, in: Aegidii Columnae Romani In secundum Libmm Sent. Quaestiones, Venctiis, 1581, vol.11, rist. anast. Minerva, Frankfurt a.M., 1968, p.68-73. questi due testi puo essere aggiunto un Cfr.
Minen/a,
A
terzo documento, gentilmente segnalatoci dal. Dr.R. Wielockx (Alhcrtus Magnus-Institut, Sentenze di Egidio Bonn), cioe una prima versione del commento al secondo libro delle tramandataci da Goffredo di Fontaines nel ms. Paris, Bibl.Nat., lat. 15819, f.311ra-312ra (la
questione
sulla
creazione
di
Aegidii
Romani Apologia, Edition
Omnia,
III, 1),
et
Eva si trova al f.311va-b). Su questi estratti cfr. commentaire par R. Wielockx (Aegidii Romani Opera
Firenze, Olschki, 1985, p. 13, nota n.35, p.75-76, nota n.3.
Sulla dottrina egidiana cfr. le opere citate alia nota n.l.
La nozione
Romano
487
Egidio, a differenza di
S.Tommaso
di quantitas matcriae in Egidio
come molta materia o poca matcria
,
e di altri autori, cerca di analizzarle. Egli sottolinea, quindi, che
molto all
si
1
altro
di
tipo 1
giustifica
uso
quantita
come
Egidio, sine
non
che
varia
variare
al
molto e poco questo nuovo concetto
di termini quali
L introduzione et
termini
i
riconducono a determinazioni quantitative. Accanto poco esistenza di un estensione, allora, si deve presupporre nella materia e
di
rarefactione
1
ipotesi di
commento
Nel
.
e
che
.
e detto, di salvare
si
dell estensione
secondo
al
consente
quantitative
a
un aumento sine additione libro
delle
Sentenze,
trattando del problema della creazione di Eva, egli riporta la posizione di
S.Tommaso. La conclusione un tipo
di
di
S.Tommaso, secondo
aumento diverse
dalla
il
o
rarefazione
quale non e possibile
i
quali
non possono trasformare poca materia
quale motive? La ragione risiede nel Essi agiscono tramite
naturali.
possono mutare condensazione,
volume
il
ma non a
di
di
1
modo
in
e
il
proprio degli agenti
moto;
un corpo tramite process!
possono modificare
differenza
la
agenti naturali,
gli
molta o viceversa. 10 Per
di agire
alterazione
osserva
dall aggiunta,
Egidio, e perfettamente corretta per quanto riguarola
di
conseguenza,
di rarefazione e di
quantita di materia; questo
inerisce alia materia piu quantita, intrinsecamente di qualsiasi qualita e della stessa forma sostanziale, oltre 11 la quale 1 azione degli agenti naturali non puo cstendersi. tipo
Non
pero alcuna ragione
esiste
impossibile un tipo di
L aver
dell estensione,
ricondotto
per
aumento quale quello
caratteristiche
molto
quali
come logicamente da Pietro Lombardo.
escludere descritto
e
nell
poco
ambito
quantitative ne fa anche delle determinazioni accidentali della materia: la
materia non e tanta o poca in virtu della propria essenza, della
quantita.
diventi
da
Allora,
poca
molta
nulla
vieta
che
una certa porzione
rimanendo
pur
sostanzialmente
ma
in virtu
di
materia
identica.
La
conclusione di S.Tommaso, sottolinea ancora Egidio, sarebbe corretta se la materia fosse tanta o poca in virtu della sua essenza, osservazione che
sembra una precisa allusione
all
idea tomista di una multiplicatio
secundum
Cfr. Aeg. Rom., In II Sent., p.69: "Scd quidam hoc dictum Magistri et etiam Hugonis, tamquam impossibile et contradictionem implicans reputantes, improbant... Sed isti optime concludunt de actione naturali creaturae...".
Ibidem, p.70: "Ergo, nullum agens creatum potest agere nisi localiter movendo vel quale faciendo. Et quia qualitas supponit quantitatem per quam materia est multa vel pauca et motus localis etiam hoc supponit, quia per motum localem non potest de materia parum fieri multum nee e converse, nullum agens naturale de poterit
materia facere multam nee e
converse".
Cfr. inoltre
Quodl.U, q.ll, p.77-78.
pauca
Donati
488
essentiam materiae. In qucsto caso,
infatti,
aumcnto o
1
la
diminuzione
materia comportcrebbero nccessariamente un cambiamcnto dclla materia in se stessa c come sostrata, consicche in ogni caso di dclla quantita di
dovrebbe effettivamente postulare un aggiunta o materia. Ma poiche la quantita e una determinazione
variazione quantitativa
una sottrazione della
estrinseca
di
si
materia,
qualsiasi quantita. Se
la
montagna fossero considerate forma, esse non differirebbero una quantita maggiore che stessa
la
viceversa.
materia,
se
in 1
un grano
una
all altra.
stesse,
facendo astrazione da ogni
dall altra e all una non competerebbe Di conseguenza, Dio, che a differenza
sostanzialmente
diventi
identica,
da
puo poca
far
che
si
o
molta
12
La posizione tuttavia
di
agire direttamente sulla materia,
puo
degli agenti naturali,
porzione di materia e in potenza a di miglio e la materia di una
qualsiasi
materia
di
Egidio sul rapporto tra materia e quantita presenta lato la quantita viene vista come
una certa ambivalenza. Se da un
una determinazione accidentale
della
materia,
quando viene
dall altro,
considerata nel suo ruolo di principio di individuazione, essa acquista carattere stesso
di
una determinazione
Egidio,
sostanzialmente
quando
la
in
un
certo
differenti,
intrinseca.
senso,
cosi
parti
come
lo
Infatti,
di
come
materia
sono individui
sottolinea
differenti diversi.
il
lo
sono
Allora,
materia aumcnta quantitavamente, ex consequent! essa viene ad
essere moltiplicata anche in se stessa, sebbene solo per accidens.
13
Ora,
queste considerazioni servono a Egidio per dimostrare ancora una volta che gli agenti naturali, non potendo agire sull essenza della materia, non
possono agire nemmeno sulla sua quantita. Sulla base di questo argomento materia egli puo concludere che la facolta di agire sulla quantita della
compete solo all agente che ha 14 materia medesima. Tuttavia, considerando
le
la
gli
Rom., In
si
potrebbe
cose sotto questo punto di
netta la distinzione tra variazione
Aeg.
capacita di creare e di annichilare la
II
Sent.,
p.71:
vista,
forse
"Miramur
Aeg.
Rom., Quodl.ll,
q.ll,
di
enim de dicentibus quod oporteat creare
materiae de se esset multa vel pauca, tune abscinderetur vel annihilaretur aliquid de ipsa materia...". !
che,
puramente quantitativa e creazione
novum subiectum sive novam materiam vel addi aliquid ipsi materiae virtute divina quodcumque sit illud ad quod essentia materiae est in essentia
obiettare
non appare piu molto
forte
ut suscipiatur ibi potentia. Si enim
non posset minorari
nisi
soprattutto p.78: "...quantitas autem, licet per se non essentia materiae per se diversificari non potest,
diversified
essentiam
diversificat
tamen ipsam per accidens. Vel, ut clarius loquamur, licet materia secundum sit diversa, est tamen alia ct alia sub diversis partibus quantitatis".
essentiam non 14
Ibidem,
p. 77.
materiae,
quia
La nozione
di quantitas matcriae in Egidio
Romano
489
15 In nuova materia.
di
effetti, in questa prospcttiva, 1 idea di una porzione materia che varia quantitativamente pur rimanendo sostanzialmente
non sembra esente da
identica
Puo non
materiae
quantitas
teoricamente altri
autori
difficolta.
essere privo di interesse osservare che, se la nozione di
1
e
idea
che
chiave
la
consente
a
Egidio
un aumento sine additione
di
non giungono
alia stessa conclusione.
Un
et
di
sine
giustificare
rarefactione,
esempio e
costituito
da Giovanni Quidort. Quidort e uno dei pochi a far propria la distinzione 16 distinzione che sembra suscitare tra egidiana tra i due tipi di quantita, 17 Nell adottare Egidio piu critiche che consensi. dottrina egidiana, Quidort conia anzi un nuovo termine per designare concetto di quantita di materia egli distingue, infatti, 1 estensione e
i
di
contemporanei
;
la il
la
sottolineando cosi la differenza tra un concetto spaziale e un
tantalitas,
18 concetto non spaziale di quantita.
Ora, Quidort concede, con Egidio, che Dio, a differenza degli agenti
ha
naturali,
la
di
capacita lui
questo significa per
quantita di materia senza contraddittoria cosi
La ragione la tantalitas,
concepita
come
di
1
quantita
della
L idea
di
materia,
tuttavia,
un aumento
della
aggiunta di alcuna materia e per questo autore
lo era per
S.Tommaso. 19
questa posizione? Essa sembra risiedere nel fatto che
pur essendo una proprieta distinta dalla materia, tuttavia e proprieta per se di questa. Per Quidort, allora, una
come una
data porzione di materia, non quantita, anzi, essa
puo
sulla
agire
creare nuova materia.
modificarla.
e,
come per
Egidio, indifferente a qualsiasi
ha una quantita certa e
fissa,
cosicche
nemmeno Dio
20
Egidio sembra prendere
in
esame un obiezione
di
questo genere
in In II Sent., p.71.
16
Cfr. In II Sent., dist.XVIII, q.2 e q.4, in: Jean de Paris (Quidort) O.P., Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportation, Livre II, ed. J.P. Muller (Studia Anselmiana, LII), Roma,
Herder, 1964, p.144-148, 149-151. Sulle "Godfrey
18
Cfr.
critiche
of
alia
dottrina
egidiana,
A.
cfr.
Maier,
"Das
Problem...";
E.
Sylla,
Fontaines...".
Jean de Paris, In II Sent., p.150.
19
Ibidem, p.146-147.
non determinat sibi aliquem gradum maior et minor... Ad aliud dico quod differunt quantitas materiae et dimensio, quia materia habet certam quantitatem, qua non est maior quantitas vel qua non est minor, et haec, sive materia accipiatur totius Ibidem, p.144,
quantitatis.
147-148:
"Item,
materia prima
Ergo sine mutatione sua potest
mundi sive aliqua determinata materia, secundum se...".
fieri
scilicet
materia partis. Et
ista
quantitas inest ei
Donati
490
in
nozione
di
duzione
della
innovatrice
in
moderna,
realta,
Una
metafisica.
ccrti
per
e,
L intro-
conclusione un ultima considcrazione.
Ci sia consentita
quantitas
rispondc
materiac, a
vicina
vcrsi,
nozione
concetti
che appare
utilizzati
dalla
cosi
scienza
Egidio a un esigenza eminentemente
per
fungono da principi-guida nella metafisica
delle idee che
egidiana e che ritroviamo anche al fondo di questa dottrina e quella della assoluta
che
materia
della
potenzialita
materia
della
potenzialita
E
prima.
siamo
causa
a
a
indotti
assoluta
della
postulare
una
suo essere molta o poca, giustifichi cosi come dobbiamo postulare una determinazione quantitativa per spiegare la sua estensione: in se stessa la materia non e ne molta ne poca cosi
determinazione quantitativa che
come non ha un
il
estensionc maggiore o minore.
Ed
indifferenza rispetto a qualsiasi quantita che una
e grazie a questa sua
medesima porzione
di
materia, di per se, e capace di assumere quantita diverse.
dunque, in questa dottrina una strategia tipica di tendenza a liberare la nozione di materia prima da ogni
Ritroviamo, Egidio,
la
determinazione
senso
della
S.Tommaso
luce
critica
e
ne
che
fisica,
potenzialita. Alia
di
queste
rivolta
da
fisica",
"troppo
metterebbe
in
considcrazioni,
Egidio
a
giacche,
Passoluta
pericolo
risulta
chiaro
anche
S.Tommaso. La posizione parlando
di
il
di
multiplicationem
secundum essentiam matcriae, fa di una caratteristica puramente fisica come la quantita una determinazione intrinseca alia materia. Ora, degno di nota e
anche
il
fatto
che questa e una
S.Tommaso S.Tommaso non
che Egidio rivolge a
Sembra quasi che, per Egidio, formulare una nozione autenticamente metafisica
in altre occasion!.
sia riuscito a
critica
21
di
materia
prima.
Pisa
Egidio adotta la stessa strategia a proposito della materia dei corpi celesti; anche incorretibilita di questi corpi questo caso respinge la posizione tomista, che spiega sulla base della natura della loro materia, in nome dell assoluta potenzialita della dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia prima. Cfr. a questo proposito S.Donati, materia dei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alia fine del tredicesimo secolo", in Medioe\*o 12 (1986), p. 229-280. in
1
"La
LEILA
HAAPARANTA
A Frcgcan Perspective into Ockham s Method
1
.
Ockham
For
Conceptual Order
s
William
of
Ockham,
the
is
logic
of
study
the
acts
of intellect
considered as signs which constitute a mental language. In contrast to the
Ockham
conventional spoken and written words,
signify
spoken and written words logicae, the first part of which I
they
signify
naturally what
conventionally.
In his
Summa
that
natural;
is,
regards mental signs as
mainly discuss in this paper, Ockham calls the acts of the parts of mental propositions, intentions of the soul.
shall is,
of
the
soul
something something else (SL I, 12). A not itself an intention of the second
intention
species,
property,
intention.
of
Terms
Ockham
s
the
in
is
is
a
first
tertn
universal,
a
that
is
capable
An
intention
of
signifying
intention signifies something that
soul,
of
sign
soul
intellect, that
e.g.,
first
man,
intention.
and proposition
is
while a
this
man, etc., For example, genus, are terms of second
of second intention belong to the conceptual machinery
logic,
by means of which
Ockham
studies the terms of
first
intention (ibid.).
In the
Summa
logicae,
Ockham
asks whether the units which he
considers to be mental signs are representations in the
mind which would
between
mental acts and the individual objects which are signified, or whether they are acts of knowing themselves. He answers that logic is fall
interested
in
those acts of knowing themselves, and hence, that
we do
not need any intermediate images of objects between mental acts and objects.
As Ockham
from postulating
puts
it,
all
the theoretical advantages that derive
from
acts of understanding can be had without making such a distinction, for an act of understanding can signify something and can supposit for something just as well as any sign (SL I, 12).
Ockham
model so
entities distinct
thus seems to think that because he builds his logical
that he takes the mental units to be signs of a mental language,
he does not have to assume that the mental units are something more than acts. Hence, Ockham does not postulate any images in the mind,
492
Haaparanta acts. Nor does he postulate any ideal which logic would be interested in. thoughts
which would be contents of those objects like propositions or
2. Tfie
Materiality of Logic
The aim
of this paper
logic
through
logic
as
the
in
appears
it
predecessors.
logic,
and
in
considered,
was
which
s
logic
which were made
Frege
Superficially
psychologistic
Ockham
to consider
is
distinctions
and philosophy of nineteenth century
in
contemporaries and closest Ockham s view comes close to his
a
by
represented
number
great
of
nineteenth century logicians such as Beneke (1820, 1842), Sigwart (1873),
Wundt
Erdmann
(1880),
criticized
Gottlob
by
(1892),
and Lipps (1893). Those logicians were
and
Frege
other
Psychologists
antipsychologists.
human thought. Some of them believed that the rules of logic concerning how we ought to think have their origin in psychological laws of association concerning how regarded logical laws as psychological laws of
people
in
fact
Others
think.
our
took
logical
concepts of plurality, relation and possibility, to analyzing the
material,
the nineteenth century that
in
logicians
that
that
is,
logic
speaks is
about
all
metaphysical
reality,
human thought, objects. Of course
logicians different
the
who
realm
of
abstract
considered
branches
within
material logical
psychologists belonged to those
and
logic
studies.
who argued
or the
phenomenal were also
there logic
Frege
and
to
even
if
anti-
that logic mirrors the
realm
a
specific
logical
objectified the transcendental structure of
of abstract
1
is
parallel
distinct from, sense-perception.
By acknowledging
distinction
be two
other
of abstract objects and that our logical source of knowledge to,
basically
represents
the psychological
formal
1
is
logic
something
world, the transcendental conditions of or
the
was one version of the doctrine upheld by a
logic
something, whether that something
realm,
as
human mind.
Psychologistic
number of
such
concepts,
become understood by
objects
among
called
thoughts.
In
source
human
this
way,
of knowledge, Frege thought into the forms
he came to make a
three realms. For Frege, there were the realm of the
See Haaparanta (19885).
A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method
493
objects of sense experience, the realm of psychological events, and the 2 realm of logical objects, which provides us with logical concepts. Even if Frege acknowledged the realm of abstract objects, he took
for
it
that
granted
knowledge of analysis.
its
objectivity
structure. This
its
By means
acknowledgements
of this of
the
is
did not prevent us from having because he relied on the method of
method we truth
of
constitutive components of thoughts.
we have
of reason, to which
handle by our methodological
start
with judgements, which are
and
thoughts, 3
direct
Frege
s
come up with
the
logical objects are objects
we
access and which
are able to
tools.
we construe Ockham s procedure in Fregean terms, we notice that for Ockham we neither have direct access to our minds nor to any realm of abstract objects, because there is no such realm for Ockham. If
Ockham
believes in the conceptual priority of ordinary languages. This
belief manifests
itself
For what Ockham thought,
he
which
as a methodological choice in his logical studies.
when he
has at his disposal calls
the
mental
studies the structure of
language,
are
the
grammatical
concepts which pertain to overt languages.
we find George Boole, whose work has a number of traces from Ockham s and other medieval nominalists thought. He even comments on some of their tenets in his more philosophical considerations. He states that if a
Among
the pioneers of
modern
logic in the nineteenth century
by symbols, he would thereby take a step towards a philosophical language. However, he does not recommend the view represented by extreme nominalists which logician should succeed in expressing logical propositions
makes
dependent on language (Boole, 1965, p. 5). What idea resemble the ideas endorsed by Ockham is the fact
logic entirely
makes Boole
s
logical symbols to be founded on the laws of mental processes which they represent (ibid.). Boole s philosophy of logic is a version of psychologistic logic, for he ties
that
Boole takes the laws of the combinations of
the
mechanism of reasoning
to
the
laws
and the constitution of the
intellect. He presumes that if this constitution were changed, our would also turn out to be different from the present one (ibid., p.
human logic
2
See
GLA,
85,
Erkenntnisquellen
GGA der
XXIV, Der Gedanke (1918), KS, p. 353, and I, pp. XVIII Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften
(1924/25), NS, p. 286. 3
See Frege,
Frege,
Was
ist
Uber den Zweck der
Begriffsschrift
eine Funktion? (1904), KS, p. 273.
(1883),
Frege (1964),
p.
101,
and
494
Haaparanta In this peculiar sense, Boole
6).
but
Hence, what Boole of
construction
the
a
is
algebra
not an empty calculus,
medieval nominalists
in
criticizes
we do
the conviction that
s logical
and the mechanisms of the human mind.
structure
the
reflects
it
views
is
precisely
not have direct access to our minds but that
which
language
logical
language takes place by means
mental
the
represents
of the tools received from the study of
overt languages.
Like Boole
s
logic,
Ockham
s
is
his
material in the sense that
is
it
a language which speaks about the realm of the objects of
is
logic
logic
realm. Frege, for his part, assumes that
interested in the psychological
sense experience and the realm of abstract objects, and that
it
is
also
transcendental, for it gives us the structure of thought in general. Frege wants to give us a new language which is not a representation of overt languages but which is a direct symbolic representation of the forms of
Ockham
thought.
and
s
secondarily
notation
model
of
is
the
primarily a
mental,
model of overt languages
whereas
model of the realm of thoughts and
a
is
model
logical
a
Frege
s
conceptual
a representation of the
4
That is, Frege s universal language is be a language of thought itself. What this means is that Frege s and Ockham s interests and objects of study are crucially different. transcendental forms of thought.
meant
3.
to
Ockham
s
and Frege
first-order
Fregean
considered
are
constituted
is
characterized
framework
the
concepts
empirical negation,
conditionality,
Ockham
Models
language
in
by
s
generality,
of
by the idea that objects
Judgements
judgements.
and
by
logical
and
existence,
functions
identity.
Even
are like if
model does not represent the same object as that of Frege s, it Frege s model provided by a conceptual machinery which distinguishes between the material and the formal constituents of is
s
like
propositions.
That
is
because
Ockham makes
categorematic and syncatcgorematic
signs.
such expressions as every, no, some and
both
signification,
which
is
its
context, and supposition, which
For arguments (1985).
in
favour
of
this
a
distinction
Syncategorematic signs include all. A categorematic sign has
meaning independently of a is
between
sentential
a property of a term in a proposition.
interpretation
of
Frege
s
logic,
see
Haaparanta
A Ockham
proposition supposits (SL
a
s
Method
subject
495
a
or
predicate
of a
63).
I,
of three kinds, personal, material, and simple
may be
Supposition
be
can
whatever
that
states
Ockham
Fregean Perspective into
A
term supposits personally when it supposits for the thing which it signifies and when it is significant in suppositing. A term has material supposition when it does not supposit significatively but supposits 64).
(ibid.,
spoken or a written word.
for a
an
for
supposits
significatively.
of
intention
The term man
in
A
term has simple supposition when it the soul and is not functioning "Man"
material supposition, and the term
example of simple supposition. In the intention
species
has
intention of the soul
Accordingly, contains
terms
personal
man which overt
the
of
first
syncategorematic signs.
it
Man
in
latter
is
a
is
an example of species is an
example, the term of second for
supposition,
it
supposits
for
the
signifies.
Ockham
which
language,
terms
intention,
A
name
a
is
man
of
second
interested
is
intention,
in,
and
part of this language, namely, terms of second
intention and syncategorematic signs, consists of the logical vocabulary of this
language.
By means
of this vocabulary
semantic model of the overt language the mental language.
Ockham
formulates a proper and secondarily a model of
itself
5
4. Tlie
Method of Analysis
In
two methodological recommendations were emphasized. grammatical concepts like subject and predicate must not be used
Fregean
First,
logic,
as basic conceptual tools.
out
must
of
method of composing judgements replaced by the method of analyzing
Secondly, the
be
concepts judgements. This is how Frege claims to have found the primitive logical 7 functions which constitute the judgements.
seems that from the Fregean point of view Ockham s logical ought to be criticized for not giving up grammatical tools but praised for adopting the method of analysis in the logical descent to It
studies
This
kind
of
reconstruction
of
Ockham
s
project
is
given
by
Moody
(1953),
on
p. 27.
6 7
See Frege (1964), pp. 2 See Frege,
(1988a, 19885).
-
3,
and Frege an Husserl (1906), BW,
Uber den Zweck der
Begriffsschrift
,
BS
p. 102.
(1964),
p.
101.
Cf.
Haaparanta
496
Haaparanta
when
individuals
Ockham common
terms
divides
Ockham
what
clarifying
having
personal
not
are
as
suppositing terms,
discrete
Ockham
(SL
supposition.
the proper
is
name
Common terms are such 70). Among common
I,
and
discrete
into
supposition
terms. In discrete supposition the term
object or a demonstrative pronoun.
terms
common
calls
of an
suppositing personally
then distinguishes between determinate, merely
confused and confused distributive supposition. A term has determinate supposition when it is possible to descend to particular objects by means of a disjunctive
This
man
man
runs, or that
when
supposition
For example,
proposition.
is
it
runs, or
possible
...
.
A man runs reduced to A term has merely confused is
descend
to
a
to
proposition
with
a
disjunctive predicate involving particulars. For example, Every man is an animal reduces to Every man is this animal or that animal or ... A .
common
term has confused distributive supposition when
descend
individuals
to
is
possible to
a conjunctive proposition. For by means an animal reduces to This man is an animal, and
of
example, Every man is that man is an animal, and
The
it
...
.
three rules of descent which correspond to the three forms of
The
supposition must be used in a certain order. is
supposition
applied
the
first,
rule
for
must be the second, and the
supposition
rule for determinate
confused rule
last
and
applied
distributive
that
is
for
merely confused supposition. For example, the proposition Every man is an animal receives the analysis This man is this animal or that animal or
...,
and
For a
that
man
is
this
animal or that animal or
uses a often
specific read as
symbol
some
.
v,
which behaves
When
for
,
y
= VX
solving
y
The
in
his
somewhere
introduce formulas like
syllogisms, Boole gives solution of the universal
is
.
solution of the universal negative proposition
No Xs
are
Ys
,
symbolically xy
= 0,
is
= v(\-x).
The corresponding forms
for particular affirmative
are
(3)
.
Broadie (1987), pp. 17-25 and pp. 90 - 96. the structure which Boole gives to propositions lies and Frege s analysis. Unlike Frcge, Boole does not
propositions of the forms A, E, I, and O. affirmative proposition All Ys are Xs symbolically v(l-A ) = 0, solutions
(2)
8 ...
that
quantifiers. However, he an existential quantifier
The
and
clarification of this idea, sec
may be noted between Ockham s It
(1)
...,
vx = vy,
meaning Some Xs are Ys
,
and particular negative propositions
A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method The very
may remind
of supposition
idea
us
497
of Frege
context
s
which the meanings of words must be looked for 9 contexts. Frege s logical analysis, which starts with
principle, according to
sentential
in
judgements and not with concepts
in isolation, is true to that principle.
10
And Ockham
s descent to individuals may resemble Frege s descent to which are put into the empty argument places of functions in his objects
conceptual notation. This is how things seem to be. But
what Ockham and Frege are doing, crucially different views of analysis.
there
a
is
different
ontological
more
consider
carefully
turn out that they endorse
their
For
doctrines.
we
if
will
Someone might argue
between
difference
great
it
logics,
example,
for
that of course
they
singular
represent
sentences
like
man
are considered by Frege to be compounded out of a refers to an object, and a function name, which which proper name, refers to a function. For Ockham, there are no functions like properties
Socrates
a
is
and relations
in the
world to be referred
to;
a
instead,
man
stands for
particular men.
However, the point which
want to make here
I
a difference between ontologies,
Ockham
not that there
is
is
being a nominalist and Frege
being a kind of Platonist. Instead, the difference which we find between their views from a logical vantage point is precisely due to a difference between the ways they use the method of analysis and thus a difference
between
their epistemologies.
Both Ockham and Frege propositions
Socrates
be a
to
reading
Socrates
as
identical with a
is
man and is
is
Socrates
the
reject
man man in a
.
That
of
such
they do not think
that
essentialist is,
the sense that Socrates
identical with his essence.
is
reading
based on a sharp distinction between the
essence
is
However, Frege s of identity and
is
and vx = v(l-y),
(4)
meaning Some Xs are not Ys (Boole, 1965, pp. 32
-
33).
These formulas bear
a
striking
similarity
to
the
basic
level
of
Ockham
s
analysis,
exception that Boole stops at the structure of propositions given by elective symbols, which serve as concepts, by the symbol v, which stands for the word some and by the symbol of identity. Ockham has only discrete terms, that is, proper names and demonstrative pronouns, and the symbol of
however,
with
the
not
unimportant ,
identity at the basic level.
9 See,
e.g.,
GLA, Vorwort
,
p.
X, and
For the interpretation of Frege 93.
60. s
context principle, see Haaparanta (1985), pp. 79
-
498
Haaparanta
the
of predication, and
is
takes the sentence to
it
11
mean
that Socrates
for his part, construes
under the concept ma/?. Ockham, and a man as names of one and the same object, that falls
is,
Socrates
as suppositing
for one and the same individual (SL I, 43). A apparently similar view is held by Bertrand Russell in Ttie Principles of Mathematics (1903). Russell
between two readings of the sentence Socrates is a man He assumes that one reading expresses a relation of Socrates to the .
distinguishes
man, while the other reading expresses the identity of Socrates with an ambiguous individual (Russell, 1950, pp. 54 55). Frege in the article in his view kind of criticizes this posthumous writings class-concept
there Logik in der Mathematik (1914). He characterizes it by saying that have been people who have held that concept-words are ambiguous names and that a man is hence a new name for Socrates (NS, pp. 230 - 231).
Frcge
criticism
s
meanings which
would not
Ockham
hit
Ockham
s
theory,
according to the
for
gives to such terms as univocity
and ambiguity
common names arc not ambiguous. The name man signifies several individuals equally, but it signifies them by one convention and it is subordinated to one single concept of the mental language,
view (SL
in
Ockham
s
17).
I,
is analysis of universal, particular and singular judgements Frege include which and between distinction based on the functions, objects
s
are concepts and relations. Proper identity statements and predications would remain kept apart in his logic in order that objects and concepts 12
Frege even connects his distinction between objects and concepts with Kant s distinction between intuitions and concepts, which are the apart.
13 two irreducible and indispensable components of our knowledge.
He
with bundles of argues that objects are not identical with concepts or statement. Proper concepts. Hence, Socrates is a man is not an identity statements like Venus is the Morning Star have a special identity
content for Frege.
They
are metalinguistic statements which claim that
two names refer to one and the same object but that they have different senses (Sinne), which they ascribe to the object named, that is, they
11
See, 12
168 13
This -
e.g., is
Frege,
Uber
168 Begriff und GegenstancT (1892), KS, pp.
strongly emphasized by Frege
169.
See GI
A
27, footnote.
in
his
Uber
-
169 and
p. 174.
Begriff und Gegenstand
,
KS, pp.
A Fregean Perspective into
Ockham
to think that the
for a
view,
form
what
signifies
he also claims that
43), but
I,
whiteness is
asserted
is
it
is
499
that
one nature
Socrates
is
it
to all
white
false to think that
sentence
in the
Method
Ockham argues common
express different aspects of the object.
name man
s
white
.
In
is
false
men (SL supposits
Ockham
s
which the subject stands is (ibid., 66), Hence, Ockham and
that the thing for
the thing for which the predicate stands
Frege agree in their criticism against essentialism, but they disagree in what they think of the basic level of analysis. In Ockham s procedure, analysis brings us to the level of individual objects, while Frege s analysis
stops at the level of individuals, concepts, and relations.
5. TJie
Two Epistemologies
But why does Frege stop
at
an earlier
level
treatment of a predicative judgement like allow
any reduction
Frege thinks that via
a
of concept-words
that
a
a sense,
via
is
it
name
a
than
Socrates
names of
to
Ockham? Frege
s
man
does not
objects.
Similarly,
a
is
conceptual component, and only
related
an
to
15
Hence, every mediated by a concept under which that object falls, and every judgement is construed as an expression of an act of knowledge which consists of conceptual components alone or together sense,
apprehension of an object
is
object.
is
with symbolic representations of individual objects.
Ockham, for his part, upholds the view that all terms, both discrete and common, stand in direct relation to individual objects and, moreover, that mental signs are on a par with overt signs, that is, that they also stand in direct relation to individual objects. proposition as a composition of
conceptual components like Frege s Sinne. Of course we might suggest that
between
Ockham
repeated
point
s
and
that
Frege
they put
s
basic
forward
disregarding this alleged difference
Ockham and Frege have Frege gives his main (1892), KS, pp. 143 144. This
remark
(1892), NS, p. 135.
is
crucially
argument for
made by Frege
Ockham
s
model construes a
two names without even a mentioning of
in
the levels
reason for of
different
analysis
the is
ontological
difference
the views.
often
But
and taking into account the fact that different aims in their logical studies,
this
his
tenet
in
his
Ausfiihrungen
Uber Sinn und Bedeutung fiber
Sinn
und Bedeutung
500
Haaparanta
we may formulate
the
answer
in
another
way.
Namely, Ockham is is committed to the
committed to his scarce basic level only so far as he view that his semantic model languages,
model
is
is
model of spoken and written sign-object relations, and that this
primarily a
thus consisting of simple
then automatically extended to the mental realm. if Ockham s mental language may appear to have the
Hence, even
same
constituents as Frege
close to constructing a
new
s
Ockham does not come What prevents Ockham from
conceptual notation,
logical language.
precisely the view upheld by him that the primary which the conceptual machinery of logic is applied are overt spoken and written languages. Surprisingly enough, this conviction brings
constructing
it
is
objects to
Ockham
to a number of logical developments of the twentieth what Ockham does, expressed in contemporary terms, is to century, give a semantic theory for natural languages and not to give a new
closer
for
universal language, which Frege
Academy
s
conceptual notation was meant to be.
of Finland,
University of Helsinki
References
F.E Erfahningsseclenlehre Siegfried Mittler, Berlin, 1820.
Beneke,
als
Beneke, F.E., System der Logik als Ferdinand Dummler, Berlin, 1842.
Grundlage Kunstlchre
alles
des
Wissens,
Denkens
I
Ernst
-
//,
Boole, G., Tlie Mathematical Analysis of Logic, being an essay towards a calculus of deductive reasoning (1847), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965.
Broadie, A., Introduction
to
Medieval Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1987.
Erdmann, 1923
B.,
Logik (1892), Walter de Gruyter
&
Co., Berlin
und Leipzig,
(3. ed.)
Frege, G., Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Verlag von L. Nebert, Halle a.S., 1879; von I. repr. in G. Frege. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsatze, hrsg. Angelelli, Georg Dims, Hildesheim, 1964. (Referred to as BS.) G., Die Gnmdlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung uber den Begriff der Zahl, Verlag von W. Koebner,
Frege,
A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method
501
Breslau, 1884; repr. and transl. by J.L. Austin in Tfie Foundations of Arithmetic I Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968. (Referred to as
Frege,
GLA.) der Arithmetik,
Grundgesetze
G.,
begriffsschriftlich
Band, Verlag von H. Pohle, Jena, 1893. (Referred
to as
abgeleitet,
I.
GGA I.)
Frege, G., Kleine Schriften, hrsg. von I. Angelelli, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, und Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1967. (Referred to as KS.) Frege, G., Nachgelassene Schriften, hrsg. von H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, und F. Kaulbach, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1969. Frege,
G.,
Wissenschaftliche
Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Hamburg, 1976. Haaparanta,
L.,
Briefwechsel, hrsg. von G. Gabriel, H. Thiel, und A. Veraart, Felix Meiner Verlag,
Frege s Doctrine of Being,
Ada
Philosophica Fennica 39,
1985. L., Frege and His German Contemporaries on Alethic Moda (1988a), in S. Knuuttila (ed.), Modem Modalities: Studies of the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988, pp. 234 274.
Haaparanta, lities
L., Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and HusserF (1988b), Synthese 11, 1988, pp. 73-
Haaparanta, 97.
Lipps, T., Grundzilge der Logik, Verlag von Leopold Voss, Leipzig, 1893.
Hamburg und
Moody, E.A., Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1953.
Ockham. W. and
S.
of,
Summa
Brown,
Ockham, W.
of,
St.
Logicae (1323 1329), ed. by P. Boehner. G. Gal, Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974. (Referred to as SL.)
Ockham
transl.
and
Notre
Dame
s
Theory of Terms, Part 1 of the
Sigwart, C., Logik, Erster Band, Verlag der H. Tubingen, 1873. Russell, B.,
Summa Logicae, Dame Press,
by M.L. Loux, University or Notre and London, 1974.
intr.
Lauppschen Buchhandlung,
The Principles of Mathematics (1903), George Allen
&
Unwin
Ltd, London, 1950.
W,
Logik: Eine Untersuchung der Principien der Erkenntnis und der Methoden Wissenschaftlicher Forschung, Erster Band: Erkenntnis-
Wundt,
lehre,
Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1880.
BRIAN HENDLEY
A New Look at John of Salisbury s Educational Theory
In recent years, there has life
been
and works of John of of John
edition
critical
s
a resurgence of scholarly interest in the
2
John
City, talks
and a
scholar,
at
appeared with an accompanying 1980, scholars from around the world
just
among
others.
3
Similar
an international Conference held
as well
interest
interdisciplinary
at Salisbury,
book
England, with Tfie
papers being published 4 Careful attention of Salisbury.
a
as to his activities as a student,
Church administrator,
in
later
of the
writings,
s
historian, a classicist, a philosopher,
of John
World
a
on John were given by a
literary
bulk
edition
of John
commemorate the octocentennial of at Fordham University in New York
was shown the
new
volume of
At the Conference held
death.
s
A
appeared.
English and Dutch translation. gathered at various conferences to In
the second
1979, 1
Letters
Maior and Minor has
Entheticus
In
Salisbury.
was
entitled,
paid
John
to
s
and inveterate traveller. Many of the papers challenged his and views argued for a revised interpretation of John and accepted political advisor,
work. It
is
the
in
spirit
of these
"John
of Salisbury
shall take a fresh look at his educational theory. article
Daniel
by
Metalogicon
of
McGarry,
John of
entitled 5
theory of knowledge John develops
what
at stake philosophically
is
I
Salisbury."
in
of Salisbury
s
Entheticus
(Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. 3
John
York 4
of
City,
Salisbury
October
Michael
Wilks
1984). Cf. also
5
my
take
shall
that
1
concentrate on an in
Theory
special
note
of
the the
the Metalogicon in order to see defense of the arts of the Trivium
in
his
W.J. Millor and C.N.L. Brooke (eds.), The Two: The Later Letters (1163-1180) (Oxford, 1979).
John
will
"Educational
1
2
I
revisionists"
Letters
Maior and Minor,
cd.
of John
Jan
of Salisbury,
van
Volume
3
vols.
University,
New
I^aarhoven,
Brill, 1987).
Octocentennial
Conference
held
at
Fordham
25, 1980. (ed.),
The
review of Wilks
of John of Salisbury (Oxford: Basil Speculum, 62 (January, 1987), pp. 220-222.
World in
Daniel D. McGarry, "Educational Theory Speculum, 23 (1948), pp. 659-675.
in
the Metalogicon
of John of
Blackwcll,
Salisbury,"
John of Salisbury s Educational Ttieory and show how
his defense
is
relevant to
some
503
of the educational problems
of today.
McGarry on John
s
article
McGarry s
Educational Ttieory
was
the
in
pivotal
sense
that
introduced
it
many
English-speaking readers to the cultural background and the philosophical foundation for John s defense of the Trivium. 6 John wrote the
Metalogicon as a defense of with
dealing
language:
grammar,
these
because
arts
and
rhetoric,
answer the attacks of those he called the of
broad sense of the three
in the
"logic"
of
their
7
belief
that
reasoning and verbal expression comes as the
fruit
study
He
logic.
"Cornificians"
it
to
decried the
"effective
facility
in
of natural talent and 8
exercise rather than as a product of formal
wrote
who
arts
teaching."
Like contemporary
proponents of education as job-training, the Cornificians were impatient with the time being spent studying great works of the past and dubious of the need to master the rules for effective speaking, clear writing, and
cogent argumentation. They would reduce the attention paid to the arts of the Trivium to a minimum in order to expedite the entry of students into lucrative occupations. They claimed that came as an innate eloquence gift
rather than as the result of formal study.
John was
eminently suited to answer this charge, according to because of his wide reading and love for the classics. 9 As a McGarry, There had been previous studies on John on a more popular level; cf., for example, Clement C.J. Webb, John of Salisbury (London: Methuen, 1932) and Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning (London, 1920). McGarry s translation of the Metalogicon did not appear until 1955. Scholars
when he
are
still
not
referred to the
Cornifician
motif
in
certain
which
"Cornificians".
John of Salisbury
Cf., s
had in particular individuals John for example, Rosemary Barton Tobin,
Metalogicon,"
History of Education,
13
mind "The
(1984),
pp. 1-6. o
McGarry, 9
This
op.
cit.,
view of John as a most notably by Janet Martin.
traditional
challenged,
p. 660.
lover Cf.
her
of
the
Classics
has
recently
of Salisbury and the interest are her articles,
"John
been
Classics"
dissertation. Harvard, 1968). Also of "John of Manuscripts of Frontinus and of Gellius," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 40 (1977), pp. 1-26; "Uses of Tradition: Gellius, Petronius and John
(unpublished
Salisbury
of
s
Viator, 10 (1979), pp. 57-76; and "John of Salisbury as Classical Scholar," The World of John of Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 179-201. Further criticism of John s classical scholarship can be found in Peter Von Moos, "The Use of Exempla in the Policaticus of John of Salisbury," in The World of John of Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 207-261. in
Salisbury,"
504
Hcndley
student of the
"Christian
humanism"
of Chartres, he was able to
draw
with upon a deep knowledge of the writings of classical authors together 10 He the Bible and the works of the Church Fathers. proposes that schools adopt the educational
wherein at
"the
lectures,
11 activity."
learning process consists in reading, active attendance reflection, memorization, exercises in imitation and original recitations,
production,
method followed by Bernard of Chartres,
full
John
s
known statement
and review,
all
of which
indebtedness to Bernard to the effect that
is
"Bernard
further
further
stress
marked
student
in his well-
of Chartres used to
compare
us to [puny] dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants. He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have
keener vision or greater height, but because we are
on
aloft
their gigantic
lifted
up and borne
12 stature."
Having traced the intellectual lineage of John s thought, McGarry is the foundation for goes on to say that "John s philosophy of education his whole pedagogical theory, and the key to his philosophy of education 13 This philosophy sees knowledge as based on is his philosophy." general
Reason frees us opinions derived from the senses and imagination. hidden natures to the access us and from deception by opinion gain helps and causes of things. Education seeks to develop reason through the fallible
study of the
arts,
which are
of experience:
light
"efficacious
tools, fashioned
by reason
in the
results expeditious short-cuts to the achievement of
10
R.W. Southern has claimed that there never was a distinctive School of Chartres with its own brand of Christian humanism. Cf. his The Schools of Paris and The School of Chartres," in Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (eds.) Renaissance
and Renewal "Humanism
in
and
the
the
and his Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 113; of Chartres," in Medie\ al Humanism and Other Studies the issue is far from 1970), p. 74. Southern does admit that
Twelfth
School
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, settled and he refers to criticisms of his view by Nikolaus M. Haring, "Chartres and Paris Revisited," in J. Reginald O Donncll (ed.), Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Peter Dronke, "New Approaches to the School of Pegis (Toronto, 1974), pp. 268-329; de estudios medie\ ales, 6 (1971), p. 117-140; and Robert Giacone, Chartres," Anuario Books and Library at Chartres According to the Cartularies of Notre-Dame "Masters, and Saint-Pere," Vivarium, 12 (1974), pp. 30-51. Also of interest on the topic is J.O. on Cicero s De Inventione by Thierry of Chartres Date of the "The
Commentary
Ward, (ca.
1095-1160?) and the Cornifician Attack on the Liberal
Arts,"
Viator,
3 (1972), pp.
219-273. 11
Ibid., p. 673.
12
The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury, trans. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley/Los this remark is commonly attributed to Angeles, 1955, reprinted 1962), p. 167. Although Bernard of Chartres, Raymond Klibansky claims that the original statement comes from 147-149. Priscian; cf. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants," Isis, 26 (1936), pp. 13
McGarry,
op.
cit.,
p. 664.
John of Salisbury s Educational Theory
would
which
be
otherwise
development of reason
is
too
or
difficult
505
unattainable."
14
The
complemented by acquiring eloquence through
study of the verbal arts. Eloquence enables us to accumulate and
the
what we know by thinking correctly, accurately comprehending what we hear and read, and effectively expressing ourselves in speech distribute
and
15
writing.
have no quarrel with this since I too am a firm supporter of the 16 view that the concerns of wisdom and eloquence are mutual for John. What I cannot fathom is McGarry s attempt to connect John to presentI
day educational thinkers by labelling to
McGarry, According between several of the
"There
in
fact,
advocated
views
of an
his theory as that
exists,
"Idealist".
a remarkable parallelism in
the
Metalogicon
and
corresponding propositions presented by R.M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago in his ... [book] Higher Learning in America, and Hutchins is
an
considered
Idealist
.
Tragmatist or Materialist
The comparison not
there
...
is
no
John was no
that
question
17 ."
of John of Salisbury to Robert
Maynard Hutchins
an apt one. Hutchins was a staunch follower of Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas. He be
could
clearly
is
St.
believed that the aims and content of education
once
delineated
we recognized
the
importance
of
metaphysics. Metaphysics gives us knowledge of the ordering principles
and causes of order
of
distinction
some as
reality
studies
in
which provide the underlying framework for the education. Even the sceptic must presuppose a
between knowledge and opinion, says Hutchins.
certain, clear knowledge. If there
such,
and
it
be
which there
in
disciplines
should
beginning of our
curriculum."
taught is
is
first.
knowledge, Let us then it
certainty and
let
us
"There
must be
should be taught
enumerate the
place
them
at
the
18
The key idea is that of order. The rational order of the universe can be known and it should be mirrored by the order of studies in school.
14 15
In
a
simplistic
but
oft-quoted statement, Hutchins puts
it
this
Ibid., p. 668.
Ibid., p. 675.
A
1
New Interpretation Cf., for example, Brian Hendley, "Wisdom and Eloquence: of the Metalogicon of John of Salisbury" (unpublished dissertation, Yale, 1967). McGarry, 18
Robert
op.
M.
cit.,
p. 665.
Hutchins,
(November, 1936),
p. 588.
"A
Reply
to
Professor
Whitehead,"
Atlantic
Monthly,
158
506
Hendley
way:
"Education
implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge.
Knowledge
everywhere the same. Hence education should be 19 Practical applications of ideas have no place in same." the everywhere the proper order of higher education. What can be learned at the is
The
truth.
truth
is
university are general principles, fundamental propositions, the theory of
any discipline, unhampered by any concern for
The university own sake. The role of
results.
their
with
"true
of
"models
as the
rules
"means
for
reasoning
excellence".
scheme
and
is
to supply us
logic are singled out
Grammar, rhetoric, how excellence is achieved". Thus,
of determining classical
speaking, is
the classics in this
of writing,
rules
demonstrative."
rigorously
20
for
pressure
to study things for
is
says Hutchins,
spirit",
or
utility
"conditions
there are
under which
The culmination of
the whole
programme of studies should be metaphysics. Indeed, Hutchins asserts that we can revitalize metaphysics and restore it to its proper place in the higher learning, we may be able to establish rational order in the modern "If
world as well as It
is
21 university."
to reconcile this view of education with that of
difficult
of Salisbury.
who
in the
For one
thing,
John
a
is
self-professed
sceptic
"in
Whether such propositions may be 22
probable certitude." guide our way in
judgements effective
John
matters that are Metalogicon with the disclaimer that to a wise man, I cannot swear to the truth of what I say.
begins his
doubtful
Academic
use
experiences,
of
of
or
false,
I
am
satisfied
with
For John, there are no metaphysical certainties
Human knowledge
education.
sensation
language.
clarify
true
and
and
imagination.
We
learn
critici/e
to
It
begins
to
fallible
advances
communicate
our opinions,
with
through the our ideas and
argue with one another
about the meaning of things. The truths that Hutchins would start from in education are the ideal end or goal that John would have us strive towards, with no guarantee of success.
The
difference between the two
approaches to knowledge can be highlighted by recalling John of universals and his
commentary on Aristotle
s
s
treatment
Organon.
Although he acknowledges Aristotle as the master on the question of universals, John stops short of fully endorsing his position. For Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher University Press, 1936, reprinted, 1965), p. 66. 20
Learning
Ibid., p. S3.
21
Ibid., p. 105.
The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,
op.
cit., p. 6.
in
America
(New Haven: Yale
John of Salisbury s Educational
507
Tiieory
knowledge of the universal was knowledge of sensible things
Aristotle,
under the aspect of their formal cause. The mind is able to abstract a content from particular sense perceptions and use this as a basis for scientific knowledge. For John, we have no such knowledge of universal
the formal aspects of individual things because
seemingly melts
when confronted by
the
strength of reason
"the
principles of
[first]
The
things."
our grasp and we must make do it (figmenta) which reason devises
real nature of sensible things exceeds
with universals which are delves deeper in
"fictions"
of learning, John assures us, their
"as
investigation and explanation of
its
All branches
things."
devise fictions to expedite
"unhesitatingly
23 investigations."
This
reluctance
reality
claim
to
certainty
John
in
our knowledge of sensible
apparent commentary on the Organon. toward Aristotle s Posterior Analytics which
also
is
in
s
relatively
with methods of logical demonstration. Such methods
mathematics,
and
especially
truths; but they are not of
geometry where we
scientific
knowledge
of what
is
may be
deal
is
deals
of use in
with
necessary use in our investigation of sensible
much
Strictly speaking, says John,
reality.
He
indifferent
"there
can be no necessary proof or
corruptible",
so
that
the
demonstrator
should leave
all topics that are not necessary to the dialectician and the seek only probability. John strongly prefers Aristotle s Topics which aids our investigation of probabilities by accounting for the mutual
orator
who
connection of things and words and provides us with an abundance of
to
24
Once
through language that we will advance, if not mathematical (or metaphysical) certainty, then to higher degrees of
reasons.
again
is
it
probability.
McGarry was
complementarity of wisdom and eloquence in John s educational theory. What he failed to appreciate was that John sees the efficacious use of language as our chief means to achieve wisdom. is
advantageous
wisdom."
Ibid.,
of
25
pp.
Universals,"
to
right
"Fluency "only
note the
does not always merit
when
it
is
oriented
Through reading and learning
praise,"
to
facilitated
[the
John
acquisition
by the
130, 135; cf. also Brian Hendley, "John of Salisbury and Journal of the History of Philosophy, 8 (1970), pp. 289-302.
24
tells us;
it
of]
arts
of the
the
Problem
pp. 212, 215, 201. Cf. also Brian Hendley, "John of Salisbury s Defense of the Arts Liberaux et Philosophic au Moyen Age. IVe Congres international de philosophic medievale. Montreal, 1967 (Paris, 1969), pp. 753-762. Ibid.,
Trivium,"
The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,
op.
cit.,
pp. 91-92.
508
Hendley
we can
Trivium,
an intuitive understanding
attain
help,
Such
into the real nature of things.
(intellectus)
it
or meditative insight
must be learned.
speaking and writing correctly in order to gain comprehensibility in the use of words. We must also learn for
in
disserendi)
(ratio
reasoning"
distinguish the true from the false and what 26
impossible.
Finally,
we must
is
order
science of
be
to
able
disprove
proposed It
in
is
that
learn the art of disputation
either
is
doubtful,
to
necessary from what
or
or
denied,
something 27 one way or another by alleging reasons." precisely because John does not think we
can
underlying principles and causes of things with our natural
is
whereby we
can persuade others of the likelihood of our assertions and seek to or
and
clarity
"the
argumentative
s
language does not come We must master
facility in
naturally, as the Cornificians contend;
rules
God
eventually get beyond fallible opinions and, with
"prove
[simply]
the
grasp
abilities that
he advocates the study of the Trivium. His defense of the verbal arts does not stem from a so-called Christian humanism which values the study of the classics for like
Hutchins who
of
reality
its
own
sake; nor
is
it
the outlook of
someone
patterns the content of education on the rational order
disclosed
to
us
through
It
metaphysics.
rather
is
the
theory sceptic whose scepticism is tempered by an abiding faith in language as the means to overcome the limits of our knowledge and draw closer to the truth. This can be seen in the of
educational
a
he poses for the Cornificians: "Can the secret and hidden recesses [cuniculos] of nature be charted by one who is utterly ignorant questions
of
all
philosophy?
Can
they be understood by one
to speak correctly, nor to
Almost
as
comprehend what
surprising
as
theory with that of Hutchins
his
is
is
attempt
McGarry
s
who knows
written or to
neither
how
28 spoken?"
link
John
disavowal of
s
educational
"Pragmatism"
as
an alternative description of what John is up to. Various scholars have commented on the pragmatic turn to John s thought. According to Peter
Von Moos, fancies
and
for
effective ideas.
26
example, John had
abstract conceptions 29
It
Ibid., p. IS.
Ibid.,p.80.
29
Ibid., p. 18-19.
Peter
Von Moos,
op.
an aversion to felt
purely
theoretical
that the only valid ideas
were
has also been noted by Michael Wilks that the lack
27 28
and
cit.,
p. 209.
509
John of Salisbury s Educational Theory
outcome of ideas was seen by John as the source of bad government as well as bad philosophy. The verbal jugglers of concern for the practical
Metalogicon are the philosophical counterparts of the nonsense minstrels and prince-pleasers he attacks in the Policraticus:
he
criticizes in the
"the
of the
universalists
This
curialium."^
the
is
he espouses a naive
that sort
the
promoted by in its
same nonsense
of the
the nugae
courtiers,
not to suggest that John was anti-intellectual, nor
is
"learning
by
Cornificians.
doing"
I
approach to education of the
think
his
overall
viewpoint
is
and that
scepticism, and
combination of
faith, fallibility, pragmatic bears strong similarities to the thought of the founder of American
it
pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914).
John and Peirce
Much
has been written about Peirce
s interest in
Duns
Scotus.
31
It
should
be noted that he read and appreciated other Medieval philosophers, of Salisbury whom he called elegant writer and
also
among them John accurate
"the
32
Peirce
thinker."
specifically
refers to the Metalogicon
men
fitting since both
approaches to the
intellect
alone",
number of
While John admits
because
35
a
s
works
times.
34
and he
This seems
share a healthy scepticism which rejects infallible
truth.
attain necessary truth
the
owned and read John
we
that in
deal only with
mathematics we can
"concepts
he would agree with Peirce that
perceptible by in
regard
to
Michael Wilks, "John of Salisbury and the Tyranny of Nonsense," in The World of John of Salisbury, op. tit., p. 276. For a good sample of John s impatience with verbal jugglers cf. his remarks in the Policraticus, VII, 12, trans, by Joseph B. Pike as Frivolities of Courtiers and Footprints of Philosophers (Minneapolis: University of Baldwin archdeacon of Totnes," Minnesota Press, 1938), p. 261, and his Letter 238, in The Letters of John of Salisbury, Volume Two, op. cit., pp. 450-451. "To
21
for example, John F. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A Cf., Study of Peirce s Relation to Duns Scotus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963). 32 Charles S. Peirce, "Letters to Lady Welby," in Philip P. Wiener (ed.), Values in a Universe of Chance (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. 403.
33
Peirce owned a copy of John s Metalogicon (Paris, 1610) and Opera (Oxford, 1848), according to Max Fisch (personal correspondence, March 6, 1967).
and
Omnia
Weiss (eds.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Harvard University Press, second printing, 1960), 1.560. Specific references to the Metalogicon can be found in 2.317, n.l, 2.364, 2.391, n.3, 2.434, and 8.378. Charles
Peirce
Hartshorne
(Cambridge,
Paul
Massachusetts:
The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,
op.
cit.,
p. 250.
510
Hendley
knowledge is never absolute but always swims 36 continuum of uncertainty and indeterminacy."
sensible reality
Peirce sees the
of
fallibility
human
in a
...
"our
opinion leading to an irritation
of doubt which acts as a stimulus to inquiry, the sole object of which
settlement
the
and
of
the
fixation
of
belief.
37
This
will
is
be
opinion achieved in the long run by the efforts of a community of inquirers using common methods of investigation. Such methods should have a public and
and be directed
self-corrective character
to a
38
common
Although he would substitute an empirical, experimental method for John s more linguistic approach to finding the truth, Peirce would support John s belief that
common methods
through
reach the truth. According to Peirce,
of investigation "all
goal.
we can
ultimately
the followers of science are
animated by a cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to each question to 39 This "cheerful hope" of science is an abiding which they apply that we can eventually ascertain by reasoning how things really and it."
faith
truly
are.
In
much
grammar,
the
rhetoric,
same way, John argues and
logic will
that
mastery of the arts of
enable us to rise above the limitations
of the senses and reach an intuitive understanding of the exact nature of
By taking advantage of the stature of the classical authors whose we read and study, we can see more and farther than our predecessors. By learning how to communicate effectively and argue cogently, we can also, in Peirce s sense of community inquiry, stand on things.
works
one another in
Peirce
s
s
shoulder. This similarity of outlook
description
investigators
of the
and
cooperate
of the
procedure "stand
one
upon
is
brought out strikingly
natural sciences
another
communicating observations, examining hypotheses, and against
experience.
The
subject to further testing.
final
results
only
shoulders"
in
testing predictions
provisionally
accepted,
40
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, op.
37
are
s
where
cit.
,
1.171.
Ibid., 5.375.
A
good treatment of Peirce s view of community inquiry can be found in John The Spirit of American Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), and in his article, "Community and Reality," in Richard J. Bernstein (ed.), Perspectives on Peirce (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 92-119. E. Smith,
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, op.
40
Ibid., 5.413.
cit.,
5.407.
John of Salisbury
s
Educational Theory
511
Such an open-minded approach to the pursuit of truth seems much more in line with John s thought than do the dogmatic pronouncements of 41 Hutchins. McGarry directs By mis-labelling John s position as "Idealist",
most interesting features: the recognition of of human knowledge and the concomitant distrust of claims
our attention away from the
fallibility
its
to certainty, the distaste for intellectual exercises that lead
the
properly trained in
hidden
nowhere, plus powers of reason and the capacity of men, the arts of language, to help one another toward the
in
faith
ongoing
the
truth
we
all
in
the
sense
pragmatic
seek.
This
that
it
is
a
claims
view
would
I
do count
ideas
that
characterize
and
as
that
community inquiry can be an effective means to the truth. It forms the core of an educational theory that still has something to say to us today, faced as we are by challenges to liberal education from contemporary
who
Cornificians truth,
disdain study of the past, seek quick shortcuts to the
and see education as a means of
satisfying
immediate vocational
wants rather than meeting long-range needs. John serves to remind us that we must not neglect our cultural heritage for we have much to learn
from the
"giants"
need some
who
tried to
make
sense out of
life
We
before us.
also
expression and logical thinking, so that we can share and compare our ideas and talk with rather than at or about one another. Above all, we should maintain a sceptical attitude towards discipline in verbal
matters doubtful to a wise man. These are the elements in John
s
defense
of the liberal arts that are worth recalling today.
University of Waterloo
One Hutchins
could
draw
similar
made by another
"Rationality
in
Education,"
parallels
between
John
s
views
leading American pragmatist, John Social Frontier, 3 (December, 1936),
Hutchins Proposals to Remake Higher Education," Ibid. and The Higher Learning in America," Ibid. (March,
and
the
Dewey. pp.
criticisms Cf.
71-73;
Dewey
of s,
"President
1937), pp. 103-104; 1937), pp. 167-169. Also of education to ultimate first principles
interest is Dewey s objection to subordinating derived from Aristotle and St. Thomas; cf. Experience Books, 1963 [1938]).
(January,
and Education (London:
Collier
CHRISTOPH KANN
Zur Suppositionsthcoric Alberts von Sachscn
Die Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachscn wird zumeist vordergriindig als
ockhamistisch angcschen und
1st
in
ihrcr
eigenstandigen Bedcutung
umstrittcn. Wcnnglcich Alberts Eintcilung der Supposition mit derjenigen seines Vorgangers William of Ockham ubercinstimmt, so sind doch bei der
einzelner
Behandlung einfacher,
und
personalcr
am
insbesondere
von
Bcispicl
welche
deutlich,
Supposition
Abweichungen
grundlcgcnde Unterscheidung von materialer Supposition betrcffen. Dies wird
welche bereits die
festzustcllen,
wesentliche
Suppositionsartcn
in
erstc,
Alberts ihren
der
Behandlung
iiber
Differenzierungen
materialcn
Ockhams
Modell hinausgeht. Die vorliegende Untersuchung zu Alberts Suppositions sich dahcr auf cine Analyse seiner Behandlung der
theorie bcschrankt
materialen Supposition und
stellt
cinen Bc/.ug zur heutigen Unterscheidung
von Gcbrauch und Erwahnung eines Sprachzeichens her. Albert
materiale
definiert
Supposition
als
eines
Verwendung
"die
Terminus, der fur sich selbst (pro sc) oder eincn ihm entsprcchenden (sibi verwendet wird, welcher simili) odcr nicht cntsprechenden (sibi dissimiii)
modo) oder anders
auf dieselbe Weise (eodcm
welchcm
nicht /ur
cr
(alitcr)
supponiert, und
Be/eichnung beigelcgt ist, und der das, wofiir er r Wcise bezeichnet" (PL 1 ll ).
supponiert, nicht in eigentlicher natiirlicher
,
Alberts Analyse der materialen Supposition geht bereits in der Definition iiber
Ockhams Bestimmung "wenn
vorliegt,
ein
dann
hinaus, nach der materiale Supposition
Terminus
nicht
sondern
signifikativ,
fur
ein
2
gesprochenes oder geschriebenes Wort supponiert" (SL 1,64). Die letzten beiden Teilbestimmungen der Definition Alberts, nach ,
welchen ein material supponierender Terminus seinem Suppositum nicht signifikativ
beigelegt
bezeichnet,
kommen
Albertus (y.itiert in
2
Saxonia,
und
es
nicht
in
eigentlicher
natiirlicher
Weise
material supponierenden Termini generell zu. Die
Perutilis
Logica,
Vencdig
1522,
repr.
Hildesheim
1974;
eigcner Ubersetzung).
William
Hamburg
de
ist
of
1984.
Ockham,
Summe
der
Logik
Uber
die
Termini,
ed.
P.
Kunze,
Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen iibrigen
Teilbestimmungen lassen sich wie
513
disjunktiv
folgt
gegeniiber-
stellen:
acceptio termini
pro se
pro aliquo I
sibi simili
sibi dissimili
I
eodem modo
supponente
(1)
supponente
(2)
Als
Terminus
eodem modo
aliter
supponente
Beispiel
aliter
supponente
(3)
materialer
Supposition
fur sich selbst nennt Albert die
als
(4)
der
Aussage
Verwendung
"Homo
est
eines
disyllabum".
Den Teilbestimmungen der materialen Supposition als Verwendung eines Terminus fur einen anderen Terminus lassen sich Alberts Beispiele wie folgt in einer Kreuzklassifikation
zuordnen:
pro aliquo
pro aliquo
sibi simili
sibi dissimili
(1)
(3)
Sortes:"Homo est
disyllabum. (supp. materialis)
eodem modo supponente
Plato:
"Homo
est
terminus
prolatus a Sorte." (supp. materialis) (2)
(4)
Sortes:
"Homo
est
animal."
(supp. personalis) Plato: aliter
"Homo
est
terminus
prolatus a Sorte." (supp. materialis)
Homo est animal, (supp. personalis)
Animal praedicatur de homme.
(supp. materialis)
supponente
Amo deum. (supp. personalis)
Amo est verbum. (supp. materialis)
Sortes currit. (supp. personalis)
Sortem currere verum.
est
(supp. materialis)
Kann
514
(1)
Angenommen,
"Homo
Sokratcs sagt
terminus prolatus a
est
"Homo
Sorte",
den ihm entsprechendcn Terminus Weise, namlich material. (2) est
Angenommen,
Sokrates sagt
terminus prolatus a
der
mil
Plato
est
und supponiert
"Homo
"homo"
den
fur
anderer Weise,
in
personal supponiert.
is
"Men
a
3
noun
schlagt als Beispiel vor:
the
in
plural"
bezieht sich
Aussage "Man is uttered in the plural", so fiir den von ihm verschiedenen Terminus
der
steht
und
"men"
namlich material. Auf die Problematik
derselben Weise,
in
fur
derselben
sagt
"man"
supponiert
sagt
"homo"
in
und Plato
animal"
kein Beispiel. Boehner
auf die Aussage
Angenommen, Terminus
hierfiir
und supponiert
so steht der Terminus
"homo"
"homo"
(3) Albert gibt
und Plato
disyllabum",
so steht der Terminus
"homo"
"Homo
Sorte",
ihm entsprechenden Terminus namlich material, wahrend
est
dieses Beispielcs wird im folgenden noch eingegangen. (4)
auf die Aussage
Angenommen,
"Homo
est
wird durch die
animal"
Aussage "Animal praedicatur de hominc" Be/.ug genommen, so Terminus "homine" fur den von ihm verschiedenen Terminus supponiert in anderer Weise, namlich material, wahrend
steht der
und
"homo"
"homo"
personal
supponiert.
Ockhams demgegeniiber
Differenzicrung lediglich
die
matcrialen
der
Unterscheidung
Supposition
vor,
daB
ein
sieht
material
ihm selbst supponierender Terminus fiir sich selbst oder fiir eincn von verschiedenen Terminus steht (SL 1,67). Eine Entsprechung zu Alberts Fallen (1) und (2) weist Ockhams Modell nicht auf. Die Teilbestimmung, nach der ein material supponierender Terminus seinem Suppositum nicht signifikativ beigelegt ist, erlautert Albert anhand Die Aussage "Vox est monosyllaba" legt eines Beispiel wie folgt (PL 11 ): zunachst die Auffassung nahe, daB hier ein Fall mctasprachlicher Bezugnahme und damit materiale Supposition vorliege. Indessen handelt es sich
nach Albert
um
personale Supposition, da
"vox"
selbst
sich
signifikativ
Entsprechend argumentiert er in Bezug auf den vierten beigelegt ra von hypothetischen Zweifel (PL 12 ) hinsichtlich der Supposition auch hier einerseits innerhalb der Aussage "Vox est sonus". Zwar scheint sei.
"vox"
der Terminus
"vox"
material zu supponieren, da er
andererseits aber personal, da er (sich
selbst)
fiir
signifikativ beigelegt
Albert spricht in der Widerlegung dcs Zweifels (PL 12 3
Ph.
Boehner,
(1958), S. 240-289.
"A
Medieval
Theory
of
Supposition",
sich selbst steht,
in:
va )
ist.
dem Terminus
Franciscan
Studies
18
Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen personale Supposition zu, was so zu erklaren
"vox"
ist:
515
Fur sich
selbst
zu
zwar eine mogliche, jedoch weder eine notwendige noch eine hinreichende Bedingung fiir materiale Supposition. Das Stehen eines stehen
ist
Terminus
fiir
Umgekehrt
sich selbst impliziert also nicht seine materiale Supposition.
impliziert jedoch die signifikative
Verwendung
seine personale Supposition, da signifikative
eines
Terminus
bei materialer
Verwendung und einfacher Supposition per defmitionem ausgeschlossen ist. Hieraus wird klar, daB in der Aussage "Vox est monosyllaba" das Subjekt fiir sich und personal, in der Aussage "Homo selbst und material supponiert. Wahrend
selbst
sich fiir
in
est
disyllabum"
dagegen
der ersten Aussage
in
fiir
"vox"
sein urspriingliches Signifikat, d.h. einen Stimmlaut, steht, supponiert
der zweiten Aussage
"homo"
offensichtlich
nicht
fiir
seine urspriing-
Menschen, sondern fiir ein Sprachzeichen. Teilbestimmung, nach der ein material supponierender
lichen Signifikate, d.h.
Die
letzte
Terminus dasjenige, wofiir er supponiert, nicht Weise bezeichnet, betrifft mentale Termini,
in eigentlicher natiirlicher d.h.
nicht
die
Termini,
aufgrund von Beilegung, sondern natiirlicherweise etwas bezeichnen. Einem mentalen Terminus, z.B. "Mensch", kommen zwei mogliche Verweisungsfunktionen
zu:
dasjenige bezeichnen,
Terminus bezeichnet;
er
in
eigentlicher
natiirlicher
Weise
was er vermittels eines konventionell beigelegten dieser Weise bezeichnet der mentale Terminus
in
Menschen und supponiert personal. Andererseits kann allgemeiner natiirlicher Weise dasjenige bezeichnen, was er ohne
"Mensch"
er in
kann
Einerseits
einzelne
Vermittlung eines konventionell beigelegten Terminus bezeichnet; er bezeichnet dann sich selbst bzw. ihm entsprechende Termini und supponiert material, wie z.B. in der mentalen Aussage "Mensch ist ein mentaler Terminus". Der mentale Terminus "Mensch" supponiert also nur
dann
material,
natiirlicher
wenn
Im Rahmen unterscheidet diskrete
er
fiir
dasjenige
was
steht,
er
in
allgemeiner
Weise bezeichnet. einer Aufstellung von
Albert
und eine
hinsichtlich
der
Suppositionsregeln
materialen
(b) determinierte Supposition,
der komplementaren Suppositionsarten
-
was
folgendes
(PL 12
Supposition -
eine
f.)
(a)
unter Einbeziehung
Schema
ergibt:
Kann
516
Bcmcrkenswcrt
daB
ist,
es sich hicrbci
um
cine Untcrscheidung handelt,
die in Alberts urspriinglicher Eintcilung dcr Supposition
bei
Ockham und den
ra (PL ll ) sowie
bekanntcn Autoren dieser Tradition
iibrigen
lediglich
Differenzierung der personalen Supposition vorkommt. Als die ersten beiden Suppositionsregeln (PL 12 ) gibt Albert an, daB das Subjekt einer als
singularen Aussage, z.B.
"Sortcs
currit",
"Isle
homo
currit",
immer
diskret,
Aussage, z.B. "Homo est animal", aber Subjekt determiniert supponiere. Im AnschluB an die zweite Regel merkt Albert ausdriicklich an, daB die genannten Regeln neben der personalen auch die das
indefiniten
einer
materiale
betrcffen.
Supposition
Albert
nennt
Supposition
die
Als
Aussage
materiale
diskrete
fur
Beispiel
est
"Sortes
nomen",
fur
determinierte materiale Supposition die Aussage "Homo est nomen". Die Unterscheidung einer diskreten und einer determinierten materialen 4 Supposition hebt Boehner als einen besonders interessanten Aspekt in der in der Suppositionseintcilung Alberts hervor und merkt hierzu an, daB
Penttilis
Logica dieses
Aussagen
in
disyllabum",
keine
Stelle
Typs der
zu
fmden
thematisiert
der
also
sei,
wlirden,
an
der
etwa
Subjcktterminus
auch
"Omne
(c)
universelle
homo
est
konfus-distributiv
supponierte. Boehner venveist auf cine anonyme Handschrift des friihen 15. Jahrhunderts in der Wiener Dominikanerbibliothek, in der eben diese
Aussage mit material supponierendem und allquantifiziertem Subjekt vorkommt. Indessen ist hervorzuhebcn, daB der genannte Aussage-Typ durchaus auch bei Albert erwahnt wird. Im Kontext der personalen Supposition
fiihrt
Albert anhand des Beispiels
"Homo
est
disyllabum",
in
genereller Terminus material supponiert, eine allgemeine materiale Supposition ein und nennt im AnschluB an die Frage, wie diese
welchem
ein
Aussage
universalisiert
disyllabum"
(PL
ll
va ).
werden konne, das Beispiel
DaB
das distributive Zeichen
4
Ph. Boehner, Medieval Manchester 1952, S. 103f.
Logic.
An
Outline
of
its
"Omne
"omne"
Development
homo
est
hierbei nicht
from
1250-1400,
Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen
dem grammatischen
Geschlecht von homo,
immer material supponiert
ein
1st
hat,
maskulinum, angeglichen Wort, welches auch
i.e.
wird, begriindet Albert mit folgender Regel:
517
"Jedes
und undeklinierbares
neutrales
Nomen."
Aufgrund dieser Regel liegt den Fallen (3) und
zwischen
ausdriicklich
fur
differenziert,
Beispielsatz angibt.
Denn
die Moglichkeit nahe,
materialen
der
(4)
Fall
nicht
(3)
ein undeklinierbarer
daB Albert, der nicht
Supposition
keinen
zufalligerweise
Terminus kann eben nicht
von seiner urspriinglichen Form abweichen, urn fur einen dann von ihm verschiedenen Terminus material zu supponieren. Hieraus ergabe sich, daB das von Boehner angefiihrte Beispiel fiir Fall (3) inadaquat ware, denn von "Men
is
a
noun
in the
zu
plural"
"Man
is
uttered in the
wird der
plural"
material supponierende Subjekt-Terminus verandert. Ein in Analogic zu Fall
(4)
konstruiertes Beispiel
Nimmt man
auf
die
grammatisch
"Homo
Aussage
unkorrekte
Fall (3) verdeutlicht die Problematik:
fiir
-
est
"Homo
disyllabum"
durch
est
Aussage disyllabum Bezug, so wird dies zwar der Regel gerecht, nach der hier die material
supponierenden komplexen Terminus
gleichbleibt,
Nimmt man
jedoch trifft die Bestimmung aber auf die Aussage "Homo est
"pro
die
est
est
"Homo
sibi
-
verum"
Form
des
disyllabum"
dissimili"
nicht
zu.
durch die Aussage "Hominem esse disyllabum est verum" Bezug, so ergibt sich zwar einerseits eine grammatisch korrekte - Aussage nach dem Muster von Alberts Beispiel
"Sortem
currere est
genannte Regel verstoBen.
verum",
Denn
Terminus "Hominem
"Hominem
"hominem"
zwei-, sondern
"homo"
esse disyllabum est
abgewandelt
esse disyllabum est
"Homo
est
disyllabum"
darf nach ihr nicht zu verum"
werden.
verum"
aber wird gegen die
andererseits
der in der Aussage
material supponierende Terminus
der Aussage
disyllabum"
falsch,
dem
in
material supponierenden
Zudem denn
ist
die
"hominem"
Aussage ist
nicht
dreisilbig.
Die Unterscheidung von materialer und personaler Supposition wird ha ufig mit der heutigen Unterscheidung von Gebrauch und Erwahnung bzw. use und mention eines Sprachzeichens in Verbindung gebracht. Die genannte Parallelisierung ist insofern naheliegend, als das grundsatzliche
Motiv der
mittelalterlichen
und
der
modernen Unterscheidung
darin
dem Bezug von Sprachzeichen auf Dinge, d.h. gewohnlichen Signifikate, und dem Bezug von Sprachzeichen auf Sprachzeichen zu differenzieren. Dennoch ist die Gleichsetzung von iibereinstimmt, zwischen ihre
personaler
Supposition
mit
dem Gebrauch
eines
Sprachzeichens
und
Kann
518
materialer
Supposition
dcr
mil
Erwahnung
cines
Sprachzeichens
bei
gcnauer Betrachtung inadaquat.
Mensch ist ein Lebcwesen", so man die Aussage liber eincn Menschen zu sprechen. um Wort man das Mensch, gcbraucht Von dem Wort Mensch ist in dieser Aussage nicht die Rede. Spricht man Mensch ist ein Lebewesen", indem man andererseits iiber die Aussage /..B. sagt, daB in ihr das Wort Mensch vorkommt, oder bildet man die Aussage "Mensch ist einsilbig", so gebraucht man das Wort Mensch nicht, Bildet
"Ein
"Ein
sondern erwahnt
es.
Hierzu bemerkt Tarski:
In Verallgemeinerung dicscr Ansicht hatten wir dann hinzunehmen, daB jedes Wort bisweilen als sein eigener Name auftreten kann; in der T erminologie der mittelalterlichen Logik hieBe das, daB das bctreffende Wort in Suppositio materialis verwendet wird und nicht d.h. in seiner gewohnlichen Bedeutung. Die in Suppositio formalis ,
Konsequenz hiervon ware, daB jedes Wort der gewohnlichen oder wissenschaftlichen Sprachc mindestens zwei Bedeutungen hatte, und nian brauchte Beispiele fiir Situationen nicht von weither zu holen, in denen ernste Zweifel auftriiten, welche Bedeutung gerade gemeint Mit dieser Konsequenz wollen wir uns nicht abfinden und es ist. lieber zur Regel macnen, daB jeder Ausdruck (wenigstens in dcr SchriftspracheJ von seinem Namen unterschieden werde. Damit entsteht das Problem, wie man allgemein Namen von Wortern und Ausdriicken bilden soil. Hierfiir gibt es mehrere Moglichkciten. Die einfachste von ihnen besteht in der Vcrabredung, den Namen eines Ausdrucks dadurch zu gewinnen, daB man den Ausdruck in
Anfiihrungszeichen
Wesentlich hierbei
ist
setzt.
nun, daB Mensch ein genereller Terminus,
"Mensch"
aufgrund der Anfiihrungszeichen als sogenannten namendagegen bildcndem Funktor - ein singuliirer Terminus ist, den wir gebrauchen, um
den urspriinglichen Ausdruck ohne Anfiihrungszeichen zu reden, bzw. ihn zu erwahnen. Nach der Konvcntion der Anfiihrungszeichen steht also iiber
der Ausdruck
"Mensch"
(mil Anfiihrungszeichen) nicmals
fiir
den Ausdruck
"Mensch" (mit Anfiihrungszeichen), sondern immer nur fiir den Ausdruck Mensch (ohne Anfiihrungszeichen). Ein mit Anfiihrungszeichen gekennzeichneter Terminus steht also als solcher niemals fiir sich selbst.
Infolge der Gleichsetzung mit der
Erwahnung
eines Sprachzeichens
werden haufig Beispiele fiir material supponierende Termini in Texteditionen und Schriften zur mittelalterlichen Logik durch Anfiihrungs zeichen gekennzeichnet. Dies
ist
zunachst schon deshalb inadaquat, weil
materiale Supposition die Moglichkcit der
A.
Tarski,
"Suppositio
Einfuhnmg
formalis"
ist
in
die
Verwendung
mathcmatisclie
nach verschiedencn Autoren
zu personaler und einfacher Supposition.
Logik, (u.a.
W.
eines Terminus
Gottingen
1966,
S.
fiir
71;
of Sherwood) Oberbegriff
Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen sich
selbst
(pro
wie
was,
vorsieht,
se)
Rahmen Zudcm legt
im
erwahnt,
Vcrwendung von Anfiihrungszeichen ausgeschlossen
519
1st.
der die
Definition sowohl der personalen als auch der materialen Supposition als einer bestimmten
Terminus nahe,
(acceptio seu usus) eines
Verwendung
daB die Erwahnung von Sprachzeichen im heutigen Sinne innerhalb der Suppositionstheorie eher als eine besondere Weise ihres Gebrauchs aufgefaBt wird. Fur die Suppositionstheorie
ist
daB
wesentlich,
metasprachliche Bezugnahme gerade ohne die Bildung von Sprachzeichen ermoglicht und sich hiermit sogar wechselseitig
eine
sie
Namen
fur
ausschlieBt.
Die Unterscheidung
in
personale und materiale Supposition miiBte ihren
wenn
in
der Aussage
Sinn verlieren,
materiale Supposition der Terminus wiirde,
denn
Terminus
"Mensch
Mensch
ist
in
als Beispiel fiir
einsilbig"
Anfiihrungszeichen gesetzt
(mit Anfiihrungszeichen) supponiert als singularer
"Mensch"
und personal. Die Teilbestimmung Alberts, nach der ein material supponierender Terminus fiir einen ihm nicht entsprechenden Terminus stehen kann, signifikativ, d.h. diskret
schlieBt zusatzlich eine Parallelisierung mit der
zeichens aus, da nach Alberts wie auch nach
wie
eine A.c.I.-Konstruktion
currere est
"Sortem
supponieren
kann. in
Subjektterminus
verum"
dem oben genannten
material
der
In
in
Erwahnung eines SprachOckhams Auffassung z.B.
"Sortem
currere
est
Anfiihrungszeichen zu setzen, ware
Konvention sicherlich
falsch.
Zudem
ist,
der Weise, wie
wie
z.B.:
Sokrates
ist
sie
Subjektstelle
determiniert
Pradikat
6
hinweist,
Bezugnahme
durch die Iterierung von Anfiihrungszeichen moglich benennt Sokrates Sokrates benennt Sokrates. .
Grieche."
AbschlieBend an
den
nach moderner
ermoglicht, worauf King
""Sokrates"
ein
(4)
verum"
die materiale Supposition keine mehrstufige metasprachliche in
fiir
Verbform
eine Aussage mit finiter
fiir
Aussage
Beispiel
sei
einer
wird.
angemerkt, daB die Suppositionsart eines Terminus Aussage durch das auf ihn bezogene Pradikat
Z.B. wird
"Lebewesen"
der
Subjektterminus
"Mensch"
auf personale, durch das Pradikat
durch das
"einsilbig"
aber
auf materiale Supposition festgelegt. Die jeweilige Suppositionsart eines
Terminus Relation.
ist
also
Satzzusammenhang
Ausdruck
zugleich
Ein Ausdruck
in
isoliert
P.
King,
Jean
Buridan
s
Consequences, Dordrecht 1985,
Logic S. 40.
bestimmten
syntaktischen
Anfiihrungszeichen jedoch kann aus seinem werden und ist insofern von einer syntak
tischen Relation unabhangig.
1
einer
Diejenige Eigenschaft eines Terminus, die
-
The
Treatise
on
Supposition
/
The
Treatise
on
Kann
520
ist nach Auffassung der mittelaltcrlichen Scmantik kontextunabhangig 1st, der seine Signifikation. Bereits William of Sherwood erklart beziiglich
Unterscheidung von
Supposition
und
Signifikation:
beziehen sich allein auf eine AuBerung
"Manche
oder ein Wort,
Pradikate
manche auf
ein
Dies andert jedoch nicht die Signifikation. Denn so wie ein Wort ein Wort ist, bevor es in einen Satz eingeordnet wird, so hat es zu auch vorher eine Signifikation, und nicht aufgrund einer Zuordnung
Signifikat.
7
Da
anderem."
ein
ohne
Ausdrucks
Anfuhrungszeichen als Anfuhrungszeichen nicht im Sinne
Ausdruck
in
Name
desselben
eines
material
bedeutet das Setzen von
supponierenden Terminus kontextabhangig ist, Anfuhrungszeichen offenbar einen Unterschied
nicht
der
Supposition,
sondern der Signifikation.
Dusseldorf
7
William
of
zungsberichte
Sherwood,
(1937); (zitiert in
Introductions
Bayerischen Akademie eigener Ubersetzung).
der
in: in Logicam, ed. M. Grabmann, der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Abteilung
Sit1
GERHARD KRIEGER
*>Homo
Homo
gic",
Notre
Dame
Journal
"
regulis generalibus
"De
in
consequentianim
Ockham und Barley
627
De obligationibus und De insolubilibus fehlen in AuBerdem sind dicse Teile in der Hss.-Familie dem letzten Teil De fallaciis (Teil III-4). Auch das
Die letzten zwei Tcile
eincr Reihe von Hss. 5 Intacta
die Aquivokation hat keinen einheitlichen Ort. Z.B. steht in
iiber
Kap.
hinter
erst
(CA O.67) und in der Easier Hs. (Bibl. univ. F.II.25) dem Kapitel 30. De aequipollentiis fehlt auch in
einer Erfurter Hs. dieses
hinter
Kapitel
einigen
Hss.
Summa
ist
Diese
der handschriftlichen Uberlieferung der
Instabilitat
daB diese keine
ein Zeichen dafiir,
einheitliche Entstehungs-
geschichte hat.
Fur
2.
die
relative
folgende Hypothese aufgestellt:
wieder
diese
dem
vor
Summa
Relation,
dieser
Chronologic
vor
6
Werke
longior.
Tractatus
Fur
longior,
den
Boehner
Ph.
hat
Tractatus brevior vor
Tractatus
dem
drei
der
Summa
zweiten
besitzen
wir
Teil
und der
wohl
ein
Zeugnis von Frater Johannes Nicolai, zusammen mit dem Terminus ad quern fur den Tractatus longior: 1329. DaB der Tractatus
verla Bliches
brevior vor der
Summa
Dazu zwei
Boehners Vermutung. Bemcrkungen. Die erste betrifft den
entstanden
kritische
ist, ist
zuletzt
Nach meiner Meinung handelt es sich um genannten eine Kompilatio aus dem Tractatus longior. Daher kann seine Abfassungszeit auch bis nach dem Datum 1329 als moglich angesetzt werden. Der Tractatus brevior.
Prolog seiner Absichtserklarung, die nur fragmentarisch eingelost wird, paBt wenig in Burleys Lebensabschnitt nach 1327, da er sich mehrere
Jahre
Hof
Abgesandter des englischen Konigs Edward III. am papstlichen 7 Avignon aufhielt. Daher betrachte ich auch Burleys Autorenschaft
als
in
fur diesen Tractatus als fraglich.
Die zweite Bemerkung
zum vor
das Verhaltnis der
1324,
Summa,
1
Summa
logicae
an, diese sei
noch
Ockhams Kommentierung der Physik entstanden, 8 "Ferienarbeit". Diese Annahme habe ich unlangst einer
als
ss.
De puritate, Zur
Summa nehmen
wahrend
moglicherweise
}
betrifft
Tractatus longior. Die Editoren der
pag. VIII.
Biographic
von
Burley
siehe:
C.
Martin,
Studies presented to Daniel Callus (Oxford 1964) 194-230. 8 Summa, 36*.
"Walter
Burley",
in:
Oxforder
Richter
628
Kritik unterzogcn.
9
Auch
Ockhams
die Autorcnschaft
fur die
Summa
habc
der
Abfassungszeit Frage gestellt. Als Terminus ante quern Ob diese werden. 1328 der Summa kann etwa das Jahr angenommen Annahme der Abfassungszeit fiir die Summa mil Burleys Autorenich dabei in
spateren
schaft des Tractatus longior vertraglich
ist,
halte ich ebenso
fiir
fraglich.
Auf jeden Fall sind diese Fragen der Authenti/itat sowie der Abfassungsdefinitiv zeit und des Abfassungsortes beider Werke heute noch nicht beantwortet. Dies ware aber sehr wichtig
des 14.
Jh.,
3.
die Geschichte der Logik
Re/cption von der /weiten Halfte der zwan/.iger Jahre des
auch besonders im Zusammenhang der
Ockhams Denken 14. Jh.
fiir
in Paris in
friihen
10
11 haben auf die Bedcutung des Salamucha 1938 und Ph. Boehner 1952
Kapitels
De
regulis generalibus
conscquentianim
in
der Logik des 14. Jh.
eine Rcihe von Regeln, die als cine hingewiesen. Dieses Kapitel enthalt miUelalterliche Form (Theorie) der Aussagcnlogik betrachtet werden kann.
Summa
In der
(Kap. 39).
am Ende
steht dieses Kapitel
Denn De
obligationibus
und De
des Teils
De consequents
insolubilibus sind wahrscheinlich
erst spater hinzugekommen und sind im Grunde eigenc Traktate (Tcile) der Logik. Es war daher ein Fortschritt ein systematischer Absicht, als die Traktate De puritatc ariis logicae dieses Kapitel bereits am Beginn ihrer Abhandlungen De consequentiis behandelt haben. Sowohl der Autor des Elementarium logicae als auch der des Tractatus minor (zwei unter
dem
EinfluB der
kleine
Summen
Gedanken des
Summa
in
den vicrziger Jahren des
der Logik, die
Ockham
Tractatus longior gefolgt
12
zugeschrieben werden),
und haben dem Kapitel
den ihm gebiihrenden Platz generalibus consequentiarum Lehre De consequentiis (De locis) zugewiesen.
9
V. Richter, Authenticity of 10
W.J.
Paris",
in:
"In
dem
regulis
am Beginn
der
Writings",
in:
Franc. Studies 45(1985), 93-105.
the University of at Reception of Ockham s Thought a I Unh ersite de Paris. Vignaux (eds.), Preuve et raisons 43-64. tneologie au XIV* siecle (Paris 1984),
Courtenay, Z. Kaluza,
"The
P.
Logique, ontologie
et
11
Medical Logic, Manchester
12
sind
De
Search to the Historical Ockham: Historical Literary Remarks on the
Ockhams
Ph. Boehner,
entstandene
14. Jh.
1952, 52ff.
E.M. Die Edition dieser 66-173. 24(1964) 34-100; 25(1965) 151-276; 26(1966)
Werke
wurde
von
Buytaert
besorgt.
Franc.
Studies
regulis generalibus consequentiarum" in
"De
wurde
Inhaltlich
4.
Es
analysiert.
daC
zeigt sich,
puritate
durch
629
Boh 1962 13
I.
hier cine logische Theorie der Implikation,
und der Negation vorliegt. Hier noch zwei interpreta zu diesem Kapitel und zur Analyse von Boh. Bemerkungen Die erste Hauptregel lautet: omni consequentia bona simplici (...)
der Verbindung tive
De
dieses Kapitel von
Ockham und Burley
et
"In
non potest esse verum
antecedens
pretiert diese "P
-->
Q
=>
Regel
u.a.
auch
als eine
Zu
dieser
-iO(P.-iQ)".
Denn
14
sine
Boh
I.
consequente".
inter-
Regel der Modaltheorie, wie folgt: habe ich einen Interpretation
doch kein Satz und keine Regel irgendeiner modallogischen Theorie. Das non potest ist hier nur eine faqon de parler, deren man sich ofters bedient, wenn man z.B. sagt, daB aus dem Vorbehalt.
Definiendum
dies
ist
"notwendig"
Die zweite
wie
antecedens.
folgt:
"Quidquid
und
consequens".
ad
Hauptregel.
Diese
ist
lautet in zwei aquivalenten
ad
sequitur
antecedit
consequens,
Quidquid Diesen Hauptregeln sind zwei Regeln
...
15
zweite
die
betrifft
nichts anderes als die Transitivitatsregel
Varianten
und umgekehrt.
die Definitio folgt
Bemerkung
ad
sequitur
ad
antecedit
antecedens,
beigefiigt,
welche der
Widerlegung einer sophistischen Argumentation dienen: "Quidquid sequitur ad antecedens, sequitur ad consequens. ... Quidquid antecedit ad consequens, antecedit ad
antecedens."
In
allgemeiner
Form
findet
man
diese Transitivitatsregel in Tractatus longior an einer anderen Stelle,
im
aber gleich im AnschluB an diese Hauptregel. 16 Im AnschluB an diese Hauptregel erwahnen die beiden Traktaten De puritate Tractatus
noch
brevior
zwei
"Quidquid
weitere
denen
die
erste
lautet:
sequitur ex consequente et antecedente, sequitur ex antecedente
1
per
von
Regeln,
abgeleitete
Regel ist im Grunde eine von Gentzen 1934 18 genannt): (so
Diese
se."
"Schnittregel"
P
->
Q, Q.P
->
R
=
P
->
spezielle
Form
der
R
1-5 I. Boh, Study in Burley: Tractatus De regulis Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 3(1962) 83-101. "A
in:
De puritate,
pag. 61,
15 Ibid., pag. 62,
16
17
lin. 30ss.;
lin. lOss.;
pag. 199,
pag. 200,
lin.
lin.
generalibus
consequentiarum",
26s.
11-14.
Ibid., pag. 69, lin. 16ss.; pag. 200, lin. 20ss. Ibid., pag. 62, lin. 12s.; pag. 203, lin. 7s.
18
G. Gentzen, "Untersuchungen iiber das logische 39(1934) 176-210, 405-431 (Reprint, Darmstadt 1969).
SchlieBen",
in:
Math.
Zeitschr.
Richter
630
Dieser hat die Bcdcutung dieser Rcgcl in dcr Mctamathcmatik unscres Jh. cntdcckt. Im Mittclaltcr wird dicsc Rcgcl zwar auch weitcrs z.B. im im Tractatus minor) erwahnt, bleibt aber praktisch Elementarium (nicht
"ohne
Anwendung"
"Aussagenlogik"
und gcrat dahcr
in
Vcrgesscnheit, samt dcr gesamten moderncn Logik wieder-
dcs Mittclaltcrs, bis dicsc in der
cntdcckt wurde.
Universitat Innsbruck
ANDREA TABARRONI
Predicazionc esscnziale cd intenliones
sccondo Gentile da Cingoli
1
La
logica a
Bologna nel XIII secolo
Le nostre conoscenzc
sull
insegnamento della logica
Benche collocate
secolo sono tuttora assai scarse. nel
curriculum scolastico medievale
insegnamento sia
numerose
tracce
lasciato
del Duecento. -
contesto
-
cattedrali
,
nella
Fa eccezione
-
lo
in posizione strategica
e pertanto certamente materia di
-
studio
della
logica
mendicant!
non sembra aver
produzione letteraria dei magistri
e quindi
assume particolare spicco
Gentile da Cingoli, maestro
la figura di
XIII
nel
Italia
sia nelle univcrsita sia negli studia degli ordini
scuole
nelle
in
italiani
in
questo
di logica e di filosofia
naturale a Bologna negli ultimi anni del secolo.
Dobbiamo poi
1941),
alle
Grabmann (Grabmann
innanzitutto alle ricerche di Martin precisazioni
fornite
da
altri
raccolte intorno alia sua vita (Hissette 1979).
studiosi,
Dopo
poche notizie
le
aver studiato a Parigi
probabilmcnte negli anni ottanta del secolo, Gentile dovette iniziare
insegnamento bolognese intorno
il
suo
1295. In quella che era allora la piu
al
importante universita della Penisola, egli entro a far parte della cerchia dotti che si riuniva attorno alia figura di Taddeo Alderotti, medico
di
e
insigne Italia.
tra
Proprio
i
primi rappresentanti della rinascita delParistotelismo in
connubio
Poriginale
medica e promozione
della
culturale della Facolta di
nuova
tra
filosofia
rinnovamento
di
andava allora formando anche dal punto di 1981). Tra i discepoli dell Alderotti, Gentile e
si
promettente carriera logica fino
e
della
alle
risultati allievi
di
filosofia.
XIV
secolo
degni del massimo rispetto, se
si
quali Guglielmo da Varignana, che di
vista 1
istituzionale
(Siraisi
unico che rinuncia
alia
medico per rimanere fedele alPinsegnamento della La sua attivita come magister dovette protrarsi
prime decadi del
d Arezzo, successore
tradizione
periodo il clima del resto Bologna, che
segnava
Medicina ed Arti
della
in quel
e
fu
senz altro
esercitata
con
deve giudicare dalla qualita fu
di
medico apprezzato, Angelo
Gentile sulla cattedra di logica, e
il
misterioso
632
Tabarroni
Urbano
cui
Avcrroista,
si
dcvc un amplissima Expositio del commento
avcrroistico alia Fisica di Aristotele.
Anche per
dovettero escrcitare,
dottrine
come
1
2
XIV
L
per
Gentile
iniziatore di quella tradizione
che caratterizzo
-
naturale del
chc
oltre
questo,
1
che
influenza
effettiva
sue
le
puo essere senz altro considerate autonoma - in logica e in filosofia
ambiente universitario bologncse nel corso
1
secolo (Maier 1955).
insegnamento logico di Gentile da Cingoli
come maestro
Dell attivita di Gentile
Scriptum super artcm
possono aggiungcre un
rimane soprattutto uno
di logica ci
conservato
veterem,
in
Ad
4 manoscritti.
esso
si
de universalibus, delle Questions, giunteci purtroppo incomplete, suU Isagoge di Porfirio ed infine un Commento agli Analitici primi, la cui autcnticita non 6 stata tuttavia ancora assicurata. Si
un corpus
di
tratta
Tractatiis
tutto
di
al
grazie
rispetto,
si
qualc
potrebbe
delinearc un profilo sufficientemente articolato delle dottrine logiche di
questo maestro. Puo suscitarc quindi un certo stupore che, a diffcrenza
quanto e
awenuto per ancora
stata
sia
oggetto
spicgazione, almeno tuttora
stato
sue teorie grammaticali,
le
parziale,
incoativo
attenzione
di
delle
di
da
parte
studiosi.
degli
di
Gentile non
la logica di
La
questa lacuna puo essere trovata nello
conoscneze
nostre
intorno
dottrine
alle
logiche che vcnivano insegnate nelle universita alia fine del XIII secolo.
Sono
trascorsi
infatti
solo
12
anni
scomparso Jan magistrale, il nuovo
da quando
lo
un saggio Pinborg e riuscito a sintetizzare, paradigma teorico giunto a maturazione con Radulphus Brito e che egli ha intcso caratterizzare come "logica dei modisti" (Pinborg 1975). Durante in
questi
la
anni,
delle
pubblicazione
di
opere
commento
Sofistici dovuti alia scuola di Pietro di Alvernia e a
Simone
agli
Elenchi
Faversham
di
ha fornito nuovi importanti contributi di conoscenza. Ma cio che manca tuttora e un panorama sufficientemente ampio e dettagliato del periodo che vide sul
la
gestazione e
concetto di intentio
dal 1275 al 1300.
riferimento
La
1
-
affermazione delle teorie semantiche imperniate vale a dire, grosso modo, del periodo che va
difficolta di ricostruire
senza
teorico
con precisione un quadro
dubbio
scoraggiare puo quindi intraprendere lo studio delle opere di Gentile. Tanto piu se
che anche
in
questo,
come
in
altri
periodi
creativi
della
chi si
di
voglia
considera
storia
della
Predicazione ed intentiones secondo Gentile da Cingoli
metalinguaggio della teoria, pur se
il
logica,
costituzione
una
di
in decisa
evoluzione verso
formalmente
tecnica
terminologia
633
la
e
prccisa
relativamente autonoma, risente tuttavia degli schemi epistcmologici allora normativi,
metafisica
della
quelli
Nonostante questo
-
possa risultare utile
e
teoria
della
conoscenza.
della
e anzi, proprio in ragione di queste difficolta
abbozzo
1
di analisi
che mi propongo in questa sede
di tentare in relazione alia dottrina degli universali di Gentile
e detto, di una presentazione ancora prowisoria, in cui
si
per quanto
vogliono fissare
XIII e
La
3
E
XIV
i
una ricerca
risultati di
primi
sulla logica
si
bolognese del
secolo.
teoria delle intentiones
rivolgersi
caso di un logico medievale
nel
naturale, al
commento
sll
trarre
per
Isagoge
come Gentile da indicazioni
dottrina degli universali. In maniera conforme ad
quel
da Cingoli
sua teoria della predicazione essenziale. Si trattera,
in particolare, alia
e,
credo
-
anche
periodo,
porfiriano
Gentile
Puniversale
come
identifica
come
inteso
secunda
altri
circa
Cingoli, la
commentatori
oggetto intentio.
del
sua di
trattatello
Con
questa
assunzione, la teoria dei predicabili viene a trovarsi fondata su di una precisa concezione del processo di formazione dei concetti e di invenzione
nomi: si tratta qui infatti del luogo teorico in cui si incontrano semantica e gnoseologia (Ebbesen 1981). La formazione dei concetti e spiegata da Gentile facendo ricorso al modello classico della teoria dei
L intelletto umano
opera
punto
nella sua continua
giunge ad un certo
ad
isolare
una
classe
comuni,
precisamente,
Pintelletto
comune
i
di
in
sostiene
individui
cosiddetti
e
egli
modi
grado
di
che
mostrano
essendi attribuire
di possedere o proprietates Piu .
una
caratteristica
a questi individui, poiche nota che ciascuno di essi e in grado di
operazione affatto peculiare, come ad esempio eseguire ragionamenti nel caso degli uomini. Questo tipo di operazione
compiere
un
tipo
distintiva veniva dell
e
,
caratteristiche
1
-
di classificazione e identificazione degli oggetti,
dell astrazione.
di
delta apparens nella terminologia dell epoca. Sulla base
uniformita dell apparens rispetto ad un insieme di individui, Pintelletto
dunque
in
grado
di
inferire
attribuita a questi individui,
sua volta,
e
il
prodotto
di
che una proprietas comune puo essere
ad esempio la razionalita. Tale proprietas, a un essenza comune (o quidditas) che ora
Tabarroni
634
1
e
intelletto
in
di
grado
dalle carattcristichc accidental! di
A
questo
gli
in
come
impositio
un
gioco
altra
astrazione,
capacita
una rclazione convenzionale
oggetti della propria attivita.
designate
di
ciascun individuo.
entra
punto,
dell intelletto, quclla di stabilire
un processo
attraverso
isolare,
Si
tratta
nominum ad
peculiare
tra
nomi e
i
del processo che veniva allora
significandum. Secondo
la teorie dei
un procedimento intellettuale complesso logici modisti, imposizione attraverso cui e possibile assegnare un oggetto o una classe di oggetti e
1
come
ad un nome, a partire dalle modalita cognitive secondo sono dati all intelletto. In forza dc\V impositio,
significato
cui quello o quegli oggetti
nome
dunque, il concezione
un
al
come
termine
condividono cui
quella
intcllecta
est.
e
quidditas
chiamata
ciascuno
significhcra
"homo"
la stessa quidditas, sulla
e
cognitiva
ut
res
la
significa
Applicando
questa
caso della formazione dei predicati universal!, ne dcriva che
stata
dai
daH
modisti
ratio
modalita
Questa
intellctto.
modus
o
intclligendi
o anche intentio. Gentile afferma dunque che, secondo
intelligendi
termine
la
res
la
intellecta
significa prima accezione, prima intentione L universale assunto in questa accezione, cioe come non costituisce ancora tuttavia oggctto formale della scientia Porphyrii. il
che
base della modalita cognitiva secondo
isolata
logici
individui
degli
"universale"
.
sua
sub res,
1
La quidditas
tipo,
dai
la
il
processo di astrazione
essere intesa anche secondo una modalita cognitiva di diverse
infatti
pu6
isolata dalPintellctto attraverso
quale, poiche presuppone logicamente la prccedcnte, viene delta del
logici
periodo sccunda
sub secunda intentione e
intentio.
In questo caso,
la
res
intellecta
quidditas considerata secondo la sua proprieta
la
di essere predicabilc di molti, cioe
appunto
di essere universale.
Lo
studio
delle intcnzioni seconde, vale a dire di quelle modalita cognitive su cui
fondano 1
le
relazioni
formali
tra
i
predicati,
e
si
secondo Gentile
allora
oggetto proprio della teoria logica degli universali, cosi
come
essa viene
formulata ncll Isagoge di Porfirio.
4 Predicazione essenziale ed intcntiones
La
teoria
semantica messa
Porfirio considera dunque un elemento estensionale,
in
all
la
opera da Gentile nel suo
interno del significato di ogni res,
e
Commento a nome comune
un elemento intensionale,
Sulla base di questa distinzione fondamentale
vengono
Vintentio.
affrontati
anche
i
Predicazione ed intcntiones secondo Gentile da Cingoli
due
nuclei
problematici
ordinamento
dell
dei
del
principal!
trattato
secondo
predicati
di
Porfirio,
modello
noto
il
635
quello
dell arbor
Porphyriana e quello della predicazione essenziale.
L ordinamento
dei
predicati
secondo
essenziali
genere,
e
specie
infatti, secondo Gentile, alle relazioni sussistenti tra le prime intenzioni, le quali, a loro volta, sono fondate direttamente sulle relazioni estensionali che sussistono tra le proprieties o modi essendi da
differenza e dovuto
e genere rispetto ad prime intenzioni. Cos! da cui e tratto perche proprieta (essere sussistente, corporeo, e di da cui e tratto animate, sensibile) piu generale quella (essere
sono
cui
tratte
le
"animal"
la
"homo"
"homo"
sussistente,
animate,
corporeo,
sensibile,
e
razionale)
individui
gli
cui
quest ultima proprieta sono una parte di quelli cui inerisce
inerisce
la
se cioe si considerano prima. Dal punto di vista intensionale, tuttavia non le res ut slant sub primis intentionibus, bensi le prime intenzioni in
se
,
1
generis.
ordine
ed e Vintentio speciei che contiene Yintentio della specie infatti sono contenute tutte le
inverte
si
Nell intenzione
Da
intenzioni dei generi superior!, piu una.
una posizione, per cosi dire, e dovuta, secondo Gentile,
al
che
fatto
parte sua, la differenza occupa
rispetto a genere e specie.
"collaterale"
differenza
la
Essa
e tratta da
una
non contiene
proprieta semplice e non-indipendente. Vintentio differentiae
un soggetto, qualis, mentre
in se le intenzioni di altre differenze e tuttavia essa implica
un ente
sussistente.
generi e specie
si
Per questo essa
si
predicano per modum
modum
predica per
quid.
questo modo, con la sua trattazione dei predicabili essenziali, Gentile disegna un ordine intensionale di contenuti semplici e composti In
(rationes
intelligendi
o
possibilita della predicazione essenziale.
cui
un predicate
di livello superiore
Gentile sottolinea
secondo: intentio
"oportet
infatti quella
si
relazioni
Elencando
le
puo predicare
fonda
si
la
condizioni secondo di
un suo
inferiore,
delFinclusione intensionale del primo nel
ratio superioris includatur in
quod
secondo
cui
sulle
intentiones},
ad
nome
cui, esempio, mediante Vimpositio costituisce un segmento Poiche dunque istituito il nome il
inferior!".
"animal"
di quella
e
La
stato
secondo
ratio
o
istituito
cui e stato
propositionibus dicendo hoc est hoc significatur esse predicatum quodammodo in subiecto", con la "homo".
proposizione res,
"homo
est
mentre viene reso
"in
animal"
esplicito
intentiones. In questo caso,
viene asserita un identita a livello delle
un rapporto
infatti,
giacche
si
di inclusione
tratta di
a livello delle
una predicazione
Tabarroni
636
essenziale, soggetto e predicate
un unica quidditas, intesa
rifcriscono ad
si
tuttavia sub diversis rationibus intelligent.
un nodo ccntrale
Si tocca qui
vicnc
un opzione
luce
alia
L
intentiones. tutta
conseguenza
soluzione
dalla
medievale,
del
e
di
dipendente, per un logico
e
problema
un
metafisico,
essenziale,
predicazione
teoria dci predicabili,
in cui
fondamentali della teoria
le scelte
della
interpretazione
la
carattere
di
preliminare
metaphysical commitment, che governa delle
semantica modista,
dcll intcra
metafisico
la
riguardante
composizione delPessenza delle sostanze composte. Tale problema, nel periodo in cui oper6 Gentile, veniva affrontato secondo due possibili e
schemi
altcrnativi
di
dell unicita
teoria
seconda che
a
soluzione,
Punicita o per la pluralita delle
forme
ci
si
pronunciasse per
(Roos 1974). Secondo
sostanziali
la
che era stata quella di Tommaso, ma radicali come Sigieri di Brabante e Boezio di Dacia
della
forma
-
anche degli aristotelici ad ogni predicato essenziale - da quello di genere sommo a quello di corrisponde in re una sola forma sostanziale, quella specifica. specie ,
Della diversita dei predicati viene percio dato conto facendo riferimento ai diversi
che
modi
sono
in
diversi
grado
punti
sostenitori
della
corrisponde
in re
direttamente dell unicita
biunivoco contrario
le
diverse
delle
principio
e
Pintelletto
sotto
essendi che concorrono a costituire la forma sostanziale e
di
di
trarre
vista,
pluralita
le
la
delle
o
opcrationes intentiones
medesima forme,
ad
quidditas.
ogni
da
apparentia
mediante
cui
Viceversa,
predicato
cui
significare,
per
i
essenziale
una diversa forma o quidditas e da esse Pintelletto trae sue intenzioni. Ne consegue che, mentre per gli oppositori
forma il rapporto tra res c intentio e un rapporto al ad ogni diversa intenzione corrisponde una diversa res essere res teoria una stessa i della sostenitori puo per della
-
,
considerata secondo diverse intenzioni. Di qui discendono owiamente due diverse possibili teorie del significato, che infatti
per un
si
contesero
il
campo
lungo periodo della storia della logica medievale.
Gentile da Cingoli fu deciso e coerente sostenitore di una di queste teorie, quella tipica dei logici modisti, secondo cui non c e corrispondenza
biunivoca tra
le
cose e
i
concetti.
consiste nel fatto che essa costitui
L importanza
storica della sua scelta
un paradigm a teorico autorevole per
rappresentanti della scuola bolognese di logica per tutto
Universita di Bologna
il
XIV
secolo.
i
Predicazione ed intcntioncs secondo Gentile da Cingoli
637
Riferimenti bibliografici
da Cingoli mi sono servito della trascrizione da me compiuta dello Scriptum super Porphyirium contenuto nel ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi J. X. 30 e di quella, Per
il
tcsto di Gentile
gentilmente messa a mia disposizione dall amico Roberto Lambertini, del Tractatiis de universalibus, contenuto nel ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Mediceo
Laurenziana, Strozziano 99.
Ebbesen S. 1981 Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle s Sophistici Elenchi, vol. I, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VII.l, Leiden.
Grabmann M. 1941 da Cingoli em
Gentile
Hissette R. 1979 "Note sur Gentile da medievale 46, 224-228.
aus der Zeit Wissenschaften,
italienischer Aristoteleserkldrer
Dantes, Sitzungsberichte Miinchen.
der
Cingoli",
bayer.
Akad.
der
Recherches de TJieologie ancienne
et
Maier A. 1955 "Die
per
Bolqgneser Philosophen des 14. Jahrhunderts", Studi e memorie Bologna, n.s. vol. I, 297-310.
la storia dell Universita di
Roos H. 1974 "Zur Begriffsgeschichte des Schriften des ausgehenden
Festschrift
mm
75.
Terminus 13.
Geburtstag
apparens
Jahrhunderts",
von Adolf Hufnagel,
Cannstatt, 323-334. Siraisi
N. 1981
Taddeo Alderotti and his
in in
Pupils, Princeton N.
J.
den logischen Virtus
politico.
Stuttgart-Bad
ANTONINO TINE
Simonc
In
comunicazione
qucsta
Simonc
Favcrsham
di
Limitcrcmo Porphyrii \ Tractatus
la
ci
Quaestioncs
(Summulae
per
scoria
dclla
c
di
logica.
,
Commcnto
ai
c Quaestiones super Elenchorum*. Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii, chc c una sorta libro
introdu/ionc gcncralc a tutta
disciplina
scien/a
Quaestioncs super libra
scgucnti:
logicales)
allc
tra
Praedicamentorunr
libro
super
csaminarc alcunc opcrc
rapporto
il
tcsti
ai
Ic scicn/c
di
proponiamo
conccrncnti
nostra indaginc
Ncl procmio di
Favcrsham c
di
chiunquc
tradi/.ionc
la
dcdichi
si
parlando dclla
logica,
aristotclica,
alia la
vicne
riccrca,
dclla
priorita
utilita di
affcrmata, su
logica
qucsta sulla
tuttc
Ic
altrc singolc scicn/c.
modum secundum quern in singularibus scientiis ex aliquo noto oporteat dcvcnire in cognitioncm alicuius ijgnoti, sic ut non quaeratur aequalis ccrtitudo in omnibus, nisi secundum exigentiam naturae subiectae. Et ideo logica, licet sit quaedam scicntia in sc, est tamen modus scicndi aliarum. Insa cnim tradit
L Autorc
ribadisce
rationis
investigationcm 6
c chc
incogniti"
a cio che
non
il
che
concetto
il
ex
cognito
modo secondo
lo e ancora,
cui la
"modus
scicntia
"omnis
devenit
scicndi
communis omnibus
Magistri Simonis Anglici sivc dc Favcrisham, Opera omnia, vol. prior, cura et studio Paschalis Ma/y.arclla,
~
Carmclo Ottaviano, Le
Faversham,
Memoria
CCCXXVII,
Serie VI, vol.
di
C.
Cedam, Padova
"Quaestiones
Ottaviano,
Ill, fasc.
IV)
per
I,
Opera
scientiis",
logica, T.us
1957.
super libro Praedicamentorum" Realc Accadcmia Na/.ionale dei
Roma
quandam
cognitionem alicuius ragione passa da cio che c noto in
di
Simone
Lincei
di
(Anno
1930.
the genuine text of Peter of Spain s Summulae Lambert Marie de Rijk, logicales, II, Simon of Faversham (d. 1306) as a Commentator of the Tracts I-V of the Summulae", Vivarium VI (1968), 69 e segg. Cf.
Simon
"On
Faversham, Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum, ed. by Sten Ebbcsen, John I,ongcway, Francesco del Punta, Eileen Serene, Eleonore Stump, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1984.
Thomas
of
Izbicki,
Quacst. sup. Porph.
6
cit.
13.
Ibid.
Ibid. Cf. Alberti Magni, Logica, Liber I, De Praedicabilibus, Trac. 1,1 De natura quamvis scientiae sint Logicae, cap. I (Ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, Vives 1890), pp. 1-2: multae, et quaelibet specialem habet modum, qui differt a modo alterius, sicut et "...
Simone va
prima
apprcso
di
si
rischio di sowertire
dedicano
corpo che all
altra
ogni
639
scienze
Non
disciplina.
monstrano
alle arti lucrative,
anima. Uomini
di quelli dell
modorum,
le
si
possono imparare
non
vuolc correre
si
ordine del sapere. Coloro che trascurata
1
impresa scientifica. Poiche "omnes artes
istorum
Faversham e
la logica e le altre scicnzc, se
contemporaneamente il
di
di preoccuparsi piu dei beni del
sono del tutto inadatti
di tal fatta
secundum aliquem
inventae sunt
scientiae
et
videlicet
la logica
dividendo
diffiniendo,
8
vel
syllogizando"
e
poiche queste tecniche vengono insegnate dalla logica, e chiaro perche questa non puo essere trascurata e non puo stare se non Nella prima delle Questioni su Porfirio, sia
logica
scienza
o
pratica
razionale.
scienza puramente speculativa
1
primo posto. Autore si chiede se
aver
Dopo
"considerat
al
precisato
naturas et quidditates
propriamente parlando, non considera le risolve la questione, affermando che la logica e intentiones, che speculativa:
mentre
la
che
logica,
la
una
rerum",
res,
sia
ma
le
pratica
quia docet syllogismo operari: docet enim syllogizare, diffmire et dividere et talia. Speculativa autem est. quia omnia ista non docet propter opus; sed propter scientiam; aocet enim logica syllogizare, ut per doctnnam illam possimus nos rectificare in aliis practica,
scientiis.
Nella seconda questione discutendo se dell universale possa esservi scienza,
1
Autore afferma che
la
"scienza
e una conoscenza
intellettuale"
che di tutto cio che e per se intellegibile puo esservi scienza
unaquaeque
scientia
rationis
ab
differt
quoddam commune quod
est
altera: in
ex cognito devenitur ad
quocumque modo
omni
est
tamen unus communis modus
scientia.
cognitionem
Et
hoc
incogniti:
sia
scientiae
e
per
per
est
quod per investigationem hoc enim fit in omni scientia
demonstrativa, sive non demonstrativa. Et gratia illius communis, est in omni scientia modus communis omnis scientiae. Et hie modus est per dicta,
sive
sit
actum
rationis, qui ratiocinatio sive argumentatio est, de cognitione cogniti procedens scientiam ejus quod erat incognitum, secundum quod Isaac in libro de Diffinitionibus (ed. J.T. Muckle, Isaac Israeli, Liber de Definicionibus, XII/XIII (1937/1938) p. in
AHDLMA
321.)
rationem
diffiniens,
dicit
quod
ratio
est
animae
intellectuals
virtus,
faciens
generaliter vocans et large, omne quod secundum intellectum simpliciter, vel quoad nos antecedit ut cognitum, per cujus cognitionem ductu rationis devenitur in notitiam incogniti." La teoria secondo la quale non si
currere causam in causatum.
possono
apprendere
Causam
contemporaneamente
la
scienza
e
il
modo
di
absurdum est simul quaerere scientiam et Aristotele, Metaf. II, 3: Arist. Lat. 2 (Leiden 1976) 39-40. "...
XXV
8
Quaest. sup. Porph. 9
Ibi, 17-18.
cit.
13-14.
essa
si
modum
trova
in
scientiae",
Tine
640
La sua conclusione
dcfinizione sia per dimostrazione.
puo
La prima
Questioni sulle categorie
delle
Simone trova modo
ancora
vicne
causa";
diffinitionem
vel
sostiene che
puo
scientia est per
causam,
12
Poco
avanti
piu
illius
habetur
scientia
"omnis
1
...
per
Autore
esservi scienza di tutto cio intorno a cui accade che
rettamente,
quelle cose circa le quali
che
detto
poi
essa se
causas cognoscimus, et quod
che
ricordato
demonstrationem".
per
possa errare o agire
Viene
"omnis
unumquodque cum
quia scire opinamur 11
affermare che
di
domanda anch
si
Nel corso della sua argomentazione
delle categorie possa esservi scienza.
est
e che dell universale
10
esservi scienza.
perche
puo accadere
affinche
di
scienza
la
o
di errare
qualcosa
e
direttiva
di agirc
si
tutte
rettamente. scienza
esservi
possa
in
si
richicdono tre condizioni: cioe che quel qualcosa sia un ente, che esso sia
che abbia parti che
intcllegibile c
intorno
a
cui
essere
possano
nccessario che cio di cui
abbia proprieta e affezioni che
come
definizione di scienza
ricorda
celebre
la
E
aggiungendo che anche
conosciuto
e
parti.
"habitus
di esso, dal
momento della
propositio
demonstratio quia
se
per
"...
della
acquisitus per demonstrationem", egli
della
dc omni eo quod est 19: Ibi, per diffinitionem, vel per demonstrationem
mezzo
per
e propter
scienza e duplice: quella che
la
la
Occorre infine che
A
dimostrazione.
per
distinzione
E
probativi.
momento che
necessario poi che abbia parti che lo
tutto
possano dimostrare
si
awiene
conoscenza
la
15
un discorso che ha
definizione c la dcfmizione e
che
procedimenti
eseguiti
momento che
dal
proprieta e affezioni
e scienza sia intcllegibile dal
vi
scienza e un abito intellettuale. costituiscano
lo costituiscano e
intellegihile
potest
quid,
acquista dcr
si
esse
scientia
vel
...".
Quest, 12
s.
libro Praed.
cit.
261.
Ibid. Ibid.:
scientia
"De
enim
omni eo de quo est
directiva
in
recte; ideo ^
rccte
et
agere
quae contingit errare
et
esse
potest recte
agere;
scientia;
sed circa
et
est nisi coordinatio
coordinare autem
supra;
circa
recte agere; idco etc. Minor probatur, quia praedicapraedicahilium [probabilium Ottaviano] secundum sub et praedicamenta secundum sub et supra contingit recte et non
praedicamenta contingit errare
mentum non
errare
contingit
hiis
etc."
hoc enim quod de aliquo possit esse scientia tria requiruntur, ens et quod ipsum sit intelligibile et quod habeat partes constituentes ipsum, proprietates et passiones quae possunt probari de hoc". Per il concetto secondo cui si puo avere scienza solo di cio che e, cf. Aristotele, Anal. Secondi, 263-264:
Ibi,
scilicet
71b25-26:
OUK
"Scientia
ideo
"Ad
quod ipsum
scibile
intellegibile",
ccrrc
sit
TO
quidam
esse
oportet Quaest.
^T)
s.
ov
crtt crrcartfat; Categ. 7b23-8al2.
habitus
intellectualis
intellegibile;
libro Praed.
cit.
et
est;
ideo
263-264.
est
illud
enim
de quo
perfectio est
intellectus;
scientia
oportet
et
esse
Simone
Faversham
di
641
e le scienze
dimostrazione propter quid e quella che si acquista per dimostrazione Per mezzo di quest ultima constatiamo che la cosa e cosi, non l(>
quia.
risaliamo
causa 17
sua
alia
dimostrazione
e
ma
scienza
la
accontentiamo
ci
propter
ci
quid
di
sapere
danno invece
\"oti
le
.
La
cause,
di risalire al dioti\
permettendoci Nel commento
Simone da una errata etimologia
Tractatus
ai
termine scienza, quando a proposito della parola logica
del
scrive:
uno modp loyca
dicitur a logos, quod est sermo, et ycos scientia quasi rationatis scientia; et per istam interpretationem est una de sermocinalibus scientiis et extendit se ad trivialem scientiam. Alio modo dicitur a logos grece, quod est ratio latine, et ycos scientia, quasi rationalis scientia, aue est directiva rationis alicuius, que est propria operatic hominis.
Simone
riporta
opinione di Alberto secondo
1
cui:
comparantur ad loycam sicut idiota ad sapientem. Idiota enim nescit se errare nee errorem aliorum corrigere. Et ideo dicit alie scientie
quod
aliquis
nescit
sciens
tamen
se
alias scientias preter loycam, ipse scire sicut comburit, nescit ignis
est
sciens,
se
tamen
comburere. Piu oltre spiegando
1
incipit dell
opera
artium et scientia scientiarum ad habens",
ale, ed. Christian Wenin, Louvain-La-Neuve 1986, II, 648-651; Idem, Roberto Grossetesta, Metafisica della luce, Rusconi, Milano 1986, Introduzione pp. 37^2; vedi anche Graziella Federici Vescovini, che se ne occupa a proposito di Grossatesta e precisa che la scienza subalternante o superiore e quella che fa conoscere secondo la causa sostanziale o il propter quid del fenomeno, mentre la scienza subalternata o inferiore fa conoscere solo il quia, presentandoci la cosa secondo le particolarita accidentali, Vivarium VI (1968) p. 40. "La
18
1
de Rijk,
"On
the genuine
...",
cit.
78.
19
Ibid. Cf. Aristotele, Metaph.: ut cum ignis exurit..." Arist. Lot. cit. vedi Aristotelis Opera omnia, graece et latine, Firmin-Didot, Parisiis 1983, vol. 19 (Metaph. 1,1). "...
8, II,
20;
469,
Tine
642
habitus intellectualis in anima existens verus et semper firmus. Per artem nichil aliud intelligimus nisi quemdam habitum intellectualem ad per applicationem ad opus. Dicitur ars per applicationem mtellectum, dicitur scientia secundum quod quiescit in anima.
E poco
dci
parlando
avanti,
piu
tra
rapporti
la
e
dialettica
le
altre
discipline aggiunge:
Notandum quod quod excelfat omnes
dicitur ars artium scientia scicntiarum ex
<non>
eo
Sexto scientias, Philosophus>
Simone
modo
ut
dictum
poi che una scien/a
rileva
in
dialectica
sive
logica
sed hoc
scientias,
dignitate
excellit
alias
est.
dice piu degna di un altra in tre
si
modi: o per la dignita dell oggetto di cui si occupa, come la metafisica che si occupa di Dio; o per la sua tecnica di dimostra/ione; o, infine, procedimenti delle altre scien/e. La logica o perche regola e dirige i
dialettica
6
prima rispetto
altre
alle
scicn/,e,
in
quest ultimo senso, cioe
procedimenti delle altre scienze. E perche regola e dirige 22 la si dice che che logica apre la via ai principi di tutti metodi. i
per questo
i
dc Rijk, cit. 81. Cf. Aristotele, Fisica, VII, 3: T$ -yap Tjpc^ifjcrat K.a.1 CTTTJIXXL TTJV Sul rapportc arte-scienza si veda il 8LO.VOLO.V cnt crracnDat K.a.1 tppovccv Xcjo^cv. in Bulletin de Philosophic medievale 28 (1986) rccente articolo di Helene Merle, 95-133; in particolare le pp. 115-130 dedicate al concetto di arte nel XIII secolo e la "Ars",
bibliografia pp. 130-133.
2*
de
Rijk,
cit.
Ho
modificato
que
ms. della Bibl. Antoniana di Padova Scaff.
e
la
il
testo
dell ed.
de
Rijk,
basandomi
sul
XX 429.
22
Su questa nozione aristotelica della dialettica che leggiamo in Top. 101b3-4: c^cTcurTtKTj 656i e^ct in cui (StaAc^Tttcii) yap oucra Ttpoc; rac, arrourwi t&v ^c&oSuv ap^dc; methodos significa scienza, ecco quanto scrive Simone. "Ad evidentiam istius est notandum quod via nichil aliud est quam medium deveniendi ab ignorantia ad ipsam scientiam. via,
Illud
declare
requiritur etiam
in
naturalibus, quia in via naturali requiruntur
quod non
sit
impedimentum
in
tria,
scilicet
ipsa via, requiritur etiam
quod
ipsa ille
ad potestatem et facilitatem (facultatem?) et valetudinem corporis adveniendi ilium terminum. Si enim via fit opposita et habet pedes (pedem Padova) ineptos, faciliter non potest venire ad talem terminum. Logica enim omnia ista facit, quia per habeat
Simone
Anche
"dialettica
24 metodi".
logica e
la
la
643
e le scienze
Elenchorum troviamo
nelle Quaestiones super libra
sccondo cui speculative
Faversham
di
che conduce a tutte
via
le
altre
la
teoria
scienze,
e pratiche, e che per questo motivo Aristotele dice che essendo arte della ricerca apre la via ai principi di tutti
Anche
concetti che
troviamo,
qui
ma
leggono nella introduzione
si
forma piu
in
alle
sintetica,
gli
23 la i
stessi
Question! su Porfirio. Viene
che chiunque voglia perfezionarsi nelle scienze altissime, quali sono quelle speculative, bisogna che si perfezioni prima nella logica, che e ribadito
il
modo
funzione
conoscere.
"organica"
In
non
ci
maniera ancora piu efficace nel Elenchorum viene affermata la
libro
della logica, in quanto tutto
che essa e ordinata
scienze
25
Quaestiones novae super
alle
proemio fatto
del
stesso
alle altre scienze
a nulla servirebbe
fossero,
il
come la
suo frutto consiste nel
a suo fine.
logica;
di
E
se le altre
conseguenza e
per medium homo devenit ab ignorantia ad ipsam scientiam, ut in Priorum et Posteriorum; dat viam ad alias scientias logica, et est via media per quam removentur impedimenta aliarum scientiarum, ut in libro Ethicorum et in Fallaciis. Logica etiam dat potestatem et valetudinem deveniendi ad alias scientias ut in libro logicam libro
docet arguere (de Rijk; agnoscere Padova). Ex dictis viam habens ad alias scientias, et ideo dicit Auctor quod ipsa logica docet medium deveniendi de cognito ad incognitum, et ipse Auctor optime dicit quod est habens viam ad principia omnium methodorum id est scientiarum. Notandum circa hoc quod dicit principia, quia logica determinat de principiis aliarum scientiarum, ideo nota quod principia duobus modis considerantur: uno modo quantum ad id realitatis quod est in ipsis, et hoc modo metaphysica determinat de principiis aliarum scientiarum. Alio modo considerantur quantum ad id rationis quod est in ipsis et hoc modo logicus determinat de principiis aliarum scientiarum; et declaratur sic: accipias tribus lineis illud habens tres contenta, figura plana, principium: triangulus est aequales duobus rectis. Hie duo sunt considerare: quantum ad modum modo logicus idem principium considerat. Alio modo diffiniendi est ens rationis potest considerari quantum ad id realitatis quod est in ipso (?) et hoc modo metaphysicus ipsum considerat. Et sic glosandus est iste textus habens viam ad omnium methodorum principia, supple, quantum ad modum sciendi, qui est in ipsis et quantum ad id quod est rationis. Nota quod methodus et facultas idem sunt, differenti tamen modo, facultas dicitur de trivialibus, methodus vero de quadrivialibus, et ideo dictum est quod methodus sumitur hie large secundum quod extendit se tarn ad scientias triviales quam quadriviales et ad omnes alias scientias. Ipsa enim logica dat modum sciendi aliis scientiis, et, quod plus est, ipsa dat modum sciendi ad se ipsam." Ed. de Rijk cit. 82-83 rivista sul manoscritto di Padova cit.
Topicorum Aristotelis, quia omnibus sequitur quod ipsa
ibi
est
<et
hoc>
Quaestiones veteres super libro Elenchorum ed. 24
cit.
27.
Ibi, 27.
ricordi
Si
che Alberto
Magno
ha
insegnato
nel
Trattato
I
intorno
ai
Predicabili
privilegio di essere scienza in se e nel contempo uno strumento per la costruzione di tutte le altre scienze. Essa puo essere paragonata al martello che il fabbro con un arte speciale costruisce nella sua fucina e che, una volta costruito,
che
logica ha
la
serve
a
costruire
scientiarum,
sicut
il
tutti
in
gli
altri
fabrili
in
strumenti:
qua
"Patet
specialis
est
quod logica una est specialium fabricandi malleum: cuius tamen
igitur
ars
usus omnibus adhibetur quae arte fabrili fabricantur", D. Alberti Magni, Logica, Liber I, De Praedicabilibus, Tractatus I, De natura Logicae, cap. I, p. 2 (Ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, Vives, 1890).
Tine
644
organo dclle scienze e sen/a 26 Anche qui di nessuna cosa. conoscenza cssa non si avrcbbc pcrfctta scienza e dcfinita come conoscenza intellettuale.
giustissimo affcrmarc chc la logica e
Pensiamo che darci
c
la
sulla dottrina di
sua prossimita
si
Simone intorno
alle
doltrine
tra
Simone e
maggiore conoscenza dei rapporti potra avere quando
di la
brani che abbiamo sopra riportato siano sufficienti a
una prima informazione mostrarci
a
i
1
di i
Alberto Magno.
Una
suoi contemporanei
si
Simone
la
delle opere di
disporra delle edizioni
alia scienza
-^o
maggior
sono ancora manoscntte.
parte delle quali
Universita di Catania
26
Quaestiones super libra Elenchorum, cit. p. 102: lihrum Praedicamcntorum dicit qucxl philosophia
"lit
in
ista
trcs
advcrtcns Simplicius super partcs
dividitur,
scilicet
in
speculativam, practicam et organicam; partem philosophiae organicam appcllans ipsam non est sui ipsius gratia, scd gratia logicam. lit valdc rationahiliter: organum enim cuiusdam alterius institutum est. Undc ct servus, quia non est sui ipsius gratia sed I Politicoalterius, ideo convenicntcr organum dici potest, ut apparct per Philosophum
rum qui dicit quod "servus est organum animatum homo alterius existcns". Totum autem fructus logicae consistit in hex: qucxl ordinatur ad alias scicntias sicut ad finem. Unde si non essent aliae scientiae ad nihil utilis essct logica, et ideo convenientissimc logica
organum scientiarum
Ibi.
scientia scientiae, sc
et
rei. lit
p. 107: in
se
cum
est, et sine ilia nullius rei
"Dicendum
est
hahetur pcrfecta
notitia."
accipiendo nomcn scientiae, quaelibct quod nulla est communis. Proprie enim accipiendo nomen sunt per cognitio intellcctualis, ipsa erit de iis quae propric
specialis est, et scientia sit quacdam
obiectum principale obiectum intcllectus. Per se autcm ideo proprie accipiendo nomen scientiae, scientia est de rebus et quiditatibus intcllectus
28
est
quidditas rcrum."
Le informa/.ioni piu aggiornate su Simone di Faversham si possono leggere nel vol. Introduction di Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones etc. Si veda in particolare articolo del compianto P. Osmund I^ewry, The Rbbcscn, pp. 1-22. Si veda anche de in Bulletin commentary of Simon of Faversham and Ms. Merton College "Simon of Faversham and Philosophic medifrale 21 (1979) 73-80. Andrea Tabarroni, Durandus de Alvernia on the Science of Logic", Knowledge and the Sciences in Medic\ al Philosophy. Abstracts, Reports from the Department of Systematic ITieology, un codice miscellaneo (Ms di rifcrisce 178, University of Helsinki, VI, 1987, p. Palermo, Biblioteca Comunale 2. Oq. D. 142) contenente un ccrto numero di opere consciuti fra il 1250 e il 1350 circa. In logiche scritte da autori anonimi o scarsamente un commento, finora non noto, all /lrs vetus attribuito nel codice a Durando di Alvernia si trovano dottrine affini a quelle di Simone di Faversham e frequenti richiami a Alberto Magno e Pietro di Alvernia. Questi ultimi due Autori, come e noto sono come hanno fatto rilevare Grabmann e, presenti negli scritti del Maestro inglese, recentemente, Ebbesen (op. cit. in particolare p. 13): "There are also remarkable similarities between other of Simon s and Peter s works; Simon s Quaestiones on Por 1
cit.
1
288",
phyry, for example, share
much
with Peter
s."
MIKKO YRJONSUURI
Obtigationes, Sophismata
Some modern commentators have suggested that
and Oxford Calculators
of the logica
moderna genre of
obligationes
the disputational rules discussed in these treatises
were
followed in disputations de sophismatibus belonging to the curriculum of late medieval universities. 1 This would naturally imply a close connection between treatises on obligations and collections of
sophisms. This connection has nevertheless not been studied carefully. In this paper I will discuss the concepts of casus and positum, which
seem
to
be connected to each other, and which seem to illuminate the
between obligations and sophismata. I will begin from Walter s and William Ockham s treatises on obligations, and then go on to Hurley Richard Kilvington s Sophismata and William Heytesbury s Regulae solvendi relation
sophismata.
1.
Obligations
Treatises de obligationibus disputations.
denied
if
They
ask
the respondent
The answer
discuss
rules
of correct
response in special which sentences should be granted and which is
given a positum which he must hold as true.
to this question
is
given in the form of rules,
whose basic
which follow from the positum must be granted, must be denied and others, called irrelevant, must repugnant propositions be treated in accordance to their truth value. In any case, contradiction idea
is
that propositions
must not
arise.
The
logic of the rules
is
propositional. Often the rules of
2 obligations are discussed by examples and sophisms.
See e.g. Alan R. Perreiah, "Logic examinations in Padua circa 1400", History of Education, 13 (1984), pp. 85-103; C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies, Methuen, London, 1970, pp. 125-134.
For introduction to obligations, see e.g. Ignacio Angelelli, "The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic", Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 800-815; Simo Knuuttila and Mikko Yrjonsuuri, "Norms and Action in Obligational Disputations", Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. In Mcmoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879-
646
Yrjonsuuri 3
s Obligational disputations in Walter Burlcy structure double with often treatises begin is
respondent
of
4
s
The
suppositions.
by the
both casus and positum
given
and William Ockham
In the
opponent.
the casus are granted only following disputation sentences entailed by the to when they are irrelevant positum. Often the rules force the
with the casus. respondent to grant sentences inconsistent casus certifies the state of statement s to explicit Hurley According
matters behind the false positum.
mean
that casus
a disputation
must be
would be a
in
way
5
Burley
Rather
true.
it
examples show that he did not
s
sets a falsehood as the basis of
from the positum.
different
seems
It
that casus
understood semantically, as describing possible configuration of the truth-values of put forward in the
propositions a certain status for a proposition while positum just gives disputation, indifferent to its truth-value. Ockham follows Burley in this issue.
determining
things
Ockham
to
According
some
concerns
casus
particular
thing
(de
re
6
concerns propositions. particulari) whi\c positio Let me clarify the relation of positum and casus by discussing one a Burley s treatise De obligationibus. Burley gives which it may be granted that "positum is false",
in
sophism presented rule
according
to
although we may
not
that
grant
According to Burley the rule
is
is "p
useful,
false",
p
if
is
the positum.
but not essential to the art of
7
obligations.
Olaf
1947),
Pluta
Amsterdam, Fourteenth
1988,
Studicn
(/.), (Bochumer 191-202; Paul
Spade,
pp.
Century",
Kretzmann
et
al.
(eds.),
Cambridge University Philosophy (CHLMP), A. From the beginning to the "Obligations:
zur
Philosophic
"Obligations:
10),
B.
R.
B.
Developments
Griiner, in the
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Eleonore Stump, 335-341; Press, pp. Early
Fourteenth
Romuald
Green
Century",
CHLMP,
pp.
315-334.
3
Burley
has
treatise to
Introduction
the
been
Logical
edited
Treatise
by
"De
obligationibus",
part
in II,
his
in The Cambridge Translations of Medical Philosophical Kretzmann and E. Stump, Cambridge University Press 1988.
translation
4
Ockham
logicae (P.
N. Y.,
s
discussion of obligations
Boehner, G. Gal,
The Franciscan
S.
is
Brown
in
An
dissertation
Louvain,
1963.
Texts,
vol.
Partial I,
N.
of his Summa chapters 39-45 of part III-3 (Opera Philosophica 1), St. Bonaventure,
(eds.\
Institute, 1974, pp. 731-744.)
unius casus non obligat sed certificat, et quia possum esse certus de veritate admitti positio que ponit Socratem sustinere vero, et potest pro reliquum oppositorum Burley, op. cit., p. 46. esse album, prius dicto in rei veritate: Socrates est niger
5
"Sed
.",
autem potest esse casus semper re, particulari, positio "Item, unius propositionis indefinitae vel particularis", Ockham, op. cit., p. 735. 7 est falsum, concedi potest haec propositio: de eo "Alia regula est: quando positum est concedendum ipsum esse falsum." Burley, op. cit., p. tamen, quod ponitur, numquam
6
debet esse de
et
de re
Obligationes, Sophism ata
As an apparent where the positum nothing else
which
false",
-
irrelevant
"only
Rome".
positum. In this situation
is
granted in
"
are in
to defend
it
Rome
in
is
fact
in certain way.
Then
You
positum? The
and according are in
Rome
Rome
1.
You
nothing else
3.
are in
positum
is
is
You
proposed
are in
Rome
.
to Burley s general rules
is
false"
if
You
it
should be
should not be
it
are in
Rome
is
the
accepted as possible
assumed
positum
are in
as casus
granted, irrelevant and true
false
granted, true according to casus
only this is positum
5.
the
disputation can be summarized as follows:
2.
4.
if
granted because of the casus. After this it is are in Rome is false". It follows from the two
You
You
"
is
it
is
true and
is
even
false
granted as sequent, but according to the rule discussed
granted that
"positum
is
it
earlier propositions,
a casus Burley assumes that is
it
referring to the positum
positum",
to Burley
proposed that
As
proposed that accordance to the rule because it
You
committed
this is
According
are in
is
is
647
Calculators
objection to the rule Burley imagines a situation "You
the positum
respondent that
is
and Oxford
Rome
is
granted, follows
false
Burley s solution of the sophism is that "only this is positum" must be denied, because it is repugnant. 9 It makes no difference that it is true
The
according to casus. is "
false"
You
and
are in
"
You
Rome
set of propositions
are in is
Rome
false"
and
is
the
"You
"You
are in
positum"
are in
is
Rome",
"positum
inconsistent, since
Rome"
are inconsistent.
we must deny the last member of an According Burley inconsistent set of propositions, when other members are already either accepted as positum or granted when proposed. The sophism is interesting since it shows that Burley thought that to
s
obligational disputation
rules
may
very well be conducted with
full
acceptance
62. o illud arguitur: ponatur te esse Romae; et volo quod nihil aliud sit positum. positum est falsum. Debet concedi per se. Deinde: tantum hoc est positum (demonstrato posito). Hoc debet concedi, quia verum per casum. Deinde: te esse Romae est falsum. Si concedas, concedis de eo, quod est positum, ipsum esse falsum. Si neges, cedat tempus, tu negas sequens. Sequitur enim: positum est falsum, et tantum te esse "Contra
Deinde:
Romae
ponitur, igitur te esse
Romae
est
falsum."
Burley, op.
cit.,
pp. 62-63.
o "Dicendum
Burley, op.
cit.,
est:
negando istam
p. 63.
"tantum
te esse
Romae
ponitur",
quia repugnans
est."
648
Yrjonsuuri
of the fact that the positum defended as true
cannot be connected to modern clear
sequent asserts that antecedent
would
here
be
the
true,
11
The
where p
is
is
only
disputation where
positum. Burley
is
it
to
be
in
his
is
true
procedure
Subjunctive
positum is not assumed answers committed to the
true:
of Burley
many
examples he does grant
s
irrelevant propositions, which are true just because positum
of
falsity
p
not grant anything which logically entails the denial of
the positum, but he may, and in
semantic
s
counterfactuals.
subjunctive
some way assumed
respondent
He may
positum.
from
different
suppositions are in to
procedure since
,
often the respondent must not respond
the positum were true.
if
often differs from the disputation also
10
is false.
As Burley elsewhere remarks,
is
s
Hurley
no one would accept a subjunctive conditional whose con
that
as he
false.
is
subjunctive counterfactuals
the positum
is
but
accepted,
not
is
false.
The
in
the
granted
disputation.
2.
Richard Kilvington s Sophismata
The 47th sophism sophism, as the sophism
Kilvington
s
looks
Sophismata
not formed like Burley
is
contains
sophism
of
like
obligational
contains discussions of the correct rules of obligations, but
it
only
s
obligational sophisms. Kilvington
The sentences
casus.
a
s
proof and the
the
in
disproof are granted as regulated by the rules of obligations supposing that the casus
is
read as a positum}
2
The sophisma sentence seated" (= KJJ). The casus
of this sophism
you know that the king
is
seated,
know
seated"
that the king
Paul
has
Spade
counterfactual
is
not
is
given by Kilvington
and
(=
if
(p -^Kjy)
deberes respondere ac
This sophism
has been
si
Counterfactual
positum esset
discussed
&
Reasoning",
in re
"If
the king
argued that obligations amount to See esp. his "Three Theories
on
know
"You
reasoning.
Kilvington and Swyneshed Logic, 3 (1982), pp. 1-32. "Nee
is
verum",
that the king
the king is
of
account
Obligationes:
Burley, op.
seated,
~p)). Because
theoretical
History
is
not seated, you
(~p->Ka
a
is
of
Burley,
and Philosophy of
cit., p.
53.
by some modern authors considering theory of
Strode on Inconsistency in Obligational E. J. Ashworth, "Ralph forthcoming in Proceedings of Eight European Symposium for Medie\ al Logic and Semantics (Freiburg 24-27 May 1988), (Analytica), Philosophia Verlag; Spade, "Three theories pp. 19-28; E. Stump, "Roger Swyneshed s Theory of obligations", Medioe\ o, 1 (1981), pp. 143-153; E. Stump, "Obligations: pp. 329-332. obligations.
Cf.
Disputations",
...",
A.",
Obligationes, Sophismata
the
king either
know
"You
the
(= Kgp V
seated"
not
king
is
Ka ~p),
formulates
Kilvington sentence.
is
or
is
that
seated,
Calculators
the casus
implies
know
seated or you
and
proof
the
the
With of
disproof
disjunction
the king
that
as Kilvington recognizes.
the
649
this
not
is
disjunction
the
sophisma
13
Let us look
at
first
must be granted that (= ~Ka ~p), because
the proof. According to rules of obligations
"You
it
is
do not know
imply the
(~Ka ~p)
the king
that
not
is
it
seated"
no way inconsistent with the casus. and the negation of its second
true and in
Ka ~p)
However, a disjunction (Kj) v disjunct
and Oxford
first
part (Kj)).
The sophisma sentence
thus
is
proved.
The disproof negation of the
(=
seated"
formulated in similar way. Kilvington connects the
is
first
~Kap)
disjunct,
or
do not know
"You
with the whole disjunction (Kj) v
second disjunct (Ka ~p) is proved. As sentence, we have the disproof.
it
is
the
that
Ka ~p),
king
is
and thus the
inconsistent with the sophisma
Both the proof and the disproof depend on a premise which is granted as true and irrelevant. Kilvington s solution of the sophisma is based on the idea that these reasons are not sufficient. 14 According to Kilvington there are propositions that are true and irrelevant, but must
be denied because they would not be true
According
of
solution
s
the positum
if
the
were
the
sophisma, proof and the disproof must be doubted. sentence should not be granted nor denied, it Kilvington
sophisma 15
However,
dubitanduni)
is
not
remarks
Kilvington
to
equivalent
that
doubtful"
"is
be
"must
true.
irrelevant
Also the
of the
premises doubted.
to
must
doubted"
be (est
dubium).^ Thus doubt whether one
(est
Kilvington is not maintaining that one may be in knows. Instead Kilvington simply points out that often the respondent must respond with doubt to propositions he knows. Kilvington says that 1-3
See Spade, Obligations",
Stump different
"Three
Theories
...",
pp. 144-145 and Stump,
discusses (in
solutions,
but
pp.
19-20;
"Obligations,
Stump,
A.",
p.
"Roger
Swyneshed
s
Theory of
329-330.
"Roger Swyneshed s Theory of Obligations", pp. 146-149) three shows that two of them are rather weak. I omit here these
two. 1
See Spade,
Obligations",
"Three
Theories
...",
p.
22 and Stump,
"Roger
Swyneshed
s
Theory of
pp. 151-152.
1
licet ista propositio sit dubitanda a te, non tamen est concedendum propositio Rex sedct est tibi dubia. Unde iste terminus dubitandum a me Text cited in Stump, "Roger Swyneshed s est superius ad istum terminum dubium mihi "Et
quod
tamen,
ista
."
Theory of
Obligations", p.
151, footnote 27.
650
Yrjonsuuri
the respondent must doubt whether the king to the casus is
It
he knows whether the king important to notice that
followed as Kilvington supposes,
it
is
is
is
seated.
if
Burley
seated, although according
s
of obligations are
rules
not possible to form both the proof
and the disproof of this sophism in the same disputation. The opponent must choose either one of them. Therefore the sophism needs a solution if it
only
must be consistent
a sense defined by Paul Spade as follows:
in
two disputations constructed from the same positum and differing only with respect to the order in which sentences are proposed are such that the respondent is required to concede a sentence in one disputation "No
and
to
deny the same sentence
in
another
disputation."
sense of consistency
is pertinent only to disputations However, where the respondent judges propositions with respect to a fixed model where they are true or false. It seems that Burley did not think that
this
would
positum
fix
of model.
kind
this
In
disputations
obligational
of
Burley propositions are answered one by one with differing criteria for granting them. As Kilvington thinks that the sophisma needs a solution,
he seems to have a different conception of the status of positum
in
an
obligational disputation.
may
It
be
that
Kilvington
s
terminology
is
related
to
this
already noticed, Burley and Ockham made interpretative viewpoint. As between scmantically understood casus and purely the distinction I
inferentially followed positum. easily
follow casus,
According
he knows
if
how
Ockham
to
to
and positum.
Kilvington
positum interchangeably and, Ockham and Burley. If
casus
is
it
seems seems,
to in
some
use
the
it
fixes a
does not
differences between
concepts casus
and
the sense reserved for casus in
a counterfactual supposition about things,
natural to think that
He
follow positum.^
discuss the rules of casus, he just points out
casus
the respondent can
semantic model
or, in
it
seems quite
other words,
some
imagined alternative of the actual world as the basis of the disputation. If
the casus
of Kilvington
s
sophisma
disputation, Kilvington s views
Spade, 1
8
Three Theories
...",
p. 9.
seem
See also
fixes
a
semantic model for the
quite natural. According to the
model
p. 11.
"Sed iste modus opponendi et respondendi non servatur quando ponitur casus, propter quod differt casus a positione. Scito tamen quomodo respondendum est facta et aliqua positione, potest leviter sciri quomodo respondendum est posito aliquo casu, ideo sufficiat pro nunc de positione tractarc." Ockham, op. cit., p. 736.
Obligationes, Sophismata
we
are informed about king
the
king according determine whether
s
we know
Calculators
651
we cannot determine whether seated; consequently we cannot
but
sitting,
model
the
to
and Oxford
is
according to the model that the king
is
seated.
may be
It
that
sophisma discusses rules
this
suggested but not discussed by Ockham. gives rules of obligations different
If so,
it
is
from the rules
Burley and Ockham, because their positum
is
for
semantic casus
quite natural that
it
for
positum given by understood to be followed
only inferentially.
3.
William Heytesbury s Regulae solvendi sophismata
John E. Murdoch has argued in
the
Regulae^ Heytesbury
and he aims
at
is
correct
giving
different kinds of
problems
Heytesbury has metalinguistic strategy concerned with disputational situations,
that
and easy-to-use rules
in disputation.
20
for answering to According to Murdoch these
rules are usually metalinguistic.
Most of the text of Regulae consists of disputational situations in which the rules apparently give wrong response. Heytesbury solves these sophisms one by one in order to show that his rules are valid in any situation.
purpose
Heytesbury also gives some clear examples of his rules, but the the discussed sophisms seems to be providing apparent
of
of
counter-examples
his
rules.
Most of
the
considered
sophisms
are
formed by imagining a casus involving some limit-decision problem. It has often been pointed out by modern commentators that casus may according to Heytesbury be impossible in nature, if it only is free from 19
See
e.g.
John.
E.
Murdoch,
"Prepositional
A
Analysis
in
Fourteenth-Century Natural
Case Study", Synthese, 40 (1979), pp. 117-146; "Scientia Mediantibus Philosophy: Vocibus: Metalinguistic Analysis in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy", Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, Akten des VI. internationalen Kongresses fur Mittelalterliche Philosophic
der
Societe
Internationale
August-S.September 1977 in
Bonn,
pour
L Etude
(Miscellanea
de
la
Mediae\e
Angelelli,
87,
54,
288,
Alexander Aphrodisiensis 41, 53, 134, 347 Alexander de Hales 160 Alexander Neckham 97-99 Alexander Sermoneta 438, 443 Alfanus Salcrnitanus 99 Alfredus Anglicus de Sareshcl) 104, C
161,
223,
53,
252,
58,
612 Alcuinus 455,461,558 Alexander de Alexandria 325, 327
C
160,
222,
190-195,
81,
46,
56, 146, 148-151,
Baldwin, J.W. 98 Bannach, K. 298 Barach, C.S. 291
286
325,
Index of Names
660
Bonifatius VIII papa (Benedictus
C.G. 302
Bardili,
Caietanus) 298 Bonner, A. 3,4,8 Bono, J.J. 286 Boole, G. 493, 494, 496, 500 Borgnet, A. 344,638,643 Bos, E.P. 12. 13,15,16.23,418
119
Bartel, T.
Bartholomaeus dc Brugis 551 Bartholomacus Salernitanus 98,
104, 105
Baswell, C. 26 Baur, Ii. 55-59
Baur, L. 25 Bazan, B.C. 127, 135, 137
Bottin,
Bcckmann,
ihn Mar/.ban 266
Bcierwaltcs, W. 462, 558 Bekkcr, I. 153
Brchicr.lv 109, 110 Brennan, R.E. 251 Brewer, J.S. 107
Bcllissima, G. 538
Bel us 40
Bridges, J.H.
107,263 Brind Amour, L. 623 Broadie, A. 496,500
Bcnekc, F.H. 492, 500 Iknjamin, A.S. 249 Benson, R.L.
504
27, 97, 98,
Brown,
Beonio-Brocchicri, M. 324 Bernardus Carnotensis 504 Bcrnardus Claraevallcnsis 331
Bernardus 329 Bcrnardus
323,
Ix>mbardi
J.
328,
1..
333
Silvestris 97,
Billow,
Blumenhcrg,
II.
290
533 228,
449, 481,
231,
328,
482, 501, 514,
Boethius (A.M.T. Severinus)
410, 516,
25,
27,
29,
31-33, 41, 43, 44, 47, 52, 60, 71-74, 77, 84,
85,
87,
248,
249,
95,
252,
100,
155,
181,
Cassircr,
275,
366,
Cassola,
325
Boncompagni, B. 27 Bonetus Locatellus 651
302
598 Celaya, Juan de 590, 594, 595, Chalcidius 66, 104, 147 Charlesworth, M.J. 248 Chatelain, A. 301
Chenu, M.-D.
Boler, J.F. 351, 354, 355, 509 111,
II.
M. 49
Charma, A. 331
Bogdan, R.J. 202 Boh, I. 436, 626, 629 45,
Carreras y Artau, J. 5 Carreras y Artau, T. 5 Cassiodorus (Havius Magnus Aurelius) 43-52, 558
103,
367, 416, 418, 440, 455, 457, 462, 465, 467, 481, 612, 626 Boethius de Dacia 140, 192, 426, 636
Bonaventura
Ifiienis 438 Canguilhcm, G. 106 Cappuyns, M. 463, 558 Carnap, R. 451,452,623 Caroti, S. 225
Caietanus dc
Parma 286
517, 521, 522, 532, 626, 627, 628, 646
225,
306
J.
294
Buytaert, I-.M. 263,521,628 148,
Bochenski, I.M. 437 198, Boehncr, Ph. 442,
(i.
Bussc, A. 46,270 Butimer, C.I I. 6
Blackwell, R.J. 163 Blasius Pclacani de
222,
273
I.
Burchardt, J. 146-149, 151, 289, 290 Burge, K.R. 460 Burgundius Pisanus 99 Burnett, C.S.F. 25, 26, 32
138, 139, 140, 142, 145
Birkenmajer. A.
80-82,
228, 263, 328, 352,
Bultot, R. 281
457
427,429 Bielcr, L. 462 Bird, O. 626
)
Bruns,
Bucheggcr,
J.
437
181,
Bruselas, Jorge dc 593
Bcrtrandus de Alemania 323 Belt, H. 463 Bianchi,
89,
646 326,
325,
Bernstein, R.J. 510
Biard,
S.F.
355, 410, 482, 501, 610, 612, 614, 615,
Bernard, C. 161 Bcrnier,
319, 408, 409, 412, 589,
Bouyges, M. 309, 312 Braakhuis. II.A.G. 418 Brands, H. 445
Bcdoret, H. 58
Bchmanayar
144,
Bourke, V. 163
264,521,522
J.P.
F.
591, 598 Bourgne, R. 68
Bcaujouan, G. 62, 66, 586 Bcccaria, A. 62
130,
155,
159,
255,
110, 170, 333, 338
Chisaka, Y. 155 Chrysippus 41
Church, A. 213
Index of Names
Cicero
(Marcus Tullius) 108-110,
103,
267,
39-41,
27,
305,
504,
535,
60,
536,
539, 540
Diels,
110
Cirlot, J.E.
Colish, M.L. 455, 456, 463
542
Conrad us de Ebrach 325 Conradus de Soltau 325 Constable, G. 27, 97, 98, 504 Constantinus Africanus 27, 98, 99,
Contreni,
Conway,
30,
32,
62,
286 J.J.
97
Donat,
271
Cordier, B. 458
Cordoba, Alonso de 598 Corvino, F. 260,262,264 Costa ben Luca vide Qusta
110
I^aertius
62,
63,
68,
100,
101,
100,
101,
b.
Luqa
Courcelle, P. 46
Courtenay, W.J. 574, 628
139,
143,
184,
J.
270
S.
d Ors, A. 468,590 Dronke, P. 32, 275, 278, 333, 504 Dubislav, W. 270 Duclow, D.F. 463 Duffy, J. 100
Couloubaritsis, L. 163-166
228, 328,
Duhem, P. 138, 322, Dunchad 97,461 Dunya,
Cranz, F.E. 461 Cresswell,
265
483,490 Donatus (Aelius) 39 d Ooge, M.L. 457 Donati,
Corax 40 II.
307,343
113
Copernicus, Nicolaus 138, 176-178 Copleston, F. 4 Corbin,
1
39, 248, Dionysius Areopagita (Pseudo-) 458, 459, 462, 463, 558 Diophantus Alexandrinus 27 Dioscurides 98 Dobsevage, A. 479 Dod, B.G. 27, 28, 95 Dodds, E.R. 458 Dolbeau, F. 43 Dominicus Gundissalinus 25, 26, 32, 53,
55-59,
4
P.
II.
Diogenes
Cleomedes 141 J.
51
Diodorus Cronus 223
Clarke, S. 141 Clavius 106
Collart,
J.
Dieterici, F.
M. 319
Clagctt,
Dewcy,
Diehl, E. 458
S.
325, 327, 331, 342
271
Durandus de Sancto Porciano
M. 578
vide
Guilelmus Durandus de Alvernia 644 Durling, R. 99
Dahan.G. 25 d Alverny, M.-Th. 27,58
Damascius 343 Dancy, R.M. 215 Daniel Morleius 56 Davidson, D. 623 Davidson, H. 566 Davis, L.D. 187 Day, S.J. 532 de Andres, T. 262,264
DeBoni, L.A.
S. 74, 417, 418, 423, 437, 551, 555, 557, 633, 637, 638, 644
Ebbesen,
Eckermann, W. 187 Eco, U. 261,264
Eduardus Upton 202 Elkana, Y. 651 Enders, H. 446, 549 Endres, J.A. 463
Ill
Engelhardt, P. 294, 297 Englert, L. 62
Decarie, V. 72 Delhaye, P. 141
D Elia,
F.
43,
Eratosthenes 41
46
Erdmann,
de Libera, A. 82, 418 Del Punta, F. 342, 409, 410, 417, 549, 638 Demetrius 286 Demosthenes 40 Denifle, H. 301 Denomy, J. 314 de Rijk, L.M. 13, 24, 94, 202, 212, 215, 407, 418,
437, 446,
584, 591, 604,
641, 642, 643
Descartes, R. 106, 107, 110, 479
638,
B. 492,500
Espinosa, Pedro de 597 Esser, C. 155
Etzkorn, G. 263, 324, 616 Euclides 27,36,41,285,286
Evans, G. 353-356,360 Evans, G.R. 25 Fakhry,
M. 309
al-Farabl,
Abu Nasr
62, 68-70, 265, 309,
al-Farghani 32
25,
312
32,
53,
55-58,
Index of Names
662
Favonius Hulogius 459 Fcderici Vescovini, G.
258. 264, 285, 286,
Glorieux, P. 324, 364, 366
641
Goddu, A. 171,234-237,351,358-360
Flatten, H. 277, 331, 340 Floss, H.J. 563
Fodor,
Gilson, E. 106, 108, 129, 351, 558 Ginters, R. 306
Godefridus de
Fournier, P. 323 Frachantianus de Vicenza 438 Franciscus Assisiensis 155-162 Franciscus de Marchia 195, 325
Franciscus de Mayronis 323, 325 Franciscus de Trivisio 257
Grabmann, M.
Frcdhorg, K.M. 74, 263 Frcddoso, A.J. 481,482 Frcdegisus Turonensis 456 Frcge, G. 451, 453, 492-501, 622
Grant,
323,
338,
445,
139,
138,
141,
142,
144,
175,
349
180, 185, 257, 264
Gratarolus, G. 334, 337, 339 Gratiadeus lusculanus 55
31,44,457
Green, R. 248, 468, 582, 646 Green, W.M. 100 Green-Pcdcrscn, N.J. 408, 440, 626
185-187, 228, 263, 328, 352,
180,
479,
410,
38,
133, 286,
E.
Grassi, O.
Gabriel, G. 501
646 Galenus
148,
176, 178, 315, 317, 322, 327, 342,
Funkenstein, A. 145, 175, 178
354,
94,
Gracser, A. 267
Friedberg, A. 89
Gal, G.
325,
Gracia, J.E. 394
S.
Friedlein, G.
226,
520,549,558,631,637
305 Fridh,A.J. 44 Freud,
197,
489 Goichon, A.M. 65, 133 Goldstein, H.T. 309 Gomez Caffarena, J. 368 Gonzalez Palencia, A. 69 Gorgias 40
M. 27
Folkerts,
Fontibus
364, 368, 370, 375, 388, 483, 484, 486,
354
J.
62,
482,
501, 515,
67-70,
98,
99.
610,
612,
104,
130.
290
G. 145, 177, Gambatese, A. 615 Galilei,
178, 215, 230,
483
Garber, D. 171, 178 Garcia Ballestcr, L. 69 Gaskin, J.CA. 306
187,
Grignaschi, M. 53 Groblicki, J. 365 Griiner, B.R. 645
Gualterus dc Brugis 325 Gualterus Burlacus 195, 229,
Gasquet, F.A. 108, 109 Gassendi, P. 140, 143 Gaunilo 248 Gauthier, R.A. 135, 263 Geach, P.T. 213, 215 Gentile, G. 302-304 Gcntilis de Cingulo 549-557, 631-637 Gentilis de Fulgineo 69 Gentzen, G. 629
Gerardus Cremonensis
X
papa 148, 149 Arimincnsis 184, 180, 188, 257-264, 325, 593 Gregorius Nazian/.cnus 463 Gregory, T. 45, 275, 277, 281, 283
Gregorius Grcgorius
28, 53, 55, 56, 58,
67-69
344, 374, 386, 388, 407, 410, 438, 442, 449, 468-
478,
582,
586,
645-648,
626-629,
592,
650-653
Gualterus de Chatton 323,
373-379,
325,
180,
183, 201, 258,
381-390,
479,
525,
526 Gueroult, M.
106
Guilclmus 27, 42 Guilelmus de Alvcrnia 119,294 Guilelmus Buser 408,410,414-415 Guilclmus de Conchis 25, 66,
97,
102,
Gerardus Odonis 325, 328 Gerardus de Senis 325
104,113, 115,275-284,331-341 Guilelmus Crathorn 183-186
Gersh, S. 455,458,459,461,463 Gersonides vide I^vi b. Gerson
Guilelmus Durandus de Sancto Porciano
al-Ghazali,
Abu Hamid
55, 104, 312, 313
Ghisalberti, A. 324
27
427,
428,
430,
651-654
Guilelmus
de
Mara
(si\
e
de
Lamara)
325, 364, 366-368 (sive Pictavicnsis)
25,71,88,101,113,347 Gillispie, C.C.
Hentisberius
434, 480, 586, 589, 593, 597, 598, 645,
Giacone, R. 44, 504 Gianotti, D. 44
Gibson, M. 465 Gilbertus Porretanus
323, 325
Guilelmus
Guilelmus de Moerbeka 314
148,
149,
285,
Index of Names
Ockham
Guilelmus de 94,
141,
183,
185-188,
229,
231-239,
178,
179,
180-
196-205,
209,
227-
A. 30 R.M.T. 89 Hilpinen, R. 438
323-
Hintikka,
14-16,
171-174,
161,
195,
257-264,
325,
327,
328,
386-389,
330,
351-363,
378,
379,
433,
479-482,
516,
519,
521-525,
527,
529,
565,
566,
579-581,
586,
597,
410,
21-23,
298-301,
431,
417,
491-501,
374,
89,
375,
418,
430,
512,
514,
532-534,
609-617, 618-625, 626-628, 645, 646, 650-653
Guilelmus Petri de Godino 325 Guilelmus de Rubione 325 Guilelmus de Sancto Theodorico 280, 331, 334-337, 340 Guilelmus Shirovodus (sive de Shyreswood) 94,
430,
445^154,
518,
520,
582,
J.
Hacking,
I.
L.
491,
492,
494,
495,
Hill,
J. 201, 202, 204, 208, 215, 222, 231, 236, 238, 416, 576
Hippocrates 99,100
41,
57,
58,
62,
67,
98,
Hocedez, E. 250
Hoffmann,
184
F.
Holder, A. 43 Holtz, L. 44
Honnefelder, L. 521,529,532,534
497,
Hubien, H. 438,443 Hudson, A. 360,361 Hughes, G.E. 578 Hugo Benzi 67 Hugo de Novocastro 325, 327 Hugo de Sancto Victore 4,
6,
25,
57,
58, 61, 62, 100, 113
171,178
Hugolinus de Orvieto 264
Hackstaff, L.I I. 249 Haring, N. 71,275,504
Hugonnard-Roche, II. 25 Humbertus de Prulliaco 325
Hagendahl, H. 44
Hume, D. 293,306
Ilalleux, R. 64
Hunain ibn Ishaq
Hamblin, C.L. 645 Hannibaldus de Hannibaldis 325
Hunt, R.W. 25,
Harming, R.W. 65 Hanson, N.R. 172, 178 Harkins, C.L. 23
Hartshorne, C. 509
Harvey, E.R. 26 Haskins, C.H. 34,98 Hay, W.H. 302 Hayduck, M. 273 Hedwig, K. 286 Hegel, G.W.F. 128
Heiberg, J.L. 28,152 Hcndley, B. .502,505,507 Henle, R.J. 249
Henri d Andeli 97,98 Henricus de Gandavo 19, 90, 226, 323, 364, 366-372 Henry, C. 26 Henry, D.P. 215 Hermagoras 40 Hermannus de Carinthia 28,32 Hermes 32 Hermes, H. 501 Herodianus 39 IIerren,
66,
212,
Hirschfeld, T. 148 Hissette, R. 138, 318, 329, 549, 631, 637 Ilobbes, T. 534
Hrabanus Maurus 104
129
Ilaaparanta, 501
Ililka,
592,
599-605, 608 Guilelmus de Ware 325 Guilelmus Varignana 631
Guitton,
663
M. 461,462
Hervaeus Natalis 323,325 Heyer, G. 446 Heynck, V. 366
63, 67, 68,
285
26, 97, 100, 101, 103-105
Hutchins, R.M. 505, 506, 508, 511
lacobus de Losanna 325 lacobus Metensis 325 lacobus Venetus 437 Ibn Adjurrum 272, 273 Ibn Badjdja, Abu Bakr (sive Avempace) 309, 310, 345 Ibn Da ud, Ibrahim 32 Ibn Gabirol, Salomon (sive Avicebron)
248
Abu
Ibn al-Haitham,
c
Al!
(sh>e
Alhacen)
152, 285-288, 292
Ibn Masawaih, Yuhanna 63, 64, 66, 68, 99 Ibn Masawaih (Pseudo-) 70 Ibn Rushd, 64,
70,
297,
Abu
al-Walld (sive Averroes)
133,
135,
191-195,
266,
294,
309-313,
344-348,
434,
479,
300,
565-572 Ibn Sab
c
m
Ibn Sina, 59,
53
Abu
61,
65,
265, 266, 480, 521
AH
(sive
Avicenna)
69,
119,
133,
135,
136,
272-274,
285,
294,
268-270,
Ijsewijn, J. 103 Inciarte, F. 524
loannes 27,42
C
58,
Index of Names
664
loannes loannes loannes loannes 142,
Alexandrinus 100, 102, 103 Baconthorpe 325 de Bassolis 325, 327 Buridanus 12, 18-20, 22-24, 175,
144,
195,
179,
225,
Johnson, R. 460 Jolivet, J. 25,71,82 Jung, C.G. 110 141,
432^35, 438, 442, 427-430, 392-403, 443,534 loannes de Dacia 113, 115 loannes Damascenus 57 loannes Dorp 442, 443 loannes Dumhleton 374 161, 140, loannes Duns Scotus 14, 23, 197,
208,
247,
257,
353,
354,
481,
521,
264,
357-359, 523,
Maior
498
501
388,
390,
534,
574,
Kelly, S. 549,550 27, 215, 324, 407, 468, 589, Kenny, A. 626
382,
F.
Kessler, E. 103 Kcyncs, J.N. 571
Kibre, P. 99 59-61,
144,
190, 192, 193
loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes
167, 170, 293, 452, 479,
I.
Karger, E. 234 Karpinski, L.C. 457 Kelley, F.E. 263, 324, 364
530, 532,
581-585 loannes Fusoris 152 loannes Gerson 480 loannes Guallensis 56, 57 loannes dc landuno 53-56,
Kant,
Kaulbach,
323,
375,
529,
Kann, C. 512
325,
298,
297,
Kaeppeli, T. 323 Kahiza, Z. 628 Kambartel, F. 501
240-
239,
231-234,
227-229, 262,
Jung-Palc/.ewska, E. 190
228-230,
299, 586, 594, 598
dc Mirecuria 325 de Ncapoli 323 Nicholai 627 Ocrcatus 27 de Oria 586-598 Peckham 286
Abu Yusuf
al-Kind[,
63, 69, 285
King, P. 394,443,519 Kirjavainen, H. 196
Klibansky, R. 290, 504 Klima, G. 210,217,218
Kkx-ker, H.R. 298
Kluxen, W. 232,521,522,529 Knealc, M. 446, 448^50, 453 Kncalc, W. 446, 448-450, 453
267, 268, 308-310, Philoponus 343,344 loannes Quidort Parisicnsis 325, 489 loannes de Reading 89-96 loannes Rodington 259 loannes Sarisbcricnsis 27, 71-73, 97, 98,
Kneepkcns, C.H. 408,410 Knudsen, C. 180,525,554
333,502-511 loannes Scotus Eriugcna 249, 455, 456, 459-467, 558-564 loannes de Scvilla 27 loannes de Stcrngasscn Coloniensis 325
Koyre, A. 322 Kraus, J. 183 Kraus, P. 266
Knuuttila, 231,
S.
212,
215,
222,
225-229,
238, 243, 416, 438, 501, 583, 584,
645
Koch,
J.
298,323
Krcimcndahl, L. 306 27, Kretzmann, N.
324, 376, 403, 437, 440, 468, 554, 589, 626, 645
loannes Versor 441,442 loannes Wiclcfus 586
Krieger, G. 521
loannitius 98, 99, 102, 104
Kristeller, P.O.
lodocus Trutvcttcr 593, 594 Isaac Israeli 58, 119,638 Isidorus 64-66
Krop, H.A. 14,23 Kuksewicz, Z. 190 Kunitzsch, P. 28
Isidorus Hispalensis 39, 55, 61, 66, 558 lustinianus 40
Kunze, P. 445, 512, 600 Kusch, M. 231
97, 302,
461
Izbicki.T. 638 ,
W.R. 95 M.L.V. 461
Jacobi, K. 224,446,447
Laistner,
Jacquart, D. 62, 63, 68
Lamas de
Jadaane, F. 267 James, M.R. 25
Lambertini, R. 264, 549, 637 Landgraf, A. 26 Landulphus Caraccioli 325
James, T.E. 408 Jcauneau, E. 66, 276, 333, 456, 461 Jesus Hali 285,287,288
Oliveira Xavier, M.L. 535
Langston, D. 240,247 Laubenthal, R. 311
407,
Index of Names
Lax, Gasparus 594
Leanza, Lear,
Manekin, C. 565 Manfredus 103
44 217
S.
J.
Manitius,
LeGoff,J. 112 Leibniz, G.W. 141, 143 Leibold, G. 180, 298, 522, 609
Lejeune, A. 286 Lemay, H.R. 276 Leonardi, C. 97,461,462 Levi b. Gerson 565-573 Lewis, D. 231,236,243 Lewry, P.O. 407, 626, 644 Ligurius 40
D.C.
108,
258,
264,
286,
287,
322, 323
Linus 42
Lipps.T. 492,501 Livesey, S.J. 89, 90 Lloyd, A.C. 458 Locke,
J.
141
Lohn, C. 600 Lohne,JA. 290 Lohr, C. 445^50, 454, 522, 550
Long, A.A. 267 Longeway, J. 638 Longpre, E. 89 Lo Presti, M.G. 558
Maurus Salernitanus 98, 102, 105 Maximus Confessor 463, 558 Mazzarella, P. 638
Menut, A.D. 314 Mercurius 40, 42 Merlan, P. 129, 458
Mabillon,J. 43 S.
144
Mesnard, P. 106 Meyer, M. 165 Michael Bononiensis 325 Michael Scotus 57, 59
McGarry, D.D. 502-505,507,508,511 Macken, R. 370 Mackie, J.L. 306 McMullin, E. 178, 179 Macrobius 46,275,459 McVaugh, M.R. 69 Madec, G. 465
Michalski, K. 429, 645
Miethke,
Maggiolo, P.M. 311,344 Magistri, Martin de 597 Mahdi, M. 309 Maier, A. 143, 175, 179, 230,
298,
319,
174, 179
342,
Moises 40 Moises b. Maimon
(sive
Maimonides)
248,309 Mojsisch, B. 302 190-192, 375,
195,
376, 483,
489, 632, 637 Maieru, A. 185, 342, 357, 408, 437, 483 Mair, J.R.S. 46
Maloney,T.S. 261,264 Mandonnet, P. 138, 485
J.
Migne,J.-P. 44,484 Millas-Vallicrosa, J.M. 29, 30 Minio-Paluello, L. 95, 105
Madkour, I. 266,566 Maecenas 39
225,
Markowski, M. 13,23 Marmo, C. 257,264,549 Maroth, M. 265 Marrone, S. 368,369 Marrou, H.-I. 49, 535 Marsilius de Inghen 12-23, 325, 408, 410 Martianus Capella 31, 32, 97, 98, 104, 455, 459-463, 465, 467, 558 Martin, C. 627 Martin, C.J. 574 Martin, J. 503 Martinus Alaunovicanus (sive de Alnewyk) 202 Martinus Anglicus 407 Martinus Laudunensis 97, 461 Martorelli Vico, R. 550 Mast, M. 457 Massa, E. 108 Matthaeus de Aquasparta 325 Matthen, M. 215 Maurach, G. 277, 278, 280, 332, 336 Maurer, A. 15, 23, 324, 327, 330, 528
Losoncy, T. 248 Loux, M. 234,236,501,623 Lucilius 39 Lucretius (Titus L. Cams) 141, 293 Luther, Martin 304, 305 Lutz, C.E. 97, 98, 461, 462, 465
MacClintock,
M. 331
Manser, G.M. 313 Mansion, A. 163 Marchegiani, L. 553 Marcolino, V. 180, 258, 263 Marenbon, J. 446, 455 Marius Victorinus 455
Le Blond, J.M. 271 Leff, G. 298
Lindberg,
665
Molland, A.G. 176, 179 Moody, E.A. 228-230, 437, 443, 482, 495, 501 Moos, M.F. 485
Morin,
J.P.
144, 145
Morpurgo, P. 97, 98 Morra, G. 302-304
Index of Names
666
al-Muhashshir ihn Fatik 28 Muller,
119, 196, 206, 207,
J.T.
Muckle,
Paulus,
Muller, P. 600 Mullcr, J.-P. 489
Pesenti.T. 99 Petrus Abaclardus
294 V. 437, 586, 596 Murdoch, J.R. 62, 143, 227, 323, 651 Musslcr, B. 445, 600 Mutahhari, M. 266 Mynors, R.A.B. 45, 46 J.
Munoz Delgado,
Petrus
143,
Aureoli
90,
195,
258,
259,
263,
323, 325, 357
167, 177, 179 176,
179,314-321 Nicolaus de Ultricuria
179, 229,
178,
Petrus de Candia 408,411,413-415 Petrus I Icliae 101 Petrus
174,
175,
Ilispanus 440,
418,
441,
94, 212, Portugalcnsis 446, 599, 604-608, 638,
641
301
Nicomachus de Cicrasa
34, 41, 457,
467
Normore, C. 403, 582, 609 Norpoth, L. 291 Nuchclmans, G. F.
143,
97, 185, 212
101,
120,
123,
128,
413,
PctrusTartaretus 521-534,594 Petrus Thomae 325 Philaretus 99
O O
Connor, W. 294 Donncll, J.R. 94,301,504 Odo Rigaldi 326 Ocstcrle, J.T. 223 O flier, U.S. 328
Phoroncus 40 Piccolomini, A.
144
Picmontc, G.A. 455, 463 Pike, J.F. 509
Oliva, C. 304
Oliver Sutton 89 J.J.
Iximbardus
Petrus dc Tarantasia 325-325
328
Obrador y Iknnassar, M. 6
Meara,
Petrus
484-487 Pctrus Mantuanus 408, 410, 411, 438 Petrus de Paludc 323, 325, 327-329 Petrus Pomponatius 144, 302-304 Petrus de Sancto Amore 55
Nielsen, L.O. 74, 263 Nict/schc, F. 156
O
101,
Petrus de Aquila 325 Petrus de Atarrabia 325
Niccolo da Rcggio 57 Nicolaus Orcsmc 141, 142, 175.
Oakley,
82,
80,
Petrus Alfonsi 29, 30 Petrus dc Alliaco 175, 480, 593 Petrus de Alvernia 419, 420, 422, 423, 632, 644
Newell, J.H. 275 I.
25.
215,331,338,339,440 Petrus de Abano 53, 68, 291
Nardi, B. 45, 304 C al-Nashshar, A.S. 265, 266 106 A. Ncgri,
Newton,
368
250,351,504 509,510 Pepin, J. 536,538 Perreiah.A. 408,409,412,413,645
M. 337
Mundhcnk,
J.
Pcgis, A.C. Peirce, C.S.
639
Pinborg,
J.
27,
261,
263,
264,
324, 407,
418, 419, 422, 426, 437, 441, 468, 549,
462
551, 552, 554-557, 589, 626, 632
Ori genes 46
M.L. 303, 304 46
Orpheus 42,48 Osier, M. 143
Pine,
Ottaviano, C. 638,640 Owen, G.E.L. 216 Owens, J. 521
Plantinga, A. 236, 241, 243 Plato 138, 40, 90, 127,
Piz/ani, U.
169, 249-252, 275, 277, 278, 393, 457, 481, 543, 559
Plinius 39
Plotinus 129, 130 Pluta, O. 229, 293, 429, 438, 645
Panaccio, C. 618, 623, 624
Panofsky, E. 285,290 Pantin, W.A. 89 Paravicini Bagliani, A.
149, 290, 342,
483
Plutarchus (Pseudo-) 27 Polos, L. 213
Parent, J.M. 275,277
Poole, R.L. 71, 275, 503
Parmenides 40
Poppi, A. 409 Porebski, S.A. 323
Paschctto, E. 147, 285
Passmore, J. 363 Paulus apostolus 249, 539, 540 Paulus Pergulensis 438, 439 Paulus Venetus 144, 407-415, 438
Porphyrius
41,
46,
100,
217,
238,
480,
481, 551, 566, 632, 634, 635, 637, 638, 639, 643, 644 Poser, H. 231
Index of Names Potthast, A.
148, 149
Robb, J.H. 399
Preaux, J. 97 Priscianus 26, 39, 102, 104, 504, 550 Proclus 458
Ptolemaeus (Claudius) Puig, J. 307
28, 32, 38, 285
M. 291 Pythagoras 41, 42, 47, 49 Quillet, J. 314,316,319 Quine, W.V.O. 450,453 Quintilianus 40 Qusta b. Liiqa 27, 41, 291 II.
202, 204-209, 259, 325, 580, 581
Robertus Kilwardby 56, 113-115 Rogerus Baco 107-110, 141, 264, 286, 325, 418
308
Radulphus Brito
419,
421, 423-426,
549-
552, 554-557, 632
Radulphus de Longo Campo 113 Radulphus Strodus 407, 408, 410, 411, 413, 415, 437, 438, 440, 443, 648, 652
Rahman, F. 65 Raimundus Lullus
Reina,
ME.
649, 652
Ronca, I. 331,334 Roos, H. 555, 636, 637
Russell, B.
Ruzsa,
Rhazes)
99,
180, 183, 185, 395,
430
(sive
W.D. 4,5,307,342
Roure, M.L. 590, 592, 595 Rufinus 46 Ruinart, Th. 43
285
Reale, G. 267
I.
498,501,622 213
Sabatier, P. 155
Sabra, A. 152,566
Remes, U. 222, 231 Remigius Altissiodorensis 97, 98, 462, 465, 466 N. Rescher, 231, 569 Rhabanus Maurus vide Hrabanus Maurus Ribeiro do Nascimento, C.A. 106 Ricardus Billingham 202, 407, 410-412 Ricardus de Bury 89 Ricardus de Campsall 374, 377, 378, 380, 384-386, 390, 391 Ricardus Conington 90 Ricardus Kilvington 229, 645, 648-650, 652, 654 Ricardus de Lavenham 407 Ricardus de Mediavilla 141, 325, 327 Ricardus Radulphi (sive FitzRalph, Arma-
Saffey,
H.D. 458
Salamucha, J. 628 Saliba, G. 68 Salter, H.E. 89 Salzinger,
I.
8
Sanchez Salor, E. 69 San Juan, Domingo de 592 Saxl, F. 290 Scarpa, L. 459 Schenkl,H. 307,344 Schepers, H. 183-185 Schmaus, M. 364, 365 Schmidt, R.W. 210-212, 214, 216-218 Schmitt, F. 365
Schneider,! 364,371 Schneider, J.H.J. 534 Scholz, H. 437 Schrimpf, G. 455, 461, 558 Schwegler, A. 72
chanus) 325, 374, 381, 382, 386, 387 Ricardus Rufus Cornubiensis 325 Ricardus Swyneshed 374, 480, 586 Richardson, H. 89 Richter, V. 180, 521, 609, 626, 628
Scott, T.K.
Riedl, J.O. 250
Servius 39, 100, 103
Riondato, E. 99
Sheffer,
Risner, F. 146, 150, 286 Ritter,
G.
Ritter, J.
12, 21,
294
23
261-
229, 374, 381, 382, 386, 387, 407, 410, 476, 586, 594, 648,
Rossi, P. 91, 127, 641
Randall, J.H. 302 Randi, E. 139,322,328 Rashed, R. 25
Ratramnus 456 Abu Bakr
161,
Rogerus Swyneshed
Ross, 3-11
Rajna, P. 44 Rand, E.K. 32,366
al-RazF,
250, 252, 253, 255, 256, 296,
Robbins, F.E. 457 Robertus Alyngton 586 Robertus Cowton 325 Robertus Fland 407 Robertus Grossatesta 55, 56, 90-92, 9496, 160, 161, 286, 288, 314, 440, 641 Robertus Grossatesta (Pseudo-) 56-59 Robertus Halifax 325 Robertus Holcot 140, 183-185, 196, 197,
Putscher,
Raabe,
667
424,428 Seneca (Lucius Annaeus) 59 Serene, E. 437, 638
H.M. 624
Sheldon-Williams, I.P. 463, 559, 463 Sheynin, O.B. 171, 179
Shoemaker,
S.
355
Index of Names
668
Siegel, R.E.
286 140,
141,
191,
192,
Thiel, C. 501
Thijssen, J.M.M.H.
636 Sigerus de Cortraco 421 Sigwart, C. 492, 501
Thirlkel,
140,
60,
163-170, 230,
307-309,
343,344 Sinner, J.R.
192,
249-256,
131,
195,
261,
90,
109-
133-137,
142,
14,
4,
130,
19,
210-218, 263,
222-228, 294-2%, 302-
304, 311, 313, 323, 325, 328, 344, 346, 273,
142,
119-126,
111,
J.
Simplicius
24
19,
W.R. 163
Thomas de Aquino
328 Siliceo, Martinez 598 Simmons, E.D. 4 Simon de Faverisham 419, 632 Sikes,
41, 571
Theophrastus
Sigerus de Brabantia
348,
349,
364-368,
383,
398,
400,
371,
374,
379,
381-
485-187, 489, 490, 521,
636
149
N. 549, 631, 637 Skutella, M. 535
Thomas de Argentina 325, 327 Thomas Bradwardinus 142, 575-578,
582,
Smith, A.M. 150, 151
583, 586, 592 Thomas Bricot
595,
Siraisi,
Smith, J.E. 510 Socrates 40
Soderhjelm, Solon 40
W.
30
Sorahji, R. 392
Soto,
590-592, 594, 596, 697
Domingo de
Southern, R.W. 504 229, 407, 450, 451, 478, 589, Spade, P.V. 592, 593, 595, 645, 648-651 Spath, R.J. 163 Spoerri,
M.Th. 106
W.H. 460 Steinschneider, M. 309 Stahl,
Stephanus
de
Aurelianis
(sive
Tempier)
138, 141
Thomas Thomas Thomas Thomas Thomas Thomas
594,
de Buckingham 325 liccleston 89 de Erfordia 419, 421, 422 de Sutton 364-372 de Wilton 190, 192-195 de Vio (si\ e Caietanus)
Trapp,
180, 187, 188, 263
li.
342
Trifogli, C.
Stiefel,T. 339
Troncarelli, F. 43
I-. 229, 324, 407, 410, 440, 477, 626, 638, 645, 648, 649, 652 Sudhoff, K. 56, 58
Stump,
al-Suhrawardi 271 62, 227, Sylla, E.D.
468-
Troupeau, G. Tusqucts,
Una 323,
374-376,
63,
68
3
Juarez, A. 468 S.
286
Unguru,
Urbanus VIII papa 144 Urbanus Averroista 632 Urso Salcrnitanus 98, 105
A.
261,
262,
264,
549,
550,
631,644 Tachau, K.M.
185,
258,
259,
264,
357,
Usener,
360, 362, 363, 374 Tarski, A. 518
Tatianus 40 Teisias 40 Tertullianus 44
Teske, R. 129 Tester, S.J. 32,366 Thaddaeus Alderottus 66, 99, 631, 637 Thaddaeus de Parma 192 Themistius 41, 307, 344, 347 Theodoricus Carnotensis 25, 97, 98, 100, 101
J.
381,
386,388,483,484,489,651
210,
213,214,217,223 Thorndike, L. 103 Thrasymachus 40 Tine, A. 638 Tobin, R.B. 503 Touati, C. 565
Stewart, H.F. 32,366
Tabarroni,
592,
588-590,
597, 598
II.
43
van Brakel, J. 171, 179 Vance, E. 623 Van den Bergh, S. 266, 312 Vanni Rovighi, S. 49 Van Riet, S. 65, 133, 521
Van Steenberghen,
F.
141
Varro (Marcus Terentius)
40, 49, 102
Veraart, A. 501
Verbeke, G. 294, 521 Vergilius (Publius V. Naso) Verhaak, C. 421 Vignaux, P. 628
39, 100, 103
Theodorus 40 Theodosius 27, 40
Vincentius Bellovacensis 56-59
Theophilus 99
Von Moos,
Vitelli,
H. 308,343 P. 503,
508
Index of Names von Wright, G.H. 231-233 Vuillemin-Diem, G. 641
Wiener, Wilks, Willis,
669
509
P.
M. 360, 361, JA. 459
374, 502, 508, 509
Wadding, L. 353,354 Waddings, L.W. 57
Wilson, B. 331 Wilson, C. 651
Wallace, W.A. 230
Wippel, J. 226,364,368 Witelo 146-154,258,262,285-292
Ward, J.O. 504 Webb, C.C.J. 333,503 Webering, D. 173, 179 Webert, J. 167 Wegerich, E. 522 Weidemann, H. 212, 216 Weijers, O. 13, 24, 113 Weisheipl, J. 4, Weiss, P. 509 Wenin, C. 641
8, 25,
Westerink, L.G. 458 Wetherbee, W. 276
Wey,J.C. 328,612 White, A. 465
Wiedemann,
E. 152
Wieland, W. 308 Wielockx, R. 366, 486
Wittgenstein, L. 355,358 Wolfson, H.A. 133, 265, 266 Wolter, A. 240,297,353,354
Wood,
R.
263,
342,
354,
361,
362,
374
Wundt, W.
492, 501
374, 483
Yates, F. 127 Yrjonsuuri, Zabell, S.
M.
229, 438, 645
171, 178
Zayid, S. 273
Zeno 42 Zimmermann, A. Zupko,
J.
392
14, 24, 184, 294,
524
373,
ISBN 95 1-9047-26-3 ISSN 0357-3095 Helsinki 1990
Yliopistopaino