Knowledge and the sciences in medieval philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.) Vol. 2

PUBLICATIONS OF LUTHER-AGRICOLA SOCIETY B

19

loo ;cvj

s

KNOWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN MEDIEVAL

PHILOSOPHY

PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (S.I.E.P.M.)

VOL.

II

Edited by

SIMO KNUUTTILA REIJO TYORINOJA

STEN EBBESEN

HELSINKI

1990

KNOWLEDGE AND THE SCIENCES IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY (S.I.E.P.M.)

Helsinki 24-29 August 1987

VOL.

II

Edited by

SIMO KNUUTTILA REIJO TYORINOJA

STEN EBBESEN

PUBLICATIONS OF LUTHER-AGRICOLA SOCIETY SERIES B HELSINKI

1990

19

HAY25W93 $, ISBN

951-9047-26-3

ISSN 0357-3095 Helsinki 1990

Yliopistopaino

PREFACE

The

Congress of Medieval Philosophy (Societe Etude de la Philosophic Medicvalc) was held in

International

Eighth

Internationale

pour

Helsinki, Finland, 24

1

-

29 August 1987. The general theme of the congress

was Knowledge and the Sciences

in

Medieval Philosophy. The program

consisted of plenary sessions with invited papers, sections with contrib

uted papers, and meetings of the commissions of the S.I.E.P.M. The titles of the sections were as follows: (1) The Origin of Medieval Notions of

and the Divisions of the Sciences, (2) Basic Epistemological Issues as Related to Medieval Conceptions of Science, (3) Trivium and the

Science

The Nature and Methods of Theoretical Sciences, (5) The Nature and Methods of Practical Sciences, (6) Theology as a Science, (7)

Sciences, (4)

New

Conceptions of Science

in

Late Medieval and Early Renaissance

Philosophy.

The

reports of the commissions have been published in the Bulletin de

Philosophic Medievale Invited papers

29 (1987), pp.

and 30 (1988), pp. 10-38.

12-70

and contributed papers are published

present three

in the

volume work, edited by the members of the program committee (Monika Asztalos, Sten Ebbesen, Dagfinn F^llesdal, Simo Knuuttila, Anja Inkeri Lehtinen, John E. Murdoch, Ilkka Niiniluoto) in collaboration with Reijo Toivo

Tyorinoja.

Holopainen

has

served

Volume I (Acta Philosophica Fennica, The contributed papers of the sections

as

assistant

to

the

editors.

vol. 48) contains the invited papers.

(Publications of Luther- Agricola Society,

(l)-(3) are included in

B

19).

Volume

III

volume

II

(Annals of the

Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics, 55) contains the contrib uted papers of the sections (4)-(7). All papers offered are published.

Every volume is provided with an index of manuscripts and an index of names. Ancient Greek and medieval Western names are in a Latin form.

The congress was

financially supported

by the Ministry of Education

of Finland, the Finnish Cultural Foundation, the

UNESCO,

and the University of Helsinki.

Helsinki, 15

The Editors

August 1990

Academy

of Finland, the

CONTENTS

Preface

Contents Section One. The Origin of Medieval Notions of Science and the Division of the Sciences

Walter

W. ARTUS, Two

Science Listings in the Writings of

Ramon

Llull

E.P. BOS, Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science C.S.F. BURNETT, Innovations in the Classification of the Sciences in the Twelfth Century ELIA Scnso e dimcnsione della reductio ad Francesco .

.

.

D

philosophiam uelle discipline matematiche nelle Institutiones di Cassiodoro Mario GRIGNASCHI, Le DC divisione philosophic de Domimcus Sextum Mctales Gundissalinus et Questiones II-V in Tandun de de Jean physiconun Danielle JACQUART, La notion d ingenium dans la medccine medievale Jean JOLIVET, Le jeu des sciences theoretiqucs selon Gilbert de .

62

Poitiers

Steven J. LIVESEY, John of Reading on the Subalternation of the Sciences Piero MORPURGO, I comment! salernitani zVCArticella Carlos Arthur RIBEIRO NASCIMENTO, L arbre de la

DO

philos(yphie

Olga WEIJERS,

106

L appellation

des sciences aux XII

C

des disciplines dans les classifications e siecles (resume) et XIII

113

Section Two. Basic Epistcmological Issues as Related to Medieval Conceptions of Science interpretation de la definition Veritas est adaequatio rci et jntcllectiis che/. St. Thomas d Aquin Bernardo Carlos BAZAN, Science, experience ct memoire Luca BIANCHI, Potcntia Dei absoluta: logique de la decouverte ou rhetorique de Pargumentation scientifique? Jer/y BURCHARDT, Les sources et les genres de la connaissance humaine d aprps Witelo Yasuo CHISAKA, Uber die Bedeutung der Erfahrung bei Fran/, von

Tomasz BARTEL, Nouyelle

.

.

Assisi

.

.

.

....

127

.....

138 146 1^5

Contents

vi

Theorie de la connaissance et dans la Somme TJicologiquc, la S. Thomas d Aquin Andre GODDU, The Dialectic of Certitude and Demonstrability among Fourteenth-Century Ockhamists Onorato GRASSI. The Object of Scientific Knowledge in Some Authors of trie Fourteenth Century Elzbieta JUNG-PALCZEWSKA Discussion on infmitas vigoris Dei in Averroists in the 13th and 14th Centuries Hcikki KIRJAVAINEN, Existential Presuppositions in Semantics According to Ockham and Holcot Gyula KLIMA, On Being and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas s Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science Simo KNUUTTILA, Nomic Necessities in Late Medieval Thought Martin KUSCH, Natural Necessity in William of Ockham Douglas C. LANGSTON, Scotus and Possible Worlds Thomas A. LOSONCY, Ideas as Evidence(s) for Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being Costantino MARMO, Gregory of Rimini: notitia intuitiva, species and Semiotics of Images Miklos MAROTH, Tasawwur and tasdlq John H. NEWELL Jr., Grammaticus et Ethicus: William of Conches Search for Order PASCHETTO, Perspectiva e conoscenza scientifica Eugenia nell opera di Witelo Olaf PLUTA, Das natiirliche Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit. eines Fall Arguments der mctaphysischcn Aufsticg und

Lambros

COULOUBARITSIS,

de Pars, Q. 84 de

scientificite

la

physique

.

.

....

.

Psychologic in der Philosophic des Mittelalters

Josep PUIG, Averroes and Aquinas on Physics VIII 1: A Search for the Roots of Dissent Jeannine QUILLET, Nicole Oresme et la science nouvclle dans le Livre da del el dii Monde Eugenio RANDI, Plurality of Worlds: Fourteenth-Century Theological Debates Italo RONCA, Reason and Faith in the Dragniaticon: The Problematic Relation between philosophica ratio and diuina .

paguia Cecilia

TRIFOGLI, The

Place of the Last Sphere

in

...

WHITE, Ockham and Hume

171

180 190 196

210 222 231

240

248 257 265 275 285

293 307

314 322 111 331

Late-Ancient

342

and Medieval Commentaries Question John F. WIPPEL, Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents (Quodlibet II, qu. 5) Rega WOOD, Calculating Grace: The Debate about Latitude of Forms According to Adam de Wodcham Jack ZUPKO, John Buridan On Abstraction and Universal G.

163

s

Cognition

351

364 373 392

Section Three. Trivium and the Sciences

Paul of Venice on Obligations: The Sources for both the Logica Mama and the Logica Parva Versions .... Naida Anna BACCIN, Homenis est poeta: un caso di predicazione E.J.

ASHWORTH,

secundum accidens Joel

BIARD, Verbes Albert de Saxe

.

cognitifs

et

appellation

de

la

407 416

forme selon 427

Contents

vii

BOH, Medieval Rules of Consequences and the Idea of Demonstrative Science Hartmut BRANDS, Die zwcifache Einteilung der formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood Marcia L. CQLISH, Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot s Conception of Nihil Angel D ORS, On Stump s Interpretation of Burley s De Ivan

...... ........ .........

obligationibus

Alvin P.

............... ................. ... De Occamensis

DOBSEVAGE,

Guillelmi

DONATI, Ancora una Egidio Romano

Silvia

dialectica

.

.

.......

HAAPARANTA, Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method Brian HENDLEY, A New Look at Jonn of Salisbury s Educational Leila

Theory

.................... von

KANN, Zur Gerhard KRIEGER, Christoph

445 455 468 479

volta sulla nozione di quantitas materiae

...... A

in

436

Sachsen Suppositionstheorie Alberts supponit simpliciter pro natiira". Der .

.

483 491

502 512

">Homo
ndon:

Oxford

Two

However, Llull s accounts of Demonstrativae^ recall

them

rather

Nichomachean

the

in

12

He

habits."

the

Ethics.

clearly as intellectual virtues,

acquired) qualities or

and of

"science"

Arils

distinction

Ramon

Science Listings in

11

5

Llull

an Introdiictoria

in

"art"

Aristotelian

In

and

account

another book he explains

though he

them

calls

"artificial

(i.e.,

thereby distinguishes them from innate

or spontaneously operative dispositions and inclinations, because science

and

are

art

normally In

acts.

appropriate

and

acquired

and

addition

and

intellectual virtues of science

retained

rightly,

any moral qualities and virtues

art with

or,

even

On

the distinction between science and

through repeated does not confuse the

only

Llull

with any purely physical non-intellectual operative habits.

less,

after noting that

art, just

people

sometimes use the terms interchangeably, Llull cautions that precision dictates that the distinction be clearly grasped because science has to do properly with

much knowledge,

entails

activities.

or

Its

rule or

is

object

make them

13

qua

"speculabilia

talia."

Art on the other hand, though

end concerns

the

in

"operable

things",

itself

it

with operations or

not in order simply to mirror,

present, within our minds but in order to have a cognitive

measure

suitable for their production. Art accomplishes this

by

determining the manner of their entitative being and of their execution or production. distinguishes

14

art

It

precisely this determining or regulative aspect that

is

as

such.

consider operations and of

course

"operable"

then

one prescinds from

If

"operable

instead

of

more complete

we have know it.

listings

original

Catalan

Doctrina

Pueril,

Ch.

1

in

numerous

s

language. The is

an

Raymundi

Haeffner, 1722), Vol.

and

earlier

ed.

of the

manual

Ivo

Ramon

"Ars

bilia 3, p.

...

56.

ut

enim

in

their

two books, a Libre de

of

instruction

Salzinger

(Mainz:

tr.

W.D.

Ross

i

Llull, Introductoria Artis,

14

the

are found in

for

young

Henry

George

(London:

Oxford

Llull, Arbre de Sciencia, part 5, 5, 5, ed. Tomas Joaquin Obrcs Essentials (Barcelona: Editorial Selecta, 1957), Vol. 1, p. 629.

in

at

3, p. 56.

Bk. VI, ch. 2, The Student s Oxford Aristotle, University Press, 1942), Vol. 5, 1139b, 17-18.

Artau

tasks,

both of them

extant

writings,

Opera,

looks

of the various bodies of knowledge,

encyclopedic

Lulli

which

science

by brief accounts of their nature

accompanied two of the author

one may indeed

it,

but in a speculative fashion. But

art,

but simply in order to

Llull s

things"

Vol.

3, p.

Carreras

i

56.

proprie est recta mensura operandi, et circa operationes et operaea regulet, et eis praefigat modum, aut determinet." Llull, Introductoria, Vol.

Artus

6

adolescents.

15

was

It

Dominic by name.

first

LlulPs

addressed by the author to his young son,

main intention

work was

the

in

make

to

young persons the essentials of knowledge for their age and order to determine rationally whether to go on with university studies or to attach themselves as apprentices to a master in some profession or available to in

The second of Llull s writings with a classification of the sciences 16 more learned and likewise encyclopedic Arbre de Sciencia. Above

trade. is

the

all

of scientific

notions

basic

of Science Llull aimed

in this Tree

else,

knowledge and at establishing and fundamental principles,

and methodology of his Art. Though the two listings or

many bodies

at unifying the

chapters their

in

its

many

all

in

conformity

with

the

principles

mentioned are

in

classifications

the

writings

just

and general agreement, there are two noticeable the order in which the various studies or disciplines, as

in basic

differences. First

well as their groupings, are given

is

not altogether the same. Secondly,

and contrary to what we may have expected, the accounts in the earlier Doctrina Pueril of the advanced university studies of philosophy and of medicine Arbre.

11

somewhat longer and more

are

The Doctrinal account

of

those

than

detailed

philosophy gives

us

a

in

division

the

of

the general speculative philosophy by acquainting us with the titles and content of the books which make up the Aristotelian corpus, exclusive of

the logical, ethical and poetical writings.

We "science"

have noted that

and

"art"

Llull

18

distinguished

on the basis of

their

directed to the truth of knowledge of what

knowledge in

for the sake of like

question,

uses the term liberal arts

of

Hugh

some St.

the

intellectual finalities:

distinct is

virtues

of

science

is

simply, art to the truth of

action or work. But in the two listings

Victor in the Didascalion,

19

he obviously

broadly so as to cover both the traditional seven

"science"

and a number of non-liberal

pursuits.

A

possible reason for

doing so was the recognition that, as an intellectual virtue, art consists 15

See

n.

2 above.

Already referred to above

in n. 12.

17

For the comparison see Ramon Llull, Libre de Doctrina Pueril, ed. M. Obrador and Arbre, part 5, 5, Bennassar (Barcelona: Gustau Gili, 1907), chs. 78-79, pp. 193-208 y 5, in

Obres, Vol.

18 Llull,

19

1,

pp. 632-33.

Doctrina, ch. 77, pp. 197-99.

"Mechanicae

septem

scientiae

agriculturam, venationem, medicinam, ch.

continet: thetricam."

lanificium,

Hugh

20 ed. C.H. Butimer (Washington: 1939), pp. 38-9.

of

St.

armaturam,

navigationem,

Victor, Didascalion, bk. 2,

Two

Science Listings

Ramon Hull

in

1

not principally, in knowledge, regulative of course of activities directed to ends other than simply knowledge. 20 In LlulPs book in great

of

if

measure,

instructions

chapters

on

to

each

young

people,

of

seven

the

on the

"mechanical

reader

the

has

clear

impression

well in at least one of them, for in

they

the classification with them,

it

names and

more necessary manual

in the

work,

are

singly,

considered

21

On

little

this

very

matter of the

differently. Starting

explains briefly a

pursuits. If the

number

of

author dealt with

was probably because they are not

it

major

young people be schooled that fashion they will be prepared

anywhere on the earth. manual or mechanical arts the Arbre proceeds a

first

separate

on the four

that

for a gainful occupation

them

short

across a single brief chapter

that

recommends

important. Indeed the author

the at that time

of

Even though none of them are explained

arts."

the

and

arts

we come

university disciplines of the day,

number

a

after liberal

exclusively

an extensive use of our bodily limbs and of instruments designed to assist our hands. Moreover they are directed primarily and almost exclusively to satisfying our physical wants and intellectual, since they entail

needs within society and individually. Probably to match the number of the traditional liberal arts, seven i.e., acquired non-liberal "artificial,"

are

arts

agriculture,

indicated:

or

iron-

metal-working,

toolmaking,

tailoring,

22 commerce, seamanship and knighthood.

In the Arbre the seven paragraph discussion of the mechanical arts is

followed by a slightly longer treatment of the traditional seven liberal 23 In the Doctrina which calls one of them 24 a "science," the latter

arts.

had been introduced briefly

In both writings however, the liberal arts are

first.

and the

explained in their traditional groupings of the trivium that

the

in

earlier

taken

quadrivium, except writing geometry up before arithmetic. Though concise, the explanations of the nature, task and purpose of each of the liberal arts show understanding and is

appreciation on the part of the author.

Separate chapters or (in the Arbre) paragraph-sections, briefly examining each of the four major bodies of systematic studies which 20

See note 14 above.

21 Llull,

Doctrina, ch. 79, p. 208.

Llull,

Arbre, part

22 23

5, 5, 5, in

Ibid., part 5, 5, 5, in

Obres, Vol.

Obres, Vol.

1,

1,

pp. 629-30.

pp. 630-32.

24

Namely astronomy.

Llull,

describes a mechanical art as

"a

Doctrina,

manual

ch.

lucrative

74,

p.

science,"

187.

In

p. 208.

chapter

79

the

Doctrina

Artus

sum and peak much of the

constituted the

of university post-baccalaureate or graduate

Mediaeval period into Modern times, 25 complete LlulPs enumeration of the sciences in the two works mentioned. In the Arbre they are taken up last and in this order: law or education during

late

jurisprudence, medicine, philosophy and theology.

names theology

other hand follows

and

philosophy)

medicine.

canon

27

The Doctrina on

and

The longer treatment

studies in the Doctrina suggest great interest

science

natural

civil

of

these

and a greater

the part of the author in the early part of his

life.

28

the

and

after the traditional liberal arts,

first,

both

law

with

26

it

(i.e.,

two

last

on

familiarity

At the same time

theology stands out clearly as the noblest science because it speaks of God s entitative interior and of His attributes and their immanent activity,

as well as of His

ad

extra

operations vis-a-vis created beings.

An

authentic science, theology begins with and has

the

truths

rational

Since

of faith.

basis

it

a

is

fact

main support

in

however, that creatures offer a

some demonstrative knowledge

for

its

29

of the

existence

and

Being within an actually sound philosophy, the 30 and theology cannot but be in harmonious agreement ultimately. Philosophy can and must assist the work of theology, defending and

perfections of the First latter

theological

strengthening

with

truths

some

understanding

whenever

possible and without forgetting the superiority of the truths of faith by reason of their divine source. History shows two things: a) philosophers

deprived of

Wcishcipl,

26

faith,

op.cit.,

Part 5, 5, 5, Vol.

Plato and Aristotle, have failed to arrive at an

e.g.,

pp. 143-44.

1,

pp. 632-33.

Chs. 75-78, pp. 189, 191, 193, 200.

28

in Actually Llull had an interest and familiarity with all four disciplines early that as evidenced by his efforts to apply the principles of the Art to all four. I reason he wrote a Liber Principiorum Theologiae, a Liber Principiorum Philosophiae a Liber ftincipiorum Juris and a Liber Principiorum Mcdicinae. liach of these works may -"or

life,

,

be

read

in

Ravmundi

Lulli

Opera,

Ivo

ed.

Sal/.ingcr

(Main?.:

John George Haeffner,

Hook on

the Principles of

Selected Writings of Ramon Llull, tr. and ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), Vol. 2, pp. 1119-1214.

Anthony Bonncr

1721),

Vol.

Medicine

may be

The

607-813.

pp.

1,

read

first

LInglish

version of The

in

de Deu en quant la sua essencia, proprietats, dignitats e les mateix e en les creatures." Arbre, part 5, 5, 5, in Obres, Vol. 1, p. 633. Theologia est finis omnium aliarum scientiarum, utpote tractans de ultimo fine, et est impressio summae sapientiae, per finem enim judicatur de iis, quae sunt ad finem." "Lo

tcolcg

parla

obres que ha en

Llull, Introductoria, "...

per

asso

si

Vol.

3, p.

57.

theologia

Doctrina, ch. 75, p. 190.

se

cove

a

la

filosofia,

qui

es

ciencia

natural."

Llull,

Two

Science Listings

Ramon Hull

in

9

31 adequate knowledge of the First Being; b) theology has been developed two valid rise to either a scriptural or positive along ways giving

The

theology or to a dialectical or discursive one.

kind of theology

latter

has been engaged in mainly by philosopher-theologians. 32

Of philosophy of

33

first

things in

reality

declares that

Llull

itself

its

By means

science

this

knowledge of the

of

"first

Being or God.

First

of the whole

therefore

of

34 simply out of love for the truth.

after

sought

principles,

of

science

a

principles),

(i.e.,

the universal science

is

it

we rise even to some This we can accomplish only on

things"

35

the basis of our prior knowledge of beings that are the effects of the "first

things,"

God

of which

the

first

principles.

with

us

the 36

significant

of the various

objects

are the visible effects of

world"

"the

distinct

The innumerable

absolutely the First One.

is

we designate Of them the more

beings that together

and numerous provide

departments of speculative

with which Llull acquaints us on the basis of

philosophy

1

Aristotelian

much

of the

course first the order of corpus? Metaphysics importance since not only is it the science of the basic notions common to all science, but also a science of the first realities and of the First of

is

in

Being through reason alone. Without entering into discussions on the various parts of philosophy, the Arbre notes in

its

classification that the

things of which philosophy speaks are the subject matter developed

first

in its

"natural

not

are

trees."

Other

"trees,"

e.g.,

the moral and imperial ones, 38

of speculative philosophy. Yet their inclusion within the

parts

Arbre proves that Llull was not ignorant of moral or practical philosophy.

no pogren,

conexensa de "...

e

Plato

e

"Aristotil

fe

Deu

per

e

"...

..."

un

los

a^o

34

delectacio pusca ...

"En

coses

...

ama

es,

aver conexensa de Deu sens que poguessen aver declaradament

volfen

qui

enteniment

....

han

filosofs

Arbre, part

E

per

major

5, 5, 5, in

ac.6

lo

de

les

Deu."

Loc.

delectacio

Obres, Vol.

cit.

que

altres,

les

coses

que

an

consira

filosof

los

per

co

633.

1, p.

Llull,

la

veritat

Arbre, part

5, 5, 5, in

coses

per

Obres, Vol.

1, p.

c_o

primeres

e

"Scientiae

aquell

saber

633.

enten lo philosof ... e tracta de les primeres coses a quis sustancies spirituals ... per so que pusque venir atrobar primera e terrenal infinida, complida, qui sia primera causa e fi de totes

les

espiritual

36

Llull,

Llull,

saber

haver."

e aquest es

37

filosofs

lur

metafisica

cove esser, so substancia

alt

cit.

filosof

"Lo

teologs ..."

universal

habit

Loc.

tant

ne de ses obres ne de so perque horn va a

car atenycn de necessitat

reals

altrcs

los

pujar

fill,

Deu."

Llull,

enim dividuntur

Doctrina, ch. 77, pp. 197-98. ut

res."

Llull, Introditctoria,

Doctrina, ch. 77, pp. 197-99.

TO

See parts 6-7 of Arbre

in

Obres, Vol.

1,

pp. 635-74.

Vol.

3, p. 56.

Artus

10

The two remaining classifications

Law

humans

peace, to the end that

must be constructed so as for the public

to

good between canon and particular

made

live

harmony and

in

to insure that

common good and civil

each member

Arbre

classification.

s

41 and, emperor and pope and an "apostolic" "imperial"

later

in

own The good.

common

law briefly taken up

to

Particular laws

of society care and

not simply for their

of the

exclusion

the

in the

orderly

already noted.

faithfully carry out 40

towards one another and before God.

their obligations

explicitly

we have

has to do with the principles of justice and of

or jurisprudence

work

39

Llull s

in

listed

disciplines

university

are jurisprudence and medicine,

the

in

Doctrina

we have an

Instead

parts,

private or distinction

the

not

is

allusion

an

of

development

"trees."

Other writings intended Art demonstrate Lullian the the

medical the

explains

knowledge essential

of

to establish medicine Llull s

42

his

day.

of

character

In

on the foundations of

and modest

interest

the Arbre

medicine

as

a

s

familiarity with

he

classification

body

of knowledge

touching on things necessary for health, as well as for the prevention 43 Since a great measure of its concern is and cure of possible illnesses. with the causes of health and disease, medicine presupposes and requires in natural acquaintance with a number of principles and truths established 44 But of course medicine calls also for a great deal philosophy or science. of experience and observations in order to see how general scientific

principles apply to particular cases.

45

bodies of knowledge are clearly of a the result and sufficiently sound grasp characteristic of a orderly cultured and well-educated person. We have seen first of all that he was aware of the strict distinction between science and art and that he Llull s classifications of the various

the moral recognized their intellectual character, different from that of virtues. Conscious however of a wider usage wherein "science" and

"art"

are interchangeable he chose this wider usage in the classifications 39

Sec Doctrina, chs. Obres, Vol. 1, p. 632. 40 Arbre, part

Llull,

41

42

Loc.

See

Llull,

AS

78,

pp.

191,

200.

Also

5, 5, 5, in

Obres, Vol.

1,

p. 632.

5, 5, 5, in

Obres, Vol.

1,

pp. 632-33.

cit.

n.

43 44

76,

28 above.

Arbre, part

Loc.

cit.

Loc.

cit.

Llull,

Arbre,

part

5,

5,

5,

we in

Two have

alluded

writings

to.

With

basically

yield

that

Ramon Hull

understanding

mechanical

needs generally

the

traditional

in

trivium

developing more more advanced

arts,

and

48

quadrivium,

man s

important

for

arts

of

satisfy

b) the liberal arts of

which

man

assist

rational cognitive nature;

distinct

studies

university

Obviously given

the

who must

beings 47

others;

49

theology.

a)

disciplines:

particularly

human

community with

effectively his

both

in

46

meeting the physical needs and wants of their

11

classifications

his

same three groups of

the

or

non-liberal

manual,

Science Listings in

medicine,

law,

ultimate destiny and

philosophy

more

in

c) the

and

particularly

the nobility of the object studied in theology, as well as the source and basis of

its

highest teachings, required that the Christian Llull declared

the highest and objectively most important science. 50

of the purely

human

On

it

the other hand,

studies philosophy in at least

its highest part, i.e., metaphysics, must be seen as highest by reason of the universal scope of its

object

which allows

philosophical theology.

to

it

The

help in the construction

of a

dialectical

value and significance lastly of the studies of

law and medicine can and must be gauged by their contribution, in theory and in practice, to the better understanding and realization of man s well-being, physically

the well-being of

and

man

socially.

It

by reason of

is

and teachings of philosophy, especially the parts of natural philosophy and philosophical anthropology. 51

St.

John

46 Llull, "...

s

University,

per donar sustentacio a vida Doctrina,

Llull,

chs.

concern with

it

we name today

New York

Doctrina, ch. 79, p. 208; Arbre, part

48

their

that they have to take into account the principles

73-4,

5, 5, 5, in

corporal."

pp.

Obres, Vol.

1,

pp. 628-30.

Llull, Doctrina, ch. 79, p. 208.

183-88;

Arbre,

part

5,

5,

5,

in

Obres,

Vol.

1,

pp. 630-32.

4Q Llull,

Doctrina, chs. 75-78, pp. 189-208.

est finis omnium scicntiarum, utpote tractans de ultimo fine, et est "Theologia impressio summae sapientiae." Llull, Introductoria Vol. 3, p. 57. "On aquesta sciencia de theologia ... cs pus noble sciencia que totes les altres." Llull, Doctrina, ch. 75, p. 189. ,

One may wonder why Llull did not include his Art on either of the two lists which we have examined. Probably because the lists were meant to include bodies of knowledge generally accepted by the learned world at large. This was not the case of course with the Art that he himself had developed, though he desired that it be so accepted.

BOS

E.P.

Marsilius of Inghcn on the Subject of a Science

1

.

Introduction

1340-1396

(shortly

before

who

discussed

Marsilius

of Inghcn

medieval

philosophers

(subiectum scientific), or, to express

of the

first

or

first

)

was one of the many

notion

the

science

and proper

1

it

of the

more

of

subject

a

precisely, the notion

and adequate subject of a science 2

proprium or primum et adaequatum scientiae) The the fundamental characteristics of the notion formulated thinkers medieval and determined its nature. They referred to Aristotle as the one who had et

primum

(subiectum

the developed this notion; indeed, we find the idea developed (under in s Aristotle to to Greek term hypokcirnenon ) especially genos 3 Aristotle s and Posterior Analytics*. In accordance with Metaphysics

some

terminology,

subiectum

of

the

medieval

spoke

philosophers

of

a

genus

.

With the help of the notion

subject

of a

science

the

medieval

of the unity of a philosophers primarily tried to determine the foundation from another. differed science one in what science and, as a result, way

What was

the bearer of the science, or, to use another medieval phrase,

what was

its

5

(natural) place

knowledge of one a collection

See

of Terms 2

See

Cuyk

e.g.

quaestio !

single conclusion, in

ii, f.

Marsilius

in

St.

Agatha,

of

Bos

define scientia its

Marsilius

in:

Inghen,

full

and X, I,

of Inghen,

in

(

science

)

as the

The question was:

Treatises

on the Properties

Quaestiones in Aristotelis Physicam, in manuscript (Monastery of the Crutched Friars) C 12,

4.

7 and

John Buridan, Quaestiones

especially required

sense the term referred to

2rb.

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, e.g.

The problem

Kruisherenklooster

Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 3

See

?

of things known, notably of conclusions.

Ritter, 1921: pp. 7-15; 6-9. ..., ed. 1983: pp.

en

1

)

because, although one could

attention

1

(locus

I,

9.

Physicam,

I,

quaestio

ii, f.

3ra.

Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science

what

the

is

among

place

central

notion

13

from which a science derives

other sciences and other characteristics?

its

unity,

its

6

problem of the two present diverging views on the status of the subiecturn scientiae which were upheld in the Middle In the present contribution

subject of a science in general;

Ages and which may serve interpretation ( 2). Then I order

do

to

it

so,

is

as

I

shall,

a background

the

elucidate

to

way

of

interpretation

the

own view

3).

(

In

fundamental

Marsilius

which he distinguishes between

in

the level of thought and the level of things

Marsilius

understand Marsilius

to

discuss Marsilius

shall

necessary viz.

philosophical viewpoint,

discuss the

first,

shall

I

subiectum

3.1).

(

Then

I

shall discuss

from some of

scientiae

his

works on natural philosophy. I have chosen some of his commentaries on one of the two versions of his Commentary (questions) on

Aristotle:

Aristotle s

mundo

8

his

Physics^,

and

his

Commentary

9

corruptione

3.2).

(

Commentary

A

on

(questions)

next section

on

(questions)

De

the

De

caelo

et

generatione

et

the

devoted to Marsilius

is

view on the

problem found in his Commentary (questions) on the Sentences, where he seems to put a different emphasis in his interpretation of the nature of the subiectum scientiae, which

nature between science) and e.g.

is

the result,

Viz.

the

lra-123ra.

science,

which

is

on the one hand, as opposed to speculative ( 3.3), on the other. A (

4).

3.3

version

in

preserved

ms Cuyk en

St.

Agatha, Kruisherenklooster

C

12,

ff.

manuscript, see De Rijk and Weycrs, 1981: pp. 7-17. Marsilius other commentary (questions) preserved in ms

For a description of

Markowski (1973) describes Vienna, 6.N.B., V.P.L. 5437, in this

of the differences in

logic (a practical science)

natural

See below,

feel,

theology (primarily a speculative, but also a practical

conclusion winds up this contribution

1

I

this

ff.

68ra-141ra (the

first

six

books have been handed down

manuscript). For a discussion of the authenticity, see Bos, 1979.

o

Preserved

in

the authenticity,

9

ms Cuyk en cf.

Bos, 1979.

Ed. Venetiis, 1505.

St.

Agatha, Kniisherenklooster

C

12,

ff.

125ra-171vb.

For

Bos

14

2. Ttie

problem of the first subject of a science

medieval thinker accepted the notion of one single subject of a will be science (which was not, by the way, accepted by everyone, as 10 this kind what arose the subject of thing problem pointed out below ), of a science was. Thirteenth and fourteenth century philosophers largely formal its differed on this, though they agreed, by and large, on

If

a

viz.

characteristics,

to

function

its

one science from another

distinguish

of

First

all,

human

bearer of the science should be the of

subject

was not understood

science

a

to

science,

etcetera.

11 was generally denied

it

the

to

unity

give

the subiectum

that

Taken

soul.

one

belonging to

as

the

as

in this sense, the

single

science: for one soul could possess many sciences. views on the nature of the Secondly, there were two diverging

subiectum.

12

John Duns Scotus

was a

subject of a science

man in human the

thing in reality outside the

God

the case of biology or theology, though the

first

its

human

case of theology.

in the

human mind

God) by

subject (viz.

1265-1308/9) held the view that the

(ca.

is

hampered

13

in its

soul, e.g. a

Even

our

in

knowledge of

to imperfect powers, a theologian tries 14

out of God. unfold, so to speak, the theological truths Another opinion was that the subiectum scientiae

general term, known by an a

in

studied

Thomas Aquinas word

:

all

in

science

and that

intellect,

certain

a

15

(1245-1274).

This

unity.

The

it

subject of

all

comprehends is

opinion

grammar,

names, verbs, particles etcetera have

adjectival

was the most

e.g.

objects

of

that

for example,

common

in

is

that

they are words.

10

See

3.3.

E.g.

by William

11

Ockham,

of

see

his

Ordinatio,

book

I,

qu.

IX,

ed.

1967:

pp.

views

on

246-250.

12

Marsilius

gives

a

catalogue

the subject of theology 19vb. 13

his

in

Duns Scotus focussed

as science

and extrapolated

his

(which

Texts

in

Zimmerman,

very

precise)

of

Commentary on the Sentences, book

interest,

it

seems

this reconstruction to

14 For a recent discussion on Duns Scotus as for literature, see Krop, 1987, esp. pp. 33-47. 15

not

is

1965: pp. 160

ff.,

to

me,

on

different I,

qu.

ii

ed.

reconstructing

1501,

f.

theology

other sciences.

view on the subject of a science, as well

notably pp. 162-163.

Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science

3.

15

Marsilius of Inghen on the subject of a science

After these introductory remarks

view on the

I

shall

now

discuss Marsilius of Inghen

subject of a science. This view can be found in

first

many

s

of

his works.

A

should

distinction

the

of

characteristics

made between what

be

and

notion,

its

I

formal

the

call

With the same formal

nature.

characteristics in hand, Marsilius determines the nature of the subiectum scientiae

with

sciences

for

differently

a

of

nature

its

between

shall distinguish

I

nature

different

some

speculative or, at least partly, practical, in

sense). In

either

(viz.

my

discussion

works on natural philosophy

his

notably contained in his Commentaries on Aristotle (written in the late 1360ies in Paris, or partly in Heidelberg) and his voluminous theological

Commentary on

the Sentences (completed in 1394 in Heidelberg), because

Marsilius determines the nature of the subiectum scientiae differently in both groups of commentaries.

Before entering into a discussion of the formal characteristics of the

let

subiectum,

us,

first,

about

something

say

Marsilius

philosophical outlook which dominates the problem, that

which he distinguishes between the

level

and the

of thought

general

the

is,

way level

in

of

things (his nominalism).

3.1. Tfie level

of thought and the

All kinds of knowledge, that as

well

as

individual

intellectual

is

of things

both knowledge acquired by the senses, are

knowledge material,

(both

things

level

such

acts,

as

16

Marsilius

cows,

says,

men,

etcetera,

about

and

immaterial, such as emotions, acts of knowledge, etcetera). Things of a

general realities.

nature,

such

Generality

of spoken

Platonic

as

17 is

Ideas,

do not

independent

and written terms. These contents of thought can refer to

individual things in the outside world.

Now

Marsilius distinguishes sharply

See Marsilius of Inghen, Commentary on the Sentences, book

Not even

as

exist

a property of concepts, or, subordinate of these,

God.

I,

qu.

ii,

f.

lOrb.

and fourteenth century view that in general God Ideas only exist as thought objects, which have a lesser kind of existence than substances, which have real existence. See for Ockham s view e.g. Maurer, 1976; Bos, 1984/5.

in

It

is

a

thirteenth

Bos

16

thought and the level of things. Those philosophers ascribe generality to mental terms of nouns are called nominalists

between the

who in

level of

the Middle

nomen

noun

(

Ages (because the

a property of the mental

is

universality

though there are different degrees

)),

which they draw

in

this distinction.

This distinction

is

used separately, terms have signification refer

to

some

at

anything existing

to Marsilius

According

place.

of signification occurs only in

in

so far as

Though

time

some

or

(suppositio), or, in

Marsilius

is

modern terms and

not as radical an extensionalist as e.g.

18

he emphasi/es that the generally connoted by Ockham, Sortes is white is not to be found in reality.

formal

In

Commentary

on

(questions)

Aristotle s

defines subiectum as opposed to obiectum intellect

20

Pliysics

19

This

is

one of the works

).

characteristics

in

of the subiectum disposition

from a book on physics;

21

(

in

The

primum. He

(habitus)

in all

which

is

clearly

an object to an

Commentary

on

the

which Marsilius discusses the formal that

says

scientia

can be

about one single conclusion,

more commonly,

conclusions contained

Marsilius

Physics

that

traditional.

is

opposition

interpreted as a

manv

white

e.g.

characteristics of the subject of a science

3.2. Tlie

his

particular

view, reference to things in the

applicable to Marsilius

is

it

(significalio),

particular

When

but they do not

and contemporary logicians the latter kind a proposition, in which it is explained in

terms of the theory of supposition

outside world.

theory of truth.

also reflected in Marsilius

e.g.

however, as a disposition of

books of the science.

Now

the question

18 to advocate that the predicate term extensionally E.g. Marsilius docs not seem refers to things in the outside world, but rather that it connotes an aspect under which the thing, or things, referred to by the subject term is (are) considered; e.g. in term white brings to the mind the concept of white Socrates is white the

predicate ness (existing individually in Socrates) under which Socrates is considered: see Marsilius of Inghen, Treatises on the Properties of Terms ..., ed. 1983: esp. p. 128).

Bos

in:

19 Note that obiectum has another meaning than the word object which can e.g. be taken to refer to things in the world outside the human subject without reference to an intellect. In

21

ms Cuyk en

See

Marsilius

Kruisherenklooster,

St.

Agatha, Kruisherenklooster

of

C

Inghen,

12,

f.

2vb.

in

C

12,

quaestio

ii,

in

f.

Physicam, Quaestiones As often in the Middle Ages,

conclusions contained in books, esp. by Aristotle.

2ra

f.

ms Cuyk en science

is

St.

Agatha,

knowledge of

Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science

17

which conclusions are proved? matter and form, a quantity of water, a bundle of straw or a heap of stones, but it is a unity of attribution order (ordo), like in an army everything is directed (attributio) or is

what causes the unity of the science

This unity

is

not that of

in

e.g.

towards a leader, Marsilius says. All things studied in a science are thus related to the first subject. The exact nature of the subiectum scientiae

whether

(viz.

it is

a thing, or concept) remains to be determined.

on Aristotle

In the other commentaries

same view on the formal shall

characteristics of the

these characteristics by

list

Marsilius

works,

his

viz.

(

subject of a science

.

I

of an example drawn from one of

way

Commentary

generatione et corruptione: the

formam

works Marsilius holds the

s

of this science

subject

being moving towards a form

on

(questions)

is

Aristotle s

De

ens mobile

ad

This concept bears the science

).

which investigates generation and corruption and all objects studied are brought into relation with it. These formal characteristics can be found in different places of Marsilius works. It

1.

is

the most general concept that can be said of

objects studied in this science. E.g. that they are in

view,

movement towards

it

all

principal

can be said of a cow or a horse

a form.

the subject of a science in fact

is

22

So, as

I

interpret Marsilius

a predicate term that can be

said of the principal objects which, in turn, are the subject terms (e.g. this

horse

is

a being

moving towards a form

etcetera).

All objects of this science are related to this subject (here the

2.

called the subiectum attributionis}?^

subiectum scientiae

is

principal objects as

mentioned under characteristic

or

parts,

negations

of

these

principal

objects.

1

Not only the

are meant, but also

For

science

the

on

generation and corruption also studies bones, blood (which are parts of the subject) and rotten organisms (which are negations of the subject).

See Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones

in

Cuyk en St. Agatha, Kruishcrenklooster C book I, qu. ii, ed. 1501: f. 19va. 23

See

Marsilius

ed.

of

Inghen,

1505, f. 65rb; Agatha, Kruisherenklooster ii, ed. 1501, f. 19va.

qu.

i,

id.,

C

De

12,

f.

caelo

et

125va;

mundo, book I, Commentary on

qu. the

1,

in

Quaestiones in De generatione et corruptione, book Quaestiones in Physicam, book I, qu. i, ms Cuyk en

12,

f.

3ra;

id.,

Commentary on

the

Sentences,

ms

Sentences,

book

I,

I,

St.

qu.

Bos

18

The

3.

24

for, as

science,

being moving towards a form

subject

has been said,

all

gives

the

unity to

objects are related to this subject. 25

The subject does not exceed the borders (mete) of the science. one subject is not at the same time the subject of another

4.

This implies:

The

science.

on

science

generation

and

is

corruption

a

necessary

discipline, not superfluous.

The

5.

known

being moving towards a form

subject

in the science,

27

that

the term

is

26

first

not in a chronological, but in the logical tries to demonstrate the

is,

sense. The science on generation and corruption essential properties of the subject.

The

6.

can supposit for

The

7.

The

3.3.

a sign, which can refer to (or, in technical terms

is

subject

other things.

)

subject

is

primarily a mental term.

of the

nature

28

of a

subject

29

science

on

works

Marsilius

in

natural philosophy

These are the main formal conceives

Marsilius

characteristics of the subject of a science as

works

the

In

it.

mentioned

which

above,

are

commentaries on Aristotle and works on natural philosophy, and therefore he seems to follow Buridan (ca. 13(X)- shortly after speculative sciences, 30

1358).

It

noted

should be

in

that

view the subject of a

Marsilius

with science is the subicctum attributionis. Though he compares a science an army in which all elements are ordered towards the leader, the subject consideration by which a scientist studies he is primarily the way of 24

en

Sec St.

qu. 25 I,

ms Cuyk in Marsilius of Inghen, Quacstiones in Physicam, book I, qu. i, book f. 2vh; id., Commentary on the Sentences, Agatha, Kruisherenkloostcr C 12, article v, ed. 1501,

ii,

19ra-rb.

ff.

See Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones

Agatha, Kruistercnklooster 19va. qu. ii, ed 1501, f. 26

27 qu.

28 29

Marsilius says terminus

See i,

Marsilius

ed. 1505,

f.

of

65 rb;

See f.

f.

,

f.

id.,

of

2vb;

in

Physicam, book

Commentary on

id.,

where we would say object Quacstiones

Commentary on

in

I,

qu.

in

book

ms Cuyk en

St.

I,

.

De generation

the Sentences,

i,

the Sentences,

book

I,

qu.

et ii,

corruption,

ed. 1501,

f.

book

I,

19va.

27.

Inghen,

Commentary

on

the

Sentences,

book

I,

qu.

ii,

ed.

19va.

See

1509,

Marsilius

12,

Inghen,

For references, see note

1501,

30

C

John

3ra.

Buridan,

Quaestiones

in

Physicam,

book

I,

qu.

ii,

conclusion

vii,

ed.

Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science

objects. Attribution

considerare

in

here to the concept. Often, Marsilius uses the term

is

this

19

E.g.

respect.

Commentary on

his

in

Marsilius

et

Aristotle s

that

De

natural

repeatedly says comiptione science which considers things in so far as they are mobile. So the subject of a science is a concept which can supposit for

generatione

a

is

philosophy

human

things in the world outside the

intellect.

In his commentaries on Aristotle

works mentioned above Marsilius

s

advocates the conception of the subject according to which emphasis is laid on the way of consideration by the intellect, though he used different intellect

comparisons to elucidate the notion. This consideration by the is also advocated by e.g. Thomas Aquinas. E.g. we may also find

comparison of the way a science obtains unity with the unity

Marsilius

of sense-knowledge.

Marsilius

also

uses

the

31

There

analogy, like Buridan.

notion

a kind

of

a kind of analogy between the objects

is

and the subject of a science,

of unity by attribution,

just

urine

as

food

or

is

healthy in

an

analogous way to the health of a natural body, to which food and urine are related. This kind of subject as the subiectum attribulionis, can already be found in

nature of the

Tlie

3.4.

Henry of Ghent (1200(?)-1296).

subject

of a science

Marsilius

in

Commentary

on the Sentences

his Commentary on the Sentences Marsilius seems to advocate the same view on the subject of a science but when he discusses the unity

In

;

of theology, of

article

in

which he

question

ii

is

book

of

interpretation

comes forward.

In

Commentary on

define

his

the

science.

that logic goal:

the

of theology,

interested I

to

that 32

it,

Sentences

and

its

the

devotes a separate

another

Marsilius

function

for

emphasis

primarily the

unity

in

his

tries

to

of the

concludes that theology and other sciences (note, however, his other example) are one because these sciences have one

is

God

theology

subject

He

so

is

tells

the goal of

men how

human

beings on their way to Paradise, and

to obtain eternal blessedness. In logic everything

For a recent discussion on the subject of physics, see Thijssen, 1987, 3.1.1.3, pp. 101-104.

See reference

in

note 22.

his

Bos

20

is

argument. In Marsilius view, logic is practical things with a view to use them to advance other

studied to frame an

because

studies

it

sciences.

33

This

science

in

everything

of

interpretation is

studied

to

as

siibiectum

the

obtain

whereby

goal,

another

is

something,

in Marsilius work. interpretation of the nature of the siibiectum sdentiae No doubt this interpretation is suggested by the problem of the nature of

Though

theology. speculative,

and

according

secondarily a

Marsilius

to

practical

is

theology

science,

that

is:

a

primarily is

it

primarily

knowledge, and secondarily to learn how to obtain eternal blessedness, everything in theology is directed to God, that which every directed

to

theologian included, tries to attain.

the

being,

He

says:

The

complete

in the proper sense goal of the Bible and theology immediately and

man

s

obtain blessedness It

its

how

salvation, vi/.

viatores,

i.e.

men on

their

way

is

to Paradise, can

34 .

should be noted that John Buridan defines ethics with regard to

goal: in practical sciences the goal

is

the formal basis of consideration

5

(ratio

fonnalis considerandi)? could think that Marsilius changed his view on the nature of of a science in his later works. I prefer to think that the

One

the subject a real existing, individual very nature of theology, which is about God, of theology) thing and the goal of human life (in Marsilius conception

brought Marsilius to a view different from Aristotle.

The other example

Sentences, to

is

logic:

his

commentaries on

Commentary on

Marsilius uses in his

the

he conceives of logic as a practical science, directed

frame arguments to advance other sciences:

of logic

earlier

syllogism

is

the

I,

qu.

subject

36 .

33

Sec Marsilius of Inghcn, Quacstiones in librum Porphyrii, Vienna, O.N.B., V.P.L. 4998, ff. 3va^rb. 34 Marsilius of Inghen, Commentary on the Sentences, book

book

I,

i,

in

ms

qu.

ii,

ed.

1501,

f.

qu.

ii,

ed.

1501,

f.

20ra.

35

36

John Buridan, Quaestiones Marsilius

19va.

of

Inghen,

in

Ethicam, book

Commentary on

I,

the

qu.

i,

ed. 1509,

f.

4vb.

Sentences, book

I,

Marsilius of Inghcn on the Subject of a Science

and William of Ockham on

Marsilius of Inghcn

3.5.

21

the

subject

of a

science

In respect of the problem discussed in this paper, Marsilius differs from

Ockham

whereas the is

latter

of a conclusion

the subject sciences

many science

is

to

who

ask

So there are

as

sense,

case,

in

for the unity science:

king of the world,

the

is

Taken

conclusions.

one can not ask

says,

science.

that

in

But one can also speak of science as a collection of things known. But in that

are

this

one.

numerically viz.

known

each

there

as

broader sense,

Ockham

former does acknowledge the unity of a science, docs not. Ockham says that the subject of a science 37

the

that

in

or

it

is

in

a

equally absurd

of Christianity:

there

for

is

none. conclusions of a science, however, there can be a certain

Among

order, either according to the subject terms, or to the predicate terms,

An

or both.

same

the

example of an order according

proved

term,

subject

hierarchic

a

in

terms

predicate

a geometrical figure,

e.g.

order,

ordered

are

to predicate

e.g.

line,

according

Ockhamist

complexity.

An

Ockham,

,

,

,

reasonable

is

The

can be proved of animal man this man to both and ordering according subject predicate terms would often given only few examples), e.g. animal is a sensitive

An

be (Ockham

man

are

properties

according to

of

properties can be proved of subject terms in a hierarchic

sensitive animal

order. E.g. etcetera.

is,

when

is

quadrangle.

increasing

example of an order according to subject terms

when common

many

triangle,

to

terms

in

In

.

strict

any

this

respect,

Marsilius

cannot be labelled an

sense as well as in others indicated by Ritter

(1921).

In his

Commentary on

can have an unity

is

the Sentences

strict

sense.

according to changing aspects.

more says,

difficult

insofar

possess this,

to

as

infused

determine, all

faith

it

Christians (fides

There

The

Ockham

denies that a science

only a unity of collection

is

difference

between the sciences

seems. Theology has a unity,

and

infusa}.

therefore Marsilius

all

Christian

is

Ockham

theologians

certainly does not deny

but he goes further than Ockham: he also acknowledges unity on the

objective side of the science (viz. in acquired faith (fides acquisita}).

William prologue, qu.

of

Ockham, Scriptum

ix,

ed. 1967, pp. 247-248.

in

librum

primum

Sententiarum.

Ordinatio,

book

I,

Bos

22

In 38

Prologue to

the

Ockham

logic

his

formulates

Commentary

the subiectum

interprets the problem of the

of

causes efficient

cause

is

of logic

in

on the books of another way: he

the problem of the

as

causes:

the

Aristotle; the final cause are acts of knowledge.

The

Then,

logic.

subject

(expositio)

of logic

he

two

are

there

says,

of course: subject cannot be the formal cause, not does Ockham in the accept. way unity

external

this

would give

logic a

Conclusion

4.

Marsilius of Inghen is not a very original parts of his philosophy others in important respects, but he also on thinker: he not only depends and theologians which arc of other to combine In

many

tries

opinions

sometimes hard

to

dependent

on

combine. In

Buridan,

at

philosophers view of the subiectum scientiae he

is

his

least

as

regards

sciences.

natural

In

his

of a science as a Commentary on the Sentences he interprets the subject

the subject continues to

goal, while

fulfil

its

other function, like giving

here theology, which, though primarily a unity etcetera. The example a practical science, for it aims to expose how speculative science, is also the faithful should act to obtain eternal blessedness. In this commentary is

logic

is

science,

provides

described in the same way as theology: logic to frame arguments. which logic aims.

aims

which

the goal at

The

is

fully a practical

subject

of

logic

too,

University of Leiden

Bibliography

I

.

Manuscripts

Ms Cuyk en St. Agatha, Kruisherenklooster (Monastery of Friars), C 12. Ms Vienna, Osterreichische Nazionalbibliothek, V.P.L., 4998. -

the Crutched

-

-

38

id.,

5437

William

of

Ockham, Expositions

2, line 15; p. 3, line

50

-

p.

6 line 83.

in

libros

artis

logicae

prooemium,

ed.

1978,

p.

Marsilius of Inghen on the Subject of a Science

2. -

Primary

-

am

Frankfurt

am

Marsilius

libros

in

super octo

Physicorum

1509

(reprint

Quaestiones super quattuor Libros Sententiarum,

De

libros

in

Quaestiones

id.,

Parisiis

libros,

Main, 1964).

of Inghen,

am

Strassburg 1501 (reprint Frankfurt -

Physicorum, Parisiis 1509 (reprint

Main, 1964).

Quaestiones

id.,

-

literature

John Buridan, Quaestiones

Frankfurt

23

Main, 1966). 1505

generatione et corruptione, Venetiis

am Main, 1970). on the Properties of

(reprint Frankfurt -

Treatises

id.,

the

Ampliationes,

Suppositiones,

Introduction,

First

and

Tertns.

and Appendices

Notes

Translation,

A

Restrictiones

Critical

Edition

of

Alienationes

with

Egbert

P.

Bos,

ingeleid

en

van

by

Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster (Reidel), 1983. -

id.,

Kennis,

en

wetenschap

theologie,

aantekeningen voorzien door E.P. Bos, Baarn -

William of Ockham, Scriptum et

Prologus

distinctio

Bonaventure (N.Y.)

3. -

Secondary E.P.

Bos,

DC

Proefschrift. -

Sententiarum. Ordinatio.

Gal adlaborante

S.

Brown,

St.

Bonaventure University), 1967.

A

1979:

s

Note on an Unknown Manuscript Bearing upon Philosophy of Nature in Vivarium, 17, 1, pp. 61-68. ,

H.A. Krop, 1987: De

Scotus.

G.

(Ambo),

primum

1987.

literature

Marsilius of Inghen -

librum

edidit

prima,

(St.

in

uitgegeven,

van de theologie volgens Johannes Duns tussen theologie en metaphysica. Academisch

status

verhouding

Amsterdam (Rodopi).

M. Markowski,

1973:

1st

Marsilius von Inghen der Verfasser der in der

Handschrift 5437 der Osterreichischen Na/ionalbibliothek sich befindenden

Quaestiones

in

I-HI libros

VI Physicae Aristotelis?

De anima in

Aristotelis

und der Quaestiones

in I-

Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonomm, XVIII,

pp. 35-50.

A.A. Maurer, 1976: William of Ockham -

The Role in

of the Divine Ideas in the Theology of

Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady, edited

by R.S. Almagno and C.L. Harkins,

St.

Bonaventure (N.Y.) (Franciscan

Institute Publications), pp. 357-377.

G. Ritter, Studien zur Spatscholastik. I. Marsilius von Inghen und die Okkamistische Schule in Deutschland (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger -

Akademie Heidelberg.

der

Wissenschaften.

Philosophisch-historische

Klasse,

4),

Bos

24

-

L.M. dc Rijk and

().

medii Weycrs, 1981: Repertorium Commentariomm

Koninklijke

Latinomm, quae in bibliothecis publids asservantur, Academic van Wctcnschappen, afdcling Nederlandsc

Letterkundc,

Verhandclingcn,

aevi

in

Aristotelem

Nicuwc

recks,

dcel

109,

Oxford/New York (North Holland Publishing Company). J.M.M.H. Thijsscn, 1988: Johannes Buridanus over het onderzoek

naar

zijn

theorie

over het

wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie. Deel

I:

oneindige

in

het

Amsterdam/ oneindige.

Een

kader van

zijn

studie; deel II: teksten.

Nijmegen

(Ingenium Publishers). A. Zimmcrmann, 1965: Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion iiber den Gegcnstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert. Tcxte und Untersuchungen Leiden/Cologne. .

C.S.F.

BURNETT

Innovations in the Classification of the Sciences in the Twelfth

Century

Nearly forty years ago Richard Hunt wrote,

The

important article on

in his

1

Twelfth

that the Century first half of the twelfth century, and more especially the second third, was a time when questions of method were a matter of deep concern ...

Introductions

in the

men

hands of

the

to

like

Hugh

the

in

"Artes"

of St Victor, Gilbert de la Porree, Peter

Abelard, Thierry of Chartres and William of Conches, traditional terms

and

schemata

formulation of of

new

into

sprang

new problems. and

philosophical

It

and

life is

works

scientific

from

make an impact on Western

beginning to

the

provided

at precisely this

basis

the

for

time that translations

Greek were

and

Arabic

scholarship.

Several authors

attempted to reformulate introductions to the seven liberal arts, and to 2 propose novel divisions of science to take into account the new texts. that of Dominicus Gundissalinus, who, blended together Latin material from of St Victor with Arabic material from al-

Perhaps the best-known example in

his

De

Thierry of Chartres and

Farabi

s

is

divisione philosophiae

Hugh

Classification of the Sciences? In this article three introductions

which divisions of knowledge are made, are discussed. Of printed and has occasionally been referred to; the other two

to the arts in

these one

is

are hitherto unknown.

The

first

text to

be considered

is

an introduction to Boethius

s

De

arithmetica in a twelfth-century manuscript from the Franciscan Convent

now

in Coventry,

1

in Trinity College,

Cambridge.

4

The

Studia Mediae\ alia R.J. Martin O.P. (Bruges, 1948), pp. 85-112, see

ultimate origin of

p. 85.

For the principal divisions of science current in the twelfth century see J. WeisMediac\al Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), p. 46. John of Salisbury is the earliest medieval author to show knowledge of the Posterior Analytics, which is summarized in his Metalogicon (written 1159). the

s

translations

of the

B.G.

1120s onwards;

,

o

37 The instrument of [arithmetic] is the abacus (i.e. set of ten ). It is the Pythagorean table on which multiplications and divisions are practised. 38 But we say that (a) it is not of this part that the abacus is an instrument, nor (b) is the duty of this part of arithmetic to multiply and divide. For abacists even divide the unit, which arithmeticians refuse to do. The description of the abacus as mensa pitagorica is found in both Bocthius"s Geometria II, ed. M. Folkerts (Wiesbaden, 1970), p. 139, and Adelard of Bath s Regale abaci, ed. B. Boncompagni, Bullcttino di bibliografia e di storia dclle scienze matematiche efisiche, 14 (1881), p. 91. 9

.

.

Qusja

translated

ibn

.

Luqa was an Greek into

from

eminent Arabic,

ninth-century other

among

mathematician things,

and

Diophantus

doctor s

who

Arithmetic,

Thcodosius s Sphaerica, and Pseudo-Plutarch s (Aetius s) Placita Pliilosophorum, and wrote commentaries on Euclid s Elements. How our author might have known this is obscure, since the only works of Qusta ibn Luqa available in Latin in the mid-twelfth century were two medical works: De differentia anime et spiritus, translated by John of Seville (earliest MS, National Library of Scotland, Adv. MS. 18-6-11, and De s.xii) ligaturis physicis, translated by Constantine of Africa (earliest MS British Library, Add. 22,719, s.xii). His works on spherical geometry - Praaica spherae solidae and Tractatus were not translated until the early fourteenth century; see M.-T. spherae volubilis d Alverny, Translations and Translators in Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth

Burnett

28

that

appear

might

new

these

been

have

authorities

made

to

fit

of the seven arts. However, there are

comfortably into the old scheme the traditional scheme without some signs that our author did not accept that grammar is qualms. First of all he admits that certain people deny be as can there that one of the seven liberal arts, saying many grammars

as

languages and therefore as the

to

physics

amongst the

highest

as

Ptolemy

as the cause of the arts

arts,

and of Aristotle

(nostri}

considers

author

our

located

On

in

should be placed above the

the authority of his

art

reason.

citation

it

These men, he says, raise which we do not number

book of the De

an

grammar his

says,

first

more than one

interesting for

have not yet

(55).

the

in

arts.

science

a

position,

since,

arts,

many

after

First

of

sophisticis elenchis,

11

This

all. all,

the Almagest,

own people

he

cites

the

is

passage Ptolemy.

Tctrabiblos,

I

the

if it is not a precise citation Centiloquium, or a doxography, but even from any of these sources, it shows that our author was keen to adduce

known by hearsay before the early twelfth century. Secondly, he knows of authorities who have substituted physics for grammar. Physics, according to our author s own

the authority of a great scientist

definition

is

(14),

who was

only

concerned with the natures of

things, judging bodies

amongst the seven arts obviously pu/./.lcd our author, since one of the two marginal notes with which his introduction ends appears to be a memorandum to himself: invisible causes of visible things. Its position

and the

cd.

Century,

Qus}a

ihn

Benson and G. Constable (Oxford,

R.L.

Luqa

of Scientific

Dictionary

,

Biography,

1982), p. 446 and E.R. Harvey, ed. C.C. Gillispic (New York,

1975), vol. 11, pp. 244-6.

John and William arc not identifiable as well-known twelfth-century geometers. A Johannes Ocreatus (who might be the same as the author of the book on the Arabic of Adelard s translation of Euiclid s Elements helccp ) is credited with a version known as Adelard II (see Adelard of Rath, op. cit., p. 170), and both John and William 10

may have been 11

pupils of Adelard.

to see which statement of Ptolemy he is referring to, since his does not correspond to any of the sayings of Ptolemy collected by al-Mubashshir ibn Fatik which preface Gerard of Cremona s translation of the Almagest (P. nor to anything in Ptolemy s own Kunitzsch, Der Almagest (Wiesbaden, 1974), p. 98), author could be division of science in the first paragraphs of the Almagest. The to Ptolemy s Planisphere which begins Hermann of Carinthia s It

difficult

is

citation

preface

remembering

que cunctis disciplinalibus scientiis finis est, ipsa earundem omnium principium existit and describes physics as being the study of the ed. J.L. Heiberg, Ptolemaei opera astronomica minora of all

Quemadmodum Ptholomeus

...

[dicit], ,

principles (Leipzig,

quoniam

the

book of De

The only reference to grammar in 165b30-32 (ed. B.C. Dod, Aristoteles latinus, 6.1-3 (Bruxelleshuiusmodi orationes, ut 1975), p. 8): Sunt autem secundum aequivocationem discunt scientes: nam secundum os discunt grammatici.

sophisticis

Leiden,

coming-to-be;

1907), p. elenchis

clxxxiii.

is

first

Innovations

more

[Say]

about

in the Classification

those

which

things

moreover, point to one such scholar -

that

is,

who

12

concern

One

physics.

substituted physics for

Petrus Alfonsi, whose division of science

Whereas

29

of the Sciences

we

will

can,

grammar

consider next.

the author of the introduction to Boethius s

De

arithmetica

did not get as far as astronomy, Petrus Alfonsi wrote a short text which

an introduction to astronomy, and accompanies his own version of astronomical tables. This text has been edited by Jose-Maria is

specifically

Millas-Vallicrosa,

and

is

Peripatetics of France.

Huesca

in

in

known

generally

Petrus Alfonsi, as in

Aragon,

but

1106,

by

is

The

as

letter

well known,

had

then

to

the

was baptised

already

acquired

considerable status in the Jewish community in Spain. His learning was formed by the rich resources of the Arabs in Spain, and in his letter he is

advertising the

the

new

science of astronomy, and himself as a teacher, to

of Europe. 14

scholars

Out of consideration

for

his

readers Petrus

takes the Latin division of the liberal arts and investigates whether they

are useful in themselves and/or to each other. In so doing he mentions that

grammar should not be included amongst

does not

prove

anything;

it

is

the seven arts, because

not an argumentalis sdentia.

it

Like the

author of the Coventry introduction, he adds the objection that grammar 15 is not the same in all Petrus omits reference to rhetoric languages. altogether,

and

examines the

states that dialectic

is

validity of arguments.

useful in that, like a touchstone,

Then he passes

via arithmetic

it

and

music to physics, which he evidently considers to be on a par with the other subjects. His conclusion, as one would expect, is that astronomy is the most useful of the arts, and the rest of the letter concerns the justification of the science of the stars, the

the division of

12

terrestrial

specifically, medicine, for

See below, Edited

way

it

should be taught and

what we may call celestial physics, 16 For Petrus Alfonsi physica physics. is that art through which health can

subject-matter into

geometry and

spherical

means

its

it

p. 22.

by J.-M.

Millas-Vallicrosa,

La aportacion astronomica de

Pedro Alfonso

,

Sefarad 3 (1943), pp. 97-105.

Trancia

probably reflects the Arabic word

Firanja

which referred to Europe as

a

whole.

Ed. studentes

98: Invenimus autem nonnullos ex vobis grammatice p. quamvis inter artes VII nequeat computari cum neque sit nee in omnibus linguis eadem sed omnino diversa, tamen et ad

Millas-Vallicrosa, scientie,

que

argumentalis scientia artes est necessaria.

16

Ed. Millas-Vallicrosa,

p. 105.

Burnett

30

17 Of be preserved and length of life in this world can be assured. well as involves theoretical as medicine course, practical knowledge

knowledge of the elements and humours, diseases. In this respect

the

ibn

mentions. the

very

al18

c

Abbas

Constantine

by

Out of deference

been formed

of medicines and

as

of

name

whose

Africa,

arts,

Petrus

makes use of

but his mental attitude has clearly

the context of the Arabic philosophy in which he had

in

been educated. In

this

philosophy physics was clearly defined, coming

between theology and mathematics. In exemplary

as well

the kind of subject described in

to his Latin audience Petrus

seven liberal

into

division

much

the translation of the Kitab al-maliki of

-

part of the Pantechni

first

CA1I

is

it

his collection of

Hebrew and Arabic

the Discipline] clcricalis, Petrus sketches a

tales,

seven arts similar to that assumed France.

He

that

grammar.

that

states

the

are

six

first

scheme of the

the letter to the Peripatetics of

in

dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, medicine (phisica), music, astronomy, but as for the seventh, those who admit the possibility of prophecies say that it is necromancy; those who do not, say it is philosophy, and those who do not study philosophy say 1

it is

The

**

of science

division

third

most

the

is

bi/.arre

and seems

to

disregard the division according to the seven arts altogether. It occurs in two manuscripts, in each case adjacent to works of Adclard of Bath. The earlier

manuscript

20 English and of the late twelfth century.

is

The

I Ut testatur Ergaphalau after its call it an introduction to the science of the stars, but docs not

is

untitled, but

It

is

itself

to

text

opening words.

this

science,

as

since,

Ergaphalau

no

states,

restrict

one

can

understand any subject unless he has thoroughly mastered the sciences

Ed. Millas-Vallicrosa, in

p.

99:

Sit

ars

ilia

quam

per

salus

servari

lihro

suo

ct

diuturnitas vite

hoc valcat mundo agnosci. Constantinus

Ed. Millas-Vallicrosa, p. 99: sicut racena transtulit in latinam testatur. 19 sint

Ed. A. Hilka and artes

habent

et

septem

enumerares.

geometria, sententiae

phisica,

W. Sodcrhjelm probitatcs

(Helsinki,

et

septem Enumerabo.

Magister: musica, astronomia.

De

in

1911),

p.

Hae

sunt

scptima

10:

vcllem

industriae,

artes:

vcro

quem de

[Discipulus]: ut

haec

lingua

sar-

cum septem

mihi

sicut

se

arithmetica, plurimorum sunt

Dialectica,

diversae

aiunt nigromantiam esse volunt esse septimam. Aliqui ex illis videlicet qui prophetiis non credunt, philosophiam vel elementa mundana praecellit. Quidam qui philosophiae naturales res quae septimam, non student, grammaticam esse affirmant.

quaenam

This text

is

sit:

Philosophi

discussed

qui

and edited

the Stars, \nAdelard of Bath, op.

cit.,

in

prophetias

my

pp. 133^45.

sectantur,

Adelard, Ergaphalau and the Science of

Innovations

in the Classification

21

which precede that subject.

of the Sciences

Thus the author

the science of the stars within a general

31

of

first

scheme of

seeks to locate

all

science. This takes

the following form. Scientia

and

the

divided into two:

is

of

science

the

body

the science of the soul or the

or

The

nature.

latter

is

will,

completely

unconnected with book-learning. Rather, it is the knowledge of how to eat and drink, how to run and fight, and how to bring up one s children, and as such is shared by men and brute animals. The science of the will,

on the other hand, requires study, and is divided into philosophy, wisdom science The last division is not described, and of (sapientia) and .

all

philosophy

that

said

is

that

is

it

is

either concerned with fables

under

hidden 22 or works through similes - revealing the nature of higher beings through the consideration of lower ones. It is to sapientia that the author devotes his attention for the rest of the

which the truth

introduction.

23

essence first

Sapientia

been

have

is

the

is

with

allotted It

.

is

the

understanding of those things to which consent of nature unchangeability of

three subjects of the traditional quadrivium -

we

are described as ministering, but

geometry science which they

Physica alone

serve:

-

kinds.

and the stations

The

first

the health of

second

kind

ministered

is

,

leads

it

according to the

way

[of the heavenly bodies].

in that

the

is

24

Physica

is

of two

the science of tempering qualities, to preserve

is

man. This

is

medicine, or the

microcosmic science

.

The

the science of investigating the fixed state and motions of the

is

greater world, and this the

music, arithmetic and

find that physica

out the natural changes of things in a controlled transits]

The

divided into a ministering and a ministered part.

science of stars

is

called the

megacosmic science

.

The

latter is

divided into a part which uses instruments and a

,

is employed. To this second part belong mathematical astronomy, as well as the kind of astronomy which appears in the form of myths or the astrology which deals with political events.

part in which the intellect alone

21

Ed.

cit.

p.

Ut

143:

testatur

Ergaphalau,

absoluta

non potest

haberi

alicuius

rei

noticia nisi precedentium, velud ratio deposcit, doctrina elucescat.

Martianus Capclla is

s

given as an example of

Ed. sue

cit.,

volente

arithmetica,

p.

143:

(presumably

Philosophy

his

De

nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii)

this.

Est sapientia

...

comprehensio rerum que inmutabilitatem essentie is modelled on that of Boethius in De

natura sortiuntur. This definition I, 1;

ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), p. 8, lines 11-15.

Est igitur sola phisica ministrata que naturales immutationes rerum secundum transitum et moras continenter absolvit. Ibid.:

Burnett

32

The

first

and

is

on instruments

part which relies

involved

with

the

prediction

is

the experimental science,

manipulation of the future.

or

receives several divisions, depending on what form of prediction

whether

and

and

talismans

For

used.

are

incantations

is

each

It

used,

of

the

divisions of the science of the stars the author gives an authority. Among those that are recognizable are Hermes and Alexander [the Great],

Martianus, al-Farghanl, and Ibn Daud.

The reference

a

to

Latin

authority,

and

Martianus,

the

verbal

echoes of Boethius, show that this text was written in Latin and is not a translation of an Arabic of Jewish text. The references to al-Farghani and Ibn Daud, along with the astronomy of certain Arabs author was aware of translations from the Arabic. translations

in

particular

which,

on

the

one

hand,

gave

substance

Aristotle s

to

It

hand,

rethinking of the old Western division into the seven

other

show

,

these

precipitated

arts,

of

division

the

that

was

but,

a

on the into

learning

was described by Ptolemy theology, mathematics and physics. This division at the beginning of the Almagest, but was known in the West largely 25 However, no early mediaeval Latin through Boethius s DC trinitate. scholar was clear about what the subject-matter of physics was meant to be. In

Arabic works such as al-Farabi

the anonymous work On

the

s

Classification of the Sciences

and

follows

the

Rise of the Sciences,

four sciences of the quadrivium, and

physics

defined in terms of the subject-

is

matter of the physical works of Aristotle. Awareness of this Aristotelian s DC esscntiis (written in physics is apparent in Hermann of Carinthia

De

1143) and Gundissalinus

s

mundi. 26 Medicine, the

physics of the microcosm

testatur

twelfth

century,

made

of

a

developed

Ergaphalau)

African

divisionc philosophiae

largely

through

more the

and De processione the words of Ut

(in

dimension

theoretical

translations

of

in

the

Constantine

the

end of the eleventh century. Astrology, the physics fitted awkwardly into the mathematical discipline of

at the

macrocosm

as astronomy, but was convincingly described by Hermann of Carinthia have introduction the of author The of may Coventry physics. part

stopped writing where he did 25

De

trinitate,

chapter

2,

in

Philosophy, ed. H.F. Stewart, E.K.

26

For a

History 389-94.

fuller discussion

of Twelfth-Century

-

Boethius,

before

tackling

The Theological

astronomy and whilst

Tractates,

Rand and SJ. Tester (Cambridge, Mass.

The Consolation of 1973), p.

8.

of this subject see C. Burnett, Hermann of Carinthia in A Western Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke (Cambridge, 1988), pp. ,

33

Innovations in the Classification of the Sciences

more about physica - simply because he no the new texts such as those on astrology and

noting that he should say

knew how

longer

to

fit

medicine into his tidy schema of knowledge.

Appendix: Edition of the Coventry Introduction to Boethius metica

The

edition

following

is

a

diplomatic

Cambridge, Trinity College, R. 15.16, indicated by \/;

editorial

Ex cerebro Arcium

1

testardi

B v -3 r

fols.

additions by



abbreviations are placed in round brackets

of

transcript

the

Scribal

,

s

De

arith-

MS

in

text

additions

are

Realizations of ambiguous

.

().

27

sermonum proprietate conrerum natura consolidatur. In sermonum proprietate

summatur, aut in arcium liberalium

aut

doctrina

liberalium

tripliciter

consistit

in

secundum quam

conitio,

distinguntur artes, grammatica, dialectica, rethorica,

quarum prima

tres

loqui

docet ad intelligendum, secunda ad credendum, tercia ad persuadendum.

Quoniam

est

prius

igitur

loqui

precedit

quadruvialium

disciplinarum

breviter sunt consideranda:

Que

materia.

que

species.

28

Que

Quid partes.

Post

iure

trivialis

trivialem

industria

\vero/

decus

non verborum, habent pronunc insistendum, cuius gratia hec

rerum,

arithmetica, cui

est

philosofari

2

sollerciam.

quadruvialem

fessionem, prima

quam

ipsa

sit.

Quod

Quod genus officium.

eius.

Que

eius

3 Addunt preterea

longiloquium libere de his que norunt facientes hec. Quis artifex. Quod instrumentum. Quis finis. Que ratio nominis. Quo ordine ipsa sit docenda

Adhuc quoque quod ubique queritur: auctor, \intencio eius,/ titulus libri, modus agendi, \cui supponitur/. 4 Sed tot extra queri ridiculum scientibus, fastidium est nescientibus. Nee placet amodo 29 5 Ut vero sit adiutum dicere, tot huiusmodi laudis temporisque venatio et

addiscenda.

.

secundum modernos finis,

Note 28 29

in

top margin.

Quaestio vel

in principio

modus, ordo, genusque,

in

margin

redemptio suprascr.

cuiusque

libri

querantur: auctor, materia,

quorum duo prima

in titulo

patere debent,

Burnett

34

qui

utique

opere,

pars

libri

ad libitum

et

cst.

prima

Cetera quatuor ex toto perpenduntur Nos vero volentibus dabimus copiam,

dic/rtis dicenda.

ut quid velint, elegant. 6 Est 30 igitur arithmetica disciplina multitudinis per se,

Quod

naturas et proprietates contemplans.

cum

habet

de

non tamen per

numeris,

proporcionaliter,

eorum

ex

quod hec quidem -

diapente

contemplans

inquit,

se

-

in duplici

ad

scd

manifesta

relacione

est huius artis,

quod proprium

alios sit

hec

-

ut diapason

Numerorum

proportione. 8

consistat

in

gemetria

apponitur ad differentiam musice que

Per se

ut

scilicet

una,

immobili, reliqua circa magnitudinem [im]mobilem

consistit

magnitudine

quarum

periciam,

versatur idonea. 7

natura,

commune

ad differentiam

est

,

,

astronomic, quo non proprie multitudinis, sed magnitudinis

geometric sibi vendicaverunt

agat

numerorum

disciplina

quod additur multitudinis

alii\s/ artibus, et

vel

dicitur

etsi sit scilicet

rclatis,

consonantiarum

in sesqualtera

-

ut

proprietates et naturas

hec enim quasi quadam

prerogativa docct dignitate, ut quis par, quis impar, pariter vel impariter

numerus,

primus

quisve

vel

et

cubus,

alia

prout

in

serie

lectionum

determinabitur, hoc tantum nunc dicto, quod natura et proprietas

tam parvo est

natura

9

distant

-

ut

indifferenter vicissim

eorum

ponantur. Altera tamen

-

id

generalior est in suis accidcntibus, ut digitus, articulus.

Genus 31

Mathcmatica

est

mathesis,

media

\h/

32

aspirata

et

correpta.

que abstractam considerat

latine dicitur doctrinalis scicntia,

quantitatem. Abstracta quanlitas est quod intellcctu a matcria separantcs, vel

ab

aliis

accidentibus vel sub(stan)t(i)is, ut est par vel impar, in sola

raciocinacione tractamus,

sunt

cuius species

.iiii.,

hec.

quarum prima

10 Generalissimum vero eius genus philosophia. Tola enim philosophia

secundum est.

tres naturales questiones

que omnibus sunt communes,

divisa

11 Dubitant enim homines de causis rerum, aut accionibus rerum, aut

racionibus rerum; iuxta

rerum causis

-

primam discretionem

constituitur

theorica,

sed

-

qua

scilicet

dubitatur de

dc accionibus, ethica,

et

de

inquisitione veritatis, logica. 12 In his tribus spccicbus tota philosophia sumitur, quarum unaqueque tripertito dividitur. Ethicam subdividunt in sexus, elates, officia; logica paries habet scienliam diffiniendi, dividendi, -in

Ars heading 31

in

Genus heading

margin in

margin

Note the form of h Haskins,

Studies

Mass., 1927), p. 45,

in n. 7.

the

used by the scribe: History

h

of Mediae\*al

(

= Greek rough breathing; Science, second edition

cf.

also C.H.

(Cambridge,

Innovations

in the Classification

35

of the Sciences

argumen\tan/di. 13 Scd iam dc sola theorica videamus, cetcre nichil ad prcsens ncgocium. Theorica igitur tres habct species, sccundum tria rerum

unum genus

genera. 14 Est substantie, circa

de

ratio

res incorporee vel extra corporea, ut divine est theorice,

que prima species Est aliud genus

deis.

-

ipsa

quibus

est

secunda species, phisica,

genus

est

in

16 vocetur?

Queritur

Ad

diximus,

productum

quomodo

sola

ista

species

lene,

cum

divinatio,

philosophic

doctrinalis

promti sumus in cognicione et incorporeorum de quibus corporum de quibus fisica raciocinatur. 17 Verbi gratia, visa in

elementis,

et

concordi composicione eorum et

celestium corporum, necessitas ingerit nobis

pociorem

longe

existere,

eorum aliquem creatorem

sicque

18 Cognita quoque proporcione qualitatum

corpore

correpta

quod dicimus quod habita perfecta cognitione illorum de

proporcione que est

in

et

agit,

theologia et

omnibus

media

vero

m.d.di.ma.

facit

quibus hec

ut

enim,

doctrina,

interpretatur

aspiratione,

unde: Scire

est

que corporibus adiacent, sicut sunt quantitates, de quibus est tercia species, scilicet

Mathesis

15

est theologia, id est

diiudicans

sed

incorporea,

accidencia, qualitates et

mathematica.

id

que

de corpora de naturis rerum. Tercium

scilicet

animalis, ipsius corporis cito

et

ad

incorporea

his

traducimur.

commixtionum habitudine

ut

natura cognoscitur, et inde medici

iuxta cognitas qualitates medicinas contempcrant. Itaque per proportiones

venimus ad istorum cognitionem. 19 Presens vero sciencia de illis est que corporibus adiacent. Omnis enim numerus rerum est. Per excellentiam ergo doctrinalis sciencia dicitur

humanorum aliter

et

omnium

quadruvium, quoniam per earn ad divinorum

et

nature rerum cognitionem ascenditur. 20 Solent et

hec dicere. Theologia

est

de

invisibilibus

invisibilium causis, fisica

33 de visibilibus mat\h/ematica invisibilium formis, mecanice autem artes sunt de visibilibus [in]visibilium, vero mathematice quia specialiter in doctrina consistunt. predicte

de

visibilium

invisibilibus

causis,

21 Quicquid enim ibi docetur vel addiscitur, subiectis figuris demonstratur. 22 De materia 34 huius artis non tanta erit dicenda. Nam incipientibus multa occurrunt, et

grammatica

et

et

arithmetica, quia prime

sunt /fol. 2r/ bifide vie sapientie, multa habent preostendere. 23 Materia

huius est numerus multipliciter variatus, secundum quod hec sciencia est introductoria ad tres vel fortasse plures facultates.

The same unusual form of Materia heading

in

margin

h has been added here.

Burnett

36

24 Species 35 eius due docet Euclides in

quam

probabilis,

et

.vii.

digessit

sunt. Est

.viii.

et

.ix.

enim quedam demonstrativa quam volumine artis geometrice, alia est

Nichomacus. 25

dicunt

Alii

huius species sui

generis esse divisionem, easque habet species quas et sua materia, scilicet et

imparem numerum

enim numeri

Sint

et

huiusmodi, quamvis possit

species, par et

autem utrorumque

artis

impar numerus,

parem

fieri distinctio.

sciencie.

26 Partes 36 relative,

huius

artis

de numero

figurali,

sunt

.iiii.:

de numero per se, de numero et medietate numerorum.

de proportionalitate

27 Quatuor autem hee paries secundum quattuor disciplinas matheseos assignantur. Sciencia numerandi per se quantum ad suam propriam conceptionem, scientia de numeris ad aliud relatis, quan ad armonice subtilem

disquisitionem,

numerum

geometricum,

Nam

genituram. 28

numerandi

sciencia fit

ad

modum

quadratus a quadrangulo

dicitur a ternario ut et

et

dicunt

quod

ordinatam

geometricarum

figurarum

numerus formatur ad

et

figuraliter,

trianguli, et triangulus

quadrangulus a

.iiii.

et

deinceps secundum naturalem progressionem numerorum in infinitum. Quo eadem consideratio a corporalibus non recedat figuris, que etiam

sic

numerorum

racione et

proporcionandi

constat

dividend!

esse

distinctionibus horarum, signorum

et

29

formata.

astronomice

Sciencia

dificultati

paralellorum.

multiplicand!, ut

in

in

hac

subservit,

Horum omnium

arte assignantur raciones, sicut sequentia huius voluminis expedient, et hie

ordo predictus

scilicet

in libri tractatu intelligitur. Alii

unde

de predictis

dicunt.

30

De

quapropter

speciebus huius artis nichil in auctoribus invenimus dictum, supersedendum. Similitcr de eius partibus. Arismetica,

his

non habet quia simplex est, et non eget ceteris artibus. vero ipsa egent. Sic dividunt qui dividere nesciunt vel nollunt. 38 huius artis est virtutes numerorum perpendere ad 31 Officium

inquiunt, partes Illae

37

speculationem virtute

persone

nature

numerorum congruus

rerum,

speculari. actus,

Partes heading in margin

The

a appears to be expunged.

Officium heading

in

margin

-

scilicet

32 Aut quia officium

officium

Species heading in margin

TO

econverso

et

huius

artis

erit

naturas est

quod

rerum

alicuius

debet

in

certe artifex

37

Innovations in the Classification of the Sciences

secundum

facere

contemplari

facultatem

propositam

numerorum

33 Quis ergo

et

hoc

est

secundum

artem

facile.

Porro

naturas et proprictates. 39

ex officio

artifex

sit

cognosci

patet

enim qui dupliciter qualibet docet artem, alius qui agit secundum artem. Artifex ergo qui docet hanc artem dicitur arithmeticus, et qui secundum artem agit, computator. arte

in

consideratur

34 Alius

artifex.

est

35 Hec enim et ex arte contingit duplicitas. Sciencia enim numerorum quam dicimus arithmeticam, sicut et alie artes, bifariam dividitur, scilicet in scienciam et operationem, quam discrecionem Graii theoricam

dicunt

sine

occurrunt,

et

In

practicam.

neutra

quibus

sciri

autem

utraque potest,

tres

de

scilicet

inspectiones proprietatibus

numerorum, de proportionibus eorundem et de caracteribus ipsorum. His ergo doctus et docens, ab horum distat operatore. 36 Quandoque vero hoc quandoque

dignius,

illud,

maxime

grammatica et theologia. 37 Instrumentum 40 huius decenus; mensa

in

artis

est

magis naturalibus

et necessariis ut

secundum quosdam abacus, quod in

qua multiplicationes et divisiones exercentur. 38 Sed dicimus nee huius instrumentum esse abacum, interpretatur

pitagorica,

nee officium huius partis arismetice multiplicare et dividere. unitatem etiam dividunt, quod recusat arithmetice.

Nam

abaciste

igitur eius instrumentum rimachia per quam ipsa exercetur, animadvertunt quod qui eius ludi sunt periti. Interpretatur autem rithmachia quod in ea docetur, id est pugna numerorum. Rithmus enim

39 Erit satis

numerus, machia est pugna, unde et sichomachia, id est anime pugna. 40 Sed videamus cui supponatur abacus, cuius causa omnium artium videamus instrumenta, que proprie sunt oblectationes. 41 Trivii, scedulis et est

tabellis

exceptis,

sumpseris similiter

.vii.

et

est

nisi

forte

que

et

vocum

sunt

In

modus

quoniam

Rerum enim

instrumentum

quadruvio vero predictum erit predicte, 42 At abacus geometrie est quantitatis pocius quam numeri habet specu-

instrumenta.

secundus

instrumentum, lationem.

nullum

scaccarii.

quantitatem investigans,

dum

per figure posituram

per campeolos \arte/ vagatur, quam multum quamve parvum consideratur. 44 Troianum etiam vel Thebanum diludium quod

aliquid

sit

a captura

Scaccarium dicunt teste diligentia geometrica pollet industria. Quidque etiam figurarum geometrie non paucas in solido dant admirationes. 39

artifex

heading

in

margin

instrumentum heading

in

margin

Burnett

38

45 Porro musicc cum plura

instrumcnta, duo que priora nostris animis

sint

monocordum, que nunc cordarum varietatem

magis vicina plusque impcrativa, scilicet fistula et

prima conducta pro instrumentorum. 46 Astrologie comprehensa iocunditas compeg<er>unt 41 vel horoscopio, necnon spera mundi vel celi et in horologio spectatur

ab

varietate

invencione

astrolapso Tholomei.

47 Septem vero mecanicarum artium infmita cuilibet sunt exempla, armature id est fabrilis, navigatio, id est lanificii, id est vestiture,

ut

negotiatio,

quod trivium magis

pertinent, relique magis ad ea

adultcrina

48

dum

artificis

opere

vero

Liberalium

ea

ad

nos

extrinsecus

que

decet

intrinsecus, id est agricultura, venatio

que

medicina. Sed hec nobis postponenda, quia

id est

vel piscatio, confectio,

est

a natura mutuantur

est

philosophia

commercium.

vel

quia

tantum

ingenuis

et

aut quia ingcniosis danda, vel quia liberos et expeditos requirunt animos, liberc et caste et sole, aut libere, id est propter se quia sui et

<non>

merces

est,

propter aliud addiscenda.

49 Finis 42 huius

per ea que docentur in arte ista /fol. subiacet 2v/ generalis expellatur ignorantia. Humana enim natura triplici incommoditati: vicio, egritudini, ignorantie. Contra has tres incommoditates

rerum

ethicam,

remedium: contra

deus triplex nobis contulit

opifex

contra

ut

est

artis

fisicam,

egritudines,

contra

.vii.

ignorantiam,

vicia

artes

liberales.

50 Unde cleganter Gal(icnus): ab animo vicium, a corpore langor

Omni et

causa laborandum ut abscidatur

a ventre saturitas,

que ignorancie

fastidicns mater.

51

Utilitas

ergo

huis

artis

est

excepta

cognicione

virtutum

et

habitudinum officiorumque numerorum universalis speculacio nature rerum visibilium et invisibilium. 52 Ars etiam ex re nomen habens dicitur 43

arit\h/metica,

ab

numerus, quoniam

53 Eo autem

quidcm

libris

ares

in

quod interpretatur virtute numeri versatur.

ordine

specialiter,

44

The

variant form of h

Finis heading in

43

is

in

quod

est

communia

doctrinaliter, designenturque

used here.

margin

The

ordo heading

rithmus

quo et docenda in singulis ad omnes autem communiter ut sit. 54 Pre-

has peculiar form of h hich has been corrected from areth-.

44

et

ars hec disccnda,

mittantur peticiones arceanturque

^

virtus,

margin

been inserted between

V

and

m

of arithmetica,

Innovations

in the Classification

proprictates et diffcrcntie. Sic presens

instat

liber.

ordo modusque agendi. gratia de reliquis.

of the Sciences

Tune secundum hoc Isque modus agcndi

De

auctoribus

55 Grammaticam unam

.vii.

45

39

quelibct sunt arte cogcnda. cst

ncque multum

distant

huius artis iam dicendum, ciusquc

artium

libcralium

quidam

diffitentur,

instantes tot esse posse

grammaticas quot idiomata, tot ergo et artes, et loco suppremo phisicam efferunt, quam nos inter eas non connumeramus, que, teste Tholomeo rege, super artes causa[que] artium ponenda est. 56 Sed auctoritate nostrorum Aristotilisque dictis in primo elencorum ars erit. Manifestum est, inquit, quoniam et ars quedam hoc potest facere

quod orationes non conligant soloecismum. 57 Hec ars primum in Egipto que mater est artium reperta est, tempore Osiris mariti Ysidis. Inde in

Greciam

sicque in Latinitatem est profecta et perfecta. 58 Herodia-

crevit,

nus et Apollonius Grece compegerunt artem primitus,

membranas

biblos et ars

pictoria

scriptitetur, in

grammatica

sparsius vagaret. Sicut

per volvolas

et

pitacia

solidum forsan adhuc

et

aliis

est

hodie cernere, quod

ob litteratorum artis

in

diligentiam

ipsa

compegenda volumen,

factum

constat

quodam

46 sunt quoniam prius elaborata

enim

antea per

licet

artibus

particulariter et

sic et

de

Aristotile

discrete

deinde aumentabantur ab

acceperunt postea quousque in artem sint create. 59 Dionisius quidem siJlabarum omnium aptissimas formas fecit; et ob id statua his

qui

honoratus

est.

dederunt

artes.

47

libertati

artem

Aristarcus et Plinius et Cicero singuli singulas grammatice Seneca vero summus philosophus addens dictis Tullii

Ciceronis, et aquile libertati

48

Mecenatis \et/ aliorum inventis

scripsit notariam, cuius iam usus periit.

60 Totam autem Donatus artem tissime Priscianus. Servius

quoque

digessit,

49


et

sed novissime

et

perfec-

Ysidorus in libro ethimo-

id est origine vocabulorum - per interpretationem multa ad logiarum hanc artem descripsit utilia. 61 Huic etiam adiacet Priscianus de

accentibus Virgilii.

45

46

47 48 49

et

Priscianus

Lucilius

quidem

auctores heading in margin e above final a

or

liberti.

or

liberti.

space of about 30 letters

de barbarismis c.

et

Priscianus

genera soloecismorum

de

distinxit

xii

versibus

que omnia

Burnett

40

sum<m>opere

spcctant

Ad

vitanda profitentibus grammaticam. 62

quecumque

hanc etiam artem

sunt metrorum, figurarum, historiarum, fabularum.

63 Rhetoricam Aristotilcs ampliavit prout a magistris Socrate

idem

scilicet

suis,

Platone susceperat, contemporaneus quoque eius Gorgias ut

et

Aristotiles

dicit

omnes

orationes

rethoricas

circa

quod

artes

Tisias

accidit

et

plene

priorum sparsas quidem autem post Theodorus vero inventiones primus, Trasimacus post Tisiam, hunc et multi alii. 64 Novissime Grece digesserunt artem plenissime,

circa

alias

.

post

Demostenes, Gorgias, Aristotiles et Ermagoras, Corax quoque apud Siracusas, Moises apud Hebreos. 65 Deinde apud Latinos magis translatores invcntores

quam

pollebant,

plenissime

Quintilianus,

Tisias,

50

vero

artem

digissit

tribus

inventionibus rethoricis, et nova rethorica,

immensum

sibi

sparsim

scilicet

et

omnium legum

topicis

sanxit

queque leges

Numa

antiquas

leges

de in

enim

Moises primum Hebrcis Phoroneus Grecis, Solon

natio.

Pompilius qui Romulo leges. 68 Consul vero Pompeius

statuere

scilicet

66 Abhinc

dequisitionibus, quid

solempnitcr scripsit leges. Mercurius Egiptiis, 51 Socrates Atheniensibus, Ligurius Lacedemoniis, Caldcis,

suis.

rethorica docet et dc orando. 67 In divisione orbis

quomodo

rethorica, terre

ars evehitur

-

Tacianus, Cato. Cicero

voluminibus,

Belus

Archadcmicis,

successit Romanis, celebres primi

.x.virorum

Solonis

qui

lulius

et

interpretes

Cesar

post

primi

tabulis

.xii.

leges

exposuerc Romanis, in libros cepere redigere leges, sed morte prevent! sunt. 69 Thcodosius vero minor augustus ad similitudinem Grecorum codicem fecit omnium constitutionum a Constantini temporibus sub proprio cuiusque

titulo

imperatoris

Novissime

lustinianus

opusque Theodosianum artem perfecit in libro de

imperator

incipiens et Codice Digestisquc

alii

augcndo,

alii

est.

Plato

fugiens in rupe conscdit non

vero

post

mortem

sui

partes

Socratis

Primum

magistri

sui,

Unde

et

dialectica inventa

primum Grecis ab

Aristotiles discipulus eius,

Egipto Athenas rediens logicam instituit. primus et solus totam comprehendit, ampliavit,

50

alii

dederunt;

a Parmenide qui cctus

modico tempore, Sed

redegit.

diversi

perficiendo, artes invenerunt.

plures eius artis auctores leguntur. 71

hominum

institutis

consummans.

70 Dialecticam secundum plures

enim incipiendo,

vocavit.

deposuit

et

perfecit

72 Marcus Terentius Varro primus dialecticam

transtulit,

in

artem

nobisque

sic

The

scribe

originally

rected his mistake.

swapped

Atheniensibus

and

Lacedemoniis

,

but

then

cor

Innovations

of the Sciences

in the Classification

Nonnulla quoque de rcthorice eiusque quoque super hec nostris addidit. dedit.

41

digessit discretione. Cicero

73 Boetius vero plus omnibus nostris transtulit, et commentatus est, multa auxit et invenit industria. Verbi gratia, Aristotiles x.

suaque

primus

chatheg(oricas)

generatione

sillogismi

primum Greci

sic

contra

artem primus duobus

Sit

quid.

predicamenta,

ergo

sicque

quid,

queritur,

Porfirius

prior

cum ea

ipsa

libris

Deinde

3r/ His ergo non sine exercicio

/f.

qui vetus novaque vocantur ars dialectica

secundum quod

De

disposuit.

duobus. 74 Commentati sunt super hec

Cicero, Boecius. 75

erit instructio,

ordiuntur,

in

libris

ut Themistius, Andronicus, Alexander, Theofrastus.

latini ut Porfirius,

plena

medii

inventione

et

de soph(istic)is

digessit, similiter

duobus

Architam/

\post

quo modo

ad

Ysagogarum

distinctione

est

que

qui

libris,

ad quid

et

et

Aristotilis

sex

predica-

mentorum.

Quorum

76 infinite

52

analecticorum

libri

de chategoricis

quod

reliquorum genera, id est sentiuncule magistrorum

ut

commenta et

ypoteticis

ars

specialiter

translatoribus

elenchorum

multa.

Sequuntur

eiusdem, priorum

Tullii

periarmenias

post

Aristotilis,

posteriorum, precedentibus quidem

sillogismis

Boetius voluminibus. 77 Deinde

Aristotelis

dicitur

topicis,

et

Boetiique

topicorum

topicis

libri

datis

viii.

Tandem

divisionibus.

et

liber Aristotilis.

78 Quadruvio post trivium insistimus, in quo prior est presens. igitur artem numerandi apud grecos Samius Pitagoras et Arist(oscripserunt, diffusiusque Nichomacus et Euclides, licet et alii in

79 Hanc tiles)

aeadem

florerent, ut

Era




duo quos

interpres et

Burnett

42

commcntor quam

inventor

extitit.

Sicut et

quidam modernorum

in

eadcm

clarucrunt, ut Alardus, Ioh(anne)s, Will(elmu)s. 53

Musicam

Warburg

^3

Institute, University of

London

Here the copy ends, except for two notes in the bottom margin of fol. 2v which might be reminders for what the scribe wished to write next: 1) quid circa fisicam amplius de his two words at 2) pitag(oras), ypoc(ras), apoll(o), merc(urius) qui tetracord(um) (these zeno linus, to (?), amphio(n). , orpheus, mercurius) right-angles

FRANCESCO D ELIA

Senso c dimcnsionc dclla reductio ad philosophiam dclle discipline

E

matcmatichc nclle

Institutiones di

da premettere che Cassiodoro, piu chc un

Cassiodoro

filosofo, si

come

presenta

un raffinato divulgatore e un pensatore rivolto al concrete. Egli non dispone felYhabitus mentale del filosofo nel senso piu appropriate del

non esprime una

termine, poiche

viva passione per

problemi metafisici e

i

idee pure e nelle sue esposizioni dottrinali non raggiunge mai

le

livello

speculativo

e

il

vigore

sono

che

intellettuale,

note

le

1

alto

carat-

suo contemporaneo Boezio, in cui confluiscono in perfetto equilibrio i temi piu ardui e le piu vive speculazioni dello spiritualismo greco-romano, assunti e rielaborati in funzione di una teristiche del pensiero del

filosofia

cristiana.

fondamentale motivo

II

da parte

attenzione ascrivere

1

Cassiodoro

di

o

disinteresse

ridotta

metafisica

della

esigenze

di

e

mutate condizioni storico-ambientali,

alle

principalmente

alle

di

da che

la tragica scomparsa del filosofo-senatore, una cultura largamente depotenziata e in progressive decline. 2

determinano, soprattutto dopo il

quadro

di

Eppure monaci una

fondatore

il

di

Vivarium, nella prospettiva di fornire

formazione

valida

culturale,

che

affondi

le

ai

suoi

radici

nei

presupposti teoretici del pensiero classico, elabora nelle sue Institutiones

un

piano

di

articolato

studi,

-

anche

se

in

gran

parte

inteso,

in

cristianesimo di Boezio e fuori discussione da

quando A. Holder ha scoperto in un granducale di Karlsruhe, attualmente catologato Karolisruhensis 106, un frammento della perduta opera di Cassiodoro, Ordo generis Cassiodororum edito da H. Usener col titolo: Anecdoton Holderi. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte Roms in ostogothischcr Zeit, Bonn 1877, dove a p. 4 si fa esplicito riferimento all attivita teologica di Boezio: "Scripsit (Boethius) librum de Sancta Trinitate et capita quaedam dogmatica", II

ms.

della

Bibl.

,

ecc. dc\\

Attualmente abbiamo altre due preziose testimonianze relative Anecdoton su Boezio: un ms. del sec. IX, scoperto da F. Troncarelli

British

del

L

Libr.,

Harley 3095, del

Mabillon,

attestazione

passato

nouveau

i

f.

Iv,

90,

di

temoin

e la trascrizione

ora

Cassiodoro a

di

circoli

ms.

perduto,

riguardo,

come

studio piu di quanto non

fragmentaire

de

ad opera

della

YAnccdoton

e

di

in

notizie

London,

Th. Ruinart, collaboratore

Biblioteca

dato cosi

alle

municipale di

rilevare,

di

Chartres.

interessava

nel

potesse pensare. Cfr. F. Dolbeau, "Un in Re\ iie d histoire des textes, Holderi",

si

12-13 (1982-83), pp. 397-399. 2

Tali considerazioni sono esposte in un nostro recentissimo saggio, L Antropologia di Cassiodoro tra ispirazione agostiniana e suggestions del mondo classico. Note teoretiche e fdologiche sul

"De

anima

",

Roma

1987, pp. 11-14.

D

44

alia

corrispondenza

fondamcnto

di

indispensabilc

a\\ intelligentia

dell

prassi

Scripturarum

-

due gruppi

liberal!, ripartite in

Elia

insegnamento e

mctodologia

come

patristico-tcologico,

forma/ionc

propedeutica

programmazionc canonica delle arti distinti ma complementari nella formazione

nella

grammatica, rctorica e dialettica, cioe le artes Mediocvo costituiranno il trivium; propriamente dette, che nel corso del

del

medievale:

civis

musica,

aritmetica,

con

classificate di

la

riduttivo

formazione

filosofica

per

del

1

e

rnagistcr

ancor

di autentico

3

e

Per

la

denominazione dclle arti Medioevo, cfr. P. Rajna,

ncl

o

carenza

acccnnata

auditores a recepire un messaggio

attrihuita

e

proprie

discorso filosofico, sia pure a livello

del

sfera

vere

le

di

elevate

alia

cioe

mathematica e che verranno

quadrivium? Queste ultime, in linea da una funzione Institutiones nelle

denominazione

puramente empirica teoreticamcnte

astronomia,

articola la scienza

si

vengono

principio,

e

geometria

disciplinae, nelle quali

per

piu

di

inadeguatezza

dcgli

incapacita

1

spessore culturale.

4

ad esse discipline e per rimportanza in denominazioni Trivium e Quadrivium

dcllc

"Ix;

",

Giacone, "Arti lihcrali e classificazione delle 58-72. II tcrminc Cassiodoro", in Ae\ um, 48 (1974), pp. scienzc: csempio di in quadmium) compare per la prima volta in fissato sara in appresso quadruvium (che 7: "Constare Bocth., DC institutione arithmetica (I, 1), ed. G. Friedlein, Lipsiae 1867, p. cumulum pcrfectionis in baud manifestum philosophiae disciplinis ad

Studi

1

Mcdic\*ali, 1

R.

quemquam

est,

nisi

evadere,

4-36;

pp. Boezio e

(1928),

cui

talis

prudcntiae nobilitas

quodam

quasi quadruvio

quadruvium est, quo his viandum nobiscum procreatis sensibus ad intelligcntiac ccrtiora

9-10:

"Hoc

igitur illud

come indurrebbe bocziano;

infatti

a lo

credere

sit,

perducitur".

Rajna, che Cassiodoro ignori

il

ricorda nella lettera scritta a

TU

nome artem

di

vcstigatur";

ibid.,

pp.

quihus cxcellentior animus a 1

Ne

si

esistcnza del

Teodorico

a

puo

pensare^,

"neologismo"

Boezio,

sia

pure

per quadrifarias praedictam CCL 96, Turnholti 1973, p. 50. I ridh, mathesis ianuas introisti", il ruolo Percio a buon diritto si puo parlare di quadrivio in Cassiodoro, anche per come vedremo meglio in scguito, attribuiscc alle quattro discipline, specifico, che egli, un quadruplice sviluppo della scienza mathematica. configurandole essenzialmente come

con

una

leggera

variantc

lessicografica: Karl. 45, ed. A.J.

4

.

.

dei

culturale Cassiodoro, soprattutto perche consapcvole del generate dcpaupcramento suo discorso alle capacita intcllettive dell uditorio il tempi, intende adeguare o et impoliti), riducendo al minimo le nozioni teoriche e traducendo (fratres simplices edizione del traslittcrando in latino la nomenclatura tccnica greca, quale si legge nell

suoi

che utilizza, almeno per il secondo libro, una redazione delle Institutiones da quella definitiva. Per un aggiornamento degli studi sulla tradizione manosde la tradition et de critta del manuale di Cassiodoro cfr. L. Holt/, "Quelques aspects della settimana la diffusion des Institutions", in Fla\ io Magno Aurelio Cassiodoro (Atti Soveria Mannelli di studi Cosenza-Squillace 19-24 settembre 1983), a c. di S. Uanza, si 281-312. Nonostante la carente formazione filosofica (occorre rilevarlo) 1986,

Migne,

diversa

pp.

ultimo retore e filologo di stampo antico in Occidente" zu Cassiodor, Goteborg 1983, trad. ital. di D. Gianotti, Roma 1988, p. 208), Cristianesimo latino e cultura classica da Tertulliano a Cassiodoro, adattandolo alia nuova realta la preoccupazione di salvare e trasmettere alia posterita, Le litterae saeculares, storica e ambientale, il patrimonio spirituale della classicita. loro nella subordinate in Cassiodoro alia vera Sapientia, sono tuttavia "garantite ne recupera e ne autenticita proprio dalla nuova sistemazione gerarchizzante, che

aweile

in

Cassiodoro, che e

(H. Hagendahl, Von

"1

Tcrtullian

Reductio ad philosophiam

E

matematiche

delle discipline

45

che

vero

nel contesto programmatico della cultura cristianofondamentale medievale, insegnamento di Agostino alle conclusioni bonaventuriane del XIII secolo, piu che sulla reductio artium ad dal

philosophiam le

ad theologiam,

discorso verte sulla reductio

il

rappresentano un

arti liberal!

nel senso che

efficace base preparatoria

intellezione

all

delle Scritture e alia contemplazione degli arcana Dei. Cassiodoro aderisce

pienamente al canone della gerarchizzazione delle arti e delle discipline culminano nella teologia. 5 Ma, quando a proposito del suo

che

orientamento

programmatico, parliamo di reductio ad philosophiam, intendiamo rilevare che il maestro di Vivarium, senza prospettare alcuna

forma

di

matematiche

scienze

delle

ancillarita

delle

(cioe

discipline

canoniche del quadrivio medievale) alia filosofia, conferisce ad esse un supporto se non proprio un ruolo filosofico, naturalmente nel senso ricordato, perche, per defmizione, Paritmetica, la musica, la geometria e

astronomia confluiscono o piu propriamente sono le componenti essenziali e costitutive della filosofia teoretica. Cassiodoro segue a riguardo una 1

linea in parte divergente dalla lezione agostiniana.

ad philosophiam

reductio artium delle

discipline

scientifiche

all

si

deve intendere

la

una progressiva ascensione

Sommo

di Dio, in cui si placa ogni

dell

et

si

6

del

agostiniana

potrebbe

disciplinarum,

disciplina

carattere

preparatorio

della verita

filosofica.

raggiungimento enuncia la definizione

classica,

humanarumque

in

riconduce

la

matematiche

finalizza

-

culturale",

Flavio

rerum,

1

arti

di sofferta ricerca

dell

uomo.

la filosofia ars

che e

la

intellettiva, del

la

segua delle

artium traccia

discipline

al

allorche in prima istanza ne

Ma,

Cassiodoro,

humanae

res

dell acquisizione

e

origine

come egregiamente

Magno Aurelio

delle

ambito

nobilitandone

sembrare delle

anima

compendiandola nella formula di divinarutn quantum homini possibile est, probabilis scientia?

conoscenza nell

Ipponese, per

funzione propedeutica

forma

posa ogni ansia esistenziale del cuore Quando Cassiodoro denomina genericamente

dell intelletto,

1

attingimento del certo e del vero, per

conquista finale, in

Vero, cioe

Secondo

si

giustificandone

esprime G. Arico,

cit.,

e

quindi

presenza

-

il

"Cassiodoro

e

la

la

delle

discipline

Considerando

filosofica.

la

messaggio etico e cultura

latina",

in

p. 172.

Per una chiara e precisa valutazione della quaestio, cfr. T. Gregory, reductio artium ad theologiam da Cassiodoro a S. Bonaventura", in // pensiero pedagogico del Medioevo, a c. di B. Nardi, Firenze 1956, pp. 279-301. "La

:

Cassiodori

Senatoris,

(repr. 1961), p. 110.

7

Ibid.

Institutiones

(II,

3,5),

Per ogni ulteriore citazione

si

edited

by R.A.B. Mynors, Oxford 1937

fara riferimento a questa edizione.

D

46

tradizionalc

dclla

triadica

ripartizione

Elia

filosofia

in

impcctiva (trasposizione latina dclla tcrminologia grcca: AO^CKT), tfewp-nxcK-n), occorre notare chc e proprio

o tcoretica), che, trascendendo

tiva

attingere

dell attivita

Ora

spcculativa.

da Cassiodoro

prefcrenza

doctrinalis (in greco

8

-

(visibilia)

per

una

secondo di

Ermia,

esscnzialmcnte

comprcndc

la

piu

seguita

a

philosophic!

qualc, connotandosi propriamcntc

la

/ja#7)/_iaTLK7)),

.

Cremone

avec

traduit

dans Pouvrage galenique et, a de Dominicus Gundisalvi, dans le De scientiis d al-Farabi. Un 1 instar meme mot arabe et un meme mot latin renvoient ainsi a deux notions Constance hilat

a

par ingenium

fois

la

19

d autre part. de mechane grecques, celle de methodos d une part, celle L une et 1 autre contiennent, certes, le sens d astuce et de ruse, mais le

repond sans doute a une autre "une machine (hilat) est tout logique. Ainsi que le rappelle George Saliba, d accomplir des procede qui permet de surmonter la resistance naturelle et 20 Pour naturelle". la tendance a contraires Galien, traduit de actions

mot en arabe

choix d un seul

en

et

latin

arabe par Gerard de Cremone, "Yintentio ingeniandi sanitatis n est rien d autre que de restaurer la sante dans les corps malades, c esl-a-dire de 21 II s agit aclion des membres". trailer toul prejudice survenant dans 1

1

ulilisanl les moyens propres a une dans perspective aristotelicienne, en tentant techne, d actualiser des principes existant en potentialite.

aussi d aller a

1

encontre d un processus en

c est-a-dire,

la

Les medecins

De

scientiis

d al-Farabi,

universcls

principes

qu

ils

XIV e

XV e siecles

et

a

generalement

connaissent

des

propos

connaissance a Iravers

la

savoir

le

el

,

citent

au medecin:

necessaires

verlus

e des XIII

italiens

livres

les

le

deux des

acquis par une longue obscrvalion de 22 II n est

Faction des medicaments dans de nombreux corps particuliers. alors

V ingenium

^

d imaginer

impossible

pas

la

et

sanitatis

qu

ils

aient

etabli

un parallcle entre

ingeniomm (ou science des machines)

scientia

sont adresses a que les Nawadir d Ibn Masawayh mcntionnes ci-dessus celui-ci est en train de traduire le Therapeutike methodos. On ou un moment Hunayn achevement du abandonne pas, 6 mon fils, en effet, a la fin des Nawadir: lit service que tu rendras au commun des hommcs et par lequel tu rejouis mon ame, grace au livre, d une importance considerable et d une grande utilite, dont tu as entrepris la aide de Dieu et traduction en arabe, livre que composa cclui qui fut assiste de

Signalons a

1

"N

1

langue solidement verse dans

DJacquart

et

la

sagesse,

G.Troupeau,

1

op.cit.,

eminent Galien, qui p.222). Le traducteur

1

intitula latin

Kitab hilat al-bur

rend

le

litre

de

1

(ed.

ouvrage

galenique par Megategni. 19 I

Cf.

R.Bourgne,

du

histoire

(CNRS), 20

"Mechanastai"

"Mechane",

vocabulaire

dans Platon, de la national

chez

n8,

Institut

mechanical

devices

scientifique,

Documents langue

pour

franchise

1986, p.9-31.

G.Saliba,

The

function

of

in

medieval

Islamic

society,

dans

Annals of New York Academy of sciences, 1985, p.14-51. 21

22

Ms.Paris, Bibl.nat.,

Cette

citation

lat.

d al-Farabi

Conciliator de Pietro d practica").

11860, XlV^s.J.Wlrb. (De ingenio sanitatis

Abano

est

des

(Diff.IV,

plus

1,5).

dans le repandues; elle figure notamment medicina non sit theorica ostenditur sed

"Quod

La d al-Farabi,

notion

d ingenium dans demarches

deux

les

adaptation des corps naturels a subir

la

medecine medievale

une

necessitant

action concue par

69

une

preparation,

esprit humain: "Ingeniorum yero scientia est scientia preparations ad faciendum convenire omnia quorum modi demonstrantur in doctrinis quarum narratio preteriit cum sermone et demonstratiqne super corpora naturalia et in acceptione eorum et situ ipsorum in eis actu 1

1

.

Le reside

principal

dans

la

obstacle

difficulte

a

de

la

la

fiabilite

de

mesure,

celle-ci

la

"machine

devant

XIV e

medecine medievale, a Pintensite des qualites. Au resume toute connaissance en Foligno constate: "en

medecin

laquelle le

de

quantite 24

estimative".

therapeutique"

s

appliquer,

siecle,

cette

en

Gentile da

science pour

un jugement sur une mesure determinee extensive est conjecturale ou arbitraire ou

doit emettre

intensive

ou

Arnaud de

Villeneuve,

dont

les

25 Aphorismi de gradibus

proposent, en se fondant sur al-Kindi, une methode mathematique pour calculer 1 intensite des qualites contenues au sein des medicaments

composes et pour en determiner le dosage precis, insiste sur le probleme de la mesure dans son commentaire au De malitia complexionis diverse de Galien: definition de la malitia complexionis diverse en general est bien exposee ci-dessus; c est en effet une qualite non naturelle en acte, alterant le membre et corrompant sa complexion naturelle. Cette consideration n est utile a Vingenium samtatis, vers lequel cette science est ordoimee, que pour connaitre la virtus de la cause responsable de la sante cette connaissance est des plus faciles et tres banale; en revanche mesurer la virtus de cette cause est difficile et demande une evaluation a 1 aide de 1 art (artificiali "La

estimatione)" .

En

savoir que telle fievre est chaude en general ne suffit pas; il en determiner la qualite et sa variation depuis le point de depart

effet,

faut

enim ad operandum potius regulabitur jusqu au point d aboutissement: 27 artifex, etenim opus istud ad ingenium sanitatis ordinatur". "Sic

A.Gonzalez Palencia

Catalogo de las ciencas, Madrid-Grenade, 1932 de Gerard de Cremone).

(ed.), Al-Farabi,

(reed., 1953), p.154 (traduction

24

Comm. au Canon d Avicenne, omnium fere scibilium in hac arte vel Ex3.

ed. Venise, 1520, t.I, f.32 (question scientia possit haberi certa cognitio").

M.R.Mc.Vaugh, Amaldi de VManova Opera medico omnia

II,

"Dubitatur

utrum

Grenade-Barcelone,

1975. ^f\

Commentum

Ballester et

super tractatum Galieni De malicia complexionis diverse, ed. L.Garcia E.Sanchez Salor, Amaldi de Villanova Opera medica omnia XV, Barcelone,

1985, p.164-5.

27 Ibid., p.224.

70

Jacquarl

L

e du De ingenio sanitatis de Galicn, au cour dcs XIII et donnc a ingenium associe a curativum ou curationis ou

assimilation

XIV c siecles, d autres

un sens precis en medecinc:

semblablcs

termcs

il

s agit

de

indissociable des principes 1 approche thcrapeutique dans son ensemble, le universels de la science naturellc dont elle est 1 application dans

domaine du la

reflexion,

passces,

la

particulier. Cette

observation dcs signes presents,

1

decision

traductions de

1

et

la

choix

le

le

septieme partie 2* Dans

Colligct

de

la

du

D

traitement.

autres

ou a ses derives dans une

d Averroes, traduit a

medecine

la

connaissance livresque,

souvenir des experiences

le

detaille

memc mot

arabe rccourent au

perspective semblable. Dans

XlII e siecle,

demarche cnglobe

est

la

nommce

fin

du

ingenium

le Grabadin du pseudo-Mesue, ingcniatio rcmotionis egritudinum. des mesures destinees, par exemple, a trailer une qualifie 1 ensemble action sur la matiere rcsponsable (dont un Cela

comprend

plcuresie.

1

suivant la nature humorale ou vcnteuse de regimen ingeniatimm variable la cause), la correction des accidents, un regime d accompagncment.-

Grace

a

emploi

1

mot ingenium,

du

pour

qualifier

une

facultc

nombre de mcdecins

mentalc ou une operation, il semble qu un certain aient pu eviter impasse dans laqucllc les menaient 1

questions du type:

"La

medecine

est-elle

a 1 theorique ou pratique?". Grace d autres contextes (en particulier

insensiblement passer de 1

la

le

plus souvent les

une science ou un

art?",

"Est-clle

dans ambiguite du termc, a son emploi che/, al-Farabi), les auteurs pouvaient

science a

1

art,

de

la

theorie a la pratique, de

universel au particulier, sans avoir a justifier leur

demarche d un point

de vue philosophique.

Centre National dc

28

Opera latin

Scicntifique, Paris

Mesue, s.l, 1541, 1,2,2. On ne connait pas le a pas etc retrouve a ce jour. original arabe n

divi loannis

de ce texte dont

Recherche

L.I, c.l et L.I.

Ed. Venise, 1497,

29

la

1

nom du

traducteur

JEAN JOLIVET

Lc jcu dcs

sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers

Jean de Salisbury resume en deux phrases la methode pratiquee par Gilbert dans son travail scientifique, et particulierement en theologie: "scion

requetes de son sujet

les

des ressources de toutes

usait

il

les

sachant qu en chaque domaine toutes choses dependent de aide qu elles se pretent mutuellement. II considerait en effet que les

disciplines, 1

disciplines sont liees les la theologie;

son 1

il

1

genre

unes aux autres,

et

mettait au service de

les

il

maintenait aussi les regies de chacune dans

Ce

.

propre"

texte

associe

un domaine

assignation a chcune d

la

les limites

des

pluralite

sciences,

connexions qui font demande en fait pour

particulier, et les

de leur ensemble un systeme; clair en surface, il etre compris entierement une analyse que nous allons tenter de faire en nous bornant aux

de

ici,

dont Gilbert parle le plus souvent et autrement que par allusions; ce sont les seules sans doute que Jean avail en tete.

L enumeration

trois sciences

des

sciences

theoretiques

(scientie

speculative)

est,

du moins dans ses grandes lignes, un des points les mieux connus de la pensee de Gilbert; je veux dire, un de ceux qui sont le plus souvent cites. Rappelons-en cependant science

la

2

(theologica)

.

1

essentiel.

y a

II

la

science naturelle (naturalis), science

la mathematique (mathematical Cette enumeration est reprise du De

Gilbert suit encore

quand

il

enumere

les objets et

chacune de ces sciences. Elles se distinguent quant a celui de la physique (nous appellerons dorenavant naturalis) "sans

[

est

"en

mouvement

non

et

separe";

non

scpare";

de

celui

de

celui

la theologie,

1

objet,

en ce que

ainsi

la

la

scientia

mathematique,

"sans

mouvement

16 20 "

Historia

cohibebat

ed.

R.

L.

Poole,

Oxford,

28

"Utebatur, prout res quippe sciens auxiliis mutuis Habebat enim connexas disciplinas casque theologie servire faciebat,

Pontificate,

exigebat, omnium universa constare. et

mouvement et

theologique

de Boece, que methodes respcctifs de

Trinitate

adminiculo

omnium

disciplinarum,

regulas infra proprii generis

in

1927,

limitem".

The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, Les citations des commentaires de Gilbert 1966, 8(T .

suivait renverront

dorenavant a cette edition.

:

singulis

ed. et

N.M. Haring, Toronto, du texte de Boece qu il

J olivet

72 3

ct

une expression de Boece, ajoute sont "exterieurs", ceux de la

Gilbert, sollicitant d ailleurs

.

separc"

les

pour sa part que mathematique,

objets de la physique

4

ceux de

et

"interieurs",

la theologie,

"secrets"

.

Quant a

la

done discursivement methode, la physique procede rationaliter, raisonnant sur

les

subsistants,

disciplinaliter,

par une Tous les

etres

les

c est-a-dire

par

la

concrets;

la

abstraction;

mathematique theologie,

procede

intellectualiter,

sont en eux-memes separes specifique des etres qui ne sont pas capables de ces sciences, et selon leurs .

intuition esprits

celle de ils se rangent en une hierarchic parallele a capacites respectives 6 de interet seul rappeler, pour la Ce bref tableau n a pas le leurs objets .

du

commodite

lecteur,

connues.

bien

choscs

des

II

semble

surtout

contenu essentiel du texte de Jean de Salisbury cite plus differences quant a haul: s il y a entre les sciences theoretiques de telles acuite la methode, la dignite, et meme 1 objet, la saisie des choses, les accrocher s done ou peuvent d esprit que chacune requiert, tenu etre ne peut Gilbert y aurait vues? Pourtant Jean "connexions"

contredire

le

1

que

et de fait, nous allons le voir, ces connexions pour un mauvais temoin; de Gilbert a sont evoquees en de nombreux passages des commentaires

Boece.

Avant de au

De

les

commentaire examiner, considerons quelques lignes du de

voisines

Trinitate,

remuneration des

qu on

celles

trois sciences.

On

y

lit

dcja citees:

a

une

suite

ellcs

precedent de dichotomies ou le

ce qu il annonce, et choix des termes est particuliercment significatif en rencontrerons nous plus loin. en quelque facon prepare, un resultat que sont soil Voici done I essentiel de ce nouveau tableau: les sciences

theoretiques

c cst-a-dire

(theorice),

speculates

c est-a-dire concernant pratiques (practice),

1

(speculative),

soil

action (active). Les sciences

5 13 6-7. Ce classement 85-91. 57-61. de Boece cst en 371 texte c g5 85 80 1026 a 13notamment combinatoi re remonte evidemment a Aristote, Metaphysique, E, 1, conformement a la tradition la 16 On laissc de cote la question de savoir s il faut lire, ou est un temoin, "non separes" (akhorista, inabstracta) plus ancienne dont Boece 3

,

moderne correction la selon deviendrait abstracta), qui et une trouvera une bibliographic resumee de la question Physique porte-t-elle sur traditionnclle dans V. Decarie, la lecon de justification Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, 38 (19 des non-separes dans Etudes aristoteliciennes. Metaphysique et Theologie, Vrin, 1985, 7-9). 468 (khbrista,

"separes"

1848)

(Schwegler

ce

On

"La

",

(repris

4 5 6

Exterioribus, interioribus, intimis:

86

16

-87

45 ;

23 45

Boece 371

42 6T

"

184

Trinitate,

ce passage n est plus, mais aux Hebdomades. ;

;

Boece, 369

14 - 17

comme

les

precedents, dans

le

commentaire au De

Le jeu des speculatives

"s

sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers

unes

les

appellent",

physiques

73

c est-a-dire

(phisice)

naturelles (naturales), les autres ethiqucs, c est-a-dire morales, les autres c est-a-dire

logiques,

souvent on appelle

Les

rationnelles.

"speculatives"

("que

sciences naturelles, que plus uno nomine naturales dicuntur que

etiam usu majore speculative vocantur") se repartissent en trois: une, sous le nom qui est universellement celui de toutes, est appelee "1

specialement naturelle dicitur

naturalis")",

theologique trois

Suivons

.

etages de ces

"naturelles",

designe,

"physiques",

et,

fil

les

appelle

nous observons sciences

sciences

dites

les

specifiquement,

1

des corps avec leur

matiere".

la

science

et,

mot:

ce

"naturelles";

sciences

trois,

la

"speculatives"

"theoretiques",

autrement

dites

celle

naturalis, "etudie

Remontons maintenant

par glissements successifs

synecdoques:

ou

trois

une des

mot

le

autrement

"physiques"

generiquement,

ceci:

un peu plus has Gilbert recopiant Boece,

le dira

specialiter

mathematique, et la troisieme, des sciences premieres nominees a chacun des s

divisions,

les

specifiquement,

comme

le

generiquement,

designe,

que universali omnium nomine

("una

autre

1

les

qui,

formes

cette

cascade de

naturelle

en vient a

apparaitre comme la science speculative ou theoretique par excellence, puisque son nom se donne aussi en commun aux trois sciences enumerees

d autre part qui les dit

qu en ce dernier usage

et

Boece,

par

il

equivaut

a

"speculative",

qui

applique aux sciences theoretiques dans la division premiere separe des sciences pratiques. Croyons Jean de Salisbury quand il s

que Gilbert

faisait servir toutes les sciences a la theologie;

mais nous

retiendrons que sa nomenclature donne a la physique une place privilegiee. Cette presomption se confirme d un autre point de vue quand nous

abordons

commentaire du passage ou Boece examine

le

des predicaments. specialites

Des

scientifiques

choses dont

les

1

attribution a

Dieu

premieres lignes Gilbert expose que certes

(facilitates)

sont

diverses

"selon

les

genres

les

de

en est une, c est la physique, qui y est traite", mais qu au plus pres du langage usuel et est la source premiere des 8 Les lignes transpositions analogiques de termes d une discipline a 1 autre se

il

il

tient

.

suivantes en donnent quelques exemples:

proprement en physique (quantus (transferuntur) 7

79

43

quantum

et qualis

en mathematique (quanta

homo

et quale, qui se disent

vel lapis} se transposent

et qualis

lined)

et

en theologie

56

-80

.

o

secundum genera rerum de quibus in ipsis agitur diverse naturalis, que in humane locutionis usu promptior transferendorum sermonum proporcionibue prior"; 115 "...cum

tamen

facultates

est,

scilicet

.

sint...

est

et

una in

74

J olivet

et

(quantus

de

transfere

la

La

notammcnt.

Deus),

quails

oppose blancheur et

qui

physique,

de

relation

blanc

le

et

contrariete

se

a

la

le

noir,

la noirceur, et a la theologie mathematique, qui oppose la 9 entame le commentaire de la Puis Gilbert le mal bien et le qui oppose .

des predicaments reproduite par Boece; nous lirons de plus pres

le

debut de ce passage, la ou sont etudiccs la substance, puis la qualite la quantite: nous y verrons mieux les rapports entre la physique et

et

liste

la

mathematique, quant aux transpositions de mots. * * *

Commencons

par

le

second

de qualitas

cas, celui

et quantitas:

ainsi

nomme

les

Bocce. Ces mots propres aux "mathematiciens" designent le les quantites plus general de toutes les qualitcs et toutes

le

genre

elles resident sont respectivemcnt. Celles-ci font que les subsistants ou

Or

qualia et quanta. tant

qu

ils

qualitas et quale, quantitas et

deux a

sont,

mathematique ou

la

deux,

"les

participation

noms

qui

quantum, different en

exprimcnt

abstraction

1

(mathcmatice abstractions,

physique"

naturalis participations}; mais cctte difference ne fait pas de qualitas et

ou

quale,

de

diversa)

.

"Genre",

comme

abstrait,

le

ct

genres differents" (genera quantum, notons-le, nc doit pas etrc compris ici au sens le plus premier tcrme de la liste porphyricnne des prcdicables,

quantitas

10

"des

mais au sens de genre de Petre, categoric: c est bien la meme categoric ou par quantitas ct quantum. qui est signifiee par qualitas et par quale, Mais cette coincidence dans le meme genre n empechc pas unc difference dans

la

couples

"de

:

que

impossible

clairemcnt pas 9

qu on prend un ou autre des termes de ces ce dont on peut prediquer quelque chose, il est

predication, selon 11

7 18

tout soit ici

predique

1

1

le

de rapports de

genre classes

de -

cela

a

12 meme"

II

.

"

115

;

nous avons

de cote quclques allusions a la politique exemple donnc a la 1. 12 est surprenant.

laissc

la

logique (in rationalibusy, 46-54 10

1

ne

s agit

moins qu on n accepte de

(in

civilibus} et a

U6

11

Si

Ton

suit

le

Compendium Logicac Porretanum (mais dans

le

tcxte

qu on etudie

ici

Gilbert parait moins strict) ce n est qu en physique que Ton peut parler a la rigueur de naturalibus proprie praedicamentum did predicaments et de predication: tantum in est Tinstrument de la predication un et predicament ), potest (78 (instrumental 11 4 ); dans les autres "facultes" on n a que des "quasi-predicaments" (78 oraedicgndi; 4 2 ils cites: nommement sont mathematici ou les genres et 78 -79 distinguent subsistants qui sont, nous le savons, objet propre cspeces en se fondant sur ccux des "leurs"

,

;

1

des naturales}. Voir Compendium Logicae Porretanum, ed. S. Ebbesen, K.M. Fredborg, L.O. Nielsen, Copenhague, 1983 ("Cahiers de Institut du Moyen Age et latin", 46). 1

12 "De

]1759-60_

quocumque enim

est genus aliquid praedicatur, impossibile

ejusdem

praedicari";

Le jeu des

sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers

faire

soutenir a Gilbert que

peut

lui

attribuer

"animal".

et

quantum]

(quale,

le

en

s agit

genre

dont

categoric)

(la

a Socratc,

"hommc"

du rapport entre

fait

du rapport entre

c est-a-dire

quantitas)\

Ton attribuc

si

II

75

les

objets

releve

il

et

on ne

le predicat

(qualitas,

pratiques de deux

mathematique degage les formes abstraites, par exemple la blancheur, et la physique enonce la participation de cette 13 forme par un subsistant en lui attribuant le predicat La regie

sciences

differentes:

la

"blanc"

enoncee par Gilbert dire

s

precisent:

on ne peut

interprete ainsi: Socrate est blanc, mais

Les rapports entre outre ceux qu on a deja enumeres est

"Socrate

.

les

blancheur".

methodes, difference entre

la participatio

deux sciences se

diversite

Vabstractio

et

d objets,

de

apparait une

-

autre difference, connexe de cette derniere et d ordre logico-grammatical,

concerne

la

mathematique

et

ellc

puisqu a

la

Compendium 14 "blanc"

la

physique entre

physique.

le

"se

relations

entre

(principale,

noms

la

telles

que

quantum

quantites

.

analyse la

les

mode

-

II

implique

s

la

d efficience la

que

termes de mathematique tout en y bornant 15

c est par abstraction

opere done un connaissance d une part, et d autre

et le

sumptum)

quantite au

comme

blancheur du blanc.

la

que mathematique renversement entre 1 ordre reel de

la

Si

comme

-

terminologie

de

la qualite

philosophic exprime en

de ces qualites et De ces relations extremement complexes ressort en derniere du moins par priorite reelle de la physique et de ses objets la realite

mathematique et aux siens. nous remontons maintenant de ces accidents a

rapport a

nomen

par exemple entre "blancheur" et avons vu plus haul, la contrariete constatee par la blanc et le noir transpose" en mathematique en

tire

grammaticale au quale, de

le

1

la

les

le lexique propre termes empruntes au

ce sont les rapports entre

contrariete entre la blancheur et la noirceur;

part

En

nomen sumptum,

le

Or, nous

.

de

celui

logicae porretanum,

et

principale

predication et les rapports entre

la

aurait

du nous y

inciter

d abord

1

la

substance,

ordre du texte de Gilbert, nous

Voir plus haul la naturalis participatio vs. la mathematica abstraction et, dans le commentaire aux Hebdomades: au sens strict un subsistant ne particioe aue de ses accidents, et non de ses genres et differences, lesquels constituent son esse (210 ). 68 - 69

14

Op.cit.n.11,26 vero in mathematicis omnium qualitatum generalissimum est; et quantitas quantitatum. Et sunt quod dicuntur non a causis que in ipsis intelligantur sed ab efficiendo ea, in quibus sunt, subsistencia, ille quidem qualia, ista vero quanta" "nichil enim naturalium nisi per causam et (116 souligne par moi). Cf. 241 "Qualitas

omnium

"

;

nichil

mathematicorum

;

nisi

per

efficiendi

potestatem concipi

potest".

Jolivct

76

trouvons une situation complexe aussi, mais d une autre facon. Le mot en effet n est pas tire "substance" genre des choses physiques" mais "du

d une

commune

"raison"

a tout ce qui est Vesse des subsistants, c est-a-

dire aux subsistances, pour etre dans

subsistances

et

aux

subsistants:

un second moment attribue

parce

qu

il

n existe

de

pas

et

aux

nom

qui

et incorporels, a pourrait etre attribue a tous les subsistants, corporels litre de leur nom le plus general en vertu de la subsistance qui leur est

commune,

souvent

mettent

Latins

les 16

a

cctte

place

vide

le

nom

dc

Ce texte presente plusieurs difficultes. II y est question d une metonymie qui va des subsistances aux subsistants: la physique en "substance"

est

done

-

.

point d arrivee et non

le

nous semblait facultas

compte

la

a

la

alors

En

etablie.

cette

second

metonymie

commune"

"raison

lieu Gilbert

etc

a

originc, par exception a la regie qui

1

instauree;

ne precise pas dans quelle physique prend-elle en

la

des subsistances?

C est

douteux; on pense

mathematique, qui opererait alors une double abstraction a

nous lisons un pcu plus loin que les partir des subsistants. D autre part mathematiciens rangent les "subsistances ou substances", simples ou animatio, humanitas

-

composees

sous un ou plusieurs des

-

"neuf

genres",

c est-a-dire des categories qui precisement ne sont pas la substance au sens que Gilbert vient de degager; il scmble en outre que ce soient les

logiciens

qui

aient

Un

en charge ces

pris

sont eux du moins qui

les

nomment 17

loin encore,

peu plus

"subsistances

ou

substances",

ce

.

nous

lisons

qu

il

n y a pas asse/ de

noms

noms sont pour que chaque chose ait le sicn, que pour cette raison des a d facullcs de certaine d une en vcrtu autres, analogic, "transferes", surtout a partir des choses naturcllcs (ct maxime a naturalibus)". Ainsi "et

nous disons que Dieu

nommc

"est

18

trcs

grand par

vers

la

quantitc" -

theologie

celui,

.

Dieu par substance, juste par

qualite,

semble bien maintenant que ce transfert precisement, du mot "substance" qui a ici le II

pour origine la physique. Cela nous remet dans une perspective connue mais ne peut entierement nous satisfaire. La

sens de

^

"subsistance"

"Hoc

nomen, quod

omnium que

sunt

esse

subsistenciis sed etiam

-

est

ait

substancia,

illis

quorum

a genere naturalium scd a communi ratione inditum est non solum illis que sunt esse i.e.

non

subsistencium, ipse

sunt esse

i.e.

omnibus

subsistentibus.

Quoniam

illorum corporalium et incorporalium subsistencium, quod ab subsistencia communi generalissimum esset, nomen non habetur, sepe Latini hoc pro eo

tamen omnium, ponunt";

17

18

.

\\(>

117 84_ U8

i.e.

96

et

Le jeu des

sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers

theologie,

manquant d un

meme

cmprunte parce qu

a

1

certain tcrme, il

cmprunte a

1

la

77

manquait, mais toutefois pour signifier

lui

ramene

aulre chose: enchainement de catachreses done, mais qui nous

notre interrogation:

oil

nom

le

elle-

physique qui

constitue?

s est-il

originel

a

semble, tout

II

bien pese, que ce soil dans la mathematique, operant en quelque sorte au

second degre; nous avons

mathematique a

Un

la

un

transfert, mediatise par la physique,

de

la

la theologie.

couple de concepts voisins de celui de substance, puisque ce sont

concepts d individualite, ou diversite numerique, et de nature, pose d une autre facon la question des rapports entre la physique et la les

que ces concepts autorisent ou non dans chacune de ces deux sciences. Car (c est ici Boece qui parle) on dit:

theologie, par le biais des inferences

le

Pere

Fils et

a

est

le Fils est

Dieu,

Esprit saint sont

1

inference

cette

Dieu,

un

1

Esprit saint est Dieu, done le Pere, le

Dieu

seul

celle

theologique

non

et

qui

trois dieux. Gilbert

en

vaut

oppose

(secundum

physique

naturalium rationem): Platon est homme, Ciceron est homme, Aristote est homme, done Platon, Ciceron et Aristote sont trois hommes, et non un scul

homme

dans

la singularite

de sa subsistance. Cette opposition reflete

regies de la logique propre a chacune des deux sciences la difference en leurs objets respectifs, des rapports entre la nature et la diversite numerique. Cette diversite est reelle, que Ton parle de trois

dans

les

hommes ou qu on a

citees le predicat:

Mais dans

diversis).

repete

des trois Personnes de

signifie

en

le fait

dans chacune des premisses affirme de plusieurs sujets (de

la Trinite:

homme, Dieu

est

cas de la premisse physique le predicat trois fois a

chaque

des natures differentes

fois

naturas; de alio aliud dicitur); en thcologie au contraire 1

des termes et de leur signification

de noms

differentes

predique:

et

chacun

dans

nom

Pere, le Fils et

1

des

Ciceron,

Platon,

repetition du

et

de

la

trois

il

("homme"

sujets

Aristote);

chose

Esprit, dont

la

la

("Dieu"

est

de

sujets". point de vue proposition physique s analyse en

de choses

diversite

(diversas

singularite

Au

essence trois fois prediquee est jointe aux trois

identite

"la

dont

signifiant des natures il

est

proposition

signifie la

meme

successivement theologique,

essence dans

successivement predique).

Au

en le

point de

vue ontologique 1 analyse de la proposition physique implique la doctrine de la confortnitas\ selon celle-ci, Gilbert le dit ailleurs, les subsistances sont diverses dans des sujets divers, de sorte qu a la pluralite des

correspond

cependant

une de

dire

pluralite

qu

ils

d humanites, sont

"un

leur

homme"

conformite

hommes

permettant

(specifiquement:

"diverses

78

Jolivct

la

implique -

On

une

sont

subsistances

Panalyse de

comment une

ici

la

proposition theologique

entre les trois Personnes

indifferentia,

"non-difference",

clairement

voit

espece");

logique de

la

19 .

se

physique peut

opposer a une logique de la theologie: se comparer parce qu elles ont en commun les concepts d unite, de diversite, d essence communaute du moins formclle ou fonctionnclle, pour ce dernier concept; et s

comparer

opposer parce que leurs contenus respectifs ne sont pas homogenes 1 un a autre. Or ces relations entre ces deux sciences se projettent egalement

s

1

un jeu

dans

d identite

de

et

axiomes: leurs rationes et leurs

entre

diversite

sujet,

les

la

communes

"raisons"

fait

dcs

Gilbert formule avec une

souvent quel que diverses

done

les

son

soil

Dans

sciences.

comme

choses se passent parfois

parfois de facon differente;

dans

le

les

conceptions de

la

mathematiquc ne doivent etre, en theologie, ni toutes il faut done marquer quelles sont les raisons

la

a toutes ces sciences, et celles qui sont propres a chacune

en d autres termes,

Trinitate,

le

il

ni toutes refusees:

acceptees

Ou

de

et

les

les

theologie

autres sciences,

physique

entre

rapports

domaine de

comme

abstraite,

leurs

et

"raisons"

regiilae.

Dans son commentaire du Contra Euticen grande precision

leurs

bien

"ou

comme

il

des raisons qui

lui

philosophie des

hommes permet que

ce discernement experience",

1

ccrit

"est

comme

.

De

dans son commentaire au

theologie dans sa majeste revendique pour sont propres, ou bien quelque analogic entre

la

20

elle seule elle et la

certaines leur soient communes"

21 .

Or

d une philosophie trcs perspicace et de longue dit a la fin du passage du Contra Euticen qu on

le fait il

le

vient de citer: c est pourquoi

beaucoup d hercsies en matierc de theologie

phrase cc pajragranhc reprcnd, en en modifiant la Notre analyse finale repose sur un passage dc Gilbert: 72 -73 multa unum dici contingit, vel conformitatc aliqua, qualiter plures "scpe homines dicuntur unus homo quoniam scilicet qui suis suhsistcntiis, que a mathematicis nominari possunt humanitatcs, sunt homines et earum numerali pluralitate plures, mais la carundem conformitate similes ct similitudine sunt conformes", 16/

Jusqu a

disposition cet autrc:

son

avant-derniere

interne,

.

"

;

conformitc diversas,

autant

implique,

immo

que

la

rcsscmblance,

numero

quia conformes ergo

la

diversas, a

diversite:

se

"conformes

invicem

natures",

72

tamcm ".

A

rapprocher du premier texte cite dans cette note, celui-ci: "diverse ... subsistentie que Voir encore 78 Y indifferentia comme raison propre a la theologie. una sunt species", 75 :

.

de rebus creatis intelligi volumus. In theologicis enim enim omnia aliqua quidem similiter, aliqua vero aliter esse sequentia nos docebunt. Non ncque nulla que in naturalibus aut mathematicis intelliguntur, in theologicis accipienda sentimus: ideoque subtilissime atque exercitatjssime philosophie esse communes utrisque ct proprias singulorum rationes notare"; 294 "Sed

hec

omnia non

nisi

"

.

majestas sibi proprias yendicat theologice quas philosophie ad ipsam qualiscumque proportio communes admittit"; 53 "...rationibus

vel

"

.

vel

humane

Le jeu des

sciences theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers

d un mauvais usage dcs raisons, scion qu on a etendu a

trinitaire resultent

une seule ou qu on

plusieurs specialites des raisons qui etaient propres a

comme

en a considere toutes

du

22 .

De

Gilbert en

Trinitate

79

une

a

propres

seule,

qui

une sorte de deduction dans

fait

a

second prologue

le

Soient d abord deux raisons propres a

.

communes

etaient

physique: a

la

proprietes diverses, subsistances diverses; une subsistance fonde un seul subsistant.

on

Si

a

transfere

les

la

theologie,

on

Arius,

rejoint

entre

d autres. Si outre ce transfer! on neglige aussi une raison qui vaut dans tous les "genres de choses": divers propres ne peuvent se rencontrer en une seule personne, on obtient Pheresie de Sabellius, et d autres. Ces

deux heresies qu on juge generalement inverses ont done selon Gilbert une racine commune, et, dit-il expressement, une conclusion commune: "concevant

correctement

la singularite

de

la divinite, ils

ont estime, selon

une raison propre aux physiciens, non seulement que le seul Dieu est un, mais encore que Dieu est seul en son unicite" 24 "Maintenant, d autres ont .

compris,

correctement,

le

que

le

Pere,

Personnes numeriquement diverses du dirons-nous,

car,

ils

une raison propre a sont

la

De

subsistances.

conclu que

cette

ont,

meme

de

raison

commune

des

sont

saint

Esprit

diverses"

-

a tous les genres

Arius, transpose a la theologie

mais d essence semblable

sont

numeriquement diverses

1

la premiere ils ont n etaient Esprit pas de meme essence

Parmi ceux-ci

.

leurs

indument jointe a

Pere, le Fils et

le

comme

1

physique: les proprietes de sujets numeriquement

et

diverses,

il

et

de leurs proprietes

fait

ont retenu cette raison

qu a oubliee Sabellius; mais divers

Fils

certains

retiennent la raison

propre a la physique selon laquelle des caracteres divers sont attaches aux subsistances diverses d un subsistant unique: chez le meme homme par exemple,

la

connaissance a

Dieu

le fait

couleur a

la

la

rationalite;

d etre

corporeite, ils

attribuent

la

passion a

done a

Pere, a sa sagesse d etre le

le

hcc quidem propter imperitos, qui diversarum communicant proprias aut appropriant communes, tetigimus"; 294 "Et

23

58

40

-61

la

sensibilite,

la

toute-puissance de

la

a sa bonte d etre

Fils,

facultatum

rationcs

aut

.

15 .

quidem omnes, de divinitatis singularitate recte sentientes, juxta naturalium rationem opinaji sunt non modo quod unus sit Deus solus verum etiam quod solus unus sit Deus"; 60 L essence divine etant commune aux trois Personnes, chacune d elles a Punicite divine, et reciproquement: point qu Arius et Sabellius ont, selon la theologie catholique, differemment mais egalement meconnu. "Et

hi

.

de Macedonius: le Pere et le Fils sont un seul Dieu; Esprit n est pas Dieu, mais n a aucune substance.

La-dessus se greffe substance ou essence et

commune aux

deux, et

il

1

heresie

sont

1

de la

meme divinite

80

1

Jolivet

comme

diverses

congoivent done un Dicu

ils

Esprit saint;

De des

theologie trinitairc

la

d Abelard

avcc des essences

On

des parties diverses.

elles etaient

si

point principal de

"triforme",

a reconnu la

le

26 .

ces divers textes retenons sculement que la theologie a certes

raisons

sont

lui

qui

mais qu y ont aussi leur place des

propres,

raisons qui valent en d autres sciences; a vrai dire Gilbert ne cite que des raisons physiques. Reduite a ses lignes principales, la theologie trinitaire

deux doctrines:

se concentre en 1

essence

de

Boece a expose

dit Gilbert,

seconde

celle

et

divine"

des

selon

Hebdomades

il

fait

"la

la

raisons

de

celle

de

singularite et simplicite

"la

nombrable des

diversite

or,

Personnes";

premiere selon des raisons theologiques, la 27 Dans son commentaire des physiques .

a plusicurs reprises

remarquer

que seule

est

propre a

la theologie la septieme des regies enoncces par Boece: "tout simple omne simplex esse suum et concentre en un seul son etre ct ce qu il 2 id quod est unum habet ^. Cette regie concerne exclusivemcnt 1 essence est",

divine. Mais, redisons-le, la theologie

qui

principes

ailleurs aussi,

que nc

laissait

propres,

ne se referme pas sur une serie de en accueille qui sont valides

elle

notamment sinon exclusivement en physique. Voici done une

de plus que

fois

seraient

lui

theoretiques admettent des communications

les sciences

pas prevoir

premiere presentation qui en a etc donnee.

la

* * *

Jusqu

nous

ici

n avons

considere,

en

fait

de

rapports

entre

la

theologie, que des cas ou les objets de chacune de ccs physique sciences etaient pris independamment 1 un de 1 autre. Nous allons et

maintenant

qu

ils

la

examiner

les

sont, respectivement,

relation

1

endroit ou Gilbert qui

ces

commente

concerne Yesse

qu en Dieu

et

comme

occasion pour presenter quelque chose que se font

les

26

194

86-89.

199

19-20

apparaissent

en

tant

Crcateur, done dans cette est-a-dire la communication de est tire

des Hebdomades, a

seconde des regies formulecs par Boece: Yid quod est en leur diversite (leur unite la

nous venons de

la

rappelcr).

II

en prend

conceptions differentes dc Yetre et de Yetre

les

theologiens d une part, les philosophes de

Voir aussi 7$-79^: distinction entre raisons avec une refutation d Arius fondee sur ce principe. 27 26 29 61 -62 28

objets le

qu est la creation, c communication du bien. Le premier

etre et la

n etant

ou

creatures et

particuliere

1

celle

textes

trois

theologiques

et

raisons

physiques,

Le jeu des sciences

theoretiques selon Gilbert de Poitiers

81

29

nous Done, selon les premiers, quand nous disons "Dieu 1 essence or cette essence est Petre de toutes de Dieu divine, prediquons Pautre

.

est",

"Phomme dans des propositions comme corps une certaine denomination extrinseque (quadam exprime

les creatures:

cet etre est

"le

est",

"par

du

extrinseca denominatione) a partir de Pessence

Phomme. Cependant

le

Phomme,

corps,

En un

corporeite, par Phumanite.

qui en

soit,

est

lui

par

la

mot: tout subsistant, toute creature,

est

objets

etre

Pour certains

quelque chose: ainsi le verbe font des distinctions; selon eux

que ne

le

(dividii)

de ce a quoi

ni

predicat

y ajoute, a savoir par les

s

done equivoque. Plus reviendra

Gilbert

sur

cette II

31

.

quelque

chose,

ni

loin,

Petre-quelque-chose, pas plus

Done

entre

la

theologie et la

dans son commentaire de

difference

n ont en eux rien qui reellement ni analogiquement ils

proportione)\ toutefois certains d entre eux

contenu

rationnel"

pleine

"propriete

la

193 51. 194

30 "Illorum

principle esse

des

(ex

fasse etre

(nee

nee

re

constitues des parties de

"sont

-

ce

c est-a-dire,

premieres"

sont

la

d apres

le

subsistance singuliere de chacune, evoquee plus haut

-

et sa

77 vero

philosophorum

ceperunt...",

retrouve

dans

predicaments principaux Gilbert ne nomme pas

quibus

sue

facultatis

genera

la

sunt

sola

ilia

que ex

193

le -

commentaire du De substance,

qualite,

Trinitate

quantite

-

cette et

les philosophes qu il range dans premiere le nom d Aristote nous vient a de Gilbert lui-meme, a la suite de Boece.

pour

les

sue rationis partibus constant):

substances

la regie

propos des rapports entre une breve allusion au mode

a

meme

y fera

d etre des objets mathematiques:

classes;

predicaments

que Pabstraction mathematique separe

sont attribues

Petre et Petre-quelque-chose.

On

par leurs

d objet engendre des differences dans la nature du propositions d une science a celles de Pautre ce

des

"est";

predicat est

contexte,

subsistants sont

la difference

physique

etre

ni

Petre,

font tous les predicats ils

un predicat equivoque.

est

les

et leurs qualites; les sept autres

n attribuent a ces subsistants

29

il

equivalent de dire etre

est

il

"est"

mesures de leurs dimensions

leur

par un genre, quel qu

sien.

subsistances et sont quelque chose par ce qui

ni

quelque chose par une

,

D autres

7,

chose"

Quant aux autres philosophes, qui considerent leurs 30 ils se repartissent independamment du fait qu ils ont ete crees est

qui

sur ce point en deux ecoles. et

quelque

est

c est-a-dire

creee,

du corps, de

Principe"

"sont

par Pessence de son principe, qui est Dieu, et subsistance

est",

distinction

entre

les

trois

autres (voir p. 115-138). une et 1 autre de ces deux

les 1

1

esprit;

pour

la

seconde celui

82

J olivet

32 "subsistancc

Ces quclques

.

specifique"

lignes, qui

d aillcurs meriteraient

une analyse speciale, sont interessantes en ce qu elles mettent en jeu une science sur laquelle Gilbert ne

etend gucre:

s

s

il

interesse principalement

a la physique et a la theologie. etre des essence divine a complexe qui va de creatures s exprime au plan du langage par 1 equivocite du predicat Une analyse de meme allure decrit la relation entre le Bien qu est Dieu et

La

relation

1

1

"est".

bien qui est celui des creatures. On sail que Pobjet des Hebdomades de Boece est de fonder ontologiquement cette derniere attribution; la solution

le

creatures apporte a ce probleme se concentre en une phrase: 33 sont dites bonnes parce que leur etre a emane de la volontc du Bien"

qu

"les

il

.

Gilbert dans son commentaire a cctte phrase dcveloppc 1

la

mention de

une fa^on qui bien entendu evoque ses propres analyses, fait le entre la question du bien et celle de etre, et introduit dans son

etre d

lien

1

analyse linguistique un concept plus operatoire que se contentait plus haul a

il

des creatures

mais

subsistance],

question de dites

ce

aussi

et

subsistant],

non seulement ce qui

-

quoi etre

les

j

ai

est

cela

et

emane de

essence] a

1

1

bonnes par denomination

une interpretation que

que

par

encore

cclui d equivocite dont

provisoire sans doute:

titre

la

et

est

tout esse

qui est quelque chose

ou

est

quelque

chose

de

[le [la

la

Petre-quelque-chose

[rappel

volonte du Bien,

creatures sont

4 (denominative)"^ 35

proposee

"puisque

ailleurs

statuts ontologiques differents de

.

les

Je nc reprendrai pas

ici

Je relevcrai simplement

.

Dicu

et

de

la

creature, objets

trouvent respectifs de la theologie et de la physique, et leurs rapports, les dans le langage une expression dont Gilbert emprunte moyens a la rhetorique. Le mot denominative, que plus haul on a simplement

en

transpose

francais,

designe

en

realite,

comme

denominatio,

la

metonymie (qiiadam denominatione que Gracce methonomia vocatur) ou la 6 et non la paronymie comme chez d autres metalepse (transsumptio)^ ,

32

^^21-25 Q. g6 27-28. (es o kj ets ^ c moins d inherer a des subsistants". 1

"Iccirco

I^e

34 3^

quoniam

esse

eorum

raisonnement entier de Boece 220

est

a boni

en 382

j

a

malhcmatique

"ne

sont

voluntate defluxit, bona esse -383

Jolivet,

Aspects

de

la

pensce

medie\ ale: Abelard;

doctrines

Gilbert origines de la Logica Modernorum: contemporains, edite par J. Jolivet et A. de Libera, Napoli, 1987, 183-197.

36

dicuntur";

382

.

.

58 61

J.

1987,

absolumcnt rien a

293-311

220

71 - 72

Aux

(et

95 -

,221

%

du langage, de Poitiers

Paris, et

ses

Gilbert de Poitiers

Lejeu des sciences theoretiques selon

83

meme "poque.Entre la theologie et la physique s introduit mediation d un art du langage, en pleine clarte methodologique. Les analyses partielles dont ces deux textes nous ont donne

auteurs de la ici la

1

occasion nous ont achemine vers celle d un troisieme,

Trinitate.

On

En void

tire celui-ci

du De

la traduction:

pas de n importe quel sujet (de quolibet) qu il est par la propriete de son essence. Mais, de Celui qui est a proprement parler, par sa propre essence et non par une autre, a ce qui est quelque chose en vertu d une forme creee par Lui, a cette forme creee ellememe, et enfm a tout ce qu on peut vendiquement attribuer a ces choses (ad omnia que de ipsis vere dicuntur)^ puisque ces choses sont a partir de Lui comme de leur principe ce mot [est] se transpose par metonymie (dictio ista transsumitur) de sorte qu on est en droit de dire de chacune: elle est, par participation de la forme divine. Or cela n est pas sans rapport avec la fa?on de raisonner des physiciens (quod non otnnino a naturalium ratione diversum est},

ne

dit

puisqu en forme.

Ces

tout

physique

En

second

lieu,

D abord,

la

et

physique

communication

cette

subsistants

les

on peut cependant

lignes parlent d elles-memes,

quelques observations.

chez

etre

va

la

vient

faire a leur s

theologie

de

1

une

a

de

la

propos

y touchent. 1

autre

et

reciproquement, mais ce croisement ne se fait pas sur le meme plan. On va de la theologie a la physique sur celui de Pontologie, censee exprimer la realite des choses: 1 etre divin descend, pour s y infuser en quelque facon (on se rappelle

le

defluxit

des Hebdomades), dans les subsistants,

les subsistances et les accidents qui s y attachent.

chemin que

la

chose: c est par

sont, et cela implique

propositions

oii

le

que

mot

le

Et

le

mot

suit le

meme

metonymie qu on dit des creatures qu elles mot se trouve dans les

sens propre du

"Dieu"

est

sujet.

"est"

Mais inversement ce scheme

au plan des structures methodologiques, par avec le analogic principe de physique selon lequel Petre vient de la forme: c est sans doute parce que cette science a etabli ce point que les theologique

est

compris,

theologiens ont pu le transposer dans

dans ce texte

la leur.

On

meme

peut

apercevoir

mathematique, presence muette. Car la physique ne saisit pas bien un esse aliquid si la mathematique n en explicite le fondement: la causalite de la forme est percue en elle-meme par cette science-ci, et en la

"

formula presque analogue a la derniere phrase: On aura note que Gilbert n est pas constant dans sa fac,on de comprendre la participation (voir plus haul n. 13; et surtout 208 -210 ou toutefois il dit que la participation des accidents Test 88

8ali, 13 (1972), pp. 919-939; J. Preaux, comtnentaire de Martin de Laon sur oeuvre de Martianus Capella", Latomus, 12 (1953), pp. 437-459; C.E. Lutz (ed.), Dunchad: Glosae in Martianum, American Philosophical Ass. Monograph. XII, Lancaster 1943 e cfr. C.E. Lutz, lohannis Scotti Annotationes in

"Le

1

Marcianum, Cambridge

1939.

.

le loro glosse.

G. Constable (edd.), Renaissance and Renewal

Mediae\-al

Nequam

commento

il

che

salernitani. Si consideri poi

verra adottata dai salernitani. Inoltre nei

"Martianus

commentariorum:

il

soprattutto Alexander

e

,

dicono anche

nuptiis i

tra

commenti

i

successivamente di

Henri d Andeli4

sono rispondenze

Infatti vi

del

Silvestre,

98

Morpurgo 8

e presente quella forma di accessus che ritorna nolle glossule

Rcmigio

E

salemitane.

che

anonimi

De

al

che introduce

sara a qucsta tipologia,

rifaranno anche

si

lettore

il

nuptiis, quelle rappresentate dai mss. di

al

testo,

commenti

gli autori delle tre diverse tradi/.ioni di

Cambridge, Trinity

Roma, BAV, Barberiniano, lat. 10; e Ottoboniano lat. 3291. Si aggiunga che dal commento di Thierry di Chartres dipende il ms. di Avranches, Bibl. Mun. 226 contenente un altro testimone della College B.1.29; di

tradizione

commentarii

dei

Montecassino e conservato

E non

sara

maestri salernitani

erano formati

dai

centri

della

1

9

una dipendenza del XII secolo che si

ipotesi di

rinascita

Inghiltcrra e in Francia

in

un caso che a

poi

ms. 332 testimone di un ulteriore tradizione

Marziano. Sembrerebbe dunque che

di glosse a

dei

anonimi. il

possa avere una sua

validita.

Queste osservazioni confortano quanto dicevo su una possibile dipendenza

Mauro

dei maestri Bartolomeo,

quella

aveva ricordato

il

Ursone da una scuola parigina come commento alia Microtegni Ursone

Adam}

magistrum mciim

come Adamo

individuato

e

Pont. Proprio nel suo

Petit

di

di Petit Pont.

L

Adam

Questo

poteva cssere

un suo riscontro

ipotesi trovava

ncl fatto che Giovanni di Salisbury, tenace oppositore della dialettica dei

Parvipontani, aveva definito

i

sczione dedicata alia medicina. Infine offerto da Alexander

1175 e

1182

il

12

che

il

Baldwin,

Nequam

P.

Morpurgo, Italia

in

di

parigina

Petit

I.

Ilaskins,

Han ard

Studies in

filiorum

Ade

quam

Ed

il

veniva

ci

e

-

tra

nel

il

suo

corso di studi

che poi vcrranno identificati

19

(1960),

pp.

"Le

Social

Perspective",

in

R.L.

di Michclc Scoto e la circolazione dei manoscritti dipendenza della scuola medica salernitana da quella diffusione delle scienze islamiche nel Mcdioe\ o europeo,

traduzioni

meridionale: Pont",

A

in

La

la

Ace. Lincei, 1987, pp. 169-191.

-

C.I

testi

at Paris from 1179 to 1215: Renaissance and Renewal, Oxford 1982.

loannis Saresberiensis, Metalogicon, Lib. 12

ricorda quale fossa

"Masters

et al. (edd.),

scientifici

Roma

una

cfr.

J.W.

Benson

dato piu significative

Lutz, "One formula of accessus in Remigius Works", Latomus mss. Roma, BAV, Vat.I^at., 2743 e Firenze, Riccardiana, 916.

C.E.

Per

c era

questi nel suo soggiorno parigino

medicina elcncando esattamente quei

774-780;

9

Pont

di Petit

era stato alia scuola dei Parvipontani.

-

Saccrdos ad altare

Nequam,

il

11

dei pessimi filosofi.

sappiamo da Henri d Andeli che nella scuola

di piu

in

come

Salernitani

sed

list

of

Textbooks

I,

IV, p.13,14.

from

the

Close

of

the

Twelfth

Century",

Classical Philology, 20 (1909), 75-94, p.93: "Studium medicine usibus et tarn Aphorismos perutile subire quis desiderans audiat lohannicium,

Ypocratis, et Tegni Galieni et Pantegni. Huius translator Constantinus. Legal etiam, tarn particulares

Pronostica

Galienus

"A

opens

quam

auctor

est

universales,

Ysaac, et Libra Urinarum, et Viaticum Constantini cum Libra Pulsuum, et Dioscoriden in quibus de naturis herbarum cogitur." Dal ms. di Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College Lib. 385.

Dietas

I commenti salemitani 0// Articella

nome

col

di Articella

13 ,

ma

quel che e piu significative e che dice che

questo aweniva usibus filiorum Ade, dunque secondo di

Petit Pont.

II

99

fatto diventa

ancor piu rilevante se

usi della scuola

gli

considera che, in

si

questa del Nequam e la prima e 1 unica testimonianza di un curriculum analogo a quello usato dai commentatori salemitani. assoluto,

Per

avere

indicazioni

altre

scuola bolognese di

vediamo come

questi schemi

cosi

bisognera

esplicite

Taddeo Alderotti 14

attendere

del tardo sec. XIII.

nella tradizione dei

Galeno sino ad Alfano e Costantino Africano

la

Inoltre da

commentaria che va da

sia

assente

il

metodo

di

introduzione alle artes:

GALENO Commentaria

ed.

AGNELLUS RAVENNATIS,

Kuhn,

sec.

VI

Scolia Peri Hereseon Galeni

19, p.62

intentio

lOHANNITiyS

utilitas

Expositio Aforismi "

verus causa suprascriptionis ordo legendi habitus doctrine

I

al-Razi: In Isagoge

Alfano

di Salerno:

De pulsibus

particularis divisio

modus Assenza

di accessus

didascalicus

ad auctores

NON in versio

Burgundionis

anno 1185 In

questo

caso,

non

la

utilizzazione

della

versio

Burgundionis fa

adozione degli accessus sia awenuta prima traduttore pisano con i maestri salemitani. pensare che

1

Pertanto bisogna pensare che avuto

modo

di

conoscere

i

i

maestri salemitani dovrebbero aver

testi della

scuola alessandrina attingendo a una

circolazione libraria diversa da quella cui proveniva

Burgundione.

Non

c e

dell incontro del

dubbio che questo fosse

il

testo tradotto

possibile, infatti

i

da

medici

antologia prese il nome dalVArs parva di Galeno poi volgarizzato in originariamente si componeva dell Isagoge di loannizio, degli Aforismi e dei Pronostica di Ippocrate e dei relativi commenti di Galeno, del De urinis di Teofilo, del

Questa

Artesella;

De

pulsibus di Filareto, della Tegni o Ars di Galeno e del relative

ibn

Ridwan, del ticella dal 1483

L Articella

e

il

Taddeo

di

Haly

regimine acutorum di Ippocrate. Sulla multiplicatio a stampa delVAral 1535, cfr. T. Pesenti, "Editoria medica tra Quattro e Cinquecento Fasciculus medicine", in E. Riondato, Trattati scientific! nel Veneto fra

UXVe UXVIsecolo, Vicenza 14

commento

De

1985, pp. 1-29.

Alderotti

seguira la cosiddetta translatio antiqua attribuita a Costantino translationem ConstanDurling infra, adducendo queste ragioni: tini persequar, non quia melior sed quia communior. Nam ipsa pessima est et superflua quandoque nam ille insanus monachus in transferendo peccavit quantitate et qualitate, tamen translatio Burgundionis pisani melior cfr. Thaddei florentini Expositiones in

Africano,

ma

vedi

"Et

est",

arduum aphorismorum 1527,

fol. 1

rA; Kibre,

Ipocratis

...

"Hippocrates

In subtilissimum Joannitii Isagogarum librum, Venetiis

latinus",

Traditio, 32 (1976), p.289.

100

Morpurgo

potrebbero esscr dal ms. Ambrosiano G. 108 salernitani

commcntario Alcssandrino.

VI

al libro

stall inf.

delle

quclla tradizione tcstimoniata

a

Icgati

e dal ms. Vat. greco 300 contenentc

Epidemic

il

Giovanni

Ippocrate attribuito a

di

15

GUNDISSALINUS 16

PARVIPONTANI Summa sophisticonim

De

elenchorum:

Nos

igitur sequcntcs predictos auctorcs artcm extrinsccam

premittamus. In qua hcc consideranda: quid sit hcc ars

divisione

philosophiae quid sit

genus matcria

sint

partes species oificium

que intcntio que materia

finis

quod officium

vcl

instrumentum

quod opus

quis finis

artifex

quod genus que partes vel species qupa instrumentum quis opifex et unde dicatur

quare

Commcntaria Johannis

intentio

Alexandrini ms. 1079

BAV,

sic

vocetur

quo ordine et

discenda

sit

Circa librum

Pal. lat.

utilitas

nomcn

auctoris

intentio

titulus

titulus

ordo ad quam partem

ordo

philosophic suppositio

spcctct

divisio

dlstinctio libri

Qui va detto che Hunt aveva ben messo

in

quattro modi

introdurre

partc mediate

di

suo studio

nel

come

evidenza

alle

sull

origine

principio del secolo XII

al

e

arti,

qucste

accessus

degli

introductiones

fossero

vi

erano

in

dalla tradi/ione della retorica antica:

A) con persona,

locus,

di

tempus

cui

continuo a servire

si

Ugo

di

San Vittore. 17 B)

con

vita,

titulus

opens,

canninis,

qualitas

scribentis

intentio,

numerus librorum, ordo librorum, explanatio usato da Servio nel

commento C) basato

a Virgilio. sui

commend

di

Boezio

alia

Isagoge di Porfirio e alle

Categoric di Aristotele.

D) dipendente

dal

De

15

differentiis topicis di

"Greek Cfr. J. Fragments of Duffy, Conference. Abstracts of Papers 4 (1978), p.13.

John

Boezio.

of

Alexandria",

Byzantine

Studies

Summa super Rhetorica ha: genus/ quid sit ars/ materia/ instrumentum/ cur vocetur. species/ officium/ finis/ partes/ 17 W.M. Green, "De tribus maximis circumstantiis", Speculum, 18 (1943), pp. 488-492. Thierry

di

Chartres nella

/

commend

Quest ultima forma masters to revive

di

it,

Porrettano, da Pietro

dunque

Hunt, anche di

completo del

sec.

Lombardo 19

"reinvento"

Hunt chc

"the

first

quei

fatto che questo tipo che caratterizzarono la

Gundisalvi

dal

la

Salemitani.

i

a

Gilberto

a Pietro Elia, a Thierry di Chartres. Se

utilizzazione

impone anche

si

XII,

filosofi

occorrera aggiungere,

Parvipontani e

i

chi

tutti

dodicesimo secolo:

del

teoria e valida,

la

101

have been able to discover, were those of

I

da

"riutili/zato"

scientifica"

"rinascita

Articella

Questo e dimostrato dal

Chartres".

accessus fu

fl//

accessus fece ritcnere a

di

as far 18

the school of

salemitani

cosi

la

ai

Appare

nomi

cosi

ricordati

da

un quadro piu

degli accessus nella Francia

questione

di

una dipendenza

della Schola Salernitana.

"francese"

GILBERTUS PORRETANUS

PETRUS ABAELARDUS

ante 1117 Glossa in Psalterium

Glossa

materia

in Categorias

intenlio

modus

materia

finis

utilitas

titulus

utrum

Ipgice supponitur inscriptio

genus prophetie

nomen

nomen auctoris modus tractandi

libri

numerus psalmorum

THIERRY di CHARTRES Swnma super rhetoricam

PETRUS HELIAS Swnma super grammaticarn

genus

quid

quid sit ars materia officium

genus materia

sit

genus

officium

finis

finis

partes species

partes species

instrumentum

instrumentum

artifex

artifex

cur vocetur

quare

g.

dicatur

quo ordine

sit

docenda

Circa librum intentio utilitas

18

19

R. Hunt,

R.

draw

introduction

The

if

a

common

we were

clearly defined type,

on zu

...",

cit.,

p. 129.

125: cit., p. may be objected that is unsafe to from these didascalica. The schemata, it may be said, are fund on which all teachers draw. Such an objection might be

introduction

Hunt, any conclusions

traditional,

serious

"The

dealing with certain

which was

in

"It

...",

types of prologue;

but

we

vogue for a comparatively short space of

Oxford, mss. Balliol Coll. 36; Auct. D.2.1 2312.

are dealing with time."

a

Morpurgo

102

MAURUS SA^ERNITANUS 21 Super Ysagogas lohannicius vcro lohannis

Alcxandrjni asscrit

filius ut

quidam

..."

Super Tcgni

Omnium

igitur

arcium, tcsle

Varrone, duplex doctrina traditur cxtrinsccus: undo dicatur hcc ars ct

quid

sit

ipsa eius

quod genus

que species que materia que partes qupu officium quis finis

Questa divisione espositiva

quod instrumentum

na ncl commento

di Guglielmo Conches Super Priscianum:

quis artifex que causa inventionis qui inventores ...

et intrinsecus:

WHILELMUS

que sit auctoris intentio que causa intentionis que utilitas pperis

modus

et

dc

di

CONCHIS

extrinsecus:

quid

cui parti philosophie

quis

ritor-

ordo tractandi

libri titulus

sit

genus materia partes species

instrumentum artifex de arte officium ex arte finis

quare vocetur

quo ordine

sit

docenda

et

cliscenda intrinsecus; intentio utilitas

causa suscepti laboris modus agendi

qrdo titulus

21

Ncl

commento

a

loanni/.io

Mauro

si

intentionis causa/ utilitas/ suppositio operis/

22

era

limitato

a

dividcre

eiusdem particio/ modus

in:

et

materia/ intentio/

ordo tractandi.

commento a loannizio: "Sed quia liber iste tante difficultatis lohannis Alexandrini discipulus, hac de causa penitus a scolaribus dimittentur, librum Galieni facilior indu ctus, has Ysagogas id est introductiones, composuit; ut ad II

erat,

cssct

ms. Digby 108 ncl

ut

adhitus."

commcnti

/

E

commcnto contcnuto

cosi, a ncl

103

salernitani a// Articclla

ncl ms. di Erfurt 335 e attribuito

del re Manfredi:

ai qucsiti

MANFREDI Close circa Ysagogas lohannici Alexandrini

que matcria que causa suscepti opcris

modus agendi quid ergo doctrine quis

que quis

divisiq operis libri titulus

confronto tra questi

II

accessus mette in luce una unita di

di

tipi

metodi sostanziale, tuttavia sarebbe stato certamente piu probante una totale identita, su questo ostacolo si sono arenati tutti i tentativi di ricostruzione distinzioni e

di

teoria

ad auctores

a questa fonte

commenta,

Servio a Virgilio e

diffusione

delPAristotclc

fondavono

sul

aggiungevano

materiale e finale.

23

del

latino

-

da

permettere

poter

L origine

dell utilizzazione

Boezio In Isagogen Porphyrii sin dal sec.

IX

-

il

commento -

sec.

XIII

-

nelle

un

sunt, ncll introdurre

formule libro

con

la

che

si

o un campo

quattro cause aristoteliche: formale, efficiente,

le

E

tale

invcntione di Cicerone. In seguito

quae consideranda

furono inserite

di studi,

risale al testo di si

De

il

accessus

degli

in indirizzi di scuole.

accorpamenti

degli accessus

di

una

pertanto evidente la complessita di un indagine

che voglia ricondurre ad un unico cenlro la diffusione del sistema degli 1 ipotcsi, fatta da Hunt, di un origine "francese" resta la

accessus, tuttavia

piu valida; e qui

con se in

la

di

tesi

da un lato parte

vorremmo

rilevare che e

un

ipotesi che

una dipendenza parigina dei maestri

si

concilia anche

salernitani. In realta,

elementi offerti da queste tabelle possono essere ritenuti in insoddisfacenti, quanto non sufficientemente unificanti, gli

dalPallro

questi

analizzati

non solo

dati

aprono

nelle

loro

un

strada:

altra

forme

di

i

accessus,

testi

ma

possono essere anche nella loro 24

di composizione. Questo vuol dire che se in codici non miscellanei, datazione non incerta, si ritrovino non solo gli accessus, ma anche una

disposizione allora

si

assunta

Cfr.

antologica

che permetta

potra ben parlare di

come

di

communis

riscontrare

affinita

di

opinio, e questa potra

"scuola"

ben essere

necessario carattere distintivo di una scuola. Intendo dire

J.B. Allen,

"Commentary as

Late Mediaeval Accessus", in Lovaniensis (1973), pp. 29-48.

J.

Formal Cause, Discursive Form and the Kessler (edd.), Ada Conventus Neo-Latini

Criticism:

Ijsewijn

-

II.

Cfr. L. Thorndike, "The problem of the composite manuscript", Giovanni Mercati, Studi e Testi 126, Roma 1946, vol. 6, pp. 93-104.

in

Miscellanea

104

Morpurgo

una schola, all interno di qucsta dovcvano cssere comuni non solo gli stcssi mctodi di ricerca e di commcnto (accessus), ma anche, oltrc a un canone di tcsti da glossare (Articella), doveva esscrci una produzione che se

vi fu

che

tale

libraria

manoscritti

forniva

cui

in

si

potevano

leggere

tutte

Ad opere che costituivano esempio un manoscritto che contenesse Marziano, Calcidio, Aristotele, fondamento culturale

il

quelle

Galcno, e

commento

il

Bartolomeo a loanni/io, che

di

un ottima

XII-XIII potrebbe costituire schola gia cosi affermata che e capace al

sec.

o

libraria

della schola.

si

possa far

incidere

di

sulla

averne addirittura una propria. Questa ricerca

di

owiamente

si

una

produ/ione e presentata

piu un opera,

laboriosa dovendosi cercare non

assai

risalirc

traccia dell esisten/.a di

ma

un

mi complesso di testi ed esprimere poi un giudizio di omogeneita. Qui e di non e estremamente tre indicare poco limito ad significativi, esempi conto che due siano tratti dai censimenti dell Aristotelcs Latinus: II ms. di Parigi, BN, Par. lat. 14700 del sec. XIII, provcnientc da 1)

San Vittore presenta una

Pan ipontanus,

Aristoteles,

Algazel,

Alfredus Anglicus, owerro alia

vicini

un canone

ma

galcnica,

intrapreso da 2)

commento

non

possa

offrire

il

abba/ia presente

di

e

possibile

alia

del

quadro

il

Alban sembra

St.

DC tcmpcramcnto

Elenchi Sophistici

medicina ippocraticocurriculum che vcniva

ci

una

risposta:

commento

sia la

in

Galcno, Prisciano, un

una Glossa super

del

sono

67, del. sec. XII,

lat.

offrire di

di Aristotele,

Rabano Mauro, un frammento

Conches a Prisciano. Dunque qui

Introduct.

di

Guglielmo medicina galenica sia

di la

fondata sugli accessus e che Hunt ricollega a centri francesi

dialettica

come

ambienti

chiedersi:

dunquc

limitato

Galcnus,

in

Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud.

di

e

agli

di

quei

Bathoniensis,

circolavano

che

testi

Occorrc

testi,

di

Adelardus

Adamus

chi volesse studiare filosofia naturale?

dall

provcniente questo caso

Porphyry

che

ms.

II

tutti

salernitana".

"schola

rintracciare

che comprendono

colle/.ione di autori

Chartres.

25

Oxford, Bodleian Library, Selden, sup. 24, del sec. certamente si XII, proveniente da St. Albans, tratteremo anche piu avanti, 3)

presenta filosofia

Del ms.

come uno

le

il

dei

piu

importanti

nella

Questo codice contiene:

naturale.

Nicomachea, queste

di

De

opere

generatione

che

et

la

ricerca

rappresentano

un canone

di

Metaphysica vetus, VEthica

corruptione,

una

di

delle

i

Metereologica,

prime

sono

testimonianze

nelle correnti filosofiche del sec. XII. delPingresso delFAristotele latino

25 R.W. Hunt, "Studies on Priscian sance Studies, 2 (1950), pp. 1-19.

in

the Twelfth Century

II",

Mediawal and Renais

/ commenti salemitani

a// Articella

Quel chc e veramente considerevole e che Alfredo

medico

Anglico,

con

contatto

in

il

riscontrare

nelle

hanno preso

loro

le

riscontri

ulteriori

ma

salemitani,

De

del

vetus

translatio

salemitani.

dei

glossule

generatione

citazioni.

tra

Pipotesi

di

1

organizzazione

e

che

stile

quello

Inoltre

proprio

da

si

di

puo

questa

Bartolomeo, Mauro e Ursone che andranno sviluppati

E ben owio manoscritti

questi di

che

testo prescnta le glosse di

Salerno,

queste glosse sembra essere un antedecente

105

lavoro

in

e

antologici

questo

caso

si

le

opere

presenta

ricca

dei di

prospettive.

Quanto abbiamo esposto

offre elementi sufficienti perche

Minio Paluello, che riteneva che centro dell Aristotele

affiancare

la

latino tesi

di

fosse

la

Normandia

Hunt

su

un origine

auctores, per poi verificare se

Mauro

e

Ursone

Universita di

alia ricerca di

Roma

di

diffusione

o

1

Inghilterra,

francese

da questo milieux siano nuovi

testi.

delle

all

idea di

traduzioni si

possa

ad

degli

accessus

partiti

Bartolomeo,

CARLOS ARTHUR RIBEIRO DO NASCIMENTO

L arbrc de la philosophic

La

comparaison faite par Descartes dans la Principcs de la philosophic entrc la philosophic

connue

et

frequemmcnt

de

lettre-preface

un arbre

et

est

ses

assez

citee:

philosophic cst comme un arbrc dont les racines sont le tronc cst la physique, et les branches qui sortent de cc tronc sont toutes les autres sciences, qui se reduisent a trois principalcs, a savoir la medccine, la mecanique ct la morale; entcnds la plus haute et la plus parfaite morale, qui, presupposant j une entierp connaissance dcs autres sciences, est le dernier degre dc

Ainsi toute la

la

la

metaphysique,

sagesse.

Cette comparaison est encore prolongce de la maniere suivante: Or, comme ce n est pas des racines ni du tronc des arbres qu on cucille les fruits, mais seulement des extrcmites de leurs branches, de ses parties ainsi la principale utilite de la philosophic depend qu on ne peut apprendre que les dernieres."

La metaphore cartesienne met ccrtainemcnt en des racines aux rameaux, en passant par

"Ix;s

Gihcrt,

principcs dc la Vol. I, p. 87.

dans

philosophic",

le

relief

tronc

-

1

unitc

-

son orientation

et

Oemrcs de Descanes,

du savoir

Lib.

Paris,

Joseph

s.d.,

Au Philosophic sagesse",

mctaphorcs utilisccs par Descartes il y a quelqucs travaux dc puissance metaphorique dc Descartes", dans Cahicrs dc Royaumont, arbrc de la 1957, p. 273-301; P. Mesnard, Paris, Ikl. de Minuit, des

sujet

M.Th. Spoerri,

"1,3

"L

II,

dans

Ibidem,

p.

A.

336-349;

Negri,

Descartes

politico,

O

della

ragione\ ole

quc dcs references par M. Gueroult, Descartes scion I ordre dcs raisons, Paris, Aubicr-Montaignc, 1968, Vol. II, p. 226-227, n. 1965, Chap. 26; G. Canguilhem, La connaissance de la vie, Paris, Lib. J. Vrin, Machine et organisme; FL Gilson, Discours dc la mcthodc, Tcxte et commentaire, Paris, idcologia,

Lib.

J.

Milan,

Feltrinclli,

1970,

ainsi

9-17;

p.

Vrin, 1967. e

Notons que le P. Clavius, Luiclidc modcrnc du XVII sieclc, dont Descartes a La Fleche les Oeu\res mathematiques ou, en tout cas, les aurait lus introduction arbre dans un autre contexte dans plus tard, emploie la metaphore de I

aurait

utilise

1

1

dc ses Oeuvres: I^aissant de cote d autres philosophcs, de ja la varicte des sectes des pcripateticiens suffit pour le prouver (1 incertitude des sciences, exceptee la mathematique). Nees toutes elles d Aristote, comme les divers rameaux d un tronc commun, elles luttent entre elles et parfois avec Aristote meme, leur source commune, de tclle maniere qu il est completement impossible de savoir ce qu a etc Aristote plus tard et si sa philosophic se rapportait premierement aux mots ou aux choses. Apud E. Gilson, La

unidad de ~

la experiencia fllosofica,

Les principes de

la philosophic

,

Ed.

Madrid, cit.,

lid. Rialp, 1973, p.

p. 87.

152-154.

L

arbre de la philosophic

on

pratique: Ics fruits de la philosophic,

mecanique

et

de

la

morale

107

les cueille

(le dernier degre de

la

de

la

medecine, de

la

sagesse).

Nous trouvons chez Roger Bacon une comparaison assez prochc de celle

de Descartes: I arbre attentivement de la examine, done, sagesse ai retourne ses racines principales, j ai signale philosophique, j Felevation du tronc robuste et la production des rameaux les plus grands, j ai flaire les fleurs de la plus douce intelligence, j ai recherche diligemment les chaumes dores de Ceres et les sarments murs pour les fruits de Bacchus; et p9ur qu il ne manquat pas 1 utile et 1 agreable verdure des feuilles, j ai rassemble avec concision, suivant les voies des saints et des philosophies, les regies de I eloquence, qui sont designees par les feuilles, dans la derniere partie du volume, considerant que la sagesse sans I eloquence est comme une epee aiguisee dans la main d un paralytique, ainsi que I eloquence, a part de la sagesse, est comme une epee aiguisee dans

J ai

main d un

la

fou.

Nous pouvons observer que Bacon, differemment de Descartes,

explicite

dans ce passage, la place de I eloquence. Pour les autres disciplines nous devons parcourir le texte de VOpus tertium. Notons aussi

seulement,

que Bacon ajoute a la metaphore de la main d un paralytique ou d un Descartes,

dictum

nous verifions que,

chez

franciscain

Descartes,

De

anglais.

fait,

developpee presente dans

arbre celle de

fou.

Confrontant

epee aiguisee, dans encore Bacon et

metaphore de arbre est un obter une constante dans les textes du I

elle

si

1

la

si

est

elle

I

ne

revet

pas

toujours

la

forme

de VOpus tertium que nous venons de elle citer, est, pourtant, presente de quelque facon dans de nombreux passages de ses oeuvres. Sans aucune pretention d exhaustivite, rapportons le texte

renommees racines quelques exemples. L Opus majus pretend exposer de la sagesse"4 qui dependent du pouvoir des langues, de la mathematique, de la perspective (optique), de la science experimentale et de la "les

philosophic morale.

L etude de

des agents est declaree

"Opus

inedita,

tertium",

Vol.

I,

Reprint Ltd., 1965,

dans

Londres,

J.S.

"la

la multiplication

racine

Brewer,

supreme

Ed.,

Her Majesty s

Fr.

des especes et des forces

et principale

Rogeri Bacon

Stationery

Office,

de

la

5 sagesse."

opera

quaedam hactenus

1859,

Wiesbaden,

Kraus

p.4.

Opus majus, Ed. J.II. Bridges, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1897, Frankfurt/Main, Minerva G.m.b.H., Unveranderter Nachdruck, 1964, Vol. I, p. 97; cf. Vol. II, p. 1-2, 167 et 223.

Opus

tertium, Ed.

cit.,

p. 38.

Ribciro

108

La

c est-a-dire

perspective,

Encore au

sujet

de

1

Do

optique

Nascimcnto

est

la

multiplication des especes,

la

de

flcur

la

6

philosophic.

Bacon declare dans

le

Fragment Gasquet: etablis toutes les racines qui concernent la multiplication et j Faction conjointement ayec les rameaux, les fleurs et les fruits necessaires a cette persuasion.

Ainsi,

La metaphore de

1

arbre met aussi en

pratique de la connaissance et

de

la

1

relief

chc/ Bacon

unite dc celle-ci.

septieme partie de YOpus majus

il

dit

En

au sujet de

la

1

orientation

au debut

effet, tout

morale:

racines d une cinquicme Maintenant, toutefois, je desire remuer les toutes cellcs deja qui est meilleure et plus noble que nommees (connaissance des langues, mathematique, optique, science toutes pratique, c est-a-dire, experimentale); cette science est parmi dans cette vie et dans 1 autrc; operative, traitant de nos oeuvrcs

science

toutes les autres sont speculatives.

A

cette affirmation

il

faut joindre ce qui est dit

au chapitre d ouverture

de VOpus majus:

La consideration parfaite de la sagesse consiste en deux choses, a manicre qu elle qu on voit ce qui est requis par elle de telle soil connue de la meilleure maniere- ensuite, comment cflc se de sorte que celles-ci soient rapporte a toutes les autres choses En effet, PEglise de Dieu convenables. facons de clle dirigees par est ordonnee par la lumiere de la sagesse, la Republique des fideles

savoir:

conversion des infideles est operee et ceux qui sont malice peuvent etre reprimes nar la force de la mieux ecartes a plus loin des limites sorte de sagesse qu ils soient de 1 Eglise que par 1 effusion du sang chrctien. est organises, la obstines dans la

D

un autre

cote, la

metaphore dc

une idee chere a Bacon,

celle

de

la

1

arbrc exprime d une maniere plastique

connexion des sciences:

et qu on ne souleve pas une question du fait que j affirme que chacune de ces sciences que j enumere ici a du nouvoir sur les autres et qu on ne peut pas connaitre une d entre elles sans toutes. Car toutes les sciences sont connexes comme les parties dans le tout En et chacune est utile non seulement a soi mais a toutes les autres. aide de toutes, etre connue sans effet, aucune d elle ne peut pas deuxieme livre des Questions puisque Ciceron affirme dans le Tusculanes: quelqu un ne peut pas connaitre peu de choses si la 1

6 dans D.C. Lindberg, Ed., Roger Bacon s Philosophy of "De multiplicatione specierum", avec Opus majus, I!d. Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 198, lin. 56; comparer 3. Vol. II, p. cit., 7

F.A. Gasquet,

"An

Unpublished Fragment of a Work by Roger

Bacon",

dans English

Historical Re\ iew, 12 (1897), p. 512.

8

Ed. E. Massa, Turici, Thesauri Mundi, 1953, Rogeri Baconis Moralis Philosophia,

9

p. 3.

ce sujet E. Gilson, Les metamorphoses de Opus majus, Ed. cit., Vol. II, p. 1. Voir a la cite de Dieu, Louvain, Paris, Publ. Univ. de Louvain, Lib. J. Vrin, 1952, Chap. 3, p. 75-109.

L

arbre de la philosophic

109

plupart ou toutes ne lui soicnt pas connues. Ainsi, n importc quelle d entre elles depend des autres et elles se pretent des aides mutuelles. II

meme

serait

sagesse

d

necessaire

aller

plus

loin

et

evoquer

de

unite

1

la

que Bacon la conceit: a une sagesse parfaite qui y

telle

est contenue dans les Saintes Ecritures et des racines de laquelfe est sortie toute la verite. Je dis done qu il - y - a une science maitresse des autres, soit, la theologie a laquelle toutes les autres sont totalement necessaires et sans lesquelles elle ne reussit pas a arriyer a la realisation dont elle revendique la force dans son droit, et a 1 ordre et au commandement de laquelle toutes les autres sont soumises pour mieux dire, il - y - a une sagesse parfaite qui est totalement contenue dans PEcriture Sainte, a etre expliquee par le droit canonique et par la philosophic. En effet, on obtient Pexposition de la verite divine par le moyen de ces sciences. Car, ceile-la avec

IJ

comme

la main et, cependant, par sagesse dans le poing; car toute la sagesse a ete donnee par un seul Dieu a un seul monde et pour une seule fin. ou 1 unite appartenant a cette sagesse, en vue de cette

celles-ci s

ouvre

soi-meme

dans

paume de

la

elle recueille toute la

D

triple relation.

Ce passage

contient une nouvelle metaphore

du poing renferme

-

de

celle

la

paume etendue

-

qui peut-etre nous oriente vers une lointaine racine de la metaphore de 1 arbre. En effet, la metaphore de la paume et du poing reprend une semblable utilisee par Zenon, le stoi cien: et

Zenon montrait

sa

main puverte,

les

disant:

"Voici

etendus:

doigts

representation", disait-il; puis il contractait 1 assentiment". Puis il fermait la "yoici

legerement

"Voici

les

la

doigts:

main et serrait le poing, en c est d ailleurs d apres cette image

la comprehension";

il a donne a cet acte un nom qui n existait pas auparavant, cemi de catalepsis; puis avec la main gauche, qu il approcnait, il serrait fortement le poing droit en disant: "Voici la science, que personne ne possede sinon le sage."

au

les

Or,

ont

stoi ciens

utilise,

entre

rapproche assez de la metaphore de

une

autres, 1

arbre.

En

comparaison

effet,

philosophic a un animal (la logique = les os et les muscles; les

est

= parties charnues; la physique la logique, puis vient la morale

"une

ville

bien

fortifiee

et

1

ame), a un oeuf et tout a

gouvernee

1

("la

la

se

la

morale =

partie extcrieure

interieur la

selon

qui

ont compare la

ils

physique")

raison".

et a

Transcrivons

Fragment Gasquet, Loc. cit., p. 512. Cf. Opus tertium, Ed. Brewer, p. 18 et 37. II de noter qu a ce sujet Bacon defend une these diametralement opposee a a ae celle de Thomas d Aquin. Voir Somme de theologie, I II q. 65, a. 1, ad 3m. est interessant

Opus majus, Ed.

cit.,

Vol.

Ill, p.

36.

Ciceron, "Premiers academiqucs", II, 145, Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pleiade, 1964, p. 255.

dans

E.

Brehier,

Les

stoi ciens,

Paris,

Do

Ribeiro

110

litteralement

metaphore de

Ou

avant-derniere

1

Nascimento

comparaison

se

qui

de

rapproche

la

arbrc:

1

la cloture qui 1 entoure terre et les arbres la

encore a un champ en pleine production: la

est

les

logique,

fruits

la

la

morale,

physique.

Nous pouvons, sto icisme,

comme

une hypothese. Les systemes cartcsianisme le et baconienne

peut-etre, risquer

la

sagesse

le

insistent

sur 1 unite de la quoique pour des raisons differentes puissamment La orientation son connaissance humaine et sur metaphore de pratique. -

1

arbre

se

comme

prcsente

dans cette

naturellcment

dans

Une

perspective.

a

sensibles

la systemes plus ce C est du savoir. secteur de chaque specificite d objet et dc methode Aristote et Thomas d Aquin. Dans ces avec arriverait, exemple, par qui la de trait de il n a cas metaphore de 1 arbre ni de metaphores pas y

autre

se

rencontrerait

de

cette

attitude

les

cquivalentes.

En

plus

baconienne

sagesse

d indiquer une

filiation

structurelle

isomorphie le

ct

cartesianisme,

il

entre

est,

Bacon

historique gcnerale:

le

sans

sto icisme,

doute,

la

possible

Descartes ont etc

et

des grands lecteurs de Ciceron et de Seneque et ils se sont inspires de ces deux derniers quant au traitement de la morale. Voila, une fois de question de

la

plus,

aurait-elle conduit a

mcmcs

la 1

usage des

antimetaphorique d Aristote de Bacon pour

nom

ftarbor

1

alchimie. Or,

philosophica

oeuf:

l

isomorphic de

sources ou, a

isomorphie de

1

traits

et

1

memes

sources aurait-il conduit a

Notons encore deux

de

et

poule

la

1

de Thomas d Aquin. alchimie,

(symbole

du

1

D

14

arbre de

reste,

marche

1

attitude

un autre, Pinteret

la

science recoit le

de

cvolutif,

processus

pensee

usage des

pensee? D un cote,

croissance d une idee, d une vocation ou d une force);

II

1

complementaires.

"en

philosophies equivaut a mettre en

envers,

la

planter

1

toute

arbre des

1 1

imagination

crcatrice."

nous pourrions pourtant, une autre direction dans laquelle baconien: la tradition judeo-chretienne. II 1 arbre

chercher les racines de

semble que

^

1

allusion ne serait pas tant a

Diogcne Laerce,

"Vies

et

opinions des

cit., p.

14

Voir M.-D. Chenu, Introduction a

d Et. Med., Paris, 15

Cf.

arbre de

philosophes",

la

vie"

et a

"1

arbre

Livre VII, 40, dans E. Brehicr,

50.

Op.

vcrhum

"1

J.

Juan-Eduardo "Arvore"

I

etude de saint

Thomas d Aquin, Montreal,

Inst.

Vrin, 1950, p. 144-146. Cirlot,

Dicionario

a (p. 102), qui renvoit

de

simbolos,

Jung, Psychologic

et

Lisboa, Ed. alchimie.

Moraes,

1984,

Ad

L arbre de

la

de

la

connaissance du bien

de

du

ct

la

11

philosophic

mal"

dc

la

16

Genese

(2,9)

,

mais a

1

1

arbre

un arbre dc

vie pour qui la saisit, celui qui VApocalypse (22,1-2) dit: son cote (Pr. 3,18). 1 le fleuve de Puis Anje me montra Vie, limpide comme du cristal, qui jaillissait du trone de Dieu et de PAgneau. Au milieu de la place, de part et d autre du fleuve, il y a des arbres de Vie qui frutifient douze fois, une fois chaque mois; et leurs feuilles peuvent guerir les

sagesse: celle-ci

la tient

devient

est

"c

De

heureux"

pai ens.

Ce passage reprend des elements d Ezechiel

(47,1-12) et sera utilise par

Saint Bonaventure pour structurer son opuscule

quelques lignes du prologue de

L

arbre de la vie. Voici

celui-ci:

Et

des que 1 imagination favorise 1 intelligence, j ai ordonne et dispose le peu de cnoses en quoi va resume le tres copieux argument dans un arbre ideal de la rnaniere suivante: dans la premiere ramification inferieure j ai decrit 1 origine et la vie du Sauveur; dans celle du milieu, la passion; et en naut la glorification. Dans la premiere serie ae rameaux vont places d un cote et de 1 autre quatre versets en ordre alphabetique; et le meme dans la seconde et dans la troisieme ramification, de chacune desquelles pend, a la maniere de fruit, un seul bourgeon- et ainsi les douze rameaux offrent les douze misterieux fruits de I Arore de la Vie.

Nous pourrions encore 1

arbre dans

signaler plusieurs ramifications de la

contexte judeo-chretien.

le

L image du

metaphore de

juste qui

comme

"est

un arbre plante pres du cours des eaux, qui donne son fruit en la saison et jamais son feuillage ne seche" (Ps. 1,3; cf. Jr. 17,8); le theme de la vigne d Israel qui, partant du prophete Osee (10,1), se rencontre chez Isai e (5,

1-7),

Jeremie

(2,21; 5,10; 6,9; 12,10) et Ezechiel (15, 1-8; 17, 3-

10; 19, 10-14) et est reinterprete

44

et Jn.

"Ainsi

15,

1-2).

dans

le

Nouveau Testament (Mt.

vaudrait la peine encore citer la parole de Jesus:

II

done, c est a leurs fruits que vous les

Notons, cependant, que dans ces references nous soteriologique ou moral et

C est

ce

qui

arrive

21, 23-

aussi

reconnaitrez"

(Mt. 7,20).

sommes dans un

contexte

non pas dans un contexte de connaissance. les fameux du Saint Esprit", a

avec

"fruits

propos desquels Thomas d Aquin explicite avec toute clarte les regies d usage de la metaphore. 18 La descendance iconographique medievale dans Pour traduite

les

citations

de

en franqais sous la

la

Bible

direction

nous avons utilise le texte de La Sainte Bible de I Ecole Biblique de Jerusalem, Paris, Les Ed.

du Cerf, 1956. 17 "A

arvore

da

vida",

Prologue,

n

2,

dans L.A.

De

Boni,

Sao Boaventura, Obras

escolhidas, Escola Sup. de Teologia S. Louren^o de Brindes, 1983, p. 375. 18 Somme de theologie, I a H ae q. 70, a. 1.

Ribeiro

112

Do

Nascimento

ce contcxte seraient les arbres des vertus et des vices dont

J.

Le Goff

nous offre un exemplc du XII e siecle. 19 En fin de comptc, qucl fruit tirerons nous dc ce parcours? Peutetre avons-nous divague sans une direction precise et meritons la malediction du figuier sterile qui exhibait seulement des feuilles et aucun fruit

(Mt. 21, 18-19).

Pontificia Universidade Catolica,

)

La ch ilisation de

hymnes de Vepres

et

I

Sao Paulo

occident medieval,

Laudes du Temps de

la

Paris,

Arthaud,

Passion: arbre de

1972,

p.

la croix.

644.

Voir aussi

les

OLGA WEIJERS

L appcllation dcs disciplines dans les dcs sciences aux XII C et XHI e siecles

classifications

Le vocabulaire des n a pas recu point de vue

Mon

1

qu on appelle

textes

attention

qu

il

merite.

II

stylistique et linguistique

objectif relevant

de

plutot

1

les

des sciences

classifications

serait interessant

comme un

histoire

1

(resume)

genre

de

etudier d un

1

litteraire distinct.

intellectuelle, je

me

aux termes par lesquels sont designees, dans cc genre de diverses sciences

ou

bornerai

textes,

les

disciplines.

mon

choix de la periode etudiee est assez large, comprenant les XII e et XIII e siecles, c est pour englober la profonde modification de la Si

science a la suite de la decouverte du nouvel Aristote et des philosophes arabes.

Le choix des auteurs ete edites et

qu

ils

a ete determine par le

represented

les differents

fait

que leurs

textes ont

courants et tendances qu on

pu discerner dans cette matiere. II s agit de Hugues de Saint- Victor, Guillaume de Conches, Gilbert de Poitiers, Dominique Gundisalvi, Raoul de a

Longchamps, Robert Kilwardby, Aubry de Reims, Jean de Dacie

et Gilles

de Rome.

Pour ce qui concerne

les

limite car elles sont basees sur la

statistiques,

un choix de

d un interet necessairement textes,

on peut noter que sur

soixantaine de denominations de disciplines ou de groupes de disciplines

on compte 21

disciplines

noms

voire quatre

differentes,

en tenant compte de la constater qu Aubry de Reims gagne

Kilwardby

est le plus

bien entendu fait

qu

On 1987.

il

est le

trouvera

Comme

trois,

la

palme de

Poriginalite et

que Robert

que Hugues de Saint-Victor merite richesse du vocabulaire compte tenu du

complet, tandis

admiration pour la plus ancien des auteurs etudies.

1

ici il

souvent designees par deux,

Lorsqu on dresse un tableau des occurrences banalite ou de la rarete des termes, on peut

differents.

resume de la communication que j ai presentee a Helsinki en aout difficile de developper ce sujet dans espacc restreint autorise prefere publier le texte dans sa totalite dans Archivum Latinitatis

le

etait

pour les actes, j ai MediiAe\ i (Bulletin Du Cange) 46 (1987)

1

[1989].

114

Wcijers

Un

certain

nombre de termcs

qui rcmonte a Boece, Cassiodorc

appartient naturcllcment a la tradition

Cependant, plus de

ct Isidore.

moitie

la

des appellations retenues ont etc puisees dans d autres sources ou ont ete

par les auteurs en question. Je termes nouveaux

inventees

les

appellerai

dans

la

suite

.

d une

Etudiant

les

part

comprenant chacune plusieurs

divisions

employees

appellations

pour

definir

les

noms

des

sciences, d autre part les

disciplines individuelles, je suis arrivee a quclques conclusions provisoires.

D la

abord, on pcut dire que,

meme

ou

discipline

seulement du au

fait

un auteur

si

utilise plusieurs

le

meme

groupe de

il

utilise

des sources differentes.

qu

disciplines,

termes pour ce n est pas y a aussi

II

clairement un les

interet, chcz certains auteurs, pour le vocabulaire et pour nuances des diverses appellations. Robert Kilwardby en est un bon

exemple. Son traite contient une grande quantite de termes differents ct il ne les utilise pas indifferemment. Au contraire, il tente de les cerner

au plus pres practica, "De

d en expliquer et

Au

;

1

istorum

et proprietatc

comme

emploi,

ac

leur

et

les trois appellations

vocabulorum:

practicum

intitule:

activum

,

et

differentia".

nivcau des termes eux-memes, je n

diversite

pour

consacre un chapitre

il

auxquclles

operativa,

appropriatione

operativum leur

et

activa

Ce

nombre.

sont

ai

plus bcsoin d insistcr sur

parfois

mots

des

classiques

(commc eloquentia) ou appartenant au latin medieval (commc sermocinalis) qui trouvent ici un nouvel emploi. Mais beaucoup dc termes viennent, par 1

intermediaire des traducteurs, d Aristote et des philosophes arabes.

certains

cas,

ou

dcmonstratio

d autres

s agit

il

c est

aristoteliciennes

demonstrative!

du

nouvelle

vague

la

arabes

et

imaginativa ) qui est a

L

innovation

nouvelles

ou

de

grecque

occonomica, dans

le

ancien

grec

des

anode L^LC,),

creditiva

appellations

et

origine du vocabulaire.

dans

le

en

provient

du

systeme d autres

Papplication

de

partie

savoir

(solitaria,

privata

et

publica

1

insertion

de

etude

des

1

(telle

noms

des

a

exemple pour donner des variantes

politico).

dans

oeuvres

des

traductions les

Dans

traduction

la

(par exemple

terme

(comme pour

terminologique

traditionnelles, par

d origine

1

disciplines

meteores)

d un heritage

latines

au

lieu

disciplines

aux termes de

Mais une cause peut-etre plus importante

renouvellement des schemas de

d autres

classification.

noms.

D autres mot

ethica,

est situee

divisions

liberalis Ainsi, pourvues traditionnellement lie aux arts liberaux, recoit une nouvelle fonction dans

doivent

etre

le

L appellation

des disciplines dans

schema de Jean

Ic

^e

Dacic,

les classifications

distinguant

speculative des arts mecaniques,

la

des sciences

philosophic

et

pratique

terme classique sapientia

le

115

est

utilise

par Guillaume de Conches pour designer une categoric de sciences en opposition avec eloquentia. D autrc part, de vieillcs divisions recoivent

noms nouveaux,

des

parfois

comme

puises a de nouvelles sources,

par

exemple philosophie pratique appelee par Robert Kilwardby et Aubry de Reims operativa et la philosophie theorique ou speculative qui se nomme la

chcz Aubry de Reims considerativa Dans le domaine des sciences .

particulierement importante, ce qui

s

du

1

langage,

innovation

explique d une part par

ces disciplines n etaient pas toujours considerces

comme une

parait

le fait

que

partie de

la

philosophie et qu elles ont ete inserees dans les schemas aristoteliciens de

d autre

part par Pampleur de leur evolution, que du vocabulaire. La tradition du latin medieval a complexite termes utilises dans ce domaine (dont litteralis, plusieurs

differentes reflete

fac,ons,

la

fourni

sennocinalis,

dissertiva),

ce qui

montre

le

caractere proprcment latin du

developpement mentionne. Finalement,

faut

il

noter

que

la

des

terminologie

divisions

des

sciences n est pas fixe ni entierement depourvue de confusion. Outre le fait

la

que

comme

decouverte de nouvelles sources apporte des termes nouveaux, le cas par exemple de factiva comme synonyme de

c est

mechanica, on constate aussi que certains termes ont, a Pinterieur mcme des divisions des sciences, des emplois differents. Ainsi, les mots naturalis et

physica dcsignent tantot

physique

proprement

general, les sciences

dite;

ensemble des sciences theoriques, tantot la le terme logica definit au debut, au sens

1

du langage ou

scientiae rationales,

mais

est applique

ensuite a la seule dialectiquc.

En savoir 1

recapitulant, je

d une

schemas; de

moins, qui

voudrais souligner deux elements essentiels, a

extraordinaire

richesse

de

ce

vocabulaire

due

a

de nouvelles sources, mais aussi au renouvellement constant

utilisation

des

part,

1

s

1

autre,

le

souci de precision,

exprime non seulement par

elles-memes, mais aussi dans

la

pour arriver a un resultat precis

et sans

le

de certains auteurs au

remaniement des

classifications

terminologie utilisee consciencieusement ambiguite.

N.W.O. (Organisation Neerlandaise pour de la Recherche Scientifique), La Haye

le

Developpement

SECTION

TWO

BASIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES

AS RELATED TO

MEDIEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE

TOMASZ BARTEL

Nouvcllc interpretation de adaequatio

Dans

la definition Veritas est

chcz

St.

Thomas d Aquin

presente communication je tache de rassembler

la

travail

grand

plus

rei et intellectus

au problcme de

sacrifie

d un

les resultats

chez

verite

la

Thomas

St.

d Aquin, prenant surtout en consideration Quaestio disputata de Veritate.

La definition de

la

-

verite

Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus

non seulcment encore une determination de mais

realite

la

c est

de connaissance,

determine aussi un certain ordre (ordo) de considcrer la verite. Elle penetre alors a la methode d exercer la science sur devoilements elle

"les

de

Dieu".

Thomas

"La

nouveaute"

consiste

en

de

1

interpretation de

premier

lieu

dans

ce

ladite

qu

il

consequemment au point de vue metaphysique, comme a

un certain

intellect,

substituant

des termes res et intellectus.

de

d objets

la

II

connaissance

tour

tour

congoit

diflercntes

par

rapport

alors sa propre position dans

soil

aux qualites 1

intcllect

de

la

relation d

obtient de cette maniere une

pouvoirs qui les recoient, quoique ce

prend

a

definition

un objet

significations

gamme

Les

Veritas

est

sources

adaequatio

humain ou

et

de

Divin.

II

une discussion visiblement animee sur

d interpretation

traditionnelles rei

riche

individuelles

la nature de la verite, qui le place dans un meme rang plutot Aristote qu avec Auguslin, Avicenne ou bien avec Anselme.

1)

St.

verite

intellectus

et

leur

de

la

avec

definition

influence

sur

des

disputes sur la nature de la verite.

Thomas lui-meme

St.

a

impute cette definition a Isaac

Israeli

se

referant plutot a la source de puisement qu a sa paternite. Saint Albert le

Grand, de

meme

que Vilhelm d Auvergne, constatent clairement que c est une definition d Avicenne. L ctude de Muckle: Isaac Israeli s Definition of Truth

porter

le

confirme egalement. Lorsque c

avec

elle

une

comprehension

est ainsi, ladite definition devait

de

la

chose

et

de

1

intellect

d Avicenne. Le problemc de la verite a etc placce dans la logique, ou les essences des choses ont etc conceptions d etres non necessaires dans des notions de genre et d espece.

Muckle

J.T.: Isaac Israeli s

Definition of Truth,

A/IDLM 8

(1933), p. 5-8.

Bartcl

120

DCS retentisscmcnts de

la

dispute sur

Sentences de Pierre Lombard dans

1

articlc

commc

verite

Thomas dans

etre peuvcnt etre trouves chcz St.

1

la

essence de

commcntaires sur

les

vcritc est-ce

"La

les

essence dc

1

constate qu aucun ctre n est connu separcmcnt du principe de la verile, en plus 1 etre est plus primordiale quc la verite, car il est etre. L etre precede la impossible dc connaitre la verite sans connaitre verite par notion et c est lui qui est la premiere notion dc 1 intellect. Ce intellect: imaginatio intcllcctus etre sc referc aux deux actions dc la

II

chose?".

1

1

1

certaines images de Pintcllcct, qui sont dcterminces par la connaissance de ce que consiste indivisiblcment dans la perception des creatures la foi qui consiste dans une simples ct une scconde, qui sc nomme fides La de premiere action se refere a jugements. composition et division -

essence

1

-

quidditas

de

la

deuxieme conccrnc

la

chose,

existence elle-

1

Lorsque dans la chose esscnce ct cxistencc sont existcncc rccllemenl differenciees, une base dc la verite forme plutot 2 existence Lc nom de de la chose que Pesscnce, constate Aquinat.

meme

1

1

ipsius).

(csse

1

1

d exister

provicnt

comprenant

1

(ens

csse),

1

ellc est,

une relation d adaequation se

ellc,

nature de

consiste la

dans

ct

existencc de la chose telle qu

a

assimilation

ab

la verite. St.

Thomas termine

de

action

grace a

1

intellect

une certaine dans cc quc

realise,

son argumentation par

pretend alors, que une constatation d unc importance extraordinaire: existencc de la chose c est la cause de la verite, car la chose est "Je

1

connue par intellect". 2) La conception de 1

De

la

definition

examinee dans Quaestio disputata

Veritate.

Lc

du premier

litre

Thomas

s

exprime:

probleme enticr -

verite

denote dans

"Qu

ce,

la

que

s agit

il

ici

ou bien

tradition

Quaestio disputata

cst-cc

verite

la

comme une

entitulc

est

cst-ce

qu

"La

article

c est

la

verite?".

mcme

probleme de

chose

question

Veritate

quc

sur

1

1

la verite

esscnce

a

1

dc

etre?".

La these du premier

d unc identification de le

De

de

St.

Le la

article

etre qui est

converlibilite de la verite et

de

dcs mcthodes de decrire

ce qui le succcde, des possibilites cettc discussion n cxistcrait s il n y avail une fort rcgnante ct

1

ctre,

et

1

etre.

Toute

a cet epoque-la position de St. Augustin, identifiant la verite a 1 etre, et cela a 1 Etre Supreme, qui peut ctre atleinlc grace a la parlicipalion dans les

idecs

!

cf. St.

dc

Thomas,

Dieu.

In

I

1

St.

Thomas,

Sent. d. 19, q. 5,

a. 1.

qui

est

deja

sous

1

influence

de

Veritas est adacquatio rci ct intellect us chez

1

St.

121

Tliotnas

antropologie d Aristote, tache de mettre d accord les theses des autorites

presentant differents aspects de perception de

Dans

Thomas

premier article, une repartition en

fait

de

la verite.

premiere question De Veritate St. qualites pour determiner la verite: la

la

trois

chose, en definitions, dans lesquelles se realise formellement raison de la verite, et en definitions qui concernent la verite presentee

de

verite la

le

dans

la

Pintellect,

Parmi definition tot

les

dans sa conception. groupes de definitions formelles,

Thomas nomme

St.

Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. Faisant

Panalyse

de

1

existence

appartient a chaque Petre,

prise

du

des

cote

la

cependant plus generales

qualites

qui

delibere sur ce que consiste Pessence de la

il

relation entre Pobjet et Pintellect et

il

determine

de cette

les conditions

un fragment caracteristique, qui illustre ce probleme: "Alio modo secundum convenientam unius entis ad aliud, et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente; hoc autem est anima, quae "quodam modo est omnia", ut dicitur in III De Anima: in anima autem est vis cognitiya et appetitiva; convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, unde in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod "bonum est quod omnia appetunt convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cogmtiqnis, sicut visus per hoc disponitur secundum speciem coloris cognoscit colorem: prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui concordet, quae quidem concordia adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur, et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum super ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus, ad quam

relation. Voici

,

conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei: sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus.

Le fragment Interpretation de

Primo,

Thomas un

c est

d Aristote du Ill-eme certain

sens

donne beaucoup de donnees

cite St.

c est

traitement livre

sur

d une

L ame, 4

tout,

quoi

existe"

,

ame dans un certain sens devient Pame se produit done Passimilation du "L

connu. Cette these presente verite est bien plus riche

essentielles

pour

lire

sur la definition examinee.

la

des

theses

qui annonce que

antropologiques "L

ame dans un

ou bien dans une autre la

totalite

de ses

objets".

place:

Dans

pouvoir, qui connait avec un objet

conscience de Thomas, que Pordre de

que

cela

s est

presente

dans

la

la

culture

philosophique jusqu a present. Jusqu a present le probleme de la verite et

St.

Thomas, De

cf.

Aristote,

Veritate, q. 1, a. le.

De Anima,

III,

431

h.

Bartel

122

de

adequation de

1

et

composant

la

connaissancc

partageant,

clairemcnt situe dans Pintellect

etait

rcalisant deja,

scicmment, dcs

ainsi dire,

pour

Thomas montre, qu on peut

reflexions sur le materiel cognitif. St.

parler

adequation dans un sens de reception des teneurs cote de existence connue, d une sorte de manifestatio du coulent qui esse. La relation de la verite est reelle lorsque un mouvement se produit sur la verite et sur

1

1

entre

realite

la

Pintcllect

et

dans un certain sens

ordre

possible

reversible,

existence

1

notre

On

conception.

Autrement

dans laquelle

et

che/.

remarqucr de Petre, ou bien de

dit

on peut decider de

de

la

de

relation

son

de

la

chose vcrs verite

reception

troisicme

par

article

Chaque chose

pouvoir

comme

la

verite

comme

d une

d ordre des

verite

la

du procede. dans cette relation se produit

le

la

la

de Pordre de

claire differenciation

Pordre

verite,

de

chose.

Secundo. Attire Pattention une connaissance

verite

Thomas

la

certaine propriete transcendentale de Petre et de idees, certaine decision

St.

met en

il

la

exprime

il

alors

peut

differentiation de la verite sur la chose.

qu

aussi

activite,

dans des opinions

recipiee

par Petre. Cctte relation du cote de Pintellect,

slimule

c.a.d.

son tour, existe une certaine

a

actif

est

intellectuelle,

intellect

qu

il

et

theorique,

est

base de

la

intellcctio

va

aussi

la

de Petre,

nommer fin

la

la

dans

le

de

ce

qui coule du cote des objets-memcs, c est la verite presente Pintellect. On peut parler cepcndant d une certaine verite, sur

mouvement dans

on

laquelle

attirait

dans

Pattention

Veritas est adaequatio rti ct intellectus,

dcs donnecs de

Pintellect

avec

la

Interpretation

que

chose.

de

la

definition

une certaine conformite

c est

Che/

St.

Thomas Petape de

precedee par la perception de Petre, la une certaine consequence de la verite, quelque chose plus retardec que la conformite. La conformite se presente alors deja dans un seul contact de Petre avec Pintellect.

connaitre

la

connaissance

verite

est

elle-meme

Etymologiquement

c est

le

terme

adaequatio

signifie

"la

comparaison"

un proces, le contact de la acquatio). Quand a la comparaison (ad chose et de Pintellect, du pouvoir qui recoil et de Pobjet, produit un Passimilation d un ecrit St. Thomas acte. Dans la connaissance c est

-

chose pour connaitre se realise, la realite a alors aussi son aspect dynamique - c est une tendence vers une fin quelconque, qui est une assimilation de pouvoir connaissante a son objet. connaissant a

Une dans

le

la

comprendre la conformite se trouve question, ou St. Thomas constate, que:

indication importante pour

troisieme article de ladite

Vcritas est adacquatio rci ct intellectus chez

enim

"Vcri

meme

ajoutc en

5 est".

d adequation jouc un role

de

obtention

relative

la

ct

intellectus",

autem non adaequatur

semble

sibi

dans

que

alors,

123

le

mais ipsi

il

sed

probleme

principe de difference entre les periodes de

le

Lc mouvcment

relation.

la

II

Tliomas

rci

adacquatione "idem

temps, que:

divcrsorum

aequalitas

in

consistit

ratio

St.

dont

cognitif,

verite,

est

le

parce que

possible

une

fait

repos

1

certaine

adequation se

realise entre differentes choscs.

Les definitions formelles de 1

de

ordre

La

relation.

la

la

verite dirigent la consideration vers

verite

exige

connaissance des deux termes rapport,

une

correctement

possibilite d identifier

En

seulement conceptuelle.

comme

La

la

cas du

de

probleme de

comme

reelle

la verite, la

la

Cela donne

relation.

la

la relation

cherche

qui

celui,

fm de

ou bien

question est

seulement quelque conceptionnellement ou bien reellement? Ici arrive le plus souvent une erreur d un melange de la propriete transcendentale de la verite qui est suit:

verite

chose

ajoute-elle

a

Petre

en droit de chaque etre par raison de son intelligibilite et une notion transcendentale de la verite, qui a, comme chaque notion, son etendue formee et separee dans la connaissance de 1 existence sur mesure de

du pouvoir intellectuelle, qui realise justement 1 operation dans ce cas operation de 1 adequation. cognitive, Examinons dans quel sens Thomas comprend les deux but de la

1

habilete

1

notamment

relation,

Commentaires Veritate

res

firmum

per

quod secundum quod hoc,

enim

"Simplicitcr

res

dicitur

St.

6 1

7

est

rationem eius

et

Thomas, De

1

Sent. 25,

1,

4c.

natura

;

"Res

places

des

dans

question

De

modo

Veritate, q.

1, 2, 4.

1, a.

1,

non

est

duo considerare

distincta."

;"Hoc

in

la

re,

3c.

le ct ad 4.

nomine

completa

nomen scilicet

sumitur quod

quod habet esse ratum accepto

est

7

aliis

dicitur res

hoc

Trinitate,

in

ab

et esse ipsius, et a quidditate

Sent. 25, 14c; 2 Sent. 37,

Super De

8

differentes et

rei

diffcrunt,

vel

Dans Lombard

intellectus.

St.

quasi aliquid ratum et nisi

et

Sentences de Pierre

Thomas revele differentes comprehensions du terme res: ad utrumque se habet, et ad id quod est in anima, prout res a reor (reris), et ad id, quod est extra animam, prout res dicitur

"Nomen

dicitur

aiix

rei,

et

ens

in esse, et

res

quidditatem

nomen

firmum

res

;

in natura,

secundum quod habet

124

Bartcl

quidditatem vel essentiam quandam, ens vcro, sccundum quod habct esse" "Quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomcn res exprimit quidditatem

,

sive essentiam entis. St.

Thomas remarque, que

chose

la

d un cote une certaine

(res) est

conception de 1 etre, mais il comprend egalement dehors de ame qui connait. Le probleme de connaitre 1 intellect presente

chose"

"la

comme

etant

1

Sommc

autres dans la

intellect peut que maniere comme ce que etre prcnd a comme universel ct de autre cote 1

ecrit,

de

defini

1

conscience

la

intellect

1

1

pouvoir

Thomas

entre

le

:

1

certain

St.

probleme sur la volonte, ou il 11 En une etre compris de deux manicres

Tfieologique dans

un

dans

ame,

et veritable,

est

acte

compris

L

defini.

compris

comme un intellect

est

compris d un cote comme un pouvoir, et de autre cote comme resultat d une conception de la realite. La differenciation des intellects, ainsi que 1

differentcs

conceptions

de

adequation lorsque on fait connaitre de la definition Veritas est adaequatio rci

la

1

Dans la

la

DC

question

de

relation

1

intellcct

Potcntia

peut

etre

niveaux

des

presentcnt

res,

verite,

possibles

faisant claire le

de

contenu

ct intellectus.

St.

Thomas

dit,

c.a.d.

que adaequatio,

en quatres manieres,

realise

et

cela

selon diffcrents objets qui les touchent:

Primo, d objets,

1

intellect

auquels

1

peut se rapporter a

intellect

se

referrc,

1

objet,

ici

dans cetle composition du res comme un

s agit

il

certain type de realite, des objets reels, exterieurs;

Secundo, intcllect peut se rapporter aux species, mentales cognitives, qui ressemble aux objets; 1

Tertio, ainsi

dire,

peut se rapporter a sa connaissance, renfermer dans son acte de reflexion il

c.a.d.

c.a.d. le

il

aux formes

peut, pour

proces

de

sa

connaissance; II 1

enfin

peut

intellect,

son produit.

sc

rapporter

et

examiner

Les differents degres et dimensions de objets lesquels on substitut dans la definition.

2 Sent. 37,

De 12

1,

le.

Veritate, q. 1, a. le.

Summa

1

idee

elle-meme

de

12

cf. St.

Thomas,

cf. St.

Thomas, De Potentia,

Thcologica,

q. 82, a. 4c.

q. 8, a. 1.

1

adequation dependent des

Veritas est adacquatio rci ct intcllcctus chez

chose

la

Lorsquc

trouve en dehors de la

comme une

comprise

(res),

structure cognitive,

la

Tliomas

St.

125

existence

reelle,

se

adequation se produit entre

1

conception de Pintellect et un objet, qui existe reellement. Nous avons un crytere d une subsistance et d une description quelle est

a faire avec

conception de

la

Dans

mode

etre.

1

deuxieme

le

d interpreter

concerne plutot

intellectus

plus grande partie des definitions et

la

cas,

du

definition de la verite Veritas est adaequatio rei et

la

conformite au niveau de species,

la

et elle est

comprise de deux manieres: comme un certain type de mouvement qui n a pas encore son repos; ou bien comme une fin, la realisation du mouvement cognitif dans

fait

Intellect

intellect.

I

renfermes, dans un

sens

tel

connaissance. Cependant

propre,

choses".

"La

se

situation

connaissance,

la

est

elle

methode

traite

De Anima nous avons

dont

le

debut

ensemble par 1

fait

1

objet

1

et

saisissons

1

de

1

et

objet

ensuite

Le

le

d une

s agit

il

comme une dans

de

acte

1

la

est

le

relation.

Ill-erne livre

le

premier chose se repete

-

1

1

du

analyse,

enfin

connaissance,

objet dans

cet

analyse de la prise

acte.

1

propre

certaine

comprend

on commence par

si

c est

esprit

objet. s

acte le pouvoir qui

meme

la

ensemble nous saisissons

1

L identification

identique.

fixee par Aristote

alors

objet,

lui

autrement

comprise

acte, devient apergue. Ensuite,

intellectuelle

a

de son

de

objet

a faire avec un certain proces de

objet, 1

et

intellect et

presente

lorsque

Conformement a

intellect

I

I

comme

centre

par

Species

quelque chose specifique de est arrivee enfin dans 1 acte de

La

adequat par rapport aux objets y le repos dans cela, dont il a deja

adequation ne se realise ainsi dans un sens conformite c est une comparaison de

1

Thomas que

ecrit

differents

est

trouve

il

Par

par

1

pouvoir, qui se fait connaitre dans

1

nous

acte

acte

1

et

acte.

1

objet

13

plus de definitions et de determinations concernent pourtant la

conception de

I

car

intellect,

I

intellect,

arme en

regies

d une reflexion

en cryteres de verites assumees, realise plus facilement une logique deduction reguliere se servant de conceptions bien construites. et

Saint

Thomas demande egalemcnt qu

est-ce

qui

est

le

premier,

utilisant

differentes significations de ces termes prius-posterius, la verite

dans

chose ou bien

d une

la

telle

maniere, que

La naissance de

!

cf.

Aristote,

la

De Anima

verite

la la

verite

II,

415

a.

dans

nature de contenu,

I

intellect.

II

resolve ce

la verite se realise

dans

dans

probleme I

intellect.

un sens d une cause, nous

Bartcl

126

trouvons cepcndant dans verite peut etre c est

1

ordre de

examinee 1

la

chose elle-meme.

comme

si

c etait

En connexion

deux ordres

-

le

essence, et alors nous examinons la verite

de

second ordre de

1

la -

connaissance de

verite

comme

essence

comme un toute la

ici

de

1

etre,

c est la subsistance ct.d. constitution interieure de

essence et de Pexistence.

Wars/.awa

la

la

premier ordre

certain resultat de la connaissance intellectuelle nous avons tradition

avec cela,

1

le

etre

BERNARDO CARLOS BAZAN

memoire

Science, experience et

La memoire occupe une place de un c Platon et d Aristote: pour 1

travers

le

processus

possedions

{

pour

deja;

de

sensible

de

la

fugacite

point

experience,

1

de

vers

la

qui

lui

faculte

est

de

depart

en sauvant

permet

propre,

connaissance

la

nous

qui

connaissance

la

qui,

epistemologies de

les

faculte

la

est

reminiscence, autre,

dans

privilege

1

ramene, a que nous impression de

constitution

la

nous

que

devons

nous pouvons facilement 1 une de deux dualiste, pour laquelle la opposition anthropologies, 1 memoire est un mouvement de Tame seule; autre ayant un conception

acquerir. Derriere la divergence epistemologique

deceler

1

de Phomme, pour laquelle

unitaire

la

memoire

est

une

faculte sensible

organique du compose. L opposition entre ces deux epistemologies et entre ces deux visions de Phomme va presider Phistoire des conceptions sur la

memoire. Bien entendu, on ne exclusives,

et

les a

pas toujours considerees

au cours des siecles

syntheses plus ou moins heureuses.

elles

comme

etant

ont ete rapprochees dans des

Comme

resultat

de cette combinaison

d elements, et des enrichissements apportes par des medecins, philosophes et commentateurs, la notion de memoire est devenue complexe, sa veritable nature et portee difficiles a determiner XIII e

Vers

le

milieu du

siecle, le

1 .

probleme prenait

la

forme d une

opposition entre les conceptions augustinienne et aristotelicienne de la

memoire:

coi ncide-t-elle

Pame

avec Pessence de

ou

spirituelle,

est-elle

une simple faculte organique du compose? Cette opposition avait les memes implications anthropologiqucs et epistemologiques que nous avons signalces

au

sujet

du

conflit

entre

Platon

tradition latine le type de pensee qui -

profondement modifie bien entendu

Augustin.

Nous

Dans

aliens

la

ncgliger

Nous y sommes

synthese

delibcrement

et

remonte a Platon -

par

augustinienne,

la

Aristote.

tradition

le

Mais dans etait

represente

neoplatonisme de Saint memoire est, avec

la

rhctorique

romaine,

en

particulier

obliges par les dimensions de ce travail. Cf. F. Yates, The of memory, Chigago, 1966, et P. Rossi, Claris universalis, Milan-Naples, 1960.

Ciceron.

la

an

un des elements qui composcnt

intelligence ct la volonte,

1

rhomme 2 Meme sont une meme vie,

dans

Trinite

spirituelles, vita

"una

una mens

...

identifiee a

d une

.

1

faut

esprit,

faculte

simple

plus,

meme

un

3

una

...

il

ces

substantia"

trois esprit,

meme

la

memoire

substance:

sa nature soil bien plus haute

que

destince

organique

des

conservcr

a

la

strictement

unc

Pour que

.

image de

1

facultes,

soil ainsi

que

celle

impressions

sensibles.

L ame

est

connaissance nature: s

Cela

vie.

et

enim tam

"quid

a

presente

in

car

elle-meme,

qu

implique

ne

elle

est?"

Ce

soucis

n est pas que car

plus,

"pense"

Tame ne

faut

II

se connaisse pas, c

qu

elle

est,

done

qu

elle

reorientc

volonte alienee et pense a elle-meme: 5

sed undc non soi

est

cogitabat"

memoire. Et

tache morale. Dans se

elle

nouveau;

si

.

1

Si

"invenict

Pignorance de

oubli

semble

I

la

1

d autres

par

attention

de

sa

autem non quod nesciebat, et

ame

react ualise

elle

presence qui la est qu elle ne se

"distraite"

soi est

alienation

est

ce processus de retour

rcconnait,

la

ce

oublic

a

elle

alienent.

1

qui

ignorer par

Si parfois elle

trompc une sorte d alienation qui 1 a rendue absente a

constitue.

d etre

sur sa veritable nature, cela doit ctre du

ignorer, et souvent se

a

est s

pas

peut 4

mente quam mens

nature

sa

un oubli, la

chute,

le

retour a

memoire

n engendre pas

est

un savoir

conscience de soi qui

la

6

La memoire augustinienne comme recupere sa nature avec experience de la conscience commun en trails des processus a done decrite par Hegel dans la Plienomenologie dc I Esprit. Mais la memoire elle

constitue,

.

1

processus de recuperation de la conscience de soi, moteur qui le declenche ct anime. Personne ne cherche

n est pas seulement elle est aussi le

ce s

2

qu

il

1

ignore totalcment. Si c est

aime,

le

qu

elle

I

ame sc cherche, c est qu elle s aime; si L oubli de soi-meme ne peut jamais

elle

etre

se connait.

DC Trinitate, IX, 2, 2-5 (mcns-notitia-amor); DC Trinitate, X, 11, 16 (memoria (Memoria-intelligcntia-voluntas); De Trinitate, XIV, 8, 11-12, surtout mis en relief la deuxieme de ces Dei-intclligentia-amor). Pierre I^ombard avail Libri IV Sententiamm, I, d. 3, c. 2, et 3; ed. Quaracchi, 1916, I, pp. 33structures Cf.

17-12,

S.

Augustin,

19

(Cf.

39).

3

De

XIII

e

X,

Trinitate,

siecle

et

11,

apres,

et scs facultes.

4

DC

Trinitate, X, 8, 11.

5

De

Trinitate,

X,

De

Trinitate,

XIV,

6

5, 8. 6, 8.

Ce

18.

pour

s

texte

opposer

est

a

la

1

autorite

fondamentale

doctrine de

la

qu on

distinction

reelle

avancera, au ame entre 1

memoire

Science, experience et

total

7

Ce que

.

et

conserve, 1

Palienation

et

souvenir ne

cessera

morale ont d etre

pas

est gratifiee

d abord par

le fait

elle

qu

la

aboli,

present

a retourner sur elle-meme pour se retrouver

inciter

Pame

Poubli

ce

129

8 .

memoire

Pame Dans ce a

et

1

a

de

retour

trouve en elle des contenus

9

dont la presence est expliquee dans le De magistro: les en nous, non pas parce que nous les avons acquises du dehors, ou dans une vie anterieure, mais parce qu elles sont suscitees en nous par le maitre interieur. Seulement nous n avions pas conscience intelligibles

,

verites

sont

d

Dans ce sens

elles.

la

memoire des

comme

intelligibles,

memoire de

la

soi, est un processus par lequel on eleve la connaissance inconsciente au 10 niveau de la conscience Mais Pame n accomplirait pas ce mouvement de .

retour vers elle-meme et vers la verite trouvait aussi cette certitude,

ne trouvera jamais

verite elle

que Pame

verite,

identifie

12 ,

qu a moins de se connaitre elle-meme et 11 le bonheur Le desir du bonheur et de .

est la

latente de la verite beatifiante.

chose

maitre

au fond de sa memoire ne se

si

telle verite

de

et

que Dieu, regie possede done memoire de Dieu. Dans son degre

ne saurait etre autre

toute le

L homme

verite.

plus haul la

memoire

memoire metaphysique du fondement et de la fin derniere 13 done la memoire en tant que connaissance latente de soi, de la est

beatifiante et de Dieu, 7

Con/, X, 18,27

la

manifestation claire de cette presence

Or une

interieur

la

que Saint Augustin place parmi

les

.

C est verite

elements de

et 19, 28.

u

De Trinitate, XIX, 11, 14. C est le texte qui est a la base de la notion de memoire du present, elaboree par E. Gilson et acceptee par la grande majorite des historiens. Cette notion a etc mise en question par R. Teske "Platonic Reminiscence and Memory of the Present in St. Augustine", The New Scholasticism, LVIII, n 2, (1984), pp. 220235. Ses conclusions, qui ne me semblent pas entierement convaincantes, ne touchent cependant pas notre point, limite a 9

Cow/, X,

conscience que

1

ame

a d

elle-meme.

10, 17.

Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness, The Hague, Gilson, Introduction a I etude de S. Augustin, Paris, 1949, p. 135, J. temps et I etemite chez Plotin et S. Augustin, Paris, 4 ed., 1971, p. 244, n. 4. Ph.

Cf.

73-76,

Le

la

E.

Le point

a

etc admirablement expose

par E. Gilson, op.

cit.

p.

135.

Cf.

1969,

p.

Guitton,

aussi

De

Trinitate, X, 3, 5.

La beatitude n etant que Conf., spirituel 21.

le

gaudium de

veritate (Co/?/,

X, 25, 36. La memoire de Dieu ne

comme

1

homme,

1

X, 23, 33).

que traduire, dans le cas d un etre omnipresence de Dieu aux choses; cf. De Trinitate, XIV, 15, fait

Bazan

130

image de Dieu, et il peut le faire car elle est 1 ista vis est memoriae. ..et hoc animus est, et hoc ego

1

d Aristote

jeunes

et

Thomas d Aquin

difficulte

principale

Aristote,

enseigne organique,

Dans

aux

memoire

la

s

"magna

14

ipse

sum"

.

1

e milieu du XIII siecle les

se

dans

demandaient

leurs

possible de conserver la memoire 15 Leur image de la Trinite dans 1 homme etait

il

provenait

Galien

commune

conception de

Bonavcnture

et

termes composant

les

Au

de ses commentateurs.

commentaires des Sentences parmi

lui-meme:

tradition augustinienne allait etre mise en crise par Pentree des

La ecrits

esprit

et

.

du

fait

les

la

que

commentateurs,

hommes

une

est

1

ont

puissance

Cette

animaux.

aux

et

comme

memoire,

nouvelle

a son origine en quatre oeuvres d Aristote.

Seconds Analytiques II, 19 et Metaphysique I, 1 Aristote, apres avoir rejete Pinneisme platonicicn, postule que toute connaissance de Puniversel, y compris celle des premiers principes, est une les

connaissance

acquise

a

donnees

des

partir

externes n en sont pas, bien entendu,

cause suffisante.

la

Mais

sensibles.

En

sens

les

effet,

il

faut

que Panimal, en plus de la puissance de recevoir des donnees sensibles, ait la capacite de depasser le caractere ponctuel de la sensation en 1 impression sensible afin que celle-ci, ainsi preservee, et accumulee avec d autres impressions semblables, puisse constituer la base de ce qu Aristote appelle une experience, d ou on pourra tirer Puniversel.

conservant

Cette capacite de conserver

ou memoire, tout en etant de

les sensations,

Pordre des puissances sensibles, n est cependant pas

animaux;

comme

ne Pest pas non plus

la

commune

a tous les

capacite de former, a partir de

Un

passage celebre synthetise le Vest ainsi que de la de la connaissance: premier expose de cette theorie sensation vient ce que nous appelons le souvenir, et du souvenir plusieurs 1

experience, une notion

fois

repete d une

meme

universelle.

chose vient

1

experience... Et c est de

1

experience

a son tour. ..que vient le principe de Part et de la science, de Part en ce qui regarde le devenir, et de la science en ce qui regarde

16 Petre"

.

les sources plotiniennes de la Conf., X, 17, 26. Nous aimerions pouvoir signaler doctrine que nous venons d exposer, aussi bien que les points fondamentaux d accord et de desaccord entre Plotin et Saint Augustin, mais les limites de cette communication

nous empechent de 15

q.l. 16

Cf. S.

le faire.

Thomas,

In I Sent., d.

Aristote, Anal. Post.,

II,

19,

Ill,

q.

4,

a.

1;

S.

100 a 5-9. Cf. Metaph.,

I,

Bonaventura, In I

1,

980 b 22 sqq.

Sent.,

d.

Ill,

a.

1,

Science, experience et

Dans

De anima

le

mais

memoire,

131

ne trouvc aucun traitement special consacre a des puissances ou de Tame, le probleme de savoir ou devrait elre siluee

or.

theorie

la

souleve

developpee,

memoire

"parties"

la

y la

memoire dans ce cadre general des facultes operatives de Panimal. En outre, le De anima developpe une distinction fondamentale entre Petal une faculte cognitive (sensible ou dianoetique) qui doit encore connaissances, et Petal potenliel de celte meme faculte

potentiel d

acquerir

des

lorsque,

toul

acluellemenl -

dont

en

17

ayanl

la

acquis

L affirmation de

.

de

Pordre

Pexercice

qu intellectuel sera la cle dont se surmonter Popposilion entre Aristole et sensible

De anima

contribution significative du

exlernes

el

Arislole

cependanl ne Celle

Pimaginalion.

pas

est

niveau

Thomas pour Augustin. Une autre

servira S.

S.

distinction

la

au

lanl

enlre les sens

de Pelude de leurs objels respeclifs 18 allarde qu a Pelude du sens commun el de

a

"inlernes"

Pexerce

Pexistence d une connaissance habituelle

de

sera

Pactualisalion

ne

elle

connaissance,

parlir

s

.

clairemenl une faculte sensible

en

tout

derniere, 20

etanl

difficile

a

classer

19

esl

,

21

et son par consequence au corps est lenu du fait Pintellecl extraordinaire, compte importance que "jamais ne pense sans image" 22 Pour que Pimaginalion remplisse bien son role ,

liee

,

.

d intermediaire entre

des

"persislance

sensation el la pensee il faudrail assurer une donl Arislole parle en 429 a 4-5 (voir aussi 433

la

images",

Pon pourrait voir une n utilise pas le mot Arislote qu

a 10) et ou esl

pas retenu son allenlion dans

Dans de

son

le

De memoria

comme une

ou

(hexis)

17

De anima,

18

On

qu 19

20

elle

432 b

Car

"la

429 b

"sens

(pathos)

De anima, De mem.

esl,

par conlre, au cenlre

des

reservoir etal

facultes

de

habiluel

sensitive

et

5-6.

internes"

n a

pas

etc

utilisee

par Aristote,

mais

428 b 11-14. sensible

n existe

pas

independamment du

(429 b 5).

23

en

1-5.

III, 3,

faculte

22

le fail

nous occupe n a

presenlee comme un exaclement comme un

affection

que expression provient des commentateurs.

Cf. Ill, 9,

esl

plus

;

19. Cf. aussi

1

De anima,

separe"

417 b

II, 5,

salt

que

memoire. Mais

la faculte qui

reminiscentia elle

et

connaissances deja acquises 23

et

De anima.

le

La memoire

interet.

allusion a la

III, 7,

431 a

et rem., 1,

15;

431 b

449 b 15-20.

1-5; III, 8,

432 a 5-10.

corps,

1

intellect

en est

Bazan

132

qu 1

vue

dc

point

comme

conserve

elle

du

habitus,

dianoetique:

en puissance;

memoire

Mais

.

et

ecoule,

distinctif.

que

Or

moyens que et

il

le

incorpore temps - mesure du mouvement

La

meme

essentiellement a la

deux

sens

mouvement, memoire par partie de

on

incidentelle (kata symbebekos)

mentales que

une

dans

dianoetique,

partie

faculte

a

c est-a-dire

internes,

la

1

-

la

est

soit

doit

appartenir

a laquelle appartiennent ccs sensitive

partie

ou

la

comme trait saisi par les memes par le sens commun

consequent

ame

temps se

certain

c est-a-dire

peut dire aussi

mesure

conservee par

etc

son objet

a

temps

imagination.

1

du point de vue de

a

qui

etc

ait

quantite et le

la

et

d actualisation

capacite

memoire qu un

est essentiel a la

ce

la

affection,

impression qui a modifie ces facultes 24

de

la

qu

pensee

elle

a

25

de

;

facon

appartient a

besoin

la

d images

memoire peut lui fournir 26 La memoire done n est pas exclusive de hommc; elle se trouve aussi en plusieurs la

.

I

animaux superieurs. Elle

est

comme un

habitus intentionnel capable de

image presentement consideree avec objet qui 1 a et travaille done en ctroitc collaboration avec le produite auparavant sens commun ct imagination en tant que facultes perceptrices du mettre en rapport

1

1

27

,

1

temps

28 .

Saint Augustin et Aristote ont dresse ainsi deux imposantes theories

de

la

connaissance,

opposent,

ellc-meme

ou

il

la

et

en

trouver

la

verite,

la

memoire

profondes

qui

les

memoire

est,

dans

1

est,

dans

rilluminisme

acquisition de la science et de reservoir d images liees a la notion de

condition de possibilite de

sagesse. Faculte organique et la

differences

1

pourra

temps,

des

depit

memoire joue un role central. Presence latente de 1 ame a moteur du processus de retour de esprit a son for interieur

augustinien, la la

ou,

1

abstractionisme aristotelicien,

la

condition

de possibilite de la constitution de experience a partir de laquelle sont C constitues 1 art et la science. Pour un penseur du XIII siecle 1 opposition 1

entre S. Augustin et Aristote etait deja un formidable defi theorique. 24 Ibid.,

449 b

Ibid.,

450 a 23-25.

Ibid.,

450 a 10-15.

Ibid.,

450 b 20-27.

25

26

27 28

Le

25.

examiner Ibid., 451 a 2-17. Nous ne pouvons pas auquel Aristote consacre le reste du traite.

ici

le

processus de reminiscence,

Science, experience et

dcvenait

dossier

encore

cep~ndant

grecs et arabes,

commentateurs,

memoire

complique

plus

dont

133

par

1

neoplatonisme, et appuyees par les idees de Galien, superposees au cadre aristotelicien primitif. II serait naif de

du

exposer

Penorme

ici

des

apport

les interpretations, parfois inspirees

richesse de cette tradition, mais

s

etaient

vouloir

est impossible

il

de

ne pas faire mention d une doctrine qui a conditionne fortement le debat au XIII e siecle. II s agit de Pilluminisme extrinseciste avicennien, ou la

memoire

meme

plus le

joue

role, car

vers

de

que

plutot

intelligibles:

tourner

en continuant de rendre possible 1 experience, ne 1 experience n est plus la source des formes

sensible, tout

dixieme

la

memoire

les

abstraire,

Intelligence

recevoir

les

pour

humain

intellect

1

29

doit

Quant a

.

se la

entierement impossible, selon Avicenne, intellectuelle, car une forme intelligible en acte ne saurait etre gardee dans la 30 L extrinsecisme puissance intellectuelle sans etre actuellement pensee est ainsi renforce: si la memoire intellectuelle n existe pas, les elle

est

.

accordes a

intelligibles doivent etre le

Dator formarum^ 1

Nous avons ad

dit plus

Sentences, a ete pour

lui

La premiere

traditions.

haul que

homme, chaque

la

Thomas

Saint

que

imaginem",

1

fois

qu

il

pense, par

.

1

question souleve

"utrum

dans

memoria

pertineat

commentaire des

le

occasion de confronter toutes ces differentes

reaction du jeune

Thomas

est conciliatrice, et elle

linguistique: tiomen memoriae aequivocatur. II y a la memoire sensible, celle qu Avicenne, a la suite d Aristote et de Galien, a

un plan

se situe sur

dans

situe

"intentions"

qui

29

la

partie

sensibles,

abstraction

fait

postcrieure et

il

de

du

cerveau

y a en outre

toute

la

difference

Avicenne, Shifa I, 356, trad. A.M. Goichon, Le textes d Avicenne, Paris, 1959, p. 170.

et

dont

memoire temporelle

recit

1

objet

sont

les

intellectuelle,

celle

ne

peut

et

qui

de ffayy Ibn Yaqzan commente

par des 5Q

Avicenne,

On

De anima,

aurait voulu

memoire,

mais

la

(ed.

Van

Riet) V,

6, p. 147.

ajouter quelques lignes au sujet de la conception averroi ste de la nature de cette communication ne le permet pas. Pour une

globale de la theorie des sens internes selon Averroes et les autres commentateurs on consultera article classique de H.A. Wolfson, "The internal senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts", Harvard Theological Review, XXVTII 2, (1935), n pp. 69-133. Pour Averroes en particulier cf. aussi mes travaux noetica de Averroes", Philosophia 38 (1972) pp. 19^49 et "Intellectum Speculativum",

presentation

1

"La

Journal of the History of Philosophy, XIX, 4 (1981), pp. 425-446.

Bazan

134

appartenir qu a ct

car

Aristote,

32

ame

1

parlent de

ils

supplemental dc

spirituelle

memoire

de

effort

cet

c est

caracteristique de la

dc

vcritate

rcconnait que

il

celle-ci

situe

est

sensible:

faculte

qu

synthese

methode de

ne peut etre appliquce a de

la

Saint

De

un

notion dc

"locus

cllc

ct

temporcllemcnt,

spccierum"

est,

car

En

mais aussi son

effet,

acte

d

le

I

objet

unc

1

plutot

et

occasion

connait

Pintellect

intelliger.

Et

sail

il

in

est

dernier mot,

Papprofondissement

par

supcrficicl

aristotcliciennes.

objet,

dc 429 a 27-28

consequent,

par

D.

les Q.

quod mcmoria, proprie loquendo, non

"constat

doctrines

.

comme

relief

memoire au sens proprc du terme,

la

rapprochement

sculement son

des formes anima33 Et

Thomas. Mais deja dans

.

certaines

"lieu

en

mettre

faut

il

34 Est-ce parte intellectiva, sed sensitiva tantum" rupture avec la tradition augustinicnnc? C est

dcpasscr

cssaie d identifier

Augustin avec ce

dans le (locus specienim} dont parle Aristote

intelligibles"

effort

eviter le conflit entre les

commun, Thomas

intellectuelle dont parle S.

Augustin

Mais dans un

differentes.

non pas a

synthcse, qui vise

traditions mais a trouver les points en la

conflit alors cntre S.

Pas dc

.

realites

la

de de

non qu

il

il ne les situe pas dans le passe. possede certaines connaissances, meme s etant une comme son contenu de et Cette saisie (notitid) de son acte

connaissance deja acquise peut etre appelee memoire: "omnis notitia non 35 Ce contenu a pu etre objet d une de novo accepta potest dici memoria" .

ou discontinue.

intellection continue

avons une connaissance intellectuelle, car

qui ne faisait illius

rei

autem

il

habere memoriam

in actu; ct sic

34 35

36

37

la

Thomas,

/ Sf/Jf, d. 3, q. 4, a.

S.

Thomas,

ibid.; cf.

S.

Thomas, Dever.,

Ibid.

Cf. plus haul, n. 17.

si

Aristote,

,

2

1.

De anima, c.

dicamur

prius habitualiter cognoscebamus,

est in parte intellectiva nostrac 37 et habituelle vient d Aristotc

pcnsee a etc connue par Saint

S.

Ibid.

quam

"ut

memoria

q. 10, a.

nous

laquelle peut etre appelee memoire d une connaissance que nous possedions mais

actuelle: pas objet de notrc consideration

d Aphrodise, dont

33

cette derniere hypothese

"habituelle",

s agit

La notion dc connaissance

32

Dans

429 a 27-28.

Thomas

non 36

animac"

.

Alexandre a travers

memoire

Science, experience et

une piece importante de sa noetique 38 Thomas done qu approfondir la tradition peripateticienne pour batir un

Averroes, avail

ne

fait

d

fait

elle

.

pont entre celle-ci et la tradition augustinienne. Ainsi ebauchee, la notion de memoire

defendue centre

objections d Avicenne,

les

Thomas dans

Saint

fait

135

De

le

veritate,

devait

intellectuelle

precisement ce que

c est

et

etre

sans que pourtant aucun des trois

39 II faudra arguments y developpes ne louche au fond du probleme attendre jusqu a la la Somme contre les Gentils pour trouver une attaque .

conlre

efficace

entre

distingue

intermediaire inlellecl

1

une qui

Celte

(I

1

acte

1

derniere

par

Avicenne n a pas

these:

la

en

(Pintelleclion

el

acle)

1

etat

a oublie que vis-a-vis des formes intelligibles -

a enseigne Arislole

actualise

s

parfait II

habitus).

comme

-

1

fondemenl theorique de

le

1

implique

du

acquisition la

comme une

a

1

savoir,

dans

presence,

double puissance,

autre

1

exercice.

de

formes

par

Pintellecl,

prealablement acquises, qui ne sont pas objet de consideration mais sur lesquelles 1 intellect peut revenir quand il veut 40 La

intelligibles

actuelle,

.

de

refutation

avicennienne

these

la

abstractionisle de la connaissance et d

intermediaire

entre

sur

base

la

une conception de

d inlelleclion

I

d une

theorie

habitus

comme

simplement en 41 dans la Somme de mais S. Thomas y puissance, reprise Tfieologie ajoute un argument de type anlhropologique auquel il tiendra dorenavant: dans 1 extrinsecisme avicennien 1 union de 1 ame et du corps devient 42 La maitrise des lextes arisloleliciens que Thomas met en superflue 1

acte

et

science

la

est

,

.

dans

relief

Somme

la

est fruit

du contact assidu

et

approfondi qu

il

a eu

TO Cf.

1985,

R-A.^Gauthier,

intellectu",

39

S.

Thomas Aq.

Sentcntia

libri

d Averroes y cites, et Revue Phil. deLouvain, 71 (1973) pp. 468-487.

100

p.

et

les

De

veritate,

q.

sensus,

oportet

quod

10,

textes

d.

2:

a)

species

in

"cum

De mon

Sensu, ed. Leonine travail

"L

intellectus

possibilis sit stabilioris stabilius recipiatur"... b)

eo recepta

XLV,

t.

authenticite

naturae

"si

du

2,

De

quam

intellectu

in

non conservarentur aliquae species, sed sola habilitas convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, aequaliter remaneret homo habilis ad quodcumque intelligibile"... c) "hoc videtur expresse contrarium sententiae Philosophi in III De anima qui commendat

possibili

antiques de hoc quod posuerunt pa item".

Summa contra S.

texte 1

II

II,

esse locum specierum

quantum ad

intellectivam

74.

79, 6. Deja dans ScG II, 74 Saint Thomas utilisait comme argument le 429 b 5 pour expliquer que actualisation de habitus est de ordre de reprend toutes ces references dans la Somme de Theologie.

Theol.

I,

De anima

exercice.

42

Gentiles,

animam

S. Theol.,

I,

1

84, 4.

I

1

Bazan

136

avec

De anima

le

de

lors

dc

redaction

la

Sententia.

sa

dans cc

Et

commcntaire, en effet, nous trouvons, autour de 429 b 5, une version habituelle rigoureuse de la refutation d Avicenne fondee sur la presence des

especes -

la

intelligibles

memoire

memes arguments memona 44

et

43

dans

intelligibles

1

esprit

meme

le

La

.

-

intellectuelle

dans

textuel,

appui

formes

des

permanence

encore reaffirmed, avec

est

les

De

Sententia

la

.

la

si

Ce qui a commence comme une preoccupation theologique (a savoir, memoire peut faire partie de image de la Trinite) est devenu un I

probleme

philosophique leur

intelligibles,

touchant

fondamental, et

origine

la

parvenu a depasser opposition entre Aristote base d un principe aristotelicicn. Mais le fait 1

cxistence d une

1

memoire

des

1

et Saint

intellect.

Augustin sur

Thomas

qui

constitue,

reccptif

dans son

que

La memoire

illumination.

1

afin

lui-meme

intellectuelle

45

acquiert

qui

,

interieur

for

les

elle

especes

la

intelligibles

est

a

la

et

presence recevoir

puisse

de Saint Thomas

la

affirme

que ne doit pas nous tromper sur essaic d etablir entre Augustin

intellectuelle

veritable portee du rapprochement qu il Aristote. La memoire augustinienne est le retour de Tame sur la

especes

En permanence textes du De anima, Saint Thomas

approfondissant Pexegese dc certains est

nature

dans

leur

1

intellcct

de

partir

et qui ne peut pas expcrience rendue possible par la memoire sensitive, a 1 etat habituel, il conserve s les meme passer a 1 acte de les contempler, 1

sans se convertir aux images scnsiblcs dont elle aussi,

immediate

4^ 1

-

comme

Cf.

la

De anima,

Sententia

libri

Sententia

De memona,

Cf.

De

veritate,

intellect possible

46

memoire

d elle-meme,

avoir

peut

43

par

la

q.

est

il

mcmoria

III, 2,

tr. II,

10

sensitive

a.

46 .

clair

la

qu

permanence a etc assurce,

a la connaissance

Quant elle

n est

pas une

sui de Saint Augustin

1

que

1

ame

conscience

mais

le

intellectuelle

et

exige

-

32-50 (ed. Leonine).

70-85. 3,

ou Thomas montre que

la

memoire

ne sont pas deux puissances diffcrentes.

La these est claire depuis le debut jusqu a la fin de la carriere de Saint Thomas. de veritate, q. 10, a. 2, ad 7m: "quantumcumque aliquam speciem intelligibilem

Q.

apud

se

habeat, numquam ad sed

convertendo

intelligibilium...non est sine

tamem

actu aliquid considerat

phantasmata";

fantasmate" (tr. II,

Sent.

De

147-150).

secundum

memoria:

illam

speciem,

"memoria

nisi

...etiam

Science, experience et

resultat sujet

d une reflexion de

du monde: anima

I

ame

memoire

137

sur la connaissance qu elle a acquise au

intelligendo alia intelligit

se^1

.

Bref, dans son effort d assumer des traditions heterogenes dans une synthese personnelle, Saint Thomas a etc coherent depuis le debut de sa

coherence

Cette

carriere.

memoire sensu

stricto,

en

manifeste

se

est

une

faculte

affirmations:

trois

sensitive

organique

qui

1)

la

rend

possible la conservation des images sensibles en tant que passees; 2) au

sens large du

mot on peut

aussi

lequel cependant n encadre pas la

les

appeler

formes

memoire

intelligibles

categoric du temps passe; 3) Pexistence d une

signifie

aucunement qu on puisse

Pintellect

qu

memoire

se passer de la

il

habituel,

conserve dans

intellectuelle

memoire

ne

sensible car

jamais Pintellect ne pense sans image. La memoire sensitive, en tant que condition

de

possibilite

de Pexperience

est

la

clef

de voute tant dans

Pacquisition de la science que dans Pexercice de la science deja acquise. En depit de tout ce que Pon dit de Pinfluence du neoplatonisme sur Saint Thomas, il y a un point ou il Pa rejete entierement, et c est en theorie

de

la

connaissance.

Le rapport entre

science, experience et

memoire

le

met bien en evidence.

Universite d Ottawa

Cf.

mon

travail

"La

ciencia del

(Mendoza), n 35 (1969), pp. 111-153.

anima y

el

conocimiento de

si

mismo",

Philosophia

LUCA BIANCHI

Potentia Dei absoluta: logiquc dc la dccouvcrtc

ou rhctoriquc dc 1 argumcntation

Au

dc

debut

notrc

pousse

siecle,

une

religieuses

precises

polcmiquc

antipositiviste,

historiographiquc

destinee

aristotelicien

la

devcnir

a

fut

et

consequente affirmation du principc de

Duhcm

savons que

naissance

de

etait alle

ideologiques

substance dans prcsque Unite

meme

medievale:

science

schematiqucment dans 1277"

de

la

la

que,

ce

dc 1277

moderee dans

comme these

le

dc

se

ton

elle

reccmmcnt, "The

ct

Effect of the

nous

retrouvc

encore

est

-

"Pannee

litterature successive sur Phistoire

chapitrc

qui

puissance absoluc de Dieu.

cette

moderne"

la

des

these

de

de en la

presentee

Condemnation of

Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy?

Je voudrais, toute

le

et

savoir

antiaverroi ste

jusqu a parlcr de 1277

science

la

la

une

avanca

processus de dissolution du

le

condamnation

la

forte

catholique

Peglise

a

cclebre:

dcclcncha

une

convcntionnaliste,

Duhem

et

theoriques

exigences

defendre

Pierre

Privec de ses presuppositions

la

de

desir

entrama une attitude critique paradigmc

dcs

epistemologie

le

d obscurantisme

accusations

par

scicntifiquc?

ici,

question,

atlirer

en

Pattention

evilant

dcs

sur

la

necessite

simplifications

de recxaminer

caricaturales

de

la

ce qui a etc bien raremcnt dynamique dc Phistoire et en tenant comptc dix annees fertilcs dernieres fait des acquisitions importantcs de ces pour la recherche. II est en particulicr indispensable de prcndrc conscience que Phistoire dc Pinflucnce rcelle du Sillabus de Tempier sur

pensee medievale, scienlifique ou autre, doit encore etre ccrite. Et pour le fairc, il nc suffit pas de reparcourir Panalyse dc Duhem, fondec la

sur

deux

articles

seulement

(les

27

et

66

dans

la

numeration

dc

Mandonnet-Hissette) et limitee au concept de Pespace. en consideration aussi les articles ayant trait aux concepts de temps et d infini, a astrologie et a la magic, a Panimation et a Pinfluence des 11

faudrait prendre

1

Cf. P. Duhcm, Le systcme du tnonde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques dc Platon a Copernic, Hermann, Paris 1913-1959, VI, 66; VII, 206; IX, 373-374.

2

Cf. E. Grant, The Effect of the Condemnation of 1277, dans The Cambridge History 537-539. of Later Medie\-al Philosophy, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge 1982, pp.

Potentia Dei absoluta

corps

a

celestes,

resultats

des anges, a Peternite du monde:

localisation

la

on

si

peut

139

de

risquer

des

faire

vraisemblablement bien peu enthousiasmants. 3

II

les

seraient

previsions

faudrait aussi considerer

avec attention quelles sont les reactions provoquees par les accusations de

de

Peveque

averroistes

Paris et

Pencontre

a

de

des

naturelle

Pepistemologie

quelles sont les consequences effectives de son insistance

Pomnipotence divine. On devrait deja retenir apres les etudes fondamentales de Courtenay et apres certains travaux recents italiens que la distinction entre la puissance absolue et la puissance ordonnee de sur

-

Dieu ne et

1277,

pas diffusee a la suite

s est

qu

nominaliste

;

ne

elle

elle fut

fut

un

pas

a cause de

et

instrument

au contraire tracee des

la

condamnation de

conceptuel typiquement debut du XIHe siecle et

le

connut des interpretations et des utilisations assez diverses. 4 On ne peut plus debiter des equations commodes mais restrictives du genre condamnation de 1277 = potentia Dei absoluta = nominalisme = critique de elle

Paristotelisme II

est

absoluta

ait

.

dans une certaine mesure incontestable que joue un role dans la nouvelle physique du

assumant une fonction heuristique de

lire

des

qu

elle

et analytique

representa Pantidote decisif au

averroistes

qu

,

libera

elle

contre-factuelles

,

potentia Dei siecle,

importante. Mais

dogmatisme

il

en

arrive

aristotelicien

scientifique et qu elle de prendre en consideration des d elaborer des experiences de pensee

Pimagination

permit de poser des nouvelles questions situations

la

XlVe

,

suggestives, d introduire des hypotheses et des theories

audacieuses

,

de

construire des modeles de la realite subfiles et originaux. 5

Tout

ceci

epistemologies a

peut la

sembler

reconfortant

mode, mais a

le

a

la

lumiere

certaines

defaut d etre depourvu de perspective

Pour un premier bilan sur influence de la condamnation du La condanna del 1277 e la crisi dell aristotelismo scolastico. 1

de

1277, voir

ma

these de

doctoral 4

Cf. W.J.

dans Divine

Courtenay, The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages, Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medie\ al Philosophy, Reidel, Dordrecht

243-269; L. Bianchi, Onnipotenza divina e ordine del mondo fra XIII e XIV Medioevo, 10 (1984), pp. 105-153; E. Randi, // so\rano e I orologiaio. Due immagini di Dio net dibattito sulla potentia absoluta fra XIII e XIV secolo, La Nuova 1985, pp.

secolo,

Italia,

Firenze 1987.

Voir pour exemple les travaux de E. Grant, Medieval and Seventeenth Century Conceptions of an Infinite Void Space beyond the Cosmos, ISIS, 60 (1969), pp. 50-51; Place and Space in Medieval Physical Thought, dans Motion and Time, Space and Matter: Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and Science, Ohio State Univ. Press, Columbus 1976, pp. 141-142; The Condemnation of 1277, God s Absolute Power and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages, Viator, 10 (1979), pp. 214-217, 239-241.

Bianchi

140

D abord

il est temps dc sc convaincre quc le dogmatisme un mythe qui provient d une projection anachronique sur le XlVe siecle d une situation propre au XVIIe siecle. Siger de

historique.

avcrroi ste

XHIe

est

et le

Brabant, Boece de Dacie et leurs collegues de

la faculte

tout, comme on s obstine a le Galilee. Au contraire ils furent les

des arts de Paris devanciers du

ne furent pas du

croire, les

Simplicius de

premiers, dans

le

monde

programme de recherche autonome sur la realite naturelle; un programme de recherche qui s en appelait a la physique et a la cosmologie d Aristote non pas par adhesion preconc.ue ou par incapacite chretien, a etablir un

mais

critique,

manque d

sincere

constatation

la

par

valables.

alternatives

XHIe

raristotelisme, deja au

6

et

et

de

monde

1

la

hypothese que

du

1

exulter devant toute sortie anti-aristotelicienne. partir

douloureuse

parfois

Done on ne doit pas identifier dans XlVe siecle, obstacle a surmontcr, pour

destruction de

1

Le

faire

image

serait

d

ailleurs

aristotelicienne

du

aurait etc favorisee plus par les attaques incidentcs et exterieures

de quelque theologien - une petite page de Scot sur le mouvement des existence du vide quc par la anges, deux lignes de Holkot sur 1

de

constatation

ses

moins

travail

importante pour

une les

aussi

est

II

mais

spcctaculaire

commentateurs:

de

prise

peres de

la

contradictions

et

difficultes

pas

conscience,

science moderne.

indispensable

donner

dc

autant

pour en

fruit

inlcrieures,

realite,

du des

sterile

extremement

7

quclques

sur

precisions

la

XlVe siecle pretendue nouveaute des problemes qui ont etc affrontes au elle permit tout ou de dans bien absoluta: Dei la a cas, potentia grace plus

de

considerer

a

nouveau et

discutees,

amplcment

des

qui

hypotheses

ensuite

avaient

dans

refusees,

deja

la

ete

tradition

Mais prendre 1277 comme terminus a quo de thematiques de la pluralite des mondes, du mouvement de la terre ou du

aristotelicienne.

comme

6

Cf.

edizione

celles

L.

Bianchi,

Velare

Quaestiones

della

philosophiam in

non

Metaphysicam

est

bonum

de Sigeri

di

.

A

proposito della nuova Brabante, Rivista di storia

della filosofia, 40 (1985), pp. 260-263.

hue usque quasi indicem illarum contradictionum, quas legendo, et conferendo hosce libros inter se, observare mihi licuit...Dixi porro, conferendo libros nam si eosdam cum caetcris operibus conferamus: Deum inter Scholasticos se, "Habes

Scholasticos

immortalem! Aristoteleos,

quot I,

Cannstatt 1964),

apparebunt!".

8,

dans

III,

pp. 147-148.

Opera

P.

Omnia,

Gassendi,

Lugduni

Exercitationes

1658

paradoxicae

(Frommann,

Stuttgart

ad\ ersus -

Bad

Potentia Dei absoluta

vide intra ou extra cosmique fait

a

qu

tradition

"Utrum

precedente.

cela ne peut etre

inexact et deviant:

est

ou

d oublier

condition

la

8

141

de

minimiser

vacuo

in

les

motus

fieri

possit

de

apports

la

violentus",

vacuo possit esse quies alicuius mobili", "utrum, posito vacuo concavitate caeli, posset caelum moveri", "utrum, posito vacuo "utrum

in

concavitate caeli, latera caeli

nos

de

historiographie,

dans

la

physique absoluta par des Mediavilla,

telles

du

les

auraient

Stagirite,

auteurs

influences et

caelo":

ete

,

si

vacuum

esset

in

inter

d apres une certaine

des situations

impossibles

soulevees de potentia Dei

par Tempier

Oresme

commentaires

"utrum,

in

traitant

questions,

Ockham, Buridan

dans

lettre

la

concurrerent",

caelum, videremus aliquid parvum

et

in

comme

Richard de

a vrai dire, je les ai trouvees a

de Roger Bacon

aristoteliciens

et

des

certains maitres averroi stes contemporains de Siger.

Par

si

ailleurs,

potentia Dei absoluta

la

apparait

souvent dans

la

formulation de ces experiences de pensee typiques de la science du XlVe dans mesure en et siecle, quelle dependent-elles, logiquement II

historiquement?

chez Locke

Phomme

-

est sans

doute

significatif

que chez Buridan

-

encore

et

Dieu qui mene aux confins hypothetiques du cosmos il mission d accomplir Texperience du bras est tout

ce soil

qui a la

;

que chez Richard de Mediavilla ou chez Nicole Oresme chez Samuel Clarke - la translation de 1 univers a ete pensee

aussi significatif -

et

meme

comme

effet

d une intervention divine

66 de Tempier.

11

Mais

les

-

parfois en se referant a

noms d Archyte, de Cleomedes

et

1

article

de Lucrece

devraient suffire pour nous rappeler que ces themes pouvaient etre, et en fait

ont ete formules a

Cf.

E.

Grant,

1

Much Ado

Middle Ages to the scienza nel medioevo,

Scientific II

origine sans la

moindre stimulation theologique;

about Nothing. Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Rwolution, Cambridge Univ. Press, London, p. 116; La

Mulino, Bologna 1983,

p. 96.

1

Cf. E. Grant,

The condemnation of 1277, pp. 240-241.

Rogerus Baco, Q. supra libros quatuor Physicorum, IV, dans Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, Clarendon, Oxford 1905-1940, VIII, pp. 210-214; Siger de Brabant. Questions sur la Physique d Aristote, IV, 26, 27, ed. Ph. Delhaye, Inst. de Philosophic, Louvain 1941, pp. 183-185; In libros Aristotelis de Anima, II, 31, ed. F. Van Cf.

Steenberghen

dans

Trois

commentaires

anonymes

sur

le

Traite

de

I

Ame d Aristote,

Publ. Universitaires, Louvain 1971, pp. 259-261. Cf. Johannes Buridanus, Q. in octo libros Physicorum, IV, 10, f. 77v; J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, II, 13, 21, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1975, pp. 175-176; Richardus de Media Villa, Clarissimi...Richardi de Media Villa...super quatuor libros Sententiarum, II, 14, 3, 3, Apud V. Sabbium, Brixiae 1591, p. 168; Nicole Oresme, Le livre du del et monde, II, 8, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1968, p. 368; S. Clarke, dans Correspondance Leibniz-Clarke, 3, PUF, Paris 1957, p. 69.

Bianchi

142

et

devrait suffire de citer Ic

il

pour nous assurer qu et

commentaire sur

se

demande

I

argumentation

Simplicius

12

mesure

alors inevitablement dans quelle

potentia Dei absoluta concerne justification et dans quelle mesure scientifique

il

II

.

logique de

la

la

de

De Caelo dc

furent reintroduits en Occident latin avant 1277,

ils

sans se soucier des droits du Tout-Puissant.

On

le

la

concerne, par contre, est

difficile

langage de

le

decouverte

de

se

la

et

de

la

rhetorique

a

soustraire

ou Ton a vu une fonction heuristique et analytique impression que il n souvent y ait qu une technique persuasive, un effort de indispensable, la

1

donner une forme dramatique, d offrir une traduction intuitive et realiste a une hypothese d etude. On pense a des formules comme les suivantes: "sit

autem

omnipotentiam Dei

libra imaginaria, vel vera per

per ymaginationem vel divinam potentiam aliqua pars

sphera

"pose

ignis...";

par ymaginacion

Dieu par sa puissance creart

ii

et

comme

si

corps separes un de

facta...";

"si

celi

poneretur in

est

possible que

il

1I autre..."

On objectera que le principe de la potentia Dei absoluta permit au moins de conceptualiser des situations retenues auparavant absurdes et impensables, en dissipant equivoque entre les impossibilitcs physiques et 1

les impossibilites logiques. etre 1

dans

present

un equivoque qui etait pent mais non pas dans classique,

toutefois d

meme

affirmaient qu un certain etat de

ils

Lorsqu du vide

s agit

medieval:

chretien

aristotelisme

II

Paristotelisme

-

est

impossible,

explicitement

ils

chez

pas fait

-

entendaient dire

mais possible pour une cause surnaturelle fait est possible de potentia Dei absoluta,

naturaliter,

etat

de

Dans

contradiction (simpliciter).

il

14 .

I

.

existencc

impossible

Affirmer que cet

ou

thcoriquement qu une question de principe logique de non

Dieu, mais impossible naturalitef n est

possible pour

terminologie.

averroi stes

les

par exemple

qui

S

il

les

deux cas

determine

est vrai

ce

c est bien le

qui

est

possible

que du XHIe au XlVe

en

siecle le

sens

absolu

domaine des

Grant rappelle la traduction de Simplicius et son utilisation par Thomas d Aquin, et reconnait que "John Buridan s discussion. ..was probably occasioned by knowledge of

il Simplicius account" (Medieval and Seventeenth Century, pp. 40-42). Cependant accent sur la condamnation du 1277 et sur la puissance absolue de persiste a mettre Dieu: cf. pour exemple Place and Space, pp. 143-144. 1

13 Cf. Thomas Bradwardine, De Causa Dei contra Pelagium, I, 1, 40, London 1618 de Celo (Minerva, Frankfurt a.M. 1964), p. 129 D; Nicole Oresme, The Questiones super Nicole Oresme, Le of Nicole Oresme, I, 9, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison 1965, p. 129; livre

14

du

del,

II, 8,

p. 370.

Cf. L. Bianchi,

Omnipotenza divina

e ordine del

mondo, pp.

121-129.

Potentia Dei absoluta

143

choses retenues possibles s etandit considerablement cela ne dependit pas de 1 appel a la puissance absolue de Dieu, mais d une extension du ,

critere

ce

etablit

qui

de

celui

emblematique,

Un

contradictoire.

est

qui

I

infmi.

Malgre

d argumentations de potentia Dei absoluta,

les

exemple 1

me

utilisation

semble massive

discussions engagees a ce

propos ne depasserent pas ce que Anneliese Maier appellait le Tmitisme d Aristote jusqu a la chute du prejudice centre Pinfini en acte, par la mise en discussion de Pevidence intuitive de Paxiome que le tout est plus 16

grand de la partie. Les perplexites soulevees jusqu

ici

discussion et a approfondir le sujet.

veulent

II

visent seulement a

emettre une sentence definitive centre

pas

son

provoquer

bon de souligner qu

est

la

elles

dialectique

la

ne des

au progres scientifique ne pouvoirs etre une etude pourra comprise que par systematique de sa frequence, qui permette d evaluer ou et comment elle agit concretement. divins

:

effective

Une recommandation

contribution

est toutefois indispensable:

faudra toujours,

il

dans ce genre d enquete, se souvenir que la potentia Dei absoluta fut en soi un instrument neutre, potentiellement eversif et potentiellement compatible avec n importe quel systeme theorique. Ainsi, si du XHIe au

XlVe

siecle

elle

-

si

XVIIe

au

-

en

put

naturelle d Aristote,

quelque maniere agir contre la philosophie Pont suggere Margaret Osier et Francis

comme

siecle

favoriser

sa substitution par le d une fois poussa ou meme plus en de cette En d autres opera faveur termes, la potentia Dei philosophie.

Oakley

mechanisme

et

elle

Patomisme 17

,

put

celle-ci

absoluta trouva a la fois des fonctions critiques et

des fonctions conservatrices et de prudence.

pour des exigences theologiques,

revolutionnaires

D ailleurs

des

le

XlVe

et

siecle,

adopta de facon toujours plus marquee ce ton conventionnaliste que Pon exalte pour son modernisme et qui cependant permit de preserver aisement le paradigme traditionnel du dcfi de toute autre alternative: en reduisant la construction de le savoir

,

nouvelles

explications

de

la

realite

ainsi

que

la

falsification

des

explications passees a un pur exercice secundum imaginationem. Garantir

Cf.

W.J.

Courtenay, Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion, dans The Pursuit of and Renaissance Religion, Brill, Leiden 1974, pp. 39^0.

Holiness in Late Medieval 1

Cf. J.E.

17

Murdoch,

M.J.

Infinity

and Continuity, dans The Cambridge

Providence

and

History, pp. 568-573.

s Views on Scientific Knowledge, Journal of the History of Ideas, 44 (1983), pp. 549-560; F. Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order. An Excursion in the History of Ideas from Abelard

Cf.

Osier,

to Leibniz, Cornell

Divine

Will

Univ. Press, Ithaca 1984, pp. 67-92.

in

Gassendi

Bianchi

144

monde

a Dieu la pleine liberle dc choisir pour le

1

ordre qu

il

voulait,

dcvint simplement la premise pour reaffirmer, sans courir de risque, qu lui

donne de facto

avail

justement

ordre decril par

1

ou qu

-

pu au moins

aurait

il

donner

lui

il

-

le Stagirite.

par exemple, aux premiers thomistes pour lesquels la mondes servait de potentia Dei absoluta de la pluralite des possibilile raisons seulemcnt a confirmer la validite physique des pour Punicite du

Pensons,

monde 18 pensons ;

Venise, ou

averroiste

a la tradition

theses

les

de Jean de Jandun a Paul de

,

caracteristiques de

la

Physique

et

du De Caelo

accompagnees par un hommage formel aux 19 ou pensons a Buridan, qui dessins incomprehensibles du Tout-Puissant de la doctrine en avancant ^impetus invoquait la potentia divina non pas

claienl

systematiquement

;

mais pour poser les conditions de possibilite des lois aristoteliciennes du mouvement, qu il venait de falsifier sur le plan 20 Et il ne s agit pas de cas isoles, mais des sources d une empirique.

pour

criliquer,

XVIIe siecle, comme le longue tradition qui remonterait jusqu au XVIe et 21 ou Pietro Pompona/zi Alessandro autres entre Piccolomini, tcmoigncnt 22 Bartolomeo Amici.

Comme

ai

j

souligne

contre

singuliere,

ailleurs,

sainte

cette

justement centre cette convergence entre

alliance

le

que deja dans thcologique et Paristotelisme philosophique avail prouve de connaitre et que soil le pape Urbain VIII -

contingentisme les Juvenilia

soil le jesuile

Jean-Baplisle Morin chercherenl a opposer au coperniciennisme 18

Le Correctorium

Cf.

Correctorium

Quacstione

,

9,

Herder,

Corruptorii

Circa

Corruptorii

Romae

,

8,

Quare Herder,

,

9,

Kain,

Romae,

p.

il

-

Galilee

1^ Saulchoir 1927, p. 49; Le 51; Le Correctorium Corruptorii

1954, p. 55.

19

Sur Jean de Jandun voir S. MacClintock, Perversity and Error. Studies on the Avaroist John of Jandun, Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington 1956, pp. 88-95. 20 Cf. Johannes Buridanus, Q. in octo libros Physicorum, VII, 7, f. 108v. Sur ce texte

La scienza degli occamisti. La scienza tardo-medie\>ale dalle origini del alia rivoluzione scientific a, Maggioli, Rimini 1982, pp. 212-213. nominalista paradigma voir

21

F.

Bottin,

Alessandro Piccolomini, Delia filosofia naturale di M. Alessandro Piccolomini, II, de Cavalli, Venezia 1565, pp. 238-241; Pietro Pomponazzi, Petri Pomponatii Mantuani libri quinque de fato, del libero arbitrio et de praedcstinatione, V, 4, 32, In Aed. Thesaurus Mundi, Lucani 1957, p. 411. 24,

22

Cf.

G.

Bartolomeo

entre

puissance

a

une connaissance excellente du debat scholastique sur la distinction et puissance ordonnee de Dieu: cf. In Aristotelis libros de

absolue

459-460. II Ill, 18, 6, Apud S. Roncaliolum, Neapoli 1626-1629, II, pp. effort de rendre theologiquement acceptable son souvent cette distinction dans impossibilite adhesion aux theses de la philosophic aristotelicienne: pour exemple naturelle du vide (voir a ce sujet E. Grant, The Condemnation of 1277, n. 16, p. 216), du ciel, impossibilite de infini en acte.

Physico Auditu..., utilise

1

1

rincorruptibilite

1

1

Potentia Dei absoluta

eleva des protestations energiques; et

recherchcr

Un

fatto".

"non...quello

indiqua a

che Iddio poteva

fare,

la

ma

science

le

devoir de

quello che Egli ha

realisme pourra sembler un peu ingenu et fideistique par

tel

rapport au

il

145

conventionnalisme

desabuse de certains penseurs du XlVe il Test, en s inspirant lui aussi a une

Et dans une certaine mesure

siecle.

hypothese theologique indemontrable: a savoir que le Createur a prefere un ideal de simplicite a 1 exhibition exuberante de sa puissance par la 23 realisation de merveilles de toute sorte. II s agit toutefois d une reaction energique, et necessaire, centre le vice originaire de toutes les conditionnelles

methodologies 1

basees

sur

la

potentia

Dei

absoluta,

introduction d une fracture irremediable, d un divorce definitif entre la

realite

scheme conceptuel destine a la comprendre; dans la aucune ne puisse etre demontree comme vraie, que toutes qu insuffisantes en relation a ce que Dieu, dans egalement et

tout

conviction

sont

Pimpenetrabilite de son dessin, pouvait avoir decrete. Pour Galilee, par centre, les theories n etaient pas des simples modeles, et

done compatibles, des mondes

infinis

des descriptions incompatibles de ce le

hypotheses, permettant

incommensurables

que Dieu aurait pu creer, mais qui en fait existe. Les

monde unique

choix entre les theories, cessent ainsi d etre de

simples exercices dialectiques, pour devenir

le

cas

limite

de ce qui

la

nature nous montre concretement, les conditions ideales des phenomenes,

experimentables par qui

"difalchi

gli

impedimenti della

materia".

24

Universita degli Studi di Milano

Bianchi, Uccelli d oro e pesci di piombo: Galileo Galilei e la potentia Dei dans Sopra la volta del mondo. Onnipotenza e potenza assoluta di Dio tra medioe\ o e eta moderna, Lubrina, Bergamo 1986, pp. 139-146. Aux textes utilises dans cet article (en particulier le Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi..., 4, et la reponse a J.B. Morin dans Le Opere di Galileo Galilei, VII, pp. 488-489 et 565-566) on peut non ho detto, ne ardirei di dire, che alia natura e a Dio fusse ajouter le suivant: impossibile il conferir quella velocita, che voi dite, immediatamente; ma diro bene che de facto la natura non lo fa; talche il farlo verrebbe ad esser operazione fuora del corso naturale, e pero miracolosa." Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi..., \, p. 45. Cf.

absoluta

L. ,

"lo

Ibidem, naturelle

du

Funkenstein,

2,

p.

234.

La

differente

fonction

de

1

hypothese

dans

la

philosophic

XlVe siecle et dans la science moderne est bien reconnue par A. The Dialectical Preparation for Scientific Revolutions. On the Role of

Hypothetical Reasoning in the Emergence of Copernican Astronomy and Galilean Mechanics, dans The Copernican Achie\>ement, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1975, pp. 186 et 190-191.

JERZY BURCHARDT

Lcs sources

Witelo,

Tils

Vitcrbc

ct

des

qu

genres de

ct Ics

il

la

commc

continuait dc considerer la Polognc 2

d un

Fils

habitabilis).

Polonais"

alors

,

sommet dc

au

parvenu

1

dcs

et

Thuringiens etait

connaissance humainc d aprcs Witelo

residait

il

(terra

dc

duds)

(procurator

a

du savant,

son pays domiciliaire

ducal

administratcur

qu

carriere

sa

Wroclaw, Henricus de Ciz (en polonais: Henryk / Zytyc; en allcmand: 3 Hcinrich von Zeit/ ) et d une Polonaise de la famille des chevaliers de

Borow4

avail

il

,

etudie,

libcraux, puis

annees 1253 a 1258, a Paris,

vers les

rcndu, vcrs 1262, a Padoue, ou

s etait

1268, y faisant dcs etudes dc droit canon

dcs

arts.

s

y cnseignant a la facultc

ct

6

Quand pas

5

arts

les

demeura jusqu en

il

il

problemes philosophiqucs, Witelo cntendait ne thcologic, qu il defmissait commc la science de la

rcsolvait les

opposer a la mais preferait suivre une autre

7

voie, qu il appelait la voie de la de en raison (via rationisP) ou, mots, la voie naturellc ct possible plus 9 D aillcurs il ajoutait par la nature (via naturalis et possibilis natura }.

vcritc

,

Witelo, Pcrspcctiva, Naturforscher des XIII. Mittelaltcrs, Bd. Ill, H. fratri

(Clemens

prologus

Jahrhnndcrts, 2,

Munster

filius

1

Witelo, Perspcctiva, Basileae 1572, p. 467:)

lib. "in

circa latitudinem quinquaginta

X,

prop.

terra

74

nostra,

X)8,

p.

Thuringorum

irrcfracto mentis radio felicem intuitum ct intellcctum

~

(

(Opticae scilicet

127,

1

o n

i

Jerzy Burchardt, Witelo, filosofo della natura del XIII sec., Polacca delle Scienze, Biblioteca e Centro di Studi a Roma,

Ossolineum, 1984,

5

6

Ibidem,

p.

25

Ibidem,

p.

38

Fcdericus

edidit

a

e,

habitabili,

26.

-

Una

biografta,

Conferenze

39, p. 42.

causa primaria paenitentiae in hominibus et de natura 11 - 13. Georgius Burchardt, Studia Copemicana, vol. XIX, p. 161,

De

Witelonis

De

causa primaria...,

p. 161,

5-6.

Witelonis

De

causa primaria...,

p. 165,

184

-

186.

Witelonis

De

causa primaria...,

167, 278

-

279.

1

Risner,

quae

est

Accademia Wroctew

87,

p. 23-25.

-

Witelonis

y

des

amatori aeternae lucis

"Veritatis

1-3:)

graduum..."

3

4

und

suhscriptorum".

Thesaurus,

P o

dcr

Polonorum,

et

perspicuum

Philosoph Philosophic

ein

Witelo,

Geschichte

zur

Westfalen

in

Wilhelmo de Morbcka Witelo,

Bacumker,

Beitrdge

p.

daemonum,

edidit

Les sources

qu le

meme

n avait

il

faire

11

philosophic, qu

de

pa^ eludie

il

la

iheologie

il

se

lettre

paenitenliae in

encore qu

,

il

147

eut le desir de

limitait a suivre les principes

rendit

compte que, sur

raison devait se soumettre a la foi chretienne.

La

humaine d apres Witelo

de

la

Cependant, tout en cheminant le long

avail compris.

nouvelle voie,

la

genres de la connaissance

que sa competence se

et

,

et les

le

plan superieur, la

13

padouane de Witelo, qui porte le litre De causa primaria hominibus el de nalura daemonum 14 conslilue un exemple ,

d applicalion pralique de celle voie nouvelle. de Calcidius Wilelo y demonlre, a 1 aide de

En

corrigeanl les opinions

argumenl plalonicien de la ordre de 1 univers (ordo universi),

,

1

double proporlion conlinue, que, dans 1 demons se trouvent entre les moteurs des spheres celesles el les elres humains. 16 Par consequenl, les demons sonl plus parfails que les homines. les

Us n apparaissenl done que Ires raremenl a ceux-ci. Pour cela, il faul que, devenus pecheurs, le peche les ait fait lomber de la place elevee qu ils occupenl normalemenl dans 1 ordre de 1 univers a un niveau inferieur,

a savoir celui des

hommes. 17 En

suivanl la voie de la raison,

Wilelo rejelle aussi le dogme de la chulle des anges. 18 Dans sa lellre padouane, il formule aussi une Iheorie psychopalhologique nouvelle porlanl sur les illusions de demons, principalemenl en vue de comballre la peur sociale

1

de son epoque. 19

Witelonis

De

causa primaria..., p. 161, 6-7.

Witelonis

De

causa primaria...,

Witelonis

De

causa primaria...,

p.

Witelonis

De

causa

p. 168,

p. 180,

primaria..."

858

-

863.

161, 1-5.

312

-

314; ibidem, p. 323

-

327.

XIX, Wrodaw, Ossolineum 1979, p. 161 -180 (avec une - 158 et un commentaire edition latin, p. 200 preface latine, p. 155 208). Voir aussi non commentee: Witelo, Epistula de primaria causa poenitentiae in hominibus et de Studio

Copemicana,

vol.

1

substantia

daemonum, dans le livre: Eugenia Paschetto, Demoni di Witelo e di Oresme, G. Giappichelli, Torino 1978, p. 89 - 132.

natura

et

Note su alcuni

scritti

Jerzy Burchardt, List Witelona do Ludwika we teoriopoznawcza, kosmologiczna medyczna, Wroclaw XIX, p. 120 - 123. i

De

Witelonis

causa primaria..., p.

175,

605

-

p.

16,

e prodigi,

Lwowku 1979,

650.

Slaskim Problematyka Studia Copemicana, vol.

J.

Burchardt, op.

cit.,

p.

124-125. 17

Witelonis

ibidem, 10

p. 173,

Witelo 278

-

De 542

De

causa primaria..., p. 178, 778 - p. 179, 793. Ibidem, p. 168, 333 543, p. 176, 681 - 688; conf. ibidem, p. 178, 777 - p. 179, 793.

causa primaria...,

284. Ibidem, p. 168, 326

19

-

334;

p.

167,

-

-

p.

167, 268

-

p.

168, 328.

Voir surtout ibidem,

327.

Burchardt, op. cit., p. 119 - 123. Idem, La psicopatologia nei concetti di Witelo, della natura del XIII secolo, Accademia Polacca delle Scienze, Biblioteca e Centro di Studi a Roma, Conferenze 94, Ossolineum, Wroclaw 1986, p. 3 - 20; idem, Les J.

filosofo

Burchardt

148

Une

fois ses

la curie pontificale

etudes achevees, Witelo se rendit a

de Viterbe, en tant qu envoye de Wtodzistaw, due de Silesie, chancelier du 20 de royaume de Boheme et archeveque de Sal/bourg. Son ami, Guillaume et

Moerbeke, chapelain de

libre

temps

penitencier

du pape,

attente prolongee de

1

1

election

lui

d

conscilla

du pape par 1

utiliser

le

les querelles

Ce

vaste traite Perspectiva? annces des 1270-1271, durant la d optique fut compose a Viterbe au cours vacance du Saint-Siege, mais le prologue de 1 oeuvre, dedie a Guillaume de

cardinaux

des

1272, les

infinies,

ecrivant

les

que penitencier de cglise romaine, dut etre ecrit en nominations des employes conferees dans la curie pontificale par

Moerbeke en

le

en

tant

1

22 Witelo y pape nouveau, Gregoire X.

des

savoir

opticiens

arabes

grecs,

et

recueillc,

en

en

latins,

le

repensant,

un

suivant

le

ordre

2

en prenant pour modele les Elements d Euclide. ete 1274, Witelo, qui etait devenu chapelain cours de

gcometrique

Au

et

1

et

de Prague pour diplomate de F^mys! Otakar II, roi de Boheme, partit de son Lyon afin de gagner le coeur de Gregoire X pour la politique elements nouveaux de psychopathologie dans la lettre de Witelo, Bulletin dc philosophic 142; idem, Nowe elcmcnty Witeloriskiegp mcdievalc, Ix)uvain-I^-Ncuvc 1983, p. 138 sredniowiecza i renesansu w rozwoj Wkfad le dans startymosci, ujccia psychopatologii, nauk medycznych, Uniwersytet im. Mikotaja Kopcrnika, Ro/prawy, Torun 1983, p. 45-51.

20

Burchardt,

Jer/.y

Witelo,

filosofo

della

natura

del

XIII

secolo,

Una

biografia,

Accademia Polacca dclle Scienze, Biblioteca e Ccntro di Studi a Roma, Conferenze 87, - 49. Alors qu il se trouvait deja a Padoue, Witelo cut Wroclaw, Ossolineum 1984, p. 48 un cntretien avec un homme venu de Sal/.bourg, vraisemhlablcmcnt un messager dc

De causa primaria..., p. 174, 559archeveque Wtod/.istew; voir a ce propos Witelo, dicto Salezpurgum..." ..ut dictum fuit mihi per bonum tcstimonium dc quodam castro

1

560:".

21

Witelo,

Perspectiva,

prologus (C. Baeumkcr, Witelo, op.

cit.,

p.

127,

1

-

3,

p.

128,

34-36). 22

natura del XIII secolo, Una biografia, p. 51. 1272 (August Potthast, Regesta pontificum Gregoire les Romanorum, vol. 2, Berolini 1875, p. 1652). II donna, sans doute, sous peu nominations aux employes de la curie pontificale. Nous savons que Guillaume de Moerbeke avec un nom alterc" de frater Guilelmus dc Moibccta, en tant que penitencier du pape jugeait en 1272, a Orvieto, un prieur des augustiniens de Paverano, qui avail d Allaro, du meme ordre monastique. T. Hirschfeld, un autre maltraite J.

Burchardt,

X

vint

Witelo,

a

filosofo

Viterbe

le

delta

10

Janvier

prieur,

Genuesischc Dokumente zur Geschichte Roms und des Papstums im 13. Jahrhundcrt, Archiven und Ribliotheken, 17 (1914 - 1924), Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen traduttorc il 6. Martin Grabmann, Gugliclmo di Moerbeke, O.P., numero 140, 108, p. dclle 50.

juillet

23 vol.

opere

D autre

di

vol. XI, Roma 1946, p. 49Aristotele, Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae, a Orvieto depuis le 5 se trouvait sa curie avec pontificale Gregoire

part,

1272 jusqu au 2 juin 1273 (A. Potthast, op.

cit., p.

1656

-

1670).

Aleksander Birkenmajer, Witelo, le plus ancien savant silesien, Studio Copernicana, 26 - 32. IV, Wroclaw 1972, p. 420 426. Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus,..., p. 129,

Les sources

souverain

24 ,

Thuringiens

et les

mais et

genres de la connaissance

sa

mission

echoua.

humaine d apres Witelo

Le 10

le

1275,

juillct

des Polonais, eleve un pcu auparavant a

la

149

fils

dcs

de

dignite

chanoine de Wroclaw, recut des mains d Henri IV, due de Silesie 25 Revenu en Italic, seigneur de Wroclaw, la prebende de ^orawina. assista,

7 fevrier 1277, a Viterbe, a

le

Simone

ami, le cardinal

Paltanieri.

26

la

et il

redaction du testament de son

Depuis 1272, toujours

pris

dans un

tourbillon d affaires politiques, Witelo n avait pas reussi a reprendre ses activites savantes.

27

En 1280, maitre Witelo passa, non pas sans accord de son souverain de Wroclaw, au service du roi des Remains, Rodolphe I. On le retrouve a Vienne, le 12 decembre 1280 et, avec le roi, a Nurenberg, le 20 aout 1281.

28

probablement dans le Hainaut, au couvent des mais la date exacte de sa mort reste toujours premontres de Vicogne II

mourut,

fort

29

,

inconnue. 24 J.

59.

Burchardt,

Codex

Witelo, fllosofo della natura del XIII et epistolaris regni Bohemiae, t.

di|>lomaticus

Sebanek 25 J.

62, p.

Sasa Duskova, Prague 1981, nr 769,

et

sec.,

V,

Una fasc.

2,

biografia,...,

p.

58-

ediderunt Jindrich

p. 439.

Burchardt, Witelo, filosofo della natura 77 - 79 et, particulierement, p. 77 et 78.

del XIII

sec.,

Una

biografia,...,

p.

60-

Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani, Witelo et la science optique a la cour pontificate de (1277), dans: Melanges de I Ecole Franqaise de Rome, Moycn Age, Temps Modernes, vol. 87, 1975, 2, p. 427 - 437. Viterbe

Le

10

le

nouveau

pape, Gregoire X, etait arrive a Viterbe (A. confera a Guillaume de Moerbeke les fonctions de chapelain et de penitencier, sans doute, dans les premiers mois de son pontifical, en 1272. Alors Witelo, qui avail deja redige ses Perspectiva, y ajouta le prologue, dedie a Guillaume. Voir Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker, Witelo,..., p. 128, 30 32). II semble qu apres que toutes les affaires silesiennes eurent etc reglees par le pape conformement aux voeux du due Wtodzistew, decede ensuile le 27 avril 1270, Wilelo ail Potthast,

Janvier

op.

cit.,

1272,

p.

1652).

II

jusqu aux premiers jours de juin 1273, la curie ponlificale a Vilerbe, Rome el Orvielo, lout en s occupant de plus en plus des inlerels Icheques. Puis, lorsque le pape a Lyon, Witelo se rendit a quitta Orvieto pour Prague. II y devinl chapelain du suivi,

Caller

roi de Boheme, Premysl Otakar II. En aoul 1274, celui-ci envoya en mission diplomalique au concile de Lyon, aupres de Gregoire X, aux fins de le gagner a ses nouvelles propositions. Mais le pape, cedanl a Rodolphe I, elu roi des Remains, s y opposa. J. Burchardt, Witelo, filosofo della natura del XIII sec., Una biografia,..., p. 58 - 59. En 1275, Witelo se trouvail en Pologne el devinl chanoine de Wroctew. Ce n est que le 7 fevrier 1277 que nous retrouvons sa trace a Viterbe (grace au travail d Agostino Paravicini-Bagliani), ou il accomplil, sans doule, une mission diplomatique pour le due de Silesie et seigneur de Wroclaw, Henri IV, dit en latin Probus. Depuis 1273 jusqu au 1277 Witelo elait en tout cas loin d avoir le loisir necessaire au savant. 28 J. Burchardt, Witelo, filosofo della natura del XIII sec., Una biografia,..., p. 70, ainsi que les documents qui s y Irouvenl publics p. 79 - 86. 1

V Bern, Burgerbibliolhek, codex 61, f. 318 Explicit perspectiua Magistri Wilelonis de Viconia conlinel aulem 807. J.R. codicum Sinner, proposiliones Catalogus :

manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bernensis, Bernae 1772,

p. 14. C.

Baeumker,

Witelo..., p. 222.

Burchardt

150

Witelo a

,

1

tous

a

interesse

s cst

30

naturelle

astronomie 31

a

,

33

a

et

de

principale entier.

35

1

entite,

La lumiere les

superieurs,

monde

La

sensible.

lumiere

de

astres,

specifiques et individuelles.

Les lumicres ligne droite. cclui

maticres

39

Cette

il

formes sensibles.

les

30

le

les

naturelle

42

40

du

formes

37

41

actions

les

tout

est

meme

sur

objective,

Ceux-ci servent a signaliser,

nature.

la

inferieur,

L homme

connait, par les

naturelles,

formes

a la puissance de sa raison,

Grace

dans

conservces

1

combinaisons

les

imagination,

sont creees par syncretiques et erronnees de cclles-ci, qui

sans

corps

faire la distinction entrc les objets naturels (res), leurs

pcut nettement

representations

monde

corps

etcndues,

deja

du monde

action

mais non pas a causer les actions de les actions des intelligences ct par intelligibles et

les

corporelles,

le

les

par

la

source

Ainsi, elle complete les objets naturels.

perception des sens.

la

diffusee

et

la

en par consequent, toutes les formes, se diffusent

indivisible.

independante de

lumiere divine

la

sensibile),

Elles agissent sur tout point

est

qui

et,

36

C est

mathematicien.

et

substances

aux

en ajoutant

inferieur,

38

(lumen les

psychologic.

(divinum lumen) et de la vitalite dans

Pintelligibilite

forme

philosophic

est

divine

sensible

la

32

la

pourquoi il se disait lui-meme naturalistc Witelo distingue deux sortes de lumiere: lumiere

de

domaincs

les

optique

1

controle

de

la

Mark

Witelonis Persp. liber quintus edidit A. - 12. 1983, prop. 18, p. 207, 10

de

fictions

les

et

raison,

la 1

phantasia,

imagination

Smith, Studio Copemicana, vol. XXIII,

Wroclaw

X

31

Witelo, Perspectiva, lib. Basilae 1572, p. 447, 52 - 53).

32

33

Witelo, Perspectiva,

Witelonis

De

prop.

53

(Opticae

prop. 58 (Opticae Thesaurus...,

lib. Ill,

causa primaria...,

Federicus

edidit

Thesaurus,

p. Ill, 14

-

16).

naturalis... p. 173, 537:

Ibidem, mathematicus. 35

Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker,

36

37 38 39

Witelo,..., p. 127, -

17

-

p. 128, 3).

Witelo, op.

cit.,

prologus (editio

cit.,

4 p. 128,

Witelo, op.

cit.,

prologus (editio

cit.,

p. 127, 11, p. 129, 13, p. 129, 21).

Witelo, Perspectiva,

lib. II,

Witelo, Perspectiva,

lib. Ill,

prop.

1

10).

(Opticae Thesaurus...,

prop. 6 (editio

cit.,

p. 88, 15

-

p. 63,

35

Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker,

Witelo..., p. 129,

12

-

41

Witelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker,

Witelo..., p. 131,

29

-

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

p. 163,

95

-

99.

36).

18).

40

42

-

15).

30).

Risner,

Les sources

et les

humaine d apres Witelo

genres de la connaissance

151

mathematique, utilisees avec succes en optique, mais qui n existent pas dans la nature. 43 Witelo souligne que

connaissances humaines (scientiae) et les

les

ames humaines,

biens (bonitates) parviennent aux les

par

corps,

1

44

aussi

intelligences

hommes

et

,

savent dans

la

45 Les qui se trouvent identifies avec les anges.

mesure ou

tissent et edifient

ils

connaissances pratiques acquises grace a Ainsi apprennent-ils, par

nature et toute

que sont

ci

a

1

1

1

contenu

enseignement sur

puissances cooperantes de

Une

d optique.

A

catoptrique.

1

aide

de

les

difficile

Dans d abord,

ses

la

inventee par Anthemius.

De

Witelo, concetti

di

filosofo

la

homme

1

Witelo

47 Puis,

il

forme

de

1

y explique

On

le

y examine est

optique

de

et

la

raisonnements

de miroirs

miroirs

cinq

des

miroirs

349

et

s

attache

-

351.

J.

il

plans

qui

est possible

Burchardt,

Tout

ardents.

XIII

del

La

-

p.

d allumer du

psicopatologia net

secolo,

170, 386. Witelo,

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

p. 164,

122

-

124.

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

p. 168,

302

-

304, ibidem, p. 163, 116

causa primaria...,

p. 165, 194

-

-

ete

avait

Accademia Polacca Studi a Roma, Conferenze, vol. 94, Wroclaw 1986, natura

Witelo, De causa primaria..., p. 168, 335 prop. 3 (Opticae..., p. 63, 59 61).

Witelo,

analyse des formes

visible.

decrit

10.

De

construction

a allumer du feu, une tache

demontre qu

169,

p.

della

Scienze, Biblioteca e Centro di

46

la

ame humaine. On

differents types

combinaison

causa primaria...,

Witelo,

y

1

siecle.

Perspectiva,

discute

il

au

1

fait

importante de figures

partie

surtout a ceux qui peuvent aider encore XIII e

-

On

de

termes,

geometriques, celle-ci etudie

bien

lumiere de Pintellect possible.

la

lumiere corporelle, sur

la

et les conditions necessaires

illusions

alors par leurs

la

les

par

,

etude, a connaitre toute la philosophie de la

oeil, sur le processus de la vision.

visibles

les

1

46

mathematique, et particulierement les parties de celleastronomie et 1 optique (perspectiva), Cette derniere fournit

homme un

de

qui sont plongees dans

intermediaire des moteurs des spheres celestes, appeles

Perspectiva,

delle p.

lib.

7II,

p. 164, 121.

195. Conf. Aristoteles

De anima

408 b 12

13.

Witelo, Perspectiva, lib. V, prop. 65 (Witelonis Perspectivae liber quintus, edidit A. Studia Copemicana, vol. XXIII, Wroclaw 1983, p. 252, 1 - 28). Plutot que donner ce litre a 1 oeuvre principale de Witelo, ainsi que le font les savants

Mark Smith, de

employant un singulier feminin, nous soutenons que, d apres Witelo, au neutre pluriel, voir Wilelo, Perspectiva, prologus (C. Baeumker, 129, 7 10:) "...praemissorum per modum entium visibilium perscrutatio

americains,

en

Perspectiva

est

Witelo...,

p.

et eadem viris qui ante nos plurimi tractaverunt huius scientiae negotium, perspectivorum nomine nuncupantes. Quorum et ego nominationem ut placitam approbo..."

placuit,

sicut

Burchardt

152

48

Ensuite, il aide de miroirs spheriques concaves opposes au soleil. entcnd prouver qu une certaine combinaison de ces miroirs peut constituer feu a

1

49 Plus un miroir ardent.

une nouvelle combinaison des

decrit

il

loin,

miroirs coniques qui pourrait allumer du feu.

d Ibn

ardent

parabolique

51

Witelo connaissait non seulement

mais aussi

largo,

la

Enfm,

De

al-Haytham.

indications pratiques aux artisans ingenieux.

50

la

nature.

53

s

homme

1

effet,

tend a

toute

la

de

philosophic

ctre

48

49 50 51

nature

la

ct

telle

accompagne

est

la

embrasse vise

que

toute

est

cette

1

Humana

(scientia

ut coniuncti).

56

Witelo, Perspectiva,

lib.

VIII, prop. 68 (Opticae Thesaurus..., p. 365, 51

Witelo, Perspectiva,

IX, prop. 37 (Opticae Thesaurus...,

62

-

lib.

lib.

IX, prop. 38 (Opticae Thesaurus..., p. 394, 42

-

Witelo, Perspectiva, Witelo,

Perspectiva,

und

Heiberg

lib.

Hilhard

Bibliotheca

Hohlspiegel,

p. 392,

-

p.366, 53).

p. 394, 41).

p.398, 22).

(Opticae Thesaurus..., p. 401, 19 Wiedemann, Ibn al-llaithams Schrift uber

IX, prop.43

mathematica,

3.

Folge,

10

(1909

Abdalhamid Ibrahim Sabra, Ibn al-Haytham, Dictionary of New York 1972, p. 195, p. 206. 52

fin

ct

Witelo appelle activite, qui propre a hommc, en tant que science d un etres humains, la science de

compose

J.L.

De

comprend.

bicn qu encore eloignee de la en va de la matiere humaine qu

55

connaissancc humaine. tous les

Chaque

il

a la forme. Cette tendance

unir

s

que aux

ame humaine,

science actuelle, dcvicnt savante, ainsi qui

est

il

appliquait

possible.

tel, celui qui sail et qui

dcvicnt alors en tant que

maniere, en

cette

mode

acquerait la science sur un

et

qu

declarait

II

1

sensibles

ainsi

c est

et

parvenu a domincr toute la philosophie de homme rentrait en lui-meme, intellect possible de objets

des

mathematique medievale sensu

la

la

(

donne

il

sorte,

52

physiologique;

psychologic

discute le miroir

il

-

1910),

Scientific

p.

-

p.

402,

14).

parabolische 293 - 307.

Biography, vol. VI,

Witelo parle d un artisan quand il traite du miroir parabolique, 44 lib. IX, (Opticae prop. Witelo, Perspectiva, artifcx}, (ingcniosus de Jean Fusoris, un grand et celebre Thesaurus..., p. 402, 2). II devait s agir, au futur, sur les constructeur parisien d instruments astronomiques, qui, dans un Commcntaire vers 1410, essaya de completer les indications ecrivit il Perspecth a de Witelo, qu fabrication du miroir parabolique. Dijon, Bibliotheque techniques necessaires pour la Divio-Godranii), le manuscrit numero 441, f. 191 Collegii publica (Bibliotheca publique

Par

exemple,

ingenieux

-

197

53

.

Voir

les

Aristoteles,

verso

54 55

56

notes

Physica,

30 lib.

et I,

Conf. Witelo, De causa primaria..., 184 a 21 - 25, editio Venetiana 1483,

32.

178, 765 3 - 4, f.

-

768.

AA

2

lib.

I,

col. 1.

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

190

-

193.

Witelo,

De

causa primaria..., p. 165, 199

-

203.

Witelo,

408 b

p. tc.

13.

De

p. 165,

causa primaria...,

p.

165,

194

-

197.

Conf. Aristoteles,

De anima,

Les sources

qu

il

et les

genres de la connaissance

humaine d apres

153

Witclo

Witclo ne surcstimait pourtant pas cetie science temporelle, parce croyait qu il y avail un autre genre de la science, bien plus

eminente, qui n est pas propre a tout essence, a leurs

1

homme, mais seulement

a son

Tame

intellective, laquelle, chez certaines personnes, grace a 57 se trouve exposee aux influences dcs moteurs celestes.

efforts,

Selon Witelo, celles-ci pouvaient agir sur 1 homme, dont ame est plongee dans le corps, a certaines conditions: homme devait liberer son ame des 1

1

plaisirs

corporels

naturelles

en

et

repos

concentrer

se

et

rester

faire

terrestres,

influences des intelligences superieures et parfois

aux

hommes

sur s

scs les

offraient

puissances objets ainsi

sensibles

eternels.

58

et

Les

aux epileptiques

occupes a rever, et parvenaient aussi aux savants

59 melancoliques assidument appliques a 1 etude, aux grands contemplatifs 60 et a ceux qui s emancipaient des souillures du peche. A un degre encore ces influences assuraient aux hommes saints et aux prophetes, plus eleve,

pendant leurs etats de contemplation, le retour de ame a soi-meme, le contact immediat avec 1 eternite et, par consequent, la connaissance de 1

Pavenir.

61

Cette

science,

62

sua)

,

toujours

actuelle,

imperissable,

que

Witelo

ame dans

son essence (scientia animae in essentia fournissait aux ames intellectives des hommes la connaissance des

appelait la science de

1

principes des objets naturels

63

Witelo pensait qu une

et le savoir

fois

65 que substance celeste et pure

,

du

futur.

64

separee du corps,

Fame humaine, en

tant

obtiendrait ses connaissances et ses biens

immediatement de Dieu meme. 66

II estimait cependant que les ignorants, n ont les sciences et qui que mepris pour pour les biens eternels, et qui, de plus, durant leur vie temporelle, se conduisent comme des betes, commettant des mefaits ou se contentant de manger et de boire, seraient

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

p. 164,

122

-

124.

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

p. 164, 146

-

149.

CO

De

causa primaria..., p. 164, 149 - 154. Conf. Pseudo-Aristoteles, ftoblemata Witelo, vulgataXXX, cap. 1, editio I. Bekkeri, Berolini 1831, 954 a 10 - 12. fJT\

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

p. 165,

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

61

62 63 64

Vide notam

65

-

172.

165, 171

-

178.

197

-

198. Conf. Liber

p. 165, 198

-

199.

109

-

112.

163, 112

-

116.

p.

61.

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

Witelo,

De

causa primaria...,

f-jf\

169

p. 165,

p. 163, p.

de causis

XIV

125.

Burchardt

154

chaties

en etant ecartes dc

homme

philosophe

polonais,

consacrant

aux ocuvres

sociale

artisans

civilis).

(vita 71

dans

,

etrc sur le ils

de

la

de

1

67

En effet, scion le presence dc Dieu. doit parvenir au Bien Eternel en se

intelligence

et

en

prenant

la

part

a

la

vie

70

69

68

intellectuels

qu

1

la

et les les savants sans doutc, Ics religieux C aux travaux s adonnaient-ils societe de XIII siecle,

Et,

,

(operationes intellectus). Certes,

bon chemin, mais

faisaient usage,

pour

le

ils

ils

jouissaicnt de

n etaient pas les seuls a 1

cstime de Witelo parce

bien du prochain et de

la societe

(civitas),

puissance intellectuelle et supreme de leur ame.

Wroclaw

67 137

^ 69 70

Dc causa primaria..., - 182. 141, ibidem, p. 165, 178

Witelo, -

Witelo,

De

Witelo,

De

Witelo,

De

p.

222

166,

-

226,

ibidem, 229

p. 166,

226

-

229.

causa primaria...,

p. 172,

493

-

495.

causa primaria...,

p. 173,

525

-

527, ibidem, p. 535

causa primaria...,

71

Witelo, Perspectiva,

lib.

VIII, prop. 68 (Opticae Thesaurus...,

-

-

232,

ibidem,

538.

p. 366,

49

-

53).

p.

164,

YASUO CHISAKA

Ubcr

Bonaventura

die

Bcdeutung dcr Erfahrung bci Franz von Assisi

schreibt,

Franziskus von Gott,

den

"Untcr

dcm generosen

iibcrnatiirlichcn

wclche

Gaben,

Schenker, erhalten hattc, war seine

Liebe zur absoluten Armut, welche ein besondcres Privileg war, das ihm 1 im reich ermoglichte, und er fiihrt weiter spirituellen Sinnc zu werden", aus,

daB Franziskus

Briider so festlegte:

unsere

Demut und

selbst "Mogen

die

Zweite Ordensregel fur die Minderen

wir

immer gemaB unserer Armut leben und

das Evangelium unseres Herrn Jesus Christ

bewahren".

2

Indessen schreibt Sabatier, daB die Zweite Ordensregel von 1223 von Franziskus fur seinen Orden keineswegs gewollt war, sondern mit Gewalt von auBen eingefiihrt wurde und 1209 bwz. 1210 die Erste

Ordensregel war und daB beide Regeln nur die Bezeichnung gemeinsam 3 Tatsachlich wurde die Zweite Rcgel gemaB der Ersten

hatten.

entsprechend gemildert, die Erste jedoch war aber cine Regel, welche frei und angenehm befolgt wurde, die andere jedoch, so nimmt man an, erstarrte in allgemeiner Form. Es sind aber nur wenige Schriften des Franziskus iiberliefert und ihre Grundlagen sind die Armut, der Gehorsam und die Keuschheit. Bei diesen Begriffen handelt es sich nicht um

Ausdrucke abstrakter Ideen. Fur Franz von strcng in die Praxis

Assisi

warcn

es

Worte, die cr

umsetzte und keine bloBe Theorie.

Fur ihn war Jesus Christus das Beispiel zu leben

Beispiel, seine Sendung war, dieses und den Menschen nahe zu bringen, diesen Weg nicht

auBerhalb sondern innerhalb der Menschen zu gehen. Dafiir entledigte er ganzen Besitzes. Fur ihn war die Besitzlosigkeit unabdingbare

sich seines

Voraussetzung der Reinheit und Schlichtheit. Fur ihn bcdeutete die Armut selbstvcrstandlich cine materielle

Armut, besondcrs die

"Armut

im

Herzen"

Bonaventura, Vita scu Lcgenda maior S. Francisci, VII, De amore pauperitatis mira suppletione defectuum. (Analccta Franciscans sive Chronica aliaque varia documcnta ad Historian Fratrum Minorum spcctantia edita a Patribus Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Tomus X, 1926-41, Quaracchi-Fircn/.c). et

Opuscula sancti Patris Francisci Assisiensis, ed. Caietanus Hsser, Cf. P. Sabatier, Vie

dc

S.

Francois

d Assise,

p. 289, 1894, Paris.

p. 237, 1978,

Roma.

Chisaka

156

dem Herzen kommcndcr

aus

als ein

Wille zur Entsagung allcr wcltlicher

Giiter.

So war

die

Er

setzte

auf diesem cine

Armut ohne

mehr nicht. ein Leben

eines Beispiels,

weder cine abstrakte Ideen-Welt, noch

Glaubenslehre oder Philosophic,

religiose

war das Lcben

lang die Besitzlosigkeit in die Praxis um, und

es fur ihn

Wege gab

sie

personliche Bcdcutung,

er

an

hatte

ihnen

als

wissenschaftliche Kategorien keinerlei Interesse, sondern nahm in allem einen freien Standpunkt ein und bewahrte nichts als einen freien Willen

Ablehnung aller abstrakten Ideen. Er wollte nur ein Leben in Schlichtheit und Armut leben, fur das Christus ein konkretes Beispiel zur

gegeben

hatte.

Werk

Im

Nictzsches

erinnert. Dieser Heilige sagt: ich Lieder

"Ich

mache, lache, weinc und

Der Heilige

hat

Mensch, der an Franziskus mache Lieder und singe sie, und wenn ein

erschcint

brumme Welt

dcr

sich

ich:

Also lobe ich

entzogen

und

Gott".

meditiert

in

der

Zuruckgezogenheit der Waldeinsamkcit iiber Gott. Fur Franziskus dagcgcn als einem gewohnlichen Menschen gibt es keincn Unterschied zwischcn der Weltabgelegenheit eines Klosters oder er lebt als ein gewohnlicher

und

fiihrt

Leben im

ein

Mensch

taglichen

dem

lauten

lieber untcr

Umgange

Leben

in

der Stadt,

gewohnlichen Menschen

mit ihnen in ihrer weltlichen

cine Methode Sphare. Sein Leben war fur ihn auch nicht einen Augenblick der Verwirklichung abstrakter Ideenvorstellungcn, sondern eine Frage des

konkreten Lebcns, fernab

aller

Kontemplationen. Fur Franziskus lag die Freiheit des Menschen in dem Privileg der Aufgabe des Besitzes, der Loslosung von Wissenschaft und Tradition, des absoluten ungeachtet des Ortes. Er sah in der Armut eine Moglichkeit Gehorsames Gott gegeniiber. Hatte denn Christus nicht auch so gelebt?

Wissenschaften,

hinzugeben,

Menschen

Glaube

Ideen,

an

nicht gerade

der

Besitz,

von

all

Wunsch,

und

Autoritaten

sich

Formen,

diesen

werden

Dingen denn die

diesen beherrscht in ihrer Existenz, und

eingeschrankt?

dem MaGe,

wie die Abhangigkeit zunimmt, bringt sie Unreinheit, Untreue und Unkeuschheit hervor und wird zur Ursache der zunehmenden In

Untreue zu Gott. Der Mensch, der den sich von der Autoritat, welcher Art

4

Nietzsche,

Kroner,

S. 7).

Also

sprach

Zarathustra,

Weg

sie

der

Armut

beschreitet, befreit

auch sein mag, und auch

Vorrede

2,

(Samtliche

Werke,

Bd.

vom VI,

Uber die Bcdeutung der Erfahning bci Franz von Assisi

La rm dcr Welt und nimmt den uns

157

alles vcrhiillcndcn Schlcicr

wcg und

gewahrt den Blick auf die Wahrhcit. AuBcrhalb der Armut und ihrer Demut und grenzenlosen Licbe zu Gott gibt es keincn anderen, wie auch

immer

der wesentlichen Praxis.

Weg

gestalteten

Auf der einen

Seite gibt

es die Moglichkeit der inbriinstigen Nichtung des eigenen Ichs, auf der

anderen

so Franziskus, gibt uns die Besitzlosigkeit ein Geschenk

Seite,

leuchtender Herrlichkeit und wunderbarer Bedeutung. Die Armut ist ohne jede Schmerzlichkeit, sic gewahrt uns die hochste Freude. Durch die

voll

Armut und

Menschen und der

Besitzlosigkeit wird uns die Existenz aller

gesamten Natur,

schlieBlich

der

ganzen Welt und

in

der eigenen

ihr

Existenz als das Geschenk der grenzenlosen Liebe Gottes zuteil. Nicht etwa nur besonderen Menschen, sondern alien Menschen, welche ein

Leben

in

Die

Armut

fiihren,

werden

Worte

folgenden

alle

von

Dinge

zuteil.

Franziskus

lehren

uns

verschiedene

Einsichten und geben gleichzeitig etwas von seinem Gefiihl zu erkennen:

Et postquam Dominus dedit mini de fratribus, auid deberem facere, sed ipse Altissimus

nemo

ostendebat mini

rcvelavit

mihi, quod secundum formam sancti Evangelii. Et ego paucis yerbis et simpliciter feci scribi et dominus papa confirmavit mmi. Et illi qui veniebant ad recipiendam vitam omnia quae habere poterant,

aeberem

vivere

t

dabant

pauperibus: et erant contenti tunica una, intus et fpris repeciata, cum cingulo et braccis. Et nolebamus plus habere. Officium dicebamus clerici secundum alios clericos, laici dicebant: Pater noster: et satis libenter manebamus in ecclesiis. Et eramus idiotae et subditi omnibus. Et ego manibus meis laborabam, et volo laborare; et omnis alii fratres firmiter volo, quod laborent de laboritio, quod ad honestcm. Qui nesciunt. discant, non propter pertinent

cupiditatem recipiendi pretium laboris, sea propter exemplum et ad repellendam otiositatem. Et quando non daretur nobis pretium laboris,

recurramus ad mensam Domini, pctendo elcemosynam ostiatim. Salutatk)nem mihi Dominus revelavit, ut diceremus: Dominus del tibi

pacem. Dieses Wort fahrt

fort,

Fremdlinge und Pilger

Das bedeutet

erleben und uns als dies das Folgen des

haben"

nichts

Beispiels die tagliche

"denn

wir sollen darin stets nur Herberge wie

(sicut

advenae

et peregrini}.

anderes, als daB wir im taglichen

Leben des

und endlose Erfahrung immer wieder von neuem Reisende auf einer endlosen Reise befinden. Es ist

Experimentes und das Stehen im taglichen ProzeB des

Experimentes.

Es kann nur

die Erfahrung oder den rcinigenden ProzeB der Praxis Die geben. Reinigung durch die Armut ist die Selbst-Verneinung und

Testamentum (Opuscula, pp. 310-11).

Chisaka

158

bedeutet die Befreiung von weltlichen Dingen und damit unscrc Selbstwerdung. Wenn hierin die Selbst-Verneinung den hochsten Grad erreicht, das Selbst sich

auf

sich

Gott

und

sich selbst versenkt

tief in

konzentiert,

verdichtet

einem

in

alles

sich

Gott uberlaBt und

alles

und

selbst

gelangt zur Verinnerlichung.

Die Selbstverleugnung ist ein Weg, die Liebe Gottes wahrzunehmen, die Verleugnung ist in anderen Worten der Beweis der eigenen Existenz, alles wegzuwerfen bedeutet schlieBlich, alien Reichtum zu erlangen, die ist

Verneinung

gleichz.eitig

die

Armut

Bejahung. Die

ist

ein

GefaB, in

Dinge hineingieBen, und die Reinigung der Erfahrung ist der Versuch, dieses GefaB zur vergroBern. Ohne zu schreiben und ohne zu sprechen inbriinstig das Beispiel Christi nachzuahmen.

welches wir

alle

In der Erfahrung und, daraus folgend, gerade auch im Experiment,

das

der Weg, den uns Franziskus konkret und direkt gezeigt hat. Die Minoritenbriider, welche sich unter Franziskus zusammen

ist

gefunden

hatten,

gleichen

verstanden, lehnten alle ab,

und weil

Dingen

sie eine

Gemiites

ihm

mit

waren

und

sein

Herz

Macht, welche aus weltlichem Besitz hervorging

Gemeinschaft wurden, die

befreit hatte, laBt sich sagen,

sich

von alien weltlichen

daB die Franziskaner den Charakter

und verbreiteten Kongregation aufwiesen. Ein weiterer Grund fur ihre Verbreitung iiber alle Stadte und Dorfer hinweg als Kongregation von Menschen ungeachtet aller gcsellschaftlichcn Untereiner natiirlich gewachsenen

schiede wie Beruf, sozialer

Sowohl

in

Rang und

den Stadten

als

Stellung

auch

ist

in

hierin zu sehen.

den Dorfern, ohne Ansehen

des Berufes, des Standcs und des Ranges gesellschaftlicher Unterschiede waren sie iiberall verbreitet, und deshalb ist es nur natiirlich, daB sich die

Lehre des Franziskus der ganzen Welt ihr,

tiefe

stimmten

mitteilte, die

ihr einhellig bei, driickten ihre

Verehrung in ihren Herzen. Jedoch wendeten sich die

Menschen

fiihlten

mit

Zustimmung aus und fiihlten

Franziskaner

nach

dem

Tode

des

Franziskus von dem, was er urspriinglich gewollt hatte, ab und anderten ihren Charakter, indem sie sich, wie auch die Dominikaner, dem Studium der Wissenschaften zuwandten. So ergab es sich zwangslaufig, daB sie die Wissenschaften und die Prinzipien der Vernunft erforschten und dafiir

Abstraktion und festgelegte Begriffe forderten und sich eine allgemeine und objektive Theorie erwarben. Diese griechische Tradition, welche hatte ungemein zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaften bcigetragen hatte, Franziskus ganzlich ausgeschlossen. Was fur ihn bedeutend war, war allein

Uber die Bedeutung der Erfahning bei Franz von Assist die

dcr Wissenschaften

fern

halten.

und vereinfacht

wird,

und

Mysteriums,

gottlichen

aufrichtigc

Erfahrung fern

allcr

59

wissen-

Tradition, im gegenteil, er wollte sich von der Entwicklung

schaftlicher

gereinigt

und

einfache

unmittelbare,

1

dem MaBe, entdeckt man in In

hierin

sich

laBt

Tendenz im denken der Franziskaner

in

dem

ihr

die

die

die

Erfahrung Wahrheit des mystische

eigentliche

finden.

Folgen wir z.B. Bonaventura, so lassen sich die einzelnen Stufen der Reise der Seele zu Gott bei sorgfaltiger Forschung genau und logisch erforschen. Die Frage nun, ob, wie etwa bei Bonaventura, sich die einzelnen Stufen der Reise der Seele zu Gott sorgfaltig und genau und logisch erforschen lassen, oder in

ob man die Erkenntnis, welche man nicht

der Theorie erlangt, der mystischen Intuition iiberlassen

sollte,

diese

Frage erhob sich gleichzeitig mit der Tradition der Wissenschaft und war moglicherweise

zum

erstenmal Gegenstand dieser Diskussion.

Fur Franziskus

mehr noch,

es

nichts,

war eine solche Diskussion

gab gar keinen

Raum

fur

sie.

die

vollig

unnotig,

Gerade im Leben des

war der eigene Korper, das Selbst

Beispiels Christi

und weil

selbst

die Absicht gewesen,

Erfahrung vollig ausreichte, gab es dariiber hinaus was noch notig gewesen ware. dafiir

Bei Franziskus z.B. war die Erfahrung ein vertieftes, verinnerlichtes

Erleben und jeder konnte

in

diese

fur

Intuition

begreifen,

Armut und Bescheidenheit und Keuschheit die

weder eine entwickelte Wissenschaft,

noch Gelehrsamkeit notig war. Natiirlich war das Begehen dieses Weges eine ureigene Gnade, und von Gott gesegnet, er sollte das Mysterium sein.

Da

aber die Erfahrung von einfacher, klarer Natur sein sollte, war das Mysterium des Franziskus ganzlich ohne jede hergcbrachte Tradition, es

war neu und

frisch,

mehr noch, es war klarer Mystizismus. in ein Leben der Armut, gerade die Abwendung von

Die Versenkung

den irdischen Dingen war das Mysterium, es war eine Mystik, die jeder durch seine eigene Erfahrung verwirklichen konnte. In der Armut Christi nachfolgen, in der Erfahrung das Beispiel Christi leben, dergestalt durch diese

Erfahrung

erblickend,

durch

die

zu

Mensch-Sein

das

muBte man

in

Worten

im

menschgewordenen

das Reich der strahlenden greifende

Predigt,

Gnade

nicht

Christus

gelangen. Nicht

durch

die

durch

Gelehrsamkeit iiberzeugen wollende Theorie, sondern durch die direkte, konkrete Erfahrung empfangt man die klare und deutliche Liebe Gottes.

Die Absicht des Franziskus jedoch wurde durch die damaligen gesellschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, durch die Tradition der Wissenschaften und

Chisaka

160

Probleme inncrhalb dcr Kongrcgation und viclcs andcre mchr verandert. Natiirlich war dicsc Verandcrung cin unauswcichliches Ergebnis. durch

Die Tradition dcs Franziskus jedoch Sic

ist

die

Grundlage

ist

nichts andcrcs als die Erfahrung.

seiner Lehre.

der EinfluB von allgemein bekannt, war im 13. Jahrhundert Aristoteles bestimmend, vor allem war es seine Metaphysik, welche

Wie

die

Gcdankenwelt

verschiedenen

des

Mittelalters

man

Universitat in Paris hielt

Logikcr und

man nahm

Schon damals

seine

der

ihn fur eincn wichtigen Metaphysiker

und

Kontinents,

aber

besonders

Methode der Begriffsanwendung

man

loste

den

an

des

Universitatcn

An

beeinfluBte.

nachhaltig

sich

positiv auf.

an der Universitat Oxford von den

dcr hergebrachten Autoritaten und der Geist der positiven Fcststellung und Urteile beruhender Begriffe und der auf eigcner Interpretation

Meinungen stand Studium

in

ebenso dcr Gcist der

Bliite,

der Heiligen Schrift hinein wirkte

und

Kritik, der

auch

als Bibelkritik

in

das

bcdeutsam

wurde.

Beim Studium dcr wahrnehmbaren Welt bediente man

sich

dcr

Naturwisscnschaft und dcr Thcologie und dcr Philosophisch-Naturwissenschaftlichcn Fakultat und vcrglichcn mit dcr Universitat Paris hatte in

Natur groBc Fortschrittc gcmacht. Auf der sich die Lchre des Franziskus in England, anderen Seite jedoch mit dem Kontincnt, besonders schnell vcrbreitct. Die ersten in

Oxford

das

Studium

dcr

hattc

verglichen

in Armut und Geniigsamkeit England gclandetcn Minoriten-Briidcr hatten verwirklicht und ich Franziskus und in rciner Naivitat die Lehrc dcs nchme an, daB wahrschcinlich der Kontakt von Robert Grossetcste mit den

Mindcrcn Briidern und der schaft cine entscheidcnde

Eintritt

Alexander von Hales

in die

Bruder-

Vcranderung bcwirkt haben.

Hattc die cinsetzendc Amtcrverteilung im Dicnstc dcr Lehre Gottes nicht ncgiercn konncn, wiirdc gestanden, hattc man die Gelchrsamkeit aber dem Geist dcr Armut die Gelchrsamkeit hinzugcfugt, wiirdc die

Wirkung eine ungchcurc Wisscnschaften ein Grund

sein,

und auf jedcn

fur die

Fall

war das Studium der

Vcranderung dcs Charakters der Brudcr-

schaft.

dem dem

Dicse Art zu denken entstand auch bci den Minderen Briidern auf Kontinent. Aber es gab auch Punkte, in denen sich das Denken von der Briider in England unterschied, z.B. den, daB auf dem Kontinent

Betrachtungen und Kommentare der Naturwissenschaftlcr den wichtigsten Hauptstrom darstellten, wohingegen unverandcrt

die

Aristotelischen

Uber die Bedeutung der Erfaiming bei Franz von Assisi

161

England die Beobachtung und das wisscnschaftliche Experiment das positive Studium bestimmten. in

Besonders Robert Grosseteste,

alter

als

Franziskus und an einem

von ihm weit entfernten Orte lebend, dazu von starrsinnigem Naturell, diirfte Franziskus personlich nicht gekannt haben. Und doch lernte er die

Gesinnung des Franziskus verehren und

nachdem

Gefiihl

ihr

in

einem besonderen

dem nach England

mil

er

zugetan sein, gelangten Franziskanern in Beriihrung gekommen war. Grosseteste hatte die Lehren des Aristoteles gut gekannt und von ihnen guten Gebrauch gemacht, nicht

ohne jedesmal

von ihnen zu fordern, und er hatte so auf der Grundlage eigener Erfahrungen zu den Studien der Natur beigetragen. Roger Bacon war geistiger nachfolger dieses Grosseteste und Adam alles

von Marsh. Zur Zeit Bacons nahm die Abhangigkeit von den althergebrachten Autoritaten ab und wurde schwacher und man befragte jetzt direkt

die

Heilige Schrift und studierte das Griechentum. Zitieren wir

Empirismus des Claude Bernard zum Punkte der

den

z.B.

bestimmung wie

L Empirisme inconsciente

pratique

Begriffs-

folgt:

n est

meme

autre

rien

comme

et

chose

instinctive

qu une

acquise

d experience habitude et la

sort

par

1

des choses.

Wie verwandt

ist diese Definition der von Bacon, auf der Grundlage der Mathematik die unbekannte Tatsache durch das Experiment zu beweisen. Die Tatsache, daB er namlich ohne vorgegebene Beweise und Kommentare

verfuhr, zeigt seine Orinigalitat, Scientia

Diese

Experimentalis

ist,

und wenn Grosseteste der Ursprung der muB Bacon als ihr Vollender gelten.

dann

Dinge verdanken ihren Urspung keineswegs nur einem

sondern

hier

wirkte

charakteristischer

erfolgreich

die

Weiterentwicklung

Merkmale der Oxforder Franziskaner

Zufall,

traditioneller

nach. Sic beruhen

namlich nicht auf spekulativen Anmerkungen und Kommentaren, sondern sind ein Weg der Erkenntnis, die sich auf experimentelle Weise und in selbstbewuBter Untersuchung herausbildete.

Die Briidern

Originalitat

herkamen,

Ockham und

der

unter

andere,

und

Denker, welche von den Franziskanischen auch Duns Scotus und Wilhelm von

ihnen ihre

auf einem

freien

Geist

und

geistiger

Erleuchtung beruhenden Erfolge konnen nicht geleugnet werden. Diese, Manner eines reichen und kritischen Geistes, gaben dem Denken cine neue Richtung,

1

Cl.

indem

sie

die

Erfahrung

zum Kernpunkt

Bernard, Principe de Medecine experimentale, 44.

ihres

Forschens

Chisaka

162

Hier entstand im Abwerfen dcr abstrakten und spckulativen

machtcn.

Erkenntnis und der philosophischen Bcweisfiihrung durch die Annahme einer direkten und eindcutigen Mcthode dcr Erkenntnis, welche auf der

Erfahrung beruhte, als dem einzig richtigen Verfahren ein neues Denken. Dies wurde zum Ursprung eines Empirismus, welcher als Morgenrote eines neuzeitlichen Geistes als sein Ursprung auf die Entstehung einer

drangte und die Morgendammerung einer 20. Jahrhunderts verkiindete. Naturlich bedarf des groBen Geistesstromung es eingehender Diskussionen, ob es zwischen dem Leben des Beispiels

Wissenschaft

neuzeitlichen

Christi bei Franziskus

und seinem Leben

in

Armut und dem Empirismus,

welcher ja in Wirklichkeit England entstand, eine direkte Beziehung kcin endgiiltiges Urtcil fallen. gibt oder nicht. Auch wir konncn dariiber in

die

Dennoch,

Menschen

inncrhalb

Franziskus trugen in ihren Herzen

der

englischen

Bruderschaft

eine tiefe Verehrung

fiir

des

Franziskus,

und im einflihlendcm Verstandnis seines Gemiites sctzten sic sein Leben in Armut in cine positive Praxis urn, und daB sic von da aus ihr eigcnes neues SelbstbewuBtscin

und

ihrc

eigenc

Originalitat

entdcckten,

daran

kann cs kcinen Zwcifel geben. Naturlich kann man nicht sagen, daB der Ursprung des Empirismus allcin auf der Person des Franziskus beruht.

Abcr

es

ist

leicht vorstellbar,

daB

Elcmente des Franziskus wirktcn und

Empirismus Erfahrung,

Rahmen

gcstaltete

und

es

laBt

hohem MaBe wesentlichc Wescn die Erfahrung zum

hier in sein sich

zum Gemiit geworden, von neuem,

durchaus

folgern,

daB

gleich einer Revolution,

die

den

der Scholastik sprcngte und so zur Antricbskraft einer ncuen

Entwicklung des Dcnkens wurde.

Kyoto Seika University

LAMBROS COULOUBARITSIS

Theorie dc dans

Au

cours de

d idealisme

la

Somme

la

connaissancc ct

Theologique,

mise en question qu

la

de son epoque, dans

Thomas

Tlieologique, S.

de connaitre

les

considere que

la

souleve

impossible. scientificite

de

S.

la

physique

Thomas d Aquin

entreprend de toutes Q. 84 de la Pars de

probleme de

la possibilite

montre

1

la

Somme

la

pour

I

ame

science physique qui deviendrait

au

importance qu il accorde theorie de la connaissance.

physique et Je souhaite, ici, relever ce lien entre theorie de la

de

formes

les

corps d une facon intellectuelle. Or, d entree de jeu, il science se trouve dans Pintelligence et que celle-ci doit

connaitre les corps, sans quoi c est

Cela

Q. 84 dc

il

la

le

dc

scicntificilc

la Pars,

rapport

entre

connaissance

la

et

physique dans le texte en question, en tenant compte de son Commentaire de la Physique d Aristote, ou cependant S. Thomas scientificite

la

occulte le sens reel de la

demarche d Aristote qui accentue

le

caractere

instaurateur de sa physique au detriment d un lien immediat et exclusif

entre

scientificite

evidence

1

et

theorie de la connaissance 1

de

originalite

1

analyse

de

.

Par

Thomas

S.

la

je

dans

mettrai en la

Somme

Tfieologique. II apparaitra ainsi que ce texte constitue un des temoins d un deplacement de centre de gravite de la metaphysique traditionnelle,

qui prepare le critique

Des

les

d Aristote,

dans

1

S.

matiere.

la

connaissance.

premieres lignes de son Commentaire du Traite de Physique Thomas affirme que dans la mesure ou toute science est

intellect,

intelligible

moderne de

il

faut

comprendre quelque chose comme etant rendu il est, en un certain sens, abstrait de la

en acte en tant qu

De

sorte

que s il existe differentes sciences, c est parce que les choses se rapportent differemment a la matiere. A cette premiere premisse fondamentale de sa pensee,

S.

statut

il

en ajoute une autre, tout aussi importante:

Thomas d Aquin, Opera Omnia, de

ce

texte,

voir

A.

ed.

Mansion,

Leonine, "Sur

le

Sur de editions des Commentaires de

II,

Rome,

texte

de

1884,

la

I,

lectio

version

1.

le

latine

la

S. Metaphysique et de la Physique d Aristote dans les Thomas d Aquin", Re\>ue Neoscolastique de Philosophic, 34, 1934, pp. 65-69,ainsi que lnroduction de VJ. Bourke a la traduction anglaise du Commentaire a la Physique d Aristote, par R.J. Blackwell, R.J. Spath et W. Edmund Thirlkel, Routledge-Kegan Paul, XV-XXXII. Londres, 1963, pp. I

Couloubaritsis

164

dans

la

dans

la

mcsure ou, dit-il, chaquc science mcsure aussi ou la definition

demonstration,

definition

interesse le present

est

le

et

demonstration,

moyen terme dans une

neccssaire que les sciences soicnt distinguees selon

est

il

modes de

divers

est etablic par

2 .

De

deux premisses, seule la premiere cepcndant, elle ne semblc pas, du

ces

Comme

travail.

telle

moins a premiere vue, de grandc utilite pour son Commentaire de la Physique, qu clle soit ou non sous-jacente a tout ce quc S. Thomas dit de abstraction ct du statut de objet de la physique. Son importance 1

1

apparait surtout dans

Q. 84 en question. Quoiquc cette premisse puisse Traite dc I Ame d Aristote, celui-ci ne la porte

la

trouver un appui dans sur

jamais surtout

le

dans

plan 1

le

d une

ordre de

illustration

systematisation,

la

sa

connaissance des

donne

du

statut

de

thematisation

Seules,

intelligibles.

amc

limilant

se

scion

d une

Pentelechie

qu premiere et intelcchic seconde a partir d une science comme possedce et d une science en acte ct, d autre part, la clarification qu il ajoute dc 1

part,

il

I

1

cette

et

possession

de son actualisation, c est-a-dire

le

theorem

qu elle domaine

rend possible, permettent d entamer cette thematisation vers le d une possible integration dc la science dans Pintellect. Cela suppose que science en acte soit egalement

cette

identique a

la

chose dont

est

ellc

Aristote admet que Pintellcct est (III, 7, 431al-2). Mais alors qu un eidos eidon, et meme que le sens est un eidos aisthcton (III, 9, 432alest une cpistcme episteton. Pourtant I intellect 3), jamais il nc dit que science

une

ne serait pas incompatible a

assertion

telle

rapports entre intellect et science,

1

idee qu

notamment quand

une etude plus approfondic de son oeuvre devrait montrer, s

quc

il

evite

instauration,

pareille les

sens,

assertion, la

constituc, des le depart,

de

1

C est

evolution

de

1

pour dire que

c est

memoire une

ct

faculte

quc 1

de

la

il

sc

me

semble-t-il,

hommc,

1

intcllect

qui se manifeste au

fil

ct s actualise par 1 action des intelligibles d une identification cntrc intellect et science these

embryon la

des

Mais

science suppose, dans son

imagination, tandis que 1

fait

les identifie.

il

.

vue. L absence au plus complexe qu elle n apparait a premiere demeurant d une thematisation plus decisive de cette perspective chez est

Aristote nous oblige d etre prudent.

pas beaucoup plus simples, dans co-extcnsivite

z

Id. ibid.,

de

rintellect

et

la

de

Thomas, les choscs nc sont mesure ou cclui-ci n affirme jamais la

Chez

la

S.

science,

mais

soutient

sculement

I, 1.

Sur cette question, je me permets dc renvoyer le lecteur a mon etude du Nous ihurathen", dans Melanges E.P. Papanoutsos, Athenes, 1980, 159-197.

"Le

probleme

Tlicorie

dc la connaissance

de

et scientificite

la

165

physique

appartcnancc de la science a 1 intcllect. Toutefois, comme il prolonge sensiblement Aristote sur ce point et envisage cette identification comme une premisse de son etude de la science, cette proposition prend une 1

autre dimension et devient centrale dans sa pensee.

En

d autres termes,

que chez Aristote cette question est presente dans ces textes mais en restant toujours en retrait, chez S. Thomas, en revanche, elle acquiert tandis

C est ce glissement decisif, qui atteste, nous le de celui-ci et une ouverture vers la verrons, Poriginalite pensee moderne. Quant a la seconde premisse, celle qui affirme que chaque science une nouvelle consistance.

est

etablie

moyen

par demonstration et qui situe d une demonstration, elle

problematique, car S.

elle se refere,

Thomas en

a

comme

me de

du

sur le plan

beaucoup

parait

d ailleurs

theorie

la

definition

la

terme

la suite

plus

de Pexpose de

des Seconds temoigne, d Aristote, qui n est pourtant jamais prise en consideration 1 instar de la plupart des par celui-ci dans ses oeuvres scientifiques. science

la

Analytiques

A

commentateurs anciens,

S.

Thomas

s

efforce de

comprendre

entre

le lien

ce type de science et Pexpose scientifique du Stagirite, sans jamais se la de savoir il s n poser question y a pas entre ces deux demarches une incompatibilite interpretes

de

fait

meme

ou

de

droit.

modernes d Aristote ont montre

Depuis longtemps deja, la difficulte de concilier

les la

theorie de la science selon Aristote et sa pratique des textes, et n ont cesse d insister sur cette incompatibilite de fait; mais, a leur tour, ils s interrogent sur son statut comme crois Pavoir peu reel, qui est, je

montre

quelques-unes de mes etudes, une incompatibilite non seulement de fait mais de droit 4 J ai montre que cette pratique d Aristote

dans

.

encore que Papplication d une demonstration - celle-ci seulement une reconstitution retrospective d un savoir

est plus originaire

constituant

deja

dans

acquis

la

mesure

ou

elle

concerne

Pinstauration

meme

des

principes. Plus concretement, cette instauration des principes n est pas de

Pordre

de

la

principalement

demonstration selon

un

mais

mode

dialectique refutative et des

de

Pargumentation;

aporetique,

ou

se

elle

Aristote

deploie

associe

methodes plus productives, parmi

une

lesquelles

Voir, en plus de mon livre, L a\>enemcnt de la science physique. Essai sur la Physique d Aristote, Ousia, Bruxelles, 1980, mes articles "Dialectique et Philosophic chez Centre de Recherches sur la Philosophic Aristote", Philosophia (Annales du grecque de Acade mie d Athenes), 8-9, 1978-79, 229-256; "Sophia et Philosophia chez Aristote", Annales de I lnstitut de Philosophic de I Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1979, 7-38; "Y-at-il une intuition des principes chez Aristote?", Rc\ ue Internationale de 1

Philosophic,

133-134,

1980,

440^71;

"Rhetorique,

dialectique

et

critique

metaphysique a la rhetorique, ed. M. Meyer, Bruxelles, 1986, 103-118.

chez

Aristote",

De

la

166

Couloubaritsis

figurcnt

1

induction, la division et

5 1

etant systematiquement elude par

argumcntation philosophiquc 1

Ce

.

point

interpretation traditionnelle bien avant

comprend que la demarche de S. Thomas perde de vue essentiel de la Physique d Aristote et de la conception chose d quelque de la science de celui-ci. Dans le cas particulicr qui nous preoccupe ici, il ne discerne pas suffisamment que le livre I de la Physique ne se contente notre epoque, on

pas seulement de mettre en relief des principes, mais les institue comme condition de la scientificite d une etude du devenir, a partir d une analyse

demarche philosophique

d une

et

logico-ontologique

occultation, S.

une demarche qui comprend autrement c est-a-dire une demarche axee, d une definition

et

Pintellection. inscrire,

C est texte

(c est-a-dire

d une

principes). Mais paradoxalement, en se permettant cette Thomas met en place, a partir de ses propres premisses,

methode des

de

la

demonstration

Autrement

dans

1

dit,

de

histoire

1

la

et,

la

scientificite

sur

part,

d autrc

occultation

la

de

la

pensee scientifique,

bien cettc seconde justification relative a

la

lui

sert

a

propre originalite.

intellection

1

de

question de

du texte d Aristote sa

physique,

question

sur

part,

la

qu eclaire

le

6

la Somme theologique auquel je me refere Comme on le sait, les Q. 84 a 86 de ce texte

de

.

s

intcrrogent au sujet

la connaissance par 1 ame des realites corporelles lorsqu elle est unie au corps. Cctte etude se deploie selon trois etapes: la premiere traite du moycn par lequel se realise cette connaissance (Q. 84), la seconde se

de

dcmande comment

et

selon

troisieme ctudie ce que

contexte

done,

la

I

qucl

amc

ordre

elle

ct

la

Dans

ce

en question en cernant

le

s

accomplit

(Q.

85)

connait de ces realites (Q. 86).

Q. 84 introduit

1

analyse

Voir la note precedcnte. Je dois cepcndant preciser un point qui n cst pas toujours suffisamment mis en evidence dans mes etudes preccdcntcs: importance de la methode de "division" che/. Aristote. Ix; role de cettc methode a etc systematiquement neglige en particulier par ses interpretes. Pourtant, tout porte a croirc qu elle est ccntrale, pour instauration des principes, et ceci scion divers precedes, dont le plus originaire est la recherche des differents sens d un tcrme (second instrument dc la dialectique), et le mieux articule se trouve expressemcnt etabli au debut de la Physique (I, 1, 184al6-26) (cf. mon livre cite a la note precedente, 76 ss.). J ai insiste sur importance Un de cette methode dans plusieurs etudes recentcs, comme par exemple, "LT-tre et 49-98 et chez Aristote", Re\ ue de Philosophic ancienne, 143-195; I, 1983, de philosophic grecque", dans Doctrines et Concepts. Cinquante ans dc Philosophic langue franqaise, 1937-1987, ed. A. Robinet, Vrin, Paris, 1988, 89-108, 103 et 108. 1

1

1

1

"La

C est la un point sur lequel j ai insiste dans le livre que j ai consacre a la Physique, pour ne pas devoir y revenir plus longuemcnt ici (voir note 3 ci-dcssus). Je rappelle seulement que la scientificite de la physique est etablie par Aristote des le premier ctre et le livre de sa Physique, a partir de deux theses preliminaires, la plurivocite de fait que Yousia est sujet ultime de toute predication, et se trouve definitivement fondee au deuxieme livre, par sa theorie des quatre causes. 1

de

Ttieorie

moyen de

la

connaissance

dc

et scientificite

la

167

physique

cettc connaissance. Or, la premiere question qui est posee est

precisemcnt celle qui concerne Pintellection, c est-a-dire, des Particle S.

et

Thomas il

demande

se

souligne que

une

exister

(scientia

ce

naturalis)

1

ame

des

S.

c est

Thomas,

se

science

la

il

ne saurait dans

trouve

de

nature

la

En

corps mobile qui disparait.

le

ayant pour objet

science

la

puisque

corps, dit

cas,

1,

a une connaissance intellectuelle du corps,

Pintelligence ne connait pas les corps,

si

science

Dans

Pintellect.

si

1 enjeu est d une importance considerable, puisque, en premisse selon laquelle la science est dans Pintellect ou, si Pon prefere, dans Pintelligence, il ne peut exister de science de la nature que si Pame peut avoir une connaissance intellectuelle des corps.

d autres termes,

admettant

la

Avant de venir aux arguments qui etayent semble la

utile

bien

la la

de nature au 12 e siecle

Thomas

S.

fait

d autre part, de

et,

textes scientifiques d Aristote.

Cependant,

decouverte parallele des revient au texte meme

la

Pon

si

d Aristote, on constate que celui-ci ne considere pas

comme un une

fait

mais

applique a

s

d accent

difference

me

il

agit comme s il considerait que on ne qu peut pas mettre en question. d une d une rehabilitation de la notion consequence, part,

de remarquer que

science physique etait un

C est

cette affirmation,

mais

instaurer

1

de

7

et

fond,

la

elle

explique

glissement de Panalyse de S. Thomas. Sculement, et cela

seconde remarque, pour partie incompatible avec

S.

Thomas,

1

science physique

Cette difference n est pas

.

me

en

partie

le

conduit a une

existence d une telle science est en

idealisme, du moins avec idealisme radical qui domine a son epoque. Car, bien entendu, il ne pouvait soupconner, qu un

autre type d idealisme,

d autres

1

1

comme

armes en faveur de

celui

que proposera plus tard Kant, cachait scientificite de la physique, que Kant

la

considere aussi, a Pinstar de S. Thomas,

comme un

fait,

mais cette

fois-ci

selon les donnees d une nouvelle physique, celle de Newton. Cela suffit a faire

voir

que

Panalyse

de

Thomas

S.

se

limite

aux donnees

physique ancienne, preoccupee surtout a etablir des conditions

de ce qui

est mobile, sans lesquelles

Ces eclaircissements

me

une science poserait des

d une

immuables difficultes.

permettent maintenant d aborder plus directement

son analyse.

En

deux

fait,

Je

me

refere

1963 (1930), que je

ici

a

la

traduction

me permets

de

mais

differentes

analyses

enchevetrent dans son expose: choses corporelles, tandis que

s

1

une concerne Pautre

J.

complementaires

Pintelligibilite

meme

des

a

leur

Webert, panic aux editions du Cerf,

Paris,

parfois de corriger.

se

rapporte

surtout

Couloubaritsis

168

La premiere analyse

scientificite.

objections retenues centre

illustree

est

Ce

corps, et la seconde par la troisieme objection.

deux analyses,

lien entre ces la

dans

science est

1

deux premieres

les

par

these d une connaissance intellectuelle du

la

c est

precisement

qui rend possible un

premisse selon laquelle

la

intellect.

La premiere objection sur

1

se refere a S. Augustin (Soliloq. 2.4) et insiste des corps au moyen de 1 intellect, connaissance d une impossibilite

sont

ils

qu

parce

des

Pobjet

sens.

Augustin en expliquant qu il rejette nullement une connaissance par des concerne

objection

d autre

part,

des

connaissance

peuvent appartenir rapport, d une part, entre

le

entre

intellect

realites

solution proposee par S.

et

intelligible,

n est

sprituelles

Thomas

est

immaterielles et

(species)

"especes"

nature

par

qui

intelligibles

Cependant S. Thomas justifie S. une saisie materielle des corps mais a

1

ame.

sens

pour

La seconde sensible

et

indiquer les

par

possible

ct,

qu aucunc sens.

d origine neoplatonicienne, puisqu

La clle

suppose qu une puissance superieure peut exercer 1 acte d une puissance inferieure sous un mode plus elcve, sans quoi on admettrait que Dieu et les anges ne connaissent pas les etres corporels. Ces deux premieres et

objections capacitc

de

les la

reponses que S. Thomas donne insistent bien sur la connaissance intellectuelle, qui n atteint du corps que

Vespccc immaterielle et

intelligible.

De

sorte

premiere analyse constitue une la connaissance intentionnelle qui

qu on pourrait dire que

cette

prcambule a sa problematique de

sorte de suit.

un pas supplemental, dans particulier de la scientificite, a

a la seconde analyse, elle franchit

la

Quant mesure ou

savoir

elle

penetre au domaine

L

necessaire.

le

objcction

qui

surgit

en

1

occurrence centre une

des corps se fonde sur le fait que 1 intellect connaissance concerne des choses qui sont necessaires et qui sont toujours de la meme maniere, tandis que les corps sont, au contraire, mobiles et existent sous intellectuelle

des

modes

la scientificite

suppose entraine

pourquoi

de

la

On comprend

que si cette objection peut concerner science des corps en devenir, c est bien parce qu elle

differents.

comme premisse que la science est dans en meme temps la necessite commune de la

reponse que

S.

le statut

qu

pour comprendre

Thomas donne il

accorde a

1

intellect,

leurs

ce

objets.

qui

C est

a cette objection est capitale

la scientificite

de

la

physique:

"Tout mouvement, dit-i! suppose quelque chose d immqbile: lorsqu il la substance demeure immobile, et a quahtatif, changement y forme substantielle, la matiere la de il a changement lorsqu y demeure immobile. Meme les choses qui se meuvent ont des bien que Socrate ne soil pas dispositions immobiles: par exemple, 2

de

Tlieorie

la

connaissance

et scicntificitc

de

la

169

physique

il est cependanl immuablement vrai quo lorsqu il est demeurc en un lieu. Par suite, rien n empeche d avoir une science immuable des choses en mouvement".

toujours assis, il

assis,

En

d autres termes, en supposant a

de

et celui

Thomas

la necessite, S.

qua non d une science principalement par son immuabilite, du ses

yeux, sine

Bien plus,

releve

il

changement immobile;

le

si

des

fait

c est

trois la

substance

la

1

la

intellection

condition, a

depuis Platon, se comprend de Pimmobilite de son objet.

qui,

accidents,

changement concerne

demeure immobile;

problemc de

le

immobilite scion

cette

au niveau

fois

la

oriente sa reponse vers

perspectives:

substance

meme,

qui

s

y a

il

demeure

c est le substrat

changement concerne la chose individuelle dans un contexte, la disposition suppose immobilite du lieu. Si S. Thomas se permet cette analyse, qui renvoie a un arriere-fond metaphysique, de la qui

et si le

1

metaphysique ancienne, c est parce que 1 argumentation qui precede ses differentes reponses ou solutions aux objections s appuie sur une de la philosophic prearistotelicienne qui etait preoccupee du conception

moyens de

devenir et des

de Platon revele qu d une sauvegarde de

le

la

position

apport de celui-ci par la recherche certitude de la connaissance intellectuelle en

la

1

mais cela au detriment d une connaissance

etablissant les idees immuables,

possible du mouvement

Son interpretation de

connaitre.

considere

il

matiere, ou prennent egalement part les demonstrations au moyen des causes efficientes et materielles. Des lors,

etablir

que

meme

la

recoil les

immatericl

condition

la

scientificite

est

intellect

de

et

"especes"

immobile,

qui recoit (in recipiente per

Thomas, n

1

mode

sous un

et

de

la

necessaire

necessite.

le

modiim et

recipientis), constitue,

prealable

pour

cela

pour

circonscrire

S. la

il

s

autorise

a

ajouter,

sans

deux modes supplementaires:

statut,

1

en montrer

universalite

et

ici

la

conclut-il, que 1 amc connait les corps au moyen de d une connaissance immatcrielle, universelle et necessaire".

"Disons,

rintelligence,

Cette absence de preuve n amoindrit en rien atteste

mode de

science de la nature. Sans nulle doute cette condition

pas suffisante, puisqu

exactement

des corps materiels et mobiles,

c est-a-dire sous le

non seulement une recherche qui

la

portee de son analyse qui

vise a la saisie

de

rintelligibilite

des corps sensibles, mais aussi au lien incontournable de cette recherche

avec dire,

le

fait

parce

qu

qu

il

il

existc

y

a

une science des corps. C est meme, pourrait-on possibilite d une connaissance intellectuelle de

rintelligibilite propre aux corps sensibles et materiels qu il y a egalement possibilite d une connaissance scientifique de la nature; et, a 1 inverse,

Couloubaritsis

170

c est la

jamais

1

une mediation que la pensee d Aristotc suppose de cette fa?on.

En

guise de conclusion, je peux dire que

concernant cette

certes,

mais sans

etablir

la

de

scientificite

qui

originalite

se

la

physique ne

realise

fait

originalite

de

S.

Thomas

aucun doute. Bien

une

a

grace

1

prolongation

plus,

de

la

problematique aristotelicienne de la science, constitue un dans Phistoire de la pensee occidentale: d abord, parce qu elle s ecarte d une approche symbolique des choses de la nature, issue de la tradition

tournant decisif

8

dionysienne

et

,

ensuite,

la

raison

pure

lie

qu

parce

elle

une

inaugure

sommet chez Kant, dont

epistemologique qui attcindra son

une

expressement

theorie

de

la

demarche

la Critique

connaissance,

de

ou

de

la scientificite ccpendant d une science physique qui cst consideree comme un fait. Dans cette une position histoire, la position de S. Thomas me semble constituer

Pintellection

est

ccartce,

a

la

question

C charniere, qui ouvre aux conceptions de la physique de la fin dcs 13 et 14 C siecles, mais dont un des defauts tient dans sa reference a une

physique qui

s

avercra, quelques siecles plus tard,

comme

insuffisante.

Universite dc Bruxelles

8

Qu on

pourrait qualifier de

de M.-D. Chenu,

La

theologie

"mentalite

au douzieme

symbolique",

siecle,

pour reprendre

Vrin, 1976, 159-209, 159.

ici

une expression

ANDRE GODDU

The

and Demonstrability among Fourteenth-Century Ockhamists Dialectic of Certitude

The paper begins with

few general remarks about probability, which arc followed by a brief discussion of the difference between the late medieval and modern understanding of the word "evidence". Then, I turn

to the subject proper;

developments this

more

The modern

common

notion

inductive

inference

construed

in

and

general

of

no

to a

number

title

of

in

expression a

as

way

I].

definitive history of the

of individual instances.

namely of quantification

probability,

century [Sheynin, 137; Hacking, point,

as used in the

"ockhamist"

the character of a family-resemblance term than a

description of an attribute

a

consider very briefly important, relevant

I

finally,

Ockham. The term

after

paper has

a

mathematical

discovery

or

terms,

invention

In spite of general

may be

of the

17th

agreement on

emergence of probability has

of

that

been

yet

written, but the evidence gathered so far suggests the following emphasis:

The development

that

distinguishes

later

from

earlier

conceptions

of

emergence of an empirically or inductively grounded notion of empirical ratios, that is, statistically stable ratios. There was a the

probability

is

qualitative

idea

of

statistical

probabilities,

but

not

yet

an

empirical

recognition of the stability of statistical ratios. In other words, a notion of frequency 122-27].

The

is

not the

transition

same to

as a calculation of frequencies [Van Brakel,

empirical

study did not

conceptual revolution alleged by Ian Hacking [Garber

require the sort of

and

Zabell, 33].

On

seem to be part of a major conceptual development that involves the transition from deductivism to inductivism and to a conception of science that accommodates the accidental, so that

the other hand, the transition does

what occurs by chance or randomly can be studied and known [Van The modern sense of probability, then, should be 134].

Brakel,

distinguished from a

which

is

associated

and with what

is

more

qualitative

historically

approvable

in

and

intuitive

sense of probability,

with verisimilitude, with what the sense of being likely to

given case [Hacking, 18-30; Sheynin, 117-21, 139-41].

is

likely,

work

in a

Goddu

172

We may

modern notion

the

that

infer

additionally

of probability

depends on a conception of evidence that was available prior to the 17th century, but certainly "evidence" was used differently in the 14th century. In

make

order to

Ockham notion

of

intuition.

immediate included

point as clear as possible,

this

understanding of

s

Ockham

s

addition

in

would suggest

intuition

terms,

as

propositions

I

corresponds more

and

In

apprehension,

self-evident

"evidence"

well

such

to as

is

restricted

to

Ockham

cognition

conclusions

that

modern

to the

demonstrated

from evidently known necessary propositions. Evidence in the modem sense, however, is understood to be in the service of indirect knowledge

and usually inductive knowledge failure to be explicit about

at

The

great deal of confusion.

that

The notion

Hanson,

[Achinstein, 1-9;

this difference

53-62].

has been the source of a

of evidence as evidence of something

else suggests inductive support for a hypothesis. To attribute that notion without qualification to any philosopher of the 14th century constitutes an anachronistic fallacy. For Ockham, intuitive cognition does not "provide

rather does

evidence,"

cause evident assent [Ord.,

it

Adams, 390-92]. As is well known, Ockham required

Prol.,

q.

1;

the object as partial cause of a

natural intuitive cognition. In addition, an evident cognition requires the

correspondence between an objective content and the then,

"Evidence,"

means

the

objective content and an act

act

of judgment.

agreement between an of judgment [Quodl., V, 4]. While knowledge correspondence

or

correspondence, not all certain truths, for example theological truths, possess the warrant of evidence or direct apprehension. Such truths are believed because there is strictly speaking no requires

such

apprehended correspondence, even though such correspondence to be certainly true [Ord., Prol., q. 7].

is

believed

Hence, according to Ockham s account, there are three kinds of evident knowledge and three sources of evident truth: self-evidence, demonstrated

conclusions

propositions, and

the certainty of faith

are

nonevident.

but

certain

adherence. Accordingly, Scripture,

rational

introduced

discourse

a

source

Such

Ockham

discourse,

inadvertently is

from

strictly

evidently

known

necessary

and immediate experience. As Ockham s views on and Scripture reveal, however, there are truths that

direct

a

possess

the

certainty

of

distinguished three sources of certitude:

and

confusion

only

truths

of

immediate

experience.

when he suggested

evident

certainty.

In

that fact,

Ockham rational

Ockham

Certitude

maintained

well

as

and Demonstrability among Ockhamists that

nonevidently known

of

identification

initial

adherence.

In

in

some

discursive

the

fact,

arguments

The source

conclusions.

non-evident details

of

with

own account

s

of

certainty

third

a

suggest

Ockham

of demonstrable propositions [Ord.,

characteristics II,

Ockham

is

addition to evident certainty and the certainty of adherence.

category This result emerges from a brief consideration of

Sent.,

the

73

but

certain

yield

of this ambiguity

certainty his

1

qq. 12-13; Sent.,

Ill, q. 8;

Quodl. IV,

6;

S

d.

L.,3,

views on the

s

30,

and

1

qq.

3;

1,1].

Although rational discourse is a source of evident certainty, Ockham maintained that propositions which must be demonstrated are initially dubitable.

the

Ockham

respect to the demonstrability of existence, essence,

obstacles with

attributes, strict

on demonstration are well known, namely

s restrictions

and cause. The end

effect

is

few cases

that there are

to

which

demonstration applies [Webering, 85-172]. In addition, there are conclusions arrived at discursively by

means

of induction. Although inductive inferences follow from experience, the

are not known evidently, because our knowledge of them on the consistency of the laws of nature, which are not first depends

conclusions

self-evident,

principles,

Nevertheless, necessary, 18,6].

In

probable.

Ockham

and certain

Ockham

s

They are

nor

demonstrable,

knowable.

intuitively

held that inductively inferred propositions are true, [Ord.,

d.

2,

q.

10;

Sent.

Ill,

Exp. Elench.,

1;

q.

terms, then, such propositions are both certain and true,

although

the

certainty

of their

truth

evident. Their probability refers to the fact that their necessity

is

is

not

neither

logical nor metaphysical but only hypothetical. Evident experience serves The effect to cause. as a foundation for demonstration from

generalization of such inferences inductively does not yield evidently true, necessary,

and certain propositions, but probably

certain conclusions.

It

necessary,

true,

follows that our knowledge of nature

falls

under the category of probable knowledge. Ockham s views on demonstrability can be summarized class

of

probable

propositions

dubitable propositions, for

and some are with

the

false.

class

propositions,

for

of

The

some

is

not

coextensive

with

broadly

briefly.

the

and

class

The of

dubitable propositions are demonstrable

class of certain propositions

self-evident,

some nonevident

demonstrable,

or

is

not coextensive

intuitively

known

propositions are true, necessary, and

Probable propositions, then, are coextensive with the class of nonevidently true, hypothctically necessary, and certain propositions. certain.

Goddu

174

Because the expression better

perhaps certainty,

which

probable

but

certain

in

"probable

render

to

seems confused

certainty"

certainty

as

"relative"

or

to

us,

it

is

"nonevidcnt"

turn must be distinguished from yet a third class of

uncertain

propositions

reducible to clearly

such

(or

are

probable)

neutrally

certain

nonevidently

propositions.

because

they

evident sources. Hence, they do not remove

Probably are all

not

doubt,

nor do they end the process of questioning. Probable propositions, which

seem

to constitute a large part of natural philosophy, invite further

and

deeper inquiry. Much has quite rightly been made of imaginative possibilities in 14th-century theology and natural philosophy, but just as important is the constructive skepticism which the ambiguity so well captured by certitude"

suggests

[Miethke,

193].

By

"constructive

skepticism"

"probable

is

meant

the following: 1) questions about the reliability of inferences from effect to cause, 2) doubts as to whether or not the genuine cause of an event

had been correctly isolated and identified, 3) the shadow this doubt casts on the generalization of such causes by means of inductive inference, and 4)

skepticism to

is

critical

phenomena could be deduced. Such

constructive because the questions and doubts are challenges

provide support.

In

few words as possible, a feeling of general

as

knowledge was accompanied by ever greater distance about inferences from sense experience and the reliability

certainty

of

shadow about the formulation of

the insecurity at the center of this

natural laws from which the observed

about

natural

and constructive critical distance, Imagination, are presuppositions of an experimental philosophy which has

generalization.

skepticism

abandoned completely the ideal of demonstrative rigor. Ockham nor did certainly did not abandon the Aristotelian ideal of demonstration, modal s use of it. Ockham for substitute clear he offer some strategies not

and hypothetical arguments was an implausibly

in the

end a merely formal concession to

rigid conception of science.

The dialectical context of 14th-century discussions makes the story somewhat more complicated than general summaries suggest, but the extremes of the dialectic have not been altered so much by subsequent research skeptical

as

to

falsify

the

general

pattern,

namely

that

an

explicitly

account position was countered by a positivistically reductive The moderate more a positivist or position. turn, provoked

which,

in

logical

account

belongs,

of

course,

to

Nicholas

of Autrecourt

whose

response to explicitly held skepticism was to reduce certitude to evident

Certitude

nonevident

eliminated

Nicholas

certitude.

and Demonstrability among Ockhamists

175

and

certitude

with

any which might be attached to different degrees of probability. to say, a probable proposition may itself be only more probable it

significance

That

is

than

its

more

opposite, not necessarily closer to the truth and in that sense

true [Universal Treatise, 106].

The standard

response, such as Buridan

validity of experience q.

s,

was

to fall

back on the

and the method of incomplete induction [Physics

I,

15]. Although not capable of generating absolutely evident conclusions,

does

induction

Buridan

s

possess

evidence

certainty of inductive

the

extent

account,

"evidence"

is

a

in

sense

hypothetical

inference

is

and to

that

not merely subjective.

In

used to refer to both direct and indirect

knowledge. Buridan included the conclusions of inductive arguments under evidently known propositions without ascribing to them the same degree of certainty that

conclusions

first

principles have. Buridan avoided characterizing the

inferences

of inductive

propositions always

as

probable,

retain a hypothetical

propositions are at best highly probable.

Oresme

inductively

yet

character.

It

will

known

follows that such

not hesitate to call

propositions probable [Maier, 393-403]. Because of the probable character of inductive inference and because an explanatory function is

such

attributed to inductive generalizations, Buridan

s

be considered as the

to the notion of evidence

in the

modern

At in

this

clear approximation

first

account of evidence can

sense. point, however,

14th-century

analyses.

we arrive at an impasse and sticking-point As we all know, hypothetical reasoning

stimulated criticism of Aristotelian natural philosophy. In order to save

was generally sufficient either that the known phenomena could have been otherwise or observed phenomena can be shown to follow from alternative the contingency of the laws of nature,

The

contexts of Buridan

s

it

discussions of evidence and certitude

to

show

that the

theories.

show

that

he was concerned to preserve the possibility of our knowledge of nature.

Unlike

many

inconclusive

accounts,

Buridan

s

general

acceptance

of

explanations firmly on what he took to be a conclusive argument. Indeed, Buridan usually left little doubt that he considered the relevant Aristotelian or his own alternative account to be

Aristotelian

is

based

certainly correct. This sort of conservatism

the second

half of the

[Funkenstein,

III;

14th century, not

is

encountered repeatedly in of all in Pierre d Ailly

least

Grant, 105-24; Maier, 406-413].

Goddu

176

The more

astonishing views

Although

there

attaining

scientific

scientific

is

disagreement

knowledge

Oresme seem

of Nicole

about

whether or

altogether

of

knowledge [Grant, 111-22; Molland, 206-20],

of the problem of the diurnal rotation of the earth

exceptional.

was

he

skeptical

empirical

attaining

Oresme is

of

s

resolution

entirely consistent

the concept of probability which I have sketched above. In that well-known text, Oresme says that the heavens move and not the earth,

with

arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, because they are persuasions which do not conclude evidently" [Oresme, 536]. That is to

"the

say, the

conclusion in behalf of diurnal rotation

as the belief in the that

motion of the heavens

Oresme regarded both

as

more

is

is

probable, but inasmuch

also not evident,

it

seems

or less equally probable. Neither

possessed nonevident or probable certainty. Oresme s reinterpretation of Scripture should be taken as hypothetical, that is, as a possible way of

understanding Scripture should the hypothesis of diurnal rotation turn out to be correct. No sooner does Oresme seem to concede greater probability to the hypothesis of diurnal rotation than

he questions the reasonableness

of such a hypothesis. Seen from the perspective of the standard accounts of certitude, 14th-century natural philosophers including

Oresme

fell

back

on the only remaining source of certitude they possessed, the authority of This view can be termed "ockhamist" as a convenient Scripture. expression,

nothing

more,

in

the

family-resemblance

sense

I

indicated

earlier.

These arguments

remarks in

Book

arguments very

provide I

of

carefully,

reasons, Copernicus

a

significant

context

for

Copcrnicus

De

s

Revolutionibus. Copernicus structured and while he did so in part for rhetorical

his

he was introducing a new kind of controversial conclusions. Just before he

was aware

that

reasoning to support his introduced all of his hypotheses about the motions of the earth in 1.9, Copernicus countered arguments on behalf of geocentricity and geostability in

demonstrative

chapter 8 with arguments that are persuasive rather than The concluding sentence of 1.8 reads:

in character.

see, therefore, that from all of these arguments it is more especially in probable that the earth moves than that it is at rest the case of daily rotations as belonging properly to the earth.

You

The beginning

of

1.9 indicates

how we

are to understand that conclusion:

Therefore, since nothing hinders the mobility of the earth, I think we should now see whether several motions belong to it, so that it can be regarded as one of the wandering stars.

Certitude

By my emphasis on with the

diurnal

and Demonstt-ability among Ockhamists

structure

I

meant the

of the

rotation

earth

The argument begins new idea), which is

following:

a

(hardly

177

advanced as being more probable (a new emphasis), followed by the first genuinely innovative move. The greater probability of diurnal rotation is used to

justify consideration of additional motions,

which

in turn require

the sun to be placed at rest at or near the center of the world. Only

then comes the principal argument in 1. 10: // the hypotheses are true, then the observations of the bounded elongations of Mercury and Venus

and the observations of the retrograde motions of all the planets follow of necessarily. Copernicus summarized the argument in one sentence: these phenomena proceed from the same cause, the motion of the earth." "All

What Copernicus gave

us

is

the

case

first

known

are

me where

to

clearly retroductive reasoning was introduced into astronomy.

Phenomena

observed which would be explicable as a matter of course

probable hypothesis were hypothesis

is

true.

true; hence, there

is

if

a

a reason to think that the

Copernicus went even further: that the observations is taken as a warrant for declaring

follow necessarily from the hypothesis the truth of the hypothesis. There

is, however, one crucially important have ignored purposely. Although the motion of the earth is characterized as a cause of our observations, all of the demonstrations

fact that

I

provided by Copernicus are mathematical, not physical. Precisely because of the necessity with which the conclusions follow from the assumptions, the mathematical demonstrations carried conviction and seemed to provide a causal explanation of the

phenomena. Copernicus himself asserted that mathematicians would be persuaded presumably because only they only would be sufficiently impressed by the demonstrations and the harmony of the system to accept probable assumptions as evidently true.

The use

if

they were physically

is repeated certainly by Galileo and, somewhat does not disappear entirely from Newton s Principia

demonstrations

causal

more

of mathematical demonstrations as

surprising,

[Galileo, 245-46;

discover

the

Newton,

cause

of

III,

Prop. XIII, Th. XIII].

gravitation

meant

that

the

Newton

s

failure to

demonstration

was

incomplete; nevertheless, the mathematical demonstrations of mechanics

seemed

be demonstratively explanatory. In retrospect we can see that Newton to

s

disavowal of hypotheses

is

unpersuasive [General Scholium]. Hypotheses arrived at retroductively are

probable character.

if

they are directly unknowable and yet causally explanatory in

The

directly

unobservable

entities

postulated

as

causes

are

Gocidu

178

precisely because they provide causal explanation by

theoretical

theory and because

they remain to

some degree unknowable,

way

of

fallible,

need of experimental support [McMulKn], It revisable, the 14th-century discussions went some that was this sense of probability distance in developing philosophically, but which fell short of their goal and continuously

in

in part by their lack of mathematical syntax and structure, experimental technique and adequate

to

Aristotelian

supplement

demonstration,

but moreso by the genuine dilemmas posed by the Aristotelian ideal of scientific truth, as that ideal was so rigidly understood in the 14th century.

To sum strategies

science.

up, the 14th-century

for

approximating

None

of

them was

problem of certitude provoked numerous

the

Aristotelian

successful, yet

out

ideal

of

demonstrative

of these efforts

emerged

an increased respect for probable knowledge. Nevertheless, the notion of the presupposes the probable character of hypotheses and and be resisted underdetermination of theory by evidence continued to

science that

disguised well into the 19th century.

University of Notre

Dame

References Achinstein, Peter, ed., Ttie Concept of Evidence (Oxford, 1983).

Adams, Marilyn, Ockham,"

Copernicus,

"Intuitive

Cognition, Certainty, and Scepticism in William

Traditio 26 (1970) 389-98.

De

Revolutionibus, ed., Nobis and Sticker, Gesamtausgabe

II

(Hildesheim, 1983). Funkenstein,

Amos,

and

TJieology

the

Imagination

Scientific

(Princeton,

1987).

Galileo,

Two New Sciences,

Garber, D. and

S. Zabell,

tr.

S.

"On

Drake (Madison, the

1974).

Emergence of

Probability,"

Archive for

the History of Exact Sciences 21 (1979) 33-53.

Grant,

Edward,

Studies

in

Medieval

Science

and Natural Philosophy

(London, 1981). Hacking, Ian, The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge, 1975). Hanson, N. R., "The Logic of Discovery" in Achinstein, pp. 53-62.

Certitude

and Demonstrability among Ockhamists

Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones Physicorum McMullin, Ernan,

"Two

179

(Paris, 1509).

Ideals of Explanation in Natural

Science,"

Midwest

Studies in Philosophy 9 (1984) 205-220.

Maier, Anncliese,

Problem der Evidenz

"Das

Jahrhunderts,"

Ausgehendes

Miethke, Jiirgen, Ockhams

A. G.,

Molland,

"Nicole

Mittelalter II

in

der Philosophic des

(Rome,

Weg zur Sozialphilosophie Oresme and Scientific

14.

1961).

(Berlin, 1969). Progress,"

Miscellanea

Mediaevalia 9 (1974) 206-220. Newton, Isaac, Mathematical Principles

of Natural Philosophy and his System of the World, tr. F. Cajori (Berkeley, 1934). Nicholas of Autrecourt, The Universal Treatise, tr. L. Kennedy

(Milwaukee, 1971). Nicole Oresme,

Denomy Sheynin,

O.

Le

livre

du del

et

du monde,

ed.,

A. Menut and A.

(Madison, 1968). B.,

"On

the Prehistory of

Probability,"

Archive for History

of Exact Sciences 12 (1974) 97-141.

van Brakel,

J.

Statistical

"Some

Remarks on

Probability,"

the Prehistory of the Concept of Archive for History of Exact Sciences 16

(1976) 119-36.

Webering,

Damascene,

Ttieory

of Demonstration According to

William

Ockham

(St. Bonaventure, 1953). William of Ockham: Exp. Elench. = Exposition super libros Elenchorum; Ord. = Ordinatio; Quodl. = Quodlibeta Sent. = on

septetn;

the Sentences;

S

L.

-

Summa Logicae.

Commentary

ONORATO GRASSI

The Object

Some Authors

of Scientific Knowledge in

of the

Fourteenth Century

Ockham

William of

describes the actus iudicativus

the intellectual act

(i.e.

tanlum rcspcctu complexi, because both complex knowledge) and dissent are inherent in propositions through which we as

peculiar to assent

we

Inceptor

and

truth

recognize

falsehood.

1

more than one

find

the

In

or

demonstrationis

or,

when he

again, -

scientific

knowledge most of

his

Vcncrabilis

when he

the latter being the

or

-

asserts

when

est rcspectu

to

referring

that sola propositio scitur.

surprising that

-

the tola propositio nota\

with natural science he maintains omnis scientia

complexonim\

the

similar statement: for instance

distinguishes the subject of science from the object

conclusio

of

writings

2

the

truth

vcl

of

therefore hardly

is

It

dealing

complexi

contemporaries, as well as some later authors,

consider him one of the foremost supporters of the cotnplcxum -theory.

We

not

will

deny that many of

interpretation,

Ockham

and

absolute,

as

be

could

thorough

considered the

demonstrating

Adam Wodeham

position embraced.

statements might lead to such an

his

more

a

upon

yet

statements

s

3

vast

examination

as

relative

range

of

rather

of different

context,

than levels

as his

had already reali/ed the necessity of a

deeper consideration of Ockham s thought. In the Prologue to Lectnra Secunda, q. 6, he noted that "frater Vilelmus ... semper ponit extra propositiones ipsa intellecta, sive sint

ficta

sive

res

ipsae extra, et

G.de Ockham, Scriptum in Libnim primum Sententiamm, Prol. St.Bonavcnture N.Y., 1967, O.T. I, p.16,12-16). 2 Ibid., q.9 (O.T. V.Richter-G.Ixibold,

45);

Id,

Scriptum

I,

I,

p.266,17-22);

Id,

St.Bonavcnture N.Y., dist.

2,

q.

4

(ed.

p.135,18-140,13). 3

See

Prol.,

q.l,

a.l

(cd.

G.Gal,

Exp. super VII libros Physic. Prol. (ed. O.P. IV, p.9,88-91; p.ll, 15-22; p.12,41S.Brown, St.Bonaventure, N.Y. 1970, O.T. II,

a.l

In

1985,

(ed.

M.E.Reina, Rivista

critica

di Storia delta

pp.48-74 and 290-314; pp.52-53) and Reportatio, I, dist. 22, a.l C.Knudsen, Cahiers de I lnstitut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin, 14 (1975), pp.1-26; Prol. et Secundum Sententiarum no.4); Gregorii Ariminensis, Lectura super Primum

File-Sofia,

(ed.

G.Chatton, Sent.

e.g.

q.l,

non

25

p.15, q.l, a.l (ed.

(1970),

,

D.Trapp-V.Marcolino, Berlin-N cw York 1981,

t.l,

pp.2-3).

Tfie Object

In the

intentiones".

ipsae

two

different

ways the

is

"complexiim

first

of

d.

book,

of

assent".

reality through the proposition because

known. Here the

res

proposition 1

Now,

Wodeham,

says

Ockham

formulation of

-

-

complex knowledge reminds us

it

only

of

the

consider the direct

to

or,

of

generally speaking,

would be the former one. 6

the intellect assents necessarily to that

whose meaning corresponds

to the aforesaid

complexum can be learnt and become, Such

terms

the

an intuition leading to an evident judgment

res,

(compositio evidens); through

then, the

if

according to Ockham, knowledge starts with a

that,

simplex apprehensio of

even

assent,

bestowed solely on the

is

we come

if

theory of assent

s

which

to

according

According to the first we reach its terms stand for what is being

a proper interpretation

Wodeham

proposition

thesis

and the assent

as intentiones

act

complexiim-

the

to

According

partial.

he explained there are

1,

q.

immediate object of second interpretation,

the

is

1,

the

interpreting

object

181

of Scientific Knowledge

judgment; only an object of

in its turn,

position, far from being alien to can be traced in those Quodlibeta, which philosophy, easily were probably discussed between 1322 and 1324 and written up fully assent.

Ockham during

a

the

of

different

form is

knows

or

what

that

proceeds

-

of

to

say

knowledge: is is

not

-

formatio complexi, not

each

through

the

is

true.

assent

its

apprehension.

Adam Wodeham,

kind

of

Lectura Secunda, Prol., See Ockham, Summa Logicae, Pars St.Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974, O.P. I, p.42,19-22).

and

8

q.

two different to

corresponding

knows

intellect

first,

this

reasoning

kind

requires

Following

an

f.!24rb).

7

III,

a

that

way; through the second, intellect

the

instead only what the proposition says.

Wodeham,

Quodlibet

9 first

In

proper object of this kind of assent, even

6

In

sciendi,

in a specific

known

that

8

Avignon.

Venerabilis Inceptor distinguishes

and of actus

assent

something

16 the

q.

in

years

following

Quodlibet IV, kinds

"non-terministic"

s

It

if is

fact,

the res

Ockham only

the

are

the

extra

we never know

things, but

only through the formation

q.

6 (Caius

&

I,

c.12 (ed.

Ph.Boehner, G.Gal,

Gondville College 281/674, S.

Brown,

Lectura, d.l, q.l, a.l (ed. G.Gal, Franc. Studies 37 (1977), p.79,29).

Ibid, (p.79,30). Ibid,

(pp.81-82,34).

See

Ockham, Scriptum

I

Prol.

q.l,

a.l

(O.T.

I,

p.!6,6ff.,

and

p.31,17ff.). o

See venture, 9

the

Introduction

N.Y,

to

G.de

Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem

(ed.

J.C.Wey,

St.Bona

1980, O.T. IX, pp.37*-38*).

Ockham, Quodl. Ill, q. 8 (O.T. IX, 233,12-18). Cf. Quodl. IV, q. 16 (O.T. IX, 376,15377,26) and Quodl. V, q. 6 (O.T. IX, 500,16-18).

Grass!

182

of a proposition in our for instance, that

On

the

contrary,

the

to

refers

object,

stone

"a

mind is

know

to

esse in

"sic

re",

10

no

the

we manage

that

donkey".

second kind of assent, having truth as

its

inherent

in

truth

for

complcxiim,

is

always

11

What follows is that intellect assents propositions rather than in things. to the complexiim even in sc et absolute and not only when this is the of a

subicclum

sicut

istam

propositionem never concern things nor is

said through the

this

for

complex proposition, in

est -

12 -

science and assent

rate,

what

to

is

be known.

to

something that may render a proposition sometimes a

false;

defined

something

Sumnia Logicae

in 13

denoted by the proposition. from the proposition;

the

quite

and respectively, a true proposition

a

est

falsilas

ita

is

sometimes

true,

csse

one

(verifas

when

Still,

falsa).

propositio

they

reverse,

false

14

el

as

It

a parte

rci

Truth and falsehood are not res distictae

realiter

vcra

importatur per

"sic

propositions; they refer to what

i.e.

itself,

proposition

At any

re".

ultimately

knows

it

a

coincide est

true

with,

propositio

proposition

would not mean that it has changed, nor that it in itself; it would simply mean that that element has acquired some new 15 Of the three as they really are. proposition has ceased to denote things Ockham considered by Bocthius, of propositions kinds different

becomes a

false one, this

always refer to the former (in mente). According to him, the truth of spoken and written that is to sentences always depends on the corresponding mental one

maintains that the latter two

say,

depends on

it

its

voce and

(in

meaning:

"propositio

est vera significans, ideo tune propositio est auditor

concipere

in script o}

est

verum

oratio

eius prolatione natus

quando ex

formare propositionem mentalem

et

mental propositions are not made of things, but between predicate and subject identity perfect

17 veram".

of concepts;

10

Ockham, Quodl.

Ill,

q.

8

IX,

(O.T.

233.20-234.25) and

falsum

vel

IV, q.

Id.,

Quodl.

Id.,

Quodl. IV,

Id.,

Quodl. V,

Id.,

Summa

12 13

14 15

16

17 18

Ibid. (O.P.

Ill, q.

q. 16

I,

q.

16 (O.T. IX, 377,37-43).

(O.T. IX, 377,26-30).

q. 6 (O.T. IX, 501,27-502,47).

Logicae, pars

Bocthius, In

I,

cap. 43 (O.P.

I,

129,202-130,210).

130,214-131,254). Sec Quodl. V, q. 24 (O.T. IX, 580,136-140). lib.

Ockham, Quodl. Ibid.

8 (O.T. IX, 234,40-42) and Quodl. IV,

DC

Interpret., ed.2a,

Ill, q.

I, c.

DC

signis

(PL

13 (O.T. IX, 251,10-13) and

(O.T. IX, 247.19-248,27);

Id.,

Scriptum

1

q.

64,

414D).

12 (O.T. IX, 247,13-17).

Prol. q. 2 (O.T.

I,

109,12-111,4).

true

16 (O.T.

377,32-34). 1

Now,

so the

by

required

Quodl.

18

IX,

The Object of Scientific Knowledge

183

propositions must be an identity between what each term presumes. is

eodem"

pro

"supponere

universal.

Ockham Ockham

19

s s

We

do not mean

it

in

singular,

itself

the

establish

to

indefinite

particular,

or

to discuss here the value of suppositio in

will

confine

ourselves

to

observation:

this

consideration of terms in a proposition proceeds from what the

whole

a

as

proposition

"denotatur

sentence,

we

philosophy;

reason

a sufficient

of any assertive sentence, be

truth

The

20

stands

Indeed

for.

a

through

res importata per subiectum

quod These are words

true

sit

assertive

res importata

remind us very closely of the expression used by the Dominican William of Crathorn when he explained the content of a true proposition: "nichil enim aliud importari videtur per per

praedicatum".

propositionem affirmativam veram sit

we

res importata per praedicatum".

are dealing with here

complexum

-

complex knowledge proposition and from entities

and

science

complexum.

22

quod

It

res importata per subiectum

may be

quite different

helpful to observe the res

from the

res

realists,

in

individual

nisi 21

significata per such as Chatton, used to speak of. Along with whose apprehension he disregarded as being useless even

propositionem that the

is

that

-

Chatton refused any entity (fictum) distinct from he assumed the res extra (i.e. real, reality;

from proposition) to be the direct object of and, by consequence, to be the meaning of

distinct

of

assent

On

the contrary in the above mentioned statements

we

find

be reduced to the meaning of separate terms and that the denotatum cannot exist apart from the denotation, even though the that the res cannot

former never coincides with the proposition

meaning

it

is

the

and the

object

of.

Dominican Robert Holkot maintained the

In contrast the

terministic

doctrine of identity between denotatum and denotalio against realism as well as against every theory implying that the object and the truth of

have

complex knowledge proposition 19 Id.,

20

itself.

As

Summa Logicae,

Ockham, Quodl.

pars

Ill, q.

an

existence

of

their

own,

apart

from

the

the assent relates to the signum, not to external

II,

cc.2-7 (O.P.

I,

251-272).

12 (O.T. IX, 250,89-90).

21

G. Crathorn, Quaestiones de universalibus (ed. J.Kraus, Aschendorff, 1937, p.13,24See Crathorn, In Sent. (Basel B V 77, quoted by Il.Schepers, "Holkot contra dicta Crathorn, Philosophise hes Jahrbuch, 79 (1972), pp.106-136, p.123, n.77). 27).

II",

22

Chatton, Sent. Prol. q.l, a.l (ed. Reina, pp.54-55); Id., Rcportatio, G.Gal, Franciscan Studies, 27 (1967), pp.191-212; pp.202-203; Id., Sent. (ed. Reina, pp.53-56).

I,

d.3,

Prol.,

q.2 q.l,

(ed. a.l

Grass!

184 23

Holkot assumed the complexum to be the sole object of science, and opinion and he denied that the truth and the meaning of a

things, faith

from the proposition itself, as if proposition could possibly be separated in or absolute terms: on the inherent it, they were absolute qualities

The proof can be found

contrary, they coincide with the proposition.

-

Holkot says - in negative or possible sentences which do not denote a res can still undoubtedly be true: presently and actually existing and yet

non

propositionis

"veritas

non

Caesar 24 rebus".

est

propositionem, quia tune

est res significata per

aliqua propositio esset vera

chimera

quae ubi

,

nulla haberet veritatem, ut patet de ista

termini

After having thus criticized the

non supponunt pro aliquibus Holkot advances the same

res,

In the first of his argument against the significatum per propositionem. refuses the fact he Sex Articuli, probably meant to confute Crathorn, that the significatum might have an existence of its own and he often identifies

with the res per complexum significata, thus discarding the per propositionem as the proper object of complex knowledge.

it

significatum

He

value

the

instead

defends

complexum mentale

of

that

is

not,

Crathorn maintained, a similitudo of written and spoken sentences: not

(scitur)

"know"

composition obiectum est

of

"things"

terms

in

a

or

"denoted

sentence: 25

complexum

mentale".

things";

what we know

"cuiuscumque

In

his

Holkot does not speculate upon - nor does he explain known: he only repeats that "obiectum scitum, creditum et

complexum statements not

fully

not

res

27 significata".

Nevertheless

-

vel

the

26

controversy, to

be

opinatum

est

what

there

is

are

some

which he seems to recognize that the terministic solution is of mental adequate, e.g. when he deals with the denotation in

between signum and res, or propositions, or with the relationship 23

is

asscrtivae

notitiae

anti-realism

as

we do

Robert Holkot,

24

Sent.

I,

q. 2

(Lugduni 1518; Oxford, Oriel College,

when he

15, f.!98ra).

Deus possit scire I (Oriel College 15, f.!99rb); der Philosophic, 53 (1971), pp.lGeschichte Archiv fur Courtenay, (ed. plum quam Satz als Zeichen der theologischen Aussage bei 21; p.7,1 1.81-88). See F.Hoffmann, "Der der Repraesentatio im Holcot, Crathorn und Gregor von Rimini", in Der Begriff Mittelalter (hrsg. von A.Zimmermann), Berlin 1971, pp.296-313; Id., Die theologische Methode des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Robert Holcot, B.G.P.T.M.A, N.F.5, Miinster i.W. 1972; Schepers, Holcot contra dicta... pp.!27ff. Ibid.;

Sex

Id.,

"Utrum

Articuli,

scit"

II",

25

Holkot, Sent.

26

II,

q.2,

a.4 (Lugduni 1518 H).

Sent. q.2 (Oriel 15, f.!98rb); (Oriel College 15, ff.!99va-200ra). Id.,

Sent.

I,

"Utrum Deus..."

(ed. Courtenay, 5,46-47).

II,

q.2,

a.4

(Lugduni 1518 H); Sex

Art.,

I

The Object of Scientific Knowledge

185

not to give a merely terministic explanation of complexum.

tries

Holkot

cannot go Crathorn observed et

signa

beyond these

who

-

did not

hints,

manage

as

draw a sharp outline was to Crathorn himself of

to

This very distinction

significata".

But -

those

among

remaining

28

"inter

primary importance, as Schepers has shown, for without it we cannot understand what is - according to him - the real object of intellectual knowledge: neither the mental nor the spoken proposition, but what is signified

through

the

i.e.

it,

whole meaning of the proposition

We

cannot

know

("totale

meaning either in se or natural but ad through concepts, only through signa placitum instituta, an which Crathorn means to include the terms, voces and expression by significatum

propositionis").

this

concepts forming the proposition. Thus the meaning does not coincide with the proposition,

it

rather

through the complexum

("illud

totale

being expressed

quod exprimitur per

significatum

meaning denoted by

it.

a mutual influence cannot be conclusively proved, Crathorn

solution shows

more than one

similarity with

as

for

instance,

in

Wodeham

same because of

not possible to consider them the differences,

is

Accordingly, instead of referring to the conclusion,

istud complexum").

science refers to the

Though

corresponds to what

their

s.

However,

it

s is

several remarkable

of

understanding

the

nature

of

mental complexum? Entering the

controversy over

overcome the

the

object

of science,

31

Wodeham

between realism and terminism, for neither could adequately answer the problem. His refusal of both theories was due to certain difficulties he had met with, and he thought he could tried

to

solve

them with

his

fixed choice

own

doctrine of the obiectum totale propositionis? 2

"78

Id.,

Sent.

II,

q.2,

a.4

7,96-101; 16,291-293); Sex Art.

(Lugduni I

1518, O); (Oriel 15, f.200ra).

29 Cf. Schepers, Holkot contra dicta... Sentences quoted in the footnotes 79 and 90.

and WJ.Courtenay, Leiden 1978, pp.95-106.

Ibid, pp.1 18-120

Writings,

G.

Nuchelmans,

II",

Deus..."

pp.123-125,

and

Adam Wodeham. An

Wodeham on

"Adam

"Utrum

the

meaning

Courtenay 5,43^6;

(ed.

Crathorn

text

of

the

Introduction to his

life

and

of

s

declarative

sentences",

K.A.Tachau, The Response to Ockham s and Aureol s Epistemology (1320-1340)", in English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries (a cura di A.Maieru), Bibliopolis Napoli 1982, pp.185-217; M.E.Reina, intuitiva ed esperienza interiore in Adamo Wodeham", Rivista di Storia "Cognizione

Historiographia

Linguistica,

delta

41

Filosofia,

1

(1980),

pp. 177-187.

(1986), pp.19^49; 211-244; O.Grassi, Intuizione delta conoscenza nel XIV secolo, Milano 1986.

Wodeham ed il problema 32

Wodeham,

Lect. Sec., d.l, q.l (Gal p.83,39-40; p.86,52).

e

significato.

Adam

Grassi

186

His studying was especially devoted to assent and to give a satisfactory explanation of its dynamics. From the analysis of the relationship between apprehension and assent, and of the necessity of this same relationship (because we assent only to what we know, that is to what we learned),

Wodeham

he comes to discard complexum as the direct object of assent.

resumes Ockham

theory of the Quodlibeta,^ maintaining that

s

complexum takes shape it

assent,

the

latter

by

Wodeham

it,

by a

as

As

non

sic

est

sibi

esse sicut

and

Deum"

esse does not proceed

a parte rd\

is

instance

est

"homo

esse

formed

sentences,

with

"signified"

is

conclusion,

assent,

i.e.

the

is

the sic esse

that

is

to say the

are respectively

verb

from any signum,

terms,

If

one out of two sentences

in

we

will

obtain

meanings. Therefore the

distinct

esse

denoted by single terms.

"thing",

tense

identical

meaning of "Deum

Anyway, as Crathorn had already means propositions, because the sic

act of consciousness nor

cannot be a the

-

two

different

esse

sic

a mental

can be

vel divisuni).

complexum (signum compositum complexum or a res as the object of assent; could not be the dictum of the proposition either. The direct

he

states,

is

what

is

"signified"

per complexum. The

significabile

33

sixth

refuses either a

this object

object,

it

with

two

only by

Wodeham

yet,

This significatum

albus"

album".

from an

we change

otherwise

his

per propositionem denotatur, which corresponds to

"hominem

for

in

same

the

complexum inducing the

observed, these significata are by no

but

In

cause.

praesuppositae".

and of

Deus"

stated

object of assent, though assent

the infinitive expression of the sentence "Deus

clearly

ad

assensus

pars dicti

propositionis immediate sibi conformis, concausantis

totale

necessario

et

is

solution: the direct object of the assenting

the whole object of that

is

est

"non

it

necessitating

own

introduces his

"significatum

\>el

35 necessitat".

complexum cannot be the

conclusion,

ilium

s

therefore

reflexus;

non

quem ipsum

act

the

34 does not necessarily do the same with the act of knowing: and it is may come later - anyway it is not necessary

induced by a actus

induced

one

in

when

mind, while always inducing an act of

Ockham, Quodl.

Ill,

q.

8

(O.T.

object

IX,

by the of assent

233,12-235,60);

dictum, is

Quodl.

i.e.

quoddam

then a something

IV,

q.

16

(O.T.

IX,

376,15-377,43).

34

Wodeham, Led.

Sec.,

d.l,

q.l,

a.l

(f.l29vb):

quod est obiectum actus anima non assentit Quia ad assensum non praecognoscitur

"...

otnne

assentiendi partiale vel totale prius natura comprehenditur. nisi

cognito

assensui,

35

Ibid.

Sed complexum

...

igitur".

I



necessitat

prefer this transcription to Gal

(Gal p.85,46-47).

s (p.83,41).

...

The Object of Scientific Knowledge seen in

meaning of

its

accident.

36

On

esse

quid rather than

in

187

of substance or

that

Wodeham

the basis of this definition,

turns his attention

object of scientific knowledge. Strictly speaking,

to the

judgement which necessarily causes the

assent:

37

is

it

Ockham

as

an evident "notitia

says,

evidens veri necessarii nata causari per praemissas ad ipsum per discursum 38

syllogisticum

object

is

applicatas".

conclusion

the

through

Real science

caused by direct acts and

is

its

the sic esse a parte rei denoted through the premise as well as 39

demonstrative

of

Therefore

syllogism.

the

peculiar and adequate object of science cannot be the significatum totale

conclusionis or rather propositions, because however certain the assent

bestowed on a

discarded

this

meaning might

as

being,

the discursus as a whole.

Now, different

the

the

at

most,

similarity.

His

science.

this

we

we

41

has

is

the

be

to

The

meaning of

far

it

to

be

as the nature of

concerned, these authors show a

is

as

develops

discover

will

as

although,

s,

Gregory disregards conclusio

reasoning

demonstration,

concludes,

solution closely,

of complex knowledge

remarkable

science

object of an actus reflexus.

Wodeham

from Gregory of Rimini

object

of

object

40

we observe

if

could never attain an evident nor as

the

and proper object of science,

right

it

be,

The conclusion

nature.

scientific

as the direct object of

we

when

follows:

consider

a

meaning of its conclusion, and the from the knowledge of this

directly refer to the

truth or falsehood of the premise proceed

meaning, a meaning that can be either true of false. But he also refuses to consider the whole demonstration or the significata omnium propositionum

demonstrations

knowledge. The one and only totale

to

36

37

conclusionis?

cause

Ibid.

2

fact,

it

adequate

its

complex

then the significatum

is

meaning, mental conclusion suffices

the

is

of the

object

object of science

Because of

In

assent.

the

as

assent

for

itself,

assenting

means

(Gal p.86,49; p.87,57; p.88,59; p.89,61; p.90,64).

Ibid, a.2

(Gal p.99, n.102).

30

Lectura

d.l,

39

40 41

Lectura

s.

a.l (f.!32rb). See Ockham, Scriptum Phys. Prol. (O.P. IV, p.6,46-48).

d.l, q.l, a.2

Ibid, q.l a.2

See

q.2,

and Exp.

p.87,20-88,2)

Prol.,

q.2,

a.2

(O.T.

I,

(Gal p.99,105); q.2 (f.!32rb).

(Gal p.99,104; p.100,106 and 108).

W.Eckermann,

L.D.Davis,

I

"Knowledge

O.S.A.,

Wort und Wirklichkeit, Wurzburg 1978, pp.45-105, and to Gregory of Rimini", The New Scholasticism, 55

according

(1981), pp.331-347.

Gregorii

Ariminensis,

Lectura

p.7,17-23; p.10,26-28); d.2, q.l (ed.

Prol.

Trapp,

I,

q.l,

a.l

(ed.

p.282,17-19).

Trapp,

I,

p.4,11-13;

p.5,17ff.;

188

Grassi

judging things as they really are,

which

i.e.

mentaliter quod sic

"enuntiare

est",

43

the essential

component of a real scientific act. Obviously the name conclusio would involve its very being inferred, yet Gregory does not consider the whole demonstration necessary before having scientific is

knowledge and

Ockham, long as

from

44

we do

truth

not have

the

process

a

Ockham

is

45

s

reasoning,

science per demonstrationem there it

we do

"knows"

know

is

what distinguishes order

in

another way to attain asserts

as

well .

facts: this

the

truth:

scientific

a science per experientiam

is

scire

know

to

that

not merely acquire a knowledge of empirical

a certain event can

remains as

it

from evidence and through a

Wodeham

absolutely non-scientific knowledge,

Wodeham and

and such

itself

necessary

process

conclusion as well. Yet there following

in

demonstrated. This

it

-

according to

contrary,

dubitabilis

is

only the former

intelligere:

demonstrative

On

assent.

scientific

a

as

Through would be

we

lacking necessity; by experience (e.g. the eclipses of the

moon, fire s happen Such knowledge we would never attain through a demonstrative process. We do not reach a categorical judgment, but 46

power of

heating).

hypothetical one:

be possible

moon is moon to be

the

//

for the

eclipsed, the

character of necessity dwell here in possible,

and

In this case

is

it

we

moon

can eclipse or

44

Ibid. (ed.

absolutely not impossible, that

reach a knowledge of

Trapp,

I,

Ockham, Scriptum

a.2

must the

"it

"the

moon

moon

the

being

is

eclipsed

eclipsable",

meaning of a proposition describing things the way they the way they can be or must be possible. 43

it

The scientific approach and the modus of the sentence:

eclipsed.

i.e.

is ".

the

are, or rather,

p.27,9-23; p.28,4ff.; p.30, 15-21). I

Prol., q.2, a.2

(f.!34vb; f.!35ra). Ibid., q.2, a.l Hie sciendi cadat immediate super

(O.T.

I

(f.!33va): sic

esse,

p.76,13-16). "...

sed

anima

Wodeham, Lectura

I,

d.l, q.2,

non quod actus super demonstrationem quae cadit scit

sic

super sic esse...". 45 See Ockham, Scriptum I Prol., q.2, a.2 (O.T. I p.88,9-12). mediante conclusione eadem, est scibilis q.2, a.3 (f.!37ra): significat, tarn a priori quam a posteriori, demonstrative et per "...

csse,

Wodeham, sic

esse

Lectura, d.l, conclusio

sicut

experientiam".

See

ibid.

q.2, a.l (f.!33vb).

Ibid. "Ad (f.!34ra): primum dico quod licet non habeatur iudicium evidens categoricum quod luna eclipsatur, habetur tamen evidens iudicium hypotheticum, scilicet quod ita est, nisi Deus decipiat me; et ex hac statim est evidens quod ita esse est possibile et non impossibile, et per hoc ad illud unumquodque etc. concede. Et sic est licet nulla propositio mere de hie hypothetice, licet non categorice"; (f.!34rb): praesenti esset vera ubi affirmatur aliquid de igne, tamen affirmativa de possibili est vera, tune sicut nunc". "...

Tfie Object

What comes

out here

is

189

of Scientific Knowledge that scientific truth

is

always the same in

nature, even though the ways through which it can be reached differ, because it corresponds to the content or meaning of the proposition in demonstrative and in experimental science. Thus we have a new its

confirmation semantics,

of

which

that

close

represents

relationship

one

of

the

philosophical debate during the 14th century.

Milano

between

most

epistemology

peculiar

features

and of

ELZBIETA JUNG-PALCZEWSKA

Discussion on infinilas vigoris Dei in Avcrroists in the 13th

Maicr

and 14th Centuries

Metaphysische Hintcrgriindc der spatscholastischen 1 Naturphilosophie, talking about the history of the problem of motion

Anncliese

shows

in

the

that

scholastic

conception,

modern mechanics, which the conclusions which came

radically

conception of

is

arrived

to

after

at

many 2

In

energy.

centuries with

different

from

based on the law of

the

inertia,

consciousness only

scientific

discovery of the law of conservation of

the

her considerations Maier does not give

much

attention

to

Averroism; she says that it does not give any impulse to development of scholastic physics. This enunciation is based on the knowledge of the questions on Physics by John of Jandun and some parts of the question

Utnim

esscntia divina

sit infinite!

intensive by

Thomas

Wilton.

3

Using Averroistic manuscripts that have been recently discovered, namely the question by John of Jandun De infinitale vigoris Dei and the 5 whole question by Thomas Wilton, we make an attempt to answer the problem; whether Averroism really did not contribute anything new to the

problem of motion

The

starting point

the Middle of

in scholastic physics.

Physics,

of consideration of the philosophy of nature in

are the laws of motion formulated in the seventh

Ages where

shows

Aristotle

the

book

between

interdependence

vis

in movcns, resistance, way and time. He does not use the term of on the in end the the which this book, eighth book, appears only occasion of solution of the problem if any power can be active in infinite "velocity"

time.

Cf.

Aristotle

answers

A.

"Bewegungskrafte

Maier,

this

spatscholastischen Naturphilosophie, 2

question

und

Roma

in

three ways:

Encrgicn",

in:

he says that

first

Metaphysische Hintergrunde der

1966, p.227-269.

Ibidem.

3

Ibidem, p.247-248. *

This

question

wistyczne, 24,

This

ms

1,

was

discovered

and

published

by

Z.

Kuksewicz

in:

Studio

Medie-

1985, p.77-152.

question is Vat. Lat. Borgh. 36,

known ff.

from two manuscripts: 47ra-55va; Firenze Bibl. Nation.

Thomas II, II

281.

Wilton

Quodlibeta

(q.l)

Discussion on infinitas vigoris Dei

no

191

in Averroisls

something potentially infinite and the case of substances not even the latter, because the world is finite.

there in

is

in

infinitiim

aclu, but only

Secondly: movens finitum can not

motion

move tcmpore

i.e.

infinite,

the infinite

time presupposes intensively infinite power. Thirdly: primus movens, which causes eternal motion, can not be in magnitudine, but it

must

in

be

because

immaterial,

substance

can

not

According to Maier, Aristotle can not prove the 6 used a new concept, which was later called energy.

Even Aristotle

s

thought.

some

had

Averroes

He

last

with

problems

take

infinite

power.

theorem because he

the

of

interpretation

gives three acceptable solutions of the problem,

why power of motion, which has immaterial nature, can move per tempus infmilum, but can not move with infinite velocity. The infinite

namely:

first

the

problem can be found in Averroes Commentary on where he Physics says that Aristotle wanted to prove only the solution of this

immateriality of is

primum movens, because power which

is

not in substance

not finite or infinite, and that he did not want to prove the infinity

of primum

movens?

The second

solution can be found in the Commentary on the where Averroes introduced two different terms for active Metaphysics the reason of eternal motion, and motor agents: infinite motor separatus

coniunctus

The

-

the cause of finite velocity of motion.

third interpretation

is

contained in

8

De

substantia orbis, and

it

proves only the temporal infinity of the power of 9 movens. primum In medieval philosophy the problem touched by Averroes is presented in other way. The question does not concern the acceptation or rejection states

that Aristotle

of the infinite

power of God, because

whether

question

is:

power by

rational means.

This works.

is

the

The

Averroism

-

it

solution

Phys.

cit.

presented

s

p.229.

Vlllcomm. 78-79.

Metaph. XII comm. 41.

De substantia

a

dogma

possible to prove that

Siger of Brabant,

Cf.A. Maicrop.

7

is

orbis, cap. 3.

last

is

by

known

the

of Faith.

God

problem which Latin Averroisls

Liber de causis, Siger 6

is

it

first

Now

the

possesses infinite

to

try

solve

in

their

representative

of

only from a short question from

work. Unfortunately, Siger

s

commentary

to

192

Jung-Palczewska

book of Physics and the Commentary to the twelfth book of not know any 13th century works Metaphysics are unknown. We also do the eighth

by other Averroists which touch this problem. 10 In his question Utnim causa prima sit infmiti vigoris in movendo Averroes and some arguments by Siger shows three interpretations by

Thomas

power of God. infinite et

who

of Aquinas,

power:

11

esscndum semper,

"ad

movendo inquantum

in

in

God

est".

And

infinite

has a triple

causando

virtus infinita perfecta in 12

se

the

proves

conclusion Siger states that

the

In

misinterpreting Aristotle

since the primus

motor can 13

take only infinite temporal power, prima causa has power like that. The broad discussion of the problem of infinite power of

can be found only

Averroists

in

the

14th

14

God by

This problem

century.

is

with by John of Jandun in his questions on the Physics and the

dealt

Metaphysics and at

relating,

in

a

the

question the

length,

great

Thomas

Averroist

power

the

in

Wilton,

who

infmitate

vigoris

arguments by

his

similarly discussed the

question:

separate

DC

Utrurn

cssenlia

where he

Dei,

older

colleague

is -

problem of

infinite

divina

infinita

sit

intensive.^

Both John of Jandun and Thomas Wilton arguments of advocates and

in

their

works report on

infinite opponents of the thesis about the

10 Libntm dc causis, q. 56 Siger from Brabant, Quaestiones super divina sit infinita intensive), in: Philosophcs Mcdifcaux, T.XII, Ixiuvain, 1972. 1 1

12 13

14

Maicr op.

Cf. A.

cit.

cit.

Ibidem. of have not any information about the possible questions on infinite power Averroists like Boethius from Dacia, Taddeo from Parma, Anthony from Parma. even do not know if the Commentaries on the eighth book of Physics and on the

We

God by

We

twelfth

^ The

csscntia

p.236-237.

Siger from Brabant op.

Cf.

(Utrum

book of Metaphysics were written by them.

This title:

a schema of the question by Thomas Wilton: Utrum esscntia divina sit infinita intensive.

is

Ratio principalis: Ex partc distinctions essentiac divinae.

Corpus quacstionis. Argument: Contra improbans (analysis of the problem) 1. Contrary arguments to Wilton 2. Response on these arguments. 3. Proper Wilton s solution. 4.Adrationemprincipalem: 5. Dubia. 6. Answers on dubia.

s position.

Ad primam

rationem principalem respondeo

Discussion on infinitas vigoris Dei

16 power of God. They discuss the problem of the themselves on the authority of Aristotle and Averroes.

of

First

Averroes -

gives careful

solutions, namely the one from the

God

that

John of Jandun

all,

has neither

nor

finite

Commentary on the Metaphysics 18 of two motors. In his actual point

infinite

193

in Averroists

infinite

power basing

consideration to two of

Commentary on

power

17

the Physics

and the one from the

which Averroes assumes the existence

in

John of Jandun assumes

that

God

has infinite

temporal power, because time has no limits and neither Aristotle nor Averroes said that God has virtus infmita intensive. 19

The

Thomas Wilton

question by

quodlibetal

and

analysis of opinions of Aristotle,

and

same time

the

at

Wilton

thinks

De

discusses

all

penetratingly

three

Commentary on

following order: the

Metaphysics,

it

Averroes

that

of

first

includes

a

profound

of his Commentator,

other

interpretations the Physics, the

are

interpretations. in

given

Commentary on

the the

and that each of them had to correct

subslantia orbis

the preceding one, and that the last one properly interpreted the world

of Aristotle. 20 In Wilton

opinion the

s

interpretation of Averroes

first

i.e.

the one

from the Commentary on the Physics omits and does not resolve the Aristotle, because of two reasons: Firstly, Aristotle

problem posed by was proving that a

virtus

moving

that such a virtus can not

be

the location of the infinite

power

it

moved

in

infinite

time

is

infinite

itself,

and

magnitudine. Secondly, irrespectively of

in

in

magnitudine or extra magnitudinem,

the heavens in an infinitely short time, but time as a measure

can not be zero.

John

Cf.

essentia divina

17 18

of sit

De

Jandun,

infinitate

vigoris

Dei

and

Thomas

Wilton,

Utrum

infmita intensive.

John of Jandun op.

cit.

Ibidem.

19 "Et

idco

minorum infinitus

concederet

1,

magnitudine meveret locis,

quam

modis.

tribus scripsit

Borgh. 36,

f.

est

48va.

vigor

(scil.

Dcus)

sit

infinitus

per

negationem

ter-

ita

1985, p. 151.

cum

aliud

eius

numquam incipit nee numquam tcrminatur. Sed quod sit quod omncm alium vigorem improportionaliter excedat non nee Commentator." John of Jandun, De infinitate... in: Studia

quia

Aristoteles

Medievistyczne, 24, "Ad

quod

dico,

durationis, intensivae

quod Philosophus dicit quod si ilia virtus esset in non tempore - ad istam rationem respondet Commentator tribus

dicitur, in

Duo

primi

sufficiens."

sunt

Thomas

insufficientcs

Wilton,

ut

Utrum

videbitur, sed ultima responsio essentia divina... ms Vat. Lat.

194

Jung-Palczcwska

For

separate motors is assumed there ihcprimum mobile directly or not? If

with

we

velocity,

coniunctus takes

we

if

the

once

on

the

existence

of

two

the

accept

whether they move

must occur

it

the

latter,

a

in

a

moment

question

i.e.

motor

if

primum movens can be

or infinite motion from

finite

Commentary

arises a question:

accept the former solution,

infinite

in

provided insufficient, because

also

is

Metaphysics

answer

the

Wilton,

asked.

Moreover, when Averroes virtus from primum movens, he

motor coniunctus takes some

states that is

in

contradiction with himself, because

substances separated from matter are pure acts and have no receptive

Wilton proves that substantia prima potency. Moreover, quoting Averroes, acts as aim and causa cfficicns, and because of this it moves as what acts.

Averroes Aristotle

that

movens?-

1

proposal from

last

intended

Wilton

show

only to this

proves

DC

would move

fmita and

in

temporal

infinity

of

primum

that

by showing substance, because in firstly

it

is

case

this

non-time (according to Aristotle s statement) or a virtus would be able to move a body for the same

in

a virtus infmita

because

time,

the

statement

impossible for temporal infinity to be it

substantia orbis correctly assumes

time, which

is

paries

finite

virtutis

the measure of

could

be added to

virtus

and

fmita

motion, would be equal with the time of

its

infinite power action, which is possible in respect of the ratio of time. is Next, Wilton unfortunately not giving any satisfactory proofs, the Commentary on De caelo and referring to De substantia orbis and to

asserts that there i.e.

of God,

comprehended

infinity of the

actionis

et

a difference

is

between the

infinity

of the

first

as infmitum actionis et passionis in se

cause

and the

motors moving the heavens, comprehended as infmitae

passionis

in

tempore;

but fmitas

in

se

in

velocitate

et

in

vigore.

Wilton

s

final

conclusion,

taken

as

true,

is

the

following:

neither

the Philosopher nor the Commentator, nor any rational reasons allow to

prove that

God

is

in vigore. infinitive virtutis intensive

Commentator circa illud sciendum, "Dico igitur tertiam responsionem quam ponit intendit ostendere, quod virtus infinita quod Aristoteles per primam dcmonstrationem duratione quae non potest esse in corpore requiritur ad motum perpetuum, nee etiam de "

alia infinitate

loquitur."

Thomas

Wilton, op.

cit. f.

50vb.

Discussion on infinitas vigoris Dei

in

A verroists

195

Summarizing, it should be stated that Averroist considerations took Averroes theses as the most important authority, widely quoting and discussing his three versions of the solution of Aristotle on problem.

The

God

third thesis that

has only infinite temporal power seemed

most interesting and best proved

the

contradiction with Aquinas

them. This statement was in

for

position which, at that time,

was

obligatory.

Referring to the misunderstood Aristotelian supposition he was arguing for God to have infinite intensive power. In

the

opinion

and

Averroists

of

Peter

particularly

Aureoli,

Averroes

penetratingly discussed

taken

by by Wilton does not position

problem completely, because such a distinguishing of the

solve the

first

cause as infinitely permanent does not characterize

it. Wilton stopped in midway, although he aptly proved that Aristotle wanted to show nothing more than that the first cause is immaterial and that the cause of

infinite

motion

is

virtus incomiplibilis et infaligabilis.

Coming back the

development surrounded by

to our basic

of medieval

"their"

22

problem about the role of Averroism in mechanics it should be said that being

problems and basing themselves very strongly on

the authority of Averroes, they, unfortunately do not develop the problem

of the motion.

The of

thesis about the infinite

of

interests

power of God

who

philosophers

take

into

is

also within the sphere

their

considerations

the

improvement of the thesis, and come into similar conclusions. Francis from Marchia, William Ockham, Walter Burley and possibility

of

John Buridan also realized infinity

in their considerations

specifying to

that

of the

is

God

"vis"

definition

of

A. Maier, Metaphysische...

Ibidem, p. 269.

s

to

prove

power. What

vis

infatigabilis is

is

only

the

important

et fatigabilis

p. 248.

which leads

not possible because of the

within the sphere of earthly events. 23

Lodz

Cf.

wanted

the appearance, by the way, of the problem of

the conclusion that pcrpeiuum mobile

lack of that

23

Aristotle

of time but not the intensity of

HEIKKI KIRJAVAINEN

Existential Presuppositions in Semantics

According to

1.

One

Introduction

of the

Ockham and Holcot

main disputes between Ockham and Holcot

According to Ockham we may Holcot criticizes this of nonexistent things. 1

concerns the idea of intuitive knowledge.

have

intuitive

knowledge

view although he

first

takes sides,

to

certain

a

extent,

with

Ockham

s

conception of theology by saying that the blessed can have theological knowledge through divine causation, although not in the natural way, 3

But then he continues by arguing that being a wayfarer and a blessed one are compatible notions and, therefore, we can in fact have intuitive theological knowledge within the natural through secondary causes.

viz.

order.

The

texts of the dispute are

the

first

book of Ockham

of Sentences

(Sent. Prol., q. 1); Quodlibeta septem V, on that in his quodlibctal disputation

comments

Quodlibct Question of Robert Holcot O.P, Ed.

The

(1958).

theological intuitive "...ita

actuali

knowledge.

theological

non

est

J.

background of the dispute

general

Ockham

maintains

that

s

5

Ordinatio on the

and VI,

first

book

and Holcot

6

q.

s

Utrum Theologia sit scientia. A T. Muckle C.S.B, Medical Studies XX is

the

there

question

is

in

of the

principle

a

quod Deus causet visionem sui But according to Ockham, there is no

in

intellectu

factual

of

possibility

for

possibility

knowledge by divine power (potentia absoluta). Quodlibeta VI,

possibile

praesentia."

q.

nisi

exhibita

q.

6:

sua

occasion for this kind

knowledge within the natural order (potentia ordinata). Accordingly, divine matters are accepted by faith alone.

of intuitive

Cf.

conclusio est quod naturaliter cognitio intuitiva non potcst causari nee naturaliter notitia non existente." Liber I, Prologus, q. I p. 38: notitiae inpossit esse sine existentia rei, quae est vere causa efficiens

"Secunda

conservari, intuitiva

obiecto

non

"...

mediata vel immediata, sicut alias dicetur." p. 30: "Dico igitur quantum ad istum articulum quod respectu incomplexi potest esse duplex notitia, quarum una potest vocari modum: quia notitia intuitiva. ... Sed et alia abstractiva per istum distinguuntur intuitiva rei est talis notitia virtute cuius potest sciri utrum res sit vel non, ita quod si res sit, statim intellectus iudicat earn esse et evidenter cognoscit earn esse, nisi forte impediatur propter imperfectionem illius notitiae. Et eodem modo si esset perfecta talis tuitivae

notitia per potentiam divinam conservata de incomplexae evidenter cognosceret illam rem non

3

re

non

existente,

virtute

illius

notitiae

esse."

Utrum theologia sit scientia: "Quod tamen omnes (articuli) sint scibiles secundo per notitiam, videlicet intuitivam, aliquarum rerum credo esse verum." ... "Nulla notitia quam viator potest naturaliter adquirere de articulis fidei est scientia secundo Cf.

modo modo

vel tertio

dicta."

(My

italics)

Existential Presuppositions in Semantics

Holcot the

s

main

criticism against

same which was

earlier expressed

that

viz.

Fontaines,

Ockham

has usually been taken to be

by Duns Scotus and by Godfrey of speak of knowing

to

inconsistent

is

it

197

nonexistent things so that the intuitive cognition

the

is

"total"

intuitively

cause of

our judgement concerning some contingent things and that we can, at the time, maintain that there are no such things within the natural

same

order.

4

This

is

Holcot

criticism; rather,

most interesting point in Holcot s interested in an even more fundamental point:

however,

not,

is

the

he wants to show what are the ultimate semantic consequences speak about intuitively knowing nonexistent things.

My

purpose

in the following will

Ockham and Holcot

if

we

be to consider the dispute between

wider perspective than perhaps is usual, and ask: what bearings does the dispute have on semantics in general in a slightly

and on religious language in particular? My presentation is nothing more than a sketch for an argument which attempts to show how far the difference might go between Holcot and Ockham when their epistemological solutions are put into the context of semantics.

introduce

the

illustrate

Holcot

2.

Ockham on

be taken

do not

one

this

we adopt

that

view and

his

then

The criticism against Ockham may way. The trivial way implies that we Truth Criterion of

the line of argument that

it

is

this

epistemic

inconsistent to

when non-p is the case. The nontrivial emerges when we realize that Ockham did not want to knows

that

p

metalogical Criterion, and further, that he did not want to criterion

apply this

shall first try to

it.

epistemic contradiction

that

viz.

interpretation

knows

comments on

in a trivial or a nontrivial

that

violate

s

directly violate the metalogical

attitude,

say

problems Ockham has with

crucial

I

a

in

something

merely negative way by saying that

not the case then

is

it

is

not. Therefore,

if

one

we meet

here a real noncircular problem, viz. the question: in what sense does Ockham claim that we can have intuitive cognition of nonexistent beings? Ockham s claims referred to in footnote 2 lead one to question what is

and

consistent

means

cognition. This

Cf.

divinam

what

p.

31:

"Et

de

re

cognosceret

illam

disputation; see the

"contra"

eodem modo non

rem non

contradictory

we have

that

conservata

Prologus,

is

existente,

esse."

Holcot

si

to

the

context

of

intuitive

explore the metalogical criteria

esset

virtute

in

perfecta illius

comments on

part of his second conclusion.

talis

notitiae this

at

notitia per potentiam incomplexae evidenter the beginning of his

198

Kirjavainen

Ockham wants idea

to apply in the context of intuitive knowledge.

by Ockham

aptly illustrated

is

main argument

in his quodlibetal

The

basic

himself in the answer he gives to the

question VI:

contradiction that an act of seeing should exist while that seen neither exists nor can exist in reality. Hence it is a contradiction that a chimera should be intuitively seen. But it is no contradiction that what is seen should be nothing actually existing outside its cause, provided only that it can exist in reality or has 5 once been in the universe. (Boehner s translation) a

is

It

which

is

merely concerns, however, the well-known distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge; we may have the latter kind of knowledge of things which are not actually present provided only that

This

answer

they

are

logically

possible

God

concerns whether even

The

beings.

can produce

crucial

in us

therefore,

question,

such an

intuitive

knowledge

where the object is nonexistent. Ockham s way of expressing himself seems to be somewhat obscure on this point. In one place he says that the

as

God,

Prime

Cause,

can

knowledge of a nonexistent thing. is

immediately 6

On

in

produce

us

intuitive

the other hand, he says that this

not possible in the sense of evident intuitive knowledge, because this

would imply a contradiction: I ... say that God cannot cause in us such a cognition through which a thing appears to be present to us when it is absent because this 7 implies a contradiction.

dilemma one could suggest

In order to explain this

qualify the

metalogical criterion for intuitive cognition.

one which implies the

Then he

actual reality of the cognition

it

spite

non

est

latter

view

nee

esse

possit.

itself,

applies

it

so that

it

only implies the

with or without the existence of the

a thing

and

in

judge whether

ct quod illud quod videtur non sit in vidcatur intuitive. Sed quod chimaera quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra suam causam, aliquando fuit in rerum natura." Quodl. VI, q. 6.

quod

est,

Ideo

visio

contradictio

contradictio, quod illud possit esse in effectu, vel

dummodo

tries to

is

quod contradictio

"Dico

effectu

qualifies

presented by Ockham as follows: is not a contradiction that we have a vision of of that we do not, on the basis of that vision,

The

...

Ockham He first

logical connection with the actual reality of the

object (Truth Criterion).

object.

that

sit

est,

6

Cf. Quodlibet, q. VI: "...omnem effectum quern potest Deus mediante causa secunda, mediante obiecto; potest immediate per se; sed in notitiam intuitivam corporalem potest igitur potest in earn immediate per se."

dico quod Deus non potest causare in nobis Quodlibet V, 5, (ad instantiam 1): est cognitionem talem per quam evidenter apparet nobis rem esse praesentem quando absens, quia hoc includit contradictionem." "...

Existential Presuppositions in Semantics

199

this thing exists or not. This is because God can make without any assent to it; but naturally this cannot happen.

This, however,

seems

and

intuitive cognition is

exist

.

On

meanings of

the one hand, according to

Ockham,

it

clearly inconsistent to speak of intuitive cognition without presupposing

the

of the Truth Criterion with existence; on the other hand,

validity

Ockham would follows

there

also take into account the case

where

in the existential sense but

satisfied "it

to lead into ambiguities concerning the

this vision

the

(from

nonexistent

previous

as

sensitive

is

10

well

not

this criterion is

he, nevertheless, claims that

clarifications)

as

where

intellectual

that

is

it

intuitive

possible

knowledge

that

of

a

This case has to be checked against the following

thing".

quotation which crystallizes

Ockham

s

problem:

admit, however, that God can cause an assent of the same species as is the evidential assent which we get in respect to the contingent sentence this whiteness exists when that whiteness does not exist,

I

but

this assent is

italics)

Ockham wants

Apparently,

similar to the case

What

not evident.(My

to say that the assent produced by God is where the Truth Criterion does not include existence.

troubles us here

is

that according to

Ockham

of the following

all

statements seem to be claimed as simultaneously true: (a)

a has intuitive vision of a star which does not Divine Power

(b)

a knows that this star does not exist / Assumption in Prologus q. I if

(c)

exist /

by

the star does not exist then it is impossible for a to intuitive vision of it / Principle in Quodlibet V,

have an

Ibid

instantiam

(ad

3):

"...

,quia

non

est

contradictio

quod

visio

rei

sit

et

tamen

visionem nee iudicem rem esse nee non esse, quia Deus potest facere visionem sine omni tali assensu; sed per naturam non potest hoc fieri." Cf. Prologus, q. I: "omnis res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta, potest per divinam potentiam absolutam existere sine ilia, quia non videtur verisimile quod si Deus vult destruere unam rem absolutam existentem in caelo quod necessitetur destruere unam aliam rem existentem in terra. Sed visio intuitiva, tarn sensitiva quam intellectiva, est res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab obiecto."

quod per

illam

n E.g.

when we

see something ceasing to be

not exist any more. Cf. Prol. q. termination of a thing. 10

Prol. q.

I,

(Corollarium)

s.

I,

s.

36:

6-12,

we

intuitively

know

where Ockham has

that in

the thing does precisely the

mind

38: 15.

Cf. Quodl. V, 5 (ad inst. 4): "Concede tamen quod Deus potest facere assensum eiusdem speciei cum illo assensu evident! respectu huius contingentis haec albedo est quando albedo non est; sed ille assensus non est evidens, ..."

200

Kirjavainen

One

gains the impression that of existence as such which causes

semantic implications of

is

it

not only the tacit presupposition but also the very basic

difficulties

this presupposition.

The formal explication On behalf of what was said above, Ockham seems in the first place to support the following eccentric situation:

3.

K a b&~(Ex)(x

(1)

12

=

b)

But as we have seen, he not only says that we may know something which does not exist, but that if we have a cognition of the being b

which does not

then

exist,

we know

K a b&Ka ~(Ex)(x

(2)

One

it

does not,

refers to there

i.e.

= b).

a interpretation of (2) says that

V

whoever

that

is

knows b and

also

knows

no such being. This interpretation

is

that

due

to

the de dicto reading of the latter part of the formula. This clearly seems to imply an inconsistency: it is not possible, i.e. it is a contradiction, knows something and that whoever or whatever that being that is

somebody is no such being which

there

that

K a ~(Ex)(x

from

=

b)

it

supposed to be known. This means follows on the basis of the Truth Criterion is

= b) is the case, and this of course is in contradiction with ~(Ex)(x = which seems to be implied by knowing b intuitively. b) (Ex)(x

that

,

Consequently, (1) seems to be inconsistent.

But what not

follow

~(Ex)(x

==

is

from b)

.

J^b Is,

depends on whether is

by

really implied

alone

then,

Ka b

that

Ka b

?

It

can be shown that

knowing b

is

consistent after all?

(1)

Whether

Ex )( x = b ) or not (

implies

taken with this existential presupposition or not.

it

does

compatible with

not

l

-

c

-

it

is

or not

whcthcr

>

And whether

Ka b it

way depends on what we mean by knowing somebody to be very careful with something intuitively. Consequently, we have to this in a moment. return I shall tacit implied here.

taken

this

presuppositions If instead of (2) (2

)

we have de re

Ka b&~(Ex)Ka (x

reading

we

is

or

the

get

= b).

This formula says that a knows b, but of no actual being does a know is that it is b, i.e. a does not know who b actually is. In one sense (2 ) 12 for

The expression K^b might seem "knowledge

by

acquaintance".

ill-formed, but

we can

think of

it

as a convention

Existential Presuppositions in Semantics

not

inconsistent,

we can

because

someone but could not things

known

formula quite

it

actually

to us. This

sensible:

a

known

actually

only of the sort:

4.

Ockham on

"I

a

~(Ex)(x = b)

is

no b

in

but

who

is

b

At

first

Does

(3)

What

(3)

Ka

"something"

it

is

valid; this is intuitively

it,

if

),

there

only no

is is

any,

is

1

anyway?"

then ask

how

did

Ockham

in addition to truth, also

presuppose might seem to be taken in

sight the criterion

closer inspection, this

is

clearly not the case. In

in the sense of

intuitive

semantic metatheory,

cognition not in the

modal

form of material implication =

br>(Ex)(x

says

latter part of the

an absolute sense; there

We may

order to express the Truth Criterion we have to say that it determines in the

existent

but cannot know who b actually is, known acquaintances is b. But from this it

the Truth Criterion

modal way. 14 But on

form but

is

So the inconsistency of (2

to a.

know b,

conceive of this Criterion. existence, or not?

among

person

we know

the

might know b his actually

does not follow that there b

that

say

sensibly

that

possible because from the

is

does not follow that

because none of

quite

find

201

is

that

if

b).

somebody

intuitively

actually exists. Apparently (1)

knows something then

and

this

(3) are contradictory, but

not so clear what exactly are the other implications of (3).

The

standard theory of epistemic logic (2) cannot be true if K b implies the a = It can also be shown that although the Condition (C.EK ), i.e. if = = then is the e pi, valid, fi, (Ex)K a (x b) b) (Ex)(x corresponding negative condition (C.~EK = ) is not. Cf. J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1962, p. 160. Adam Wodeham also criticizes Ockham and follows Walter Chatton at this point when he says that while the intuitive cognition together with the existing object suffice to produce a judgement of existence, intuitive cognition cannot in the same way produce a judge ment of nonexistence. Cf. Quaestiones in I librum Sententiariim, Prologus, q. II, sec. In

the

actual existence of b.

24 (according to Marilyn McCord Adams, William Press, Notre Dame, Indiana 1987, Vol. II p. 602).

The passage Quodl.

~M(Ka b &

VI,

6

(quoted

in

the

Ockham, University of Notre Dame

note 5)

gives

a

de dicto

reading (*)

~(Ex)(x = b)). But from the de dicto reading of the passage - and Ockham is well aware of this - the formula (**) Ka b 3 N(Ex)(x = b) or (***) K fl b D (Ex)N(x = b) does not logically follow. These two are variations of the de re reading of the modal form of the Truth Criterion. (**) says that if somebody knows b, then it is necessary that b actually exists. But it is not necessary because one can perfectly well speak of knowing a real being which is not actual. The existence of b is a necessary rather than a contingent matter and we can speak of knowing contingent things which are not actual at a certain moment of time. (***), instead, says that something real necessarily is b. But again, something being b is not a necessary but a contingent matter.

202

Kirjavaincn

only

b)

a

there

if

can

plausible: we can move from K a b to (Ex)(x an actual individual of which a knows that it is

seems

following, at least,

is

This

identify b.

say that

to

we have

=

b,

to

presuppose that = is fulfilled because this in K a b is not that 7? (Ex)K a (x b) guarantees In other words: a has to know precisely who or what empty. actually is. We can namely quantify existentially in epistemic contexts only if it is i.e.

is

V

about.

15

The

formula is

presupposition the term

we can somehow

that

presupposed

the

that

precisely

we

are

it

does not say = (x

speaking

quantificational

that in the context of intuitive

viz.

fulfilled,

not empty. But

is

/?

says

(3)

entities

identify

knowledge

we words, we

knowing only

that,

b,

can identify any actual being as (Ex)K a b) says. In other may have a kind of intuitive knowledge where we are acquainted with a actual being without being able

real

from not being able to properly know whether it

identify

it

to

it

identify

properly,

exists or not either.

it

This

And, then,

properly.

follows

to say that

is

have a kind of semantically loose knowledge which

we cannot we may

that

the general

satisfies

existential presupposition, but not the personal identity condition.

We may

conclude that the fulfilment of existential presupposition follows from the condition (Ex)K a (x = b) i.e. from the condition that we

Kab

can identify 7/. This condition, therefore, implies both b)

converse

Holcotian

Ockham by

crucial

implication

holds.

approach, could assert

as

sense of (2 a

the

However,

.

condition

the

like

Criterion of Truth

as

this

to

cognition

(Ex)K a (x

behind Holcot

is

is

It

well

remains,

question

the

of

namely,

to

is

:

b)

.

Speculum puerorum nonexistent

criticism.

s

We Since

shall

see

See Jaakko Hintikka, Vol.

Tokyo

1987,

lid.

8,

285;

p.

Synthese 60 (1984),

p.

beings 7?

is

that

Ockham does

the

tradition.

only

and

much

16

the

in

not specified precisely

this

say that the

be taken with the existential presupposition

the case of intuitive knowledge, but does not say

Profiles,

(Ex)(x

which brings us to the

the sense that the individual term

in

i.e.

),

condition

question

and

whether

in

of that sort in

Jaakko Hintikka. Synthcse Library, Dordrecht/Boston/I^ncaster/ there nonexistent objects? Why not? But where are they?"

"Replies

R.J.

Bogdan,

"Are

Comments"

Reidel

Publ.

in

Comp.,

45M58.

The discussion concerning the relationship between epistemic and semantic condi became quite explicit shortly after Holcot s time. Martin of Alnwick, Richard Billingham and Edward Upton became famous by their tracts on the "probationes

tions

terminorum".

Cf.

L.M. de define

Sonic 14th Century Tracts on the

relations, viz. in

PROBATIONES TERMINORUM.

Ed.

Nijmcgcn Ingcnium Publishers 1982. These authors tried to would govern semantic tics in different sorts of semantic "rcsolubilia", "exponibilia" and "officiabilia".

Rijk, Artistarium the rules which

3,

Existential Presuppositions in Semantics

where the cognition of a nonexistent thing

case

the

203

clearly rejects (2) but not perhaps (2

we do

if

Furthermore,

at

is

he

stake,

).

not

the

realize

import of existential and

specifiability presuppositions for the logic of intuitive

knowledge, then

it

very problematic indeed to consider (1), (2) and (3) as compatible with each other. And if they are incompatible, then Ockham seems to be is

forced to end up with a choice between two alternatives: either he has to accept the ambiguity of knowing or he has to accept the equivocity of

term

the

exist

would now

I

.

explore these alternatives a

to

like

little

further.

5.

Hie univocity of

however,

two

exist

Ockham

reveal

fully

types

of

concerning

the

and knowing

involved:

of

existence

do

)

as

are,

existential

and

b\

and (2

(2)

There

basic difficulty.

s

presuppositions actual

Formulae

not,

see

I

it,

presuppositions

semantic

presuppositions

b\ Consequently, we get the following alternatives for reformulations of (2) and (2 ): concerning the identifiability of

Ex (2

)

Ka b &

(Ex)(x

&

(Ex)(x

Ex (2

)

iy>

Eb (2

)

Ka b &

(Ey)(y

&

(Ey)(y

Eb (2 If (2

see

Ex )

is

knowing

b)

& ~ (Ex)Ka (x & Ka ~(Ex)(x & ~ (Ex)Ka (x

= b)

and

Ockham

If

is

it

epistemically

Ockham

limits

is

s

b)

= b) = b)

,

,

,

.

thought, then

it

easy to

is

become ambiguous and Ockham

exist

is

that

which

=

b)

=

inconsistent simpliciter.

formulation, then to

=

b)

& K a ~(Ex)(x

which sense the formula

is

position to say in

=

b)

the correct explication of

both

that

suggest

K,b

)

=

Ex (2

)

is

the case, then

inconsistent,

inconsistent.

If

though Eb (2

I

hard

would

like to

the

correct

is

)

is

it

s

proposing that one always knows according

something

knowable

is

i.e.

intuitive

knowledge

is

Eb

17

restricted by the semantics of absolute terms. In this sense (2 ) can be said to be restrictedly inconsistent. If, lastly, (2 Eb ) is the case, then Ockham is not speaking epistemically inconsistently (though he may be

speaking ambiguously) because only the condition of the identifiability of the object of intuitive cognition is not fulfilled.

Which one of

Ockham

s

thought?

See the footnote

21.

these cases

We

can,

is

the

most plausible interpretation of

according

to

Ockham,

talk

sensibly

of

204

Kirjavaincn

making knowledge claims in the form of categorical K a 6(b) are the objects of predications. These predications of the form intuitive intuitive knowledge the existence of the knowledge. By individuals only by

which

individuals

about

are

claims

the

is

because the individuals compose the domain of in

categorical sentences. Therefore,

presupposed,

semantically all

references of the terms

Ockham seems

to

accept Existential

Importation when he thinks that intuitive cognition implies the following formula:

0(b)D(Ex)e(x)

(4)

The

existence

of the

individuals

met

intuitive

in

knowledge is always what it needs

semantically presupposed, as seen from formula (4), because for

its

-

validity

exists,

i.e.

(5) is

-

precisely that

is

presupposes

(Ex)(x

=

Criterion

the individual in question actually

that

b)

But precisely

true.

Truth

it

has been shown for general semantic purposes by

as

18 Jaakko Hintikka

in

this

hh (2

)

presupposition was secured via the cpistemic and (2 hx ). Therefore, the presupposition of

Ockham

Existential Importation relating to absolute terms in

semantics

s

in strongly supports the view that he would be helplessly ambiguous 19 What he needs, trying to offer (2) as an explication of his thought.

instead, l

b\ That

sort of differentiation concerning the semantic roles of

some

is is,

in

order to avoid an inconsistency,

Ockham must

allow

some

kind of non-identifiability for the object of intuitive knowledge. In this Lh is the most sense (2 plausible candidate for Ockham. Consequently, )

when he says mean that it intuitive

6.

Tfie

that in such

not

is

a case the assent

what

evident

or

who

"is

not

actually

20 evident"

is

the

he must object

of

knowledge. Holcotian approach

I

would now

like

to

turn

to

Holcot. His

discussion many places, mostly because of the corruption of the text. In any case, he does not share Ockham s view concerning the Ockham in claiming cognition of nonexistent beings, although he follows is

18

Cf.

confused

"Existential

Philosophy, vol.

Presuppositions

56 (1959), pp. 125-137.

See the quotation 20

in

Seethe footnote

in

11.

footnote 7 above.

and

Existential

Commitments".

Journal

of

205

Existential Presuppositions in Semantics

mental language as acts of the mind is the access to in three The semantic to culminate conditions, according Holcot, reality.

that

"natural"

context

the

in

contexts,

of:

the

(i)

sentences,

epistemic

categorical

referential

and existence, (iii) the compossibility of knowledge and the natural order. Criterion

Concerning the individual

via

first

intuitive

Holcot

knowledge,

consider a negative existential proposition in

then,

intuitive

theological

the

says

we

following: If

Socrates does not exist

e.g.

order to become a genuine object of intuitive knowledge, is

proposition

simple

be seen as a

to

i.e.

"exponents",

in

and

negative

knowing the nonexistence of an

i.e.

context,

of

tics

interdependence of the Truth

the

(ii)

sum

logical

,

this

of the existentially relevant

truth conditions or existential presuppositions expressible

categorical

sentences. But

candidates

the

all

such

for

in our example are simple sentences of sensation, such as I "exponents" do not see Socrates now or I do not touch Socrates now However 5

.

logically follow from them that the sentence

Consequently, the idea of Holcot

true.

we compose,

sentences of immediate sensation

many such

criticism against

s

a particular and negative existential proposition factual

empirical

because

"exponents",

does not

it

Socrates does not exist

is

not verifiable

do

they

Ockham

not

is

is

that

through

constitute

the

semantic or quantificational truth conditions of the sentence. many such "exponents" we have we do not know all

sufficient

Therefore, however

of the truth conditions of the sentence expressing intuitive knowledge of the non-existence of a certain being.

Furthermore, exist

is

the truth value of the sentence

if

not settled via

empirical

Socrates does not

or truth conditions, then

"exponents"

semantic presuppositions for knowing a nonexistent being are not settled either. This is because if we can specify among our acquaintances the

who

Socrates

is,

then Socrates

not follow that he does not

and

(2),

more

is

theoretical

or

possibility

less

for

exists,

exist.

but

This

is

if

we

cannot,

to say that

it

certainly does

Holcot

is

rejecting

consciously relying on (2 ), which only is a Ockham. But Holcot is clearly saying even

more. 21

Another way of putting Holcot

s

idea

is

to say that even

if

every intuitively known

which categorical proposition makes its contradictory false, this is not enough to say of all the possible propositions con-tradictory to intuitively known ones are false, i.e. we cannot define the whole Universe of Discourse. This is crucial, because it implies

could

that

know

we it

cannot,

only

if

logically speaking,

we

could

list

all

know the

the cause of non-existence because existent

beings against

the

we

non-existent

206

Kirjavainen

Concerning the second context, i.e. the interdependence of the Truth Criterion and existence, Holcot tries to is the specify the semantic conditions of existential propositions. (This

7.

Hie

univocity

exist

of

main content of the discussion of the not forgetting

He,

many

too,

exist

secundum adiacens and latter part of

Holcot

s

is

i.e.

some

reality of

tertium

in

adiacens.

because,

Below

I

text.)

equivocal

shall

discuss

in

the

disputation.

has

"exponents"

Holcot

innumerable

fact

in

it

res.

disputation,

is

is

although

univocal,

Every proposition as a truth claim "implicative"

s

considerable difficulties in the exegesis of the

that

thinks

Holcot

latter part of

semantically

s

truth

(if

not simple and categorical)

is

or truth conditions which imply the

unusual theory seems to be that there are conditions for each cognitive expression every

speaking,

cognitive

expression

identified

is

an adequate mental act, and thus the meaning of the expression becomes a semantic function of the innumerable indexical truth

with

The most crucial truth condition for any existential expression this is called secundum adiacens meaning this thing ( the if we But implicative proposition we are not negate

conditions. is

what

exists

).

is

supposing that anything

exists.

Holcot

says:

of possible to say that in order to get the contradictory part an implicative proposition, we have to put the negation before the And this as follows: no chimera exists. implicative proposition holds for alt implicative propositions ... In a usual way of speaking mat an whether true or not one could say more easily implication before the negation does not posit anything as existing is

It

and thus we can say: what God. (My italics) 22

What Holcot means here

is,

is

I

bigger than

think,

that

God

only

is

not bigger than

explicitly

not what quantified sentences import existential truth claim,

existentially is

referred

to via exponents.

In

supposition,

ones. fore,

22

technical jargon: the semantic rules of personal distributive i.e. the descent to singulars, do give us the semantic rules

more

And if we cannot know we cannot intuitively know

Cf.

"Utrum

Theologia

Sit

the cause of something

we simply cannot know

it.

There

non-existent things. Scientia."

Ed.

habendum contradictorium propositions

J.

T. Muckle p. 149:

implicativae,

oportet

"Et

posset dici

ponere Et sic

quod ad

negationem ante est de omnibus

non chimera est. implicationem et sic haec concedenda: dici propter usum loquentium, sive verius sive non, quod implicativis. Levius posset et concedere tales: melius deo non est implicatio ante negationem non possit aliquid melius deo

..."

Existential Presuppositions in Semantics

an

of

existential

implicative

have:

"this

be that

to

(is

defined for

is

etc.

not)"

no sense does the being

"this"

of

an

extension. In that case

we

the

Correspondingly, its

proposition empties

not) and this

(is

in

that this

expression.

existential

all

in

Therefore, the conclusion must

question exist (provided of course

speak of knowing nonexistent things intuitively. But this is not what is the most crucial

ingeniously thinks

that

negation

it

objects). Consequently,

we cannot

207

idea

inconsistent

Holcot

here.

the semantic

exhaust

is

conditions via

epistemic conditions. These two sets of conditions are not on a par. If

we

having arrived

ask,

what

is

"this"!

at

the final point of our descending procedure:

(pointing to something), the answer must be that

not exhaustively

know

it

because

we cannot know

its

we do

complete concept,

in an absolute sense. It follows we cannot semantically identify that we can, while knowing something, fail to know for semantic reasons what it really is. And if we cannot do that, we cannot know, for i.e.

"this"

semantic reasons again, which extensions are empty and which not absolute sense. On the other hand, if we cannot intuitively nonexistent things without spoiling the logic of knowing, then, that the objects of intuitive cognition, although real

and

in

an

know

must be

it

existent, are not

semantically ready made. Therefore, Holcot wants to remind us of something which could be expressed in modern clothing by saying that we

may

to

fail

identify

an object of

intuitive

in

cognition

some

of the

relevant possible worlds.

With the help of the separation of the semantic

rules

epistemic conditions Holcot can support the consistency of his that

viz.

it

is

impossible to define the

could assimilate the semantic

God".

or

this

or

refers

etc.

to

23

The semantic

leo

we

A

few

lines later

from the

conditions

ace.

to

non

est

for

"this"

could imply that

God. But the innumerable semantic conditions which

Muckle

ed.:"Probari

deus potest esse quaelibet res de

quod

view,

such a way that

of this term with the epistemic

could set up the relation between the term

Cf.

in

above Holcot says that "there is no demonstration that a lion is This is because God could be anything in the world, i.e. this

not

"this"

"exponents"

of the corresponding statements.

"exponents"

citation

God

term

from the

own

deus..."

lion

and

God do

not

tell

us

ergo potcst octava conclusio quia fide tenetur quod simul et per consequens non potest probari

mundo

208

Kirjavainen

what epistemic to

"exponents"

have to be satisfied

order for us to be able

in

make epistemic truth claims concerning God. 24

8.

What was

The theological context

,

V

the term

the sentence F(b),

in

of the proposition

we know who he

we

that

the

lack

cognitive

without definite knowledge of i.e.

we

identify

him

for is

like

This

further

is

know

however, is

in

principle

in spite

of the

But

identification.

we can know

that he judges,

as a judging being.

Furthermore, Holcot theological

means

who God

is.

one

complexum where the

God signifies. We can, God judges because God

identifiable as a being before fact

a

is

nicely

He says that if God cannot be

what

parts only indirectly signify

the truth

God

i.e.

comes out

said above

concerning the third context of Holcot s discussion. knows intuitively that God judges then the term

is

of the opinion that

because

knowledge

x

could

be

Ka F(x)

is

identified,

the form of

not

only

metaphysically as being (as Scotus said), but also as something specific in the world. This is in fact the case with Christ; it means that we can intuitively

relevant

know

a theological proposition of the

"exponents"

evidence

cognitive

form

F(b)

even

if

the

within the natural order do not offer us sufficient for

reaching

the

complete

identification. In

other

words, we may have intuitive knowledge without knowledge of what it really is about in some ontologically more perfect sense. If we have this kind of intuitive cognition, perhaps without any mediation by the Prime Cause, are we not forced to give up the univocity of exist ? In a sense, we are not. We could deal with divine things without supposing for them any peculiar ontological category. We should our world could only remember that these perfectly normal individuals of

be bearers of considerably deeper semantic burdens than can be seen on the surface level. In this sense ordinary terms of our language must be understood as becoming metaphorical, so that those individuals which we made in any ontological quantify over via these terms are not ready sense.

24 25

25

See the footnote

15.

This Holcotian idea

is

not to be assimilated to

some modern

ideas in this area. E.g.

between two distinct quantifiers here, one ranging over acquainted individuals, another ranging over public figures. Cf. of Knowledge and Belief: Acquaintances and Public Figures", The Intentions of "Objects and Other New Models for Modalities. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Hintikka

suggests

that

we have

to

distinguish

Intentionally

Dordrecht-Holland / Boston-U.SA. 1975,

p. 43-58.

Existential Presuppositions in Semantics

9.

The main

Conclusion

the

nature

intuitive

of

difference between

semantic

the

language.

individuals. Instead,

what Holcot wants

not wrong,

first

know

the

in

nonexistent

in

place,

According to Ockham, and well specified

remind

to

this

us,

is

we

somewhat

is

concerns

existent

maintaining that

although

things,

Ockham and Holcot

domain of

presupposes a

cognition

of

ties

209

that

Ockham

is

could intuitively

peculiar

from the

point of view of his theory concerning absolute terms. So, according to

Holcot,

quantification

Holcot

Admittedly

to

say

that

is

not the only problem here.

Ockham

s

presupposition

of

concerning absolute terms in the context of cannot be the semantic "exponent", because in that knowledge

existential intuitive

over nonexistents

wants

generalization

we would be bound to infer ambiguously the existence of a nonexistent. The crucial point, however, is that and in any case our case

commitment

to

an object of

concerning the identifiability failures

in

satisfying

these

intuitive

knowledge sets up requirements of that object, and furthermore, that the requirements are not simply due to our

epistemic incapabilities, but to the ways our language works. Intuitive

cognition,

of terms.

according to Holcot, then, allows a continuous This

seen in theological sentences which might acquire their meaning through the language of our everyday world without us having a perfect semantic metatheory for setting up specification

how

they

radical or

manage

this.

sceptical

as

This

is

is

Ockham

especially

why, in

opinion,

He

is

rather drawing from

ideas conclusions which go a step further towards

theory.

University of Helsinki

Holcot

is

not

as

concerning the cognitive possibilities of

the semantics of religious language.

own

my

Ockham

s

modern semantic

GYULA KLIMA

On Being and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas s Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science In

this

reconstruction of

they

function

would

I

paper

his

s

of

outlines

the

present

Thomas Aquinas

St.

in

to

like

formal

a

concepts of being and essence as

metaphysics and philosophy of science. This

will

some formalism, however, I try to keep between formal and informal presentation so that we can steer our way safely between the Scylla of empty concepts and the the introduction of

necessitate

certain balance

Charybdis of blind

intuition.

we

as

Now, secundum quod copula

dicitur

well,

"esse

duobus modis

Uno modo

dicitur.

veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est esse, quod pertinct ad naturam rei, secundum 1

decem

secundum

dividitur

quod

know

significat

modo

Alio

...

all

So

(3SN.d.6.q.2.a.2.)

genera."

copulative est signifies the truth of a proposition. But what is it that makes a proposition true? Well,

is

it

the

the actual

existence of an individualized form, or nature, signified by the predicate term in the individual supposited for, i.e. referred to by the subject term

time of the predication.

at the

2

For what individualizes a form of which in

"forma

1

[Since analysis,

is

it

form. Such a form

a

what

is

St.

supposito singulari existens per quod

severely restricted space did me ask the reader to "take

let

an eye on

in the first instance is the individual

the

texts

referred

to

allow

not

my

notes

me

individuatur".

to

indulge

seriously",

below, secundum

illud

Thomas speaks

i.e.

vulgo

dictum:

(STl.q.13.

detailed

in

to read

my

of as

textual

paper with

melius

est

esse

iimum quam caecum.] Cf. 1SN 19.5.1.adl.; 1SN 33.1.1.adl.; 2SN 34.1.1.; 2SN 37.1.2.adl.&ad3.; De Fnte 1.; De Pot 7.2.adl.; De Malo I.l.adl9.; Quodl 9.2.2(3).; in Meta 4.1.; in Meta 5.9.; in Meta 6.2.; in Meta 6.4.; in Meta 11.8.; ST1 3.4.ad2.; ST1 16.3.ad2.; ST1 48.2.ad2.; ST1-2 36.1; ScG ScG 1.58.; ScG 3.9.; cf. also Cajetan: Comm. in de Ente, c.l. in princ. in: 1.12.; Summa Philosophiae, Tom. 1. Sect. II.5.1. Opuscula Omnia, (Lugduni, 1577); Alamannus: to Saint Thomas Aquinas 1888); R.W.Schmidt: The Domain of Logic according (Paris,

(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) Part Cf.

"Sicut

cum

dico,

Socrates

compositione formae humanae ad homo."

in

Meta

9.11. vide

totum locum;

II.

ch.4.

&

Part

III.

ch.VIII.

est homo, veritas huius enuntiationis causatur ex materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hie cf.

also Schmidt, op.

cit.

pp.212-214

&

224-226.

Being and Essence

in

Tliomas Aquinas

3

But the other individuating condition dividual can have numerically the same form a.9.)

is

time:

211

even

for

an

if

at different times,

in

the

still,

form once emitted cannot recur numerically the same, "quia quod omnino in nihilum decidit idem numero resumi non potest". (4SN.d.22.q.l. a.l.)

So predicates different

course

)

individuals

and may be

signify different forms.

an individual u

in

same

in the

time

t,

same

hoc enim quod aliquid

quam

propositione,

same time cannot

the significate of a predicate

which, therefore, can be denoted as a this:

Sgt(P)(u)(t).

copula."

(in

rerum natura

in

P

intellectus

Meta

time

t

if

term,

of u at

"ex

t):

est sequitur veritas vel falsitas in

per hoc verbum

significat

est

prout est

6

5.9.)

But so we can say that a proposition of the form at

of

individual at different times.

for the truth of a predication (namely, of predicating

verbalis

divinity,

the existence of such an individualized form that accounts

is

it

of

case

individual at the

value of a function for these arguments like

Now

the

for

So we can speak of at

which are numerically

forms,

(except

different in the

But the same predicate

P

individualized

signify

different

in

S

est

according to a given supposition, or acception of

the significate of

P

in the individual supposited for

P

is

its

by S

true

subject at

time

homo, et illud homo, quod eadem sit numero non est eadem albedo numero" 2SN 17.1.1.; cf. e.g. ST1 85.1. & 2.ad2.; cf. also Alamannus, op.cit. q.2. aa.1-3. Note that from the point of view of this reconstruction it makes no difference whether we speak of Cf.

"Non

enim oportet

humanitas utriusque,

sicut

si

hoc

est

duobus

in

albis

Socrates s humanity or of the humanity individualized by Socrates s matter, i.e. by the materia signata that makes Socrates this individual. Indeed, these are one and the same form, the forma totius of Socrates. Cf. also the references of the next note. 4

In

Cf.

Phys.

5.6.;

Quodl.

4.3.2.;

Quodl.

11.6.;

ScG

4.80

&

81;

4SN

44.1.1.;

Comp.

Theol. 1.154. Cf. ST1 39.2 & 3.; 1SN 9.1.2.; De Pot. 9.6. By the way, this approach offers a very is the same F as as good criterion of truth for relative identity statements, like The former holds is identical with opposed to absolute identity statements like iff the F in the suppositum of a is identical with the significate of significate of F in the suppositum of b So "Filius est idem Deus cum Patre" is true, for Deus Filius and in the suppositum of signifies the same nature in the suppositum of Pater But "Filius est idem cum Patre" is false, since the Son and the Father are "a

b",

b".

"a

.

.

distinct

supposita

of

this

nature,

while

this

sentence

states

the

identity

of

these

supposita. 1

Cf.

1SN

19.5.1.;

propositionibus

...

1SN

fundatur

33.1.1.adl: in esse

rei";

"esse

quod

Schmidt, op.

significat

cit.

veritatem

pp.232-237.

compositionis

in

Klima

212

time

at

t,

exists.

t

founds the truth of

But from this

For

the

facit,

the significate of

the

can

dividends".

say

when

(Quodl.9.2.2(3)).

what

that

and only

if

is

the predicate

is

the

in

is

such that

significate of the predicate

it

to

propositional in

is

signifies

9

the

(In

some

of

case,

real form, not a

these latter cases also the

In

rationis.

See

n.17.)

idea a formal expression consider the following.

this

give

would be an ens

sense.

first

negation or relation of reason.

Now

a

by

signified

the form signified by the predicate in

if

suppositum of the subject

privation,

in reality.

a sort of ens rationis signified by the copula, which

is

the second sense,

course,

which

copula,

cuiuslibet enuntiationis

is

we

so

composition

us suppose that everything that can be signified by any means 10 Let us suppose further either actual or not actual at a given time t. let

First,

which

that everything

ens reale. is

is

also

involves

proposition

actu animae componentis ct

is

form

this

quam "significans compositionem unde hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum in

For the copula

But

that

significate

composition, which need not have a direct counterpart

signifies

the

this

7

does not follow that

it

of

existence

actual

this proposition.

this

proposition.

anima

the

is

It

11

is

actual

mere ens

either a

is

or also an

rationis

significate of a predicate P in an individual u at time

The

W(t), where W(t) actual or not actual are either which signifiable things

an element of one of these domains: Sgt(P)(u)(t)

the set of

Cf.

all

Schmidt,

Thomas

pp.224-228.,

op.cit.

Aquinas",

also

cf.

Knuuttila

S.

in:

-

J.

II.

The

Weidcmann: The

Hintikka:

Logic

of

Ix>gic

of Being

Iking

t

is

at

in

(Dordrecht,

Holland, 1986). ^

This

is

point

out

brought

nicely

in

Wcidemann,

sect. IV;

op.cit.

cf.

also

Schmidt,

op.cit. pp.238-239.

would

I

tentatively identify the significate the proposition, expressly called

expressed

by

41.1.5.

say:

I

enuntiabile

of

as

a

enunciation"

24.1.1b.; 14.14.;

1SN

ST1

because

"tentatively",

for

synonym Schmidt,

De

38.1.3.;

14.15.ad3.;

op.cit.

Ver.

ST1

of

enuntiatio

St.

of

by

(although

ST3

1.2.ad2.

For

Thomas s

Thomas 2.7.;

a

res

tendency

"cmphasi/.ing

a

as

proposition

Thomas

p.223. n.84.). For St. 2.13.ad7.; 1.6.; 14.8.;

16.7.;

a St.

1.5.;

s

to

the

the

enuntiabile

rationis

use

in

the

objective

1SN term

meaning

use of the term see

3SN

Quodl.

ST1

14.12.;

clear expression

4.9.2.;

of the view that

the significate of a proposition see e.g. Logica Modernorum, vol.11. is also: Peter of Spain: Traaatus See de L.M. two Assen, 1967) pp.208-213. Rijk, (ed.: part Cf. also G. Nuchelmans: Theories of the (ed.: L.M. de Rijk, Assen, 1972.) pp.205-207. Ancient and Medie\>al Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity Proposition

an enuntiabile

(Amsterdam-London, 10

1973.) pp. 165-194.

c.l. For a medieval-style resolution of the problems involved in e.g. nonexistents see my "Existence, Quantification and referring to and quantifying over the Mediaeval Theory of Ampliation", Doxa 9(1987) pp.83-112.

11

De

Cf.

Cf.

2SN

Princ.

34.1.1.

Being and Essence time

in

so that the set A(t) / = Ra(t)/

t,

Tfwmas Aquinas

213

a part of W(t), and Re(t)

is

is

a

part of Ra(t).

Now for

this

may be

significate

the argument

construed as the value of a function

But so the function

t.

itself

can be got from

this

by

lambda-abstraction as follows: At(Sgt(P)(u)(t))

But

again,

this,

u.

argument

So,

can be regarded as a value of a function for the

we

again,

abstraction to u too

-

and

let

me =

Sg(P)

Now

us

let

the function itself by applying lambda-

get

call the result

u

Au(At(Sgt(P)(u)(t)))

further

suppose

the signification ofP:

what

that

the

copula,

the

sign

of

composition composes are this function and its consecutive arguments, supplied by the subject term and the time of the predication. So we can write:

= Sgt(S est 2 P)(t)(Sp) Sgt(est 2 )(Sg(P))(Sp(S)(t))(t),

where

Sp(S)(t)e{u: otherwise Sp(S)(t)

=

13

and

0,

not

empty,

Sgt(est 2 )(V)(u)(t) eW(t),

where

set

this

if

Sgt(S)(u)(t)EA(t)},

is

V(u)(t)eW(t) and Sgt(est 2 )(V)(u)(t)eA(t) iff V(u)(t)eA(t). That is, what is signified by a proposition (at time t according to a given supposition, or acception of its subject term) is what is signified by the copula when to

(according subject

its

time

(at

aliquod esse

For the

rei"

of

use

it

composes the nature

absolute t)

at

consideration

time

t:

for

(STl.q.l4.a.l4.ad2.).

14

signified

with

)

the

suppositum of

enuntiabilis

"compositio

It is this

by the predicate

composition of the

its

significat intellect

see A. Church, Introduction to Mathematical Concerning the close parallelism between functional abstraction, on the one hand, and the Aristotelian conception of abstraction, on the other, see P.T. Geach, "Form and Existence", in: God and the Soul (London, 1969) and Thomas Aquinas on the Meaning of Words", Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 3-4(1984) my

Logic (Princeton,

lambda-abstraction

1956.),

pp.15-23.

"St.

pp.298-313. (in Hungarian with course, the terms "signification"

English

and

abstract).

As are

"significate"

for

not

the to

be

terminology used, of regarded as strictly

St. Thomas s use of significatio and significatum. What I call most frequently referred to by St. Thomas as forma significata (per natura individuata pracdicatum), and what I call "significate" is St. Thomas s forma

to

corresponding

is

"signification"

\ux,

University of Notre 14 Brill,

15

Leiden 1984.

Ibid. p. 68.

"Ockham

Dame

on

Generality",

in

Ockham have shaved Wyman

M. Loux, Ockham

Press 1974, pp. 23-46, here p. 41.

s

s

Theory of Terms,

Natural Necessity

A

worlds.

is

proposition

true of a world

referred to by the proposition

affairs

proposition

is

referred to

is

known

true

a

in

in

world w^

and only

if

the state of

if

A

part of the ontology of w^. and only if the state of affairs

some world

w2

as being part of the ontology of

Goddu makes

w1

235

is

if

part of the ontology of

Ockham

in

or other, say

Using

Wj.

the following suggestions as to

how

w2

,

but

this distinction

different notions of

(3)

be distinguished: = true of every possible world logical df = true in every possible world metaphysical df = true in

(4)

and maximally of every possible world = true in physical every possible world

necessity can (1) (2)

logical metaphysical

minimally

df

every possible world

df

=

16

of every possible world Goddu observes that Ockham does not differentiate between logical and metaphysical necessity, and he therefore feels that only categories (3), ontological

(5)

df true

can be attributed to Ockham. Examples given for logicaland non-A cannot be true at the same metaphysical necessity include (4),

and

(5)

"A

time",

"If

man

As examples

is,

man

is

a rational

for physical necessity

animal",

Goddu

and

"If

man

provides an example for ontological necessity "God exists". 17 The problems I have in understanding Goddu

"Man

is,

is

he

is

risible",

risible".

and as

treatment are the

s

following:

of

First

all

it

remains unclear to what extent

Goddu

intends his

suggestions as providing a general framework for systematic as well as historical study of

to

evaluate

Goddu s, Ockham s is

also

modal

Ockham

s

distinctions, 1

meanings".

of

systematic

notions. Occasionally he writes as

notions

against

the

if

background of

he wanted

his,

that

is

yet he also writes that "these distinctions reflect In case Goddu does want to provide a theory that interest,

I

think

his

theory

is

open

to

several

serious objections. In his model, the defmientia of ontological and logical

and so do the defmientia of metaphysical and physical Furthermore, the distinction between truth of and truth in possible worlds needs to be related to such much-debated issues like necessity coincide,

necessity.

16 17 18

Ibid. p. 69-70.

Ibid.

Md.

Kusch

236

world-indexed and unindexed attributes or accessibility relations holding 19 between possible worlds.

(or not holding)

To make my

uneasiness

will suffice here.

examples

more

Goddu

as being logical-metaphysical, while regarding

risible"

Goddu

Sticking with

necessity.

physical

expressing

Goddu

concrete, a brief glance at

treats the necessity of

man

"If

own

seems

is,

s is

risible"

as

definitions

of

is

"Man

s

he

once

explicitly logical-metaphysical and physical necessity, these two cases, for between no difference there however, is, out, spelled it

both cases amount to saying that

he

exists,

and

risible,

this

every possible world

about those worlds

he regards the proprium

explicitly,

in

necessity

Ockham

s

Ockham.

In

reasoning for

man

which

known

in

all

as

this

Ockham

says

hard to accept,

by Ockham

are told that

God

the conclusion that

But

to propria in general.

own

s

we

Goddu draws

on pcccabilitas applies for

clear

main case of physical conclusion Goddu relies on the

discussion of pcccabilitas in d. 44, where

could separate this attribute from man.

is

in

Goddu makes

the last example already suggested and as

As

what

is

worlds."

possible

also

is

"In

fact

that

criteria peccabilitas

this

cannot be

of regarded as a proprium of homo. Peccabilitas is not only predicated the species homo but also of the species angclus. Thus the soli et semper

condition context

of proprium

of d.44

is

Ockham

not

met here.

noteworthy that

is

It

the

in

never refers to peccabilitas as a proprium

of

homo.

The reason why

this

point

bring the discussion of d.44

is

rather important

somehow

into line with

we have to what Ockham writes is

that

on proprium and accidens inseparable in Summa Logicae I, cap. 24 & 25. For in these passages Ockham states quite explicitly that he regards the accidentia

inseparabilia

necessity. For instance

man;

God

The it

such that

20

constituting

Ockham

the

true

writes that

belongs to every man, and could not create a man without making him for

hands,

19

as

See

e.g.

"...

only to

it

area of merely natural risible

is

a property of

man, and always

risible

to

man.

20 ..."

s predicated with a necessity that binds even God proprium human a make is omni-soli-semper true, since God cannot being is

it

cannot laugh. The attempt to make the proposition

the works by Hintikka, Plantinga and Lewis cited in note

Loux, op.

cit.

p. 101.

1

above.

homo

est

Natural Necessity

false

risibile

would amount

would involve God to trying to

in

make human

Ockham

in

a

237

contradiction

in

terms since

it

beings non-human.

This case of logical-metaphysical necessity is contrasted by Ockham in the following chapter (SL c. 25) with God s and nature s abilities vis a-vis accidentia:

accidents are separable or inseparable.

...

A

separable accident

is

be removed from its without the destruction of that subject; whereas an subject inseparable accident is one that cannot. It could, however, be so removed by divine power. Inseparable accidents differ from properties in that although an inseparable accident cannot as a matter of natural fact be taken away from the subjects whose inseparable accident it is, it could be taken away from some other subject without the destruction of that subject. ... A 21property, on the other hand, cannot be taken away from anything.

one which can as a matter of natural

Here God

God

s

potentia

fact

contrasted with that of nature: even though

is

as seen above separate the proprium from its subject, God can nevertheless separate the accidens inseparable. Nature can separate accidentia separabilia, but it cannot separate accidentia inseparabilia

cannot

-

-

.

More

questions arise from these passages than can be dealt with

Therefore

here.

have

I

confine

to

myself

to

three

brief

concluding

remarks. First

of

Ockham

all,

proprium suggest a

Goddu

definitions

s

more complex

of

accidens

inseparable

and

definition of necessary attributes than

provides us with. Such definitions must take into account possible

worlds, time and comparisons of different species.

As

the key to such an

enterprise one can use Ockham s idea that worlds themselves come species and that the belonging of a world to a given species of worlds

in is

determined by the natural species that that world contains. Thus one might suggest an Ockhamian definition of proprium along the following lines: If

attributed

A

the proprium of species

s has,

(2)

no other species has^l

(3)

Furthermore, since

in

A

is

iff

(3.1) s is a part of Wj,

and

Ibid. p. 104.

then

member

w2

of s

a disposition

s at least 2,

there

(3)

is

at

least

one possible world

vv

(possibly identical with

?

Wj) in which another species t has A for some time only. Secondly, even though I have not as yet found any other medieval

author

who

draws

the

between proprium and accidens between metaphysical and natural necessity does, many schoolmen, when commenting on distinction

inseparabile as the distinction as

still

Porphyry, driving

Ockham come close

as

clearly

behind

force

of

interpretation

committed

to suggesting such a kind of distinction.

modalities

to treating

There are two main

moves

such 22

since

one

might

suspect this

prima facie

the

As

the

statistical

conception

seems

proprium and accidens inseparabile on equal terms. strategies in medieval thinkers in dealing with this

on the one hand the de omni case of the inseparable accident unequivocally accepted as a per se case and thus accepted as a

difficulty: is

necessary de re predication. the

more

to explain

usual approach

why

the de

-

On

we

the other hand

find the

omni case of

facie de omni; thus the

-

and

this

was perhaps

commentators engaged

the inseparable accident

commentators draw attention

is

in

attempts

only prima

to the fact that the

accident in question must first develop, that the same accident appears separably in other species, or that the prima facie de omni case still allows for exceptions or changes. In parentheses,

it

must be mentioned

whole tradition of commentators does not give an exhaustive list of possible forms of attributions, e.g. the question as to how we are to that the

classify cases

like peccabilitas

tackled. Neither case can is

or

having two hands

is

never sufficiently

be handled as proprium since the ^//-condition

not met, nor can they be treated as accidentia inseparabilia, since

we

See the study by Hintikka et al. in note 2 above, as well as Simo Knuuttila (ed.), 1981. Reforging the Great Chain of Being, Synthese Historical Library 20, Reidel, Dordrecht

Natural Necessity

in

Ockham

239

can refer to no second species of which they could be separated time or other.

at

some

Thirdly and

finally, it should be pointed out that an intensional of interpretation proprium and accidentia is only justified as far as their

ontological status capacities,

is

we have

concerned. to

worlds Wj, w2 identity can in some cases

initially

,

Due

to the limitations of

human

epistemic

add to both definitions given above that at least and w3 have to be identical. As science proceeds,

and in some cases only be given up. Scotus held that in natural science there remain inductive generalizations that cannot be reduced to conceptual truths. 23 Perhaps Ockham commits this

-

-

same stand when he states that knowledge by demonstration and knowledge by experience are of the same kind. 24 But Ockham does not seem to state his position on this issue as as himself

the

to

clearly

Scotus does.

University of Oulu, Finland

23 94

Ord.

SL

I,

Dist. 3, Pars

111:2,

p.

Bonaventure 1967-.

524.

1,

qu. 4,

n.

237.

Opera philosophica

et

theologica,

The Franciscan

Institute,

St.

DOUGLAS

C.

LANGSTON

Scotus and Possible Worlds

In Ordinatio,

Book

one

as

to

five

Scotus explains

how

explains

in

explanation

as

immutability of

the

in

are

God knows consistent

is

39, questions

of the Lectura,

then

indicates

with

the

first

how

this

and

certainty

knowledge of contingents. According

s

He

future contingents:

he

contingencies;

contingency

God

sections

corresponding

two parts how

there

of

two and distinction

distinction 38, part

I,

well

to

Scotus,

an essential order of causes for every effect in the universe. Moreover, all these essential orders are ordered to one cause, God. His there

is

sustains

activity

effects

with

every chain of co-existing causes and co-causes

of every essential order. Since Scotus equates

"having

been caused

follows

it

contingently,"

"being

that

the

all

contingent"

be

can

there

contingents only if God causes contingently. If God necessarily produces whatever he produces, all the essential orders of causes would be orders of necessary causes and there would be no contingent causes or effects. 1

Since Scotus believes that

God

causes

obvious that there are contingents,

is

it

on

Thus,

contingently.

contingents because there are some things logically have refrained from producing.

Scotus

Since will,

it

is

not surprising

important part of the

claims

eternal

now,

God

s

the

that that

all

Scotus

God

analysis,

of affairs.

intellect

Out of

possible

states

chooses

one possible consistent

activity of

God

all

set

presents

to

the

s

will

A

Treatise

on

God

as

Franciscan Herald Press, 1966)

First p. 85.

s

an

will

all

these possibilities, the divine will to

exist

in

willed

existence.

Scotus believes that whatever the divine will causes to exist

comes

as

to Scotus, in

divine

divine intellect then grasps the determination of the divine will.

existence necessarily

God

occurrences are co-caused by

he sees the

are

has willed that he could

knowledge of contingents. According divine

follows

it

there

The

Because in

willed

to exist in actual existence, Scotus concludes

Principle,

translated

by Allan

B.

Wolter

(Chicago:

Scotus and Possible Worlds

knows with

that the divine intellect

certainty

241

what

states of affairs exist

Of course, these states of affairs are known with certainty since God could

in actual existence.

contingent even

though they are

will

existence

some

We

into willed

other consistent set of contingents. analysis in terms of possible worlds. Instead

can recast Scotus

of thinking about consistent sets of possibilities presented to God, think of

worlds.

God

s

intellect as

Thus God,

in

presented with an

creating a world,

is

number of

infinite

we can possible

effectively willing that

some

one possible world be actual. The actual world, on that account, is contingent because God could have willed some other possible world to be actual than the

one

he, in fact, did.

world because he knows

God knows what

the complete content of

all

occurs in the actual possible worlds and

he knows what possible world he wills to become actual. These possible worlds are perhaps best understood as maximal or

complete states of affairs, i.e., a state of affairs such that no additional 2 of affairs can be included in it without causing a contradiction.

state

They are populated by and so on. Each item history of

all

in

Dixon,

Shirley

is

is

a possible world carries with

Temple

a complete world we are

it

in the actual

named Ronald who was born Jane Wyman, who starred with who will meet with Hagen

also a possible world, there

in

who was married a movie named

in

to

"That

in 1988,

Ronald Reagan

Thus,

it.

a person

is

the current president of the United States,

Illinois,

Gorbachev

in

that occurs concerning

part of, which

Reagan, who

possible persons, possible chairs, possible events,

and so on. Since

Girl,"

God knows

the complete history of

our world and knows that our world

is

actual,

he knows

what Ronald Reagan in our actual world does at any time in his life. Of course, all of Ronald Reagan s actions are contingent because God could have made actual some other possible world than the one he did. He might have

Reagan. Of

made

actual, for example, a

course,

God

world

in

world with Ronald Reagan as we know him. Let us think some more about Ronald reasonable to think that the is

no Ronald actual our

Reagan, however. It is in our world

Ronald Reagan we know about

not the only Ronald Reagan there could be. Surely, in the infinite

Plantinga, Alvin God, Freedom, 35.

is

make

which there

did not so choose; he chose to

and

Evil

(New York: Harper and Row,

inc.,

1974) p.

242

Langston

number

God

of possible worlds

conceives

there

of,

a possible world in

is

which Ronald Reagan, instead of Jimmie Stewart, starred in the movie s a Wonderful Life," went on to true cinematic success, and ignored "It

This perhaps seems obvious, but

politics.

the relationship between our Ronald

which world we

Life,"

identical to

shall

Ronald Reagan

in

make

perfect

sense

saying that our Ronald

Wonderful

Life."

The

in

for short.

s

a Wonderful

Ronald Reagan

Is

"It

W

in

is

found

in

W

and

Ronald Reagan

that

This

Life."

in

in

is

W

seems

It

our Ronald Reagan

Wonderful

a

s

possible person should not deter us from

a

"It

to think that they are identical.

Reagan fact

W

call

us to say that

for

world could have starred

only

think carefully about

our world and the Ronald

our world?

There are strong reasons to

in

the possible world in which he starred in

in

Reagan

we must

Reagan

in

our

captured by

stars in

"It

possible world

s

W

a is

equating our actual

Ronald Reagan with Ronald Reagan in W. After all, since every actuality is also a possibility, our actual Ronald Reagan can also be described as a possible person.

On

wonder

Ronald Reagan Ronald Reagan. The complete history associated with our Ronald Reagan is different from the complete history of Ronald Reagan in W. There are a number of similarities between the two histories, but there arc significant differences. Most importantly, however, in

W

the other hand, there are reasons to

identical to our

is

Ronald Reagan

the fact that

characteristic of the world in

our world

is

inhabiting

and

it

some person

in

W

W just

is

in

world

W

seems

as the fact that our

to

be an essential

Ronald Reagan

an essential characteristic of our world. That

makes

of what

part

if

a

world, by definition

world the world

characteristics.

their

different

possible

If

there

is

it

is,

some

is

is

the

is

to say,

persons

characteristic of

from the characteristics of the person in the actual are talking about a possible world different from

we

our actual world. It

Reagan entity

is

for

in

W

that

is

such reasons that some philosophers claim that Ronald is a counterpart of our Ronald Reagan. A counterpart is an very

much

like

some

real

entity,

in

fact

it

is

more

like

the actual entity than anything else in the relevant possible world; but is

not

bound found

identical

to

the

real

entity.

W

can

exist

only in

these

counterparts

are

Thus the counterpart of Ronald Reagan W. Likewise, the actual Ronald Reagan can

to the worlds they are in. in

Moreover,

it

Scotus and Possible Worlds

243

only in our actual world. This counterpart view has been defended

exist

most strongly by David Lewis. 3 Those who claim that Ronald Reagan can be found in more than one possible world dismiss the types of problems I have described by about world-indexed properties. In general, they wish to talking s a Wonderful is acknowledge that Ronald Reagan who starred in found in possible worlds different from our own. But they insist that it is our Ronald Reagan but with different properties who is found in these Life"

"It

This

worlds.

properties starred

in

because

so

is

like

Wonderful Life

a

It s

Ronald

our

W

possible world

"in

"

and

characteristic of not having starred in

the

actual

Ronald Reagan

Reagan

exists in,

various

worlds

short,

all

the

the

"in

world-indexed

actual

world has the

a Wonderful Life

It s

differ

So

it

is

from world to world. This type of analysis of

been developed at great length by Alvin Plantinga. appear to be at least two ways of understanding

there

would Duns Scotus have endorsed? While of question to ask, invitation

".

the different possible worlds Ronald

possible worlds: the counterpart view and the canonical view.

an

of having

characteristic

but the properties that characterize his existence in the

possible worlds has

In

in

has

Reagan

has

to

it

is

decide

this is

not without meaning.

which view better

If

fits

Which one

obviously a peculiar sort

we

see the question as

his

texts,

we

stand

a

chance of answering it in an intelligible way. To be sure, any answer will be less than certain, but this should not deter us from attempting an answer. Since at

II.

we cannot

a particularly relevant

possibly examine

all

relevant texts, let us look

one from Ordinatio, Book

I,

d.

44, q. unica, n.

4

essays "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic" and "Possible which are reprinted in Michael J. Loux s The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modalities (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979) pp. 110-128 and 182-89. See also his book On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Black-well s Press, 1986). In

his

Worlds"

The

presented by Simo Knuuttila in "Being Qua Being in Thomas Aquinas Scotus" (in The Logic of Being (Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 217-8, footnote 56) as showing that Scotus believed that individuals exist in more than one possible world. His article is the occasion for my text

and John

is

Duns

present paper. I am grateful to him for sending the article and for raising the question about Scotus views about possible worlds. The Latin text is found in Duns Scotus Opera Omnia, Vatican Edition (Vatican City: Vatican Press, 1950- ), Volume VI, pp. 367-68.

244

Langston

The

text

is:

A

power is said to be ordained according to the order of universal law and not according to the order 01 a right law about some This is clear from the fact that God can save someone particular. ne does not save, [someone] who will die in final impenitence and be damned. It is not granted, however, that he can save Judas already damned ([even though] this is not impossible for God s absolute power because it does not involve a contradiction). Therefore, this [phrase] "save Judas" is impossible in the same order in which it is possible to save the someone [who will die impenitentl. Therefore, he can save this someone by his ordained power and cannot save Judas by it. Not, however, py a particular order (which is only of particular agents and operations), out by a universal order; because if he saves this someone, this fact would obtain together with pre-established right laws concerning the salvation and damnation of individuals. For the fact would obtain one who dies evil will be damned/ (which is a with this law, is so] because this someone is fixed law about the damned). [This not yet a sinner at the end of his life, and can refrain from sinning especially while he is alive since God can with his grace prevent him [from sinning]. It is like the case of the king who prevents someone from committing murder and by not damning him does not act contrary to his universal law concerning murder. The fact that God saves Judas, however, cannot obtain together with the specific law [that one who dies impenitent will be damned]. God can see that Judas can be saved by ordained power, but in some order different from the present order brought about by God s absolute power. 1

"that

The

point at issue here

save. will

how God can

is

save

someone whom he does not

There are two people discussed: Judas, who die in the state of final sin;

is

some person who

already will

damned and

die in the state

sin. According to Scotus, God cannot save Judas by his presently ordained power because on that power Judas will die in final impenitence who dies in final impenitence will and there is a universal law that be damned." Scotus thinks this apparently because what he means by

of final

"he

Judas being already damned ("iam of Judas identity that he will be

damnatum") is that

in

who where the general law must be damned. Judas obtains,

that in an order will

be

damned"

Of

course,

damned. By

"he

by

his

his absolute

absolute

is

power God can save Judas already

who

general

damned

unless he followed Christ

e.g.

"he

fixed as part

dies in final impenitence

power God could make an order

rules

obtain,

it

the state of final impenitence and

as

dies

in

final

in

which other

impenitence

will

a disciple for at least one

year."

new ordained Judas already damned in

Since Judas followed Christ for at least one year, in this

order (different from the one that now obtains), the present ordained order could be saved.

be

Scotus and Possible Worlds

In the case of the

the situation

he

who

will die in the state of final

sin"

the person dies in the state of final impenitence,

If

be damned because the general law "one who dies in the state of impenitence will be damned" obtains in the present ordained order.

will

final If

this.

is

"someone

245

he does not die

It

impenitence because

in the state of final

him from so doing by

his grace,

he

will

God

prevents

not be damned.

very easy to regard these cases as in line with the canonical

is

interpretation of possible worlds.

On

one would claim that

this reading,

it

same Judas in one order (or possible world) who is saved and another order (another possible world) who is damned. Likewise, it is the same person who is damned without God s help in one possible world and who is saved with God s help in another possible world. To is

the very

in

substantiate this canonical reading of these cases, one might point to the

tone

general

is

question

of

whole

the

investigating

about some individual.

who

is

there

is

is

s

ability

to

one would argue,

change

asking whether

God

the

the

truths

contingent

can save some person

damned.

This

is,

of course, a very plausible reading of the text. Yet,

an equally plausible alternative reading, which

is

what

It

Clearly,

question.

God

is

in

I

line

think

with

have described as the counterpart theory of possible worlds. That to say, were God to save someone in the actual world whose history I

included

the

which

fact

new

establish a

the

that

he

will

state of affairs.

did

individual

would be

not

die

in

final

He would die

from

impenitence,

God would

need to bring about a world final

impenitence.

in

The new

from the old individual precisely in not in final but would otherwise be very much like the old dying impenitence individual. In fact, the new individual would be a counterpart of the old

individual

one who It

different

will die in final is

impenitence.

perhaps not elegant to describe alternatives for individuals by

means of counterparts. Yet, I believe that this counterpart reading of the text is more consistent with Scotus remarks on how God knows contingents

I

sketched above than the canonical interpretation, and so

should be the preferred reading. Recall that in Scotus discussion

of

God s knowledge God

it

is

presented with an infinite variety of possible worlds. Also recall that these worlds are complete: the individual entities of these worlds have

complete histories associated with them and

God knows what

occurs at

246

Langston

any time in any possible world by knowing these histories. In the possible s a Wonderful world W, Ronald Reagan has the property of starring in "It

among many

Life"

other properties that give a complete history for him.

In the possible world

we

live

in,

the actual world, Ronald

i.e.,

complete history does not include starring in cannot be found course, Ronald Reagan in

"It

W

Wonderful

a

s

in the actual

Reagan

s

Of

Life."

world for

in

s a Wonderful Life." Reagan does not star in Likewise, our Ronald Reagan cannot exist in W, for Ronald Reagan in stars in s a Wonderful Life" and his so starring is one of the factors

the actual world Ronald

"It

W

"It

constitute the possible world.

that

Scotus.

"world-bound"

for

possible world.

Thus God,

That

It

is

to

is

then, that individuals are

clear,

they can

say,

in creating the

what circumstances to place Ronald Reagan in; Ronald Reagan to make actual. Moreover, God s the

world

actual

whose

includes

history

impenitence is really God s ability possible world than the one he did.

only

one

God

he chooses which

rather,

ability to

in

dying

made

have

to

in

exist

world he does, does not choose

save

the

someone of

state

actual

a

in

final

different

does not change the individual

conditions of possible worlds to change the histories of actual individuals;

he

changes

instantiating

the a

contingent

different

possible

world.

It

counterpart view of possible worlds with individuals better captures this tie in

of

components its

the

seems

views about

to

insistence

me

that

by the

on world-bound

between individuals and possible worlds

Scotus thought than does the canonical view. I also believe we reach a similar conclusion

Scotus

world

actual

human freedom. One

when we

think about

of the motivations for ascribing

the canonical view of possible worlds to Scotus that Scotus accepts a libertarian definition of

is

to undergird a claim

freedom

as the ability

and

opportunity of an agent to do other than he does. It is held that this notion of freedom is best presented in terms of the canonical view of

Ronald Reagan has the ability and opportunity to resign from the presidency and this can be represented by saying that in some possible world, our Ronald Reagan resigns from the presidency. possible worlds. Thus,

Similarly,

if

there

is

no possible world

in

able to run a mile in under one minute,

which our Ronald Reagan is say he is not free to

we would

under one minute. Of course, the counterpart view does not offer much hope for a libertarian analysis of freedom. Simply put, run the mile

since

it

is

in

not our Ronald Reagan, but

some counterpart

to our

Ronald

Scotus and Possible Worlds

Reagan, who

is

found

in

247

other possible worlds, our Ronald Reagan does

not really have the ability and opportunity to do other than he does.

Each counterpart of Ronald Reagan,

as well as

Ronald Reagan

himself,

can only perform the actions he performs in the relevant possible world. Scotus does not, however, subscribe to the libertarian definition of

have argued elsewhere, 5 he offers what today we would In Scotus eyes, God brings a compatibilist definition of freedom

freedom call

As

.

I

.

about the actions of

all

free

agents, but they nonetheless remain free.

These actions are brought about by God through his choice of which possible world to make actual. That there is a being very much like our

Ronald Reagan who exists in another possible world and performs actions very different from our Ronald Reagan is an interesting fact but has to

little

do with the

ability or

Once

other than he does.

better matches Scotus

about

human freedom

again,

opportunity of our Ronald Reagan to do it

claims for

seems it

to

me

that the counterpart view

seems more

than the canonical view.

It

in line with

his views

me

thus seems to

that

were Scotus asked which view of possible worlds he would endorse, he would opt for the counterpart view. 6

do not want to misrepresent the argument I am making in this paper. I certainly have not shown that the canonical view of possible worlds cannot be used to discuss Scotus views. I have shown, however, I

that the counterpart fact

seems

to

human freedom

New College

fit

view can be used to interpret Scotus claims and in with Scotus views on God s knowledge and

better

than the canonical view.

of the University of South Florida,

Sarasota

I argue for this in my book God s Willing Knowledge: The Influence of Scotus Analysis of Omniscience (University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1986) and in my article "Scotus Conception of Human Freedom" in L Homme Et Son Univers Au Moycn-Age. Actes du septieme congres international de Philosophic Medievale, edited

by Christian Wenin (Paris:

Vrin, 1986).

am presenting obviously of God s Willing Knowledge.

The Scotus chapter five

J.

I

bears great similarity to Leibniz as

I

argue

in

THOMAS A. LOSONCY

Ideas as Evidence(s) for Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being

for is hard for me to recount all this as if I were a God, not fitting for men to understand intellectually or to explain verbally all the dispositions of the Divine work.

But

it

it

is

"Philosophy"

the

avers a restraint in this passage that rightly captures

many medieval thinkers. They profess a reluctance to which they somehow frequently speak about and investigate.

of

stance

address that

Such expressions of inadequacy and reluctance didn t prevent Pseudocoelesti Dionysius from writing the De divinis nominibus and the De hierarchia.

St.

Augustine

developed

a

argument

lengthy

for

God

s

Book II of the De libero arbitrio which he would conclude existence 2 work of reason. was the somewhat 3 Later St. Anselm would tease the reader of the Proslogion with in

"tenuous"

the following:

do not try, Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way equal to it. But I do desire to understand Your truth to some extent (aliquatenus)... (chap. 1.)

1)

I

2)

I

thank You, good Lord, I give thanks to You, since what I believed before through Your free gift I now so understand through Your illumination that if I did not want to believe that You existed, I should nevertheless be unable not to understand it.

Therefore, Lord, not only are You that than which a greater cannot be thought, but You are also something greater than can be thought, (chap. 15.)

3)

1

(chap. 4.)

Homer, Iliad XII, 176; Consolation of Philosophy. Book IV, prose 6 & Richard Green), N.Y. & Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1962, p. *

Bocthius, (tr.

96.

2

This

reflection

3

remark

upon the

is

not

difficult

the strength of Augustine reasoning process involved.

about

s

argument

but

rather

a

The translations are those of M.J. Charlesworth, St. Anselm s Proslogion with and The Author s Reply to Gaunilo. Oxford: Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo Clarendon Press, 1965. Any variations are my own.

A

Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being

249

The list of thinkers and works could be extended well beyond such Moses Maimonides, Avicebron, the Liber de Causis and others but it of this paper to focus briefly on the use of

the intent

"ideas"

as is

(species

knowledge of angelic and divine being. The of and continuing investigation making precise man s knowledge of ideas enables him to expand his knowledge of separate substances (angelic

intelligibiles)

in trying to gain

beings) and God.

Plato

world

s

which were

his

of

trademark.

no

definite, fixed, with

immaterial

the

It

is

is

notable

for

certain

features

characterized as a world where being

past, present, or future,

4

becoming, the material, which is changing and fleeting. Recalling Saint Paul s words that the world is divided into

and

seen

5

medieval

early

unseen",

thinkers,

contrast the material with the immaterial in

Citing numbers, Augustine

will

is

and unlike the world of

such

as

St.

"things

Augustine,

words suggestive of

Plato.

claim the realm of reason differs from

that of the senses in the following fashion:

Even if I did perceive numbers with the bodily senses, I would not be able to perceive with the bodily senses the meaning of division and addition. It is with the light of the mind that I would prove wrong the man who makes an error in addition or subtraction. Whatever I may experience with my bodily senses, such as this air and earth and whatever corporeal matter they contain, I cannot know how long it will endure. But seven and three are ten, not only now, but forever. There has never been a time when seven and three were not ten. Therefore, I have said that the truth of number is incorruptible and common to all who think. Augustine further asserts a difference between the material and immaterial on the grounds that material things are constantly changing 7 into one another whereas the immaterial things do not. Boethius too distinguishes the material and the immaterial in terms reminiscent of Plato.

8

These characteristics are detailed in the following works: Laches 198DE and 199BC; Gorgias 482A; Meno 97E-98A; Cratylus 400AB; Symposium 210E-211A. See also my, The Platonic Ideas: Some Permanent Contributions to Medieval Philosophies of VII (1979), 105-110, and for St. Thomas, R.J. Henle, SJ, Saint Thomas Man", Diotima, and Platonism. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956. Epistle to Corinthians

De

libero

Hackstaff Ind.:

7 8

The

De

arbitrio,

II, 4,

II,

8.

18.

The

translation

On

Free Choice of the Will. (ed. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964. in

Genesi ad Litteram VII,

Liber de Persona

et

12, 19;

Migne,

duabus Naturis,

6;

is that of Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. The Library of Liberal Arts), Indianapolis,

PL XXXIV, 362. PL LXIV, 1349C-D.

Migne,

250

Losoncy

VHIth

In the

John Erigena

century,

repeat the division between

will

the material and immaterial in typically Platonic fashion and enlarge the division.

9

immaterial

the

upon

Set within the context of a Christian view of the universe, is

repeatedly

given

Platonic

distinctly

features

and

overtones in early medieval thinkers.

Although thinkers throughout the Middle Ages

continue to echo

will

Plato in speaking of the immaterial new precisions and refinements will be introduced so that what appears as Platonic is frequently new material

new

a

in

Rome

Aquinas and Giles of

man

in

present

s

new

invokes

setting that

refer to ideas,

intellect,

now

manner

a

in

For example,

principles.

Thomas

St.

labelled universals

that

and

Plato

recalls

still

s

description of the immaterial. Ideas, they claim, are abstracted from the

now

here and

As

of the material world.

from change and made permanent. 10 These same ideas, in the human

constitute

intellect,

a gateway to

of the entire realm of immaterial being. This

the exploration

man

imply that

abstractions, ideas are set free

actually experiences or

not to

is

knows the essences of such beings

as God, angels, or even the human soul. Rather, according to St. Thomas, and later Giles, man gains some knowledge of such beings through

examining the immaterial aspects of Homilia "...

in

l*rologum

intcllectus

S.

Evangelii

intcllcgcndo

his

own

11

ideas.

secundum Joanncm. Mignc, PL

dicitur

ahstrahcrc

a

(

matcria,

XXII, 294A-B. quia

intcllcgcndo

rcm

iam non considcrat formam ut cst hie ct nunc ct ut hahct essc matcrialc, scd considcrat totam rcm ct totam quidditatcm ut hahct cssc formalc. Hrgo ratio intclligihilitatis ct abstractionis sumitur ex forma, quia in hac, ut dictum cst, ctiam ipsa matcria trahitur ad conditiones formac." Giles of Rome, Thcorcmata XXII de Esse ct abstractam

Essentia (1278-85/6), ed. lid gar Hoccdc/) Ixmvain:

1930; X; pp. 55, 1. 24-p. 56, I. 4. Cf. edition cited is Expositio in Librum dc Causis, (c. 1290); Prop. XXIV, dub.; fol. 84v. 1-112 fols. Also IZxpositio in Aristotelis Libros (IVenice: 1550; fols. ai-aviii, bi-bviii III) dc Anima, (1273); Lib. I, Comm. 75, dub. The edition cited is Venice: 1496, 86 fols. I"hc

&

"List

ctiam

ct

agcntcm..."

Pontifical

in

a

phantasmata

St.

anima invenirc quamdam virtutem activam materialibus

conditionibus

abstrahit.

lit

Thomas, Quaestiones de Anima, Q. V,

Institute

of

Mediaeval

Studies,

1968.

Cf.

immatcrialitatis,

hoc

(ed.

pcrtinet

James

Tractatus

II.

de

ad

quae

ipsa

intcllcctum

Robb), Toronto: Unitate

intcllectus

contra Avcrroistas, cap. V, 111. "Secundo,

quia

per

intellectum

nostrum

et

per

ea

quac

experimur

in

nobis

sumus

apti nati ascenderc ad ea quae sunt in intellectu angclico, assignabimus differentias inter intellectum nostrum et angelicum, ut ex differentiis illis possumus videre quod

sit de angelico intellectu." Giles of Rome, De Cognitione Angelorum, q. VI; A; Venice edition (1503), by Simon de Lucre, fols. 76r-119r. For St. Thomas see, Quaestiones de Anima, q. XVI, (ed. Robb), pp. 224-225. St. Thomas also cautions one that this docs not mean one comprehends the quiddity of separate substances through this knowledge of them, "Unde per hoc quod intellectus noster intclligit quidditates rcrum materialium, non sequitur quod intelligat quidditates separatas." Ibid., p. 244. For

tencndum fol.

89r,

Man s Knowledge oj Angelic and Divine Being Some

from

texts

specific

St.

They both represent an

effort.

Thomas

In

some

"Whether

An

body?"

V

article

at

work on these problems.

of Concerning Spiritual

substance

spiritual

is

provide details of this

survey of these philosophical

historical

endeavors and reveal a specific thinker

will

251

created

that

Thomas

St.

Creatures, is

not

united

asks,

a

to

elaborate response leads to additional questions about one

s

knowledge of separate substances, God, and human knowledge as such.

Thomas

First

scans the previous philosophical research into being

and the gradual advances made in understanding human knowing itself. His review moves from the early naturalists (materialists) to the awareness of the immaterial by Plato and Aristotle. He then comments on the

For

methods surveyed: this

reason

ways to show what

He

first

these ways are not very suited to us

"However

is proposed."

12

from the

argues

"perfection

necessary for separate substances to exist. of

substance

such

is

....

necessary for us to proceed in different (other)

is

it

that

as

exist

it

of the

He

universe"

that

it

is

notes that just as the ratio

not

in

inhering

another,

as

contrasted with the existence of an accident, so this distinction should

apply to the very genus of substance in order that

some substance

without any dependence upon a body. This, of course,

and not

God who

is

exist

said of creatures

exists outside of

any genus. Next Thomas argues that from the very order of things, there should exist a middle ground between any two extremes. The universe,

be thought of as comprised of beings with degrees vertical arrangement. Consequently as one finds

for this reason, should

of

excellence

in

a

extremes for the material realm of beings so too extremes exist for the immaterial realm of beings. St. Thomas adds that God is one extreme in the intellectual hierarchy albeit not a fitting

then that between

God and

member

of any class or genus.

beings, both those joined to matter and those wholly separate Lastly,

he

this

resolving

considers

the

question.

Since

act

It

is

material beings there exist immaterial

of the

intellection

human

itself

intellect

from as

can

it.

a

key

to

operate

background material to this discussion and subsequent material in this paper John O. Riedl, "The Nature of the Angels", Essays in Thomism. (Ed. Robert E. Brennan, OP), N.Y.: Sheed & Ward, 1942, 111-148. See also, Anton C. Pegis, "Penitus Manet Ignotum", Mediaeval Studies, XXVII (1965), 212-226. further

consult,

"Sed

procedere

istae viae

ad

q. unica, art. 5,

... Unde oportet nos aliis viis Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis,

non sunt nobis multum accommodae:

manifestationem respondeo.

propositi."

252

Losoncy

independently of matter it must be an entity with esse independent of matter. Yet, as an intellectual being, this substance is so weak that it

must learn through the material and so what the

bespeaks

genus

that

in

perfect

an

genus,

than perfect

less

is

a

in

being that

intellectual

neither operates through matter nor exists in a body.

The

overtones

Platonic

the

in

are

question

twofold.

St.

First,

is developing something inherent in the Platonic view of ideas. he takes the experience of the intellectual act and uses it to Second,

Thomas form

about the natures of intelligences. Specifically, Aquinas

insights

that any class

two arguments exploit the Platonic position

first

He

and a worst.

best

most and a

consists of extremes, a

-

metaphysics of participation

-

then converts this insight into an

using a least,

works

insight

independence of the

argument

Aristotelian

The

ostensibly

the

position,

from the material. This, however, depends

intellectual

the additional assessment of the difference of both the intellect and

upon its

an

out

a

for the

existence of a highest species in the created genus of intelligences.

second

s

contents,

Boethius

exceeds

that

Boethius

reasons.

additional

for

Aquinas

Aristotle s

Soul.

the

Concerning

is

In

question

this

fails

Thomas,

late in

the

Concerning

instead,

craftsman

He

question. to

compares

who does

not

then

dictum

a

study

position"

contribution

is

from

from

raises in his Disputed

the Disputed

after

Thomas career. 13 Soul, Thomas inquires, Origen is said to s view of the

specifically?"

the

product

of

maker.

its

the creation of the universe to the

make

a

observes that Origen

properly

appreciate

of

This

These were written

or not an angel and a soul differ

be behind universe

from

VII,

Aristotelian

Thomas

St.

obviously,

is,

cogni/ant

principle.

Questions Concerning Spiritual Creatures and

"Whether

latter

"ostensibly

evident in questions which

is

Questions

The

sensible.

by Plato. The nuance of an

initiated

made

from the

ideas,

the parts of his

work equal

St.

work of a

as this

would

be detrimental to the good of the whole. For, just as all the parts of a house are not equal in their contribution and value to the whole so too there

exists

a

diversity

whole as good and as a 13

See

Intro,

14

the

art. 8.

in

for

carries

instance,

on

St.

its

universe

the

creator.

that

constitutes

Questions on the Soul, Wise.; Marquette University Press, 1984; 2-8. of II,

the

14

Thomas Aquinas, OP,

discussion and line Contra Gentiles, Book

this

Summa

in

reflection of

by James H. Robb), Milwaukee,

Thomas

See,

discussion

fit

of beings

argumentation chap. 46;

De

in

various

(tr.

w.

places.

spiritualibus creaturis,

Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being

253

Aquinas next discusses the way in which a difference of species is and one s discernment of same. He adds that to

realized in the universe arrive

at

a

knowledge of immaterial substances one must begin with a how material substances are known. Material substances

consideration of

moving from the simple to the complex additional reason of the properties each more complex being possesses. by are said to be differentiated by

He

concludes

this part as follows:

It is because of this that the Philosopher, in Book VIII of the Metaphysics, states that the species of natural things are like the species of numbers, in which the addition or the subtraction of a unit brings about a change in species. In a similar fashion, therefore, a diverse grade of natural perfection brings about a difference of species in immaterial substances. Nevertheless, the way in which species are diversified among immaterial substances is different in some respects from their diversification in material substances.

To the

explain these

of

perfection

For

material

levels

principle.

differences"

"respective

results

from

substances

Thomas the

this

notes that diversity in

level s

relation

from

results

to

their

a

single

relation

to

The more numerous and complex parts. For immaterial substances the opposite occurs. The relation immaterial substances bear to the First Efficient Cause is responsible for their hierarchical order. St. Thomas lowest such substances are the simplest while the highest are

matter.

those with

writes:

Now

the supreme perfection of the First Efficient Cause consists in in simple unity the totality of goodness and perfection. Hence the closer an immaterial substance is to the First Efficient Cause, the more perfectly it possesses its goodness in its own simple nature, and the less it neecls inhering forms for its own fulfilment. And indeed this process continues step by step down to the human soul, which holas the lowest rank among immaterial substances, just as prime matter does in the genus of sensible

His

possessing

16

things.

Two observes

further observations will elucidate St. that

because

separate

substances

Thomas

and

the

s

claim here.

human

soul

He are

constituted differently in species the very acts of operating in the genus

of intelligences,

their

respective

know by means of an know discursively and

acts

of knowing,

intellectual species innate to

The 16

translation

Ibid, 106.

is

that of

they

Robb,

ed.

abstract

cit.,

105-106.

their

are different. Angels

them but human

intelligible

species

souls

from

254

Losoncy

17 Even more, diverse angels have intelligible species which phantasms. differ in kind and so the angels themselves are specifically different. In

effect,

the

an angelic being

closer

fewer and more efficacious are

Thomas

St.

its

the

to

is

ideas.

Efficient

First

human and

enlarges upon the difference between

XV

ideas in question

of this

Cause the

18

series when he asks,

"Whether

angelic

or not the

soul can understand in a separated state from the body?" He answers that although human souls may know by reason of the influx of ideas from angels this is not especially beneficial for the human soul.

human

Such ideas are extremely universal whereas the human soul

is

attuned to

19 (Thomas does allow knowing singulars with the assistance of the senses. that one retains previous knowledge of singulars and will know whatever

additional knowledge of singulars

is

provided by

God

s

special grace or

20

allowance.) In question

human

XVI,

St.

know

can

soul

Thomas separate

inquires outright,

substances

"Whether

from

the

or not the

principles

of

philosophy and by knowing their quiddities directly such as it knows the of quiddities of material things?" The response invokes another survey philosophy states

s

that

history. all

phantasms and,

But

proper

going

"his

own

human knowing

for this reason,

is

way"

on

directed

this

issue

Aquinas toward the use of

one cannot know what angelic quiddities

Rather, one knows of such beings through the reflective the intellect on its effects and the effects of beings of a superior order: are

like.

Therefore a

soul, while united to

its

act of

body, can rise to only such a

knowledge of separate substances as that to which it can be led through species received from phantasms. Now in this fashion a soul is not able to understand what separate substances are, since such substances are utterly disproportionate to intelligible objects derived from phantasms; but we can in this way and in some fashion know that separate substances exist. In the same way we can proceed from lowly effects to a knowledge of higher causes, so that we know only that these causes exist; and at the same time that we [know] that these causes are superior, we know that they cannot be of the same order as the effects we observe. And this is rather to know what they are not than to know what they are. And in this sense it is to some extent true that insofar as we understand our intellect, in quiddities which we abstract from material things, turning toward those quiddities, can understand separate substances, 17 Ibid.,(\.

18 Ibid.,

19 Ibid.,q.

20

Vll,adlm;

ad 5m; XV,

Ibid., 190.

107.

107-108. 189.

Man s Knowledge of Angelic and Divine Being

255

to be immaterial, like those quiddities it understands them themselves which are abstracted from matter. And thus through the reflective activity of our intellect we are led to a knowledge of separate intelligible substances.

so that

Imbedded

in

these

discussions

latter

important principles hinted

at

earlier.

will

It

of

St.

Thomas

help to identify

From Boethius he

assess their respective roles in the questions he treats.

the

adopts

important

principle

that,

"the

according to the manner of being of the

known

knower."

22

some them and

are

knower

the

in

is

This principle

is

used

explain and account for the different knowing activities of human souls, angelic beings and God, their differing respective intelligible objects, and their respective ways of being. Coupled to this principle is to

the Aristotelian principle that

"the

higher includes, in

the lower

itself,

s

23

However, Aristotle s De Anima a kind of principle suggests quantitative complexity whereas St. Thomas s to the realm of approach intelligences complexity is from a different

more

features and something

Angelic

perspective.

the

regards

power and the

universal

besides."

is

complexity

not

of their ideas which

power

of

their

quantitative

but

are innate and

intellects

which

as

intensive

more

deal

or less

with

these

intelligible objects. Varying degrees of intellectual power are indicative of

a hierarchical ranking of intellectual beings. St.

Thomas

explains this as

follows:

For

more powerful an intellect is, the more it many meanings from a few instances. An example

clear that the

is

it

able to grasp

is

of this is that things must be explained one by one to ignorant persons and slow learners, and particular examples used for each single instance.

Thomas

St.

in

s

approach

is

also discernible in St.

Bonaventure

s

argument

another context.

Asking whether the world has been produced in time or from in his Commentary on the Sentences?5 Bonaventure comments

eternity that

if

one were

to

wonder whether an angel could make

or throw a stone in spite of it

is

21 Ibid., q.

22 23 24 25

its

lack of hands the answer

capable of doing such without these

XVI,

200.

The Consolation of Philosophy, V, prose

De anima Robb,

Book

q. II,

II, 3;

414b29-415a.

XVIII, 217. d.

I,

p. 1; a. 1, q. 2,

ad 6m.

4.

a pottery cup

would be

human organs because

that

of

its

256

Losoncy

He

higher being and power.

world from

nothing without

God

adds that similarly

any change

in

God

s

could create the

being.

The human

problem conceiving things separating one s from their thinking imagination. To what extent then have things changed as medieval thinkers over the centuries repeatedly pondered man s knowledge of God and angels?

difficulty

What,

such

in

especially,

clues

important

was the

role of ideas?

and evidence

regarding

their origin (innate or abstracted)

and

of

a

is

Certainly ideas provided these

questions.

their intensity

many

Furthermore

and number would

be used to assert a hierarchical array of intellectual beings. Still the initial caution endured if St. Thomas and numerous others

him are considered. Indeed, with Ockham and later medievalists, the approach became more cautious and wary. Yet there are

before

and

after

specifics of the problems are refined. The an intellectual being has grown with the help of the studies of the intellect by Aristotle, the Arabian commentators, and

also

vast

changes.

comprehension of the

university

The

man

faculties

sounded as a prayer

as

of the

in the

XHIth Century. Thus, what

St.

Anselm

Xlth Century:

O

God, that I may know You and love You, so that I may You. And if I cannot do so fully in this life may I until it comes to fulness. Let the knowledge of progress gradually You grow in me here, and there [in heaven] be made complete; I

pray, rejoice

in

...

St.

Thomas echoes with the metaphysician s calm statement: The ultimate perfection for a human soul in the order

of natural

knowledge is to understand separate substances. But it can achieve this knowledge more perfectly DV the fact that while in the body it can be disposed to this end through study and more especially through 2 merit. Consequently it is not united to its body to no purpose.

Villanova University

Proslogion, chap. 26.

27

Robb,

q.

XVII, ad 3m, 207-208.

MARMO

COSTANTINO

Gregory of Rimini: notitia intuitiva, species and Semiotics of Images

Introduction

0.

In this paper

of Rimini

I

will briefly

regarded

as

examine three cognitive problems that Gregory

preliminary to

every science:

his

definition

of

and abstractive cognition, his theory of cognitive species and his reflections on signs. For the sake of conciseness, however, I will give intuitive

only a sketchy account of the

As

one.

will

it

Augustine

s

one,

first

Rimini

appear,

a renewal which implies a lessening of the cognitive

value of sign and arises in opposition to

In

least

at

three

intuitive cognition,

know

not that their is

it

Ockham

s

opinion.

and species

Intuitive cognition

1.

two topics and focus on the third is a radical renewal of

semiotics

s

places,

Rimini argues against

charging

it

with circularity. 1

Ockham

s

definition of

The reason why we can

contingent truths through abstractive cognition

is

just the fact

does not terminate in the real things outside the mind, but to

images.

The

distinction

traced then not along

Wodeham

(as also

did

2 ),

between

Ockham

s

intuitive

steps, that

and abstractive cognition is

starting

by

their effects

but by directly looking at their nature:

intuitiva est notitia simplex,

"notitia

qua formaliter aliquid immediate in se ipso

cognoscitur. Abstractiva vero est notitia simplex, qua formaliter aliquid in

In

2 Sent.

d. 7, q. 3 Additionalis, vol. V, p. 107, 6-11. See also In 2 Sent. d. 7, V, p. 122 (against Franciscus de Trivisio and Joannes Scotus); and In 1 Sent. 1, art. 1, vol. I, p. 307. For Ockham s definition, see Ord., Prol., q. 1,

q.

3,

vol.

d.

3,

q. p. 6.

vol.

2

I,

See Grassi 1986,

OTH

p. 81.

Mar mo

258

medio repraesentativo cognoscitur". 3 The representative media both sensible and intellectual cognition are called by Rimini aliquo

for

"species".

Rimini he employs

use of the term species

s

all,

explain the physical process of perception, along the

to

it

rather problematic. First of

is

lines layed down by the perspectivi. Although his adherence to their verum sit view could seem cautious in a passage - where he says in medio" de commune dictum (ibid., p. 331, 24multiplicationc specierum "si

he certainly does not question such a common teaching, as Ockham Furthermore, he argues against Ockham s total rejection of species in

-

5)

did.

his

II

dist.

book,

Rimini,

7,

q.

3 additionalis (vol. V, pp. 102-4). According to

corpus

"quodlibet

multiplicando speciem

immutabit medium

visibile

suam"

Sent.

1

(In

d.

3,

q.

et

etiam organum,

art. 2, vol.

1,

I,

p. 328,

Every organ not only receives species, but also keeps the species absence of the objects, just as wax receives and keeps the figure of a

20-1). in

seal

332,

p.

(ibid.,

Thanks

21-26).

to

the

Aurcol

retention, Rimini can rebut Peter

s

natural possibility to have a notitia intuitiva rei

He

clearly accepted

could wonder what

is

physical

process of species

arguments in support of the non existentis. 5

the theory of mutliplicatio specierum.

But we

according to him the nature of multiplied species,

whether they share the semiotic status of the intelligible and sensible species. To answer this question, it is important what Rimini says that

a quaestio

in

Sent.

a

is

form

which 6

d.

7,

q. 3).

"quae

is

kept only by the Venetian print of 1522 (In 2

There he declares

est similitudo seu

anima... apta nata ducere similitudo"

(ibid.,

non sunt

sensitiva exterior!

which

species,

3

In

1

Sent.

Rimini

as

He On

3,

3,

q.

-

species"

principles, in

art.

after

which

1,

vol.

in

is

and firmly

(ibid.,

389,

organs,

34

distinguishes

virtualiter

manens

is

naturaliter in

states that

105,

p.

sense

pp.

I,

explains,

proper sense, species

rei cognitae,

notitiam rei cuius ipsa est imago et

in

105, 2)

impressed

immediately

knowledge of 4

d.

are

imago

animam

pp. 104, 33

that, in the

11-2).

"in

The

potentia

multiplied

have

therefore

no

390, 2. The adverb formatter, from the abstractive cognition

-

included that of the conclusion.

Sent. d. 3, q. 1, art. 2, vol. I, p. 328, 20the perspecth i and, in general, on the problem of vision in medieval philosophy see: Federici Vescovini 1965; Lindberg 1976; Tachau 1981 and 1982. 6.

refers

at

least

to

Witelo

in

In

1

quotes from Aureol, Scriptum, I, prooem., s. 2, art. 3, vol. I, pp. 198where five experiences are listed, and does not refer to d. 3, s. 14, vol. II, pp. 696-7, where are the eight famous experiences against which Ockham, Chatton and Rimini

200,

Wodeham

argued.

Venicius

Markolino pointed out the importance of volume of the critical edition (1981, p. LXIX).

tion to the first

this

edition

in

his

introduc

Gregory of Rimini and Semiotics of Images

value:

representative

are

they

not

iconic

of

signs

259

the

species in the widest sense

7

Only

knowledge

V,

3,

2, vol.

a.

1,

q.

I,

p.

way, intuitive cognition can be said to be a direct

in

this

of

outside

yielded by the

They are

and they are the forms received and kept by

the sense organs in perception (see In 1 Sent. d. 340).

since,

objects,

probably, they are just the objects themselves or their forms.

with

Species

objects.

2 Sent.

intuition of a thing (In

first

force

representative d.

7,

q.

are

3 add., vol.

p. 116, 17-8). It

of a

possibility

out

points

the context of the rejection of Aureol

in

is

a

possibility that

knowledge of non-existent things that Rimini difference between his definition of

natural

noticeable

further

intuitive cognition, as

God

compared

Ockham

to

which

keep

it

as a notitia, that

of Rodington

us

of

definition

parallelism

is,

God

he admits the

a

as

its

can keep the thing or

s

ones:

connotative

as

just

He

can not

argument reminds

upon the

they pivoted

Rimini

term,

but

object,

as a real knowledge. His

and Holcot

s

visio

that

if

could produce or keep the perception of an absent or

the notitia intuitiva without

is

Even

one.

s

non-existent object, he states precisely that quality

hypothesis of the

s

the

stresses

strict

holds between the relation of fatherhood and the term

"quamvis patrem deus facere possit tamen potest conservare patrem sine filio

sine

notitia:

et conservare,

filio

non

quod pater sit pater non habens filium". 8 In other words, God can create a male without sons, but not as father, since He would yield a contradictory state of affairs: quod sit

pater

pater

non

habens filium.

In

et

the

case

of

a

intervention in the sphere of cognition, the visio produced by

not be actual, but only potential, just as a male

is

in case of supernatural intervention,

that,

The

quality which

God

assent or to dissent

God would

a possible father. In

why Rimini holds

opinion, this argument can better explain the reason

my

supernatural

no judgement can be

can produce in sense organs

on a contingent proposition.

epoch?, therefore, accompanies the possible

God

A s

is

elicited.

not sufficient to

sort of unintentional

interference in

human

9

cognition.

Ibid,

ad

p.

notitiam

24-6: "Uno modo, communissime [accipitur species] pro omni forma habendam concurrente. Et secundum hunc modum etiam forma corporis,

104,

quod cognoscitur, 8

On

dicitur

species."

Rodington and Holcot, see Tachau 1981, pp. 232,

n.

8 and 296,

n. 8.

o

See

ibid,

p.

334,

14-9.

Here,

Rimini

agrees

partially

with

Ockham,

in

denying

the possibility of a supernatural affirmative existential judgement, and with his fictitious

Marmo

260

2.

I

Rimini

on

s reflections

and

signs

their place in late

medieval semiotics

not repeat what Francesco Corvino already said in

will

Rimini

s

1978 about

notion of intelligible species or about his particular interest in

explaining in detail the process of concepts point out

Rimini

is

of signs,

s

formation. as

What

he sketches

I

want

to his

it

along conception treatment of received and constructed species. Both of them are images, but they differ in the fact that while we don t have naturally a received species of a thing that

we

didn

t

359, 29-30),

we can

we imagine

a likeness of Christ

p.

360,

But also

1-5).

construct the final one

mind,

it

in

this

(ibid., p.

know

necessary to

is

perceive immediately in

construct a species of a thing s

we

itself (ibid.,

p.

never saw, just as

even if we never saw him (ibid., we need some received species to 10 Whatever species we have in 5-7).

face,

case,

360,

previously something similar to

order that they can play their cognitive

role.

Rimini

clarifies that

sensibilia necesse est

quod per species receptas cognoscamus

them "ad

in

hoc

nos habere

habituales notitias illorum, per quas cognoscamus hanc esse speciem huius et

hanc

illius,

et

sic

de

singulis"

we

case of species of things

something similar to

them

p.

(ibid.,

we have

never saw,

And

360, 9-11).

also in the

to perceive previously

(ibid., p. 360, 13-5).

Rimini explains in the same question (d. 3, q. 1) that a species in mind is both res secimdum se and imago vel similitudo alterius rei. Therefore, there are two different kinds of cognition of a species: one which takes it as a thing and one which regards it as an image of

another thing. The of the image and

last

cognition

memory

-

Rimini says

as

function in

includes perception

of the thing represented by the image

342, 23-6). Rimini clearly repeats here a

is

-

common

(ibid., p.

how images Ockham. As it

teaching on

human knowledge, which goes back at least to Ockham employed these explanations to rebut

well known,

the theory

of cognitive species: since they are images or likenesses of the things, they require a previous knowledge (intuitive cognition), therefore they are not useful as cognitive tools.

At the outset of

his

Summa

logicae,

Ockham

opponent, in rebutting the opposite possibility (see Ockham, Ord., Prol., q. 1, vol. I, pp. 56 and 70-1). It seems to me that, in the quoted addition 13, he could have developped his position shadowing his partial agreement with Ockham.

He L, vol.

I,

refers p. 351.

here to Augustine,

De

trinitate

XI,

8,

14,

Corpus

Christ.,

Series Latina,

Gregory of Rimini and Semiotics of Images

261

such as images and footsteps, a radically

sets against representative signs,

"Propter tamen protervos est sciendum quod signum Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid

different kind of sign:

dupliciter accipitur.

quamvis non facial mentem venire ostensum [Ord. d. 3, q. 9, vol.

aliud facit in cognitionem venire,

primam cognitionem

eius, sicut alibi est

pp. 544-545; Rep.

qq. 12-13, p. 274], sed in actualem post

(Summa

logicae

II,

53-6, pp. 8-9).

1,

I,

n

This

Ockham

is

shows all,

it

christ.

I,

ii,

2). It

at least two changes in comparison to the previous ones. First of omits any reference to the sensible nature of signs. But this is not

a novelty,

we remember Roger Bacon

if

s

every kind of knowledge mediated by signs.

Ockham

s

conception

common

previous

between

teaching. According

and

species

things

It

is

Ockham

12

signis.

depreciates

far

from

different

to Bacon, for example, there

which

of

how

interesting to note

knowledge was

mediated

of

De

definition in his

Secondly, as a consequence of his theory of relations,

gap

II,

habitualem"

reformulation of

s

the traditional Augustinian definition of sign (De doctr.

in

they

are

is

no

The

likenesses.

and likeness of the species in comparison with the not discovered a posteriori, but is given: the species, like the

relations of conformity

thing

is

real images, agree

a priori with

reality. In virtue

former

the

Bacon

stresses

meanings (De

employ

better,

or,

species,

I,

in

from

infer the latter

cognition,

must be better known

also that signs

signis

of the real relation that

we can immediately

holds between species and thing,

instead of thing.

13

for us than their

p. 83), recalling a feature of the Stoic notion of

5,

Thomas also shared, at least in which Ockham put partially aside. I say partially since Ockham with sign, that

his theory of perception

14

and

5

second meaning of sign recovers the priority of the knowledge through signs he seemed to have rebutted:

"Aliter

cognitionem

signum

accipitur

venire

natum

et

est

pro

pro

illo

his

illo

quod

supponere vel

in

facit

aliquid tali

addi

in

See, on this subject, Tabarroni 1984.

12

I, 2, p. 82. On his semiotics, pp. 16-9 and Tabarroni 1984, pp. 65-7.

De

see

Pinborg 1981, Maloney 1983, Eco

et

al.

1984,

modus signi naturalis est quando non propter aliquid, se propter conformitatem et configurationem unius rei in partibus et proprietatibus, ut imagines et picturae et similitudines et similia et species colorum et saporum et sonorum et omnium rerum tarn substantiarum signis

illationem

5,

I,

aliquam ad aliud

p.

83:

"Secundus

significatur

quam

accidentium, quoniam points out this feature again in his

14

Perspectiva

I,

d. 1, 4,

omnia haec sunt configurata in

his

pp. 7-9.

See, for example, Sent.

lib.

De an.

II,

et

conformata

aliis."

Bacon

Tractatus de multiplicatione specierum, p. 421, and

12, p. 115; 24, p. 169.

Marmo

262 15

(SL

propositione"

These natural

59-64, p. 9).

I,

which are then completely different with things.

our author, we are

to

position on

s

From

signs.

should be clear that Rimini doesn like

signs:

even

these,

the

is

opinion,

aliqua

(ficti)

d.

3,

1,

q.

nisi

by our mind. What

2, vol.

art.

numquam quam dormiens

elephantis et

vidit

occur runt"

it

t

mean

to

res

re penitus

ilia

17

know

As he

to

ipsum

illius,

ignorata"

(In 1

This implies that to have "Unde

it:

qui fmgit

formam

non plus elephantem

vel phreneticus cognoscit per

phantasmata, quae

again stresses, in order to

something through a species or a concept, it

my

on species per nullum

signis ut

elephantem, per illam

(ibid, p. 360, 23-5).

notitia habitualis of

important, in

reflections

his

360, 20-32).

p.

I,

is

cognoscantur esse signa

ipsa

a concept of something doesn

cognoscit

able to better appraise

distinguish concepts from other iconic

t

esse alicuius rei cognosci non potest

quoque

now

which has been stated above

generale omnibus

est

"hoc

cognosci,

possit

that

Rimini extends

that

fact

every kind of signs:

sibi

other signs: they

concepts also are images and likenesses of the thing,

they are constructed

if

Sent.

all

16

Coming back Rimini

signs are the concepts

nature from

fact, a sort of spontaneous reaction of the intellect confronted

in

are,

in

we have

or of something else similar to

to

keep

in

know

mind

a

it.

Conclusions

To

conclude

I

would say

Rimini

that

s

opinions on the complexity of

same

these subject matters constitute a real novelty and, at the

As

of the

for

Francesco

the

time, a

Corvino

already species, past. recovery noted the development of the notion of intelligible species from Duns Scotus to Rimini, but, as from many places of his Commentary on the

Sentences can be seen, his theory of multiplied and impressed species

appears to be a revival of Bacon s and Witelo s theories. As for intuitive cognition, Rimini shows himself quite independent of the English

For a 1978.

On

approach to the notion of natural signification see McCord conception of the mental sign, see also Tabarroni 1984, pp. 79-81.

critical

his

Ockham

,

them

compares

to

the

relation

infirmorum and the pain they suffer. See on

among

which

holds

between

De Andres

topic,

the

gemitus

pp.

99-100,

Christ.,

Series

1969,

others.

Here, I

this

Adams

he

-atina, L, vol.

I,

refers p. 312.

to

Augustine,

De

trinitate

X,

1,

2,

Corpus

Gregory of Rimini and Semiotics of Images

discussions

after

Ockham,

particularly

Adam Wodeham

of

which, often in contemporary criticism, throw Rimini shade.

As

263

s

positions,

s originality

into the

well as his notion of intuitive cognition, his semiotics, though

radically divergent from Ockham s one, appears to be deeply indebted to Augustine s theory of knowledge. Anyway, much work has to be done in order to achieve a better understanding of his thought and of it

is

contemporaries and to

his relationship to his

his authorities.

Bologna

References

a.

Sources

Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, eds. A.D. Trapp, V. Markohno et. al., 6 vols, Berlin-New York 19791984.

Peter Aureol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, Proemium - dist. 8, ed. E.M. Buytaert, 2 vols., St. Bonaventure, N.Y.-Louvain-Paderborn 1952-1956.

Roger Bacon, De multiplicatione specierum, ed. J.H. Bridges, in The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon, vol. II (reprint: Frankfurt am M. 1964).

De

signis,

ed.

K.M. Fredborg,

Unedited Part of Roger Bacon 34 (1978), pp. 81-136. Perspectiva

-

Opus maius V,

ed.

L. s

Nielsen and

Opus Maius

cit.,

vol.

of

Ockham,

(Reportatio),

ed.

Quaestiones

in

J.

De

Pinborg, in signis

,

"An

Traditio

I.

Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima, omniaXLV,!, Roma-Paris 1984. William

:

R.-A. Gauthier, Opera

ed.

librum

secundum

Sententiarum

G. Gal and R. Wood, Opera Theologica V,

St.

Bonaventure, N.Y. 1981. Scriptum

in

librum

primum Sententiarum

G. Etzkorn and F. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1967-1979.

Brown,

Summa

logicae,

Philosophica

I,

St.

Kelley,

(Ordinatio), eds. G. Gal, S. Theologica I-IV, St.

Opera

Ph. Boehner, G. Gal Bonaventure, N.Y. 1974.

ed.

and

S.

Brown, Opera

Marmo

264

b.

Secondary Literature

Corvino, Francesco nozione di 1978

da Duns Scoto ai maestri specie intelligibile agostiniani del secolo XIV (Gregorio da Rimini e Ugolino da Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 70, pp. 149-78. Orvieto)", "La

De Andres, Teodoro 1969 El nominalismo de Guillemio de Madrid.

Ockham como

filosofia del lenguaje,

Eco, U., Lambertini, R., Marmq, C., Tabarroni, A. 1984 "On Animal Language in the Medieval Classification of Signs", Versus. Quademi ai Studi Semiotici 38/39, pp. 3-38, (now in Eco. U. & Marmo, C. (eds.), The Medieval Theories of Signs, Amsterdam, 1989, pp. 3-41).

Federici Vescovini, Graziella 1965 Studi sulla prospettiva medievale, Torino. Grassi, Onorato 1986 Intuizione e significato. Adam conoscenza nel XTv secolo, Milano.

Wodeham

ed

il

problema

della

Lindberg, David 1976 Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler, Chicago.

Maloney, Thomas S. 1983 "The Semiotics of Roger

Bacon",

Mediaeval Studies 45, pp. 120-54.

McCord Adams, Marilyn 1978

"Ockham s

Theory of Natural

Signification",

The Monist

61, pp. 444-

59.

Pinborg, Jan 1981 "Roger Bacon on Signs: Newly Recovered Part of the Opus Mams", in Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, ed. J.P. Beckmann et al., Berlin-New York (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 13/1).

A

Tabarroni, Andrea 1984 "Segno mentale e teoria della rappresentazione in Ockham", Versus. in Quademi di Studi Semiotici 38/39, pp. 63-90, (now in Engl. transl. Marmo, C. (eds.), Trie Medieval Theories of Signs, Eco, U.

&

Amsterdam,

1989, pp. 195-224).

Tachau, Katherine H. 1981 Vision and Certitude

1982

"The

in the

Age of Ockham,

Problem of the species

after Ockham",

in

Mediaeval Studies

medio

Diss.,

at

Winsconsin.

Oxford

44, pp. 394-443.

in the

Generation

MIKLOS MAROTH

Tasawwur and

Tasawwur and

modern

baffled

are the two basic concepts in the center of the logic, "but the origin of these two Arabic terms has

tasdiq

Arabic

traditional

tasdiq

scholarship for over a

They are mentioned

first

century",

by al-Farabi,

2

as

HA.

but even All

Wolfson

1

writes.

Sam! al-Nas^ar

discussion of logical methodology, written as late as in 1947, has

s

been

centered round them. 3

Our knowledge, moon,

sun,

or

spheres"

as al-Farabi says, can

intellect, "the

world

is

(e.g.

and tasdiq (e.g. heaven consists of and compound every compound thing is created,

soul)

the world

be divided into tasawwur "the

4

his examples show tasawwur ). As and tasdiq refers to a phrase or group of phrases. Assent, the traditional translation of tasdiq, comprises both and

consequently,

refers

to

"group

of

is

created".

concept

"phrase"

phrases".

Concept and assent are mentioned

in al-Farabfs works,

which from

the logical point of view are not of primary importance. In this respect the situation has been can see completely changed with Ibn SIna.

We

these terms discussed in the that

they

became

chapters of his logical works, showing the guiding principles of his logic. "Every knowledge

of concept

consists "Concept

is

a

and

first

assent"

-

as

knowledge comprised

he wrote in

a

in

definition

his

or

Kitab

al-na&at.

similar

things,

HA. Wolfson: "The Terms Tasawwur and Tasdiq in Arabic Philosophy and Greek, Latin and Hebrew equivalents." The Muslim World 33(1943), p. 114. Uyun al-masa Leiden 1890.

al-Farabl: Dieterici.

Ali

il,

Sami Nassar Manahig

46.

al-Farabi: loc.

cit.

p.

56.

Ed. c

al-baht_

in:

their

Alfarabl s philosophische Abhandluneen

inda mufakkirl al-isfam. Cairo 1947,

p.

F

25 and p.

Maroth

266

assent

is

a syllogism or a similar thing. Definition

two instruments to acquire new Ibn Sina

s

knowledge."

Behmanayar account of the same views. He pupil

concept and

assent.

Concept

(hypographe,

rasm),

assent

and similar

syllogism

tasawwur and

tasdiq,

and syllogism arc the

5

is is

ibn Mar/.ban gives an even that

says

contained a

of

a definition or a description

an

or

syllogism

explicit

consists

every knowledge

in

mental

more

induction.

Definition,

the terms operations comprised and these are the two instruments to gather new

are

in

information. In

his

assents.

We

encyclopaedia Ibn Sina asserts that the

philosophical

large

only aim of

is

logic

can state

two axes of the Arabic

human

supply the

to

intellect

brief that tasawwur

in

with concepts and

and tasdiq constitute the

logic.

This structure of Arabic logic differs from that of the Greek. the

reason

the

why

question

was

It

is

what was the origin of the

raised:

Arabic system. There are two answers given.

Modern (pav-cavCa.

scholarship

and

the second one

seeks

to

cru^KaTatfecrLC,.

These

have been well known

-

these

identify

8

two

terms

expressions

in Stoic

cpistemology,

with

especially it

means,

they are to be explained in terms of Stoic logic.

This opinion seems to be based on an accidental coincidence of words. QavTao-Ca.

and

(nj^Kardtfecric,

are

really

terms

of

Stoic

cpistemology, but not that of the logic, to begin with. Furthermore, in epistemology the four words, phantasia, synkatathcsis, katalepsis,

Stoic

Ibn Sina: Kitab al-nagat. Cairo 1938, le monde Arabe. Paris 1969, 53-56.

p.

See

3.

also:

I.

Madkour:

L organon d Aristote

dans

IJehmanayar ibn Mar/ban: al-Tafeil. lid. Murtada Mutahhari. Tehran 1970, p. 4. Kullu un in wa imma tasdiq un Wa M-tasawwuru huwa al- c ilmu 1-awwalu fa imma tasawwur wa yuktasabu bi- l-haddi wa ma yagri magrahu ka- l-rasmi...wa innama 1-tasdiqu c

ilm

.

yuktasabu bi-M-qiyasi wa

ma

yagri

magrahu

La logique. I. Ibn Sina: al-Shifa c gayatu ilmi 1-mantiqi an yuflda 1-dihna .

ka- I-mitali

L isagoge. ma c rifata

wa

l-istiqra

i.

Ed. I. Madkour. Cairo 1952, hadaini M-say aini faqat.

p.

18:

Fa

Wolfson: op. cit. P. Kraus: Re\-ue des etudes islamiques. 1935 N 4, p. 220. Simon van den Bergh: Averroes Tahafut al-Tahafut. Vol. II. London 1954, p.l. A.S. Nassar: op. 1

cit.

p. 23. etc.

Tasawwur and

267

tasdiq

and phantasia kataleptike form a system together, 9 where each one of them can be regarded as a more and more perfect and clear form or a higher grade of the

admit

not

did

the

same improving knowledge. Since

the Stoic philosophy

referred

to individuals, knowledge whereas in Arabic logic concept was always universal. In Stoic epistemology synkatathesis is to assent to a phantasia evoked in our soul by an individual being, whereas tasdiq means connection of phantasiai, i.e.

or

"sentence"

universals,

we

If

"syllogism".

we should

opinio, then

this

attach

ourselves

the

to

communis

find an explanation of these structural differences

between the Stoic and Arabic systems. According to my knowledge there has been no effort to reconcile them, so it seems to me that the Stoic line is to be rejected, as it has been done by F. Jadaane. He pointed out that tasawwur was based on a definition, it

which consists of genus proximum and differentia specified, so 11 origin. And this is the second answer.

had to have an Aristotelian

In connection with tasawwur he tried to

show the

peripatetic origin

of the term tasdiq as well, but because of his poor argumentation his

conclusion

is

not convincing. But even

if

he were

right,

his result

would

Arabic system. As it is well satisfactory known the theory of concepts and that of sentences have been treated in the first two books of Aristotle s Organon, in the Categoriae and the De not

account

a

give

interpretatione,

constitute

the

which

have

or

important part of the Organon illustration first

I

the

introductory

core of the Aristotelian logic,

important Prior Analytics

The

an

of

refer

to

to

not

opposed to the more that was the most

Posterior Analytics

in the

Philoponus

as

do

and

character

s

Neoplatonic tradition.

Commentary on

To

furnish an

Posterior Analytics.

sentences run as follows:

9

7 A.A. Long: Hellenistic Philosophy. ^Berkeley and Los Angeles 1986, p. 126. G. Reale: History of Ancient Philosophy. III. The Systems of the Hellenistic Age. Albany 1985, p. 222. Cicero: Academica priora II, p. 145.

A

A. Graeser: The Stoic Categories", in: Les Sto iciens et leur Logique. Actes du colloque de Chantilly 18-22 septembre 1976. Paris 1978, p. 201: "Sextus reports that a true presentation is one of which it is possible to make a true affirmatio (kateThe passage shows the difference between our terminology and that of the Stoics. gorian)." 1

F.

106-113.

Jadaane:

L influence du

stoicisme

sur la pensee musulmane.

Beyrouth

1968,

p.

Maroth

268

The theory of demonstration is the aim of logical sciences. Aristotle gave his other books on logic to us only for the sake of demonstration. Here one can reler to the teaching on simple words in the on sentences in the De mterpretatione and Categpriae, syllogisms in Prior Analytics.

Ibn

Sina

holds

book the

-

same view

the

He

Posterior Analytics.

says

-

including Prior Analytics

and evident

real

in

is

commentary on

his

Aristotle

s

highest reason of every previous

the

that

method of acquiring

to attain to the

This purpose

pursued by the science of and without the contribution of the other branches of

demonstration

truth.

is

^ logic.

and demonstration first

most important book of the Organon the core of logic, then Ibn Sma s words in the

Posterior Analytics

If

of

chapter

is

Kit ab

the

is

al-burh an

of special

arc

The passage

interest.

quoted reads as follows: After having mentioned the purpose of the book - that is to show the way to the true assent and right concept - the benefit of the book has already been evident: it is the attainment of evidently true sciences and true concepts which are useful for us. 3 Ibn Sina refers here to the

he speaks of assents and concepts

be

sentence of his book. There, too,

first

15

explicitly.

Examining the structure of Ibn Sma s Kit ab al-burh~an we find it to accordance with the words just quoted. The first three parts of

in

loannis Philoponi in

An.

Arist.

Post.

Commcntaria.

lid.

M.

1,5-10. TOIJTO TeAoc, CCTTL TT/C, \ofLKTic, Trpay^aTccac,, anode TOC yap aAAa AoyLKa crtiyypcqa^ocTa OLO. (.

ea>
.

6

1909, p.

6

ncpl

r&v

npo-taucrcDv

ctnX&v ev T

FIcpi.

dci

~cu>

A. Badawi. Cahirae 1966, p. 7. Wa hada 1-garadu yu-

~\ :A.

1-haqqi

A6?o

TOLC, ITporcpotc;

ci>

Lcr^iI>v

TT/L>

rrcpt

i&v

of)

1-yaqini.

1-fununi.

iri

c

TC,

TT)L>

ncpl

TT)L>

cnl TauTTji^

K.a.1

65(J3

1-garada fiduhu hada 1-fannu duna sa

c qi ati

KCCC

ai.c,

De Demonstratione

anna

li-

Ae?w

AptcrroTcATjc,,

5t5ao:aA(. ai; cv

Bcrolini

Wallies.

T)^IL

l-ta^awwuri

ulumi

I-kitabi

1-haqIqF.

1-yaqiniyyati

wa

-

wa huwa Fa 1-

ifadatu

manta c atu

tasawwurati

1-muM-turuqi un ?ahirat

M-kitabi

1-haqiqiyyati

1-na-

Tasawwur and book arc devoted

the to

while the

assent}, 16

All

concept). of

that

this

Aristotle

to the theory of demonstrative syllogisms (that

fourth

means

programme marked by the should try to throw Ibn Sina

s

part that

Posterior

s

269

tasdiq

light

gives this

a

treatment of definitions

structure,

Analytics,

is

which the

summarized

of

the

then

we

on the meaning of tasawwur and ta$diq taking in

my

my

treatise to

results

must

be be

as follows.

demonstration

of illustration

I

is

always based on a Tabula Porphyriana. By way

refer to a scholastic textbook of logic.

Substancia

materialis

immaterialis

corpus

animatum

inanimatwn

animal

rationale

irrationale

homo Caius, Plautus, Tiberius

On

If so,

(i.e.

from

theory of demonstration as a basis for our examination.

have investigated Ibn SIna s Kit ab al-burh an 17 Before continuing this paper published later.

17

different

realization

duality of assent and concept.

I

A

is

is

pp. 3-192 and 193-258.

The book has

the

title

Greek questions

in

Arabic sciences.

Maroth

270

On

the

of

basis

Tabula

this

one

can

the

compose

following

demonstration:

Every material being is substance every body is material every body

is

substance

Every animated being is body every living being is animated every living being

is

body

Every sensitive being every animal

is

is living being sensitive

every animal

is

living

being

Every rational being

is

every

man

is

rational

every

man

is

animal.

animal

This scheme has been abstracted from Greek works, but true in respect to Arabic logic as well.

with

some quotations Ibn

Sina in

genera

18

In another passage

species.

As

the

for

below

species

its

forbeing

genus

in

in

of

theory

will

my

prove

statement

highest

demonstration

genus

be

to

in

the

that

the

lowest

as follows:

the middle, each the species below

one of them is reason and in the individual

it

that.

The Arabic expressions navf

his

make the we read

middle

the

I

holds

only.

describing

says

Here

it

al-$ins

c

al-akhir,

al-anw~a al-mutawassita

al-mutawassit, etc.

al-^ins

c al-a fa,

al-

have no meaning, except

in

terms of Tabula Porphyriana. 20 18

-

Sec the Tabula

195-196:

Fa

inna

Donat: Logica. Oeniponte 1914, 1-mutawassita yugibu wuguda 1-ginsa in

J.

-

Ibn Sina: al-Burhan, c c f7 M-nau l-a la M-ginsi

p.

45.

i

p. 1-

ahir.

Op.

cit.

y

r

_

fi

yt

f.

M-naw

W.

Dubislavc

Die

Keleten.

Budapest

1980,

1887, p. 1-22.

Fa inna __

248-249:

p.

li-wugudi ginsihi

i

lladi

Definition. p.

c

54-59

-v-

l-anwa a M-mutawassitata kullu nau -

dunahu wa

fi

Leipzig

*_

cm minha sabab un

1-ashasi tahtahu.

1931,

passim.

Maroth

M.:

A

gorog

logika

and 59-64. Porphyrii Isagoge. Ed. A. Busse. Berolini

Tasawwur and

The found

short

of the Arabic theory of demonstration

summary

in the following

271

tasdiq

is

to

be

passage of al-Suhrawardl:

If you take the lowest consequence, then you arrive at the highest cause in the end ... and if you begin with going down, you find the highest cause first. It is so with the genus generalissimum and species specialissima and with the others. The demonstration ... is based on this chain. 21

After having seen these unambiguous words of the passage quoted now, we must recall what we know about definition. It is the common teaching of Arabic logic that definition consists of genus 22

differentia

These terms too are

specified.

be

to

proximum and

understood

Tabula Porphyriana. So we have to say that definition and syllogism, assent are based equally on a Tabula Porphyriana,

on the

basis of

potentially a hierarchic order of definitions (e.g.

animal is

is

a sensitive living being, living being

is

man

is

concept and which contains

i.e.

a rational animal,

an animated body, body

a material substance) and a hierarchic series of syllogisms.

These

and syllogisms are convertible, they imply one

definitions

another mutually. Let us see only one example: vs.

rational being

"Every

every

man

definition

which

is

is

animal,

man

The same items

is

"Man

is

rational

animal"

rational being, consequently,

to be found in both the and the syllogism. According to this theory of demonstration, based on the Neoplatonic Tabula Porphyriana, sciences are is

transformed

animal".

into

are

a

hierarchic system of definitions and a hierarchic system of syllogisms running parallel to one another. The elements of this system appeared already in the second book of Aristotle

s

Blond has pointed out. 23 This most advanced and systematic form in the

Posterior Analytics,

Aristotelian line reached

its

wa

al-Suhrawardi: Kitab al-masarf Oeu\res_ philpsophiques et ^mystiques. 303.

Hakada

fi

ginsi

1-agnasi c

yubtana burhanu 1-nihayati

J.M.

dit

en

le

Mfyar al-

Blond: Logique

c

wa nau

ilm. Ed. et

J.

c i

c i

le

l-mut arahat.

In: Shihaboddin Yahya Sohravardi. Ed. H. Corbin. Paris-Teheran 1976, p. 302c 1- anwa wa gayriha, wa c ala hadihl 1- salasili ahadiha.

Tome

inda igtima

00 E.g. al-Gazzali:

as

I.

i

Suleyman Dunya. Cairo 1961,

methode chez

Aristote.

Paris

p. 269.

1939, p. 167. "Nous avons qu une telle conception du raisonnement scientifique tend a transformer la science une hierarchic de definitions: Aristote semble ici le realiser dans une certaine

mesure..."

Maroth

272

Neoplatonic and Arabic theory of demonstration under discussion. definitions

common

and syllogisms,

s

"assents",

serve with

As

their

source, the Tabula Porphyriana, for theoretical background of

we can understand

demonstrations, Slna

concepts and

i.e.

and

his successors logic.

new and emphasized role in Ibn the explanation why tasawwur and

their

This

is

tasdiq are the two axes of the Arabic logical Organon.

After having seen the theory,

The

text of the well

known grammar

let

us turn to a practical example.

written by Ibn Agurriim begins with

the following sentences:

a meaningful complex of sounds." This is a definition. the defined species, "meaningful" is differentia specified, is genus proximum. Speech can be divided into "complex of sounds" three parts: nouns, verbs and particles. Noun is marked by / of "Speech

"Speech"

is

is

"

etc.

genitive, al-

"Verb

is

These arc descriptions, which

marked oy qad,

saufa,

..."

etc.

substitute the definitions.

24

The

text suggests

the following Tabula: lafy

uncompound, not meaningful

compound, meaningful 1

,

speech

-L-

ral-,

-i,

tanwin,

-r-

saufa, qad, etc.

etc.

noun

verb

This Tabula, which

is

others

particles

suggested by the definitions and descriptions

of the text, implies the following order of syllogisms: All meaningful complex entities are sounds

every speech

is

compound and meaningful

every speech

is

a complex of sounds

al-,

24

Kit ab

p. 171.

-i,

are characterizing speech characterized by al-, -i, etc.

etc.

noun

is

noun

is

speech

al-Ajurrumiyya.

In:

Briinnow-Fischer:

Arabische

Chrestomathie.

Leipzig

1964,

Tasawwur and Speech characterized by al-, "al-Agurrumiyyati" is

is

"al-Ag\irrumiyyati"

Kit abu

arrangement like

logic,

typical

noun -/

a noun.

of

mathematics,

etc. is

characterized by al- and

an introductory textbook of grammar.

is

l-~A^umimiyyati is

-i,

273

tasdiq

so

etc.,

introductions

similar

all

it

is

suitable

into

show

to

other

Its

sciences

general what

in

was the Arabic practice in arranging sciences. But there is a difficulty left. The terms phantasia and synkatathesis do not occur in Neoplatonic logical texts. problem, if we turn to the Greek commentaries on Aristotle s De anima. Alexander of Aphrodisias says in his commentary written before Neoplatonic times that the sensitive

seems a solution

It

human

faculty of the tithesthai.

25

Phantasia

followed by horme, there

sciences

26

synkatathesis. is

synkatathesis

the

to

and synkatafollowed by synkatathesis, which on its turn is

soul has the duty of phantasiousthai is

movement

of body. In the case of the theoretical

is no movement, since phantasia is followed only by They are different terms, because phantasia is simple and

compound.

27

There

a

is

harmony between these passages

and between that of Simplikios who says that synkatathesis reasoning

connection parallel

diexodos)

(logon

to

of

concepts

definitions

through

already

defined.

a psychological phantasia,

as

28

as

the

way of

Assent

(horous).

Thus

well

is

is

definition

logical

a logical syllogism

a is

is

parallel to a psychological synkatathesis.

The same picture is given by Ibn SIna. According to him we get our concepts and assents with the aid of our bodily organs. Our sense abstracts the universals from the individual perception beings (i.e. sense perception

Alexandri 26

Op.

cit.

is

the source of our ta$awwurat. This

De anima

73 from line

liber

cum

mantissa. Ed.

I.

is

one cognitive

Bruns. Berolini 1887,

activity

p. 119, 12-13.

12.

optcrrticak; Simplikios describes the two ways of thinking: Simplikios de Anima. Ed. M. Hayduck. Berolini 1882, p. 46.

and

ccTroScc

98 Simplikios: op.

p. 204, 25.

cit.

Ibn Sma: Al-sifa

.

1974, p. 197: Fa 1-nafsu li-1-tasawwuri wa 1-tasdiqi.

c

Al-nafs. Ed. G. Anawati and Sa id Zayed. Cairo c 1-insaniyyatu tasta inu bi- l-badani li-tahsili hadihi 1-mabadi a

Al-Tabfiyyat

6.

Maroth

274

of the

human

connection, and

and

Then our

soul.

we

get acquainted with true propositions from experience

These are the three ways

tradition.

second cognitive

activity of the

Tasawwur and of

concepts

soul brings the universals (tasawwurat) into

logic.

tasdiq,

They

psychology as well. So,

human

to obtain tasalq at.

30

This

is

the

soul.

as our quotations show, are not only central

are

two basic notions of Greek and Arabic

we can summari/e

as follows: in the late

Greek

and Arabic philosophy there is a tripartite structure of the soul with hierarchically ordered faculties. The sensitive part of soul abstracts elementary tasawwurat and tasdiq at through sense perception from the world.

outside

The

theoretical

part

is

supplied

with

evidently

true

tasawwurat and tasdiq at by the divine intellect. Tasawwurat and tasdiq at acquired from sense perception and divine intellect through induction and deduction

are

arranged

in

Tabulas,

which

constitute

the

basis

for

sciences.

The Neoplatonic concept of logic together with late Greek and Arabic psychology can give a clearer and system bound account for the difficulties connected with the terms tasawwur and tasdiq.

University of Budapest

-sn

.

.

Ihn Sina:

loc. cit.

JOHN H. NEWELL Jr.

Grammaticus

ct Ethicus:

William of Conches Search for Order

William

Conches

of

was

a

and

grammarian

twelfth-century

natural

philosopher of the school of Chartres. In addition to glosses on Plato Consolatio philosophise, and Macrobius

Timaeus, Boethius

s

commentary

on the S omnium Scipionis, William composed the Philosophia mundi and the Dragmaticon, encyclopedic

of

compendia of

all

the scientific knowledge

1

Throughout these works, William strives to establish an orderly system and to follow that system to its logical conclusions and implications. Thus for example, in his grammatical studies, he perceives his

day.

Rome as of continuing value and not at all with Christian doctrine; consequently, in the most salacious incompatible the ancient myths of pagan

of the adulteries of the gods,

tales

cosmological essence

of

truths.

2

human

he finds the matter for moral or

In his discussion of moral philosophy, he sees the

nature

residing

therefore, he rigorously expunges

in

from

man his

which might interfere with the individual

freedom

s

of choice;

and,

system of ethics any factors

moral autonomy. Similarly in explorations of natural philosophy, William posits an orderly and

his

benign

universe

comprehensible

operating

to

human

to

certain

laws

natural

set

reason. In explaining the creation and adorning

of the universe, he strives to possible and to

according

s

limit severely

make

these natural laws as

autonomous

as

any intrusions into the natural functioning

of the universe.

Like

many

of

his

fellow

Chartrians,

William

philosophy on a kind of Christian Platonism.

He

bases insists

his that,

natural in

the

On

William s life and works see especially Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the of Medieval Thought and Learning, 2nd rev.ed. (Ixjndon, 1920), 106-112 and 294-314; J. M. Parent, La doctrine de la creation dans I ecole de Chartres, Publications de lnstitut d etudes medicvales d Ottawa, vol. 8 (Paris, 1938), esp. 11-25; Tullio Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches c la scuola di Chartres (Florence, 1955); and Nikolaus M. Haring, "Chartres and Paris Revisited," in Essays in Honor of Anton Charles Pegis, cd. J. Reginald O Donncll (Toronto, 1974), 294-95. History

I

See for example Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth Medieval Platonism, Mittellateinische Studien und Texte, Band 9 (I,eyden, 1974), 13-78.

in

Newell

276

beginning, unity,

God, existed by

i.e.

mind from

in his

the

and some of

individuals.

form

or

of

it

containing the forms of eternity

came

all

things in his

all

from eternity which form would Some of these forms are of genera, some of

mind before he makes

idea

this unity

the forms of

eternity because he provided

agree with which thing. species,

and from

itself

God had

the multiplicity of the universe.

and

3

and likenesses of

4

The archetype

of

things has existed as the unity of

all

reality,

mind.

his

in

the truest reality.

is

Just as a carpenter visualizes something

so God, before he created anything, had

it,

From

this true reality

come

which constitute the universe

-

world

the

God from the images

the

sensible

world.

Things

in

the

world can never equal the

sensible

reality

of the

divine mind, for the things of the created world always remain imperfect

made

copies, just like a circle

copy of

reality,

mud

or water. 5 But although only a

everything which exists does bear

God. And the creation 6

in the

as a

whole

some resemblance mind on which

reflects the divine

to it

is

Man

can know only the images of the divine mind united with itself; but what is important for William is that the status of the world as a reflection of the divine mind makes the

based.

matter, not the archetype

man through the investigation source of only knowledge. views the matter which is united with the

greater reality of the latter accessible to

of the sensible world,

William

man

naturally

reflections of the divine

from

nothing.

As he

s

mind says,

to

make up

"The

the sensible world as created

Creator

is

prior

to

everything

for

Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.14., MS. Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class fol. 7vb, ed. Helen Rodnite Lemay, The Doctrine of the Trinity in Guillaume de Conches Glosses on Macrobius: Texts and Studies, diss. Columbia Univ., 1973, 125-26: "Ideas vero omnium rerum deus in mente ab eterno habuit quia providit ab eterno que forma cui rei conveniret. Sed idearum qucdam sunt generales, quedam speciales, quedam individuales." In the following references to William s works, I will provide the Latin only for references drawn from manuscripts or other unpublished sources.

40,

Glosae super Platonem, ed. Edouard Jeauneau

(Paris, 1965), 99.

Glosae super Platonem, 112-15. Glosae

super

Macrobium

(longer

redaction)

1.6.8,

Munich

MS

14557,

fols.

119v-

creaturarum que dicuntur sequi ipsum creatorem in hoc quod ab eo contrahunt existentiam et ei etiam in aliquo sunt consimiles. Nulla enim est creatura 120r:

"...

id

est

que cum ipso non obtineat similitudinem, sive maximam, sive minimam, sive inter Cum autem ita omnia in aliquo conveniant cum creatore, per unitatem utrumque. tamen creator ab eis sequestratur, in hoc scilicet quod ipse solus vera est unitas." Cf. Lemay, Doctrine of the Trinity, 172-76. For a discussion of the importance of this theme in the Chartrians see Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century (Princeton, 1972), 16-17, 31-32, and 172-73. ...

Grammaticus

everything receives

its

et

Ethicus: William of Conches

existence from

him and he from

277 7

nothing."

William

Plato as agreeing with Christian doctrine on the creation of

interprets

matter. According to his interpretation, Plato ascribes to

God

the creation

matter from nothing. William argues that, when the ancients said that the world never began, they did not deny that the world began but of

all

began in time. For Plato and for Aristotle, as much as for 8 Augustine, the world began with time. Believing firmly in the sacredness of both the Bible and Plato, William consistently interprets them as in only that

it

agreement.

The prime matter, which God created from nothing, has no form and quality of its own but is able to receive the forms and qualities of all things. Everything is able to be composed from it because it becomes whatever form but

from

it

has received.

form

its

it

is

9

From prime matter

made

to

be what

a thing

is.

it

is

made

to be,

William gives as an

example that a statue is not called a statue of Achilles because it is made from copper but because it is imprinted in Achilles form. 10 Prime matter itself.

is

God

able to be understood by itself but

it

is

not able to exist by

simultaneously created both the prime matter and the elements

which are composed from prime matter joined with form. 11 William explains that the elements - pure earth, water, air and fire are the simple and minimal particles of which all bodies are formed. Unlike prime matter, the elements have their

own

distinct

forms and

but like prime matter, they are unable to exist by themselves. Although they cannot exist by themselves, these elements, when mixed qualities,

with one another, are present in the composition of

and

all

bodies. Visible

which are also commonly called elements, are each composed of a combination of these four simple elements and are named after the element which dominates in their make-up. William earth, water, air,

suggest that call

if

fire,

we wanted

to use a

more

precise terminology,

we would

the simple particles elements (clementa) and the four bodies which

Philosophia, ed. Gregor Maurach (Pretoria, 1980), 18. For discussion of William s and the other Chartrians views on creation from nothing, see Parent, 40-43 and 95107; Gregory, 189-97; and Heinrich Flatten, Die Philosophic des Wilhelm von Conches

(Coblenz, 1929), 122-26. 8

Glosae super Platoncm, 104 and 180. Cf. 108 and 176-81. Glosae super Platonem, 168-69 and 258.

Glosae super Platonem, 261. Glosae super Platonem, 259-60.

Newell

278

elemented things (elcmentata). 12 Since William describes the elements as existing only in the composition of elemented things, he are

seen,

apparently considers the elemented things to have been created by

God

simultaneously with the prime matter, the elements, and time. with

Consistent

emphasis on the orderliness of the

constant

his

creation as a reflection of the divine mind, William emphatically rejects the

of chaos,

existence

tradition:

they

say that the opinion they propound

"We

follow

is

13

understood."

doctrine supported by ancient and Christian

a

inappropriate,

William

existing in chaos

is

first

and the

ridiculous.

From

cite

the reasoning is

not

well

their original creation the elements,

some

in

occupy some

some

if

false,

explains that the idea of elements originally

which are the matter of bodies, had to be space. But

is

they

authority

they were

where they are now or someplace

The elements were,

else,

space, since

all

bodies

space, they were either but outside of the elements no

in

where they are now, even not so disposed as they are now: some above, some below, and some place

exists.

therefore,

the middle. But, since the elements occupied

could not at the same time

all

all

if

in

the space there was, they

arise or all descend; therefore, there

was

14

no chaos.

William then rejects the reason proposed for the existence of namely that God created chaos to show what confusion there

chaos,

would be

if

he had not ordered the world.

already

angels created,

knew

the

He

nature of things and

there was no one to

whom

argues that, since the

men had

not yet been

15

Next William

he could show

it.

attacks the proponents of chaos for misinterpreting their authorities.

concludes that Plato said that

God

led the elements to order

He

from an

unordered tossing about not because there ever was such a disordered confusion, but because without God s direction there could have been. For

where

is

creation

when God disposes everything? 16 The movement from a potential disorderly

there a place for disorder is

then for William the

chaos to an actual, ordered universitas

.

Glosae super Platonem, 129-30 and 278-80. For discussion of the significance of the term elcmcntatum see "Elementatum: Its Appearance Among the Twelfth-Century and Peter Dronke, "New Approaches to the School Cosmogonists," MS 16 (1954): 156-62; of Chartrcs," Annuario de estudios medie\ ales 6 (1969): 129-31. 1-1

Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 34. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 34. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 34-35.

Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 35.

Grammaticus

et

Ethicus: William of Conches

279

opponents view of chaos, William gives his own view of the original condition of the elements. All the elements were from the beginning where they are now and had the same

Having disposed of

substantial

his

but not

qualities,

all

their

present accidental qualities.

The

earth was covered with water, and the other elements were thicker and

darker than they are now, but there was never any disordered tossing 17 about of the elements. God created in the sensible world an ordered whole, a universe, which reflects the order in the divine mind and which

man

can rationally comprehend. Following

the

God

s

creation of the four elements from nothing

unfolding of the universe.

which was mixed

The

stars

comes

were formed from the water

in the air:

From what

they were [by their fiery nature] they immediately began to be moved. And from their motion they began to warm the air underneath and, by the mediation of the air, the water. From the warmed water were created two kinds of animals: flying and aquatic .... But since those were made from water, the water was dried up in places and muddy earth appeared. In certain places it was thinner and there, warmed by the neat of the sun the earth 18 produced various kind of animals, namely reptiles and man.

William supposes that what occurred after the original creation of the four elements was done, not directly by God, but by the laws of nature.

While

these

autonomously rational

after

explication

owe

laws

natural

their

their

creation.

of the

basically as a closed system.

origins

existence

William of things,

God may

thus for

to

God,

they

presents

a

operate

rigorously

he sees the universe

choose to enter

this closed

system through miracles, but William seeks to limit the occurrence of such incursions to a minimum, such as the virgin birth. 19 at times

The

creation of the

human

body, like the rest of the adorning of the universe, occurs within the closed system of nature. William explains that,

17

human body was where there was an equality among

following the creation of the other animals, the

made from

a certain part of the earth

Glosae super Platonem,

1 19.

Cf. Philosophia, 28-29.

10

Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9. 5, Leipzig MS 1253, fols. 60v-61r; Munich MS 4603, fol. ita facta sunt 162v, Troyes MS 1101, fol. 7v, and Troyes MS 1381, fol. 52r: corpora stellarum que statim ex quo fuerunt moveri ceperunt, et ex motu suo subditum aerem calefacere et acre mediante aquam. Sed ex aqua calefacta creata sunt duo genera animalium: volatilia scilicet et aquatilia. ... Sed cum ita ex aqua fierent ilia desiccata "Et

est

per loca

et apparuit terra limosa.

calefacta diversa genera

In quibusdam locis tenuior fuerat, que calore animalium produxit, scilicet reptilia et hominem."

ed. Guilielmus Dragmaticon, Gratarolus, (Strasbourg, 1567; rpt. Frankfurt, 1967) 120-32.

Dialogus

de

substantiis

solis

physicis

280

Newell

the four elements. This

man from

mud

the

the

is

of the

God formed meaning of Genesis 2:8: 20 For William, the account in Genesis "and

earth."

God directly created the human body, but that the God had created, produced the human body, like the other land animals, from the mud of the earth. Having his body created by natural causes strengthens man s ties to nature. He is not mean

does not

that

forces of nature, which

distinct

from

the

world,

naturalistic explanation of

Again someone was so created.

but

man

rather

part

of

it.

William

defends

his

creation:

s

detracts from divine power to say man respond that on the contrary it confers to God both to have given such a nature to things and thus to have created the human body through the working of nature. will

We

say

it

By thus explaining the creation of man s body in terms of secondary cause, William further insists on the comprehensibility of the world and emphasizes that man himself is a part of nature. William also endeavors to apply a naturalistic

Eve

interpretation

to

creation:

s

But since what

somewhat

is nearest to equality is, even if less, nevertheless temperate, it is likely that the body of woman was

from nearby mud. And, therefore, woman is neither the man nor is she entirely different from man. Nor is she so temperate as man because the hottest woman is colder than the coldest man. And this is what the divine page says, "God made woman from the side of man." For it oui*ht not to be believed 22 literally that God tore a rib from the first man. created

same

In

as

order to

William

ascribe

interprets

the

the

creation

biblical

of

woman

account

of

s body to natural causes, Eve s creation as a myth.

Woman

was not formed by God from the side of man, but by natural forces from mud which was near the mud where the first man was formed. Obviously he uses the same method

man and

the rest of the universe, but his account of the

St.

first

woman

s

more

blatantly from the Bible. Under attack from William William Thierry, replaces his naturalistic account of Eve s creation

creation differs

of

in explaining the creation of

with the biblical account in his Dragtnaticon. 23 Nevertheless, except for the account of the creation of woman, William retains his explanation of the creation through secondary causes. His retraction, under criticism, of 20

Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 38.

Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 39.

22

Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 38.

Dragmaticon,

1.

Grammaticus

the explanation of

Eve

et

Ethicus: William of Conches

281

creation seems a withdrawal from a minor point

s

rather than a real change in his thinking.

William

In

s

the world,

view,

a reflection of the

as

divine

mind,

must be not only ordered but also good. Goodness was, of course, one of God s main attributes in all Christian tradition, and Augustine had referred to the beauty and order of God reflected in the William follows Augustine in identifying the final cause of the world with God s goodness. 25 Throughout the early middle ages, the frequently

world.

24

monastic writers viewed the natural world as good and beautiful primarily as a consequence of the fact that the world symbolized the beauty and 26 Like the monastic writers, William finds the basis for goodness of God. the world s beauty in the world s relation to God, but William emphasizes that the world is good and beautiful because God created it in harmony

and order. William says that while man cannot know divine actions, he can know that all things disposed by to

God

are directed

some good. 27 William significantly extends

to

the causes of

all

his

include the postlapsarian world.

praise of the goodness of nature

The

Fall

of

man was

for

monastic

theme of any discussion of nature and man. The Fall corrupted, stupefied, and despoiled man so that, incapable of recovering 28 William naturally cites the Fall himself, he has to be restored by God.

writers the central

as the source of evil in the world, but the scarcity of references to the Fall in his

works

though

period,

William

is it

striking.

lack

may

differences with

s

prominent

especially

writers describe

all

He

insists

that nature in the postlapsarian

remains

perfection,

29

essentially

good.

the monastic view of the natural world are

in his discussion

of sexual relations.

Many

monastic

sexual desires and relations as sinful in themselves

For examples of Augustine s statements on the beauty of the world, see Enchiridion Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 29 (Turnhout, 1970), 233-34.

4.13-15,

25

Glosae super Platonem, pp.

On

60, 62,

and 97-99.

monastic attitude which found beauty in nature because of its symbolic connotations see Robert Bultot, La doctrine du mepris du monde (Louvain, 1963-64), the

4.1:112-16.

27

Glosae super Platonem, William, see Gregory, 98-106. 28

176.

On

the

theme

of

the

goodness

See for example Anselm of Canterbury, Cur deus homo, Anselmi opera omnia, 6 vols. (Rome and Edinburgh, 1939-61) 2:5. ?Q

Glosae

2.3,

ed.

of

F.

the

S.

world

Schmitt,

in

S.

Platonem, 117-18. Cf. 213 and 219. These are the only three in William s Glosae super Platonem. His other works similarly deemphasize the theme. references

super the

to

Fall

Newell

282

arc the means of propagating a sinful nature. Sexual described as irrational and beastly, and Anselm of Canterbury,

because

they

pleasure

is

be accomplished without But in the Dragmaticon when the Duke suggest that William his discussion of coitus because it is not respectable

for example, argues that sexual relations should

any desire.

30

discontinue

(honesta), William replies,

"Nothing

which

is

natural

ugly for

is

the

is

it

31

For William, the world retains its value and goodness; of creation." remains worthy of study because of its order, harmony, and goodness as a creation in the image of the divine mind.

gift it

Belief in

goodness of

the

all

includes

creation

a

belief

in

God

s

providential ordering of the universe. William describes the universe as 32 Nature is the structured and functioning according to God s will.

creation of

God

serving to unfold his

will,

and

it

is

God

s

will that the

universe be as good as possible. William explains that the motion of the planets is contrary to that of the firmament because if both moved in the

same to

stand

earth

speed would be so great that nothing would be able on the earth. 33 The sun moves obliquely around the

direction, the

or

live

because

if

it

were always

directly

overhead there would be no

change of seasons, and without the change of seasons the earth would never conceive, fruits would never mature, and so nothing would be able to

live.

the

air,

34

After giving a physical explanation for the absence of stars

in

William continues:

But what is more important it was not the will of the creator for be in the air. For since air is near the earth, if stars were in it, they would burn the j^arth by their nearness and nothing would be able to live on earth. stars to

The

structure of the world

willed that

it

reflect his divine

is

good because

in

creating the world

God

order and goodness.

Although the world is the result of God s will, it nevertheless remains subject to certain orderly and discernable rules. William limits the direct actions of God in the world to the original creation of the elements

from

nothing

and rare miracles

Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Dcus homo, Dragmaticon, 244. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 39. !

Dragmaticon, 116-17. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 62-63.

Philosophia, ed. Maurach, 37.

2.16,

like

Opera, 2:119.

the

virgin

birth,

which

Grammaticus

Ethicus: William of Conches

et

occur against the usual course of nature.

adorning of the universe and of

effects

God

but

the

differences.

William, the

to

37 As through nature. view of the work of nature bears certain

this

to Augustine s Both allow for

similarities

According

continuing operation are not the direct

its

effects

Gregory has shown,

Tullio

36

283

of

God working

rationes

God

s

seminales

instantaneous

but

with

creation

important

of souls

and

elements from nothing and for the further development through agents of God. But Augustine used the rationes seminales to reconcile the doctrine of the simultaneous creation of

new

all

things with the daily appearance of

so that he could then deny the appearance of any truly new William of Conches, on the other hand, places his definition of

birth,

being.

nature

as

a

presupposition

of

a

vision

scientific

of the

world which

38 For permits him to attribute a proper efficacy to secondary causes.

William, nature has a true efficacy of

conformity Since

the

to

the

will

of

rules

interventions of

God

its

own

and, though created in

and mind of God, enjoys a

relative autonomy. unchangeable except for the rare and since they are ordered reflections of the divine

nature

are

mind, they are in general comprehensible to

human

reason.

Even

in his

Dragmaticon, where he retracts a number of his specific speculations such as his explanation of Eve s birth, William steadfastly retains his doctrines of the creation through secondary cause and of the In

the

asserting

efficacy

recognizes the autonomy he

is

autonomy places on God

of

secondary

autonomy of nature. causes,

William

clearly

ascribing to nature and the restrictions

power. In the Dragmaticon, William has four elements were necessary in the Philosopher explain construction of the universe. Earth and fire, the two elements necessary

this

the

for

s

that

the world

to

be seen and touched, had to be separated by some fire would burn up whatever was on the earth. A

medium. Otherwise single

medium would

water more the

Duke

not have sufficed because air was

like earth; therefore,

raises

more

like fire

two media were necessary. At

and

this point

an objection:

obvious even to the bleary eyed and tonsured that these and other disagreeable things would follow if only one of these were placed in the middle. But I wish you would say whether God could not have created some body which would be equidistant from both extremes. It

36

x

is

Glosae super Platonem, 104. Dragmaticon, 31-32.

->o

Gregory, Anima, 179-81.

284

Newell

I do not place a limit on divine power, but I will tell he had done that there would be neither air ... nor water, whose use is necessary to man in many ways.

Philosopher:

you that

if

Duke:

God had wanted

If

to make the world without these extremes could have sufficed.

medium between

Philosopher: No, not

if

man one

the nature of things remains. 39

William specifically states that he is not placing limits on God s power, since God could have done whatever he willed. But in creating the nature of things as he has,

God

has given autonomy to secondary causes, and he

has voluntarily limited himself.

William argues that such a view does not really detract from

God

s

power because it confirms divine power granted such a nature to things and through nature created other things. 40 All the works of nature are ultimately the result of the will and

power of God, and the autonomy of

nature does not detract from God. Establishing the efficacy of secondary causes does, however, make an examination of the nature and causes of things

a valid

subject

for

certain comprehensible

human

and orderly

study,

of the world and time.

College of Charleston, Charleston, S. C.

Dragmaticon, 46. Glosae super Boetium

3.

m.

9. 5.

because they are governed by

rules willed

See above note

20.

by

God

at the

beginning

EUGENIA PASCHETTO

Perspectiva c conosccnza scicntifica ncll opcra di Witclo

Ncll Introduzione alia Perspectiva, Witelo afferma d csscre stato sollecitato

da Gugliclmo

ma

di

Mocrbckc

a

quanto

annoiato dalla prolissita del perspective, intcrcssato dalla loro problematica, auspicava la nascita d un trattato

base

in

chc,

delucidare

i

come

stato

precedentemente

fondamentali

problemi perspecliva medioevale percio,

era

che,

infatti e la

di

questa

scien/a.

sin dall inizio del nostro sccolo e stato puntualizzato la

perspectiva

rappresentazione artistica della realta, mentre dai

fatti

forniti

dall occhio

e

la

da E.

artificialis

pingendi del Rinascimento: quest ultima e la formulazione delle

muove

La

scienza della luce e dei corpi luminosi

Panofsky, essa non ha nulla a che fare con

la

potesse

ipotizzato,

complessa

o

norme per

prima e un sapere che

che privilegia tra

sensazioni

le

la

una scienza piu ampia e complessa anatomia ottica araba, vuoi pcrche le

In questo senso la perspectives e

vista.

dell ottica

geometrica euclidea e

dell

abbraccia entrambe, vuoi perche piu di esse comporta la valutazione della sensazione e del sensibile. Da un lato infatti la perspectiva s interroga

natura della luce e dei fenomeni ad essa connessi, chiamando in

sulla

causa

fisica e matematica; dall altro implica 1 analisi dell origine, della trasmissione e dell utilizzazione del dato sensoriale, nonche la valutazione

delle

facolta

chc

vi

prendono

parte,

ed

in

questo

caso

presuppone

gnoseologia, psicologia e medicina.

A greca, fisico

e

determinare talc quadro concorsero in varia misura oltre da Euclide a Tolomco e alle successive rielaborazioni

ed empiristico dovute ad Alkindi e ad Alhazen, della

ncoplatonica

galenica,

con

animali;

nonche

divulgate

E.

dai

Panofsky,

la

sua

problemi

elaborata

gnoseologia basata

conoscenze

le

sulla

biologiche

la

ed

"Die

medie\>ale,

senso

circolazione

anatomiche in

la

medicina

degli

spirit!

dcll occhio,

gran parte

als Symbolische Form" Vortrage dcr Bibliothck Per un interpretazione e un ampia bihliografia dei principali di prospettiva mcdicvale: G. Fcderici Vescovini, Studi sulla

Perspective

storico-filosofici

ottica

visione metafisica

da Avicenna;

mcdici arabi Hunain, Jesus Hali, Rasis ed

Warburg 1924-25, 258-330. prospcttiva

conoscenza,

all

in

Torino 1965.

,

Paschctto

286

tradotte

vanno

prohlematica Per tali

Dcmctrio c

di

Costantino

di

Pinterpreta/ione

relativa ai concetti di spa/io, di continue, di

Africano; ne

1

e

luce

dclla

sostanzialistica

la

distan/a."

la perspectiva ha un posto ambiguo nel sapere: fisica da Arislotele, e assimilata alia metafisica da e geometria

situata tra

R.

ad opera

latino

in

dimcnticatc

ragioni

ed

Grossatcsta

ricondotta

e

da

Bacone

Ruggero

tra

scien/.e

le

alia fine del Medioevo, da Biagio sperimentali, per poi essere awicinata,

Pelacani da Parma, alia matematica intesa

come conoscen/a

delle quantita.

in tempi a noi Perspectiva di Witelo, diffusissima nel Medioevo, una parafrasi del De aspectibus di piu vicini fu definita fin troppo spesso

La

tuttavia di Alha/.en, per gli evident! debiti nei confront! dell opera araba; recente e stato sottolineato che Witelo introduce nel suo testo rcttifiche,

ben apparen/a marginali, ma tali da dare allo scritto caratteristiche 3 della Witelo dall diverse. A cominciare introdu/ione, importan/a precisa in

1

d ogni

altra

puo

cercheremmo

in

della

forma

che e

e

terra

sulla

scien/.a

quale

perspectiva:

e

essa

cose,

la

infiuen/c

le

disciplina

conoscerc

e

essen/.a

l

cogliere

che trasmette

luce,

delle

celcsti

che meglio

Invano

verita.

la

Alha/.en una affcrma/.ione del genere che Witelo deve

aver ripreso invece dal neoplatonismo arabo e dalla metafisica della luce, sostenuta dalla corrente francescana di Roberto Grossatesta.

A

differen/a

ripropone nel

De

del

una

I.I

dagli Elcmenti d Euclide.

che Witelo ruolo

sia

2

A.

medie\

ma

geometrichc

dei

Rccherches

sur

che

la

tratte

catoptriquc

il

infatti,

grecquc

perloppiu

non

significa

un

tale scien/a riconosca

4

predeccssori:

witeloniana

Perspectiva

e stato giustamente notato, cio

semplicemente

quello

di

Ixjjeune, ales,

Com

la

poi,

un grande matematico, ne che a

predominante,

sistematico

aspcctibus

seric di dimostra/.ioni

suo

procedere

dovendo

d aprcs

Ics

far

sources

e

piu

frequente

antiques

et

and

Medicine, 1954; R.K Sicgcl, Galen s System of Physiology 1968 c Galen on Sense Perception, ibid. 1970; D.C. Lindhcrg, "Lines

Bruxellcs

Basilca New York of Influence in ITiirteenth Century Optics: Bacon, Witelo, 66-83; J.J. (\984), 91-130. I,

3 del

un 4

G.

Bono,

Fedcrici

Trecento

e

"Medical

Vescovini,

Biagio

Spirits

Aslrologia

Pelacani

and the Medical

c

scienza.

da Parma,

La

Firen/.e

Pccham", Speculum 46 (1971), Traditio XL language of Life",

crisi

1979,

deiraristotclismo

155-177

che

sul

riporta

cadcre

anche

esscn/.iale hihliografia di Alhax.cn.

and Thirteenth Century Mathematics: an Assessment of His introduzione all ed. critica Vitelonis 63 (1972), IV, 496-508, nonche Varsavia 1977 ed il commento alle prop. Perspectivae liber I, Studia Copernicana XV, Witelo si trovano per intero in Alhazeni Arabis 22, 39, 66-72. I testi d Alhazen e Vnellonis Thuringopoloni opticae 1. X, ed. F. Risncrus, VII, Opticae Thesaurus I. Basileae 1572; una scelta di passi di Witelo fu edita da Cl. Baeumker, Philosophisch S.

Unguru,

Contributions",

"Witelo

Isis

1

Pcrspcctiva e conoscenza scientifica nell opera di Witelo

a

ricorso

no/.ioni

diffusione

dclla

gcomctrichc

nozioni

tali

preponc

luce,

chiarirc

per

alia

alia

perche

trattazione,

Cio prova che

lettore possa averle present! all occorrenza.

rclativi

problemi

i

287

il

la perspective!

d Alhazen, e piu geometrica che sua dottrina della conoscenza piu razionalistica che empiristica;

di Witelo, a differenza di quella

fisica e

la

ma

indica pure che

della perspectiva.

d

cio

ruolo della matematica e strumentale rispetto a quello

il

Tuttavia,

la

poiche

Witelo

di

posizione

s

arricchisce

spunti, 6 indispensabile darne conto, seppur brevemente, prima di

altri

tentarne una classificazione e una valutazione.

L organo capace di cogliere la luce e formato da quattro tuniche e tre umori, cristallino

o umor

1

occhio,

il

piu

Pelemento fondamentale

glaciale, e

che Witelo ritiene

interne

dei

quali,

il

della visione. Tutte

tuniche sono traversate dal foro della pupilla, per cui penetra il cono luminoso recante 1 immagine visiva al cristallino. La descrizione di Witelo le

segue Alhazen e

rifiuta

1

interpretazione di Jesus Hali che, nel

a sostenere che nelPocchio

oltre

vi

primaria importanza alia retina, per

sono

De

oculis,

tuniche, aveva attribuito

sette

sua capacita di reagire a stimoli

la

nervosi.

Alhazen consistenza

invece

umorosa,

privilegio

che

il

rende

lo

basandosi

cristallino,

simile

all

e

acqua

sua

sulla

al

vetro;

di

conseguenza, la visione non e che il passaggio del cono visivo da un mezzo ad un altro di diversa densita, percio e soggetta alle leggi della rifrazione

5

Accettando 1 impostazione d Alhazen, Witelo a sua volta ricollcga la perspectiva all ottica geometrica, indi apre una parentesi medica: qualsiasi parte dell occhio sia malata o lesa

studiate

nell ottica

geometrica.

impedisce o deforma temporaneamnente

purche non a

esposto

si

del

tratti

malattie,

ma

cristallino,

che

e

la

ma

visione,

e curabile

che 6 certo piu protetto e

incurabile

percio,

meno

malanno

qualsiasi

lo

6

provoca 1 inguaribile perdita della vista. occhio sano al contrario non fallisce

colpisca,

L

consiste nell accogliere

bedeutsame Abschnitte aus d.

Mittelaltcrs,

cono luminoso recante

Witelo s

"Perspectiva",

Beitrage

1

z.

il

suo

compito che

immagine Gcschichte

d.

Philosophic

127-179. Inoltre D.C. Lindberg, Introduction to a 1908, of the 3rd ed. (Risner) of Perspectivae of Alhazen and Witelo,

New York

1973; K. Hedwig, Sphaera lucis. Studien zur Intelligibilitdt des Seienden im mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation, Beitrage z. Geschichte d. Philosophic Theologie d. Mittelalters, Neue Folge, 18, Aschendorff 1980, 218-222.

Kontext

und

dell oggetto

Munster

of Alhazen

Facsimile

il

mai

der

Jesus Hali, Tractatus de oculis, Venetiis 1500, 6

Witeio, Perspectiva,

111,4.

1,4 e 10,

Alhazeni Opticae,

1,16.

288

Paschetto

estcrno,

per

trasmcttcrla

poi

L

ccrvcllo.

al

punti chiave dclla concezione witcloniana:

-

medioevo

ripresa nel

da Grossatesta

latino

chiarisce

Jesus Hali

rifiuta la tesi di

secondo

-

tre

pari d Alhazcn e della

al

1)

Witelo

di perspectivi e medici,

maggioranza

affermazionc

la

quale

1

occhio

emette anzicche accogliere i raggi atti a formare Pimmagine visiva. 2) A differenza d Alhazen Witelo, quando asserisce che la visione inizia

ma

conclude nel cervello, contrappone la sensazione visiva o che e ricezione del sensibile per se, alia comprensione o aspcctus simplex, intuitio diligens, che coglie il sensibile per accidens. 3) Come Aristotele, ncll

occhio

si

Witelo ritiene che Peventuale errore non nasca

ma

sensazione

da quello che

dall

organo che riceve

la

la valuta.

Witelo dunque segue Alhazen nella descrizione del meccanismo dclla visione, ma non nc accetta Pempirismo gnoseologico di matrice stoicoepicurea

tanto

intelligibile,

cosicche sensibile

il

1

a

rifarsi

preferendo

che,

pone una duplice distinzione:

una

sul

fonti

platonico-aristoteliche,

piano ontologico, tra sensible e

piano gnoseologico tra sensazione e comprensione, sensibile per se, oggctto dell aspectus, e subordinato sia al altra sul

1

accidens,

per

sia

dell intuitio,

oggetto

all intelligibile

oggetto

della cognitio. I

termini aspectus, intuitio, cognitio sono gia in Alhazen,

diverse significato perche per

comprensione

dell oggetto sia

confuso, sia che manifcsti

come

misurare, etc.

ma

il

si

presenti

il

filosofo

che

come

arabo

verifichi

si

intuitio,

che

in

la

come

modo

aspectus, in

momentaneo

prevalere

il

d una

attivita

sulle

con

modo

piu

piu nitido, sia che

prevcde paragonare, Le diverse denominazioni indicano non cognitio,

ma

sensazione visiva e gia

il

la

altre

distinguere,

si il

subordinazione,

perche

la

vista,

essendo perfettamente idonea a cogliere la verita dell oggetto esterno, non c uno strumcnto inferiore alia comprensione. Anche per Witelo la sensazione visiva non sbaglia, ma solo perche, pura ricezione della luce fisica e dell immagine, non e conoscenza ne

comprensione della quiddita: 1

esatta corrispondenza tra

essa

infatti

immagine

non

e

in

grado

visiva e oggetto veduto,

di

valutare

ne

la reale

esistenza di quest ultimo. Tale valutazione e compito dcWintuitio diligens

che certifica le

sue

I

immagine

intenzioni

dcll universale,

cui

della cosa vista attraverso la conoscenza di tutte

particolari; si

giunge

Alhazeni, Opticae, 11,64-65, 67, 69-70.

mentre

dopo

la

molte

cognitio intuitiones

e

comprensione e

attraverso

il

Perspectiva e conoscenza scientifica nell opera di Wltelo

confronto tra

la

nella

forma quiescens

memoria

289

e la forma dell oggetto

8

pcrcepito.

In tutte queste opcrazioni e possibile

causa rcmota e visione:

retta

9

1

questi casi

all

e

distinctiva

la

con

cognitio,

perspectiva, riescono agevolmente a spiegare.

A

errori

tali

correggere

di

capacita

condizioni In

eccessiva distanza.

aiuto

1

Ma

e

distinguere

non e

confrontare,

delle

talvolta

6 percepito di misura assai diversa dal reale, cioe piccolo.

di

possono avere immagini visive imprecise e confuse che

si

virtus

la

pero

e

incerte

alle

illuminazione,

alia

gran numero

un

contempla

diversa densita dei mezzi

alia

atmosferiche, tutti

alPinsufficiente

relativi

problemi

Witelo

di

cui

la

assenza d una delle otto condizioni indispensabili casistica

la

insorgere dcll errore,

1

1

della

leggi

oggetto esterno

estremamente grande o con la sua

sufficiente la cognitio,

sicche

gli

credono che

ignoranti

quelle immagini smisurate corrispondano realmente ad oggetti enormi

Benedetta

sia la

il

vera causa di questi errori e

la

spiega

attraverso

angolo d incidenza

dall dell

ci

permette

calcolo dell angolo d incidenza del

il

si

potesse desumere

il

visiva e dell oggetto, era a quei

immagine

successivamente

e,

fenomeno, lo attribuiscono all inganno dei demoni. matematica, esclama quindi Witelo, perche tale scienza

incapaci di spiegarsi

criticata

e

abbandonata,

di valutarne la gravita

cono

visivo.

rapporto tra

tempi

perche

assai

La

le

tesi

dimensioni

comune,

inesatta

e

che

di

ma

fu

difficile

10

applicazione.

Piu disciplina

interessante

e

che illumina

le

calcolo,

esaltata

che per

1

1

percio

esattezza e

1

il

richiamo

alia

matematica,

vere cause dei fenomeni che

come guida

vista

come

piu

come

scienza del

conoscenza della quidditas, piu obbiettivita dei suoi metodi. Witelo intuisce infatti alia

importanza della matematica ma, legato ad un idea di scienza di tipo da un lato le attribuisce un valore qualitativo, sostanzialistico

aristotelico,

Witelo, Perspectiva, in

superficie

visus

...

111,51:

intuitio

"...

aspectus simplex est solum receptio formae sensibilis veritatem formarum comprehensarum Ibid.,

certifies!

..."

enim non comprehendit veram formam rei visae nisi per comprehensionem omnium intentionum particularium quae sunt in ilia forma Visus numquam potest comprehendere veram formam rei visae in primo aspectu sed solum post diligentem "Visus

111,56:

...

intuitionem." Ibid., Ill,

58-59, 61.

Q Ibid.,

aeris,

IV,1:

"...

tempus, sanitas

L analisi

Lux, visus".

distantia,

Tutto

il

situs

oppositio,

l.IV e dedicate all

magnitude,

esame

soliditas,

diaphanitas

dei diversi errori.

e delle loro cause e ripresa, brevemente ma con grande de primaria causa poenitentiae in hominibus et de substantia et natura daemonum, edita da noi in Demoni e prodigi, Torino 1978 e da J. Burchardt, List Witelona do Ludwika we Lwowku Slaskim, Studia Copernicana XIX, Varsavia 1979.

acume,

degli

ne\\ Epistola

errori

290

non

e 1

Paschetto

(come faranno invccc

quantitative)

inserisce

un enciclopcdia

in

subordina

alia

perspective/,

del sapcre riconoscendo

d individuare Pintelligibile sotto

matematica

physici del sec. XIV); dall altro

i

di

che

gerarchico,

tipo

qucst ultima

a

la

la

capacita

apparen/.e sensibili e riservando alia

le

ruolo strumentale di eliminare errori e supersti/ioni che

il

la retta visionc.

impediscono

Altra fonte d errore e la mancan/a d una pcrfetta salute e poiche Witelo accoglie la posi/ione aristotelica che crrore nasce dall organo di giudi/io piu che da quello di senso, non solo dovra essere sano occhio, ma anche il cervello, nei cui ventricoli risiedono cinque sensi interni. 11 1

1

i

A

diffcrcn/a dell occhio, la cui fun/.ione c simile a quella d

che solo se incrinato deforma assolvere

1

immagine,

sensi

i

interni

uno specchio non possono

loro compito per diverse ragioni, le une piu gravi e durature,

il

quali malattie e lesioni del cervello, le altre piu lievi e transitorie, dovute

umore

alPcccesso d

Com

c

nell

T eucrasia",

cioe

organismo. aveva

Galcno

noto, il

perfetto

che

sostenuto dei

equilibrio

prcvalcn/a d uno di essi e gia sintomo

malattia.

di

uomini

gli

e

collerici

sanguigni,

lievemente d un

dotati

prevalente

di

nonche

la

sugli

nei in

altri;

ncll

pare

tali

poiche

la

teoria, per la sua

per ritenere sani non

un umore

casi

ha

chi

infatti

la

si

melanconici,

manifestasse

sovrabbondan/a

in

tesi

qucsta

una

serie di

malanni sintomatici,

12

umore

cccesso d un

seguire

La

anche flemmatici, quali

solo

specifica caratterizzazione fisica e psicologica,

stato patologico in atto.

Indicando ci

coloro

propensione ad incorrere

ma non uno Witelo

eucrasia,

ossia

umore determina una

ma

fini

si

c

umori,

quattro

eccessiva rigidita, fu ben presto modificata e solo

sano

e

la

causa

fonderla

di certi errori di giudi/io

con

le

conce/.ioni

sulla

Sulla conoscenza in Witelo: A. Birkenmajer, Etudes d histoire des sciences en Cologne, Studia Copernicana IV, Wroclaw 1972, 97-434; J. Burchardt, Witclo filosofo della natura del sec. XIII. Una biografia, Accadcmia polacca dellc scienze. Biblioteca e

Centre

di

studi

a

Roma

della natura del XIII sec., nell

introduzione

dell ed.

n.87,

1984 e

Ibid.,

n.94,

critica.

La

psicopatologia nei concetti di

1986 che

Per

una

in

diversa

Witelo filosofo

gran parte riprende quanto gia detto interpretazione:

J.A.

Lohne,

"Der

eigcnartige IZinfluB Witelos auf die Entwicklung der Dioptrik", Archh es for History of Exact Sciences 5 (1968), 414-426; A. Paravicini Bagliani, "Der Naturforscher und Philosoph Witelo, Domherr von Breslau 1275-77", Archiv fur schles. Kirchengcschichte 34 (1976),

31eseg.

~

Su complessioni e umori R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, F. Saxl, Satumo e la Melanconia, Torino 1983. Sull interpretazione degli umori in Witelo ci sia concesso rinviare al nostro: "Alcune fonti mediche arabe dell Epistola de natura daemonum di Witelo", Oricntalische

344-357.

Kultur

und Europaisches

Mittelalter,

Miscellanea

Mediaevalia

17,

1985,

Pcrspcctiva e conoscenza scientifica nell opera di Witelo

circolazione differentia

dcgli

animali,

spirit!

et

spiritus

espostc

291

da Qusta ben Luqa ncl

De

animae. Quando una causa occasionale, qualc

la

fcbbre, provoca un notevole aumento del calore corporeo in un individuo umore in eccesso tende a muoversi liberamente privo d eucrasia, 1

nelForganismo ed a salire prima verso lo stomaco, indi nelPipocondrio e infme nel cervello. Se la massa umorale, o il fumo da essa sprigionato, invade uno o piu ventricoli cerebrali, blocca

che

vi

questi

risiedono e trasmette casi

il

paziente

monocromatiche

cui

il

1

non recepira

reali

i

colore e quello dell

del

attivita

sua colorazione

la

alle

interni

In

immagini

visive.

ma

immagini

colori,

umore

sensi

in

solo

eccesso:

sicche

il

flemmatico recepira immagini bianche, il melanconico nere etc. Inoltre non potendo valutarle con il senso comune e il giudizio, ne confrontarle con le

forme quiescenti nella memoria, perche

parzialmente,

impediti

dall

umore

tali

sensi interni sono,

dovra

eccessivo,

giudicarle

almeno con

la

13 phantasia incorrendo cosi in ogni tipo d errori.

Mentre a proposito autonomia,

le

matematica Witelo non dimostra grande

della

sue osservazioni su questi problemi medici sono nuove,

precise e denotano

una capacita

dovuta

frequentazione

forse

diagnosticate,

alia

secondo

le

anamnesi non comune a quei tempi,

di

malati

di

conoscenze

il

dell epoca,

cui in

stato

modo

patologico assai

e

nitido.

Witelo possedeva quindi un ampio bagaglio di nozioni mediche, il gusto dell osservazione puntuale e, cosa ancora piu importante, la convinzione

non come

dell utilita della medicina, intesa

pratica terapeutica

ma come

disciplina teorica.

Proprio su questo punto stesso valore

ci

sembra

si

possano cogliere al tempo infatti, sebbene le sue

e limite della posizione di Witelo:

cognizioni risentano di osservazioni personal!, alia diagnosi Witelo seguire la prognosi, ne

si

che lo stato del malato, lo interessa sue

cause.

Cosi,

a

differenza

di

trascurar la teoria per vedere solo

Witelo

13

s

awicina

a

quanti

non

fa

sofferma sulla possibile cura, perche ben piu la

razionalizzazione del male e delle

certi 1

medici

del

tempo,

accusati

di

applicazione pratica della loro arte,

apprezzano

nella

medicina

il

solo

aspetto

Costa ben Lucae, De differentia animae et spiritus, ed. C.S. Barach, Insbruck 1878; Norpoth, Der pseudo-augustinische Traktat De spiritu et anima, Koln Bochum 1971; M. Putscher, Pneuma, Spiritus, Geist, Wiesbaden 1973, 46-48. Per gli errori che, secondo Witelo, alimentarono la credenza nei demoni ci permettiamo rinviare ai nostri: De natura daemonum di Witelo", Atti deU Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, n.109, sez.II, 1975, 231-271 e "Witelo et Pietro d Abano a propos des demons", L homme et son univers au Moyen Age, Louvain-la-Neuve 1986, II, 675-682. L.

"II

Paschetto

292

teorico,

con

il

pericolo di

malato

con

i

suoi

fame un sapere

D altro

problemi.

capace

speculativa,

cause

le

spiegare

il

canto, sebbene Witelo riconosca

che non e ars mechanica

validita scientifica alia medicina, di

astratto che perde di vista

naturali

di

ma

certi

disciplina

fenomeni,

non sembra concederle piu autonomia di quanta ne abbia concessa matematica: anche la medicina non e considerata per il suo valore

tuttavia alia

ma

intrinseco,

per le

subordinate;

la

sue

sua funzione propedeutica e merita percio un ruolo conoscitive

capacita

infatti

riguardano

forme

le

corporee e materiali, cioe un oggetto ontologicamente imperfetto, essa piu alti livelli di conoscenza, non quindi, utile ma incapace d attingere i

in nobilta \aperspectiva.

puo eguagliare

La subordinazione

di

matematica e medicina

indichi nel pensiero di Witelo

nonostante

1

quest ultima

perspectiva, dalla

forma;

sensazione e dall esperienza,

questo

d Alhazen,

ci

fatto,

unito

all

non

diminuisce

sistematicita, per la

costante

razionalismo, biologici,

la

valore

favori

delle la

ma

dell

la

con

la

ruolo

privilegiato perche perche puo conoscere la

qualitativa

opera

cause

di

e

medici contribuendo a creare fisiche.

la le

e sostanzialistica.

Witelo

che,

per

la

Ma sua

matematiche e mediche, per

delPerrore

conoscenza

nuove scienze

e

delFempirismo gnoseologico perspectiva di Witelo non e una

la rielaborazione di nozioni

ricerca

alia nascita delle

Torino

il

ma

pare

infatti

abbandono

pare dimostrare che

scienza quantitativa e sperimentale cio

suo

il

aristotelici:

metafisica

della

sapere,

assume

alia perspectiva ci

schemi

fisico-matematiche

discipline

del

non

di

persistere

le

per

nell enciclopedia

sostituzione,

muove

interesse

il

e

premesse

il

per

diffusione

di

suo

coerente

problemi

fisici,

culturali indispensabili

OLAF PLUTA

Das

naturliche Verlangen nach Unstcrblichkeit

Aufstieg und Fall eines Arguments der metaphysischen Psychologic in der Philosophie des Mittelalters

sibi

enim quisquam tune

se vitamque requirit, corpus sopita quiescunt; licet aeternum per nos sic esse soporem, nee desiderium nostri nos adficit ullum." "Nee

cum nam

pariter

mens

et

(Titus Lucretius Carus:

Das

"Land

der

Wahrheit"

ist

-

De rerum

natura,

III,

919-22)

nach einer bekannten Metapher Kants

-

"umgeben von einem weiten und stiirmischen Ozeane, dem eigentlichen Sitze des Scheins, wo manche Nebelbank, und manches bald wegschmelzende Eis neue Lander liigt, und ... den auf Entdeckungen

herumschwarmenden 1 tauscht".

Seefahrer

unaufhorlich

mit

leeren

Hoffnungen

Eine der natiirlichen und unvermeidlichen, wenn auch nicht

unaufloslichen

weiten und stiirmischen Ozeans

dieses

ist nach Kant die metaphysische Psychologie. Die Destruktion der metaphysischen Psychologie beginnt aber nicht erst in der Aufklarung mit Humes Essay On the Immortality of the Soul und Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Bereits im spaten Mittelalter gab Illusionen"

es eine Tradition methodologisch streng philosophischer Kritik

Unsterblichkeitsbeweisen.

3

Die

mittelalterliche

physischen Psychologie und ihrer Kritik eines ihrer zentralen

Argumente

Verlangen (desiderium naturale)

-

-

soil hier

Geschichte exemplarisch

dem Argument

aus

dem

and den

der

am

meta Beispiel

natiirlichen

dargestellt werden.

Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A235f, B295. 2

Vgl. Vgl.

KrVA298. Olaf

Pluta:

Kritiker

der

Unsterblichkeitsdoktrin

Amsterdam 1986 (Bochumer Studien zur

Philosophie, 7).

in

Mittelalter

und Renaissance,

Pluta

294

4

Das Argument aus dcm natiirlichen Vcrlangcn hat cine lange Tradition. Der Grundgedanke dieses Arguments findct sich bei Aristoteles und in Augustinus, Averroes und Avicenna. Dominicus Gundissalinus hat es 5 seiner Abhandlung De immortalitatc animae weiter ausgearbeitet. Durch Wilhelm von Paris (Auvergne) wird Uberraschend haufig fmdet bei

es weiter verbrcitet. sich

6

das desiderium-naturale-Argumcni

Thomas von Aquino. 7 der

In

Summa

Form

folgendcn

fiihrt

(1259-64)

Thomas

es

in

dcr

naturale} kann

an:

nicht vergcbens scin, intelligcns}

(quilibet

contra gentiles

Ein natiirlichcs Vcrlangen (desidcriurn 8 da die Natur nichts umsonst tut; aber jeder Mensch hat cin natiirlichcs Vcrlangen nach individuellcr

9

blciben. folglich kann dieses Verlangen nicht unerfullt Bcwcis des Untersatzes unterschcidet Thomas /unachst ein bewufttes

Unstcrblichkcit;

Zum y.ur

Gcschichtc

"Desidcriurn

Bd.2,

Darmstadt

Mittclalters, Bd.3,

5

Zum

Dominicus

desidcrium

des

naturale",

1972,

in:

Historisches

Paulus Engelhardt: Art. naturalc -Bcgriffs vgl. Wortcrbuch dcr Philosophic, hrsg. von J. Ritter,

Sp.118-130; ders.: Art. "Desidcriurn 1986, Sp.723-724.

naturale",

Lexikon

in:

des

Munchen/Zurich

Gundissalinus bei dcsiderium-naturale-A.Tgumcni Gundissalinus Schrift von der Unstcrblichkcit dcr

Georg

vgl.

Seele,

Billow:

herausgegeben

Des und

Ncbst cinem Anhangc, cnthaltend die Abhandlung philosophicgcschichtlich untcrsucht. des Wilhelm von Paris (Auvergne) De immortalitate animae, Munster 1897 (Beitrage zur Gcschichte dcr Philosophic des Mittclalters, 11,3), S. 120-125; G. Verbeke: "Methode eincr dcr Sccle", in: Albert Zimmermann philosophischcn Bcweisfiihrung: die Unstcrblichkcit Methoden in Wissenschaft und Kunst des Mittclaltcrs, Ikrlin 1970 (Miscellanea (Hrsg.):

mcdiaevalia, ()

7), S.23-49,

Wilhelm von

Appendix,

cbd. S.31f.

Auvergne:

DC

immortalitatc

animae,

hrsg.

von

Biilow,

Gcorg

a.a.O.,

S. 39-61.

Sccle im System des Thomas von Aquin. Ein Beitrag Vgl. Johannes Mundhcnk: Die zur Klarung und Beurteilung dcr Grundbcgriffc dcr thomistischcn Psychologic, Hamburg zu den 1980, S.121. Die Unsterblichkeit der Sccle gchort fur Thomas von Aquino

Glaubcnswahrhciten, die mittels der Vernunft bcwiescn werdcn konnen. Die Auffur Thomas - ncben crstchung des Ixibes und das Jungste Gericht hingcgen gchorcn zu denjenigen dcr Drcifaltigkcit, der Menschwerdung Christi und den Sakramenten Wahrhcitcn, die nur geglaubt werden konnen, wcshalb er sic im vierten Buch der Summa contra gentiles erortert, das diejcnigen Wahrhciten behandclt, die auBerhalb der Rcichwcite der menschlichcn Vernunft licgen. Zur Literatur vgl. Engelhardt, a.a.O., O Connor: The eternal quest. The teaching of St. Thomas Sp.127. Vgl. vor allem William

York 1947; ders.: The natural desire for Aquinas on the natural desire for God, New God, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 1948 (Marquette University. The Aquinas Lecture, 1948). 8 "Impossible

(Summa

cst

naturale

contra gentiles,

9 "Scd

quilibet

desiderium

lib. II, c.55;

intelligcns

esse

inane:

natura

enim

nihil

facit

frustra."

ed. Leonina, S.394b).

naturaliter

desidcrat

sed etiam pcrpctuctur esse secundum speciem,

esse

individuum."

perpetuum:

(ebd.).

non

solum

ut

Das und ein

natiirliche Vcrlangen

nach Unsterblichkeit

295

10

Bci dcnjcnigen Wescn, die unbewuBtes Verlangcn nach dem Scin haben, gibt es solche denen die Kraft inncwohnt, ihr Sein als Einzelwescn (wie die Sterne), secunditm numerum - zu erhalten, und solche (wie die Pflanzen), die unbewiifites natiirlichcs Vcrlangen.

lediglich ein

vermittels

speciem

nur als Art - secundum Fortpflanzungsvermogens bewahren konnen. 11 Den gleichen Unterschied muB es, Thomas per analogiam, ebenso bei den Lebewesen geben, die ihres

-

ihr Sein

so folgert

auch ein bewuBtes Verlangen nach

dem

Sein haben. Die Tiere, die nur das

gegenwartige Sein (esse ut mine) erkennen, verlangen auch nur nach dem gegenwartigen Sein und konnen ihr Sein nur secundum speciem bewahren, die

Menschen

(substantiae intelligentes) hingegen, die das immerwahrende Sein (esse perpetuum) erkennen, verlangen nach ihm und konnen ihr Sein

secundum numerum Spa ter

faBt

erhalten.

Thomas

12

diesen

Gedankengang kurz wie

folgt

zusammen:

nicht

vergeblich

Ein

natiirliches

sein;

aber der Mensch (homo) verlangt von Natur aus danach, fortdauernd

Verlangen

(appetitus

naturalis)

kann

zu sein (perpetuo manere). Zum Beweis des Untersatzes fuhrt Thomas aus: Es ist das Sein, das von alien erstrebt wird (esse est quod ab omnibus appetitur).

nur

als

Der Mensch aber gegenwartiges

(simplidter) und

"Quod

sicut

lupus

naturaliter inclinatione

sic

(ut

erfaBt durch seinen Intellekt das Sein nicht

mine)

wie

hinsichtlich jeder Zeit

patct.

die

sondern

Tiere,

(secundum omne

Naturalis enim appetitus quibusdam desiderat occisionem animalium

naturaliter

quidem ex

schlechthin 1*

tempus).

inest ex apprehension e: pascitur, et homo

quibus

desiderat felicitatem. Quibusdam vero absque apprehensione, ex sola naturalium principiorum, quae naturalis appetitus in quibusdam dicitur: sicut

grave appetit esse

deorsum."

(ebd., S.394b-395a).

autem modo

inest rebus naturale desiderium essendi: cuius "Utroque signum est quia et ea quae cognitione carent, resistunt corrumpentibus secundum virtutem suorum principiorum naturalium; et ea quae cognitionem habent, resistunt eisdem secundum

modum

suae cognitionis.

Ilia

igitur cognitione

carentia

quorum

principiis

inest virtus

ad

conservandum esse perpetuum ita quod maneant semper eadem secundum numerum, naturaliter appetunt esse perpetuum etiam secundum idem numero. Quorum autem principia non habent ad hoc virtutem, sed solum ad conservandum esse perpetuum secundum idem specie, etiam sic naturaliter appetunt perpetuitatem." (ebd., S.395a). et in his inveniri quibus desiderium essendi igitur differentiam oportet cognitione inest: ut scilicet ilia quae non cognoscunt esse nisi ut nunc, desiderant esse ut nunc; non autem semper, quia esse sempiternum non apprehcndunt. Desiderant tamen esse perpetuum specie: tamen absque cognitione; quia virtus generativa, ad "Hanc

cum

quae

hoc deservit, praeambula est, et non subiacens cognitioni. Ilia igitur quae ipsum esse perpetuum cognoscunt et apprehendunt, desiderant ipsum natural) desiderio. Hoc autem convenit omnibus substantiis "Impossible

perpetuo manere.

est

intelligentibus."

Quod

(ebd.).

naturalem esse patet ex hoc quod esse

appetitum

frustra. est

Sed

homo

naturaliter

quod ab omnibus

appetitur:

appetit

homo

296

Pluta

Thomas hat den Gedankengang dcs dcsiderium-naturale-ATgumcnts weitercn Schriftcn in mehreren Hinsichten prazisiert. Im

Summa

erstcn Teil dcr

inwiefern

Weise

die

Thomas,

theologiae (1266-68) bcgriindet

Erkennens

des

das

fur

in

natiirliche

Verlangen ist: Jedes Wesen auf seine Weise von Natur aus richtungsweisend verlangt nach dem Sein. Bei den erkennenden Wescn aber folgt das Verlangen der 1*

Erkenntnis (desiderium ... sequiturcognitionctn). In der Quaestio disputata de anima (1269) verdeutlicht Thomas, daB der

Mensch nach dem Sein In der Sententia

als

secundum

namlich nichts anderes

als

se) strebt.

15

schlieBlich begriindet

Thomas

Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit nicht

natiirliche

vergeblich und illusorisch (inane ist

(esse

Ethicomm (1271)

libri

eingehend, weshalb das

solchem

et

vacuum]

sein kann: dieses

Verlangen

cine durch die von Gott gegebene Natur-

16 Ware dieses Verlangen ordnung den Dingen innewohncnde Neigung. nicht erfullbar, dann miiBte man annehmcn, daB Gott den Menschen als

Wesen

geschaffen hat, desscn Verlangen niemals bcfricdigt werden dessen Existenz mithin absurd ist. Das dcsidcrium-naturalc-Argumcni kann, setzt also einen christlich-aristotclischcn Naturbegriff voraus: Die Natur ein

wird gedacht

als

ein

wohlgeordnetes, hierarchisch gegliedcrtes Ganzes,

erschaffcn und erhalten von eincm weisen und guten Gott.

autcm per intellcctum apprchcndit esse non solum ut nunc, sicut bruta animalia, sed simpliciter. Consequitur ergo homo perpetuitatcm secundum animam, qua esse simpliciter et secundum omne tempus apprehendit." (Summa contra gentiles, lib. II, c.79; cd. Leonina, S.498a). "unumquodque naturalitcr suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Scnsus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hie et nunc; sed intellectus apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne habens intellectual naturalitcr desiderat esse semper. Naturale autem desiderium non

potest

Omnis igitur intellectuals substantia est incorruptibilis." (Summa q.75, a. 7; ed. Marietti, S.356). Das natiirliche Verlangen ist zwingend und nicht dem freien Willen, frei ist der Mensch lediglich in der Wahl der

esse

theologiae,

unterliegt

inane.

I,

kontingenten Mittel "Signum

(vgl.

autem

Summa

huius

ex

theologiae,

duobus

I,

q.83, a.l).

accipi

potest.

...

Secundo,

ex

naturali

appetitu

Videmus enim in hominibus appetitum esse perpetuitatis quia cum ipsum esse secundum se sit appetibile, oportet quod ab

qui in nulla re frustrari potest.

hoc rationabiliter;

et

intelligente

esse

qui

simpliciter

inanis;

sed

apprehendit esse simpliciter, et secundum omne tempus.

quod

homo secundum animam

disputata de anima, a.14, ed. Marietti, 8.Aufl. q.14, ed J. H. Robb, Toronto 1968, S.202). 1

"ergo

et

non

Unde

hie

intellectivam

Rom

nunc, appetatur naturaliter

et

videtur

quod sit

iste

appetitus non

incorruptibilis."

sit

(Quaestio

1949, S.334b; Quaestiones de anima,

seque(re)tur quod naturale desiderium sit inane et vacuum; sed hoc est naturale desiderium nihil aliud est quam inclinatio inhaerens rebus ex

impossibile, quia

ordinatione primi moventis, quae non potest esse lib.I, com.2; ed. Leonina, S.8a).

supervacua"

(Sententia

libri

Ethicorum,

Das

Duns Scotus

Bereits Johannes

oxoniense,

naturliche Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit

weist in seinem Sentenzenkommentar

daB

nach,

1300-01)

297

das

unzulassige theologische Voraussctzungen macht; philosophisch

Argument non potest

17

nicht schliissig.

18

esse

frustra."

Das Diktum des Averroes

dieses

Der Mensch

hat

ein

Unsterblichkeit. In bezug auf diesen Satz

um

naturale

gesteht Scotus den Vertretern des desiderium-

naturale-ATguments

es sich hier wirklich

dieses

ist

"Desiderium

Seine Zweifel richten sich gegen den Obersatz

zu.

Arguments:

(Opus

desiderium-naturale-Argdm&nt

Verlangen nach er sich die Frage: Handelt

natiirliches

stellt

ein natiirliches Verlangen?

folgt: Unabhangig davon, ob man den im Verlangen eigentlichen Sinne (proprie dictum) als Begriff eine unbewuBte natiirliche Neigung oder im uneigentlichen Sinne (minus

Scotus antwortet darauf wie natiirliches

proprie dictum) als ein der naturlichen Neigung entsprechendes bewuBtes ist

Verlangen versteht,

um

hier

ein

der

Moglichkeit

Natiirlichkeit des

daB man

nicht beweisen kann,

wenn man

Verlangen handelt, im Bereich

der

Unsterblichkeit

andernfalls wiirde

gesagt",

klar,

natiirliches

man

setzt

dem

naturlichen Verlangen

Mit

dem

ist

nachweist;

machen. 19 Die

naturliche Erfiillbarkeit voraus.

schlieBt er seine diesbeziiglichen Ausfiihrungen,

anscheinend

sich

nicht zuvor die

Natur

sich einer petitio principii schuldig

Verlangens

daB es

"kein

"Kurz

Beweis aus

20 schliissig".

Zerfall der mittelalterlichen Gesellschaft, die wirtschaftlich

vom

GroBgrundbesitz, geistig von der Kirche bestimmt wird, zerfallt auch der christlich-aristotelische Naturbegriff. Kaisertum und Papsttum, die beiden einigenden

Machte

dieser

Gesellschaftsordnung,

verlieren

im

spaten

Zur Literatur vgl. Engelhardt, a.a.O., Sp.l28f. Vgl. vor allem A. Wolter: "Duns Scotus on the natural desire for the supernatural", in: The New Scholasticism 23 (1949), S.281-317. 10

Averroes: In Metaphys., II, com.l. Vgl. Johannes Duns Scotus: In IV Sent. (Opus selection oxoniense), d.43, q.2; ed. Wolter, in: Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings. edited and translated by Allan Wolter, Edinburgh/London/Melbourne 1962, S.134.

A

19 "planum

est,

primo probetur est petitio

principii"

"Breviter

S.159).

quod

non

possibilitas

ergo

in

potest probari desiderium naturale ad aliquid, nisi natura ad illud, et per consequens e converse arguendo

(ebd., S.158).

omne medium

ex

desiderio

naturali

videtur

esse

inefficax"

(ebd.,

Pluta

298

an Ansehen und Macht. Papst Bonifaz VIII. wird 1303 in Anagni gedemiitigt, seine Nachfolger stehen von 1309 an unter dem EinfluB des franzosischen Konigs. Kaiser Heinrich VII. unternimmt 1310Mittelalter

1313 einen letzten erfolglosen Italienfeldzug.

Die

den

aus

sich

Umwalzungen

ergebende Verunsicherung der Menschen laBt sie an den herkommlichen Autoritaten zweifeln. Die Frage nach der Evidenz wird zu einem brennenden Problem.

Annahme

Die

des

Weltgeschehens wird

mittelalterlichen

Gesellschaftsordnung

durchgangigen Finalitat

einer

des

angesichts

gesellschaftlichen

Niedergangs

der

unglaubwiirdig.

Wilhelm von Ockham

zieht die philosophischen

21

Konsequenzen.

Er

wie bereits die Gutachter der gegen ihn eingesetzten papstlichen die Grundlagen fast der gesamten damaligen 22 Eine durchgangige Finalitat der Philosophic und Theologie zerstort.

hat

-

Kommission erkannten

Ockham

nach

Natur

ist

These

-

(finis

ultimus)

natiirlichcn

Vcrlangen die

kann wollen, verniinftige

nicht

zu

Menschen

zukiinftiges

Damit

Scienden.

allcs

,

Gott

dem

ist

sein

sich

ist

glaubcn,

als

auch

21

Zur Diskussion des Problems der Finalitat Anncliese Maier: "Finalkausalitat und Naturgesctz",

offen gegen die "Man

viele

sowohl Glaubige, die an Unglaubige, die an ein

bei in:

dem

aus

Verlangen nach dem Sein: Die Annahme ist offenbar, weil -

die

das letzte Ziel

natiirliches ...

(multi utentes ratione}

Lebcn

sei

Argument

Grundlage entzogen. (1317-18) wendet er

Im Sentenzenkommentar These, jeder Mensch habe ein

ein

Noch weniger beweisbar

nicht beweisbar.

hierin stimmt er mit Scotus iiberein

Wilhelm

von

Ockham

vgl.

dies.:

Metaphysische Hintergrunde der spdtscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Rom 1955, S.271-335; Harry R. Klocker: "Ockham and Efficient Causality", in: The Thomist 23 (1960), S.106-123; ders.: "Ockham and in: The Modern Schoolman 43 (1965-66), S.233-247; Gordon Leff: William of Finality",

The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse, Manchester 1975, S.543-547, 580Gottes bei Wilhelm von Ockham. 584; Klaus Bannach: Die Lehre von der doppclten Macht und Bedeutung, Theol. Diss. Miinchen 1974, Voraussetzungen

Ockham.

Problemgeschichtliche Wiesbaden 1975 (Veroffentlichungen des Instituts fur europaische Geschichte Mainz, 75), Wilhelm von Ockham", in: S.300-304; Gerhard Leibold: "Zum Problem der Finalitat bei Philosophisches Jahrbuch 89 (1982), S.347-383.

22 "Quod

dicere

et

tenere

per

modum,

quern

iste

tenet,

esset

subvertere

fere

Aktenstucke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon gefuhrten Prozess", in: Recherches de theologie ancienne et medie\>ale 1 (1935), S.350-380, 8 (1936), S.79-93, 168-197; wieder abgedruckt Josef Koch: Kleine Schriften, Bd. 2, Rom 1973 (Storia e letteratura, 128), S.275in: auch den Satz "quod voluntas 365; ebd. S.344. Als haretisch verurteilt die Kommission

totam doctrinam tarn theologie

...

potest nolle beatitudinem sibi

quam

inesse"

philosophic.

(ebd., S.321).

(Josef Koch:

"Neue

Das naturliche Leben

zukiinftigcs

Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit

-

nicht glauben

sich sclbst umbringen."

das ewige Leben glaubt, hat also nach

nach

ewiger

Gliickseligkeit.

daB eine

"glauben,

299

Ockham

wer an

Selbst

kein natiirliches Verlangen

kann

Ebensogut

23

Mensch aber auch

ein

(zukiinftige) Gliickseligkeit nicht moglich

denn

ist,

er

kann glauben, daB nur der (gegenwartige) Zustand, den wir tatsachlich sehen, fiir ihn moglich ist; folglich kann er alles das, was mil dem Zustand, den wir sehen, unvereinbar er

die

Gliickseligkeit

(zukiinftige)

(causa finalis)

ist

24

nicht

Ockham

namlich nach

-

nicht wollen

ist,

und

kann

Zweckursache

Die

wollen."

folglich

bestimmte

nichts anderes als eine

Wirkursache (causa efficiens), namlich die Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes im Hinblick auf seine Verwirklichung derart, daB diese Vorstellung die entsprechende Handlung bewirkt. Ein natiirliches Verlangen des Menschen nach einem letzten Ziel gibt es also nicht. 25

den

In

Brevis

in

libros

Physicorum

sumtna

Aristotelis

libri

Summula

-

Schriften

naturphilosophischen

naturalis (1319-21),

philosophiae

Physicorum (1321-23), -

(1322-24)

findet

sich

Expositio

bereits

die

Bemerkung, daB eine Naturfmalitat nicht beweisbar ist: Ockham hebt nicht nur hervor, daB fast alle antiken Philosophen vor Aristoteles eine Natur-

"aliquis

efficaciter

potest

beatum

non

velle

consequens ad non

ct

esse,

evidenter

sciri

potest

quod

non

ergo potest velle non esse beatus, et per consequens nolle beatitudinem. Assumptum probatur, quia multi utentes ratione - tarn fideles credentes vitam futuram quam infideles nullam vitam futuram credentesinterfecerunt se ipsos et exposuerunt se morti; ergo volebant non esse." (In I Sent. esse

est

[Ordinatio], d.l, q.6;

24

Opera

theologica,

I,

esse;

S.504, 3-9).

nullam beatitudinem esse possibilem, quia potest potest credere tantum statum quem de facto videmus esse sibi possibilem; ergo potest nolle omne illud quod isti statui quem videmus repugnat, et per consequens potest nolle beatitudinem. S.503, (ebd., 12-17) Vgl. die entsprechenden Ausfiihrungen in der Reportatio zum vierten Buch der Sentenzen: "Sed intellectus potest credere nullum esse finem ultimum nee beatitudinem, et per consequens potest dictare finem ultimum sive beatitudinem esse nolendam." (In IV Sent. [Reportatio], q.16; Opera theologica VII, S.350, 8-11). John Mair (Johannes Maior) hat Ockhams Gedanken im vierten Buch seines Sentenzenkommentars aufgegriffen: "voluntas viae potest non velle et nolle beatitudinem ... intellectus potest credere nullam beatitudinem esse possibilem, ut patet de multis infidelibus et haereticis, ergo voluntas potest beatitudinem nolle" (In quartum Sentencredere

intellectus

"sed

"

tiarum, d.49, q.6; Paris 1509, f.H2ra).

ultimum".

Argument Sent.,

naturaliter inclinatur in principale dico quod voluntas non (Ebd., S.507, 9-10). Ausdriicklich greift Ockham das desiderium-naturalein seiner Quaestio zur distinctio 43 des vierten Buches der Sentenzen (In IV

argumentum

"Ad

finem

q.12:

beziiglich

ratione

respectu

Utrum omnes homines

der

resurgent

Frage "Utrum resurrectio sit naturali beweisen konne. "Videtur beatitudinis.

Sed

auf.

incorruptibiles)

possibilis"

quod non possumus perfecte

igitur etc." (Opera theologica VII, S.247, 18-20). ist in der uberlieferten Reportatio nicht enthalten.

sic,

ist,

ob

quia

beatificari

Ockhams

man

Einer der die

dcsiderium nisi

Zweifel

Auferstehung est

naturale

post resurrectionem, Antwort auf diesen Zweifel

Pluta

300

verneint

finalitat

Averroes kraft

26

haben,

sondcrn

-

weist

er

unter

auf

Berufung

darauf hin, daB die Argumcntc des Aristoteles keine Beweis-

-

haben.

27

man

Betrachtet

die

Beweise zugunsten einer

bisherigen

man, so Ockham, fest, daB entweder das zu Naturfinalitat, ebenso Ungewisses vorausgesetzt wird. 28 oder etwas selbst Beweisende In den Quodlibeta (1322-25) fiihrt Ockham in zwei Quaestionen dann

stellt

daB weder eine durchgangige

detailliert aus, 29

Finalitat der

noch die These, Gott sei das Ziel alles Seienden.

ist,

Natur beweisbar

30

Die Kritik

am

desiderium-naturale-Argumcnt wird hicr noch verscharft. Im Sentenzenkommentar hatte Ockham ausgefiihrt, der Mcnsch konne das ewige Leben

unabhangig davon, ob er an ein Weiterleben nach den Tode In den Quodlibeta weist er darauf hin, daB der Mensch nicht. odcr glaubt 31 Das auch nach etwas verlangen kann, das iiberhaupt nicht existiert. dessen Natiirlichkeit Ockham Vcrlangen nach dem ewigen Leben nicht wollen

-

antiqui,

"aliqui

immo

fere

omnes,

omnes

rcducehant

necessaries

tarn

effectus,

negando causam cfficientem agentem in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, 1.2, c.12; Opera philosophica finem." (Expositio propter IV, S.367, 17-20). antiqui dixerunt quod ilia quae fiunt naturaliter sine cognitione ct dcliberatione, non fiunt propter aliqucm fincm." (Ebd., S.371, 4-6).

quam

hanc causam,

in

alios,

scilicet

matcrialem,

"isti

"notandum

sed

quas adducit Philosophus, non sunt simpliciter persuasivac et convincentes adversarium ex propriis conclusio non possit simpliciter dcmonstrari, scilicet quod rationcs

istae

quod

demonstrative,

sunt

magis

Quod autcm ista omne agens naturale agit propter dictis.

57,

...

Vgl.

61-63).

"notandum,

die

aliquid, dicit cxpresse Commentator" (Ebd., S.374, 55der Bre\ is summa libri Physicorum: Stelle in

entsprechende

secundum Commcntatorem, quod

dcmonstrari non potcst, sed tantum

conclusio

ista

pcrsuadcri."

(1.2,

c.6;

natura agit

propter finem

Opera philosophica

VI, S.36f,

24-26).

^o

ideo

"Et

aliqui

volentes

conclusioncm

istam

petunt

quod deberent probare,

patere

discurrendo per rationes eorum.

vel

accipiunt

hie

aeque

Sed causa

probare,

vcl

in

rationibus

ignotum conclusioni,

brevitatis

pertranseo."

suis

sicut

posset

(Ebd.,

S.375,

68-71).

effectus potest probari ex per se notis nee per experientiam quod quilibet causam finalem nee distinctam nee indistinctam ab efficiente, quia non potest finalem." (Quodl.IV, q.l; probari sufficienter quod quilibet effectus habet aliquam causam "non

habet

Opera theologica "Et

dico

IX, S.295, 53-56).

non

quod

potest

probari

sufficienter

quod

Deus

sit

causa

finalis

secundae intelligentiae in se ... Nee potest probari quod Deus sit causa finalis secundae dico quod non potest probari quod Deus sit causa intelligentiae in essendo ... Secundo finalis agentis naturalis sine cognitione" (Ebd., q.2; S.302f, 40-41, 51-52, 59-60).

3*

esse potest desiderari quamvis non sit; et ideo potest (Ebd., q.2; S.294, 38-39). Bereits in der Summula philosophiae naturalis hat Ockham auf diese Moglichkeit hingewiesen: "sicut aliquid potest desiderari esse quando non est, ita potest esse causa finalis quando non est, quia nihil aliud est "finis

causa

potest

finalis licet

causam finalem

amari

non

nisi

et

sit."

esse

Opera philosophica VI,

amatum

S.223f, 82-85).

vel

desideratum propter quod agens

agit."

(1.2,

c.4;

Das

nach Unsterblichkeit

fmdet moglicherweise keine

-

bestreitet

natiirliche Verlangen

301

Damit wird denkbar,

Erfiillung.

Glaube an ein ewiges Lcbcn cine Illusion ist. Ein der natiirlichen Vernunft folgendcr Mench

dafi dcr

(homo sequens naturalem rationem) wiirde nach Ockham annehmen, daB unser Denken Akt einer korperlichen und zerstorbaren Form ist. Wir erfahren unser Denken nicht

als

Vernunft folgenden Menschen

natiirlichen

der Seele nicht

die Unsterblichkeit

fur

hinaus

immateriellen

einer

Tatigkeit

die

der

Abhangigkeit

Substanz. 32 ist

einen

Fiir

mehr moglich, sondern

der

Beweis

also nicht nur ein

dariiber

und

die

desiderium-naturale-Argument

ad

Denktatigkeit von

der

Materie

Sterblichkeit der Seele gewiB.

von

Nikolaus

absurdum

Autrecourt

das

hat

1346 wurde er

gefiihrt.

dafiir verurteilt.

Einer der originellsten

Denker des

Mittelalters verlor seine Magisterwiirde; er muBte seine Lehren widerrufen und seine Biicher vor versammelter Universitat verbrennen. Ein

der

Artikel

Verurteilungsurkunde

papstlichen

lautet:

"Welter

hat

er

in

einer Disputation gesagt: Weil ein natiirliches Verlangen nicht vergeblich

werden wir

ist,

erreichen.

(Nostra ihr

alles

Daher wird

das,

jeder,

wonach wir verlangen, irgendwann einmal der das Verlangen hat, zur Jungfrau Maria

Domina, Notre Dame)

[in

den Himmel] zu kommen, eines Tages zu

kommen.

32 Quodl.I,

Vgl.

"Quod

corporis.

q.10: sic:

Utrum

possit

demonstrari

Quia experimur quod

quod

intellectio

anima

est

in

intellectiva

nobis;

et

sit

forma

intellectio

est

hominis; igitur eius causa efficiens et subiectum recipiens est in nobis. Hoc non potest esse intelligentia separata, quia operationem talis substantiae non possumus experiri; nee esset talis operatio alicuius compositi; igitur receptivum illius operationis est aliquid hominis; non materia, igitur forma. ... Ad principale, concederet sequens naturalem rationem quod experimur intellectionem in nobis, quae est actus formac operatio

consequenter quod talis forma recipitur in forma quae est operatio propria substantiae immaterialis; et ideo per intellectionem non concludimus illam substantiam incorruptibilem esse in nobis tamquam formam. Et forte si experiremur illam intellectionem esse in nobis, non possumus plus concludere nisi quod eius subiectum est in nobis sicut et

corporea extensa.

corruptibilis;

diceret

et

Non autem experimur

motor, non autem sicut "Item

[dixit

in

forma."

quadam

illam intellectionem

(Opera theologica IX,

disputajtione,

S.62, 4-10,

...

S.65, 88-97).

quod quia desiderium naturale non

est frustra

desiderajmus, aliquando adipiscimus. Unde quicunque appetit ire [ad Nostram Dominam] aliquando Denifle/Chatelain (Hrsg.): Chartularium Universitatis ide[o

quicquid

ibit."

Parisiensis, Bd.2, Paris 1891, S.583. Eine entsprechende Stelle findet

sich in seinem - nur unvollstandig in einer einzigen Traktat Exigit ordo executionis. arguebatur quod desiderium naturale hominum quod est ad aeternitatem non est

Ilandschrift erhaltenen "Cum

-

Pluta

302

und

Pietro

Pomponazzi den (1516) bilden

34 Abhandlung De immortalitate animae

seine

Auseinandersetzung um das natiirlichen Verlangen. Die Ansicht des Thomas von

Argument aus dem Aquino (Pomponazzi

vom

spricht

der

in

Hohepunkt

Thomas

"Divus

sich

in

35 wohlbegriindet"

im

bezeichnet,

achten

iiber

die

"wahr

und

hingegen

als

Aquinas")

Unsterblichkeit der Seele wird im Vorwort der Abhandlung Kapitel

als

unhaltbar erwiesen, nicht ohne daB Pomponazzi ironisch bemerkt, seine Ausfiihrungen gegen Thomas dienten nicht dazu, einem so bedeutenden

Philosophen zu widersprechen

-

"was

vermag denn schon

ein Floh gegen

arguitur contra primo quia videmus quod multa sunt frustra ut desiderium naturale essendi ad aliqucm locum et tamen numquam erit ibi. Hoc non obstat, immo videtur confirmare magis propositum: illud desiderium naturale est res quae semper erit et licet non sequatur nunc itio ad talem rem, alias sequetur nee etiam est nunc frustra. Propter quod sciendum est quod in hac materia sic frustra

ut

videtur,

aliquis habet

ita quod imaginor: quaelibet res est sub intentionc naturae primo per se ipsam, et secundum hoc est quaclibet res habet quasi propriam deitatcm et propriam bonitatem, sub intentione naturae primo, et secundario quantum ad intentionem sccundariam reperi-

tur connexio quodammodo inter entia, ita quod unum est propter aliud. Nunc igitur si ad rem numquam sequcretur illud propter quod est secundario, videretur inconveniens; sed si aliquo tempore non sequatur, non videtur inconveniens quia remanet ratio prima secundum quam erat sub intentione naturae, et ita diceretur hie. Unde istud desiderium est aliqua res ad quam aliquando sequetur motus ad Nostram Dominant. (Itxigit ordo executions, ed. J. Reginald O Donnell, in: Mediae\ al Studies 1 (1939), S.I 79-267; ebd.,

S.193Q.

von Autrecourt, wiewohl es strengubcr/eugcnd. Ga be es kein I^ben nach dem Tode, dann waren die Menschen voller Trauer und das Leben kame ihnen vor wie ein ludus batcrellorum (= ludus batellerorum): "Illud quod appetit omnis homo naturaliter et quo non habito non quiescit, immo habet quasi quamdam displicentiam super suo esse, est; sed aeternitatem sui quilibet homo appetit; ergo etc. Major videtur nota quia

Das desiderium-naturale-Argumcni

genommen

talis

Beweiskraft

keine

appetitus

uni\ ersalis

Minor

in

experitur

naturaliter

ipsi

desinent

desinunt

naturaliter,

modo

modo non

baterellorum,

34

nobis.

est

fiir

videtur

<non>

frustra,

alitcr

esset

esse

omnem legem positivam ad modum equorum de

tristabuntur est,

or

i

est,

videbitur

et

or n

i

est

une."

eis

et

ordinatio

videretur

universalis appetitus ad illud quod Desiderat enim omnis homo aeternitatem

sic

unde circumscribe

tendit;

hominum quod simpliciter

natura

in

inconveniens universi quod

Nikolaus

halt

besit/,e,

numquam sui

et

in

inerit.

earn

propone communitati

quibus

quod

aestimant

non

sit

nisi

quod ludus

(ebd., S.203).

Bardili, Tubingen 1791; hrsg. von Bologna 1516; hrsg. Giovanni Gentile, Messina/Roma 1925 (Opuscoli filosofici. Testi e document; inediti o von William rari, 1); hrsg. von Gianfranco Morra, Bologna 1954; englische Ubersetzung Henry Hay II, bearbeitet von John Herman Randall und Paul Oskar Kristeller, in: The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Selections in translation, hrsg. von Ernst Cassirer/Paul Oskar Kristeller/John Herman Randall, Chicago/London 1948, S.280-381; deutsche

von

Christ.

Godofr.

Ubersetzung von Burkhard Mojsisch (Manuskript). 35 "veram

et in se firmissimam" (ed. Gentile, S.5; ed.

Morra, S.36).

Das cinen

natiirliche Verlangen

Elefanten?":

36

der Floh

nach Unsterblichkeit

303

dcr klcinc Perctto, 37 der Elefant

ist

ist

der

massigen Korperbau bekannte Thomas. Pomponazzi mochte seine einer, Ausfiihrungen gegen die Ansicht des Thomas auch nur machen fur seinen

"als

der zweifelt, nicht jedoch als einer, der GewiBheit fur sich in Anspruch 38 "und

nimmt";

vielleicht",

so hofft er verschmitzt,

Dominikaner diese Zeilen daB

mir von seinen

"wird

hochst gelehrten Anhangern die Wahrheit entdeckt

werden".

DaB

richtig verstanden haben, beweist der

nach Erscheinen des Buches lautstark nach

sie gleich

39

die

Umstand,

dem

Scheiter-

haufen riefen: Alle erreichbaren Exemplare des Buches wurden in Venedig 40 offentlich verbrannt; Pomponazzi selbst kam mil dem Leben davon, weil

Bembo, Sekretar des Papstes und

Pietro

Freund Pomponazzis, seine schiitzende Hand

Im

siebten Kapitel der genannten

iiber ihn hielt.

41

stellt

Abhandlung

Pomponazzi

Beweise des Thomas fur die Unsterblichkeit der Seele auch

das

desiderium-naturale-Argumeni:

naturgemaB

folgt

auf

die

Intellekt aber erfaBt das Allgemeine,

Denn

Weise,

zu

ist;

Wille

das

Ewige

erstrebt;

natiirliches

ein

Streben

der

erkennen;

daher

der Wille das Ewige ersehnen. Ein solches Ersehnen aber jeder

auch

die Weise, etwas zu

etwas

welches ewig

die

darunter

vor,

sich

laBt

"Dafiir

einleuchtender Erfahrungsnachweis erbringen. erstreben,

und guter

ein ehemaliger Schiiler

diirfte

auch

ist natiirlich,

aber

kann

da

nicht

zwecklos sein, da, so im ersten Buch der Schrift Uber den Himmel, Gott

und die Natur

ohne Zweck

nichts

schlechthin unsterblich

Intellekt

tun. 42

ist."

Damit ist nachgewiesen, daB der Im folgenden Kapitel werden die

Beweise des Thomas fur die Unsterblichkeit der Seele widerlegt. Mil ganz ahnlichen Griinden namlich, so Pomponazzi, laBt sich das genaue Gegenteil 1

enim pulex contra

"quid

elephantem?" (ed.

Gentile, S.42; ed. Morra, S.102).

Pomponazzi wurde wegen seiner kleinen Gestalt Peretto oder Pierino genannt. TO "per

modum

dubitantis et non

asserentis"

(ed. Gentile, S.30; ed.

Morra,

S.82).

on "fortassisque

Martin

Vgl.

mihi ab eius doctissimis sectatoribus veritas L.

Padua 1986 (Saggi e 41

Pine:

Pietro

testi, 21),

aperietur"

(ebd.).

Pomponazzi: Radical Philosopher of the Renaissance,

S.47 und S.125f.

Vgl. Pine, a.a.O., S.127.

42

hoc evidenter probatur. Nam modus appetendi naturaliter cognoscendi; intellectus autem universale apprehendit, quod est aeternum, quare et voluntas aeternum desiderabit. Tale autem desiderium naturale est, cum omnes voluntates hoc appetant; naturalis autem appetitus frustrari non potest, cum, "A

signo

insequitur

etiam

modum

primo De caelo, Deus simpliciter S.76).

et

immortalem."

natura nihil agunt frustra. Quare convincitur intellectum esse

(De immortalitate animae, VII,

ed.

Gentile,

S.27f,

ed.

Morra,

Pluta

304

-

natiirlichen

daB

der

Sterblichkeit

die

es

Weise auch

Verlangen bemerkt

(ein wirkt,

eines

beweisen.

er:

"Mit

Wesen wie der Mensch) als wahrnehmende Seele

ist.

Organs bewiesen sein,

Das

...

als

beweiskraftiger

eine

Zum Argument

gleichem Recht aber

nicht alle

damit,

nach

wahrhaft

es

Und

Formen aufnimmt,

und

namlich

ist

Argument

andere."

dem

aus

diirfte

vegetative Seele auf stoffliche

als

daB

44

das

43

bedient

korperlichen strebt,

Hinfalligem sterblich

-

Seele

weiter

und

schlechthin nicht

offensichtlich

unten

sich

und

Zeitlichem

unter

es

heiBt

Berufung auf Aristoteles: "Was nun das Argument beziiglich der Erfahrung es der HI. Thomas betrifft, bin ich besonders dariiber verwundert, wie angefiihrt hat,

bemerkt doch Aristoteles im

Wille

sich

richtet

dritten

wie etwa auf Unmogliches, daher gilt: Wenn unser

Buch der beim

Von

Unsterblichkeit:

Erkenntnisseele anzutreffen

ist,

und wenn

Erstreben

nur

Wille

in

Der der

der

er nach Aristoteles durch das

Erstreben der Unsterblichkeit auf Unmogliches aus

menschliche Seele nicht unsterblich

Ethik.

ist,

dann kann die

45 sein."

Ein vemiinftiger Glaube war im spaten Mittelalter nicht mehr moglich, denn der Versuch, die ratio fidei, die Verniinftigkeit des Glaubens, nachzuweisen, war gescheitert. Pomponazzi stellte fest: "Wer die Wahrheit 46 finden will, muB in der Philosophic ein Haretiker sein." Moglich blieb ein

Glaube gegen

willentlicher

iiberdeutlich

aus:

"Wider

ermessen und ausforschen 43

consimilibus

"quoniam

Vernunft.

die

solches

alles,

was

will, ja,

rationibus

quibus

was alle

hanc

Luther sprach dies 1532 Vernunft eingibt oder

die

Sinne fiihlen und begreifen,

probat,

opposita

probari

potest."

(Ebd., VIII, ed. Gentile, S.30, ed. Morra, S.82).

44 "Sed

pariter,

cum

ipsa

materialiter

operetur,

ut

vegetativa,

non

omnes formas

caduca sit mortalis. ... Non enim maior probabitur quod ipsa veraciter et simpliciter uno quam de altero esse videtur." (Ebd., VIII, ed. Gentile, S.30f, ed. Morra, S.82, 84). recipit,

ut

45

et

sensitiva,

eadem organo corporeo

utitur,

temporalia

et

affectat,

ratio

de

Divus Thomas illud experimento, in primis miror quomodo tertio Ethicorum, dicat voluntatem esse impossibilium, veluti in appetendo immortalitatem; unde, si voluntas nostra non est nisi in anima intellectiva, anima humana si appetendo immortalitatem per Aristotelem appetit impossible, non ergo ed. Morra, S.146). potest esse immortalis." (Ebd., X, ed. Gentile, S.67f, "Ad

adduxerit,

vero

illud

cum

46

de

Aristoteles,

veritatem invenire cupit." (zitiert philosophia haereticum esse, qui sull insegnamento di Pietro Pomponazzi", in: Giornale critico della fllosofia italiana 1 (1926), S.274. Vgl. Bruno Nardi: Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi, Florenz 1965, S.19f und Pine, a.a.O., S.18). "Oportet

enim

nach Cesare Oliva:

in

"Note

Das

naturliche Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit

am Wort

miissen wir lernen

ob wir wohl

fur

halten und schlecht nach demselben richten,

sehen, daB der

Augen

305

Mensch unter

die

Erde gelegt

wird,

und muB

verwesen und den Wiirmern zu fressen gegeben dazu, daB er soil Die Schrift mehr ist denn aller und endlich gar zu Staub werden Menschen Gedanken, Fiihlen und Erfahren."47 Der Glaube an ein Weiterleben nach dem Tode griindet sich nach Luther also allein auf die Schrift. ...

Damit gerat ist

er aber in einen circulus vitiosus:

wahr, da

Schrift

ist

sie

in

Die Auferstehung Christi und die heilige

der heiligen Schrift gelehrt wird,

wahr, weil die Auferstehung Christi dies bezeugt.

Das desiderium-naturale-Argument fiihrt vor Augen, wie stark der Glaube an die Unsterblichkeit vom Wunsch nach Unsterblichkeit motiviert ist. "Mich wird niemand von der Unsterblichkeit abbringen" nemo de ("me

48 depellet"), sagt Cicero in den Tusculanae disputationes, und deutlicher noch im Cato Maior. "Wenn ich aber in dem Glauben irren

immortalitate

die Seelen der

sollte,

und

irren,

erfreue,

Menschen

seien unsterblich, so will ich darin

haben, daB mir dieser Irrtum, an

will es nicht

entwunden werde, so lange

ich

49 lebe."

dem

ich

gem mich

Ein Glaube aber, in ist - wie Freud

dessen Motivierung sich die Wunscherfiillung vordrangt, gezeigt hat

-

eine Illusion.

muB

Angesichts dessen der

50

Unsterblichkeitsdoktrin

Mensch

ein

sofern dies

es wirklich iiberraschen,

noch heute

oft

daB die Vertreter

darauf hinweisen,

daB der

Verlangen nach Unsterblichkeit verspiire. Denn spricht es nicht fur, sondern gegen die Wahrheit des

natiirliches zutrifft,

Unsterblichkeitsglaubens; gerade dieses Bediirfnis erklart namlich, weshalb die

Uberzeugung von einem Weiterleben nach dem Tode entsteht und sie auch dann noch hartnackig verteidigt

bestehen bleibt, und weshalb

Vidder

solchs alles, was die vernunfft ein gibt odder ermessen und aus forschen was alle sinne fuelen und begreiffen, mussen wir lernen am Wort halten und schlecht nach dem selben richten, Ob wir wol fur augen sehen, das der mensch unter die erden gelegt wird, dazu, das er sol und mus verwesen und den wuermen zufressen gegeben und endlich gar zu staub werden ... die Schrifft mehr ist denn aller menschen gedancken, fulen und erfaren." (Das 15. Capitel der Ersten Epistel S. Pauli aw die

wil,

ja

Corinther. Predigt

am

11.

August 1532;

Cicero: Tusculanae disputationes,

WA Bd.36, S.494, 13-17

I,

...

S.496, 33).

77.

49

in hoc erro, qui animos hominum immortales esse credam, libenter erro "quodsi nee mihi hunc errorem quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo" (Cicero: Cato Maior de

senectute, 85).

Vgl. Sigmund Schriften, Frankfurt

Freud:

am Main

Die

Zukunft

1986, S.165.

einer

Illusion,

VI,

in:

Kulturtheoretische

Pluta

306

wird,

wenn

auch wahr

es keincn guten

sci.

Grund mchr

fur die

Annahme

gibt,

daB

sic

51

Ruhr-Universitat

Bochum

Dieses Argument hat John Leslie Mackie in anderem Zusammenhang vorgetragen The Miracle of Theism. Arguments for and against the Existence of God, Oxford 1982, S.198; Deutsch von Rudolf Ginters: Das Wunder des Theismus. Argumente fur und gegen die Existenz Gottes, Stuttgart 1985, S.314. Es findet sich aber bereits in David Hume s Essay Of the Immortality of the Soul, wo dieser bemerkt: "Alle Lehren, die von unseren Neigungen begiinstigt werden, sind verdachtig, und die Hoffnungen und Angste, die diese Lehren verursachen, liegen offen auf der Hand." (David Hume: Dialogues concerning Natural Religion and the Posthumous Essays of the Immortality of the Soul and of Suicide, ed. Richard H. Popkin, Cambridge 1980, S.96. Deutsche Ubersetzung: David Hume: Die Naturgeschichte der Religion. Uber Aberglaube und Schwarmerei. Uber und herausgegeben von Obersetzt Uber Selbstmord. der Seele. die Unsterblichkeit Lothar Kreimendahl, Hamburg 1984 S.86). Vgl. zu diesem Essay: J.CA. Gaskin: Hume s s Philosophy of Religion, London 1978, Kap.6, S.85-102; Josef Bucheggen David Hume Argumente gegen das Christentum, Frankfurt am Main/Bern/New York/Paris 1987 (Europaische Hochschulschriften, Reihe 20: Philosophic, 225), Kap.IV, S.42-53. in:

JOSEP PUIG

Averroes and Aquinas on Physics VIII Roots of Dissent

The beginning

of the

first

1:

chapter of Aristotle

A Search for the

Physics VIII seems to be

s

and best defining the aim of the book. The question is one of whether there always has been and always will be motion. 1 Therefore the very clear

Greek commentators of Simplicius (d.

proof of

Aristotle,

like

Themistius (d.388) or the

last,

533) focused their analysis on the arguments leading to a 2 thesis. Themistius reads Aristotle s passage of 251alO-blO

this

and points out the basic argument, which leans on the very definition of movement: eyTcAe^eca TOV KLVTJTOU TJ KLLVJITOV. According to it, before any movement or change occurs, there always must be something capable of it. If the things capable of motion have been in existence for ever, but their change started at a given moment, some antecedent change must have happened, which removed the hindrance to their motion. existence,

it

is

granting them

Of jLtcya

we may

differentiate

and the

tells

way

1

2 3

came into movement

as active capacities.

It

is

movement simply

the

,

First

4

Principle.

Trpa^/jcara

same

The Neo-

line that Simplicius will

commentaries give us much more

mean any

dvvd-

look basically at the

will

particular

(arc Awe; KtyTjcrcc,)

search here ends and that the metaphysical one

toward the

prior

themselves.

in

6uva/iecc,

us that Aristotle does not here

change, but

between the

of interpretation, like Themistius

follow, although his painstaking

He

some

evident that there must have been

KLLVCLCT-&OLL

SwancLc,

the things capable of motion

existence.

course,

Platonist

If

3

detail.

movement

or

and that the physical starts and moves

now

That suggests that the

"capacities"

cannot

Physics VIII.1 250511-13. Cf. D. Ross, Aristotle, Oxford 1949, pp. 93-94. In Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis,

In Physicorum

W

4 Ibidem, 1126,1.

posteriores

CA.G. V. Ed. A.

Schenkl, Berlin, 1900, p. 210,2-211,20.

Commentaria, C.A.G. X. Ed. H. Diels, Berlin, 1895,

p. 1126,21.

308

Puig

become

active without a prior change,

the eternity of

We

and therefore another argument

for

movement.

need not refer

need not mention

his

to Simplicius

and

to the passage

commentary

polemic with the Christian thinker John Philoponus (d. 580-), author also of a commentary of

John the Grammarian

or

Aristotle s Physics.

number of pages

The polemic

against Philoponus covers quite a large

(ibidem, 1157,2-1169,8) and

Contra Aristotelem 5 and to the

De

refers mainly to the lost

it

Mundi

Aetemitate

contra Proclum (d.

6

485)

.

Seldom

in the history

of philosophy has so short a passage (251a28-

many works with the subject and has enkindled so many discussions. Simplicius accuses him of writing a lot of but he

blO) supplied so

"rubbish"

does

not

lose

his

(cTrt^ccpYjfiaTa). questions:

function

we

If

of

movement

when

temper

For

our

I

purpose,

take the definition of motion and assume the specific

potentiality,

we have

temporally anterior to

is

4 thesis Philoponus want to underline two

refuting

to

agree

the

that

potency

of

any

7 it.

Philoponus however did not accept this priority in all kinds of change or movement. According to the old theory of the four natural elements, earth, water, air and fire, these have changes of place, for instance fire goes upwards by nature. Philoponus maintained "natural"

that

of this

potentiality

generates

fire,

(cvaviia.)

means

to

On

are found in the necessity

a

heavy and

show falls

the

in

contradiction

same of

that there

is

down, but as

fire

the

wood, which burns and

Two

occurs:

contraries

object.

a

deny the eternity of the

very keen to

the other hand,

movement upward

because

Denying the

is

To be we cannot place

here potentiality exists simultaneously with movement.

and to ascend belong together. 8

potentiality

prior

no contradiction it

to

any movement

movement. Simplicius was therefore

becomes

fire,

in

the fact that

wood

moves upwards: bodies

Simplicius Commentary remains our basic source of information about its contents. The Arabs however knew the book; Ibn an-Nadim (Fihrist, p. 254), al-Qiftl (Ta rih alHukama p. 356) and Ibn Abl Usaibi c a flfyun al-Anba I, p. 105) witness its existence. ,

,

Ed. H. Raabe, Leipzig, 1899; R Hildesheim, 1963. For Philoponus commentary, Aristotelis Physicorum libros ..., CA.G. XVI-XVII. Ed. H. Vitelli, Berlin, 1887-88.

Festschrift

In

Physicorum VIII,1 1126,29 & passim. For the general polemic, v. W. Ewigkeit der Welt. Der Streit zwischen Philoponos und Simplicius", H.G. Gadamer, (Tubingen, 1960) pp. 291-316.

Simplicii

Wieland,

v.

In

"Die

8 Ibidem, 1133,16-1135,27.

Averroes and Aquinas on Physics

can have one quality in act and

warm

and cold

actually

movement of

the

contrary in potentiality,

its

The main

potentially.

the 4 elements

9

i.e.

be

to

point lies in proving that

posterior to

is

309

VIII, 1

real possibility

its

and

not simultaneous with their coming to be:

come into existence moves upwards, but us say as long as it is being generated in the air, that what is in potencv acts foregoing that what is in actuality and that what is found potentially in the fuel foregoes Fire

soon as

as

has

it

during the passage,

what

that

is

Simplicius

actual.

position

by al-Farabi (d.950). Aristotle s

De

let

Caelo,

was

We

VIII

"Treatise

mutagayyira,

about

made made

al-Farabi wrote

text is extant.

not unfortunately, but

is

content.

its

M.

taken up by the Falsafa and especially

can see his influence

since

Yahya an-Nahwi and the

later

11

we know

on the mutable Steinschneider

in

Averroes and Maimonides.

in

Avempace and

12

We

The its

in

the discussion about Ar-Radd cafa

a refutation,

parallel writing to Physics

title,

beings"

was the

Kit ab al-mau^udat al-

as well first

as

things

to collect references

can add to them more references

works of Averroes. 13 As

in other

some

far as

we can

see from these references, al-Farabi was very aware of the link between

very clear in

movement and

which appeared the case of the circular movement but dubious in that of

the Aristotelian definition of

its

eternity,

the animal after rest and in that of the 4 elements. I

would say

(d.1138).

In his

that his answer

commentary

is

not different from that of Ibn Bag^a

the Physics

to

14

he quotes al-Farabi and

an explanation of the problem presented by the wood fire, which now becomes an oil fire. Avempace tries to solve it by stating a looks for

9

Cf. 1138,6-11.

10

Ibidem, 1139,31-1140,2.

M. Mahdi, The Arabic Text of Alfarabi s Against John the Grammarian in Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz S. Atiya, Leiden, 1972, pp. 268284. English tr.: M. Mahdi, "Alfarabi against Philoponus", / of NESt. 36(1967) 233-260. "

Al-Farabi (Alpharabius) Petersburg, 1869, pp. 119-123. 13

des

arabischen

Philosophen

und

Leben

Schriften.

St.

as-Samcf af-Tabfi (Abbrev. Ed. M. Fakhry. Beirut, 1973, zr/z). c Rasa il Falsafiya, ed. G. al- AIawT, Beirut, 1983, p. 110. c Ibn Rusd, Tafslr ma ba d at-Tabfa. Ed. M. Bouyges. BA.S, VI, Beirut, 1942 (R 1964) c pp. 884-886. Taltij ma ba d a t-Tabfa. Ed. U. Amm, Cairo, 1958, p. 125. Epitome in Physicorum Libras (V. Arabica) (Abbrev. Epit. Phys.). Madrid, 1983, pp. 134-135. Al-MaIbn

Bagga,

zr

pp. 134, 144-145, 153;

sa

il

al-Falsafiya

English

tr.:

(Masa

H.T.

[Thesis], 1956, pp. 49-52).

14

%arh, pp. 144-145.

il).

Ed.

Goldstein,

c

G. al- Alawi, Casablanca, Averroes: Quaestiones in

1985,

pp.

Physica.

231-233

(v.

also

Harvard-Radcliffe,

310

Puig

homonymy in the use (tartib) among them: The

(quwa) and a ranking or order

[movement] upward, of the heat and of by nature but in a ranking This is Grammarian did not heed or feigned not to heed. all

exist in the oil

concerns the

it

"potentiality"

of the

potentialities

the lightening what John the

As

of

homonymy

of quwa, he gives us as an instance:

The

potentiality of the fire exists in the oil in a kind very different

that

of the heat in the

the

fire.

coined

has

16

Starting from the Neo-Platonic

own

its

value

from

tradition,

of

"potentiality" (quwa) clearly (imkan) placed between a pure metaphysical one and the concrete things, where it is now to be found. This is the point of view which Averroes (d.1198) has inherited when he writes in 1159 about his first commentary (short) to the

Falsafa

from that of

distinguished

11

or later his long

Physics In

steps:

"possibility"

the

movement

commentary of the

18 .

(tafsir)

natural

He

follows

the

elements,

Avempace

s

was

potentiality

from which the movable (the element) is generated. The potentiality of moving upward was found in wood, from which fire existent in the body,

arose, but

related

of being fire. There the potentiality of although in a ranking. I mean, the potentiality motion exists only [in the wood] tnrough the potentiality of 1 the

to

its

movement

of

its

being

[fire].

Averroes

commentary

tradition.

Falsafa

and

definition valid for

potentiality

exists,

aims

It

therefore

fits

at

motion

"in

counters Philoponus

it

general"

thesis

that

as

and

Neo-Platonist it

this

results

from

definition

is

its

not

movements of the four Empedoclean reason we are very surprised when we read in other

some movements,

elements. For this

the

into

i.e.,

the

places of Averroes himself a very different interpretation. In a second "editing"

text

15

of

of his summary, the

&w#,

p. 145.

zr/i,

p. 144.

16

long

20

in

his

commentary,

21

Quaestiones

although

in

or even in the

form

of

a

same

"revisionary"

Epit. Phys., pp. 129-135, lower part. The date appears at the end of his of the Metereologica (v.g. Haidarabad print: Rasa il, 1947, p. 104.

summary

10 Aristotelis

Opera Omnia cum Averois

Venice, 1562-72.

R Frankfurt

19 Epit. Phys., p. 132,

20 21

1.

1962. Vol. IV,

15-17.

Epit. Phys., pp. 129-135.

Masa

c

il,

ed. al- AlawT, pp. 231-235.

...

fol.

commentariis (Junctas). Ed. 338r-342v.

"apud

Junctas",

Averroes and Aquinas on Physics 22

he

observation,

VIII of

Book

mind

from

tells

us that Aristotle

to prove that heavenly

is

s

aim

movement

311

VIII, 1

the beginning of the

at is

Such a change moves away

eternal.

involves, of course a change in the argument which

the

Aristotelian

movement

as an everlasting

movable

now mentions

Averroes

line.

only in order to

show

that

it

the

definition

of

needs an eternal mover as well

object.

We

need not doubt the import of his words. He insists: Aristotle s here is not to demonstrate that motion does not passes away as purpose genus (bi-l-^ins) as opposed to numerical identity, because he investigates

now

whole

"the

universe"

23

and not a part of

it,

where movements are

following one after the other. Averroes himself acknowledges that before he adhered to the "traditional" opinion, but he was aliquantulum in errore.

24

when he has recognized

Since

the true meaning of Aristotle

s

words. 25

Aquinas was reading Averroes to Aristotle s Physics.

expositio

26

At

long commentary while writing his that

point

of the

could not say about this interpretation other than

With

it

is

commentary he omnino falsum.

and sharpness he enumerates several reasons Laubenthal s dissertation 27 treated them again and I would

his usual wit

refusal.

point out the

main one,

in

for his like to

my view:

xiii) inquirere intendens de sempiternitate primi motus, utitur eo quod hie demonstratur, quasi principio: qilpd nullo modo faceret, si hie probasset primum motum esse aeternum.

Aristoteles inferius (lect.

Therefore, Aquinas search for possibility

of

Creation: this

no doubt

has

that

Aristotle

intends

here to

communi and his concern is one of reconciling the an eternal movement with the faith and the doctrine of

motu

is

in

the matter of his Lectio

II.

Junctas, fol. 339r. It is obviously inlaid later by Averroes himself. M. Alonso ("La cronologia en las obras de Averroes", Misceldnea Camillas, 1943; vol. I, pp. 443-460) considers that the tafslr was written in 1186. I dare to say that this was the year of the

first editing.

23 Epit. Phys., p. 133,

24 Junctas,

fol.

1.

25 Epit. Phys., p. 135, S.

Thomae

7.

Junctas,

fol.

339r,

#D.

339r #C. 1.

9-10. V.

Aquinatis:

In

Note

22.

Octo Libras Physicorum

Ed. P.M. Maggiolo, Torino-Rome, 1965. 27 R. Laubenthal: Das Verhdltnis des Hlg. Thomas seinem Physikkommentar. Kallmuenz, 1934. Pp. 79-82. 28

Expositio, VIII, lectio

I,

966 (p.500).

Aristotelis

von Aquin

Expositio

zu

(Expositio).

den Arabern

in

312

Puig

But we want to know why Ibn Rus d interpretated the passage in We find a textual explanation following the lines where he

manner.

this

informs us of his change of mind. Apart from the

motions"

"first

no

generated (h adit) movement precedes another movement essentially. It happens only accidentally and this is the mistake made by "Plato, the Kafam people of both religions" but obviously also by al-Farabi and himself.

29

How

Averroes come to hold

did

this

view?

Let

us

30

where he defends

passages

this

look

we

polemics with al-Gazali (d.llll): in his Tah afut at-Tah~afut

at

his

find three

theory of a double causality. Let us

look at the second one: Al-Gazali argues that the philosophers have to acknowledge that there are new events happening in the world ant that they have causes. These events cannot lead one to another without limit. If there is a limit, this must be eternal and consequently, temporal beings can proceed from an eternal being. The last sentence is asserted by the mutakailimun, but denied by the fafasifa. Al-Gazall attacks a weak point

of the Aristotelian system, but Averroes provides an answer:

The philosophers permit the existence of a temporal being ad in an accidental way, when this is repeated in a finite infmitum 31 matter.

This

existence

of

something ad infmitum

among

the

generated

way how they share something of the eternity of the First Mover. This participation happens by means of His direct activity: Every movement depends therefore on this [First] Mover and its

beings

the

is

setting in It

motion

not

is

essentially, not accidentally.

difficult

to

understand

that

this

Averroistic

theory

rebounds negatively upon the argument for the everlasting nature of motion or change which is based on the definition itself. May be it more fully

explains

"mechanically"

far as

acts

upon His

well run universe.

beings;

However,

it

no doubt,

it

depicts

a

also affects causality in so

primary substances loose their capacity to act as essential causes.

29 Junctas,

VI

how God

fol.

339r, 341r. Epit. Phys., p. 134.

Masa

il,

p. 231.

Tahafut al-Tahafut. Ed. M. Bouyges, B.A.S. VIII. Beirut, 1930. Passages in pp. 20-22; 265-269. For the translation, S. van den Bergh: Averroes Tahafut al-Tahafut,

56-60;

London

1954,

31

Ibidem,

R

1969, 2v., pp. 10-12; 32-34; 157-159.

p. 56; tr. p. 33.

32 Ibidem, p. 59;

tr.

p. 34.

Averroes and Aquinas on Physics

313

VIII, 1

we

not a denial of causality, of course, and in any case a Metaphysics with a physical, natural orientation. It

is

Definitely,

Aquinas saw

Aristotle

this.

On

had

not

thought

such

of

a

stay before

he was not very prone to resort to

his side,

As

stays in this case closer to al-Gazali.

is

well known,

and

distinction

33

it:

he

Aquinas does

not think that reason can decide between the arguments for or against the eternity of motion. He has a respectful but critical attitude towards Aristotle,

him an

and the

Patristic tradition to

issue through

We may

its

finally

Divinity as the essential

was not

which he somehow belongs offers

conception of faith. ask -

why Averroes

ourselves

and

direct

34

-

cause of

would say

all

solution,

changes

i.e.

the

in the world,

was a physical solution and not an ontological one and Thomas, since his earlier works like De Ente et Essentia, went the way of the ontology of being, which attractive to Aquinas.

I

that

it

emphasizes just the dependency for being on the Creator. This ontology enables him to express the radical dependency of each individual in the it receives permanently from the First Esse: Averroes and Aquinas - want to underline.

esse -

A

dependency

that both

Universidad Complutense de Madrid

V.g., in the

34 Cf.,

on

Summa

his

contra Gentiles,

relation

II,

with Averroes:

Wissen bei Averroes. Paderborn, 1911.

38, ed.

Leon. (Rome, 1934).

G.M. Manser, Das

Verhaltnis von

Glaube und

JEANNINE QUILLET

Orcsme

Nicole

dans

cell. ..Nam

librum

"Eccc

nullus

potior

in

Ic Livre

ct la science nouvelle

du Ciel et du Monde

naturalis liber

orbe

fuit",

du Peri ouranou

ccrit

unquam philosophic Nicole Orcsme a la

Pulcrior aut

dc

fin

de

d Aristotc,

sa

n a

Lisicux

que Peveque connu qu a travcrs la nova translatio du grcc en latin, commencee vers 1250 par Robert Grossetestc, corrigee et complctce par Guillaumc de

"translation"

Moerbccke

vers 1265

homme

n est

1

mortcl

philosophic naturellc

ne en

nc en

latin,

Orcsme

a

1

.

Et qui

que

il

ajoute:

onques est

francois",

"...

veist

cestui,

je ose dire

ne

bel

plus

me

et

meilleur

qu

il

de

livrc

ne en ebreu, ne en grec ou arable

ce qui n est pas un mince eloge

d Aristote, bicn que son caractere une louange ad homincm.

oeuvre

laisser croirc a

fort

fais

qu adrcssc

ambigu puissc

admiration exprimce envers ocuvre du Stagirite n empcche pas son commcntateur du XIV siccle de nier 1 une des theses les plus fondamcntales dc la physique aristoteliciennc, a savoir que le

Quoiqu

monde

est le

(malgrc

en

il

soit,

un grand

1

1

vivant.

Lc realisme archaique de

caractere revolutionnairc de Pidec d un

creation originairc ni catastrophe finale) tient a

la

cette cosmologie

monde

cternel,

sans

survivance de Pidee du

commc

grand animal vivant. Conception impie du point dc vuc judco-chretien, mais qui s est conservee longtemps, soit sous la forme simplement nai vc d une figiira mundi, avec haul et bas, droite et gauche,

cosmos

soit

a

dcs imaginations pseudo-hcrmetiqucs ou jouc

travcrs

TJicos-Cosmos-Anthropos avec

microcosmc. nouvelle",

ou,

les multiples

analogies cntre

Faut-il voir dans cette negation

du moins, sa condition de

le

triangle

macrocosme

Pcmergence d une

et

"science

possibilite, lice a la speculation

sur la puissance absolue dc Dieu, qui a constituc,

notamment depuis

la

condamnation dc 1277, un instrument d analysc puissant en matiere de philosophic naturelle?

49 de

1

la

a deja soulignc Pimportance des articles 34 et

condamnation, a savoir, que Dicu peut faire plusieurs mondes,

Le Li\re du Ciel et du Monde, A.D. Menut, Madison, Milwaukee and London,

Nicole Oresme,

Intr.

On

ed.

A.D. Menut

et J.

Denomy,

1968, Introduction, p. 10-11.

trad, et

Nicole Oresme

d unc part,

et que,

meme

ligne droite,

et la

315

science nouvelle

d autrc part, il pout mouvoir le s il faut admettre que, dans ce

ou

cicl,

il

cas,

monde, en 2 y ait du vide Ic

.

Certes, Dieu n a pu creer actuellement d autres mondes, mais

de formuler des arguments cherchant a

interdit

moins au plan de

Dans sont

n est pas rendre possibles, au

les

il

Pintelligibilite.

cette perspective, les gloses d

Qu

eclairantes.

particulierement

potentia Dei absoluta

tres

est

Oresme au De Coelo d Aristote se

il

clair:

de

prevaille

ainsi,

Pargument de

propos de

a

plusieurs mondes, Peveque de Lisieux, apres avoir

1

de

existence

commente

la position

que Pen puet dire en ceste matiere sanz regarder a autorite de homme, mais seulement a pure rayson". La reference, ici, a la raison est connexe d une intervention d Aristote, renvoie a

la

consideration

"selonc

verite ce

de Pimagination: on peut imaginer que plusieurs mondes soient en trois manieres, nous dit le glossateur infidele d Aristote. Apres avoir evoque la

comme on

doctrine stoi cienne de Vekpurosis, inspiree,

d Empedocle,

qu Aristote

et

avoir

peust

annichilier ce

monde

critique

mais

impossible naturellement, faire,

3 il

,

et apres creer

de Platon

sail,

considere

la

"...combien

ajoute:

tellement

faict

auteur

notre

et

comme

que Dieu pourroit

de sa toute puissance ou du tout

un

Mais

autre".

cette hypothese lui

beaucoup moins interessante que

celle qu il developpe aussitot esbatement et au de c est-a-dire apres, toujours plan Pimagination, pour exercitation de engin"; a la difference de la premiere, cette en d autres termes, il rayson", hypothese ne lui parait pas impossible

parait

"par

"par

n

est

pas necessaire

ici

de

faire appel a la potentia

Dei absoluta pour en pas recevable au plan

rendre compte, et pour conclure que si elle n est de la nature, elle est vraisemblable. II s agit, la, de

mondes

plusieurs

"imagination"

emboites

les

intervcnir

fait

uns

dans de

Pargument

Oresme invoque

la

les 1

la

consideration de

autres.

existence divine

La

troisieme

du

vide,

et,

oppose aux

qu Dieu pourrait par sa toute puissance creer du neant une nouvelle matiere et faire un autre monde4 Le recours a la potentia Dei absoluta est encore plus explicite correlativement, raisons

aristoteliciennes

de

la

puissance

rejeter.

En

il

effet,

.

dans Pargumentation, puisque Peveque de Lisieux considere que

le

vide

The Condemnation of 1277, God s absolute power, and Physical Thought in Late Middle Ages, dans Viator, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vol. 10 (1979), Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, p. 211-244. E. Grant,

the

3 Aristote,

4

De

Coelo,

1,

10 279 b et Livre du Cicl, ed.

Li\re du del, p. 174 38 c-d.

cit. p.

166 sq,

f

35d.

316

pcut

Quillet

non,

existcr,

au plan dc

ccrtes,

chose ymaginable sans contradiction la

la

ce

ne

que

estre

pourroit

fait

vertu

par

Certes, la connaissance de notre entendcment

sont corporels, "espace

font

possible, ja 5 naturelle..."

depend de nos

sens,

.

qui

bien que nous ne saurions comprendre, ni concevoir un

si

incorporel qui est hors

connaitre

purement

ce

s agit

II

faire".

symplement

"et

est

"toutfoys

quc Dieu pourroit

et

d une chose imaginable sans contradiction

soit

mais

nature,

qu

le

raison et verite nous

et toutefois,

ciel",

Oresme de terminer

Et

existe.

il

discussion:

la

"Je

conclu donqucs que Dieu puct ct pourroit faire par sa toute puissance un autre monde que cestuy ou plusieurs semblablcs ou dessemblables, et

ne autre ne prouva onqucs souffisammcnt le contraire; mais fait ne fu et ja ne sera fors quc un seul monde corporel, si

Aristote

onques de

comme

il

est

6

dit

d un espace vide

devant"

et infini,

.

On

mais

le

Orasme n

voit,

de

la possibilite

affirme pas Pexistence

concevoir par

le

raison

la

humaine, eu cgard a la puissance infinie de Dieu.

Comme

nous

dimensions du directions

1

monde

montrc

avons

sensible, ligne,

article

recent

ne

droite-gauche

7 ,

les

meme

surface, volume, de

dessus-dessous,

haut-bas,

un

dans

trois les

que

sauraient

etre

autrement qu elles ne sont dans la hierarchic naturelle des etres doues de mouvement; cependant, dans Pabsolu, peut-on les maintenir? Ontcllcs

encore un sens? La rcponse

est

car ces distinctions ne

negative,

sont valables que par rapport a nous. Pour Aristote, tout corps parfait,

du

celui

cicl,

contraires, ce

cxemple,

par

les

comporte

dimensions

trois

leurs

et

qu Oresme ne saurait admettre, car cela voudrait dire que

est un vivant, et, pour notre glossateur, cela ne peut s entendre de maniere figuree. Droitc et gauche, pour ne prendre que ces deux que directions, ne peuvent ctre dites du ciel, car, s il est vrai qu on peut le

ciel

appliquer ces qualites a des vivants, on ne peut "qui

ciel,

le

n ont vie fors par similitude ou en relation" 8 ce qu Oresme va montrer. Sans entrer dans

,

faire

pour

comme le

les

choses

c est le cas

detail

du

de ses gloses,

mentionnons que si le geant Atlas mouvait le ciel d Est en Quest, c est-adire de droite a gauche comme le dit Aristote, sa droite serait a 1 Est et sa gauche a 5

6

Ibid. p. 176 Ibid. p.

8

Ouest; mais

s

il

meut

le ciel

continucllement, alors sa droite

39 a-b.

176-178 39 b-c.

Jeannine

Economies

1

La

Quillet,

et Societes,

n

1

Li\re du Ciel, p. 314, 77

droite

et

la

gauche

(1987), Paris, p. 119-127. c.

du

ciel

scion

Nicole

Oresme,

dans

Nicole Oresme

317

science nouvelle

et la

gauche a Test; on aura ainsi totalement retourne Atlas, devant-derriere. Done, on ne saurait dire que 1 Est est a droite et 1 Ouest a gauche, ni meme que 1 Est ou 1 Ouest soient a droite en ouest

sera

le

ni a

gauche; ou alors

soir

sa

et

il

faudrait admettre

qu Atlas

immobile, ce qui

est

est contradictoire.

Oresme ne met pas en

Certes,

1

espace euclidien

comme

nom

de Vomnipotentia divine. Dieu pourrait faire mouvoir circulaire en ligne droite, malgre les impossibilites tirees de

au

tel,

question

monde

physique aristotelicienne, mais ce mouvement de translation se

le

la

en

ferait,

toute hypothese, dans un espace galileen (ou newtonien), sans haut ni has, droite

comme

ou gauche

dimensions euclidiennes. nouvelle mecanique,

Oresme,

monde

le

de dieu. Cela

et lorsqu

gauche",

(faisant est

1

echo a

la

antarctique

mouvement

est

dit,il

realites absolues,

C est,

On

le

naturelle,

reste,

une chose inanimee continue

a

croire

non

1

comme

questions

comme

de cette figure. d une maniere generate, au niveau de

voit,

1

essentiel le

cosmos

dit-il

il

s agit

la

alors

1

horizon

des

le

mouvements

et le

comme on

theologique,

et

ciel"

que

que

nous

"despend

comme

les

il

leur

de Dieu Lui

a dit

il

9

le

le

les

fondement. les

"sauver

attribuons

une

createur qui

10 .

Dieu, dans

choses soient autrement qu elles

Grant, Nicole Oresme, dans The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

Livre du Ciel, p. 298, 73 b.

,

notamment

plaira"

q 547-549. 10

1

Livre du Ciel que c est pour

du

garde en estre tant

sa puissance infinie, peut faire

E.

philosophie

qui a rendre egalement plausibles les solutions alternatives aux

pas lui-meme dans

conserve

continue a

1

d une strategic,

regularite necessaire; en verite, le ciel le

il

argumentation de potentia Dei conduit a considerer les preuves strictement demonstratives

physiques,

apparences

le

aristotelicien:

considerations sur la puissance absolue de Dieu, en seraient

Ne

monde

"naturel"

"parfait"

inadequates. S

consisterait

pole nord du

oeuvre convenable de Dieu en raison

Oresme ne recuse pas pour le

le

pose

il

est

inverse de celui des aiguilles d une horloge. Et

comme

fils

plus noble que un homme la tete en bas

que

arctique),

non un dieu ou un

"droit

imagine le cosmos comme these d Aristote selon laquelle

reste le cadre de sa reflexion. Cependant,

absoluta

et creee,

il

terrestre,

cadre des trois

le

dans cet espace que se situe la au sublunaire et au supra-lunaire. Pour

commune

parler de la sphericite du ciel

du caractere

du

mais dans

New York

1967

p.

318

Quillet

ne sont 11

commc

Et,

.

nous

1

avons vu,

1

homme

peut imagincr hors du

monde un espace infini et immobile, dans lequel un mouvement rectiligne. Et, ajoute Oresmc,

monde

le

le

"dire

condamne

article

12 de 1277

.

De

a

Paris",

meme

la

comme

manierc,

sont egalement plausibles; qu

egalement

comme

nous

1

il

y

le

le

note Particle 49 de

mouvement du

ait

domaine du

le

a

aristotelicienne

la

mu

par

condamnation

ciel et celui

un seul monde ou une

de

la terre

pluralite Test

avons mentionnc plus haul.

Peut-on, dans ces conditions, se demander

dans

serait

contraire est un

savoir,

dans

au

permis

les

savoir

limites,

si

1

irruption

de

toutefois,

de

Pelargissement

de

la

foi

la

science

son

champ

d investigation par 1 exercice, notamment, des puissances de 1 imagination speculative et de la raison? C est a ce niveau que 1 analyse du role et des la pensee d Oresme est lice a Dei absolutam, et a la consideration du argumentation per potentiam

de

fonctions 1

1

comme

possible

imagination

dans

Ainsi, la phusis aristotelicienne est

tel.

un modele possible

parmi d autres, car possible se dit de ce qui peut etre imagine, meme si cela n cxiste pas au niveau de la nature, sans pour autant que nous entrions dans le domaine de la fiction pure et simple, puisque usage 1

d imagination est quasiment equivalent a celui dc raison, scion les termes

meme

de notre glossateur. Le Livre du Ciel est explicite sur ce point: impossible rcnvoie, non pas seulement a cc qui implique contradiction dans ne peut estre naturellement", a savoir, dans absolu, mais aussi a ce 1

la

est

"qui

de notre monde. En revanche, possible se dit tout ce qui possible en quelconquc maniere, soit necessaire ou contingent, commc

realite

"de

Secondement

de ce qui pourrait estre selon ymagination sanz contradiction, combien que ce ne puisse estre mis en 1 On le voit, le respect du principe de naturellement" ^. estre

que ce

soit".

contradiction

est

a

1

"possible

hori/on

de

est dit

1

imagination

speculative,

et

nous

que nous ne sommes pas dans la fiction pure, dans le chimerique fantaisie, dans le pur arbitraire, mais aussi que peut s ouvrir largement 1 argumentation de potentia Dei absoluta, etant cntendu que la

garantit lie

a

la

puissance ordonnee divine

correspond, en gros est possible

11

p.

a,

a la Creation, etabli un ordre naturel qui

paradoxalement, au cadre aristotelicien.

que un autre monde

Ibid. p. 294, 72

Ibid.

et

soit, et

Lhre du

lieu soit

du tout

"Et

ainsi

vieu,

ou

c.

368, 93 c et

R. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219 articles p. 118-120.

7 Mars 7277, Louvain-Paris 1977, notamment 13

que un

Ciel, p.

208 sq, 48 b sq.

condamnes a Paris

le

Nicole Oresme

quc soit

319

repouse ou que la terre soil mcue hors de son perciee et que Ten voie de 1 autre part et de telles

Ic cicl

entre le possible et le reel, dont

lien

le

science nouvelle

et la

charniere est

la

ou que

lieu

choses".

la

elle

Tel est

puissance

divine absolue.

Une

telle attitude

n est pas seulement d ordre epistemologique; mais

remet-elle en cause, au plan ontologique, un possible ordre des choses? Si

phusis aristotelicienne peut etre mise a la question, en est-il de meme pour les mathematiques, dont Oresme remettrait en cause la valeur la

absolue?

Sur cette vexata quaestio, les opinions sont partagees: un passage du Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum et motuum autorise son editeur,

M.

Clagett, a considerer qu Oresme tient les objets mathematiques comme de pures fictions: "Etsi nichil sunt puncta indivisibilia aut linee, tamem oportet mathematice fingere pro rerum mensuris et earum proportionibus 14 .

cognoscendis" 1

a

oppose

Sans entrer dans

aux

Maier

d A.L.

analyses

de

le detail

la discussion doctrinale qui

15 ,

qui

conteste

les

que

configurationes ne soient que des representations graphiques et les tient

pour des

spatiales veritables et tres reelles des

"formes

qualites",

on

doit

d un usage des mathematiques appliquees a la realite des mathematiques elles-meme, comme discipline En tout etat de cause, seule une analyse exhaustive de scientifique pure. 1 usage et de la signification de 1 imagination dans Poeuvre d Oresme noter qu

physique,

s agit la

il

non

et

pourrait contribuer a eclairer le debat; on peut dire d ores et deja que, dans sa dimension speculative, cette fonction de la pensee et son exercice

permettent de mesurer reflexion

sur

naturelle

et

ses le

la

distance entre une lecture de la Nature et une

fondements ontologiques. La distinction entre realite possible sans contradiction s oppose aux perspectives

pour lesquelles realite, necessite et intelligibilite sont au plan d une science de la phusis. cet usage de 1 imagination correspond la reference a la subtilitas,

aristoteliciennes,

identifiables

A

que Ton peut, M.

comme on

configurationibus qualitatum

A.L.

L

dit

16 ,

et motuum",

comme une

considerer

categorie

Geometry of Qualities and Motions: Intensities

Madison, 1968

known

as

"Tractatus

A de

p. 164.

Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Geistesgeschichte des 1967, et M. Clagett, ed. cit. p. 451.

Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter:

Jahrhunderts, vol. F.

a

Clagett, Nicole Oresme and the Medieval on the Uniformity and Difformity of

Treatise

14.

1

Bottin,

La

imagination selon (1987) p. 219-227.

1, p.

342-43,

scienza

Nicole

Rome

degli

Occamisti,

Rimini

1982,

p.

344

et

Jeannine

Oresme, dans Archh es de Philosophic, tome

50,

Quillet,

cahier

2

320

Quillet

dc la pensee du Moycn Age tardif, c est-a-dire comme la d cxpliqucr de maniere coherente et rationnelle, mais aussi capacite nouvcllc, tous les aspects du reel, mais aussi du possible. S il est vrai

csscntielle

qu alors

valeur scientifique d une explication se mesure a la subtilite

la

avec laquelle on pose un probleme, qui, lui, n est pas nouveau, alors, on comprend de quelle maniere intime se noue le rapport de Pimagination et

de

Cette derniere

subtilite.

la

fait

fonctionner

imagination pour reperer logiquement possibles dans univers. Dans la plupart probleme pose est "fictif, en ce premier sens qu il est pour cause d orthodoxie, de le situer dans un univers

toutes les situations

des

le

cas,

preferable,

1

1

concerne des situations impossibles a verifier ou a observer au niveau de Pexperience. S agit-il pour autant de imaginaire, mais aussi parce qu

simples

"experiences

arbitraires,

de

il

pensee",

d evocation de casus, sinon purement

du moins sans rapport a

realite

la

Pour ce qui dans la mesure ou

naturelle?

la pensee d Oresme, ce n est guere plausible, Lisieux manifeste un souci de "sauver les apparences", c est-ade Peveque dire de ne pas contredire les doctrines aristoteliciennes lorsqu elles sont

concerne

accord

en

avec

la

comme, par exemple, pour Phypothese d une Apres en avoir montre la possibilite, Oresme

foi,

possible rotation de la terre.

son

qualifie

evidemment"

de

la

A

la

Oresme

foi,

nature

.

subtilite

non Pevidence de

certitude,

des

de

argumentation 17

la

"persuasions

mesure, c

physique

possible, cette

pas

Pimagination speculative des contraintes de la observer, experimenter, ccrtes, mais aussi calculer, la

quantification et a

un autre univers mental que s ouvre Pesprit de la vouee a Pexploration de Pimaginaire et du "nouvclle",

est

dite

concluent

libere

choses:

cnvisager les cas, faire des hypotheses, recourir a la

ne

qui

de Pimagination correspond le degre de verite. Par souci de preserver Porthodoxie

a

pensee du possible dont

la

puissance absolue de Dieu reste

le chiffre indelebile.

de Pastrologie, Pintroduction de Pirrationnel a propos des corps celestes, sont autant d exemples de la conviction de Peveque de Lisieux, qu on ne saurait limiter notre connaissance de Poeuvre de Dieu a

La

la

critique

philosophic

naturelle

d Aristote,

mais,

qu au contraire,

il

s agit

de

mobiliser toutes les puissances de Pame, et singulierement Pimagination, liee

17

a

Pexercice

de

la

subtilitas,

pour parvenir, sinon a

Li\re du del, p. 355-7; 364; 536; 89 d-90 b; 92 a-b; 143 d sq.

la

verite,

du

Nicole Oresme

et la

science nouvelle

moins a une certitude probable; en tous secrets de la philosophic".

En n

est

d autres termes,

pas toujours bonne.

Universite de Paris XII

cas,

s

321

efforcer de percer

du rationnel au raisonnable,

la

"les

consequence

EUGENIC) RANDI

Plurality of Worlds: Fourteenth-Century Theological Debates*

Just as

other themes in

many

modern

philosophy, the idea of a plurality

or an infinity of possible worlds can be retraced in the scholastic debates

of the

late

Aristotle

s

Middle Ages. strong

It

defence

is

of

widely accepted

the

unicity

of

that

the

the

rejection

of

should

be

universe

connected to the well-known condemnation issued by the Archbishop of 1 Paris in 1277. This condemnation, it is argued, pushed the theologians to place

I

the possibilities open to God s absolute power: could thus go beyond the confines of Aristotelian natural inquiry philosophy with its particular set of physical and metaphysical doctrines into a broader area in which Aristotelian laws might be

more emphasis upon

am

very grateful to Miss Nathalie Rochon,

who

kindly revised the English text.

It the well-known opinion of Pierre Duhcm: is decrct du 1277 marque done un rcnvcrsement complet dans opinion des maitrcs parisicns touchant la pluralite dcs mondcs. Avant ce ils accumulent les raisons tirees dc la decret, Physique afin d etablir existencc de mondcs cst unc pc ripateticienne quc plusieurs "\jc

1

1

ce

mcmc

tous

Ics theologiens ticnnent pour certain quc Dieu pourrait, s il le voulait, creer des mondcs multiples; ils s appliquent soil a ruincr Ics raisons de Physique qu on avail opposces a ccttc proposition, soit a les interpreter dc telle maniere qu ellcs nc soicnt plus des objections" (P. Duhem, Le systeme du mondc, Ifistoirc dcs doctrines cosmologiques de Platon a Copernic, Paris: Hermann, 10 vols., 1913-59, 9, p. 380. See the english translation by Roger Anew in P. Duhem,

impossibilite...

Mcdie\ al

Apres

Cosmology.

Theories

decrct,

of

Place,

Time,

and

Void,

the

Plurality of by the harsh Koyrc s attacks, Edward Grant observed: "Despite the exaggerated and indefensible character of Pierre Duhem s claim that the Condemnation of 1277 was birth of modern science", he was right to emphasize the special significance of two articles, 34, which made it mandatory to concede that God could make more than one world, and 49, which compelled assent to the claim that God could move the heavens, or world, with a rectilinear motion even though such motion might leave behind a vacuum. Since these two articles struck at fundamental ideas in Aristotelian natural philosophy..." (E. Grant, The Condemnation of 1277, God s Absolute Power and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages", Viator 10 (1979), pp. 211-244; cfr. E. Grant, Much Ado About Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Nothing. Re\ olution, Cambridge (Mass.): University Press, 1981, p. 103. See also, by the same the Middle Ages, author, Physical Science in Cambridge: University Press, 1971; in D. Lindberg (ed.), Science in the Middle Ages, pp. 265-302, now also in "Cosmology", E. Grant, Studies in Medieval Science and Natural Philosophy, London: Variorum

Worlds,

Chicago:

University

Press,

Infinity,

1985).

Defending

Duhcm

s

thesis

"the

Reprints, 1981,

II).

Plurality

of Worlds

323

violated. The result was that Aristotle s arguments and conceptions were put through an unprecedented process o? logical testing.

The

increasing presence of philosophical subjects and arguments in

theological works such as the Sentences

Commentaries should then be

viewed as part of the campaign against aristotelianism led by theology. To check the accuracy of this well-known picture, it would be

theologians, clarify

examine

to

necessary

the

development of the problem among the the Arts Faculties and in the scientific works, and to

at

and how theology had

if

influence

any

writings of the natural philosophers.

At

present,

on I

the

will

thought

limit

and

myself to

some general remarks based on the Sentences Commentaries, and approach more closely the treatment of the problem by a dominican of the early XlVth century, Bernard Lombard!, 3 who is among the theologians who

God

admit that

de potentia absoluta could have created more than one

goes without saying that the present contribution has a very limited purpose, that is to present a sketch intended to puzzle a current

world.

It

interpretation as far as fourteenth-century theologians are concerned.

Murdoch, E.D. Sylla, The Science of Motion", in D. Lindberg (ed.), Science in Middle Ages, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978, pp. 206-64, p. 218. See also J.E. Murdoch, "From social into intellectual factors: an aspect of the unitary character of late medieval learning", in J. Murdoch, E.D. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, Proceedings of the 1st International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science and Theology in the Middle Ages, sept.1973, Dordrecht-Boston: Reidel, 1975, pp. J.E.

the

271-339 (discussion, pp. 339-348).

Bernard Geistesleben,

scuola

Lombardi has been studied by Grabmann (M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliche Munchen: Hiiber, 3 vols., 1926-61, 1, pp. 330, 416; 3, pp. 372, 385; Id., "La

tomistica

italiana",

Rivista

di

Filosofia

Neoscolastica

15

(1932),

pp.

143-153),

Koch (J. Koch, Durandus de S.Porciano OP. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, Munster: Aschendorff, BGPMA 26.1, 1927, esp. pp. 314-39), and more recently by Porebski, who edited a question from his Sentences Commentary (SA. Porebski, question de Bernard Lombardi concernant la difference reelle entre essence et 17 (1973), pp. existence", Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum "La

1

157-86).

(1938),

Romae: became

See also

1

P.

Fournier,

Th.

"Bernard

Lombardi",

Histoire Litteraire de la

France 37

Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, I (A-F), Ad S.Sabinae, 1970, pp. 227-9. Bernard read in Paris on 1327-28, and there he master in theology (probably on 1331-32). He is depicted as an independent

p.

517-22;

Kaeppeli,

whose purpose was to defend Aquinas from the attack of Durandus; in fact Koch s judgement - he stands between them, autonomously searching his own way.

thomist, it

is

In the Sentences-Commentary, Bernard discusses recent authors like Ghent, Scotus, Aureolus, and his confreres Peter de la Palu, Hervaeus, John of Naples. In his later Quodlibet, he shows familiarity to english authors like Ockham and Chatton, to Bertrand de Alemania, and to Francis of Meyronnes.

Randi

324

As

far as it can be judged from the Sentences Commentaries, theological interest in the problem of the plurality of worlds didn t grow significantly after 1277.

1.

As

has often been noticed, the place to look for the cosmological problem in the Sentences Commentaries is in the section of the first

book devoted

to

God

omnipotence, that

s

is

distinctions 42 to 44.

Then, a

problem comes from

general indication about the relevance of the

first,

the frequency, in this section of the Commentaries, of questions devoted to the study of the possible existence of another universe.

on

4

some

A

preliminary

50

Sentences performed questions Commentaries composed between 1230 and 1345, suggests the following test,

the

of

list

of

remarks: a.

there

b.

A

is

a general trend of reduction of the

little

some

In

and/or

number of

concerned can be noticed. These, however, constitute a part of all the questions devoted to God s power.

questions

c.

of questions. 5

but constant increase in the incidence of the

slight

very

number

cases

problem has been treated under a different most likely, in connection to the problem 6 of a better world. At all events, the questions

the

less specific label;

of the possibility

concerning the possibility of the creation of a better world, which are more frequent than questions on plurality, decrease considerably

from the

late Xlllth century.

Furthermore,

it

might be interesting to observe that

the problem of the plurality of worlds almost disappears from the

d.

English commentaries of the fourteenth century, while

number

by a See

J.

of

continental

Pinborg and A. Kenny,

authors,

"Medieval

usually

Philosophical

Literature",

Pinborg, E. Stump (eds.), The Cambridge Philosophy, Cambridge: University Press, 1982, pp. 21-42, p. 30.

A.

Kenny,

On

the

J.

general

tendency

to

reduce

number

the

of

ranked

History

questions

it

is

treated

among

the

in N. Kretzmann, of Late Medieval

see

P.

Glorieux,

de Theologie Catholique 14-2 (1941), cols. 1860-84, esp. 1871-78; "Jean de Falisca. \j& formation d un maitre en theologie au XIV siecle", Archh es d Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age 33 (1966), pp. 23-104, p. 74; enseignement au Moyen Age", Archives d Histoire Doctrinale et "Sentences

(Commentaires sur

les)",

Dictionnaire

"L

Litteraire

du Moyen Age 35

(1968), pp. 65-186, p.

1

15.

is e.g. the case for William Ockham, Sent. I, d.44, q.un. (Opera Theologica 4, eds. Etzkorn, F.E. Kelley, St.Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1979, pp. 650-61); on this text see A. Maurer, "Ockham on the Possibility of a Better World", Mediaeval Studies 38 (1976), pp. 291-312; A. Ghisalberti, "Onnipotenza divina e contingenza del mondo in Guglielmo di Ockham", in M.T. Beonio-Brocchieri (ed.), Sopra la volta del

It

G.I.

mondo. Onnipotenza Lubrina, pp. 33-56.

e potenza assoluta di

Dio

fra

Medioevo ed Eta Modema, Bergamo:

Plurality

traditional

Thomas

the

theologians:

of Strasbourg,

or

of Worlds

325

augustinians Augustin

Ancona and

of

dominicans Jean Quidort and our

the

Bernard Lombardi. 7

The

2.

possibility of a plurality of

worlds was admitted before 1277.

Before and around 1277, Aristotle world was caelo

One

accepted.

critically

chs.

8 and

and

s

defence of the unicity of the

of his main arguments, exposed in

in

chs.

7 and

was

De

that the

9, Physica VIII, another world would be impossible because no other raw materials exist. This position was challenged by a I,

world includes

number these

all

9,

possible matter

of theologians

still

who appealed

maintained that

it

God s

omnipotence. Yet, some of possible to demonstrate the unicity of the

is

world: Albert the Great, Aquinas,

to

8 Roger Bacon, Godfrey of Fontaines.

Peter of Tarantasia, the pope Innocent V, writing around 1258, doesn t limit himself to claim the absolute freedom and power of God, but also technically discusses the famous arguments against the plurality of the world based on the theory of the natural places: the earth of a second world, Aristotle argued, couldn t avoid moving towards the center of the first

this

world,

since

contradiction,

towards is,

its

own

it,

second earth would

the

same

at the

claiming that

same or of another

A

9

place.

This at

the

would

involve

a

same time move

center and towards the center of the other earth, that

inward and outward

and refuses

natural

its

being

God

species.

time. Peter presents this argument,

could produce infinite worlds of the

In such

a case,

each earth would move

question or article concerning the plurality of worlds does appear in the (bk. I, dd. 43 or 44) of Peter Tarantasia, William de la Mare, Richard Middletown, Peter de la Palu, Augustine of Ancona, John of Paris, Alexander of Alexandria, Hugh of Novocastro, Bernard Lombardi, William of Rubione, Thomas of Strasbourg; do not appear (even if the problem is in some cases treated under a different heading) in the commentaries by Albert the Great, Eudes Rigaud, Bonaventure, Hannibaldus, Walter of Bruges, Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Giles of Rome, Matthew of Aquasparta, Scotus, John of Sterngassen, Humbert of Prully, William Peter Godin, James of Metz, William of Ware, Robert Cowton, Hervaeus Natalis, John of Bassoles, specific

commentaries

Durandus, James of Lausanne, the anonymous of Paris BN lat. 14570, Antonius Andreae, Aureol, Landulphus Caraccioli, Ockham, Francis of Marchia, Peter of Atarrabia, Francis Meyronnes, Anfredus Gonteri, John Baconthorp, Peter Thomae, Gerard of Odo, Gerard of Siena, Fitzralph, Peter of Aquila, Gregory of Rimini, Alphonsus Vargas, Buckingham, Mirecourt, Michael of Bologna, Conrad of Soltau, Conrad of Ebrach, Marsile of Inghen nor in the so-called "question-commentaries", like Wodeham s, Holkot s, Chatton s,

-

Halifax

See 9

See

s,

P.

and so on.

Duhem, Le systeme du monde,

e.g.

Aristotle, De caelo,

I,

8,

9,

pp. 375-80.

276b4-20.

Randi

326

towards

own

its

center,

identical

to

every other

center in specie, but

individually distinct:

cum isto aliud facere universum, id est aliud mundunij infinites mundos sive ex rebus eiusdem generis sive alterius... Si tamen fieret ex rebus eiusdem generis, non sequeretur quod moverentur partes terrae alterius adidem centrum numero, sea ad idem specie et natura: Jiunc vero omnes moventur ad idem numero, quia non est nisi unum. potest etiam

et

In

case

the

Peter

of

subsequent authors,

we

of

as

Tarantasia,

the

is

case

for

many

are simply dealing with a few lines of physical

much longer theological context. We should keep mind, to avoid overemphasizing the scientific contribution of this of work. Tarantasia, however, testifies for the existence of a

speculation placed in a in

this

kind

somehow

elaborated

criticism

of Aristotle

need further evidence to confirm that position in the

fifties.

this

However, we do know

s

before

positions

We

1277.

was a common or widespread

that

it

existed.

To admit

to the possibility of a plurality of worlds doesn t entail a rejection of Aristotle s physical principles: the other way around, it is usually conceived as a refinement of his arguments.

3.

to

Bernard Lombardi shares the theological statement that produce more than one world; nevertheless he offers an

solution

the

to

hypotheses

of a

creation

composed by

a

God

is

able

aristotelian plurality

of

universes:

Eadem

proportio vel connaturalitas mobilis pertinet respectu alicuius distinctarum situ, sicut si essent distmcte loco et subiecto. Quod autem moveantur ad unam partem respectu illarum partium et non ad aliam, hoc est per accidens, scilicet quia una est propinquior alia et alia remotior, dato quod naturaliter ad utramque possit moveri ad utramque partem; et idem iudicium est de quiete, loci

quia

divisibilis

idem

naturaliter

potest

quiescere

modo

in

diversis

modo

partibus

situ

hie ibi hoc est per accidens, distinctis, sed quod quiescat quia illud est sibi magis propinquum. Verbi gratia constat quod grave naturaliter appetit centrum et ibi quicscit; centrum autem est in partes situ distinctas, et ideo lapis ita naturaliter quiesceret in ista parte centri sicut in ilia. Sed quare hie quiescit, hoc est per accidens, quia ista pars centri est sibi propinquior et alia remotior.

divisibile

Bernard twenties:

s

is

position

before

him,

it

neither original nor rare

at

the end of the

was maintained by a number of theologians,

Peter of Tarantasia, Sent. I, d.44, q.un., a.5 (Innocentii PP. V in IV libros Sententiarum Commentaria, Tolosae, Colomerio, 1652, repr. Ridgewood: Gregg, 1964, pp. 366a resp.; 366b ad 5). 1

11

Bernard Lombardi,

Sent.

I,

d.44, q.un. (ms.

Napoli Bibl. Naz. VII.G.98 f.53vb).

Plurality

whom

among

Middletown, Peter de

above

the

(besides la

of Worlds

327

mentioned

Palu (one of Bernard

Peter

s

of

Tarantasia)

sources), Augustine of

Ancona, Alexander of Alexandria, John Bassoles, Hugh of Newcastle, Ockham. 12 This position is obviously interesting, inasmuch as it seems to

some

introduce

determinations

quantitative

one) which

in

framework

a

(the

essentially qualitative. Namely, he admittedly refuses the averroistic interpretation according to which distance doesn t aristotelian

is

have influence on motion. 13 In position of a body with

movement.

It

this case,

respect

to

Bernard

clearly claims that the

a center of gravity determines

its

important to observe that the admission of a possible is not intended to dismiss the aristotelian theory of

is

plurality of worlds

motion, but on the contrary,

is

seen as a refinement of

worlds, closed to each other, would

still

-

it.

Two

different

according to Bernard, and to

most of the authors conceiving such a hypothesis - work according to, and be ruled, by the aristotelian laws. Within this, the actual world, ut mine, the validity of the scientific arguments remains unchallenged.

12

See Peter de la Palu, Sent. I, d.42, q.l (ms. Basel Univ. B.II.21, f.234ra): se habet mobile ad unum locum divisibilem et ad diversas partes eiusdem loci divisibili... ut si duo centra movebitur naturaliter ad illud centrum quod est sibi propinponatur and, among others, Alexander of Alexandria, Scriptum super I Sententiarum quius"; (revised edition, post 1307, of the first redaction of 1303), d.44, q.2 (ms. Paris B.N. "sic

f.lat.

15859, f.!72rb):

quo non

in

"Posset

enim dicere

aliquis

quod Deus potest

facere alium

mundum

cum terra potest dici quod movetur mundi. Que enim sub una connexione sunt, moventur ad centrum

est terra; vel

si

facit

a

centr

(ms.: a centro) proprii proprie connexionis; duo autem mundi haberent due connexiones et duo centra, sicut etiam duo homines habent duo corda et duo cerebra"; but see a very similar argument in the augustinians Augustin Triumphus (Lectura super I Sententiarum, completed 1303, d.44, a.2, q.l, ms. Troyes 269, f.202vb: Ad III. dicendum quod posset facere ex rebus

eiusdem generis

ex rebus alterius generis, sicut sibi placeret, nee esset inconveniens universi moverentur a centro et ad centrum; non tarn respectu

et

terre

quod partes

illius

numero, sed respectu eiusdem in specie) and Thomas of Strasbourg, a.4 (Thomae de Argentina, Commentaria in IIII libros Sententiarum, Venetiis: Zelettus, 1564, repr. Ridgewood: Gregg, 1965, f.HSra 11.40-45). Cf. the famous argument by Richard Middletown, Sent. I, d.44, a.l, q.2 (Ricnardi de Mediavilla... Super eiusdem centri

Sent.

IVor

I,

d.44,

libros

continentes,

in

q.un.,

Sententiarum 2 vols.,

Brixiae:

Quaestiones

... Quolibeta quaestiones LXXX Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1963, 1, p.

subtilissimae

Gonzaga, 1591,

repr.

392b) and William Ockham, Ord. I, d.44, q.un. (OTh 4, pp. 657-8) concerning the two fires burning in Paris and in Oxford: they share the same natural place, but each one is directed towards a different part of the heaven. Middletown s and Ockham s texts are discussed by Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277", and Maurer, "Ockham on the Possibility of a Better 1

World",

Based on Aristotle

monde,

9,

pp. 363-74,

8,

s

De

respectively.

caelo

pp. 231-319.

I,

8,

276b23-27, 276b29-277al3;

Duhem, Le

systeme du

Randi

328

The

4.

idea

of potcntia

absolute/,

Bernard discussion

question

text

s

also

is

be

he introduces into

his

s

because

interesting

God

of

notion

the

could

conceived,

traditionally

used to confirm the actual validity of Aristotle

cosmology.

whole

the

absolute

power. Moreover, conceived as the testing of a hypothesis de potentia absoluta.

is

s

At the very beginning, Bernard defines

God

s

absolute power as follows:

In ista questione est communis opinio philosophorum et theologorum quod de facto non est nisi unus mundus; sed cum questio querat de

Ubi sciendum quod potcntia Dei quedam est autcm potentia absoluta ilia que non incluuit repugnantiam terminorum et ista respicit omnia possibilia que crunt et que non erunt. Ordinata autem respicit solum que erunt. Et de ista similitcr est communis oppinio, scilicet quod de potentia Dei ordinata non potest facere plures mundos; sed questio nostra querit de potentia absoluta utrum possit. possibili, est difficultas.

absoluta.

ordinata; vocatur

quedam

Bernard uses the potcntia absoluta in a rather traditional way the way used, in both Aquinas and Peter of Tarantasia s mainstream

e.g.

Bernard clearly stresses the hypothetical character of any reasoning de potcntia absoluta: the absolute power of God covers the whole set of ideas.

Summa

the

also

very

franciscan

Logicae, and later in

close

Geraldus

Bernard; which 14

la

meaning

Odonis,

in short, a

is,

Bernard Ixmibardi,

Peter de

the

to

Sent.

Palu, Sent.

I,

d.42,

I,

Franciscan

lecturing

his political

to

common and

the

Paris

in

reali/.ed.

in his sixth

traditional

a

is

Quodlibet,

works.

15

distinction

the

in

It

But by

same year

view.

16

it

the

Namely,

as it

q.un. (ms. Napoli Bihl. N az. VII.G.98, f.53va). Cf. (ms. Basel Univ. B.II.21, f.232vb): "omnes sancti et quod non sit nisi unus mundus nee essc possit de

q.l

q.l

1980,

modcrnos sunt

(Opera theologica pp.

585-6);

9,

Summa

tres

ed.

opiniones...".

J.C.

logicae,

Wey, St.Bonaventure: III,

4,

ch.6

(Opera

Brown, St.Bonaventure: The Franciscan 1974, pp. 779-88); Opus nonaginta dierum, ch. 95 (Opera politica, eds. U.S.

philosophica Institute,

Institute,

some of

attributed

philosophi conscntiunt potentia ordinata, sed de potentia absoluta inter

ITie

be

never

d.44,

modern!

See Quodlibcta septcm, VI,

will

one Ockham presented

definition very close to the in

which

those

including

possibilities,

1,

Ph.

eds.

G.

Bochner,

Gal,

S.

Manchester: University Press, 3 vols., 1956-1974, 2, pp. 715-19, 724minorcs (Opera politica, 3, p. 14), Contra loannem, ch.22 (Opera politica 3, p. 88), Contra Bcncdictum, III ch.3, VI ch.2 (Opera politica 3, pp. 230-34, 273). For a discussion of those passages see H. Randi, // So\rano e I Orologiaio. Due Offler,

J.

Sikes,

26), Epistula

immagini

Nuova

di

Italia,

ad

fratres

Dio ncl 1987,

inedito di Giovanni

dibattito sulla potentia

esp.

pp.

65-76,

XXII", Mcdioe\

tune

si

faceret

aliter,

esset

ordinata, et ita non posset facere nisi distinction between potentia absoluta and

preordinatum

quod

faceret...".

potentia

et

On

ordinata,

tune

non

the

history

see

W.J.

esset

nisi

of

the

Courtenay,

and Causality in Medie\p/i/ce

tractabimus".

Reason and Faith

As

the

for

relative

in the

337

Dragmaticon of

interchangeability

terms

the

the

in

Philosophia, William of St Thierry had not missed the opportunity to expose the philosopher s explanation of the divine Persons and the

man

creation of

8.

We

as that of a disguised physicus.

now

can

sketch the complex relation between philosophica ratio

and auctoritas diuinae paginae in the Dragmaticon: a) Theory.

The

central role played by ratio in William s remarkable

I shall recall only the main points: ratio is epistemology soul to formulate defined as the faculty of the true and firm judgment

is

well known;

"a

on a physical rebus as

rationem quaerere, reddere de the task of the natural philosopher. His arguments ought to be

is

as

far

12

(Dragm. VI, 307)

thing"

possible

accessible

to

"necessary".

sensory perception

But

:

world

the

since

(the basis of rational

not

is

knowledge), the

philosopher must often be content with probable arguments, as a physicus. Ratio "fluctuating

always

if

he were

further said to derive from uera opinio, a true but

is

and uncertain

judgment",

when

confirmed either by the

is

"it

agreement of those who know or by necessary

arguments"

(si

uel assensu

sapientum uel argumentis necessariis confirmetur).

We

can see that auctoritas, in

written by a sapiens

must be

,

is

metonymical sense of something connected with uera opinio: to be reliable, both its

either assensu sapientum

"confirmed

or argumentis

Consequently, auctoritas is theoretically inferior to what Adelard of Bath had claimed. 13

reason

necessariis".

This

.

in

is

fact

b)

In

ratio

practice

Dragmaticon,

with

and,

the

and

auctoritas

of

exception

go

hand

in

hand

in

the 14

a

single

allusion,

cryptic

PL 180,339A "homo physicus et philosophus physice de Deo philosophatur; ... creationem primi hominis philosophice, seu magis physice describens"; 340A physico illud sensu interpretans..." "Et

12

"Here the Gratarolus edition, following the wrong reading of a small class of mss. which omit two lines of text, must be emended to read: Si uero hoc iudicium de re

corporea

enim

ratio




hoc

sit

ostendat, uel utilitatem

ad quam hoc

sit praetendat"

(Dragm.

111,68-9).

CECILIA TRIFOGLI

The Place

of the Last Sphere in Late-Ancient and

Medieval Commentaries

Aristotle

treatment

s

frequently discussed

of

the

place

of

the

last

of his doctrine of place

topic

the

is

sphere

most

Late-ancient

among

and Medieval commentators. 1 They raise many questions about it and attempt different solutions which often reflect either conceptions of place different

from Aristotle

The

exposition

primary concern of consider

the

to the

it

of

Rome

To

this paper.

s

position

on

this

context

of

the

and

problem

doctrine of place seems to be inconsistent

s

same

topic

we

introduce his position

is

the

shall briefly

the

major

when

applied

proposed by the commentators.

heavens since

but, at the

or innovations introduced in the doctrine.

Aristotelian

interpretations of

Aristotle

s

of Giles

it

turns out that the heavens cannot be in a place,

time, must be in a place. In particular, the definition of

place as an external

container"

and the derived

criterion for being in a

3

deny a place to the heavens. For this criterion claims that only bodies which are contained by another external body are in a place. As a consequence, the heavens or the outermost body of the universe cannot place

be

in a place, since they are not

however,

heavens

other

must

contained by another body. There are,

primary assumptions about place which show that the be in a place. They concern the essential connection

between place and

local

motion;

this requires that

every body that moves

wish to thank prof. F. Del Punta for advice and comments on this paper; I am Rega Wood for her patience in helping me to elucidate some of the linguistic oddities and for her precious remarks and encouragement. I

also indebted to dr.

On

the

history

of Aristotle

Systeme du

Monde

(10 vols.),

s

of place, see, for instance: P. Duhem, Le A. Hermann, 1913-1959; vol.1, pp.197-205, 297-300,

doctrine

Paris,

313-320, 333-350; vol.7, pp.158-302; vol. 10, pp.50, 79-81, 100, 157-160, 204-210, 396-412; E. Grant, "The Medieval Doctrine of Place: some Fundamental Problems and Solutions",

XIV

secolo

Paravicini Bagliani)

Roma,

in:

Studi sul

in

memoria

di Anneliese

Maier

(a

cura

di

A.

Maieru e A.

Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1981, pp.57-59.

See Aristotle s Physics (a Revised Text with Introduction and 1 Ross), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936 IV.4, 212a20-21. 3 See Aristotle, Physics, IV.5, 212a31-32. ,

Commentary by W.D.

TJie

with

motion must be

local

circular

motion,

Aristotle

s

in

Place of the Last Sphere

i.e.

4

a

in

343

But the heavens move with

place.

with a kind of local motion. So the problem with

doctrine can be

summed up

as follows: the heavens cannot

be

a place, since they are not contained, but must be in a place, since

they

move with In

local motion. this

facing

the

problem,

Aristotelian

reached

two

unavoidable

and

tradition

different positions:

the

1)

first

declares

that

contradiction

the

is

the Aristotelian doctrine of place completely. This position was

rejects

who

supported by Simplicius and Philoponus, Following

place.

Damascius

doctrine,

formulate other doctrines of defines

Simplicius

as

place

measure of the position of the bodies, whereas Philoponus defines three-dimensional incorporeal extension.

Proponents

2)

of

second

the

the

it

as a

remove

the

5

to

attempt

position

contradiction without giving up the whole Aristotelian doctrine, but by

some

modifying

principles

from

which

it

This

derives.

was

position

supported by some Greek commentators and commonly by the Medieval commentators. These commentators, however, followed different routes to save

Aristotle

difficult

s

doctrine;

all

them

of

reflect

of

interpretations

the

passage of Physics IV.5 where Aristotle attempts to deal with the 6

place of the heavens.

Aristotle claims that only the parts of the heavens are in a place

move from

since only they

a place to another; the heavens as a whole

are not in a place since they do not change place, as they rotate. This solution assumes that circular motion for

right, its

it

is

not the rotating body

is

not a local motion in

parts.

There are two main terminological ambiguities which

commentators.

The

first

for the

concerns

ambiguity

the

See, in particular, Aristotle, Physics,

See Simplicii In

Aristotelis

term

and the universe,

continuous parts which compose the

(

Aristotle

text

s

this

last

parts

.

Since

term can stand

sphere or

(ii)

for

IV A, 211al2-14.

Physicorum

Physicorum Commentaria, ed. H. Regia Borussica, Berlin 1887, pp.557,8-585,4.

Aristotelis

See Aristotle, Physics, IV.5, 212a31-b22.

ed. H. Diels (CA.G. vol.IX), 1882, pp.601, 1-645, 19; loannis Philoponi In

Commentaria,

Academia Litterarum Regia Borussica, Berlin

6

in

justify the different reconstructions of his solution offered by the

Aristotle mentions both the heavens (i)

own

its

changes place, but only

itself that

Vitelli

(C.A.G.

vol. XVI),

Academia Litterarum

344

Trifogli

the single celestial spheres

as

parts of the celestial region or

(iii)

for

spheres and the sublunar elements as parts of the universe. The second ambiguity concerns the expression per accidens

both the

celestial

.

For Aristotle

s

heavens

the

account of the place of the heavens clearly indicates that are in a place in virtue of their parts, but Aristotle

concludes that they are If

only

the

second

of

Aristotle

reconstructions

The

traditions.

per paries

in a place per accidens.

ambiguity solution

s

1)

the

different

broad

exegetic

considered,

two

into

assumes that per accidens simply means the second tradition makes a distinction between the meaning

;

tradition

first

of per accidens and that of per paries

The

.

seems chronologically

tradition also

first

and

Themistius

in

is

fall

for

first

it

appears

and

in

Philoponus paraphrasis Simplicius commentaries. 7 These commentaries also show that this tradition divides into two, according to the interpretation given to the first ambiguity, to

the term

refers

are

parts

According

.

continuous

the

second they are the single the Middle

the

Ages

commentary, who Themistius, in faithful

of

parts celestial

the

it

i.e.

the parts to which Aristotle

first,

last

sphere,

according

to

the

spheres and the sublunar elements. In

interpretation reappears in

first

accepts

to the

but falsely ascribes

it

Thomas Aquinas

to Themistius.

8

For

follows the second. Both these interpretations remain

fact,

on two important aspects: 1) they accept motion of a body can be reduced to the local

to Aristotle s doctrine

the view that the circular

motion of

its

parts;

definition of place

is

2)

they assume

that

an essential element of the

containing the located body. Both these aspects are

rejected by the second exegetic tradition. 2)

This

second tradition

Albert the Great, criticized by

Rome

and such important

See Themistii In

starts

from Averroes;

it

followed

is

Thomas Aquinas, and defended by

later

authors as Walter Burley.

Aristotelis Physica Paraphrasis,

Academia Litterarum Regia Borussica,

Berlin,

ed.

9

Its

by

Giles of peculiar

H. Schenk (C.A.G. vol.V,

p.

II),

1900, pp.119,12-121,20. Simplicius, Physics,

pp.588,1-595,26. loannes Philoponus, Physics, pp.593,1 1-597,4; 600,25-604,19. o See S. Thomae Aquinatis In octo Libras Physicorum Expositio, ed. Torino-Roma, Marietti 1965, Bk.IV, lectio 7, pars. 478-480, pp.232-233.

P.M. Maggiolo,

See Averrois Cordubensis Aristotelis de Physico audito (Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. IV), Venetiis 1562 (repr. Minerva G.M.B.H., Frankfurt 1963), Bk.IV, Comment 43, fol.!41L-M; Comment 45, fols. 143M-144E. Alberti Magni Physicorum Libri

VIII (Opera

Omnia,

Thomas Aquinas, Romani Commentaria in

p.269.

ed. A. Borgnet, Parisiis 1890, Bk.IV, tract.I, cap.XIII, Bk.IV, lectio 7, par.477, p.232; par.486, p.234. Aegidii octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Venetiis 1502 (repr. Minerva vol.III),

Physics,

The Place of the Last Sphere

the distinction between being in a place per paries and being in a

trait is

which refer

place per accidens,

heavens

When

.

turn

in

to

different

meanings of

the

the heavens are conceived as the whole celestial region,

because the single celestial spheres a place; but when the heavens are conceived as the last sphere,

they are in a place per paries, are in

345

i.e.

they are in a place per accidens,

i.e.

per centrum, namely the earth. This is clearly an innovation

account of the accidental location of the heavens introduced by Averroes and, furthermore, Aristotle

it presupposes the rejection of which reduces circular motion to the motion of the principle

s

parts of the rotating body. I

will

discuss

treatment of the accidental location of

Giles

next

the heavens.

To

Giles

clarify

position

claim that the last sphere

is

in

it is necessary to analyze further the a place in virtue of the earth. It includes

two assumptions which are conceptually and factually distinct. The first comes out from the spatial relationship between the sphere and the not contain

earth.

So

The

earth

is

contained by the

last

last

sphere but does

in

attempting to solve the problem of the place of the heavens, the second tradition gives up the primary axiom on place, that of containment, and admits an internal place, at least for the bodies it.

which move with circular motion.

But

this

does not yet explain why,

contained inside the is

chosen to define

last its

among

all

the bodies which are

sphere, the one most distant from

place.

The explanation

is

it,

the earth,

provided by the second

assumption concerning the immobility of place: place must be immobile and the earth is the only body in Aristotle s universe which is properly immobile. All the followers of the second exegetic tradition share both these

assumptions and occasionally repeat the arguments which Averroes used to support them.

Regarding internal place, Averroes declares that it is not necessary to have an external place, since they move circa and not in continente. aliquid Furthermore, he seems to accept for

spherical bodies

Avempace

G.M.B.H., Aristotelis

s

arguments on

Frankfurt Expositio

et

1968),

this

Bk.IV,

Quaestiones,

York, 1972), Bk.IV, fol.l02vb.

topic:

lectio

Venetiis

8,

unlike the rectilinear bodies,

fol.82ra-b.

1501

(repr.

Walter

Hurley,

In

the

Physicam

Georg Olms, Hildesheim-New

346

Trifogli

sphere

is

by something

does not need to be completed

in itself and, therefore,

complete else, a

10

containing place.

Regarding the immobility of place, he declares that the heavens are in

a place because of the earth since the immobility of the earth

cause of the /lv/0 of the heavens.

is

the

11

Besides repeating these arguments, Giles formulates other arguments in

favour of the opinion that the heavens are in a place per centrum.

These arguments describe a new interpretation of the connection between place and local motion. For they stress the function of place in the description of local motion, but they deny any real dependence of local

A

motion on place. from this function. In

new

quantitative concept of place

what follows

aspects

I

shall

try to

Giles

in

appear

sphere and of the immobility of the treatment of the

In

framework

within

emphasi/ed. Giles against

Thomas

of

virtue

its

parts,

before and after

it.

claim, showing that these last

first

problem, the function of place as a

and

are

rest

described

is

chiefly

main argument formulated by

position.

Thomas

Following Aristotle, in

derive

place.

appears, for instance, in the

It

to

treatment both of the place of the

motion

which

this

prove

seems also

held that the

since each

Giles

part

criticism

is

is

last

sphere

in a place

is

contained by those which are

the following:

with the relative order of the parts of the

last

if

place

is

identified

sphere, the last sphere

undergoes motion, but it cannot be recogni/.ed and described, since this order does not change, as it moves. The correct frame of reference is an internal

i.e.

the

because the position of the

last

sphere changes with respect to the earth, as it rotates. For, as Giles explains: Moto enim celo, partes celi habent alium ordinem ad paries centri. Pars

enim

place,

earth,

que prius respiciebat hanc partem aliam partem terre. Totum ergo celum semper ilia

terre,

moto

respicit

celo,

respicit

totam terram, sed

non semper respicit earn eodem modo, partes vero celi non semper respiciunt easdcm partes terre, propter quod, si comparamus celum ad centrum

10

See

Comment 11

et

partes celi ad partes centri, inveniemus

Averroes,

Physics, 45, fol.l44B.

Bk.IV,

See Averroes, Physics, Bk.IV,

Comment

Comment

43,

quod totum celum

fols.!41M-142B,

43, fo!.142G.

142E,

142M-143A;

347

The Place of the Last Sphere

mutat locum secundum dispositionem, partes vero eius mutant locum

secundum substantiam

The same

12 .

criticism

raised against the opinion that identifies the

is

place of the last sphere with

cum ad

convex surface:

its

huiusmodi superficies

Si

celum semper uniformiter se habeat, sequeretur quod celum ex motu suo nullo modo mutaret locum, esset locus celi,

quod

est

illam superficiem

omnino inconveniens

The

function

description of local

of place in the

underlined

definitively

13 .

the

in

third

argument

motion

favour

in

is

also

of Averroes

Tertia via sumitur ex parte eorum que debemus salvare circa locum. Sic enim tribuendus est alicui locus ut per motum eius localem opinion:

modo

mutet locum. Si enim ponemus celum nullo Alexander, vel

ponemus ipsum

si

posuit Themistius, vel ultime, ut

Sed

si

quidam

alii

si

esse in loco solum

diceremus ipsum esse

posuerunt,

ponimus ipsum esse

esse in loco, ut posuit

secundum

nunquam per motum

in loco per

partes, ut

in loco ratione superficiei

eius mutaret locum.

comparationem ad centrum

vel per

comparationem ad terram, cum totum celum semper respicit eandem terram, partes vero celi non semper respiciant easdem partes terre, salvabimus in celo quod per eius

motum mutet locum

et

salvabimus quod

quantum ad eius partes mutet locum secundum substantiam, quantum ad se totum mutet locum secundum dispositionem 14 .

These passages show first that the causal connection between the motion or rest of the heavens and the earth, maintained by Averroes, has completely

disappeared.

Furthermore,

they

show a

sharp

distinction

between the existence of motion and the elements necessary to describe it it, and place appears to be relevant only for the description. From this follows that Giles gives

of

place.

Place,

Aristotelian

surface

provided that this function

it

it it

no

clear indications about the physical properties

be

seems,

could

of

container,

the

either

a

of

space

several

or

things

an internal

-

the

place-

allows a suitable description of motion. But to perform

must meet an

essential requirement:

it

must not only be

physically separated from the mobile body but immobile since, as Giles Omnis enim motus fit respectu alicuius immobilis; nunquam explains: 12

Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio

8,

fol.82vb.

fol.83ra. This opinion is not mentioned Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, by Averroes, but by Albert the Great, who ascribes it to Gilbertus Porretanus (see Albertus Magnus, Physics, Bk.IV, tract.I, cap.XIII, p.270). lectio 8,

14

Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio

8, fol.83rb.

348

Trifogli

cnim possumus imaginari motum 15 cuius aliquid dicatur moveri

nisi

imagincmur

aliquid

immobile respectu

.

The

espoused by all the followers of the second exegetic tradition, whereas the second is introduced by Giles. It contains an explanation of the immobility of place that is clearly conclusion in this passage

first

congenial to the

new

is

function of place. Averroes himself, for instance,

explained this point in a different way: the place towards which a body moves must be immobile because: Si aliquid movetur ad motam rem, tune

motus eius This Aristotle

esset ociosus

explanation,

16 .

that

real connection

absent

completely

in

it

to

assumes a

between place and motion based on the nature of bodies. of the immobility of place also shows which

physical properties place

These

rest.

refers

Giles,

treatment

Giles

and

is

doctrine of natural place and motion. Therefore,

s

must have

out

turn

properties

provide a description of motion

to

be

to

different

from

those

of

Aristotle s place.

To

explain

this

point

we must

turn

Giles

to

distinction

between

introduced to counter an

formal and material place. This distinction

is

objection against the immobility of place:

place, according to Aristotle,

if

the surface of a natural body, since each natural

is

can

be

place

answered

if

and

body

immobile?

Giles

admits

that

this

body can move, how objection cannot be

completely reduced to the surface of the containing place Locus est immobilis formulates the following distinction: is

formalitcr, mobilis vero materialiter.

The of the place fixed

material place coincides with the Aristotelian place as surface

containing body in

is

the ordo

points

contact

ad universum of

of the

universe

with

the

contained,

this surface,

(the

earth

i.e.

and the

its

whereas formal

relationship to the poles). The Thomas Aquinas

celestial

of this distinction already appear commentators offer an explicit definition of the ordo Neither commentary. ad universum; there are, however, some differences in the terms and essential

in

traits

examples they use which

illustrate

Giles

place.

15

16

Acgidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio Averroes, Physics, Bk.IV,

Comment

8, fol.83rb.

41, fol.!40A.

1

Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio

7, fol.Slra.

quantitative

notion of formal

The Place of the Last Sphere

To

how

349

ad universum remains unchanged when the founded vary Thomas introduces the following analogy: Sicut etiam dicitur idem ignis manere quantum ad formam, licet secundum materiam varietur, consumptis et additis quibusdam lignis 18 explain

on which

surfaces

the ordo is

it

.

Thomas

ordo, therefore,

common

to

the

all

similar to Aristotle s form, being a quality

is

containing surfaces and conferring the function of

place upon them. But there

no analogy between place and form

is

in

commentary. For Giles explains the permanence of place by the permanence of the distance between the located body and the fixed points Giles

consequenter ponitur, ideo locus est immobilis quia, licet, te quiescente, possit moveri aer qui est iuxta te vel aliquod aliud corpus circumdans te, semper tamen diceris esse in eodem loco quia of universe:

semper

es in

From

Nam,

ut

eadem

distantia

this

it

passage

ad centrum evident

is

et

ad polos

that

19 .

Giles

replaces

the

generic

notion of ordo with the quantitative notion of distantia. This distance

can be measured and, therefore, the formal place conceived as distance is

a suitable

framework

The comparison

for the description of local

motion and

rest.

of the quoted example with other similar examples

offered by Giles reveals a doctrinal aspect that, though not systematically

developed

by

position. For,

located

body

the

consequences of his example, Giles refers to the distance between the and the fixed points of the universe, whereas in the elucidates

Giles,

theoretical

in this itself

examples he refers to the distance between the surface of the containing body and these points. How can this be explained? Perhaps, other

the explanation could be

when considering formal

found place,

remark by Edward Grant 20 that, the Medieval authors speak indifferently a

in

measured from the place itself or from the body in that since place and the external surface of the located body are

of the distances place,

coincident, according to Aristotle. Consequently, the distance

both cases formal

is

place,

identified

with

simply completes Aristotle but

seems

to

replace

essentially to evaluate

it.

s

a

no longer something

is

distance,

in

Thomas Aquinas,

motion and

in

rest

fact,

and

it

according

performs

Physics, Bk.IV, lectio 6, par.468, p.227.

10

Aegidius Romanus, Physics, Bk.IV, lectio

7,

See E. Grant,

Place"...,

"The

that

notion of place as surface of the container, Place,

10

?n

measured

the same. This explanation has a further implication: the

Medieval Doctrine of

fol.Slrb.

p.65, note 25.

to

Giles,

this function

serves

when

350

it

is

Trifogli

defined as a distance that remains the same,

at rest,

and

indifferently itself

varies,

if

satisfied

the located body

when

the

is

distance

if

the located

to

introduce

the

is

motion. Both conditions are

is

measured from the located

and from the surface of the body containing

body it seems superfluous

body

in

containing

located body, at least as far as the description of motion

it.

Consequently, besides the

surface is

concerned.

emphasis on the role of place in the description of motion seems to lead to a quantitative and relational notion of place. In conclusion, Giles

Giles, however,

does not completely substitute the Aristotelian notion of is only one of the

place for that of place as a distance. Place as distance

two notions of place which appear in his commentary. The other, which is related to material place, assumes an intrinsic connection between place and the located body

that cannot

Universita degli Studi di Pisa

be founded on distance alone.

WHITE

G.

Ockham and Hume s Question

There has been, bring of

Ockham

scepticism",

secondary

some

no shortage of attempts to

literature,

sort of meaningful relationship with

however

Such

conceived.

Ockham

link

to

attempts

in the

into

with

later

attempts

figures;

thus

about induction and the

possibility of a scepticism

Goddu 1

problem with

go

generally

the

raises

reliability of causal

Ockham

connections, which gains a hold because of

"the

s

principle that the

existence of one thing cannot necessitate the existence of another thing.

Even though have, as

this

later did

it

Goddu seems fact

principle did not lead

Hume; and

to think, needs to

Ockham

the fact that

to scepticism,

didn

t

is

it

could

something

that,

be explained.

We

find a similar chain of thought in

that

Ockham subscribed to that God could cause

principle

it

a

certain

us

to

Adams. 2 Again, we have principle

believe

-

in

this

falsehoods

assertion that this principle leads to a form of scepticism

-

-

case,

the the

and the

in this case,

3 scepticism about mind-independent material objects. Here, too, the path from the principle to fully-fledged scepticism is one that Ockham didn t

take, but

1.

somebody

else

-

in this case

Prepositional Structure, Assent,

Descartes

-

did.

and Cause

Ockham s key texts: the Prologue to concerned here with the structure4 of acts of

Let us start by examining one of his

Ordinatio.

Ockham

is

Andre Goddu, The Physics of William of Gcistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 16 (Leiden 1984), p. 217. "

Marilyn Ockham",

In

McCord Adams,

Cognition,

Certainty,

Studien

und

and Scepticism

Texte

in

zur

William

Traditio 26 (1970), pp. 389-398. See p. 394.

her

Scepticism",

A. C. Pegis,

definition in

of

scepticism,

she

follows

Etienne

Gilson,

The

Road

to

The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York 1937), pp. 61-91, and

"Concerning

John Boler, 85-98. See p. 86: Cf.

"Intuitive

Ockham.

William of

"Ockham "the

Ockham",

doctrine

Traditio 2 (1944), pp. 465-480.

Cognition", Franciscan Studies NS 36 (1976), pp. of intuitive cognition depends upon an analysis of the

on Evident

White

352

assent

more

with

(specifically

evident

assent

to

theological

here interested

He

the evident assent which belongs to science

in

but

propositions,

generally with evident assent to propositions in general.)

not

is

(i.e.

that

comes from knowledge of first principles and the like; 5 such in principles are known when the terms occurring in them are known

which

Ockham

fact,

statement

of

knowledge

first

(complcxa) which

knowledge of called

I

terms. it

-

their

knowledge

(notitia

someone

broad definition of

s

it

know

-

applies

is

white.

Ockham

as

sees

Socrates and being

at

9

and whiteness existing

Socrates

sees

intuitively

knowledge of

intuitive

extends to the sort of knowledge of

it

someone has when looking

Socrates, then (s)he can

evidently that Socrates

is

in

white.

thought."

Sent.

Ockham, Bonavcnture "Si

with

contrast

by

intuitiva),

a rather general definition, and

able to judge on that basis that Socrates

structure of

However,

with will be like

(notitia abstracted).

Ockham

empirical facts which

if

the

to

to a variety of cases. Firstly,

...

6

in that it is knowledge of propositions be caused simply by (a certain sort of) terms (incomplexa}? The sort of knowledge of terms

able

knowledge

is

contains

terms".

principles

is

shall call this It

which

Aristotle

we know their Ockham is concerned

in that

principles

intuitive

abstractive

in

passage

of evident assent that

the sort

is

a

to

refers

know

"We

NY

dicatur

Prol.

qu.

quod

Opera

1,

Theologica

ed.

I,

G.

Brown

S.

Gal,

(St.

6:

1967), p.

cvidens veritatis

notitia

contingentis

nunquam

causatur sufficicnter

incomplcxa terminorum, quia tune scirctur cognitis terminis. Sed omnc tale 18est principium per se notum, secundum Philosophum I Posteriorum [c. 3 t. 21, 72 26]. Sed nulla veritas contingens est per se nota; igitur etc.: Dicendum quod propositio per se nota est ilia quae scitur evidentcr ex quacumque notitia terminorum ipsius propositionis, sive abstractive sive intuitiva. Sed de propositione contingente non est hoc possibile ex

notitia

..."

"Principia

cognoscimus

in

quantum terminos

cognoscimus."

Post. Anal.

3

c.

t.

21, 72

18-26. "Notitia

evidens

est

cognitio

vcri

alicuius

incomplexa immediate vel mediate nata sufficientcr O.Th. I, p. 5.

complexi, causari."

ex

terminorum

notitia

Ockham,

Sent.

Prol.

qu.l,

Q

The this is

existence

proved

"...si

in

aliquis

of such a

Ockham, videat

ibid.

distinction

intuitive

evidenter scire quod Sortes est

is

Conclusio

1

of qu.

1

(Ockham,

ibid.

p.

15);

pp. 22-30.

Sortem

albus."

et

Ockham,

albedinem

Sent. Prol. qu.

exsistentem 1,

O.Th.

I,

in

p. 6.

Sorte,

potest

Ockham and Hume s much

applies to

it

Secondly,

evident

is

Ockham mental

states.

above;

such

(This

mental

associated with terms

-

-

incomplexa

and thus

we have

in the technical -

things

huiusmodi

et

tristitiae

delectationes,

are

the

-

our

argues

own

of our

described

way

intellectiones,

and

-

10

have:

love, are happy or are

fact,

that

intuitiva

be interpreted

states

we

that

contingent

to notitia

to

is

of a

is

knowledge,

must be due

-

we

introspective knowledge that

knowledge that we understand something, sad

353

Question

affectiones,

notitia

intuitiva

is

referring to these things.)

polemics against Scotus, Ockham seems to insist on this precisely property of intuitive cognition - that it guarantees of the propositions that it occurs in. But we can also see now knowledge in

And,

the

his

of

point

certain

Ockham

that

objections

made

Scotus

to

characterisation of the distinction:

When

(1)

Scotus

said

some diminished whatever

11

When

(2)

the

in

est

quod

notitia

aliqua

refers

not

-

"according

to

objects to this that, according to

anything,

and,

one

can

must be

it

consequently,

doubt

12 abstractively under that description.

in

that,

whereas

intelligibile

cuius

or

exist

know something

Scotus said

omne

"...

sensibile,

one

description

motive,

Ockham

similitude".

whether that thing possible to

intuitive

knowledge only has to do with the object

abstractive

to

knowledge has to do with the description" (sub perfecta ratione), whereas

that

a complete

"under

object

a

intuitive

knowledge, the thing

abstractive

solo

intellectu sufficit

incomplexa

knowledge

ad

itself

is

it

is

some

apprehensibile et nullo modo notitiam evidentiam alicuius

de eo et aliqua notitia incomplexa eiusdem non sufficit, potest duabus cognitionibus specie distinctis. Sed intellectiones, affec tiones, delectationes, tristitiae et huiusmodi sunt intelligibiles et nullo modo sensibiles, et aliqua notitia incomplexa earum sufficit ad notitia evidentem utrum sint vel non sint,

veritatis

contingentis

ab

cognosci

et etc.

intellectu

utrum sint in tali subiecto vel non, Minor quantum ad primum partem

et

aliqua

patet,

notitia

earundem non

sufficit;

delectatur, tristatur; et ista notitia, cum sit respectu contingentis, ligit, diligit, potest accipi ex propositionibus necessariis." Ockham, Sent. Prol. qu. 1, O.Th. I, p. 28.

qu. 6 n.

Scotus, Quodl.

Ockham,

Sent. Prol.

O.Th.

1

Ockham,

Sent.

(Oxford

1982), misidentification

Prol.

p.

I,

8;

Wadding, XII,

145; ed.

and

tr.

non

Wolter, pp. 135f. Cf.

p. 34.

O.Th.

219:

ed.

igitur

quia quilibet experitur in se quod intel-

"...

pp. 36f. Cf. the property

I,

Gareth Evans, The of

being

Varieties

of Reference through of a term] is not one

immune

to

error

[which corresponds to Ockham s notitia intuitiva which applies to propositions simpliciter, but one which applies only to judgments made on this or that basis. Once we appreciate this relativity to a basis, which arguably must be taken into account in the case of mental self-ascription as well, the fact that there

are

cases

the involving the self-ascription of physical predicates in which error has been provided for [these correspond to Ockham s notitia abstractiva] will be seen not to impugn the fact that there are cases in which it just as clearly has not." possibility

of

White

354

representative of the thing.

comes about by natural acting

God

directly;

13

Ockham thus

located at

God

Rome

about

bring

knowledge of things without the things point talks of

God

can be brought about by

causality

can

objects to this that whatever

14

acting.

an

such

intuitive

And Ockham

at

one

bringing about intuitive knowledge of something

(presumably when he

is

15 away from Rome.)

A

modern philosopher may have a few reservations good. describing mental states as things, and describing psychological

So about

far so

language as referential tout court, but otherwise John Boler seems to be more or less on track when he remarks, citing Jerry Fodor, that 16 I think Ockham s enterprise [could] be ... fruitfully compared to ... those recent studies which claim some relation between logical form and linguistic structure, and between those and cognitive psychology.

And

Ockham

all

Socrates

we

that

way

white

is

attitudes (let

has surely done I

,

am happy

-

to

is

and

certain

analyse

to

claim that,

propositions

we

if

-

analyse the

deal with such propositions there must be different mental us say) corresponding to the terms; these mental attitudes

give us, for each term, a grasp of the corresponding object.

Very

similar

made by Gareth Evans when he

talks

about

been

have

distinctions

personal pronouns; he 17 "Ideas".

Now

in

the mental attitudes corresponding to terms

calls

Ockham

s

analysis,

there

two ways of having a

are

we know

grasp of objects, corresponding to whether or not proposition evidently;

too,

so,

in

knowledge that we can have of propositions such 13

Scotus, Quodl. qu. 13,

Ockham, 14

15

Sent. Prol.

Ockham,

O.Th.

Sent. Prol.

Ockham,

II

Sent.

I,

n.

cd Wadding, XII,

p.

My

as

311; ed.

and

tr.

legs are crossed

Woltcr,

p.

292. Cf.

p. 34.

O.Th. qq.

10;

the relevant

theory, there are two sorts of

Evans

I,

p. 37.

12/13,

O.Th. V, ed. G. Gal, R.

Wood

(St.

Bonaventure

NY

per cognitio intuitivam iudicamus rem esse quando hoc est, et cognitio naturaliter causetur sive supernaturaliter a solo Deo. Nam si naturaliter causaretur, tune non potest esse nisi obiectum exsistat praesens in debito approximatione, quia tanta potest esse distantia inter obiectum et potcntiam quod naturaliter non potest potentia tale obiectum intueri. Et quando p.

258:

obiectum

est

1981),

igitur patet quod gcneraliter sive intuitiva "Sic

sic

praesens

modo approximatum, modo praedicto. Si autem

tali

potest

intellectus

per

actum

supernaturalis, puta si Deus causaret in me cognitionem intuitivam de aliqua obiecto exsistente Romae, statim habita ita bene cognitione eius intuitiva possum iudicare quod illud quod intueor et video est, ilia sicut si cognitio haberetur naturaliter." Ockham does say elsewhere that

assentiendi iudicare

rem

esse,

sit

"in

cognitione intuitiva [obiectum] est praesens in 16 J. Boler, "Ockham on Evident Cognition",

se";

Thought (New York, 1975). Evans, The Varieties of Reference, p. 104.

II

p.

Sent. 12/13, 86;

he

O.Th. V,

cites J.

p. 310.

Fodor, The Language of

Ockham and Hume s or

(evident

corresponding precisely to two different

this

non-evident);

355

Question

18 And these two uses will differ person pronoun. in whether the utterances precisely they are used in are grounded by

uses

of

other

the

first

or

propositions

concerns and

Adams

not;

this

analysis of

establishes

Ockham

s

a

these

19

position.

However, things are not as simple as illuminating to say that

continuity between

that.

It

is

possible,

and

20

... the doctrine of intuitive cognition depends on an analysis of the structure of thought, an analysis which is controlled directly not by any observation of the parade of cognitive activity but rather by the demands of the analysis of propositions.

It is maybe even when he says: 21

true.

a concept

And Ockham

himself says something very similar

given so that

it corresponds to utterances, so understood by an external utterance, so understood] by the concept signified [by the utterance]. ...

However,

Ockham

is

as something

just

the

is

continuities

that

this

establishes,

is

between

thought and modern philosophy of mind, are entirely of one are to do, that is, with the functional role of language, mental they

sort;

s

attitudes,

and the

like.

Now

there are two sides to the philosophy of

mind; on the one hand, you have to

talk

various theoretical entities that you use. tell

analysis

that, [it

certain causal stories which describe

about the functional role of the

On

the other hand, you have to

how our

brains (or our souls)

And the work that I have just described ignores another in Ockham s theory, besides the analysis of ingredient propositions; it ignores, that is, Ockham s ontology and his physics. My claim is that it is these which give Ockham s theory some of its most actually do the

distinctive

and

stuff.

features,

and which are responsible

for

its

major

difficulties

peculiarities.

10

Evans, The Varieties of Reference pp. 215-220. Cf. Sidney Shoemaker, "SelfReference and Self-Awareness", in S. Shoemaker, Identity, Cause and Mind (Cambridge ,

1984), pp. 6-18; 1958), pp. 66-7.

19

Adams,

and Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Blackwell, Oxford

"Intuitive

Cognition in

Ockham", p.

393.

on J.

Boler,

21

"Ockham

on Evident

Cognition",

p. 86.

conceptus ponitur ut correspondeat vocibus, ut sicut aliquid intelligeretur prolata voce et concepto suo significato." Ockham, Questione in Libras Physicorum Aristotelis qu. 5, ed. Stephen Brown, Opera Philosophica VI (St. Bonaventure NY 1984), p. 405. (Cf. Ockham, Exp. Periherm. I, Proem, 4, O.Ph. II, pp. 349f.) ...

White

356

1.1

Logical Atomism

Now Ockham evident

a

to

proposition.

I

proposition was;

and immediately by

Now

as

this quaestio,

began

assent

it

(a certain sort of)

this definition is not,

have described, by defining what is assent that is caused solely

knowledge of the terms of

any particular analysis of the proposition

in

that

biased in favour of

at this stage,

question.

One

for

could,

example, very well introduce the distinction in the way that Gareth Evans does: in Evans terms, such knowledge is not identification-dependent; is not the result of knowledge that b is thus, knowledge that a is

F

F

and

a

that

firstly,

is

that

propositions

work

b\ But Evans

done

is

it

terms

in

he

from Ockham

subject-predicate 22

interested

is

differs

a

of

in;

two ways;

in

s

of

analysis

secondly, he does not

the as

talk,

23 does Ockham, of knowledge being caused by other pieces of knowledge - Evans talks, rather, of propositions being deduced from, or grounded

on, others.

However, elsewhere Ockham imports a bias intuitive

knowledge of terms (this

is,

remember,

just that

knowledge of

terms that causes evident assent to the propositions that they occur

He

defines

it

as follows:

of

definition

his

in

in).

24

knowledge of a thing is such knowledge by virtue of can be known whether the thing exists or not, in such a way that if the thing exists, the intellect always judges that it unless perhaps it is it exists and evidently Knows that exists, impeded because of an imperfection of that knowledge. And, in the same way, if a perfect such knowledge were conserved, by divine power, when the thing did not exist, by virtue of that knowledge of a term [notitia incomplexa] it would evidently be known that the thing did not exist." ...

Now

intuitive

which

it

this

is,

on

the

of

face

it,

term can occur

propositions that the

of a term a, then, according to

a

on

restriction

in;

Ockham

if

we have

s

broad

the

of

analysis

intuitive

knowledge this

definition,

should

guarantee knowledge of a whole variety of propositions with a occurring 22 23

Evans, The Varieties of Reference, pp. 180ff.

Note

that

praemissorum

Ockham est

causa

explicitly talks of efficient causality notitiae conclusionis" (Ockham, Sent.

in

this

Prol.

qu.

context; 8;

"notitia

O.Th.

I,

p.

Furthermore, he defines per se notae propositions in this way, "propositio per se nota cognoscitur ex notitia terminorum" (Sent. Prol. qu. 2, O.Th. I, p. 81), as well as ratione propositions scibilis est quod eius the idea of a knowable proposition;

222).

"de

notitia possit causari ex notitia principiorum" (ibid., p. 82).

24

Ockham,

Sent. Prol. qu.

1;

O.Th.

I,

p. 31.

Ockham and Hume s them.

in

In

actual

a

Ockham

though,

fact,

and a does not

357

Question

two

about

talks

only

25

(And, in fact, only the propositions; former applies in the normal course of events.) Let us call this Ockham s narrow definition of intuitive knowledge of a term. He adds to it (as an exists

extension? a corollary?

it is

exist

not quite clear) that

.

26

knowledge is such that, when several things are of which one inheres in the other, or one is spatially distant from the other, or is related to the other in some other way, then always, by virtue of that knowledge of terms [corresponding to] those things, it is known if the things inhere in each other or not, if they are distant from each other or not, and so on for other contingent truths ... Thus, if Socrates is, in fact, white, that knowledge of Socrates and of whiteness, by virtue of which it can evidently be known that Socrates is white, is called intuitive knowledge. And generally every knowledge of terms ... by virtue of which some contingent truth can evidently be known ... is intuitive Similarly, intuitive

known

knowledge.

Ockham

thus seems to be sliding between the narrow definition and

There are probably several reasons

the broad definition.

One

for this.

Scotus originally defined intuitive cognition by saying that

that

se

"per

existence."

This

of

existence,

27

This

is

and

one

the

attains

it

the

factor;

fact

in

object that

intuitive

was

it

own

its

is

actual

was

cognition

not simply an isolated oversight;

in Ockham, II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, mediante qua cognoscitur res esse quando est, et non esse quando non (p. 256); and ibid.: quolibet sensu, qui habet aliquam cognitionem virtute cuius potest cognoscere rem esse quando est et non esse quando non est, est cognitio intuitiva et experimentalis. Quia ilia est cognitio intuitiva per quam sic cognosce rem esse vel non esse". (pp. 268f.) See also ibid., pp. 286f.

we

is

have:

est

intuitiva

"[cognitia]

ilia

est"

notitia

"Similiter,

una inhaeret statim

virtute si

inhaeret,

Sortes

in

omnis I,

aliqua

intuitiva

una

vel

non

veritate

sit

quod

est

distat

talis

res

quod quando aliquae

loco

ab altera vel

alio

modo

cognoscuntur quarum habet ad alteram,

se

incomplexae illarum rerum scitur si res inhaeret vel non et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus ... Sicut si

notitiae

vel

cognosci

notitia

cognosci

illius

distat rei

evidenter

O.Th.

alteri

"in

distat,

albus,

Sortes

incomplexa termini veritas contingens

albus,

vel ...

Sortis

notitia

ilia

est

dicitur

terminorum

est

notitia

et

albedinis

notitia ...

virtute

intuitiva."

virtute

Et

intuitiva.

cuius

Ockham,

cuius

potest Sent.

potest

universaliter

evidenter

Prol.

qu.

1,

pp. 31f.

Similarly, immediately after the passage similar analysis of the proposition

from

II

Sent,

above

cited

(n.

25),

there

is

a

this is introduced with corpus est album so it seems as if it is supposed to follow from the definition in terms of quia existence and non-existence. (Nothing of the sort is added after the second passage referred to there.) And in IV Sent. qu. 2 there is the claim that per cognitionem alicuius accidentis absoluti devenitur in O.Th. VII subiecti"; cognitionem (St. Bonaventure NY 1984), p. 23. There is no indication of whether this happens necessarily, or only in the normal course of events.

very

;

,

"...

27 Scotus,

Ockham Logic in

s

Quodl.

and

Italy in the

XXV:521. Cf. Katherine M. Tachau, "The Response to Epistemology (1320-1340)", in Alfonso Maieru (ed.), English and 15th Centuries (Naples 1982), pp. 185-217. See p. 192. Vives

13;

Aureol If"

s

White

358

designed,

Another

the

factor

is

to

which

according

the

solve

to

initially,

shape

many

of

problem

Ockham

of

semantics

s

are

propositions

of

existence.

and

ontology,

knowledge

equivalent

logically

propositions which assert that a certain relation holds between a

set

to

of

Now

this corresponds to a very important strain in Ockham s Goddu rather vigorously summarises his views, 28 reduced natural phenomena to Ockham s philosophy of nature

terms.

thought; as

...

and their functions, [and] existences expression of relations, acts, and events functionally. absolute

Now

this

is

rather problematic. For example,

the

prescribed

leads to an analysis of

it

I am happy into a proposition asserting that there is a 29 in Ockham was which inheres me; and, as we have seen, happiness in and to describe our such terms, correspondingly, quite willing to talk 5

the proposition

knowledge of our mental

states in

terms of

However, those of us

things as happinesses.

intuitive

probably find such reification disturbing. This semantic assumption, however, explains

will

so

between

easily

broad

the

and

the

interested

the

in

intuitive

was mainly interested

in

it

read Wittgenstein

how Ockham

could

slip

definitions.

Since

his

narrow

semantics treated individuals so prominently,

knowledge of such

who have

why he was so and why he

explains

knowledge of referential terms,

one particular

sort of proposition: a proposition

asserting the existence, or non-existence, of an individual. to

this

has

it

later;

to

do

with

We

narrow definition

the

return

will

of

intuitive

knowledge.

1.2

The Razor at Work

However, there

one of Ockham

is

s

objections to Scotus which seems

much more

problematic, and which has attained

Scotus

that

says 30

objects,

capacity,

28

29

Ockham and

essential

its

intuitive

its

objects to this that

30 Scotus, 552f.

(Vivs

intuitive

When

notoriety. existent,

knowledge

is

present

a mental

object (the thing the term refers to) cannot be one of

causes.

It

can therefore continue to

Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, Above,

some

knowledge can only be of

exist

with

the

thing

p. 236.

p. 2.

Opus Oxoniense II dist. 3 pars 2 qu. 2 nn. 318-322 Ockham, Sent. Prol., O.Th. I, p. 33.

qu. 9 n. 6.) Cf.

(ed. Vaticana

1973), pp.

Ockham and Hume s we can

destroyed;

have

therefore

359

Question

intuitive

knowledge

nonexistent

of

31

objects.

Now

there are two separate things here that

may seem

problematic,

only one of which is, I think, genuinely so. The first is the very idea that we can have intuitive knowledge of nonexistent objects at all. Now if we think of this in terms of Ockham s broad definition of intuitive

knowledge,

this

knowledge

in

will

terms

lead us to give an abstract definition of intuitive

of

a

functional

but

role;

a

functional

role

is

something which is manifested when the term occurs in a range of propositions; and here this range of propositions seems to include the a does not exist Now in the normal course of events, we have intuitive knowledge of a when we stand in certain causal relations to it (when we can see it, and so on). Thus, the empirical realities of the proposition

way

that

that

we

.

we have

intuitive

knowledge rule out the semantic

could have intuitive knowledge form. However, there

this particular

about by direct divine causality that -

nonexistents

just

knowledge of what chains

apparently

we

general

could,

going on in sort

problematic

nonexistents; and

very

is

usual

of the

as

Ockham

definition

lets

of

nothing to prevent

we could have divine

by

Rome

about

and the

himself in for intuitive

it

causality,

us.

causing

component

bringing

it

knowledge of have

intuitive

there are no causal

This

is

one of the

knowledge of because he gives a simply intuitive

knowledge

of the truth

God

intuitive

(that

knowledge of some component of a proposition which evident

possibility

figured in a proposition of

Rome, even though

between things

is

when a

is,

is

that

is

it

suitable

for

of propositions containing the

knowledge and because he does not specify any particular

in question),

how this knowledge should arise. I also suspect that much about intuitive knowledge of nonexistents because

causal story about

Ockham

talks so

existence assertions are so prominent in his semantics anyway, so that

if

he wanted to establish a clear difference from Scotus, since Scotus would not have found the intuitive knowledge of existence problematic,

Ockham

had to commit himself firmly to the intuitive knowledge of nonexistence. In fact, one of the major differences between Ockham and

his

contemporaries seems to be that his contemporaries would define intuitive

and abstractive cognition case by case, in terms of such things as the presence or absence of the object; e.g. Richard Campsall says that the Sent. Prol., O.Th. I, pp. 35f. There is an extensive A. Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, pp. 32-51.

Ockham, argument

in

treatment

of

this

White

360

same mental

when

intuitive cognition 32

is

entity

abstractive cognition

when

it is

the object

is

present,

and

absent.

However, there is something genuinely problematic about Ockham 33 position, and that is the way that he argues for it. He says:

s

... every absolute thing, different in place and subject from some other absolute thing, can, by absolute divine power, exist without the latter thing (since it does not seem likely that, if God wanted to destroy one absolute thing existing in the sky, that (s)he would necessarily have to destroy another thing existing on the earth.) But intuitive vision - sensitive or intellectual - is an absolute thing, distinct in place and subject from its object. Just as, if I see whether intuitively a star existing in the sky, that intuitive vision sensitive or intellectual - is distinct in place and subject from the object seen; therefore, that vision can remain, with the star destroyed; therefore, etc.

What

is

here

problematic

is

Ockham

that

simply

of the

thinks

vision, or, generally, the intuitive knowledge corresponding to a term, as 34

which

Ockham

talks

an absolute thing, generally,

mental

of

naturally supposit for their objects.

when

that,

of

knowledge

guarantee

A

constant.

absoluta

res

this

36

propositions

modern philosopher

-

entities

mind.

s

And Ockham seems

held

is

constant, that

it

for example,

its

Evans

of the grasp of propositional components in the

that

Ockham

32

is,

Katherine M. Tachau,

Oxford

Thought",

in

is

"The

in)

who

-

same

is is

of Richard

(to

held

willing to

of

way

same

sort

Campsall on Fourteenth-Century

(eds.), From 1987), p. 112.

Anne Hudson, Michael Wilks

Studies in Church History, Subsidia 5 (Blackwcll, Oxford

role also

sort

willing to talk of certainty in the

Influence

assume

to just

functional

occurs

talk

and who

35

And, more which ("intellectiones")

located in the knower

is

Ockham

to

Wyclif;

1

res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab alia re absoluta, potest per "...omnis divinam potentiam absolutam existere sine ilia, quia non videtur verisimile quod si Deus vult destruere unam rem absolutam exsistentem in caelo quod necessitetur destruere unam aliam rem exsistentem in terra. Sed visio intuitiva, tarn sensitiva quam intellective, est res absoluta, distincta loco et subiecto ab obiecto. Sicut si videam

exsistentem in caelo, ilia visio intuitiva, sive sit sensitiva sive manere distinguitur loco et subiecto ab obiecto viso; igitur ista visio potest

stellam

intuitive

intellectiva,

Stella destructa; igitur

34 35

Cf.

etc."

Ockham,

Sent. Pro/, qu.

1,

O.Th.

A. Goddu, The Physics of William of Ockham, pp.

I,

pp. 38f.

30f.

One

be careful, however, to notice that, for Ockham, something should intellectual does not per se have a physical location; it is "subiective in intellectu, non extensive in aliquo composite sive organo corporali" (II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, p. est in loco, quia corpus est in loco" 285). Correspondingly, "Anima enim per accidensh O.Ph. V, p. 100). (Expositio in Libros Physicorum IV cap. 8 3, t. 45 212 7-13, 36 sicut vox ita 411: O.Ph. VI, p. Ockham, Quaestiones physicorum qu. 7, naturaliter pro supponit ex institutione pro suo significato, ita ista intellectio supponit "Et

re cuius

est."

Ockham and Hume s would probably be much more

of way,

knowledge

components would

prepositional

-

reticent about talking of intuitive

In fact, such an intuitive grasp of

a thing in this sense.

as

361

Question

normal case

the

in

-

involve

the

functioning of suitable causal chains from the object to the knower, and if

the object, or the causal chains

Such an

also go.

This

head.

Fontaines.

1.2.1

"intuitive

grasp",

is

someone

not really located in

made by Godfrey

already

s

of

37

Action at a Distance

However, we should notice

Ockham

explanation in believed

action

in

propagation of

medium 39

-

lynxes

e.g.

then,

objection which was

an

is

were destroyed, then the grasp would

means of

s

-

light

41

in

this

is

he

that

connection

the

in the

Now when Ockham fulfills

of

Rega Wood,

In this connection, one can even talk of

of a distant object, brought about by divine power, and

me and

without anything caused between

Century

cited

which does not happen by means of species

action at a distance.

cognitions

he

distance;

a strong element of causal

still

of the crucial factors

and the action of magnets. 40 Furthermore, certain animalcan see through walls, and this too is to be explained by

intuitive vision

which

is

One 38

a

at

that there

theory.

a

certain

the

of

in

42

of a notitia intuitiva,

functional

existence

"Intuitive

Perspective",

talks

the object.

the

role:

namely,

when

object

it

Cognition and Divine Omnipotence:

Anne Hudson, Michael Wilks

(eds.),

this it

is

something

causes

and of

exists,

Ockham

evident

in

its

Fourteenth-

From Ockham

to

Wyclif,

pp. 51-61.

38

Ockham,

III Sent.

qu.

2,

O.Th. VI

(St.

Bonaventure

NY

1982), pp. 48-58.

-JO

Although sometimes the light source causes illumination of the medium: aliquando causatur aliquid a colore in medio, sicut prius dictum est ... Sed quando est et quando non, difficile est dare experientiam in visu..." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. "...

VI, p. 81.

Tertia experientia est de magnete, qui secundum Commentatorem, commento ferrum distans ab eo localiter: trahit, dico, immediate et non virtute aliqua medio vel in ferro." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. VI, p. 53. trahit

aliquod

"...

murum, 2,

et

O.Th. VI,

illud

animal videt per

medium non

medium opacem,

recipit

sicut

speciem aliquam,

patet

igitur

9,

in

de lynce qui videt per

etc."

Ockham,

III

Sent.

qu.

p. 81.

objectum distans ab angelo et a me potest intuitive videri ab angelo et a me, per potentiam divinam objectum nihil causet in medio, nee speciem nee cognitionem." Ockham, III Sent. qu. 2, O.Th. VI, pp. 55f. "...

etiam

si

White

362

when

noncxistencc

be told

to

it

does not

each case:

in

exist.

"the

And

there are relevant causal stories

judgment of existence

is

caused by the

cognition together with the object, while the judgment of nonexistence

is

43

caused by the cognition in the absence of its object." Thus, we have an which fulfills a certain functional and a causal role, entity story about how it does it; the difference from the modern theory is this, that

nowadays one talks about information propagating through the physical environment by means of physical processes, whereas Ockham talked of things acting directly at a distance.

Now

one asked him why this intuitive cognition was a cognition 44 And object, he would have a story about similitude to tell.

of this

Ockham

if

about representation quite generally

talks

in

terms of similitude;

Ockham

example, representation is transitive because similitude is. had clearly not read Nelson Goodman. And since, quite for

causation

of

is

46

like

by

like,

as

is

this

representation,

generally,

brings

the

semantic and causal categories very close to one another, in Ockham s view. Tfms he can talk of knowledge of the premises of an argument being the efficient cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, he can talk first principles as being those propositions knowledge of whose terms causes assent to the proposition, and of a demonstration being the cause of assent to its conclusion (so that one cannot demonstrate

of the

principles;

2.

one already assents

to

them when one knows

their terms.)

Hume now

Let us

think about

Hume. Why was Hume

a sceptic? Well, he

project of basing a philosophical methodology upon a

and such a science of of

associative

Rcga Wood, 44 "...

anima

sensitivam

utraque

est

relations

"Intuitive

est

by which the

45

46

man",

Cognition and Divine

mind constructed thoughts and

Omnipotence", pp. 51-61.

per cognitionem omnium. Nam per cogmtionem per cognitionem intellectivam omnia intelligibilia. Et

est

sensibilia ita

et

perfecta

similitudo

obiecti

Ockham, II Sent. qq. 12/13, O.Th. V, p. of Later Medical Philosophy (Cambridge

Campsall", p.

had a

have, as a major component, a theory

ligibilis]."

History

of

quoddammodo omnia

omnia

cognitio

man would

"science

121.

Ockham,

II

Sent. qq. 12/13,

O.Th. V,

p. 304.

Ockham,

II

Sent. qq. 12/13,

O.Th. V,

p.

287 f.

et perfectio quam species [intel309. Cf. M. Adams, in the Cambridge

1982),

p.

439;

K.M. Tachau,

"Richard

Ockham and Hume s theories out of the ideas presented to

was constructed

man"

in the

way

363

Question 47

it.

And, because

his

"science

of

was, he thought he had a grasp of

it

mechanisms underlying the functioning of the mind which (although not complete) was enough to undermine the usual views of common sense. Thus, one s causal theory of the mind has to have a the

causal

certain sort of their

pursue

autonomy

for

one

be a Humean; causal explanations the world, and do not satisfy the to

own way through

requirements of grounding propositions.

Not so they do not

seem

be

to

for

Ockham. Although he does

seem

postulated

in

order

semantic facts he has discovered. very interested in

And

because of

talk of causal

to figure in his theory in their

"the

physics,

He

to

implement

own

mechanisms,

right;

whatever

they mostly interesting

does not, as Tachau remarks, seem

psychology, or mathematics of

this disinterest,

48 vision".

even though he assumed a rather naive

psychological parallelism, the causal mechanisms that he proposed were so flexible

that

he

ended

Wittgenstinian malgre is

lui\

up

as

what

one

can

only

describe

the significant factor in his philosophy of

as

a

mind

given by the prepositional and semantic component, not by the causal

mechanisms.

Clare Hall, Cambridge

Cf.

J.

Passmore,

Tachau,

Hume s Intentions (London

"Response",

p. 198.

1980), p. 106.

JOHN

Thomas

WIPPEL

F.

of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents

(Quodlibet

While the date of Thomas Sutton

comes some time

clearly

comes

after

after the criticism of

Moreover, Sutton with

Henry

would suggest

s

s

theory

.

death

Aquinas

treatment of

Ghent

of

qu 5)

Quodlibet

s

the

of future contingents by William of

II,

s

of

intention

Sutton

s

is

still

uncertain,

Thomas Aquinas.

it

also

It

views concerning divine knowledge

Mare

la

this issue

in the latter s

Correctoriwn

presupposes that he

of essential

is

.

familiar

being (esse essentiae). This

that Sutton s Quodlibet should date

1280s, or as other indications suggest,

the

II

in

some time from

the

1290s.

1

It

is

within

not

my

here to attempt to settle the question of the exact dating of Quodlibet, but rather to turn to him as one representative of the

English Dominican school who was strongly influenced by the views of Thomas Aquinas. This should be useful in enabling us to determine of future divine knowledge s of and Aquinas position. understanding application As regards Aquinas s position, medieval, renaissance, and twentiethcentury interpreters have differed with respect to one issue in particular.

Sutton

s

contingents, and

Qn

Aquinas

I -"or

views

personal

s

detailed

concerning

his

by reason of their eternal presence to

account,

is

it

discussion

of

conflicting

opinions

concerning

the

dating

of

God

Sutton

s

two quodlibets see the Introduction to M. Schmaus s edition of Sutton s Quodlibeta (Munich, 1969), pp. xvi-xxii (as early as 1284-1285 or as late as the mid-1290s). Schmaus s remark that Sutton s Quodlibet I, qu. 14 is refuted by Godfrey of Fontaines first

Quodlibet VII, qu. 9 (of 1290, or possibly 1291/1292, as I have suggested elsewhere) is need not be to highly questionable, it seems to me. The alleged reference by Godfrey Sutton. But Schmaus is correct in noting how difficult it is to arrive at any exact of these dating for these first two Quodlibets, and in his acknowledgment that any proposed datings seems to be too early if Sutton only became a Master in Theology in 1299/1300 (see p. xix, commenting on Gloricux). For a strong defense of an early see F. dating for Sutton s becoming a Master and for Quodlibet I, i.e., 1284 or before, Kellcy,

Introduction

Aristotelis

1976),

De

1-31.

pp.

For

SchneyJer^ Introduction pp. 44 .57 .

Thomae Aquinatis in Libros edition of Expositionis D. de Sutona (Munich, corruptions. Continuatio per Thomam reaction to this and defense of a later dating see J. critical

to

his

generatione

et

to

his

ed.

of Sutton

s

Quaestiones

Ordinariae

(Munich,

1977),

Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future he knows future contingents? Or

that

awareness of the eternal decrees of that

is

365

Contingents

God

rather by reason of

it

s

concerning such contingents

his will

he knows them? 2 In Quodlibet

II,

qu. 5, the following question

Did God have from

was posed

aetemo) certain knowledge of future

eternity (ab

contingents insofar as they are contingents?

3

Sutton comments that the

question has been properly phrased since the reduplication they are

-

contingents"

would pose only by fact that

little

God

is

-

"insofar

as

Without the reduplication, the question is contingent can be known not

crucial.

difficulty;

even what

but by us once

you are now

for Sutton:

has been realized in actuality. Thus the

it

Even

anyone here can be once such a contingent Hence, not undetermined but necessary in the

sitting is contingent.

so,

certain of this simply by using his eyes.

event

is

realized in actuality,

one

sense that while

When

is

it

is

sitting,

it

is

necessary for him to be

sitting.

viewed as future and as contingent, however, it is not something yet determined to one side or the other. Therefore, when it is so viewed, it cannot be known with certainty. Hence it seems to remain in doubt is

whether even

God

can know such a contingent as contingent.

It

is

clear,

continues Sutton, that no created intellect can do so; for then

it

could

only

know such

a contingent as

it

exists in its causes.

And

these causes

4

may be impeded from producing their effect. Sutton now begins to develop his reply by

God knows But God knows God s knowledge is

arguing that

all future contingents insofar as they are in their causes.

them with

certainty

measured by

and from

eternity. This

is

because

But eternity is iota simul and nonetheless contains the whole of time. Therefore all things which are in eternity just as

is

his being.

time or in any part of time are always present to God, and were so present from eternity.

2

For

Hence Sutton reasons

that the divine vision bears

recent interpreters of Aquinas concerning this see J. Dei futurorum contingentium secundum S. Thomam eiusque primos sequaces (Krakow, 1938), pp. 7-10. For this in classical commentators on Thomas see F. Schmitt, Die Lehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin vom gottlichen Wissen des Zukunftig Kontingenten bet seinen grossen Kommentatoren (Nijmegen, 1950), especially pp. 196-202. differences

Groblicki,

De

among

scientia

Schmaus ed., p. 202. "...utrum deus ab aeterno futurorum contingentium, secundum quod contingentia sunt." 4

Ed.

cit.,

pp. 202-03.

habuit

certam

cognitionem

366

Wippcl

such things from eternity (ab aeterno) even though they take 5 place only in the course of time. Moreover, Sutton continues, it is not only the essences of such all

upon

known by God from eternity when such a contingent exists even Therefore,

things but their actual existences which are as

present in

only

God its

s

himself.

to

its

its

cause,

coming in

knowledge and,

when

cause as

future

it

time.

This

is

when

contingent himself.

6

because

In

it

is

support

cause

its

as present before

is

actually does

the is

future for us as

upon

Sutton

comes

it

present forth

same degree of

bears

of this

still

to

from

turns

certainty

actually realized in itself in

God s knowledge

still

is

Hence, argues Sutton, any such

so.

future in itself as

still

is

fact,

from

known by God with when it

is

contingent

when

it

forth

to

upon any such future that

the

which

well

is

present to

known view

of

Boethius as set forth in his Consolation of Philosophy, V. This follows, Sutton continues, because for

Then Sutton present to

God from

God

there

is

no past or

warning. Even though

a

issues

eternity in

future. all

things

have been

terms of their actual existence,

it

does

not follow from this that they have actually existed in themselves from 8

of la

reminded of an objection raised by William Mare against the position of Thomas Aquinas, and of Henry of

Ghent

s

Here the reader

eternity.

effort to avoid

the objection

is

this:

is

being driven to if

this

same

conclusion.

The

point of

things are eternally present to God, they must

9 have actually existed from eternity. Sutton counters that for something to be said to be present to God s knowledge from eternity, it is enough

5 Ibid.,

p.

quacumque 6

203.

See

parte eius,

especially:

"...et

ideo

semper sunt deo praesentia

omnia, quae sunt in toto et ab aeterno fuerunt...."

tempore

vel

Ed.cit., pp. 203-04.

^

For Boethius see The Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy, by H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, S.J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), Bk V, 6, p. 426:77-80, 61-66. Sutton also cites Augustine. See De ch itate Dei XI, c. 21 (CSEL 40.1, p. 541). 8

Ed.

cit.,

p. 205.

See William s criticism of Aquinas s ST I, q. 14, a. 13 in his Correctorium. See ed. by P. Glorieux Les premieres polemiques thomistes: I. - Le Correctorium Quare (Le Saulchoir, Kain, Belgium, 1927), p. 18. While the date of this work has been disputed for some time, the general consensus now is that it falls ca. 1278-1279. See R. Wielockx, ,

IILI. Apologia (Florence, 1985), p. 39, n. 68, for the and especially V. Heynck, "Zur Datierung des Correctorium Wilhelms de la Mare," Franziskanische Studien 49 (1967), pp. 1-21. For fratris Thomae Henry see Quodlibet VIII, qu. 2 (Paris, 1518), fol. 303v. For discussion see my Meta 267-70. physical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp.

Aegidii

Romani opera omnia

important

references,

Tfiomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future Contingents for

it

God

to enjoy actual existence at any point in time. This

s

to

present

future.

support from

embraces

It

other texts in

existence in

existing

in

This

itself.

when viewed

future

in

that

something

God from

is

it

one

that

it

Henry

defend in meeting William s challenge. As Sutton continues, something its

when

existence

present exceeds

the

as

owing

divine

to the

To

warning.

now

does not

time. This

actually

distinguish

essence

immensity of

possibles

that to say its

existence

enjoys actual existence from

of

la

Mare

in his critique

Ghent had attempted

to

may be

present to

God

in

terms of

actually exist in itself; for the divine that the divine present contains both

exists

and that

in

which

it

does not,

a

proper likeness for all creatures 12 But now Sutton introduces a perfection.

itself its

of pure

11

means

which the contingent

that time in just

all

it

to

eternity in terms of

eternity. This point was not granted by William of

of Aquinas, though

Sutton

Thus Sutton can hold

not the same as to say that

is

(esse)

enable

God s knowledge

and

in actuality.

present to

is

should

as

of any contingent, whether past or present or

itself,

which are never realized

God

be viewed by

not

precision

God s knowledge

between

finds

1

helpful point. If something never enjoys

will

it

itself,

Once more Sutton

Consolation.

s

so because

is

from past through

transition

of time.

all

Boethius

Here Sutton has made a actual

no

eternal and admits of

is

present

367

hold that things are

is

known by God from

eternity because

they are eternally present to him should not be taken as implying that

from eternity they are what they are through their own essences as distinct from the divine essence and as realized in some way outside God. This would be contrary to the faith which maintains that thing (res)

from

Sutton essential

Sutton to

nature, 10

12 13

refers to

what

I

existential

i.e.,

Ed.

cit.,

See

n.

an

p. 205.

is

true

Pp. 205-06.

we

is

a

intrinsic

theory of hold that Henry, might

i.e.,

limit the

name

"thing"

s

(res)

to that

which enjoys or is a of It would be contrary to principle operation.

being belongs,

or

See Boethius, Consolation V, 6

9 above. For Sutton see p. 205.

Ibid.

if

Henry of Ghent

take to be

being (esse essentiae). Someone,

which

alone

eternity.

now

previous denial

s

God

13

to

that

(p. 432).

368

Wippcl hold that any such

to

faith

from God. 14 But

if

divine

or

intellect,

by

"thing"

we

"thing"

mean

be such things from

God

it

is

not opposed to faith for essences to

One

might even argue that it is necessary to be things in this sense from eternity. And

eternity.

for essences other than

that

thereby

impossible, one might hold that

such things might also be said to be outside the expression

from eternity in distinction mind an object of the which is not intrinsically

existed

rather have in

God from

eternity

if

we

take

in the negative sense,

meaning thereby that such things are not God. Defenders of this view, i.e. Henry, would not claim that such things exist outside God in the subjective sense from "outside

God"

15

eternity.

other words, Sutton

In

is

presenting in his

own way Henry s view

because the essences of things arc objects of God s knowledge from eternity and thereby constituted as intrinsically possible in themselves, that

may

they often

put

also it,

be called

one

may

"things"

(res)

accordingly

from

ascribe

eternity.

an

As Henry would

eternal

esse

essentiae

Yet, Henry would always insist, this is not to (essential being) say that they actually exist in themselves from eternity. Existence comes to them only in the course of time owing to the added intervention of to them.

the divine will, to them.

when

it

communicates

existential being (esse existenliae)

16

Sutton will have no part of this theory. But, like Henry, he has defended the eternal presence of contingents to God s knowledge against the

by William of la Mare that this entails admitting But now he quickly distances himself from theory of an eternal essential being (esse essentiae) which the

charge

raised

eternally existing creatures.

Henry s P. 206.

Ibid. For discussions of Henry s complicated theory see J. Paulus, Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa metaphysique (Paris, 1938), pp. 69-74, 123-25; J. Gomez Caffarena, Ser participado y ser subsistente en la mctafisica de Enrique de Gante (Rome, 1958), pp. 65-92; J. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 66-79; "Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on the Reality of Nonexisting Possibles," in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, pp. 173-80; S. Marrone, Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 104-29.

On my (as distinguished from Godfrey s) reading of Henry, he assigns an eternal real (but not actual) being to possibles or essences insofar as they are objects of God s eternal knowledge. Marrone (pp. 122, 123, and n. 83, and 124-29) seems to overlook this distinction in my reading; hence the need for me to state it explicitly here.

Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future

And

Master from Ghent assigns to such possible creatures.

Henry

appreciates

that

such a theory

is

Sutton clearly

taken from

as

res

reor,

one

if

required

to

is

not merely

fact that nonexisting possibles are truly res,

account for the

chimerae (or

claim

s

369

Contingents

but genuine essences and

reris),

1

objects of knowledge (res as taken from ratitudine.}.^ Sutton begins his criticism of this part of

observing that in this case poison

from

the

eternity

intellect.

But

intellect

it

it

were

objects

does not follow that whenever something

also

is

hidden under honey.

creatures

of

essences

is

Henry

a thing

especially

(res),

when

s

by

position

He

grants that

of

the

is

the latter

divine

an object of is taken in

Henry s strict sense. For something can be understood by human intellects even when it does not exist. For instance, today I can understand yesterday even though yesterday

is

not

now

a thing

(res). If

the fact that

something is known suffices for it to be called a res, it would follow from the fact that I understand yesterday here and now that yesterday is 18 here and now a res, and, adds Sutton, an actually existing thing. In

like

fashion,

continues

Sutton,

God knew

all

creatures

from

eternity, not merely in terms of their essences but also in terms of their

actual existences.

enough

for us to regard

existed,

for the sake of discussion

them

as things (res).

they were understood by

that

fact

Suppose

such creatures were understood by

the fact that

which now

exist,

God

It will

that

or which ever will

all

we

Henry

grant

God from

that

eternity

also follow

is

from the

creatures which have

exist

must have enjoyed

actual existence from eternity. Sutton rejects this conclusion. Therefore

he also rejects the claim that whatever

is

an object of

intellect

must

also

19

be a

thing.

Sutton

from

counters

eternity

and

that that

the

they

essences

were

of

not

creatures

essences

were not things from

In

eternity.

themselves from eternity they were simply nothing. Otherwise they would not have been created by God in the course of time; for creation is

production ex nihilo. But if they were nothing from eternity, they were not for nothing means the same as thing" (nulla res). This "no

"things";

For a good presentation of 18

this distinction in

Henry see Marrone,

pp. 108-13.

Ed.cit., pp. 206-07.

19

P. 207. Henry, of course, would not admit that, simply because a creature thing (res) in the sense of enjoying essential being, it therefore enjoys actual existence.

is

a

370

Wippel

objection

creation

concerning

was frequently

others, for instance, by Godfrey of Fontaines.

Nor, continues Sutton, does the mere

something to

for it

be realized

raised

fact that

it

as a thing (res). In other words, intrinsic possibility

technical sense.

not repugnant

is

in actual existence suffice for

us to describe something as a

when

"thing"

Here Sutton appears

Henry by

against

20

is

us to refer to

not enough for

term

is taken in Henry s mind Henry s claim that

that

to have in

something is not contradictory in itself, i.e., if it is be a res. Against possible, it must enjoy essential being and

if

counters that such a possible

still

is

of the soul of the Antichrist.

true

nothing

21

in

his

(In

itself,

own

intrinsically this

much

as

Sutton is

now

discussion of divine

2, Henry had contingents 22 of the the issue to attention considerable devoted Antichrist.)

knowledge

Sutton is

in

of future

insists

not enough for

Quodlibet VIII, qu.

that the fact that it

to

be a

thing.

something

He

they have actually existed

recall that, as

to say that

God

(extra Deutri) amounts to from eternity. 23 Here we should

essences were things from eternity outside saying that

the object of an idea

is

repeats his criticism:

Sutton had earlier presented Henry

s

position,

Henry does

not admit that essences were things from eternity and outside God sense, i.e., as existing apart from God. They are "subjective"

in the

"outside"

God

in

the

in

not

are

that

God. Sutton

they negative sense, only apparently regards this distinction as a subterfuge: to say that essences other than God were things from eternity and outside God in the negative

20

For Godfrey see Quodlibet VIII, qu. 3 (1292/1293 by my dating). If he things he has created in the same way he knows things he is to create, must know their existence as well as their essential being from eternity. Hence Henry should grant the eternity of all things, past, present, and future, both as regards their essence and existence (Les Philosophes Beiges, Vol. 4, p. 37). Moreover, Godfrey argues P.

207.

God knows

Henry s view really implies God, they are not thereby created

that

that

when

(p. 45).

creatures

receive

existential

See Quodlibet IX, qu. 2

(p.

190),

being

and

from

my The

Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey, pp. 136, 140. 21 Ed. cit., p. 207. For other texts from Henry see, for instance, Quodlibet III, 9 (Macken ed., pp. 53-55); Quodlibet IX, qq. 1-2 q. 1 (f. 61r, bottom); Quodlibet I, q. (Macken ed., pp. 7-8, 22-23, 34-37); Quodlibet X, q. 7 (Macken ed., pp. 151-52); Summa

quaestionum Ordinariarum, 22 23

See Quodlibet VIII, qu. P. 207.

a. 28, q.

2, ff.

4 (Paris, 1520), Vol.

301v-302v.

1, fol

167v.

Thomas of Sutton on Divine Knowledge of Future sense

is

ho-d they existed outside

to

really

sense, that

"subjective"

is,

in

that they actually existed apart

sums up by

Sutton

God

the

and

stronger

from God. 24

from eternity

that

stating

371

Contingents

God had

certain

knowledge of future contingents insofar as they are contingents; but from eternity. 25

such contingents did not enjoy the status of In assessing Sutton s position, which

"things"

we

should

Sutton

that

recall

grounds

contingents on the eternal mode of God

s

taken largely from Aquinas,

is

God

knowledge of future knowledge and therefore on the s

eternal presence of such contingents to God. There is no indication that Sutton would account for this by appealing to God s knowledge of the

decrees of his

will,

Sutton

therefore,

as

Henry of Ghent ends by

appears

me

to

be

to

an

doing.

accurate

On

this

point,

interpreter

of

Aquinas.

to

On the other hand, Sutton states that God in terms of their actual existence,

eternal existence in themselves. First of

God

his

were eternally present

terminology could be misleading.

as did Aquinas, Sutton speaks of things as being present to

all,

"from

Here

things

without their having enjoyed

eternity"

(ab aeterno}. This could give the mistaken impression

27 In fact temporal succession. both Sutton and Aquinas would deny this. Secondly, for Sutton to say that things were eternally present to God is misleading. It would be

that he regards eternity itself as subject to

better for

him

to say that they are eternally present to

Sutton

Finally,

Cf.

p.

the

rejects

God

presence of creatures to

claim

as their

that

God. 28

admission

knower

entails

of

the

ascribing eternal

For Sutton s rejection of a third esse between being extra intellectum see Quaest. Ord. 26 (Schneider ed., p. 725).

206.

and ens naturae

eternal

in

the

mind

dicendum quod ab aeterno deus habuit certain cognitionem futurorum contingentium secundum quod contingentia, quae tamen non fuerunt res ab aeterno" (p. "Et

207).

See the references given reading of Aquinas see

in

n.

2

above.

my Metaphysical Themes,

For

justification

of this

as

the

correct

pp. 244-64.

For Thomas see ST I, q. 14, a. 13: "Unde omnia quae sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt: sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout sunt in sua praesentialitate" (Marietti ed., Turin-Rome, 1950, pp. 86-87). For discussion see my Metaphysical Themes, 28 Perhaps Sutton

p. 268, n. 82.

s usage was partly determined by the way the question was framed (see n. 3 above). But for other texts where he uses similar language see p. 205:73-74; and the concluding text cited above in n. 25.

372

Wippel

(actual) existence to them. In

making this point, he is in agreement with Henry of Ghent. But Sutton has distanced himself from Henry s theory of an eternal essential being which would be enjoyed by all possibles insofar as they are eternally objects of

God s

The Catholic University of America

knowledge.

REGA WOOD

Calculating Grace:

The Debate about

Latitude of Forms

According to Adam de

Most

today believe

Christians

the

that

and

Scholastics

Wodeham

nature

of

is

grace

veiled

in

achieved

sought greater precision. They determined that grace was an accident not a subject. They asked: to which of the nine categories of accidents, described by Aristotle in his mystery.

was

a

to which of the four species of quality does

it

does

Categories,

inquired:

it

belong?

Concluding

that

it

quality,

they

belong? They

belonged to the first species; it was a habit or disposition. And since any such quality is subject to increase and decrease, they felt obliged to ask how grace increased or decreased. The intensification and decided that

remission

it

of

was

grace

one

of

most

the

hotly

debated

theological

questions in fourteenth century Oxford.

At the same

time, increasing and decreasing forms, like grace,

a subject of intense controversy

among

were

natural philosophers. Although

masters of arts were forbidden to discuss theological questions, most fourteenth century philosophers and theologians assumed that degrees of charity were gained or lost in exactly the same way heat was intensified or

Whether spiritual or physical, any quality which was and subject to change by degree was considered a form with Arguments about latitude of forms dealt with continua and the

diminished.

divisible latitude.

1

nature of gradual change.

Many

of the

same

issues raised in discussion of

the intensification of charity were also topics in the discussion of time

and motion. 2 Hence fourteenth century theology on degrees of charity Chatton, Reportatio,

I,

d.

17,

q.

2,

a.

1,

cod.

Paris.

Bibl.

Nat.

lat.

15,887, fol. 48rb:

subiectum sub calore corrumpendo, et ille non est indivisibilis, cum sit eiusdem rationis cum praecedente, et per consequens habeat latitudinem, ergo adhuc restat pars corrumpenda post istud instans ... Si in illo instanti est sub frigore, idem argumentum est, quia illud non est indivisible sed habet latitudinem." "Si

2

in

instanti

Wodeham,

[alteratione,

illo

Tractatus

motu

indivisibilibus,

est

et

quaest.

1,

50 omnibus his cap. (Continuum): "[D]e par ratio sicut de continue." fol. 139va); Tractatus de quaest. 3, dub. 4: "(Djifficultas est aequalis de omnibus

alphabeticus,

tempore] art.

1;

est

Wood

374

was

scientific

not just

also in the sense that

it

sense that

the

in

was a

was

it

logically

but

rigorous,

topic in natural science: latitude of forms.

Edith Sylla discusses the debate about latitude of forms among the 3 Oxford Mertonians from about 1320 to 1337. Sylla describes three positions:

(1)

and

the

(3)

succession of forms theory (2) the admixture theory

the

addition

intensification of

theory.

The

succession

theory

describes

the

forms as a series of instantaneous changes. The addition

theory describes a gradual change over time as infinitesimal parts are gained or lost. Sylla considers Walter Burley as a proponent of the succession

admixture

the

represented by Roger Swineshead, and the addition theory by John Dumbleton and Richard theory;

is

theory

Swineshead.

The English Franciscan

theologian,

Adam Wodeham

discusses Oxford

opinions on the subject of latitude of form, in the period 1316-1329, in his Tractatus alphabeticus,

dated about 1333.

4

Thus Wodeham was writing

about a period that overlaps with the earlier period Sylla has described for the Mertonians. Wodeham was chiefly concerned with the views of

Wodeham

and

5

Ockham,

Fitzralph.

Fitzralph,

and

himself are addition theorists. Chatton adheres to an admixture

identified

theory,

Chatton

Ockham,

Campsall,

by

Wodeham

Thomas Aquinas. 6 Campsall

as

held a

a

"modern

associated

theory"

new theory according

to

with

Wodeham,

compositis divisibilibus, sivc intensive sive extensive ... [et] apud me ilia quae inducunt difficultatem [in] inquisito, omnia inducunt difficultatem circa continuum, licet non e converse."

et

...

"Et

nota quod omnia haec duhia aequaliter possunt fieri in augmentatione sicut de continue." (ed. R. Wood, Dordrecht, 1988, pp. 34, 180).

decremento formarum

of dating Burley s works, it is not clear exactly what the difficulty under discussion. But Weisheipl dates Burley s Tractatus primus, 1320 to 1327. Roger Swineshead wrote his Descriptiones motuum between 1328 and 1337. See James Weisheipl, "Ockham and Some Mertonians," Mediac\>al Studies 30 (1968), p. 185, 1%, 212 and Sylla, "Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms," Archives d histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen age 40 (1973), p. 240n.

Given

period

4

is

Codex

Re

Erfurt, Stadtsbibliothek,

CampsalPs

Wyclif, ed.

see

dates,

Amplon., Folio 133,

Tachau,

A. Hudson and M. Wilks,

p.

134ra-145va.

fol.

"Richard

K.,

Campsall,"

in

From

Ockham

to

HOn.

Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 2 (Aciio maxime reperitur in qualitate): contra hoc et pro ista conclusione arguitur et contra argumentum Thomae, I Sent. d. 17, q. 2, art. 2, cuius est opinio quod calor remissus per <prima parte Summae

Wodeham,

"Sed

E>,

approximationem agentis modernos eadem res ut esse, est

A

calor."

great

(fol.

many

fit

est

postea intensus, nulla (!) sibi addito, ita quod secundum transmutatione est latitudo quaedam, ut autem in quieto

in

134ra).

theories

were

theories. Quaest. in III Sent., q. 8

current.

(OTh

Ockham

list

four

kinds

of

addition

VI, 220s.). Aureol describes six possible opinions

Calculating Grace: Adam de

one which we

will

succession of forms

is

In this paper

I

call

connotation

a

Wodeham

theory.

No

375

of

proponent

the

named. 8 will discuss three issues in the

theory of latitude of

Do

forms undergo intension and remission? (2) How are intensified? and (3) Are maximal degrees in the intensity of qualities forms possible? I will be chiefly concerned with the views presented by forms:

(1)

Adam Wodeham

by reference to the views discussed by another fourteenth Walter Chatton, and by Edith Sylla. The least

amplified

century

but the discussion will be

in his Tractatus alphabeticus,

Franciscan,

controversial of these issues for fourteenth century philosophers

1.

is first:

Do forms undergo intension and remission?

Addition and succession of forms theorists agree on this issue; in no sense is it true that the same form undergoes remission or intension.

For the simultaneous existence of contrary forms in exactly the same subject is impossible. Ockham and Wodeham held that strictly speaking it is the subject, not the form, which becomes more white, more hot or

more

charitable.

added

of intensification, parts are

case

same form which was remiss does not become new form appears in which the additional parts are and the new form is more intense than the previous form

As Anneliese Maier

succession

like

the

in

though

Rather, a

incorporated, 10

And

to the form, the

intense.

was.

9

succession of

theorists,

new

forms.

pointed out, this means that addition theorists,

hold

They

on augmentation. Scriptum super 1 Sent.,

that

intensification

differ only in

dist. 17,

pars 17,

is

the

result

of

a

claiming that the parts of

a. 1

(ed.

Romae 15%,

427-35).

Q

Scotus,

and

Ockham

Scotus, Ordinatio, I Sent., dist. 17, q. 5

loquendo de ipsa

fit

Non quod ideo

talis

plures

1

vi

si

intensior,

this

2,

q.

(ed.

non vel

(OTh

III,

de quantitate

extensiva."

(OTh

Ockham, Scriptum

in

V, 418s.).

481ss.).




"Ultra dico (Augmentatio): quod etiam et remitti. Sed auctores hoc errant, quod additur formae alia forma, ex qua

subtrahitur aliqua

pars ut

forma remissior

numero primo sit intensa forma habet veram latitudinem intensivam realiter

Godfrey of Fontaines.

15 alphabeticus, cap. nulla forma potest intendi,

aliqua una forma

partes

view to

Vaticana, V, 234ss.).

pars

485); Quaest. in II Sent., q. 19

in I Sent., dist. 17, q. 4

vocis,

attribute

III,

Tractatus

dicentes intendunt, et

him,

17,

(OTh

Ockham, Scriptum

Wodeham,

d.

I,

following

distinctas (fol.

constituentes earn

135rb).

sit

quam

praefuit.

et post remissa vel e converse. vel gradualem, quia habet in

[ut]

qualitatem,

sicut

suo

modo

Et se est

Wood

376

11

the old form are not destroyed in the process. at

stake

lower

whether there

is

is

As

Sylla puts

it

"What

is

within the higher degree a part equal to the

12 degree."

Chatton subject

too

agrees

that

undergoes

statement forma suscepit magis

speaking

strictly

and

intension

et

remission.

minus

not

the

form

but

its

13

Strictly

the

speaking

is false.

Wodeham

is expressing a common view when he argues that properly dearness cannot be increased, because no underlying, constant speaking 14 subject remains. According to Wodeham, when we say that the dearness

increases, this

greater than

more and

it

less.

parts of the

means

same dearness

that the

that formerly existed

is

now

formerly was. But one and the same thing cannot be both 15

However, according

same form can be added

to

proponents of the addition theory, which were

to the parts of dearness

and the new parts together with the old parts make which the form inheres more dear. And wherever there

originally present,

the substance in

genuine latitude of form, it must be possible to add and subtract parts of that form to an underlying substance. When Peter become dearer, his is

former

dearness

is

not

really

intensified.

Rather

additional

parts

of

dearness reach him and combine with the preexisting form to produce a

Annclicsc Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, zur Naturphilosophie dcr Spatseholastik II (Rome, 2nd cd., 1951), p. 54.

Studien

"

Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 231s.

est hie una opinio quod non est Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. 3, a. 4: dicendum quod forma suscipiat magis et minus Contra. Unde calorem suscipere magis et minus non est nisi subiectum suum esse calidius. Sed tamen ad hoc bene requiritur quod forma sit maior vel perfection Et si hoc intendebant quidam dicentes "Et

...

istam augmentationem

fieri

Norman Kretzmann

per inesse subiecto, discusses

a

similar

bene."

(fol.

problem

Aristotelian Anti-Atomism," History of Philosophy Quarterly

Wodeham, secundo quod vel

logice

Tractatus sicut

loquendo,

non per

alphabeticus, suscipit,

illo

cap.

...

51va). in 1

his

"Adam

Wodeham

s

Anti-

(1984), 381-97.

(Augmentatio): "Dico

modo

praedicationem

crementum huiusmodi cum hoc adverbio

magis quia non potest dici quod forma talis, puta albedo sit magis albedo quam ante. Immo, quod plus est, nee intensa albedo est talis magis albedo quam sit remissa, licet sit maior, id est intension Sed

minus album

et

postea magis vel e

converse." (fol.

135 ra).

Calculating Grace:

Adam

16

form of greater

377

form combine

distinct parts of a

Numerically

intensity.

Wodeham

de

to constitute a unified whole.

When

intensify,

qualities

according to this account, the preexisting

form becomes part of something greater. Only Richard Campsall presented obvious

the

to

objection

view:

this

this

"On

account

is

nothing

more

intense; and neither augmented." the resulting whole nor the new part existed before, so they cannot have been intensified.

For what was there before

not

is

But though most fourteenth century medievals agree on

common

their views are not the result of

views

are

contrary

sense observation. Indeed, these

our ordinary experience

to

increase and decrease in their intensity.

another;

was a

God

-

namely, that qualities wall can be whiter than

The ground

by Aristotle

supported

consideration,

logical

One

love for Peter can increase.

s

this subject,

s

for this denial

authority:

a form

cannot increase or decrease while retaining its identity any more than a number can. 18 Different accidents can inhere in the same subject at different times,

of the

19

but different degrees of whiteness cannot be predicated to examples: Peter can be dearer, but his

same form. Returning

grace cannot increase while retaining its identity. If one wall is whiter than another, a different form of whiteness inheres in it; a wall which increases in whiteness by being painted gains a

new form.

How are forms intensified?

2.

Considering qualities as Aristotelian forms,

change more

qualitative

1

Tractatus

Wodeham, intelligi

non

ad

etiam bene

vim

vocis,

difficult.

Emphasis on

alphabeticus,

cap.

15

commune dictum quod

illud

alicui

quia

made medieval

formae

advenit

(Augmentatio):

forma aliquid

discussions of

a related logical dictum

suscipit

modo

"Alio

magis

constituens

et

cum

potest

minus ilia

-

,

licet

formam

perfectiorem. Et ideo dicitur suscipere magis et minus. Aliquando veto subtrahitur pars aliqua, qua subtracta non remanet ilia forma sed alia minor priore, non quod eadem sit et post minor, nee e converse. Et potest improprie dici quod maior cuius pars subtrahitur minuitur, vel adhuc magis proprie quod minor quae remanet minuitur,

primo maior pro eo quod

ista est

minor

ilia totali

quae

praefuit."

(fol. 135ra).

est 3: I, 17, 2, opinio (marg.: Campsale), q. augmentatio per additionem], quia si aliquando sic, tune nihil esset auctum, quia nee pars nova, cum ilia non praefuit, nee praecedens, quia ilia non est intensior quam prius, nee totum, quia non praefuit." (fol. 49ra).

Chatton,

d.

Reportatio,

quod nunquam

[est

18 Aristot., Metaph., VIII,

19 Aristot., Topica,

II, c.

c.

3 (1044a 9-10).

7 (113a 34-35).

a.

"Et

Wood

378

contrary

cannot

qualities

raises similar

What

problems

inhere

simultaneously

same

the

in

subject

-

second issue discussed here.

in considering the

the process by which forms intensify? Fourteenth century medieval authors tried to answer this question in such a way as would is

allow them to affirm that (1) qualitative change

is

gradual (2) the quality

resulting

from change constitutes a unified whole and

do

exist

not

simultaneously

of

paradigm

of qualities

The

are added.

parts

nature of change.

added

same

also allows that as a quality increases,

It

a

is

would combine

parts are

new

qualitative

it

could not account for

whole. According to Richard

unified

Campsall, a Mertonian contemporary of believe that old and

new

form which remains.

new form

the

that

change.

theory readily accounts for the gradual

addition

to the preexisting

fact

quantitative

forms

theorists

a successive process in which infinitesimal

is

Opponents of the addition theory claimed the

(3) contrary

Addition

subject.

resembles

change

qualitative

Intensification

the

in

Ockham, there -

parts

is

no reason

or individuals of a form

to -

produce a unified whole. For the only things which one, are actual beings which can be combined with

to

when combined make or

beings,

potential

entities

receiving

which

can

combined

be

with

would be parts of the same the same subject, they would not constitute a

received entities. But parts of a single form kind, so

if

they inhered in

whole, but remain separate individuals. Consequently, any intensible form

acquired over time would be composed of an infinite number of separate 20 parts and constitute an actual infinity, which is absurd.

Campsall claims

the infinitely

that

many new and

preexisting parts

posited by addition theorists would remain separate and unintegrated and

an

constitute

20

actual

Chatton, Reportatio,

91

detur

secundum,

Addition

alphabeticus,

quod

in

cap.

quolibet

secundum inconveniens,

scquitur

21

scilicet

sit

sequitur:

quod alteratum

consequentiae, quia quacumque infinitae albedines tantae virtutis sunt

est infinitae virtutis

maioris virtutis ilia.

-

argumentum

Et in

si

sit

in

fine

virtutis

infinitae

in

demonstrata in actu, hoc subiecto, igitur hoc subiectum

albedine in

Consequentia patet, quia actualiter habet infinitas quia cito post hoc instans habebit tune

quam

and

data,

.

isto posito, erit

Aristotle

57 (Infmitum in augmentatione conlinua): nova albedo praecedcntibus remanentibus,

Probatio

vigore.

like

theorists,

d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, fol. 49rb.

Tractatus

Wodeham,

"Si

I,

infinite.

quam

virtutes.

Hoc dato antecedens patet quarum quaelibet

infinitas qualitates

quia quaelibet adquisita post datam erit intensior rcmissior ordinate, contra: illo modo tenet ipse fundasti TE, igitur argumentum tuum contra TE

virtus data,

quaelibet

sequens

hoc argumento

cum

fuerit

(Campsall).

Respondeo concedendo

illud

quod

infertur

in

ista

forma qua

infertur.

Et hoc etiam

Calculating Grace:

almost

all

actual

medieval thinkers,

in

agreed

de

Wodeham

Wodeham

that

states

simply

379

the

rejecting

But addition theorists had no

infinity.

objection.

Adam

possibility

replying to this

difficulty

infinitely

of an

many

parts

qualitative

infinite, provided each producing successive part is less than the part which preceded it. Although attacks of this kind were not taken seriously by addition

added

be

can

an

without

actual

were committed

theorists, they did take seriously the claim that they

holding that contraries simultaneously coexisted in the

same

subject.

to

By

same genus but are maximally different appears to be the case that when something

definition contraries belong the

from

each

other.

gradually changes

period

22 its

It

color from white to black, there

when we might

say that

is

it

is

an intermediate

both black and white, which

is

a

contradiction.

Ockham and Wodeham

agree with succession of forms theorists that contraries cannot inhere in the same subject. They disagree with Chatton

who

holds that addition theorists must embrace the claim that remiss 23

Ockham degrees of contrary forms can coexist in the same subject. explains that it is unnecessary to posit that remiss degrees of contrary qualities inhere in the

same

subject; the degrees of quality

added when

forms are intensified are not contraries, but individuals of the same kind, numerically not specifically different. It is the addition of numerically distinct individuals of a form which produces intension. And these distinct constitute together a single unified form. No change in when tepid water is added to tepid water, because recorded intensity 24 the forms involved remain in distinct subjects. Change takes place individuals

is

successively, part

CAMPSALE,

25

by

part.

cuius est argumentum, concedere habct de partibus albedinis extensae,

neget indivisibilia." (fol. 140vb). Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. componeretur ex infinitis partibus,

2,

a.

3:

tempore mensurante ilium motum sunt novum quod nunquam praefuit." (fol. 49ra). 22 23 2,

Aquinas, In Metaph.

Ockham, Quaest. a.

sis,...

1:

Sed

gradibus, formae."

24 25

"Dicunt

isti

quidquid quia

(fol.

aliter

X,

nulla

infinita

lect. 5, n.

19

in II Sent.,

q.

quod aqua

est

tune quaelibet forma augmentabilis alia nee pars alterius, quia in

est

instantia,

in

quolibet

est

aliquid

V, 418s.). Chatton, Reportatio, I, d. 17, q. quia calor et frigus sunt in partibus diver-

(OTh

tepida

de hoc, teneo quod non salvaretur successio

sit

in I Sent., dist. 17, q.

Quaest. in II Sent., q. 19

et

2032^4.

[contraria] in

motu

et

48va).

Ockham, Scriptum Ockham,

Aristot.,

"Item,

quarum

cum

7

(OTh

(OTh V,

III,

418s.).

542-5).

compatiuntur in

se

adquisitione

in

remissis

partiali

talis

Wood

380

The forms.

addition theory

We

come now

was the most popular theory of the

to the minority views. Succession of

latitude of

forms

theories

change on substantial change, the kind of change described as generation and corruption. According to succession theorists,

model

qualitative

a quality appears to increase, a more remiss quality is replaced by an entirely different form of greater intensity. When something changes

when

from white to black, there is no intermediate period when the subject is partly white and partly black, rather there are a series of entirely forms; all the various shades of white, grey and black succeed each other. This means that what appears to be gradual change is really different

a series of sudden changes.

A

succession theorist can readily deny that contrary forms coexist

same

the

in

subject.

forms with

entirely

For intensification

new

intense

is

the result of replacing remiss

But

forms.

succession

difficulty accounting for the fact that qualitative

is

have

theorists

gradual, since

change change takes place suddenly, and forms cannot be intensified by adding parts.

Not only was the succession theory vulnerable was contrary

to the charge that

to our experience of gradual qualitative change,

it

was

it

also

attacked as a form of indivisibilism. According to Richard Campsall,

if

qualitative change involves the annihilation and replacement of forms,

it

is

is

instantaneous. But

composed

principles,

if

this is

motion,

of indivisibles, which as a

common

is

we have

to conclude that

motion

contrary to Aristotelian philosophical

opinion concedes. So according to

Wodeham,

Campsall claimed that adherents of the succession theory were committed to indivisibilism, just as addition theorists were committed to defending an actual

infinity.

Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 57 (Infmitum in augmentatione continua): hoc ALIQUI arguunt quod si in tola transmutatione non maneat eadem lectio dubia> mensuretur instanti vel qualitas maior et minor, sequitur vel quod motio quod alteratum sit infinitae perfectionis in vigore. Consequentiam probant, quia si non maneat etc., aut igitur in quolibet instanti est alia et alia forma corrupta priori; aut priori manente si corrupta praecedente, tune ille motus solum mensuratur instanti, quia ille motus non est nisi ista qualitas secundum quam movetur mobile. Ire enim ad calorem est calor quoquo modo. Sed ista qualitas tune non mensuratur nisi instanti. Et praeterea lectio dubia> si motus ille tune non sit haec qualitas nunc exsistens,

Wodeham,

"Et

ideo ex




mensuretur

instanti vel

140vb).

(OTh

III,

formae accidentalis

481ss.). fiat

Fitzralph,

per additionem,

Sent.,

cod.

Tractatus alphabeticus, cap. 15 (Augmentatio), instanti, as cited by Sylla, "Medieval Concepts," p. 234n.

fol.

De

in 1),


0

Perreiah, op.cit., p.341, points out that the Logica Parva rules omit the phrase He believes this to be important, but I scitum esse tale infra tempus obligationis think it could be explained by the brevity of the text. In the Logica Magna s treatment .

of sophisms 39 Strode,

The

little

seems to hinge on the presence or absence of the phrase

op.cit.,

fol.VS^.

relations are as follows:

Sophism

1

(LP

p.[122])

is

of Mantua. Sophism 2 (LP p.[123]) (following Strode) Peter ra Candia, op.cit., fol.67 Sophism 3 (LP p.[124]) is

LM

.

Sophism 4 (LP

in question.

LM

and found

LM is

found in Strode and one in Peter of found in Strode alone.

1.1,

similar to

3.3,

a variety of sources. Sophism 5 7.1 and found in a variety of sources. Sophism 6 (LP p.[126]) is p.[125]) is 9.1 and is found in Albert of Saxony and Strode. Sophism 7 (LP p. [127]) is

LM

found found

in

p.[125])

is

4.1

in

Strode and the Logica Oxoniensis. Sophism 8 (LP p.[128])

LM

is

LM LM 11.1

(LP 8.2

and and

Sophism 9 (LP p.[128]) is LM 12.1 and is similar to a sophism in Strode. Sophism 10 (LP p.[129]) is LM 12.2. For full references, see my edition cited in note 12. In the case of sophism 3, Perreiah s punctuation (op.cit., pp.218-219) obscures the sense. It should read: I posit to you this proposition: "You run and You do not run is to be conceded by you". 41

in

LP

a variety of sources.

pp.[129]-[134].

Ashworth

414

is

Logica Magna, and the

in the

no such separate section

six rules

found

in Logica Parva are not in the Logica Magna. Nor do they feature in here a case have so we I that authors know, may any of the other which Paul included new material in the Logica Parva, only to change his in the

mind about

its

Be

value before he wrote the Logica Magna.

may, the bulk of the section on interchangeable propositions the discussion of one sophism, I posit to you: "There is a

human being

is

a

donkey

are

interchangeable".

is

that as

it

devoted to

God and A

This sophism

is

discussed

in three separate places in the Logica Magna, and the third discussion, which owes a great deal to the long and elaborate discussion found in

extremely long and elaborate, occupying one whole page in 42 the 1499 edition. My hunch is that Buser inspired Paul s interest in the is itself

Buser,

this interest in the

sophism, that Paul indulged

worked

The fully

more

through the material yet fourth section

discussed

is

fully in

on similars and

is

dissimilars.

also discussed in the Logica

the sophism mentioned previously,

it

Logica Parva, and that he

the Logica

Magna

Magna. 43

The one sophism

at length and,

like

44

The

derives from William Buser.

the Logica package of rules is the same in both the Logica Parva and in any of be found is to no such and neatly organized package Magna; the other sources that I know.

The

final section

is

on

45

Here the Logica Parva has

depositio.

five

where the Logica Magna has twelve. Of the Logica Magna rules, the first two appear as general principles rather than as rules in the sources. Rule three of the Logica Magna is rule one of the Logica Parva. Rules rules

four and ten of the Logica

Magna

are included in rule two of the Logica

Parva; rules five and six are included in rule three; and rules seven and nine in rule four. Most of rule twelve is captured by rule five of the in Logica Parva. Rule eight of the Logica Magna, which also appears of Peter of Candia, does not appear in the Logica Parva .^ Rule eleven

the Logica

Magna appears

a definition given after the rules in the

as

Logica Parva. Apart from the placing of the Logica twelve, the content and ordering is virtually the

LM foLlTB*;

1

1

foI.lSO"

*; fol.lSS va

LP

pp.[134]-[138];

44

LP

fol.76 pp.[134]-[135]; Buser, op.cit.,

45

46

fol.l90

Buser, rb

"*;

43

LM

same

-fol.!91

-fol.75

op.cit., fol.74

.

vb

ra

-fol.77

LM foLWl^-foUM*; LP pp.[138]-[142]. LM 01.191^; Peter of Candia, op.cit.,

;

LM

va fol.!90

"

.

rules ten

in

va

va

3

"

42

Magna

.

and

both cases.

Paul of Venice on Obligations

While

415

have already argued that Peter of Candia was the main source for the Logica Magna rules, he was not responsible for their ordering. I

depositio.

are

there

Finally,

One

four

sophisms

the Logica Parva

in

section

on

of these features in the Logica Oxoniensis but not in the

A

47

second is given a different wording in the Logica but the discussion, which largely derives from Peter of Candia, is

Magna

Logica

Magna

,

same. 48 The remaining two sophisms appear 49 Magna, and they both come from Strode. exactly the

To sum

up: the pattern of sources for the Logica Parva

of obligations

Magna

Logica

in

is

s

the

exactly

same

We

treatment.

as

the

pattern

the Logica

treatment

s

of sources

for

the

find Albert of Saxony, Buser, the Logica

The rules given are generally standard rules, but their organization is idiosyncratic, and common to both the Logica Magna and the Logica Parva. The sophisms in the Logica Oxoniensis, Strode and Peter of Candia.

Parva are nearly all found in the Logica Magna. Given these facts, I would be astounded to discover that the same man had not compiled both treatises. Whether similar conclusions can be drawn for other parts of the Logica Parva remains to be seen.

University of Waterloo

47

Antichristus

non

est

albus

Oxoniensis, see English restored to the text found there.

Logica 48

Tu

homo

es

est

homo

animal

:

vel

tu

49

Aliquae op.cit.,

fol.192

fol.89 ;

propositiones .

Tu

es

et

Antichristus

Romae

es

LM fol.191

vel

Obligationes

-fol.192

:

.

LP

Strode, op.cit., fol.89

.

tibi

,

p.326.

pp.[139]-[140];

Peter of Candia,

non sunt simul verae

omne

coloratus

est

Texts

depositum

:

est

LP

:

Tu

LP a

non

should be

Romae

es

va

op.cit., fol.69

For the

p.[140].

The word

vel

aliquis

.

ra

LM

p.[140]; te negandum

fol.192 :

LP

;

Strode,

p.[141];

LM

NAIDA ANNA BACCIN

Homerus

estpoeta:

un caso

di prcdicazionc

secundum accidens

Con del

distinzione tra predicazione

la

CLVOLL

verbo

il

passo

Kcttf

21 a 25-28

auTO De

ancor oggi un oggetto di complesse discussioni. Non voglio addentrarmi nel problcma

Kara

e

del

Interpretatione

dell interpretazione

costituisce

del testo

la traduzione boeziana, della quale si greco, ma mi limitero a proporne awalgono commentatori medievali: Verum autem dicere de aliquo et simpliciter, ut quendam hominem hominem aut quendam alburn hominem album; non semper autem, sed quando in adiecto quidem aliquid oppositorum inest quae consequitur sed falsum est, ut mortuum hominem contradictiq, non verum hominem dicere, quando autem non inest, verum. Vel etiam quando inest quidem semper non verum, quando vero non inest, non semper verum, ut Homerus est aliquid. ut poeta. ergo etiam est an non? secundum accidens enim praedicatur esse de poeto est, sed non secundum se, Homcro; quoniam praedicatur de Homero quoniam est. i

<enim>

Nella prima parte del capitolo undicesimo del De Interpretatione si sono delineate le condizioni d inferenza da un enunciate con predicazione disiunctim

da e si

al

corrispondenteco/im/icf/w: est

"Socrates

da

inferire:

L inferenza non

si

per esempio, da

dato infenire

coniunctim

1

Per

la

posteriore

a

pu6

est

inverso,

est

homo

albus".

tuttavia generalizzare, senza

"Socrates

est

bonus"

bonus

ossia

e da

"Socrates

veda

in

opportune est

restrizioni:

citharedus"

non e

citharedus".

d inferenza

quello

una disiunctim, presenta analoghe

difficolta si

albus"

"Socrates

"Socrates

caso

II

est

"Socrates

puo

homo"

CLVOLL degli usi di e particolare: S. Knuuttila in

da

una

restrizioni.

predicazione L inferenza

e nella tradizione filosofica Hintikka, The Logic of Being, Reidel:

Aristotele J.

Dordrecht 1986. 2

Cfr.

A.M.S. Boetii Commentarii

Meiser, Lipsiae 1877, pp. 370, 373.

in

librum Aristotelis

ITepc Epfrnvet occ;,

II

ed.,

rec.

Un caso non e

una qualche forma

ci sia

quando

valida,

-

della predicazione

componenti

secundum accidens

di predicazione

oppositio

opposizione tra

di

le parti

-

adiecto

in

417

-

oppure quando passi da una predicazione

si parafrasando con una terminologia moderna con il verbo esse in accezione puramente copulativa -

sua accezione

alia

esistenziale.

testo

II

due

dunque

complesse come dall accezione

inferenza

(ossia

da

A

est

sua scia

sulla

B

A

ad

in

Nel

est).

di

et C,

De

De

del

ossia

esse

A

ergo

est

convinzioni

da

inferenza

A

et

est C, e

sua forma esistenziale

alia

Sophisticis Elenchis*

nuovo accomunati e

i

due schemi

classificati

come

4

tende

si

Interpretation

1

B

accomuna

-

nostre

le

differenti:

B

di

tardo-antica

dall esegesi

undicesimo

est

secundum quid et simpliciter.

casi $\ fallacia

Fin

A

medievale

esegesi

secondo

che,

copulativa

d inferenza vengono

validi

1

sostanzialmente

appaiono

predicazioni

non

e

d inferenza,

tipi

semantiche,

1

-

greco

alia

connettere

a

il

secundum

fallacia

passo et

quid

simpliciter degli Elenchi, secondo una linea, che tende a sviluppare una

tradizione

comune

Nel medioevo da

due opere.5

alle I

esempio

"Homerus est

spiega con la contaminazione tra

Ci6 forse

si

forniti nel

De

"Quod

non

poeta"

che e ricondotto a

"Homerus est in opinione",

est, est opinabile,

di "Homerus est

ergo

i

est poeta,

"Homerus

Interpretatione:

6

In ogni

est".

viene a volte sostituito

"Homerus est opinabilis".

due seguenti esempi, ergo

modo

una maggiore uniformita nella trattazione dei due valida o fallacia secundum quid. Sembra infatti che

in

entrambi

natura della determinazione, che funge da predicato

o

da

*

predicato

De Sophisticis Elenchis Occam

c.5,

("est

homo

mortuus"),

a

e

("est

i

ad

non

di inferenza

tipi

la

parte

est"

trasformazione

in "Homerus est in opinione/opinabilis" porta

poeta"

del

Homerus la

casi sia

opinabilis")

condizionare

la

167a sgg.

la necessita di precisare che la fallacia secundum quid et due modi: un modo, per cui si passa da est tertium adiacens ad est secundum adiacens; un secondo modo, per cui parte eiusdem extremi, vel a compositione sumpta cum determinatione, arguitur ab aliquo sumpto cum addito ad ipsummet sumptum sine addito". (Si veda: Guillelmi de Ockham, Expositio super libros Elenchorum in: Opera Philosophica et Theologica, III, ed. F. del Punta, St. Bonaventure

Tuttavia gia

simpliciter

si

sente

articola in

"a

University 1979, p. 54). 5

Cfr. S. Ebbesen, "The dead man is alive", Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle s

in:

Synthese,

40 (1979),

Sophistici Elenchi,

v.L,

p. 43 e idem, Leiden 1981, p.

171. 1

L esempio

di

inferenza

dato talvolta nella versione:

non

valida

"Chimera

"Quod

non

est opinabilis,

ergo

est, est".

est

opinabile,

ergo

est"

viene

Baccin

418

era piuttosto

poeta"

ad

inferenze coniunctim-disitmctim

di

possibilita

1

in

(mentre

est

"Homerus

uso contestuale a decidcre del senso da annettere

est).

entrano in gioco nella spiegazione dei due tipi non di e diminuens di detenninatio d inferenza: quella quella

Due validi

nozioni

detrahens

determinatio

come

mortuus

dcterminazione

homo

alter!

"Socrates

(distraint]

mentre

il

L

distrahens.

comunemente,

piu

o,

fondamentale e che in espressioni

homo

est

come

mortuus",

la

termine

del

significato

idea

est

in

determinazione attenui (diminuit) o indebolisca il grado opinione", essere espresso dalla copula. Si ammette infatti che il verbo esse,

di

-

delerminato

,

in

espressioni

"Homerus

la

in

almeno presenza di certa determinazioni, pcrda importo esistenziale - e che di indebolito un a nel senso di esse extra grado designare passi -

1

essere, quale

A

comportino uniscono.

8

1

Se

accetta la

si

e

Vimpositio assai

irripetibile

problematico

cui

per

secolo,

("voces

acccttare

,

il

significato

per

che,

dei

dei

suis

csempio,

su

ossia

cui

termini,

diffusa nella

non cadunt a

-

poiche pare che esse

significato

comunemente

tesi,

9

tredicesimo

del

distrahentes

-

adiccto

in

sostanziale

alterazionc

e soprattutto dalle quaestiones,

determinazioni

sulle

focalizzata

e

tuttavia,

che implicano un oppositio

quelle

del

commenti

giudicare dai

attenzione

1

essere mcntale, quello immaginato e cosi via.

1

si

seconda meta

termini

6

fisso

significatis"),

e

diventa

neU espressione

homo

- manca - "Homerus est una predicazione, che rimandi poeta" esempio originate mentale o che esprima una qualchc no/.ione di modalita, e dunque li si di Boezio, secondo cui cio di cui si asserisce prcferisce mantencre la spiegazione cssere non e quanto e designate dal soggctto, ma dal predicate poeta). In altri commenti c e una netta distinzione tra il caso di oppositio in adiecto e quello di classificati come casi di predicazione predicazione accidentale, poiche entrambi vcngono con una nozione diminuens: come opinibalis diminuisce il senso di est in "Chimera est cosi fa mortuus nei riguardi di homo o pictus rispetto ad homo o ad animal opinabilis", Tractatus Called Afterwards Summule Logicales, ed. L.M. de Rijk, Petrus

Ncll

al

piano

1

Hispanus,

(cfr.

Assen 1972,

p. 158.

1

S.

9

Ebbesen,

Cfr.

History

J.

"The

dead man

Pinborg,

of

is

alive",

op.

cit.,

pp. 43-7.

Problems of Semantic Representation in Medieval Logic", in H. Parrel, Thought and Contemporary Linguistics a cura di

"Some

Linguistic

Berlino-New York 1976. Idem, Ebbesen,

"The

contributions in

a

English

"The

to

sophisma"

dead the in:

contribution man",

cit.;

discussion

the

to

H.A.G.

on univocal

Medieval Semantics and

Logic",

Synthese

Braakhuis,

40

"Kilwardby

(1979),

versus

pp.

Bacon?

19^2;

The

of being and non-being found de Metaphysics. Studies Dedicated to L.M.

signification

et Niimega, 1985; A. de Libera, "Roger Bacon and Semantics from the End of the 12th Century to the time of Ockham and Burleigh. Acts of the 4th European 1981. Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, a cura di Braakhuis, Niimega

Rijk, a cura di Bos, Artistarium Suppl. 2,

le

probleme de Tappellatio

univoca",

in:

English Logic

Un caso mortuus

vivum

-

congiunzione con

in

sccundum accidens

perda

mantenere una

nell impossibilita di di esse

homo

termine

il

di predicazione

suo

il

419

originario

significato,

delle sue proprieta essenziali

la

-

quella

determinazione mortuum.

Se dunque si condivide la tesi della fissita del significato, occorre individuare un interpretazione semantica, capace di render conto di cio che awiene in espressioni come homo mortuus ed anche, in diversa misura, di cio che determina

come

est

"Homerus

Tra

opinione".

i

sostenitori

della

tesi

"radicale"

trovano alcuni esponenti di quella che permanenza in particolare Pietro d Alvernia e ha chiamato modista: Pinborg logica del significato

della J.

in

accezione indebolita di esse in espressioni,

1

Simone

di

si

Faversham.

mi occupero delPargomento relativamente ad alcune di Pietro d Alvernia; ricorrero anche ad un questioni In Perihermeneias In questa sede

passo, tratto dal

commento

di

Tommaso

Erfurt In Perihermeneias

di

Infme attraverso alcune delle argomentazioni

1

a

individuare

potra

di

esigenza

secondo

il

linee

larghe le

garantire

modello degli Analitici

una nuova

si

semantiche

e

scelte

Posteriori.

secundum quid o con oppositio

in adiecto

riflessione sulla teoria del singificato?

e che considerare

fatto

le

e plausibile chiedersi: perche la presenza nel linguaggio di

Ordunque

II

tra

da Rodolfo Brito 12

condizioni fondamentali del sapere scientifico,

predicazioni con determinazioni esige

nesso

il

tratte

n .

sostanzialemente

differente in

significato di

il

un termine quale homo

un espressione come

"x

est

homo

mortuus"

da quello in espressioni del tipo est homo" equivale ad ammettere che un cambiamento contestuale - quale la presenza della determinazione mortuum - o un mutamento di referenza - nel caso di est homo "x

"x

variabile

la

mortuus"

come

x

varia su

un dominio

di

enti

-

nel passato

non

solo, aspetta, possano cambiare le condizioni di verita, ma la stessa struttura semantica dei termini. Cio viola la tesi della fissita del ci

si

significato dei termini

nozioni di

tempo o

ed anche quella della

di modalita,

totale indifferenza dei

come insegna

il

nomi a

secondo capitolo del De

Interpretatione^

Si sono esaminati il Ms. F = Firenze, Ms. P = Paris BN lat. 16170.

11

12

Ms. L = Ms.

UB Leipzig

Vat. lat.

Cfr.

communi

distribuat

Ms.

B

Laur. S.Croce Plut. XII Sin.3 e

il

1356.

2141 e Ms. Vat.

Pietro

il

d Alvernia,

lat.

3061.

"Utrum quaestio signum universale additum ipsum pro suppositis presentibus, preteritis et futuris" (Ms.

terminis F,

f.lOrb

Baccin

420

Una

soluzione praticabilc potrcbbc consistere ncl mantencre

dell immutabilita

del

termini

significato,

delle

e

della suppositio

ratione

essendi.

logica

terministica

a

sviluppando,

loro

mezzi della

ai

una

volta,

di

logica

tipo dalla

costituita

appunto portante connotazione dei termini e non dalla loro funzione denotativa. intensionale,

Cio comporta che certe

espressioni,

verbo esse vada cercata

La nozione, termini

cui

piano dei

si

fa

-

analoghi:

tanto

di

I

ed

i

che cio che

pictus

prius-posterius e

&3\Vimpositio

est similis

-

rientra,

di

una

est

mortuus":

est

gia

(Homo termine

il

significati

secondari sussiste sempre una

mette

quondam

attributionern): nel caso

una relazione

in

di

continuita

fuit

materia

homini

sulla

la

"

La relazione

hominis".

tra

pura somiglianza pittorica

vero").

conta,

piu

cosi

dire,

nel

tale

relazione

"programma

un opportuna determinazione o nell atto

inscritta

quod terminus communis

la

e

fissata

del

semantico" -

nel caso del

funzione significativa,

dell imposizione,

substantialis

sicut

homo

che

in

non

ratione

nullum".

"Die Logik der Modistae", Studio Meditwistyczne, 16 (1975), pp.39-97; idem, Problems of Semantic Representation in Medieval Logic", cit., pp.263-4.

Pietro d Alvernia, q. Si sequatur: Sor f.lOva 20-1.

a

analoghi sono regolati secondo una relazione

per

di

uniti

secondario

significalo ("Homo

un opportune contesto modifica

regola,

"Intelligendum

sua tempus includit

vivus);

un

a

mentre

vivus che a quello di cadaver).

che

cio

e,

La presenza

verbo esserc

rimandano

homo

fonda invece

si

significati dei termini

secondo

un

di

tipi

verbo esse) vanno

il

infatti

homo

a

del

dei referenti.

analogia. Alcuni

vivo con quella di cadaverc sia la materia:

quod

pictus,

termine.

essi

se,

ad

concetto di

al

enim de cadavere quod

homo ed homo

55-6):

per

somiglianza (secundum

homo sembra nozione di uomo di

("Homo

non

di

"aberrante"

occorrenze

certe

di

di

quella

cadaver), oppure ad entrambi

qualche forma

di

di

presi

significato primario

dicitur

e

homo rimanda

homo rimanda il

significati e

ricorso

primario (es.: determinazioni rimandano

certe

Tra

predicativa,

sul

significato

mortuus

o

termini di sostanze corruttibili ed

i

(tutti

considerati

spiegazione del comportamento

la

funzione

in

de

diminutio

di

e

struttura

la tesi

tecnica

la

espressioni con

le

nozioni

sembrano rinunciare

modisti

i

14

cui

la

temiinonim

contenenti

comunque

Tuttavia

attraverso

nell analizzare

altre proprieties

o

distrahentes

c

est

homo

mortuus, ergo Sor

est

"Some

homo, Ms.

F,

Un caso dunque

implica

mutamento

il

sccundum accidens

di predicazionc

del

e

significato

421

reversibilita

la

dell impositio.

La nozione

di analogia

trattazione uniforme

adiecto

e

di

nell oppositio

il

in

di

tipo

adiecto

un

offre

altro vantaggio:

riconduce ad una

different! casi di predicazione

predicazione e

predicazioni

due

i

secundwn

chc

termine,

e

quid.

Cio

viene

con oppositio in nelle due

muta

che

interessato

dall analogia:

sempre un nome, che entra a comporre

il

predicate, ad essere analogo (homo), mentre nella predicazione accidentale

e analogo

il

verbo esse.

Occorre precisare che la soluzione, che si awale del criterio di come vedremo analogia, non e adottata da tutti i modisti: mentre alcuni nel caso di Rodolfo Brito

-

da quello esposto,

come

altri,

Paccolgono,

ma di

Sigieri

commento boeziano. 16 Tommaso

in

senso notevolmente diverse

Courtrai,

ripetono

il

vecchio

Erfurt riporta tanto la spiegazione

di

boeziana che quella fondata sull analogia e dell invenzione di quest ultima 17 attribuisce il merito ad Ammonio. Non e possibile in questa sede esaminare tutte le conseguenze di quest uso della nozione di analogia 1 ^;

mi limitero ad alcune considerazioni. verbo

esse,

del

usi

gli

ha

il

vantaggio

verbo;

di garantire

ambiti,

gli

per

interessata da nozioni di modalita di

seconda intenzione

II

modello analogico, applicato

una pur tenue forma

esempio,

in

("Chimera est

cui

la

di unita tra

predicazione

opinabilis")

("Homerus est in opinione")

al

e

o da termini

vengono esaminati

alia

luce dei significati secondari del verbo esse, che rappresentano, per cosi

che vuol dire che, per esempio, la di "Chimera est opinabilis, ergo Chimera non e dovuta alia netta separazione tra un uso puramente copulative ed uno esistenziale di gradi indeboliti

dire,

di

essere.

II

falsita

esse,

est"

ma

al

passaggio illegittimo da un grado forte d esistenza ad uno

debole.

Sigieri di Courtrai inserisce

comunque a qucsto proposito un rimando ad Ammonio. van Kortrijk, Commentator van Perihermeneias. Inleidende studie en tekstuitgave door C. Verhaak S.J. Verhandelingen von de koninklijke vlaamse academic voor wetenschappen, letteren en schone kunsten van Belgie. Klasse der Letteren. Cfr.

Zeger

Jaargang XXVI, 1964, n.52. Brussel 1964, p.143. 17

Ms.

18

L, f.26ra 80.

Va anche

nei testi del

Inoltre part. -

an.

detto che non dodicesimo secolo.

nelle

640b

si

tratta

di

un idea totalmente originale: era gia presente

opere biologiche di Aristotele (De gen. 726b 24, 734b 25, 735a 8; De 412b 14; ma anche: Meteor. IV, c.12 389b 31) si trovano alcuni passi

36,

del resto citati dai modisti

-

sull

equivocita dei termini di sostanze corruttibili.

Baccin

422

La

non

teoria

comunque

priva

di

di

esse,

che

viene

extra!

E

e

primario

significato

esse

dall espressione

in

re

ambiguita.

infatti

il

indicate

genericamente

suo importo

il

Qual e

csisten/.iale

(esse

in

oppure il suo riferimcnto ad essenze in atto? Alcuni passi della lettcratura modista sembrano attribuirc al significato primario di esse un

effectu}

csistcnziale.

importo

che

ritiene

il

ncll esscre

19

Tuttavia

significato

o

pcnsato

immaginato

contrapposizione

al significato

Pcrtanto

extra

Vesse

non

ma

secundum adiacens,

proposito della

fallacia

sia

(cs.:

ncl

csaurisi

dell analogia,

che

qucllo est

"Chimera 1

come

"Homcrus

in

est

esse

come

Tommaso

opinione,

in

cssere extramentale.

puro

chc

csistere

consistc

opinabilis"),

esistenziale

va intcso nclla sua contrapposizione

vicne confermata da un passo di

ipotesi

dottrina

la

esse

di

primario, chc dcsigna

puo

mcntali o fantastichc, tanto

L

sosticnc

chi

sccondario

essere di

o

entita

allc

dell essenza.

Erfurt,

che,

ergo Homerus

a

est",

afferma:

Omne ...

enim

Et ratio

verbum

"est"

effectu

et

quocumque In ogni

che

oppinione diminuit de ratione essendi absoluta subiecti est ista: quod secundum quod dicit Armonius hoc est terminus analocus, quia prius supponit pro esse in essentie el per consequens pro esse in anima et pro in

alia

modo

rinviare

1

le

secundum e

alio esse.

fa applicazione del concetto di analogia al verbo esse non tradizionali difficolta, che sussistono nel rapporto tra

tertium adiacens, alle

nuove nozioni

di significato

primario e

secondario del verbo esse. Notevoli pcrplessita affiorano anche nell applicazione dcWanalogia termini di sostanza corruttibile, di

mondo

sostanze fisiche del

significato,

different!

ma

anche

^ J.

Si

veda

Pinborg,

pp.260 sgg. 20

Ms.

21

la

distinzione

L espressione

ai

nomi

perche sussiste un etcrogeneita profonda tra termine homo annovera, per esempio, secondo suoi significati secondari, individui, che sono in

i

umane (homo

"Bezeichnung

i

sublunare verrebbero a possedere piu di un

potenza uomini, individui nel passato

sembianze

tutti

i

11

analogati.

Pietro d Alvernia, tra

come homo: non solo perche

21

pictus).

= (

cadaveri),

Ordunque,

ma

in

due accezioni di esse in effectu nella q. 56 In An.Pr. in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts", Misc. Med., 8 (1971),

tra in

anche immagini e che modo, se non

ricorrc piu volte nella letteratura modista.

L, f.26rb 20-3.

Pietro d Alvernia, Ms. F, f.lOva 17-20.

Un caso puramentc equivoce statua?

si

di predicazione

sccundum accidens

di

puo parlarc

per un immagine o una

"uomo"

22

La quanto

scelta

di

di

tradurre

in

una

trovare

potrebbe

estensionale

problcmi di teoria del significato anche sua comoda interpretazione a livello

Alcuni tra

modisti non accettano

i

mantenendo

concetto

il

di

con

fmisce

terminonim,

proprieties

significato di aspetti difficilmente riconducibili

pur

conseguenze della

le

Uno

della logica terministica.

materiale (id

quod

della

permanenza

risulti

de

significatur),

proprio quello

sermonis

virtute

una semantica, che

ottiene

egli

di analogia.

nettamente due accezioni

significant,

Rodolfo Brito. Distinguendo nella (significatum ut significatum) ed uno

che uno dei concetti, che

pro

e,

agli sviluppi consueti

una continua reimposizione dei nomi, ma che dei supposita una condizione imprescindibile per la verita quindi naturale

radicale

tesi

ratio

necessita di

e

il

di questi e

un elemento formale

significatio

caricare

il

ad unita.

sviluppando una semantica per certi versi piu affine

Ed

423

Nella

q.

eius

primario

si

degli enunciati.

trova

a ridiscutere

Utrum terminus analogus 2^ Autore

significato

terminus analogus: una,

di

evita la

fa dell esistenza

1

stet

separa

come

nel caso di

termine ha piu significati, ma secondo una relazione di sanus, prius-posterius; la seconda e quella dei termini come homo, che hanno un in cui

solo

il

significato

e

che

impropriamente

sono

impiegati

per

designare

o semplici immagini. Questa seconda non e una vera e propria analogia, ma solo una certa forma di similitudo o di attributio, che viene delta analogia solo in senso lato e che non ne possiede le individui morti

caratteristiche.

permettere espressioni fare con

homo

con

"programmato"

linguistico,

il

una vaga idea

solo

di

linguistico

come homo

un

coincide

Pertanto

alPuso

homo

pictus o

deminutus.

Si

nell imposizione; il

si

somiglianza in re

termini

di

homo

Pietro

homo

come

mortuus, dove in verita

badi che questo

secondario

significato

che non intacca

impiegare

di

si

homo

in

ha a che

deminutus non d Alvernia,

tratta piuttosto del risultato di

significato di

puo

preso di per

se,

gia

un atto

ma

che

La regola sui termini analoghi pone qualche difficolta a Pietro d Alvernia. Nella q. Utrum sequatur est homo mortuus, ergo est homo (Ms. F, f.lOra 71-2) il magister accetta che ex usu auctorum un qualsiasi termine analogo, preso per se, rimandi solo al suo primo significato. Precisa tuttavia che cio non awiene de virtute sermonis: infatti secondo la natura del linguaggio un termine analogo pone tanto il suo significato primario che quello secondario. Parzialmente edita da Ebbesen,

"The

dead

man...",

pp.60-1.

424

Baccin

piega

a

espressione

1

designate

in

cui

di

cio,

passato

termine era

il

un esse secundum quid e non un esse simpliciter. L insistenza con cui PAutore ribadisce che un nome di sostanza

predicabile, ossia

puo essere usato

corruttibile la

solo equivoce per riferirsi agli individui

dopo

loro corruzione, evidenzia la sua convinzione che, al fine di confutare

semantica radicale, occorra ricondurre

la tesi

termini a quello che realmente sono: cui

in

luogo sofisma

dove

Sorte non existente,

due

intrecciano

si

fa

risalire

1

sit

quella

significative:

consueta

status

sullo

E

esistenti, poiche nel in

homo teoria

della

semantico all

tratta

si

Sortes est

vera:

II

del 25 ",

del

asserti

degli

autorita di Aristotele

idea della fondamentale equivocita dei

secundum Philosophum

Item,

non

nomi

riferiti

De animalibus si dice che: De animalibus, membrum mortuum

membrum, nisi equivoce, sicut diceret aliquis statuam regis hominem vel etiam ymaginem hominis esse hominem et non est

est

esse

equivoce.

Una

dottrina semantica, che leghi se

referenza,

e

primari

tematiche:

epistemologica

ad individui non piu

nisi

ista

presunti usi analogic! dei equivocita dei termini.

di

e

e sulla validita di alcune scicnze.

scientifici

egli

una

e

significato

che

questa

ripete

"Utrum,

casi

osservazione

i

secondari, al

ambiguita

da un lato

scientifico.

rischia

linguaggio: se

Infatti,

libera

si

e

tuttavia

non solo

nelle

il

dalla

scien/e

significato alia sussistenza della

proliferazione dei significati in

di

a

conferire

quello

una

ordinario,

biologiche

i

nomi

fondamentale

ma di

a

quello

sostanze

godono sempre di referenza, secondo quanto dice Aristotele, awiene per la scienza contenuta nel Meteorologica. In che modo

corruttibili

non

cosi

possono fare dunque asserzioni scicntifiche su fenomeni transeunti, come un eclissi, la pioggia o il tuono? 27 Nella q. Utrum rebus corruptis, corrumpatur scientia de rebus 2^ Rodolfo Brito si awale di una soluzione molto articolata, che nasce da si

presupposti gnoseologici

e

semantici ben

precisi.

usare nomi in completa assenza di referenza e

che

attraverso

Ci6

si

Radulphi 25

26

Ms.

i

phantasmata

supplisce

Ci6 che permette

la facolta della

all attualita

della

in

Vat. lat. 3061, f.44ra.

Ibidem, f.44ra, 35 sgg. Cfr. T.K. Scott,

"J.

Buridan on the Objects of Demonstrative

Science",

(1965), pp.666-7.

28

percezione:

nella questione Utrum sequatur homo mortuus, ergo homo, Quaestiones in artem veterem, ed. Venezia 1499, f.lSvb.

puo constatare

Briti

di

memoria,

Rodolfo Brito, Quaestiones In An. Po., Ms.

Vat. lat. 2141, f.205ra-206ra.

Speculum 40

Un caso condizione passato:

semantico

la

che

dell

di scienza;

A

cio

sul

corrisponde

elemento formale del

La duplice natura

425

awenuta una percezione

sia

esse.

nel

piano

dunque un sussistenza di un

significato:

rimane garantito almeno dalla

pluvia

significato formale.

modello

solo

habuerit

prius

permanenza

come

termine

e

indispensabile

dummodo

secundum accidens

di pre dicazione

un duplice

del significato permette

primo esige, accanto al significato formale, anche da una scienza qua scitur res esse et ex quibus

il

Pattualita dei referenti e

L altro

causis passiones sibi insunt.

formali

del

significato,

modello

si

costituisce sui soli element!

prescindendo dal problema della sussistenza

di

e la scienza qua scitur ex quibus causis res potest esse et ex

referenti:

29 Questa scienza studia le possunt inesse. condizioni del verificarsi dei fatti scientifici, senza presumerne 1 esistenza,

quibus causis passiones

ma si

sibi

richiede una condizione minimale d esistenza: che dei fenomeni studiati

modo da

dato un qualche caso nel passato, in

sia

nella

averne un immagine

memoria.

La

struttura

logico-grammaticale degli asserti

relativi

scientifici,

al

secondo modello, deve essere probabilmente espressa in forma implicitamente ipotetica e non categorica: sappiamo infatti che un asserto del tipo "Homo

est

sarebbe falso per Rodolfo Brito, se non esistesse piu

animal"

alcun uomo;

31

modificato in

"Si

est

homo, homo

est

animal",

esso risulta

invece sempre vero.

Quest interpretazione

Cum

dicitur:

ci

viene suggerita da un altro passo: se

que per

insunt de omni,

insunt,

quacumque

yerum

est,

sicut

differentia

temporis ponitur pro subiectum, ponitur etiam predicatum, sicut Philosophus exponit, si verum est cucere esse hominem, verum est dicere esse animal. Et si intelligendo:

pro

verum

est dicere mine esse hominem, verum est dicere nunc esse animal. Ista est sua intentio: pro quocumque tempore ponitur homo, ponitur et animal.

Pertanto un asserto generale su fenomeni transeunti, e sempre costituito nel

29 30

primo modello Ibidem, f.205rb 45-va

di scienza

da una proposizione, che

risulta essere

per

5.

Ibidem, f.205va 2-28:

"Dico

quod, corrupta

re,

non corrumpitur

scientia

de

re,

qua

scitur ex quibus et qualibus causis res potest esse et passiones sibi possunt inesse ... si res non sit, dummodo prius habuerit esse, potest esse scientia de ipsa, qua scitur ex quibus et qualibus causis possit esse."

Rodolfo Brito, Quaestiones "Sor

32

est

homo",

f.!89vb 13-5.

Ibidem, f.!98vb 22 sgg.

in

An. Po., Ms.

Vat.

lat.

2141, q.

Utrum

ista

sit

per

se:

Baccin

426

se,

ma non sempre

A

vera.

sempre

conclusione

ci

a

sottesa

semantica,

mentre ncl sccondo modello e

vera,

proposizione per se e

potrebbe chiedere quali sia la questo secondo modello di scienza.

senso

modo

riappaia

come

termini,

li

poiche

lato,

la

nozione

tonitms,

E

di analogia

eclipsis,

pluvia

mia

presa in

etc.,

ma

senza alcuna relazione a\Vesse actuate del fenomeno,

usati

struttura

si

convinzione che in qualche

da una

costituito

33

sono

solo

in

relazione alia loro possibilita d esscrc. Inoltre la condizione gnoseologica,

che rende possibile,

il

sapere scientifico su insiemi di oggetti, che non

siano sempre esistenti, e data dalla presenza dei phantasmata: e Rodolfo

anima

Brito osserva che Yesse in et

secundum

Detto

quid.

subiscono un ampliazione, possibili:

La

altrimcnti,

nel

i

stare per supposita

non

ma

attuali, 34

e questo e per Rodolfo Brito un uso analogice del linguaggio.

formale e materiale - della funzionc componenti dei termini rende comunque plausibile la teoria dei due

duplicita delle

significativa

modelli di scienza, anche se -

attuale dei referenti, pare libro

modo da

in

sempre un esse deminutum secondo modello termini

delle cose e

degli

Analytica di

"ipotetico";

universalita,

di

fatto

il

tipo di scienza, che

1

in osserva nza al capitolo iniziale del

postcriora

pero

presuppone

e

rispetto

privilegiato

quest ultimo

a

garantire

i

al

esistenza

secondo modello

caratteri

di

necessita e di onnitemporalita, che sono tipici del sapere

scientifico.

Universita

Una "Zur

"La

Sapienza"

di

Roma

J. Pinborg, posizione per certi versi affine e quclla di Boezio di Dacia: si veda 15 des Boethius de Dacia: ein Uberblick", Studio Mediewistyczne

Philosophic

,

(1974), pp.165-85. Cfr.

ratione cit.,

In

pro

pp.274-75.

Topica, suppositis

q.

6

Utrum

praesentibus,

terminus praeteritis

communis et

futuris,

distribuat in:

aequaliter

Pinborg,

et

unica

"Bezeichnung",

JOEL BIARD

Vcrbes

de

cognitifs ct appellation

la

forme

selon Albert de Saxe

Les Sophismata

de Saxe contiennent plusieurs sophismes, au

d Albert

demeurant classiques dans leur formulation, qui comprennent dans leur enonce le verbe savoir. De maniere generate, ces sophismes sont traites

la distinction

du sens compose

appel systematiquement pour resoudre

fait

la

grace a

troisieme

partie

du

recueil.

et

les

du sens

sophismes 20,

1

propositions modales, par exemple dans

II

n

1 .

32

Albert y

33 de

et

Bien evidemment, cette distinction

familiere a tous ses contemporains. Jean Buridan

Mais

divise

le

livre

est

evoque a propos des des Consequently

2 .

pour autant mise en rapport avec 1 etude des propositions comportant un verbe cognitif. Lorsqu il examine les problemes semantiques souleves par des verbes signifiant des actes de 1 esprit, Jean elle

est

pas

Buridan retrouve bien

n en

la division

du sens compose

et

du sens

divise,

pas principal moyen de resolution des difficultes; pour ce faire un concept forge a cet effet: Pappellation de raison. le

fait

il

mais

utilise

Curieusement pour quelqu un qui a etudie puis enseigne a Paris a Pepoque de Buridan, Albert n evoque pas cette notion, pourtant promise a un certain succes. En revanche, il fait un usage qui au premier abord peut paraitre curieux de

appellation de la

l

forme.

C est

pour tenter de

determiner ce qu il entend par cette expression, et pour preciser a travers comment Albert se situe par rapport a ses predecesseurs ou a ses eme contemporains que je voudrais etudier ici le sophisme 34 de la IH cela

Sortes patrem

partie:

On

suppose que

marche a quatre

Hoc

suum le

pattes.

credit esse

asinum.

pere de Socrate

Le sophisme

est revetu

d une peau d ane et

se prouve de la maniere suivante:

Sortes credit esse asinum, hoc est pater suus, ergo patrem

suum

Cf. J. Biard, Les sophismes du savoir. Albert de Saxe entre Jean Buridan et Guillaume Heytesbury, a paraitre dans Vivarium. Albert de Saxe, Sophismata, Paris, eme eme 1490, sophismes 33, 34 et 47 de la II partie, et sophismes 20, 32 et 33 de la

m

partie.

Cf.

Louvain

Jean -

Buridan,

Tractatus

Paris, 1976, pp. 56-57.

de consequents,

livre

II,

chapitre

2,

ed.

H.

Hubien,

Biard

428

asinum

csse

credit

3

L improbatio,

.

c est-a-dire

demonstration de

la

la

faussete de la proposition, procede quant a elle de la maniere suivante: Sortcs patrcm suum credit esse asinum, ergo Sortes credit quod pater

suus est asinus; hoc est falsum; la

faussete de

la

du consequent. Mais

faussete

refutee

est

Vimprobatio

infercrait le sens

le

a

grace

la

compose du sens

1

anteccdent resulterait de tenu

est

sophisme

pour

vrai,

et

d une consequence qui Dans son principe, le mode de

non-validite

divise.

resolution propose par Albert de Saxe est identique a celui

qu

il

a mis en

oeuvre pour les sophismes contenant le verbe savoir: il repose sur la these selon laquclle on ne peut pas systematiquement convertir 1 une en 1

une

autre

memes

les

comportant

sens

au

prise

proposition

mais

termes,

et

compose au

prise

sens

une

proposition

divise

longuement devcloppe par Guillaumc Heytesbury Un sophisme semblable est examine par Jean Buridan:

principe

.

esse asinum

accentue

Car

si

est

un

5 .

le

un ane, est

c est parce

voisine

de

c est-a-dirc

tu ne crois pas

est plus cxpeditive:

ctait

la

que -

vraie

que

celle

sais que tu n cs pas un ane. Mais la resolution differe. Tout d abord,

tu

elle

tu es

que

La probatio

ane.

Vimprobatio

que

credis te

paradoxe,

tu crois

voisins,

Tu

un peu differente qui En depit d une formulation le casus permet de rapprocher les deux sophismes. initiate

proposition initiale est

tu crois

que ton pere par

proposee

un ane parce

tu es

que

Albert.

les

sophismes paraissent sophisme doit etre nie, fausse, alors que chez Albert si

le

ce qui est une difference notable. Sans doute est-ce a

Vimprobatio tellc qu elle a etc ici formulee, immediate du savoir de soi et de sa propre nature humaine. Reste alors a refuter la probatio. En admettant le casus, on peut Pour quelle a conceder: aller patrem meum credo esse asinum

de

cause

1

evidence

reposant sur

1

de

intuition

jusqu raison? Jean

.

Buridan

reste

ici

asse/

elliptique:

quia

patrem

meum

meus credebam esse asinum, sed non secundum hanc propositionem Ainsi, contrairement a est asinus" scd secundum istam "Hoc est asinus". sens compose et du du distinction la a il ne fait aucunement appel "Pater

Albert,

sens divise, qui aurait pu etre 3 4

Albert de Saxe, Sophismata,

5

Guillaume

Jean Buridan, Sophismata, IV,

p. 73.

6

sign,

pertinente.

m

II

II

est vrai

Id., ibid., p. 81.

11,

ed.

qu

il

n explicite

vb.

Heytesbury, Tractalus de sensu composite P 2ra et f Bra. Sophismatibus, Venise, 1494, en part.

Cf.

cum

XXXIV,

ici

et

dn-iso,

Regule eiusdem

Th. K. Scott, Stuttgart -Bad Cannstatt, 1977,

Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe

son

guere

raisonnement,

mais

de

suffit

il

429

dans son

celui-ci

replacer

contexte pour Peclairer.

Pour resoudre toute

la

serie

prend place, Jean Buridan juge nomme Pappellation de raison

de sophismes dans laquelle celui-ci de faire appel a ce qu il Cette derniere, resultant de la

necessaire .

presence de verbes comme comprendre, connaitre, savoir, ne doit etre prise en compte que si le terme suit un tel verbe. Selon la theorie

credo patrem le

proposition,

difference entre

la

buridanienne,

meum

patrem

esse asinum

vient

meum du

terme patrem n appelle pas

comme

individu est compris et signifie

fait

credo esse asinum

que dans

la

et

premiere

raison selon laquelle cet

la -

pour que la proposition soit vraie, il suffit done que je croie que ceci, de maniere indeterminee, est un ane - tandis que dans la seconde proposition, le terme appelle sa Par

raison.

la

s eclaire

la

que c etait un ane, non pas selon mais selon la proposition est un "ceci

Rien de parait bien

autre chose.

s

de

formulation buridanienne:

croyais ane"

pere

la

proposition

mon

"mon

pere, je

pere est un

ane".

ne se retrouve chez Albert de Saxe. Le sophisme 33 approcher de cette idee, mais il s y agit en verite de tout

tel

A

1

argumentation qui a ete presentee plus haut,

auteur

1

ajoute ceci: li a sequitur hoc verbum scit, appellat suam formam. Et ideo hec est falsa a Sortes scit esse idem ipsi a. Quando enim precedit hoc verbum scit, tune non appellat suam formam. Et ideo nee bene conceditur: Sortes a ipsi a scit esse idem

Quando enim

.

Puisque cette appellation de la forme vient de ce qu une expression suit un verbe intentionnel, on pourrait au premier abord faire Phypothese qu il s agit

d une reformulation de

alors attribuer a Albert

la

doctrine buridanienne. Mais

il

faudrait

un grossier contresens, revenant a confondre ce

que precisement Jean Buridan differencie, a savoir Pappellation d un terme - c est-a-dire le renvoi d un terme, dans une proposition, a pour sa forme Propter ista sophisma sciendum est quod ista verba huiusmodi, de quibus post dicemus, et participia et nomina inde descendentia [...] faciunt in terminis cum quibus construuntur quosdam modos speciales appellationum. [...] Talia verba faciunt terminos cum quibus construuntur appellare rationes secundum quas imposita sunt nomina ad significandum, et non solum res cognitas ad extra, sicut faciunt alia verba; a propos de cette notion, cf. J. Biard, Le cheval de Buridan. Logique et philosophic du langage dans analyse Cf.

id.,

intelligo

,

ibid.,

pp.

cognosce

,

73-74:

scio

et

1

d un verbe intentionnel, in Die Philosophic irn 14. und 15. Jahrhundert, in memoriam K. - ou Ton trouvera Michalski, O. Pluta, ed., Amsterdam, 1988, pp. 119-137 egalement des references a de nombreux articles anterieurs sur le meme sujet. 8

Albert de Saxe, Sophismata,

XXXIV,

sign. m.II. va.

Biard

430

ce qu -

et

connote, done

il

1

Bethune,

ne suppose pas selon le maitre de

pour quoi cependant

de raison qui seule

appellation les

9

signifie, et

caracterise,

verbes signifiant des actes de

1

il

On

esprit.

peut avancer une

hypothese differente. L exemple n est pas necessairement emprunte a Buridan, car il ne est pas propre et la formulation d Albert est un peu differente. revanche, on trouve une fois de plus

meme

le

lui

En

enonce chez Guillaume

mode de division et Heytesbury, parmi tuum credis esse Patrem de composition: asinum, igitur credis patrem les

tuum

esse asinum

sens

le

La

fait

de

1

appellations.

le

encore, Heytesbury se contente d opposer

ici

sens

divise.

II

done a expliquer

reste

1

usage

appcllation.

Perutilis

L

Mais

.

et

compose

qu Albert

10

exemples relevant du huitieme

un

comprend

logica

existence

d un

tel

sur

portant

chapitre

les

chapitre, dans un oeuvre a bien des logicac de Guillaume d Ockham, traduit

egards tres proche de la Summa la place prise par ce concept d appellation dans au milieu parisien, et 1 importance nouvelle qui

les

discussions propres

lui

a etc conferee par

Jean Buridan. Mais en ce qui concerne le contenu du chapitre, Albert s ecarte de son maitre. En vertu du vieil adage selon lequel le predicat appellation est presentee comme une propricte du appelle sa forme, 1

predicat.

Mais

il

ne

s agit

ni

de reduire immediatement

1

appellation a

une espece de la supposition (comme le faisait Guillaume d Ockham), ni de nommer appellation tout renvoi a des choses que le terme signifie et pour lesquelles il ne suppose pas (comme die/ Jean Buridan), ni a plus raison

forte

penser par

(comme

la le

c etait

le

cas

avec

Guillaume de Sherwood), de

commune. Que

renvoi a une forme

le

predicat appelle sa

simplement que dans la forme mentale ou vocale selon se trouve predique dans une proposition, il peut se un terme laquelle verifier, dans une autre proposition au present, du pronom demonstratif

forme

signifie

qui renvoie a ce pour quoi suppose si

dit,

animal

qu

il

est

un animal

en montrant un homme,

est le

vraie,

11

premiere

peux

dire

.

Autrement

ceci

predicat devant conserver la

M.

est

un

forme

par ex. Jean Buridan, Summulae dialecticac, IV (Tractatus de suppositionibus), V, E. Reina in Rivista critica di storia delta Filosofta, 1957, fasc. II III, p. 343.

&

Guillaume Heytesbury, Tractatus de sensu composito 11

je

la

a dans la proposition initiale.

Cf.

ed.

Phomme

de

le sujet

Cf. Albert

de Saxe,

Perutilis logica, Venise, 1522,

F

et diviso,

16rb.

F

3va.

Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe

Ceci

tres

est

des

proche

ou

passages

Le

allusion a cette formule traditionnelle.

431

Ockham

Guillaume d

fait

evoque a trois reprises dans la Somme de logique. Le plus important de ces passages se trouve dans le chapitre 72 de la premiere partie. II vient a la d un

suite

developpement

contenant,

exemple,

par

a

qui

un

Venerabilis Inceptor

au

une

dans

que

precise

verbe

proposition

introduire

faut

il

passe,

1

une

terme suppose pour des choses qui existent ou que pour des choses qui ont existe. Mais, ajoute 1 auteur, cette distinction ne concerne que le terme qui est sujet et non pas celui qui est predicat distinction selon

le

puisque

d

le

A

12

appelle sa forme

predicat

.

occasion, Guillaume

cette

Ockham explique comment il comprend cette formule: Quod est sic intelligendum: non quod supponat

pro se vel pro

conceptu, sed quod per talem propositionem denotatur quod propositio in qua ipsummet praedicatum sub propria forma, hoc est ipsummet et non aliud, praedicatur de illo pro quo subiectum supponit fuit vera, si tails propositio sit de praeterito; vel quod erit vera si talis propositio sit de ruturo; vel quod sit possibilis si prima propositio sit de possibili... .

Apres avoir ecarte une hypothese selon laquelle 1 appellation de la forme serait le renvoi au terme lui-meme ou au concept (done la supposition

ou simple), Guillaume propose quelques elements d

materielle

En

premier

Autrement expliciter

le

lieu,

dans

dit,

cette

terme les

propositions

on

appellation,

bien que

chose,

si

terme

lui-meme,

morphologic du

la

et

signifiant.

sub

considere

Ton

que

va

explication.

forma. reformuler pour propria

trouver ce terme et non pas autre

doit

forme au

etre

doit

nous oriente chef

premier

En meme

ici

vers

du

ou

la

configuration

est indique

il

temps,

vers la materialitd

la

par

la

qu une

proposition dans laquelle ce terme est predique, sous cette forme propre,

de

ce

pour

quoi

proposition initiate 1

suppose le sujet, a ete est au passe; autrement

vraie, dit,

si

appellation de la forme par le predicat implique qu

sub propria forma, temporalites

ou

Sortes est albus modalites.

Par

-

et

verbe

le

si

Sortes il

fuit

fut vrai

de

la

albus, de dire,

pareillement pour les autres

consequent,

cette

formule

implique

egalement une relation semantique, qui se traduit comme c est souvent le cas par une predication, ainsi que le respect des temporalites, le privilege

donne

au

present

dans

la

formulation

predication/supposition se traduisant par 12

Cf.

Guillaume d Ockham,

13 Id., ibid., p.

216,

1.

61-68.

Summa logicae,

I,

de

la

relation

une indexation temporelle de

chap.72, p. 216.

de la

432

Biard

de

valcur

de

verite

la

DCS considerations semblables

proposition.

retrouvent dans les deux autres passages de allusion a

1

appellation de la forme par

le

Somme

la

se

de logique qui font

14

predicat

.

Tous ces elements sont bien ceux par Icsqucls Albert de Saxe explique appellation de la forme par le predicat dans son chapitre 1

lequel toutefois est 1

beaucoup plus complet sur

1

appellation que ne

1

etait

oeuvre ockhamiste.

Jean Buridan, le

lequel

il

evoque lui aussi enonce commun selon 15 sa forme Mais en depit de certaines

vrai,

appelle

predicat

convergences,

est

1

.

interpretation de cet adage

1

pas vrai au sens propre des mots

16

-

Si

le

dont

-

il

precise

qu

n

il

est

est quelque peu differente. II se propose d analyser les causes de verite de propositions comportant des termes appellatifs, qui signifient ou cosignifient des choses pour

lesquelles

ils

ne supposent pas.

terme en question

est

sujet,

il

chose, selon auteur, non seulement en appelle expression de relation au temps du verbe mais selon une disjonction de ce temps et du temps present. Par exemple, le blanc qu appelle le terme album lorsqu il sa

est

sujet

1

d une

1

au

proposition

futur,

peut

etre

signifie

comme

etant

presentemcnt ou dans un temps futur adjacent au suppot. On pcut ainsi considerer comme equivalente a album erit nigrum, la disjonction quod est vel erit album erit nigrum. Pour qu une proposition au futur soil il

vraie,

n est

pas requis que dans

futur

le

la

proposition

au present

simplement qu une certaine reduction au s Mais dans ce cas, present puisse operer. appellation doit disparaitre et le sujet doit etre transforme en terme non appellatif. II suffira en effet correspondante

soit vraie.

faut

II

1

qu

il

ait

etc vrai de dire

hoc

est

album, en montrant

proposition actuelle, qui a ce moment-la sera noir.

pour

le

predicat car celui-ci appellant

sa chose

II

le

sujet

de

la

en va diffdremment

en relation determinee

au temps du verbe de la proposition, il doit toujours, si Ton de telles transformations ou reductions, conserver la meme forme: opere 17 ... debet manere in propria forma quantum ad appellationes On et exclusive

.

retrouve ainsi Pambivalence de cette notion de

terme doit rester 14

16

17

le

meme

quant

Cf.

id., ibid., II,

Cf.

Jean Buridan, Sophismata, chap. IV,

Id., ibid., p. 64. Id., ibid., p. 63.

chap.

7, p.

a

la

materialite

271; et III-l, chap. 43, p. 473. p. 64.

forme

qui indique que le

du

signifiant,

mais

433

Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe

comporte en meme temps une indeniable composante semantique puisque la forme est aussi Pobjet meme de appellation telle que 1 a definie Buridan. 1

De

la resulte

forme

1

interpretation que Buridan propose de

tout terme, des lors

realite

et ceci vaut

qu

le sujet;

egalement pour

la

adage classique: en

comme

mais

exclusivement en relation au temps du verbe,

dans

1

par definition sa

est appellatif, appelle

il

formulation des causes de verite, qu

il

n

est

il

ne Pappelle pas

pas indispensable,

reste sub propria

forma 18 que ce doit etre le cas du predicat Dans ces d6veloppements de Buridan, on retrouve des questions evoquees par Albert, puisqu il s y agit, identiquement, des termes

cum

il

appellatione, alors

appellatifs.

.

De meme, on

peut deceler une facon identique de designer

la

du terme. Cependant, le developpement de Buridan insere sans equivoque dans une conception de 1 appellation de la forme

forme propre s

(comme

type de renvoi signifiant contredistingue de la supposition) qui est

absente de Pexpos6 d Albert. En revanche celui-ci met sur le meme plan questions liees aux determinations temporelles et leur effet sur le

les

predicat d une part et les problemes particuliers suscites par des verbes intentionnels d autre part, avec

comme

denominateur

commun une

idee de

qu indiquait deja Guillaume d Ockham. Si done les deux champs que Buridan traite a 1 aide des notions d appellation de forme et d appellation de raison sont de ce fait rassembles, il ne s agit forme

reduite au seul aspect

pas pour autant de confondre indument les deux concepts buridaniens; s agit

plutot de les remplacer par

d une certaine

qui,

la

vague que usage ockhamiste. avoir enumere des apres

qui est plus proche de

En

un concept d appellation de

est plus

fac,on,

effet,

la

il

forme

notion buridanienne et

1

regies

qui

concernent

appellation dans une proposition au present, au passe, au futur puis a la modalite du possible, Albert ajoute une cinquieme regie qui prend en compte les verbes tels qu intelligo, scio, cognosco. Us sont caracterises

1

que lorsqu ils sont suivis d une complexio, et non pas seulement d un adjectif ou seulement d un substantif, 1 adjectif n appelle le

par

fait

pas seulement sa forme

egalement sa complexio substantif.

Ce n

Par exemple, cette

il

est

proposition

18 Id., ibid., p.64.

pas

est vrai

-

au sens qui a etc precise plus haul - mais ici son union, sa conjonction - avec un

done

le cas,

que

6quivaut

en revanche,

Deum a

si

trinum et

hoc

le

terme precede

unum

cognovit

le

verbe.

cognovit Aristoteles;

Aristoteles,

ou

hoc

Biard

434

Mais

renverrait a Dieu.

Deum unum

Aristoteles cognovit

trinum

et

est

faux, parce que impliqucrait quo non sculement le Philosophe ait connu Dieu, ce qui etait le cas, mais encore qu il 1 ait connu comme un et 19 On retrouve encore une fois des trine, ce qui n etait pas le cas

cela

.

voisins de ceux qui etaient etudies par Jean Buridan.

phenomenes

Albert se garde d introduire Pidee d appellation de raison,

Mais

meme

la

ou

Buridan y faisait appel, par exemple a propos de Penonce canonique, d inspiration aristotelicienne, Sortem venientem tu cognoscis. Cette demarche s etend aux cas ou la complexio qui suit le verbe est

une proposition. Supposons par exemple que a signifie la proposition Deus est mais que tu 1 ignores. a scis esse verum doit etre tenue pour hoc scias esse verum, hoc renvoyant au vraie: il suffit pour cela que sujet

de

la

a

proposition

scis esse

vcrum. En

revanche, d aucune chose

hypothese tu ignores que Deus est la proposition a. On pcut done estimer que dans les cas ou la est proposition suit le verbe, elle appelle sa forme, ce qui a Pevidence

vraie tu ne

sais

c est a, puisque par

que

croyance porte sur la proposition Deus est elle-meme, ou plus prdcisement que on sache que a signifie Deus est. La forme n est done pas simplement ici Pidentitc a soi materielle du

que

ici

implique

le

ou

savoir

la

1

bien

terme,

qu

elle

qui

specifique,

etre

devrait

un

ni

impliquc,

I

renvoi

des

distingue

de supposition, mais Pidentite du terme simple ou complexe.

qu

il

soil

Meme

dans

si

concernant

Perutilis

logica,

signifiant

eclairer

suffit

de

comme

de Saxe rcste assez

Albert

cela

dernier

ce

type

habituelles

relations

signification et tel,

d un

semantique

allusif

les

quelques pour exemple, phrases des Sophismata qui avaient initialement retenu notre attention. Le

sophisme XXXIII precise: 20 appellat suam formam universali patrem suum

forma

et

in

-,

Socrate a ce

un

;

particular!. est

un

..

mais d apres

moment

En

homme est

le

li

hominem sed

effet,

-

il

Socrate

tient,

casus, la

ceci est

individu qui est son pere, alors

Id., ibid.,

m

II,

vb.

ignorat

sail

qu

le il

pronom

hoc

in

propria

cette

proposition

la

croyance de

ceci

renvoyant a

ignore cette identite.

meme

"scit",

de maniere generate

forme propre de

un ane,

meme

verbum

Sortes in dicto casu in

a juste litre,

On peut noter au passage qu on trouve le Heytesbury, attribue a Averroes. 20 Albert de Saxe, Sophismata, XXXIII, sign, m II, va. 21

a sequitur hoc

sophisme XXXIV:

esse

scit

21

que son pere pour vraie

Quando enim et le

exemple

chez

Toute

Guillaume

Appellation de la forme selon Albert de Saxe

proposition qui suit

fonde

la

peu qu est

ou

croire

appelle sa forme, ce qui

savoir

non-substituabilite d expressions de reference equivalente, pour

elles soient

assez

ratio

verbe

le

435

de

forme

differente.

Le sens

exact de cette notion

a preciser mais elle est sensiblement differente de

difficile

Non seulement

buridanienne.

la

concerne aussi bien des termes

elle

mentaux que des termes vocaux, mais elle implique a la fois le respect de la litteralite du terme et une portee semantique qui peut se traduire par des propositions du genre s agit

pas

d une

simple

ceci est

confusion

un x.

II

entre

en tout cas qu il ne deux types d appellation

est clair

les

distingues par Jean Buridan. Albert cherche a elaborer, en integrant les

phenomenes semantiques que son aine raison,

de

1

done

les

appellation

demarque

ainsi

expliquait grace a Pappellation de

problemes suscites par qui

s

appuie

sur

consciemment de

Centre National de

la

Recherche

la

les

seule

la theorie

verbes cognitifs, une theorie notion de forme, et il se

buridanienne.

Scientifique, Paris

IVAN BOH

Medieval Rules of Consequences and the Idea of Demonstrative Science

Introduction. Medieval logic rules.

The

inferential for

truth,

rules

in

question

moves are such

are

been

basically a logic of

indicating what

devices

metalinguistic

help us in our rational search

that they will

such that they

i.e.,

said to have

may be

never lead from truth to

will

falsity;

and

seemingly correct inferential moves are faulty, e.i., of the sort which can lead from truth to falsity. While truth of propositions was correctness of inferences, the rules of sharply distinguished from

what

consequence were nevertheless conceived scmantically and, in the case of obligational and epistcmic logic, they essentially involved a pragmatic relation or reference to a user of language signs.

was

Logic specifically

characterized

always

one

as it

of

one

as

listed

sermocinal

of

arts.

the

and

arts

liberal

But

medieval

authors

would make a

as a science. Occasionally, they

more also

distinction

between logica utens and logica doccns, the former concept stressing the nature of logic as an ars and the latter suggesting the nature of logic as a system of correct principles which can be learned so as to enable us

speak

"to

enables us

Obviously,

truly".

"to

speak

the

congruously"

In their investigations

relation

of

was never quite

on the nature of

logic

to

grammar which

coincidental.

logic medievals

were led

to

two related questions. One was primarily ontological: If logic is a science in the sense of an enterprise of formulating a set of true propositions, it must have its proper object. But then, what is this object? Philosophers

who

spoke

of

second-intentional

being

were

Acknowledgements: The author gratefully acknowledges State

University

&

for

granting

him

the

sabbatical

year

his

ontologically

inclined

indebtedness to the Ohio

1986/87,

to

the

International

Exchange Board (I.R.E.X.), and to the U.S. Department of Education for their research grants to the German Democratic Republic and to Poland during the same academic year. Most special personal thanks are due to Dr. Gunther Schenk of the Martin Luther University (Halle) who always found ample time to share his views on the history and philosophy of logic. Research

Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science philosophers of logic

who

answer

tried to

this first question.

437

The

present

paper does not concern itself with this line of discussion. The second question in the discussion of the nature of logic became prominent soon after the recovery in the Latin West of Aristotle s Posterior

Analytics

the

in

translated into Latin by

half

first

demonstration?

limited

to

If

categorical

so,

syllogistics?

1

century

meet the Aristotelian requirements of

what

in

when it was The question now was: Does

twelfth

James of Venice.

logic itself conceived as a science strict

of

It

sense? is

the

demonstrative

Is

science

impact of the recovery of

on the conception of logic that interests us in this The has two parts. The first one deals with the rules of study. paper consequence considered as the very core of medieval logic. The second

Posterior Analytics

part

relates

the

systems of consequences to the idea of demonstrative

knowledge as formulated

in the Posterior Analytics.

A

concluding section

summari/.es the findings.

Pan One. Some of

history

years of progressively intensified research in the

sixty

medieval

logic,

from

pioneering

work of H.

Scholz,

I.M.

Boehner, through the studies and editions by EA. J. Pinborg, S. Ebbesen, N. Kretzmann, A. Maieru, V.Munoz Delgado, E.J. Ashworth, etc., and through a long and expanding list of other prominent investigators and editors, there can be no doubt Bocheriski,

and

Moody, L.M. De

about

the

P.

Rijk,

centrality

medieval logical

of

treatise.

rules

of

consequence

in

any

Nor can there be any doubt

comprehensive

that the idea of

consequence itself and of its types developed significantly through the centuries from the seeds found in Aristotle s Topics and Prior Analytics

and possibly from other sources. One can also observe a progressive extension of areas brought under the umbrella of a comprehensive system of rules

of consequence,

culminating,

perhaps,

in

the

treatise

entitled

Conscquentiae by Ralph Strode. This English logician collected rather eclectically, twenty four general rules of consequence among which one could find rules of prepositional logic, of alethic modal logic, of a "logic

of

quality",

of obligational disputations,

and of epistemic and doxastic

Cf. E. Serene, "Demonstrative Science", in The Cambridge History of Later Philosophy. Ed. N. Kretzmann et al., Cambridge: University Press, 1982, pp. 496-517.

Medie\>al

Boh

438

The only notable absence from

logic.

axiological rules.

The

the

set

and

of deontic

that

is

2

earlier systems of

consequences such as that of Walter Burley,

system of John Buridan

s Consequentiae developed in the 3 mid-1300s on the Continent, were indeed more perfect than the system of Strode if we consider them simply as quasi-axiomatic structures. There

or the

is

"mature"

made

a clear distinction

in

Burley and Buridan between the principal

and the derived rules of prepositional logic and the proofs of the latter from the former are consciously and carefully worked out; while in Strode all

24 general rules seem to be treated as

of

them are shown

be

to

"reducible"

"principal",

even though some

to another. This shows, of course,

independent and that from a strictly axiomatic point of view Strode could have done with fewer than 24 principal rules. Strode s that they are not

admirers

and

critics

such

as

Alexander

logicians such as Peter of

work by

raising

many

Paul

Sermoneta,

Cajetan of Thiene, and Frachantianus of Vicenza,

of

Pergula,

as well as other great

Mantua and Paul of Venice continued Strode

interesting

questions

about

various

s

problematic

points of his text.

The medieval correctly be

rules

of consequence

are

done and what should be avoided

relations in various areas of discourse. This in the controversies

of what

descriptive in

can

considering inferential

comes out

especially vividly

over the definition of consequence and in the implied

or even explicit attitude toward certain problematic rules. Everyone, of course, agreed that no consequence could be sound unless

it

rules out the

case where the antecedent obtains but the consequent not. While keeping in

mind the

distinction

between the so-called material implication,

implication, and relevant entailment, and

This

is

not

to say that medievals did

have

stipulating

a

strict

new symbol

not pursue deontic logic at

all,

=>

but only that

been

integrated into a comprehensive quasi-axiomatic system. For developments in this area, see the pioneering work of Simo Knuuttila: "The Emergence of Deontic Logic in the Fourteenth Century", in New Studies in Deontic M. Logic. Ed. R. Hilpinen, Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1981, pp. 225-248; and S. Knuuttila

deontic

rules

not

yet

&

Yrjonsuuri, "Norms and Action in Obligational Disputations", in Die Philosophic im 14. and 15. Jahrhundert (Bochum Studien zur Philosophic 10). Ed. O. Pluta, Amsterdam: B.R. Griiner, 1988, pp. 191-202. Cf.

Tractatus de Consequentiis. Ed. H. Hubien (Philosophes Medievaux 16). Louvain,

1976.

For relevant texts, see Consequentiae Strodi cum commento Alexandri Sermonetae, Gaetani in easdem Consequentias, Dubia Magistri Pauli Pergulensis,

Declarationes

Obligationes eiusdem Strodi ... Quaestiones in Frachantiani Vicentini. Venice 1517.

Consequentias Strodi perutiles

...

Antonii

Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science

439

ergo ) to represent systematically-ambiguously all the consequential structures of medievals, we can say that everyone agreed that if P Q is (read

=>

to

be sound, then

satisfied

as

at least

necessary

~(P & ~Q)

~O(P & ~Q)

must be

Whether these conditions were

conditions.

soundness of

sufficient conditions for

not even

if

P

=*

Q

seems

matter of some dispute throughout the ages. The

Ex

to have

also

remained a

impossibili quodlibet

and the Ex falso quodlibet rules which come along with the acceptance of ~(P & ~Q) or ~O(P & ~Q) as sufficient conditions for the soundness of

P

=>

Q also remained a source of perplexity. We should stress that medieval rules

when

there

is

a

question

of

the

of

whole

of the intellectual structures (or

"constitutive"

not formally constitute them in the

way

consequence,

system

of

"games"):

especially

them, that

is,

not

are

they do

in which, say, the rules of chess

may be said to constitute the game of chess, or in the way in which the formation rules and definitions may be said to constitute certain systems. Rather, they take the intellectual structures or

as already given.

"games"

They merely bring out explicitly the most general features inherent in or and they help to organize and tacitly assumed in those structures, possibly

the

reorganize

framework

materials.

They

also

a

provide

theoretical

comparison and contrast of various deductive fields. the mutual Thus, consequential rule which in fact allows us to use P Q and ~Q =$~P interchangeably may be seen to be operative in the system of alethic modalities, e.g., allowing for interchange of OP nQ and for the

=>

=>

~OQ

=>

of

system

CP [P

=>

~OP,

with

the

obligational

possible

proviso

disputation

and

e.g.,

that

allowing

N%Q =*N%P The general consequential rules, such as Q] and known by a to be sound [Ka (P =>C^0

n(P

(with the proviso that If =>

=>

and

Q));

for

in

interchange

the of

Ka (P=* Q)). a consequence Q)], then

is

sound

P is to be [CQ]\ should if

conceded by a [C%P], then Q must also be conceded by a not be confused with constitutive rules of the game of obligation such as the following three rules from Paul of Pergula

which

s

Obligationes:

Everything

possible and posited to you and known by you to be such must be admitted by you Everything which is possible and posited to you, is

;

and admitted by you

be conceded by you for as long as the Everything which follows from what has been posited and admitted from it alone or from it together with some thing which has

obligatio lasts

is

to

;

been conceded, or some things which have been conceded, is to be conceded The constitutive rules are sufficient to play the game, while .

Boh

440

the general rules of consequence help to explicate the logical force of

to-be-conceded, to-be-denied,

and to understand the conceptual or

etc.,

theoretical underpinnings of various types of obligationes.

Mutatis mutandis, one could

make

remarks about the rules of

parallel

a consequence is sound such as Strode s Rule 13, then if he knows the it to be sound [K (P = and a knows Q)], [P Q] a antecedent [K^], then he also knows the consequent [Ka Q]\ in relation to our first order knowledge, opinion, and justification claims in various If

epistemic logic, =>

areas of

human

We

Part Two. in

logic

will

now

some medieval views on

explore

general and of the theory of consequence

demonstrative

of

ideal

endeavor.

science

as

in

expressed

in

the

the relation of

particular to the

newly

recovered

Posterior Analytics.

As

already noted, the medievals since Boethius characterized logic loosely as both art and science. It was cultivated together with grammar, rhetoric

opposed

and other to

the

liberal

"real"

arts

-

as

opposed

and

sciences,

to mechanical arts, i.e.

The recovery

sophy, metaphysics, and theology.

and also as

mathematics, natural philo of Posterior Analytics in

the mid-twelfth century changed greatly the discussions of the nature of these disciplines. Arguments were set up to establish the status of

demonstrative science for

all

these disciplines,

-

a status which

seems

have become a high desideratum. As for logic, two remarkable phenomena should be observed.

On

to

the

one hand there was a progressive development by logicians such as Abelard, Peter of Spain, and others, of certain ideas on inference found Aristotle

in

Megaric

s

Prior Analytics

tradition),

culminating

systems of consequences.

development,

the

5

On

appeared

in

(and possibly in the Stoicformulation of quasi-axiomatic

Topics a

the other hand, and concomitantly with this -

under

the

influence

of

the

Posterior

a rising tendency to claim for logic itself the status of a demonstrative science. This tendency became especially strong by first half of the 13th century when Robert Grosseteste wrote a

Analytics strict

there

and

On

-

the relation of topics to consequence see E. Stump, Topics: their development Later Medieval Philos consequences", in The Cambridge History of

and absorption into

Kretzmann et al., Cambridge: University Press, 1982, pp. 273-299. See also Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of Topics in the Middle Ages, Miinchen: Philosophia

ophy. Ed. N. N.J.

Verlag, 1984.

441

Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science

detailed

commentary on every aspect of the

particular on

central concept,

its

The requirements

of

i.e.,

Prior Analytics,

and

in

that of scientific demonstration.

demonstration

scientific

as

understood

by

medievals were rather restrictive and stringent. Scientific knowledge was supposed to consist of syllogisms in Barbara whose premisses are true, universal,

better to

and necessary, as well as immediate, and more certain and the conclusion to be demonstrated. While restrictions

known than

seem

have been incorporated into the very of science and while scientific demonstration was originally syllogism

categorical

definition

to

phenomena and

thought to be a model to explain natural

certain metaphysical propositions, the concept of science

demonstration was

extended

soon

geometry and arithmetic, as well as

to

cover

other

grammar and

to establish

and of

disciplines

scientific

such

as

logic.

But although the criteria of demonstrative science were in a sense relaxed, there were still some definite criteria to be met. Thus, the

anonymous author of a mid-14th century Petri

I-III

Hispani

rules,

in logic

"for

treatise Quaestiones in tractatus

emphatically denies that logic requisites of

all

its

is

a

mere

being a science are

collection of found".

The

requisites he listed are three, viz.

the subject of which a property

which

(dignitas} means or

More

is

being demonstrated, the property

been demonstrated of the

has

subject,

and the principle

known

proposition which serves as demonstration that the property belongs to that subject.

or

the per se

the

concretely,

logic has a subject, such as syllogism ... it also has properties, such as demonstrative probable and^ apparent (as are the enthymeme, the induction, and many other things). Moreover, it has principles (dignitates), e.g. if that which appears less to inhere inheres, then that whicn appears more [to inhere] also inheres , or to whatever fits the defimens, the deiiniendum also , and many others, as is evident from Topics and from the fifth treatise of this book [i.e., Summulae Petri Hispani}. ,

Several

centuries

later,

John Versor

question of whether logic can

He

first

"analysis",

points

and

out

that

is

the

"first

material principles of syllogism,

Cf.

Jan Pinborg,

"Anonymi

(1982), pp. 1-170; pp. 12f.

means

Quaestiones

Analytics

"resolutio".

resolution"

i.e.

concerned with the same

claim to be a demonstrative science.

(etymologically)

that in Latin this

explain that there

1

itself

is

when one

have to

do with

Then he goes on

to

points out both the

terms and propositions, as well as the

in

Tractatus Petri Hispani

I-III",

CIMAGL

41

Boh

442

formal principles, i.e., the mode and figure and the regulative principles, i.e. the dictum de omni and the dictum de nullo. But after this first there

resolution

the

is

second

one

which

is

a

of

resolution

the

consequent or of the thing concluded into the principles and causes of that consequent, these causes being signified

remarked

be

and of

circularity his

Vcrsor

that

commentary on

infinite

is

fully

regress,

Prior Analytics

as seen

where he

of

It

premisses."

the

from the

initial

should

charge

possible

of

paragraph of

says:

of a conclusion acquired by a syllogism; therefore, if there be knowledge of syllogism, it too must be through syllogism. Thus, such a syllogism is either known or not known. Not the first, because then it would be known by another syllogism, and that one by another, and so there would be a process in infinitum. Nor could one say the second, because then there would he no principle on the basis of which to come to knowledge of syllogism.

Every science

demonstration;

Versor consists

possession

now demonstration

is

escape from both circularity and the recourse to the distinction between the

s

in

a

is

firm

aware

by the

a

knowledge by resolution There is no doubt

infinite

.

were

that medieval authors

fully

conscious of the

significance of the structure of their systems of consequences

procedures of deriving

regress

two senses of

some

rules

and of the

from others. Four cases should

suffice

to illustrate the point. [1]

puritate [i.e.,

rules

with

De

Walter Burley (12757-1345?), explaining artis

logicae:

Tractatus

regulis generalibus

longior,

he

consequentiarum

his

says: ]

in the

procedures "In

are laid

the

first

down

which ought to be assumed as the principles in this the rejection of incorrect rules which lead to the

De

chapter

the general

art",

together

fallacy

of

second chapter Dc modo arguendi enthymematice consequent ...; in conditionalibus ] it will be explained in what way one ought to argue on the basis of these rules in the realm of enthymematic consequences. in the

[

John Buridan (1295/1300 Consequentiae, states his aim as

[2]

of his

d.after 1358), in the

opening sentence

follows:

In this book I wish to discuss consequences, dealing as much as I can with their causes, about which many things have sufficiently been proved by others in an a posteriori manner, although perhaps they were not reduced [by them] to the first causes in virtue of

Cf.

8

Johannes Dorp, Super omnes

Ed. P. Boehner,

p. 60.

libros

nove

logice,

Koln, 1503, a2 rA.

Rules of Consequences and Demonstrative Science

Now

which they are saki to hold.

it

443

will

be necessary to put forward

his

discussion

some assumptions. Johannes

[3]

Dorp

sciences,

points out that,

of other sciences at

in

(fl.c.1400),

whether logic can establish

its

first

own

of

principles logic

all,

but only shows

all,

of the

question

or only those

of other

does not establish principles

how one can

correctly derive

conclusions from premisses in any science. Having said that, that

"in

principles,

from

its

Dorp adds its own

sense logic also provides a method in respect of

this

because

own

it

teaches 10

principles]."

how

form argumentation from these

to

The use

[i.e.

of logic in a deduction of derived

from the principal ones in closely analogous to the deduction of conclusions from principles of particular sciences.

rules

[4]

Alexander Sermoneta (d.1486),

on Strode tract

on

s

in the

Prologue to his commentary

Consequentiae, speculates on the proper location which a

on consequences should have

in a systematically

ordered textbook

logic:

say that this book [Consequentiae] is the most universal part of the Prior Analytics, or else is introductory to it; and therefore it should be placed immediately after the De Interpretatione, and before the Topics, Sophistical Refutations, and Posterior Analytics. This order is evident, because this book is concerned with consequence as its subject, and this is more universal than any kind of argumentation or syllogism, with which the Prior special Analytics is concerned. I

Conclusion. Medieval rules of consequence can be seen as metalinguistic

formulations of the logic of propositions and also of the most general principles of particular sub-branches of logic. The principal rules are

analogous to axiom-rules, and the derived rules are analogous to theorems in our natural deduction systems. The function of the rules of

consequence was not only to provide a logical tool for reasoning in any subject-matter and in all sciences and speculative arts, but also to make explicit

The

the most general logical presuppositions in any inferential area.

recovery

of

the

Posterior

Analytics

stimulated

the

subsequent

n

Ed. H. Hubien, p. 17. Cf. also P. King, Jean Buridan s Logic: Supposition; The Treatise on Consequences. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.

The

Treatise

on

Johannes Dorp, Commentary on Buridan s Dialectica; quoted in E.A. Moody, Truth in Mediaeval Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1953, pp. 14f.

and Consequence

Alexander Sermoneta, 1493.

in

the Prologue to his

Commentary on Strode

s

Consequences,

Boh

444

discussions that logic

on the nature of is

because they

The Ohio

itself

logic

itself.

Medievals did come to believe

a demonstrative knowledge, but this was possible only

in fact re-defined

State University

and extended the concept of science.

HARTMUT BRANDS

Die zweifache Einteilung dcr formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood

Von den Anfangen

bis

heute hat

man

die verschiedenen Einteilungen der

Arten und Unterarten durch sogenannte porphyriaSupposition nische Baume darzustellen versucht. Es verdient eine gewisse Beachtung, in

daB

ein

ihre

solches,

Unternehmen

im

und

triviales

Prinzip

auch

unproblematisches

von William of Sherwood gegebene Einteilung bis heute nicht adaquat gelungen ist. Der Grund hierfiir ist ohne Zweifel, daB William

of

fur die

Sherwood

bei

der

formalen

Supposition

Einteilung vornimmt. Diese wird namlich einerseits personale, andererseits in die diskrete

Es

und allgemeine

eine

zweifache

in die einfache

und

eingeteilt.

gibt zwei Modelle, diese zweifache Einteilung in die

stammbaum-

artige Darstellung zu integrieren. Das erste findet sich bereits als Marginalie in der Pariser Handschrift und faBt die zweifache Einteilung selbst als eine Zweiteilung auf.

Dies hat zur Konsequenz, daB aus zwei

Zweiteilungen eine Vierteilung wird. Da das genannte Schema in keiner der beiden Editionen 1 der Introductions in logicam des William of

Sherwood enthalten

ist,

fiihre ich es hier an:

2

Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood. Einleitung und Textausgabe von Martin Grabmann, Miinchen 1937. William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam: Critical Text. By with Peter Kunze and Bernhard Mussler. New York 1983. (Edition Lohr)

2

MS Paris

Bibliotheque Nationale,

lat.

16617,

fol. 14r.

Literarhistorische

Charles

H.

Lohr

Brands

446

Die weitcren Einteilungcn schlieBcn an die personale Supposition an und sollen hier iibergangen wcrden. Im Prin/.ip gleiche Darstellungcn finden sich in

3 4 neueren Arbeiten bei Enders und Marenbon

Modell

Das zweite

.

denkbar einfach: die Einteilung der formalen

ist

Supposition in eine diskrete und allgemeine wird weggelassen. Dieser Umstand wird von Kneale/Kneale allerdings angemerkt: "Apart from one

be noticed

pair to

later,

all

the varieties of suppositio distinguished by

6 5 William of Shyreswood are shown in the (...) table." Bei de Rijk und 7 Heyer die wohl auf Kneale/Kneale /uriickgreifen, wird die Unvollstandigkeit des Schemas indessen nicht vermerkt. Moglicherweise ist das Schema ,

bei

deshalb

Kneale/Kneale

Verhaltnis

der

denn

erschien,

one distinction

sie is

Zweiteilung monieren: he docs not explain

in

"...

allerdings,

ihnen

das

anderen nicht hinreichnend klar

/,ur

related to the

meine

Ich

weil

geblieben,

unvollstiindig

einen

how

detail

the

8 other."

daB William of Sherwood dieses Verhaltnis

keineswegs ganzlich uncrklart liiBt, merkt er doch eigens an, daB es sich bei beiden Einteilungen um vollstandige Disjunktionen handelt. nota, totaliter sub se divisionum suppositionem, comprehcndit quod utraqiie "Et

formalem

Omnis cnim

dico.

Aut

Item.

discreta.

accipitur

suppositio, out pro re defcrente

muB man

Jacobi

10

supponens out

dictio

pro forma significata

formam

et

tune est

communis

est et

aut

tune est simplex 9

personalis."

Insofern

zustimmen, daB mil dieser zwcifachen Einteilung der

formalen Supposition eigentlich eine Kreu/.klassifikation vorliege, wenn er

H.

Enders,

Munchen J.

5

Sprachlogische

Traktate

des

Mittelalters

und

der

Semantikbegriff,

1975, S. 81.

Marenbon, Later Medie\-al Philosophy, Ixmdon/Ncw York

W. Kncale and M. Kneale, The of

Peter

Spain,

Tractatus.

De\<elopment

First

1987, S. 44.

of Logic, Oxford 1962,

Critical

Edition

S. 253.

from the LXXVIII.

(Kneale/Kneale)

Manuscripts

with

an

Introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Asscn 1972. Introduction, S. in: Peter of Spain, Tractatus K. Jacobi, Rez. von Philosophise he Vgl. hierzu: dem Diagramm, das de Rijk von der Rundschau 22 (1976), S. 48 - 64; bes. S. 58: ,

"In

bei

Einteilung

communis

-

Wilhelm

von

Shyreswood

discreta gar nicht vor. Dies

ist

gibt,

jedoch

kommt

G. Heyer, Generische Kennzeichnungen, Munchen 1987, 8

(Kneale/Kneale), 9 K.

Jacobi,

Unterteilung

suppositio

S. 68.

S. 256.

S. 266.

(Edition Lohr), 1

die

unrichtig."

in den Die Ai Modalbegriffe - Koln 1980, S. 414, Anm. 127.

Shyreswood, Leiden

logischen

Schriften

des

Wilhelm

von

Die Einteilung der formalen Supposition bci William of Sherwood

auch bei

schematischen

der

11

447

von dieser Einsicht

Darstcllung

keinen

Gebrauch macht. Alle genannten

Darstellungen der

William of Sherwood

in

der Supposition des

Einteilung

Stammbaumform

miissen als wesentlich unvoll-

angesehen werden, weil keine von ihnen die von William of

standig

Sherwood eigens hervorgehobene und thematisierte suppositio simplex discreta

AuBerdem wird Williams

enthalt.

Einteilung

schematische ausgesetzt

anderen

mit

ist,

aus

diesen

den

Darstellung,

die

hatte folgende

Form:

kritischer

Schemata

nicht

vorgebrachten

seiner

Vergleich verstandlich.

Eine

Einwanden

nicht

suppositio formalis

communis

discreta

L

I

simplex

simplex

personalis

personalis

Hierauf bezogen wird unmittelbar verstandlich, was William of Sherwood an anderen Einteilungen verwirft, und es erscheint die Annahme gerechtfertigt,

daB William of Sherwood

Supposition gerade wegen hat. sit

"Volunt

divisio

discreta

die zweifache Einteilung der formalen der suppositio simplex discreta vorgenommen

enim quidam, quod haec

communis

suppositionis,

divisio, alia simplex, alia personalis,

non

quia

cadit

haec

diversitas

in

12 suppositione."

Fur diese diskrete und einfache Supposition

gibt

William of Sherwood

einen Beispielsatz, zu dessen Verstandnis es sinnvoll erscheint, zunachst

kommenden

die hier in Betracht

Definitionen der einzelnen Suppositions-

arten durchzugehen. Ein formal supponierender Terminus supponiert

immer

signifikativ. Supponiert er einfach, so supponiert er unmittelbar fur sein

Signifikat

(und

nicht,

wie bei der personalen Supposition, mittelbar fur GemaB der Definition von significatio,

eine unter dieses fallende Sache).

worunter William of Sherwood die begriffliche Vergegenwartigung bzw. Darstellung einer Form versteht, bedeutet einfach zu supponieren auch,

Form - pro forma significata enim nomen significat solam formam

fur

11

12

eine

K. Jacobi, a.a.O., S. 163.

(Edition Lohr), S. 267.

13

(Edition Lohr),

S. 268.

-

zu supponieren. Denn: 13

,.."

"Omne

Diskret schlieBlich supponiert

Brands

448

um

ein Terminus, sofern es sich

handelt wie Sokrates oder dieser

aus

Das

sich

der

Kreuzklassifikation

Mensch

Problem

stellcnde

hier

einen diskreten bzw. singularen Terminus .

offensichtlich

sich

ergibt

beiden

der

Einteilungen

gerade formalen

der

Supposition, d.h. speziell aus der Kombination von einfachcr und diskreter Supposition.

Was

soil

daB ein singularer

darunter verstanden wcrden,

Terminus, insbesondere ein Eigenname eine Form bezeichnetl Genau namlich eine Form zu bezeichnen, behauptet William of Sherwood Sokrates

Subject

seines

und

einfache

die

fiir

diskrete

dies,

vom

Supposition

gcgebenen Beispielsatzes. "Cum dico Socrates est praedicabile de uno 14 Dem Verstandnis solo respicitur pro forma significata per nomen." ,

Eigenname cine Form bezeichnct, kommt man wohl ein Stuck naher, wcnn man sich um ein Verstandnis des von William of Sherwood angefiihrten Beispielsatzes bcmuht. dessen, was es heiBt, daB ein

Kneale/Kneale erscheint

Sherwood

offensichtlich

sowohl die von William of

postuliertc suppositio simplex discreta

und

die damit

Annahme, daB singulare Termini eine Form bezeichnen, Beispielsatz abwegig:

be

said

to

a

signify

suppositio.

As

substance,

Socrates

he

"...

example means anything Socrates Socrates

is is

and

rightly

not

is

at

that

this

remarked

predicable all,

verbundene

auch Williams

name can

very strangely that a proper

insists

form

Aristotle

als

it

of

is

in

essential

to

doctrine

his

anything.

If

its

having

of

primary William s last

must mean either that being-called-

one thing or that being-identical-withpredicable predicable of only one thing, and in neither case is a form of of only

1

Socraticity

Die

involved."

kritische

Interpretation von Kneale/Kneale leuchtet ein,

man das esse praedicabile als Wenn Aristoteles sagt, daB erste

Pradikat-(in

einem Urteil)-sein

Substanzen weder

in

wenn

auffaBt.

etwas sind noch von

etwas ausgesagt werden, so besagt dies in logischer Terminologie, daB singulare Termini in einer Aussage niemals an Pradikatsstelle stehen

konnen. Folglich rekonstruieren Kneale/Kneale

Sokrates

als

einen auf

genau ein Objekt zutreffenden allgemeinen Terminus, und zwar in Form einer Relation zu Sokrates (als Person) bzw. zu Sokrates (als Namen), in der

nur Sokrates selbst

steht.

DaB

Sokrates

nur von einem

einzigen

ausgesagt wird, besagt dann, daB die als offene Schemata dargestellten 14

(Edition Lohr), S. 267.

15

(Kneale/Kneale),

S. 257.

Die Einteilung derformalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood Pradikate

x

x wird

bzw.

identisch mil Sokrates

1st

Sokrates

nur von einem einem einzigen Objekt, namlich Sokrates

449

genannt

selbst,

erfiillt

werden.

Es

mir

erscheint

Intention Williams

ob

zweifelhaft,

Es

wird.

getroffen

mit

dieser sich

bietet

die

Interpretation

namlich ein anderes

Verstandnis des esse praedicabile und damit auch des von William of Sherwood gegebenen Beispielsatzes an, da der Ausdruck esse praedicabile de uno solo als Defmiens im Pradikabilien-Kapitel der Introductiones

vorkommt, und zwar

als

Defmiens des Definiendums Individuum

individuum, quod de uno solo

:

est

"Et

nomen proprium

est praedicabile, ut est

et

pronomen et dictio communis cum pronomine. Dicitur enim individuum, eo 1 quod non dividitur in partes subiectivas." Die Erlauterungen, die William of Sherwood der Definition hinzufiigt, *

erleichtern zunachst das Verstandnis des Satzes nicht.

einen Schritt sichtlich

in

kommen: Der

weiter

den

Socrates

aquivalenten

Form

angefiihrte

Dennoch kann man

individuum

est

darf offen-

Beispielsatz

transformiert

von Kneale/Kneale keine Parallele zu Aussagen wie eine Ansatzpunkte mehr. Ferner ergibt sich Homo est species insofern species zu sein bedeutet, daB homo von werden. In dieser

bietet er fur die Kritik

,

mehreren ausgesagt werden kann. "Species autem est, quod praedicatur de 17 Weiterhin kann gesagt werden, daB wegen der angefiihrten pluribus ,.."

Socrates

innerhalb des transformierten Beispielsatzes vorliegt. Historisch

und systematisch

Wenn nun

in

einfach

von Interesse, daB W. Burleigh im gleichen praedicatur de pluribus und Socrates est

hier

ist

Homo

Kontext die Beispielsatze 18 individuum verwendet.

Socrates

der einfachen Supposition auch im Falle von

Modus

Parallele der erste

dem

Satz

Socrates est individuum

supponieren

soil,

so

kann er nicht

der Eigenname fur

die

Person

Sokrates supponieren. Folglich kann individuum nicht als solcher Begriff verstanden werden, der auf Personon zutrifft. Die Erlauterung ut est

nomen proprium sonst

Socrates

William

of

...

kann aber auch

material

Sherwood

nicht wortlich

(Edition Lohr),

17 (Edition Lohr),

W. St.

Burleigh,

weil

supponieren wiirde. Vorlaufig bleibt der von

fur

die

suppositio

simplex

Beispielsatz in beiden Versionen problematisch. 16

genommen werden, discreta

angefiihrte

Zur Vorbereitung eines

S. 237. S. 238.

De

puritate

Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955,

S.

17

artis u. 19.

logicae

tractates

longior,

edited

by Ph.

Boehner,

Brands

450

angemessenen Verstandnisses gehe vorlaufig zu dcr Frage zuriick, was cine

Form

es heiBt,

und kehre

Umweg

daB ein diskreter Terminus

bczeichnct.

Wort

Ein

ich einen kleinen

(material) noch

wenn

einfach,

supponiert

es

weder

fur

sich

selbst

Gegenstande (personal) supponiert. Dasjenige, was von etwas ausgesagt wird, sind nun aber auch weder Worter ( Sokrates ) noch entgegen der bei Aristoteles iiblichen Ausdruckweise Gegenstande fiir

(Sokrates). Ausgesagt werden in der Regel Eigenschaften bzw. Begriffe. Beide sind Kandidaten fiir dasjenige, was als Bedeutung eines Terminus im

Unterschied zu seiner Referenz Sokrates

Es

ist

Betracht gezogen wird. Die Person

das Referenzobjekt des Eigennamens Sokrates

als

Supposition

.

keine groBen Schwierigkeiten bereiten, die Theorie der

diirfte

Sherwood

in

Referenztheorie

cine

aufzufassen.

19

Fiir

William

of

wcitergehende Auffassung, daB die Referenz eines Terminus ausschliefllich eine Sache seiner Supposition sei. offensichtlich

gilt

die

Hiervon zu trennen

ist die Signifikation: die Bezcichnungsfunktion eines Terminus ist die Darstellung einer Form. So auch des singularen jeden kann sich auch durch den jeweiligen Satzkontext immer nur die -

d.h.

Supposition

20

Signifikation.

konscquent

Referenz

Was

Terminus wandeln,

eines

nicht

aber

wir somit bci William of Sherwood vorfinden,

durchgefiihrte,

die

d.h.

singularen

Termini

seine

ist

eine

einbeziehende

Semantiken sind uns

in der Gegenwarts"Wenn wir die Trennung zwischen Bedeutung wohl vertraut. philosophie und Referenz richtig beachten, spaltcn sich die Probleme dessen, was so

dualistische Semantik. Derartige

leichthin

Semantik genannt wird,

verschieden sind, daB

sic

Wir konnen von der

Tfieorie dcr

21

(

denn

Eigennamen

er

trennt

in

Namen

nicht

so fundamental

mehr

verdienen.

Bedeutung und der Tfieorie der Referenz kommt William of Sherwood sehr

ubercinstimmend

Sache

der

die

signiflcatio

)

an,

dann

muB

singulare

Termini,

speziell

eine Entitat benannt werden, die als Bedeutung

P.V. Spade, The Semantics of Medie\ al Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, theory of reference."

"71

die

Gebiete,

von der suppositio ( Referenz ). Wcndet man diesen Dualismus auf

Bedeutung

20

zwei

Dieser modernen Sicht

sprechen."

nahe,

in

einen gemeinsamen

in:

Terms",

S.

192:

The

The

Cambridge

History

of Later

theory of supposition proper

is

a

Vgl. (Edition Lohr), S. 267 (1. Dubitatio); ferner: (Kneale/Kneale), S. 254.

W.V.O. Quine,

"Anmerkungen

zur

logischen Standpunkt, Frankfurt 1979, S. 125.

Theorie

der

Referenz",

in:

ders.,

Von einem

Die Einteilung derformalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood

451

Unterschied zu ihrer Referenz fungiert. Hierbei so vermute ich, um dicjenigen Entitaten, die nur von

singularer Termini in:

handelt es sich,

einem einzigen ausgesagt werden konnen: die Individua. Diesen mochte ich mich nun in Form eines kleinen Exkurses in die Semantik der

Gegenwart zuwenden. Von den verschiedenen dualistischen Semantiken der 22 Gegenwart wahle ich die von R. Carnap in Bedeutung und Notwendigkeit entwickelte Theorie von Extension und Intension.

Carnap

semantischen Begriffe der Extension und Intension

fiihrt die

per Abstraktion ein. Dabei handelt es sich um das prazisierende Verfahren der Begriffsexplikation, bezogen auf bekannte Begriffspaare wie Umfang

oder Freges Bedeutung und Sinn Der Begriff der Intension wird vor allem im Hinblick auf die Modallogik eingefiihrt und ist nicht

und

Inhalt

.

identisch mit

dem umfassenden

Begriff der Bedeutung in

Abgrenzung zur

Referenz. Nicht nur aus diesem Grunde sind Analogisierungen zwischen

der significatio bei William of Sherwood und dem der 23 iiberhaupt nur cum grano salis zulassig. Bevor Wesenheiten gesucht werden, die als Extension bzw. Intension

dem

Begriff

Intension

wenn

Frage kommen, wird die Gleichheit, bzw. allgemein die Aquivalenz von Extension und Intension festgelegt. Ich beschranke mich hier auf die von auf die singularen d.h. Carnap so genannten Individuenausdriicke in

,

Termini. Zwei Individuenausdriicke sind extensionsgleich gdw. der Satz a = b wahr ist; sie sind intensionsgleich gdw. dieser L-wahr ist. Ein Satz

L-wahr

soil

heiBen,

Tatsachenwissen kann.

Da

wenn

seine

iiber

Wahrheit

unabhangig

von

aufgrund semantischer Regeln entschieden werden a = b genau dann wahr ist, wenn a und b auf

allein

der Satz

dasselbe Objekt referieren,

kommt

als

Extension eines singularen Terminus

nur das jeweilige Referenzobjekt in Frage. Der Begriff der L- Wahrheit ist an sich umstritten. Davon unabhangig bereitet es gewisse Schwierigkeiten, sich einen L-wahren Satz der Form a=b

vorzustellen, vor

sollen.

allem

wenn

Dementsprechend bieten

sich

a

und

b

echte

Eigennamen

sein

auch keine Wesenheiten unmittelbar

an, die als Intensionen singularer Termini in Frage

kamen. Das hiermit

angedeutete Problem scheint mir demjenigen analog zu sein, welches sich als Frage nach der durch einen singularen Terminus bezeichneten Form darstellte.

7? R. 1

und

23

Da

bei den anderen Designatoren als jeweilige Intensionen sich

Carnap, Bedeutung und Notwendigkeit,

9.

Vgl. P.V. Spade, a.a.O., S. 188.

Wien

-

New

York,

1972,

insbes.

Kap.

Brands

452

solche Wesenhcitcn ergaben, die gewohnlich als Bedcutungen odcr Begriffe

bezeichnet wcrden, Individuenbegriff

Terminus

fuhrt

zur

Carnap

Entsprechung dazu den Ausdruck

in

der

Bezeichnung

Intension

eines

singularen

ein.

In Ansehung der Analogic, aber auch im BewuBtsein der Differenzen zwischen den dualistischen Semantiken William s of Sherwood und R.

Carnaps mochte ich vorschlagen, den von William of Sherwood eindurch Individuum Terminus Individuenbegriff im Sinne gefiihrten Carnaps zu iibersetzen. Williams Erlauterung ware danach wie folgt zu verstehen: Ein Individuenbegriff ist dasjenigc, was nur von einem einzigen ausgesagt werden kann, wie dies bei der Verwendung singularer Termini der

Fall

werden

Sie

weil

sie

(im Unterschied zu Allgemeinbegriffen) keine untcrgeordneten Begriffe haben. Entsprechend ware species in dem Satz homo est species durch ist.

Individuenbegriffe

genannt,

24

Artbegriff wiederzugeben.

von

Die

hiermit

der

durch

vorgcschlagene Interpretation, welche ihren Ausgang William of Sherwood eingefiihrten suppositio simplex

kann selbstverstandlich nicht ohne Folgen fur ein Verstandnis der suppositio simplex im allgcmeinen bleiben. Es hat den

discreta

genommen

hat,

Anschein angesichts der verschiedenen, Beispielsatze,

angefiihrten

wenn

als

supponierende Termini Suppositionsart auch ganz

fur einfach

diese

verschiedene Gebrauchsweisen von Termini abdecken wiirde, welche der

personalen oder materialen Supposition nicht zugeordnet werden konnen. Feststeht, daB ein an Subjektstelle einfach supponierender Terminus durch ein bestimmtes Pradikat determiniert sein muB, und daB unter

diesem Subjektterminus ein descensus ad singularia generell nicht moglich ist. Die Griinde fiir die Unmoglichkeit eines Descensus sind allerdings andere

als bei

der immobilen Supposition.

Angesichts der Frage nach

dem

quantitativen Status von Satzen mit

einfach supponierendem Subjekt, weist William of

Sherwood

die Auffas-

sung, derartige Satze seien singular, deshalb zuriick, weil sie eine mit Semantik unvereinbare Deutung der einfachen dualistischen seiner

Supposition voraussetzt. Diese faBt namlich species

als

Eigennamen

muB fiir William Terminus homo indem

Interpretation

der

24

,

So

z.B. Kant, Logik,

A

150.

homo

in

dem

Satz

homo

est

einer Art auf, also als singularen Terminus. Diese

of er

Sherwood unakzeptabel erscheinen, weil nicht mehr als konkreter allgemeiner

Die Einteilung derfortnalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood

Terminus sondern

abstraktcr singularer Terminus 25 fungieren wiirde,

als

seine Signifikation andern wiirde.

personal und

Dann

homo ohne

aber wiirde

Zweifel

supponieren. Die gleiche Konsequenz ergabe sich einen material supponierenden Terminus durch

diskret

wenn man

iibrigens,

453

Hinzufiigen von Anfiihrungszeichen modifizieren wiirde.

Es

den

hat

wiirden

Kneale/Kneale die einfache Supposition als miBliche Folge des Umstands verstehn, daB wir zwischen abstrakten, singularen und konkreten, allgemeinen Termini im gewohnals

Anschein,

lichen Sprachgebrauch nicht hinreichend scharf unterscheiden:

use the

new

word homo

as a substitute for the

But William refuses to admit

sense.

account

incoherent

two

of

kinds

we

word humanitas, we give it a this, and produces instead an 26

of

if

"For

suppositio."

Da

dieses

sich

Verstandnis der einfachen Supposition offensichtlich mit der dualistischen

Semantik

Williams

vereinbaren

nicht

la Bt,

man

konnte

andere

eine

erwagen, welche den Vorzug hat, daB sie sich aus unserer Interpretation von Williams semantischem Dualismus ergibt und zugleich erklart, warum ein derart einfach supponierender Subjektterminus keinen Descensus zula Bt.

Wenn

es so

ist,

daB ein Terminus

nach unserer Interpretation

Signifikat,

in einfacher fiir

Supposition

sein

fiir

einen Begriff steht und dies

durch den spezifischen Charakter des Pradikats bewirkt wird, dann liegt es nahe, derartige Pradikate im Sinne Freges als Begriffe zweiter Stufe aufzufassen.

Individuum,

solche Begriffe, welche

species,

und praedicabile de uno solo

immer nur auf andere

Begriffe zutreffen.

sinde

Nun

sind

allerdings die durch solche Begriffe zweiter Stufe Begriffen erster Stufe

zugesprochenen Eigenschaften nicht auch schon deshalb Eigenschaften der unter diese fallenden Gegenstande. Das ist der Grund dafiir, daB ein

Descensus

diesem Fall nicht moglich

in

ist.

Die Beziehung der Unter-

ordnung eines Begriffs unter einen andcren, wie animal

,

ist

transitiv,

anderen, wie in

Zum FaBt

25

diejenige

Satz

homo

AbschluB mochte

man,

wie

Zweiteilungen auf,

dem

erhalt

Vgl. hierzu:

man

Fallens

est species

,

ist

(Kneale/Kneale),

dem

Satz

Begriffs

homo

unter

est

einen

dies nicht.

noch auf ein Problem

am Rande

die

W.V.O. Quine, Grundzuge der Logik, Frankfurt

26

in

eines

hinweisen.

Ausfiihrungen Williams nahelegen, beide formalen Supposition als vollstandige Disjunktionen einen Stammbaum der Arten und Unterarten der

dies

der

ich

des

S. 255.

1969, S. 262

f.

Brands

454

Supposition,

dcr den

Intentioncn von William

of

Sherwood zumindest

dahingehend entspricht,

daB

Nun

daB William dann auch die suppositio personalis

ist

es zweifellos so,

schon

discreta

einfiihren

die suppositio

simplex discreta

fiihrt

Zweiteilung

der

Supposition

personalen

determinierte und eine konfuse. Konfuse Supposition dictio

27

supponit pro

diskreten nicht fur

Ich

enthalt.

Abgrenzungsgriinden, wie das Schema ausweist, aber zu Schwierigkeiten mil der nachfolgend

aus

muB. Das

vorgcnommenen

er

multis".

Supposition sein,

liegt

vor,

in

cine

"quando

Dies kann aber keine echte Unterart der

da ein diskreter Terminus per defmitionem

mehreres supponieren kann. hoffe

gezeigt

zu

haben,

daB

die

zweifache

Einteilung

der

formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood mil einer Reihe nicht nur formaler Probleme verbunden ist. Die Einbe/iehung der modernen Semantik hatte nicht nur den Sinn, diese Probleme besser zu verstehen, sondern

auch zu zeigen, wie modern William of Sherwood

Universitat Diisseldorf

27

(Edition Lohr), S. 266.

ist.

MARCIA L. COLISH

Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot

The importance

s

Conception ofNihil

of John the Scot in the history of medieval thought has

always rested squarely on his transmission and use of Neoplatonism.

1

To

the extent that scholars have sought to bring the Latin school tradition

bear on their assessment of John

to

the

as

logic,

discipline

conceptual tool. his

2

There

which he is,

philosophy they have turned to applied the most consistently as a s

however, a key juncture in John s thought, 3, at which he distances

analysis of the term nihil in Periphyseon

himself both from the Neoplatonic tradition and from the discipline of

As

logic.

with

other

medieval

authors

confronted

with

the

task

of

explaining the idea of creation ex nihilo, John canvasses the liberal arts

and the philosophy available to him for assistance. But, in this case, he finds the help he seeks in the science of arithmetic, as it had come down to him in the works of Boethius and Martianus Capella, whom John and his

studied

associates

appeals

to

school

foundation of

all

and glossed. The

arithmetic

is

the

critical

point

at

of monad,

definition

which John the

abstract

numbers. Can the monad be equated with the deity, as Can the monad be defined as nihil!

the later Neoplatonists had argued?

I

would

like

to

acknowledge the support of the

Princeton, where this paper was written

The

in

Institute

for

Advanced Study,

1987.

conspectus on John and his relation to his Neoplatonic sources is Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the ftehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden, 1978) and Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, 1986). For

provided

best

by

overall

Stephen

see Marcia L. Colish, "John the Scot s Christology and Soteriology in Relation to His Greek Sources," Downside Re\ icw, 100 (1982), 138-51. For the influence of Marius Victorinus in particular see Gustavo A. Piemonte, expression quae sunt et 6 Jean Scot et Marius Victorinus," Jean Scot ecrivain: Actes du IV quae non sunt 28 aout-2 ed. G.-H. Allard international, Montreal, 1983, colloque septembre earlier literature

"L

:

Vita in omnia pervenit El vitalismo eriugeniano y Mario Victorino," Patristica et Mediae\>alia 1 (1986), 3-48. I would like thank Dr. Piemonte for making offprints of these two papers available to me. "

(Montreal/Paris, 1986), pp. 81-113; la

to

influencia de

:

}

John Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre: Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981); Gangolf Schrimpf, Das Werk des Johannes Scottus Eriugena im Rahmcn des Wissenschafts\<erstdndnisses seiner Zeit: Eine Hinfuhrung zu Periphyseon, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters, n.F. 23 (Miinster, 1982). See, especially,

Logic,

456

Colish

Can it

nihil

be viewed as the privation of essence, species, or habitusl Can logical opposite of aliquid, which it excludes? All of

be defined as the

these

contemporary

Carolingian

patristic sources.

grounds It

more

and

possibilities

3

had

been well

as

masters,

In the Periphyseon

John

and

as

by

rejects

all

their

ancient

and

these options and

argument instead on the arithmetical notion of the monad. should be noted that Periphyseon 3 is not the only place where

prologue to

John

St.

argument, and one

s

nihil.

He

does so as well

in his

all

things. Further,

coeternal and coessential with the Trinity. Since the

was not made

line

of

tune with the Boethian logic of opposition. In ipso factum est nichil

"Sine

quod factum

observes that nothing was created except through the includes

homily on the

Gospel, where he uses a much simpler

fully in

explicating the line

that

earlier

his

John addresses the idea of

Word

by

ventilated

Word is the in Him and

Word

est,"

John

because the

is

impossible to envision anything

Word

except the other Persons of the

it

logos of creation, 4

"nothing

Nihil here

at

all

remains

nihil

omnino, through of omnia in and at the the created all, nothing conceptual opposite through the Word, which omnia logically negates. The Boethian logic of Him."

is

mutually exclusive opposites is sufficient for John s task in this homily, is not the case in Periphyseon 3, where he sets for himself a much more complicated assignment. For it is here that John develops his

but this

doctrine of the primordial

causes.

It

invokes the mathematical idea of the

Periphyseon

is

largely for this reason that

monad

in his

he

handling of nihil in

3.

Before we

proceed to the Periphyseon it must be stressed that ancient Greek mathematicians had developed a standard notion of the later Neoplatonists rang their own changes. The mathematical definition of the monad as the abstract substratum of all

monad, on which the numbers, to which the

all

numbers can be reduced, was

first

formulated by

Pythagoreans. While the Pythagoreans were not averse to number

symbolism in other areas, their treatment of the monad was straight forward and strictly mathematical. This perspective was continued by the

Neopythagorean

A

mathematicians,

detailed investigation focusing

provided by Marcia L. Colish, Theological

Method,"

whose most

influential

exponent was

on Fredegisus of Tours and Ratramnus of Corbie Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae: A Study

"Carolingian

is

in

Speculum, 59 (1984), 757-95.

John the Scot, Homelie sur le Prologue de Jean 8, ed. Edouard Jeauneau, Sources chretiennes, 151 (Paris, 1969), p. 240: "nichil omnino relinquit quod in ipso et per ipsum factum For the whole argument see pp. 238-40. sit."

Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot

Nicomachus of Gerasa. Written remained the

teaching and

Nicomachus

debt

the

to

conception of the monad.

5

main currents of Neopythagorean

the

textbook in the

classic

Pythagoreans

can be

centuries.

for

field

seen especially

in

his

Eschewing any cosmological applications of the

he treats number as the structure of

idea,

457

Conception c/Nihil

the second century A.D., his Intro

in

summed up

duction to Arithmetic

s

reality.

The monad and

the

and dyad, the two most primitive elements of number, refer not to as actual numbers but to the metaphysical principles of unity and alterity underlying them. According to Nicomachus, all actual numbers "one"

"two"

monad, which is a pure intelligible simple, and alone incomposite, and

derive their essential natures from the

mind

the

in

constituted

"in

When textbooks

it

of

God,

primary,

accordance with

6 itself."

Boethius was preparing his translations of the quadrivium was to Nicomachus that he turned as the authority on

arithmetic. His treatment of the

aequalitas in Latin,

the

preserves

not by any other but by

itself,

monad, which he renders

more abbreviated than

is

of

essentials

Nicomachus

as unitas or

Nicomachus, but he

that of

Boethius

Numbers,

teaching.

agrees, are diverse in themselves. They can be reduced to the concepts of "odd number" and "even number," which in turn "come forth from one 7 source."

This source

is

equality,

from which

all

inequalities are derived

8

With these definitions in hand, in which they are all resolved. Boethius propels the strictly mathematical Neopythagorean view of the monad firmly on its course in the Latin school tradition. and

The

later

Neopythagorean handling of Plato For their

part,

they sought

were

however,

Neoplatonists,

to

with

dissatisfied

this

doctrine of the one and the many.

s

explore

broader metaphysical and

the

On Nicomachus and his place in the arithmetical tradition see Frank Egleston Robbins and Louis Charles Karpinski, "Studies in Greek Mathematics," the intro. to Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic, trans. Martin Luther d Ooge (New York,

1926),

16-17,

pp.

35,

37-38,

99-102;

Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction arithmetique 1

Dernier,

Nicomachus

trans.

of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic d Ooge, pp. 190, 192, 211-12. The quotation is at 1.6.4,

De

Boethius, 13:

Janine

"ex

Number

institutione arithmetica

una tamen genitura Theory:

A

profluunt."

Translation

of the

to

intro.

her

trans,

of

(Paris, 1978), pp. 16, 24-25. 1.7.1,

1.6.1-4,

1.16.9-10,

2.1.1,

p. 190.

Godofredus Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867), p. a translation by Michael Masi, Boethian De institutione arithmetica (Amsterdam, 1983), p. 1.2,

ed.

There

is

76.

o

De

arith.

inst.

aequalitate

2.1,

processerit.

componuntur,

The same point

et is

in

p.

77:

Tota

inaequalitatis

Sed quae rerum elementa

eadem

rursus resolutione facta

also found at 1.32, p. 66.

substantia sunt,

a

principe

ex hisdem

solvuntur."

The

sui

generis

principaliter translation is

omnia mine.

Colish

458

monad

monad,

concern we can document

a

Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagitc. Since they saw the

in

especially

of the

implications

cosmological

as the opposite of

Neoplatonists held

plurality, these

all

be

to

it

even as identical with, a higher hypostasis of being. analogous Proclus envisions each order of being, not merely numbers, as starting from a monad and as being reducible to the monad at the top of its or

to,

He

particular order of being.

the deity.

and

is

9

A

similar view

docs not hesitate to equate the monad with found widely among the late Neoplatonists,

further elaborated by Dionysius. Recasting the

and the many

in

above

creation,

each order of being to the

all

the archetypes.

or

directly

Creation

simple and beings that are composite.

monad "Every

the

number it

is is

unified in the

monad,

distinguished

and

number

of

in

its

whole. In Stephen Gcrsh

monad

in

relation

Neoplatonists gave

monad

But

the

God

to this

s

more

10

restricted

sense

idea a

is

the

all

unity levels

are

that

As Dionysius it

puts

it,

proceeds from

having transferred the to

the

11 number."

warm welcome,

of

beings

creation

words, Dionysius has also recast

which creation

status

alone shares with the

but inasmuch as

multiplied,"

its

supreme

monad

contains

the quality of radical and indivisible unicity.

monad

concept

level of the

God becomes

indirectly.

problem of the one

monad up from

numerical terms, he moves the

as the archetype of that stands

of

is

God

as

as

a

"the

Other Christian

treating the deity as the

and physical worlds. They sei/cd on this notion as a useful way of conceptuali/ing the emanation of plurality from unity that harmoni/ed with the additions and revisions they imported into in relation to the angelic

the pagan Ncoplatonic view of the spiritual order.

are

12

While the Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean theories of the monad manifestly different, they were sometimes combined by authors in

Proclus, Theologia Platonis 138, 231, ed. H.D. Saffcy and I,.G. Wcstcrink (Paris, 1968- ); In Timaeum 3.106.1-17, cd. E. Dichl (Ixipzig, 1903-06); Institutio theologica 24.1-3, 2nd cd., cd. E.R. Dodds (Oxford, 1965). On this whole development sec Gcrsh, to Eriugena, pp. 63, 99, 141 n. 81, to whom this account is much A.C. Lloyd, "The later Neoplatonists." The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mcdic\ al Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge, 1970), p. 307; Philip Merlan, "Zur Zahlenlehre im Platonismus (Neuplatonismus) und im Sefer Yezira," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 3 (1965), 175-76.

From lamblichus indebted;

also

Dionysius the Areopagite, De divinis nominihus 5.6, ed. B. Cordier, PG, 821A. The trans, is that of Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena, p. 140. Gersh, From lamblichus to Eriugena, p. Neoplatonists more generally see ibid., pp. 140-41. 12

Ibid., pp. 175-77.

140.

On

Dionysius

and

3:

820D-

other

late

Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot

s

459

Conception o/Nihil

Favonius Eulogius, a pupil of Augustine, produced a de Somnio Scipionis in the late fourth century which reflects a Disputatio blend of this sort. On the one hand, Favonius describes the monad as an late

antiquity.

which generates

indivisible unity

and

first

numbers 13 and, on the

all

causes manifested as God,

final

14

mind,

15

other, as the

or soul.

16

As

with

monad can be viewed as the deity The reasons leading mind or soul are far from clear. A much

Dionysius later on, he thinks that the

because of

him

primordial incapacity to suffer division.

to extend this idea to the

more

influential

commentator on the dream of

Scipio, Macrobius, follows

Consistent with his generally Neoplatonic outlook, Macrobius defines

suit.

the

its

monad

as that

"which

is

the beginning and end of

knows neither beginning nor end, distinguishes our understanding of

is

to

applied

Him from

the

all

things but itself

highest

God and

the plurality of things and

17 But, in the same passage, Macrobius goes powers subsequent to Him." on to say that the monad can also be found in the ranks of creatures

below

God,

He

which

innumerable forms of

generates,

including

intellect,

soul,

and

the

1

things.

Also open to some confusion is an author even more central than Macrobius to the educational enterprise of John the Scot and his Martianus Capella. In the seventh book of his Marriage of Mercury and Philology, devoted to arithmetic, Martianus offers both the associates,

Neopythagorean

unambiguous,

crisp,

which they return, creator

God,

Favonius

in

15 16

and a Neoplatonic

contrast with matter in

Eulogius,

Scarpa (Padova, 1974). 14

19

of

definition

principle of numbers, the source from which

all

the

monad

definition of the

a state

monad

of generation.

de Somnio Scipionis 3.1, 4.1-2, 5.12, author see Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:739.

Disputatio

On

this

the

as

numbers proceed and

as the

20

6.1-2,

to

Even

ed.

L.

Disp. 5.4. Ibid. 6.3, 7.3.

Ibid. 5.2.

Somnium Scipionis 1.6.8, ed. JA. Willis (Leipzig, 1963), 2:19: "Haec finisque omnium, neque ipsa principii aut finis sciens, ad summum refertur deum eiusque intellectum a sequentium numero rerum et potestatum sequestrat, nee in inferiore post deum gradu frustra earn desideraveris." The translation is that of Macrobius, In

monas

initium

Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:525. 18

In Som. Scip. 1.6.8-9, Willis, 2:19-20.

Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae Willis (Leipzig, 1983), pp. 263, 269, 270. 20

Ibid. 7.733, p. 264.

et

Mercurii

7.732,

7.743,

7.745,

cd.

J.A.

Colish

460

more problematic

is

the speech of Arithmetica which opens Book

together in

Before

all

things,

let

monad be

the

disparate notions

these

way Martianus lumps

the

7:

numbers coming

called sacred;

have taught that before everything the monad is the original quickener. For if form is an accident 01 to that anything that exists, and if that which numbers is prior which is numbered, it is fitting to venerate the monad before that which has been called the beginning. Then too, I shall not neglect to point out to those who examine the matter that because the monad is unity, it is alone self-sufficient. From it other things are is generated; it alone is the seminal force of all numbers; it alone the measure and cause of increases and the extent of losses. The monad is everywhere a part, and everywhere the whole; it endures through all things. For that which is prior to things existing and which does not disappear when they pass away, must be eternal. and Jove - a conclusion Rightly is the monad called Father of All, corroborated by the causative force of its ideal and intelligible form. have called the monad Concord, others Piety or Friendship, ... Some because it is so compact that it is not cut into parts. But more and father of the properly is it called Jupiter, because it is the head after

and associated with

it

it

gods.

Richard Johnson and E.R.

Burge,

their

in

commentary on Martianus

acknowledge the eclectic character of his treatment of the monad. But, they stress, despite his comparisons between the monad, the in practice Martianus tends to deity, and various benevolent attitudes,

arithmetic,

confine

his

application

of the

function of undergirding

all

monad more

rigorously

to

the

numbers, from the dyad on down,

abstract

in the less

rhapsodic manner of the Neopythagoreans.

Given

this

array

of

possibilities,

Neopythagorean mathematical approaches, how did John the Scot come literalism

from

Neoplatonic

to texts that freely

use

as

it

a

strictly

mathematical

to

mingle these

monad? Was he of the monad and

to grips with the

able to dismiss as an allegorical fancy the theologi/.ing to

theology

concept,

or

did

he

tread

the

monas esto, quam ante Quae si species est accidens cuilibet extantium primo, priusque est quod numeral quam illud numerandum, rite earn ante ipsum, quem principem dixere, veneramur. Nee dissimulabo ex eo, quod monas, retractantibus unum solum ipsam esse ab eaque cetera procreari omniumque numerorum solam seminarium esse solamque mcnsuram et incrementorum causam statumdum per cuncta perque detrimentorum. Quae tamen ubique pars est, ubique totum, Ibid.

cuncta

7.731,

vibrantem

pp.

262-63:

sociati

"Prae

cunctis

igitur

postmodum numeri

affata

principia

sacra

docuerunt.

non absconditur, neque enim, quae est ante extantia et quae post absumpta omnium lovem rite esse nominatam, quod potest non esse perpetua. Hanc igitur patrem testatur. ... Hanc quoque alii quidem idealis illius intellectualisque speciei vis causativa in Concordiam, hanc Pietatem Amicitiamque dixere, quod ita nectatur, ut non secetur sit idem caput ac pater deorum." The partes; tamen rectius luppitur nuncupatur, quod William H. Stahl et al., Martianus Capclla and the Seven Liberal Arts translation is petua;

by

(New York,

1977), 2:276-77.

Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot

Ncoplatonic path, equating the

monad

s

Conception o/Nihil

with the deity? John

s

461

work both

as

pedagogue and as a philosopher affords an unambiguous answer. In Periphyseon 3 he adheres expressly to the Neopythagorean concept of the monad. As was suggested earlier, his inspiration here was the need a

to

distinguish

came

causes from God. But even before John

the primordial

to address that problem,

he and

had taken

his circle of educators

a solidly Neopythagorean stand on the

monad

in their

commentaries on

Martianus Capella.

There

some

is

commentaries and

on the relationships among these is not likely to be resolved

scholarly debate

their

authorship, which

a complete critical edition of all the known manuscripts has been made. 22 None the less, a scholarly consensus has been achieved on two until

main

points:

systematic

First,

study

of

while the

who

was Alcuin

it

liberal

whose

in

arts,

first

out

mapped

service

the

Martianus

the

were produced, the program was not activated until the middle of the ninth century under the leadership of Martin of Laon, John the Scot,

glosses

and other Hiberno-Latin masters. Second, while the

literary

form of the

commentary is by nature somewhat fluid, making attribution within a group of scholars joined in a common pedagogical pursuit rather difficult, it

is

agreed that the glosses contained

in a Paris

manuscript published by and those preserved in an Oxford manuscript, Book 1 of has been published by Edouard Jeauneau, 24 may be read as 23

Cora Lutz, which

authentic

brought

indices to

the

to text

the

learning,

and the point of view, which John

of Martianus. 25

In

the

addition,

continental

first

On the status of this question and the scholarly literature pertaining to it, see Gersh, Middle Platonism, 2:799 n. 100; Michael Ilcrren, "The. Commentary on Martianus Attributed to John Scottus: Its Hiberno-I^tin Background," Jean Scot ecrivain, pp. 26571; Claudio Leonardi, "Martianus Capella et Jean Scot: Nouvelle presentation d un vieux ibid.,

probleme,"

21-23,

35-36,

pp.

37-48,

"Martianus Lutz, Kristeller and F.E.

196-207; Schrimpf, 133-34. Authors not

Capella,"

Catalogus

Das Wcrk discussed

des Johannes Scottus Eriugena, pp. by these scholars include Cora E.

Translationum

Commentariorum

et

ed.

,

P.O.

Cranz (Washington, 1971), 2:367-78, who at that point attributed to Martin of Laon the commentary she had earlier published and assigned to Dunchad; and M.L.W. Laistner, "Martianus Capella and His Ninth-Century Commentators," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 9 (1925), 130-38, who attributes to Martin the Paris MS. 12960 which was later edited by Lutz and which subsequent scholars have agreed in assigning to John.

John

the

Scot,

Annotationes

in

Marcianum,

ed.

Cora E. Lutz (Cambridge,

MA,

1939).

Edouard Jeauneau, Quatre themes

erigeniens (Montreal/Paris, 1978), pp. 91-166.

Commentary on Martianus," Das Werk des Johannes Scottus Eriugena, pp. Herren,

"The

pp.

269,

21-23,

271,

35-36,

272,

37-48,

274,

285;

133-34;

Schrimpf,

"Zur

Frage

Colish

462

master to gloss Martianus, Remigius of Auxcrrc, shows a close dependence 26

and, on both the Paris and the Oxford stages of the Eriugenian project, as we will see, he shares and expands on John s treatment of the monad in particular.

One

now

of the leading scholars

Leonard!, has argued that this outlook

made

asserts,

to

recover

however,

the

decidedly Neoplatonic. John, he

guide to Martianus, in whose work he sought 27 With respect to the monad, cast of mind.

Platonic

exactly

is

Claudio

texts,

his

Dionysius

the

work on these

at

reverse

is

the

Not only does John avoid speech that would have allowed

case.

lemmatizing the portion of Arithmctica

s

on the Neoplatonic description of the monad as the line dependent on Boethius deity, he also takes a strictly Neopythagorcan He proceeds in a nomonad. the discuss he does in those glosses where

him

to

expatiate

nonsense and non-metaphorical manner. The monad, he states, is the mathematical substratum underlying all numbers, and abstract 28 Whatever their capacity for subdivision and of all numbers."

"the

principle

he

composition,

continues,

numbers are

"all

likewise

reducible

29 Finally, he notes, "once monad, which alone is irreducible." have been reduced, the monad endures ... because above

nothing, since the end of the

In

may be

line

that lies

numbers

all

constituted in

is

there

it

is

it."-

cited

time John had moved

translations,

more

to consider

dcr Authentizitat unscrcr Tcxtc von Johannes Scottus J.J.

By the work he had had the

the Periphyseon.

Platonic theory of the

and he was able

ed.

in

to the composition of that

opportunity to acquire a

Mind of Eriugena,

the

John does not speculate on what the nihil above the monad, or how they are related. This theme is last

one to which he devotes extended attention

Greek

to

numbers

all

O Meara

and

its

monad thanks

to his

merits side by side

Annotationcs

Ludwig Biclcr (Dublin,

in

Martianum,

1973),

pp.

The

125-39;

Scottus Eriugena und die Re/.cption dcs Martianus Capella im karolingischen ed. W. Beicrwaltes (Heidelberg, Eriugena: Studien zu scincn Qncllen,

"Johannes

Bildungswcsen,"

1980), pp. 135-48.

26

27 28

Herren,

The Commentary on

I^eonardi,

John

"Martianus

the

Scot,

numerorum

"omnium

Martianus," p.

Capella et

Annotations principium."

Jean

Scot,"

272.

pp. 202-03.

in Marcianurn, Musica 490.14, ed. Lut/., p. 202: Similarly Arithmctica 366.20, 367.18; Musica 490.15, pp.

155, 202.

2^ Ibid.,

Arithmctica 367.13,

quae non potest 30 Ibid.,

remanet

...

p.

155:

"quando

rcsolvuntur numeri ad

monadem

pcrvenitur

resolvi."

Arithmetica

367.15,

quia supra earn nihil

p.

155:

est,

quia

"postquam

finis

omnium

omnes numeri consummantur, monas in

ea

constat."

Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot

s

monad which he

with the Neopythagorean understanding of the

463

Conception o/ Nihil

reflects in

Martianus glosses. In Periphyseon 2, the first point in the work where 31 he holds up these two alternatives almost as he refers to the monad, of the monad as the cause and end of all the notion He cites parallels. his

numbers

one instance of the general philosophical maxim

as

cause can have

effects.

many

32

He

also quotes Dionysius

mathematical understanding of the monad to the 33 and Maximus Confessor s similar analysis in cause,

that a single

yoking of the

monad

as

the

first

commentary on monadic teaching

Gregory Nazianzus, whom Maximus reports as principle that no difference should be admitted into the

Book

not until

is

It

his

"the

First

34 Cause."

3 of the Periphyseon, in the context of defining

and explaining creation ex nihilo, that John makes a preclusive choice between these contrasting approaches. His ultimate goal in this section of the work is to dismiss one Neoplatonic conception of nihil in

nihil

As he

poses the question of nihil, he asks "whether it is the complete privation of essence or substance or accident, 3 or the excellence of the divine superessentiality." The Neoplatonism of of another.

favor

initially

*

both the

which he doctrine

which John supports, and of the privative theory, has been noted by previous commentators on John s

latter position,

rejects,

of nihil,

as

well

as

the

fact

Carolingian discussions of the subject

Cf.

Greek

I.

P.

Sheldon-Williams,

monad and

identifies

it

Philosophy, with God as

which, however, does not mention the

Hiberniae, 9 (Dublin, 1972),

Ibid.

2.618B-C,

p.

Eriugena, p. 140 n. 76. 34 Periphyseon 2.615B, introducatur."

The

trans,

p.

202:

is

responding to recent

addition to older debates.

Eriugena,"

36

What

Cambridge History of Later

522, who claims that John the first cause in Periphyseon

adverts 1.1,

a

to

the

passage

at all.

ed.

and

trans.

I.

P.

Sheldon-Williams, Scriptores

p. 174.

210. This passage

is

he

p.

monad

John the Scot, Periphyseon 2.602B, Ixitini

Scottus

"Johannes

and Early Medieval

in

that

"de

has been noted by Gersh,

monade rationcm

ut

Prom lamblichus

non separatio

in

primo

to

causali

at p. 203.

3.634B, ed. and trans. I. P. Sheldon-Williams and Ludwig Bieler, Scriptores Hiberniae, 11 (Dublin, 1981), p. 60: "utrum privatio totius essentiae vel substantiae vel accidentis an divinae superessentialitatis excellentia." The trans, is at p. 61. Ibid.

I^atini

36

The

fullest

A. Piemonte,

study to date of John s doctrine of nihil in the Periphyseon is Gustavo sobre la creatio ex nihilo en Juan Escoto Eriugena," Sapientia, 23

"Notas

Donald F. Duclow, "Divine Nothingness and Self-Creation in John Journal of Religion, 57 (1977), 110-15 and Sheldon-Williams, intro. to his ed. of Periphyseon 3, pp. 5-11. Briefer accounts are given by Henry Belt, Johannes Scotus Eriugena: A Study in Medie\>al Philosophy (New York, 1964 [repr. of 1925 ed.]), (1968), 37-58; see also

Scotus

Eriugena,"

97 and Maieul Cappuyns, Jean Scot Erigene: Sa vie, son oeuwe, sa pensee (Bruxelles, 1964 [repr. of 1933 ed.]), pp. 344-50. The first scholar to note that John was respond-

p.

Colish

464

has not been appreciated

his use of the

is

Neopythagorean view of the

to exclude the Neoplatonic identification of the

monad

monad

with the

nihil, preserving nihil as a denomination for his handling of nihil in his Johannine homily, with God alone. In contrast where he treats it as the opposite of omnia, in Periphyseon 3 John

and the monad with

deity

of aliquid, here equates the divine nihil with omnia, seen as the opposite with omnia and nihil superessence. In identifying aliquid with essence and arriving at

that

John also has

destination,

to

define the nature of the

which remain eternal in primordial causes, which are created by God and themselves God. For not which are but the mind of God once created, this

purpose

as

the

well,

strictly

supplies him with conceptual

tools

notion

mathematical that

help him

of

the

monad

to obtain the desired

result.

John presents the idea of

as

nihil

the privation of being as the

major traditional position he needs to refute, including under this heading nihil as the absence of species, accidents, and habitus as well as the absence of essence

He

itself.

insists

that

there

is

between

a difference

the privation of being, on the one hand, and the apophatic method as an to the latter, he epistemic approach to God, on the other. With respect reflect appropriate to predicate negations of God, for they not denote do and our awareness of His transcendence any privation they

agrees,

is

it

of substance

means the view, says

already

37

on His

Nihil,

part.

however,

is

when

not acceptable

it

or aptitude of being. Such a privation of being or any function from a being of something it removal John, would involve the

possesses.

the

But,

nihil

that

before the

requires

when

explanation

there were

is

the

no created

creation, nothingness present of their essences or of beings yet in existence that could be deprived 38 second definition of nihil which John rejects, although anything else.

A

the exegetical tradition than he claims, is the identification of nihil with unformed matter. "For He Who made the

there

less

is

support for

it

in

and contemporaries and not just to a remoter past ing to his Carolingian predecessors J.A. Endres, Forschungen zur Gescluchte der fruhmittelalterlichen Philosophic, zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, 17:2-3 (Miinster, 1915), pp. 12-

was

Beitrage 13,

although this forerunner

is

not acknowledged by Piemonte,

"Notas,"

pp.

4M2

n.

6.

Carolingian background see Colish, "Carolingian Debates," scholars mentioned above has noticed the Speculum, 59 (1984), 757-95. None of the mathematical and anti-Neoplatonic aspects of John s treatment of nihil.

For more

37 38

details

on

the

128. Periphyseon 3.634C-D, 3.663C, pp. 60-62, Ibid.

3.634C-D, 3.686A-687B, pp. 60-62, 178-80.

Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot

all,"

he plainly

backing up

states,

idea with a

this

465

Conception o/Nihil

made unformed matter

world out of unformed matter 39

s

out of nothing at

number of

familiar

40

arguments.

Having cleared the decks of these alternatives, John turns to two other theories, one of which he plans to refute and the other of which he intends to support. The

equated with

In the

nihil.

first

the

is

section of

idea

that

monad can be

the

Book 3 where he

considers this

John does not mention Martianus

specially, although he cites Boethius as an authority on arithmetic, summarizing and applying the Boethian doctrine of the monad, which we also find in the Martianus

possibility

41

Numbers, John notes, are themselves pure concepts, which can be reduced to the monad, the monad ... is the beginning and the middle and the end of all numbers."42 While they may explain the nature of changeable realities in act and operation, numbers remain eternal in glosses.

"for

their condition as

pure

intelligibles

and share,

in the

monad,

attribute

its

of abstract unity and indivisibility. Given that status, can the

monad be

regarded as the nihil out of which number was created and, through number, the phenomenal world that number can describe? After due consideration,

monad

the

John

with the

monad

reflected

it

any attempt to equate

cause. In thus de-Neoplatonizing the

first

John may well have had in mind nihil lies above the monad. This the

and with

rejects this idea,

remark

his

in the

monad,

Martianus gloss that

clear decision to bring his doctrine of

into line with a purely mathematical understanding of

and

more

still

it

is

commentary on

in

pointedly, Remigius Remigius expressly abandons the philosophical, that is, the 43 Neoplatonic, monad in favor of the exclusively mathematical monad. later,

Martianus.

39

Ibid.

3.636D, p. 66:

materiam de omnino 40

Ibid.

"Qui "

nihil.

The

enim

fecit

trans,

is

mundum

de materia informi ipse

fecit

informem

at p. 67.

3.637C-638C, 3.650B-651A, pp. 68-70, 98-100.

For the whole passage see

3.652B-663A, pp. 102-10. References to Boethius in have been noted by Goulven Madec, "Jean Scot et ses Scot ecrivain, p. 166, who emphasizes the fact that John cites Boethius auteurs," Jean primarily as a mathematician; and Alison White, "Boethius in the Medieval Quadrivium," Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford, 1981), pp. 169, this

section of the Periphyseon

195

n.

51,

arith. 1.32

who emphasizes John

and

Periphyseon

3.652C,

monas."

The

367.7,

quotations from Boethius on the

102: "est enim p. trans, is at p. 103.

Remigius of Auxerre, 367.6,

s

monad

at

De

inst.

2.1.

42

numerorum

ibid.

367.9,

367.13,

Commentum 367.15,

376.9,

in

principium

et

medium

Manianum Capellam,

377.10,

et

365.9, 377.18, 378.5, 378.12, ed.

finis

omnium

365.15,

367.4,

Cora A. Lutz

Colish

466

But John

for that choice.

Remigius offers no reasons

s

reasons for making

He has two aims in mind. First, Periphyseon are quite specific. of any unique metaphysical status by he wants to deprive the monad causes. And second, he wants to use treating it as one of the primordial for the monad as a model for explaining the primordial causes and in the

it

showing why they are not

The primordial

nihil either.

causes,

John agrees, are

eternal,

and they are the 44

Word brings all things into being. agents through which the are not nihil and they are not identical with God Himself. ,

several limitations.

creation

causes

to

They have

While they are eternal once created, they are created. causes have the capacity to be and not to be,

Hence, the primordial which is not true either of the

Yet, they

God

or of nihil. Further, before

God

ordained

phenomenal world, the capacity of the primordial 45 The actualizing of this causes was only potential.

of the

act

as

their own autonomous power but through a capacity occurred not through 46 Thus, the seminal force (vis seminalis) implanted in them by God.

called nihil. Nor, since they are created, are primordial causes cannot be dwell in the mind of God. The they identical with God, even though they nihil out of

which the world was created

Word, John

in the

says,

must be

no creature can possess, even consubstantial with the Word, those causes that occupy the second, or created and creative, subdivision a status that

of nature.

47

With

this

reasoning in place, John arrives

at

his positive definition of nihil as the superessential

aliquid,

the nihil-as-omnia

that

denotes

God

s

his

final

conclusion,

God, the opposite of

superabundant goodness.

that is infra-real but Nihil-as-omnia, John stresses, refers not to a being that are to a being that is hyper-real, "beyond all things that are and 48 In John s terms the divine nothingness is the direct antithesis of not."

the idea of

omnino

nihil,

and

it

is

the only conceivable nihil out of which

196-99. At 367.16-368.18, pp. 182-84, Remigius 1962-65), 2:177, 178, 180-82, the association of the monad with Jupiter by Martianus, and argues vigorously no way are to be under that his remarks here are merely allegorical and that they in

(Leiden, tackles

stood

44 45

46 47 48

literally.

Periphyseon 3.641C-D,

p. 78.

Ibid.

3.642C-644A, 3.663B-670D, pp. 80-82, 126-44.

Ibid.

3.672A-C, 3.679B-C, pp. 146-48, 162-64.

Ibid.

3.679C-680B,

p. 164.

Ibid. 3.681C, p. 168:

"ultra

omnia quae sunt

et

quae non

sunt."

The

trans,

is

at p. 169.

Mathematics, the Monad, and John the Scot s Conception o/ Nihil the world can have been created.

As

the

name

of God, nihil

is

467

thus an

accurate denotation of a divine nature that admits of no privations and

an adequate reflection of the divine transcendence which makes the negativa apposite to the deity.

This

conclusion

is

via

49

of

is,

course,

compatible

perfectly

with

the

Neoplatonic theology which John derived from his Greek sources. But, as paper has sought to show, in the argument John develops enroute to

this

that

conclusion he displays a willingness to dissociate himself from the

Neoplatonic tradition, not only by rejecting a privative view of nihil but also by detaching himself from the Neoplatonic doctrine of the monad.

For

it

he substitutes the Neopythagorean understanding of the monad, by Nicomachus, Boethius, and the Latin transmitters and

mediated

accepted by John himself as a way of teasing the purely mathematical idea

of

monad

arithmetic.

out

of the

tangled

how

After

eclecticism

he

of Martianus this

observing applies metaphysical problems he addresses in Periphyseon conclusions

of our

own.

First,

3,

Capella to

principle

s

the

we may draw two

John was no mere imitator or passive

conduit of his Greek Neoplatonic sources; rather, he wields them with

independence and discrimination. Second, in investigating the intellectual principles that informed John s philosophy, we need to widen our perspective to include the science of school arithmetic, which at

work

in the case just

examined.

Oberlin College

49

Ibid.

3.684C-685A, pp. 174-76.

is

clearly

ANGEL D ORS

On Stump s Interpretation of Barley s De obligationibus

her

In

contribution

valuable

the

to

History of Later Medieval Philosophy

1

important reader Jlie Cambridge Eleonore Stump has looked into

the doctrine on obligations according to Walter Burley (ca. 1275-1344/5)

2

one of the apparently paradoxical examples analyzed In her work, E. Stump the which present paper will focus upon. by Burley does the following: a) tend to the interpretation of two texts by Burley which he respectively formulates and solves the paradox); b) reject and

specifically into

(in

offered by Burley;

solution

the

paradox. In

new

the

my

and

c)

propose a new solution to the

of Burley opinion, both the rejection

s

solution as well as

solution proposed by Stump come about by means of an incorrect of Burley s texts. Burley s solution can be defended. This is

interpretation

of the object of this paper, and along with it a greater comprehension be in my view, the nature and history of the doctrine on obligations can,

obtained.

1.

On

The

the Interpretation of Burley s texts

texts

which Stump tends are the following: ex posito et opposite Item, probatur quod non omne sequens es Romae vel bene negati sit concedendum. Et ponatur ista:

by Burley

321-

to

"tu

A. From the beginning to the early fourteenth century", in J. Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 315-334. E. Stump has also gathered together a large Philosophy, Cambridge, 1982, pp. Logic of carried out in this work in a later work: the of analyses part 63 (1985), pp. 355-374, in Walter Burley s Treatise on obligations", Synthese disputation to which we can apply everything said in this paper. 1

E.

Stump,

"Obligations:

N. Kretzmann, A.

Kenny

&

"ITie

2

Burley

Treatise

s

unpublished,

by

R.

DC

of a doctoral dissertation, as yet obligationibus is the topic to at the Catholic University of Louvain: An Introduction

Green

texts of William of Sherwood (?) been able to consult this work and texts I have stuck exclusively to the texts therefore s life and works see Una offered in Stump s work. For a complete reference of Burley cultural de Walter Burley, Biblioteca Contexto XIV. del La siglo Juarez, A., Filosofia Ciudad de Dios", Real Monasterio del Escorial, Madrid, 1978.

the

and

"La

Treatise

logical

Walter

De

obligationibus. I

With

have

Burley. Unfortunately for the analysis of Burley s

critical

not

Stump on Burley s De

469

obligationibus

Romae

te esse

est concedendum". Deinde, esse prpponatur: est concedendum". Haec est falsa et impertinens, igitur

Romae

"te

Deinde,

neganda.

proponatur:

posito et opposito bene negati". conditionahs est necessaria:

"si

Romae

concedendum, sed

est

cedendum,

igitur tu es Romae".

Romae

esse

"te

ex haec

sequitur

Haec

est necessaria, quia tu es vel te te esse non est Concessa ista te esse

Romae Romae

esse

con

Romae

"

sequitur ex posito et opposito bene negati", proponatur ista: esse Romae est concedendum". Si concedas, idem concessisti et negasti, igitur male. Si neges, cedat tempus, negasti sequens per regulam. Quia si regula sit bona, tune sequitur: te esse Romae sequitur ex posito et opposito bene negati, igitur "te

"

Romae

te esse

quod haec

Dicitur

3.22:

est concedendum". "

est

te

neganda:

esse

Romae

sequitur ex

opposito bene negati". Nee haec est necessaria. Et, si sit necessanum te esse Romae sequi ex disiunctiva, quae ponitur cum opposito alterius partis, tamen non est necesposito et t

sarium istam disiunctivam poni. E.

Stump

formulated

-

analyzes

the

in the following terms:

Oponens

Romae

est

conce-

dendum

which

the

paradox

is

Ratio

(la)

T

(2a)

F

(Ib) estpositum

(2b) est falsa et imperti-

nens

Romae sequitur e posito et opposito bene negati

(3) te esse

Romae

est

(3a)

conce-

The paradox concede

(4)

T

(3b) (3) follows from the truth of (1) and the falsity of (2)

(4a) ?

dendum

either

in

Respondens

Romae vel te esse Romae est concedendum

(4) te esse

-

3

(1) tu es

(2) te esse

text

first

resides in the fact that the respondent can not in (4a)

because

it

is

the

same proposition

(2)

which he has

already denied, or deny (4) because from (3) which has been conceded there follows the truth of (4). In

my

opinion, in this analysis

incorrect interpretation which

paradox. This

we can

already find the root of the

Stump makes of Burley

s

treatment of

this

so for at least three reasons:

first, because she analyzes the answers given by the respondent in terms of truth (T) and falsehood whereas in the text are in terms of concession and (F) they presented is

negation; second, because (3b) does not constitute an adequate analysis of

P. 323. In the presentation of these analyses I have recuperated of the enunciations translated into English by E. Stump.

the

Latin version

D

470

0rs

the concession of (3); the reason explicitly given in this text in favor of third column and third, because by introducing within the analysis as a the

reasons

given

inadequately in

my

favor

in

opinion

-

respondent s answers, it seems as though these reasons come to be part of of

-

the

the respondent. By the dialogue maintained between the opponent and in her analysis the concession of (3) in terms of truth (T), interpreting is then taken to interpret the negation of (3), which Burley

Stump

the paradox, as a declaration of the falsehood proposes as the solution to what I believe to be Hurley s intention. On the other (F) of (3), against in his text in favor of the concession of hand, the reason Burley gives the not the one to be found in Stump s analysis, but rather is (3)

conditional proposition whose consequent is not necessity of a determined in the first part of the disjunctive (1). If we analy/.e (1) (3) but rather text in the ultimate the form of (pvq), the reason alleged in Burley s the conditional instance in favor of (3) is the necessity (validity) of the of in favor reasons the given Finally, (((pvq)A-iq)^p).

not be interpreted as part of the dialogue respondent s answers must which is initially maintained between the opponent and the respondent of a metadialogue which both maintain around the but rather as part

if the respondent has rules of the the not does obey answered correctly or not and which

initial

dialogue

but

obligations

with

the

rather

object

strict

of

determining

considerations

of

truth

or

falsehood;

the

be even more urgent when and a the very initial dialogue bears upon the conditions of the dialogue, the as same enunciation can be presented as a proposed enunciation and as in the reason for one of the respondent s answers in that dialogue, distinction

between either dialogue

paradoxical

case being analy/ed

is

in

made

to

which an enunciation which

in

the

true is denied in the dialogue metadialogue would be recogni/ed as being has its of repugnance with regard to what in spite of its truth by reason

The relevance of these three observations will previously been conceded. of be made more clearly manifest when we analy/c Stump s interpretation the solution offered by Burley.

Stump

offers

two interpretations of the second

text in

which Burley

to formulates his solution to the paradox: one, more immediate, according and a which Burley s solution would be, in her opinion, extravagant, her opinion, also second more elaborated solution which is, according to

Stump on Burley s DC

4 inadequate although apparently more reasonable. According to of these two interpretations, Burlcy would have maintained in

logically

the

471

obligationibus

first

text that the answer given to (3) is incorrect given that (3) must not be conceded but rather denied and this by virtue of the fact that (3) is not necessary, a fact which according to Stump Burley would have this

concluded by is

is

derived,

text

s

Burley

completely

such a solution would effectively be, as Stump points out, 6 extravagant and completely do away with doctrine on

But what

obligations.

In

virtue, in turn, of the fact that premise (1), from which (3) not necessary. 5 If this happened to really be the meaning of

the

face

is

Stump attempts

leads,

the textual fundament of this

of the

extravagance

to

which

first

interpretation?

this

first

interpretation

a second interpretation which allows a reasonable

meaning to Burley s solution, but this interpretation, in her opinion, makes an important confusion to become manifest. 7 This interpretation is based upon a new analysis of the paradox in the following terms: 8

Oponens

Respondent (1 a)

T

(2

)

q

(2 a)

F

(3

)

p

seqiiitur ex posito et opposito bene negati

(3 a)

T

Ratio

(3 b) (3) follows from the truth of (1) and the falsity

The Stump,

9

previously mentioned confusion would be found, according to it is p and not (3 ) what follows from the truth of (! ) and

that

the falsehood of (2 favor

),

10

"On

8 9

has

to

);

be

sustained in (3 b) as the reason in

such a case, according to Stump s considered as impertinent and, in

the face of

premisses

7

(3)

is

in

Pp. 324-325. it, then, Burley is saying that (3) is to be denied because it is not reason for claiming that (3) is not necessary is that one of the derived from, namely (1), is not necessary" (p.324).

and

necessary,

6

against what

or the concession of (3

interpretation, 4

of (2)

it

is

his

P. 324. P. 324. P. 324. P. 324. "Suppose

we then consider

(3)

irrelevant

and judge

it

on

own

its

merits.

According

Burley, we ought to judge it false. If (3) had read That you are in Rome follows from the conjunction of this disjunction - namely, "You are in Rome or that you are in Rome is to be granted" - with the denial of the second disjunct then Burlcy would, I to

,

D

472

Ors

agreement with Stump s reading of Burley, to be considered as false. This es Romae" follows requires that we do not interpret (3) as if meant "(u

from

Romae

es

"tu

vel

le

Romae non

est

concede

but rather in

1

(3),

concedendum

would not

"ex

posito"

be

false and, in

its

,

my

necessarily refer to the

opinion,

I fail

meaning

my

opinion,

not say that (3)

disjunctive

Stump

s

(1),

esse

te

(3)

would

interpretation, (3)

two interpretations

of Burley

texts.

s

As

three confusions previously mentioned.

we

"

to understand).

of these

neither

and

concedendum"

agreement with Burley as to

ascertaining the true

if

est

which case Burley would have to sense in which case the expression

in

literal

has to be denied (for what reason In

Romae

esse

capable of both are the Underlying is

for the first interpretation, in

meaning of the texts, Burley docs must be denied because (3) is not necessary, but rather stick

to the literal

he says that (3) has to be denied and that (3) is not necessary; neither does he say that (3) is not necessary because premise (1), from which (3)

alleged

not

is

derives,

in

favor

of

(3),

and

to

necessity

necessary,

the this

but

concession is

so

rather because the (metadialogue

positum is not necessary because (1) should be posited.

As grasp

-

for the

since

I

rather

not s) it

of

that

the

(3)

does

because

(1)

necessary not is

not

enunciation which says that (1) is

in

its

necessary but is

the

contingent that such an enunciation

second interpretation, whose meaning I fail to completely fail to understand, as I have already stated, the value and

meaning of the alleged reason in favor of the falsehood of (3) said,

proposition

communicate

-

it

can be

opinion and for reasons I shall soon put forth, that Burley try to defend that (3) should be impertinent and false but

my

docs not

on the contrary, and here is the key to the solution proposed by him, that in the metadialogue from the moment that (2) is denied both (3) and (4) are true but repugnant with regard to the opposite of the rather,

enunciation (2) already negated; for this in the dialogue by virtue of rule 2 of the obligations (omne repugnans opposito bene negati est negandum), although they are true they must be negated. The reason for which

Burley has recourse to the non-necessary nature of (3)

is

not the defense

think, agree that (3) had to be granted. But (3) does not read that way; and if we are considering (3) as it stands, on its own merits, then Burley seems to think we should deny it because the phrase from the positum need not refer to the particular disjunction which just happens to be the positum in this particular case of obligations.

other positum; but unless it refers to It could refer to some Therefore, on Burley s view, it is a mistake to grant (pp. 324-325). (3)"

this

one,

(3)

is

false.

Stump on Barley s De of the falsehood of (3), but rather of in

order for

to

it

because what

is

its

contingency, a needed condition

be repugnant with regard

necessary

is

473

obligationibus

to

some other

From whence

not repugnant to anything.

not necessary) and should be (since

enunciation, (3)

repugnant to In the the opposite of (2)) negated. proposed interpretations it can be seen how by virtue of the inadequate analysis of the reason alleged in favor of (3) there is no adequate separation of the conditions of the can (because

it

is

it

is

dialogue and of the conditions of the metadialogue, and that there comes about an undue transposition of questions relative to the concession or the negation of enunciations in the dialogue to questions relative to the truth or falsehood of enunciations in the metadialogue.

In

opinion, in order to adequately

my

comprehend Burley

need to tend to the global meaning of the stated question: -

pretended with the paradox is to the absurd which furthermore is

is

11

s texts

that

we

which

by means of a procedure of reduction a dialogue

-

to

make problematic

the

value of one of the parts of rule 1 of the obligations: quicquid sequitur ex posito

et

opposite bene negati

est

concedendum, which can also be

expressed in the following terms:

Ax(x sequitur ex posito

etc.

->

x est concedendum),

which has the form of a universal enunciation, one of whose singulars is:

(p sequitur ex posito etc.

->

p

est

The argument around which ponendo ponens (which

Rl

I

shall call

(3)

(p sequitur ex posito etc. p sequitur ex posito etc.

(4)

p

est

from which follows

from

it

concedendum). the question revolves

is

the elemental

argument Al): ->

p

est

concedendum)

concedendum is

(3)

argued (an argument I shall call A2) that given that (4) and Rl, and that (3) has been conceded, if Rl were and

admissible rule (4) would have to be conceded (by virtue of the other part of this same Rule 1 which states: quicquid sequitur ex posito et

concedendum); now, since (4) is the same enunciation (2) which before has been denied we can now not concede it but rather we

concesso

est

to the question in a global manner and this is probably the root of her incomprehension; even in the English translation which she offers of Burley s texts she omits the initial enunciation in which the main question is

E.

what

is

Stump does not tend at

formulated

(p. 323).

D

474

must negate

it

Ors

and therefore we either have

an admissible rule (which

to conclude that (3) should

what Burley concludes) or that Rl what the objection pretends), and since

not have been conceded (this is

is

not

is

(3)

is

(supposedly) necessary and therefore must be conceded, it is concluded that Rl is not an admissible rule. Both arguments, Al and A2, are in my

opinion logically impeccable.

The key

to

s

Burley

solution,

has been

as

denial of the supposed necessity of (3) which

indicated,

lies

the

in

held in the final part of

is

argument A2. Now, why does Burley deny the necessity of (3)? In the paradox, the argument put forth in favor of the concession of (3)

and the argument put

necessity

following argument (which

of

favor

in

its

necessity

its

is is

the

argument Bl): ct

nq

opposite benc ncgati

argumented (an argument I shall call B2) that given that true and necessary since the conditional (((pvq)A-iq) ^p) in

is

(3 b)

ct

p sequitur exposito

)

from which

which

shall call

p sequitur ex (p vq)

(3 b) (3

I

forth

it

fundamenled

is

it

is

necessary, and given

is

that

Burley rejects argument

(3

Bl:

necessary )

is

the

(3

(valid),

necessary,

(3

)

is

)

has

to

true

also

does not follow from

conclusion

and

be conceded. this

premise only but rather requires two complementary premises; argument

Bl must be transformed

into the following

argument (which

I

shall call

argument Cl): p sequitur ex (p v q)

(3 b)

-iq est

ii)

(3

from which

-iq

oppositum bcne ncgali

p sequitur ex posito

)

ct

(P vcl) est positum

i)

it

is

ct

opposito benc ncgati

argumented (an argument

the three premises are true, the conclusion (3 b)

is

necessary given that both

contingent,

we can

not

i)

and

conclude that

shall call

I

is

ii)

(3

)

C2) that given that

also true but that although

are not necessary but rather is

necessary and

is

in

fact

contingent.

This

is,

in

my

opinion, the true

problem put forth by Burley. interpretation offered by in

meaning of the texts and of the is what lies beneath the second

Argument Bl

Stump but however

it

does not come to the fore

her interpretation because she does not approach the matter from the

theory of argumentation but rather from the theory of signification. She considers - incorrectly in my opinion - that (3 b) and (3 ) are two possible equivocal meanings of (3), and that Burley got

them confused

Stump on Burley s DC

475

obligationibus

understand the already mentioned confusion to which Stump alludes). But, in my opinion, this is not the analysis which Burley s text, completely removed from such a confusion, requires. Burley clearly distinguishes between (3 b) and (3 ) and he considers that both (only in this sense can

What Burley

are true. relation

I

denies

there should exist between the two a

is

and hence he denies the truth of the second

of consequence

premise and therefore the truth of the conclusion of argument B2.

2.

Critique of Burley s Solution

Whatever the meaning of Burley

s texts,

whatever his reasons for denying

Stump maintains

(3) as the solution of the paradox,

that Burley s solution does not solve the paradox since the paradox reproduces itself regardless of (3), in spite of the negation of (3), because with just (1) and (2) we would be obliged to concede (4). 12 Her argument (which I shall call Dl) in favor of this thesis is the following:

conceded we also have is

to

concede

Burley has accepted that

(4), that is (4)

if

(3)

follows from (3); and

is it

a condition, in order to admit this, that one also admit the following

argument (which

I

shall call

D2):

P

p

est

concedendum

and, for the

p

est

p E.

est

same

reason, the following argumentation as well:

concedendum concedendum

Stump

est

concedendum.

further considers that there are reasons within the art of

obligations in order to admit this argumentation and she presupposes that 13

Burley admits it. the enunciation p

conceded, and

if

In this manner,

later

if

instead of (3)

we were

to

propose

enunciation would have had to be Romae), we were to propose (4) once more, in virtue of D2,

(tu es

this

seems to have in mind the mistaken notion that if (a) is false, (c) is false hence we can deny (4) and the paradox is solved. But of course, he has not solved the paradox by such means since (c) can be true even if (a) is false. Furthermore, if Burley is willing to accept the inference from (a) to (c), we can show him that on his own views (c) must be true" (p. 325). (a) is here enunciation (3) and (c) enunciation (4). "lie

inference from (a) to (c) depends on accepting as valid the inference from (b) Rome to (c) That you arc in Rome must be granted and there is some reason for accepting the inference from (b) to (c) in an obligations disputation" (p. 325). "The

You

are in

;

D

476

it

would also have

Ors

be conceded, with the resulting reproduction of the

to

14 paradox regardless of the primitive enunciation (3).

There

however here a

is

follows from I

argument

clear

error.

If

Burley admits that

(4)

argument Dl, it is only by virtue of the have called Al whose first premise, for being precisely a rule (3)

as

said in

is

presupposed and whose fundament is none other than ponendo ponens. Why would argumentation D2 also have to be admitted? On the contrary, there are very good reasons making us think

of obligations,

is

the

D2

that

is

an inadmissible argument within the framework of obligations. in the strict sense, would lead us to absolutely concede all

To admit D2,

on obligations not only allow us but even force us to deny true enunciations which are repugnant with regard to previously conceded enunciations or with regard to the opposite of

true enunciations,

and the

rules

previously denied enunciations.

paradox

3.

is

D2

not reproduced. Burley

s

can not be admitted and therefore the solution, therefore, can

be defended.

Stump s Solution

E.

the supposition that the paradox put forth by Burley happens to

Upon

not be solved by him and that

reproduces itself regardless of (3), in argument D2, Stump proposes her own personal solution to the paradox. In order to do this she relies on both argumentation D2 as well it

virtue of

as

on

its

p

inverse (which

est

I

shall call

D3):

concedendum

P

from which she concludes the equivalency of both parts, p and disjunctive (1) which for the same reason would be equivalent

q,

of the

to

(pvq)

or to (qvq) and, in virtue of the idempotency of the disjunctive, also to

"Even

with the denial of

(3),

however, from the truth of (1) and the

Rome. And

falsity

of (2),

given the validity of the inference from (b) Rome it follows that You are in Rome is to be granted. Hence even with the denial of (3), we are committed, on Burley s own views, to the truth of (4). And so, even if we give Burley all he wants, the falsity of (3) and the validity of the inference from (a) to (c), we can demonstrate that the paradox remains. follows that you are in to (c), from You are in it

The respondent

is

same proposition

at

committed (2a)"

to

the

(pp. 325-326).

so,

truth of (4) although

he has correctly denied the

Stump on Barley s DC

p,

or to q.

15

In such a case,

with respect

q,

clear that p (or q) are not impertinent

(pvq) but rather pertinent, equivalents, and that they and therefore (2), which is none other than

to

follow from

is

it

477

obligationibus

that disjunction

insofar as

follows from (1), should not have been denied but rather

it

conceded. This not only would have solved the paradox but indeed it 16 This is Stump s proposed would have impeded its very apparition. Obviously, once D2 is rejected, and for analogous reasons D3 the art of obligations allows to concede something which is false (since

solution.

it follows from something already conceded), we can no longer admit such an equivalency between the parts of the disjunctive, nor can

when

we admit Stump

proposed solution. Burley

s

s

my

solution, in

opinion,

is

the only admissible solution, given the general rules on obligations.

4.

Conclusion

Having seen the foregoing analyses, of

insufficiencies

believe to have clearly

I

of Burley

s

s

texts

shown the

and to have

Stump interpretation come closer to the real meaning of those texts. As a result I do believe that some of the consequences to which Stump comes from her analysis of the nature of the rules on obligations within Burley

would require

revised, but such a task

a

more

s

work have

to

be

detailed study of the whole

work and of course goes beyond the scope of this paper. These analyses, however, do not merely pretend to rectify the

of Burley

s

made by Stump concerning these all, to shed some light on the

interpretations

rather hope, above

on

the doctrine

In

obligations.

my

opinion,

texts

by Burley, but

nature and history of

the distinctions established

between the dialogue and the metadialogue, between the conditions of truth and falsehood in the metadialogue and the conditions of concession and negation in the dialogue, which allow us to deny in the dialogue an enunciation which in the metadialogue

is

recognized as true,

lies

at

the

"And we can also show the converse, that if q is true, p is true. If you grant q, you are granting that p is to be granted. But if you grant that p must be granted, you cannot consistently deny p, and so you must also grant p. Hence, if q is true, so is p. Consequently, p and q are equivalent" (p. 326).

"Hence,

irrelevant.

in

In

between p and really

solved;

place"

(p. 326).

this fact,

q.

or,

case, it

And more

it

is

a

from

mistake

to

consider

(2)

in

the

schematisation

as

the positum and the implicit logical relationship so (2) ought to be granted. In this way, I think, the paradox is accurately, in this way the paradox fails to arise in the first

follows

D

478

Ors

"revolution" brought about by Swyneshed within the rules of P.V. which and Spade speaks of in his contribution to the obligations

root of the

17 same reader.

University of Navarra

17

P.V.

335-341.

Spade,

"Obligations:

B.

Developments

in

the

fourteenth

century",

op.

cit.,

pp.

ALVIN

P.

DOBSEVAGE

DC Guillclmi Occamcnsis dialcctica

Salvete

domini

omncs,

dominacquc,

philosophiae et certe sodales

litteris

professores,

fovendis

latinis.

Hodie argumenta rcnovare volo utrum nominalista sit

studiorum

cultores

aut conccptualista

noster Inceptor Venerabilis.

esse

Et responsum facile in mcntcm evenit. Sunt qui aiunt Guillclmum antcccdentem illorum Rcnati Descartes et Emmanualis Kant et

Summam

delatorem philosophiae scholasticae. Est nobis tigare ad haec omnia noscenda.

Cum nisi

de tempore

et loco

compositions

Summae

Logicae inves-

Logicae non habeamus

coniecturam... Londinii in Anglia fuisse compositam (notat G. Gal). Ibi

amicos Chatton

et

Wodeham

ciae Angliae habuit. Et

Londiniensis. Chatton

Sed

in

"Prologo"

ex ordine Fratrum

Ockham

ct

Wodeham

Summam

Logicae

Summae

Logicae

legit

Minorem

erant

(Gal

et socios

Provin-

socii

Custodiae

Adam

de Anglia

quoque

p. 55-56).

fratris et magistri

notatur:

Quam magnos

veritatis

sectatoribus

afferat

fructus

sermocinalis

scientia, quam logicam dicimus, multorum peritorum docet auctoritas, ratioque et experientia liquido cpmprobat et convincit. Unde Aristoteles, auctor praecipuus huius scientiae, nunc introductoriam

methodum, nunc viam

sciendi

modum, nunc dans

scientiam omnibus

communcm

nulli ad Averroes sapientiam patet accessus nisi in quoque, Aristotelis interpres, in Physicis dialectam dicit esse "instrumentum discernendi verum a falso". Ipsa namque cuncta dubia definit, cunctas Scripturarum difficultates dissolvit et penetrat, ut testatur doctor egregius Augustinus.

et

Et deinde

in

veritatis

"Epistola

Logica enim

appellat,

Prooemialis"

ex

his intellegere quod scientia logica erudito.

Ockham

ipse notat:

omnium

artium aptissimum instrumentum, sine qua potest, quae non more materialism instrumentorum usu crebro consumitur, sed per cuiuslibct alterius scientiae studipsum exercitium continuum recipit incrementum. Sicut enim mechanicus sui instrument! perfecta carens notitia utendo epdem recipit pleniorem, sic in solidis logicae principiis eruditus dum aliis scientns operam impendit sollicite simul istius artis maiorem in logica labilis ars adquirit periliam. Unde illud vulgare solis sapientiale studium negligentibus locum reputo obtinere. nulla

est

scientia

perfecte

sciri

"ars

est"

480

Dobsevage

eorum Swincshcad, Hcytcsbury, Gcrson

In scriptis cst

nominalista

cum

ct

conditorcm

d

ct

suae

scholac

Ailly,

crcdunt.

Ockham Ockham

ct hanc male venit partim Avicennae. Porphyrius quoque partim Augustini, partim huius problematis erat. In libcllo suo Isagogc (sive introductione in Catcgorias Aristotelis) notat Porphyrius a. Genera et species suntne

Aristotclcm a Scotistis male interpretari credit ex auctoritate

St.

substantia aut mentis notioncs? b.

corporalia vel incorporalia?

Si

c.

Si,

modo

fortassc, in se constant, suntne vel

sunt incorporalia, suntne in rebus

sensibus percipi vel eis rebus separata?

Ens horum disputationum Medii Acvi scientiae

mctaphysicam

per

Ockham scqucns

philosophiam

Aristotelem

logicam

e

erat ct

logicam

ct

theologiam

metaphysica

doctrinam

interpretari.

philosophia

et

e

theologia disiungere inccpit.

Primum de

divisione

terminorum

scribit,

subordinata conceptibus scu intentionibus

et

notat

animae".

"voces

esse signa

In cap. 4 ad

metam

venit dicens:

quia terminorum quidam sunt categorcmatici, quidem syncategoTermini categorcmatici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc nomcn homo significat omnes homines et noc nomcn animal omnia animalia, et hoc nomcn albedo omnes albedincs.... Termini autem syncatcgorcmatici, cuiusmodi sunt tales tantum totus nullus omnis inquantum et aliquis practer huiusmodi, non habent finitam significationem et certam, nee significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per categoremata. (p. 25) ...

rematici.

,

,

Per se

omnis

,

nihil significat,

sed ante

,

,

,

nomcn hominem

est classis

omnium hominum. Hie videtur logica esse instrumentum ad philosophiam naturalem fovendam. Philosophia naturalis est de rebus. Logica est de sententiis

de terminis universalibus. Et

mentis, est

de multis praedicabilc.

Ockham numquam

Cum

omne

univcrsale est

de scientia humana loquitur universalia apud

sunt individualia. Et logica universali post

rem

refert.

universalia non sunt res extra animam. Propter quod non sunt de csscntia rerum nee partes rerum extra, sed sunt quaedam entia in anima, distincta inter se et a rebus extra, quarum aliqua sunt signa rerum extra, aliqua sunt signa illorum signorum. Sicut hoc nomen universale est commune ad omnia universalia, et per conscqucns est signum omnium aliorum universalium a se. Et ideo potest concedi quod illud universale quod est pracdicabile de quinque universalibus, non tamen pro se sed pro universalibus, est genus ad universalia; sicut aliqua dictio praedicabilis de omnibus dictionibus est nomen, et ...

non verbum, nee participium, nee coniunctio Qui

vult

pleniorem

notitiam

de

universalibus

etc. (p.

et

83)

proprietatibus

habere, legere poterit Porphyrii librum. Sed Porphyrius duabus

eorum

sellis

sedet

De

Guillelmi Occamensis dialectica

ut notat Bocthius. Est inter et

Ockham

alii

scripsisse

Platonem logicam

481

Aristotclcm. Dicit Pater Boehner

ct

Aristoteleam

reapse

formalem

et

universe certam.

Ex

(signum universale) et ex haeccitate (signum individuale), aut connotatione et denotatione, ut hodie dicimus, Duns Scotus viam ad nominalisticam philosophiam logicam discipulo suo Ockham offert.

Et

quidditate

animo

in

illius

Ecclesiae Catholicae movit.

modo

Ockham est omnia eum contra Papam

in et

quaestionem vocare. Amor et Philippo et Ludovico

pro

Logicus erat qui salutem Ecclesiae promovere voluit. Sed hoc contra Papam et pro regibus ille ex ordine fratrum minorum optavit.

Praecepta Ecclesiae Catholicae in toto per fidem, non per philo sophiam noscuntur. Creatio ex nihilo non demonstratur sed sentitur.

Multum de rebus audimus

externis individualibus quas videmus, tangimus, olfacimus,

gustamus ut res particulares notantur. Universalia sunt signa mentis, sunt nomina. Benigne Guillelmo Ockham et Scoto philosophia scholastica fracta et

est.

Ockham fundamentum logicae modernae mathematicae incepit cum terminis syncategorematicis. Necesse esset hoc

Et fortasse formulare

ratum facere per logicos huius temporis ut Quine, Hiz, et al. (Aliquid de theoria Occamensi et quantificationis terminorum et propositionum de modali notatur ab Alfredo J. Freddoso: Ockhatris quoque logica TJieory

hodie

of Propositions. Part unus qui logicam

est

II

of the

Summa

Occamensem

Logicae, pp.

terminis

logicae

19-28.

Ille

hodiernae

investigat et describit.)

Hoc

loco necesse

sit,

credo, tacere. Sed

non

sine

mentione horum

logicorum hodiernorum et eruditorum historiae philosophiae naturalis qui non multum de Venerabilis Inceptoris scriptis logicis investigant. Satinest, si

vobis

quiretis?

acroasin meam ita dedi expolitam, ut improbare non multum De me quidem vestrum erit iudicium. Valete et plaudite.

Western Ct State University

482

Dobscvage

Bibliographia:

Guillelmi de

Cura

Ockham

s

Ockham. Summa

Theory of Propositions. Introduction ab Alfred

Univ of Notre Philotheus

Boehncr G. Gal, Bonavcnturc Univ. N.Y. 1974.

logicae. Ed. P.

Instituti Franciscan!. St.

Dame

J.

S.

Brown.

Freddoso.

Press, Indiana, 46556. 1980.

Boehner. Collected Articles Bonaventure, N.Y. 1858.

on

Ockham.

Institute. St.

Ernest A. Moody. The Logic of Ockham.

New York.

1935.

Ed.

Franciscan

SILVIA

Ancora una volta

DONATI

sulla

nozione di quantitas

materiae in Egidio

II

tema

di

elaborata attirato la si

1

questa

comunicazione

e

Romano*

nozione

la

di

quantitas

materiae

da Egidio Romano. La dottrina egidiana ha gia in passato attenzione degli studiosi; A. Maier fu la prima a sottolineare che

nozione quantitativa introdotta da Egidio, distinguendosi dall estensione, awicina al concetto moderno di massa. 1 II merito di Egidio starebbe

nell aver

fatto

e

analisi

di

oggetto

riconosciuto

quantitative una nozione che, come vedremo, anche

e

presuppongono

utilizzano

loro

nella

come altri

descrizione

un

concetto

autori medievali

dei

mutamenti

pero darne una precisa definizione. stato anche osservato che le maggiori innovazioni medievali sulla

quantitativi senza

E nozione alle

di quantita si

numerose

Un altra

sono avute

discussioni

occasione

di

in

un contesto

connesse

riflessione

per

con i

il

2

teologico;

problema

pensatori

basti pensare

delPEucarestia.

medievali e costituita

dalla questione della creazione di Eva, questione che viene affrontata in

genere nel corso dei commenti

appunto

problema

dell applicazione

della

creazione

al

secondo

libro

delle Sentenze. Ora, e

della nozione egidiana di quantitas materiae al di

Eva che intendiamo occuparci

in

questa

comunicazione.

Questo articolo e il frutto delle ricerche condotte grazie ad una borsa di studio Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung (Bonn). Intendo ritornare su questo tema in uno studio piu ampio attualmente in corso di preparazione. della

Cfr. 14.

Problem der quantitas materiae", in- Die Vorldufer Galileis im Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1966 p.26-52; cfr. inoltre, J.A. Concept of Matter in Fourteenth Century Science", in: The Concept of

A. Maier,

"Das

Roma,

Jahrhundert,

Weisheipl, The Matter in Greek

,

and Medieval Philosophy, E. McMullin ed., Notre Dame, Indiana, The University of Notre Dame Press, 1963, p.147-169; E. Sylla, "Godfrey of Fontaines on Motion with Respect to Quantity of the Eucharist", in: Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier, a cura di A. Maieru e A. Paravicini Bagliani, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1981, p.105-141. 2

Cfr. E. Sylla,

"Godfrey

of

Fontaines...",

p.107.

484

Donati

Secondo di

Adamo.

la

Bibbia? Eva

Pietro

un interpretazione sola

dalla

lettcralc:

costola,

4

secondo

libro dellc Sentenze,

Eva

intcro corpo di

si

fu

attiene a a partire

prodotto senza alcuna aggiunta cstrinscca. In caso contrario, 1

dovrebbe dire che Eva

infatti, si

da Dio a partire da una costola

fu prodotta

ncl

Lombardo,

anche a partire dal materiale

fu prodotta

teorico che

problema pone teologi successivi e dunque qucllo di un aumento non accompagnato da nessuna aggiunta. Parlando di un aumento non dovuto ad alcuna addizione, teologi II

aggiunto.

ai

si

i

medievali vogliono escludere

sia

ipotesi che la materia aggiunta esistcsse

1

precedenza sotto altra forma, sia ipotesi che essa venga creata ex novo da Dio, giacche anche nel caso della creazione di nuova materia il in

1

Eva contcrrebbc

di

corpo

In

costola.

trasformare

la

formazione

di

intero

in

una costola

umano

corpo

Eva rappresenta

non era contenuta

che

discussione

della

materia contenuta

un

a

sufficiente

materia

della

nocciolo

il

effetti,

senza

e

proprio

una quantita

in

creare

un caso limite

allora

se

altra

nella

Dio puo di

materia

materia.

di

La

in

aumento, cui, una ccrta quantita di materia, senza alcuna addizione estrinseca, gra/ie a una sorta di espansione, cresce fino a diventare una quantita maggiore. Per

riformulare

medievali,

porzione

di

la

nei

questionc

termini

adottati

tecnici

dagli

autori

un aumento quantitativo da parte di una ccrta materia che in se stessa rimane sostanzialmentc idcntica.

si

tratta

di

Questo processo appare chiaramente in contrasto con le norme che regolano Paumento in natura. Nella filosofia della natura medievale vengono

distinti

rarefazione. Ora, gli

due

base

della

Nell

aumento

coppia

nozione

la

comunque

autori medievali

aumento, Paumcnto vcro e propria e

di

tipi

di quantita di

sembrano distinguere di

concetti

i

quantita

due di

tipi

di

mutamento

materia

variazione

la

la

materia venga intcsa,

e

delle

sulla

estensione

dimensioni

.

e

propriamcnte intcso, accompagnata da un aumento della quantita di materia. La rarefazione, cstensione aumenta, la invece, non e un aumento reale, giacche, se materia rimane invariata. Ora, aumento reale in natura e sempre un 1

I

aumento per additionem; 3

1

agente

naturale,

che

non ha

il

potere

di

Cfr. Genesi, Lib.I, cap.2, w.21-22. Cfr.

logiae

Lombardi Sententiarum

Petri

cursus

completus,

series

libri

secunda

quatuor, Lib. II, dist. XVIII, cap.5, in: Patroaccurante J.P. Migne, t.192, Parisiis,

(latina),

1880, col.688. Sulla

distinzione

Fontaines...",

medievale

p.105-107.

tra

i

due

tipi

di

aumento

cfr.

E.

Sylla,

"Godfrey

of

La nozione

di quantitas matcriae in Egidio

Romano

485

trasformare poca materia in molta ne di creare nuova materia, puo far crescere un corpo solo aggiungendo dclla materia gia esistente sotto altra

forma. Sulla

possibilita

da parte

Dio

di

causare un tipo di aumento

di

diverse sia dall addizione che dalla rarefazione, un

registrano

aumenta

materia

di

quantita

tredicesimo

nel

S.Tommaso escludono questo sibile e di

senza

secolo

conseguenza respingono

1

la

possibilita di

rarefactione in natura, lo

un

aggiunta

discordant!.

opinioni

cio6 in cui la estrinseca,

Pensatori

si

come

aumento come teoricamente impos-

tipo di

interpretazione letterale della Genesi

data da Pietro Lombardo. Altri autori,

pur negando

alcuna

aumento

come per esempio Egidio Romano,

tipo di

aumento

sine additione et sine

ritengono possibile per Dio.

problema viene chiaramente impostato da S.Tommaso. Nel commento al secondo libro delle Sentenze egli respinge la posizione di II

Pietro

Lombardo defmendola

inintelligibile.

S.Tommaso

distingue due

modi

materia puo aumentare: o secundum quantitatem tantum oppure secundum essentiam. Nel caso di un aumento solo secundum quantitatem, in cui la

una certa materia, numericamente ad un certo momento avra una data estensione e in seguito

cioe relative soltanto alle dimensioni, identica,

acquistera un estensione maggiore. Ora, questo tipo di mutamento, che

comporta soltanto

la

variazione

delle

processo di rarefazione. Se invece essentiam, allora nel corpo, quella

che c era

materia,

alPinizio.

non importa

dopo In

1

la

aumento,

altri

se creata ex

dimensioni,

non e

altro

che un

materia aumenta anche secundum

termini,

novo o

ci

sara altra materia oltre a

sara

stata

preesistente.

aggiunta

Un

nuova

terzo tipo di

6 aumento, diverse da questi due per S.Tommaso non e possibile. Questo passo rappresenta un tipico esempio del modo di procedere che si e menzionato prima: se da una parte S.Tommaso distingue un

Cfr.

Thomas Aquinas,

In

II

dist. XVIII, q.l, a.l, in: Scriptum super libros M.F. Moos, Parisiis, Lethielleux, 1929-1947, vol.11, enim per multiplicationem materiae hoc factum dicant, oportet multiplicatiop.448: nem hanc aut secundum quantitatem tantum attendi, aut secundum essentiam materiae. Si primo modo, sic oportet ut eadem materia numero quae fuit primo sub parvis dimensionibus, postmodum majores dimensiones recipiat: hoc autem idem est quod rarefieri... Si vero multiplicatio essentiam materiae attingat, cum nihil aliud sit multiplicari quam aliquid fieri quod prius non erat, oportet quod aliquid materiae sit sub forma corporis mulieris quod prius sub forma costae non erat...". Cfr. inoltre Summa Theologiae, Pars

Sententiarum,

ed.

P.

Mandonnet

Sent., -

"Si

I,

q.92, a.3,

Taurini-Romae, Marietti, 1952, p.452.

Donati

486

aumcnto

da un aumcnto della quantita

dclla sola estensione

di materia,

7

non introduce alcun concetto quantitative divcrso da quello aumento della quantita di materia Tommaso di estensione. Per descrivere essentiam materiae, usa cioe un concetto secundum di multiplicatio parla dall altra, egli

1

non quantitative. D altronde, poiche aumento della quantita di materia e in se concepito da S.Tommaso come una moltiplicazione della materia 1

come

stessa e

sostrato, e evidente che

1

idea di una

medesima porzione

di

materia che aumcnta quantitativamente pur rimanendo sostanzialmcnte identica

gli

A

volte.

piu

appare

problema

II

inintelligibile.

della creazione di

questo argomento e

Quodlibet; piu tardi al

secondo

il

problema vicne

libro delle Scntcnze.

dottrinale:

continuita

Eva viene discusso da Egidio Romano dedicata una questione del secondo

8

trattato

nuovamente

polemica con S.Tommaso,

in

accetta

egli

pretazione di Pietro Lombardo. La soluzione del problema

un applicazione

della

nozione

egidiana

di

quantitas

commento

nel

una sostanziale

In questi testi troviamo

si

materiae.

1

inter-

fonda su Infatti,

e

proprio grazie a un concetto quantitative diverse da quello di estensione che Egidio puo difcndere 1 idea di un tipo di aumento diverse sia

addizione che dalla rarefazione.

dall

Considcriamo brevemente

Come

e

noto,

Egidio,

la

accanto

nozione egidiana alia

introduce una nozione non spaziale

di quantita.

di quantitas

nozione

tradizionale

di

materiae. estensione,

Egli distingue la quantita

occupa un certo spazio dalla quantita in molta o poca. Infatti, se la medesima quale materia, in condizioni diverse, puo assumere volumi differenti, estensione e quantitas materiae sono carattcristiche diverse. In che cosa consiste la novita di Egidio? Osservando che nella descrizione dci mutamenti in

virtu

dclla quale la materia

della

virtu

la

materia

nozione

quantitative, accanto alia

A

questo

cd.cit.,

8

proposito

cfr.

e

anche

di

volume, compaiono anche espressioni

Thomas Aquinas,

In

II

Sent.,

dist.XXX,

q.2,

a.l,

p.778-779.

anast. rist. Acgidii Columnae Romani Quodlibcta, II, q.ll, Lovanii, 1646, Frankfurt a.M., 1966, p.76-79; In If Sent., dist. XVIII, q.l, a.3, in: Aegidii Columnae Romani In secundum Libmm Sent. Quaestiones, Venctiis, 1581, vol.11, rist. anast. Minerva, Frankfurt a.M., 1968, p.68-73. questi due testi puo essere aggiunto un Cfr.

Minen/a,

A

terzo documento, gentilmente segnalatoci dal. Dr.R. Wielockx (Alhcrtus Magnus-Institut, Sentenze di Egidio Bonn), cioe una prima versione del commento al secondo libro delle tramandataci da Goffredo di Fontaines nel ms. Paris, Bibl.Nat., lat. 15819, f.311ra-312ra (la

questione

sulla

creazione

di

Aegidii

Romani Apologia, Edition

Omnia,

III, 1),

et

Eva si trova al f.311va-b). Su questi estratti cfr. commentaire par R. Wielockx (Aegidii Romani Opera

Firenze, Olschki, 1985, p. 13, nota n.35, p.75-76, nota n.3.

Sulla dottrina egidiana cfr. le opere citate alia nota n.l.

La nozione

Romano

487

Egidio, a differenza di

S.Tommaso

di quantitas matcriae in Egidio

come molta materia o poca matcria

,

e di altri autori, cerca di analizzarle. Egli sottolinea, quindi, che

molto all

si

1

altro

di

tipo 1

giustifica

uso

quantita

come

Egidio, sine

non

che

varia

variare

al

molto e poco questo nuovo concetto

di termini quali

L introduzione et

termini

i

riconducono a determinazioni quantitative. Accanto poco esistenza di un estensione, allora, si deve presupporre nella materia e

di

rarefactione

1

ipotesi di

commento

Nel

.

e

che

.

e detto, di salvare

si

dell estensione

secondo

al

consente

quantitative

a

un aumento sine additione libro

delle

Sentenze,

trattando del problema della creazione di Eva, egli riporta la posizione di

S.Tommaso. La conclusione un tipo

di

di

S.Tommaso, secondo

aumento diverse

dalla

il

o

rarefazione

quale non e possibile

i

quali

non possono trasformare poca materia

quale motive? La ragione risiede nel Essi agiscono tramite

naturali.

possono mutare condensazione,

volume

il

ma non a

di

di

1

modo

in

e

il

proprio degli agenti

moto;

un corpo tramite process!

possono modificare

differenza

la

agenti naturali,

gli

molta o viceversa. 10 Per

di agire

alterazione

osserva

dall aggiunta,

Egidio, e perfettamente corretta per quanto riguarola

di

conseguenza,

di rarefazione e di

quantita di materia; questo

inerisce alia materia piu quantita, intrinsecamente di qualsiasi qualita e della stessa forma sostanziale, oltre 11 la quale 1 azione degli agenti naturali non puo cstendersi. tipo

Non

pero alcuna ragione

esiste

impossibile un tipo di

L aver

dell estensione,

ricondotto

per

aumento quale quello

caratteristiche

molto

quali

come logicamente da Pietro Lombardo.

escludere descritto

e

nell

poco

ambito

quantitative ne fa anche delle determinazioni accidentali della materia: la

materia non e tanta o poca in virtu della propria essenza, della

quantita.

diventi

da

Allora,

poca

molta

nulla

vieta

che

una certa porzione

rimanendo

pur

sostanzialmente

ma

in virtu

di

materia

identica.

La

conclusione di S.Tommaso, sottolinea ancora Egidio, sarebbe corretta se la materia fosse tanta o poca in virtu della sua essenza, osservazione che

sembra una precisa allusione

all

idea tomista di una multiplicatio

secundum

Cfr. Aeg. Rom., In II Sent., p.69: "Scd quidam hoc dictum Magistri et etiam Hugonis, tamquam impossibile et contradictionem implicans reputantes, improbant... Sed isti optime concludunt de actione naturali creaturae...".

Ibidem, p.70: "Ergo, nullum agens creatum potest agere nisi localiter movendo vel quale faciendo. Et quia qualitas supponit quantitatem per quam materia est multa vel pauca et motus localis etiam hoc supponit, quia per motum localem non potest de materia parum fieri multum nee e converse, nullum agens naturale de poterit

materia facere multam nee e

converse".

Cfr. inoltre

Quodl.U, q.ll, p.77-78.

pauca

Donati

488

essentiam materiae. In qucsto caso,

infatti,

aumcnto o

1

la

diminuzione

materia comportcrebbero nccessariamente un cambiamcnto dclla materia in se stessa c come sostrata, consicche in ogni caso di dclla quantita di

dovrebbe effettivamente postulare un aggiunta o materia. Ma poiche la quantita e una determinazione

variazione quantitativa

una sottrazione della

estrinseca

di

si

materia,

qualsiasi quantita. Se

la

montagna fossero considerate forma, esse non differirebbero una quantita maggiore che stessa

la

viceversa.

materia,

se

in 1

un grano

una

all altra.

stesse,

facendo astrazione da ogni

dall altra e all una non competerebbe Di conseguenza, Dio, che a differenza

sostanzialmente

diventi

identica,

da

puo poca

far

che

si

o

molta

12

La posizione tuttavia

di

agire direttamente sulla materia,

puo

degli agenti naturali,

porzione di materia e in potenza a di miglio e la materia di una

qualsiasi

materia

di

Egidio sul rapporto tra materia e quantita presenta lato la quantita viene vista come

una certa ambivalenza. Se da un

una determinazione accidentale

della

materia,

quando viene

dall altro,

considerata nel suo ruolo di principio di individuazione, essa acquista carattere stesso

di

una determinazione

Egidio,

sostanzialmente

quando

la

in

un

certo

differenti,

intrinseca.

senso,

cosi

parti

come

lo

Infatti,

di

come

materia

sono individui

sottolinea

differenti diversi.

il

lo

sono

Allora,

materia aumcnta quantitavamente, ex consequent! essa viene ad

essere moltiplicata anche in se stessa, sebbene solo per accidens.

13

Ora,

queste considerazioni servono a Egidio per dimostrare ancora una volta che gli agenti naturali, non potendo agire sull essenza della materia, non

possono agire nemmeno sulla sua quantita. Sulla base di questo argomento materia egli puo concludere che la facolta di agire sulla quantita della

compete solo all agente che ha 14 materia medesima. Tuttavia, considerando

le

la

gli

Rom., In

si

potrebbe

cose sotto questo punto di

netta la distinzione tra variazione

Aeg.

capacita di creare e di annichilare la

II

Sent.,

p.71:

vista,

forse

"Miramur

Aeg.

Rom., Quodl.ll,

q.ll,

di

enim de dicentibus quod oporteat creare

materiae de se esset multa vel pauca, tune abscinderetur vel annihilaretur aliquid de ipsa materia...". !

che,

puramente quantitativa e creazione

novum subiectum sive novam materiam vel addi aliquid ipsi materiae virtute divina quodcumque sit illud ad quod essentia materiae est in essentia

obiettare

non appare piu molto

forte

ut suscipiatur ibi potentia. Si enim

non posset minorari

nisi

soprattutto p.78: "...quantitas autem, licet per se non essentia materiae per se diversificari non potest,

diversified

essentiam

diversificat

tamen ipsam per accidens. Vel, ut clarius loquamur, licet materia secundum sit diversa, est tamen alia ct alia sub diversis partibus quantitatis".

essentiam non 14

Ibidem,

p. 77.

materiae,

quia

La nozione

di quantitas matcriae in Egidio

Romano

489

15 In nuova materia.

di

effetti, in questa prospcttiva, 1 idea di una porzione materia che varia quantitativamente pur rimanendo sostanzialmente

non sembra esente da

identica

Puo non

materiae

quantitas

teoricamente altri

autori

difficolta.

essere privo di interesse osservare che, se la nozione di

1

e

idea

che

chiave

la

consente

a

Egidio

un aumento sine additione

di

non giungono

alia stessa conclusione.

Un

et

di

sine

giustificare

rarefactione,

esempio e

costituito

da Giovanni Quidort. Quidort e uno dei pochi a far propria la distinzione 16 distinzione che sembra suscitare tra egidiana tra i due tipi di quantita, 17 Nell adottare Egidio piu critiche che consensi. dottrina egidiana, Quidort conia anzi un nuovo termine per designare concetto di quantita di materia egli distingue, infatti, 1 estensione e

i

di

contemporanei

;

la il

la

sottolineando cosi la differenza tra un concetto spaziale e un

tantalitas,

18 concetto non spaziale di quantita.

Ora, Quidort concede, con Egidio, che Dio, a differenza degli agenti

ha

naturali,

la

di

capacita lui

questo significa per

quantita di materia senza contraddittoria cosi

La ragione la tantalitas,

concepita

come

di

1

quantita

della

L idea

di

materia,

tuttavia,

un aumento

della

aggiunta di alcuna materia e per questo autore

lo era per

S.Tommaso. 19

questa posizione? Essa sembra risiedere nel fatto che

pur essendo una proprieta distinta dalla materia, tuttavia e proprieta per se di questa. Per Quidort, allora, una

come una

data porzione di materia, non quantita, anzi, essa

puo

sulla

agire

creare nuova materia.

modificarla.

e,

come per

Egidio, indifferente a qualsiasi

ha una quantita certa e

fissa,

cosicche

nemmeno Dio

20

Egidio sembra prendere

in

esame un obiezione

di

questo genere

in In II Sent., p.71.

16

Cfr. In II Sent., dist.XVIII, q.2 e q.4, in: Jean de Paris (Quidort) O.P., Commentaire sur les Sentences. Reportation, Livre II, ed. J.P. Muller (Studia Anselmiana, LII), Roma,

Herder, 1964, p.144-148, 149-151. Sulle "Godfrey

18

Cfr.

critiche

of

alia

dottrina

egidiana,

A.

cfr.

Maier,

"Das

Problem...";

E.

Sylla,

Fontaines...".

Jean de Paris, In II Sent., p.150.

19

Ibidem, p.146-147.

non determinat sibi aliquem gradum maior et minor... Ad aliud dico quod differunt quantitas materiae et dimensio, quia materia habet certam quantitatem, qua non est maior quantitas vel qua non est minor, et haec, sive materia accipiatur totius Ibidem, p.144,

quantitatis.

147-148:

"Item,

materia prima

Ergo sine mutatione sua potest

mundi sive aliqua determinata materia, secundum se...".

fieri

scilicet

materia partis. Et

ista

quantitas inest ei

Donati

490

in

nozione

di

duzione

della

innovatrice

in

moderna,

realta,

Una

metafisica.

ccrti

per

e,

L intro-

conclusione un ultima considcrazione.

Ci sia consentita

quantitas

rispondc

materiac, a

vicina

vcrsi,

nozione

concetti

che appare

utilizzati

dalla

cosi

scienza

Egidio a un esigenza eminentemente

per

fungono da principi-guida nella metafisica

delle idee che

egidiana e che ritroviamo anche al fondo di questa dottrina e quella della assoluta

che

materia

della

potenzialita

materia

della

potenzialita

E

prima.

siamo

causa

a

a

indotti

assoluta

della

postulare

una

suo essere molta o poca, giustifichi cosi come dobbiamo postulare una determinazione quantitativa per spiegare la sua estensione: in se stessa la materia non e ne molta ne poca cosi

determinazione quantitativa che

come non ha un

il

estensionc maggiore o minore.

Ed

indifferenza rispetto a qualsiasi quantita che una

e grazie a questa sua

medesima porzione

di

materia, di per se, e capace di assumere quantita diverse.

dunque, in questa dottrina una strategia tipica di tendenza a liberare la nozione di materia prima da ogni

Ritroviamo, Egidio,

la

determinazione

senso

della

S.Tommaso

luce

critica

e

ne

che

fisica,

potenzialita. Alia

di

queste

rivolta

da

fisica",

"troppo

metterebbe

in

considcrazioni,

Egidio

a

giacche,

Passoluta

pericolo

risulta

chiaro

anche

S.Tommaso. La posizione parlando

di

il

di

multiplicationem

secundum essentiam matcriae, fa di una caratteristica puramente fisica come la quantita una determinazione intrinseca alia materia. Ora, degno di nota e

anche

il

fatto

che questa e una

S.Tommaso S.Tommaso non

che Egidio rivolge a

Sembra quasi che, per Egidio, formulare una nozione autenticamente metafisica

in altre occasion!.

sia riuscito a

critica

21

di

materia

prima.

Pisa

Egidio adotta la stessa strategia a proposito della materia dei corpi celesti; anche incorretibilita di questi corpi questo caso respinge la posizione tomista, che spiega sulla base della natura della loro materia, in nome dell assoluta potenzialita della dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia prima. Cfr. a questo proposito S.Donati, materia dei corpi celesti. Discussioni sulla natura dei corpi celesti alia fine del tredicesimo secolo", in Medioe\*o 12 (1986), p. 229-280. in

1

"La

LEILA

HAAPARANTA

A Frcgcan Perspective into Ockham s Method

1

.

Ockham

For

Conceptual Order

s

William

of

Ockham,

the

is

logic

of

study

the

acts

of intellect

considered as signs which constitute a mental language. In contrast to the

Ockham

conventional spoken and written words,

signify

spoken and written words logicae, the first part of which I

they

signify

naturally what

conventionally.

In his

Summa

that

natural;

is,

regards mental signs as

mainly discuss in this paper, Ockham calls the acts of the parts of mental propositions, intentions of the soul.

shall is,

of

the

soul

something something else (SL I, 12). A not itself an intention of the second

intention

species,

property,

intention.

of

Terms

Ockham

s

the

in

is

is

a

first

tertn

universal,

a

that

is

capable

An

intention

of

signifying

intention signifies something that

soul,

of

sign

soul

intellect, that

e.g.,

first

man,

intention.

and proposition

is

while a

this

man, etc., For example, genus, are terms of second

of second intention belong to the conceptual machinery

logic,

by means of which

Ockham

studies the terms of

first

intention (ibid.).

In the

Summa

logicae,

Ockham

asks whether the units which he

considers to be mental signs are representations in the

mind which would

between

mental acts and the individual objects which are signified, or whether they are acts of knowing themselves. He answers that logic is fall

interested

in

those acts of knowing themselves, and hence, that

we do

not need any intermediate images of objects between mental acts and objects.

As Ockham

from postulating

puts

it,

all

the theoretical advantages that derive

from

acts of understanding can be had without making such a distinction, for an act of understanding can signify something and can supposit for something just as well as any sign (SL I, 12).

Ockham

model so

entities distinct

thus seems to think that because he builds his logical

that he takes the mental units to be signs of a mental language,

he does not have to assume that the mental units are something more than acts. Hence, Ockham does not postulate any images in the mind,

492

Haaparanta acts. Nor does he postulate any ideal which logic would be interested in. thoughts

which would be contents of those objects like propositions or

2. Tfie

Materiality of Logic

The aim

of this paper

logic

through

logic

as

the

in

appears

it

predecessors.

logic,

and

in

considered,

was

which

s

logic

which were made

Frege

Superficially

psychologistic

Ockham

to consider

is

distinctions

and philosophy of nineteenth century

in

contemporaries and closest Ockham s view comes close to his

a

by

represented

number

great

of

nineteenth century logicians such as Beneke (1820, 1842), Sigwart (1873),

Wundt

Erdmann

(1880),

criticized

Gottlob

by

(1892),

and Lipps (1893). Those logicians were

and

Frege

other

Psychologists

antipsychologists.

human thought. Some of them believed that the rules of logic concerning how we ought to think have their origin in psychological laws of association concerning how regarded logical laws as psychological laws of

people

in

fact

Others

think.

our

took

logical

concepts of plurality, relation and possibility, to analyzing the

material,

the nineteenth century that

in

logicians

that

that

is,

logic

speaks is

about

all

metaphysical

reality,

human thought, objects. Of course

logicians different

the

who

realm

of

abstract

considered

branches

within

material logical

psychologists belonged to those

and

logic

studies.

who argued

or the

phenomenal were also

there logic

Frege

and

to

even

if

anti-

that logic mirrors the

realm

a

specific

logical

objectified the transcendental structure of

of abstract

1

is

parallel

distinct from, sense-perception.

By acknowledging

distinction

be two

other

of abstract objects and that our logical source of knowledge to,

basically

represents

the psychological

formal

1

is

logic

something

world, the transcendental conditions of or

the

was one version of the doctrine upheld by a

logic

something, whether that something

realm,

as

human mind.

Psychologistic

number of

such

concepts,

become understood by

objects

among

called

thoughts.

In

source

human

this

way,

of knowledge, Frege thought into the forms

he came to make a

three realms. For Frege, there were the realm of the

See Haaparanta (19885).

A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method

493

objects of sense experience, the realm of psychological events, and the 2 realm of logical objects, which provides us with logical concepts. Even if Frege acknowledged the realm of abstract objects, he took

for

it

that

granted

knowledge of analysis.

its

objectivity

structure. This

its

By means

acknowledgements

of this of

the

is

did not prevent us from having because he relied on the method of

method we truth

of

constitutive components of thoughts.

we have

of reason, to which

handle by our methodological

start

with judgements, which are

and

thoughts, 3

direct

Frege

s

come up with

the

logical objects are objects

we

access and which

are able to

tools.

we construe Ockham s procedure in Fregean terms, we notice that for Ockham we neither have direct access to our minds nor to any realm of abstract objects, because there is no such realm for Ockham. If

Ockham

believes in the conceptual priority of ordinary languages. This

belief manifests

itself

For what Ockham thought,

he

which

as a methodological choice in his logical studies.

when he

has at his disposal calls

the

mental

studies the structure of

language,

are

the

grammatical

concepts which pertain to overt languages.

we find George Boole, whose work has a number of traces from Ockham s and other medieval nominalists thought. He even comments on some of their tenets in his more philosophical considerations. He states that if a

Among

the pioneers of

modern

logic in the nineteenth century

by symbols, he would thereby take a step towards a philosophical language. However, he does not recommend the view represented by extreme nominalists which logician should succeed in expressing logical propositions

makes

dependent on language (Boole, 1965, p. 5). What idea resemble the ideas endorsed by Ockham is the fact

logic entirely

makes Boole

s

logical symbols to be founded on the laws of mental processes which they represent (ibid.). Boole s philosophy of logic is a version of psychologistic logic, for he ties

that

Boole takes the laws of the combinations of

the

mechanism of reasoning

to

the

laws

and the constitution of the

intellect. He presumes that if this constitution were changed, our would also turn out to be different from the present one (ibid., p.

human logic

2

See

GLA,

85,

Erkenntnisquellen

GGA der

XXIV, Der Gedanke (1918), KS, p. 353, and I, pp. XVIII Mathematik und der mathematischen Naturwissenschaften

(1924/25), NS, p. 286. 3

See Frege,

Frege,

Was

ist

Uber den Zweck der

Begriffsschrift

eine Funktion? (1904), KS, p. 273.

(1883),

Frege (1964),

p.

101,

and

494

Haaparanta In this peculiar sense, Boole

6).

but

Hence, what Boole of

construction

the

a

is

algebra

not an empty calculus,

medieval nominalists

in

criticizes

we do

the conviction that

s logical

and the mechanisms of the human mind.

structure

the

reflects

it

views

is

precisely

not have direct access to our minds but that

which

language

logical

language takes place by means

mental

the

represents

of the tools received from the study of

overt languages.

Like Boole

s

logic,

Ockham

s

is

his

material in the sense that

is

it

a language which speaks about the realm of the objects of

is

logic

logic

realm. Frege, for his part, assumes that

interested in the psychological

sense experience and the realm of abstract objects, and that

it

is

also

transcendental, for it gives us the structure of thought in general. Frege wants to give us a new language which is not a representation of overt languages but which is a direct symbolic representation of the forms of

Ockham

thought.

and

s

secondarily

notation

model

of

is

the

primarily a

mental,

model of overt languages

whereas

model of the realm of thoughts and

a

is

model

logical

a

Frege

s

conceptual

a representation of the

4

That is, Frege s universal language is be a language of thought itself. What this means is that Frege s and Ockham s interests and objects of study are crucially different. transcendental forms of thought.

meant

3.

to

Ockham

s

and Frege

first-order

Fregean

considered

are

constituted

is

characterized

framework

the

concepts

empirical negation,

conditionality,

Ockham

Models

language

in

by

s

generality,

of

by the idea that objects

Judgements

judgements.

and

by

logical

and

existence,

functions

identity.

Even

are like if

model does not represent the same object as that of Frege s, it Frege s model provided by a conceptual machinery which distinguishes between the material and the formal constituents of is

s

like

propositions.

That

is

because

Ockham makes

categorematic and syncatcgorematic

signs.

such expressions as every, no, some and

both

signification,

which

is

its

context, and supposition, which

For arguments (1985).

in

favour

of

this

a

distinction

Syncategorematic signs include all. A categorematic sign has

meaning independently of a is

between

sentential

a property of a term in a proposition.

interpretation

of

Frege

s

logic,

see

Haaparanta

A Ockham

proposition supposits (SL

a

s

Method

subject

495

a

or

predicate

of a

63).

I,

of three kinds, personal, material, and simple

may be

Supposition

be

can

whatever

that

states

Ockham

Fregean Perspective into

A

term supposits personally when it supposits for the thing which it signifies and when it is significant in suppositing. A term has material supposition when it does not supposit significatively but supposits 64).

(ibid.,

spoken or a written word.

for a

an

for

supposits

significatively.

of

intention

The term man

in

A

term has simple supposition when it the soul and is not functioning "Man"

material supposition, and the term

example of simple supposition. In the intention

species

has

intention of the soul

Accordingly, contains

terms

personal

man which overt

the

of

first

syncategorematic signs.

it

Man

in

latter

is

a

is

an example of species is an

example, the term of second for

supposition,

it

supposits

for

the

signifies.

Ockham

which

language,

terms

intention,

A

name

a

is

man

of

second

interested

is

intention,

in,

and

part of this language, namely, terms of second

intention and syncategorematic signs, consists of the logical vocabulary of this

language.

By means

of this vocabulary

semantic model of the overt language the mental language.

Ockham

formulates a proper and secondarily a model of

itself

5

4. Tlie

Method of Analysis

In

two methodological recommendations were emphasized. grammatical concepts like subject and predicate must not be used

Fregean

First,

logic,

as basic conceptual tools.

out

must

of

method of composing judgements replaced by the method of analyzing

Secondly, the

be

concepts judgements. This is how Frege claims to have found the primitive logical 7 functions which constitute the judgements.

seems that from the Fregean point of view Ockham s logical ought to be criticized for not giving up grammatical tools but praised for adopting the method of analysis in the logical descent to It

studies

This

kind

of

reconstruction

of

Ockham

s

project

is

given

by

Moody

(1953),

on

p. 27.

6 7

See Frege (1964), pp. 2 See Frege,

(1988a, 19885).

-

3,

and Frege an Husserl (1906), BW,

Uber den Zweck der

Begriffsschrift

,

BS

p. 102.

(1964),

p.

101.

Cf.

Haaparanta

496

Haaparanta

when

individuals

Ockham common

terms

divides

Ockham

what

clarifying

having

personal

not

are

as

suppositing terms,

discrete

Ockham

(SL

supposition.

the proper

is

name

Common terms are such 70). Among common

I,

and

discrete

into

supposition

terms. In discrete supposition the term

object or a demonstrative pronoun.

terms

common

calls

of an

suppositing personally

then distinguishes between determinate, merely

confused and confused distributive supposition. A term has determinate supposition when it is possible to descend to particular objects by means of a disjunctive

This

man

man

runs, or that

when

supposition

For example,

proposition.

is

it

runs, or

possible

...

.

A man runs reduced to A term has merely confused is

descend

to

a

to

proposition

with

a

disjunctive predicate involving particulars. For example, Every man is an animal reduces to Every man is this animal or that animal or ... A .

common

term has confused distributive supposition when

descend

individuals

to

is

possible to

a conjunctive proposition. For by means an animal reduces to This man is an animal, and

of

example, Every man is that man is an animal, and

The

it

...

.

three rules of descent which correspond to the three forms of

The

supposition must be used in a certain order. is

supposition

applied

the

first,

rule

for

must be the second, and the

supposition

rule for determinate

confused rule

last

and

applied

distributive

that

is

for

merely confused supposition. For example, the proposition Every man is an animal receives the analysis This man is this animal or that animal or

...,

and

For a

that

man

is

this

animal or that animal or

uses a often

specific read as

symbol

some

.

v,

which behaves

When

for

,

y

= VX

solving

y

The

in

his

somewhere

introduce formulas like

syllogisms, Boole gives solution of the universal

is

.

solution of the universal negative proposition

No Xs

are

Ys

,

symbolically xy

= 0,

is

= v(\-x).

The corresponding forms

for particular affirmative

are

(3)

.

Broadie (1987), pp. 17-25 and pp. 90 - 96. the structure which Boole gives to propositions lies and Frege s analysis. Unlike Frcge, Boole does not

propositions of the forms A, E, I, and O. affirmative proposition All Ys are Xs symbolically v(l-A ) = 0, solutions

(2)

8 ...

that

quantifiers. However, he an existential quantifier

The

and

clarification of this idea, sec

may be noted between Ockham s It

(1)

...,

vx = vy,

meaning Some Xs are Ys

,

and particular negative propositions

A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method The very

may remind

of supposition

idea

us

497

of Frege

context

s

which the meanings of words must be looked for 9 contexts. Frege s logical analysis, which starts with

principle, according to

sentential

in

judgements and not with concepts

in isolation, is true to that principle.

10

And Ockham

s descent to individuals may resemble Frege s descent to which are put into the empty argument places of functions in his objects

conceptual notation. This is how things seem to be. But

what Ockham and Frege are doing, crucially different views of analysis.

there

a

is

different

ontological

more

consider

carefully

turn out that they endorse

their

For

doctrines.

we

if

will

Someone might argue

between

difference

great

it

logics,

example,

for

that of course

they

singular

represent

sentences

like

man

are considered by Frege to be compounded out of a refers to an object, and a function name, which which proper name, refers to a function. For Ockham, there are no functions like properties

Socrates

a

is

and relations

in the

world to be referred

to;

a

instead,

man

stands for

particular men.

However, the point which

want to make here

I

a difference between ontologies,

Ockham

not that there

is

is

being a nominalist and Frege

being a kind of Platonist. Instead, the difference which we find between their views from a logical vantage point is precisely due to a difference between the ways they use the method of analysis and thus a difference

between

their epistemologies.

Both Ockham and Frege propositions

Socrates

be a

to

reading

Socrates

as

identical with a

is

man and is

is

Socrates

the

reject

man man in a

.

That

of

such

they do not think

that

essentialist is,

the sense that Socrates

identical with his essence.

is

reading

based on a sharp distinction between the

essence

is

However, Frege s of identity and

is

and vx = v(l-y),

(4)

meaning Some Xs are not Ys (Boole, 1965, pp. 32

-

33).

These formulas bear

a

striking

similarity

to

the

basic

level

of

Ockham

s

analysis,

exception that Boole stops at the structure of propositions given by elective symbols, which serve as concepts, by the symbol v, which stands for the word some and by the symbol of identity. Ockham has only discrete terms, that is, proper names and demonstrative pronouns, and the symbol of

however,

with

the

not

unimportant ,

identity at the basic level.

9 See,

e.g.,

GLA, Vorwort

,

p.

X, and

For the interpretation of Frege 93.

60. s

context principle, see Haaparanta (1985), pp. 79

-

498

Haaparanta

the

of predication, and

is

takes the sentence to

it

11

mean

that Socrates

for his part, construes

under the concept ma/?. Ockham, and a man as names of one and the same object, that falls

is,

Socrates

as suppositing

for one and the same individual (SL I, 43). A apparently similar view is held by Bertrand Russell in Ttie Principles of Mathematics (1903). Russell

between two readings of the sentence Socrates is a man He assumes that one reading expresses a relation of Socrates to the .

distinguishes

man, while the other reading expresses the identity of Socrates with an ambiguous individual (Russell, 1950, pp. 54 55). Frege in the article in his view kind of criticizes this posthumous writings class-concept

there Logik in der Mathematik (1914). He characterizes it by saying that have been people who have held that concept-words are ambiguous names and that a man is hence a new name for Socrates (NS, pp. 230 - 231).

Frcge

criticism

s

meanings which

would not

Ockham

hit

Ockham

s

theory,

according to the

for

gives to such terms as univocity

and ambiguity

common names arc not ambiguous. The name man signifies several individuals equally, but it signifies them by one convention and it is subordinated to one single concept of the mental language,

view (SL

in

Ockham

s

17).

I,

is analysis of universal, particular and singular judgements Frege include which and between distinction based on the functions, objects

s

are concepts and relations. Proper identity statements and predications would remain kept apart in his logic in order that objects and concepts 12

Frege even connects his distinction between objects and concepts with Kant s distinction between intuitions and concepts, which are the apart.

13 two irreducible and indispensable components of our knowledge.

He

with bundles of argues that objects are not identical with concepts or statement. Proper concepts. Hence, Socrates is a man is not an identity statements like Venus is the Morning Star have a special identity

content for Frege.

They

are metalinguistic statements which claim that

two names refer to one and the same object but that they have different senses (Sinne), which they ascribe to the object named, that is, they

11

See, 12

168 13

This -

e.g., is

Frege,

Uber

168 Begriff und GegenstancT (1892), KS, pp.

strongly emphasized by Frege

169.

See GI

A

27, footnote.

in

his

Uber

-

169 and

p. 174.

Begriff und Gegenstand

,

KS, pp.

A Fregean Perspective into

Ockham

to think that the

for a

view,

form

what

signifies

he also claims that

43), but

I,

whiteness is

asserted

is

it

is

499

that

one nature

Socrates

is

it

to all

white

false to think that

sentence

in the

Method

Ockham argues common

express different aspects of the object.

name man

s

white

.

In

is

false

men (SL supposits

Ockham

s

which the subject stands is (ibid., 66), Hence, Ockham and

that the thing for

the thing for which the predicate stands

Frege agree in their criticism against essentialism, but they disagree in what they think of the basic level of analysis. In Ockham s procedure, analysis brings us to the level of individual objects, while Frege s analysis

stops at the level of individuals, concepts, and relations.

5. TJie

Two Epistemologies

But why does Frege stop

at

an earlier

level

treatment of a predicative judgement like allow

any reduction

Frege thinks that via

a

of concept-words

that

a

a sense,

via

is

it

name

a

than

Socrates

names of

to

Ockham? Frege

s

man

does not

objects.

Similarly,

a

is

conceptual component, and only

related

an

to

15

Hence, every mediated by a concept under which that object falls, and every judgement is construed as an expression of an act of knowledge which consists of conceptual components alone or together sense,

apprehension of an object

is

object.

is

with symbolic representations of individual objects.

Ockham, for his part, upholds the view that all terms, both discrete and common, stand in direct relation to individual objects and, moreover, that mental signs are on a par with overt signs, that is, that they also stand in direct relation to individual objects. proposition as a composition of

conceptual components like Frege s Sinne. Of course we might suggest that

between

Ockham

repeated

point

s

and

that

Frege

they put

s

basic

forward

disregarding this alleged difference

Ockham and Frege have Frege gives his main (1892), KS, pp. 143 144. This

remark

(1892), NS, p. 135.

is

crucially

argument for

made by Frege

Ockham

s

model construes a

two names without even a mentioning of

in

the levels

reason for of

different

analysis

the is

ontological

difference

the views.

often

But

and taking into account the fact that different aims in their logical studies,

this

his

tenet

in

his

Ausfiihrungen

Uber Sinn und Bedeutung fiber

Sinn

und Bedeutung

500

Haaparanta

we may formulate

the

answer

in

another

way.

Namely, Ockham is is committed to the

committed to his scarce basic level only so far as he view that his semantic model languages,

model

is

is

model of spoken and written sign-object relations, and that this

primarily a

thus consisting of simple

then automatically extended to the mental realm. if Ockham s mental language may appear to have the

Hence, even

same

constituents as Frege

close to constructing a

new

s

Ockham does not come What prevents Ockham from

conceptual notation,

logical language.

precisely the view upheld by him that the primary which the conceptual machinery of logic is applied are overt spoken and written languages. Surprisingly enough, this conviction brings

constructing

it

is

objects to

Ockham

to a number of logical developments of the twentieth what Ockham does, expressed in contemporary terms, is to century, give a semantic theory for natural languages and not to give a new

closer

for

universal language, which Frege

Academy

s

conceptual notation was meant to be.

of Finland,

University of Helsinki

References

F.E Erfahningsseclenlehre Siegfried Mittler, Berlin, 1820.

Beneke,

als

Beneke, F.E., System der Logik als Ferdinand Dummler, Berlin, 1842.

Grundlage Kunstlchre

alles

des

Wissens,

Denkens

I

Ernst

-

//,

Boole, G., Tlie Mathematical Analysis of Logic, being an essay towards a calculus of deductive reasoning (1847), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1965.

Broadie, A., Introduction

to

Medieval Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford,

1987.

Erdmann, 1923

B.,

Logik (1892), Walter de Gruyter

&

Co., Berlin

und Leipzig,

(3. ed.)

Frege, G., Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Verlag von L. Nebert, Halle a.S., 1879; von I. repr. in G. Frege. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsatze, hrsg. Angelelli, Georg Dims, Hildesheim, 1964. (Referred to as BS.) G., Die Gnmdlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung uber den Begriff der Zahl, Verlag von W. Koebner,

Frege,

A Fregean Perspective into Ockham s Method

501

Breslau, 1884; repr. and transl. by J.L. Austin in Tfie Foundations of Arithmetic I Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968. (Referred to as

Frege,

GLA.) der Arithmetik,

Grundgesetze

G.,

begriffsschriftlich

Band, Verlag von H. Pohle, Jena, 1893. (Referred

to as

abgeleitet,

I.

GGA I.)

Frege, G., Kleine Schriften, hrsg. von I. Angelelli, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, und Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1967. (Referred to as KS.) Frege, G., Nachgelassene Schriften, hrsg. von H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, und F. Kaulbach, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1969. Frege,

G.,

Wissenschaftliche

Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Hamburg, 1976. Haaparanta,

L.,

Briefwechsel, hrsg. von G. Gabriel, H. Thiel, und A. Veraart, Felix Meiner Verlag,

Frege s Doctrine of Being,

Ada

Philosophica Fennica 39,

1985. L., Frege and His German Contemporaries on Alethic Moda (1988a), in S. Knuuttila (ed.), Modem Modalities: Studies of the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1988, pp. 234 274.

Haaparanta, lities

L., Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and HusserF (1988b), Synthese 11, 1988, pp. 73-

Haaparanta, 97.

Lipps, T., Grundzilge der Logik, Verlag von Leopold Voss, Leipzig, 1893.

Hamburg und

Moody, E.A., Truth and Consequence in Medieval Logic, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1953.

Ockham. W. and

S.

of,

Summa

Brown,

Ockham, W.

of,

St.

Logicae (1323 1329), ed. by P. Boehner. G. Gal, Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974. (Referred to as SL.)

Ockham

transl.

and

Notre

Dame

s

Theory of Terms, Part 1 of the

Sigwart, C., Logik, Erster Band, Verlag der H. Tubingen, 1873. Russell, B.,

Summa Logicae, Dame Press,

by M.L. Loux, University or Notre and London, 1974.

intr.

Lauppschen Buchhandlung,

The Principles of Mathematics (1903), George Allen

&

Unwin

Ltd, London, 1950.

W,

Logik: Eine Untersuchung der Principien der Erkenntnis und der Methoden Wissenschaftlicher Forschung, Erster Band: Erkenntnis-

Wundt,

lehre,

Verlag von Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1880.

BRIAN HENDLEY

A New Look at John of Salisbury s Educational Theory

In recent years, there has life

been

and works of John of of John

edition

critical

s

a resurgence of scholarly interest in the

2

John

City, talks

and a

scholar,

at

appeared with an accompanying 1980, scholars from around the world

just

among

others.

3

Similar

an international Conference held

as well

interest

interdisciplinary

at Salisbury,

book

England, with Tfie

papers being published 4 Careful attention of Salisbury.

a

as to his activities as a student,

Church administrator,

in

later

of the

writings,

s

historian, a classicist, a philosopher,

of John

World

a

on John were given by a

literary

bulk

edition

of John

commemorate the octocentennial of at Fordham University in New York

was shown the

new

volume of

At the Conference held

death.

s

A

appeared.

English and Dutch translation. gathered at various conferences to In

the second

1979, 1

Letters

Maior and Minor has

Entheticus

In

Salisbury.

was

entitled,

paid

John

to

s

and inveterate traveller. Many of the papers challenged his and views argued for a revised interpretation of John and accepted political advisor,

work. It

is

the

in

spirit

of these

"John

of Salisbury

shall take a fresh look at his educational theory. article

Daniel

by

Metalogicon

of

McGarry,

John of

entitled 5

theory of knowledge John develops

what

at stake philosophically

is

I

Salisbury."

in

of Salisbury

s

Entheticus

(Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. 3

John

York 4

of

City,

Salisbury

October

Michael

Wilks

1984). Cf. also

5

my

take

shall

that

1

concentrate on an in

Theory

special

note

of

the the

the Metalogicon in order to see defense of the arts of the Trivium

in

his

W.J. Millor and C.N.L. Brooke (eds.), The Two: The Later Letters (1163-1180) (Oxford, 1979).

John

will

"Educational

1

2

I

revisionists"

Letters

Maior and Minor,

cd.

of John

Jan

of Salisbury,

van

Volume

3

vols.

University,

New

I^aarhoven,

Brill, 1987).

Octocentennial

Conference

held

at

Fordham

25, 1980. (ed.),

The

review of Wilks

of John of Salisbury (Oxford: Basil Speculum, 62 (January, 1987), pp. 220-222.

World in

Daniel D. McGarry, "Educational Theory Speculum, 23 (1948), pp. 659-675.

in

the Metalogicon

of John of

Blackwcll,

Salisbury,"

John of Salisbury s Educational Ttieory and show how

his defense

is

relevant to

some

503

of the educational problems

of today.

McGarry on John

s

article

McGarry s

Educational Ttieory

was

the

in

pivotal

sense

that

introduced

it

many

English-speaking readers to the cultural background and the philosophical foundation for John s defense of the Trivium. 6 John wrote the

Metalogicon as a defense of with

dealing

language:

grammar,

these

because

arts

and

rhetoric,

answer the attacks of those he called the of

broad sense of the three

in the

"logic"

of

their

7

belief

that

reasoning and verbal expression comes as the

fruit

study

He

logic.

"Cornificians"

it

to

decried the

"effective

facility

in

of natural talent and 8

exercise rather than as a product of formal

wrote

who

arts

teaching."

Like contemporary

proponents of education as job-training, the Cornificians were impatient with the time being spent studying great works of the past and dubious of the need to master the rules for effective speaking, clear writing, and

cogent argumentation. They would reduce the attention paid to the arts of the Trivium to a minimum in order to expedite the entry of students into lucrative occupations. They claimed that came as an innate eloquence gift

rather than as the result of formal study.

John was

eminently suited to answer this charge, according to because of his wide reading and love for the classics. 9 As a McGarry, There had been previous studies on John on a more popular level; cf., for example, Clement C.J. Webb, John of Salisbury (London: Methuen, 1932) and Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning (London, 1920). McGarry s translation of the Metalogicon did not appear until 1955. Scholars

when he

are

still

not

referred to the

Cornifician

motif

in

certain

which

"Cornificians".

John of Salisbury

Cf., s

had in particular individuals John for example, Rosemary Barton Tobin,

Metalogicon,"

History of Education,

13

mind "The

(1984),

pp. 1-6. o

McGarry, 9

This

op.

cit.,

view of John as a most notably by Janet Martin.

traditional

challenged,

p. 660.

lover Cf.

her

of

the

Classics

has

recently

of Salisbury and the interest are her articles,

"John

been

Classics"

dissertation. Harvard, 1968). Also of "John of Manuscripts of Frontinus and of Gellius," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 40 (1977), pp. 1-26; "Uses of Tradition: Gellius, Petronius and John

(unpublished

Salisbury

of

s

Viator, 10 (1979), pp. 57-76; and "John of Salisbury as Classical Scholar," The World of John of Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 179-201. Further criticism of John s classical scholarship can be found in Peter Von Moos, "The Use of Exempla in the Policaticus of John of Salisbury," in The World of John of Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 207-261. in

Salisbury,"

504

Hcndley

student of the

"Christian

humanism"

of Chartres, he was able to

draw

with upon a deep knowledge of the writings of classical authors together 10 He the Bible and the works of the Church Fathers. proposes that schools adopt the educational

wherein at

"the

lectures,

11 activity."

learning process consists in reading, active attendance reflection, memorization, exercises in imitation and original recitations,

production,

method followed by Bernard of Chartres,

full

John

s

known statement

and review,

all

of which

indebtedness to Bernard to the effect that

is

"Bernard

further

further

stress

marked

student

in his well-

of Chartres used to

compare

us to [puny] dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants. He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have

keener vision or greater height, but because we are

on

aloft

their gigantic

lifted

up and borne

12 stature."

Having traced the intellectual lineage of John s thought, McGarry is the foundation for goes on to say that "John s philosophy of education his whole pedagogical theory, and the key to his philosophy of education 13 This philosophy sees knowledge as based on is his philosophy." general

Reason frees us opinions derived from the senses and imagination. hidden natures to the access us and from deception by opinion gain helps and causes of things. Education seeks to develop reason through the fallible

study of the

arts,

which are

of experience:

light

"efficacious

tools, fashioned

by reason

in the

results expeditious short-cuts to the achievement of

10

R.W. Southern has claimed that there never was a distinctive School of Chartres with its own brand of Christian humanism. Cf. his The Schools of Paris and The School of Chartres," in Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable (eds.) Renaissance

and Renewal "Humanism

in

and

the

the

and his Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 113; of Chartres," in Medie\ al Humanism and Other Studies the issue is far from 1970), p. 74. Southern does admit that

Twelfth

School

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, settled and he refers to criticisms of his view by Nikolaus M. Haring, "Chartres and Paris Revisited," in J. Reginald O Donncll (ed.), Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Peter Dronke, "New Approaches to the School of Pegis (Toronto, 1974), pp. 268-329; de estudios medie\ ales, 6 (1971), p. 117-140; and Robert Giacone, Chartres," Anuario Books and Library at Chartres According to the Cartularies of Notre-Dame "Masters, and Saint-Pere," Vivarium, 12 (1974), pp. 30-51. Also of interest on the topic is J.O. on Cicero s De Inventione by Thierry of Chartres Date of the "The

Commentary

Ward, (ca.

1095-1160?) and the Cornifician Attack on the Liberal

Arts,"

Viator,

3 (1972), pp.

219-273. 11

Ibid., p. 673.

12

The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury, trans. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley/Los this remark is commonly attributed to Angeles, 1955, reprinted 1962), p. 167. Although Bernard of Chartres, Raymond Klibansky claims that the original statement comes from 147-149. Priscian; cf. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants," Isis, 26 (1936), pp. 13

McGarry,

op.

cit.,

p. 664.

John of Salisbury s Educational Theory

would

which

be

otherwise

development of reason

is

too

or

difficult

505

unattainable."

14

The

complemented by acquiring eloquence through

study of the verbal arts. Eloquence enables us to accumulate and

the

what we know by thinking correctly, accurately comprehending what we hear and read, and effectively expressing ourselves in speech distribute

and

15

writing.

have no quarrel with this since I too am a firm supporter of the 16 view that the concerns of wisdom and eloquence are mutual for John. What I cannot fathom is McGarry s attempt to connect John to presentI

day educational thinkers by labelling to

McGarry, According between several of the

"There

in

fact,

advocated

views

of an

his theory as that

exists,

"Idealist".

a remarkable parallelism in

the

Metalogicon

and

corresponding propositions presented by R.M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago in his ... [book] Higher Learning in America, and Hutchins is

an

considered

Idealist

.

Tragmatist or Materialist

The comparison not

there

...

is

no

John was no

that

question

17 ."

of John of Salisbury to Robert

Maynard Hutchins

an apt one. Hutchins was a staunch follower of Aristotle and

Thomas Aquinas. He be

could

clearly

is

St.

believed that the aims and content of education

once

delineated

we recognized

the

importance

of

metaphysics. Metaphysics gives us knowledge of the ordering principles

and causes of order

of

distinction

some as

reality

studies

in

which provide the underlying framework for the education. Even the sceptic must presuppose a

between knowledge and opinion, says Hutchins.

certain, clear knowledge. If there

such,

and

it

be

which there

in

disciplines

should

beginning of our

curriculum."

taught is

is

first.

knowledge, Let us then it

certainty and

let

us

"There

must be

should be taught

enumerate the

place

them

at

the

18

The key idea is that of order. The rational order of the universe can be known and it should be mirrored by the order of studies in school.

14 15

In

a

simplistic

but

oft-quoted statement, Hutchins puts

it

this

Ibid., p. 668.

Ibid., p. 675.

A

1

New Interpretation Cf., for example, Brian Hendley, "Wisdom and Eloquence: of the Metalogicon of John of Salisbury" (unpublished dissertation, Yale, 1967). McGarry, 18

Robert

op.

M.

cit.,

p. 665.

Hutchins,

(November, 1936),

p. 588.

"A

Reply

to

Professor

Whitehead,"

Atlantic

Monthly,

158

506

Hendley

way:

"Education

implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge.

Knowledge

everywhere the same. Hence education should be 19 Practical applications of ideas have no place in same." the everywhere the proper order of higher education. What can be learned at the is

The

truth.

truth

is

university are general principles, fundamental propositions, the theory of

any discipline, unhampered by any concern for

The university own sake. The role of

results.

their

with

"true

of

"models

as the

rules

"means

for

reasoning

excellence".

scheme

and

is

to supply us

logic are singled out

Grammar, rhetoric, how excellence is achieved". Thus,

of determining classical

speaking, is

the classics in this

of writing,

rules

demonstrative."

rigorously

20

for

pressure

to study things for

is

says Hutchins,

spirit",

or

utility

"conditions

there are

under which

The culmination of

the whole

programme of studies should be metaphysics. Indeed, Hutchins asserts that we can revitalize metaphysics and restore it to its proper place in the higher learning, we may be able to establish rational order in the modern "If

world as well as It

is

21 university."

to reconcile this view of education with that of

difficult

of Salisbury.

who

in the

For one

thing,

John

a

is

self-professed

sceptic

"in

Whether such propositions may be 22

probable certitude." guide our way in

judgements effective

John

matters that are Metalogicon with the disclaimer that to a wise man, I cannot swear to the truth of what I say.

begins his

doubtful

Academic

use

experiences,

of

of

or

false,

I

am

satisfied

with

For John, there are no metaphysical certainties

Human knowledge

education.

sensation

language.

clarify

true

and

and

imagination.

We

learn

critici/e

to

It

begins

to

fallible

advances

communicate

our opinions,

with

through the our ideas and

argue with one another

about the meaning of things. The truths that Hutchins would start from in education are the ideal end or goal that John would have us strive towards, with no guarantee of success.

The

difference between the two

approaches to knowledge can be highlighted by recalling John of universals and his

commentary on Aristotle

s

s

treatment

Organon.

Although he acknowledges Aristotle as the master on the question of universals, John stops short of fully endorsing his position. For Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher University Press, 1936, reprinted, 1965), p. 66. 20

Learning

Ibid., p. S3.

21

Ibid., p. 105.

The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,

op.

cit., p. 6.

in

America

(New Haven: Yale

John of Salisbury s Educational

507

Tiieory

knowledge of the universal was knowledge of sensible things

Aristotle,

under the aspect of their formal cause. The mind is able to abstract a content from particular sense perceptions and use this as a basis for scientific knowledge. For John, we have no such knowledge of universal

the formal aspects of individual things because

seemingly melts

when confronted by

the

strength of reason

"the

principles of

[first]

The

things."

our grasp and we must make do it (figmenta) which reason devises

real nature of sensible things exceeds

with universals which are delves deeper in

"fictions"

of learning, John assures us, their

"as

investigation and explanation of

its

All branches

things."

devise fictions to expedite

"unhesitatingly

23 investigations."

This

reluctance

reality

claim

to

certainty

John

in

our knowledge of sensible

apparent commentary on the Organon. toward Aristotle s Posterior Analytics which

also

is

in

s

relatively

with methods of logical demonstration. Such methods

mathematics,

and

especially

truths; but they are not of

geometry where we

scientific

knowledge

of what

is

may be

deal

is

deals

of use in

with

necessary use in our investigation of sensible

much

Strictly speaking, says John,

reality.

He

indifferent

"there

can be no necessary proof or

corruptible",

so

that

the

demonstrator

should leave

all topics that are not necessary to the dialectician and the seek only probability. John strongly prefers Aristotle s Topics which aids our investigation of probabilities by accounting for the mutual

orator

who

connection of things and words and provides us with an abundance of

to

24

Once

through language that we will advance, if not mathematical (or metaphysical) certainty, then to higher degrees of

reasons.

again

is

it

probability.

McGarry was

complementarity of wisdom and eloquence in John s educational theory. What he failed to appreciate was that John sees the efficacious use of language as our chief means to achieve wisdom. is

advantageous

wisdom."

Ibid.,

of

25

pp.

Universals,"

to

right

"Fluency "only

note the

does not always merit

when

it

is

oriented

Through reading and learning

praise,"

to

facilitated

[the

John

acquisition

by the

130, 135; cf. also Brian Hendley, "John of Salisbury and Journal of the History of Philosophy, 8 (1970), pp. 289-302.

24

tells us;

it

of]

arts

of the

the

Problem

pp. 212, 215, 201. Cf. also Brian Hendley, "John of Salisbury s Defense of the Arts Liberaux et Philosophic au Moyen Age. IVe Congres international de philosophic medievale. Montreal, 1967 (Paris, 1969), pp. 753-762. Ibid.,

Trivium,"

The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,

op.

cit.,

pp. 91-92.

508

Hendley

we can

Trivium,

an intuitive understanding

attain

help,

Such

into the real nature of things.

(intellectus)

it

or meditative insight

must be learned.

speaking and writing correctly in order to gain comprehensibility in the use of words. We must also learn for

in

disserendi)

(ratio

reasoning"

distinguish the true from the false and what 26

impossible.

Finally,

we must

is

order

science of

be

to

able

disprove

proposed It

in

is

that

learn the art of disputation

either

is

doubtful,

to

necessary from what

or

or

denied,

something 27 one way or another by alleging reasons." precisely because John does not think we

can

underlying principles and causes of things with our natural

is

whereby we

can persuade others of the likelihood of our assertions and seek to or

and

clarity

"the

argumentative

s

language does not come We must master

facility in

naturally, as the Cornificians contend;

rules

God

eventually get beyond fallible opinions and, with

"prove

[simply]

the

grasp

abilities that

he advocates the study of the Trivium. His defense of the verbal arts does not stem from a so-called Christian humanism which values the study of the classics for like

Hutchins who

of

reality

its

own

sake; nor

is

it

the outlook of

someone

patterns the content of education on the rational order

disclosed

to

us

through

It

metaphysics.

rather

is

the

theory sceptic whose scepticism is tempered by an abiding faith in language as the means to overcome the limits of our knowledge and draw closer to the truth. This can be seen in the of

educational

a

he poses for the Cornificians: "Can the secret and hidden recesses [cuniculos] of nature be charted by one who is utterly ignorant questions

of

all

philosophy?

Can

they be understood by one

to speak correctly, nor to

Almost

as

comprehend what

surprising

as

theory with that of Hutchins

his

is

is

attempt

McGarry

s

who knows

written or to

neither

how

28 spoken?"

link

John

disavowal of

s

educational

"Pragmatism"

as

an alternative description of what John is up to. Various scholars have commented on the pragmatic turn to John s thought. According to Peter

Von Moos, fancies

and

for

effective ideas.

26

example, John had

abstract conceptions 29

It

Ibid., p. IS.

Ibid.,p.80.

29

Ibid., p. 18-19.

Peter

Von Moos,

op.

an aversion to felt

purely

theoretical

that the only valid ideas

were

has also been noted by Michael Wilks that the lack

27 28

and

cit.,

p. 209.

509

John of Salisbury s Educational Theory

outcome of ideas was seen by John as the source of bad government as well as bad philosophy. The verbal jugglers of concern for the practical

Metalogicon are the philosophical counterparts of the nonsense minstrels and prince-pleasers he attacks in the Policraticus:

he

criticizes in the

"the

of the

universalists

This

curialium."^

the

is

he espouses a naive

that sort

the

promoted by in its

same nonsense

of the

the nugae

courtiers,

not to suggest that John was anti-intellectual, nor

is

"learning

by

Cornificians.

doing"

I

approach to education of the

think

his

overall

viewpoint

is

and that

scepticism, and

combination of

faith, fallibility, pragmatic bears strong similarities to the thought of the founder of American

it

pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914).

John and Peirce

Much

has been written about Peirce

s interest in

Duns

Scotus.

31

It

should

be noted that he read and appreciated other Medieval philosophers, of Salisbury whom he called elegant writer and

also

among them John accurate

"the

32

Peirce

thinker."

specifically

refers to the Metalogicon

men

fitting since both

approaches to the

intellect

alone",

number of

While John admits

because

35

a

s

works

times.

34

and he

This seems

share a healthy scepticism which rejects infallible

truth.

attain necessary truth

the

owned and read John

we

that in

deal only with

mathematics we can

"concepts

he would agree with Peirce that

perceptible by in

regard

to

Michael Wilks, "John of Salisbury and the Tyranny of Nonsense," in The World of John of Salisbury, op. tit., p. 276. For a good sample of John s impatience with verbal jugglers cf. his remarks in the Policraticus, VII, 12, trans, by Joseph B. Pike as Frivolities of Courtiers and Footprints of Philosophers (Minneapolis: University of Baldwin archdeacon of Totnes," Minnesota Press, 1938), p. 261, and his Letter 238, in The Letters of John of Salisbury, Volume Two, op. cit., pp. 450-451. "To

21

for example, John F. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A Cf., Study of Peirce s Relation to Duns Scotus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963). 32 Charles S. Peirce, "Letters to Lady Welby," in Philip P. Wiener (ed.), Values in a Universe of Chance (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958), p. 403.

33

Peirce owned a copy of John s Metalogicon (Paris, 1610) and Opera (Oxford, 1848), according to Max Fisch (personal correspondence, March 6, 1967).

and

Omnia

Weiss (eds.), Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Harvard University Press, second printing, 1960), 1.560. Specific references to the Metalogicon can be found in 2.317, n.l, 2.364, 2.391, n.3, 2.434, and 8.378. Charles

Peirce

Hartshorne

(Cambridge,

Paul

Massachusetts:

The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,

op.

cit.,

p. 250.

510

Hendley

knowledge is never absolute but always swims 36 continuum of uncertainty and indeterminacy."

sensible reality

Peirce sees the

of

fallibility

human

in a

...

"our

opinion leading to an irritation

of doubt which acts as a stimulus to inquiry, the sole object of which

settlement

the

and

of

the

fixation

of

belief.

37

This

will

is

be

opinion achieved in the long run by the efforts of a community of inquirers using common methods of investigation. Such methods should have a public and

and be directed

self-corrective character

to a

38

common

Although he would substitute an empirical, experimental method for John s more linguistic approach to finding the truth, Peirce would support John s belief that

common methods

through

reach the truth. According to Peirce,

of investigation "all

goal.

we can

ultimately

the followers of science are

animated by a cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to each question to 39 This "cheerful hope" of science is an abiding which they apply that we can eventually ascertain by reasoning how things really and it."

faith

truly

are.

In

much

grammar,

the

rhetoric,

same way, John argues and

logic will

that

mastery of the arts of

enable us to rise above the limitations

of the senses and reach an intuitive understanding of the exact nature of

By taking advantage of the stature of the classical authors whose we read and study, we can see more and farther than our predecessors. By learning how to communicate effectively and argue cogently, we can also, in Peirce s sense of community inquiry, stand on things.

works

one another in

Peirce

s

s

shoulder. This similarity of outlook

description

investigators

of the

and

cooperate

of the

procedure "stand

one

upon

is

brought out strikingly

natural sciences

another

communicating observations, examining hypotheses, and against

experience.

The

subject to further testing.

final

results

only

shoulders"

in

testing predictions

provisionally

accepted,

40

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, op.

37

are

s

where

cit.

,

1.171.

Ibid., 5.375.

A

good treatment of Peirce s view of community inquiry can be found in John The Spirit of American Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), and in his article, "Community and Reality," in Richard J. Bernstein (ed.), Perspectives on Peirce (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 92-119. E. Smith,

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, op.

40

Ibid., 5.413.

cit.,

5.407.

John of Salisbury

s

Educational Theory

511

Such an open-minded approach to the pursuit of truth seems much more in line with John s thought than do the dogmatic pronouncements of 41 Hutchins. McGarry directs By mis-labelling John s position as "Idealist",

most interesting features: the recognition of of human knowledge and the concomitant distrust of claims

our attention away from the

fallibility

its

to certainty, the distaste for intellectual exercises that lead

the

properly trained in

hidden

nowhere, plus powers of reason and the capacity of men, the arts of language, to help one another toward the

in

faith

ongoing

the

truth

we

all

in

the

sense

pragmatic

seek.

This

that

it

is

a

claims

view

would

I

do count

ideas

that

characterize

and

as

that

community inquiry can be an effective means to the truth. It forms the core of an educational theory that still has something to say to us today, faced as we are by challenges to liberal education from contemporary

who

Cornificians truth,

disdain study of the past, seek quick shortcuts to the

and see education as a means of

satisfying

immediate vocational

wants rather than meeting long-range needs. John serves to remind us that we must not neglect our cultural heritage for we have much to learn

from the

"giants"

need some

who

tried to

make

sense out of

life

We

before us.

also

expression and logical thinking, so that we can share and compare our ideas and talk with rather than at or about one another. Above all, we should maintain a sceptical attitude towards discipline in verbal

matters doubtful to a wise man. These are the elements in John

s

defense

of the liberal arts that are worth recalling today.

University of Waterloo

One Hutchins

could

draw

similar

made by another

"Rationality

in

Education,"

parallels

between

John

s

views

leading American pragmatist, John Social Frontier, 3 (December, 1936),

Hutchins Proposals to Remake Higher Education," Ibid. and The Higher Learning in America," Ibid. (March,

and

the

Dewey. pp.

criticisms Cf.

71-73;

Dewey

of s,

"President

1937), pp. 103-104; 1937), pp. 167-169. Also of education to ultimate first principles

interest is Dewey s objection to subordinating derived from Aristotle and St. Thomas; cf. Experience Books, 1963 [1938]).

(January,

and Education (London:

Collier

CHRISTOPH KANN

Zur Suppositionsthcoric Alberts von Sachscn

Die Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachscn wird zumeist vordergriindig als

ockhamistisch angcschen und

1st

in

ihrcr

eigenstandigen Bedcutung

umstrittcn. Wcnnglcich Alberts Eintcilung der Supposition mit derjenigen seines Vorgangers William of Ockham ubercinstimmt, so sind doch bei der

einzelner

Behandlung einfacher,

und

personalcr

am

insbesondere

von

Bcispicl

welche

deutlich,

Supposition

Abweichungen

grundlcgcnde Unterscheidung von materialer Supposition betrcffen. Dies wird

welche bereits die

festzustcllen,

wesentliche

Suppositionsartcn

in

erstc,

Alberts ihren

der

Behandlung

iiber

Differenzierungen

materialcn

Ockhams

Modell hinausgeht. Die vorliegende Untersuchung zu Alberts Suppositions sich dahcr auf cine Analyse seiner Behandlung der

theorie bcschrankt

materialen Supposition und

stellt

cinen Bc/.ug zur heutigen Unterscheidung

von Gcbrauch und Erwahnung eines Sprachzeichens her. Albert

materiale

definiert

Supposition

als

eines

Verwendung

"die

Terminus, der fur sich selbst (pro sc) oder eincn ihm entsprcchenden (sibi verwendet wird, welcher simili) odcr nicht cntsprechenden (sibi dissimiii)

modo) oder anders

auf dieselbe Weise (eodcm

welchcm

nicht /ur

cr

(alitcr)

supponiert, und

Be/eichnung beigelcgt ist, und der das, wofiir er r Wcise bezeichnet" (PL 1 ll ).

supponiert, nicht in eigentlicher natiirlicher

,

Alberts Analyse der materialen Supposition geht bereits in der Definition iiber

Ockhams Bestimmung "wenn

vorliegt,

ein

dann

hinaus, nach der materiale Supposition

Terminus

nicht

sondern

signifikativ,

fur

ein

2

gesprochenes oder geschriebenes Wort supponiert" (SL 1,64). Die letzten beiden Teilbestimmungen der Definition Alberts, nach ,

welchen ein material supponierender Terminus seinem Suppositum nicht signifikativ

beigelegt

bezeichnet,

kommen

Albertus (y.itiert in

2

Saxonia,

und

es

nicht

in

eigentlicher

natiirlicher

Weise

material supponierenden Termini generell zu. Die

Perutilis

Logica,

Vencdig

1522,

repr.

Hildesheim

1974;

eigcner Ubersetzung).

William

Hamburg

de

ist

of

1984.

Ockham,

Summe

der

Logik

Uber

die

Termini,

ed.

P.

Kunze,

Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen iibrigen

Teilbestimmungen lassen sich wie

513

disjunktiv

folgt

gegeniiber-

stellen:

acceptio termini

pro se

pro aliquo I

sibi simili

sibi dissimili

I

eodem modo

supponente

(1)

supponente

(2)

Als

Terminus

eodem modo

aliter

supponente

Beispiel

aliter

supponente

(3)

materialer

Supposition

fur sich selbst nennt Albert die

als

(4)

der

Aussage

Verwendung

"Homo

est

eines

disyllabum".

Den Teilbestimmungen der materialen Supposition als Verwendung eines Terminus fur einen anderen Terminus lassen sich Alberts Beispiele wie folgt in einer Kreuzklassifikation

zuordnen:

pro aliquo

pro aliquo

sibi simili

sibi dissimili

(1)

(3)

Sortes:"Homo est

disyllabum. (supp. materialis)

eodem modo supponente

Plato:

"Homo

est

terminus

prolatus a Sorte." (supp. materialis) (2)

(4)

Sortes:

"Homo

est

animal."

(supp. personalis) Plato: aliter

"Homo

est

terminus

prolatus a Sorte." (supp. materialis)

Homo est animal, (supp. personalis)

Animal praedicatur de homme.

(supp. materialis)

supponente

Amo deum. (supp. personalis)

Amo est verbum. (supp. materialis)

Sortes currit. (supp. personalis)

Sortem currere verum.

est

(supp. materialis)

Kann

514

(1)

Angenommen,

"Homo

Sokratcs sagt

terminus prolatus a

est

"Homo

Sorte",

den ihm entsprechendcn Terminus Weise, namlich material. (2) est

Angenommen,

Sokrates sagt

terminus prolatus a

der

mil

Plato

est

und supponiert

"Homo

"homo"

den

fur

anderer Weise,

in

personal supponiert.

is

"Men

a

3

noun

schlagt als Beispiel vor:

the

in

plural"

bezieht sich

Aussage "Man is uttered in the plural", so fiir den von ihm verschiedenen Terminus

der

steht

und

"men"

namlich material. Auf die Problematik

derselben Weise,

in

fur

derselben

sagt

"man"

supponiert

sagt

"homo"

in

und Plato

animal"

kein Beispiel. Boehner

auf die Aussage

Angenommen, Terminus

hierfiir

und supponiert

so steht der Terminus

"homo"

"homo"

(3) Albert gibt

und Plato

disyllabum",

so steht der Terminus

"homo"

"Homo

Sorte",

ihm entsprechenden Terminus namlich material, wahrend

est

dieses Beispielcs wird im folgenden noch eingegangen. (4)

auf die Aussage

Angenommen,

"Homo

est

wird durch die

animal"

Aussage "Animal praedicatur de hominc" Be/.ug genommen, so Terminus "homine" fur den von ihm verschiedenen Terminus supponiert in anderer Weise, namlich material, wahrend

steht der

und

"homo"

"homo"

personal

supponiert.

Ockhams demgegeniiber

Differenzicrung lediglich

die

matcrialen

der

Unterscheidung

Supposition

vor,

daB

ein

sieht

material

ihm selbst supponierender Terminus fiir sich selbst oder fiir eincn von verschiedenen Terminus steht (SL 1,67). Eine Entsprechung zu Alberts Fallen (1) und (2) weist Ockhams Modell nicht auf. Die Teilbestimmung, nach der ein material supponierender Terminus seinem Suppositum nicht signifikativ beigelegt ist, erlautert Albert anhand Die Aussage "Vox est monosyllaba" legt eines Beispiel wie folgt (PL 11 ): zunachst die Auffassung nahe, daB hier ein Fall mctasprachlicher Bezugnahme und damit materiale Supposition vorliege. Indessen handelt es sich

nach Albert

um

personale Supposition, da

"vox"

selbst

sich

signifikativ

Entsprechend argumentiert er in Bezug auf den vierten beigelegt ra von hypothetischen Zweifel (PL 12 ) hinsichtlich der Supposition auch hier einerseits innerhalb der Aussage "Vox est sonus". Zwar scheint sei.

"vox"

der Terminus

"vox"

material zu supponieren, da er

andererseits aber personal, da er (sich

selbst)

fiir

signifikativ beigelegt

Albert spricht in der Widerlegung dcs Zweifels (PL 12 3

Ph.

Boehner,

(1958), S. 240-289.

"A

Medieval

Theory

of

Supposition",

sich selbst steht,

in:

va )

ist.

dem Terminus

Franciscan

Studies

18

Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen personale Supposition zu, was so zu erklaren

"vox"

ist:

515

Fur sich

selbst

zu

zwar eine mogliche, jedoch weder eine notwendige noch eine hinreichende Bedingung fiir materiale Supposition. Das Stehen eines stehen

ist

Terminus

fiir

Umgekehrt

sich selbst impliziert also nicht seine materiale Supposition.

impliziert jedoch die signifikative

Verwendung

seine personale Supposition, da signifikative

eines

Terminus

bei materialer

Verwendung und einfacher Supposition per defmitionem ausgeschlossen ist. Hieraus wird klar, daB in der Aussage "Vox est monosyllaba" das Subjekt fiir sich und personal, in der Aussage "Homo selbst und material supponiert. Wahrend

selbst

sich fiir

in

est

disyllabum"

dagegen

der ersten Aussage

in

fiir

"vox"

sein urspriingliches Signifikat, d.h. einen Stimmlaut, steht, supponiert

der zweiten Aussage

"homo"

offensichtlich

nicht

fiir

seine urspriing-

Menschen, sondern fiir ein Sprachzeichen. Teilbestimmung, nach der ein material supponierender

lichen Signifikate, d.h.

Die

letzte

Terminus dasjenige, wofiir er supponiert, nicht Weise bezeichnet, betrifft mentale Termini,

in eigentlicher natiirlicher d.h.

nicht

die

Termini,

aufgrund von Beilegung, sondern natiirlicherweise etwas bezeichnen. Einem mentalen Terminus, z.B. "Mensch", kommen zwei mogliche Verweisungsfunktionen

zu:

dasjenige bezeichnen,

Terminus bezeichnet;

er

in

eigentlicher

natiirlicher

Weise

was er vermittels eines konventionell beigelegten dieser Weise bezeichnet der mentale Terminus

in

Menschen und supponiert personal. Andererseits kann allgemeiner natiirlicher Weise dasjenige bezeichnen, was er ohne

"Mensch"

er in

kann

Einerseits

einzelne

Vermittlung eines konventionell beigelegten Terminus bezeichnet; er bezeichnet dann sich selbst bzw. ihm entsprechende Termini und supponiert material, wie z.B. in der mentalen Aussage "Mensch ist ein mentaler Terminus". Der mentale Terminus "Mensch" supponiert also nur

dann

material,

natiirlicher

wenn

Im Rahmen unterscheidet diskrete

er

fiir

dasjenige

was

steht,

er

in

allgemeiner

Weise bezeichnet. einer Aufstellung von

Albert

und eine

hinsichtlich

der

Suppositionsregeln

materialen

(b) determinierte Supposition,

der komplementaren Suppositionsarten

-

was

folgendes

(PL 12

Supposition -

eine

f.)

(a)

unter Einbeziehung

Schema

ergibt:

Kann

516

Bcmcrkenswcrt

daB

ist,

es sich hicrbci

um

cine Untcrscheidung handelt,

die in Alberts urspriinglicher Eintcilung dcr Supposition

bei

Ockham und den

ra (PL ll ) sowie

bekanntcn Autoren dieser Tradition

iibrigen

lediglich

Differenzierung der personalen Supposition vorkommt. Als die ersten beiden Suppositionsregeln (PL 12 ) gibt Albert an, daB das Subjekt einer als

singularen Aussage, z.B.

"Sortcs

currit",

"Isle

homo

currit",

immer

diskret,

Aussage, z.B. "Homo est animal", aber Subjekt determiniert supponiere. Im AnschluB an die zweite Regel merkt Albert ausdriicklich an, daB die genannten Regeln neben der personalen auch die das

indefiniten

einer

materiale

betrcffen.

Supposition

Albert

nennt

Supposition

die

Als

Aussage

materiale

diskrete

fur

Beispiel

est

"Sortes

nomen",

fur

determinierte materiale Supposition die Aussage "Homo est nomen". Die Unterscheidung einer diskreten und einer determinierten materialen 4 Supposition hebt Boehner als einen besonders interessanten Aspekt in der in der Suppositionseintcilung Alberts hervor und merkt hierzu an, daB

Penttilis

Logica dieses

Aussagen

in

disyllabum",

keine

Stelle

Typs der

zu

fmden

thematisiert

der

also

sei,

wlirden,

an

der

etwa

Subjcktterminus

auch

"Omne

(c)

universelle

homo

est

konfus-distributiv

supponierte. Boehner venveist auf cine anonyme Handschrift des friihen 15. Jahrhunderts in der Wiener Dominikanerbibliothek, in der eben diese

Aussage mit material supponierendem und allquantifiziertem Subjekt vorkommt. Indessen ist hervorzuhebcn, daB der genannte Aussage-Typ durchaus auch bei Albert erwahnt wird. Im Kontext der personalen Supposition

fiihrt

Albert anhand des Beispiels

"Homo

est

disyllabum",

in

genereller Terminus material supponiert, eine allgemeine materiale Supposition ein und nennt im AnschluB an die Frage, wie diese

welchem

ein

Aussage

universalisiert

disyllabum"

(PL

ll

va ).

werden konne, das Beispiel

DaB

das distributive Zeichen

4

Ph. Boehner, Medieval Manchester 1952, S. 103f.

Logic.

An

Outline

of

its

"Omne

"omne"

Development

homo

est

hierbei nicht

from

1250-1400,

Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen

dem grammatischen

Geschlecht von homo,

immer material supponiert

ein

1st

hat,

maskulinum, angeglichen Wort, welches auch

i.e.

wird, begriindet Albert mit folgender Regel:

517

"Jedes

und undeklinierbares

neutrales

Nomen."

Aufgrund dieser Regel liegt den Fallen (3) und

zwischen

ausdriicklich

fur

differenziert,

Beispielsatz angibt.

Denn

die Moglichkeit nahe,

materialen

der

(4)

Fall

nicht

(3)

ein undeklinierbarer

daB Albert, der nicht

Supposition

keinen

zufalligerweise

Terminus kann eben nicht

von seiner urspriinglichen Form abweichen, urn fur einen dann von ihm verschiedenen Terminus material zu supponieren. Hieraus ergabe sich, daB das von Boehner angefiihrte Beispiel fiir Fall (3) inadaquat ware, denn von "Men

is

a

noun

in the

zu

plural"

"Man

is

uttered in the

wird der

plural"

material supponierende Subjekt-Terminus verandert. Ein in Analogic zu Fall

(4)

konstruiertes Beispiel

Nimmt man

auf

die

grammatisch

"Homo

Aussage

unkorrekte

Fall (3) verdeutlicht die Problematik:

fiir

-

est

"Homo

disyllabum"

durch

est

Aussage disyllabum Bezug, so wird dies zwar der Regel gerecht, nach der hier die material

supponierenden komplexen Terminus

gleichbleibt,

Nimmt man

jedoch trifft die Bestimmung aber auf die Aussage "Homo est

"pro

die

est

est

"Homo

sibi

-

verum"

Form

des

disyllabum"

dissimili"

nicht

zu.

durch die Aussage "Hominem esse disyllabum est verum" Bezug, so ergibt sich zwar einerseits eine grammatisch korrekte - Aussage nach dem Muster von Alberts Beispiel

"Sortem

currere est

genannte Regel verstoBen.

verum",

Denn

Terminus "Hominem

"Hominem

"hominem"

zwei-, sondern

"homo"

esse disyllabum est

abgewandelt

esse disyllabum est

"Homo

est

disyllabum"

darf nach ihr nicht zu verum"

werden.

verum"

aber wird gegen die

andererseits

der in der Aussage

material supponierende Terminus

der Aussage

disyllabum"

falsch,

dem

in

material supponierenden

Zudem denn

ist

die

"hominem"

Aussage ist

nicht

dreisilbig.

Die Unterscheidung von materialer und personaler Supposition wird ha ufig mit der heutigen Unterscheidung von Gebrauch und Erwahnung bzw. use und mention eines Sprachzeichens in Verbindung gebracht. Die genannte Parallelisierung ist insofern naheliegend, als das grundsatzliche

Motiv der

mittelalterlichen

und

der

modernen Unterscheidung

darin

dem Bezug von Sprachzeichen auf Dinge, d.h. gewohnlichen Signifikate, und dem Bezug von Sprachzeichen auf Sprachzeichen zu differenzieren. Dennoch ist die Gleichsetzung von iibereinstimmt, zwischen ihre

personaler

Supposition

mit

dem Gebrauch

eines

Sprachzeichens

und

Kann

518

materialer

Supposition

dcr

mil

Erwahnung

cines

Sprachzeichens

bei

gcnauer Betrachtung inadaquat.

Mensch ist ein Lebcwesen", so man die Aussage liber eincn Menschen zu sprechen. um Wort man das Mensch, gcbraucht Von dem Wort Mensch ist in dieser Aussage nicht die Rede. Spricht man Mensch ist ein Lebewesen", indem man andererseits iiber die Aussage /..B. sagt, daB in ihr das Wort Mensch vorkommt, oder bildet man die Aussage "Mensch ist einsilbig", so gebraucht man das Wort Mensch nicht, Bildet

"Ein

"Ein

sondern erwahnt

es.

Hierzu bemerkt Tarski:

In Verallgemeinerung dicscr Ansicht hatten wir dann hinzunehmen, daB jedes Wort bisweilen als sein eigener Name auftreten kann; in der T erminologie der mittelalterlichen Logik hieBe das, daB das bctreffende Wort in Suppositio materialis verwendet wird und nicht d.h. in seiner gewohnlichen Bedeutung. Die in Suppositio formalis ,

Konsequenz hiervon ware, daB jedes Wort der gewohnlichen oder wissenschaftlichen Sprachc mindestens zwei Bedeutungen hatte, und nian brauchte Beispiele fiir Situationen nicht von weither zu holen, in denen ernste Zweifel auftriiten, welche Bedeutung gerade gemeint Mit dieser Konsequenz wollen wir uns nicht abfinden und es ist. lieber zur Regel macnen, daB jeder Ausdruck (wenigstens in dcr SchriftspracheJ von seinem Namen unterschieden werde. Damit entsteht das Problem, wie man allgemein Namen von Wortern und Ausdriicken bilden soil. Hierfiir gibt es mehrere Moglichkciten. Die einfachste von ihnen besteht in der Vcrabredung, den Namen eines Ausdrucks dadurch zu gewinnen, daB man den Ausdruck in

Anfiihrungszeichen

Wesentlich hierbei

ist

setzt.

nun, daB Mensch ein genereller Terminus,

"Mensch"

aufgrund der Anfiihrungszeichen als sogenannten namendagegen bildcndem Funktor - ein singuliirer Terminus ist, den wir gebrauchen, um

den urspriinglichen Ausdruck ohne Anfiihrungszeichen zu reden, bzw. ihn zu erwahnen. Nach der Konvcntion der Anfiihrungszeichen steht also iiber

der Ausdruck

"Mensch"

(mil Anfiihrungszeichen) nicmals

fiir

den Ausdruck

"Mensch" (mit Anfiihrungszeichen), sondern immer nur fiir den Ausdruck Mensch (ohne Anfiihrungszeichen). Ein mit Anfiihrungszeichen gekennzeichneter Terminus steht also als solcher niemals fiir sich selbst.

Infolge der Gleichsetzung mit der

Erwahnung

eines Sprachzeichens

werden haufig Beispiele fiir material supponierende Termini in Texteditionen und Schriften zur mittelalterlichen Logik durch Anfiihrungs zeichen gekennzeichnet. Dies

ist

zunachst schon deshalb inadaquat, weil

materiale Supposition die Moglichkcit der

A.

Tarski,

"Suppositio

Einfuhnmg

formalis"

ist

in

die

Verwendung

mathcmatisclie

nach verschiedencn Autoren

zu personaler und einfacher Supposition.

Logik, (u.a.

W.

eines Terminus

Gottingen

1966,

S.

fiir

71;

of Sherwood) Oberbegriff

Zur Suppositionstheorie Alberts von Sachsen sich

selbst

(pro

wie

was,

vorsieht,

se)

Rahmen Zudcm legt

im

erwahnt,

Vcrwendung von Anfiihrungszeichen ausgeschlossen

519

1st.

der die

Definition sowohl der personalen als auch der materialen Supposition als einer bestimmten

Terminus nahe,

(acceptio seu usus) eines

Verwendung

daB die Erwahnung von Sprachzeichen im heutigen Sinne innerhalb der Suppositionstheorie eher als eine besondere Weise ihres Gebrauchs aufgefaBt wird. Fur die Suppositionstheorie

ist

daB

wesentlich,

metasprachliche Bezugnahme gerade ohne die Bildung von Sprachzeichen ermoglicht und sich hiermit sogar wechselseitig

eine

sie

Namen

fur

ausschlieBt.

Die Unterscheidung

in

personale und materiale Supposition miiBte ihren

wenn

in

der Aussage

Sinn verlieren,

materiale Supposition der Terminus wiirde,

denn

Terminus

"Mensch

Mensch

ist

in

als Beispiel fiir

einsilbig"

Anfiihrungszeichen gesetzt

(mit Anfiihrungszeichen) supponiert als singularer

"Mensch"

und personal. Die Teilbestimmung Alberts, nach der ein material supponierender Terminus fiir einen ihm nicht entsprechenden Terminus stehen kann, signifikativ, d.h. diskret

schlieBt zusatzlich eine Parallelisierung mit der

zeichens aus, da nach Alberts wie auch nach

wie

eine A.c.I.-Konstruktion

currere est

"Sortem

supponieren

kann. in

Subjektterminus

verum"

dem oben genannten

material

der

In

in

Erwahnung eines SprachOckhams Auffassung z.B.

"Sortem

currere

est

Anfiihrungszeichen zu setzen, ware

Konvention sicherlich

falsch.

Zudem

ist,

der Weise, wie

wie

z.B.:

Sokrates

ist

sie

Subjektstelle

determiniert

Pradikat

6

hinweist,

Bezugnahme

durch die Iterierung von Anfiihrungszeichen moglich benennt Sokrates Sokrates benennt Sokrates. .

Grieche."

AbschlieBend an

den

nach moderner

ermoglicht, worauf King

""Sokrates"

ein

(4)

verum"

die materiale Supposition keine mehrstufige metasprachliche in

fiir

Verbform

eine Aussage mit finiter

fiir

Aussage

Beispiel

sei

einer

wird.

angemerkt, daB die Suppositionsart eines Terminus Aussage durch das auf ihn bezogene Pradikat

Z.B. wird

"Lebewesen"

der

Subjektterminus

"Mensch"

auf personale, durch das Pradikat

durch das

"einsilbig"

aber

auf materiale Supposition festgelegt. Die jeweilige Suppositionsart eines

Terminus Relation.

ist

also

Satzzusammenhang

Ausdruck

zugleich

Ein Ausdruck

in

isoliert

P.

King,

Jean

Buridan

s

Consequences, Dordrecht 1985,

Logic S. 40.

bestimmten

syntaktischen

Anfiihrungszeichen jedoch kann aus seinem werden und ist insofern von einer syntak

tischen Relation unabhangig.

1

einer

Diejenige Eigenschaft eines Terminus, die

-

The

Treatise

on

Supposition

/

The

Treatise

on

Kann

520

ist nach Auffassung der mittelaltcrlichen Scmantik kontextunabhangig 1st, der seine Signifikation. Bereits William of Sherwood erklart beziiglich

Unterscheidung von

Supposition

und

Signifikation:

beziehen sich allein auf eine AuBerung

"Manche

oder ein Wort,

Pradikate

manche auf

ein

Dies andert jedoch nicht die Signifikation. Denn so wie ein Wort ein Wort ist, bevor es in einen Satz eingeordnet wird, so hat es zu auch vorher eine Signifikation, und nicht aufgrund einer Zuordnung

Signifikat.

7

Da

anderem."

ein

ohne

Ausdrucks

Anfuhrungszeichen als Anfuhrungszeichen nicht im Sinne

Ausdruck

in

Name

desselben

eines

material

bedeutet das Setzen von

supponierenden Terminus kontextabhangig ist, Anfuhrungszeichen offenbar einen Unterschied

nicht

der

Supposition,

sondern der Signifikation.

Dusseldorf

7

William

of

zungsberichte

Sherwood,

(1937); (zitiert in

Introductions

Bayerischen Akademie eigener Ubersetzung).

der

in: in Logicam, ed. M. Grabmann, der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Abteilung

Sit1

GERHARD KRIEGER

*>Homo
Homo
gic",

Notre

Dame

Journal

"

regulis generalibus

"De

in

consequentianim

Ockham und Barley

627

De obligationibus und De insolubilibus fehlen in AuBerdem sind dicse Teile in der Hss.-Familie dem letzten Teil De fallaciis (Teil III-4). Auch das

Die letzten zwei Tcile

eincr Reihe von Hss. 5 Intacta

die Aquivokation hat keinen einheitlichen Ort. Z.B. steht in

iiber

Kap.

hinter

erst

(CA O.67) und in der Easier Hs. (Bibl. univ. F.II.25) dem Kapitel 30. De aequipollentiis fehlt auch in

einer Erfurter Hs. dieses

hinter

Kapitel

einigen

Hss.

Summa

ist

Diese

der handschriftlichen Uberlieferung der

Instabilitat

daB diese keine

ein Zeichen dafiir,

einheitliche Entstehungs-

geschichte hat.

Fur

2.

die

relative

folgende Hypothese aufgestellt:

wieder

diese

dem

vor

Summa

Relation,

dieser

Chronologic

vor

6

Werke

longior.

Tractatus

Fur

longior,

den

Boehner

Ph.

hat

Tractatus brevior vor

Tractatus

dem

drei

der

Summa

zweiten

besitzen

wir

Teil

und der

wohl

ein

Zeugnis von Frater Johannes Nicolai, zusammen mit dem Terminus ad quern fur den Tractatus longior: 1329. DaB der Tractatus

verla Bliches

brevior vor der

Summa

Dazu zwei

Boehners Vermutung. Bemcrkungen. Die erste betrifft den

entstanden

kritische

ist, ist

zuletzt

Nach meiner Meinung handelt es sich um genannten eine Kompilatio aus dem Tractatus longior. Daher kann seine Abfassungszeit auch bis nach dem Datum 1329 als moglich angesetzt werden. Der Tractatus brevior.

Prolog seiner Absichtserklarung, die nur fragmentarisch eingelost wird, paBt wenig in Burleys Lebensabschnitt nach 1327, da er sich mehrere

Jahre

Hof

Abgesandter des englischen Konigs Edward III. am papstlichen 7 Avignon aufhielt. Daher betrachte ich auch Burleys Autorenschaft

als

in

fur diesen Tractatus als fraglich.

Die zweite Bemerkung

zum vor

das Verhaltnis der

1324,

Summa,

1

Summa

logicae

an, diese sei

noch

Ockhams Kommentierung der Physik entstanden, 8 "Ferienarbeit". Diese Annahme habe ich unlangst einer

als

ss.

De puritate, Zur

Summa nehmen

wahrend

moglicherweise

}

betrifft

Tractatus longior. Die Editoren der

pag. VIII.

Biographic

von

Burley

siehe:

C.

Martin,

Studies presented to Daniel Callus (Oxford 1964) 194-230. 8 Summa, 36*.

"Walter

Burley",

in:

Oxforder

Richter

628

Kritik unterzogcn.

9

Auch

Ockhams

die Autorcnschaft

fur die

Summa

habc

der

Abfassungszeit Frage gestellt. Als Terminus ante quern Ob diese werden. 1328 der Summa kann etwa das Jahr angenommen Annahme der Abfassungszeit fiir die Summa mil Burleys Autorenich dabei in

spateren

schaft des Tractatus longior vertraglich

ist,

halte ich ebenso

fiir

fraglich.

Auf jeden Fall sind diese Fragen der Authenti/itat sowie der Abfassungsdefinitiv zeit und des Abfassungsortes beider Werke heute noch nicht beantwortet. Dies ware aber sehr wichtig

des 14.

Jh.,

3.

die Geschichte der Logik

Re/cption von der /weiten Halfte der zwan/.iger Jahre des

auch besonders im Zusammenhang der

Ockhams Denken 14. Jh.

fiir

in Paris in

friihen

10

11 haben auf die Bedcutung des Salamucha 1938 und Ph. Boehner 1952

Kapitels

De

regulis generalibus

conscquentianim

in

der Logik des 14. Jh.

eine Rcihe von Regeln, die als cine hingewiesen. Dieses Kapitel enthalt miUelalterliche Form (Theorie) der Aussagcnlogik betrachtet werden kann.

Summa

In der

(Kap. 39).

am Ende

steht dieses Kapitel

Denn De

obligationibus

und De

des Teils

De consequents

insolubilibus sind wahrscheinlich

erst spater hinzugekommen und sind im Grunde eigenc Traktate (Tcile) der Logik. Es war daher ein Fortschritt ein systematischer Absicht, als die Traktate De puritatc ariis logicae dieses Kapitel bereits am Beginn ihrer Abhandlungen De consequentiis behandelt haben. Sowohl der Autor des Elementarium logicae als auch der des Tractatus minor (zwei unter

dem

EinfluB der

kleine

Summen

Gedanken des

Summa

in

den vicrziger Jahren des

der Logik, die

Ockham

Tractatus longior gefolgt

12

zugeschrieben werden),

und haben dem Kapitel

den ihm gebiihrenden Platz generalibus consequentiarum Lehre De consequentiis (De locis) zugewiesen.

9

V. Richter, Authenticity of 10

W.J.

Paris",

in:

"In

dem

regulis

am Beginn

der

Writings",

in:

Franc. Studies 45(1985), 93-105.

the University of at Reception of Ockham s Thought a I Unh ersite de Paris. Vignaux (eds.), Preuve et raisons 43-64. tneologie au XIV* siecle (Paris 1984),

Courtenay, Z. Kaluza,

"The

P.

Logique, ontologie

et

11

Medical Logic, Manchester

12

sind

De

Search to the Historical Ockham: Historical Literary Remarks on the

Ockhams

Ph. Boehner,

entstandene

14. Jh.

1952, 52ff.

E.M. Die Edition dieser 66-173. 24(1964) 34-100; 25(1965) 151-276; 26(1966)

Werke

wurde

von

Buytaert

besorgt.

Franc.

Studies

regulis generalibus consequentiarum" in

"De

wurde

Inhaltlich

4.

Es

analysiert.

daC

zeigt sich,

puritate

durch

629

Boh 1962 13

I.

hier cine logische Theorie der Implikation,

und der Negation vorliegt. Hier noch zwei interpreta zu diesem Kapitel und zur Analyse von Boh. Bemerkungen Die erste Hauptregel lautet: omni consequentia bona simplici (...)

der Verbindung tive

De

dieses Kapitel von

Ockham und Burley

et

"In

non potest esse verum

antecedens

pretiert diese "P

-->

Q

=>

Regel

u.a.

auch

als eine

Zu

dieser

-iO(P.-iQ)".

Denn

14

sine

Boh

I.

consequente".

inter-

Regel der Modaltheorie, wie folgt: habe ich einen Interpretation

doch kein Satz und keine Regel irgendeiner modallogischen Theorie. Das non potest ist hier nur eine faqon de parler, deren man sich ofters bedient, wenn man z.B. sagt, daB aus dem Vorbehalt.

Definiendum

dies

ist

"notwendig"

Die zweite

wie

antecedens.

folgt:

"Quidquid

und

consequens".

ad

Hauptregel.

Diese

ist

lautet in zwei aquivalenten

ad

sequitur

antecedit

consequens,

Quidquid Diesen Hauptregeln sind zwei Regeln

...

15

zweite

die

betrifft

nichts anderes als die Transitivitatsregel

Varianten

und umgekehrt.

die Definitio folgt

Bemerkung

ad

sequitur

ad

antecedit

antecedens,

beigefiigt,

welche der

Widerlegung einer sophistischen Argumentation dienen: "Quidquid sequitur ad antecedens, sequitur ad consequens. ... Quidquid antecedit ad consequens, antecedit ad

antecedens."

In

allgemeiner

Form

findet

man

diese Transitivitatsregel in Tractatus longior an einer anderen Stelle,

im

aber gleich im AnschluB an diese Hauptregel. 16 Im AnschluB an diese Hauptregel erwahnen die beiden Traktaten De puritate Tractatus

noch

brevior

zwei

"Quidquid

weitere

denen

die

erste

lautet:

sequitur ex consequente et antecedente, sequitur ex antecedente

1

per

von

Regeln,

abgeleitete

Regel ist im Grunde eine von Gentzen 1934 18 genannt): (so

Diese

se."

"Schnittregel"

P

->

Q, Q.P

->

R

=

P

->

spezielle

Form

der

R

1-5 I. Boh, Study in Burley: Tractatus De regulis Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 3(1962) 83-101. "A

in:

De puritate,

pag. 61,

15 Ibid., pag. 62,

16

17

lin. 30ss.;

lin. lOss.;

pag. 199,

pag. 200,

lin.

lin.

generalibus

consequentiarum",

26s.

11-14.

Ibid., pag. 69, lin. 16ss.; pag. 200, lin. 20ss. Ibid., pag. 62, lin. 12s.; pag. 203, lin. 7s.

18

G. Gentzen, "Untersuchungen iiber das logische 39(1934) 176-210, 405-431 (Reprint, Darmstadt 1969).

SchlieBen",

in:

Math.

Zeitschr.

Richter

630

Dieser hat die Bcdcutung dieser Rcgcl in dcr Mctamathcmatik unscres Jh. cntdcckt. Im Mittclaltcr wird dicsc Rcgcl zwar auch weitcrs z.B. im im Tractatus minor) erwahnt, bleibt aber praktisch Elementarium (nicht

"ohne

Anwendung"

"Aussagenlogik"

und gcrat dahcr

in

Vcrgesscnheit, samt dcr gesamten moderncn Logik wieder-

dcs Mittclaltcrs, bis dicsc in der

cntdcckt wurde.

Universitat Innsbruck

ANDREA TABARRONI

Predicazionc esscnziale cd intenliones

sccondo Gentile da Cingoli

1

La

logica a

Bologna nel XIII secolo

Le nostre conoscenzc

sull

insegnamento della logica

Benche collocate

secolo sono tuttora assai scarse. nel

curriculum scolastico medievale

insegnamento sia

numerose

tracce

lasciato

del Duecento. -

contesto

-

cattedrali

,

nella

Fa eccezione

-

lo

in posizione strategica

e pertanto certamente materia di

-

studio

della

logica

mendicant!

non sembra aver

produzione letteraria dei magistri

e quindi

assume particolare spicco

Gentile da Cingoli, maestro

la figura di

XIII

nel

Italia

sia nelle univcrsita sia negli studia degli ordini

scuole

nelle

in

italiani

in

questo

di logica e di filosofia

naturale a Bologna negli ultimi anni del secolo.

Dobbiamo poi

1941),

alle

Grabmann (Grabmann

innanzitutto alle ricerche di Martin precisazioni

fornite

da

altri

raccolte intorno alia sua vita (Hissette 1979).

studiosi,

Dopo

poche notizie

le

aver studiato a Parigi

probabilmcnte negli anni ottanta del secolo, Gentile dovette iniziare

insegnamento bolognese intorno

il

suo

1295. In quella che era allora la piu

al

importante universita della Penisola, egli entro a far parte della cerchia dotti che si riuniva attorno alia figura di Taddeo Alderotti, medico

di

e

insigne Italia.

tra

Proprio

i

primi rappresentanti della rinascita delParistotelismo in

connubio

Poriginale

medica e promozione

della

culturale della Facolta di

nuova

tra

filosofia

rinnovamento

di

andava allora formando anche dal punto di 1981). Tra i discepoli dell Alderotti, Gentile e

si

promettente carriera logica fino

e

della

alle

risultati allievi

di

filosofia.

XIV

secolo

degni del massimo rispetto, se

si

quali Guglielmo da Varignana, che di

vista 1

istituzionale

(Siraisi

unico che rinuncia

alia

medico per rimanere fedele alPinsegnamento della La sua attivita come magister dovette protrarsi

prime decadi del

d Arezzo, successore

tradizione

periodo il clima del resto Bologna, che

segnava

Medicina ed Arti

della

in quel

e

fu

senz altro

esercitata

con

deve giudicare dalla qualita fu

di

medico apprezzato, Angelo

Gentile sulla cattedra di logica, e

il

misterioso

632

Tabarroni

Urbano

cui

Avcrroista,

si

dcvc un amplissima Expositio del commento

avcrroistico alia Fisica di Aristotele.

Anche per

dovettero escrcitare,

dottrine

come

1

2

XIV

L

per

Gentile

iniziatore di quella tradizione

che caratterizzo

-

naturale del

chc

oltre

questo,

1

che

influenza

effettiva

sue

le

puo essere senz altro considerate autonoma - in logica e in filosofia

ambiente universitario bologncse nel corso

1

secolo (Maier 1955).

insegnamento logico di Gentile da Cingoli

come maestro

Dell attivita di Gentile

Scriptum super artcm

possono aggiungcre un

rimane soprattutto uno

di logica ci

conservato

veterem,

in

Ad

4 manoscritti.

esso

si

de universalibus, delle Questions, giunteci purtroppo incomplete, suU Isagoge di Porfirio ed infine un Commento agli Analitici primi, la cui autcnticita non 6 stata tuttavia ancora assicurata. Si

un corpus

di

tratta

Tractatiis

tutto

di

al

grazie

rispetto,

si

qualc

potrebbe

delinearc un profilo sufficientemente articolato delle dottrine logiche di

questo maestro. Puo suscitarc quindi un certo stupore che, a diffcrenza

quanto e

awenuto per ancora

stata

sia

oggetto

spicgazione, almeno tuttora

stato

sue teorie grammaticali,

le

parziale,

incoativo

attenzione

di

delle

di

da

parte

studiosi.

degli

di

Gentile non

la logica di

La

questa lacuna puo essere trovata nello

conoscneze

nostre

intorno

dottrine

alle

logiche che vcnivano insegnate nelle universita alia fine del XIII secolo.

Sono

trascorsi

infatti

solo

12

anni

scomparso Jan magistrale, il nuovo

da quando

lo

un saggio Pinborg e riuscito a sintetizzare, paradigma teorico giunto a maturazione con Radulphus Brito e che egli ha intcso caratterizzare come "logica dei modisti" (Pinborg 1975). Durante in

questi

la

anni,

delle

pubblicazione

di

opere

commento

Sofistici dovuti alia scuola di Pietro di Alvernia e a

Simone

agli

Elenchi

Faversham

di

ha fornito nuovi importanti contributi di conoscenza. Ma cio che manca tuttora e un panorama sufficientemente ampio e dettagliato del periodo che vide sul

la

gestazione e

concetto di intentio

dal 1275 al 1300.

riferimento

La

1

-

affermazione delle teorie semantiche imperniate vale a dire, grosso modo, del periodo che va

difficolta di ricostruire

senza

teorico

con precisione un quadro

dubbio

scoraggiare puo quindi intraprendere lo studio delle opere di Gentile. Tanto piu se

che anche

in

questo,

come

in

altri

periodi

creativi

della

chi si

di

voglia

considera

storia

della

Predicazione ed intentiones secondo Gentile da Cingoli

metalinguaggio della teoria, pur se

il

logica,

costituzione

una

di

in decisa

evoluzione verso

formalmente

tecnica

terminologia

633

la

e

prccisa

relativamente autonoma, risente tuttavia degli schemi epistcmologici allora normativi,

metafisica

della

quelli

Nonostante questo

-

possa risultare utile

e

teoria

della

conoscenza.

della

e anzi, proprio in ragione di queste difficolta

abbozzo

1

di analisi

che mi propongo in questa sede

di tentare in relazione alia dottrina degli universali di Gentile

e detto, di una presentazione ancora prowisoria, in cui

si

per quanto

vogliono fissare

XIII e

La

3

E

XIV

i

una ricerca

risultati di

primi

sulla logica

si

bolognese del

secolo.

teoria delle intentiones

rivolgersi

caso di un logico medievale

nel

naturale, al

commento

sll

trarre

per

Isagoge

come Gentile da indicazioni

dottrina degli universali. In maniera conforme ad

quel

da Cingoli

sua teoria della predicazione essenziale. Si trattera,

in particolare, alia

e,

credo

-

anche

periodo,

porfiriano

Gentile

Puniversale

come

identifica

come

inteso

secunda

altri

circa

Cingoli, la

commentatori

oggetto intentio.

del

sua di

trattatello

Con

questa

assunzione, la teoria dei predicabili viene a trovarsi fondata su di una precisa concezione del processo di formazione dei concetti e di invenzione

nomi: si tratta qui infatti del luogo teorico in cui si incontrano semantica e gnoseologia (Ebbesen 1981). La formazione dei concetti e spiegata da Gentile facendo ricorso al modello classico della teoria dei

L intelletto umano

opera

punto

nella sua continua

giunge ad un certo

ad

isolare

una

classe

comuni,

precisamente,

Pintelletto

comune

i

di

in

sostiene

individui

cosiddetti

e

egli

modi

grado

di

che

mostrano

essendi attribuire

di possedere o proprietates Piu .

una

caratteristica

a questi individui, poiche nota che ciascuno di essi e in grado di

operazione affatto peculiare, come ad esempio eseguire ragionamenti nel caso degli uomini. Questo tipo di operazione

compiere

un

tipo

distintiva veniva dell

e

,

caratteristiche

1

-

di classificazione e identificazione degli oggetti,

dell astrazione.

di

delta apparens nella terminologia dell epoca. Sulla base

uniformita dell apparens rispetto ad un insieme di individui, Pintelletto

dunque

in

grado

di

inferire

attribuita a questi individui,

sua volta,

e

il

prodotto

di

che una proprietas comune puo essere

ad esempio la razionalita. Tale proprietas, a un essenza comune (o quidditas) che ora

Tabarroni

634

1

e

intelletto

in

di

grado

dalle carattcristichc accidental! di

A

questo

gli

in

come

impositio

un

gioco

altra

astrazione,

capacita

una rclazione convenzionale

oggetti della propria attivita.

designate

di

ciascun individuo.

entra

punto,

dell intelletto, quclla di stabilire

un processo

attraverso

isolare,

Si

tratta

nominum ad

peculiare

tra

nomi e

i

del processo che veniva allora

significandum. Secondo

la teorie dei

un procedimento intellettuale complesso logici modisti, imposizione attraverso cui e possibile assegnare un oggetto o una classe di oggetti e

1

come

ad un nome, a partire dalle modalita cognitive secondo sono dati all intelletto. In forza dc\V impositio,

significato

cui quello o quegli oggetti

nome

dunque, il concezione

un

al

come

termine

condividono cui

quella

intcllecta

est.

e

quidditas

chiamata

ciascuno

significhcra

"homo"

la stessa quidditas, sulla

e

cognitiva

ut

res

la

significa

Applicando

questa

caso della formazione dei predicati universal!, ne dcriva che

stata

dai

daH

modisti

ratio

modalita

Questa

intellctto.

modus

o

intclligendi

o anche intentio. Gentile afferma dunque che, secondo

intelligendi

termine

la

res

la

intellecta

significa prima accezione, prima intentione L universale assunto in questa accezione, cioe come non costituisce ancora tuttavia oggctto formale della scientia Porphyrii. il

che

base della modalita cognitiva secondo

isolata

logici

individui

degli

"universale"

.

sua

sub res,

1

La quidditas

tipo,

dai

la

il

processo di astrazione

essere intesa anche secondo una modalita cognitiva di diverse

infatti

pu6

isolata dalPintellctto attraverso

quale, poiche presuppone logicamente la prccedcnte, viene delta del

logici

periodo sccunda

sub secunda intentione e

intentio.

In questo caso,

la

res

intellecta

quidditas considerata secondo la sua proprieta

la

di essere predicabilc di molti, cioe

appunto

di essere universale.

Lo

studio

delle intcnzioni seconde, vale a dire di quelle modalita cognitive su cui

fondano 1

le

relazioni

formali

tra

i

predicati,

e

si

secondo Gentile

allora

oggetto proprio della teoria logica degli universali, cosi

come

essa viene

formulata ncll Isagoge di Porfirio.

4 Predicazione essenziale ed intcntiones

La

teoria

semantica messa

Porfirio considera dunque un elemento estensionale,

in

all

la

opera da Gentile nel suo

interno del significato di ogni res,

e

Commento a nome comune

un elemento intensionale,

Sulla base di questa distinzione fondamentale

vengono

Vintentio.

affrontati

anche

i

Predicazione ed intcntiones secondo Gentile da Cingoli

due

nuclei

problematici

ordinamento

dell

dei

del

principal!

trattato

secondo

predicati

di

Porfirio,

modello

noto

il

635

quello

dell arbor

Porphyriana e quello della predicazione essenziale.

L ordinamento

dei

predicati

secondo

essenziali

genere,

e

specie

infatti, secondo Gentile, alle relazioni sussistenti tra le prime intenzioni, le quali, a loro volta, sono fondate direttamente sulle relazioni estensionali che sussistono tra le proprieties o modi essendi da

differenza e dovuto

e genere rispetto ad prime intenzioni. Cos! da cui e tratto perche proprieta (essere sussistente, corporeo, e di da cui e tratto animate, sensibile) piu generale quella (essere

sono

cui

tratte

le

"animal"

la

"homo"

"homo"

sussistente,

animate,

corporeo,

sensibile,

e

razionale)

individui

gli

cui

quest ultima proprieta sono una parte di quelli cui inerisce

inerisce

la

se cioe si considerano prima. Dal punto di vista intensionale, tuttavia non le res ut slant sub primis intentionibus, bensi le prime intenzioni in

se

,

1

generis.

ordine

ed e Vintentio speciei che contiene Yintentio della specie infatti sono contenute tutte le

inverte

si

Nell intenzione

Da

intenzioni dei generi superior!, piu una.

una posizione, per cosi dire, e dovuta, secondo Gentile,

al

che

fatto

parte sua, la differenza occupa

rispetto a genere e specie.

"collaterale"

differenza

la

Essa

e tratta da

una

non contiene

proprieta semplice e non-indipendente. Vintentio differentiae

un soggetto, qualis, mentre

in se le intenzioni di altre differenze e tuttavia essa implica

un ente

sussistente.

generi e specie

si

Per questo essa

si

predicano per modum

modum

predica per

quid.

questo modo, con la sua trattazione dei predicabili essenziali, Gentile disegna un ordine intensionale di contenuti semplici e composti In

(rationes

intelligendi

o

possibilita della predicazione essenziale.

cui

un predicate

di livello superiore

Gentile sottolinea

secondo: intentio

"oportet

infatti quella

si

relazioni

Elencando

le

puo predicare

fonda

si

la

condizioni secondo di

un suo

inferiore,

delFinclusione intensionale del primo nel

ratio superioris includatur in

quod

secondo

cui

sulle

intentiones},

ad

nome

cui, esempio, mediante Vimpositio costituisce un segmento Poiche dunque istituito il nome il

inferior!".

"animal"

di quella

e

La

stato

secondo

ratio

o

istituito

cui e stato

propositionibus dicendo hoc est hoc significatur esse predicatum quodammodo in subiecto", con la "homo".

proposizione res,

"homo

est

mentre viene reso

"in

animal"

esplicito

intentiones. In questo caso,

viene asserita un identita a livello delle

un rapporto

infatti,

giacche

si

di inclusione

tratta di

a livello delle

una predicazione

Tabarroni

636

essenziale, soggetto e predicate

un unica quidditas, intesa

rifcriscono ad

si

tuttavia sub diversis rationibus intelligent.

un nodo ccntrale

Si tocca qui

vicnc

un opzione

luce

alia

L

intentiones. tutta

conseguenza

soluzione

dalla

medievale,

del

e

di

dipendente, per un logico

e

problema

un

metafisico,

essenziale,

predicazione

teoria dci predicabili,

in cui

fondamentali della teoria

le scelte

della

interpretazione

la

carattere

di

preliminare

metaphysical commitment, che governa delle

semantica modista,

dcll intcra

metafisico

la

riguardante

composizione delPessenza delle sostanze composte. Tale problema, nel periodo in cui oper6 Gentile, veniva affrontato secondo due possibili e

schemi

altcrnativi

di

dell unicita

teoria

seconda che

a

soluzione,

Punicita o per la pluralita delle

forme

ci

si

pronunciasse per

(Roos 1974). Secondo

sostanziali

la

che era stata quella di Tommaso, ma radicali come Sigieri di Brabante e Boezio di Dacia

della

forma

-

anche degli aristotelici ad ogni predicato essenziale - da quello di genere sommo a quello di corrisponde in re una sola forma sostanziale, quella specifica. specie ,

Della diversita dei predicati viene percio dato conto facendo riferimento ai diversi

che

modi

sono

in

diversi

grado

punti

sostenitori

della

corrisponde

in re

direttamente dell unicita

biunivoco contrario

le

diverse

delle

principio

e

Pintelletto

sotto

essendi che concorrono a costituire la forma sostanziale e

di

di

trarre

vista,

pluralita

le

la

delle

o

opcrationes intentiones

medesima forme,

ad

quidditas.

ogni

da

apparentia

mediante

cui

Viceversa,

predicato

cui

significare,

per

i

essenziale

una diversa forma o quidditas e da esse Pintelletto trae sue intenzioni. Ne consegue che, mentre per gli oppositori

forma il rapporto tra res c intentio e un rapporto al ad ogni diversa intenzione corrisponde una diversa res essere res teoria una stessa i della sostenitori puo per della

-

,

considerata secondo diverse intenzioni. Di qui discendono owiamente due diverse possibili teorie del significato, che infatti

per un

si

contesero

il

campo

lungo periodo della storia della logica medievale.

Gentile da Cingoli fu deciso e coerente sostenitore di una di queste teorie, quella tipica dei logici modisti, secondo cui non c e corrispondenza

biunivoca tra

le

cose e

i

concetti.

consiste nel fatto che essa costitui

L importanza

storica della sua scelta

un paradigm a teorico autorevole per

rappresentanti della scuola bolognese di logica per tutto

Universita di Bologna

il

XIV

secolo.

i

Predicazione ed intcntioncs secondo Gentile da Cingoli

637

Riferimenti bibliografici

da Cingoli mi sono servito della trascrizione da me compiuta dello Scriptum super Porphyirium contenuto nel ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi J. X. 30 e di quella, Per

il

tcsto di Gentile

gentilmente messa a mia disposizione dall amico Roberto Lambertini, del Tractatiis de universalibus, contenuto nel ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Mediceo

Laurenziana, Strozziano 99.

Ebbesen S. 1981 Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle s Sophistici Elenchi, vol. I, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VII.l, Leiden.

Grabmann M. 1941 da Cingoli em

Gentile

Hissette R. 1979 "Note sur Gentile da medievale 46, 224-228.

aus der Zeit Wissenschaften,

italienischer Aristoteleserkldrer

Dantes, Sitzungsberichte Miinchen.

der

Cingoli",

bayer.

Akad.

der

Recherches de TJieologie ancienne

et

Maier A. 1955 "Die

per

Bolqgneser Philosophen des 14. Jahrhunderts", Studi e memorie Bologna, n.s. vol. I, 297-310.

la storia dell Universita di

Roos H. 1974 "Zur Begriffsgeschichte des Schriften des ausgehenden

Festschrift

mm

75.

Terminus 13.

Geburtstag

apparens

Jahrhunderts",

von Adolf Hufnagel,

Cannstatt, 323-334. Siraisi

N. 1981

Taddeo Alderotti and his

in in

Pupils, Princeton N.

J.

den logischen Virtus

politico.

Stuttgart-Bad

ANTONINO TINE

Simonc

In

comunicazione

qucsta

Simonc

Favcrsham

di

Limitcrcmo Porphyrii \ Tractatus

la

ci

Quaestioncs

(Summulae

per

scoria

dclla

c

di

logica.

,

Commcnto

ai

c Quaestiones super Elenchorum*. Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii, chc c una sorta libro

introdu/ionc gcncralc a tutta

disciplina

scien/a

Quaestioncs super libra

scgucnti:

logicales)

allc

tra

Praedicamentorunr

libro

super

csaminarc alcunc opcrc

rapporto

il

tcsti

ai

Ic scicn/c

di

proponiamo

conccrncnti

nostra indaginc

Ncl procmio di

Favcrsham c

di

chiunquc

tradi/.ionc

la

dcdichi

si

parlando dclla

logica,

aristotclica,

alia la

vicne

riccrca,

dclla

priorita

utilita di

affcrmata, su

logica

qucsta sulla

tuttc

Ic

altrc singolc scicn/c.

modum secundum quern in singularibus scientiis ex aliquo noto oporteat dcvcnire in cognitioncm alicuius ijgnoti, sic ut non quaeratur aequalis ccrtitudo in omnibus, nisi secundum exigentiam naturae subiectae. Et ideo logica, licet sit quaedam scicntia in sc, est tamen modus scicndi aliarum. Insa cnim tradit

L Autorc

ribadisce

rationis

investigationcm 6

c chc

incogniti"

a cio che

non

il

che

concetto

il

ex

cognito

modo secondo

lo e ancora,

cui la

"modus

scicntia

"omnis

devenit

scicndi

communis omnibus

Magistri Simonis Anglici sivc dc Favcrisham, Opera omnia, vol. prior, cura et studio Paschalis Ma/y.arclla,

~

Carmclo Ottaviano, Le

Faversham,

Memoria

CCCXXVII,

Serie VI, vol.

di

C.

Cedam, Padova

"Quaestiones

Ottaviano,

Ill, fasc.

IV)

per

I,

Opera

scientiis",

logica, T.us

1957.

super libro Praedicamentorum" Realc Accadcmia Na/.ionale dei

Roma

quandam

cognitionem alicuius ragione passa da cio che c noto in

di

Simone

Lincei

di

(Anno

1930.

the genuine text of Peter of Spain s Summulae Lambert Marie de Rijk, logicales, II, Simon of Faversham (d. 1306) as a Commentator of the Tracts I-V of the Summulae", Vivarium VI (1968), 69 e segg. Cf.

Simon

"On

Faversham, Quaestiones super libro Elenchorum, ed. by Sten Ebbcsen, John I,ongcway, Francesco del Punta, Eileen Serene, Eleonore Stump, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1984.

Thomas

of

Izbicki,

Quacst. sup. Porph.

6

cit.

13.

Ibid.

Ibid. Cf. Alberti Magni, Logica, Liber I, De Praedicabilibus, Trac. 1,1 De natura quamvis scientiae sint Logicae, cap. I (Ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, Vives 1890), pp. 1-2: multae, et quaelibet specialem habet modum, qui differt a modo alterius, sicut et "...

Simone va

prima

apprcso

di

si

rischio di sowertire

dedicano

corpo che all

altra

ogni

639

scienze

Non

disciplina.

monstrano

alle arti lucrative,

anima. Uomini

di quelli dell

modorum,

le

si

possono imparare

non

vuolc correre

si

ordine del sapere. Coloro che trascurata

1

impresa scientifica. Poiche "omnes artes

istorum

Faversham e

la logica e le altre scicnzc, se

contemporaneamente il

di

di preoccuparsi piu dei beni del

sono del tutto inadatti

di tal fatta

secundum aliquem

inventae sunt

scientiae

et

videlicet

la logica

dividendo

diffiniendo,

8

vel

syllogizando"

e

poiche queste tecniche vengono insegnate dalla logica, e chiaro perche questa non puo essere trascurata e non puo stare se non Nella prima delle Questioni su Porfirio, sia

logica

scienza

o

pratica

razionale.

scienza puramente speculativa

1

primo posto. Autore si chiede se

aver

Dopo

"considerat

al

precisato

naturas et quidditates

propriamente parlando, non considera le risolve la questione, affermando che la logica e intentiones, che speculativa:

mentre

la

che

logica,

la

una

rerum",

res,

sia

ma

le

pratica

quia docet syllogismo operari: docet enim syllogizare, diffmire et dividere et talia. Speculativa autem est. quia omnia ista non docet propter opus; sed propter scientiam; aocet enim logica syllogizare, ut per doctnnam illam possimus nos rectificare in aliis practica,

scientiis.

Nella seconda questione discutendo se dell universale possa esservi scienza,

1

Autore afferma che

la

"scienza

e una conoscenza

intellettuale"

che di tutto cio che e per se intellegibile puo esservi scienza

unaquaeque

scientia

rationis

ab

differt

quoddam commune quod

est

altera: in

ex cognito devenitur ad

quocumque modo

omni

est

tamen unus communis modus

scientia.

cognitionem

Et

hoc

incogniti:

sia

scientiae

e

per

per

est

quod per investigationem hoc enim fit in omni scientia

demonstrativa, sive non demonstrativa. Et gratia illius communis, est in omni scientia modus communis omnis scientiae. Et hie modus est per dicta,

sive

sit

actum

rationis, qui ratiocinatio sive argumentatio est, de cognitione cogniti procedens scientiam ejus quod erat incognitum, secundum quod Isaac in libro de Diffinitionibus (ed. J.T. Muckle, Isaac Israeli, Liber de Definicionibus, XII/XIII (1937/1938) p. in

AHDLMA

321.)

rationem

diffiniens,

dicit

quod

ratio

est

animae

intellectuals

virtus,

faciens

generaliter vocans et large, omne quod secundum intellectum simpliciter, vel quoad nos antecedit ut cognitum, per cujus cognitionem ductu rationis devenitur in notitiam incogniti." La teoria secondo la quale non si

currere causam in causatum.

possono

apprendere

Causam

contemporaneamente

la

scienza

e

il

modo

di

absurdum est simul quaerere scientiam et Aristotele, Metaf. II, 3: Arist. Lat. 2 (Leiden 1976) 39-40. "...

XXV

8

Quaest. sup. Porph. 9

Ibi, 17-18.

cit.

13-14.

essa

si

modum

trova

in

scientiae",

Tine

640

La sua conclusione

dcfinizione sia per dimostrazione.

puo

La prima

Questioni sulle categorie

delle

Simone trova modo

ancora

vicne

causa";

diffinitionem

vel

sostiene che

puo

scientia est per

causam,

12

Poco

avanti

piu

illius

habetur

scientia

"omnis

1

...

per

Autore

esservi scienza di tutto cio intorno a cui accade che

rettamente,

quelle cose circa le quali

che

detto

poi

essa se

causas cognoscimus, et quod

che

ricordato

demonstrationem".

per

possa errare o agire

Viene

"omnis

unumquodque cum

quia scire opinamur 11

affermare che

di

domanda anch

si

Nel corso della sua argomentazione

delle categorie possa esservi scienza.

est

e che dell universale

10

esservi scienza.

perche

puo accadere

affinche

di

scienza

la

o

di errare

qualcosa

e

direttiva

di agirc

si

tutte

rettamente. scienza

esservi

possa

in

si

richicdono tre condizioni: cioe che quel qualcosa sia un ente, che esso sia

che abbia parti che

intcllegibile c

intorno

a

cui

essere

possano

nccessario che cio di cui

abbia proprieta e affezioni che

come

definizione di scienza

ricorda

celebre

la

E

aggiungendo che anche

conosciuto

e

parti.

"habitus

di esso, dal

momento della

propositio

demonstratio quia

se

per

"...

della

acquisitus per demonstrationem", egli

della

dc omni eo quod est 19: Ibi, per diffinitionem, vel per demonstrationem

mezzo

per

e propter

scienza e duplice: quella che

la

la

Occorre infine che

A

dimostrazione.

per

distinzione

E

probativi.

momento che

necessario poi che abbia parti che lo

tutto

possano dimostrare

si

awiene

conoscenza

la

15

un discorso che ha

definizione c la dcfmizione e

che

procedimenti

eseguiti

momento che

dal

proprieta e affezioni

e scienza sia intcllegibile dal

vi

scienza e un abito intellettuale. costituiscano

lo costituiscano e

intellegihile

potest

quid,

acquista dcr

si

esse

scientia

vel

...".

Quest, 12

s.

libro Praed.

cit.

261.

Ibid. Ibid.:

scientia

"De

enim

omni eo de quo est

directiva

in

recte; ideo ^

rccte

et

agere

quae contingit errare

et

esse

potest recte

agere;

scientia;

sed circa

et

est nisi coordinatio

coordinare autem

supra;

circa

recte agere; idco etc. Minor probatur, quia praedicapraedicahilium [probabilium Ottaviano] secundum sub et praedicamenta secundum sub et supra contingit recte et non

praedicamenta contingit errare

mentum non

errare

contingit

hiis

etc."

hoc enim quod de aliquo possit esse scientia tria requiruntur, ens et quod ipsum sit intelligibile et quod habeat partes constituentes ipsum, proprietates et passiones quae possunt probari de hoc". Per il concetto secondo cui si puo avere scienza solo di cio che e, cf. Aristotele, Anal. Secondi, 263-264:

Ibi,

scilicet

71b25-26:

OUK

"Scientia

ideo

"Ad

quod ipsum

scibile

intellegibile",

ccrrc

sit

TO

quidam

esse

oportet Quaest.

^T)

s.

ov

crtt crrcartfat; Categ. 7b23-8al2.

habitus

intellectualis

intellegibile;

libro Praed.

cit.

et

est;

ideo

263-264.

est

illud

enim

de quo

perfectio est

intellectus;

scientia

oportet

et

esse

Simone

Faversham

di

641

e le scienze

dimostrazione propter quid e quella che si acquista per dimostrazione Per mezzo di quest ultima constatiamo che la cosa e cosi, non l(>

quia.

risaliamo

causa 17

sua

alia

dimostrazione

e

ma

scienza

la

accontentiamo

ci

propter

ci

quid

di

sapere

danno invece

\"oti

le

.

La

cause,

di risalire al dioti\

permettendoci Nel commento

Simone da una errata etimologia

Tractatus

ai

termine scienza, quando a proposito della parola logica

del

scrive:

uno modp loyca

dicitur a logos, quod est sermo, et ycos scientia quasi rationatis scientia; et per istam interpretationem est una de sermocinalibus scientiis et extendit se ad trivialem scientiam. Alio modo dicitur a logos grece, quod est ratio latine, et ycos scientia, quasi rationalis scientia, aue est directiva rationis alicuius, que est propria operatic hominis.

Simone

riporta

opinione di Alberto secondo

1

cui:

comparantur ad loycam sicut idiota ad sapientem. Idiota enim nescit se errare nee errorem aliorum corrigere. Et ideo dicit alie scientie

quod

aliquis

nescit

sciens

tamen

se

alias scientias preter loycam, ipse scire sicut comburit, nescit ignis

est

sciens,

se

tamen

comburere. Piu oltre spiegando

1

incipit dell

opera

artium et scientia scientiarum ad habens",
ale, ed. Christian Wenin, Louvain-La-Neuve 1986, II, 648-651; Idem, Roberto Grossetesta, Metafisica della luce, Rusconi, Milano 1986, Introduzione pp. 37^2; vedi anche Graziella Federici Vescovini, che se ne occupa a proposito di Grossatesta e precisa che la scienza subalternante o superiore e quella che fa conoscere secondo la causa sostanziale o il propter quid del fenomeno, mentre la scienza subalternata o inferiore fa conoscere solo il quia, presentandoci la cosa secondo le particolarita accidentali, Vivarium VI (1968) p. 40. "La

18

1

de Rijk,

"On

the genuine

...",

cit.

78.

19

Ibid. Cf. Aristotele, Metaph.: ut cum ignis exurit..." Arist. Lot. cit. vedi Aristotelis Opera omnia, graece et latine, Firmin-Didot, Parisiis 1983, vol. 19 (Metaph. 1,1). "...

8, II,

20;

469,

Tine

642

habitus intellectualis in anima existens verus et semper firmus. Per artem nichil aliud intelligimus nisi quemdam habitum intellectualem ad per applicationem ad opus. Dicitur ars per applicationem mtellectum, dicitur scientia secundum quod quiescit in anima.

E poco

dci

parlando

avanti,

piu

tra

rapporti

la

e

dialettica

le

altre

discipline aggiunge:

Notandum quod quod excelfat omnes

dicitur ars artium scientia scicntiarum ex

<non>

eo

Sexto scientias, Philosophus>

Simone

modo

ut

dictum

poi che una scien/a

rileva

in

dialectica

sive

logica

sed hoc

scientias,

dignitate

excellit

alias

est.

dice piu degna di un altra in tre

si

modi: o per la dignita dell oggetto di cui si occupa, come la metafisica che si occupa di Dio; o per la sua tecnica di dimostra/ione; o, infine, procedimenti delle altre scien/e. La logica o perche regola e dirige i

dialettica

6

prima rispetto

altre

alle

scicn/,e,

in

quest ultimo senso, cioe

procedimenti delle altre scienze. E perche regola e dirige 22 la si dice che che logica apre la via ai principi di tutti metodi. i

per questo

i

dc Rijk, cit. 81. Cf. Aristotele, Fisica, VII, 3: T$ -yap Tjpc^ifjcrat K.a.1 CTTTJIXXL TTJV Sul rapportc arte-scienza si veda il 8LO.VOLO.V cnt crracnDat K.a.1 tppovccv Xcjo^cv. in Bulletin de Philosophic medievale 28 (1986) rccente articolo di Helene Merle, 95-133; in particolare le pp. 115-130 dedicate al concetto di arte nel XIII secolo e la "Ars",

bibliografia pp. 130-133.

2*

de

Rijk,

cit.

Ho

modificato

que

ms. della Bibl. Antoniana di Padova Scaff.

e

la

il

testo

dell ed.

de

Rijk,

basandomi

sul

XX 429.

22

Su questa nozione aristotelica della dialettica che leggiamo in Top. 101b3-4: c^cTcurTtKTj 656i e^ct in cui (StaAc^Tttcii) yap oucra Ttpoc; rac, arrourwi t&v ^c&oSuv ap^dc; methodos significa scienza, ecco quanto scrive Simone. "Ad evidentiam istius est notandum quod via nichil aliud est quam medium deveniendi ab ignorantia ad ipsam scientiam. via,

Illud

declare

requiritur etiam

in

naturalibus, quia in via naturali requiruntur

quod non

sit

impedimentum

in

tria,

scilicet

ipsa via, requiritur etiam

quod

ipsa ille

ad potestatem et facilitatem (facultatem?) et valetudinem corporis adveniendi ilium terminum. Si enim via fit opposita et habet pedes (pedem Padova) ineptos, faciliter non potest venire ad talem terminum. Logica enim omnia ista facit, quia per habeat

Simone

Anche

"dialettica

24 metodi".

logica e

la

la

643

e le scienze

Elenchorum troviamo

nelle Quaestiones super libra

sccondo cui speculative

Faversham

di

che conduce a tutte

via

le

altre

la

teoria

scienze,

e pratiche, e che per questo motivo Aristotele dice che essendo arte della ricerca apre la via ai principi di tutti

Anche

concetti che

troviamo,

qui

ma

leggono nella introduzione

si

forma piu

in

alle

sintetica,

gli

23 la i

stessi

Question! su Porfirio. Viene

che chiunque voglia perfezionarsi nelle scienze altissime, quali sono quelle speculative, bisogna che si perfezioni prima nella logica, che e ribadito

il

modo

funzione

conoscere.

"organica"

In

non

ci

maniera ancora piu efficace nel Elenchorum viene affermata la

libro

della logica, in quanto tutto

che essa e ordinata

scienze

25

Quaestiones novae super

alle

proemio fatto

del

stesso

alle altre scienze

a nulla servirebbe

fossero,

il

come la

suo frutto consiste nel

a suo fine.

logica;

di

E

se le altre

conseguenza e

per medium homo devenit ab ignorantia ad ipsam scientiam, ut in Priorum et Posteriorum; dat viam ad alias scientias logica, et est via media per quam removentur impedimenta aliarum scientiarum, ut in libro Ethicorum et in Fallaciis. Logica etiam dat potestatem et valetudinem deveniendi ad alias scientias ut in libro logicam libro

docet arguere (de Rijk; agnoscere Padova). Ex dictis viam habens ad alias scientias, et ideo dicit Auctor quod ipsa logica docet medium deveniendi de cognito ad incognitum, et ipse Auctor optime dicit quod est habens viam ad principia omnium methodorum id est scientiarum. Notandum circa hoc quod dicit principia, quia logica determinat de principiis aliarum scientiarum, ideo nota quod principia duobus modis considerantur: uno modo quantum ad id realitatis quod est in ipsis, et hoc modo metaphysica determinat de principiis aliarum scientiarum. Alio modo considerantur quantum ad id rationis quod est in ipsis et hoc modo logicus determinat de principiis aliarum scientiarum; et declaratur sic: accipias tribus lineis illud habens tres contenta, figura plana, principium: triangulus est aequales duobus rectis. Hie duo sunt considerare: quantum ad modum modo logicus idem principium considerat. Alio modo diffiniendi est ens rationis potest considerari quantum ad id realitatis quod est in ipso (?) et hoc modo metaphysicus ipsum considerat. Et sic glosandus est iste textus habens viam ad omnium methodorum principia, supple, quantum ad modum sciendi, qui est in ipsis et quantum ad id quod est rationis. Nota quod methodus et facultas idem sunt, differenti tamen modo, facultas dicitur de trivialibus, methodus vero de quadrivialibus, et ideo dictum est quod methodus sumitur hie large secundum quod extendit se tarn ad scientias triviales quam quadriviales et ad omnes alias scientias. Ipsa enim logica dat modum sciendi aliis scientiis, et, quod plus est, ipsa dat modum sciendi ad se ipsam." Ed. de Rijk cit. 82-83 rivista sul manoscritto di Padova cit.

Topicorum Aristotelis, quia omnibus sequitur quod ipsa

ibi

est

<et

hoc>

Quaestiones veteres super libro Elenchorum ed. 24

cit.

27.

Ibi, 27.

ricordi

Si

che Alberto

Magno

ha

insegnato

nel

Trattato

I

intorno

ai

Predicabili

privilegio di essere scienza in se e nel contempo uno strumento per la costruzione di tutte le altre scienze. Essa puo essere paragonata al martello che il fabbro con un arte speciale costruisce nella sua fucina e che, una volta costruito,

che

logica ha

la

serve

a

costruire

scientiarum,

sicut

il

tutti

in

gli

altri

fabrili

in

strumenti:

qua

"Patet

specialis

est

quod logica una est specialium fabricandi malleum: cuius tamen

igitur

ars

usus omnibus adhibetur quae arte fabrili fabricantur", D. Alberti Magni, Logica, Liber I, De Praedicabilibus, Tractatus I, De natura Logicae, cap. I, p. 2 (Ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, Vives, 1890).

Tine

644

organo dclle scienze e sen/a 26 Anche qui di nessuna cosa. conoscenza cssa non si avrcbbc pcrfctta scienza e dcfinita come conoscenza intellettuale.

giustissimo affcrmarc chc la logica e

Pensiamo che darci

c

la

sulla dottrina di

sua prossimita

si

Simone intorno

alle

doltrine

tra

Simone e

maggiore conoscenza dei rapporti potra avere quando

di la

brani che abbiamo sopra riportato siano sufficienti a

una prima informazione mostrarci

a

i

1

di i

Alberto Magno.

Una

suoi contemporanei

si

Simone

la

delle opere di

disporra delle edizioni

alia scienza

-^o

maggior

sono ancora manoscntte.

parte delle quali

Universita di Catania

26

Quaestiones super libra Elenchorum, cit. p. 102: lihrum Praedicamcntorum dicit qucxl philosophia

"lit

in

ista

trcs

advcrtcns Simplicius super partcs

dividitur,

scilicet

in

speculativam, practicam et organicam; partem philosophiae organicam appcllans ipsam non est sui ipsius gratia, scd gratia logicam. lit valdc rationahiliter: organum enim cuiusdam alterius institutum est. Undc ct servus, quia non est sui ipsius gratia sed I Politicoalterius, ideo convenicntcr organum dici potest, ut apparct per Philosophum

rum qui dicit quod "servus est organum animatum homo alterius existcns". Totum autem fructus logicae consistit in hex: qucxl ordinatur ad alias scicntias sicut ad finem. Unde si non essent aliae scientiae ad nihil utilis essct logica, et ideo convenientissimc logica

organum scientiarum

Ibi.

scientia scientiae, sc

et

rei. lit

p. 107: in

se

cum

est, et sine ilia nullius rei

"Dicendum

est

hahetur pcrfecta

notitia."

accipiendo nomcn scientiae, quaelibct quod nulla est communis. Proprie enim accipiendo nomen sunt per cognitio intellcctualis, ipsa erit de iis quae propric

specialis est, et scientia sit quacdam

obiectum principale obiectum intcllectus. Per se autcm ideo proprie accipiendo nomen scientiae, scientia est de rebus et quiditatibus intcllectus

28

est

quidditas rcrum."

Le informa/.ioni piu aggiornate su Simone di Faversham si possono leggere nel vol. Introduction di Simon of Faversham, Quaestiones etc. Si veda in particolare articolo del compianto P. Osmund I^ewry, The Rbbcscn, pp. 1-22. Si veda anche de in Bulletin commentary of Simon of Faversham and Ms. Merton College "Simon of Faversham and Philosophic medifrale 21 (1979) 73-80. Andrea Tabarroni, Durandus de Alvernia on the Science of Logic", Knowledge and the Sciences in Medic\ al Philosophy. Abstracts, Reports from the Department of Systematic ITieology, un codice miscellaneo (Ms di rifcrisce 178, University of Helsinki, VI, 1987, p. Palermo, Biblioteca Comunale 2. Oq. D. 142) contenente un ccrto numero di opere consciuti fra il 1250 e il 1350 circa. In logiche scritte da autori anonimi o scarsamente un commento, finora non noto, all /lrs vetus attribuito nel codice a Durando di Alvernia si trovano dottrine affini a quelle di Simone di Faversham e frequenti richiami a Alberto Magno e Pietro di Alvernia. Questi ultimi due Autori, come e noto sono come hanno fatto rilevare Grabmann e, presenti negli scritti del Maestro inglese, recentemente, Ebbesen (op. cit. in particolare p. 13): "There are also remarkable similarities between other of Simon s and Peter s works; Simon s Quaestiones on Por 1

cit.

1

288",

phyry, for example, share

much

with Peter

s."

MIKKO YRJONSUURI

Obtigationes, Sophismata

Some modern commentators have suggested that

and Oxford Calculators

of the logica

moderna genre of

obligationes

the disputational rules discussed in these treatises

were

followed in disputations de sophismatibus belonging to the curriculum of late medieval universities. 1 This would naturally imply a close connection between treatises on obligations and collections of

sophisms. This connection has nevertheless not been studied carefully. In this paper I will discuss the concepts of casus and positum, which

seem

to

be connected to each other, and which seem to illuminate the

between obligations and sophismata. I will begin from Walter s and William Ockham s treatises on obligations, and then go on to Hurley Richard Kilvington s Sophismata and William Heytesbury s Regulae solvendi relation

sophismata.

1.

Obligations

Treatises de obligationibus disputations.

denied

if

They

ask

the respondent

The answer

discuss

rules

of correct

response in special which sentences should be granted and which is

given a positum which he must hold as true.

to this question

is

given in the form of rules,

whose basic

which follow from the positum must be granted, must be denied and others, called irrelevant, must repugnant propositions be treated in accordance to their truth value. In any case, contradiction idea

is

that propositions

must not

arise.

The

logic of the rules

is

propositional. Often the rules of

2 obligations are discussed by examples and sophisms.

See e.g. Alan R. Perreiah, "Logic examinations in Padua circa 1400", History of Education, 13 (1984), pp. 85-103; C. L. Hamblin, Fallacies, Methuen, London, 1970, pp. 125-134.

For introduction to obligations, see e.g. Ignacio Angelelli, "The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic", Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 800-815; Simo Knuuttila and Mikko Yrjonsuuri, "Norms and Action in Obligational Disputations", Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. In Mcmoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879-

646

Yrjonsuuri 3

s Obligational disputations in Walter Burlcy structure double with often treatises begin is

respondent

of

4

s

The

suppositions.

by the

both casus and positum

given

and William Ockham

In the

opponent.

the casus are granted only following disputation sentences entailed by the to when they are irrelevant positum. Often the rules force the

with the casus. respondent to grant sentences inconsistent casus certifies the state of statement s to explicit Hurley According

matters behind the false positum.

mean

that casus

a disputation

must be

would be a

in

way

5

Burley

Rather

true.

it

examples show that he did not

s

sets a falsehood as the basis of

from the positum.

different

seems

It

that casus

understood semantically, as describing possible configuration of the truth-values of put forward in the

propositions a certain status for a proposition while positum just gives disputation, indifferent to its truth-value. Ockham follows Burley in this issue.

determining

things

Ockham

to

According

some

concerns

casus

particular

thing

(de

re

6

concerns propositions. particulari) whi\c positio Let me clarify the relation of positum and casus by discussing one a Burley s treatise De obligationibus. Burley gives which it may be granted that "positum is false",

in

sophism presented rule

according

to

although we may

not

that

grant

According to Burley the rule

is

is "p

useful,

false",

p

if

is

the positum.

but not essential to the art of

7

obligations.

Olaf

1947),

Pluta

Amsterdam, Fourteenth

1988,

Studicn

(/.), (Bochumer 191-202; Paul

Spade,

pp.

Century",

Kretzmann

et

al.

(eds.),

Cambridge University Philosophy (CHLMP), A. From the beginning to the "Obligations:

zur

Philosophic

"Obligations:

10),

B.

R.

B.

Developments

Griiner, in the

The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Eleonore Stump, 335-341; Press, pp. Early

Fourteenth

Romuald

Green

Century",

CHLMP,

pp.

315-334.

3

Burley

has

treatise to

Introduction

the

been

Logical

edited

Treatise

by

"De

obligationibus",

part

in II,

his

in The Cambridge Translations of Medical Philosophical Kretzmann and E. Stump, Cambridge University Press 1988.

translation

4

Ockham

logicae (P.

N. Y.,

s

discussion of obligations

Boehner, G. Gal,

The Franciscan

S.

is

Brown

in

An

dissertation

Louvain,

1963.

Texts,

vol.

Partial I,

N.

of his Summa chapters 39-45 of part III-3 (Opera Philosophica 1), St. Bonaventure,

(eds.\

Institute, 1974, pp. 731-744.)

unius casus non obligat sed certificat, et quia possum esse certus de veritate admitti positio que ponit Socratem sustinere vero, et potest pro reliquum oppositorum Burley, op. cit., p. 46. esse album, prius dicto in rei veritate: Socrates est niger

5

"Sed

.",

autem potest esse casus semper re, particulari, positio "Item, unius propositionis indefinitae vel particularis", Ockham, op. cit., p. 735. 7 est falsum, concedi potest haec propositio: de eo "Alia regula est: quando positum est concedendum ipsum esse falsum." Burley, op. cit., p. tamen, quod ponitur, numquam

6

debet esse de

et

de re

Obligationes, Sophism ata

As an apparent where the positum nothing else

which

false",

-

irrelevant

"only

Rome".

positum. In this situation

is

granted in

"

are in

to defend

it

Rome

in

is

fact

in certain way.

Then

You

positum? The

and according are in

Rome

Rome

1.

You

nothing else

3.

are in

positum

is

is

You

proposed

are in

Rome

.

to Burley s general rules

is

false"

if

You

it

should be

should not be

it

are in

Rome

is

the

accepted as possible

assumed

positum

are in

as casus

granted, irrelevant and true

false

granted, true according to casus

only this is positum

5.

the

disputation can be summarized as follows:

2.

4.

if

granted because of the casus. After this it is are in Rome is false". It follows from the two

You

You

"

is

it

is

true and

is

even

false

granted as sequent, but according to the rule discussed

granted that

"positum

is

it

earlier propositions,

a casus Burley assumes that is

it

referring to the positum

positum",

to Burley

proposed that

As

proposed that accordance to the rule because it

You

committed

this is

According

are in

is

is

647

Calculators

objection to the rule Burley imagines a situation "You

the positum

respondent that

is

and Oxford

Rome

is

granted, follows

false

Burley s solution of the sophism is that "only this is positum" must be denied, because it is repugnant. 9 It makes no difference that it is true

The

according to casus. is "

false"

You

and

are in

"

You

Rome

set of propositions

are in is

Rome

false"

and

is

the

"You

"You

are in

positum"

are in

is

Rome",

"positum

inconsistent, since

Rome"

are inconsistent.

we must deny the last member of an According Burley inconsistent set of propositions, when other members are already either accepted as positum or granted when proposed. The sophism is interesting since it shows that Burley thought that to

s

obligational disputation

rules

may

very well be conducted with

full

acceptance

62. o illud arguitur: ponatur te esse Romae; et volo quod nihil aliud sit positum. positum est falsum. Debet concedi per se. Deinde: tantum hoc est positum (demonstrato posito). Hoc debet concedi, quia verum per casum. Deinde: te esse Romae est falsum. Si concedas, concedis de eo, quod est positum, ipsum esse falsum. Si neges, cedat tempus, tu negas sequens. Sequitur enim: positum est falsum, et tantum te esse "Contra

Deinde:

Romae

ponitur, igitur te esse

Romae

est

falsum."

Burley, op.

cit.,

pp. 62-63.

o "Dicendum

Burley, op.

cit.,

est:

negando istam

p. 63.

"tantum

te esse

Romae

ponitur",

quia repugnans

est."

648

Yrjonsuuri

of the fact that the positum defended as true

cannot be connected to modern clear

sequent asserts that antecedent

would

here

be

the

true,

11

The

where p

is

is

only

disputation where

positum. Burley

is

it

to

be

in

his

is

true

procedure

Subjunctive

positum is not assumed answers committed to the

true:

of Burley

many

examples he does grant

s

irrelevant propositions, which are true just because positum

of

falsity

p

not grant anything which logically entails the denial of

the positum, but he may, and in

semantic

s

counterfactuals.

subjunctive

some way assumed

respondent

He may

positum.

from

different

suppositions are in to

procedure since

,

often the respondent must not respond

the positum were true.

if

often differs from the disputation also

10

is false.

As Burley elsewhere remarks,

is

s

Hurley

no one would accept a subjunctive conditional whose con

that

as he

false.

is

subjunctive counterfactuals

the positum

is

but

accepted,

not

is

false.

The

in

the

granted

disputation.

2.

Richard Kilvington s Sophismata

The 47th sophism sophism, as the sophism

Kilvington

s

looks

Sophismata

not formed like Burley

is

contains

sophism

of

like

obligational

contains discussions of the correct rules of obligations, but

it

only

s

obligational sophisms. Kilvington

The sentences

casus.

a

s

proof and the

the

in

disproof are granted as regulated by the rules of obligations supposing that the casus

is

read as a positum}

2

The sophisma sentence seated" (= KJJ). The casus

of this sophism

you know that the king

is

seated,

know

seated"

that the king

Paul

has

Spade

counterfactual

is

not

is

given by Kilvington

and

(=

if

(p -^Kjy)

deberes respondere ac

This sophism

has been

si

Counterfactual

positum esset

discussed

&

Reasoning",

in re

"If

the king

argued that obligations amount to See esp. his "Three Theories

on

know

"You

reasoning.

Kilvington and Swyneshed Logic, 3 (1982), pp. 1-32. "Nee

is

verum",

that the king

the king is

of

account

Obligationes:

Burley, op.

seated,

~p)). Because

theoretical

History

is

not seated, you

(~p->Ka

a

is

of

Burley,

and Philosophy of

cit., p.

53.

by some modern authors considering theory of

Strode on Inconsistency in Obligational E. J. Ashworth, "Ralph forthcoming in Proceedings of Eight European Symposium for Medie\ al Logic and Semantics (Freiburg 24-27 May 1988), (Analytica), Philosophia Verlag; Spade, "Three theories pp. 19-28; E. Stump, "Roger Swyneshed s Theory of obligations", Medioe\ o, 1 (1981), pp. 143-153; E. Stump, "Obligations: pp. 329-332. obligations.

Cf.

Disputations",

...",

A.",

Obligationes, Sophismata

the

king either

know

"You

the

(= Kgp V

seated"

not

king

is

Ka ~p),

formulates

Kilvington sentence.

is

or

is

that

seated,

Calculators

the casus

implies

know

seated or you

and

proof

the

the

With of

disproof

disjunction

the king

that

as Kilvington recognizes.

the

649

this

not

is

disjunction

the

sophisma

13

Let us look

at

first

must be granted that (= ~Ka ~p), because

the proof. According to rules of obligations

"You

it

is

do not know

imply the

(~Ka ~p)

the king

that

not

is

it

seated"

no way inconsistent with the casus. and the negation of its second

true and in

Ka ~p)

However, a disjunction (Kj) v disjunct

and Oxford

first

part (Kj)).

The sophisma sentence

thus

is

proved.

The disproof negation of the

(=

seated"

formulated in similar way. Kilvington connects the

is

first

~Kap)

disjunct,

or

do not know

"You

with the whole disjunction (Kj) v

second disjunct (Ka ~p) is proved. As sentence, we have the disproof.

it

is

the

that

Ka ~p),

king

is

and thus the

inconsistent with the sophisma

Both the proof and the disproof depend on a premise which is granted as true and irrelevant. Kilvington s solution of the sophisma is based on the idea that these reasons are not sufficient. 14 According to Kilvington there are propositions that are true and irrelevant, but must

be denied because they would not be true

According

of

solution

s

the positum

if

the

were

the

sophisma, proof and the disproof must be doubted. sentence should not be granted nor denied, it Kilvington

sophisma 15

However,

dubitanduni)

is

not

remarks

Kilvington

to

equivalent

that

doubtful"

"is

be

"must

true.

irrelevant

Also the

of the

premises doubted.

to

must

doubted"

be (est

dubium).^ Thus doubt whether one

(est

Kilvington is not maintaining that one may be in knows. Instead Kilvington simply points out that often the respondent must respond with doubt to propositions he knows. Kilvington says that 1-3

See Spade, Obligations",

Stump different

"Three

Theories

...",

pp. 144-145 and Stump,

discusses (in

solutions,

but

pp.

19-20;

"Obligations,

Stump,

A.",

p.

"Roger

Swyneshed

s

Theory of

329-330.

"Roger Swyneshed s Theory of Obligations", pp. 146-149) three shows that two of them are rather weak. I omit here these

two. 1

See Spade,

Obligations",

"Three

Theories

...",

p.

22 and Stump,

"Roger

Swyneshed

s

Theory of

pp. 151-152.

1

licet ista propositio sit dubitanda a te, non tamen est concedendum propositio Rex sedct est tibi dubia. Unde iste terminus dubitandum a me Text cited in Stump, "Roger Swyneshed s est superius ad istum terminum dubium mihi "Et

quod

tamen,

ista

."

Theory of

Obligations", p.

151, footnote 27.

650

Yrjonsuuri

the respondent must doubt whether the king to the casus is

It

he knows whether the king important to notice that

followed as Kilvington supposes,

it

is

is

is

seated.

if

Burley

seated, although according

s

of obligations are

rules

not possible to form both the proof

and the disproof of this sophism in the same disputation. The opponent must choose either one of them. Therefore the sophism needs a solution if it

only

must be consistent

a sense defined by Paul Spade as follows:

in

two disputations constructed from the same positum and differing only with respect to the order in which sentences are proposed are such that the respondent is required to concede a sentence in one disputation "No

and

to

deny the same sentence

in

another

disputation."

sense of consistency

is pertinent only to disputations However, where the respondent judges propositions with respect to a fixed model where they are true or false. It seems that Burley did not think that

this

would

positum

fix

of model.

kind

this

In

disputations

obligational

of

Burley propositions are answered one by one with differing criteria for granting them. As Kilvington thinks that the sophisma needs a solution,

he seems to have a different conception of the status of positum

in

an

obligational disputation.

may

It

be

that

Kilvington

s

terminology

is

related

to

this

already noticed, Burley and Ockham made interpretative viewpoint. As between scmantically understood casus and purely the distinction I

inferentially followed positum. easily

follow casus,

According

he knows

if

how

Ockham

to

to

and positum.

Kilvington

positum interchangeably and, Ockham and Burley. If

casus

is

it

seems seems,

to in

some

use

the

it

fixes a

does not

differences between

concepts casus

and

the sense reserved for casus in

a counterfactual supposition about things,

natural to think that

He

follow positum.^

discuss the rules of casus, he just points out

casus

the respondent can

semantic model

or, in

it

seems quite

other words,

some

imagined alternative of the actual world as the basis of the disputation. If

the casus

of Kilvington

s

sophisma

disputation, Kilvington s views

Spade, 1

8

Three Theories

...",

p. 9.

seem

See also

fixes

a

semantic model for the

quite natural. According to the

model

p. 11.

"Sed iste modus opponendi et respondendi non servatur quando ponitur casus, propter quod differt casus a positione. Scito tamen quomodo respondendum est facta et aliqua positione, potest leviter sciri quomodo respondendum est posito aliquo casu, ideo sufficiat pro nunc de positione tractarc." Ockham, op. cit., p. 736.

Obligationes, Sophismata

we

are informed about king

the

king according determine whether

s

we know

Calculators

651

we cannot determine whether seated; consequently we cannot

but

sitting,

model

the

to

and Oxford

is

according to the model that the king

is

seated.

may be

It

that

sophisma discusses rules

this

suggested but not discussed by Ockham. gives rules of obligations different

If so,

it

is

from the rules

Burley and Ockham, because their positum

is

for

semantic casus

quite natural that

it

for

positum given by understood to be followed

only inferentially.

3.

William Heytesbury s Regulae solvendi sophismata

John E. Murdoch has argued in

the

Regulae^ Heytesbury

and he aims

at

is

correct

giving

different kinds of

problems

Heytesbury has metalinguistic strategy concerned with disputational situations,

that

and easy-to-use rules

in disputation.

20

for answering to According to Murdoch these

rules are usually metalinguistic.

Most of the text of Regulae consists of disputational situations in which the rules apparently give wrong response. Heytesbury solves these sophisms one by one in order to show that his rules are valid in any situation.

purpose

Heytesbury also gives some clear examples of his rules, but the the discussed sophisms seems to be providing apparent

of

of

counter-examples

his

rules.

Most of

the

considered

sophisms

are

formed by imagining a casus involving some limit-decision problem. It has often been pointed out by modern commentators that casus may according to Heytesbury be impossible in nature, if it only is free from 19

See

e.g.

John.

E.

Murdoch,

"Prepositional

A

Analysis

in

Fourteenth-Century Natural

Case Study", Synthese, 40 (1979), pp. 117-146; "Scientia Mediantibus Philosophy: Vocibus: Metalinguistic Analysis in Late Medieval Natural Philosophy", Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, Akten des VI. internationalen Kongresses fur Mittelalterliche Philosophic

der

Societe

Internationale

August-S.September 1977 in

Bonn,

pour

L Etude

(Miscellanea

de

la

Mediae\e

Angelelli,

87,

54,

288,

Alexander Aphrodisiensis 41, 53, 134, 347 Alexander de Hales 160 Alexander Neckham 97-99 Alexander Sermoneta 438, 443 Alfanus Salcrnitanus 99 Alfredus Anglicus de Sareshcl) 104, C

161,

223,

53,

252,

58,

612 Alcuinus 455,461,558 Alexander de Alexandria 325, 327

C

160,

222,

190-195,

81,

46,

56, 146, 148-151,

Baldwin, J.W. 98 Bannach, K. 298 Barach, C.S. 291

286

325,

Index of Names

660

Bonifatius VIII papa (Benedictus

C.G. 302

Bardili,

Caietanus) 298 Bonner, A. 3,4,8 Bono, J.J. 286 Boole, G. 493, 494, 496, 500 Borgnet, A. 344,638,643 Bos, E.P. 12. 13,15,16.23,418

119

Bartel, T.

Bartholomaeus dc Brugis 551 Bartholomacus Salernitanus 98,

104, 105

Baswell, C. 26 Baur, Ii. 55-59

Baur, L. 25 Bazan, B.C. 127, 135, 137

Bottin,

Bcckmann,

ihn Mar/.ban 266

Bcierwaltcs, W. 462, 558 Bekkcr, I. 153

Brchicr.lv 109, 110 Brennan, R.E. 251 Brewer, J.S. 107

Bcllissima, G. 538

Bel us 40

Bridges, J.H.

107,263 Brind Amour, L. 623 Broadie, A. 496,500

Bcnekc, F.H. 492, 500 Iknjamin, A.S. 249 Benson, R.L.

504

27, 97, 98,

Brown,

Beonio-Brocchicri, M. 324 Bernardus Carnotensis 504 Bcrnardus Claraevallcnsis 331

Bernardus 329 Bcrnardus

323,

Ix>mbardi

J.

328,

1..

333

Silvestris 97,

Billow,

Blumenhcrg,

II.

290

533 228,

449, 481,

231,

328,

482, 501, 514,

Boethius (A.M.T. Severinus)

410, 516,

25,

27,

29,

31-33, 41, 43, 44, 47, 52, 60, 71-74, 77, 84,

85,

87,

248,

249,

95,

252,

100,

155,

181,

Cassircr,

275,

366,

Cassola,

325

Boncompagni, B. 27 Bonetus Locatellus 651

302

598 Celaya, Juan de 590, 594, 595, Chalcidius 66, 104, 147 Charlesworth, M.J. 248 Chatelain, A. 301

Chenu, M.-D.

Boler, J.F. 351, 354, 355, 509 111,

II.

M. 49

Charma, A. 331

Bogdan, R.J. 202 Boh, I. 436, 626, 629 45,

Carreras y Artau, J. 5 Carreras y Artau, T. 5 Cassiodorus (Havius Magnus Aurelius) 43-52, 558

103,

367, 416, 418, 440, 455, 457, 462, 465, 467, 481, 612, 626 Boethius de Dacia 140, 192, 426, 636

Bonaventura

Ifiienis 438 Canguilhcm, G. 106 Cappuyns, M. 463, 558 Carnap, R. 451,452,623 Caroti, S. 225

Caietanus dc

Parma 286

517, 521, 522, 532, 626, 627, 628, 646

225,

306

J.

294

Buytaert, I-.M. 263,521,628 148,

Bochenski, I.M. 437 198, Boehncr, Ph. 442,

(i.

Bussc, A. 46,270 Butimer, C.I I. 6

Blackwell, R.J. 163 Blasius Pclacani de

222,

273

I.

Burchardt, J. 146-149, 151, 289, 290 Burge, K.R. 460 Burgundius Pisanus 99 Burnett, C.S.F. 25, 26, 32

138, 139, 140, 142, 145

Birkenmajer. A.

80-82,

228, 263, 328, 352,

Bultot, R. 281

457

427,429 Bielcr, L. 462 Bird, O. 626

)

Bruns,

Bucheggcr,

J.

437

181,

Bruselas, Jorge dc 593

Bcrtrandus de Alemania 323 Belt, H. 463 Bianchi,

89,

646 326,

325,

Bernstein, R.J. 510

Biard,

S.F.

355, 410, 482, 501, 610, 612, 614, 615,

Bernard, C. 161 Bcrnier,

319, 408, 409, 412, 589,

Bouyges, M. 309, 312 Braakhuis. II.A.G. 418 Brands, H. 445

Bcdoret, H. 58

Bchmanayar

144,

Bourke, V. 163

264,521,522

J.P.

F.

591, 598 Bourgne, R. 68

Bcaujouan, G. 62, 66, 586 Bcccaria, A. 62

130,

155,

159,

255,

110, 170, 333, 338

Chisaka, Y. 155 Chrysippus 41

Church, A. 213

Index of Names

Cicero

(Marcus Tullius) 108-110,

103,

267,

39-41,

27,

305,

504,

535,

60,

536,

539, 540

Diels,

110

Cirlot, J.E.

Colish, M.L. 455, 456, 463

542

Conrad us de Ebrach 325 Conradus de Soltau 325 Constable, G. 27, 97, 98, 504 Constantinus Africanus 27, 98, 99,

Contreni,

Conway,

30,

32,

62,

286 J.J.

97

Donat,

271

Cordier, B. 458

Cordoba, Alonso de 598 Corvino, F. 260,262,264 Costa ben Luca vide Qusta

110

I^aertius

62,

63,

68,

100,

101,

100,

101,

b.

Luqa

Courcelle, P. 46

Courtenay, W.J. 574, 628

139,

143,

184,

J.

270

S.

d Ors, A. 468,590 Dronke, P. 32, 275, 278, 333, 504 Dubislav, W. 270 Duclow, D.F. 463 Duffy, J. 100

Couloubaritsis, L. 163-166

228, 328,

Duhem, P. 138, 322, Dunchad 97,461 Dunya,

Cranz, F.E. 461 Cresswell,

265

483,490 Donatus (Aelius) 39 d Ooge, M.L. 457 Donati,

Corax 40 II.

307,343

113

Copernicus, Nicolaus 138, 176-178 Copleston, F. 4 Corbin,

1

39, 248, Dionysius Areopagita (Pseudo-) 458, 459, 462, 463, 558 Diophantus Alexandrinus 27 Dioscurides 98 Dobsevage, A. 479 Dod, B.G. 27, 28, 95 Dodds, E.R. 458 Dolbeau, F. 43 Dominicus Gundissalinus 25, 26, 32, 53,

55-59,

4

P.

II.

Diogenes

Cleomedes 141 J.

51

Diodorus Cronus 223

Clarke, S. 141 Clavius 106

Collart,

J.

Dieterici, F.

M. 319

Clagctt,

Dewcy,

Diehl, E. 458

S.

325, 327, 331, 342

271

Durandus de Sancto Porciano

M. 578

vide

Guilelmus Durandus de Alvernia 644 Durling, R. 99

Dahan.G. 25 d Alverny, M.-Th. 27,58

Damascius 343 Dancy, R.M. 215 Daniel Morleius 56 Davidson, D. 623 Davidson, H. 566 Davis, L.D. 187 Day, S.J. 532 de Andres, T. 262,264

DeBoni, L.A.

S. 74, 417, 418, 423, 437, 551, 555, 557, 633, 637, 638, 644

Ebbesen,

Eckermann, W. 187 Eco, U. 261,264

Eduardus Upton 202 Elkana, Y. 651 Enders, H. 446, 549 Endres, J.A. 463

Ill

Engelhardt, P. 294, 297 Englert, L. 62

Decarie, V. 72 Delhaye, P. 141

D Elia,

F.

43,

Eratosthenes 41

46

Erdmann,

de Libera, A. 82, 418 Del Punta, F. 342, 409, 410, 417, 549, 638 Demetrius 286 Demosthenes 40 Denifle, H. 301 Denomy, J. 314 de Rijk, L.M. 13, 24, 94, 202, 212, 215, 407, 418,

437, 446,

584, 591, 604,

641, 642, 643

Descartes, R. 106, 107, 110, 479

638,

B. 492,500

Espinosa, Pedro de 597 Esser, C. 155

Etzkorn, G. 263, 324, 616 Euclides 27,36,41,285,286

Evans, G. 353-356,360 Evans, G.R. 25 Fakhry,

M. 309

al-Farabl,

Abu Nasr

62, 68-70, 265, 309,

al-Farghani 32

25,

312

32,

53,

55-58,

Index of Names

662

Favonius Hulogius 459 Fcderici Vescovini, G.

258. 264, 285, 286,

Glorieux, P. 324, 364, 366

641

Goddu, A. 171,234-237,351,358-360

Flatten, H. 277, 331, 340 Floss, H.J. 563

Fodor,

Gilson, E. 106, 108, 129, 351, 558 Ginters, R. 306

Godefridus de

Fournier, P. 323 Frachantianus de Vicenza 438 Franciscus Assisiensis 155-162 Franciscus de Marchia 195, 325

Franciscus de Mayronis 323, 325 Franciscus de Trivisio 257

Grabmann, M.

Frcdhorg, K.M. 74, 263 Frcddoso, A.J. 481,482 Frcdegisus Turonensis 456 Frcge, G. 451, 453, 492-501, 622

Grant,

323,

338,

445,

139,

138,

141,

142,

144,

175,

349

180, 185, 257, 264

Gratarolus, G. 334, 337, 339 Gratiadeus lusculanus 55

31,44,457

Green, R. 248, 468, 582, 646 Green, W.M. 100 Green-Pcdcrscn, N.J. 408, 440, 626

185-187, 228, 263, 328, 352,

180,

479,

410,

38,

133, 286,

E.

Grassi, O.

Gabriel, G. 501

646 Galenus

148,

176, 178, 315, 317, 322, 327, 342,

Funkenstein, A. 145, 175, 178

354,

94,

Gracser, A. 267

Friedberg, A. 89

Gal, G.

325,

Gracia, J.E. 394

S.

Friedlein, G.

226,

520,549,558,631,637

305 Fridh,A.J. 44 Freud,

197,

489 Goichon, A.M. 65, 133 Goldstein, H.T. 309 Gomez Caffarena, J. 368 Gonzalez Palencia, A. 69 Gorgias 40

M. 27

Folkerts,

Fontibus

364, 368, 370, 375, 388, 483, 484, 486,

354

J.

62,

482,

501, 515,

67-70,

98,

99.

610,

612,

104,

130.

290

G. 145, 177, Gambatese, A. 615 Galilei,

178, 215, 230,

483

Garber, D. 171, 178 Garcia Ballestcr, L. 69 Gaskin, J.CA. 306

187,

Grignaschi, M. 53 Groblicki, J. 365 Griiner, B.R. 645

Gualterus dc Brugis 325 Gualterus Burlacus 195, 229,

Gasquet, F.A. 108, 109 Gassendi, P. 140, 143 Gaunilo 248 Gauthier, R.A. 135, 263 Geach, P.T. 213, 215 Gentile, G. 302-304 Gcntilis de Cingulo 549-557, 631-637 Gentilis de Fulgineo 69 Gentzen, G. 629

Gerardus Cremonensis

X

papa 148, 149 Arimincnsis 184, 180, 188, 257-264, 325, 593 Gregorius Nazian/.cnus 463 Gregory, T. 45, 275, 277, 281, 283

Gregorius Grcgorius

28, 53, 55, 56, 58,

67-69

344, 374, 386, 388, 407, 410, 438, 442, 449, 468-

478,

582,

586,

645-648,

626-629,

592,

650-653

Gualterus de Chatton 323,

373-379,

325,

180,

183, 201, 258,

381-390,

479,

525,

526 Gueroult, M.

106

Guilclmus 27, 42 Guilelmus de Alvcrnia 119,294 Guilelmus Buser 408,410,414-415 Guilclmus de Conchis 25, 66,

97,

102,

Gerardus Odonis 325, 328 Gerardus de Senis 325

104,113, 115,275-284,331-341 Guilelmus Crathorn 183-186

Gersh, S. 455,458,459,461,463 Gersonides vide I^vi b. Gerson

Guilelmus Durandus de Sancto Porciano

al-Ghazali,

Abu Hamid

55, 104, 312, 313

Ghisalberti, A. 324

27

427,

428,

430,

651-654

Guilelmus

de

Mara

(si\

e

de

Lamara)

325, 364, 366-368 (sive Pictavicnsis)

25,71,88,101,113,347 Gillispie, C.C.

Hentisberius

434, 480, 586, 589, 593, 597, 598, 645,

Giacone, R. 44, 504 Gianotti, D. 44

Gibson, M. 465 Gilbertus Porretanus

323, 325

Guilelmus

Guilelmus de Moerbeka 314

148,

149,

285,

Index of Names

Ockham

Guilelmus de 94,

141,

183,

185-188,

229,

231-239,

178,

179,

180-

196-205,

209,

227-

A. 30 R.M.T. 89 Hilpinen, R. 438

323-

Hintikka,

14-16,

171-174,

161,

195,

257-264,

325,

327,

328,

386-389,

330,

351-363,

378,

379,

433,

479-482,

516,

519,

521-525,

527,

529,

565,

566,

579-581,

586,

597,

410,

21-23,

298-301,

431,

417,

491-501,

374,

89,

375,

418,

430,

512,

514,

532-534,

609-617, 618-625, 626-628, 645, 646, 650-653

Guilelmus Petri de Godino 325 Guilelmus de Rubione 325 Guilelmus de Sancto Theodorico 280, 331, 334-337, 340 Guilelmus Shirovodus (sive de Shyreswood) 94,

430,

445^154,

518,

520,

582,

J.

Hacking,

I.

L.

491,

492,

494,

495,

Hill,

J. 201, 202, 204, 208, 215, 222, 231, 236, 238, 416, 576

Hippocrates 99,100

41,

57,

58,

62,

67,

98,

Hocedez, E. 250

Hoffmann,

184

F.

Holder, A. 43 Holtz, L. 44

Honnefelder, L. 521,529,532,534

497,

Hubien, H. 438,443 Hudson, A. 360,361 Hughes, G.E. 578 Hugo Benzi 67 Hugo de Novocastro 325, 327 Hugo de Sancto Victore 4,

6,

25,

57,

58, 61, 62, 100, 113

171,178

Hugolinus de Orvieto 264

Hackstaff, L.I I. 249 Haring, N. 71,275,504

Hugonnard-Roche, II. 25 Humbertus de Prulliaco 325

Hagendahl, H. 44

Hume, D. 293,306

Ilalleux, R. 64

Hunain ibn Ishaq

Hamblin, C.L. 645 Hannibaldus de Hannibaldis 325

Hunt, R.W. 25,

Harming, R.W. 65 Hanson, N.R. 172, 178 Harkins, C.L. 23

Hartshorne, C. 509

Harvey, E.R. 26 Haskins, C.H. 34,98 Hay, W.H. 302 Hayduck, M. 273 Hedwig, K. 286 Hegel, G.W.F. 128

Heiberg, J.L. 28,152 Hcndley, B. .502,505,507 Henle, R.J. 249

Henri d Andeli 97,98 Henricus de Gandavo 19, 90, 226, 323, 364, 366-372 Henry, C. 26 Henry, D.P. 215 Hermagoras 40 Hermannus de Carinthia 28,32 Hermes 32 Hermes, H. 501 Herodianus 39 IIerren,

66,

212,

Hirschfeld, T. 148 Hissette, R. 138, 318, 329, 549, 631, 637 Ilobbes, T. 534

Hrabanus Maurus 104

129

Ilaaparanta, 501

Ililka,

592,

599-605, 608 Guilelmus de Ware 325 Guilelmus Varignana 631

Guitton,

663

M. 461,462

Hervaeus Natalis 323,325 Heyer, G. 446 Heynck, V. 366

63, 67, 68,

285

26, 97, 100, 101, 103-105

Hutchins, R.M. 505, 506, 508, 511

lacobus de Losanna 325 lacobus Metensis 325 lacobus Venetus 437 Ibn Adjurrum 272, 273 Ibn Badjdja, Abu Bakr (sive Avempace) 309, 310, 345 Ibn Da ud, Ibrahim 32 Ibn Gabirol, Salomon (sive Avicebron)

248

Abu

Ibn al-Haitham,

c

Al!

(sh>e

Alhacen)

152, 285-288, 292

Ibn Masawaih, Yuhanna 63, 64, 66, 68, 99 Ibn Masawaih (Pseudo-) 70 Ibn Rushd, 64,

70,

297,

Abu

al-Walld (sive Averroes)

133,

135,

191-195,

266,

294,

309-313,

344-348,

434,

479,

300,

565-572 Ibn Sab

c

m

Ibn Sina, 59,

53

Abu

61,

65,

265, 266, 480, 521

AH

(sive

Avicenna)

69,

119,

133,

135,

136,

272-274,

285,

294,

268-270,

Ijsewijn, J. 103 Inciarte, F. 524

loannes 27,42

C

58,

Index of Names

664

loannes loannes loannes loannes 142,

Alexandrinus 100, 102, 103 Baconthorpe 325 de Bassolis 325, 327 Buridanus 12, 18-20, 22-24, 175,

144,

195,

179,

225,

Johnson, R. 460 Jolivet, J. 25,71,82 Jung, C.G. 110 141,

432^35, 438, 442, 427-430, 392-403, 443,534 loannes de Dacia 113, 115 loannes Damascenus 57 loannes Dorp 442, 443 loannes Dumhleton 374 161, 140, loannes Duns Scotus 14, 23, 197,

208,

247,

257,

353,

354,

481,

521,

264,

357-359, 523,

Maior

498

501

388,

390,

534,

574,

Kelly, S. 549,550 27, 215, 324, 407, 468, 589, Kenny, A. 626

382,

F.

Kessler, E. 103 Kcyncs, J.N. 571

Kibre, P. 99 59-61,

144,

190, 192, 193

loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes loannes

167, 170, 293, 452, 479,

I.

Karger, E. 234 Karpinski, L.C. 457 Kelley, F.E. 263, 324, 364

530, 532,

581-585 loannes Fusoris 152 loannes Gerson 480 loannes Guallensis 56, 57 loannes dc landuno 53-56,

Kant,

Kaulbach,

323,

375,

529,

Kann, C. 512

325,

298,

297,

Kaeppeli, T. 323 Kahiza, Z. 628 Kambartel, F. 501

240-

239,

231-234,

227-229, 262,

Jung-Palc/.ewska, E. 190

228-230,

299, 586, 594, 598

dc Mirecuria 325 de Ncapoli 323 Nicholai 627 Ocrcatus 27 de Oria 586-598 Peckham 286

Abu Yusuf

al-Kind[,

63, 69, 285

King, P. 394,443,519 Kirjavainen, H. 196

Klibansky, R. 290, 504 Klima, G. 210,217,218

Kkx-ker, H.R. 298

Kluxen, W. 232,521,522,529 Knealc, M. 446, 448^50, 453 Kncalc, W. 446, 448-450, 453

267, 268, 308-310, Philoponus 343,344 loannes Quidort Parisicnsis 325, 489 loannes de Reading 89-96 loannes Rodington 259 loannes Sarisbcricnsis 27, 71-73, 97, 98,

Kneepkcns, C.H. 408,410 Knudsen, C. 180,525,554

333,502-511 loannes Scotus Eriugcna 249, 455, 456, 459-467, 558-564 loannes de Scvilla 27 loannes de Stcrngasscn Coloniensis 325

Koyre, A. 322 Kraus, J. 183 Kraus, P. 266

Knuuttila, 231,

S.

212,

215,

222,

225-229,

238, 243, 416, 438, 501, 583, 584,

645

Koch,

J.

298,323

Krcimcndahl, L. 306 27, Kretzmann, N.

324, 376, 403, 437, 440, 468, 554, 589, 626, 645

loannes Versor 441,442 loannes Wiclcfus 586

Krieger, G. 521

loannitius 98, 99, 102, 104

Kristeller, P.O.

lodocus Trutvcttcr 593, 594 Isaac Israeli 58, 119,638 Isidorus 64-66

Krop, H.A. 14,23 Kuksewicz, Z. 190 Kunitzsch, P. 28

Isidorus Hispalensis 39, 55, 61, 66, 558 lustinianus 40

Kunze, P. 445, 512, 600 Kusch, M. 231

97, 302,

461

Izbicki.T. 638 ,

W.R. 95 M.L.V. 461

Jacobi, K. 224,446,447

Laistner,

Jacquart, D. 62, 63, 68

Lamas de

Jadaane, F. 267 James, M.R. 25

Lambertini, R. 264, 549, 637 Landgraf, A. 26 Landulphus Caraccioli 325

James, T.E. 408 Jcauneau, E. 66, 276, 333, 456, 461 Jesus Hali 285,287,288

Oliveira Xavier, M.L. 535

Langston, D. 240,247 Laubenthal, R. 311

407,

Index of Names

Lax, Gasparus 594

Leanza, Lear,

Manekin, C. 565 Manfredus 103

44 217

S.

J.

Manitius,

LeGoff,J. 112 Leibniz, G.W. 141, 143 Leibold, G. 180, 298, 522, 609

Lejeune, A. 286 Lemay, H.R. 276 Leonardi, C. 97,461,462 Levi b. Gerson 565-573 Lewis, D. 231,236,243 Lewry, P.O. 407, 626, 644 Ligurius 40

D.C.

108,

258,

264,

286,

287,

322, 323

Linus 42

Lipps.T. 492,501 Livesey, S.J. 89, 90 Lloyd, A.C. 458 Locke,

J.

141

Lohn, C. 600 Lohne,JA. 290 Lohr, C. 445^50, 454, 522, 550

Long, A.A. 267 Longeway, J. 638 Longpre, E. 89 Lo Presti, M.G. 558

Maurus Salernitanus 98, 102, 105 Maximus Confessor 463, 558 Mazzarella, P. 638

Menut, A.D. 314 Mercurius 40, 42 Merlan, P. 129, 458

Mabillon,J. 43 S.

144

Mesnard, P. 106 Meyer, M. 165 Michael Bononiensis 325 Michael Scotus 57, 59

McGarry, D.D. 502-505,507,508,511 Macken, R. 370 Mackie, J.L. 306 McMullin, E. 178, 179 Macrobius 46,275,459 McVaugh, M.R. 69 Madec, G. 465

Michalski, K. 429, 645

Miethke,

Maggiolo, P.M. 311,344 Magistri, Martin de 597 Mahdi, M. 309 Maier, A. 143, 175, 179, 230,

298,

319,

174, 179

342,

Moises 40 Moises b. Maimon

(sive

Maimonides)

248,309 Mojsisch, B. 302 190-192, 375,

195,

376, 483,

489, 632, 637 Maieru, A. 185, 342, 357, 408, 437, 483 Mair, J.R.S. 46

Maloney,T.S. 261,264 Mandonnet, P. 138, 485

J.

Migne,J.-P. 44,484 Millas-Vallicrosa, J.M. 29, 30 Minio-Paluello, L. 95, 105

Madkour, I. 266,566 Maecenas 39

225,

Markowski, M. 13,23 Marmo, C. 257,264,549 Maroth, M. 265 Marrone, S. 368,369 Marrou, H.-I. 49, 535 Marsilius de Inghen 12-23, 325, 408, 410 Martianus Capella 31, 32, 97, 98, 104, 455, 459-463, 465, 467, 558 Martin, C. 627 Martin, C.J. 574 Martin, J. 503 Martinus Alaunovicanus (sive de Alnewyk) 202 Martinus Anglicus 407 Martinus Laudunensis 97, 461 Martorelli Vico, R. 550 Mast, M. 457 Massa, E. 108 Matthaeus de Aquasparta 325 Matthen, M. 215 Maurach, G. 277, 278, 280, 332, 336 Maurer, A. 15, 23, 324, 327, 330, 528

Losoncy, T. 248 Loux, M. 234,236,501,623 Lucilius 39 Lucretius (Titus L. Cams) 141, 293 Luther, Martin 304, 305 Lutz, C.E. 97, 98, 461, 462, 465

MacClintock,

M. 331

Manser, G.M. 313 Mansion, A. 163 Marchegiani, L. 553 Marcolino, V. 180, 258, 263 Marenbon, J. 446, 455 Marius Victorinus 455

Le Blond, J.M. 271 Leff, G. 298

Lindberg,

665

Molland, A.G. 176, 179 Moody, E.A. 228-230, 437, 443, 482, 495, 501 Moos, M.F. 485

Morin,

J.P.

144, 145

Morpurgo, P. 97, 98 Morra, G. 302-304

Index of Names

666

al-Muhashshir ihn Fatik 28 Muller,

119, 196, 206, 207,

J.T.

Muckle,

Paulus,

Muller, P. 600 Mullcr, J.-P. 489

Pesenti.T. 99 Petrus Abaclardus

294 V. 437, 586, 596 Murdoch, J.R. 62, 143, 227, 323, 651 Musslcr, B. 445, 600 Mutahhari, M. 266 Mynors, R.A.B. 45, 46 J.

Munoz Delgado,

Petrus

143,

Aureoli

90,

195,

258,

259,

263,

323, 325, 357

167, 177, 179 176,

179,314-321 Nicolaus de Ultricuria

179, 229,

178,

Petrus de Candia 408,411,413-415 Petrus I Icliae 101 Petrus

174,

175,

Ilispanus 440,

418,

441,

94, 212, Portugalcnsis 446, 599, 604-608, 638,

641

301

Nicomachus de Cicrasa

34, 41, 457,

467

Normore, C. 403, 582, 609 Norpoth, L. 291 Nuchclmans, G. F.

143,

97, 185, 212

101,

120,

123,

128,

413,

PctrusTartaretus 521-534,594 Petrus Thomae 325 Philaretus 99

O O

Connor, W. 294 Donncll, J.R. 94,301,504 Odo Rigaldi 326 Ocstcrle, J.T. 223 O flier, U.S. 328

Phoroncus 40 Piccolomini, A.

144

Picmontc, G.A. 455, 463 Pike, J.F. 509

Oliva, C. 304

Oliver Sutton 89 J.J.

Iximbardus

Petrus dc Tarantasia 325-325

328

Obrador y Iknnassar, M. 6

Meara,

Petrus

484-487 Pctrus Mantuanus 408, 410, 411, 438 Petrus de Paludc 323, 325, 327-329 Petrus Pomponatius 144, 302-304 Petrus de Sancto Amore 55

Nielsen, L.O. 74, 263 Nict/schc, F. 156

O

101,

Petrus de Aquila 325 Petrus de Atarrabia 325

Niccolo da Rcggio 57 Nicolaus Orcsmc 141, 142, 175.

Oakley,

82,

80,

Petrus Alfonsi 29, 30 Petrus dc Alliaco 175, 480, 593 Petrus de Alvernia 419, 420, 422, 423, 632, 644

Newell, J.H. 275 I.

25.

215,331,338,339,440 Petrus de Abano 53, 68, 291

Nardi, B. 45, 304 C al-Nashshar, A.S. 265, 266 106 A. Ncgri,

Newton,

368

250,351,504 509,510 Pepin, J. 536,538 Perreiah.A. 408,409,412,413,645

M. 337

Mundhcnk,

J.

Pcgis, A.C. Peirce, C.S.

639

Pinborg,

J.

27,

261,

263,

264,

324, 407,

418, 419, 422, 426, 437, 441, 468, 549,

462

551, 552, 554-557, 589, 626, 632

Ori genes 46

M.L. 303, 304 46

Orpheus 42,48 Osier, M. 143

Pine,

Ottaviano, C. 638,640 Owen, G.E.L. 216 Owens, J. 521

Plantinga, A. 236, 241, 243 Plato 138, 40, 90, 127,

Piz/ani, U.

169, 249-252, 275, 277, 278, 393, 457, 481, 543, 559

Plinius 39

Plotinus 129, 130 Pluta, O. 229, 293, 429, 438, 645

Panaccio, C. 618, 623, 624

Panofsky, E. 285,290 Pantin, W.A. 89 Paravicini Bagliani, A.

149, 290, 342,

483

Plutarchus (Pseudo-) 27 Polos, L. 213

Parent, J.M. 275,277

Poole, R.L. 71, 275, 503

Parmenides 40

Poppi, A. 409 Porebski, S.A. 323

Paschctto, E. 147, 285

Passmore, J. 363 Paulus apostolus 249, 539, 540 Paulus Pergulensis 438, 439 Paulus Venetus 144, 407-415, 438

Porphyrius

41,

46,

100,

217,

238,

480,

481, 551, 566, 632, 634, 635, 637, 638, 639, 643, 644 Poser, H. 231

Index of Names Potthast, A.

148, 149

Robb, J.H. 399

Preaux, J. 97 Priscianus 26, 39, 102, 104, 504, 550 Proclus 458

Ptolemaeus (Claudius) Puig, J. 307

28, 32, 38, 285

M. 291 Pythagoras 41, 42, 47, 49 Quillet, J. 314,316,319 Quine, W.V.O. 450,453 Quintilianus 40 Qusta b. Liiqa 27, 41, 291 II.

202, 204-209, 259, 325, 580, 581

Robertus Kilwardby 56, 113-115 Rogerus Baco 107-110, 141, 264, 286, 325, 418

308

Radulphus Brito

419,

421, 423-426,

549-

552, 554-557, 632

Radulphus de Longo Campo 113 Radulphus Strodus 407, 408, 410, 411, 413, 415, 437, 438, 440, 443, 648, 652

Rahman, F. 65 Raimundus Lullus

Reina,

ME.

649, 652

Ronca, I. 331,334 Roos, H. 555, 636, 637

Russell, B.

Ruzsa,

Rhazes)

99,

180, 183, 185, 395,

430

(sive

W.D. 4,5,307,342

Roure, M.L. 590, 592, 595 Rufinus 46 Ruinart, Th. 43

285

Reale, G. 267

I.

498,501,622 213

Sabatier, P. 155

Sabra, A. 152,566

Remes, U. 222, 231 Remigius Altissiodorensis 97, 98, 462, 465, 466 N. Rescher, 231, 569 Rhabanus Maurus vide Hrabanus Maurus Ribeiro do Nascimento, C.A. 106 Ricardus Billingham 202, 407, 410-412 Ricardus de Bury 89 Ricardus de Campsall 374, 377, 378, 380, 384-386, 390, 391 Ricardus Conington 90 Ricardus Kilvington 229, 645, 648-650, 652, 654 Ricardus de Lavenham 407 Ricardus de Mediavilla 141, 325, 327 Ricardus Radulphi (sive FitzRalph, Arma-

Saffey,

H.D. 458

Salamucha, J. 628 Saliba, G. 68 Salter, H.E. 89 Salzinger,

I.

8

Sanchez Salor, E. 69 San Juan, Domingo de 592 Saxl, F. 290 Scarpa, L. 459 Schenkl,H. 307,344 Schepers, H. 183-185 Schmaus, M. 364, 365 Schmidt, R.W. 210-212, 214, 216-218 Schmitt, F. 365

Schneider,! 364,371 Schneider, J.H.J. 534 Scholz, H. 437 Schrimpf, G. 455, 461, 558 Schwegler, A. 72

chanus) 325, 374, 381, 382, 386, 387 Ricardus Rufus Cornubiensis 325 Ricardus Swyneshed 374, 480, 586 Richardson, H. 89 Richter, V. 180, 521, 609, 626, 628

Scott, T.K.

Riedl, J.O. 250

Servius 39, 100, 103

Riondato, E. 99

Sheffer,

Risner, F. 146, 150, 286 Ritter,

G.

Ritter, J.

12, 21,

294

23

261-

229, 374, 381, 382, 386, 387, 407, 410, 476, 586, 594, 648,

Rossi, P. 91, 127, 641

Randall, J.H. 302 Randi, E. 139,322,328 Rashed, R. 25

Ratramnus 456 Abu Bakr

161,

Rogerus Swyneshed

Ross, 3-11

Rajna, P. 44 Rand, E.K. 32,366

al-RazF,

250, 252, 253, 255, 256, 296,

Robbins, F.E. 457 Robertus Alyngton 586 Robertus Cowton 325 Robertus Fland 407 Robertus Grossatesta 55, 56, 90-92, 9496, 160, 161, 286, 288, 314, 440, 641 Robertus Grossatesta (Pseudo-) 56-59 Robertus Halifax 325 Robertus Holcot 140, 183-185, 196, 197,

Putscher,

Raabe,

667

424,428 Seneca (Lucius Annaeus) 59 Serene, E. 437, 638

H.M. 624

Sheldon-Williams, I.P. 463, 559, 463 Sheynin, O.B. 171, 179

Shoemaker,

S.

355

Index of Names

668

Siegel, R.E.

286 140,

141,

191,

192,

Thiel, C. 501

Thijssen, J.M.M.H.

636 Sigerus de Cortraco 421 Sigwart, C. 492, 501

Thirlkel,

140,

60,

163-170, 230,

307-309,

343,344 Sinner, J.R.

192,

249-256,

131,

195,

261,

90,

109-

133-137,

142,

14,

4,

130,

19,

210-218, 263,

222-228, 294-2%, 302-

304, 311, 313, 323, 325, 328, 344, 346, 273,

142,

119-126,

111,

J.

Simplicius

24

19,

W.R. 163

Thomas de Aquino

328 Siliceo, Martinez 598 Simmons, E.D. 4 Simon de Faverisham 419, 632 Sikes,

41, 571

Theophrastus

Sigerus de Brabantia

348,

349,

364-368,

383,

398,

400,

371,

374,

379,

381-

485-187, 489, 490, 521,

636

149

N. 549, 631, 637 Skutella, M. 535

Thomas de Argentina 325, 327 Thomas Bradwardinus 142, 575-578,

582,

Smith, A.M. 150, 151

583, 586, 592 Thomas Bricot

595,

Siraisi,

Smith, J.E. 510 Socrates 40

Soderhjelm, Solon 40

W.

30

Sorahji, R. 392

Soto,

590-592, 594, 596, 697

Domingo de

Southern, R.W. 504 229, 407, 450, 451, 478, 589, Spade, P.V. 592, 593, 595, 645, 648-651 Spath, R.J. 163 Spoerri,

M.Th. 106

W.H. 460 Steinschneider, M. 309 Stahl,

Stephanus

de

Aurelianis

(sive

Tempier)

138, 141

Thomas Thomas Thomas Thomas Thomas Thomas

594,

de Buckingham 325 liccleston 89 de Erfordia 419, 421, 422 de Sutton 364-372 de Wilton 190, 192-195 de Vio (si\ e Caietanus)

Trapp,

180, 187, 188, 263

li.

342

Trifogli, C.

Stiefel,T. 339

Troncarelli, F. 43

I-. 229, 324, 407, 410, 440, 477, 626, 638, 645, 648, 649, 652 Sudhoff, K. 56, 58

Stump,

al-Suhrawardi 271 62, 227, Sylla, E.D.

468-

Troupeau, G. Tusqucts,

Una 323,

374-376,

63,

68

3

Juarez, A. 468 S.

286

Unguru,

Urbanus VIII papa 144 Urbanus Averroista 632 Urso Salcrnitanus 98, 105

A.

261,

262,

264,

549,

550,

631,644 Tachau, K.M.

185,

258,

259,

264,

357,

Usener,

360, 362, 363, 374 Tarski, A. 518

Tatianus 40 Teisias 40 Tertullianus 44

Teske, R. 129 Tester, S.J. 32,366 Thaddaeus Alderottus 66, 99, 631, 637 Thaddaeus de Parma 192 Themistius 41, 307, 344, 347 Theodoricus Carnotensis 25, 97, 98, 100, 101

J.

381,

386,388,483,484,489,651

210,

213,214,217,223 Thorndike, L. 103 Thrasymachus 40 Tine, A. 638 Tobin, R.B. 503 Touati, C. 565

Stewart, H.F. 32,366

Tabarroni,

592,

588-590,

597, 598

II.

43

van Brakel, J. 171, 179 Vance, E. 623 Van den Bergh, S. 266, 312 Vanni Rovighi, S. 49 Van Riet, S. 65, 133, 521

Van Steenberghen,

F.

141

Varro (Marcus Terentius)

40, 49, 102

Veraart, A. 501

Verbeke, G. 294, 521 Vergilius (Publius V. Naso) Verhaak, C. 421 Vignaux, P. 628

39, 100, 103

Theodorus 40 Theodosius 27, 40

Vincentius Bellovacensis 56-59

Theophilus 99

Von Moos,

Vitelli,

H. 308,343 P. 503,

508

Index of Names von Wright, G.H. 231-233 Vuillemin-Diem, G. 641

Wiener, Wilks, Willis,

669

509

P.

M. 360, 361, JA. 459

374, 502, 508, 509

Wadding, L. 353,354 Waddings, L.W. 57

Wilson, B. 331 Wilson, C. 651

Wallace, W.A. 230

Wippel, J. 226,364,368 Witelo 146-154,258,262,285-292

Ward, J.O. 504 Webb, C.C.J. 333,503 Webering, D. 173, 179 Webert, J. 167 Wegerich, E. 522 Weidemann, H. 212, 216 Weijers, O. 13, 24, 113 Weisheipl, J. 4, Weiss, P. 509 Wenin, C. 641

8, 25,

Westerink, L.G. 458 Wetherbee, W. 276

Wey,J.C. 328,612 White, A. 465

Wiedemann,

E. 152

Wieland, W. 308 Wielockx, R. 366, 486

Wittgenstein, L. 355,358 Wolfson, H.A. 133, 265, 266 Wolter, A. 240,297,353,354

Wood,

R.

263,

342,

354,

361,

362,

374

Wundt, W.

492, 501

374, 483

Yates, F. 127 Yrjonsuuri, Zabell, S.

M.

229, 438, 645

171, 178

Zayid, S. 273

Zeno 42 Zimmermann, A. Zupko,

J.

392

14, 24, 184, 294,

524

373,

ISBN 95 1-9047-26-3 ISSN 0357-3095 Helsinki 1990

Yliopistopaino