Investigative Journalism in China: Journalism Power and Society

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Investigative Journalism in China: Journalism, Power, and Society

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Investigative Journalism in China: Journalism, Power, and Society

By Jingrong Tong*

The Continuum International Publishing Group The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane 11 York Road Suite 704 London SE1 7NX New York, NY 10038 www.continuumbooks.com Copyright © 2011 by Jingrong Tong All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tong, Jingrong. Investigative journalism in China: journalism, power, and society / by Jingrong Tong. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-4411-0104-4 (hardcover: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 978-1-4411-0104-7 (hardcover: alk. paper) 1. Journalism--Political aspects–China. 2. Investigative reporting–China. 3. Freedom of the press–China. 4. Press and politics–China. I. Title. PN5367.P6T66 2011 070.4'30951–dc22 ISBN: HB: 978-1-4411-0104-4

Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India Printed in the United States of America by Thomson-Shore, Inc

2010023531

For my parents: Tong Changsen and Wang Zhaoli


Contents

List of Figures

ix

List of Tables

xi

Acknowledgments

xii

Chapter 1: Introduction: Understanding “Watchdog Journalism” in an Authoritarian Country

1

Chapter 2: Conceptualizing Investigative Journalism in China

11

Chapter 3: The Flourishing of Investigative Journalism in the 1990s

31

Chapter 4: The Fall of Investigative Journalism in the Twenty-first Century Questioned

49

Chapter 5: Maintaining the Legitimacy of Chinese Journalism

86

Chapter 6: An Organizational Analysis: The Case Study of Southern Metropolis Daily

110

Chapter 7: Reporting on Social Riots: How Investigative Journalists Tell Stories

154

Chapter 8: Investigative Journalism and the Public

192

Chapter 9: Conclusion: Investigative Journalism as a Reforming Force

220

Notes

236

Bibliography

244

Index

257


List of Figures

Figure 6.1

The organizational structure of the Southern Metropolis Daily in 2006 Figure 6.2 The organizational structure of Southern Metropolis Daily Figure 6.3 The members sitting on the newspaper management committee (in shadow) and their responsibilities Figure 6.4 The working procedure of investigative reporting at SMD Figure 6.5 A model of organizational influences Figure 7.1 The Power relations of newspapers to local authorities Figure 7.2 The dichotomy of “Us vs. Them” in the model of Party Organ Representation Figure 7.3 The evolution of conflicts within social riots of this kind Figure 7.4 A model of truth-telling representation: three conflicts in the Wanzhou and Chizhou riot events Figure 7.5 The underprivileged and the privileged in the two riots Figure 7.6 The dichotomy of “Us vs. Them” in DD journalist’s original report Figure 7.7 The Dichotomies of “Us vs. Them” in the SMD journalist’s original report Figure 7.8 The model of half truth-telling representation: two conflicts in the published report of Dahe Daily Figure 7.9 The Dichotomy of “Us vs. Them” in the model of half truth-telling representation Figure 7.10 Three models of social riot representations in the six reports Figure 8.1 The mobilization model of investigative reporting (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991, p. 15)

136 137 138 139 152 158 161 165 167 169 170 171 178 180 185 198

x

List of Figures

Figure 8.2 The mobilization model of investigative reporting in China Figure 8.3 The process of the contra-flow of agendas in investigative reporting in the new media era Figure 8.4 The process of disseminating and promoting investigative reports in new media era Figure 8.5 The mobilization model of investigative reporting in the Web 2.0 era

200 208 209 210

List of Tables

Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7 Table 7.8 Table 7.9 Table 7.10 Table 7.11 Table 7.12 Table 7.13

2003 best journalists in China Three core professional norms of the interviewed SMD investigative Journalists and specific meanings The list of reports Labels used to call the rioters in the CD’s June 27th report and the SMD’s June 28th report Tone of labels used to call the rioters in the CD’s June 27 report and SMD’s June 28 report The nature of news sources in the Dahe Daily journalist’s original report The nature of news sources in the Southern Metropolis Daily journalist’s original report Labels used to call the riot in the Dahe Daily journalist’s original report Labels used to call the riot in the Southern Metropolis Daily journalist’s original report Labels used to call rioters in the Dahe Daily journalist’s original report Labels used to call the rioters in the Southern Metropolis Daily journalist’s original report Labels used to call the riot in the published report of Dahe Daily Labels used to call the rioters in the published report in Dahe Daily Labels used to call the riot in the July 1st published report in Southern Metropolis Daily Labels of the rioters in the July 1st published report in Southern Metropolis Daily

96 125 159 163 164 172 172 174 174 175 175 178 179 182 182

Acknowledgments

I have benefited from the help of, discussions with, many people, and here I can only acknowledge very few of them. I would like to thank both staff and students of the Department of Media and Communication at University of Leceister for their support during the time I was writing this book. Special thanks go to Professor Colin Sparks of University of Westminster, who encouraged and shared many valuable thoughts with me throughout my research. My gratitude also goes to Professor Hugo de Burgh of Univeristy of Weminster, for his patient supervision throughout my Ph.D. study, which later led to the writing of this book. The empirical materials used in this book are mainly collected during my doctoral fieldwork conducted in 2006, which was supported by University of Westminster. Their support is also gratefully acknowledged. Dr. Marina Svensson at University of Lund has provided many valuable insights regarding Chinese media. Besides, I would like to thank Landong for technological supports. This book could not have been written without the help of Southern Metropolis Daily and Dahe Daily. I gratefully thank the two newspaper organizations and their staff for their cooperation. I would especially like to thank Bao Xiaodong, Cao Ke, Chen Lewei, Chen Liang, Fan Yijing, Feng Hongping, Fu Jianfeng, Jia Yunyong, Jiang Yingshuang, Lu Bing, Lu Hui, Li Weihua, Liu Qing, Ma Yunlong, Pang Xinzhi, Tan Renwei, Wang Chunfu, Wang Ci, Wang Jilu, Wang Jun, Wang Lei, Wang Peng, Wei Huabing, Yang Haipeng, Yuan Xiaobing, Zhu Changzhen, Zhuang Shenzhi, and all other journalists who accepted my requests for interviews and who talked to me, for their friendship and contributions to this book. The research presented in this book would not have been possible without the unconditional love and support of my beloved parents, Landong, Jingwei, Lin Ji, Xiaowu, and Xiaolv.

Chapter 1

Introduction: Understanding “Watchdog Journalism” in an Authoritarian Country

This book is about investigative journalism and its social impacts in China. In the recent decades, contemporary journalism in China has witnessed the proliferation of investigative journalism that is supposed to be West-only journalism (Zhao 2000; De Burgh 2003; Tong 2009). Investigative journalism of this kind is no longer what is called “internal reporting” (neican) (Grant 1988) but public reporting in the Western sense of “watchdog journalism” (Kovach 1999; Zhao 2000; Bennett and Serrin 2005). To the surprise of the West, Chinese journalists risk their jobs and even lives, digging out and telling the “truth”—at least the “truth” that journalists believe (Tong and Sparks 2009). Even as the fear that serious journalism may be dying has spread widely in Western societies (Hardt 2000), investigative journalism still fascinates individual Chinese journalists and media organizations, who respect this type of journalism as a paradigm of good journalism (Pan and Chan 2003). Journalists who have successfully produced influential investigative reports are hailed as heroes, winning both fame and fortune. News organizations have committed substantial financial resources to support their investigative journalists, provide them with good pay, a special autonomy, and “star” prestige. It is the dream of newly graduated journalists to become successful investigative journalists (Tong and Sparks 2009). In recent years, investigative journalism has even survived the tightening of propaganda and the control of power holders, consistently producing successful investigative reports (Tong 2007; Tong and Sparks 2009). Investigative journalism in China has indeed posed challenges to the political authority. Investigative reports, such as that of Zhang Jinzhu in 1997,1 of Sun Zhigang in 2003,2 the Niuniu event in 2005,3 the Pengshui Poem Scandal in 2006,4 the Shanxi Brickfield Scandal in 2007,5 the Sanlu

2

Investigative Journalism in China

Contaminated Milk Powder Scandal in 2008,6 the case of HFMD Epidemic in 2008 and 2009,7 and the Shanxi Unsafe Vaccines Scandal in 2010,8 took power into account and triggered changes in sociopublic issues and even public policies. In the new century especially, the Internet exercises its democratic power in helping investigative journalism circumvent the pressure from above. The influences of investigative reports have become stronger with the help of enthusiastic new media practices of the Chinese public (Tong and Sparks 2009). In the Western imaginary of Chinese journalism, Chinese journalists are always in tune with the authority. The popularization of investigative journalism, as described above, in the Chinese authoritarian media system has apparently subverted and deviated from the Western imaginary. Understanding this type of investigative journalism and to what extent it influences society is the aim of this book. To understand these, we not only need to examine the relationship of investigative journalism to other social entities, but also to probe into how investigative reports are made in newsroom. This book emphasizes the reasons that investigative journalism in China has developed in the way it has, the concepts and practices, as well as the social impacts of investigative journalism, which refers to the actual social function in Chinese social, economic, and political life, instead of merely the legitimate function given by the political authority. This book first examines the concept of investigative journalism and its philosophical principle in the Chinese cultural context, then discusses the development of investigative journalism and how social factors have influenced its development. It then analyzes how investigative journalism is practiced within news organizations and, finally, discusses what social function investigative journalism has.

Why Study Investigative Journalism in China? The main reason for scholars’ initiatives in studying journalism is that they want to understand why a specific social context generates a particular type of journalism and why a specific genre of journalism will produce specific social functions, and to develop a theoretical understanding and an in-depth perspective of journalism. In a global scope, we have many different systems of journalism, as journalism does not exist independently outside of social contexts and specific journalism genres are produced and shaped in specific social environments (Weaver 1998). In turn, due to distinctive journalistic practices and ideals, a specific

Introduction

3

journalism genre will indeed result in unique social functions that are different from the functions other types of journalism may produce. For a better understanding of journalism and its social functions, therefore, it is essential to examine how journalism shaped in different geo-political systems works. We do have studies of this kind. There have been thousands of books and articles trying to understand the role that the society has played in the development of journalism and that journalism has played in the development of society. In journalism studies, scholars who are concerned with the relationship between journalism and society have tried to understand journalism’s professional practices and functions (for example, Sigal 1973; Sigelman 1973; Roshco 1975; Tuchman 1978; Fishman 1980; Gans 1980). They have tried to discover how news is made, what factors impact the process of news production, how society shapes the development of journalism, and journalism’s power in society. From the Siebert’s four press theories to, more recently, Hallin and Mancini’s three models of media systems, scholars examine different media systems that have appeared in different societies (Siebert, Peterson et al. 1956; Hallin and Mancini 2004). These studies however, either understand different media systems through the Western eyes and a Western way of thinking, or examine specific journalism produced in a Western social context, especially those of the USA and the UK. Studies of Western journalism, journalism in the Anglophone system particularly, are the mainstream of journalism studies. Scholars from Western developed countries dominate the global academic discourse. For a very long period of time, therefore, our understanding of media and journalism has been limited to these dominant normative Western discourses and the attention to Western media. By contrast, the attention to developing countries’ media and journalism has been isolated in the global academic discourse and attention (Curran and Park 2000). From the end of the 1990s, the global academic circle has gradually seen a rise in de-Westernizing media studies. The de-Westernizing media studies promoted by the Goldsmiths Media study group in the UK, for instance, called for an understanding of the media experiences of non-Anglo-American countries, that helped broaden our theoretical understanding of media and journalism as a whole (Curran and Park 2000). Academic institutions have also established non-Western media research centers, for example the China Media Centre and the Arab Media Centre at the University of Westminster in the UK. Academic journals have also started publishing articles on non-Western media

4


systems. The studies of media in developing countries for instance, in Asian and African countries, have begun to appear in the global academic discourse and, drawing the attention of Western academic circle. There are three main reasons to account for the appearance of such attention. The first of these concerns the rise of economy in developing countries, such as China. Second, some existing theories of these, such as Sierbert and his colleagues’ study of media in Communist countries, are no longer applicable in interpreting the current media phenomena, along with the ending of Cold war and the refiguring of global power structures (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Third, the prevailing media imperialism theory that previously dominated the global academic discourse was criticized by scholars such as Boyd and Thussu (1992), Giddens (1999), Sparks (2007), Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996), who refuted the view that sees the West still as a centre monopolizing information and controlling communication flow. According to them, a contra-flow of information and communication has instead been seen at the global level or the global current information and communication flow is multidirectional and multicentered (Curran and Park 2000). Among many others, a prominent academic attention has been given to the Chinese journalism system. The Chinese journalism system is one of the most important contemporary journalism systems in the world, either judging from the rise of political and economic power of China, or looking at the role of China in the world’s shifting power structures, or concerning Chinese journalism as an important representative of journalism that remains under the Communist Party’s authoritarian political control in the post-Cold war era, when the Communist block no longer exists, and the conditions of its production are different from the ones of the Anglo-American journalism. The empirical study of such an important contemporary journalism system not only offers us concrete knowledge of Chinese journalism, but also greatly contributes to our theoretical understanding of journalism as a whole. Since the 1990s, severe changes have occurred in the Chinese journalism system, as a result of the 1980s media reforms, though the authoritarian political rule remains untouched (Chu 1994; Chen and Chan 1998). Prominent changes include the commercialization of media, the conglomeration of media organizations, an increase in the types of newspapers and broadcasting channels that are available, the reformed personnel recruitment system, the booming of investigative journalism, the flourishing of the public’s new media practices and so on. As a result of these, the post-reform media era has witnessed many conflicting

Introduction

5

elements within the media system, such as political control co-exists with the interference of the media market, Party organ media are run in parallel with non-Party organ media, non-Party organ media are operated according to the market principles, but are meanwhile owned by the Party, and journalists who enjoy positions within the political and administrative system (tizhi nei) work together with journalists who are outside the system (tizhiwai). Among these, the rise of investigative journalism and its flourishing is the most contradictory element of the Chinese authoritarian media system. The contradiction embodied in the practices of investigative journalism in China comes from a prominent pair of paradoxical factors: the authoritarian nature of the regime that tames and controls the media and the adversarial nature of investigative journalism that rivals the power. In the West, investigative journalism is thought to be a major contribution of the press to democracy and the cornerstone of democracy (Schultz 1998). The situation, however, is different in China, as it is above all an authoritarian country, rather than a democratic one (Ma 2000). In terms of Chin-chuan Lee, democracy is “an elusive goal” in modern China (Lee 1990: 9). The Communist Party ruled China remains authoritarian decades after Lee made the statement, despite this country being a newly emerging economic power in the world stage. The ruling CCP maintains its authoritarian rule over almost all aspects of society, especially in the ideological and cultural aspects. The CCP has never stopped its efforts to monopolize media control (Tong 2010). Numerous sanctions, such as Internet censorship, tight propaganda control over politically important issues, the prosecution of investigative journalists and political dissidents, e.g., the 2009 sentence of Liu Xiaobo, a veteran human-rights activist, have caused concern among the international society. The unyielding propaganda commands depict a scenario where news media and journalists are manipulated like mindless puppets by the CCP’s propaganda departments. Bans are imposed in newsrooms every day to instruct the news media what to report and how to report. Detailed reporting instructions will usually be given by the propaganda departments immediately after the happening of important or sociopolitically sensitive events. After a powerful earthquake struck Yushu County, Qinghai Province in 2010, for instance, the CCP required all media across China speak in one voice, especially on April 21 and that was designated to be the official condolence day for people to express their condolences for the earthquake victims. It was demanded that on that day all entertainment activities be cancelled. The same

6


television programs, produced by CCTV, were broadcasted on television channels across China. The same pictures taken by Xinhua News Agency appeared in nationwide newspaper coverages. A producer from Beijing Television complained that they had to stop broadcasting their own program but to broadcast programs from CCTV, despite the fact that they had already produced and were just about to broadcast their own TV programs. Such state control seems to be wholly incompatible with the adversarial nature of investigative journalism. Investigative journalism is the journalism genre that is most likely to have an emancipating power and democratic potential, as it aims at social improvement by revealing flaws in social systems (Greenwald and Bernt 2000). This type of journalism is the type that will most likely bring China freedom of expression, plural media discourses, and challenges to the ruling power. Given the political conditions it works under, it is a bit difficult for this type of journalism to exist, survive, and develop in China. It is questionable, therefore, that how investigative journalism can emerge and survive political persecution in this country and what kind of social function Chinese investigative journalism may have. The understanding of investigative journalism in this country therefore, would highly contribute to our knowledge of the nature of Chinese journalism and the power struggle in the relationship between journalism and politics in China, which would add to the bulk of journalism theories as a whole. Four aspects of knowledge can be gained through the study of investigative journalism practiced in China’s authoritarian political system: (1) the formation and development of specific journalism concepts and practices in a specific social environment; (2) the power struggle between journalism and politics in an authoritarian, but commercial media system; (3) the performance, adaptation, and self-adjustment of journalism as an occupation, and the way it has influenced the society governed by the arbitrary exercise of political power; and (4) the factors such as local cultural values, the public, and organizational culture that influence the concept of journalism and the social function of journalism.

The Bottom-Up Perspective This book takes a bottom-up perspective on investigative journalism in China. A bottom-up perspective means, first, that the analysis of this

Introduction

7

book mainly relies on the author’s own empirical research on investigative reporting, and on studies of cases of investigative reporting in China. Methodologically, the three-month full participant observation in the investigative reporting team in Southern Metropolis Daily (nanfang dushi bao) in 2006, another three-month fieldwork in Dahe Daily (dahe bao) in 2006, and the nearly 100 formal and informal in-depth interviews with media workers from 2004–09 provide the empirical basis for the analysis in this book. The bottom-up perspective also means this study is different from top-down or macro-oriented researches of investigative journalism because it focuses on the real practices of investigative journalists, microdynamics within news organizations, and interplay of dynamics between investigative media and local social entities. This book regards that if we want an in-depth understanding of how investigative journalists do their job, it is necessary to go to the work place of investigative journalists to observe their real practices; if we want to gain an insight into the dynamics of news production within news organizations, we need to go to news organizations to scrutinize the most subtle scenes of organizational dynamics in news production. Such studies on micro-dynamics are often neglected by scholars who take top-down approach, but they can provide us a first-hand and effective understanding, for example, of how investigative journalists are deployed within news organizations, what kind of relationship exists between investigative journalists, their editor, supervisors, and news sources. How do investigative journalists get story leads and gather information in their investigation? How do investigative journalists know what they know and justify the knowledge they produce? How are investigative reports revised after being submitted to the editor’s desk and before publication? The answers to these questions can tell us the real situation of investigative journalism, and also about the factors and power struggles that influence investigative reporting. This book emphasizes the analysis of individual investigative journalists and individual news organizations that support investigative journalism. The knowledge of investigative reporting and interaction within a news organization can contribute to our understanding of investigative journalism and its social function as a whole. Besides the focus on individual investigative journalists and news organizations, the book also concerns local dynamics that directly influence the development and quality of investigative journalism. When analyzing the relationship between investigative journalism and external social entities, usually we would consider the macro-political climate at

8


the national level—or even at the international level—and the pressures from international society. However, most real practices of investigative journalism happen locally and news organizations are also locally located. We need to consider the local political climate, and take the influences of local dynamics into account. In this book, therefore, the analysis of investigative journalism combines the analysis of general patterns at the macro-level, and the microlevel analysis of real practices of investigative journalists, as well as the interplay between investigative journalism and social entities. This book hopes to provide a theoretical understanding of the development, adaptation, and social function of investigative journalism in the arbitrary exercise of socioeconomic and political power in China.

The Structure of the Book The book is organized into three sections. In the first of these, the concept of investigative journalism in the context of China is discussed and the conceptual basis for the book is set. In the second section, the development of investigative journalism and the ideals and practices of investigative journalists are discussed. The third section looks at the social function of investigative journalism. Chapter 2, then, discusses the concept of investigative journalism. Before detailed discussion of investigative journalism, it is necessary to clarify the basis of that discussion: whether the investigative journalism about which I am talking here is what you understand. The similarities and differences between investigative journalisms in the West and China are discussed. Particular emphasis is placed upon the historical and philosophical origins of Chinese investigative journalism that is influenced by Confucianism, liberalism in late Qing era, and the criticism and self-criticism of the CCP. Specific social conditions are always needed for the sprouting of a new genre of journalism. Chapter 3 and 4 discuss the development of investigative journalism in China from the 1990s and the social conditions that influence its development. Chapter 3 is about the rise of investigative journalism in the 1990s, its traits and subjects during this period of time, and the development of the concepts of investigation and criticism. Investigative journalism, however, is suffering a decline as a result of political crackdowns but far from completely dysfunctional in the twenty-first century. Chapter 4 analyses the reasons for the difficulties

Introduction

9

investigative journalism has met through an examination of the changes in social conditions and of the interplay between investigative journalism and social entities, especially the political Party. The insistence of investigative journalism practice is also analyzed. Chapter 5 looks at how investigative journalism has been used as an efficient means for the legitimation of Chinese journalism. The crisis of prestige that Chinese journalism is facing in the post-reform era is discussed. The theoretical background to the establishment of professionalism of investigative journalism as a strategy is considered, as is the process of regaining privilege and prestige for Chinese journalism in practice. The discussion in Chapter 6 is based on a case study of the investigative reporting team at Southern Metropolis Daily. This chapter discusses the influences of news organization on the practices of investigative journalism. The conflict of interests among individual agents residing in different positions in the organizational structure and working procedures is considered as a main source for journalistic autonomy limitation; while organizational culture and recruitment measures guarantee the maneuvering autonomy of investigative journalism. The organizationallyshaped epistemology of investigative journalism will be discussed. Consensus, patterns, and routines in investigative reporting process as an outcome of the organization of investigative journalism, will also be discussed. Chapter 7 discusses how investigative journalists tell stories of riots and how the conflict of interests among different agents within a news organization impacts the output of news production. This chapter analyzes the way in which investigative journalists report social riots, which is different from the official way, and the way in which the newsrooms of the two newspapers revise investigative reports submitted by journalists. Two cases of reports are discussed: the Chizhou Riot in Southern Metropolis Daily, and the Wanzhou Riot in Dahe Daily. Original reports submitted by journalists and the final published reports are compared and analyzed. The analysis tells us about a conflict of interests between journalists and newsrooms, which results in newsroom self-censorship. Chapter 8 looks into the relationship between investigative journalism and the public, and the way investigative journalism impacts the public. A public mobilization model and its modification in the new media era will be discussed. The roles of investigative journalism and the public in the evolvement of social events, especially in the new media era are analyzed.

10


Chapter 9 is a concluding chapter, which considers the social function of investigative journalism in this authoritarian country. A theoretical discussion of the social function of Chinese investigative journalism is at the centre of this chapter. This book is an academic work that attempts to contribute to our understanding of journalism and its functions through studying the case of investigative journalism in China. It is not a practical handbook about how to practice investigative journalism in China, though real-life materials from practice are taken into account from a theoretical viewpoint. In this world, there is more than one journalism system, as specific social settings produce specific types of journalism with specific traits and specific social functions. Only if we have a fairly good knowledge of how journalism looks and performs differently in different societies will we have a better theoretical understanding of journalism.

Chapter 2

Conceptualizing Investigative Journalism in China

When mentioning investigative journalism, we often think of several events that have become almost paradigms, such as the “Watergate Scandal” in the US, or the UK’s “Thalidomide scandal.” The universal understanding of investigative journalism originates from people’s memories of the heroic practices of a special type of journalism in Western democracies, especially in the US and the UK, in the 1960s and 70s. This type of journalism fulfills the democratic role of journalism by exposing individual and institutional scandals and faults. In the Western discourse, investigative journalism is deemed to be the “most vigorous” journalism (Glasser and Ettema 1989). Investigative journalism disrupts the normal pattern of the “indexing” of views expressed by mainstream government sources and upsets the cozy world of daily reporting (Bennett 1990). Investigative reporting should reveal new information, expose what is being covered up, accuse bad guys and organizations, raise concerns over new/hidden problems, trigger changes, and make society better. Investigative journalism is crucial to democracy, not only because it is connected to “the logic of checks and balances” in democratic societies, monitoring powerful individuals and institutions, such as governmental bodies and corporations, but also because it helps nurture an informed citizenry, which enables the public to hold government accountable through political participation, such as voting (Waisbord, 2001). Both the public and journalists recognize investigative journalism as good journalism. People have shown respect to a British journalist, Phillip Knightley, as he revealed the Thalidomide Scandal in 1972. Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, the two reporters who pulled the President down in the Watergate Scandal, also in 1972, on the other side of the ocean, have become icons for good journalists and the

12


journalism they were practicing has been regarded as the paradigm of good journalism (Pilger 2005). Many big names, for example Seymour Hersh, John Pilger, and Paul Foot, are related closely to the bold and provocative journalism (De Burgh 2008). It is quite fashionable for investigative journalists to present themselves as the true guardians of the public interests or the “custody of conscience” (Ettema and Glasser 1998). The ideas discussed above are usually used to describe the concept of investigative journalism in the Western contexts as well as more generally. What, then, is the concept of investigative journalism in China? Is it the same to what we mean in the Anglophone societies? In an attempt to add the case of China to the main body of studies on investigative journalism in other parts of the world, it is necessary to clarify the concept of investigative journalism by first trying to find some common ground for analysis. This chapter aims to conceptualize Chinese investigative journalism by looking at three issues, namely the differences between investigative journalism and daily journalism, the philosophical principle of investigative journalism, and the legitimate function of investigative journalism. Similarities and differences between investigative journalism in the West and China will be analyzed. This chapter will first discuss the traits that differentiate investigative journalism from daily journalism in both Western and Chinese contexts, and then look at the continuities and discontinuities of the three ideological and journalism traditions that offer a philosophical basis for the idea of modern Chinese investigative journalism, particularly investigative journalists’ conception of their role, and the expectations of the public and the ruler on the role of investigative journalism. Here, the chapter does not try to build a “grand historical narrative” but aims to give some ideas of what modern Chinese investigative journalists, the public, and the ruler hold instinctively in their minds about the function of investigative journalism, which offers explanations at the ontological level for why they practice investigative journalism in China and how they do this. The chapter will conclude by discussing the legitimate function of investigative journalism in China and putting forward one of the key questions in this book: what kind of actual social function does Chinese investigative journalism have in this country. This chapter suggests that though sharing some things in common with Western investigative journalism, particularly with reference to practices, investigative journalism in China is indeed different from that in the West, in terms of philosophical principles and legitimized social function.


13

Differentiating Investigative Journalism from Daily Journalism An efficient way to understand “what investigative journalism is” is to understand how investigative journalism is different from daily journalism. In the West, what differentiates investigative journalism from daily journalism is not whether there is investigation or not. Being investigative does not necessarily mean it is investigative journalism (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991). Just as McDougall put it: “all reporting is investigative” (MacDougall 1982: 227), the work of journalism itself involves investigation and a process of evidences collection, with the only difference being that daily journalism is unable to investigate into events due to the daily deadline pressure, while investigative journalism can make it without such a pressure. The main differences between investigative journalism and daily journalism are thought by some scholars to be the skeptical nature of investigative journalists, who believe in the “conspiracy theory” of the powerful, and their ability to find evidences that those daily journalists may not be able to find, to circumvent obstacles that may stop daily journalists from probing, and to pursue facts tirelessly (MacDougall 1982). Other scholars, such as Greene (1983), regard what determines investigative journalism as whether the content exposes what other people want to conceal. De Burgh also defines investigate journalists as those whose job is to “discover the truth,” and reveal the concealed truth in media coverage (De Burgh 2008: 11). Investigative journalism is further regarded as “the journalism of outrage” (Ettema and Glasser 1988; 1989; Ettema and Glasser 1998; Protess, Gordon et al. 1991). For them, investigative journalism should contribute to civic betterment by catching the attention of the public and arousing their anger through media exposure of wrongdoings or social pitfalls. This process involves agenda setting, agenda changing and interpretation(Protess, Gordon et al. 1991). In sum, therefore, in Western discourse, investigative journalism refers to a special style of journalism that probes into topics more deeply than most other daily journalism, involving extensive investigation that makes investigative reporting less timely, time-consuming, and expensive. Investigative reporting is beyond what is told by the authorities and it needs journalists to cast doubts on official narratives about something and make inquiries into it. Investigative reports are more aggressive than routine daily news and need more resources. Compared to daily news

14


reporters, investigative journalists are usually full of suspicions of wrongdoing, disobedient, but more experienced. They are highly motivated and energetic. They operate carefully and usually have adversarial relationships with powerful individuals and institutions, even the ruling authorities. Investigative journalists sometime rely on “deep throat” for reliable but confidential information. Investigative journalists even take risks for the truth they are telling. More importantly, investigative journalism needs to be able to arouse the outrage of the public, inspire civil consciousness, and challenge the boundaries of civil morals in order to improve the society. These traits that differentiate investigative journalism from daily journalism in Western discourse are applicable in distinguishing investigative journalism from everyday journalism in China. Investigative journalism in China is a type of journalism that involves extensive investigation and produces news reports revealing hidden information, arousing the public’s attention, and influencing their understanding for a purpose to make a change. Chinese investigative journalists are a group of journalists who gather information and write reports about something important, but hidden from the public’s eyes, or potentially concealed by some individuals or organizations (De Burgh 2003; Tong and Sparks 2009). They see themselves as different from daily journalists. This type of journalistic work needs extensive financial support as it is expensive and time-consuming (Tong and Sparks 2009). Besides, Chinese investigative journalists need protection from political punishment because of the adversarial nature of their work (Tong and Sparks 2009), which Western investigative journalists may not need. Chinese investigative journalism also exercises an agenda-setting function, setting agendas and explaining the meanings of those agendas to the public by making moral judgments (Hua 2000; De Burgh 2003). In terms of work practices, therefore, Chinese investigative journalists share some things in common with their Western counterparts.

The Philosophical Principle What differentiates Chinese investigative journalism from investigative journalism in liberal democracies is the philosophical principle that justifies its practices and impacts on the concept of its social function. As mentioned before, in Anglo-American societies, what underlies and justifies the practices of investigative journalism is the high expectation


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of the democratic role of the press. Investigative journalism is expected to perform its watchdog role in maintaining democracy. As Lord Acton asserted, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Pilger 2005). Liberal democracies need power to be held accountable. Investigative journalism is exactly needed in this aspect. Especially when the ideals of Free Press in Western discourse that suggest the free market media systems can be indeed totally free from State interference have failed, investigative journalism fills the gap by representing another tradition of the press: the social responsibility theory (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991). Investigative journalism is thought of as standing opposite to the powerful, obliged to ensure that political authorities to watch out for the public interest and do their job well. Practising investigative journalism can arouse the public’s awareness of failures within the social systems of regulation and the wrongdoings of the powerful, the rich, and the corrupt. This potential democratic function of investigative journalism fits democracy’s expectation on the role of the press in the public sphere: to inform the public and to help them forge the viewpoints that influence policymaking, making sure policy is made and implemented in the correct way. Investigative journalism has therefore been historically justified as a useful means of maintaining a healthy democracy (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991; De Burgh 2008). Unlike the Western ideal, Chinese investigative journalism is not associated with democracy; instead it has its own philosophical principles rooted deeply within its historical and cultural framework. The philosophical principles of investigative journalism in China have developed over thousands of years of Chinese history, with origins that can be traced back to Confucian times. The philosophical principles largely come from the ideological and journalistic traditions of Confucianism, Liberalism, and Communist Maoism. The first of these traditions refers to traditional Confucianism’s great expectations on intellectuals in their mission to save the nation and the people. The second refers to the liberal journalism tradition in the late Qing Dynasty. The third is the Communist Party’s criticism and self-criticism tradition. The historical line therefore runs from Confucian times in the tenth century, to the late Qing Dynasty, and to Communist-Party-ruled modern China. Modern Chinese investigative journalism has reflections of all the three traditions, and has also built in its own process of change. The cultural values embodied in these traditions, which indicates the specific relationship of journalists to the ruler and to the audience, offer ideological justification for, and characterize, investigative journalism in China.

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The tradition of the Confucian intellectual The basic historical and ideological root underlying and justifying the practices of investigative journalism in this current one-Party authoritarian country is the tradition of Chinese Confucian intellectuals’ selfcommitment to their social function, cultivated and guided by the ethical thought of Confucianism. Though some scholars, such as Zhao, regard contemporary investigative journalists more like professional journalists than public intellectuals (Zhao 2000), journalists’ self-descriptive expression and public discourse are more likely to show that Chinese journalists still recognize themselves, and are seen as intellectuals by the public (De Burgh 2003; Tong and Sparks 2009). Scholars have traced the origin of the Chinese intellectual tradition to the feudal Confucian intellectual class (Lee 1947; Wang 1958; Tu 1990). Confucianism, named after Kongzi (Confucius, 551–479 bc), is an intellectual tradition of political and social thought established by Kongzi (Fairbank 1979; Ackerly 2005). Many Westerners believed that Confucianism was abolished and abandoned in Communist China during the time of Cultural Revolution, when all “four olds” (sijiu)—old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits— definitely including Confucian thinking were supposed to have been smashed completely. Nevertheless, it is not true. After more than two-thousand years of consistent institutionalization, Confucianism has already infiltrated all aspects of Chinese people’s social and cultural life. It is hard to erase the deep and widespread influences of Confucianism in the country with a long history. One can find two essential elements of the Confucian intellectuals that characterize the social role that Confucian intellectuals should play and the relationship of Confucian intellectuals to rulers and to people. (1) Confucian scholars are thought, paradoxically, to compromise to the system at the same time as they criticize it (Li 1991; Ackerly 2005; Li 2007). On one hand, the group of intelligentsia in Confucian China was traditionally and closely attached to the class of officials and was never independent as part of the government (Fairbank 1979). As they are integrated into the bureaucratic system, the group of educated and intellectual élites has an image of compromising with the system rather than criticizing and challenging the system (Fairbank 1979; Chen 2001). On the other hand, especially in the political ideals of Confucius, Confucian scholars have the responsibility to ensure that society follows


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the right way and that rulers govern humanely, by assessing political activities, investigating, reporting, and speaking out abuses of official authority or violations of the law by those in power, even opposing against the authority. This social responsibility is embedded within the ethical value system of Confucianism. The ethical value system of Confucianism does not support the abuse of political authority, and even argues that bad rulers need to be replaced by good rulers, even through violent means such as revolution (Reid 1923; Tu 1993; Li 2007). The ethical system believes that the key virtues—humaneness (ren), ritual propriety (li), righteousness/justice (yi), and wisdom (zhi)—are the key to good human nature and social and political stability. Among all other virtues, Ren (humaneness) is the core value of the ethical tradition. Society can run well under the premise that the moral virtues are maintained and rulers treat the ruled people humanely. The cultural values of Confucianism also justify the overthrow of bad rulers and bad government and to replace them with sage kings, even through revolutions, especially in early Chinese history, such as the Xi-han Dynasty1 (Reid 1923; Li 2007). At this point, the orthodox Confucianism has a revolutionary nature as it advances a key concept in which the ruling power needs to be held by sages, instead of being inheritted by the offspring of previous rulers (Reid 1923; Gan 2003). Confucianism’s tenets indeed require Confucian scholars to restrict imperial power and prevent abuse by the ruling power (Tu 1993). Confucian intellectuals act in the interests of humanity when criticizing the corruption or wrongdoings of officials, as they direct authority to follow the way of “Ren” (Ackerly 2005). Good emperors should be those who allow Confucian intellectuals to freely speak out their opinions boldly. Confucian intellectuals not only believe their knowledge endowed them with enough wisdom to help the rulers correct their behavior, but also believe they have the responsibility to improve politics and policy. Nevertheless, the ability of ciriticizm is fundamentally limited by two factors. First, this radical view of “sages ruling” was later limited by integrating intellectuals into the system and by promoting the concept of “emperor as the son of God” (huangdi shouming yutian) that the imperial authority promoted to reinforce and justify its rule (Gan 2003; Du 2005). Second, Confucian intellectuals have “never questioned the fundamental principles of the monarchical system” (Tu 1993: 28). (2) Chinese Confucian intellectuals traditionally see themselves as a bridge between ruling élites and ordinary people in society (Tu 1993).

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This means, in Confucian times in China, that Confucian intellectuals regard themselves not only as those who should transfer the commands of the ruling class to the people, but also the ones who should petition for the people (shangtong xiada), help the people gain justice and make their voice heard by the ruling class (Xu 2005). In terms of their attitude towards the ordinary people, Chinese Confucian scholars see themselves as being better than ordinary people, need to educate and enlighten common people, and are qualified and clever enough to criticize the powerful and to change realpolitik on behalf of the people according to their political ideals (Xu 2005). From the side of the people, a good intellectual should be the one who could inform the rulers, policy makers, and policy implementers of the people’s dissent and resentment, and who could change the reality for the best interests of the people. A good intellectual therefore, is supposed to fearlessly speak for the people who are usually the vulnerable masses. A good intellectual is also thought to be an official, or to have the ability to influence officials if the intellectual himself is not an official. This Confucian intellectual tradition is regarded as providing a solid foundation for the Chinese humane tradition, with humanistic and justice values at the centre of its value system. We have many good examples of good intellectuals in history. Among them are the examples of two Confucian officials: Bao Zheng and Hai Rui. Bao Zheng served as an official during the reign of the Song Dynasty,2 more than a thousand years ago. As being best known for his intolerance of injustice and corruption, he is nicknamed “Clear-blue-sky Bao”, which is a symbol of justice in China. Hai Rui was an official of the Ming Dynasty,3 when the then Chinese emperor was stupid and incompetent, ignoring the corruption of government officials, and unable to administer the country. Hai Rui dared to impeach the emperor and was concerned for the people, especially the Hai Rui did not enjoy a successful political career as he insisted in reducing officials’ corruption and making reforms to improve the people’s lives, for example by the taxation reform, which rivaled the whole corrupt system of governance. Hai Rui therefore, was the classic example of the failure of “one man versus the system.” Though Hai Rui fought with the system, he was always loyal to his emperor. He did so because he believed it was good for his ruler instead of challenging the legitimacy of his ruler. For Chinese journalists, or in the expectations of the public for journalists, a good journalist needs to be “Clear-blue-sky Bao” or


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“Clear-blue-sky Hai,” who has concern for the ordinary people and opposes wrongdoings (De Burgh 2003; Michelson 2008). This historical and cultural ideal is deeply rooted in the self-identity of most Chinese journalists, especially investigative journalists. The expectations that both Chinese Confucian intellectuals themselves as well as the general public hold on Confucian intellectuals’ social function provide some convincing explanations for the characteristics of investigative journalism in China. Investigative journalists think that they have the obligation and responsibility to help the people achieve justice like “Clear-blue-sky Bao/Hai” did thousands of years ago. In the Black Brickfield Scandal, for instance, Fu Zhengzhong, the Henan journalist who initiated the investigation into the scandal, referred to his decision to undertake the investigation by saying “I wanted to help them.” According to him, . . . the information given by the kidnapped and abused children’s parents was one normal lead among a large number of news leads. It was a very normal lead that many journalists might receive everyday. But as a father, I saw the anxiety and worries of the parent and therefore decided to help them. (cited in Tian 2008) For the public, investigative journalists have become a channel between ordinary people and government and even a representative of social justice. When the ordinary people cannot figure out problems they are facing or unjust treatment they are encountering, they turn to investigative journalists for help. The once popular investigative television program, CCTV’s Focus received more than 2300 letters/emails/SMSs from ordinary people every day.4 The ordinary people wrote to and visited the program in order to draw the attention of investigative journalists. Investigative journalists are treated with respect shown to “Clear-blue-sky Bao.” When reporting the Zuoyun Mine Disaster in 2006, I saw a lot of appealing survivors waiting outside the hotel where the officials from the state and province stayed, and they sat quietly in front of the county government, blocking the whole road. When they saw us, many of them stopped us (the journalists and I), asking us to get them justice, and calling us “Blue Sky Bao.” The expectation of the public on intellectuals in ancient Confucian times now focuses intensively on investigative journalists. Thousands of people who have received injustice appeal for the help of investigative journalists who are seen as the last straw (Lu 2007). Investigative journalism is expected to work like a medicine that can cure all types of diseases. The expected function of investigative

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journalism and the expectations of its functions show the special meaning of investigative journalism in China. The liberal journalism tradition in the twentieth century The journalism tradition in the late Qing Dynasty, combining the missions of Confucian intellectuals and some Western liberal democratic thoughts that were, for the first time introduced in the New Culture Movement (xin wenhua yundong), called for freedom of the press, and advocated an idea of “media supervision” (meiti jiandu). This idea suggests the press and journalists should have the responsibility and freedom to supervise and criticize government that may fall short of practicing good governance. The establishment of the liberalism journalism tradition in the late Qing Dynasty can be considered to relate strongly to the encouragement of the late Qing feudal government to launch newspapers and practice journalism, which, however, is deemed as to oppose against the Western influences, e.g., the Western imperialist invasion (Passin 1963; Lee 2005). There are two main reasons for the late Qing Dynasty’s positive attitude to the domestic press. The first is that the frequent launches of newspapers by foreigners in the Chinese territory were thought to be a symbol of invasion and the influences of foreign press needed to be counteracted by domestic press. Chinese newspaper publishing has a long history, first appearing as the official (or semiofficial) gazette (dibao) of government activities in the tenth century (Lee 2005). Since then, the press had been owned by feudal governments, mainly functioning as information providers for the public, especially businessmen. The monopoly of the official gazette was broken in the twentieth century when newspapers launched by foreign investors were often seen in China. After the Opium wars, Westerners started to launch newspapers in China, for example Chinese Serial (1853) in Hong Kong, North China Herald (1850) in Shanghai, and Northern Post (1880) in Tianjin (Ding et. al 1997). Chinese open-minded intellectuals and bourgeois reformists in the late Qing political power block viewed newspaper with foreign investment as a symbolic form of colonialism and even as facilitating the colonial expansion of Western countries. The second is that launching and reading newspapers was regarded as an efficient way to save China from the invasion of the West. Around the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese society faced a decline in the domestic market and the invasion of Western imperialism. The


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Qing Dynasty was collapsing and the feudal system that had lasted for thousands of years in China was ending. The press was thought to have a great potential for national salvation and public enlightenment by increasing the literacy of the people and making them understand current affairs, which enabled the Qing Dynasty to bring about reforms and hence realize self-salvation. Open-minded intellectuals and bourgeois reformists who recognized the potential of the press for enlightening the public, appealed for political reform and good policies to encourage the Chinese to launch newspapers and stimulate ordinary people to read them. For example, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and thousands of other Confucian intellectuals urgently requested that the Qing authority encourage the launching of newspapers, encouraging the flourishing of the press, and issuing laws to regulate the press in the Gong Che Shang Shu movement5 in 1895. In 1898, Guangxu, the then puppet emperor, issued a few policies to encourage the development of the press during the Wuxu reform.6 Such policies, which were the first in history, led to the flourishing of the “liberal” press in China. Though the promising development of the press was stopped at the failure of the Wuxu reform, the Chinese press made great development during this period in many ways. One important development, was the introduction of Western liberalism thoughts such as press freedom, into China. Contemporary China saw a special period of time when democratic and liberal thoughts was promoted among the public within Chinese intellectual discourse facilitated by the rise of contemporary “liberal” press at the late Qing Dynasty in the twentieth century. Within the then social cultural context, what competed with the dominant Confucianism was the introduction of Western democratic liberalism by avant-garde intellectuals, who regarded democracy as an emancipative power and a key to national salvation (Lee 2005). Most of these avantgarde intellectuals had overseas study or work experience. Returning to China or staying overseas, and having much interest in Western democratic political system and society, these intellectuals introduced Western democratic enlightenment thoughts into China, especially by launching newspapers and magazines that covered stories about, or writing articles about Western liberalism thoughts. Freedom of the press and media supervision were two main thoughts among these liberalism thoughts. These two concepts—“freedom of the press” and “media supervision” were strongly advanced by Liang Qichao, who was the most prominent of these several generations of intellectuals who longed for democracy

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and who were influenced by the Western democratic ideals that were brought into China after the Qing Dynasty decided to open up China to the rest of the world. With an admiration for the Western press’ social influences, Liang was the first to promote the idea of “media supervision.” One main role of the press he defined was that the press needed to supervize the government and take power into account. In his editorial published in the Xinmin Congbao (new citizen) in 1902, Liang clearly wrote that the press should take on the two instinctive responsibilities of supervizing the government in its watchdog role and acting as a guide to the people. In theory, the idea of “media supervision” is based on Western liberal thoughts. According to Liang, the reason the press was able to take the responsibility of supervizing the government was “freedom of the press.” Liang explained in an editorial in Xinming Congbao in 1902 that freedom of speech and freedom of the press guarantee all other freedoms; newspapers and journalists can freely act as a watchdog to supervize the government because they have freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Though heavily influenced by the Western liberal thoughts, especially the Western free press theory, Liang still followed the Confucian logics. The main reason to account for the necessity of press supervision over the government is exactly the Confucian ethical concern over human nature. Liang questioned whether the good human nature could always remain. Liang explained why supervision is needed because human nature may not all be essentially good and even Saints are imperfect and may abuse power. In terms of human nature, the human being finds it difficult to fulfill his/her obligation without supervision, while, in terms of government, government that has powerful authority may abuse power if it is without supervision. The reason for media supervision over government is very Confucian. The relationships among the press, the government, and the people also fit the ethical logic of Confucianism, although it is revolutionary to put the press in an equal position to the government. The people empower the government because the people hire them to serve the people; while the press, representing the people, speaks out for the people. What the press does in supervizing the government should be what a father would do in educating his children. To supervize the government does not mean challenging or subverting it. Instead, to supervize the government is to help the government fulfill its duty to serve the people. This is exactly what Confucian authoritarian regimes


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need intellectuals to do: to provide criticism to improve the regime at the same time as comprising with and belonging to the system. The ideas of freedom of the press and of media supervision are a continuity of the Confucian tradition together with some new implications from Western thoughts. That’s why Nathan labels Liang Qichao a Confucian reformer, and Lee Chinchuan ranks the journalism tradition in the twentieth century as a Confucian-Liberal journalism model, as he regards the intellectuals’ impulse as Confucian, although it is “fuelled by western liberalism” (Lee 2005: 109). Similarly to the responsibilities Confucianism expects intellectuals to take, Liang gave a mission of national salvation to journalists. In the eyes of Liang, media supervision is a useful tool that can be used to save the country. It is good to recognize the function of media supervision in enlightening the public and stopping power abuse and corruption. It is too heavy, however, to give journalists such a social responsibility and a mission to punish political failure and corruption and save the country, especially when Chinese journalists have the reputation of being a “literary people” who are dependent on the ruling system that limits their emancipatory power. Such a mission and social responsibility is not only the continuity of the ancient Confucian intellectuals’ mission, but also has a historical heritage for modern Chinese investigative journalism. The communist party’s ideological tradition of criticism and self-criticism For many people, it will be a surprise to know that modern Chinese investigative journalism appeared and boomed under the support of the ruling Party. A question emerges then: how can one explain the once friendly attitude of the authoritarian regime towards critical investigative journalism? The answer to this needs us to look at the Communist Party’s ideological tradition of “criticism” and “self-criticism,” also known as “inner-Party Struggle,” which is the CCP’s traditional major mechanism to control and discipline cadres and political élites (Dittmer 1973a; 1973b). The rise of investigative journalism in the 1990s can be attributed to the Party’s conventional favor for criticism and self-criticism and later more specifically “media supervision” (yulun jiandu). The idea of “media supervision and criticism” entailed in practicing investigative journalism was ironically embedded within the political discourse of the Party from the very beginning. This tradition within the Party’s political discourse

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provides official ideological justifications for practicing this type of journalism under the authority of the Communist Party. The Communist Party’s ideological tradition of criticism and selfcriticism is inherited from ancient Confucian intellectual’s mission, which expects journalists to provide criticism for improvement and to bridge the Party and people. This tradition, however, discards the liberal tradition with particular reference to freedom of the press. The Communist Party shares the Confucianism’s ideas of criticism, as it deems criticism to be an efficient measure for intersystem self-improvement and self-correction (Dittmer 1973b). In the history of the CCP, criticism and self-criticism has been heavily used in internally purging oppositions and helping inner Party construction (Sullivan 1985). As early as 1937, Mao Zedong suggested that the internal conflicts of the Communist Party should be solved through criticism and self-criticism (On Conflicts). From then on, Mao repeatedly stressed the importance of criticism and self-criticism on the construction of the Party and the improvement of Party members. Mao even regarded the practice of self-criticism as distinguishing the Communist Party from other political parties. In 1945, criticism and self-criticism were written into the new Party Constitution that was passed at the 7th National People’s Congress Conference as being an excellent tradition of the Communist Party, which should be practiced and implemented from time to time to ensure the integrity of the Party. Both ideas: “providing political criticism” and “media supervision,” promoted by Liang Qichao, have also been inherited by the ruling Communist Party. In terms of the function of the press, the Communist Party incorporates what Liang Qichao promoted in the twentieth century that newspaper and journalists should represent the people to supervize the government, here the Party, but refutes the idea of “freedom of the press.” In CCP-ruled China, Party journalism is regarded as the tongue and throat of the Party. Party journalism is also expected to take a mediating role between the Party and the people and between the upper and grassroots leadership, which is the Confucianism’s expectation that the role of intellectuals is to connect the top and the bottom (Zhao and Sun 2007). The press is also required to take the responsibility for criticism and self-criticism within the Party. From 1950 onwards, the agent who had the role of practicing and implementing criticism shifted from being the role of Party members to that of journalists, who were deemed to be representing both the masses and the Party; newspapers were set up


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as the main arena for practicing criticism and self-criticism. In 1950, the Central Party launched a document entitled “On the decision on practicing criticism and self-criticism in newspapers.” According to this document, it is necessary “to criticise and self-criticise all wrongdoing and disadvantages of the Party’s work among the people/masses and all public arenas, especially in newspapers.” In 1954, the Central Party further stressed the argument that “newspapers are the most powerful weapon the Party can use to practice criticism and self-criticism” in the document On Improving Journalistic Work in Newspapers. The Communist Party further clarified the role of the newspaper and journalists in supervising and providing political criticism in 1987 and 1989. “Public opinion supervision” (yulun jiandu) was first time mentioned and explained in the official discourse of the Party at the 13th National People’s Congress Conference, suggesting that “the people should be informed of important issues and be given the chance to discuss them.” “Public opinion supervision” is in fact, supervision through the media, which represent the people. According to Li Ruihuan, then Director of the Propaganda Department, the supervision of media is actually the people’s supervision, which is the supervision by the people of the Party and the government’s work and staff through the media. Media are the tool for the practice of the social supervision system by the Party and the people. Media supervision is that of the Party and the People instead of individual journalists’ or media organizations’ supervision. For example, Wen Jiabao appealed in the Lianghui7 in 2010 for the government to create conditions for the people to criticize and supervize the government, and allow news media to exercise supervision power over those in power. Though what investigative journalists and media organizations mean by investigative journalism is slightly different from what the Party means, the idea of “media supervision and criticism” within the Party’s official discourse offers an ideological justification for investigative journalism in China. The Party has had an instinctive desire for “media supervision” and “criticism” since its establishment, what the Party means by “media supervision and criticism” is comrade-like criticism and self-criticism within the system. That means, “media supervision and criticism” is defined by the Party more or less as a self-correction tool, and the function of journalists as helping the rule of the ruling Party. In this sense, investigative journalism is welcomed by the ruling CCP, if with the good intention of helping the current authoritarian Communist regime. The expectations the ruling CCP has from investigative journalism are exactly those that

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imperial power wanted from Confucian intellectuals, to reinforce its rule by providing constructive criticism without fundamental revolution. These three threads of traditions integrate with each other, justifying and characterizing China’s investigative journalism and distinguishing it from that in Anglophone societies in its nature. Three traits can be found in the instincts of contemporary Chinese journalists that indicate implications for the social function of investigative journalism. First, Chinese investigative journalists have the instinctive desire to be able to express freely, which is a continuation of both Confucianism and the liberal journalistic tradition of the twentieth century. Such a desire however, is oppressed by commands from politicians in this authoritarian country and the compromising nature of intellectual journalists. Second, Chinese investigative journalists are entitled to speak for the people, petition for them, and provide criticism for the ruler. In treating its relationship to the public, journalists see themselves as being representatives for the public, who need to be helped, enlightened, informed, and guided. The spirit of caring-for-people and criticism that are embedded within the Confucian intellectual tradition form the historical basis of the philosophical principles behind practicing investigative journalism in modern China. Though bringing new implications from Western democratic liberal thought, “freedom of the press” and “freedom of media supervision and criticism” that are promoted by the liberal journalism tradition in the twentieth century, still follows the Confucian logic of: “media supervision and criticism” that is needed because human nature may not always essentially be good, and even Saints may make mistakes (Liang 1902). Both the twentieth-century liberal journalism tradition and Communist Party journalism since 1949 also follow this line. Third and very paradoxically, Chinese investigative journalists are expected to serve the rulers (Lee 2001), but meanwhile have the revolutionary instinct to challenge the ruling authority and even to fundamentally subvert the existing ruling system. This paradox originates from the key contradictions in the tradition of the Confucian intellectual’s social function: serving the ruler, and challenging the ruler for the sake of humaneness. In contemporary China, absorbing the Confucian heritage of “serving the ruler,” the ruling Party only expects investigative journalism to supervize the government in order to serve that ruling government, instead of challenging it, and has used investigative journalism’s function of “media supervision and criticism” as a sort of useful political and ideological tool of self-correction and to keep the integrity


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of the Party. However, such an expectation from the ruler does not mean journalists do not have a rebellious instinct, though this is limited to a great degree. In sum, investigative journalists in China have the instinct to fulfill the expectations that its intellectual culture has on its function as a channel through which to petition for powerless people or the masses, to seek for freedom of expression, and to take the responsibility of checking the accountability of those in power, despite the ruling political Party merely expecting it to function as a political tool to keep the integrity of the ruling Party. Nevertheless, the revolutionary instinct and the adversarial relationship that Chinese investigative journalism has with the ruling Party is not fundamentally thorough. It is first because of the constraints from the authoritarian political system which stays untouched and second because of being counteracted by the compromising nature that intellectual journalists may have to the ruling system. In practice, therefore, it would be unrealistic to expect Chinese investigative journalism to function as a power check on the ruling political authority, or to anticipate that it will have a revolutionary power to facilitate the alternatives of political Party, as it happens, in multi-Party democratic societies. What Chinese investigative journalism could more likely do is to form a bridge between the ruled and the ruler, and to exercise journalism’s reformist and advocacy influences to improve social development. These distinctions in the nature of investigative journalism do make a difference to Chinese investigative journalism in terms of the ideas and functions of investigative journalism, though we call them by the same name: “investigative journalism,” we need to acknowledge the differences between investigative journalisms in the Western and Chinese contexts, which contribute to our understanding of journalism and its social role in the context of China through more general understanding.

The Legitimate Function of Investigative Journalism in China The distinctive difference between investigative journalisms in China and the Western world therefore lies in their legitimate social functions, as an outcome of their different historical and philosophical origins. Modern investigative journalism in China is a realistic practice of traditional missions for intellectuals, which gives journalists a sense of media freedom, and which is justified by the CCP’s requirement for criticism

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and self-criticism. The three converged ideological traditions in the historical and philosophical origins help to explain the three paradoxical and contradictory aspects of investigative journalism in China. The first paradox refers to the target of investigation. Investigative journalism in China is criticized as merely beating flies and leaving tigers (Huang 2001; Lee 2001). Only the misbehaviors of local officials, local governmental work, and rich individuals are criticized and reported; the political system, central leadership, the ruling Party, and high-ranking officials are left untouched (Huang 2001). The second paradox is that the watchdog role of Chinese investigative journalism serves to strengthen the Party’s hegemonic control rather than to challenge it (Zhao 2000). Due to its adversarial nature, investigative journalism is supposed to challenge those in power for the public. Chinese investigative journalism indeed takes individual wrongdoers, especially officials and riches, into account and calls for social improvement by exposing wrongdoings and problems. Nevertheless, such investigative journalistic work is thought to help the ruling Party regain its legitimacy, instead of challenging its authoritarian rule. The third lies in the paradoxical attitude of the Chinese central leadership toward investigative journalism (Tong and Sparks 2009; Tong 2010). The Chinese central leadership promotes the practices of investigative journalism in the country, but at the same time cracks down on journalists’ and news organizations’ over-brave investigative reporting as a result of its worries over the impacts of investigative reports on social stability (Tong and Sparks 2009; Tong 2010). These paradoxes are largely caused by the special relationship of Chinese investigative journalism to the political authorities and the public, characterized by the three ideological traditions. In terms of the relationship between investigative journalism and the political authorities, investigative journalism in Western discourse is expected to function as the “custodians of conscience” (Ettema and Glasser 1998), taking an adversarial stance to those in power, especially the ruling political authorities, checking the governance ability of the government. We have many heroic examples of this in Western journalism history. In the “Watergate scandal,” Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein’s report in Washington Post in 1972 brought down the Nixon administration and led to Nixon’s resignation. Keeping “sleaze” in the public eye from 1994–97, the “cash for questions” legend in the British investigative journalism history so damaged the Conservative government that it was defeated in the 1997 General Election (De Burgh 2008).


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No Chinese investigative reports have had such influences, however. Both the Confucian culture and the liberalism of the late Qing Dynasty require investigative journalism to take the social responsibility for the facilitation of national development and advancement, and to enable the ruler to better rule the country by supervizing them. The “serve the ruler” discourse, in fact, locates investigative journalists at the side of the political authorities, let alone the Communist Party’s criticism and self-criticism tradition, which is actually a form of inter-Party supervision, and even implies that the work of investigative journalists is actually a part of Party and government work. The “serve the ruler” discourse promoted by the first two historical ideologies has been adopted by the political authority to legitimate its control over journalism and restrictions on freedom of speech. Therefore, investigative journalism in China is expected to reveal the problems and pitfalls within society in order to correct them, rather than challenging the prevailing political system and overthrowing the ruling Party completely. Chinese investigative journalism may stand against individuals and organizations, but will not oppose the rulers. This is the official attitude of the ruling authority towards investigative journalism. Though the revolutionary side of Confucian values and liberalism have also endowed Chinese journalists with an instinct for revolution and freedom seeking, such an instinct is prohibited under the authority of the CCP. In terms of the attitudes of investigative journalists towards the public, the aim of Western investigative journalism is to inform the public in order to enable them to make the right choice when voting. Chinese investigative journalists, however, share certain elitism with regards to the public’s lack of the ability to decide responsibly and to make their own, correct judgment, therefore needing journalists to guide and enlighten them. Though the three ideological traditions all require to take the people as the root of the governance (yiminweiben) and the Communist China takes “the mass line” (Dittmer 1973a), the people are usually thought of as the “masses” who lack logical thinking ability and need élites to organize and speak for them. In the traditional social responsibility discourse of Chinese intellectuals, intellectuals need to save the nation as well as save the people. Through their nature, therefore, the people are inferior to Chinese intellectuals. Revealing problems is not targeted to empower people, but aims to enlighten people and tell them what is right and what is wrong, enabling the ruler to self-correct instead. At this point, the elitism attitude of investigative

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journalism also results from the current political system in the context of China. In multi-Party system countries, if the ruling Party makes mistakes, the public could vote for, and bring another political Party to power to replace the dysfunctional ruling Party. Investigative journalism therefore plays an important role in the process of election. In China, however, there are no alternative political parties, as there is a one-Party political system in this country. The CCP is thought to represent the people, as the people are thought of as being unable to make a right choice. Chinese investigative journalists inherit this attitude from the ruling Party and regard the public’s need as having to be told, enlightened, and guided. These aspects influence the investigative journalists’ conception of the social function of investigative journalism in China. In modern China, investigative journalism is legitimately expected to help the ruler to improve its rule by providing criticism. The historical and philosophical origins imply that investigative journalism in China lacks the revolutionary power that may result in alternatives to political regimes. However, this neither means that Chinese investigative journalists do not want to put forward social development and to enlighten and wake up civic consciousness in order to reform China, especially through carrying on the critical instinct of intellectuals and under the inspiration of Western democratic thought such as media freedom; nor does it mean that Chinese investigative journalism has no actual social function. The kind of actual social function that Chinese investigative journalism has, at the centre of this book’s research, will be discussed in the following chapters.

Chapter 3

The Flourishing of Investigative Journalism in the 1990s

Compared with the history of journalism as a whole, the history of contemporary Chinese investigative journalism is a short one. It has been practiced for around twenty years since its first rise in the early 1990s.1 Within the twenty years, Chinese investigative journalism first experienced a boom in the 1990s, and then a decline in the twenty-first century. The flourishing was an inevitable result of the State’s political needs and the marketization of Chinese media, which are also thought to be responsible for the fall of Chinese investigative journalism in this new century. By the 1990s conditions have been created for the rise in and the flourishing of investigative journalism that has since become a paradigm of good journalism and has changed the relationship between Chinese journalism and politics. In the 1990s, the practice of investigative journalism was initiated in several media, including CCTV and Southern Weekend, whose innovation of this journalism genre was soon widely mimicked and followed by many other media across the country. This fever in the media led to the booming of this type of journalism in China.

The 1990s and Social Problems The 1990s was a special era. By saying this, I first of all mean it was a time of change and conflict in social conditions. The new social changes and conflicts created a climate of need that required Chinese journalism to do one thing—to investigate society’s problems and publicly reveal them—which the Party journalism was incapable of doing. The need mainly came from the feeling of the Party, which originated from worries about the doubts in the public’s mind about social problems, that the

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practice of investigative journalism should be necessary and in its best interests. The 1990s saw the resurgence of liberal thoughts that had been activated in the process of economic reform during the 1980s. China witnessed a thriving of diversified liberal thoughts before the 1989 turmoil. Chinese people debated over whether economic reform was Socialism or Capitalism, and looked forward to political reform and democracy in the near future. They actively participated in debates raised by newspapers and journalists in public media coverage. The sparks of new ideas and the desire for political reform that thrived in the intellectual movement that was known as the “new enlightenment” in the 1980s, however, almost died out immediately in the encounter with the Tiananmen Square Crisis, which was contemporary with the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the Soviet Union, indicating the collapse of the Communist Bloc and the end of the Cold War. The domestic turmoil ended with the failure of the liberalists, headed by Zhao Zhiyang, who wanted liberalism and political reform. The media and the public thereafter, stopped discussing politically sensitive topics, especially those relating to political system reforms. The restoration of conservatism that had hesitated at a radical reform and wanted social stability, led China to a national hesitation about the question as to whether China should have economic reform, especially reforms of the economic market. This concern held back the reform that was launched by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s. There was even a period of silence and wondering, especially in the ideological and cultural sectors, after the Tiananmen chaos. After 1989, this stagnation lasted for several years until the retired Deng made the “Southern-tour” in 1992, in which the old man bypassed central leadership and advocated a deepening of economic reform. In order to make it happen, Deng compromised with old conservatives by ignoring political reform and merely promoting economic reform. China, in the 1990s, therefore had a wider-scale economic reform than before, under a call for “thought liberation” promoted in Shenzhen Special Zone Daily during Deng’s “Southern-tour,” but paid the ultimate price of sacrificing political reform. The process of economic reform continued and liberal thoughts revived, though under the premise of forgetting political reform and leaving it behind. The revival of thought liberalism made it possible for media to give voice to the public’s concerns over problems that emerged in the reform process. It is true that after two generations of the top leadership merely


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pursuing economic growth, the Chinese economy grew rapidly and amazingly in the 1990s. The GDP of China rose from RMB 362.4 billion in 1978 to RMB 8,206.8 billion in 1999,2 but what accompanied the rapid economic growth were prominent social problems. These problems were identifiable in all aspects of Chinese society, and prominent among them were social injustice, the corruptions of political officials, the abuse of power by local governments, human rights problems (for example, environmental problems), and problematic commercial activities that were justified by the Deng Xiaoping’s famous “Cat” remark3 but indeed impaired ordinary people’s interests (Gilley 1998; Teiwes 2001; Wu 2004; Sausmikat 2006; Wang 2006). Deng’s slogans of a “few getting rich first” and the “Cat remark” justified the rise of a small group of new rich who accumulated their wealth probably in an unfair, often rent-seeking and even illegal way, and they did this at the cost of sacrificing ordinary people’s interests. Deng passed a wrong message to the whole society that to be rich is glorious, in whatever way it is achieved. The first social problem was the low, and even fake quality of commodities and commercial services. Especially after Deng’s Southern-Tour, there was an overwhelming tendency for people to run businesses. However, the regulation and legal system in China had not been completed by then. Business people did everything to make money, whether it was good or bad. The result was the appearance of lots of counterfeit and inferior goods and of cheating commercial behavior in the market. This problem damaged the interests of ordinary people who were losing their confidence in the Socialism economic market, and this therefore worried the top leadership. The China Association of Quality 10,000 Miles Promotion (zhongguo zhiliang wanlyxing), an influential social movement in the 1990s, was initiated by the central government and carried out by media across China. This concern over improper commercial behavior helped generate media supervision activities, which led to the systematic practice of investigative journalism in Chinese media. Besides wrongdoings on the commercial side, we can see that the second problem was misconduct in the political sector, which was even worse than counterfeit goods. Privileged with political power, the political elite group controlled the overall capital, including political, economic, and cultural capitals, monopolized social resources, and hence soon accumulated financial fortunes. In this way, a huge amount of social and economic capital converged in the hands of a very small group of the privileged political and economic elite, who had access to resources,

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decision and policy making (Tu 1993; Sun 2002a; Sun 2002b). Also, in this way, possibilities increased for the emergence of the political élites’ corruption and the social injustice that was suffered by ordinary people as they lacked access to resources. According to the Party’s Prosecution Department, 122,476 cases relating to corruption and bribery were put on file for investigation and prosecution in 1995. In the same year, more than 4000 officials from all administrative levels were declared guilty and sent to prison (Lin 2003). Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zeming, the Chinese top political leaders during the 1990s, gave an absolute priority to economic growth above all other issues, for example, social equality and environmental issues. Perhaps what Deng actually wanted was social inequality that broke down the egalitarianism promoted under Mao’s rule. Social inequality was thus growing quickly, and this was the third social problem. At the same time, when the small group of the newly rich was increasing, a large group of Chinese people, a majority of whom were from the former working class and peasants, had formed a penniless lower class. The reason why Chinese workers and peasants had such miserable experiences was that their interests were sacrificed for economic growth. At the same time as China was speeding up its economic development, workers were losing jobs in urban cities and peasants were losing their land in villages. On one hand, up to 1999, most of the State-ownedenterprises (SOEs) were reformed and a large group of former SOE’s employees were laid-off. The deepening of SOEs reform in the mid1990s resulted in an accelerating urban unemployment rate. The reform of State-owned enterprises and adjustments in industrial structure produced around 8 million laid-off and unemployed workers in urban China by June 2003.4 On the other hand, the industrialization of urban cities has expanded into the rural areas of china. Rural land has been exploited by the State for industrial and commercial use. Urbanization results in a massive number of landless peasants, most of whom either have became migrant labor in urban cities or who work in factories that are built on the peasants’ land, where they had formerly made their living. The rising number of laid-off workers and landless peasants began to expose the social problems of unemployment and poverty (Wu 2004). The term “poverty” is beyond an economic term. Instead, it means vulnerability and political and social exclusion from the social structures and security (Sun 2002a; Sun 2002b; Wang 2006). Meanwhile, human rights problems emerged in the process of economic reform as the fourth social problem. As top and local political


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leaders merely prioritized economic growth, Chinese policy-makers completely ignored sustainable development, resulting in environmental problems, such as pollution, the depletion of nonrenewable natural resources, and the destruction of the natural ecological environment, as well as human right problems, for example, the lack of human rights for urban residents in urban displacement and of rural landholders in land requisitions. These problems resulted from urbanization and industrialization, which was assumed to contribute to economic growth, but in fact at the price of sacrificing the interests of ordinary people. Jiang Zeming and Zhu Rongji, then Party General Secretary and Premier during the 1990s, however did nothing effective to solve these social problems. Both the people and the Party therefore needed investigative journalism. The ordinary people strongly required the public’s attention to their miserable life and the misconduct of the powerful and rich, but they could not make their voices heard as a result of their lack of access to social resources. They turned to journalists and the media just as the ancient Chinese people turned to the help of intellectuals thousands of years ago. Besides, domestic social problems as a result of the economic reform required the ruling Party to return to its tradition of self-criticism in order to keep its integrity and to re-establish its legitimacy.

The Chinese Media Landscape in the 1990s The 1990s was also a crucial period during which the Chinese media landscape was totally changed, and Chinese journalism began to try to shrug off the heavy burden of Party journalism in its real meaning. Since the late-1980s, the ruling authority had gradually stopped giving financial subsidies for most media and commercialized media. The stopping of financial subsidy for the media pushed it to plunge into the market for profits. In the 1990s, Chinese media started facing fierce commercial competition under the pressure to be self-funding. Media organizations needed to accumulate financial resources for their organizational development. The commercialization of Chinese media started from the 1980s. Before then, the majority of Chinese newspapers were Party Organs. A Party organ system, led by People’s Daily and other Party organs at different administrative levels, was established in China. In this system, the State-owned-and-sponsored Party organs had to obey political commands from the CCP Committee at the same administrative level. It was

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called the “responsibility system of the CCP committee at the same level” (tongji dangwei fuze zhi). At that time, newspapers had to speak for the Party and advocate the Party’s policies. Journalists were more like staff who worked in government bureaucratic offices. The Party turned journalism into part of the Party’s work by means of political control and economic support. The situation changed after 1978’s economic and media reforms. The number of Party Organs was falling greatly, while the number of commercial newspapers increased rapidly in the 1980s. In 1988, the Party Organs that dominated the Chinese newspaper market before the 1978 media reform only occupied 25% of the total number of Chinese newspapers. The circulation of People’s Daily, the central Party Organ, decreased heavily from more than 6 million at its peak in 1979, with a proportion of 16.74% of the total newspaper circulation in China, down to less than 3 million, with a proportion of 5.71% of the total newspaper circulation in 1989, and had a further decline in the 1990s. Other Party Organs suffered decreasing circulations in the same way (Feng 1994). In opposition, one newspaper was launched less than every two days, and most of the newly launched newspapers were commercial, non-Party newspapers (Feng 1994). Commercial newspapers mean newspapers that are financially supported by advertisement revenue and circulation income, but are usually launched and owned by a Party organ. Though the number of commercial newspapers increased, their development in the 1980s was limited by the then economic situation. This increase in new newspapers stopped and even went into decline after 1989. In the 1990s, further economic reform in the economic sector stimulated the rapid development of Chinese media, especially newspapers. In order to lessen the financial burden, the State and the Party began to stop financial subsidies to Party organs from the 1990s, and pushed them to seek market profits (Chen 1999; Chen and Lee 1998). The State and the Party allowed two methods that prepared Party organs to earn financial support from the market. The first was to take on advertising income.5 The second was the shift in circulation methods.6 After these two important changes in advertising and circulation methods, press commercialization was launched gradually. Besides the cessation of financial subsidy, administrative subscription, a kind of indirect administrative financial subsidy, was also prohibited step by step, though not totally stopped until the document7 was issued in 2002. Party organs cannot make ends meet if self-dependent and they are a loser in the market (Zhao 2000). As a result, there has been a boom in


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non-Party newspapers since the mid-1990s in the Chinese press market. The appearance of the weekly appendix of the Party organs follows the emergence of evening newspapers. Furthermore, since the first metropolitan daily, Huaxi Metropolis Daily (huaxi dushibao), was established in Chengdu in 1995, readers have seen the prosperity of metropolitan newspapers that are still administratively dependent on Party organs. These newspapers usually carry softer content than the Party organs, make much more profit than their parent Party newspapers (mubao), and hence even support Party organs financially. Media market competition became harsh in the mid-1990s. Party organs could not wait to launch their weekly appendix, or metropolis newspapers to gain financial support. The financial burden therefore was transferred from Party organs to these non-Party newspapers. It was not rare to see more than two metropolitan newspapers competing in a small geographic region. Or, speaking more precisely, almost all provincial capitals and some prosperous cities had more than one metropolitan newspaper. These regional or local newspapers shared similar editorial policies, were targeted at similar readership levels, and competed for similar advertisement. For example, in the 1990s, in Guangzhou City, we had Yangcheng Evening, Southern Weekend, and Southern Metropolis Daily; Shenzhen City had Shenzhen Special Zone Daily and Shenzhen Business; Chengdu City had Huaxi Metropolis Daily, Chengdu Business, Chengdu Evening, Tianfu Morning, Shu, and Shangwu Morning. Due to the harsh competition in localities, some powerful newspapers even expanded into other regions for profits. The market was so competitive that some that did not manage well closed down. For example, Shu and Shangwu Morning were defeated in the harsh competition and closed down in 2001 because of financial deficits. Against such a backdrop, the Chinese media embraced the need for changes. They welcomed new genres of journalism that could produce diversified media outlets attractive to advertisers and individual subscribers. Television stations launched more soft-content channels, and newspapers had a tendency to be thicker and heavier. They also needed long news stories that could fit into the enlarging space between ads in media coverage, exactly like their British counterparts did in the nineteenth century. A predictable consequence of this was more coverage given to topics that the public liked; among which topics of investigative reporting were one main type. News organizations needed investigative journalism whether in terms of catering to the Party and the public’s taste, or in terms of their commercial strategies.

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The then domestic political attitude toward investigative journalism allowed news organizations to do so. At the central level, investigative journalism was welcomed by the CCP at that time, as the Party needed to legitimize economic reform and to consolidate the Party’s leadership through practicing media supervision over lower governments, local cadre, and local business people. Locally, liberal local political cultures in some places, such as Guangdong and Henan, provided chances for the development of investigative journalism in those places. Guangdong and Henan, for instance, were two provinces that embraced the rise of investigative journalism in the 1990s. One main reason to explain the local booming was the liberal political cultures in the two provinces. In Guangdong, reformist governors such as Ren Zhongyi8 and Xiefei9 had liberal minds toward active media activities, which created spaces for the development of liberal newspapers and investigative journalism and facilitated the emergence of diverse opinions. In Henan, local news practitioners accredited the development of investigative journalism in Dahe Daily to Lin Yanzhi,10 an open-minded Director of the Propaganda Department, who supported “Public Opinion Monitoring” (yulun jiandu), saved Dahe Daily several times from closing down because of its boldness and gave relatively more freedom of expression to the newspaper.11

The 1990s Boom Chinese investigative journalism emerged and flourished against such a backdrop. The idea of “media supervision” was systematically promoted in journalistic and academic circles in the 1980s, especially from 1987 to early 1989. The cry for “media supervision,” which closely touched the nature of economic reform and aimed to promote politically sensitive political reform, was stopped for a while after the 1989 event. The thought liberalization released by Deng’s “Southern tour” brought “media supervision” back to the journalistic circle in the 1990s, though it could no longer touch issues of political reform. During this period of time, “media supervision” was mainly applied to reveal social injustice, corruption and the wrongdoings of the powerful (especially local cadres) and the rich and problematic commercial activities that were emerging in the process of economic reform, about which the public were concerned. Investigative journalism systematically emerged in China during the 1990s and was mainly practiced in the two camps of television and


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newspapers. In the TV sector, China Central Television (CCTV) started practicing this type of journalism. Two flagship programs, Focus (1994) and News Probe (1996), were launched by CCTV and successfully initiated the practice (Zhao 2000; de Burgh 2003; Tong and Sparks 2009). Top leaders including Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Zhu Rongji publicly supported these initiatives, which were therefore quickly copied by stations at lower administrative levels of the broadcasting system which set up their own programs investigating local problems and scandals (Tong and Sparks 2009). For example, Guangdong TV’s Social Focus (shehui jiaodian) (1994), Wuhan TV’s Urban Portray (dushi xiezhen) (1995), Dalian TV’s News Panorama-New Focus (xinwen quanjing-xin shidian) (1996), Shanghai TV’s News Observation (xinwen guancha) (1997), and Shanxi TV’s Journalists’ Investigation (jizhe diaocha) (1998) were born during the 1990s and claimed to conduct investigative work. The number of television programs that emerged from Central and Provincial TV stations and claimed to be investigative exceeded 60 by 1999 (China Journalism Annual Journal [zhongguo xinwen nianjian] 2000). In the medium of radio, China National Radio also launched a program of Xinwen Zongheng with a similar nature in 1994. The lead of CCTV however was not followed by the central Party press, like People’s Daily, on the newspapers’ side (Tong and Sparks 2009). Though central national newspapers like People’s Daily, Guangming Daily, Fazhi Daily, China Youth Daily, and Jingji Daily created columns strengthening “media supervision” in their reports, they had not systematically advanced and practiced investigative journalism. Instead, it was the lower-level newspapers and, most remarkably, the Guangzhou-based Southern Weekend, that took the lead in practicing the new journalism in the late 1990s (Zhao 2000). Southern Weekend was reformed from an entertainment tabloid to a weekly that aimed at in-depth investigative reporting in 1995. In the late-1990s, the weekly influenced a whole generation of the Chinese population with its reports focusing on official corruption and care for powerless groups’ needs. Almost all journalism graduates in China wanted to work on the weekly and the journalism circle admired the journalism practiced in the weekly as a paradigm of professional journalism (Tong and Sparks 2009). The tradition of promoting investigative journalism in newspapers was developed and continued by a generation of metropolitan newspapers, prominent among which were Southern Metropolitan Daily and Dahe Daily. Investigative journalism in these metropolitan newspapers appeared in the late 1990s and reached their peak in the twenty-first century. Investigative journalism appeared in print magazines later than in their counterparts of television and newspapers. An important news

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magazine, Caijing, was born in 1998, but the sign of its influence was not seen until entering the new century.

Subjects Investigative journalism practiced during the 1990s was a continuity and combination of all these journalism genres: critical journalism, literary journalism, and in-depth journalism, which were popularized in the 1980s. Investigative reports in the 1990s looked like 1980s’ critical reports (piping baodao), reportages (baogao wenxue), or in-depth reports (shendu baodao). It was different from all three types of journalism, however. The mixed ideas of investigation, criticism, and evidence distinguished investigative journalism12 from its predecessors. Compared to critical reporting, investigative reporting involved extensive research/ investigation, and therefore it was less timely, but more expensive, and time-consuming. Compared to reportage, investigative reporting was objective, as it was no longer presented in a novelistic way as reportage was. Instead, investigative reporting spoke with facts: telling stories through facts, based on evidences collected through an investigation process in an objective manner, though the idea of objectivity had just started forming during the 1990s. Compared to in-depth reporting, investigative reporting was usually more critical, which criticized individuals or institutions. Among the three journalisms that were popularized in the 1980s, in-depth reporting was the most difficult to distinguish from investigative reporting. Investigative reports in the 1990s involved a large amount of investigation. Conducting investigation was for collecting evidence to reveal the “truth.” The “truth” could be the wrongdoings of some powerful people or organizations but which they meanwhile wanted to cover up and about which they did not want the public to be informed. The “truth” could also be general social problems in the country, and could merely be a whole picture of what happened and why, explaining in detail the “what” and “why” of news events. Through revealing the “truth,” journalists could get the public’s or even the ruling Party’s attention to stories warning of problems and risks in Chinese society. By practicing investigative journalism, Chinese journalism changed its image to the public from being the Party’s “lapdog” to becoming the “watchdog” on the Party’s leash (Zhao 2000). Investigative journalists started to reveal the wrongdoings of the powerful and rich, to question


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power, and to stop the abuse of that power, especially the power at lower levels, revealing information that some people wanted to know but which other people wanted to conceal, and revealing the hidden problems that Chinese society was facing. Despite being critical and revealing the “truth,” investigative reporting in the 1990s aimed at depicting a picture of “justice beating the evil side” (zhengyi zhansheng xie’e), representing the determination and capacity of the ruling CCP to punish the black sheep, which enhanced the public’s confidence in the CCP’s rule. The subjects of investigative reports reported in the 1990s can be broadly classified into five types: (1) the wrongdoings and corruption of local government officials, (2) social problems existing within society, for example, environmental problem, (3) major and key criminal cases, (4) social injustice encountered by vulnerable populations, and (5) democratic events such as elections. Compared to the subjects of investigative reports in Western contexts, most of the Chinese subjects are domestic and local. It is very rare to see international subjects like Seymour Hersh’s The Massacre at My Lai (1970) or John Pilger’s Year Zero: the silent death of Cambodia (1979). The focus of investigative reporting varied in different media. Local officials’ wrongdoings, social problem and injustice were at the centre of Focus’s investigative reporting topics, while News Probe focused more on reporting social problems, big events, and major cases, especially those relating to official corruption. Southern Weekend tended to report officials’ wrongdoings and corruption, major cases, and social injustice. In the 1990s, Southern Metropolis Daily was keen to reveal local commercial cheating, while Dahe Daily was committed to criticizing local officials’ misconduct as well as problematic local commercial activities. The wrongdoings and corruption of local government officials that were exposed mainly touched on three types of social problems: (1) the misconduct of local officials that had damaged the interests of the State or of ordinary people, especially peasants; (2) economic and political achievements claimed by local officials that had turned out to be elaborate hoaxes; and (3) government officials’ abuse of power for private interest. Looking into the investigative reports on local officials’ wrongdoings in the 1990s, we find that what these investigative media did was exactly what an ancient government inspector assigned by Emperors (qingchai dacheng) would have done: to understand the sufferings of the people caused by the bad behavior of local government officials, to discover and reveal the misconduct of local officials who had tried to conceal the truth from higher authorities and from the people.

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Investigations looked into the illegal selling of farmland by a village in Sunyi County, Beijing to property developers who built a tomb on the farmland (Focus: A Tomb was Built in Farmland in a Beijing Outskirt Area April 1994); the misbehavior of local cadres in Wudalian City, Helongjiang Province, who diverted a large amount of money that should have been paid to peasants who sold grain to the Wudalian government to build a mineral water factory, but who merely gave peasants an IOU (baitiao) for the sale of their grains (Focus: The Loss of a Large Amount of Money Received from the Sale of Peasants’ Grain December 1996); a huge financial loss caused by local officials from the Grain Bureau in Feidong County, Anhui Province, who illegally sold State reserve grain (Focus: Illegally Sold State Reserve Grain Deficit Paid by State Account June 1998). Fake achievements were the subjects of several important investigative reports in the 1990s, including Focus’s program on the truth of “a full barn of grain”13 (November 1998) and News Probe’s program which exposed a major irrigation project in Yuncheng District, Shanxi Province, as an elaborate hoax14 (Inside Story of Irrigation Project in Yuncheng October 1998). Officials’ power abuse was examined in a multitude of reports, such as Southern Weekend’s “Official Cadres: has your household exceeded housing standard?” (November 1995) and Dahe Daily’s reports on “28 out of 30 total members in the Youth Summer Camp were Henan Propaganda Department officials ” (July 1997) and on “ten thousand flood control sacks were sold by a local cadre, who put an IOU (baitiao) in stock instead ” (May 1999). There were many reports dealing with environmental issues in one form or another. Investigative reporters gave reporting space to environmental problems that became prominent in the 1990s, in order to attract political and public attention to environmental damage as a by-product of economic growth and the urgent need for sustainable development. Perhaps the first and most influential actual investigations during this period told the story of an 80-year old man, Xu Zhimin, who had spent his life in the successful establishment of a forest plantation in the desert sandy regions in Yuanzitala, Inner Mongolia, but found the forest was destroyed by his descendent for commercial purposes, and, as a result, the desert returned to Yuanzitala (Guangming Daily: Who can make the old man’s dream come true 1995; Focus: A Green Dream could not become a reality, August 1, 1995). During that period of time, though television stations reported on many subjects that had already been covered in the print media, television programs were more influential and convincing. Take this subject for example. It was the program in Focus that became a classic story, instead of the report in Guangming Daily that first reported


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the story of Xu Zhimin. The program “A Green Dream could not become a reality” was awarded the 1995 Sixth China News Award 1995, and the First Prize of China Broadcasting and Television News. News analysts commented that the program was classic not only in terms of subject, but in terms of techniques and the approach of story telling. This program criticized the wrongdoings of “officials working in the public sector” (gongjiaren), through establishing a positive image of a green hero and telling a story about how the achievements of the green hero were destroyed by these officials. At that time, environmental problems were becoming an imminent problem. Such a subject therefore had significance historically and politically. Top-leadership encouraged the reporting on the subject of environmental problems. For example, Zhu Rongji, then Premier, highly praised the program Illegal Logging Endangering the Baotou to Lanzhou Main Railway Line, which criticized illegal logging by peasants who left holes in the shelterbelt that served as a wall, keeping sand out, and rail safety(Focus, December 1996). Later on, News Probe, Southern Weekend, and Freezing Point (Bingdian) also showed their attention to environmental problems. Besides environmental problems, many other social problems, such as the misconduct of unscrupulous traders and the AIDS epidemic, emerging in the reform process, were also the subjects of investigative reporting during the 1990s. Investigative media criticized fake products and wrongdoings of dishonest traders that impaired the interests of ordinary people. For example, Focus criticized the fake cotton sold to peasants by traders in Lankao, Henan (Heavy Cotton, 1994); News Collection (Xinwen Zongheng) revealed the problem of shoes made of materials that produced poison gas (Shoe Shops in Poison Gas, 1995); Southern Metropolis Daily investigated the commercial scandal of the hogwash oil and fake Toufu (1998). The AIDS epidemic subject was a special one. The AIDS epidemic in China was a by-product of failed politics and was a completely manmade disaster. Villages in the Henan province became the main AIDS plague areas of China as a result of the government policies. AIDS broke out in Henan around 1995 due to the “blood economy”15 promoted by the Henan government. The situation became worsened as the government refused to take any action (Wang 2003; Zhang 2005). Facing the breakout of the epidemic and the lack of government accountability, the media in Henan were forced to keep silent (Human Right Watch 2003; Wang 2003). The subject of the AIDS epidemic was, and still is, an extreme propaganda taboo in China. Only a few of the investigative

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media reported on this subject. The most important reports on this subject first revealed the situation of the AIDS epidemic in China and the disastrous reality in the AIDS-affected villages in Shangcai County, Henan Province (Southern Weekend, Aids Epidemic in China, November 1996). Compared to reports like A Tomb was Built in Farmland in a Beijing Outskirt Area, or A Green Dream Could Not Become A Reality, which met the political requirements for propaganda, the subject of AIDS was touching a total propaganda taboo, challenging the bottom-line of the CCP’s public opinion supervision. These investigative media were keen on the subjects of major and key criminal cases, as they considered that the public wanted to know the “truth,” which served very much as moral educational lessons. Major and key criminal cases which the media investigated included two types: officials’ corruption cases and criminal cases. News Probe and Southern Weekend were the two main sites that carried stories on these subjects. News Probe regularly exposed official corruption, or told stories of anticorruption from 1996–99. Influential reports include Who Will Supervise the Corrupt Factory Director (December 1996), From Mayer to Prison (April 1997), Anti-corruption Action in Ha’erbing (1998), Big Corruption of A Low-ranking Official (1999). On the subject of official corruption, Southern Weekend covered such diverse areas, such as investigations into how exchanging political power for money led Xu Bingsong to prison (Close Personal Relationship Ruined Senior Cadre Xu Bingsong, January 1999) and the first anticorruption case in the Sanqin areas (November 1997). Anticorruption official Dong Yang’s efforts to fire corrupt officials in Hekou was found to have failed as a result of resistance from the broader system (Southern Weekend: Dongyang’s Political Reform Met Powerful Enemy and “Waterloo” in Hekou, May 1998). Southern Weekend was the first to practice cross-regional investigative reporting, for example, in the case in which the Director of the Police Bureau in the Nanchang City was found guilty of having abused his power (February 1999). Southern Weekend revealed another type of power abuse, the evidence of which could be found in major criminal cases. The revelation that Sun Xiaoguo committed crimes, but his parents interfered with justice probe and helped him walk away without any punishment by using their political power in Kunming City caused a sensation and finally led to the death sentence for Sun Xiaoguo (Kunming appealing to punish hooligan Sun Xiaoguo, January 1998). Investigative reports that reveal individuals’ and organizations’ wrongdoings often serve social justice, as the misconduct usually damage the


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interests of a vulnerable population. In the reports on officials’ power abuse cases, powerful individuals and organizations abused their position of power to gratify their own needs without regard of harm to others. The media were revealing social injustice in the interest of powerless people. In 1998, Kou Suixian, a Vice County Governor in the Liquan County, Shanxi Province, issued an arrest warrant for a couple of peasants because the peasants’ son got married to the daughter of the Governor without his permission. The father died in custody as a result of an extensive beating by the police. The police gave an explanation of “committing suicide by poison” to cover up the father’s death. Southern Weekend investigated the case and reported on it (County Governor Daughter Eloped with Peasant’s Son The Father-in-law Died in Custody, April 1998). The exposure in the weekly caused a sensation and resulted in the sentencing of the people involved in the abuse of power, in 1999. As the national judicial system in China is incomplete, we can not only see that powerful people can escape from punishment by using and abusing the power they have, but also that tortures used in the inquests and judges’ misjudgments have resulted in many wronglyjudged cases. Southern Weekend revealed that the death sentence on 20-year-old Chen Jincang was a misjudgment as a result of torturing the young man to extract a confession (Innocent Youth Tortured to Extract Confession Sentenced to Death, When Wrongly Judged Cases Will End, May 1998) and that Yang Zhijie was arrested in 1991 and had been held in custody for eight years without reason (Kept in Custody for Eight Years Without Any Reason, April 1999). More easily justified on the grounds of public interest was the Southern Weekend 1998 exposure of administrative power harming private property rights through Beijing urban demolition and displacement, which epitomized a nationwide concern over the protection of private property rights through the governments’ enclosure movement of the 1990s (Old Lady Sued Real Estate Bureau, How to Protect Private Property Ownership, September 1998). One more focus of attention of the investigative media was on democratic events such as grass-roots elections. China Youth’s “Freezing Point” (Election in Dong Wangzhuang Village, April 1998), News Probe (Vote for Village Officials in Daguan Village, 1998) and Southern Weekend (Shangpo Village Three Elections for Village Committee Members But No Results Yet, August 1998), and Focus (Village Officials Can not be Assigned by Government, 1998) all conducted investigations and reported on the grass-roots democratic events.

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The Implications for Chinese Journalism The practice of investigative journalism has triggered at least four identifiable changes in Chinese journalism. The first is that investigative journalism has achieved its legitimacy as a new genre of journalism, which facilitates the breaking down of the dominance of Party journalism in China. As discussed previously, before the commercialization of the Chinese media in the 1980s, Party journalism dominated Chinese journalism. Though the national media system remains the same structure that corresponds to the political administrative structure of China, media commercialization has enabled Chinese journalism to step away gradually from Party journalism that merely reports news on politicians’ activities and government policies, and has started paying attention to what happens to ordinary people. Investigative journalism is accelerating the process by which Party journalism is losing its dominant position in Chinese journalism as an established and justified genre of journalism with a privileged position and it has even replaced Party journalism as a paradigm of good journalism through a decade of practice. The legitimacy of investigative journalism in China has first been officially validated by the Beijing leadership, which has essentially made the wide practices of investigative journalism across China possible. Investigative journalism has also been quickly accepted by media organizations that support this type of journalism as an integral part of their organization-supported journalistic practices. This genre of journalism is no longer practiced and favored by avant-garde individual journalists alone, but has achieved the support of media organizations and has even been gradually institutionalized within media organizations, which not only helps investigative journalism to develop rapidly as a complete journalistic genre, but also enables media organizations to achieve financial rewards in their market. Investigative journalism has achieved support from media organizations in terms of the prolonged time and financial costs allowed for investigations, and through political protection given after the publication of stories (Tong and Sparks 2009). The recognition of the public also has justified the practices of investigative journalism. During the ten years of the 1990s, investigative journalism successfully fostered and established a readership and audience who favored the taste for brave and revealing stories. Investigative journalism has changed the Chinese public’s understanding of what journalism is, and has won an image of fearlessly speaking for the people in the pubic imagination (Tong 2006). During the boom time of the 1990s,


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investigative coverage and programs created sensations among Chinese readers and audiences. The audience waited early in front of TV to see the 13-minute long Focus program every night at 19:38 p.m, and Southern Weekend also became the favorite newspaper of readers. People talked about investigative stories covered towards the media, showed their anger towards the wrongdoers, and urged the government to punish them. Second, a decade of investigative journalism practice has changed Chinese journalists’ perception of their occupation. The time when journalists were required to vow to serve the Party is over. Party journalists’ loyalty to the Party declined when journalists started to challenge Party members’ behaviors and publicly questioned government policies. Though most subjects fit the propaganda tone, investigative journalism in the 1990s started to touch those taboo subjects, such as the topic of AIDS. Journalists began rethinking the role of journalism and decided to serve the people as well. What replaced the blind loyalty to the Party was the Confucian intellectual’s sense of social responsibility and the romantic imagining of Western journalistic professionalism. The social responsibility sense was promoted through a spirit that started first among investigative media organizations. In the 1990s, a large group of journalists who shared similar views about the role of their work gathered in investigative media, such as Southern Weekend, and Southern Metropolis Daily, and were led by certain “spirit leaders” within these media organizations. After achieving reputations within the national journalistic circle by practicing investigative journalism, these media organizations and their journalist employees advanced their organizational professional norms among their national journalist peers and even among the public. This process contributed to the professionalization of Chinese journalism and made the social responsibility of Confucian intellectuals a part of the professionalism of journalists. Chinese journalists’ desire for the professional journalism paradigm of the West has been activated as well (Pan and Chan 2003). By practicing investigative journalism, they believe they are looking for the “truth,” which is thought of as being what a professional journalist in the West would do. “Looking for truth” thus repeatedly appears in the journalistic discourse of the 1990s so often that it has been embedded within the professional norms of Chinese journalists and even the Chinese public’s perception of good journalism. Investigative journalism therefore facilitates the professionalization of Chinese journalism as a way to establish professional norms, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

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Third, Chinese journalists have developed more professional practices. The idea of criticism and investigation that first appeared in the 1980s, continued and developed in the 1990s. News started to raise criticism based on evidence collected through in-depth investigation, and distinctions between facts and novel or fictional reportage started to appear. The idea of objectivity began to become established. The concern over objectivity has brought new techniques to journalism, whether they are good or bad. During this period, Chinese investigative reporters started to pay attention to being objective. They developed this through presenting stories with facts that they collected from investigations. In many cases, facts were collected when journalists disguised their real identity. Besides identity disguise, reporters also adopted another type of secret investigation technique: the use of secret camera. Investigations were under way in journalists’ interview processes. Journalists started to do “secret filming” (toupai) and “secret investigation” news (anfang xinwen).16 Two months after its launch, Focus secretly filmed the scene when “invoice vendors” (piao fanzi) illegally sold invoices to customers in the Shanghai Train Square (Astonishing fake invoices found 1994). The camera was set up 40 meters away. The journalist came to deal with the female invoice vendor without revealing his real identity. The recorded tax-cheating scene was thought of as being objective and as “truly” representing the facts and the “real situation.” The “secret filming” used in this case was the first in Chinese history. In “Illegally Logging Natural Forest in West Sichuan” (September 29, 1998) the “Half an Hour Economics” team used a secret camera to film the illegal logging scene and record the conversations between journalists and illegal loggers and even local officials. On the press side, this type of interview was initiated and extensively used in Southern Metropolis Daily, and was widely adopted by other media after its successful application at SMD. Particularly in 1998, the newspaper covered a lot of famous and influential “secret investigation” news, e.g., investigations into the “hogwash oil” (shaoshuiyou) phenomenon,17 the black inside story of “selling blood,” the police-woman-beat-people event, etc.

Chapter 4

The Fall of Investigative Journalism in the Twenty-first Century Questioned

The situation of investigative journalism in China in the twenty-first century is a harsh one. Since the beginning of the century, Chinese investigative journalism has not developed in a smooth and straightforward way. Chinese investigative journalism made a great leap in 2003 (Branigan 2010); but soon after this, it suffered from a setback as a result of serious pressures from both the Party-State and advertisers that reduced the opportunities for developing this kind of journalism. A decline in the quantity of investigative reports can be seen after 2003, and some media organizations have gradually given up the commitment to investigative journalism. Chinese journalism, however, has not victimized so much as to completely surrender the practice of investigative journalism to either political control or the commercialization of the media industry. Many other media organizations still persist in practicing this type of journalism, though developing new reporting strategies to adapt to the changed situation. The subjects of investigative reports in the twenty-first century vary from those in the 1990s, and in the meantime, the concepts of investigation and objectivity have been established in the new century.

The Peak in 2003 Investigative journalism continued its boom into the beginning of the new century, and soon saw a peak that was also a critical turning point in 2003. There are three important reasons for calling the practice of investigative journalism in 2003 a peak. The first is the level of challenges investigative reporting has posed to the political authorities. In the 1990s, investigative reports revealed mainly the wrongdoings of individual cases, which, in contrast with the correctness of the central Party leadership,

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bearing the blame for damaging the public interest. That is to say, those who made mistakes were local individuals or local organizations, while the overall policies were correct. Investigative reporting during this period of time was supposed to help facilitate the implementation of the central policy in localities, and ensure that the local implementation was in accord with the always-correct-grand-policy of the CCP and was also under the control of the CCP. Investigative journalism therefore remained a propaganda product of the “instruction news” of the 1990s. In 2003, however, investigative reporting started to turn around their guns and called the central policies and policy making of the central government into question. The autonomy Chinese journalism had obtained, and the sense of public service that Chinese journalism had achieved from practicing investigative journalism in the 1990s, started to enable Chinese journalism to put the central government or, say, the Party-State as a whole, under scrutiny, which was not what the Beijing leadership wanted and was something Beijing was intolerant of and felt it was running out of control. In the twenty-first century, therefore, a struggle can be seen for the control of the agendas of investigative journalism between the CCP and Chinese journalism. The CCP is trying to limit the scope and scale of “media supervision” to a manageable level, while Chinese journalism is struggling to breakthrough the boundaries set by the CCP. Both SARS reporting and the case of Sun Zhigang are two outstanding examples of this. The case of SARS is one in which Chinese media, especially the media in Guangdong Province, successfully forced the central government to give up its stubborn traditional approach towards risk communication. Following the Chinese version of Marxist media theory, the Chinese Party-State prioritized political stability as usual and carried on the tradition of “censoring and controlling information” in an encounter with a public crisis, which explained the restricted reporting of SARS and the official concealment of the disease’s situation and reality at the beginning of the disease’s breakout in late 2002 and early 2003. SARS started its spread in China from November 2002 and this was followed by a wide spread panic among the public. The media in Guangdong Province, including Xinkuai Daily, Southern Metropolis Daily, Yangcheng Evening, Guangzhou Daily, and Southern Daily, initiated reports revealing the epidemic in January and February 2003, strongly questioning the central government’s diagnosis of the disease in February 2003, and challenging again the central government’s claim that China had effectively controlled the spread of the disease in April 2003. Media in

Investigative Journalism in the 21st Century

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other cities also provided their support. Caijing, for example, covered an investigative report in February 2003 to reveal what had happened in Guangdong and covered 38 investigative reports from April–May 2003. The efforts of the Chinese media led to the dismissal of two high-ranking Chinese officials and helped break new ground for media freedom in China. Once Hu Jingtao and Wen Jiabao instructed Chinese media and other propaganda departments to “report honestly” (rushi baodao) on the spread of SARS in April 2003,1 China witnessed a “U-turn” from limited to overwhelming coverage in Chinese media’s coverage of SARS (Zhang and Wu 2006). The case of the Sun Zhigang event reporting2 was also seen as a breakthrough in Chinese journalism. In 2003, Sun Zhigang, a migrant worker in Guangzhou, was arrested for not carrying his ID card. He was beaten to death by local officials. Southern Metropolis Daily investigated and exposed the brutal event that led to a nationwide social movement and a change in the constitution. The second reason to call 2003 a peak is the establishment and internalization of the idea of objectivity in journalism. In the 1990s, Chinese journalists developed the concepts of objectivity and investigation. In the twenty-first century, the concept of objectivity has obviously been accepted by journalists as an established professional norm (see Chapter 5). Journalists try to avoid directly expressing their viewpoints and criticism, but instead use facts and quote news sources’ comments to demonstrate their intentions. Chinese journalism has reached a consensus that there is a need to separate opinions from facts. The narrative strategy of being objective also protects investigative journalists from political punishment in some cases. The report on the Sun Zhigang event covered by Southern Metropolis Daily is a classic report of this type. The reporters of the story wrote merely with facts, intentionally, and for political safety purpose. According to the reporters, exactly because of the objective tone of the article, the local authority had no chance and was unable to accuse them of wrongly guiding public opinion.3 The third is the participation of the public. Investigative reports in the early twenty-first century set agendas for the public and the latter actively participate in discussions about the issues raised by investigative reports. Especially for those élites who appear in public discourse like public intellectuals, their active participation has exaggerated the influences of investigative reports. Since the exposure of the illegal killing of Sun Zhigang, for instance, several jurists have appealed for a revision of the regulation in the name of the Chinese citizens (Zhao 2008). The active

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participation of citizens and élites demonstrates that investigative journalism fit in with the needs of the Chinese public quite well and also meets the Chinese citizens’ expectation for social development. 2003 is also a watershed for Chinese investigative journalism. On the one hand, before 2003, the political authorities showed their support for investigative journalism in public while, after 2003, the political authorities started to ostensively express its loathing of this type of journalism, which inevitably resulted in restrictions on investigative reporting. For example, the imprisonment of two managing editors of Southern Metropolis Daily in 2004, the dismissal of the Editor-in-Chief of Beijing News and the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Southern Metropolis Daily, and the administrative closure of “Freezing Point ” (bingdian) in Chinese Youth Daily in 2006, suppressed the joy over the victories won in the SARS and Sun Zhigang cases and the new guidelines of the CCP.4 On the other hand, before 2003, Chinese journalism mainly followed propaganda instructions in the practice of investigative journalism, i.e., Chinese journalists investigated what they were told to investigate. Since 2003, however, Chinese journalists have initiated many investigations into taboo subjects despite these investigations perhaps being against the will of the authorities. Investigative journalism in China has therefore gradually started to become a threat.

Investigative Journalism as a Threat How the Party sees investigative journalism is not as simple as a dichotomy of favor or loathing. Instead, it is a paradox. The Party has a contradictory attitude towards investigative journalism. On the one hand, following the traditions and principles of Marxist media control and of inner-Party democracy, the Party believes investigative journalism is an efficient political propaganda tool that can be used for inner-Party criticism and self-criticism, aiming to improve the Party’s administrative work and strengthen its solidarity and unity. On the other hand, investigative journalism is suspected of being liberalist, which has a previous record of bringing political catastrophes in Chinese contemporary history. The Party therefore would worry that the overwhelming revelation of the negative sides of social reality would impair a prosperous and peaceful image of the nation and therefore pose a threat to the rule of the CCP in China. This means, investigative journalism can help to reconstruct the legitimation of the Party, but could also ruin it (Tong 2010).


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In the 1990s, the high expectation that investigative journalism would regain social integration outweighed the worries of the Party about the revolutionary force of this type of journalism. Entering the twenty-first century, however, the worrying side increasingly overbalanced the positive side of the Party’s attitude. Investigative journalism therefore gradually poses more threats to the rule of the CCP. The Party’s worry first of all comes from the increasingly intensive social problems. The Party expected this type of journalism to resolve social conflicts and achieve social integration by exposing social problems. During the 1990s, when the Chinese people were suffering from official profiteering and inferior products made and sold by unscrupulous merchants, investigative journalism did help the Party to regain the trust of the public and legitimated the economic reform by revealing and criticizing official corruption and illegal business practices and by punishing corrupt officials and dishonest business people. Nevertheless, the scale of official corruption has expanded instead of narrowing and many other fundamental social problems can be seen in the twenty-first century, for example the occurrence of mass incidents one after another indicates that social conflicts have increased rather than decreased. The accumulated social conflicts come to the boil and it is not enough to rely on the propaganda power of investigative journalism to correct social problems. Investigative journalism and its educational function, therefore, are questioned and are losing their attractiveness to the Party. Besides, the revelation of too many social problems is thought to make those ruled knowledgeable about what bad things are happening in society and could lead to a loss of public confidence in the Party. If this was to happen, the Party would lose control of the situation. Second, in the twenty-first century, the tone of propaganda has shifted from the correction of individual mistakes to the construction of a harmonious society. An appeal for the construction of a harmonious society was made in February 2005. The Hu-Wen leadership hoped to mitigate domestic social conflicts, cope with a crisis of governance, and regain Party legitimacy. Facing social disorder resulting from Capitalism, the Hu-Wen leadership started to strengthen ideological education and to revive and redefine Marxism to cope with market transition (Zheng 2005; Sausmikat 2006). President Hu Jintao returned to ideologism that had prevailed in the Mao era. Differently from Mao, however, Hu wants to establish an ideological unity through a way of harmony to dull interParty cleavage and domestic conflicts, while Mao believed class struggles were the only way to achieve this. In such a situation, investigative

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journalism that might result in too much media exposures is thought to sing opposite to the tone of the construction of a “harmonious society.” Third, investigative journalism in the twenty-first century is trying to deviate from the reporting orbit set by the ruling Party and to seek more journalistic autonomy. Investigative journalism in this era is no longer the one in the 1990s which performed as a propaganda tool for the CCP. Investigative journalists no longer merely reveal the problems that they are told to expose. By contrast, they have started to investigate topics, such as the SARS case and that of Sun Zhigang, which poses a real challenge to the rule of the CCP. With the support of public intellectuals and public awareness, investigative journalism provides a channel through which the public can express their dissonance and influence the policy making of the CCP, which is seen as a great danger to the basis of the CCP’s rule. Fourth, investigative journalism has posed a great threat to local authorities. Local leadership is in the opposite position to that of central leadership in terms of practicing investigative journalism. I (Tong 2010) argue elsewhere that the Party-State’s once dominant control over media has been deconstructed in the lower administrative levels of government. Local governments compete with central government for media control for the sake of their local interests. Investigative journalism not only puts local political activities under national scrutiny but also brings national awareness of local issues, which will help to negate the current burgeoning of localism and contribute to the rebuilding of the CCP’s legitimacy. Even when the central leadership encourages the media exposure of local issues, local leadership has a tough attitude towards investigative journalism and is willing to see it disappear. Finally, investigative journalism would challenge the collaboration between political power and economic capital (Tong and Sparks 2009; Tong 2010). The Communist political authorities have never stood in an antagonized position to the capitalists. Instead, the two are linked formally and informally in many ways. As part of the webs of power, the media organizations not only interact with the political Party but also with advertisers and subscribers (Tong and Sparks 2009; Tong 2010). Problems revealed by investigative reporting may break down this kind of collaboration.

Government Regulations, Attacks, and Resistance The twenty-first century is therefore a tough time for practicing investigative journalism. It is tough because investigative journalism is under


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siege and lives in fear. In the first place, the gradual deviation of investigative journalism means it is losing the support of the central government. The central government is attempting to tighten the reins on the practice of investigative journalism, though the CCP still strongly advocates the practice of investigative journalism in China in public at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 2003, articulation of the support for free media information in public has won an open image for the central leadership. Furthermore, in 2003 and 2004, the central government repeatedly expressed its determination to carry on media supervision at public events and in documents, for example, in the 2003 and 2004 Government Working Reports and the Third Plenum of the 16th CCP Central Committee in 2003. Top leaders, such as Hu Jingtao and Li Changchun, also stressed the need to practice media supervision. In 2004, the CCP even included “media supervision” into the Regulation of the CCP’s Inter-Party Supervision. This regulation is the first of this type in the history of the Party to formally justify media supervision. The CCP’s public declarations, however, are actually a way in which the Party attempts to keep investigative journalism under its control and to grab the right to define what investigative journalism should be and should do. In this way, the Party strengthens that investigative journalism should be in accordance with the propaganda needs of the Party. For example, in the 2004 regulation, the CCP reiterated that “news media should stick to the Party Principle, obey news rules and occupational ethics, correctly guide public opinion when practicing media supervision, and pay attention to the social influences of media supervision.”5 Furthermore, Liaowang Magazine, a current affairs news magazine launched by Xinhua News Agency in 1981, stressed again that media supervision is part of the work of the Party and the government, and further introduced ten rules for the practice of media supervision.6 Of these three rules: the one that states media supervision must work in cooperation with and benefit the central work of the Party and the government, should help to solve problems, and assist in retaining social stability, the one that news media must communicate with and source government officials, and the one that central media should communicate with local governments and sometimes even need local governments to give advice on reports, set guidelines for investigative journalism and greatly restrict journalistic autonomy in practicing investigative journalism. The attempt of the central Party to limit the practice of investigative journalism was further expressed by the issuing of the 2005 document7 that banned cross-regional media supervision, which is a major genre of

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Chinese investigative journalism. This is regarded as a symbol of the tightening grip of the authorities over the media. Cross-regional media supervision is a prominent characteristic of Chinese investigative journalism. In the Chinese press system, the Party Committee is responsible for newspapers at the same administrative levels as the Party Committee. Newspapers need to obey order and accept governmental censorship at the same administrative level, and they cannot criticize government(s) at the same or higher levels. There are lacunae in the control of local government over media at higher administrative levels and over media from other cities (Tong 2010). This means local government only has the qualifications to censor local media on the same or administratively-vertically-lower levels. This censorship system means local governments have no power to directly intervene in the journalistic activities of higher level or cross-regional media, for example, preventing national media, especially People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, CCTV, and cross-regional media, from disclosing local negative news. There is an increasing decentralization in intra-government relations in China that has occurred in the process of economic reform. The self-splitting of the authorities in China is the predictable result of economic reform, as the central government has given more and more power, especially the fiscal power, to the local levels. The diverged interests of the central and local levels have led to localization or, perhaps we would say, decentralization, of intra-governmental relationships. In the late-1990s and 2000s, local governance hollowed out central governance and some local policies even antagonized central policies. The central government requires the media to take social responsibility for supervision and ranks media supervision as one means of internal Party supervision, especially that of the lower governments.8 The lacunae in government control make this possible. This is why Chinese media is both keen and good at practicing investigative journalism in some places that are geographically distant from the places where the media is based. Local governments are fighting back. Local governments are the second main force that constrains and attacks news media that support investigative journalism. Not only those cities that have no local investigative news organizations, but also those cities in which investigative news organizations reside, have started to counterattack investigative journalism. In the twenty-first century, there are some changes in local political culture in provinces, such as Guangdong and Henan, which


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were the main basis for practicing investigative journalism in the 1990s. The leaving of liberal-minded governors and the arriving of conservative governors in the provinces of Guangdong and Henan have resulted in difficulties for investigative journalism. The first and most efficient way to interfere in news media’s investigative journalism practice is to issue official regulations to forbid investigative reports. In September 2004, seventeen provinces and municipal cities signed and delivered a statement to central government to appeal for the forbidding of cross-regional reporting in consideration of regional stability and economic development.9 The central propaganda department publicized a document, which banned cross-regional media supervision, in May 2005.10 Since then, provinces and municipal cities responded quickly. Nanjing City and Jiangsu Province even publicized The Regulations of Critical Report censorship (xinwen danwei yulun jiandu gaojian shenhe banfa) which required that all the critical reports be read and censored by the criticized.11 In the newsroom of Dahe Daily, I saw a ban with the title: Forbid Cross-regional Public Opinion Supervision and Emergency Events Reporting from the local propaganda department, which interpreted the orders from the central office. It carried the following words: The offspring newspapers launched by local media, target newspapers, and Central media shall obey their editorial policies and orientation and shall not supervise (yulun jiandu ) cross-district and cross-region and shall not report emergency events in other districts and regions. Due to the limitations, including the incapacity of journalists to collect information and the lacking of access to news sources, these media are not familiar with the situation in other districts and industries and it is easier for them to carry reports with bias and inconsistent with the facts. . . . It will cause troubles to local work and impair the local social stability and the people’s sense of security.12 Since then, all cross-regional supervision reports have been officially banned by the CCP, although, in practice, the policy has not been efficiently implemented by the media. The second way to repress investigative reporting by local authorities is to issue reporting instructions and even bans to newsrooms. Investigative reporting is frequently cancelled by local authorities’ administrative demands.13 Newsrooms have seen more propaganda bans, arriving in newsrooms everyday by official letter, fax, and even telephone instructions in the twenty-first century than there were in the 1990s.14 The issuing

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of a reporting ban is a more useful way than censorship for local government to pass on superior orders from above, and to dictate local instructions. Topics banned by propaganda departments from national to local levels range widely, from land requisition conflicts to big traffic accidents. In the newsrooms in Guangzhou City and Zhengzhou City, one or more bans are issued by propaganda departments on almost every working day. From January–September 2006, each newsroom received around 30 bans every month.15 Reporting bans establish political minefields (leiqu) for media practice. In practice, judging what is in these minefields and what is not is not easy. The third way is to block the journalists’ access to information and news sources. In daily practice investigative journalists have found it difficult to access news resources, due to the intervention of local authorities. Since the issue of the 2005 documents, local governments have had legal excuses to block journalists’ activities as well as to blame and punish media organizations and news workers. For example, in June 2003, the Propaganda Department in Guangdong Province publicized a regulation on Regulating Journalists’ Reporting on Court Trial Cases, which banned journalists from reporting unfinished cases and it required journalists to obtain the permission of courts before reporting on any cases. Several months later, according to this regulation, the Guangdong Highest Court sanctioned six newspapers from the three press conglomerates in Guangdong Province and banned their six court journalists from accessing court information and reporting on court news for a year from the November 20th, 2003 to November 19th, 2004, because these six journalists had investigated and reported a case that was still being tried in the Highest Court. News personnel and media organizations were punished because of brave investigative reporting that entered “mine fields” (leiqu) (Tong 2007). The targets of these punishments range from Editors-in-Chief to individual journalists. Usually, the punishment arrives at the level of Editors-in-Chief, which is also the most efficient way to control a newspaper. The authorities lay off the Editors-in-Chief, of the rebellious media and assign “air-borne” (kongjiang) Editors-in-Chief who are obedient to the superior orders for the media. They can even close media organizations. For example, Jiang Yiping, the Editor-in-Chief of Southern Weekend, was forced to leave the position by the Propaganda Department in Guangdong Province, in 2001, because of pressures from Beijing. Four months after she left, Qian Gang, the Acting Editor-in-Chief of the weekly, was removed, and Chen Mingyan, the Vice


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Editor-in-Chief, was dismissed. A “politically reliable” 29-year-old editor was assigned by the authority to the weekly to take on the position as Editor-in-Chief. After reporting on the SARS case and the Sun Zhigang case in 2003, a propaganda official was assigned to Southern Metropolis Daily to be a Deputy Editor-in-Chief. As for individual journalists, although they face less political risk, they do face another kind of danger. Individual journalists may lose their job and personal security. After Southern Weekend and Yangcheng Evening carried investigative reports about the breakout of Aids in Shanxi Province in 2001, the Shanxi provincial leaders dismissed the Director and two journalists from the special reporting team of Sanqin Metropolis Daily, because they first reported on the event, and this was seen as leaking the information to the public and to Zhao Shilong, a journalist from Guangdong Province. Individual journalists also face the revenge of those whose wrongdoings have been revealed in investigative reports. In 2007, the Tixi Tuojiang Big Bridge in Fenghuang County, Hunan Province collapsed. Five journalists from different cross-regional media went to Fenghuang County to interview people about the tragedy. Local officials beat up the five journalists when they wanted to interview the family of a victim. Three journalists were injured.16 A more recent incident happened in 2008. A Party boss in Xifeng County in Liaoning Province sent his men, including two policemen, to arrest a Beijing journalist because the journalist investigated into and wrote a report on a libel case that had happened in Liaoning. The report was covered in Law and People Magazine, revealing the scandal of Zhang Zhiguo, the Party boss in the Xifeng County.

The Decline Investigative reporting seems to have become a Pandora’s Box for Chinese media. On the commercial side, investigative reporting, a once valuable asset for media organizations, is losing its attractiveness to Chinese media. The first reason comes from the authority’s “carrot”: the lure of the monopoly market, which guarantees financial benefits for Chinese media. Governments have a double-face in China’s media reform process. Governments snatch media and journalism for their own propaganda use, and, meanwhile, ensure a sort of monopoly market for Chinese media, e.g., enacting preferential policies for State-owned media. Echoing Wang Hui’s critique of liberalism (Wang 2003), which

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believes that elite interest groups can gain benefits that depend on the premises of State preference, Chinese media also benefit from the reform as a result of the State’s permission. In this case, media’s collaboration with the authorities means the guaranteeing of a monopoly market; while annoying the authorities leads not only to political punishment, but also to a loss of market. Why, then, should the media practice investigative journalism to enrage the authorities? The Shenzhen Press Group, which was examined in Lee et al’s study, is an excellent example of the type of media which bows down to the dictatorship of the PartyState and enjoys the monopoly market and its maximized economic profits. Lee and his colleagues argue that the media help to polish up the image of the Party, and justify the Party’s legitimacy. In the meantime, the media and its workers have become apolitical and are satisfied with the status quo (Lee, He et al. 2006). In the Shenzhen study, the authorities that the media collaborate with are not only the Party-State, but also the local government of Shenzhen City. The second reason relates to the organizational strategy of media organizations. Most media that practice investigative journalism were established in the 1990s. Practicing investigative journalism was a gamble for them. It could be a shortcut to success. If they succeeded, the media would get everything: economic profits, huge circulations, and professional reputation; if they failed, the media would have nothing to lose, as they were just beginners. In the Post-SARS era, however, many media organizations that were formerly famous for investigative journalism are large media enterprises with thousands of employees, huge revenue income, and a high reputation. For them, it would be a high-stakes gamble to risk their future by practicing investigative journalism, facing the authority’s “stick”: political punishment, especially at the time when political control is tightened. In this situation, media organizations that practiced investigative journalism in the 1990s have been found to be changing their editorial policies and orientations, so that they no longer favor investigative journalism, in the Hu-Wen era. This is the result of “Carrot and Stick” policies of the authorities. Let us look at Dahe Daily, for instance. In 2001, Dahe Daily witnessed a turmoil caused by several brave supervision reports and ending with the dismissal of Ma Yunlong and a three-month Marxist News Ideology study for the newspaper. The newspaper has since reduced the quantity and quality of critical reports in its coverage. After the Party appointed Pang Xinzhi to his current position as Editor-in-Chief in 2004, Dahe Daily shifted to become a newspaper that “makes the Party, the government


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and the people satisfied.”17 Pang Xinzhi, the Editor-in-Chief of Dahe Daily, explained the different editorial tenets in the following words: When Dahe Daily was established in 1995, Zhengzhou Evening dominated the press market. What we need to do was to scramble to take away the press market from Zhengzhou Evening. To practice public opinion monitoring was the most efficient way to occupy the market. It was a period in which we could accumulate capital. Because we were just beginners, without much capital and built up from nothing, we did not need to worry about failure and loss. (Pang Xinzhi, 2006) The development of investigative journalism in China has been severely influenced. The number of investigative programs was rapidly decreased in television. Two leading national watchdog television programs: Focus and News Probe, are two prominent examples. The annual percentage of media supervision programs in Focus dropped from 47% in 1998 to 17% in 2002 (Lu and Pan 2002). As for News Probe, the situation is quite similar. News Probe was praised as China’s Panorama, which beat “live tigers instead of dead tigers,” and as a representative for Chinese investigative journalism. This 45-minute program even attracted the admiration of a British Panorama journalist (de Burgh 2005). If we closely examine what News Probe had in 2007, however, it is astonishing to find that this famous investigative television program only had one report that could be claimed to be investigative report among all of the 52 reports in that whole year. This one was about an investigation into the event where it had been arranged by their school that art school students worked as wine servers during their internship (yixiao xuesheng peijiu shijian). Most other reports were in-depth reports instead of investigative reports and many of them were even positive reports that praised governments (Tong and Sparks 2009). Another example is Weekly Quality Report. This CCTV-run television program was good at media supervision when it was launched in 2003, but lost its critical abilities from 2004 onwards and gradually become a tool for the glorification of commercial companies. The most notorious of these reports was the one about the Sanlu Infant Milk Powder in 2007. In 2007, Weekly Quality Report ran a program that praised the Sanlu Company and the high quality of its infant milk powder. In 2008, however, the Sanlu infant milk powder was revealed by other Chinese media to include Melamine, which was toxic and which resulted in the kidney illness of 3000 victims, who suffered and some died from kidney problems. The scandal

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led to the collapse of the program’s reputation, and it was closed down in 2009. Decline has also been visible on the side of the newspapers. From the mid-1990s to the present, Southern Weekend, Dahe Daily, Southern Metropolis Daily, and Beijing News successfully achieved their fame for investigative reporting. For Southern Weekend, its golden time of investigative reporting was from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. The CCP assigned an “air-borne” Editor-in-Chief to Southern Weekend in 2001, after being continuously annoyed by the investigative reports in this brave weekly during its golden time. Southern Weekend started its content reform in 2002 and witnessed a rapid decline in investigative reporting from 2003. Since 2003, the once pugnacious newspaper has been tamed. Many famous journalists, including Yang Haipeng, Li Yuxiao, Qian Gang, Zhai Minglei, Chen Juhong, left the newspaper, because they lost confidence in the newspaper.18 As mentioned above, Dahe Daily shifted its editorial policies in 2001 from a focus on critical reports following the dismissal of Ma Yunlong, then Executive Editor-in-Chief as punishment from the local CCP. In Southern Metropolis Daily, investigative journalists claimed that many themes could no longer be reported after the local CCP’s two crackdowns in 2003 and 2005.19 The Editor-in-Chief of Beijing News was compulsively dismissed in 2006, resulting from a brave investigative report in the newspaper on Dingzhou Event.20 After the political crackdown, the newspaper was criticized by its own journalists and by journalist peers as no longer carrying the spirit of Southern Metropolis Daily.21 The 2009 resignation of Hu Shuli, the Chief Editor of Caijing, was further regarded as a sacrificing of journalistic values to the political control of the CCP. On the whole, therefore, Chinese investigative journalism’s development have plunged into low ebb, after the boom in the 1990s and its transient peak in 2003. Many media that were keen to practice investigative journalism are now starting to change orientations.

The Resistance In the process, besides a decline, one also can identify a resistance of Chinese journalism. Not all media organizations have quit the practice of investigative journalism. Though practicing with cautiousness and under threat, investigative journalism in China has survived especially in the print media. There are four symptoms of this resistance. First, a new generation of media that support investigative journalism has


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appeared while those existing media retain their preference for investigative journalism. In the newspaper sector, metropolitan newspapers, such as Southern Metropolis Daily, Beijing News, Haushang Daily, News Morning and even some Party organs, such as Guangzhou Daily and Nanfang Daily have launched their own investigative reporting teams, members of which are thought to be the best journalists at the newspapers. News magazines, such as Caijing, Chinese News Weekly, Liaowang News Weekly, Sanlian Life Weekly, Xinmin Weekly, and Phoenix Weekly retain the fancy for investigative journalism. Xinwen Zhongheng continues to be the Shepherd of radio investigative journalism. Second, investigative journalism is further symbolized as a model for good journalism. Investigative journalists usually enjoy a strong reputation and their peer journalists and the public are respectful of them. Financially, investigative journalists earn more and are given more journalistic autonomy than the ordinary journalists in a media organization. This point will be discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Third, investigative journalists have become increasingly independent in their reporting in terms of news resources and sources. In their practice, investigative journalists no longer rely on official documents provided by official departments as sources of information (see Chapter 7). Instead, they prefer to source information from ordinary people. In the Zuoyun Mine Disaster reporting process, for instance, I found that investigative journalists kept questioning the credibility of the information provided by official sources and instead interviewed mine workers, their families, and ordinary local people for their investigative reports. Fourth, a lot of influential investigative reports have been identifiable since 2003. Of these, the case of Niu Niu (2004); the cases of the Peng Shui Poem and of Gao Yingying,22 as well as the scandal of the live human organ transplant experiments23 (all in 2006); the Chongqing “Nailhouse,”24 the case of Lan Chengchang,25 the Xiamen PX project,26 and Shanxi Brickfield Scandal (all in 2007), the collapse of a dam in Xiangfen27 and the Sanlu Milk Powder Scandal (both in 2008), the case of Hide and Seek (duomaomao)28 and the case of Deng Yujiao incident29 (both in 2009), and the case of Shanxi Unsafe Vaccines in 2010 are prominent examples.

What Saves Investigative Journalism? There are seven factors that keep investigative journalism in China alive.

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(1) The first and most important factor is still the central authority’s paradoxical attitude to investigative journalism. The paradox continues to exist in the twenty-first century. Though they are skeptical, the top leadership has never dropped the requirement for media supervision. Since the 1990s, the central Party leadership has kept calling for media supervision and the opening up of public information to the public, despite their actual actions being opposite. At the 17th National Congress of the CCP in 2007, Hu Jingtao emphasized that the people should be guaranteed four rights—the right to be informed, the rights of participation, expression, and supervision. When he narrated his idea of a “scientific development perspective” (kexue fazhan guan), his speech was regarded as being an optimistic sign of the loosening of propaganda control over Chinese media and a symptom that the Central government’s attitude towards investigative journalism was changing from that of three years ago. It is actually not good for the central government if cross-regional media supervision is totally banned. With the ban, local authorities would turn down any critical reports and the central government would not be informed of what really happens locally. In June 2008, Hu Jingtao further emphasized the importance of media supervision in his speech, which was published in People’s Daily. His emphasis is no longer put on “propaganda guidance” (yulun daoxiang) but on a “propaganda lead” (yulun yindao) and “the diversion of the public’s mood” (shudao gongzhong qingxu) (Zhan 2009). Because of Hu’s publicly expressed attitude towards media supervision, scholars optimistically think that the CCP was becoming investigative journalism friendly from 2008 onwards (Zhan 2009), although there is a possibility that this will turn out to be untrue. From 2008, it is thought that the propaganda control was being loosened again, since the government issued “Regulation of Open Access to Governancy Information” and Hu Jingtao repeatedly mentioned guaranteeing the people’s four rights and again mentioned “media supervision” in the 17th Conference report (Zhan 2009). However, I think it does not mean a loosening of propaganda control, but only means a paradox in the top leadership’s attitude, which leads to a tricky situation. The top leadership gives more support to investigative journalism while they think the situation in China allows or needs them to do so and while they can benefit politically from media supervision, but discourages investigative practices when the situation needs the tightening of control. In the 1990s, the CCP encouraged investigative journalism to meet its need to reconstruct the Party’s legitimacy and mitigate domestic conflicts, but increasingly intensive domestic problems


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and pressure from local authorities has made the CCP tighten propaganda control in the twenty-first century. Since 2007, there has been an increasing need for the ruling Party to build up a national image that is open and different from what was being described in the Western media. China has experienced several risks and sociopolitically significant events since 2007. Events such as the Snow Disaster, the 3/14 Tibet riot, the 5/12 Sichuan earthquake, the Olympic games in Beijing in 2008, and the Xinjiang Riot in 2009, have put China in the focus of international society’s attention. It is important to show the outside world an image of open government, which helps to maintain legitimacy and achieve recognition from international society. In domestic media practices, therefore, propaganda control over media is loosening and chances for more investigative journalism are provided. As mentioned above, we have seen many influential investigative reports covered widely in the media across China since 2007. However, these optimistic signs do not mean that the central leadership wants to hand over the propaganda control. A tighter control will return when the situation changes. The alternation of tight and loose controls will happen again and again because of the paradox of the CCP. (2) The second factor is the political strategies of politicians. In terms of its relationship to political parties, investigative journalism functions in at least two ways in Western democracies. One, which is good for democracy, is that it makes the government accountable. Exactly as would be expected in a democracy, investigative journalism has heroically brought down politicians or political parties in power, for example, the Watergate Scandal in the US, and the “Cash for Questions” scandal in the UK. The multi-Party system allows this to happen: when a ruling government is found not to be doing its job well, its opposite will replace it by entering the arena of power. Investigative journalism facilitates the alternation of power by checking the accountability of the administration. Investigative journalism therefore, is in the public interest and is opposite to the interests of political parties and politicians. The other, which damages the ideals of democracy, is that investigative journalism falls victim to politician’s manipulation to facilitate the crushing of political rivals. The Watergate Scandal happens to be one of these cases. In the UK, the British media continued the tradition of “cash for questions” and revealed scandals about MPs from 2008–09. The “sleaze” of the Labor Party in the public eye has earned credits for the Conservative Party and especially David Cameron. In such cases, it is difficult to

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say whose interest investigative journalism is serving. Political parties and politicians use investigative reporting for political purposes. Investigative journalism is practiced in the best interest of political parties and politicians, and the serving of public interest is merely a by-product of political struggle. In this sense, therefore, investigative journalism is more like a political tool. The latter in which investigative journalism connects to political parties does work in China. In China, investigative journalism is thought of as not challenging and overturning the rule of China’s current government. This is not only because of the prevailing one-Party system in China that leaves no chance for such power alternation, but also because investigative journalism was initiated by the ruling Party to meet its need for the relegitimation of its rule in China. The Chinese ruling Communist Party sees it as an efficient vehicle for the consolidation of the leadership. In this sense, investigative journalism in China is serving the interests of the Party, within the orbit of the Party line. What investigative journalism has done and can do, is to get rid of “black sheep” from the Party so that it can come up with a better and purer image. Political strategies offer more than this. Investigative reports are also used as a means for political struggles between higher government and lower government. In my fieldwork in Zhengzhou city, the Dahe Daily journalists showed me a specific story about struggles of this kind. Zhu Changzhen, an investigative journalist at Dahe Daily, published a series of reports on the case: Man Forced into Drug Addiction by Government Officials (liguoqin qiangzhi jiedu an), in 2005. According to Zhu and his Director, when they published the first report, they were waiting for a ban from the propaganda department. To their surprise, a ban did not follow. They tried again with a second report and still did not get a ban. The ban finally came about when they had almost finished the whole report. Afterwards, they realized the reason for the authorities’ unusual tolerance: the local government wanted to remove the officials in the town leadership who were mentioned in the reports. The series of reports just accelerated personnel shifts. In this case, the higher government successfully used the media to control the lower government.30 In regard of political struggles, we could identify many examples of this. The Shanghai Social Security Case (shebao an), in August 2006 resulted in more or less the predicted rectification of Jiang Zeming’s Shanghai Gang31 by central authority, namely Hu Jiangtao’s Tuan Pai.32 Media reports of the Social Security Case created public opinion for the fall of Chen Liangyu, who was not obedient to the leadership of Hu (BBC 2006; Kahn 2006). Investigative journalism is therefore the


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politician’s political strategy. To leak the information or not does not serve the public interests; instead it serves the political needs of politicians. (3) The third factor that contributes to the survival of investigative journalism is the organizational concern for commercial profits. The mainstream media that cover investigative reports in the twenty-first century are print media, i.e., newspapers and magazines. Television investigative journalism is declining. The question to be asked is why these Chinese media report news that does not apparently help to increase their circulation and advertisement in an era of commercialization? Why would readers care about the stories happening somewhere else that have no relevance to readers’ lives? According to Lu Hui, the then Director of the in-depth investigative team at SMD in 2006, to cover in-depth investigative reports is first of all the newspapers’ strategy to compete with television and the Internet for readership and, second, it is based on a judgment of the Chinese Middle class’s taste: the newspapers’ readership cares about serious political and social issues. In terms of investigative journalism, television programs have a crucial weakness, i.e., it is difficult for television journalists to collect evidence and to present them as videos or pictures. As for the Internet, the large amount of Internet information attracts the attention of readers, but lacks credibility. By covering investigative reports, newspapers can act both as an authority and as a credible information source. Besides, Lu Hui argues differently that from the Western situation where the public are inclined to read about entertainment and information, Chinese readers are keen to know what is happening in the political arena and in society. Chinese investigative journalists therefore need not worry about the lack of resources for investigations nor about a lack of readers for investigative reports. The public show their enthusiasm for investigative reports and have high expectations from investigative reports. It is risky for the media to tell lies, and if the public realized that what the media covered is not true, the media will lose their credibility and reputation with the public. The case of Weekly Quality Report, as discussed above, is a prominent example (Zhang and Qin 2008). (4) The fourth factor is the internalizing and institutionalizing of investigative journalism and journalistic professionalism. Investigative journalism has been institutionalized within media organizations. After achieving a certain autonomy and prestige in the 1990s with the support of the PartyState, Chinese journalism, as an occupation, tries to retain its prestige in

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the market place and even advocates for its professional status through the professionalization of journalism. The institutionalization of watchdog journalism means media organizations have tried or even succeeded to embed investigative reporting within organizations so that it becomes an established custom. In those media organizations that were practicing investigative journalism in the 1990s, employees recognized the organizational professionalism promoted during that time and their readers recognized the image of watchdog media. Shifting away from investigative reporting would lead to the loss of both employees’ recognition and public recognition. Media organizations have to be concerned with the professionalism that is shared among journalists along with the already established public recognition. Southern Metropolis Daily is a prominent example of this, which will be further discussed in Chapter 6. A strong collective journalistic professionalism has been found in the newspaper, but the journalists do not have a high collective feeling of belonging to the organization. This means they would leave the newspaper if the quality of the journalism in the newspaper declined. They do not claim they will stay at the newspaper for ever. The journalists, however, regard the newspaper as being the best newspaper in China at the moment. The newspaper can provide them with a platform for the realization of their professional ideals. They strongly recognize the newspaper’s professional ideology and hence recognize the organization. The high coherence of individual and organizational professionalism results in a strong work force, ensuring the newspaper does not move far away from what individual journalists want. In such a situation, media organizations, for example, Southern Metropolis Daily, which care about their journalists’ morale and their readership are still practicing investigative journalism, but perhaps in a different way than they did in the 1990s. The institutionalization of the watchdog journalism also means that practicing investigative journalism is not part of the journalists’ individual activities, but part of the media’s organizational activity. Media organizations have shown strong influence and intervention on individual journalists’ investigative journalism practice. Investigative journalism in China is no longer practiced spontaneously by individual journalists who have the instinct of public intellectuals; instead, media organizations support and modify the way in which investigative journalism is practiced according to certain standards in order to deal with the shifting dynamics of power in society outside the profession. Although the contradictory psychology of the central leadership and the antagonized attitudes of local authorities put investigative journalists and media organizations at risk, both media organizations and journalists benefit


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from practicing the watchdog journalism. Consequently, the best way to practice watchdog journalism safely is to adjust its traits to correspond to the social contexts, rather than totally getting rid of this form of journalism. (5) The fifth factor refers to the “guerrilla tactics” used by journalists and newspaper organizations to help avoid political minefields and yet meet their professional call (Tong 2007). The ambivalence of the authority results in crevices in which journalism can realize its professional ideals and which give possibilities for media’s counterstrategies against the governments’ propaganda control. Media have their skills to move round minefield and bans, and to push the bottom line with the authority (Pan and Lu 2003). Investigative journalism’s “guerrilla tactics” ensure the mediating of safely information among power struggles. Four tactics can be identified in investigative journalists’ practices. They are (1) to exploit the crevices among the power-holders; (2) to race against report bans (it is necessary to report before a ban is put in place) (Tong 2007); (3) to find the core mine zone in bans to avoid touching it and to understand the real bottom line in order to push it; (4) to oppose the punishment from social organizations and actively punish problem-makers (Tong 2008).33 (6) The sixth factor comes from cooperation among journalists from different media organizations. There is usually cooperation among media organizations when they are covering an event. This means that in many cases today investigative reporting is no longer exclusive reporting. After finding out what has happened, journalists from different media organizations work together to investigate and collect evidence. They sometimes share what they get. This media organization cannot cover the story, which may be covered in another media organization. Once an event is revealed by a media organization, media across China give intensive attention to the event, which puts a local event under national attention. It is then difficult to turn down media coverage, even if the CCP dislike the attention to the story. (7) Finally, the Internet helps to keep investigative journalism vivid. The Internet, especially online discussion fora, not only provides resources for investigative journalists, but also exaggerates the influence of investigative reports. The most significant new trait in the scope of today’s Chinese investigative journalism nowadays is covering online fora’s hot topics in traditional investigative reporting. This means that traditional

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media organizations, e.g., newspapers and their investigative journalists utilize information from online fora and online impacts on public opinion to ensure successful offline investigative journalism practice (see Chapter 8). This type of investigative journalism has been proved to have strong sociopolitical impacts and contributions (Tong and Sparks 2009). The introduction of online impact in practicing investigative journalism is one important and efficient way for Chinese journalists who struggle to practice investigative journalism under great pressure and, hence, make great social and political contributions.

Investigative Journalism in the Twenty-first Century The main place where investigative journalism is practiced in the twentyfirst century is in newspapers and magazines, while television is taking a back seat. The persistent practices of investigative journalism in newspapers, especially the generation of metropolitan dailies and news magazines has kept the bloodline of this type of journalism for Chinese journalism. In the newspaper arena, newspapers launched by the Southern Daily press group, such as Southern Metropolis Daily, Southern Weekend, Beijing News, and Yunnan Information, take the lead in this practice, while other newspapers across China, for example, Beijing Youth, Dahe Daily, Huashang Daily, China Economic Times, China Youth, Time Weekly, Henan Business, and Oriental Morning, practice investigative journalism from time to time. On the magazine side, the magazines Caijing, Liaowang Oriental Weekly, China News Weekly, and Xinmin Weekly are among those which favor investigative journalism. Central People’s Radio’s Xinwenzhongheng still frequently covers investigative reports. Television, however, has not contributed much to the contemporary development of investigative journalism in China when compared to their print media counterparts. In the twenty-first century, the Internet has apparently shown its influence over the practice of investigative journalism in traditional media. There are two perspectives on the influence. The first results from the contra-flow of investigative reporting agendas from online discussions to media that increasingly rely on online resources for their investigative reporting. Such a contra-flow is a result of the influence of user-generated-content, especially online discussion fora, on traditional investigative reporting. Through participating in online discussions the public indirectly sets the agenda for investigative journalists in traditional


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media. According to Lu Hui, then Director of the investigative reporting team in 2006, 80% of investigative reports in SMD originate from online information and discussions. Many cases in recent years demonstrate such a contra-flow of news. Both the case of Lan Chengchang and the event of Nail House, for instance, were first heatedly discussed online and then picked up by journalists from traditional media and were then reported in the real world. As the events were transferred from the virtual world to the real world, they triggered more influences among the public than they would have done when they were discussed in the virtual world. The second perspective is the exaggeration of influence that the Internet can provide for investigative reporting in the traditional media. The case of the Shanxi Brickfield is one prominent story among many others. In the Shanxi Brickfield Scandal, thousands of children were discovered to have been sold and forced to work as slaves in illegal brickfields. Many had been tortured by the owners. This was an influential case that shocked China in 2007. The first person to reveal the scandal was Fu Zhengzhong, a chief investigative journalist at Henan Television. He visited the brickfields three times with the parents of kidnapped kids. Henan Television broadcasted 21 documentaries made by Fu Zhengzhong between the 19th May and the 11th June. These documentaries, however, did not trigger enough responses among the public until a post was put on the Dahe Forum in a local Henan website. This post entitled “The Guilty Journey of ‘Black Men’: 400 fathers whose kids were sold to black brickfields seeking help” attracted a great deal of attention from the public. On the 11th June, this event became the top story on most websites and even attracted the attention of Hu Jingtao, the top CCP leader (also see Chapter 8). During this time, the notion of objectivity has been further established as an occupational standard for Chinese investigative journalism. Evidenceand fact-based criticism is expressed and the direct opinions of journalists are avoided. The coverage of the Sun Zhigang case set an excellent example for Chinese investigative reporting. Journalists should avoid directly expressing their own viewpoints, but should carefully select facts and quotations from news sources and construct them in such a way that they could imply what they really mean.34 The expression of over-apparent opinion in news articles will be revised into evidence— and fact-based views during the self-censorship of media newsrooms (Tong 2009). The objective narrative of investigative reports in China implies the journalists’ judgment on what happened and their stance on

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an event. This trait fits well with the enlightening and guiding function of investigative journalism that is expected by the intellectual role of journalists. Opinions and viewpoints are two ways among others that can easily lead to political catastrophes, it is therefore necessary that journalists can stick to being objective if they want to be politically safe at the same time expressing their ideas. The subjects of investigative reports covered in the twenty-first century are more plural and diversified than those in the 1990s, and this echoes the diversity of social problems and the plurality of social concerns in the new century. The abuse of power that is seen as the root of most of social problems in China is one of the major concerns of both the media and the public in the twenty-first century. Chinese society in the twentyfirst century has seen the intensifying of social conflicts and problems, most of them having been triggered by power abuse by powerful institutions, especially with reference to government departments and political and economic authorities at all administrative levels. The power abuse that has been revealed in media coverage therefore, mainly focuses on the areas of administration, law enforcement, and economy. The power abuse of powerful institutions is mainly shown in two ways. The first is the capitalization of political and administrative powers. This means political and administrative powers have become closely allied with market capitalism in order to make economic profits in the marketization process. To a great extent political and administrative powers have become an efficient means to make money through making policies beneficial to economic groups. Wang Hui accused the Chinese market economy of “market extremism” under the premises of State policies (Wang 2003; Mishra 2006). Without the permission and authorized priority of State policies, the Chinese market economy would not be so successful, at the cost of alarming unemployment, a vacuum in social security, the rising number of the poor, and all the other negative social problems in the transition process (Wang 2003). The problems of the capitalization of political and administrative powers have emerged prominently in many fields, for example, the transformation of SOEs,35 land requisition (zhengdi), the government’s urban displacement scheme (chengshi chaiqian),36 the launch of environmental-unfriendly projects, the property market, and even the stock market. The abuse of political and administrative powers has also been represented in another way, that is, the public’s lack of access to political and administrative resources, and the lack of transparency in policy making and enforcement. The twenty years economic reform in China


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has resulted in a cleavage in Chinese society (Sun 2002; Li et al. 2004; Sun 2006). A very small number of ruling elites who sit at the top controls a huge amount of resources, while a large group of the lower class population who resides at the bottom has very little access to political and economic resources with which to protect their interests (Li 1993; Sun 2002; Li et al. 2004). Between them are the middle Class. China’s middle class, however, though usually having a stable income and their own estates and cars, are still vulnerable to the overwhelming political-economic capital alliance and also to the lack of access to political and administrative resources. Their vulnerability can be seen in many ways, for example, the governments’ urban replacement scheme and the real estate market. The tragedy of Tang Fuzhen37 in 2010 is a prominent example of this. The fact that policy making and policy enforment is obscure and the judicial system is incomplete in China, has led to public distrust in powerful institutions, especially, judicial departments, such as police stations, detentions, and even courts. The public tends to disbelieve in justice administered by official judicial channels. They question official explanations and regard official adjudications as problematic. This reflects the widely spread distrust of the public for the Chinese government. The problem of power abuse has resulted in many other social problems, such as mass incidents, social injustice, and even environmental problems. Chinese investigative journalism in the twenty-first century has covered these topics and revealed the terrible things that have happened in China in their media coverage. This is demonstrated in the diversified subjects of investigative journalism during this time. Basically, the subjects of investigative reports in the twenty-first century can be classified into eight categories: 1) the power abuse of authority institutions, especially in the domains of administration, law enforcement, economy, and the medical industry, or the failure of administration and law enforcement; 2) the wrongdoings of individuals or groups, including power abuse by officials and individuals who enjoy certain powers over ordinary people, official corruption, and the commercial misbehaviors of business groups; 3) the resentment breaking out among individuals or groups towards society, refers to tragic events conducted by the powerless in circumstances where they could not fight against the powerful individuals or institutions, reflecting the polarization of the powerless and powerful; or mass incidents; 4) the truths that governments want to hide from the public, or the truth of what has

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happened that is hidden from the public; 5) environmental issues; 6) democratic events; 7) historical topics; and 8) events that happen in foreign countries. From the beginning of the twenty-first century, we can see one focus of investigative reporting is on power abuse by institutions that have power over policy making and implementation and ordinary people, for example, government departments, official management committees, hospitals. Caijing made a great contribution to this kind of report in the economic domain. Caijing first investigated and exposed the violation and corruption in China’s fund management industry, which triggered uproar among the public and an “earthquake” in the stock market (The Scandal of Fund, October 8, 2000) in 2000 and then revealed Yinguangsha’s lie about its export activities (The Yinguangsha Trap, August 3, 2001) in 2001. The two investigative articles that exposed the dark side of the financial world helped Caijing earn its reputation for financial investigative reporting. Caijing further disclosed the fraud and corruption in the pension funding system in Shanghai (Social Benefit System in Shanghai: a dangerous investment, August 21, 2006), and revealed the alliance between banks and estate companies who monopolized and manipulated the estate market (The Alliance of Oligarchies: the fraud by the collabouration of banks and estate companies, November 16, 2006). In 2007, Caijing further investigated and exposed the problems in the transformation of Runeng, a major state-owned enterprise in the Shandong Province, criticizing the collusion between corrupt political and economic élites that may lead to the Socialist-Capitalism, and successfully stopped the loss of several billions of state-owned capital (Who’s Runeng, January 1, 2007). Collusion between political power and commercial institutions is also criticized by other investigative media. For example, in 2008, Beijing News revealed that the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (zhijian zongju) used its public power to guarantee that a company could monopolize the electronic security market from 2005. The official-commercial beneficial collusion brought the administration an annual profit of RMB two millions (The suicide of an official leaked a 2 millions profit behind, August 27, 2008). Chinese media also disclosed power abuse in the domain of administration and law enforcement, which on many occasions accompanied the failure of administration and law enforcement. Power abuse in this domain is usually exposed through reporting tragic individual cases, in which injustice is found, and we can see the powerlessness that


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vulnerable individuals have faced and the polarization of the powerless and powerful. In these tragic individual cases arising from power abuse, we can usually find the miserable experiences, or even death, of defenceless individuals who had encountered powerful individuals or institutions. Ordinary people are often found to have lost their lives in police detentions, and this usually turns out to be an unnatural death. Southern Metropolis Daily’s famous report on the case of Sun Zhigang in 2003 is one prominent example of this type. This revealed the mistreatment of Sun Zhigang in detention and further accused the unreasonableness of the constitution (The Death of Detainee Sun Zhigang, April 25 2003). Life (shenghuo bao), based in Heilongjiang, investigated the death of Ma Zhixin, a veteran soldier who was suspected of committing fraud, and exposed the scandal of the beating to death of Ma while he was in the detention (Investigation of the death of “Swindler” in detention, November 10, 2006). A similar event was revealed in Yunnan Information in 2009: a 24-year-old man who was accused of stealing trees was found dead in local detention as a result of the mistreatment of a security guard, but those who had been detaining him claimed it was because he hurt his head in a game of “hide and seek” (A Yuxi Man died half a month later after he was detained for stealing trees, February 13, 2009). Besides police detention, house replacement is another source of this kind of power abuse. Ordinary people were forced to quit their job, were moved from their current jobs and assigned to work in remote areas, or were put in custody just because they did not fully support the replacement policies of the Jiahe County government, which was found to have been misusing and abusing its political and administrative power (Beijing News: Hunan Jiahe County Government: Who Want to Damage County Development I Would Damage Their Entire Life, May 8, 2004). Huaxia Times revealed the tragedy that occurred when Du Jianping, a Chinese citizen who refused to move his home, was beaten to death when he was watching the administratively compulsory replacement undertaken by the Xicheng District People’s Court with his neighbor; when the tragedy happened there were several policemen around but they did nothing to stop the crime happening (Investigation of the citizen in Nanlishilu beaten-to-death on street event, March 3, 2006). Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekend exposed official abuse of power in the case of the Pengshui Poem, in which a citizen was taken into custody because he wrote and disseminated a poem via mobile messages that was thought to be sarcastic to the local authority in 2006

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(Chongqing Pengshui Poem Case, 2006). 2010 witnessed a similar case that happened in Yunxi City, Hubei Province. A citizen Chen Yonggang was detained for eight days after he posted his doubts about the local government policy online and this was regarded as libeling local officials (Chongqing Evening, Post Questioning Image project, Hubei Internet User Detained, 2010). Hospitals have also become the target of investigative reporting. Southern Metropolis Daily exposed a medical scandal when the Shanghai Oriental Hospital and the Zhejian No 1 Hospital did “heart and lung transplant operation” (xinfei yizhi shoushu shiyan) as tests on human bodies, through cheating the victims by telling them that they had to have their hearts changed otherwise they would die (Doubts on the Death of Shanghai Laid-off Female Workers Who Accepted Free Heart and Lung Transplant: Are Hospital Doing Live Experiments on Human Beings? October 20, 2006, and Female Peasant Became Live Advertisement after Organ Transplant, October 22, 2006). In 2009, Economy Half an Hour of CCTV revealed that many hospitals across China assigned intern doctors who had no legal medical qualification to diagnose and even perform operations on patients, which led to the death of many patients, among which was Xiong Zuowei, a medical professor from Beijing University Hospital, who died in Beijing University Hospital where she had an operation that was conducted by unlicensed intern doctors (A Beijing University Professor Died in Beijing University Hospital after Having an Operation Conducted by Doctors Having No Legal Medical Qualification, November 3, 2009). In 2010, Wang Keqin from China Economic Times revealed the scandal of unsafe vaccines in which around a hundred children died due to unsafe vaccines that were used in these children. He also revealed the abuse of power by the Shanxi Ministry of Health in Shanxi province after a half-year’s investigation (China Economic Times: Investigation into The Truth of Shanxi Unsafe Vaccines, March 17, 2010). Changzhou drug detoxification was exposed and female drug addicts undergoing detoxification were sold to pimps and forced into prostitution (Yangchen Evening: Black Inside Story of Female Drug Addicts Undergoing Detoxification Sold to Pimps and Forced to be Prostitutes, March 21, 2002; News Probe: The Nightmare of A’Wen, July 14, 2003). Southern Metropolis Daily revealed that 43 people undergoing detoxification were infected with AIDS when they were staying in Fujian’s compulsory isolation for detoxification (Collectively Infected with AIDS in Isolation Detoxification, March 1, 2005). The misbehavior of powerful individuals or groups is questioned, revealed, and criticized by the investigative media. In 2006, media across


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China, including Southern Metropolis Daily, Dahe Daily, China News Weekly, CCTV, assigned their investigative journalists to report on the real reasons for the death of Gao Yingying, who was found dead one morning outside the hotel where she worked as a waitress. Her corpse was taken away by the local authority and this triggered public’s doubt about her death and it was believed that Gao Yingying had been raped and killed by local officials. Wei Wenhua, who was the Chief Manager of a construction company in Hubei Province, was beaten to death by more than 50 staffs from the City Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement Bureau (chengguan renyuan), just because Wei was filming the scene in which these same people were beating some villagers (China Youth: An Entrepreneur Died after attacked by Chengguans for filming Chengguans’ beating villagers, January 9, 2008). When Deng Yujiao killed a local official, media across the country again gave intensive attention to the case and investigated the event, revealing the dead local official had wanted to rape Deng Yujiao before Deng Yujiao killed him in 2009. Several different media revealed that police from Xifeng County, Liaoning Province had been assigned by the Governor of Xifeng County to go to Beijing to arrest Zhu Wenna for libel. Zhu was a Beijing journalist who published a report revealing the Governor’s abuse of power in Faren magazine (e.g., Beijing News, Reporting Negative News of Xifeng Governor, Liaoning Xifeng Trying to Arrest Journalist in Beijing, January 7, 2008; Southern Metropolis Daily, County Police Come to Beijing to Arrest Journalist, January 10, 2008; China Youth, Report involving County Governor Xifeng Police Came to Beijing to Arrest Journalist, January 7, 2008). Southern Metropolis Daily exposed that a Shenzhen official, Lin Jiaxiang, had attempted a sexual assault on an 11-year-old girl and had even claimed that he was a high-ranking official and could handle this with money (A Man Attempted Sexual Assault on A 11-year Old Girl Claim to Be A High-ranking Official from Beijing, October 31, 2008; Shenzhen Marine Issue Bureau Communist Party Secretary Lin Jiaxiang Suspected Sex Assault on a 11-year Old Girl, November 1, 2008). News Probe investigated the event in which Liu Jun died in the police station when he was summoned for enquiries. While the police claimed Liu Jun committed suicide, News Probe revealed that Liu had been beaten to death in revenge, by his superior, because Liu had reported his superior’s wrongdoings (The Falling from a Building Event in a Police Station, November 3, 2003) (Zhang and Wu, 2006). The wrongdoings of business individuals and groups are also exposed in media coverage, of which there is less than in 1990s. Weekly Quality Report exposed that the Jinhua ham (jinhua huotui) producers added a pesticide in Jinhua ham (which had enjoyed a 1200 year long

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reputation) in order to keep it fresh (Polluted Ham, November 17, 2003) and also revealed that the so called “green environmental” indoor decoration materials sold in city markets across China were indeed poisonous (Revealing Black Story of ‘Green’ Decoration Materials, June 25, 2005). In 2007, Henan TV first disclosed a scandal in which thousands of children were sold by child traffickers to black brickfields to work as laborers and meanwhile some local government departments had ignored the crime, and sometimes even helped with it and were involved in the crime (The Series of Guilty Road of Black Men, from May 19–June 11, 2007). San Lu milk powder was exposed as being contaminated in media coverage of Oriental Morning (Gansu 14 infants Get Kidney Disease Possibly as a Result of Drinking Sanlu Milk, September 11, 2008). There are investigative reports addressing people’s resentment towards powerful individuals and institutions, or to society. Investigative media have given space to extreme and tragic events that have been undertaken by powerless individuals who are in despair as they find they are helpless against the injustice they have received. Some citizens committed suicide because they were dissatisfied and strongly disagreed with government policies or their employers. For example, Bund Picture revealed and criticized problems in the urban replacement scheme by investigating Wen Biao’s death. He burned himself to death because he refused to move (Investigation into the truth of the ‘self-immolation’ event in Nanjing: a tragedy under bulldozer, September 3, 2003). A mine worker killed himself by exploding a mine in Western Sichuan because he was being treated badly by the mine owner and, in this case, terrible employment relationships between mine owners and mine workers were revealed and local government and police’s responses to this event were criticized (Southern Metropolis Daily: The Revenge Death of A Chuanxi Mine Worker, September 8, 2004). In 2009, there was a similar tragedy. Tang Fuzhen, an entrepreneur, killed herself because she did not want her home pulled down. The media reported on the event after her death. In some other cases, individuals killed others as a protest against injustice against them. Southern Metropolis Daily did lots of reports of this kind. An influential report of this type is the story of A-Xing, a migrant worker in Shenzhen who killed his line manager because he had been fired (Don’t Want to Be ‘Cut Hand Gang’ Still Killed A Person, July 11, 2005). Southern Metropolis Daily soon covered another report on a similar case in which Wang Bingyu killed four colleagues when he found he could not get his wages (Anger and Sadness of Wang Binyu, September 15, 2005). In this report, the journalist blamed Wang Bingyu, but at the same


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time accused Wang’s black-hearted boss, who owed workers’ wages, as being responsible for the tragedy. In these reports, the journalists, generally, showed their sympathy for the powerless, even those who were the killers, and connected the reasons for tragedies to social problems, for example, the rich–poor gap, and the heartless rich. Besides individual tragedies, Chinese media also have paid attention to mass incidents or riots that happen across China. Investigative journalists give attentions to social conflicts, such as people’s anger towards the failures of governance, rich-poor gaps, and social injustice, and warn that accumulated social conflicts and resentment would lead to more mass social incidents. For example, Dahe Daily covered an investigative report on the Wangzhou Riot (Why A Small Trivial Event Has Become a ‘Big One’?, October 26, 2004) and Southern Metropolis Daily investigated and reported the Chizhou Riot, revealing that the incident actually arose from the public’s anger towards local governance and the heartless rich (Investigation into Chizhou Mass Incident, July 1, 2005). More recently, more media have started reporting on mass incidents as they happen very often. For example, many of the media across China sent their journalists to investigate and report on riots, such as the Shaoyang Armed Police Trying to Grasp Corpse event in 2005, the Sichuan Dazu Mass Incident in 2007, the Gansu Longnan event and the Yunnan Menglian event in 2008, the Shishou Grasping Corpse event, the Guizhou Wen’sn event, and the Jilin Tonghua Steel Workers Strike event in which they killed their Chief Manager in 2009. Investigative journalists in the new century are keen to reveal the “truth,” including “truth” covered up by individuals or institutions, for example, local governments or, in the case of SARS, central government, which are either not publicized or which is hidden from the public. The reports revealing the truths that local governments want to hide from the public, especially focus on: 1) major accidents; 2) important events with negative consequences from which a large group of the public would suffer; and 3) epidemics. In the early years of the new century, the Nandan Mine Disaster report in Yangcheng Evening was a prominent one that exposed the local government in Nandan that had colluded with mine owners to cover up the mine disaster. This led to the failure of the rescue effort and there were no survivors from the hundreds of mine workers who were trapped (Seven Mines in Nandan Flooded, August 5, 2001). Similarly, Shanxi Linfen County government was found to black out a gas explosion in Yangquangou Mine and had lied about the number of mine disaster victims (Focus: Truth about Linfen

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Mine Disaster, January 12, 2003; News Probe: Death List, January 18, 2003). Liaowang News Weekly revealed that at least 41 people died in the Loufan Collapse Event, which was certainly a man-made disaster, and about which fake news issued by local government and media said that it was a natural landslide incident that involved the death of 11 people (Loufan: the Delayed Truth, September 1, 2008). When the Sangmei Typhoon struck Fujian Province in 2006, Xinhua News Agency, Southern Metropolis Daily, and First Financial and Economic News accused local government in Fujian of the failure of the rescue effort and of lying about the number of the Typhoon’s victims. Other accidents, such as work injuries, are also the focus of investigative journalists who want to reveal the truth. For example, Xinhua News Agency and Xinwenzongheng revealed the unsafe working environment in which workers lacked of protection caused more than a thousand workers each year to lose their fingers, hands, or even arms in Yongkang City (the home of hardware), Zhejiang Province (Xinhua News Agency: Numerous Fingers Lost in the Home of Hardware, December 19, 2002; Xinwenzongheng: Losing Fingers in the Home of Hardware in Zhejiang, February 18. 2003). Xinmin Weekly investigated and revealed the foil production industry in middle Zhejiang that was booming but lacked workplace safety protection and had led to collective lead poisoning which had involved more than 2000 child victims (Investigation into Lead Poisoning in Middle Zhejiang, January 1, 2005). In recent years, investigative journalists cast their intensive attention on Silicosis (a lung disease that is also called as “glass lung” or “stone lung” that usually results from work-exposure to silica dust) among workers who worked in stone factories or mines and revealed their employers’ failures in providing workplace safety protection and their failure to compensate workers for their suffering (China Law and Regulation: Investigation into Silicosis in Mashan County Guangxi, January 20, 2006; Life: Investigation into Silicosis in Hulan County Heilongjiang, January 16, 2006; Southern Metropolis Daily: Difficulties in Protecting the Rights of Silicosis Patients, July 29, 2009). Epidemics, such as SARS, AIDS, HFMD, and H1D1, are also major subjects of investigative report that reported on public health. Southern Metropolis Daily and Caijing even accused the central officials of lying about the SARS situation in 2003. Local government, Buyang, was found to have concealed the appearance of the HFMD epidemic which caused the HFMD breakout and the death of several children who were affected but did not receive the appropriate cure (Democracy and Law


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Times: Investigation into Buyang HFMD, April 28, 2008). In 2009, China Broadcasting Net first revealed that local government had concealed the HFMD epidemic in Minquan Country, Henna, by faking medical records (Henan Minquan County Changed Medical Records and Concealed the HFMD Epidemic, March 18, 2009) and this was followed by many other investigative reports in media across China, for example HFMD: Dead Children Not on the List (Southern Metropolis Daily, March 24, 2009), Doubts about the investigation of Minquan HFMD (Beijing News, March 23, 2009), Investigation into Minquan HFMD Event (Xinhuazongheng, April 6, 2009). After the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, Southern Metropolis Daily first revealed that school children were among earthquake victims because the teaching building in Juyuan Middle School had collapsed during earthquake (A Large Number of Students Were Buried, May 13, 2008). Southern Metropolis Daily, Southern Weekend, Liaowang Weekly, and Caijing further reported that the teaching building that collapsed was a shoddy building, before the topic was banned by propaganda departments (Southern Metropolis Daily: Morning Students May 20–22, 2008; School ‘Shaddy’? Find the Truth within a Month, May 26, 2008; Southern Weekend: Experts from Construction Department Judge Juyuan Middle School Teaching Building as Shabby Work; Dongqi Middle School: Tragedy Could be Avoided; Mianzufu Second Junior School: How the Collapsed Buildings Were Built, May 29, 2008; Liaowang News Weekly, Investigation into Collapsed School Buildings: Why No Collapse of Old Private Buildings Nearby, June 3, 2008; Caijing: Worries Over School Buildings, June 9, 2008). Southern Metropolis Daily’s investigative journalists revealed the inside story of a direct sales trap (Undercover Fanyu Direct Sale, September 1, 2004; Revealing Secrets of Direct Sale, September 14, 2004). Fuzhou Zhenyuan Caring House was revealed selling babies to foreign fosters. The parents of these babies could not afford the fine for giving birth to more than one child. The caring house was even found buying babies to sell for profits as if it was a business (Southern Metropolis Daily: Making Abandoned Baby, July 1, 2009). Investigative journalists also want to tell their version of the truth about happening and this may be different from the “official” version of the stories. For example Southern People Weekly tried to discover the truth about the teenager killing his mother (Investigations into Teenager Killing Mother Event, November 29, 2007). Environmental issues have been one of the major subjects of investigative journalism since the 1990s. We can find many influential cases that have arisen from time to time, especially in recent years. Southern

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Metropolis Daily revealed the terrible consequences of industrial development in China which had caused numerous people to develop cancer (Water Pollution Crisis in China, November 5, 2007). People’s Daily revealed that an impermeable membrane had been put across the entire bottom of the Yuanming Yuan, and this would destroy the general biosystem of the Yuanming Yuan. In the anti-Rubbish burning project in Guangzhou in 2009, Southern Metropolis Daily was the first to reveal that local police had put pressure on property owners who had signed up in support of the small campaign; China News Weekly investigated and reported that many citizens who lived near the Guangzhou Likeng Rubbish Burning Electronic Factory had died of cancer (December 5, 2009). It is rare to see investigative reports on democratic events, but Southern Metropolis Daily revealed the truth about a democratic election and how villagers had collectively dismissed a village governor (Investigation into Dismissing Village Official in Taishi Village, September, 12, 2005). Different from the 1990s, investigative journalists start to report on historical topics, for example, reports on the Secrets of Southern Street, Seeking for Anti-Japanese War Veterans, in Southern Metropolis Daily. These reports reinterpret historical events that are different from what is defined by the CCP authorities. Some investigative media, for example, Southern Metropolis Daily, also begin to investigate and report on events that are happening in neighboring countries. There are, for instance, investigative reports on problems with the Vietnamese manufacturing industry in Southern Metropolis Daily (Digging Gold in Vietnam, Harsh Time Remaining, June 9, 2008), and an investigation into the death of a Chinese gambler in Laos was published in Southern Metropolis Daily (Gambler Lost life in Laos, March 31, 2010). Besides the differences and pluralism in the subjects, investigative reporting in the twenty-first century is different from that of the 1990s in four ways. First, the public, especially online participants, have played an active role in the process of investigative reporting and dissemination. The active online participation of the public is what first brought certain local issues to national attention. These are later investigated and covered in investigative reports. Online participants also actively disseminate and promote investigative reports via new communication tools, which provide an alternative type of communication, different from mass communication, and exaggerate the influences of investigative reports. Second, the identity of the criticized target is blurred, and investigative journalists tend to use one individual event to reflect societal problems.


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In journalists’ terms, it is safer if the criticized target is less identifiable, for example, to criticize a group of people, society, or social problems like the rich–poor gap. In recent years it has been common for investigative journalists to criticize the social problems behind an individual tragedy or event. The report on the Wanzhou Riot38 in Dahe Daily in 2004 and the report on the Chizhou Riot39 in Southern Metropolis Daily in 2005 were two prominent examples of journalists addressing social problems by reporting on a social event. Both reports focused on analysis of social problems, including the rich–poor gap and the antagonistic relationship between the people and the government/the rich (see Chapter 7). Although criticized as being subjective and sensational, the case of A-Xing in Southern Metropolis Daily in 2005 and the case headlined “Female Teacher is a Sex Worker” in Southern Weekend in 2006, strongly criticized the rich–poor gap and the injustice to “substitute” teachers (minban jiaoshi) by reporting on the sad fates of two trivial individuals. This tendency is not only a way to bypass the real “mine field” but is also a continuity of the instinctive grass-rooting trait of investigative journalism in China. Third, media organizations like Southern Metropolis Daily have started to assign investigative journalists to investigate and report on events in foreign countries. In the history of Chinese investigative journalism, investigated topics have changed from the coverage of local grass-roots issues to cross-regional sociopolitical ones. After the ban on crossregional reporting in 2005, the topics on which stories focus has shifted again, from cross-regional sociopolitical issues to less sensitive social and economic issues, many of which continue the grass-roots trait. Now, Chinese investigative journalists have started to conduct investigative reports in foreign countries. The topics of these reports usually have a certain relationship to China. For example, Wang Lei’s investigative report on gambling in Burma in Southern Metropolis Daily in 2005 criticized Chinese tourists who gambled for high-stakes in Burma and also implied that many of the tourists were Chinese officials. Fourth, there is cooperation between news organizations in the twenty-first century. Outside news organizations, Chinese investigative journalists are not working alone. Instead, they work in groups. Investigative journalists who are assigned to report on the same event or topic are likely to work together as a temporary team. For example, in the reporting of the Zuoyun Mine Disaster in 2006, Lu Hui assigned Feng Hongping to report on the event at the weekly department meeting on 22nd May. Feng invited Wei Huabing from Oriental Morning to join him

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in investigating the event. Wei was Feng’s former colleague in Shanghai. After arriving in Zuoyun, the two journalists were joined by two other Beijing journalists. They shared official information and went out to interview together, for example, the Beijing journalist had a private chat with an official in the Central Bureau of Quality and Safety from Beijing, while the other three did not. The Beijing journalist shared the information she got about secret stories on the disaster with the other three. Working as a team like this empowers investigative journalists to gain greater access to official information and avoid the official control. In some other cases, collaboration enabled investigative journalists to complement each other’s expertise, for example, in reporting on the case of Raping Virgins Event in 2006, Jia Yunyong, an investigative journalist from Southern Metropolis Daily, and Zhu Changzhen, an investigative journalist from Dahe Daily worked together to investigate the story. According to them, Zhu Changzhen had the ability to gather information that was more difficult for Jia Yunyong to get, while Zhu needed Jia to organize stories and find good news angles for him. Investigative reporting does certainly have exclusives. These exclusives usually refer to the first appearance of investigative stories in the news media. As soon as the scandals or events are revealed, an investigative reporting herd phenomenon usually follows. For example, after Southern Metropolis Daily published an investigative story on the death of Lan Chengchang in January 2007, many of the news media across China, including Southern Weekend, CCTV, and China Youth, sent their journalists to Shanxi province to make follow-up investigative reports. In the herd phenomenon, the influences of investigative reports do not always stay with the news media that first have covered these stories. For those nationally influential media, such as Southern Metropolis Daily, the influence stays, while, for less influential media, the situation may not be the same. In the case of the Lan Changcheng reporting, the big stories remained with Southern Metropolis Daily who first covered the story, while other media could only cover some follow-up information. It was a different situation in the case of the Shanxi Brick Field Scandal. Henan TV first covered the investigative stories, but the Henan TV reports did not result in strong effects and influences over society until an Internet forum re-covered the stories. The influence of the reports was removed by other news media with greater influences, for example Southern Metropolis Daily, Beijing News, and CCTV. These influential news media act as the bellwethers in investigative reporting. They set the media agenda and lead the definition of news events.


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It is common therefore, to see cooperation among investigative journalists from different news organizations when they are investigating stories that have been revealed. Investigative journalists do not exclude their competitors from their practice. Instead, they often organize a temporary association for information gathering, which, they believe, fits each other’s needs. The competition exists in terms of news angles, the degree of exposure, and the effects of reports. The publication of the story in two different media at the same time is regarded as maximizing the influences that are strong enough to keep the reports alive and to force the government to make changes. As long as investigative journalism becomes institutionalized and as a division of labor within news organizations, investigative journalists’ practices share some things in common with daily reporting. Such cooperation is one of them. Reporters on beats share resources and reach agreements. Now, Chinese investigative journalists do the same. Besides sharing resources and elaborating the effects of investigative reports, these journalists organize an association so that political risks are taken together. This lessens those political risks. Such cooperation is therefore not only a result of the institutionalization of investigative journalism, but also is a strategy to circumvent media control from above. As long as reports about a scandal are covered in many news media in different places across China, the Central and local propaganda departments can do nothing to deal with them and the situation goes beyond the control of propaganda people. For some co-operators, even when one of the news media has turned down an investigative report, that report can be covered in another news medium in another place. To a certain degree, this helps to increase the scope of expression to a national level. For example, Zhu Changzhen from Dahe Daily and Jia Yunyong from Southern Metropolis Daily are two good friends and partners. They have investigated many stories together. For some stories, such as the case of Raping Virgins Event, Dahe Daily could not cover the story because it happened locally; Jia covered the report in Southern Metropolis Daily instead. This is a strategy to get around local propaganda controls.

Chapter 5

Maintaining the Legitimacy of Chinese Journalism

Chinese journalism was seen as a politically privileged and prestigious occupation by others in society when the Party organ media monopolized the market. Chinese journalism characterized by Party journalism enjoyed high social esteem and its journalistic descriptions of reality were credible to readers. Such esteem and credibility were guaranteed under the political protection of the ruling authorities. In the process of media commercialization, however, journalism in China confronted a problem of legitimacy and a loss of privilege and prestige. In order to maintain a continuing authority and to keep the trust of the public and journalists themselves, the occupation of journalism needed to build up a new image that could be “perceived as valid and legitimate” (Hallin 1994, quoted in Clayman 2002). This chapter argues that the practice of investigative journalism has helped Chinese journalism to regain the privilege and prestige that it lost in the marketization process, and the professionalism of investigative journalism has been utilized as an agent through which Chinese journalism can be legitimized. The goal of this chapter is to shed light on how journalistic legitimacy of Chinese journalism is maintained through the practice of investigative journalism, and to examine how a new set of normative professional values has been constructed in the legitimation process. This chapter is in two parts. The first offers an account of the situations that resulted in loss of prestige which Chinese journalism was facing when investigative journalism was on the rise. The second discusses how investigative journalism fits into the prestige gap and has become a paradigm of good journalism by providing a new set of professional values and norms.

The Legitimacy of Journalism Journalism is not a profession like medicine or law, but is an occupation residing within the professionalization process. Like all other occupations


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in the process of professionalization, journalism needs to improve its professional status and achieve its legitimacy in order to emerge and survive as a major social institution with some power over society. Thus it is important for journalism to make and maintain journalistic boundaries in order to sustain its authority and credibility, as boundaries are central to a profession’s gaining of social legitimacy and a privileged status in the market (Larson 1977; Freidson 1994; Macdonald 1995; Dooley 1997). Occupational boundaries define the work, societal role, and legitimacy of an occupation (Dooley 1999). Boundary setting and maintenance, which are deemed as a strategy of social closure or exclusion, is and can separate and protect the profession from other occupational groups (Larson 1977; Freidson 1994; Macdonald 1995; Dooley 1997). With the establishment of boundaries, it is difficult for lay people to enter a profession but it is essential for a profession to control the entry to that profession for the purposes of prestige and privilege. Boundaries however, are not tangible, nor are they static or fixed (Dooley 1999; Fakazis 2006). There is a sort of borderline fighting among different professions in society (Macdonald 1995). Neighboring professions fight for monopoly in the labor market as well as for authority and credibility. For the former, the monopolization of educational training and recruitment can be employed by professions to set up exclusive borders in the labor market (Freidson 1970; Boyd-Barrett 1980). For the latter, professions employ traits of professionalism, such as claims of abstract knowledge or expertise skills, to compete with other occupational groups (Freidson 1970; Larson 1977; Freidson 1983). The traits of professionalism, the professional ideology, are actually seen as a guarantee for the setting up of boundaries and the maintenance of market monopoly as well as the public’s recognition of its privilege in the marketplace (Larson 1977). In the case of journalism, journalists do not have the abstract knowledge or expertise that medical or law people have, and that can legitimate it as a profession (Dooley 1999), though journalists do require certain knowledge and skills that must be mastered before an individual enters the profession (Bishop 2004). It is a main way that professions such as journalism gain prestige through the employment of professional values and norms, especially of socially positive ones, to gain public recognition of the professions’ privilege and prestige (Freidson 1970; Larson 1977; Macdonald 1995). The most common thing journalism does to maintain its boundaries and legitimacy is through establishing a “self-serving occupational discourse,” such as “claims to knowledge

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and truth,” a portrait of “agents of social change,” a sense of public service, objectivity, discourse on ethics, or other discursively constructed occupational values and norms (Dooley 1999; Pieper 2000; Ekström 2002; Deuze 2005). Such occupational discourse embodying professional value does indeed help journalism to establish a socially-positive image that is recognized and accepted by both the public and journalists themselves. A system of normative professional values, therefore, not only guides journalists in their occupational performance, but also is a powerful strategy for gaining public recognition of journalism’s prestige in the market place (Johnson 1972; Freidson 1994). Different professional values and norms need to be discursively constructed in different time periods in order to maintain this legitimacy of journalism.

Chinese Journalism: Once Privileged and Prestigious Chinese journalism was a very special and privileged occupation in China when it was dominated by Party journalism before the 1980s media reform. The privilege and prestige of Party journalism came from three facts. Contemporary journalists were first politically privileged by the fact that they were a part of the political administrative system, though meanwhile they had to sacrifice their journalistic autonomy to the compulsory commands from politicians. Before the 1980s reform, journalists who worked for Party organ media were all recruited by allocating them positions within the political administrative system (bianzhi) (Mao 2008). People included in the bianzhi system are equated with cadres, who are “leading personnel in the State and Party organs” (Brødsgaard 2002). The identity of being “inside-the-system people” (bianzhinei renyuan) means the guarantee of a life-long job, or, say, an iron rice bowl (tie fanwan), a promising career, a riskless stable income, and no competition (Mao 2008). Journalists with an inside-the-system position were more like semi-government officials, mandated to obey the “Party Principle” (dangxing)1 and integrated into the orbit of the Party as a means of political control (Wu 2000; Lee 2001). These journalists and their news organizations did not need to worry about economic factors at all as the State subsidized these Party organ media, and journalists’ salaries were paid by the State as if they were “state employees” (Lee 2001). The second fact that led to the privilege given to Party journalism was the monopoly of the media market. Before the 1980s reform, there were usually one newspaper and one television station in a city (Ding


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et al. 1997). At that time, the state-subsidized media monopolized the market (Zhao 1998). The Party journalists of that era therefore held a high social position, monopolizing the propaganda market as the mouthpiece of the Party (De Burgh 2003). Both political and economic resources were provided and guaranteed to the Party organ media by the State. The monopoly of the market not only means they are the only media that the people can consume, but also means they are the only media that other groups and institutions in society can rely on for the expression of their own voices. This is a kind of monopoly of discourse and of the right to representation. Journalists enjoyed privilege because they enjoyed the monopoly of discourse and the right to representation that was guaranteed by the State. For example, in order to have the stories about their institutions and organizations published nicely and prominently in the media, communication workers (tongxunyuan) from social institutions and organizations needed to gain the favor of Party journalists. The privilege of Party journalism also came from the public’s acceptance of journalistic claims to be the Party’s mouthpiece, which guaranteed the credibility of news reports produced by Party journalists. Journalistic authority was valued in the people’s perception and in judgments on journalists and news organizations (Hove 2009). When the legitimacy of the Party’s rule was unquestionable, practicing Party journalism was undoubtedly thought of as practicing the best journalism in China, and Party’s journalists were thought to be the best journalists in China. Journalistic role models such as Mu Qing, Guo Chaoren, were set for journalists and the public. There were no challenges to the credibility of journalistic descriptions of reality covered in Party organ media, nor questions about the legitimacy of journalists as mouthpieces of the Party, especially in the early years of the PRC (Liu 2008). Nevertheless, the rationale for journalistic legitimacy was justified by the Party-State. The privileges journalists enjoyed at that time were bestowed on them by the Party media system and through their identity as the Party’s journalists, rather than through legitimacy gained naturally in the market.

A Crisis in the Privilege and Prestige of Chinese Journalism Since the 1980s media reform, however, the authority of Chinese journalism has become deeply problematic, as an outcome of changes in

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the journalistic and political field. As a result of the media reform, the State stopped financial subsidies, the journalist recruiting system was changed, alternative journalism genres appeared, and news media increasingly gave attention to its audience. Chinese journalism was no longer equated with Party journalism, and Chinese journalists no longer meant journalists with a position inside the system. In the outside media environment, the legitimacy of the CCP was in crisis as quite a number of domestic conflicts appeared during the economic reform process. Why should people trust the journalism of the Party when they no longer trusted the Party? These changes have brought four challenges to the authority of Chinese journalism.

The blurred boundaries of the journalistic circle The first change that Chinese journalism witnessed was a blurring of the boundaries of the journalistic circle. Before the reform, the journalistic circle was a closed and static one. Boundaries were set by specific recruitment and employment measures separating Party journalism from other occupational groups in the market, but making it attached to the political system. There are three traits of the closed journalistic circle. First, as discussed above, Party journalism practitioners belonged to the political administrative system as a result of being given places within the political administrative system. Journalists, who would be separated and independent from the authority in the West, were integrated into the system in China. They are called inside-the-system journalists (tizhi nei jizhe), a name which suggests that these journalists are one part of the political system. Second, relevant government departments, such as Organization Departments (zuzhibu) or the Personnel Departments (renshibu) of the CCP Committee helped media organizations to recruit or arrange personnel, including high-ranking staff and ordinary journalists, for Party organ media, according to a specific set of standards, for example, their level of political loyalty to the Party and Party membership. The journalistic community was singularized by a group of loyal Party servants who obeyed the Party’s commands. Third, little flow of human resources could be found. Journalists’ jobs were permanent and fixed. Once recruited, journalists would work for a media organization life-long; it was also very difficult for them to change their employers. They would merely be able to go for internal job changes that were initiated by the Party or Party organ media if there were some changes.


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In sum, a closed journalistic circle was established in the era of Party journalism by the Party-State. Only those who fitted the criteria set for journalists by the Party were able to enter the occupation. There was little personnel flow between journalism and other occupational groups, except, sometimes, for instance, military veterans would be appointed as journalists or even high-ranking staff in Party organ media by the Party to ensure the political correctness of Party organ media. The recruitment reform in news organizations across China, however, led to the collapse of the closed and static circle and the occupational boundaries of Chinese journalism in the job market. Especially in the 1990s, news organizations were allowed, and even encouraged, to recruit by themselves journalists who are on short-term contract employment in their news business from outside the political and administrative system (tizhi wai jizhe). Outside-the-system journalists started to appear in the mid-1990s. After the 1980s reforms, though important figures within media organizations are still largely appointed by the Party committee and government, news organizations can employ lower-ranking staffs freely and ordinary journalists can choose their employers freely. It is also normal for journalists to move between media organizations and for news organizations to recruit a large number of outside-the-system journalists. This group of outside-the-system journalists are mostly hired in non-Party organ media and are therefore supposed to be mainstream journalists who practice non-Party journalism. Some of the outside-the-system journalists are those who long for the occupation of journalism, but who do not have the chance to get into the Party journalism system. Some of them leave the Party journalism system as they disagree with it. Overall, they are a group of journalists who have more motives and desire to be involved in professional journalism, but who have less political and economic resources than their Party journalist peers. These changes not only gradually detach journalism from the political system, but also break down the occupational boundaries of journalism. The occupational boundaries are broken down by two means. First, Chinese journalists are no longer pure Party’s journalists. The once closed journalistic circle has gradually opened. Chinese journalists are now both inside-the-system and outside-the-system journalists, as well as both Party members and non-Party members. The shifting recruitment measures and standards have resulted in the pluralism of journalism practitioners. People who do not fit the standards of Party journalists or who were once excluded from journalism can now enter the occupation.

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The once prevailing standards are no longer applicable, for example Party membership. Second, the interchanges between journalism and other occupations and between different news organizations have increased. Journalists, especially outside-the-system journalists, are easy to move from one news organization to another, or can move from journalism to another occupation, and vice versa. The previous boundaries in the labor market therefore no longer exist.

The confused identity of Chinese journalists Chinese journalists have also suffered from a confusion of identity. The confusion of identity first comes from the loss of the self-pride that journalists had in the pre-reform era. With the appearance of a group of outside-the-system journalists, who are outside the conventional Party journalism system, Chinese journalists start to lose the collective selfpride and privilege that they have long experienced while being part of the political administrative system. Unlike their Party journalist peers, as they are in contract employment, these outside-the-system journalists are more flexible but lack a sense of belonging to the Party system as well as a sense of security. Self-pride is further lost when journalists find they need to chase news like paparazzi. Particularly to journalists from nonParty organ media, government departments are passive or unwilling to provide information. In some cases, journalists even need to beg for information. A hierarchical atmosphere within newsrooms makes the situation worse, especially for the outside-the-system journalists. Basically, there are two possible situations within news organizations that outside-the-system journalists have to face. Within news organizations that are dominated by Party journalists, such as Dongnan Business (a commercial non-Party organ launched by Ningbo Daily), there is a sort of hierarchical atmosphere in the newsroom, as a result of the unequal treatments that journalists inside and outside the system receive. Outside-the-system journalists are inferior to inside-the-system journalists in terms of salary and benefits, sense of security, and resources. They do the same amount of work, sometimes even much more, than inside-the-system journalists, but are less well-paid and less respected by their colleagues. The situation is better in news organizations, in which the majority of personnel are outside-the-system journalists, such as Southern Metropolis Daily, and CCTV’s Focus. In this kind of situation, a hierarchical atmosphere is less easy to detect as outside-the-system


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journalists are in the majority, who are paid well and enjoy high social status. It is not rare therefore to see outside-the-system journalists move from the former to the latter. The disrespect by inside-the-system journalists to outside-the-system journalists, however, still occurs from time to time (Liang 2002). The confusion of identity is also caused by different standards for good reports and good journalists. The different requirements and codes of behavior that news organizations have for journalists, especially in non-Party organ media, has confused journalists’ concepts of what good journalists and good reports are. Journalists no longer think of themselves as loyal servants of the Party. Chinese media organizations have gradually started to move their attention to the ordinary people. Journalists need to conform to the new requirements of their employers, who expect them to practice non-Party journalism and bring new blood to their news organizations. Especially for outside-the-system journalists, they need to produce reports significantly different from what their Party peers produce in order to survive in news organizations. They also need to build up a high degree of occupational respect as this gains them the autonomy to move frequently between news organizations. For this group of journalists, the answer to the question “what are good journalists” obviously is not the same as Party’s journalists would give. They are not within the system and do not see them as Party’s journalists in the first place, they do not practice Party journalism in their work, and therefore disrespect the occupational values the Party has given to journalism. They are seeking a new set of occupational values and practice a new genre of journalism that enables them to establish their occupational prestige and reputation among the journalistic community. The shifted codes of behaviors and requirements of news organizations have facilitated the collapse of journalists’ orthodox perception of journalistic role. What accompanies a collapse of boundaries is a loss of professional belief in the journalism circle among journalism practitioners. The question “what are good journalists” is reconsidered by Chinese journalists, who no longer take seeing themselves as loyal servant of the Party for granted, as they now have the choice to practice different types of journalism. Journalists and even journalism students begin to admire Western elite media rather than the domestic, orthodox Partyorgan media, and think highly of the role that their Western journalist counterparts have played, instead of that played by their Chinese Party journalist peers. All of these put the notion of Party journalism, as the best journalism, at risk.

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Mismatching the public’s expectation2 The crisis in the legitimacy of Chinese journalism, Party journalism in particular, also comes from the different expectations of the Party and the public about the role of journalism. The Party organs’ failure in the marketplace is because Party journalism is not what the Chinese public would like to consume. That is, what “good journalism” and “best journalists” mean to the Party are different from what they mean to the public. There is a gap between the expectations of the role of journalism from top and bottom. This gap is deeply reflected in a conflict that the official and public discourses of journalistic professionalism have got into. The official discourse constructed by the CCP authorities on journalistic professional norms has always centered on the Party Principle (dangxing), which has mostly been put above the People’s Principle (renmingxing).3 However, the public discourse of journalistic norms considers journalists need to serve the people, the People’s Principle, which confirms the different expectation of the public on journalists’ role. The origins of the official discourse need to be traced back to the discursive approaches to journalism in the partisan journalism in the first half of the twentieth century in China. Newspapermen, like Zheng Guangong, Chen Duxiu, and Sun Yat-sen, believed newspapers should serve the needs of political parties. Before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, numerous Party organs, for example, CCP’s Xiangdang Weekly (xiangdao zhoubao) and KMT’s Zhongyang Daily (zhongyang ribao), were launched to meet the parties’ needs, including those of the Communist Party and the Kuoming Party (Ding et al. 1997). This discursive approach is still incorporated in the official journalistic professionalism discourse used today by the Chinese authorities. Since the CCP’s first articulation of the Party Principle in Liberation Daily (jiefang ribao) reform in 1942, this has traditionally been seen as the foremost among the guidelines and professional values for running the press. This means that the best journalists need to serve the Party above all others, including the people. Despite the official discourse of journalistic professionalism having included some norms that support the people’s principle (Tong 2006), the Party still wants to have a centralized control over ideological aspects (Tong 2010). The Party Principle is still given a priority. In the official discourse of journalistic values, therefore, journalism must first serve the needs of the CCP, then the People’s principle. The public discourse around journalistic professionalism, however, regards journalists as needing to serve the people, reflecting a different


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expectation from the public on the journalists’ role. The public’s expectations on one hand come from the awakening of the self-consciousness of the Chinese public, which has been aroused by the marketization after the 1980s, and they want to draw the media’s attention to them. In opposition to the traditional collectivism, the individualism and selfidentity of the Chinese people have been awoken by the wave of reform (Weber 2002). The “I” consciousness desires the attention of the media. The public’s expectations, on the other hand, come from their desire for social justice and expression. As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the economic reforms in China have not only brought great economic development, but also rising social costs caused by this economic growth: social disparity, corruption, wrongdoing, and social instability, which have led to a legitimation crisis of the ruling Party (Gallagher 2002; Lewis and Xue 2003). People are eager to see fairness in the punishment of corruption and wrongdoing. The status quo of the Chinese political and juridical systems, however, leads to a possible situation where many powerless people cannot achieve fairness through juridical means. The people need someone who can act as a link between governments and people and need journalism to take on this role to serve the people instead of the Party. Party journalism cannot fulfill this requirement. The Chinese public need a totally different type of journalism, independent from the political administrative system, which can do what Party journalism cannot do. In an investigation on the attitude of citizens to journalists in three cities, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou4 in 2003, 80% of citizens regarded being able “to communicate information and inform the public” as most important for journalists. According to the survey, 59.5% of citizens believed journalists should “supervise society,” 44.4% believed journalists “speak for the powerless,” and only 23.0% saw journalists “as the throat and tongue of the Party and government.” The public also regarded journalists as the embodiment of justice and equity and 64.1% people said they would turn to the help of the media when they encountered inequity.5 The models set by CCTV’s “Eight Best Journalists” of 2003, drew the profile of “best journalists” in the public’s mind and this reflected the public discourse of the journalistic professionalism. The journalists who were given awards were nominated by media organizations and voted for by the public over the Internet. Moreover, during the competition process, the opinions of experts and academics were also considered. These models not only represented good journalists in the eyes of the public, but also in the eyes of news organizations. Consequently, they

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reflected publicly recognized criteria for good journalism. Table 5.1 lists the names of journalists, the media organizations from which they come, and their famous reports, which are all about revealing the hidden truth and social injustice.6 Though some of them come from Party organs, such as CCTV and Xinhua News Agency, the reports presented here are completely different from traditional Party journalism. From these journalistic role models, which are completely different from role models set by the CCP for journalists, we can see the public norms of professionalism can be explained in the following ways: looking for truth and facts, standing for the powerless, having no fear of danger, speaking for public interest, and pushing social development or triggering social change. The public’s different expectations of the role of journalists have challenged the dominant Party’s Principles constructed by the CCP authorities to act as journalistic professional norms that are supposed to be accepted by both the public and journalists. Party journalism functions are unable to fulfill what the Chinese public expect. Chinese journalism is, therefore, facing a crisis of prestige in the public’s eyes.

Table 5.1 Journalists

2003 best journalists in China Media Organizations

Famous Report(s)

Report Category

Keqin Wang China Financial Times

Inside Story of Monopoly of Taxi Industry in Beijing

Investigative report

Feng Chen

Southern Metropolis Daily

The Death of Sun Zhigang


Huiyan ji

China Central Television

Reports on Iraq war

War Reports

Xue Jiang

Huashang Daily

Series Reports on ‘the Event of Couple Watching Porn’


Yu Zhu

Xinhua News Agency

Longdanxieganwan: Good Medicine or Nosogenesis?


Changying Qu

China Centre Television

True Story of Linfeng Mine Disaster


Shilong Zhao

Yangcheng Evening News

Investigating the Event of Changzhou Drug Rehabilitation Center Forcing Female Drug Rehabilitors to be Prostitute


Jing Chai

China Central Television

Wars toward SARS in Beijing

In-depth reports


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The collapse of journalistic authority and credibility The uneasy legitimacy of Chinese journalism also relates to a collapse of journalistic authority and credibility in three aspects. First, there is a decrease in the credibility of Party organ media. The journalistic authority of Party journalism is problematic when non-Party organ media start to provide a different version of reality, which is described and interpreted in different ways, while the Internet provides a new platform for the public to share and communicate information personally. Different versions of reality impair the Party journalism’s epistemic authority, that is, the “legitimate power to define, describe, and explain bounded domains of reality” (Gieryn 1999). The public has lost confidence and even has deep doubts about news produced by Party media. In 2010, for example, when Xinhua New Agency published an article to refute the investigative reports published by China Economic Times, Xinhua News Agency was heavily criticized by the public and was accused of being instructed by politicians, while Wang Keqin and his investigative reports had achieved wide support from the public across China. Despite being continuously censored by the Internet police, members of the public kept posting updated information about the 2010 Taixing Kindergarten Tragedy,7 and reminded the general public not to trust what the official media said. Second, when there is more than one news medium coexisting in a geographic place, other societal institutions and organizations residing within that social space have more choices about where to publish their stories. One news organization no longer enjoys the monopoly of discourse and the right of representation. Communication workers in these institutions and organizations, who enjoy the resources of information, are thus able to strategically manipulate journalists rather than carefully achieving the favor of one particular journalist. Third, in the rise of non-Party commercial media, it is not rare to see news stories that turn out to be fake news, and journalists gain economic benefits through means such as taking red envelopes or company stock (Huang 2001). The problems with journalistic ethics further destroy the image of journalism as a whole. The occupation of journalism in China has a need to regain prestige and recognition among the public and journalists themselves. Chinese journalism needs to establish a new image embodying new values in the market to regain the authority and prestige it has lost during media marketization. News organizations also need a new image in the market

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in order to grab more of the market share and a new identity for the journalists they employ. Chinese journalism however, cannot re-establish its prestige by merely practicing citizen-oriented journalism genres, because sensational and entertainment media content is neither something unique and niche, nor is it something that is respectable and socially positive. Citizen-oriented journalism appeared first as a type of journalism that tends to cover the lifestyle stories of ordinary people and infotainment, this accompanied the rise of non-Party evening, morning, or metropolitan newspapers in China, especially in metropolitan cities, such as Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, or the coastal prosperous cities such as Hangzhou. For example, the most prominent characteristic of Shanghai-style newspapers is that they are full of citizen-oriented and entertainment information (Tong 2002). This type of journalism however, was unable to rescue the problematic credibility of Chinese journalism. There are two problems with media content of this style. First, sensational and entertainment media content does help Chinese media that are looking for money and to make profits, but it is easily replicated in the market. It is common to see several newspapers with similar editorial policies compete for the same group of readers. So, even though they try to gain market share through sensational media content, Chinese media may still not be able to achieve a large market share. Second, reporting on lifestyle or even entertainment news cannot give journalism a sense of profession but may give it a sense of “paparazzi style” in some cases (Ogden 2002). Practicing citizen-oriented journalism cannot offer an effective set of values that can replace the normative values set by the Party. Chinese journalism needs to achieve prestige via something that can really inspire the public’s trust and media organization also need something special to gain public support in order to guarantee market share and control of their journalists. The main way for professions to gain prestige and recognition concerns the employment of professional values, especially, those socially positive ones, in order to gain public recognition of the profession’s privileges and prestige (Freidson 1970; Larson 1977; Macdonald 1995). There is an urgent need for a new set of professional values hence to be established in Chinese journalism to replace the decadent journalistic professional norms that have been constructed by the CCP authorities, and a new type of journalism is needed to fill the gap in journalism’s function that has been left by Party journalism. The practices of investigative journalism fill in the gap,


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for example, like Li argues, that exposes of wrongdoing have earned prestige for television journalists in China (Li 2002).

Investigative Journalism as an Agent of Legitimation The main contribution that investigative journalism has given to Chinese journalism, in terms of legitimation, is a new set of professional values and norms that have been set up in the process of practicing investigative journalism. This has helped Chinese journalism to establish a new image that has regained the public’s recognition and re-established journalists’ identity and role models.

A new set of professional values and norms Investigative journalism practices in news organizations including Southern Weekend and Southern Metropolis Daily in Guangzhou, Dahe Daily in Zhengzhou, and Focus in Beijing, have set up a new journalism paradigm for the public and journalistic practitioners through their influential investigative reports. This new journalism paradigm has successfully set up a new set of professional values that matches the image of journalists with the public as a hero who can save the people from social suffering. This new set of professional values has rivaled, if not replaced, the previous Party journalistic values set and promoted by the ruling Party, and has become a competing concept for good journalism in journalistic circle. This concept of good journalism is especially popular with and accepted by non-Party media. Three normative values are at the centre of the new set of professional values. The first is the “claim to truth.” Investigative journalists and news organizations that support investigative reporting frequently claim to report the “truth” (zhenxiang) of events. Investigative reports need to provide an account of reality that is usually different to the official version, revealing what has happened and the “real” meanings that are likely to be covered and distorted by the powerful. This is more than a commitment to fact-checking and accuracy. This discourse not only reflects the skepticism about the official version of events, but also expresses the willingness and ability of investigative journalists and news organizations to provide important and reliable information which justifies the position of journalism as an institution that stands for justice in an authoritarian society.

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The second concerns the “claim to objectivity.” This is about the fairness and balance of view points. In the process of interviewing and writing up, investigative journalists tend to avoid expressing their views directly but make the report include facts and views from news sources. In terms of news sources, investigative journalists prefer to give voices to ordinary people rather than to officials. According to them, to include the official views is to give a sense of balance to reports. The readers can judge who is telling the truth and who is lying if they see two viewpoints in the reports.8 An objective account is not only deemed to be a practical strategy with which to deal with a power struggle that is frequently identified in news events that need investigation, but also as a necessary stance for journalists if they wish to claim their professional status. Like Qian Gang put it, journalists have to control their own feelings, such as a natural sympathy or an instinctive hatred, and must treat reporting targets through an objective professional means in order to establish the credibility of news media and journalism in society (Qian 2008). To be professional is to be objective in a narrative that is fact-based and unbiased. Objectivity is the ethical precondition for determining whether a journalist is professional or not as well as being a condition that reflects the skills of journalists in dealing with facts and opinions. The third is the “claim to helping the powerless,” which is equated with the “claim to represent the conscience of society.” This is a sense of social responsibility that has been established and accepted by Chinese journalists. The “claim to helping the powerless” is a quasi-sense of public service that is classically accepted by journalism in the Western context, as well as a sense of journalist as savior that is a typical expectation of the role of the intellectual in the Chinese historical context (as discussed in Chapter 2). With these feelings, Chinese journalists can perceive occupational values and be proud to be a journalist. The normative value of this is the motive behind investigative journalists revealing scandals that often involve a polarized opposition of the powerful and the powerless. Chinese journalists regard the watchdog role as one of the most important roles of journalism (Chen and Mi 1995). This ideal later evolves into a claim to “help social development.” This discourse is advanced by some news organizations in the twenty-first century, based on the claim to “helping the powerless.” This is another of the key norms of social responsibility that helps investigative journalism to justify the legitimacy of journalism. The discourse of democracy has started to appear in the journalistic discourse of their claims. For Chinese investigative journalists, “helping social development” is equated with


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helping to achieve democracy, or, in a more Chinese type of discourse, to help the democratic development of Chinese society (zhongguo shehui de minzhu jincheng).9 This set of journalistic values that is embedded in the new professional paradigm has successfully replaced the traditional journalistic values promoted by the Party. The renovated professional values, including “objectivity,” “social responsibility,” and the “claim to truth,” that have been established in the practices of investigative journalism, have helped Chinese journalism regain public recognition, privilege, and a high social position it has lost during media marketization. The new set of values reflects the professional ideals of a new generation of Chinese journalists, which originate not only from journalists’ instinctive desire for professional ideals that arouse during the thought emancipation that accompanied market reform, but also from a self-seeking motive of journalism and news organizations to polish their market image. These new professional values also mark the Chinese journalism’s professional development, which has been moved away from Party journalism.

How the new set of professional values came into being This new set of professional values was shaped in the practice of investigative journalism. There are five reasons to account for how it came into being. (1) The continuous publication of influential investigative reports sets examples for Chinese journalists, promoting values and making them accepted as recognized values for journalism. For example, the Zhang Jinzhu Case in 1997, the Dushugui Case10 in 2000, and the Sunzhigang Case in 2003, not only promoted the values of “revealing the truth” and “appealing for the powerless and punishing the evil powerful,” but also set examples that employed the reporting techniques of fact-bases embodying the value of “objectivity” for Chinese journalists. (2) The popularity of the new value system is accredited to the efforts of news organizations’ promotion. News organizations frequently articulate, interpret, and promote the new values and their meanings in public through slogans, the launching of journalistic awards, and the setting of role models for their journalist employees. For example, in the first Journalist festival on November 8, 2000, Southern Weekend

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published a series of special reports to commemorate and celebrate the special day for Chinese journalists. It carried the following words: To reveal truth to the public not only reflects the anger of journalists, but represents the conscience of society . . . journalists and media need to give power and care to the powerless and should encourage the pessimists to walk forward.11 Another example is from Southern Metropolis Daily. This newspaper often promotes the values in its slogans and tenets. For example in 2003, it covered its tenets in this matter: [this newspaper wants to] ‘timely, vividly, objectively, and accurately represent news events and restore facts and truth; wholly and practically serve people.’ The slogan and tenets show that the newspaper defines the “best newspaper” as one which is objective, neutral, and serves the people, and, furthermore, journalists should seek truth. (3) Very importantly, the shaping of the new value system is due to the gathering of a group of journalists who share similar professional ideologies. The reform in the recruitment measures has in fact transformed the culture of Chinese journalism as a whole. In ordinary non-Party news organizations, outside-the-system journalists have brought new concepts about journalism practices. In some avant-garde news organizations, such as Southern Weekend, and Southern Metropolis Daily, they have even gathered a large group of outstanding outside-the-system journalists, sometimes even called itinerant journalists (liulang jizhe). Journalists with similar professional ideals, who were fearless because they had nothing to lose, rallied around several figures who worked as spiritual leaders and who were also itinerant journalists. The similar professional ideals of this group have forged a collective set of professional ideals within news organizations, which offer the basis for organizational professionalism and in return influence the operation of these news organizations. Most investigative journalists in China were itinerant journalists in the 1990s. “Itinerant journalists” refer to a group of journalists who seek journalistic jobs in news organizations that are not usually in their hometowns but which can provide a platform for them from which to realize their professional ideals, which are different from those of the orthodox journalistic ideology. This group of journalists are independent of the traditional media personnel system (tizhi wai renyuan) and hence depend on news report writing for most of their income.


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The phenomenon of itinerant journalists started from the early 1990s, when the personnel recruitment system in Chinese media had just began a thorough reform. The newly launched metropolitan newspapers and the nontraditional TV channels first recruited a large number of itinerant journalists, who were the avant-garde in Chinese media reform and contributed to the transformation of the Chinese media landscape and to the development of investigative journalism. For example, the News Commentary Department (including Focus) employed only 30 staff who were within the system and more than 340 staffs from outside the system (Liang 2002). Those famous journalists working on Focus, such as Bai Yansong, Shui Junyi, were from outside the system. Big names of investigative journalists from investigative media, such as Southern Weekend and Southern Metropolis Daily including Wang Keqin, Shi Ye, Zeng Huafeng, Yang Haipeng, Zhao Shilong, were all itinerant journalists, who had no political administrative places within the system. Compared to journalists who were in the system, itinerant journalists have five prominent traits. These traits also differentiate them from ordinary outside-the-system journalists. First, itinerary journalists are out of the traditional media personnel system. They have no political administrative places within the system (bianzhi), no local resident permit (hukou), and no professional ranks (zhicheng). Second, they usually want to pursue their journalistic ideals, which are different from the orthodox journalistic ideals of Party journalism. Third, itinerant journalists may change their employers very frequently as well as the places where they live, as a way of making a living and of realizing their journalistic ideals. For example, Zhao Shilong, a well-known investigative journalist known to be an itinerant journalist, changed journalistic jobs three times in 1993, and merely stayed at Southern Weekend for two years after joining this weekly in 1996. Fourth, itinerant journalists tend to write reports about negative aspects of society and to reveal hidden stories and problems, which are the main elements in investigative reporting. They were the mainstream force practicing investigative journalism in 1990s. This is partly because they had nothing to lose, and partly because their journalistic ideals drove them to practice this type of journalism. Furthermore, daily journalists who are responsible for routine reporting need to establish solid working and personal relationship with media relations people in government departments. This limits their chance of finding a job in another news organization, especially in another city. Investigative journalists do not have such problems as they are not limited by a specialist domain. This enables them to

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freely change their jobs. Finally, itinerant journalists usually have a grassroots background. For example, in Southern Metropolis Daily, the bulk of newspaper personnel in the 1990s were itinerant journalists from all corners of China. Most originated from the grass-roots and worked at the bottom of society (Southern Metropolis Daily 2004). They were, to a certain degree, fearless. The personal traits of investigative journalists determined its grass-roots orientation. According to Qian Gang, the Acting Editor-in-Chief of Southern Weekend, “. . . the majority of journalist staff at Southern Weekend was from poor families. Exactly because of their background, they have a natural sympathy towards peasants and other lower class people and an instinctive hatred towards those power abusers, such as police, prosecutors, and judges . . .” (2008). Nowadays, to recruit journalists from outside of the system is no longer a fresh thing, instead it has become normal in many news organizations especially in metropolitan newspapers, magazines, and TV channels in cities like Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. Many of these itinerant journalists have now settled down and have achieved a certain economic status and professional fame. Besides, the term itinerant journalists began to slowly wane from the discourse of journalistic circles and the public eye from the late 1990s, though occasionally people used it, especially when talking about such journalists or those well-known itinerant journalists themselves used it, for example in an interview with Zhao Shilong in 2008. Nevertheless, the five traits of itinerant journalists have remained constant in investigative journalists. They are still migrant journalists, still change their jobs more frequently than journalists within the system, are full of professional ideals, tend to write investigative reports, and have a grass-roots background. This group of itinerant journalists can be seen as the origin of a new generation of journalists, whose journalistic practices have brought a new set of journalistic professional values to the surface and into force. Because groups of them assembled within specific news organizations, collective professional ideals came into being, which influences the organizational journalistic professionalism and the operation of news organizations. (4) The establishment of the new value system results from the forging of an investigative reporting community. The consensus of investigative journalism shared by members of the community promotes standards that are recognized by the journalistic circle. There is a forging of an imaginary investigative community that is comprised of investigative


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journalists, who share similar journalistic ideals. Such a community is called as a journalistic “occupational community” (zhiye gongtongti) in words of Fu Jianfen, an investigative journalist and editor of Southern Weekend (Fu 2010). The forging of such an “occupational community” is facilitating investigative journalism in three ways. First, the collaboration between investigative journalists in their real-life practices has brought together an unofficial association of investigative journalists who share resources and interests in the same topics, and has given them not only a sense of being together, but also a sense of occupational safety. For example, as discussed above, if a story cannot be published in his/ her medium, an investigative journalist may share the story lead with journalist peers working in other news organizations so as to reveal the “truth,” because she/he thinks the truth should be revealed (Fu 2010). Such selfless behavior enables the investigative journalist to be accepted by the community, which brings him/her reputation and, in another sense, helps keep the safety of his/her career as an investigative journalist, especially when she/he, though facing threats from the powerful, cannot seek help from his/her employer. Second, a collective sense of journalistic professional norms is forged and recognized by members of the community. This group of journalists share similar journalistic norms and similar standards for the functioning of good journalists. Third, the image of professional journalists has been established by news organizations through appraisal of or the revealing of assaults on journalists, which draws resonance from other journalists. These journalist heroes or victims have worked as role models for their journalist peers and help to promote a sense of recognition. Names such as Ma Yunlong, Wang Keqin, Zhao Shilong, Chen Feng, and, more recently, Yao Haiying, are repeatedly mentioned as having left a legacy or making a mark for good journalists. The case of Yao Hiaying can be used to summarize these three points. In 2009, Yao Haiying, the former Chief Journalist and former Director of the investigative team at Changjiang Commercial (changjiang shangbao) in Hubei Province, was accused of committing corruption and was illegally summoned to court by the local procuratorate because he published an investigative report on a violation of business secrets. The newspaper and high-ranking staffs at first tried to protect Yao from persecution by the local procuratorate, but later gave up under pressure from them, withdrawing their support for Yao and even requiring him to stop working at the newspaper. Yao had no choice but posted an article about his miserable experience online. The online post

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attracted the attention of Beijing, who put pressures on the local procuratorate, who apologized. Yao however, lost his job at Changjiang Commercial because of this, but was soon accepted and employed by Times Weekly in Guangzhou, which is highly committed to investigative journalism. Southern Weekend was the first to reveal Yao’s experience in the offline world. Either Yao’s online post or the article in Southern Weekend caused resonance among other investigative journalists in China. For example, Fu Jianfeng wrote in his article: When I listened to (Yao’s narration), I suddenly had strong feelings of sorrow and grief, which not only came from sympathy towards his personal experience, but also from reflection on my own occupational fate, and the resonance of feeling about the external pressures that the occupation of journalism meets. His remarks reminded me of my friend and former colleague, the deputy Editor-in-Chief of a newspaper in Nanning City, who had to quit the job and moved to another city, because his newspaper first revealed the event that the Nanning Qihang Saving Training Centre had killed a teenager when trying to help him quit being a web-addict. His remarks reminded me of some journalist peers who are suffering from injustice because they criticised an inappropriate law, of Ma Yunlong, a journalist predecessor who was forced to leave because he issued the investigative report that first revealed the injustice that was imposed on Nie Shubing, who was wrongly sentenced to death and executed ten years ago, . . . they paid prices for telling truth that is not suitable at current value, which ordinary people could not imagine. They are truth defenders who are fragile but firm and are owed my respects. They and I, and all others who regard themselves as professional journalists, have formed same discourse and ways of thinking, we share consensus ideals and professional values. Just because of this, the first time I met Yao Haiying, who got a job here in Guangzhou, we felt we had known each other for years and understood each other. (Fu 2010) The forging of consensus, therefore, takes place beyond the boundaries of the newsroom, as a result of conversations held among journalists who gather together as an investigative reporting community and of the recognition among the investigative journalist community. Investigative journalists have been knitted together flexibly and unofficially, as an investigative reporting community with some degree of organization. Such an investigative reporting community is an invisible, unofficial, and


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flexible organization, which is automatically organized on the basis of the common interests of investigative journalists. It is neither a professional association nor a union organization. It is merely an imagined community of investigative journalists who share interests and attention around the country. (5) The final factor that influences the establishment of the new set of professional value is related to the journalism education and training. There was a major gap between university journalism programs and the real-world journalistic practices. First, most Chinese university journalism educators were merely academics with no practical experiences (Wu 2002). The lack of practical knowledge at the level of university educators has limited the ability of journalism students to develop their self-perceptions of journalists. Second, the text books and teaching materials that were used in university journalism programs were extremely outdated and advocated the codes and occupational ideologies of Party journalism (Pan and Chan 2003). Four changes can be identified in journalism education in China in recent years. First, more and more investigative journalism practitioners are invited to give talks to university students. For example, Lu Hui, former Director of the investigative journalism team at Southern Metropolis Daily, regularly gave lectures to media students in Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. This type of teaching helps bring knowledge and professional ideals from the newsroom to the classroom and nurtures future journalists through the investigative newspaper’s professional ideology. Another example, Fan Yijing, the former Chair of the Southern Daily press group, is leading the journalism school at Jinan University since his retirement. Second, university students now frequently seek internships in news organizations; especially those that are famous for investigative journalism. Third, Western organizations, for example some NGOs, have started to launch training courses for Chinese investigative journalists; the Caijing journalism training course and the Henan training course, for instance. Fourth, it is more about the move of journalists from prestigious investigative media to less prestigious media. For example, the organizational journalistic professionalism of SMD has expanded to nationwide news organizations and has influenced journalistic professionalism in journalistic circles via the job changes of its employees and the launching of its “children newspapers” (zibao) in other places. The newspaper is called an “excellent journalist’s training school” (huangpu junxiao) in Chinese newspapers, and a lot of ordinary employees were

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hired for at least middle rank positions in other media organizations after they quit their jobs at Southern Metropolis Daily. When the newspaper launched its children newspapers in Beijing and Yunnan, the organizational professionalism of the newspaper was also replicated and extended to its children newspapers, which would contribute to the professionalization of Chinese journalism nationwide. Reproducing and regaining legitimacy The new set of professional values embedded in the practices of investigative journalism has functioned as an agent of legitimation for Chinese journalism. Basically speaking, there are three main types of legitimation. The first is the reestablishment of the boundaries of the journalistic circle. Though the previous boundaries have been shaken, Chinese journalism sets up new boundaries that feature techniques, knowledge, and practitioner expertise. For example, membership of the Party is no longer a key standard for gaining an entry into journalism. Instead, the occupation of Chinese journalism keeps its authority and privilege, and protects itself through the setting of a new set of entry conditions, among which, the ability to produce a beautiful text, the ability to judge news values, and the ability to discern the social meaningfulness of news events, are the three key skills that a journalism practitioner should have. The second is to employ the new professional value system to regain the public’s recognition and trust. Chinese journalism has regained its authority via a new image, with a new set of professional values it has established in the practicing of investigative journalism by a new generation of journalists. A reputation as being “kings without crowns” (wumianzhiwang), for instance, has been gained for Chinese journalism among the public through the practices of investigative journalism (Zhao 2000; Li 2002; De Burgh 2003). Such an image of journalists fits well with the public’s imaginary of journalists, which comes from the civil expectations of the role of Confucian intellectuals in ancient times. The recognition of the public is reflected in market success. Public recognition has brought huge financial rewards for investigative media. For example, after the series of reports on the Zhang Jinzhu event, the advertising of Dahe Daily rose from 3.2 million RMB at the beginning of 1997, to 23 million RMB by the end of 1997, and its circulation climbed from 75,000 to 226,000 (DaheDaily 2005). After 1997, the ad revenue and circulation of the newspaper increased quickly year by year. From


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1997–2003, annual ad revenue increased from 3.2 million RMB to 300 million RMB, while circulation has grown from 75,000 to 800,000 (Ma 2004). The third is to use the new value system to establish a journalistic identity (especially for outside-the-system journalists). The new system of values helps build journalists morale and produces some prominent divisions in the journalists’ working practice. Being identified as professional journalists has made these outside-the-system journalists believe they are better than inside-the-system journalists, despite the unsteadiness of their employment and their financial disadvantages. This is what Murdock called “a more ‘flexible’ cultural labor force” (Murdock 2000). Guided by the new set of professional norms, journalists have reestablished the concept of their role, and have turned these norms into their own individual values. The journalists at Southern Metropolis Daily are a good example of this. Their journalists, especially investigative journalists, highly recognize the organizational journalistic professionalism that advances ideas like “objectivity” and “social responsibility” (this example will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6). The flourishing of investigative journalism in China coincides with the rise of a new generation of journalists—investigative journalists— who see themselves as being in a distinctive occupation with a unique social function, rather than as being a dependent part of the Party work. This group of journalists have moved away from the orthodox model of journalist as loyal Party servants, towards professional journalists who have a sense of public service, want to fulfill their intellectual mission, and articulate social conscience. Wang Keqin12 is one among them. This marks the latest cultural transformation of Chinese journalism and demonstrates the changed professional values and expectations of the role of journalists that contemporary journalists hold in the face of the media commercialization that started in the 1980s. The new set of professional values is constructed in and by the practices of investigative journalism, underpinning the journalistic professionalism of investigative journalists and legitimizing the authority and credibility of Chinese journalism.

Chapter 6

An Organizational Analysis: The Case Study of Southern Metropolis Daily

The practices of contemporary Chinese investigative journalism are increasingly organizationalized in news organizations. The organizationalization of investigative journalism starts from the extensive support news organizations have given to investigative journalism since the 1990s. The organizational support manifests itself in three ways. First, news organizations pay for the considerable expenses necessarily incurred in practicing this kind of journalism (Tong and Sparks 2009). News organizations allocate substantial financial resources to support this expensive journalism, and allow investigative journalists extensive time to undertake an investigation. The practice of investigative journalism is really expensive. As soon as investigative journalists are assigned to follow a story, news organizations start paying the bills. Investigations may last several days, several weeks, several months, or even more. The Shanxi Unsafe Vaccines Scandal in 2010, for instance, took Wang Keqin, the investigative journalist from China Economic Times, half a year to investigate, while Yu Chen and Wang Jilu, the two investigative journalists from Southern Metropolis Daily, spent more than a year investigating the medical scandal of the Dongfang Hospital which conducted “heart and lung transplant operation” tests on living humans in 2006. In the investigation process, accommodation, transportation, interview equipments, and human resources, for example the hiring of a local guide, all cost money. The average cost for investigative stories in Southern Metropolitan Daily was RMB 5,000 per story in 2006.1 Times Weekly (shidai zhoubao) supported Wang Peng RMB 30,0002 on a single investigation of the desertization of the Kumtag Dessert in 2009. Without the support of the organization, it would be completely unrealistic for individual journalists to bring a successful investigation to an end. Second, news organizations develop special ways of assessing the work and pay of investigative journalists. A daily reporter needs to fulfill a daily reporting quota and it is therefore less possible to probe deep into

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a topic, making an in-depth investigation. An investigative journalist, however, is allowed to spend several months, or more, to follow-up a story without the guarantee of getting a feasible story at the end of the investigation process. Many complex and uncertain factors need to be taken into account when judging investigative journalists’ work, while daily reporters can be mainly judged on the quantitative criteria of news stories (Tong and Sparks 2009). The basic salary of investigative journalists is higher than that of ordinary journalists, and news organizations have great rewards for a single investigative report regarded as a good report. An investigative journalist can still get a nice basic salary, even though he/she has not published a word in that month, while an ordinary reporter would be fired if no publishable report were produced. In many news organizations, for example, Southern Metropolis Daily, an investigative journalist can still get paid for any reports that are refused for political reasons. An investigative journalist can be quickly promoted because of a single good investigative report. For example, the success of the Sun Zhigang investigative report produced material benefits for its co-authors from Southern Metropolis Daily. Both authors, Chen Feng and Wang Lei, were promoted quickly and advanced through the organizational ranks. Chen Feng was appointed as Deputy Editor-in-Chief in Beijing News, which was co-launched by Southern Metropolis Daily and Guangming Daily, soon after the publication of the report, and Wang Lei was also soon promoted as Chief Journalist at Southern Metropolis Daily and then as Deputy Editorin-Chief at Yunnan Information, launched by Southern Metropolis Daily, while still in his early thirties. The same thing happened to Long Zhi. Soon after publishing the investigative report on the Pengshui Poem event, Long Zhi was promoted to Chief Journalist in 2009 and later Deputy Director of the team in 2010 at Southern Metropolis Daily in his 20s. To practice investigative journalism, therefore, has become a shortcut to a successful journalism career.3 Third, many news organizations that commit to investigative journalism remove possible political risks that potentially result from publishing over-brave investigative reports from individual journalists (Tong and Sparks 2009). Several decades ago, it was individual journalists who conducted investigative reporting and ran the political risks alone. Liu Binyan, for example, was expelled from the CCP three times, spent more than 20 years in prison, and was eventually forced into exile, as a result of his journalism. Today, media organizations or their high-ranking news staff members are often punished rather than individual journalists.4 For example, in 2001 Dahe Daily published a series of reports that incurred official sanction: the executive Editor-in-Chief, Ma Yunlong, was fired

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and the whole newspaper team was obliged to undertake a three-month study of “Marxist News Ideology.”5 In 2006, Xia Yitao was removed from the position of Deputy Editor-in-Chief at Southern Metropolis Daily as a punishment for publishing several offensive reports, including “Investigation into the Dismissing of Village Official in Taishi Village.” This freedom from political risk encourages individual journalists to practice this genre of journalism, though it may have led to conservative views on this type of journalism among high-ranking news staff who may not want to sacrifice their career for investigative journalism. In giving such support to individual investigative journalists, Chinese news organizations internalize investigative reporting so that it is part of their ordinary reporting work. Chinese investigative journalists, who had the sense of being individual knights, have been organized to work as a division of the labor force that serves a specific function within news organizations. As investigative journalism has increasingly become institutionalized as a profit center within news organizations, organizational factors and dynamics have more and more influence on investigative work. Individual investigative reporters, for instance, may compromise their professional commitment to maximize opportunities to meet job expectations and to attain the preferences set by news organizations. Previous newsroom studies have provided media and journalism research with important insights into the working mechanism of newsrooms (see Sigal 1973; Abbott and Brassfield 1989; Schudson 1991; Shoemaker and Reese 1996 and Tuchman 1973; 1978). These studies have indicated how organizational factors, such as economic constraints, bureaucratic hierarchy, news values, ownership, and organizational requirements and guidelines, have influenced individual journalists’ perception and actions, news making, and, finally news content. So far, studies of Chinese investigative journalism have neither examined the institutionalized practices of investigative journalism, nor have they taken organizational influences into account to explain the patterns and routines of the practices of investigative journalism. A close examination of the institutionalized practices of investigative reporting within news organizations will contribute to our knowledge of how news organizations’ organizational factors have influenced its practices in China, which is the focal point of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to study all the news organizations that are committed to investigative journalism. It is more realistic to look at one individual news organization as a case study. This chapter therefore examines Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD) as a case study, but I am not intending to generalize it as representing the whole range of news organizations, as news organizations


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are different from one another in terms of size, culture, resources, and goals. Overall, what the case study offers is a conceptual framework for understanding current institutionalized practices of investigative journalism in China. The objectives of this chapter are twofold: (1) to understand what are the factors at the organizational level in a particular individual news organization that have influenced the practices of investigative journalism, and (2) the patterns of the organized practices of investigative journalism in a particular individual news organization. This chapter has made use of Bourdieu’s field theory, the concepts of “field” and “habitus” in particular, as explanatory frameworks to understand how these journalistic practices are influenced by organizational factors. Bourdieu sees society differentiated into semiautonomous and historically- constructed fields, such as fields of politics, economics, religion, and cultural production (Benson 1999;2006; Benson and Neveu 2005: 3). The journalistic field is one among them. Relations of power within and among these fields “fundamentally structure human action” (Benson and Neveu 2005: 3). The “actions” in the journalistic field are thus structured by relations of power, which come from “the interplays inside the field between heteronomous and autonomous poles (between advertising and news sections, for example), from institutional settings (media laws, or the political system), and interrelations between individual journalists and the field” (Rupar 2007: 593). For his conception of field, Bourdieu highlights the importance of structure, position, and agency. In Bourdieu’s own terms, “a field is a field of forces within which the agents occupy positions that statistically determine the positions they take with respect to the field” (Pierre 2005: 30). Bourdieu further puts emphasis on “the individual agent as the embodiment of a complex historical trajectory or “habitus” (Benson 2006: 194). That is to say, the social and educational background of individual agents is important in shaping their actions, and their early experiences shape those that follow (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 133, quoted in Benson 2006: 194). There is an important relationship between the “habitus” and the “field”: “the field forms patterns of dispositions of habitus and habitus forms the field as a meaningful structure of positions” (cited in Halas 2004: 241). Despite the fact that he does not place emphasis on particular news organizations, or detailed journalistic practices (Schultz 2007), Bourdieu provides an analytical framework that analyzes journalistic practices in the light of the spatial structure of the sphere in which investigative journalists reside, the early experiences of investigative journalists, and investigative journalists’ current understanding of their relationship to the field. The micromilieu of a news organization can

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be seen as a specific hierarchical social space that is located within the journalistic field. That is to say, the explanations of the practices of investigative journalists can draw on an analysis of the positions that different agents, i.e., investigative journalists, editors, directors, and editorsin-chief, occupy within organization structure and working procedure, and the influences of their personal backgrounds and their understanding of the “rules of the game” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 81) on the dispositions towards topics of investigation. The notions of “field” and “habitus” explain why individual agents positing in different structural positions and from backgrounds of significantly different habitus will have different attitudes towards investigative journalism and different approaches to topics. These two notions also explain how investigative journalists develop a practical sense of their job, based on the “rules of the game.” The rules of the game define organizational preferences and requirements as well as the relationships among agents, such as the relationship between investigative journalists and their Director, the relationship between investigative journalists and Editor(s)-in-Chief. The rules also tell investigative journalists “how to react in everyday situations” (Rupar 2007: 593), such as when to submit investigative reports to which Editor(s)-in-Chief who will less likely refuse to publish, which angle to take to lessen political risks from investigative reports, what topic fits the organizational preferences, and which topic is more likely to trigger public outrage. This chapter takes the investigative reporting team of Southern Metropolis Daily as a case study and analyzes how the ways in which investigative journalists are organized inside the news organization has influenced the practices of investigative reporting. Southern Metropolis Daily is based in Guangzhou and is a non-Party offspring daily of the Southern Daily Press Conglomerate. It is a famous investigative newspaper as well as a big seller in China. It has built up its fame through its pugnacious investigative reporting on social issues and the dodgy doings of (local) corrupt officials.6 It is regarded as a pioneer in independent reporting, for example, on SARS reports7 (Yu 2004), and as a paradigm of the investigative press. The investigative reporting team of this newspaper was launched in 2003, and the journalistic practices of its team members were later branded as a paradigm of good journalism by the newspaper, as well as by journalist peers from other news organizations. As the first and most successful press investigative journalism team in China, the team has become a model of investigative reporting team for other Chinese newspapers. Newspapers such as Chengdu Commercial Daily,


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Huashang Morning, and Xiaoxiang Morning consulted SMD before launching their own investigative reporting teams.8 In discussions in this chapter, the empirical materials used largely result from the three months of full-participant-observation in the investigative reporting team in 2006 and other empirical researches conducted between 2004 and 2010. This chapter argues that the individual and organizational consensus of journalistic professionalism and the organizationally nurtured favoring for investigative journalism that have resulted from the unique recruitment measures and organizational culture, function as an emancipatory force that guarantees the journalistic autonomy for investigative journalists, while a conflict of interests that occurs among individuals in other positions in the organizational structure and working procedure limits their autonomy. The autonomy of investigative reporting in news organizations is relational, and the relations of power come from two sides: the structure of the field and the interplay inside the field “between heteronomous and autonomous poles” (between concerns over public interests and journalistic professional ideals, and concerns over political safety and economic profits, for example). As a consequence of the interplay, new routines have arisen from the organizationalized practices of investigative journalism in SMD, and the epistemology of investigative journalism has become organizationalized, i.e., the way in which investigative journalists know what they know is rooted within organizationalized practices.

Nurturing the Organizational Favoring for Investigative Reporting in the Organizational Context This newspaper has a high commitment to investigative reporting, influenced by market strategy, a historically constructed organizational culture, and journalistic professionalism, which have guaranteed the continuous practices and autonomy of investigative reporting. Organizational consensus about what investigative journalism is, how to practice it, and what good investigative reports are, is shaped and constructed in the organizational context.

Practicing investigative journalism as a market strategy SMD is a classic example among those news organizations that have greatly benefitted from investigative reporting. During the first ten years, from

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1995–2005, SMD expanded quickly. Its circulation jumped from around 30,000 to 1.5 million.9 The annual advertising income of the metropolitan newspaper grew from RMB 8 million to RMB 1.3 billion. The number of SMD staff also grew, from just over 100 people to 4,400 people.10 The successes the newspaper achieved during its first ten years of development were largely credited to many influential investigative reports, including the report on the case Sun Zhigang; a series of reports on SARS in 2003; and the report on the case of the Dismissing of Governor in Taishi Village (taishicun baguan diaocha) in 2005. These reports brought huge fame and financial income to the newspaper, as well as political punishment from the government. The newspaper did not practice investigative journalism from the beginning. The tradition of investigative journalism practices was established, step by step, during its development. In the beginning, SMD wanted its employees to believe sensationalism was good, and they should practice journalism according to this tenet. In 1997, when the newspaper became a daily, since the newspaper lacked news sources and needed to increase its readership quickly, the editorial board welcomed the “strange,” “shocking,” and “different” news,11 which did not need to rely on official news sources. The expected readership was lower class people, and the so-called new Guangzhounese, who were migrants who had moved to Guangzhou to work from other areas.12 The demographic traits of the readership were coherent with those of the news workers of SMD. The newspaper often carried sensational reports, for example, stories on the Guangzhou pornographic industries, in order to attract advertising revenue and increase circulation. For the sensationalism purpose, SMD started to do “secret investigation” news that investigated bad behaviors of powerful individuals and institutions. Guangzhou’s citizens welcomed news of this kind that was close to the life of Guangzhou citizens. In 1998, especially, the newspaper covered a lot of famous and influential “secret investigation” news, e.g., investigations into the “hogwash oil’ phenomenon, the black inside story of “selling blood,” the police-woman-beat-people event, etc. The appearance of “secret investigation” news at SMD was the predecessor of investigative journalism from two aspects. First, it showed that SMD journalists cared about people and had the sense of social responsibility that an investigative journalist should have. It is true that reports of this kind were a sort of strategy to open up the market to the newspaper, but the “secret investigation” news also showed the grass-roots nature of the newspaper’s social responsibility, increasing its readers’ trust, and


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preparing for the later appearance of investigative reports (Southern Metropolis Daily 2004). Second, journalistic investigation skills that are needed in investigative reporting were practiced and developed through the practice “secret investigation” reports. The investigation targets gradually shifted from grass-roots issues, e.g., “fake Tofu” and “hogwash oil,” to certain elitist issues, e.g., official corruption and power abuses. SMD had followed the trail of “secret investigation” to reveal the black side of society and this reached its peak in 2003, with two famous reports—the reports on the Sun Zhigang Event and the SARS epidemic— which marked the newspaper as one that favored investigative journalism instead of mere sensationalism. Historically constructed organizational culture The organizational culture at SMD is a historically constructed one. It is worth one’s effort to examine the historical trajectory along which the newspaper’s organizational culture. Three traits can be identified in this development process: a grass-roots spirit, a tradition of itinerant journalists, and prominent organizational journalistic professionalism. These three traits integrate with each other. The grass-roots spirit comes from the newspaper’s tradition of itinerant journalists. This group of itinerant journalists has enabled the newspaper to effectively practice investigative journalism. As they share similar professional ideals and personal grass-roots backgrounds, this group of journalists also have forged a collective collection of professional ideals within the newspaper, which they have shaped into prominent organizational journalistic professionalism. The newspaper’s successful practices of investigative journalism come from a group of itinerant journalists (Southern Metropolis Daily 2004). The majority of newspaper personnel in 1997 were itinerant journalists from all corners of China. Most originated from the grass-roots and the bottom of society (Southern Metropolis Daily 2004). This group of itinerant journalists rallied around several key journalistic figures such as Guan Jian and Chen Yizhong, who were their organizational and professional leaders. The traits of the personnel at the newspaper determine its grass-roots orientation, which first make the “secret investigation” reports, and later the investigative reporting possible. It is only possible for these reports on grass-roots issues to come from the minds of those journalists living in the village-in-the-city (chengzhongchun), rather than those living in luxurious flats.

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With the development and expansion of the newspaper, the once itinerant journalists achieved both economic benefits and privileged positions in the journalistic circle. They are no longer itinerant journalists who are materially poor and lack job stability. The economic conditions of journalists are much improved. They no longer live in villages-in-the-city and have moved to flats. Within this newspaper, many have become middle- or even high-ranking staffs, who are elite journalists and professional leaders. What has not changed so far is the grass-roots spirit of itinerant journalists, as the journalists currently working at the newspapers share similar personal backgrounds. In 2006, three traits were observed that relate to the personal background of SMD journalists. First, most journalists are from areas outside Guangdong, especially from China’s middle and Western provinces. According to Liu Qing, the Chief Administrative Director of the Human Resource Department, SMD has many more journalists from areas outside Guangdong than it has native journalists from Guangzhou. A lot of journalists are from villages and small towns and are the children of peasants. Second, they are young journalists. The average age of SMD junior staff in 2006 was around 27 years old, and that of senior staff and directors, 32 years old. The third characteristic is that a lot of the journalists working at SMD are the people who dislike, or even hate, the old system and whose ideologies and activities are incompatible to the old journalism system. They are a group of people who come to Guangzhou, following their dreams of pursuing journalistic professionalism. This group of journalists has forged a strong collective sense of professional ideals as a result of sharing commonness. This newspaper has taken advantage of, considered and incorporated the collective sense of professional ideals forged by this group of journalists into their organizational professionalism—journalistic values and norms—that have gradually become shaped and used as paradigms in its development. The values of “objectivity,” “social responsibility,” and “autonomy,” as the core norms of the organizational professionalism at SMD have been progressively established during its development. Three ways to establish the set of professional values have been identified. First, the organizational professionalism of this newspaper is embedded in both practices and organizational slogans. The three journalistic values were implanted thoroughly in the reports such as the Sun Zhigang Case and the SARS reports (SouthernMetropolisDaily 2006). Slogans, such as “to be the best newspaper in China,” to “timely, vividly, objectively, and accurately represent news events and restore facts and truth; wholly and practically serve


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the people ” set the great and final aim for all the people working on the newspaper (Fan 2005; Southern Metropolis Daily 2006). By claiming this, SMD defines the best newspaper as being the one that is objective, independent, reveals “truth,” and serves the people, attempting to be a newspaper that takes social responsibility and becomes a strong power that facilitates social improvement (Southern Metropolis Daily 2006). Second, organizational professionalism is indicated in editorial policies or in Editors-in-Chief’s speech and articles, as codes of behavior for journalists who must perform according to them. The editorial policies of this newspaper are best represented in the 2005 editorial guideline, in which the Editorial Board clarifies the purpose, core values, and principles of the newspaper. According to the guideline, the newspaper defines its social function as “to speak and guard the public interests of the society” and “to provide information to readers and to achieve market benefits in return.” It also requires its journalists to be independent of interest groups and self-interest requests, and to be objective and fair in reporting. To be independent guarantees objective and fair news reports. It warns its journalists that the flattering of authorities and the rich, and discrimination against any group or individual, will affect the objective and fair position of the media. In scrutinizing the discourse of the guideline, one can find the importance of public interest and readers’ interests (the commercial interests of the newspaper) juxtaposed in the newspaper. The ideologies SMD wants its employees to accept are those that protect public interest, to speak for the public and the people, and to attract the interests of readers. It is more public interest- and reader-oriented than Party line-oriented. Zhuang Shenzhi the executive Editor-in-Chief further explained the organizational professionalism in his speeches and articles. In an internal article aimed at increasing the morale of his employees, he wrote: . . . News and information does not include thoughts and standpoints. A newspaper, especially an excellent newspaper, however, should have its own thoughts and standpoints. . . . We can have a clear cognition of what SMD is doing everyday and can understand the meanings and values behind the publication of the newspaper and of making money. To be best, and to take responsibility, reflects in the ordinary as well as the grand role of SMD: we should be the ones to record the era and the history, to cultivate and boost modern society, and to enlighten civil consciousness.

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These words clearly indicate the professional values that SMD wants its employees to accept and use to guide their practices. Third, journalistic values and norms have been successfully set up through establishing “spiritual figures” or “role models” who are symbolic of journalistic values. During its ten-year development, “individual heroism” has always been the core spirit that supports the morale of newsworkers. SMD has always had “spiritual figures,” who are usually professional as well as organizational leaders, despite a series of political crackdowns. We can see the continuity of the spiritual leaders: Guan Jian, Chen Yizhong, Zhuang Shenzi, Xia Yitao, and Jiang Yiping. After the removal of Guan Jian, Chen Yizhong replaced him and became the spiritual leader of this newspaper. Zhuang Shenzhi substituted for Chen Yizhong after the administrative dismissal of Chen Yizhong. After Xia Yitao was dismissed in 2005, she still stayed at the newspaper as “a backbone of spiritual power” (jinshen zhizhu)13 and Jiang Yiping joined the newspaper in 2006 as “a source of hope.”14 In this way, the spiritual power passes from one “hero and spiritual leader” to another. Besides the key spiritual figures at the newspaper, many individual journalists are shown as models of good journalists through, for instance, “the Southern Metropolis Daily News Awards” and “Annual Job Grades Assessments.” Nevertheless, we have to say that journalistic professionalism at the organizational level has been a sort of strategy and ideological weapon throughout the newspaper’s development. The occupational professionalism that the newspaper has promoted to the public and its journalists actually sets professional ideals for journalists and demonstrates the identity of both newspapers and journalists to the public. The newspaper has successfully occupied the market and attracted a group of elite journalists by establishing the image of an avant-garde press that is objective, neutral and independent, and seeks the truth, serving public interest and shouldering social responsibility. In this way, it is easier for the newspaper to manage and control its journalists, as they stick to this spirit and their performance is guided by these principles. For journalists, it is easier to climb the career ladder if they practice according to the occupational professionalism promoted by the newspaper organization. Furthermore, the newspaper can successfully occupy the market, as the public has accepted and welcomed an image of this kind. This point was proven in the interviews with journalists. Lu Bing, an investigative journalist with six years of experience, commented: It (SMD) is regarded as a radical newspaper, but . . . it is only because its content is decided by the needs of the market. It (the newspaper)


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cultivated the reading expectations of the readers at the beginning of its establishment and its competing for the market. If it wants to keep the market, it has to carry such content . . . The public and most colleagues regard our newspaper as one with professionalism and ideals, but . . . my understanding is that the top managers of the newspaper think in another way . . . Ideals are only one strategy for the newspaper, because first of all it is an enterprise. (Lu Bing, 2005) At SMD, journalistic professionalism has been widely accepted by individual journalists and has thus become a powerful ideological weapon, which can counteract the overwhelming interference of the political authorities. Recruitment, characteristics of investigative journalists, and their professional claims No open recruitment and fixed and objective criteria are found in the process of recruiting investigative reporting team members. Though both sides play active roles, the newspaper devotes time and effort to recruit new investigative journalists and applicants actively put in applications, recruitment is seldom conducted through the personnel department, and job advertisements are seldom placed for recruitment. Recruitment for new team members is largely conducted privately at the departmental level. Judging from the fact that nobody in the team has CCP membership, and some do not have degrees, one can see CCP membership and university degree are not among the selection criteria for team members. The selection criteria for new team members are quite subjective and flexible, largely based on whether the journalists have professional norms and understandings of their job that fit with those of the majority of the team, and whether the journalists have a reputation as investigative journalists, or the potential to be investigative journalists. The team members were recruited in three main ways. First, some, such as Lu Hui, were recommended by prestige journalists because of their existing word-of-mouth fame in journalistic circles. Second, some, such as Jia Yunyong and Wang Lei, were moved from other job roles at the newspaper because they showed the potentials to be good investigative journalists. Third, some, such as Wang Jilu and Long Zhi, were contacted directly by the team’s Director because they had produced influential reports in other news media that implied their potentials as good investigative journalists. Newly recruited members need to pass a probation period during which they should produce high quality investigative reports to prove their ability. If they fail, they will be asked to leave.

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With this unique recruitment measure, a group of journalists who have similar ideals and ideas about investigative journalism have been gathered in the team. There are some common points shared by the staff working in the investigative reporting team, coherent with the profile of the journalists working in this newspaper. All the eleven investigative journalists and their Director in the investigative reporting team at SMD are very young. They were in their 20s and 30s in 2006. All are from middle-sized or small cities outside Guangdong, especially from the middle and Western provinces, such as Guizhou, Henan, Hunan, Anhui, and Jiangxi. Most are from villages and small towns, and many are the children of peasants. Most of them are experienced journalists. They all dislike, or even disdain, the old journalistic system. None are CCP members. Some left the traditional Party journalism system. They are a group of people who came to Guangzhou to follow their dreams, which mainly refer to the pursuit of their journalistic professionalism. A glimpse at a portrait of staff members in the investigative reporting team at SMD offers us the chance to make sense of the whole picture of the profile of Chinese investigative journalists. Jia Yunyong Jia is in his mid-thirties, with 13 years career experience.15 Before joining SMD in 2001, he was a deputy Editor-in-Chief on an evening newspaper launched by a Party organ at the municipal city level in Henan Province. He was only 30 years old when promoted to this high ranking position. It was very rare for such a young man to make such achievements. However, Jia quit the job as a Deputy Editor-in-Chief and joined SMD as an ordinary editor. When I was conducting the fieldwork, Jia was hired as a Department Chief Journalist in the investigative reporting team at SMD. Jia gave three reasons for leaving the high ranking position at that evening newspaper. First, he was attracted by the journalistic professionalism and the “ideal” journalistic place at Guangzhou. He wanted to follow his journalistic dream. He wanted to practice according to the natural rules of news (xinwen guilv). Second, he wanted to change his lifestyle, since he was still very young. In his terms, he could see what his future looked like, if he stayed there. He wished to taste the feeling of risking his life in the outside world (chuang jianghu). Third, he found human relations too complicated and there were too many old system rules and prohibitions with his former employer. He wanted to stay in a newspaper with simple personal relations and a flexible working environment. After joining SMD, he produced


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a lot of influential investigative reports, including the reports on Gao Yingying Case.

Yuan Xiaobing Yuan, similar age to Jia, with 13 years journalism experience, is an obstinate and rebellious journalist who totally deprecates the old system. He was a Department Director in a newspaper launched by a provincial Party organ in Jiangxi Province when he was around 30 years old. He felt prohibited and uncomfortable in that Party organ and so quit the job. After joining SMD as an investigative journalist, he produced a lot of influential reports and was praised as the journalist with the most beautiful and elegant style of writing. He was hired as Department Chief Journalist at the SMD investigative reporting team during the time I was conducting the fieldwork. He regarded SMD as the best place and the most suitable for him. He gave an example to support the argument of “the best and most suitable place.” He was obsessed by his inner loneliness and longed for nature. In 2005, because of his wish to travel to remote areas and stay there for quite a long time, he wanted to quit his job at SMD. When he talked to his Director, he was told that he could keep the position and come back to work after he became tired of an itinerant life in the wildness. Then Yuan stayed in a village in Yunnan Province for four months. He remarked: “no newspaper except SMD would allow me to do this.”

Yu Chen Yu is a famous investigative journalist with 11 years career experience, and is also a refugee journalist who was expelled by the Henan Government. He, a native Henannese, was the first journalist to report on the outbreak of the Aids in Henan Province caused by the selling of blood, and because of this, he lost his job twice and was exiled from his home province. He later joined SMD as an investigative journalist but had to change his name when reporting. He was promoted to be the director of the investigative reporting team in 2009 after Lu Hui left.

Wang Jilu Wang, with 2 years career experience, was hired by SMD because of his experience of being arrested by the police at Nanjing during an

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interview. Wang applied for the job at SMD and was rejected before he graduated from Nanjing University. When he worked as an intern for a magazine in Shanghai, he went to interview about the anniversary case of a “city displaced resident’s self-immolation” in Nanjing, and was arrested by the local police. After his release, he published an article about the arrest in the Shanghai magazine. Fang Sanwen, then Department Director at the investigative reporting team, called and invited him to join the team. Lu Hui The Director of the investigative reporting team in 2006 was Lu Hui. Lu Hui was a former Director of the news department at Bund Picture at the peak of the time when it carried investigative reports. It was later forced to shift its editorial policy from focusing on investigative journalism to focusing on entertainment. There is some continuity in the personnel at the Director level in the investigative reporting team at SMD in some ways. The first Director of the team was Fang Sanwen, who was an investigative journalist at Southern Weekend before joining SMD, and was dismissed from his position because he signed off the publication of the SARS news reports in 2003. After being dismissed, Fang Sanwen recommended Lu Hui, Fang’s Beijing University classmate, as his successor. After Lu left SMD in 2009, Lu recommended Yu Chen, who was Lu’s subordinate and took up the directorship. From the profiles of these investigative journalists, we can see they are a group of journalists who dislike the old journalistic system, as well as being disliked by members of the old Party journalism system. They have traveled a long way to pursue their ideals in being a good journalist, and saw SMD as the best platform from which they could realize these ideals. They share much commonality in their backgrounds. These commonalities help establish consonance among them and are the basis for the formation of consensus on good investigative journalism. These investigative journalists show a very high and clear perception and expectation of the professionalism that a journalist should have, and the functions that the media and journalism should have. There are three major traits of SMD investigative journalists in terms of journalistic professionalism. First, the news organization has successfully made its investigative journalists recognize the organizational journalistic professionalism, and to accept it as their own, as previously discussed. Organizational journalistic professionalism has been transferred to the


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Table 6.1 Three core professional norms of the interviewed SMD investigative Journalists and specific meanings Professional Norms Meanings Objectivity

Giving chances to both sides involved in news events to speak; balanced reporting with position or attitude of journalists; and be just

Social Responsibility

Objectively and justly recording the era and history; pushing forward society’s development, or to enlighten society; covering the truth and facts

Independency

Independent from the interference of interest groups, including the political authority and commercial interest groups

investigative journalists employed and they have a high recognition of organizational professionalism. In other words, SMD investigative journalists have a clear cognition of what SMD wants them to do, and of what kind of journalists they should be. Second, the investigative journalists have conspicuous and coherent journalistic professionalism and specific understandings of norms (see Table 6.1). SMD investigative journalists clearly and systematically stated their professional claims. Almost all of the journalists included objectivity, social responsibility, and independence in their professional claims, but they definitely had their own understanding of these terms. For SMD investigative journalists, objectivity in reporting means that it is closest to its Western meaning understood by the journalists: balanced reporting (pingheng baodao). All of the interviewed SMD investigative journalists regard it as impossible to keep reports absolutely objective, because it is inevitable that personal judgment and cognition will be brought into reports, but the most important thing is to “be just” and “to give voices to both sides involved in news events.” Although sometimes it is impossible to collect viewpoints from both sides, it is still important for them to try their best to do so, which is both an ethic of journalism and a strategy for self-protection. Furthermore, the investigative journalists believe objective reporting should show the reporter’s position. For example, Jia Yunyong explained the meaning of objectivity, or so-called balanced reporting, in his selfreflective article entitled: “Unsolvable Question” (wufa jiejue de wenti) following publication of his report: . . . The original report was criticised by the Chief Editor. I revised it several times before publication. He criticised the original one as being too balanced, without any emphasis . . . I agreed with the Chief Editor,

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but what confused me at the beginning was my understanding of objectivity. One principle in the BBC is to balance opinions, and the professionalism I accepted after I joined this newspaper was to give discourse rights to both parties involved in events. In fact, in interviews, if involving two sides, the situation is usually that one side (usually the side of the powerless) is very eager to speak, while the other side (usually the government and gangdom) is unwilling to express their opinion. As a result, our reports will speak from the position of the side of the powerless and use the expression ‘refused to accept our interview’ on the powerful side. In this interview, I tried to interview the powerful side and got many viewpoints from them. When I wrote opinions from both sides into the report, my position and attitude were lost in the report and, as a result, and I became a by-stander . . . The possible result is that readers, who are accustomed to following the opinions of journalist-narrators, will find they are confused: who is right? So, how can we identify the boundaries/limits of balanced reporting? How can we express the position of the journalist? Is it okay if a journalist does not have opinions and a position in a report? Afterwards, I thought it over again, I maybe have found the answer: . . . nobody has any position in his narration. Maybe the opinion is an insult to readers: the professional attitude of narrators usually makes them believe that readers are silly, and it is necessary to give readers a basic judgment and orientation, but, honestly, I think it is necessary. (Jia Yunyong, 2005) The norm of social responsibility is also important to the SMD investigative journalists. All of the interviewees gave the author this answer. Three core meanings can be identified in the professional claims of SMD journalists. They are “to objectively and justly record the era and history,” “to push forward society’s development, or to enlighten society,” and “to cover the truth and facts.” These discourses are highly coherent with organizational professionalism. In the professional claims, if compared to the other two norms, the norm of “independence” is mentioned less, but the journalists’ understanding of the norm is close to the Western liberal journalism ideal: to be independent from the interventions of interest groups. From these norms, one can see SMD investigative journalists, who want to be social enlighteners and an impetus to democracy, admire and are becoming more like, advocacy journalism.


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Another prominent trait in the journalistic professionalism of SMD journalists is that investigative journalists have a high recognition of their colleagues’ journalistic performance and professionalism. In the interviews, when asked: “Could you please give me three examples of good journalists, either from history, or from Western or domestic journalism, or from your organization?” and “Why do you think they are good journalists?,” most journalists put their colleagues in the team into the list of good journalists because of their bravery in speaking the truth, their hard work, their deep insight into society, and the skills they have in dealing with sensitive topics without causing political trouble. Though sharing organizational professionalism and being a part of organizational work, investigative journalists are not loyal to their news organizations. For example, as Tan Renwei, an investigative journalist in the team, remarked: The newspaper (SMD) wants to represent the correct direction for social development. The majority should support that direction. In its nature, it (to represent the correct direction for social development) is not utopian; instead it is the need of the market . . . As a commercialised enterprise, our newspaper has to fulfil the expectations of the public . . . Why did I say I would be loyal to the occupation (of journalism) instead of the organisation? As a professional news worker, I have to consider my career instead of the organisation. We should stay in an organisation that has professionalism that coincides with our professionalism and provides the conditions for us to realise our professionalism. . . . At the moment, only two newspapers tally with these two conditions. They are Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekend. (Tan Renwei, 2006) The example of Wang Peng demonstrates the comments of Tan enwei. Wang Peng was an investigative journalist at this newspaper and was responsible for reporting on events in Western China. After he left SMD, he joined Lanzhou Morning as the Director of the investigative reporting team. Half a year later, he joined Times Weekly, based in Guangzhou, as an investigative journalist and is still responsible for reporting on events in Western China. According to him, his employers may change, but not his professional ideals.16 As long as journalists are dissatisfied with their news organizations, they will choose to leave. The reformed journalist recruitment system

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enables them to do so. Besides, compared to daily journalists, investigative journalists have more chance to get a job in another news organization, especially in another city. It is common to see investigative journalists change their job from one news organization to another, sometimes even from one medium to another. Shen Yachuan (Shifeike), for instance, was an investigative journalist working for 21st Global Report and then CCTV after 21st Global Report was closed down. He changed his job to work on the magazine SMD Weekly. It is very important, therefore, for news organizations to maintain the organizational professionalism in order to keep its elite investigative journalists. Organizational consensus Besides the coherent organizational and individual journalistic professionalism, there are two other types of organizational consensus that have been formed about the investigative journalism practices within the news organizations. First, consensus can be found by addressing the way investigative journalism is practiced. There are some conventions of investigative report making and arranging, choosing subjects, finding news angles, gathering information, and constructing narratives of stories. The second is the consensus about what good investigative reports and what good investigative journalists are. The forming of consensus is thanks to “shop talks” (Sigal, 1973), editorial comments on particular reports, and internal awards. In his book, Sigal analyzed how the space arrangements at Washington Post and New York Times facilitate “shop talk”, during which editors and journalists exchange information and discernment on news events, which helps to “forge a consensus about what is news” (Sigal 1973: 39). In this case of SMD, the “shop talk” happens in both the virtual and the real world. SMD uses an internal forum and a staff QQ system for internal communication between colleagues and between different employment levels. It is quite usual to see an ordinary employee write something criticizing the activities of the management of SMD, and the management actively respond and correct their activities. Every day journalists and editors at all levels express their opinions on daily reports (meiri pingbao) and point out both good and bad points in order to enhance their practice. In the area of investigative reports, it is usual to see investigative journalists discuss writing and interview techniques, the good and bad points of certain investigative reports. In the discussion about the “Teenager killing Mom” event (shaonian shamu) in 2007, for instance, the conversations


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about whether this report could be regarded as a good investigative report were held online among SMD colleagues and even among colleagues from the magazines, i.e., Southern People Weekly and Fashion weekly. All these conversations and discussions are open to all employees in the newspaper and its offspring magazines. Journalists also publish articles in the internal forum to share their interview experiences with colleagues. In articles of this kind, journalists usually explain what kind of difficulties they have met, how they have solved their problems, what kind of techniques they have used in news gathering, and how the ideas about news angles have been developed. The post “How a Shenzhen Journalist Dealt with Wang Rong’s Parents” in 2010, for example, explained clearly how the journalist persuaded an official in the propaganda department in Binghai City, and introduced his experiences, including the good points and bad points, that he thought would be useful for other journalists to learn. The journalist also mentioned that he consulted one of his colleagues, who had previously undertaken similar interviews, and they reached an agreement about how to make a successful interview on such a subject. The discussions that help people to arrive at a consensus also happen in the real world. In the investigative team, the editorial meeting is usually held every week, though not all team members would attend the meeting. In the meetings, investigative journalists report to their Director about what they are doing and exchange ideas with the him/her and sometimes with editors, about newsworthiness and news angles. It is also a chance for the team members to discuss their reports and problems when they meet together as a team. The most common topics they are addressing include the newsworthiness and writing skills of investigative reports and interview skills of investigative reporting. They also discuss how to deal with government officials. For example, Long Zhi introduced his successful experiences of dealing with officials in the Disciplinary Committee in Hunan Province in the weekly meeting, and then in the internal forum. Appraisals, criticism, and ranking by the Director and Editors-in-Chief on specific reports help forge the consensus. Director and Editorsin-Chief sometimes write their views about particular reports. These comments are open to all employees in the newspaper. For example, the Director and the Editor-in-Chief commented “this report is an excellent investigative report that represents the high levels of quality of SMD with a big public reaction” after the publication of “Investigation into the Sangmei Typhoon”, and commented “good news angles” after covering

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the investigative report on the Zuoyun Mine Disaster. The Director and Editors-in-Chief also criticized when they found the reports were in need of improvement. A comment: “It is the best investigative report on this topic so far. Only regret is Beijing News first revealed the event. But our report may have strong influences in the longer term,” for instance, was given after the coverage of “Investigation Into the Truth of the Popularity of Amazing Gel (Breast Augmentation Agent),” and the report “When National Natural Protection Zone Meet National Poverty Country” got a comment of “this report is cumbersome and long.” Published investigative reports are also ranked by the Director and Editors-in-Chief. The ranking determines the payment above the basic salary that investigative journalists can earn from their reports. These comments, critiques, and rankings can help investigative journalists make sense of the real editorial line of the newspaper. Furthermore, the annual best news awards set by SMD provide the organizational judgment on good journalism and good investigative journalists. For example, for the investigative report on the Pengshui Poem Event, Long Zhi won the Best report of the year in 2006. The Director of the Southern Newspaper Group explained the reasons for the award to this piece of work: this report reflects “the Chinese reality that citizens may be bereaved of freedom of speech and officials may abuse power. Though a case of an ordinary individual, it is an excellent example for the reality that Chinese people can not speak freely and an excellent sample of political life. From the report, we can not only see the ‘ruling’ habit that has filtrated into local governance, but can feel the deep fear that exists deep in our hearts. This topic is exactly the type on which SMD casts its long term attention and wants to cover. It is a classic example of the triumph of media supervision, as the report successfully attracted the public’s attention, caused public outrage, and led to the solving of the event. As the medium that first revealed the scandal and triggered the public outrage, SMD is continuing its glory.” In explaining the criteria for selecting the best reports, Zhuang Shenzhi, the Executive Editor-in-Chief also distinguished ordinary reports from investigative reports. According to Zhuang, reports like Revealing the Inside Story of Drug Dealing in Houjie belong to the “secret investigation” that SMD’s journalists have traditionally adopted, especially in the 1990s, which were not real “in-depth investigation.” The report of Debates on Real Estate Law is appraised as a new type of investigative report with the merits of addressing current affairs and political topics. This highly recognized professionalism, a consensus


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about what good investigative reports are, and what good journalists are also encourages the autonomy of investigative reporting within the organization.

Looseness of Organizational Management and Autonomy of Investigative Reporting The situation of the investigative reporting team at SMD fits the arguments put forward by Lee: “Where commitment is high, control mechanisms are less necessary. . . . The greater the professionalism and expertise residing in the organisation’s middle and lower levels, the greater the necessity for an overriding looseness in organisational structure” (Lee 1973). At SMD, as discussed above, the first generation of itinerant journalists has become middle- or even high-ranking staffs within the newspaper and has become role models and professional leaders for journalists at the lower level. Journalists at the lower level share a highly coherent and prominent professionalism. A looseness of organizational management has been observed in the newspaper, especially within the investigative reporting team. For example, during my observation, no investigative journalists were observed to appear in the office in the mornings when they were in Guangzhou. They usually came to the office after lunch or only when necessary. Some of them are even based in other cities and only visit the headquarter in Guangzhou a few times per year. They are employed full time, but work like freelances. They do not have time limitations for their investigations, except in some cases that involve deadlines. The weekly departmental meeting is the most organized mechanism. However, it is rare to see all team members attend the meeting. During the three months I stayed at the newspaper for fieldwork, none of them attended any meeting at the newspaper level that required all staff members to attend. This is partly because some of them were away on interview trips, but partly because the management style of the Director and the newspaper is loose and they do not think it compulsory for staff to attend the meetings. The newspaper has been found giving its investigative journalists journalistic autonomy to a much greater extent in their news production process, if compared to daily reporting. The control of newsroom over investigative journalists is relatively weak until the moment when investigative journalists hand in their reports. Investigative journalists are encouraged to self-generate topics and avoid self-censorship in their topic

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choosing, data collection, and writing up. In the words of the Director, investigative journalists “need to leave self-censorship to the newsroom.”17 Investigative journalists themselves have the power to make decisions and decide what they need to do and how. Investigation and writing up is largely the action of individual journalists. Editors and Directors hardly interfere with the process of news writing. Most investigative journalists at SMD finish their reports at home or in other cities. The autonomy that investigative journalists have gained in the processes of investigation and writing, however, varies from one newsroom to another. The autonomy the SMD investigative journalists have is found to be greater than that of investigative journalists in some other news media. In reporting the Zuoyun Mine Disaster, for instance, the author observed the work of two journalists from two news organizations. In the process of writing reports and in communications with newsrooms, one could see that the degree of journalistic autonomy varied. SMD gave more autonomy to journalists than Oriental Morning (OM). Feng Hongping told his Director and editors about what happened, the theme Feng wanted to follow, and the publishing schedule. The editors of SMD only checked the details with Feng, and Feng made the decision and set the theme by himself before he wrote the investigative report. In terms of Feng, the person who best knew the situation was the journalist and the editors or Director did not know what had happened. OM, however, pointed the theme out to Wei Huabing and made clear what Wei needed to report. Wei decided to leave for Shanghai on June 30. His Director, however, asked him to stay in order to gain more information about official-business collusion, but he clarified that Wei had to stop reporting on the event if he could not discover information related to the chosen theme.

Organizational Limitations to the Autonomy of Investigative Journalism: Organizational Control Mechanism Beyond the autonomy given to investigative journalists, the newspaper organization does have organizational controls over the work of investigative journalists that limit the autonomy they have. Such organizational controls originate from organizational structures and working procedures that investigative journalists have to go through.


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Investigative journalism as a division of labor The organizationalization or, bureaucratization of investigative reporting inside news organizations has guaranteed financial supports for the expensive practices of investigative journalism and has given individual investigative journalists a sense of political security, but it has meanwhile resulted in internalizing investigative journalism as part of news organizations’ daily routine work. That is to say, at the same time as individual investigative journalists benefit from the support and commitment of news organizations to the practice of investigative journalism, they have been turned into organizational people, who are characterized by a division of labor based on functional specialization within news organizations. They therefore need to follow every step in the organizational process of news-making, which is a collective decision-making one, and complies with organizational rules and regulations. Being part of a division of labor essentially means that investigative journalists are news workers, hired to produce reports that fill the dedicated spaces in newspaper or magazine pages, in television or radio programs. As a return for the backup of news organizations, investigative journalists need to produce high-quality but politically safe investigative reports, which are supposed to meet the expectations and preferences set by newsrooms, to fill the gaps between advertisements, to polish up the image of news organizations in the market, and to help defeat news organizations’ rivals in that market. Some news organizations, such as Southern Metropolis Daily, Dahe Daily, Beijing News, Huashang Daily, Focus, News Probe, employ a team of journalists who are especially dedicated to investigative reporting. For these news organizations, specific space in media coverage has been allocated for investigative reports and investigative reports regularly appear in media coverage like daily journalism. For example, the “In-depth” (shendu) pages at Southern Metropolis Daily, the “Key Report” (zhongdian baodao) at Beijing News, and the “Special Report” (tebie baodao) at China Youth, and “Focus” (jiaodian fangtan) at CCTV. Some other news organizations, though not having a special team who specifically work on investigative reporting, also have journalists who practice investigative journalism from time to time, and are willing to allocate space in media coverage for this type of report. Oriental Morning, Economic Half an Hour on CCTV, and Henan TV are among these news organizations. In either type of news organizations, investigative journalism is internalized and normalized as part of ordinary journalism work that is practiced to fill the space between ads in the media coverage.

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Being part of a division of labor also means that investigative journalists, located in a bureaucratic hierarchy, need to obey, the orders from their superiors, who sit at the top of the bureaucratic structure, and need to go through the working procedure at news organizations before getting their reports published. The working procedure determines the production process of investigative reports and is a collective decisionmaking one. Investigative reporting work is no longer individual investigative journalists’ sole work, but is a collective work based on coordinating activities and communications between a variety of individual persons who sit in different positions in the organizational structure and employ their own expertise in particular areas. The production process of investigative reporting is, therefore, a collective decision-making one in which a considerable number of people who are involved in the working procedure offer views and spread decision-making across news organizations. From beginning to end the investigative report-making process is a highly complex one that is like “a kind of assembly line production in which individual persons make discrete decisions about” investigative reports (Rosenblum 1978: 427). As in a division-of-labor system, investigative journalists need to comply with criteria and standards set for investigative reporting by the news organization. Editorial policies set the editorial lines for investigative journalists to follow. The practices of self-censorship, internal awards, and higher ranking staffs’ comments indirectly set standards to which individual journalists must abide. In the Chinese contexts, the editorial line not only explains what good investigative journalism is, and what investigative journalists should do in order to practice a good investigative journalism, but also indicates what investigative journalists should not do in order to avoid unnecessary resentment and political punishment from above. Investigative journalists compromise their personal interests to accommodate to their news organizations, make personal decisions, and do their jobs within the framework of the editorial line that represents the interests of that news organization. At SMD, as within the organizational structure of other news organizations, the investigative reporting team complies with rules, regulations, and organizational working procedures, even when such compliance may limit personal autonomy. The 2005 editorial guidelines carry the general editorial policy for the newspaper. According to the guidelines, the number of staff members of the investigative reporting team at SMD usually remains at around thirteen, including one Director, 10 investigative journalists, and two Editors. In 2006 when I undertook full participant


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observation with the team, there were sixteen staff members. Lu Hui was the Director and managed eleven investigative journalists, one journalist for dialogue types of report, and three Editors.18 In theory, the editorial guideline issued in 2005 set rules for investigative reporting. According to this editorial guideline, a standard investigative report in the newspaper is “2500-words long, no deadline, reporting major news events, such as the Nandan Mine Disaster, revealing inside stories like the Washington Post’s Watergate report, investigating social phenomena and problems like the Aids epidemic, analysing social tendencies, and interviewing news people. Before being published, investigative reports should be edited and revised by the Director and the editor(s) assigned by the Director. In principle, an investigative report shall not be edited and published the day it is submitted by investigative journalist(s).” The editorial guideline reflects the organizational understanding of the newspaper about what good journalism is. The editorial guideline indicates the general principles for all news makers, including investigative reporters and editors, at SMD. According to the editorial guidelines, objectivity, impartiality, multinews sources, and in-depth reporting are the four essential parts of the journalists’ creed that need to be applied to journalistic practices. The editorial guidelines are a basic principle for the practice of investigative journalism. Nevertheless, there are some differences in practice. For example, the average length of investigative reports written by eleven investigative journalists in 2006 was around 7000 words long. More importantly, what guide the work of investigative journalists include many other factors, for example propaganda bans issued by relevant propaganda departments and the interpretation of the spirit of propaganda in various periods of time. Positions of investigative journalists in the “field” The position of investigative journalists in the organizational journalistic field can be measured in many ways, such as the structure of the organization, working procedures, and a continuum with Party journalism at one end, and investigative journalism at the other. The position of investigative journalists discussed here refers to their spatial positions in the organization’s structure and their procedural positions in working procedures. At SMD, the investigative journalism team is found to inhabit the bottom of the organization structure (see Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). Figure 6.1 is the organizational structure of the newspaper in 2006, while Figure 6.2 indicates the overall management measures and procedures

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Newspaper Management Committee (sheweihui)

A1 Pages

Hotline & Fast-breaking News

Editor Dep.

Figure 6.1

Business Management Board

Zhu River Delta District News

Guangzhou News

Administrative Board

Shenzhen News

SM Weekly

Sports & Entertainment

In-depth Investigative Team

Fashion Weekly

Supplement

Picture

International News

The organizational structure of Southern Metropolis Daily in 2006

Shenzhen Pages


Editorial Board

Newspaper Management Committee (sheweihui)

SMD

Management Committee

e.g. Advertising, distribution, resources departments

News department 1

News department 2

Other media owned by this newspaper

In-depth Investigative Team

News department 3


Editorial Committee

Administrative Committee

News department 4 ..... News department N

The organizational structure of Southern Metropolis Daily

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Figure 6.2


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Executive Editor-in-Chief 1 Executive Editor-in-Chief 2 Deputy Editor-in-Chief 1

Editorial committee

Department Directors

Deputy Editor-in-Chief 2 Newspaper management committee

Editorin-Chief

Deputy Editor-in-Chief 3 Deputy Editor-in-Chief 4

General Manager

Management Committee

Administrative Editor-in-Chief

Administrative Committee

Figure 6.3 The members sitting on the newspaper management committee and their responsibilities

of the newspaper. Overall speaking, members of the leadership team in the newspaper’s management committee reside at the top of the organizational structure and manage the daily work of the newspaper (see Figure 6.3). Despite the management section (such as advertising and distribution) being separated from the editorial function of the newspaper, the Editor-in-Chief needs to negotiate different interest appeals from the editorial section and the management section. In the organizational journalistic field, the management section is close to the economic field in the outside social space, while the editorial section is the main body of the organizational journalistic field. The Editor(s)in-Chiefs are those people who deal with the relationship of the newspaper with political and economic fields. There is a two-rank bureaucratic hierarchy within the investigative reporting team: the Director and his journalists/editors. The Director, who was Lu Hui in 2006, who is also the Chief Editor for the investigative reporting team, is at the top of the inter-team hierarchy and investigative journalists and editors are in the lower hierarchy. Inside the team, Lu Hui was responsible for job design, work allocation, job assessment, and the promotion of investigative journalists and editors. Lu needed to make sure his subordinates were doing a good job, as well as staying safe. Lu gave suggestions to journalists before they were assigned out to jobs, and monitored journalists while they were gathering news. Lu was


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both first reader and first gatekeeper for the journalists’ work. He edited it and decided whether and when to hand in journalists’ reports. Outside the team, Lu took the responsibility of bargaining with Editorsin-Chief on the Editorial Board, to try to persuade them to publish journalists’ work, and to negotiate space and publishing time for those reports. Lu also carried messages from the Editorial Board and the newspaper organization to his staff. Editors in the investigative reporting team are mainly responsible for editing investigative reports. When arriving at the Editor’s desk, investigative reports are usually already been revised and checked by the Director and in some cases by the Editor(s)-in-Chief. The practice of investigative reporting needs to follow a series of working procedure through work allocation, gathering news, the submission of reports, and the editorial process. Figure 6.4 is the working procedure of investigative reporting at SMD. The whole working procedure has three main stages. The first is work allocation. There are two ways to allocate work. The first are the topics self-generated by investigative journalists. If investigative journalists have got some ideas about what they want to report on, they usually report their ideas to Lu Hui to see if Lu recognizes the newsworthiness of their ideas. After conducting initial research, they discuss the possible topics and decide an initial news angle with Lu. Second are the topics initiated by Lu Hui or other higher-ranking news staff, for example, when some important events

Submitting reports Reporter

Director Assign 1 Work allocation

Director

Gathering writing up News reports 2 Investigation, info gathering, and writing up

Editor(s)-in -Chief

Team Editor(s) Edit Revise Reject

Pass Editor(s)-inChief Reporter

Edit Revise

3 Gate keeping, Editing and Self Censoring

Reject

Figure 6.4 The working procedure of investigative reporting at SMD

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happen, Lu Hui will decide whether to investigate and report on them. In this case, Lu decides which journalist to assign to report on the story. The second stage is the investigation, information gathering, and writing up. At this stage, investigative journalists communicate with Lu Hui, or sometimes with team editors, about what they have found out and they adjust news angles as the investigation continues. Lu Hui, or the team editors, provide investigative journalists with their advice and sometimes with updated background information they have accessed from the newsroom. When writing up the reports, unusually it is the investigative journalists themselves who decide which angles to take and which information to include. Investigative journalists at SMD usually finish their report writing away from the newsroom. The third stage is the gate-keeping, editing, and self-censoring stage. After journalists have gathered information and wrapped them into investigative reports, the reports will be sent back to Lu Hui, and sometimes further to the Editor-in-Chief, and, finally, to the Editors’ desk. When the Editor receives the reports, they are usually almost ready to go, and do not need severe editing and revision. There are three possible ways the work may proceed at this stage. The first is “Rejection.” If the Director thinks the report is unsuitable for publication or receives propaganda bans that forbid publication, then investigative reports will be rejected. The second is “Pass.” The Director directly passes reports he thinks are good for publication to the team editors for further editing and further approval by Editor(s)-in-Chief. The third type is a kind of “Seeking for Collective Wisdom” process. This type occurs either when the reports do not fit the expectation of Lu Hui on news angles or writing techniques, such as narratives, or when Lu Hui thinks the subjects are too politically sensitive and political risks are too difficult to judge, or when the reports are refused by one Editors-in-Chief, but are thought worthy of publication by the investigative journalists and Lu Hui. On these occasions, investigative journalists would be required to revise; or the Editor-in-Chief would revise and modify reports to make reports relatively safe ones or decide to reject. This is a process of self-censorship, that helps circumvent political risks (Tong 2009). Gate-keeping and self-censorship happens at the third stage, rather than at the first two, which guarantees the autonomy of investigative journalists at the first two stages. The work of investigative reporting is therefore an organizational work instead of individual work. A group of people work on one piece of investigative report instead of a single individual producing it all.


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In sum, in the whole process of the working procedure, investigative journalists have the power to make decisions during the first two stages, and the autonomy to negotiate with their Director. Their position is almost equal to that of their Director in the working procedure, but they are in a position inferior to that of the Editors-in-Chief. Despite having the power to instruct investigative journalists, the Director gives much autonomy to them. The Editor(s)-in-Chief have the power to decide what to include for publication, and how. A conflict of interests among departments and individuals The conflicting interests of different individuals, who reside in different positions in the organizational structure and levels of the working procedure, do happen and they can become the main obstacle to the autonomy of investigative reporting. As discussed above, the production process of investigative reports is a process of hierarchical and collective decision-making. Which stories will be investigated and included for publication, which people’s views will be included in reports, which angles will be taken for the story, and which headlines will be given to them, are all decided by the relevant individuals within the organization. It is not difficult to identify the conflicts of interest between the relevant individuals who are in different positions within the organizational structure and working procedures, and who have a different habitus. In the study of SMD, conflicting interests are found, noticeably occurring among various agents. These agents struggle for control over discourse, especially in the third stage at working procedure producing three main types of organizational conflicts, namely the tension between the investigative reporting department and the advertising/circulation departments; the tension between different levels of supportiveness among Editors-in-Chief, and the tension between investigative journalists and Editors-in-Chief. Different departments and individuals in different positions in the organizational structure have their own functions and interests, and therefore are likely to come into conflicts with each other. Conflicts have especially been found between the investigative journalism department and the business departments, such as advertising/circulation department. Although business departments at SMD are operated separately from the editorial departments, staffs who work in the business departments spontaneously protect the customers’ interests. It often happens that business staffs require the editorial department to stop

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reporting on certain issues, fearing loss of revenue. By threatening to withdraw their advertising investment or subscriptions in order to manipulate business departments, big revenue contributors, especially real-estate developers, were found to have severely interfered in media practices and have become an alternative threat to the autonomy of investigative reporting in recent years. Though Editors-in-Chief at SMD expressed their determination to resist this kind of interference, such things still happened from time to time. For example, the investigative report on “the Lijiang Garden Real Estate Owners’ Rights Protection Movement,” by Jia Yunyong, was refused because of complaints from real estate developers. Business staff even tell advertisers about what will be covered in advance. In 2007, SMD employees witnessed a fierce debate in their internal forum. Many journalists in the newspaper, especially those in the investigative reporting team, accused some of business staff of being local economic entities’ “home thief” (neigui), as big advertisers were found to have been able to completely hold back journalists’ movements. According to these journalists, advertisers even knew the topics the journalists were still working on, or the reports they had just submitted.19 In this way, media workers are losing autonomy in their practices. Besides the conflicts between the investigative reporting department and the commercial departments, the different attitudes of high-ranking editors do matter, especially towards politically sensitive reports, or towards the CCP. Factions that hold different views over editorial policies can be found within the news organization. One Editor-in-Chief is more supportive of investigative journalism than another. The differentiated views especially exist between those Editor(s)-in-Chief who were officials in, and assigned by, the local government’s propaganda department and who were pro-Party and those who had straightforwardly developed their careers at the Southern Daily press conglomerate, who were more inclined to the organizational journalistic professionalism. The different levels of willingness to take political risks are also found among these Editorsin-Chief. Similarly, conflicts are also found between investigative journalists and Editors-in-Chief, especially those who are pro-CCP and less willing to risk their career for investigative reporting. The conflict of interests among these relevant individuals is an outcome of the different positions in which they are located in and the levels at which they are influenced by interference from the economic and political fields. These are reflected in the self-censoring stage of the working procedure. At the self-censoring stage, different individuals,


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i.e., Editor-in-Chief, Director, editor, and investigative journalists, are struggling for control over discourse, which will be discussed later.

The Organizationalized Practices of Investigative Journalism The politics of avoiding the organizational interest conflicts Investigative journalists and their superiors have developed tactics to circumvent obstacles that arise from the conflicting interests existing among individuals working in different positions in the organizational structure and working procedures. Three main types of tactics have been developed. The first concerns the confidentiality of the topics of investigative reports. To deal with the tension between the professional department and the nonprofessional department, i.e., the investigative reporting team and the advertisement department, the investigative reporting team works like an independent team and keeps up a close conversation between the investigative journalists, the editors, and the Director. They try to keep what they are investigating confidential and for themselves, and do not reveal what it is unless this is necessary. Second, investigative journalists and their Director choose the right time to submit their reports to the right person. It is not rare to see an investigative report being rejected by one Editor-in-Chief, but being revisted and accepted by another. When to submit investigative reports, and to which Editor-in-Chief investigative reports should be submitted has become tricky. Investigative journalists and their Director take the advantage of the different viewpoints of Editors-in-Chief to maximize their chances of getting their reports published. Third, investigative journalists and their Director try to convince Editors-in-Chief of the political safety of their reports by, for example, relating the reports to previous successful examples, or by arguing that the topics have previously been reported on in Party organ media. There is a good example to illustrate the second and third point. In reporting the Ancient Temple Abolition Event, Han Fudong investigated the whole story and wrote an investigative report. When the report was presented to the editors and the Director, all deemed that the self-censorship by the newsroom might lead to the turning down of the report because of its political sensitivity. They decided to postpone presentation of the report to the Editor-in-Chief on duty that day because that Editor-in-Chief was thought to be overcautious and would certainly

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refuse the report. They chose the right time to submit it, when a more open-minded Editor-in-Chief was on duty and successfully had the report published, successfully convincing the Editor-in-Chief that the report would be safe as the event’s trigger had previously been safely reported in the newspaper. It is questionable, therefore, whether investigative journalists work for the team or for their news organizations, since investigative journalists work in a unit for their team. Sometimes, the team keeps secrets from the top and from other departments, especially the advertising department. The Director, who is responsible for his team, fights for more space for their investigative reports, and chooses a suitable time to submit their reports. It is more of a team activity than an activity of the newspaper.

The epistemonology of investigative journalism News is what journalists want to pass to readers as knowledge or the truth of reality, so are investigative reports. In their classic work, Ettema and Glasser argue investigative journalism involves special claims to knowledge and truth and investigative reports usually not only present facts, but also “critically examine common assumptions” and reveal hidden truths about moral disorders (Ettema and Glasser 1998, Ekstrom 2002: 271). Investigative journalists at SMD claim they need to do the job according to certain professional principles such as objectivity and social responsibility. By making such claims, they often declare they are reporting the “truth” and are committed to the ideal that they should report the “truth.” In their terms, “truth” of this kind is a bit authoritarian in interpreting the events involved in investigative reports. As news constructivist media researchers have argued, journalistic practices and news media construct reality for readers instead of mirroring reality (Tuchman 1978; Schlesinger 1987; Schudson 1991). The “truth’ of reality in investigative reports, therefore, is merely one version of the interpretation of the news events involved that are presented in an objective way. By claiming the “truth,” investigative journalists give these events, and perhaps phenomena, what these journalists think of as “true” meanings, justify them and make them acceptable to readers in certain ways. The process of investigative journalism reporting is actually a process of seeking for and justifying meanings, or of a knowledge/ truth-producing process.


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We then have the question: how do investigative journalists know the “truth?” Ettema and Glasser have given an answer to this question through an examination of US investigative journalists (Ettema and Glasser 1987). According to them, in regard to their epistemologies, daily reporters justify their knowledge claims with “well established and legitimated context.” Investigative reporters, however lack this kind of context, and thus need to create “conditions of justification” for their assertions, in order to deal with the epistemological difficulty and to prove their correctness in exposing others’ faults. Ettema and Glasser (1987) identify three steps in the process that justifies the story-telling of a TV investigative story: (1) Selection and assessment tips of ideas according to three criteria, i.e., whether they are “real,” “doable,” and have the potential to result in an “effect.” That is to say, investigative reporters tend to select those topics that are credible and able to produce powerful reports to present to their colleagues and for investigation. (2) Collecting evidence and evaluating its values. Evidence of various types are decided to have different weights. Acts recorded on videotape are thought of as the heaviest evidence; evidence recorded on paper is the next heaviest; while the “anonymous phone call” is the least. Many tactics are involved in this phase. (3) The assembling and fitting of the pieces of evidences into an investigative story in a way that is suitable and makes the report look valid. The more pieces of evidence that can be put into the story, the more true and justified that report is seems to be. The methods used by the investigative team from CBS to justify their knowledge claims conform with what was found in the study of the SMD investigative reporting team. Investigative journalists at SMD have been found to adopt similar methods and procedures, and, indeed, they justify their claims to “truth” or knowledge by applying a series of tactics. Especially in the sociocultural context of China, where political authorities are still exercising arbitrary control over media, it is really important for investigative journalists to make sure the evidence they have collected backs up their assertions and allows them to reveal wrongdoings, as well as enabling them to present stories in such a way that they look valid to the public. Five stages, which are slightly different to the characteristics described in Ettema and Glasser’s work, but which echo many of Ekstrom’s findings (Ekström 2002), have been found to be used by SMD

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investigative journalists to justify their assertions during the reporting process. In the first stage, investigative journalists assess the feasibility of the story leads and ideas available to them according to certain criteria. Investigative journalists are willing to do further active investigations if the leads and ideas are (1) credible; (2) doable; (3) meaningful. That is to say, when judging whether a story lead or idea is feasible, investigative journalists first consider whether events and problems involved are real. There are three main ways in which investigative journalists provide story leads. The first refers to the information provided by members of the public to the newspaper. Members of the public frequently phonein, or write mails and emails, to SMD, providing information about scandals, problems, or people’s miserable experiences. The second concerns information shared by other journalist peers. Investigative journalists from different news organizations across China often share information, especially when their own news organizations do not allow them to investigate a specific news lead which looks very interesting and important to them. The third is the online information to which investigative journalists have access. This type of information occupies a large proportion of the story sources that investigative journalists cover. These sources of information are probably real, but possibly faked. Investigative journalists need to discern which are real and which are not. There are dual meanings to being “doable”: the chance that an investigation can be turned into a good story, and the manageable political risk. As they are encouraged to avoid self-censoring, SMD investigative journalists have been found to give more consideration to the chance to write good stories from story leads. Journalists also take into account whether the ideas embody important social meanings that are good for social development and address social problems that society is confronting. In the second stage, investigative journalists make assumptions on what the possible truth is, or what the greatest meaning of the stories is. Based on their judgment of meaning and possible “truth,” investigative journalists decide news angles and themes for their stories. In the early stage, investigative journalists usually decide what they want the report to tell readers and then set up particular plans to gather relevant evidence that can support their plans. Which interview techniques will be involved, who will be involved, which case will be used, what information will be collected, and even which cities will be chosen for the investigation, all sometimes strongly depend on the report’s theme.


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At the third stage, investigative journalists look for representative cases or gather suitable evidence to prove their assumptions, or to answer the questions in their minds. It is common to see investigative journalists telling a universal truth through the reporting of a single representative case. This point corresponds well with the argument made in Ekstrom’s work (Ekström 2002: 273): “Good stories require good cases. The individual cases are the timbers on which the journalists construct a more general truth. A variety of discursive techniques are employed to transform extreme, nonrepresentative individual cases into general truths.” At the fourth stage, weighted evidences are fitted into reports by using certain discursive strategies, including taking a fact-based objective tone: constructing a sense that the scene is recovered, and keeping convincing evidences, but cutting out incoherent evidence in order to make the theme sharp and focused. At the final stage, the investigative reporting team has to find a suitable time to submit the report for publication, while the newsroom will selfcensor the reports handed in, in order to try to minimize political risk and maximize resonance with the public. This is a unique trait of the epistemology of investigative journalism in the Chinese context. Other journalistic patterns and routines One consequence of the institutionalization of news-making is said to be the routine behaviors in news production, especially in news collection and writing. Journalists on beats follow routines in the collection of information, and wrap up information according to existing patterns. Routines in daily newsmaking often are produced by routinized information collection, deadlines, and space allocation. Investigative reporting does not have the same routines that daily reporting has. First, investigative journalists need not rely on official information provided by the relevant officials and media relations people in various government departments, and therefore can keep their distance from them. Most investigative reports are self-generated and even criticize government departments. Second, there is no deadline and few space limitations in the covering of investigative reports, as they are usually allowed a prolonged time to complete them. However, investigative reporting has its own routines that daily reporting does not have. Basically speaking, two types of routines were identified in the practice of investigative journalists at SMD in 2006. The first is in work allocation. In this process, investigative journalists are

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assigned to report on different topics according to certain patterns, for example, journalists’ backgrounds, especially their personal interests and experiences, and the geographical regions from which they come. According to Lu Hui, for instance, the “geographical location” factor is a rule in work allocation for the team’s investigative journalists. He usually assigns a journalist to conduct an investigation in their hometowns, cities or provinces, because they know the local situation better than other colleagues. Consequently, most events that happen in Henan Province would be assigned to Jia Yunyong, who is Henannese. Such geographical allocation not only facilitates investigative journalists by employing their social capital in their home cities during the investigation, but also facilitates Lu Hui’s management under condition of journalist scarcity. It is easy to ask a journalist conducting interviews in Henan to investigate breaking news in that province. Another rule of work allocation is related to experiences. Investigative journalists are likely to be assigned to report on topics that they have reported before. For example, Lu assigned Feng Hongping to report on mine disasters three times in a year, because Feng had experience in reporting on mine disasters. A topic such as people killing others because of poverty usually would be assigned to Fu jianfeng, because Fu has considerable interest and experience in reporting on such topics. Experience and geographical origin, two basic standards used by the Director to assign work to his investigative journalists may, however, lead to a situation in which one journalist is responsible for investigative reporting in one geographic area, or for one topic area. Examined in a longer term, such allocation would result in routines, as individual journalists have their own fixed tastes and news angles, which could lead to partial emphasis on some news and the neglect of other news. Furthermore, a journalist who works harder than another one will also lead to there being more investigative reports about some provinces than others in the newspaper’s coverage. For example, in 2006, almost half (46%) of Jia Yunyong’s reports were about events in Henan Province, and on most of these he collaborated with Zhu Changzhen from Dahe Daily. The second is the rhetorical patterns created by the consensus on “beautiful writing” (youmei wenben) and “good investigative reports” advanced by the news organization and accepted by investigative journalists. These widely accepted criteria, or judgments, of news-worthiness or the preferred way to interpret news events, results in fixed models of investigative reports. For example, it is common for SMD journalists to probe social problems in social contexts to find explanations or even


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justifications of tragic events or riots. It is also common for SMD investigative journalists to adopt a calm narrative in recovering the “truth,” structuring facts into a frame that implies meanings and judgments on the events. It is often seen that SMD investigative journalists tell a universal “truth” or criticize social problems and flaws in the system, through telling the factual story of an individual case, mostly about miserable lives and injustices that disadvantaged individuals or groups have received. The necessity to self-censor investigative reports The conflict of interests between the newspaper’s different departments and individuals is in fact a clash of interests between individual investigative journalists and the newsroom (for example Editors-in-Chief). For individual investigative journalists, practicing investigative journalism, following professional guiding principles, and meeting the public’s requirements, not only gives them a sense of public service, but also helps them to develop their own careers and gain fame. They tend to embrace investigative reporting partly because of their professional ideals, and partly because of their need for fame and fortune. These frontline journalists do not have so much concern for political risk as do high-ranking media practitioners and news organization. Even if their investigative reports cause political trouble, the worst situation individual journalists will meet is being fired, despite, in some extreme cases—especially involving national security—journalists risk being put in prison, for example, Shi Tao in 2007. However, if journalists are fired because of their brave reports, they become heroes in journalistic circles and will be offered a job somewhere else, and they might also achieve fame and fortune. Yao Haiying, mentioned in previous chapters, is an example of this. Nevertheless, for high-ranking media practitioners, i.e., those at the Editors-in-Chief level, and for the news organizations, the consequence of offending the authorities and of stepping into a political mine field could be fatal. For Editors-in-Chief, it means they may lose all the political achievements they have gained, while for news organizations, it means they may have to close down, which will have an influence on all the employees within the organization. The Sun Zhigang case is an excellent example of this kind. As a result of the report, several highranking media workers at SMD were dismissed and even imprisoned. However, the two reporters, Chen Feng and Wang Lei, gained great fame and were quick promoted. High-ranking media practitioners and media

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organizations, therefore, place more attention on political safety than individual “frontline” investigative journalists do. The conflict of interest is also indeed a conflict between the newspaper’s concerns over “self-interest” and “public interest,” i.e., a contradiction between the need to achieve political safety and economic profit and the need to shoulder social responsibility. The newspaper needs to make money in the market, at the same time it has to keep its image of serving public interest. These two driving forces, however, come into conflict from time to time. In facing the conflicts of interest, journalists can gain autonomy and practice professionalism only after the newspaper organization has fulfilled its interests. In many cases, the reasons why investigative journalists, the frontline news practitioners, stop reporting do not come from the journalists themselves, but from the news organization: either due to the arrival of a propaganda ban, or because of the compromises news organizations have to make to serve their self-interest. During my fieldwork, I witnessed several cases of economic actors putting pressure on the newsroom via the advertising department. On occasions, the newsroom successfully resisted this pressure, and thus lost advertising revenue due to this resistance. SMD however, was not always able to keep professional persistence, but gave up to the pressures. The practices of investigative journalism, however, cannot merely be abandoned by SMD, because it has established a strong collective journalistic professionalism through practicing investigative journalism. Investigative journalists at SMD share similar professional ideals and claims and the same wishes to push social democracy forward and to enlighten the public. The journalists, however, do not have a high collective feeling of belonging to their organization. This means they will leave the newspaper if the quality of the newspaper’s journalism declines. They do not claim they will stay at the newspaper for ever. The journalists, instead, regard the newspaper as being the best one in China at the moment. This provides them with a platform to realize their professional ideals. They strongly recognize the newspaper’s professional ideology and thus recognize the organization. The high coherence of individual and organizational professionalism results in a strong workforce that ensures the newspaper does not go far from what individual journalists want. Professionalism, in this case, forges a sort of power that counteracts the political and economic influences on the newspaper. The self-censorship of the media is necessary in investigative reporting as a way to mediate information between power struggles: to lessen


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political risks, to maximize the interests of social forces involved under the premise of political safety, and to best realize the journalists’ professional ideals. The reports on the Wanzhou and Chizhou Riots that will be discussed in the next chapter, are two cases of self-censorship. As discussed elsewhere (Tong 2009), to practice self-censorship is to avoid stepping into a political minefield (leiqu) while maximizing the fulfillment of other interests. In this way, media positively reigns in the government and broadens market boundaries. This is a positive side of self-censorship, which meanwhile oppresses journalistic professionalism. Then what is the political minefield? The authorities set both visible and invisible minefields for the media. Bans arrive from the propaganda department at newsrooms almost everyday. They are about specific topics on which the media report. Furthermore, from the editorial meetings arranged by the press conglomerate’s weekly meetings (jituan zhouhui), to the daily editorial meetings before the editing (bianqianhui), all editors and Directors are given information about reporting taboos. During the fieldwork, I asked journalists, editors, and their Directors about what the minefields zones for reporting were. They gave the author certain specific topics, including land requisition (zhengdi wenti), group events (qunti xing shijian), calamities, and faults in national policies, but they usually concluded with the remark: the boundaries of the minefield are blurred and measurement depended on their own experiences and judgment.20 As Wang Jun, an Editor-in-Chief Assistant, put it, A Ban does not mean the media cannot touch the news event at all. It only means we should be cautious about reports on the news events. We should know the core anxieties of the authorities. What are they genuinely afraid of? Even when the propaganda department has issued a ban on a news event, we can still find a way to report on it through tricky means. To avoid the core minefield in news events, is safe for reporting.21 (Wang Jun, 2006) Discursive devices in reports embody judgments on bans and the illusion of a violation of a ban. The news workers at different levels have different considerations and judgments about the minefields relating to a topic. Due to discrepancies in positions and considerations, we can see a second-level struggle within the newsroom that occurs between top-ranking news workers and individual journalists. The struggles over the discourse of news reports throw light on the different considerations of

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the Editor-in-Chief, Editors, and Journalists, which thus reflect power relations in a broader social context (Tong 2009).

Conclusion: A Model of Organizational Influences In this case study, a number of organizational factors influenced the practices of investigative reporting (see Figure 6.5). Amongst these factors, organizational culture, recruitment measure, organizational structure, and working procedure are prominent. They produce two types of influences. One is an emancipatory power, produced by organizational culture and recruitment measures, and the other is a prohibitive force produced by organizational structure and working procedures. Organizational culture and recruitment measures generate cultural capital of SMD, drawing investigative reporting toward the autonomous pole as some form of protection for journalistic autonomy; while in organizational structure and working procedures, those agents who sit closer to economic and political poles draw investigative reporting closer to the heteronomous pole. The former is flexible, while the latter is fixed. Liberal power at the professional ideological level weakens the procedurally routinized prohibitions and the damage to the autonomy of investigative reporting caused by organizational structure and working procedure. Organizational culture and unique recruitment measures produce the organizational favor for investigative journalism, investigative journalism-centered organizational journalistic professionalism, and

Organization structure

Organizational culture

Investigative journalism practice

Working procedure

Figure 6.5 A model of organizational influences

Recruitment measures


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an organizational consensus on how to do investigative journalism. These three consequences guarantee the autonomy of investigative reporting within the newspaper, but meanwhile produce certain routines and patterns of practice. Individuals, who reside at different positions of the organizational structure and in working procedures, take different actions with different viewpoints on investigative journalism, and diverse considerations that are a result of the dissimilar positions they hold and of different relations to the field. A conflict of interests therefore occurs, and this limits the autonomy of investigative reporting, but cannot wholly stop it. The emancipatory force provided by organizational culture and recruitment measures counterballances the prohibitions to the autonomy of investigative journalism that are produced by the conflicts of interest. The two types of influences have shaped the “rules of the game,” according to which investigative journalists do their job at the newspaper. The two types of influences are also the power interplay within the newspaper’s journalistic field, which must consider and balance these influences. Self-censorship, therefore, is important as one of the main measure used to balance these influences on discourse.

Chapter 7

Reporting on Social Riots: How Investigative Journalists Tell Stories1

This chapter looks into the ways in which Chinese investigative journalists tell stories in their reports and how newspapers revise those reports. The newspaper coverage of the Chizhou riot in Chizhou Daily (CD) and Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD), and the coverage of the Wanzhou Riot in Dahe Daily (DD) are selected as case studies. The news report covered in CD is seen as a typical official account of a social riot in China, which provides a comparison parameter to analyze the investigative reports in SMD and DD. The reports that investigative journalists from SMD and DD produce and submit to the editors’ desk and the reports that the newspapers finally produce and present to their readers after a series of editions, are analysed and compared separately. The analysis aims to examine the ways in which both newspapers and investigative journalists explain social riots and their attitudes towards the social groups involved in such events. Are their interpretations of the events of this type different from the official accounts provided by Party organs? From analysis of both “what is said” and “what is unsaid,” one can see the conflicts of interest between investigative journalists and newspapers and the different ideologies and concerns of two newspaper newsrooms about the balancing of power relations and attempts to remain politically safe.

Social Riots in the News: News as a Social Construction of Reality How media represent social riots is a topic that has caught the academic attention of many Western scholars with interests in media discourse. There are two main arguments in previous studies that have examined

Reporting on Social Riots

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the press discourse on social protests. First, scholars regard news coverage on social protests as usually focusing on the action of protesters, instead of the cause of protests (McLeod and Hertog 1992). That is, news coverage is more likely to present the violent activities of protesters and rioters, rather than to explain the reasons behind the events. For example, reports tend to describe the conflict and confrontation of protesters with the authorities. Second, the protesters and the authorities, e.g., the police and the government, are usually put in a sort of “us vs. them” dichotomy analysis frame. The protesters are “deviant” from normal mainstream people and are depicted as a threat to social stability and the sovereignty of the State, through their aggressive and violent activities, while the police are imaged as a type of victim of violent actions (Fowler 1991; Lee and Craig 1992; McLeod and Hertog 1992; Hackett and Zhao 1994). Furthermore, news reports are also found to give protesters more negative attributes, e.g., sentimentality or misinformation, besides being violent (Lee and Craig 1992; Hackett and Zhao 1994; STAMOU 2001). The journalistic paradigms are the topical bias and the “stereotypical treatment of its subject” of protests (STAMOU 2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that the media play an essential role in constructing an image of a harmonious and consentient society by dissolving social classes and concealing social conflict (Hall 1977; Curran 2000). The media support the existing power structure, social order, and elite hegemony (Downing 1980). Particularly in the views of radical media theorists, it is usually the powerful that successfully control media by acting as suppliers of news, interpreters of news events, and agenda-setters. The underprivileged are deprived of discourse rights. A relatively full discussion can be seen in Curran’s book (2000) and it will not be redundant to repeat it here. The analysis of this chapter takes into account the following theoretical concerns:

Do reports dissolve social classes instead of constructing them and conceal social conflicts rather than revealing them? • Do reports put emphasis on “cause” or “action?” • What dichotomy of “us vs. them” do the reports have? • Have the reports given the social groups involved a chance to express their views? •


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The Background to the Case Study: Reporting Two Social Riots The events The two social events discussed here are the Wanzhou Mass Riot in 2004 and the Chizhou Mass Riot in 2005. On October 18, 2004, the Wanzhou2 District of Chongqing Municipal City witnessed a serious mass incident (qun ti xing shi jian) involving thousands of protestors.3 That day, two persons, who claimed to be “civil service officials” (gong wu yuan) beat up a peasant laborer in the street. This event sparked off the mass riot. In the Shuangbai Road in the Wanzhou District, when Hu Quanzong and Zeng Qingrong passed Yu Jikui, a porter (bian dan) who had come into the city to work, Yu’s carrying pole struck Zeng by accident. This triggered a fierce argument and blows between the two sides, and resulted in Yu’s injury. Hu claimed to be a civil service official and that he could spend money to fix any possible problem (chu le shen me shi yong qian bai ping). Hu’s behavior and words caused anger in the bystanders and finally led to a large-scaled riot. In the riot, police cars were burned, protesters surrounded and looted the Wanzhou District government building, and a violent confrontation occurred between the rioters and police. A similar event happened in Chizhou City on June 26, 2005. That day, a Honda hit a student bicyclist. The driver and the three other passengers in the Honda required the boy to compensate the damage to the car (some scratches), while the boy wanted them to send him to hospital. After negotiations failed, the four Honda passengers beat up and injured the boy. They even claimed that they could spend RMB 300,000 to cover it up if the boy were beaten to death. Their behavior and words triggered public anger in the nearby crowds, leading to a mass incident involving up to ten thousand people. The riot resulted in the smashing of a police station, the looting of a supermarket, the burning of cars, and injury to the (armed) police.4

Reports Dahe Daily is a commercial offspring newspaper of the Henan Daily Press Conglomerate, which enjoys a high circulation and large advertising revenue. During its early years of development, like Southern Metropolis Daily, it was famous for its brave investigative journalism and was even


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regarded as being the initiator of public opinion monitoring and critical reports in China (Jia 2006). DD covered the Wanzhou Mass Riot on October 26th, 2004, while SMD reported the Chizhou Mass Riot on June 28th and July 1st, 2005. Zhu Changzhen, an investigative journalist at DD, saw the information on the Wanzhou Riot on a web forum soon after the riot happened on October 18th, 2004. He arrived in Wanzhou that day, after getting permission from his Director.5 On October 26th, DD covered the riot with a big headline on the front page as the reading guide, followed by two full pages of text. A ban from the Propaganda Department reached the newsrooms on the same day, although too late to stop publication. Although two Deputy Editors-in-Chief of DD were summoned and submitted self-critical letters to the Henan Provincial Propaganda Department because of the report, it was still regarded as being relatively “safe” (xiangdui anquan), drawing no political punishment.6 Afterwards, no other media covered the riot with reports produced by their own journalists following interviews and investigation, and only some official media, e.g., Xinhua News Agency, Wanzhou Daily, covered the official investigation results.7 On June 28th, 2005, SMD reprinted a news report that had been published on June 27 in CD, the local Party Organ in Chizhou City. Afterwards, Wang Jilu, an investigative journalist at SMD, was assigned to Chizhou to investigate the event. Wang had just finished reporting on a riot in Zhejiang Province before being sent on this report assignment. The newspaper refused the report on the Zhejiang riot by self-censorship, due to the political sensitivity of the topic. Despite the failure of the former report, Wang still accepted the assignment, because he thought the event was a representative case for Chinese society, but he decided to avoid the politically sensitive points in reporting on the Chizhou Riot event, as a result of his experience of failure with the former report.8 On July 1st, SMD published a long investigative report on the riot, written by its own journalist and based on his investigation. Since its economic reform, China has witnessed a rapid increase in social protest, caused by an explosion of accumulated civil resentment towards escalating social inequality. For the sake of political safety, however, the news media are seldom willing to cover events of this kind, whether they receive a propaganda ban or not. Those with coverage of such events are usually Party organs that aim to give an official explanation on behalf of the government in order to guide public understanding of the event. Such reports give the official definition of social riot events, reflecting the official ideology of the authorities to ensure regime

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solidarity. The propaganda tongue reports are called “official reports” (guanfang baodao). The news sources of official reports are mainly official ones and their texts are based closely on official documents without any journalistic investigation by the news media. As a comparison, we have other reports that are classified as “civil reports” (minjian baodao), which offer alternative, nonofficial definitions for social protests and deviate from official ideology through the news media’s journalistic investigation. The journalistic values recognized by news media are represented by whether an official or civil report is given, or whether they keep silent, and also by how the news stories are presented. Both DD and SMD sent their journalists to the event sites and safely covered “civil reports.” Nevertheless, DD and SMD are two newspapers in two geographically different cities, with different sorts of journalistic professionalism, either among journalists, or at organizational level. It is worth comparing the two newspapers and their journalists’ story-telling. Furthermore, as newspapers decide to include or exclude events and information about various events, their coverage, according to the overall position of the newspapers and their underlying ideologies and understanding of sociopolitical situations, it is valuable to bring in the original reports to examine what is unsaid in order to reveal the two newspapers’ ideologies and underlying power struggles. DD has one civil report and its original version, while SMD has one civil report and its original version, and one reprinted official report, the Strong Local Party Organ

Chizhou Daily

The Local Authority’s Political Control

Cross-regional Non-Party Organ

Dahe Daily


Weak Figure 7.1 The Power relations of newspapers to local authorities9

Table 7.1

The list of reports Categories of Producers

Categories of Reports

Title

Dahe Daily’s Reporter

Cross-regional Reporter

Journalist’s original report submitted to Editor’s desk

Full Story of Wanzhou ‘Mass Incident’

Southern Metropolis Daily’s Reporter

Cross-regional Reporter

Journalist’s original report submitted to Editor’s desk

Follow-up Stories of Chinzhou ‘6.26’ Event

Dahe Daily

Cross-regional Non-Party Newspaper

Civil Report

Why Trivial Dispute Led to ‘Big Event’ Full Story of ‘Mass Incident’ Caused by the Beating of Wanzhou ‘Biandan’

Chizhou Daily

Local Party Organ

Official Report

Mass Incident Happened in Anhui Chizhou Ordinary Case Caused Fight-Smash-Loot-Fire


Cross-regional Non-Party Newspaper

Reprinted Official Report

Anhui Chizhou (Broke) A Large-scale Riot A Traffic Dispute Led to Vicious Incident, Six Armed Police injured, and a supermarket looted

Civil Report

Investigation of Chinzhou ‘6.26’ Mass Incident Event Why and How Car-hitting-passenger Became FightSmash-Loot-Fire



Producer

159

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original report of which is the report carried in Chizhou Daily, the local Party Organ of Chizhou City. Hence this chapter includes the reprinted official report in SMD and the official report in Chizhou Daily as the basis of analysis. Among the three newspapers, CD is the local Party Organ of Chizhou City, while both DD and SMD are cross-regional news media. The political control of the local authorities in Chizhou City and Wanzhou City varies among the three newspapers (see Figure 7.1). We thus have four published news reports in the three newspapers, and two original reports in DD and SMD. The six reports are listed in Table 7.1. There are two original reports produced by the journalists of the two newspapers and the other four are published reports in newspapers.

An Analysis of Content and Discourse: Three Models of Newspaper Representation The discourse analysis of the six reports concerns five features in the text of the newspaper reports, i.e., newspaper headlines (captions) and leads, topics and their order, quotation patterns (news sources), and lexical agency.

A model of party organ representation: “us” government vs. “them” rioters Before publishing its own journalist’s report, SMD reprinted a news report about the Chizhou Riot on June 28th. This had been published on June 27th in CD. The analysis shows that the two reports present a model of the Party organ representation of a social riot, which provides an official definition of social riot. In the news texts, the government/ police are represented as a positive “Us” and as victims, while the rioters are represented as a negative and violent “them,” who are a threat to social stability. The CD report speaks for the government and aims to calm down the public anger of Chizhou’s people. Although based on the CD report, the SMD report was found to speak less for the local authorities in Chizhou City, through the changing of the lexical labels of rioters used for the rioters and the revision of sentences with clear intentions in the CD report. With no mention of the triggers for the riot, the CD report only addresses the conflicts between protesters and the police/government, which is the physical conflict that could be seen at the riot site. The


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report describes in detail the activities of the rioters and the scene at the riot’s locale. The theme and topic of the CD report is that Chizhou City witnessed a serious mass incident, in which crowds attacked a police station and supermarket at the instigation of some “lawless unprincipled fellows” (bu fa fen zi). One can see the description only includes the activities of the rioters and excludes what the armed police did to the rioters. The descriptions show rioters as a violent mob: they attacked the police station and the armed police, burned a propaganda car and a police car, and even looted a supermarket like robbers. In the process, the authorities wanted to hold a dialogue with the rioters, but the rioters refused a dialogue with the authorities. The images of the authorities and the armed police are reasonable. The report represents the privileged, i.e., the government, the police, and the supermarket owner, as victims and “us,” while the protesters are represented as a violent “them,” who threaten social stability (See Figure 7.2). The June 27th report in CD is a typical “propaganda report,” underlining the official ideology and providing an official account of the event. The purpose of the CD report is to calm down the people’s public anger. Within the short text, the report transfers three levels of meanings. First, the report uses “a Honda with the license tag of Jiangsu A” to refer to the car that hit the boy, in order to clarify that the car owner is not from Zhejiang. In this way, the report refutes Chizhou citizens’ belief that the car was driven and owned by a Zhejiang investor. It aims to dissolve the public anger of the Chizhou people towards the Zhejiang investors, Chizhou Daily’s report The Government/Police

The protester

Victim

Violent

Rational

Irrational

Us

Them

The Supermarket Boss

The protester Irrational

Victim

Violent

Us

Them

Figure 7.2 The dichotomy of “Us vs. Them” in the model of Party Organ Representation

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who are believed to have bribed the Party boss of Chizhou City in order to obtain a business opportunity.10 Second, the report points out that the police responded quickly and dealt with the traffic dispute in time. The report explains to readers that there was no mistake in the governance of the police. The purpose of this claim was to defend the police, because Chizhou citizens thought that the police covered up for the assaulters. The belief in the police’s malfeasance speeded up the evolution of a traffic dispute into a social riot.11 Third, the report implies that Liu Liang was still alive and in the First People’s Hospital Emergency Department in Chizhou City. Actually, the people in Chizhou believed that the Honda passengers had beaten Liu Liang to death. This belief led to the breakout of the riot. The three points included in the CD report are used to guide public opinion and soothe public anger. The report stands in the position of the government and speaks for the government. By contrast, the report blurs the identities of the Honda passengers and of the only news source quoted in the text. The report uses “passengers in the car” to refer to the assaulters. Then, who are the “passengers in the car?” The identity of the assaulters is intentionally hidden in the text. In terms of news sources, speaking overall, the reporters did not point out who gave them the information included in the news text. The whole report has only one news source “according to local witness(es)” in the third paragraph, which describes the place where the riot happened. This obscures the identity of the witnesses. Nevertheless, who are the “local witness(es)?” To blur the identity of news sources usually has three purposes. First, journalist(s) might want to protect news sources, for certain reasons. Second, news sources might not want to tell journalist(s) their identities. Third, and most probably in this case, it could be a fake news source. The facts provided in the quotations from the uncertain news sources may be false and may actually reflect the viewpoints of the journalist(s), being used to achieve certain purposes and to realize ideology indoctrination. Reading between the lines, one would believe that the invisible people who gave the journalists this information included in the news text be the local government of Chizhou City. After being asked to judge who the invisible news source was, Wai Li, a Chief Editor of DD, pointed out that “such types of reports, with invisible news sources, are so-called propaganda reports, written under the guidance of the government (shouyi xinwen).”12 The reason that CD carried such a report is that the local government of Chizhou City


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wants Chizhou citizens to have a “correct” understanding of what happened on June 26th, 2005. When SMD reproduced and covered the official report that had already been covered by CD on June 28th, its own journalist had not finished his investigation. The CD report was the only reliable resource SMD could have turned to. Furthermore, the topic is highly politically sensitive and SMD is very careful with this kind of topic. We can find that SMD’s June 28th report falls into the same category as CD’s June 27th report, but revisions of lexical choices and event descriptions made in the SMD reprint report demonstrate the different overall position of the two newspapers and their power relations to the local authorities of Chizhou City. SMD need not maintain the image of the Chizhou government or speak for it, as CD does, because it is a cross-regional medium. The differences lie in two points. First, SMD has less intention of speaking for the government. The SMD’s June 28th report deletes the above-mentioned three implications from the CD report. In this way, SMD’s June 28th report shows more balance in its coverage and has less intention than CD to speak for the government. The second difference is in the different labels placed on rioters in the two reports. SMD less frequently uses negative labels in referring to rioters, while CD labels the rioters very negatively (See Table 7.2 and Table 7.3). Throughout the whole news text, the CD report often uses the following words to label rioters: “lawless unprincipled fellows” (bufa fenzi), and in a few places, “crowd who did not know the fact” (bu ming

Table 7.2 Labels used to call the rioters in the CD’s June 27th report and the SMD’s June 28th report Labels

Frequencies in CZD

Frequencies in SMD

Tone

(Bystanders) crowds/masses

3

5

Neutral

citizen

2

2

Neutral

Masses who did not know the truth

2

1

Negative

People

1

4

Neutral

People involved

0

1

Neutral

The suspected

1

0

Negative

Troublemakers

1

0

Negative

Undisciplined lawless fellows

8

5

Negative

Total

18

18


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Table 7.3 Tone of labels used to call the rioters in the CD’s June 27 report and SMD’s June 28 report Tone of Labels

CZD

Negative

12 (66.7%)

6 (33.3%)

Neutral

6 (33.3%)

12 (66.7%)

18 (100%)

18 (100%)

Total

SMD

zhenxiang de qunzhong), “bystander crowds” (weiguan qunzhong), and “troublemakers.” However, SMD’s June 28th report changed some of the labels from “lawless unprincipled fellows” (bufa fenzi) into “some crowds,” and “some people” (youren). Among the 18 labels that are used to refer to the rioters, 12 labels in the CD’s June 27th report are negative, and merely 6 labels in the SMD’s June 28th report are negative. A model of truth-telling representation: the original reports produced by investigative journalists and submitted to editors’ desk The two original reports produced by Zhu Changzhen for DD and Wang Jilu for SMD present a model of representation, which is absolutely different from the first model of the Party Organ representation. This chapter calls it a model of truth-telling representation, because both reports make an effort to represent the “truth” about the riots—the “real reasons” within the contexts that the two investigative journalists thought triggered the riots. It has been found that both reports focus on the cause of the riots, instead of the action. The two reports, therefore, reveal three levels of conflicts. The image of the government and other privileged social groups in the two reports is negative instead of positive, while the image of rioters and the underprivileged is not necessarily “negative.” Both reports give a voice to the public and the people. SMD’s journalist holds a more neutral attitude toward the rioters and riot than the DD journalist, while the DD’s journalist establishes a clearer power hierarchy in the text of the report. A focus on cause instead of action Differently from the arguments of McLeod and Hertog (1992), it has been found that journalists from both DD and SMD focus on the cause instead of the action in the riot reporting. That is, their reports explain the social reasons for the events, and address deeper conflicts involved


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in them, instead of merely addressing the clash between protesters and the police/government. On analyzing the two events, one can see the two riots were directly triggered by conflicts between underprivileged individuals and privileged individuals. More accurately speaking, the arrogant claims of the individually powerful, i.e., the “official” in the Wanzhou Riot, and the rich in the Chizhou Riot, that they can solve problems with money, ignited the public anger towards the government, who are regarded as the representatives of the powerful and even as covering up their crimes. The two original reports point out both the direct and indirect riot triggers by describing the three steps of conflict evolution in the riots, and summarizing the whole process of conflict evolution. The three steps are (1) disputes between powerless individuals and powerful individuals; (2) the evolution from the individual disputes into the anger of passers-by towards the powerful individuals; and (3) the evolution from the anger of the passengers to public anger towards the government, finally leading to mass riots. Furthermore, both riots involve three dualistic social forces: (1) the individual lower class people (the unprivileged) vs. the individual “official”/”rich” (the privileged), the passers-by vs. the official/rich, and the people vs. the government. Figure 7.3 shows the conflict evolution of social riots of this kind.

Underprivileged Individual

Standby people

The People

Privileged Individual: the official/the rich

Privileged Individual: the official/the rich

The Government

Figure 7.3 The evolution of conflicts within social riots of this kind

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The DD journalist’s report points out that the original motivation of the bystanders was reasonable, because what they required was to punish the assaulters. More importantly, in the journalist’s report, the riot was actually triggered by accumulating conflicts and the negative mood of the people towards the government, instead of by merely being triggered by a trivial dispute, which was only the flashpoint. Furthermore, the report points out that it was not the first time that the government had used the police force to suppress the people (in fact, the government’s previous suppression in the “removal and moving” in the plaza contributed to this riot). According to explanations given in the journalist’s original report, the invisible crisis in the social context was the main reason for the outbreak of the riot. Example 1 is an excellent example of this argument. Similarly, the SMD journalist implied several major social contextual reasons for the riot. The contextual reasons include the negative mood of Chizhou citizens to official corruption, to possible collusion between business people and the city’s governor in the government’s activities to “Attract and Invite Business and Capital,” to rapidly climbing real estate prices, and to the cancellation of motor-cycle taxis13 in Chizhou City. The focus on cause in the journalists’ reports actually defines the two riots in a broader social context and therefore finds certain reasonability for the rioters’ activities. Through analysis, one can further see the incongruence of the interests of investigative journalists and the Chinese government.

... ... What local government needs to do next is to revise the document to deal with emergency events and to try their best to improve the life quality of citizens. Furthermore, (local government) declared in the conference on October 23rd: from that date, the lowest level of social benefits for urban citizens in Wangzhou District was inceased from RMB115 Yuan per month to RMB 140 Yuan per month. In the process of the investigation, the journalist learnt the reasons given by citizens to account for the riot. Citizens believed the increasing number of laidoff workers and the accumulating conflicts between people and government was the main reasons for the riot. As more and more people were laid-off, a lot of people lost their jobs and sources of income and had to sell their labor to


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making living. At the same time, however, the government was constructing the so-called ‘image project’ (xingxiang gongcheng) and political achievement project (zhengji gongcheng). The riot broke out in the Gaosuntang Business Culture Plaz that was just finished and furnished in front of the District Government building. According to the government, to build this plaza was a city development activity. The government, however, used the armed police to force out residents and shops who had not reached ‘remove and move’ agreements (chaiqian xieyi) with the government. It was a sort of police suppression on ‘remove and move’. Besides, the corruption of officials was also believed to contribute to the outbreaking of the riot. A staff member from the Chongqing government said that in the urban development process, six officials including the Vice-Governor of Wanzhou District were doubly regulated (shuanggui), besides a myriad of smaller corruptions. All of these social reasons became accumulative conflict between people and government, which finally broke out after being triggered by a trivial individual dispute. Example 1 Quotation from the Dahe Daily journalist’s original report, submitted to newsroom14

Revealed conflicts With an emphasis on the cause of the riots, both DD’s and SMD’s investigative journalists constructed and revealed three dualistic conflicts instead of concealing them in their original reports. The three conflicts include (1) the people vs. the government in a social context, which was the deep trigger for the riots; (2) the protester vs. the police/government, and (3) the underprivileged individual vs. the privileged individual (See Figure 7.4). The two reports represent one model of representing

The People vs. The Government Protester vs. Police/Government Underprivileged Individual vs. Privileged Individual Social context Figure 7.4 A model of truth-telling representation: three conflicts in the Wanzhou and Chizhou riot events

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social riots. This model excuses the irrational behavior of protesters by explaining the riots in a broader social context.

The dichotomy of “Us vs. Them” Following the analysis above, there are two dimensions through which to examine the dichotomy: “us and them.” One is the underprivileged vs. the privileged and the other is the violent vs. the victim. Although they have an emphasis on the cause of social riots, both reports also describe, to a certain degree, the behavior of both sides of the conflict in the riots. In examining closely the behaviors of the two sides in conflicts and the labels the reports use to refer to them, it has been found that the image of the victim varies in the three stages of the evolution of the events. Before further analysis, the concepts of the underprivileged and the privileged should be clarified. By examining the reports, one can find that they are not limited to individual people, but are extended to collective social groups within a social context. Social groups in social contexts beyond those directly involved in the riots have been brought into the reports. Figure 7.5 classifies the news actors mentioned in the two reports into the underprivileged and the privileged. In the Wanzhou riot, the rioters and the police in the DD journalist’s report are both shown as victims. The journalist describes the behavior of the two sides: rioters and police. Not only did protestors attack the police, but also the police attacked protesters. The police even used weapons— e.g., tear gas—to suppress the rioters, while the rioters threw “something” at the police. People on both sides were injured. Furthermore, the police, finally controlled the riot by using armed force. The DD journalist builts different images of victims at every stage of the event’s evolution. We can see two types of dichotomies between “Us vs. Them.” The first dichotomy is the one of the powerless individual vs. the powerful individual. However, because of the description of the violent action of the police, the journalist does not describe the police as being innocent victims. Instead, both rioters and police are violent in the second dichotomy. In the third dichotomy, however, the people are shown as “us,” and the government as “them,” by describing the related government’s behavior in a social context. One can see the privileged, i.e., the “civil service official,” the government, the police, and officials, are represented as the negative “them,” while the underprivileged are represented as victims and as “us” (See Figure 7.6).

The Underprivileged

Laid-off SOE workers

Wanzhou Riot ‘biandan’

House-displaced residences

Government ‘Civil service official’ Social context

Police

Government

Civilians

Police

Chizhou Riot Liu Liang Social context

Figure 7.5

Officials

The boss

Motor-taxi Drivers

Social context


Social context

The Privileged

Supermarket boss/Boss/Rich

The underprivileged and the privileged in the two riots

169


170

Dahe Daily Journalist’s Original Report Individual Privileged

Individual Underprivileged

Violent

Victim

Irrational Them

Us

The Government

The protester

Irrational

Irrational

Violent

Violent

The Government

Laid-off SOE Workers

Impaired Laid-off SOE workers’ Interests

Interest Impaired Victims

Them

Us

The Government/Police/Official

House-displaced Residents

Impaired House-displaced Residents’ Interests

Interest Impaired

Violent and Corrupt

Victims

Them

Us

Figure 7.6 The dichotomy of “Us vs. Them” in DD journalist’s original report

The SMD journalist’s original report also presents three dichotomies of “us vs. them.” The journalist describes in every detail the scene in the locality and how the Honda’s passengers beat the boy and claimed that spending money could solve any problem. In the first dichotomy of “Us vs. Them,” therefore, the student, the underprivileged individual, is the victim and the side of the rich boss, the privileged individuals, are a violent and negative “them.” Differently from the DD’s journalist, the journalist from SMD does not describe the behavior of the government/police in dealing with the rioters’ attack. Hence, the second dichotomy is built as the “us” government and “them” protesters through a description of the activities of the rioters. The third dichotomy is the “us” people and the “them” government. This dichotomy is set by the use of intertextuality and coherence to


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change the concept of the government, the police, and the boss into “the assaulters’ accomplices.” The report, therefore, represents Liu Liang in the image of a victim and their dichotomies as “the assaulted vs. the assaulter,” “the protesters vs. the assaulters’ accomplices,” and “the people vs. the government” by describing the activities of the assaulters, the injury to Liu Liang, the rumors believed by the people in Chizhou City, and the related government activities and other social issues in social contexts. The police, the supermarket owner, and the government are ranked as being in “cahoots” with the assaulters in the description of the public opinion of the people in Chizhou City in the report. Through also introducing the related government activities and other social issues into social contexts, such as the remarks of an official, the concept of the two sides involved in the conflict is shifted into “the people vs. the government.” The dichotomies in the SMD journalist’s report are listed in Figure 7.7.

The Southern Metropolis Daily journalist’s original report Privileged Individual


Violent

Victim

Irrational Them

Us

The Government

The protester

Irrational

Irrational

Victim

Violent

Motor-cycle Taxi Drivers

The Government

Interest Impaired

Impaired Motor-cycle taxi Drivers’ Interests

Victims Civilian

The Government/Boss/Official

Interest Impaired

Impaired Civilians’ Interests

Victims

Possible Corruption

Figure 7.7 The Dichotomies of “Us vs. Them” in the SMD journalist’s original report


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News sources: voice and the voiceless The two reports present four similar characteristics in the way they cite news sources. The first is that both cite information from official and nonofficial news sources (See Table 7.4 and Table 7.5). There are even more unofficial news sources than official and expert news sources. This means that the two reports give voice to both the authorities and the public. The second characteristic refers to the blurred identity of nonofficial news sources and the clear identity of official news sources. Both journalists use vague phrases, such as “according to a witness,” or more certain phrases, such as “a witness with the surname Zhang/Zhu,” as a way to refer to the primary sources in describing the scene of the riot and civilian explanations to the riot. By contrast, the journalists clarify the identity of official news sources in talking about the official account of the news event. They use “official ranks” (guanxian) to refer to official news sources, for example the District CCP Committee Secretary, Ma Qizheng. Here, we can see the power relations of the journalists to the Table 7.4 The nature of news sources in the Dahe Daily journalist’s original report Nature of News Sources

Frequencies (Percentage)

Expert

expert

3

3 (15%)

Official

official

4

5 (25%)

Unofficial

official document

1

citizens

12

Total

20 (100%)

12 (60%)

Table 7.5 The nature of news sources in the Southern Metropolis Daily journalist’s original report Nature of News Sources Expert Official Unofficial

Frequencies (percentage)

Expert

2

Expert document

1

Official

14

Official document

3

Other journalists or media

4

citizens

23

Total

47 (100%)

3 (6.4%) 17 (36.2%) 27 (57.4%)


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news sources from the allegations given to news sources. The respect shown to officials, and especially those with high official ranks, in the news text, represents a kind of respect for or fear of authorities, if it does not show the proximity of the authorities. The officials are treated first of all as “officials.” The third feature is the voiceless rioters. The journalists did not interview those people who attended the riot, nor were their words quoted. The neglect of the rioters’ voice in the news text more or less reflects both the taboos of the authorities and the intention of the journalists to avoid political risks. The fourth characteristic lies in the news source strategies the journalists have used to increase political safety. The DD journalist cites the opinion of a professor to point out the failures in governance. According to Zhu Changzhen, it is necessary to cite the viewpoints of academics and experts on some occasions in order to make the report politically safer by voicing the journalists’ viewpoint via the voice of experts. Wang Jilu’s report cites a lot of direct quotations from very explicit news sources. Actually, almost all description of the local scene and the definition of the nature of the event are direct quotations. Chinese investigative journalists usually use direct quotations to show their neutral attitude and to shake off responsibility. To point out who says what, specifically, is a sort of self-protection strategy. In the terms of Wang Jilu, the journalist, to clearly point out news sources is an extremely efficient way to increase the degree of political safety in the report. Attitudes towards the two sides and the construction of the power hierarchy The journalists’ attitudes towards the two sides in the conflicts are not only shown in the established dichotomy, analyzed above, but in the labels journalists use to refer to the riots and the news actors involved. From analysis of the labels, we can see the SMD journalist has a more neutral attitude towards the rioters and the riot than does the DD journalist, while the DD journalist establishes a clearer power hierarchy in the report’s text. There are no significant differences in the labels both journalists use to refer to the riots. Both reports call the event a “mass incident” (qunti xing shijian) or even a “serious violent mass incident,” following the official definition of the riots (See Table 7.6; Table 7.7). Neutral appellations, such as “this event” or “big event” occupy 50% in both reports. Both reports mention words reflecting the activities of the


174 Table 7.6 report

Labels used to call the riot in the Dahe Daily journalist’s original

Labels for events DD

Tone

Frequencies

Mass incident

Negative

10

Unusual large-scale mass incident in recent years/the mass incident with the largest-scale since the establishment of Wanzhou District/large-scale mass incident

Negative

3

This event

Neutral

12

Big event

Neutral

1

Riot

Negative

1

October 18 event

Neutral

1

Tone

Frequencies (percentage)

Negative

14 (50%)

Neutral

14 (50%)

Total

18 (100%)

Table 7.7 Labels used to call the riot in the Southern Metropolis Daily journalist’s original report Labels for events SMD

Tone

Frequencies

Serious mass violent incident

Negative

2

June 26 event

Neutral

1

This event

Neutral

4

Violent conflict/conflict

Negative

2

Violent event

Negative

1

Tone

Frequency (percentage)

Negative

5 (50%)

Neutral

5 (50%)

Total

10

rioters, such as “attacked” (chongji), “surrounded and attacked” (weigong), “looted” (qianglue), and “clash” (chongtu) in the news texts, but there are indeed some nuances between the two reports when they label both sides of the riots. Table 7.8 and Table 7.9 show the labels used in the two reports to refer to the rioters. From the appellations, one can see that the journalists classify the rioters under two classifications. The first is a collective

Reporting on Social Riots Table 7.8 report

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Labels used to call rioters in the Dahe Daily journalist’s original

Labels DD

Tone

Frequencies original

common people

Neutral

3

Bystanders/masses/masses/masses on the scene/ passengers

Neutral

20

Masses/people who do not know the truth

Negative

2

Troublemakers

Negative

11

A few with ulterior motives

Negative

1

Criminal suspects /criminals/few criminals

Negative

8

Biandan

Neutral

2

Crowds

Neutral

2

somebody/few people/these people

Neutral

6

a man

Neutral

1

a youth

Neutral

1

some attacking government building

Negative

2

those involved

Neutral

1

Tone

Frequencies (percentage) original

Negative

24 (40%)

Neutral

36 (60%)

Total

60 (100%)

Table 7.9 Labels used to call the rioters in the Southern Metropolis Daily journalist’s original report Labels or rioters SMD

Tone

Frequencies

Common people

Neutral

1

Masses

Neutral

2

Bystander people/bystanders

Neutral

5

People

Neutral

10

Someone/a lot of people

Neutral

5

Troublemakers

Negative

1

Tone

Frequencies

Negative

1 (4.2%)

Neutral

23 (95.8%)

Total

24 (100%)

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general noun for the people who attended the riots. In the Wanzhou Riot report, it is mainly “masses” or “crowds,” with 40% use, while the majority of the collective appellation in the Chizhou Riot report is “people” with 87.5%. The second refers to a small group of rioters who made trouble in the riots. The DD journalist calls them “troublemakers,” a “few with ulterior motives, or even criminal suspects/criminals/few criminals’, which occupies 24%. The SMD journalist refers to the rioters as “troublemakers” only once, which occupies only 4.2%. One noticeable point here is the negative label, such as “criminals,” for the rioters, which mainly appears in the quotations from official news sources in both reports. One can see that the SMD’s journalist holds a friendlier attitude, or perhaps a neutral attitude, towards the rioters. Most labels for the rioters are neutral words such as “people” (renmen). The DD journalist, however, refers to the rioters mostly as “masses” and “someone who does not know the truth.” The Chinese words “qunzhong” (crowds or masses) and “official” show the hierarchy in the event. The word “qunzhong” (crowds or masses) in a Chinese context has the implication that they are the people who are led by certain leaders, who have a lower social status, and who are part of the masses and mobs without their own ideas and rationality (Zhong 2005). The tendency of the Dahe Daily journalist to use the word reflects and implies his opinion of the rioters that the rioters are a mass who have no ideas of their own, do not know the truth, and can easily be instigated to violence. Beside the news sources discussed above, by examining closely the lexical agencies of the original report of Wanzhou Riot, one can see a clearer power hierarchy in the text. For example, the DD journalist uses the word “biandan” to label, and even to substitute for, the porter Yu Jikui and other porters in the text. “Biandan” is a collective appellation for the occupation of porter in the Chongqing dialect. The word represents a group of lower-class people who sell their labor for little money. The title “biandan” appears either to refer to Yu Jikui, or to label the rioters who attacked the police car (See Example 3). Besides this appellation, the journalist uses “qunzhong” to refer to the rioters, but refers to the other side in the event as “officials” or “official ranks.” Take Example 2, for example, one side in the conflict is “the masses,” and the other side “officials and police.” The hierarchy of the news actors can be seen in the text of the news report. The appellation “official ranks” even shows the respect of the journalist to the news actors, while the titles “qunzhong” and “biandan” do the opposite.

Reporting on Social Riots To the surprise of local officials, around 6 pm, 4,000 or 5,000 masses gathered again and blocked the traffic. A lot of people surrounded the District Government building. The cries of ‘Hand over the killer, Punish the killer’ fell and rose from time to time. Officials and the police organised the crowd of people (renqiang) in order to prevent rioters crushing into the building. Conflicts occurred between the two sides, a witness said.

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To the surprise of local officials, around 6 pm, 4,000 or 5,000 masses gathered again and blocked the traffic. These fellows surrounded the District Government building. The cries of ‘Hand over the killer, Punish killer’ fell and rose from time to time. Government staff and police organized the crowd of people in order to prevent rioters crushing into the building. Conflicts occurred between the two sides, a witness said.

Example 2 On the left is the quotation from the Dahe Daily journalist’s original report, submitted to the editor’s desk, and on the right is the quotation from the published report of the Dahe Daily

. . . police car’s windows were smashed by bystanders and ‘biandans (porters). Bystander crowds/masses gathered again, the number of them climbed up to four or five thousands. Example 3 Quotation from the Dahe Daily journalist’s original report submitted to the editor’s desk

Revising Differently: The Reports the Newspapers Produce and Present to their Readers A model of half truth-telling representation: DD October 26th report The published report of the Wanzhou Riot in DD on October 26th, gives us a model of half-truth-telling representation, which is still different from the official account of the riot in CD. This kind of representation tells more truth than the representation used in the model of the Party organ representation, but less than that in the model of truth-telling representation.

178

Investigative Journalism in China Protester vs. Police/Government Underprivileged Individual vs. Privileged Individual

Figure 7.8 The model of half truth-telling representation: two conflicts in the published report of Dahe Daily

By comparatively examining the published report, one can find one similarity and three major differences from the journalist’s original report. The similarity refers to the similar attitudes of the investigative journalist and the newspaper towards the riot and the rioters, which we can find in the labels that the two versions of the reports used to refer to the rioters and the riots in the original and published reports (See Table 7.10 and Table 7.11). The labels for the riot and the rioters have not much changed in the revised published report. The differences lie in the interpretation of the riot and the attitudes towards the government. The first difference is that the published report only reveals two-level conflicts in the text, and greatly reduces the rationality that the original report gives to the rioters. To achieve its Table 7.10 Labels used to call the riot in the published report of Dahe Daily Labels for events DD

original

revised

Mass incident

Negative

10

9

Unusual large-scale mass incident in recent years/ the mass incident with the largest-scale since the establishment of Wanzhou District/large-scale mass incident

Negative

3

3

This event

Neutral

12

11

Big event

Neutral

1

1

Riot

Negative

1

1

October 18th event

Neutral

1

1

Tone

Frequencies Original

Frequencies Revise

Negative

14 (50%)

13 (52%)

Neutral

14 (50%)

12 (48%)

Total

18 (100%)

25 (100%)


179

Table 7.11

Labels used to call the rioters in the published report in Dahe Daily

Labels DD

Tone

Frequencies original

Frequencies revised

common people

Neutral

3

0

Bystanders/masses/masses/masses on the scene/passengers

Neutral

20

25

Masses/people who do not know the truth

Negative

2

1

Troublemakers

Negative

11

7

A few with ulterior motives

Negative

1

2

Criminal suspects who have been caught/ criminals/few criminals

Negative

8

6

biandan

Neutral

2

2

Crowds

Neutral

2

1

somebody/few people/these people

Neutral

6

6

a man

Neutral

1

0

a youth

Neutral

1

1

some attacking government building

Negative

2

2

those involved

Neutral

1

0

Tone

Frequencies (percentage) original

Frequencies (percentage) revised

Negative

24 (40%)

18 (34%)

Neutral

36 (60%)

35 (66%)

Total

60 (100%)

53 (100%)

purpose, the Dahe Daily newsroom has changed the riot’s trigger in the editing process by deleting its contextual social reasons. Although describing the three stages of conflict evolution in the Wanzhou Riot, the published report points out in its reading guide (functioning as a lead) and the text that the riot originated from a misunderstanding that the assaulter was actually not a real “civil service official,” to dissolve public anger towards official cadres. It implies that the anger towards the official and government was unnecessary, as the assaulter was not a real “official.” More significantly, it completely deletes the paragraph the journalist has used to analyze the (real) social reasons behind the riot (the part in italic in Example 1 has been deleted in the revision process). It does not mention the invisible crisis in the social context at all, which in the journalist’s original report is the main reason for the riot. It thus minimizes the rationality behind the event, which the


180

original report gives. The published report in DD therefore merely explains the direct reason for the riot and depicts the two conflicts (See Example 1). In this way, however, the published report is much safer politically than the original report which is avoiding too much difference from the official ideology. Second, the image of the government has been shifted so that it is now positive. The published report in DD only describes the action of the protesters, and it has deleted the action of the police that is described in the journalist’s original report. In this way, the rioters are described as a mob that attacked and injured the police, and the police are the victim. From Figure 7.9, we can see two dichotomies of “us and them.” In the first, the privileged individual (the “civil service official”) is represented as “them,” while the underprivileged individual is represented as “us.” In the second, the privileged, that is, the government and the police, are imaged as victims and “us,” while the protester is described as being a violent and irrational “them.” Third, the opposition between “masses” and “officials” is mitigated in the published report. Take Example 2 as example. In Example 2, the change of a word (in bold) is very interesting. The word “official” (guanyuan) in the original report is changed to “government staff” (zhengfu gongzuo renyuan) in the published report. Official is a word showing hierarchy, while the words “government staff” are more neutral, without any status implication. In describing the locality of the conflicts between the rioters and the police/officials, the shift of “officials” to

Dahe Daily’s published report Privileged Individual


Violent

Victim

Irrational Them

Us

The Government

The protester

Rational

Irrational

Victim

Violent

Us

Them

Figure 7.9 The Dichotomy of “Us vs. Them” in the model of half truth-telling representation


181

“government staff” shows the newsroom’s intention to mute the presentation of conflict and opposition. Furthermore, the intention to mitigate the opposition between the unprivileged and the privileged shows in the grammatical agency as well. For example, in Example 4, we can see the identity “civil service official” is deleted from the published report. In the original report, the identities of “biandan” and “civil service official” are very opposite; while in the published report, the people who beat up the “biandan” are invisible. The Chinese word “zao” in the original report also has the meaning of sympathy and surprise. In the published report it is changed into “bei,” which only shows the passive action without any emotional meanings.

A ‘biandan’ was beaten up by a ‘civil service officieal’ in street ‘biandan’ in street was ‘gongwuyuan’ beaten up ‘biandan’ jietou zao ‘gongwuyuan’ baoda

A ‘biandan’ was beaten ‘biandan’ was beaten ‘biandan’ bei da Example 4 Grammatical agencies analysis of a sentence in the journalist’s original report (above) and the published report in Dahe Daily (below)

Remaining truth-telling representation: Southern Metropolis Daily July 1st report After the investigative journalist, Wang Jilu, submitted his report to the newsroom, SMD carried the report on July 1st. In comparing the published report in the newspaper to the journalist’s original report, one can find that the published report makes few adjustments and retains the soul of the original. The published report in SMD has the same dichotomy of “us vs. them” and is classified into the same model as its original report. Apart from what remained in the published report, there are two prominent differences between its two versions. First, the published report in SMD shows more sympathy to the rioters. We can see this point from the lexical and grammatical agencies. Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 list the labels used to refer to the event and to the rioters in


182

Table 7.12 Labels used to call the riot in the July 1st published report in Southern Metropolis Daily Labels for events SMD revised

Tone

Frequencies

Mass incident

Negative

1

June 26th event

Neutral

2

This event

Neutral

4

June 26th violent crime incident

Negative

1

Tone

Frequencies

Negative

2

Neutral

6

Total

8

Table 7.13 Labels of the rioters in the July 1st published report in Southern Metropolis Daily Labels SMD revised

Tone

Frequencies

Some undisciplined lawless fellows

Negative

1

Common people

Neutral

1

Bystander people/bystanders

Neutral

5

People

Neutral

12

Someone

Neutral

2

Those who looted the supermarket

Negative

1

Tone

Frequencies

Negative

2

Neutral

20

Total

22

the published report. From the two tables, we can see that the published report has a more neutral attitude toward the event, and a more sympathetic attitude towards the rioters. Furthermore, this attitude also shows in some lexical and grammatical agencies. Example 5 is an example of this kind. The two sentences are from the first paragraphs of the July 1st published report and the original report. One can see the identity of the action subject is invisible in the sentence from the published report. To hide the identity of the subject is to lessen the readers’ attention to it.


183

Some masses attacked the police station, smashed and burned cars, beat police, and looted a supermarket. Six armed police were injured and all products in supermarket were looted.

. . . in which, several armed police and police people were injured, four cars were burned, police station was smashed, and a supermarket was looted. . . . Example 5 Quotation from the original report (above) and the July 1st published report (below) in Southern Metropolis Daily

Second, the published report becomes politically safer, but has an even clearer presentation of the social conflicts. The lead in the published report protects it, since it claims to act as a sample for the provision of references for the government. The position of the newspaper shown in the published report seems to support the government’s governance in a friendly way, instead of making troubles for the government or criticizing governance. Furthermore, the newspaper classifies public opinion about the event narrated in the original report by the journalist under the name of “rumours,” and clarifies public opinion, for example, the official-businessmen collusion (guanshang goujie). The newspaper chooses to say that there are “rumours” to represent the real reasons that triggered the riot, in order to explain the event. Rumors are usually the truth.15 For example, one of the rumors listed in the report is about the official-businessmen collusion (guanshang goujie) between the real estate developers and business people, with He Minxu, the CCP Committee boss in Chizhou City. He Minxu is accused of corruption in the rumor. The next year, He Minxu was doubly-admonished (shuang gui) because of corruption, official-businessmen collusion, and some issues about his private life. Despite the report being safer, its theme is more prominent than in the original report. Differently from the published report about the Wanzhou Riot in DD, the published July 1st report in SMD strengthens, instead of weakening, the cause of the Chizhou Riot and keeps the three conflicts that were mentioned in its original report. The published report also reveals the three conflicts and establishes the three dichotomies in

184


its text as the same as those in the text of its original report. As in the journalist’s original report, the focus of the published report is placed on why and how an ordinary traffic dispute led to a large-scale riot. At the point of the theme and topic, the two versions of the report carry similar themes. Apart from the similarities, there are some differences in the details and the focus. For example, the original report puts more emphasis on describing the whole process of the event’s evolution with more description of the details, for example, including the scene setter: “Motorcycle-taxi drivers fought with the four people,” which, however, is deleted in the published report. The published report is, nevertheless, more focused on the reasons for the event’s evolution. It has listed the high-level and low-level themes, and the topics are listed as follows: (1) A common car-hitting-passenger traffic dispute in Chizhou Anhui evolved into a mass incident that involved fights, smashing, looting, and setting on fire. (2) A lot of rumors, the instigation of unprincipled fellows, and the improper treatment and so on, contributed to the event’s evolution. (3) What Wu said annoyed the crowds. (4) Bystanders believed that the student was beaten to death. (5) People thought the police covered up for the assaulters, who were cross-regional business people and were believed to have colluded with the CCP Secretary of the city, and so were hated by the people in Chizhou City. Between the lines, the published report in SMD transfers to its readers the theme that the riot originated from several reasons, and the rioters were not a mob. In other words, what was behind the riot and what really triggered it, were the conflicts, misunderstanding, and negative moods of people in Chizhou City towards the authorities, e.g., the police, the officials, and the rich, e.g., the Zhejiang investors in this case.

Conclusion: Social Riots, Investigative Journalists, and Newsrooms This textual analysis presents three models of newspaper representation of social riots (See Figure 7.10). The first model is the model of Party organ representation, which embodies the official account of a social riot. With this model, the report in CD, the local Party organ of Chizhou


185

Chizhou Daily’s June 27 Official Report

1

Southern Metropolis Daily’s June 28 Reprinted Civil Report

Dahe Daily’s October 26 Civil Report

Protester vs. Police/Government

Protester vs. Police/Government Underprivileged Individual vs. Privileged Individual

2

Dahe Journalist’s Report

Daily’s Original The People vs. The Government Protester vs. Police/Government

3

Southern Metropolis Daily’s July 1 Civil Report

Underprivileged Individual vs. Privileged Individual

Southern Metropolis Daily’s Journalist’s Original Report Social context

Figure 7.10 Three models of social riot representations in the six reports

City, as well as the reprinted report in SMD, show only the conflict between the rioters and the government/police/supermarket owner. The image of the rioters is a negative and violent “them,” while the government is represented as a victim and as “us.” A report of this kind follows traditional Party journalistic practices and speaks for the government and the privileged. It merely cares about the interest of the government and acts like a comforter to pacify popular outrages. It plays a role in maintaining the existing social order. In the second model, the model of half truth-telling representation, the published report in DD on October 26th, 2004, represents two conflicts, including the one between the underprivileged individual and the privileged individual and that between the protesters and the government/police. The image of the government/police is also represented as that of the victim and “us,” while the protesters are presented as a violent “them.” It is very congruent to CD’s official account of the riot. Despite revealing the voice of the underprivileged individual, this type of

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report mainly explains the riot from the position of the government, as does the official report in CD. The function of the newspaper is between an investigator and a comforter. It tries to act as an investigator, because the newspaper had sent its own journalist to investigate the riot. In the guise of investigation, the newspaper keeps in tune with the authorities as a result of severe self-censorship. The third model is the model of truth-telling representation. In this model, the DD journalist’s original report, the SMD journalist’s original report, and the published report in SMD on July 1st, reflect social dynamics by revealing the three social conflicts in their news texts. The latent social conflicts behind the riots are revealed in the reports instead of being concealed. In their reports, the privileged e.g., the government, officials and the rich, are not necessarily “us,” but are a negative “them” instead, while the underprivileged are the victims. The journalistic practices in this model offer a new genre of journalistic practices that differ from traditional Party journalism. With the function of an investigator and revealer, this new type of journalism tends to represent the voice of the underprivileged social groups and depict a panorama of the events, instead of passively broadcasting the government’s voice and following the official account of the events. In this model, one can see media practitioners from both DD and SMD act like investigators and revealers of the truth of the events, and they give discourse rights to underprivileged social groups. They have a clear understanding of social reality and are willing to tell the truth. The outbreak of social riots, especially those triggered by trivial individual conflicts like the two riots discussed here, reflects the accumulated antagonized mood of the people towards the authorities. Both the Wanzhou riot and the Chizhou riot show the “hate the rich” (choufu) and “hate the official” (chouguan) public psychology of the Chinese people, which has accumulated during the process of economic reform, as economic success has not been accompanied by social and cultural success, but rather by increasing social inequality and a rapidly growing rich–poor gap. Both journalists realized this invisible social crisis and wanted to tell the “truth,” because they thought it dangerous to cover up the people’s negative mood towards the government. They took different discourse strategies to express their own cognition and ideology. In comparison, the journalist from DD more candor than the journalist from SMD. The latter used more covert strategies, because his former report about the riot in Zhejiang was refused by the newspaper due to the overcandid way in which he was explained the event.


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Although the two journalists practice similarly and produce a similar critical discourse, DD and SMD, revise reports in different ways. The revision in the editorial process reflects the clashes in the interests of the journalists and of the newsrooms. Facing conflicts of interests, newsrooms practice self-censorship in order to gain political safety. Both newspapers have concerns about the political risks of covering social riots, but they have different ways of dealing with reports on this topic. DD shifts the tone of the original report and keeps it congruent with the official report. However, SMD keeps the major meanings of the original report, but makes it safer to present the story by using hidden script and discourse strategies. The practices are coherent with what the author observed in the newsrooms and from interviews. For this point, one can see the importance of organizational factors in journalistic practices. More conservative media organizations limit the realization of liberal journalistic practices, while more liberal newspapers help the fulfillment of journalistic professionalism and so help speak for the interests of the people and the underprivileged. The expression of the interests of underprivileged social groups, however, is covert and circuitous instead of being straightforward and open-and-shut expression. Another important point is made here: to reprint the official report in SMD before its own civil report becomes a way to increase political safety, as well as to show the newspaper’s social responsibility. The report in CD has been instructed by the local authorities and is an official version of the explanations of the event. To cite a report of this kind is absolutely safe. According to journalists in SMD, to carry something about events like social riots is much better than to keep silent. Furthermore, we can speak in our own voices by using official reports.16 What SMD has done is to make revisions to the official report according to its own position. After covering the official report, it is then safer to later cover its own civil report. From the discourse analysis, we can find two traits of the way of investigative journalists’ story telling. First, investigative journalists’ efforts to tell the “truth”: their reports reflect their understanding of social reality and their attitudes to different parties involved in news events and, therefore, provide an alternative nonofficial account of reality. From in-depth interviews with investigative journalists in both SMD and DD, one can find that most interviewees have deep understandings of social reality. In interviews, when asking journalists about their viewpoints on social conflicts, I found, surprisingly, that the journalists at SMD made very similar comments about social conflicts, though the journalists at DD

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could not reach consensus. Most Guangzhou journalists, and some of the Zhengzhou journalists,17 pointed out the rich–poor gap, the failed social warfare system, and the mood of the people towards the government, ranking it as being the biggest social problems. These journalists expressed a similar opinion about social problems. This opinion can be represented by Tan Renwei’s remarks as follows: Though also having benefited from the economic reform, the ordinary Chinese people feel increasingly exploited as the rich–poor gap is enlarging. The people who most benefit from the economic reform are only the minority at the top, who are usually the policy-makers, the beneficiaries and hold the majority of the political and economic resources. The great resentment of the interest-impaired people is just like a heated powder barrel. Telling the people the truth creates a channel for them to release their resentment and cool down the powder barrel. We cannot wait for the powder barrel to explode, because the explosion will be destructive18 (Tan Renwei, 2006) Journalists’ cognition of reality and their viewpoints are reflected in their reports. In this way, they believe they are promoting the social development of the whole society. For example, both in the Zuoyun Mine Disaster reporting, and in the texts of the two social riot reports, one can see the significant influence of journalists’ cognition of reality. The themes and topics of the news reports in these cases reflect journalists’ understanding and viewpoints of reality. In the Zuoyun Mine Disaster reporting, the SMD journalist believes the government should take the greatest responsibility for a disaster of this kind, and even mineowners are victims. He therefore reconstructed in his report an image of the mine owner that is no longer a black-hearted mine owner. He even tried to criticize the failures and mistakes the government made. In the reporting on the two social riots, journalists from both DD and SMD also believe the riots were an outbreak of the emotion of powerless people, and were a sort of invisible social crisis. They want to tell the truth because they regard it as dangerous to cover up the negative mood of the people to the government.19 They reveal deep social conflict in their reports and point out the invisible crisis within the social context as the real reason for the outbreak of riots. All three cases show that journalists represent their understanding of reality and reflect their viewpoints in their reports.


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By analysis of the three cases, one can see the ambivalent attitudes of investigative journalists to lower class people. The underprivileged are imaged as “powerless” and “vulnerable,” but also “irrational,” “violent,” or “numb.” For example, mineworkers in the Zuoyun mine disaster are depicted as being “poor” and “vulnerable,” but “numb,” “running after making money,” “disregarding life and colleagues’ death,” and “having no sense of human rights.” The incompatible representation of lower class people has proved to be compatible with the ambivalent attitudes of journalists to this group of people. From the interviews with journalists, one can find that journalists show both their sympathy and disdain for lower class people in the in-depth interviews. Here I cite Wang Lei’s comments to show this ambivalent feeling: “I feel sad for their misfortune, but become angry for their lack of endeavor (ai qi buxing nu qi buzhen).”20 In the Zuoyun case, when Feng Hongping and I went to a village to conduct interviews, we saw a lot of villagers gathered to chat instead of working. Feng commented that “a lot of villagers are very lazy and are unwilling to work hard. That is one of the main reasons for their poverty. So we feel sympathy for their poverty, but they are not worth of our sympathy.” Comments of this kind are coherent with the image of lower class people represented in Feng’s report. Second, investigative journalists tend to objectify their views and opinions. That is to say, investigative journalists try to keep their reports objective by quoting news sources and listing facts. As discussed in previous chapters, investigative journalists, for example those at SMD, regard objectivity as taking a position, perhaps with personal attitudes and judgments, in fact-based and balanced reports. From the discourse analysis in this chapter, one can find that journalists tend to express a sort of viewpoint. More specifically speaking, the journalists express their understanding and interpretations of social reality, based on facts they collect by investigation. Both official and nonofficial sources have been cited in the reports. Who journalists want to talk to, and whose views journalists want to include in reports, are highly decided by the journalists themselves. All reflect the ways in which journalists think about their social role. Following the specific historical and traditional beliefs of Chinese intellectuals, investigative journalists believe they have the responsibility and ability to help push forward social development. They believe their journalistic practices help solve social problems and improve social development. They not only claim professional ideals, but also try to realize the

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ideals in their practice. They have the desire and make efforts in their practice to “find and tell the truth” and to serve the public interest. In the reporting process, individual journalists play a more significant role than news organizations, especially in nonroutine practices. Journalists have their “improvisation” practices with which to deal with the influences of hegemony and ideology (Pan 2000). Furthermore, the work of a journalist is a subjective human work, producing news from information that is collected and chosen according to a series of professional principles and personal cognitions. Personal traits, including background, a cognition map of reality, and even personality, influence the human work of journalists. Among these factors, their understanding of reality is the major essential factor that affects journalistic practices, especially when journalists distrust the existence of absolute “objectivity” and tend to reflect their viewpoint in reports. Actually, the more autonomy a newsroom gives to journalists, the more effect individual factors have on journalistic practices. As discussed in Chapter 6, there are conflicts of interest between individual journalists and the newsroom. Self-censorship is an efficient way for newspaper organizations to deal with the clash of their interests with those of journalists. With more concerns for political safety, newspaper organizations act as gatekeepers through self-censorship, to avoid potential political risks caused by the violating-propaganda-taboo expression of journalists in their reports. The published reports in newspaper coverage are the result of negotiations between the considerations of the journalists and the newsrooms. The considerations of the Editorin-Chief represent the considerations of the newsroom in order to keep a balance of power within the social context, while journalists and editors have more of a desire to meet their professional calls. The struggles of power relations over media discourse happen at two levels: between media and other social institutions and between newsrooms and individual journalists. What media can do is that they can first ensure political safety and then keep other social forces in balance, while realizing the professional ideals of journalists to the greatest degree possible. This means that media have to avoid annoying power-holders as well as counter-attacking those power holders’ controls. Self-censorship emerges, as the situation requires. This book regards the self-censorship of media as a way to mediate information between power struggles: to lessen political risks, to maximize the interests of the social forces involved under the premise of political safety, and to best realize the journalists’ professional ideals.


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To practice self-censorship is to avoid stepping into a political minefield (leiqu) while maximizing the fulfillment of other interests. In this way, media positively rein over the government and broaden market boundaries. This is the positive side of self-censorship, though it meanwhile still oppresses journalistic professionalism. The reports on the Wanzhou Riot and the Chizhou Riot are two cases of self-censorship. As a result of more consideration for political safety, the self-censorship at DD is more severe, while remaining at the kernel of the journalist’s report and destroying journalistic autonomy than did SMD, while self-censorship at SMD exaggerates the core spirit of investigative journalism that is reflected in the reporting on the Chizhou Riot in a more strategic way. Discursive devices in reports embody judgments on bans and the illusion of the violation of a ban. The news workers at different levels have different considerations and judgments about the minefields relating to a topic. Due to discrepancies in positions and considerations, we can see a struggle within the newsroom between top-ranking newsworkers and individual journalists. The struggles over the discourse of news reports throws light on the different considerations of the Editorin-Chief, Editors, and Journalists, which thus reflect power relations in a broader social context.

Chapter 8

Investigative Journalism and the Public

This chapter examines the shifting relationship between investigative journalism and the Chinese public, and how that influences the social impacts of investigative journalism. Severe changes have occurred in the relationship between investigative journalism and the public during the twenty years’ practice of investigative journalism from 1990s to the present. The changes have been triggered by the increasing desire of Chinese people for public participation in public issues. From the peaceful marches in Xiamen and Shanghai, to the physical clashes of thousands of people with local government and police in Guizhou, Hubei, and Gansu; from the release of Sun Dawu under the pressure of public opinion, to the stepping down of the official Zhou Jiugen whose corruption was exposed by Internet participants, numerous public events in recent years have overthrown our imagination of the masses of Chinese people. Chinese people, especially those in urban cities, are no longer the “masses” (qunzhong), who are supposed to blindly follow the Party line with no disagreement, but instead they are active citizens, who are willing to express their views, protect their rights, and challenge unjust policies and practices that result from authoritarian policy-making structures and processes and a faulty legal justice system. Online discussion fora, bulletins, blogs, microblogs, social networks, and other types of online applications, facilitated by information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as the Internet, Web 2.0, and SMS, have created relatively maneuverable free spaces for public expression and participation. The public’s active participation in online discussion, and the exchange of information and views among members of the general public, has significantly transformed the relationship between investigative journalism and the public in terms of the public’s role in the communication process, and thus the way in which investigative journalism influences society.


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The active role that the public has played in influencing the practices of investigative journalism manifests itself in two ways. The first concerns the public’s role in informing investigative journalists. Informing and influencing mass media is not what the Chinese public would usually have done in the past. With the help of the ICTs, however, it frequently happens today. The public’s online discussions and expressions have become an endless, primary source of story leads for investigative journalists. The second refers to the online dissemination of investigative reports facilitated by Internet participants who amplify the influence of these stories and help news media resist pressures, and on some occasions, punishment from above. Many recent investigative reports, such as the cases of the Pengshui Poem, the Black Brickfield, Lan Chengchang, the Hide-and-Seek event, and the Deng Yujiao Killing Official event, have offered extensive evidence that in the process of investigative reporting, by being online, the public in China have shifted from being passivelyinformed masses in the past, to becoming active communicators in the present, disseminating original information, informing media, and even shaping/reframing media coverage (Zhou and Moy 2007), and helping to exaggerate social influences of investigative reports. Scholars, for example, Yu Haiqing, have some optimistic views about the active online activities of the Chinese public in shaping and constructing media discourse, and suggest that the mainstream media is losing its dominant hegemony in the mass communication process. The online practices of the active audience are seen as the practices of “media citizenship,” and the public are seen as a co-author of news reports with professional journalists (Yu 2006; 2009). Being online has empowered both the ordinary people and élites, including journalists, to discuss and circulate their ideas and even to exercise their citizenship, which circumvents the political incapacity of traditional Chinese media (Yu 2004; 2006; 2009). According to Yu, traditional journalism fundamentally lack emancipatory power as an inevitable result of the intrinsic political and economic prohibitions on it. Journalistic professionalism, and even investigative journalism itself, is fragmentary and can only break through when online public opinion has become irresistible and can no longer be ignored by the political authorities (Yu 2006). Similarly, Lagerkvist (2005) suggests that online news fora have taken the agenda-setting function away from traditional media in China and, in this case, journalists are no longer the guys who are usually responsible for setting the agenda and seeking for truth, instead it is the public’s

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role, as the extensive and lively discussions online make the public take certain issues seriously, and because of their seriousness, traditional media have to give such issues their attention. Though recognizing the importance of the involvement of traditional mainstream media in promoting the bottom-up online activism, Yu and Lagerkvist have underestimated the role of mainstream media in the whole process. Holding a different view, this chapter argues that so far, the formation of online public opinion has not really become part of the public’s media practices, and it does not mean that traditional media’s authority and hegemony have been impaired. Instead, in a context where mainstream media want to include the public’s new media practices as an extension of their operations, online public opinion is picked up by mainstream media to utilize in its orthodox journalistic practices for their organizational interests. The online public, indeed, also become a major information provider for investigative journalism and an effective means for the protection of media and journalists against political pressures. Despite having already recognized the power of the Internet, mainstream media always cast doubts on the credibility of online information that is provided by online communities, who merely form a small proportion of the whole population, and whose identity is blurred. The picking up of online information for mainstream media’s use is a sort of process of online information legitimation. Only after being picked up by mainstream media, can online information be legitimated and therefore generate genuine influence on society. In the whole process, offline mainstream media still function as the agenda-setters, selecting, reconstructing, and interpreting information available online. In the past, investigative journalism in China cast its influence over society through mobilizing the public. Today, the means by which investigative journalism exercises its influences remain despite the sequences of information flow in the public mobilization model having been changed as a result of the public’s increasingly active role in the practice of investigative journalism by traditional news media and in the process of social mobilization. This chapter will first analyze the public mobilization model of the influence of investigative journalism, and then discuss the shifting relationships between investigative journalism and the public. An examination of the influences of the shifting relationship on the communications effects of investigative reports through the analysis of the cases of the Pengshui Poem and the Black Brickfield Scandal will follow. After that, the roles of investigative journalism and the public in the public mobilization process are scrutinized, which suggests a modified public mobilization model of the influences of investigative journalism.


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The Public as “Masses”: A Public Mobilization Model of Investigative Reporting Investigative journalists traditionally reside in the position of informing the public, in both the West and in China. In the West, to provide the public with the information that is needed to make a good citizenship is supposed to be the right thing for the democratic media to do. What investigative journalism should do is to tell the public what the public do not know, but should know. The public need to be well informed about matters for the public good and journalism can thus forge public opinion that shapes policy making and enables the public to make the right choice in voting. Investigative journalism in China also takes the responsibility of informing the public about what is important, but about which the public is unable to know in the usual way. The difference between the West and China in informing the public lies in the traditional reasons for which they need to be informed. Chinese investigative journalism’s need to inform the public has nothing to do with voting. Instead, it is important because investigative journalism needs to tell the public what is right or wrong by revealing wrongdoings and by punishing wrongdoers, which actually educates the public to reach a broad consensus on social ethical values and guide them to acknowledging the correctness of what the government is doing. In orthodox Chinese media and cultural discourse, the receiver of the media message is regarded as the “masses” (qunzhong), rather than as citizens or the public (Lee 2005). The concept of “masses” is a highly politicized one that reflects “the Maoist Party–press ideology” (Zhang 2000: pp 618; Lee 2005). Guided by the Chinese version of Marxism, the CCP saw ordinary people as the “masses”, which implies that the people are led by Communist Party leaders and follow that leadership without dissent and without their own ideas (Zhong 2005). Media readers are seen as target of mobilization and education (Lee 2005). The media is the main State ideological apparatus, through and within which the Party’s domination and leadership can be achieved and maintained. Chinese media audience, then consisted of ordinary people, who are those guys sitting at one end of the communication process, passively receiving the message, which are usually official guidelines and policies from the above, sent by the media at the other end of the communication process. What and when to tell the “masses” is decided by the Party in much of the time, while the media are merely a channel through which information flows from the ruler to the ruled.

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There are two reasons that legitimize the need to inform the “masses” about the negative sides of society, the main subject of investigative journalism. The first is the establishment of the “right to know” in Chinese media discourse in the 1990s. The appeal for the people’s “right to know” was first initiated by liberal intellectuals in the pre-1989 time period (Yu 2006). This appeal was an important part of the ideals for freedom of the press and free speech that were advanced by a group of liberal intellectuals including Hu Jiwei and some CCP leaders, such as Zhao Ziyang, in the pre-1989 liberal wing of the Party. The concept of the “right to know” is a discourse advanced to prepare for the desired political reform and democratization that were longed for by these liberalists. For example, Hu Jiwei, the former Editor-in-Chief of People’s Daily, commented: “Freedom of the press for citizens is the right to be informed as masters of the country, their right of political consultation, their right of involvement in government and their right, of supervision over the Party and government’’ (Zhao 1998: 36). Despite the liberalization tendency having been defeated in the June 4th event, and freedom of the press being far from having been achieved, the idea of the “right to know” has been established in Chinese media ideology as a result of the commercialization of the media system in the 1990s (Yu 2006; Zhang 2007). Media commercialization has shifted media attention from the government to the ordinary people, driven by commercial interests. It is important for the media to protect the people’s “right to know” in order to win their users’ trust and maintain their readership, although the “right to know” in this sense is not exactly what Chinese liberal intellectuals wanted a decade ago. For example, Zhang (2007) argued that the Chinese media do respect the readers’ “right to know” what the Party allows them to know in order to gain commercial advantages. The lack of fundamental freedom of political choice in informing readers makes the establishment of the “right to know” in Chinese media discourse subject to the second reason, the Beijing leadership’s perception of the need to inform the “masses” (Zhang 2007). Second, when investigative journalism rose in China it was at a time when the ruling Party regarded the “masses” needed to be informed about what bad happened in society, and what these meant. Negative consequences of economic reform were appearing, among which corruption, disorders in economic activities, and the decline of ethical values about what is right and what is wrong were the most prominent. The “masses” were vulnerable to corrupt officials, unscrupulous traders, and diabolic criminals, which stood in opposite to their imagination of a


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socialist society. If lacking in right judgment and discernment, the “masses” were thought easily confused by social problems and what they were seeing in daily life. It was therefore thought not to be a good means for achieving social stability to cover up all the problems, as covering-up would result in doubts in the people’s mind, impairing the legitimacy of the ruling Party and the correctness of launching economic reform. The “masses,” therefore, needed to know what was happening in society in order to have a correct understanding of these happenings and to form correct public opinion that was good for the CCP’s rule, especially when society was experiencing enormous changes and consequent problems, which had generated questions in the people’s mind. Orthodox Party journalism, however, was used more to report on positive events, the reporting of which established a harmonious image of society that was obviously contradictory to what the “masses” were experiencing. Investigative journalism was thus initiated to do the job: setting agendas for the “masses”, informing them what was happening in society, and telling them what these occurrences meant. Such a process of agenda setting, information, and interpretation mainly aimed to resolve doubts in the people’s mind and, in return, helped to maintain confidence in the ruling Party. In fact, before informing and setting agendas for the general “masses,” investigative journalists were usually informed by some individual members of the “masses.” In many cases, the actual scene would be that a handful of the “masses” happened to know something ugly, but important, before investigative journalists knew. Nevertheless, due to limited access to resources, these individual members of the “masses” had no channel to tell the general “masses” what they knew, or to make the general “masses” believe their stories. Justification of the information was only achieved after the information was selected by and disseminated through the mass media that were embodied with the image of being part of the authorized ideological apparatus. Based on the information provided by a handful of the “masses,” investigative journalists investigated the “truth” and informed the general “masses” about the “truth” they had found. In this way, investigative journalists revealed the “truth” for the “masses” as well as for the ruling Party, warning them of the problems and risks in Chinese society, and explaining to them what the causes for the problems were. This is a process of selection, agenda setting and interpretation. Investigative journalists select what they think having news values and being socially and politically meaningful, from the information provided by a small number of the “masses,”

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interpret and produce them into investigative reports, and then disseminate these reports among the general “masses.” The overall communication sequence in investigative reporting and dissemination is still a sender–receiver model. Informing the public however, is not enough, as investigative reporting cannot have a strong influence without the outrage of the public (Ettema and Glasser 1988; 1989; 1990; Protess, Gordon et al. 1991). Investigative journalism cannot exercise its power without the participation and cooperation of the public. The ideals of investigative journalism can be fulfilled only if it receives support from both journalists and the public (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991). The public need to be mobilized. That is to say, investigative reporting can have influences over society only if able to mobilize the public and rally public opinion, which catalyses social and policy changes. Not all investigative reports can mobilize the public, but successful investigative reports can. Protess and his colleagues advance a mobilization model of investigative reporting, which is thought as soaked into Western democratic tradition, with a highly linear process of changes (see Figure 8.1). Within the mobilization model, investigative journalists are able to fulfil their longing for professionalism, influencing public policy but meanwhile “independent of the governing process” (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991: 15). With the mobilization model, the media influences policy making through a process in which: “the press tells the public what they need to know, the people then decide what they want, and the press helps communicate these decisions back to policy makers” (Linsky 1986, quoted in Protess, Gordon et al. 1991). The mobilization model of investigative reporting is applicable in the context of China though it needs some modifications. Chinese influential investigative reports often exercise their influences following a three-step process in which media reports revealing scandals, wrongdoings, and problems are the original cause, the mobilized public act as the crucial catalyst, and the authorities practice corrective actions, despite such corrective actions seldom being legislative and/or resulting

Published media investigations

Changes in public opinion

Public policy reforms

Figure 8.1 The mobilization model of investigative reporting (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991: 15)


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in policy reforms as would be expected in Western democracies. Since the 1990s, there have been many examples of this mobilization model at work. The case of Zhang Jinzhu in Dahe Daily, for instance, presents us a good example of how the public mobilization model works. The series of reports on the Zhang Jinzhu Event is regarded as the beginning of public opinion supervision in Chinese journalism, which means that the Chinese media starts to influence society in a different way (Jia 2006).1 In this case, we can see the three stages in the public mobilization process. At the first stage, on August 25th, 1997, Dahe Daily (known as Dahe Culture Daily at that time) carried a report on a hit-and-run traffic accident entitled “A Malign Traffic Accident in Zhengzhou Last Night: White Crown Toyota Vehicle Hit and Runs Away Dragging a Victim; Taxis Run After the Crown Full of Indignation” on its front-page. The summery of the report is a white Crown Toyota vehicle, the licence number of which is YUA54010, hit Su Donghai and Su Lei, a father and son who were riding bicycles. Su Lei was hit and fell down to the vehicle and then the ground. Su Donghai, the father, got stuck in the wheels of the vehicle. The Crown didn’t stop and ran away instead, dragging Su Donghai for hundreds of meters. Passengers and taxi drivers started to run after the Crown and forced it to stop. Su Lei died after he was sent to the hospital and Su Donghai was severely injured. (Jia 2006) The report caused the indignation of Zhengzhou’s citizens. The public outrage was reported on the following day in the newspaper, without pointing out the identity of the driver. On August 27th, Dahe Daily revealed the identity of the driver to be a police official in its report that was covered in a prominent place in its coverage. The public became even angrier as they got to know the hit-and-run driver was a police official. Dahe Daily continued to report on the event and how the government dealt with it for the following four and half months. At the second stage, the reports in Dahe Daily were picked up by national news media. The nationwide public outrage was triggered, especially when Southern Weekend that had deep influences over Chinese intellectuals and CCTV’s Focus investigated and reported this event in October the same year (Jia 2006). According to Ma Yunlong, at that time, the public outrage targeted not only at Zhang Jinzhu himself, but also at the whole police force. The reports of the case of Zhang Jinzhu just triggered and reflected the nationwide public outrage toward the police (Jia 2006).


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At the third stage, the Zhengzhou Intermediate Court (zhongji fayuan) held a public trial of the case and even set speakers outside the court to live broadcast the trial. A large group of citizens gathered and listened to the trial. On January 12, 1998, Zhang Jinzhu was sentenced to death and soon was executed following the sentence (Jia 2006). In this case, we can find the corresponding reactions of the news media, the public, and the government: the reports in news media triggered the anger of the public, which then pushed the government to respond to the hit-and-run event. In such a mobilization process, investigative journalism exercised its power when the public anger that was ignited by the reports was recognized by the government. Nevertheless, the conventional mobilization model of investigative reporting in the context of China deviates from the one in the Western context in two ways. First, though the intermediate between media exposes and corrective actions, the Chinese public is not believed to be a group of people who can independently make reasonable decisions for the good of themselves. The public is thought of as having to be informed and told what has happened, as well as how to understand what has happened. The moral standards of right and wrong are usually set by the media that represent the ruling government, and public outrage is summoned and guided by the media. This is because of the conventional relationship between news media and the public in China, as discussed above. Second, the corrective actions are seldom related to changes in public policies,2 but, most of the time, are solutions to problems in individual cases, accompanied by punishment of problematic individuals or groups of individuals. Furthermore, changes, if there are any, are usually at the level of individual cases, as a result of pressure from above or from other political actors. It is difficult to see any changes that occur at the policy-making level. In China, therefore, the traditional model for the impacts of investigative reporting will be that media exposes lead to problem solving, first by changing public opinion and achieving public consensus, and then by pushing the authorities to act (see Figure 8.2).


Changes in public opinion & Achieving Public consensus

Problem solving

Figure 8.2 The mobilization model of investigative reporting in China


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The Shifted Concept of the Chinese Public: From Passive “Masses” to Active Citizens Important changes that subvert the typical understanding of the Chinese people as the “masses,” have happened in Chinese media discourse. The ideas of “audience” (shouzhong) (or message receivers) and “citizen” (or the public) have started to supplement, and even sometimes replace that of the “masses,” though, which has not been totally abandoned, in the understanding of the receiver of media message (Zhang 1998). The concept of the “audience” has gradually entered the discourse of Chinese media along with the deepening of media marketization in the 1990s. The concept of the “audience” has depoliticized “the mediamasses relationship,” which was formalized during the 1940s with the support of Mao Zedong (Zhang 2000), but which has commoditized the relationship between the media and its message receiver, who is the “consuming audience” in terms of Lee (2005). The new media-receivers relationship has redefined the media’s functions, as the media are expected to satisfy its two masters: the Party and the audience, impairing the former “commandist-commanded relationship between the Party and the media operations” (Zhang 2000: 619). The introduction and popularization of this concept is seen not only as a starting point from which Chinese media can move away from being a loyal Party propagandist, but as the first time that the activeness of the audience has been recognized in the contemporary Chinese media history (Zhang 2000). Seeing message receivers as an audience respects the diversity and individuality of readers, viewers or listeners, who are no longer monolithic “masses” who passively receive media messages. Instead, the “audience” is seen as a group of consumers of media products, who select what they like to consume according to their own tastes (Lee 2005). Besides actively selecting media products, the audience in China has started to make their voices heard. The Chinese people indeed have a willingness to express their political opinions as citizens, even when they were treated as the “masses.” The Chinese public’s political expression was once very active, especially before 1989. The newspaper was the main medium in which the public’s voices were made heard. The case of Guan Guangmei is an excellent example of this.3 In 1987, aiming to correct the public’s understanding, to clear doubts from the people’s mind, and to prevent leftist conservatism from interfering in the economic reform, Economic Daily launched a series of reports and discussions in its coverage about the controversy, later called the Guan Guangmei phenomenon

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debate in the history of Chinese journalism. The letter from Guan Guangmei covered on the front page of Economic Daily started the debate, the centre of which was whether leasing enterprises were “socialist” or “capitalist.” The letter attracted more than 10,000 letters from readers within 45 days, all of them commenting on the phenomenon. Economic Daily covered more than 200 pieces of hard news, features, commentaries, readers’ letters, and pictures, bringing private conversation on this issue into the public forum. In this case, despite that the newspaper still acted as the opinion leader in forging public opinion and the initiative of the newspaper was to guide the pubic along the right road, the active participation of the wider public in the political discussion on this important issue showed their desire for political expression. The then active public political expression was facilitated by the appeal for political reform that prevailed before 1989, and was soon dwarfed by the Zhao Ziyang fiasco in 1989. At the post-1989 time, there was an apolitical tendency in both Chinese media and public discourse, partly because the political authorities wanted the public to turn their attention to economic development, instead of political reform, partly because the public was disappointed by the apparent defeat of their political goals, and partly because of the increasingly apolitical media content resulting from media commercialization. Since the 1990s, the public’s political expression willingness have been stimulated and revived by audience participation in TV programs, the practice of investigative journalism, commentary on current affairs especially in newspapers and news magazines, and user-generatedcontent functions of the Internet. The rise of audience participation TV programs in the 1990s first forged the concept of the “right to speak” for the public (Yu 2006). The audience is encouraged to attend discussion panels in TV programs and to express their views and concerns about certain topics. In the TV sector, therefore, the audience are no longer spectators, but are participants and part of the program. The audience are invited to attend TV shows, or vote for their star on TV programs in the various popular commercial entertainment TV programs that have been launched across the country, such as Happiness Headquarters (kuaile dabenying) and Super girl (chaoji nvsheng) on Hunan TV, Happiness Mobilisations (huanle zongdongyuan) on Beijing TV, Who Last to The End (shei xiaodao zuihou) on Zhejiang TV, and the latest program Meet Me With Your Heart (feicheng wurao) on Jiangsu TV. In 2005, when 400 millions of the Chinese audience tuned into Super girl and millions, for the first time, voted for Li


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Yuchun, some Western media called the phenomenon an alternative rehearsal for Chinese democracy. Ordinary people have also started to appear in TV current affairs and politics programs in recent years. The first way is as TV studio audience. One of the most successful programs of this was CCTV’s Tell It Like It Is (shihua shishuo) (which was launched in 1996 but closed down in 2009). In this program, the ordinary audience joins in the conversation with journalist presenters and invited guests in the TV studio, and the conversation, which is mainly about sociopolitical topics chosen by media, may generate public discussion in the wider society. The second type is that audience participates in TV programs as interviewees or news sources. In-depth investigative TV programs, such as Oriental Horizon, Focus, and News Probe, have reformed the format of their TV programs. In the 1980s, current affairs TV programs, such as Xinwen Lianbo, took the reporting format of “picture plus explanations.” That is, TV news programs then merely presented pictures of news events and gave journalists’ explanations about what happened, excluding the voices of ordinary people. Oriental Horizon, launched in 1993, was the first to introduce the notion: “let ordinary people tell their own stories” (rang laobaixing jiangsu ziji de gushi). Since then, Chinese TV news programs have started to move towards being “people-centered,” and they include interviews with ordinary people who thus have a chance to express themselves and their concerns. In the West, the “audience” has been seen as potential citizens who actively participate in democratic progresses in the public sphere (Corner 1991; Livingstone and Lunt 1994). In the context of China, scholars cast their skepticism about whether the media see their audiences as citizens. Contemporary Chinese media “has not treated the audience as public citizens,” but political masses and economic consumers (Lee 2005). Audience participation opportunities provided by mainstream media are cultivating citizenship to a certain degree, though, are quite limited. On the one hand, the television audience has established a sense of the “rights, obligations and responsibilities as well as common values of society” (Li, 2002: 26; Yu, 2006). As long as audiences are treated as individuals and can speak their independent voices as citizens with rights and obligations to speech, audiences participating in these programs present themselves as citizens and such participation thus has implications for democracy. On the other hand, however, the democratic implications are limited due to the nature of the programs. Though reflecting the public’s

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desire to express their views, the audience participation in commercial entertainment TV programs is merely a political illusion, not something politically serious that generates debates on politics that are good for democracy. These commercial TV shows draw the audience’s attention to narrow entertainment issues, which are an apolitical and deideological politics instead of real public debates that can breed democracy-friendly public opinions (Lu 2009). Compared to the audience participation entertainment TV programs, current affairs TV programs that involve the audience’s active participation and voices on certain social and political issues have more democratic potential. The nature of the program content has endowed such audience participation with a sense of political participation, the scope and scale of which, however, is limited by media authority (Yu 2006). The active audience can only be authorized to participate in programs and express themselves when the media invite them. It is a sort of mediadriven audience participation in which audience’s stories and opinions on certain of media’s chosen topics are selected and constructed by mainstream media. Such media-driven audience participation reflects the intention of the TV media to integrate the audience as one part of their media practices in order to survive in the marketplace, but also to indicate the enthusiasm of the public to actively participate and the public’s longing for expression. The practice of investigative journalism has, since the mid-1990s, successfully brought politically sensitive topics, events, and issues to the public’s eyes, which helps to nurture the sense of citizenship by pushing the public to critically think about something politically serious. As with its psychology of informing and educating their readers, investigative journalists, however, limit the political expression of the public as citizens in their practices. Another book could be written about commentary on current affairs in China. China has a long history of political commentary, starting from the pre-Qin period. The modern commentary on current affairs, developed from political commentary in the early nineteenth century, has become popular among newspapers and news magazines since it was first readvanced in Southern Weekend that set up a column for it in 1996. The initiative of Southern Weekend was soon followed by other newspapers, such as China Youth and Beijing Youth. China Youth first contributed a column to the commentary in 1998 and soon gave it a whole page in 1999. Southern Metropolis Daily started its daily “SMD Current Affairs Commentary” page in 2002, and soon increased the number of pages for the commentary, which gave the commentary a


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regular space and intensive attention. Newspapers across the country, such as Qiru Evening, and Times Weekly, now have their own regular pages for current affairs commentary. The popularity of current affairs commentary offers the readers diversified unofficial voices, opinions, and even criticisms of current affairs and political issues, which protects the right to speak. These voices and opinions, however, are usually from intellectuals and élites from different areas instead of ordinary people. According to He Xuefeng, the Chief Editor at SMD’s Commentary Department, there are four types of writers who regularly contribute to the current affairs commentary at SMD. They are experts and professionals, media workers, overseas intellectuals, and Internet writers. Except for the Internet writers, the other three types of commentators are intellectuals and élites. The Internet writers are also few in number and are themselves élites among other Internet users. Commentary in news media does offer the space for a diversity of public opinions, but lacks the grass-roots contributions and still reflects the media’s psychology as being an informer and educator. The public’s participation in public debates as citizens in China is likely to be embodied in online discussions. The Internet is growing fast in China. The absolute number of people using the Internet is very large indeed, though the proportion of Internet users in the total population is still small. In 2008, China surpassed USA by becoming the country with the largest number of Internet participants (MacLeod 2008). By the end of 2009, according to the China Internet Network Information Centre (CINIC), China had over 384 million Internet users. Regardless of the access and Internet literacy, new media technologies, such as the Internet, Web 2.0, and SMS, have offered a chance for ordinary people to express their thoughts and concerns. The Internet has indeed diversified usage. However, it is common and important for the Internet to be used for public expression and participation purposes. Facilitated by these new media technologies, despite the Internet censorship, ordinary Chinese people can relatively freely post their views in online discussion fora and send messages to their friends. A prominent trend in contemporary Chinese public life is that Chinese citizens use the Internet heavily as a discursive space for their opinions on various issues and for information obtained from direct and indirect sources. Online bulletins, chat rooms, discussion fora, blogs, microblogs, such as Twitter, social networks such as Kaixin.net (the Chinese version of facebook), are among those frequently used by citizens to exchange information and views. The wave of online current affairs commentary that started from 2003 is a good example of this. Since 2003, various main Internet portals,

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such as Sohu, NetEase, People, and Qianlong, set their online commentary columns so that ordinary Internet users can post their comments about current affairs and political issues. Other websites, such as Tianya, and kdnet, have gathered a large aggregate of Internet users who have interests in social and political issues and are actively involved in the discussion (Zhao 2008). Such an online discussion is thought to contribute to democracy, though the number of net users who join in discussions on politics is still relatively small and they tend to have a high educational background (Zhao 2008). It is true that some forum participants are élites in the real world, for example, they may be journalists or government officials. The facilitation provided by the Internet however, has offered an alternative way to express and forge public opinion. The revival of commentary in news media and in the Internet is thought to forge the public sphere in China (Zhao and Zhang 2004). The author regards it to be very difficult to say that this is the public sphere, because the Habermas’ concept of the “public sphere” is one that originates and exists in the social context of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheles, one thing that has been confirmed is that it is a dialogue space in which the public can participate as citizens, which has been constructed through commenting on news media and new media. The forging of such a space has proved that the Chinese public are active citizens. The relationship between the media and the public is no longer the media-masses relationship, and is not merely the media-audience relationship; instead it is a media-citizens relationship. The public participates in the construction of public discourse as citizens, striving for an expression space for political and public discourse.

The New Relationship between Investigative Journalism and the Public The public’s activeness in constructing public discourse indicates a new type of relationship between investigative journalism and the public. In the new relationship, the public plays an active role in informing investigative journalists as well as in disseminating investigative reports. The first meaning of this new relationship is that the public has begun to greatly inform investigative journalists, instead of merely being informed by them. The flourishing of online public debates on social and public issues has made visible public opinions that used to be invisible in the real world. The debates are now written down in traceable text messages and have resulted in a contemporary contra-flow of agendas in investigative


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reporting. The contra-flow of agendas means some topics are heatedly discussed by the public in the online virtual world and have successfully moved into the discourse of mainstream media, taking their place on media agendas in the offline real world. Internet-based communication among the public brings certain issues to the attention of online citizens who first discuss such issues and forge particular public opinions. These issues are later picked up by investigative journalists from mainstream media, who investigate them and publish their investigations that reinterpret the issues in a way that is probably different from, but probably congruent to, the initial online interpretation. The public no longer passively receive what has been selected and fed to them by investigative journalists, but frequently inform investigative journalists about what the public want to discuss and the meaning of those events. This kind of informing media activity, however, is not the information-providing activities of some individual members of the “masses,” such as writing letters, making phone calls to, or visiting news media or investigative journalists, as it was in the early years of the development of investigative journalism, especially in the 1990s, and this is still valid today. Instead, news media are informed through the active information-seeking and selection activities of investigative journalists from public expression on the Internet. This kind of information from the public is an inevitable consequence of the initiatives investigative journalists have undertaken in seeking useful information as news leads from various forms of citizen’s active expression on the Internet. The contra-flow of agendas in investigative reporting is made possible for two reasons. The first of these concerns the challenge the Internet poses to all the “old” news media. The circulation of print media is shrinking; TV audience and newspaper readership are also declining as a whole. Traditional news media are unable to compete with the Internet in terms of the amount, intimacy, and interactivity of information, but is superior to the Internet in terms of credibility. Facing the large quantity of Internet information, Internet users will lose discernment as not knowing what is true and what is fake. Traditional news media is thought to be most suitable for playing the role of authority, since they have well-trained professional journalists whose professional norms are a guarantee of credibility. They also have the financial resources their news media give to make expensive investigations into events and issues (Lu 2007). The second reason is the recognition by traditional news media of Internet information as a resource for their reporting. An early successful use of information from online discussion fora as an effective source for investigative reporting was seen in 2004, when Fu Jianfeng and Jiang

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Yingshuang, both from Southern Metropolis Daily, successfully transferred a hotly-discussed topic in the online virtual world into an influential investigative report in the offline real world, as discussed in Chapter 3. Since the launching of Web Eye (wangyan) in SMD, which particularly covers stories from online discussions and is the first of this kind in China, information from Internet discussions has been used as a primary source for investigative reports. The most famous investigative reports in recent years include the case of Lan Chengchang, the case of Huanan Tiger, the case of Chongqing Nailhouse, and the Case of Pengshui Peom, which are excellent examples of this. Information is first exchanged online, and is then picked up by traditional mainstream media after becoming influential among a group of people. It is then reproduced for mass communication. In contemporary times, it has become a common pattern that some problems are solved by first being communicated among a group of the public, who are using new communication tools, and then they are investigated and reported by investigative journalists in traditional media coverage, therefore drawing the attention of the general public and the authorities (see Figure 8.3).

Usually local events/scandals/ problems

Pressures for change: problem solving, punishment, and even reforms

Public outrage in discursive spaces in the virtual world

Mass communication

Communication among the public via new communication tools, e.g., the Internet, mobile etc.

National/international attention and public outrage in the real world

Investigated by investigative journalists from “old” media

Published media investigations in real world

Figure 8.3 The process of the contra-flow of agendas in investigative reporting in the new media era


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Besides the contra-flow of agendas in investigative reporting, the relationship is called new, also because the public plays a new role in disseminating and promoting investigative reports via the Internet following their publication in traditional news media. There are two ways in which the public contribute to the dissemination of investigative reports. First, the public, especially online participants, can be the disseminators of investigative reports, by easily circulating and even reproducing investigative reports, for example, by posting them on the public’s own blogs and websites. Investigative reports can become resource inputs for usergenerated-content tools. Second, investigative reports can be discussed in cyberspace, and they then contribute to the forging of strong public opinions on the (local) issues covered in the investigative reports. This means that national prominence can be achieved via Internet dissemination and promotion, which can be used as a means to resist the pressure from (local) government. The Internet has become an effective channel for disseminating investigative reports and for increasing the influences of investigative reports (see Figure 8.4).

Usually local events/scandals/problems

Pressures for change: problem solving, punishment, and even reforms

National/international attention and public outrage in the real world Mass communication

New media communication Public outrage in discursive spaces in the virtual world

Dissemination or reproduction via new communication tools, e.g., the Internet, mobile etc.

Published media investigations in real world

Figure 8.4 The process of disseminating and promoting investigative reports in new media era


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The Public Mobilization Model Revised We can find there are some changes in the mobilization model of investigative reporting in the new media era (see Figure 8.5). The changes can be seen in two points. First, in many cases, the stories of influential investigative reports are first discussed hotly among a small group of the public, especially by online participants. Strong public opinions are forged and recorded, in the form of traceable text messages in user-generated-content produced by online participants before news media pick up on the leads, investigate them, and publish the results of media investigation. Second, the public are mobilized not merely by published media investigations, but also by the online dissemination of the published media investigation. There is an interactive communication effect between the online participants’ new media practices and investigative reporting. The process of change is no longer linear. However, it is still questionable whether online participants have taken over the authority of mainstream media and become the dominant agenda-setter and sources of effects in the process. Public mobilization brings together a relatively large group of the general public to cast their attention on certain issues at a certain time. Their collective presence will produce pressures on the power holders and policy makers who trigger changes in these issues. Public mobilization will generate a bottom-up grass-roots power to facilitate the solution to certain problems. In the process, consistent and strong public attention and support are essential in making an impact on policy makers who otherwise might

Public opinion among a small group of the public, especially internet participants, expressed and recorded in traceable text messages in usergenerated-content


Changes in public opinion among wider public Achieving Public consensus

Problem solving

Figure 8.5 The mobilization model of investigative reporting in the Web 2.0 era


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ignore the call (Rucht 2004). Traditional mass media usually play a crucial role in mobilizing public opinion, as mass media target the general public and rally public opinion in the agenda-setting process (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991; Rucht 2004). In the new media era, however, the use of ICTs overrides the limitations of face-to-face interaction, and endows ordinary public members with the ability to communicate with millions of people. At the time when more and more user-generatedcontent impacts on and influences mainstream media discourse and the shaping of public opinion, we cannot help asking the question: who takes the lead in shaping the discourse of public opinion now?—Online participants who generate nonprofessional content or traditional investigative journalists who make professional investigative reports? Two cases will be discussed in the rest of this chapter. From these two cases, one can find 1) how the new public mobilization model works; 2) whether online participants have taken over. The pengshui poem scandal: “freedom of expression,” official abuse of legal power, and the contra-flow of the investigative reporting agenda In Chinese society, one of the most striking social injustices is the abuse of legal power, while one of the biggest problems in human rights is about freedom of expression. The Pengshui Poem Scandal has both. In this case, an ordinary person was taken into custody and faced a charge of libel because he wrote a poem that was thought to contain satirical comments on the local governor. The online discussions on this scandal entered into mainstream discourse and demonstrated a powerful influence on the solution of this issue. One can find, however, that only after the case was investigated by investigative journalists and revealed in coverage by the traditional mass media, did the online discussions have any influence. Qin Zhongfei would still have been in jail, if Long Zhi and He Haining had not published their reports in Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekend revealing the Pengshui local authority’s power abuse in the case of Qin Zhongfei, as well as the corruption in Pengshui County. Qin Zhongfei was an obscure low-ranking civil servant in his early 30s, in Pengshui County of Middle-Western China’s Chongqing Municipal City. He probably would have remained unheard of for the rest of his life if he had not written a few lines of politically satirical poem and sent it off to his friends via SMS and QQ messages. But he did. As a result, for

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the first time in his life, he suddenly became the focus of public attention in Autumn, 2006. On August 15, 2006, Qing Zhongfei, wrote a poem and sent it out to his friends via text messages. In this poem, he commented on current affairs and criticized the performance of politicians in Peng Shui County. On September 11th, he was arrested by local police and accused of libelling the County Governor, the CCP boss at the County level, and another high-ranking County official. More than 40 other people were investigated by the police during this event. On October 18th, the County Procuratorate decided it was a criminal case and formally accused Qin of libelling the County Party Secretary, Lan Qinghua, and the County Governor, Zhou Wei. A criminal libel carries a penalty of up to 3 years in prison. Li Xingchen, a middle-school classmate of Qin, wrote and published an article in his blog with a title: “A Modern-day Literary Prosecution Stuns Pengshui Chongqing’ on the 19th of September. Li, himself a journalist in a local media, was also investigated by the police. Li’s blog article stirred up the Internet fora and rumors swept around Pengshui. The public opinion however, did not alter the situation much. Long Zhi from Southern Metropolis Daily and He Haining from Southern Weekend learnt about this event from the Internet. They read Li Xingchen’s blog article and noticed the furious online discussion in early October, and started investigation into the event separately. The two journalists, widely talked to many people, including Li Xingchen, Qin Zhongfei, Qin’s wife and friends, relevant officials, ordinary people, and published the investigative reports at the same time on October 19th. The scandal was thus first time revealed in the “old” media and then came into the public focus. A U-turn was seen immediately in the Qin Zhongfei’s case. One week later, after the publication of the two investigative reports, the County Police dropped the charges, admitting the case was faulty, and apologized to Qin and his family on October 24th. Qin was even given an immediate compensation of RMB2125.7 (around $266) before he applied for it. After publication of the two investigative reports, moreover, mass media across the country, including CCTV and those from outside the country, gave their attention to the event. Even after the local authority admitted it was a faulty case, Liaowang Weekly, a magazine launched by the Xinhua Agency, still published a report entitled “Investigation into the Chongqing Pengshui Poem Scandal: a faulty case because of local authority’s power abuse.”


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As a result of the extensive media exposure, Qin achieved his freedom and received financial compensation. Lan Qinghua, the county’s leader, who was involved in the poem scandal, was dismissed in December 2006. Long Zhi and He Haining’s reports about the misfortunes of Qin Zhongfei are categorized as a classic example of “investigative journalism” in China. Reporting on the case of Chongqing Pengshui Poem Scandal is even regarded as a triumph of investigative journalism, which demonstrates that the Chinese media, in their watchdog role, successfully halt the abuse of power, helping an innocent citizen to achieve justice, because in this case, shortly after the publication of the investigative reports in the two newspapers, the case was decided to be faulty, the oppressed Qin Zhongfei was released and received both an apology and compensation, and the official involved in this case was later dismissed.4 The Shanxi Brickfield scandal: wrongdoings, official-commercial collusion, and online dissemination In 2007, less than a year after the Chongqing Peingshui Poem case, the collaboration of investigative journalism and the Internet launched another popular mobilization against the black brickfield owners and the official-commercial collusion involved. In this case, the Internet exercised its influence in a different way from that with which it influenced the Pengshui Poem case. On May 9, 2007, the news hotline at the Urban Channel of Henan TV received a phone call from two parents whose children were missing. Fu Zhengzhong, a journalist at the channel, decided to meet the two parents who had reported that their missing children were kidnapped and sold to black brickfields in Shanxi by traffickers. Fu Zhengzhong was appalled, since he could not imagine such a thing exists, which was similar to the notorious black slave trade of history. Fu Zhengzhong therefore did in-depth undercover investigations with his colleagues, Fan Qi and Song Xinwei. They discovered the scandal that children were enslaved and mistreated in the black brickfields in Shanxi and Henan. Some of them were even sold by local government departments. They recorded the horrible scenes with their secret cameras and made them into a series of programs. Urban Channel of Henan Television broadcast 21 programs from May 19–June 11. The broadcasting of the television programs attracted extensive attention from the local audience and from those parents whose children were missing. The broadcasting, however, did not draw

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the attention of the national audience and the local government in Shanxi before the programs were disseminated and discussed through the Internet. On June 5, a post titled “a guilty road of ‘black men’! Children were sold to black brickfields in Shanxi. 400 fathers appealing for help with tears of blood” was posted in the Dahe Forum of Dahe.net based in Henan province. This post was so influential that it was soon reposted in the national Tianya forum on June 7. The post in the Tianya forum immediately attracted extensive national attention. The local media in Shanxi province published an investigative report as a response to Henan TV’s initiative. News media across China also started to give their attention to this scandal. It became the top news on various news portals in China. According to Caijing, local government did not take actions against the scandal until mid-June. On June 13, Wang Zhaoguo, a central highranking official who was a member of CCP’s Central Committee of Politburo, indicated that the scandal needed to be investigated. On the same day, Zhang Ming, another central high-ranking official from China’s Central Labor Union, arrived in Shanxi for the investigation. From June 15th, the Shanxi government launched actions aimed at cracking down on the black brickfields. On June 18th, China’s Central Labor Union had a press briefing, informing the public and media about the latest information on “The Scandal of the Shanxi Black Brickfields.” Wen Jiabao, the Permier, also expressed his attention to this event and urged for an investigation. On June 22nd, Yu Youjun, the Governor of Shanxi Province, apologized to the victims and their families. On July 4th, the owners of black brickfields were prosecuted in court.

Investigative journalism and the public in public mobilization Several implications can be drawn from the two cases that will assist our understanding of the roles that investigative journalism and the public are playing in mobilizing public opinion in the Web 2.0 era in China. Though impacts intertwined, investigative journalism in the traditional mass media still takes the lead over the new media practices of online participants in public mobilization. User-generated-content produced by online participants provides investigative journalism resources as well as exaggerating its impact, while investigative journalism legitimates and validates the information provided by online amateur-produced-content and helps it to be taken up in political discourse. Besides, Internet users,


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particularly literate online content producers, have adopted strategies to catch the attention of the wider public and mainstream media in a way that cannot be underestimated. Members of the Chinese public have been found striving to gain and establish new platforms of communication for their appeals, especially in the absence of access to traditional mass media. In these two cases, the Internet becomes the only choice (Zhu 2007). In the Pengshui Poem Scandal, Chen Ga, the wife of the victim, appealed to Li Xingchen for help in desperation. Li Xingchen is himself a local journalist, who claims to be an idealist,5 but he could do nothing more than write about the injustice that Qin Zhongfei had been subject to in an article published on his blog. In the Shanxi Brickfield Scandal, Xin Yanhua, whose nephew was sold as a slave, posted an appeal for public attention to the trauma that child-slaves were facing, when she found traditional mass media were unable to solve the problem. The two cases show that their efforts were successful as they soon caught the attention of other online participants and mainstream media that gave wider visibility to the scandals. In both cases, the Internet provides common people with the freedom to bypass the communication obstacles and reach a wider public. The use of the Internet by the public aims to reach a nationwide audience so as to achieve the support of the national powers, in order to reconstruct the local world from outside. Despite the Internet providing this chance, not all members of the public are able to use it as an effective means to defend their interest. In both cases, the two online content producers have good literacy abilities. Li Xingchen is a professional journalist, while Xin Yanhua is “well-educated, able to write beautiful articles, and familiar with the Internet” and her husband is a journalist who has experience of managing a website (Zhu 2007). Because of their high literacy ability, Li and Xin’s posts were written in a journalistic style, fluently and logically, which might be one of the reasons why they soon caught the attention of the public. Because of their knowledge of how communication works, Li and Xin also figured out an alternative way to communicate the information they had. In contrast to them, the wife of the Poem scandal victim and the parents of children victims lack the ability to employ the Internet as a new platform for communication. Parents of children victims in the Shanxi Brickfield Scandal, for instance, did not know what else they could do, and did not even have written material (Zhu 2007). The freedom that the Internet provides to ordinary people is therefore, first of all limited by the Internet users’ literacy.

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Online posts, however, could not have led to substantive changes in social issues without the involvement of the traditional mass media. Traditional media succeed better than online posts in two ways. First, in contrast to professional journalists in traditional mass media, online forum posters are amateur information producers and communicators. The information communicated by them is short on credibility and validity. Both Li’s blog article and Xin’s forum post were written without a basis in facts and investigation, but were based merely on their personal statements. Despite being sensational in the virtual world, the information reflected in the two online articles were thought as “online rumours,” the credibility of which needed to be proved by traditional media (Xin 2007). Both cases went through an evolving process from online “rumors” to authoritative media coverage. The roles traditional mass media and investigative journalists played in the two cases were to justify and validate online information, which had been provided by members of the public, through making investigations in a professional manner. In the investigative journalists’ investigation and storytelling in traditional media, traditional mass media and investigative journalists thus maintained their journalistic authority. Second, traditional media are the main means that link the majority of citizens to the political sphere. Political discourse can be created only when traditional media include facts and interpretations of situations and problems in political agenda and then influence the political field itself (Gibbins and Reimer 1999; Cardoso and Neto 2004). The influences of the two online articles were not powerful enough but needed the help of traditional media to be incorporated into political discourse. The attention of mainstream media therefore needs to be captured in order to mobilize the powers in the political sphere to gain their support. This was why the online information communication of the event that was initiated by a blog article by Qin Zhongfei’s journalist friend created public rage against the local authority on a small scale, but failed to change the situation that Qin Zhongfei was facing. The situation did not change until the “old” media published the investigative reports in the real world. The “old” media, however, do not always have influence over politics either. How much social impact investigative reports in traditional media can have is closely related to the influence of the traditional media themselves. In the Black Brickfields Scandal, investigative journalism in “old” media took the lead, but was unable to create a nationwide sensation. This was because the influence of Henan TV in the Brickfield Scandal was itself limited. The purpose of the media exposure was not achieved


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and “the cross-provincial activity to save the children was not improved, because Urban Channel in Henna TV was not satellite broadcast, and few of the local media gave attention to the event” (Zhu 2007). When “old” media failed in the first place, Xin Yanhua’s posting disseminated the information to a wider audience and attracted the attention of more influential traditional media, which sent their investigative journalists to follow the event. Both of the cases discussed above thus indicate the close relationship between traditional investigative journalism, and the Chinese public’s new media practices, which involve citizens’ spontaneous investigations and dissemination of information. The active roles of the Internet in shaping public opinion and mobilizing the public for changes in issues, however, are different in these two cases. The real effect of the investigative reports broadcasted on Henan TV was reached with the help of online dissemination. From these two cases, one can find that online information communication by the public can have surprising effects only after being justified by traditional media; while the effects of reports in traditional media can be increased by communication through ICTs, such as the Internet or mobile phones. Sources of information on the Internet, or transmitted through other ICTs by the general public, have credibility only after being selected, interpreted, and framed by the traditional mass media, though they do manipulate the news reporting in offline traditional media. As an orthodox, ideologically legitimate tool, the offline traditional media still function as agent setters, selecting, assembling, reinterpreting, and reconstructing online information sources. We often see traditional investigative journalism collaborates with the Internet, generating a force that pushes the power holder to make changes. The Ten Million Luxury Door Scandal in 2007, for instance, is another good example of this. In this scandal, an online forum post on a local portal in Shenzhen City exposed that the Highway Bureau in Bao’an District, Shenzhen City, spent RMB thirty million in rebuilding its door, which had been built three years ago. Traditional media, such as Southern Metropolis Daily, soon sent journalists to investigate the scandal. After the media exposure of this event, the Bureau’s Director was dismissed from his position. The attention and outrage of the public not only puts pressure on the authorities to deal with issues, but also supports investigative media, and provides investigative media with political protection by forging strong public opinion. In the Shanxi Unsafe Vaccine Scandal, for

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instance, Xinhua News Agency covered a report “Recovering the Turth— Journalist’s interview about ‘the case of Shanxi vaccine’ ” to refute the validity of Wang Keqin’s investigation. The Xinhua journalist’s report, however, was heavily criticized by Internet users, who even accused Xinhua’s report of being manipulated and instructed by Zhang Baoshun, the Party boss in Shanxi Province, who was the Deputy Director of the Xinhua News Agency from 1993—2001. Public mobilization, however, is tricky. First, it is not wholly dependent on the subject whether an investigative report has influence or not. The same subject might produce different levels of influences at different times. According to Wang Lei, one of the coauthors of the Sun Zhigang case report, “. . . they did not expect this report would have such an influential power over society. Reports on similar topics, about people being illegally killed in custody, are covered every year.” The success of the Sun Zhigang case was determined by many other societal factors outside media. For example, Zhao accredited the sensation of the Sun Zhigang case to the resonance among the middle class, due to their similar and shared background (Zhao 2008). Second, the power of investigative reports is difficult to retain; as the public might steer away to other important issues that occur later, which might impair their influences. The Shanxi Unsafe Vaccine reports in 2010 are a prominent example. The impacts created by the series of reports in China Economic Daily were soon counteracted by the earthquake that happened in Yushu County. The public and the media shifted their attention from the vaccine event to the natural disaster, which eventually impaired the effects of the investigative reports produced by Wang Keqin. Third, though essential, public outrage does not necessarily lead to changes in policies or social issues. The authorities might just ignore public opinion. Finally, online public discussions and offline investigative journalism however, are not always staying congruent. The active public may provide their account and understanding of the reality in opposition to that provided by investigative journalists. Both online public discussions and offline investigative journalism produce knowledge or tell the “truth” to the general public. The versions of truth produced by the online and offline worlds may not match, and offline investigative journalists are not always able to justify their version of “truth.” In some cases, the public are even trying to take over the epistemic authority from traditional journalism. The case of Deng Yujiao is a prominent one in this regard. In this case, the account of a story presented by Long Zhi


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from Southern Metropholis Daily was not in tune with the one understood by online participants and therefore received criticism, blame, and even cursing from the public. In this case, the public wanted to subvert the “truthful” account provided by traditional investigative journalists, but the attempt was not successful. Online public participants and offline investigative journalists competed for the legitimation of their versions of truth in this case. In sum, in the new media era, the online participation of the public and the use of ICTs by the public have changed the public’s role in the public mobilization model. The public has become a force that mobilizes investigative journalists. This public’s influence in mobilization however is not some sort of news media practice, but is instead more of an information provider and initial public opinion that may influence public opinion on a wider scale, which can then be utilized by mainstream news media. Though recognizing the power of the Internet, mainstream media still casts doubts on the credibility of its information. Information from the Internet can have credibility only after being selected, interpreted, and reconstructed by the mass media. The mood and opinion in the virtual world needs to be justified by orthodox news media and then can have great influence in the real world. The online and offline powers interact. The offline news media, however, still acts as the agendasetter, who selects, interprets, and reconstructs the information from the Internet produced by the public.

Chapter 9

Conclusion: Investigative Journalism as a Reforming Force

For our better understanding of investigative journalism, it is worth raising a critical question about the function that investigative journalism has in Chinese society. This question is about the essential nature and role of investigative journalism’s philosophical principle and professional practices in an authoritarian society. This concluding chapter suggests investigative journalism in China acts as a reforming force for social change, serving both the ruling authorities and the people. I see investigative journalism in this country as a genre of journalism that has the potential to reform the existing social order, though it can also frequently reinforce the status quo. To practice this genre of journalism not only satisfies the motives of both the Party and news organizations, but also realizes the journalistic ideals of journalists who have mixed the ancient Confucian intellectuals’ desire to save the nation and the people together along with some of the Western journalistic professional values.

A Prevailing View Mass communication has always been integrated with politics (Garnham 2000). A Marxist perspective on the role of media suggests that even in democratic societies, the media can help to persuade the people to accept the rule of the State as legitimate (Garnham 2000). The media not only largely propagate the dominant ideology of the ruling class, but also reproduce and reinforce the dominant ideology, societal values, and the status quo to serve the interests of dominant groups (Thompson 1990; Garnham 2000). Even investigative journalism that is respected as being the “custodian of conscience” in liberal democracies, is thought of as reinforcing and relegitimating dominant “national and societal values by publicizing and helping to punish those who deviate from the values”

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through the “objectification of moral claims” (Gans 1980: 293, quoted in Glasser and Ettema 1989: 1). Following this line, one cannot help asserting that investigative journalism in an authoritarian society must be serving the ruling authorities. In terms of the social function of investigative journalism in China, a prevailing view in the existing literature echoes the tradition of the critique discussed above. Pessimistically, the prevailing view sees Chinese investigative journalism mainly as serving the power holder. Scholars, such as Zhao, Chan, and Pan, regard Chinese investigative journalism as helping the ruling Party consolidate, instead of being a challenge to its rule. Though recognizing that investigative journalism has a “killing power” (Zhao and Sun 2007), scholars regard it as mainly functioning to legitimate a bureaucracy that needs to re-establish its credibility with the public, to serve the Central Party’s need to polish up its image, to supervise local governments and officials, and to ease the tension between the Party and the public (Zhao 2000; Zhao 2001; Chan 2003; Pan and Chan 2003). For example, Zhao (2000) has studied investigative journalism by examining it in its social contexts and argues that investigative journalism, whose rise was a result of changes in political and media settings, was instrumental to the Party leadership as the latter wanted to use investigative journalism to strengthen the Party’s hegemony. Other scholars, for example Pan and Chan, have a resonant view. Pan and Chan (2003) regard the practice of investigative journalism in China as an efficient way in which the Party authorities use it to solve the tension between following the Party line and speaking for the people, as investigative journalism helps the public express their concerns and, therefore, shows that the CCP does represent the basic interests of the people and the propaganda of the Party speaks for the people. Without such political support, investigative journalism would not survive in a country that believes in tight propaganda control. Despite encouraging the apparently free practices of investigative journalism, the Chinese ruling Party continues to hold its traditional Marxist perspective on media function. In this sense, investigative journalism is a type of political tool.

The Challenges to this View The main reason that accounts for the prevailing pessimistic view, is that unlike what drives investigative journalism in Western democracies, Chinese investigative journalism was actually initiated by the ruling

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Communist Party in the hope of helping relegitimate the Party’s rule in China. This view, however, has its limits if we examine it in the face of the evidence of contemporary reality. This view is, for instance, incompatible with the facts, such as that investigative journalism is still alive during times when the Party-State considers too many exposures of problems as a threat to social harmony and so wants to constrain this genre of journalism, and investigative reports have indeed triggered changes in sociopolitical issues and policies, as well as posing challenges to the rule of the authorities from time to time. The challenges to this view come from three essential points that emerge from the relationship between investigative journalism and the ruling authority, media organizations, and the public. (1) Chinese investigative journalism is found not to passively and willingly submit to the propaganda control of the ruling authorities. Instead, Chinese investigative journalism actively seeks journalistic autonomy and manipulates its relationship to the ruling authority to maximize its autonomy. The relationship between investigative journalism and politics in China is a mutually beneficial one. The ruling authorities employ investigative journalism to consolidate their rule, while Chinese journalism utilizes the political psychology of the ruler to develop journalistic practices, to seek occupational autonomy, and to improve its professional status. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Central authority holds a paradoxical attitude towards investigative journalism. Such a contradictory view originates from the expectation of the authority on investigative journalism that it will help its rule and the authority’s willingness to constrain investigative journalism when the latter has been found untamable and not totally under control. This paradox in the attitude of the ruling Party is produced by a conflict between the authoritarian nature of the regime and the adversarial nature of investigative journalism. The ruling authorities have always attempted to turn investigative journalism into a propaganda tool that helps their political rule. This attempt is from the Chinese style of Marxist media theory, which regards the media as part of the political system and needs to help the ruling Party to disseminate national ideology, dissolve dissent, and achieve harmony between top and bottom (Tong 2010). A tight propaganda control over the media is the guarantee of the strong and united power of the State in the State management model: “big State, small society” (Su 1991; Wong 2004; Tong 2010). In the 1990s, the Central Government’s great encouragement of the practice of investigative journalism

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turned investigative journalism from internal references to public media coverage. That encouragement was largely given for political need. Investigative journalism, for example, was needed to criticize local individual wrongdoers and to reconstruct local order, when a decentralization of administrative political power and an increase in local powers was seen. However, investigative journalism must be practiced under the control of the Propaganda Department. The authorities thus set up rules that limit the practices of investigative journalism in many ways, for example, bans were imposed that instructed on what can and what cannot be investigated and reported on. What’s more, the authorities firmly crack down on the overbrave and rebellious media as a warning to others. Chinese journalism has successfully taken up the opportunities provided by the authorities and has developed some new journalistic techniques and concepts from investigative journalism practices. A new set of journalistic professional ideals have been recognized and accepted by the public and journalists. Investigative journalism becomes a paradigm of good journalism and an effective mechanism for the maintenance of the legitimacy of Chinese journalism after Party journalism lost its privileged position in China, as discussed in Chapter 5. Despite the ruling authority efforts to integrate it into the administrative political system, Chinese journalism has an instinct to maintain occupational independence and a desire for freedom. As discussed in Chapter 2, such a wish comes from the instinctive critical spirits of Confucian intellectuals, the liberalism of the 20th century, and the enlightenment concept of “free press” from the West. The occupational desire for professional status and independence of journalism also helps. When it has gained certain professional status and autonomy with the support of the State and élites, the occupation of journalism in the process of professionalism will try to separate from the State and élites in order to attain more autonomy. Although under control, investigative journalism does not wait to be manipulated by the propaganda departments, but instead actively handles the relationship with the political authorities. Under the circumstance that the authorities have a paradoxical attitude, media élites who practice investigative journalism employ a range of tactics, carefully probe the boundaries of media discourse, and warily construct nonofficial accounts of reality and truth that are different from the official ones constructed by Party organ media. Investigative journalists believe that this truth and the nonofficial discourse they construct could help enlighten the consciousness of the public and therefore gently reform China.

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(2) Chinese investigative journalism has gained the support of media organizations that require investigative journalists to match the expectations of the public on the role of journalists as a result of the organizational concerns of commercial profits and organizational image. Media organizations and investigative journalism are in the same boat to a certain degree. The development of Chinese investigative journalism is embedded in the history of the commercial practices of Chinese media. A mutually beneficial relationship has been developed between media organizations and investigative journalism. For media organizations, investigative journalism brings financial profits at the same time as political trauma, while for investigative journalism, media organizations provide support as well as prohibitions. When the ruling authorities initiated and legitimated investigative journalism as a political tool to cleanse wrongdoers within the Party and the country, media organizations earned the first pot of gold in the media market through practicing investigative journalism, winning both fame and fortune. On one hand, with the practices of investigative journalism, media organizations built up their image in the market, forged a large readership, and brought in economic income. On the other, by practicing investigative journalism, media organizations claimed to provide a good platform where journalists could practice investigative journalism, attracting a group of media élites, and earning a prestige and a privileged position in journalistic circles. Investigative journalism, however, can also bring political misfortune to media organizations. For Chinese media organizations, political mistakes are always more disastrous than economic mistakes. Some news organizations have therefore quit the practice of investigative journalism, taking a stance to please the ruling authority. The tradition of investigative journalism, however, has not been completely abandoned due to the institutionalization of investigative journalism. News organizations and journalists that insist on practicing investigative journalism are carefully handling the censorship of the ruling authorities, which is reflected in the newsroom’s self-censorship. In the stable development of the 1990s, when permitted by the ruling authority, investigative journalism was gradually internalized as an organizational activity, as indicated in Chapter 5 and 6. Individual journalists who are outside the administrative and political system, or who are even itinerant journalists, have been internalized to news organizations and have become organizational people. The professional ideals of individual

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journalists have been established as a kind of organizational journalistic professionalism. Such organizational professionalism has been recognized by generations of employees in news organizations and has become the journalistic values and a norm system that guides their practices. These values have also been accepted by the public, and public recognition has become an important strategy through which to occupy the market. The organization of investigative journalism further prevents media organizations from wholly quitting the practices of investigative journalism during politically harsh times. Despite being initiated by the Party, therefore, investigative journalism has become an important part in the process through which Chinese journalists shift from loyal Party’s propagandists toward professional journalists. The political needs of the Party and economic concerns of media organizations have created a good chance for journalism to develop a new model of journalism and have satisfied the instinctive desire of journalists to seek journalistic autonomy. The development of this new genre of journalism is based on achieving more journalistic autonomy and higher professional status and on the development of more professional practices. Journalistic autonomy embodied in the practices of investigative journalism, though limited, can also be accredited to the journalism’s fight against the political control over journalism. The ways in which investigative journalism develops itself, is a way in which Chinese journalism has carefully and tactfully gained journalistic autonomy and professional practices from the gap between political and economic controls. Within the twenty years of its development, many media organizations and investigative journalists who bravely and strongly confronted the authorities were punished, e.g., World Economic Herald, 21st Century Report, Southern Weekend, Southern Metropolis Daily, Dahe Daily, Ma Yunlong, Chen Yizhong, and Yao Haiying. Learning from these lessons, contemporary investigative journalists are starting not to blindly resist control from above, but adopt various tactics and strategically seek journalistic autonomy through the crafted practices of investigative journalism. Though not always working, these tactics have sought autonomy and chance for investigative journalists. (3) Chinese investigative journalism has not only successfully made the public accept it as a paradigm of good journalism, but has also attracted the public to actively participate in public mobilization.

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In its twenty years of development in China, investigative journalism was gradually legitimated as a paradigm of good journalism for Chinese journalism. Both the public and journalists recognize the privileged position of investigative journalism in Chinese authoritarian society. If one sees the trajectory that Chinese journalism has taken since the 1980s as a continuum, investigative journalism resides at the professional end of that continuum, while Party journalism inhabits the other end. Investigative journalism, though it was initiated by the Party, has become an important vehicle in the transition of Chinese journalists from loyal Party propagandists to professional journalists in that trajectory. The public recognition comes from the fact that the public in China needs investigative journalism. In a society in which the expressions of the public are suppressed and where individuals cannot protect their basic rights by using a judicial weapon, investigative journalism is needed to act as a defender of justice and a channel of communication that reflects a wide range of social interests, especially the suppressed ones. Not to mention the poor and underprivileged, even those rich and privileged, are vulnerable to the abuse of administrative power and the State-Capitalism of China. In 2006, for instance, Qin Zhongfei, a civil servant working for local government, was illegally taken into custody because of the poem he wrote. In 2009, Tang Fuzhen burned herself to death in a protest against the forced demolition of her home in Chendu City. In 2010, Chen Shaohong, the boss of a restaurant, drank pesticide to protest against an illegal fine meted out by a government department in Hubei Province. Though still a taboo in political discourse, mass incidents (quntixingshijian), largely led by peasants and workers, have been rapidly increasing in China since 1999 (Yu 2007). Whether selfimmolation or drinking pesticide or social unrest, all are means of the public’s appeal for a redress of injustice and to get their voices heard. Investigative journalism matches such a need in the people. The public embraces the emergence of investigative journalism and sees it as the model of good journalism that could help appeal for justice. The public in China today is no longer what was called the “masses” decades ago. The public pays attention to agendas raised by investigative reports, actively provides information for investigative journalists, helps to forge public opinion and therefore impresses and influences policy makers to generate changes. The public even actively participates in discussing sociopolitical issues, facilitated by ICTs. A new middle class is said to be emerging in contemporary China. It has strong interests in

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political issues, seeks political engagement, and uses media, especially the Internet, as channels through which to participate in political discussions (Wang 2009). The middle class and élites among the public have played an especially crucial role in the production and dissemination of investigative reports. As discussed in Chapter 8, the discussions of the public in online fora and the blogosphere, provide sources for investigative reporting, and amplify the influences of individual investigative reports.

The Power of Chinese Investigative Journalism Like investigative journalism in other parts of the world, Chinese investigative journalism exercises its power over society in two main ways. The first is through agenda building to fulfill the public’s right to know, to mobilize the public, to cause changes in public opinion, and therefore to influence public policies (Protess, Gordon et al. 1991). By making some issues more prominent and noticeable than many others, and by providing facts and opinions, the media influences the attention focus of the public and shapes their perspectives on certain topics (McCombs and Shaw 1972; McCombs 2005). By setting agendas for a nationwide audience, investigative journalism draws the national or even international attention to those important, but usually concealed issues in localities. The attention from the wider society on particular issues helps to find a solution to the problems in the locality, which often reconstructs their local social order. Especially when such agendas have triggered the outrage of the public, investigative reports have power over society. The Sun Zhigang Case in 2007, for instance, is a successful one, as its publication immediately attracted the public’s attention and caused the public’ anger (Zhao 2008). The Shanxi Unsafe Vaccines in 2010 is another more recent example of this. As for the subjects of the agendas, part of these investigative reports fits into this propaganda rhythm. That is to say, some investigative reports indeed reinforce the State ideology and the existing dominant societal values, especially those investigative reports on anticorruption and inferior goods in the 1990s, or those investigative reports that employ the chances provided by State policies. The investigative report on the direct sales in 2004 is one prominent example of this. On June 1st, 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao gave his instructions on the event in which several thousands of graduates in Chongqing were cheated into joining a direct

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sales organization. The year 2004 therefore became the year of antidirect sales (Fu 2005). Fu Jianfeng, an investigative journalist from Southern Metropolis Daily, went undercover to investigate and revealed the problems in direct sales. This case can be seen as an example in which media and investigative journalists sought a suitable time for their reporting autonomy, but can also be seen to reinforce the dominant ideology by blaming wrongdoers (Glasser and Ettema 1989). Due to the tactical handling of propaganda bans and instructions, the subjects of agendas are not limited to those on the list approved by the authority, as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. Particularly from the beginning of the 21st century, the reported subjects gradually steered away from what was justified and expected by the Party and overrode the reporting instructions. The diverse subjects covered in investigative reports represent a wide range of social interests, not just those who can normally access the media, and make their voices heard. Some investigative reports, especially those in the 21st century, such as reports on the Sun Zhigang case, mine disasters, the brickfield scandal, the selling babies scandal, and the unsafe vaccines scandal, indeed challenge the existing social order and values and try to re-establish a new social value system for Chinese society. The effects of such investigative reports are not limited to what is expected by the authorities. The second source from which the power of investigative journalism originates lies in the process of news production. Investigative journalism has influence over the society in many cases, due to the moral judgments that investigative journalists have made in their news-making process, and the interpretations investigative reports give to news events, rather than merely revealing something negative. There is a paradox between value judgments and objectivity. Investigative journalists make value judgments in their production process, which includes moral judgment (what is right and what is wrong) and meaning judgments (how to understand news events). John Pilger defined what an investigative journalist needs to do. An investigative journalist “not only gets the facts right,” but also “gets the meaning of events right” (Pilger 2005). Ettema and Glassers discuss deeply and extensively how American investigative journalists make moral judgments, find meanings, and interpret news events when they are making investigative reports. That is, when investigative journalists tell the public what happened, they also try to tell the public how to understand what happened, which is the meaning of news events.

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In the Chinese context, what investigative journalists provide readers with is a nonofficial narrative of reality or “truth,” which is fact-based but reflects investigative journalists’ judgment and their interpretation of news events. The interpretation and judgment reflected in investigative reports are combining investigative journalists’ own understandings of social reality, and voices from the bottom-up. The ideals of objectivity and independence and their instinctive skepticism towards the authority and the powerful make them keep a distance from the authority, powerful institutions, and individuals, and turn to ordinary people. The grassroots personal background of investigative journalists also determines their interests in issues encountered by ordinary people. Investigative journalists themselves have links to, and show sympathy to, the bottom of society. The investigative journalists at SMD, for instance, do not have an elite background. They come from small places in China, e.g., remote villages and small towns, and have changed their life and moved into the circle that dominates media discourse through personal hard work, e.g., through Higher Education or through career achievements. These people have living experience at the bottom of society, and thus have innate sympathy for the lower classes and a deep understanding of social problems. Investigative journalists, therefore, tend to make the voices of people from the lower class heard by casting their attention on grass-roots subjects and citing views from ordinary people. The voices from the people, however, are incorporated into the epistemology of investigative journalists and are reconstructed in the texts of investigative reports according to investigative journalists’ judgments and understandings. The process of this is justified by journalistic professionalism. Investigative journalists have specific journalistic professionalism that is shaped in the sociocultural context of China. They tend to use journalistic professional norms, such as objectivity, truth, and social responsibility, to justify intellectualized interpretation and turn investigative journalism practices into the main means by which intellectuals can save the country. For example, despite objectivity being a core norm in their professional claims, one can find that journalists are presenting their views and opinions instead of merely facts, if one observes their practices and analyzes their text. Chinese investigative journalists have a congruent and special understanding of objectivity, social responsibility, and independence, and have developed a specific way to justify the credibility of their reports. These are reflected in their

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moral judgments and interpretation of news events, and in the meanings of news events. They present these judgments and opinions objectively on the basis of facts, providing an account of reality and an alternative “truth” that is different from the official account which, according to them, is good for democracy and helps social development. Through agenda setting and interpretation, investigative journalists disseminate intellectual understanding among a nationwide audience. In the new media era, such an understanding incorporates the voices from the social bottom that has been initiated by online activism. Especially when conflicts happen, such bottom-up voices are interpreted, reproduced, and justified by traditional media and intellectuals. As often different from official explanation or official agendas, both investigative topics and the meanings of events help change the social order and help break down a monopoly of political power, especially in localities across China. This is a reforming power in authoritarian China, though not a revolutionary one that might totally change China, for example, by subverting the one-Party rule.

The Limits of the Power The power of investigative journalism, however, is mainly limited in three ways. The first of these concerns the limitations of the middle class. The concept of class seems out-of-date and gone with the end of Mao’s regime, which advanced class-struggle. Class, however, still “remains a pivotal force in shaping the ways we live now” (Murdock 2000). A new middle class is thought to be emerging in the marketization process in China. Whatever components the new middle class has (see Buckley 1999, Stivens 1998, and Murdock 2000), the middle class is mediating between the ruling élites at the top, and the lower class mainly comprised of peasants, workers, and laif-off workers at the bottom, in the “pyramidal social structure” of China (He 2000; He 2002). In a situation in which the ruling élites want to maintain the status quo, and a proletariat lower class, who traditionally is a revolutionary “leading force” in social movements (Marx 2003), which however, has no ability to express its voices and to calmly participate in public mobilization, because of their material as well as literacy limitations, a hope for social change and liberation has therefore been given to the middle class Chinese, including journalists themselves. For example, one can find Zhao’s confidence in the middle class has been increased if one compares her

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works in 2001 and 2008 (Zhao 2001; Zhao 2008). This hope, nevertheless, is romantic but unrealistic. It is true that the influential effects of investigative reports are primarily supported by middle class Chinese, for example in the case of Sun Zhigang (Zhao 2008). This group of people, however, have their fundamental limitations. The limitations come from two concerns. First, the middle class is a minority (Zhao 2001). The size of the middle class is small, especially if compared to the lower class. He Qinglian called the middle class the “underdeveloped middle class,” merely occupying 15.8% of the total work force (He 2000; Zhao 2001). The middle class has less political and economic privilege than the ruling élites, while consisting of a smaller number than the proletariat lower class. The urban-based middle class fears not only the repression of the ruling élites, who are superior in terms of political and economic privileges, but also fears the large population of lower class people, whom they see as an element that is threatening the stability of the society. Second, the middle class sits on the fence. Middle-class Chinese are themselves benefitting from economic reform. They have no fundamental desire for social change, despite possibly having all kinds of links to the lower class; and in the face of the strong administrative power of the State, the middle class is also underprivileged. When their interests are impaired, they might ally themselves with the large population of the lower class to defend their interests against the State, but it is easy for them to compromise with the State. They know how to struggle with the ruling élites. They might initiate social movements for their own interests, and utilize investigative journalism to solve the problems they are facing, for example the antiestate developer movement in the Lijiang Garden residential block, and the proenvironmental movements in the Guangzhou Rubbish-burning event, the Xiamen PX project event, and the Shanghai Maglev event. Nevertheless, these are all individual cases and it is very difficult for them to trigger real changes at the level of policies and in the longer term, as well as benefitting the large number of lower class people. Journalists themselves belong to the middle class either in terms of cultural capital or economic capital. As discussed in Chapter 5, Chinese journalists were themselves part of the political and administrative system. Though now have separated from the system, most of them, including investigative journalists, are part of the middle class population. The emancipatory power of this group of people comes from two sources. First concerns the critical spirit of intellectual that is increased by

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journalistic professionalism developed in the professionalization process. Second is that the vulnerability of being the middle class population, especially when they confront the ruling elites, has pushed them to oppose the authorities. Such an emancipatory power, however, is limited in two ways as discussed above. First is the compromising nature of journalists as the middle class people, who are easy to compromise with the ruling authorities. Second is the fear and distrust of journalists in the lower class population. This is the reason why this study found that the journalists have sympathy towards the lower class, but at the same time show contempt for them. The second limitation refers to the arrogance of politics, which results from the one-Party political system, in which there is no fundamental constraints on the power of the ruling Party. From the case of Zhang Jinzhu in which Zhang Jinzhu was executed because the authorities deemed Zhang Jinzhu needed to die, one can find the politics in China working on its own logics and endeavoring to control everything. It is not powerful enough for romantic intellectuals to change the logics of politics by merely speaking out with critical voices or mobilizing the public. In this case, after the Court first announced the death sentence to Zhang Jinzhu, both Ma Yunlong, the then Executive Editor-in-Chief in Dahe Daily and a journalist from Xinhua News Agency submitted “internal references” (neican) to the above, appealing for another trial, as they thought Zhang Jinzhu might not be so guilty to be sentenced to death. Their appeals however, were totally ignored. When it is in conflict with the hegemonic purposes of the State, public opinion will be ignored. For example, in the case of Tang Fuzhen, the public were very angry at the administrative demands for demolition and blamed the law enforcement officials. But the death of Tang Fuzhen not only did not stop the government’s urban displacement scheme, but did not even stop her house from being pulled down. Her death was even defined as “a violent resistance against law enforcement.” When the brutal event of Taixing Kindergarten happened in 2010, the government again totally ignored public opinion. In this event, a farmer intentionally attacked many children and teachers in the Taixin Kindergarten, Jiangsu province, before he burned himself to death. The tragedy happened during the time when China was hosting the World Expo in Shanghai. In order to avoid destroying the harmonious atmosphere, the authority used all kinds of means to cover up the truth and keep silent. Journalists were ordered not to report on this event. Online

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posts were deleted immediately after they were posted. The public remained in darkness, not knowing what had happened or how many children died in the event. Even the parents of children victims were refused to visit their dying kids in hospital. The public’s outrage was aroused, not only as a result of the brutal event, which was the fifth time in the same year that this sort of thing had happened, but also because the authorities had covered up the truth. Tens of thousands of people gathered before the local hospital where children victims were sent. People started to curse the government, but the government just ignored public opinion. Besides, the political power itself is difficult to break down. In some cases, dismissed officials later returned to their posts or were even promoted. For example Lan Qinghua, the local Governor of Pengshui County, who was dismissed in the Pengshui Poem Scandal, was appointed as the Deputy Director of the Chongqing Statistics Bureau several months later. The third is the limitations resulting from the commercial logic that mass media are following in the market. In the West, the ideal democratic function of investigative journalism, which is thought to check the evil powers of the media market, however, has ironically been defeated by the evil side of the media market. Investigative journalism in the West is thought to have fallen a victim to the increasingly concentrated media ownership and the corporate media’s greed for profits (McChesney 2003; McChesney 2004). The financially expensive practices of spending weeks or even months in investigating an event that also risks damaging the relationship between media organizations and other powerful social entities, makes publishers and media owners reluctant to commit to investigative reporting (McChesney 2003). They are keener to deliver soft news that is “emotional and immediate,” with “little social significance” for greater profits (Bennett 1990). The over-reliance on public relations and the priority given to corporate interests has put investigative journalism in difficulty. Scholars and journalist practitioners, such as Roy Greenslade, sigh that investigative journalism is dying both in the commercial media system in the USA and in the British media system with public service reporting ideals. In China, the market also acts as a constraint on investigative reporting, despite the situation not being so bad. Some media organizations totally surrender to the monopolized market created by the State, some others, though, insist on the practices, the commercial logic still generates constraints on that practice. Big advertising and circulation

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revenue contributors have increasingly interfered into the practices of investigative journalism (Tong and Sparks 2009; Tong 2010). Business interests of commercial institutions are even protected through administrative means through which official bans are issued by propaganda departments to prevent news media from reporting negative news of commercial institutions (Tong 2010). Journalists’ willingness and passion for investigative journalism could be weakened by their material situations. Besides, constraints also come from the criteria on which investigative journalists rely to judge whether a topic is worth investigating and reporting. The judgment of news values, for instance, is driven by market competition (Palmer 2000). For example, one reason for media organization to support the practices of investigative journalism is because of its sensationalism. Investigative journalism indeed creates sensationalism (de Burgh 2008). If media organizations consider sensationalism more than some other factors, such as the public interest, they would assign their investigative journalists to investigate and report on the type of news events that happen for the first time and may cause sensationalism, but would stop contributing their coverage to stories involving events that are happening again, despite that these events may reflect some important social values and reveal flaws of the social system. In sum, investigative journalism in China is a genre of journalism that has the potential to reform the existing social order, but its reformist power is limited by political and economic logics and social factors. Despite being initiated by the ruling Party, investigative journalism in China is a new genre of journalism that is able to pose challenges to the authorities through mobilizing the public, though in many cases it reinforces the social status quo. Seeing investigative journalism as a paradigm of good journalism, Chinese journalism takes the initiative to seek occupational autonomy and develop occupational tactics to oppose the arbitrary exercise of political power. In the 1990s, investigative journalism was indeed used by the authority to police social conditions and to consolidate its rule, which is the legitimate social function that the authorities give to investigative journalism. Legitimation by the authority, however, has provided a possibility for Chinese journalism to seek occupational autonomy in their occupation, while news organizations have provided material supports to this possibility. In the 21st century, therefore, as an established journalism genre, investigative journalism has gradually separated itself from its legitimate social function, looking for journalistic autonomy, acting as dissenters, social

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watchers, informers, and enlighteners, and trying to exercise the power of reform over society, which was not expected by the authorities. This actual function of investigative journalism comes from the instinct of investigative journalists as Confucian intellectuals, who instinctively want to supervise rulers and help social development. This instinct is exaggerated under the influences of liberalism, the free press from the West, and the journalisitc professionalism. In a public mobilization model, investigative journalism in China gently exercises its power to improve social reform.

Notes

* For all Chinese names in this book (except the author), the surnames come before first names.

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Zhang Jinzhu was a policeman who hit a father and a son in Zhengzhou city, Henan Province, and ran away. This event was revealed by Dahe Daily (dahe bao) in 1997, causing public outrage in Zhengzhou city. Sun Zhigang was a college migrant worker who was taken into custody because he did not bring his residential permit with him. He was beaten to death in custody. Southern Metropolis Daily (nanfang dushibao) exposed this scandal in 2003. The exposé in newspaper coverage caused a social movement that resulted in constitutional changes. In October 2004, online rumors suggested that Niuniu, a young woman who invested in and directed a film called Sheep with Wings, and who boasted a personal fortune of about one million dollars, was the daughter of a high official of the Chinese Communist Party in Shenzhen. Two Southern Metropolitan Daily reporters investigated and proved the rumors true. Niuniu’s father was punished by the CCP soon after publication of the investigative report. In 2006, both Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekend (nanfang shoumo) published investigative reports revealing the abuse of legal power in the Pengshui County, in which an ordinary citizen was imprisoned because he wrote and disseminated a poem that was thought satirizing the local governor. The reports stopped the ridiculous power abuse. Henan Television broadcast a series of investigative programs in 2007. The programs exposed a scandal in which children were discovered to have been sold and forced to work as slaves in illegal brickfields. Many children had been tortured by the brickfields owners. The relevant local government department in Shanxi Province was even found participating in the slave trade. After the exposure, central and local governments started active investigations into the scandal, and acted to solve the problem. Yu Youjun, Governor of the Shanxi Province, who was dismissed from the position the following year, apologized in public. In 2008, Oriental Morning (dongfang zaobao) revealed baby milk powder produced by the Sanlu Company was contaminated. This event pushed the government to investigate, the company to recall contaminated products, and to compensate for families’ losses. In 2008, Democracy and Law Times (minzhu yu fazhi shibao) exposed the cover up by local government in Buyang City of the HFMD epidemic. Again, in 2009, China Broadcasting Net (zhongguo guangbo wang) revealed local government concealed HFMD epidemic in Minquan County. Media exposés made medical experts, assigned from the central to the local, help to prevent the epidemic’s spread. Relevant people and officials were dismissed and punished. In 2010, China Economic Times (zhongguo jingji shibao) revealed the scandal of unsafe vaccines, from which around 100 children were sickened, disabled, or died. The series of investigative report drew extensive attention from the whole society. Journalists who follow up the event even fiercely questioned the credibility of the investigation report issued by the Shanxi Health Bureau.

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Around 206 bc–8 ad. Around 960–1279 ad.

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Around 1368–1644 ad. According to the introduction to the program in its website, accessed on April 22, 2010 at http://www.cctv.com/program/jdft/02/index.shtml. The movement is the first modern political movement in China, in which a joint petition by Kang Youwei and other intellectuals in 1895 was submitted to the emperor to oppose against the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and appeal for reforms. The Wuxu Reform, or the Hundred Days’ Reform, is an important historic event, which was launched by the Emperor Guangxu in 1898 to start a series of reforms, but only lasted for 103 days. Two Sessions of the Year: the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

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There is no consensus about when investigative journalism first appeared in China. For example, de Burgh believes that Chinese investigative journalism existed in the 1920s and 1930s; Zhao argues investigative journalism emerged in the late 1970s and was heavily practiced by investigative journalists like Liu Bingyan (Zhao 2000). For them, the investigative journalism practices in the 1990s were the re-emergence of investigative journalism in China (Zhao 2000; de Burgh 2003). I agree that Liu Bingyan was a prominent adversarial investigative journalist (Gittings 2005), judging by his attitude towards the ruling Party, the subjects of his reports, and the extensive investigations he made. However, I regard the journalism practiced in the 1970s as being not what we mean by investigative journalism today, but instead reportage (baogao wenxue) that usually involves extensive investigation and mixes facts and literary imagination. Quoted from the following website, accessed March 2, 2007: http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm.

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Differently to Mao’s egalitarianism, Deng realized the importance of individual wealth and was willing to see individual differences. Deng wanted to break the egalitarian status and to promote individualism and wealth privatization. He even claimed that some people were allowed to become rich first (rang shaoshuren xianfu qilai). Deng decided to start economic reform while ignoring political reform (Yang 2004). For Deng, ideology was less important than economic wealth (Teiwes 2001). He did not care much about the orthodoxy of CCP principles. This point was reflected in his famous “Cat” remarks: “it does not matter whether a cat is white or black as long as it can catch mice” (wulun heimao baimao neng zhuadao laoshu jiushi haomao ). In this way, Deng explained and legitimized the market economy in terms of Socialism with Chinese characteristics (you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi ), while his predecessor, Mao, dichotomized ideologies into being either Socialist or Capitalist. The data is from The Analysis and Forecast of Tendencies in the Chinese Society, 2003, Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House. There are 3.57 million workers who have been laid off from SOEs (state-owned enterprises) among the 8 million unemployed workers. Before 1979, the major newspaper income relied on administrative fiscal subsidy and the governments’ public fund subscription (Chen 1999).The first advertisement in Liberation Daily (jiefang ribao) in 1979 was a signal for the newspapers to start to carry advertisements again. In 1981, newspapers got official permission from the Central Office of the Propaganda Department to carry advertisements. Advertising income did not become the main financial income of newspapers until the mid-1990s (Chen 1999). In 1985, Luoyang Daily (luoyang ribao) in Henan was the first Party organ that stopped circulation via the post office and turned to self-circulation (ziban faxing), i.e., to circulate the newspaper itself. Since then, almost all newspapers have changed their circulation method to self-circulation (Wu 2005).

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Detailed Introduction to the Reforms of News Publication and Broadcasting in China (CBNP 2002). Ren Zhongyi, who was Secretary of the CCP of Guangdong Province from 1980–85, was the first governor of Guangdong after economic reform, who is believed to have played an extremely important role in the development of Guangdong, especially in the opening-up of Guangdong. Ren Zhongyi took an important role in the opening-up of Guangdong, especially in the power struggles between Deng Xiaoping’s market economy reformists and Chen Yun’s planned economy conservatives. Ren Zhongyi also promoted the open social environment for social democracy and media development. Ren regarded political civilization (zhengzhi wenming) and “let a hundred flowers bloom and let a hundred schools of thought contend” (baihua qifang baijia zhenming) as being extremely important in social development (Yangcheng Evening, November 12, 2002). Two cases that occurred after his retirement in 1985, threw light on his attitudes towards renewed thought and media. The first was the case of the Nanfengchuang magazine and the Tongzhougongjin magazine. The magazines carried an interview with Ren Zhongyi on his opinions on Deng Xiaoping’s reform project in 2004 July. In the interview, Ren bravely suggested that Deng’s biggest failure was the failure of political system reform and criticized recent tight political control on the media. Afterwards, the editors-in-chief of the two magazines were dismissed and there was a crack down on the magazines (Lianhe Zaobao, December 7, 2004; Apple Daily, October 25, 2004). Ren Zhongyi and another four consultants resigned from the Tongzhougongjin magazine as a protest (Lianhe Zaobao, December 7, 2004). The second case was the Southern Metropolis Daily event, in which the Editor-in-Chief and another high ranking staff member of the newspaper were taken into custody as a punishment for the newspaper’s Sun Zhigang report and SARS reports in 2003. Ren Zhongyi and Wu Nansheng wrote to the present governor, Zhang Dejiang, to appeal for the journalists and suggested that Zhang reconsider the punishment. Xie Fei was Secretary of the CCP of Guangdong Province from 1991–98. Like Ren Zhongyi, Xie Fei is praised for his liberal mindset toward both economic development and media activities. In the period of Xie Fei’s governance, the headline of the front page of the Nanfang Daily (nanfang ribao) carried one critical report almost every month. Some of these critical reports directly criticized the government and officials. This was quite rare in the journalistic practices of Party Organs. In the 1990s’ Southern Weekend Crisis, Xie Fei protected the famous weekly investigative newspaper from closing down (Lai 2005; Dong 2006). Lin Yanzhi was the director of the Propaganda Department and a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP of the Henan Province from 1995–2000. According to Ma Yunlong, the ex-executive Editor-in-Chief, and Pang Xinzhi, the Editor-in-Chief of Dahe Daily, Lin Yanzhi took a very important role in the development of Dahe Daily. Lin’s famous remark about “Public Opinion Monitoring” (yulun jiandu) was “The Propaganda Department also needs to be monitored by the public” when he supported Dahe Daily in covering a critical report on the behavior of the Propaganda Department in Henan Province (Li 2005). In the words of Ma Yunlong, Lin Yanzhi supported Public Opinion Monitoring in order to prove the efficiency of Party work, instead of running after media freedom, because he recognized the commercial nature of the media and the positive functions of critical reporting. According to in-depth interviews with several Editors-in-Chief of Dahe Daily and other high-ranking staff in newspapers in Henan Province. The concept of investigative journalism is changing over time in a continuum with critical reporting at one end and a mixture of critical reporting and in-depth reporting at another, rather than fixed. In 1998, then Premier Zhu Rongli planned to visit a state-owned grain barn in Nanling County, Anhui Province. Before Zhu’s visit, local cadres borrowed grain from other counties to make the barn stocked with grain that was stacked from floor to ceiling. They did so to please Zhu. The latter was impressed by the illusion of a bumper harvest in Nanling County. After Zhu left, so did the grain. This story was first revealed in the internal reference edition (neican) of People’s Daily. Gao Qinrong, the then journalism from Xinhua News Agency, wrote the article.

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Following up on the complaints of a local peasant regarding the irrigation project, Gao spent one year investigating the project and found the model irrigation project was in fact a corrupt and fake project that cost the State a huge amount of money. The story was soon picked up by media outlets across China, including News Probe, but Gao was arrested at the end of 1998 and sentenced to eight years in jail. Blood economy means the government in Henan Province encouraged local people, the majority of whom were peasants, to sell blood for income in order to boost the local economy. Secret investigation means doing secret interviews without showing journalist’s identity. Hogwash oil (shaoshuiyou), refers to oil made from hogwash. Some people in China collect hogwash from the cloacae of hotels and restaurants and make oil from the hogwash in some villages-in-the-city (chenzhongcun). Hogwash oil is usually sold to small restaurants.

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From an article “Chinese media: Breaking new ground” in China Daily, August 22, 2005, accessed December, 2005 at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–08/22/ content_257190.htm. The related information can be seen in “Southern Metropolis Daily Article on the Case of Sun Zhigang” at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/china/beijing08/sun.htm From fieldwork interviews. See the article “Publish and be damned” in Guardian, April 16, 2004, online, accessed December, 2005 at. http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,1193529,00.html; Also see the article “Beijing paper’s staff strike after editor’s removal” in Guardian, on December 31, 2005, online accessed in December, 2005 at. http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1675736,00.html.

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The Clause No. 34 of the regulation. Liaowang: the Central concerns over media supervision, accessed on November 20, 2009, at http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20040824/101328.shtml. Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Propaganda Supervision Work (guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin yulun gongzuo de yijian). According to the (Trial) Regulations of the Chinese Communist Party Internal Supervision (zhongguo gongchandang dangnei jiandu tiaoli [shixing]), 2003, accessed October 2, 2006 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2344222.html. According to Asian Weekly. Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Propaganda Supervision Work (guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang he gaijin yulun gongzuo de yijian). Southern Weekend, August 5, 2005. From fieldwork. From fieldwork interviews. From fieldwork interviews. From fieldwork. According to “Five Journalists Were Beaten Up in Fenghuang,” in Caijing Magazine, August 15, 2007. From in-depth interview with Pang Xinzhi. According to in-depth interviews with former journalists in Southern Weekend. According to in-depth interviews with investigative journalists in Southern Metropolis Daily. The Dingzhou case was caused by land requisition in 2005. In this case, officials hired around 300 hatchet men to attack villagers who protested because they were opposed to local government land requisition. Six villagers died and 48 were injured in the attack. According to in-depth interviews with journalists in Southern Metropolis Daily and in Caijing. On the evening of March 15, 2002, Gao Yingying, an 18-year-old female waitress in the Baoshi Hotel in Xiangfan City, Hubei Province, was found dead. The local police

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concluded that Gao Yingying committed suicide. However, Gao’s family believed their daughter was killed by officials, as there was a lot of evidence, including sperm stains found on her underwear, that pointed to a different conclusion. They refused to cremate Gao’s corpse. The police seized Gao’s corpse and forced her family to cremate it. The Xiangfan City public believed the death of Gao Yingying was the responsibility of the local CCP boss. They believed Gao was thrown from the window of the 10th floor of the hotel as a result of her resisting rape. The event was not properly investigated until the CCP boss of Xiangfan City was arrested for corruption in 2005. Two hospitals were suspected of conducting experiments on living human beings. One victim, Chen Fengying, was an unemployed woman, who was around 50 when she died. Another was a peasant, Xu Xiaoping, aged 35. Before the events, they had both done heavy physical work all their lives without encountering any problems. They had both given birth to babies as normal healthy women. They had had no heart problems before they went to the Jiangsu People’s Hospital. There, they were both diagnosed as suffering from severe congenital cardiopathy. The doctors in Zhenjiang People’s Hospital, Jiangsu, told them that they would have to have heart and lung transplant operation, otherwise they would soon die. These operations would be very expensive. The two hospitals waived most of the costs of the operation. One doctor from Zhengjiang People’s Hospital and another from Shanghai Oriental (Dongfang) Hospital conducted the operations together. The results were that Chen Fengying died during the operation, and Xu Xiaoping survived but was unable to work. After the operation, the two hospitals paid monthly living expenses to Xu Xiaoping. In return, Xu had to appear in public as an advertisement for the treatment. The victim’s families and other medical experts suspected that the two hospitals were conducting experiments on live subjects. Journalists from Southern Metropolitan Daily investigated and reported the events and listed four main reasons for suspicion. Yang Wu and Wu Ping were the owners of a house and refused to accept the compulsory purchase compensation that was offered by real-estate developers in 2004. Eventually, their house was the only one left in the block, and, was popularly called a “nail house.” The local government in Chongqing City ordered them to move in 2007. The event was first discussed in Internet fora and then covered in Southern Metropolitan Daily as an online story. The newspaper coverage attracted the attention of national media and there were numerous subsequent reports. In January, 2007, Lan Chengchang, a Shanxi journalist, was beaten to death by a mine owner and his employees during an interview in Datong City. The mine owner said Lan was a fake journalist and that they beat him up because he demanded money from the mine owner. A journalist from Southern Metropolitan Daily saw a report of the event on a website and made an investigation. He wrote the first newspaper report. This proved extremely influential and subsequently lots of journalists came to Datong City to follow-up the story. The Xiamen PX Project was a plan to develop an industrial chemical plant in Xiamen City. It was believed that it would cause permanent and serious pollution of the environment. Xiamen citizens protested, and the domestic media reported on the project and the opposition. Eventually, the project was temporarily halted. See the following website (accessed on July 9, 2008): http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ asia-pacific/7195434.stm. In September, 2008, the collapse of a mine dam triggered a landslide of sludge that buried a village in Xiangfen. The local government and media, however, said it was a natural landslide and covered up the collapse. Liaowang News Weekly revealed it later. The relating officials have been taken to prison. Li Qiaoming died from fatal brain injuries when in custody in Yunan Province. The local police explained that Li hit his head against the wall while he was playing “duo maomao.” This event caused the outrage of online participants. The online anger led to an investigation of the case. In May 2009, Deng Yujiao, a 21-year-old female pedicure worker, killed Deng Guida, a local official, at a hotel located in Badong County, Hubei province. Online participants paid their sympathy to Deng Yujiao and made the case come to a national prominence. Deng Yujiao did not receive a sentence, though found guilty.

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Based on in-depth interviews with Zhu Changzhen and Wang Ci, the Director. The Shanghai Gang is a faction that is a group of high-ranking officials who have certain relations to Shanghai, e.g., native Shanghainese or formerly officials in Shanghai. This group of people have the same interests and helps each other to gain political achievement and forge an influential political force. Jiang Zemin is the key figure of the Shanghai Gang and therefore, the Shanghai Gang has the most power in the Jiang era. The Tuanpai officials refer to officials who were once officials in the Communist Youth League (gong qing tuan). The Tuanpai faction hence has the name Tuan. Hu Jintao is the key figure of Tuanpai. Please see Tong 2007 and Tong 2008 for detailed discussions of the four tactics. From fieldwork interviews. One example is the transformation of the Jiangsu Tongyu Company, investigated by Wang Hui, Cui Zhiyuan, and Zhou Xiaozhuang. In this case, the state-owned SOE was legally privatized and the interests of the workers impaired (Wang 2006). It is a result of urbanization. Chinese governments are keen to reconstruct cities. As explained above, Chinese people do not have the right to own land. The State and government have permanent ownership of the land. Local governments sell land, where citizens are resident, to developers to increase their fiscal income and for urbanization purposes. So, no matter whether they are willing or unwilling to move on, citizens have to move out if land is requested for government use. A lot of problems arise from urban displacement. In 2009, Tang Fuzhen, a 47-year-old female entrepreneur, set herself on fire in order to protest against the forced demolition of her home in Chendu City. A riot, involving thousands of protesters, was triggered by the beating of a peasant laborer by two self-claimed officials. It happened in 2004 in Wanzhou City. This case will be discussed in Chapter 7. A riot sparked by a trivial traffic event happened in 2005 in Chizhou City. Tens of thousands of people joined the protest. This case will be discussed in Chapter 7.

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The Party Principle means the Party leads the press and the press must promote its policies as an integrated part of the Party (Ding et al. 1997). Some arguments in this part have been discussed in the paper “Social Discourse of Journalistic Professionalism in the Chinese Context,” presented in IAMCR, July, 2006, Egypt. The People’s Principle argues that newspapers should reflect the opinions, attitudes, and lives of the people. The investigation was launched by Beijing Youth News Investigation Workshop You Pang Consultant Company Limited in 2003. In a report entitled “It is dangerous to be a journalist” in Beijing Youth, November 8, 2005. All these jouranlists except Huiyan Ji are thought as investigative journalists and their reports selected here as investigative reports, according to Zhan Jiang. In the tragedy, an unemployed man killed children and teachers before burning himself to death. According to fieldwork interviews. According to fieldwork interviews. Du Shugui was the Deputy Head of a police station in Bazhou town, Hebei Province. He shot dead another driver in a traffic dispute. While Du was driving the police stations minibus, Du’s wife, Tong Jianhua, and his son, Du Hui, were angry about the other car not slowing down. So they forced it to stop. They then insulted the driver, while Du got his gun out of his minibus and shot the driver to death. Du, his wife, and son, then drove away and even attempted to cover up the crime. Beijing Evening News first revealed the crime. Du was sentenced to death on July 24, 2000 (Liebman 2005).

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From “Because We are Journalists,” in Southern Weekend, on November 9, 2000. The story of Wang Keqin can be found in the article in the Guardian (Branigan 2010).

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According to interviews with investigative journalists and managers at SMD in 2006. 5,000 RMB is roughly USD 730 and the monthly salary of a journalist in Guangzhou is normally around 5,000 RMB. RMB 30,000 is about USD 4380. In some cases, investigative journalists, for example Wang Keqin, though has achieved huge fame, are suffering from poverty and unstable life, according to “My initial dream: it is an honour to be a journalist-the story of Wang Keqin” in Southern Weekend (2010). Accessed at August 21, 2010 at http://www.infzm.com/content/48814. This rule is not applicable on all occasions. In some news organizations that occasionally practice investigative journalism, individual investigative journalists are still the target of political punishment. According to interviews with journalists and Editors-in-Chief at Dahe Daily. Evaluated by Asia Cases 2004, accessed in November 2005, at http://www.cpj.org/ cases04/asia_cases04/china.html. In 2003, when national and local governments in China covered up the truth of the SARS epidemic, Southern Metropolis Daily carried reports questioning the official lies in media coverage and drew foreign and domestic attention. From fieldwork interviews. Data collected in 2006. Ibid. From in-depth interviews. From in-depth interviews. From in-depth interviews with Xia Yitao and other newsworkers at the newspaper. From fieldwork interviews. All career experiences are counted by 2006. According to an interview with him. From fieldwork interview. Of the three editors, one was on study leave, another on maternity leave during the time I did the research. During that period of time, therefore, only one editor was in action. According to the inner forum of SMD. Ibid. From interview.

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Some of materials in the chapter has been used in my article “Press Self-censorship in China: a case study in the transformation of discourse” in Discourse and society, 2009, 593–612. “Wangzhou” literally means “myriad-prefecture,” which was famous for its resources in its history. Now it is one of the eighteen poorest districts in China. Due to the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, 2/3 of Wanzhou’s old urban area will be underwater by the time the reservoir is filled. Two hundred and fifty thousand Wanzhou residents will migrate to other places. Accessed April 12, http://www.wz.xinhua023.com/zjwz_1.asp & http://www.classic023. com/showart.asp?art_id=462&cat_id=1.

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of thousands people attended the protest (BBC 2004; CNA 2004; HKCNA 2004; Zhu 2004). Summarized, based on reports in several media, accessed April 17, 2007 on the Factiva database. For example, (Agence France Presse 2005; Global Insight Daily Analysis 2005, etc.). According to in-depth interviews with Zhu Changzhen and Wang Ci, the Director of the Investigative Report Department. According to in-depth interviews with Zhu Changzhen and his Director and Zhu Changzhen’s blog article “Experts Greet Each Other by Saying ‘Hello, Donkeys’ after the Xi’an Workshop.” Ibid. According to in-depth interview with Wang Jilu, May 2006. The relationship between media and local authority will be discussed later. According to the report of Southern Metropolis Daily, July 1, 2005. According to the report of Southern Metropolis Daily, July 1, 2005. From fieldwork interviews. A lot of laid-off workers and peasant laborers work as motorcycle taxi drivers to earn their living. However, a lot of cities in China have prohibited taxis of this kind. The governmental decision, in fact, made those taxi drivers jobless. The words in italics were deleted in the Dahe Daily newsroom’s process of editing. From in-depth interviews. From in-depth interviews. Other Zhengzhou journalists were unwilling to talk much about social problems. From in-depth interviews. From in-depth interviews. From in-depth interview with Wang Lei.

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It is also taken from the in-depth interview with Ma Yunlong, the ex Executive Chiefin-Chief and one of the four founders of Dahe Daily. There are some exceptions. The Sun Zhigang case is such an exception which has led to changes in a constitution. The story of Guan Guangmei was a dramatic success of the leasing system. Guang Guangmei was a former ordinary shop assistant in a store in Benxi City, Liaoning Province. From 1984 on, Guan leased eight formerly State-owned shops that suffered losses to form a large commercial group, the Dongming Commercial Group. In two years, five of the eight shops increased their profits by nearly 600 percent and the other three by more than 300 percent. The success of Guan Guangmei, however, resulted in doubts and criticisms among the public from the end of 1986. The criticism became even fiercer in 1987. Guan Guangmei was accused of engaging in bourgeois liberalization and traveling a nonsocialist path, and the supportive Benxi government was also criticized. According to the comments Zhuang Shenzhi, the Executive Editor-in-Chief at SMD gave. From his blog, accessed at http://www.chinavalue.net/175141/Default.aspx.

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Index

7th National People’s Congress Conference 24–5 16th CCP Central Committee in 2003 55 1960s 11 1970s 11 1978 3, 33, 36, 112, 134, 144 1990s 3–4, 8, 23, 31–43, 45–51, 53–4, 56–7, 60, 62, 64, 67–8, 72, 77, 81–2, 91, 102–4, 110, 130, 192, 196, 201–2, 204, 207, 222, 224, 227, 234 1997 General Election 28 20th century, the 223 21st century, the 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 228 21st Global Report (21 huanqiu shibao) 128 2003 and 2004 Government Working Reports 55 2005 editorial guideline of Southern Metropolis Daily 119, 134 academic discourse 3–4 activist 5 adversarial 5–6, 14, 27–8, 222 African 4 agenda 13–14, 50–1, 70, 84, 155, 193–4, 197, 206–11, 216, 219, 226–8, 230 agenda-setting 14, 193, 211 AIDS 43–4, 47, 59, 76, 80, 123, 135 air-borne (kongjiang) 58, 62 Anglo-American journalism 4 Anglophone societies 12, 26 annual best news awards (in Southern Metropolis Daily) 130

Annual Job Grades Assessments (in Southern Metropolis Daily) 120 arrogance of politics, the 232 Asian 4 audience 15, 46–7, 90, 193, 195, 201–4, 206–7, 213–15, 217, 227, 230 active audience 193, 204 studio audience 203 authoritarian 1–2, 4–6, 10, 16, 22–3, 25–8, 99, 144, 192, 220–2, 226, 230 authoritarian media system 2, 5 authority 1–2, 17, 21–2, 24, 26–7, 29, 35, 51, 59–60, 64, 66–7, 69, 73, 75, 77, 86–7, 89–90, 97, 108–9, 125, 158, 194, 204, 207, 210–12, 216, 218, 222–4, 228–9, 232, 234 autonomy 1, 9, 50, 54–5, 63, 67, 88, 93, 115, 118, 131–2, 134, 140–2, 150, 152–3, 190–1, 222–3, 225, 228, 234 journalistic autonomy 9, 54–5, 88, 115, 132, 152, 191, 225, 234 Bai Yansong 103 balanced reporting/reports (pingheng baodao) 125, 126, 189 bans 5, 57–8, 69, 135, 140, 151, 191, 223, 228, 234 reporting instructions 5, 57, 228 Bao Zheng 18 Beijing 6, 42, 44–6, 50, 52, 58–9, 62–3, 65, 70, 74–7, 81, 84, 95–6, 98–9, 104, 106, 108, 111, 124, 130, 133, 196, 202, 204 Beijing News (xin jingbao) 52, 62–3, 70, 75, 77, 81, 84, 111, 130, 133

258

Index

Beijing Television 6 Berlin Wall 32 Bernstein,Carl 11, 28 blood economy (xueye jingji) 43 selling blood 48, 116 bottom-up perspective 6–7 Bourdieu, Pierre 113–14 field 84, 90, 113–15 habitus 113–14, 141 Brickfield Scandal 1, 19, 63, 71, 78, 84, 193–4, 213–16, 228 British media system 233 broadcasting channels 4 bureaucratization 133 Bund Picture (waitan huabao) 78, 124 bureaucratic hierarchy 112, 134, 138 Burma 83 Caijing (caijing) 40, 51, 62–3, 70, 74, 80–1, 107, 214 Cameron, David 65 capitalist 54, 202 capitalization 72 capitalization of political and administrative powers 72 Cash for Questions 28, 65 Cat remark (maolun) 33 CCP (China Communist Party) 5, 8, 23–5, 27, 29–30, 35–6, 38, 41, 44, 50, 52–5, 57, 62, 64–5, 69, 71, 82, 90, 94, 96, 98, 111, 121–2, 142, 172, 183–4, 195–7, 212, 214, 221 Communist 4–5, 15–16, 23–6, 29, 32, 54, 66, 77, 94, 195, 222 Communist Party 4–5, 23–6, 29, 77, 195, 222 Mao 15, 24, 34, 53, 63, 88, 195, 201, 230 Maoism 15 the Party 5, 23–5, 27–8, 31, 34–8, 40, 47, 49, 52–6, 60, 64, 66–7, 86, 88–95, 97–8, 101, 109, 160, 162, 164, 177, 195–6, 201, 218, 220–2, 224–6, 228 Central Bureau of Quality and Safety 84

central government 50, 54–7, 64, 79, 222 Changjiang Commercial (changjiang shangbao) 105 Chen Duxiu 94 Chen Feng 105, 111, 149 Chen Juhong 62 Chen Liangyu 66 Chen Mingyan 58 Chen Yizhong 117, 120, 225 Chengdu Business or Commercial Daily (chengdu shangbao) 37, 114 Chengdu Evening (chengdu wanbao) 37 China 1–8, 10–36, 38–40, 42–6, 48–52, 54–6, 58–66, 68–74, 76–86, 88–92, 94–100, 102, 104, 106–10, 112–14, 116–18, 120, 122, 124, 126–8, 130, 132–4, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144–6, 148, 150, 152, 154, 156–8, 160, 162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 174, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188, 190, 193–6, 198, 200–6, 208, 210–14, 216, 218, 220–4, 226, 228–30, 232–5 China Association of Quality 10, 000 Miles Promotion (zhongguo zhiliang wanlixing) 33 China Broadcasting Net (zhongguo guangbo wang) 81 China Central Television (CCTV) 6, 19, 31, 39, 56, 61, 76–7, 84, 92, 95–6, 128, 133, 199, 203, 212 CCTV’s ‘Eight Best Journalists’ of 2003 95 CCTV’s the News Commentary Department 103 China Economic Times (zhongguo jingji shibao) 70, 76, 97, 110 China Internet Network Information Centre (CINIC) 205 China Law and Regulation/Fazhi Daily (fazhi shibao) 39, 80 China News Weekly (xinwen zhoukan) 63, 70, 77, 82 China Youth (zhongguo qingnianbao) 39, 45, 70, 77, 84, 133, 204

Index Chinese journalism 2, 4, 9, 31, 35, 40, 46–7, 49–52, 62, 67, 86–91, 93–5, 97–9, 101–3, 105, 107–9, 199, 202, 222–3, 225–6, 234 Chinese journalist 1–2, 16, 18, 23, 26, 47–8, 51–2, 70, 90–3, 100–2, 226 Chinese press 21, 37, 56 Chinese Serial 20 Chongqing 63, 76, 156, 167, 176, 208, 211–13, 227, 233 Chongqing Evening (chongqing wanbao) 76 Chongqing Nailhouse (chongqing dingzihu) 63, 71, 208 circumvent 2, 13, 85, 140, 143, 193 citizen-oriented journalism 98 civic betterment 13 Cold war 4, 32 post-Cold war 4 collaboration 54, 60, 84, 105, 213 colonialism 20 commentary 103, 202, 204 commercialization 4, 35–6, 46, 49, 67, 86, 109, 196, 202 communication worker (tongxunyuan) 89, 97 concept of journalism 6 conflict of interests 9, 115, 141–2, 149, 150, 153–4, 187, 190 On Conflicts (maodun lun) 24 Confucianism 8, 15–17, 21–4, 26 Confucian ethical values 196 Confucian intellectual 16–21, 23–4, 26, 47, 108, 220, 223, 235 Confucian scholar 16–17 Confucian values 29 Confucius 16 Kongzi 16 Ren (humaneness) 17 righteousness/justice (yi) 17 ritual propriety (li) 17 wisdom (zhi) 17 conglomeration 4 consensus 9, 51, 104, 106, 115, 124, 128–30, 148, 153, 188, 195, 200, 210

259

Conservatism 32, 201 Constitution 24, 51, 75 contemporary journalism system 4 contradictory 5, 28, 52, 68, 197, 222 contradictory psychology 68 contra-flow 4, 70, 71, 206–9, 211 control 1, 4–6, 23, 28–9, 33, 36, 42, 49–50, 52–6, 58, 60, 62, 64–6, 69, 73, 84–5, 87–8, 94, 98, 100, 120, 131–2, 141, 143, 145, 155, 158, 160, 168, 190, 221–3, 225, 232 media control 5, 52, 54, 85 cooperation 55, 69, 83, 85, 198 crackdown 8, 62, 120 credibility 63, 67, 86–7, 89, 97–8, 100, 109, 194, 207, 216–17, 219, 221, 229 criticism 8, 15, 23–30, 35, 40, 48, 51–2, 71, 129, 205, 219 self-criticism 8, 15, 23–5, 28–9, 35, 52 cross-regional 44, 55–7, 59, 64, 83, 158–60, 163, 184 Curran, James 3–4, 155 custody of conscience 12 Dahe Daily (dahe bao) 7, 38, 41, 60–2, 66, 79, 83–5, 99, 108, 111, 154, 156, 158–9, 167, 170, 172, 174–9, 181, 199, 232 Dahe Forum (dahe luntan) 71, 214 daily Journalism 12–13, 133 Dalian TV (dalian dianshitai) 39 decentralization 56, 223 On the decision on practicing criticism and self-criticism in newspapers 25 decision-making 133–4, 141 deep throat 14 democracy 5, 11, 15, 21, 32, 52, 65, 80, 100–1, 126, 150, 203–4, 206, 230 Democracy and Law Times (minzhu yu fazhi shibao) 80 Deng Xiaoping 32–4 Deng Yujiao 63, 77, 193, 218 developing countries 3–4

260

Index

development 2–3, 6–8, 21, 27, 29–30, 34–6, 38, 42, 52, 57, 61–2, 64, 70, 75, 82, 95–6, 100–1, 103, 116–18, 120, 125–7, 146, 156, 167, 188–9, 202, 207, 224–6, 230, 235 de-westernizing media studies 3 dichotomy 52, 155, 161, 168, 170, 173, 180–1 ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy 155, 161, 168, 170–1, 180–1 displacement scheme (chengshi chaiqian) 72 land requisition (zhengdi) 58, 72, 151 division of labor 85, 133–4 dominant ideology 220, 228 Dongnan Business (dongnan shangbao) 92 Dushugui Case 101

fake Tofu 117 Fan Yijing 107 Fashion weekly (fengshang zhoukan) 129, 136 Feng Hongping 132, 148, 189 First Financial and Economic (diyi caijing ribao) 80 Focus (jiaodian fangtan) 7, 19, 39, 41–3, 45, 47–8, 61–2, 65, 74, 79–80, 83, 99, 164, 166, 184, 199, 212, 227 Foot, Paul 12 four press theories 3 free press 15, 22, 223, 235 freedom of expression 6, 27, 38, 211 freedom of the press 20–4, 26, 196 Freezing Point (bingdian) 43, 52 Fu Jianfen 105–6, 148, 207, 228 Fu Zhengzhong 19, 71, 213

earthquake 5, 65, 74, 81, 218 Economic Daily (jingji ribao) 201–2 Economic Half an Hour (jingji banxiaoshi) 133 economic reform 32, 36, 38, 53, 56, 72, 90, 157, 186, 188, 196–7, 201, 231 Editor-in-Chief 52, 58–62, 104, 106, 111–12, 119, 122, 129–30, 138, 140, 142–4, 151–2, 196, 232 egalitarianism 34 emperor 17–18, 21, 41 empirical 4, 7, 115 entertainment 5, 39, 67, 98, 124, 136, 202, 204 environmental issues 34, 42, 74, 81 epistemology 9, 115, 147, 229 ethical values 17, 195–6 Ettema and Glasser 13, 28, 144–5, 198, 228 excellent journalist’s training school (huangpujunxiao) 107 expectation 12, 14–15, 18–20, 24–5, 27, 52–3, 67, 94–6, 100, 108–9, 112, 121, 124, 127, 133, 140, 222, 224 extensive investigation 13–14

Gansu Longnan event 79 Gao Yingying 63, 77 gate-keeping 140 GDP 33 Goldsmiths Media study group 3 Gong Che Shang Shu 21 good journalism 1, 11–12, 31, 46–7, 63, 94, 96, 99, 114, 130, 135, 223, 225–6, 234 grass-roots 45, 83, 104, 116–18, 205, 210, 229 Greenslade, Roy 233 Guan Guangmei 201 Guan Jian 117, 120 Guangdong Province 50, 58–9 Guangdong TV (Guangdong dianshitai) 39 Guangming Daily (guangming ribao) 42 Guangxu 21 Guangzhou City 58 guerrilla tactics 69 Guizhou 79, 122, 192 Guo Chaoren 89

Facebook 205 faction 142

Habermas 206 public sphere 15, 203, 206 Hai Rui 18 Hallin and Mancini 3–4

Index Hangzhou City 98 Happiness Headquarters (kuaile dabenying) 202 Happiness Mobilisations (huanle zongdongyuan) 202 He Xuefeng 205 Henan Province 43–4, 122–3, 148, 214 Henan Television 71, 213 hero 1, 11, 28, 43, 65, 99, 105, 120, 149 Hersh, Seymour 12, 41 HFMD epidemic 80–1 Hide and Seek (duo maomao) 63 H1D1 80 hogwash oil 43, 48, 116 Hong Kong 20 Hu Jingtao 51, 64, 71 Hu Jiwei 196 Hu Shuli 62 Huashang Daily (huahsang bao) 70, 96, 133 Huashang Morning (huashang chenbao) 115 Huaxi Metropolis Daily (huaxi dushibao) 37 human right 33–5, 43, 189, 211 ideals 2, 8, 15–16, 18, 22, 65, 68–9, 101–7, 115, 117–18, 120–2, 124, 127, 149–51, 189–90, 196, 198, 220, 223–4, 229, 233 identity 19, 48, 82, 88–9, 92–3, 95, 98–9, 109, 120, 162, 172, 181–2, 194, 199 imperialism 4, 20 incompatible 6, 118, 189, 222 in-depth report 40, 61, 96, 135 in-depth reporting 40, 135 inner-Party struggle 23 inside-the-system people (bianzhinei renyuan) 88 institutionalization 16, 68, 85, 147 instruction news (zhiling xinwen) 50 internal forum (neibu luntan) 128–9, 142 internal reporting (neican) 1, 232 international society 8, 65 internet 2, 67, 69–70, 95, 97, 192, 194, 202, 205–9, 212–15, 217, 219, 227

261

blog 192, 205, 209, 212, 215–16, 227 chat rooms 205 fora 69–70, 192–3, 205, 207, 212, 227 forum 71, 84, 128–9, 142, 157, 202, 206, 214, 216–17 Internet Communication Technologies (ICTs) 211, 217, 219 internet-based communication 207 online bulletins 205 online discussions 70, 193, 205, 208, 211 online dissemination 193, 210, 213, 217 online participants 82, 209–11, 214–15, 219 QQ 128, 211 Twitter 205 Web 2.0 192, 205, 210, 214 Web 2.0 era 210, 214 investigative journalism 1–2, 4–86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98–118, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132–6, 138, 140–4, 146–50, 152–3, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 168, 170, 172, 174, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188, 190 investigative journalist 1, 5, 7–9, 12–14, 16, 19, 25–30, 40, 51, 54, 58, 62–3, 66–71, 77, 79–85, 99–100, 102–7, 109–14, 116, 121–35, 138–50, 153–4, 157, 164, 166, 181, 184, 187, 189, 193, 195, 197–8, 206–8, 211, 216–19, 223–6, 228–31, 234–5 iron rice bowl (tie fanwan) 88 itinerant journalists (liulang jizhe) 102–4, 117–18, 131, 224 Jia Yunyong 84–5, 121–2, 125–6, 142, 148 Jiang Yiping 58, 120 Jiang Zeming 34–5, 66 Jiangsu Province 57, 232 Jiangsu TV (jiangsu dianshitai) 202 Jinan University 107 Jingji Daily (jingji ribao) 39

262

Index

journalism education and training 107 journalism genre 2–3, 6, 31, 40, 90, 98, 234 journalism of outrage 13 journalistic authority 89, 97, 216 journalistic circles 104, 107, 121, 149, 224 journalistic patterns and routines 147 journalistic practice 2, 46, 104, 107, 113–14, 135, 144, 185–7, 190, 194, 222 Kaixin.net (kaixin wang) 205 Kang Youwei 21 kings without crowns (wumianzhiwang) 108 KMT (guomindang) 94 Knightley, Phillip 11 Kumtag Dessert 110 Labor Party 65 laid-off 34, 76, 166, 169 Lan Chengchang 63, 71, 193, 208 Lanzhou Morning (lanzhou chenbao) 127 Laos 82 late Qing 8, 15, 20–1, 29 Law and People Magazine (faren zazhi) 59 legitimacy 18, 28, 35, 46, 53–4, 60, 64–5, 86–91, 93–5, 97, 99–101, 103, 105, 107–9, 197, 223 legitimate function 2, 12, 27 legitimized social function 12 legitimation 9, 52, 66, 86, 99, 108, 194, 219, 234 agent of legitimation 99, 108 Li Changchun 55 Li Peng 39 Li Ruihuan 25 Li Xingchen 212, 215 Li Yuxiao 62 Liang Qichao 21, 23 lianghui (Two Sessions of the Year: the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) 25

Liaowang News Weekly (liaowang xinwen zhoukan) 55, 63, 70, 80–1, 212, liberal democracies 14–15, 220 liberalism 8, 15, 20–1, 23, 29, 32, 59, 223, 235 liberalism in late Qing era 8 Liberation Daily (jiefang ribao) 94 Life (shenhuo bao) 75 Lin Yanzhi 38 literacy 21, 205, 215, 230 literary journalism 40 Liu Xiaobo 5 local cultural values 6 local dynamics 7–8 local government 28, 33, 41, 54–6, 58, 60, 66, 78–81, 142, 162, 166, 192, 213–14, 221, 226 local resident permit (hukou) 103 logic of checks and balances 11 Long Zhi 111, 121, 129–30, 211–13, 218 Lu Hui 67, 71, 83, 107, 121, 123–4, 135, 138–40, 148 Ma Yunlong 60, 62, 106, 111, 199, 225, 232 management 74, 128, 131, 135–8, 148, 222 newspaper management committee 136–8 Mao Zedong 24, 201 Maoism 15 market extremism 72 Marxist 50, 52, 60, 112, 220–2 masses 18, 24–5, 27, 29, 163, 175–7, 179–80, 183, 192–3, 195–8, 201, 203, 206–7, 226 mass line 29 media-masses relationship 206 media-receivers relationship 201 media control 5, 52, 54, 85 media discourse 6, 154, 190, 193, 196, 201, 211, 223, 229 media reform 4, 36, 89–90, 103 media supervision 20–6, 33, 38–9, 50, 55–7, 61, 64, 130 critical reports 57, 60, 62, 64

Index investigative reporting 7, 9, 11, 13, 40–1, 44, 49–50, 52, 54, 57–9, 62–3, 66, 68–71, 74, 76, 82, 84, 99, 104, 106, 111–12, 114–15, 117, 121–4, 127, 129, 131, 133–5, 139–42, 145, 147, 149–50, 152–3, 193, 195, 198, 200, 207–10, 227, 233 public opinion supervision 25, 44, 57, 199 media system 2–3, 5–6, 15, 46, 89, 196, 233 Meet Me With Your Heart (feicheng wurao) 202 middle class 67, 73, 218, 226–7, 230 Ming dynasty 18 mobilization 9, 194–5, 198–200, 210–11, 213–14, 218–19, 225, 230, 235 mobilization model 9, 194, 198–200, 210–11, 219, 235 public mobilization 9, 194–5, 199, 210–11, 214, 218–19, 225, 230, 235 public mobilization model 9, 235 model of organizational influences 152 morale 68, 109, 119–20 MPs 38, 65, 76, 122, 220 Mu Qing 89 Nandan Mine Disaster 79, 135 Nanjing City 57 Nathan, Andrew 23 New Culture Movement (xin wenhua yundong) 20 new media era 9, 208–11, 219, 230 new media practice 2, 4, 194, 210, 214, 217 news 1–9, 13–14, 19–22, 24–5, 28, 32, 35–48, 50–2, 55–8, 60–3, 67–71, 74–7, 80–5, 88–108, 110–40, 142–4, 146–51, 153–60, 162–3, 167–8, 172–4, 176–9, 181, 183–4, 186–91, 193–4, 197, 199–207, 209–10, 213–14, 217–20, 224–5, 228–30, 232

263

news as a social construction of reality 154 News Collection (xinwen Zongheng) 39, 43, 80, 147 news constructivist media researchers 144 news organization 1–2, 7–9, 28, 37–8, 56, 83, 85, 89, 91–3, 95, 97, 99–105, 107, 110–15, 124, 127–8, 132–4, 142, 144, 146, 148–50, 190, 220, 224–5, 234 News Probe (xinwen diaocha) 39, 41–5, 61, 76–7, 80, 133, 203 news production 3, 7, 9, 131, 147, 228 newspaper management committee 136–8 newspapers 4, 9, 20–2, 24–5, 32, 35–9, 56–8, 62–3, 67, 70, 94, 98, 103–4, 107–8, 114, 118, 120, 127, 154, 158, 160, 163, 177, 187, 202, 204–5, 213 newsrooms 5, 9, 57–8, 71, 92, 112, 132–3, 151, 154, 157, 184, 187, 190 newsroom studies 112 NGOs 107 Ningbo Daily (ningbo ribao) 92 Niu Niu 63 non-party 5, 36–7, 91–3, 97–9, 102, 114, 158 normative 3, 86, 88, 98–100 norms 47, 86–8, 94, 96, 98–100, 105, 109, 118, 120–1, 125–6, 207, 229 North China Herald 20 Northern Post 20 objectivity 40, 48–9, 51, 71, 88, 100–1, 109, 118, 125–6, 135, 144, 189–90, 228 occupation 6, 47, 55, 67, 71, 86–8, 90–3, 97, 100, 105–9, 120, 127, 176, 222–3, 234 occupational boundaries 87, 91 occupational community (zhiye gongtongti) 105 Olympic games 65 Opium wars 20

264

Index

organization 1–2, 4, 6–9, 11, 14, 25, 28–9, 35, 37–8, 40, 44–7, 49–50, 54, 56, 58–60, 62–3, 67–70, 83, 85, 88–93, 95–115, 117–21, 123–35, 137–53, 158, 187, 190, 194, 220, 222, 224–5, 228, 233 institutionalization 16, 68, 85, 147 organizational analysis 110–11, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 125, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135, 137, 139, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153 organizational consensus 115, 128, 153 organizational people 133, 224 organizational structure 9, 115, 132, 134–5, 137–8, 141, 152–3 organizationalization 110, 133 Organization Departments 90 Oriental Horizon (dongfang shikong) 203 Oriental Morning (dongfang zaobao) 70, 78, 83, 132–3 Party journalism 24, 26, 31, 35, 46, 86, 88–91, 93–8, 101, 103, 122, 124, 135, 186, 223, 226 Orthodox Party journalism 93, 197 outside the system (tizhiwai) 5, 92, 103 outside-the-system journalists (tizhiwai jizhe) 91–3, 102–3, 109 Pang Xinzhi 60 Panorama 39, 61, 186 paparazzi 92, 98 paradigm 1, 11–12, 31, 39, 46–7, 86, 99, 101, 114, 118, 155, 223, 225–6, 234 paradox 5, 16, 26, 28, 52, 64–5, 222–3, 228 parent Party newspapers (mubao) 37 participant observation 7, 115 Party General Secretary 35 Party line-oriented 119 party organ 5, 35–7, 63, 86, 88–94, 96–7, 122–3, 143, 157–8, 160–1, 164, 184, 223 non-party 5, 36–7, 91–3, 97–9, 102, 114, 158

Party Principle (dangxing) 55, 88, 94 Party propagandist 226 Party’s Prosecution Department 34 Pengshui Poem Scandal 211–12, 233 people-centered 203 People’s Daily (renmin ribao) 35–6, 39, 56, 64, 76, 82, 238 People’s Principle (renminxing) 94 Personnel Departments (renshi bu) 90 Phoenix Weekly (fenghuang zhoukan) 63 Pilger, John 12, 15, 41, 228 philosophical principle 2, 12, 14–15, 26, 220 policymaking 15 political minefield (leiqu) 58, 151, 191 political participation 11, 204 political punishment 14, 51, 60, 116, 134, 157 political reform 21, 32, 38, 44, 196, 202 positions within the political administrative system (bianzhi) 88, 103 post-reform 4, 9 poverty 34, 130, 148, 189 power holder 1, 190, 210, 217, 221 Premier 35, 43, 227 prestige 1, 9, 67, 86–9, 93, 96–9, 121, 224 privilege 9, 33, 46, 86–9, 92, 98, 101, 108, 118, 155, 161, 164–5, 167–71, 178, 180–1, 185–7, 189, 223–4, 226, 231 profession 3, 9, 16, 39, 47–8, 51, 60, 67–9, 86–8, 91, 93–6, 98–109, 112, 115, 117–22, 124–8, 130–1, 142–4, 149–52, 158, 187, 189–91, 193, 198, 205, 207, 211, 215–16, 220, 222–6, 229, 232, 235 professional claims 121, 125–6, 229 claim to helping the powerless 100 claim to objectivity 100 claim to represent the conscience of society 100 claim to truth 99, 101 professional journalist 16, 47, 105–6, 109, 193, 207, 215–16, 226

Index professional practice 3, 48, 225 ideals 2, 8, 15–16, 18, 22, 65, 68–9, 101–7, 115, 117–18, 120–2, 124, 127, 149–51, 189–90, 196, 198, 220, 223–4, 229, 233 norms 47, 86–8, 94, 96, 98–100, 105, 109, 118, 120–1, 125–6, 207, 229 professional ranks (zhicheng) 103 professionalism 9, 47, 67–8, 86–7, 94–6, 102, 104, 107, 109, 115, 117–22, 124–8, 130–1, 142, 150–2, 158, 187, 191, 193, 198, 223, 225, 229, 232, 235 propaganda 1, 5, 25, 38, 42–4, 47, 50–5, 57–9, 64–6, 69, 81, 85, 89, 129, 135, 140, 142, 150–1, 157–8, 161–2, 190, 221–3, 227–8, 234 propaganda control 5, 64–5, 69, 221–2 propaganda department 5, 25, 51, 57–8, 66, 81, 135, 142, 151, 157, 223 Protess and Gordon 13, 15, 198, 211, 227 public, the 4, 6, 9, 11–16, 18–21, 23, 26, 28–32, 35, 37–8, 40–1, 43–4, 46–7, 50–1, 53, 59, 63–5, 67, 71–4, 79, 82, 85–9, 94–9, 102, 108, 111, 119–21, 124, 127, 129–30, 145–7, 149–50, 160, 162, 164–5, 171–2, 190, 192–5, 197–207, 209–19, 221–8, 233 public interest 12, 15, 45, 50, 65–7, 96, 119–20, 150, 190, 234 public mobilization 9, 194–5, 199, 210–11, 214, 218–19, 225, 230, 235 public policies 2, 227 public recognition 68, 88, 101, 108, 225–6 public sphere 15, 203, 206 Qian Gang 58, 62, 100, 104 Qin Zhongfei 211–13, 215–16, 226 Qing dynasty 15, 20–2, 29 official (or semi-official) gazette (dibao) 20

265

ranking 28, 44, 51, 77, 90–1, 105, 111–12, 118, 122, 129–31, 134, 139, 142, 149, 151, 188, 191, 211–12, 214 reader-oriented 119 recruitment 4, 9, 87, 90–1, 102–3, 115, 121–2, 127, 152–3 reforming force 220 Regulation of Open Access to Governancy Information (zhengfuxinxigongkaitiaoli) 64 relationship between journalism and society 3 release of Sun Dawu 192 Ren Zhongyi 38 ‘report honestly’ (rushi baodao) 51 reportage (baogao wenxue) 40, 48 reporting instructions 5, 57, 228 representation 89, 97, 160–1, 164, 167, 177–8, 180–1, 184–6, 189 model of half truth-telling representation 177 model of truth-telling representation 164, 167 newspaper representation 160, 184 party organ representation 160, 164 responsibility system of the CCP committee at the same level (tongjidangwei fuzezhi) 36 right to know 196, 227 right to speak 202, 205 righteousness/justice (yi) 17 riot 9, 79, 149, 151, 154–7, 159, 161, 163–9, 171, 173–9, 181, 183–9, 191 3/14 Tibet riot 65 Chizhou Riot 9, 79, 83, 151, 154, 157, 160, 165, 167, 169, 176, 183, 186, 191 The evolution of conflicts within social riots 165, 179 mass incident (quntixingshijian) 151, 156, 173, 226 Sichuan Dazu Mass Incident 79 Wanzhou Riot 9, 83, 154, 157, 165, 168–9, 176–7, 179, 183, 186 Xinjiang riot 65

266

Index

ritual propriety (li) 17 role models 89, 96, 99, 101, 105, 120, 131 sanctions 5 Sangmei Typhoon 80, 129 Sanlian Life Weekly (sanlian shenghuo zhoukan) 63 Sanlu Contaminated Milk Powder Scandal 1, 61, 63, 78 Sanqin Metropolis Daily (sanqin dushibao) 44, 59 SARS 50–2, 54, 59–60, 79–80, 96, 114, 116–18, 124 scandal 1–2, 11, 19, 28, 39, 43, 59, 61, 63, 65, 71, 74–6, 78, 84–5, 100, 110, 130, 146, 194, 198, 208–9, 211–17, 228, 233 ‘scientific development perspective’ (kexue fazhan guan) 64 secret investigation news (anfang xinwen) 48, 116, 117, 130 Secret filming (toupai) 48 self-adjustment 6 self-censorship 9, 71, 131–2, 134, 140, 143, 150–1, 153, 157, 186–7, 190–1, 224 self-criticism 8, 15, 23–5, 28–9, 35, 52 self-generate 131, 139, 147 self-salvation 21 sensationalism 116–17, 234 Shanghai 20, 39, 48, 66, 74, 76, 84, 95, 98, 104, 124, 132, 192, 231–2 Shanghai Social Security Case 66 Shanghai-style newspapers 98 shangtong xiada (transfer the commands of the ruling class to the people, but also the ones who should petition for the people) 18 Shangwu Morning (shangwu chenbao) 37 Shanxi Province 42, 45, 76, 84, 214, 218 Shanxi TV 39 Shanxi vaccine scandal 2, 63, 76, 110, 217–18, 227–8 Shen Yachuan (Shifeike) 128

Shenzhen Business (shenzhen shangbao) 37 Shenzhen Special Zone Daily (Shenzhen tequbao) 37 Shi Tao 149 Shi Ye 103 Shishou Grasping Corpse event 79 shop talks 128 Shu (shubao) 37 Shui Junyi 103 Siebert et al. 3 Silicosis (glass lung; stone lung) 80 sleaze 28, 65 slogan 33, 101–2, 118 Snow Disaster 65 social conditions 8–9, 31, 234 social context 2–3, 69, 148, 152, 166–9, 171, 185, 188, 190–1, 206, 221 social entities 2, 7–9, 233 social environment 2, 6 social factors 2, 234 social function 2–3, 6–8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, 26–7, 30, 109, 119, 221, 234 social impacts 1–2 social problems 31, 33–5, 40–1, 43, 53, 72–3, 79, 83, 146, 148–9, 188–9, 197, 229 social responsibility 15, 17, 23, 29, 47, 56, 100–1, 109, 116, 118–20, 125–6, 144, 150, 187, 229 socialist 74, 197, 202 socioeconomic 8 sociopublic 2 Song Dynasty 18 Southern Metropolis Daily (nanfang dushi bao) 7, 9, 41, 43, 48, 50–2, 62–3, 68, 70, 75–85, 92, 99, 102–4, 108, 110–12, 114, 117, 119, 127, 133, 137–8, 154, 159, 171–2, 174–5, 182–3, 185, 204, 208, 211–12, 217, 225 SMD 48, 67, 71, 107, 112, 115–32, 134–5, 137, 139–42, 144–50, 152, 154, 157–8, 160, 163–4, 166–7, 170–1, 173–6, 181–9, 191, 204–5, 208, 229

Index Southern People Weekly (nanfang renwu zhoukan) 81, 129 Southern Weekend (nanfang zhoumo) 37, 39, 41–5, 47, 58–9, 62, 70, 75, 81, 83–4, 99, 101–4, 106, 124, 199, 204, 225 Southern-tour 32–3 Soviet Union 32 spirit leaders 47 State, the 5, 19, 31, 34–6, 41, 60, 88–9, 155, 220, 222–3, 227, 231–3 Party-State, the 49, 54, 60, 89, 91, 222 State-capitalism 226 State-owned enterprises 34 SOEs 34, 72 stock market 72, 74 studio audience 203 subjects 8, 40–4, 47, 49, 52, 72–3, 80–2, 128, 140, 227–9 Sun Yat-sen 94 Sun Zhigang 1, 50–1, 54, 59, 71, 75, 96, 111, 116–18, 149, 218, 227–8, 231 Super girl (chaoji nvsheng) 202 systems of journalism 2 taboo 43–4, 47, 52, 151, 173, 190, 226 tactics 69, 143, 145, 223, 225, 234 Taishi Village 82, 112, 116 take the people as the root of the governance (yiminweiben) 29 Tan Renwei 127, 188 Tang Fuzhen 73, 78, 226, 232 television 6, 19, 37–9, 42–3, 61, 67, 70–1, 88, 96, 99, 133, 203, 213 Teenager killing Mom event (shaonian shamu) 128 Tell It Like It Is (shihua shishuo) 203 Ten Million Luxury Door Scandal 217 tenet 17, 61, 102, 116 text (wenben) 148 Thalidomide scandal 11 theoretical understanding 2, 4, 8, 10 Third Plenum of the 16th CCP Central Committee 55 thought liberation (sixiang jiefang) 32 Tiananmen Square Crisis 32

267

Tianfu Morning (tianfu chenbao) 37 Tianjin 20 Times Weekly (shidai zhoubao) 106, 110, 127, 205 truth 1, 13–14, 40–2, 44, 47, 73, 76, 78–82, 88, 96, 99–102, 105–6, 118–20, 125–7, 130, 144–7, 149, 163–4, 167, 175–81, 183, 185–8, 190, 193, 197, 218–19, 223, 229–30, 232–3 Tuan Pai 66 TV shows 202, 204 Twitter 205 UK 3, 11, 65, 103 unemployment 34, 72 University of Westminster 3 Urban Channel (dushi pingdao) 213, 217 urbanization 34–5 USA 3, 15–16, 18–19, 21, 35, 42, 60, 71, 78, 80, 156, 177, 192, 205, 227, 233 user-generated-content 70, 210, 214 Vietnamese 82 village-in-the-city (chengzhongchun) 117 vote 30, 45, 95, 121, 202 voting 11, 29, 195 Wang Bingyu 78 Wang Hui 59, 72 Wang Jilu 110, 121, 123, 157, 173, 181 Wang Jun 151 Wang Keqin 76, 97, 103, 105, 109–10, 218 Wang Lei 83, 111, 121, 149, 189, 218 Wang Peng 110, 127 Washington Post 28, 128, 135 Watchdog journalism 1, 68 Watergate Scandal 11, 28, 65 Web eye (wangyan) 208 Weekly Quality Report (meizhou zhiliang baogao) 61, 67 Wei Huabing 83, 132 Wei Wenhua 77 Wen Biao 78

268

Index

Wen Jiabao 25, 51, 214, 227 west, the 1–5, 8, 11–13, 15, 20, 22, 27, 47, 65, 67, 90, 100, 126, 195, 200, 203, 220, 223, 233, 235 the west as a centre Western journalism 3, 28 Western media 3, 65, 203 Western societies 1 Who Last to The End (shei xiaodao zuihou) 202 within the political administrative system (tizhinei) 88 Woodward, Bob 11, 28 working mechanism of newsrooms 112 working procedure 9, 114–15, 132, 134–5, 139, 141–3, 152–3 working procedure of investigative reporting at Southern Metropolis World Economic Herald (shijie jingji daobao) 225 Daily 139 Wuhan TV 39 Wuxu reform 21 Xia Yitao 112, 120 Xiamen City 63, 192, 231 Xiamen PX project 63, 231 Xiangdang Weekly (xiangdao zhoubao) 94 Xiaoxiang Morning (xiaoxiang chenbao) 115 Xie Fei 38 Xifeng County 59, 77 Xi-Han Dynasty 17 Xin Yanhua 215, 217 Xinhua News Agency 6, 55, 80, 96, 157, 218, 232

Xinhuazongheng 81 Xinkuai Daily (xinkuaibao) 50 Xinmin Weekly (xinmin zhoukan) 63, 70, 80 Xinming Congbao 22 Yang Haipeng 62, 103 Yangcheng Evening (yangcheng wanbao) 37, 50, 59, 79, 96 Yao Haiying 105–6, 149, 225 Yinguangsha 74 Yu Chen 110, 123–4 Yu Haiqing 193 Yuan Xiaobing 123 Yunnan Information (yunnan xinxi bao) 70, 75, 111 Yunnan Menglian event 79 Yushu County 218 Zeng Huafeng 103 Zhai Minglei 62 Zhang Jinzhu 1, 108, 199–200, 232 Zhang Zhiguo 59 Zhao Shilong 59, 103, 105 Zhao Zhiyang 32 Zheng Guangong 94 Zhengzhou Evening (zhenzhou wanbao) 61 Zhengzhou Intermediate Court 200 Zhongyang Daily (zhongyang ribao) 94 Zhou Jiugen 192 Zhu Changzhen 84–5, 148, 157, 164, 173 Zhu Rongji 35, 39, 43 Zhuang Shenzhi 119–20 Zuoyun Mine Disaster 19, 63, 83, 130, 132, 189

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